

TELERGY

(THE COMMUNION OF SOULS)

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IN GRATITUDE
TO
SIR WILLIAM BARRETT, F.R.S.

“ But a stirring fills the air
Like to sounds of joyance there,
That the rages
Of the ages
Shall be cancelled and deliverance offered
From the darts that were,
Consciousness the will informing
Till it fashions all things fair.”

—Hardy.

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PREFATORY NOTE

THE evidence for the truth of telepathy, which has been accumulated by the Society for Psychical Research, is now so strong that many accept it as amounting to proof, and as I, the writer, am one of these many, the argument of this book will proceed on an assumption that telepathy is proved to be part of human experience. But, to prevent misapprehension or confusion, some explanation must be given, at the outset, as to the meaning of the word "proof."

We can by evidence prove nothing fundamentally and that for a very good reason—a reason which applies as fully to scientific as to legal evidence. For, in dealing with evidence, we use thought and thought is not only limited (ideas which we use for thought

are relative) but exists between limits of contradiction. Hence the commonplaces that knowledge is relative and that our universe is a universe of contradiction. We can, therefore, by the use of thought, arrive only at that high degree of probability which we *use and are justified in using as amounting to proof*. We can arrive only at *evidential proof*.*

About the time when, as readers will remember, Mr Massey offered £1,000 to anyone who would prove to him a case of telepathy, he called on me and made the offer direct. I replied: "If telepathy be a fact the proof you ask for is impossible. Even as to gravity only evidential proof can be offered."

Telepathy imports communication between human beings independently of the recognised organs of sense: the mode of action cannot be found in sensibility. We *must*, then, have

* When it is said telepathy can only be proved by cumulative evidence what is meant is that it can only be established by evidential proof. Science itself can arrive at no higher form of proof.

some mode of action which is not dependent on the sensuous. The present work is concerned with this mode of action.

F. W. H. Myers, referring to this mode of action, terms it Telergy. He says Telergy is "A name for a hypothetical force or mode of action concerned with the conveyance of telepathic impressions and perhaps with other super-normal operation." (*Proceedings, S.P.R.*, Vol. XII., p. 174).

Sir William Barrett referring to Telergy says it "differs from telepathy, as it is not merely an unknown mode of communication from one mind to another but implies the direct influence of an extraneous spirit."

The object I have now in view is the same as that of *Personality and Telepathy* (1911, Kegan Paul & Co.), of which book this is mainly a synopsis.*

* In *Personality and Telepathy* (p. ix.) I stated: "It is possible that Kant's commentators have ignored the fact that even his *Æsthetic and Logic* are based on an assumption of a soul in man. . . . Assuming telepathy as a fact of human experience I try to show that in Kant's *Æsthetic and Logic* we find scientific proof of the existence of the intuitive self." I now do not use the term "intuitive self," but "soul" or "transcendental subject."

The attempt made is to adduce proof that telepathy points to communion between us all as souls, that is, the mode of action which telepathy must have exists in such communion.

The importance of the argument lies in this :—

If telepathy be a fact of human experience and if the theory now propounded be sound, then we have human experience which proves, evidentially, not only that we exist as souls, but that we exist, transcendent of time and space, in communion one with another as souls.

I begin the book by shewing what reason would appear to lead us to assume our really real* personality is : we find it in the soul. I then turn to human experience and try to show that it supports the judgment of reason. Bear in mind the proof offered is evidential proof.

The reader must forgive a certain amount of repetition. It is a jig-saw puzzle I have

* The term " reality " is so commonly applied to what is material that, for the spiritual, the term " real reality " must be introduced.

Prefatory Note

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to try and fit in, and of the many pieces to be put in place no few are alike. But, when fitted in, they take on different appearances because *related* differently to the complete picture.

TELERGY

WE must start by considering what reason leads us to suppose our really real personality is.

Kant in his *Æsthetic and Logic* assumes there is "a soul in man," and says "imagination is deep buried in the soul of man." Imagination is the Deus ex Machinâ that he relies on and uses throughout his philosophy.

In the *Dialectic* he says that the really real subject is the transcendental subject.* This I take to be the same as his "soul in man," as the term is used in the *Æsthetic and Logic*. Kant's subject, then, is the transcendental subject (the soul) conditioned in time and space. The transcendental subject is purely non-physical with psychical not physical activity. I give to the transcendental subject

* Meiklejohn's *Kant*, pp. 299, 330, and, especially, 308 and 309.

psychical activity because "imagination is deep buried in the soul of man."

Now mark an important fact: we are subjects not beings. And, as transcendental subjects, we are subjects to ultimate Transcendental Being. Herein lies the relation between each one of us which is so important as a fact for support of the theory. We are, as transcendental subjects (souls), emanation as it were of transcendental Being through which, as a centre, we are related one to another.*

The subject, embodied in time and space, has human experience. The subject exists in the *now*, a progressive continuity between the past and future. The subject has memory of its human experience, is generally said to remember the past. But this is an error.† The subject accumulates human experience in time, but stores it up timeless or, more correctly, in transcendence of time. What it has, then, in its storage of memory is neither of the past,

* For the "ultimate" I do not accept unity or immanence: I hold both mere limits of thoughts. I accept C. C. Massey's term, "the accomplished in the accomplishing." The transcendental subject exists in the accomplishing, so human personality is not lost, it is simply subsumed.

† Cf. the chapters on Memory in *Personality and Telepathy*.

present or future: it exists transcendent of all these phases of time: time is subsumed, it does not vanish.

The subject *uses memory in time*. When we say we remember some detail of the past, what we do is to take out this detail from our timeless storage and *relate it* to the present in time. But the subject is conditioned in time and space, so this storage cannot be given to the subject. It exists transcendent of time and must be referred to, is possessed by, the transcendental subject, the soul.

When, then, the subject is disembodied it carries away with it—as a disembodied subject—its storage of memory of its human experience as an embodied self. But we cannot explain what aspect this storage has for the transcendental subject: it regards all its past human experience in, as it were, “a lump.” We ourselves, as subjects, when we think or do anything, form some opinion at the time about it; but when time has past and we remember, we remember it in relation to many other thoughts and acts since occurring, and find we do not then form the same opinion as

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to the particular thought or act: it takes on a different aspect. Much more must this change of aspect exist for the transcendental subject who regards all its human experience in "a lump."

So human experience is not lost when the subject is disembodied; it still remains for the soul of man, though we cannot determine what aspect it has then taken on.

The transcendental subject has psychical activity in that "imagination is deep buried in the soul of man." But it has something else if it has been embodied: it has memory of all its past human experience.

Are we correct in terming this transcendental subject the soul of man? Apart from any question of immortality, which depends not on reason but faith,* I think we are.

Down from past ages man has considered painfully what is and where is the soul of man. It has been defined as man's shadow, his breath, as a facsimile of the body, even as an

* At the same time there is no reason, a priori, why the soul should not be immortal if we take for our ultimate "the accomplished in the accomplishing." If we make the finite disappear in the infinite, I think we are driven to agreement with Spinoza's philosophic conclusion.

emanation, savouring of the material, of a "world soul." It has been located in man's shadow, his breath, liver, heart, blood or some obscure ganglion. All such attempts have failed to arrive at any satisfactory conclusion. But, perhaps strange to say, in rejecting them all one may fairly be termed a savage. For the mere savage, by his indifference to death, shows he holds death as not causing annihilation of the personality.

Of the contrary current of opinion—down through the neo-platonists to the present time—opinion based on the consideration of the soul of man as purely spiritual, I must write without authority at my back: I can only express my own opinion.

The soul of man is non-physical, we may, if we will, define it as psychic or spiritual. But the current of opinion I refer to marks invariably an attempt to *define* the spiritual in material terms. Thought, through the brain, is always related to the material, and even Plotinus in defining the spiritual considers the material as something to be *got rid of* by the monastic principle. For goodness, essence,

etc., *limits of thought* are used for ultimates, whereas I hold we transcend these limits of thought by a power in us transcending thought, a power which I term insight.* Knowledge is relative, insight transcends the relative. It is insight alone which can "touch on" real reality—on the thing in itself.

Reason† can only treat the soul of man as the transcendental subject. It is non-physical. But, with Kant, I give it imagination and there is, I believe, some authority in support of my contention that if the soul have been embodied it carries away with it, on disembodiment, full memory of its embodied human experience.

We must hold, a priori, that the soul survives disembodiment. But reason can go no further. What happens on disembodiment we cannot know, apart from faith. And faith offers countless and contradictory statements of what happens, while alleged human experience offers such countless and contradic-

* I use the term insight to get rid of the term intuition. For many different meanings are attached to intuition—Kant himself gives it at least five different meanings.

† I here use reason as Kant uses it—as a power transcending understanding.

tory explanations that reason stands appalled.

Herein is no denial of any statement of faith or of any explanation offered by human experience. But, at the same time, there is no acceptance of any. It is sufficient for the present purpose to confine ourselves to consideration of the existence of the soul of man. And, subject to the above explanation, we may, with Kant, hold that the transcendental subject spells the soul of man.

To the soul of man we now give imagination and memory of its past human experience if it has been embodied: this "content" of the soul has been dealt with already and will again be referred to in argument.

Leaving apart any question of pure reasoning I think we have human experience that we exist as souls. Each one of us is conscious of his personality: self-consciousness, indeed, is the one sheet-anchor we have for real reality, for human experience being *ours*. Thought, insight, imagination to be *mine* (as they are) must have "at the back" self-consciousness. And, as Sir William Barrett says in his book, *On the Threshold of the Unseen*:

“So through our life we are conscious of the same identity, the same self, albeit the whole material of body, brain and sensory organs has been repeatedly swept away and renewed.”*

What do the words of Sir William mean, not metaphysically but for ordinary human thought? That this self is not affected by time or space. The whole material of body, brain and sensory organs changes continuously in time and space: is conditioned in time and space. But the self, the self-conscious subject, changes not. This means—not only metaphysically but for ordinary human thought—that the self is *not* conditioned in time and space as known to us.

But here, again, we must stop: we cannot condition, cannot define this ultimate “self” in any way. It is not a subject of our thought, insight, intuition or imagination:† for us it

* If we define the human body as “a chemical machine consisting chiefly of colloidal material and possessing the peculiarity of preserving and reproducing itself,” we must admit also that it is in constant flux and changes from moment to moment. It seems to follow that the “self” who uses and directs this body must have some form of permanency.

† Herein, I fear, is a departure from Kant. He says: “I am conscious of myself, not as I appear to myself, nor as I am in myself, but only that *I am*.” (Meiklejohn’s *Kant*, p. 96). This representation he holds is a *Thought*.

simply is. It may or may not be manifest in one or more "forms"—material or etheric, possessing or not possessing sense known or unknown to us.

Self-consciousness is, in fact, as Coleridge says, *groundless because it is the ground of all certainty*. Nothing of certainty can exist for *me* unless *I* exist transcendent of time and space. For time and space import change.*

To this self we must give imagination; and this involves psychical activity. For the very vagueness, the limitless vagaries of imagination mark it as transcendent of time and space, so that the subject exercising it must be so transcendent. If this subject be limited in any way its *exercise* of imagination must also be limited.

That this "self" if it has been embodied carries away with it on disembodiment full memory of all its human experience is, I suggest, proved by the theory for memory I propounded in *Personality and Telepathy*.

In the second part of *Personality and Tele-*

* Psychical activity imports what can hardly be termed change. In all thought of "change" the material is involved.

pathy, I propounded a theory for telepathy, assuming I had rightly interpreted the meaning of personality, and tried to support it by argument drawn from so termed cases of telepathy. In argument I used the hypothesis that each one of us exists as a transcendental subject as before shown and tried to show the facts of telepathy pointed to the correctness of the hypothesis.

The importance of the second part lies, as before stated, in this: If the theory for telepathy therein propounded be sound, then we have, *in human experience*, evidence to prove we exist as souls, and have communion one with another as souls. Kant *assumes* the existence of the soul in man, he never considered telepathy because in his time there was no sufficient record of human experience in support of it: he admitted its possibility.*

* Meiklejohn's *Kant*, p. 164.

THE THEORY

WE now consider human experience.

Telepathy is very generally held to be unconditioned by time and space. This assumption is now relied on. What does it mean? The percipient certainly receives communication in time and space. But the *source* of the communication is often at a great distance, and the communication itself takes place without using the physical and without using sensibility—that is, there is no presentation through the normal senses. The law of the inverse square would appear not to affect the fact of the communication taking place.*

It will be assumed, then, that we are considering communications which take place, unconditioned in time and space, between subjects, but which emerge as impressions or ideas

* Proceedings, S.P.R., Vol. XII., p. 352.

(the effect on the percipient) in time and space. This drives us to the conclusion that we have human experience of ourselves, as subjects, being at times in communication with one another however distant we may be.

But such communication is quite impossible between subjects fully conditioned in time and space: for such subjects the law of the inverse square must hold. Bear in mind that the law of the inverse square holds good only for the physical—is not, even in science, held to apply to the psychical.

We are driven to assume there is something in or underlying the embodied self which is personality—but which is unconditioned in time and space. For the communion is between personalities, and it cannot be that personalities conditioned in time and space should be capable of timeless and spaceless communion. We have the personality we want in the transcendental subject (the soul); and such communion is possible, for this subject has imagination and memory.

We thus even at this early stage of the inquiry appear to arrive at the conclusion that

at the foundation of telepathy is communion between each one of us as transcendental subjects, as souls. This communion is transcendent of time, is, in Mr. Gerald Balfour's words, universal. When we consider, then, merely the fact that telepathy spells communication between men otherwise than through the normal organs of sense, we find it points to the existence of a soul in man and communion between us all as souls.

But, though we appear to have our psychical foundation for telepathy already, how can we relate it to the building on it? How can we relate this psychical communion to the communications (the recorded cases) between subjects in time and space which human experience gives us?

Here explanation is necessary, and I regret to state it must be fully dogmatic. I have worked the whole thing out, but the result, good or bad, is not yet published.

We start with the transcendental subject, the soul of man, in which "imagination is deep buried," and which has memory. The subject

thinks : thought is an inhibited form of imagination. It is inhibited in this way :—

All thought is correlated to motion of the brain, that is, imagination cannot be exercised except so far as the motion of the brain permits. But knowledge is *â priori*, sensibility only gives the “occasion” for knowledge, so, though there is parallelism between thought and the motion of the brain, it is thought which sets up the motion of the brain; sensibility is merely a term for the fact that what Kant terms the “internal sense” can be affected by the external. It is the innate power of imagination which gives the subject power to use the brain for thought. Knowledge is relative, we think relations only. William James in his *Human Immortality* (p. 57) cites the following passage from Kant : “The body would thus be not the cause of our thinking, but merely a condition restrictive thereof, and, although essential to our sensuous and animal consciousness, it may be regarded as an impeder of our pure spiritual life.”

This statement is like to the theory now propounded. For, by the theory, our spiritual

life is found in the soul with imagination deep buried in it, and the brain inhibits imagination in the form of thought; thought uses only ideas which are relative and which exist between limits of contradiction.

It is to be remembered that, though Kant holds "all in our cognition that belongs to intuition contains nothing more than mere relations," he still uses thought as having a wider purview than that I give it. He uses it, I think, as including fully processes of reason.

Through sensibility objects are presented to us, but we do not think objects, we think about them. When we say we think a chair we are not thinking the object sensibility has presented to us. We are thinking about the chair, thinking its likenesses and unlikenesses to other objects. The chair is merely an occasion for thought.* We think relations which are not presented by sensibility. We do not think objects: when we think we use *ideas* of objects for thought. This is why Kant speaks of knowledge as *â priori*.

Knowledge is not only relative but exists

* Meiklejohn's *Kant*. Introduction. I.

between limits of contradiction. This, however, we cannot *know*, for a subject of knowledge merely, cannot be aware of its own limitations : knowledge cannot transcend knowledge.

We must recognise the fact that there is a power in the subject transcending thought. This power I term insight, to be free, as before stated, from the confusion which arises for thought when the omnibus word intuition is used. Kant makes somewhat the same distinction when he gives to his subject reason transcending understanding. Insight is fully psychical ; thought correlated to motion of the brain cannot be held fully psychical or, more correctly, must be held as psychical *but* limited by the physical—the brain. Insight thus establishes a nexus between the subject and the transcendental subject.

Thought is imagination, but imagination inhibited because its purview is bounded by the possible motion of the brain. Coleridge's "Kubla Khan" gives a good illustration of this. His *dream* was of full imagination. When he awoke and translated his dream into

words conveying thought the imagination was, as he himself understood, inhibited. Imagination failed to find full expression in ideas.

But if thought *in itself* has nothing to do with sensibility, as generally understood, how can we find the nexus between thought and our objective universe, whereby the subject can think about this universe?

Science, if we accept the electron theory, informs us that objects exist in etheric form. The form is determined by a comparatively few entities (matter or energy?) whose *movement* is confined to the form of the object: the form is determined by *movement*. Not only this: the resistance of the object—its appearance as matter—is determined by the *movement* of the entities. We get back to the old, old theory of motion.

The brain is an object in the objective universe, it is in (constant?) motion: thought is correlated to the motion of the brain. The brain is, as it were, a receiving station for the correlated motion of itself and thought. Through the brain we find the nexus we want between thought and the objective universe,

whereby the subject can think about the objects which are presented to it through sensibility. We have reduced objects, as presented to us, to motion, the brain is a machine of motion.* So far as the brain can move, so far imagination can use it as a connecting link for imagining about objects. This inhibited form of imagination is thought. We do not imagine or even think objects, we think about them.

By the above arguments I relate the communion, transcendent of time, between us all as souls, to the manifestations in time and space which take place between us as embodied subjects: as embodied subjects we use ideas. The soul of man has the power of imagination. The subject is the soul of man embodied, as an object, in our universe. It also exercises imagination but necessarily in a limited form. The soul of man, as embodied, can only do

* The brain is an automatic tool of motion presented to the embodied self for the use of self-consciousness. With this tool the subject creates ideas of objects for the objective universe. The subject has also an automatic tool in its body. With this tool the subject objectifies its ideas, that is creates objects. Imagination uses its automata for the purposes of the subject. In the same way the subject commands the laws of nature by obeying them.

what the embodied self can do : its exercise of imagination is limited by time and space. It exercises thought which is a limited form of imagination.

And, yet, most strangely, the subject *can* exercise imagination which carries it beyond its human experience as an embodied self. As human beings we do thus exercise imagination but we treat the exercise as comparatively useless, as consisting only of senseless vagaries. Why? Because the exercise may be in itself meaningless in relation to our objective universe. To the materialist, for example, all now written is meaningless and consists but of limitless vagaries, because his universe is confined to the material, and I now treat of something which is not material as having dominating existence. The assumption that all must be referred back ultimately to the material affects very many, and often affects them unconsciously. Leading men of science, even, reject telepathy and spiritual manifestations because they require a material explanation for what in its nature is *not* material, before they will believe : they demand the impossible.

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Those who thus charge "free" imagination are right and wrong. They are right when they take our objective universe as their standard of relation. But assume—as now assumed—that this exercise of imagination marks the fact that the subject is really a transcendental subject? Then this exercise of free imagination is "round" a universe transcendent of our objective universe and so, when related to our infinitesimally small universe, *must* appear as comparatively meaningless and full of senseless vagaries. To us, embodied, it is a meaningless vagary to say there is any relation between perfect love and a flower born to blush unseen. But there is something *in us* which makes us aware the relation must exist. We all of us, to some degree, exercise imagination. We must either give it the transcendent power which Kant gives it or treat it as a mere useless incomprehensible excrescence to ourselves as personalities and to the universe at large.

TELEPATHY

WE have human experience of telepathy, and when we consider this human experience I think we shall find it drives us to a conclusion that each one of us exists as a relatively permanent "self"; that is, we are unconditioned in time and space. If so, this "self" must be fully non-physical. For where the material is, there is material change also.

I think, too, that the principle of Telergy, that is, of timeless communion between each one of us as souls, is necessary to explain the accepted cases of telepathy.

By analogy to the scientific acceptance of the existence of energy and the theory of the conservation of energy, there is, to account for telepathy, a theory of world consciousness; manifest in detail in personal consciousness, just as energy is manifest in protean form as

gravity, electricity, magnetism, etc.* But I suggest that consciousness is meaningless without a self which is conscious. I repeat Coleridge's statement that self-consciousness is groundless because it is the ground of all certainty. Without self-consciousness as of "groundless origin," we cannot formulate any theory—even that of selfless world consciousness.

The accepted cases of telepathy must now be considered. But, before doing so, some consideration must be given to a theory in direct opposition to that now relied on. For this opposing theory has strong authority at its back.

* Cf. *The Gate of Remembrance* (B. H. Blackwell). A remarkable book.

THE BRAIN WAVES THEORY

Some cases are, on their face, explainable by this theory. But when we turn to other cases, generally, we find the hypothesis fail. I agree with Gurney and Myers that some one hypothesis must be sought to cover all the cases: this theory would appear not to cover all cases.

But something must be here said as to wireless telegraphy because this scientific fact has been used as supporting the brain wave theory. In fact, wireless telegraphy supports the theory I propound.

It is generally assumed that, for wireless telegraphy, we want but a despatching station, a receiving station and electricity: electricity is treated as a thing-in-itself*—though fully non-physical—which we have at our command. This is not so. Science *starts with* something

* The tendency of science is, now, to treat even electricity as savouring of the material.

that it terms energy : science also accepts the theory of the conservation of energy. What does this theory import? That energy is not subject to the changes which time and space necessarily involve : energy itself is not conditioned by time and space. But energy is manifest to us in time and space in diverse form—as electricity, etc.

When then we have attained efficient means for wireless telegraphy, what is it we have done? We have established our despatching and receiving stations, and by *relating energy to the material** we have made it take the form of electricity.

Wireless telegraphy is founded on, is derived from, energy. So, even this remarkable means of communication between men, however distant, requires for explanation, scientifically, the assumption of the existence of “something” at its root which is unconditioned by time and space or, as I submit, which is transcendent of both. It is in support of not in contradiction to the theory now propounded.

* An electric machine, for example, is material : it makes energy manifest in the form of electricity.

Wireless telegraphy by analogy, though analogy, far-fetched, is like to telepathy which requires telergy—"something" unconditioned by time and space—for explanation. Energy, transcendent of time and space, may be likened to communion, transcendent of time and space, between us all as souls. Electricity, an inhibition of energy, manifest in form in time and space, may be likened to thought, a similar inhibition of imagination.

Consider the simplest form of telepathy.

Suppose that Mr. Brown is the agent, his wife the percipient. They find that, very often, when Brown thinks about anything his wife, before he can voice it, herself voices it. There is apparent direct transfer of thought.

But, assuming the theory now propounded is correct, what has taken place?

Brown has imagination "deep buried in his soul." This is the origin of his power to think. What has Brown done? He has perhaps used his innate power of imagination to move his brain as a machine at his command; that is, he has, perhaps, by exercise of will, himself determined what thought has arisen in his

brain. But, perhaps, his imagination, acting in some way unknown to us, has caused "vagrant" thoughts to arise in him : we often find thoughts arise in us, the origin of which we cannot trace.

What has Mrs. Brown done when she receives the message? If her brain, as a machine, could receive her husband's thought *directly* then it would not matter what the message despatched was : it would be received.

But suppose Brown is a skilled metaphysician or mathematician and has in him thoughts about some deep problem ; while his wife is ignorant on such subjects? Human experience informs us that such thoughts are never transferred directly. Mrs Brown's power of thought and so her power to receive external impressions of thought is limited by her storage of memory and the form and degree of "education" of her brain : the personal equation comes in.

But if there be communion between husband and wife as souls with imagination deep buried, then imagination is common to both and it may be that Brown's exercise of imagination in a

particular line of thought sets Mrs. Brown's imagination to work on the same line, so that *so far as her brain permits* the same thought arises.

And human experience in some measure supports this suggestion. For when Brown may be thinking of some mathematical problem incomprehensible to Mrs. Brown, she may say: "Very funny! I see a lot of figures, all in confusion." Or when Brown is trying to think out the relation between faith and hope, she may say: "What makes me think of faith, hope and charity?" It is the communion in imagination existing between the two which affects Mrs. Brown and causes her imagination to be manifest in thought *so far as her brain permits*. There are no direct brain waves.

The above argument applies to all experimental cases of so-termed thought transference. Some succeed, some fail, some are partly successful. But I think in all—especially those partly successful—we find that what is *first* excited is the imagination of the percipient, and that success or failure depends on how far the imagination of the percipient

“strikes out” the thought of the agent. In one case, Miss Ramsden simply *imagined* “a white pig with a long snout.” The experiment, with Miss Miles as percipient, was fully successful.* In the recent experiments between Mrs. Salter and Mrs. Wilson as percipient† it would appear that it was the imagination of the percipient that was in action—groping to “strike out” the thought wanted: there is little to support the theory of brain waves. Mrs. Salter says that the form of her experiments was determined by her idea “that if thoughts are transmitted by the subconscious rather than the conscious mind, Mrs. Wilson might in this way get into touch with my subconscious thought as expressed in automatic writing.” I take this to mean that, in Mrs. Salter’s idea, the communion between her and Mrs. Wilson was by some means underlying (transcending?) normal thought, and that by using such means Mrs. Wilson was more likely to strike on Mrs. Salter’s normal thought. For what Mrs. Salter says means that the sub-

* Cf. *Personality and Telepathy*, p. 225.

† Proceedings, S.P.R., Vol. XXIX., pp. 306 et seq.

conscious is the vehicle for conveying normal thought. If, for the somewhat indefinite term subconscious, we use the term "communion between us as transcendental subjects," we depart little from Mrs. Salter's suggestion.

Again, Sir William Crookes himself in suggesting the theory of brain waves says: "And is it also inconceivable that our mundane ideas of space and distance may be superseded in these subtle regions of unsubstantial thought where 'near' and 'far' may lose their usual meaning?"*

If we relate back the power of thought to innate imagination, then we might perhaps use the term unsubstantial thought for imagination—the unsubstantial thought becoming substantial when correlated to the motion of the brain; that is, when inhibited in the form of normal thought.

I think that when experimental cases are considered generally they support, from human experience, the theory now propounded.

* Proceedings, S.P.R., Vol. XII., p. 352.

EXPERIMENTAL AND SPONTANEOUS CASES

The distinction between experimental and spontaneous cases is this:—

In experimental cases there is a deliberate use by man of—in Kant's words—"a power of the mind to place itself in community of thought with other men, however distant they may be."* In spontaneous cases this power is in force but *not* from deliberate use by man. The result merely of the power is manifest in time and space—in human impressions or ideas. It is manifest spontaneously.

When we consider that only within the last forty years or so has humanity made any attempt to criticize and examine scientifically the alleged phenomena of telepathy, and bear in mind the sheer absorption of mankind at

* Meiklejohn's *Kant*, p. 164.

large in the material concerns of its objective universe, we find just what we should expect to find :—

We find that experimental cases touch merely the fringe of the subject, spontaneous cases having a far wider range. So our attention must be directed rather to spontaneous, than experimental cases : they offer a greater variety of human experience for consideration. If we had more experience of experimental cases our task would be simpler. But we must take things as they are : the investigation of telepathy is only just beginning. And we have already given some consideration to experimental cases.

SPONTANEOUS CASES

Spontaneous cases may be divided into four classes, and it is assumed that for all these one solution must be found, if it is to be acceptable to reason.

But before we consider these four classes it is advisable to point out certain governing principles of reason which will, in some measure, define and limit the task set us.

(1) In the first place there is nothing abnormal in telepathic communications *in themselves*.* the abnormality is in the form of communication. For instance, A in England appears to sense—visibly or audibly or through muscular sense—his brother dying or dead in Australia. Or A appears, to himself, to travel in personality to Australia, and there, in Aus-

* Communications from the disembodied to the embodied or vice versa, are considered separately.

tralia, senses in some way his brother's death. Where is the abnormality? Merely in relation to time and space. The abnormality lies only in this: The law of the inverse square is in abeyance: the thought of the percipient is not conditioned in time and space so far as presentation goes. If the percipient's personality were not conditioned in time and space there would be nothing abnormal.

(2) Telepathic communication, as recorded, takes place ordinarily—but not always—in relation to some marked event: for instance, the event of death or sudden accident or exceptional stress of feeling. But any event, however exceptional it may be, *cannot create* the power to send or receive a telepathic message. All it can do is to be the “occasion” for a manifestation in time and space of some power already existing. This power we must, in reason, give to all mankind. For the recorded cases of telepathy do not show that the percipients and agents concerned come from any defined class: they may be clever or stupid—short of idiotcy—moral or immoral, sentimental or “strong-minded,” educated or un-

educated. It may be true that for some* there is more probability of the power being made manifest in time and space, but I do not think we have any ground for depriving any part of humanity of the power itself.

(3) Human beings are subjects of hallucination whether telepathy exist or not as a fact. I hold that hallucinations are the same as ideas with, possibly, a wider range. Some argument in support of this view, though it is not original,† must be given.

We are surrounded by innumerable objects which are the result of human invention. None of these new things has been created in our universe without a *precedent idea* of it in someone's mind: a new object is always the result of a precedent idea. For instance, Faraday had the idea of a dynamo, Bell of a telephone, before either a dynamo or telephone existed, or could exist, as an object. So, though objects are an "occasion" for thought—*ideas* can be (and are for all new objects) an "occasion" for thought.

* Second sight and family descent of "psychic" temperament are examples.

† Cf. Pro., S.P.R., Vol. III., p. 153, where Edmund Gurney points out, I think, that M. Taine puts forward much the same view.

But we can have ideas and *think about* ideas of things impossible as objects in our universe. Our ideas, then, cover ideas of objects possible and impossible of existence in our universe—our imagination outruns the possible. Ideas include hallucinations.

An extreme form showing how the most “impossible” ideas can originate thought is exemplified in the records of Nicolai and John Beaumont.* They both had ideas, constantly, of multitudes of men and women round them, who not only talked together but with Nicolai or Beaumont themselves as the case might be. We cannot set up any arbitrary hard and fast line of distinction between ideas and hallucinations;† the only distinction we can raise is that ideas are of “things” possible of existence in our universe, and hallucinations are of things impossible of existence in our universe. But for both classes the operation of the mind is, for the sane, the same. Nicolai, in the admirable account he has left us of his cold-

* Cf. *An Essay towards a Theory of Apparitions* by Dr. Ferrier (1813), and that strange work *The Maniac* (Redman, Limited).

† Bear in mind the distinction between hallucination and illusion.

blooded investigation into his "hallucinations" of phantoms, was as sane in mentality as Faraday was in using his "ideas" of a dynamo.

An hallucination has been defined as "the apparent perception of some external thing to which no real object corresponds." This confines hallucinations to ideas which are externalised. But externalisation of an idea is a mere detail. Faraday certainly had his dynamo "in his mind's eye" before it was an object in our universe: no real object corresponded to it. Suppose he had told us that, when thinking about his dynamo, his ideas had been externalized so that he appeared to himself to *see* his dynamo in space? How would this have differed from an hallucination, and how would it have interfered with the operation of his mind? In no way. He would have been simply exercising a power, innate in degree in all of us, of externalising his ideas.*

There may be certain forms of hallucination which can be referred directly to irregular

* A real object sensed sets up an idea of it in the brain. An idea originated in the brain might, by reversed influence, set up sensation of its object; the idea is externalized.

action of the brain or disturbance of the nervous system. For instance, Nicolai found some relation between the appearance of his phantoms and the state of his digestion, while a lunatic may be impressed with the idea that the world is banded against him in enmity or that he is a teapot. In such cases false ideas are in question where the falsity is explainable materially. But these instances do not affect the present argument. The vagaries of the brain as a machine are admitted, but now we assume the action of the brain to be normal so that any mental irregularity is as far from the subject in hand as the fact of the deflation of the wheel of an automobile.

Now, human experience tells us that any one of us is capable of receiving an idea from some other person, and we have power to think about any such idea: the same is true of hallucinations. We have normal power also to externalise these ideas and hallucinations. There may also be "contagion" of ideas, especially if they are hallucinatory. For instance, a child may see the phantom of a saint at some grotto and, telling others of what she has seen, they

may catch the contagion from her and also be subject to the hallucination. These facts are accepted even by those who deny telepathy. What explanation is given? That the child's hallucination is false, is the result of some vagary of imagination; and that the contagion set up is contagion from a false idea.

But now mark what is admitted by the above explanation. The *idea* is admitted though it is defined as false: the contagion is admitted though it is said to be contagion from a false idea. The explanation, therefore, admits that if the idea were veridical, the contagion would still take place.

Again, hypnotism is now generally accepted as a fact of human experience, is accepted far more generally than telepathy. And the reason for this is that hypnotism has been far longer under the consideration of humanity than telepathy—we have had longer time to get accustomed to the “new thing.” And hypnotism proves that we *can* receive hallucinations from the external.

So, in investigating telepathy, we start with power in man to think about ideas, including

hallucinations, which have had their origin from the external or which may be externalized. There is *no magic* in the hallucinations of telepathy. The only question is, are they veridical? That is, are they the result of communication free from the restrictions of time and space?

In any case, then, of telepathy, there is nothing abnormal in the facts. The possible abnormality only arises when conclusions are drawn from the facts. Adherents and opponents of telepathy both rely on the same facts; they quarrel only over the conclusions. For instance, A in England sees the eidolon of his brother dying in Australia at the time of the death. Both sides admit the fact, both sides admit the coincidence. The one explains the coincidence by chance,* the other by telepathy.

(4) We must beware of our use of the terms unconsciousness, super-consciousness, normal consciousness. It is the transcendental sub-

* Does not "chance" mean something exceptional? If the same "chances" occur frequently do we not give up "chance" for "probability"? If they occur with regularity, do we not give up chance for proof? The law of gravity itself is proved merely by innumerable chances being found subjects of a law,

ject, the soul of man which has real, full consciousness, so that the self-consciousness of the subject (the embodied self) is not so full as that of itself, the soul: it is, as Myers suggests, but a *slice* of consciousness. But, still, it is advisable to speak of the consciousness of the subject as normal consciousness: the term is too generally accepted to depart from it now. And if this term be retained, the term super-consciousness, as suggested to me by Sir William Barrett, is best for really real consciousness.

Lastly, we must not neglect the distinction between consciousness and *the content* of consciousness.

We may compare consciousness to a mirror. The pure mirror may reflect nothing or anything, simple or complex, that is presented to it. The mirror always remains the same, it is its content that varies. We may extend the comparison thus:—

The mirror may be dim, slurred, on its surface, so that what is presented to it is reflected imperfectly. But the *mirror itself* is still pure. Herein we find analogy for the self-conscious-

ness of the soul of man and the self-consciousness of the soul embodied in human form :—
“Now we see as through a glass dimly, but then face to face.”

If it be objected the argument points to self-consciousness even in an oyster I can only reply : “I write as a man. I am ignorant as to any possible or impossible relation of self-consciousness to an oyster.”

For the reasons given above we will use the term “normal consciousness” for the embodied self, and super-consciousness for the consciousness of the soul.

Now let us consider the four classes into which I divide spontaneous cases. Bear in mind we are concerned with Telergy; we are trying to seek out the genesis of telepathy—the power in us all which *must be* for telepathy to exist.

In the first class there is an agent and a percipient and the telepathic communication is manifest at the spot where the percipient is. In some cases the agent is *unconscious* at the time. (Cf. *Phantasms of the Living*, Cases

128, 152, 176, 202, 203, 217, 452, 547 and 561). It is manifest also in the time when the percipient is thinking. For example: A is in England, his brother—or it may be a stranger—is dying, or near death, or has just died in Australia. And yet A, in time and space where he is, is impressed by the fact of B's presence on the spot or even senses the event, as if it were taking place where he, A, is. But when A is so affected his material surroundings are not affected. If B so appear to A the appearance is non-physical in that B moves as freely through walls or doors as through empty space.* There may be, to A, the appearance, for example, of a door opening. But this is, ordinarily, in appearance only. I think, with Myers, the agent *may* affect space. (Cf. *Personality and Telepathy*, p. 182).

In the second class there is also an agent and percipient, but the telepathic communication is manifest at the spot where the agent is and in the time where the agent is. These are so-termed cases of clairvoyance. For example: A is in England, his brother, as aforesaid, in

* Herein is no denial that B may have power over matter; the question is left open.

Australia. And yet A, though as to time and space in England, has apparently travelled in personality to Australia. For he sees, hears or feels B and the event of his death in Australia as if he himself, A, were there.

The third class is somewhat obscure, but I think it exists. It would appear that sometimes a percipient projects his personality, as it were, to a distance and sees, hears or feels what is there happening, without the intervention of any agent. Edmund Gurney doubts whether such cases exist.* But it is best to give them a class. I do not think, whether we have veridical evidence or not of such cases, the theory propounded is affected, but the class is considered hereafter.

The fourth class is that of so-termed reciprocal cases. For this class both agent and percipient are telepathically affected, so that, as Myers says, the terms, agent and percipient, are scarcely applicable.

These cases are of great importance. They

* Cf. *Phantasms of the Living*, Vol. I., p. 368. Whatever Gurney's opinion he does not take these cases into consideration in *Phantasms of the Living*. Myers, I think, accepted them as veridical. (Pro., Vol. XII., p. 174).

are few in number, but their fewness is, as Myers has pointed out, only what is to be expected whatever theory as to telepathy be set up. Both Edmund Gurney and Myers accept them as veridical.

In view of the importance of the class I give short digests of two cases. I have picked out these two cases because they illustrate the interchange of the *form* of telepathic communication between the so-termed agent and percipient.*

(1) Commander Aylesbury, when 13 years of age, was capsized in a boat, when landing on the Island of Bally, near Java, and was nearly drowned. On coming to the surface he called his mother, and was heartily laughed at by the boat's crew. While he was under water he saw his mother in England; he said to her on his return: "I saw you all—Mother, Emily, Eliza and Ellen." His mother in England heard him, at the time, cry out for her. (*Phantasms of the Living*, Vol. II., p. 227).

(2) Mr. Milward Pierce when living in

* Besides the cases in *Phantasms of the Living*, recorded under the head of "Reciprocal Cases," I think those reported in Vol II. at pp. 44, 48, 67, 140, 227, 692 and 695, and those in Vol I., pp. 226, 248 and 560 are in point.

Nebraska, U.S.A., was engaged to be married to a young lady living in Yankton, Dakota, 25 miles north of where he was. He had a ranch, and while trying to catch a horse was kicked in the face and only escaped being brained by an inch or two. He says: "I did not faint, nor was I insensible for a moment, as I had to get out of the way of the next kick. There was a moment's pause before anyone spoke. I was standing, leaning against the stable wall, when I saw on my left, apparently quite close, the young lady I have mentioned. She looked pale. . . . I was so haunted by the appearance that next morning I started for Yankton. The first words the young lady said when I met her were: 'Why, I expected you all yesterday afternoon. I thought I saw you looking so pale, and your face all bleeding.'" The young lady saw him at the time of the accident. (*Phantasms of the Living*, Vol. II., p. 157).

In both these cases the event round which the telepathic communication emerges is an accident. In the former case the boy to whom the accident occurred travels in personality to

England *from* the scene of the accident. In the latter case it is the young lady who travels in personality *to* the scene of the accident.

Now what facts have we from all these cases?

In the first place let us assume we exist merely as embodied selves: that is, that the personality of each one of us is so indissolubly related to our own particular bodily form that on the dissolution of that material form our personality is lost and gone.

Then personality exists conditioned in space and is subject to the law of the inverse square. It is conditioned also in time, and time, whatever else it may be, is a continuity which imports change.

How can such personalities communicate with one another? Through and only through their normal senses of sight, hearing and feeling: wireless telegraphy, even, requires the use of the normal senses to result in communication between human beings. For such personalities any form of *non-physical communication is impossible*: the personality is largely a physical thing.

But telepathy spells non-physical communication between personalities. If, then, we are, *quâ* personality, but mere physical beings, telepathy is impossible.

Herein we find the ground on which certain men of science not only deny the possibility of telepathy, but refuse to investigate it. For, if telepathy be a fact of human experience, it proves that personality is non-physical: is, we may say, psychical or spiritual.

But now we start with an assumption that telepathy is a fact of human experience: so we have, *given to us, as a fact from human experience*, our personality as non-physical.

In telepathic communications we cannot call in sensibility* as explaining them, for the normal senses take no part in the communications. But we must have *something* for explanation and, as telepathy is unconditioned by time and space, this *something* must be non-physical. Even at this point of the argument, telepathy would appear to demand a non-physical subject and non-physical means of communication.

* In *Personality and Telepathy*, I gave a wider meaning to sensibility than that usually given. I now use the term in its ordinary sense.

Telepathic communications, as recorded, centre round some event; in the reported cases generally, but not always, round some marked or exceptional event like death or a serious accident or great stress of feeling. But we cannot, as before stated, hold that the event creates the power of communication. Just as we must have the power of thought before we begin to think, so this power of communication must exist before its exercise. Death may make an "occasion" for the exercise or manifestation of the power, just as the birch may make an "occasion" for the exercise or manifestation of the power of thought in the school-boy. But the power in either case must exist before its exercise or manifestation.

Can we, from the facts of human experience which the reported cases of telepathy give us, find further support for the theory propounded? Let us try.

In the first class the percipient's personality is on the spot where he is; the agent's personality is also on the spot where he, the agent, is. But the agent's personality also travels to the spot where the percipient is, for it is there

he impresses the percipient with a sense of his presence.

In the second class the facts as to personality are the same, except that it is the *percipient's* personality which travels to the spot where the agent is.

In the fourth class—for we may at present neglect the third for the reasons given—the first and second class coalesce, as it were. For while the agent's and percipient's personalities are on the spots where they are, *each* travels in personality to the spot where the other is. Not only this. The *clairvoyant* travel is sometimes of the one on the spot where the event occurs to where the other is, and sometimes of the one not on the spot where the event occurs to the spot where the other is.

Now we assume that all these classes are supported by veridical evidence, and that some one explanation must be given for all: we want Myers' one great fundamental law.

In the first class, as before said, we must hold the agent's personality is on the spot where he is. Even if sleeping his *consciousness of self* must be in existence there: all we

can hold is that, in sleep, the normal consciousness is not manifested in activity. When we say that in sleep we are unconscious* we do not mean the self is absent or lost, and I cannot separate self from self-consciousness. In the case of such separation "self" seems to me a meaningless expression. But the agent's "self" is manifest also in the place where the percipient is. Indeed, as the cases show, it may be manifest at the same time to more than one percipient where the percipients are at different places at the same one time.† The explanation must cover the above facts.

In the second class the percipient's personality must, as before shown for the agent, be where his body is. But this personality is also at a distance. Consider any case of crystal gazing. The seer stands at the crystal and talks to people round, about what he sees in the crystal. He is there in the body: his normal consciousness is active there. He sees

* For the unconsciousness of sleep I would, as before shown, speak of the super-consciousness, which still exists when normal consciousness is in abeyance.

† Cf. *Phantasms of the Living*, Vol. II., Collective Cases, and Combined Index, S.P.R., under heading Telepathy, Hallucinations, Collective.

through the crystal what is taking place *at a distance*. We may hold that his personality is also at the distant spot where he sees things happening or that his personality—where his body is—is impressed by what is taking place at a distance. But even if the second statement be taken we must hold that his personality is of such a nature that it can be impressed by what is taking place at a distance when there is no *physical* means of communication between the place where his body is and the place by which he is impressed. The explanation must cover the above facts.

We see more clearly the difficulty before us when we consider the fourth class. For in this class *both* the so-termed agent and percipient have their personalities where their bodies are,* and *each* “travels in personality” to where the other is. Sometimes the one on the spot of the event round which telepathy takes place is clairvoyant, sometimes the one *not* on the spot is clairvoyant: they interchange their form of telepathic experience. The explanation must cover the above facts.

* If their personalities are *not* there then personality is purely psychical.

If I am no more than an embodied self with no more than a normal consciousness, I cannot travel in personality away from my body and—there being no psychical action and reaction between me and other embodied selves—I can only communicate with my fellows through material channels. In such case I cannot, to cite a given instance, be drowning at Java and see what, at the moment, is taking place in England. No case of telepathy can be veridical.

If then, as we now do, we accept cases of telepathy as veridical, our theory for them cannot admit that each one of us is a mere embodied self with merely normal consciousness. What *must* we have?

We must have in each one of us some power of non-physical communion, and we must have some power in the personality of each one of us of *manifesting itself* at more than one place in time and space. But this power of manifestation is impossible if the personality is indelibly fixed to the one place of its bodily form: the personality must be free from the conditioning of space and time. It appears

to me that the facts of telepathy demand this form of communion and of personality.

But what limit are we to put on this psychical communion, how are we to define it? Bear in mind what it *must* be. It is not one or all of the bye-paths of communication manifest in time and space. It is the broad high way which makes possible the communications between the little bye-paths: it is a public highway.

If I tell you that I travelled from London to York and there held a conversation with a friend then, if you believe me, you assume there was a material road by means of which I travelled. If I tell you that, my body remaining in London, I travelled from London to York and there held a conversation with a friend then, if you believe me, you assume there was a psychical road by which I travelled. In neither case could you assume the road was a private road.

Telepathy demands this power of psychical communion between us all, communion always open and free as a highway.

But no embodied self can travel by this

road,* it is non-physical. What do we mean, then, by travel of personality and by *manifestation* of personality in more than one place at the same time?

The personality must be non-physical, and must be of such a nature that it can be *manifest* at the same time in more than one place.

Let us consider the facts of this personality and communion from the point of view of gravity.

Consider any point of attraction† and assume it exists in three-dimensional space empty of the material. Then the attraction of the point on *any* spherical surface is always the same. The attraction on a small surface is the same as on a large surface only, in common parlance, it is more widely distributed over the larger surface. And these surfaces vary directly as the square of the length of the radii from the point.

Now introduce any other point on the surface of *any* such sphere. It follows directly,

* There is no material in it to withstand the pressure!

† The argument is the same for radiation. There being no matter external to the point there is nothing to interfere with the radiation or attraction.

from what has before been said, that the attraction of the point on the external point varies inversely as the square of the distance.

The law of the inverse square is a *deduction* from the fact that the attraction of a point is the same throughout space.

From what is above written we find analogy to the timeless and spaceless communion in question. The attraction of the point is unconditioned in itself in time and space. It is only when we introduce an external point or points that the law of the inverse square comes in.

But the *point* of radiation? We must consider this as we have considered communion.

The non-physical self is unconditioned in time and space, it cannot be considered as a point. We must, so far as space is concerned, consider it of universal existence, it may be said to pervade space.*

But how can we have any idea of a personality pervading space or, more correctly, transcendent of space and time? Any such

* This opens thought to a delicious theory in explanation of gravity. Has the Euclidian point quantity?

idea is impossible, for ideas are relative. But the very fact that we are *aware* of the limited nature of the ideas we use for thought proves the existence in us of a power transcending thought, a power which I term insight. I hold we can imagine a personality transcending space and time, and yet with psychical activity, just as we can imagine communion transcending time and space: for such communion, indeed, it has been shown that gravity gives us analogy.

The difficulty we meet with as to imagining any such personality arises from the fact that language has been evolved to express thought and nothing but thought. And thought, as has been shown, is related in correlation to the material. When, then, we wish to express the psychical in words we have to use words which express the physical. For instance, when we state that the self pervades space we import contradiction, for space is related to the physical. All we can state is that the self transcends space: we state a negative: for we refer to something transcending ideas. Insight which makes us aware of transcendence has

no language, can state conclusions only negatively. Myers appreciated this difficulty.

Still, though we cannot define it in words, I hold we *can* imagine a "self" transcendent of time and space and communion transcendent of time and space between all of us as such selves.

TIME AND SPACE

Something must be added as to the beginning and ending of such selves, for all written on the subject appears to me mere beating of the air. I hold that the question does not, cannot, arise.*

What do we mean by any beginning or ending? To raise the question we *must have sequence in time*. Think of any beginning, any ending of anything. The thought is meaningless, cannot exist, unless subject to the conditioning of time. Consider, for instance, the general confusion of thought as to memory: try to condition your storage of memory in time. You cannot. You condition it in the past in time? But, if so, how can you at any moment in the present passing *now* take out

* Cf. Kant on his antinomies and his explanation, though the explanation is perhaps given in language difficult to follow.

any part of your storage and use it in the present.*

For the self under consideration we have *transcendence* of time, that is, the very condition (time) that we require for the existence of any beginning or ending is absent. We must use some such word as *transcendence*, for there is in us a power subsuming thought, a power I term insight. And this power opens to us a universe wider than the universe of thought. But, if transcendence exist, it has no language: for language is the language of thought. It can find expression only in the negative. So, in transcendence of ideas, we must hold that for the soul there is transcendence of beginning and ending.

Metempsychosis which has always held such wide sway over mankind may have—I do not say has—some basis in truth. For we can imagine the soul of man making a pilgrimage in embodiment from manifestation in the form

* Cf. The Chapters on Memory in *Personality and Telepathy*. The difficulties that arise for thought in considering any beginning or ending for personality result from our taking limits of thought for our ultimate. When we take for our ultimate a limit of *insight* the difficulties disappear: we transcend thought.

of an oyster through manifestations in evolution to the form of man and thence onward.

But now we are only concerned with the fact that any question as to a beginning or ending for the self in question may be ignored.*

Down from the ages, as before stated, there have been countless attempts to determine the location of what is termed, the soul, the ego, the self or personality—it matters not now what we term this ultimate *something*. For, I repeat, we must start all reasoning with an assumption that we exist as self-conscious subjects or (as some hold) beings. And all reasoning has, I think, started under the influence of the preconceived idea of some indissoluble link between personality and bodily form. This is why reasoning has given location to the “self,” and so has always failed. But now we treat this “self” as non-physical though *manifest* through the physical. What ground then have we for locating it *anywhere* in space? We have no ground left at all. Reason informs

* Cf. William James' *Immortality*. Bear in mind that science itself admits it can consider only *relations* when its subject is size, quantity, or even what science terms quality.

us it cannot be located in space—any more than energy can be.

If it be objected that I, now, give to this “self” psychical activity and memory of its past when embodied and that therefore the argument fails because I must give *unity** to the “self,” the objection fails. For I simply give to a non-physical “thing,” non-physical power, so that still there is no reason to limit the *thing* in space. This self we may still hold to be a unity in relation to other selves.

And we can *imagine* this self unconditioned in space and yet with psychical activity: we can *imagine* ourselves “pervading” space in personality, and can *imagine* what our experience would then be. We can even *imagine* ourselves in space of two† or four dimensions. We are “things” of imagination, and our imagination can outrun the limits of our embodiment in space as known to us as embodied subjects. Even this marks that *we* are not

* Unity is a limit of thought involving space as a reality. Kant’s “unity” is a unity for reason.

† To the self conditioned in two-dimensional space, three-dimensional space is immaterial: to the self conditioned in three-dimensional space, two-dimensional space is immaterial!

limited in space, that it is our bodies only which are so conditioned.

The self is free from the conditioning of space.

But what, in detail, about the self in time?

When we consider the phenomena of our objective universe, Kant is right when he says: "The phenomena of the past determine all phenomena in the succeeding time."* So, as the self disembodied carries away with it full memory of its past human experience when embodied, we may *so far* give it knowledge of the future. But what the general purview of the self disembodied is we cannot surmise: as before shown we cannot surmise even what aspect its memory of past embodiment would take on for it, and this because past, present and future exist only for a subject conditioned in time. For the soul there is transcendence of time. Bear in mind, that time is never lost, never destroyed: it is subsumed, though how we cannot even imagine.

For the non-physical public high way and

* Meiklejohn's *Kant*, p. 148.

the non-physical self which telepathy would seem to demand I suggest the interpretation : Communion transcending time and space between us all as selves (souls)* transcending time and space.

If we accept this communion between souls as the basic fact of telepathy, the *manifestation* of personality at different points in space at the same time becomes possible, though whether it occur or not must rest on observed facts.

To exemplify what is above stated we may use, as an illustration, wireless telegraphy. We shall find human experience gives us close analogy for our theory of reason.

Assume that a wireless message is sent out from some despatching station, and assume, at first, there are no receiving stations. Where is the message?

It is radiating through what we term space. But if there be no receiving stations we cannot determine the nature of this radiation : it may

* To the soul of man I would give full self-consciousness. The self-consciousness of the embodied self is but, in Myers' words, a *slice* of consciousness. This *slice* is the normal consciousness.

be through space of dimensions or no dimensions or transcend space in radiation! It is human experience drawn from *receiving* stations that makes us aware of radiation manifested in three-dimensional space. We can neither affirm nor deny anything at all as to this radiation in itself, where there are no receiving stations.*

Now assume there are receiving stations. Where shall we place them, how many shall there be? We may place them anywhere, we may make their number just what we please. What will these stations receive? At the best they can receive the message† despatched fully and clearly. But if any of the receiving stations be faulty or incomplete the message as received will be faulty or incomplete.

Have we, in what is recorded above introduced all the factors in question? No. We have left out of consideration the most important of all. We have not brought in the *personality* who originated and despatched the message. There could be no message

* We may liken this radiation to communion.

† We may liken this message to a communication.

despatched unless this personality had existed. We have left out the personalities who receive the messages. None could be received if there were no such personalities. We are still driven back to self-conscious personality as groundless but the ground of all certainty.

Now let us consider this personality, this self. The really real self is non-physical, the self who despatches the message is a human personality, the self-embodied. What does this mean? The self is still existent transcendent of time and space, the embodied self is this self *manifest in time and space*. The same is true for the receiving personalities.

We have our ground for communication between embodied selves in the communion between selves not inhibited in time and space.

But this communion is not communication between embodied selves; it must be conditioned in time and space before such communication can be set up. This communion is the outflow, the artery, ramifying into countless channels to supply the inflow from the veins of communication.

The personality at the despatching station

must first formulate its message before it can despatch it: it must have an *â priori* idea of what message it wants to send. It then sends off its message. How? By radiation into what we term space—like to wireless telegraphy. The *means of carriage* is the communion between souls, just as in wireless telegraphy the means of carriage is energy. If there are receiving stations, no matter how many, the message is received and it is received fully and clearly or faulty or incomplete according to the nature of the receiving station in question. The receiving stations may also be receiving innumerable other messages in which they are more directly interested, so that the message in question fails to get through or is received faulty and incomplete from their manifold interference.

If we begin with the hypothesis of communion between souls we see that the embodied self can be manifest in more than one place at the same time to other embodied selves.*

If this hypothesis of communion between

* It might *itself* get back its own message, in which case it would appear to itself to be itself externalized.

souls be held as a sound judgment arrived at by consideration of telepathy, then—as telepathy is assumed to be a fact of human experience—we have *human experience that we exist as souls and have communion one with another as souls.*

It is well here to repeat that Kant held there is a soul in man: that he contemplated the possibility of telepathy: that he rejected any consideration of it,* because in his time there was not a sufficient accumulation of human evidence in support of it for his consideration.

It is well also to emphasize what is now meant by the soul in man. The question of immortality is not in question—that is beyond reason, is a matter of faith only. At the same time there is no *â priori* reason why the soul should not be immortal: argument has been offered that it is. Even survival of bodily death is not alleged as proved: it is merely rendered so highly probable that there is *evidential* proof. For the soul, being purely non-physi-

* There are records to show that though Kant never used telepathy as a factor in his philosophy he accepted certain instances, which came before him, as veridical.

cal, there is no *â priori* reason why physical change, even the crisis of death, should affect that which is non-physical and, relatively, permanent.

AUTHORITY. THE UNCONSCIOUS

Let us see how near this theory has been approached by leading authorities:—

Gerald Balfour in raising the question, Why is not telepathy universal? replies: "The answer I am disposed to give to this question would be that taken in its widest sense telepathy probably is universal, and that what is rare and exceptional is only our realisation of it." (Pro., S.P.R., Vol. XIX., p. 383).

Sir William Barrett says: "If this unconscious* radiation and reaction is going on between mind and mind, then observed cases of telepathy would simply mean the awakening of consciousness to the fact in certain minds." (Pro., S.P.R., Vol. XVIII., p. 337).

F. W. H. Myers says: "No one supposes

* For unconscious I would read super-conscious.

that the few emergent cases which happen to have become accessible to our view comprise the whole range of what must by its very nature be a great fundamental law. (Pro., S.P.R., Vol. XV., p. 408). There is reason to suppose that our normal consciousness represents no more than a *slice* of our whole being. (*Phantasms of the Living*, Vol. II., p. 285). I have led up to a statement of this difficulty because I believe that the answer, if we ever attain to more than a glimpse of it, will involve that true principle of classification which we are still seeking. And as a hint towards such reply I will repeat what has been already suggested, namely, that the right way of regarding these startling incidents is not as isolated psychical operations, but rather as emergent manifestations of psychical operations which are continuous, though latent: and which belong, not so much to the self of which we are habitually conscious, as to a hidden chain of mentation, which, for aught we know, may comprise a continuity of supernormal percipience or activity." (*Phantasms of the Living*, Vol. II., p. 312).

Mrs. Henry Sidgwick says: "Increased knowledge about the subliminal self, by giving glimpses of extension of human faculty and showing that there is more of us than we are nominally aware of, similarly suggests that the limitation imposed by our bodies and our material surroundings are temporary limitations." (Proceedings, S.P.R., Vol. XXIX, p. 247).

None of these statements would appear to be in contradiction to, but rather to support, the theory now propounded. Indeed Sir William Barrett's "radiation and reaction going on between mind and mind" differs little from "communion between souls," if souls be given the meaning I give. For I think his radiation and reaction is to be read as free from the restrictions of time and space, and his "minds" must be something transcendent of brain activity.

A great deal has been written, and written recently, about the "unconscious." Why has the unconscious attracted so much attention? Because the sole fact of our possessing normal consciousness fails to explain many phenomena

which have recently come within the purview of human experience—the phenomena of hypnotism for example.* But what do these phenomena point to? Some timeless and spaceless radiation and reaction taking place between mind and mind transcending time and space. The term unconscious would appear to have meaning only when the normal consciousness is regarded as our full consciousness. But the term is *used* for something *transcending* our normal consciousness. The term used should be “superconsciousness,” for the term “unconscious” *as used* means a consciousness under which the normal consciousness is subsumed. I interpret Myers’ subliminal consciousness as the full consciousness of the soul of man under which the supraliminal consciousness is subsumed. The subliminal self is the soul of man, the supraliminal self is the embodied self. But if this interpretation be correct was not Myers—to

* It is a scandal to medical science that it should now make important use of hypnotism while still ignoring the great men of the past who first revealed this power in man. The scandal is the greater when we consider the foul abuse and mental torture that these great men of the past had to bear from medical science.

whom we all owe so profound a debt of gratitude—just a *leetle* influenced by our very common preconceived idea that we are merely embodied selves? *Not* influenced I suggest in thought, but in the use of language? Should not the soul be the supraliminal and the embodied self the subliminal? * Normal consciousness is subsumed *under* superconsciousness. Myers himself was fully aware of the difficulties we all encounter in stating psychical facts in physical terms. (*Phantasms of the Living*, Vol. II., p. 290).

The main object of this little book is now complete. I have preferred an argument to show that, assuming telepathy to be a fact of human experience, we have evidential proof, *proof from human experience*, that we exist, transcendent of time and space, as souls; and that communion, transcendent of time and space, exists between us all as souls.

But, if the theory now propounded be sound,

* In the *Gate of Remembrance*, the author uses the term supraliminal for the term subliminal as generally used! The error is, I think, natural.

it changes altogether the standpoint from which we regard the phenomena of telepathy and something as to this must be added.

THE COMMUNION OF SOULS

The tendency of human thought at present is, I think, towards some such theory as that now propounded. But in the past telepathy has been viewed from the human standpoint, from the standpoint of the embodied self. Telepathic communications have been considered as importing some extension of human faculty—the term exaltation of faculty has been largely used. All thought has *started from* the embodied self as the really real self.

Now, however, we hold the embodied self is no more than an inhibited form in time and space of the soul of man: we start with the soul of man and communion, transcendent of time and space, between us all as souls.

An analogy for what is stated above may be found from Darwin's theory of the descent of man. The tendency of human thought was originally based on the idea that Darwin held

men to be close relations of monkeys. In fact he made them distant collaterals tracing back from some, probably, arboreal ancestor. In the same way telepathy was first regarded as marking direct communication between men while now the tendency is to regard normal and telepathic communications as collaterals from some basic mode of communion—by the present theory, communion between souls. The “self” we now start with is the soul of man; formerly we started with the embodied self as the self.

Again, in all that has yet been written we have been considering telepathy as a fact of human experience, and assume to have shown that it gives us evidential proof that we exist as souls in full communion with one another. *Now* we assume we do exist as souls with communion as aforesaid, and try to worry out what telepathy should be under the hypothesis.

The soul as before shown is assumed to have psychic activity in that it has imagination and, assuming it is or has been embodied, it has full memory of its human experience.

The embodied soul (the subject) has as before shown a brain which is an automatic tool of motion, so that the subject—through ideas and by means of its body, an automatic tool,—can effect change and even create objects in the objective universe. Its brain also gives the subject power to analyse, as it were, the imagination* of itself as a soul. Sensibility presents to the subject objects as unrelated. The brain, analysing imagination into the form of thought, enables the subject to think relations between these objects which sensibility has presented as discrete—unrelated things; we sense objects; we think relations between objects. These relations we term ideas—we use ideas of objects not objects themselves for thought.

Now sensibility is the same for us all, we all sense the external in the same way. And we all have the *same kind* of brain machine; one machine differs from another only in degree. For instance, a nincompoop senses the sun in the same way as an Isaac Newton, and

* The soul, in parable, may be said to think in a "lump" of thought.

he thinks about it in the same kind of way. The difference in thought between the two arises because their brains differ in degree.*

Again, bearing in mind that imagination is "at the back" of all thought, consider flights of the highest imagination as shown, for instance, in Shelley's and Keats' poetry, in Coleridge's "Ancient Mariner" and "Kubla Khan," in Edgar Allen Poe's "Tales of Mystery and Imagination." Herein we have, as in all records, the language of ideas through the brain-machine, but imagination more fully colouring the language than is the case with other writers—imagination "gets through" better. Genius is expressed when imagination "gets through" into manifestation in thought to some exceptional degree. Genius manifests imagination in the highest degree possible for the "parables of thought."

Subject to this difference in degree between brain-machines, how do these machines, normally, work?

* There is evolution in our use of thought. To the nincompoop the sun is simply a round thing of light; to an Isaac Newton it is a thing of many diverse relations. The average use of thought by man evolves for all mankind.

They work normally, for the purposes of their owners as self-conscious subjects, as things of thought and activity. But the ideas governing the motion of the machines are not always ideas proceeding from their owners. As we have seen, the owner may derive ideas, including hallucinations, from the external, from other subjects, or from recorded ideas, and has power to externalise such ideas.*

Each one of us, then, though as a soul in full communion with his fellows, will, as an embodied self be normally engaged in using his brain-machine for personal purposes; his thought and activity will be, normally, so self-concentrated.

It follows that the affairs purely of others, the communion itself of souls, will for the most part, never affect our normal consciousness. If the communion between us all as souls were in full course of emergence in telepathic com-

* The tendency of education of the young is to cram them with facts; that is, to give them ideas from the external which, as starting points for thought, determine their future line of thought and so their form of activity, the result being that children grow up creatures of past, dogmatic thought, instead of reasonable subjects using personally evolved ideas.

munications it would be impossible for us to be reasonable subjects of thought and action. Why we are embodied we know not, but we *are* embodied, and so our duty in thought and action is and should be centred round our objective universe : imagination is inhibited in the form of thought, probably to this end.

From the theory, then, we should expect two facts to follow :—

(1) When we compare our normal with our telepathic experience we should find the latter form very exceptional.

(2) When we have telepathic experience we should find it most often happens when the brain-machine is at rest from employment on its owner's business.

I think we find these are two facts involved in telepathy. In an *extreme* case, under the second head, we might find the brain-machine of one subject so idle that another subject* takes possession of it and works it. But, as to this, we have no satisfactory human ex-

* Even a disembodied subject.

perience—experience of so-termed possession. The only definite case I can find is that of the Watseka Wonder* which appears to have been fully considered and fairly reported. Unfortunately, its source is tainted, for those who investigated it *started with* full belief that it was a case of possession. Experimental cases also show that “blankness of mind” is an important factor for the percipient towards success. (*Cf. Personality and Telepathy*, p. 230). For automatic writing the same would appear to hold. (*Cf. Personality and Telepathy*, p. 205).

So far we find that the hypothesis of a soul in man and communion between souls offers an explanation for the facts of telepathy.

Let us now consider cases of clairvoyance. The self is everywhere, is in communion everywhere with its fellows. But the clairvoyant experience of the seer is manifest in ideas through the brain. The seer, where he is in the body, has manifest to him in idea something happening at a distance which cannot

* By E. W. Stephens, M.D. Austin Publishing Company.

be given to him by sensibility. How can this be?

Under the hypothesis, class 3 (*cf.* p. 43) must be now considered with cases of clairvoyance. The former infers power in the seer to be impressed on the spot where he is with impressions from a distance without any influence from any agent: the latter implies the same power but under some influence* from an external agent.

Now, even as an embodied self, I *can* receive ideas from the external, and I *can* externalize any such ideas. Why, then, should not my really real self, myself as a soul unconditioned in time and space, receive ideas from a distance and externalize them? I think, from the hypothesis, such clairvoyant power naturally follows.

With reciprocal cases we need not now deal. For they mark no more than a coalescence of the two classes of cases considered. All needed for consideration is the smallness of the class. But this is accounted for. It is

* What this influence may be is considered hereafter.

accounted for because the probability against the emergence of communication in classes one and two is far greater for cases where they coalesce.

DREAMS

But with the hypothesis now under consideration, dreams become of great importance. I agree entirely with what Edmund Gurney has written showing how difficult it is to get satisfactory veridical evidence based on dreams. (*Cf. Phantasms of the Living*, Vol. I., p. 298). But that does not derogate from the fact of the importance of dreams in themselves.

I hold that dreams belong to the same class as ideas; they are the same in kind. They differ only in degree. Waking ideas find their genesis in imagination, but the purview of imagination is, for waking ideas, relatively small. Dreamland opens a relatively wider purview of imagination, and this is just what we should expect. For in sleep the sleeper is divorced from external sensuous impressions, and so the mind has that "blankness" which is useful

for ideas direct from imagination to "get through." As Gurney says: "In dreams, if anywhere, the range of possibilities seems infinite." The hypnotic state makes the getting through of ideas from the external much simpler, and one feature, at least, hypnotism has in common with sleep—it relieves the subject from the interruption of normal sensuous impressions and occupation in thought about such impressions.

Again, no authority is wanted for the statement that, while in dreamland, the dreams of the sleeper are as objectively real to him as if he were waking. It is only when he awakes, that is, when he becomes again fully subject to the restrictive environment of his objective universe, that they appear to him baseless, unreal. And, if the dreams have been in a universe transcending the objective universe, they *must*, as before shewn, appear baseless, unreal, when related to our objective universe.

We have no direct evidence of any one single dream.* It is the dreamer, divorced from the inhibitions of sensibility, who dreams:

* Cases of hypnosis may form exceptions to this. But so far as they go they support the theory propounded.

the dream is his dream. All the evidence of dreams that we have are from "the sleeper awakened": we have to trust to his memory, and his memory, as a dreamer, no longer exists for manifestation. We have only the memory of a waking man, subject to his inhibitions, to trust to.

Consider your own experience not only of your dreams but also—a very different thing—your memory of your dreams. You will find your dreams are of two kinds or, more correctly, appear to you to have come from two different sources. You remember some dreams as ordinary, perhaps laughable, "make-ups" from your normal experience: these are almost infinite in variety. But, sometimes, when you wake up, you remember the fact that you *have* dreamt, but, now, your dream itself is beyond memory—it is so mysterious, vague, reaching out so widely in imagination, that it has transcended your ideas and so is not the subject of memory. Or you may wake up and remember you have had an "awfully happy"* or an "awfully miserable" dream. But that is all

* It is most exceptional for dreams to be sensual. Any theory that they are is supported by evidence from a half-waking, half-sleeping state.

you can remember: the facts are beyond memory. Of our dreams, too, we can sometimes remember that—in some preposterous, impossible way—we *did* transcend space and time: we are still conscious when we wake that *we ourselves* have, in dreamland, been part of a universe transcending our little material and infinitesimal speck of world with its mean concentration on eating, drinking, struggling for wealth, rank or power against our fellow men.

Now for those dreams in a universe transcending our little objective universe, we must do one of two things: we must refer them to *ourselves* as selves transcending our embodied selves, and so as having a power of communion transcending communication subject to the inhibition of sensibility, or we must treat them as sheer, useless drivel. There is no *tertium quid*. If we are mere embodied selves these dreams are ridiculous in that they make the material which is real, subject to the psychical which is unreal: they are mere senseless divagations from real reality. If we are souls they come into our scheme naturally: they are what we should expect.

I offer no proof of either conclusion, some may prefer one, some the other. But I suggest, in reason, there is so strong a probability that this class of dreams spells a self in us transcending the embodied self, with communion between us all as souls, that we are justified in treating the probability as evidential proof.

But we have not finished consideration of our "make-up" dreams.

When we wake we are fully conscious of the fairy tales we have made up in dreamland from use of our normal human experience. But we are conscious of something else too—so many of us have this form of the content of consciousness that it is unnecessary to refer to recorded cases. What we are conscious of is that we have dreamt of some one or many human beings at a distance from us; dreamt of their environment, perhaps conversed with them or *done* certain things with them. And bear in mind, if you please, that during the time you dream all this, your dreams are objectively real to you.

Now I agree with Gurney that it is very difficult to get veridical evidence to prove the

psychical reality* of these dreams. But, if our hypothesis be sound, then the great probability follows that these dreams mark really real experience. The dreamer has, psychically, had really real experience of his dream. In dreamland we are no longer inhibited in our range of personality by sensuous impressions from the external: we are no longer engaged actively in thought and action round our little objective universe: our minds are free to wander. How to wander? *Psychically*.

This "wandering" must be, even for science, psychic. And why? Because science admits that dreams† may tend to *accumulation* of energy during sleep. But the one object of sleep, scientifically, is restoration of energy for its after use in the waking stage. The admission follows that "happy" dreams cannot result from any expenditure of energy materially considered—they *store up* such energy. The energy expended in dreamland must be psychic—though the term transcends ideas.

I have said it is unnecessary to give any

* Throughout we hold material reality is subject to psychical reality.

† This is especially true for "happy" dreams.

cases in detail, but one late case reported by Sir William Barrett appears so strong in internal evidence and so directly to illustrate the present argument, that it is advisable now to record it. I give this case in Sir William's own words, taken from *The Contemporary Review* for February, 1918:—

“The facts are, briefly, as follows: Mr. Mackenzie-Ashton, when a young man, went to stay at a vicarage in Nottinghamshire in September, 1882. After his visit he went to his parents' home in Hertfordshire, 130 miles away. Soon after he left the vicarage, Mr. (now Colonel) Nicholson and Mrs. Nicholson, with both of whom he was unacquainted, went to stay at the vicarage, and a few days later Mr. Mackenzie-Ashton received from Mr. Nicholson the following letter, which explains itself:—

“September 14th, 1882.

“‘I have been staying at W—— Vicarage lately, and last evening (Wednesday) we amused ourselves with “table turning.” The table, when asked by whose spirit it was possessed, answered, “Arundel Mackenzie”; and to the further question, “Where is he?” it replied, “His soul is here.” To the question, “How is his body occupied?” it returned a perfectly definite answer. Would you mind informing me how you were occupied last night from 10.30 to 11.30 p.m., and

in whose company you were, and what you were doing out of doors in the day time? Pray excuse a perfect stranger asking you these impertinent questions, but I am anxious to be satisfied whether these "manifestations" were true or false.'

"Mr. Mackenzie-Ashton, who had recently added the name 'Ashton' to Arundel Mackenzie, replied, giving the particulars asked for, and Mr. Nicholson then writes: "Will you assure me on your word of honour that you had heard nothing whatever from any person at the Vicarage that evening?" This assurance was given, and then follows this letter from Mr. Nicholson:—

" 'When I asked for your assurance I felt it was scarcely necessary, but the experience was so extraordinary that it seemed more satisfactory to have it.

" 'We [naming the persons present at the Vicarage] had our hands on the table, which began immediately to move; on being asked to tilt if a spirit was present, it did so. Asked, "Whose spirit?" it replied [tilting at the right letter when the alphabet was repeated] and gave the answers named in the previous letter; asked, "What is his body doing?" at first no reply was given. After waiting, we asked the same question again, and the reply was given, "Playing billiards"; the time was then 11.15 p.m. Asked "Who is with him?" the answer was "Father"; asked "Who is winning?" answer "Son." Asked "How many games have been played?" answer "Two." Asked "What has he [A. Mackenzie] been doing

during the day?" answer "Shooting." At this there was a general exclamation, "Impossible!" for it was not believed that you had any shooting, and H—— asked, "Pheasants or partridges?" laughing—but we could get no more. H——, by request, left the table, and we asked the [soi-disant] spirit why it had not replied; it answered "Flippant!" and we could get no more. This is a literal and exact statement of what took place. . . . A peculiar tremor ran through the table till the right letter was reached, and then the tilting was decided and distinct. The lights in the room were not lowered; the experience has thoroughly astonished me.'

"Highly improbable as it seemed to the sitters at the table, all the above particulars were perfectly correct. Mr. A. Mackenzie-Ashton writes:—

" 'I had been shooting during the day (Wednesday), and in the evening I had two games of billiards with my father. I won both of them, and after that I lay down on a couch in the billiard-room and fell asleep. Then I had a dream that I was back in W—— Vicarage.'

"Of the trustworthiness of my informants and the accuracy of the narrative there can be no doubt, nor can the facts be explained away by chance coincidence, or by surreptitious knowledge on the part of the sitters at the Vicarage, who did not know that Mr. Mackenzie-Ashton was at the time visiting his parents 130 miles away. Here, then, we have evidence of what

appears to be either telepathy from the subliminal personality of a sleeping person, or, more probably, telergy—the direct influence of an extraneous mind on the brain and organism of the distant sitters.”

This dream of Mr. Mackenzie-Ashton is interesting for the following reasons: Such dreams frequently occur, they are almost commonplace. But, for the very great majority, there is never a chance of their being objectified, that is, of their setting up any action at a distance from the sleeper—at the distant place he dreams of. In the present case the chance was seized and the result was that the dream *was* objectified. (*Cf. Phantasms of the Living*, Cases 200, 201 and 291).

Again, whence comes the full contentment that we suck in, for instance, from the dream creations of Shelley, Coleridge or Wordsworth? There is no address to ourselves if we are mere things of embodiment: the address is to us as transcending embodiment. The dreams spell imagination transcending ideas: we feel this transcendence at the back of the words recorded. But all this were impossible

if man be but an embodied self. And yet it all touches us. How can what is impossible for any self have any effect on any self? I think we are driven in reason to hold *because* such dreams affect us we must be of such a nature that they have some real reality for us. And how can this be unless we transcend embodiment? The very existence of such poetry, the very effect of it on us, seems explicable only by holding there is a soul in man.

Again, when are you most conscious of your own personality? In a moment of personal triumph or when swept away with your fellows in one great wave of feeling in common? Has not the present cruel war, by involving us all in one great wave of feeling which has led to personal self-sacrifice for one common ideal, made each one of us more fully conscious of *himself as a soul*? Why all our material sacrifice and suffering? For an ideal. Does this, then, not spell the fact that to our really *real* selves the ideal is something which dominates the material?

Consider your normal life, try to worry out what it really is. You will find it based on

dreams of what may be; you will find that hope, the very root of your existence, is based on ignorance, but ignorance coloured by faith. If you knew beforehand what would happen to the potatoes you plant your interest in them would be gone. It is your very ignorance of what the future of your *embodied* life will be and so your hope and expectation about it, which make the backbone of your life, which give you the necessary interest.

And, yet, what is at the root, the foundation, of your existence as a self? That, although the whole material of your body, brain and sensory organs, is from moment to moment changing, *you yourself* remain the same; remain the same unaffected by this continuity of material change.

And this is explicable only by some such theory as that now expounded.

THE DISEMBODIED

When we use the term "communion of souls," the term soul must be confined to those of us who are still embodied or those of us who have passed through the human bodily state. We ignore all other possible or impossible beings or subjects. We now only consider our own souls, embodied or disembodied. The communion is related to all of us who are embodied or, after embodiment, are disembodied.

But how can there be *communication* between the embodied and disembodied, what limits are to be placed on such communication?

If, as the theory assumes, those of us who are disembodied exist in a universe of wider purview than our little objective universe, the disembodied can give us no information as to

their existing state : * far more easily might Sir Isaac Newton make a child of five years fully acquainted with the infinitesimal calculus. All they can do is to give us ideas *in parable*.† If they still have form they can give us no full information as to what it is. For the term form is meaningless to us unless in relation to the objects of our little universe.

Now, as Myers said : “ If an immortal soul there be within us, she must be able to dispense with part of the brain’s help while the brain is living, as with the whole of its help when it is dead.” (Proceedings, S.P.R., Vol. IV., p. 260). But as to this statement bear in mind what the brain is. It is a machine for the analysis of imagination into the inhibited form of thought. Imagination, from which thought finds its origin, still exists for the soul disembodied and so, for it, thought still exists, subsumed under imagination. But to communicate with the embodied, the disembodied must have the use of a brain. Communion is in imagination :

* Stainton Moses, the spiritualist, held to this. Myers says that Stainton Moses was a man of the highest rectitude.

† As it may be said without irreverence, our Lord pictured man’s future as absolute heaven or absolute hell.

communication is an inhibited form of communion in that through a brain it uses thought, an inhibited form of imagination. For this thought a brain is necessary.

The disembodied, then, can only "appear" to the embodied as they the disembodied were, in form, when on earth. Having no brain themselves, the disembodied must for communication use some still existing brain—the brain of someone still embodied.

Now the reported cases of communication, so far as they go, point to the above limitations in the form of communication between the embodied and the disembodied. These cases are so numerous, so diverse, they present such difficulties in distinguishing those that are veridical from those that are not, that they cannot now be referred to in detail. But I think what is about to be stated is true for all veridical cases:—

(1) If the communication be, for instance, from Myers or Gurney, the communicant appears to be the Myers or Gurney *we knew on earth*—in the words of Sir William Barrett, merely a "fragment" of the really real Myers

or Gurney. (2) The communications got through have reference to the thoughts and affairs of the Myers or Gurney *we knew on earth*. (3) The form of communication, so far as it is veridical, is confined to human thought and human affairs.

So far as the recorded cases carry us, I think they support the theory now propounded. But, to my mind, though the evidence we have accumulated is strong and demands serious attention, it does not yet attain to that degree of probability which we are justified in using as proof. It is not so strong as the evidence for telepathy, in spite of the fact that telepathy itself gives us evidential proof that we exist as souls in full communion.

Do not forget, however, that what is stated above spells neither rejection nor acceptance of such more definite forms of communication as those disclosed in Sir Oliver Lodge's *Raymond** and in many other recorded cases. But they must all be treated as *parables* for thought. The idea of a disembodied spirit

* A book marking supreme courage and love of truth in the writer.

longing for, or even imbibing, a whiskey and soda is objectively false. But it may be sound in parable. Hans Andersen's Fairy Tales are all objectively false, but they all convey, in parable, deep underlying truth.

SYMPATHY

One difficulty still remains in our way—*why* do these communications emerge in relation to certain agents and percipients? Why are some subjects of the communications and not others? Only an attempt can now be made at reply: it is to be feared full reply is as yet beyond us.

But we can prove something in negation: the emergence of these communications, as already shewn, does not depend on the brain or its form—the unlettered and foolish* are as likely to be subjects as the most highly gifted and cultured. The reason, then, for certain individuals being “picked out” for such communications must be sought in personality apart from the form or capacity of the brain. This would appear to be a justifiable conclusion. This personality must be non-

* Cf. a case of deranged intellect. *Phantasms of the Living*, Vol. II., p. 351.

physical : it is not conditioned by the brain, it is merely manifest through the brain.

On page 723, Vol. II., of *Phantasms of the Living* there is an analysis of the relation of the percipient to the agent for all the reported cases. Twins are not marked as a separate class, but (*cf.* p. 279 of Vol. I.) Gurney says : "As a matter of fact, we have a certain number of twin cases, which, though actually small, is indisputably disproportionate, if we remember what an infinitesimally small proportion of the population twins form." Gurney gives three cases of twins, and in all three cases the effect was *in feeling*.

When we examine the above analysis we find only six per cent. show the relationship of husband and wife, the largest number, 31 per cent., is that of friends. Consanguinity is found in only 47 per cent., and, as Gurney says, "it seems reasonable to conclude that consanguinity, as such, has little if any predisposing influence in the transmission of telepathic impressions." As to this statement bear in mind that all the cases given of twins mark impressions in *feeling*.

Now what sympathy means we do not know—it is a term for something transcending ideas. We refer it to feeling.* But the term feeling is objectionably vague as James Ward holds when considering psychology as treated from a scientific standpoint. (*Cf. Encl. Britt.*, Vol. XXII., page 551).

Still we can consider, though vaguely, the term sympathy.

Sympathy can exist very generally, may exist even between a man and a dog or horse. When two people marry, as sometimes happens, for pure love, this spells an exceptional form of sympathy between them, though it may be accompanied by constant conflict in intellectual thought. Even in many if not most marriages, which are determined by environment of wealth, class or opportunity, by chance sensual attraction or even the diplomacy of relations or friends moved by considerations of expediency, long companionship may lead to the evolution of sympathy.

But, in no way, can we inhibit this sympathy

* Kant points out that feelings are not cognitions, Meiklejohn's *Kant*, p. 40.

as intellectual. Dr. Johnson and Wilkes, intellectually irreconcilable opponents, were closely attracted in sympathy, sat indeed with their heads close together hobnobbing; there is sympathy between Quasimodo and Esmeralda; dullards may attract us in sympathy while the intellectual may repel. Sympathy, as a human bond, exists but would appear to be conditioned in no way by body, brain or sensory organs.

I think sympathy may be held to exist for the soul of man, manifest in various ways for the embodied self. If this be so then when any event occurs in relation to an agent, the percipient is not affected because his brain is in sympathy with that of the agent. The impression is received by the percipient through the high way of communion, it emerges as communication in the percipient because of "soul sympathy." The particular percipient is more close in sympathy with the agent than others are.*

* A stranger to the agent may be a percipient when a near relative, present with the percipient, is not. (Cf. *Phantasms of the Living*, Vol. I., p. 524, Vol. II., p. 61). Of our millions of fellows there must be many with "soul sympathy," who never meet on earth.

We may liken the brain to a fiddle, all fiddles like in kind but varying in degree. The owner of each fiddle—the soul of man—plays tunes. An event affects one owner—the agent—to play a particular tune. Another owner from sympathy with the first owner is affected by the same event (impression), and so plays a tune on *his* fiddle. But it is very seldom, if ever, the *same* tune—impressions emerging in the percipient as ideas have generally what is termed an embroidery of imagination. The transfer exists not in the same tune being played, but in the imagination of the particular percipient being the one which *does* play because the other has played.

A poor thing and, perhaps, not altogether my own.

ECSTASY.

By the theory propounded ecstasy is possible, even probable. For ecstasy spells personal experience in which the soul of man is conscious of a state of freedom from embodiment.* And if, as now held, the soul of man with superconsciousness is imprisoned for a time as an embodied self with normal consciousness, it is not unreasonable to suppose it may, for short periods, escape. This embodiment marks a life sentence, it is true. Still, even in a life sentence, we may contemplate the prisoner being allowed, at times, exercise in the outside yard, under the sky.

William James in his work, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, holds that ecstasy is part of human experience; and he holds, too,

* Myers defines ecstasy as a trance during which the spirit of the automatist partially quits his body.

that any explanation of human experience to be acceptable to reason must cover *all forms of human experience*.

William James' statement that ecstasy is a part of human experience is now relied on, and I would suggest that it is far more generally a part than is commonly assumed. We, the *profanum vulgus*, may not attain to that degree of ecstasy which Plotinus did, but many have experience which can only be explained by a state transcending that of normal consciousness operating with ideas which depend on use of the brain as a machine. In *Personality and Telepathy* it is stated:—

“No few of us have known moments of mystic experience which we can *recall in memory*: experience which cannot be referred to cognition, cannot be referred to bodily state. The very feeling exists in *consciousness of non-self in time and space*: of the non-existence of the human personality, and yet in the finding of one's real self in this negation of human personality. Anyone who has had such experience remains through earthly life impressed with living belief that he exists in some

reality of which his human existence is but a passing shadow."

The charge against such moments of ecstasy that they spell absence of any desirable form of personality, in that all activity is lost, is not, I think, justified. For there is full memory of human experience though the regard and aspect of memory have changed; there is no loss of mental power, such power is but subsumed under higher and wider power. There is feeling, in such moments, that the riddle of our liliputian material universe is solved for us. But this solution as to the material, opens to us, perhaps, a wider problem as to the psychical. Psychical activity remains in the vast universe which, then, is ours.

Deeply interesting as is the subject of ecstasy little is now to be written of it, and this because it is not evidential—he who returns from such state to normal existence has personal proof of the state, but he has no evidence to offer his fellows: he has been in a universe transcending ideas, and our language, as before shown, is confined to the expression of ideas. He may, indeed, in parable, offer

evidence of his experience; but ecstasy itself must not be judged by such evidence. The voluminous evidence which is extant proves this. For we find the evidence of everyone who alleges himself to have been in a state of ecstasy, fundamentally coloured by dogmatic opinion in religion and belief. Preconceived ideas veneer all such evidence. It is hence that the Christian, Buddhist, Neo-Platonist or Materialist all regard such evidence from the differing standpoints which their preconceived ideas have established.*

Still, in spite of this, I think the evidence we have points, in many cases, to its coming from those who have had veridical experience of the state. To get at this basic truth we must, by intellectual dissection, cut away the fringe of imagination which preconceived ideas have introduced—we have often to do this even in cases of telepathy.

By the theory now propounded we exist as souls with full communion one with another. But this, in relation to our normal conscious-

* Personally, I except the mysticism of Jesus Christ from any criticism.

ness as embodied selves, is normally *sub-conscious*. For, normally, we are absorbed—and rightly absorbed—in thought and action “round about” our little objective universe: superconsciousness is in abeyance—we cannot see the wood for the trees.

Now, this existence as souls with full communion may be the same as ecstasy.* In moments then, when we are free from absorption in our earthly life, ecstasy may be possible. So far the theory makes ecstasy possible, even probable. We are not seeking for, not suggesting, any proof of ecstasy. We are using thought only in argument and so can reach out only to *evidential proof*.

* Cf The ecstasy of Plotinus. The veridical experiences given in Harold Begbie's *Broken Earthenware* are of great interest.

CONCLUSION

IF the theory now propounded be sound, it is a good theory; it appeals even to the pragmatist.

We, each one of us, are souls, our self-consciousness is "groundless because it is the ground of all certainty." We are embodied, why we know not, as human personalities for a passing time in our little objective universe. But, though we know not why we are embodied in our universe of sin and suffering, insight, *a power in man*, makes us aware that we are subjects of duty to God: therein appears the categorical imperative.

Insight, transcending thought, makes us aware of the real reality of love, beauty, truth and justice; the goal duty points out to us.* And happiness? It has no existence in itself,

* Insight makes us aware of a transcendent ideal of love, beauty, truth and justice; we cannot even think any one without thinking also the others.

it is but the atmosphere, the appanage of struggle to perform duty to God.

Abandon thought of self, consider your fellows who surround you. Which of them are happy, which of them mark the highest state of what is *best* for man? You will find rank, wealth, power, beauty of form and strength of intellect fade away into the unreality of the material, and that, for decision, you must turn to the spiritual.

Who is the happier? The ignorant old-age pensioner placidly awaiting death conscious of a past of duty, however mean, manfully and cheerfully performed, or the man of wealth or intellect conscious of a past of work and thought for *self*? Bear in mind we are considering really real happiness down at the very foundation of self-consciousness; not the mere self-satisfaction which arises from thoughts of superiority over one's fellows in rank, wealth or power. This self-satisfaction is never satisfying—unless perhaps for some negligible homunculi.

The universe of thought of the pensioner is a wide, spiritual ocean into which he has

1 poured his own few drops of activity for duty : the universe of the self-involved man of wealth or intellect is a little material universe, himself the centre, himself the one thing of importance.*

- We have seen that reason points to the soul in man. How can the materialist escape the crux that he can prove nothing unless he *begins* by admitting that his own self-consciousness exists and is groundless because it is the ground of all certainty? The materialist's certainty is *based* on this groundlessness : only as a self-conscious subject can he arrive at his certainty! Huxley, as honest a man as Hume, recognized the crux and bowed to it.

But what, mainly, have we been striving to prove?

A theory has been propounded with the support of authority that *our human experience of telepathy gives evidential proof that we all exist as souls in full communion one with another.*

* *The Maniac*, I think, marks a strong instance of the awful mania that may result from an extreme form of self-centralization.

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