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# PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY

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TO  
MY FRIEND  
EDMUND GURNEY



## INTRODUCTION

THE first part of this book is separable from the second and third parts. Those who are not interested in what savours of the metaphysical may, I think, pass over the first and still find the second and third intelligible.

The attempt herein made is to prove that we have *human experience* of our existence as (relatively) spiritual selves. That we have such human experience has been already suggested by many, and evidence, to that end, adduced. But I do not know of any systematic treatise the sole object of which has been to prove, by the evidence of human experience exclusively, that we exist as spiritual selves. It is possible that only in the comparatively present time we have, through the evolution of human knowledge, been given command of the evidence necessary to prove the fact.

The new factor in reasoning introduced is telepathy: I assume that, as human personalities, we are so related to the external that we have human experience of it otherwise than through the normal organs of sense.

The assumption, it must be admitted, is dogmatic; at the same time it is to be borne in mind that a large and increasing number of men of science accept telepathy as a fact of human experience.<sup>1</sup>

In psychology, treated as a science, an assumption is made of the existence of an ego in relation to the series of conditions in which we exist; that is in relation to our *universe of relations*. 'Psychology is not called on to transcend the relation of subject to object or, as we may call it, the fact of presentation' (James Ward).

I take but one step beyond the psychologist: I make the human personality (the subject or psychological 'I') a partial and mediate manifestation in our universe of a spiritual self.<sup>2</sup> I term this spiritual self an intuitive self.

<sup>1</sup> Certain marked men of science hold that to explain Darwin's scheme the fundamental factor *conation* (having part in evolution from the very first) must be introduced. They refer the origin of evolution to the psychical; for *conation* imports will and volition. Cf. *Ency. Brit.*, ninth edition, vol. xx. p. 42, where a luminous explanation of *conation* is given by James Ward.

<sup>2</sup> The term 'mediate' is used because we have no human evidence that human personality is the only possible manifestation of the spiritual self.

I have been led to use the term, intuitive self, for the following reasons :—

All human thought is based on (emanates from) intuition. And as human thought is active, intuition must be active and must be actively presented to the subject (the human personality). Now sensibility is passive and so intuition (which is active) cannot be referred to (cannot emanate from) sensibility. What, then, is the origin of this active presentation of intuition to the subject? I argue that a personality of intuition (an intuitive self) must present intuition to its subject, that is, to the human personality which exists as its (the intuitive self's) partial and mediate manifestation in our universe.

I hold that this active presentation of intuition is not a *general* presentation to humanity from God, Nature or the Unknown, but from intuitive selves to their manifestations in our Universe, because (as I try to prove) each one of us has, *as a human personality, human experience of existence as a spiritual or intuitive self.* There I stop.

The argument makes no pretence to extend to proof of an immortal soul in man: it extends only to proof of the spiritual self and approximate proof of the survival of personality after the dissolution by death of human personality.<sup>1</sup> And though we have (by the argument) proof in human experience of the existence of the intuitive self, we cannot determine (arrive at the nature of) this intuitive self. For this intuitive self is (relatively) a spiritual self and so free from (not subject to) those conditions of our earthly universe to which the human personality, even in thought, is subject. For the same reason we cannot determine the intuition of the intuitive self: we must distinguish between real (relatively noumenal) intuition and, so termed, human intuition. Intuition is presented to the subject (the human personality), but it is only partially and mediately manifest in human thought. So while we must hold that intuition is presented actively to the human personality to account for the fact that we think, still we can know nothing of intuition itself. For we know nothing but the partial and mediate manifestation of intuition in our particular universe of relations.

As the argument is confined to an attempt to prove solely by

<sup>1</sup> I do not deny that this spiritual self may be the immortal soul in man. But, as human beings, we can have no human experience of immortality, and the argument is concerned only with what can be proved by human experience: belief and revelation are outside the purview of this book.

human experience the existence of the intuitive self, it is not, I think, metaphysical.

The first part is mainly concerned with Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, and this part—though most of my time has been expended on it—may, as I have already suggested, be omitted if the reader seek for interest only in definite facts.

It is possible that Kant's commentators have ignored the fact that even his Aesthetic and Logic are based on an assumption of *a soul in man*.<sup>1</sup> From this arises confusion between the manifold on the one hand and the manifold in our apprehension on the other. And, so, Kant's theory (?) of the schema and his use of the term 'imagination' have, possibly, been unfairly criticised. If, however, we expand the purview of human experience by an assumption that the subject has human experience otherwise than through the normal organs of sense, I think it will herein be shown that we can understand more clearly the reception by the subject of the schema and Kant's use of the term 'imagination.' The manifold (the unconditioned) though presented to the subject, remains undetermined: the manifold *received* by us (the schema) is conditioned by our apprehension, it is *in* our apprehension: it is the manifold *in* (conditioned by) *our apprehension*. How is it received? Otherwise than through the normal organs of sense. Kant, by his use of the term 'imagination,' *inferred* this reception otherwise than through the normal organs of sense.<sup>2</sup>

Assuming telepathy as a fact of human experience, I try to show that in Kant's Aesthetic and Logic we find scientific proof of the existence of the intuitive self. I rely on Kant's Dialectic in no way: the supreme problems of God, Free-will and Immortality have no part in the present scheme.

The second and third parts deal with (assumed) facts of *human*

<sup>1</sup> It has been alleged that Kant had a false or at least inadequate idea of the individual. If, in truth, his subject was treated by him (as I allege) as no more than a partial and mediate manifestation in our universe of the soul of man, all such objections to his theory fail. He was not under the necessity of defining the nature of the soul in man.

<sup>2</sup> I have the audacity to hold that *telepathy* relieves Hume himself from the crux of his theory. He says: 'In short there are two principles which I cannot render consistent, nor is it in my power to renounce either of them, viz. that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connection among distinct existences. Did our perceptions either inhere in something simple or individual, or did the mind perceive some real connection among them, there would be no difficulty in the case.' If telepathy be a fact of human experience, then (without introducing 'imagination' as a power of the soul, as Kant does) we get the *reception* of the schema by the subject otherwise than through the normal organs of sense. By so 'expanding' human experience we get a foundation, *in human experience*, for 'a real connection among distinct existences.'

*experience*, and the proof essayed is that they are explicable only if the intuitive self have real (relatively noumenal) existence.

A few words must be written as to spiritualism.

The theory that human personality comes to an end with death does, on its face, conflict with most spiritualistic theories. But a little reflection will show that there is no real conflict.

For the embodied human personality is very generally admitted to be phenomenal; so when I argue it is no more than a partial and mediate manifestation in our universe of an intuitive self, I do not *degrade* human personality in any way. If, however, embodied human personalities are phenomenal, then *appearances* of the disembodied in human form must also be phenomenal. So, in the present thesis, no argument lies against the assumption that disembodied appearances may have the same *relative* reality in our universe as embodied appearances. If we survive death and survive in some higher form of personality, I cannot see why we might not still have power to 'project' ourselves in earthly appearance on to the human universe.

Assume, for instance, that Myers, disembodied and existing in some form (?) higher than human form, is communicating with us. No one, I think, would suggest that the real (relatively noumenal) Myers is revealing himself fully in his communication with us: his communication must be subject to *our limitations*—just as Sir Isaac Newton could only communicate in mathematics with a child subject to the child's limited knowledge. It must be a partial and mediate manifestation in our universe of the (relatively) noumenal Myers—a 'fragment' of Myers as Barrett holds—that is communicating.

As spiritual selves we are timelessly in communion with the disembodied: but this communion transcends human thought, human reason.<sup>1</sup> As human personalities we cannot be in full communion with the disembodied, just as (in lower degree) there can be no full communion between the mind of a child and the mind of a philosopher.

If, however, human thought be not lost but merely subsumed under the intuitive thought of the disembodied, then the disembodied might have power to communicate with us on the level of our conditioned universe. I, confined from birth in a prison-house, cannot communicate with those at liberty. But if those who are

<sup>1</sup> Mark the distinction I hereafter draw between telepathic communion and the manifestation to us, as human personalities, of this communion.

at liberty have power to place themselves in the limited confines of my prison-house, then we can communicate *subject to my conditions*: we can communicate, but the freedom of our exchange of thought must be subject to *my* limitations of thought—to *my* human experience gained in the prison-house.

Again, my argument on its face may be criticised as in opposition to the theory of F. W. H. Myers—that great man to whom we all owe so deep a debt of gratitude. For he expounded the theory of the survival of *human* personality. But what did he mean by human personality?

If the attempt now made to prove by human experience that we exist as intuitive selves be held successful, I do not think spiritualism is affected in any way—unless it be held that a good foundation is thereby laid for *some* theory of spiritualism. And, as to F. W. H. Myers' line of thought, I shall try to show that the present argument is very possibly not so opposed to his theory as, at first, it may appear to be—even though I deny anthropomorphic intellectual distinctions in the spiritual.

We have advanced so rapidly in knowledge of and command over the forces and material of nature, that humanity is in danger of being stifled in a soulless atmosphere of the intellectual. Where the false gods of rank, wealth and power are set up for worship, the ideals of the soul in man lie sullied in the dust.

If *human experience* could be shown to prove to us that we exist as spiritual selves—spiritual selves which survive earthly death—would not such proof introduce a new factor for the spiritual advance of humanity? If it were brought home to all of us that our earthly life of mean distinctions in wealth, rank, power and intellect is but a passing phase, and that each one of us enters, on the dissolution of body and brain by death,<sup>1</sup> a new life of the spirit free from such evil conditions, should we not all be drawn together more closely in full love and respect? Should we not more clearly understand that for us, even on earth, the spirit rather than the body must be cherished? Would not religion, itself, be given thereby a new and stronger human foundation for belief?

I believe most firmly that human experience does prove that we exist as spiritual selves: I try to make the proof clear in words.

<sup>1</sup> The common idea that death affects life may be positively stated as false, unless we regard life as a function of forms of matter. All that death does is to put an end to the manifestation of life in or through (or as a function of?) material organisms.

No one can appreciate more fully than myself the audacity of the attempt now made, and no one can be more conscious than I of the paucity and fallibility of the language in which the attempt is clothed. But, if this book spell failure, I have strong hope it may influence some stronger man to prove, clearly and intelligibly, what I feel sure can be proved. And the proof, once established, must inure, immutable, for the spiritual good of mankind.

The full debt of gratitude I owe to the Society for Psychical Research needs no acknowledgment: it is apparent through all now written. The altruistic labour of the marked men and women who come to our minds in very thought of the Society, stands on record for the benefit of humanity at large, now and in the future. An equal debt of gratitude is due to many others, the records of whose work have been herein used. The reader will understand why particular names are not given, but it is right to state that Herbert Batty of Combe Grange has gone through the whole of the first part with me, laboriously, and that, under his guidance, important changes in language have been made.

F. C. C.

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## EDITIONS OF KANT'S WORKS REFERRED TO

*The Critique of Pure Reason.* By MEIKLEJOHN. (George Bell and Sons, 1905.)

*Inaugural Dissertation of 1770.* By GEORGE ROFF. (Columbia College, New York, 1894.)

*Kant's Prolegomena.* By BELFORT BAX. (George Bell and Sons, 1903.)

*Philosophie de Kant.* By M. VICTOR COUSIN. (Librairie Nouvelle, Paris, 1857.)

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## PART I

### THE MANIFOLD AND THE INTUITIVE SELF

KANT states that our faculty of cognition is unable to transcend the limits of possible experience, while the most essential object of the science of metaphysics is to transcend these limits. He solves the difficulty thus :—

‘The estimate of our rational cognition *a priori* at which we arrive is that it has only to do with phenomena, and that things in themselves, while possessing a real existence, lie beyond its sphere. Here we are enabled to put the justice of this estimate to the test. For that which of necessity impels us to transcend the limits of experience and of all phenomena, is the *unconditioned*, which reason absolutely requires in things as they are in themselves, in order to complete the series of conditions. Now, if it appear that when, on the one hand, we assume that our cognition conforms to its objects as things in themselves, *the unconditioned cannot be thought without contradiction*; and that when, on the other hand, we assume that our representation of things as they are given to us, does not conform to these things as they are in themselves, but that these objects, as phenomena, conform to our mode of representation, *the contradiction disappears*: we shall then be convinced of the truth of that which we began by assuming for the sake of experiment; we may look upon it as established that the unconditioned does not lie in things as we know them, or as they are given to us, but in things as they are in themselves, beyond the range of our cognition’ (Kant, Preface to second edition, p. xxx. Cf. *Prolegomena*, p. 31, where Kant refers, not to intuition but human intuition, for he relies on the assumption that ‘all which can be given to our senses (the outer in space, the inner in time) is only intuited by us as it appears to us, and not as it is in itself’).

What I lay the greatest stress on in the above is the statement, ‘For that which of necessity impels us to transcend the limits of experience and of all phenomena is the *unconditioned*, which reason absolutely requires in things as they are in themselves, in order to complete the series of conditions.’ The above statement is uncontestedly true, and it shows our ‘vital knowledge of our own ignorance’; *i.e.* our reason tells us most surely of the existence of

something which, though the basis of all our cognition, is, and must be, incomprehensible to us in cognition so long as, and so far as, we are conditioned in our time and space.

Now the *unconditioned* must be referred to in Kant's *Critique*, for he relies on it as required in things as they are in themselves in order to complete the series of conditions, and it is this series of conditions which forms the groundwork of the *Critique*. The unconditioned is the 'stuff' of our series of conditions.

These references we can only find in the term 'The Manifold.' The manifold is (to us) the real, the (relatively) noumenal: our universe (the series of conditions in which we exist and which determine us as subjects) is to us phenomenal of the manifold. But still our series of conditions must in some way be what is, to us, an abstraction from the unconditioned.

The manifold is then, to us as (Kant's) subjects, the unconditioned, and we cannot cognise or even think it: we cannot touch it, consider it, in any way by our reason. More than this, by no possibility can we, as subjects, *think the manifold*.

But, herein, we find an apparent contradiction. For we not only do think<sup>1</sup> the existence of the manifold, but we arrive at a necessary conclusion that it exists, though outside our cognition as subjects. Bear in mind I now refer to the existence of the manifold, not the manifold itself.

'To say that we "know" the Infinite is a manifest contradiction, for "knowing" is, as we have said, determining or finitising. But to say that we know the *fact* of the Infinite in the conditioned is not a contradiction: it is simply a fact' (Laurie's *Synthetica*, vol. i. p. 256).

The manifold is presented to us in intuition<sup>2</sup> (from what source will be hereafter considered): for we know that our cognition results from a determined form of intuition, and there could be no such determination of form unless intuition itself were presented to us. From this presentation arises the possibility of our arriving at the existence of the manifold as a fact. But the manifold is not *received* by us fully in intuition: such reception can only be by a subject of intuition. We cannot, therefore, treat it as in itself conditioned in any way: we cannot treat it as conditioned in itself in unity or diversity as known to us. But as our unity and diversity are no more than phenomenal in our series of conditions we cannot hold that the manifold may not exist in some unity or diversity. For the manifold is no more than that which is *to us* the unconditioned, as outside our particular series of conditions. But we must hold that if such unity or diversity exist in the manifold, it must

<sup>1</sup> If it be held we do not think but intuite the existence of the manifold, the present argument, if affected in any way, is strengthened. If we think no more than the existence of the manifold (the unconditioned) the thought is without content.

<sup>2</sup> I distinguish between 'intuition' and human intuition or intuitions.

exist in a form (?) unknown to us. For the unconditioned (the manifold) is, to us, the permanent out of which our (transient) series of conditions is abstracted, and in the permanent there can be *no contradiction*. So the unity of the manifold cannot exist in *contradiction* to diversity or *vice versâ*, whereas unity as known to us necessarily exists in contradiction (in contradiction to diversity) because we exist in a series of conditions. In the manifold no such contradiction can exist.

It is true Kant 'arrives at' the existence of God in unity, at Free-will and Immortality (ultimately) for the subject. But he does not allege that he proves the existence of any one of the three. For all involve the fact of *real* unity, and Kant holds this unity to be, for us, purely hypothetical:—

'It is not maintained that this unity does really exist, but that we must in the interests of reason, that is, for the establishment of principles for the various rules presented by experience, try to discover and introduce it, so far as practicable, into the sphere of our cognitions' (Kant, p. 398).

Our present inquiry has nothing to do with God, Free-will, or Immortality: the reference is made to them simply to press home the fact that, though Kant holds we do 'arrive at' the fact of the existence of the manifold (which is, to us, the noumenal), we cannot, as subjects, determine anything in human proof as to its nature or constitution. At the same time Kant does hold as to personality that *I* (not as a subject) *do intuite* myself, as myself: there exists (relatively to the subject) intuition of a noumenal *I*. Kant introduces into his scheme a personality of intuition. To what extent he relies on the fact of this personality is hereafter considered.

As subjects (in our series of conditions) we cannot compass the fact of the existence of the manifold (the unconditioned) outside our series of conditions: but we *do* compass or 'arrive at' the fact. Therefore the 'I' to whom this existence is a fact must be a subject higher in form of thought than the 'I' existing in and conditioned by the series of conditions of our limited universe. Kant relies on the existence of the 'soul of man': herein he finds the real self in relation to the phenomenal, cognitional self. I shall argue that we can get this 'I' from the fact that selves exist which intuite themselves, and that (reading between the lines) we thereby do not affect Kant's reasoning.

What is above written consists in some part of bare allegation: it is dealt with in fuller detail later on.

But, though we arrive at the fact of the existence of the manifold, we arrive at a fact quite beyond all cognition. The manifold cannot be said to be determined in any way by us as subjects; we can only regard it as a bare inexplicable fact. This is why Kant laid such stress on the fact that the noumenal is beyond our empirical range. He considered it only hypothetically for the interests of reason.

What is in our apprehension is not the manifold but the manifold of (relations between) phenomena with which we deal in our series of conditions. Bear in mind that in stating this I refer to the manifold itself, not the existence of the manifold.

When, then, one commentator states that Kant 'tells us in the analytic that sense only presents to us a *mere* manifold which requires to be bound together in the unity of a concept ere it can be apprehended as an object': another refers to the 'looseness of the manifold': while yet a third informs us that 'the faculty (intuition) which gives us multiplicity (the manifold?) and the faculty (self-consciousness) which gives us unity, are different in kind,' they cannot be held to refer to the manifold itself. For if we say the manifold is conditioned in any way—even in unity or diversity as known to us *in cognition*—we are conditioning the unconditioned. And this cannot be done.

But if we hold they are referring to the manifold *in our apprehension*,<sup>1</sup> then their meaning is clear. For this apprehension is the apprehension of a subject with unity of apperception: they treat this unity of apperception as real, and so, *in relation*, the manifold is a 'loose' or 'mere' manifold which requires 'binding together' for the unity of apperception.

It will appear hereafter that our unity of apperception is no more than a particular phenomenal unity in our particular phenomenal series of conditions; and that, in relation, the transcendental unity of apperception may (for the interests of reason) be referred to the *I* which intuits itself.

The fact of the existence of the unconditioned is a fact to *me*. But as the unconditioned does not lie in cognition, it is not a fact to me in my apprehension as a subject of cognition: from my apprehension of the manifold I conceive it as a loose or 'mere' manifold. So we are driven, even at this early stage of our investigation, to the fact of the existence of an *I* of which the personality of cognition is no more than a part or a partial manifestation: the purview of thought of the latter is but part of the fuller purview of thought of the former. The former may be said to intuite (or, possibly, think without content?) the manifold itself; the latter thinks it only in its (the subject's) series of conditions: thinks it conditionally, in that the subject's (human) intuition of the manifold is subject to the formal conditions of time and space. Thought (dependent on a form of intuition) of the subject is active, and must be referred to active presentation of intuition itself. We must distinguish between the manifold itself and the manifold in our apprehension as subjects.

I should here also point out that Kant never alleged things-in-themselves to exist in the noumenal. If he had said they did or

<sup>1</sup> See p. 66 for the meaning I give to apprehension.

did not so exist he would have been conditioning the unconditioned in diversity or unity—he left the question severely alone.

‘How things may be in themselves, without regard to the representations through which they affect us, is utterly beyond the sphere of our cognition’ (Kant, p. 143).

‘This permanence is, however, nothing but the manner in which we represent to ourselves the existence of things in the phenomenal world.’

‘Kant has pointedly declared that it would be a gross absurdity to suppose that in his view separate, distinct things-in-themselves existed corresponding to the several objects of perception’ (by Professor Adamson, *Ency. Brit.*, vol. xiii. p. 851, 9th ed.).

He uses the term things-in-themselves, but as a term in relation to our experience. Indeed, in the universe of the intuitive self, that for which Kant uses the term things-in-themselves, may quite possibly appear as phenomenal: we can determine in no way the relation of the intuitive self to its external.

In the *Dialectic* Kant states: ‘In relation to this criterion (the law of reason), therefore, we must suppose the idea of the systematic unity of nature to possess objective validity and necessity’ (Kant, p. 399).

This apparent conditioning of the unconditioned in unity does not refer to any unity known to us in our series of conditions. The passage will be again referred to.

The manifold, as used by Kant, has been defined as: ‘The total of the particulars furnished by sense before they are connected by the synthesis of the understanding: that which is in the sense and has not been yet in thought.’

But this is not a definition of the manifold itself, but of the manifold in *our apprehension*. We reason under a synthesis of the understanding, and in relation to this synthesis we regard the manifold as a ‘total of particulars.’ We treat our synthesis as giving us noumenal unity: we shall find hereafter this is not so; synthesis is no more than a necessary process for subjects (conditioned in time and space as known to us) to have self-apperception.

‘There are many laws of nature that we can only know by means of experience, but regularity in the connection of phenomena—*i.e.* nature in general—we can never learn through experience, because experience itself requires such laws, and these lie at the foundation of its possibility *a priori*. The possibility of experience in general is at once the universal law of nature, and the axioms of the one are at the same time the laws of the other. For we know nothing of nature otherwise than as the sum-total of phenomena, namely, of presentations in us, and hence can derive the law of their connection in no other way than from the principles of the same connection in ourselves: in other words, from the conditions of

necessary union in a consciousness, which constitutes the possibility of experience' (*Prolegomena*, p. 66).

In the above statement Kant, in defining nature in general as 'regularity in the connection of phenomena,' necessarily gives only a definition of nature *in our apprehension*. But he marks the distinction I have pointed out between the manifold on the one hand and the manifold in our apprehension on the other hand.

'Our apprehension of the manifold in a phenomenon' (cf. Kant, p. 142, where the words 'in a phenomenon' are replaced by the words 'of phenomena') 'is always successive, is consequently always changing. By it'—our apprehension—'alone we could, therefore, never determine whether this manifold, *as an object of experience*' (my italics) 'is co-existent or successive, unless it had for a foundation something that exists *always*, that is, something fixed and permanent, of the existence of which all succession and co-existence are nothing but so many modes (modi of time). . . . It is only by means of the permanent that existence in different parts of the successive series of time receives a *quantity*, which we entitle *duration*' (Kant, p. 137).

Herein, again, Kant distinguishes between the manifold itself and the manifold in our apprehension. By saying the manifold exists always and is permanent he means it is not conditioned in our time and space. Succession and co-existence arise only in relation to our apprehension of the manifold. Our apprehension of the manifold is subject to succession and co-existence, not because succession and co-existence exist in the manifold, but because our apprehension itself exists in and subject to time: succession and co-existence are mere modi of time, and time has but phenomenal existence.

Even in mathematics we find thought driven to admitting the existence of the manifold or manifoldness, as the unconditioned. For while, in practice, some arbitrary unit must always be used, the admission of continuity obliges us to hold that any such unit may be multiplied or subdivided to an unlimited extent. In the infinitesimal calculus, when dealing with continuity, we bring in 0 and  $\infty$  as limits (?) beyond, even to, which we cannot proceed in cognitional thought. Herein, as we deal with symbols unknown in themselves, and having meaning to us only in relation to other symbols, and as our universe is a limited universe of relations, we find we cannot relate those symbols which have meaning to us (that is, relations for us) in our universe of relations, to those symbols which have, for us, no relative meaning—that is, to 0 and  $\infty$ . Our cognition is limited to knowledge of relations: 0 and  $\infty$  are outside our universe of relations (they are, to us, the unconditioned) so we cannot use them in cognition. This is why, in practice, we can say  $\infty : 1/ :: \infty : 10,000$ , or that the ultimate term of the series  $1, \frac{1}{2}, 1/x - 1/\infty$  is 0. In theory there are no grounds to support the former

statement. It amounts simply to saying: Infinity (the unlimited) is outside our universe of limits; any number, however great or small, is within our universe of limits, and any such number being, to us, nothing in itself but a relation, has no existence at all (or exists as 0) when compared with that which is outside our universe of relations. The related has, in cognition, no existence in the unrelated.

But when considering such a series as  $1 \frac{1}{2} . . . 0$ , I think we are justified in accepting the series as a fact *to us*. If, however, it be a fact, what follows? We find a relation between the related terms down to the unrelated term 0: a contradiction. For 0 is outside our universe of relations. We have then (outside cognition) proof of *some* relation between the conditioned and unconditioned. This is seen again when we consider the statement  $1 + \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{4} . . . 1/\infty = 2$ . We have a relation between numbers and  $1/\infty$  or 0. It follows that:—

‘Pure mathematics no less than pure natural science can never refer to anything more than mere phenomena’ (*Prolegomena*, p. 61; cf. Kant, p. 33). The manifold (the unconditioned) lies at the back even of mathematics.

If we consider our universe as one of relations only, and admit that the activity of the mind must bring with it certain principles of relation under which the manifold of sense must be brought, we still find we must treat the manifold as the unconditioned. For the ‘principles of relation’ referred to are not noumenal in any way. These relations are no more than abstractions from the manifold, necessary for human cognition because the subject (the human personality) does not exist in the unconditioned, but in a series of conditions: its universe is a universe of relations. A subject existing in the manifold (in the unconditioned) would not require these relations for cognition, just as its understanding would require no synthesis of the manifold in intuition—it would ‘intuite’ directly in the manifold.

But it must be borne in mind that the manifold (the unconditioned) is no more than that which reason absolutely requires in things as they are in themselves, in order to complete the series of conditions in which we exist. It does not infer the reality of things-in-themselves: they may be mere phenomena of noumena or of some noumenon, or no more than an expression for noumena or some noumenon. Nor, so far as our reason can touch the manifold, can we say it is the ultimate. It may well be that what is the manifold to us is in itself conditioned in some way outside our cognition or even our reason—outside our series of conditions. But all such questions being outside our cognition, we must still treat the manifold itself as being, to us, the unconditioned.

What is above written may be criticised as a mere statement of indisputable fact. But the statement had to be made, for it is

important at the outset of our argument to mark the wide distinction which exists between the manifold on the one hand and the manifold in our apprehension on the other. The manifold is the unconditioned, and so cannot, itself, be conditioned in any way as a 'loose' or 'mere' manifold. It is only in our apprehension (as subjects of time and space) that it can be so conditioned.

To prevent misapprehension I would here anticipate the argument. For the student may, at first thought, hold that what has been written tends to a theory destructive of any reality in personality—points, indeed, to all personalities being merely phenomenal. And this is true if we consider only human personalities of time and space; but it is true only so far. For though what has been written points to human personality being merely phenomenal, it opens the possibility also of human personality being phenomenal (a manifestation in time and space) of some (relatively) real personality. Indeed, that *we* determine the fact of the existence of the manifold demands the existence of personalities higher in form of thought than human personalities; for *we*, as mere human personalities, exist and have our being only within the limits of human experience.

Kant says: 'The understanding or mind which contains the manifold in intuition, in and through the act of its own self-consciousness (in other words, an understanding by and in the representation of which the objects of the representation should at the same time exist), would not require a special act of synthesis of the manifold as the condition of the unity of its self-consciousness, an act of which the human understanding, which thinks and cannot intuit, has absolute need' (Kant, p. 85). Human thought always includes (exists in?) limitation (Kant, p. 43).

Herein Kant refers to such higher personalities as possible, and I shall argue hereafter that he infers and relies on the existence of such personalities. But, as they exist in the manifold, when Kant speaks of their *unity* of self-consciousness he uses the word to mark only, for us, the personal self of any one in distinction from all other selves. He does not use the word 'unity' as the unity we know in our series of conditions. It is a hypothetical unity in the unconditioned, or, rather, in that which is, *to us*, unconditioned: it is a unity outside our cognition.

If, indeed, we dissect the meaning of the unity of human personality, we find it to be only phenomenal—it is a variable thing of time and space as known to us. So we have no grounds for holding that the unity of personality as known to us is the only possible unity of personality. The unity of a self-consciousness in what is, to us, the manifold may also, very possibly, be phenomenal. But as it exists in what is, to us, the unconditioned, we must treat it as noumenal, as real.

And, herein, lies the whole gist of my present argument—the unity of Kant's subject is phenomenal, not real. At the same time

Kant's whole scheme fails unless we make this subject phenomenal of a real subject—a subject, to us, marked by noumenal, not phenomenal, unity in self-apperception. Kant, it is true, never states definitely his reliance on the existence of this (to us) real subject: he refers to it but vaguely as the 'soul of man.' Why he was so indefinite I attempt hereinafter to explain.

## THE MANIFOLD—UNITY AND DIVERSITY

KANT'S *Critique* leads, I think, to a definite conclusion that unity and diversity, as known to us, are no more than what may be termed abstractions from the manifold; that is, from what is, to us, the unconditioned. Or we may consider unity and diversity as merely relative and interchangeable terms; for example, any 'thing' in our universe can be thought as a thing of unity, while in relation to other things it can be thought as a thing of diversity.

We cannot think unity without thinking diversity in contradiction, nor can we think diversity without thinking unity in contradiction. Neither the one nor the other can, then, be the ultimate, the permanent. For in the permanent contradiction cannot exist.

We can have a conception of an object, so any object exists, to us, as a thing of unity. But an object is that in the conception of which the manifold in a given intuition is united (Kant, p. 84; cf. p. 143). That is, the conjunction of this manifold must be related to the fact of the conception: there is required a synthesis of this manifold for the conception to exist.

But this object of unity may become an object of diversity in relation to other objects. For instance, we may think of the unity of any given part of a machine. But we may also think of the machine itself as an object, and, when so thinking, we think of the parts of the machine as objects of diversity. In relation to the unity of the machine, its parts become objects of diversity. So the terms, unity and diversity, are no more than terms of relation in our universe of relations. Any unity that we think is no more than a unity in our series of conditions—in our universe of relations.

The highest, most inclusive unity we can think is the unity of Nature. But what is this unity as thought? It is no more than a synthesis of diversity: we can only think this unity of Nature by thinking at the same time the contradiction diversity.

Just as there is contradiction between the terms 0 and  $\infty$ , so there is contradiction between the terms unity and diversity. But, also, just as we find a continuum between 0 and  $\infty$ , so we find a continuum between unity and diversity. The contradictions are phenomenal in our universe of relations. Reason informs us that Kant's antinomies have no real existence: they arise only phenomenally in our universe of relations conditioned in time and space.

It may be objected that 0 is a real fixed limit of the infinitely

small, and  $\infty$  a real fixed limit of the infinitely great, whereas the above argument gives no such fixity to unity in contradiction to diversity, for it makes the same one object a thing of unity or a thing of diversity not in itself, but as it is thought in relation to or not in relation to other objects. But, always remembering that pure mathematics never refer to anything more than mere phenomena (*Prolegomena*, p. 61), this proves no more than that unity differs from diversity only in synthesis. Any unity is no more than a synthesis of some diversity, and all synthetic thought is phenomenal.

Again, the manifold is manifest, to us, in diversity. But we have no human experience of any real diversity. For every conception must be considered as a representation which is contained in an infinite multitude of different possible representations (Kant, p. 24). That is, the simplest conception requires—in Kant's language—a synthesis of the manifold in a given intuition. All thought, even the simplest, involves synthesis, that is, is phenomenal. Once grant that our universe is a universe of relations only, and we arrive at the fact not only that it is phenomenal, but that any subject conditioned in such a universe can only think within the limits of synthetic thought.

If an object exist only in a given synthesis of particulars of the manifold, it is phenomenal; that is, it exists only in relation to the human understanding as conditioned. So any synthesis of objects must be also phenomenal, for the synthesis amounts to no more than a summation of the phenomenal.

We can think an object in its unity; we can think of classes or groups of objects in unity, in which case each object loses its appearance of unity in its appearance of diversity in relation to the class or group. And so (in a continuum of thought?) we can think ultimately the unity of Nature. But the unity of any object differs from that of Nature itself (as thought by us) in degree, not in kind. Both involve synthesis: the only distinction is that the latter involves a fuller and more comprehensive synthesis than the former. And, as synthesis has existence only in relation to a manifold, considered as a sum or total of particulars, that is, to the manifold in our apprehension, and not to the manifold itself, it follows that we only appear to ourselves to think any real unity, in the same way that we think ourselves not as we are, but as we appear to ourselves to be.

We exist in a series of conditions. When we consider any diversity, we find it is no more than a synthesis of particulars of the manifold as manifest to us. So we can only deal in thought with a synthesis of (a summation of) these syntheses of particulars of the manifold *in our series of conditions*: the highest, most inclusive synthesis of these particulars that we can arrive at must, then, be phenomenal in our phenomenal universe of relations in time and space. This synthesis we term the unity of Nature, and it is pheno-

menal not noumenal; it is no more than a unity in our series of conditions. There is, herein, no denial (or affirmation) of any noumenal unity, but any such unity is not within the purview of cognition.

If we hold that by any synthesis we arrive at unity, and that this unity is a unity of the manifold, then this unity is 'outside' the series of conditions in which we exist. It is a unity of reason as opposed to any unity of possible experience, and so is purely hypothetical (Kant, pp. 217, 398). So this unity is not a unity known to us as subjects of time and space.

We arrive, necessarily, at the fact that our understanding when thinking in unity or diversity is thinking in (particulars of) the manifold. Unity and diversity are, then, abstractions from (limits or conditions of) the manifold, and we are driven to conclude that the subject is restricted, in cognition and judgment, to these abstractions, because its personality is conditioned in some way. We are so conditioned that we think within limits (abstractions) of the manifold, our limits of contradiction (so far as the present argument is concerned) being unity and diversity.

If the subject were objective, and so its conditions objective to it, it could not reason outside the limits of unity and diversity; it could not travel outside cognition. But *I* do determine that I exist in limits: I arrive at the necessity of the existence of the unconditioned to complete my series of conditions as a subject; I *do* travel outside cognition. The subject therefore manifests a limited power of reasoning outside its series of conditions: though it cannot determine in any way the manifold, reason leads it to the definite conclusion of the existence of the non-conditioned, that is, of the manifold. This power of reasoning, outside cognition, imports the fact that the subject is a manifestation within limits of some (relatively) real self. This real self I hereinafter term the intuitive self. The intuitive self is the self of an understanding or mind which contains the manifold in intuition (Kant, p. 85). But the subject arrives only at the fact of the existence of the intuitive self: it can determine this self only so far as it is manifest to it in its universe.

## UNITY AND THE INTUITIVE SELF

THE conception of an object is really, for cognition, the conception of a particular relation. So we see that the conception of an object *per se* is impossible.<sup>1</sup> The object is really a dependence on other objects which are also dependences, and to know anything of the object itself we must know its relation to other objects, so we must know other like and unlike objects. And this—in the limit—leads to the necessity of knowledge of relations in general. For if there were not this knowledge of relations in general, the particular relation (which we *term* an object) could not be a subject of cognition.

But all conceptions depend on intuition. So when intuition results in the conception of an object, it must also result in (what I may somewhat loosely term) a general conception of objects. More exactly, as intuition is the means through which an object given to us can be a thing of cognition, there must also be—for human knowledge—a synthesis of the manifold which is presented to us in intuition. The manifold itself is given through sensibility: for our unity of apperception there must be a synthesis of the manifold. (The synthesis is of the manifold in our apprehension, not of the manifold itself.)

Consider this from a different point of view. The subject is given. The subject being given, we must infer unity of apperception in the subject. Concepts, judgments, even (Kantian) ideas, cannot be mine, unless this unity of apperception exists in me.

But if *I* do exist as an objective reality, whether as a disembodied human personality, a personality of intuition or a soul, I must exist as a limit, as a condition. Grant that (to us) any such objective reality is not conditioned in time and space, that it is a thing not of concepts or ideas but of intuition; still, the fact that it has real objective personality (as distinct from other personalities) makes it a condition. I do not allege it is a limit or condition like to any limits or conditions we know by our human understanding. All I allege is that it cannot be the unconditioned as the Supreme is unconditioned. Perhaps, instead of positively alleging it is a limit

<sup>1</sup> As through the external sense, nothing but mere representations of relations are given us, the said external sense in its representation can contain only the relation of the object to the subject, but not the essential nature of the object as a thing in itself (Kant, p. 40).

or a condition, I should write negatively that it is not really unconditioned, though it appears to be unconditioned in relation to us as human personalities. And that would be sufficient for the present purpose.

Now the unconditioned is no more and no less than that which completes our 'series of conditions,' and this series of conditions is determined by the subject; that is, it is the subject itself which recognises this series of conditions as no more than a series of conditions which require the unconditioned for completion. So it must be carefully borne in mind that we do not deal with the manifold as unconditioned in itself, but simply as unconditioned in relation to the subject. Though, then, we must, for the requirements of reason, assume the fact of unity of apperception in a personality of intuition, we cannot form any conception of this unity of apperception. At the same time, as all we want to find out is what ultimate conclusions we can arrive at by the exercise of our own reasoning power, we *must* make an assumption; we must assume as objectively true our unity of apperception as intuitive selves. Kant himself holds that I *do* intuit myself as I am, whereas to determine myself (?) as a subject, a determinate mode of intuition is necessary. I deal later on with the impossibility of the subject's determining itself as an object or subject.

But how does our unity of apperception as subjects arise? Is unity of perception given to the subject so that it is (necessarily) received in unity? If so, then through sensibility unity must be given directly, sensibility must not merely open the possibility to the subject of arriving at its unity by abstraction from the manifold given.

This is not so: unity is not given through sensibility directly: what is given through sensibility is the manifold to be intuited. Sensibility is passive; it may, perhaps, be termed the potentiality of active thought: or we may liken it to the circumambient air, which is a condition precedent to the active breathing of a live thing. So when sensibility is spoken of as 'giving' the manifold to be intuited, it must be borne in mind there is never any active giving by sensibility. (The intuitive self presents (actively) the manifold *in* intuition, as we shall afterwards see.)

The following extracts from Kant show that this unity of perception for the subject is not given: it exists because of the limitations of the subject itself.

'Now, as the categories have their origin in the understanding alone, independently of sensibility, I must, in my deduction, make abstraction of the mode in which the manifold of an empirical intuition is given, in order to fix my attention exclusively on the unity which is *brought by the understanding*' (my italics) 'into the intuition by means of (under?) the category. In what follows it

will be shown from the mode in which the empirical intuition is given in the faculty of sensibility, that the unity which belongs to it is no other than that which the category imposes on the manifold in a given intuition. . . . But there is one thing in the above demonstration of which I could not make abstraction, namely, that the manifold to be intuited must be given previously to the synthesis of the understanding, and independently of it' (Kant, p. 89).

Bear in mind that the categories have their origin in the understanding alone; they are merely rules for *our* understanding as human personalities; they possess no significance in relation to a faculty of cognition where the understanding is itself intuitive (Kant, p. 89). 'The understanding draws its laws (*a priori*) not from nature, but prescribes them to it' (*Prolegomena*, p. 68). Note, too, the importance of the word *imposes*, in the statement that 'the unity which belongs to it is no other than that which the category imposes on the manifold.'

Again, Kant distinctly says unity is *brought by the understanding into* the intuition by means of (under?) the category. Both statements show that unity is treated as the result of an abstraction from the manifold: that it is not given.

'The manifold content given in a sensuous intuition comes necessarily under the original synthetical unity of apperception, because thereby alone is the unity of intuition possible' (Kant, p. 88).

Here Kant, though indirectly, refers again to the manifold as what is given, and says it comes necessarily *under* the original synthetical unity of apperception.

Kant, in his reasoning, is hampered by his assumption (in the aesthetic) that sensibility gives only objects—though he still refers to the manifold in intuition. But he treats unity as an abstraction from the manifold—from the unconditioned.

In considering the manifold that is given by sensibility, Kant introduces 'imagination,'<sup>1</sup> and, while he says it belongs to sensibility, says also it belongs in part to the understanding. He states:—

'Thus under the name of a transcendental synthesis of imagination, the understanding exercises an activity upon the passive subject, whose faculty it is: and so we are right in saying that the internal sense is affected thereby' (Kant, p. 94).

'Now that which conjoins the manifold of sensuous intuition is imagination, a mental act to which understanding contributes unity of intellectual synthesis, and sensibility manifoldness of apprehension' (Kant, p. 100). Here Kant expands the purview of sensibility in relation to the subject. For now he says the subject can

<sup>1</sup> I use here the (unsatisfactory) word imagination, because it is the word used by Meiklejohn. I consider hereafter what Kant means by the word so translated.

be affected through sensibility, not only as to objects, but in manifoldness of apprehension. Through sensibility the manifold is given, but the subject can only receive the manifold within the limits of its particular apprehension.

The above extracts must be read with the following before they can be considered :—

‘ Now in order to cognise ourselves, in addition to the act of thinking, which subjects the manifold of every possible intuition to the unity of apperception, there is necessary a determinate mode of intuition whereby this manifold is given ; although my own existence is certainly not mere phenomenon (much less mere illusion) the *determination of*’ (my italics) ‘ my existence can only take place conformably to the form of the internal sense, according to the particular mode in which the manifold which I conjoin is given in internal intuition, and I have therefore no knowledge of myself as I am, but merely as I appear to myself. . . . My intelligence (that is, I) can render that conjunction or synthesis perceptible only according to the relations of time, which are quite beyond the proper sphere of the conception of the understanding, and consequently cognise itself in respect to an intuition (which cannot possibly be intellectual, nor given by the understanding) only as it appears to itself, and not as it would cognise itself, if its intuition were intellectual’ (Kant, pp. 96, 97).

In considering the above three passages bear in mind that sensibility is passive.

The first and second passages refer clearly to the subject—the human personality. But the last refers also to a higher, fuller personality. For the subject by the act of thinking could not subject the manifold of every possible intuition to its (the subject’s) unity of apperception unless this manifold of every possible intuition were presented to the subject. And this presentation must be active ; that is, the presentation must be from a personality of intuition.

Kant distinguishes between the ‘ I ’ which intuits itself and the ‘ I ’ which thinks itself, even though he holds that the act of such thinking subjects the manifold of every possible intuition to the unity of apperception. (He holds definitely there *is* an ‘ I ’ which intuits itself, Kant, p. 95.) The distinction is shown in the following passage :—

‘ The understanding or mind which contained the manifold in intuition, in and through the act of its own self-consciousness, in other words, an understanding by and in the representation of which the objects of the representation should at the same time exist, would not require a special act of synthesis of the manifold as the condition of the unity of its consciousness, an act of which the human understanding, which thinks only and cannot intuite, has absolute need’ (Kant, p. 85). This amounts to a definition

of the intuitive self, and marks the distinction I rely on. For this *I* which intuits itself has no need of any synthesis of the manifold content of presentations for its unity of consciousness, whereas the 'I' which thinks itself has such need (Kant, p. 96).

But how does Kant use this 'I' which thinks itself? Possibly as no more than a step between the intuitional 'I' and the 'I' which is said to cognise itself.

'Now, as in order to cognise ourselves, in addition to the act of thinking, which subjects the manifold of every possible intuition to the unity of apperception, there is necessary a determinate mode of intuition whereby this manifold is given. . . . I have therefore no knowledge of myself as I am, but merely as I appear to myself' (Kant, p. 96). (By means of the pure apperception of our understanding in the thought *I am* no manifold content is given (Kant, p. 85). The 'thought' *I am* has no content.)

Kant would appear (?) to state that the subject determines itself as an object. I cannot see how this is possible, for (to the subject) any subject only exists in opposition to object, and *vice versa*. Only the self of intuition can determine itself (can think itself as it is) in, to us, unity of apperception. For (this determination requiring no synthesis) to the intuitive self subject *is* object and object *is* subject—in other words the contradiction between the two has no existence. The 'I,' when thinking itself as *I am*, finds no content in its thought; the moment it gives content to the thought it thinks itself only as a phenomenon. I find difficulty in distinguishing between intuition and this thought without content.

The 'I' which intuits itself exists. Consider a manifestation of this 'I' in space and time—the subject. Its intuitive self presents intuition to it: the subject receives intuition in a particular mode (conditioned in time and space). The subject has power of cognition (an abstraction from intuition). So it *appears to itself* to cognise itself, to determine itself: but it cannot really determine itself, for it is a thing of transience in time and space, there is nothing for determination. The intuitive self, however, *can* determine the subject as a manifestation of itself (the intuitive self), or a projection of itself in time and space. When we thus introduce into our course of reasoning the intuitional *I*, then possibly we do not require the nexus of the *I* which thinks itself. I do not deny that I think myself as *I am*; but, as this thought is without content, how does it differ from intuition of myself as an intuitive self? For I do determine myself as a subject, and this determination can only be referred to myself as an *I* which is a personality of intuition. This would appear to require consciousness of self as an intuitive self.

It has been necessary to cite the above passages at once in order to show that they have not escaped my observation. But the phrase 'the transcendental synthesis of imagination' must be considered hereafter: it cannot be dealt with now.

So far, in considering the 'stuff' for unity of apperception of the subject, Kant still treats the manifold as the unconditioned, and he treats the unity of the subject as a condition arising from the synthesis of imagination, where, through sensibility, the manifold is given. He opposes to this unity of the subject the higher, fuller (relatively noumenal) unity of the 'I' which intuites itself. This latter does not require any synthesis.

We have then the manifold presented in intuition to the subject : for unity of apperception of the subject there must be unity of perception. This unity of perception results (for the subject) from the transcendental synthesis of the imagination—it is a conditioning of the manifold. We need not now trouble with the difficulty involved by the fact that the subject (by its understanding) sets up, itself, unity for itself ; that will be dealt with hereafter. (Kant, as we shall see, does *not* refer the power of synthesis to the understanding.)

But it is clear that unity is throughout treated as the result of abstraction from the manifold. For Kant's subject a determinate mode (a conditioning) of intuition is necessary : he refers incidentally only to the subject which subjects, in abstract thinking, the manifold of all possible intuition to *its* unity of apperception. But he relies on the fact of the existence of this self of intuition : his whole scheme is based on this fact.

Using the word 'idea' in its ordinary, not its Kantian meaning, we find that the idea of diversity is impossible without the accompanying idea of unity, and so we find that the idea of unity is impossible without the idea of diversity in contradiction. But unity is not diversity, and diversity is not unity. Therefore neither can have objective reality ; neither can be the permanent, for the one cannot be thought without thought of the other in contradiction. But they have *both* objective reality *for us*. The only solution of the difficulty is that they are both the results of abstraction from the unconditioned, that is, from the manifold as the unconditioned.

The reception of the manifold through the normal organs of sense gives diversity : the necessary unity of apperception in the subject makes unity of perception obligatory. Unity and diversity conjoint, as the result of abstractions from the manifold given, are necessary for the human personality, conditioned in time and space, to exist as a subject with self-apperception. The human personality thinks, not in the manifold, but within limits of the manifold. Unity and diversity mark the limits of the synthetical thought of the subject.

Or we may consider diversity and unity in relation to time and space, and shall find we arrive at the same conclusion.

If we consider objects as external, we must consider them in

space. If we relate one object to another we must relate them in space: two like objects can only be distinguished, one from the other, if related in space. And, I think, when, through mental operation, we relate external objects one to another, succession in time is involved. Diversity in objects, therefore, imports for us the conditions of space and time.

On the other hand, if we consider the subject in relation to the external, we find from Kant:—

‘It is true that I exist as an intelligence which is conscious only of its faculty of conjunction or synthesis, but subjected in relation to the manifold which this intelligence has to conjoin to a *limitative* (my italics) conjunction called the internal sense. My intelligence (that is, I) can render that conjunction or synthesis perceptible only according to the relations of time’ (Kant, p. 97). (To prevent misapprehension, I should perhaps here again state that the ‘intelligence’ above referred to, is one of concepts, judgments and (Kantian) ideas. An intelligence of intuition would not require the said conjunction or synthesis.)

We find, then, that for the very existence, not only of diversity, but of unity as known to us, we must have the conditions of time and space. But time and space are mere forms of sensibility. Therefore diversity and unity, as known to us, have only real existence for the subject in time and space. They have no existence, so far as we know, outside the conditioning of time and space. So they must be merely the result of abstractions from the manifold: for the manifold is not conditioned in time and space as known to us.

There may be some difficulty in understanding how unity can be a mere abstraction from the manifold, for unity is ordinarily regarded as resulting from a real synthesis of diversity, the fact being ignored that there is presentation of the manifold in intuition. This results from the subject, whose very existence involves (phenomenal) unity of apperception, making (in human thought) the manifold subject to its unity of apperception, and so treating unity of *perception* as a thing in itself. (The distinction between the manifold on the one hand and the manifold in our apprehension on the other hand is lost sight of.) But when we bear in mind that all human cognition and judgments are conditioned in time and space, and that it is from this conditioning the fact arises that we can only think in unity and diversity, then we see that unity and diversity are necessarily subjective to the manifold—they are but abstractions from the manifold.

‘But the unity of objects is determined simply by the understanding, according to conditions that lie in its own nature’ (Kant’s *Prolegomena*, p. 69).

It may be granted that, to our reason, unity of apperception is necessary for the existence of any subject, but unity of perception, as we know it, is not necessary for any possible unity of apperception.

Our unity of perception is from the conditioning of the subject in time and space as we know them: it is a *particular* unity of perception. Granting that the intuitive self has unity of apperception, we cannot even imagine that it is the same as ours.

The following passages, collated, support my allegation that what I have stated as to the relation of the manifold on the one hand to diversity, and on the other hand to unity, is in accordance with Kant's treatment of the manifold.

'But this principle'—that the synthetical unity of apperception is the highest principle of all exercise of the understanding—'is not to be regarded as a principle for every possible understanding, but only for that understanding by means of whose pure apperception in the thought *I am* no manifold content is given. The understanding or mind which contained the manifold in intuition, in and through the act of its own self-consciousness (in other words, an understanding by and in the representation of which the objects of the representation should at the same time exist), would not require a special act of synthesis of the manifold as the condition of the unity of its self-consciousness, an act of which the human understanding, which thinks only and cannot intuit, has absolute need' (Kant, p. 85).

'The manifold in an intuition, which I call mine, is represented by means of the synthesis of the understanding, as belonging to the necessary unity of self-consciousness, and this takes place by means of (under ?) the category. . . . Now, as the categories have their origin in the understanding alone, independently of sensibility' (that is, they exist as laws of cognition and thought for the understanding, because the understanding is conditioned in time and space). 'I must, in my deduction, make abstraction of the mode in which the manifold of an empirical intuition is given, in order to fix my attention exclusively on the unity which is brought by the understanding into the intuition by means of the category. In what follows it will be shown from the mode in which the empirical intuition is given in the faculty of sensibility, that the unity which belongs to it is no other than that which the category imposes on the manifold in a given intuition, and thus its *a priori* validity in regard to all objects of sense being established, the purpose of our deductions will be fully attained' (Kant, p. 89). Bear in mind that if we speak of the faculty of sensibility, we must—as sensibility is passive—speak of it as a passive faculty, if such faculty be possible. Intuition must be presented actively to the subject, and if sensibility is passive (as Kant says it is), I cannot understand how it can, even passively, give empirical intuition; it certainly cannot present intuition.

'But the unity of objects is determined simply by the understanding, according to conditions that lie in its own nature' (Kant's *Prolegomena*, p. 69).

If, in considering the above passages, we bear in mind that—(1) unity and diversity as known to us are, for us, the result merely of abstractions from the unconditioned, the manifold; (2) that through sensibility (which is passive, and is not in itself conditioned in time and space) the manifold is given to be intuited; (3) that intuition is not in itself conditioned in time and space; (4) that Kant, in using the word understanding, means the human understanding—then the whole meaning is clear. Bear in mind also that Kant has throughout *inferred* the faculty of imagination which belongs to sensibility.

We have :—

Through sensibility the manifold is given to be intuited, where the manifold is the unconditioned. The subject being conditioned in time and space, receives and deals with the manifold in time and space. So far as the subject is conditioned with the normal organs of sense it receives the manifold through those organs—necessarily in diversity. The subject, limited as it is, can only cognise and think under the categories which are its laws of limit—it does not itself ‘lay down laws for nature,’ it only lays down laws for nature as phenomenal to it. As the subject is given, so its unity of apperception is given, and it must receive the manifold in unity as well as in diversity. Unity and diversity are the limits of abstraction from the manifold, so we may speak of a continuum from diversity to unity.

But, so far, only the manifold *to be intuited* is given (passively) to the subject, and we must have the manifold *in intuition* presented to the subject. And this must be presented actively. As to this the following passage is important :—

‘But there is one thing in the above demonstration, of which I could not make abstraction, namely, that the manifold, to be intuited, must be given previously to the synthesis of the understanding, and independently of it. How this takes place remains here undetermined. For if I cogitate an understanding which was itself intuitive (as for example, a Divine understanding which should not represent given objects, but by whose representations the objects themselves should be given or produced), the categories would possess no signification in relation to such a faculty of cognition. They are merely rules for an understanding, whose whole power consists in thought, that is, in the act of submitting the synthesis of the manifold which is presented to it *in intuition* (my italics) from a very different quarter, to the unity of apperception—a faculty, therefore, which cognises nothing *per se*, but only connects and arranges the material of cognition, the intuition, namely, which must be presented to it by means of the object’ (Kant, p. 89).

The above statement is of great importance to our present purpose.

When Kant, as above, refers to the manifold *to be intuited*, he refers to that which is given through sensibility: sensibility could

not give the manifold *in* intuition for sensibility is passive, and the presentation of the manifold in intuition infers the active presentation of intuition itself. There can be no passive presentation of intuition; such presentation can only be active by a self of intuition.

So we find, in the same statement, that when Kant refers to the categories he says:—

‘They are merely rules for an understanding, whose whole power consists in thought, that is, in the act of submitting the synthesis of the manifold which is presented to it *in intuition* from a very different quarter, to the unity of apperception.’ That is, the manifold is presented in intuition, while the understanding submits the synthesis of this manifold to the unity of apperception.

Here Kant necessarily refers to a presentation of the manifold *in intuition*: the giving or presentation of the manifold to be intuited is not sufficient for him: intuition itself must be presented and presented actively to the subject. He could not say the presentation in intuition is from sensibility, for sensibility is passive; so he uses the indefinite term ‘from a very different quarter.’ This ‘very different quarter,’ he would appear to refer to as the soul of man (?). I refer it to the intuitive self. (Intuition cannot possibly be intellectual, nor given by the understanding.—Kant, p. 97.) In any case it must be a subject of intuition as defined by Kant, and if we introduce this subject of intuition, we have all that Kant wants for his presentation of intuition to the subject. My act of thinking, which subjects the manifold of every possible intuition to my unity of apperception must refer, ultimately, to myself as an intuitive self. As an intuitive self I have intuition for presentation, and it is my intuitive self which presents the manifold in intuition to myself as a subject in time and space. The part of sensibility is passive; it is merely the medium through or by which the manifold to be intuited is given to the intuitive self; it is the passive nexus between the intuitive self and some universe—of which our world of time and space is but phenomenal or partial and mediate. The intuitive self receives the manifold in intuition, and presents the manifold in intuition to the subject of the intuitive self—the human personality. But the subject being conditioned in time and space can only receive a form of intuition, *i.e.*, it receives a form of intuition determined (conditioned in limits) in time and space.

Kant’s whole scheme stands on the fact that the manifold *in* intuition is presented to the subject. From sensibility, which is passive, he can only get the giving of the manifold to be intuited. He must be held to assume the existence of an intuitive self to get his active presentation to the subject of the manifold in intuition. This (active) presentation to the subject of the manifold in intuition is a condition precedent to the subject’s being able to appear to determine itself in cognition (a limit of intuition) in its universe of

relations in time and space. The intuitive self determines itself (is to itself as it in fact is) in intuition : the subject only appears to determine itself in cognition.

It follows that the unity of self-apperception of the subject is not a real, a permanent unity : it is but a unity phenomenal of the unity (outside our cognition) of the intuitive self.

## THE INTUITIVE SELF

THE manifold is the unconditioned: it is that which reason absolutely requires in things as they are in themselves (things-in-themselves). The manifold is presented to the subject in the manifold of intuition. Bear in mind that this 'subject' is the human personality: a subject of intuition *receives* the manifold in intuition.<sup>1</sup> We must distinguish between the manifold in intuition as presented, and the manifold in intuition as fully received by the intuitive self, or as partially or mediately received by the subject in time and space.

Sensibility is passive and, therefore, though it may be termed a source of human knowledge (Kant, p. 18), by no possibility can it give more than the manifold to be intuited. For intuition itself is meaningless unless we refer it to a personality of intuition (Kant's 'soul of man' must be what is, to us, a personality of intuition). And to say the subject (the human personality) thinks in a form of intuition is equally meaningless unless we have intuition presented to the subject; for (unless our form of intuition is directly presented, which is impossible) any form of intuition must have intuition itself for foundation. It cannot then be that sensibility presents the manifold in intuition to the subject, for such presentation must be active. But (Kant himself holds this) the manifold in intuition *is* presented to the subject and presented actively. This presentation must be from a self of intuition—the intuitive self.

The subject (the human personality which is considered by Kant) is conditioned in time and space. So the subject can only, in reference to itself, be affected by intuition conditioned by time and space; that is, it can receive and deal with the manifold only when conditioned: this is why Kant speaks of *our* intuition as sensuous. For the subject, then, space and time must be forms of sensibility (Kant, pp. 72, 110). But this does not show that sensibility itself is conditioned in any way.

These forms of sensibility have objective reality for the subject in relation to its concepts and judgments: they have no objective reality in themselves—they condition the manifold only in relation to the subject.

<sup>1</sup> The intuition of God is pure intuition. The subject of intuition (an intuitive self) being a condition, intuition must be presented to it and received by it. But, for our present purpose, we are not concerned with the profound problems of the nature of this presentation or of this reception.

' In whatsoever mode, or by whatsoever means, our knowledge may relate to objects, it is at least quite clear that the only manner in which it immediately relates to them is by means of an intuition. To this as the indispensable groundwork, all thought points. But an intuition can take place only in so far as the object is given to us. This, again, is only possible, to man at least, on condition that the object affect the mind in a certain manner. The capacity for receiving presentations (receptivity) through the mode in which we are affected by objects, is called *sensibility*. By means of sensibility, therefore, objects are given to us' (my italics), ' and it alone furnishes us with intuitions: by the understanding they are *thought*, and from it arise conceptions. But all thought must directly, or indirectly, by means of certain signs, relate ultimately to intuitions: consequently, with us, to sensibility, because in no other way can an object be given to us' (Kant, p. 21).

Now this requires explanation, for on its face it would appear to state that sensibility *does* give objects. But this is not so. What Kant states is that objects are given to us or *in relation to* us and, as we are conditioned in certain ways, what is given must be limited by our power of reception before it can be received by us: what is given through sensibility is the manifold to be intuited.

It is necessary also to point out that if it be held Kant says sensibility itself gives us intuitions, he is in error: he makes a statement opposed to his scheme of reasoning. For sensibility is passive, and so can only give the manifold to be intuited: by no possibility can it present the manifold in intuition, for that infers the presentation of intuition itself, and nothing passive can have intuition. The subject must be furnished with intuition actively, and this can only be by a subject of intuition. I think that Kant in saying sensibility furnishes us with intuitions means no more than that sensibility is a passive carrier for intuitions. Thought of the subject is active, and thought is a limit of intuition which must, therefore, also be active. The distinction between thought and intuition is in degree, not in kind.

Again, we find that Kant here uses the plural word ' intuitions.' But what is given through sensibility is the manifold to be intuited. What, then, gives rise to intuitions? Kant relates back an object which is given to us to *an* intuition and, in this connection, we may well, as subjects, speak of intuitions. Kant distinguishes between intuition and human intuition. But bear in mind only intuition is presented. Intuitions have only subjective existence in relation to objects.

In the Aesthetic Kant uses the word sensibility in a very limited sense.<sup>1</sup> In the Analytic, when considering Imagination (as defined by him), he extends its purview, and in so doing introduces, what

<sup>1</sup> I have already stated that sensibility gives the manifold to be intuited. We find this justified from Kant's own words.

may be to some of us, confusion as to what the word really means. This is considered later on when we shall find, as will be submitted, that the fact of telepathy places Kant's reasoning on firmer ground.

But, confining ourselves at present to the restricted meaning of sensibility as used in the Aesthetic, we find that Kant means by sensibility that which, in ordinary parlance, enables us to have sensuous information (intuitions)—information through (what we term) our normal senses.

Now the subject, wholly conditioned in time and space, is conditioned in some measure also by the normal organs of sense in time and space: it is not fully conditioned by these organs as we shall hereafter see. Through sensibility the manifold is given, not only objects: the subject through its normal senses receives the manifold in diversity (as objects). Bear in mind what has been recorded as to diversity. Kant's objects are not simple things: they are made up of parts, of varying presentations: they are particular syntheses of particulars of the manifold.

If we consider our human experience, derived through the normal organs of sense, we shall find that this is so: we, necessarily, derive this experience in diversity. Why we receive the manifold in diversity, we do not know: all we know is the fact that we are so constituted that we do so receive it.

Through sensibility is given the manifold, and this makes possible intuition of the manifold. But through sensibility (in its restricted meaning of the Aesthetic) objects only are given to us, and so conceptions of objects result from what Kant terms *sensuous* intuition.

Kant, in stating his opinion with respect to the fundamental nature of our sensuous cognition in general, says, 'We have intended, then, to say, that all our intuition is nothing but the representation of phenomena; that the things which we intuite are not in themselves the same as our representations of them in intuition, nor are their relations in themselves so constituted as they appear to us' (Kant, p. 35).

Here Kant is using the word 'intuition' in a limited sense, in the limited sense of our intuitions as subjects in time and space: he is speaking of human intuition.

But when he states:—'Where we think of an object—God—which never can be an object of intuition to us, and even to himself can never be an object of sensuous intuition—we carefully avoid attributing to his intuition the conditions of space and time—and intuition all his cognition must be, and not thought, which always includes limitation' (Kant, p. 43)—then he is using the word 'intuition' in its full and real sense. He also refers to a subject whose understanding gives to it intuition direct, and not merely cognition from intuition. It is in this latter sense, and this sense only, that I use the word intuition. But even in this sense the intuition of the intuitive self cannot be held to be the same as the

pure intuition of God. For though to us, as subjects, the intuition of the intuiting self is noumenal (that is, has reality as opposed to phenomenal thought), still the intuitive self must be a condition in relation to the Supreme, and so its intuition must be a limit of the pure intuition of the Supreme.

For cognition there must be a determinate mode of intuition, that is, a conditioning or form of the manifold in intuition (cf. Kant, pp. 88, 89, 94).

Kant, I submit, brings the whole question of the existence of the intuitive self to a head in the following passage:—

‘At the same time how (the) “I” who thinks is distinct from the “I” which intuites itself (other modes of intuition being cogitable as at least possible), and yet one and the same with this latter as the same subject; how, therefore, I am able to say: “I,” as an intelligence and *thinking* subject cognise myself as an object *thought*, so far as I am, moreover, given to myself in intuition—only, like other phenomena, not as I am in myself, and as considered by the understanding, but merely as I appear,” is a question that has in it neither more nor less difficulty than the question, “How can I be an object to myself?” or this, “How can I be an object of my own intuition and internal perceptions?”’ (p. 95).

Note, at the outset, that Kant makes the ‘I’ who thinks subjective to the ‘I’ who intuites. For he says the ‘I’ who thinks, thinks in a *particular* mode of intuition—this follows from his admission that other modes of intuition are at least cogitable. The ‘I’ who thinks is therefore necessarily phenomenal of the ‘I’ who intuites.

Again, he asks how can the ‘I’ who thinks be distinct from the ‘I’ which intuites itself, and yet one and the same with this latter as the same subject? I hold the question to be answerable only when we make the ‘I’ which intuites objective in relation to the ‘I’ which thinks as subjective. We can only reply reasonably by making the ‘I’ which thinks, a partial and mediate manifestation in time and space of the ‘I’ which intuites.

And again, he asks, ‘How can I be an object to myself?’ I deny that I can be an object to myself: only a self of intuition can be an object to itself. But when he asks, ‘How can I be an object of my own intuition and internal perception,’ then I reply, ‘If by “I” is meant the human personality in time and space and by “my own intuition and internal perceptions” is meant my real self as an intuitive self (that is, the *I* which intuites itself), then I can be an object of my intuitive self. Kant, I think, endorses this when he says:—‘In the same way do I require, in order to the cognition of myself, not only the consciousness of myself or the thought that I think myself, but in addition an intuition of the manifold in myself, by which to determine this thought’ (Kant, p. 97). Herein, he says, I, as a subject, cannot determine the thought of myself; it

is only by intuition of the manifold in myself that I can determine myself. But by no possibility can we refer this 'intuition of the manifold in myself' to myself as a subject of cognition. Intuition of the manifold in myself must be referred to a 'myself' of intuition in the manifold, and it is this real self which determines the phenomenal self as an object. He says, also, that it is by the nature of our soul we attain to the clear consciousness of ourselves as subjects (*Prolegomena*, p. 100). Herein, we find, as in the previous passage, that, as subjects, we cannot attain to the clear consciousness (the determination) of ourselves as subjects: this determination can only be by the nature of our souls. I submit the fact of an intuitive self is sufficient, for all Kant requires is a personality which intuites and which presents intuition to its subject.

The extracts given are reconcilable and understandable only when we make Kant's subject a partial and mediate manifestation in time and space of an intuitive self.

'Cognition is necessarily limited. The categories are restricted, in their application to elements of possible experience, to that which is presented in intuition, and all intuition is for the ego contingent. But to assert that cognition is limited and its matter contingent, is to form the idea of an intelligence for whom cognition would not be limited, and for whom the data of intuition would not be given contingent facts, but necessarily produced along with the pure categories.<sup>1</sup> This idea of an intuitive understanding is the definite expression for the completed explanation which reason demands, and it involves the conception of a realm of objects for such an understanding, a realm of objects which, in opposition to the *phenomena* of our relative and limited experience, may be called *noumena* or things—in—themselves. The *noumenon*, therefore, is in one way the object of non-sensuous intuition, but more correctly is the expression of the limited and partial character of our knowledge. The idea of a noumenon is thus a limiting notion' (*Ency. Brit.*, vol. xiii. p. 853, 9th ed.).

The above extract from an article by Professor Adamson amounts, I submit, to a statement that the fact of the intuitive self is a fact underlying all Kant's reasoning in the *Critique*. For when we hold that cognition is limited and its matter contingent, we do not simply 'form the idea of an intelligence for whom cognition would not be limited'—we are driven to assume that such an intelligence exists. The term itself 'limited' imports the existence of the unlimited: the statement that cognition (which is active) is necessarily limited, imports either cognition which is unlimited, or that cognition is an abstraction from thought unlimited in time and space—from intuition. But cognition can only exist in the subject when intuition is presented to it, and received by it (so far as it can be received)

<sup>1</sup> I do not understand the meaning of the words 'the pure categories' in the above connection.

in time and space. And this presentation must be active—we are driven to assume the existence of an intelligence of intuition.

In what is above written I have followed Kant closely. But here I must qualify what has been written, though this qualification, I think, will not vitiate Kant's line of reasoning. Possibly there is no qualification but only a statement of certain deductions direct from Kant's own reasoning.

Sensibility is passive, so through it only the manifold to be intuited can be given: it cannot present the manifold in intuition. But the manifold in intuition must be presented to us before we can have any knowledge, any human experience. And the manifold in intuition is presented to us. From what source?

It must be presented actively from some source, and we cannot hold that sensibility, which is passive, is this active giver. There must be intuition in the source from which intuition is presented to us, and this necessarily infers that the source is personal—has personality.

Now Kant says: 'An understanding, in which all the manifold should be given by means of consciousness itself, would be intuitive' (Kant, p. 83). This self of understanding I term the intuitive self, and I submit that Kant's scheme fails unless we introduce the intuitive self as a fact. For the manifold in intuition is presented to the subject, and this (active) presentation can only be by a self of intuition. When Kant states positively that I do (I *must*) intuite myself, he relies on the fact of the existence of an intuitive self, though he only vaguely terms it the soul of man.

Sensibility then is the passive means for all knowledge; but real knowledge (intuition) is presented to the subject.

This presentation of real knowledge must be active, and can only be from an intuitive self as the giver. We have then:—

Through sensibility (passive) is given the manifold to be intuited: the intuitive self (active) receives the manifold in intuition. The intuitive self presents the manifold in intuition to its subject (the human personality in time and space). The subject receives the manifold in intuition so far as it can receive it (phenomenally) in time and space in its universe of relations.

I do not think this qualification affects Kant's reasoning: it possibly amounts to no more than a justifiable interpretation. Indeed, if for the vague expression 'soul of man' which he uses, we replace the more definite expression 'intuitive self,' it is possible his reasoning is rendered clearer and more direct. I have even attempted to prove that, reading between the lines, we find Kant himself relies on the existence of an intuitive self as a necessary part of his scheme.

The intuition of the Supreme is in God; His intuition is, what we may term, pure intuition. With this—even as intuitive selves—we can deal in no way. For the intuitive self must be a condition:

so its intuition cannot be pure intuition—it must, in some way, be conditioned. While, therefore, we must hold that the ‘soul of man’ is immortal, we cannot predicate this of the intuitive self. I think Kant introduces the ‘soul of man’ because (as intuition is presented to the subject) he must have something intuitive in itself which can actively present intuition to the subject. We get this presentation of intuition from the intuitive self without travelling into the unknowable country of the soul of man.

The confusion between the manifold on the one hand and the manifold in our apprehension on the other has taken so strong a hold on human thought that it is advisable to extend our consideration of the relation between the intuitive self and the subject (the human personality).

When we consider human personality we find it is a thing not of any fixity or permanence but of successive change in time; it is a thing of transience. The constitution of the material body of the subject is in a state of flux; we cannot say that at any moment, even, this body is the same as it was in the preceding moment. And with the material body the material brain changes in like manner from moment to moment—there is no fixity, no permanence; all is subject to successive change in time. And all human thought, human ideas are functions of the particular constitution of each particular material brain. Sir Oliver Lodge, for instance, manifests higher output of brain action than a gutter-snipe, because the two differ in the material formation of their brains. (I neglect, now, the influence of environments, for I am considering the facts of personality itself, not the mere manifestations in action of human personality in our universe of relations.)

We appear to ourselves to determine, to recognise, ourselves, even our human thought, as existing in change, in succession of time.

I think Buddhism (certainly one school) stops short at consideration of the human personality—it is the human personality that by learning (through human knowledge) ‘life is sorrow’ arrives at the *not I*, where this *not I* is no more than a negation of human personality.

‘What follows on the extinction of delusion?’ asks a monk of the learned nun Dhammadinnā. ‘Abandon the question, brother! I cannot grasp the meaning of the question. If it seem good to thee, go to the Enlightened One, ask him for an explanation of the question.’

And the Buddha, asked, makes answer: ‘Wise is Dhammadinnā, and mighty in understanding. Wouldst thou ask me for an explanation, I would give thee exactly the same answer’ (*Buddhist Essays*, Macmillan & Co., 1908).

Even that supreme exponent of the theory of the survival of human personality, F. W. H. Myers, has said:—

‘If an immortal soul there be within us, she must be able to

dispense with part of the brain's help while the brain is living, as with the whole of its help when it is dead' (*Proceedings S.P.R.*, vol. iv. p. 260).

Myers (reading between the lines) acknowledged the fact that those distinctions manifested between human personalities which exist from differing constitution of the material brain only exist in time, that is, only so long as the particular material brains have earthly existence—they disappear on death, or, at the lowest, are subsumed under what he would term the subliminal.

So far, then, human personality exists only in time and ends with bodily death. For all human thought (which requires the help of the brain) exists in *succession in time*, and on the dissolution of the body and material brain neither exists any longer in succession in time.

We find that I appear to determine myself as a mere subject of succession in time; a subject of no fixity, no permanence.

But by no possibility can a subject of succession in time determine itself as a subject of succession in time. One and the same *I* cannot be an object to itself, unless it be the *I* which intuites itself. If I exist only in limits, by no possibility can I travel in thought outside those limits, whatever they may be. So the *I* which determines itself as a subject of succession in time must exist free from the limits of succession in time, and we arrive at the conclusion that this *I* must be a personality which, in the present connection, determines not itself, but itself as partially and mediately manifested in (succession of) time.

Myself, as the intuitional *I*, I as a subject cannot determine: the thought is without content. I can only arrive at a conclusion (outside cognition) that I do exist as an intuitive self. Nor can I determine the intuition of myself as an intuitive self. All I can arrive at in thought is that intuition is the stuff (?) of my cognition as a human personality, so that it consists of more than knowledge of mere relations between phenomena, more than mere cognition in time and space. But, still, I can say that the intuitive self thinks in the manifold of intuition while the subject thinks synthetically in particulars of the manifold: the thought of the subject may be termed phenomenal, that of the intuitive self (relatively) noumenal. It follows that there is a relation between the intuition of the real self and the cognition of the subject,—thought in the manifold of intuition is related to synthetic thought in particulars of the manifold of intuition. There are not two selves: there is no real relation of subject to object. The human personality is the intuitive self conditioned in (transient) time and space in a universe of relations.

When we consider the manifold in our apprehension it takes the form of a 'loose' or 'mere' manifold, or a sum of particulars. So, in our apprehension, we arrive at a real synthesis (for self-

apperception) of this manifold. But this synthesis is no more than that which is necessary in our series of conditions for the self-apperception of the subject.

If, however, we start with the manifold itself, that is, with the manifold (not as conditioned in any way but) as the unconditioned which completes our series of conditions, we find at once the phenomenal nature of our synthesis. But we do more than this. It is *we* ourselves who determine the subject as thinking in limits of the manifold, who determine its self-apperception as phenomenal in its series of conditions. So we are driven to define *ourselves* as subjects thinking in the manifold itself with self-apperception which is (relatively) noumenal: for this self-apperception no synthesis is necessary. And these intuitive selves differ, so far, not in kind but in degree only from their subjects in time and space. The very fact that, to me, my cognitional thought exists in limits, proves the existence of thought in me higher than mere cognitional thought. And this higher form of thought must have been actively presented to and, at the least, partially and mediately received by me as a subject, or I could not determine cognitional thought as existing in limits. The *I* which determines itself as limited in cognitional thought must be a self of this form of thought higher than cognitional thought.

If we once free ourselves from our ingrained assumption that thought is necessarily thought in succession in time, the difficulty vanishes in arriving (in reason, not cognition) at the intuitive self which thinks in the manifold—in, as it were, ‘a lump.’ The question is one of thought, for there can be no fixity, no permanence of distinctions of personality in space: relations in space are phenomenal only.

We all, as human personalities, think within the same limits, the same particulars of the manifold: our universe of relations is one and the same. Why should our distinctions between one another as intuitive selves be lost when we all think free from such limits? If, thereby, the distinctions disappear it must be because they are creations of thought in limits (particulars) of the manifold. I deny the possibility of such creation, so far as our present argument is concerned.

When I think myself (assuming the thought has some content) what is the *myself* that I think? I think myself as a subject distinct from other subjects in time and space. Even quâ the intellectual I can only distinguish myself from other subjects in thought related ultimately to the particular material formation of my brain as distinct from other material formations.<sup>1</sup> And these distinctions exist only in time and space.

<sup>1</sup> All religions ignore intellectual distinctions: knowledge, as used by Gautama, is but a detail of will or feeling.

I think myself then only phenomenally : for space and time are phenomenal.

But I assume that I do determine my own existence : my thinking self is an object of my real self (here we reverse the ordinary meaning of object and subject). And, as any subject (of space and time known to us) cannot think itself (determine itself) as an object, this real self must be one which can determine itself as a thinking self.

The only solution is that an intuitive self exists which is the real self, and which determines its thinking self as a manifestation of itself in time and space.

Bear in mind how very limited is our present inquiry into personality. We do not touch on any such abstract questions as those of God ; Nature ; Free-will ; the Soul of man. All I do is this :—In psychology the science starts with an assumption of what may be termed the psychological ego, that is, the ego in relation to the series of conditions in which we exist as human personalities. I, on the other hand, start with the intuitive self and treat the psychological ego as a partial and mediate manifestation in time and space of this intuitive self. I hold the intuitive self to be ' the ultimate postulate of all thought and action whatever ' (cf. *The Roots of Reality*, by Belfort Bax, published by Grant Richards, p. 53), and have tried to prove that all Kant's reasoning in the *Critique* is founded on the fact of the existence of this intuitive self.

Mark, too, that though (following Kant) I treat the external as distinct from external personalities, I trench in no way on the question of the ultimate relation of the external to personality.

Let us make a preposterous assumption : let us assume that Fichte, Hegel, for instance, and, to some extent, Schopenhauer, all confused the manifold with the manifold in our apprehension, so that their reasoning fails because they were all attempting the impossible : attempting, that is, to explain, to compass, the unconditioned by reasoning within the limits of their series of conditions. Or—in other words—that their reasoning fails because they start with (unconscious ?) denial that the manifold is the unconditioned which completes our series of conditions and treat it as subject to (conditioned by) our apprehension ; that is, treat it as a subject of human reasoning.

Even with this preposterous assumption the present argument is not affected. For I attempt in no way to explain or dissect the manifold. I treat even the intuitive self as a condition, and though I hold that, to us, it exists in the manifold, I suggest the possibility, even the strong probability, that what is, to us, the manifold of the intuitive self, may itself be conditioned in some way, though not in our series of conditions.

## TIME AND SPACE

THE relation between time and space has little to do with the argument and so need not be discussed at length. But there must be some short reference to the subject, in order to get rid so far as possible of what may appear to be confusion in my use of the terms. This confusion exists because I am unable to distinguish between time and space : they are, to me, but, as it were, different appearances of one and the same thing. Following a theory two thousand years old, I have argued elsewhere that we are not conditioned in space and time but in motion, and that ideas of space and time are derivative only. The external (motion) we regard as conditioned in space : the external (motion) as affecting us internally (in intellectual thought) has for us the aspect of time.

Kant, I think, points to something of which time and space are but aspects.

Space imports the existence of time : time ordinarily imports the existence of space. Space is the external appearance of our conditioning : time the internal affect on us of the same conditioning. 'All that can be given to our senses is the outer in space, the inner in time' (*Prolegomena*, p. 31).

When we regard the external we regard it as conditioned in space. But when this same external affects us (when, we may say, the external regards us) it affects us as conditioned in time. Kant says : 'What we call outward objects, are nothing else but mere representations of our sensibility, whose form is space' (Kant, p. 28). This, I think, is the same as saying that outward objects (the external) when regarded by us (through sensibility as external representations) take on the appearance of being conditioned in space.

Kant also says : 'Time is nothing but the form of our internal intuition' (Kant, p. 33), and elsewhere he speaks of the mere non-entity of time (Kant, p. 43). This, I think, is the same as saying that the same outward objects (the same and one external) affect us (through our internal sense as internal presentations through sensibility) under the appearance of being conditioned in time. These differing conditions of appearances would apparently result merely from the external being on the one hand considered as seen or felt as the external, and, on the other hand, being considered quâ its effect on the internal sense.

In the *Dissertation* Kant defines space as 'the absolutely first

formal principle of the sensible world.' He defines time also in the same way as 'the absolutely first formal principle of the sensible world' (Kant's *Dissertation*, p. 63 and 67). He, so far, makes no distinction between them in definition. I cannot find that he resiles from this position in the *Critique*. The only distinction he there raises is that he says we regard the external as, in appearance, conditioned in space: that our internal sense is affected by the external as, in appearance, conditioned in time.

The subject is conditioned in relation to the external. It regards the external in one way, it is affected by the external in another way. Kant himself, in the *Critique*, explains at length how it is that our internal sense is affected by the external in time (in succession and, as it were, in a line—a plane?), and how it is we regard the external in space (in three dimensions).

James Ward says: 'We should never have a self-consciousness at all if we had not previously learnt to distinguish occupied and unoccupied space, past and present in time, and the like. But, again, it is equally true that, if we could not feel and move as well as receive impressions, and if experience did not repeat itself, we should never attain even to this level of spatial and temporal intuition' (*Ency. Brit.*, vol. xx. p. 81, 9th ed.).

James Ward was considering the science of psychology when he made the above statement. But I think, so far, it supports the contention that both our spatial and temporal intuition result from our being conditioned in motion.

## IMAGINATION, TELEPATHY, AND THE INTUITIVE SELF<sup>1</sup>

ONE difficulty encountered as yet in the argument preferred, has been as to the extent that the subject may be affected by the external through sensibility: for sometimes Kant would appear to restrict sensibility to the 'giving' of objects. I begin now by attempting to remove this difficulty by a consideration of what the purview of sensibility must be if we assume the subject is affected through sensibility otherwise than through the normal organs of sense. I do not enter on any full discussion of difference between the meanings attached to sensibility by Kant, Leibnitz, or others, or as to whether or not Kant used the word as having different meanings.

I assume that through sensibility the subject is affected, not only through, but otherwise than through the normal organs of sense, and submit that by so extending the purview of sensibility we remove great part of the difficulty some of us find in following the reasoning of Kant. I think the *Critique* requires from sensibility something more than the mere giving of objects.

Sensibility is passive: through it is given to the subject the manifold to be intuited. It gives (passively) the manifold itself, that is the (relatively) noumenal—necessarily unconditioned in time and space as known to us.

Through its normal organs of sense the subject (conditioned in time and space) receives the manifold in diversity (data of sense). Otherwise than through its normal organs of sense it receives the manifold *not* in diversity: for diversity (a limit or abstraction) results solely from the limited and particular powers of reception of the normal organs of sense.

I shall hereafter argue that human experience establishes, practically, the fact that the subject is affected by sensibility otherwise than through the normal organs of sense. And, if this be so, it follows that sensibility gives<sup>2</sup> to the subject the manifold as fully as the subject, conditioned in time and space, and not conditioned by its normal organs of sense, can receive it: it gives the universal

<sup>1</sup> 'Imagination' I now use in the meaning attached to it by Kant. 'Telepathy,' for the purposes of this chapter, may be defined generally as a term expressive of the fact that through sensibility the subject is affected otherwise than through the normal organs of sense. When we, afterwards, consider human experience, this definition must be particularised.

<sup>2</sup> The verb 'gives' in relation to sensibility is always used in a passive sense.

or what may be termed the manifold of sense from which is derived the manifold in our apprehension.

Sensibility gives the manifold to be intuited: sensibility gives, to the subject, the manifold to be intuited in its (the subject's) apprehension, where this apprehension is conditioned in time and space—the 'universal' (that is, the manifold in our apprehension) is received not conditioned in diversity as received through the normal organs of sense. This 'universal' is a continuum from unity to diversity (which are the limits of contradiction in our universe).

Professor Adamson referring to the manifold of sense as defined by Kant says: 'The manifold of sense, which plays so important a part in the critical theory of knowledge, is left in an obscure and perplexed position. . . . The sense—manifold is not to be conceived as having, *per se*, any of the qualities of objects as actually cognised; its parts are not cognisable, *per se*, nor can it with propriety be said to be received successively or simultaneously' (*Ency. Brit.*, vol. xiii. p. 851, 9th ed.).

Professor Adamson would appear to use the terms 'the manifold of sense,' and 'the sense-manifold' as both having the same meaning: that is, he does not hold either term refers to a faculty (?) of the subject, but that both mean the manifold given through sensibility and received (so far as it can be received) by the subject. I think he means the manifold as conditioned by reception by the subject and, if so, I doubt that Kant can be said to leave it in an obscure and perplexed position. It is an expression for the 'universal' which the subject receives through sensibility otherwise than through its (the subject's) normal organs of sense. So it can have none of the qualities of objects as actually cognised—all its reception does is to make possible for the subject the cognition of objects. And, therefore, its parts cannot, *per se*, be cognisable. The term 'parts' has no meaning in relation to the universal until, in our apprehension, the universal appears to us as a synthesis.

Whether it can with propriety be said to be received neither successively nor simultaneously is a more difficult question to deal with. We cannot, indeed, say that the manifold, itself, is given through sensibility either successively or simultaneously, for either word has meaning only in time and the manifold itself is given through sensibility unconditioned in time. So the intuitive self cannot be said to receive the manifold either successively nor simultaneously. But the subject which receives the manifold of sense is a subject conditioned in time, and so receives the manifold of sense in time. Still I doubt whether this manifold of sense can, in itself, be said to be received as either simultaneous or successive: for having no parts it has nothing to which to refer simultaneity or succession.

It is when we regard this manifold of sense in our apprehension it appears to us as a sum of particulars, as a synthesis of diversity

from which we extract, by analysis, our data of sense. And so, I think, the manifold of sense appears to us as received simultaneously. But we thus arrive only at a principle for the empirical use of the understanding. All we can say is that by regarding the manifold of sense as a sum of particulars we arrive at that (phenomenal) synthesis necessary for thought in analysis (cf. Kant, p. 136, first paragraph; *Prolegomena*, p. 83).

The facts of telepathy hereinafter referred to support, I think, the theory that the subject is affected through sensibility, otherwise than through its normal organs of sense free from the conditioning of time and space. And we must bear in mind that all synthesis and analysis are phenomenal: both have existence for the human understanding only. Why this is so we do not know; Kant refers synthesis to a power of the soul. So, though the reception of the manifold of sense is a reception in time, it appears to me reasonable to hold that there is no reception either simultaneously or successively. The manifold of sense (the universal) is a particular of the manifold itself, and it is only when the understanding uses this manifold of sense as the background, as it were, for data of sense, that it appears to the understanding as a synthesis or sum of particulars. The subject, though conditioned in time, does, I think, to some limited extent think in the manifold (cf. pp. 95, 96).

But, so far, we have no thinking, no active cognitional subject, for we have, as yet, considered directly but the potentiality of the subject in reception. I deny that by any possibility can sensibility, which is passive, present intuition, thought, or cognition to the subject to make it as it is, an active subject. Such presentation must be active.

That active thought of the subject, which makes it an active subject, lies in cognition, and cognition is a limit of intuition. So intuition must be (actively) presented to the subject. And this active presentation is, as before shown, from the intuitive self. But now, by introducing the fact of telepathy, we find that the subject can receive from its intuitive self intuition applicable to the 'universal' as well as to diversity. We thus get, directly, the 'universal' in our apprehension which is necessary for the particular (data of sense) to be the subjects of cognition. For sensibility, in its now extended meaning, enables the subject to be affected by the external otherwise than through its normal organs of sense. (Sensibility being the passive source of all knowledge, we may still possibly speak of the intuition the subject receives as sensuous. But, if so, we must expand our meaning of the word sensuous: it now includes affects received by the subject otherwise than through its normal organs of sense.)

Let us consider a certain paragraph written by Professor Adamson which deals with the alleged inconsistencies and imperfections of Kant's doctrine:—

'The mode in which Kant endeavours to show how the several portions of cognition are subjectively realised, brings into the clearest light the inconsistencies and imperfections of his doctrine. Sense had been assumed as furnishing the particular of knowledge, understanding as furnishing the universal: and it had been expressly declared that the particular was cognisable only in and through the universal. Still, each was conceived as somehow in itself complete and finished. Sense and understanding had distinct functions, and there was wanting some common term, some intermediary which should bring them into conjunction. Data of sense as purely particular could have nothing in common with the categories as purely universal. But data of sense had at least one universal aspect—their aspect as the particular of the general forms, space and time. Categories were in themselves abstract and valueless, serviceable only when restricted to possible objects of experience. There was thus a common ground on which category and intuition were united in one, and an intermediate process whereby the universal of the category might be so far individualised as to comprehend the particular of sense. This intermediate process—which is really the junction of understanding and sense—Kant calls productive imagination, and it is only through productive imagination that knowledge or experience is actually realised in one subjective consciousness. The specific forms of productive imagination are called schemata, and upon the nature of the schema Kant gives much that has proved of extreme value for subsequent thought' (*Ency. Brit.*, vol. xiii. p. 852, 9th ed.).

The statement that: 'Sense had been assumed as furnishing the particulars of knowledge, understanding as furnishing the universal, and it had been expressly declared that the particular was cognisable only in and through the universal,' is, I think, erroneous, so far as the first part of the sentence is concerned.

It is true Kant lays down, at first, the principle that sensibility gives only objects. He was concluded by the then state of human experience to the fact that sensibility affects the subject only through the normal organs of sense. But, later on, he is driven to assume that sensibility gives more than objects.

'Now that which conjoins the manifold of sensuous intuition is imagination, a mental act to which understanding contributes unity of intellectual synthesis and sensibility, manifoldness of apprehension' (Kant, p. 100).

In considering the above statement, bear in mind that Kant also says: 'Apperception (and its synthetical unity) . . . applies, under the name of the categories, to the manifold of intuition in general, prior to all sensuous intuition of objects' (Kant, p. 94).

If sensibility be confined to giving objects only, then it cannot give manifoldness of apprehension. Sensibility (in this restricted meaning) gives the manifold to be intuited, but the subject receives

(and only receives) the manifold (through its normal organs of sense) conditioned in diversity—the subject can have only sensuous intuition to operate with. There may be, for the subject, a synthesis of this sensuous intuition, but this synthesis exists only in relation to the subject and its (phenomenal) synthetical unity. We not only make the subject with its synthetical unity purely phenomenal, but we fail to get the presentation to the subject of the ‘universal,’ which is absolutely necessary for its cognition.

And Kant sees and admits the difficulty when he says apperception (and its synthetical unity) applies to the manifold of intuition in general, prior to all sensuous intuition of objects.

The manifold of intuition in general must be presented prior to all sensuous intuition of objects as a condition precedent to apperception and its synthetical unity. But sensibility is the medium for this presentation, and so must give more than objects: it must give the manifold to be intuited. And, for the subject, we must have a sense-manifold, that is, the subject must have the potentiality of being affected through sensibility by more than objects, which is the same thing as saying it can be affected otherwise than through its normal organs of sense. And Kant says there *is* a sense-manifold.

It is thus seen that Kant ultimately interprets sensibility as furnishing more than mere particulars of knowledge: it furnishes the universal.

That Kant never assumed that the understanding furnishes the universal, but that it is furnished through sensibility, is shown by the following passages:—

‘Imagination is the faculty of representing an object even without its presence in intuition. Now, as all our intuition is sensuous, imagination, by reason of the subjective condition under which alone it can give a corresponding intuition to the conceptions of the understanding, belongs to sensibility’ (Kant, p. 93).

‘Now that which conjoins the manifold of sensuous intuition is imagination, a mental act to which understanding contributes unity of intellectual synthesis and sensibility, manifoldness of apprehension’ (Kant, p. 100).

I have dealt at length with the impossibility of sensibility, which is passive, giving intuition to the subject and so now ignore the question. But why—in this connection—does Kant introduce imagination? Because he is bound to hold that sensibility (as a faculty?) must be able to give more than objects ‘present in intuition.’

If we hold that sensibility affects the subject otherwise than through the normal organs of sense, we get directly this ‘power of imagination’ from sensibility. But, however this may be, Kant does not hold that the understanding furnishes the universal. All he says is that it operates with the universal—given through sensi-

bility—and contributes that unity of intellectual synthesis which is necessary for the phenomenal self-apperception of the subject. Kant makes this self-apperception phenomenal of the (relatively) noumenal self-apperception of the soul: he even refers synthesis, ultimately, to a power or function of the soul (Kant, p. 62).

Again, if sensibility affects the subject only through the normal organs of sense, we get from sensibility only data of sense (diversity) and these, as purely particular, can have nothing to do with the categories as universal. But the particular is cognisable only in and through the universal. (Our universe, as already shown, is one of phenomenal relations, and these cannot give cognition unless a 'general scheme' of relations is present in the understanding. Or we may perhaps say there must be present in the understanding a full integration (the universal) before partial integrations (data of sense) can produce cognition).

Here we find Kant's great difficulty, which led him to his theories of imagination and the schematism of the understanding. But if the subject has the potentiality of being affected through sensibility otherwise than through the normal organs of sense I submit the difficulty disappears.

Without introducing 'imagination,' we get through sensibility the universal and the particular: without any schema, we get the universal received by the subject. We have, directly, what Kant wanted.

It may be true Kant makes sense and understanding distinct functions (?) for sensibility is passive and so gives only the manifold to be intuited, whereas the understanding operates actively with intuition presented actively to it. But Kant did not require to bring sense and understanding into conjunction: he had already got sensibility as giving the manifold to be intuited. What he wanted was power of reception in the understanding from sensibility of *more than objects*: he wanted power of reception of the universal. And he—reading between the lines—gets this by making sensibility affect the subject otherwise than through the normal organs of sense. Sensibility remains sensibility whether or not we term it imagination.

The categories exist and have effect only for our universe: the reception of the 'universal' from the manifold given to be intuited exists and has effect only for our human understanding. Both are conditioned in and determined by time and space as known to us. The categories are general rules or forms of thought determined by the subject itself as defining the limits of its understanding in operation. This power of determination imports the potentiality of the reception by the understanding (through sensibility) of the universal.

Kant's statement that the understanding has an *original power* of conjoining the manifold of intuition (Kant, p. 94), requires some

explanation, for, on its face, this would appear to give the understanding power to create its own self-apperception. But this is not so. For the intuitive self (the relatively noumenal self) intuites itself, and for such intuition no conjunction of the manifold in intuition is necessary. The conjoining of the manifold in intuition is a conditioning of the manifold in intuition necessary only for the (phenomenal) subject's apperception because the subject is conditioned in time and space. So this power of conjunction in the subject can only be said to be original in that it is peculiar to the subject, and it marks in the subject no more than a limit of the full power of thought of the intuitive self.

In the *Dissertation* Kant does not introduce imagination or the faculty of imagination: he does not give to the understanding this original power to conjoin the manifold of intuition.

But he must get what, in the *Dissertation*, he terms co-ordination of all sensations from somewhere. He gets it from a law or power of the soul:—

' Things cannot appear to the senses under any form but by means of a power of the soul co-ordinating all sensations in accordance with a fixed law implanted in its nature ' (*Dissertation*, p. 66).

' For sensations excite this act of the mind—the co-ordinating its sense concepts in accordance with perpetual laws—but do not influence intuition, neither is there anything connate here except the law of the soul, in accordance with which it conjoins in a certain way its sensations derived from the presence of an object ' (*Dissertation*, pp. 68 and 69).

And in the *Critique* itself he does not resile from this position. For he says:—

' Synthesis, generally speaking, is, as we shall afterwards see, the mere operation of the imagination, a blind but indispensable function of the soul, without which we should have no cognition whatever, but of the working of which we are seldom even conscious ' (Kant, p. 62, cf. p. 109, last four lines). It is, to me, most strange that so many of Kant's commentators miss the point that Kant's whole scheme falls to the ground unless we give reality to, what he terms, the soul of man.

We find then that Kant, in the *Critique*, follows his reasoning in the *Dissertation*; that is, he only gives subjectively to the understanding any original power of conjoining the manifold of intuition: he relates synthesis to a blind but indispensable function of the soul. This means, I hold, that the soul of man is Kant's real subject, and that his subject (the human personality) is no more than a manifestation of its soul in time and space. Synthesis is merely a necessary condition (or limit) for Kant's subject in time and space.

If, however, we assume sensibility affects the subject otherwise than through the normal organs of sense, abandon reliance on any

blind but indispensable function of the soul, and rely on the existence of the *I* which intuits itself, I think Kant's reasoning is strengthened.

We may, in reason, give (transcendental ?) unity of apperception to the intuitive self for which it requires no synthesis. But for the subject (the human personality) conditioned in time and space, we find this synthesis is inherently necessary, not as creating any real unity but as a condition of its active existence in time and space. If the active subject in time and space is given or assumed, I submit its unity of apperception (requiring a synthesis) is also given or assumed : they appear to me but differing expressions for one and the same thing. But the subject and its unity of apperception are merely phenomenal, they are no more than manifestations in time and space of the intuitive self and its (transcendental ?) unity of apperception.

And now, when we assume sensibility affects the subject otherwise than through the normal organs of sense, we find that sensibility gives to the subject the manifold to be intuited and that the subject can receive this manifold *not* conditioned by its (the subject's) normal organs of sense ; that is, can receive it in the universal. It is this acceptance which makes Kant's co-ordination of all sensations possible. The subject (through intuition presented to it by its intuitive self) can operate with the universal. We no longer require reliance on a blind but indispensable function of the soul. And we can now interpret 'imagination' simply.

Imagination as belonging to sensibility expresses sensibility itself in reference to the continuum from unity to diversity (the universal), which the subject can receive from the manifold to be intuited given through sensibility. Imagination as belonging to the understanding marks the operation of the understanding on the universal which has been received through sensibility. This operation infers (phenomenal) synthesis.

It is not said that we now require the terms imagination or the faculty of imagination. I refer to them only to show that, assuming sensibility affects the subject otherwise than through the normal organs of sense, we do not vitiate, but possibly strengthen, Kant's reasoning.

In this connection it is to be noted that Professor Adamson criticises Kant's definition of the mind or self in that 'the mind or self appears as though it were endowed with a complex machinery by which alone it could act upon the material supplied to it' (*Ency. Brit.*, vol. xiii. p. 851). But surely this criticism is not well based ? For, throughout the *Critique*, Kant makes this 'mind' or 'self' phenomenal of the soul of man : he even refers the transcendental synthesis of imagination necessary for the self-apperception of the subject to a function of the *soul* of the subject. Kant's subject is a partial and mediate manifestation in time and space of the soul

of the subject. And as he holds our world is but one of other possible worlds, he necessarily treats his subject (the mind or self) as being endowed with a particular complex machinery by which alone it can operate upon that which is presented to it. It may be that, herein, the distinction between the *I* which intuits itself and the *I* which thinks itself is lost sight of by Professor Adamson, a blindness shared by Cousin and other commentators.

Bear in mind that the present argument has little or nothing to do with Kant's *Dialectic*, and that in substituting the term 'intuitive self' for the term 'soul of man' used by Kant, I rely, hereafter, on the evidence of human experience.

In support of the argument that Kant's reasoning is not vitiated, but strengthened and clarified if we give sensibility the extended meaning in question, and, abandoning all reference to the soul of man,<sup>1</sup> rely only on the fact of the existence of the intuitive self, I now paraphrase an important passage from the *Critique* :—

'That which determines the internal sense is the understanding and its original power of conjoining the manifold of intuition, that is, of bringing this under an apperception. (Upon which rests the possibility of the understanding itself)' (Kant, p. 94).

In the first place, for the understanding to operate on the manifold of intuition this manifold of intuition must be presented actively to it, the understanding. And this presentation cannot be by sensibility: for sensibility, which marks, for the subject, no more than the potentiality of being affected, is passive. The presentation of the manifold of intuition must be active.

Again, the manifold of intuition is not conditioned in time and space, while the understanding is so conditioned. So the conjunction of the manifold of intuition by the understanding is not real but phenomenal, it is a *conditioning in time and space* of this manifold. This I have termed the abstraction of unity from the manifold. If we hold that this conjunction is real then we make the understanding (a phenomenon of time and space) *create* a noumenon, which is impossible.

'Now, as the human understanding is not in itself a faculty of intuition, and is unable to exercise such a power, in order to conjoin, as it were, the manifold of its own intuition, the synthesis of understanding is, considered *per se*, nothing but the unity of action, of which, as such, it is self-conscious, even apart from sensibility, by which, moreover, it is able to determine our internal sense in respect of the manifold which may be presented to it according to the form of sensuous intuition' (Kant, p. 94).

What does Kant, when speaking of the human understanding, mean by 'the manifold of its own intuition'? This understanding is not a faculty of intuition. He must mean the manifold of intui-

<sup>1</sup> The argument does not in any way touch on the question of whether a soul in man does or does not exist.

tion which is presented to it, the understanding. And this presentation, I repeat, must be active. Has Kant's 'internal sense' only a form of sensuous intuition? If so, how is intuition itself presented to the understanding?

'Thus, under the name of a transcendental synthesis of imagination, the understanding exercises an activity upon the passive subject, whose faculty it is; and so we are right in saying that the internal sense is affected thereby' (Kant, p. 94). (The word transcendental is probably introduced because Kant gets the power of synthesis from the soul of man.)

This would appear to make the understanding an active faculty of the internal sense, the internal sense being treated as passive. And Kant continues:—

'Apperception and its synthetical unity are by no means one and the same with the internal sense. The former, as the source of all our synthetical conjunction, applies, under the name of the categories, to the manifold of intuition in general, prior to all sensuous intuition of objects. The internal sense, on the contrary, contains merely the form of intuition, but without any synthetical conjunction of the manifold therein, and consequently does not contain any determined intuition, which is possible only through consciousness of the determination of the manifold by the transcendental act of the imagination (synthetical influence of the understanding on the internal sense) which I have named figurative synthesis' (Kant, p. 94).

I think Kant here suggests that the internal sense contains the manifold of intuition in general, prior to all sensuous intuition of objects; and that the understanding determines (in synthetical conjunction) this intuition. For, if not, then the internal sense contains merely a form of intuition, and the giving of the manifold of intuition in general prior to all sensuous intuition of objects must be through sensibility otherwise than through affection on the internal sense. There appears to be a difficulty here as to how the internal sense is to be defined. But the point I make is that Kant holds apperception and its synthetical unity apply to the manifold of intuition in general, prior to all sensuous intuition of objects.

If the understanding is a faculty of the internal sense (a receptivity) as passive, then the internal sense must (following Kant) contain the manifold to be intuited in general, prior to all sensuous intuition of objects. The internal sense (passively acceptive) must contain the manifold which is to be intuited by the subject.

If sensibility gives only sensuous intuition (objects in diversity), how can there be active presentation to the subject of the manifold of intuition in general prior to all sensuous intuition of objects? Such presentation is impossible: for it is through sensibility alone that the subject has the potentiality of being affected. It follows that sensibility must give more than sensuous intuition of objects,

and, through sensibility, the subject must have power to receive more than sensuous intuition of objects—it must have power to be affected by sensibility otherwise than through the normal organs of sense. The apperception of the subject applies to the manifold of intuition in general, so this manifold of intuition must be presented to the subject and received by it so far as it can be received in time and space. This infers such power of reception in the subject, and all potentiality of reception in the subject from the external can only be found in sensibility.

## THE SCHEMA

I HAVE argued that—reading between the lines—Kant's reasoning in the *Critique* is based on an assumption that the subject can be affected through sensibility otherwise than through its (the subject's) normal organs of sense: his *Dreams of a Spirit Seer* is based on the assumption. And, that this potentiality in the subject is possible, is shown in a remarkable passage in the *Critique* itself. Therein Kant refers to the possibility of 'a power of the mind to place itself in community of thought with other men, however distant they may be.' It is true that, speaking of this and other conceptions, he says, 'They are conceptions, the possibility of which has no grounds to rest upon. For they are not based on experience and its known laws: and without experience they are a mere arbitrary conjunction of thoughts, which, though containing no internal contradiction, has no claim to objective reality, neither, consequently, to the possibility of such an object as is thought in these conceptions' (Kant, p. 164). Bear in mind, however, that he holds this 'power of the mind' to be possible, because, as he states, it contains *no internal contradiction*. He rejects its consideration for the sole reason that he could find no basis for its acceptance in human experience and known laws. I suggest that we now have grounds based on human experience for such acceptance.

If we consider Kant's schema and the schematism of the understanding under the light of (as I now assume) our lately acquired human experience that sensibility affects the subject otherwise than through the normal organs of sense, I think we shall be able to follow his reasoning. In spite of certain modern authoritative opinion I cannot but think the theory of the schema contains profound and valuable truth.

Kant says that conceptions 'are quite impossible, and utterly without significance, unless either to them, or at least to the elements of which they consist, an object be given';—here he refers to conceptions of diversity—'and that, consequently, they cannot possibly apply to objects as things-in-themselves without regard to the question whether and how these may be given to us, by means of the modification of our sensibility, and, finally, that pure *a priori* conceptions in addition to the function of the understanding in (under ?) the category, must contain *a priori* formal conditions of sensibility (of the internal sense, namely) which again contain the

general condition under which alone the category can be applied to any object. This formal and pure condition of sensibility—to which the conception of the understanding is restricted in its employment—we shall name the schema of the understanding, and the procedure of the understanding with these schemata we shall call the schematism of the pure understanding. The schema is, in itself, always a mere product of the imagination. But as the synthesis of imagination has for its aim no single intuition, but merely unity in the determination of sensibility, the schema is clearly distinguishable from the image' (Kant, p. 108). (Is not the internal sense here treated as more than a mere receptivity for sensuous intuitions?)

If we hold that sensibility gives only data of sense (diversity) then we find that Kant in the above passage is seeking to get rid of the conflict between the category as the universal and the data of sense as the particular. (He says the schema is, in itself, always a mere product of the imagination—he introduces 'imagination' to get his 'universal.') But, if this be so, what does he mean when he says that pure *a priori* conceptions must contain *a priori* formal conditions of sensibility which again contain the general condition under which alone the category can be applied to any object? These conceptions are conceptions of the understanding, and only through sensibility (which is passive) can the understanding get its 'stuff' to enable it to arrive at any conceptions. So sensibility must give 'the general condition under which alone the category can be applied to any object'—must give the universal which is necessary for cognition of the particular. (The manifold to be intuited must be given previously to the synthesis of the understanding and independently of it' (Kant, p. 89). It is sensibility through which the manifold to be intuited is given.) Thus we get our schema direct through sensibility, not from a mere product of the imagination, while we see that the schema is clearly distinguished from the image. By making sensibility affect the subject otherwise than through the normal organs of sense, we clarify Kant's reasoning without rejecting it.

Kant, when treating of diversity and its synthesis, begins by stating:—

'The first thing that must be given to us in order to the *a priori* cognition of all objects, is the diversity of the pure intuition; the synthesis of this diversity by means of the imagination is the second' (Kant, p. 63). But later on he says:—

'In truth, it is not images of objects, but schemata which lie at the foundation of our pure sensuous conceptions' (Kant, p. 109).

When, then, Kant refers to a 'synthesis of diversity' what is this diversity? If schemata lie at the foundation of our pure sensuous conceptions, I think he must have a synthesis of schemata. And, if we assume sensibility affects the subject otherwise than through

the normal organs of sense, we have to hand the schema as foundation for this synthesis of schemata.

But, however this may be, if schemata lie at the foundation of our pure sensuous conceptions, they must be given to us, and by no means can they be given unless through sensibility. Sensibility, then, can give us more than objects—can affect us otherwise than through our normal organs of sense.

When Kant says, 'The first thing that must be given to us in order to the *a priori* cognition of all objects, is the diversity of the pure intuition; the synthesis of this diversity by means of the imagination is the second,' he gets what Cousin terms 'reminiscence.' And this is of great importance when we (as we shall hereafter) consider memory. But this synthesis of diversity is not sufficient for him: he must have something else.

So, later on, he says:—'In truth, it is not images of objects, but schemata which lie at the foundation of our pure sensuous conceptions.'

These schemata must result from what is given through sensibility, and (there being no objects given) must be given by sensibility as affecting the subject otherwise than through the normal organs of sense. What is received (passively) through sensibility is the schema: the schemata exist only (phenomenally) in relation to the understanding and its schematism.

It is too often forgotten that Kant refers synthesis, not to the understanding, but to a function of the soul of the subject, so that while he holds there is an *I* which intuites itself he holds that the *subject* 'intuites itself, not as it would represent itself immediately and spontaneously, but according to the manner in which the mind is internally affected, consequently, as it appears, and not as it is' (Kant, p. 41). He states also that *I*, as a subject, require 'in order to the cognition of myself, not only the consciousness of myself or the thought that I think myself, but in addition *an intuition of the manifold in myself*, by which to determine this thought' (Kant, p. 97). That is, *I* can only as an *intuitive self* determine myself as a subject. Kant assumes the existence of the intuitive self: for *I* do determine myself.

Now if we begin with this intuitive self in reasoning, and work down to the subject, instead of beginning with the subject and working up to the intuitive self, Kant's Schema and the schematism of the understanding are rendered clearer in our thought.

Sensibility gives the manifold to be intuited; the subject receives this manifold to be intuited in time and space: it receives it through and otherwise than through its normal organs of sense. The reception through the normal organs of sense is a reception of particulars of the manifold (diversity). The reception otherwise than through the normal organs of sense is a reception of the manifold in time and space, that is, the manifold is received in a continuum from unity

to diversity (the universal) which are the limits of contradiction of our universe of relations. The reception through the normal organs of sense gives objects: the reception otherwise gives the universal. The universal appears, to us, in our apprehension as a sum or total of particulars. From this latter reception we get, through sensibility, Kant's schema, and it requires no further argument to show that without this schema given to the understanding, objects would have no meaning in cognition: the particular is cognisable only in and through the universal.

The intuitive self presents intuition to the subject. But the subject is conditioned in time and space and so can only receive intuition conditioned in time and space. But—assuming sensibility affects it otherwise than through the normal organs of sense—the understanding now gets, through sensibility, not only objects, but the schema to operate on.

The understanding being conditioned in time, the schema is, to it, so conditioned: the categories (which apply to our universe in time) apply generally and are logically correct rules for the schema.

Kant says that 'it is not images of objects, but schemata, which lie at the foundation of our pure sensuous conceptions' (Kant, p. 109). And this requires explanation, for it is only the schema which is received by the subject.

Just as Kant relates conceptions to intuitions, though only intuition is presented, so he relates back images of objects to schemata, though only the schema is given. When I think of a number in the particular I can relate this back to its particular schema of a number in general. But just as all classes of objects given to and received by the subject are phenomenal only, so their schemata are phenomenal only. The schema itself is the manifold given to be intuited and received (phenomenally) in time and space. Thus Kant says:—

'Hence it is apparent that the schematism of the understanding by means of the transcendental synthesis of the imagination, amounts to nothing else than the unity of the manifold of intuition in the internal sense' (Kant, p. 112). The schematism of the understanding is the procedure of the understanding with the schemata, and Kant, herein, defines the schema as the manifold of intuition in the internal sense. The manifold of intuition in the internal sense can only be in the internal sense so far as it can be affected through sensibility.

The only distinction I raise is that the internal sense (a receptivity) can only contain the manifold *to be* intuited: it is the receptacle of the 'stuff' on which the subject can operate with the intuition presented to it (the subject) from the intuitive self. The internal sense being conditioned in time and space the manifold to be intuited which it contains is so conditioned.

Bear in mind, too, that Kant has said, 'apperception (and its

synthetical unity) . . . applies, under the name of the categories, to the manifold of intuition in general, prior to all sensuous intuition of objects' (Kant, p. 94). So when he refers above to the manifold of intuition in the internal sense, I think he does not mean to restrict this manifold of intuition to affects on the internal sense through the normal organs of sense, and it is important to note that now it is the schematism of the understanding which is in question for the transcendental synthesis of the imagination—there is no synthesis of mere objects.

But the intuitive self intuits and determines itself without any synthesis, so the synthesis of the subject must mark a conditioning of personality, must result from the limited nature or constitution of the subject. It is phenomenal.

I am afraid I must admit I can find nothing transcendental in the 'synthesis of the imagination.'

Given a subject unconditioned in time and space. By no possibility can we make any synthesis necessary for its self-apperception. But given a subject conditioned in time and space then we must have a synthesis. For no matter how or by what external such a subject is affected it must, in its human experience, refer all affection to itself as a thing of place and succession in time, and this imports synthesis. But there is no real synthesis, for the external remains the same whether or not the subject exist. Self-apperception of the subject means that it refers all its experience to itself as a thing of space and time. The self-thought of this 'particular of time and space' imports synthesis of its experience.

Before leaving this part of the subject one aspect has to be considered which is opened by our giving to sensibility power to affect the subject otherwise than through the normal organs of sense:—

The particular is cognisable only in and through the universal: the universal must be in the understanding for any conception of diversity to exist. (We shall find this is so in human experience when we hereafter consider memory.) Real knowledge is in the intuitive self only: the knowledge of the subject is but knowledge of relations between phenomena.

Sensibility gives us,—through our normal organs of sense—objects: it gives to us the external in diversity. We cannot hold that there is any reality in this diversity. For the diversity arises from the conditioning by the normal organs of sense of the manifold given to be intuited. What then does sensibility give us when received by us otherwise than through our normal organs of sense?

When the understanding uses ideas (as distinct from feeling or impressions) it uses them ordinarily as conditioned in the visual, auditory or tactile. This arises, I think, from the fact that the human personality is so largely conditioned by its normal organs of

sense: its understanding operates ordinarily as altogether subject to (conditioned by) its normal organs of sense.

But when sensibility affects us otherwise than through our normal organs of sense we do not receive the manifold as conditioned in the visual, auditory or tactile. This is an important fact sometimes lost sight of when telepathy is considered. (Both Gurney and Myers, as we shall afterwards see, recognised the fact.) So if these affects from sensibility emerge in the understanding as visual, auditory or tactile ideas, this must result from the understanding itself relating them to, or conditioning them in, the visual, auditory or tactile *after reception*.

It follows that from the nature of the understanding itself as conditioned by the normal organs of sense results the conditioning in diversity of the manifold to be intuited which is given to the understanding. (If we consider diversity I think it is a function of the visual, auditory or tactile.) For as the manifold to be intuited, received otherwise than through the normal organs of sense, is not received in diversity,—certainly not as visual, auditory or tactile,—we can only hold that this reception in diversity arises when the reception is through the normal organs of sense. Bear in mind, however, that when the understanding conditions in diversity the manifold to be intuited given to it, there is no *creation* of diversity: diversity, as before shown, is no more than an abstraction from the manifold.

This abstraction exists because of the particular and limited nature of the understanding as conditioned by its normal organs of sense.

We get, then, the manifold to be intuited given to the subject and received by it (otherwise than through the normal organs of sense) not conditioned in diversity. This reception by a self of intuition would be unconditioned in any way. But as the subject is conditioned in time and space, its reception must be conditioned in time and space. It can only receive the manifold to be intuited within such limits (a continuum from unity to diversity or the universal).

Kant starts with sensibility as giving only diversity (objects). But when, afterwards, he is driven to hold that the manifold to be intuited must be given previously to the synthesis of the understanding and independently of it (Kant, p. 89), he must be held to refer to sensibility this giving of the manifold to be intuited. There is difficulty here. When, however, we hold that sensibility affects the subject not only through its normal organs of sense but otherwise than through those organs, we get the manifold to be intuited as given to the subject through sensibility free from the limitations of reception through the normal organs of sense. The subject, though still limited in time and space, must be held *not* limited by its normal organs of sense. So there is given to it the manifold to be intuited in the highest form the subject is capable of receiving

it—within, that is, the limits of unity and diversity—(particulars of the manifold) where there is a continuum from diversity to unity. We get directly what Kant wants,—the giving by sensibility of the manifold to be intuited to a subject capable of receiving it within the limits of unity and diversity—capable of receiving it (under the conditions of time and space) in the universal and the particular.

The subject has, then (through sensibility which is passive), the potentiality of being affected (by the manifold to be intuited given by sensibility) both in the universal and the particular. And so, when it receives intuition from its intuitive self it can use this intuition not to intuit the manifold itself directly and fully, but within the limits of the universal and the particular, where the universal and the particular are limits of contradiction in our universe of relation in time and space.

I have argued that Kant's real subject is what he terms the 'soul of man' and that the subject he uses throughout the *Critique* is no more than a partial and mediate manifestation in time and space of this soul of man. Kant gives (a form of?) personality to the soul of man, and I have further argued that if we rely only on the *I* which intuits itself as the real subject and ignore all reference to the immortal soul of man we do not, to a certain point, affect Kant's reasoning in the *Critique*. I have even suggested we strengthen his reasoning and render it more easily intelligible.

But, by so doing, we limit the purview of our inquiry. If I can hereafter show there is human evidence in proof of the existence of what I term the intuitive self (the *I* which intuits itself), still this gives us no assistance in considering such questions as the existence of God, Immortality, Morality, Free-Will, or the relation of the External to Personality.

I barely touch on Kant's *Dialectic*.

Still, if it can be shown that *I* and *you* really exist as personalities higher in form than mere human personalities of transient time and space, so that the dissolution of material death affects us as (relatively) real subjects in no way, we shall have made an advance in human thought.

We can,—before considering human experience,—arrive at certain conclusions from the assumption of the existence of the intuitive self and of the fact that sensibility affects the subject otherwise than through the normal organs of sense.

The intuitive self presents intuition to its subject. The subject receives and operates with intuition so far as it can receive it. (The very assumption of the existence of this subject infers the assumption of its self-apperception: it is an active subject.) But the subject can only receive the manifold to be intuited through sensibility (which is passive).

It follows that the highest form of thought of the subject must

exist in the use of its fullest potentiality of being affected through sensibility.

Now the subject is most fully affected by sensibility when the affect is otherwise than through its normal organs of sense :—hence is the affect of the universal, whereas affects through the normal organs of sense are affects only in the particular (in diversity). (For unity we speak of a synthesis of diversity—or we analyse unity in diversity.)

But the particular is cognisable only in and through the universal. I think this means the universal must be in the understanding, for it to cognise the particular. And, if so, the universal must lie in cognition : it is not images of objects but schemata which lie at the foundation of our pure sensuous conceptions. But, however this may be, the understanding must have the universal to operate with in order to cognise the particular.

The highest form of thought, then, of the subject lies in its thought of the universal *not* of the particular (diversity).

By this argument we reduce our visual, auditory and tactile ideas to the subordinate positions of conditioned thought in the particular where there is in the understanding (relatively) a higher form of thought in the universal. As subjects, we have experience of the universal and we thus reduce our ordinary experience in the visual, auditory and tactile to mere conditioned particulars of this experience. We reduce our human personality conditioned by the visual, auditory and tactile to a supraliminal part of our (relatively) real subliminal human personality which is not so conditioned. (I here use Myers' general terms of the supraliminal and subliminal as marking the distinction between the subject as able to receive, through sensibility, only objects and as able so to receive the (relatively) universal. It is from this reception of the universal (otherwise than through the normal organs of sense) that I get the possibility of the subject and its self-apperception.)

We have thus opened to us a vast field of thought as to what is the consciousness, the human experience of the subject ; what is the true nature of its ideas and how these are related to the impressions received from sensibility either through or not through the normal organs of sense.

All such questions, however, I must, in the main, leave unanswered. I would only point out that when even psychologists admit we have *human experience* of feeling and impressions which are not conditioned in the visual, auditory or tactile, then the fact that sensibility affects us otherwise than through the normal organs of sense offers a possibility of approaching the solution of what are now insoluble problems.

But certain details must be considered.

The assumption made covers, for instance, the possibility that an event in Australia may affect a subject in England otherwise than through his normal organs of sense.

Can this affect result in visual, auditory or tactile *ideas* of the event in the subject? That is, can human evidence of the event be in the subject? Bear in mind that if such visual, auditory or tactile ideas emerge in the subject, the evidence of the event is in him, whether or not he record it for the knowledge of others.

I submit that such a result is possible.

Through sensibility the subject is affected by the event. Through intuition presented to the subject, the subject may be able to cognise the event. And to cognise the event in relation to its normal organs of sense the understanding has to create nothing. All it has to do is to condition its experience in relation to the visual, auditory or tactile; *to abstract* visual, auditory or tactile ideas of the event. The subject conditioned by its normal organs of sense is but a part of the subject not so conditioned. Through sensibility and intuition the subject has full experience of the event in its cognition. (Hereafter I try to prove that impressions, as distinct from visual, auditory or tactile ideas, lie in cognition.) From this full experience its understanding abstracts visual, auditory or tactile ideas.

Bear in mind I do not allege the subject does do this: its power in action can only be determined by the evidence of human experience. All I submit is that the potentiality may well be in the subject.

Kant dealt with a series of conditions. Reason proved to him incontestably that the fact of sensibility giving to us the universal, must be brought into his series of conditions. He could find no proof of this in human experience, and fell back on reliance on 'an art hidden deep in the soul of man.' If we now have proof in human experience that sensibility affects the subject otherwise than through the normal organs of sense, then we have the fact of sensibility giving to us the universal (an abstraction from the manifold, that is, a continuum from unity to diversity) brought into our series of conditions, and we can abandon reliance on an art hidden deep in the soul of man. We get our schema direct from sensibility without having to rely on any (transcendental?) transformation of sensibility into imagination.

More than this: in the light of the new proof we must expand or extend the meaning we attach to the term 'the subject.' We bring it into closer and less material relation to the (relatively) real, intuitive self—a self which, I hold, must be inferred to exist if Kant's scheme is to stand in reason.

It must not be forgotten that in all written above of the manifold as unconditioned, it can only be regarded as unconditioned in relation to the series of conditions in and through which the subject exists. All meant by saying it is unconditioned is that it is not subject to any conditions known to us.

## FURTHER ARGUMENTS AS TO THE INTUITIVE SELF

I ASSUME, by a consideration of Kant's reasoning, to have shown that unity and diversity are the results merely of abstractions from the manifold, the unconditioned; that they constitute, as it were, no more than limits (of contradiction) of the manifold as manifest in time and space; Kant's antinomies cannot exist in the manifold; they have existence only, for us, in our universe of relations.

And I have adduced argument to show that Kant's scheme necessarily infers the existence of an intuitive self, his subject being no more than a partial and mediate representation in time and space of this intuitive self.

Incidentally I must here explain that thus we answer directly an objection raised by Cousin, for Cousin points out that Kant states:—

'Elle (l'unité de la conscience) n'est donc qu'un phénomène elle-même, et elle est entièrement accidentelle' (Kant, by Cousin, p. 95), and that he (Kant) also states: 'Mon existence propre n'est pas un phénomène encore bien moins une simple apparence' (Kant, by Cousin, p. 97).

Cousin holds these statements to be contradictory, and by his reasoning they are contradictory. But if we hold that Kant's subject, the human personality, is no more than a partial and mediate manifestation in time and space of an intuitive self—that is, of a real self in relation to the phenomenal human personality—then Cousin's reasoning fails. For by 'l'unité de la conscience' Kant refers to the human personality, his subject, and this personality is clearly phenomenal and accidental; while by 'mon existence propre' he refers to the intuitive self, which is objectively real in relation to the human personality.

Having now arrived at an interpretation of what the manifold is, and determined its relation as the unconditioned to unity and diversity, we are in a position to consider a further and direct argument in support of the contention that the existence of an intuitive self is inferred in Kant's scheme.

Kant says: 'For that which of necessity impels us to transcend the limits of experience and of all phenomena is the *unconditioned*, which reason absolutely requires in things as they are in themselves in order to complete the series of conditions' (Kant, preface to second edition, p. 30).

Now I hold that the above statement is incontestably correct ; I doubt if many deny it.

But let us assume that Kant's subject constitutes our sole personality, that each one of us is no more than a thing conditioned in time and space ; a subject, that is, of human experience and of human experience only.<sup>1</sup> Then I deny the possibility, for this subject, of reason as defined by Kant in relation to understanding, and I deny the possibility of Kantian ideas.

For, in reasoning, we must treat this thing as an objective reality ; the ' thing ' itself can only reason about itself and its experience as objective realities. These were the assumptions that Hume made, and that most conscientious of all men admitted that the assumptions led him to conclusions which could not be exhaustive.

Haeckel, on the other hand, in his *Riddle of the Universe*, never admits that his conclusions are unsound. But what do we find ? He treats the subject as objective, the universe as objective. He assumes to solve the riddle of the universe by treating the series of conditions in and through which the subject and the universe exist as an infinite, exhaustive or unlimited series, so that the unconditioned is non-existent. But then, after an expression of his vague reliance on ' scientific ' faith, he says that his closed circle of moments of evolution and devolution takes place under ' the eternal iron laws of nature.' He founds his solution of the riddle of the universe—in the ultimate—on the fact of the immaterial governance of something immaterial of which he knows nothing but its effect on his personality and his lilliputian universe. He completes his series of conditions by admitting the existence of the unconditioned.

If the subject is objective it cannot, by reasoning, determine that it exists in a series of conditions. For its reason must be determined by its constitution, and its constitution is determined by the series of conditions, so that, to the subject, the series of conditions is objective and exhaustive ; there is no place for the unconditioned. Such a subject cannot think or reason outside itself and its conditions ; for itself and its universe, being objective, there is nothing ' outside ' for it to think or reason about.

How could such a subject determine that its universe is phenomenal ? How determine that things-in-themselves are the foundation of its phenomenal universe, when things-in-themselves are beyond its limits of experience and of all phenomena ? The very statement that it is objective is a statement that it is limited in concept, in (Kantian) idea, and in reasoning power within the limits of its own objectivity.

But what does Kant's subject do ?

By its own reasoning power it transcends the limits of its own experience and of its phenomenal universe (reason frees the conception of the understanding from the unavoidable limitation of a

<sup>1</sup> This assumption is to be taken as importing the falsity of telepathy.

possible experience, Kant, p. 256) ; by its own reasoning power it proves that it exists in a series of conditions. This proof imports proof, and proof for the subject itself, that the unconditioned exists. More than this, the subject can prove the relation of its series of conditions to the unconditioned ; it can prove that the unconditioned is the very foundation on which the series of conditions rests, though this foundation is buried so deep beyond the purview of cognition that the subject cannot determine what it is.

The subject could not thus reason outside itself and outside time and space if it were not more than a simple thing of space and time. For its reasoning power cannot be separated from itself ; this reasoning power is an attribute of, a characteristic inseparable from, the character itself. So there is something in the subject itself capable of transcending the limits of its own experience, and of its phenomenal universe.

If, then, the subject has this power of transcending its own experience and its phenomenal universe, it must be more than an objective thing of space and time. It arrives at definite conclusions that something exists which, in itself, is beyond its (the subject's) cognition. If the subject were simply a thing of cognition, this would be impossible.

We are driven to a conclusion that for the subject which can, in Kant's words, subject the manifold of every possible intuition to its unity of apperception, there is also necessary for it to cognise itself a determinate mode of intuition whereby the manifold is given (Kant, p. 96), and this imports the active presentation of intuition which can only be from a (relatively) real self. For when, in reasoning, we transcend our own experience and our phenomenal universe, we think (or intuite ?) in the manifold, though we cannot reduce such thought to cognition. By such thought or intuition we arrive at 'vital knowledge,' though this vital knowledge is, in cognition, sheer ignorance: the thought, if thought there be, is without content.

'That man knows that he is relative and anthropomorphic means that he is more, that he can stand above and outside himself, and measure himself against the infinite and eternal' (By Father Tyrrell, *Quarterly Review*, July 1909, p. 122).

Kant's subject, then, must be subjective to a (relatively) real subject. No determinate mode of intuition is necessary for the apperception of the real subject ; for Kant's subject a determinate mode of intuition in time and space is necessary. Kant's subject is a 'form' in time and space of the real, the intuitive subject ; or, as it were, a projection of the intuitive self on or in time and space.

## TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC

HEREIN, Kant arrives by pure reasoning at the conclusion that : —In our moral consciousness we find ourselves under a law which calls upon us to *act* as beings who are absolutely self-determined or free, and which, therefore, assures us that our intelligible self is our real self, and conclusively determines our empirical self in contrast with it as phenomenal (*Ency. Brit.*, vol. xvi. p. 84, 9th ed.).

If for the expression 'intelligible self' we replace 'intuitive self,' it may possibly be held that Kant himself proves that the human personality (the empirical self) is no more than a partial and mediate manifestation in time and space of the intuitive self (the intelligible self). And, if this be so, it would appear there is no reply to the accusation that I have been uselessly showing the way to a goal which is already full in sight.

But there is an important distinction in the method of proof.

In his Dialectic Kant introduces the factors of God, Free-will, and Immortality : it is the moral law he uses to give reality to the intelligible world. But I leave all these factors unconsidered : I refer them to the manifold. I neither affirm nor deny the moral law, for I do not engage in that higher form of thought necessary for its consideration or for consideration of the *Being* of God, or of the existence, in us, of Free-will or Immortality.

What I have as yet attempted to prove is that, under the assumption that sensibility affects us otherwise than through our normal organs of sense, we can prove by reasoning, *based on human experience*, that we exist as intuitive selves.

What I shall hereafter attempt to prove is that we do not need the assumption that sensibility affects us otherwise than through our normal organs of sense : I hope to show we do not need the assumption because it is a fact of human experience.

If this be proved it follows directly that our existence as intuitive selves is a fact of human experience. We arrive at this proof without relying, as Kant relies, on the assumption of the existence of moral law, and without entering on the profound problems of the *Being* of God or Nature, or of Immortality or Free-will.

Kant never assumes to prove the fact of the intelligible self otherwise than by transcending human experience. I, on the other hand, with the new fact of telepathy, assume ultimately to prove

the existence of the intuitive self without transcending human experience.

At the same time, when Kant's reasoning in the *Critique* up to (but not including) the Dialectic, is considered—as I have considered it—by the light of the new fact of telepathy (which imports the fact that sensibility affects us otherwise than through the normal organs of sense) I have tried to show that not only does all his reasoning stand good, but that it necessarily imports the fact of the intuitive self.

Bear in mind, however, I repeat, how very limited is the present inquiry, when compared with Kant's profound investigation disclosed in his Dialectic. The intuitive self is herein defined as no more than a self existing free from the limits of the series of conditions of the human personality in time and space. It is only in relation to the human personality that the intuitive self can be said to be immortal, to have freedom of will. The intuitive self, it is true, must be conditioned in relation to God, Immortality, and Freedom of Will. But all such questions I do not touch on—I restrict the argument to an attempt to prove, in human experience, the fact of our existence as intuitive selves.

In all yet written I have kept clear of any Dialectic. I have barely touched on Kant's Transcendental Dialectic, but as Kant does, in a certain connection, assume—he does not state as a fact—that the idea of the systematic unity of Nature possesses objective validity and necessity (Kant, p. 399), I must refer in some detail to his Transcendental Dialectic, though what I write must be eminently unsatisfactory. For I have only studied this part of the *Critique* with reference to the particular point I deal with.

In the first place, Kant defines Dialectic in general as no more than a logic of appearance. And he says: 'This does not signify a doctrine of probability, for probability is truth, only cognised upon insufficient grounds, and though the information it gives us is imperfect, it is not therefore deceitful' (Kant, p. 209).

But if in any Dialectic we are dealing with no more than a logic of appearance, we can by no possibility arrive at more than determinations in appearance. The intuitive self is a condition, and so, even for the self apperception of such a subject, there must appear, to us, to be objective validity and necessity in some systematic unity of Nature. But this is only in appearance, for if we hold there is absolute truth in such conclusions, we are reasoning under an assumption that we can condition the unconditioned, an assumption which is false.

In appearance we arrive at conclusions of the objective validity and necessity of some systematic unity of Nature, and at the unity of God. But these conclusions are purely anthropomorphic conclusions. They result from the particular nature of the subject's

unity of apperception in time and space, so that the subject treats unity as objective, as a real synthesis of the manifold. I hold that Kantian ideas lead us to a conclusion of the objective validity and necessity of the *manifold* of Nature, and of the *manifold* of God. We can prove the existence of the manifold; we can prove that unity and diversity are mere abstractions from the manifold. But this is simply arriving at vital knowledge of our own ignorance, for we know nothing of the manifold but within the limits of its abstractions of unity and diversity. If, then, we hold that God and Nature exist in unity as known to us, we are conditioning both.

God and Nature exist, to us, in unity; but there is an astounding power in man to reach out beyond all human experience, all phenomena. We can reach out to proof of the manifold where the manifold itself is incomprehensible to us in Kantian ideas, in ordinary idea, or in conception. Reason tells us that God and Nature exist, in fact, in the manifold.

But herein is no denial of the fact that God and, perhaps, Nature exist in some unity transcending any known to us. For though the manifold is, to us, the unconditioned, it is, in fact, no more than that which completes the series of conditions in and through which we exist.

Kant himself states:—

‘The unity of reason is therefore not the unity of a possible experience, but is essentially different from this unity, which is that of the understanding. That everything which happens has a cause is not a principle cognised and prescribed by reason. This principle makes the unity of experience possible and borrows nothing from reason, which, without a possible experience, could never have produced by means of mere conceptions any such synthetical unity’ (Kant, p. 217).

That is, the unity of reason is not the unity of the understanding, and for this unity of reason the principle does not hold that everything which happens has a cause: for, I think, Kant holds that this unity of reason is not conditioned in time and space as known to us. If so, we can in no way determine the unity of reason by any analogy to the unity of the understanding.

‘Now, as the unconditioned alone renders possible totality of conditions, and, conversely, the totality of conditions is itself always unconditioned, a pure rational conception in general can be defined and explained by means of the conception of the unconditioned, in so far as it contains a basis for the synthesis of the conditioned’ (Kant, p. 226).

All we can do is, by reason, to arrive at a conclusion that the unconditioned exists. I doubt if this imports a conception of the unconditioned, and as we can only negatively determine the relation of the unconditioned to a totality or synthesis of conditions, I do not see how any conception—if possible—of the unconditioned can

be a real basis for any synthesis of the conditioned. A synthesis of the conditioned exists only because of, and in relation to, the conditioned nature of the understanding, and all our knowledge is merely relative. I think that Kant, in the passage above cited, is referring, not to the manifold itself, but to the manifold in our apprehension.

‘These relatively fundamental powers must again be compared with each other to discover, if possible, the one radical and *absolutely* fundamental power of which they are but the manifestations. But this unity is purely hypothetical. It is not maintained that this unity does really exist, but that we must, in the interests of reason—that is, for the establishment of principles for the various rules presented by experience—try to discover and introduce it so far as is practicable into the sphere of our cognitions’ (Kant, p. 398).

This passage, read with that cited before it, would appear to show that Kant does not allege objective existence for the unity of reason, but only objective existence for it in relation to the subject, conditioned as the subject is; and this interpretation would appear to be supported by the following passage:—

‘Natural theology is a conception of this nature at the boundary of the Human Reason, inasmuch as it sees itself necessitated to look beyond to the idea of the Supreme Being (and in a practical connection, also to that of an intelligible world), not in order to determine anything in respect of this mere essence of the understanding—in other words, anything outside the world of sense—but to guide itself for its own use within the latter, according to principles of the greatest possible unity (theoretically as well as practically).’ (Kant’s *Prolegomena*, pp. 110 and 111.)

Throughout the whole of Kant’s chapter on the ‘Determination of the Boundary of the Pure Reason’ (Kant’s *Prolegomena*, p. 99, *et seq.*), I find nothing to show that he conditions the Supreme Being or the intelligible world in unity of reason against my statement that reason leads us to conclude they are, or exist in the manifold. I only find he states that reason, for its own guidance in the world of sense, deals with them according to principles of the greatest possible unity.

## DREAMS OF A SPIRIT SEER

I HAVE assumed, by somewhat lengthy reasoning, to show that Kant's *Critique* infers the existence of an intuitive self in each one of us, of which his subject is a partial and mediate manifestation in time and space. The main argument to this end is based chiefly on the fact that all human experience must be referred ultimately to the presentation of the manifold in intuition. Sensibility (which is passive) can only present the manifold to be intuited. But the presentation of the manifold in intuition must be active and so it can only be from a personality of intuition—an intuitive self. I have already tried to show why it is that, in the *Critique*, Kant does not definitely rely on the existence of the intuitive self but on that of the immortal soul in man.

But now we are in a position to show that he had in mind the possibility of the existence of this intuitive self, and that he contemplated this possibility without relying on the fact of the 'moral law' in support. For his *Dreams of a Spirit Seer*, is, I think, based on the assumption that this intuitive self—unconditioned in our time and space—has real existence, and the whole work would appear to consist of a consideration of the conclusions that naturally flow from such an assumption.

In *Dreams of a Spirit Seer*, Kant departs from strict reasoning: he theorises. It is true he laughs at himself for theorising (see p. 61)—says that never again will he indulge in so remote a part of metaphysics as that of spirits—and that as he cannot attain the great will restrict himself to the mediocre (p. 90). But, for all that, he presents the conclusions he draws, under his assumption of the existence of the intuitive self, as conclusions of reason.

Now if we hold that telepathy is a fact of human experience, I assume to have proved that Kant's *Critique* is rendered clearer in reasoning: I thereby make the intuitive self a fact in Kant's reasoning. And, if this be so, we may treat the conclusions Kant arrives at in his *Dreams of a Spirit Seer* as conclusions not based on the assumption of the existence of the intuitive self but on the fact of the existence of the intuitive self.

We can, then, consider these conclusions not in theory but in reasoning. That these conclusions are almost entirely negative follows directly from the fact that we who reason are largely conditioned in our time and space, whereas the intuitive self, about

which we reason, is not so conditioned—exists free from our series of conditions.

But though we arrive at a conclusion that the intuitive self exists, we can know nothing of what its existence is, *per se*: we can know it only so far as it is manifest to us in our phenomenal world. In this connection we may speak of the spiritual ideas of the intuitive self to distinguish them from the human ideas of the subject. Kant says:—

‘This difference, however, in the nature of spiritual ideas and those belonging to the body—life of man must not be considered so great an obstacle as to remove all possibility of becoming, sometimes, conscious of the influences of the spirit-world even in this life. For spiritual ideas can pass over into the personal consciousness of man, indeed, not immediately, but still in such a way that, according to the law of the association of ideas, they stir up those pictures which are related to them and awaken analogous ideas of our senses. These, it is true, would not be spiritual conceptions themselves but yet their symbols’ (*Dreams of a Spirit Seer*, p. 69).

Herein Kant shows how the intuitive self may be manifest to the subject. But herein we find also, incidentally, a reason why he only assumed the existence of the intuitive self. For by our ‘senses’ he meant our normal senses, so that he is still hampered by the assumption that sensibility affects us only through our normal organs of sense. Clearly, spiritual ideas can have no direct affect on our normal senses. But if, assuming telepathy as a fact, we widen the means sensibility has of affecting us and hold it affects us not only through but otherwise than through our normal organs of sense, we see how spiritual ideas (intuitive thought) may affect us and be manifest to us symbolically in ideas, visual, auditory or tactile. It is telepathy which, in human experience, makes possible this degree of manifestation of the intuitive self (even if disembodied) to the human personality.

Whereas affects from the external received through the normal organs of sense are, on reception, conditioned as visual, auditory or tactile, this is not so with such affects (telepathic) received otherwise than through the normal organs of sense. The conditioning of the latter as visual, auditory or tactile takes place, *after reception*, on their emergence as ideas in the human mind. This again shows that while ‘spiritual ideas’—to use Kant’s expression—cannot in themselves be conditioned as visual, auditory or tactile, they may, symbolically, so affect us as to ‘awake analogous ideas of our senses.’

Again Kant says:—

‘Departed souls and pure spirits can indeed never be present to our external senses, nor communicate with matter in any other way than by acting on the spirit of man, who belongs with them to one great republic’ (p. 72).

' We should, therefore, have to regard the human soul as being conjoined in its present life with two worlds at the same time, of which it clearly perceives only the material world, in so far as it is conjoined with a body, and thus forms a personal unit. But as a member of the spiritual world it receives and gives out the pure influences of immaterial natures, so that, as soon as the accidental conjunction has ceased, only that communion remains which at all times it has with spiritual natures ' (p. 60).

Herein, when Kant speaks of the human soul, he speaks of it as conditioned, for it is a personal soul. And I doubt if, for his immediate purpose, he places great reliance on the immortality of the human soul he refers to : he uses it only as a personality surviving its accidental conjunction with a body in the material world. If then we replace for the expression ' human soul ' the more limited expression ' intuitive self,' it would appear we do not interfere with Kant's meaning. Possibly we make his meaning clearer ; for the human experience of Kant's subject (a thing of bodily life) is derived from intuition, and, in relation to the subject, we may well speak of the intuition of the intuitive self as consisting of ' spiritual ideas.'

I have referred thus to *Dreams of a Spirit Seer*, because, if we accept telepathy as a fact, we find the theory of Kant therein referred to is raised to more than mere theory. We find his assumption of the existence of the intuitive self is more than a bare assumption : it is a fact. And so Kant's theorising becomes reasoning.

## MEMORY

### IDEAS AS SUBJECTS OF MEMORY

MEMORY, I think, is of far greater importance than is generally supposed when considered in relation to any attempt to determine whether or not there exists in each of us a (relatively) noumenal self. This is why I now try to worry out what memory really is. For all extant theories appear to me defective.

But before trying to determine what memory is, we must consider what it is that is the subject of memory. So far as possible this subject must be defined.

The term 'idea' appears to offer the nearest approach to what is wanted. But if we hold that 'ideas' are the subject of memory, explanation is necessary, in this connection, of what meaning I give to 'ideas.' For the term 'idea' has, in ordinary parlance, many and diverse meanings. At this point all we can say is that the definition to be arrived at will not include Kantian ideas: for when we consider the subject of memory, we are considering that which has relation to the human personality where the human personality is treated as objective.

Again, before stating the meaning that I now give to 'ideas,' it is necessary to define the terms, apprehension, perception, percept, conception, concept. For these terms are involved in any definition given for ideas: ideas are impossible without apprehension, perception and conception. I must, too, establish some relation between perception and conception before I can define the term 'ideas.'

When we consider sensibility we must treat the human personality as no more than a partial and mediate manifestation in our universe of the intuitive self, for in sensibility lies not only the possibility of the human personality being affected by the external, but of the intuitive self being so affected. And thus, when considering sensibility, we must consider the relation of the human personality to the intuitive self.

But when we try to define such terms as apprehension, perception and conception, we must treat the human personality as objective: for such terms have reference only to the subject, the human personality: the intuitive self is a personality of intuition, not of apprehension, perception or conception as known to us.

Apprehension has been defined as a term for the human faculty of perception. For instance—the intuitive self, being a personality, may be said to apprehend the manifold itself, the subject apprehends the manifold only so far as its (the subject's) apprehension permits.

Sensibility gives the manifold to be intuited. The human personality has only the potentiality of receiving the manifold to be intuited within the limits of space and time. This limited form of reception determines the limits of the perception of the subject. Perception is a term for the potentiality of the subject to receive the manifold to be intuited, and, as already shown, this potentiality extends, not to the manifold to be intuited, but exists only in limits, where the limits of contradiction are the universal and particular or unity and diversity. If we term the perception of the subject a passive human faculty (?) then the apprehension of the subject is this faculty of perception. The intuitive self may be said to have a noumenal faculty of perception so that the manifold itself is in its apprehension. The human personality has but a phenomenal faculty of perception so that the manifold itself is not in its apprehension. The manifold in the apprehension of the human personality is not the manifold itself, but the manifold in limits or abstraction. These limits (of contradiction) are from the universal to the particular or from unity to diversity.

But, so far, we have been considering the subject merely as passive: we have no active thought: we have no self-consciousness of perception.

The result of perception is, for the subject, conception of the understanding. Herein I find self-consciousness of perception. Just as sensibility (passive) is related to intuition (active) so—when we consider the human personality as objective—I make perception (passive) related to conception (active). We must hold sensibility to exist in itself, to be noumenal, but perception exists only in relation to the human personality.

Perception is a passive attribute or faculty (?) of the human personality: conception marks the activity in thought of the human personality.

Now conception, which is the act of conceiving, imports that something is conceived. And human experience informs us that the most diverse 'somethings' may be the subject of conception. We may have conception of the most simple object presented to us through our normal organs of sense or, at the other extreme, we may, for instance, have conception of the unity of nature. But whether we have a simple conception of any such object or a more complex conception (even of the unity of nature) all these conceptions differ from one another in degree only, not in kind. For the 'object' of conception, whatever it may be, exists in synthesis, and one 'object' differs from another only

in the relative complexity of the synthesis involved in the 'object.'

As I give this general meaning to conception, so I must give as general a meaning to 'concept.' I define the 'object' of any conception as a concept. Bear in mind, however, that the diversity of human conceptions (and so the diversity of concepts) arises phenomenally from the fact that the human personality is conditioned in time and space.

A 'percept' can have no reality in itself, for perception only marks the limited potentiality of the human personality to receive the manifold to be intuited given through sensibility. But just as we can use the term 'intuitions,' though only intuition exists, so we can use the term 'percepts,' though only perception exists for us: we can relate a 'concept' to a 'percept.' But bear in mind that conception gives us no knowledge of objects: the mere presentation of objects cannot make conception possible. For conception gives us knowledge only of relations between phenomena, so the universal must be presented to the understanding for conception to be possible.

Still, so far, we have nothing that can be the subject of memory. For perception has nothing to do with memory or the use of memory, and conception marks only the activity of the understanding—it is the act of conceiving: conception, itself, has nothing to do with any continuing effect in time on the understanding, it relates only to particular acts in time. Any percept, itself, can have no continuity in time, and so has nothing to do with memory. And a concept? It is no more than (in a general sense) the 'object' of conception: it has nothing to do with continued effect in time.

As memory is a fact of human experience, we must find something which affects the mind in self-consciousness where the effect is lasting in time.

I find this 'something' in ideas. It is necessary, therefore, as before said, to explain what I mean by ideas.

The first and simplest definition we arrive at for an idea is: A mental image, conception or notion.<sup>1</sup>

So far we find little or no difference between an idea and a concept—for a concept is an object of conception. But as an idea has a wider meaning than a concept, we must, so far, hold that an idea includes a concept, or that its inception infers the previous existence of a concept.

There is a definition of an idea by the Scottish school given as:—  
'The immediate and direct mental product of knowing, as distinguished from the object of knowing or process of knowing.'

The process (potentiality?) of knowing is in perception: the active mental product of knowing is in conception. So in this definition I find no satisfactory distinction between idea and concept. For

<sup>1</sup> My references will be mainly found in Murray's and the Century Dictionaries.

though conception includes its concept (the object of conception), I cannot admit that any object itself constitutes or is a concept. The concept itself appears to me to be no more than the (phenomenal) immediate and direct product of knowing, of conception.

Now a concept arises or originates in time, but does not, I think, in itself, infer continuance in time. An idea, however, does infer continuance in time.

Hence we get the further definition of an idea as :—

‘An image existing or formed in the mind. The mental image or picture of something previously seen or known and recalled in memory.’ Stanley (1659) says: ‘Ideas are notions of the mind, and subsist in our minds as similitudes and Images of Beings.’

These two latter definitions are not in substitution of the two former: they are but extensive of meaning. They show that subsistence in the mind after being formed in the mind is a characteristic of ideas: for otherwise they could not be recalled in memory. Herein I find a vital distinction between concepts and ideas.

So at this stage we arrive, for our present purpose, at the definition of an idea as :—

‘The immediate and direct mental product of knowing, as distinguished from the object of knowing or process (potentiality) of knowing; the product being such that, once formed, it subsists in the mind so that it can be the subject of memory.’

The ‘subject of memory’ means, so far, a mental product of knowing formed in the mind of the human subject at any time, which has continuance or subsistence in the mind, so that at any future time the human subject can bring it into the *present* time of its, the human subject’s, consciousness. Bear in mind that here a power only of the human subject is referred to—the *exercise* of the power is not referred to. Memory itself is the potential: the exercise of Memory is the use of this potentiality in bringing up into the present, ideas already in the mind.

But still we have not exhausted the subjects of memory.

For the term ‘idea’ means also :—

‘More generally, a picture or notion of anything conceived by the mind: a conception.’

This definition is weak as it stands, for, ‘anything conceived by the mind’ is not, I think, intended to refer to ordinary conceptions only, but to include imaginative or derivative conceptions. Otherwise it carries us little further than the previous definitions.

Now, when we have formed any ideas coming under the definition already arrived at, we can ‘play’ with these ideas in imagination. (The ‘bringing up’ into the present of ideas already in the mind infers only the exercise of memory: the *use* of these ideas to form deduced ideas infers the exercise of imagination (in its ordinary sense) as a characteristic of the understanding.) We can form in our minds deductions, and even inductions, from these ideas which

result in ideas in our minds: we can even use these ideas for the concoction of fantastic imaginative creations continuous in themselves—romantic tales, etc. And these ideas once formed in the mind have continuous existence in the mind. The man of science, for example, can, by the exercise of memory, recall not only the facts he dealt with in experiment or the books he read at any past time, but he can also recall, not only the deductions he made in his mind from this experience, but the theories he formed, the laws of nature he arrived at. These ideas are formed in his mind, and so subsist in his mind.

All such ideas are subjects of memory.

But, again, we must widen our definition to determine the subject of memory. For we can recall in memory impressions of feeling. We can recall in memory not only past events, but the feeling we experienced in relation to the events. We can do more. We can recall in memory impressions of states of feeling, of general malaise or abstract pain or pleasure, where the state of feeling is with difficulty associated with memory of any cognition, *per se*, or bodily state.

Herein I find myself faced by a question of great difficulty and am likely to stumble.

Imprimis, a digression is advisable but, as mystic, it may well be omitted by the reader. For what I now say is in apparent contradiction to the line of argument ensuing.

How, or in what way I do not know, but I allege that the human personality has direct experience of feeling quite apart from cognition or bodily state. (There may be a possible explanation for this when we use the fact that sensibility affects us otherwise than through our normal organs of sense.) If my own experience stood alone, what I now write would not be written. But I know others have had like experience—many, experience far more impressive than my own.

No few of us have known moments of mystic experience which we can *recall in memory*: experience which cannot be referred to cognition, cannot be referred to bodily state. The very feeling exists in *self-consciousness of non-self in time and space*: of the non-existence of the human personality, and yet in the finding of one's real self in this negation of human personality. Any one who has had such experience remains through earthly life impressed with living belief that he exists in some reality of which his human existence is but a passing shadow.

Herein I find a particular proof that we really exist as intuitive selves and only phenomenally as human personalities of time and space. But the proof is particular for a few of exceptional experience and so cannot be relied on generally. I therefore reject it as evidence of any value. I refer—in digression—to this exceptional

human experience merely to show that for some there is proof, outside cognition, that we are not objective things of time and space.

I enter now on the question of 'feeling,' and, for the reason above stated, my reply must be weak. But 'feeling' either, *per se*, or conditioned in some way, is a subject of memory and so must be considered.

Kant says that feeling is not cognition. But when he says 'the feelings of pain and pleasure . . . are not cognition' (Kant, p. 40), I think we may add the explanation that they cannot exist without consciousness in cognition. For cognition may be taken as a synonym for knowledge (Hamilton), and memory is perpetuated knowledge. Therefore, so far as feeling is a subject of memory, it must exist in cognition. And we know that moments of pain and pleasure are subjects of memory.

I distinguish feeling from the manifestation of feeling to us as subjects, in the same way that I distinguish intuition from cognition, which is the manifestation to us of intuition.

James Ward arrives at the ultimate conclusion that: 'The simplest form of psychical life, therefore, involves not only a subject feeling, but a subject having qualitatively distinguishable presentations which are the occasion of its feeling' (*Ency. Brit.*, vol. xx. p. 41, 9th ed.). Herein I find a distinction between feeling itself, and the manifestation of feeling to the subject. For the subject to be a 'feeling' subject, there must be presentations to it which are the *occasion* of its feeling. But when we bear in mind that James Ward, in arriving at the above conclusion, was treating of psychology as a science, and keeping at arm's length from the metaphysical, we get a second conclusion from what he states.

The subject must have 'occasion' through presentations for it to be a feeling subject. But feeling itself (whatever it may be) must be presented to the subject: feeling for the subject exists and exists only in consciousness. If feeling were not so presented, by no possibility could the subject get consciousness of feeling through any presentation.

And sensibility (passive) cannot present feeling: it merely opens the possibility for the subject to be affected by feeling. The presentation of feeling must be active, must be by an active subject of feeling which can feel without those presentations, necessary for the subject we consider to be a 'feeling' subject.

But so far there is some confusion in the argument which arises from the want of definiteness in our term 'feeling.'

James Ward in his essay on Psychology in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (vol. xx. p. 40),—where he distinguishes, carefully, metaphysical reasoning from psychology treated as a science—gives a general definition of feeling as:—

(a) A touch, a feeling of roughness; (b) an organic sensation, as

feeling of hunger; (c) an emotion, as feeling of anger; (d) feeling proper, as pleasure or pain.

He prefaces this definition of feeling by the statement that: 'As to the meaning of the term, it is plain that further definition is requisite for a word which may mean any one or all of the statements (a), (b), etc., given above.'

As I assume the subject can be affected (through sensibility) otherwise than through its normal organs of sense, I would add to these definitions—(e) impressions on the subject from the external and external personalities which do not result in sufficiently definite operation of the understanding to cause the emergence of visual, auditory or tactile ideas. These I term impressions of feeling, though they import some measure of cognition, and may be the basis of full cognition.

I do not think that, for the human personality, any fuller definitions for the term 'feeling' can be found than those above given. And what do the definitions amount to? They do not define feeling; they define only impressions of feeling. They explain in no way what feeling itself is; they explain only what feeling as manifest to the subject is. Still, without them, the subject could not be a feeling subject: they are the presentations which give occasion to the subject so that it can be a feeling subject. More than this. They are all subjects of memory and so must be cognition or be in cognition.

But we are carried no further in our attempt to get a definition of 'feeling' itself: feeling itself does not exist in cognition any more than intuition does.

I think no definition of feeling is possible. All we can do is to arrive at the fact that feeling exists.

James Ward does not treat the subject as a *pure* feeling subject: its 'feeling' is conditioned in that, to be a feeling subject, it requires presentations for the occasion of its feeling. It cannot feel directly: it can only feel through presentations in its universe of contradictions. But, as feeling itself must be presented actively to the subject, we are driven to assume the existence of a pure feeling subject which presents feeling to the subject.

What then is feeling? We do not know any more than we know what intuition is. But we must hold it exists as it is manifest to us in our universe. And we must distinguish. The pure feeling subject is the intuitive self: the subject is not a pure feeling subject, it is merely a subject to whom feeling is presented; and, being no more than a partial and mediate representation of its intuitive self, its feeling is no more than a partial and mediate manifestation (in its universe) of pure feeling. The confusion in our argument has arisen from our confounding pure feeling with those limited manifestations of feeling which only affect us consciously as subjects.

It was said by G. H. Lewes that all cognitions, even the most

abstract, are primarily feelings, and perhaps I should not err in saying I define feeling as an expression for the affect of intuition on the subject. But all I want, for our present purpose, is the fact that impressions of feeling are subjects of memory: and this fact, it would appear, is established.

Consider our universe: it is one of relations. The intuitive self intuiting directly has knowledge. We, as subjects, conditioned in a universe of relations have but a form of knowledge: our knowledge is relative. Even a concept gives us no knowledge: it gives but relative knowledge of the concept as a relative thing: knowledge only of the particular relation of the concept to other relations.

Now the idea of pleasure has no meaning to us unless we have in mind the idea of pain also in contradiction; feeling of pleasure has meaning only in relation to feeling of pain. So, even a feeling of sympathy or of pride imports ideas in the mind of the contradiction of sympathy, the contradiction of pride. And any impression on the subject otherwise than through the normal organs of sense, must—if the subject is to be conscious of the impression—give occasion to the subject for feeling by affecting its understanding, an understanding which exists, and exists only, in its universe of contradictions. If then—as we must—we give reality to feeling, we find it cannot, in itself, consist of pleasure, pain, sympathy, pride, etc., for no one of these can be thought (or felt?) without its contradiction also. These must be but forms of feeling manifest to us in our universe of relations.

But as we are justified in relating back our cognition (partial manifestation to us of intuition) to the unknown 'intuition,' so we are justified in relating back feeling, as manifest to us, to the unknown 'feeling.' As unity and diversity can have reality only for us, so pleasure and pain, for example, *as known to us*, can have reality only for us.

The first affect from the external on the subject may be said to be in feeling. From this feeling it derives or abstracts cognition—the cognition of its self-apperception in time and space. I cannot understand how the memory of the human personality, as a human personality, can affect it, the human personality, in self-apperception (as it does affect it), unless the understanding has been affected in some way. And this must be in cognition.

How then can the subject in self-apperception be affected by impressions of feeling as distinct from impressions of ideas? Feeling itself cannot so affect it.

It follows that feeling must be manifest in time and space before it can affect the subject. And as feeling so impresses us that we can recall the impressions in memory, we know that feeling *is* manifest to us in time and space: we can recall in memory these past impressions of feeling where the recalled impressions are not conditioned as visual, auditory or tactile ideas.

So, though we are ignorant of what feeling is, *per se*,—it is not cognition—yet we can cognise its manifestation in time and space. For impressions of feeling are subjects of memory, that is, by the exercise of memory we can recall, in present time, past impressions of feeling as distinct from past visual, audile or tactile ideas, and this could not be unless through the cognition of the understanding.

We find, then, that not only ideas, as before widely defined, but impressions of feeling are the subject of memory. An impression, then, comes under the term 'idea' as defined by me as the subject of memory.

But still, for the following reason, I distinguish impressions from ideas.

Assume—as I shall hereafter assume—that telepathy is a fact. Imagine that A is affected by the external otherwise than through his normal organs of sense. How will he be affected if conscious of the affection? He will be affected first by an impression of feeling. This impression I admit lies in cognition. But it may end in what may, perhaps, be here termed inchoate cognition; it may be followed by no such definite affect on the understanding as to give rise to definite ideas as distinct from impressions of feeling. His cognition may only give him information that he has been affected by the external without giving him definite information as to who or what affected him, without giving him any definite sublunary facts in ideas, visual, auditory or tactile. For such definite ideas to arise in him there must be not only the affection from the external which affects him in impressions of feeling, but this affect must be of such a (continuing) nature as to cause operation of the understanding in the emergence of definite ideas.

In all such cases the impression in feeling must precede the emergence of ideas in the subject. This is, indeed, no more than a corollary from the fact that intuition (which we can only now term feeling) is the basis of all cognition—of all ideas.

I therefore treat the subject of memory as consisting in impressions and ideas as defined. When we come to a consideration of the facts of telepathy, we shall find it is of the greatest importance to bear in mind that impressions in feeling always precede the emergence of definite ideas in the understanding of the subject, when affected by the external otherwise than through the normal organs of sense.

## MEMORY

IN now trying to worry out what memory really is, I begin by assuming that the subject and its ideas have objective reality. With this assumption the conclusion is arrived at that the ideas we use when exercising the power of memory are unconditioned in time and space. I then abandon the above assumption and, treating the subject as a partial and mediate manifestation in time and space of the intuitive self, try by strict reasoning to reconcile what theory tells us must be fact with the practical (but impossible) conclusion originally arrived at.

I am standing at some place at some time—no matter where, no matter when. I hear a bell ring. This is something external to me: let us call it an event in my life—I being an ordinary human being.

Now, so far as I am concerned, that bell rang once and for all: the same ring of the same bell can never be repeated. The ringing of the bell was, for me, an event that took place in time and space *once*, never to occur again.

But how was it I knew that the bell rang? Because the ringing affected me in some way. I heard the ringing. In fact I know nothing at all of what the event was except the affect of the event (the ringing) on me. So all I can allege is that an event occurred as to which I know nothing but that its effect on me was, what I term, the ringing of a bell.

But though I know nothing of what the event really was in itself, I can say I know, *so far as I am myself concerned as a human personality*, that it happened in time and space once and for all, never to be repeated. How I know this and what the knowledge is worth will be considered hereafter.

Now I shall make an assumption: I shall assume for the present that my memory is a perfect memory.

A week, a month, a year, or a day has passed since I heard that bell ring and, therefore, since the event happened once and for all never to be repeated. But I can still think about the event when I choose to do so. When I do not choose to do so, I do not think about the event. It does not matter at all how much or how little time has passed since the event happened: I can, if alive, still

think about it when I choose. And as I always, when I choose, think about the event itself as always exactly the same, it seems—even at this early stage of our argument—as if time and space had nothing to do with my thinking about the event: it would appear to be only my *choice* of thinking that has to do with time and space.

But how is it that I can think at any time about this event, which happened once and for all in time and space? Which, as an event, is to me a dead thing of the past?

It is because when I assume to think of the event I am not thinking of the event, but of the affection of the event on me, and because, though the event, to me, happened once and for all, the affection of the event on me is lasting.

When the event happened, the happening caused a mental impression on me. I term this impression an idea of the event. Bear in mind I have already defined what I mean by an idea.

If at any time, so long as I live, I can use this idea of the event whenever I choose: if, when I take it out for use, I find it always exactly the same; if, when I take out any such idea for use, I find it is not necessarily governed by any law of succession in relation to other ideas (bear in mind the distinction between events and ideas of events), then it follows that the idea, so long as I live, is not subject to change, decay or death in time and space. The idea is not, during my lifetime, conditioned in or by time or space.

And here an important distinction must be borne in mind: the distinction between the idea and the use, by me, of the idea. The idea must be *in me* or I could not use it: and it is in me, unconditioned in time and space. But when I take it out for use, I take it out *in* time and space. For I and my understanding are conditioned in time and space, and I can only exercise my power of memory in time and space.

Ideas, then, in relation to the human personality, are not conditioned in time and space: the use of ideas by the human personality is conditioned in time and space.

But any idea comes into being in time and space: it is the happening of the event in time and space that gives birth to the idea of the event in (approximately) the same time and space. And the idea—as an idea—ends in time and space with me, the human personality, when I end in time and space. So we find that the idea is (apparently) only unconditioned in time and space for a definite period between two particular times—and two particular spaces?—which on its face is impossible: the unconditioned cannot, itself, be limited by the conditioned.

Besides the above there are many other objections to the allegation that ideas, for a particular period and a particular period only, are unconditioned in time and space.

I proceed to deal with the objections.

The object in view is to prove that, in spite of these objections, the allegation made points to the truth. What the truth is will appear later on, when we consider the fact that the real basis of ideas is in intuition.

### A PERFECT MEMORY

Is there such a thing as a perfect memory ?

I argue that each one of us has, potentially, a perfect memory, and that it is only our power to use memory in the present which is, normally, imperfect ; under abnormal circumstances we have full power to use this, potentially, perfect memory in the present.

Myers says : ' I hold that every impression made on the organism . . . be it visual, auditory or tactile, is in a certain sense remembered by some stratum of that organism, and is potentially capable of being reproduced in the primary memory ' (*Proceedings*, vol. vi. p. 191).

The exercise of memory consists in the use in the present of ideas already stored up in the subject. These ideas have had their origin in events which have happened in relation to the subject, so that the subject has been affected by the events.

I have dealt at present only with a simple event—the ringing of a bell—where the event was a positive act. But now we must have a more general definition. ' An event ' as hereinafter used, means any of the originating causes giving rise to ideas and impressions as hereinbefore defined. I shall here use the term ' idea ' as covering both an ' idea ' and an ' impression.'

Now, however involved or intricate our ideas may be, when we call them up in the present by the exercise of our faculty ' memory,' we call them up *from ourselves* : the ideas must necessarily be already in us, or there is no exercise of memory. This sounds a mere commonplace, but it is of the greatest importance. The ideas must be in our potential memory or by no operation of the understanding could we, by the exercise of memory, call them up into the present. Further, if we can always call up these ideas into the present, the ideas themselves must always, potentially, be in the present *in relation to ourselves*.

Mark, then, these facts :—

When we consider ' memory ' we must have (1) a storage in us, potentially in the present, of ideas which arose in us in relation to events of the past ; (2) a capacity to call up into the present, for use in the present, these or some of these stored ideas. If our capacity extends to calling up into the present for use in the present, all and every of these stored ideas, then we have, what is ordinarily termed, a perfect memory. If there is in all of us a full storage of ideas of all past events which have affected us, then, whether we can or cannot call them all up into the present for present use, we have

in all of us, the 'stuff' for a perfect memory. If we have not what is termed a perfect memory it is because we cannot use all this 'stuff.'

This question of the fallibility or perfection of memory has not, necessarily, anything at all to do with the storage of ideas. For it may well be that each one of us has the same full and complete storage of ideas and yet that each one of us has varying capacity to take out of and use from the storage, ideas of these events for use in the present.

Human evidence points very strongly to, if it does not prove, the fact that there is the same full and complete storage of ideas in each one of us, and that we differ from one another, in memory, only in our varying capacity to take ideas out of this storage and use them in the present.

Events do affect us, and it is the ideas resulting from these affects that we use when we exercise memory. The fact that any one of us can only, by the exercise of memory, call up for use in the present certain ideas of certain past events, constitutes no evidence that only these certain events have given rise to ideas. When we say that the memory of some particular person is defective, we mean simply that he fails in normal capacity to call up for use in the present, ideas of past events: we predicate nothing as to his having or not having, in him, the ideas themselves. Indeed, the very limitation referred to, when we speak of a defective memory, would appear to be based on the assumption that there is this full storage of ideas in the subject, and that the defect in memory consists in want of capacity to use it as it is normally used.

If we make any attempt to limit the storage in any one of ideas of past events, by the measure of his capacity to use the ideas in the present, we must fall into hopeless confusion. For the capacity of each of us to exercise memory varies from time to time normally, and if the power to exercise memory is taken as a measure of the ideas stored in us, then this storage must vary from time to time; and this cannot be.

Again, we have much 'abnormal' evidence which supports the allegation that there is this full storage of ideas in all of us.

Cases are not rare where human beings at a crisis of life—danger of death by drowning or otherwise; a serious mental or nervous shock; exceptional emotional state—find all the events of their past life brought before them in consciousness in the immediate present: trivial details of the past that they had forgotten, flash into present conscious clarity.

Now no crisis in a human life can create, for such human life, events of the past or present ideas of the past. So what happens must be this: the crisis so affects the personality that it, the personality, is enabled abnormally to call up into present consciousness what is already in it, the personality. What is called up into present

consciousness must have been (crisis or no crisis) already in potential consciousness.

Again, it is the external, the crisis, that causes this result. The understanding through the internal sense of the subject is affected by the external. (The crisis cannot affect the subject in unity of apperception directly.) So the power to call up, in a flash, all the past into the present must have been pre-existent to the crisis. What the crisis has done is simply to give circumstance (the external) to the understanding which has enabled the personality to exercise patently its latent power.

(I admit an apparent contradiction in the above paragraph; for the understanding is conditioned in time: the use of the term 'understanding' may be incorrect. But as the understanding can, for example, think a house in the manifold, so it might, in any such crisis referred to, be able to think its storage of ideas in the manifold.)

The importance of such cases lies in this.

The only relations in time are simultaneity and succession (Kant, 137). I am arguing that our storage of ideas is in us unconditioned in time and space, not stored in succession. Events happen successively, their affects on us have effect successively; that is, ideas are stored in our minds successively. But when stored up they fall back, or retreat as it were, into what is to us the manifold where there is neither succession nor simultaneity. It is true that when we use these ideas in the present we use them successively or simultaneously, for human thought in the present is so conditioned. But by the exercise of memory we can abstract these ideas in *arbitrary* succession or simultaneity: that is, we find our storage of ideas is not conditioned in any determined form of succession or simultaneity. For if it were so determined in form we could not change the form: we could not pick and choose, arbitrarily, now some ideas, now others for use in present time. So if, in any crisis like to those stated above, we find all our past present to us in a flash of the present, then we are affected abnormally by all our stored ideas at once, that is, *not* in succession. (The affect I think is in the universal, not in simultaneity). So the storage of ideas cannot, in itself, be conditioned in time.

It may be argued in objection that though, in such a crisis, all our past flashes before us in an instant of time, still, as we know nothing of absolute time, this past may still flash before us in succession. And the argument cannot be definitely proved as false; though, in relation to the subject, it is not easy to understand how a period of years can flash before one in an instant and without any appearance of succession.

In support of my argument, I can refer to cases of dreams of pure (not Kantian) imagination where the dramatisation is backwards:—

'A long dream of the Reign of Terror concluded with his "the

dreamer's" arrest, trial, conviction; he clearly remembered all the details of his transportation in a tumbril to the place of execution, how he was bound to the fatal plank, how the knife fell—and with the blow he awoke to find that the curtain pole of his bed had fallen and struck him a severe blow on the back of the neck. His mother, who was in the room, said that he awoke the instant it fell.'

Again:—

'A similar case was narrated by a friend of mine. She had been very ill with typhoid fever but was convalescent; she had fallen into a light doze in her chair and dreamed that she was being pursued from room to room by a savage dog. She would enter a room, close the door, hold it against him; he would make his appearance by another door, and she would escape by the one she was holding and take flight to another room. This lasted, she thought, for half an hour or so. She had been driven to the third storey and taken refuge in a small room with but one door. That door she held against the dog's pressure until her feeble strength gave way, the brute sprang upon her with a howl—and she woke with a start to find that her sister had at that moment placed her hand upon her arm and said "Boo"' (By Professor W. Romaine Newbold. *Proceedings S.P.R.*, vol. xii. p. 20).

The above two cases are given as examples of a class: they show the mere play of fancy or imagination.

Now I deny that fancy or imagination—even hypnotism—can create anything which had not previous existence: apparent exaltation of faculty or power results only from a freeing of the subject from normal restrictions or from a change in what is external to the subject, so that it can manifest patently what was before latent. When imagination plays with a storage of ideas it creates nothing new, it simply gives new (phenomenal) form to what is pre-existent.

If we hold that the two dreams were dreams unconditioned by time and space—dreams where there was no succession—the difficulty as to 'dramatisation backwards' disappears. But, if we hold this, we must also hold that it was the freedom from certain bonds of the external that sleep gave, which enabled the subjects to 'dream' unconditioned by time and space. Further, we must hold that the power to use ideas, unconditioned in time and space, was latent in the subjects when *not* asleep, and became patent only from change—by sleep—in the relation of the subjects to the external.

If the blow from the curtain-pole and word 'Boo,' spoken, did originate the dreams recorded, then I do not think we can introduce 'succession' as governing the dreams.

But when the dreamers awoke they could only think in time and space—in succession. Looking back on their dreams in the 'manifest' they could only regard them under the limiting condition of succession.

All these imaginative dreams, where the dramatisation is backwards, are really kaleidoscopes where the ideas already stored in the dreamer are used as material. But they certainly point to power in us to dream in the manifold, though, doubtless, most normal dreams take place in succession in time.

Of many remarkable cases bearing on the question of a perfect memory now under consideration, the most remarkable I know is that reported in the *Journal of the S.P.R.*, vol. xii. p. 287.

I give a digest, as short as possible, of this case.

The subject, Miss C., was not a professional medium. She was hypnotised, and when in trance described herself 'as leaving her body and going "up" into other "planes" of existence of which the one most constantly visited is described as the "Blue."' In one of these planes Miss C. purported to meet a certain lady, Blanche Poynings, who lived in the time of Richard the Second and—from alleged conversations with this lady—Miss C. purported to give many details as to Richard the Second, the Earl and Countess of Salisbury, and others. These details were found to be historically correct, especially the genealogical data. Miss C., in her normal state, could remember nothing that she had read bearing on the facts given.

It was, however, ultimately discovered that in 1892 (the experiment was in 1906), when Miss C. was a girl of eleven, her aunt had read to her a novel entitled *The Countess Maud*. In this book the character Blanche Poynings appeared, and 'the book proved to contain the whole of the personages and facts she, "Miss C.," had given.'

Now leave out of consideration the imaginatively objective reality Miss C. gave to the people she spoke of; leave out of consideration also any distinction between the 'subliminal' and 'supraliminal' self. Personally I think that if the 'subliminal' and 'supraliminal' self are considered they must, in many connections, be considered as no more than subjective conditions of a relatively objective self.

What does the case prove?

That the chance reading of a chance novel to Miss C., when she was a girl of eleven in 1892, left stored up in her after long years, ideas of what she had heard. If we treat this 'reading' as an event in the life of Miss C., we cannot imagine any event in her life less likely to leave, stored up in her, ideas of the event. The 'event' was not even in itself of such 'imaginative' interest as to be likely to make any lasting impression. Much of what was remembered was from the appendix to the book, and, as Mr. Fielding says, 'dull as was the book from all accounts, the appendix was still more dull, and it was improbable either that a child should read it willingly herself, or even that her aunt should have inflicted it on her.'

In volume xii. of the *Proceedings S.P.R.*, p. 263, is an interest-

ing case given by Professor J. H. Hyslop, and received by him from a Mrs. D. who wrote in 1883 :—

‘ A few years ago I was visiting my mother. I said “ Mother, I dreamed of being in some place last night. It seemed so real, I want to tell it to you.” After telling her of the house, the queer garden, etc., mother told me I had been there, but that I was a very small child when I made my visit.’

A hypnotised girl recognised and named a doctor with whom her only connection was that at the age of two she had been an inmate of an institution he had visited (*Proceedings*, vol. iv. p. 545).

I refer hereafter to certain experiments carried out by the Rev. H. E. (see Part II. pp. 191 *et seq.*), which point to there being in each one of us this perfect memory. Now (February 10, 1910) the Rev. H. E. sends me a statement of the following experiment :—

‘ I once gave a subject, while awake, a cedar pencil which I took from my pocket. He was to make some calculations for me, previously to being hypnotised, and he used the pencil for about five minutes or so. After he had been hypnotised, and had completed the experiment in which I was engaged, I asked him suddenly the name, etc., of the maker of the pencil. He gave it me at once, and knew the number of the particular make, which was stamped in the usual gold letters and figures, together with the name of the manufacturer. Afterwards, when he was awake, I offered him five shillings if he would give me these details, but he was quite unable to, adding that he had never troubled to look at the pencil. Now he *had* looked at the pencil, and he had taken in all these details—probably at a glance—but he was quite unconscious of the fact. It may be argued that he read my mind. But this will not help much, as I must, equally unconsciously, have learnt these details and stored them, for I did not know in the least the words or numbers on the pencil, and should be quite ready to declare I had never seen them.’

Referring to a particular case of this class, Myers states :—

‘ In this and similar cases the original piece of knowledge had at the time made a definite impress on the mind—had come well within the span of apprehension of the supraliminal consciousness. Its reappearance after however long an interval is a fact to which there are already plenty of parallels’ (*Proceedings S.P.R.*, vol. viii. p. 381, cf. the cases reported on pp. 488 and 489).

These many cases can only be reasonably accounted for by the theory that there is in all of us the same full storage of ideas of past events, and that we vary in memory one from another only in our varying power to use these ideas in immediate consciousness. If, for example, it had not been for the offchance that Miss C. was mesmerised, she herself would never have had the remotest present human consciousness that these ideas were stored up in her.

Consider, again, cases of multiplex or alternation of personality, leaving out of question the possibility of possession—a possibility which I neither accept nor reject. Can we suppose that each personality has its own exclusive store of ideas for the use of memory? that each personality has an entirely different and separate store of ideas?

Take a simple case where the subject has two personalities, personality A and personality B. When B comes on the scene, can he by any possibility originate in himself a new storage of ideas foreign altogether to that already existing in A? When B disappears and A returns, where does he find his original storage of ideas if B has replaced it by a foreign storage?

On the other hand, if A and B both use different parts of the same storage, we can account for the change of personality as humanly manifested. But here again we find we cannot measure the storage itself in A or B by the use of it by A and B. For A and B both use a different storage, and if we measure each storage by its use, there is real exclusive difference between the storage of A and the storage of B; and this would appear to be impossible. The difference then must consist in A using one part, B another of the same one storage. And this points to, though it does not prove, full storage of ideas of all past events in A—and so, necessarily, in B. There is difference only in the use of the storage.

Where the difference between the personalities A and B is in feeling, the problem becomes more difficult and cannot now be dealt with.

So far we can only say that multiplex, or alternations of, personality result from varying outcome in human manifestation of one and the same understanding where the ideas for the use of memory are the same for all the personalities in any one particular case, though the use itself of the ideas varies.

‘For any difference in memory involves a certain difference in character, and in proportion as the two memories are *co-exclusive* (which they may be in varying degrees) the moral and intellectual habits founded on the differing memories will be likely themselves to diverge’ (By Myers, *Proceedings S.P.R.*, vol. iv. p. 225).

We find, then, there is strong evidence to support the contention that there is in all of us this full storage of ideas, unconditioned in time and space, of past events, and that we differ from one another in memory, simply in that our understandings vary in power to use this storage. Or, it may be, that the understanding of each one of us has power to use this full storage of ideas in the present, but that, normally, each one of us cannot so use it, simply because circumstance is normally adverse to such full use. And this view appears to me the more probable. (Cf. the chapter on Crystal Gazing, and, especially, the experiments therein referred to of the Rev. H. E. These experiments support the above argument.)

I think the evidence is strong enough to justify the assumption that there is in each of us, potentially, a perfect memory.

Another objection may be put forward on the ground of:—

### THE RELATION OF IDEAS

It has been shown that unity and diversity are the results merely of abstraction from the manifold, and that a concept of an object in itself gives no knowledge of the object to the subject: the universal is necessary for cognition of the particular.

But it has been shown, too, that Kant holds sensibility to give the manifold to be intuited, and I assume to follow Kant in holding that the concept of an object results from an abstraction from the manifold given to be intuited, and that synthesis (unity) results also from an abstraction from the manifold given to be intuited. Further, either abstraction infers the other.

Now if when we call up an idea in the present we find it is indissolubly linked with other ideas, do we not find that *time* becomes a condition of ideas in themselves?

For we cannot relate one idea to another without introducing succession, *i.e.*, time, and an idea, for us, exists only in relation to another idea or other ideas.

Here again I think we find confusion between the idea itself and the use of the idea by the subject. For we only relate an idea to another idea when we *use* the idea for relation to other ideas, and this use is necessarily in time and space.

The idea itself, being the result of an abstraction from the manifold, must have in it, the idea, at least something of, or in relation to, the manifold. The idea truly is a phenomenon; it could not, however, be a phenomenon if not based on the permanent. But the subject can only use the idea in diversity, in relation to other ideas.

The subject receives the idea in diversity. This does not show that the idea is conditioned in itself; it shows but a condition of its reception.

Again, it has been stated that an idea of an object is really the idea of no more than a particular relation, and therefore it may be argued that it is in itself a (subjective) thing of diversity, therefore of time. And this is true *for us*.

But when, by reasoning, we are driven to conclude that ideas are not fundamentally conditioned in time and space, we find we can explain away the above argument.

All we, as human personalities, know of ideas is their use. We may have a full storage of ideas in potential consciousness of which we ordinarily know little, because we cannot fully use it. As we are conditioned in time and space, we know we can only use ideas in time and space. Clearly, then, we cannot disprove the state-

ment that ideas only appear conditioned in time and space because we are so conditioned.

If ideas are of 'stuff' conditioned in time and space, there can be nothing in them of, or in relation to, the permanent. But they are the result of abstraction from the manifold, and so must have something in them of, or relating to the permanent—though this is beyond our knowledge as human personalities. Succession in time infers the existence of the permanent, which is not conditioned in time (Kant, p. 40).

The constitution of our brain is material, and so in a state of constant flux; we can understand, then, the passing effect on us of a passing event. But we cannot understand the lasting effect on us of the idea of the passing event. If it be replied that the idea is lasting simply because of a lasting material change (effected by the idea when arising) in the material brain, the reply fails. For no part of the material brain can remain changeless in time: if this permanence in the brain be alleged, we then have material permanence between *two times*, which is impossible. Every event is probably correlated to some material change in the brain of the subject affected. But this does not support any argument for the fixity of such change.

Such ideas, however, are in us unconditioned in time and space if:—

*Ideas do not change in time.*

When by the exercise of memory we call up for use in the present any of our stored ideas, we find that these ideas have apparently changed in time. The great river of childhood has, in our middle age, dwindled to a little brook. Venus has evolved into Hecate, and the loved apple a thing of fear.

But it is we who have changed, not the ideas. We have, in time, stored up new and fresh ideas: when we call up into the present a past idea, we call it up for use in relation to our other stored ideas, and so the relation of the idea to our storage constantly changes, as the storage itself changes; hence the apparent change in the remembered idea. (Bear in mind that imagination, whatever it may mean in ordinary parlance, is not memory. It may be based on memory, may be a kaleidoscope which uses ideas to make quasi-original pictures from ideas. But it is not memory.)

In considering this question of whether ideas do or do not change in time, leave out of consideration all question of will. Will in itself has nothing to do with cognition and nothing to do with the subject now considered—the human personality, the ordinary human being (Kant, p. 40). It has to do with the real self of intuition. By the exercise of will independence of memory, of all past ideas, of the external itself can be attained. The many well

recorded cases of the remarkable effects of 'self suggestion' show that there is in all of us—though generally undeveloped, even altogether unused—power by exercise of will to subject the external to ourselves. But this has nothing to do with cognition.

The great river of our childhood is in itself the same thing as the little brook of our later age. The affection of this thing on us, as children, remains in us in idea in continuity of personality. By what possibility can after-change affect this idea? The idea itself?

The idea, changeless in itself, remains in us: the very fact that we can compare the idea of our childhood with the idea of our later age proves the continuance of the former idea.

When, in age, we see the same stream of water that we saw in youth, the impression on us from the external may be the same. But the resulting idea (in itself a new idea) relates to a different storage of ideas, which makes the affection of the idea on us to differ from what it would have been were we still children.

We store up changeless ideas: we deal with this storage in bulk: that is, when we use any idea or ideas, we necessarily relate the particular idea or ideas to the whole storage, and as the storage changes, the relation of the idea or ideas to the storage changes. It is this which effects differences between *human* personalities. Each of us practically records the same events of passing time differently, because each of us relates them to a different storage of ideas.

Consider an extreme case:—

I have a perfect memory and abnormal power of sight. I watch, during thirty years, a seed grow to a tree. Every period of evolution in growth is a fact, for me, in time: each happens once and for all, never to be repeated. At the end of thirty years these periods are things of the past, and instead of a seed there exists a tree.

But my storage of ideas in regard to the tree?

At every future moment of my life after the thirty years, these ideas are, still, potentially in the present. By the exercise of memory I can call up into the present for use in the present any or all of the ideas in me which were originated, in me, by the growth of the tree from a seed during thirty years. It may be quite true that I can only use these ideas in succession, in time. But by no argument can we condition the ideas themselves in time.

The whole growth of the tree *in time* becomes to me, potentially, a growth unconditioned in or by time: in idea the whole growth of thirty years is, potentially, in the present: I can even think the whole growth in the manifold. For I know nothing of what really happened, though, with Kant, I hold something did happen. All I know are the effects on me, the ideas in me, resulting from the happenings. And these ideas are, potentially, not conditioned in or by time; that is, they do not, with reference to myself, change in time.

Or consider the following illustration, which I have stolen from Sir Oliver Lodge for my own purposes.

I travel by rail from London to Brighton for the first time in my life. What I see of the country as we pass I see successively: we may call this 'seeing' successive events in my life, and so ideas of these events arise in me in succession, in time. But when the journey is completed, when I have arrived at Brighton? Is there any succession in my stored ideas of the country I have seen? There is not: the whole country passed through was, and still is, an existing fact, and is so in idea to me: Chislehurst exists at the same time as Reigate, and so for all I saw in succession. I can think all I saw (a synthesis) at one moment: my new storage of ideas is in itself unconditioned in time, though when used by me in the present it is used in time (cf. Kant, p. 99, l. 4).

When I start on my journey, all I am going to see—future events in my life—already exists. As I journey I see in succession that which already has existence—my succession in sight results only from the fact that I am a subject conditioned in time and space. But after I have seen this one existing thing, successively? After my arrival at Brighton? Then, to me, this one existing thing has one existence in time; there remains in me nothing but an idea of the journey in relation to all I saw.

If, however, I think about the journey in detail then, though I use the idea of the journey stored in me, I must analyse the idea, must break it up into ideas of the successive events of the journey. And so I must use these ideas in succession. But this use of them in succession proves in no way that they are stored up in me in succession: for the succession I use is arbitrary—I determine it myself.

This illustration may be used to show that our being conditioned in time and space constitutes a limit of our real personality.

For suppose that I am not conditioned in time and space, and, so, that I exist at every point of the journey from London to Brighton. Then for me all the landscape exists at one moment. I exist *in reference to all the landscape* at the same one moment, and so I have an idea of all the landscape at the same one moment. Herein we find what appears to be perfectly natural. (Bear in mind that Kant's *object* is in itself a series of representations.)

But, unfortunately, I am conditioned in time and space, and it is because I am so conditioned I can only take in the whole existing landscape in succession. This shows that succession in time and space arises from *my* limitation.

If we were not so limited I should receive directly the empirical intuition of the whole journey by apprehension of the manifold contained therein (cf. Kant, p. 99, l. 4). But, even limited as I am, once the idea of the journey is in me it remains in me changeless in time.

The fact that when we use ideas we use them related in time

does not, I think, prove that the ideas, themselves, are conditioned in time. If so, ideas do not change, *per se*, in time.

I deal now with the strongest objection.

### IDEAS ORIGINATE IN TIME

If ideas arise in time and end in time, there can be no middle period between their arising and ending which is unconditioned in time. This is certain, and no proof is necessary.

If we hold that ideas are determined immediately by the constitution itself of the material brain, they cannot be unconditioned in time and space: for the constitution of the material brain is so conditioned.

Now, to us, an idea has its origin in or with an event. Bear in mind we know nothing of what this event is in itself, we know only the effect on us (the idea originated in us) of the event.

But though we know nothing of what the event is in itself, we know something about the event; we know that we can only cognise and think in time and space, and so we know that any happening to us must be a happening in time and space. The event, therefore, to us, happens in time and space simply because we are conditioned in time and space.

Again, we know that our relation to the external is through sensibility which give the manifold to be intuited. Sensibility does not directly give diversity (objects, events); it does not directly give unity. We, as subjects, receive within the limits of unity and diversity the manifold in intuition presented to us by the intuitive self.

An event, then, is, to us, an affection on us of the manifold. So, whatever the event may or may not be, it cannot of itself be conditioned in time and space; it is the affection only of the event on a subject in time and space which is conditioned in time and space.

'In fact when we regard the objects of sense, as is correct, as mere appearances, we thereby at the same time confess that a thing in itself lies at their foundation, although we do not know it, as it is constituted in itself' (Kant's *Prolegomena*, par. 32, p. 62).

This affection of the event on the subject is (through conception) in idea. The event is external to the subject, the affect of the event is through the internal sense of the subject, and this affect results in an idea of the event. (Concepts in relation to events may be termed the effects of percepts as affects.)

Now 'we cannot cognise any thought except by means of intuitions corresponding to these conceptions' (Kant, p. 101).

We have seen that the subject does (practically) store up ideas of past events unconditioned in time.

But the basis of all these ideas is in intuition. Kant even says that for conceptions there are always corresponding intuitions.

Bear in mind, however, that this correspondence of intuitions to cognition in thought is only subjective: the correspondence exists only in relation to the subject. When intuition is used as I use it, it means only the intuition of the intuitive self.

When, then, ideas are or appear to be stored up, what becomes of their corresponding intuitions? For if the corresponding intuitions no longer exist, these ideas can no longer exist.

I hold that the intuitions must be as lasting as the ideas. The existence of the idea (the conditioned) infers necessarily the existence of the intuition (the relatively unconditioned).

As we know in human experience that the subject does (practically) store up these ideas unconditioned in time, we must, in reason, assume that the intuitions corresponding to these ideas are—in relation to the subject—stored up. But this storage of intuitions can only be related to the intuitive self. Bear in mind that it has already been shown that the intuitive self cannot be unconditioned, though how conditioned we know not; for its conditioning does not come within the series of conditions known to and limiting the subject.

Now ideas arise in time and die in time, so they cannot really be unconditioned in time, though to the subject they appear unconditioned in time.

The explanation is this:—

The (relatively) real, permanent self is the intuitive self: the ideas of the subject exist only in relation to (have no existence apart from) the intuition of the intuitive self.

The intuitive self is always affected by the manifold, and stores up these affections in intuition. (Neglect at present the impossibility of the intuitive self 'storing up' intuition or intuitions.) These affections are unconditioned in time and space.

To the subject (a partial and mediate manifestation in time and space of the intuitive self) the manifold appears externally as events; this subject is affected internally by these events as ideas, these ideas being abstractions from the manifold in intuition. Following Kant we may say these ideas correspond to intuitions.

'Memory' in the subject, which human experience tells us has real existence, is this:—

The subject has power to use the storage of intuition in its intuitive self. It can at any time and all times abstract ideas from what are, to it, corresponding intuitions.

The 'stuff' used (intuition) is not conditioned in time: the ideas abstracted are conditioned in time. But, as the subject can at any and all times abstract the same ideas from the same (subjectively) corresponding intuitions, and as the subject is unconscious of its act of abstraction, the subject—to itself—appears to use a full storage of ideas unconditioned in time and space of all past events.

The schematism of the understanding is made possible by the presentation to the understanding, otherwise than through the normal organs of sense, of the schema. Events (data of sense) are presented through the normal organs of sense, and it is through the schematism of the understanding that these events can give rise to (active) concepts which are conditions precedent for ideas to have (apparently) lasting effect on the understanding. The universal presented makes possible the particular in cognition : the particular is always an abstraction from the universal.

Now human experience informs us definitely that when any idea has been formed in the mind of the subject, the subject can, by the exercise of memory, recall into the present this idea of the past. The subject, then, appears to itself to have in it a full storage of all past ideas unconditioned in time. But this we know is impossible, for no storage of ideas can be unconditioned in time.

How did the subject get the original conception which led to the idea ? By abstraction from its, the subject's, universal. So we are driven to assume that when the subject exercises memory it recalls past ideas into the present by abstraction from the universal—it repeats the operation which led to the original idea. By the exercise of memory it abstracts a present idea of the past from the intuitive (timeless) memory of itself as an intuitive self.

It is true that memory is personal to the subject, and so the personal memory of the subject depends on its past human experience, and this may apparently lead to the conclusion that ' my ' universal is not ' your ' universal. But personal memory does not condition the universal itself ; all it conditions is the *use* the subject can make of the universal for the abstraction of ideas : you and I differ only in the use each of us can make of the universal.

The schema (the universal) I admit is not the manifold : it is but the manifold as presented and received by us—the manifold in our apprehension. But the manifold of our apprehension is phenomenal of the manifold of the intuitive self, and, to us, the memory of the intuitive self subsumes the past, present and future. So we may hold that by the exercise of memory we abstract the past from the timeless thought of our intuitive selves. Only so, I submit, can we explain the strange fact in human experience that the subject has power by the exercise of memory to recall in the present ideas of the past.

Or we may consider this question from another point of view. And now bear in mind that we have nothing to do with the profound question of whether the intuitive self is or is not immortal : we are concerned only with the question of its survival of the dissolution of the body and brain, dissolution which imports the death or destruction of the human personality.

The human personality exists, passively, as a thing of perception ; it exists, actively, in its power or faculty (?) of conception.

The concepts of conception result in ideas as the subject of memory. That is, concepts appear to the subject to have lasting effects on the understanding of the subject, which lasting effects I term ideas. Human experience informs us positively that memory exists in each subject, and this memory infers, for the subject, the lasting effect in time of its ideas. But, as already shown, there can be no reality in this apparent lasting effect of ideas.

We are driven, in reason, to the following conclusions:—

If the human personality has no ideas there is nothing in it which can be the subject of memory—it has no memory. Human experience, therefore, is a condition precedent for the subject to have memory. So the memory of each subject is personal to itself—it depends on its personal human experience. But this personal human experience is phenomenal; it is no more than the experience of a partial and mediate manifestation of the personality of the intuitive self. It has existence only as phenomenal of the (relatively) noumenal experience of the intuitive self. The concepts (in cognition) of the subject have existence only in relation to the intuition of the intuitive self: they are abstractions from intuition. So the resulting ideas (the subject of memory) can have no lasting effect in time, and we must conclude (in reason, not assumption) that as the original concepts were abstractions from intuition, so ideas, as the subject of memory, mark a power in the human personality to bring ideas of the past into the present by repeating this same abstraction from intuition which originally led to the concept.

This power in the human personality to bring up into the present ideas of the past certainly exists, and by no possibility can past ideas remain so unchanged in time that at any future time they can be recalled, unchanged, in the present. So the only explanation of memory is that its exercise exists in some present process of the understanding in relation to 'stuff' unconditioned in time. I find this 'stuff' in intuition, and submit that the abstraction of a concept by the subject once made, the fact of memory proves that the same abstraction can be repeated again and again. This is why the subject appears to itself to have in it a full storage unconditioned in time of all past ideas.

The intuitive self is always being affected in intuition by the manifold. So, to the subject conditioned in time and space, the intuitive self stores up intuition in time. The affection of the external, the manifold, on the intuitive self takes, for the subject, the phenomenal form of affection from external events. These affections, for the subject, as internally affected, constitute ideas. These ideas are the subject of memory, and appear to be lasting in time because they are abstractions from (timeless) intuition. When once an idea is impressed on the subject it remains earmarked as his idea; and at any future time he can, by the exercise

of memory, abstract what is to him practically the same idea from the intuition (timeless) of his intuitive self.

To meet a possible objection at this point I here interpolate an explanation.

When an external event affects the subject it affects the material brain materially—causes some change in its material constitution. But the brain, being conditioned in time and space, is in a constant state of flux. So the change itself is not lasting—it is subject to constant flux. We cannot, therefore, refer directly a perfect memory to stereotyped changes in the brain.

But I think the relations between the material changes in the brain may be lasting, and these relations cannot, in themselves, be said to be material. We know that ideas are but relative, and I think it may be that the relations between the material changes of the brain are lasting because of some direct (though to us phenomenal) connection with the permanent—that the permanent, which exists as the foundation of events, reveals itself to us phenomenally in these relations which are not material.

In mathematics, for instance, we may, when dealing with numbers, change our unit arbitrarily, and yet the relations between the numbers remain—4 has the same relation to 2 as 32 to 16, though the numbers differ. In dealing with numbers we find they have no meaning for us, *per se*; any number has meaning only in relation to other numbers, and this is why we can change our unit arbitrarily and yet preserve relations. In the same way ideas have no meaning for us, *per se*; any idea has meaning only in relation to other ideas. An idea is no more than a relation, and herein we find why ideas have only phenomenal form.

Now, when, in exercising memory we use intuition, then, for intuition to emerge in idea, the 'machinery' of the material brain must be used. The material changes effected in the brain by past events are used. But as, in the passing of time, these changes of the brain have no fixity, they are useless in themselves as records of past events. At the same time the relations between these changes may have fixity. And all intuition requires for the emergence of ideas when memory is exercised is this fixity of relations.

That the material constitution of the brain constantly changes in time is a fact. So if we refer memory to these changes, *per se*, memory must change in time. Any change effected in our youth by an event will have changed in our old age: the event recalled in old age must be referred to the brain as it exists. I deny the possibility of any material change in the brain existing timeless: and yet we can in age recall in idea the events of our youth. An explanation of this would appear to lie in the fact that relations between the changes—which are non-material—do, for us, appear to exist timeless.

These relations, however, cannot, for the subject, exist timeless : for the subject nothing can, in cognition, exist timeless. They can only exist timeless in relation to intuition. So the subject, when exercising memory, must be able to use the intuition of its intuitive self to call up these relations into the present—to abstract ideas from intuition for conscious use in present time.<sup>1</sup>

Perhaps my meaning may be rendered clearer by the following line of argument.

C. C. Massey finds 'the accomplished in the accomplishing' (*Thoughts of a Modern Mystic*, pp. 146 *et seq.*). Paraphrasing this we may say that a full integration of those relations which constitute, for us, ideas gives us the universal. I would thus make our particulars of knowledge not to disappear in the universal, but to be subsumed under it; in the same way that I have suggested limits do not disappear in the limitless, but are subsumed under it. In this way, though relations still remain phenomenal in our phenomenal universe, we still give them a form of noumenal reality. A shadow is phenomenal of the body that casts it. But—with an heroic stretch of imagination!—we may assume that a full integration of all possible shadows cast by the body would give us the body itself.

Returning to our argument as to memory, let us consider a concrete instance.

At some particular time an event affected me. A month after I recall the event in memory—bring up into the present an idea of the event. I use the idea and abandon it. The idea is gone for me—is a thing of the past. Again, in twelve months I recall in idea the same event in memory. I use the idea (which to me is the same as the former idea) and abandon it. The idea is gone for me—is a thing of the past.

Now these two ideas cannot be, *per se*, the same one idea; each is conditioned in different time, and is related to a different storage of ideas in me. But to me they appear to be one and the same. For, granting a perfect memory, I may recall the event myriads of times, and always the idea, to me, is the same.

The apparent explanation is that the intuition corresponding to the idea of the event and stored up in the intuitive self is always the same (that is, is not conditioned in time); and that I, in abstracting, at any time, the idea from the intuition, always make the same abstraction which must always, to me, result in the like idea. But an intuition, as before shown, has no real existence: only intuition exists. So the true explanation is that, the idea being originally

<sup>1</sup> Scientific knowledge advances not through evolving knowledge of things-in-themselves, but through evolving knowledge of the relations between the phenomena studied by men of science. And this, perhaps, points to the fact that the unconditioned (or manifoldness) lies at the background even of science.

an abstraction from intuition, the abstraction once made, memory gives power to the subject to repeat, again and again, the same abstraction which always results in, apparently, the same idea.

Memory enables us to recall the past into the present. Therefore memory must use something timeless (something which subsumes the present and the past) for the exercise of its strange power. This 'something timeless' we find in intuition.

But in the above argument have we not got rid of the lesser difficulty by the creation of a greater ?

If ideas cannot really, but only apparently, be stored up in the subject, must it not be impossible for the intuitive self to store up intuition ? How can intuition be stored up unless in time ? And, when intuition is unconditioned in time, how can it be stored up in time ?

This objection, I am sure, can be proved unsound, and I now try to prove it unsound. If I fail it is from want of personal clearness in thought and language.

The intuitive self is always affecting and being affected by the external and other intuitive selves ; as the intuitive self is a condition this requires no proof, though we can only state, without explaining, the fact. Indeed, my use of the word 'always' is but an attempt to get rid of the conditioning of time and space as known to us.

This affection is not, in itself, conditioned in time and space ; but, in relation to the subject (not the intuitive self), it is conditioned in time and space ; and, as it is the subject who is using the ideas resulting from the conceptions of the understanding for reasoning, this conditioning must be, for it, treated as objective.<sup>1</sup>

Consider the subject at any time, and again at any future time. During the interval between these times there has, for the subject, been this affection between its intuitive self and the external. This affection is not really in time, but to the subject it appears to be in time and objectively in time. For during this interval the subject has been living and thinking in time, and (as it is a partial and mediate manifestation of the intuitive self) it is that which has been affecting the intuitive self unconditioned in time which must have been affecting the subject conditioned in time. So, to the subject, this affection of the intuitive self is objectively in time.

(It must always be remembered that, in time, we deal only with (phenomenal) abstractions from the (relatively) noumenal.)

This means that, from the point of view of the subject, the in-

<sup>1</sup> Succession of thought is a limit or conditioning of thought in the manifold. The thought in the manifold of the intuitive self is timeless ; that is, for the subject, it subsumes thought in the past, present and future. The subject, when exercising memory, abstracts thought of the past from the thought in the manifold of its intuitive self.

tuitive self has been storing up intuition in time. And this is all that is required for proof.

Bear in mind in reading what is above written that the real, the permanent, is not conditioned in time and space. The permanent is the basis of our universe, but our universe is a phenomenal universe. I might almost say that for anything to be objectively true for the subject it must be only phenomenally true. For the permanent does not come into the series of conditions in and through which the subject exists ; it only comes in to complete the series by the unconditioned.

The above line of reasoning may be somewhat difficult to follow, both from want of clarity in my language and from the fact that the distinction between thinking in the manifold and thinking in time and space has never been fully dissected. As we have already seen, some commentators of Kant treat the manifold as something loose or indefinite in itself, while treating unity as a real product by synthesis from diversity. They do not distinguish clearly between the manifold itself and the manifold in our apprehension.

I therefore prefer further argument.

I have given instances which, I have suggested, show power in the subject to think in the manifold : indeed, I hold that all human thought is in particulars of the manifold.

On its face this may be in opposition to Kant, but I do not think it affects the groundwork of his scheme. And it must also be borne in mind I assume to follow Kant in holding that while the intuitive self presents to the subject the manifold in intuition, the subject, through sensibility, is affected by the manifold to be intuited, which assumption itself opens the possibility for the subject of thought in the manifold to some limited degree.

Kant says ' we may certainly give the name of object to everything, even to every representation, so far as we are conscious thereof.' And he says an object (phenomenon) is nothing more than a complex of representations of parts succeeding one another in time (Kant, pp. 142, 143).

Again he says, ' We cannot think any object except by means of the categories ; we cannot cognise any thought except by means of intuitions corresponding to these conceptions ' (Kant, p. 101).

Consider the following passage :—

' For example, I see a ship float down the stream of a river ; my perception of its place lower down follows upon my perception of its place higher up the course of the river, and it is impossible that in the apprehension of this phenomenon the vessel should be perceived first below and afterwards higher up the stream. Here, therefore, the order in the sequence of perceptions in apprehension is determined ; and by that order apprehension is regulated ' (Kant, p. 144).

Here all is plain sailing : the ship is conditioned in two suc-

cessive times and two successive places—we have a case of succession, not simultaneity.

But Kant continues, speaking now not of a ship but a house : ‘ My perceptions in the apprehension of a house might begin at the roof and end at the foundation, or *vice versâ* ; or I might apprehend the manifold in this empirical intuition by going from left to right, and from right to left. Accordingly, in the series of these perceptions there was no determined order, which necessitated my beginning at a certain point, in order empirically to connect the manifold ’ (Kant, p. 144).

What does this mean ? It means that when the concept of a house is formed, *and the resulting idea is afterwards used, in memory*, the succession of the representations of parts of the house is not determined, but arbitrary. Therefore succession in time, as to the complex of representations going to make up the object, has nothing to do with the past concept of the house, when the past concept is used in the present by the exercise of memory.

But simultaneity and succession are the only relations of time (Kant, p. 137), and the concept (which is the basis of the idea) of a house when used in memory is a concept in time.

But the subject does not think the house in any determined succession of parts when exercising memory. It must, therefore, think it in (phenomenal) simultaneity of parts. The thought of the object is in time, but there are no relations of different times for the parts of the object thought. The subject thinks the object as one in time—thinks it in (a particular of) the manifold. The subject does, to some limited extent, think in the manifold.

Now go a step further. Consider a subject not different in kind but only in degree from Kant’s subject. Expand the limited power of thought in the manifold in Kant’s subject to full power of thought in the manifold in this new subject. (Bear in mind that now power to think in diversity and unity is not necessarily lost : it may simply become subjective to this full power of thought in the manifold. A subject, thinking in the manifold, might well have power to project its thought on to our phenomenal universe of time and space, and so communicate *in ideas* with subjects conditioned in time and space. This relationship, in fact, exists for each one of us. An intuitive self thinks in intuition ; its human personality, conditioned in time and space, uses intuition conditioned in time and space as ideas.)

Then this subject is not conditioned in our time and space or in any way by the normal organs of sense.

We arrive (so far as is possible for us) at the mind of an intuitive self. But still the relation between the subject and the intuitive self remains : the subject of time and space is a manifestation within the limits of time and space of its intuitive self, not a distinct subject in kind. And to the subject (conditioned in time and

space) the affections on the intuitive self (which are not conditioned in time and space) must *appear* to be in time (intuition becomes subject to succession), because time conditions all the cognition of the subject.

So, relatively to the subject, the intuitive self does store up intuition. This storage is only phenomenally real; but, so far, it is for the subject objectively real.

We arrive, then, at the following conclusions:—

As intuitive selves we receive the manifold in intuition; we think in intuition. So far we have nothing to do with the conditions of time and space as known to human personalities. The 'stuff' of the memory of the subject is this manifold in intuition of its intuitive self.<sup>1</sup>

The subject is the intuitive self conditioned in time and space or, in other words, a partial and mediate manifestation in time and space of the intuitive self. So, to the subject, the intuition of the intuitive self originates in time and space with events. This simply means that the subject can only be affected in its understanding by intuition conditioned in time: what affects it must appear to be so conditioned.

Events, to us, become things of the past. But ideas of the events do not become things of the past. In relation to memory these ideas are always potentially in the present: the subject has a full storage of ideas of all past events, potentially in the present and which by the exercise of memory can be used to a greater or less extent in the present.

What is stated in the above paragraph is phenomenally true for the subject, but it has no (relatively) noumenal truth. The truth is this:—

The intuitive self is affected by the manifold in intuition; to its subject this is an affection in time. At any and all times the subject can abstract ideas of past events from the intuition of its intuitive self; but the subject is unconscious of its acts of abstraction and so, to itself, appears to have a full storage of ideas potentially in the present of all past events.

When the subject, by the exercise of memory, calls up for use in the present an idea of a past event it appears to itself to call up this idea directly from a full storage in it, the subject, of ideas of all past events. What it really does, when it calls up for use in the present an idea of a past event, is to abstract this idea from the intuition of its intuitive self. But as it can at all times make the same abstraction and is unconscious of the act of abstracting, it appears to itself to call up the idea directly from a full storage of

<sup>1</sup> Past, present and future exist only for a subject in time, so only such a subject can exercise memory: memory expresses the potentiality of making the past, the present. The intuitive self does not require this potentiality, for to it the distinction between past and present does not exist: the 'stuff' of memory is in the intuitive self without the exercise of any such faculty (?) as memory.

ideas in itself as above stated. The intuition of the intuitive self is, to the subject, a storage in time. The subject can abstract thought of the past from the thought in the manifold of its intuitive self.

Bear in mind that when in cognition we think the manifold in time, that is, in the past, present or future, we *condition* the manifold: we deal with nothing more than, as it were, a projection of the manifold on or in time and space. When we think in unity and diversity we are really thinking within limits of the manifold.

I am strongly of opinion that in making the foundations of memory to lie in intuition and in thus explaining the (apparent) timeless fixity in the understanding of ideas of past events, I am propounding no new theory. For Professor W. F. Barrett in his Presidential address to the S.P.R. says:—

‘Our minds are like a photographic plate, sensitive to all sorts of impressions, but our ego develops only a few of these impressions, these are our conscious perceptions, the rest are latent, awaiting development, which may come in sleep, hypnosis, or trance, or by the shock of death, or after death’ (*Proceedings S.P.R.*, vol. xviii. p. 337).

Here the opposition between ‘minds’ and ‘ego’ is doubtful; for by ‘minds’ is clearly meant something on which impressions can be impressed and remain impressed unaffected by time. For, if not, the impressions could not be exactly developed in after time. If for ‘minds’ we read ‘intuitive selves’ and for ‘impressions’ ‘affects in intuition,’ the difficulty is removed. By the ‘ego’ is meant the human personality, and Barrett states that this human personality can only deal, in conscious perception, with the ‘impressions’ when they are developed,—he makes these developments (ideas) subjective to the impressions (intuition).

Paraphrasing his statement we arrive at the theory that the intuitive self does (in relation to the human personality) store up intuition unconditioned in time and space, from which the human personality can abstract (develop) ideas in present time and space. And this is closely the same as the theory now propounded as to memory.

That, by the exercise of memory, we can at any present time recall in idea the events of our past life, appears to me the most extraordinary of all the facts of human experience, and I do not think that there is any definite extant theory which explains how a subject existing in the present can have power so to make its past exist in the present. The theory I suggest may offer some explanation.

But if my theory be sound then we find in it further proof that each of us exists as an intuitive self. For memory is possible only when intuition is (timelessly) presented to the subject by its intuitive self.

## UNCONSCIOUS MEMORY

To prevent misapprehension I should here point out that all subjects at all times exercise what may, relatively, be termed unconscious memory. This follows directly from the fact that our universe is a universe of relations.

Anything present in the understanding cannot be a subject of cognition unless other like and unlike things are also present. For we know nothing of things-in-themselves, but only their relations one to another, as they affect us.

A ball, a rattle, has no meaning in itself to any child first seeing it. It is only when the child learns by experience the distinction of the thing presented to it from other things that it knows anything about the particular thing, —can form a concept of the particular thing. So when a child cognises anything at any time it must at the same time (by unconscious memory) have other things present in its mind. This is true for all of us, and for all our experience (cf. Cousin's *Kant*, pp. 92, 114).

And this must also be true for impressions of feeling. Any feeling (including emotion or sensation) recalled in memory is meaningless in itself for cognition. There must be present in the mind also, with relative unconsciousness, ideas *in contradiction* of the idea of the particular feeling; there must be the exercise of unconscious memory. For, if not, the particular idea has no relative meaning for us; that is, it has in our universe of relations no meaning at all.

We find examples of the truth of what is above stated even with some adult human beings. For certain individuals exist whose physical condition and sense organs are normal, so that their understanding must be affected by the external in the same normal way that ordinarily reasonable persons are affected. And yet these individuals manifest weakness in intellect—forms of idiocy.

Now if we bear in mind that nothing present in the understanding can be a subject of cognition unless other like and unlike things are also therein present;—that is, unless there be the exercise of unconscious memory,—then we find an explanation for the absence in manifestation of normal intellect in these individuals. They fail from want of power to exercise unconscious memory: they have experience of the external like to that of normal individuals, but this experience giving them no knowledge of *relations for use*, they have no power to use their knowledge for cognition. They cannot operate with it in making what are,—to the normally constituted,—real things; *i.e.* things of relation.

Or consider an individual normally constituted but in that he has lost all sense of personal identity. This means that he cannot relate his thought in the present to himself as distinct from other personalities. But the word 'himself' as above used does not mean himself at the moment of thought: at the moment of thought

he does relate his thought in the present to himself. The word means, himself of the present *and the past*. For full sense of personal identity all our 'past of personality' must be present to us in the passing present moment, and this full presence of personality exists in unconscious memory. The individual in question has lost sense of personal identity from inability to exercise unconscious memory.

We err when we assume that our consciousness of self is a mere consciousness of self in the present passing moment: it is a consciousness of self in the present passing moment in relation to the self of all past personal human experience.

'Lorsque je me trouvais seul,' said a patient of Krishaber's, 'dans un endroit nouveau, j'étais comme un enfant nouveau-né, ne reconnaissant plus rien. J'avais un ardent désir de revoir mon ancien monde, de redevenir l'ancien moi: c'était ce désir qui m'a empêché de me tuer' (*Proceedings*, vol. iv. p. 502).

The fact of the 'ardent désir' proves he was conscious he was still himself. But he could not determine himself as himself because he could not recall in present consciousness his 'ancien monde' or his 'ancien moi.' He was incapable of relating himself in the present to himself in the past, and without this relation he could not determine himself in full self-consciousness.

The following passage from Cousin bears on the meaning of what I now term unconscious memory. His reference to *three* faculties,—imagination, memory and consciousness—may have been held by some as not sound in any explanation of Kant's *Critique*. But the faculty of memory has a more important place in Kant's scheme than is, perhaps, generally given to it. It is because of Cousin's direct reference to 'reminiscence' that I give the passage: for it supports the theory I have developed as to what memory really is.

The passage runs as follows:—

'Ce n'est pas tout; si l'on veut avoir une idée exacte de l'entendement dans le système de Kant, il faut savoir aussi quelles sont les facultés particulières que supposent, selon lui, cette faculté fondamentale. La fonction de l'entendement est de ramener à l'unité la variété de nos représentations ou de nos intuitions: mais cette unité nous ne pourrions l'obtenir, si nous n'avions pas la faculté de rapprocher, de rassembler les diverses parties qui doivent former le tout: cette faculté, c'est l'imagination. Comme vous le voyez, son rôle est d'opérer la réunion, la synthèse sans laquelle l'entendement ne pourrait penser les objets. Mais cette réunion ne se fait pas d'un seul coup, pour ainsi dire; elle se fait successivement. Il faut que je parcoure l'une après l'autre toutes les parties; et pour cela il faut que mon imagination, chaque fois qu'elle passe à une partie nouvelle, reproduise toutes les parties précédentes; sinon, celles-ci seraient perdues pour moi et la réunion serait impossible. L'imagination est donc, sous ce point de vue, une faculté repro-

ductive, on la nomme la réminiscence. Enfin il ne suffit que l'imagination reproduise les diverses parties ; pour que cette reproduction soit efficace, il faut que nous soyons convaincus intérieurement que ce que reproduit l'imagination est le même que ce qu'elle avait reproduit d'abord, et cette conviction, c'est la conscience qui nous la donne. Il y a donc, en résumé, trois facultés, l'imagination, la réminiscence et la conscience, au moyen desquelles l'entendement pense les objets que lui livre la sensibilité' (Cousin's *Kant*, pp. 92, 114).

In the above passage Cousin, in a certain connection, treats imagination as a reproductive faculty which is to be termed memory.

When we think of anything we think of it in the present. As, however, we know nothing of things-in-themselves but only of their relations, *inter se*, as phenomena, it follows that human 'thought' of a thing infers the presence in the mind at the same present moment of thought of other things of which we have had experience in the past. We *must* exercise memory in order to 'think' anything in the present. This power to exercise memory Cousin terms imagination as a reproductive faculty.

When we think anything in the present we are conscious of the thought of the thing. But we are not conscious in the same way that this thought involves also present thought of other things. This accompanying thought, then, of other things is (relatively) unconscious thought : we exercise unconscious memory.

An instance showing how we exercise this (relatively) unconscious memory may well be given.

It is commonly held that the philosopher's idea of the sun is quite different from that of the savage. But this requires consideration ; for the affect of the sun on both is the same. The distinction really lies in this :—

When the savage is affected by the sun he relates the affect in idea to his storage of past ideas—to his past human experience. The sun is to him an unknown moving thing which gives light and life on earth. Of what it is, how or why it moves, he knows not, but he knows it does do something and so may even personify it as a mystic being governing all life and nature. The idea in him of the sun is an idea in relation to (conditioned by) his existing storage of ideas.

The philosopher, so affected, makes the same relation. But now his stored ideas give him more definite information, and the sun is to him a material centre of the movement of the earth : he can determine more or less materially why the sun, as such a centre, has its effect on the earth. But the mystery of the unknown remains a mystery for both, unless we hold the mystery is rendered greater for the philosopher because his judgment has a wider purview than that of the savage.

Both are affected by the external in the same way : the affect on

both is the same. Why, then, does this same affect result in such differing ideas in the two ?

Because ideas are relative only, so that, though the effect on both is the same, the emerging ideas differ because the idea of the savage exists in relation to one storage of ideas, and that of the philosopher to another.

When the external affects us in idea we always by the exercise of (relatively) unconscious memory relate the effect on us to our storage of ideas. The emerging idea is relative to our storage, our past experience. Given the same normal organs of sense then any particular of the external affects each one of us in the same way. But, in idea, we relate this affect to our storage of ideas, our past experience.

We effect this relation by the exercise of (relatively) unconscious memory. And as this storage in each one of us differs from those of all others, and the idea in us is but a thing of relation, we find that the same affect on each of us results in a differing idea.

But bear this in mind :—A child of three may see the sun and may constantly see the same sun till the age of fifty, when he has grown to be a philosopher. The affect on him is always the same, but his ideas mark a continuum of evolution from his idea of the sun as a child of three to that of his idea as a philosopher of fifty. So these ideas are phenomenal only, and exist only in relation to a human personality conditioned in succession of time and space.

In the same way we may consider the same child of the age of three, but assume, at the age of fifty, he is not a philosopher, but remains as sheerly ignorant of the real nature of the sun as when three years old. We have now the same continuum of ideas, but we have not the same evolution in ideas.

We find then, from the above considerations, that the evolution of human personality is determined by environment in time and space : there is nothing of the permanent in human personality. We arrive at the ' illusion ' or ' delusion ' or ' sorrow of life ' of the Buddhist. (Gautama in determining the illusion of the ' I ' necessarily arrived at the ' not I.' But as the ' not I ' is beyond human knowledge he treated it as a negation, for he confined his philosophy within the four corners of human knowledge, though he treats the root of the intellectual as existing in feeling.)

Kant understood clearly that human personality is illusion, and that is why he said we think ourselves not as we are, but as we appear to ourselves to be.

But the personality of the child remains the same whatever its human experience may be. Kant referred this (relative) permanence to the soul of the child.

The three faculties (?) ' l'imagination, la réminiscence, et la conscience,' refer to the subject, the human personality. Kant wanted more for his (relatively) noumenal self. And he got it by the

presentation to his subject of the manifold of all possible intuition previous to sensuous intuition of objects. For this presentation is active and can only be effected by an intuitive self. (Kant's soul of man.) We *must* assume the fact of the existence of this (relatively) noumenal I (though we are ignorant in cognition of the 'I' itself) to explain why our self-apperception is, to ourselves, a phenomenal self-apperception.

The strange results of habit or custom are, too, explained by this exercise of unconscious memory: it explains automatic or instinctive action.

When any subject does anything or engages in any line of thought it finds, normally, that by constant repetition of the act or engagement in the particular line of thought, it ordinarily gains constantly evolving power in effecting the act or in determining the line of thought. It is by constant repetition that the child learns to walk, the marksman to shoot nearer the bull's-eye; the philosopher by constantly engaging in one line of thought arrives ultimately at or near to the truth he wishes to search out.

It is the subject itself as to which this evolution in power (by repetition) takes place. The child has in its *present* thought (by unconscious memory) each and all its past efforts to walk. These constitute, for it, experience. It knows, by past failure, what *not* to do, and so, under accumulating experience, ultimately does only that which leads to success. And so with the philosopher. By constant shooting at his particular target of truth, he attains ultimately success in hitting the bull's-eye. Relatively unconscious memory of past failures leads to approximate success in the present.

If unconscious memory be thus involved in the full self-consciousness of the subject, we must give to the personality of the subject a *certain continuity in time*: we must modify our conclusion that the subject is a mere transient 'thing' of the passing, present moment.

## GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

WHEN we assume that sensibility affects the subject otherwise than through the normal organs of sense, I hold we clarify and strengthen Kant's reasoning in the *Critique*: his theory of the Schema and his use of 'Imagination' as referable both to sensibility and to the understanding are rendered more intelligible. Possibly, under the assumption made, we do not require for our reasoning either the Schema or Imagination.

Again, Kant's *real* subject is the soul of man: he relies always on the soul for ultimate explanation of the existence and, so, the self-apperception (with synthetic thought) of his assumed subject, the human personality. I have tried to show that his reasoning points conclusively to the existence of an intuitive self, and that the fact of this intuitive self is sufficient for him without any reference to the soul of man,—if we leave out of consideration his reasoning in the *Dialectic*.

And we not only can, but must leave out of consideration Kant's reasoning in the *Dialectic*, for the profound problems therein attacked of God, Immortality, Free-Will, and the Moral Law are outside the purview of our present investigation. All as yet attempted has been to prove the existence of the intuitive self, and that Kant's subject is no more than a partial and mediate manifestation in our universe of this intuitive self. This proof has been based on an assumption that sensibility affects the subject, not only through, but otherwise than through, the normal organs of sense. But I have also tried to show that this assumption underlies Kant's own reasoning.

We now turn from more or less abstract reasoning to the facts of human experience, and I try to show that *in human experience* we find proof of what is but yet an assumption; that is, that sensibility affects the subject, not only through, but otherwise than through, the normal organs of sense.

At the outset it may be stated positively that if telepathic communication takes place between human personalities then sensibility does affect human personalities otherwise than through the normal organs of sense. It is by the light of this fact and that of the existence of the intuitive self I try to find the fundamental law underlying the various psychical phenomena we shall deal with.

What I now attempt is to apply the theory of personality and the incidental theory of memory, which I have already explained, to telepathy as part of *our human experience*. We shall thus find the psychical phenomena considered brought under the governance of one fundamental law.

But it is right to state that there are some alleged psychical phenomena which I do not consider at all, and others for which I offer no explanation. My main object is to show that *in human experience* we have the strongest evidence in support of the argument that each one of us exists as an intuitive self.

## PART II

### TELEPATHY DEFINED

THE first part of this book has been confined mainly to an attempt, by the light of Kant's *Critique*, to prove that human personality is no more than a partial and mediate manifestation in our universe of time and space of a (relatively) real personality, the intuitive self. As incidental to the argument the assumption has been made that sensibility affects the subject (the human personality) not only through, but otherwise than through, the normal organs of sense.

This assumption I have argued to be obligatory for full effect to be given to Kant's reasoning in the *Critique*—if we ignore his Transcendental Dialectic.

But I have not introduced the intuitive self as a new factor in Kant's reasoning. What I hold is that he himself makes his subject (the human personality) a partial and mediate manifestation in time and space, as known to us, of the soul of man; and all I have done is for the term 'soul of man' to replace the term 'intuitive self,' and I have tried to show that this term (which is not so extensive as that of the soul of man) is sufficient for his purpose, if we do not touch on his Dialectic. It is important to bear in mind that I make no attempt to define (to determine) the personality of the intuitive self: I arrive only at the fact of its existence. This personality we cannot determine in idea, for we know it only to that limited extent in which it is manifest to us in our limited universe.

So far as the argument has proceeded we have no more than a bare, if necessary, assumption that sensibility affects the subject otherwise than through the normal organs of sense: so the argument, as yet, rests on a bare assumption.

If, now, we can find human experience in proof of the fact that sensibility affects the subject otherwise than through the normal organs of sense, then we may abandon the assumption and rely on the fact proved. With this fact as proved I submit we shall have human evidence in *human experience* that the intuitive self exists.

This brings us to a consideration of human evidence of the facts of telepathy. To this point I have treated telepathy as marking

no more than the fact that sensibility affects the subject otherwise than through the normal organs of sense; for, whatever telepathy may or may not mean, it must have this fact for foundation. When, however, we consider human evidence of human experience we require a more exact and particular definition for telepathy.

Such a definition I shall now try to worry out.

The ultimate attempt is to bring the differing phenomena of telepathy under the one great fundamental law foreshadowed by Myers. If this can be effected we shall, I think, find, in human experience, proof of the existence of the intuitive self. What I attempt is to prove the fact without transcending human experience.

Myers, in the year 1896, defined telepathy as 'the communication of impressions of any kind from one mind to another independently of the recognised channels of sense.' He defined *Telaesthesia*—perception at a distance—'as implying any direct sensation or perception of objects or conditions independently of the recognised channels of sense, and also under such circumstances that no known mind external to the percipient's can be suggested as the source of the knowledge thus gained' (*Proceedings*, vol. xii. p. 174. See also *Proceedings*, vol. i. p. 147). He thus made telepathy refer to affects on the percipient from external personalities otherwise than through the recognised channels of sense; *telaesthesia* to affects on the percipient from the external (as distinct from external personalities), otherwise than through the recognised channels of sense.

In June 1884 Professor Sidgwick had stated that the S.P.R. had arrived at the important conclusion that 'feelings and ideas, under certain exceptional and as yet unknown conditions, are transmitted from one living human being to another, otherwise than through the recognised organs of sense' (*Journal*, vol. i. p. 8).

The importance of Professor Sidgwick's statement lies in this: Whereas Myers' definition of telepathy refers to communication between mind and mind, Sidgwick more cautiously refers to transfer from one living human being to another: the former definition, too, refers to the communication of impressions, the latter to the transmission of feeling and ideas. (Gurney, in considering thought-transference, says: '*Thought* must here be taken as including more than it does in ordinary usage; it must include sensations and volitions as well as mere representations or ideas.'—*Phantasms*, vol. i. p. 11.)

Now, by the theory I propound, there is (through sensibility which is passive) constant action and reaction between any intuitive self and other intuitive selves and the external. For the intuitive self this manifests itself actively and directly in the intuition of the intuitive self.

The intuitive self thinks in intuition, and we may term this

thought intelligent, for it relates to affects in self-apperception. But the affects on the intuitive self from other intuitive selves and the external are direct—they are not received in the form of time and space. So the intuitive self is affected and thinks in the manifold—thinks, as it were, 'in a lump,' and not in succession as known to us. Bear in mind that this thinking (unconditioned in time and space) is a higher form of thought than thought in succession: thought in succession is a limited form of thought in the manifold, it is a conditioning of thought in the manifold. We can ordinarily only think in succession; in a limited form of thought in the manifold. So we cannot think with our intuitive selves, we are but phenomenal forms (in space and time) of our real intuitive selves. It is our intuitive selves that really think; we, as human personality, but think phenomenally (in time and space). So our intuitive selves may be said to think with us, though we cannot think with them: they determine our thoughts. For instance, a shadow is but a phenomenon of something which casts the shadow: it is this 'something,' however, which determines the shadow.

(So an intuitive self, disembodied, might possibly communicate directly with the embodied, though the embodied can only communicate indirectly with the disembodied. For intuitive selves, disembodied, may be able to *limit their thought in succession* for communication with us, whereas we cannot, as human personalities, communicate with them fully in thought in the manifold.)

In this connection conceptions and their resultants, ideas, may be termed projections of intuitional thought on or in time and space. And, herein, we find an explanation of genius. For the man of genius differs in degree only, not in kind, from his fellows: he marks the high-water mark of the emergence of true phenomenal ideas in the understanding from the intuition of the mind of the intuitive self. It is 'the shadows of the real' that affect us in cognition, and the man of genius is he who, with unique power, most truly relates these shadows to the real.

In what is above written a distinction arises incidentally between 'mind' and 'understanding' which must be explained. Myers refers to the communication from *mind to mind*; Sidgwick, more cautiously, refers to transmission from *one human being to another*. I think that Sidgwick, in referring to transmission from human being to human being, confined the transfer from human mind to human mind, or from understanding to understanding.

Now psychology as a science must, so far as is possible, keep clear of the metaphysical, and so must ignore Kant's distinction between the ego as pure and the ego as empirical: it ignores the unconditioned, and so, for the science, the ego or subject is denoted by the simple fact that everything mental is or is referred to a *Self* of our universe. In other words an assumption is necessarily made that the human personality exists objectively in personal consciousness.

But, in psychology, the terms mind, human-mind and understanding are used as—I think—having different meanings, and—I think—there is an underlying admission in psychology that the distinction between mind and human mind, though it must exist, cannot be clearly defined; psychology evades, and quite rightly evades, the distinction.

After dealing at some length with the question of what mind is, James Ward says:—

‘There still remains an alternative, which, like the first, may be expressed in the words of J. S. Mill, viz., “the alternative of believing that mind or ego is something different from any series of feelings or possibilities of them.” To admit this, of course, is to admit the necessity of distinguishing between mind or ego, meaning the unity or continuity of consciousness as a complex of presentations, and mind or ego as the subject to which this complex is presented. In dealing with the body from the ordinary biological standpoint no such necessity arises. But, whereas there the individual organism is spoken of unequivocally, in psychology, on the other hand, the individual mind may mean either (1) the series of feelings or “mental phenomena” above referred to, or (2) the subject of these feelings for whom they are phenomena, or (3) the subject of these feelings or phenomena plus the series of feelings or phenomena themselves, the two being in that relation to each other in which alone the one is subject and the other a series of feelings, phenomena, or objects. It is in this last sense that mind is used in empirical psychology, its exclusive use in the first sense being favoured only by those who shrink from the speculative associations connected with its exclusive use in the second. But psychology is not called upon to transcend the relation of subject to object or, as we may call it, the fact of presentation. On the other hand, as has been said, the attempt to ignore one term of the relation is hopeless; and equally hopeless, even futile, is the attempt by means of phrases such as consciousness or the unity of consciousness, to dispense with the recognition of a conscious subject’ (*Ency. Brit.*, vol. xx. p. 39, 9th ed.).

The above extract shows that in psychology there is an assumption of the existence of a conscious subject, where the consciousness of the subject is related—and related only—to a series of feelings or ‘mental phenomena.’ This is an assumption of an objective human personality, and so, for it, the term ‘mind’ means the same as ‘human mind.’ But James Ward very carefully guards himself from coming into conflict with Kant’s distinction between a Self as pure and a Self as empirical. He says psychology is not called upon to transcend the relation of subject to object. For just as Darwinism deals only with the facts of variation and the struggle for existence without touching the question of *why* such facts are facts to us, so psychology only deals with the fact of human person-

ality as a fact, without touching the question of why human personality exists as it exists, or of whether it may be the mere object of some subject or the subject of some object. (Kant says the understanding is a faculty of cognition and of judging (Kant, pp. 84, 57). But he makes cognition and judgment subjective to intuition. This, I have held, makes the understanding (as marking the human personality) subjective to a (relatively) objective self of intuition. For intuition must be given *actively* to the subject.)

If, now, we enter the realms of metaphysics we find that the 'conscious being' of psychology is empirical; it is, in the language I have used, no more than a partial and mediate manifestation in time and space of an intuitive self—relatively, a pure self. So, if I am correct in holding that the 'mind' of *psychology* is not distinct from a human mind, I may, *metaphysically*, refer the term 'mind' to the intuitive self as opposed to the term 'human mind' of the human personality. This distinction in definition I shall use throughout what I now write.<sup>1</sup>

But we must go further than this, for, in psychology, it is possible that we can find no satisfactory definition of the human mind as related to or distinguished from the understanding.

The assumption of psychology of the existence of a Self (a mind) to which everything (determined as) mental is referred, does not mean a general consciousness in humanity of the existence of humanity and the external. It means, for each one of us, self-consciousness of self in distinction from other selves. In what does the distinction consist? Bear in mind that we are now considering these selves as objective, not as mere manifestations of intuitive selves. The distinction must exist in time and space, and so must be—as it is—referred to mentality. This self is objective and so its mentality must be personal—the mentality in question is not a general human mentality but a particular and personal mentality. And distinctions in mentality must be referred to distinctions in brain structure. Give all men absolutely the same brain structure, and distinctions—psychologically—between human minds disappear.

It may be objected that even if two men have absolutely the same brain structure, still, their human experience cannot be the same and so their minds will differ. But in such a case differences will arise from differing affects from the external resulting in differing material effects, and, again, the distinction exists in difference in brain structure.

Or, it may be objected, I treat man as simply a thing of cognition, whereas he is a thing also of feeling. But with this question I have already dealt when treating of Memory and Ideas.

<sup>1</sup> If it be herein proved that we have in human experience proof of the existence of the intuitive self, then, I think, it may be fairly claimed that, spite of the use made of Kant's *Critique*, the argument is not founded in any way on the metaphysical.

Lastly, it may be objected that any attempt to identify the human mind with the understanding is merely comparing two things distinct in themselves; the human mind means the Self to which everything mental is referred, while thought consists merely 'of a certain elaboration of sensory and motor presentations and has no content apart from these.' In other words the human mind is that which is conscious of thought; the understanding is that which is or produces thought.

If this objection be raised I accept it at once as unanswerable. For I go further—I hold that the understanding is no more than a very limited machine which the mind of the (relatively) pure Self uses for limited purposes. But where, then, is the 'mind' of the psychologist?

Psychology, it is true, recognises the distinction between the thinker and the phenomena which are thought, but guards against defining the mind as the subject 'of these feelings for whom they are phenomena.' It makes the mind 'the subject of these feelings or phenomena *plus* the series of feelings or phenomena themselves,' that is, confines the 'mind' to a universe of these feelings or phenomena. This mind is a human mind, and the subject itself can only determine (?) these feelings or phenomena through the understanding.

The moment we enter the realms of metaphysics we see at once that this 'mind' is subjective: it is a human mind where the self-consciousness is determined by the series of feelings or phenomena. And there must be a mind behind this human mind, or we should have no mind to determine the universe of the human mind as merely phenomenal.

So, as before said, I refer 'mind' to the intuitive self and 'human mind' to the human personality, which human mind is or is determined by the understanding.

Again, in the distinction thus drawn between the intuitive self and the human personality, we find the distinction which Myers often relies on between the subliminal and supraliminal consciousness.

We, as human personalities, cannot distinguish between past, present and future as different 'things' in themselves. Where time is, it is but past, present or future in relation to our consciousness in time as human personalities: past, present and future are to us but aspects of time. (Indeed, as already shown, for us to have cognition in the present the past also must be present to us by (relatively) unconscious memory.) And it is not difficult to understand that these aspects are merely phenomenal: that is, these differing aspects have no reality in themselves; they exist, *to us*, only because we exist as limits in a universe limited in time and space. So even human experience leads us to the conclusion that, following Kant, time is no more than a form of our internal intuition. Bear in mind that our internal intuition is not intuition: it is no more than a form of intuition.

Now our consciousness is not a full consciousness, it is a supraliminal consciousness ; that is, a form of consciousness in our universe of time and space. So there must be a relatively full consciousness free from the conditions of time and space, of which our consciousness is a form. Our consciousness may be said to be phenomenal of a full consciousness—just as a shadow cast in two dimensions may be said to be phenomenal of some three (or even higher than three) dimensional body which casts the shadow.

This (relatively) full consciousness is the subliminal consciousness : it is what we can only term the self-apperception of the intuitive self.

Some have criticised Myers' distinction between the subliminal and supraliminal as false because pointing to different beings of different consciousness. But I think the criticism baseless, and that Myers (in the present connection) means by the supraliminal consciousness no more than, as it were, a projection—a shadow cast—on our universe of time and space of full (subliminal) consciousness.

The intuitive self being unconditioned in our time and space is not so conditioned that it views time and space under differing aspects : for it, there is no distinction in time as past, present and future ; no distinction in space as ' here ' and ' there. ' (The intuitive self, exists, to us, in an everlasting and changeless now. But this is true only for human apprehension : where the past and the future are not, *now* (the present) is not ; it has but relative existence.) So its consciousness is (relatively) a full consciousness. But this consciousness being the consciousness of a (relatively) real personality as distinct from other personalities must be conditioned in some way, though not in time and space as known to us.

It follows that supraliminal consciousness being but a partial and mediate manifestation, in our universe of time and space, of the subliminal consciousness, can never be or become the subliminal consciousness : it can only be phenomenal of it. But the subliminal consciousness is the real (the noumenon) of this phenomenon and so—by limitation—may be or become the supraliminal consciousness.

For the intuitive self the distinctions of human personality which exist for us in form, size, distance and time do not really exist : nor do those mental distinctions, which are necessarily referred to the particular material formation of the brain. But all such distinctions have phenomenal existence for the intuitive self : they are partial and mediate manifestations of (relative) reality.

So the intuitive (subliminal) self is not a separate and distinct thing from the human (supraliminal) personality : the human personality is a (phenomenal) manifestation of the intuitive self.

Accepting the above further explanation of personality we can now return to a consideration of telepathy. I shall use the word

telepathy as including telaesthesia, *i.e.* I make telepathy cover affects from external personalities and affects from the external.

The distinction between impressions ('feeling') and 'ideas' is that the former are affects on the understanding, followed, for consciousness, by some operation of the understanding: the latter are or are related solely to operation of the understanding. If the subject be conscious of feeling it must be conscious in time and space. And, as our consciousness infers some operation of the understanding, the affect of feeling on the understanding can only be manifest to the subject where there is some conscious operation of the understanding; where there is cognition, however vague.

I hold, as before stated, that the first manifestation to the subject of this consciousness of feeling is in *impressions*.

We may say that feeling is marked by pure impressions: the term 'impressions' as used by me means impressions accompanied by some operation of the understanding.

These impressions being impressions of the subject are in time and space; they are not in their origin conditioned in time and space: it is as manifestations to the subject that they are so conditioned. Feeling is manifest in impressions.

Now, in a digression (see p. 70, Part I.), I have contended that we can be affected in feeling quite apart from any affect in bodily state or cognition. But so few have had experience of this that it cannot be relied on for argument as establishing a fact. So I ignore it as evidence. With this proviso I continue:—

These impressions of feeling being impressions of the subject must be related to the subject, which is a thing of space and time. So they must affect the bodily state, and this affection, for consciousness, must include an affection of the understanding, that is, of the human mind. Through intuition the subject is always being affected by impressions on the understanding. Where the subject is conscious of these impressions the consciousness sometimes extends only to consciousness of feeling—so far we get impressions. But it is the human mind that is conscious, so the subject has cognition of these impressions. Sometimes these impressions result in more definite operation of the understanding and then ideas result.

It may be, indeed, that these impressions always lead to the same operation of the understanding in the evolution of ideas. If this be so we must hold that the human mind is not always immediately conscious of its ideas—we have conscious and (relatively) unconscious ideas.

When referring to the production of hypnotic trance Gurney uses the expression 'unconscious idea.' And as to this he says:—

'It is difficult to avoid using this expression, but I of course do not mean by it mere "unconscious cerebration." My whole view of telepathic transference is that it is a *psychical* event—with a physical side possibly, but psychical certainly; consequently the idea

transferred, in this as in every case, must have complete psychical reality. In calling it unconscious, therefore, I am, for convenience, confining the meaning of "conscious" to the mode or plane of ordinary human experience—in which we may surmise the true consciousness of the individual to be only partially manifested' (*Proceedings*, vol. v. p. 233).

Gurney, it would appear, refers 'unconscious ideas' to what I term the intuitive self. I, on the other hand, refer all ideas conscious or unconscious to the understanding. At the same time I refer the *foundation* of ideas, conscious or unconscious, to the intuitive self.

Impressions give but consciousness (in time and space) of personal feeling: ideas give consciousness (in time and space) of the external and external personalities. But bear in mind we are here considering the consciousness of the subject; the consciousness of the intuitive self is in intuition, where this distinction between feeling and ideas does not exist.

Clearly, impressions are precedent to ideas, so we may be conscious of the preceding impression without being conscious of any after emerging definite ideas in cognition. But we may be conscious of impressions and also of after emerging ideas. As, however, we have no means of determining this after emergence *in time*, we should expect that varying time may often elapse between consciousness of the impression and consciousness of the after emerging ideas. We may even be unconscious of the impression, and only conscious of the after emerging ideas.

Again, our consciousness in impression is a consciousness of a real affect *on* the understanding from intuition, made manifest to us (in time and space) in impression. But the after emerging ideas result solely from operation *of* the understanding. So—as the understanding cannot be assumed always to operate correctly or free from the influence of stored ideas, or of imagination—a real impression may be followed by the emergence of ideas only symbolically or even falsely related to the particular affects from the external or external personalities. Bear in mind I do not say the impression *is* the real affect: I only say it results from a real affect: real affects can be referred only to the intuitive self.

Impressions, though but partial and mediate manifestations to us in time and space of affects from the external and external personalities, have always a real relation to these affects: ideas, resulting from operation of the understanding, though this operation is always started by some affect from the external or external personalities, may or may not (phenomenally) interpret correctly the said affect. (Bear in mind that if telepathy be a fact it follows necessarily that sensibility affects the human personality otherwise than through the normal organs of sense.)

What is above written leads at once to a distinction between

telepathy itself and telepathy as manifested to us, as subjects, in action. I, therefore, suggest the following definitions.

Telepathy is a term used to express the timeless and spaceless communion between intuitive selves and between intuitive selves and the external—communication between mind and mind and between mind and the external in intuition. The intuitive self has 'mind,' the human personality has 'human mind.'

Telepathy as manifested to us as subjects (human personalities) is a term used to express :—

The communication, otherwise than through the normal organs of sense, between subjects and between subjects and the external in impressions (feeling which emerges consciously in the understanding), and communication otherwise than through the normal organs of sense between subjects and between subjects and the external which emerges consciously in ideas in the understanding.

(The impressions are manifestations in time and space of real affects from external personalities and the external; they consist in affects on the understanding and some operation of the understanding: the ideas are subjective in that they result solely from operation of the understanding preceded and given rise to by impressions on the understanding.)

The above definitions of telepathy and of telepathy as manifested to us, though determined subject to the theory of personality propounded, will still be found to be mere expansions of the definitions of Sidgwick and Myers referred to, while incorporating the distinction raised by Sidgwick and Gurney between 'feeling' and 'ideas.' (Cf. the two passages from *Dreams of a Spirit Seer* given on p. 64, Part I. The comparison will show that I have, in some measure, drawn these definitions from Kant's theory. Cf. also the statement by Barrett: 'If this unconscious radiation and reaction is going on between mind and mind, then observed cases of telepathy would simply mean the awakening of consciousness to the fact in certain minds.'—*Proceedings*, vol. xviii. p. 337.)

But, by the theory of personality propounded, we must consider a possible expansion of the above definition of telepathy.

For the intuitive self may have continued existence after the dissolution of its phenomenal form as a subject of time and space. Indeed, as we know that time and space exist only phenomenally for the phenomenal subject, we have no foundation to rest on if we argue that the dissolution of the phenomenal infers the dissolution of the (relatively) noumenal. But, herein, I do not think we arrive, in theory, at any absolute proof of the continued existence of the intuitive self after the dissolution of its (phenomenal) bodily form. All we arrive at is negative proof that dissolution of the (phenomenal) subject establishes no evidence against the continued existence of the intuitive self.

Assuming, however, as I think we may, that the intuitive self

survives what we term bodily death, then disembodied intuitive selves may be able to communicate telepathically with subjects embodied. For if the disembodied intuitive self have power—as it may possibly have—to project its thought in the manifold in intuition on to our universe of relations in time and space, it could so communicate with the embodied. The intuitive self thinks in the manifold: we think in particulars of the manifold (within the contradictory limits of unity and diversity). There seems no reason, *a priori*, to suppose the intuitive self cannot think within our limits.

And herein lies the importance of memory as already defined. For the disembodied carry away with them *full memory* of all that, to us, is their past. And if they have power to condition this memory *in succession*, that is, in time and space, they can communicate with the embodied, not only in feeling (impressions), but in ideas of what is, to us, the past, and possibly what is, to us, the future.

This form of communication, however, if rendered probable, is not, I think, fully established in human experience, and so, at present, can be no more than the subject of theory. I shall consider it, then, only incidentally when dealing with alleged facts. We need not, therefore, at present expand our definition of telepathy as manifest to us.

It should be explained, however, that I do not at any time consider the bare fact of the existence of intuitive selves never manifested as subjects in time and space. I shall consider only intuitive selves disembodied: that is, intuitive selves existing *after* they have appeared (phenomenally) in bodily form.

And mark here an important fact which, so far as I know, has been ignored by writers on telepathy.

The accepted definitions of telepathy, however much they may differ *inter se*, have nothing to do with 'a power of the mind to place itself in community of thought with other men, however distant they may be' (Kant, p. 164). They are no more than attempts to determine what the telepathic communication from man to man is, and how it takes place: they do not, any of them, infer power in man to *use at his own will* this means of communication.

For instance, in Podmore's admirable work, *Apparitions and Thought Transference*, he relies mainly for proof of telepathy on experimental cases, as distinct from spontaneous cases. But if experimental cases are to be relied on, then telepathy must be a fact, for otherwise man could not use it at will. (That he can, at present, only use it within very narrow limits does not affect the fact that he can use it.) Spontaneous cases on the other hand, as a rule, prove only the fact of telepathy without offering any evidence of its possible active use by man at his will.

But though, if experimental cases are proved to be trustworthy,

they prove, incidentally, the fact of telepathy, still a consideration of such cases cannot be expected to give as much information as a consideration of spontaneous cases. For in experimental cases telepathy is used only for limited and particular purposes, and so is manifested in action only in a limited and particular way. In spontaneous cases, on the other hand, we should expect to find all possible forms of manifestation of telepathy in action.

I do not suggest that all these varying forms of the manifestation of telepathy in spontaneous cases are explicable. But I think that, in due course, the consideration of the manifestation of telepathy in spontaneous cases should precede consideration of the use of telepathy by man as shown in experimental cases.

Mark, too, a second fact which I think is generally ignored. (Gurney and Myers consider this fact at length.) The affects on us from the external, or external personalities through our normal organs of sense, are received by us directly as visual, auditory or tactile. But such affects when telepathic are not received by us as visual, auditory or tactile: it is *after reception* that, as effects, they are conditioned as visual, auditory or tactile: it is in the resultant that the form of the ideas is determined as visual, auditory or tactile.

When we are affected telepathically, we are affected through sensibility otherwise than through our normal organs of sense—we are not affected directly in the visual, auditory or tactile. And yet, as we shall hereafter find to be the fact, these affects may emerge consciously in the understanding of the person affected as visual, auditory or tactile ideas. I hold that this proves power in the understanding to relate these impressions to its normal experience, that is, there is power in the understanding to abstract from these impressions ideas of the visual, auditory or tactile. Bear in mind that as impressions which have never been reduced to visual, auditory or tactile ideas are the subject of memory, these impressions must be affects on the understanding. So the understanding has these affects to operate on for reduction into visual, auditory or tactile ideas: the understanding *reduces* the (relatively) universal into the particular, or, in other words, abstracts the particular from the (relatively) universal.

## TELEPATHY

THE cumulative weight of the evidence going to proof of telepathy is now so great, and the evidence itself is, in detail, of such a nature, that many marked men of science accept it as, practically, proving the fact. It is true, also, that many scientific men are said to reject the evidence as unreliable: but I think they must be held to ignore rather than reject. For scientific rejection implies a decision arrived at after full investigation and criticism of the evidence, and I can find no report of any such full investigation and criticism by any marked man of science followed by rejection. Those denying would appear to proceed on the principle that 'the antecedent improbability of telepathy is so great that no amount of human evidence can overcome it,' and so to ignore rather than reject the evidence in proof.

We have then, on the one hand, many scientific and thoughtful men who, after full investigation and criticism of the evidence for and against telepathy, have come to the conclusion that it is, practically, proved to be a fact: we have, on the other hand, many scientific and thoughtful men who, without any full investigation and criticism of the evidence, rely on chance coincidence as an explanation, or declare that telepathy is but the creation of fraud, a fantasy of human imagination, or the result of self-deception.

To the ordinary individual the former class of scientific men would appear to offer a conclusion based on reason: the latter a conclusion based on dogmatic assertion. The opinion of this latter class must be treated by us all as having great weight, but its weight would appear to be that of bare authority, whereas the weight of opinion of the former would appear to be not only of authority, but of authoritative reasoned decision on evidence. (Cf. *Hypnotism*, by Dr. A. Moll, translated by A. F. Hopkirk, pp. 510-5. Herein Dr. Moll, while admitting the possibility of telepathy as a fact, denies we have evidence in proof of the fact. But I cannot think his criticism of the evidence exhaustive or satisfactory. On p. 513, l. 1-5, there appears to be an error in fact.)

In the previous chapter I have given definitions of telepathy, and of telepathy as manifest to us as human personalities. And I have assumed to deduce the definitions from the theory as to personality set forth in the earlier part of this book, coupled with the fact that sensibility affects the human personality otherwise than through the normal organs of sense.

But now we are considering human experience. And I do not allege that, in human experience, the truth of telepathy is established. I doubt greatly whether, in human experience, we can ever arrive at any absolute truth. But I shall assume that we have, in human experience, sufficient evidence to justify the assumption that communication takes place between human personalities otherwise than through the normal organs of sense. This assumption I shall make.

Still, bear in mind, this assumption does not cover an assumption that telepathy, and telepathy as manifested to us, defined as I have defined them, are facts. That remains open for proof on a consideration of the material at our command.

The first definite attack on behalf of telepathy against the citadel of science was made, I think, by Professor W. F. Barrett. In the year 1876 he read a paper on the subject at the British Association, when he asked that a committee of scientific men might be appointed to investigate the question of the possibility of ideas or information being voluntarily or involuntarily transferred from one mind to another, independently of the recognised organs of sense. The suggestion was scouted: even that great man, Helmholtz, declaring that telepathy was impossible (*Proceedings*, vol. xviii. p. 329).

But the suggestion had effect. For, thereafter, a large body of earnest and independent men of position—of whom Barrett was one—formed the Society for Psychical Research.

As I had nothing to do with the labour of these men, I may, without prejudice, say they are worthy of all admiration for the work they did in the accumulation of reported facts going to prove, especially, the truth of telepathy. For public opinion was dead against them. I can myself well remember that in the sixties one was treated as an amiable lunatic if investigating mesmerism, a congenital idiot if considering spiritualism, and an atheist if accepting the Darwinian theory. We are too apt to forget that the first pioneers in new fields of science have to face moral and social suffering from the cruel inquisition of authority and public opinion as great in degree as the physical suffering of martyrs of religion.

The year 1886 was marked in the annals of the Society for Psychical Research by the publication of a book called *Phantasms of the Living*. The writers were Edmund Gurney, F. W. H. Myers, and Frank Podmore. By far the greater part of the labour of composition was borne by Edmund Gurney (see *Apparitions and Thought Transference*, p. 11). This work is now a classic of research and record.

The fully expressive term, telepathy, was, I believe, coined by Myers. I have, above, defined telepathy as:—

‘The timeless and spaceless communion between intuitive selves,

and between intuitive selves and the external: communication between mind and mind, and between mind and the external in intuition.'

Telepathy, as manifested to us as subjects (human personalities with human minds), I have defined as:—

'Communication otherwise than through the normal organs of sense between subjects, and between subjects and the external in impressions (feeling which emerges consciously in the understanding), and communication otherwise than through the normal organs of sense between subjects, and between subjects and the external which emerges consciously in ideas in the understanding.'

(Impressions are manifestations of real affects on the understanding from external personalities, and the external where, for consciousness of the impressions, there follows some operation of the understanding. Ideas result solely from operation of the understanding, originated or preceded by impressions on the understanding.)

Bear in mind that to this point we do not take into consideration 'a power of the mind to place itself in community of thought with other men, however distant they may be' (Kant, p. 164). Kant refers to a power in the subject exercisable by the subject at its own will or desire; the definition given refers but to an involuntary passive power or, rather, attribute of man. The power glanced at by Kant will be afterwards directly considered: now it can only be incidentally referred to.

The question is, does human experience point to the definition of telepathy and its manifestation I have offered as the most correct definitions we can arrive at?

For proof, I shall rely mainly on the facts contained in *Phantasms of the Living*, and those collected and published by the Society for Psychical Research.

There are some who attack the S.P.R. as too restrictive in their method of research: as requiring too much weight of evidence before they accept any 'case' for publication. No one, I think, who has studied the evidence, charges them with laxity in the reception of evidence.

Now, in this, the S.P.R. may be right or they may be wrong. But there is no doubt at all that their restrictive method of proceeding makes the matter of their publications of far greater value for the cautious student than it could otherwise be. Speaking as a student, I say it is far better for *me* that the S.P.R. should reject nineteen veridical cases than that they should accept them—and with them accept one false case. (Some few even of the cases they have accepted have been found to be untrustworthy.) The S.P.R. offers us a mass of evidence which has already gone through the fire of adverse criticism from men and women, not only of exceptional intelligence and acumen, but influenced by differing even con-

ficting preconceived ideas as to what theory or theories offer the best solutions of the problems psychical research presents to us.

Besides the cases recorded by the S.P.R. there are many others also reported. I do not deny that these latter are worthy of full attention. But I do not rely on them generally for the following reasons :—

The S.P.R. regard telepathy, not as a fact proved, but a fact which has to be proved. So they consider each case on its own merits : they do not consider each case with reference to any cut and dried theory. Each case, then, that they offer for consideration is supported by strong evidence of its truth—they eliminate, so far as is possible, errors arising from preconceived ideas in the percipients and from the fallibility of human observation.

But most of the other reported cases are offered as no more than *evidence* in support of telepathy as already proved as a fact, and frequently as evidence of communication with the dead where the fact of such communication is assumed to be already established. These cases may all be veridical : but, evidentially, they are weak. For telepathy and communication with the dead being assumed as facts, the reporters accept evidence of psychical phenomena as proof, without weighing it so strictly as does the S.P.R.

There is also a mass of evidence, of the most astounding psychical phenomena, with the authority of marked scientific men at its back. This evidence, though it touches closely the question of personality, travels far outside the limits of telepathy. So, without expressing any dogmatic opinion, I have good excuse for ignoring such evidence.

As I have said, however, I hold that the mass of evidence accumulated by the S.P.R. justifies acceptance of the fact that communication does take place between human beings otherwise than through the normal organs of sense, and in so holding I am but a humble follower of a large number of men and women marked by exceptional ability, even scientific ability and reputation. What I shall try to do is to justify (using references to the opinions of men of authority) the definitions of telepathy and its manifestation which I have given, and the distinction incidentally raised between impressions and ideas. If the attempt be successful, then we have proof, in human experience, of the existence of the intuitive (the spiritual) self.

In considering the carefully selected cases of the S.P.R. as the basis for any such general theory of telepathy as that I offer, it must be borne in mind that the S.P.R. only publish those cases which comply with certain stringent conditions they have laid down. The three following passages will show what these conditions are.

‘ For our purposes, then, the dreams must have been noted down, or communicated to others, directly after their occurrence. If concerned with grave events, those events must not be of a chronic but of a critical kind, such as sudden danger or actual death. If

concerned with trivial events, those events must be in some way bizarre or unexpected, not such everyday occurrences as a visit from a friend or the arrival of a present' (*Proceedings S.P.R.*, vol. i. p. 143).

This principle of exclusion governs the decision of the S.P.R. with respect to the publication of nearly all cases—not of dreams only—coming before them.

'The abnormality of the agent's state, though needed to make the coincidence striking enough to be included in this book' (*Phantasms of the Living*), 'may not for all that be an indispensable condition : genuine transfer of ideas of which we can take no account may occur in the more ordinary conditions of life : and the continuity of the experimental and spontaneous cases may thus conceivably be complete.'

'We must not be too positive that the telepathic action is confined to the well-marked or ostensive instances on which the *proof* of it has to depend' (*Phantasms of the Living*, vol. i. p. 97).

The cases recorded by the S.P.R. are, in fact, picked cases ; cases concerned with trivial events are not, ordinarily, recorded : the recorded cases are closely confined to those where the exceptional nature of the event and the abnormality of the agent's state make the coincidence in question striking.

If then telepathic communion takes place, as I allege, ordinarily and generally amongst humanity, even as to the most trivial matters, and where those concerned are in a normal state, we find the S.P.R. has deliberately refrained from recording such cases. This is stated as a bare fact, not as an attack on the methods of the S.P.R.

It follows directly that the whole body of spontaneous cases reported by the S.P.R. constitutes no evidence at all in disproof of any theory that telepathy is of constant and general occurrence, even as to the most trivial matters, and when agents and percipients are in their ordinary normal state. At the same time we find that in experimental telepathy, as carried on by the S.P.R. itself, both agents and percipients are, ordinarily, in a normal state, and only the most trivial matters are dealt with : and Gurney himself says that if telepathy occurs in the more ordinary conditions of life, the continuity of the experimental and spontaneous cases may conceivably be complete.

That this continuity exists is highly probable if not certain. For it approaches absurdity to argue that in experimental cases telepathy has one field of action and in spontaneous cases another field of action. Therefore, though from the reported spontaneous cases evidence is not available in proof or disproof of telepathy being of constant and general occurrence, we can still, by comparing the experimental with the spontaneous cases, arrive at a high degree of probability that telepathy is of constant and general occurrence

as to the most trivial as well as the more important occurrences of life, and that abnormality in the agents or percipients is not a necessary factor. Personally, I treat this high degree of probability, when coupled with the theory propounded, as practically establishing the fact.

That telepathy is of this constant and general occurrence, that its whole range must be referred to some great fundamental law, known or unknown, is supported by the following three passages:—

‘Here, moreover, the prophetic element clearly takes us on to altogether fresh ground’: the reference is to a case where a lady saw ‘an event,’ shortly before it in fact occurred. ‘So, again, there is strong evidence that *clairvoyants* have witnessed and described trivial incidents in which they had no special interest, and even scenes in which the actors, though actual persons, were complete strangers to them; and such cases seem properly assimilated to those where they describe mere places and objects, the idea of which can hardly be supposed to be impressed on them by any personality at all. Once more, apparitions at death, though the fact of death sufficiently implies excitement or disturbance in one mind, have often been witnessed, not only by relatives or friends in a normal state but interested in the event—a case above considered—but by other observers who had no personal interest in the matter. In some of these cases the disinterested observer has been in the company of the person for whom the appearance may be supposed to have been specially intended, as in the now classical case of the apparition of Lieutenant Wynyard’s brother. In other cases there is not even this apparent link, as where a vision or apparition announces the death of a perfect stranger to some one who is wholly at a loss to account for the visitation.

‘Clearly, then, the analogy of Thought-transference which seemed to offer such a convenient logical start, cannot be pressed too far. Our phenomena break through any attempt to group them under heads of transferred impression, and we venture to introduce the words *Telaesthesia* and *Telepathy* to cover all cases of impressions received at a distance without the normal operation of the sense organs’ (*Proceedings S.P.R.*, vol. i. p. 146).

‘No one supposes that the few emergent cases which happen to have become accessible to our view comprise the whole range of what must by its very nature be a great fundamental law’ (*Proceedings S.P.R.*, vol. xv. p. 408. By F. W. H. Myers).

‘The answer I am disposed to give to this question would be that, taken in the widest sense, telepathy probably is universal, and that what is rare and exceptional is only our restriction of it.’ By Gerald Balfour (*Proceedings*, vol. xix. p. 383).

If in this whole range there be but the operation of one great fundamental law, then we must hold that the phenomena of so termed telepathy, *telaesthesia*, *clairvoyance* and *clair-audience* are

but differing manifestations (or forms of evidence) of one and the same power in or attribute of man. I use, as before said, the word telepathy as covering all such phenomena and try to get at the one great fundamental law.

To this end we must consider the recorded cases and try to determine what conclusions are to be drawn from them. But before entering on this task a further explanation must be given turning on the nature of these recorded cases.

I have said that impressions received otherwise than through the normal organs of sense are, in their origin, unconditioned in time and space; it is only as manifestations to us in feeling and idea that they are so conditioned. But the recorded cases do not give any great assistance in proving this unconditioning in time and space, *i.e.* the proof is but weakly supported by human evidence. This absence of evidence, however, can be accounted for.

If these impressions are in their origin so unconditioned in time and space we should expect to find recorded cases dealing with events not only of the present but of the past and future. But clearly any case dealing with an event of the past must, in its nature, be weak evidentially, and so is not likely to be reported by the S.P.R. for the reasons given above.

Herein we find an explanation for the paucity of such cases reported.

Again, cases dealing with the future, that is, cases of prophecy, are almost as weak evidentially. For prophecy is to the majority of us an impossibility, a thing of superstition or a subject for laughter. So if such a case occur to any one it is unlikely to be recorded or even kept in mind. Coupled with this attitude of mind of the great majority, the ordinary carelessness even of those who believe in prophecy is so great, that they are unlikely to make any record at the time of the event: they will ordinarily trust to personal memory. So, even when such cases are brought to the attention of the S.P.R., the chances are that they are so weak evidentially that they are held not worth recording.

Herein we find an explanation of the paucity of such cases recorded.

For proof, then, that these impressions are in their origin so unconditioned, I must admit there is little human evidence to rely on.

Still there are recorded cases. Many, for example, are referred to by Ernest Bozzano in a paper 'Symbolism and Metapsychical Phenomena,' reported in the *Annals of Psychological Science*, vol. vi. pp. 235 and 335.

Incidentally I would suggest that Bozzano's reasoning on these cases is worthy of the attention of the student: I submit that the point of view from which he considers them is the correct point of view. I give the following passage from page 364 in detail:—

'As to this, however, I was constrained to remark that in the

same category of phenomena incidents were found which were not capable of psycho-physical interpretation, leading us to the assumption of the existence of a subconscious Ego, endowed with psychic faculties unknown to the conscious Ego, and of superior quality.'

The purview of the present inquiry may be stated as follows :—

Starting with the theory that the human personality is a partial and mediate manifestation in time and space of an intuitive self: that the intuitive self, *in relation to the human personality*, stores up intuition in time, so that the human personality has, practically, a full storage of ideas unconditioned in time and space of events past in time and space to work with in potential memory, then can we, by consideration of the facts of telepathy, find support for the theory in human experience? Can we, incidentally, arrive at any fundamental law governing the psychic phenomena which have been under consideration?

If these questions can be answered in the affirmative then, I think, we have scientific as distinct from metaphysical proof that the intuitive (spiritual) self exists. But we can know (can determine) this intuitive self only so far as manifest to us in time and space.

If we read Myer's 'subliminal self' as meaning, in certain connections, the intuitive self, and in certain other connections the human personality with a perfect potential memory, we shall find the theory propounded is in expansion of rather than in opposition to the theory propounded by him. The following extract supports this allegation.

'I have already urged that the impulse which ultimately generates the phantom is in no case directly received by the superficial self, but always by the subliminal faculties, in some unknown fashion. I have suggested that this impulse is not in itself of any definite sensory or motor quality, but is generally capable of being *translated* to the superficial self in either sensory or motor terms, according to the subject's psychostatical condition—perhaps according to the predominance of visile, audile or motile imagery in his habitual psychic operations' (*Proceedings*, vol. vii. p. 321. By F. W. H. Myers).

In the above paragraph write for 'impulse' the word 'intuition,' and for 'subliminal faculties' the words 'intuitive self,' and we find how like the theory propounded is to Myers' theory.

Consider, too, the following passage by Gurney :—

'We have encountered several cases, which there seems strong ground for considering telepathic, where the phantasmal form was not recognised: and we have seen that on the theory that the telepathic impulse may take place on various levels, or even below any level of consciousness, and may be projected into sensory form

by the percipient with various degrees of distinctness, this lack of recognition is not surprising' (*Phantasms*, vol. ii. p. 73).

If we hold that the 'telepathic impulse' takes place always on one level (that of the intuitive self) we get *one* relation to human consciousness and the projection 'into sensory form by the percipient with various degrees of distinctness,' directly follows. We arrive, so far, at a theory not unlike that now propounded.

## SPONTANEOUS CASES

I BEGIN with a consideration of spontaneous cases. For they involve, generally, as has already been stated, only the fact of telepathy itself, whereas experimental cases infer not only the fact of telepathy, but the fact also that telepathy is used by man at will. But it must not be forgotten that some, of whom Podmore himself is one, rely mainly on the evidence of experimental cases for proof of telepathy as a fact.

The names of the agents and percipients, in the cases I refer to, are most of them published, and if not published can probably be made known to the student on reference to the Society for Psychological Research.

In considering the recorded cases, I shall group them more or less arbitrarily. I do this for the better exemplification of the theory propounded. And this grouping is justifiable: I do not interfere with truth, I simply deal with it in arbitrary succession.

## FEELING

As I hold that telepathy is manifest to us in impressions (feeling), and that ideas arising from telepathy result from operation of the understanding originated or preceded by these impressions, I must begin by a consideration of the communication of impressions. But bear in mind that, for consciousness, these impressions must infer *some* operation of the understanding. Otherwise there would be no recorded cases for consideration: these impressions to be evidential must be the subject of memory.

Telepathic communion itself takes place between intuitive selves (subliminal selves): it is manifested to us in the communication of impressions and ideas. Impressions are manifestations to us in consciousness of affects on the understanding; ideas result solely from operation of the understanding.

Thus, where the S.P.R. speaks of deferred 'impressions,' I speak of deferred 'ideas.' For instance: Where A in England sees the death of B in Australia some time after the event, I hold we have a deferred 'idea,' not 'impression' of the event. And in many such cases I should expect *evidence* of preceding impression (feeling) close to the time of the event.

The recorded cases where feeling (impressions) exceptional in its nature precedes the emergence of ideas are too numerous to be all referred to. A glance through *Phantasms of the Living* will show how many they are. (See, for instance, *Phantasms*, vol. i. pp. 196, 204, 208, 240, 243, 271, *et seq.*; vol. ii. p. 138).

Note, too, the general statement as to percipients in experimental cases made by Professor Oliver Lodge:—

'With regard to the feelings of the percipients when receiving an impression, they seem to have some sort of consciousness of the action of other minds on them: and once or twice, when not so conscious, have complained that there seemed to be 'no power' or anything acting, and that they not only received no impressions, but did not feel as if they were going to. . . . I asked one of them what she felt when impressions were coming freely, and she said she felt a sort of thrill or influence' (*Proceedings*, vol. ii. p. 200).

Here for 'impressions' I replace the word 'ideas'; and for 'a sort of thrill or influence' the feeling (impression) in the percipient manifesting the intuition of the percipient's intuitive self.

Again, there is a feature marking, I think, the majority of reported

cases of feeling, the importance of which has escaped the attention it deserves.

These cases show that the particular experience of the percipients was not an ordinary, but an extraordinary experience. We all, more or less, dream waking and sleeping. But these percipients say their experience was not that of ordinary vision: they were, in all these cases, peculiarly affected, so that the experience had unique effect on them. In very many instances—indeed, I think, in the large majority—we find that the percipients had but once or twice been the subjects of such experience, while we must hold they had often been the subjects of ordinary visions.

Now can we refer this unique effect to the ideas themselves of the experience? I think not. I think we must refer it to the exceptional nature of the impression preceding the emergence of ideas, for the ideas are *always* of the nature of ordinary human ideas. I think we have, herein, very strong evidence of unique affection in intuition which has led to the impressions or the emergence of the ideas.

I record now three cases of 'feeling' for consideration:—

## 1

'Miss M. says:—

'I was sitting alone in the drawing-room, reading an interesting book, and feeling perfectly well, when suddenly I experienced an undefined feeling of dread and horror; I looked at the clock and saw it was just seven P.M. I was utterly unable to read, so I got up and walked about the room trying to throw off the feeling, but I could not: I became quite cold, and had a firm presentiment that I was dying. The feeling lasted about half an hour, and then passed off, leaving me a good deal shaken all the evening; I went to bed feeling very weak, as if I had been seriously ill. The next morning I received a telegram telling me of the death of a near and very dear cousin, Mrs. K.' (*Phantasms*, vol. i. p. 197).<sup>1</sup>

## 2

'When a boy, about fourteen years of age, I was in school in Edinburgh, my home being in the west of Scotland. A thoughtless boy, free from all care and anxiety; in the "Eleven" of my school, and popular with my companions; I had nothing to worry or annoy me. I boarded with two old ladies now both dead.

'One afternoon—on the day previous to a most important cricket match in which I was to take part—I was overwhelmed with a most unusual sense of depression and melancholy; I shunned my friends, and got "chuffed" for my most unusual dullness and sulkiness. I felt utterly miserable; and even to this day I have a most vivid recollection of my misery that afternoon.

<sup>1</sup> The death had taken place at 7 P.M. the previous night.

‘I knew that my father suffered from a most dangerous disease in the stomach—a gastric ulcer—and that he was always more or less in danger, but I knew that he was in his usual bad health, and that nothing exceptional ailed him.

‘That night I had a dream. . . . I at once left for home, and found my father had just died when I reached the house. The ulcer in the stomach had suddenly burst about four o’clock on the previous day, and it was about that hour that I had experienced the most unusual depression I have described’ (*Journal S.P.R.*, vol. i. p. 364; *Phantasms*, vol. i. p. 278).

## 3

‘On the evening of January 28, 1863, I had met several old friends at dinner at a friend’s house near Manchester, in which neighbourhood I had been paying visits. My return home to my father’s house was fixed for the next afternoon. I ought to say that between that father and me, his first-born child, a more than common bond of affection and sympathy existed, arising from circumstances I need not mention, and I was looking forward to my return with earnest longing. The evening had been bright and happy, surrounded by friends I valued. When I was about to leave, my hostess pressed me to play for her a very favourite old march. I declined, on account of the lateness of the hour, and keeping horses standing. She said, “It is not yet twelve, and I have sent the carriage away for a quarter of an hour!” I sat down laughing, and before I played many bars, such an indescribable feeling came over me, intense sadness heralded a complete breakdown, and I was led away from the piano in hysterics. By ten o’clock the next morning I got a telegram to say my father had gone to bed in his usual health, and at a quarter to twelve the night before had passed away in an epileptic fit, having previously said to my sister how glad he was to think of seeing me so soon, and when she bid him good-night, praying to God to give them both a quiet night and sleep’ (*Journal S.P.R.*, vol. i. p. 365). (See also three cases reported in the *Journal S.P.R.*, vol. ii. pp. 76, 78, and 100.)

(In the experimental case reported at p. 271 of vol. x. of the *Proceedings*, there appears to have been success in transfer of feeling, the failure was because there was no sufficiently definite operation of the understanding of the percipient for definite ideas to emerge.)

All these percipients state that their experience was unique.

Now these percipients were conscious only of personal feeling, not of cognition in idea of the external, or of external personalities: they were affected in impression as distinct from idea. And this affection was in each case a telepathic affection.

We cannot refer this communication of impressions to a cause different from that resulting in the apparent transference of ideas.

(In the second case, indeed, the impression was followed by the emergence of ideas in a remarkable dream not here set out as it is not now in point.) If we consider the numerous other reported cases where impressions were followed by the emergence of ideas, I think we must hold that in the cases now considered the impressions *might* have been followed by the emergence of ideas. And what does this mean? It means that the evidence of these impressions is evidence of the manifestation to the percipients in consciousness of affects on them (as intuitive selves) from the external or external personalities, which might have emerged, but did not emerge in definite ideas because there was no sufficient conscious operation of the understanding. That is, the telepathic impulse is exactly the same in these cases as in those where ideas emerge: the only distinction between the cases is that in these cases the telepathic impulse is not followed by action of the understanding in the conscious emergence of definite ideas in cognition.

Myers says: 'There are a good many cases where the phantasm is observed some time *after* the apparent death of the agent—we may even say some time after his actual bodily death. Now in these cases the phantasm seems almost always to await a quiet moment—generally at night—for its appearance; and it seems possible to suppose that the *impression* (my italics) received perhaps at the moment of the friend's death, has gone through a period of incubation in some subconscious region of the percipient's mental activity, and is developed or externalised as soon as the stimuli of active existence have ceased to engross the brain' (*Journal*, vol. i. p. 183).

Note that here Myers refers the telepathic impulse to an *impression* which later on emerges in the understanding in definite idea of the phantasm: the externalisation of the phantasm is made subjective to the manifestation in impression of telepathic communion. He distinguishes between impressions and ideas. And this is in agreement with the theory propounded—if, too, for Myers's 'subconscious region of the percipient's mental activity' we read 'the intuitive self,' we find still closer agreement.

There is a case reported in the *Proceedings*, vol. vii. p. 33 *et seq.* (many other like cases are therein recorded). I refer only to that part of it which has a bearing on the present argument.

Mrs. P. states:—

'I arose about the usual hour on the morning of the accident'—an accident to her brother Edmund, who was at some distance from her—'probably about six o'clock. I had slept well throughout the night, had no dreams or sudden awakenings. I awoke feeling gloomy and depressed, which feeling I could not shake off. After breakfast my husband went to his work, and, at the proper time, the children were gotten ready and sent to school, leaving me alone in the house. Soon after this I decided to steep and drink

some tea, hoping it would relieve me of the gloomy feelings aforementioned. I went into the pantry, took down the tea canister, and as I turned around, my brother Edmund—or his exact image—stood before me, and only a few feet away.'

Mrs. P. then gives details of the accident to her brother as she saw it. It was afterwards proved that the accident had happened as she said she had seen it happen.

Now the accident happened about 3 A.M. Mrs. P. woke up about 6 A.M. that is, three hours after the accident, feeling gloomy and depressed. It was, perhaps, three hours later, that is, six hours after the accident, that Mrs. P., still feeling gloomy and depressed, saw *in idea* the accident to her brother.

Mrs. H. Sidgwick, in referring to this case, says: It will have been noticed that her impression was not contemporaneous with the event to which it related, but occurred some six hours afterwards' (p. 34).

Herein Mrs. Sidgwick refers to the appearance of the phantom as the *impression* on the percipient. I prefer to say that the impression on the percipient was the feeling of gloom and depression which probably affected her in sleep at the time of the accident, and continued in affect till she awoke three hours later. The appearance of the phantom, again three hours later, was not, I hold, in impression but in *idea*—the impression emerged so late in *idea* because then for the first time the external environments of the percipient were consonant with the emergence of the *idea* in her human understanding: the *idea* emerged in her soon after she was first alone.

Again, Mrs. Sidgwick referring, I think, to Mrs. P. says: 'But it seems quite possible that the nervousness and depression may have had to do with some condition in the percipient which rendered the vision possible.'

I hold that it is not simply possible but certain that the connection Mrs. Sidgwick refers to, existed. At the time of the accident the personality of Mrs. P. was affected in intuition and her human personality was *impressed* by the affect. Afterwards—when she was comparatively free from normal external disturbance—the affect emerged in *idea* through operation of her understanding.

In all cases like to this the first impression of the percipient is in conscious personal feeling, not in definite *idea*: it is but a detail (of the understanding) that after *ideas* emerge. And there can be no transfer of feeling by direct thought-transference, for feeling has nothing to do, *per se*, with cognition. I hold that such cases go to prove that the communion between personalities is *not* in *idea*: the after emergence of *ideas* must result from some operation of this communion on the understanding.

There is a remarkable case reported in *Phantasms of the Living*, vol. i. p. 274:—

‘ During the whole afternoon I remained in this state of dismal wretchedness. All at once a telegram arrived from home, informing me that my grandmother was taken very ill, and that she was earnestly longing for me. There I had the solution of the riddle. Nevertheless from that hour my melancholy gradually decreased, and in spite of the telegram it completely disappeared in the course of the afternoon. In the evening I received a second telegram, to the effect that the danger was over. In this way the second phenomenon, the rapid decrease of my wretchedness—a circumstance which in itself was surprising, inasmuch as the melancholy should naturally have *increased* after the receipt of the first news—received its explanation. For the afternoon was just the time when the change in the patient’s condition for the better took place; and the danger to her life once over, her yearning for my presence had decreased; while simultaneously my anxiety was dispelled’ (Reported also in *Proceedings*, vol. ii. p. 122).

This case is remarkable in that it shows the affect on the percipient, from an impression *on* her understanding arising from telepathic impulse, was stronger than the affect on her (through the operation *of* her understanding) of positive information conveyed through her normal organs of sense. The case I must admit does not form one of a class: I can find only one like to it (see *Phantasms*, vol. i. p. 244). But so far as we can rely on these two we have evidence of the subjectivity of mental operation to what Gurney terms emotional state, or what I term impression. The evidence of these two cases goes in direct support of the theory I propound.

The following case is of interest with reference to the present argument:—

‘ Two friends of ours, Mr. X. and Mr. G. lived together till the marriage of Mr. X., and were, therefore, intimately associated in our minds.

It happened that though Mrs. X. and I had exchanged cards we had not met, and I merely knew her by sight at the time when Mr. G. also married. But as I had found Mrs. G. at home I was slightly acquainted with her.

‘ It was a few months after Mr. G.’s marriage, on the night of May 14th, 1879, when my dream occurred. I was staying at Bristol at the time. It seemed to me I was making my first call on Mrs. G., and that she proceeded to show me her trousseau—a thing that would never have occurred to her in actual life, or to any but very intimate friends. A variety of dresses were displayed, and as I was looking at a black net evening dress, with crimson trimmings, thinking it was very like one of my own, a sudden transformation took place. Mrs. G. had changed into Mrs. X., and the dress was a widow’s dress complete. I woke very strongly impressed with the dream, and mentioned it to my father the next morning. It

haunted me till, on May 15th or 16th, I saw the *Times*' announcement of Mr. X.'s death.

'Afterwards I learnt that, on the afternoon preceding my dream, Mr. X. had returned home, apparently in his usual good health, only rather tired, but within half an hour had died of quite unsuspected heart disease' (*Journal*, vol. i. p. 393).

In this case the operation of the understanding of the percipient resulted in a purely imaginative dream: in no way can we refer this dream itself to direct communion in telepathy between the percipient and the external or any external personality. Even the idea of the widow's dress was purely imaginary; there was no transfer of ideas between the percipient and any external personality.

But the widow's dress—in association with Mrs. X.—was certainly symbolic of Mr. X.'s death. We must therefore hold that there was some affection on the percipient from the external or some external personality which *started* the mental operation of the percipient: the affect must have been *on* the understanding of the percipient. There is no evidence, it is true, of the manifestation of any impression, but the emerging ideas being purely imaginative and yet, in part, symbolic of the death which had really occurred, we must refer the dream to some real affect from the external or some external personality which might have been manifest in conscious impression.

Now the recorded cases of unique impressions as distinct from ideas are, as I have said, very numerous. We must do one of two things: We must hold (1) that the telepathy which sets up impressions in the percipient is a different thing from the telepathy which sets up ideas in the percipient, or (2) we must refer both series of cases to one and the same principle of telepathy.

I reject the former and hold to the latter theory.

It follows that we must refer cases of (apparent) transfer of impressions and cases of (apparent) transfer of ideas to one and the same root. That is, there is an affect from the external or external personalities on the personality of the percipient, and this (the root of apparent transfer) manifests itself in conscious impressions (feeling) of the percipient, and sometimes in the after emergence of ideas in the understanding of the percipient by more definite operation of the understanding.

But it may be objected—the very cases of impressions that you rely on prove the real transference of impressions.

An examination of the cases relied on and, indeed, of all the reported cases, will prove this is not so.

Consider the first three cases set out at length.

In all these what were the impressions of the percipient? Gloom and depression; an hysterical state resulting in sharp personal unhappiness or discomfort. The impressions were all of *personal*

feeling in the percipient, personal feeling which in no single case we are justified in holding was shared by the agent.

In all these cases the death or nearness of death of the agent was the 'event' in question. Now we have no grounds at all for holding that death or the nearness of death necessarily impresses the person dying with any feeling of gloom or depression. Ordinarily the feeling is one of supreme indifference, or even longing for the end of human life. There *may* be gloom or depression, but, even where there is, it is a feeling personal to the agent dying and to his personal state; whereas the feeling of gloom or depression in the percipient is personal to the percipient and his personal state. We can well understand the agent, dying, to experience full happiness, while the percipient is affected, in contradiction, by gloom or depression.

What conclusion follows directly?

The event is the supreme crisis death. The agent is affected by the event in impression; the impression is personal to himself. The event telepathically affects the percipient in impression personal to himself, where his impression may be directly the opposite of that of the agent. So the communion between the agent and percipient cannot be in transfer of impressions: it must be in something which is merely *manifested in* the (probably differing) impressions of the agent and percipient.

The same argument holds for all cases of 'feeling.'

We are driven to a conclusion that the telepathic impressions or ideas of any percipient are no more than manifestations of an affect on the percipient from the external or external personalities; and I cannot, in this connection, treat the percipient as a human personality of feeling and cognition. If we so treat the percipient we must so treat the agent, and the communion must be held to be direct between two subjects of human feeling and ideas, so that the communication is direct in feeling and idea. The evidence available disproves any such direct communication.

These cases of impression, then, show that telepathy is a term used to express the communion in intuition between the intuitive self and other intuitive selves and the external, *manifested* to us, as subjects, in impressions and sometimes in ideas.

## RUDIMENTARY IDEAS: SIGHT, SOUND, AND TOUCH

WHERE telepathy results in impressions only, and is not followed by the definite operation of the understanding necessary for definite ideas, there is still some operation of the understanding. We might, then, term impressions rudimentary ideas. But the term 'rudimentary ideas' is already appropriated by the authors of *Phantasms of the Living*, and so it will be better to follow them and refer rudimentary ideas to ideas involving sight, sound, and touch.

Rudimentary ideas herein mean ideas of the hearing of tappings, tickings, knocks, crashes, footsteps, bells, clocks, etc., the seeing of vague forms or the feeling of vague touches.

All these ideas are of sight, sound, or touch (cf. *Phantasms*, vol. i. p. 503; vol. ii. pp. 73-6, 125-32, 570-6, 635-9).

Now telepathic impressions are probably of constant and general occurrence even as to the most trivial matters, and when agents and percipients are in their ordinary normal state (see p. 123). And telepathy as manifested to us results from an affect on the understanding, so that when there is operation of the understanding this operation is originated by the affect on the understanding. In the great majority of cases, then, we might expect the resulting ideas to be rudimentary ideas. For, in most cases, we may assume that the operation of the understanding is at a minimum. So the number of such cases extant—not necessarily published—should be large: it is, in fact, very large (cf. *Proceedings*, vol. vi. p. 330).

But evidentially little reliance can be placed on such cases. For winds play with trees, even with walls, windows, chimneys; furniture creaks—especially at night—on change of temperature, and thus we are often conscious of uncanny sounds: our senses of sight, hearing, and feeling, too, frequently give rise in us to false rudimentary ideas. It follows that the available evidence of rudimentary ideas is largely worthless as evidence of telepathy. For, though we may be unable to trace their cause, we know that any one of numberless natural causes *may* be the origin quite apart from telepathy (cf. *Phantasms*, vol. ii. p. 125).

The following case is worthy of attention as showing how easily natural noises may be the genesis of a good 'ghost' story. As Whateley has told us, the most difficult false story to break down is one based on a substratum of truth.

T. E. C. states :—

' In the winter of 1857 I was living in a roomy old-fashioned house in Wiltshire. Many people will recollect the severity of that winter, and in particular the bitter cold of that Christmas Eve. On that intensely cold afternoon, my father-in-law, Mr. D., started from London and travelled by a very slow train, stopping at every station, and not reaching the town where I lived till quite late in the evening. The result of that journey to him was a severe attack of bronchitis. He was confined to his bed for some days, and we were getting rather anxious as to the prospect of his recovery.

' One night I had occasion to go downstairs rather late and saw a light in the pantry, a small room on the ground floor, without a fireplace, and paved with stone.'

He found all the servants in this fireless place, and asked why they were there and not in the warm kitchen. The reply was, ' Oh, sir, we daren't sit there. There 's a horrible noise there every night. We never hear it in the daytime. We are sure Mr. D. is going to die.'

He then went into the kitchen, being told by the servants the noise was like that of a woman very far off screaming in pain, but that they could not locate the sound.

' There,' continues T. E. C., ' was the noise sure enough. An uncanny sound of a small voice of some one in pain at a distance, or rather as if it came through a wall.'

He went to different places—to the scullery, to the top of the cellar steps, outside the back door. He still heard the sound wherever he was, could not locate it, and was greatly puzzled.

Ultimately he marked that the sound occurred regularly once in three seconds, and, now on the right track, traced its origin to a gas meter. The water valve had got rusty, and shrieked each three seconds as it measured the passage of gas. He explained the matter to the servants, and they were content.

But the story does not end here. For, after the discovery, T. E. C. tells us that the sound was not heard again, and, too, ' my father-in-law began at once to get well ' (*Journal S.P.R.*, vol. iii. p. 311).

Herein we see how easily honest witnesses may interpret a near and natural sound as a distant and ' ghostly ' sound—in this case as the distant screaming of a woman in pain. Not only this. We have a real coincidence in time between the uncanny sound and the illness of a person in the house, and a second real coincidence in time between the ceasing of the sound and the ceasing of the illness.

So, as Gurney says, ' the vast majority of these non-human phantasms may be safely pronounced purely subjective affections.' But, as he also says, ' there are instances of strong and unique hallucinations of light or noise which have too markedly coincided with some external crisis for the hypothesis of telepathic origin to be ignored ' (*Phantasms*, vol. i. p. 503).

By the theory I propound these rudimentary ideas of telepathic origin must be very large. But all we can consider is *the evidence* towards proof that such rudimentary ideas are of telepathic origin. And, quâ evidence, I fully agree with Gurney.

I give three cases where the evidence points to telepathic origin. They are treated by Gurney as veridical.

### 1. SIGHT

' About the year 1841 I was in a room with my father in our house in the Isle of Wight, when he exclaimed, " Good God, what is that ? " starting up as he spoke and looking at something. He then turned to me and said he had seen a ball of light pass through the room, and added, " Depend upon it, Nurse Symonds is dead." This was an old servant in London, to whom he had been sending money, in illness. In course of post came information that she passed away at the very time in question. S. H. S.' (*Phantasms*, vol. ii. p. 76).

Here we may fairly assume the seeing the ball of light was unique in the experience of the percipient. But the coincidence is only a bare coincidence between the seeing by the percipient of a ball of light and the death at a distance. For telepathy, I would suggest, the case is strongest evidentially because of the strength and uniqueness of the hallucination, and the *feeling* of the percipient manifested in impression and partial idea which led him to associate the hallucination with the death.

The next case is given by a gentleman whose name can only be communicated privately.

### 2. SOUND

' Two days after leaving St. Helena I was up aloft doing some trifling sailor's work with the fourth officer, on the mizzen topsail or top gallant yard, when I heard a bell begin to toll. I said to him, " Do you hear that bell tolling ? " " No," he said, " I hear nothing." However, my agitation was so great that I went down and examined both our bells, and placed my arm near them to see if they were vibrating, or if any chance rope was swinging loose and striking them. However, while doing this, I still heard the boom of the tolling bell, and it seemed far away. I then, when I had satisfied myself that the sound was not attributable to either of our ship's bells, went up aloft and scanned the horizon in search of a sail, but saw none. I then said to my messmates, " That 's my ' black letter.' I knew I should have bad news this voyage." '

He found when the ship reached Falmouth that a lady who had been to him an elder sister, and whom he, boylike, adored, had died at the time he had heard the booming of the bell. He adds, ' I am forty years old now, and have been through dangers of all sorts, in imminent danger of death many times, but I have never had a pre-

sentiment since. After nearly twenty-five years I can still remember the boom, boom of that old bell in the Manx churchyard, which I heard in latitude 14 S. or thereabouts. . . . I have never suffered from any hallucinations' (*Phantasms*, vol. ii. p. 127).

### 3. TOUCH

W. B. C. states:—

'I well remember a singular circumstance I have often heard my father (one of the early civil engineers of this country) relate, which occurred to himself. He was a man of very strong mind, and more free from fancies and superstitions than most people. At the time of the occurrence he was about thirty years of age. He was in the habit of lying with his right hand extended out of bed; and one morning, about five o'clock, when wide awake, he felt a firm hand grasp his, so much like the grasp of his father's hand that he immediately told my mother "that his father had taken his hand as he usually did when saying 'good-bye.'" His father died at that time that morning, somewhat suddenly. My father did not know he was ill. His father died near Sunderland; my father, at that time, was living in Sussex' (*Phantasms*, vol. ii. p. 574).

If we dissect these cases I think we find that they do not point to direct thought transference, but to some telepathic affect on the understanding originating or followed by operation of the understanding resulting in ideas.

For in the first it is impossible to hold that the agent had in her the idea of appearing to the percipient as a ball of light, and in the second it is equally impossible to hold that the agent transferred the idea of hearing a bell boom.

The third is more difficult to deal with, for we can well imagine that the father dying had, in him, the idea of a last handshake with his son. But he must also, if thinking of his son, have had many other ideas related to him; and there is no reason, *a priori*, why the idea of shaking hands should have been the particular one transmitted.

On the other hand, if the event, death, affected the percipient's mind telepathically, we can imagine that it was followed by operation of his understanding which caused the emergence of an idea relating to a characteristic of the agent marked in the (his percipient's) human mind. Again, if we find in the former two that there could be no direct transference of idea, I think we may hold there was no direct transference in the third. For all three are of one class, and so one fundamental law should explain all.

If we make these rudimentary ideas of sight, sound, and touch, subjective to affects on the minds of the percipients, we find one law in explanation of all. These affects have been, in Myers' language, 'translated to the superficial self in either sensory or

motor terms according to the subject's psychostatical condition—perhaps according to the predominance of visile, audile, or tactile imagery in his habitual psychic operation' (*Proceedings*, vol. vii. p. 321; cf. *Phantasms*, vol. ii. pp. 76, 129, 130).

The simplest form of rudimentary ideas resulting from telepathic affects is, perhaps, manifest in sounds like raps or ticks. If so, these should be of common occurrence: but bear in mind they are, as before explained, weak evidentially. They would, in fact, appear to be of common occurrence.

An interesting case is to be found in the *Journal*, vol. x. pp. 162 *et seq.*

Mrs. Verrall, too—who is so generally known as an able and trustworthy investigator that her name may fairly be given—reports her own experience as to 'tickings' in the *Journal*, vol. ix. pp. 134, 159.

## DEFINITE IDEAS IN THE PERCIPIENT, BUT NOT RELATED TO THOSE OF THE AGENT

WE consider now a large class of cases where the evidence points to the percipients being affected by the external or external personalities, but where the facts disprove that the affection can be in transference of ideas. That is, where the percipients are so affected, and yet where the emerging ideas are foreign to any possible ideas of the agents.

I give three cases for consideration.

### 1

A Miss V. dreamt that she saw the corpse of a friend of hers, Mrs. A., laid out on a bed. A Mrs. M. staying in the house with Miss V. states that in a dream the same night 'I saw my friend, Miss A., running towards me. She passed me by, and took off her hat and bent her head down into the sea. I tried to grasp her by her clothes, but she cried out, 'Don't stop me, for my mother is dying.'

Mrs. A., who was in perfect health the day before, died about the time of these dreams. The facts of Mrs. M.'s dream were all imaginatively false (*Phantasms of the Living*, vol. i. p. 362).

### 2

The Rev. C. C. W. states: 'In my bachelor days I lived for two years at C., in the outskirts of London. On a certain night I dreamed that Mr. W. with whom I was acquainted and myself were walking in the cloisters of Westminster Abbey.

'He abruptly bade me "Good-bye," saying that he must go to a particular gravestone. I—in my dream—entreated him not to go, but to come back with me out of the cloisters. "No, no," he replied, "I must go, I am fated to go," with that he broke from me, hurried to the stone, and sank through the floor. The next morning I mentioned the dream to my landlady, and told her it was my firm conviction that my friend was dead.

'The next morning's post brought me a letter from my brother, who stated that on the previous night Mr. W. had died suddenly from disease of the heart' (*Phantasms of the Living*, vol. i. p. 364).

## 3

Mrs. H. states : ' The dream that I am about to relate occurred about two years ago. I seemed to be walking in a country road, with high grassy banks on either side. Suddenly I heard the tramp of many feet. Feeling a strange sense of fear, I called out, " Who are these people coming ? " A voice above me replied, " A procession of the dead. " I then found myself on the bank, looking into the road where the people were walking five or six abreast. Hundreds of them passed by me—neither looking aside nor looking at each other. They were people of all conditions and in all ranks of life. I saw no children amongst them. I watched the long line of people go away into the far distance, but I felt no special interest in any of them, until I saw a middle-aged friend, dressed as a gentleman farmer. I pointed to him and called out, " Who is that, please ? " He turned round and said in a loud voice, " I am John M. of Chelmsford. " Then my dream ended. Next day, when my husband returned from his office he told me that John M. of Chelmsford had died the previous day ' (*Phantasms of the Living*, vol. i. p. 366).

The above three cases mark in characteristics a large class. In none of them can we find any evidence of direct transference of ideas : indeed they disprove such direct transference. For we cannot relate Miss A.'s running down into the sea ; Mr. W.'s impossible conduct in the cloisters of Westminster Abbey ; John M.'s peculiar declaration of his own decease, to any reality in thought or action on the part of the agent. These ' imaginings ' constitute no more than subjective ideas on the part of the percipients, which are false in relation to those of the agent. But this constitutes no explanation of what took place ; the coincidences on which the authors of *Phantasms of the Living* rely still remain inexplicable if referred to chance.

If, however, we assume that the percipients received intuition of what was happening to the agents, and that intuition gave rise to ideas, related to the intuition but false in detail, because of the fallible or imaginative working of the understanding of the percipients, then we have a clear explanation of what took place. I have no doubt that Mrs. M. knew Hastings before she dreamt of it ; that the Rev. C. C. W. knew the cloisters of Westminster Abbey before he dreamt of them ; and Mrs. H. tells us, herself, she had afterwards another dream of the same kind in general detail as to the procession, which shows her tendency to the same form of dreaming. All these percipients had true telepathic experience in intuition, but when their understandings came into operation ' imaginative ' ideas emerged : for, by imagination, used in its ordinary sense, we can ' play with ' our storage of ideas. Bear in mind that quite apart from the active and definite exercise of memory, our imagination has always a vast storage of ideas to ' play with ' : it can

relate them to one another in the most heterogeneous, exaggerated and fantastic fashion, and so construct the strangest pictures in idea.

But in all these cases the foundation for even false imaginative ideas must be referred to real telepathic impression from the agents.

The following passage from *Phantasms of the Living* is in point directly as to the theory I propound.

'Suppose the same kind of real event—say the peaceful death of an aged parent—were to occur in twenty cases, and in each of them to produce a real and unique sort of disturbance in some absent person's mind; then, if that disturbance clothed itself in some sensory form—or, as I should say, if it reached the point of causing hallucination—the hallucination might take twenty different forms. One percipient may hear his parent's voice; another may imagine the touch of his hand upon his head; a third may see him in his wonted dress and aspect; a fourth may see him as he might appear when dying; a fifth may see him in some transfigured aspect; a sixth may see a figure or hear a voice resembling his, but not recognise it, or recognise it only in recollection; and others may invest the disturbing idea with every sort of visible symbolism, derived from their mind's habitual furniture and their wonted train of thought' (*Phantasms*, vol. i. p. 539).

If we consider this 'real and unique sort of disturbance in some absent person's mind,' we find that three different classes of result may follow. The disturbance may result, (1) in the emergence of no idea of any sensory form but merely in impression; (2) in the emergence of ideas of sensory form resulting from the affect of the disturbance on the stored ideas in the absent person's mind; (3) in the emergence of ideas of sensory form directly related to the disturbance—cases, that is, of apparent thought transfer.

This 'real and unique sort of disturbance' precedes in all cases the emergence of ideas—bear in mind that all our concrete ideas are clothed in some sensory form. The distinction between the disturbance and the emerging ideas is this:—the disturbance is an affect on the understanding from the external: the emerging of ideas clothed in sensory form is the result of an operation of the understanding. Herein we find Gurney closely in agreement with Myers when the latter relates telepathic impressions to the subliminal self. The disturbance does not consist in idea, it is the affect of the disturbance which makes possible the emergence of idea or ideas. So I prefer for Gurney's statement a 'real and unique disturbance in some absent person's mind,' the statement 'a real and unique disturbance *on* some absent person's mind.'

If for Gurney's 'real and unique disturbance' we write 'an affect in intuition,' we find his theory in agreement with the theory propounded.

The importance of the cases now under consideration lies in this :—

We are justified in assuming that one and the same fundamental law must hold good for these cases *and* for all cases (if any exist) where there is apparent direct thought transference—cases, that is, where the ideas that emerge in the percipients are like to those of the agents. But in the cases considered we find there is no direct thought transference. So in the latter cases there can be no direct thought transference. We cannot, therefore, refer the transfer to direct communication in brain-thought between the agent and percipient : we must refer it to some communion between them which starts the brain-thought of the percipient. This communion is between them as intuitive selves : between them as ‘minds’ as distinct from ‘human minds.’

## THEORIES OF DIRECT THOUGHT TRANSFERENCE

AFTER considering definite ideas in the percipient which are not related to those of the agent, we should, in due course, consider cases where there are definite ideas in the percipient like or related to those of the agent. But such cases (apparently) involve direct thought transference and, therefore, before considering them, we must consider the theories extant as to direct thought transference.

In disagreeing with all such theories, I shall try to prove that I am not so heretical as would to many investigators at first thought appear to be the case.

The Literary Committee of the S.P.R. state :—

‘ Clearly then the analogy of Thought Transference, which seemed to offer such a convenient logical start, cannot be pressed too far. Our phenomena break through any attempt to group them under heads of transferred impressions; and we venture to introduce the words *Telaesthesia* and *Telepathy* to cover all cases of impression received at a distance without the normal operation of the recognised sense organs’ (*Proceedings*, vol. i. p. 147).

The distinction I raise between impressions and ideas is not marked in the above extract. Doubt, however, is thrown on the general application of any theory of direct Thought-Transference.

‘ But as our evidence has developed, our conception of telepathy has needed to be more and more generalised in other and new directions—still less compatible with the vibration theory’ (*Proceedings*, vol. xv. p. 409. By F. W. H. Myers).

But the great exponent of so-termed brain-wave theories is Sir W. Crookes. I claim, however, that the theory I propound is in extension rather than in opposition to his theory.

Sir W. Crookes in his Presidential Address, reported in vol. xii. p. 338 of the *Proceedings S.P.R.*, says :—

‘ It seems to me that in these rays ’—that is, certain series of rays as to the affect of which on us we are at present scientifically ignorant—‘ we may have a possible mode of transmitting intelligence, which with a few reasonable postulates may supply a key to much that is obscure in psychical research. Let it be assumed that these rays, or rays even of higher frequency, can pass into the brain and act on some nervous centre there. Let it be conceived that the brain contains a centre which uses these rays as the vocal cords use sound

vibrations (both being under the command of intelligence) and sends them out, with the velocity of light, to impinge on the receiving ganglion of another brain.'

So far we are on clear ground, though the sending out and receiving (?) of these vibrations is made subject to intelligence.

But he continues :—

'To this hypothesis it may be objected that brain waves, like any other waves, must obey physical laws. Therefore transmission of thought must be easier or more certain the nearer the agent and recipient are to each other, and should die out altogether before great distances are reached. Also it can be urged that if brain waves diffuse in all directions, they should affect all sensitives within their radius of action instead of impressing only one brain. The electric telegraph is not a parallel case, for there a material wire intervenes to conduct and guide the energy to its destination.

'These are weighty objections, but not, I think, insurmountable. Far be it from me to say anything disrespectful of the law of inverse squares, but I have already endeavoured to show we are dealing with conditions removed from our material and limited conceptions of space, matter, form. Is it inconceivable that intense thought concentrated towards a sensitive with whom the thinker is in close sympathy may induce a telepathic chain of brain waves, along which the message of thought can go straight to its goal without loss of energy due to distance? And is it also inconceivable that our mundane ideas of space and distance may be superseded in these subtle regions of unsubstantial thought where "near" and "far" may lose their usual meaning?' (*Proceedings*, vol. xii. p. 352).

I claim that the theory I propound is not open to the objections raised by Sir William; that, as before said, it is in extension rather than in opposition to his theory.

If, in the subtle regions of unsubstantial thought, we formulate any theory whereby 'near' and 'far' have lost their usual meaning, then we are in regions free from the limits of space and time, and where the law of the inverse square does not hold sway. But by no possibility can we imagine waves from a material centre travelling through regions outside the tyrannic authority of the inverse square.

Now bear in mind that Sir William leaves free to me the directive force of intelligence.

Suppose we consider the limit of his waves? Suppose that, as he himself suggests—we hold that for them 'near' and 'far' are the same or, in other words, that they are not conditioned by 'near' and 'far'? And also that, in travel, they are not conditioned by the law of the inverse square?

Then these waves cannot be brain-waves, for we cannot refer them to material centres of origin.

If, however, sensibility exist and (passively) affects us otherwise

than through our normal organs of sense, we have what is closely the same as these waves, unconditioned by 'near' and 'far'; that is, unconditioned in time and space and free from the governance of the inverse square. Sensibility requires no active 'diffusion'; it exists, timeless, spaceless, passive in omnipresence. We have then in sensibility our means (not our voluntary use of the means) of communication between personalities, though not directly between human personalities.

These personalities are our intuitive selves, always (through sensibility) in communion with other intuitive selves and the external, where the communion is manifest *actively* to each intuitive self in intuition. Sir W. Crooke's theory, applied to intuitive selves, follows directly—for the means of communication are not conditioned in time, or by 'near' and 'far.' And, herein, we find the definition I have given for telepathy.

Telepathic communion is the basis of telepathy as manifest to the human personality. But this manifestation is not in intuition: it is in impressions and ideas. Some few of us have had experience of, relatively, *pure* telepathic impressions, that is, impressions not conditioned in cognition (see p. 70, Part I.). But I reject this experience as evidential for the reasons already given. Our human experience then lies in these pure impressions followed by *some* operation of the understanding which results in what I term impressions, and in impressions sometimes followed by more definite operation of the understanding which results in the emergence of ideas in the human personality.

So I make telepathy free from the conditioning of time and space and telepathy manifest to us in impressions and ideas subjective to telepathic communion.

I submit this theory as in expansion of rather than in opposition to that of Crookes. For the human understanding is not only conditioned in time and space, but its impressions (not pure impressions) and ideas are so conditioned. When, then, impressions or ideas emerge in the human understanding, the human personality, being unconscious of the genesis of its ideas, necessarily regards them as objective. This fact explains the *appearance* to human beings of direct thought-transference. There is, in fact, as Crookes puts it, transfer of intelligence: but I refer this intelligence to our intuitive selves.

Consider, for instance, wireless telegraphy. Herein is no *direct* transfer of ideas. At one point a centre of matter is put in vibration. The vibrations affect a distant centre of matter. If these two centres of matter are in certain attunement, an 'idea' is (apparently) transferred from one centre to the other. But these centres of matter transmit nothing: they are no more than centres for the manifestation of transfer—the emitting centre of matter transmits its message in every direction through space. And the emitting

centre itself originates nothing : it is but *used* by the operator, it is the operator who determines it as a point of emission. In fact, there is no transference of ideas at all ; all that takes place is that the message despatched (which is one thing) is like to the message received (which is another thing). The message is despatched in all possible directions : it is received only at one distant centre because of material attunement between the centre of despatch and centre of reception.

The theory I propound carries us thus far, but no farther. It explains how apparent direct thought transference takes place : but it does not explain why this thought transfer only takes place between particular human beings. For this we must introduce theory as to will or desire, or particular attunement between particular understandings or exceptional receptive power on the part of the percipient. But I think the theory propounded is, I repeat, in extension rather than in opposition to that of Sir W. Crookes.

Turning now to the theory of F. W. H. Myers, we shall find an underlying likeness to the theory propounded : I have already shown that Myers throws doubt on brain-wave theories.

What I do is, practically, to give Myers's subliminal self two distinct meanings. That is, I assume he uses the expression sometimes as meaning the intuitive self which I have deduced from Kant's *Critique*, and sometimes as meaning the human personality regarded as a full storehouse of, potentially, present ideas of all its past events. I think—whether my theory be sound or not—that if this distinction be assumed and kept in view, Myers's theory will be more easily grasped. Possibly, too, he sometimes uses the subliminal self in a third sense as meaning the soul of man (cf. *Proceedings*, vol. iv. p. 260), as distinct from the intuitive self. But this meaning we may neglect for our present purpose.

The following extract from a paper by Myers on the Subliminal Consciousness is in point :—

‘ I have already urged that the impulse which ultimately generates the phantom is in no case directly received by the superficial self, but always by the subliminal faculties, in some unknown fashion. I have suggested that this impulse is not of itself of any definite sensory or motor quality, but is generally capable of being *translated* (Myers's italics) to the superficial self in either sensory or motor terms, according to the subject's psychostatical condition—perhaps according to the predominance of visile, audile, or motile imagery in his habitual psychic operations. To explain these collective or elective cases ’—cases, that is, where ideas from an agent emerge as somewhat the same ideas in more than one percipient—‘ with their similarities in the general image, but difference in detail, we should have, on this view, further to suppose that the said impulse is sometimes of a kind which affects the subliminal self of all suitably constituted persons within a certain area, and which, although

modified in each observer's case by individual conditions, has yet a prepotent tendency to translate itself into one special form of imagery, so that the phantom which each observer perceives is similar, but not identical' (*Proceedings*, vol. vii. p. 321).

If we assume that Myers in the above statement is treating the subliminal self as the intuitive self I rely on, we find he is closely in agreement with the theory propounded. What he states is clearly in opposition to all brain-wave theories: he makes the communication between human beings to consist in 'impulses,' and treats ideas as subjective to these impulses. All that I object to is his suggestion that 'the said impulse is sometimes of a kind which affects the subliminal self of all suitably constituted persons within a certain area.'

I hold that the impulse referred is an affect (through sensibility) in intuition. It therefore affects all persons, not merely suitably constituted persons: and its affect is not confined to a certain area. The 'suitable constitution' of the person affected is in the constitution of the human understanding of the person: so that, though all persons are affected, corresponding ideas only emerge in those few whose understandings are in peculiar attunement with that of the agent, or peculiarly receptive, or where the will or desire of the agent (and possibly of the percipient) is a factor.

To return to the general argument against theories of direct thought transference.

There would appear to be some strong probability that the percipient can be affected by the external as distinct from external personalities. Even admitting that in all cases of affection from the external there is some action or influence from external personalities, there is still *some* direct affect from the external.

In such cases there is no external brain as a centre of radiation for brain-waves.

Again, in all experimental cases, where the percipient sees or hears or feels in attunement with the agent, it must be—as held by Gurney and Myers—that the percipient himself creates, as it were, the visual, auditory or tactile idea in himself, for there is no direct transfer in the visual, auditory or tactile.

And, again, however freely we may sublimate the brain itself or its action, the brain must remain a material thing of space and time, and its action must be referred for origin to the material in space and time. So the dissolution of the brain on death must put an end to communication through telepathy, if we hold with any brain waves theory.

Now I do not allege there is evidence to prove communication between the living and the disembodied: but there is evidence towards proof which demands the most serious consideration,<sup>1</sup> and this evidence is of such a nature that it goes to show this communi-

<sup>1</sup> Since the above was written the evidence towards proof has increased.

cation does, to a certain extent, take place in the same way as telepathic communication between the living. The theory I propound makes possible—if, to us, extremely difficult—this like mode of communication between the living and the dead as between the living and the living. But any theory of brain waves makes this like mode of communication impossible—if telepathic communication takes place directly between the living from brain to brain, then communication between the living and the dead must take place by other and unlike means: for on death the brain becomes non-existent.

‘If an immortal soul there be within me, she must be able to dispense with part of the brain’s help while the brain is living, as with the whole of its help when it is dead.’ (by Myers, *Proceedings*, vol. iv. p. 260). This statement must be equally correct if we write ‘intuitive self’ for an ‘immortal soul.’

Lastly, the theory I propound, is altogether in opposition to any theory of brain waves. For, according to that theory, in all cases of affection from the external or external personalities, otherwise than through the normal organs of sense, the affects are in intuition: emerging impressions and ideas are subjective to intuition.

## DEFINITE IDEAS IN THE PERCIPIENT APPAR- ENTLY TRANSFERRED FROM THE AGENT

BEAR in mind that we are now considering spontaneous, not experimental cases. When we come to experimental cases the apparent transference of definite ideas will be considered at greater length.

By the theory propounded any direct transference of ideas from an agent to a percipient is impossible.

In *Phantasms of the Living* we find a chapter headed: 'Transference of Ideas and of Mental Pictures' (vol. i. p. 232). And as to the cases therein considered Gurney says:—

'The great point which connects many of the more inward impressions of spontaneous telepathy with the experimental cases is this, that what enters the percipient's mind is the exact reproduction of the agent's thought at the moment' (p. 232).

In this chapter thirty cases (numbered 37-66) are given as instances of this exact reproduction. But when the cases are examined, I think most of them are found to fail in showing any exact reproduction of the agent's thought.

For instance in case 47 (p. 245), a child of five in Edinburgh says: 'Cousin Janie at the Cape, she's dead.' And it is afterwards found that the lady died at the Cape at the time the child spoke of the death. In this case an event affected the agent in South Africa, and the same event affected the child in Scotland: I can find no exact reproduction of thought from agent to percipient: the exact reproduction would appear to have been of the event, death, in relation to its affect on the agent.

For, certainly, the child's words were the result of mental operation started by some affect from the external otherwise than through the normal organs of sense. If we admit that this affect was from 'Cousin Janie,' still the communication was *not* in mentality but in affect *on* the understanding on the percipient.

Again in the well-known case of Bishop Wilberforce (p. 248), when he suddenly exclaimed, 'I am certain that something has happened to one of my sons,' and it was afterwards found that at the time, the foot of his eldest son had been badly crushed by an accident at sea, we also find that the Bishop was affected by the *event* in relation to his son.

Suppose that the accident had taken place in the presence of the

Bishop, so that he had been affected through his normal organs of sense? Then he would have been affected in the same way by the event (though more definitely because, in cognition, the affect would have been through his normal senses) and we should require no abnormal explanation of his experience: we should not set up any theory of exact reproduction of thought. Why should we set up such a theory when he was affected otherwise than through his normal organs of sense?

But a few of the cases given suggest at first thought this transference of ideas.

Consider the following case:—

Mrs. H. D. says: ' . . . One evening I suddenly laid down the book I was reading, with this thought so strong upon me I could scarcely refrain from putting it into words: 'I believe that Mr. C. is at this moment dying.' She asked her husband to note the time—it was 7 P.M. The next morning they learnt through a letter that Mr. C. died at 7 P.M. (*Phantasms*, vol. i. p. 243).

Herein, I think, consideration of the case will show that there was not even apparent direct transference of ideas from agent to percipient. Mrs. H. D. was impressed only by the event—death. Her impression had nothing at all to do with Mr. C.'s ideas at the time of death. It is quite true that the idea in her that the death was the death of Mr. C. may fairly be held to have been the result of some 'play' between her intuitive self and that of Mr. C. But there is no evidence at all of any transference of human thought. Even if we hold she associated the event, death, with Mr. C. because he was thinking of her, that establishes only a possible explanation of the emergence in her of the idea of Mr. C.'s death. Or even if we hold that she associated the event, death, with Mr. C. because he was not only thinking of her but also thinking of his own death, we are carried no further for any argument in support of transference of ideas. For Mr. C.'s ideas as to his own death were in all probability, if not necessarily, different altogether from Mrs. H. D.'s ideas of the same event.

Or consider the following case—and this it is more difficult to explain.

It is given by Sir L. G. at length. I offer but a short digest.

Sir L. G. was with Colonel L. A. in a large unoccupied room, given up to lumber and packing-cases. He was turning over some old songs and lighted on a duet, 'Dal tuo Stellato soglio,' in which he had, years before, been accustomed to take part. As he was looking at it Colonel L. A.—who stood at the other end of the room reading, his back to Sir L. G.,—began to hum the air of the song Sir L. G. was looking at (*Phantasms*, vol. i. p. 234).

Here is an apparent case of transference of ideas. But dissect the case and the explanation will not stand.

How was Colonel L. A. affected? Not through his normal organs

of sense. There must have been some affect on his understanding which caused him to exercise (relatively) unconscious memory: for we must assume he knew beforehand the tune he hummed. So what he did was to take out of his storage of ideas his idea of the particular tune and use it as a present idea—that he hummed the tune is but a detail. The affect on him was from the external in impression on the understanding which caused operation of the understanding in the emergence of the particular idea in the present.

Doubtless when Sir L. G. looked at the duet a flood of memory of the past came over him. But Colonel L. A. was affected only by the 'event,' that is, in the same way as Sir L. G. in relation to the tune of the particular piece of music. Why Colonel L. A. was so affected in the particular case that the affection emerged in idea it is unnecessary to enter on. All now wanted is to show there was no direct transference of ideas between the agent and percipient.

Or consider the following case:—

The narrator was at St. M.'s vicarage, Leicester, her two sisters at H., fourteen or fifteen miles from Leicester. 'I had been asleep for some time, and was not consciously dreaming at all. I was awoke instantaneously, not by any sound, but intensely awake, starting up in a panic—not of fear, but of horror, knowing that something horrible was close by . . . whilst it was there I was very angry with myself for being so absurd; and I remember wondering whether a young German, who was living there as a pupil, a *protégé* of Chauncey Townsend's, could be mesmerising me.'

About the same time her two sisters R. and E. were affected by the same consciousness that something dreadful or harmful was near (*Phantasms*, vol. i. p. 240).

In this case I do not see why we should infer transference of ideas. Chance coincidence may (most improbably) be an explanation. If not, the explanation to our hand is that something external—material or spiritual matters not—affected all three sisters. And one of them being distant from the other two, the affection cannot have been in human thought: the affection was manifest in the idea of horror relating to something external.

The following case, I think, is explicable without inferring telepathy. Miss C. E. S. states:—

'My brother and I were travelling together from Cologne to Flushing. We were alone in the carriage, when suddenly my brother, who had been half asleep, said to me that he had an odd idea that some one else was in the carriage sitting opposite me. The very same idea had struck me just before he spoke' (*Phantasms*, vol. i. p. 239).

It seems probable that the time was night or near the fall of night; that both were half asleep, and that some movement heard by both on the empty seat gave rise to the hallucination. Miss S. says her feet were on the opposite seat where the phantom was suspected,

and the movement heard by both might have been the result of involuntary action on her part.

The next case to be considered appears as near to one of transference of ideas as is possible. Mrs. F. states:—

‘The other night my husband and I dreamt at the *same hour*, the same dream—a subject on which neither of us had been thinking for months. It was a dream of wandering about our first home, and in it looking at the same spot’ (*Journal*, vol. ii. p. 179). Mrs. F.’s husband corroborates the account published.

But let us see what this case amounts to. Mrs. F. in dreaming was using, in memory, her storage of ideas of past events. She was simply calling up into the present ideas already in her. Her husband was doing exactly the same thing. But he, for his dream, was using his own storage of ideas, just as his wife was using hers. Each used a different storage.

We reduce the case, then, to one, not of transference of ideas, but simply of approximately like mental operation. We can well understand that some of the ideas of the past thus called into the present by Mrs. F. were pleasurable to her, while Mr. F.’s ideas (as to the *same events*) recalled by him were not pleasurable. The ideas recalled by both were as to the *same events*, but the ideas of the one were not the ideas of the other.

This approximately like mental operation was perhaps the result of partial attunement in understanding between husband and wife, who had probably lived together for a long time, during which they had been affected by the same external environments.

When we consider experimental cases, that is, cases where those concerned deliberately *use* telepathy for their own purposes—we shall find greater difficulties in our way in explanation. But spontaneous cases, it appears to me, can be more easily dealt with.

Consider, for instance, cases like to that of Sir L. G., where one thinks of a tune and thereon another sings or hums it aloud.

Now, so far as I know, there is not one established case of this class where the percipient, humming the tune, did not know it beforehand. I cannot find one case even of hypnotism where the hypnotiser, thinking of a tune which the hypnotised does not already know, has succeeded in making the hypnotised hum or sing it.

Such a case, I think, is possible, but it would only prove extraordinary power on the part of the hypnotiser in directing his patient how to exercise his own understanding.

Ordinarily, for success in telepathic communication, the percipient must know the tune beforehand—it must be part of his storage of ideas of the past.

In cases of success, then, there is no transference of ideas. All effected is this: By some affect of the agent *on* the understanding of the percipient the percipient brings up into his present (from his storage of the past) the particular tune. That this particular tune

is like to the tune the agent is thinking of must be referred to like mental operation.

It may be objected that in the above argument I am but beating the air as I, practically, admit the transference of ideas. But the distinction raised is most important.

Kant, for instance, when he uses the term 'object' is most careful to provide against our falling into the error of imagining it is an objective thing to us. He states, again and again, that *we* can analyse it as no more than a series of representations. Not only this: he shows that, *to us*, it is no more than a thing of relation. He gives reality only to the manifold.

But certain of his commentators reason as if an object were, to us, a thing-in-itself and so fall into error in treating analysis and synthesis of objects as real, whereby they arrive at the looseness of the manifold or the definition of it as a 'sum of particulars.' They *condition* the manifold, confusing the manifold itself with the manifold in our apprehension.

Just as Kant uses the term 'objects' so we can use the term 'transference of ideas.' But we must always bear in mind that there is no reality in transference of ideas. The real communion between agent and percipient is in intuition between them as intuitive selves (in telepathy) where this communion is or may be manifest to them as human personalities in (apparent) transference of impressions and ideas (manifestations of telepathy).

So though we know there is no real transference of ideas, we can still use the expression 'transference of ideas' if we keep in mind the fact that it refers only to what is manifest to us as human personalities.

## RECIPROCAL CASES

As to these cases, Edmund Gurney says :—

‘ It will be seen that the number of these reciprocal cases (even with the addition of those in the Supplement) is small—so small that the genuineness of the type might fairly enough be called in question. There is some danger that our view of the rarer telepathic phenomena may be unduly affected by the sense of certainty that gradually and reasonably forms with regard to the broad fact of telepathy itself. The argument for the reality of telepathy, we must remember, depends on a mass of narratives so large as to make a universal error in the essential point of all, or nearly all, of them exceedingly improbable ; and is not available in respect of peculiar features, which are present in only a very small proportion of the alleged cases. For these, the various possibilities of error so fully discussed in the general sketch of the evidence (vol. i. cap. iv.) may seem quite sufficient to account ; and the greater the theoretic interest of the peculiarities, the more jealously must their evidential claims be scrutinised. As to reciprocity, the reader must form his own opinions. That the examples should be few, as compared with those of the simpler telepathic types, cannot at this stage of our inquiry seem unnatural. For if, amid all the apparent opportunities that human lives present, the unknown and probably transient conditions of telepathic percipience and of telepathic agency only occasionally chance to coincide, so as to produce a telepathic phenomenon at all (pp. 77-8) : and if, of the two, the conditions of percipience are the rarer, as experimental thought-transference would lead us to suppose ; then the complete conditions of a reciprocal case must be rare among the rare ’ (*Phantasms*, vol. ii. p. 167. See, too, p. 303).

If we consider these reciprocal cases by the light of the theory propounded, we must expect them to be as they are, in fact, the rare among the rare : all Edmund Gurney’s arguments apply directly. The following argument may be added to those adduced by him.

For the evidence to be sufficient to establish a reciprocal case the agent must be, what I shall term, a clairvoyant percipient. So, in all reciprocal cases, we must have the unlikely coincidence that telepathy results in an affection of both the agent and percipient in idea : we have the evidence of *both* in support of the

telepathic phenomenon. And probability is against our having the evidence of both in any particular case.

The reported reciprocal cases in *Phantasms of the Living* are fourteen (see *Phantasms*, vol. ii. p. 154 *et seq.*, and p. 590 *et seq.*). I find, also, in the Collective cases, eight—numbers 309, 339, 340, 341, 343, 354, 667, 683—which, though not so definite, are, in their nature, reciprocal. That is, twenty-two in all (cf. case 82). Of these I reject two (numbers 642 and 644) as doubtful. I do not reject them as false, but, considering the complexity of the facts, as involving possible error in memory on the part of the percipients.

Now there is a common likeness in all these twenty cases which not only in itself increases the weight to be attached to the evidence in support of them as facts, but which is in itself of exceptional interest.

I give a very short digest of three of these cases.

(303) vol. ii. p. 154 :—

The percipient, in his drawing-room, saw his grandmother, who embraced him and vanished. The agent (the grandmother) who was at a distance, and in delirium, suddenly put her arms round a lady's neck and then, on opening her eyes and regaining consciousness, she said, with a look of surprise, 'Oh, Polly, is it you? I thought it was somebody else.'

(304) vol. ii. p. 156 :—

The agent was kicked violently in the face by a horse. He was not rendered insensible and, after the kick, stood leaning against the stable wall, when he saw, in idea, the lady he was engaged to. Haunted by the appearance, he went next day to the place where the young lady lived, who said, 'Why, I expected you all yesterday afternoon. I thought I saw you looking so pale and your face all bleeding.'

The time she fancied she saw him was the time of the accident.

(308) vol. ii. p. 164 :—

Two young ladies, great friends, but unrelated, who were in a rectory garden, and running down a path which was separated by a hedge from an orchard adjoining, distinctly heard themselves called twice, apparently from the orchard, thus, 'Connie, Margaret—Connie, Margaret!' They stopped, but could see no one, and so went to the house, a distance of about forty yards, concluding that one of Margaret's brothers had called them from there. But, to their surprise, they found this was not the case.

It was found afterwards that a brother of Constance—not of Margaret—who lay sick five miles off, had, at the time of this hearing of the words 'Connie, Margaret,' called to them in delirium, and said, 'Now I see them running along the hedge, but directly I call them they run towards the house.' (See, too, *Proceedings*, vol. i. pp. 121 and 122; vol. x. p. 299.)

The common likeness between these three cases that I am about

to define is to be found in all the other reciprocal cases, not excepting the two I do not rely on.

In all these reciprocal cases, if we take the evidence only of the percipients who were, physically, on the spot, we find ordinary cases of telepathy. But in all there is also corroboration of the evidence of the percipients by the direct evidence of the agents themselves as percipients.

But what is the nature of the evidence of the agents? It is, in all the cases, evidence of telepathy of the type termed clairvoyant or clairaudient. In each case the agent, though at a distance, states that—in idea—he was there on the spot to accomplish more or less closely that which the percipient, physically on the spot, saw or heard. This ‘undesigned’ likeness in the form of corroboration in all the cases is remarkable, and more than one inference can be drawn from it in support of the authenticity of the alleged facts of telepathy.

But it affects the present argument mainly in the following way:—

If we consider ordinary cases of telepathy, there is found strong reasons to believe that we can divide them, *quâ* evidence, into two great classes. In the one class the percipient feels or hears or sees something where he is physically: and in all these cases the percipient is affected by impressions or ideas arising from telepathic impressions from some agent at a distance. In the other class the percipient feels or hears or sees something *not* where he is bodily, but at a distance.

These latter cases all involve what is ordinarily termed clairvoyance or clairaudience; they are all marked by the (apparent) travel of the personality of the percipient to the spot of the psychical phenomenon. If, in these cases, the percipient were physically on the spot, and not merely psychically on the spot, there would be nothing in them of the abnormal.

The distinction between these two great classes is merely one of evidence: in the first class we have the evidence of the percipient on the spot: in the second class we have the evidence of the percipient who travels psychically to the spot. For in all these cases, as I hereafter argue, there must be psychical travel of the agent.

The following is an example of the first class:—

‘A young girl of ten dreamt that she saw an old friend who had gone away to the city of Mexico. In her dream she saw him sitting in her father’s office, and immediately ran up to him, exclaiming, “I’m so glad you’ve come back!” But he put his hand up, as if to repulse her gently, and said gravely, “You must not come near me. I am dying in Mexico of the sore throat, and I have come to tell your father.” This old friend died in Mexico at the time, of a sore throat’ (*Phantasms*, vol. i. p. 352).-

The following is an example of the second class:—

Mrs. V. S., when she was in England, and her eldest and first-born son in Australia, says that:—

‘I saw my son nursing a little child, then dash over the plains on horseback without a hat, then dig a hole and place, with much care and very slowly, something in it, then kneel down and, with his hands, slowly fill the hole with earth. He had a book from which he appeared to be reading, which, bye the bye, I thought very remarkable. He slowly, and with much solemnity, left the spot, book in hand, but did not turn to look back on me.

‘Then came the letter. On the wild sheep plains he was living with a man and his wife and little children. His pet was taken ill. He mounted his horse to go for the doctor—too late! His little favourite was dead. He dug the grave himself, and with his own hands put the little child into its last resting-place, and with prayer-book in hand read a portion at the grave’ (*Phantasms*, vol. i. p. 387).

Note, incidentally, that in this case the percipient is impressed in no way by the personality of the child; it is circumstance directly affecting the personality of her son, the agent, that impresses her.

Now if we divide telepathic cases into the two great classes above stated, we can, *a priori*, predict what a reciprocal case will be: if there were not one reported reciprocal case, we could predict what such cases *would* be, if known. The only distinction between all these cases on the one hand and reciprocal cases on the other hand is in the amount and nature of the evidence forthcoming in support of their truth.

Suppose in the former case set out, we had evidence also that the old friend dying in Mexico had said he had—in idea—visited England and seen his young girl friend?

Suppose, in the latter case, we had evidence also that the son in Australia had—in idea—seen or been impressed by the presence of his mother at the place where he was, and at the time he was burying the child?

Then in both cases we should not change the story in any way. All we arrived at is that additional evidence which raises the cases to the reciprocal class.

I hold that these three classes all belong to one and the same form of telepathy; the distinctions between them are only in the available evidence:—

In the first class we have the evidence of the percipient who is on the spot of the ‘event’; but the evidence of the agent is wanting.

In the second class the evidence of the percipient on the spot is wanting, but we have the evidence of the agent not on the spot, who is called clairvoyant or clairaudient, and who, on the evidence, is the percipient.

In the third class, reciprocal cases, we have the evidence of the percipient on the spot *and* the evidence of the agent, who is also a percipient, and who is not on the spot.

Now in all reported cases of ordinary telepathy, apart from those of pure clairvoyance or clairaudience (I explain hereafter what I mean by such cases), there is an agent and a percipient. Where the percipient is on the spot we must assume the influence of the agent on the spot : where the percipient is not on the spot we must assume he is, psychically, on the spot because of the presence of the agent on the spot.

These two classes of cases, then, really form one great class, and differ from each other only in the nature of the available evidence. Reciprocal cases, again, belong to the same one great class, and differ from the other two classes only in the available evidence : we have, in reciprocal cases, the evidence of the percipient physically on the spot where the agent is not on the spot, and also the evidence of this agent as percipient who is not physically, but psychically on the spot.

All cases of telepathy, then (apart from those of pure clairvoyance or clairaudience), are cases where there is a percipient physically on the spot and an agent psychically on the spot. In support of the truth of these cases we have three kinds of evidence : (1) the evidence of the percipient on the spot ; (2) the evidence of the agent psychically on the spot, who so becomes a percipient ; (3) the evidence of the percipient physically on the spot, *and* the evidence of the agent—percipient, who is psychically on the spot. These last are the, so termed, reciprocal cases.

The difficulty of the above explanation arises from the allegation that there is psychical travel of personality. This is dealt with in a following chapter.

## CLAIRVOYANCE AND CLAIRAUDIENCE

By the reasoning of the previous chapter we have reduced clairvoyance and clairaudience, where agents and percipients are concerned, to details of telepathy. In all cases of telepathy as between human personalities, clairvoyance (I neglect the term clairaudience, as what applies to clairvoyance applies to it also) is merely a term used as marking a necessary ingredient of the evidence a percipient gives when he happens to be not physically but psychically on the spot of the event. Where the percipient is physically on the spot, and we have only his evidence of what occurred, his evidence is not clairvoyant evidence: where the percipient is psychically and not physically on the spot and we have only his evidence of what occurred, we have clairvoyant evidence. But in every case where we have the evidence of the percipient physically on the spot, clairvoyant evidence is possible. For the fact of the percipient being affected on the spot infers the psychical presence of the agent, so that in all such cases the evidence of the agent (as a clairvoyant percipient) *might* be available.

Psychical travel of personality by the agent is involved in all cases of telepathy between human personalities. But evidence of clairvoyance on the part of the agent is not always forthcoming: for cases of clairvoyance only arise for record when the evidence of percipients psychically and not physically on the spot is available.

Clairvoyance is no more than a detail, a characteristic of the evidence of certain percipients in cases of telepathy.

## EXTERNALISATION

BEFORE entering on the question of the travel of personality which I have argued takes place in all cases of telepathy where an agent and percipient are involved, it will be best to try to worry out what is the real distinction between externalisation and non-externalisation, so far as these terms apply to the subject now considered. Both must be incidentally referred to in considering the travel of personality.

Gurney discusses this question in *Phantasms of the Living* (see vol. i. pp. 480-3, vol. ii. pp. 29 and 38), and Barrett informs me by letter that he agrees generally with the view expressed by Gurney (cf. *Proceedings*, vol. ii. p. 163).

Myers defines the word *externalise* as one 'used to represent the process by which an idea or impression on the percipient's mind is transformed into a phantasm apparently outside him' (*Proceedings*, vol. xii. p. 170).

For the words 'an idea or impression' I should prefer the one word 'an impression.' For while I hold there can be an impression on the understanding, I refer all ideas to operation of the understanding.

All ideas, even of the vaguest, are, when present to the subject, conditioned in time and, in one sense, may be said to be external to the subject. But there is a class of ideas which, though having the aspect of being conditioned in time, cannot in any way be said to have the aspect of being conditioned in space. We receive ideas from reading or from oral instructions, and we use these ideas for mental operation in evolving other ideas. For all such evolved ideas there would appear to be no question at all of externalisation or non-externalisation in space, and this because visual, tactile or auditory ideas are not directly involved. But such ideas are the subjects of memory—when past we can recall them in the present by the use of memory. So they come under the definition of ideas that I have given.

With all such ideas, however, we have at present nothing to do, and I refer to them only to show that when considering externalisation and non-externalisation we are considering but a particular class of ideas. For we have ideas which are not related to space at all. If we, restrictfully, define the term 'form' as meaning no more than something which has existence only in relation to matter,

then we find that ideas which do not involve 'form' have nothing to do with externalisation or non-externalisation in space: the ideas have no relation to space. There are ideas, for instance, of pleasure or pain. It is when the ideas involve form—for instance, the idea of any object—that the question of externalisation or non-externalisation arises.

When we consider certain other ideas in general we can divide them into two distinct classes—or, perhaps, more correctly, we find for them two limits of distinction. Some have their own externality, but have no relation to the externality of space in general: others have not only their own externality, but are related to externality in space generally. Between these limits there may be a continuum.

When we consider externalisation or non-externalisation of ideas we must relate our thought to the visual, tactile or auditory: we must relate our thought to the affects received through our normal organs of sense.

Gurney says: 'In proportion as the sensorial element in hallucination is attenuated and dim, or full and distinct, will the perception appear internal or external; and these cases' (soundless voices, the language of the soul, for example) 'are simply the most internal sort, between which and the most external sort there exist various degrees of *partial* externalisation' (*Phantasms*, vol. i. p. 480).

With the above I agree in the main. I would only add the explanation that I take the 'most internal sort' to mean those having no relation to space in general, and the 'most external sort' those having full relation to space in general. When any one hears a 'soundless voice' he is clearly not affected directly (through sensibility) through his normal organs of sense. But as the effect on him is the effect of a voice, it is clear that there has been on him an impression which he has conditioned as audible *after reception*: as a human being conditioned by the normal organs of sense he has abstracted from the impression an 'audible' idea. In all such cases (including those where visual or tactile ideas are abstracted) there is no full externalisation in space. In all such cases the subject has been affected (through sensibility) otherwise than through the normal organs of sense. (We, necessarily, except from consideration those cases where the mind, without any affect from the external through sensibility, 'conjures up' visual, audible or tactile hallucinations external or internal. Such cases are to be dealt with by psychology as a science.)

It appears to me to follow that full externalisation of ideas can only occur where the subject has been affected (through sensibility) through its normal organs of sense. The subject, affected otherwise than through its normal organs of sense, cannot be so affected directly in the visual, audible or tactile. If it, from such affect, 'exteriorise,' for instance, a phantom, this must result from

the subject relating the impression to itself (the subject) as conditioned with the normal organs of sense, *after* reception of the impression. So though the phantom is, to the subject, externalised, it is only the phantom itself which is so externalised—it is not externalised in relation to space in general.

If it be objected that human experience proves that in certain cases a phantom is seen as objectively external in space by, possibly, more than one observer, then I reply that, generally, the phantom must be an objective thing of space, or something external to the observers, which has in some way affected space where it is seen or heard or felt. In such cases the reception by the subject is through the normal organs of sense. But it is important to bear in mind that this does not necessarily give reality to the effect on the subject of the particular external which has affected it, the subject. (Kant gives no reality even to the object itself which is presented to the subject.) So, to take an extreme instance, if a disembodied spirit could affect space and so, *as a thing of space*, affect any subject, we may assume the subject could not be affected in sight, hearing, or touch by the spirit as it exists. It could only be affected by the personality of the spirit in impression. But the subject might well relate this impression to itself (the subject) as a subject conditioned by its normal organs of sense. And, so, it might appear to itself to see or hear or feel in space the spirit as it was when embodied or in some anthropomorphically glorified embodied form.

To make my meaning clearer let us consider two simple instances.

In the first place suppose that there is an orange on your mantelpiece which you look at. You then go away and think of that orange—call up in your mind an idea of that orange. You call up the idea in a particular time, and also in relation to space generally. That is, you think of the orange in a particular place (on your mantelpiece), and so relate it to space in general. For you call up this idea of the particular orange from your storage of ideas, and the idea itself is related to space in general, because the idea has resulted from an 'event' which you experienced from impressions through your normal organs of sense.

But now leave out of consideration this particular orange and simply, by the exercise of imagination, call up in your mind the idea of an orange.

This idea of the orange is clearly in time; it is not, however, in any time of reality, but in time only of your imagination. For the idea itself, though (we may now treat it as) based on the reality of your past experience, is not itself of experience; it is only of imagination. But how about space? We find somewhat the same limit of space as of time. Your idea of the orange imports an idea of size and form, and, so far, involves the condition of space; involves externality. But you don't place this orange in any particular place—in ordinary parlance you will say you have the idea simply

'in your mind's eye.' To think of any particular orange means to think of it in a particular place, that is, related to space in general: to think simply of an orange means to think of it in no particular place, that is, not related to space in general. In your thought you no more place the orange on your mantelpiece than you place it on your hearth-rug; the orange, in fact, is, to you, nowhere in space. That is, it is not conditioned generally in space as was the particular orange you first thought of.

Now what I have stated cannot be controverted as fact; but, at first sight, it would appear necessary to reject it as involving the impossible.

Dissect the statement of fact, however, by the light of the theory of memory propounded, and we shall understand it to be a fact, and a simple fact.

You appear to yourself to get this idea of an orange from memory—from the storage of ideas in you. What you do, in fact, is to abstract the idea of the orange from what is (relatively to you) a storage of intuition. And the intuition which is the 'stuff' of this storage of intuition is not conditioned in time or space. When, by imagination, you abstract the idea of the orange you necessarily abstract it in time; but the idea of the orange, to be a complete idea, only requires the *conditioning* of space with reference to the orange itself in size and form. The relation of this idea of an orange to space external to it is not necessary for the complete idea. All you require is the externality of the orange; you do not require, for the full idea, the relation of the externality of the orange to externality in general. Your idea of the orange imports the condition of space so far as the size and form of the orange are concerned, but it imports no relation of the orange to space external to itself (the orange), and so there is no necessity for you to use intuition to get this relation. Naturally, all you want for use is the idea of the orange, and so all you abstract is the idea of the orange 'in your mind's eye,' that is, unrelated to external space in general.

Instead of an orange you may think of anything else, you may think of many things interrelated to one another in space; you may, waking or sleeping, dream dreams. In all such cases where you are using, with ordinary imagination, your storage of ideas, you will find you do not abstract from intuition any general relation to space: your ideas, dreams, visions, are 'in your mind's eye.' That is, you condition no more of your intuition in space than is absolutely necessary for the emergence of the idea or ideas—there is natural economy in your conditioning of intuition.

Recall in memory any particular event of your past life. When you had human experience of that event there was the externality of the event related to externality in general: you received the event through your normal organs of sense. So this externality of the event to externality in general is an implicit part of the event

itself, and when the event is recalled in memory its externality in general is also recalled.

But now, by imagination, make up (what are practically) new events from the storage of events in your memory. You will find they are conditioned only in their own externality, have no necessary relation to externality in general. This is because the 'stuff' (intuition) you are using is not conditioned in space, and you only use it so far as is necessary for your ideas to emerge in time and space. For this emergence externality in general is not necessary.

Herein we find an explanation of the distinction between ideas emerging in us from the play of imagination and ideas recalled in memory of past events. The former are 'in our mind's eye.' They consist only of their own externality, which has no relation to externality in general; whereas the latter have not only their own externality, but this externality has, ordinarily, relation to externality in general.

In all dreams or waking or sleeping visions, in certain hypnotic experiences, there is externality of the 'event.' But there is (ordinarily not always) no relation to the external in general—we cannot 'place' the dream or vision in relation to our normal externality of space. This must mean that the conditioning of externality in general is absent—there is, so far, no conditioning in space.

Even when a phantom is seen floating casually in the air, or passing through a wall, this is because the percipient does not relate the phantom to the external in general, though he is impressed by the externality of the phantom itself.

All (relatively) pure impressions are in themselves unconditioned in time and space: all ideas (now considered) are conditioned in time and space, but not always fully in space.

Bear in mind that when I use the term 'impression' (not pure impression), I mean an impression accompanied by *some* operation of the understanding.

So the ideas we now consider have two forms of externality. I would then define:—

**Externality.** An idea is said to have externality when it has, to the subject, externality not only in itself, but in relation to space in general.

**Non-externality.** An idea is said to have non-externality when, though it has externality in itself, it has no externality in relation to space in general.

These definitions rather elucidate than contradict the theory of Gurney and Barrett, and cover the definition of Myers.

And how do these definitions apply when we relate them to human experience of impressions received otherwise than through

the normal organs of sense? They lead to a conclusion which is supported by the veridical reported cases.

Impressions received otherwise than through the normal organs of sense are not—as is the case with impressions received through the normal organs of sense—related in their origin to time and space. So when ideas emerge from such impressions they are ordinarily conditioned only in their own externality—externality which is not related to externality in general. (If it be a fact, as it probably is, that an agent can, by psychical travel of his personality, affect space at a distance, this apparent contradiction will be found explicable.) Such ideas, to emerge fully as ideas, require a conditioning in space of the intuition from which they are derived so far only as the ideas themselves require such conditioning. And this is why they are often marked as savouring of the dreamlike or visionary.

Our cognition is a limit of, an abstraction from, intuition. Wherein lies our fullest form of cognition? It must lie in cognition resulting from the fullest reception of intuition, and this fullest form of intuition must be received through (passive) sensibility as it affects the subject *otherwise* than through its normal organs of sense. For the affection of sensibility through the normal organs of sense is *restricted* by its reception being confined to the channels of the normal organs of sense. Thought in the universal (made possible by the fact that sensibility affects us otherwise than through the normal organs of sense) is then our highest form of cognitional thought (*cf.* Kant's Schema): our thought in diversity is our lowest form of cognitional thought.

But externalisation of ideas means full relation of thought to diversity. So it follows our highest form of thought lies in ideas non-externalised, our lowest in ideas externalised.

The above argument is on its face iconoclastic, it is the exact contrary of what we ordinarily hold to be true. And if we give reality to the human personality and its ideas, it is not true. For these ideas are of diversity and, for them, there is a (relatively) real synthesis of unity.

But consider the question from the following point of view:—

The knowledge of each one of us consists only in a degree of ignorance: of specks of sand taken from a limitless shore, no two specks are, to us, alike. Full knowledge lies in the innumerable specks of the limitless shore.

Knowledge of the full shore subsumes all knowledge of each individual speck. For the subject conditioned in a particular universe of a few particular specks, the full shore will be the unconditioned, and he will consider his particular knowledge of the relations between the particular specks of his universe as his highest form of knowledge—he finds his highest form of knowledge in diversity. But, even so, he must have (relatively) universal know-

ledge: he must know (or have actively presented to him) the general relation between all the specks of his universe before the particular relations between any two or more have meaning for him—can give him ideas. So the real foundation of his ideas lies in the schema of his universe—in thought in what is, to him, the universal.

The more inclusive his universe—the greater the number of specks of sand it includes—the more nearly his universal (the schema of his universe as received by him) approaches the manifold. So, in the limit (when his universe consists of the limitless shore), the universal in which he thinks becomes the manifold.

If it be objected I 'jump' in evolution from the limited to the limitless, I reply that I can so jump—though the leap be into the dark: reason enables me to make the leap. I jump from my universe of cognition into a universe where cognition is superseded by intuition. In reason the ultimate term of any such progressive series as 1, 2 . . . is  $\infty$ . But my cognition only covers symbols of relation, and  $\infty$  is outside human relations. Reason justifies this jump from limits to the limitless.

Bear in mind, too, that (as already shown in the chapter on memory) when we consider the full self-apperception which constitutes consciousness of self in the present, this full self-apperception requires the immediate presence, by the exercise of (relatively) unconscious memory, of all past human experience. Present consciousness of self (a transience) may be termed a synthesis of all past moments of consciousness. But the phenomena of the past determine all phenomena in the future (Kant, p. 148). So self-apperception in the present is no more than a particular phenomenal determination of self in time where the self itself, the relatively noumenal self, exists undetermined (unconditioned) in time. And, therefore, thought in time is no more than abstraction of thought from thought in the manifold. The highest form of thought for the intuitive self involves no question of externalisation or non-externalisation: all externalisation of ideas must be related, not only to space and time, but is possible only in relation to a subject conditioned by the normal organs of sense. Thought, then, in diversity constitutes the lowest form of thought of the subject.

Knowledge of diversity is mere abstraction from knowledge of the universal: it is relative ignorance, and the subject is in error in assuming that, in it, lies his highest form of thought.

Ideas as contents of the understanding may be said to be external to the subject. But I cannot understand so-termed externalisation of ideas, unless in relation to the subject as conditioned by his normal organs of sense. If so, such ideas express the lowest form of thought (thought in diversity) of the subject. The highest form of thought lies in the schema as received—the universal. But it is the manifold to be intuited which is given through sensibility,

and as to this no question arises as to externalisation or non-externalisation in space : it is given not only not conditioned in space, but is related to space only phenomenally.

We know nothing of what any object may or may not be in itself : we know but an affect on us which we relate to an object. If, then, a disembodied spirit can impress us with its continuing personality, it may well be that the subject impressed may relate the impression to itself as a subject conditioned with the normal organs of sense. And if it make this relation it must abstract from the impression visual, audible or tactile ideas of the disembodied spirit : it must see or hear or touch it as an anthropomorphic being. But in such a case the 'phantom' would have only its own externality in space, it would not be related to space in general. If, however, the disembodied spirit have power to affect space, then the subject might see it fully conditioned in space—in externalisation. But even so the subject could not see (or hear or feel) it as it is, but simply as it appears to it (the subject) conditioned by the subject's normal organs of sense.

Lest what is above written be misunderstood, it must always be borne in mind that we do not 'see' even our fellow beings as they are, but merely as they appear to us, conditioned as we are by our normal organs of sense.

## TRAVEL OF PERSONALITY

As to the travel of personality which is above assumed, I prefer the following argument. But the problem involved is so difficult that I am forced to admit my argument is, even to myself, very weakly expounded.

When we receive impressions from the external through our normal organs of sense these impressions are, thereby, conditioned by the normal organs of sense. We, therefore, necessarily refer these impressions to the external conditioned in space. We know the laws governing what we see, hear, or feel normally. We can only see, hear, or feel the external to a (practically) known limited distance from us. We know that, to affect our normal organs of sense, the source of the impression must be within a certain distance from us in space.

Again, what, for example, we see, is conditioned by a known law under which its appearance to us varies in size according to its distance from us. This is in some measure true for hearing and touch. But this law clearly has existence only in relation to our normal organs of sense. I see a house near me : I walk a hundred yards from it. Then I know that I see the same house of the same size, but the house to me appears (in two or three dimensions) smaller according to the law of the inverse distance or inverse square of the distance. It is experience that teaches me to correct this appearance ; it teaches me that what from different distances appears to me different in size is really of the same size. This difference in appearance arises solely from the conditioning of my normal organs of sight.

I see, hear, and feel as I do see, hear, and feel because of the particular and limited nature of my organs of sense. There is no reason, *a priori*, why these senses should exist as they do exist : we do not know why we exist in the particular universe of time and space in which we do exist.

When, therefore, I receive an impression from the external otherwise than through my normal organs of sense, I have no valid ground to assume that the source of the impression is conditioned in space. (For the only grounds I have for holding that any object which affects me through my normal organs of sense is conditioned in space is that the affect on me (not the object itself) is conditioned in space, and this variation of the affect on me results entirely from

the fact that the affect on me is conditioned by my normal organs of sense.) There are, indeed, no arguments to be adduced in proof that it is conditioned in space. In relation to any ideas that the impression may give rise to in me, the impression is conditioned partly or wholly in space. But that is a separate matter.

And if the source of the impression is not conditioned in space, the law of the inverse distance (or inverse square of the distance) will not apply. The source of the impression may be near me or very far distant: the distance will condition in no way the affect on me of the impression.

Herein we find an explanation of the fact, in human experience, that spontaneous cases of telepathy take place as definitely when the agent and percipient are separated by thousands of miles as by tens of inches, and that an event may be as clearly and largely seen or heard at ten thousand miles' distance as close at hand.

Sensibility is the passive carrier; the intuitive self, unconditioned in our time and space, receives the manifold in intuition: intuition is the foundation of the ideas emerging in the human personality. Where intuition is, on reception, not directly conditioned by the normal organs of sense it is free, so far, from the governance of the laws of time and space; it is conditioned in idea (visual, auditory or tactile) *after reception*. Do not stumble over the fact that ideas must emerge in time and generally in space, and emerge largely as visual, auditory or tactile. This is the necessary result of the human personality being conditioned in time and space, and partially (in idea) by its normal organs of sense.

Now consider a case of telepathy where the percipient is on the spot, and the impression received is not from the external itself (a case, as we shall see hereafter, of pure clairvoyance) but from some external personality. To simplify the example—though this is not vital—assume the impression is accompanied by the emergence of ideas. Then the percipient is impressed on the spot by the personality of the agent who is, physically, at a distance. For this impression is from the personality of the agent, and you cannot separate—in space or in any other way—the impression from the personality.

A is dying in Australia from a bullet wound through the chest: his brother B stands by him. C is dying in Australia with a bullet wound through the chest: the same man, B, a stranger who hates him, stands by his side. The event in both cases is the same. But in the former we may assume B feels sorrow: in the latter B may feel sorrow, he will more likely feel indifference, or even pleasure. The event (which is the same in both cases) is conditioned by the personality it has affected, and the impression on B is affected in the one case by the personality of A, in the other by the personality of C; B's feeling is determined by the personality in either case. If this feeling is in intuition, still the effect on B as a human person-

ality is conditioned by the personality of A in the one case and by that of C in the other.

Now suppose A or C is dying in Australia from a bullet wound through the chest, and B in England sees an appearance of A or C as he is, dying. Assuming his ideas are subjective, I still think he will be affected by the personality of A or C, for his feeling will differ as he sees A or C dying.

I fear the argument above is weakly stated. But I cannot myself understand a percipient receiving a telepathic impression from any agent (if the impression partakes in itself, as it were, of the personality of the agent), unless the personality of the agent is involved on the spot where the percipient is. I cannot separate any such impression from the agent.

When we receive impressions through our normal organs of sense from another personality, we receive these impressions direct from such personality; the distance of the personality from us is not, within certain limits, a factor. For where the impressions are, there is the personality from whom the impressions come: I do not think the fact of reception through the normal organs of sense conditions the fact that the personality from whom the impressions come is there where the impressions are. If so, the same must be true when impressions are received otherwise than through the normal organs of sense.

But it may be objected that we *can* separate this personality from the event, that we do it in the affairs of ordinary life. And the telephone may be adduced in support of this argument.

For A in England can telephone to B in France, so that B hears him speaking near to him, B. And—granting, as we must, a perfect telephone—B in France may hear A speaking there as definitely in his own voice as if he, A, were sitting in a chair close to B. The event to B is conditioned by the personality of A, and yet A is not physically on the spot.

But what does the telephone effect? No more than a mechanical extension of the power of hearing in space, where there is no accompanying extension of the power of sight.

Consider the case of a blind man, remembering that we recognise the personality of others by sight and hearing—we do not touch them to be assured of the presence of their personality.

The blind man is talking to a well-known friend seated in a near chair. He is fully assured of the personality of his friend, through his normal organs of hearing.

Now place the blind man in France, and in communication with the same friend—who is still in England—by means of the telephone. Grant that the telephone is a perfect instrument, and let the blind man be under an assumption that his friend is seated in a near chair from which the telephone, not the friend, is really speaking. Don't introduce objections as to details—that, for instance, the

telephone cannot reply as promptly as the friend would : we must assume that the telephone does speak as the friend would.

Then the blind man has no human experience to correct his human experience that his friend is seated in the chair.

In this case the blind man is talking to the personality of his friend as near him objectively (in relation to him, the blind man) as he would be if he were materially near.

The blind man's normal organ of sense is hearing, and his friend is to him as objectively near when, materially, far distant as when close by.

It may be replied : ' But we know as a fact the friend is not on the spot.' This is no reply, for we have to deal only with the knowledge of the blind man ; we can only consider personal experience. If we attempt to enlarge the personal experience of any human being by the personal experience of other human beings where their personal experience is—as in this case—impossible for the first human being, we are landed in vague and impossible mysticism.

Imagine a world of blind men with no sense of touch. And imagine that in their world there are telephones—telephones walking as men. Imagine each telephone operated from Mars by a male resident in Mars, so that each moving telephone is a moving centre of speech and hearing in the blind men's world for each such inhabitant of Mars.

Then, each moving telephone is a personality to these blind men, and a personality like to their own personalities in their own world.

Grant that these Martians are intuitive selves. They can give the blind men no knowledge of themselves as they are. But, as telephonic centres, they can reveal to the blind men partial and mediate manifestations of their personalities in the universe of the blind men's ideas. They can reveal and manifest their personalities so far as it is possible for the blind men to apprehend them as personalities. Then these partially manifested Martian personalities only exist in the blind men's world. But they become real presences to the blind men : not real presences as they are in fact, but real presences so far as their personalities can be manifested to the blind men.

The blind men cannot correct or extend their human experience of hearing by sight or touch : they have no human experience of sight or touch. In their limited world of existence their personalities are manifested within certain limits. The personalities of the Martians are manifested as fully within the same limits. So the Martians are of like human personality with the blind men.

Now let us condition the Martians in Mars in some form of material body. Then they are not only to the blind men, but to themselves, psychically present in the blind men's world, for there

is direct communication between the personalities of the Martians and the personalities of the blind men in the blind men's world: the distance of Mars from this blind world is not a factor in the communication.

And there is another reply to the objection raised.

When I talk to a man I can talk with him at an inch distant or as far away as speech and hearing will carry. In such a case no one will argue that the distance between us conditions the presence of my personality to him or his personality to me. Now suppose a Martian has a long antenna, and that his organs of speech and hearing are placed at its end. Make this antenna as long as the distance from the earth to Mars. Then he can remain in Mars and hold converse in speech and hearing with people on the earth. Where, then, is his personality? I say you cannot condition it in Mars. If you say the Martian's brain is in Mars, and his personality is in his brain, I reply—the brain has extent in space, and you cannot condition the personality by this extent. So I may well make the Martian's brain extend along his antenna.

This last example may seem too long a stretch of imagination: but can we condition the extent of personality in space in relation to the extent of the material body or the extent (size) of the material brain? No one, I think, alleges that the extent in space of a man's physical body or brain conditions the extent of his personality in space. No one would suggest that Tom Thumb had a smaller extent of personality than Daniel Lambert, or Spurzheim than a monomaniac, because Spurzheim's brain was smaller. So if the Martian should have such an antenna, it would enlarge in no way the extent of his personality in space. We cannot, in fact, condition personality in space in any way: it is only the manifestation of personality we can so condition.

But if the Martian were an intuitive self and had this antenna—its organic end in our world and phenomenally manifested to us as a material human body—we could not deny his personal presence in this world. Herein we again find that when we regard personality as conditioned in time and space our ideas of personality are purely subjective.

Attempts have been, and are constantly, made to determine the 'place' of personality: it has been referred to the heart, the stomach, to a ganglion of the brain. All these attempts would appear really to amount to the one attempt by any given human personality to externalise its own personality, to determine its personality as an object to itself. And this, on its face, is impossible. Again, if we hold personality exists in an existing relation between the varying parts or any parts of any given material body and brain, we find this does not define an objective personality: the personality is subjective. But I assume there is a real personality in each one of us. If so, this personality must be indivisible and unique.

But what does indivisible mean? It means it is *not* in time or space. There is nothing conditioned in time and space which is not divisible to the ultimate 0. We may take  $x$  to represent anything, material or spiritual. If it is in time and space then it is subject to division to the ultimate  $\frac{x}{\infty}=0$ .

It may be objected—the spiritual is not divisible. But that is what I am arguing. If it again be argued that the spiritual is one and indivisible, I reply dogmatically that the personality of each one of us is unique. I reply dogmatically because I am not well read enough to discuss usefully the conflicting views of a vast number of able metaphysicians; I rely on Kant alone. And, too, I stop short at the intuitive self: I do not consider even the relation of this intuitive self to the soul of man. At the same time if, in arriving at the existence of an intuitive self from a consideration of Kant's *Critique*, I am correct, then we have for each one of us (relatively to our human personality) a self indivisible and unique. And this self (personality) cannot be conditioned in time and space as known to us.

Dr. Alfred Backman has recorded certain remarkable experiments in clairvoyance that he carried out in Sweden. I refer to one incident, because, strange as it is, it is explicable by the theory I now formulate. But as, so far as I know, this incident is unique in its details, little reliance can be placed on it, though it is very strong evidentially.

Dr. Backman, when at the camp of the regiment of Kalmar, hypnotised a girl of fourteen, and directed her to go, in thought, to his residence at the town of Kalmar, about thirteen miles distant. He says, with reference to the incident I rely on:—

'There was an old lady in my house, and expecting that the girl might "see" her also, I asked if she did not see another lady, to which she answered that she did see another, a young girl, whom she described so exactly that I recognised Miss H. W. After that she told me that my wife dressed and went out, entered a shop and bought something. The experiment ended here.'

Dr. Backman wrote to his wife at once; she replied by post. The reply 'expressed my wife's great surprise (as I had not mentioned the means by which I had learnt the facts), and said it was certainly true that she had spoken to Miss H. W. on that day and hour, and had afterwards gone to a shop in the same street to buy something, but Miss H. W. had not been at our house, but at Ryssby, twenty kilometres from Kalmar, and had been talking to my wife through a telephone' (*Proceedings*, vol. vii. p. 201; *Proceedings*, vol. viii. p. 407).

Now it is quite indifferent to the point I am making how the hypnotised girl saw Miss H. W. The point is that she related the human personality of Miss H. W. to the spot where she, the girl,

had travelled psychically: Miss H. W. was there where her voice was speaking.

These arguments, if on their face some of them are grotesque, seem to me to bear on the possibility of psychic travel. We cannot condition personality in space: where the thought is, there is the thinker, and where distant thought emerges in the human personality in idea there is psychic travel of the personality of the distant thinker—a personality which cannot be the human personality. The difficulty in understanding this arises from confounding personality with the human personality conditioned in a material body in our space and time.

If A in England has only a human personality conditioned in a material body in space and time, he cannot possibly, as a personality, have *human experience in idea* of a vivid and minute scene in Australia: if he have such human experience he must be affected in personality, not in human personality, and affected in Australia.

Now we know that such human experience is possible, and we know that A's human personality conditioned in a material body in time and space cannot be directly affected by what takes place in Australia. But A is so affected. The affection then must be on the intuitive self, which is unconditioned in our time and space, and the idea of the scene related to Australia must emerge in A's human personality in England from the intuition of his intuitive self. We may fairly term this psychic travel of the personality.

This argument is further supported by the fact that percipients on the spot are affected by the personalities of agents not on the spot. (See *Combined Index, S.P.R.*, 1904. Cases under the heading: 'Telepathy. Cases where the personality of Agent is impressed on Percipient rather than his ideas.')

But this travel of personality must not be confounded with the spiritistic theory—I here follow Myers in distinguishing between the spiritistic and spiritualistic. The theory propounded is spiritualistic in that the travel of personality assumed is a manifestation of the apparent travel of the intuitional self. But when there is an apparition of the agent I treat it as but a thing in idea of the percipient—the affect is in intuition. The theory propounded does not touch on—for proof or disproof—the details, which may perhaps be termed anthropomorphic, of the spiritistic theory.

If what is above suggested be correct, then, in all cases of telepathy, where the impression received by the percipient is from some agent, there is psychical travel of the personality of the agent to the spot where the percipient is, even though the agent as a human personality is quite unconscious in idea of this travel of his personality. And so, in *all* cases, we might have the clairvoyant evidence of the agent—percipient in support of the truth of the case, as above argued (cf. *Phantasms*, vol. i. p. 368).

But bear in mind this travel of personality is phenomenal not

real: the personality (the intuitive self) is never subject to the gross labour of travelling; it *is* everywhere. The term 'psychical travel of the personality' is used only to express what appears, to us, to take place. Bear in mind, too, that the intuitive self is a condition. So when we say it is everywhere all we mean is that it is not conditioned in our space.

## TRAVEL OF PERSONALITY

### AN OBJECTION TO THE THEORY

ASSUMING that this theory of travel of personality is sound, does it explain all the recorded cases ?

It appears to me there are certain cases that it does not explain.

Let us see, first, how far the theory carries us.

This travel of personality is phenomenal travel of the intuitive self, not of the human personality. Bear in mind the intuitive self is unconditioned in time and space as known to us. So there is no real travel, there is only what, to us, is travel. As the intuitive self is not conditioned in time and space, we can understand that it may be able to determine itself anywhere in space ; and that, as the result of such determination, the human personality of any such intuitive self may be impressed in idea by 'events' taking place in that particular space where the intuitive self has determined itself. Thus would I explain cases of clairvoyance or clairaudience.

But the intuitive self can, so far, only determine itself as an intuitive self in space—not as a human personality. So, if we term the individual in question the agent, he can only affect percipients on the spot (where he has determined himself) in *impression*. It may be that, from will or desire or attunement of understanding, the ideas emerging in the percipients may be like or more or less like to those of the agent. But what appears to me impossible is that the agent should impress the percipients with an idea of his, the agent's, objective presence in space where the percipients are. The impression on the percipients, arising from the presence of the agent as an intuitive self, may well give rise to subjective ideas in the percipients of the agent's objective presence. But for such ideas to be objective, the agent must affect space in some way akin to a material affection of space.

Now there are a large number of cases where one percipient sees the phantom of the agent open and enter at a door, sit in a chair, or move in some life-like manner : that is, where the phantom is—to the percipient—related to externality in general. These, *prima facie*, constitute objective appearances. But I think they may be explained—though not easily—as subjective.

There are, however, other cases not so explicable ; cases, for

instance, of two or more percipients where the phantom is seen from the different standpoints of the percipients, as it would have been seen if an objective thing—one percipient, for instance, sees the back, another the side or full face. If such cases are to be trusted, the only explanation seems to me to be some objective affection of space in general by the agent, manifested by the appearance of the phantom.

Consider the following case which I condense from the full narrative as given in *Phantasms of the Living*, vol. ii. p. 201.

Mr. S., at the time he writes of, was playing the flute to an accompaniment on the piano by his wife's mother. He distinctly felt the approach of some one, or rather something, coming behind him, and, turning his head to the right, distinctly perceived a shade of a greyish colour standing by him upon his right hand, a little in advance of him. He says, 'I did not see the whole figure, but what I saw was part of a shadowy face, the outline of the forehead, nose, mouth, chin, and a part of the neck being visible.'

It was afterwards found that the lady playing the accompaniment had seen the same phantom. But she says:—

'Yes, I saw the back and shoulders of the form of a man; it passed across like a shadow behind you, stood to your right hand, and then disappeared. I was not alarmed but surprised.'

The peculiarity of such cases lies not so much in the fact that two persons at the same time see the phantom, but that the percipients see the phantom from their different positions as they would have seen it if it had been an objective reality. In this case Mr. S. saw it partly face to face; Mrs. R. saw its back.

So termed 'Collective' Cases are discussed at length in the *Proceedings*, vol. x. p. 319, *et seq.* And therein the theory that Myers offered in 1901 is referred to. This theory is stated to be as follows: 'The view there set forth was that in all cases there is an agent who is himself telepathically or clairvoyantly affected, and that the appearance of this agent, A, to the percipients, B and C, depends on A's own perception of his own presence (psychically) in the scene where his phantasm is observed' (*Proceedings S.P.R.*, vol. x. p. 322).

This theory of Myers is stated at length in *Phantasms of the Living*, vol. ii. p. 277, *et seq.*, and a perusal of it will show that I have followed Myers very closely in my theory of travel of personality. But I cannot think it gives a full explanation of such cases as that cited. Thought transference between the percipients is admitted to be no full explanation.

The difficulty is this:—

Travel of the personality infers travel only of the intuitive self. From this we can infer the emergence in the percipient or percipients of subjective ideas of the human personality of the agent: that is, the externalisation of a phantom in the percipient's mind of the

agent as known or even (by clairvoyance) as he may in fact exist in dress and outward form. But where two percipients see the same phantom from their different positions, and so see different parts of the phantom, then the phantom is (apparently) an objective thing in relation to space in general.

Myers' earlier explanation that such cases are to be accounted for by the agent's own perception of his own presence (psychically) in the scene where his phantom is observed does not, I think, go far enough. We must get in some way the agent's objective affection of space.

If we extend Myers' earlier theory by assuming a power in the agent as an intuitive self to determine himself phenomenally in space, and so affect space where his body is not, we arrive at an explanation, though, herein, we infer an extraordinary power of personality possibly over matter, and are getting near to the spiritistic belief. Still, if the agent have this power to affect space, I cannot believe that his phantom, seen by the percipient, has any objective reality.

Now Myers himself, it would appear, did so extend his theory in 'Human Personality and its Survival of Bodily Death.' For he therein stated that there is a secondary state in which the spirit can leave the body, and not only travel far but actually modify spatial relations at a distance, so as to impress the sense-organs of other conscious persons (*Proceedings*, vol. xviii. p. 56).

The following two well authenticated cases seem necessarily to require some such theory in explanation.

## 1

Mrs. H. B. states:—

'The evening of the next day (Friday, December 11), about eleven o'clock, I had such a sensation of being suffocated' (this was after an acute attack of laryngitis on the previous day) 'that I felt as if I were dying, and would never see my home again. I was suddenly filled with an overpowering longing to be at home, and whether I fell asleep for a few minutes and dreamed, I do not know, but it seemed the next minute as if my desire was granted and I felt I was actually there.'

Now at this time Mrs. H. B. was in Edinburgh, at a distance from her home.

Three servants, who were at the home, sign a statement that: 'On Friday, December 11, 1896, about 11 P.M., we were all sitting by the fire in the kitchen. We heard steps in the passage, coming from the hall along by the nursery door. Jane looked up and asked if I heard anything. I said, "Yes, I thought I heard Mrs. B. walking along with her skirts rustling, from the front door along by the nursery." We had all heard it. I said I thought it was like a warning, and I said, "I hope Mrs. B. isn't dead. . . ."'

Miss B., a daughter of Mrs. H. B., at home at the time, states that about the same time: 'I was writing, alone, in my bedroom—the first room at the top of the staircase, which is a low one. The house was quite quiet, and I fancied the servants had gone to bed, so that I was surprised to hear footsteps coming along the passage downstairs. I heard the steps come from the hall, past the foot of the staircase, and along the passage known as the "Nursery Lobby." There they died away and I heard no more. It was rather a heavy, quick, decided step, accompanied by the rustle of a silk dress, and was so exactly like my mother's, that if I had not known her to be in Edinburgh ill at the time, I should not have had two doubts about it' (*Journal*, vol. viii. p. 319).

There is fuller corroborative evidence in the record, which we need not here refer to.

In this case, as Mrs. H. B. was not on the spot, the percipients' ideas of sound were subjective, but to the percipients themselves these ideas were objective, and had definite relations to space in general. To explain why these ideas emerged in the percipients, we must assume not only psychical travel of H. B.'s personality, but, it would appear, also some affect of her personality on space in general.

## 2

The second case is even more striking:—

A. H. B. states: 'On an evening in February 1891 I was seated in the smoking-room of the New Club, Edinburgh, about 11 P.M. I fell asleep, and slept soundly for an hour. During the time I was asleep I had the following very vivid dream. I dreamt that I was running home as fast as I could to the house in Abercromby Place, in which we then lived, fearing I was late for dinner. I opened the door with my latch-key and hurried upstairs to dress; about half way up, I looked down, and saw my father standing in the hall, looking up at me. At this point I awoke and, finding it was a few minutes past 12 P.M., I rose immediately from my chair and went home. On my arrival I was astonished to find that the house was lighted up, and my father and one of my brothers searching the rooms, and calling for me.

'My father, on seeing me, expressed much surprise, and asked whence I had come. I explained that I had only just returned from the Club. He then asked me if I had not come in about twelve o'clock, and on my replying in the negative, told me the following facts:—

'He had, as was his custom, been sitting in his smoking-room, and about twelve o'clock rose from his chair, intending to go to bed. On opening the door, which led into the hall, he heard the front door shut, and distinctly saw me hurriedly cross the hall and run upstairs,

and, looking up, saw me glance down at him and disappear' (*Journal*, vol. viii. p. 321).

This case also can apparently be only explained by the personality of A. H. B. having had some effect at a distance on space in general.

Or consider the following two cases:—

## 3

This case is from Mr. Aksakoff; it is translated (into French) from the original Russian of Mr. D. A.

The facts shortly are that the family of Mr. D. A. himself at the time sixteen years old, were assembled together: 'Tout à coup les ébats joyeux des enfants s'arrêtèrent, et l'attention générale se porta vers notre chien "Moustache" qui s'était précipité, en aboyant fortement, vers le poêle. Involontairement nous regardâmes tous dans la même direction, et nous vîmes sur la corniche du grand poêle en carreaux de faïence un petit garçon de 5 ans à peu près, en chemise.'

The boy was recognised as one André, son of their milkman (who died about the time).

The important part of the narrative for our present purpose is the following:—'L'apparition se detacha du poêle, passa au-dessus de nous tous, et disparut dans la croisée ouverte. Pendant tout ce temps—une quinzaine de secondes à peu près—le chien ne cessait d'aboyer de toutes ses forces, et courrait et aboyait *en suivant le mouvement de l'apparition*' (*Proceedings*, vol. x. p. 227).

Here the phantom, or something which caused it, would appear to have been fully externalised in space.

## 4

Miss H. W. states:—

'It was Sunday night. F. T. my cousin, Mrs. H. (an old servant and friend of the family) and I were sitting in the drawing-room. All the rest of the family were gone to church, the house was shut up, the shutters closed, and door shut.

'F. and I sat opposite each other on the same side of the table; two candles were on the table.

'I sat reading with my back turned to the candle near me, so that the light fell on my book. Suddenly the light disappeared, so that I could not go on reading. I looked round quickly, and saw a dark shadow pass between me and the candle. The shadow was so thick as to seem almost like a substance, but I did not see any *shape*. We both exclaimed, "I thought both the candles were going out," and F. said, "It seemed to me to come from the door." When the shadow had passed, the candles were perfectly clear and steady; the old nurse was stooping low over the fire, on the same side of the

room as we were. She was in great trouble about a sick brother, and when we spoke to her, did not seem to have noticed anything or heard us talk.

'Early next morning this old nurse was called away—her brother had died that night at 3 A.M.' (*Proceedings*, vol. x. p. 313). (See, too, *Proceedings*, vol. viii. p. 226 ; vol. x. p. 374.)

Now people do not ordinarily suffer from hallucinations like to that stated above : I think the case points to some objective affection of space, for Miss H. W. and her cousin had each differing experience of the shadow.

If we assume there is sufficient evidence in proof of this power of the intuitive self to affect space at a distance by psychical travel, we do not find any valid objection to the theory of psychical travel of personality : all we arrive at is that human experience proves, or makes it probable, that psychical travel infers power over matter.

I shall deal separately with this question of matter and personality, for there is a very large number of reported instances involving the alleged power of spirit over matter, and this must affect the question of personality. But these instances cover so wide a field—from hypnotism to alleged materialisations—they are so diverse, in many cases so bizarre, that it is well to state at once that I offer no definite explanation for them all. I can suggest no theory that will cover them all. Bear in mind, however, that if we reject all these instances as false—I do not either accept or reject them—telepathy still stands firm on its own foundation of fact.

## CASES OF PURE CLAIRVOYANCE AND PURE CLAIRAUDIENCE

It has been shown that the telepathic phenomena already dealt with are of one and the same nature, in that in all there is action and reaction between the so-termed percipient physically on the spot and the so-termed agent (who in some cases is also the percipient) psychically on the spot to which the phenomenon is referred. They differ from one another only in the character and source of the evidence available to support their truth.

The terms clairvoyance and clairaudience are, so far, but expressions marking the necessary characteristics of the evidence certain percipients offer when they are witnesses in support of the truth of certain telepathic phenomena. In all the cases we have yet dealt with, what may be roughly called clairvoyant or clairaudient *action* is involved: for if we have evidence of a psychical phenomenon, it must be evidence relating to a particular time and place to which the agent must have travelled psychically. But direct personal evidence (as distinct from action) of this psychical travel is only available in certain cases.

Consider, for instance, the case already referred to on p. 158. Here the man dying in Mexico was psychically present in England. So there was what I have termed clairvoyant action, as the evidence of the percipient shows. But the man dying gives no evidence himself, so we have no clairvoyant evidence.

In all these cases there would appear to be action and reaction between personalities—between a percipient and an agent, a possible percipient also: the fact of there being some personality on the spot to which the personality of the agent travels would appear to be always involved in these cases.

It might then, at first thought, be argued that there must be some action and reaction (some relation) between any one personality and some external personality before the former personality can travel psychically.

But it would appear that there may be other cases, which we will now consider, where there is this travel of personality without any action and reaction between the travelling personality and any external personality:—

‘So, again, there is strong evidence that clairvoyants have

witnessed and described trivial incidents in which they have no special interest, and even scenes in which the actors, though actual persons, were complete strangers to them ; and such cases seem properly assimilated to those where they describe mere places and objects, the idea of which can hardly be supposed to be impressed on them by any personality at all' (*Proceedings S.P.R.*, vol. i. p. 146. Cf. *Phantasms*, vol. i. p. 368).

Mrs. H. Sidgwick, for the purposes of a paper on clairvoyance, defines clairvoyance in the following passage :—

'The word clairvoyance is often used very loosely, and in widely different meanings. In the present paper I intend to denote by it a faculty of acquiring supernormally, but not by reading the minds of people *present* (my italics), a knowledge of facts such as we normally acquire by the use of our senses. I do not limit it, notwithstanding the derivation of the word, to knowledge which would normally be acquired by the sense of sight, nor do I limit it to a knowledge of present facts. A similar knowledge of past and, if necessary, of future facts may be included' (*Proceedings S.P.R.*, vol. vii. p. 30). If, as I hold, the external affects the personality in intuition (unconditioned in time and space), then it is certain that impressions, not received through the normal organs of sense, may be received of what are, to us, past and future facts ; though in idea they emerge in the present.

Mrs. Sidgwick would appear to distinguish—though not without doubt—clairvoyance from telepathy. Indeed, if a percipient can be impressed by the external itself—as distinct from external personalities—then these affects would not come within certain of the definitions of telepathy extant : we must have the term *telaesthesia* also.

But I think they would come within the meaning of the definition of telepathy given by the literary committee of the S.P.R. : that is, they are impressions received at a distance without the normal operation of the recognised sense organs. They certainly come within the definitions of telepathy and its manifestation that I have myself given.

What, then, is the distinction ordinarily drawn between cases of clairvoyance (using the term generally as Mrs. Sidgwick uses it) and cases of telepathy ?

It is no more than that between psychical phenomena where the percipient is affected by an agent, and psychical phenomena where the percipient is not affected by an agent, but by the external. Assuming the distinction to exist, we have, in telepathy, cases where the percipient is affected by an external personality : in clairvoyance, cases where the percipient is affected by the external as distinct from external personalities.

But by the theory propounded, the intuitive self is affected both by the external and by external personalities : and the affection

in both cases is the same—it is a direct active affection in intuition through sensibility which is passive. It is only when we consider the human personality of understanding (in time and space) that we find a distinction in the affects from the external on the one hand and from external personalities on the other.

By the theory, then, cases of affection from the external as distinct from external personalities come under the general term telepathy.

It is these cases of affection from the external which I term cases of pure clairvoyance or clairaudience.

Now in cases where the percipient is affected by the external only, there is only one personality involved—that of the percipient. In other cases two personalities at least are involved, those of the agent and percipient. So it is in the latter class of cases only that we encounter the difficulties arising from such questions as attunement of understanding between agent and percipient, or transference of ideas, symbolic or otherwise, from the one to the other. Therefore, in theory, the ideas emerging in a percipient, when affected by the external, should be more definite than those emerging in him when affected by, or through, external personalities.

We should expect, then, the reported cases would show :—

1. Where the percipient is on the spot of the psychological phenomenon, the ideas emerging in him, from impressions as to which an agent is involved, are generally rudimentary or ordinarily differ largely from those of the agent: symbolic likeness between the ideas of the agent and percipient will be more common than direct likeness.
2. Where an agent and percipient are involved, and the agent travels psychically to the spot of the psychological phenomenon then as there is, in some degree, a direct impression on the agent from the external, his record (as a percipient) of what he sees or hears is, if available, ordinarily far more exact as to the external and in closer agreement with reality than that of the former percipient physically on the spot.
3. Where the percipient is directly affected by the external, approximately correct ideas of what is experienced result.

I think the reported cases support these conclusions.

For instance, all vague cases of 'tappings, tickings, knocks, and crashes, the sound of footsteps or of a door opening'; all symbolic appearances; all appearances of the agent in symbolic form, or as he was known to the percipient, not as he is at the time of the psychological phenomenon; all cases of feeling, of general malaise, are supported by evidence of percipients on the spot. Such cases are never evidenced by the percipient where psychical travel of his personality is involved. In these 'vague' cases the percipient is affected by or through external personalities, and so—I think—clear and definitely objective ideas of the external seldom or never emerge, though there may be (apparent) direct transfer of thought from an external personality.

But where an agent and percipient are involved, and there is psychical travel of the personality of the agent-percipient to the spot of the psychical phenomenon, this results in his being affected to some degree directly by the external. There may be illusion—for instance, a hare-lip on a boy may be mistaken as the result of an immediate accident (see *Phantasms*, vol. ii. p. 31), but there will be more or less exact representation in idea of the external. The evidence will be closely akin to that the percipient would have given had what he appears, for instance, to see been really seen by him through his normal organs of sight.

These facts—if facts they be—are not only in agreement with the theory propounded, but show for all cases a foundation of truth in detail: for if telepathy had no basis in fact, it would be hard, if not impossible, to explain why the evidence of percipients physically on the spot is always distinguished by certain important characteristics from the evidence of percipients psychically on the spot. The evidence of both types of percipients would appear to be in agreement with a fundamental law, and we cannot apply the governance of fundamental law to alleged facts resulting from the mere working of human imagination.

‘Where the percipient is directly affected by the external, approximately correct ideas of what is experienced result.’ These are what I term cases of pure clairvoyance or pure clair-audience. (Bear in mind that our attention is now confined to spontaneous cases of telepathy: experimental cases will be treated separately.) If such cases exist, then the evidence of the percipient may be as clear and precise as if he had been affected directly through his normal organs of sense.

## THE DIVINING-ROD

A VERY large number of veridical cases of the use of the divining-rod have been reported.

A majority of these have been collected by Professor W. F. Barrett, who has given much time and thought to the subject. The evidence appears to me to prove that the position, direction, and depth from the surface of running water can, with approximate certainty, be determined by use of the divining-rod. There is evidence also that it can determine the position of hidden metals, and even lead to detection of the past movements of human beings (see the *Combined Index*, 1904, of the S.P.R. for the very large number of cases as to the divining-rod reported and considered).

The use of the rod is experimental, not spontaneous. But I deal with the question now because, whatever explanation we may arrive at for the movements of the rod, I think these movements must be referred ultimately to an affection on the dowser from the external, not ordinarily from external personalities. If this be so we make the phenomena of the divining-rod to be phenomena of telepathy as manifest to us: they are 'communications otherwise than through the normal organs of sense between subjects and the external.' They constitute facts which prove human beings can be affected by the external otherwise than through the normal organs of sense, where no external personality comes into question.

The movement of the rod I assume is the natural result of muscular action on the part of the dowser. But there is no conscious exercise of muscular power on the part of the dowser: it is the affect on him of the external, otherwise than through the normal organs of sense, which causes the (relatively) unconscious muscular action (some dowsers can determine the position of running water without using the rod).

But, herein, we are faced by a great difficulty which I admit at once I cannot fully remove.

Let us first assume that the divining-rod marks only the place of running water—not of minerals, for instance, or the past movements of individuals. If so, we must explain why water, and water only, has this effect. Why water alone should have this effect I am at a loss to explain. For by the theory propounded, we have the fact that the external does affect the personality, and that this affect may emerge in idea in the human personality. So what, to

us, is a particular of the external may emerge in idea. But we cannot relate the emerging ideas to particulars only of water as the external. We should expect, then, that the rod should mark not only water as a particular of the external, but other particulars of the external—minerals for instance.

And there is some evidence that the rod can do this, evidence which Barrett accepts as satisfactory evidence in proof.

On this moot question I do not enter. All I do is to point out a deduction which naturally follows if we assume the rod has this general power.

The dowser starts with the intention of finding water: he finds water. Again he starts with the intention of finding some mineral: he finds the mineral. Or if his intention be to track out the past movements of some individual he does so track out the past movements. (Success in the last instance I would refer to lasting affects on forms of matter of the past movements or ideas of the person tracked.)

But why, *through the same means*, does he arrive at these diverse successes? Why does the rod move at one time under the influence of water, at another under the influence of some mineral?

I hold these differences in the results must be referred to the dowser himself: it must be the intention with which he sets out that determines the particular form of success. And what, herein, does intention mean? Intention must be referred to a dominant idea in the mind of the dowser. His own *idea* determines the particular movements of the rod.

The phenomena of the divining-rod are so mysterious and, at present, so little understood, that I do not propose to consider them at length. I refer to them now only because the exhaustive and admirable labour of Barrett would appear to have established the fact that the divining-rod can, at the least, determine the presence of running water—and, if this be so, we have in the phenomena of the divining-rod proof that the human personality can be affected otherwise than through the normal organs of sense by the external as distinct from external personalities.

## CRYSTAL-GAZING

I THINK that (apart from the phenomena of the divining-rod) we are most likely to meet with instances of impressions purely from the external in cases of crystal-gazing. Dreams, as most of us know, are often peculiarly vivid and exact: we may even, in dream, be so impressed with the reality of the external, that waking is from the real to the unreal. But, in dreaming, imagination—the play with stored ideas—has so large a part, and the memory of what has been experienced in dreamland is ordinarily on awaking so unreliable, that I would attach little importance to dreams for the present purpose, however great their importance may be in other connections.

In one sense, crystal-gazing is experimental. But there would appear to be a large number of cases where, by mere gazing, visions of the external arise spontaneously, and these may fairly be classed under the head of spontaneous cases.

Now, whatever may be the explanation of the phenomena of crystal-gazing, one feature is common in many if not all the cases—the vividness and even minuteness in detail of what is seen. And this directly supports the argument as to affects from the external (see pp. 186 *et seq.*).

‘In one point nearly all observers concur. These visions’ (crystal vision) ‘imply a visualising power, greater than the seer can exercise by voluntary effort. The distinctness and artistic quality of these crystal-pictures can be estimated more truly than that of hypnotic, or even of post-hypnotic hallucinations, on account of the subject’s more thoroughly normal state, and the illuminations of the pictures, the movement of the figures, often cause the seer great surprise’ (*Proceedings*, vol. vii. p. 319. By Myers).

Before we attack cases of crystal vision which result from impressions from the external otherwise than through the normal organs of sense, we may consider another class—those which result from visualisation, at the time, of some particular part of the seer’s storage of ideas. For a consideration of such cases will throw some light on the cases with which we are immediately concerned.

The number of such cases is very large, as a glance at the *Combined Index* (1904) of the S.P.R. will show. I now record three experiments by the Rev. H. E., which are, I think, original in showing the genesis of such visions. The first I condense, the second

and third I give in the words of the Rev. H. E., as sent to me personally by letter.

#### EXPERIMENT I

The Rev. H. E. knew one E. E. P., who was a crystal-gazer, and could easily be hypnotised by H. E. One day E. E. P. saw in the crystal and described more or less minutely, a room and its furniture, laying particular stress on a great clock. E. E. P. declared he had never, in fact, seen such a room. H. E. then hypnotised E. E. P., who, when in the hypnotic state, said he had seen the room and the great clock five years before when in London with his brother. When E. E. P. was brought back to his normal state, he *then* remembered what he had seen with his brother.

A very ingenious and, I think, original experiment now occurred to H. E. During the previous part of the day, I should here explain, he and E. E. P. had been looking at the interior of a church, and E. E. P. had been greatly struck by some brass candle-holders, and even handled some cut-glass knobs hanging below.

H. E. re-hypnotised E. E. P., and asked him *why* he had seen the particular scene in the crystal? E. E. P., *after long hesitation*, replied that he 'supposed' what he had seen in the crystal had been recalled to his memory by analogy to what he had seen with his ordinary vision in the afternoon.

#### EXPERIMENT II

J. M., aged twenty-one, carpenter, of good average ability, good hypnotic subject, and good at crystal vision. January 22, 1909. One o'clock A.M.

Sees in crystal a man in white apron kicking a boy. Thinks boy is a grocer's assistant. Can't see faces plainly. Man takes boy by the arm and kicks him again. Says he does not know either boy or man. Thinks it is inside a shop, but is not sure. Vision fades.

On questioning J. M. he cannot remember ever having seen this. I should state that I consider he has a bad ordinary memory, and a fairly bad memory when in the hypnotic trance, *i.e.* bad compared with the ordinary run of subjects in this state. On being hypnotised, and asked where the scene took place, he replies at once that it was five years ago, when he was working with another boy W. L. under a carpenter named E. C. The boy and he had each made a wheelbarrow. The carpenter E. C. found fault with W. L., 'and he gave him cheek, so he put his boot into him, and kicked over the barrow.' Asked what made him see this picture, he answered, 'I was pushing a barrow this morning.'

Further asked 'what this had to do with it,' he replied, 'I thought of the new one I was making, as I was pushing the barrow.'

*Awake* J. M. says he remembers clearly thinking of the new

barrow he is making, and noticing the way the one was made that he was pushing, but feels sure he never thought of W. L. or of the kicking affair. It seems to me fairly obvious that the barrow J. M. was pushing suggested the barrow he is making. His mind was fairly idle probably as he was going along the road, and the incident about W. L. rose at least as far as his sub-conscious memory, being suggested by barrow-making.

### EXPERIMENT III

J. M., date, time, etc., as above.

Sees in crystal a man hanging from a beam in a room by his neck—small table upset on floor below him. Man about seventy years of age. Light tweed coat, dark trousers; rope fastened to hook in old-fashioned white-washed beam. Rope double. Face is to right. Vision fades.

J. M. remembers this incident thoroughly. It happened at T. in the Midlands on Easter Monday, 1907. He was called into the house, together with the man with whom he was lodging, to cut the man down. The house was opposite the one in which he lodged where this took place.

The question now was—what made him see this very unpleasant vision? There was no need to find out further details as to what the vision was, as he could naturally describe such an affair thoroughly. On being hypnotised, and the question being asked, he replied, 'I saw them hanging up a pig (on January 18th) that was just killed, a day or two ago.' Did you think of this man when you saw that? 'No, not that I know of.' 'If you saw that a day or two ago, why do you see it *to-day* in the crystal?'

'I saw a postcard *to-day* with a pig on it.'

After waking, J. M. told me that while driving a cart with a horse that went very slowly through the village of O. on Monday last, he saw a newly killed pig hung up to the roof of a shed that opened on to the road. He merely looked at it as the horse went slowly by. As far as he knows, he never thought of the suicide at all.

This morning, *i.e.* January 22, about half an hour before these experiments, he called at B.'s house, and was shown a postcard, sent for a joke, showing a pig without its head. Is quite sure he did not think of the pig he saw hung up at O.

The chain of memory is again obvious. The postcard pig suggests the dead pig at O., and this in turn suggests the suicide at T.

But these two cases seem to have a fuller interest. After J. M. had seen Vision III., I took the crystal away and wrote the notes of the experiment. This took rather less than ten minutes. I then handed J. M. the crystal again. He immediately saw the No. II. Vision. Why does this one follow the other? The wheelbarrow in No. II. that he was pushing, he stopped outside B.'s house

and went in. Here he took the postcard into his hands and examined it. After staying there a little while, he went back to the barrow and took it to its destination, and then came on to me for experiments. Again the chain is fairly obvious.

The deductions made by the Rev. H. E. are, I submit, sound : for the class of cases now in question it would appear that the particular vision emerges from the influences of association of ideas in the understanding of the seer.

Consider the following simple instance of ordinary life :—

When any number of us are conversing together, we often find that the particular topic discussed leads us to call up in memory certain particular ideas of the past that we should not have recalled in memory if we had not had the particular topic under discussion. Jones, for instance, says he has lately seen a particular event happen, whereon you remember that seven years ago you saw the same thing happen in Bond Street. That is, because Jones speaks to you of his recent experience, you take out of your storage of ideas a particular idea for use in the present that you would not have taken out if Jones had not communicated to you his own experience : the particular idea emerges in your understanding in present time from an ' association of ideas ' started by what Jones said.

Now it would appear that for the crystal-gazer the reception of impressions through the normal organs of sense is in abeyance, so his whole potential memory is freer for use in the present without ordinary disturbance from the normally passing external, than when he is in the normal state.

May it not be, then, that passing action of the human understanding of the crystal-gazer determines the *particular* ideas which he takes out of his storage of ideas for visualisation ? The crystal-gazer, it is true, is ordinarily unconscious of this action of his human understanding, so that ideas of the past seem to ' crop up ' spontaneously : but this does not disprove the fact of such action.

The ' magic ' of crystal-scrying as to the class of cases as yet considered, lies in the fact that the seer visualises some part of his storage of ideas. That he does do this is a fact of human experience.

But, so far, what have we proved in human experience ? That the crystal-seer who has had past human experience can, in the present, visualise his past experience. But, again, how is this past experience *in* the seer ? The past experience is relatively to him (as already shown) a storage of intuition : it is intuition which he uses for the abstraction of his visual ideas in the present.

These facts of human experience open for us the possibility that when the seer is affected by the external through sensibility, otherwise than through the normal organs of sense, he may be able to abstract from impressions on his understanding visual ideas which

infer operation of the understanding. If the subject be affected in impressions by sensibility otherwise than through the normal organs of sense, there is no reason why this understanding should not operate with the resulting impressions as it does with his storage of ideas—a storage, relatively to him, of intuition.

The argument in support runs thus: Intuition results in (relatively) pure impressions: these impressions on the understanding (whether or not received through the normal organs of sense) cause the emergence in the understanding of impressions, which import some operation of the understanding, and so lie in cognition. These impressions may be termed ideas, for they are the subject of memory. These ideas, when they become things of the past, constitute the seer's storage of ideas, and the cases referred to prove that the seer can call up in the present visualised ideas of his past experience received through his normal organs of sense. There is this power in the seer as human experience proves, though I offer no explanation to account for the power.

It follows, I think, directly that when the seer is affected otherwise than through the normal organs of sense, this same power should enable him to visualise in idea the affects on him from the external. (Bear in mind that now we are concerned only with the seer's power to visualise affects from the external: the question of affects from external personalities is not in point.)

Human experience proves, I submit, that this power exists. And the proof exists in the large number of recorded cases where the crystal-gazer 'sees' what is taking place outside the range of his normal organs of sight.

The following is an example of a large class.

Miss A. states:—

'Some time ago I was looking in my crystal and saw Lady R. sitting in a room I had never seen, in a big red chair; and a lady in a black dress and white cap whom I had never seen came in and put her hand upon Lady R.'s shoulder. It was about 7.30, I think. I immediately, that same evening, wrote to Lady R. to ask her to write down what she was doing at 7.30, as I had seen her in the crystal. Shortly afterwards I saw Lady R., and she said she had done what I asked her, and told me to tell her what I saw. It was quite right; she had been sitting in a red arm-chair, and Lady Jane E., dressed as I described her, had come in and put her hand on her shoulder. Afterwards, when I met Lady Jane E., I recognised her, without knowing who she was, as the lady I had seen. Also, when I went to the house, I recognised the chair.'

This statement is confirmed by Lord and Lady R. (*Proceedings*, vol. viii. p. 501).

In trying to explain what took place in the above case, we are to a certain point on firm ground.

The scene that affected Miss A. did not affect her directly through

her normal organs of sight ; she must have been impressed otherwise, and this impression cannot, therefore, in itself, have been visual, auditory or tactile. True, she *had* a visual idea of the scene, but as she did not receive the scene directly through her normal organs of sight, it must be that it was something that impressed her otherwise than in sight which emerged in her as a visual idea.

Perhaps, by gazing in the crystal, she confined the impression—if emerging in idea—to emergence as a visual idea. But that affected the impression itself in no way : the impression was altogether distinct from the after visual idea.

Now this visual idea was, to Miss A., a new idea from the external : it was called up in no way from her storage of ideas. So it must have been derived ultimately from intuition. For this idea did not arise from the play of the imagination with her stored ideas of the past ; it arose from an impression from the external. The impression, therefore, was in intuition, and so from intuition the correct corresponding idea ultimately merged.

I think cases of this type are largely the result of direct impression from the external : if so, their peculiar vividness and exactness in idea are accounted for. But I think, too, the fact that Miss A. knew Lady R. suggests strongly that there was some play of their personalities which determined the particular scene Miss A. had experience of : in some measure Miss A.'s vision was the result of association of ideas.

By gazing in the crystal the intuitive self and the impressions it receives, and is always receiving from the external, can be affected in no way. But by such gazing we may probably assume the percipient is rendered practically incapable of receiving impressions from the external through the normal organs of sense, so that his understanding is freed from the interference of such impressions, and thereby left more open to deal with impressions received otherwise than through the normal organs of sense. This may, perhaps, explain in some measure the *modus operandi* of crystal-gazing.

'We know that the sort of day dream which comes nearest to hallucinations is favoured by *repose* of the sense-organs ; that when we want to call up the vivid image of a scene, to make it as real—as sensorial—as possible, we close our eyes' (*Phantasms*, vol. i. p. 484).

Barrett suggests that crystal-gazing may constitute a form of incipient self-induced hypnotism (*Journal*, vol. iv. p. 83).

But still this offers no explanation of the fact that by crystal-gazing visual ideas emerge in the understanding of the percipient corresponding to particular details of the innumerable impressions received in intuition. I think we may hold that the ideas emerge as *visual* ideas because, by the very act of crystal-gazing, the percipient confines himself, ordinarily, to the abstraction in emergence of visual ideas. This, however, carries us very little further in explana-

tion, though I think we must refer this 'restriction in abstraction' to operation of the human personality of the percipient.

The ideas would appear to emerge in the percipient without any conscious action on the part of the percipient—they appear to be fully spontaneous. But I think, ordinarily, there must (for the particular ideas to emerge) be some subconscious operation of the understanding of the percipient if the affect is from the external, and not from some external personality.

Necessarily, if we have cases established where the impression is from some external personality, embodied or disembodied, the percipient must personally use his own understanding for the emergence of ideas, but the external personality must *direct* the particular use: we have cases akin to possession. I doubt, however, if any such cases are established as fully veridical as to the disembodied, though the evidence of such cases opens the possibility.

Myers states:—

'These "crystal visions" appear to run parallel to the whole range of visual hallucinations. Some of them closely resemble dreams; appearing to be mere modifications of past experience. Others, again, exhibit a supernormal revivification of past events—a *hypermnestic* character—on which we shall hereafter have to dwell. In other cases the vision seems to have a telepathic origin. In others, again, the crystal shows a message purporting to have come from a deceased person. In others, again, it shows scenes apparently depicting the remote past, or the future, and not clearly traceable to any individual intelligence. Nor can we at present discriminate by any difference in the characteristics of the vision itself what its origin or its meaning may be' (*Proceedings*, vol. vii. p. 318. Cf. *Proceedings*, vol. vii. p. 30).

Now—assuming for the moment that crystal-seers experience the various classes of vision referred to by Myers—we find that the greater part of what he states, as above set out, is explainable at once by the theory propounded. But still I think the seer *ought* to be able to determine to some extent the origin of his visions. There would appear to be, as yet, no recorded evidence as to this, but I think evidence might be forthcoming if the attention of crystal-gazers were directed to its record.

The experience of crystal-gazers would appear to have its origin in two different sources: (1) his storage of ideas of events of the past; (2) impressions received otherwise than through the normal organs of sense from the external or external personalities. And, I think, the seer may be conscious *in impression* of this distinction in origin.

Is it not possible that there is a difference in the effect on the human personality of the seer, when on the one hand affected by the external or external personalities and, on the other hand, by ideas recalled in memory or, as Myers says, by ideas which are 'mere

modifications of past experience' ? I should expect the effect on the crystal-gazer from impressions from the external or external personality to be exceptional in its nature while that from memory would be normal.

This distinction I think, as before pointed out, we find in dreams and waking visions, though the S.P.R. lays no stress on the fact.

That the distinction exists is supported by the evidence of Mrs. Verrall. But in giving the following record of what is stated by her, it must be borne in mind I do not suggest for a moment that she supports me personally in the explanation I have given to account for the distinction. Mrs. Verrall states :—

' I have, however, all my life had occasional vivid impressions in sleep, differing altogether from the ordinary dream into which familiar persons or objects enter in a more or less confused way. It has been my habit for the past fifteen or sixteen years to record these vivid dream-impressions immediately after their occurrence, distinguishing in particular a certain class of them as "what I call my real dreams." The chief characteristic which marks these "real" dreams is the sense of reality which accompanies them, and the durability of the impression left on waking ; the effect on waking is as though I had come from a world of reality into a world of appearance, and this effect often lasts through the whole of the following day, so that I have a curious sense through all my ordinary occupations of playing a "pretence game" while my real self is occupied somewhere else' (*Proceedings*, vol. xx. p. 148).

In the above statement we find, not only the distinction I have pointed out between dreams and dreams, but marked emphasis placed on the reality of 'real' dreams in distinction from the 'appearance' of ordinary waking life. And this points to support of my previous argument that, in sleep, freed from the limits of time and space, the subject may be conscious of 'dreams' in the manifold—such 'dreams' being, relatively, dreams of the intuitive self.

Our ordinary dreams or waking visions are the result of mere play of the imagination with our storage of ideas : they have no marked effect on us. But some dreams and waking visions have extraordinary effect on us. Many, very many of us, have had dreams and waking visions innumerable which pass and leave not a mark in memory behind. But some of us have had, too, waking or sleeping experience—possibly only once or twice in a lifetime—so exceptional in its nature, so far removed in its effect on us from ordinary visions that it is scored for life on memory ; may even have had such influence that it has changed the whole course of our lives. In most of the cases reported by the S.P.R., I think in a large majority, it will be found that the percipients speak of their experience as unique.

If such exceptional visions are really from the external or external personalities as distinct from visions resulting from the mere play

of imagination with stored ideas, this difference in effect is exactly what we should expect.

I believe, then, that if the attention of crystal-gazers were engaged, we should find from them like experience of like difference in effect.

The statement of Myers that 'we cannot at present discriminate by any difference in the characteristics of the vision itself what its origin is or its meaning may be,' is of great importance, when we consider time and space.

The seer, in the present, sees a vision in the present. And yet the seer has in many cases no human experience by which to determine whether the vision itself relates to the past, present, or future. To the seer, the idea of the vision is in present time; but the vision itself may be of 'events' which took place in a past, or which will take place in a future in relation to the *time* of the seer's ideas of the visions.

How can a personality conditioned in time have such human experience? If I am an objective thing objectively conditioned in time, I can by no possibility have human experience out of my own time.

But if I am an intuitive self I can have such experience, and such affection will have effect on me as a personality conditioned in time: the affection can only emerge in ideas in present time. A future event has no existence for me, as a human personality, and so cannot affect me in idea. But it does—we now assume—affect me. What, then, is the 'me' affected? A personality not conditioned in our time: an intuitive self.

Crystal visions which Myers refers to messages from the disembodied, and those depicting the future and not clearly referable to any earthly individual intelligence, are of great importance, but do not now require our consideration.

On the whole I would refer these cases of, as I term them, pure clairvoyance (and clairaudience) mainly to effects on the personality from the external as distinct from external personalities. But they still come under the general law of telepathy.

## AUTOMATIC WRITING

IN automatic writing I think there is often involved affection from the external as well as from external personalities, *i.e.* there is often involved what I term psychical travel of the writer. The subject of automatic writing must therefore—in part, not fully—be considered. Generally it may be said that, in spite of many admirably reported phenomena, the genesis of such writing is obscure.

Now in assuming that telepathy is a fact, I have largely relied on the weight of cumulative evidence in support of the fact: each individual case depends in some measure on the credibility of personal evidence, so that each link in this cumulative evidence is open to adverse criticism. Those who rely on the argument that a chain of evidence is no stronger than its weakest link will find, herein, an argument against the validity of my assumption. But I reply: When we find thousands of recorded cases which, if true, can be accounted for only by telepathy, then we may rely on these cases for proof from the weight of their cumulative evidence. For we cannot—in haste or at leisure—hold all men to be liars and utterly incapable of correct observation. I think, myself, as before said, that we must accept the great majority of the cases so closely examined by the S.P.R. before publication, as honest records of personal experience. So if, when we consider them collectively, we find they require the theory of telepathy for explanation, we are justified in assuming telepathy to be a fact. Remember that Kant, so far as he touched on it, held telepathy to be possible: he refused to consider it only because, in his time, there was no human experience in support of its truth. (Kant, however, if he did not fully accept, was influenced by certain of Swedenborg's experiences.)

But when we consider automatic writing we find *one* case, reported by Mrs. Verrall, which stands out clear from all other reported cases of psychical phenomena in the weight of the evidence available for its proof. I doubt if, in any court of law, evidence in support of a fact has ever been offered stronger than the direct and indirect evidence offered in proof of this case: it is possibly unique, in that it is supported so strongly by evidence of *undesigned coincidence*. And undesigned coincidence constitutes the strongest form of human evidence.

Before, however, I record this case, it is advisable to explain

how the automatic writing is produced by Mrs. Verrall. Referring to her second successful attempt on March 5th, 1901, she says:—

‘ On the second occasion, March 5th, at first the words presented themselves to me as wholes, but the sequence was unintelligible ; then I suddenly felt a strong impulse to change the position of the pencil, and to hold it between the thumb and first finger. Ever since an attack of writer’s cramp some sixteen years ago, I have held the pen or pencil between the first and second finger, and I had naturally held the pencil in the same way when trying to get automatic writing. Now, however, in obedience to the impulse, I took the pencil between the thumb and first finger, and after a few nonsense-words it wrote rapidly in Latin. I was writing in the dark and could not see what I wrote ; the words came to me as single things, and I was so much occupied in recording each as it came that I had not any general notion of what the meaning was. I could never remember the last ; it seemed to vanish completely as soon as I had written it. . . . The end of the impulse to write was often signalled by the drawing of a long line. After the first two or three times of writing I never read what had been written till the end, and though I continued to be aware of the particular word, or perhaps two words, that I was writing, I still retained no recollection of what I had just written, and no general notion as to the meaning of the whole’ (*Proceedings*, vol. xx. pp. 8, 10).

I think Mrs. Verrall’s explanation may be taken as applying to automatic writing generally. If so, it shows that, whatever interpretation we may place on automatic writing itself, such writing marks a most interesting phase of human experience. And for this reason:—

Let any one write consciously any succession of words (unknown to him at the time of writing) which, taken together, have a definite meaning. He will find it absolutely impossible to keep in abeyance the working of instinctive (unconscious) memory : he cannot help marking, not only the meaning of each word as written, but the consecutive meaning of the words taken together as recorded : his imagination will probably also be at work in guessing or approximating at, if not determining, the meaning of the words to be recorded.

But in automatic writing this operation of instinctive memory is, for the writer, in abeyance.

Again, in some cases but not in all, Mrs. Verrall before—not always immediately before—writing is conscious of an impulse to write. By the theory propounded this impulse cannot be separated from the after writing : it marks very possibly the impression on her of some real affect from the external or some external personality, manifest afterwards in the writing itself ; though, possibly, the writing itself may demand the continuance of the affect.

And that there is this real telepathic affect from the external or

some external personality is, I think, practically proved by the case referred to, which I now give verbatim (see *Proceedings*, vol. xx. p. 213):—

‘The next incident is of a very different type, being one of the most striking instances of a cross-correspondence that has occurred in my experience. On January 31st, 1902, I had been lunching with Mr. Piddington in town, and, after the arrival of Sir Oliver Lodge from Birmingham, was about to walk with them to the S.P.R. Council Meeting at 3 P.M., when I felt suddenly so strong a desire to write that I came down and made an excuse for not accompanying the gentlemen, saying I would drive later. As soon as they had started I wrote automatically in the dining-room the following words: *Panopticon σφαίρας ἀτιτάλλει συνδέγμα. τί οὐκ ἐδίδως; volatile ferrum—pro telo impinget.*

‘A few more words were added, when I was interrupted by Mr. Piddington, who had returned, in order to drive with me to the meeting. All the rest of the day I felt a wish to write, and finally in the train on the way home to Cambridge more script was produced. That script contained no verifiable statement, but was signed with two crosses, one of them being the Greek cross definitely stated elsewhere in the script to be the sign of Rector.

‘The curious opening words interested my husband, who saw them on February 1st, 1902, as well as myself, but we could not find any application for the Greek (or quasi-Greek), though the meaning is pretty clear. *Panopticon* is not a Greek word, and it is difficult to make out what it is supposed to mean, beyond saying that it contains the ideas of “universal” (πᾶν) and “seeing” (οπτικόν). It is noticeable that this word, apparently but not really Greek, is written in Roman letters, the genuine words next after it being written in Greek characters. The word *ἀτιτάλλει*, “tends, cherishes, fosters,” is not a common one, though it occurs in Homer, Theocritus, and Pindar; *συνδέγμα* is not an existing Greek word, but is legitimately formed as a noun from the verb *δέχομαι*, “I receive,” compounded with the preposition *σύν*, “with,” and means “joint-reception” or “common reception.” The whole sentence therefore seems to mean that some sort of universal seeing “of a sphere fosters the mystic joint-reception.”<sup>1</sup>

‘The next words mean “Why did you not give it?” The Latin words may be translated: “the flying iron—*ferrum* (iron) for *telum* (weapon)—will hit.”

‘The Latin words suggested the hurling of a spear, and on February 7th, 1902, after looking up some passages, I noted that *volatile ferrum* is used by Virgil for a spear. The more common phrase, *volatile telum*, which is used by Lucretius and Ovid for a

<sup>1</sup> Possibly the sentence may be read as meaning: ‘The allseeing of our universe (intuition) nurtures or supports and encourages (human) intercommunication. Cf. p. 342 of the same volume where *panopticon* and *sphaerae* are also used.

spear, is also applied by Ovid to an arrow. I, therefore, took this passage to refer to a "spear," described as "the winged iron"—to use Virgil's variant on the common phrase, *volatile telum*—and recorded this interpretation.

'So far for what happened in England. In Boston, as I subsequently learned, the following took place. At Mrs. Piper's sitting on January 28th, 1902, after the reference to my daughter's supposed vision, Dr. Hodgson suggested that the same "control" should try to impress my daughter in the course of the next week with a scene or object. The control assented. Dr. Hodgson said: "Can you try and make Helen see you holding a spear in your hand?" The control asked: "Why a sphere?" Dr. Hodgson repeated "spear," and the control accepted the suggestion, and said the experiment should be tried for a week. On February 4th, 1902, at the next sitting, and therefore at the very first opportunity, the control claimed to have been successful in making himself visible to Helen Verrall with a "sphear" (so spelt in the trance writing). The confusion between the "sphere" and "spear" of January 28th, seems to have been persistent, at least in the mind of the medium, and to have produced the combination "sphear."

'To the best of my knowledge my name had never been mentioned by Mrs. Piper since her return to America in 1889 till during the sittings that began in January 1902. The first intimation that my name or my daughter's had been mentioned by her reached me on February 8th, 1902, from Sir Oliver Lodge. On February 13th I received a letter from Dr. Hodgson, enclosing the report of the sitting of January 28th. The report of the sitting on February 4th reached me on February 18th. Thus no news at all of Mrs. Piper's sittings came to me till after February 7th, the day on which I recorded my impression that the Latin allusion in my script was to a spear; the Greek allusion to a sphere is beyond question. In no previous writing of mine had there been any allusion to a spear; the word "sphere" occurred once before in a very intelligible early writing on March 14th, 1901; there, too, in conjunction with the word "panopticon." In view of this it is perhaps worth noting that the suggestion of a sphere as the object to be shown came not from Dr. Hodgson but from the "control."

'To sum up then: on January 28th, 1902, during Mrs. Piper's trance, a suggestion was made that a spear or sphere should be shown to my daughter, and on February 4th the experiment with the "sphear" was said to have been made with success. On January 31st, between those dates, my script (as interpreted by me at the time) said that the seeing of a sphere effected a mysterious "co-reception," and associated this statement with a reference to a spear. It seems to me that, though the proposed experiment did not succeed in the way intended, there is strong reason for thinking that my script was in some way affected by it. The reader will note that the

connection between my script of January 31st and the Piper sittings is made perfectly clear by the signature of my script, which introduces Rector's Greek cross.'

The following arrangement perhaps helps to mark the sequence of dates :—

## STATEMENT IN PARALLEL COLUMNS

Mrs. P., Boston, U.S.A.	Mrs. V., England.
Jan. 28. 'Spear and Sphere suggested.'	..
..	..
..	..
..	Jan. 31. 'σφαίρας,' <i>volatile fer- rum.</i>
..	..
..	..
..	..
Feb. 4. 'Sphear' claimed.	..

When we consider the above case I think we find the facts are indisputable. Quite apart from the authority of Mrs. Verrall and Dr. Hodgson, we have the written record of what took place. And I submit confidently that if the case cannot be explained by 'chance' coincidence, then we are thrown back for explanation on the acceptance of some theory involving telepathy between the living or the intervention of some disembodied external personality, or the existence of timeless and spaceless relation between the external and human personalities which may be manifest in human ideas.

Consider the facts—that the message was received by Mrs. Verrall and not her daughter Helen, I ignore. If anything it strengthens the argument for psychical communication of some kind.

Rector—no matter who he may or may not be—assumed to be the control of Mrs. Piper operating in New York.

The message to Mrs. Verrall was taken by her to be marked as from Rector. So we have Mrs. Verrall's script earmarked as a reply to the message sent from Rector: we have the relation of the message despatched to the message received. In addition to this we have an implicit (it may almost be termed explicit) likeness between the message despatched and the message received, which cannot, I submit, be referred to chance coincidence.

But we have more than this: we have the almost irresistible evidence of undesigned coincidence.

In New York Dr. Hodgson said: 'Can you try and make Helen

(Miss Verrall) see you holding a spear in your hand ?' The control (Rector) asked : ' Why sphere ? ' Dr. Hodgson repeated ' spear,' and the control accepted the suggestion, and ' said the experiment should be tried for a week.'

There was undesigned confusion in New York as to whether the message to be despatched should relate to spear or sphere. Mark this, too : it was Mrs. Piper's control, Rector, who was to operate in transferring the message ; the message received was, I think we may assume, under the sign of Rector. And it was Rector in New York who gave rise to the undesigned confusion, and Rector afterwards confirmed this undesigned confusion by alleging that the message despatched and received related to *sphear* (sic).

In England the message was received, and the message *as received* involved the same undesigned confusion as to ' spear ' and ' sphere.' There was *undesigned coincidence* in the confusion of the message despatched and the message received.

Not only this : there was, as already stated, further confirmation of this undesigned coincidence. For, ' at the very first opportunity,' Mrs. Piper's control in New York claimed to have been successful in making himself visible with a ' sphear ' (so spelt in the trance writing).

Such undesigned coincidence constitutes, I think, the strongest evidence humanly attainable in support of the facts of any case.

There are many other cases recorded by Mrs. Verrall and others of automatic writing which offer valuable evidence in support of the contention that automatic writing is not always subjective, but does at times result from telepathic affects on the writer from the external and external personalities, otherwise than through the normal organs of sense.

We have then to consider such cases of automatic writing, and bring them within the definitions given of telepathy and its manifestation.

Consider, first, what takes place in other telepathic cases, both spontaneous and experimental, where automatic writing is not involved. I shall now use the term ' transference of ideas ' ; but it is always subject to the explanation of the term already given.

When any idea is telepathically transferred to a percipient, this transfer is complete before the percipient speaks or records in writing what his experience has been. His personal experience is exactly the same whether he does or does not speak of it, or record it in writing : his so speaking or writing has effect only in giving a record of his experience for the use of other people. That is, his speech or record forms no more than the evidence, available for the use of others, of his personal experience ; experience which was complete before the record of it.

Even if the experience runs with the writing, the writing is no

more than the record of the experience—unless the case be one to be explained by possession.

In so speaking or writing the percipient exercises an acquired art—he is not born with the power of speech or writing, he has acquired it. So in thus speaking or writing there is operation of his understanding: no art that a human being has acquired can ordinarily be exercised without some operation of the understanding.

The transfer of idea is the result of some affect *on* the percipient's understanding; it is from this affect that the idea emerges in his understanding. On this emergence the psychical phenomenon is complete. All he does by speech or writing is, by use of an acquired art, to record his psychical experience for the benefit of others.

There are two reputed cases of children (who had never acquired the art of writing) writing automatically. But the evidence, I think, is too weak for acceptance (*Proceedings*, vol. ix. pp. 122, 127). The evidence, however, for a case reported by Dr. Pickering (*Annals of Psychical Science*, vol. vii. p. 484), where an automatist, ignorant of the *Taal*, wrote automatically in that dialect, appears to me, perhaps, only to be accounted for by some theory of possession. Dr. Pickering has informed me, personally, of the facts of this case (cf. *Proceedings*, vol. ix. 118, 6, 18; *Proceedings*, vol. xv. p. 403).

I hold, then, that as writing is an acquired art, there is operation of the understanding of the percipient in all cases of automatic writing.

In the ordinary affairs of life, when any one writes he is conscious of the directive force of his understanding over his writing. But in cases of automatic writing we find that directive force can be exercised with apparent unconsciousness (see p. 200).

There is a large body of cases going to prove that in some cases of automatic writing there is this (relatively) unconscious operation of the understanding of the percipient. What may be termed the 'leading' case is from the Rev. P. N. R., consisting of a series of experiments with his wife (*Proceedings*, vol. iii. pp. 6 *et seq.*).

As to some of these experiments he says: 'We soon found that my wife was perfectly unable to follow the motion of the planchette. Often she only touched it with a single finger; but, even with all her fingers resting on the board, she never had the slightest idea of what words were being traced out. This is important to remember, in view of the fact that five or six questions were often asked consecutively without her being told of the subject that was being pursued' (p. 12).

The whole series of experiments is too long to be here given, but I think their perusal—with that of other recorded cases—proves this remarkable power in some of us to write without the conscious direction of the understanding. And yet the understanding *must* direct the writing especially if, as in some cases, the internal evidence of the writing itself discloses this operation of the understanding of

the percipient. So human experience would appear to support the contention that in all cases of automatic writing the understanding of the percipient is in operation.

Do we find, herein, evidence of human experience which is inexplicable by the theory of personality propounded, and the definition of telepathy incidentally arrived at? I think not.

In cases of telepathy, generally, the fact of the percipient's recording by speech or writing his psychical experience has not—as I have shown—anything to do with the psychical experience itself. When, then, the psychical experience is automatically and unconsciously recorded that also has nothing to do with the psychical experience itself. The automatic writing *itself* is not the psychical experience. The writing, whether effected consciously or unconsciously, is no more than a *record* of the psychical experience.

We thus reduce the magic of automatic writing to this:—

Human experience proves that certain human personalities can, by the apparently unconscious exercise of the acquired art of writing, record their personal experience. The magic lies in the apparently unconscious exercise of the acquired art.<sup>1</sup> Is this automatic exercise of the art of writing really unconscious?

I think in considering this question we can get firm ground to start on.

Consider cases of walking somnambulists—these are admitted by all as facts. The somnambulists are (apparently) unconscious; the exercise of their normal organs of sense is in apparent abeyance. And yet they put in operation their acquired art of walking—there is no case of a somnambulist who has never learnt to walk engaging in the act of walking. They can, indeed, use this art under circumstances which would prevent them from using it if normally awake, *i.e.* if their normal organs of sense were normally in action. For the human being, sleeping, can walk in safety where, waking, he would fear to tread.

Surely in such cases there is, in operation, the directive force of the understanding of the sleep-walker? (We cannot say that sleep increases the power of this directive force. What we must hold is that the art of walking is more surely exercised simply because—his normal organs of sense being inoperative—the sleeper is, by sleep, freed from the interference of the normal operation of his normal organs of sense, freedom which enables him the better to exercise his acquired art.)

But how are we to explain this exercise of an acquired art under the *unconscious* operation of the understanding? Let us, at the

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Journal*, vol. ii, pp. 127 *et seq.*, pp. 158 *et seq.*, pp. 234 *et seq.* Herein the student will find an interesting and warm discussion between Myers and Roden Noel on the meaning of memory and of unconsciousness in opposition to consciousness. The latter subject is perhaps more logically and certainly more dispassionately dealt with by Gurney. Cf. *Proceedings*, vol. v. pp. 232, 233.

outset, free ourselves from preconceived ideas as to the subliminal, subliminal selves or secondary or complex personalities.

The conscious exercise of the understanding means exercise which is referred to oneself as a human personality. This human personality is not a personality simply conscious of itself in relation to the present passing moment: it infers consciousness of self not only in the present, but in the past. For this full personality of consciousness there must be, in the present, relatively unconscious memory of the past. If you, the reader, are conscious of yourself only in the present passing moment, you have lost your personal identity; you don't know who you are: you fail to exercise unconscious memory, and so cannot relate yourself to your own past—your full personal consciousness is in abeyance. But still you know that you *do* exist. And, while you know that you do exist as a human personality, you can still exercise those arts of walking, speaking and writing which you acquired when fully conscious of your personal identity in relation to the external (cf. Part I. p. 100).

Now consider the automatic writer, and apply to him the above facts of human experience that we have for use.

The act of writing (like the act of walking) is an act inferring succession in time. Each movement of the pen and each recorded mark of the pen is in time, and is in succession to the previous movement or mark. The automatist is conscious of himself and of his use of an acquired art *in the present*. But he is not so conscious as to the past: his unconscious memory is (in this connection) in abeyance.

So, though his understanding is in fact directing his use of the acquired art, he is not fully conscious of what he is doing. We relate consciousness to a full consciousness in the present coupled with relatively unconscious memory of the past. This unconscious memory being in abeyance, the automatist is *relatively* unconscious of the operation of his understanding when writing.

Herein we find an explanation of the fact that the automatic writer is, relatively, unconscious of what he writes, while at the same time it is his understanding which is in operation for the writing: his unconsciousness is only unconsciousness *relatively* to his immediate normal human consciousness in the present. But, at the same time, the action of writing may be determined by his (relatively) unconscious memory. I use the words 'may be,' because sometimes the understanding of the writer would appear to be directed in action by an external personality.

There is a most interesting case reported in the *Proceedings*, vol. xxi. p. 352, which shows how the understanding of the automatic writer thus operates.

Mrs. Holland had been given, by Miss Johnson, a glove belonging to a deceased son of Mrs. Forbes, in order to see if she could obtain

any script relating to it. Mrs. Holland was under the impression that the glove belonged to Mr. Fielding of the S.P.R. She recorded certain script: but the script that she obtained referred to Mr. Fielding. (This script is otherwise of great interest, but I confine myself now to the question under consideration.)

How was it Mrs. Holland recorded certain facts relating to Mr. Fielding and conveyed to her telepathically? It was because she thought the glove given her belonged to him. But the glove did not belong to him, so no theory of psychometry can account for the fact. We must refer the recorded facts to her belief that the glove was a glove of Mr. Fielding.

Herein, we see the *directive* force of Mrs. Holland's understanding. And, too, what she recorded had nothing to do with Mr. Fielding himself or his ideas: there was no transference of ideas at all from any human personality; her record shows that she was affected only by the external—by the material environments of Mr. Fielding. We must hold, then, that the reason why particular ideas of Mr. Fielding's environments emerged in her was because her attention (understanding) was directed to Mr. Fielding.

It would take too long a time to go through in detail Miss Johnson's admirable paper on the automatic writing of Mrs. Holland reported in the *Proceedings*, vol. xxi. pp. 166 *et seq.* If, however, we bear in mind that, telepathically, we can be affected, not only by external personalities, but also by the external, we shall find the records of the varying scripts given much simplified.

Most of the recorded passages of automatic writing which are published by Miss Johnson can be divided into two classes. As to these the script must be referred to (1) mere vague wanderings of the imagination of the writer, or (2) the affect on the writer of telepathic impressions from some external personalities living or disembodied. But there are some of a class which, I think, cannot be so referred. These latter are passages which refer to distant scenes pure and simple.

For instance, Mrs. Holland's script of 15th March 1906 is to the following effect: 'A dining-room, narrow for its height, a long room. Dull red paper on the wall; brown wood dado or high wainscot. A great deal of brass about the fireplace. Table laid for a meal, bright fire. Something Egyptian in the room, or else ornaments of an Egyptian pattern. Lady in brown dress reading letter. Is it Mrs. V.? An elaborate coffee-making machine and a silver urn. Green handled knives. Honeycomb Indian tree-patterned china' (*Proceedings*, vol. xxi. p. 329).

Herein was contained a statement of ten differing facts. Eight of these facts were found to be closely coincident with eight facts of a room in the house of Mrs. Forbes where, at the time, Mrs. Verrall was not, but to which she shortly after went: (Mrs. Holland's script was recorded at 8.45 A.M., it was not till 5.30 P.M. of the

same day that Mrs. Verrall arrived at the house). We do not find here a coincidence; we find eight coincidences of eight different facts in the same event, and this is of vital importance as decreasing very greatly the probability of chance coincidence. The S.P.R. in considering the probability of chance coincidence, treat each psychical phenomenon as *one* fact, whereas, generally, more than one fact is involved. In doing this I think, as before stated, that the S.P.R. make the probability of chance-coincidence very much too great.

Now I deny that the above statement of Mrs. Holland can be explained by any direct transference of ideas from Mrs. Verrall to Mrs. Holland. (Mark especially the fact that a lady in a 'conspicuous' brown dress was in the house when Mrs. Holland wrote—a fact unknown to Mrs. Verrall.)

The script was the result of an affect on Mrs. Holland direct from the external—there was psychical travel of her personality. Doubtless Mrs. Holland recorded what she did record because she associated her exercise of the art of writing with the personality of Mrs. Verrall, and that is why those *particular* impressions of the external which related to Mrs. Verrall's possible environments emerged in her understanding in idea. I do not deny that Mrs. Verrall might have been thinking of the room, and that it was for this reason the idea of the room emerged in Mrs. Holland's understanding. But that shows no transference of ideas. Mrs. Verrall's thought in such case could have been only *directive*: it accounts only for the particular details of the external emerging in Mrs. Holland's understanding.

A great part of Mrs. Holland's—and, indeed, all automatic writers'—script must be referred to the vague wanderings or guessings of imagination. But I think such part is fairly separable, and that no little is left which cannot be so accounted for.

This 'veridical' part I would divide into two classes. The one to affects from external personalities living or disembodied: the other to affects direct from the external, but probably *determined by* external personalities.

This latter class comes under the head of Pure Clairvoyance. For, as before stated, the automatic writing is no more than a record, by the exercise of an acquired art, of a previous or accompanying psychical experience. And this psychical experience lies in psychical travel of the personality of the writer.

What is above stated holds also for cases involving what may be termed automatic speaking. For speaking is an acquired art. When, even, cases of multiplex personality are considered, it is often ignored that each personality which speaks or writes uses an art acquired by one and the same personality: there are, I think, no veridically established cases where A, who has acquired the art of speaking or writing in one language, assumes another personality

B, who speaks or writes freely in another language the art of which had never been acquired.

But, as I have stated, there may be some cases which cannot be accounted for by the above line of argument. These are cases where, as some allege, the information given by the recorded automatic writing is of such a nature that we cannot hold it to come from living external personalities or from the external of the writer. So we are thrown back on the theory that this information comes from the disembodied.

But the facts of such cases appear to me never to offer evidence which *in itself* imports the fact of communication from the disembodied: the facts are anthropomorphic facts. Direct intercourse between ourselves and the disembodied can, I hold, only be between them and us as intuitive selves, and so cannot be in idea.

So-termed instances of possession might be explained thus:—

The disembodied affect us as intuitive selves, and this is manifest to us as human personalities in ideas which result from the operation of our own understandings, where the disembodied direct or influence the operation through affection on our intuitive selves (cf. Part I. p. 64).

The evidence for the theory that the disembodied take direct possession of the understanding of the embodied and use it, appears to me weak.

## PART III

### WILL, DESIRE, AND VOLITION

WE have, as yet, considered only spontaneous cases of telepathy, that is, cases where human beings have not deliberately used telepathy as a means of communication, but where telepathic communication seems to 'crop up' more or less fortuitously. But now we must consider what may be termed 'experimental cases,' that is, cases where the particular psychical phenomena are the resultants of deliberative human conduct.

Spontaneous cases show that there is what may broadly be termed community of thought between human beings otherwise than through the normal organs of sense and, therefore, probably unconditioned by space and time. The possibility of this is referred to sensibility (which is passive), the active community of thought is referred to the intuition of the intuitive self, while the active communication in *human* thought is referred to impressions or ideas of the human understanding. From this it follows that if the intuitive self survive the dissolution of the body, there may still be some form of communication between the embodied and the disembodied; this communication might be even in ideas, if the disembodied have power to limit their thought in time and space.

But, so far, we have only considered this community of human thought in impressions and ideas, as spontaneous. Now we have, when turning to experimental cases, to consider 'a *power of the* (human) *mind* to place itself in community of thought with other men, however far distant they may be' (Kant, p. 164). This also infers community of thought otherwise than through the normal organs of sense.

So far, we have but considered a 'power (as a potentiality) of the mind.' Now we must consider the conscious deliberate *use* of this power by human personalities. We introduce a new factor: the conscious deliberate *use* of this power by mankind. And this, I think, introduces the new factors of Will, Desire and Volition; for, as yet, we have treated the manifestations of telepathy as practically involuntary, while now we shall treat them as the resultants of some voluntary exercise of power by human personalities.

I define Will as a faculty of the personality for conscious action, or as the potential of the personality to effect change in what is external to it, the personality. Desire is an inherent characteristic of all human personalities, it is that which moves the human personality to exercise its faculty, Will. Volition defines the conduct of the human personality where the exercise of its will is effective: that is, where something has resulted from the exercise of will. Volition marks some result of the exercise of will-power, the desire of the human personality having given rise to the particular use of the will.

But bear in mind how very restricted is the meaning I attach to Will, Desire, and Volition; for my limited goal is proof only of the existence of the intuitive self, which is a conditioned personality, though not conditioned in the series of conditions of our universe. So it is quite unnecessary to enter on any metaphysical disquisition as to the meaning of Will, Desire, and Volition in the ultimate: we have nothing to do with free-will, noumenal desire or volition. Practically, I keep at arm's length not only from the theories of metaphysicians later than Kant, but even from any close consideration of Kant's Dialectic. I rely for my proof on no Dialectic.

As already shown, I do not deal with any question of what is the ultimate personality of human beings or of the *Being* of God, of free-will or immortality. Just as the psychologist stops short at the human personality, so I stop short at the intuitive self. I take but one step beyond the psychologist,—I do not stop short at the human personality; the one step I take is to treat the human personality as but a partial and mediate manifestation in our universe of the intuitive self. This intuitive self is a condition, but, in relation to the human personality, it must be regarded as objective or noumenal.

It follows that we must refer Will to the intuitive self, and that *in relation to* the Will (as manifest) of the human personality, we must regard the Will of the intuitive self as Free-will. Desire and Volition have meaning only in relation to the human personality. It is true that as the Will of the intuitive self is manifest to us, so far as it can be manifest in our universe, there appears to us to be Desire and Volition in the intuitive self, but beyond this appearance we cannot proceed in thought.

From the definition of the human personality given it follows that its conduct must be mainly determined by the intuitive self: this is self-evident. The human personality as a material thing may move and breathe: may exist, passively, with the faculties of sight, hearing, and touch. It may operate instinctively; that is, free from the conscious direction of itself—even, possibly, of the personality itself. Barrett says: 'When any action becomes automatic and effortless, it ceases to create consciousness' (*Thoughts of a Modern Mystic*, p. 36). But where the use of these faculties

or of the potentiality of movement is deliberative we must, ultimately, refer the use to the directive force or influence of the intuitive self. For all thought of the human personality is but an abstraction from intuition: the self-apperception of the human personality is subjective to or phenomenal of that of the intuitive self, and so the 'conduct' of this being of self-apperception must be phenomenal of the conduct of its (relatively noumenal) intuitive self. The activity of thought has effect in operation through the activity of will.

For instance, we may compare our human personality to a shadow having more or less continuous existence. Such a shadow may well be imagined to have what appears to itself to be self-apperception and—from the continuum in memory of its passing experience—to determine its own actions. In fact, its volition is subject to the body that casts it: its will is subjective to the will of the body that casts it. Even we ourselves in our human experience must admit that what we term 'chance' has great, possibly absolute, command over our lines of life—I can see no reply to Clark Maxwell's fanciful theory of the unknown directive force of daemons.

Now when we consider Will, Desire, and Volition we find ourselves involved in questions that appear unanswerable. The theories extant are almost innumerable, and there may, perhaps, be some general confusion between the meanings of Will, Desire, and Volition, and their manifestations in relation to bodily state, or as determined by bodily (including mental) state. But, as already said, I think we need, for our present purpose, trouble very little about complicated metaphysical explanations of these questions: we need refer only to certain underlying principles as to which most if not all metaphysicians appear to be in agreement.

In the first place, Kant himself says that 'Will' is not cognition (Kant, p. 40). I think this means that Will in action is a directive force *on* the operations of the understandings in cognition: Will is distinguished from the human understanding. Even, in human experience, this distinction between Will in manifestation and understanding seems to hold, for we do not find that degrees of will-power are related in any way to degrees of intellectual capacity.

Again, when certain metaphysicians hold that Will, manifested, marks a limit of causality even in the material world, surely they treat it as a directive force *on* the understanding?

Leave out of consideration what Free-will in the ultimate means—all I want is some directive force *on* the human understanding. Then is it not a fact that man can use his understanding to affect causality? Are not the forces of nature used in particular ways in which they would never have been used but for the conduct of man? Do not (so termed) forms of life exist which would never have existed but for the conduct of man? (Darwin himself says that man does make his artificial breeds, and this because his selective

power is of such importance relatively to that of slight spontaneous variations. *Life and Letters of Charles Darwin*, vol. iii. p. 33). If this be so, then man has affected causality in his material universe.

Now admit—as I admit—that the human understanding is a subject of evolution in time and space. Can we by any possibility find in this subject of evolution activity in use of itself by itself? I think not: even in common parlance we say we *use* our understanding: we distinguish between ourselves and our understanding.

We are thrown back on the metaphysical point of view, that Will is distinct from cognition, and that it marks a limit (or power) over causality.

And this is all we now want. We may neglect any involved and profound reasoning as to Will, Desire or Volition, their relations *inter se* or to the ultimate. All we want is some directive force or influence acting on or affecting the human personality which cannot be referred to the human personality of understanding: something external to the understanding.

To what, then, are we to refer this activity in directive force or influence? <sup>1</sup> It is part of the personality of man: it is not part of the human personality of man as a subject of understanding. We must refer it to what Myers terms the subliminal in man: in my language to the intuitive self. (Cf. *Thoughts of a Modern Mystic*, pp. 36, 37. Kegan Paul & Co., 1909. Herein, I think, Massey refers 'Will' to the personality of man: he says the potential consciousness of the individual is 'contracted' for the particular earthly personality.)

In thus reasoning I assume, as before stated, in no way to touch the deeper problems of what is the ultimate in God, nature or man. The conception of an intuitive self which I offer may even be termed anthropomorphic. All I rely on is the admission by metaphysicians that Will is something distinct from understanding, but that it is still part of the personality of man. I do not even require any definition of what Will itself is. All required is its *manifestation to us* in our universe as a directive force or influence on the human understanding: something which is not the human understanding or the cognition of such understanding, but which affects such understanding and its cognition.

The reader, I again repeat, must bear in mind how restrictive is the meaning I give to Will, as manifested, and that I keep at arm's length from all questions touching the ultimate relations or distinctions between Will, Desire, and Volition.

The 'mind,' then, that we now consider is the mind of the intuitive self, not that of the human personality. And I find the power of the mind referred to, to be exercised through the Will of the intuitive self. Herein we find the directive force or influence of

<sup>1</sup> Though I am not under the necessity of going the whole way with Schopenhauer, the student will find his theory throws great light on what I now state.

the intuitive self on the human understanding. Bear in mind that Will is distinct from manifestations of Will in our universe.

We have already defined the human personality as a partial and mediate manifestation in time and space of the intuitive self. Now we find the directive force of the intuitive self on the human personality in Will, but the human personality can deal only with manifestations of Will in time and space. The Will of the human personality is a manifestation in our universe of the Will of the intuitive self. So, as we must hold that *in relation to* the human personality the intuitive self is immortal—that is, unaffected by the mortality of its phenomenal form of life—it follows that, *in relation to the human personality*, the intuitive self has Free-will. The human personality appears to itself to have Free-will: but this appearance is phenomenal only of the (relatively) noumenal Free-will of the intuitive self.

So far I proceed, but no farther: I attempt but to prove that, with the new fact of telepathy, we arrive at the fact of Will in the human personality which we are justified in treating as phenomenal of the Free-will of the intuitive self. The infinite prairie of thought where the plough of cognition cannot be used to cultivate, for human thought, the profound problems of God or Nature, Free-will or Immortality of man, I leave untouched.

## AGREEMENTS TO APPEAR AFTER DEATH

If there be a power of the mind to place itself in community of thought with other men, however distant they may be, it is not a power necessarily inferred in telepathy. For it might well be that telepathic communion in idea takes place between human beings at indeterminable times and under some law outside human control.

We have now very definite human experience that this power exists. Our possible exercise of the power is as yet rudimentary : but that has nothing to do with the existence of the power.

The existence of this power which, as I have said, is not necessarily inferred by the fact of telepathy, is of the greatest importance. It appears to me that the S.P.R. have not laid sufficient emphasis on the fact that proof of telepathy by no means infers proof of this power : it has even been treated as if it were a corollary from proof of telepathy. I think it is this power in man which makes the fact of telepathy interesting, for humanity in the concrete : without it the interest in telepathy would be merely abstract.

We shall find definite evidence of the power when we consider purely experimental cases. But there are also quasi-spontaneous cases, now first to be considered, which I hold can only be explained by admitting its existence.

The student will have in mind many spontaneous cases which point more or less definitely to the existence of this power. I deal now with a class of cases—cases of agreements to appear after death—because I think they are the strongest, in the nature of the evidence, of all quasi-spontaneous cases. They are, indeed, initiated by experiment, but they savour of the spontaneous.

I agree with what Gurney says as to these cases :—

‘ Considering what an extremely small number of persons make such a compact compared with those who do not, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that its existence has a certain efficacy ’ (*Phantasms*, vol. ii. p. 66).

The exact attunement between, let us say, the understandings of A and B, accounts in no way for telepathic transfer in idea between them : all it does is to make such transfer possible. Why the transfer takes place only occasionally between some particular A and some particular B remains as yet unaccounted for in any way.

All the reported cases turning on agreements to appear after death are cases where the percipient is physically on the spot. I

think (from the nature of the cases) there can be no reciprocal cases where the evidence of the agent psychically on the spot is also available.

But in all these cases the *causa causans* of the telepathic phenomena must, I think, be found in the personality of the agent. The percipient—because of the existing agreement—may be better prepared and more open to telepathic impression from the agent; he may be peculiarly susceptible to such influence: but I think there must be what I have termed psychical travel of the personality of the agent, whether or not still embodied.

But how is the personality of the agent involved: what personality is involved?

We have already considered all brain-wave theories and rejected them.

I think we are thrown back on the theory that the personality of the agent involved is a personality of intuition: if disembodied this must be so. More than this: these cases where the agent appears to the percipient in fulfilment of a previously made agreement to appear, show continuing personal command in him over his intuitive self. His intuitive self is a personality where *personal will* has still directive force. And I think we must hold the agent has power to determine his personality in time and space (cf. the argument on p. 178 *et seq.*, Part II.).

One of the most remarkable of the reported cases is the following:—

The percipient when at sea made a compact with two midshipmen, J. F. I. and T., that the man who died first should show himself to the others. Some time after the percipient saw T., and ‘he asked him if he was happy: to which the apparition replied by slowly swaying his head to and fro, with a sad expression, and a sound as of the clanking of chains accompanied the gesture.’

T. died at the time of the apparition.

Some considerable time after this first appearance the percipient saw the apparition of his other friend, J. F. I., and ‘asked him the same question as he did his friend T.; to which an exactly similar reply was made, *i.e.* by the slow swaying of the head, accompanied by a sound as of the clanking of chains.’

J. F. I. died at the time of the apparition (*Phantasms*, vol. ii. p. 489).

Here, as the percipient was on the spot, we find what we should expect: the appearances of the agents with no real appearance of the external except so far as to determine the personality of the agents, and the emergence of false or subjective ideas in the percipient. For the ideas of sadness and of the clanking of chains in *both* cases must be referred to the percipient, not the agents. Doubtless the percipient—a naval lieutenant who had suffered imprisonment as a prisoner of war—when impressed by the presence of the agents,

inferred their death and *personally* associated the idea of death with unhappy loss of liberty.

But the facts of the previous agreements and of the two distinct appearances to one percipient make it, following Gurney, difficult to resist the conclusion that the agreements had a certain efficacy.

In these two cases, though the appearances must be referred to Will on the part of the agents, we must, perhaps, assume also a peculiar or exceptional power of receptivity on the part of the percipient, as a human personality.

The probabilities against the *two* appearances to the agent coinciding by chance with the times of death are enormous (cf. *Phantasms*, vol. i. pp. 26, 31, 73, and 303 ; vol. ii. pp. 12, 653, where the theory of probability is mathematically and exhaustively dealt with, but where, as before stated, the probability of chance coincidence would appear to be taken as too large).

There is a very large number of reported cases where (even though there is no agreement to appear), we must refer the appearance to, or impression on, the percipient to the exercise of will on the part of the agent. Bear in mind that it is impossible this exercise of will should create the means of communication ; it can only use general and common means of communication already existing between the agent and percipient. We have already found this general and common means of communication in the communion (unconditioned in our time and space) between intuitive selves and between intuitive selves and the external.

These cases, I think, point strongly to the existence of an intuitive self where personal will has still directive force.

The following is a somewhat remarkable case—and, I think, certainly veridical—where the directive force of the agent was clearly a factor. I refer to it because it appears inexplicable by any theory of brain-waves, while explicable (granting the directive force of will in the agent) on the theory propounded :—

E. W. R. had made an agreement with a friend, Captain W., to appear after death. Her friend was in New Zealand, she, it is to be assumed, in England. One night, when awake, she saw the cloudy appearance of a man's head and shoulders, which she ultimately recognised as that of Captain W.

At the time of this appearance in England, Captain W., in New Zealand, had fallen off a coach, and was insensible for some time, and then, as he says, his head was not clear for a time (*Phantasms*, vol. i. p. 527).

The importance of this, and other like cases, lies in the fact that the agent was not at or near the time of death : an unexpected occurrence had rendered him simply insensible for a passing time. So any theories as to abnormal mental action, set up by the supreme crisis death, cannot be applied.

I think the fact of the appearance in England must most probably

be referred to the directive force of the personality of the agent in New Zealand : that is, to the will of the agent. But the opportunity for the appearance arose from the state of mental insensibility of the agent—the coincidence of the appearance in time with the state of insensibility in time justifies this conclusion.

Now any theory of brain-waves in explanation must be a material explanation. The disturbance in the material brain of the agent is supposed to cause a like disturbance in the material brain of the percipient, so that like ideas emerge, or, perhaps, the like material disturbance in each brain is supposed to constitute like (material ?) ideas. How, then, can mental insensibility in the agent be a condition for originating or setting free directive force in the material brain of the agent, so that he can impress a percipient at a distance ?

Push any such theory to its logical conclusion. It infers that the agent's human personality consists in conscious relation to the external, where the external must be considered as material. It is the working of the material brain of the agent in relation to the external that constitutes his human personality, his consciousness of self. Where the brain is not working in relation to the external, there is no self-apperception of a human personality. The agent, while the brain is not working in relation to the external, has no human personality on the spot, much less a human personality to transfer in impression to a distance.

Where then the agent is mentally insensible his human personality is in abeyance—practically non-existent—and any exercise of will or desire over the material working of the brain is impossible.

Any brain-wave theory, in fact, necessarily imports command by the agent over the working of his brain, for it is the motion of his brain which is assumed to set up the same motion in the brain of the percipient, so that the same ideas emerge in the percipient as those that have emerged in the agent. But we cannot imagine that loss of conscious relation to the working of the brain can give rise to action (through will) of the brain, manifesting itself by effect at a distance.

We are driven to separate the personality altogether from the material brain : we must regard the material brain as no more than a machine which the personality is ordinarily bound to labour at for ordinary purposes, and we must hold that separation of the personality from labour at the machine gives it an opportunity to enter on more pleasant, if less remunerative, extraordinary employment. When an accident happens to the machine the worker is never hurt—heaven's statute laws prevent injury in all such cases to the worker—and he can go away, anywhere he chooses over the wide world, for a holiday. But bear in mind that when he has gone on a holiday, other human beings can only know the fact, in idea, if he still have power to influence or direct the working of their brain machines ; that is, we must assume that the power of

will still exists actively in the intuitive self, in regard to other personalities.

These cases point very strongly not only to the reality of a personality of intuition, but to will and the power to exercise it in our universe as still existing in the intuitive self, when no longer manifest as a human personality. And, if they may be relied on, they show that telepathy can be used at will for the purpose of communion between personalities, that it can be used even for communication in idea between human personalities.

## EXPERIMENTAL CASES

I AGREE with Podmore that experimental cases constitute the strongest evidence we have towards proof of the fact of telepathy, and that a full consideration of the cases leads, practically, to proof of the fact.

But I think such cases are more open to suspicion of good faith than spontaneous cases. In spontaneous cases, the very weakness of, the lacunae in, the evidence points to good faith: in experimental cases, the very strength, the completeness of the evidence, may point to fraud. And in experimental cases there is far more opportunity for constructive fraud, in that fraudulent preparations are possible before the times of the experiments. All this would appear impossible in spontaneous cases. We must, too, never forget how easily our normal senses can be deceived.

In considering, then, the *internal* evidence of experimental cases, I find some that cannot be relied on. For instance, compare the experiments with Mr. Blackburn (*Proceedings*, vol. i. p. 78. I do not refer to those reported on p. 161, for, as to them, it is admitted that the possibility of signalling was not excluded. See p. 164), with those carried out by Malcolm Guthrie and James Birchall (*Proceedings*, vol. i. p. 263), and those of Sir Oliver Lodge (*Proceedings*, vol. ii. p. 189. Note especially the experiment reported on p. 196). I find nothing in the internal evidence of the latter which seriously weakens the weight of evidence in proof. But in the former, the internal evidence suggests—I do not say proves—fraud.

Many of Mr. Blackburn's experiments were with contact, which necessarily opens the possibility of fraud: where there was not contact, Mr. Blackburn probably (see p. 162, line 24) stood close to the percipient: contact, after a time, was renewed as 'the increased effort of concentration needed when there was no contact brought on neuralgia in B' (p. 80): all trials with Mr. Blackburn and the percipient in different rooms failed (p. 79).

Again, the thirty-seven experiments with the arrow in different positions are somewhat suspicious (p. 166. The forty-second experiment should evidently be recorded as a failure).

In these thirty-seven experiments with Mr. Blackburn, he succeeded every time (twenty) when the arrow was placed up or down: when it was placed horizontally (seventeen times) he succeeded only six times. This does not prove but opens the possibility that there

was signalling, in that the signalling of up or down might have been more easily and surely effected than that of right or left. It is also impossible to consider the full remarks of the experimenters as to signalling, without assuming they themselves were suspicious of fraud (pp. 164, 165). There was certainly a possibility of fraud.

When, however, we consider the other series of experiments, we are driven, I think, to assume there was no fraud unless the experimenters themselves were, therein, involved. And this possibility I reject. Nor can I find, practically, any possibility that the normal senses of the experimenters were deceived.

I have compared these experiments of Mr. Blackburn with others, because I have reason to believe Mr. Blackburn has since personally admitted he was guilty of fraudulent deception and, therefore, it is advisable to show that *his* experiments suggest, by internal evidence, that they were untrustworthy.

But though some of the numerous experiments made must be rejected, I fully agree, as already said, with Podmore that, on the whole, they present strong, perhaps the strongest possible evidence in support of the fact of telepathy.

I propose to examine certain various types of experimental cases with a view to determining, so far as is possible, whether they can be explained by the theory propounded. But, in the first place, one conclusion must be considered, which is established by the mere fact of telepathy being a subject of experiment.

In experimental cases the agent deliberately assumes the character of an agent as does the percipient the character of a percipient. The experiments so carried out sometimes fail and sometimes succeed. But the successes are of such a nature in relation to the failures that, as before said, we cannot refer them to chance: we are driven, I think, to the conclusion that telepathy, as a fact, is involved and is used as a means of communication.

It follows that, in these cases of success, telepathy has been used deliberately by the agents and percipients for communication in idea otherwise than through the normal organs of sense. So we find it is a fact that there is 'a power of the mind to place itself in community of thought with other men' at a distance, and otherwise than through the normal organs of sense. Whether this power be conditioned in any way by time and space, must be considered separately—*prima facie*, it is not so conditioned in our time and space, as the communication is otherwise than through the normal organs of sense.

It may be that these experiments are, as yet, but directed to the possible transfer of the simplest ideas. Nevertheless they prove that telepathy *can* be used at the will of man: what the future may hold we know not.

In this fact of the active use of telepathy by man, lies the real importance of experimental cases. For though I assume there is con-

tinuity between spontaneous and experimental cases (cf. *Phantasms of the Living*, vol. i. p. 171), we find that spontaneous cases do not necessarily prove anything more than a passive power in or attribute of man for communication otherwise than through the normal organs of sense, while experimental cases prove an active power in man; that is, power at personal will to communicate with one's fellows in idea otherwise than through the normal organs of sense. In theory I refer will itself to the intuitive self. We have, as human personalities, only the manifestation of this will in our universe to consider.

The number of experimental cases is very large. Let us consider, first, four different types of these cases—cases in which the ideas desired to be transferred are more or less simple, and where the agent is at no great distance from the percipient.

One type of these cases is where the agent or agents have before them some more or less common object and fix their gaze on it. (See, for example, the experiments of Malcolm Guthrie and James Birchall. *Proceedings*, vol. i. pp. 263 *et seq.* The experiments with the Creery family reported at p. 21 of the same volume cannot be relied on fully, as the children concerned were afterwards caught cheating (see *Proceedings*, vol. v. p. 269).

Another type is where some common or grotesque subject is drawn on paper, and the agent or agents fix their gaze on the design (see *Proceedings*, vol. v. pp. 55 *et seq.*; *Phantasms*, vol. ii. pp. 643 *et seq.*).

A third type is where the agent or agents taste something, or are the subjects of particular bodily feeling—generally unpleasant or even painful (*Zoist.*, vol. v. pp. 126, 140, 243, 307. *Proceedings*, vol. ii. pp. 2-5). These are cases of transfer of feeling or sensation in relation to a particular bodily affection.

A fourth and the most important type is where the agent or agents do not use their normal senses or bodily affections at all, but simply call up and fix their attention on a particular idea, arbitrarily chosen.

For instance, in the experiments of Malcolm Guthrie, above referred to, there will be found on pp. 270, 271-4, 278, 279, 281 instances where the agents merely *thought* of something, without having this something before their bodily eyes. And these experiments were, in part, fully successful. A good instance of cases of this type is the following:—

The agents drew roughly a tetrahedron. 'The percipient then said, "Is it another triangle?" No answer was given, but Professor Lodge silently passed round to the agents a scribbled message. "Think of a pyramid." The percipient then said, "I only see a triangle"—then hastily—"Pyramids of Egypt. No, I shan't do this." Asked to draw, she only drew a triangle' (*Phantasms*, vol. i. p. 50).

A somewhat striking instance also is reported at p. 120 of the *Proceedings*, vol. i. :—

‘ A mesmerist, well known to us, was requested by a lady to mesmerise her, in order to enable her to visit in spirit certain places of which he himself had no knowledge. He failed to produce this effect ; but found that he could lead her to describe places unknown to her but familiar to him. Thus on one occasion he enabled her to describe a particular room which she had never entered, but which she described in perfect conformity with his remembrance of it. It then occurred to him to imagine a large open umbrella as lying on a table on this room, whereupon the lady immediately exclaimed, “ I see a large open umbrella on the table.”

Let us first consider the agents in these four types of cases, neglecting the percipients.

As in all cases the *modus operandi* must be the same, I think the success of the experiments rests mainly on the agent’s having the idea which he wishes to transfer present in his mind, no matter whether the idea has been called up or not from his imagination : the fourth type is, as I have written, the most important.

But something else seems also involved : the agent must have his attention fixed on the idea he wishes to transfer. And, if this be so, there *may be* more chance of success when the agent has before him the thing of which he wishes to transfer the idea, for this may assist him to fix his attention on the idea.

But what does ‘ fixity of attention ’ mean ?

I suggest that it does not infer any general operation of the understanding : it infers, rather, the keeping the understanding in ‘ a state of inward blankness ’—an expression hereafter again referred to.

The agent by an operation of the understanding *chooses* the idea from his storage of ideas, or by imagination ‘ concocts ’ it from that storage. Having done this, he does not use the idea for any exercise of his understanding : he simply keeps it fixed in his mind. That is, having extracted an idea from his storage of intuition, he keeps the idea present to him, the agent, in present time and space.

As to the factors for success in such cases, Barrett writes to me : ‘ Certainly my view is that the agent after fixing his attention on the thing required . . . thenceforth must abandon all voluntary effort on his part. The *intention* must be there fixed in the agent’s mind, but his will and the conscious exercise of his mind or of his muscles must be in complete abeyance. In other words, the desire or intention must be formed and sustained, but not pass into a consciously directed exercise of that desire . . . there must be no intelligent and purposive exercise of the mind or of muscular action to carry out the intention.’ (The agent wishes to keep the particular idea fixed in his mind in present time, and it is through his

inherent characteristic of desire that he can so wish. It is through will-power that he is enabled to exercise his desire in the particular case and the exercise of the power itself marks volition on his part).

Now from the many experiments Barrett has been party to, his authority on this point is great. So we may fairly hold that that fixity of attention in the agent, which is a factor for success, does not infer any operation of the understanding. All it does is to keep *present in present time and space* the relation of the agent as a human personality to the particular idea. The agent does not really *think* the idea in any operation of the understanding: he simply keeps present in his understanding the particular idea to the exclusion of other ideas.

It follows that where the normal organs of sense are fixed, for instance, on a seen thing, this act of seeing, though not a necessary factor for successful transfer, still may have effect in assisting the agent to keep his understanding fixed in the present on the particular idea to the exclusion of other ideas. But I think, too, that the agent may more easily fix his attention on an imagined idea than on any ordinary idea of any ordinary thing. For an imagined idea may be less subject than an idea called up from ordinary human experience, to interference from other related ideas.

Since I wrote the above paragraph I have heard of a case—not yet reported—which supports the argument that an *imagined* idea may be thus easily transferred:—

Miss Ramsden, experimenting with Miss Miles in thought transference at a distance, imagined ‘a white pig with a long snout’; any such particular animal she had never seen. The experiment was one of the most successful made; the thought transference was exact.

But, in this case, others had seen the phantom of a pig with the peculiar characteristics, and had told Miss Ramsden of what they had seen, not long before the time when she tried her experiment with Miss Miles. This fact, probably, assisted Miss Ramsden to keep her attention fixed on ‘the white pig with a long snout,’ and so was a factor in success.

It may be, then, that the root of transfer, so far as the agent is concerned, lies in the fact that he fixes his attention on the idea he wants to transfer.

Now when the agents think of something in general—calls up, for instance, the idea of an orange, not of any particular orange—the idea in him is externalised in itself, but not externalised in reference to space in general. His idea is an idea ‘in his mind’s eye,’ and as he has only this floating idea to transfer, only the floating idea can be transferred (see p. 162 *et seq.*, Part II.). This agrees with what Gurney says as to the percipient, that he ‘never perceives the image as an actual sight or sound—there is never an external hallu-

ination' (*Phantasms*, vol. i. p. 536. Barrett writes to me that, so far as he can trust his memory, he agrees with Gurney). That is, the idea of the percipient has only its own externality, no externality in general. And so what is transferred is an idea *not* fully externalised.

But when the agent fixes his gaze on some more or less common object, or on some recorded design, his idea is fully externalised in space. Can he transfer this fully externalised idea? I think this is doubtful, probably impossible. Imagine, for instance, he is fixing his gaze on an orange. Then he has an externalised idea of an orange. This can be transferred. But he has also an idea of the particular orange fully externalised, that is, externalised in relation to space in general. This relation to space in general is, however, the direct result of direct impression through the agent's *normal* organs of sense, and the percipient does not receive any impressions at all through his normal organs of sense. This may explain why, even in such cases, no fully externalised idea is transferred. But as to such cases it must be borne in mind that the percipient may be affected in idea, not only by the agent as an external personality, but also by the external itself—by, for instance, an orange the agent's gaze is fixed on. In such a case the percipient might have (by clairvoyance) a fully externalised idea of the orange: possibly, as we shall hereafter see, this effect of the external is often to some degree a factor.

Where the agent's sense of taste or smell or touch is in question, the feeling of the agent is objectively affected. But clearly this objective affection is incapable of transfer. So, for transfer, the agent must affect the percipient in such a way that what objectively affects him, the agent, must in the same way, subjectively, affect the percipient. Imagine, for instance, that the agent tastes sugar: the taste may be said to be objective to the agent. The percipient has no sugar to taste, so in no way can the taste of sugar be said to be objective to him.

How, then, is the taste transferred?

It must necessarily be that the agent, whether as a personality or a human personality, must so affect the percipient that his understanding gives to him the idea of the taste of sugar. The affection must be that of an external personality (the agent) *on* the understanding of the percipient, which affection is of such a nature that it causes operation *of* the understanding of the percipient. For consciousness of the taste of sugar must, I hold, lie in cognition. The communion, then, for transfer of idea from the agent to the percipient does not lie in play of the understanding of the one on that of the other: for the idea emerges in the understanding of the percipient from some external affect *on* his understanding, and the 'root' of communication must lie in intuition, not in idea. The idea in the percipient is the effect of this affect.

And this leads to the supreme difficulty in accounting for experimental cases :—

Experience tells us that the agent may, from his storage of ideas, concoct an imaginative idea, fix his attention on it, and apparently transfer the idea to a percipient.

How does the transfer take place? If we can explain this we explain all cases of transfer, for I hold the *modus operandi* must be always the same.

Consider any particular case.

The agent fixes his attention on something in idea—no matter whether a thing of imagination or not. The agent, at a distance, thinks the same thing in idea, and records it as the *very idea* the agent wished to transfer.

Now experience tells us that all ideas successfully transferred telepathically from agents to percipients are anthropomorphic ideas. If we consider the pictures of scenery, of human beings, the records of language alleged to be revealed (for instance, from Mars), we find only anthropomorphic ideas—ideas possible to human experience or human imagination. When, then, an idea emerges in the understanding of any percipient, it cannot, in itself, give information to the percipient that it is the *very idea* the agent wished to transfer. There must be some affect *on* the understanding of the percipient which ‘earmarks’ the particular idea as the idea wanted. We shall find, too, hereafter that sometimes the percipient chooses the particular idea as the correct one from many ideas arising in his mind, and this choice—if justified by success—must result from the particular idea having effect on the percipient distinct from the effect on him of other ideas. This particular effect cannot be from the idea itself: it must be the result of some affect *on* the understanding of the percipient distinct from the idea itself in or of his understanding.

This affect (distinct from idea) I refer to the will of the agent (and, perhaps, the will of the percipient) accompanied by some attunement in operation of the understanding of both. So it is Will—the master of cognition—that determines the manifestation of telepathic communion in the cases under consideration. The percipient is affected psychically by the personality of the agent in relation to the fixed idea in the agent, and this affect takes place because the agent and percipient have agreed to carry out the experiment. I think mere Desire is no explanation of what takes place if success follow: there must be the exercise of Will on the part of the agent, and, at the least, no opposition of Will on the part of the percipient.

Bear in mind that when any agent and percipient agree to experiment, the fact of the agreement makes it more probable that the particular external of the agent should emerge in idea in the understanding of the percipient. In cases of alleged transfer of idea we

must distinguish between the ideas emerging in the percipient: some mark transfer of ideas from the agent, some from the external of the agent.

So far, then, as the agent is concerned we find that he can transfer an *imagined* idea—his looking at, touching or tasting an object only, possibly, assists the transfer. What is transferred is the idea, and this, *prima facie*, points to direct transference of ideas. But I assume to have shown that direct transference is impossible. So the transfer from the agent must take place by some affect *on* the understanding of the percipient which results in operation of his understanding in the emergence of an idea like to that of the agent. And it is Will which (moving from the agent) determines the choice by the percipient of the particular idea.

If we hold that the percipient is always, as an intuitive self, being affected by the external and external personalities, and that the agreement between the agent and percipient has such affect on them as human personalities that ideas can emerge in the understanding of the percipient determined by the ideas (and sometimes the particular external) of the agent, then, so far, we have an explanation of what takes place. For there can be no direct transfer of visual, auditory or tactile ideas: such ideas in the percipient must result from operation of his understanding set up by affects *on* his understanding. But the ideas of the percipient are active ideas of an active self and, so, must have intuition for their root. It is the agreement (entered into at will) between the agent and percipient which determines the particular ideas emerging in the percipient.

If we turn now to consider the percipients we find at once, as we should expect, evidence that the first affect on the percipient is marked in feeling (in impression), and that ideas emerge afterwards. It is advisable to repeat here a passage already given. Gurney says:—

‘The following passage from the close of Professor Lodge’s report has a special interest for us, confirming as it does the accounts which we had received from our former “subjects,” and the views above expressed as to the conditions of success or failure:—

“With regard to the feelings of the percipients when receiving an impression, they seem to have some sort of consciousness of the action of other minds on them; and once or twice, when not so conscious, have complained that there seemed to be ‘no power’ or anything acting, and that they not only received no impressions, but did not feel as if they were going to.”

‘I asked one of them what she felt when impressions were coming freely, and she said she felt a sort of thrill or influence’ (cf. what is written in the chapter on Feeling, p. 128, Part II. See *Phantasms*, vol. i. p. 50; *Proceedings*, vol. ii. p. 200).

This 'thrill or influence' marks the real affect in transfer: it is from this affect the ideas emerge. The 'thrill or influence' marks the affect *on* the understanding, the ideas emerge from operations of the understanding. Bear in mind that while we must hold this thrill or influence to manifest always a real and correct communion in intuition between the agent and percipient moving to the percipient, the ideas emerging in the percipient are *not* always those it was desired by the agent should be transferred: the percipient not seldom finds the emerging idea in him is not the same as that the agent willed to be transferred. I rely on the failures as well as on the successes.

Again, in most if not all cases, the percipient would appear to exercise *choice* in determining what is the idea intended to be transferred, and this strengthens the argument that the transfer takes place through some affect *on* the understanding of the percipient.

The following is a statement by a lady, a percipient in experimental cases, as to transfer of designs:—

'After about a minute there appears a circle, lit up as though by magnesium, in which are to be seen figures of more or less distinctness; sometimes there are so many of them that I do not know which to sketch. It has happened in unsuccessful cases (I cannot explain why) that having once seen the right figure, I have been deceived by others which have followed, and appeared with greater distinctness' (*Proceedings*, vol. v. p. 206).

Another percipient says:—

'Whenever I have been most successful, I have remarked that the picture has presented itself to my imagination almost instantaneously' (*Proceedings*, vol. v. p. 207).

There would appear in most, if not all, cases to be *possible* choice on the part of the percipient between differing ideas arising in the mind. But the choice of the particular idea, if successful, must depend on some affect on the understanding of the percipient which is external to the percipient's understanding. For, sometimes, a number of ideas arise in the percipient, and (neglecting chance) if the percipient choose the very idea intended to be transferred this cannot be from a difference in the idea itself from other ideas: the idea must be 'earmarked' extraneously. This earmarking I refer to Will when the affect on the percipient is not direct from the external (clairvoyant). The fact that there is greatest success when the picture has 'presented itself to the imagination' almost instantaneously supports this contention; for the 'instantaneousness' suggests (approximately) direct, uninterfered-with influence from the external personality in the emergence of ideas in the percipient.

Now bear in mind that in all cases of successful transfer the ideas in question are ideas which are already in the percipient's storage of ideas, or ideas which the percipient, by means of his imagination, can 'concoct' from his storage of ideas. In all the most extreme

of recorded cases where messages are alleged to have come down to earth from other spheres—even from the disembodied—we do not find one single original idea, foreign to human ideas based on human experience: there is no revelation of any kind. All the ideas alleged to be transferred can be referred to anthropomorphic ideas or the play of human imagination with anthropomorphic ideas. It appears to me to follow directly that where the percipient 'spots' a particular idea as the very idea intended to be transferred, the success *must* result from some external affect on the understanding of the percipient which 'earmarks' the particular idea as that required. It is this 'earmarking' which determines the success of the experiment, and I can only refer it to the play of Will between the agent and percipient. Even where the affect on the percipient is direct from the external of the agent (clairvoyance) we must hold this affect would not have emerged in idea if the agreement between the two had not been entered into.

I suggest, then, that the affect of the agent on the percipient where there is apparent transfer of ideas, operates as an affect on the storage of ideas of the percipient coupled, possibly, with some affect on his imagination, which affect results in the percipient's 'spotting' the particular idea from his storage of ideas, or from his 'concocting' the idea from his storage of ideas.

That, in cases of success, the idea emerges in the percipient from some affect external to his understanding, and not directly from any exercise of his own understanding, is supported by the following statements:—

'Whenever I have taken part in the experiments as percipient, I have endeavoured to expel from my mind all thoughts and images, and have remained inactive' (*Proceedings*, vol. v. p. 206).

'It occurs to me that the percipient should be in a partially dazed state' (by Professor Chattock, *Journal*, vol. viii. p. 303).

'And the percipient should be as passive as possible, make no effort to guess the word, but allow the perception to reveal itself through some involuntary action' (*Proceedings*, vol. xviii. p. 334, by Barrett).

'For from the descriptions which intelligent percipients have given, it would seem that the best condition is a sort of inward blankness, on which the image of the object, sometimes suddenly but often only gradually, takes shape. And this inward blankness is hard to ensure when the objects for choice are both few and known. For their images are then apt to importune the mind, and to lead to guessing; the little procession of them marches so readily across the mental stage that it is difficult to drive it off, and wait for a single image to present itself independently' (by Gurney, *Phantasms*, vol. i. p. 34).

I find in the Combined Index (1904) issued by the S.P.R. 249 references to cases where the percipients were children—children

perhaps form the largest particular class of successful percipients. And the normal exercise of the understanding is certainly less in children than in adults.

Now this state of 'inward blankness' means inactivity of the understanding. Inactivity of the percipient's understanding does not mean that the understanding, *per se*, is affected in any way: it means simply that the percipient is not consciously using it, and, too, the storage of ideas in the understanding remains the same whether the understanding be in conscious operation or not. And where the percipient is not consciously exercising his understanding the possibility of the external having effect on the understanding to determine the emergence of a particular idea in the understanding, is far greater than it is when he is consciously using it. Indeed, where the percipient is consciously exercising his understanding, it would appear that any successful result is highly improbable. Successful experimental cases would, then, appear to result from some telepathic affect *on* the understanding of the percipient resulting in operation of his understanding which is manifest in the emergence of particular ideas.

Bear in mind, too, the difference between the mental state of the agent and percipient, for success. The agent's state is one of 'blankness of mind,' *but* he keeps his attention fixed on the idea he wishes to transfer. The percipient's state is one also of 'blankness of mind,' *but* he keeps his attention fixed in no way on any idea: his mental state is one of pure passivity. It follows that, in a case of success, there is affect from the external on the understanding of the percipient, and that the emergence in his understanding of the correct idea results in some way from the fact that the agent's attention is fixed on the idea. If the transfer were from understanding to understanding, we should expect alertness in expectation of reception, not blankness of mind of the percipient to be a factor in success.

The theory that the personality of the agent 'takes possession' of the understanding of the percipient, and uses it to make the desired idea emerge, is attractive, and has been formulated for those cases where the agent is disembodied. But I cannot find satisfactory support for it in human experience. So, neglecting any such theory, let us try to determine what direct conclusions we can, by reasoning, arrive at with the facts already stated and assumed now to be trustworthy.

The agent, for success, does not use cognition, does not use his understanding. He fixes his attention on the one idea he wishes to transfer, that is, he marks *one* idea from his storage of ideas, and keeps it before him in the present time to the exclusion of all other ideas. When he uses his understanding he is using an idea or ideas in the present for relation to other ideas, to arrive at other (relative) ideas in cognition, from this action of the understanding. But in

the case considered, as he does not *use* the idea he has fixed on, for relation to other ideas, it is clear he does not use cognition: he keeps the exercise of his understanding in abeyance, except in so far as, by exercise of Will, he keeps the idea *present* in his understanding: that is, he makes the idea a present fact to him continuously in present passing time.

It follows that—as the Will of the agent as a personality to transfer an idea to the percipient has the greatest chance of success when he fixes his attention on the particular idea to the exclusion of other ideas, and keeps the general exercise of his understanding in abeyance—the exercise of the agent's will is quite distinct from his exercise of understanding (cf. Lawrie's *Synthetica*, Longmans, 1906, vol. i. p. 195. There is, herein, a most interesting treatment of 'will' as something pre-existent in itself, and yet, quâ the human subject, a thing of evolution).

(There is a fact of our ordinary human experience the importance of which is not sufficiently recognised—we can find no fixed relation between the human power of will and the human power of understanding. A man of even the most powerful intellect may be greatly wanting in will power, while the man of comparatively mean intellect may have will power in the highest degree. Some, indeed, hold that our leading public men are ordinarily men of 'second class' intellect, which, if true, points to the superiority of will over intellect. But, however this may be, the fact of there being no fixed relation between will and intellect suggests that the will of any personality cannot be part of the personality of intellect. And this supports the argument that Will must be referred ultimately to the intuitive self.)

If, on the other hand, we consider the percipient, we find that, for success, he also does not use cognition, does not exercise his understanding. Many ideas, it is true, may emerge in his understanding, and he may (under some affect from the agent) choose correctly a particular idea as the idea desired to be transferred. But, even in a case of choice by the percipient, we do not find ordinary exercise of the understanding—if the percipient *consciously* exercises choice, then he is using his understanding. And all such cases are followed by failure.

For success, the particular idea, if it be the idea the agent desires to transfer, is chosen or 'spotted' by the percipient because of *some affect external to himself without the normal exercise of his understanding*. It is not the normal exercise of his understanding which determines choice of the particular idea desired to be transferred: so far as the understanding of the percipient is concerned it is a *blind* choice.

That the above line of reasoning is correct is strengthened by the fact that an 'inward blankness' of the percipient's understanding gives the best state for success. This inward blankness means that

the normal exercise of the percipient's understanding is in abeyance, that is, that the exercise of the percipient's understanding militates against success.

Recall, now, the fact already held to be established, that the storage of ideas in the percipient is really (in relation to the percipient) a storage in intuition. This storage remains the same whether the understanding is or is not being exercised. Bear in mind, too, as already stated, that human experience points very strongly to the fact that ideas—as in dreams, waking or sleeping—can emerge in the mind without any active, normally conscious exercise of the understanding.

Now by no possible exercise, *per se*, of his understanding can the percipient determine the particular idea desired to be transferred: there must be affection from the external—from the agent. Therefore in a case of success the idea must emerge in the percipient's understanding from some affection on the percipient's storage of ideas: the agent's will determines the particular idea 'picked out' by the percipient or the particular idea 'concocted' by the percipient's imagination—except where the affect on the percipient is direct from the external.

There is, in fact, no transfer of idea at all.

The link between the agent and percipient is in sensibility: sensibility enables both (as intuitive selves) to be in communion in intuition. The agent fixes his attention on an idea which he has abstracted from his storage of intuition: this constitutes an affect from the external on all external personalities, including the percipient. But it is the agent and percipient only who, by preparation in which the will of both is probably involved, have placed themselves in such environments that the percipient may be conscious of the emergence in time of the desired idea. This points to there being *directive* force in the will of the agent moving to the percipient, and, perhaps, the same *directive* force of will in reception moving from the percipient to the agent. 'If this unconscious radiation and reaction is going on between mind and mind, then observed cases of telepathy would simply mean the awakening of consciousness to the fact in certain minds' (*Proceedings*, vol. xviii. p. 337, by Barrett).

But I still think that we must perhaps also assume some exceptional attunement between the understanding of the agent and that of the percipient, where success in transfer is marked.

I give now two peculiar cases where it is, possibly, doubtful how the percipient was impressed. The authority for them is strong:—

### 1

'The two agents being seated opposite one another, Professor Lodge placed between them a piece of paper on one side of which

was drawn a square, and on the other a cross. They thus had different objects to contemplate, and neither knew what the other was looking at; nor did the percipient know that anything unusual was being tried. There was no contact. Very soon the percipient said, "I see things moving about. . . . I seem to see two things. . . . I see first one up there and then one down there. . . . I don't know which to draw. . . . I can't see either distinctly." Professor Lodge said: "Well, anyhow, draw what you have seen." She took off the bandage and drew first a square, and then said, "Then there was the other thing as well . . . afterwards they seemed to go into one"—and she drew a cross inside the square from corner to corner, adding afterwards, "I don't know what made me put it inside" (Phantasms, vol. i. p. 50).

Sir Oliver Lodge informs me that the percipient did not know the experiment involved *two* agents.

## 2

'There is one point of novelty which is thus described by Mr. Guthrie: "We tried also the perception of *motion*, and found that the movements of objects could be discerned. The idea was suggested by an experiment tried with a card, which in order that all should see, I moved about, and was informed by the percipient that it was a card, but she could not tell which one because it seemed to be moving about. On a subsequent occasion, in order to test this perception of motion, I bought a toy monkey, which worked up and down on a stick by means of a string drawing the arms and legs together. The answer was: "I see red and yellow, and it is darker at one end than the other. It is like a flag moving about—it is moving . . . now it is opening and shutting like a pair of scissors!"' (Phantasms, vol. i. p. 37).

As to these two cases I would attach no great importance to the fact that in Sir Oliver Lodge's experiment two agents were involved. Where there are two agents the experiment only differs from an experiment in which there is one, in that the chances of success are less; for it is more difficult for two distinct ideas to be transferred than for one. The point of the particular case seems to lie in the fact that the percipient received separate impressions of the cross and the square, which shows that the agents affected the percipient separately, and that the percipient could not relate the two images she saw to one another *in space* (she says she did not know why she put the cross inside the square). So there was no transfer to her of ideas fully externalised in space. In this case, I attach no importance to the statement of the percipient that she saw 'things moving about': that simply was her expression for the fact that they were in 'her mind's eye.'

But the two experiments of Mr. Guthrie have exceptional interest

because they involved transfer of the idea of motion: the percipient externalised her ideas in motion (cf. *Journal*, vol. viii. p. 223, second paragraph—'twirling her umbrella').

Now I cannot understand a percipient having a transferred idea, which involves definite motion, unless the idea is related to space in general (time and space may be termed our aspect and regard of motion. See p. 34, Part I.). So in these two cases the ideas of the percipient were fully externalised.

What took place I suggest is as follows:—

The ideas emerged in the understanding of the percipient as already shown; but the agreement between the agent and percipient to carry out the experiment determined a mental state for the percipient rendering her more capable than she normally was of being affected *in idea* by the particular external of the agent. She was also affected by the moving card and monkey *directly* (clairvoyantly).

I suspect that in all cases where an agent and percipient enter on experiments for transfer of ideas, the mere fact of their so exercising will, determines a mental state for the percipient, whereby there is established a greater probability of his becoming conscious not only of the ideas desired to be transferred, but of the external in relation to the agent. There is evidence for this theory in the cases about to be given.

The cases we have as yet dealt with are of simple ideas, where the agents and percipients are comparatively near to one another.

But there are other cases where the agents and percipients are at considerable distances away from one another, which we will now consider.

In comparing these two classes of cases, it must be borne in mind that the former—where the agents and percipients are comparatively near—can be carried out far more easily and effectively than the latter, where considerable distances are involved. And this is true quite apart from any question of difficulties in the way of communication that may or may not arise from the fact of the percipients being at considerable distances from the agents.

Where the agent and percipient are in the same room, or near one another, a considerable number of experiments can be carried out in any given time: the fact that the two experimenters see and converse with one another at or not long before any particular experiment, must impress each with a strong present sense of the personality of the other, and tend to fixity of attention (on the part of both) on the experiment in question. And in such cases, the details and object of the experiment are arrived at with comparative ease.

Where the agent and percipient are at a considerable distance from one another, these factors for success are wanting.

So—quite apart from any question of distance—we might expect

that success would be more marked where the agent and percipient are near one another, than when they are at a distance. These facts make more remarkable than they would otherwise be the recorded cases that we have of thought-transfer at a distance.

There is a series of experiments between Clarissa Miles and Hermione Ramsden, reported in the *Proceedings S.P.R.* (vol. xxi. p. 60 *et seq.*), which is of great interest both from the precautions taken by the experimenters (under the direction of Barrett) against mistake or false play of the imagination, and from the variety of the experiments themselves, and their results. These may well be considered at some length.

The method of Miss Miles and Miss Ramsden was this :—

They fixed times for the experiments, and then ' Miss M. noted at the time of each experiment, in a book kept for the purpose, the idea or image which she wished to convey, while Miss R. wrote down each day the impressions that had come into her mind, and sent the record to Miss M. before knowing what she had attempted on her side ' (*Proceedings*, vol. xxi. p. 61, and *Journal S.P.R.*, vol. xii. p. 223).

So the relations established between the agent and percipient at the times of the experiments were these : The agent at the time of any experiment called up in her mind an idea, and at the same time willed that the percipient should call up the same idea ; the percipient at the time of any experiment tried to call up or permit to arise in her mind an idea like to the idea which (normally unknown to her, the percipient) the agent had called up in her mind : the percipient had ' blankness of mind.'

In each experiment the agent was at a considerable distance from the percipient.

## EXPERIMENT I

### *Miss Miles's written statement*

' I sat with my feet on the fender ; I thought of Sphinx ; I tried to visualise it. Spoke the word out loud. I could only picture it to myself quite small as seen from a distance—C. M.'

### *Miss Ramsden's written statement*

' I could not visualise, but seemed to feel that you were sitting with your feet on the fender in an arm-chair, in a loose black sort of tea-gown. The following words occurred to me :

1. Peter Evan or ' Eaven (Heaven)
2. Hour-glass (this seemed the chief idea).
3. Worcester deal box.
4. Daisy Millar.

- 5. × Arm socket or some word like it.
  - 6. × Suspension bridge.
  - 7. × Sophia Ridley.
  - 8. × *Soupirer* (in French) which I felt inclined to spell *souspirer*.
- 'There is some word with the letter S. I don't seem quite to have caught it.—H. R.'

At the time of this experiment Miss Miles was in London; Miss Ramsden in Buckinghamshire about twenty miles from London. The words marked with a cross indicate those which impressed Miss Ramsden as being especially vivid.

## EXPERIMENT VII.

*Miss Miles's written statement.*

'October 27th. Spectacles.—C. M.'

*Miss Ramsden's written statement.*

'Friday, October 27th, 7 P.M. Spectacles.

'This was the only idea that came to me after waiting a long time. I thought of "sense perception," but that only confirms the above. My mind was such a complete blank that I fell asleep and dreamt a foolish dream (but not about you). At 7.25 I woke with a start.—H. R.'

At the time of this experiment the agent and percipient were, apparently, still twenty miles apart.

These two experiments are well worth consideration together.

In the first the percipient 'saw' the agent sitting with her feet on the fender, and dressed in a loose black sort of tea-gown, as she, in fact, was sitting and was dressed.<sup>1</sup> This must be referred to an affect on the percipient from the external. But we have, at the same time, the fact that the percipient would probably not have been so impressed by the external in idea if the experiment had not taken place, though the experiment was not directed by the agent to any transfer of idea in relation to her position in space.

Eight ideas came to the percipient's mind. These were ideas she called up, or that were called up in the present from her storage of ideas.

Now mark that the correct word 'sphinx' was not 'picked out.' But four words impressed the percipient as especially likely to be correct, and if we consider these four words we find a dim likeness in them (in the letter S or the sound of the letter) to the word 'sphinx.' There is also in an hour-glass a slight resemblance to the form of the Sphinx, the idea of which the percipient said seemed the chief idea called up by her.

<sup>1</sup> Miss Miles, by a letter of 31st December 1909, says: 'I write to tell you that the description of the tea-gown was quite correct; it was a loose black one. I used to wear it constantly.'

The percipient, then, exercised *choice* (involving mental operation) in trying for success. But why did some words (dimly like to the correct word) affect her as probably the correct one or akin to the correct one? There must have been some affect *on*, not *personal exercise* of, her understanding, and this affect must have been from the agent as a personality: the affect was not of the same kind as that (from the external) which informed her, in idea, of how the agent was sitting. I think there could not possibly have been any direct transfer of the idea of Sphinx: the agent must have affected the percipient in some way which was not in idea. The percipient had, in human experience, a storage of myriads of ideas of which Sphinx was one. It seems to me that the affect of the agent on the percipient was in will (of the agent) that the percipient should 'pick out' the one idea. But, still, for this explanation we want, perhaps, some exceptional attunement of understanding between the two experimenters.

In the second case (the 7th experiment) the percipient 'seized' at once the very idea intended to be conveyed. In this case her mind was a 'complete blank,' the very condition, as before shown, best fitted for successful transfer.

And in this case we have the important statement by Miss Miles that: 'I thought of sense-perception, but that only confirms the above'—confirms, that is, her reliance on the word 'spectacles' as the word wanted.

Now there is an underlying likeness between the general term 'sense-perception' and the particular term 'spectacles': for spectacles are things made with reference to the particular sense-perception of sight. But, to you who read, the idea of sense-perception is no more likely to be related to spectacles than, for example, to an ear-trumpet. The percipient, however, in this case *did* relate her idea of spectacles to sense-perception as a general accompanying idea. This suggests, I think, that the impression on her was in some way greater than a mere direct impression in idea on her understanding, which emerged in her understanding as the particular idea of spectacles. If the idea of spectacles was transferred direct, the idea of sense-perception was subjective to the idea of spectacles, and in such case I do not understand how her idea of spectacles was confirmed to her as the wanted idea by the subjective idea of sense-perception.

Remember that what has been suggested as to attunement of understanding between the percipient and agent, only explains *how* the like idea can emerge in the percipient's understanding: it explains in no way why, when the idea has emerged, the percipient is conscious that it is the very idea desired to be transferred. If we grant that the percipient's mind was directly affected in idea by transfer from the agent's mind, I think we still want another factor to explain how it was that the percipient was conscious that the

idea in her mind was the particular idea willed to be transferred, and for this we must, I think, have some external affect on the percipient which is not in idea, but, as I suggest, in Will.

## EXPERIMENT VIII.

*Miss Miles's written statement*

'Sunset over Oratory. (The Brompton Oratory.)'

*Miss Ramsden's written statement*

'October 15th, 7 P.M.

'First it was the sun with rays and a face peering out of the rays. Then something went round and round like a wheel. Then the two seemed to belong together, and I thought of windmill. A windmill on a hill where it was dark and windy, and there were dark clouds. Then it became the crucifixion, and I saw the three crosses on the left side of the hill, and the face on the cross looked to the right, and it was dark. Wind and storm.

'Surely this is right. It is the most vivid impression I have ever had. I scarcely visualised at all, it was just the faintest indication possible, but the suggestion was *most vivid*.

*Miss Miles's note on Miss Ramsden's statement*

'I was painting Mr. M., and there was a beautiful sunset over the Oratory. Mr. M., who was so seated that he could watch it better than I could, walked to the window and drew my attention to it. His face became illuminated with the rays of the sun. It was a very windy, stormy evening, with weird orange lights in the sky. The sun sets to the left of the Oratory. From my window I see the central figure, and two sorts of uprights which look like figures in the dim twilight. These three objects show out dark against the sky to the left of the dome, on which there is a gold cross. All this I visualised the whole evening for Miss R. to see. At first I could not account for the windmill. I discovered a weathercock in the distance on the top of a building.'

The Oratory here referred to is the Brompton Oratory, of which a photograph is given in the *Proceedings*, which shows details imaginatively transferred to the percipient.

In this case the idea the agent wished to transfer was simply that of the Oratory. But what was transferred? The details of the percipient's vision were so many and marked so closely, if imaginatively, the details of the agent's environments that some real transfer seems certain.

I do not think we can refer Miss Ramsden's vision solely to an affect on her from Miss Miles: I think she must have been affected also by the external—in ordinary parlance she saw Miss Miles's environments by clairvoyance. But if this be so, the percipient

saw what she saw because the agent was there at the place, and because the two had arranged to make the particular experiment—a mental state for the percipient was determined whereby there was established a greater probability of her becoming conscious in idea, not only of the ideas desired to be transferred, but of the external in relation to the agent.

There are two series of these experiments—fifteen in each series; and if they be all considered I think we find strong evidence that the percipient was at times affected, not only by the ideas of the agent, but also by the particulars of her external also.

Miss Ramsden writes (p. 92):—

‘One fact which is rather puzzling is that the most vivid impressions are not always the most correct: and it has often happened that those which are the most surprisingly correct are some which were not *intentionally* transferred at all.’ Miss Ramsden then gives the four occasions which she has in mind.

An examination of the thirty cases shows, I think, that we may divide them into two classes: In the one the agent tried to impress the percipient with a particular idea, and, in the result, the percipient was so impressed that the idea intended to be transferred was transferred, or there was symbolic transfer. In the other class (though the agent might have been trying to impress the percipient with a particular idea) the percipient was impressed by the particular external of the agent, where the agent was *not* trying to impress the percipient with her particular external.

The four cases referred to by Miss Ramsden, I admit, present certain difficulties. But I think they can be brought under the second class.

These cases of the second class are explicable by (what I have termed) psychical travel on the part of Miss Ramsden (see p. 170, Part II.). I suggest that the rapport established between the agent and percipient had effect (outside the object of their agreement) in rendering it more probable that the particular external of Miss Miles should emerge in idea in Miss Ramsden.

The experiments of Mr. Kirk in thought-transference with Miss G. at a distance (*Journal*, vol. v. pp. 21, 111, 182) were not so fully successful as those above referred to. But they are of importance in showing that the first effects on Miss G. were in impression as distinct from idea. Indeed, in some cases the impression was strong, while the emerging ideas were but vague and not always correct.

Cases like to the above do not prove, but point to proof that thought-transference takes place unconditioned by space.

The following case supports the argument that there is general communion between the personality (the intuitive self) on the one hand, and external personalities and the external on the other,

unconditioned in our time and space. I give it at length—it is supported by other recorded cases. I cannot accept the theory that, in this or any other case, the agent *creates* the power of the percipient to see at a distance beyond normal sight; I think all he can be held to do is to so affect the percipient that what he ‘sees’ as a personality he is enabled to reduce into anthropomorphic ideas:—

‘In the year 1867 I was living in Odense, Denmark, and often received visits from two young gentlemen established in that town as photographers; they are brothers, the elder named Valdemar Block Suhr, the younger one Anton Suhr, sons of a famous landscape gardener, and nephews of the then favourite preacher, the Rev. Block Suhr, Helliggeistes Church, Copenhagen. Besides these, I often saw, as a visitor at my house, a young man named Valdemar Balle, who is now established as a lawyer in Copenhagen.

‘On several occasions I had hypnotised Mr. Balle. . . . One evening, when I had hypnotised Mr. Balle, and he was fast asleep in an easy-chair, the elder of the brothers Suhr requested me to try if Balle mentally could travel to Roskilde, a town in Seeland, distant about seventy-five or eighty English miles, sixteen of which are sea, and there see if Suhr’s mother was well. I consented to try, and told Balle to go to Roskilde. He at first was unwilling to do so; afterwards he said, “I am in Nyborg” (a town sixteen miles distant), “but I do not like to cross the water, it is so dark.” I told him not to mind, but to go on to Roskilde. Shortly after he said, “I am in Roskilde.” “Well, then, find Mrs. Suhr,” was my reply. The moment after he said that he was standing outside Mrs. Suhr’s abode. I asked him, in order to verify his correctness, “Where does she live?” He gave me the name of the street, and, if I remember rightly, said it was the corner house.

‘As I did not know Mrs. Suhr nor her address, I looked round at Mr. Suhr, my face expressing the question, “Is it correct?” but Suhr shook his head and made such gestures, as told me that the clairvoyant was mistaken. I then said to Balle that he was mistaken and should look again. He, however, in a rather indignant tone of voice, told me he was not mistaken, saying, “What! cannot I read? There, the name of the street is written, you can see it yourself.” I believe the name of the street was Skomagerstraede, but am not sure of this. I remember, however, that the two brothers Suhr both told me it was the wrong street. As the clairvoyant, however, seemed offended at my trying to correct him, I made no more remark to him about what we thought his mistake, but requested him to enter the house and see if Mrs. Suhr was well. He at first seemed unwilling, and made the excuse that the door was shut. I told him not to mind, but to go in all the same. “I am in,” was his next reply, and then I asked him, “How is Mrs. Suhr?” “She is in bed, not quite well; the illness, however, is of no moment; it is only a slight cold. She is thinking of Valdemar,

she will write him a letter, and there are three things she will write about." He then mentioned three things relating to business. What they were I have forgotten. I then woke him up, the brothers Suhr remarking that the information he had given was of no value, as there was a decided mistake in it, namely, with regard to their mother's address, as she did not live where Balle had said. I believe it was two days after when Valdemar Suhr received a letter from his mother, which proved that Mr. Balle had been in the right. Mrs. Suhr had, namely, removed to the house mentioned by Balle during the hypnotic state without her sons having any idea that she was going to do so. She had really had a slight cold, and she did write to her son, about the three matters mentioned by Balle, and, as I remember being told, nearly in the same words he had used.

Now I must mention that neither Mr. Balle nor I knew anything of Mrs. Suhr. We had never seen her; neither of us had ever been in the town of Roskilde, nor did we know the names of the streets there; therefore it seems to me there could be no telepathy in this case, as the clairvoyant could not read an address we had no idea about, nor would it be likely to come into his brain from any unconscious memory. In fact, I have looked into the case from all the points of view that I can, and it seems to me that the finding of the town and the address are pure clairvoyance, whereas from the moment the clairvoyant entered the room of Mrs. Suhr he seems to have become a thought-reader. (Signed) Carl Hansen, Hypnotiseur.' (*Proceedings S.P.R.*, vol. vii. p. 367.)

Dr. Alfred Backman gives a similar record of this case (see *L'Inconnu*, p. 479). The two brothers Suhr also give an account of the same experiment in the volume of the *Proceedings* above cited (see also the *Annals of Psychological Science*, vol. vii. p. 523).

In this case Mr. Balle was affected by the external, for he 'saw' where Mrs. Suhr was living, though no one in the room with him knew that what he stated was true to the fact. But Mr. Balle was affected also, to some degree, by an external personality.

For if Mr. Balle had not been hypnotised and directed by Mr. Hansen to 'go' to Mrs. Suhr's house, he would not have been thus affected by the external so that ideas from the affection emerged in him: Mr. Balle had nothing at all to do with determining what particular place he should 'go to'; that was decided by Mr. Hansen. Therefore we must hold that the success of the experiment depended in no way on the particular place chosen for Mr. Balle to 'go to': he might have been sent anywhere (neglecting, at present, distance as a factor) and the chances of success would have been the same.

If the above line of reasoning be held correct, it follows that Mr. Balle, hypnotised, was in such a state that under directions from the hypnotiser he might have been 'sent' anywhere, and that,

wherever sent, ideas relating to the place he was sent to might have emerged in his understanding.

(That hypnotism is not generally used for this purpose is not in point. What is in point is, that any human beings should be found who take interest in investigating the facts of hypnotism: this is the real difficulty. For humanity at large holds that men owe duty but to themselves, and so confines its respect and admiration to those who excel in wealth, power or rank: it offers but contempt to those cranks or imbeciles who, careless for earthly reward, live absorbed in the mysteries of nature.

When it is argued that *if* telepathy were a fact, *if* the strange phenomena of hypnotism were trustworthy, then we should find the abnormal human power involved manifested in general action, instead of having, as we have, but isolated instances of the power in action, this general contempt for the whole subject must never be forgotten. Of our forty-five millions of human beings, only a very very few have the courage and inclination to devote their lives to the investigation of such abnormal phenomena.)

It appears to me to be incredible that by hypnotism or any other means, the power of psychical travel, as exemplified in Mr. Balle's case, can be created or originated. By no human means can the intuitive self be affected: the affection can only be on the human understanding. If this power of psychical travel was not already latent in Mr. Balle, then Mr. Hansen, the hypnotist, by material movements of his hands or eyes, by material use of his understanding or otherwise, created this psychical power. I cannot contemplate the possibility of this, nor can I contemplate the possibility of hypnotism inducing any exaltation of faculty in the person hypnotised. Hypnotism can only affect the subject so that latent power in his understanding becomes patent in action.

Now I have already referred to the suggestion of Barrett, that 'if this unconscious radiation and reaction is going on between mind and mind, then observed cases of telepathy would simply mean the awakening of consciousness to the fact in certain minds' (*Proceedings S.P.R.*, vol. xviii. p. 337).

If we change this statement slightly, and expand it, so that it reads: If this unconscious action and reaction is always going on between personalities (intuitive selves) and between personalities and the external (in intuition through sensibility), then observed cases of telepathy, like to that under consideration, would simply mean the awakening of consciousness in the human personality to particular facts in idea of this general communion.

Herein we find Barrett's statement in accordance with the theory propounded, and we find an explanation of the case under consideration.

No psychic power of any kind was created or induced in Mr. Balle by the fact of his being hypnotised.

As an intuitive self he was already in a state of action and reaction in relation to external personalities and the external. All that was done by hypnotism was to so affect his understanding that ideas could emerge in it from the affections *on* it of this action and reaction—ideas which could not or would not have otherwise emerged. The affect of hypnotism was simply an affect on the environments of the understanding, and the possibility of this we can well accept. For by the theory propounded, the (humanly) unconscious action and reaction between personalities and the external above referred to is always taking place.

Cases like to the above tend to proof that thought-transference is unconditioned in space. They show, also, that a percipient is affected by the external as distinct from external personalities, though still, I think, affection from external personalities may also have effect in *directing* the emergence in idea of this affection from the external. (See, too, 'Experiments in Clairvoyance.' *Proceedings*, vol. vii. p. 199 *et seq.*, p. 364. Note on a visit to Kalmar by Myers, p. 370 of the same volume. Cf. 'On the Evidence for Clairvoyance,' by Mrs. Sidgwick, p. 30 *et seq.* of the same volume.)

My consideration of experimental cases is not, and is not intended to be, exhaustive. All attempted is to show that that continuity between spontaneous and experimental cases which we should expect does in fact exist, and that the definitions given of telepathy and its manifestation to us as human personalities hold good for experimental as for spontaneous cases.

Those who hold that our personality consists solely in our human personality, conditioned by the normal organs of sense, must reject the facts of telepathy as false. Those, even, who hold that our personality consists solely of our human personalities only partially conditioned by the normal organs of sense, must still hold that the human understanding conditions the human personality, and as play of human understanding on human understanding is not sufficient to account for the phenomena of telepathy, they also must reject the fact of telepathy. If the phenomena of telepathy are accepted as trustworthy, we are driven to conclude that personality transcends human personality.

Experimental cases prove that telepathy as manifest to us can be used by us *at will*: that is, we can communicate actively one with another in impressions and ideas otherwise than through the normal organs of sense. But close examination of even experimental cases shows that the *root* of transfer of impressions and ideas must be found in intuition: we must have that (relatively) unconscious radiation and reaction between mind and mind of which Barrett speaks, and this 'mind,' I hold, must be referred to the intuitive self.

We find, even from a consideration of experimental cases in telepathy, proof in human experience of the existence of the intuitive self.

## DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN NORMAL AND TELEPATHIC HUMAN EXPERIENCE

A WIDE distinction exists between our normal and our telepathic human experience : I think an explanation is to hand as to why this distinction exists.

When, as human personalities, we are in communication with other human possibilities or the external, the time during which we remain in communication in any particular case is largely subject to our own will, desire and volition, and there is, ordinarily, some more or less definite continuity in the time of the communication. We use our normal senses at will—look at objects, for example, for just as long or short a time as we choose.

But in spontaneous and in most experimental cases of telepathy the particular time of communication is not subject to the will of the percipient ; frequently there is no more than ‘ a flash,’ as it were, of idea in the percipient, as constituting communication with the external or external personalities : the *will* of the percipient in making the communications continuous in time would appear to be in abeyance. This is true also in some measure for human experience during sleep. (In hypnosis, however, there is a remarkable distinction which is hereinafter considered.)

For instance, A is present at the deathbed of his brother. At his own will he can remain there as long as he likes and watch what takes place in time continuously. But when A in England has telepathic communication of the death of his brother in, for example, Australia, then the communication ordinarily consists of no more than a passing ‘ flash ’ of idea of what is taking place : A would appear to have no power by will to make his ideas of what is taking place continuous in time.

In certain dreams, and especially in cases of hypnotism, it is true there would appear to be greater continuity in time than in the normal waking state in the telepathic communication. But in dreams the will of the percipient would still appear largely in abeyance, and in cases of hypnotism the will of the hypnotiser rather than that of the percipient would appear to determine the continuity of the telepathic experience.

In normal cases we can explain at once why we can fix the time during which, in any particular instance, we remain in communication with the external or external personalities : we communicate

through our normal organs of sense, and the *use* of our normal organs of sense is largely under our personal control.

But in telepathic communication the personal use, *direct*, of our normal senses is in abeyance; for the communication is otherwise than through our normal organs of sense. So we cannot personally determine the time of telepathic communication by the use of our normal organs of sense.

Now when we are in communication through our normal senses, we must, for continuance in time of the communication, not only keep our understanding in operation, but must fix our attention on the particular communication. For instance, A by the deathbed of his brother must, for continuance in time of his experience of what is taking place, keep his understanding in operation in fixity of attention on what is going on—if his mind ‘wander’ he is not fully conscious of what is going on in relation to the deathbed scene.

But for telepathic communication to emerge in ideas of the understanding of the percipient, he must keep the operation of his understanding in abeyance, and must not fix his attention on *anything*. This from human experience we know to be the case. So, in these abnormal cases, we find the means ordinarily taken to keep the communication continuous in time are the very means which, for successful communication, must *not* be taken.

It seems to me, then, that what we should, in theory, expect is: telepathic communication ordinarily takes place in discontinuous ‘flashes’ of time, and is likely to be ‘mixed up’ in the human consciousness of the percipient with normal communications or normal ideas of the understanding. And this would appear to be supported by human experience. For telepathic communications only find their chance of emerging in ideas in the percipient when his ‘mind is a blank’; and I think, ordinarily, this state of mind is exceptional and discontinuous. We must bear in mind also that ‘there is a tendency to repel the intrusion of any ideas unrelated to our usual habits of thought.’ (By Barrett. *Proceedings*, vol. xviii. p. 330.)

This, perhaps, explains the rarity of telepathic communications in idea, and the shortness of time during which they are experienced. For instance, in spontaneous cases of telepathy, that which is outside the field of the normal senses is ordinarily ‘seen’ or ‘heard’ for a short, passing time (during a *lacuna* in normal experience through the normal senses), and often exists only in an *impression* which, when emerging in idea, is ‘mixed up’ with normal ideas (perhaps of imagination) from the normal operation of the understanding.

But, as this power in man to communicate otherwise than through the normal organs of sense is, I assume, a fact, it would appear that it should be capable of expansion by some form of self education. And this form should apparently be in developing capability for

mental abstraction from the influence of the external of our universe through the normal senses.

Now there always have existed and always exist certain individuals who allege they have, or have developed in themselves, this power to communicate telepathetically in continuity of time. And the form of self-education which they say has led to the development of the power, is the very form they should adopt for success which we have arrived at by the above line of reasoning: they allege that they have gained this power by self-education in personal abstraction from the things of this world. But I doubt if the evidence these individuals offer to prove their power is sufficiently strong for our acceptance—I neither reject nor accept it. All I draw attention to is that the power is potential in man, and that if these individuals can use the power as they allege, then their declared form of self-education is, by theory, the right form.

When we consider human beings in the state of sleep, we find that their power of will or volition over the operation of their understanding is largely in abeyance—there is no fixity of attention. In this state the understanding operates with its storage of ideas, and there being no *will* direction in fixity of attention, we find, ordinarily, dreams of more or less grotesque imagination or vague ‘concoctions’ free from the normal connection of cause and effect.

But we find, also, that as there is no fixity of attention and no normal influence of will over the operation of the understanding, the state of sleep is one favourable for telepathic communications to emerge in idea in the sleeper. And, I think, human experience points to the fact that telepathic communications do so emerge in idea more often in the sleeping than in the waking state.

But there is difficulty in the *evidence* as to telepathic dreams. For the dream must be remembered to be evidential. This is why such importance is attached to what are termed waking dreams. For all dreams as subjects of memory are in time, and, should the dreamer wake immediately after the dream, the chances of his remembering it are far greater than if it be a dream followed by a period of sleep, during which other (veridical or non-veridical) dreams will probably have been experienced.

In hypnosis, however, we find that the subject can receive and record continuously in time the ideas emerging in him from affects received otherwise than through the normal organs of sense. In such cases the hypnotiser (who is still receiving affects through his normal organs of sense) seems to have power to enable the subject to fix his attention. This question is considered later on (see p. 253).

All I attempt to show now is that the distinction which exists between normal experience as continuous in time, and telepathic experience, as ordinarily fragmentary and wanting in continuity in time, is a distinction which, by theory, we should expect to exist.

## SLEEP AND HYPNOSIS

ASSUMING it to be proved (1) that the human personality is a partial and mediate manifestation in time and space of an intuitive self; (2) that sensibility opens the possibility to the human personality of being affected otherwise than through the normal organs of sense; (3) that the human personality has *practically* a full storage of all its past human experience, then, I think, we may arrive more or less closely at certain conclusions as to what Sleep and Hypnosis are, and how the one is related to the other.

Now by no change of state of the subject in time and space can the intuitive self be affected: shadows (phenomena) are affected by, cannot affect the (relatively) real which casts the shadows. So neither hypnotism nor sleep—I do not consider alleged cases of possession—can affect the intuitive self. What must be affected is the understanding or its environments.

But I refer the understanding of each one of us to his material brain, and this brain exists materially as it *does* exist, so its faculty of operating cannot be psychically increased. Its environments, however, may be so affected that certain powers of operation normally latent may be rendered patent, and thus apparent exaltation of faculty result.

The affect of hypnotism, therefore, is not on the understanding, but on the environments of the understanding. The question of how far the will of the hypnotiser and of the hypnotised are involved in hypnotic phenomena is considered later on (see pp. 257 *et seq.*, pp. 268 *et seq.*).

First, consider the state of sleep.

In sleep the human personality still exists. The difference between the sleeping and waking state lies in this: Waking, the relation between the human personality and the external through the normal organs of sense is, normally, in active operation: sleeping, this relation is to a great extent in abeyance. Probably there is a full waking state in which this relation to the external is fully active, and a full sleeping state in which it is completely in abeyance, while, between these limits, there are intermediate stages of partial waking and sleeping where this relation to the external varies from full activity to complete abeyance (cf. *Hypnotism*, by Moll, pp. 176 *et seq.*).

But, sleeping or waking, the human personality *has still its storage of ideas for use.*

It is when waking that the human personality is impressed with the existence of the external as material. For it is through impressions received through the normal organs of sense that the personality has an idea of the material; and it is not sight or hearing but touch which gives us impressions resulting in ideas of the material: for the material is motion, and its resistance results from motion resisting motion. Matter (following G. H. Lewes) exists in human experience from physical feeling or touch, or the idea of matter results from what is felt or touched. Impressions received otherwise than through the normal organs of sense do not, *per se*, give any idea of the material. When the human personality, waking, uses in the present its storage of ideas, these ideas are referred to the immaterial, for they are compared with passing ideas through the normal senses which give the idea of the material in contradiction.

When, however, the human personality, sleeping, uses in the present its storage of ideas, these ideas may suggest the material; for, impressions from the external through the normal organs of sense being in abeyance, the human personality has no standard of contradiction by which to determine such ideas as immaterial: the understanding in sleep may, from analogy to past waking human experience, relate to the material that which affects it (subjectively) in sight, hearing or touch.

Thus, in sleep, there may be to the human personality an apparent reality *in the material* when the human personality is only using its storage of ideas. This accounts for the material vividness or reality of dreams which is so often experienced.

A case reported in the *Proceedings*, vol. xii. p. 197, though inexplicable at first thought, is thus simply explained. It is an experiment in hypnotism, but I show hereafter how like the state of hypnosis is to that of sleep.

Dr. J. Milne Bramwell hypnotised a patient and made her see by suggestion a hallucinatory cat. 'She was always delighted with the imaginary animal, and evinced great pleasure in playing with it.' But when she was in an apparently waking state, and he successfully suggested a similar hallucination, she did not like it at all, she said, 'I see that cat, but I know it is not a real one; I know it is only an imaginary one which you have made me see. I don't like this. I don't mind seeing the cat now, because I know you have done it as an experiment and will blot it out again. But if I commence to see cats when I am by myself, I shall be horribly frightened.'

In the former instance—as in sleep—her normal senses being in abeyance, she treated the cat she saw as materially real, and so was pleased. In the latter she had conscious ideas of the material for relation to passing experience, and so *knew* what she saw was hallucinatory.

We have, then, this important distinction. In the waking state we are always, through our normal organs of sense, faced by the

material: in the sleeping state the material is, ordinarily, absent, though at the same time we may, in the sleeping state, be impressed by our dreams as material from the continuing influence on us of our past human experience in waking.

In the sleeping state we can, ordinarily, only determine what dreams have taken place to a very limited extent: we, as human personalities, know what we have dreamt only so far as we remember our dreams on awaking.

No continuous scientific experiments have ever, so far as I know, been carried out where the attempt has been to bring the normal sleeper into relation with some external personality; so that, by communication from the sleeper, some external personality may be made aware of how the understanding of the sleeper is working in sleep. The casual experiments that have been made show, however, that, in sleep, the understanding is ordinarily still working; for the sleeper, still sleeping, may for instance, be made to converse with external personalities.

Thus we have very little human evidence as to the experience of the sleeper during sleep, and from this results the vague and unsatisfactory nature of the various scientific theories as to what the state of sleep is.

But we have certain facts to go on in trying to determine what this state is. One fact is that when sleeping the relation between the sleeper and the external from impressions through the normal organs of sense is very largely in abeyance. This means that the brain, in sleep, is relieved from certain waking labour, and so in sleep we should expect to find lessened physiological action of the brain as a material centre. This expectation we find is correct—it brings us to our second fact, that during sleep there is this lessened physiological action.

‘Sleep is a normal condition of the body, occurring periodically, in which there is a greater or less degree of unconsciousness due to inactivity of the nervous system, and more especially of the brain and spinal cord.’

‘It may therefore be considered certain that during sleep there is an anaemia or partial bloodless condition of the brain, and that the blood is drawn off to other organs, whilst at the same time this anaemic condition may be modified by changes in the circulation or in the respiratory mechanism caused by position, by sensory impressions, or by sudden changes in the state of repose of the muscles’ (*Ency. Brit.*, vol. xxii. p. 156, 9th ed.).

Myers, referring to an hysterical patient brought by Dr. Babinski from the Salpêtrière, and hypnotised by him, says: ‘Well, she was kept for an hour in the trance—a time far more than sufficient to neutralise any attempt at fraudulent retention of breath—and the products of her expiration for that hour were measured. It was found that, as compared with the normal state, the ventila-

tion of the lungs had diminished in about the proportion of seven to two, and the generation of carbonic acid in about the proportion of nine to five. The reality of the somatic change was thus amply established' (*Journal S.P.R.*, vol. iii. p. 100).

This hypnotic change is like to a sleep-change and not only supports what is stated in the previous two extracts, but suggests that in the hypnotic state there is, as in the sleeping state, lessened physiological action of the brain.

Now sleep can have no effect on the intuitive self. But in sleep we find what is ordinarily termed exaltation of faculty—the sleeper may solve mathematical problems or have poetic or literary ideas impossible, apparently, to him in the waking state. It is true that in such cases what the sleeper has done has been recorded by him, as, otherwise, we should have no evidence of what he has done; and, therefore, though asleep, he has still remained to some degree in relation to the external through his normal organs of sense (cf. *Hypnotism* by Moll, p. 181). But, even so, it is impossible to suppose that the state of sleep creates higher physiological action of the brain—the material constitution of the brain is the same in sleep as in waking.

It may be that in sleep (and hypnosis) exaltation of faculty results from an inhibition of great tracts of the brain and nervous system so that, though on the whole the physiological action is lessened, there is increased activity in certain small tracts on which the action is centred. But I think that—when we consider experimental facts—it is more probable that the understanding, in sleep or hypnosis, being relieved from normal operation in regard to passing ideas received through the normal organs of sense, can deal more directly and efficiently not only with ideas resulting from affects received otherwise than through the normal organs of sense, but with its storage of ideas resulting from past human experience. There is lessened physiological action, but as the field of operation in general is restricted, the output in the restricted field is greater. The reported facts appear to be in favour of the latter theory—the monoideism (or fixity of attention of the hypnotised on some particular) of the hypnotised is, I think, determined not by the *state* of hypnotism, but by suggestion moving from the hypnotiser.

Sleep, therefore, is not an affection of the understanding but of the environments of the understanding; an affection which, under certain circumstances, enables the understanding to operate more freely and correctly. Sleep has effect only in so affecting or changing the environments of the understanding, that the understanding is enabled to exercise power that otherwise would not be exercised: there is freeing rather than exaltation of faculty. Sleep, we know, releases the understanding from the disturbing influence of impressions from the external received through the normal

organs of sense. This, apparently, constitutes a change in the environments of the brain which enables it to accomplish that which it could not otherwise have accomplished.

Now ordinary dreams (that is, the ideas of a sleeper) result from the play of imagination (and in some measure, perhaps, from the will or desire of the sleeper) with his storage of ideas. In sleep, the sleeper may—like a colt set free—kick up his heels in dreams of fantastic, incoherent imaginings; but he may also indulge in more or less coherent dreams running connectedly and successively in time—the understanding is still at work, and at work relieved from the incubus of commonplace impressions from the external through the normal organs of sense. Dreams also may be in the manifold, though, *in after memory*, they are always conditioned in time, in succession.

But though, from the weakness of human memory, we have no great amount of evidence of what the sleeper experiences, still the evidence we have is in its nature strong. And this evidence justifies us in holding that the 'stuff' of dreams does not always consist of the sleeper's storage of ideas. This 'stuff' sometimes consists of impressions received otherwise than through the normal organs of sleep.

For we know now that the human personality receives impressions from the external and external personalities not only through the normal organs of sense, but otherwise than through those normal organs. And, in sleep, it is only impressions received through the normal organs of sense which are in abeyance: those received otherwise than through the normal organs of sense are *still received in sleep*. No reason can be alleged for holding that the state of sleep inhibits the reception of these impressions. Whether they emerge fully in ideas is another question, but the probability is that they do.

By the theory propounded, then, it is possible that during the state of sleep impressions received otherwise than through the normal organs of sleep may emerge consciously in ideas; and, as the subject is in the state of sleep, these ideas will emerge as dreams.

The human evidence that we have proves that these ideas do at times emerge consciously in sleep.

It is clear that as, in sleep, the disturbing influence of impressions received through the normal organs of sense is in abeyance, ideas emerging consciously in the sleeper from impressions received otherwise than through the normal organs of sense have a better chance, than in the waking state, of emerging truly and correctly, that is, as true and correct phenomenal interpretations of intuition.

Dreams then may result from: (1) mere fantastic or more or less coherent successive imaginings resulting from the sleeper's 'play' with his storage of ideas (external stimuli may also cause dreams); (2) ideas emerging in the sleeper from impressions from the external

and external personalities received otherwise than through the normal organs of sense; (3) mixed ideas resulting partly from (1) and partly from (2).

Secondly, consider the state of hypnosis.

The sleeping state is a normal state; the hypnotic state may be termed an abnormal state in that the former results from physiological necessity, while the latter, as I shall argue, results from the deliberate action of human will or directive force. I neglect, at present, the question of from whom the will or directive force moves.

The hypnotic state is, in some measure, the same as that of the sleeping state, in that its distinguishing feature from the normal waking state lies in the abeyance of impressions received from the external through the normal organs of sense. (Bernheim holds that there is close similarity between natural and artificial sleep, *Proceedings*, vol. xii. p. 217. And in this Dr. M'Dougall agrees, *Brain*, vol. xxxi. p. 244. Liébault, Brullard, Forêt and Vires consider hypnosis to be an ordinary sleep. Cf. *Hypnotism* by Moll, p. 176.)

But there is a wide distinction between the two states quâ the evidence available in proof of what the subject experiences in the sleeping or hypnotic state. (I have before laid stress on the distinction between a fact in itself and the evidence in support of the truth of a fact.)

In cases of sleep we have to depend for proof of what the sleeper has experienced in sleep on the sleeper's own evidence. And the existence or non-existence of this evidence depends on the degree of the sleeper's use of memory. We can have no more evidence than that of the witness *after the event*. All available evidence is subject to a certain infirmity.

But in cases of hypnosis we have available the evidence of the subject hypnotised at the passing time of his experience—at the time itself of the events.

Herein lies the important distinction in the evidence available as to the two states.

We have indubitable human evidence that the subject hypnotised can, when in the hypnotic state, communicate to a determined external personality what he, the subject, is experiencing. Let us, at present, take this fact for granted, without entering on the question of why the fact exists. Let us, too, for the present, leave out of consideration a marvellous power which in certain cases seems to arise in the hypnotic subject of command over his mental and bodily state.

With this assumption and these exceptions, I think we can determine somewhat closely what the hypnotic state is in likeness to and distinction from that of sleep.

The state of hypnotism is akin to that of sleep, in that in both states the percipient is largely freed from the affects of the external from impressions received through the normal organs of sense:

there is in both states that 'blankness of mind' which, we have already seen, is advisable for success in both spontaneous and experimental cases of telepathy—that is, for success in the emergence of ideas in the percipient from impressions received otherwise than through the normal organs of sense.

In both states we find the like apparent exaltation of faculty to be sometimes exhibited.

And, in both these states, though the reception of impressions through the normal organs of sense is ordinarily in abeyance, the reception of impressions otherwise than through the normal organs of sense is not in abeyance—this reception is the same as in the waking state. For, it seems to me, the *mechanical* effect of both sleep and hypnosis is only in inhibiting normal functioning of or through the normal organs of sense, and so in lowering generally the physiological action of the brain.

When, however, we turn to consider the evidence available as to the experience of the percipients in these two states, we find a great difference.

In the first place, whatever the experience of the percipient may be in either state, we can have no evidence at all unless the impressions on the percipient have emerged consciously in idea, and, for evidence of the emerging ideas, we must have the recorded statements of the percipient.

In cases of sleep this evidence can only be the statement of the percipient after the event: in cases of hypnosis this evidence of the percipient is evidence of the event at the time of the passing of the event.

If we bear in mind the important fact that the human personality is affected by the external otherwise than through the normal organs of sense, we have an explanation to hand of the varying stages of sleep and hypnosis. These stages depend on the degree to which the subject is *relieved* from the affects of the external on him through his normal organs of sense. The deeper, the more complete the state of sleep or hypnosis, the more fully can the subject's understanding function with affects received otherwise than through the normal organs of sense. Thus the deeper the stage of sleep or hypnosis the more possible become the abnormal phenomena of sleep or hypnotism. And these abnormal phenomena are manifest in hypnosis and (ordinarily) not in sleep, because in hypnosis they can be manifest in human evidence whereas, in sleep, such evidence is ordinarily wanting. Probably in the deepest sleep the subject is in fullest communion with the external and external personalities otherwise than through the normal organs of sense. But seldom, if ever, can the subject *record* such sleeping experience: evidence of it is ordinarily wanting. In cases, however, even of the deepest hypnosis, human experience proves, I think, that this evidence can be attained.

## RAPPORT

WHEN writing of collective cases Gurney says: 'I have spoken often, throughout the book, of a *rapport* between the parties concerned in a psychical transference—meaning by the word simply some pre-existing psychical approximation which conditions the transfer' (*Phantasms*, vol. ii. p. 265).

Gurney offers a theory worthy of consideration as to the meaning of *rapport* in relation to collective cases. But I would suggest that psychical travel of the agent (really the theory of Myers) offers the best explanation. For instance, A is the agent, while B, a brother of A, and C, a stranger to A, are the collective percipients. Now it may be that the presence of B determines A's psychical travel to the spot where B and C are. But, by the theory, A's psychical presence on the spot may result in the emergence of ideas of or in relation to his presence on the spot, in B or C, or in B and C. It is the *will* of A which has determined his psychical presence on the spot. His presence being so determined other factors come into action in determining whether or not ideas of the presence shall emerge in B or C, or in B and C.

These factors may involve 'similarity of immediate mental occupation' or 'common environments,' or may be referred to the influence of local conditions as Gurney suggests. But I think the most important factor must be the abnormal (?) capacity of B or C or both for the emergence in their understanding of ideas from impressions received otherwise than through the normal organs of sense. In what this capacity (?) lies, we are, I think, ignorant: it may lie in the physical or in the psychical, or be related to both.

My reason, however, for considering *rapport* separately is that, at first thought, it may appear there is a wide distinction between the two states of sleep and hypnosis, in that in the former there would appear to be no direct *rapport* between the sleeper and any particular external personality, whereas such *rapport* would appear to be a common feature in cases of hypnotism.

On examination I think this distinction will be found wanting, or, at least, not so definite as it, at first thought, appears.

Consider the large number of cases of certain spontaneous veridical dreams, that is, of cases where ideas emerge in the dreamer from impressions from external personalities otherwise than through the normal organs of sense.

Now why any dream should be of or related to some particular person we, very possibly, do not know. But I think we must assume there exists some reason for the particular impressions emerging consciously in idea. And, if so, we must assume some action on the part of the personality of the person dreamt of, or on the part of the personality of the dreamer (cf. the very ingenious theory submitted in the *Journal S.P.R.*, vol. iii. pp. 109 *et seq.* Herein Mr. Downing has to introduce the factor *directive force* from the agent. He finds it in the theory that *will is belief*. M'Dougall says that belief is the essence of suggestion. I would prefer to say that belief, in the present connection, consists in a dominant idea (possibly transferred from a hypnotiser) which for the time determines the judgment of the human personality. Cf. *Hypnotism* by Moll, pp. 172, 173).

In the former case will or directive force on the part of the agent must in some way be involved: in the latter case we must, I think, hold that the percipient himself (by exercise of will?) determines the emergence in his understanding of ideas of the particular external. But in this latter case I think the will of the agent may be involved also.

The distinction, then, as to rapport in cases of hypnosis and sleep would appear to lie in this:—

In cases of sleep the dreamer may be affected by an external personality without any predetermination of who the external personality shall be, while in cases of hypnosis the external personality who affects the percipient is (or may be) predetermined. If we term the dreamer the percipient we find that in the dreams in question *some* agent is probably always involved. The distinction of cases of hypnosis from dreams is simply that in them the agent is predetermined by will or directive force.

In cases of hypnosis, therefore, we find that by will or directive force the environments of the understanding of the person hypnotised can be so affected that particular ideas emerge consciously in him from particular impressions received otherwise than through the normal organs of sense which, otherwise, would not have emerged—these ideas emerge from the directive force of the agent who is predetermined. In sleep such ideas may also so emerge, and now an agent is also involved; but the agent is indeterminate. We may, perhaps, hold generally that spontaneous cases differ from experimental cases only in that in the former the agents are indeterminate, in the latter determinate. And, if this be so, we find that in *all* cases considered, both of sleep and hypnosis, there is rapport—in the former indeterminate, in the latter determinate as to the agent.

Certain dreams prove each of us to be in communication with his fellows otherwise than through the normal organs of sense: hypnosis proves that this communication *can be used by us at will*;

that is, by means of hypnosis, a subject may be so affected that he can communicate with external determined subjects, otherwise than through the normal organs of sense, and manifest the communication in idea. Dreams prove the fact of a passive power : hypnosis (like experimental cases generally) proves the possibility of the use by us of this power.

The magic then, so far, of hypnosis lies in this :—

One who has the power to hypnotise can, at personal will (probably the will of the patient is also, as I shall argue, involved), put his patient into a state akin to sleep, that is, a state where the patient is largely (possibly altogether) freed from normal affects on him through his normal organs of sense of the external and external personalities. But, in neither sleep nor hypnosis, is the patient freed from the normal affects otherwise than through his normal organs of sense of the external and external personalities.

In sleep the patient may find ideas emerging in his understanding from indeterminate personalities—we cannot always say why, of the innumerable impressions received, those only from certain personalities so affect the understanding of the sleeper that they cause ideas to emerge in him.

In hypnosis, however, the hypnotiser himself can largely determine what impressions shall emerge in idea in the understanding of his patient. The hypnotiser creates no power in the patient ; he simply deals with his impressions and directs certain of them into conscious emergence in idea. ('The operator directs the condition upon which hypnotic phenomena depend, but does not create it.' By Myers, *Proceedings*, vol. xii. p. 225.)

What is above written may, at first thought, seem to suggest that I hold the will or directive force of the hypnotised to be in abeyance and replaced by the will or directive force of the hypnotiser :—

'Braid held that the operator acted like an engineer, and called into action the forces in the patient's own organism, and controlled and directed them in accordance with the laws which governed the action of the mind upon the body' (*Proceedings*, vol. xii. p. 139).

I doubt if Braid went so far as this : I certainly do not. I hold that the will or directive force of the hypnotised must still be in command over the operations of his understanding : the will or directive force of the hypnotiser has affect only in influencing the hypnotised *how* to exercise his own will or directive force, in manifestation in the material universe. The limits of this influence must be very large—in some cases the will or directive force of the hypnotiser will (apparently) have almost full effect where the will or directive force of the hypnotised is weak : in others it must (apparently) almost wholly fail in effect where the will or directive force of the hypnotised is in opposition and is comparatively strong. But more probably the limits of this influence lie, not between the relative

strength and weakness of the wills of the hypnotiser and hypnotised, but between their relative agreement and disagreement in will.

Braid himself says 'that the Almighty would never have delegated to man such a dangerous influence over his fellow man as to have given him such irresistible power over his volition. . . . While under the hypnotic influence, the patients evince great docility, but there is, however, such a state of the perceptive faculties and judgment that they will be quite as fastidious of correct conduct as when in the natural state' (*Proceedings*, vol. xii. p. 149). I think this means that the will or directive force of the hypnotised over the operations of his understanding is always, in some degree, in action (cf. *Hypnotism* by Moll (1909), p. 149, where it is stated that it would be a great mistake to think of the subject as an automaton without a will).

Consider the following instance:—

A boy in his normal state is told that if he pick up a sovereign lying on the floor before him it shall be his. He picks it up. How does he pick it up? By the exercise of will or directive force he uses his understanding to so move his body that he picks up the coin.

Again he is hypnotised and told to pick up a sovereign lying on the ground before him, when it shall be his. But he is told at the same time by his hypnotiser that he cannot pick it up. And, though he tries, he cannot move his body to take up the coin.

Why does he fail thus? His will and his sense of the possibility of the action proposed are still in force (see *Proceedings*, vol. i. p. 253; vol. ii. p. 287). He fails because by his will (still in force) he cannot use his understanding to so direct the movements of his body that he picks up the coin. Then what is the influence of the hypnotiser over him?

The hypnotiser has so affected the boy that he cannot use his understanding as he wishes to use it in so directing the movements of his body that he may pick up the coin. To what must we refer this affect?

Now the hypnotiser might, by heroic mechanical means, so affect the boy that he could not pick up the coin—might destroy his sight or sever some nerve. So it is possible the hypnotiser has affect in directly inhibiting the movements necessary to pick up the coin. Or, it may be, he influences the will or directive force of the boy so that he cannot use his understanding as he wishes to.

A consideration of the authorities on this point leads me rather to conclude that the influence of the hypnotiser lies in this: He causes an idea to emerge in the present in the patient that the act in question is impossible on his part. As this idea is not one simply in the storage of the patient, but is called up in his understanding *in the present*, through the directive force of an external personality, it may have dominating influence. If the idea of impossibility emerges *in the present* in the patient's understanding, then, as I

hold, the act in question is impossible on his part (cf. *Journal*, vol. v. p. 152 : 'Negative Hallucinations'). The experiment recorded on p. 175 of Moll's *Hypnotism* is a definite instance of the dominating influence on the subject of an idea of the impossible suggested by the hypnotiser. This idea *in the present* determined the operation of the subject's understanding.

We have already found that an agent can transfer to a percipient an imagined idea—a *fortiori* a hypnotiser can transfer an imagined idea to his patient. So we can understand the possibility of the transfer by the hypnotiser of an idea of the impossibility of a particular action (or even thought) on the part of the patient.

For (except as to automatic action) a condition precedent to the performance of any act by any one, even in the normal state, is an idea in him of the possibility (by himself) of the action. A child well acquainted with its lesson, and yet silent in the presence of unaccustomed examiners; or a woman, physically able to cross a plank, unable to step on it when laid across water, is said to be obsessed by fear: the will to speak or move is still in action. If either felt certainty of success there would be no fear—it is really an idea of the impossibility of the action which lies at the background of fear. Personal belief in nothing being impossible marks the audacity which leads men of inferior ability to success where even genius may fail. I would refer the cases reported in *Proceedings*, vol. v. p. 281 to self-suggestion in idea of the impossibility of the movements in question. Bernheim says an idea has a tendency to generate its actuality (*Proceedings*, vol. xii. p. 217). Braid says: 'The marvels (of hypnotism) only appeared when the various physical stimuli were associated with mental impressions, and were invariably absent when these were excluded' (*Proceedings*, vol. xii. p. 205).

I would relate all physical action (unless grown automatic, when the relation to consciousness in the present is absent) to mental impressions—as Braid terms them—and I would relate the influence of the hypnotiser on his patient to influence by means of mental impressions.

Speaking of rapport generally<sup>1</sup> it would appear that:—

In all spontaneous cases where the communication is between the percipient and some external personality, there is rapport between the two, where the external personality is indeterminate so far as the percipient is concerned. In experimental cases the same is true; but the external personality is predetermined—by prearrangement between him and the percipient, he is made the particular agent.

Hypnotism marks a particular phase of experimental cases: the agent and percipient are predetermined, where the percipient

<sup>1</sup> The reader will have seen what wide use I have made of the admirable papers by Dr. J. Milne Bramwell in vol. xii. of the *Proceedings*.

is in a state of induced sleep. But this relation of agent and percipient only exists *in idea* in the percipient.

Bramwell says (1) That *rapport* does not appear unless it has been directly or indirectly suggested. (Herein he follows Braid.) (2) That the condition is always an apparent and not a real one (*Proceedings*, vol. xii. p. 229).

But I have tried to show that rapport exists for all telepathic phenomena (except as to cases of pure clairvoyance), spontaneous or experimental—including cases of hypnosis. In some cases the agent (*en rapport*) is determinate, in some indeterminate. Therefore rapport, generally speaking, is not confined to cases of hypnotism: it exists in all cases of telepathy except those of, what I term, pure clairvoyance and clairaudience. I would confine the truth of the first statement of Bramwell to cases where the agent is determinate.

## SELF-SUGGESTION

IN trying to define suggestion I must shortly recapitulate.

I refer will to the intuitive self, so the will of the human personality can only be a manifestation of the will of the intuitive self, so far as that is possible when we consider how the human personality is conditioned in our time and space.

But just as we know nothing of telepathy itself, but only its manifestation to us, so we know nothing of will itself, but only its manifestation to us. Therefore, in cognition, we may, apart from all questions of automatism (which, quâ the human personality, involves divorce of consciousness), treat the will of the subject as determining the operation of its understanding.

Now ideas which have resulted from past human experience constitute environments of the understanding, and it is with (or in relation to) these environments (or certain of them) that the understanding operates. It follows that all actions and direction in thought (even I think judgments) are subjective to ideas.

The hypnotiser can transfer ideas to his subject—he can, as before shown, cause ideas to emerge in the subject's understanding as part of its environments of ideas. And these transferred ideas can be predetermined by the hypnotiser. As, too, they are transferred *in the present* (even, it may be, with continuous effect in the present) we must contemplate the possibility that they may have dominant effect on the subject in largely determining his action or direction of thought *in the present*.

So I would define suggestion from the hypnotiser as existing in transference of ideas. The will of the subject remains in action: his understanding itself is not affected; it is the environments of his understanding which are affected. Ideas are the 'stuff' that the understanding uses for its operation in thought: they constitute environments for the use of the understanding. The distinction between the learned and unlearned man is that the former has more stored ideas for the use of his understanding when in operation. (But that full storage of ideas from past human experience which is in all of us affects only the manifestation of our human personality. Bear in mind that we cannot know the human personality of any one of our fellows—we have (for such knowledge) evidence only of its manifestation to us.)

But if we can be so subject to ideas transferred from a hypnotiser

we must, *a fortiori*, be subject to our own ideas—we must be subjective to *self-suggestion*. In the ultimate, I would refer the influence of the hypnotiser to induced self-suggestion in the person hypnotised.

As to self-suggestion Myers has written :—

‘ It is, therefore, as it seems to me, in a field almost clear of hypotheses that I suggest my own—my view that a stream of consciousness flows on within us, at a level beneath the threshold of ordinary waking life, and that this consciousness embraces unknown powers of which these hypnotic phenomena give us the first sample, the scattered indications : powers sometimes exercised (as we shall presently see) “ spontaneously ” or at the bidding of some higher will ; but sometimes obedient to a summons sent downwards from the supraliminal self.

‘ How we are to explain this obedience we shall consider presently. But first it will occur to every one that there is one way in which such a conception as this can be tested at once. If the most advanced effects of suggestion are really due to an agency within the subject, the subject ought to be able, if any one is able, to start that agency himself. The words of others cannot be of fundamental importance. *Self-suggestion*, in short, must be the central type, and suggestion from without must be no more than an aid to the subject’s own belief. It appears to me that actual observation does largely bear out this view ’ (*Proceedings*, vii. p. 350).

Consider the following case :—

A man may have a brain normal in operation, and yet he himself be obsessed by an idea that he is St. Paul or some emperor. We call him a monomaniac—his conduct and thought are normal unless either involves the use of the idea as to which he is abnormal. We treat his false idea (his self-suggestion) as an environment which, when (and only when) it has effect, causes irregular operation of a normal understanding.

And from where does he get this false idea that he is St. Paul or an emperor ? I hold it does not arise directly from any percept. It is a self-suggested idea which the monomaniac has, himself, given rise to as a concoction from his storage of ideas. In waking dreams we, who assume we are fully sane, make ourselves the heroes of our imaginative concoctions—kings, priests, vagabonds or thieves. While we are dreaming we *are* the human personality we have imagined. The monomaniac’s ‘ dream ’ differs from ours not in kind but only in degree : our ‘ dreams ’ have but passing effect ; the ‘ dream ’ of the monomaniac has continuous effect in self-suggestion.

The determining influence of ideas (as environments of the understanding) over material motion of the brain is possibly shown in certain experiments of M. M. Binet and Féré :—

‘ With their hypnotic subjects they found that complementary after-images, resembling in all respects a normal negative image,

followed on induced hallucinations of colour, and the experiments were repeated by Charcot' and found equally successful (*Proceedings*, vol. x. p. 144. But cf. Moll on *Hypnotism*, p. 212, where he shows that self-suggestion or even fraud on the part of the hypnotic subjects may, as to these experiments, have been in question).

Now I do not admit such an induced hallucination can be termed a percept or the result of a percept—there was no external object to give rise to perception. Assuming that the induced hallucination resulted, then it resulted from the percipient (under directive force from the hypnotiser) bringing up into the present a present idea of a particular colour from the storage of ideas already existing in him. The genesis of the idea did not lie in a percept of the colour of an external object: the 'stuff' it was made of was a storage of ideas already in the percipient; bear in mind, however, that these ideas had their origin mainly in percepts.

But this induced idea *did* materially affect the material brain of the percipient: for the fact of the after emergence of the idea of the complementary colour can only be explained by previous 'fatigue' influence on the material brain from affection of (the idea of) the original colour. That is, the percipient by 'imagining' a particular colour did affect the motion of his material brain: a 'concocted' idea of the percipient had effect as an environment on the motion of the material brain.

Herein—as the brain would not have been affected unless the idea had existed—we have a definite example of the objective influence of ideas as environments of the understanding: they are seen to determine the material motion of the brain.

What has been above written leads, I think, to a conclusion that, in the hypnotic phenomena in question, we find always the influence of *self-suggestion*. The dominating idea arises in the subject from the will of the subject. What the hypnotiser does, in cases where the suggestion apparently moves from him, is to so affect the environments of the subject's understanding that an idea of dominating influence emerges as part of those environments. This idea, though predetermined by the hypnotiser, can only be held to result from suggestion on his part as setting up self-suggestion in the hypnotised.

A close study of the cases reported by the S.P.R. leads me to the conclusion that there are none where suggestion from the hypnotiser imports any change *in kind* of the operation of the subject's understanding, and none where the transferred ideas are different *in kind* to those possible to the subject as a particular human personality. There appears to me never more than an affect on the environments of the understanding of the subject.

But, as I treat ideas as environments of the understanding, we arrive at what may be the dominating influence of ideas (or even an idea) over the manifested operation of the understanding of the

patient; and so, in certain cases, we must give supreme power to suggestion as I have defined it. The will of the patient has only ideas for use in its operation.

‘The energy of psychical phenomena exhibits itself particularly in two ways, on which all suggestion ultimately depends: in the persistence of ideas and in the tendency of all ideas to external realisation of themselves’ (*Proceedings*, vol. ix. p. 215).

## EXALTATION OF FACULTY

It may be argued that in certain cases of hypnotism we find the operation of the understanding of the subject to differ *in kind* from its normal operation. And cases of exaltation of faculty may be relied on.

Exaltation of faculty in hypnosis may be referred to : (1) Manifestations of mental operation in the subject higher in order than he is capable of in his normal state. (2) Manifestations of a power in the subject (not normally manifest) to reduce into ideas affects from the external received otherwise than through his normal organs of sense, and to record these ideas by speech or writing. Bear carefully in mind that we know *nothing* of the effect of hypnotism on the subject except so far as it is manifest to us ; that is, so far as the subject can inform us, in some normal way, what his experience is, or so far as we can gain information from his changed bodily state.

We consider now the first head—the second will be considered later.

This exaltation of faculty, as before argued, is apparent not real. It results simply from the environments of the understanding being so affected by hypnosis that the understanding of the subject can operate more surely and correctly.

But, if this explanation be correct, should it not follow that the educated man would more probably manifest exaltation of faculty than the uneducated ? At first thought this must be so : for the educated man has a fuller storage of ideas (wider environments) for use than the uneducated. On reflection, I think, we shall find this is not so.

I have tried to show that, in sleep, though there is lessened physiological action of the brain, the understanding, being freed from the interference of passing effects from the external through its normal organs of sense, can use its storage of ideas more fully and correctly than when in the waking state. This, as shown, is probably true also for the state of hypnosis. And this theory is not, I think, altogether in conflict with the well elaborated theory of Dr. M'Dougall. It is perhaps a generalisation from the theory that inhibition within the nervous system sets up a 'process of drainage of energy' from one path or system to another (*Brain*, vol. xxxi. p. 252).

But we have another fact—we underrate very largely the normal powers of our understanding. Education is certainly a condition precedent to the manifestation of certain powers of the understanding. But what is education? I hold it does not affect the understanding itself: it affects only the environments of the understanding—gives it more ideas to operate with. (At the same time it may be that *over long periods* these constantly increasing environments of the brain may, by reaction, lead to evolution in brain capacity for the reception of ideas.)

It is often forgotten that if we hold man has evolved from some primordial form of protoplasm then there must have been (from the first) in this original form the potentiality of such evolution. It is true the evolution has, in manifestation, taken place in relation to environments, so there has been constant action and reaction between the organism and its environments. But the potentiality of future evolution must always, and in the present, be *in* the organism: otherwise, we must hold that material environments create, as time passes, an increasing potentiality of evolution.

Destroy for any future generation of men all the recorded output of the understanding of past generations: deny to this generation all education from men of the previous generations. Then this generation comes into the world with exactly the same potential powers of understanding that it would have had in normal circumstances. But it has been deprived of certain environments—that is, of the recorded ideas of men of past generations. So—these environments being wanting—the generation will not be able to manifest in thought or idea the potentiality of understanding which is in it as it would have been able in normal circumstances.

Or we may consider a converse case, where a negro, taken in youth from barbarous surroundings, is given highly civilised education and human associations. In such case the potentiality of his understanding remains the same, but wider environments *in idea* being given to him, he will manifest more fully his potentiality in output of thought.

Now apply this principle to our universe as it exists, and we find that the average man can never fully manifest his potentiality of understanding. Possibly the best existing environments—most developed forms of education and human association—though of advantage in one way may, in another way, tend to restrict rather than increase the possibility of manifestation of potentiality of understanding, by cross-gartering us all with the red tape of dominant dogmatic ideas based on principles of religion, social relations, art, and, even at times, of science, which, in abstract reasoning, we know to be false.

If this be so we must admit there is in each of us a potentiality of understanding which, in normal life, is never fully manifest in act or thought.

Then, may it not be that, when freed from the passing interference of affects from the external through the normal organs of sense, the understanding *itself* can operate more fully and correctly than in the normal state, no matter what its storage of ideas may be? May not those false judgments in art, science, and morality, which in normal life operate as dominant ideas, be directly related to our normal life so that, when we are free from affects through our normal organs of sense, we are free from these dominant ideas, and the understanding can, itself, operate more fully and correctly?

'I must indeed confess myself unable to explain why it is that beneath the frequent incoherence, frequent commonplaces, frequent pomposity of these messages there should almost always be a substratum of better sense, of truer catholicity, than is usually to be heard except from the leading minds of the generation' (*Proceedings*, vol. xv. p. 400, by Myers).

The understanding of each one of us is quite distinct from our understanding as normally manifest in act and thought: a plough-boy may have the understanding of a Newton, and yet never manifest his power from the affect on him of adverse environments—want of education, opportunity or self-confidence. The power of the understanding is one thing: the 'stuff' (the ideas) it has for use is another thing. We can well understand a powerful understanding making better use of little than a weak understanding of much.

If this be so, suggestion in hypnosis may result in apparent exaltation of faculty to as high a degree in the unlearned as in the learned. And the cases appear to support this.

But suggestion may have other effect also. I now deal with the second head of exaltation of faculty, that is, manifestation of a power in the subject (not normally manifest) to reduce into ideas affects from the external received otherwise than through his normal organs of sense, and to record these ideas by speech or writing.

Whoever the hypnotised may be, he is, under hypnotism, receiving affects from the external and external personalities otherwise than through his normal organs of sense in exactly the same way as when he was in the normal state.

Consider any case where the hypnotiser suggests that the patient should 'go' to some distant place and describe what is there happening. The hypnotised goes to the particular place and describes what is happening. He does what he could not have done in his normal state.

What has really taken place?

Under suggestion from the hypnotiser the hypnotised has been enabled to reduce into conscious ideas in the present a particular part of that whole which is always (out of our time and space) affecting him otherwise than through his normal organs of sense. And he has been enabled to use his normal powers of speech or writing to record for the benefit of others the ideas which have

emerged in him. (See case reported on p. 241.) There is no exaltation of faculty : it is simply that the environments of the hypnotised are so changed that his latent power is rendered capable of being patent.

I think in such cases we must assume the will of the hypnotiser and of the hypnotised in operation and in agreement—the will of the hypnotiser acting as no more than a directive force on the hypnotised's exercise of his own will. And the suggestion from the hypnotiser must operate by 'transferred idea' on the understanding of the hypnotised. The hypnotised—possessed by the idea in suggestion—centres the operation of his understanding on some particular of the external he is receiving otherwise than through his normal organs of sense. This particular of the external is brought within the limits of time, for ideas exist in time. And it is brought into continuity in time, for only so can we account for the fact that the hypnotised gives a continuous record of his experience.

I think we may possibly have a partial explanation to hand to account for this power in the hypnotiser to so affect the hypnotised that he can record his experience in continuity in time.

In those experimental cases of thought transference where the condition of both agent and percipient is normal, we find success requires 'blankness of mind' on the part of the percipient and the same 'blankness of mind' on the part of the agent, *but* the agent must fix his attention on the idea he wishes to transfer—he must exercise will. And we find it is this fixity of attention on the part of the agent which enables the percipient to 'spot' the idea in question : the percipient, at times if not always, exercises choice in 'spotting' the required idea. And as the percipient is in a normal state we can understand, as already explained, why in such cases the idea is 'spotted' by the percipient in, as it were, a passing flash of time.

But in cases of hypnosis while the agent is in a normal state, the percipient is in an abnormal state, akin to sleep. That is, his relation to the external through his normal organs of sense is largely in abeyance. So his mind is left free to operate with impressions received otherwise than through his normal organs of sense. In ordinary experimental cases the percipient is incapable of giving a continuous record in time of the ideas emerging in time from impressions received otherwise than through the normal organs of sense, because of the constant disturbance of ideas of or related to his waking senses. In cases of hypnosis this disturbance is absent, and so he *might* be able to give this continuous record. But, ordinarily, I cannot find power in the percipient himself to give such record : he has no 'fixity of attention' on any particular of the external to enable him to do this.

May it not be that the 'fixity of attention' of the hypnotiser enables the understanding of the hypnotised to operate subject to

a dominant idea continuously in time? A dominant idea of operating with a particular of his external, so that ideas emerge in him *continuously in time* as to the particular of his external? The hypnotiser being in a normal state can, and does, exercise 'fixity of attention'; and, from his rapport with the percipient, he is constituted a normal agent enabling the percipient to have like 'fixity of attention.' I think this possibility is worthy of attention.

I agree that the distinction between hypnotic phenomena and the experiences of normal consciousness is one only of degree not of kind. Indeed, we can ourselves arrive at certain analogies between the two (cf. *Journal*, vol. iv. p. 20). But the immediate question dealt with at present is that of suggestion in relation to exaltation of faculty.

Now in sleep and hypnosis the subject is, I repeat, still receiving affects from the external otherwise than through the normal organs of sense in just the same way as when in the normal state. And we have *recorded* evidence that at times these affects emerge in idea in the subject without suggestion from any external personality. But these records ordinarily mark mere flashes of intelligence. At the same time the absence of record of continuous experience in time of the emergence of such ideas does not prove that such continuity in time of the experience does not take place: we are left mainly in the dark as to its occurrence or non-occurrence. Still, we have *some* evidence of such continuous experience in time, quite apart from the influence of suggestion from the hypnotiser. The following is a good example of such evidence:—

Liébault, at Nancy, hypnotised a certain patient in order to cure her of a certain complaint—the cure was effected *en deux séances*. Afterwards the patient exhibited abnormal power in automatic writing—power which she herself referred to the influence of a spirit.

One day—believed by Liébault to be the 7th February 1868—she was suddenly seized about 8 A.M. by a desire to write, and the writing purported to convey information from one Marguerite that she was dead: 'On supposa aussitôt qu'une demoiselle de ce nom qui était son amie, et habitait, comme professeur, le même pensionnat de Coblenz où elle avait exercé les mêmes fonctions, venait de mourir.'

Information was received from Coblenz that the girl Marguerite had died there on the 7th February about seven o'clock in the morning (*Phantasms*, vol. i. p. 293).

In this case an affect on the subject from the external, received otherwise than through the normal organs of sense, emerged in idea in such continuity of time as to enable the subject to record her experience. And this resulted *without* any suggestion from the hypnotiser.

What, then, suggestion from the hypnotiser effects would appear to be this: It *creates* no power in the subject: there is no exaltation of faculty. It simply enables the subject to keep continuously in

present time, and record continuously in present time, ideas emerging in him from affects on him from the external received otherwise than through the normal organs of sense. I think, too, it must be held also to have influence in enabling the subject to so keep in present time ideas emerging from some *particular of the external*. And this would appear to point to the deduction that the hypnotiser can determine *himself* what particular of such affects from the external shall emerge in idea in the subject, and by his own 'fixity of attention' make the emergence continuous in time (cf. *Hypnotism* by Moll (1909), p. 136).

So far we are on fairly firm ground in argument. But when we consider the 'how' and the 'why' of this power in the hypnotiser, I think we can at present only indulge in more or less vague imaginings.

The position is this: The subject has 'blankness of mind': the hypnotiser's understanding is in a normal state, operating with affects through his normal organs of sense. The latter has, then, full normal power to keep his attention fixed in time and space in relation to any particular of the universe that he may choose. Is it not then possible—varying slightly a former argument—that the hypnotiser may by suggestion (by transferred idea continuous in time) so fix, continuously in time, the environments of the subject's understanding in relation to a particular of the affects on him from the external and external personalities, that he, the subject, is in a state where not only ideas constantly emerge in him, but where he can constantly (continuously in time) *record* his experience? The subject's mind being a blank he requires external assistance for fixity of attention in time. The subject is always (in the manifold) being affected by the external, and the hypnotiser so affects the environments of his (the subject's) understanding, that he has fixity of attention to a particular of the external, so that ideas continuously emerge and can be continuously recorded in time.

Here, again, we find that suggestion moving from the hypnotiser has effect only on the environments of the understanding of his subject: there is no exaltation of faculty. What really has effect is self-suggestion in the hypnotised. And this, I think, is practically in agreement with Moll's theory (cf. *Hypnotism* by Moll (1909), pp. 134 *et seq.*), for I doubt if the importance I attach to induced ideas does more than to elucidate his theory.

## MEMORY IN HYPNOSIS

I MUST assume that I have been successful in attempting to prove that human experience results in (practically) a full storage of ideas in each one of us of all our past, and that we vary from one another only in the degree we can use this full storage (p. 75 *et seq.*, Part I.). I give each one of us *as a human personality*, a perfect memory but ordinarily only varying power to use this memory in the present.

When, then, in sleep or hypnosis we find the power to *use* memory is either increased or decreased, I hold this results altogether from the affect of sleep or hypnosis on the human personality as a thing of understanding. So I deny the distinction sometimes raised between subliminal and supraliminal memory. If it be replied: 'By subliminal memory is meant that which you term a perfect memory: by supraliminal memory is meant that which you term *use* of memory,' then I make the replication:—

'Supraliminal memory has no definite meaning, for, in the normal state, our power to use memory varies from time to time, and, too, it is subjective to subliminal memory which exists in the *human personality*. By using the term subliminal memory in opposition to supraliminal memory, you open the heresy that subliminal memory is referable to a subliminal self, as objective to a supraliminal self with supraliminal memory.'

If we admit this distinction between memory and the use of memory, the consideration of the question of memory in relation to hypnotism becomes simplified. Memory itself remains absolutely the same in sleep or in the hypnotic state as in the normal state. What varies is only the use of memory—the power to bring into the present stored ideas of the past. The exercise of this power is to be referred to the understanding, and the degree of power exercised must depend on the environments of the understanding. I have already argued that under the most favourable environments the understanding can make full use in the present of all its storage of ideas.

Now sleep and hypnosis both affect the environments of the understanding, and so will probably in some way affect the power to use memory. For reasons already given, we should expect the power to use memory to be greater in the sleeping or hypnotic than in the normal state. And this, perhaps as a rule, is found to be so. But it is not invariably the case (*Proceedings*, vol. xii. pp. 193 *et seq.* Cf. *Journal*, vol. xiii. pp. 83 *et seq.* by Dr. T. W. Mitchell).

We should expect, too, that the power to use memory would be subject to suggestion. For suggestion from the hypnotiser I refer to transferred ideas, and if these ideas are transferred in relation to the use of memory they may inhibit memory or may increase its use by inducing those associated ideas on which we know the exercise of memory largely depends. Especially, these transferred ideas may direct the attention of the hypnotised (who is free from the interference of his normal senses) to particular stored ideas, and so cause apparent exaltation of the faculty of memory—the hypnotised remembers in the hypnotic state that which he could not in the normal state.

Dr. Bramwell says: 'The subject may be unable, even in response to suggestion, to remember certain events and sensations of previous hypnosis' (*Proceedings*, vol. xii. p. 194). And we can well understand this as possible when we consider the normal defects of our use of memory. But when he continues: 'Of this we have already had an example in the patient who could not recall painful impressions after suggested analgesia. This case may be taken as a typical one, for amongst the numerous operations performed during hypnosis with which I have had to do, I have in no instance been able to revive any memory of pain,' I doubt if he shows failure of the power of suggestion. I would suggest that in all these cases there *was* no pain, and so there was nothing of pain in memory. The very existence of pain lies in consciousness: so no interference of any kind with the bodily state in itself creates pain, unless accompanied with an affect in consciousness. Generally, the patient operated on while hypnotised does not manifest those bodily reactions in movement which ordinarily result from consciousness of pain (see *Proceedings*, vol. xii. p. 244; the last paragraph on p. 203 of *Proceedings*, vol. vi.; and the last paragraph on p. 323 of *Proceedings*, vol. vii.). Sir Humphry Davy's well-known personal experiment shows that even when normally conscious we can, by self-suggestion, render painless an interference with our bodily state which would, normally, be most painful—the self-suggested idea inhibits the feeling of pain. The mechanical effect of such interference is the same whether there be or be not self-suggestion. So the effect of the self-suggestion must lie in inhibiting the emergence in consciousness of the feeling of pain. For Sir Humphry was fully conscious of what he was doing, he did it himself in the normal state. Therefore, by self-suggestion, all he affected was his personal consciousness in relation to a particular self-induced bodily state.

Hypnosis, then, cannot affect memory—that is, the full storage in each human personality of ideas of past human experience. But it can affect the use of this full storage by the subject: can so affect the environments of the subject's understanding that he can use it to a larger or smaller extent than he could in his normal state.

## MEMORY AND MULTIPLEX PERSONALITY

As I define the human personality as no more than a partial and mediate manifestation in our time and space of the real personality (the intuitive self), the problem of multiplex personality is reduced to comparative insignificance. For we can well understand the possibility of differing manifestations in our time and space of one and the same personality. But still there are aspects of multiplex personality which require consideration.

'Certain actions occur which presuppose for their origination all the faculties of the human spirit, but which nevertheless work themselves out without the knowledge of the agent. These actions we term automatic. Among them are certain automatic movements, as the act of dressing oneself, or of retracing a well-known path; and some other automatic performances, such as counting one's footsteps, or adding up columns of figures. These latter acts plainly indicate the existence of a separate train of *memory* employed upon them. And, moreover, although they take place without the agent's *knowledge*, they cannot take place without his *consciousness*, they cannot truly be unconscious acts. They must in some fashion belong to a *subconsciousness* which, in its relation to the more potent *upper* consciousness, may best be understood if we consider it as a *secondary* consciousness. And if we regard Consciousness and Memory as the essential constituents of an Ego, we may boldly say that every man conceals within himself the germs of a secondary personality' (*Proceedings*, vol. vi. p. 207).

The above argument I think may be extended to apply to multiplex human personality in each of us, and leads to the conclusion that in every one of us, as human personalities, there is no unique and indissoluble personality.

If, however, we hold our normal self-consciousness and these various phases of consciousness are but manifestations in our time and space of an unique and indissoluble self-consciousness (the intuitive self), we get rid of the difficulty: we arrive at a real personality in each of us.

It may be admitted that Consciousness and Memory are essential constituents of an Ego, but the consciousness of our normal self and the above various phases of self are but limits of consciousness of the intuitive self in manifestation in our time and space. And this is true also of Memory. For the memory of the intuitive self

exists in the manifold, not in the narrow limits of unity and diversity in our time and space, whereas the use of memory may differ, differ even, at times, in the same one human personality.

On this question of multiple personality Myers has said: 'But the question of origin will still remain: and it is not really an hypothesis wilder than another if we suppose it possible that that portion of the cosmic energy which operates through the organism of each one of us was in some sense individualised before its descent into generation, and pours the potentiality of larger being into the earthen vessels which it fills and overflows' (*Proceedings*, vol. vi. p. 215).

I think this analogy is very fine: I find the 'origin' in the intuitive self.

I have written: 'We err when we assume that our consciousness of self is a mere consciousness of self in the present passing moment: it is a consciousness of self in the present passing moment in relation to the self of all past personal human experience.' For full normal self-consciousness there is always *in the present* an affect on the human personality of memory of its past. We may term this 'unconscious memory,' though I am disposed to think it is an affect in the manifold—all the past *in time* of the subject has affect, as it were, 'in a lump' on the subject in the present passing moment. I really make the normal subject of the present passing moment an integration in present passing consciousness of all his past.

What is above written applies to normal self-consciousness.

I hold then that, normally, there is by the subject *full use* in the present of his memory for the establishment of the fact of his normal consciousness as a self. But this use can scarcely be said to lie in idea. The full storage of ideas, it is true, constitutes environment of the understanding: it is the 'stuff' the understanding *does* use in the present for normal self-consciousness. But the subject's consciousness of the operation of his understanding in the present passing moment is of the present ideas he subtracts, as it were (by the operation of the understanding), from his experience in relation to this storage—his present passing self-consciousness regards this full storage as but 'stuff' for thought, and it is in thought of the present passing moment that *to him* his normal self-consciousness exists.

If we accept the above theory of memory we can, leaving untouched theories of differing strata of personality, understand the theory of dissociation. For if by abnormal structure (or operation?) of the brain the present passing self-consciousness is in relation, now with one stream of memory of the past, again with another, we arrive at once at differing manifestations of human personality, while leaving the real (the intuitive) personality untouched. We need not, indeed, confine ourselves to two streams of memory, we may assume

many. And thus we arrive at the phenomena of multiplex personality.

And, herein, I must repeat myself. If we consider any case of multiplex personality we find *each* personality exercises ordinarily the same acquired arts (for example, walking, talking, and writing) which the normal personality acquired normally: there are certain factors common to all the personalities. And each personality would, in most cases, appear to exist only in exclusion of the others.

I have referred 'Will' to the intuitive self. And as I make the human personality no more than a manifestation in time and space of the intuitive self, so I make the 'Will' of the human personality no more than a manifestation in time and space of the Will of the intuitive self. It follows that the Will of the human personality is conditioned in time and space, and operates (not with intuition) but with ideas. And, again, it follows that the manifestation of Will in each personality of a multiplex personality must (as it operates with differing parts of the storage of ideas) take on a differing form of manifestation—we find (practically) that each personality of a multiplex personality may differ in personal Will.

Again, if we once admit the possibility of dissociation of Memory (that is, the affect on the human personality of part, not all, of the storage of ideas), why should not two (or more) streams of memory have effect at the *same time*? In such case the normal personality will be replaced by two (or even more) abnormal personalities (apparently) existing, not successively, but *at the same time*.

M'Dougall says: 'We may suppose that in such cases (multiple personality) the elements of the nervous system, which normally constitute a single functional group, have become divided into two or more such groups, and that the functioning of each group is then accompanied by its own stream of consciousness, a synthesis of the elementary psychical processes accompanying the elementary nervous processes of that group. This is the explanation of these cases most generally accepted. There are cases which seem clearly to involve this kind of functional splitting of the nervous system and a corresponding splitting of the conscious personality' (The Case of Sally Beauchamp, *Proceedings*, vol. xix. p. 421). And he holds the case of Miss Beauchamp to be thus explainable *except* as to one particular personality (p. 422).

He makes this exception as to the particular personality of Sally Beauchamp: (1) because her personality was manifest *simultaneously* with that of another or other personalities. For the reasons given I see no force in this objection. (2) Because she manifested so marked and distinct an individuality in thought and feeling from the other personalities that 'in short, to assert, as Dr. Prince does, that Sally is a split off fragment of Miss B. is to maintain that the part may be greater than the whole' (pp. 424, 427).

In the first place mark this: Whatever exceptional power of

thought, feeling, or will Sally manifested, she did *not* make use of the storage of ideas of any third person : she used only the storage of ideas of Miss B. She may, indeed, have made fuller and better use of memory than Miss B. herself, but still this was the memory of Miss B. (Cf. the case reported at p. 99, *Journal*, vol. x., which, on the other hand, suggests possession.)

And is it true, for our present argument, that the part cannot be greater than the whole ? I would submit that the axiom does not apply.

Gerald Balfour says : ' The Self of which we are each of us conscious is neither the organism as a whole nor any grouping of psychical centres within the organism. It is a single mind or soul whose conscious states at any given moment are the expression of its reaction against its native environment ' (*Proceedings*, vol. xix. p. 393). I take these ' conscious states ' to be phenomenal of the ultimate consciousness of the single mind (intuitive self). Couple with Gerald Balfour's statement the fact I rely on that the powers of the human understanding of any one are never, under normal environments, fully manifested in recorded thought or deed (p. 266), and we arrive at the possibility of multiplex personality without introducing the theory of ' possession.'

Apply what is above written to a man even of Lord Byron's genius.

Men born to great rank and great wealth and living in such environments must, I think, be admitted to have the same chance of intellectual power as other men. And if this be so, we must hold it has been their adverse environments which account for the fact that not one of such men has ever produced work of supreme genius in art, science, or literature. If Byron had not had the favourable environment of comparative poverty he would not have produced his work of genius.

But let us assume Byron lived throughout his life in adverse environments of great wealth and great rank, and so, *normally*, was never manifest as a poet of genius. And let us assume that during his lifetime he had at various times been hypnotised and, while in the hypnotic state, had recorded verse displaying supreme genius.

Should we not in such case have had, apparently, an example of a secondary personality marked by the exceptional characteristics of genius from the ordinary characteristics of the normal personality ? Would not this ' hypnotic ' genius have been far more distinct in individuality from the normal Lord Byron, than any phase of Sally Beauchamp from her normal personality ? And yet, in this assumed case, we should know there was no evidence of ' possession ' : we should know that hypnotism had merely so affected the environments of Byron's understanding that his *own potential* power was manifest in a way it could not have been while he was in a normal state.

In his normal state Byron would have been an ordinary commonplace individual of rank and wealth—for in the present connection we must treat wealth and rank as mere environments affecting the real self in no way. In his hypnotised state he would have been a man of genius. By *removing* certain of the environments of his understanding the potentiality of his own understanding would have had more effect in manifestation. In such a case we should have (apparently) found the part greater than the whole.

Like argument applies to many recorded cases of apparent possession.

But though I think Sally Beauchamp's case and others come under the ordinary theory of dissociation, I do not, as already said, either deny or accept the possibility of possession: I ignore the possibility because it has nothing to do with the theory I prefer. I think, however, it is possible that normal self-consciousness, using its full storage of ideas of the past, may not constitute the highest possible manifestation of the operation of the understanding—cases of exaltation of faculty support this view. It may be that inhibition of the use of certain 'streams' of memory may lead to fuller and more correct operation of the understanding. Our storage in memory of the past is a mixed storage of the true and the false. If we could imagine a sorting of memory—streams of distinction between the true and the false—then we might find the normal personality commonplace, and a secondary personality (using only a stream of the true) a personality even of genius.

The case of Marie M. reported by MM. Ball and Boeteau illustrates, I think, the previous argument while showing, incidentally, the influence of self-suggestion (*Journal*, vol. v. p. 260):—

'Marie M., now aged twenty-two, has been subject to hysterical attacks since she was twelve years old. She became an out-patient at the Hôpital Andral for these attacks; and on April 24th, 1891, the house-physician there advised her to enter the surgical ward at the Hôtel-Dieu, as she would probably need an operation for an internal trouble. Greatly shocked by this news, she left the hospital at 10 A.M., and lost consciousness. When she recovered consciousness, she found herself in quite another hospital—that of Ste. Anne—at 6 A.M. on April 27th. She had been found wandering in the streets of Paris, with haggard aspect, worn-out boots, and lacerated feet, in the evening of the day on which she left the Hôpital Andral, under the shock of painful apprehension. On returning to herself, she could recollect absolutely nothing of what had passed in the interval. While she was thus perplexed at her unexplained fatigue and footsoreness, and at the gap in her memory, M. Boeteau hypnotised her. Like Ansell Bourne, she passed with ease into the hypnotic state, although she had never before been hypnotised: and, like him, she at once remembered the events which filled at least the earlier part of the gap in her primary consciousness.

‘ It appears that when she left the Hôpital Andral she set out for the Hôtel-Dieu, as recommended : but that the horror of the impending operation upset her balance of mind, and suddenly transformed itself into a conviction that her baby, which had died at the Assistance Publique, was being kept from her by the nurse to whom she had entrusted it at Chaville. She had walked to Chaville, and then on to Versailles, whither the nurse had removed. She could learn nothing of her baby, and walked back to Paris. During this long walk, which wore out her boots and wounded her feet, she was insensible to fatigue or hunger. But on regaining Paris she began to be haunted by spectral surgeons endeavouring to perform operations on her. . . . The patient’s account of her adventures was found to be correct.’

Dr. Boeteau treats this as a clear example of alternating and divided personality, with complete separation between the two psychical existences. And with this Myers, I think, agrees.

But I contend that the personality was not affected in any way. The distinctions between the personalities manifested arose from abnormal operation of the understanding. In both states the memory of Marie M. was the same—her storage of ideas was the same. But, in either state, she made use of a different part of her storage—her *use* of memory differed.

And the case is especially interesting because we find internal evidence showing how this abnormal operation originated.

Under the shock of being told an operation was necessary, her imagination came into abnormal play : she was subject to *self-suggestion* in relation to her dead baby, and so was subject to a dominating idea of the continued existence of her child. This dominating idea, by its very nature, related to that part of her storage of ideas relevant to her child when, in fact, alive, and she *used* this part of her storage of ideas in relation to her false dominating idea. This use was impossible if she used that other part of her storage of ideas which was in conflict with the *truth* of her self-suggested idea, and so she did not use that other part.

We see the same thing in forms of monomania. While the patient is under the influence of the monomaniacal idea he does not use that part of his storage of ideas which is in conflict with the *truth* of his false self-suggested idea.

Should the student consult M’ Dougall’s paper on Sally Beauchamp, I would ask him to bear in mind that I give to the intuitive self full memory, in the manifold, of the experience of its human personality.

## TIME MEMORY IN HYPNOSIS

DR. J. MILNE BRAMWELL has carried out exhaustive and scientific experiments on the Appreciation of Time by Somnambules (*Proceedings*, vol. xii. pp. 176 *et seq.*). Dr. T. W. Mitchell has supplemented these experiments by later ones carried out by himself (*Journal*, vol. xiii. pp. 83 *et seq.*). The arguments of Mitchell as to memory in hypnosis appear to me sound—not the less so because he admits no existing hypothesis fully explains the facts.

Bramwell, when considering his experiments, says:—

‘The experiments were all of the same character. On each occasion I suggested to her (his subject) during hypnosis, that at the expiration of a varying number of minutes she should feel impelled to make a cross on a piece of paper with a pencil, and also, without looking at clock or watch, write down what time she believed it to be, and then immediately compare this with the actual time and, if possible, obtain corroborative testimony from her friends’ (p. 180).

These experiments were, for the most part, fully successful. For instance, on Wednesday, January 15th, at 4.45 P.M., *three* experiments were made:—

13. From 4.45 P.M. Suggestion in 4.453 minutes.
14. From 2 P.M. Suggestion in 10.470 minutes.
15. From 3 P.M. Suggestion in 10.060 minutes.

All these were successful.

But some failed wholly or partially: and on these non-successes I rely. I think they prove that hypnosis had effect only on the environments of the understanding of the hypnotised: the normal understanding of the hypnotised was in operation and established the result. The exaltation of mathematical faculty was apparent, not real; it resulted from the understanding being able to work more fully and exactly because freed from the disturbance of passing ideas resulting from affects through the normal organs of sense. (Mitchell doubts that the calculations are beyond the ordinary powers of the subject. *Journal*, vol. xiii. p. 84.)

In all such cases we must hold there was agreement between the wills of the hypnotiser and the hypnotised. The distinction between ordinary cases where the subject carries out a particular action or is impressed with a particular idea and these ‘time’ cases lies only

in this : in the former, time is not a factor in the question of performance or thought ; in the latter it is. The new factor introduced is that the *times* of performance of the acts in question are delayed and carried out at fixed future periods ; so we may neglect the question of how it was that the subject made a cross when directed to make it : we have only to consider how it was the subject made the cross at the pre-determined future times.

The time of accomplishment was determined by the hypnotiser, and communicated to the subject under hypnotism. *At once*, on the communication, this fixed time became part of the storage of ideas in the subject—became part of her memory : the idea of the performance of the act was associated in her mind with the idea of the time fixed for performance. Is it going too far to hold that the hypnotic state she was in, when the communication was made, gave her abnormal power of keeping in her present (use of memory) the communicated idea ? In her after normal state, when fully subject to impressions through the normal organs of sense, she might well be relatively unconscious of the working of her understanding with the communicated idea : but still she might be (with relative unconsciousness) working with it, and so determining the particular time of the particular day fixed for accomplishment. But whether the subject at once made a calculation, and so arrived at the terminal time and fixed it in her mind at once, or whether—as seems possible—she carried on a continuous time watching, supplemented by counting or additions at regular or irregular intervals (*Journal*, vol. xiii. pp. 83 and 84), appears to me comparatively unimportant. For in either case her human understanding was in operation. Bear in mind, too, that the established fact of multiplex personality shows that one and the same human personality may be carrying on two distinct strains of human thought each accompanied or marked by a (relatively) *separate* form of consciousness.

But still we find no explanation of what appears to be a definite *sense* of time in the subject. For she would appear to have been closely successful in some experiments in making the cross at the fixed time with no clock at hand to assist her.

But perhaps some explanation of this may be offered.

We all exist in time ; our thoughts and actions are subject to succession in time, so that, as human personalities, we must treat time as objective. Now, in thought, succession in time appears to vary—engaged in one form of labour it passes slowly, in another it passes quickly. But on the average we must all, throughout life, be constantly impressed by the affects on us of some average rate of succession in time. Even when, in thought, time passes slowly or quickly we are in some measure conscious that we must relate this comparative quickness or slowness to ourselves and our occupation, not to time itself. That is, we correct our personal

experience by reference to a general idea of average time which is *in us*.<sup>1</sup>

Is it not possible that there is in each of us an acquired or inherited sense of time? Of this sense, it may be true, we make little use: may be quite unconscious, absorbed as we are, in ordinary life, with experience through our normal organs of sense. But, if it exist, then we should expect it to be manifest more fully in cases where we are not disturbed by passing experience through our normal organs of sense.

Suppose the subject in his normal state is told that after the lapse of 21.453 minutes from a given time he is to make a cross on a piece of paper; and suppose he consents to the experiment. Then he can calculate when the 21.453 minutes will expire—let us assume on a Wednesday at 12 P.M. He can keep this time in present memory, and when it comes make the cross. Even if, when the time comes, he has no clock before him to give him the exact time, he can make a good 'shot' at the time from his inherent sense of time, or from the affects from the external through his normal organs of sense giving him a more or less close idea of what the time is.

How does such an experiment differ from an ordinary hypnotic experiment?

In the first place the hypnotised subject would appear to be able to determine more easily than when in the normal state the particular time of the particular day that 21.453 minutes marks. There is that exaltation of faculty which has already been considered and shown to be apparent, not real.

In the second place the above calculation would appear to have been carried out by his understanding quite apart from normal self-consciousness, in the present, of any such operation of the understanding.

But human experience informs us that multiplex personality is a fact: we know that one and the same individual can manifest differing human personalities. It follows directly that the human understanding can carry on operations of which the normal personality may be quite unconscious.

And this is all we want to explain, what has occurred as stated above 'in the second place.'

In the third place the subject (without the assistance we will assume of any clock) makes the cross at the given time without normal self-consciousness of *why* the act is accomplished.

The fact of absence of normal self-consciousness has been already considered. But the sense of time?

In the experiment referred to when the subject is in the normal state, we have seen he could make a good 'shot' at the time. It follows that in the hypnotic state all he has done is to make a far

<sup>1</sup> In *The Last Days of Kant*, by De Quincey, it is shown how Kant himself, in old age, lost all sense of the relations of time.

better 'shot' at the time—his hypnotic power differs from his normal power only in degree not in kind. Perhaps we may hold that in all of us the sense of time referred to is, in the hypnotic state, or from the continuing effect of induced hypnosis, rendered more acute.

The following experiment of Gurney seems to support this theory: Referring to a certain hypnotised subject he writes: 'Again he was told at 9.8½ P.M. to poke the fire in ten minutes. He was woke, and at 9.12 was set to the planchette. The writing began at once, and ran, "*Three minutes has passed and now there is seven more minutes has got to pass, and then I shall poke the fire.*" The writing was unusually slow, occupying five minutes, so that though it began by being nearly correct, it became less so as it went on. He was then re-hypnotised and other experiments were made. When woke he went to his former seat, and after looking uncomfortably at the fire for some time, said to me, "You don't mind my poking the fire, sir?"—and poked it. This was some time after the expiration of the ten minutes: but possibly the intermediate hypnotisation had had a confusing effect' (*Proceedings*, vol. iv. p. 312).

In the above case the will of the subject was in agreement with the will of the hypnotiser, and the time of performing the determined act was arrived at by operation of the understanding of the subject aided by some sense of time. But he only made a fairly good 'shot' at the time fixed.

I think this case supports the argument that the sense of time manifested in hypnosis is not a sense created by or evolved under hypnotism, but that it results merely from that apparent exaltation of faculty often found in hypnosis, and which has already been considered. This 'sense of time' is in all of us; the hypnosis makes it vary in degree, not in kind.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> I read Dr. Moll's exhaustive work on Hypnotism after the above chapters on Sleep and Hypnosis were written, and have interpolated references. The Theory of Hypnotism (pp. 224 *et seq.* of his work) which he gives is based on the existence of a dream-consciousness as distinct from ordinary consciousness, while he treats consciousness itself as primary and secondary. I have the audacity to think that if the three assumptions I have made (see Sleep and Hypnosis, p. 248) be accepted, then Dr. Moll's argument is strengthened, while his assumptions of primary, secondary, and dream-consciousness are no longer needed. To a certain point it would appear I have arrived at the same conclusions as Dr. Moll himself.

## PERSONALITY AND THE MATERIAL

THOUGH I treat the intuitive self as a condition, any reasoning as to the relation of this self to its environments is beyond the limits of the theory propounded. For, in cognition, we can know nothing about this relation: indeed, any reasoning round it would appear to involve the *absence* of any distinction (contradiction) between subject and object, and, for cognition, we must have the limits in contradiction of subject and object. The theory now propounded goes no further, in the present connection, than an attempt to prove, within the limits of human experience, that the intuitive self exists: it considers *what* this existence is only so far as it is manifest to us on the plane of our existence.<sup>1</sup>

When, however, we consider the subordinate question of the relation of the human personality to the material (to its material environments), we find ourselves on firmer ground. We have facts of human experience and conclusions of human thought which lead to remarkable conclusions. These conclusions I attempt to put into words.

Consider our universe at a long past stage when there existed only the material together with primordial forms of life.<sup>2</sup> There was then action and reaction between the organisms and their environments (the material); natural selection ruled, and in the struggle for existence the fittest survived. But mark this important fact. The 'fittest' who survived were merely the 'fittest' *in relation to their environments*. Darwin states positively that by the 'fittest' is not to be understood the highest in morality and intellect. The passive struggle of the organisms was in natural competition to survive in relation to their environments: there was no question

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Synthetica*, by S. S. Laurie, vol. i. p. 155. Laurie says: 'When the subject, making itself its object, by an act of will constitutes Ego it proclaims its freedom. Its limitation is then itself alone and in itself. But its freedom has already been vindicated. It is only as a sentient and attitudinal subject that it is the slave of the other, of that which is *not* it.' This stage, when subject becomes object, it would appear, Laurie holds to have been reached by evolution (even in Will?) on the stage of our universe. I go so far only as to hold that though the human personality may evolve into fuller and fuller manifestation of its intuitive self, it can never become an object to itself: it is its intuitive self only which can determine it as an object: and I refer Will to the intuitive self. It is for the intuitive self only—in some way beyond our comprehension—that subject becomes object, and so only the intuitive self can determine itself. I doubt whether this line of reasoning is so opposed to Laurie's as at first thought it might be assumed to be.

<sup>2</sup> The term 'form of life' is misleading. Forms of life are really no more than material forms in or through which (the unknown) life is manifest.

of morality or intellect, *per se*; neither came into question unless of benefit to the organism or any class of organisms for survival *in relation to environments*.

I think, too, I am not alleging anything in contradiction to Darwin's theory when I say he kept quite clear of any question as to there being or not being some scheme of Nature or God from the beginning. He dealt with the universe as it exists, *ex parte* any question of why it exists as it does exist.

'I mean by Nature only the aggregate action and product of many natural laws, and by laws the sequence of events as ascertained by us' (*Origin of Species*, 6th edition, p. 63). But it must be borne in mind that Darwin says also: 'The birth both of the species and of the individual are equally parts of that grand sequence of events which our minds refuse to accept as the result of blind chance' (*The Descent of Man*, 2nd edition, p. 613).

For a certain period natural selection had free play: there was a more or less blind struggle for survival and, under natural selection, the fittest in relation to their environments survived. So far there was only the question of the adaptation (under variation) of the surviving organisms to their environments, where the organisms had (passively) to take the environments *as they found them*: there was what I have termed more or less blind action and reaction.

But, after this period, a new and remarkable factor came into play. Certain organisms began to vary or even make their own environments. Birds, for example, began to build their nests, certain animals to make their burrows.

We have nothing to do, now, with *how* or *why* this power appeared manifest in certain organisms: we have only the fact to consider. And the fact proves that, even at this point of evolution, the action and reaction between these organisms was no longer a blind struggle where the organisms had to adapt themselves to their environments. For now we find the organisms themselves beginning, to some degree, to adapt their environments to themselves: they begin to vary or *select* their own environments with a view (no matter whether or not instinctive) to their own survival or the survival of their class. This amounts to saying that these organisms began to exercise power over the material as manifest to them. For we know nothing of what the material is in itself: all we know are its relations in form, colour, size and, what may roughly be termed, consistency. So, as far as the material is manifest to us, these organisms did begin to exercise power over it.

Let us again consider a far later period when man himself comes on the scene as an organism.

We now find the power of man over the material approaching supremacy. (I think Darwin himself entertained the possibility that the appearance of this 'power in man' introduced a new factor in evolution, but I cannot find any authority for what I think.)

Within large limits he can vary the form, colour, size and consistency of the matter he deals with : he can even originate forms of matter which he can use for the manifestation of force or energy in certain ways which would never have been manifested but for the exercise of his will. Chairs, tables, for instance, exemplify the former power ; steam engines, wireless telegraphy, flying machines, exemplify the latter power. These all constitute changes in the environments of man effected by him at his own will—they result from his command over the material as manifest.

But the power of man does not stop here : he can create *new forms of life*.<sup>1</sup>

' Man does make his artificial breeds, for his selective power is of such importance relatively to that of the slight spontaneous variations ' (*Life and Letters of Darwin*, vol. iii. p. 33).

It is true that man ' can neither originate varieties, nor prevent their occurrence : he can only preserve and accumulate such as do occur ' (*Origin of Species*, 6th edition, p. 62). That is, variation is a fact of nature beyond the command of man. But, given these variations, then man can use them for his own purposes : he can, by using these variations, create new forms of life *at his own will*.

Herein we find man has power, not only over forms of matter, but over (what we term) forms of life. But bear in mind this infers no power over life itself ; the power manifested is only over the forms of matter through which life is manifest or which involve manifestation of life.

And still we have not exhausted the power of the human personality over its environments. For any existing generation of any nation can not only largely determine its own environments, but those of the *succeeding generations*. The manifestation of character of the units of any nation are largely determined by the environments they are born into, and these environments are the results of the laws and customs of the land enacted by and handed down from previous generations : the form of morality and the degree of intellectual cultivation of the average man are so determined.

The old belief of the small leisured class that morality lies in the hands of God, that intellect is a simple result of heredity—a belief arising from confusion between morality and the manifestation in conduct of morality and between intellect and the manifestation of intellect—is dying. A public conscience is coming into action which recognises the fact that man's environments are to a great extent in his own hands, and that on environments depend largely the manifested forms of the morality and intellect of nations.

<sup>1</sup> Bear in mind what a ' form of life ' means, for as it stands it is misleading. It means no more than a form of the material in, through or in relation to which the principle of life is manifested. Life itself is the unknown : all we know of it is in its manifestation in relation to certain forms of the material.

The very character, as manifested by the average man, is so greatly dependent on the environments determined by a previous generation, that the evolution of national character as manifest can be largely affected.

'The more efficient causes of progress seem to consist of a good education during youth whilst the brain is impressible, and of a high standard of excellence, inculcated by the ablest and best men, embodied in the laws, customs, and traditions of the nation, and enforced by public opinion' (*The Descent of Man*, 2nd edition, p. 143).

In European nations and the United States the principle of education of the young is based on personal intellectual development with a view to best fitting each child concerned for personal success in his after struggle for existence: he is imbued with feeling that his duties to the State and his neighbour are but incidental to his personal rights and wants. And, under the existing competitive system, these personal rights and wants must be generally treated as in opposition to the collective rights and wants of the community.

On the other hand the Japanese, since 1872, have taken as their principle for education of the young, personal moral education with a view, in the first place, to best fitting each child to be a reasonable member of society, and one imbued with a sense of his duty to the State and his neighbour, and, only in the second place, to have, personally, a reasonable chance of success in his after struggle for existence.

Which form of education is the better is not now in question. All contended for is that these opposing forms of education have direct influence on the form in manifestation of the national character concerned. Man, in fact, has such wide power over his environments that, in action, he can largely determine the form of evolution of national character.

It is here necessary—in order to clear the way for a consideration of the particular facts of human experience hereafter dealt with and to mark the limits of the theory propounded—to show more definitely what man can and cannot do.

Life and the material are in themselves unknown to us: so personality can affect them in no way, so far as cognition goes. What man can do is simply to bring into being, in his universe, new *forms* of matter, new *forms* of life, and so to determine the environments of future generations that their manifested *forms* of morality and intellect are affected. There can—so far as the present argument is concerned—be no influence by man himself on the evolution of morality or intellect as things-in-themselves; man can only influence the evolution in what, to him, appears to be morality or intellect.

This shows, incidentally, that I keep clear of Kant's *Dialectic*,

in that I do not rely on the existence of moral law. But I still hold that if we see manifest to us the influence (from the external on our universe) of moral law itself then—outside cognition—we arrive at the fact of moral law. The theory propounded does not require any consideration of this question. At the same time I am quite unable to understand the evolution of Will itself in the human personality: I can only understand the evolution of Will in manifestation in our universe. I must refer Will itself, as before argued, to the intuitive self.

It may, perhaps, fairly be argued that the facts above referred to point to some scheme in Nature or of God, the object of which is the ultimate full command of personality as humanly manifested over the material. But with any such argument we are not concerned. All I now rely on is this:—

We find in the process of evolution a stage is reached where the relation of the organism to its environments changes. Up to this stage the relation is one of blind action and reaction. But when the stage in question is reached the organism begins to exercise command over its environments.

Now I deny that the theory of evolution as accepted predicates the appearance in evolution of this stage: by no means can we hold that this potent change in the relation of the organism to its environments is a natural result of natural selection.

Laurie, I think, accounts for this stage by the evolution of Will power. I would suggest we find no more than the evolved manifestation of Will in our universe. For I do not admit that Will can result from evolution under a blind struggle between organisms and their environments. This 'struggle' must have begun in time. Where, at the beginning, was Will? Is it possible for us, even in cognitional thought, to imagine that at this beginning Will power was not in existence, and that it was evolved (created?) in organisms under evolution, where evolution has consisted in blind action and reaction between the organisms and their external? Or how could the activity of Will suddenly appear (under evolution) at some intermediate stage of evolution? Bear in mind that Will power, as now referred to, is *personally* manifested; it is not an impersonal manifestation of power in the abstract. I am not now referring to self-consciousness or apperception: I am referring to a potentiality (Will) of the being conscious of its own existence.

We may even 'bring down' Hegel's theory into application to the theory of natural selection. I think we then find we must hold that when we consider the action and reaction between organisms and their environments, we must assume that the potentiality of self-consciousness (which I find in Will) existed from the first; and that, in our universe, we only see its manifestation in evolution. If we do not hold this we must hold that consciousness of self and its potentiality, Will, evolve (not from action and reaction between

life and matter, but) from action and reaction between *forms* of life and *forms* of matter. For it must be kept in mind that natural selection does not depend on any action and reaction between life and matter—both are unknown, whether we term them principles, quantities, qualities, or anything else; it depends on action and reaction between forms of life and forms of matter. So we must hold that consciousness of life and its potentiality, Will, are the subjects of evolution dependent on and marked in some evolved form or forms of life. We give the supremacy of consciousness of self and its potentiality, Will, to an evolved *form* of life—not to life itself.

But I think we know, in cognition, what forms of life are: they exist only within the limits of our universe, and one form of life differs from another only in specialisation of form and complexity of function—the *distinctions of form are material distinctions*. So we arrive at the conclusion that consciousness of self and its potentiality, Will, are natural evolutions resulting from natural (material) evolution in the specialisation of form and complexity of function of the organism. Is this possible? If so, what did Darwin mean when he said: 'The birth both of the species and of the individual are equally parts of that grand sequence of events, which our minds refuse to accept as the result of blind chance' (*The Descent of Man*, 2nd ed. p. 613). Surely he meant that there is something—call it what we may, Nature, God, Design, or the Great Unknown—which, to us, must be assumed as the pre-existing cause of this grand sequence of events? I would myself go further. I think we are justified in holding that when we consider this grand sequence of events we must introduce some *active* factor (known or unknown) which is external to the sequence: something active to which (and yet transcending cause and effect) this grand sequence of events must be referred.

When we bear in mind the phenomenal nature of Time we find an argument, by analogy, in support of the argument that what I will now term Nature is active in itself.

What does Nature do? Nature does this: given the fact of variation and the law of the survival of the fittest, she evolves the complex organism, man, from some simple primordial form of life. Nature, to us, effects this vast change by the accumulation of variations in evolution over long periods of time. But what does human experience tell us man himself can do? Man himself can make his 'artificial' breeds, that is, he can bring into being new forms of life which without his action would not have had existence. Man himself can effect in detail, in the particular, that which Nature herself effects in her general scheme. So far, the power of man differs in degree only, and not in kind, from the power of Nature.

But, again, how does man effect his purpose? He is moved by

Desire to bring into being some new form of life, and it is the activity of Will in him which enables him to fulfil his Desire.<sup>1</sup>

We ordinarily consider Time as something necessary for the operations of Nature—we say Time is necessary for change to take place. But in reasoning about Nature we must treat Time as non-existent, and, then, we see that man can do in the particular what Nature can do in the universal. So when we find it is Desire (Object) in man coupled with the activity of Will power which enable him to operate in the particular, it would seem reasonable to give Nature Desire (Object) and the activity of Will power in operating in the universal.

But any such argument I do not consider. There may or may not be this Object and Will in Nature. All I rely on is the subjection of the human personality in Will to its intuitive self.

For our present purpose, I repeat, we have nothing to do with supreme problems of Nature, God, Design, or the Great Unknown: all I claim is admission that something which *to us* is the Ultimate must exist. And, in human experience, all I rely on is that the activity of Will cannot result and come into being from natural selection: it must be pre-existent.

Here there must be a most unscientific lacuna in my argument. For—in due sequence—I should give some explanation of the evolution in manifestation of Will power in evolving organisms till we find its fullest manifestation in man. All this I ignore: it is not part of my scheme, and, so far, I admit the scheme is not exhaustive (cf. Laurie's *Synthetica*). Personally, I repeat, I cannot understand the evolution of Will itself, but only its evolution in manifestation. But, as before said, I am not sure my view may not be reconciled with that of Laurie).

All I rely on is that in the evolution of organisms we find at a certain stage the first appearance of Will in the organism, and that—Will not being a subject of evolution—we must treat this first appearance of Will as no more than its first appearance *in manifestation* in our universe.

What we find is that the Will of man has, to a large extent, command over his environments; and as this Will is no more than a partial and mediate manifestation of the Will of the intuitive self, it would appear to follow that the intuitive self has full command over the material. We must *start* with this full command of the intuitive self in order to get a foundation for the manifestation of Will in the human personality. (There is analogy here to the necessity facing Kant of assuming the existence of the soul of man

<sup>1</sup> Activity of thought is manifest in Desire, and it is the activity of Will in man which enables his Desire to be effective; that is, it is the activity of Will which enables man (within limits) to change his environments, or even bring into being new environments at his own Desire.

in order not only to explain synthesis itself, but even human cognition.—Kant, p. 62, last paragraph.)

The facts above stated, showing the relation of the human personality to the material, are facts of human experience, and I think they point to an important conclusion. I think they lead us to *expect* that man, as a human personality, has Will power over his own organism—his material body.

But what is the 'stuff' that man can use for the exercise of Will? Ideas, not intuition: the Will of the intuitive self I refer to intuition: the Will of the human personality to ideas. And, if the facts of human experience already dealt with be considered, we shall find that it is the ideas of man, singly or collectively, which have been the 'stuff' used in his exercise of Will. Human desire (personal or collective) wants, for example, chairs, tables, steam-engines, new forms of life, new forms of education for the next generation. Why? Because *in idea* (personal or collective) such changes in environments would lead to the benefit of the individual or the race. This desire is based on ideas, and so ideas are the 'stuff' Will uses to accomplish what it can accomplish.

Human experience offers very strong evidence that man has this Will power over his own organism. I think, too, this evidence shows that the Will power is exercised through ideas. Bear in mind that by ideas I mean anthropomorphic ideas as already defined: we do not consider the profound problems attacked by great metaphysicians.

Out of a large number of extant cases I pick a few showing the exercise of this extraordinary power in man.

'On April 26th, 1890, a hysterical woman was deeply hypnotised, and it was suggested to her that her right hand and wrist would swell and become cyanosed. After she was woken this suggestion gradually realised itself, and in four days the right hand was in the condition of the patients who had had spontaneous attacks. . . . M. Charcot re-hypnotised the patient, and assured her that her hand was quite natural again, helping his suggestion with a little massage. After a quarter of an hour the anaesthesia, venous colour, and swelling were gone' (*Proceedings*, vol. vii. p. 337).

On page 338 of the same volume is reported a somewhat similar experiment carried out by Dr. G. Rybalkin in the presence of his colleagues, at the Hôpital Marie at St. Petersburg.

Dr. Elliotson records a case of the cure of cancer of the breast under mesmerism—the patient's father's mother had died of a bleeding cancer of the breast. The patient was first seen on the 6th March 1843. In the same year all pain had ceased, and in 1848 Dr. Elliotson reports: 'The cancerous mass is now completely dissipated; the breast is perfectly flat: and all the skin rather thicker and firmer than before the disease existed. Not the smallest

lump is to be found : nor is there the slightest tenderness of the bosom or the armpit.'—'The diseased mass was dissipated and absorbed, and painlessly and imperceptibly' (*Proceedings*, vol. ix. p. 203 ; *Zoist*, vol. vi. pp. 213-237).

A boy of sixteen went to Dr. Wetterstrand : 'As the result of a blow about a month before on the knee, the joint was swollen, and he could neither bend nor straighten it, but kept it in a semi-flexed position. Strong fluctuations could be felt in it, and there were two places above the patella painful on pressure. After being hypnotised he was able to walk without limping, all pain had disappeared, and he could bend and extend the leg without difficulty. The next day the effusion had almost entirely disappeared, and he could walk quite well' (*Proceedings*, vol. xiv. p. 141).

Professor Liégeois, in a book reviewed by Walter Leaf, 'relates at length some extraordinary experiments in vesication by suggestion, carried out by Focachon, the production of stigmata by MM. Bourru and Burot, and the use of hypnotic anaesthesia in surgery' (*Proceedings*, vol. vi. p. 223).

Myers, in his paper on 'Subliminal Consciousness,' shows the wide range of effect on the bodily state of the hypnotised resulting from suggestion on the part of the hypnotiser (*Proceedings*, vol. vii. p. 331 *et seq.*).

Dr. Moll discusses these phenomena at length. He says : 'No matter how sceptical we may be on this point, it would be perverse to deny the possibility of such phenomena' (*Hypnotism*, Hopkirk's translation, 1909, p. 114). And though he would appear to consider the evidence in support not altogether scientifically unimpeachable, he, I think, gives great weight to it (see p. 120). One remarkable case that he refers to is worth recording :—

'If some object, such as a match-box, a pair of scissors, a snuff-box, a linen-stamp, etc., was pressed upon the skin in the morning, and the subject was at the same time told that his skin was being burned, a blister in the form of the object resulted in the afternoon. The marks remained a long time visible. If the object was pressed on the left side of a patient who was anaesthetic on the right, the burn appeared symmetrically on the right almost as if reflected in a glass, as could be especially seen if letters were used' (p. 116).

In the last case, I think, we have a clear instance showing that it was auto-suggestion on the part of the patient which resulted in the physical change. For the suggestion from the hypnotiser referred only to the *left* side of the patient, and the fact that the right side was also affected shows, I think, that the operation of the understanding of the patient himself effected the double result.

The 'looking-glass' effect on the right side is of peculiar interest, for I think we cannot refer this to any *direct* operation of the understanding of the patient. The ideas of the patient were centred on causing the effect on the left side, so the reversed effect on the right

must have been incidental to the intended effect—a reflected shadow, as it were, of the direct effect to be explained physiologically.

The point I make as to all such reported cases is that the hypnotiser has no direct influence on the bodily state of the patient: the influence is generally (not always) through suggestion from the hypnotiser; that is, by influence, ultimately, on the understanding of the patient. But this suggestion from the hypnotiser fails in effect unless it 'set up' self-suggestion in the patient. This self-suggestion which exists in idea can operate only through Will using ideas to effect physical change. For the influence of the hypnotiser is, ultimately, on the understanding of the patient, and this understanding has nothing but ideas to use for its operation under the active potentiality of Will. Suggestion is the offering of an idea from the hypnotiser to the patient: self-suggestion (in the present connection) marks the acceptance of the idea by the patient.

We find, then, on a full consideration of the facts, that the Will of the human personality can use ideas not only to determine largely its own environments, the environments of future generations, to bring into being new forms of matter and even of life, but to affect its own bodily state. Bear in mind that the Will of the human personality is no more than a manifestation within the limits of our universe of the Will of the intuitive self: the Will of the human personality is manifest in relation only to ideas, not to intuition.

Assuming I am correct in holding that Will as manifest in the human personality has, in evolution, this constantly increasing command over the material as manifest to us, we find ourselves faced by a great difficulty.

When we consider the ideas of any human personality there appears to be some indissoluble link between them and the material formation of the brain: the intuition of the intuitive self can only partially and mediately be manifested subject to the material formation of the brain. And this manifestation is in ideas which are limits of intuition.

But if this be so, there must be some form of action and reaction between ideas and the material brain.

Now it has already been shown that all ideas, even ideas conjured up by imagination, have effect on the motion of the material brain of the thinker; that is, they have effect on the material form of the brain. And it has also been shown that the effects of these ideas on the form of the brain are *lasting in time*; that is, so long as the material brain has existence, so long the effects on it of these ideas continue to exist in fixity of relations.

If, then, ideas are stored up in the material brain as has been argued, must it not be that, sometimes, ideas may *automatically* emerge in the thinker, without any action of Will? I think this must be so—there must be a form of action and reaction between

ideas and the material brain. (In sleep, if the Will be in abeyance, we may perhaps find this automatic emergence of ideas.)

But if we once admit this form of action and reaction, we must, I think, admit the possibility of some form of action and reaction between ideas and *all* forms of the material as manifest to us. For we cannot stop short at any form of action and reaction between ideas and the material form of the brain alone. If I, as a human personality with a material brain, change, this imports change of my relation to *all* my external: and so for all human personalities.

The material brain is no more than a form of matter, peculiarly complex in formation and specialised in function. It is the result of evolution over a long period, and the reason for this form of evolution must be found in some form of action and reaction between the brain and ideas. The material brain practically stores up all the ideas of its thinker.

It follows that I make the average evolution of the brain of the human personality dependent on the evolution of the ideas of the race. The brain capacity of a civilised race is greater than that of a barbarous race, because *over a long period* it has been operating in relation to higher and more complex forms in evolution of ideas.

Now consider anything that a man makes; for instance, a bottle. This bottle is a form of the material, and it is the creation of the ideas of the man who made it: if a work of art we speak of it as a personification of its creator's ideas. All things made by man (forms of the material created by man) are expressions of his ideas. When any one thinks of anything he has made—for instance, a simple bottle or a beautiful work of art—does he not find all the ideas he had when making the thing are present to him in the manifold? I think this is so. And, if this be so, then it is not a far stretch to hold that as there is a certain full storage of ideas in that particular form of matter, the human brain, so there is some limited storage of ideas in other forms of matter.

The above argument is not suggested as based on strict reasoning: it amounts to no more than the expression of a doubtful theory.

At the same time it appears to me that, in theory, we must be led to assume the supremacy of ideas over material forms of matter. Ideas are the 'stuff' that man has for use in formulating Desire, and Desire leads him to exercise his activity of Will in creating new forms of matter, even new forms of matter manifesting life.

When we consider human experience we find evidence that ideas do impress themselves on forms of matter, and that these impressions are lasting in time. This evidence, though, I admit, far from conclusive, must be considered.

## HAUNTED HOUSES

THE theory I now offer that the phenomena of haunted houses are to be explained by the lasting influence of ideas on forms of matter is very doubtful. At the same time I am bound to state that I cannot find in these phenomena any evidence for the continued existence of human personalities after disembodiment.

Those interested in this subject may be referred to the papers on 'Phantasms of the Dead,' by Myers and Podmore (*Proceedings*, vol. vi. pp. 229 *et seq.*, and pp. 314 *et seq.*). Differing views are therein given, and, I think, the arguments on both sides are worthy of full consideration. Both writers accept the facts of Haunted Houses as, for the most part, veridical. But neither arrives at any definite theory fully accounting for the facts.

Using the brains of others, I suggest the following view as to the facts:—

If we consider England alone we know there are hundreds of thousands of houses. Of these we find only a very very few which are alleged to be haunted. These few, too, are not marked in themselves by any peculiarity from others except as to their character of being haunted. For a haunted habitation may be a palace, a secluded mansion, a cottage, a semi-detached villa, or a large or small house of many, standing together in a street or square. In ordinary belief crime or some remarkable event marks the past history of the haunted house: but examination of the cases shows that this is by no means a necessary accompaniment.

In some of these houses different persons inhabiting them at different times—perhaps at intervals of years—witness the same or like phenomena which cannot be referred to normal causes: I refer now especially to appearances more or less like to human beings. The witnesses as to these phenomena are of all classes, from noblemen to servant maids; some are cold-blooded experts sent to the houses for the purpose of investigation into the phenomena. And, too, they are all normally sane in mind and body; and all, or nearly all, are subject to these hallucinations only when occupying haunted houses.

Now, on the evidence, I assume something happens in these few houses which does not (apparently) happen in the remaining hundreds of thousands: the happenings have some relation to the particular houses. Myers and Podmore both agree as to this: where they

differ is in their explanation of *why* and *how* these happenings occur. And neither of them, as before stated, arrives at any definite or dogmatic conclusion.

Can we find anything peculiar to these happenings? When we compare the conduct of these 'haunters' with that of living human personalities do we find any marked and definite distinctions? I think we do.

You, the reader, or I, the writer, when we move, think or act in any way, find that our conduct is that of human beings existing in the present, and having relation to present passing events. And when we consider the 'ghost' of the romance writer we find the conduct of the ghost like to that of living human beings.

But when we consider veridical cases of haunted houses we find the haunters do *not*, for the most part, appear and conduct themselves as disembodied personalities existing in the present, and as being related to present, passing events. Their apparent movements, it is true, are, more or less, like to those of living human beings; but even these movements have no relation, generally, to present passing events in the haunted house or to the chance occupants who catch glimpses of the movements (cf. *Journal*, iii. p. 69, by Mrs. Sidgwick).

Haunters, for instance, appear seated in chairs; entering or leaving rooms; ascending or descending staircases; they are heard to move from place to place; to cry, sob, or laugh; to cause uncanny sounds, from the noisy movements of furniture to the rolling of casks or clanking of chains. And these happenings are not only sporadic and discrete—in that they have no definite beginning or ending—but they have no apparent relation to the present events passing in the house, or to the present occupants of the house.

And bear in mind that in all these cases what is heard and seen is, for the most part, normally subjective, not objective. For instance—the crash of crockery is heard; no crockery in fact is broken: a locked door is seen to open; the door, in fact, has not opened.

Even in cases where the conduct of the haunters is related to the present, and there is assumed communication from them to the living, we generally find the communication is with reference to some past thought or action of the haunters (cf. the Children Case, *Proceedings*, vol. vi. p. 54; vol. viii. p. 211). These haunters manifest themselves to us as beings whose human experience came to an end at some moment when they became disembodied; they offer no evidence of continued existence in the present *in idea*: for the ideas they use (?) relate to their past bodily existence.

The facts referred to are facts, I think, for a great majority of the veridical recorded cases; and may, perhaps, have led Myers to his theory that hauntings exist in the dreams of the disembodied—dreams of their past when they were embodied.

If we expand Myers' theory, and hold that the 'earthbound' live

in a continuous dream of their past—of which we on earth catch now and again chance flashes in time—we have opened to us what must be, for many, a future of intolerable misery. The man who has passed a life absorbed in selfish pleasure would suffer the tortures of Dante's hell if condemned to eternal conscious repetition of his past: sensual pleasure would, for him, no longer exist, and he would experience but the timeless repetition of monotonous, hopeless, commonplace.

But, whether Myers' theory be sound or not, I think there must be something abnormally objective in these hauntings: something happens external to the percipients. If not, we must assume that hundreds of human beings, normally sane and free from baseless hallucinations, are subject to baseless hallucinations when within a few specified houses. Nor, great as is my respect for Podmore's reasoning, can I believe that chance presence in a particular house can cause abnormal manifestation of telepathic communication: the houses *themselves* (forms of matter) must, I think, have something to do with the hauntings in them.

I think these particular hauntings exist because the particular houses exist. I can dream in the present of my past experience in a particular house equally well whether the house still exist or does not exist; and, if the disembodied dream of their past human life, they can probably do what I can do. The existence of these houses has, then, nothing to do necessarily with the dreams of the disembodied. So, if we accept Myers' theory, we must explain why these dreams are manifest to us in particular existing houses. If, as I hold, they are manifest in these houses because the houses still exist, we must refer the *dreams* to the continued material existence of the houses. And this, I think, we cannot do for the reason above stated. We must hold, then, that the human experience of the hauntings when embodied has left some record on the house itself—has had effect on the particular form of matter.

It seems to me possible that, when these hauntings lived, their conduct in general impressed itself on the forms of the houses, and that these impressions have been lasting in time.<sup>1</sup> If this be so, then any after occupant of any such house might be so affected by the form of the house that ideas might emerge in him, from impressions from the house itself, like to those which would have emerged in him from impressions if he had been present when the hauntings lived, and he had witnessed their conduct. The houses 'take' negative photographs of the conduct of the hauntings when living, and some living individuals can, afterwards, develop these photographs positively.

But any such theory is weak, as it offers no explanation why only

<sup>1</sup> It is to be noted that these 'hauntings' would always appear to be related to forms of matter created or affected by man. Hauntings even of fields, roads, etc., I think come to an end with the destruction of the form of the road or field.

a very few houses are so affected by the impressions of human conduct.

The only definite conclusion I can arrive at is that haunted houses offer no satisfactory evidence towards proof of the continued existence of the disembodied : there appears to be no evidence of their present existence. The evidence, so far as it is veridical, shows that ideas are conveyed to the living only of the past of these haunters when embodied : the 'ghost' haunting the house is an eidolon of the past.

And, too, another fact has to be considered : not only the disembodied, but the living can appear as haunters of houses : past occupants of houses, while still living elsewhere in the body, appear sometimes to haunt their former habitations. This again points to the conclusion that it is *something* done in the past by a living being which causes these hauntings. For, though these hauntings by the living may perhaps be in themselves explainable by telepathy, when we find the same kind of hauntings caused also by the disembodied, we must, I think, relate both to the same cause. And I have already argued that, from their nature, the hauntings by the disembodied cannot be referred to telepathy from the surviving intuitive selves of the haunters, and so we cannot ordinarily refer the hauntings in question by the living to telepathy between the living.

## PSYCHOMETRY

IF we accept psychometry as a fact we are driven, I think, to accept some theory which assumes that ideas have lasting effect on forms of the material. But the evidence is by no means conclusive, certainly not nearly so strong as that for telepathy. I do not think we can, at present, place any great reliance on it.

Still, we have a great mass of diverse evidence in support. The experiences of Mrs. Piper and others show that the holding by the medium of some article belonging to an absent living person, or which belonged to some one who was disembodied at the time of the experiment, has some effect in assisting the emergence of ideas in the medium related to the person, living or dead, in question: the many reports extant of sensitives 'reading' the lives of people when they hold articles belonging to them, can scarcely be altogether false.

But as I do not attach any great weight to the present argument, I give only one instance. I give this case because it appears to me to be unique.

After more than one successful experiment with Mrs. Verrall (cf. *Proceedings*, vol. xx.), we arranged for another. I sent her a parchment inducting a clergyman into the living of West Wittering, dated 1792. Mrs. Verrall, 'sitting' with this, obtained certain automatic writing. (West Wittering, I may explain, incidentally, was very fairly described, though no one concerned had ever been there.) That part of the script which is now in point referred to a 'long low white house with a verandah,' and the question was asked: 'Where is that charming grandfather's clock which played tunes?'

When I received the script I had never been to West Wittering, and had never heard, I feel sure, of such a thing as a grandfather's clock that played tunes. Before trying to find out if there were any meaning in the question, I took precautions: I ascertained from certain leading members of the Council of the S.P.R. that they had never heard of such a thing as a grandfather's clock that played tunes. (I hold their replies in writing received by me before I went to West Wittering.) I did this to establish the fact that such a clock had never been the subject of discussion in the S.P.R. Mrs. Verrall, so far as she can trust her memory, had never seen or heard of such a clock. My clockmaker (of London) informed me that such clocks are not very rare.

Ultimately, I found that a Mr. Combes of West Wittering had purchased a grandfather's clock that played six tunes. It had been purchased by him at Chichester in the year 1862, brought to West Wittering, and kept there till 1896. I found out also where the clock now is, and that it had been for a few months in the long, low white house (no one knew of there ever having been a verandah), a house which belonged to Mr. Combes.

But mark this: the incumbent referred to in the parchment died in 1816; the clock did not come to West Wittering till 1862.

I think, then, the information as to the clock must be related to the parchment itself, not to the disembodied incumbent, though in whose possession the parchment was before it came to my hands I do not know. At the same time we must contemplate the possibility of chance coincidence; though, for that, we must strike a bull's-eye at incredibly long range. For the chances against so exceptional a clock having ever been in such a place are very large, and the chances against Mrs. Verrall's having *by chance* referred to such a clock are also very large. And the chance against these two chances having *accidentally coincided*, is a multiple of the two chances against unity!

But if we reject chance as an explanation of the coincidence, there must be some other explanation. What this may be I cannot suggest. I can only surmise, on the facts, that the disembodied were not concerned, while the fact that Mrs. Verrall 'sat' with the parchment must, in some way, be concerned.

We arrive, on the whole, at the following conclusions:—

Human experience proves the command of human personality, by Will, over forms of the material, and even forms of life. It proves also power by will manifested in the human personality over its own bodily state. And as the 'stuff' used by the human Will is ideas, these facts of human experience point to (do not prove) the subjection of forms of matter to ideas. This, again, makes possible the lasting influence or effect of ideas on forms of matter.

(We are in great need of long continued and extensive experiments in psychometry. Many experiments have, it is true, been carried out and recorded. But, I fear, the conditions under which these experiments have for the most part been conducted cannot be held sufficiently stringent for them to be treated as material for the formulation of any acceptable theory.)<sup>1</sup>

The above line of reasoning is sound to a certain point. But,

<sup>1</sup> The phenomena termed 'materialisations,' and those involving the movements of material objects without material contact, I do not consider—neither accept nor reject them. It is true there is a great mass of evidence, and some of it, from the exceptional character of the investigators, hard to reject. But, by common admission, there is so great a mixture of fraud; the opportunities for deception of the normal senses are always so great and the phenomena in themselves so bizarre and startling, that I think it is best, at present, to ignore the evidence.

when the possibility of ideas impressing themselves on forms of matter with lasting effect in time is dealt with, the reasoning is weak and unsatisfactory. In theory we can only contemplate this possibility: in human experience we find the evidence in support of the theory fails: there is evidence pointing to truth, but that is all.

Still if, as I hold, we find definite evidence in human experience that there is evolution in man's will-power of command over the material, so that the tendency of this evolution is towards full command by man through Will over the material, we are driven to the assumption of the existence of an intuitive self with full command by Will over the material. For personal Will cannot, I have tried to show, be the result in evolution of a blind struggle for existence between forms of life and their environments: this personal Will must always have existed from the beginning of the struggle for existence. I refer this power (Will) itself to an intuitive self, partially and mediately manifest in evolution in the human personality. There I stop. The deep problems opened up, and which Schopenhauer and others assume to solve, I do not consider.

## THE DISEMBODIED

I ASSUME proof to have been attained by the preceding argument that the human personality is no more than a partial and mediate manifestation in time and space of an intuitive self: the human personality is phenomenal, the intuitive self is (relatively) noumenal. The unique importance of this proof lies, I think, in the fact that the material used for proof is human experience and human experience only. The dissolution, therefore, of the human personality does not import the dissolution or ending in time of the intuitive self; for any interference with, even the destruction of the phenomenal, can affect in no way the existence of the (relatively) noumenal. We are justified, therefore, in assuming that the intuitive self survives the dissolution of the human personality. There is strong evidence in support of such survival but, as yet, no full proof.

But this intuitive self must not be treated as the soul of man; for we cannot give to it either immortality or mortality: our ideas of mortality and immortality result from what we know of matter (the unknown) and life (the unknown) as manifested to us in form in our universe, and the intuitive self is not a 'thing' of our universe. Though I have already stated it more than once, I now repeat that the present inquiry does not extend to any such supreme question as that of the soul of man.

To the human personality, it appears to me, we cannot give free-will, we can only give a form of free-will. I refer free-will (relatively, but only relatively) to the intuitive self. The full argument may therefore be termed anthropomorphic, in that I ignore the deeper problems of God, Nature, and Free-will, and my argument relies in no way on any Dialectic. Indeed, I arrive at the fact of the existence (not the nature) of the intuitive self by anthropomorphic *reductio ad absurdum* reasoning; for though I submit that our series of conditions can only be explained by the existence of the unconditioned, I still hold that what, to us, is the unconditioned is not in itself necessarily unconditioned. The unconditioned is beyond our cognition, so the intuitive self though it is, relatively to ourselves, the noumenal, may be still a subject of a series of conditions higher in order than ours.

It follows that the disembodied personality, which by assumption survives human dissolution, cannot be a subject of our cognition. And the same is true of the intuition of the disembodied, for the

intuitive self exists free from our limits of contradiction, and so we cannot even imagine how it *thinks* that which is not itself, when, for it, subject is object and object is subject.

But still I hold that the human personality is the intuitive self manifest, so far as is possible, in our series of conditions, and that the ideas of the human personality are limits (in time and space) of the intuition of the intuitive self. Thus the intuitive self is partially manifest to us in our universe. We can therefore arrive, in cognition, at certain negative conclusions as to the nature of the intuitive self which survives the dissolution of the phenomenal human personality—we can determine limits from which the disembodied are free.

The intuition of the disembodied is not limited by action and reaction between thought and any material brain—the material brain is absent: it is only human ideas which are subject to this action and reaction. And the fact should, I think, bring comfort to us. For it reduces to the phenomenal the existing form of competition between human personalities; a form of competition which, to many, appears to be the cause of meaningless wrong and injustice in our universe.

The mental (material brain) power of each of us is one thing; its manifestation on earth is another and distinct thing. For the manifestation depends on widely differing environments of rank, wealth and opportunity. A Gurney or Myers born and wedded to the plough would not have evolved into the two men we know: of the thousands of ploughboys now existing any one of them *might*, with the environments of a Gurney or Myers, have evolved into human personalities as distinguished as that of either of the two men. The human personalities we have human experience of are largely the creation of material environments of rank, wealth and comparative opportunity. To hold that such human personalities survive bodily death is to hold that God or Nature stereotypes, possibly for ever, those intellectual personal distinctions which are the result of evolution under human environments. Human personality is the result of evolution in relation to human environments; and these environments, as already shown, have been practically made by man, and made by man not for the benefit of all, but for the benefit of the few who, by their possession of property, can take full advantage of the environments.

So, if human personality survive bodily death, then it is *man himself* who determines the nature of the surviving personality. Man constitutes himself as God, for it is he who stereotypes, possibly for ever, personalities which he has himself created for the benefit, not of all, but of a class. A God is formulated who sacrifices the overwhelming majority in order that a few may have supreme, even eternal, bliss.

In the universe of which we have human experience we cannot deny the fact of a common struggle for survival, and that in this struggle the individual is sacrificed for the eventual benefit of the class and ultimately the race. We cannot deny that in this struggle all those who strike out new and so strange paths of advance for humanity suffer, personally, from the contumely of mankind. Why this evil exists in our universe as constituted we know not; but we can espy the roots of the evil: they exist in the common struggle for survival. Given variation, then we have the law of the survival of the fittest, and this infers competition where the weakest 'go to the wall.' And there is, herein, no competition necessarily inferring that the most moral survive—the weakest may be the most moral. Indeed, under society as constituted, those who are, to us, the most moral and most intellectual cannot establish beneficial environments for the survival of their descendants. For it is not the most moral and intellectual who leave their descendants in environments of wealth, rank and favourable opportunity, but self-seeking opportunists, who use morality and intellect only as crutches for personal material success. Superiority in art, science, literature or morality never founded the aristocracy of any nation. The foundations always lie in personal success in the personal acquisition of wealth, rank and power: a Shakespeare, Newton, Faraday, Kant or Martin Luther never founded a family. Even should such a man found a family, the family could only survive by successive inheritance of wealth and rank.

But though it must be admitted that any man to gain personal success must consult, mainly, his own material interests, many, perhaps a majority of such men when successful (and their descendants), use their acquired property largely for the benefit of their less fortunate fellows. I state this, not because it affects the argument, but to guard the reader from belief that I am unjustly attacking any class of humanity.

The roots of the evil that we see in our universe exist in competition. But what does this competition rest on? Competition for the survival, not of life, but of *material forms manifesting life*—the higher complex forms manifesting life have been evolved from simpler forms in competition between forms manifesting life. We have no human experience of the evolution of life itself: life whether manifest in the amoeba, or in a Newton or Kant, remains one and the same.

But these so-termed forms of life exist only in our universe—in our series of conditions. They cannot, therefore, survive material dissolution. So far the intuitive self cannot be subject to competition.

And what are the distinctions between intellectual knowledge? No more than distinctions between degrees of ignorance. We generally treat sheer ignorance as the normal state of man, and

assume evolution (in complexity ?) of knowledge. But when we consider advancing human knowledge we find ourselves faced by a strange fact—advancing knowledge simplifies, does not complicate, the riddle of the universe: advancing knowledge of the laws of nature tends to bring into harmony the discords of unrelated facts. The law of gravity finds one and the same harmonious explanation for the fall of an apple to the ground and the motion of the earth round the sun: discoveries as to electricity bring into accord the relation between the little sparks on a child's head, when combing its hair, and the lightning of heaven: Pasteur reduces the incomprehensible fiends who cause human diseases to microbes subject to human will: the giants, Darwin and Wallace, solve the complex problem facing us in innumerable, apparently unrelated forms of life, by their simple theory of evolution.

This, I say, points to a natural state of self-consciousness in full knowledge, where *full* knowledge lies in comprehension of the simplicity of nature. It is ignorance that sets up the complexity of nature. For a being in a natural state the material complexity of the brain is not necessary as a machine for comprehension of the complexity of nature: where there is full knowledge there is no complexity of nature.

We assume a child is born when it leaves its mother. Is not its real birth at the time of conception? If so, you who read and I who write, started our personal existence in manifested forms of life as, what may be termed, simple germs. We, ourselves, passed through all those evolving forms of life which had been predetermined by the evolution of our race from some simple primordial form through millions on millions of years. And so when, nine months old, we each started our separate human existence with a brain of certain complexity of form, this brain had been evolved in each of us. How evolved? By relation to the evolution of the brain of the race through countless ages. The evolution had not been in relation to any real complexity in the external, but in relation only to that complexity which is set up by the series of conditions in which we exist.

Consider this argument from another point of view. Intuition is given by the intuitive self to the human personality, and received by the human personality so far as it can receive it within the limits of its series of conditions. This series of conditions is an abstraction from the unconditioned, and hence arises, for us, the appearance of the discontinuous, that is, of the complex. From this we see that nature appears to the human personality to be complex, not because nature is really complex, but because the human personality, limited as it is, can only be affected by it in complexity. As human beings we only know the affects of nature on us, only know some noumenon phenomenally in broken, discontinuous parts: we exist in a universe of relations, so that *contradiction* exists for all

our ideas. Black has no meaning without the accompanying idea of white, and so, even, for evil and good as known to us. It is these facts which explain the discontinuity, the complexity of human thought in our universe of relations. The complexity is phenomenal.

I think it possible we may hold that human thought in evolution tends to intuition in the limit. And, if so, we may consider the fact that that complexity of nature which exists for the ignorant tends to disappear in simplicity for the learned.

We have experience of what may now be termed the supreme simplicity of nature in unity. But, conditioned as we are by our normal senses, we have experience of the external, not as matter (the unknown), but as conditioned in myriad differing forms of what we term matter. We 'take in' nature only through myriad separate 'peep-holes' in the dim glass separating our phenomenal existence from the (relatively) noumenal: our complexity of perception arises solely from our own limitations. But advancing knowledge relates, always more and more definitely, each peep-hole of knowledge to other peep-holes of knowledge; so that, always, we are getting rid of the discontinuous (the miraculous is subjective to the discontinuous) by evolved knowledge that real continuity lies behind apparent discontinuity. Even through the dim glass itself some light in general, I think, reaches us, so that we are conscious of that which, to us, is the unconditioned—the Ultimate of which, in cognition, we can apprehend but those discrete parts which, for us, constitute the apparent complexity of nature. Bear in mind that I now use the term 'the unity of nature' only for the purposes of argument. Nature itself exists in the manifold.

Without pressing this argument too far, does it not suggest that in comparison with the full knowledge of the intuitive self our knowledge is but relative ignorance, and that there is full simplicity in the noumenal, and so full simplicity in intuition?

If this be so, we must hold that the material brain is no more than a complex machine necessary only for the *human* personality in order that it may be able to receive and operate with the (apparent) complexity of human knowledge. And so, for the intuitive self, the intellectual distinctions of human personality vanish or, rather, are subsumed under full knowledge.

This line of thought leads to a conclusion that, for the intuitive self, distinctions of personality in intellect do not exist. But I think that, even as human personalities, we find distinctions of personality in what is ordinarily termed feeling quite apart from distinctions of intellect. A giant in intellect may be incapable of love or affection and incapable of inspiring either, while the ugly and mentally deficient child may be capable not only of inspiring full maternal love but of reciprocating such love. Herein I think exist distinctions of personality. We may find in personal love or

affection distinctions of personality which are conditioned in no way by intellectual distinctions.

And if we leave out of consideration not only intellectual distinctions, but distinctions in personal love or affection, I think there is still left for us feeling of distinctions in personality. Perhaps 'sympathy' is the best word we can arrive at for definition of this feeling in manifestation. But, if so, the term 'sympathy' can only now be used in the abstract; the concrete definitions given in dictionaries are useless.

It is quite true that very few of us choose our ordinary companions because of intellectual distinctions or personal liking or affection: it is comparative wealth, rank and opportunity that ordinarily choose our companions for us. But, in spite of these facts, I think many of us at times find ourselves influenced by a feeling of abstract sympathy for others quite irrespective of all questions of intellect, personal liking, rank or wealth: we may even find personality in ourselves, in a *personal* feeling of (abstract) sympathy with humanity in general. The feeling *is* personal feeling, but it has no content in relation to human distinctions of rank, wealth, power, intellect or physical form. This feeling appears to me to lie in intuition rather than in any form of human thought: the bond of sympathy between ourselves and these others seems to be a bond outside the purview of cognition or normal human feeling.

Now bear in mind that each one of us is an intuitive self manifested as a human personality. May not this consciousness of self, this consciousness of relation to other selves, which savours in no way of the intellectual or other material distinctions, be manifestation to us (outside cognition) of the underlying relation between intuitive selves? May we not *feel* the distinctions, though the distinctions are beyond human cognition? May it not be that, herein, we find our real personality?

And when I think myself as *I am*, do I not think myself free from all environments? Whether I be duke or ploughboy, a hard-headed man of intellect or a good-natured fool, I think myself as *I am* without content. That is, I think myself unconditioned by the dukedom or the plough, even by intellect or human nature in manifestation.

When I intuite *I am*, I intuite myself as disembodied, and I would suggest that when I think *I am* even then, for the thought is without content, I think myself as not bodily conditioned. Even the thought *I am*, without content, appears to me thought of myself as a personality. Herein we again arrive at personality unconditioned by the intellectual or physical.

All thought of oneself as a human personality infers some content in the thought. If then there can be the thought *I am* without content, I suggest this infers consciousness of self as something

higher in being than a human personality : the thought must be of a personality not bodily conditioned. But we only arrive at the fact of this personality ; that is, we can determine it in no way positively. We can only negatively define it as free from the conditioning of the series of conditions in which we, as human personalities, exist.

Again, when we consider life itself, I think there is very general confusion of thought as to what we mean by life. What do we mean when we say one thing is alive and another thing is not alive ; what is the distinction we raise ? I think all we mean is that in the thing alive something (which we term life, but which in itself is unknown to us) is manifest. In the thing not alive this something is not manifest. As a live thing *and in relation to life itself* I cannot distinguish between any primordial form of protoplasm and the complex organism man. It is the same one unknown thing *life* which distinguishes all these forms of life, simple or complex, from things not alive. Life appears to me to be what we may term a principle to which we need not necessarily refer self-consciousness or its potential, will.

How can we distinguish between the *life* of any primordial form of protoplasm and the *life* of man, unless we introduce the factors of the complexity of form and specialisation of function of the organism, man ? But the moment we do this we make the life of man dependent on his material form of life ; we define the ' life of man ' as meaning ' the life of a being of particular complexity of form and specialisation of function.' And so, when this material form is dissolved the life of man no longer exists ; there is nothing personal to survive.

The above arguments I submit tell strongly against any theory for the survival of human personality and, especially, against the survival of those distinctions between human beings which we refer to the intellect—to the form of the material brain.

Again, I have shown that Kant, for the unity of self-apperception of his subject, does necessarily assume, as a foundation for the very existence of this form of self-consciousness, the existence of what he terms the soul of man. And this soul of man, existing as he holds outside our series of conditions, cannot be a thing of intellect, cannot be a thing or being *existing* in complexity of form and specialisation of function as forms and functions are known to us.

I think it follows that we err when we attach so much importance to the life of man ; for, in man as a human being, there is no more than a manifestation of life indissolubly connected with his (material) complexity of form and specialisation of function. If this be so we may perhaps find an excuse (?) for nature ' red in tooth and claw.'

We accuse nature of innate cruelty and brutality (Winwood Read,

in *The Martyrdom of Man*, marks the acme of the charge) in so ordering our universe that organisms exist on the constant and disorderly destruction of individual lives—even in evolution there appears, to us, to be immoral strife where the many and the weakest (very possibly the most moral and intellectual) are constantly sacrificed for the benefit of the strong. But if we regard life as a principle in the abstract, of which we know but manifestations in relation to the material forms of organisms, then we see that nature never destroys life: it but puts a sudden end to certain material forms through which life is manifest. Nature does not play with life itself: it plays but with shadows cast on our universe, shadows which it uses but as toys of the passing hour, or, perchance, that which appears to us but pastime may, in truth, reveal to us dimly the timeless activity of the Supreme, using nature as its passive instrument for some timeless 'accomplishment in the accomplishing' (C. C. Massey).<sup>1</sup>

We must contemplate the possibility that at some future time science may discover life itself to be a subject of natural evolution from lifeless matter. But such a discovery would not, I think, have any effect on the present argument.

For both life and matter are the unknown: we know them only so far as manifest in form in our universe: life we know only as manifest in relation to certain forms of the material as before shown. But the intuitive self to which, in reason, we give self-consciousness and the activity of will-power, is not a thing of form as known to us. So even if we make life a function of matter (or matter a function of life), we do not touch the problem of the existence or of what is the existence of the intuitive self. By making life a function of matter the manifestations of form of life still remain as facts to us. All we do is to solve the lesser problem by the creation of a greater.

The *I am* exists in intuition. Even if we say the *I am* exists in thought, the thought is without content. For the moment we give content to the thought, we think *I am* in a manifested form of life, and so this thought is phenomenal. We do not even attempt to define life itself; for if all attempted definitions be dissected, they will be found but to amount to defining the manifestation of some unknown principle (?) termed life in our universe in relation to form.

What does Herbert Spencer's definition, 'the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations,' mean? What does it explain? It is no more than a statement of observed facts which result from the action, influence or affect of the unknown 'life'

<sup>1</sup> Absolute good and absolute evil are, in cognition, meaningless terms. For we know good and evil only in relation the one to the other: there is, for us, no good without evil, no evil without good. So the Supreme Purpose must transcend both good and evil. But bear in mind that in stating this *I am* referring only to what *appears* to us to be a conclusion of reason.

on certain manifested material forms, so that in these forms there is found to be the said continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations which constitutes them what we term forms of life. He defines not life itself, but the resultants as manifest in our universe of the action, influence or affect of the unknown 'life.'

It is not life itself which exists in the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations: life is merely manifest in this continuity of operation—I should rather write 'in these innumerable and diverse continuities of operations.' And certainly Herbert Spencer was referring to continuity or succession *in form*. For in matter itself (apart from form) we find no adjustment of internal relations to external relations; matter itself, unless with form, is as unknown to us as life itself.

When, then, both matter and life are unknown to us, we cannot now, in reasoning as to the intuitive self, be concerned with the question of what the relation of the one may be to the other.

We arrive at the conclusion that when we consider embodied, that is human, personalities, we must have forms of matter manifesting life. But when we consider disembodied personalities, we are considering personalities existing free from the limits of the series of conditions in which we exist. And as form (as known to us) exists only in relation to time and space (which may be termed the passive determinators of our series of conditions), the disembodied must exist unconditioned by any form known to us. As 'life,' as known to us, can exist without self-consciousness and will, I cannot understand why life should be held as a condition precedent for self-consciousness and will. Matter and life may be but aspects of something transcending both. We must contemplate the possibility that for the intuitive self (a thing of self-consciousness and will) life and matter are subsumed under something noumenal. As both life and matter are unknown to us, we cannot term either or both as noumenal.

But as the embodied are (phenomenal) forms of the disembodied, there must still be some real relation between the embodied and the disembodied, if only that of a shadow to its body. We may, perhaps, for the purposes of reason, give some (unknown) reality of form to the disembodied. And, if so, we may hold that the form of the embodied is not lost, but subsumed under the form of the disembodied. In any case, however, the distinctions of personality which must be assumed, if we hold that intuitive selves exist, cannot lie in distinctions of form as known to us in matter, intellect, or even life.

Consider this question from, again, another slightly different point of view.

The life of man cannot be distinguished from the life of any other organism—even the simplest primordial form of life—unless we hold there is an indissoluble link between such life and the particular

complexity of form and specialisation of function of the organism, man. Otherwise there is no distinction between the life of man and the life of any other living organism. Life (the unknown) as manifest in innumerable forms of matter is always the same, may be termed the same one principle. The life of the human personality differs only from the life of other living things in that it is manifest in a particular material organism of exceptional complexity and specialisation. If the personality of any human personality as distinct from other human personalities consists in distinctions of form, as known to us, whether purely physical or psychical (?) mental form, then on the dissolution of these forms, following bodily death, the personality of all human personalities comes to an end.

So if that which is above stated be true, I can find no reply to what is ordinarily termed the materialist argument, that on the dissolution of the material form of man his personality comes to an end.

But I refer personality to self-consciousness and will-power, which manifests, to us, activity in volition. I make this personality dependent in no way on any form, physical or psychical (?) as known to us. And the whole of the argument is addressed to proof that, *in human experience*, we find definite evidence that this personality, which I term the intuitive self, does exist. I repeat that we know nothing of any indissoluble link between self-consciousness and will on the one hand, and life on the other. For though we have no human experience of self-consciousness and will without life, still we have experience of life without (apparently) self-consciousness and will.

Therefore I do not reject the materialist argument: I rely on it as a step towards the proof I offer. With the origin or timeless being of self-consciousness, will and volition we are not concerned. I repeat that I leave untouched the deep problems of God, nature, free-will, or the Ultimate in any way.

And life itself? It always remains the unknown; manifest, to us, only as, possibly, an active principle in relation to certain forms of matter. I think life and non-life may be merely relative terms to be referred to some principle (?) transcending both, so that a (relatively) noumenal self of self-consciousness and will transcends both. I can attach no supreme importance to life.

It is true that, in evolution, we never find the manifestation of will and volition until living organisms appear. Life, for us, is a condition precedent for the manifestation of will and volition. Therefore, in reason, we may hold that the intuitive self is a living thing—has life. But life itself still remains the unknown. So I cannot help thinking that life may be merely a condition precedent for the manifestation of will and volition in our universe: may not be (I would say probably is not) a condition precedent for self-consciousness and will. Treating the intuitive self as a thing of

will (and volition?) it may exist without the unknown life. Even if we discover that life is a 'something' which is the subject of evolution in the evolution of our material universe, we do not thereby make will itself a subject of evolution.

Is life a principle separable from matter? If so, what evidence have we of its existence? None. I do not deny that life may be a condition precedent for personal self-consciousness, will, and volition; but I deny that we have any human evidence in proof of the fact.

Bear in mind we arrive only at proof of the existence of the intuitive self: we know the intuitive self and its intuition only so far as manifest to us in our universe. The personality of the intuitive self transcends human personality, transcends the life of the human personality.

The normal organs of sense are part of our material body, and so are conditioned in time and space. It is from the form of our communication with the external (our normal experience) by means of our normal organs of sense that we think, or are impressed by the existence of, time and space: this communication is subject to certain limitations which we term the laws of time and space. Time and space only exist, for us, in relation to our communication with the external through our normal organs of sense.

But the fact of telepathy imports the fact that we can communicate with the external otherwise than through the normal organs of sense.

Now reason informs us that we are conditioned in time and space because we are human personalities conditioned in time and space. So if we can communicate with the external otherwise than through the normal organs of sense (otherwise than with the aid of the normal material body), then reason does not tell us that the 'we' so communicating are conditioned in time and space; for this communication cannot, in itself, be referred to personalities embodied in human material form. Such communication must be between personalities not conditioned in material bodies: it must be communion between personalities not bodily conditioned. This appears to me a direct conclusion of reason, requiring no dialectic, no logic, as defined. It follows that if we find telepathic communication between human personalities this must be subjective to (an abstraction in time and space from) the communion between our (relatively) spiritual selves unconditioned in time and space.

The telepathic communication is of such a nature that it cannot be explained by the assumption of some additional normal organ of sense which is part of the material body: the communication, in itself, is of such a nature that it cannot be referred to direct communication between human personalities conditioned in material bodies.

The explanation would appear to be:—

All our cognition as human personalities is based on intuition given (actively) to us by our intuitive selves.

In the same way the communion in intuition between (embodied) intuitive selves is the basis of telepathic communication in impressions and ideas between human personalities. The stuff (?) of telepathic communication between human personalities is the communion in intuition between their intuitive selves.

We cannot condition the spiritual self in time and space as known to us, so we cannot condition it in any form known to us—we cannot condition it in any human form of intellect or even life.

But 'disembodied' we still exist in personality.

It has been shown that Kant's whole scheme in the *Critique* is founded on the fact of the existence of a soul in man, and he arrives ultimately at the fact of the existence of what he terms the 'intelligible self'; a self unconditioned in any bodily form.

Again, in modern time (1906), Laurie arrives at the following conclusion:—

'Thus man, as the head of a finite world, is not restricted to the finite, but, on the contrary, has the infinite insistently thrust on him in Feeling, and also in all knowing of the conditioned. In the root experience—pure feeling of being unconditioned, in his further experience of the same being as immanent in sense—Man is permeated and surrounded with that which is not less but more than knowledge, and is compelled to the further affirmation of that which is *above* all knowledge. He is thus, from the first and always, involved in the Universal a conscious sharer in the Divine Life in his feeling, his sentience, and his knowing. To be consciously at home with the infinite is the privilege of man' (Laurie's *Synthetica*, vol. i. p. 257).

From Kant to Laurie we find the Dialectic is used for argument in arriving at the conclusion that a spiritual self exists.

The method of proof in this treatise is radically different. For I assume to use no Dialectic, no logic, as defined. I rely solely on human experience; I use only the facts of human experience for conclusions of reason.

I assume that telepathy is a fact of human experience. If this be a fact, it is a fact that human personalities can communicate with one another otherwise than through the normal organs of sense. And, herein, we arrive at a direct conclusion that there is manifest in human personalities the potentiality of being affected through sensibility otherwise than through the normal organs of sense. By no possibility can we refer this potentiality itself to the human personality as a subject conditioned in time and space and thereby restricted, for communication with the external and external personalities, to the use of its normal organs of sense. For such potentiality there must be in each one of us a spiritual self and the

telepathic communication between human personalities can be no more than phenomenal manifestation of this (relatively) noumenal communion.

The reason of man, using no Dialectic, no logic, as defined, but relying on human experience only, arrives at the existence of the spiritual, the intuitive self.

But no further step is possible for human reason : we arrive at the existence of the spiritual self, we can know nothing of what this self is in itself, cannot determine it. We can know this self only in so far as it is manifest to us in our phenomenal universe of relations.

I touch in no way on the supreme question of man's immortality : I leave that for faith, belief and revelation to answer.

But still if it has been proved in reason, using only human experience as the stuff of reasoning, that the personality of man survives the dissolution by death of human personality, then a great advance in human thought has been effected. We may remain sheerly ignorant, in reason, of what our spiritual future can be ; may still kick, in wonder and perplexity, against our pricks of ignorance ; may still strive, as man will always strive, to explain the lesser difficulties of our universe by the creation of others greater still. But if Death, till now guised as our executioner, be proved our friend and helper—our friend and helper to a personal life far, far transcending in freedom and spirit our mortal existence—then we know we are subjects of the spiritual, not vain passing shadows of the material. We have established an advance in human thought. Reason does more than free us from the limitations of any possible human experience. For, now, Reason, though still shackled by the limitations of our human experience, transcends the *not-I* of the human personality, and assures us of the existence of the *I*, as a spiritual self.

## COMMUNION WITH THE DISEMBODIED

FROM a general purview of what has already been written it follows that we are, as intuitive selves, timelessly in communion with the disembodied as intuitive selves. But this communion, lying in intuition and not in ideas and impressions, is unevidential: it has nothing to do with cognition. Herein is seen the importance of distinguishing between a fact and the evidence of a fact. For many of us know—outside cognition—that this communion is a fact. But the 'knowledge' is purely personal: we have no human *evidence* to offer of the fact, so that we can offer no proof to others who have not had like experience. For such evidence to be available the experience must be related to extraneous human facts, and, by the nature of the case, this is impossible.

It would appear then, at first thought, that we cannot even discuss this question of communion with the disembodied, for, in human experience, we can only deal with evidence of facts, not with facts themselves; and, so far, we have no evidence before us.

Still I think there may be evidence, though it can never be conclusive.

I have given grounds for holding we have human experience that the intuitive self embodied can, in Myers' words, 'leave the body and not only travel far but actually modify spatial relations at a distance, so as to impress the sense-organs of other conscious persons' (see Part II. p. 178).

How in such cases would the sense organs of other conscious persons be affected? Certainly not directly: there must be an affect *in space* on such conscious persons which has led to the emergence in their understanding of visual, auditory or tactile ideas. So these emerging ideas are subjective. And this affect is from the intuitive self (the spirit, Myers terms it) of the agent, *not* from the agent as a human personality. So, if the percipient sees or hears or touches the agent as a human personality, he is affected by the intuitive self of the agent in the phenomenal form of a human being: all human forms are phenomenal. But this phenomenal form may have been, as it were, created by the percipient: it may be simply a phenomenal abstraction (effected by the percipient) from the intuitive self of the agent present in space.

I do not think, if we admit that this power to modify spatial relations exists in the intuitive self (or spirit) embodied, we can

fairly deny it to the intuitive self disembodied : in the latter case it is arguable that the power would be more extensive. So I would give to the disembodied this power to determine themselves in space.

The intuitive self also *may* have power to manifest itself in space as a human personality. For, when we bear in mind that the human personality is phenomenal, we see at once that any such power when exercised by the intuitive self infers no creative power : the intuitive self does not create human personality for itself. All it does is to project, as it were, its (relatively) noumenal self on to our phenomenal universe of space and time : it merely abstracts the phenomenal from the noumenal. In any such case it would be the agent, not the percipient, who gives rise to the phenomenal human form in which the agent appears to the percipient.

And what would be the nature of this 'projection' of human personality ? It would be an anthropomorphic personality apparent (phenomenally) to certain human beings conditioned by their normal organs of sense. When we bear in mind that all human beings are phenomenal, we conclude at once that this 'projection' would in many ways appear like other human beings.

I am unable to appreciate the force of the 'clothes' objection to the appearance of 'spirits.' If the disembodied cannot appear, to us, as phenomenal human beings, *cadit quaestio*. But if they can, then they *must* appear in anthropomorphic form, for in human experience we are altogether incapable of being affected in any way but by those material forms possible for our universe. Grant that the disembodied have 'form,' but some form entirely different from, unrelated to, our known anthropomorphic forms. Then, should they appear to us in their real form, by no possibility could they impress us, through or in relation to our normal organs of sense, with consciousness of their presence. They must, to so impress us, appear (phenomenally) in human form and human guise. I write 'in human form and human guise,' because if the disembodied do appear to us anthropomorphically, there is no more difficulty in such appearance in human guise (or clothes) than there is in appearance in human form. Indeed, should Louis Quatorze, for instance, appear to any one of us *in puris naturalibus*, then—his valet being dead—we should not recognise him. He was known, even to his contemporaries, mainly by the form of his clothes.

I would not, therefore, deny the spiritualistic theory of human intercourse with the disembodied. And, in this connection, it must be remembered I give to the disembodied full memory in the manifold of (what is to us) their past embodied experience, so that, if they have power in thought to project their memory in the manifold on to our universe of space and time (that is, to condition their thought memory in succession), they may have power to communicate with us in idea as to their past.

But, too, the evidence for the spiritualistic theory of such intercourse appears to me, in its nature, inconclusive.

Though a great part of the evidence offered is of such a nature that it deserves no consideration, there is, also, no little evidence that appears to be sound in itself. But a full consideration of the best evidence leads me to the conclusion that though we find evidence which, if accepted, involves intercourse in the present with the disembodied, we do not find any evidence of the *continued existence* of the disembodied in the present. I do not deny the fact of this continued existence; it is the *evidence* for the fact which I say is inconclusive.

Consider, for instance, the great mass of evidence reported by the S.P.R. as to 'cross-correspondences,' so far as it has been made public.

What do we find?

The evidence published is that which bears on the theory of intercourse *in the present* with individuals who are disembodied. But what is the subject of the 'cross-correspondences'? Facts which were in the mind or memory of the disembodied when *embodied*.

Assume, for example, that the Myers communicating is but a present eidolon of the Myers which was embodied. Assume, that is, that the personality of Myers vanished on death, and only an eidolon of all his human past now exists.<sup>1</sup>

We can imagine that this eidolon has power to think in the past, indeed an analogy showing what I mean may be drawn from human experience of the phenomena of double consciousness.

Suppose a man, John Brown, lives a normal life till the age of seventeen. Then assume a period of unconsciousness supervenes so that when he comes to himself his memory of the past is gone, and for three years he lives what is, practically, a new life. At the end of the three years his memory of the first seventeen years returns to him, *but* he has forgotten all his personal experience during the aforesaid three years.

Now if, when John Brown first becomes conscious (at the end of the three years) of his former life, we hold converse with him he can only talk about his first seventeen years of past life: the last three years is a blank in his memory.

In such a case we know the John Brown we talk to is the still existing John Brown of twenty years of age—we know this because we see him and hear him speak in the same one form of life.

But suppose we could not see and hear speak the same material form of John Brown? Suppose it is only through a machine (for

<sup>1</sup> I can neither accept or reject the theory some of the members of the Council of the S.P.R. have promulgated as to these cross-correspondences. For, not the full evidence before them, but only those parts of the evidence on which they rely to establish their theory, have been made public.

in this connection we may speak of a medium as a machine) we converse with some one or something alleging itself to be John Brown? Then, if this machine could tell us nothing of the last three years of Brown's life, but only of the preceding seventeen years, we should have *evidence* of converse, not with Brown in the present, but only with the past Brown of three years before. This converse would be *evidence* also of the present existence of Brown, but the evidence would be inconclusive: for conclusive evidence we should want converse with Brown in the present passing moment about happenings in the present passing moment. And this evidence is absent. We are, practically, only conversing with a present eidolon of John Brown's past.

If we assume that these cross-correspondences reveal converse as alleged, the converse would appear to be *present* converse with a past embodied personality: we have direct evidence of no more than a present eidolon of such a past embodied personality. (Cf. the hypothetical theory as to haunted houses, Part III. p. 294. Barrett suggests that the Myers communicating with us is but a 'fragment' of the surviving Myers.)

I doubt whether we have more than evidence of converse with the disembodied as to their past. It is true the disembodied are assumed to converse in the present about present passing affairs. But the evidence so offered appears to me doubtful: it may very possibly be all referred to subjective thought on the part of the medium. For there is never—there cannot be—any reference to the passing present events of the experience of the disembodied themselves. Some, indeed, who were present when certain of the communications on which the theory of cross-correspondences is based were given, say the evidence was, to them, strong, because marked by the personality of Myers. But what personality? The human personality of Myers manifest to them in the past when he was embodied. I can find no evidence of any continuing personality after leaving the body, no evidence of evolution of personality after bodily death.

It may be urged that what is above written destroys the whole weight of the evidence of these cross-correspondences as suggesting intercourse with the disembodied. But I do not think so.

For, assuming Myers still exists as a personality with power to project his personality on to our universe of time and space, how could he thus communicate directly with us? Only in human impressions and ideas, and these, to be evidential to us, must refer to his past when embodied: for anything that has happened to him since death must be, to us, non-evidential; the 'happenings' are outside our series of conditions. If, then, we assume he still survives, the only way he can communicate with us is with reference to his past embodied state. The evidence he offers of his continued existence must, in its nature, be inconclusive.

If Myers still exists as an intuitive self, he exists outside our series of conditions, so of his present state (and his existing personality) he can give us no evidence in cognition. The continuing nexus between him and ourselves as human personalities exists only in his memory of that which, to us, is his past. This nexus is all he can use for human intercourse. So, *assuming he still exists*, he can only communicate with us directly as the Myers that existed in the past as a human personality: that is, he can only offer us evidence of his (to us) past experience. He can offer evidence of his continued existence, but the evidence, for our cognition, cannot be conclusive.

There is fairly strong human evidence that the intuitive self can determine itself in space—can affect spatial relations: there is some human evidence that the intuitive self can determine itself in space as a (phenomenal) human being but, in the nature of the cases, this evidence must, I think, be inconclusive.

Bear in mind I am referring to human evidence. Personal experience may *prove* to the individual having such experience that we can hold communion with the disembodied. But such purely personal experience is unevidential. Bear in mind, too, that what I write has nothing to do with the supreme question of revelation.

So far, the point I make is that *direct* communication between human beings and the disembodied in idea can only be with reference to what is, to us, the past of the disembodied when embodied, and this communication cannot prove the continued existence of the disembodied at the time of communication; it can only prove what is, to us, a present eidolon of the past embodied human being.

But there may, too, be present *indirect* communication between the embodied and disembodied which is well shown in the following words of Kant: 'For spiritual ideas can pass over into the personal consciousness of man, indeed, not immediately, but still in such a way that, according to the law of association of ideas, they stir up those pictures which are related to them and awake analogous ideas of our senses. These, it is true, would not be spiritual conceptions themselves, but yet their symbols' (*Dreams of a Spirit Seer*, p. 69; cf. Part I. p. 64).

Herein we find the distinction I have already made between impressions and ideas. If we speak of the spiritual ideas as impressions, the emerging ideas are subjective; they are mere symbols.

I think we have, in human experience, evidence, possibly strong, that communication in this form does take place between human beings and the disembodied.<sup>1</sup> But from the great mass of evidence

<sup>1</sup> I would, possibly, thus explain the cross-correspondences of the S.P.R. But I think the S.P.R. are now accumulating evidence—which may ultimately prove directive force from the disembodied on anthropomorphic communications otherwise than through the normal organs of sense.

offered it is most difficult to distinguish the true from the false. Human imagination, often unconsciously, plays strange pranks with the storage of ideas in humanity: human desire, for the most part unconsciously, often vitiates human conclusions in thought and memory, while love of notoriety or self may originate deliberately false statements. And, too, as Kant points out, even where true symbolic ideas of spiritual conceptions emerge, they are generally so largely accompanied by the emergence of other ideas, arising from the normal operation of the understanding, that it is most difficult to arrive at the genesis of the true symbolic ideas separately. Ordinarily the 'flashes of intelligence' from the disembodied are so inextricably mixed up in a vast mass of normal ideas that the disentangling is a labour of Hercules. The expenditure of energy by Mr. Piddington in separating and collating the evidence for cross-correspondences from a tangled mass of matter irrelevant to his argument (as shown in his well-known paper) must have been prodigious.

For proof (as apart from evidence) of communion with the disembodied we are, I think, thrown back on personal experience. And this personal experience is non-evidential; that is, useless as evidence for those who have not had the personal experience.

The above line of reasoning is not, I think, opposed to the theory or belief of many so termed spiritualists. But it is opposed to the theory or belief of no few.

For some hold that, after bodily death, our personality survives in a spiritual form like to our bodily form. They give to the surviving personality senses of sight, hearing and touch like to our normal senses: feelings (in contradiction) of love and hatred, pleasure and pain, akin to our normal feelings: continuing human interest in sublunary affairs, even interest in the material success or failure of human beings. And some hold that intellectual distinctions resulting from human education mark, still, personal distinctions in the disembodied—they make the personal distinctions of these 'spirits' depend on whether during earthly life they had the material environments of Eton and Christchurch or a board school and the gutter.

As I make human personality itself a mere passing phenomenon of a (relatively) noumenal self, I cannot admit this disembodied continuity of human personality.

At the same time when we bear in mind that our human personalities are phenomenal, why should not the (relatively) noumenal have power to communicate with us on our phenomenal plane? Such communication should be, I think, possible. The *real* communion is in intuition, the phenomenal communication is in symbolic ideas. So I would give reality to the feeling of comfort many experience in the continued presence, which is felt by them, of those who have passed the grave: even anthropomorphic appear-

ances and communications of the disembodied may be symbolic of reality and real communion.

But herein, it appears to me, lies a very great danger.

The human understanding is always in operation; each one of us, as a human personality, is always subject to Desire, which determines the activity of Will in Volition. Where there is real communion with the disembodied which emerges in ideas, these ideas are always symbolic: but they seldom emerge as *true* symbols. For the understanding functions, not with these symbolic ideas alone, but with these ideas and other ideas always arising normally. Herein lies the danger.

In normal thought we relate back our Desire and the activity of Will to normal ideas—we conduct ourselves, more or less, as reasonable beings. But if we relate back certain of our ideas to communion with the disembodied, we may become subject to these ideas as dominant ideas, so that our Desire and activity of Will depend on these ideas alone. Our human conduct, human thought, then, becomes abnormal, and we may think and act in contradiction to the dictates of reason.

If these dominant ideas were exclusively those symbolic ideas emerging from real communion, there might be no danger from our subjection to them. But, nearly always, these dominant ideas are a great mixture of such symbolic ideas and normal ideas resulting from normal functioning of the understanding, so that the human personality, while believing its thought and action to be dictated by revelation from the disembodied, is in reality largely subject to normal ideas. Under such influence the activity of the human personality may be manifest in conduct or thought dangerous to the well-being of the individual, even to that of others (cf. *Spiritism and Insanity*, Dr. Marcel Viollet, 1910).

In Dr. J. Maxwell's *Metapsychical Phenomena*, Appendix C, is given an account showing how abnormal the conduct of a reasonable man may be when under the influence of dominant ideas referred to an abnormal spiritual source. The whole story is so bizarre, so impossible, that it cannot be fully rejected, and yet acceptance is equally impossible. One fact, however, seems indisputable: that under the influence of direction from a 'spirit,' M. Vergniat allowed himself, against his reason, to be financially ruined.

Both in theory and in human experience I think we can get near to proof that personality survives the bodily dissolution of the human personality, and that we, embodied, are very possibly in communion with the disembodied. That we exist as spiritual selves is, I have argued, a fact of human experience.

But when we consider the question of human intercourse in ideas with the disembodied, we are faced at present by insuperable difficulties. Most of the evidence offered must be rejected, and it

is impossible to so collate what is worthy of consideration that we can arrive at any theory based on human experience. So all now written on the subject must be treated as tentative.

What I rely on is the proof offered in these pages that we exist as intuitive selves, our human personality being merely partial and mediate manifestations in our universe of our intuitive selves. And this proof is based on direct conclusions of reason from facts of *human experience*.

From this it follows that there must be timeless and spaceless communion between all intuitive selves embodied or disembodied. But intercourse between the embodied and disembodied in idea is not proved : in theory it is possible ; in human evidence we have, at present, no proof. We have but evidence which, in its nature, is inconclusive.

And here I must reiterate the importance of bearing in mind the distinction between a fact and the evidence of a fact. Some of us *know* that communion between the embodied and disembodied does take place : I can well understand that many who assume to be in direct communication with the disembodied in *idea*, may *know* there is, for them, communion with the disembodied, though the direct ideas they rely on may be false. But in neither case is there any evidence of communion or intercourse : facts only are involved which are facts to those concerned, but quite unevidential for those not concerned.

## LAST WORDS

THE child, trailing clouds of glory as it comes, enters on human life full of delight in the incomprehensible. Grown to manhood it strives to solve with its intellect the Riddle of the Universe. But always the 'Eternal Iron Laws of Nature' bar the goal of full knowledge: the Supreme Architect has fixed the goal-posts of full knowledge far beyond the limits of our Lilliputian universe. Live as we may, absorbed in personal pleasure or with mind and body centred on personal aggrandisement in wealth, rank or power, always experience teaches us that our labour is lost—even those who attain an earthly goal find no rest and content. The goal won, the vista of another opens, for which the race of human competition is keener. What man on earth has found rest and content in ambition?

The higher and more spiritual man's life, the greater his freedom from human personality, the fuller his forgetfulness of self in thought of others, the nearer his approach to rest and content on earth. The labourer who, bound to the earth, tends it as a friend to whom he owes duty; the harmless fool who, loving humanity, pursues honestly his simple course in life; the man of intellect who—for us the ignorant—wrests from Nature her secrets; the poet who fixes on earth—for us the less gifted—flashes of light from the spiritual, all rejoice in existence. All find some earthly rest and content.

But there are others—be they few or many—whose earthly attainment is still higher. The nearest approach to earthly rest and content is in the priest, the nurse who, fully forgetful of self, lives absorbed in relieving the spiritual and bodily sufferings of others.

All points to the spiritual in man: all points to the subjection of the material to the spiritual. The ideals of humanity may be, verily are, false and brutal. We idolise success in wealth, rank and power: we imbue the young with belief that their duty to the State and their fellows lies in personal success: we justify foul competition even when faced by its horrors of starvation in the midst of plenty; of labour, man's delight, twisted to the hateful; of warfare, justified by the priest, useful to the politician, abhorred by and destructive of the millions; of the mean, the ugly, even the poisonous, produced that the vulgar few may accumulate personal wealth.

We preach the revealed truth of The Sermon on the Mount; we

teach its negation ; we give honour to those who ignore it in practice and ostracise as traitors to their country those who would enforce it.

Spite of all, the spiritual rules ; spite of all, rest and content—the supreme offerings from Heaven to earth—fall to the lot only of those who live unspotted by the world.

Till now, though the world has been flooded by metaphysical disquisitions, man has—apart from belief—required the logical, the dialectic, the transcendence of human experience, for proof of his spiritual being. If, now, Reason, with the aid of *human experience only*, assures us we exist, each one, as a spiritual self, has not a great advance been made in human thought ?



# INDEX

## DIGEST OF THE ARGUMENT

### PART I

Pages 1 to 9.—The manifold is the unconditioned which reason absolutely requires in things as they are in themselves in order to complete the series of conditions of the universe in which we as human personalities exist and have our being. Therefore, though we may be said to 'know' the existence of the manifold, we cannot determine the manifold itself (define what it is) in any way. We must distinguish between the manifold itself and the manifold in our apprehension: it is only in our apprehension that it *appears* as a 'loose' or 'mere' manifold. It appears as a 'loose' manifold (or a total of particulars) because the subject (a thing of time and space) must have synthesis for its unity of self-apperception: the subject regards this unity as noumenal and so it appears to itself to synthesise the manifold for the unity arrived at. But this unity of self-consciousness of the subject is phenomenal, not noumenal; the subject is no more than a partial and mediate manifestation in our universe of, what Kant terms, the soul of man. Kant refers synthesis to a power of the soul of man.

Pages 10 to 12.—Unity, as known to us, exists in contradiction to diversity, and diversity exists in contradiction to unity, so neither can be noumenal: the one cannot be thought without accompanying thought in contradiction of the other. They must then be 'abstractions' from the manifold—particular abstractions for our particular universe of time and space. There is no noumenal unity even in an object; if we consider *any* unity we find it is merely relative to diversity: our universe is a universe of contradictions. This results from our universe being a universe of relations, so that synthesis is a necessity for all (the unity of) thought of the subject—the human personality. Even at this stage of the argument we find grounds for holding that the subject is no more than a manifestation within limits of some (relatively) noumenal self.

Pages 13 to 23.—The giving or presentation to the subject of the manifold to be intuited is not sufficient for Kant's scheme. For this giving or presentation is passive: it is through sensibility which is passive. Kant must have the *active* presentation of the manifold *in* intuition for the activity of thought of the subject. He gets this active presentation from the soul of man which, at the lowest, must be an intuitive self or self of intuition. It follows that the unity of self-apperception of the subject is not a real, a permanent unity, it is but a unity phenomenal of what we may term, for the purposes of reason, the unity (outside our cognition) of the intuitive self.

Pages 24 to 33.—The relation between intuition and thought—human thought always exists in limitation—is considered, and it is shown that Kant relied on the existence of an 'I' which intuits itself, of which

'I' the human personality is a partial and mediate manifestation in our universe. The subject (the human personality) can only cognise itself in appearance, that is, it is only in appearance it can be an object to itself. But the intuitive self does intuit itself, that is, can be an object to itself: for the intuitive self the contradiction between object and subject does not exist. But as the subject is a partial manifestation of the intuitive self, this intuitive self can determine its subject as an object to itself.

Pages 34, 35.—The terms 'Time' and 'Space' are considered.

Pages 36 to 46.—The meaning attached to sensibility in Kant's scheme is considered, and it is shown that sensibility must be held to be passive. It is, further, attempted to be proved that sensibility, as used by Kant, must be held to *open the possibility* for the subject of being affected by the external *otherwise than through the normal organs of sense*.

Pages 47 to 55.—Kant's Schema is herein considered. Kant holds that 'the schematism of the understanding by means of the transcendental synthesis of the imagination, amounts to nothing else than the unity of the manifold of intuition in the internal sense.' The active thought of the subject he gets from the *active* presentation of intuition: the schematism of the understanding is active. The manifold *to be intuited* is given or presented (passively) by sensibility: it is *received as the schema* by the subject. I suggest (with doubt) that Kant's 'internal sense' is affected by the manifold *to be intuited*, but when the internal sense is regarded in relation to the subject (conditioned in time and space), it must be treated as limited in that the understanding can only 'deal with' the schema—not with the manifold itself. It is argued that, if the subject can be affected by the schema, it must have the potentiality of being affected otherwise than through its normal organs of sense: for through those organs it can only be affected by objects. If this be so, then as the subject *is* affected by the schema otherwise than through its normal organs of sense, it has presented to it the 'universal' (without which presentation it could have no human experience of the particular). Kant introduces the term 'imagination' as referred to sensibility, simply because he requires for his scheme the (passive) presentation to the subject of more than objects—he must have presentation of the universal. If we hold that the subject can be affected (through or by sensibility) otherwise than through its normal organs of sense we get directly this presentation of the universal (the schema) through sensibility. In such case it would appear we do not require the term imagination as referred to sensibility. Imagination as referred to the understanding marks the power of the understanding to 'deal with' the schema as distinct from objects. But if we get through sensibility the presentation not only of objects but of the schema, then the normal synthetic thought of the understanding can 'deal with' both objects and the schema, and we do not require the term imagination as referred to the understanding.

Pages 56 to 58.—The argument, so far as it has advanced, is summarised and further argument adduced to show that Kant's real (relatively noumenal) subject is a self of intuition, of which his assumed subject is but a partial and mediate manifestation in our universe.

Pages 59 to 62.—Kant's Transcendental Dialectic is considered shortly. The reason for this short reference is to emphasise the distinction between Kant's form of argument in his Dialectic and the form of argument in the present work. Kant arrives at the conclusion that our intelligible self is

our real self, and that our empirical self is, in contrast with it, merely phenomenal. But he arrives at this conclusion by *transcending human experience*. I, on the other hand, assume to prove that our intelligible (intuitive) self is our real (relatively noumenal) self and our empirical self (self of human personality) but its partial and mediate manifestation, *without transcending human experience*. The new factor for proof I introduce is telepathy: I argue on the assumption that telepathy is *a fact of human experience*.

Pages 63 to 65.—Kant's work, *Dreams of a Spirit Seer*, is considered. The argument goes to show that Kant did consider—though he rejected—the possibility of proving the existence of the intelligible (intuitive) self *without transcending human experience*. Kant rejected this possibility because, in his time, there was no proof that telepathy is *a fact of human experience*.

Pages 66 to 103.—The astounding power (faculty?) in the human personality of exercising memory—that is, of calling up and using in the present ideas of the past—is considered at length. A doubt is thrown on extant theories. It is argued that the 'stuff' of memory must be free from the limits of time and space and so must exist in or be intuition. Any idea results from an abstraction in time from intuition. So ideas cannot have timeless and spaceless existence. When then the subject *appears to itself*, to extract in present time any idea from its storage of past ideas and to use the idea in present time, it is deceived, for it can do nothing of the kind. What really takes place is this: The idea in its inception was (through a concept) an abstraction from intuition. The abstraction once made in time, the subject can, in all its future time, *repeat* the abstraction. The abstraction (at any time) being like to the original abstraction, the subject *appears to itself* to extract the present idea from its storage of past ideas. For this abstraction the understanding (conditioned by the form of the material brain) is used. But the brain is in a constant state of flux, its material formation changes from moment to moment. It is difficult, then, to understand how the brain can be used for the exercise of memory. It is suggested that, in spite of this flux, there may still be *fixity of relations*—ideas are but 'things' of relation.

By this theory we again prove the existence of the intuitive self. For the theory requires the active presentation of intuition to the subject, where the presentation is timeless and spaceless, though the reception is in time.

## PART II

Pages 106 to 117.—The first part has proceeded upon an assumption that the subject can be affected through sensibility otherwise than through its normal organs of sense. And the argument has been that the assumption not only clarifies and simplifies Kant's reasoning, but that his schema involves this affection of the subject through sensibility otherwise than through its normal organs of sense. Sensibility when in the guise of 'imagination' given to it by Kant, can only be explained as (passively) affecting the subject otherwise than through the normal organs of sense.

In Part II. we consider certain *facts of human experience*. These facts are only explicable if the subject can be affected otherwise than through

the normal organs of sense: this form of affection through sensibility is *part of human experience*. Definitions of telepathy and of its manifestation to us as human personalities are given. It is argued that the facts of human experience, to be considered, are only explicable if communion does exist (timeless and spaceless) between all and each one of us and the external as intuitive (relatively spiritual) selves. This communion, it is argued, is the necessary foundation (the 'stuff') for telepathy as ordinarily defined—that is, for communication in impressions and ideas between human personalities otherwise than through the normal organs of sense. This communication I define as the manifestation to us of telepathy. Crooke's theory of brain-waves is considered later on (pages 145 to 150), and an attempt is made to show that by an *extension* of the theory we arrive at the same definition of telepathy (as distinct from its manifestation to us) which I have given.

Pages 118 to 127.—Telepathy is considered generally. The continuity between spontaneous and experimental cases is relied on, but the distinction between the two classes is pointed out: it is the latter class only which prove a power in the human mind to communicate with other human minds otherwise than through the normal organs of sense. It is argued that if the telepathic cases considered can be all brought under the definitions given of telepathy and its manifestation, then we arrive closely at the one great fundamental law foreshadowed by Myers.

Pages 128 to 169. Certain classes of spontaneous cases of telepathy are successively considered, and the argument is preferred that in *all* cases where agents and percipients are involved there is 'psychical travel' of the personality of the agent. Assuming this 'psychical travel,' then the only distinction between these classes is of the evidence available in proof of the phenomena in question. Clairvoyance is shown to be no more than a necessary feature of the evidence available, where the percipient has travelled psychically to the spot of the phenomenon.

Pages 170 to 183.—The (psychical) travel of personality is considered, its phenomenal nature explained, and evidence adduced to show that the subject has not only this power to travel, but (following Myers) power to 'modify spatial relations at a distance.'

Pages 184 to 210.—By the definitions given of telepathy and its manifestation to us as subjects, the subject can be affected telepathically both by the external and external personalities. Where the percipient is affected by the external, cases of what I term 'pure clairvoyance' result. Such cases are considered.

### PART III

Pages 210 to 215.—Will, Desire, and Volition are considered as a necessary preliminary to consideration of experimental cases; for whereas the spontaneous cases already considered do not (apparently) involve Will, Desire, and Volition, experimental cases do. It is argued that when experimental cases are successful, Will, Desire, and Volition are involved—the success manifests the *exercise* of a power of the human mind to communicate with other human minds otherwise than through the normal organs of sense. But as the argument requires no more than the manifestation of will-power in the subject over the operation of its understanding, the question of free will is not considered. All required is

*relative* free will in the intuitive self, partially and mediately manifest in the will of the subject. For the present attempt is limited to proof of the existence of the intuitive self; no attempt is made to prove this intuitive self to be immortal or to have free will: it is immortal, and has free will only *relatively* to the human personality. So far as the present inquiry goes, the existence only of the intuitive self is sought to be proved: its nature is not defined (determined) in any way, except in so far as manifest to us as human personalities.

Pages 216 to 220.—Agreements to appear after death are first considered. For such cases would appear to form a link, as it were, between spontaneous and experimental cases: there is something of the spontaneous in their occurrence, and yet Will, Desire, and Volition are apparently involved.

Pages 221 to 244.—Experimental cases are considered. They show that telepathy as manifest to us as human personalities *can be used by us at will*. But it is argued that for their full explanation the *root* of transfer of impressions and ideas must be referred to intuition: there must be (timeless and spaceless) communion between us all and the external as intuitive (relatively spiritual) selves. They prove the existence of the intuitive self.

Pages 245 to 247.—The distinction which ordinarily exists between normal and telepathic human experience is considered. This distinction exists in the continuity of normal human experience and in the discontinuity of telepathic human experience—telepathic communications are manifest very commonly not in continuous ideas but in mere 'flashes of intelligence.' The reasons for this distinction are given, and it is shown to be a distinction we should expect to exist if the theory relied on be correct.

Pages 248 to 254.—Sleep and Hypnosis are considered. It is argued that neither can affect the intuitive self, and that the human personality, in Sleep or Hypnosis, continues to receive impressions from the external and external personalities otherwise than through the normal organs of sense. The state of sleep is like to that of Hypnosis in that it, to a greater or less degree, inhibits the affection of the subject through its normal organs of sense. The distinctions between the two states are also considered.

Pages 255 to 260.—Rapport is considered, and it is argued that it is not a particular feature of certain cases of Hypnosis, but that it exists in all telepathic cases where the subject is affected by some external personality otherwise than through the normal organs of sense. Rapport exists whether or not the agent be predetermined by human will.

Pages 261 to 264.—Self-suggestion is considered. It is argued that the hypnotiser can only affect his subject in suggestion by 'transferring' ideas to him, and thereby affecting the environments of his (the subject's) understanding—the understanding operates with ideas. But this suggestion can have no effect unless the subject 'accept' the idea attempted to be transferred. There must be self-suggestion in the subject for the suggestion of the hypnotiser to have effect.

Pages 265 to 270.—Exaltation of Faculty is considered. It is argued that sleep or hypnosis can effect no real exaltation of faculty. There is the *appearance* of exaltation of faculty because the understanding of the subject being freed, by sleep or hypnosis, from affects through the normal organs of sense, can operate more efficiently with its storage of ideas, and

with affects from the external or external personalities otherwise than through the normal organs of sense.

Pages 271, 272.—Memory in hypnosis is considered. It is argued that memory—the storage of ideas of the past—cannot be affected by hypnotism; that it is only the use of memory which is subject to being so affected.

Pages 273 to 278.—Memory and Multiplex Personality are considered. Arguments are adduced to show that to explain the phenomena of multiplex personality and the use of differing streams of memory, we must rely on the existence of the intuitive self.

Pages 279 to 282.—Time Memory in Hypnosis is considered.

Pages 283 to 293.—Personality and the material are considered, that is, the relation of personality to the material. It is shown how great is the command even of the human personality over the material. This command is referred to Will. Ideas determine the Desire of the subject and Desire is operative through Will. The relation of ideas to forms of matter is considered.

Pages 294 to 300.—Haunted Houses and Psychometry are considered, and the theory offered (with doubt) that forms of matter may be 'impressed' by ideas.

Pages 301 to 313.—The subject of the Disembodied, that is, intuitive selves after bodily death, is considered. It is shown that personality can survive the destruction by bodily death of all normal distinctions between human personalities.

Pages 314 to 321.—Communion with the Disembodied is considered. The distinctions that exist between (1) Direct communication in ideas, (2) Symbolic communication, and (3) Communion in intuition, are relied on in a criticism of the human evidence available to support belief that there is communion, or communication in ideas, with the disembodied.