

# META-CHRISTIANITY:

SPIRITISM ESTABLISHED.  
RELIGION RE-ESTABLISHED.  
SCIENCE DISESTABLISHED.



BY


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## PREFACE.

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IN the course of the production of this work, the author's purpose has become much extended, indeed, entirely re-constituted. Originally, the work was merely intended as an investigation, from the standpoint of metaphysic, of certain papers, by Dr. Hodgson and Professor Hyslop, published by the Society for Psychical Research. This purpose has become merely incidental and subsidiary to the main drift of the work, which has resolved itself into a fairly complete statement of metaphysical principles, and full application of them in the domains of religion, ethics, and sociology. Especially, this work has become a vindication of spiritism against empirical science and issuing philosophies, which are assailed all along the line. In such an encounter it would be affectation to adopt the kid-glove method. From the author's standpoint, the conflict must be unrelenting until empirical science is relegated to the exclusive function of determining empirical contingencies, and has ceased to impose itself as having relevancy to the supreme human concerns of religion and morality.

This work contains a critical consideration of the position of empirical philosophy in regard to the problems of organic evolution, soul and immortality. Professor Haeckel's work, *The Riddle of the Universe*

(a third edition of which has been recently issued to English readers by the Rationalist Press Association), is the special object of the author's critical attention. As it is announced, in a preface to the *Riddle*, that "the work is unanswered, because it is unanswerable," the author hopes that Professor Haeckel and his followers may consider the author's present work as filling the void to which the writer of the preface to the *Riddle* draws attention, and that, by answering the author's work, if they are able, they may escape the taunt of incapacity which they level, in regard to Professor Haeckel's work, at those who uphold belief in God, against atheism.

To the author's knowledge, there is no system of thought, ancient or modern, which his metaphysic even remotely resembles, except in regard to certain fundamental implications respecting (*a*) the nature of matter and what is called objective experience; (*b*) the conditions of possible experience. In regard to (*a*), the author's metaphysic resembles Berkeley's; in regard to (*b*), it resembles the Kantian system. Essentially, the author's metaphysic is entirely different from either of these systems.

As President of the British Association, 1902, Professor Dewar said: "In spite of the great progress made in science, it is curious to notice the occasional recrudescence of metaphysical dogma. For instance, there is a school which does not hesitate to revive ancient mystifications in order to show that matter and energy can be shattered by philosophical arguments and have no objective reality." The author owns to the egotism—if the reader likes the term—of assuming that Professor Dewar is here referring to the author's metaphysic.

Professor Dewar's comments lead the author to suppose that the professor knows nothing about the metaphysic, which no more "revives ancient mystifications" than does Professor Dewar's theory about the absolute zero of temperature.

Professor Dewar emphasises the "objective reality" of matter and energy. The author feels curious to know what ideas lie behind Professor Dewar's words, "objective reality." There seems to be considerable obscurity, in the arena of investigation adorned by Professor Dewar, regarding the implication of the words, objective reality. The author can hardly see why a person who applies the words to matter and energy shall snub metaphysic, especially metaphysic about which he is ignorant.

Professor Dewar expatiates about "the boundaries between what is knowable, though not yet known, and what must remain for ever unknowable to man," and he is very severe regarding the dogmatism of theology. It seems, to the author, that the dogmatism of science, expressed in Professor Dewar's words about the knowable and unknowable, has a family likeness to the dogmatism of theology, and that science requires the discipline of metaphysic as much as theology once required that of science.

The concepts prevailing in what, in the connection, may be termed the parish of science, are inherently foreign to the concepts through which, alone, any real approach to a solution of the phenomena of spiritism is possible. On this account, the parochially clever ones, hypnotically enslaved by their own conceptual limitations, try to put the problem of spiritism to bed, by vetoing, with papally infallible emphasis, phenomena of spiritism *en bloc*. Neces-

sarily, like great authorities generally, these clever ones find a large constituency of hypnotics behind them, and there is a stentorian chorus of assertion that spiritism is all humbuggery, fraud, crazy hallucination. Moreover, what interprets the phenomena of spiritism becomes, on the authority of these popes, a "recrudescence of metaphysical dogma," and those people who think there may be something worth having in the "recrudescence," become "a school which does not hesitate to revive ancient mystifications." To the metaphysician, the age of "science" has its comic reliefs. To the spiritualist, to whom seeing is believing, the age of "science" must be somewhat aggravating.

Professor Dewar, in his British Association address, quoted, with evident gusto, Tyndall's assertion: "We claim and we shall wrest from theology the entire domain of cosmological theory." Professor Dewar says that this claim has been practically conceded. The metaphysical measurement of the contingency is that cosmological theory has merely passed from one to another incompetent tribunal. Metaphysic claims and, the author believes, will wrest cosmological theory both from theology and science!

The whole range of spiritistic phenomena will be dealt with in this work, though the Piper manifestations will have first attention. The Piper case has now become classical in the records of spiritism. No investigation is known, in this branch of inquiry, approaching, in rigidity, detail, and persistence, that devoted to the case of Mrs. Piper, by members of the Society for Psychical Research, including psychologists and other scientific people of the first rank. However, by none of these investigators, so far as

the author is aware, has metaphysics been applied to interpreting the phenomena. In themselves, the Piper manifestations are merely of a type profusely recorded in the literature of spiritism long before the advent of Psychical Researchers. Mrs. Piper and her feats merely arrest special attention on account of the systematic scrutiny given to them by the Society. The author had never seen a paper issued by the Society until his attention was drawn to the papers of Dr. Hodgson and Professor Hyslop (numbered, respectively, 33 and 41 in the *Proceedings* of the Society) through reading an address by Mr. James Robertson, reported in *Light*, of October 18th, 1902. On reading the papers, the author saw the futility, from his standpoint, of the method of scrutiny they applied to the problem, and felt impelled to deal with it according to the metaphysical principles already set forth and applied to spiritistic phenomena, in *Heresies*.

For the author's purpose, he need enter into no detail regarding the arguments of Professor Hyslop and Dr. Hodgson, which, as regards the position of the author, have hardly any relevancy to the root-problem. Nevertheless, the author hopes that the main grounds and inferences of the writers are fairly and adequately outlined in this work.

What is popularly termed spiritualism is a technical limitation of spiritism, implying, mainly, a single affirmation: that the dead, as so-called spirits, manifest their continued existence to the living. Spiritualism, as popularly expounded, virtually implies nothing more than this assumed fact, and the spiritualist seems to find a ready solution of all mysteries by invoking the spirits, who become, on

these conditions, so ubiquitous and active, that the living personality seems a nonentity in the scheme of his activities. Spiritism, in the scientific sense, embraces the whole range of the so-called occult, and implies no foregone conclusion regarding extra-mundane agents.

The interpretation of the psychical and physical phenomena of spiritism is, essentially, the same thing, and is based on the metaphysical demonstration that the empirical distinction between psychical and physical is non-essential. The "moving" of thoughts is, essentially, the same contingency as the moving, say, of a table. Empirical processes of scrutiny are rather impediments than facilities in investigating spiritistic phenomena. We might as well try to identify the physicist's energy, from the standpoint of the child's observation and intelligence, as try to interpret the phenomena of spiritism, from the standpoint of empirical science applied to the observed facts.

In the earlier course of the Society's investigations, the conclusion reached appeared to be that the Piper phenomena were accountable as examples of telepathic communication and the activity of the subliminal personality of Mrs. Piper, to the exclusion of "spirits." The latest conclusion, according to the papers to be considered, is that this interpretation is inadequate, and that the phenomena involve communication between souls of the dead and living. The author traverses this conclusion. Though, on metaphysical grounds, he is fully assured of the possibility of such communication, he holds that the Piper phenomena are accountable as purely mundane interactions.

The author's attention was drawn to a *brochure* written by Mr. Arnold White, entitled *For Efficiency*. As this book seems to have excited considerable public interest, and the views expressed in it seem to represent a large and growing body of public opinion, the author felt impelled to adopt it as an object of critical attention, in elucidating his ethical and sociological views.

The present work advances, fundamentally, what the author believes to be the only possible religion compulsive of belief under present intellectual conditions of conviction. The work shows the evolutionary continuity of this religion with what preceded it, but has now become merely a matter of formal acceptance and observance, utterly inoperative as a means of raising the individual above the animal plane of incentive.

For Western civilisation there are, at present, two main types of what pass as systems of morality. The types are the religious and the utilitarian or empirical. The religious type ostensibly conforms with Christ's teaching. Actually, it merely involves the gratification of certain benevolent impulses, this gratification being assumed to involve the following of Christ's teaching. It will be shown, in this work, that such gratification is foreign to the following of Christ.

The utilitarian system of so-called morality is, essentially, merely the tabulation of one or another set of expedencies and sentimental preferences happening to prevail as social convention, and an attempt to extract a system of theoretical right by applying the empirical doctrine of evolution to these expedencies and preferences.

Each of these types of so-called morality influences the individual according to his personal bias, dependent on his temperamental inclinations, and on his submission, as the case may be, to the letter of traditional religion, or to the pronouncements of empirical science. If he has not discarded the letter of traditional religion, the individual is prone to become a so-called philanthropist, gratifying himself by benevolent deeds or aspirations, always subject, however, to their conformity with utilitarianism that does not question his right to the material possessions through retention of which he is enabled to gratify himself as "philanthropist," without undue incursion on his personal comfort.

If the individual has cut himself adrift from the letter of traditional religion, his morality is apt to become of the speculatively universal order. What he calls humanity, society, the race, becomes, for him, an abstract substitute for the individual as object of ethical application. In this abstraction, the individual is merged as a moral agent, so that his personality, as such agent, is, practically, obliterated. His personal conduct has moral significance merely as conforming to or opposing one or another expediency excogitated as involving what is called racial or social fitness.

In this work, a clean sweep is made of all pre-existing ethical theories and conventions. Moral principle, as criterion of right, is identified as a single obligation of the creature, to God, standing by itself, above and independent of expediences, sentiments, personal inclinations, and equally compulsive whether to the individual or to society. This prime obligation of the creature, to God, may be



said to subsume all obligations of the creature to its fellows, and of society to the unit ; it is, to practical conduct of society and the individual, as the law of gravitation is to subsidiary physical laws.

The religion set forth in this work is an intellectual re-statement of the main teaching of Christ. The author holds that, through this re-statement, Christ's main teaching is rendered as intellectually compulsive of acceptance as it earlier was emotionally compulsive. The morality and the religion set forth in this work together constitute what the author calls *Meta-Christianity*.

If there is nothing after this life, for the individual, there is nothing, in this life, to induce concern of the individual about more than the gratification of himself. A morality of expediency—his personal expediency—meets the needs of such a person. If there is a state of individualised existence after this life, the individual may well concern himself about more than his personal expediency. In this work, the fact of a post-mundane state of existence is rendered intellectually acceptable as a settled conviction.

If a personal Deity, in moral relationship with the creature, is rendered intellectually compulsive of acceptance, it behoves the individual, even from the standpoint of selfish prudence, to govern his conduct by the criterion of his belief regarding the demands of that Deity. In this work, such a Deity is rendered compulsive of intellectual acceptance.

Pedagogic philosophy turns on distinction between what are called things and thoughts, and there are two main schools, the one, Idealist, denying the distinction ; the other, Materialist, maintaining it.

The author's metaphysic is idealist, in the sense of denying the possibility of experience external to mind, and, accordingly, denying that things can be less integrant of mind, than are thoughts. Nevertheless, this identification of things with thoughts, as necessarily, equally constituent of mind, is shown to be entirely consistent with the empirical distinction between things and thoughts. So far as the author is aware, no other metaphysic has obviated the empirical antithesis between things and thoughts, without annulling the distinction.

While the Materialist urges against the Idealist alleged confusion of thoughts with things, all the advanced theories of empirical science, involving ethers, atoms, etc., exist only through implying the confusion. As will be shown, in this work, the whole of ostensibly materialistic science resolves itself, ultimately, into the complete ignoring of distinction between things and thoughts, becoming what may be termed an illogical and bastard idealism. To the idealism advanced in this work we must appeal, the author contends, if we would recognise how completely the distinction between things and thoughts was ignored by modern speculative materialism. The Idealist, not the Materialist, now maintains the distinction in its practical integrity.

It seems advisable to the author to offer, here, some anticipatory comments on the subject of medical remedies. In the body of the work, the subject is treated purely from the standpoint of metaphysical causality, involving the demonstration that there is no really causal efficiency in drugs.

The author finds that medical acquaintances with whom he has discussed this question have ultimately

accepted his theory, but that they confront him with this problem :—What you argue—they say—is sound, but tell us what you do! We cannot resist your theory, but what is your practice? Do you take drugs? If you were dangerously ill, would you consult a faith-curer, or a regular practitioner?

These questions are worth dealing with, in a practical way, in anticipation of what follows, in the body of the work, on the subject of morbid causality. For several years, the author has virtually abandoned the use of drugs, of which he was never a large consumer. For thirty years or more, he has not seen a doctor in his professional capacity, though occasionally suffering from aches, pains, depressions, and so forth, some of which visitations, he has good reason to suppose, would have induced the average person to seek medical treatment. The author is personally assured that he has willed away such ailments. Of course, it is easy for a sceptic to suggest that the ailments were trivial and would have vanished whether or not the author had "willed." Possibly this is the case. However, the author must here be allowed to be judge. His metaphysical investigation has involved, for him, the fullest confidence that, if he could only apply adequate will-power, he might absolutely free himself from the possibility of bodily ailment. Naturally, when he finds that particular ailments do disappear coincidentally, or nearly so, with his experience of willing them away, he thinks that the sceptic's easy method of accounting for the particular contingencies is more plausible than reliable. In plain terms, the author contends that some of those ostensibly trivial ailments might, under ordinary conditions, have taxed

the ablest professional skill of the orthodox practitioner.

Against the above—or rather, apparently against—the author owns that on rare occasions within the last four or five years, he has had recourse to a single drug, which was practically the only one he used (apart from homœopathic pilules) in his ante-metaphysical years. He administered this drug to himself to meet catarrhal and rheumatoid ailments, which were—and are, still—his sole physiological troubles to which are commonly applied the term, sickness. To his own apprehension, these occasions of departure, in practice, from his metaphysical conclusion regarding the causal impotency of drugs, have happened when his will-power was below its normal efficiency, involving that he has tried to fortify and supplement it through the fetish (drug).

The adoption of this course, by the author, does not involve any lack of confidence in the truth of his metaphysical conclusions: any "faith" in drugs as really causal agents. The adoption of the course merely involves that the author has appealed to the orthodox consensus of suggestion, involving the practical efficiency of drug-fetishes. His "faith" is in this orthodox consensus, not in the drug. As an expedientalist, he reflects that, if fetish-*rapport* with drugs involves a stronger consensus of suggestion than does "psychopathic" willing, without fetishes (drugs), he had better trust himself to the more powerful suggestive "battalions," even though they lack the philosophical credentials of the numerically weaker "battalions" (heterodox, "psychopathic" consensus).

Had the author, instead of taking the drug, put

himself under treatment by a "psychopathist," the will-power of the latter, supplementing the author's enfeebled will, might have been as efficient to effect a cure as was the author's appeal to the bigger battalions of suggestion, by taking the fetish (drug). In the case of the heterodox, non-drugging treatment, the author would need to be in *rappor*t with the psychopathist and his heterodox consensus, instead of with the orthodox consensus of suggestion affirming the efficiency of drugs (fetishes).

¶ In the case of the author's believing that his illness was grave—which belief would depend on his solicitude about the gravity of his ailment: a solicitude which has not hitherto troubled him—the author's dealing with himself would probably largely depend on his estimate of the state of his own will-power. He might recognise that his will-power was much weakened. Then would come his selection of a particular consensus of suggestion through which he might hope to obtain the greatest access of external suggestion of a cure. Whether he appealed to the orthodox or heterodox practitioner and consensus might depend on the diagnosis. Certain diseases notoriously outside orthodox control, might drive the author to the psychopathist. Other diseases which appear particularly amenable to orthodox treatment, would probably drive him into the orthodox camp. Broadly, the issue, for the author, would depend on his estimate of the consensus of suggestion most likely to preponderate in regard to the ailment.

Of course, at present, the weight of consensus of suggestion, measured in "battalions," is with the orthodox system and its fetishes. The heterodox

consensus, at present, is merely "feeling its way," though, daily, we may say, there is a considerable accession to the heterodox "battalions," tending to render them more formidable as consensus of suggestion. Perhaps, even now, were the environment of the author what may be termed a suggestive atmosphere of the heterodox order, he might, no matter what was the character of his illness, appeal to the psychopathist. However, under existing circumstances, friends and relatives who, in case of his grave suffering and enfeebled will-power, might determine the suggestive environment, would probably turn the scale in favour of the orthodox practitioner. In a word, the author thinks he would be likely to submit to the unphilosophical consensus of his friends and relatives, rather than to the philosophically valid heterodox consensus.

Another point merits a little notice in the present connection. The author is doubtful whether any illness would induce him to worry about its gravity. So long as he was sufficiently vigorous to move about, he thinks he might be likely to keep his friends in the dark, and kill or cure himself with or without a fetish. The author would probably have little solicitude about living, if he felt himself played out as a social asset. Unless he can suppose that he is better worth worrying about on account of work before him, than on account of himself, he imagines that dying, for him, will be somewhat pleasurable: of course, apart from the incident rupture of emotional ties. When the author thinks of the trouble taken, by themselves and others, to keep people alive, it seems to him that efficient lethal chambers have hardly received the attention they deserve as public

requirements. When he ponders the most obtrusive object of living (to play the game of skin-my-neighbour), it occurs to the author that the lethal chamber may offer unsuspected advantages to people who have not insured their lives and see themselves permanently excluded from the game of "skin." Were the author a devotee to the "skinning" competition, who had omitted to pay a considerable sum in premiums for the benefit of others at his death, he thinks he would be more likely, in case of serious ailment, to appeal to the lethal chamber, than to the consensus of therapeutic suggestion, orthodox or heterodox. He would probably reflect that he would not be missed at the flaying business, and that, for him, further enjoyment of its delights was hardly commensurate with the bother getting well again.

Of course, apart from consideration of emotional ties, most men are of value to their families, and so, on restrictedly utilitarian grounds, worth preserving. But, the author is doubtful whether one man in a million is worth taking therapeutic trouble about as a social asset. Indeed, the author is inclined to the opinion that, under present social conditions, virtually the totality of male adults develop their highest value, as social assets, when the Gentleman with the Scythe stops their little game of skin-my-neighbour. It will be later seen that the author's measurement of the individual's value as a social asset is, like most of the conclusions advanced in this work, adapted to ruffle the serenity of the foremost representatives of what at present pass as culture and moral excellence, who seem too busy admiring one another and teaching the Philistine how to suck eggs, to notice the unsettling truths to which the author, for some years,

has been trying to draw their attention. Such truths no more come out of universities than tigers come out of ladies' linen-chests. But, representatives of culture come out of universities, or stay in them. Whether the representatives stay in, or come out, makes no difference as regards the unsettling truths. It takes them a generation or so to work their way into the collection of fossils on which the gaze of the culture-camp is focussed.

The author notices that Lord Kelvin has recently stated that "science positively affirmed creative power." The author does not know whether the fact just announced, by his Lordship, is one of his latest discoveries; but, assuredly, the pronouncement comes none too soon, and will be likely to spread salutary consternation in that blatant camp of atheism which, in these days, seems to pose to the lay herd as being the voice of science regarding the ultimate and most vital issues that confront humanity. As his Lordship has progressed so far towards conformity with metaphysical demonstration, the author suggests that he shall proceed a step further in the metaphysical direction, by investigating the possibility of the co-existence of "creative power" and self-determinism by the creature. The author believes that when his Lordship has investigated this problem, the conclusion at which he will arrive will be that which the author has been affirming for the last decade.

Twelve years ago, when the author had no more regard for metaphysic than an oyster has for the equator, he wrote:—"All energy is manifested under Law. Atoms, the basis of matter, and molecules, the first combination of atoms, energise under Law; all



solids, liquids, gases, and vapours are formed and energeise under Law; all organisms have been evolved, and energeise under Law; all celestial bodies have been evolved, and energeise under Law. The universe is in the iron grip of Law. Science infers no self-evolved Law. Hence she infers a Law-maker. This Law-maker is her Deity—the inevitable corollary of everything she has verified" (*Against Dogma and Free-will*, p. 96).

Again:—"In the following pages the writer will endeavour to show that the Supernatural of Science *is* manifest. In reference to the critic's" (one who traversed a certain differentiation between law and phenomena) "observations *re* Law and Phenomena, the writer may here observe that his statement as to the absurdity of importing any agent outside Law to account for *phenomena* is quite consistent with his conviction that it is essential to import an outside agent to account for *Law*. The essence of his work is to show that Law is all-efficient to determine phenomena, but utterly powerless to originate itself. There is no self-refutation in such a position" (*The Supernatural of Science*, p. 4).

Again:—"We must refuse to dogmatise about an infinite universe just as inevitably as we must refuse to dogmatise about three persons that are not three, but one person. Keeping as our sheet-anchor the well-established fact that no effect without a cause is known to occur in the realm of matter, and that every experienced cause is an effect, it seems to the writer that we are inevitably driven to the assumption of a cause behind and superior to matter. This Cause satisfies the writer's reason—and what he can experience as emotion—and is his God" (*ibid.*, p. 11).

Again :—" At present, under the influence of the mechanical tradition, chemists are trying to interpret atomic selection involving chemical transmutations, as mere effects of the absorption and dissipation of energy. I think they will soon see the futility of the attempt. Cooke, in *The New Chemistry*, remarks : ' But while we recognise in our last analysis mass and energy as the only fundamental elements of Nature, let us not forget that there must be a directive faculty by which atoms are arranged and controlled.' This 'directive faculty' is the gist of the matter. We may as well try to explain chemical phenomena without taking it into account as try to explain physiological functions, ignoring the heart" (*Heresies*, vol. ii. p. 389).

Since the above passages were first published, and since advancing what, he believes, is the essential totality of what can be urged, from the standpoint of materialism, as inferential necessity for the assumption of Deity, the author has entirely discarded the whole realm of empirical science as having any relevancy to the demonstration—as distinguished from speculative assumption—of God, and has held up to the world the banner of metaphysic, as being the sole real science competent to decide the supreme and final issues confronting the thinking creature of this age.

The author may be excused a little discursive self-gratulation when he finds one whom his *confrères* describe as a Prince of Science figuratively kicking over the traces of the scientific "apple-cart" and taking a header into supernaturalism by publicly avowing unorthodox conclusions, to which the author has been trying to give prominence during the last

decade or more, within which he has been applying criticism to what may be termed the deification of materialistic illusionism. The author owns to a somewhat unphilosophic buoyancy of spirit when he ponders the probable effect of the *ipse dixit* of such a master in the realm of physics as is Lord Kelvin, in impressing on the recognition of the noble army of lay hypnotics (who take their convictions much as nestlings take the worms from their parents) the large pinch of salt with which must be gulped the confident utterances of certain eminent, noisy, and zealous exponents of the cult of materialism, engaged in what they protest to be the demolition of religious superstition.

The reflective and non-partisan reader of the recent correspondence in the *London Times*, *à propos* Lord Kelvin's pronouncement at University College, who ponders the wordy bickerings, dogmatic assertions inconsequent to the essential issue, characterising the contributions of an eminent botanist and an eminent mathematical wizard and scientific "handy-man" who enter the fray to repel Lord Kelvin's uncompromising recognition of the claims of supernaturalism on the belief of the reasonable person, will probably recognise that ultimate problems are hardly likely to be elucidated by eminent wranglers in the arenas of materialistic specialism, and that it is a good thing for society that specialistic experts, of the philosophic calibre of Lord Kelvin, are occasionally in evidence to impress the lay public with the shortcomings of their fellow-experts. Reading that correspondence in the *Times* will probably help the average person to discriminate vividly between big and little eminents. Lord

Kelvin looms large in comparison with his eminent opponents.

To the metaphysician, the value of Lord Kelvin's pronouncement does not consist in its illuminating the problem of the supernatural; to the metaphysician, Lord Kelvin's standpoint disables him from shedding light on this problem. The metaphysician esteems Lord Kelvin's pronouncement solely as what may be termed a centre from which may emanate certain hypnotic suggestions. As the *Times* remarks, in a leading article devoted to the controversy: "The deliberate and reiterated judgment of such a man that 'scientific thought is compelled to accept the idea of Creative Power' is at the least a very weighty contribution to the formation of a just opinion on the subject." To the metaphysician, the "weight" of Lord Kelvin's "contribution" is of the hypnotic order of ponderosity, and what the *Times* calls "a just opinion," is expressible in the terms, "advantageous suggestion," imposed on a hypnotic constituency, suggestively submissive to Lord Kelvin as a great authority accepted without scrutinising his credentials in regard to the specific problem in question. The author has been advancing the obvious conclusion now affirmed by Lord Kelvin, for the last decade. However, as the author is not an "authority," though he has devoted hundreds of pages of close reasoning to establishing the inferential necessity, for "science," of invoking Creative Power, nobody appears either to have intellectually accepted the author's reasoning, or to have been hypnotically affected by his pronouncements. That is the defect of not being an "authority." The great magic-man of this age is the "authority." He "bosses" what may be termed

the hypnotic show. The result of the "bossing" is what the *Times* calls "just opinion."

One pronouncement, by the eminent botanist, Sir W. T. Thiselton-Dyer, affords joy to the author. The pronouncement runs: "Lord Kelvin said that 'ether was absolutely non-atomic; it was absolutely structureless and homogeneous.' He speaks of it as if it were a definite concrete thing like the atmosphere. . . . The fact is that the ether is a mere mathematical figment, convenient because it satisfies various formulæ. As it is only an intellectual conception, we may invest it with any properties we please. The late Professor Clifford once told me that it was harder than steel. I believe it is now thought to be gelatinous. Anyhow, it is nothing more than a working hypothesis, which some day, like phlogiston, will only have historic interest." Those who have read *Heresies* and who read this work, will appreciate the author's rapture in quoting the above pronouncement of Sir W. T. Thiselton-Dyer. If scientists, in the various arenas of empiricism, will only get properly to work, "giving one another away," the date at which metaphysic comes to its own cannot be long deferred.

To the metaphysician, the person who descants, in terms of the ultimate entities and theories of physics, chemistry, biology (atoms, molecules, ethers, energies, biophors, Kelvinism, Daltonism, Darwinism, Weismannism, *et hoc*), about religion and morality, is as inept as, to a modern physicist, would be an oracle who descanted about matter and energy, in terms of the ultimate entities and theories of antique alchemy. As vindicating or discrediting religion: as authenticating and elucidating an intellectually moral

system, those entities and theories of materialistic science have no more relevancy, according to metaphysical estimate, than have the contents of a child's book of nursery tales. To apply modern materialistic science, as a critical means of investigating the problems of religion and ethics, is, according to metaphysical estimate, about as profitable an enterprise as trying to clean windows with a paving-stone.

As will be shown, in this work, and, as has been shown in *Heresies*, all modern conclusions constituting the last deductive resultants of materialistic science, are built on speculative confusion of two radically distinct types of experience: sensory and psychical. The conception of atoms, on which are grounded, and through which, alone, are rendered possible all modern chemical and physical theories, involves this fundamentally false implication of identity between what are metaphysically demonstrated, and practically evident, as radically different types of experience.

The author strongly advises readers of this work to give some preliminary attention to the index, which is, to a large extent, epitome as well as index. He thinks that by adopting this course readers will readily start with a fair intellectual grip of the new standpoint and its implications advanced in the work, and so ensure easy reading and lively initial interest. This applies particularly to the religious and moral sections of the work. Indeed, its essential religious and moral implications may be well assimilated through study of the index.

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# META-CHRISTIANITY:

SPIRITISM ESTABLISHED; RELIGION  
RE-ESTABLISHED; SCIENCE DISESTABLISHED.



## CHAPTER I.

### THE FACTS.

To afford the reader some familiarity with the character of the class of phenomena with which we are concerned, I will offer a few preliminary observations embodying what I have read in the report of Dr. Hodgson, and will quote from his report a short account of what occurred at a sitting.

Mrs. Piper goes into a trance state, in which she is said to be "controlled" by certain spirits. A few of these ostensible spirits adopt the *role* of intermediaries, through whom the identities of other ostensible spirits are revealed to the person, as "sitter," who wants to get into communication with his dead friend or relative. The particular intermediary spirit who communicates as agent for the deceased in the subjoined account is a "Dr. Phinuit." But in later sittings the spirit of the deceased (called George Pelham) directly communicates, and Phinuit is dispensed with. Other

mysterious spirit-personalities of the same type as Phinuit are Rector and Imperator, who seem to be consistently anxious to assure the world of the fact of spirit intercourse, and to raise the ethical standard through that intercourse. Rector and Imperator may be figured as masters of the spiritual ceremonies. They do not appear during the Phinuit *régime*, but are very prominent and dramatically impressive in other sittings than that in the account cited below.

The communications are either received as the writing or the speech of the acting communicator (of course through the medium). In the case of Phinuit, speech is the means of communication. Other spirit-operators communicate through writing (automatic, of the medium). In the latter case, the hand seems to hear. In the former case, hearing seems to be through the normal channel. Sometimes there is simultaneous communication on entirely different topics to three people, by writing (both hands) and speech. Whatever be the conclusion as to "spirits," or mundane souls, as agents, nobody who has studied the methods and precautions adopted by the Society will, for a moment, attribute the Piper phenomena to any form of collusion or fraud, or will be likely to doubt that, however the phenomena may arise, they indicate some super-normal form of intercommunication.

The "spirit" who communicates, at first through the intermediation of Phinuit, later, directly, is a Mr. George Pelham (pseudonym). I will now quote from Dr. Hodgson's Report :—

G. P. (Pelham) met his death accidentally and probably instantaneously, by a fall in New York, in

February 1892, at the age of thirty-two years. He was a lawyer by training, but had devoted himself chiefly to literature and philosophy, and had published two books which received the highest praise from competent authorities. . . . He was an Associate of our Society, his interest in which was explicable rather by an intellectual openness and fearlessness, characteristic of him, than by any tendency to believe in supernormal phenomena. He was in a sense well known to me personally, but chiefly on this intellectual side; the bond between us was not that of an old, intimate, and, if I may so speak, emotional friendship. We had several long talks together on philosophic subjects, and one very long discussion, probably at least two years before his death, on the possibility of a "future life." In this he maintained that, in accordance with a fundamental philosophic theory which we both accepted, a "future life" was not only incredible, but inconceivable; and I maintained that it was at least conceivable. At the conclusion of the discussion he admitted that a future life was conceivable, but he did not accept its credibility, and vowed that if he should die before I did and found himself "still existing," he would "make things lively" in the effort to reveal the fact of his continued existence.

On March 7th, 1888, he had a sitting with Mrs. Piper, one of a series arranged by the Committee on Mediumistic Phenomena connected with the American S.P.R. . . . The names of the sitters in this series were very carefully guarded by the Committee, and I may add my own opinion that Mrs. Piper never knew until recently that she had ever seen G. P. At the sitting which G. P. attended,

the Rev. Minot J. Savage acted as the supervising member of the Committee, and G. P. was a stranger to him.

G. P.'s conclusion was, briefly, that the results of this sitting did not establish any more than hyper-æsthesia on the part of the medium.

I knew of G. P.'s death within a day or two of its occurrence, and was present at several sittings with Mrs. Piper in the course of the following few weeks, but no allusion was made to G. P. On March 22nd, 1892, between four and five weeks after G. P.'s death, I accompanied Mr. John Hart (not the real name), who had been an old, intimate friend of his, to a sitting. I understood from Mr. Hart that he had some articles with him to be used as tests, but he gave me no further information than this, though I surmised that the articles might have belonged to G. P. The appointment for the sitting was made by myself, and of course Mr. Hart's real name was not mentioned to Mrs. Piper.

The sitting began by some remarks of Phinuit concerning the sitter, followed by an incorrect statement about a cousin, said to have died some years before with heart trouble. Mr. Hart presented a pencil.

*Phinuit.* Cousin. Heart, through here (*clutches throat and about breast and lower*), something like pneumonia. Do you know that's a brother?

*Hart.* Sometimes he used to call me brother.

*Phinuit.* He's very close to you.

*Hart.* He isn't my brother, though we used to say it of each other. The pencil had been worn by an uncle of mine who died of inflammation of the bladder.

Phinuit here calls out a name that suggests an attempt at Howards.

*Hart.* I don't know any one of that name. (*Hart gives a locket, saying, "He also wore this."*)

*Phinuit* (*fingering locket hard*). It has hair in it. It is the hair of his father . . . George . . . and of another, his mother, too.

*Hart.* Yes, that's right. I have something else here (*giving watch*).

*Phinuit.* Yes. George. Ha . . . Har . . . Hart.

*Hart.* All correct. The name of my uncle George is in the back of the watch. When he died, my uncle Albert wore it. I did not remember that the name was engraved on the inner case of the watch.

*Phinuit.* Lal . . . lal . . . Albert. . . . Is that the way you pronounce it? He is very fond of you. He says he is not ded . . . dead. He will see you again. He is glad to see you. He is very fond of you.

*Hart.* Lal was a pet name my father sometimes called my uncle Albert.

*Phinuit.* Who is James—Jim?

*Hart.* Yes, I know, but he is not dead.

*Phinuit.* There is another George who wants to speak to you. How many Georges are there about you, anyway?

Dr. Hodgson then comments as follows:—The rest of the sitting, until almost the close, was occupied by statements from G. P., Phinuit acting as intermediary. George Pelham's real name was given in full, also the names, both Christian and surname, of several of his most intimate friends, including the name of the sitter. Moreover, incidents were referred to which were unknown to the sitter or myself. One

of a pair of studs which J. Hart was wearing was given to Phinuit.

*Hart.* Who gave them to me?

*Phinuit.* That's mine. I gave you that part of it; I sent that to you.

*Hart.* When?

*Phinuit.* Before I came here. That's mine. Mother gave you that.

*Hart.* No.

*Phinuit.* Well, father, then. Father and mother together. You got those after I passed out. Mother took them, gave them to father, and father gave them to you. I want you to keep them. I will them to you.

Mr. Hart notes. The studs were sent to me by Mr. Pelham as a remembrance of his son. I knew at the time that they had been taken from G——'s body, and afterwards ascertained that his step-mother had taken them from his body and suggested that they would do to send me, I having previously written to ask that some little memento be sent to me.

James and Mary (Mr. and Mrs.) Howard were mentioned with strongly personal specific references, and in connection with Mrs. Howard came the name Katharine.

*Phinuit.* Tell her; she'll know. I will solve the problems, Katharine.

Mr. Hart notes. This had no special significance for me at the time, though I was aware that Katharine, the daughter of Jim Howard, was known to George, who used to live with the Howards. On the day following the sitting, I gave Mr. Howard a detailed account of the sitting. These words, "I will solve the problems, Katharine," impressed him more than

anything else, and at the close of my account he related that George, when he had last stayed with them, had talked frequently with Katharine (a girl of fifteen years of age) upon such subjects as Time, Space, God, Eternity, and pointed out to her how unsatisfactory the commonly accepted solutions were. He added that some time he would solve the problems and let her know, using almost the very words of the communication made at the sitting.

Mr. Hart added that he was entirely unaware of these circumstances. I myself was unaware of them, and was not at that time acquainted with the Howards, and, in fact, nearly every statement made at the sitting whereat I was the note-taker, concerned matters of which I was absolutely ignorant. (*Proc. S.P.R.*, vol. xiii., part 33, pp. 295-298.)

Points to be noted in regard to the above account:—

Mrs. Piper had no normal knowledge of Pelham. An intimate friend of Pelham's, when living, Mr. Hart (normally unknown to Mrs. Piper), has a sitting. Phinuit, the so-called "control" of Mrs. Piper, communicates orally on behalf of Pelham. First there is an incorrect reference to a cousin of the sitter. Then a pencil is presented to the medium's hand. (The presentation of articles worn or handled by the deceased when living is said to strengthen the hold on the communicating agent.) Phinuit suggests "That's a brother." Hart says that Pelham and he used to call each other brother. Phinuit mentions a name something like Howards. Pelham lived with a Mr. Howard. Hart presents a locket. Phinuit correctly states that it contains hair of Pelham's father and mother. Hart presents a watch. Phinuit mentions the names, George and Hart. Hart's uncle

was named George, which is in the back of the watch. Phinuit says: "Lal, Albert." Albert is the name of Hart's uncle, and the father called him Lal. Phinuit asks, "Who is James—Jim?" This refers to James Howard. Phinuit talks of "another George" (Pelham), and opens up a vein of incidents intimately connected with Pelham—how the mother gave the studs to the father, to be forwarded to Hart (unknown until afterwards by Hart). There is the impressive reference to Katharine Howard, and the "solving of the problems" (entirely out of the knowledge of Hart and Dr. Hodgson, and only elucidated later by Mr. Howard).

Having now, I hope, afforded the reader what may be termed a working familiarity with the facts, we will turn to the problem.



## CHAPTER II.

### CONTROVERSIAL.

WE have to consider the following problem:—

Mrs. Piper reveals a multitude of incidents relevant to the personalities of dead people, when they were living. She (or whatever is the active agency) infuses into these revelations a mass of dramatic by-play, verisimilitude, characterisation, such as is apparently only consistent with the agency of these dead people in some extra-mundane state of existence. Various people, of whose personal identity Mrs. Piper, as a normally experiencing person, would be totally ignorant, are convinced through what happens under her mediumship, that the personalities of deceased relatives, friends, acquaintances are communicating. The possibility of fraud in any guise, we are to assume is entirely excluded. The revelations, through whatever means they occur, are genuine products of some psychical activities, of which we have no experience in normal intercourse, and which conventional psychology is totally unable to interpret. The question before us is, Do these manifestations occur as psychical interactions exclusively among the living, or as interactions between the dead and living? According to Professor Hyslop and Dr. Hodgson, the latter is the correct interpretation.

The grounds on which these investigators base

their conclusion will be rendered sufficiently obvious for my purpose, to the reader, if I cite a passage or two from the papers of Professor Hyslop and Dr. Hodgson. The former writes: "To state it" (the telepathic hypothesis) "as boldly and clearly as is possible, it involves the power of the medium, wholly unconscious and not knowing the sitter, as any condition of establishing rapport at any distance, to select any absolutely unknown person necessary anywhere in the world, and from his memory make the selection of pertinent facts to represent personal identity, as that selection has been described for the mind of the sitter! Such a conception is the Nemesis of the credulity which is usually charged to Spiritism" (*Proceedings*, vol. xvi., part 41, p. 139). Again: "But now, right in contradiction with this infinite discriminative power, occurs the perfectly finite capacity for confusion, error, and difficulty, in getting right these memories about the actual communicators, which have been infallibly separated from my own personal experience, associated and unassociated with the communicators! This is a kind of discrepancy or weakness that ought not to occur with so unfailing a power to discriminate between pertinent and impertinent incidents, bearing upon personal identity. Assuming the application of telepathy, therefore, we have here a capacity absolutely free from illusion and mnemonic error, in discriminating between the individual and the common incidents, and selecting its field of operation, but full of contradictions, confusions, and indistinctness, within the limits of the field chosen for the acquisition of the facts. Why should this infallible distinction between the right and wrong groups of facts consist with so finite and

fallible a capacity to give the right ones thus circumscribed?" (*ibid.*, p. 138).

Dr. Hodgson writes:—"The mixtures of truth and error bear no *discernible* relation to the consciousness of the sitters, but suggest the action of another intelligence, groping confusedly among its own remembrances. And as further light appears in this confused groping, the bonds of association appear more and more to be traceable to no other assignable personality than that of the deceased. It is not this or that isolated piece of private knowledge merely, not merely this or that supernormal perception of an event occurring elsewhere, not merely this or that subtle emotional appreciation for a distant friend, but the union of all these in a coherent personal plan, with responsive intellect and character, that suggests the specific identity once known to us in a body incarnate" (*Proceedings*, vol. xiii., part 33, p. 360).

The above extracts seem to me to convey a fairly clear notion of what impresses Professor Hyslop and Dr. Hodgson, as excluding the purely mundane interpretation. So far as regards mere accuracy as to facts, of the revelations, neither investigator would seem likely to invoke the "spirits" on that ground alone. What clinches their decision in favour of the extra-mundane interpretation is the dramatic element, the play of personality, the natural (on the assumption that minds such as ours are trying under difficulties to communicate with us) lapses, errors, ignorances, diversions, characterising the method of the manifesting agency, whatever it may be.

In ordinary hypnotic phenomena, the personality of the hypnotic is always more or less in evidence,

acting a *rôle* of its own, within the cycle of automatic responses, and often successfully resisting the will of the hypnotist. To this source of possible perturbation may be added the complex facts of multiple personality, to the imaginative possibilities of which there is no assignable limit, though Professor Hyslop thinks that there are radical differences between the Piper personalities and ordinary cases of hypnotically imposed simulation and multiple personality. Even if we grant the Professor's contention, that in such cases the alienation "nearly always, if not absolutely always, shows a point of connection and unity between two or more streams of consciousness which indicate an *identity of subject* in spite of the apparent plurality of subjects" (*op. cit.*, pp. 270, 271), and if we grant that such unification does not occur in the case of the Piper personalities, this only indicates that, in the case of Mrs. Piper, there is a more complete rupture of the "ego" than occurs in the more familiar cases, in some of which, on the showing of Professor Hyslop himself, "the cleavage is almost perfect." If we have cases of cleavage almost perfect, we have hardly ground for rejecting, as not being typically the same, a case in which the cleavage is perfect. It seems to me that the familiar facts of multiple personality warrant the assumption that the subliminal Piper is as capable of manipulating a dramatic *mise en scène* and preserving dramatic identities as is a dramatist in ordinary dramatic construction. Given telepathic suggestion of facts, in addition to the "imagination," of multiple personality and subliminal memory, I submit that there is *prima facie* ground for adhering to the law of parsimony, and avoiding appeal to the spirits.

Let us suppose Mr. Pinero, as medium, giving trance-utterances of his characters. Then we may assume he will preserve personal identities and infuse the right dramatic atmosphere though the whole of his *dramatis personæ* "communicate." His trance-memory will, we may assume, equal Mrs. Piper's. Now let us assume that Mrs. Piper, through telepathic suggestion, normal observation, acquires incidents in the lives of dead people, and hints as to their personal peculiarities (temperaments, pet phrases, and so on). So far as regards raw material, Mrs. Piper and Mr. Pinero consciously constructing his plays will be essentially in the same position, and Mr. Pinero, as medium, and Mrs. Piper, will be essentially in the same position as giving utterances from the characters. It may be urged that Mr. Pinero, as medium, would be remembering his own dramatic creations, while Mrs. Piper would have to remember a host of things which she had never consciously known. The reply to this objection is that consciousness has nothing really to do with Mr. Pinero's fabrication of his play, beyond letting him know that he has fabricated it, and that it has nothing to do, as active agent, with his remembering what he has fabricated. These points will be fully dealt with when we come to apply metaphysic to the problem. At present, it will suffice to observe that all mental activity is really accomplished outside consciousness, which is, as Huxley, looking through his materialistic spectacles, termed it, an epiphenomenon, or sort of superfluity to the real thinking and feeling processes. Consciousness is merely a *quasi*-feeling through which we know that we do think and feel. Thoughts and feelings (other than conscious-

ness itself) "go on" in entire independence of consciousness.

Whether the *dramatis personæ* are, as we say, imagined, or are telepathically suggested, so far as regards their actual embodiment and persistence in memory, the case is the same. Whether the dramatist is a Pinero or a Piper, the only difference of moment between the two, as dramatists, is that, while Mr. Pinero gets raw material through normal observation of character and incident, Mrs. Piper gets raw and finished material, to some extent, probably through normal observation, but mainly through hypnotic submission to other wills, involving what is called telepathy. However the material may have been acquired, there is really nothing more mysterious about her than about Mr. Pinero's dealing with it.

If the actual welding of the raw material into dramatic consistency is, in every case, effected independently of the "epiphenomenon," consciousness, the essential conditions are the same so far as regards dramatic output, whether the agent is a Piper or Pinero. What difference there is is in mode of acquisition of raw material. In the one case, the mode involves accession of the material through the so-called senses; in the other case, the material is acquired through some other channel than the senses. We shall see, when we come to apply metaphysic to the problem, that this difference is illusory; that, really, there is no such contingency as that anything "comes through the senses," implying that the thing penetrates the senses from outside them.

A point that can hardly be over-emphasised in regard to Mrs. Piper, is her lengthened training in what may be termed the high-art of mediumship.

Professor Hyslop himself states this point as plainly as need be when he writes: "Assume also, that, in the process of fifteen years' experimenting and careful directions under Professor James, Dr. Hodgson, and others, Mrs. Piper has gradually, though unconsciously, become the subject of a thorough education into the more than usually perfect instance of multiplex personality in which the dramatic play can reproduce the realism that we observe in it" (*op. cit.*, p. 273). The champion of the mundane interpretation, under these circumstances, can hardly be denied if he makes a very large demand on the subliminal personality of Mrs. Piper, apart from suggestion, whether by discarnate or incarnate souls, as accounting for that dramatic realism and play of personality which so impress Professor Hyslop.

Another point to be noted in the present connection is what I may term the general tendency to perversity or malignity of the subliminal personality. This is very manifest in experimental telepathy, as disposition to deceive, hoax, hoodwink. As the eminent "Researcher," Mr. Podmore, writes: "A certain degree of moral perversity is a frequent and notorious characteristic of automatic expression" (*Apparitions*, etc., p. 95). In *Heresies* I have contended for the general application of this rule in all cases of deviation from normal personality (involving the exclusion of intellect). I believe that most villainy is actually perpetrated in some subliminal state, and that those we call hereditary criminals are in chronic states of subliminal personality. How far the artfulness, cunning, general "moral perversity," of the subliminal Mrs. Piper,

after fifteen or more years of "consciousness" of her mediumistic reputation, may contribute to rendering plausible the spiritualistic interpretation, I think we are more likely to under- than over-estimate.

There is always this "*x*" quantity of the subliminal *bonâ-fides* to be taken into account. Why shall not the subliminal Piper be trying to add to the plausibility of the *mise en scène*, by inventing appropriate lapses and complications? Why shall not her subliminal personality apprehend the veridical significance of the lapses and complications as completely as do Professor Hyslop and Dr. Hodgson? Indeed, why may not these gentlemen and others, who have had Mrs. Piper under observation for all these years, be themselves accountable, as suggesters, for the lapses and complications—not, of course, in detail, but as a system of procedure adapted both to ensure belief in spirit-agency, and to afford a practically unlimited field for mediumistic failures, without discredit to the medium, through constituting defects in the "spirits" merits in the medium? I think that we may safely assume that Mrs. Piper, in her normal state, has become fully aware of the construction put upon the lapses and complications by Dr. Hodgson and Professor Hyslop. This knowledge, on the assumed conditions, will have "oozed up" from the lower strata of mind, and the vein may well be worked by her subliminal personality.

Metaphysically, moral action involves action according to belief. Belief emanates through the only real faculty, intellect, and, through its conditions of existence, is the only pure auto-suggestion of the soul. Belief is never actualised, but with maximal "consciousness." In familiar terms, we can only



believe when we are fully conscious. On these conditions, there is no moral nature in subliminal personality. In this personality all action is hypnotic, whether *ab extra* or *ab intra*. Hence, the "*moral perversity*" of the medium is metaphysically a foregone conclusion.

Of course, moral perversity of the subliminal personality need not characterise the normal "consciousness." On the other hand, integrity (so far as it involves genuine mediumistic manifestation) of the subliminal personality may co-exist with moral perversity in the normal consciousness. So, the comparatively inefficient medium may be impelled to eke out his mediumistic defect by conscious trickery. I surmise that the great majority of detections of mediumistic imposture occur on these conditions, and that the conscious imposture of mediums is, more likely than not, accompanied by genuine mediumistic manifestation. I hardly think that anybody would deliberately adopt the calling of medium unless endowed with some degree of trance-capacity for genuine mediumistic exercise. There can be no greater fallacy in this connection than that of popular condemnation, merely on the strength of detected imposture. If every medium had been detected in trickery, that would not dispose of the residue of manifestations, about which no trickery had been detected. A single case, that indubitably baffles interpretation, unless as involving the supernatural, imposes the *onus* of proof on those who deny the supernatural. In view of the multitudes of cases on record which involve sheer bigotry, if cited merely on the grounds that their acceptance involves tacit acceptance of the supernatural, and

that the supernormal has been discredited in other cases, the common attitude adopted towards mediums seems to indicate credulous enslavement by the infallibility of prejudice and ignorance, rather than intelligent judgment.

It appears that the personal identities of Rector and Emperor (two supervising "spirits" often acting as intermediaries) cannot even be speculated about, no clue connecting them with any known individual. Yet they are, perhaps, the most completely embodied personalities in the whole Piper "repertory." Assuming that they are invented personalities, it would seem that the subliminal Piper should be credited with ability to build up, as effectively, other personalities, identified with dead people, with the material of telepathically derived facts.

In dealing with the above standpoint regarding Emperor and Rector, Professor Hyslop writes:—"We may also ask, as a further objection, who Emperor and Rector are? Here we have two alleged spirits, whose identity is absolutely concealed from us, and apparently with '*malice prepense*.' . . . Now, are we not obliged to determine whether they are spirits or not, before accepting the veridically spiritual character of the personalities that seem to be verifiable? May we not, in the absence of evidence for their identity, assume that they are secondary personalities of Mrs. Piper's organism, and representative of supernormal conditions which qualify her for telepathic acquisition of the data that simulate the personal identity of others? . . . As for myself, I cannot study the dramatic play of personality, to say nothing of its complication with telepathy, without appreciating the naturalness and

the rational strength of the spiritistic theory, more than I can the emphasis of analogies which are too general to affect anything except the superficial features of an argument. In addition to the wonderful dramatic play of personality that I have so elaborately discussed, just think of the memory that must be involved in conducting the right adjustment and connections of incidents, ideas, and advice, necessary to give the psychological complexity and the unity of the phenomena that so successfully represent spirit existence, while hundreds of sitters follow each other from day to day in miscellaneous confusion. If any man wishes to combine such a number of 'miracles' in one act or brain—namely, such elastic range of secondary personality as appears in these trance-intermediaries and others, like G. P. and Phinuit, all with character as distinct as we ever knew it in life, and capable of playing a real part, wholly unlike secondary personality as we know it ordinarily, and then add to this an omniscient telepathy—if any man does this I can only say that I do not follow him into the *a priori* construction of such a hypothesis. He must give a detailed analysis of cases that are similar, and yet that do not have any spiritistic content. This may be possible, but I suspend judgment until it is effected. The supposition appears strong, as any appeal to the infinite must appear strong, for the lack of any assignable limits to such powers. But these are not the customary modes of scientific explanation, which has a preference for the finite" (*op. cit.*, pp. 262, 263).

Professor Hyslop here blames the "telepathic" advocate for being impressed by the "superficial

features of an argument." It would appear that the Professor himself was impressed by such features. Because something happens, the mundane interpretation of which is not very obvious to the Professor, he "cuts the knot" with spirits, while offering nothing to show that his term has any real meaning. When the physicist talks of his atoms and energies, the psychologist of his mind, each at least lets us know what he means by his terms. Professor Hyslop and Dr. Hodgson give us a word and imply that the word does things. This is a common way of dealing with words, but it is not satisfying for people who yearn for more than "superficial features." As "spirits" seem to be doing things that they did before they became spirits, it would seem that we might properly ignore them until we had identified them, as doers in the mundane arena. So far as I can glean from Professor Hyslop and Dr. Hodgson, the mundane doer is a thing of arms, legs, trunk, sense-organs, nerve-cells and fibres, and the distinction between it and the extra-mundane doer lies in the fact that the latter doer has dispensed with those things.

There seems much needing elucidation about this distinction. Spirits, *ex hypothesi*, are remembering earthly experiences. This involves that they continue mundane action. An active agent that continues action can only be itself when it started action. Then, if what starts action is arms-cum-legs, etc., it must be arms-cum-legs as continuing action. If it is not arms-cum-legs, it must be another thing. Corollarily, as spirits are not arms-cum-legs, etc., spirits are other things than earthly doers and are tricking us when they lead us to identify them with

earthly doers, or we are tricking ourselves if we worry ourselves about them at all.

On the other hand, if spirits are really earthly doers in some non-mundane state of existence, we must identify earthly doers that are not arms-cum-legs, etc. Such earthly doers, when we have identified them, will enable us to make affirmations about "spirits" that are not mere words. In this connection, we can affirm nothing about continuity of action, until we have verified possible continuity of agent; and we can verify nothing about continuity of agent, until we have identified an earthly doer, as spirit. There is no possibility of real notion of extra-mundane spirits until we have identified them as mundane spirits.

Let us now turn to the "appeal to the infinite," charged as not being scientific, against the "telepathist," by Professor Hyslop. Presumably, the Professor endows the spirits and the sitters with the common mind of psychology, implying an external world jumping into and out of this mind. This involves "miracle" and the "infinite" with a vengeance. When the external world is not in this mind, it has to annihilate the world; when the external world gets into the mind, it has to create the world. How are this mind and the external world possible, unless we impute omniscience and omnipotence to the mind? How can it know an external world that it has not created, or banish an external world that it has not annihilated? If only through this mind the known exists, what is an external world that gets into and out of this mind?

I surmise that Professor Hyslop has given too much consideration to the infinite, for invoking

which, he blames the "telepathist"; but, too little consideration to the infinite which he claims for the spirits, into whose minds, by implication, all those experiences (presented objects, persons, questions, etc.) are jumping from the mundane sphere. The difficulty of accounting, on the assumption of the conventional mind, for this intrusion into the minds of the spirits seems as great as the difficulty which impresses the Professor in regard to the telepathic interpretation. It seems here a case of "glass houses," in regard to infinity and miracle, between the spiritistic and telepathic interpretations.

Professor Hyslop wants the man who attributes the "miracles" to the Piper subliminal and telepathy to "give a detailed analysis of cases that are similar." Perhaps the man will say that one case is enough: that of Mrs. Piper. Subliminal personalities that have been trained for fifteen years or more by Professor James, Dr. Hodgson, Professor Hyslop, and others, are not available every day as cases.

There are other classes of abnormal achievements quite on an equality, as "miracles," with Mrs. Piper's feats in regard to her *dramatis personæ*. Take the case of the "calculating boy," Zerah Colburn, son of an American peasant. Of him, Dr. Carpenter wrote:—"It was when the lad was under six years of age, and before he had received any instruction either in writing or in arithmetic, that he surprised his father by repeating the products of several numbers; and then, on various arithmetical questions being proposed to him, by solving them all with facility and correctness. Having been brought over to London in 1812, at the age of eight years, his powers were tested by several eminent mathematicians; among them Francis Bailey,

from whose account of him the following examples are selected:—He raised any number consisting of one figure progressively to the tenth power; giving the results (by actual multiplication, and not by memory) faster than they could be set down in figures by the person appointed to record them. He raised the number 8 progressively to the sixteenth power; and in naming the last result, which consisted of fifteen figures, he was right in every one. Some numbers consisting of two figures he raised as high as the eighth power; though he found a difficulty in proceeding when the product became very large. On being asked the square root of 106,929 he answered 327, before the original number could be written down. He was then required to find the cube root of 268,336,125; and with equal facility and promptness he replied 645. He was asked how many minutes there are in 48 years; and before the question could be written down, he replied, 25,228,800, and immediately afterwards he gave the correct number of seconds. On being requested to give the factors which would produce the number 247,483, he immediately named 941 and 263, which are the only two numbers from the multiplication of which it would result. On 171,395 being proposed he named  $5 \times 34,279$ ,  $7 \times 24,485$ ,  $59 \times 2,905$ ,  $83 \times 2,065$ ,  $35 \times 4,897$ ,  $295 \times 581$ , and  $413 \times 415$ . He was then asked to give the factors of 36,083, but he immediately replied that it had none, which is really the case, this being a prime number. Other numbers being proposed to him indiscriminately, he always succeeded in giving the correct factors, except in the case of prime numbers, which he generally discovered almost as soon as proposed. The number 4,294,967,297,

which is  $2^{33} + 1$ , having been given to him, he discovered (as Euler had previously done) that it is not the prime number which Fermat had supposed it to be, but that it is the product of the factors  $6,700,417 \times 641$ . . . . On being interrogated as to the method by which he obtained these results, the boy constantly declared that he did not know how the answers came into his mind. In the act of multiplying two numbers together, and in the raising of powers, it was evident (alike from the facts just stated, and from the motion of his lips) that some operation was going forward in his mind; yet that operation could not (from the readiness with which the answers were furnished) have been at all allied to the usual modes of procedure, of which, indeed, he was entirely ignorant, not being able to perform on paper a simple sum in multiplication or division. But in the extraction of roots and in the discovery of factors of large numbers, it did not appear that any operation could take place, since he gave answers immediately, or in a very few seconds, which, according to the ordinary methods, would have required very difficult and laborious calculations; and prime numbers cannot be recognised as such by any known rule" (*Mental Physiology*, fourth edition, pp. 233, 234).

Assuming that memory, in the conventional sense, has anything to do with such manifestations as those of Mrs. Piper and Zerah Colburn (which, from my standpoint, memory has not), I submit that the "miracle" of memory, in "conducting the right adjustment and connections of ideas," is as fully evidenced in the achievements of Colburn as of Mrs. Piper.

Anticipating a little what is to follow, as meta-



physical interpretation, I may here observe that what we call memory is, essentially, merely the willing of ideas in a subliminal personality. What is "remembered" is, really, not "past," but "present," only it is present in such a personality as renders it empirically out of what we call actual experience.

Colburn simply projects into "consciousness," as what is called the solution of the problem, the final issue of what psychologists call a flow of ideas. What we call reasoning is an automatic process, really performed "unconsciously." Reasoning with numerical ideas is called mathematics; reasoning with ordinary thoughts is called logic. Whether we reason with thoughts or numbers, we do this "unconsciously," what we call consciousness being merely superadded to the essential movements of the thoughts or numbers, without in any way affecting the "flow," or juxtapositions of the thoughts or numbers. Really, there is no such thing as reasoning, in the conventional, empirical sense of the term, implying that consciousness has some determinate influence on the "flow." All that consciousness does is to render us "aware" that the thoughts have "flowed," or are "flowing" in particular ways.

When we say: twice two is four, we do not commonly reason to the affirmation. The process is then "automatic" and "mnemonic." We "remember" but do not reason. Still, when we "consciously" reason to the conclusion, we only bring the same ideas into actual "conscious" experience, as ratiocinative intermediates to the "conclusion," which, when we "remember" and automatically affirm that twice two is four, we exclude, as intermediates, from "conscious" experience. The process of thought-

movement is the same, whether the flow of ideas is ratiocinative (with consciousness) or merely automatic (without consciousness).

The so-called laws of thoughts are simply a predominating, common experience, or consensus in regard to the "unconscious," "automatic" flow of ideas. The normal mathematician has conscious experience of the "flow"; accordingly, he "knows how" he solves the problem. The abnormal mathematician, Colburn, has no conscious experience of the flow; accordingly, he does not know how he solves the problem. Still, he and the normal mathematician solve the problem in, essentially, the same way. Once the particular flow is started, it must end in the particular solution. Of course, the particular flow may not be started. Then, the person to whom the problem is put will not "understand" it. His not understanding it will involve that there is no flow. Or, he may understand it, and yet offer a wrong solution; then there will be started some flow deviating from the mathematical "consensus," and the solution will be "wrong."

Though Colburn, as a mathematician, is not what we call a thinking agent, in the sense that the ordinary mathematician is such an agent, this apparent difference only amounts to the fact that Colburn is not what we call conscious of his method, while the ordinary mathematician is conscious of his. That the latter is conscious of his method involves that he wills "consciousness" with the thinking, while Colburn excludes it—thinking without "consciousness." The case of Colburn is an empirical illustration of the metaphysical fact that what we call mind is not at all the "mind" of the ordinary psychologist,

or of common assumption. The metaphysical mind is not the individual's own, specialised, thinking "machine," or doer. The metaphysical mind does nothing, is common to all individuals, and is entirely distinct from any individual. These points will be elucidated in the following chapters. Here, let us take them as granted, and assume that all the ordinary mathematician's numerical ideas are Colburn's.

Now, just as Colburn has all these numerical ideas of the ordinary mathematician, so, also, Mrs. Piper has all the thoughts of all the people who come to her to be put into communication with their dead friends. The only difference, in this connection, between Mrs. Piper and these people is that, while they "remember" thoughts about their dead friends, Mrs. Piper does not "remember" those thoughts. As Colburn is "unconscious" of his thinking about numbers, Mrs. Piper is "unconscious" of thinking about the dead people. But Mrs. Piper, unlike the mathematician in regard to numbers, does not "reason" out what we call incidents in the lives of these dead people. She does not attain a "solution" as do Colburn and the ordinary mathematician, merely by willing a flow of ideas. If she could attain her "solution" as Colburn and the ordinary mathematician obtain theirs, she would need to be what we imagine as omniscient and omnipotent—determining, as well as knowing, the incidents. Still, as she can think unconsciously, as does Colburn, and can "remember" unconsciously, as he does, if she can only, somehow, get incidents connected with the lives of those dead people, she can attain her "solution" as effectively as Colburn attains his.

Given what is called suggestion, we shall see that

there is no more "miracle" in the Piper "memory that must be involved"—as Professor Hyslop impresses—"in conducting the right adjustment and connections of incidents, ideas, and advice necessary to give the psychological complexity and the unity of the phenomena that so successfully represent spirit existence, while hundreds of sitters follow each other from day to day in miscellaneous confusion," than in the Colburn memory.

Another class of spiritistic phenomena allied to the case of Colburn, and quite as "miraculous" as anything that impresses Professor Hyslop in regard to the Piper manifestations, are the productions of so-called mediumistic writers who have given to the world remarkable works which, apparently, cannot be attributed to normal processes of conception, or to normal processes of acquisition, as what we call culture. Of such a mediumistic writer I read the following remarks by a prominent Spiritualist, Mr. James Robertson, reported in *Light* of October 11th, 1902:—

"As showing the spirits' action in the realm of science, I would point out that Darwin takes some of his statements on the origin and antiquity of man in his great work, *The Descent of Man*, and acknowledges the indebtedness, from Hudson Tuttle, whom all Spiritualists know to be what is called a spirit medium." (Darwin writes: "I have taken some of the above statements from H. Tuttle's *Origin and Antiquity of Physical Man*.") "Tuttle's own words," says Mr. Robertson, "in defining his position are so clear that no one can misread them: 'Mine is the task of the amanuensis, writing that which is revealed to me. I have faithfully, carefully, and conscientiously

presented my impressions as they have been given me by my masters, the invisible spirits, claiming neither the honour nor dishonour pertaining thereto. . . . Ever have I been cheered by the presence of spirit friends and bathed in their magnetism been supremely blessed.'” Mr. Robertson proceeds: “We almost wonder whether Darwin would have looked upon the writings of Tuttle as an authority had he known that the inspirers claimed to be spirits, and that the books written through Tuttle were part of the phenomena which make up the fabric of Spiritualism. . . . There were others beside Darwin who were charmed with the depth and grandeur of Hudson Tuttle’s mediumistic writings. *The Arcana of Nature* was translated into German and advanced minds of that country saw in this volume a solution of the problems for which the thinking world had been so long looking. When Büchner, the great German naturalist, went to America, and hunted out the author, he was a bit surprised to find that he was a poor farmer, toiling for his daily bread. And, of course, Büchner could not accept Tuttle’s statements as to the source of his inspiration. Who that has not some close acquaintanceship with mediums could believe that a farmer’s boy, without books, education, apparatus, with none of the appliances of schools, not even cultured surroundings, could launch upon the world works at once philosophical and profound, commencing with the construction of the atom, and ending with the laws of spirit life?”

The metaphysician is quite able to account for such phenomena as the above without invoking the “spirits.” The phenomena afford the most cogent evidence for the truth of the metaphysical demonstra-

tion of mind, and of the fallacy of the common and "scientific" conception of mind. As we shall see, metaphysic says that mind is, really, not an individual's, but is common to all individuals. There is no knowing, in the sense of the common empiricist and psychologist. There is only willing. The thoughts we will are "our" mind. But, we take them out of the mind that is not "ours." And, we take "unconsciously." Darwin took his thoughts as "unconsciously" as did Tuttle or Colburn. Tuttle was probably more accurate than Darwin, in measuring the debit and credit. Though Darwin escaped the illusion of dispensing "spirits," he hardly seemed properly to estimate the reality of a dispensing God. Like the rest of the great and little folk of the world, he seemed to imply that the cosmic concern was run by Bug, Almighty & Co. At present there are too many folk, great and little, who seem to consider Bug the head partner. The consequences of this misapprehension provoke some curious reflections for the metaphysician, who sees Bug, not as partner, but as fly on the wheel. For instance, philanthropists and regenerators, who begin indulging themselves after pilfering from the Almighty, don't smell sweet to the metaphysician. These virtuous Bugs affect him much as does an emetic, and even render him sensible of a comparative fragrance distilled by the vicious Bugs. He's a curious fellow, the metaphysician! Like Tuttle, he has visions, and has got Bug measured up.

The whole Piper problem, so far as regards the main conclusion of Professor Hyslop and Dr. Hodgson, seems to resolve itself into the question, Is it practically possible that, considered *en bloc*, such seats of

memory, dramatic construction, and such acquisition of evidential facts in regard to dead people, can occur merely as phenomena of subliminal thought-processes and telepathic acquisition of facts? The answer of Professor Hyslop and Dr. Hodgson is that they cannot—with the rider that we must, accordingly, invoke the agency of some speculative entities called spirits. Neither investigator would seem to assert that any of the Piper manifestations, merely as a type, was out of the category of comparatively familiar subliminal phenomena. The facts of telepathy and of the capacity of the subliminal personality for purposeful action are fully recognised by both investigators. What, for them, turns the scale, may be termed the collective momentum of the Piper incidents.

I contend that, until we scientifically identify a specific spiritistic phenomenon intrinsically outside practical possibility as a resultant of mundane suggestion and auto-suggestion, we must abstain from speculative excursions into the extra-mundane region, and that, until we have attained a scientific notion of spirits, we must abstain from talking about them.

Dr. Hodgson, particularly, lays stress on the difficulties under which the ostensible spirits labour in communicating. Though I cannot claim to have been an industrious reader of the records of sittings, I find that there is a formidable array of errors and confusions, as well as of successes in the revelations. The failures, we are to assume, are attributable to the difficulties encountered by the spirits in using what is called the "machine" (Mrs. Piper's capacity for automatic expression, whether by speech or writing). In respect to the spirits, Mrs. Piper would

seem to be distantly comparable to a wheezy piano in respect to the learner.

To illustrate this point, I will quote from Dr. Hodgson. He writes: "Let the reader start to hold a conversation with two or three friends, but let him be forced to spell out his words instead of speaking them in the ordinary way, and be absolutely confined to this method of expressing himself, no matter what his friends may do or say. Let him be interrupted at every two or three words by his interlocutors, who tell him that they 'didn't catch the last word,' and ask for it to be repeated, and occasionally several times repeated. Let them, further, frequently interrupt him by asking fresh questions before his answer to a previous question is completed. Further, let him suppose that it is very difficult for him to hear precisely what their questions are, so that he hears only portions of what they say. Having made this experiment, let him then suppose further that instead of using his own voice to spell his words with, he is placed in one side of a machine so constructed that the thoughts running in his mind have a tendency to be registered in writing on the other side of the machine, not so fast as he thinks them, but at the rate of writing, and that it is only by reading this writing that his interlocutors know what he has to tell them. Let him suppose, further, that one or more persons are standing near him on his side of the machine and talking to him or to one another within his hearing, so that the words which they say tend to be registered in the writing; and let him further suppose that he is unfamiliar with the machine, and that the writing produced has a tendency to vary somewhat from the words actually



thought of by him, owing to imperfections in the machine. Let him further suppose that the part of the machine in which he is placed is filled with a more or less suffocating gas which produces a partial loss of consciousness, that sometimes this gas is much more poisonous than usual (weakness or ill-health of medium) and that its effects are usually cumulative while he remains in the machine. The important failures of G. P. (Pelham) were due primarily, I believe, to the ignorance of the sitters that he was communicating under some such conditions as these. And I cannot too strongly emphasise my conviction that, unless the presence of such conditions is constantly recognised by the investigator, his further research in this field will be futile. Having recognised the limitations, he may be able to modify them and minimise the effect of them; and in my opinion, it is to the fuller and more exact appreciation of what these limitations are, and to what extent they can be removed, that the main path of progress in psychical investigation trends. Once more I repeat that I hold this to be true, even if the 'communicators' are but fragments of Mrs. Piper's personality" (*Proceedings*, part 33, pp. 332, 333).

It would seem that, as the spirits, in addition to being reminiscently awake to their own mundane identities and those of their friends, are clairvoyantly sensible to the personal identities of sitters and to events occurring since they (the spirits) left the mundane life, that they should be equally alive to the difficulties in working the "machine" and to what it was writing or speaking, as was Dr. Hodgson himself, and should be able to obviate complications likely to arise through the remarks of adjacent spirits,

wrong reporting, and the interruptions and repetitions of questions by sitters. If John, Thomas, Henry are pelting the spirit with questions, why cannot the spirit tell one to be quiet until the other has finished ; tell John : this is for you ; Thomas, this is for you ? Why cannot Pelham say to some other interrupting spirit : Do stop talking until I have done with the " machine " ! It is recording your remarks as well as mine, and those at the other end cannot tell which are which.

As the spirits appear to be clairvoyant, as well as merely reminiscent, I hardly think that Dr. Hodgson's ingenious analogy can be allowed as between the reader, in the pictured predicament, and the spirits using the " machine." The supposititious reader does not, according to the apparent implication of Dr. Hodgson, see his friends. (If he does see them, the above suggestions about the spirits apply to him.) The spirit, by implication, sees the sitters (indeed, often assures them that he both sees and hears them), and accordingly can discriminate between one and another interlocutor. On what I take to be the conditions, I fail to see that Dr. Hodgson's extenuation of the spirit's errors and confusions, on the ground of difficulty in using the " machine," has even plausibility.

This does not apply if the " communicators are but fragments of Mrs. Piper's personality." In that case, there is no discriminating, determining agency such as is implied in the case of spirits. Mrs. Piper's " fragment " has no personal identity with a deceased person, but is merely the " mirror " and automatic register of one or another set of thoughts or emotions auto-suggested and suggested by some other person-

ality or personalities. On such conditions, we may readily account for the errors and confusions in "registering," and the analogy of the non-seeing communicator will somewhat apply.

In later observations, Dr. Hodgson writes that these interruptions by "spirits" other than the communicator have been largely obviated, and that the communications have become clearer and more coherent. This has occurred through the advent of the "controls" of W. S. Moses, who "demanded that the control of Mrs. Piper's 'light' should be placed in their hands. In other words, 'Imperator' claimed that the indiscriminate experimenting with Mrs. Piper's organism should stop, that it was a 'battered and worn' machine, and needed much repairing; that 'he' with his 'assistants' 'Doctor,' 'Rector,' etc., would repair it as far as possible, and that in the meantime other persons must be kept away. I then for the first time explained to the normal Mrs. Piper about W. S. Moses and his alleged relation to 'Imperator,' and she was willing to follow my advice and try this new experiment—to which, I may say, I was repeatedly and emphatically urged by the communicating G. P. I explained at the following sitting to 'Imperator' that the medium and myself agreed to the change" (*Proceedings*, part 33, p. 408). This all seems to follow naturally, on the telepathic hypothesis, from Dr. Hodgson's theory about the "machine" and perturbing spirits, and from Mrs. Piper's close *rapproch* with Dr. Hodgson. Pelham says ditto to Dr. Hodgson, and Imperator comes to the rescue, keeping the interrupting spirits out of the way. I think that Dr. Hodgson does not adequately estimate his own "control" of Mrs.

Piper, after fifteen years of experimenting. What Mrs. Piper, as medium, owes to Dr. Hodgson's training can hardly, it seems to me, be over-estimated.

Professor Hyslop asserts that we know nothing, causally, about telepathy and clairvoyance. Metaphysically, as we shall see, we know a great deal about telepathy and clairvoyance. However, the Professor's implication does not contemplate metaphysic in the connection. He is merely affirming about telepathy and clairvoyance in the light of empirical psychology. He writes: "There is first the elastic and indefinite meaning in the terms clairvoyance and telepathy. I have already shown that they are mere names for an unknown cause. They are convenient weapons for scepticism, and serve a most useful purpose in keeping the standards of evidence as high as possible, but they are not in truth explanations of any sort. We get into the habit of assuming *a priori* that they mean necessarily processes between living minds on the ground that the evidence does not prove spirits, and we forget wholly that we are so ignorant of the real *modus operandi* in the case that it does not occur to us that possibly the agency intermediating the whole effect may be spirits" (*Proceedings*, part 41, p. 254).

While suggesting the above in regard to spirits as superseding "living minds" in the business of communication and vision commonly attributed to telepathy and clairvoyance, Professor Hyslop is careful to discount the suggestion by assuring us that he does not advance the supposition as being probable. Still, as he has made the suggestion in order to discredit the telepathic hypothesis, it may be well

to give a little consideration to what the Professor's suggestion implies.

If "spirits," instead of "minds" do the business called telepathy and clairvoyance, it would seem that we might relieve "minds" of any active significance, considering them merely "machines" disposed of at the option of "spirits." If spirits cause minds to communicate ideas and to reveal the normally hidden, why shall not spirits cause minds to do all that we embrace under the terms, thinking, feeling, sensing? The Professor's suggestion seems to lead naturally to the virtual implication of the extreme order of popular spiritualism: that humanity, as minds, is merely a congeries of pawns moved by spirits.

Again, it may be asked, in connection with the Professor's suggestion that "the agency intermediating the whole effect may be spirits," wherein are spirits, less than telepathy and clairvoyance, "mere names for an unknown cause"? What, apart from metaphysical demonstration of causality, do we know about spirits, that we do not know about telepathy and clairvoyance? Wherein are we better off as affording "explanation," in attributing, on the conditions of psychological empiricism, causal efficiency to spirits than to telepathy and clairvoyance?

Professor Hyslop implies, in the following terms, that he has established the identity of spirits, as really causal agents, better than the identity of telepathy and clairvoyance is established as such agency. He writes:—"Spiritism is an appeal to known causes, the fundamental criterion of all scientific procedure; telepathy is an appeal to the unknown. We know just what an individual consciousness can do when it exists. In supposing its continuance beyond death.

we are but extending a known cause beyond certain concomitants and limitations of its terrestrial manifestation. As a phenomenon it is quite as intangible and invisible in its incarnate conditions as it can be supposed to be in the discarnate. We know it even terrestrially, in others, only by induction applied to certain physical movements. Hence when we advance spiritism to explain the Piper and similar phenomena we are but extending *known* causes precisely as Newton extended terrestrial gravitation to explain phenomena previously excluded from its operations. We are using the same cause to explain the unity of certain facts that we used to explain them when the person was living. It is telepathy then that appeals to the unknown, so that the spiritistic hypothesis has one scientific credential that telepathy has not" (*Proceedings*, part 41, p. 294).

No doubt, we are "using the same cause"; but, what if this ostensible cause is no cause? The above begs the whole question of causal identity, whether of "consciousness" or "spirits." Calling a "living mind" or "consciousness," cause, is no more explanatory of causal identity than is calling a condition, as telepathy, or clairvoyance, or gravitation, cause. The term consciousness, on the Professor's conditions, is no less a "name for an unknown cause" than is the term telepathy, or gravitation. To speculate about the post-mundane continuity of such empirical causes is futile. We know, empirically, that consciousness, telepathy, gravitation are conditions obtaining in the mundane sphere of experience. This knowledge is entirely foreign to the question of causal identity in the mundane, let alone in a problematical post-mundane sphere. To imply that "consciousness" acts

in a non-terrestrial sphere, while we have not even identified active agency in the terrestrial sphere, is the acme of speculative adventure. We may just as well speculate to the non-physical activity of gravitation. Before we can speculate about post-mundane continuity, as "spirits," we must identify spirits in the mundane sphere. This implies that we must identify an agent, to which, as cause, we can attribute "mind" and "consciousness," equally with "telepathy" and "gravitation."

For the above reasons I dissent from Professor Hyslop's assertion that "spiritism" (as empirically authenticated) "is an appeal to known causes, . . . but extending a known cause beyond certain concomitants and limitations of its terrestrial manifestation." I contend that spiritism has identified no cause at all, and has not a particle of justification, as empirically expounded, for predicating about the post-mundane continuity of personal identity as the so-called spirits. I contend that "mind" or "consciousness," as empirically identified, is no more a causal agent than is telepathy or gravitation. I contend that Newton did not "extend terrestrial gravitation" in the sense that the empirical spiritist extends the causal activity of "consciousness." The phenomena to which Newton extended gravitation were mundane, in the sense that they were within the arena of normal experience. To extend "consciousness" to the extra-mundane arena is to beg the question of the existence of the extra-mundane, and apply to it a spuriously causal agency which we only know as operating in the mundane arena. Did I not contemplate spiritism from the metaphysical standpoint, I must confess that the arguments and facts adduced by

Professor Hyslop and Dr. Hodgson would leave me as sceptical about the spirits as does the tale of "Jack the Giant-killer" about what it recounts.

This polemic is the outcome of a very desultory reading of what it assails. Professor Hyslop's paper runs to 649 pages of psychological introspection, dialectics, and details of sittings. Dr. Hodgson's paper runs to 379 pages. Neither is indexed—a fact, alone, from my standpoint, enough to repel a critical reader. However, my main inducement to not very judicious "skipping" was the conviction which early occurred to me that the arguments advanced were wholly of the empirical order, and, accordingly, from my standpoint, mere beatings of the wind so far as regarded the crucial issues; and that the recorded facts were all of a type which could be recognised from consideration of a few sittings. The mere multitude of instances did not, to my apprehension, affect the essential problem. The Pelham facts which I have cited seem to me to embody all the most impressive features of the manifestations, and I soon recognised that the arguments were merely dialectical attempts to project such facts beyond the range of mundane activity. My prejudices as a metaphysician, in favour of what, under the circumstances, I will call the "osses," must be my excuse for lack of industry as reader. To me, so far as I have read it, Professor Hyslop's argument seems a weary waste of words—able, ingenious, conscientious, yet, alas, a Sahara of words! One assurance has come to me, with perhaps added force, through seeing these papers of Dr. Hodgson and Professor Hyslop. This assurance is of the futility, so far as regards the issue of causation, of the empirical method of investigating phenomena.



Professor Hyslop seems to have a lofty contempt for what he calls the "unscientific imagination." In connection with spiritism, and judged from the metaphysical standpoint, there does not seem much to choose as between the scientific and unscientific imagination. Professor Hyslop writes, very truly, that "faith no longer charms with her magic wand, except among those who do not accept or appreciate scientific method, but whose flimsy standards afford no criteria for defence against illusion and deception. Hence men who have been saturated, consciously and unconsciously, with the scientific spirit either give up the hereafter or insist that their belief shall have other credentials than authority. Consequently, every institution connected with social, moral, and religious life must be profoundly affected, whether for good or ill, by such an assurance as that of a future life, the doubt about which has turned the aspirations of modern civilisation from the moral to the economic ideal" (*op. cit.*, p. 289).

Metaphysically considered, the proofs of "science" for the "hereafter" have little better foundation than those flimsy standards to which Professor Hyslop refers, and can no more affect the diversion of the "aspirations of modern civilisation from the moral to the economic ideal" than can the flickering faith of the unscientific imagination. So long as "science" is the ultimate court, so long will the economic, effectually keep beyond the horizon of civilisation, the moral, ideal. The moral ideal is no more to be got out of "science" than pity is to be got out of a stone. The moral ideal can only manifest itself under the auspices of metaphysic.

## CHAPTER III.

### METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES.

WHEN we say that a person is conscious, we commonly imply that something renders him aware that he has thoughts and feelings, and that things exist about him as being external to himself. This easy, empirical way of looking at the matter suffices for our common needs but is totally inadequate to afford us any knowledge of the causal conditions determining the contingencies. When we come to deal seriously with the phenomena of experience we have to ask and answer a number of questions with which, as practical folk, we do not trouble ourselves. Not only as ordinary, practical folk, do we adopt this easy method of slurring over the essential, but we do this as people who are prone to appropriate for themselves, exclusively, the title of scientists. Indeed, these monopolists of the title of scientists seem banded together against research that is applied to essentials. However, the force of circumstances is getting too strong to permit of our evading research applied to essentials. The essential is rapidly becoming the main question of the age. Spiritism is beginning to elbow its way in advance of materialistic common-sense, and we now want to know something more about a conscious person than satisfied us a few years ago, and than seems, even now, to satisfy the scientific monopolist.

What is a person? How can he have thoughts and feelings? How can there be things external to himself? If he has thoughts and feelings, why does it need anything else to render him aware of the fact? What is having thoughts and feelings, if it is not being aware of having them? May a person have thoughts and feelings without knowing he has them? If so, on what conditions? Is a person a certain object that we see, that moves, and out of which come certain sounds? How do we see this person, and hear the sounds? This person that we see must, in some way, get into ourselves, as other persons, or how could we see him? If he is bigger than we, how does he get into us? How does a mountain get into us? Does anything get into us at all? Does consciousness thrust things into us—does it do anything at all? Even the hard-headed, practical man is now, perforce, beginning to worry himself with questions like these.

To anybody who reflects, it will be obvious that whatever he experiences must be, as experience, within himself, whatever the self may be, and that, to imply that anything is outside himself is to imply that something exists which he does not know to exist. A seen thing only exists as being seen. To be seen, it must be experience. To be experience, it must be within ourself. To imply that a thing exists outside ourself is to imply that a seen thing is not a seen thing. So it is with a heard, a tasted, a touched, a smelt thing. All these things, as seeings, hearings, tastings, smellings, touchings, can only exist as within ourselves, as experiences.

These experiences come and go. What makes them come and go? Consciousness? But, what can con-

consciousness be but a sort of experience? What makes it come and go, and what becomes of the other experiences when consciousness goes? Are they put out of existence: annihilated? Then, if consciousness makes them appear again, it must create them. But, what creates and annihilates can only be what causes us to exist. Consciousness does not cause us to exist, because it is only experience. Experience cannot exist until we exist, and we only know we exist through experience. So, we are driven to account for experience by verifying a *vera causa*. Metaphysic identifies causes as of two orders, relative and absolute. Relative causes are souls. Absolute cause is God, the only true cause.

From the metaphysical standpoint, our real self is soul, and this causes consciousness and all other experience. How does it cause these experiences? By willing them. Does this mean that it makes them appear *ex nihilo*? No; God created them; soul can only "glance" at them. They exist as mind: the God-mind, whether they are, or are not, experience. Though the soul makes them appear and disappear, as experience, the soul nowise affects their integrity as mind. Still, the soul creates and annihilates them, as experience. Only seemingly. Through experiments and observation we know that people may think, feel, sense when they are what we commonly term unconscious, even more efficiently than when they are what we call conscious. Even on empirical grounds, we may be assured that thoughts, feelings, sensings, persist, whether they are in or out of experience.

This God-mind is thus the possible experience common to all souls. As souls will, so is the part of

the God-mind they constitute experience. This willing into experience of parts of the God-mind constitutes what we commonly call mind, the mind of the individual. The willing into experience is determined by the willing of "consciousness." It will be seen that the mind identified by metaphysic is entirely different from the mind of psychology and of common assumption. The mind of metaphysic does nothing. The mind of psychology and of common assumption does a great deal. The mind of metaphysic is the same for everybody. The other mind is peculiar to the individual. The mind of metaphysic is outside the real self (soul). The other mind is the self. The metaphysical mind may be imagined as a landscape at which the soul, as an eye, glances. Though the glance may be only at a small spot, the landscape remains intact. Millions of eyes (souls) are glancing at the landscape, and each eye (soul) has the whole landscape from which to make selection.

What is commonly called consciousness is merely a particular grade and intensity of a certain constituent of mind which I call the consciousness-sensation. During what we call life, the soul is always willing one or another grade and intensity of the consciousness-sensation in conjunction with thoughts, feelings, sensings, constituting all possible experience, or what I term the possible universe (the God-mind). Each "self" or soul has thus the possible experience of all other "selves" or souls. That this possible experience is not actual experience occurs because actual experience only arises so soon as a particular grade and intensity of the consciousness-sensation are willed with thoughts, sensings, feelings. Could the soul will this particular grade and intensity of the

consciousness-sensation, as it wills all other grades, all possible experience would be actual.

This willing of the consciousness-sensation, in various grades and intensities, with thoughts, feelings, sensings, involves that the soul so "glances" at the universe, as to constitute it in what I figure as "storeys" or "strata," the storey depending on what grade and intensity of the consciousness-sensation may be willed. Thus the consciousness-sensation may be imagined as a light cast by the soul on thoughts, feelings, sensings. When a soul wills what I call maximal grade and intensity of the consciousness-sensation, the person is what we commonly call conscious. When other grades and intensities are willed the person is "unconscious." Whether he is "conscious" or "unconscious" he is willing all possible thoughts, feelings, sensings, as the "possible universe." What is called death involves that he ceases to will the consciousness-sensation with thoughts, feelings, sensings, constituting mundane experiences.

All thoughts, feelings, sensings, are "there" for everybody, as mind, or possible universe. The question is: With what grade and intensity of the consciousness-sensation are these things willed? Possibly they are willed, only with such a minimal grade and intensity of the consciousness-sensation as involves a "storey" or "stratum" of mind constituting what we call unconsciousness. Then, the ideas, empirically, do not exist, though, really, they exist in their full integrity. Possibly, again, the ideas exist as what we call memory. Then they are in a particular personality which I call mnemonic, and are willed with a feeling which we commonly call time (in my metaphysic, termed the duration-sensation), as

well as with a particular grade and intensity of the consciousness-sensation. Again, the ideas may be in some other so-called subliminal personality, involving that they may be "externalised," as writing or speech, by a suitably suggestible person, called a medium. Corresponding to this "trance," or "subliminal" personality, there is, as in the other cases, a determining grade of the consciousness-sensation. Finally, the ideas may be willed in what we call the normal personality. Then, we are what we commonly call conscious, and we are willing, with the ideas, what I term a maximal grade and intensity of the consciousness-sensation.

In this investigation, we are particularly concerned with a condition to which we apply the term communication. We have to consider the alternative of "communication" between incarnate and discarnate souls, or between incarnate souls alone. It may be well at once to clear the ground by settling the meaning we now attach to the term communication. Our whole problem, from our present standpoint, depends, as regards intelligibility and solution, on our having a clear mental grip of what we mean by this term, communication. What do we mean when we say: one person communicates with another? We then mean that one person conveys thoughts to another. But, the question arises: How can one person convey thoughts to another? We can readily understand, as ordinary folk, how one person conveys, say, a parcel, to another; but how does he convey thoughts? From our present standpoint, conveying a parcel is not, essentially, a different process from conveying thoughts, and we may as well say that the person communicates, as that he conveys, the parcel;

or that he conveys, as that he communicates, the thoughts.

Our term, communication, now means that one soul so dominates another, that the latter constitutes what we call experience, any thought, feeling, sensing, that may be determined for it, by the former. To this interaction between souls, we may apply the term will-dominance. Whatever be the things "communicated"—thoughts, feelings, sensings; whatever technical or common name be applied to the mode of the "communication"—suggestion, telepathy, telæsthesia, persuasion, intimidation, coercion, speaking, writing—the "communication" itself is this will-dominance by one soul (or many souls) over another soul (or other souls).

The above implies that, so far as regards "communication," thoughts and feelings are the same sorts of things as what we call objects; but, that all these things are essentially different from the things (wills) that cause them to be "communicated." It further implies that all these things (thoughts, feelings, sensings) are equally available (as being possibly "communicated" by, or to any soul) to all souls. These thoughts, feelings, sensings, thus equally available to all souls, are what, from our present standpoint, is called mind. They are the metaphysical mind, or possible universe.

This process of communication through the domination of one by another soul, is commonly called suggestion. In cases of ordinary suggestion, the dominating soul wills for itself a certain grade and intensity of the consciousness-sensation with the suggested thoughts, feelings, sensings, as the case may be. This willing for itself, by the suggesting or



dominating soul, is called auto-suggestion. This auto-suggestion of the dominating soul involves like auto-suggestion for the dominated (called hypnotic, or suggestible) soul. According to the degree of hypnotic subjection (suggestibility) of the dominated soul is what may be termed the accuracy with which it will auto-suggest thoughts, feelings, sensings, auto-suggested and hypnotically imposed by the suggesting or dominating soul. The degree of this suggestibility of the dominated soul is called *rapport*. The suggestible soul may be imagined as a more or less true echo of the suggesting soul, according to the intensity of the *rapport*. In ordinary hypnotism we see examples of the greatest intensity of this *rapport*, with corresponding subjection of the "hypnotic" to the "hypnotist." In what are called normal states, we do not notice this subjection, and we roughly assume that people "normally" are what we call free agents, acting on their own initiative. Nothing can be more fallacious than this assumption. *Rapport*, in one or another intensity, is universal, involving that we are all, more or less, hypnotics. On this universal *rapport* depend our social conventions, expedencies, opinions, parties, prejudices. On it depend our diseases and what we call cures. There is one faculty—and one alone—which enables us to escape this general subjection, or *rapport*. This faculty is called intellect. Through intellect alone, man is a (relatively) free agent.

When the grade and intensity of the consciousness-sensation willed by the suggesting or dominating soul are such as to involve what we commonly call consciousness of the thoughts, feelings, sensings which it (the soul) suggests to the dominated soul, the

suggestion may be termed deliberate. When the grade and intensity of the consciousness-sensation so willed by the suggesting soul are such that the suggester is "unconscious" of what he is suggesting, the suggestion may be termed involuntary, unwitting, spontaneous. Such "spontaneous" and "deliberate" suggestion involves, as I contend in this work, the communications which Spiritualists attribute to "dead" personalities acting in some extra-mundane sphere of existence. I contend that these ostensible communications from the "dead"—so far, at any rate, as concerns the Piper phenomena—are products of "spontaneous" and "deliberate" inter-suggestion among the "living."

If we could imagine a state in which the soul was willing the most minimal grade and intensity of the consciousness-sensation, we should recognise a "mind" in which was all "experience," "past," "present," "future." We cannot imagine this state; but we have actual experience of states in which such a minimal grade and intensity of the consciousness-sensation are willed, that thoughts, feelings, sensings constituting past and present experiences of people indefinitely remote in "space," from another person are "subliminally" "conceived" and "perceived" by the latter person. This person, who practically acts as what may be termed a reservoir into which flow the experiences of these other people, is called a medium. He is simply an abnormally intensified example of ordinary suggestibility, who is able to "externalise," by writing or speech, the thoughts, feelings, sensings of these other people, which he subliminally "experiences" through his abnormal suggestibility. As he wills these thoughts, etc., of

the other people with the particular minimal grade and intensity of the consciousness-sensation involving that he "subliminally" experiences them; so, also, he wills the writing or speech, through which these thoughts, etc., are externalised, as subliminal experience. The result is called automatic writing or speech.

All mundane suggestion is, essentially, compulsion to will the consciousness-sensation in such grade and intensity as will involve either: (a) normal experience, or (b) sub-normal or subliminal experience that may be externalised as expression (through writing or speech). The thoughts, feelings, sensings are not necessarily suggested. What is necessarily suggested is only the particular grade and intensity of the consciousness-sensation which the dominated soul is compelled to pick out, as it were, from the continuum of the consciousness-sensation, and to will in conjunction with the thoughts, etc., which, when the suggestion occurs, are being willed with that same grade and intensity of the consciousness-sensation, by the dominating, or suggesting soul. The thoughts, etc., are being auto-suggested (willed) in one or another "storey" of mind, by everybody. The essence of suggestion is that the consciousness-sensation, in a particular grade and intensity, shall be, as it were, focussed on the particular thoughts, etc. Suggestion is this compulsion to focus the consciousness-sensation.

In the case of ordinary suggestion thoughts, sensings, feelings, in addition to particular grades and intensities of the consciousness-sensation, are generally though not necessarily "deliberately" communicated by the suggesting soul. Assuming that "spirits" are suggesters, they cannot, from the metaphysical stand-

point, communicate thoughts whether "deliberately" or "spontaneously," because they can no longer will the mundane universe. If they could will the mundane universe, they could will themselves back as what we call living people. Metaphysic denies this possibility, and we have no experience that such retrogression from the post-mundane stage occurs. But, metaphysic does not deny that what we call consciousness may exist for the soul, in the post-mundane, as it exists in the mundane stage, and we have sufficient empirical evidence to warrant the belief that "consciousness" does so persist. Then, if a "spirit" willing the consciousness-sensation dominates (as being in *rappor*t with) a mundane soul, the "spirit" may suggest grades and intensities of the consciousness-sensation, as does a suggesting mundane soul.

However, this *rappor*t (as constituted of communication of "consciousness" to the mundane soul) would not involve communication of actual thoughts to the mundane soul, but would only involve stimulus to the mundane soul to auto-suggest thoughts as memories, relevant to the deceased person represented by the spirit. On these conditions, in a case of so-called spirit-communication through a medium, there is no *rappor*t between the medium and the spirit, but only between the sitter, as intimate with the deceased, and the spirit. Moreover, this *rappor*t involves nothing more than the excitation of memories for the sitter (and other intimates who may be in *rappor*t with him). The medium is merely, as it were, a reflecting surface projecting these memories, through writing or speech, into sensible experience. The thoughts constituting these memories of the sitter need not be "conscious" memories. The sitter may have entirely forgotten

them. Still, they persist, as thoughts pertinent to the deceased, in the lower storeys of mind, for the sitter, and may be "tapped," as suggestions, by the medium. So also, thoughts pertinent to the deceased, in one or another storey of the "minds" of people spatially remote from the sitter and, like him, intimate with the deceased, may reach the medium through the sitter.

It may here be observed that, in suggestive contingencies, what we call space is a negligible factor. Metaphysically, "space" (applying also to "time") is a constituent of mind, just as are thoughts, feelings, and sensings, generally. The soul "makes" (wills) space just as it "makes" thoughts, etc. Our common, empirical notions about "space" are totally irrelevant to the conditions of suggestion. In any psychiatric treatise, multitudes of facts are adduced which are as completely demonstrative of the irrelevancy of our common notions about space, to suggestive contingencies, as are the facts adduced, say, in a treatise on mechanics, of the determinate nature of space in regard to mechanical contingencies. Psychiatric facts not only entirely contradict our common notions regarding the conditioning nature of space in regard to the "conveying" of thoughts; they also entirely contradict those notions in regard to the conveying of what we call physical objects, so demonstrating, to the same observation which, alone, affords us conviction that space does condition the conveyance of physical objects, the fact that space does not condition the conveyance. This point will be further elucidated later.

Assuming that there is such *rapport* as Spiritualists affirm, between the dead and the living, it does not

exist within our normal states of consciousness, and we have no reason to suppose that it can be manifested except through souls that have been in mundane *rapport* with the dead person. Thus, as indicated, the person called a medium is in no *rapport* with the deceased, and is merely what may be figured as a reflecting surface, or recording apparatus for thoughts arising to the sitter through his *rapport* with the deceased. Of course, this does not preclude that the medium may subliminally affect the empirical issue through his own personality, by infusing into the actual revelations one or another element indicating what we call intelligent design, as in the case of Mrs. Piper. Though the actual incidents must all come through the sitter (or others, through him), the mode of manipulating the incidents as externalised expression may depend on the free exercise of the subliminal personality of the medium, who may thus infuse any amount of verisimilitude, dramatic consistency, imaginative embellishment into the externalised narrative. Again, subliminal memories of other suggested incidents relevant to other sittings may be arbitrarily externalised so as to involve apparent confusions, interruptions, etc., in the course of a "narrative."

The capacity differentiating the mediumistic trance-personality from other trance-personalities and normal personality, is that for "automatic" expression by sensory signs (writing or speech). The medium can so externalise "sub-conscious" experience. The others cannot. If an ordinary person, in *rapport* with his dead friend, could externalise, in subliminal personality, as does the medium, his manifestations would probably be more consistently relevant to the dead

person than are those of the medium. This would not occur because the former's memories were more accurate and consistent than those reaching the medium, as suggestion, and merely "reflected" by him, but because *rapport* would tend to render the friend's memories, as it were, concentrated on the dead person, thus giving them what may be termed arbitrary precedence over other memories. In the case of the medium, this fixity of memories is comparatively non-existent. So far as it exists, it depends on the degree of *rapport*, between the medium and other people. If the *rapport* between these other people and the deceased and the medium is exceptionally strong, there will be corresponding fixity in the suggestions to the medium. Then, the revelations will be proportionately accurate and consistent. If the *rapport* between the sitter and others and the deceased, or between the sitter and the medium is weak, then, other suggestions will be thrusting themselves into the narrative, which will be correspondingly disturbed, as regards the deceased.

Notwithstanding the above, though a person mediumistically communicating with his dead friend would probably be more effectively "kept to the point," through *rapport*, than is the ordinary medium, other suggestions would render his automatic expression more or less disconnected, confused, or irrelevant to his dead friend. When in normal consciousness, he came to read his automatic writing about his dead friend, he would probably find it not widely different from the character of ordinary mediumistic expression. His dead friend could communicate nothing more than *rapport* to him. For actual incidents, he would have to rely on his own memory. As between him

and the ordinary medium, the case would only differ in regard to incident, to the extent that incident was his own memory, while in the case of the medium, it was suggested memory.

Apart from *rappport* between one and another person, as souls, there is *rappport* which may be figured as between a person and himself. This *rappport* involves what is called self-consciousness, which is constituted by the willing of what I call the self-sensation. Whenever this is willed, as it always is during what we call normally conscious states, the person is in *rappport* with himself. Again, there may be *rappport* between a person, as soul, and his own willings of the universe, or mind, as what we call objects of sense. Such a person is not in *rappport*, on the conditions, with a soul, but with what may be called fetishes. Such a "fetish" may involve what the person calls his "own" property. He constitutes this property his "own" by willing with the objects the self-sensation, as he so constitutes his body his own. So also he constitutes thoughts and feelings his own. Apart from this willing of the self-sensation with the property, his body, or the thoughts and feelings, these things are no more the person's own than they are anybody else's own.

Similarly, the savage is in fetish-*rappport* with his magic stone, and with some effigy supposed to embody a dead ancestor; the Indian Brahmin is in such *rappport* with his mentrams or secret formulas of evocation, his trinity of earth-gods, Brahma, Vishnu, Siva, and with his Supreme God, Zyaus, or Swayambhouva; the ancient Egyptian was in such *rappport* with "words of power" recited over a figure, with his trinity of earth-gods, Ptah, Seker, Ausar, and with



God, the Almighty; the modern religionist is in such *rapport* with "words of power" recited over wine and bread, with the figure of a saint, with the trinity of earth-gods, Father, Son, Holy Ghost, and with God, the Almighty; the modern party-man is in such *rapport* with "words of power" as a party-shibboleth, or with inane gossip about, and the picture of, an eminent politician whom he has never seen; the æsthetic connoisseur is in such *rapport* with a pretty face, a neatly turned ankle, an artistic arrangement of drapery. What we call knowing people by sight is a form of fetish-*rapport*, quite distinct from soul-*rapport* occurring between kindred and friends, or other people to whom we have become subject as hypnotic. In the earlier cases we are hypnotic to things of our own mind; in the last cases, we are hypnotic to souls.

When a person dies, the *rapports* established between him, when alive, and his friends, become empirically weakened and gradually obliterated. The intense grief we at first experience, on the death of our friend, is incidental to two contingencies: the persistence of fetish-*rapport* between us and the bodily relique of our friend, and the imagined, though not real, extinction of soul-*rapport* between our dead friend and us. If we could only be assured that, though our friend, as soul, had done with earth, he had not done with *rapport* with ourselves, so obviating the imagined loss of soul-*rapport*, we should look with considerable equanimity on what now involves such anguish for us. Popular Spiritualism affords this assurance to a vast number of people, who naturally feel impatient of criticism of the credentials of the assurance.

We may now devote a little consideration to the question of what constitutes a person. Of course, empirically, the question is hardly worth considering. But, this empirical determination tells us nothing about a person but that he is something that we can see and speak to; who can speak to us, and who has thoughts and feelings, as we know we have. This is not much of an answer, from our present standpoint, to the question. What we see and hear can only exist, as experience, to us, as being within whatever constitutes our mind. If it exists in any other way than as seeing and hearing, it cannot so exist, for us, as experience. Again, if it thinks and feels merely as something we can see and hear, it must think and feel merely within ourself, as our mind. This would involve that what we called a person was merely ourself; that its thinking and feeling was merely experience as our mind. Again, though we commonly assume that this thing which we can see and hear, and which we call a person, thinks and feels, we have no real proof that anything we can see and hear does anything whatever, and we certainly cannot conceive how anything that we see and hear can either think or feel. Physiology, psychology — all the "ologies" within the arena of empiricism — are utterly unable to enable us to conceive how what we see and hear can think and feel.

Obviously, if we are to get any real knowledge about what constitutes a person, we must approach the problem from some other standpoint than that of empiricism. We must get to know what can do anything. Whatever really does anything is a person: the only person that can exist, for us. Now, whatever does anything must do to something that is not

itself. A really active agent cannot act on itself. Analogously as the eye must have something to look at, in order to see, so the acting agent must have something to act on, in order to act. We say that a knife cuts. This implies that the knife does something. A little reflection tells us that the knife and the cutting are merely sequential effects, and that we, whatever we are, are causally behind the knife and the cutting. Really, we, not the knife, cut.

Similarly, we say that a thought causes a feeling, or *vice versa*. But, a little reflection will show us that, if a thought causes a feeling, it must create the feeling, *ex nihilo*. If the feeling is caused by the thought, the thought must bring the feeling into itself, as experience, out of "nothing." That means that the thought creates the feeling. Obviously, we have the same dilemma about the thought as we had about the seen and heard person. The thought must bring the feeling into itself, as we must bring the seen and heard person into ourself. So, as in the latter case, we must be the other person, the thought must be the feeling.

Then, as thought, feeling, and the seen and heard "person" do nothing, what does anything? The seen and heard "person," the thought, the feeling exist. They do nothing. That they exist means that something takes them to itself, as experience, and that something has caused them to be possible, as experience, to the thing that takes them, as experience. The "person," the thought, the feeling can neither be the thing that takes them to itself, as experience, nor can they be what caused them to be possibly taken by that thing, to itself. Obviously, the "person," the thought, the thing must be acted on by the thing that

takes them to itself, and this thing must be acted on by what caused the "person," the thought, the feeling, to be possibly taken as experience.

Here, at last, we come to real doers. There is no knowing, but as belief. We cannot avoid believing that the thing which takes to itself the "person," the thought, the feeling, is a genuine doer. Or, can we avoid believing that what causes the "person," the thought, the feeling, to be possibly taken by this genuine doer is a Supreme Doer—the Final Cause? To the former doer, I apply the term soul. To the latter doer, I apply the term God.

The real person is soul. What we commonly call the person, as seeings, hearings, etc.—body, voice, thinking, feeling—is entirely distinct from, outside of, the real person. Essentially, these things are no more your real person than they are mine. They are only things that our real person has taken to itself out of mind. The metaphysical definition of this illusory person, as seen, is that it is a sensory complex and preter-empirical notion. The preter-empirical notion constitutes it what we call a thing; the sensory complex constitutes it the "thing" determined by the preter-empirical notion.

In the foregoing consideration, we have determined the following points:—

(a) That what is commonly called consciousness is a particular grade and intensity, called maximal, of a feeling called the consciousness-sensation, and that when thoughts, feelings, sensings are willed with this grade and intensity of the consciousness-sensation, they are in what we commonly call actual experience.

(b) That when a maximal grade and intensity of

the consciousness-sensation, together with the self-sensation, are willed in conjunction with sensings which we commonly call our body, we are self-conscious.

(c) That when the above conjunctions of willings of the consciousness-sensation and self-sensation occur with other sensings which we commonly call objects, these "objects" are what we call our own, and that, on like conditions, thoughts and feelings are our own.

(d) That when one soul dominates another, the former compels the latter to will thoughts, feelings, sensings, as the case may be, as does the former, and those thoughts, etc., so become, empirically, the thoughts, etc., of the dominated soul. This interaction is called suggestion, and the condition under which it exists is called *rapport*.

(e) That *rapport* occurs in various degrees of intensity, and may exist between a soul and what it wills as mind ("fetish"-*rapport*), as well as between a soul and other souls.

(f) That *rapport* is a practically universal condition determining our collective and individual activities.

(g) That thoughts, feelings, sensings do nothing and are equally "objective," as being external to the real doer, soul.

(h) That the real self is soul, and that the body is, essentially, akin to what we commonly call an object.

(i) That what is commonly called the mind is not the real mind.

(j) That the real mind is all possible experience to all souls that have existed, do exist, or are to exist, thus being all possible thoughts, feelings, sensings.

This metaphysical or real mind is called the possible universe (God-mind).

(*k*) That all possible thoughts, feelings, sensings are fixed in this mind, as, by way of analogy, stones are fixed in a mosaic.

(*l*) That our individual mind is what "stones" the soul picks out of this mosaic.

(*m*) That what we call death is the soul's cessation of picking "stones" out of the "mosaic."

(*n*) That, then, the soul starts picking "stones" out of another "mosaic," the post-mundane mind, or universe.

(*o*) That there is only one "stone" in the mosaic ("consciousness," as *rapport*) that the post-mundane can suggest, or communicate to the mundane soul; because, the post-mundane soul is constituted post-mundane only through having ceased to will any "stones" in the mosaic but the consciousness-sensation. This, the only "stone" of the mosaic that the post-mundane soul is willing, it can suggest to the mundane soul.

(*p*) That, when *rapport*, as the consciousness-sensation, is so suggested by a post-mundane, to a mundane soul, the latter is so dominated as to will memories relevant to the deceased person represented by the former.

(*q*) That the medium merely receives and externalises such memories as may be suggested by the mundane, in *rapport* with the post-mundane soul.

(*r*) That such memories need not be conscious experience to the mundane soul that suggests them.

(*s*) That what we commonly call a thinker is a soul willing particular constituents of the God-mind, as thoughts, feelings, sensings.

(4) That there is no such thing as knowing, in the common sense of the term; that knowing is, essentially, the same thing as sensing or feeling.

In connection with the automatic expression of mediums, it may be well to offer a few remarks, from the metaphysical standpoint, about words and thoughts. Words are entirely distinct from thoughts. The connection between them is purely arbitrary. I fully recognise that I think before, or out of words. Every problem I really think about is, to my apprehension, "thought out" before a line is written. The actual expression, to me, is quite another thing from the actual thinking, and I am often assured is quite inadequate to present the thinking. In ordinary intercourse, verbal expression cannot be said to involve thinking, in the sense I indicate. Ordinary intercourse is practically as much automatic expression as is the medium's. In what often passes as thinking, a modicum of real thinking is, as we may say, adulterated by hypnotic "interference," as prejudice, sentiment, expediency. This involves the great evil incident to the emergence from emotional into intellectual conditions of mental activity, and is at the root of all present social wrong and calamity, and individual debasement. Real thinking always involves belief, as what may be termed end-issue. Metaphysically, belief is manifestation in experience of the only real faculty, intellect, and constitutes the direct influence, as guidance, of God, on the individual soul.

Automatic expression involves subliminal memory of the arbitrary connection between words and thoughts. Essentially, this sort of memory is a product of suggestion. Practically, we "remember" our own language partly because we have established

a habit of willing sensings (words) with thoughts; partly because other people are continually suggesting to us the words with the thoughts. Failing this suggestion from others, we may "forget" even our own language. Then, all our thinking (assuming we had acquired no other language) would be with such a grade and intensity of the consciousness-sensation that it would be out of experience. On the other hand, we may remember our language, and will words with thoughts, while yet we have neither in experience. This is the case of the medium.

It will be seen that what we call conversation and literature involves two distinct sorts of suggestion arbitrarily connected. In conversation, we suggest sounds (in metaphysical terminology, sensory bodies of the auditory order) and thoughts (in metaphysical terminology, psychical bodies of the non-affective order). When a person talks to us, he does essentially the same thing, so far as regards the vocal sounds, as he does in respect to the thoughts, as we say, represented by those sounds. As an ordinary empiricist, the person who talks to us supposes that he does nothing else than cause us to hear certain sounds; he does not suppose that he also, in the sense that he conveys the sounds, conveys to us thoughts as we say corresponding to the sounds. Really, he conveys (suggests) the thoughts just as he does the sounds, and he might ("telepathically") convey (suggest) the thoughts without the sounds, or the sounds without the thoughts. We also, under so-called morbid conditions, might hear the sounds (have them suggested to us by a speaker) and yet fail to auto-suggest the corresponding thoughts, which the speaker would then fail to suggest. Whatever occurred would



depend on what grade and intensity of the consciousness - sensation we will with the thoughts and sounds. Thus it will be seen that there is no essential difference between what is called telepathy and ordinary conversation. Whether the sounds are or are not suggested with the thoughts does not affect the causal identity of the contingencies.

The foregoing of course applies to writing. The person who writes suggests shapes (metaphysically, sensory bodies of the visual order) and thoughts to those who read. These shapes and thoughts we arbitrarily connect, as in the case of speech we connect sounds and thoughts. Analogously as in the case of conversation, that the person "speaks" the words does not affect the fact that he suggests them as sounds; so, that the person who suggests to us written or printed characters "writes" or "prints" them, does not affect the essentially causal act as being will-dominance involving suggestion. A person might cause us to see the writing or printing without, himself, "writing" or "printing." The result might be either what was called a hypnotically suggested hallucination of sense, or a telepathic apparition. The distinction between "hallucination" and "apparition" need not be discussed here, but, it may be observed that there would be no essential difference between the shapes as "apparition" and as what we called real writing or printing. This point will be further discussed in a later chapter dealing with apparitions. The distinction between "apparition" and "reality" is only empirically significant.

What we commonly call thinking is almost wholly a product of suggestion. However, we may auto-suggest thoughts (that is, will them with such grade

and intensity of the consciousness-sensation as renders them experience) independently of suggestion. If we do this, we are what is called an original thinker. Our "originating" capacity merely involves that we are able to bring thoughts into experience which other people cannot bring into experience. Until we, as original thinker, have auto-suggested these thoughts, they remain, for other people, in the lower storeys of mind, involving that they are out of experience.

When we think and write or speak our thoughts, the writing or speaking is "automatic expression" as fully as in the case of the trance-medium. Our "awareness" or "consciousness" of the fact that we are writing or speaking, as distinguished from the medium's "unconsciousness" of the fact that he is writing or speaking, does not affect the essential character of the act itself as being "automatic." As already indicated, "consciousness" nowise affects the willing of sensings and thoughts, but merely renders the willing experience.

What we call the action of speaking or writing is not essentially different from the action of thinking. When we speak or write, we perform certain so-called physical actions as incident to the vocal sounds or written characters. These "physical actions" are merely sensory experiences willed with a particular grade and intensity of the consciousness-sensation, just as are the "resulting" vocal sounds or written shapes. It is only empirically, not metaphysically, essential that we shall perform the preliminary "physical actions," in order that we may see (auto-suggest) the writing, or hear (auto-suggest) the sounds. The empirical attribution of causal efficiency

to "physical actions" is altogether illusory. What we commonly call action is merely the effect of causal activity. There is no real action but as the manifestation of will. The grounds for this proposition have been earlier stated. All empirical causality is illusion.

## CHAPTER IV.

### APPLICATION TO PIPER CASE.

LET us now, from the metaphysical standpoint set forth in the preceding chapter, consider the Pelham case referred to in Chapter I. Phinuit may represent a person in "real" life who has hypnotised Mrs. Piper, and so imposed his personality, as "fetish"-*rapport*, on Mrs. Piper's subliminal personality. Again, this person, before hypnotising Mrs. Piper, may, himself, have been hypnotised by somebody else, and imposed as "fetish"-*rapport*, on Mrs. Piper's subliminal personality, not his own personality, but that of the person who hypnotised him. Mr. Podmore writes that Phinuit, according to Dr. Hodgson, "is an invention, borrowed from the person through whose agency Mrs. Piper first became entranced, and who purported himself to be controlled by a French doctor named Albert Finnet (pronounced Finné)" (*Apparitions*, etc., p. 330). If the latter contingency happened, the person who hypnotised Mrs. Piper would impose on her subliminal personality *fetish-rapport* with the doctor who similarly imposed his personality on that of Mrs. Piper's hypnotist. Then, to trace who Phinuit really was "in the flesh," we should have to identify the French doctor. So may have arisen other unknown personalities in the Piper "repertory": Rector Imperator. Once these unknown personalities got

into that "storey" of the Piper mind constituting her trance-personality, they would persist as auto-suggestions until some other suggestion of the sort supplanted them. Such a suggestion might come from a sitter. This actually does occur, when, in later sittings, the Phinuit "control" is supplanted by the Pelham control, established through Dr. Hodgson, Mr. Hart, and others. So, personalities become, as it were, stereotyped in the Piper subliminal "mind," of whom, normally, she has no personal knowledge. To judge from the accounts, she has no normal, personal knowledge of Pelham; yet, he becomes one of the most potent "controls." I surmise that this substitution of Pelham for Phinuit is attributable to the *rapport* established between Dr. Hodgson and the medium, and the *rapport* that existed between Dr. Hodgson and others and Pelham. So would arise a concentration of suggestion tending to obliterate the Phinuit control.

In regard to the sitting now being considered, there are three strong soul-*rappports* operating between Mrs. Piper and Dr. Hodgson, between Dr. Hodgson and Pelham, and between Mr. Hart and Pelham. These involve what we may figure as streams of suggestion compelling Mrs. Piper to bring Pelham-incidents into that storey of mind which permits of automatic expression by writing or speech. Gradually, this fetish-*rapport* between Mrs. Piper and Pelham (through the others) becomes intensified, with correspondingly increasing "suctions" of Pelham-incidents from the lower storeys of the "minds" of Dr. Hodgson and Mr. Hart. Then, other *rappports* begin to intrude. When Hart presents the locket, he thinks of Pelham's father and mother, as donors. But, while presenting

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the locket, he subliminally "remembers" that he is going to present a watch with his uncle George's name in the back. So, before he actually presents the watch, and while he is presenting the locket, the medium refers to George, as well as to Pelham's father and mother. Here, while Hart is actually suggesting the locket-incident, we may figure Mrs. Piper's subliminal personality as prophesying that Hart is going to suggest the watch-incident. Later, we shall devote special consideration to clairvoyance and prophecy. Mrs. Piper is clairvoyant to the watch-incident while the immediate suggestion is the locket-incident. The former, as it were, casts its shadow alongside the latter suggestion. Metaphysically, prophecy is just as possible as is memory. All events being fixed, as mind, the "future," as the "past," is merely a question of with what events the consciousness-sensation is so willed as to bring the events into an upper storey of mind.

Again, there is a spatially remote *rapport* established between Mr. Hart and the Howards, with the result that Howard incidents reach the subliminal Piper, through Mr. Hart. One of these incidents, regarding Katharine and the "problems," has, apparently, at the time, been entirely in the lowest storeys of Mr. Hart's mind. In common terms, he was entirely ignorant of the "problems" incident. Still, as he was in *rapport* with the Howards, such suggestion reached him as enabled him to suggest the incident to the Piper's personality, so that Mrs. Piper could externalise it as an automatic expression.

Fetish—as well as soul-*rapport* between spatially remote people—is readily identified in ordinary life. I daresay that most people have the experience of



thought about a distant person, which seems to project itself like a spectre into the normal mental vision, void of any connecting antecedent. Without the slightest relevancy to the current concern, all at once, comes the spectral interloper. Try as we may, we can identify nothing in the slightest degree connecting it with what we are thinking about. Another experience that I have so often had, as, I daresay, have others, that what we call chance (always merely an empirical contingency) is entirely precluded, is visual anticipation of a person with whose appearance I have some familiarity, though the familiarity may be of the slightest, and the person an entire stranger to me. Say I am on a tram-car. I see a person walking at some distance ahead of the car. I think he is somebody whom I have casually met. When the car overtakes him, I look at him, and find his appearance does not at all resemble the other person. Perhaps the car has gone on half a mile, when, there, walking along, is the person whom I had earlier in view. This sort of thing, under various circumstances, has so often happened to me, that I almost take it as a matter of course that I shall soon see the person whom I earlier "focus."

Once the medium is in the strongest *rapport* with a sitter, he is, through the sitter, in indirect *rapport* with an indefinite number of people, who are or have been what we call intimate with the sitter, and with the deceased with whom the sitter is trying to hold communication. All these people are, as it were, bombarding the medium with suggestions relevant to the deceased. The sitter acts as intermediate medium between these other people and the end-medium or "reservoir," who thus receives the experiences of all.

The outcome of this mediumistic interaction is that the "end-medium" externalises, as automatic expression, oral or scriptory as the case may be, more or less of the indefinitely extended suggestive interaction, all of which may or may not be out of conscious experience (as top-storey) until the final process of automatic expression by the end-medium reveals it to the sitter.

Intermittently with this *rapport* between the end-medium and the sitter, and, indirectly, other people, may be manifested other *rapports*, say between the end-medium and previous sitters, involving the interruptions and complications referred to by Professor Hyslop and Dr. Hodgson. Or, the end-medium may so obtrude his own personality, that he auto-suggests and externalises what we call imaginary experiences, as dramatic embellishment, deceptions, irrelevancies, discrepancies, omissions. Thus will arise the various complications considered, by Professor Hyslop and Dr. Hodgson, to discredit the telepathic interpretation, and to be rather accountable through the difficulties under which the spirits labour in making themselves known.

In all this process of inter-suggestion and auto-suggestion, there is nothing really indicating "conscious," "intelligent" selection of the empirical order, unless we consider as such the initial desire of the sitter to get into communication with his deceased friend. All is merely what may be termed a stream of will-dominance, involving that one or another set of ideas reaches the "reservoir" or end-medium, and is constituted "top-storey" of mind, or "conscious" experience, as the automatic expression, oral or scriptory. There is here no need to invoke post-

mundane "intelligences," all bent on the one object of making themselves or others known to the sitter.

Really, the medium is not a single personality, but is the personalities of a multitude of people, all of whose souls are compelling him to glance at the universe as do their souls. With all these people the medium is in direct or indirect *rapport*. Analogously as, in physics, one stretched string, on certain conditions, duplicates the tonal vibrations of another, so the medium may be imagined as duplicating the "vibrations" of an indefinite number of souls. So arises what Professor Hyslop and Dr. Hodgson call the "selection" of material. Really, the term selection is as inappropriate to the conditions, as to the conditions of ordinary "opinions," sympathies, and so forth, or to the sympathetic vibration of the string. The medium no more selects than does the vibrating string, taking the term, selection, to imply some process of "intelligent" discrimination.

The material for this "selection" is, really, equally at the disposal of every soul. Everybody's life-episodes are fundamentally the life-episodes of everybody else. Empirically, this is not the case, only because the life-episodes are not equally "patent" (as what is called experience) for all souls, but are in various "storeys" or "strata" of mind, involving that some life-episodes are not the individual's "own." These episodes, the individual cannot "externalise," as constituting them what is called conscious. Or, can he externalise them by what we call expression, as through speech or writing? With the medium the case is different. Though he cannot externalise as "conscious" (his "own") certain life-episodes, he can externalise them "automatically," through speech or

writing. This capacity to externalise, through writing or speech, the life-episodes of other people in the "unconscious" experience of the medium, constitutes the difference between him and ordinary people.

The agency, through Mrs. Piper, not only communicates "past" experiences occurring to itself (assuming that it is a discarnate soul) during what we call life, but it also reveals events which must have happened (assuming a discarnate soul) after what is called death, and occurring, as experience, to "living" people, spatially remote from Mrs. Piper, and, normally, unknown to her. Under these circumstances either a "spirit" is recounting its mundane experiences, and experiencing what is going on among its intimates of the mundane stage, or, Mrs. Piper's capacity enables her to reveal all these things.

From our present standpoint, we must attribute these revelations solely to Mrs. Piper's personality dominated by other personalities. The "spirits" are entirely superfluous in the connection. If they ever do communicate with mundane souls, we have every reason to deny that they can communicate mundane experience of any sort except "consciousness" as *rapport*. Were the fact established of the communication of mundane experience beyond "consciousness," by the "spirits," we should be hard pressed, as metaphysicians, to distinguish "spirits" from mundane souls. Could "spirits" communicate thoughts and feelings, there would be no metaphysical ground for denying that they could reinstate themselves as ordinary mundane entities, and there would be no appreciable reason for their having become "spirits."

Professor Hyslop's and Dr. Hodgson's, equally with the popular tolerance of the "spirits," arises from the

materialistic fallacy that personal identity is essentially involved in physical identity, and that, accordingly, "spirits" must be essentially different from mundane personalities. Spiritism, as popularly and "scientifically" interpreted, is only a form of materialism. Either the "spirits" are conceived as sorts of vaporous attenuations ("astral" bodies, or what not) of our own organisms, or they are not conceived at all, but merely affirmed. The revelations of these "spirits" are nothing but reiterations of the fallacious crudities of materialistic empiricism, which even mundane intellects have transcended. The "spirits" can tell us nothing about their environment, but what we can readily invent without their assistance. They can tell us nothing about our goings on, or theirs when they were like us, but what we can readily show can be told without their assistance. Their sentiments, prejudices, weaknesses are all our own. Where, then, is the *raison d'être* of the "spirits," on the grounds advanced by their materialistic champions?

Spiritism is a vastly bigger issue than its adherents or opponents suppose. It is entirely subversive of the fundamental concepts governing our common determinations. So long as we attempt to measure the spiritistic issue by these concepts, we shall flounder in a quagmire of futility. Holding the conventional, "subjective," "knowing," active, individualised mind of psychology and materialistic speculation, we inevitably shut ourselves out from even approaching the problem. Here, we have passed the *Ultima Thule* of empiricism, and must start afresh, from the fundamental question: How do we know?

If Mrs. Piper reveals things normally unknown to herself, she must "know" them "unconsciously." If

a spirit reveals things through Mrs. Piper, still Mrs. Piper must unconsciously know the things independently of the spirit. Did Mrs. Piper not unconsciously know these things, she would need to import them *ab extra*. But, this would involve that Mrs. Piper created her own mind, inasmuch as knowing things is merely having mind. Then, if things are once unknown that become known, mind must be created. If the "spirit" reveals things through Mrs. Piper, it must enable her to create her own mind, and if she reveals to others what they did not know, she must enable them to create their own minds. We know nothing of spirits at all, except as our own essential selves, and we know that we cannot create anything. In whatever sense these revealed things may be unknown, they can only exist as mind common to Mrs. Piper and everybody else, and so really known to Mrs. Piper and everybody else.

Mrs. Piper's ignorance of these things is only empirical, involving that she does not know she knows them. When she knows that she knows the things, she brings the things into what we call experience. This she does by transposing the things from one to another storey of mind. This she does through manifesting her only really active capacity: will. There are things which she, as medium, can transpose, only by submitting to other wills. These are things that Professor Hyslop and Dr. Hodgson imply to be revealed through her, by spirits. But Professor Hyslop and Dr. Hodgson can tell us nothing about spirits, except that they reveal things through Mrs. Piper. Then, as we know other agencies than these indefinite spirits of Professor Hyslop and Dr. Hodgson, through which agencies we can account for

Mrs. Piper's revelations, we may reasonably appeal to these agencies rather than to the "spirits."

These things that are revealed are entirely outside and independent of the essential Mrs. Piper and of the spirits. The essential Mrs. Piper may "glance" at these things, or force other essential personalities to glance at the things; or these other essential personalities may force the essential Mrs. Piper to glance at the things; but no essential personality can take any of these things, "bodily," to itself *ab extra*. Where these things are, there they have ever been, and no essential personality can take them to itself out of their eternally fixed situation. There they remain for the common "use" of all essential personalities, each of which personalities will use the things according to causal determinism.

Within this causal determinism, essential personalities compel one another to use these things. This compulsion is called suggestion. Mrs. Piper, as essential personality, is so compelled to "use" many of these things, so that though she does not know she uses them, she can enable other essential personalities to know that she uses them. This she does through what is called automatic writing or speech. Were not all these things, as "possible universe," thus usable by all essential personalities or souls (so involving possibility of the conventional, individualised "mind" of psychology), such phenomena as the Piper manifestations would be impossible. By no possibility, then, could suggestion, whether by post-terrestrial souls or the souls of living people, "reveal" anything. Moreover, failing the willing in one or another storey, of this possible universe (as a "whole"), no progressively normal acquisition of experience would be

possible. To an individualised "mind," such as is implied by common empiricism and conventional psychology, accretions of what we call knowledge would be impossible. Nothing could "get into" such a mind; all would have to be in it, *ab initio*; but, this empirical and psychological "mind" has not all in it, *ab initio*; fresh things are ever entering it. How do they get in? Psychology cannot tell. Metaphysic proves that they could not get in: that, if fresh things apparently enter, they only enter as what the spectator supposes is not in the conjurer's box, but is there all the time. The things were never out of mind; they were only out of experience.

Metaphysically, there are no such things as what we commonly imply by the term, happenings, as involving something fortuitous coming to a person independently of his volition, from outside himself. Events do not occur by "chance." There is really no such thing as chance. Whatever "happens" to a person can only be some sensing, thinking, feeling. As such, the "happening" must be determined by the will of the person to whom it occurs, as bringing into "top storey" some part of the possible universe. Suppose a man gets knocked down by a horse. He can only be "knocked down" as willing the experience. By no possibility could he be knocked down, unless he constituted a certain part of mind, experience, by transposing from a profound storey of mind, into top storey, various sensings, feelings, thoughts. That the horse knocks the person down involves that the horse, assuming it to be soul, suggests to the person those sensings, feelings, thoughts. This process of suggestion by the horse, as soul, is not essentially different from the process, called telepathy, involving that



Mrs. Piper brings experiences of dead people into some storey of mind allowing her to externalise the experiences as the ostensible communications from spirits.

What we commonly imply by the term accident, cannot possibly exist outside empirical illusion. Suppose the man instead of being knocked down by the horse, is knocked down by a runaway locomotive. The people who allow the locomotive to go free are suggesting it and the concussion to the person who is struck. He, again, is "struck" by the locomotive, because he takes the suggestion from these other people, so auto-suggesting the concussion. The locomotive itself really does nothing. Essentially, the struck person is in "*fetish*"-*rapport* with his mind, as the engine, as the savage is with his mind, as a magic stone, through which he gets suggestion of some sort of happening to himself; or, as is the patient with the drug through which he gets suggestion as to what is called cure of an ailment.

The persistence, as experience, of the possible universe, is determined by this process of intersuggestion between souls. What is called humanity is constituted a coherent whole through this intersuggestion. All experiences of all people may be figured as personal documents pigeon-holed in mind and available, as experience, to any soul that can transpose them from lower to higher storey. When such "documents" are in a certain storey called mnemonic, they are readily suggested to a subliminal personality called a medium, by any number of souls that can establish, directly or indirectly, *rapport* with the medium. That Mrs. Piper externalises the mnemonic experiences of multitudes of people, in-

definitely remote in "space," is, metaphysically, just as accountable as is her externalisation of the thoughts of a person in immediate contact with her. If we accept a "spirit," as communicator, we merely constitute it, so far as regards the communications, the equivalent of one or another of such people telepathically suggesting to Mrs. Piper.

If we really knew what spirits were, and had no evidence as to ordinary mundane suggestion, we should of course be driven to attribute the communications to spirits. As we know nothing about spirits, but as our essential selves (souls), and have the amplest evidence for mundane suggestion of the sort rendering possible the communications, we must, as scientific investigators, exclude spirits, until other phenomena are in our experience for which we cannot account as being of mundane origin. While inclined to believe that such phenomena are in evidence, I am assured that they are not the Piper manifestations.

The "Research" method is analogous to trying to determine the number of a tree's roots by counting twigs on the top branches. There is no real profit to be got out of investigation of the supernormal unless by starting from the bottom issue of causality. In this sort of investigation we cannot afford to take as our fundamental premises the causal illusionism of empirical science. I doubt whether the methods of Psychical Researchers or of ordinary Spiritualistic propagandists, on present lines, can do more than humour hypnotic prepossessions, for or against, as the case may be. Spiritualism will go on in spite of Researchers' scepticism, and will not be materially advanced by their favour. Scepticism will go on in spite of Spiritualists' assurance, and will not be

materially affected by the attitude of Researchers. On present lines, we shall get no farther than two partisan camps. Real believers will only be in evidence so soon as the issues are contemplated from the standpoint of metaphysical cosmology and causality.

Spiritism, in the wide sense—the scientific sense—is not at all affected whether there is, or is not, post-mundane communion. If this communion occurs, it is, essentially, the same phenomenon as intersuggestion between the living. What passes as spiritism, whether to Researchers or to adherents of the popular order, is really not spiritism at all, but merely disguised materialism. The conception, such as it is, of "spirits," even as held by scientific people, is merely a nebulous duplication of the common conception of bodies, as being entities outside mind. These "spirits" merely manifest the causality crudely attributed to objects, by common empiricism. The metaphysical proofs for the persistence of the soul, after "death," are far more conclusive than is anything I have read in the records of spiritism. I should have no disposition to accept the fact of post-mundane communion merely on the ground of what I have read of empirical testimony. Metaphysic is the real ground on which I am disposed to accept post-mundane communion. When, as a metaphysician, observed facts seem to me sufficiently evidential, I cap my affirmation of the possibility of such communion by affirming its actual occurrence.

Before I can affirm anything about spirits, I must know what I mean by the term. Only metaphysic can afford me this knowledge. Until I have it, I may as well assert that shadows with cast-iron tongues and plaster-of-Paris brains communicate, as assert that

spirits communicate. Affirming action of something we cannot conceive and have nowise logically demonstrated, is easy, and seems to meet the requirements of many people. The metaphysician is harder to satisfy in this connection.

## CHAPTER V.

### POPULAR SPIRITUALISM AND ETHICS.

WHAT we commonly consider to be morally right action is such as conforms to certain emotional exercises of what are called the benevolent order and to certain expediencies favouring people whose capacities have enabled them to own things by the sanction of law not based on any scientifically identified morality. To metaphysic, there is no moral quality in action unless as judged by an intellectual criterion of right principle. The moral quality of action, is, for metaphysic, to be determined by the same sort of discrimination as enables the physicist, chemist, mathematician to determine their principles of right; or, as enables the capable expedientalist, as politician, trader, industrial director, to determine his principles of right. For metaphysic the moral principle of right transcends all other principles of right, and, where this supremacy is ignored, there is collective and individual degeneracy. For metaphysic, emotional exercise of any sort has only moral significance to the extent that it conforms with or affronts the intellectually identified principle of moral right. This principle is justice.

To identify justice, it is necessary to identify the conditions on which thinking and feeling are possible, and corollarily, the conditions on which what we call

human faculties or capacities are manifested by the individual—how, for instance, it comes about that one man is clever, another stupid; that one man is industrious, another lazy; one sober and frugal, another profligate and spendthrift.

The conventional measurement of the above contingencies implies that, while such capacity as what is called, say, talent or ability, is given to the creature by the Creator, entirely independently of any deserving or effort of the creature, such capacity as, say, perseverance or determination, involving that the creature effectively manifests this "talent" or "ability," though also given by the Creator, is, nevertheless, in some unexplained way, dependent on something not a gift from the Creator, but obtained from some undefined source, and enabling the creature to do things which the Creator has not determined, and not to do things which the Creator has determined. This undefined thing is called choice. Through it, the implication is that the creature determines its destiny against the determinism of the Creator.

A moment's reflection, to the ordinarily intelligent person who professed to believe in God, would seem enough to expose the shallow assumption and intellectual dishonesty of a pretension that anything could exist that was not given existence and determined by the Creator. How anybody, in these days of biological research, to say nothing of metaphysic and the plainest common-sense, can for a moment tolerate this puerile implication of liberty to thwart the Creator, is only conceivable on the assumption that human vanity and selfishness have neutralised human intelligence and the commonest intellectual integrity;

that the individual is so eager to grip against his fellows that his antipathy to the truth has rendered him blind to it. On no other conditions is it conceivable that the normally intelligent person of these days will practically deny and affirm the Creator in one breath: that he will proclaim belief in one God, Maker of all things visible and invisible, and stultify the affirmation by the practical affirmation that the Maker does not create the motive and action involving "choice."

It hardly needs more than a child's wit to recognise that, if the affirmation of a Creator has any rational significance, it is that what exists can only exist as the determinism of the Creator, and that if there is really any such thing as choice, it must involve that the Creator has not determined what exists. That choice can be manifested, it is obvious that motive and action must be manifested. If choice involves that motive and action are manifested not according to the determination of the Creator, it involves that motive and action are created which the Creator has not created, and that motive and action are annihilated which the Creator has created. This stultification of his reason and blasphemy against his God is the crime of every man, be he bishop or layman, who proclaims belief in one God, Maker of all things visible and invisible, and professes the lie that the creature determines against its Maker.

Assuming the foregoing to be true, it may be urged that its logical outcome is the abolition of individual responsibility and the practical impossibility of the social state. This is not really the case. Responsibility is fixed and rendered compulsive, as it never was before, through the truth of determinism

Through it, a man knows that his capacities, so far as regards their product, belong to his fellows. He knows that he must render his best to his fellows as being their rightful property. He now acts as he does not know. His knowing constitutes his responsibility, and his acting constitutes his moral crime. He is responsible to God and his fellows through knowing to whom his capacities rightfully belong. If he is just, he will act as he knows, rendering to his fellows his best for the same reward as others get for their best, though their best is essentially inferior to his best. This the man will do who acts the responsibility imposed by the truth of determinism.

On the other hand, society can only render justice to the individual, through rendering it to itself, society. To render justice to all individuals, society must extract the best from each individual. Hence, society may adopt expedients for extracting the best from each individual. So, society will adopt expedients on behalf of justice. These expedients will involve bribes to individuals, according as their best is superior or inferior (according to the impartial and enlightened judgment which society will be morally bound to exercise) to the best of other individuals. This responsibility of society, to exercise and apply enlightened and impartial judgment, will be as compulsive as is the responsibility, to the individual, to give his best to his fellows. Thus, instead of doing away with responsibility and rendering society impossible, we see that the truth of determinism is the only means of determining real responsibility and of rendering society really stable.



Practically all the crime, misery, vain contention, malignant passion now afflicting society emanates from society's lack of honesty to God through ignoring the responsibility rendered self-evident through the demonstration of creative determinism. At present the masses are too ignorant, too selfish, too unintelligent, too absorbed in sensual vapidities and trivialities to recognise the only real remedy for the evils which they denounce and bewail. Instead of setting themselves, *en masse*, to establish the principle of justice, they squander themselves as sections rushing hither and thither after rule-of-thumb futilities called practical measures, dangled before them by contending enthusiasts, self-seekers, superficialists, bigots, each with some nostrum plausible enough to attract one or another crowd of hypnotics whose ideals ultimately resolve themselves into what may be expressed by two words, seize and hold: grab and grip. The true *raison d'être* of modern spiritism and its demonstration of determinism is to substitute honesty to God, as the principle of justice, for all this vain scrambling and groping after things of the swill-trough.

The metaphysical demonstration of right action identifies it solely as action conforming to what the individual believes to be right. To metaphysic, the individual's sole, real faculty is intellect, and this is his only guide to what is right. All other so-called faculties than intellect are, to metaphysic, not faculties but merely automatic manifestations of will. To metaphysic, intellect alone differentiates the human from the brute, and is the sole, special light vouchsafed by God to the individual human soul. Whatever intellect tells a man is right, is right

—the only right, according to metaphysical demonstration, that man can know.

The manifestation of intellect, in experience, is as belief. What is commonly called belief is not at all belief in the metaphysically demonstrated sense of the term. What is commonly called belief is merely acquiescence in conformity with "fetish"-*rapport* with our brute, or automatic willings, of mind, as emotional or expediential preferences; or in conformity with the hypnotic suggestion of others, as what is called authority or convention. This "acquiescence" implies slavery. Belief implies liberty. Action according to belief involves the only real freedom possible to humanity. Action according to belief as to what is right involves the only real merit possible to humanity. What a man really believes to be right is the only right possible to the apprehension of that man. If that man acts any other ostensible right than that revealed to him by belief, he is slave and acts, according to metaphysical ethics, either immorally or non-morally (as brute). To metaphysic, honesty is the highest human attribute, and there is no honesty but as action conforming to what belief determines to be right.

Obviously, the metaphysical identification of right, liberty, human character, divine guidance does not accord with common estimate, any more than the metaphysical identification of mind or of soul accords with that estimate. According to common estimate, right is what authority, as convention; expediency, so-called religion tell a man to do; liberty is acting according to something called (but nowise identified) choice; human character is acting according to the

compulsion of emotions, sentiments, expediencies; divine guidance is certain emotions (to the exclusion of others which must have equally arisen through the determinism of the Divine), or, the dicta of people called divine or inspired.

Whether we accept the metaphysical or the common determination of the above issues, it will be obvious that we shall be in a very different position, as acting agents, from that involving that we yield ourselves to the "spirits." This submission seems to be the ideal of what is popularly called Spiritualism. According to this cult, our guides and commanders are to be the spirits. As a metaphysician, I am impressed with the vast calamity to society, and the woeful debasement to the individual involved in the common, current determinations of social and ethical issues. However, it seems to me that submission to the spirits, in respect to those issues, would be likely to ensure a climax of calamity and debasement, compared with which, the calamity and debasement incident to current procedure would be trivial.

If I could believe that the spirits could and would think as honestly and efficiently as does the human metaphysician; if I could believe that even a preponderant majority of the spirits were likely to think more honestly and efficiently than does the conventionally honest and cultured man, I should view with less repulsion than I do, submission to the spirits. As I am totally unable to believe that the spirits, assuming their existence, will think any more honestly or efficiently than they did, as mundane entities, I unequivocally vote for subjection to mundane hypnotists, rather than for subjection to spirits.

The implication of the teachers of popular spirit-

ualism seems to be that a man must discriminate between the spirits that try to bring him to subjection, and must only yield himself to the "good" spirits. This teaching, if we could only credit that it would be probably adhered to, would modify the evil. On the other hand, it may be asked, by what criterion is the spirit-led person to judge between the good and bad spirits that are competing to lead him, unless the criterion is determined by his own belief, or if not belief, his prejudices, sentiments, self-interest? Either he must take direction about the spirits from some other person, or, he must decide himself. On the conditions of these teachers of popular Spiritualism, it seems hard to distinguish between following the spirits and following one's own likes and dislikes, or those of somebody else. Things seem *in statu quo*, on the conditions of these teachers. Practically, on the conditions of these teachers, it would seem that the spirits might as well save themselves the trouble of interfering with the normal course of mundane activities. Of course "fetish"-*rapport* with exclusively good spirits would be a good thing, just as is "fetish"-*rapport* with his magic stone, to the savage, or, with his "Saviour," to the average Christian. But, the uncertainty whether the good spirits would monopolise the *rapport* would seem at least to counterbalance the certainty of their good offices.

As one whose main effort, for many years, has been to render the individual his own master, I must confess that I view with very mixed feelings the probable advent of the extra-mundane, to co-operate and contend with the mundane, hypnotist in imposing persuasion, intimidation, supplication, virtue, vice, truth, fallacy, and what not else in the categories of

hypnotic dictation, on the poor mundane soul, already, Heaven knows, too well prodded, lured, terrorised, cozened, hoodwinked, by its fellow-denizens of the mundane stage.

It may be comforting to be assured that our departed dear ones are ready, as soon as we get our army of Pipers, to enter into communion with us and dower us with their solicitude. On the other hand, it is disquieting to reflect that, if these benevolent and pure ones are eager to visit us, to our salvation, there is no reason to suppose that another type of visitants is not equally ready to put in appearance, to our perdition. Under the circumstances, I personally would rather defer communion until I was in a position to deal with my post-mundane intimates on their merits, and to discuss things without the intermediation of the Pipers. When I am *tête-à-tête* with my post-mundane circle, I want to have the same opportunities as I have on earth, of segregating and dealing with the "wrong 'uns."

I don't like the privilege of post-mundane communication, on the condition of opening my mouth and shutting my eyes and trusting that things will come right side up.

Plainly and seriously, I feel strongly that spiritualistic communion of the post-mundane sort is better left alone than indulged in. I am assured that the less a man has to disturb him in attending to the light given him, by God, for his particular individual guidance, the better it will be for him when he passes over to the "spirits," and for him and his fellows when he is on earth. The grand mission of Spiritualism, from my standpoint, is to free the human from his brute. I feel hopeful that the Almighty has

decreed that Spiritualism shall fulfil this mission. Attending to the babbling of "spirits" is not the true vocation of Spiritualists. Their true vocation—as of all men—is attending to the voice of their own intellects.

Humanity now wants justice. To get justice there must be men, not hypnotic mannikins. Spiritualists must, and I feel assured will, supply us with men. Spirits on earth, in heaven, in hell, must yield obedience to man's intellect; the direct voice of the Master of spirits, God Almighty.

In view of what seems to me the pernicious tendency, or at any rate, possibility, incident to Spiritualism, involving blind reliance on guidance by souls of the dead, I submit that the metaphysical discrimination between all hypnotic forms of soul-activity and the soul's relatively free manifestation involving action according to belief, is vitally important to Spiritualism. I cannot conceive a greater subversal of mental integrity and individuality than would result from a spread of Spiritualism coupled with abject submission to the "spirits." That would be a calamity for humanity, compared with which even the present materialistic orgies would be a triviality. The man needs no spirit, but God's voice through his own intellect, to tell him what is right. There is no Man, who allows spirits, whether on earth, in heaven, or hell, to strangle his own intellect. Hypnotic subjection to spirits of the living is the giant curse of modern society. Add to that, hypnotic subjection to the spirits of the dead, then would brute Ossa be on Pelion!

## CHAPTER VI.

### PHYSICAL PHENOMENA OF SPIRITISM.

FORCED by the concussion of "hard facts" to recognise that there is such a thing as thought-transference, empirical scientists also recognise that they must maintain their prestige by somehow smuggling the facts into their own parish. If they cannot do this, so much the worse for the facts! For the empirical scientist, facts that won't come into the parish are utterly disreputable. Sticking, like flies in treacle, in the assurance of their forces, ethers and what not, empirical scientists are cudgelling their wits to account for thought-transference by some sort of "force"-solvent. They now talk as knowingly of "telepathy" as their forefathers talked of witchcraft, and are as far from attaining any real notion of the nature of the telepathy as were their forefathers, of the nature of witchcraft.

There are other "hard facts" that empirical scientists, at present, cannot assimilate. Ethers and forces do not seem, by the utmost stretch of scientific imagination, susceptible of adjustment to these facts.

Accordingly, empirical scientists adopt the radical method of denying the existence of these facts. "Fetish"-*rapport* afflicts the empirical scientist much as it does the Philistine in outer darkness.

What will not fit in with forces and ethers, his pet fetishes, is, to the empirical scientist, obviously intolerable, and must be treated with a papally comprehensive *non possumus*. Take away his gravitation—as well rob him of his good name! Cast a doubt on the “objectivity” of his matter and energy—beware of Professor Dewar, and when you have expiated your sin to his satisfaction, ask him, in a quiet corner, to tell you all about “objectivity,” just a little more simply that he can tell you about the absolute zero of temperature—of course, rigidly excluding metaphysical dogma, and modern versions of ancient mystifications. In the meantime, as we are out of the range of Professor Dewar and the British Association, let us indulge in a little irresponsible theorising which involves the enormity of “shattering” Professor Dewar’s matter and energy!

Conformity to convention, or common habit in thought and emotion, constitutes what we define by such terms as sanity, common-sense, reasonableness. Departure from this convention constitutes what we define by such terms as eccentricity, mental instability, insanity, mania, idiocy. As we normally think and feel according to this fixed habit of willing in juxtapositions, thoughts and emotions, so also we normally sense according to fixed habit of willing, in juxtapositions, sensory experiences which we call objects. Thus we have a convention of sensing as well as of thinking and feeling.

Again, as we may think and feel abnormally, so also we may sense abnormally—our sensory experiences, on such conditions, becoming analogous to what we call eccentric or insane thoughts and emotions. What we call morbid growths and function-



ing, as "disease," involve such abnormal modes of sensing and feeling. Thinking, sensing, feeling, are processes of what psychiatrists call suggestion and auto-suggestion. We may here recapitulate what has been earlier advanced about suggestion and auto-suggestion.

To metaphysic, the term suggestion conveys (*a*) control by one soul, or many souls, of the willing of the universe, or God-mind, as thoughts, feelings, sensings, by another soul, or other souls, and (*b*) the actual willing, by any soul, of the universe as that soul's particular experience or "own" mind. This latter willing constitutes auto-suggestion. All suggestion, *ab extra* (that is, from other souls to the suggestible soul), involves, to metaphysic, a state called hypnosis, in the case of the suggestible soul. All activities exclusive of those incident to the manifestation of intellect, are, to metaphysic, hypnotic. The soul only manifests real freedom through intellect.

All experience, whether as sensory objects or thoughts and emotions, is the product of the soul's activity, as "selectively" willing (that is, willing in conjunction with a particular grade and intensity of the consciousness-sensation) one or another constituent of the God-mind, common, as possible experience ("possible universe"), to all souls, though only willed in "fragments" by the individual soul, as, in metaphysical terminology, "actualised universe."

The experiences which we call thoughts and emotions, and which we empirically distinguish as being "subjective" or exclusively mind-products, from other experiences considered to be things existing independently of our mind, and called objects of

sense, are, for metaphysic, equally "objects," as are the latter experiences. Again, what we call objects of sense, and commonly consider as being things independent of mind, are, for metaphysic, no less things of mind (mind itself) than are the thoughts and emotions which we commonly designate as being exclusively "subjective."

For metaphysic, the terms subjective and objective, as empirically applied, imply the fundamental fallacy that some things (thoughts, emotions) exist as being inherent to mind, or mind itself, while other things (objects of sense) exist that are essentially, as we may figure, interlopers forcing themselves into this empirical "mind."

In its speculative differentiation between things inside and outside the mind, empiricism entirely ignores the problem as to how things that, *ex hypothesi*, are outside the mind, can get into it, involving that they are known as existing. To ignore this problem is to ignore all that is vitally important to a rational theory of cognition. For metaphysic, it is as futile to ignore this problem, as, for physics, it is futile to ignore the law of gravitation, or for chemistry to ignore the law of conservation of mass.

If, as metaphysic demonstrates to be the case, sensory "objects," equally with thoughts and emotions, are things of mind (mind-stuff, or mind itself), it follows that the location (relativity in position) of objects of sense involves essentially the same activity as involves the "location" (relativity in position) of thoughts and emotions.

Then, as abnormal "location" of thoughts and emotions, involving psychical "insanity," "aberration" and so forth, does occur, so also may abnormal loca-

tion of sensory objects occur, involving sensory "insanity" or "aberration."

When the latter contingency arises, we get various abnormal physical phenomena vouched for, as facts of experience, by Spiritualists, involving the moving of heavy bodies apart from physical contact and so contradictory to the law of gravitation. For instance, under such abnormal conditions of willing sensory bodies, a heavy table may be raised or flung about, analogously as the lunatic's thoughts are "flung" out of normal juxtaposition. Just as the soul, as will, can depart from its habit in respect to willing thoughts, so also it can depart from its habit in respect to willing the table.

Gratuitously assuming that tables and a "force" called gravity are external things not determined, as are thoughts, by will, as actualising mind, the empirical scientist scouts the possibility of moving tables in default of what he calls physical contact. Investigating from another standpoint than that of the empiricist, metaphysic discovers that the empiricist's so-called physical contact has no really causal relevancy to the contingency of the table's being moved, and that, given the particular activity of the will, the table will be as surely moved in default of "physical contact" as one thought or emotion is substituted for another in default of physical contact.

The empiricist's induction of multitudinous cases in which tables are only moved on the condition of physical contact does not at all impress the metaphysician, as excluding the possibility of moving tables without physical contact. The metaphysician sees this possibility as clearly as Adams saw Neptune, and through essentially the same intuitive processes.

Let me cite, and devote a little metaphysical scrutiny to a case, typical of many I might cite, of the possibility I indicate. M. Arago, the great French physicist and astronomer, experimenting with a girl, Angélique Cottin, at the Paris Observatory, made the report from which I cull, in conjunction with MM. Laugier and Goujon, to the Paris Academy of Sciences. The report states:—

"1. It is the left side of the body which appears to acquire this sometimes attractive, but more frequently repulsive, property. A sheet of paper, a pen, or any other light body, being placed upon a table, if the young girl approaches her left hand, even before she touches it, the object is driven to a distance, as by a gust of wind. The table itself is thrown the moment it is touched by her hand, or even by a thread which she may hold in it.

"3. As had been observed the first day, if she attempted to sit, the seat was thrown far from her, with such force that any person occupying it was carried away with it.

"4. One day a chest, upon which three men were seated, was moved in the same manner. Another day, although the chair was held by two very strong men, it was broken between their hands.

"6. Then the girl is obliged to continue standing, and is in great agitation.

"7. She can touch no object without breaking it or throwing it upon the ground.

"8. All articles of furniture which her garments touch are displaced and overthrown.

"9. At that moment many persons have felt, by coming in contact with her, a true electrical shock.

"11. It (her body) is affected by jerks, unusual

movements, and a kind of trembling, which seems to communicate itself to the hand which touches it.

"12. This young person presents, moreover, a peculiar sensibility to the action of the magnet.

"The great fact demonstrated in this case is that, under peculiar conditions, the human organism gives forth a physical power which, without visible instruments, lifts heavy bodies, attracts or repels them, according to a law of polarity, overturns them, and produces the phenomena of sound."

Let us consider the above facts from the metaphysical standpoint. Arago, ignoring the supreme metaphysical question, How do we know? assumes that the girl's body is the causal agent, whereas it is only an "object" like the things that are moved.

From the analogy of the physicist's "forces," Arago further attributes the abnormal activities to something like magnetism; ignoring that magnetism must be "made" as experience, by the same agent that "makes" the girl's body and the other objects, as experience.

Being fully convinced that something analogous to magnetism must be the causal agent, Arago suggests to the girl (as hypnotic in a state of hyper-suggestibility). She accordingly "presents a peculiar sensibility to the action of the magnet" (the "magnetic" theory is now discarded, and "suggestion" is adopted by modern psychiatrists), and people in contact with her auto-suggest the "electrical shocks" through holding the "force"-theory, or through suggestion by those who hold it.

In moving the objects, the girl senses abnormally; that is, she wills sensory ideas (objects of sense) in abnormal juxtapositions analogously as the demented

person wills psychical ideas (thoughts, emotions). As the experimenters suggestively dominate her will, involving her auto-suggestion of "magnetic" susceptibility, so also she suggestively dominates their wills, involving that they auto-suggest the moving objects as she does. Did she not so dominate the wills of the experimenters, they would auto-suggest the objects normally, and would attribute the girl's abnormal auto-suggestion (commonly called perception) to "hallucination."

The convulsive movements of the girl, and the "trembling" (suggested to the experimenters), are abnormal auto-suggestions of sensory and psychical ideas analogous to the auto-suggestions involving the abnormal movements of the other objects. Spasmodic diseases (epilepsy, etc.) are instances of this sort of auto-suggestion among ordinary people. Various epidemics of the sort (dancing mania, Tarantism, etc.), waves of enthusiasm, fanaticism (Dreyfus case, *pro*- and *anti*-Boerism, "mafficking"), political "opinions," social conventions, religion and morality of the current orders, depend on inter-suggestion. Practically all activities, apart from those intellectually imposed, are products of the same sort of suggestibility as involved the manifestations recorded by Arago. Under present conditions, society is a congeries of hypnotics who imagine they are free agents. What we call disease, whether "nervous" or "physical," is abnormal auto-suggestion of sensory and psychical ideas. In metaphysical terminology such ideas are "bodies." What we commonly term objects, things, bodies, are to metaphysic, "preter-empirical notions."

The supreme metaphysical problem is to identify a truly causal agent and the conditions on which such

an agent can constitute experience. Obviously, all possible experience, sensory or psychical, must be equally "mind." The empirical implication that objects of sense are not mind, but are things coming into and going out of mind, involves, as already often indicated, confusion of mind with experience.

Metaphysic recognises that, though experience is necessarily mind, mind is not necessarily experience. Were mind nothing but experience, the empirical sequences in "time" and "space," constituting human experience, could not occur. Such an "experience-mind" necessitates a supreme knower and doer—God.

The empirical implication that there are things outside mind involves dogmatic affirmation of a rationally impossible contingency; that things exist outside the only agent through which existence can be known at all, and that these things are created and annihilated accordingly as they enter or disappear from the agent. On this gigantic puerility of assumption all "science" is founded. If, as metaphysic demonstrates to be the case, all possible experience is mind itself, that experience appears (is metaphysically "patent") and disappears (becomes metaphysically "latent") must depend on an active agent, distinct from mind, and determining what empirical part of mind shall be manifested. Though the notion of this agent (as cause, will, soul) is mind itself, the agent itself, as existence, is outside mind.

Mind is the fixed, inert *corpus vile* on which (though as "possible universe," it is common to all souls) each soul operates in a more or less idiosyncratic manner. As the soul "glances" at this mind, so are the experiences. If one soul dominates another, the

latter will "glance" at mind as does the former. Then, experiences will be alike. Normally, this "glancing" is consistent, involving that we commonly see, touch, etc., think, feel, as may be figured, to like patterns. The "glancing" may also be inconsistent with the norm. Then arise the phenomena we call occult, the various psychoses and neuroses dealt with in pathology, and the eccentricity we call genius.

The "forces"—magnetic, odyllic, psychic, or what not—invoked by empiricists, are no more really causal agents in moving objects than are the objects in moving themselves. Calling an idea "force," solves nothing regarding causal activity. So it is in regard to the "spirits" of empirical Spiritualism, which have no more significance for the metaphysician than have the forces of the physicist. Metaphysic is more spiritualistic than the most accentuated Spiritualism of the popular order, which, essentially, is not spiritism at all, but, as already pointed out, is merely disguised materialism.

As the ordinary empiricist asserts that a knife cuts, and as the empirical scientist asserts that gravitation causes an apple to fall from a tree, so does the empirical Spiritualist assert that "odyllic" or "psychic" force, or a "spirit" moves a table or reveals a secret, as the case may be. Metaphysic cannot rest with such naïve assurances. It has to investigate on what causal conditions the ideas, knife, gravitation, force, spirit, can exist. They can only exist as known. On what conditions are they known? That is the problem for metaphysic. So soon as metaphysic identifies the conditions on which these things are known, it establishes a *vera causa*.



Until the conditions are identified, the "cause," whatever it may be called, is merely empirical, and as such, spurious. Metaphysic opens its arms to all the facts of spiritism, just as empirical science embraces the facts of ordinary experience. Metaphysic is to the former order of facts as empirical science is to the latter.

The foregoing considerations involve metaphysical interpretation of all the physical phenomena of spiritism. It is unnecessary to examine, in detail, further phenomena of the sort than those already considered. However, it may be well to tabulate a few more cases. Out of the great mass of testimony accessible to anybody who cares to look for it, I now select that of Professor Sir William Crookes. He testifies, with all the weight of his reputation as an observer, thinker, exact investigator, honourable witness to the following among many other facts:—

That he has seen Home, the medium, cause a balance to record additions to weight, without contact or any mechanical interference. This involves what Professor Dewar calls the "shattering" of gravity. That he has seen Home and others rise bodily from the ground, without mechanical support. This involves the same "shattering." That he has seen Home hold incandescent coal, as a little furnace, in his hands, without suffering pain or structural lesion. This "shatters" physiology.

That he has seen an accordion floating about the room playing all the time.

That Home has made an accordion play, without touching it, and while the instrument has been held, keys downwards, in Professor Crookes's own hand.

That he has seen Home "pull up Venetian blinds

eight feet off, sound notes on a distant piano, cause a card-plate to float about the room, . . . make a coral necklace rise on end, cause a fan to move about and fan the company, set in motion a pendulum when enclosed in a glass case firmly cemented to the wall" (*Researches in Spiritualism*, p. 90).

There is one type of physical phenomenon of a different character from those above considered which, excluding the assumption of trickery, deserves a little special treatment from the metaphysical standpoint. The hero of the achievement with which I am going to deal was an Indian Fakir, named Covindasamy, and the witness was M. Louis Jacolliot, Chief Justice of Chandanagur, French East Indies. The account is in his work, *Occult Science in India*. The reader will, of course, exercise his discretion in measuring it. As a metaphysician, I see no reason to reject the ostensible facts on the ground of possibility, and am only concerned to apply metaphysic to them.

"Among the extraordinary claims advanced by the Fakirs," writes M. Jacolliot, "is one that they can directly influence the growth of plants, and that they can so hasten it as to accomplish in a few hours what usually takes months or even years. I had already seen this phenomenon performed by itinerant magicians a number of times, but, as I had always regarded it merely as a successful fraud, I had omitted to record the circumstances under which it occurred. Absurd as it seemed, as Covindasamy, who was really a man of remarkable power, proposed to repeat the various phenomena which I had already seen performed by others at different times, I determined to watch him so that he could do nothing which should escape my notice. . . . The Fakir suspected nothing,

and I thought he would be highly surprised when, upon his arrival, I told him what I intended. 'I am entirely at your service,' said he, in his usual simple way. I was somewhat disconcerted by his assurance, but I continued: 'Will you allow me to choose the earth, the vessel, and the seed which you are about to make grow before my eyes?'

"The vessel and the seed, yes; but the earth must be taken from a nest of carias.' These little white ants, who build, for shelter, small hills, often reaching a height of nine or a dozen yards, are very common in India, and there was no difficulty, whatever, in procuring a little of the earth, which they prepare very skilfully for their purpose. I told my cansama to have a flower-pot of the usual size filled with the earth required, and to bring me, at the same time, some seeds of different sorts. The Fakir asked him to break the earth between a couple of stones, as it was only to be obtained in pieces, almost as hard as old building material. . . . In less than a quarter of an hour my servant had returned with the articles required. I took them from his hands and dismissed him, not wishing to leave him in communication with Covindasamy. . . . The Fakir asked me to give him the seed that I had selected, as well as about a foot and a half of some white cloth. I chose at random a Papaw seed from among those which my cansama had brought, and before handing it to him, I asked him if he would allow me to mark it. Being answered in the affirmative, I made a slight cut in its outer skin. It was very much like the kernel of a gourd, except in colour, which was deep brown. I gave it to him, with a few yards of mosquito cloth.

"I shall soon sleep the sleep of the spirits,' said

Covindasamy; 'you must promise me that you will neither touch me personally nor the flower-pot' I made the promise required.

"He then planted the seed in the earth, which was now in a state of liquid mud, thrusting his seven-knotted stick—which, being a sign of his initiation, he never laid aside—into one corner of the vessel, and using it as a prop to hold up the piece of muslin which I had just given him. After hiding from sight in this manner the object upon which he was to operate, he sat down on the floor, stretched both hands horizontally above him, and gradually fell into a deep cataleptic sleep. I had promised that I would not touch him, and at first I could not tell whether his sleep was real or simulated; but when I saw, at the end of half-an-hour, that he had not stirred, I was forced to believe the evidence of my own senses. No man, however strong he might be, was able, except in that condition, to hold both his arms stretched horizontally before him for the space of even ten minutes. An hour passed by, and no motion of the muscles indicated that he was alive. . . .

"At first, I took my place opposite him, so that I could see everything that was going on, but he looked at me in a manner that soon became unendurable. His eyes seemed to be half dead, but they were filled at the same time with magnetic influence. . . .

"I had been waiting for a couple of hours, and the sun was fast sinking below the horizon, when a low sigh startled me. The Fakir had recovered possession of his senses. He made signs to me to approach. Removing the muslin that hid the flower-pot, he then pointed out to me a young stalk of papaw, fresh and green, and nearly eight inches high. Anticipating

my thoughts, he thrust his fingers into the ground, which, meanwhile, had parted with nearly all its moisture, and carefully taking up the young plant, he showed me, upon one of the two cuticles still adhering to the roots, the cut I had made two hours previously.

"Was it the same seed and the same cut? I have only one answer to make. I noticed no substitution. The Fakir had not left the terrace; I had not lost sight of him. When he came, he did not know what I was going to ask. It was impossible for him to conceal a plant in his clothes, as he was almost entirely naked, and, at any rate, he could not have told, in advance, that I would select a papaw seed, among thirty different kinds that my cansama had brought. . . . After enjoying my surprise for a few moments, the Fakir said to me, with an ill-concealed movement of pride: 'If I had continued my evocations longer, the papaw tree would have borne flowers in eight days, and fruit in fifteen.'

"Bearing in mind the accounts of Huc, the missionary, as well as various other phenomena of the same character which I had myself witnessed in the Carnatic, I said in reply that there were other performers who accomplished the same results in two hours. 'You are mistaken,' said the Hindu; 'in the manifestations you speak of, there is an *apport*, as it is called, of fruit trees by the spirits. What I have just shown you is really *spontaneous vegetation*; but the pure fluid, under the direction of the Pitris, never was able to produce the three phases of germination, flowering, and fruitage in a single day.' . . .

"There are a multitude of kitchen plants (I have seen the experiment tried a score of times) which,

when put at dawn into moist soil, and exposed to the favourable influence of a sun which does wonders, appear above ground between noon and one o'clock, and at six o'clock, or the close of day, are already nearly half an inch high. On the other hand, I am bound also to say, in justice to the Fakir, at least fifteen days are necessary to the germination of a papaw seed" (pp. 259-264).

Taking the fact to be as affirmed by the Fakir, that the plant really germinates, one of two contingencies is involved. Either the plant is a soul, and so susceptible to suggestion, or it is merely a sensing "made," by the percipient soul, as are other objects constituting experience. In the former case, the plant auto-suggests what is called its growth, as does an animal soul, and this auto-suggestion may be affected, like other auto-suggestions, by suggestion *ab extra*. The Fakir is such an external source of suggestion, affecting the plant-soul analogously as Angélique Cottin affects the souls of those who witness her manifestations. As the latter souls "make" the various objects behave abnormally, in conformity with Angélique's suggestion, so, also, the plant-soul "makes" the plant-body behave abnormally, in conformity with the Fakir's suggestion. If the plant, on the other hand, is not a soul, but merely an object, it will "grow" on the same conditions as, say, a thrown ball will "move." The growth and the moving will be equally products of auto-suggestion by the active agent, soul, which becomes in "fetish"-*rappport* with its own mind as the plant and the ball. As the Fakir, on such conditions, auto-suggests the growing plant, so, also, he suggests it, as sensing and preter-empirical notion, to M. Jacolliot, analogously as

Angélique auto-suggests, and suggests to M. Arago, the thrown table. Personally, I reject the assumption of vegetable-soul, and attribute vegetable life and growth to consensus of auto-suggestion of sensings by animal souls.

Jaccoliot draws attention to the mystical significance attached by the Brahmins to the number seven. The Fakir's seven-knotted stick is one instance. Others are the seven sages of India ; the seven celestial cities ; the seven sacred islands ; the seven oceans ; the seven sacred rivers ; the seven holy mountains ; the seven sacred deserts ; the seven celestial trees ; the seven castes ; the seven superior and inferior worlds. The origin of this mysticism in regard to the number seven, is in a conception of emanations from, or manifestations of the Supreme God (1), as (2, 3, 4) the initial trinity, Nara, Nari, Viradj (the two former, sexual emanations—male and female—the last, the Word or Creator, produced by the two former) ; (5, 6, 7) the manifested trinity, Brahma, Vischnou, Siva.

The Jews held like notions regarding the number seven. Thus, the Bible tells of the seven-days' creation ; enjoins that land shall rest every seven years ; records the Sabbatic year of jubilee as returning every seven times seven years ; describes the great golden candlestick in the Temple as having seven branches, the seven candles of which represented the seven planets ; states that seven trumpets were blown by seven priests for seven consecutive days around Jericho, the walls of which city fell down on the seventh day after the Israelitish army had marched round it for the seventh time. John's Apocalypse records the seven churches, chandeliers, stars, lamps,

seals, angels, vials, plagues. Isaiah, describing the glory surrounding Jehovah, says: "It is seven times greater than that of the sun, and equal to the light of seven days combined."

In the above cases, we see instances of *fetish-rapport* with a number. The Fakir is in such *rapport* with his seven-knotted stick analogously as the water-dowser is in *rapport* with his forked twig, or the doctor and patient are with the drug. The essential agency in all the cases is suggestion. The Fakir's stick, the dowser's twig, the drug, are merely incidentals to the essential agency. Some dowsers dispense with the twig; some doctors dispense with drugs. The point, in regard to drugs, will be specially dealt with in a later chapter.

Once a *fetish-rapport* of the sort in question has arisen, it may persist, as we see in the cases of the Hindoos and Jews, for indefinite periods. The trinity of the modern Christian is a survival of such *fetish-rapport*. Dogmatic Christianity is, essentially, as polytheistic as is Brahmanism, or were the religion of ancient Egypt, and what is called Hellenic and Roman heathenism. In all these cults, the polytheistic element is merely superficial. Radically, their implication is monotheistic. Their polytheism is merely analogous to the dowser's twig, the Fakir's stick, the doctor's drug, in respect to the essential agency of auto-suggestion and suggestion. Christian trinitarianism is in evolutionary continuity with Neo-platonist, Cabalist, and Brahmanical trinitarianism, which last is probably the ancestral origin of all expressions of theistic trinity. All religious theories are plagiarisms from Brahmanism. As Jacolliot observes: "If the Cabala, if Magism, Plato, the Alexandrian School,



and Christianity did not derive their doctrines from original sources, if, on the contrary, we find them in the remotest ages in the philosophical works of ancient India, not as isolated facts but as a complete collection of beliefs, dogmas, and mysteries, which go to make up the whole of what is called the Brahminic civilisation, have we not every reason to maintain that they came originally from the country of the Vedas?" (*op. cit.*, p. 193).

I am tempted to quote another incident recorded by Jaccoliot. "As the Fakir was about to leave me, to go to his breakfast and obtain a few hours' rest, of which he stood in urgent need, having had no food or sleep for the last twenty-four hours, he stopped in the embrasure of the door leading from the terrace to the outside stairs, and, crossing his arms upon his chest, lifted himself up gradually, without any apparent support or assistance, to the height of about ten or twelve inches. I was able to determine the distance exactly by means of a point of comparison which I had fixed upon during the continuance of the phenomenon. Behind the Fakir's back there was a silken hanging, which was used as a *portière*, striped in gold and white bands of equal width. I noticed that the Fakir's feet were on a level with the sixth band. At the commencement of his ascension I had seized my chronometer; the entire time from the moment when the Fakir commenced to rise until he touched the ground again, was more than eight minutes. He remained perfectly still, at the highest point of elevation, for nearly five minutes. As Covindasamy was making his parting salaam, I asked if he could repeat the last phenomenon whenever he pleased. 'The Fakir,' answered he emphatically,

'can lift himself up as high as the clouds'" (*op. cit.*, p. 258).

Regarding the above class of phenomenon, Professor Crookes writes: "The most striking cases of levitation which I have witnessed have been with Mr. Home. On three separate occasions have I seen him raised completely from the floor of the room. Once sitting in an easy-chair, once kneeling on his chair, and once standing up. On each occasion I had full opportunity of watching the occurrence as it was taking place. There are at least a hundred recorded instances of Mr. Home's rising from the ground, in the presence of as many separate persons, and I have heard from the lips of the three witnesses to the most striking occurrence of this kind—the Earl of Dunraven, Lord Lindsay, and Captain C. Wynne—their most minute accounts of what took place. To reject the recorded evidence on this subject is to reject all human testimony whatever; for no fact in sacred or profane history is supported by a stronger array of proofs" (*Researches*, pp. 89, 90).

The following is vouched for by Lord Lindsay: "I was sitting with Mr. Home and Lord Adare (now Lord Dunraven) and a cousin of his. During the sitting Mr. Home went into a trance, and in that state was carried out of the window in the room next to where we were, and was brought in at our window. The distance between the windows was about seven feet six inches, and there was not the slightest foothold between them, nor was there more than a twelve-inch projection to each window, which served as a ledge to put flowers on. We heard the window in the next room lifted up, and almost immediately after we saw Home floating in the air outside our window. The moon was shining full into the room;

my back was to the light, and I saw the shadow on the wall of the window-sill, and Home's feet about six inches above it. He remained in this position for a few seconds, then raised the window and glided into the room feet foremost and sat down. Lord Adare then went into the next room to look at the window from which he had been carried. It was raised about eighteen inches, and he expressed his wonder how Mr. Home had been taken through so narrow an aperture. Home said, still entranced, 'I will show you,' and then with his back to the window he leaned back and was shot out of the aperture, head first, with the body rigid, and returned quite quietly. The window is about seventy feet from the ground" (*Studies in Psychical Research*, Podmore, pp. 52, 53). Independent testimony, to the above effect, was given by Lord Adare and Captain Wynne, the cousin referred to.

The following appeared in the *Morning Leader*, of December 6, 1902:—"The extraordinary feats accomplished by the Indian Fakir have often been descanted upon, but we doubt whether so many interesting examples of inexplicable mysticism have ever been published together as appear in an article contributed to *Gold and Silver*, of Allahabad, by Mr. Harry Kellar. Mr. Kellar describes the rising of a man in mid-air, without any visible means of support and apparently against the law of gravity; the complete restoration of another who had been divided in pieces; the transformation of a silver coin held in the hand of a spectator into a serpent very much alive, and little birds modelled in clay who came to life and flew away. He tells of a Hindu conjurer at Cawnpore, who threw a ball of thread into the air, keeping one

end of the thread in his hand; the ball flew up out of sight, and the Hindu actually climbed up after it, he, too, disappearing, only to reappear smilingly a few minutes afterwards from nowhere. At Calcutta, Mr. Kellar and some friends were present at a performance by three Fakirs, given in a large room. One end was marked off by a chalk line beyond which the spectators were not allowed to pass during the performance, although before it commenced they were permitted to explore minutely the whole room. The only outlet was the door by which they had entered. The eldest Fakir lit a fire in a small brazier, and over the flame he sprinkled a white powder, which emitted an odour similar to that of tuberose. The Fakirs then commenced dancing, spinning like dervishes with giddy rapidity. Shortly after the dance had started, Mr. Kellar and his friends noticed that there were four instead of three dancers. These went on multiplying until there were twelve whirling figures who gradually drew closer together until they became one inextricable whole. Then, to the intense astonishment of the watchers, the spinning mass grew smaller and smaller, finally assuming the dimensions of a single figure, which stopped—one Fakir alone remaining of the twelve who had been visible. Hypnotism has been suggested as an explanation of these apparent miracles, but Mr. Kellar and his friends are quite positive that their senses were normal throughout the performance."

People who have no knowledge of the conditions under which the Fakirs perform, of the disciplines they have to undergo before they are qualified for what, to them, is a sacred calling, will, doubtlessly, either treat such accounts as the foregoing as *canards*,

or, if the accounts are accepted as honest, will take the performance as being mere jugglery of the Egyptian Hall type. To enlighten people apt to jump at this sort of conclusion, I will quote a few remarks by one who writes authoritatively, about these Fakirs and the conditions under which they perform. Jaccoliot writes:—"Having spent twenty years of his life after receiving the first degree of initiation, during which the body is mortified by fasting and privations of every kind, and the intellect is trained and disciplined by means of prayers, invocations, and sacrifices, the candidate finally takes his place in one of the three following categories:—*Grihasta, Pourohita, Fakir.*" After summarising earlier particulars regarding the two former, Jaccoliot writes, regarding the Fakir:—"He becomes a performing Fakir, and from this moment forward all his time is employed in the manifestation of occult power by means of the public exhibition of exterior phenomena" (*op. cit.*, p. 69). Regarding the conditions under which the Fakir performs, Jaccoliot writes:—"Every European has heard of the extraordinary skill of the Hindu Fakirs, who are popularly designated under the name of Charmers or Jugglers. They claim to be invested with supernatural powers. Such is the belief of all Asiatic people. When our countrymen are told of their performances, they usually answer: Go to the regular magicians, they will show you the same things. To enable the reader to appreciate the grounds of this opinion, it seems necessary to show how the Fakirs operate. The following are facts which no traveller has ventured to contradict:—

"*First.* They never give public representations in

places where the presence of several hundred persons makes it impossible to exercise the proper scrutiny.

"*Second.* They are accompanied by no assistant or confederate, as they are usually termed.

"*Third.* They present themselves in the interior of the house completely naked, except that they wear for modesty's sake, a small piece of linen about as large as the hand.

"*Fourth.* They are not acquainted with goblets, or magic bags, or double-bottomed boxes, or prepared tables, or any of the thousand and one things which our European conjurers find necessary.

"*Fifth.* They have absolutely nothing in their possession, save a small wand of seven knots of young bamboo, as big as the handle of a penholder, which they hold in their right hand, and a small whistle about three inches long, which they fasten to one of the locks of their long, straight hair; for, having no clothes and consequently no pockets, they would otherwise be obliged to hold it constantly in their hands.

"*Sixth.* They operate, as desired by the person whom they are visiting, either in a sitting or standing posture, or, as the case may require, upon the marble granite, or stucco pavement of the verandah, or upon the bare ground in the garden.

"*Seventh.* When they need a subject for the exhibition of magnetic or somnambulistic phenomena, they take any of your servants whom you may designate, no matter whom, and they act with the same facility upon a European, in case he is willing to serve.

"*Eighth.* If they need any article, such as a musical instrument, a cane, a piece of paper, a pencil, etc., they ask you to furnish it.

"*Ninth.* They will repeat any experiments in your presence as many times as you require, and will submit to any test you may apply.

"*Tenth.* They never ask any pay, merely accepting as alms for the temple to which they are attached, whatever you choose to offer them.

"I have travelled through India in every direction for many years and I can truthfully state that I have never seen a single Fakir who was not willing to comply with any of these conditions. It only remains for us to ask whether our more popular magicians would ever consent to dispense with any of their numerous accompaniments, and perform under the same conditions. There is no doubt what the answer would be" (*op. cit.*, pp. 208, 209).

All the physical phenomena of which I have read in the records of popular Spiritualism, in works by Sir William Crookes and others, are equalled, if not surpassed, in impressiveness, by Jacolliot's records of his personal experience of the achievements of naked Indian Fakirs. For thousands of years, manifestations, which are now stirring the popular imagination and exciting "scientific" ridicule, here and elsewhere, have been familiar, everyday occurrences in the East. To any eminent scientist, confident in his theories, who wants a sensation of impotency and bewilderment, I suggest the perusal of Jacolliot's work. When he has read it, and reflected on what is fluttering the doves of scientific assurance in his own country, I incline to the opinion that the fact will begin to dawn on the scientist that there is something after all in metaphysic, and considerably less than there once seemed to be in "Science."

The Brahmanistic doctrine of the Pitris, or Spirits,

as I find it expounded by Jacolliot, is, essentially, the same disguised materialism as the popular cult of Spiritualism. Indeed, to my apprehension, this applies to the whole philosophy of Brahmanism, even in its metaphysical aspects, as it also applies to Magism, Kabbalism, Platonism, Alexandrine Speculation—all ancient philosophies and their modern offshoots.



## CHAPTER VII.

### APPARITIONS.

THE class of phenomena with which we are about to deal includes the most widely testified spiritistic occurrences, as what are called ghosts. There are records of speaking apparitions, and of apparitions touched and felt, as well as seen; of apparitions of what we commonly call objects, as well as of what we call bodies, or organisms. The question that now particularly demands our consideration is: what is the difference, or is there any real difference, between what we call an apparition and what we call a real object or body? As ordinary observers we have little difficulty in assuring ourselves that there is a difference, and a vital one, between a real object and an apparition. However, as the reader who has reached this chapter will probably recognise, the common determination of this difference may not be so reliable as it seems. To the metaphysician, the distinction between real objects and apparitions is, essentially, illusory.

To metaphysic, all sensings, whether we call them objects or organisms, are, essentially, apparitions. That we empirically distinguish between what we call real objects and bodies, and what we call apparitions, ghosts, phantasms, occurs through our fanciful externalisation of these things, as being outside mind,

and, so, as being other than ideas. Whether objects and organisms are empirically real or unreal, they can be nothing, as sensed experiences, but seeings, touchings, hearings, smellings, tastings, all of which experiences are mind-stuff, or ideas.

That one or more of these experiences involves for us what we call a "thing," still leaves unchanged the resultant, as mind-stuff or idea. The "thing itself" is no less idea than is any particular seeing or touching. As idea, the "thing" is identified by metaphysic as being what I term a preter-empirical notion. When any seeing or touching involves a "thing," it is determined as such through our willing, in conjunction with it, a preter-empirical notion. With such a preter-empirical notion we are all, normally, in "*fetish*"-*rapport*, involving that we recognise the "same" thing. Through hypnotic suggestion, we may be compelled to be in abnormal "*fetish*"-*rapport* with a preter-empirical notion, and sensing. The resultant is called a suggested hallucination of sense. Thus, a preter-empirical notion may be imagined as a welding and typifying agency through which diverse classes of sensings become empirically coherent, fixed individualities.

Whenever we will a preter-empirical notion with one or more sensings, there is a "thing." Thus, the soul "makes" organisms and other objects, as it "makes" thoughts and feelings, and, as we have seen in the case of Angélique Cottin, the soul may move objects just as, in the case of Mrs. Piper, it moves thoughts—in entire contradiction to our common experiences regarding such contingencies.

What really assures us that we are in sensory contact (visual, tactual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, as

the case may be) with a "real" thing, is "fetish"-*rapport* with a preter-empirical notion. When this "fetish"-*rapport* is in maximal intensity, we have no doubt that the thing is "real." When the intensity is less than maximal, we are not "sure" whether the thing is real or not. When the intensity is still more minimal, we say that the thing is a fancy, phantasm, apparition, hallucination, "ghost." Nevertheless, whatever the thing may be—real or unreal—so soon as we will in conjunction a sensing and preter-empirical notion, the essential "thing" is in our experience. We cannot make it more or less than a sensing and preter-empirical notion.

"Fetish"-*rapport* in maximal intensity, with preter-empirical notions and sensings, occurs because our normal sensings and willings of preter-empirical notions constitute what I have termed a convention, or habit of sensing, just as our willing of thoughts and feelings constitutes a convention of thinking and feeling, as what we call common-sense, sanity. We are in "fetish"-*rapport* with such thoughts and feelings, as we are with the sensings and preter-empirical notions.

This convention, as a continuum of thoughts, feelings, sensings, preter-empirical notions, as the case may be, occurs because we constitute certain sensings, thoughts, etc., as what I term bridges to other thoughts, sensings, etc. When these "bridges" are not willed, thoughts become what we call disconnected, rambling, insane, etc., and "things" become what we call unreal, phantasmal, etc.

To illustrate the foregoing in regard to "things": if we see a table depending from the ceiling, we fail to will normal "bridges" (floor, chairs, etc.) leading

to the table. Then "*fetish*"-*rapport* with the table becomes weakened, and we say that the table is unreal. Still, as visual sensing and preter-empirical notion, the table is, essentially, as real as when we see it in normal connections. It is unreal as a seen thing, only because we fail to will such bridges as will establish maximal "*fetish*"-*rapport* between us and our mind, as the sensing and preter-empirical notion.

Other contingencies than the willing of bridges may affect our recognition of the table as being real. If, for instance, we see the table standing on the floor, but, when we try to touch it, find that it is impalpable, we at once so weaken "*fetish*"-*rapport* that we are assured the table is a phantasm. Still, we have not affected the essential reality of the table, as a visual sensing and preter-empirical notion. It would be, in these respects, exactly the same table if we also willed tactual sensing, involving that we could touch it. We only know that it is unreal so soon as we try to feel it. But, essentially, we have put no more reality into it by touching it.

In the vast majority of our common determinations of reality, we are perfectly assured though we do nothing but see. The most fragmentary seeing is often sufficient fully to assure us about reality. A glimpse of a hat and face in a crowd convinces us that our friend is really there. We know nothing more about his real presence than that we will maximal "*fetish*"-*rapport* with the glimpse. Suppose we go to the person and find he is not our friend. Then, we will minimal "*fetish*"-*rapport*, and he becomes a stranger. Though we are still in full "*fetish*"-*rapport* with our mind, as the person as a body, we are out of soul-*rapport* with


him as our friend. If we are in a certain so-called pathological state, we may be in "fetish"-*rapport* with our friend, as a body, and yet be out of soul-*rapport* with him. Then, though we shall completely see and touch him, we shall not "recognise" him. To us, he will be a stranger. Or, we may be in full "fetish"-*rapport*, say, with our own house, *qua* house, and yet be out of "fetish"-*rapport* with it as our own house. Then, we shall fail to will the self-sensation, involving the experience of owning, with the house, and, in familiar terms, we shall not know where we are. All our "realities" depend on the willing of "fetish"-*rapport* with preter-empirical notions and sensings.

Empirically, we may divide apparitions into two main classes, though the division has no metaphysical significance. These empirical classes are apparitions of organisms and of objects. The former class may be divided into two sub-classes: apparitions of the living and of the dead.

In spiritualistic literature, there are multitudes of records of the evocation of all sorts of apparitions. Sometimes the apparition is "spontaneously" generated: that is, it is seen, touched, heard independently of any traceable suggestion by an outside soul. At other times, the apparition is empirically traced to suggestion by an outside soul. Then the apparition is called telepathic or hypnotic. Such an imposed apparition may occur through the inter-suggestion of people indefinitely remote in "space," from one another. It may occur at a particular "time" determined by an experimenter, as hypnotist. If we are to trust records, the apparition may be suggested by the soul of a dead person, involving that people see,

hear, touch him, as though he were still "alive." At spiritistic *séances*, it is a common occurrence for people to see apparitions of human forms: hands, faces, etc., and of common and uncommon objects.

The "spirit-form" of "Katie King," rendered classical in the records of Spiritualism, by the long-continued, detailed, scientific investigation of Professor Crookes, is one of the most impressive occurrences of the kind with which we are now dealing that I am acquainted with. In this case, the apparition was borne in the arms of Professor Crookes, conversed with by many people, photographed together with the medium, Miss Cook, by Sir William. The manifestations were under Professor Crookes's observation for months together, in his own house, in the presence of his family and visitors. To assume trickery in the case, is to confront ourselves with difficulty almost as great as if we exclude trickery. To assume that Professor Crookes and his friends were all suffering from collective delusion, for months together, merely in regard to this one contingency, is to assume the practically impossible. So far as I can see there is not a scintilla of ground, except crass prejudice, against what contradicts common experience, for rejecting the testimony that the Katie King manifested to Professor Crookes was a real human body, in every sense that any such body is empirically real.

Accepting the facts, Katie King, from the metaphysical standpoint, is a spirit-form, or apparition, in the sense that we are all spirit-forms or apparitions, with the reservation that we, as souls, are in "fetish"-  
support with our bodies, so constituting them our "own," while there was no soul in such "fetish"-

*rapport* with the body of Katie King as to constitute it a soul's "own." In my metaphysical terminology, our "own" body is a medium (not to be confounded with a trance-medium). The only real, essential distinction between a body and an ordinary object is that the body is constituted a medium by a soul, as "owning" the body. Otherwise, the body is anybody's, and given requisite conditions of auto-suggestion with or without suggestion from another soul, any person, as soul, may will any body, just as he may will any object. The conditions of auto-suggesting a body or object involve what we call seeing, touching, hearing, smelling, tasting the body or object. We "see" the body or object, because we will certain (visual) sensory ideas, and a particular preter-empirical notion. The body or object does not thrust itself, as a seeing, into us (our mind) from outside. We have to "make" it as a seeing, by getting into "fetish"-*rapport* with our mind. When we are in this "fetish"-*rapport*, we will the body or object as a seeing. So it is with other sensings. Empirically, of course, this interpretation seems superfluous. Empirically, it is quite enough for us to be assured that we see, etc., through what we call sense-organs and nerves. When we come to deal with fundamental problems, we find that this empirical solution solves nothing. Then we recognise that our "sense-organs" are only such things as we empirically assume to be only known through the sense-organs. Moreover, we have profuse empirical demonstration that we do not need sense-organs to sense. Thus, in any psychiatric treatise, we shall find many instances of people who see, entirely independently of their eyes (things behind their backs, through opaque

bodies, in distant localities). There is any amount of empirical evidence that the empirical decision regarding the active agency of "sense-organs" is entirely wrong.

Now, the only ground on which Katie King is assumed to be different from an ordinary person is that she appears and disappears as ordinary people do not appear and disappear. In a moment, she is there; in a moment, she is not there. This difference occurs because, while in the case of ordinary people, we will what I have termed bridges, when the people appear or disappear, so obviating the abruptness of appearance and disappearance; in the case of Katie King, no "bridges" are willed. There is no essential difference between the appearance and disappearance of Katie King and of ordinary people, except in regard to this willing of bridges. This willing of bridges does not affect the essential act of seeing an ordinary person. The bridges merely involve a conventional mode of effecting the essential act. The ordinary person, as a seeing, is nowise essentially differentiated, through the bridges, from Katie King as a seeing. Suppose Katie King had appeared as a "spirit-form" and had henceforth made normal appearances and disappearances, even those who had seen her appear as "spirit-form" would soon begin to doubt whether she had not normally appeared and they were not "hallucinated" at her earlier appearance. Katie King, on such conditions, would soon become an ordinary person, so far as regarded seeings and touchings.

The only condition for this persistence of the normally appearing and disappearing Katie would be that other people should continue to auto-suggest her



as a seeing, touching, hearing. Once anybody had started this auto-suggestion, he might start a process of inter-suggestion which would render Katie a normal seeing, touching, hearing to everybody. Or, the person might auto-suggest Katie as a "ghost" or "spirit-form," and so suggest her to an indefinite number of people who would all testify that they had seen, etc., the "ghost." So, Katie, as "ghost," might trouble people who slept in a "haunted" room. All that these people would have to do, to be troubled by Katie, would be to take suggestion from others who had taken it. Then, they would be able to auto-suggest Katie as readily almost as they could auto-suggest their friends, in the morning, when recounting their night's experience. So far as regards seeings and touchings, etc., we are all "ghosts," auto-suggested with other ghosts, as bridges. Our real self is what "makes" us as ghost. To metaphysic we must apply if we would know who we really are.

Souls constitute ghosts, as ordinary bodies, by "glancing" at mind, and so selecting seeings, touchings, etc., and preter-empirical notions. That my ghost has a nose involves that I, as soul, glance at certain parts of mind, involving sensory ideas, and so get into "fetish"-*rapport* with a preter-empirical notion, and sensing constituting a nose. This, I suggest to you. Then, you see my nose, as ghost. That your nose is differently shaped from mine involves that you, as soul, glance at certain parts of mind, at which I, as soul, do not glance, when I look at your nose and then at my own in a glass. (That I have to look in the glass to see my nose, involves that I have to glance at parts of mind, as the glass, in conjunction with parts, as my nose.) That you and I are alike as

having a nose, involves that we both, as souls, exist at mind in like manners and suggest to one another our glancings. That a child is apt to resemble parent involves like glancing at mind by both. When the child is born, the parent suggests a certain cluster of glancing at mind to the "unborn" child's soul. This suggestion is called pre-natal, and in what biologists call hereditary character. The child's "born" involves that a soul has taken station from two other souls, the parents. So soon as this occurs, the "unborn," as soul, begins suggesting a "body." Then begins what scientists call embryogeny.

In the case of Katie King, Miss Cook, the medium auto-suggests Katie, as ghost, analogously as Angélique auto-suggests the moving objects, as ghost. Miss Cook suggests to Professor Crookes, analogously as Angélique suggests to Arago. Questions in regard to Miss Cook, which do not arise in regard to Angélique, are (a) does Miss Cook take suggestion from some post-mundane soul that once "owned" the body of Katie? (b) does Miss Cook take suggestion from a mundane soul "owning" the Katie-body? does Miss Cook take suggestion from some mate with a "real" Katie?

It is practically impossible absolutely to have communion of any sort with a post-mundane soul. At the best, this communion can only be a matter of probabilities. On metaphysical grounds I am disposed to accept evidence for post-mundane souls which I should otherwise reject. Being convinced of the possibility of this communion, I am inclined to accept certain recorded facts of apparitions as evidence for the actual

this communion. The so-called psychical manifestations, as in the case of Mrs. Piper, are, to me, no evidence of the sort.

The case of Katie is such evidence, to the extent that, so far as I know, no living person has been identified as Katie, and nobody is in evidence to whom, as intimate, we could reasonably attribute capacity to suggest the Katie-body to Miss Cook. On the other hand, as the Katie-body is constituent of mind, and all mind is potentially available as auto-suggestion, by all souls, there is the possibility to consider that Miss Cook has auto-suggested the Katie-body independently of suggestion by any soul, mundane or post-mundane.

To me the probability is far greater that a post-mundane soul, once auto-suggesting the Katie-body, has suggested it to Miss Cook. An additional ground for accepting this contingency is that Katie holds converse with Professor Crookes and others. This converse, merely as words and thoughts, does not necessarily involve that the active agent is a post-mundane soul. It may be auto-suggested by the subliminal Miss Cook and suggested, as auditory ideas and thoughts, to Professor Crookes, in conjunction with the Katie-body, which would then apparently speak and think. However, if we have adequate ground for accepting the extra-mundane origin of the body-suggestion, I consider that the thought and word suggestion must be taken as cumulative proof. In the case of Katie, I am disposed to invoke post-mundane communion.

Though bodies, as distinguished from objects, are, equally with the latter, and with thoughts and feelings, constituents of mind, and theoretically susceptible of

being "made," or auto-suggested, independently of suggestion *ab extra*, the essential distinction between bodies and the other experiences is that, in the case of bodies, the auto-suggestion must be initiated by a soul that wills the body as its "own" (medium). In this respect, unlike all other experiences, a body is primarily, peculiar, as possible experience, to a particular soul. Only this particular soul can auto-suggest, to the exclusion of external suggestion (other than pre-natal), that body. Once such auto-suggestion is started by an initiating soul owning that body as medium, there is no limit to the possible appearance, as apparition, of that body to other souls, any number of which may derive the requisite suggestion from the initiating soul, and transmit the suggestion to other souls. Empirically, this proposition is illustrated by the tolerably familiar facts of what are called telepathic apparitions, involving that, in common terms, a body may be in two or more places at once, so appearing to those who normally see it as "real," and to others who see it as "phantasmal." Meta-physically there is no limit to the different "places" in which a body may be "at the same time." This contingency entirely depends on the particular *rapport* involving suggestion between the soul "owning" that body and other souls, and on the latter's capacity for externalising the suggestion as sensory experience.

The Katie-ghost presupposes suggestion by a soul which is either willing the body, as its own (medium), or which has willed but is no longer willing the body as its own. In the latter case, the soul would be post-mundane, and the body would not be a medium, or what we call living. If it conversed, the voice would be auditory sensings. These sensings might

either be auto-suggested, independently of external suggestion, as are ordinary sounds, thoughts, feelings, or, it might be suggested by the post-mundane soul, as were the visual and tactual sensings and preter-empirical notion constituting the body as ghost. As I take the Katie-body to be suggested by a post-mundane soul, I also attribute the voice to that source. This applies to the thoughts' and feelings constituting what we may term the temperament of Katie. If we have ground for attributing the body suggestion to a post-mundane soul, we may also attribute the other manifestations to that agency, though, as already shown, psychical manifestations, alone, are not indicative of extra-mundane agency.

What we call temperament is an established idiosyncrasy in willing psychical ideas, as thoughts and emotions. This idiosyncrasy may be individual or collective. Thus, we have a national as well as an individual temperament. So, also, we have a national appearance, as ghost, as well as an individual appearance. The French or German ghost differs from the English ghost. Both temperament and ghost, individual and national, are "cut to pattern" through inter-suggestion. The national temperament and ghost are fashioned by what may be termed collective segregations of inter-suggestion. So it is with cliques, parties, sects, professions. The Quaker and Puritan; the legal and clerical; the commercial, the aristocratic; the artistic; the agricultural, are all well-marked temperaments and ghosts. This point, I have been interested to learn, is well illustrated in the case of spiritistic apparitions. According to Professor Danmar, who writes an article entitled "The Double," appearing in *Light*, of October 25, 1902, "every

materialised spirit bears some sort of resemblance to the medium, to whom the medial substance is due, and it is not unjustifiable to say that in a certain sense such materialisations are doubles." This resemblance to the medium, so the article states, may be slight or close, and there may be resemblances to other people present, involving the rider that, by the term medium, is here to be understood, not merely the "official medium," but also, "the medial substance, which is taken from the members of a *séance*, of whom the official medium is only one, though the most important ; and of which each member contributes a portion according to the degree of his medial power."

The article deals with this question from the conventional materialistic standpoint, speculatively assuming a highly attenuated substance called "medialum," more or less of which is drawn from the medium, "official" or otherwise, by the "spirits" so constituting part of the materialised figure. This standpoint is, of course, what we are now disproving.

In *séances*, souls are in *rapport* with the "official medium" and among themselves. Each soul (as involving the resemblances dealt with by Professor Danmar) is suggesting its "own" body as an apparition, as well as in its normal character. According to its suggestive dominance over any of the other souls, one soul in the *séance* will render its "own" body, as apparition, more or less obtrusive to other souls. The "official medium," with which the "consensus" of souls is most completely in *rapport*, exercises this dominance most strongly. Consequently, the "official medium's" body is most closely "reproduced" in the materialisation.

The interpretation, according to metaphysic, is involved in the demonstration of different "strata" or "storeys" of mind, involving what psychiatrists call alterations of personality, or alienation. Such cases involve that people deal with their own bodies and thoughts and feelings, as constituting strange personalities. The resemblances indicated by Professor Danmar are metaphysically interpretable as cases of collective alienation. The figures are accountable, so far as regards resemblances to the medium, and sitters, as auto-suggestive alienations of personality and suggestive imposition of a collective resultant as the materialised figure.

The "official medium" is in a "second personality." To the extent that "non-official" mediums exteriorise resemblances to themselves, they are also in some stage of alienation. These mediums, official and non-official, suggest to one another such products of alienation (visual ideas) as involve the particular resemblances. The result is what may be termed a compound telepathic apparition, involving the product of the various alienations.

A nation may be compared to the sitters at a *dance*, who exteriorise their own ghosts. So ensues the national ghost, and, on like conditions, the national temperament. For the medium, we may substitute, in the case of the nation, particular predominances of souls engaged in the collective inter-suggestion. At one time, the English ghost and temperament were what may be termed of the ponderous, bucolic, phlegmatic type. Now, they have become of the alert, "nervy," emotional type. Accurate caricature, of only a few decades past, is utterly inappropriate to the prominent type of *this* nation, to-day. John

Bull, ghost and temperament, is a very different animal from John Bull of forty or fifty years ago. To me it seems that he has changed more within a few decades than within an equal number of centuries earlier.

From the metaphysical standpoint the only evidence approaching real proof that spirits do communicate with mundane souls, is evidence for ghosts, or apparitions of the dead. Apparitions of the living are readily interpretable as products of mundane inter-suggestion. Apparitions of the dead cannot be fully accounted for as merely mundane interactions. We must here adopt the hypothesis that some analogue of the mundane body is actualised, with the self-sensation, by the post-mundane soul, or so-called spirit, and that this actualisation involves that the spirit can directly suggest its mundane body to mundane souls. On these hypothetical conditions, as the spirit actualised its post-mundane body, so would mundane souls, in *rappor*t with spirit, actualise the latter's mundane body.

In the case of ordinary thoughts, feelings, sensings, there is no ground, metaphysical, or empirical, for assuming such occurrence as that above indicated in regard to the body of the dead. Apart from the probable occurrence of suggestion of its mundane body by a spirit, there is no ground for affirming communication between the souls of the dead and living. All other suggestions are interpretable as telepathic phenomena, involving inter-suggestion, exclusively between mundane souls.

Once a soul has auto-suggested a body, as medium, that body persists, as possible experience, so long as mind persists. What we empirically recognise as the



decay and metamorphosis of this body is irrelevant to the persistence of the body as possible sensing and preter-empirical notion. The "decay" and "metamorphosis" merely involve that we will the body, as sensing and preter-empirical notion into "latent" mind, and bring other sensings and preter-empirical notions, as what we call products of chemical decomposition, into "patent" mind. These latter, we mnemonically associate with the body which we have relegated to a lower storey of mind. A full discussion of these points will involve a metaphysical investigation of the nature of what we call parts and transformations, which, metaphysic proves to be merely empirical illusions. Really, there are no such things as parts, and one thing cannot be changed into another. This point will be dealt with later.

The foregoing applies to what we call the growth of a body. The body we have in immediate experience is the only body about which we can empirically predicate. This body only illusively changes, through our empirically substituting another body (as "grown") for it, and mnemonically preserving the earlier ("ungrown") body. So, this body empirically changes, as growing. Metaphysically, the body is all these "changes," and the empirically whole body is merely an empirical (illusory) part of the thing that "changes."

Again, as such body is really all the changes empirically identified as the history of that body, so also, all empirical bodies are, essentially, only "changes" in a metaphysically single body. Assuming that brutes are souls, their bodies, like ours, are "parts" of this metaphysically single body. Every body auto-suggested, as medium, by a soul, is "part"

of this metaphysically single body. Bodies, as what we call objects, not auto-suggested by souls, as their "own," constitute "parts" of another metaphysically single body which we call the physical universe of "dead" matter. Both these metaphysically single bodies empirically change. This empirical change, we call evolution. Really, there is no change in either of these metaphysically single bodies. There is only real change in souls. The metaphysically real change in souls involves that they will another mind, so becoming what we call post-mundane. Metaphysically, though post-mundane souls may suggest the mundane mind to mundane souls, they cannot themselves auto-suggest it, as what we call experience, for themselves. Accordingly they cannot auto-suggest as their "own," their mundane bodies.

That souls can auto-suggest their "own" bodies and objects not their own bodies as "parts" of the two metaphysically single bodies constituting what we call the organic and inorganic, it is necessary that there shall be inter-suggestion between the auto-suggesting souls and another soul. This latter soul I call the matter-soul, and the inter-suggestion I call, hypnotism of the matter-soul. This interaction or inter-suggestion between the auto-suggesting soul and the matter-soul involves sensing, and is the necessary precondition of thinking and feeling.

As the auto-suggesting, thinking and feeling soul changes, involving what we call death and altered possible auto-suggestion, as what we call the future life, so also, the matter-soul changes, involving the changed interaction or inter-suggestion that constitutes the post-mundane analogue of mundane sensing, which becomes, in relation to post-mundane

thinking and feeling, what the mundane inter-suggestion (hypnotism of the matter-soul) was to mundane thinking and feeling. So arise post-mundane analogues of mundane sensings and, corollarily, post-mundane analogues of mundane bodies, as mediums. Auto-suggesting the post-mundane analogue to its "own" mundane body, and being in such *rapport* with a mundane soul as to involve suggestion, the result is what we call an apparition of the dead.

The so-called occult phenomena, which only within recent years have been rendered comparatively familiar to the European and American public, have, for ages, been popular exhibitions in the East. I will conclude this chapter with a vivid account of some further doings, recorded by Jacolliot, of the Fakir, Covindasamy, involving the evocation of apparitions of the types vouched for by Professor Crookes and others.

"Before entering my apartments," writes M. Jacolliot, "he (Covindasamy) had divested himself of the small piece of cloth, called the *langouty*, about four inches wide, which usually composed his only garment, and had deposited it upon one of the steps. He was entirely naked when he came in, and his seven-knotted stick was fastened to a lock of his long hair. 'Nothing impure,' said he, 'should come in contact with the body of the *evocator*, if he wishes to reserve his power of communication with the spirits unimpaired.' My bedroom was on a level with the terrace. I set apart both rooms for our experiments, and carefully shut and fastened all the outside doors. . . . The terrace was securely closed by its movable ceiling and curtains of vetivert matting. There was no opening

from the outside, and nobody could gain admission except through my bedroom. In the centre of each room there was a cocoa oil-lamp, protected by a glass shade of the clearest crystal, which hung from a bronze chain and diffused a soft light, sufficiently intense, however, to enable any one to read the smallest type in the remotest corner of the room.

"All Hindu houses contain small copper furnaces which are kept constantly supplied with burning coals, on which are burned from time to time a few pinches of a perfumed powder, consisting of sandal-wood, iris-root, incense, and myrrh. The Fakir placed one of these in the centre of the terrace, and deposited by its side a copper platter filled with the fragrant powder; having done so, he took his seat upon the floor in his usual posture, with his arms folded across his chest, and commenced a long incantation in an unknown tongue. When he was through with the recitation of his mentrams, he remained in the same position without making a movement, his left hand resting upon his heart, and his right hand leaning upon his seven-knotted stick. I thought that he was going to drop into a cataleptic sleep as he had done the day before, but such was not the case. From time to time, he pressed his hand against his forehead, and seemed to make passes as though to relieve his brain.

"Involuntarily, I experienced a sudden shock. A slightly phosphorescent cloud seemed to have formed in the middle of my chamber, from which semblances of hands appeared to go and come with great rapidity. In a few minutes several hands seemed to have lost their vaporous appearance and to resemble human hands; so much so, indeed, that they might have

been readily mistaken for the latter. Singular to relate, while some became, as it were, more material, others became more luminous. Some became opaque, and cast a shadow in the light, while others became so transparent that an object behind them could be distinctly seen. I counted as many as sixteen.

"Asking the Fakir if I could touch them, I had hardly expressed a wish to that effect, when one of them, breaking away from the rest, flew toward me and pressed my outstretched hand. It was small, supple, and moist, like the hand of a young woman. 'The spirit is present, though one of its hands is alone visible,' said Covindasamy. 'You can speak to it if you wish.' I smilingly asked whether the spirit to whom that charming hand belonged would give me something in the nature of a keepsake. Thereupon, in answer to my request, I felt the hand fade away in my own. I looked; it was flying toward a bouquet of flowers, from which it plucked a rosebud, which it threw at my feet and vanished.

"For nearly two hours a scene ensued which was calculated to set my head in a whirl. At one time, a hand brushed against my face, or fanned it with a fan. At another, it would scatter a shower of flowers all over the room, or would trace in the air in characters of fire, words which vanished as soon as the last letter was written. Some of these words were so striking that I wrote them down hastily with a pencil. *Divyavapour gatvā*: meaning in Sanscrit — 'I have clothed myself with a fluidic (*fluidique*) body.' Immediately afterward, the hand wrote: *Atmānam crēyasa yoxyatas Dehasya 'syā vimācanant*— 'You will attain happiness when you lay aside this

perishable body.' Meanwhile, flashes of genuine lightning seemed to dart across both rooms.

"Gradually, however, all the hands disappeared. The *cloud* from which they came seemed to vanish by degrees as the hands became more material." 'Immaterial?'; "In the place where the last hand had disappeared, we found a garland of those yellow flowers with penetrating fragrance which the Hindus use in all their ceremonies.

"I offer no explanation—I merely relate what occurred—leaving the reader at perfect liberty to draw any conclusion that he may see fit. I can state positively, however, that the doors of both rooms were closed, that I had the keys in my pocket, and that the Fakir had not changed his position. To these phenomena succeeded two others, that were, perhaps, more surprising still.

"Shortly after the hands had disappeared, and while the Fakir was still going on with his evocations, a cloud similar to the first, but more opaque and of a brighter colour, hovered near the little furnace, which, at the Hindu's request, I had kept constantly fed with burning coals. By degrees it seemed to assume a human form, and I distinguished the spectre—for I cannot call it otherwise—of an old Brahminical priest kneeling by the side of the little furnace. On his forehead he wore the signs of his consecration to Vischnou, while his body was girded with the triple cord, which signified that he had been initiated into the priestly caste. He clasped his hands above his head as in the performance of sacrifices, and his lips moved as if they were reciting prayers. At a certain moment he took a pinch of the perfumed powder and threw it upon the furnace; there must have been an

unusual quantity, for the fire emitted a thick smoke which filled both rooms.

"When the smoke dispersed, I noticed the spectre less than a couple of yards distant; it held out to me its fleshless hands. I took them in my own, as I returned his greeting, and was surprised to find them, though hard and bony, warm and lifelike. 'Are you really,' said I, in a distinct voice, 'a former inhabitant of the earth?' I had hardly finished the question, when the word *Am* (meaning 'Yes') appeared and disappeared in letters of fire upon the bosom of the old Brahmin. The effect was similar to that which would have been produced if the word had been written in the dark with a bit of phosphorus. 'Will you not leave me something as a token of your presence?' The spirit broke the triple cord, consisting of three strands of cotton, which was tied about his loins, gave it to me, and then faded away before my eyes.

"I supposed that the *séance* was over, and I was going to raise the movable curtains that shaded the terrace, to admit a little fresh air inside, where the heat was really suffocating, when I noticed that the Fakir seemed to have no such idea. All at once, I heard a strange tune performed upon an instrument, which seemed to be the harmoniflute that we had used a couple of days before. That, however, appeared impossible, inasmuch as the Peishwa had sent for it the day before, and it was consequently no longer in my rooms. It sounded at a distance, at first, but soon it came so near that it appeared to come from the next room, and I seemed before long to hear it in my bedroom. I noticed the phantom of a musician from the pagodas, gliding along the wall.

He had a harmoniflute in his hands, from which he drew plaintive and monotonous notes exactly like the religious music of the Hindus.

"When he had made the circuit of my room and of the terrace, he disappeared, and I found the instrument that he had used at the very place where he had vanished. It was actually the rajah's harmoniflute. I examined all the doors, but found them all securely locked, and I had the keys in my pocket. Covindasamy then arose. All his limbs were covered with perspiration, and he seemed to be thoroughly exhausted. . . . I threw myself upon a hammock for a few hours' rest. When I awoke and remembered the strange scenes that had passed before my eyes, it seemed as though I had been the plaything of a dream. Yet there was the harmoniflute, and I could not find out who, if anybody, had brought it. The floor of the terrace was still strewn with flowers, the crown of flowers was upon the divan, and the words that I had written had not vanished from the memorandum book in which I had jotted them down" (*Occult Science in India*, Jacolliot, pp. 265-271. Translated from the French by Willard L. Felt; John W. Lovell Company, New York).

A somewhat common source of assurance of their acuteness, to those who attribute such occurrences as the foregoing to trickery, is that the ostensible spirits (when what they wear happens to leave a physical trace behind when they have departed) are discovered to be clothed in the common materials of everyday wear. These astute detectives seem to think that the "spirits" ought to wear what human beings had never worn. When we assimilate the metaphysical truth that there is no essential difference between



sensings as what we call the real and phantasmal, the ground for the assurance of this type of critic is seen to be as unsubstantial as is his notion of "spirits."

That the garments of "spirits" are earthly fabrics will occur because earthly fabrics, like the spirits' bodies, are constituents of mind willed as experience. If some part of such garment remains for the delectation of critics of the order in question, it will remain through the same cause, auto-suggestion by the critic, that involved the transitory persistence of the rest of the garment and the spirit itself. Whatever the material of the garment be—if it be something never before seen by mortal eyes—it can only be, as constituent of mind, the same thing as the commonest linen or cotton rag. That a spirit was clothed in broadcloth cut as by a Bond Street artist, would, in itself, have no significance as demonstrating anything for or against the genuineness of the "spirit" and its sartorial embellishments. There is no more reason that a spirit should not wear a "billy-cock" than that Mr. See-through-a-stone-wall should not wear one.

## CHAPTER VIII.

### CLAIRVOYANCE AND PROPHECY.

AS, in the case of what we call a real object, the sensing involves "bridges," as a continuum of objects leading to the end-object, so, also, in the case of what we call events, incidents, happenings, the end-happening is led to by bridges of other happenings. Sometimes we do not experience intermediate happenings, as constituting bridges. Then, we say that the end-happening is accidental, fortuitous, unforeseen. What, empirically, we recognise as causal relationship between happenings is this willing of bridges, as happenings leading to an end-happening, which latter, we say, is caused, necessitated, induced by the intermediate, or bridge-happenings. To illustrate these points: suppose that our reading a certain passage in a book is an end-happening. Then, taking the book from the shelf and opening the page are bridges leading to the end-happening, and we say that there is causal relationship between the happenings, implying that we could not read the passage unless we did the other things.

Metaphysically, this empirically causal relationship is irrelevant to causal relationship. Happenings have no really causal relationship, and any happenings may be willed as empirically isolated from other happenings. We have actual experience of such

exclusion of bridges, as what are called clairvoyance and prophecy. The clairvoyant and prophet will happenings without willing bridges that other people will as being necessarily incidental to the willing of what the clairvoyant or prophet wills independently of the bridges. For instance, the clairvoyant can describe the interior of a room that he has never normally seen, and the prophet can tell what will happen without what we term judging from other happenings, as bridges, and so, as we say, inferring or speculating to the "future" happening. There is an abundance of evidence for the actual occurrence of such willing of happenings, independently of bridges, and so abolishing what we call causal relationship between events.

Those Piper manifestations which we have earlier discussed do not constitute examples of true clairvoyance, or prophecy, inasmuch as they are accountable as telepathic phenomena. To show real clairvoyance and prophecy, we must be able to exclude inter-suggestion as telepathy. The real clairvoyant and prophet must dispense with suggestion as well as with bridges. They must, as it were, take leaps to parts of the universe which other people can only reach by taking little steps. This involves that, in a sense, the clairvoyant and prophet miss parts of the universe, as bridges, which other people identify. For instance, they miss what we call "space" and "time," which other people detect when they come to will the happenings willed by the clairvoyant and prophet. To illustrate this: the clairvoyant can read the passage in the book, without going to the book-shelf and opening the page. So, he ignores "space" and "time," which the other

person makes experience. Similarly, the prophet can tell what will occur at a future time and remote place. The ordinary person can only realise the occurrence when he has realised a number of bridges involving the realisation of "space" and "time."

As there is no such thing, metaphysically, as causal relationship between happenings, there can be no such thing as what we call chance, or accident. Causal relationship can only exist between souls, as inter-suggestion, or between souls and what determines souls. Events happen as souls determine they shall. The causal contingency is not in relation to happenings, but to the things, souls, that cause happenings. This causal contingency relating to souls is determined by God. Hence, as souls determine happenings, subject to God, happenings are ultimately determined by God. Accordingly, what we call choice, like chance, is an illusion.

The ordinary person implies that choice is not an illusion. He says: I can choose to do this and not to do that. Whether he does this or that, he must, as earlier indicated, have motive for doing it. By implication, what he calls choice is here his motive. If this "choice" involves real liberty to select, it involves that he can create motive against the motive created by the only agent he can identify as causing anything. The Creator causes all motive, yet the creature causes motive which the Creator has not caused. Such is his implication if he implies that he has any real liberty of selecting. That he has not such liberty does not involve, as earlier impressed, that, in practice, he is not to assume that he has it. That the illusion is given him, and whether in practice he is to accept or repudiate it, are two

entirely different issues. On proper discrimination in regard to these issues depends what we call moral responsibility. Such discrimination shows us that, in regard to ourselves, we must ignore that "choice" is illusion, just as, in regard to objects, we must ignore that their "objectivity" is illusion, and must assume, instead, that they are things independent of ourselves.

The person—whether clairvoyant, prophet, or ordinary—may be imagined as pouncing on happenings and dragging them out of the obscurity of "latent" mind. Where the ordinary person pounces on a multitude of happenings (bridges), the clairvoyant or prophet may only pounce on a single happening. This constitutes what he "reveals." Essentially, his "revelation" is the same thing as the ordinary person's, when he sees a figure and says: This is a man. When the ordinary person does this, he excludes bridges, just as does the reputed clairvoyant or prophet. That there are no bridges, for the ordinary person, when he sees the figure and pronounces about it, merely implies that he does not know there are any bridges. So it is with the prophet or clairvoyant. He does not know there are any bridges. The conventionally "hidden" thing is to him as the conventionally "displayed" thing is to the ordinary person. There is no essential difference between the hidden and displayed things.

The "hidden" thing must be as the prophet or clairvoyant wills it, just as the "displayed" thing must be as the ordinary person wills it. But, suppose the prophet or clairvoyant makes a mistake, does not this involve—it may be asked—that the "hidden" thing is not as he wills it? The thing is still as he

wills it, just as a thing misinterpreted by an ordinary person is still as he wills it. When the ordinary person interprets it "incorrectly," he merely wills another thing, as "correct," in its place and imagines causal relationship between the remembered incorrect thing and the present correct thing. He has simply transposed one thing into lower storey, and another thing into top storey. The things, whether "correct" or "incorrect," can be only what he wills.

Essentially, there is neither "right" nor "wrong" in the contingencies. There is only willing of one or another thing. If the prophet or clairvoyant is "right," the ordinary person creates the "correctness" by willing what the prophet or clairvoyant wills. If the prophet or clairvoyant is "wrong," the ordinary person creates the "wrongness" by willing what the former does not will. If I "mistake" an orange for a lemon, I merely substitute the one for the other, as "patent" universe, or upper storey of mind. So long as I see lemon-preterempirical notion, there is lemon. When I see orange-preterempirical notion, there is orange. I can predicate nothing about lemon-preterempirical notion while I see orange-preterempirical notion. The orange or the lemon only exists, as experience, so long as I will the one or the other preter-empirical notion, "thing itself." I can only predicate about experience. That I have, successively, orange and lemon experience does not warrant my asserting that I have made essential "mistake." "Mistakes" are only empirical contingencies.

When the prophet says that an event will happen at a certain "future" time, he wills the event and the "time" (as duration-sensation) as "present," analogously as when the ordinary hypnotist says that the

hypnotic will do a thing (as what is called post-hypnotic suggestion) at a "future" time, the hypnotist wills the action and "time" as "present." What we commonly call determination is a form of prophecy. When I say that I will go to the theatre next Monday, I illustrate, in regard to myself, essentially the same phenomenon as occurs in the case of the hypnotist's suggestion to the hypnotic. Again, when the prophet says that an event will happen at such and such a time, he is, in relation to those people who verify the prediction as being "true," essentially in the position of the hypnotist in respect to the hypnotic who performs the suggested action. The people who verify the prophet's "prediction" have to bring a certain part of mind, as the predicted event, into upper storey, as experience, just as the hypnotic has to bring a certain part of mind, as the hypnotist's "suggestion," into experience. If the hypnotic fails to perform the action, the hypnotist's "prediction" is falsified, just as, if other people fail to see, hear, etc., what the prophet predicts, they "falsify" his prediction.

In these contingencies, all is a question of what will does, not of what events do. Will causes events to happen or not to happen. Events do not, in familiar terms, happen of their own accord. Subject to God, we are the only causal agents, and events are but the things through which we manifest our causal agency. People do not starve because there is no food, but because people collectively do not will food. People do not do wrong because wrong forces them to do it, but because they will that wrong shall be done. If people did not will that wrong should be done, they would will that food so existed that people

should not starve. Wherever there is prepotency of will for wrong, wrong will prevail. The power that makes events is prepotency of will.

In the category of prophetic or genuinely clairvoyant manifestations are such cases as that of the missing stockbroker, Mr. Foxwell, which, a year or two ago, aroused much popular interest. All trace of this man was lost until some mediums stated that his body would be found within a certain time, at a particular spot in the River Thames. This happened as predicted. To my judgment, the facts exclude collusion, fraud, or any normal acquisition of the information. Taking the case, which is typical of many on record, on these conditions, it is good evidence for the metaphysically identified mind, common to all souls. The mode and place of death, the drifting of the body in currents—all are fixed, as mine. The question is: What soul can bring these constituents of mind into "upper storey," so that the incidents can be externalised as speech or writing? Telepathy is excluded, because nobody, we assume, had previously brought these incidents into upper storey, as experience. In common terms, nobody knew what had become of the stockbroker. Still these incidents were the incidents of everybody, in a possible universe.

Here, we are justified in supposing—and, if we remember aright, the accounts stated as much—that the mediums had read or heard of facts about the disappearance. This would start what may be termed a train of auto-suggestion. The accounts stated that several attempts were made before the medium succeeded. The train of auto-suggestion would so become more and more, as we may say



concentrated on the object of search in the possible universe. Finally, the prophetic auto-suggestion brings the particular constituents of the possible universe into trance-personality, and the resultant is externalised as automatic expression.

Another factor, beyond those above indicated, which probably conduced to the mediumistic discovery, was what may be termed a consensus of will-power, as popular desire to elucidate the mystery. What we call desire (empirically resulting in "effort") is the empirical expression of such exercise of will-power. We had a good illustration of such exercise of will-power in the case of the King's recent recovery. I have no particle of doubt that his Majesty owes his recovery mainly to this exercise of will-power by the nation. A like effect occurred in the case of the mediums.

The worldly-wise say: Trust to the biggest battalions. Metaphysically this implies: trust to the greatest consensus of will-power. Behind the biggest battalions is usually the biggest nation, manifesting itself as consensus of will-power. However, sometimes the Almighty sets aside the biggest consensus of will-power. Then, the biggest battalions crumble, and the maxim is falsified. The biggest battalions are now on the side of injustice. I believe that the Almighty is going to intervene!

We need more than a theory of telepathy, whether mundane or extra-mundane, to account for genuine prophecy, which is utterly incompatible with any cosmological system that does not show the possibility of annihilating what we commonly call time and space as things persisting independently of mind. One of the strongest empirical confirmations of the

metaphysical identification of the nature of "time" and "space" is involved in the empirical demonstration of prophecy and clairvoyance. I have come across a few cases of what seems to me prophetic activity, and Dr. Hodgson's paper mentions a case or two, in connection with Mrs. Piper, seemingly in this category.

Prophecy and clairvoyance can only be interpreted from the standpoint of metaphysic, involving the possible universe common to all souls, and "time," and "space," as things constituent of mind, and, like thoughts and sensings, generally, rendered "latent" or "patent," according to the activity of will. Metaphysically, there is neither "past" nor "future," but only "present." Events do not come into and go out of mind, but only, of experience. They are only empirically past or future. "Time" is simply a feeling (called, in my metaphysic, the duration-sensation). We have no real empirical experience of time, as future, but only as past. That time is empirically past, involves that it is really present, as the duration-sensation. As soon as the duration-sensation is willed as "latent" universe, there is no "time," just as, so soon as a sensory thing is willed as latent universe, the thing has "gone." That an event is prophetically foretold involves that it is brought into the "top storey" of mind with the duration-sensation, "forward." The event and the duration-sensation are always "there," as mind; they are only "there" or not "there," as experience.

The prophet merely actualises as empirically present, what ordinary people do not actualise. These people can only have the prophesied event

as experience, on the condition of willing other events as "past." The prophet does not need to actualise these other events as past. They are to him unessential "extrinsics" to the "future" event. To ordinary people, the "past" events are necessary "bridges" leading to the "future" event.

The proposition that prophecy and clairvoyance are exclusive of suggestion, applies in regard to empirically recognisable suggestion imposed on the prophet or clairvoyant, as what is called telepathy. Though this empirically recognisable form of suggestion is excluded in prophetic and genuinely clairvoyant contingencies, we are justified in assuming that a more profound form of suggestion, beyond empirical postulation, does occur in such contingencies. To this preter-empirical form of suggestion we will now devote a little attention.

As already indicated, the successful prophet is, essentially, a powerful suggester. The realisation of his prophecy depends on the efficiency of his suggestion, and comes to pass when his suggestion is accepted by others, who, on the conditions, will the events he prophesies. As indicated, events only happen through our determinism as willing them from lower to upper storey of mind, so constituting them experience. Wills are the only active agents. Events are inert. Whether the event is an earthquake or the pricking of our finger, the causation is essentially the same.

Now, though we can empirically identify no possibility of collectively effective suggestion, by the prophet, of the events he predicts, we are metaphysically justified in assuming that the preter-empirical suggestion above referred to does occur,

as collectively effective, and that the success of the prediction is contingent to it. We must assume that, really, the prophet suggests "future" events as determinately as the ordinary hypnotist suggests what is called a hallucination of sense, or, as Angélique Cottin, or Home, suggests a particular "insane" sensing. When the prophet's prediction is, as we say, falsified, we consider him a humbug, dreamer, lunatic, or what not. So he may be, but, so far as regards his prophecy, its failure to be accomplished solely occurs through the prophet's weakness as suggester. When his suggestive power is adequate, what he prophesies must occur, just as must, on like conditions, what the ordinary hypnotist "prophesies" when he imposes what is called a post-hypnotic hallucination or action. What we commonly call time has no more significance in regard to the prophet's, than in regard to the hypnotist's, suggestion. The people who "verify" the prophet's prediction are, essentially, in the position of the hypnotic who "verifies" the hypnotist's prediction.

To this profound, preter-empirical form of suggestion imposed by the prophet on multitudes of people we must attribute what is called the fulfilment of the prophecy. Again, the prophet himself is subject to this preter-empirical form of suggestion, which is imposed on him by what may be figured as the unconscious omniscience of his fellows. The events which he predicts are fixed, as mind. All are actualising this mind, as lowest storey. That the prophet predicts the events depends on the preter-empirical suggestion imposed on him by this collective "unconscious omniscience." In regard to this "collective omniscience," the prophet may be

compared to the end-medium (Mrs. Piper, for instance) constituting the "reservoir" and "reflector" of a line of empirical suggestion, as what is called telepathy.

Apart from this preter-empirical form of suggestion, the prophet gets an empirical form of stimulus which may be loosely termed suggestion, as the social conditions in which he lives. These afford a stimulus for the prophecy, analogously as the hypnotist's passes and words afford stimulus for his suggestion. To illustrate this point: the present social conditions are such that many prophets are emotionally impelled to assure the world that the conditions are destined to be abolished and others substituted. The conditions involve this empirical suggestion by society, imposed on the prophet. If his suggestion (prophecy) is destined to be accepted by the public, his will will dominate the collective will, and the prophecy will be fulfilled. On these conditions, society will as assuredly submit to the prophet's suggestion, as the ordinary hypnotic submits to the suggestion of the hypnotist, and society will no more recognise that it is dominated by the prophet's will, than the hypnotic recognises, when he performs a post-hypnotic suggestion, that he is dominated by the will of the hypnotist.

There is no essential difference between what is called clairvoyance and prophecy. The empirical difference between clairvoyance and prophecy merely involves the "time" factor. Clairvoyance involves supernormal knowledge of empirically existing contingencies, apart from empirical suggestion, as telepathy. Prophecy involves such knowledge of "future" contingencies. Metaphysically, as has been indicated, the "time" factor has no causal significance.

I cannot recall many cases of ostensible clairvoyance of which I have read that will pass muster as pure clairvoyance. Almost all that is commonly called clairvoyance is accountable as telepathy. In all cases, pure clairvoyance is complicated with prophecy, as is prophecy with clairvoyance. The two following occur to me as cases of pure clairvoyance. Jacolliot writes: "Finally, as a last experiment, placing my hands upon a closed book containing extracts from hymns in the *Rig-Veda*, I asked for the first word of the fifth line of the twenty-first page. I received the following answer: *Dévadatta* ('Given by a god'). Upon comparison I found it to be correct" (*op. cit.*, p. 255). Sir W. Crookes writes: "A lady was writing automatically by means of the planchette. I was trying to devise a means of proving that what she wrote was not due to 'unconscious cerebration.' The planchette, as it always does, insisted that, although it was moved by the hand and arm of the lady, the *intelligence* was that of an invisible being who was playing on her brain as on a musical instrument, and thus moving her muscles. I therefore said to this intelligence, 'Can you see the contents of this room?' 'Yes,' wrote the planchette. 'Can you see to read this newspaper?' said I, putting my finger on a copy of the *Times*, which was on a table behind me, but without looking at it. 'Yes,' was the reply of the planchette. 'Well,' I said, 'if you can see that, write the word which is now covered by my finger, and I will believe you.' The planchette commenced to move. Slowly and with great difficulty, the word 'however' was written. I turned round and saw that the word 'however' was covered by the tip of my

finger. I had purposely avoided looking at the newspaper when I tried this experiment, and it was impossible for the lady, had she tried, to have seen any of the printed words, for she was sitting at one table, and the paper was on another table behind, my body intervening" (*Researches in Spiritualism*, pp. 95, 96).

In the above cases, the "collective omniscience" "knows" (wills) the words as being in the particular positions. The Fakir and Professor Crookes's subject get preter-empirical suggestion, accordingly. What is called dowsing (not usually classed as clairvoyance) is the most familiar and pure example of clairvoyance with which I am acquainted. I attribute the dowser's manifestation entirely to preter-empirical suggestion. In all the above cases there is, of course, a prophetic element. Various activities vaguely classified as "intuition," "inspiration," are largely attributable to preter-empirical suggestion, which may be termed the bed-rock of suggestion, on which rest all its normally empirical forms.

What is called telepathy may be termed a surface-product of this basical suggestion, to which latter we must ultimately attribute what I have termed our convention ("sanity") in thinking, feeling, and sensing. Objects are "normally" sensed; feelings, thoughts, "normally" experienced, through our common response to preter-empirical suggestion by the "collective omniscience." Occasionally, however, a single will rejects, to some extent, this preter-empirical suggestion. The result is what we call abnormality, as insanity, mania, etc., or sensing, as in the cases of Angélique and the Fakir, with corresponding "insane" empirical suggestion imposed on others. In such

cases, the "collective omniscience" fails to prevail, as suggester, against the single will. Our normally empirical world of sensing, thinking, feeling is determined by this preter-empirical suggestion by the "collective omniscience."



## CHAPTER IX.

### WILL-CURE.

INCIDENTALLY to the "recrudescence" castigated by Professor Dewar, various heterodox systems of therapeutics are trespassing in the preserves until lately sacred to graduates in our temples of physiological, histological, anatomical learning. These graduates, if we may judge by expressions of their prominent representatives and of the press devoted to their interests, resent the intrusion of unlicensed experimenters in the art of healing, and treat those who venture to question the established dogmas regarding the causal efficiency of drugs and the essential nature of what are called physical ailments, in like judicial spirit as animates the cosmologist by authority when he is confronted by products of the "recrudescence" who lack reverence for those sacrosanct entities matter and energy. To put the matter plainly, doctors no more like what may be broadly termed will-curing than physicists like metaphysics.

To illustrate the judicial spirit in which the lights of licensed medical empiricism meet heterodox incursions, it will suffice to tell the reader that that eminent healer, Sir Dyce Duckworth, casting effulgence before the Medical Faculty of the Owens College, Manchester, on September 20th, 1902, drew his hearers' attention to what he termed "the wicked and blas-

phemous nonsense called Faith-healing," and that the *Lancet*, in noticing, without criticising, the fifth volume of *Heresies*, discovered the same sin in the metaphysical conclusions regarding the nature of disease and what are called cures, advanced in that work, as Sir Dyce discovers in the pretensions of faith-healers.

When one reflects on the sins committed by those who, in these days, do not bow the head before the images of the cult of materialistic science, one is reminded of the sins committed by those who, in the good old times of the rack and thumbscrew, held aloft the banner of intellectual freedom in the sight of the Holy Catholic Church, and one recognises that blasphemy and wickedness, to the Dyce Duckworths, are much the same things as were blasphemy and wickedness to Holy Inquisitors. In both cases, the epithets seem to be merely synonymous, at root, with offence to that highly respectable and potent entity called vested interests.

The modern innovator can afford to contemplate the imputation of blasphemy and wickedness, by the Dyce Duckworths and *Lancets*, with more complacency than could his predecessor in the innovating business, when the Holy Catholic Church imputed the like and applied her gentle remedies. The modern innovator, especially if he is a metaphysician, is inclined to smile and snap his fingers at medical authorities who determine moral iniquity from the standpoint of "vested interests." The pronouncements of the Dyce Duckworths, on certain empirical approximations to dealing with a *vera causa* in regard to disease, have a sentimental, lachrymose, unscientific flavour strongly appealing to the bump of humour of

the modern metaphysician who has busied himself with the problem of causality.

As a metaphysician, I assure Sir Dyce Duckworth that there is no essential difference between his orthodoxy and the heterodoxy of the "wicked and blasphemous" faith-curers. Moreover, putting aside the question of wickedness and blasphemy, about which, in the connection, Sir Dyce seems hardly a satisfying authority, I submit that it does not much matter if people imagine themselves cured by the faith-treatment of a Mrs. Eddy and her followers; the psychotherapeutics of Sir Dyce's eminent fellow-practitioners, Drs. Lloyd Tuckey and Milne Bramwell; the nostrums of the advertising quack, or the rigidly proper prescriptions of Sir Dyce. As a metaphysician, I unequivocally affirm that the really curative agent administered by all these practitioners is the same thing: suggestion. I contend that the old magic cured as effectively, and, essentially by the same means, as does modern medicine, and that the Chinese doctor who, by warrant of his anatomical authorities, takes the heart to be where we place the stomach, is not thereby precluded from curing as effectively as does the speaker who addressed the Medical Faculty at the Owens College.

The practical man, who does not bother himself about metaphysics, but who is apt to take as unquestionable gospel the pronouncements of great authorities like Sir Dyce Duckworth, may hesitate about yielding himself body and soul to the charmer, if he reflects on one little question: Assuming that Sir Dyce Duckworth and his fellow-authorities are right, how comes it that disease has left any representatives of humanity on the face of the globe? The man who

initiated the all-conquering germ-theory of disease, on which is based all our sanitation, is only just dead. The man of whom Huxley wrote: "So far as medicine is concerned, I am not sure that physiology, such as it was down to the time of Harvey, might not as well not have existed," has been dead only about 250 years, and yet there are several hundreds of millions of people in the world to testify that disease has not altogether had its own way. If the orthodoxy of the Dyce Duckworths is alone capable of coping with the ravages of disease, how comes this about? How comes it about that, in the words of the late General Lucas Meyer, to a correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian* (see issue of July 28, 1902), "there was always water, and I made a point of drinking it four times a day, early in the morning and late at night and during the day. . . . We rarely had sickness—never, as far as I remember, enteric. In every case we used veldt medicines, as we had no ambulances nor any medicine. Buchu—at least a species of bush they call Buchu—is considered a prophylactic against enteric, and I must say it served us excellently"? We all know what orthodox therapeutics says about "germs," water and enteric, and what enteric did for the British army, under the auspices of orthodox therapeutics—what has Sir Dyce Duckworth to say about the statements of the late Boer General?

Blasphemy and wickedness, from the standpoint of the *Lancet* and Sir Dyce Duckworth, seem to be inherent to what questions the infallibility of empirical therapeutics of the orthodox order. The question for Sir Dyce and the *Lancet* would seem *rightly* to be a question of cure or no cure, not of *theological* and moral issues, or of danger to a "doxy"

and the interests of its adherents. Do drugs cure; does suggestion cure? That is the point for the *Lancet* and Sir Dyce Duckworth.

Empirical therapeutists prove, to their own satisfaction, that drugs are actively curative agents. Metaphysic proves that drugs, except as facilitating suggestion, have no more effect on disease than has the dog-Latin of prescriptions or the clinical thermometer; that orthodox therapeutics is based on philosophically false grounds; that heterodox methods, of the deliberately suggestive order, whether called faith-healing, Christian science, psycho-therapeutics, or anything else, are based on philosophically true grounds. Moreover, there is an abundance of facts in evidence to show that the method of the heterodoxy is at least as effective as the method of the orthodoxy in dealing with disease. Under the circumstances, it is not rash to predict that the present heterodoxy is going to oust the present orthodoxy, and squat down on its throne.

So long as empirical therapeutics is not based on philosophically true principles regarding causality, it must be, essentially, quackery, whether called orthodox or heterodox. The orthodox medical man combats disease, not really by his drugs, but by his own suggestive dominance of the will of his patient. His confidence in his methods, and the patient's confidence in him, are the real factors in the cure. He unconsciously cures through suggestion, while supposing that he cures through drugs and general "treatment."

The heterodox "psychopathist" or "faith-healer" implicitly relies on the really causal agent underlying the causally spurious agent of the orthodox practitioner.

Hence, of the two practitioners, the heterodox is really less a quack than is the orthodox. We may compare the latter empiricist to the savage who thinks that the wheels move a locomotive. The heterodox "quack," denounced by Sir Dyce Duckworth, may be compared to the person who attributes the movement to steam and the internal mechanism of the engine.

As Angélique Cottin could will tables to move through mere contact with her dress, or without contact of any sort; as the Indian Fakir could will the accelerated germination of the Papaw seed; as Miss Cook could will the apparition of Katie King; as, in the comparatively familiar cases of telepathic apparition, people spatially remote from one another see the same person's body, "in two places at once," so, also, normal people are in the habit of willing what are called morbid growths and functionings. To illustrate the causation of morbid growth purely through willing, I will cite a case recorded by that eminent doctor, C. Lloyd Tuckey.

"The same lady kindly allowed me to try other simple experiments on her. She was ignorant of the nature of them, and only stipulated that they should not make her appear ridiculous or cause much pain. When in the hypnotic sleep I gently touched and kept my forefinger on a small surface of the wrist, saying while I did so, 'Poor Mrs. H—— has a nasty burn on her wrist, probably from some boiling water; the place is very red, and rather painful.' In a few minutes I awakened her, and she immediately began rubbing her wrist, as if in pain there. On my asking her what was the matter she replied, 'I think I must have spilt some boiling water on my wrist; it feels as if I had burnt it.' On looking at the spot, there was a

very perceptible patch of redness about the size of a sixpence, and every moment this became more defined and angry-looking. As the pain was increasing, it would have been a breach of our agreement to protract the experiment, so I hypnotised her once more, and told her that there was no burn, and that the redness and pain would be quite gone when she awoke. In point of fact, a very short time was sufficient to disperse the morbid appearance, and on re-awakening her there was no complaint of discomfort" (*Treatment by Hypnotism and Suggestion*, Tuckey, pp. 340, 341).

In this work, I am not concerned to give an elaborate survey of actual facts supporting the metaphysical demonstration that all diseases and all cures are attributable to auto-suggestion and suggestion. Those who want such a survey will find it in *Heresies* and other works referred to therein. The facts are so overwhelming and so familiar to everybody who has studied psychiatric records, that, I contend, as truly scientific judgment, nobody would think of denying metaphysic on this point. That the public has not yet recognised the significance of these facts occurs because ignorance is rife regarding them, and because personal interests and prejudices of those schooled in conventional fallacies, and, as authorities, hypnotising the public, render the issue a partisan one.

A single case, such as that recorded above, is enough to validate the metaphysical demonstration of morbid causality to anybody not blinded by habit and prejudice. If a blister can be raised purely through suggestion, there is no real ground for denying that a cancer or small-pox may be so occasioned. If suggestion can cure the blister, suggestion can cure

the cancer and small-pox. That suggestion does not, at present, to popular apprehension, cure cancer or small-pox occurs because popular prejudice renders impracticable the exercise of adequate will-power to ensure the suggestion. Instead of trusting directly the really causal agent, the public trusts it indirectly and unwittingly, getting suggestion through the authority of medical people who have attained confidence, and so will-power to suggest that drugs and treatment do really, as causal agents, affect disease.

The practical outcome of this confidence in fallacy is that drugs and treatment do affect disease. But this nowise affects the proposition that the practical outcome of like confidence in the really causal agency, suggestion, without drugs, would have equal, or rather, greater efficacy in subduing disease. Medical men, such as Dr. Tuckey, have a measure of confidence in the really active agency; so, they successfully deal, without drugs, with diseases which ordinary medical practitioners treat with drugs. Inevitably this metaphysically right measure of the contingencies must force itself into recognition by the whole faculty. What, at present, only a small part of the faculty, and that part only partially, recognises as the truly causal efficient must be accepted by all, so ensuring a universal, popular consensus. When that occurs, the ordinary person will no more think of flying to drugs when he is ill, than he now thinks of going to the faith-curer.

Even at present, outside the professionalism of therapeutics and the general public, there is a great consensus of will-power of the order ensuring effective suggestion without drugs. A great body of what may be termed emotional, non-scientific people have



already, as we may say, instinctively grasped, in relation to therapeutics, the underlying causal contingencies revealed by modern metaphysic. Such people call themselves Christian Scientists, and Faith-healers. Whatever they may call themselves, they are applying the same principle in their methods. Really, the orthodox medical man does nothing but apply this principle *via* his drugs, as does the advertising quack with his nostrums.

Disease is sensing, feeling, thinking. These experiences, as we have seen, are all communicable between people through will-dominance, as suggestion. Drugs are sensings. A consensus of suggestion regarding drugs involves that they have certain so-called effects. Very familiar to psychiatrists is the fact that suggestion may nullify the consensus of suggestion in regard to drugs. Then, the drugs lose their characteristic effects—*ippecacuanha*, for instance, becomes as water, or water has the effect of *ippecacuanha*. Multitudes of cases are on record of such reversal of the consensus of suggestion regarding drugs. So it is with poisons. There are cases in which the most virulent poisons—arsenic, prussic acid—are taken with impunity in normally fatal doses. It is metaphysically—and to a large extent practically—possible entirely to nullify the effects of drugs and poisons, through suggestion.

That substances taken as food, drugs, poisons, have certain effects, arose, we may assume, at the creation of mundane souls, as certain auto-suggestions which have been perpetuated through pre-natal suggestion. That, for instance, an infant is nourished by food and affected by drugs and poisons occurs because the infant is conditioned by pre-natal suggestion and

the existing consensus of suggestion. Through its parents, it gets pre-natal suggestion conforming with the consensus of suggestion respecting food, drugs, poisons. So it is with what are called physiological functions. The infant digests, breathes, etc., through pre-natal suggestion. So it is with the infant's body. This, it auto-suggests through pre-natal suggestion from its parents.

Now, if a consensus of suggestion were to arise involving that drugs did not poison; food was unnecessary to life; breathing, digestion, etc., were so unnecessary, parents would pre-natally suggest this, and people would be born on whom poisons had no effect, who consumed no food, inhaled no air, yet, whose bodies might be just as are ordinary bodies, even in their minutest anatomical characters. Their hearts might beat, lungs dilate, blood circulate, intestines move just as do ours, without food or air going into them. Live without food or air—impossible! will, no doubt, be the verdict of the practical person. Well, there are cases on record showing that even people as now constituted may live without air or food. Here is such a case, recorded in Dr. Tuckey's work :—

“There are some authenticated cases of apparent death being produced by auto-suggestion. We hear of this being accomplished by Indian Fakirs and other religious enthusiasts in Eastern countries. Braid cites a remarkable and, he believes, thoroughly well-authenticated instance of a distinguished holy man, who, to convince the Maharajah Runjeet Sing that he possessed this power over himself, apparently died, and was laid in a sealed coffin within a vault, the entrance to which was also sealed and guarded

by soldiers. After six weeks, the time appointed by himself, he was taken out of the tomb in the presence of the Rajah and of several credible witnesses, English as well as native, and found to display every appearance of death. Having been gradually revived by his own servant, the still ghastly-looking, corpse-like creature sat up and spoke, his first words being addressed to the doubting Rajah: 'Do you believe me now?' Commenting, in a note, on this case, Dr. Tuckey remarks:—'This case is related in medical detail by Dr. M'Gregor in his *History of the Sikhs*, p. 227. He was an eye-witness of the disinterment. There are other cases of a similar character, apparently well authenticated. The late Sir Richard Burton wrote to me on the subject, stating that he had investigated cases of vivi-sepulture, and was convinced of their genuineness'" (*op. cit.*, pp. 27, 28).

In this connection, it may be noted that Professor Crookes testifies, in regard to the Katie King apparition:—"On one evening I timed Katie's pulse. It beat steadily at seventy-five, whilst Miss Cook's pulse, a little time after, was going at its usual rate of ninety. On applying my ear to Katie's chest I could hear a heart beating rhythmically inside, and pulsating even more steadily than did Miss Cook's heart when she allowed me to try a similar experiment after the *séance*. Tested in the same way, Katie's lungs were found to be sounder than her medium's, for at the time I tried my experiment Miss Cook was under medical treatment for a severe cough" (*Researches in Spiritualism*, Crookes, pp. 110, 111).

It may be urged that the above case of the Fakir proves nothing, empirically, against the causal efficiency of food in maintaining life and repairing waste

of tissue: that the case is only on the plane of that of the familiar fasting-man performance. If we grant this, there remains the air-question. A man cannot be boxed up and buried for six weeks, and yet live through respiring air. If we refuse to grant that the man really auto-suggests to live without food, and elect to suppose that he merely consumes what may be termed, in the connection, accumulated food, this will not hold in regard to the air-question. A man cannot be confined for six weeks, as was the Fakir, and yet respire accumulated air in the coffin. He must really will to live without air. So, also, a man may possibly will to live and die without having disease. Given adequate consensus of suggestion, humanity would extirpate diseases *en bloc*, and what we call death would occur as a normal, painless process of transition, just as does ordinary sleep.

## CHAPTER X.

### MIRACLE.

SPIRITUALISM of the popular order seems a thorn in the flesh to religion of the theological order. If we try to find kind words for Spiritualism of the popular order, we must not look for them in what pass as the organs of religion. The gravamen of the offence committed by popular Spiritualism against "religion" seems to lie in the fact that Spiritualism is disturbing some structural foundations on which "religion" has erected an imposing edifice. To put the matter more plainly, the great offence of Spiritualism, from the standpoint of "religion," seems to be that Spiritualism is cheapening something called Miracle.

Empirically, a miracle is considered to involve violation of what is called natural succession of events. "Natural succession" is that succession which we commonly observe, and, on the ground of our observation, assume to be necessary. The implication is here that events are things outside ourselves causally affecting one another: that they succeed "naturally" through some inherent activity in themselves. But, we contradict this implication by attributing what we call miracle to agencies distinct from the events. Thus, we say that Moses or Christ performed a miracle. How could either do this if events had, really, any causal efficiency involving real meaning in the words, *natural succession*? If "natural phenomena" are

things progressing outside ourselves, how can we reconcile this with the possibility that human beings can arrest or prevent "natural succession"? The two propositions are mutually contradictory. Either "natural succession" is made by the same agency that unmakes it, as what is called miracle, or there can be no miracle. If events cause natural succession, they must cause miracle. If human beings "perform" miracle they must "perform" natural succession.

Metaphysic demonstrates that "natural succession" is determined by the same agency, will, that arrests or prevents natural succession, involving "miracle," and that there is nothing essentially differentiating "miracle" from "natural succession." That "natural succession" involves that the waters of a sea do not part across; that food does not appear "*ex nihilo*" in a desert; water does not gush from the inside of a rock; a table does not move through mere contact with a girl's dress; Katie Kings do not "materialise," merely involves that the soul does not will particular sensings. When the sea parts, the food comes, the water gushes, the table moves, Katie appears, the soul simply departs from its customary willing of sensings. If the latter set of willings constitutes miracle, there is no real ground for denying that the former set does.

Metaphysically, there can be no such thing as miracle, in the theological and vulgar sense, inasmuch as every ostensible miracle must be "made" by the souls that constitute it experience. On these conditions, there is as much miracle in scratching one's nose as in parting asunder the water of a sea, or in making water gush from a rock. If I will the waters of the Atlantic to part in two, unless others do the same, the waters will only part to me. That I am

first to will the parting does not essentially differentiate what I have done from what others do after me. If parting the waters of the Atlantic is a miracle, everybody performs the miracle who sees the waters parted. Everybody has to will the parting, that there may be any parting, just as I have, who "perform" the "miracle."

Similarly, if I perform the "miracle" of feeding multitudes in a desert, by willing food "*ex nihilo*," every one of the multitudes has to perform the same miracle in regard to himself, or he will not get any food. If a person wills food out of a filled larder, or out of a desert, he has to perform essentially the same "miracle." The food in the desert is, essentially, as accessible as is the food in the larder. The "miracle" is no more peculiar to the contingency in the desert than to that in the larder. The larder has to be willed full, just as has the desert. The "miracle" is not in the particular action, but in the will that makes the action. As every action involves essentially the same manifestation of will, as bringing thought, feeling, sensing, into experience, every action is equally "miraculous."

We are told that faith can move mountains. Faith is, practically, will-power, inasmuch as invigorated will-power is incident to faith. Faith in God, Christ, Buddha, Mahomet, a stone, a drug, a Prime Minister, a political party, our own muscles or wits, implies *fetish-rapport* with the particular object of faith and will-power to act consistently with that in which we have faith. If we have faith in God, Christ, Buddha, Mahomet, we act consistently with what we believe these authorities direct. If we have faith in a drug, we act consistently with what suggestion, as medical

authority, imposes on us in regard to the drug. The "cures" us. If the savage has faith in his stone, wills to do what he thinks the stone will enable him to do. If we have faith in a political party, we will do what the party directs.

What we now require is the miracle of justice. We need faith in God to invigorate our will-power to do as God's light to each of us tells us to act. This will really be a supreme miracle. Parting seas and feeding multitudes in deserts will not be comparable in magnificence with this miracle of justice. Theologians and Spiritualists may meet on common ground in regard to this miracle. Even the politician need not consider his high vocation sullied if he bears a hand consummating this supreme miracle. There is much faith invigorating the willing of riches, scientific discoveries, commercial supremacy, "temperance," "purity," "righteousness," philanthropy, Christian converts, Liberalism, Toryism, Socialism, patriotism, Imperialism, but, at present, there seems desperate little faith invigorating the willing of honesty to God and justice. Personally, the author would exchange the whole of the other invigorants, with something "thrown in," for the last.



## CHAPTER XI.

### CAUSE AND THING.

At the root of the foregoing exposition of spiritism is a single, fundamental notion common to every thinking creature. All intelligent apprehension, as what we call knowledge, is founded on, and is only possible contingently with this fundamental notion. What we feel, as impulses, desires, sympathies, antipathies, bodily activities, drives us back to this fundamental notion. All our inferences from facts of immediate experience urge us forward to this notion. Implicitly or explicitly it may be figured as the fulcrum on which works the lever of intelligence. The notion in question is of active agency, and is expressed by the term, cause.

It is the special province of metaphysic to apply scientific scrutiny to this fundamental notion, and so to identify it in its ultimate, pure character, divested of all that human intellect can demonstrate to be illusion. In applying its method of scrutiny, metaphysic discovers that empirical determinations of the nature of cause are totally fallacious: that causal activity is entirely foreign to the factors (sensings, thinkings, feelings) exclusively dealt with by empiricism. Metaphysic discovers that cause is really behind all these things; that sensings, thinkings, feelings, are only products of the activity of cause. Thus, metaphysic projects this fundamental notion,

which *qua* notion, is thought, into something which transcends thought, while yet being necessitated by thought. To express this transcendent thing, meta-physic adopts the term, will.

As mind, or thought, will is this notion: cause. Because the notion implies what transcends thought, I call the notion preter-empirical: notion, which, as we may say, eventuates beyond notion. Every content of mind, as thought, feeling, sensing, other than a preter-empirical notion is what may be termed an entity completely enveloped, as experience. It does not matter what the thought, feeling, sensing may be—any but a preter-empirical notion reveals itself in its fullest integrity whenever we experience it. Then, we know it finally, completely. Let me illustrate this.

Take any thought, feeling, sensing, at random—say, the thought, probably; the feeling, anger; the sensing, green. Nobody can discover what may be termed an X-quantity about these experiences; each, in itself, is, as we may say, finally consummated—no “vanishing point” robs it of its defining outline. Now, contrast with these experiences the thought, cause. Immediately we think cause, we necessarily identify with it an agent, as doer. It is impossible to think cause, without this implication. Exclude doer, we exclude cause. This necessary implication of doer is the “X-quantity” constituting the thought, cause, a preter-empirical notion, and necessitating answer to the question: who or what is a doer?

To anybody who reflects, it will not need impressing that every doer, or cause that he can empirically identify, is only the product, as what we call effect, of a doer; that the whole range of empirical causes

(thoughts, feelings, sensings) are merely "effects." Accordingly, as rational beings, we are driven to recognise that the only doer is will: the thing presented in mind as the preter-empirical notion, cause.

There are two preter-empirical notions. We have considered one; let us now consider the other. A fundamental experience, analogous to cause, is what we call a thing, implying an object of sense. As ordinary superficialists, we have full assurance that this "thing" is a very simple and obvious matter needing no precise, scientific investigation. However, the moment we reflect about it, this "thing" may be said to bristle with perplexities. Take, for instance, the "thing" knife. Here, we have certain seeings and touchings, beyond question. But, assuredly, none of these seeings or touchings, or all of them, is our experience as the "thing." By no possibility can we assimilate our experience, as these seeings and touchings, with our experience as the "thing," or "thing itself." This eludes the ring-fence of our mind as completely as does cause. The same incompetency of thought to grasp the full implication confronts us in the case of thing, as in the case of cause. Thing is obviously only partly in mind, as a preter-empirical notion. What it is, essentially, is a problem for metaphysic. The metaphysical interpretation of thing is that it is entirely and radically distinct from experience as sensing, though it is always experienced with sensing. Metaphysic identifies thing as the product of interaction between two active agents; the soul and the matter-soul. Whenever this interaction occurs (as is always the case so long as the soul is willing the mundane

mind, "things" are in some storey of mind. When the interaction occurs coincidently with the willing of a particular grade and intensity of the consciousness-sensation, "things" are in the "top-storey" of mind, as experience.

Having identified will, as cause, metaphysic has to investigate whether cause is multitude or unity. Metaphysical investigation shows that cause can only be unity, though relatively active agents exist, as souls, determined by Cause, God.

## CHAPTER XII.

### CHANCE AND DESIGN.

It is hard to say how many tons of logic-chopping and miles of curves, lines, and figures have been launched on the world by mathematicians, psychologists, logicians, and others to demonstrate by implication, the active agency of what are called chance and design. For metaphysic, all this weight and extension of learning is lumber, for the reason that metaphysic has assured itself that chance and design, so far as regards the issue of determinism, are essentially identical, and that chance has no more real existence than have the incorporeal lines and points of the geometer, or the abstract numbers of the mathematician. Like these latter, chance is a convenient fiction which metaphysic leaves for the gratification of the romantic schools of empirical science, and for the needs of the practical person. When an eminent mathematician assures the world that the chances against a certain happening are twenty odd billions to one (which, if the author remembers aright, is one among a number of airy assurances of the sort with which mathematicians have arrested his attention), the metaphysician involuntarily murmurs, "Prodigious!" and marvels at the intensity of "fetish"-*rapport* established between mathematicians and symbols of inconceivability.

The theorist whom I will take the liberty of dubbing Mesopotamist (because he reminds me of a certain old lady who was said to find solace in the syllables expressing an oriental locality) tells us that if we toss up a penny, there are only two possible chances as to how it will fall—head or tail up, or not up. Thereon, he bases what he calls a theory of objective probability, and implies that chance (Mesopotamia) causes the penny to drop one way or the other. From this humble one-to-nothing beginning, he soars aloft into the empyrean of billions-to-one uncertainties. He grounds his fundamental certainty about the penny on his experience that pennies only drop head or tail up, or not up, and, on like grounds of his experience of happenings generally, attains his billions-to-one staggerers. Assuming the rectitude of his premises and inferences establishing the one-to-nothing objective probability in regard to the penny once thrown, he similarly establishes objective probabilities of the billion-to-one order in regard to series of throws and of happenings generally.

Limiting ourselves to the penny, the implication of this statistical method is that as one throw, or series of throws, of the penny is, causally, entirely severed from another throw or series of throws, and that as, in the case of series, influences involving special tendency so vary as not to affect expectation about the result, the causal agent determining the single event or series of events must be chance.

This way of dealing with events is plausible and, of course, practically necessary, but it begs the question whether the fact that events sometimes happen as we do not expect, or "design," involves

that we do not determine them, but that something called chance does determine them. On this statistical principle of affirming active agency, the implication is that an active agent is demonstrated on the mere ground that we empirically fail to identify determinate conditions. But, as we empirically identify determinate conditions in multitudinous cases, and as the whole implication of what we call science is that events, without exception, are rigidly determined, it seems, even from the empirical standpoint, a mere figure of speech to talk of chance at all, and an absurdity of the infantile order to imply any causal contingency as pertaining to chance. To attribute active agency to what we cannot really identify as existence is, on the face of it, irrational.

When people apply defining terms, especially if the people are scientific authorities, we are entitled to information from these authorities regarding the scientific implication of their terms. The scientific people with whom we are now concerned distinctly imply that chance is an entity determining events; but, so far as I know, they can tell us nothing more about chance than that it is chance, and, to my apprehension, they might just as well call it hulla-bulloo, or that venerable mathematical entity,  $x$ . Let us now apply metaphysic to this causal denizen of Weissnichtwo, and see what becomes of it in the head-and-tail contingency.

When we toss up the penny, we will what I have termed a convention of sensing, involving the revolutions of the coin, its ascent, descent, and rest on the ground. The penny, our hand, the air, the ground do nothing; they are merely sensings. The penny

drops one side up because we will it as that side up. It might drop on its rim, or not drop at all. There are plenty of recorded happenings of this sort, many of which have been already referred to in earlier chapters. The Mesopotamist may urge: whichever way the will causes the coin to drop, the one way that the will does cause it to drop will involve chance. Suppose we grant this, it merely involves that chance is a word defining a mode of willing. This is quite another thing from implying, as does the chance-theorist, that chance itself wills (causes) the dropping.

Now, as to "design." Let us suppose that, instead of tossing up the penny in a haphazard way, we deliberately determine how it shall drop. Here, the chance-theorist tells us, there is no chance. Really, there is neither more nor less chance in this than in the earlier case. Our "deliberate" method merely involves that we will some sensing and thought which we did not will in the "haphazard" method. The sensing and thought have no causal influence on the result. As between the "deliberate" and "haphazard" modes of tossing the coin, and assuming that we exclude the real Cause, God, the chance, such as it is, is not in the modes of the tossing, but in our willing of the one or the other mode, as sensing. This "chance" in willing need not be consistent with "design" in tossing. We may "design" the tossing to one event, while we will it to another event. The event must occur, whether we "design" it or not. The empirical consistency between design and execution has no really causal significance, however practically necessary it may be to assume the significance.



If chance is a mode of willing, so is design. There can be no causal difference between modes of willing. As modes of willing, there is no causal difference between chance and design; the difference can only be empirical, superficial. The difference, empirically, between chance and design, occurs because we will certain feelings which we call effort, exertion; certain memories, as "bridges"; certain thoughts; certain sensings, as "bridges," as the case may be, with the events which we say are determined, while we omit such willings in the case of events which we say are fortuitous. The end-event is determined irrespectively of these contingencies.

The chance-theory is founded on the fallacy that events are things determining themselves independently of the only agent through which they can exist as events. While the chance-theorist grants occasional, active agency outside events, involving what he calls design or deliberation, and, while he implies that events are commonly in causal relationship, he also implies that, sometimes, this causal relationship between events involves that they compete, as we may say, with himself, as a designing agent. He fails to recognise that, if he knows these competing events, he must determine them, as known, and that this necessity excludes the possibility that they can be competitors with himself in causation, inasmuch as he can only know the causation through determining it. No causation can exist, for him, but such as he knows; and what he knows he must determine as known. So, he may determine, as known, his own causation, as soul; so, he may determine the causation of God. But, about causation by events, outside himself, he can determine nothing. As known, for

him, events are merely processions of experiences. About their causal relationship he can predicate nothing except that the relationship is determined by the only causal agents he can know : God and his own soul, as will.

## CHAPTER XIII.

### SECONDARY CAUSES, RELIGION AND ETHICS.

THE empirical scientist tells us that what he calls secondary causes are good enough for him. Moreover, according to his pronouncement, disseminated for the benefit (?) of the culture-aspiring Tom, Dick, and Harry, and Mary, Jane, and Eliza, in a cheap edition of Haeckel (now, somewhat a joke-of-last-year's-pantomime sort of authority in his own country, but, apparently the most up-to-date weapon in the armoury of the atheistic propaganda of this country), we are assured that "science has conducted God to its frontiers, thanking Him for His provisional services." The latter contingency (barring the thanks for provisional services, eloquent of the scientist's courteous recognition of a discarded assistant) is corollary to the former. Applying secondary causes to the God-problem is about as profitable as applying a yard-tape to measure the diameter of the sun. The results of secondary cause-worship are tolerably obtrusive as the orgies of materialistic animalism which some optimists call civilised progress. People of another cut of optimistic appreciation have uneasy doubts in view of the results whether it would not be a good thing for society were it to allow the empirical scientist to simmer in his own fat with his "secondary causes," and God outside the frontiers of his parish, and

whether the Gothamite constituency would lack pabulum were the Mesopotamist to abstain from gambolling in the mathematical empyrean in order to determine causal efficiency by the canon of secondary causes.

Notwithstanding its profanity and inane jingle, the statement that science has conducted God to its frontiers contains that element of half-truth well adapted to betray the ignorant, sensual, and unreflecting of this epoch. Really, it is as puerile to apply the statement to science as to pudding-making. As a determination of faith, or belief, God is as foreign to science as to pudding-making. It is really no more significant to assert that science has conducted God to its frontiers, than to make a like assertion about pudding-making. God was never more within "the frontiers" of science than of pudding-making. The only difference of moment in the connection between science and pudding-making, lies in the fact that science happens to have shattered certain theories about God on which depended one form of *fetish-rapport* with God. Extinguishing theories about God, and abolishing God, are two different contingencies, which the enthusiasm of the votary of science has led him to confound in his pronouncement.

Theories about God came and passed before "science" was out of the womb of destiny. Still, God is. We cannot escape God by escaping theories. If we escape one set of theories about God, we must, *nolens volens*, submit to another set. Theories about God are not trifles subject to the annihilative capacity of scientists any more than of cooks. There is no possibility of annihilating theories about God. There is only possibility of transforming and substituting

them. One or another theory about God has always conditioned humanity. Not even the lowest grades of savagery lack theories about God.

Blank atheism, as absolute negation of God, though here and there sporadically in evidence, has never occurred as a common mental state. What is called Agnosticism is the nearest approach to negation of God that has moved any considerable body of people, and this is mainly a product of the most recent modern epoch, during which has arisen what may be termed the mushroom-growth of science. This "Don't-know-ism" is, essentially, nothing better than an implicit confession, on the part of those who profess to hold it, that their methods of investigation are inadequate to meet the problem. Their lapse from affirmation one way or the other only evidences their impotency as investigators. To discuss God, at this epoch, and pretend that you have a cult in the conclusion that you know nothing about God, seems somewhat like proclaiming your own imbecility. If you know nothing about God, why proclaim the fact of your ignorance? Why try to persuade others that they are ignorant, by parading your ignorance in the guise of knowledge? Why not let others discover their ignorance without your assistance? What good do you do a man by persuading him that he is ignorant about God? One can understand a man who affirms there is no God; but, a man who merely says he does not know whether there is or is not a God, and takes credit to himself for shouting his mental palsy from the house-tops, is, in these days of unfettered expression of opinion, somewhat of an enigma, not very far removed, say, from the zealous imbecile who, from sheer love of the pastime, rendered

himself hoarse in assuring the public that he had not learned his alphabet.

Of course, anybody who does not believe there is a God, is, morally, a rogue, if he professes to hold the belief. Probably the vast majority of educated people in this country hold no settled convictions about God, though, unlike the protesting Agnostic, they profess to be believers. The crime of these professing hypocrites is not chargeable to the open Agnostic. If his protestation is fatuous, it is, at any rate, not dishonest. The course for the honest man who fails to believe in God is to abstain from professing to believe. The course for the reasonable man, on the conditions, is to abstain from flaunting his lack of belief. No reasonable man will contend that there is any good in failing to believe in God. Accordingly, if he is an unbeliever, he will see no good in hallooing his unbelief. Converts to unbelief in God are not so desirable that the reasonable man will try to make them. He will be content to let people discover their unbelief for themselves.

The present scepticism regarding God involves what may be termed an interregnum precedent to a new theory about God. Metaphysic supplies the new theory which will bridge the interregnum and afford Agnosticism quietus. Then, scientists will recognise the chimerical nature of the conductorship with which some of them now credit science. Though the statement that science has conducted God to its frontiers has more sound than sense in it, it is plain that the popular satisfaction — ratified by science — with secondary causes, is practically answerable for the present downfall of religion and the collective spiritual degeneracy. The more completely we seem

to identify this practically necessary, though spurious causation, called secondary, the more prone we are to conduct God to our frontiers and establish *fetish-rapport* with the Golden Calf. Then, it may be urged: that this occurs must be designed by God. Undoubtedly such is the case. On the other hand, God has also designed a light to guide us: our intellect. If intellect tells us of secondary causes and so involves *fetish-rapport* with the Calf, intellect tells us something more, and may undo that *rapport*. That intellect does tell us more involves that some see the evil of the course and oppose it. This is also designed by God, as will be the success of the opposition.

It seems to the author that the opposition will succeed so soon as the public have become enlightened as to the real conditions of causality and as to the radical fallacy involved in the present scientific and popular assumption that what are called secondary causes are not illusions imposed through inadequate scrutiny of the problem of causality. As adequate scrutiny of this issue can only exist as metaphysic, the author maintains that metaphysic is the supremely important branch of investigation, and that "science," without metaphysic as corrective, is the prime source of social degeneracy. If it is expedient to popularise science, it is doubly expedient to popularise metaphysic. Without metaphysic, science is poison.

The spiritual must, in the nature of things, dominate the carnal. At one time, the carnal, as "science," was ruled by the spiritual, as religion. The rule of religion passed through various stages involving, at first, benign approval; later, uneasy tolerance; later, oppression. Finally, religion has abdicated and left science a free hand. Now, science, *nolens volens*, has

practically abolished the spiritual, as religion, and excludes the possibility of re-establishing the spiritual through any exertion of religion on the old lines of emotionalism. If the spiritual is to be re-established, this must occur on the intellectual lines of science itself. Men must renew their faith in God through believing religion as they believe science. Only through metaphysic can this be consummated. The root-issue which now concerns humanity is the issue of causation, and it is the special province of metaphysic to decide this issue for modern civilisation.

That religion may reassert its dominating influence, it must be transformed conformably with the intellectual conditions on which alone its renewed supremacy is possible. This implies that religion must take its intellectual credentials from metaphysic, which latter, indeed, implies all the essentials of religion. So, likewise, morality, the first-born of religion, must be transformed conformably with the solution of the problem of causality by metaphysic. This will involve that society shall be re-constituted on the basis of justice: that men shall start being "good" by being honest to God.

The implication of empirical science, based on its dealings with spurious causality, is that man is a very unimportant item in the scheme of things. Overpowered by its demonstrations of the might and majesty of the potency of what it calls matter, attained by the romantic method of ignoring the real and hypnotising itself with the imaginary, empirical science has given birth to a practical philosophy, the *alpha* and *omega* of which may be put: Make the best of this life; there is none other with which you need concern yourself. Consider—says, by



implication, empirical science—the stars, suns, planets, births and deaths of worlds; the unnumbered æons; inconceivable bigness, littleness, remoteness; immutable laws; immeasurable potency of matter that I have revealed! What are you, oh man, that you shall consider yourself of more moment in this eternal mill of destiny than is the maggot in the cheese? What rational ideal can be yours, other than to emulate the maggot—to get what you can and stick to it until chemical decomposition snuffs you out?

The champion of empirical science will perhaps smile contentedly at the above implications, assuring the world that empirical science, notwithstanding that it has “conducted God to the frontiers,” is only concerned to maintain what it has demonstrated, and is content to leave to religion—if any is left—ethics and philosophy, the business of elaborating the demonstrations in the idealistic arena. Notwithstanding this gracious assurance of the empiricist, it is evident that, assuming the demonstrations of empirical science to be invulnerable, religion, ethics, and philosophy will stand a poor chance of affecting the essentially identical root-motive of the civilised man, the savage, and the tiger.

If religion, ethics, and philosophy, in these days of spiritual atavism, are really to affect ideals, the demonstrations of empirical science must be proved vulnerable. Metaphysic proves their vulnerability by proving their merely provisional and limited applicability. By proving that man makes, as his own mind, stars, suns, planets; births and deaths of worlds; unnumbered æons; inconceivable bigness, littleness, remoteness; immutable laws; immeasurable potency of matter, metaphysic proves that man

is bigger than all these contingencies. Man's littleness is not in comparison with these contingencies of thinking and sensing, but, in comparison with that God which "science has conducted to its frontiers."

By identifying true cause, metaphysic proves that man's body is determined by what survives its "chemical decomposition," and "makes" this decomposition as incidental to the continued life of man's essential self. From the grand achievement of metaphysic in identifying real causation emanates an ethical revelation which intellect must, perforce, recognise as being higher than any that has earlier been accessible to humanity. This ethical revelation of metaphysic is the revelation of intellectual justice. Through it, alone, the motive of the tiger and savage will be transcended by civilised man.

At present, we deceive ourselves with an illusion of justice which we imply to be honesty to man. Metaphysic reveals real justice as honesty to God. At present, we deceive ourselves with the illusion that a man's capacities are rightfully his own, to be administered purely for his personal gratification. Metaphysic proves that the man who monopolises his capacities against his fellows, robs God, as assuredly as, according to conventional ethics, the burglar robs the man he despoils. Then, it may be urged, God is responsible for this robbery which He has designed. Undoubtedly, God has designed this robbery, or it could not occur. But, mark: God once designed that men should not know it <sup>was</sup> robbery; now, God designs that men shall know ~~it~~ is robbery, and, as God designs that men shall know ~~it~~ <sup>also</sup>, God designs that men shall know that the ~~act~~ <sup>act</sup> as they know.

I, you, reader—how do we like knowing that we are robbing God and persisting, against our knowledge, in the deed? Assuming that we are destined to live after we have, conventionally, died, can we, as reasoning beings, escape the assurance that knowing we are robbing God, and, knowing that we are persisting, in defiance of our light, in this course, the result, for us, will be evil destiny, now or hereafter? Can we resist the conviction that, in some shape, we shall suffer for this giant crime of lying in the face of God's light, intellect? Can such perjury, for this age, be anything less than that blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, of which Christ said: "it shall not be forgiven"? (Luke xii. 10).

The individual may urge: what can I do? If I am to subsist tolerably, which seems a lawful aspiration, I must claim as my own the product of honest exercise of my capacities. If others are dishonest to God, I may as well hang myself as be honest. Of course, each, here, must be his own judge and fate. If we grant the practical force of this sort of extenuation, the fact remains that the individual knows his crime against God, and, to his own apprehension, elects to continue the crime for the object of maintaining his sensual well-being and gratifying his selfish lust. However he may elect to act under the circumstances, one thing is certain, that, if he abstains from opposing the conditions which compel the criminal action, he wilfully connives at the action. Whatever he may do pending the conditions, there can be no palliation of the offence of conniving at the action.

If each individual ceased the connivance, the conditions would, of course, be abolished. Pending the

abolition, the obvious duty of every individual is to work for it: to strive for such a reconstitution of society as will render practically possible the individual's honesty to God. Personally, I am assured that no solution of the social problem now perplexing civilisation will be attained but through the institution of metaphysical justice. The empirical expedients now being advocated as solution of the social problem are, from the metaphysical standpoint, worse than useless, inasmuch as they obscure the essential issue through fixing popular attention on sensual expediencies instead of on moral principle. The disease is moral; the cure will have to be moral.

Sentiment and emotion—benevolent or malevolent, philanthropic or rapacious—are foreign to the moral problem. Intellect, alone, is here the determining factor. Through it, alone, we know the right. Emotion is relevant to the issue merely as impelling or not impelling in the direction pointed by intellect. Justice, not charity (though charity is incidental to justice), is now the supreme good revealed to humanity. The age of intellect must transpose the index of right conformably with God's determinism of knowing. God now designs that we shall know through belief, not through emotional inclination.

## CHAPTER XIV.

### THE ILLUSION OF CHOICE.

It will be seen, from the metaphysical ethics incidentally outlined in earlier chapters, that, in relation to what is called choice, there are two distinct contingencies: (*a*) the question of the reality, or unreality of choice; (*b*) the question of the practical application of the metaphysical determination regarding the nature of choice. The question (*a*) is answered by the metaphysical demonstration that choice is illusion. The answer to question (*b*) is involved in the metaphysical demonstration of moral right, as justice, emanating from the metaphysical demonstration of divine determinism. If justice is the supreme moral right, a properly constituted society must, manifestly, be based on justice, and exact justice from the individual. If society fails to exact justice from the individual, society will, obviously, sanction injustice, and thereby itself become criminal. If society exacts justice from the individual, society must, obviously, hold the individual responsible for his infraction of justice. Thereby society will, necessarily, exact against the individual, the illusion of choice.

A just society would be manifestly impossible did society not deal with the individual as a choosing agent. That he is not really such an agent is no concern of society so long as society penalises him solely on behalf of justice. The only practical concern

of society and the individual, with the metaphysical demonstration of the illusion of choice, is in regard to the revelation of justice emanating from the demonstration.

In regard to society, justice involves one fundamental requirement: that all human capacity shall be administered on behalf of the collective welfare, as collective property. This involves that human capacity shall be judged by society according to intellectual standards of value, and (as a matter of collective expediency, on the present conditions of low individual incentive) that rewards for service shall be differentiated according to the intellectually determined value to the community, of the service. This differentiation of rewards is only morally tolerable as a concession to collective expediency necessitated by the low development of individual incentive.

In regard to the individual, justice involves that he shall make no aggression on others, otherwise than as competing for the general advantage; that he shall honestly contribute his best capacity to the common fund; that he shall repress, to the best of his ability, whatever he knows, in himself, to be adverse to the general welfare.

The question of aggression, in respect to justice, involves the question of international relationships. Until nations have adopted justice within their own confines, the question of international justice has not much practical significance. Regarding national aggression, it will suffice to observe that any aggression is morally right that is undertaken for the enforcement of justice, and that no aggression is morally right that is undertaken for any other object. This involves that any just nation is morally sanc-

tioned in assailing, and imposing justice on, an unjust nation.

Within a nation, any section is morally sanctioned in any aggression on behalf of justice, on any other section or sections. All action on behalf of justice is morally right, and there is no justice but what is revealed as such through the metaphysical demonstration of divine determinism and the illusion of choice.

Metaphysically investigated, the feeling that we can do or not do a thing is proved not to have the slightest relevancy to what conditions the actual deed. The feeling of "choosing" is merely a part of mind willed into upper storey, just as is the activity we actually "choose." We must really *do* in order to choose, just as we must do in order to perform what we choose. The choosing no more does the action than the action does the choosing. The active agency is obviously as much behind the choosing as behind the action. Did we not will the feeling of choosing, the action would be performed, or not performed, just as occurs when we do will the feeling of choosing.

The feeling of choosing merely affords us an illusion that we are free agents in determining action. We know, as belief, that, practically, we must ignore that the feeling is illusion. Metaphysical morality is just as exigent in demanding the practical ignoring of the illusiveness of choice as metaphysical demonstration of causality is exigent of the recognition that choice is illusion. Failing recognition of the illusiveness of choice, there can be no recognition of the nature of justice. Failing the practical ignoring of the illusiveness of choice, there can be no human manifestation of justice.

That what we now call morality is immorality or non-morality occurs because, while we recognise the necessity of ignoring the illusiveness of choice—or, rather, fail to recognise that choice is illusive—we repudiate justice through warrant of the false assumption that choice is not illusive. On these conditions, our dealing with choice merely involves arbitrary regulations for maintaining the unjust pretensions and appropriations of one or another section of society. Failing logical development, involving intellectual justice, of the truth that choice is illusion, the practical assumption that it is not illusion involves that society is based on injustice, and that every individual is dishonest to God.

Metaphysically considered, the honest man does not yet exist; all are rogues to God. The conventional criminal is merely the rogue who is on his back with other rogues on top of him. Morally, the criminal is an offender against nothing but justice. Now, he is merely an offender against the selfish pretensions of other criminals. While these topmost criminals are all robbing God, they take the law into their own hands against the criminal who "robs" them of what they have no moral right to possess. Morally, the latter crime is venial compared with the former. Indeed, there is no moral crime in despoiling robbers. The whole issue, as society now exists, is merely a question of brute preponderance and the right to hold what is unjustly acquired.

The above is the necessary conclusion of anybody who honestly applies his intellect according to the opportunities afforded him by modern investigation. This must not be taken as sanctioning spoliation, unless on behalf of justice. That the robber on his



back is, morally, as well justified as the robber on top of him involves, also, that the more powerful robber is as well justified in pinioning the other as the latter is in despoiling. As a matter of social expediency, it is better that the holders shall oppress unlicensed practitioners in the art of despoiling than that those who want to hold shall have a free hand as to the mode of gratifying themselves. Socialists, of the conventional cut, only see virtue in robbers who want a free hand to despoil and establish a new social dispensation based on emotional aspirations speculatively assumed to be of the benevolent order. At present, the thinker is not enchanted with Socialism. He wants no upsetting of things until people know the meaning of justice, and have schooled themselves to adopt it.

The author has been called a dreamer. He accepts the label as an honour. The world has moved mainly through the visions of dreamers. In the absence of dreamers, the rest of humanity would no more move the world than logs will move the ocean. The author's dream is that a tidal wave of justice may carry humanity past the brute stage of development, and his hope is that he may live to see some indication of the formation of the tidal wave. It will begin to form as soon as there is a body of men and women honest and unselfish enough to oppose the present social conditions, not on the ground of inclinations, but of belief, and to work for another social dispensation conformable with what human intellect identifies as honesty to God: justice. The author suggests that those who call themselves ministers of religion will find a particularly appropriate vocation in helping to form the nucleus of the tidal wave.

Moreover, he ventures to tell these ministers of religion that, if they fail to work for the formation of this tidal wave of justice, their profession, whatever courtesy title they may apply to it, is that of liars to God.

It is to be hoped that the reader will now recognise that spiritism is a much more practical and momentous concern for humanity than is involved in the investigation of "spooks" and Piper manifestations from the standpoint, say, of the Society for Psychical Research, and by the canon of the aspirations and convictions of the *habitués* of the popular *séance*. Indeed, it is to be hoped that the reader will recognise that spiritism is the supremely practical and momentous concern of humanity, involving, as it does, scientific determination of man's relations to his fellow-man, to society, and to God, and of society's relations to the individual and to God. Never, in the world's record, has a more important and practical concern confronted humanity than is spiritism viewed in the light of modern metaphysic. No science, no ethics, no religion that has earlier been revealed to humanity is so momentously significant to this age as is the revelation of spiritism in the light of modern metaphysic.

It may be well to offer a few remarks regarding the contingency of what we call effort, in connection with the metaphysical demonstration of the fact of determinism. If choice is illusion and we all act as we are determined to act, it may be asked: why shall not a man adopt a *laissez-faire* course, comforting himself with the reflection that whatever he may do or fail to do cannot matter in the scheme of things, and that, accordingly, he may as well take things easily as

strive ; indeed, that he may as well be indifferent to all but his personal ends?

The first point to be noted as answer to such questions as the foregoing is that each man is ignorant of what is determined about him as a moral and social "asset," and that he has, accordingly, no better ground for assuming that he is destined for "loss" than for "profit." The next point is that he knows, as infallibly as is humanly possible, that he is to do certain things and abstain from doing other things. The next point is that, as he knows that affliction and punishment are designed for him during his mundane stage of life, so, also—he has no rational ground for denying—such contingencies will be incident to his post-mundane life.

As, in man's mundane life, the illusion of his personal merit or demerit is operative as determining his individual experiences, so may this illusion be determinate in the future life. To rational apprehension, the probabilities are altogether in favour of such continuity of determinism. There is no scintilla of rational ground for assuming that the illusion of personal merit or demerit will be less operative, in regard to personal experiences, in the post-mundane, than it is in the mundane, stage of life. If God afflicts on earth, there is every reason to suppose that God will afflict after we have done with earth, and that afflictions may be substituted, in the post-mundane life, corresponding to gratifications in the mundane life, and *vice versa*, in conformity with a divine justice transcending human apprehension. We know the justice God has decreed for us. About the justice God has determined for Himself we know nothing. Still, we have every reason to suppose that post-

mundane, will be ethically sequent with mundane, life: that our justice will affect post-mundane, as it affects mundane, life.

The last thing that the demonstration of the illusion of choice commends to the thinking individual is the *laissez-faire* procedure. Indeed, this procedure is, practically, impossible. A man must act with the consciousness of selection and deliberation. If he "swims with the stream," "lets things go their own way," he has the illusion of electing, as a free agent, to do so, exactly as he has the illusion of opposing or directing the drift of things. He knows, by the light of his intellect, that he must act according to his illusion, and he has no reason to suppose that he is not destined to reap as he has the illusion of sowing. A man must, practically, elect "non-resistance" as completely as he practically elects "resistance." He can no more throw the responsibility on God of his non-resistance, than of his resistance. Essentially, he implies the illusion of choice as completely if he adopts the one as the other procedure. He must act, and he can only act on the illusion that he chooses.

## CHAPTER XV.

### SPIRITISM AND RELIGION.

THE ostensible religion of this country is based on the precepts of Christ. Christ was, before everything, an archetype of honesty. Act according to your faith! was his supreme demand. The hypocrite was Christ's supreme aversion, and, to him, the supreme moral criminal. This fact is self-evident to anybody who has read the records of Christ. Metaphysical religion is, here, in direct continuity with Christ. Honesty is the supreme virtue revealed by metaphysical religion: the very essence of metaphysical teaching. Again, Christ taught absolute, unswerving non-resistance by force. "Resist not evil" epitomises Christ's prohibition, as behaviour. Metaphysical religion here diverges from Christ. It says: resist evil. The honest profession of metaphysical religion requires that we manifest it by resisting evil. The honest follower of Christ must submit to evil.

Still, this divergence between Christ and metaphysical religion is only a surface one. By non-resistance to evil, Christ obviously meant non-resistance by physical force. To Christ, force itself was evil. As Christ believed force to be evil, he forbade it. Still, he hoped to overcome evil, by non-resistance, which, on the conditions, becomes tantamount to resistance. As he believed about force, so Christ

acted and taught. Those who profess to follow Christ must, obviously, offer no violent resistance to what they believe to be evil. Christ only forbade force because he believed it to be evil, and because he believed that evil would be overcome by non-resistance. If Christ had believed that force was not evil, he would not have forbidden it. As Christ believed, so he pronounced and acted, exemplifying the supreme virtue, honesty.

The question arises: Could Christ be mistaken about the evil of force—he was mistaken about some things—and about the possibility of overcoming evil without resorting to force? To real followers of Christ, this question cannot arise, because, to them, Christ must be authority above their own intellects. These people must strangle belief by emotional (hypnotic) devotion to, called faith in, Christ. Such people will be loyal, on the animal plane, as hypnotics, to Christ, instead of being loyal, on the human plane, to their own intellects. Therein, they will be honest according to their lights. There are such people, but they count little in the social vortex. The people who count as professing Christians are those who humour their benevolent impulses merely to gratify themselves, according to convenience and the demands of expediency. These people merely render Christ a tool through which to preserve intact their animal advantages. They want Christ merely for ensuring non-resistance to injustice.

When I contemplate "Christian" societies, I see force everywhere in the ascendant; worshipped, indeed, as the criterion and embodiment of excellence. I see the very professionals of the Christ-cult extolling the employment of force; exulting, gloating over its

victories; devoting their sons, as to the godliest vocation, to the work of slaughtering their fellows. I see the productive capacity of "Christian" nations frittered away, and the needy and toil-worn robbed and befooled to gratify the aggressive ambitions of truculent parasites. Instead of seeing, in our edifices dedicated to Christ, effigies of heroes of peace, I see mainly effigies of professors of homicide. Instead of seeing the highest appreciation apportioned to the adepts of the arts of peace, of science, and philosophy, I see it apportioned to the adepts at carnage and aggressive jobbery, called statesmanship. Instead of brotherhood, help for the weak, concession by the strong, I see everywhere callous rivalry, malignant intrigue; the iron-shod heel of the strong planted with grim, dire determination on the necks of the weak.

On the conditions, I ask, where is Christ; where are his followers; where are those who believe that force is evil? If Christ were here to-day, I ask, could he believe that force was evil, and that evil could be overcome without force? I surmise that the work of the "scientific imagination" and the results of nineteen centuries of effort by his professed followers would materially alter Christ's recorded views, did he bring them with him to this age, and, I have no doubt that Christ, the archetype of honesty, would, on the conditions, enjoin on men what metaphysical religion and ethics—men's intellects—revealed to them about the rightness of justice and the permissibility of employing force to establish and maintain justice. Another thing, I surmise that Christ would do. I think he would bless his professed followers in the terms he blessed certain upholders of righteous-

ness, called Pharisees, and would sicken at the insincerity and imbecility flaunted in his name, from archbishops down to the Sunday-Christians-and-Monday-pagans who professed adoration but acted defilement of their ostensible deity.

Then, it may be asked, do I hold that the Christ ideal is annihilated—for ever impossible? I hold the contrary. I hold that the Christ ideal—not, be it said, peculiar to Christ as an avatar—will be practically realised on earth. "Peace on earth, goodwill towards men" will be actuality. But, only through metaphysical right, justice, the actuality will come into being. The Christ ideal must come *via* intellectual justice, or not come. Emotion has failed to realise the Christ ideal. Now, it is the turn of intellect, as purifier. When society is based on justice, practically all motive for aggression will be non-existent. That will mean the Christ ideal on earth. Malignant passion will be practically extirpated when justice is the rule between man and man, and between society and the individual.

When the average man knows justice, and knows that his society is just, he will be practically disabled from feud with his neighbour and will be practically compelled to goodwill. Through his rational apprehension of God, revealed to him through the metaphysical demonstration of causation, the average man will pity, rather than condemn, the foibles of his fellow. Through his rational apprehension of the conditions under which human capacity exists, revealed to him through metaphysical demonstration of causation, the average man will willingly contribute his best effort to the general fund. Then, there will be no bitterness in rivalry. Knowing, through metaphysical demon-



stration of the soul, that the earth-life is merely an incident in his personal existence, the average man will feel no rancour against those whose endowments surpass his own and are better rewarded by society than are his. Indeed, when justice is finally consummated, there will be no difference in the rewards of society for service. Love, charity, pity—all the benevolent emotions—will have the fullest scope for indulgence under the conditions of the justice revealed by metaphysic. The metaphysical ideal is, essentially, the Christ ideal: the one adapted to intellectual; the other, to emotional conditions of cognition. Metaphysical religion is Christianity on the intellectual plane.

But, justice has to be established in a society based on injustice. There's the rub! Unjust privileges, ownerships, pretensions have to be uprooted, and the people who enjoy them, love these things and, at present, determine the constitution of society. Will these people, when the crucial issue sternly faces them, follow Christ, intellect, or their sensual lusts? Thereon hangs the question, for this age, of the good or evil of force. The change is inevitable: down in the Book of Fate. The choice, for these people, will lie between Christ, intellect, and the devil. How will they choose? Will they be sacrifices for Christ, intellect, or the devil? *Magna est justitia et praevalabit.* The Christ ideal is nearer than the wise ones of the world suppose. Will it arrive as the whirlwind or the zephyr? The answer is down in the Book of Destiny!

The empirical origin of all religions are two fundamental experiences, faith and cause, to which attention has been given in earlier chapters. Intellectual

religion is based, as belief, on the experience of cause. Emotional religion is based, as hypnotic compulsion, on faith. Hypnotic compulsion, as faith, is what may be termed the vital factor in intellectual, as well as in emotional religion. The difference between the intellectual and emotional religionist is that, while the former necessarily experiences faith in conjunction with belief, the latter may or may not experience the conjunction, or may hold faith against belief. The type of religionist holding faith against belief, is practically extinct. The Christ-cult is, essentially, emotional, based on hypnotic subjection to Christ. Attempts to reconcile it with intellectual belief, rendered compulsive through the advance of modern empirical research, have devitalised it and rendered necessary its evolutionary transmutation. Metaphysical religion involves this transmutation. Metaphysical religion is non-hypnotic, or believed religion based on the fundamental intuition, cause.

The idea, cause, metaphysically investigated, ultimately resolves itself into the knowledge of God. The feeling, faith, metaphysically investigated, involves the doing of what, as intellectualists, we believe, or, as hypnotics, are taught, as the will of an entity which we know, through the idea, cause, to be God, or Cause Absolute, Creator. Every other cause than this Supreme Cause is relative, as created soul. Beyond relative causes, as souls, there are entirely spurious causes, as what are called secondary, or practical, to which attention has been given earlier.

There has been much discussion among investigators of religion, as a phenomenon of human experience, to decide whether religion was originally monotheistic or polytheistic. Within comparatively

recent years, a vast mass of evidence, historical and mythological, has been accumulated bearing on this and other questions affecting the origins, persistence, and extinction of religious cults. The result of this comparative study of religions is to establish the fact that all religions come under the evolutionary theory of development, religious lines of metamorphosis being empirically tabulated analogously as typical metamorphoses are tabulated by the biological and physical sciences.

In regard to prehistoric (mythological) religions, the result of modern research seems to show that the majority of such religions were what Professor Max Müller has termed henotheistic, that is, that while they embraced pantheons, one individual god in the pantheon was constituted superior to the rest, and became the supreme deity implicitly worshipped by the devotee of the cult. Such a supreme deity of a mythological (or present savage) cult is, according to metaphysic, the same God, in what in my metaphysic I term a lower "storey" or "stratum" of mind, as we now worship in a higher "storey," and, as Christians, call the Father; or, as intellectual religionists, call God, or the Supreme Cause. In common terms, we have now a more vivid experience, or are more "conscious" of this One God, than was the case with the prehistoric, or is the case with the modern savage, religionist.

Still, only as intellectual religionists can we hold a purely monotheistic religion. The Jewish and Mohammedan cults, among modern religions, approach nearest to the pure monotheism of intellectual religion. The Christian cult, in its theological aspect, is only a form of henotheism. Its Son and

Holy Ghost are merely variants of, say, the Egyptian gods, Horus, Ra, Osiris, Ammon, Knum, in relation to one or another of the series taken as supreme over the others, as was the case in ancient Egypt when the worshipper ascribed to one god of the pantheon the attributes of all the others, constituting the latter subsidiary gods. Similarly, the Zeus of ancient Greece was exalted above the popular deities. Such tendency to monotheism may be traced practically throughout mythological cults. Essentially, Christ and the Holy Ghost, as theologically elaborated, are merely such subsidiary gods in a triple pantheon. Theological Christianity is, essentially, a form of polytheism.

The result of the willing of faith and cause in conjunction with some particular concrete object, or objects, is that the object becomes what may be termed a practical substitute, acting as what I metaphysically term a "signal," for the One God of metaphysical demonstration. The association of such an object, as being God, with particular likes and dislikes, involves the attribution of certain preferences of the god, for one rather than another class of actions. The god then determines that we shall do one thing, abstain from doing another. So arises religious morality. The culmination of this association of human action with the direction of Deity is the so-called ethical religion, of which Christians naturally consider their cult to be the highest example.

Whatever be the developmental stage of an emotional religion, its essential virtue lies in the efficacy of its special Deity to impose hypnotic suggestion on the devotee. Probably, in all cases of ethical religions, this hypnotic suggestion has been initiated through a

human individual endowed with extraordinary faith (in metaphysical terms, actualising an abnormal intensity of the faith-sensation) and capacity to dominate other souls. Once such an individual, destined to initiate a "revealed" religion, had imposed suggestion on followers, the disciples would "spread the faith" through the same process of hypnotic suggestion. Then would arise ecclesiastical organisations and institutions perpetuating the suggestive influence. So have probably arisen, and are certainly propagated, all the great emotional cults of the world, of which Christians are prone to consider theirs the only one not destined for further evolutionary transformation—so attributing to their religion lack of that capacity for adaptation which is the surest sign of vitality.

The effects of the above-indicated cults occur through the same activities (suggestion and auto-suggestion) as involve ordinary hypnotism. Intellectual religion is essentially different from such cults, to the extent that it is a manifestation of the individual soul as exercising intellect so as to preclude suggestion by other souls. The tenets of intellectual religion are matters of belief, not of faith, in the common acceptance of the term. Belief, unlike this "faith," cannot be suggested, unless directly, by God. The individual soul has to believe for itself, and for itself alone. No other soul can force it to believe, though other souls may force it to have "faith."

A common illustration of this essential difference between a hypnotic and non-hypnotic religion is what is called conversion. The "sinner," of emotional religion, is never "converted" by intellectual demonstration, involving his own soul-activity as

believer. He is only converted, say, by the thundering Boanerges, or the "inspired" boy-preacher such as has recently been stirring the public. When such a hypnotist operates, there is an epidemic of "conversion," just as there might be an epidemic of measles or small-pox. The people get converted just as they might narcotise themselves with opium or morphia. The greater is the activity of intellect, the remoter is the possibility of such conversions. In all ignorant and emotional communities, religion is virtually nothing but this process of hypnotic suggestion.

The conflict between the conditions of emotionalism and intellectualism constitutes the great phenomenon of the present epoch. At one time, it seemed as though intellectualism was destined to annihilate religion. Now, it is clear, through the revelations of modern metaphysic, that only through intellectualism can religion—at any rate, the Christian aspect of it—persist. The more completely intellectual criteria of truth are applied, the less capacity there is for hypnotic subjection. So far as regards Christianity and mentally fermenting communities, the capacity is practically extinct. Unless Christianity is to follow the lost capacity for hypnotic subjection through which it (Christianity) arose and flourished, Christianity must become an intellectual cult.

Intellectual religion involves a God that is known through belief, as distinct from a God that is held through faith. So soon as belief affirms the God of intellect, faith operates in regard to that God as it does in regard to the God affirmed solely through faith itself. Belief may be considered a type of faith imposed by God directly on the individual soul. It

is distinguished from all other types of faith by being non-suggestible. Christianity, as a living cult, will have to become adapted to the non-suggestible form of faith.

The problem before metaphysic, so far as regards religion and ethics, is (*a*) to afford intellectual proof of the existence of God; (*b*) intellectually to define the attributes, if any, of God; (*c*) intellectually to define moral right and wrong. Metaphysic will accept no premises as given by way of assumption, hypothesis, speculation. Metaphysic starts its processes of inference only from immediate experience, first asking: What is really experienced? To this question, the reply is: ideas, emotions, feelings are the only things experienced. Metaphysic investigates these real experiences and involves an intellectual interpretation of what we call the universe, and demonstrations of soul-individuality and of God, as First Cause.

However, the foregoing achievements of metaphysic are not enough to constitute an effective religion, which requires that we know God, not merely as Creative Source, but also as in moral relationship with ourselves. We need intellectually to know that God determines particular activities, just as, under the conditions of emotional religion, we require hypnotic suggestion to influence us in certain ways as being determined by God. Investigating this moral relationship of the creature to God, metaphysic demonstrates that God's supreme direction to the creature involves what belief reveals as justice. As Christ, the Prophets, Mohammed reveal, through hypnotic suggestion, to the respective religionists, the direction of God, so, intellect, as

belief, reveals to the intellectual religionist, God's direction. So long as each religionist obeys the particular influence, hypnotic or intellectual, as the case may be, determined for him by God, he acts rightly; when he disobeys that influence, he acts wrongly. In a word, honesty, in the sense of action in conformity with our "faith," or belief, as the case may be, is God's supreme requirement.

It is doubtful whether any normal person, under modern conditions of civilisation, altogether lacks the guidance of one or another of these influences, hypnotic or intellectual. Be this as it may, the logical inference is that each soul's destiny is determined by its conformity or lack of conformity with such measure of hypnotic or intellectual guidance as may be apportioned to it by its Maker. The great crime before God, revealed both by hypnotic and intellectual religion, is hypocrisy: the profession of faith or belief, with action affronting what is professed. "For by thy words thou shalt be justified, and by thy words thou shalt be condemned" (Matt. xii. 37). This is the crime against which, Christ, of all inspired religionists of the emotional order, most forcibly warned mankind. Permeating Christ's teaching, through and through, is the demand for honesty, which may be termed the warp of the fabric of Christianity. Intellectual religion, in regard to this supreme demand, is but Christ's teaching interpreted in conformity with fresh conditions of knowing.

Intellectual religion, like hypnotic cults, demands unquestioning obedience to the divine direction it reveals. To the Christian, this divine direction is the teaching of Christ; to the Mohammedan, the direction is the teaching of Mohammed; to the intellectual



religionist, the direction is what his intellect enables him to believe as being the demand of God. It will be seen that so soon as we apply intellect to an emotional (hypnotic) religion, we begin to undermine its foundations. Subjects of belief change. Subjects of hypnotic compulsion persist. Then one or the other must go to the wall. They cannot co-exist on an equality, in opposition. The result of their coincident manifestation is what we now see as the downfall of emotional religion, which has become, to an immense majority of its ostensible adherents, mere formalism, professionalism, and vulgar sensationalism.

Under existing conditions, the essential virtue of religion as a motive force of the ethical order is lost, and the worship of the Deity is degraded to the mechanics of a primitive paganism, ritual and vulgar sense-appeals taking the place of that profound influence on the higher spiritual element in humanity, without which, at this epoch, religion becomes a mere show on the lines of the lower forms of dramatic dissipation. The popularity of ostensible religion is now almost wholly dependent on its sensationalism, of which the "revivalism" depicted in such a work as Frederic's "Illumination," or the "Salvationism" of the Booth propaganda, is a typical illustration. Religion of this sort only appeals to that order of culture which, for centuries, we must suppose that it has been the office of what we call mental evolution, to eliminate. To maintain this sort of religion, as to maintain the popular drama, one "sensation" must be surpassed by another, so that the hysterical screech of imbecility approaches ever more closely to the blood-curdling yell of acute mania.

The greater the prevailing intellectual activity, the more rapid is the disintegration of the emotional cult. Christianity being the cult of the more intellectually advanced nations, is, of course, peculiarly exposed to the process of decay. Nevertheless, looking at the matter in its philosophical aspect, Christianity, probably more completely than any other cult, promises to have a new birth through the conditions involving its apparent dissolution.

Interpret the Christ of the New Testament in the terms of intellectualism, he is the supreme type of the metaphysical Man, on the emotional plane, as well as, potentially, on the intellectual plane. His absolute honesty presents the type of the true intellectual Man, while his emotional excellence presents the type of the true emotional Man. Were he to manifest himself, to-day, analogously as he manifested himself, according to tradition, nineteen centuries ago, he would typify the perfect man of intellectual demonstration. Then, his supreme teaching would be intellectual honesty and justice.

Again, interpret the Holy Ghost, or Spirit, of the New Testament (not of ecclesiastical creeds) in the terms of intellectualism, it becomes the direct command of God to the individual soul, as identified by metaphysics. Finally, interpret the New and Old Testament God in the terms of intellectualism, He is the Source, Ruler, Guide, Preserver of all souls—figuratively, the Father.

Here we have virtually the whole of essentially doctrinal Christianity embraced by intellectual religion, in which, moreover, is room for all the explicitly emotional morality of Christ in conjunction with a still higher—to present apprehension—form of

morality: that submission to God's direct command adapted to other conditions than those prevailing at Christ's epoch, though implicitly, as we may say, anticipated in his teaching. Interpret Christ's teaching of emotional surrender on behalf of faith in him, and of non-resistance to the world, as surrender of emotional preferences on behalf of justice, and, corollarily, non-resistance to intellect, we get Christ's morality on the intellectual plane. For faith in Christ, we merely substitute faith in the Holy Ghost: God's direct command to our individual soul. So long as we have faith in God's command to our individual soul, and act that faith, we are carrying out Christ's central teachings of honesty, self-surrender, and non-resistance.

Intellectual religion is merely another version, adapted to altered conditions, of New Testament Christianity. It may be termed intellectual Christianity. Of course, it has no concern with what has been grafted on to Christ's Christianity, by Sacerdotalism. It is said that Christ will come to judge the quick and the dead. Metaphysical or intellectual religion is Christ come to judge humanity, through the Holy Ghost. What Christ called the Spirit (metaphysically, God's command to the individual soul) does now judge both the quick and the dead, by the canon of intellectual discrimination.

## CHAPTER XVI.

### SPIRITISM AND EFFICIENCY.

IT is the opinion of close observers of events that this nation is rapidly decaying, physically, intellectually, morally, industrially, and commercially, and that it now affords a picture recalling the historian's account of decrepit Rome. The latest nostrum that I have noticed, to meet the decadent emergency, is that prescribed by Mr. Arnold White, as what he calls efficiency. Mr. White's "efficiency" seems to resolve itself into the homely advice not to put square pegs into round holes, and to keep the national eye focussed on the main chance: in a word, to manage the national concern strictly on what are recognised as business principles.

It would seem that, if the lack of business principles were accountable for the present decadence, they should have earlier manifested their efficiency in that direction, inasmuch as the present administration of the national concern, so far as regards lack of business principles, may be assumed to be what it has been for some centuries, during the last of which this nation, judging it from the standpoint of materialism, has attained its pinnacle of greatness. On the conditions, it does not seem that a sort of anti-municipal-corruption crusade, applied to the national concern, will meet the difficulty.

Looking at the matter from the standpoint of the "business principles" of metaphysic, it would seem that the diagnosis of the disease by publicists of the order of Mr. White, was inaccurate. Indeed, it would seem that the very ideal, to attain which Mr. White was solicitous, itself constituted the disease, and that the only way of stopping the national rot was by getting another ideal.

The ideal of "getting on" is now supreme. It does fairly well for certain individuals, but it won't suit the complaint of civilisation for very long. Mr. White seems to have faith in it, and to hold that the pressing need is that the nation shall qualify as a smart business-man "on the make," with a keen eye to the petty cash and countermen who don't know the secret of push. Mr. White knows only one statesman, in the present Cabinet, who satisfies the requirements of the nation. This statesman had been particularly successful in applying business principles, on his private behalf, before he dowered the country with their application on its behalf. The result of the latter application was a war which has afforded Mr. White many facts to point his moral, as well as affording many facts to point morals other than Mr. White's.

It would seem that this nation, and others too, had got past the stage of grogginess that could be filliped by the pick-me-up prescribed by Mr. White. The national disease seems to be moral palsy. The "getting on" ideal is its most pronounced symptom. When everybody is "on the make," from the "Pariah" to the "Brahmin" who, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, and so trustee for the nation, buys from himself, in his private capacity as landowner, an estate valued

by "good and impartial judges" at from £33,000 to £38,000, for £93,411, so pocketing a "profit" of £55,411 on property independently valued at a *maximum* figure of £38,000—when these sort of facts, of which Mr. White has a large stock on show, are in evidence, it seems that it is rather late in the day to look for social regeneration to the ideal of getting on, and that it is time to recognise that the "heathen Chinese" in civilisation is about played out.

The official, political, social corruption and flabbiness against which Mr. White wields a courageously uncompromising and scathing pen (the products of which first appeared in the *Daily Dispatch*, as, so Mr. White states, "no London daily newspaper of standing would venture to print them") are merely surface-indications of the rot that is undermining society. So long as the national religion is the religion of "make," it seems unreasonable to wax furious against its manifestation in one rather than another section of the community. If the religion of "make" is wrong for the "Brahmins," it is wrong for everybody. Then it would seem reasonable to "go for" the religion, not for the "Brahmins." The religion of "make" goes with the grain and is easily practised. As the nation, at present, only exists by and for this religion, the individual, whether "Brahmin" or "Pariah," takes to it as naturally as a duck takes to water. The nation gets just as good "Brahmins" and "Pariahs" as it deserves. It deserves according to its ideal. Its ideal is as its religion.

Everybody is grasping at more, or trying to squeeze the last drop of self-gratification out of what he has grasped or what others have grasped for him. One good thing, alone, there seems no eagerness to grasp.

It is justice. Mr. White, on his own showing, is a constitutionalist and patriot of the first water. No rebellious spirit against the *status quo ante*, unless as affronting business principles, disturbs the serenity of his convictions. His attachment to—we might almost say, idolatry of—royalty and what he calls the well-born aristocracy, old families *et hoc*, reveals itself explicitly and implicitly throughout his *brochure*. Adventurers, interlopers within the sacred pale of patrician privilege—especially if they are not what he calls full-blooded Englishmen (perhaps he means Britons and pardons a Norman taint)—are to him as a red rag is said to be to a bull. The King's partiality for Jews renders Mr. White unhappy.

Mr. White wants the "English" to grasp, with no uncertain grip, England, Scotland, Ireland, and Wales, and, we may assume, as much of the rest of the earth as is worth grasping. Mr. White's gospel is the gospel of "make." He wants "England" to be in the first flight of "makers," but seems to overlook that the vast majority of his fellow-patriots are more anxious about being in the first flight themselves, than about their country's taking the proud position. *Hinc illæ lacrimæ!* These patriots contemplate the Roman contingency as applying to this country from the academic standpoint of the gentleman who, confronted by a similar problem, disposed of it by the question: What's posterity done for me? In these days of business principles, the patriot is apt to contemplate with equanimity what will happen to his country when there's nothing to be appropriated but a covering for his carcass, and there is only one thing that will render him solicitous about the contingency. This inducement is that his country shall adopt the

ideal of justice, in place of the ideal of "getting on." This is the "efficiency" now wanted. Mr. White has "got the wrong pig by the ear." Neither "Brahmins" nor "Pariahs," nor well-born nor ill-born, are the culprits. There is only one culprit—the nation, and it is the business of those who call themselves men to bring that culprit to book and make him amend his ways. Then, only, we shall have efficiency. Men, money, ships, markets, territory will not do the trick of keeping this nation right side up. Mr. White's efficiency will not do the trick. This nation, if not doomed, must turn to God and fling away the religion of "make." Then the patriot will be as solicitous about his country as about himself.

Mr. White implies that we are the favoured of the gods, by virtue of what he calls our race primacy, and that, accordingly, we need not unduly worry ourselves about principle—outside the Government departments. If the outlook at home be unsatisfactory, Mr. White assures us that "the outlook on the horizon of the empire is bright and hopeful," and he almost persuades us, if we are Constitutionalists, that, given "efficiency," we shall be able, till the crack of doom, to make good use of our "eighty years' start in the international race for wealth and empire." This is alluring to the constitutional imperialist with a good balance at his bankers. But there seems a rift in the Whitean lute. The "big blond brute"—business is getting flat. Those who do the fighting and feel the paying are beginning to reflect that it may be more profitable to fight for bellies than for race primacy; that, if there is to be fighting, it may as well be with those who monopolise the belly-pabulum, as to demonstrate favouritism of the gods for the race.



Antipathies between the white races are, to-day, almost wholly superficial and artificial, based on ignorance, and fomented by interested self-seekers. The ignorance is being rapidly dissipated, and the motives of those who encourage it recognised. There can be no more arrantly nefarious and puerile twaddle, in these days, than that voiced in this country about racial superiority. It is only pap for fools who, let us hope, will soon be in a negligible minority. The "racial primacy" that is gulled by such swagger needs relacquering. The great struggle of the future is likely to be, not between nations, but within nations, with the corollary that racial questions will be consigned to oblivion. The tie of belly will soon be stronger to bind peoples than is racial difference to set in opposition. The pocket-stimulus, making for feud, is lagging behind the belly-stimulus, making for amity. A great European war would probably precipitate cohesions that would overthrow society as now constituted. If the potentates and "Brahmins" knew what was best for their own security, and acted it, they would have single hundreds of armed men where they now have tens of thousands. That would defer settlement of the belly-problem by peoples for themselves. On present conditions, the "price of empire" is likely to be paid in other coin than that contemplated by constitutional imperialists.

The modern wave of what is called Imperialism is one of manifold aspects of the result of the loss of belief in Deity and of the downfall of the Christian cult. Nietzsche is the fountain-head, in recent literature, of this modern revival of Paganism. Bismarck was its greatest practical exponent in our time. At present, there is a swarm of minor exponents of the

cult, ranging from the practitioner at Berlin, and, in this country, political leaders of the Rosebery and Chamberlain order and writers such as Mr. White, down to the swashbuckling mouther of bombast in the village pot-house, or his compeer in the daily press.

This ego-mania is a necessary resultant of the loss of God. Men must have something to worship—whether it be a stone, birth, race, pocket, belly, “temperance,” “purity,” Buddha, Mohammed, Christ, God. Imperialism is, essentially, merely self-worship disguised as an unselfish ideal. The man who holds that his country has a mission to dominate and appropriate other countries merely transposes the index of common selfishness and vanity. As he cannot emulate a Napoleon or Bismarck, he wants to feel that he is an item in accomplishments such as theirs. His enthusiasm is, essentially, merely to place himself on a pedestal above his fellows. He is, at root, merely the vanity-stricken brute who has transferred to himself the devotion which the follower of Christ or Mohammed yields to his master, or which the believer in God yields to Deity.

Mr. White is much impressed by the necessity of discipline, as obedience to superiors, in the army and navy. He wants his nation to be superior to discipline. For a nation, there can be no discipline but as obedience to God. The soldier or sailor who obeys his superior in defiance of what intellect or faith, as the case may be, imposes on him as obedience to God, is a craven, intimidated by fear of personal consequences. The imperialist who holds that his nation's mission is forcibly to dominate other nations is only justified if he can rationally reconcile the domination with obedience to God. Obviously such domination

is totally inconsistent with obedience to Christ. It can only be consistent with obedience to God on one condition : that his nation, in its own constitution, is the manifestation of justice, and that the object of domination is to establish justice. This nation is based on injustice. Accordingly, it has no warrant, whether as obeying Christ or God, for forcibly dominating other nations. While Imperialism, to serve its own ends, is exigent for discipline, its own ends involve that it repudiates discipline. It obeys no superior; it is a law to itself, and its law is injustice.

The man who appeals to force, unless on behalf of justice, repudiates or ignores God and Christ. He is pagan, pure and simple. Whether he kills or gets killed is of no more moral moment than is a like issue between hogs. If he knows the quality of his action; if others know, and incite him to it, he and they are deliberate criminals against God and Christ, and, we have every reason to suppose, will have to answer for knowing and acting. Militarism of the current order is a pagan institution. Professed Christians who tolerate it are liars to Christ. Professed believers in God who tolerate it are liars to God. Any man who undertakes military service, on present conditions, undertakes to flout God and Christ.

Assuming aggressive militarism to be wrong, it may be asked : Is not protective militarism right? To the professed follower of Christ, it must be wrong, as involving the exercise of physical force. To the believer in God, it is right, on the condition that what is protected is consistent with justice. As what militarism is now designed to protect is inconsistent with justice, the moral *status* of militarism, even for protec-

tion, is *nil*. It is merely expediential. All our present protective agencies, law, police, military, have no moral justification, and are inconsistent with the fundamental teaching of Christ. To follow Christ means, primarily, to be non-resisting. Of all the hypocrisies and imbecilities, none is more obtrusive, to the reflecting person, than the close association of ostensibly Christian ecclesiasticism with militarism. If there were real Christian salt in clericalism, the clergy would tell the soldier that his vocation was leprous; that, if he wanted salvation through Christ, the first thing he should do would be to throw his rifle into the gutter, or hand it back to his officer, and go to prison as a deserter.

A short time ago I conversed with the daughter of a distinguished General, Sir John Murray, K.C.B. This lady officiated for the Salvation Army with the field force in the late war, and has recorded her heroic work in a book issued by the Salvation Army. She formed a league among the soldiers. The following is the Leaguer's declaration: "Having the assurance that God, for Christ's sake, has pardoned all my sins, I am determined to love Him with all my heart, to love my neighbour as myself, and to serve God as a true soldier in the ranks of the Salvation Army. By the grace of God, I promise—1. Total Abstinence. 2. Purity. 3. To discourage gambling. 4. To read daily from God's Word. 5. To do my level best to bring my comrades to Christ." Alas for good intentions—how apt they are to work evil! With the fullest admiration for this heroic lady and her fellow-workers, I ask: Is it honest to sanction such a declaration by ignorant men who, at the very moment of signing it, are virtually in the act of deliberately

slaughtering their fellows? Can any man, under the circumstances, sign such a declaration without stultifying it; without lying to God and to himself? Who that has read a single chapter in the record of Christ can, as a rational agent, on the conditions sign such a declaration? Does it not tacitly imply that a man is saved through Christ for mocking Christ? If this declaration, on the conditions, does not involve blasphemy, what does? Surely it would be better to tell the Leaguer the truth, or, at any rate, give him some indication of its whereabouts, than betray him into this quagmire of illusion!

By those who conscientiously try to follow Christ, he is stultified through lack of intellectual integrity and virility. By those who merely exploit him, he is made a laughing-stock through precept without practice: glass-covered insincerity solemnly ignored as though the sham were concealed. To the conscientious follower of Christ, in these days, the watchword should be: Use your wits! Following Christ with the "heart" will not do much for Christ, unless the wits follow too. For these days, Christ means as much intellectually as emotionally. He does not tolerate declarations such as the foregoing by men who are bent on putting lead or steel into their fellows. Such people must defer their declarations!

It goes against my grain to labour this one point against the amiable and devoted writer of the book (*At Work in the Boer War*, by Adjutant Murray). My extenuation to her, if she needs it, is that, though I do not profess to follow Christ, I revere his memory and recognise his supreme importance as an agent in God's work for the illumination and guidance of mankind. Under these circumstances, I conceive it my

duty, according to my lights, to maintain the truth about Christ. My work is not to turn men from Christ, but rather to show them how far they are from Christ, and what Christ means to those who follow Him. Those who follow Christ are, in my eyes, among the salt of the earth. They go their way; I go mine. We are, ultimately, not very far apart, though I cannot follow Christ. Christ's demand is honesty and self-sacrifice. My ideal is justice. Justice involves honesty and self-sacrifice.

## CHAPTER XVII.

### SPIRITISM AND SOCIALISM.

THE people that has lost religion, beyond the religion of materialistic supremacy, is, *ipso facto*, rotting. The loss is not merely characteristic of this nation, but of Western civilisation generally. Though the outward indications of the rot may be more pronounced in one than another nation, the toxic pus is percolating through all. Each nation has its "skeleton in the cupboard," destined to come to life and kill or cure its owner. This "skeleton," for each nation, is one or another form of what is called Socialism. Slowly, surely, it is coming to life and gathering a strength, resolution, and universality destined, we may reasonably suppose, ultimately to transform society from root to apex.

In its present guise, Socialism is, essentially, merely a materialistic revulsion from the current economic conditions, supplemented by an emotional ideal of inspiring mankind with benevolent sentiment. In regard to this ideal of benevolence, Socialism, naturally, invokes Christ as its authority, while, equally naturally, ignoring that Christ set his face against all forms of aggression. Failing aggression, the economic ideal of Socialism can, obviously, only be realised through voluntary renunciation by those who at present hold, as legal owners, what Socialists want to distribute as

the collective property. The prospect of a violent collision between these opposing interests is, of course, dependent on the degree of unresisting acceptance of Socialist terms by those who hold, when the issue before them is to surrender or fight. So soon as Socialism feels that it has the power to seize, it will try to seize. About that there can be no reasonable doubt.

From the metaphysical standpoint, the main interest in this prospective upheaval or transition, as the case may be, is as to its moral and religious bearings. Will it involve moral and religious renaissance, or merely an economic reorganisation and a transient wave of animal contentment and easy goodwill persisting only until selfish emotions and consciousness of individual superiority have had time to reassert themselves and reinstate the old landmarks? In this connection, we cannot reasonably credit emotion with more in the future, than we recognise of it in the past. Through all ages, we see it only constant as preponderating in the direction of malignancy. We see what it has accomplished after nineteen centuries under the ægis of the greatest exemplar of benevolence and self-renunciation the world has known, who, for many centuries, imposed intense faith in His supreme divinity on a large part of humanity. What can we expect of emotion, now that His divinity is doubted, if not rejected, by the vast majority of thinking people—when, least of all, He is the believed God of those who use Him as authority for economic reorganisation, but ignore Him as authority against aggression?

Again, apart from probabilities after Socialism is established, is it conceivable that any authority—exclusive of overwhelming physical force—incident to



the propagation of Socialism will induce the self-renunciation necessary for the institution of Socialism? If we grant all that zealots of the cult claim for it as a means of ensuring animal contentment and economic prosperity, the question is still there: How is the wherewithal to be acquired? By purchase? Who is to pay? By force? Is the game worth the candle? What is acquired by force will have to be retained by force. What is acquired by unjustified force means interminably internecine feud. Can force be justified, unless on the ground of partisan expediency, to compel a man to renounce what he has acquired by the agesanctioned exercise of his capacities? Socialists say that they must have all the land, buildings, mines, railways, machinery. Some say they would buy these things—at their own price. Others, probably the vast majority, have hardly given a thought as to how the things are to be acquired. The teachers of the popular cult, while demonstrating to their followers, with convincing force, the obvious, consistently evade the problem of acquisition, or openly confess that they care nothing about it, and would, personally, prefer to make a clean swoop on the frank lines of the burglar.

Of course, this Socialist propaganda is utterly severed from morality, whether of the Christian or intellectual order. It is purely expediential and selfish. Its emotional aspect is entirely anti-Christian, though its leaders, in this country, use Christ as a stalking-horse; its intellectual aspect is entirely anti-moral. The great question that concerns humanity, in connection with Socialism, is: Will the Socialist agitation become transformed into a moral movement before the ultimate crisis occurs? Will Socialism involve metaphysical religion and justice before it

exacts its terms? Only on such conditions will it be justified. The problem for Socialism is the problem decided by metaphysic. As a moral and religious movement, Socialism depends on the metaphysical demonstration that a man's capacities are God's, to be administered as the collective property. On behalf of honesty to God, force is, morally, not merely permissible, but necessary.

The possibility of Socialism, as a regenerative dispensation, hangs on the ideal of Socialism. If its ideal, as at present, is merely to re-apportion the means of animal contentment and start another social dispensation based on State-ownership, its ideal will be merely expediential. On these conditions, motive will be left in its present state, and Socialism will only persist until the strong man reasserts his supremacy. What a man believes to be right, if the right involves his personal aggrandisement and animal gratification, will be the right for which that man will strive, though all the world sets itself against his striving. Failing intellectual conviction that his capacities belong to God, the strong man, under Socialism, will strive to re-establish Individualism. Not all the power, all the appeal, all the intimidation of the Socialist state will prevent the strong man from attaining his object.

If Socialism is to be peacefully and permanently established as a regenerative dispensation, it will need to change the motive of the public before exacting its "pound of flesh" by upsetting the present system. Socialism can only change the motive of the public by familiarising it with the metaphysical demonstration of causality, and so establishing the general conviction that the individual's capacities belong to God and must rightfully be administered by society,

as trustee for God, on behalf of the collective welfare. When this ideal of justice has become the ideal of Socialism, Socialism will be ready to apply the quick wrench and manipulation to the cripple, society, as the eminent Viennese surgeon has been recently applying it to the afflicted in our hospitals. Society, at present, may be compared to those deformed human beings. Socialism, when it has the ideal of justice, may be figured as acting the beneficently vigorous, rigorous, and scientific part of Dr. Lorenz. Then, the grating and knocking of the old bones of society will announce that heads are going into sockets, and that soon the once-deformed limbs will be straight, supple, and strong.

## CHAPTER XVIII.

### SPIRITISM AND EVOLUTION.

THE conception of evolution, as held in empirical science, implies complexity and differentiation arising from simplicity. It occurs through the ostensible activity of successions of agents that have the capacity for transformation. In biology, what is called the cell is the materialistic representative of the originating simplicity, with capacity for transformation. To overcome the difficulty of accounting for organic complexity as arising from ostensible simplicity, Weismann has promulgated a theory of what may be termed biological metaphysic, attributing to the cell-nucleus a high degree of complexity sufficient to account for morphological complexity. With this theory I was much impressed, and dealt with it in my ante-metaphysical stage of intellectual development in *Against Dogma and Freewill and for Weismannism* (Williams & Norgate, 1892), and later, from the metaphysical standpoint, in *Heresies*. Like all other theories of the sort, it ignores the essential problem of causation.

What is attributed to cells, by the biological operator with the microscope, is applied to organisms by the zoologist. Darwin's theory of evolution and descent is, by the microscopist, applied to cells. From the empirical standpoint, the evidence is over-

whelming to prove phylogenetic or typical continuity between organisms. From the standpoint of the empiricist, there is no ground for denying his confident assertion that, in the words of that uncompromising champion of the creed, Professor Haeckel, "Our human body has been built up slowly and by degrees from a long series of vertebrate ancestors" (*Monism*, Black, p. 40); or, again: "Sufficient for us, as an incontestable historical fact, is the important thesis that man descends immediately from the ape, and secondarily from a long series of vertebrates" (*Riddle of the Universe*, Watts & Co., p. 30).

Speculators from the standpoint of Professor Haeckel overlook that the changes on which they base their inferences, can only exist as experience for the observer. He must cause them to exist as his own mind. They are what I have termed conventions of sensing. About the "descent of man" they prove nothing, inasmuch as they only exist so soon as man has constituted them experience. All that they prove is that man has the experience of sequences of sensing, which he calls sequences of organisms, culminating in his own organism. Proving this is not proving causal *nexus* between one and another sensing as organisms. The man himself, as will, or cause, has to constitute the *nexus*, as his own experience. As cause, man is the beginning, as well as end, of this series of changes.

There is really no better ground for postulating causal *nexus* because of likeness between the structures of the man and ape, than because of likeness between the wigwam and mansion. Both likenesses merely indicate empirical sequence in willing sensings. The man has "descended" from the ape only in the sense

that the mansion has "descended" from the wigwam. The man and the ape, merely as sensings, have had no more causal influence on their relationship, than have the wigwam and the mansion. There is no "man," as active agent, but as soul. To prove that man had descended from the ape, we should need to prove an ape-soul, and demonstrate that, in some way, it had necessarily preceded the man-soul. Assuming the ape-soul, that it has willed sensings constituting its body, and that the man-soul wills sensings, as the ape-body, together with sensings as his own body, and experiences likeness between these sensings, proves nothing about the ape-soul, as causally affecting the man-soul. That a man-soul should "descend" from an ape-soul would necessitate one of two contingencies: (1) That the Creator was compelled to create the man-soul as sequent to the ape-soul; (2) That some ape-soul was able to create a man-soul. Either contingency is impossible.

Empirical descent, as bodies, is entirely foreign to the question of soul-descent. If ape-soul exists, it was created ape-soul. If it can become man-soul, that will involve annihilation and recreation. This applies if man-soul can become ape-soul. If a soul is annihilated, there can be no "becoming"; it is done with. Within our apprehension, there is no possibility of transformation of one into another soul. Each is eternal, *sui generis*. So there can be no "descent," in regard to souls. Empirical descent depends on pre-natal suggestion by fixed souls. Pre-natal suggestion merely determines willings of the universe, or mind, as sensings constituting the body, or medium, and the consciousness-sensation. All willings of the universe, except as the medium and

the consciousness-sensation, are products of post-natal suggestion. Family resemblances in features, etc., are mainly, though not wholly, products of pre-natal suggestion. Family resemblances other than these, as well as family differences, are the products of post-natal suggestion. What we call ability, aptitude, genius, stupidity, temperament, intelligence, brain-power, energy, industry, laziness, generosity, stinginess, valour, timidity, etc., etc., depend on capacity or incapacity to receive post-natal suggestion, whether of the empirical order, or of what I have termed the preter-empirical order (by the "collective omniscience").

What is commonly called hereditary predisposition, I believe to be wholly a product of post-natal suggestion. The stronger is the consensus of suggestion in favour of "hereditary" predisposition, the stronger will be the post-natal suggestion imposed on the particular soul, as offspring. To illustrate this: there is a strong consensus of suggestion that certain diseases are hereditary. The consensus imposes suggestion on the parents; they suggest to the children. If the parents could resist the consensus of suggestion, there would be no hereditary disease. As earlier indicated, all disease is a product of suggestion.

Biologists assert that one species of organism is derived from a pre-existing species; but biologists cannot point to a single actual case of one species of animal begetting another species. As the reader will be aware, such empirical derivation, if it were established beyond doubt, by the actual procreation by animals of a specifically different organism from themselves, would not touch the question of causal

continuity. "Species," as sensings, cannot causally affect "species," as sensings. If one soul, as offspring, wills some part of the universe constituting the resulting organism as specifically different from the parents, whatever that difference may be, involves creative interference. The soul that wills the difference must be creatively determined to will it. The parent-souls cannot pre-natally or post-natally suggest the difference, inasmuch as they can only suggest according to their pre-determined capacity for willing the universe. To imply that they can do more than this is to imply that they have no limitations; that they are, themselves, creators.

While advanced as obviating creative interference, the empirical theory of descent really involves creative interference at every specific change. The organisms supposed to initiate specific changes are really credited with all the creative inception which the supernaturalist attributes to God.

Professor Haeckel writes, triumphantly: "For the definitive proof and establishment of this fundamental pithecometra-thesis the palæontological discoveries of the last thirty years are of the greatest importance; in particular, the astonishing discoveries of a number of extinct mammals of the Tertiary period have enabled us to draw up clearly in its main outlines the evolutionary history of this most important class of animals, from the lowest oviparous monotremes up to man" (*Riddle*, p. 30). Metaphysically, this amounts to nothing more than that man has willed a certain sequence of sensings. There is nothing proved, causally, about descent. So far as regards the essential problem of descent, it would be just as significant to point to a number of ancestral portraits on a wall



as being descended from one another. Professor Haeckel and those with him take for granted that what is empirically outside and independent of the observer is really outside and independent. Before we can approach the real problem of descent, we must settle the problem of causality: of "subjectivity" and "objectivity"; of the real doer and the spurious doer. The method of empiricism will no more enable us to do this than cooking a chop will enable us to understand the heliocentric theory. From the metaphysical standpoint, the theory of evolution, as empirically held, is, like other empirical theories, right as a system of practical illusion affording us orderly cognition within the arena of empiricism. On the other hand, when it is applied, as it is by Professor Haeckel and others, for the purpose of upsetting established convictions regarding the soul, immortality and God, it only exposes the incapacity of those who so apply it, and misleads those sufficiently ignorant and unintelligent to follow its expounders.

In some prefatory remarks to the latest English edition of the *Riddle*, the writer (who cites the elegant extract earlier referred to apparently from a second or third-rate Italian poet of the sixteenth century, regarding the efficiency of science in closing the door on Deity) tells us that "the work is unanswered, because it is unanswerable." Presumably, the writer here implies that no empirical critic has dealt with it. This may be the case, though Haeckel, in his own country, is hardly what may be termed a twenty-shilling-in-the-pound authority, and has been severely dealt with by investigators in his own walk. That Haeckel's work is unanswerable, as a solution of the "riddle," is obvious

enough, inasmuch as the work is entirely foreign to the "riddle." It is just as unanswerable, as solution of the "riddle," as is "Old Mother Hubbard."

Professor Haeckel gives us some illuminating—from his standpoint—dissertation about the soul, and gives some doughty whacks to those who believe in the immortality of the soul, "the scientific impossibility of which" he professes to prove. Before turning to the "proof," we may consider a preliminary discovery of the Professor, that the soul is a certain material which the Professor calls psychoplasm, "for this good reason," he says, "that chemical analysis proves it to be a body of the group we call protoplasmic bodies, the albuminoid carbon-combinations which are at the root of all vital processes (*Riddle*, p. 32). Fancy, these albuminoid carbon-combinations knowing all that of themselves! The Professor owns that this view is slightly materialistic, but then, he says, "it is at the same time empirical and naturalistic, for our scientific experience has never yet taught us the existence of forces that can dispense with a material substratum, or of a spiritual world over and above the realm of nature" (*ibid.*). This encourages the metaphysician to suggest that the scientific experience will perhaps be none the worse for a little stretching, besides impressing him with the weighty significance of the prefatorial writer's assurance that the Professor's work is unanswerable. A man who has assured himself that the soul is "albuminoid carbon-combinations" is as hard to deny as the man who tells you he has got jumping toothache. The metaphysician here feels himself *de trop*—out of the running, flabbergasted. On the other hand, he feels kindly disposed towards "the most influential leader

of German philosophy, Immanuel Kant," and "two of the most famous living scientists, R. Virchow and E. Du Bois-Reymond," who, on mature consideration, found the albuminoid carbon-combinations soul unsatisfying. As these three distinguished souls have now effectively tested the carbon-theory, perhaps my friend the editor of *Light* will see if there is any testimony available from them on the subject. Another distinguished soul, still on this side of the "border," who has found the carbon sort of soul unsatisfying, is the eminent psychologist, Wilhelm Wundt. Of him, Professor Haeckel writes: "Wundt himself says in the preface to the second edition that he has emancipated himself from the fundamental errors of the first, and that he 'learned many years ago to consider the work a sin of his youth'; it 'weighed on him as a kind of crime, from which he longed to free himself as soon as possible.' . . . In fact, the most important systems of psychology are completely opposed to each other in the two editions of Wundt's famous *Observations*. In the first edition he is purely monistic and materialistic, in the second edition purely dualistic and spiritualistic" (*op. cit.*, p. 36). The metaphysician is impelled to say: "Well done, Wundt!" And he entirely agrees with Professor Haeckel, that "this entire change of philosophical principles, which we find in Wundt, as we found it in Kant, Virchow, Du Bois-Reymond, Carl Ernst Baer, and others, is very interesting" (*ibid.*).

What has been above written regarding descent of organisms applies, of course, to "descent" of thoughts, etc., as being common to brutes and man. Psychical and sensory experience being, causally, on the same plane, what is called psychical evolution

is, essentially, the same phenomenon as physical evolution. Change of thoughts, etc., involves change in willing the universe, as does biological or geological change, or change in celestial bodies. It follows that, in the same sense that man's body has been "evolved" from other organisms, "man's highest mental powers: reason, speech, and conscience—have arisen from the lower stages of the same faculties in our primate ancestors (the *simiæ* and *prosimæ*)" (*op. cit.*, p. 38). This, metaphysically, means no more than that man wills sequences of thoughts, etc., as his own, while constituting them consistent with thoughts, etc., which he attributes to his "primate ancestors." Whether these "ancestors" really exist as souls, or whether they are merely sensings by man, man can only speculatively decide. Of course, in regard to brutes, we have hardly less assurance that they are souls than that we are souls. The point here to be noted is that the psychical gradation has no more significance, in regard to soul-descent, than has the sensory gradation as sequence in organic types. Man makes the psychical gradations as experience, as he makes the physical gradations. It will be obvious to the reader of the metaphysic earlier set forth, that man must, necessarily, have the thoughts, etc., of the brutes as his own, just as he must have their bodies as his own sensings, otherwise he could neither attribute thoughts, etc., to the brutes, nor perceive their bodies. This applies, conversely, to the brutes, so far as they are souls. They must will the same psychical universe as does man, if what man attributes to them as thoughts, etc., is what they really do think, etc.

Metaphysical dualism is nowise the dualism be-

tween soul and body contemplated by materialists. The "substance" of materialism is, to metaphysic, a fiction. The materialist's "substance" is, metaphysically, not different from the materialist's notion of spirit, as the antithesis of "substance." The dualism of metaphysic is not between "substance" and "spirit," but between a causal agent (soul) and that on which it operates (mind, embracing both the "spirit" and "substance" of the materialist).

Let me illustrate the utterly unphilosophical nature of the materialistic position, in regard to "spirit" and "substance," by considering a short statement by Professor Haeckel. He writes: "At the lowest stage of organisation, the *whole psychoplasm*, as such, is sensitive, and reacts on the stimuli from without; that is the case with the lowest protista, with many plants, and with some of the most rudimentary animals" (*op. cit.*, p. 39). In regard to the problem he professes to attack, the above is a mass of speculative crudity. First, as to the "psychoplasm." This is "substance." How does Professor Haeckel know anything about it, but as making it as his own experience? Next, as to "stimuli from without." Without what? Himself? How then does he know they exist? Without the "psychoplasm"? How can that be unless the Professor puts them "without," as his own experience? The above is enough to upset all the Professor's theorising about fundamentals. It disqualifies his foundations. He is out of his depth. He misses all that is essential to the problem with which he professes to deal. The atheistic and demi-semi-atheistic enthusiasts who want pulling out of the swamp need a more vigorous tug than Professor Haeckel can give them.

Take another instance affecting the Professor's card castle—his organisms without exception have *spontaneous movement*, in contrast to rigidity and inertia of unorganic matter (*op. cit.*, p. 39). What does he know about movement, spontaneous or otherwise, beyond certain relations between matter and motion? In order that these relations he must constitute as his own, in order that they may exist for him, he must predicate about spontaneity, under the name of an active agent to which he may attribute, as its own activity, what he knows for himself, and can only know for himself. Suppose that the Professor teaches he is, nothing but "substance," that "substance" know that another substance moves, spontaneously or otherwise. The Professor goes on to refer to the movement of organisms, "chromacea," "protococcus," "diatomacea" *et hoc*, and calls this movement "voluntary psychic activity." What does he know about the movement of organisms, primitive or otherwise? What does he know about the movement of "chromacea" or elephants, except that it is voluntary psychic activity? Suppose the "chromacea" activity, can it exist for Professor Haeckel other than as his own psychic activity?

It would seem that "psychic activity" cannot recognise the utter futility of its own activity. If of Professor Haeckel was in the position of anything requisite, one might suppose that he, who professed to deal with the question of immortality, would be to question

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Take another instance affecting the foundations of the Professor's card castle—he writes: "All living organisms without exception have the faculty of *spontaneous movement*, in contradistinction to the rigidity and inertia of unorganised substances" (*op. cit.*, p. 39). What does the Professor know about movement, spontaneous or not spontaneous, beyond certain relations between sensings, which relations he must constitute as his own experience, in order that they may exist for him? How can he predicate about spontaneity, unless he has identified an active agent to which he can imaginatively attribute, as its own activity, what he must determine for himself, and can only know as his own experience? Suppose that the Professor is, as he implies and teaches he is, nothing but "substance," how can one "substance" know that another "substance" exists and moves, spontaneously or otherwise? The Professor goes on to refer to the movements of primitive organisms, "chromacea," "protophyta," "metaphyta," "diatomacea" *et hoc*, and calls the movement "elementary psychic activity." What does he know of organisms, primitive or otherwise, but as sensings? What does he know about the "psychic activity" of "chromacea" or elephants, except as his own psychic activity? Suppose the "chromacea" have psychic activity, can it exist for Professor Haeckel otherwise than as his own psychic activity?

It would seem that "psychic activity" that did not recognise the utter futility of such speculation as that of Professor Haeckel was in a bad way. The first thing requisite, one might suppose, in an investigator who professed to deal with the problems of soul and immortality, would be to question himself about the



possibility of his own knowing, and to abstain from dogmatising about the psychic activity of other agents, until he had attained a philosophical standpoint regarding his own psychic activity. For people who formulate theories about "substance," and "stick to the last," it is all right to make the clean sweep by naïve assurance about things inside and outside. That sort of easy going will not do when we are theorising about immortality, soul, God. Professors who embark on that venture should look to the craft.

Starting from the "psychic reflex activity" of primitive organisms, Professor Haeckel shows a line of psychic continuity up to the manifestations in man. As earlier indicated, this psychic continuity is no more causally significant than is the morphological continuity. Both are equally determined by the only active agent, in the contingency; the human soul, as willing the universe. Man, in himself, may be figured as the embodiment of what empiricists deal with as the evolving universe. There can be no "evolution" but what exists "within" man, as his willing (actualisation) of the sensory and psychical universe (God-mind). It is to be hoped that this will be obvious to the reader of this work. The empirical theory of evolution is merely descriptive. It really interprets nothing. It has no bearing on the essential "how." Metaphysic deals with the "how."

Professor Haeckel deals with what he calls the embryology of the soul. The human soul, according to him, is a cell, and is started on its mundane journey through the sexual frolics of a spermatozoon, which falls in love with a coy germ-cell. Professor Haeckel tells us that it is correct, "both in the chemical and the romantic sense," to call the activity of the gay

sperm "sexual cell-love." Accordingly, "the . . . fact of extreme importance is established, that every man, like every other animal, *has a beginning of existence*; the complete copulation of the two sexual cell-nuclei marks the precise moment when not only the body, but also the 'soul,' of the new stem-cell makes its appearance. *This fact suffices of itself to destroy the myth of the immortality of the soul*" (*op. cit.*, p. 49). (Italics here are the author's.) This perhaps accounts for the frequent failures in the casting of horoscopes. The astrologers ought to look to this. The great desideratum, for them, would seem to be to know the exact moment of copulation of the cell-nuclei. The metaphysician is usually a serious person; and this work is not intended to provoke grins. But the Professor is great, as an "external stimulus." He somehow makes one think of Sandow trying to poise a cannon ball on the top of a feather. This destruction of "the myth of the immortality of the soul" is stupendous as a provocative to undue hilarity. A man who has, once and for all, determined the exact moment of the appearance, from *Ewigkeit*, for one's soul, and smashed up immortality by his demonstration, stuns us, as it were, so that we confound the sublime with the ridiculous and our cachinnatory cells explode.

Let us now glance at this empirical evolutionism, from the standpoint of its adherents, and see where it leads. The minutest evolutionary difference must obviously involve creative interference, as fully as does the greatest. As affecting the question of creative activity, whether changes are graduated or abrupt, is insignificant. If the cells destined to issue as a human organism are, as they must be, according to the em-

pirical theory, endowed with capacities different from those of cells destined to issue, say, as an ape; and if the ape-cell necessarily preceded the man-cell—as the theory implies to be the case—then, the difference, whatever it may be, must come from outside the ape-cell, or be in the ape-cell “from the beginning.” If it was so in the ape-cell, the difference must have been in every cell, backward, to the “protista” cell.

The logical result of this theory is, accordingly, that all organism was, originally, a single cell, and that this cell started, as it were, emptying itself of contents, resulting in man as the end-issue. Now, a further contingency confronts us. How came this originating cell to exist? Either it must have been self-caused or caused by some other active agent. To ~~refuse~~ to contemplate the causal contingency in regard to this originating cell is no more rational than to close our minds to the causal contingency in regard to any other cell, or in regard to any common experience. Here, we cannot rationally evade the creative contingency.

Again, if this originating organic cell has arisen—as is implied in the “chemico-physical” theory of life—from the inorganic, then we simply transfer the creative problem, from the organic to the inorganic. So we get what is called “monism”—the universe as a self-existent, self-created entity. But, the moment we reflect, we find that all this phantasmagoria of creative activity can only exist as within ourselves, as experience. Then we are the “creators” of this ostensible continuum of creative activity. Now, we want to know, what are we? The empirical evolutionist will be the last to hold that we (“cells”) created ourselves. Still, we cannot get away from the con-

viction that we must be the creators of that ostensible continuum of creative activity which the empirical evolutionist calls the universe. The answer to the question, what we really are, is given in this work, and it shatters the structure of empirical evolutionism.

Professor Haeckel, though he is the reverse of fastidious about the epithets he applies to those who squirm at the carbon soul, is decent, considering his partisan zeal, in his references to Deity. He writes: "When atheism is denounced as a grave reproach, as it so often is, it is well to remember that the reproach extends to the whole of modern science, in so far as it gives a purely mechanical interpretation of the inorganic world" (p. 92). This is decidedly less fragrant than that precious quotation from Caro flaunted by the writer of the preface, though the same indubitable truth is implied by both methods of putting it. Science is essentially atheistic, just as is common reasoning from cause to effect. When I say that the fire has destroyed the building, I make an atheistic assertion, in the sense that I do not involve God in the contingency. This is the case with all scientific propositions. In themselves, they are irrelevant to God, and the person is, necessarily, atheist to the extent that he accepts them as final truth. Professor Haeckel does so accept them, and honestly avows the fact. Therein he manifests the highest human excellence. If I believed as does Professor Haeckel, I should consider it my obvious duty to do as he does. On the other hand, I believe that Professor Haeckel promulgates pestilent fallacy, and that it is his business to "own up" unless he can upset what I advance against him.

I want Professor Haeckel to consider, and own up

the consequence, whether he knows a single scientific fact or conclusion advanced in his work, otherwise than as his own experience as thoughts or sensings, made by whatever constitutes himself as a thinking and sensing agent. If he says he is a "combination of the psychic activity of cells," that is merely saying that he is experience made by Professor Haeckel. The Professor must be behind this. He must know that he knows that he is the combination, that is: he must know that he has made the experience. If it be granted that Professor Haeckel is the combination, that will not enable him to know that he is. A cell does not know it is a cell. "Psychic activities" do not know they are "psychic activities." A thought does not know it is a thought. A feeling does not know it is a feeling. How can a combination of "psychic activities" know it is a combination?

What may be termed inspired self-appraisement, involving the willing of what I have called the self-sensation and the consciousness-sensation, absolutely differentiates the "ego" from what it determines, as other experience. The "ego" is not merely "conscious," it empirically detaches itself, so that it knows it is "conscious." This highest manifestation of self-knowledge by the "ego" is, of course, absent in various states (trance, dream, etc.). Still, we have the clearest empirical apprehension of its existence as distinguishing, in the most radical manner, the essential self from the "psychic activities," etc., with which Professor Haeckel identifies it. These "psychic activities" only exist through the activity of that which appraises itself as external to the activities. Were these "psychic activities" alone in operation, they would not be known, *qua* activities. Thoughts,

feelings, sensings involve no knowledge that they are thoughts, etc. When we burn our finger, we not merely experience a certain "psychical activity," as sensation, but we also know that we know it as sensation. Wundt has called this sort of knowing, apperception. It is the distinguishing mark, empirically, between the soul and its experiential creations which Professor Haeckel jumbles together as the essential personality. This "apperception" involves that the soul has, as we may say, empirical knowledge of its own identity. The Professor takes his stand on empirical evidence. Well, this empirical knowledge of the soul is just as determinate as is the Professor's knowledge of "chemico-physical" transformations. That the Professor is enchanted with the "chemico-physical" knowledge but dislikes the other sort of knowledge is merely significant as indicating the partisan preferences of the Professor.

The Professor gives us a comprehensive account of what he calls the Law of Substance, which, he says, is the "supreme and all-pervading law of nature" (p. 75). This "law of substance" embraces "two supreme laws, . . . the older is the chemical law of the 'conservation of matter,' and the younger is the physical law of the 'conservation of energy'" (*ibid.*). The reader will be aware of the significance, metaphysically, of these "laws of nature." Professor Haeckel's appreciation of them is more liberal than that of the metaphysician. The Professor tells us that, "at the present day the scientist, who is occupied with the study of natural phenomena, is so firmly convinced of the absolute 'constancy' of matter that he is no longer able to imagine the contrary state of things" (*ibid.*). It would seem that this state of

things somewhat disqualified the scientist as a trustworthy guide on the subject. The element of prejudice would seem likely to perturb his judgment.

Nevertheless, there are scientists, as Professor Haeckel points out, who hardly seem to have been cock-sure about the constancy of the law. Professor Haeckel has some very doleful comments on these scientists. Thus, he writes:—"One of the most remarkable forms of superstition, which still takes a very active part in modern life, is *spiritism*. It is a surprising and a lamentable fact that millions of educated people are still dominated by this dreary superstition; even distinguished scientists are entangled in it. . . . It is a frequent boast of spiritists that even eminent men of science defend their superstition. In Germany, A. Zöllner and Fechner are quoted as instances; in England, Wallace and Crookes. The regrettable circumstance that physicists and biologists of such distinction have been led astray by spiritism, is accounted for, partly, by their excess of imagination and defect of critical faculty, and partly by the powerful influence of dogmas which a religious education imprinted on the brain in early youth, . . . where the alleged marvels of spiritism have been thoroughly investigated, they have been traced to a more or less clever deception; the mediums (generally of the weaker sex) have been found to be either smart swindlers or nervous persons of abnormal irritability. Their supposed gift of 'telepathy' (or 'action at a distance of thought without material medium') has no more existence than the 'voices' or the 'groans' of spirits, etc. The vivid pictures which Carl du Prel, of Munich, and other spiritists give of their phenomena must be regarded as the outcome of a lively imagina-

tion, together with a lack of critical power and a knowledge of physiology" (pp. 108-109).

Professor Haeckel's imagination seems here to sprint in as lively a way as, according to the Professor, does the spiritists', and his knowledge of spiritism seems to equal theirs, of physiology. All the eminent folk who have amended their bad atheistic ways (of whom Professor Haeckel mentions a fair number—Kant, Du Bois-Reymond, Virchow, Baer, Wundt—of the first rank) seem to labour under constitutional or acquired defects such as disqualify the physiology-lacking and too imaginative spiritists. Wherever we find a tendency to diverge from the "chemico-physical" theory, or to doubt the carbon soul, there must be a kink of one sort or another! As a psychological study of Professor Haeckel, those comments of his on the eminent backsliders from the "chemico-physical" faith are instructive and diverting. The comments of the Professor reveal to us, in a forcible way, the "chemico-physical" energies in the carbon soul that make for the vitality of superstition. Professor Haeckel is an object-lesson to be inwardly digested, or rather, we will say, elaborated by the chemico-physical energies. Reading him, we have no difficulty in understanding how the "scientist" becomes "so firmly convinced of the absolute 'constancy' of matter that he is no longer able to imagine the contrary state of things," and how it comes about that Professor Haeckel's faithful followers consider his pronouncements to be unanswerable.

Professor Haeckel writes: "As a matter of fact, there are metaphysicians . . . whose highest wisdom lies in denying or calling into question the existence of an external universe; according to them only one



real entity exists—their own precious personality, or, to be more correct, their immortal soul. Several modern physiologists have embraced this ultra-idealist view, which is to be found in Descartes, Berkeley, Fichte, and others. Their 'psycho-monism' affirms: 'One thing only exists, and that is my own mind.' This audacious spiritualism seems to us to rest on an erroneous inference from Kant's correct critical theory, that we can know the outer world only in the phenomenal aspect which is accessible to our human organ of thought—the brain and the organs of sense. If by those means we can attain only an imperfect and limited knowledge of the material world, that is no reason for denying its existence altogether. In my opinion, the existence of ether is as certain as that of ponderable matter—as certain as my own existence, as I reflect and write on it. As we assure ourselves of the existence of ponderable matter by its mass and weight, by chemical and mechanical experiments, so we prove that of ether by the experiences and experiments of optics and electricity" (*Riddle*, p. 80).

The metaphysician does not begrudge Professor Haeckel his "opinion" about ether, any more than the metaphysician begrudges the child its opinion about toffy. To the metaphysician, the opinions of Professor Haeckel and the child, in the connection, are equally significant. On the other hand, the metaphysician, too, holds certain "opinions." One of these opinions is that dogmatic empiricists who pronounce about soul and immortality on the ground of confusing sensing, as "ponderable matter," with what is not sensed, as ether, have mistaken their vocation. To the metaphysician, this confusion involves, in an ultra-irrational form, that "ultra-idealist view" which

offends Professor Haeckel when it is adopted by the metaphysician, and "several modern physiologists." On these conditions, the value of Professor Haeckel's efforts, when he "reflects and writes on" ether, seems to be of that ethereal character which Professor Haeckel detects in the "audacious spiritualism" of the metaphysician. The "audacious" materialism of the Professor impresses the metaphysician much as the latter's "audacious spiritualism" impresses the Professor. The "erroneous inference from Kant's correct critical theory" seems, to the metaphysician, to be chargeable to the speculative adventurer who dogmatizes about the carbon soul and the impossibility of immortality, by confounding "ponderable matter," which only exists as sensing, with "imponderable matter," which only exists as thinking.

If the thought ether exists, in the same sense that the seen or felt stone exists, it seems superfluous to make discrimination between what is imagined and what is "real." On these conditions, the imagined stone is the same thing as the seen and touched stone; the mathematician's imagined line or point is the same thing as the seen figure. Then, if there is no distinction between thinking and sensing, the person who imagines that his soul is spirit and immortal is on as safe ground as Professor Haeckel, who imagines his soul to be carbon and mortal. Professor Haeckel's "ether" is validated in the same way as is the other person's "spirit." Professor Haeckel imagines his "ether" to be equivalent to a sensing; the other person imagines his "spirit" to be equivalent to such a sensing. If the Professor will look at a number or two of *Light*, he will probably find that the person who confounds "spirit" with sensing has attained

similarly triumphant empirical assurance of the "reality" of his spirit as Professor Haeckel has attained of the reality of his ether. The spiritistic medium and sitter can vouch as conclusively for the presence and feats of "spirits," as Professor Haeckel can vouch for the presence and feats of "ether." The metaphysician attaches just as much, or as little, weight to the evidence of the "Spiritualist" for his "spirits," as to that of the Professor for his "ether." The "ether" and "spirits" are equally born of empirical confusion between sensing and thinking. Just as the Professor assures himself "of the existence of ponderable matter by its mass and weight," so, also, the "Spiritualist" assures himself of the existence of the "spirits" by witnessing their demolition of the "mass and weight of ponderable matter." As a zealous partisan, the Professor disposes of the "Spiritualist" by calling him bad names and denying his testimony—even if he testifies with the weight of a Crookes, or Wallace. So, the Professor compels the metaphysician to smile and lack reverence.

The Professor asserts that the "audacious spiritualism" of Berkeley rests on an "erroneous inference from Kant's correct critical theory." If this be the case, it would seem that the "spirits" must have been on the rampage, inasmuch as Berkeley's "psychomonism" appeared in 1710, while Kant's "correct critical theory" only began to appear in 1756. My "precious personality" was up to the nose in "psychomonism" before it had read a line of Kant. The metaphysician does not want to deprive Professor Haeckel of his "material world." The metaphysician merely wants to prevent Professor Haeckel from misleading people still more incompetent than himself to

approach the fundamental problems which concern the well-being of humanity. So long as the Professor "sticks to his last," the metaphysician will treat him with the awe he merits, as an efficient "cobbler" in the realm of empirical illusionism. When the Professor's orbit becomes too extended, the metaphysician has to dance on the Professor, as being an estimable person doing a vast amount of harm, with the best of intentions.

There is a form of amusement indulged in by the "free and independent" over the border, when an aspirant for parliamentary distinction solicits his good offices. The Professor provokes the "audacious" metaphysician in the direction of that form of entertainment. He cannot well resist the allurements to heckle Professor Haeckel. For instance, the audacious metaphysician, as heckler, asks the Professor to elucidate various obscurities in regard to those "organs of thought." Do they know they are organs of thought? If not, what does know? If they do know, will the Professor explain how? The audacious metaphysician is, no doubt, a dull fellow. Will the Professor put a spark into him? Again, the audacious metaphysician does not quite see to what that universe of Professor Haeckel's is "external." The Professor, of course, implies that it is external to the "organs of thought." But the audacious heckler wants the Professor to elucidate how the universe gets into the "organs" so that they know it is inside them. It would seem necessary that the organs of thought should know that the universe was inside them, otherwise Professor Haeckel would seem disabled from pronouncing that it was outside them.

Professor Haeckel's proofs are merely proofs of his

theories. Theories are more or less logical deductions from premises. The premises of empirical theories are constituted by the induction of what are called facts. In investigating the problem of soul, we involve the question of efficient causation, and we find that the facts constituting the premises of empirical theories are only the products of efficient causes. Hence, the logic of empirical theories arises from premises that are irrelevant to the problem of efficient causation. This involves that the logic of empirical theories is irrelevant to the problem of soul. The empirically causal *nexus* between changes being demonstrably spurious, the whole of empirical speculation, as science, is essentially nothing more than a logic of illusion. The stupendous system of applied logic, called the theory of evolution, has no more causal significance than has a child's causal determination when the child imagines its doll to be naughty and to say it won't come out of bed. The causation of "matter" and "energy" is, essentially, as spurious as is the causation imaginatively attributed, by the child, to its doll. Being so thoroughly enmeshed in his illusion, the empirical scientist is, as Professor Haeckel indicates in the passage earlier quoted, practically disabled from recognising that it is illusion, just as is the ordinary hypnotic who experiences a suggested hallucination. The empirical scientist is in what I have termed *fetish-rapport* with his theory.

It may, perhaps, be urged that the metaphysician is also in *fetish-rapport* with his theory. This may be the case. Then the question is: which subject of *fetish-rapport*—the empiricist's or the metaphysician's—is destined to prevail as involving preponderant belief? The empiricist, or the metaphysician, as the

case may be, is assured—as hypnotic, in fetish-*rapport*—that his theory is destined to dominate, as belief. My theory is in this work; Professor Haeckel's, in his. My disproof of Professor Haeckel's theory is in this work; his disproof of my theory has yet to come.

In the preface to the *Riddle*, it is stated that "one of the supreme questions that divided the opposing forces in the later period of the nineteenth century was that of the evolution of the human mind. The theory of the evolution of man's bodily frame has long been beyond controversy; but it was maintained with some spirit, and this not merely by Catholic scientists, that the development of the mind from lower types of mentality was not yet established. Here were still gaps in our knowledge on which the theologian loves to build. The chief merit of the present work lies in its masterly treatment of the question of the evolution of mind. . . . The case for the evolution of mind has been placed on the same experimental base as the theory of the evolution of the body. Distinction has no longer the semblance of reason. From the lowest kingdom of the protists to the phenomena of human intelligence we pass with tolerable ease. The few lacunæ in our evidence are insignificant beside the broad, overpowering tendency of their cumulative force. In this respect Professor Haeckel may well claim that with this volume he 'draws the line under his life's work.' That task is accomplished, and one of the most important contributions to the science or philosophy of human life, with its myriad problems, has been for ever established."

Professor Haeckel's "line," in the light of metaphysic, seems a tolerably black one, and the "for ever" establishment of his "science or philosophy of

human life" does not seem a contingency on which a prudent insurance office would take a risk, at the heaviest premium. Before the writer of that preface frolics with further predictions, it may prevent him from unduly committing himself, if he reads this work.

## CHAPTER XIX.

### BELIEF AND AUTHORITY.

BELIEF involves fetish-*rapport* with a theory. Thus, I fear to eat arsenic, because I am in fetish-*rapport* with a theory (believe) that arsenic is poison. Professor Haeckel does not like religion, because he is in fetish-*rapport* with a theory that religion is false. The unbelieving cleric affirms that God created the world in six days, because he (the cleric) is in fetish-*rapport* with a theory that it is the proper thing for a cleric to affirm what has been affirmed for a long time by the Church. The man who knows that his capacities are put into him by God, and that he has no right to deal with them as his own, does so deal with them, because he is in fetish-*rapport* with a theory that it will be to his personal disadvantage if he deals with those capacities as he knows he ought to deal with them. The "Christian" bishop or rector, who knows that Christ explicitly and implicitly forbade resistance by force, sends his son into the army, because he (the bishop or rector) is in fetish-*rapport* with a theory that the profession of homicide is one in which a man may earn much personal exaltation. The man who knows that his country is perpetrating injustice tries to twist the injustice into justice, because he is in fetish-*rapport* with a theory that it is the proper thing to be what is called patriotic. The man who believes that the



"worker" has a right to what he "produces," and so to dispose of his capacities on his own behalf, tries to despoil other people who have disposed of their capacities on their own behalf, because he is in *fetish-rapport* with a theory that what these other people have acquired ought to be redistributed on behalf of the "worker." The man who takes a cab to the station, does so because he is in *fetish-rapport* with a theory that this will enable him to catch the train. And so on, throughout the round of our activities—each person who acts as he believes, does this because he is in *fetish-rapport* with one or another theory.

Now, so far as a man acts in conformity with this *fetish-rapport* to a theory, he is sane; that is, honest. The metaphysical meaning of sanity is honesty. Honesty is the essence of what we commonly term, morality. The man who is honest is moral. But it will be urged: the people in the foregoing cases are not honest. For instance, it will be urged: the man who wants to despoil on behalf of the "worker"; the bishop who sends his son into the army, or professes to believe in the six days' creation, are dishonest. These people are honest to the extent that they act the theories with which they are in *fetish-rapport*. So far as the cleric or the champion of the "worker" acts according to his believed theory that it is a good thing to serve one's own ends or inclinations, he is honest. But there is a question outside his honesty, as obedience to his theory. This question is: is the theory itself sane or honest?

In all the foregoing illustrations involving what we commonly call a moral issue, there are really two theories involved: one, in what may be termed critical relationship with the other as determining its moral

value. Thus, in the case of the cleric who sends his son into the army, there is involved, besides the indicated theory, another: a man who professes to follow Christ must not sanction resistance. Accordingly, there must be *fetish-rapport* with a theory discriminating between the two other theories. Similarly, in the case of the despoiler, there is the theory involved: if one man's capacities belong to himself, another man's do, and if one man has acquired property, conformably with law and precedent, another man has no right to seize that property.

This leads us to the question of what is called authority. All subjection, as *fetish-rapport*, to theories other than those imposed by authority outside the empirical personality of the agent is selfish, and all selfish authority is brute authority. To constitute obedience to theory unselfish, there must be obedience to theory about the authority of theory. Thus, in the case of the cleric, theory about the authority of theory involves that the authority of Christ, to the cleric, is higher than the authority of expediency or inclination. In the case of the despoiler, theory about theory involves that the authority of law and precedent is higher than the authority of expediency and inclination. So, the cleric and the despoiler disobey their higher authorities.

We see here two forms of sanity, or honesty: the selfish and unselfish; the one within, the other outside the empirical personality. Christ is outside; expediency and inclination, inside the cleric. Law and precedent are outside the despoiler; expediency and inclination, inside. In all such cases, we have to decide between authorities, and must, as unselfishly honest, always obey the outside authority. Of course,

the question of outside authority may not be involved. Then, the honesty is rightly selfish. In the other cases, it is wrongly selfish. Thus, in the arsenic instance, earlier adduced, no question of authority arises, and the honesty is rightly selfish. This applies in the case of the conscientious so-called Rationalist, or atheist, such as Professor Haeckel. He obeys his *fetish-rapport* with theory, as belief, as I do when I abstain, through fear of consequences, from eating arsenic.

Then, it may be asked, is not my honesty merely selfish when I act according to my belief, by advocating the reconstitution of society? Do I not really try to despoil on the same ground as that of the champion of the "worker," or, on the same ground as that on which the Rationalist obeys his theory? No; I do not try to despoil on their grounds. I try to despoil on behalf of what I believe to be the supreme authority: God. My authority is outside my empirical personality. My authority, as is the authority of everybody who acts on my grounds, is the authority to which Christ appealed. Christ pronounced, as he believed, on the authority of God. So do I.

I am in *fetish-rapport* with the theory that God endowed me with a faculty: the only real faculty—differentiating me absolutely from the brutes. From my standpoint, belief is the product, in experience, of this faculty. Through belief, I interact directly with God. So did Christ. So does everybody who believes. Accordingly, my advocacy of spoliation involves that I obey belief because I believe that belief is God's direction to me, personally. On these conditions, my authority is outside myself, and is the highest authority that is possible for me. On these conditions, my

authority is absolutely differentiated from that of the champion of the "worker." Moreover, it is absolutely differentiated from the authority of the Rationalist, who does not believe that belief is God's direction to him. He has no authority whatsoever, outside himself. His honesty is entirely selfish: animal.

This *fetish-rapport* with theory about God involves a feeling called faith, entirely distinct in itself from belief, though in the case of the believer in God coincident with belief. Whether there is, at the present day, any real *fetish-rapport* with theory about Christ, as being God, I do not pretend to decide, though my opinion is that there is not. This means that I hold that there is no belief that Christ is God. In earlier times, there was such belief held by people who applied their intellects to the determination of the question of Christ's divinity. Nevertheless, the followers of Christ have been mainly, and at present, in my opinion, are wholly hypnotics to Christ. In the case of such people, belief is not in the contingency. There is simply faith with hypnotic submission.

It is significant of the hiatus in rationalism that it is void of what may be termed rationally inevitable morality. Professor Haeckel implies this fact when he writes: "The Christian religion (in its primitive and purer form) has so high an ethical value, and has entered so deeply into the most important social and political movements of civilised history for the last 1,500 years, that we must appeal as much as possible to its existing institutions in the establishment of our monistic religion. . . . The best part of Christian morality, to which we firmly adhere, is represented by the humanist precepts of charity and toleration, com-

passion and assistance" (*op. cit.*, pp. 119-120). Now, I contend that the last rational necessity of Professor Haeckel's "religion" is that the Rationalist shall adopt "the precepts of charity and toleration, compassion and assistance." I contend that the adoption of such precepts merely betrays the defection from Rationalism, and the implicit confession of the irrationality of his doctrine, by the Rationalist. I contend that the mortal, carbon-soul doctrine, rationally applied, means neither more nor less than that the essence of right is self-gratification. I contend that charity, toleration, compassion, assistance are rationally antipodal to the carbon-soul doctrine; and I contend that the inherent inconsistency is the prime manifestation of the present rationalistic outcome, as society. I contend that Professor Haeckel's theorising is cynically laughed out of court by the practice of a rationalistic society, and I contend that rationalistic academics will never alter the ugly facts. The rational outcome of rationalism is the cock-pit.

If I held the carbon-soul doctrine, I should consider virtue to involve possession of the spurs, and capacity to use them. My ideal would be to "survive," to make every other cock slink out of my way, or to transfix him. Those I "liked" I would befriend, strictly according to the degree of self-gratification I derived from exercising my liking. If I had intense emotional attachment, I might show it by gratifying myself to the extent of rendering my carbon soul defunct, on behalf of the object of my attachment. So, like the miser clutching his coin in his death struggles, I should show my attachment to self, to the last. Charity, toleration, compassion, assistance, as a line of conduct! I should as soon think of these

exercises as of cutting off my head to oblige my enemy. The weak, the yielding, the affluent,—ye gods, how I should be the "blond brute" among them! No belief in God; no belief in immortality; belief in the carbon soul, in the eternal snuffing out! Not with belief in the virtues of charity, toleration, compassion! My rationalism will not stand that! "What's posterity done for me?" is the question I ask, on such conditions. Then, I want to be imperialistic, patriotic, "money and the men-otic." I want to be "on the make"—Hun, Vandal, tear-'em, pink-'em, eat-'em. I want Mr. Arnold White's "efficiency," with a good chunk of the "mailed fist" thrown in.

Incidentally, it may be observed that the "mailed fister," notwithstanding the demands on his industry in exhibiting and applying the fist, has found leisure to take Christ under his wing. Thus, it is reported, in the *Morning Leader* of February 21, 1903, that the Emperor has assured the world that "Christ was God sent to redeem and inspire man, who follows Him, believing His word alone, through toil and sorrow unto death, for we have in Him revealed the Word of God, who never lies." According to the same issue of the journal: "Orthodoxy is grateful to the Kaiser for his public declaration of adherence to the Christian faith." The metaphysician who reads these effusions is inclined to exclaim: Poor, doddering, servile orthodoxy! garrulous Kaiser! and to entertain decided views as to how Christ, if he were here, would comment on the gratitude of orthodoxy and the garrulity of the Kaiser.

The Kaiser's following of Christ impresses the metaphysician as being, at any rate, respectful—in

the sense of being at a distance which rivals those jotted down by the astronomer, in his romantic moods, when he is dealing with stars and nebulae. Contemplating the Kaiser, as a product of Christ's mission to inspire, does not impress the metaphysician with the success of the mission. Contemplating the gratitude of orthodoxy to the Kaiser impresses the metaphysician with the low market-price of the gratitude, and with the opinion that orthodoxy is suffering from something analogous to senile paralysis.

Belief never changes; it is always the same thing: a feeling emanating through the peculiarly human faculty, intellect, and involving direct interaction between the creature and God. It is the metaphysical equivalent of what Christ called the Spirit. We commonly say that belief changes. This is fallacious. Theories, as subjects of belief, change; belief is belief and nothing else, in the sense that joy is joy; grief, grief. We may have more or less joy, or grief. So, we may have more or less belief. This quantitative difference arises through our willing a greater or lesser intensity of the consciousness-sensation in conjunction with belief, joy, grief.

What is called doubt is commonly implied to involve some measure of belief. Really, doubt is the entire absence of belief: its antithesis. Doubt involves what may be termed the paralysis of intellect. So far as regards any particular issue, the man who is in doubt has no more intellectual significance than has a jellyfish. A certain eminent man has written a good deal about what he calls philosophic doubt. If he had called it unphilosophic self-maceration, he would have been nearer the definitive mark. Philosophy that results in doubt is of the same profitable nature as

running yourself out of breath to arrive at the spot you started from. So long as you are in doubt, you are neither fish, flesh, fowl, nor good red-herring, and you may as well keep the fact to yourself. Nobody is particularly interested in your condition; it does not even excite commiseration. When you have passed through doubt, you may be able to give your fellows a wrinkle or two worth having. While you are in doubt, stick there, and tell nobody, just as though you were in the Bankruptcy Court, or just out of gaol!

There is a religion as well as a philosophy of doubt. It is called Agnosticism. Its professors apotheosise themselves because they don't know—they have no doubt that they doubt; know they don't know—and get into tantrums at people who do know. Some of the most impressive efforts of erudition have been exerted on behalf of this religion of don't know, and some of its teachers are reckoned among the greatest of philosophers. Moreover, it is a more or less thriving industry, affording bread and butter to a number of more or less honest folk who run papers, make the paper, and print on it. Perhaps the thriving industry-element is its justification. In these days there seems a good deal to say in favour of what brings bread and butter. Indeed, that seems the main criterion of utility.

What is called opinion may, or may not, involve belief. Very commonly, opinion is merely hypnotic subjection to an individual or a number of individuals, as, say, a party or clique. Belief is entirely independent of outside hypnotic influence; the individual soul's direct response to God. Subjects of belief, with which, as theory, we are in *fetish-rapport*, involve, so far as regards the rapport, self-hypnotism. This



self-hypnotism, as conditioned by belief, is, practically, hypnotism by God. So soon as we will belief, in this contingency, we will rapport with the theory. Opinion, as what we call acquiescence, involves self-hypnotism, unconditioned by belief, but conditioned by outside suggestion, by souls. Religions (other than intellectual religion) and political opinions are mainly of this order. The authority is here, outside the individual, holding the opinion, but it is not an authority imposing belief. It merely imposes hypnotic suggestion.

Social conventions of all sorts constituting what I have termed consensus of suggestion ; prophecy and clairvoyance, dependent on suggestion, by what I have termed the "collective omniscience," involve "opinion," as acquiescence. The prophet, equally with the ordinary follower of convention, holds "opinion." This collective suggestion involves God's hypnotism of humanity, or society, as a whole, as belief involves God's hypnotism of the individual soul. In the latter case God directs the individual, as, in the former case God directs society. What is called religious faith, apart from faith coincident with belief, involves God's direction to the individual, on the emotional plane, as belief involves it on the intellectual plane.

Professor Haeckel passes in review the various ideas of God which have dominated mankind, and truly states that these ideas have taken on "an infinity of shapes . . . from fetishism to the refined monotheistic religions of the present day" (p. 98). His conclusion about all theistic ideas but those he holds, is that they are false. Professor Haeckel's views about God are called pantheistic. His God is a "godless world-system." His view of Pantheism is expressed in a

quotation which he cites from Schopenhauer, to the effect that "Pantheism is only a polite form of atheism. The truth of Pantheism lies in its destruction of the dualist antithesis of God and the world, in its recognition that the world exists in virtue of its own inherent forces. The maxim of the pantheist, 'God and the world are one,' is merely a polite way of giving the Lord God his *congé*" (p. 103). This is just what Mr. Caro, the defunct Italian poet, says in the preface, through the medium of the gentleman who introduces Professor Haeckel to Tom, Dick, and Harry.

It will be seen that, as the "godless world-system" which Professor Haeckel worships, is merely Professor Haeckel's own mind, that Professor Haeckel worships himself, and that the only authority to which Professor Haeckel appeals is Professor Haeckel. Well, there is more profit in worshipping one's self as God, than in worshipping "philosophic doubt." There is not much philosophic, or any other sort of doubt, about Professor Haeckel. He is "all there," as a believer. If he is the pontiff of what is called Rationalism, as he appears to be from the preface issued under the auspices of the Rationalist press, it would seem that it was about time that "Rationalism" cut itself adrift from "Agnosticism," and affectionately took the arm of "Theism." Agnosticism and Haeckellian "theism," arm in arm, seem no more congruous than would be Mr. Herbert Spencer and the Archbishop of Canterbury in those bonds of fraternity.

I notice that the pontiff of popular Socialism, in this country, has issued a bull, or cow, or hee-haw to his faithful, assuring them that "this book of Professor Haeckel's demolishes the entire structure upon which

the religions of the world are built. There is no escape from that conclusion." Without, for the moment, calling in question the authority of this pontiff to decide what has demolished "the entire structure upon which the religions of the world are built"—rather a "large order"!—it may be observed that the pontiff in question has rather childish notions regarding the "entire structure," which, he says, is demolished. He seems to confound "the entire structure upon which the religions of the world are built," with a few statements as to ostensible facts, in the traditional records of the Jewish and Christian cults. Assuming that Professor Haeckel's book had demolished these statements, that would hardly seem equivalent to the demolition pronounced by the pontiff of popular Socialism.

There is a somewhat obtrusive difficulty in understanding how "the entire structure of the religions of the world" can be vitally affected by the fact that Professor Haeckel has succeeded in externalising into objective divinity a hypnotic hallucination constituted of his own thoughts and sensings. During thousands of years, races and civilisations, engaged in this business, have come and gone, and still "the foundations" necessitate that Professor Haeckel shall "demolish" them! And that Professor Haeckel shall "demolish" merely by emulating the Australian aborigine! Surely, this is a "riddle of the universe" to which Professor Haeckel and the pontiff of popular Socialism—to say nothing of the Rationalist Press—hardly seem to have given enough attention. There does not seem much of a chasm between worshipping a stone and worshipping Professor Haeckel's god, as "*an intramundane being everywhere identical with*

nature itself" and "operative within the world as 'force' or 'energy'" (p. 102).

Of course, Professor Haeckel's divinity may be peacefully—or, shall we say, monistically?—reposing with all other divinities "inside"—like, say, Brother Ascetico, resting after his devotions near the abbey-bin. Still, it seems that the Professor's divinity is much of the same kidney as some of those "inside," and is at least as perplexing as the divinity identified, about sixteen centuries ago, by the sages of Nicæa. It is difficult for wits, other than those of the pontifical order, to understand a god that is "everywhere identical with nature itself," yet "is operative within the world as 'force' or 'energy.'" The god seems to be doing things without having things with which to do anything. If the god is "nature," the god must seemingly be the "world." Then, if the god is doing things to the world, the god must be doing things to itself. This point seems to call for elucidation by Professor Haeckel. Perhaps the pontiff of popular Socialism, or the Rationalist Press, will stir up the Professor on the subject. There is a constituency—perhaps outside "Rationalism" and pontifical Socialism—that takes kindly to "reasons." The metaphysician, for instance, has a yearning for them, and can sniff them, when thrust well under his nose, as effectively as his long-suffering and eared friend can sniff the carrot.

The metaphysician wants Professor Haeckel—or perhaps the pontiff of Socialism, or the Rationalist Press, can do the trick—to elucidate how a god can do things to itself. Pending the elucidation, the metaphysician timidly suggests that a god that does things, needs things to do them with. The contin-

gency seems to involve a sort of give and take interaction—to adopt a colloquialism familiar to pontifical Socialists and “Christians” eager to illustrate the acquisitive section of the ideal. The god, as “nature,” that acts on the “world,” seems to have nothing to give to, or take from. It seems much in the position of the pontifical Socialist or “Christian” who tries the feat of practising reciprocity with himself.

Again, from the standpoint of Professor Haeckel, he would seem to be a part of the “nature” that did things with the “world.” So, the part would appear to know the whole. To know the whole, the part must, in some way, appropriate the whole, as experience. It may be advisable for the Professor—as a clinching demonstration that he has “demolished the entire structure upon which the religions of the world are built”—if he explains how the part comes to know the whole. If the whole is outside the part, it would seem, to the metaphysician, that the part, knowing the whole, would need to go one better than the boa-constrictor when it assimilated the blanket. The part that had identified “matter” and “energy,” as god, would seem somehow to have boxed up the whole in its (the part’s) internal economy. Such an achievement would discredit the verification, by a distinguished, defunct geometer, that the whole was greater than the part.

Every line of investigation, when critically examined, drives us to God, as authority (through belief) and finally efficient cause outside ourselves. Professor Haeckel’s god, as “nature,” is merely a word, with no idea behind it. It is a rational impossibility—a contradiction in terms. While it involves self-existence and creative activity as fully as does the God of

theology, it stultifies not merely metaphysical causation, but also the very empirical causation on the identification of which depend all Professor Haeckel's theories.

The evolutionary sequence on which Professor Haeckel founds his identification of the god of "monism" is merely one behind another cause, with an end-issue as man. This end-issue knows all the other issues as "causes and effects." How is this possible unless the end-issue has all the other issues within itself? As all the other issues can only exist for man as experience, man becomes, according to Professor Haeckel's logic (which he ignores), "nature," and man must create Professor Haeckel's "nature," as the experience called evolution.

But, according to Professor Haeckel, man creates nothing, and "nature" is something inclusive of, and outside, man, and that has created man. This involves speculative dogmatism as arrant as that of any of the schools of antiquity. How can man predicate about "nature" outside, but inclusive of, himself, when man, *ex hypothesi*, is merely an effect of antecedent causes? To imply, from the standpoint of Professor Haeckel, that man can make this determination is no more reasonable than to affirm that the finished knife knows all its intermediate states, from the ore and rough bone to the final stage.

Professor Haeckel has, it may be granted, "demolished the entire structure" of one religion—his own. He has accomplished this by propounding his religion. It carries its condemnation on its face, which, we may say, is adorned with a nose on which rubies and carbuncles tell a tale of misdirected energy, perseverance, and devotion.

## CHAPTER XX.

### TRUTH.

It will be seen that the issue between science and spiritism involves the question of the supremacy of one over another form of truth. There are obviously two distinct forms of what we commonly call truth operating, as between science and spiritism (which latter, in the connection, is metaphysic, which is to spiritism as science is to materialism). These forms of truth may be termed illusory and real. Metaphysic is the science of what, in the connection, is the real; conventional science is only science of the illusory. Given its presuppositions, conventional science determines the most efficient truth within the apprehension of present humanity. Metaphysic, through investigation of the conditions of possible experience, goes behind conventional science and invalidates its presuppositions.

What we commonly call truth is supposed to involve the knowing of things in such a way that we identify and determine a cognitive event that exists outside ourselves and independently of our determining activities. Metaphysic proves that there can be no such cognitive event: that any cognitive event can only exist by virtue of the agent that constitutes it experience. Metaphysic identifies this agent as soul, and shows how this agent determines the experiences

which, according to the presuppositions of conventional science, are, so far as regards the so-called percipient, self-determined, and, as we may say, self-obtruded on the perceiving agent. Obviously the truth of conventional science uncritically takes for granted the only question that is vital to the problem of cognition.

Scientific truth is, essentially, subject of belief—that is, thoughts in a convention of sequence (called reason) willed in conjunction with the feeling called belief. Any such sequence of thoughts willed with belief involves scientific truth. The child who says, If I throw this ball up it will drop, expresses scientific truth, just as does the physicist who “explains” why the ball will drop. The physicist’s truth is merely a different form of scientific truth from that of the child. Essentially they are identical as scientific truth. Likewise, the metaphysician’s truth is a different form of scientific truth from that of the physicist.

What we believe is “true”—absolutely, infallibly—to us. This proposition is not affected though our truth be puerile fallacy to others. The believer is the sole judge of the validity of scientific truth. If one man believes (holds the scientific truth) that the earth is flat, and a million men believe it to be round, the earth *is* flat or round, according to the believer. Perhaps it is not far from the mark to assert that not one man in a million does believe the earth to be round—that not one man in a million believes at all on the subject. Probably all but the one man out of the million merely affirm, as hypnotics to authority, that the earth is round. This leads us to a class of truth other than scientific.

Beyond scientific truth there is non-intellectual or



hypnotic truth, as submission to authority. In religion, politics, social conventions, ordinary activities, this class of truth is in universal operation. All the great religions of the world have hitherto depended for persistence on this class of truth. Political partisanship, again, is almost entirely dependent on it. It may be termed the truth of the helot. Scientific truth is the truth of the free-man. The two classes of truth are antithetical, and humanity is the battlefield on which they struggle for precedence.

The truth of conventional science is scientific only as regards what is affirmed about a fundamental presupposition (that experiences operate as non-experiential). In accepting this fundamental presupposition conventional science is unscientific, inasmuch as it is intellectually impossible to predicate about non-experiential experiences, the terms involving mutually exclusive ideas. The acceptance of this fundamental presupposition involves that conventional science is built on what may be termed sensory hallucination, quite analogous to that imposed by the ordinary hypnotist on the hypnotic. As regards this illusory externality, we are our own hypnotists, imposing the hallucination on ourselves.

As it is practically necessary to deal with the illusion of choice as though choice were real, so also it is practically necessary to deal with illusory externality as though it were real. The evil of this procedure in both and all other such cases arises when the illusory presuppositions are elaborated outside their scope of applicability. When we deal with spiritistic problems, among which are religion and morality, we are brought face to face with the problem of efficient causation. On such conditions, to base

our inferential processes on the presupposition of illusory causation can only drive us away from our real problem and render our knowledge vanity.

So the masses get betrayed by people who are accepted as first-hand authorities on subjects of which the rudiments are outside their apprehension, and who disseminate their abominable nescience among the masses through a still denser medium of ignorance and lack of critical capacity: the raw mob-leaders and scribblers of plausible rhetoric who have *carte blanche* under our blessed conditions of worship of the fetish called freedom—in this case, anarchy—to reach their dupes through the press and from the platform. So the rot progresses. So the masses are rendered “free men,” and prepared for the Socialist millennium by such pronouncements as that “this book of Professor Haeckel’s demolishes the entire structure upon which the religions of the world are built.” Verily, if the conviction of this ostensible achievement of Professor Haeckel’s book is destined to rule the world, the so-called age of reason may well be called the age of imbecile extravaganza.

## CHAPTER XXI.

### AUTHORITY AND PERSONAL RIGHTS.

CHRIST compared himself to a door, by issuing through which man would attain salvation. "I am a door: by me if any man enter in, he shall be saved" (John x. 9). Here and elsewhere Christ compares himself, implicitly, to the fetish, charm, isman of the pagan. Through no self-initiation activity, merit, determinism of the agent, was he, the case might be, to be saved, preserved, victorious over his enemies, or over adverse circumstances; "salvation," victory, or what-not was to emanate from his "door," stone, figure, magic wand, and so forth. The Christ-cult of salvation may be termed an acme of fetishism, involving a purely hypnotic submission to the active efficiency of an agent outside the empirical personality. What we commonly call trust in a person is a familiar example of the type of submission which Christ taught as being the means of salvation for his followers. So far as regards salvation through Christ, the demand is that an agent shall be what may be figured as a mechanism, the movements of which are solely terminated by Christ. The "mechanism" must not reason: argue with itself about the quality, practicality, expediency of Christ's determinism. All that a "mechanism" has to do is to respond to the

determinism. The hold which Romanism claims over the individual is corollary, granting the pretensions of the Holy See, to Christ's teaching. All forms of so-called free (Protestant) Christianity are entirely inconsistent with this central conception of self-renunciation by the devotee.

The non-Christian as well as the Christian may have Christ as "door" leading to justice. As "door" to justice, for the Christian, Christ means that the Christian is not to resist the institution of justice. To the intellectual religionist, Christ as "door" means that, when justice is established as the social dispensation, the intellectual believer in God shall perpetrate no aggression on his neighbour—shall carry out the "golden rule." Thus justice is "door" to Christ, as Christ is to justice.

Again, Christ as "door" means, to the intellectual religionist, that he shall obey authority outside himself. This involves that his motive for working for the institution of justice shall not be his own sympathies, inclinations, expediencies, but belief that justice is God's law revealed to him individually by God. This latter requirement, if satisfied, involves that the follower of the law of justice, even though he empirically perpetrates aggression on others for the purpose of establishing justice, really perpetrates no aggression.

There can be no essential aggression where there are no rights to assail. The "rights" established by empirical law and precedent are only really rights so long as empirical law and precedent constitute the highest authority for rights. They can only do this so long as we are in *fetish-rapport* with a theory (believe) that they do constitute such authority. So

long as we believe that a man rightfully owns his capacities (which we cannot believe if we believe in Christ or God), empirical law and precedent constitute, for us, the highest authority, and we perpetrate aggression when we assail rights contingent to this law and precedent.

Christ is the supreme authority for Christians. To Christ there was no such contingency as human rights. His whole teaching was to the effect that the individual's duty was utter, absolute self-renunciation, to the entire exclusion of personal claims of any sort. The teaching of absolute non-resistance follows inevitably from Christ's view of humanity. Hence, the Christian has no *locus standi* as maintaining what he calls his rights. He must either abjure these or abjure Christ.

This really applies to the intellectual believer in God. He has no rights to maintain. As intellectual believer in God, he does not fight for justice as involving the question of personal rights, but as involving submission to what, for him, is the supreme authority: God's direction to himself personally. Personal rights are merely incidental and entirely subsidiary to the question of justice as a moral ideal. Personal rights are merely contingent to the practical exemplification of justice, as practically necessary illusions, as in the cases of the illusions of choice and empirical causality.

It will be seen that the intellectual religionist is here in entire consonance with the essence of Christ's teaching. The difference between the Christian and intellectual positions arises through difference in standpoint. Christ's directions were designed to apply to a stage of humanity that had not trans-

cended crude empiricism, and was incapacitated from formulating or conceiving any system of non-empirical truth. To such a stage of humanity there could be no intellectual demonstration of man's lack of personal rights. The conviction of the lack, if it was to occur, must come through some overpowering personality capable of imposing irresistible hypnotic suggestion, and of manifesting in his own life, in every conceivable way, the supreme law of self-renunciation. Such a hypnotist was Christ. In the light of metaphysical contemplation he was an inevitability in the Divine scheme of human illumination.

Christ is the supreme authority for those who fail to attain belief that personal rights are chimerical. The moral ideal of justice is essentially the same as the ideal set forth by Christ. The two empirically different ideals are, essentially, a dual identity appealing to different planes of capacity for knowing. While the Christ-ideal appeals solely to emotion, the intellectual ideal appeals to intellect as well as to emotion; while its credentials are intellectual, its motive force must be emotional. The soul, in this case, must will the emotion impelling to action, as well as will belief revealing the quality of the action. While the ideal of justice can only be the ideal of believers that personal rights do not exist, the ideal of self-sacrifice as set forth by Christ can only be the ideal of hypnotics to Christ.

It will be seen that, as often indicated in this work, metaphysical morality and religion are, essentially, Christian morality and religion. The two are simply complementary, the one to the other. The difference between them is only surface-difference. In the one case, the authority is God,

through belief; in the other case, the authority is God, through hypnotic subjection to Christ.

The law, whether called of self-sacrifice, or justice, is the same law, and God is its authority. The means through which the law becomes revealed and practically exemplified may be an avatar, such as Christ (for the emotional stage of conviction), or relief (for the intellectual stage of conviction). The means of the revelation and practical compulsion does not affect the God-decreed compulsion of the law. Until the law is satisfied, humanity must drain the cup of woe. The final consummation of humanity is completely to submit to the law. The "Devil" is the animal in man, that lures him from submission.

Ideals emanating from authority within the self—imperialism, collectivism, socialism, anarchism, freedom, "efficiency"; national, race, political, commercial, industrial, scientific, artistic, supremacy are will-o'-the-wisps unless vitalised by the ideal emanating from the authority of God. Never in its record has this country—applying to others—been so completely severed from ideal emanating from the authority of God, as at this day. Thereon hangs the tale of prospective dissolution.

## CHAPTER XXII.

### META-CHRISTIANITY.

CHRIST'S teaching was for the individual, and its sum may be stated in the single word—non-resistance. Hence, apart from Christ's hypnotic power to overcome the world, as it now exists and always, so far as we can form a conclusion, has existed, Christ's teaching was foredoomed to failure as conditioning societies. It is beyond question that Christ's hypnotic power has failed to impose his teaching on any body of men beyond a few early zealots. Even among these, contentions and jealousies soon arose and grew into the bitterest feuds; and what occurred, as ostensible propagation of Christ's teaching, in later ages, is recorded in the bloodiest annals of humanity.

It must be obvious, to anybody who has read the record of ostensible Christianity, and who reflects on the present state of society, that Christ's teaching can only become collectively operative through teaching which shall appeal to human capacity different from that to which Christ appealed. It must be obvious that emotion, after the fullest trial, stands condemned as a factor leading to Christ: that, though Christ planted the seed, its fruition must come through another agency than Christ's hypnotic dominance.



If we may judge by the records of Christ, he foresaw what was destined to be perpetrated in his name and on his behalf. "Think not that I am come to send peace on earth: I came not to send peace, but a sword" (Matt. x. 34). Inevitably, the sword must be unsheathed so soon as a teaching, solely to the individual and appealing solely to the individual's emotions, becomes distorted, as it necessarily must where rival teachings are in operation, into a propaganda of collective domination. Christ, the archetype of submissiveness, must, on such conditions, become the practical fount of violence, cruelty, and oppression. Given the emotional conditions, the saturnalia of distortion of Christ follows as a logical and practical inevitability. So long as there is anything to resist, there will be resistance. Christianity soon verified this proposition. For Christ's teaching to prevail in conformity with Christ, necessitated that there should be nothing to resist: that each individual should emulate Christ, himself. On such conditions, that a body of Christians should exist, there would need to be sudden revulsion, such as is familiar under the name of conversion, involving motive force from within the individual, not as extraneous compulsion. This was the case with the early Christians, just as it now is in regard to various eccentric Christian bodies. Failing this process of attraction, Christian propagandism must needs become, as it did, a mere partisan exercise of brute force: the very antithesis of the Christ-method.

That the Christ-ideal may be realised, human intellect must do the work which emotion could not and never can do. This work is to achieve practical

unanimity of judgment. No hypnotic appeal to emotion, such as was Christ's, can accomplish such a work. There never was and never will be, on present human conditions, emotional unanimity, as practical submission to what assails the fundamental animal incentive of humanity: the gratification of self. But, there may be intellectual unanimity of the sort, and, given belief in God and soul, emotion may render this intellectual unanimity efficient to ensure the realisation of the Christ-ideal. The issue may involve the preliminary application of force. Whether it does, or does not, the result—unlike that in the case of "Christian" application of force—will be the establishment of the Christ-ideal on earth. The "Christian" application of force, on ostensible behalf of Christ, has merely served to intensify emotional repulsion to Christianity, and by "Christians," to themselves. At this day, there is hardly any bitterer animosity than that between sections of what is mis-named Christianity. Political contention is Christ-like compared with the cold, cynical repulsions and rivalries of sects ostensibly unanimous in propagating the Christ-ideal.

That Christ's teaching may become collectively operative, a teaching must operate that concerns an object which was outside the concern of Christ. This object is society. Christ determined duty for the individual. This duty was to be hypnotic to Christ. But, society—the "world"—exists, as well as the individual, and society is not, and never has been, hypnotic to Christ. Every society that has existed since Christ gave his teaching has been constituted in direct antagonism to that teaching. This means that for the individual to follow Christ,

the individual must court extinction—he must starve if others do not give him bread, or if others take from him bread that has been given him. "But I say unto you, That ye resist not evil: but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also. And if any man will sue thee at the law, and take away thy coat, let him have thy cloke also" (Matt. v. 39-40). "Therefore I say unto you, take no thought for your life, what ye shall eat, or what ye shall drink: nor yet for your body, what ye shall put on. . . . Therefore take no thought, saying, What shall we eat? or, What shall we drink? or, Wherewithal shall we be clothed? . . . Take therefore no thought for the morrow: for the morrow shall take thought for the things of itself" (Matt. vi. 25, 31, 34).

Such procedure as the above is, obviously, incompatible with normal human nature, and cannot even be approached until a society exists that has abolished the incentive to assertion of personal rights. Even then, literally to follow these injunctions of Christ would be impossible unless to hypnotics to Christ. Were justice the condition of society, the individual would be called on personally to resist injustice. Failing this resistance by the individual, society could not exact justice. If one man has no personal right to a coat, neither has another man. If, in conformity with the principle of justice, society apportions the wherewithal to obtain a coat, to one man, that man, if he resists (on behalf of the principle of justice, not of himself) dispossession of the coat, acts as unselfishly as does another man who, as hypnotic to Christ, yields his coat. The man who believes that God is authority for the justice maintained by society, and who acts his belief by resisting unjust disposses-

sion, is as "unworldly" as is the hypnotic to Christ who does not resist dispossession.

Christ's injunction against resistance implied that force was intrinsically evil if exerted by humanity. Of God, alone, was force the prerogative. But, the standpoint of Christ precluded His contemplation of a contingency involving human application of force, which should be God's application. The individual or community that applies force to maintain what that community or individual believes to be God's authority does really constitute the application of force, God's application. Then, the force applied is, really, no more of men, than in the case, say, of an earthquake. The maintenance of intellectually identified justice, by human force, involves that God employs humanity as machinery for manifesting His force, just as truly, as in the case of an earthquake, God employs empirically different machinery for manifesting His force.

In the propagation of no religious cult known to the world has force been more remorselessly applied than in the propagation of the ostensible cult of Christ. Immediately Christian propagandism passed beyond what may be termed its individualistic stage, becoming collectively integrated, it necessarily became aggressive and falsified Christ's determination of the essential evil of force. Then, Christ became a law, instead of an appeal and example, and, like all law, Christ then involved compulsion to obey.

The new teaching that must supplement, and, empirically somewhat disqualify Christ's, if the latter is to become practically possible, must determine duty for society, as well as for the individual, and must so affect the individual that he will be impelled

to work for the imposition of this duty, on society. Only when society performs its part of the "contract" will it be possible for the individual to perform his. Only on these conditions can the Christ-ideal be more than a vague enthusiasm, and can the violence and passion which have hitherto dogged and eviscerated the Christ-cult throughout the world, be obviated. This new teaching I venture to call, Meta-Christianity.

Meta-Christianity involves absolute self-surrender to God's law: justice, revealed, to his own complete apprehension and intellectual approval, to every normally intelligent person who applies his intelligence to the problem of justice as elucidated by modern metaphysic. The Meta-Christian must obey God's law, as the Christian must obey Christ's teaching. When this happens, the follower of Christ will be relieved of the superhuman burden of having to turn the other cheek to the smiter, inasmuch as the smiter will be practically eliminated. Then, there will be no necessity for the follower of Christ to yield his coat, on demand, inasmuch as nobody will think of demanding his coat. Then, the Christian will be enabled to manifest, entirely undisturbed by society, all the emotional virtues inculcated by his master.

## CHAPTER XXIII.

### CONSCIENCE.

IN Chapter XIX. I dealt with certain ostensibly ethical resultants of Professor Haeckel's carbon-soul theory, and I made certain avowals of what I should be likely to attempt in the rôle of "blond brute," "overman" *et hoc*, did I hold the carbon-soul theory. Professor Haeckel maintains that the carbon-soul theory involves the diametrical opposite of those unangelic aspirations to which I confessed a carbonaceously provisional attachment. Indeed, the Professor has some ingenious theorising, based on what he calls the "social instinct of the social animals," to the effect that what the Christian takes to be duty to Christ, and what the believer in God takes to be duty to God, is, in some undefined way, congruous with this "social instinct of the social animals." Thus, the Professor writes: "man belongs to the social vertebrates, and has, *therefore*" (italics mine), "like all social animals, two sets of *duties*" (italics mine). The inferential process, here, seems somewhat akin to that affirming: the dog belongs to the hungry vertebrates, and has, therefore, like all hungry animals, a chemico-physiological theory as to the nutritive properties of a vegetable as compared with a flesh diet. The Professor's easy transition from "social instinct" to "duties" excites

our admiration, as does the dexterity of a Houdin or Maskelyne. Still, the Professor is hardly satisfying; there seems an aching void after his trick is performed.

Professor Haeckel assures us that "the feeling of duty does not rest on an illusory 'categorical imperative,' but on the solid ground of *social instinct* as we find in the case of all social animals" (*op. cit.*, p. 124). Assuming that the "social instincts of animals" exist outside the experience which Professor Haeckel has fabricated for himself through willing thoughts and sensings, various questions remain to which Professor Haeckel hardly seems to have devoted enough attention. To the human being, the conception of duty involves the conception of authority to which submission must be yielded. The Professor does not show that the social instinct of social animals, merely as "instinct," involves any conception of such submission. Failing the Professor's proof, we may assert, on the ground of psychology and metaphysic, that the conception of necessary submission constitutes an entirely new factor in the contingency. To assert that this conception arises from the instinct is—well, just to assert. What the assertion is worth, as proof, has been already pretty fully investigated in earlier chapters.

But, even if we grant the Professor his point: that the feeling of duty does not "rest" on the "categorical imperative," but, that it "rests" on "social instinct," this nowise involves that, as man belongs to the social vertebrates, "*therefore*," he has "duties." This only follows on the condition that social instinct is identical with the conception of necessary submission

to authority. That duties theoretically "rest on" social instinct is not equivalent to the proposition that duties are, practically, necessarily incident to social instinct. Were this the case, the wolf, equally with the man, would perform duties merely by manifesting the social instinct. This would imply that the terms, duty and social instinct, expressed the same contingency. But, the Professor distinguishes between duty and social instinct, by implying that the one is only sequent to the other. The necessity of the sequence he fails to show.

The Professor is here too emulous of the grasshopper; he wants to take too big a jump. The social animals do not seem to worry themselves about authority, unless it be "social instinct," and even this authority has to be made by Professor Haeckel before it emerges from the "Ewigkeit." Now, the human animal worries itself most unmercifully about authority—even about the authority of the pontiff of monistic ethics and the carbon-soul religion, or the authority of the gentleman in blue: to say nothing of such authorities as Christ and God. The essence of duty, as it is conceived by the human animal, is necessary submission to authority outside the empirical personality of the agent, and what Professor Haeckel calls Kant's "curious idol, the famous 'categorical imperative'" has that complete relevancy to duty which is entirely lacking in Professor Haeckel's curious idol, the "social instinct."

Professor Haeckel implies that Kant's "categorical imperative" is discredited because "modern anthropology . . . has shown that conceptions of duty differ even more among uncivilised than among civilised nations. All the actions and customs which we



regard as sins or loathsome crimes (theft, fraud, murder, adultery, etc.) are considered by other nations in certain circumstances to be virtues, or even sacred duties" (p. 123). Kant's identification of duty is no more affected by such disparities in empirical estimates of what is or is not duty, than Professor Haeckel's identification of the "social instinct" in animals is affected by the fact that a pack of wolves is apt to "associate" with a flock of sheep by digesting the sheep. The question of the nature of duty, and the question of what constitutes its actual manifestation are entirely distinct, just as are the question of the nature of the social instinct and the question of what constitutes its actual manifestation. Submission to authority outside the empirical personality, involving duty, may be just as consistent with theft, or homicide, as submission to social instinct is consistent with one social animal's devouring another. Professor Haeckel confounds two entirely distinct contingencies: the nature of an activity, and the circumstances under which that activity is manifested. The man who slays or despoils in obedience to his "categorical imperative," performs "duty" as completely as does the man who, through like obedience, abstains from slaying or despoiling. The wolf that devours the sheep acts "social instinct" as completely as does the sheep that eats the grass.

In itself, duty is the conception of necessary submission to authority outside the empirical personality. In practical application, the conception involves what we call conscience, and what Kant called the categorical imperative. When this submission is yielded, "conscience" is satisfied. From the metaphysical

standpoint, conscience involves the willing of one or another of two feelings ("affective bodies"). These feelings involve special preferences and repulsions contingent to the willing of thoughts; belief; faith; other feelings; movements (actions). When the special liking or preference is willed, we feel that we have performed our "duty." When the special repulsion is willed, we feel that we have failed to perform our duty. What we call remorse, regret, are other feelings incident to the willing of "conscience." No merely social animal can be supposed to feel remorse or regret.

The authority to which, according to Professor Haeckel, the duty-performing carbon soul must yield submission, is not outside the empirical personality, but is merely a theory invented by Professor Haeckel, that, as he wills certain sensings involving certain movements (actions) of ostensibly active agents (social animals), and, as these movements imply, for Professor Haeckel, co-operation and mutual assistance among these animals, therefore, the human individual is to surpass this co-operative achievement, even to the extent of practising Christ's injunction: "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself," with which injunction, Professor Haeckel writes: "our monistic ethics is completely at one" (p. 124). This involves a delicate suggestion that the carbon soul is to become hypnotic to Professor Haeckel, as the Christian is hypnotic to Christ. But, what if the carbon soul bethinks itself of those social animals which, instead of co-operating and loving, take to killing and digesting! How will that affect hypnotic submission to Professor Haeckel, as authority outside the empirical personality of the carbon soul?

Is it not probable that the carbon soul will be in favour of emulating the "social" digesters, rather than the "social" digested, and that, instead of being hypnotic to Professor Haeckel, the carbon soul may feel inclined—shall we say, to make faces and snigger, at Professor Haeckel? Speaking personally, as, *pro tem.*, a carbon soul, I hardly think I should be hypnotic to Professor Haeckel. I think I should take kindly to the business of those digesting "socials." Moreover, I think I should have a large carbon majority of "socials" co-operating with me in the business of digesting. The Haeckellian carbon-soul theory, if not overtly accepted by society, seems now to have won its covert approval, and, even in its surreptitious guise, the theory seems to be very efficient in illustrating the digestive tendencies of "our monistic ethics," whatever Professor Haeckel, in his sanguine moments—apparently chronic—may think of the "ethics."

Professor Haeckel's roseate vision, coloured by his *etish-rapport* with his theory, is that what he calls "our monistic ethics" will "re-establish the natural equality of egoism and altruism, of the love of oneself and the love of one's neighbour" (p. 124). The implication seems to be that something has disestablished the "natural equality." As the Professor offers no evidence to support his assertion of the "natural" equality between self-love and love of others, and as all the evidence but that which perhaps Professor Haeckel has "up his sleeve" tends to assure us that love of others, except as emotional self-gratification on behalf of kindred or friends, is what may be termed a non-natural superstructure on the natural foundation of predaceous impulse—under these circum-

stances, it would seem that the Professor's assertion of the "natural" equality was hardly adequate to carry conviction, outside the hypnotic constituency that has Professor Haeckel for its prophet.

Professor Haeckel writes:—“(1) Both these concurrent impulses” (love of oneself and of others) “are natural laws of equal importance and necessity for the preservation of the family and the society; egoism secures the self-preservation of the individual, altruism that of the species which is made up of the chain of perishable individuals. (2) The social duties which are imposed by the social structure of the associated individuals, and by means of which it secures its preservation, are merely higher evolutionary stages of the social instincts, which we find in all higher social animals (as ‘habits which have become hereditary’). (3) In the case of civilised man all ethics, theoretical or practical, being ‘a science of rules,’ is connected with his view of the world at large, and consequently with his religion” (p. 124).

Incidentally, it may be remarked that, throughout his work, Professor Haeckel affirms the inheritance of acquired qualities. Thus, above, he writes of “habits which have become hereditary.” The great weight of recent biological investigation is dead against this central assumption of Professor Haeckel. What is called use-inheritance, involving that “habits” are transmitted hereditarily, may be termed an exploded biological fallacy. With the biological aspects of Professor Haeckel's theories I am not concerned; but, it seems to me that biologists of the prevailing cult will find plenty of “cock-shies” in Haeckellian biology.

Metaphysically considered, the above propositions

of Professor Haeckel are beatings of the air so far as regards ethics. They concern nothing but expediency. Ethics is an issue that involves conscience. Conscience is not concerned whether the individual, the species, or society is preserved. Conscience is only concerned about submission to authority outside the empirical personality. Nobody is "conscience-stricken" merely because his house is burnt down, and his family with it; or because his country is devastated and subdued by an enemy. Nobody would be conscience-stricken merely because he was the last of his species.

What is merely expedient can have ethical significance only on one condition: that the expediency is enforced by an authority outside the empirical personality of the individual, and able to control his conscience. Society, as enforcing particular expediencies, may be such an authority controlling the consciences of particular individuals, as hypnotics. These people will be "conscience-stricken" when they offend the expediencies enforced by society. In respect to such individuals, the expediencies will have ethical significance, while they may have none to other individuals. The lack of ethical significance to these other people will occur because their "conscience is clear" if they offend the expediencies.

Again, the expediencies of society may have ethical significance, beyond the question of society, as authority. This contingency will arise so soon as a higher authority than society complicates the issue. Such higher authority will exist so soon as the individual believes it to exist. It is safe to assert that, in one or another form, as God, there has always been, to the belief of individuals, a higher authority than

society. Then, if the expediencies of society offend what the individual believes to be the directions of the higher authority, those expediencies will offend the individual's conscience, unless he has deadened it by hypnotic helotry to society. On such conditions, if the individual tolerates those expediencies of society, he will have an "uneasy conscience": he will ignore the "categorical imperative," and connive at offence against God.

There is really no "stopping place," as authority, on the way to God, as authority. Society, like the individual, must have authority outside the empirical personality. The only authority outside the empirical personality of society is God, directly, to the individual, as belief, or, indirectly, as faith in some avatar taking his message directly from God. There is no "natural" ethical law; there is only "natural" law of expediency. Though this is not ethical law, it may have ethical significance to the individual who obeys society, as authority outside his empirical personality. If he so obeys society, notwithstanding his belief that society offends the higher authority, he prostitutes himself to the lower authority.

There can be no ethical law for societies but such law as has been educed incidentally to beliefs in God, as religion. All genuinely ethical laws emanate from religious revelations. These laws are not natural, in Professor Haeckel's sense of the term. Though they may be embodied in philosophies, ostensibly independent of religious revelation, the laws have never originated in such philosophies. The seed has had to be sown by religious revelation before philosophy could use the fruit. Philosophies have merely enunciated principles, consistent or inconsistent, as the

case may be, with those extra—or super—naturally imposed laws.

I am extremely sceptical that any "monistic ethicist"—to say nothing of the ordinary "social animal" of everyday life—will feel pangs of conscience through offending the laws of monistic ethics. Indeed, I doubt whether the arch-ethicist, Professor Haeckel himself, could muster a single pang purely on account of "monistic" criminality. I surmise that, if the pang came to the Professor, there would be something behind monistic ethics to account for the visitation. Unless the "overman" and the "blond brute" are to caper *ad lib.*, I fail to see that we can dispense with the "pang."

Before I could credit that Professor Haeckel's laws could show any result as pangs of conscience, I should need to increase my present stock of faith in Professor Haeckel's ability to rival Christ, or, say, Mohammed, as a hypnotist. Though Professor Haeckel assures us that "our monistic ethics is completely at one with Christianity" (notwithstanding that the ideal of the ethics is to equalise egoism and altruism, but that the Christ-ideal is to eradicate egoism), it would seem that the carbon-soul demonstration would tend to render that "natural equality of egoism and altruism," with which the Professor allures us, somewhat akin to the proverbial equality occurring between the litigant and his legal adviser. It would seem that the oyster would be likely to go—let us hope, with a plentiful supply of typhoid germs!—to egoism, and the shell to altruism.

Conscience may be considered, in the moral arena, analogous to pain, in the physiological arena, or, to a lighthouse on a rocky coast. Conscience is the moral

danger-signal: the empirical criterion, for the individual, of the ethical quality of action. The metaphysical criterion, in this connection, has been earlier dealt with. It is, shortly, for the Christian, hypnotic submission to Christ; for the Meta-Christian, belief regarding the conformity of action with God's supreme law: justice. Offence to Christ's teaching involves the "prick" of conscience to the Christian offender. Offence to the law of justice involves the prick of conscience to the Meta-Christian offender. No mere offence to what Professor Haeckel calls "a science of rules" can involve the prick of conscience. This depends on the authority, not on the "science." There is no prick for the "monistic ethicist," merely as a follower of "rules." The question, in regard to conscience, is the authority for the rules. The authority for the rules of monistic ethics is altogether inadequate to control conscience. Herein lies the great empirical difference between all merely "scientific" systems of conduct and those emanating from a "revealed" religion.

So far as regards conscience, it does not matter what "scientific" value attaches to the rules. They may be entirely "unscientific," or, judged from the standpoint of people who do not accept them, they may be foolish, cruel, unjust. Yet, that the prick of conscience is incident to their breach raises such rules on to an entirely different plane from that of merely scientific laws. Of course, "evolutionary" changes in religious revelations involve corresponding changes in regard to the relation between religiously ethical rules and conscience. As religions change, so do religiously ethical authorities outside the empirical personality. The man who has lost hypnotic sub-



mission to Christ must either lose religiously ethical authority outside his empirical personality, or must find another religiously ethical authority than Christ.

From the standpoint set forth in this work, the only religiously ethical authority available to the person who has lost Christ as such authority is the supreme authority, God: the authority of Christ, himself. At present, while Christ, as religiously ethical authority, is practically lost, there is practically no other religiously ethical authority, and people try to find substitutes for such authority, either in society itself, as imposing expediencies and conventions, or in various so-called scientific systems, of which, "monistic ethics" is an example. The inevitable result of this appeal to debased authorities is social and individual degeneracy.

## CHAPTER XXIV.

### THE HEAVENS AND EARTH.

IT is written: "God said, Let there be lights in the firmament of the heaven to divide the day from the night; and let them be for signs, and for seasons, and for days, and years: and let them be for lights in the firmament of the heaven to give light upon the earth: and it was so. And God made two great lights; the greater light to rule the day, and the lesser light to rule the night: *he made* the stars also. And God set them in the firmament of the heaven to give light upon the earth" (Gen. i. 14-17).

As scientific folk, we are assured that this Biblical account of the doings of God is too naively mythical and inconsistent with facts to be credible even to a child at school. As scientific folk, if we are assured of anything, we are assured that this account of "lights in the firmament to give light upon the earth," with the stars as a sort of afterthought of the Creator, is, as regards credibility, on the plane of the nursery fable. We know, as scientific folk, that this "greater light," ostensibly placed above the earth, as a sort of electric lamp, is more than a million times as large as the earth, and weighs as much as would 300,000 earths, and that some of those apparently minute points of light, called stars, are as large and brilliant as many suns.

As scientific folk, we know that this so-called firmament which, the scriptural account leads us to suppose, is spread out as a sort of ceiling to the earth, is limitless "space," within which the earth, as one of multitudes of comparative celestial mites, is performing various movements, under the immediate control of the sun which itself is performing movements under the control of other celestial bodies, and so on, *ad infinitum*, throughout the illimitable "space," which, in the Bible, is called the firmament. We need not further pursue this utter inconsistency between the Biblical account of the "firmament" and the "lights" for the earth, and what science has to say on the subject. The point with which we are now concerned is the question: Is the scientific account of these lights and the firmament less vulnerable, from the standpoint of metaphysic, than is the Biblical account, from the standpoint of science?

The essential problem, so far as regards metaphysic, depends on a critical investigation of two contingencies which we call movement and distance. To metaphysic, the only movement that is real experience is sensed and continuous difference, as distance, between objects. Such difference may be seen (visual) or felt (tactual). To metaphysic, there is no real movement but such as is seen or felt, as continuous difference, as distance, between objects. Intermittent difference—involving that objects are, in familiar terms, at one moment in one place, at another moment in another place—does not, in itself, to metaphysic, involve movement, but merely involves speculative assumption that something equivalent to movement has occurred. Metaphysically, we cannot accept this imaginative, ideal movement as any more

equivalent to real movement, than we can accept an imagined but insensible line or point as equivalent to a sensed line or point. To metaphysic, a line, point, movement only exist as sensed experience. Failing the sensed experience, the line, point, movement are, for metaphysic, chimerical—just as would be a disembodied house, mountain, steam-engine; or, just as is a numerical sign isolated from thoughts, feelings, or sensings.

Metaphysically analysed, movement involves the following willings:—

(a) Preter-empirical notions ("things") and sensory complexes, visual or tactual (together constituting objects of sense).

(b) The above in conjunction with a non-mnemonic grade and intensity of the consciousness-sensation (involving that the sensings are in "immediate experience").

(c) Distance-sensations, with and without mnemonic grade and intensity of the consciousness-sensation (involving that the distances are, empirically, continuous, though changing).

The above sensory and psychical experiences together constitute what we call movement.

Metaphysically analysed, intermittent change of position involves the following willings:—

(a) Preter-empirical notions and sensory complexes, with distance-sensation and non-mnemonic grade and intensity of the consciousness-sensation (involving that objects are in immediate experience and relative positions).

(b) Some of these preter-empirical notions and sensory complexes, with one or more distance-sensations and the mnemonic grade and intensity

of the consciousness-sensation (involving that the objects and distances are memorised).

(c) The difference-sensation (involving that the immediate and memorised experiences are brought into imaginary relationship). The above sensory and psychical experiences together constitute intermittent change of position.

It will be seen that, while in the case of movement, there is real continuity of experience as the objects, and empirical continuity as the distance-sensation; in the case of intermittence, there is not even empirical continuity of objects or distance-sensation. The experiences of movement and of intermittent change of position are, accordingly, entirely different. While it is practically convenient and necessary to assume their equivalence in connection with objects that we do not sense as moving, equally as in connection with objects that we do sense as moving, we must, in the case of the former objects, discriminate between our altogether fanciful proof of movement and its real experience. As empiricists, we may dogmatise as resolutely as we like on the ground of our fanciful proof. As metaphysicians, we cannot confound what is sensed experience with what is not.

Looking at the matter from the standpoint of what is called common-sense, it may seem absurd to question that, if a thing is seen in one position and afterwards in another, it has moved. When the metaphysician is taxed with this apparently absurd scepticism, he is tempted to "have it out" with his easy-going critic. To the metaphysician, to "move" implies that something manifests movement. So, he wants to know what is movement. Again, he wants to

know what sort of a thing can "manifest." He sees that, to "manifest," is to do something. So, he must know what can do anything. He finds that the only thing that can do anything is a soul, as will.

Accordingly, to the metaphysician, the "it" of the champion of common-sense has not "moved"; "it" has done nothing. Whatever it has apparently done is what the will has done with it. It "moves" because the will has constituted the above-indicated experiences, as movement. When the will has constituted other experiences, as intermittent change, "it" has not moved. If we say "it" has moved, we simply assert that one experience is another experience. Then, unless we prefer to emulate the carbonaceous dogmatist, we must show how one experience can be another experience.

For metaphysic there is no such possibility as that one can be another experience. Hence, metaphysic denies the possibility of all those so-called transformations, metamorphoses, equivalences which afford the physicist and chemist such an extensive field for speculative dogmatism. For instance, the metaphysician denies that, except as empirical illusion, there is any necessary connection between the "mixture" of oxygen and hydrogen and the experience which we call water. There is no such metaphysical possibility as, in familiar terms, the changing of one thing into another. There is only possibility of affording ourselves the illusion that willings of the universe are necessary antecedents of other such willings, and that the empirically "last" of such willings are products of the "transformation" of the empirically "first." Metaphysically, there is

no better ground for affirming "transformation" of the empirically first into last, than *vice versâ*.

Empirical order of succession has no causal significance to metaphysic. Thus, the comprehensive system of speculation involving the physicist's theory of the transformation of energy, and the chemist's theory of the transformation of substance, is, to metaphysic, a card-castle of logical illusionism. This applies to biological and geological successions. The biologist and geologist are in the empyrean of chimera as fully as are the chemist and physicist. To metaphysic, there is no better ground for affirming that "protista" preceded man, than that man preceded protista; that "nebulous matter" preceded what we experience as our world, the earth, than that the earth preceded nebulous matter; that the earth was cast off from the sun, than the sun, from the earth; that "palæozoic rocks" were antecedent to "alluvial deposits," than that the latter came earlier. All the causal antecedence and metamorphosis dealt with by empirical science is, to metaphysic, significant of like confusion as involves speculation to the assumption that intermittent change of position is equivalent to movement. For metaphysic, there is no causal necessity as between different experiences, involving that one is necessarily antecedent to another. Metaphysic denies causal relationship, except as between souls, and between God and souls.

It may be urged: surely there is causal sequence between, say, a whole orange and the parts into which we divide it! There is only this sequence as the willing of empirical illusion. When we "divide" the orange, we merely will the "whole" orange into latent universe (with mnemonic grade and intensity

of the consciousness-sensation), and will the "parts" into patent universe (with maximal grade and intensity of the consciousness-sensation), as "immediate experience." Metaphysically, each of the "parts" is as much a "whole" as is the empirically whole orange. The parts are only parts because we imaginatively identify them with the remembered whole.

But it may be urged: surely, when we cut up the orange, we have absolute proof that the parts are really the orange! Metaphysically, we have no such proof. For metaphysic, there is no "whole orange," but as a particular sensing. When there is some other sensing, as "parts," the "whole orange" still exists, in its integrity, as memory; otherwise we could not imagine the "parts," as parts. We have done nothing to the whole, except transfer it from one to another "storey" of mind. We have "transformed" it into nothing. We have merely imagined it as something else, as we imagine intermittent change of position to be equivalent to movement. For further discussion of this and cognate points I must refer the reader to *Heresies*. To metaphysic, parts are chimerical. The bearing of the metaphysical demonstration of the illusive nature of parts, on the logic of numbers, mathematics, is to demonstrate that this logic is one of illusion, analogous to that in the case of the concrete.

We may empirically illustrate this difference between chimerical and real movement, by an easy experiment, involving what astronomers call parallax, by which they measure celestial distances. If we fix a narrow strip of paper vertically in the middle of a window-pane, and observe through one eye, closing



the other, the situation of the paper relatively to an object outside—say, a tree-branch—and, later, bearing in mind this relative position between the paper and the object, gaze at the object through the other eye, we find that the relative position between the paper and the object is altered. The paper has chimerically moved. The change in distance has been intermittent, instead of continuous, and there has been no sensing as movement. This applies to astronomical determinations of celestial movements. These are merely intermittent changes in distances, and, as movement, are as fanciful as is the geometrical point or line, or the mathematical number.

Even when the astronomer, using his telescope, looks, say, at a planet passing over the face of the sun, he sees no movement; he merely sees intermittent differences in distances. He infers the movement on the ground of the intermittent differences. He has really no better ground for postulating movement than has a person for postulating the existence of an elephant merely on the ground that he imagines one to be before him. But, it may be urged, if the planet changes its position in regard to the edge of the sun, surely the planet or the sun must have moved! It has only moved in the sense that the paper has moved when we look at the branch behind, with one or the other eye, and note the positions of the paper.

Of course, metaphysically, the real movement is made by the soul, as willing the universe, just as is the chimerical movement. But this does not involve that making movement, as sensing, is to be confounded with making movement, as thought. We might as well confound a sensed elephant with an imagined

one. We sense heavenly bodies as in different positions with regard to one another, but we sense no movement of these bodies. We see the sun in one position in regard to ourselves one hour, and in another position the next, but we see no movement. We speculate that something must have moved to involve the change in position; but we have no means of demonstrating even analogy between this ostensible movement and what we sense as movement. Metaphysically considered, the astronomer has no scintilla of proof that heavenly bodies do move. To metaphysic, movement is as rigidly defined as sensed experience, as, to a geometer, an ideal point or line is defined as psychical experience. So soon as we begin confounding psychical and sensory experience, we prepare for the great plunge into the vortex of empirical illusion and speculative dogmatism called science.

The astronomer, on the ground of chimerical movement, is assured that the earth rotates about an ideally rigid axis, and the mathematical physicist, through his demonstration of what he calls gravitation, "explains" the why and wherefore of this assumed movement of the earth about its axis—as well as all other celestial movements. This "gravitation," metaphysically considered, is merely the fanciful externalisation, as a so-called force, of a fixed habit of willing the sensory universe, involving what I have termed a convention of sensing. Imagining this convention of willing to be an entity outside himself, just as he imagines a planet, or "matter," or light to be something outside himself, the mathematical physicist measures what he calls the "force of gravity." Because he never detects

any deviation from this convention of willing, as "gravity," the physicist assumes that "gravity" is operative outside the region of willing sensory experience as movement, just as it is operative within that region. But, inasmuch as he only knows "gravity" as incidental to the willing of sensed difference, as movement, and, as he senses no difference, as movement, in regard to heavenly bodies, the "gravitation" which he attributes to heavenly bodies must be as fanciful as is the movement he attributes to them.

That the astronomer's "law of gravitation" "explains" celestial movements follows naturally on its "explaining" terrestrial movements, inasmuch as the chimerical celestial movements are imagined to be typically identical with sensed terrestrial movements. But, this "explanation," by the law of gravitation, is quite outside the question whether the celestial movements are really typically identical with terrestrial movements. Metaphysic denies such identity, on the simple and ample grounds that terrestrial movement is continuously sensed difference in distance between objects, and that there is no such continuity of sensed difference in the case of celestial bodies. Terrestrial objects "move" merely because the soul wills them in such continuous states of mutual difference in position. If we see a terrestrial object at one moment in one position with regard to another object, and at another moment in another position, we speculatively affirm that the object has "moved," though we have had no actual experience as the movement. This speculative affirmation is justified in respect to the terrestrial object, because we have sensed experience

as movement, in regard to such an object. But we have no sensed experience, as movement, in regard to celestial bodies. In regard to such bodies, we have only sensed experience as intermittent difference in position, and, apart from pure speculation to identity, the movement we attribute to them can only be spurious, as an ideal re-presentation of the real movement we sense in connection with terrestrial bodies.

The facts of spiritism which have been earlier dealt with are complete empirical demonstration that the so-called force of gravity is merely a mode or convention of willing the sensory universe. Given such deviations from this convention as are profusely in evidence in the records of spiritistic phenomena, the ostensibly omnipresent, incessantly active "force" becomes unable to control the behaviour of a table, let alone of a planet, or sun. If we find that "gravity" cannot prevent a table from committing all sorts of outrages on "gravity's" ostensibly despotic sway, what rational ground, apart from practical convenience, have we for bowing to the scientist when he measures up the universe with "gravity" as his tape? What rational ground, apart from practical convenience, have we for predicating that gravity determines celestial movements, when we have copious empirical evidence that the determinate influence of gravity, even over the movements of a table, is frequently abolished?

As we can will away "gravity" terrestrially, why cannot we will it away celestially? If we can, why may not the sun have stood still, as readily as a table have jumped up towards the ceiling, or the waters of a sea have parted, or a human body have

flown up to "heaven"? Why shall "science" annihilate religious tradition as controlling the minds and actions of men? Why shall the intermittent displacements which "science" confounds with sensed movement involve that stars, suns, planets are not fixed in the "firmament," in conformity with tradition? Why shall the earth be spheroidal; ellipsoid; like a badly shaped peg-top; like a potato—all of which shapes are vouched for by scientific authorities—rather than flat? Why shall not the "firmament" be over the earth, like a ceiling, rather than be illimitable "space" containing the earth as an insignificant item? Why shall not the stars, suns, planets be "for lights in the firmament of the heaven to give light upon the earth," when we, on the earth, make it as well as the stars, suns, and planets?

Why shall the man with the telescope, microscope, spectroscope, equations, snuff out the Bible? As a metaphysician, I somehow think that the Bible is nearer the kernel of things than are those zealous denizens of the crepuscular recesses of empirical illusionism. We occasionally hear of a devotee who is styled flat-earthite, and whose definition of the shape of the earth is irreverently applied to himself by those who differ from his conclusions. It would seem, judging from the metaphysical standpoint, that whatever "flatness" there might be about this enthusiast was attributable rather to his efforts to establish his definition by the method of the round-earthite, than to his affirming the definition. If the flat-earthite would only take his stand on the metaphysical rock of truth that there is neither flat nor round, but as what is sensed as flat or round, he might make a passable show as rival to the advocate

of rotundity. So soon as the advocate of the pancake persuasion emulates his rival by floundering in the bog of confusion between the sensed real and ideal imaginary—between roundness or flatness that is not sensed, and roundness or flatness that is sensed—he may throw up the sponge and leave the field to his rival.

It may be urged that the movement of the earth about its fixed axis is demonstrated by what is known as Foucault's experiment, in which the plane of oscillation of a pendulum is in different positions with regard to the surrounding walls of the building ostensibly rotating correspondingly with the earth. The ostensible movement is here merely intermittent change in position, and, as such, ideal. No sensed movement, exclusive of that of the pendulum, is in evidence. There is merely speculative inference, on the ground of intermittent change in position, that sensed movement has occurred. The movement of the room, like that of the earth, is merely ideal.

It may be urged that the astronomer does see celestial bodies move when he sees them pass over the spider-threads in his telescope. The metaphysical answer to this objection is that what the astronomer then senses is terrestrial, not celestial movement. He then constitutes the celestial image a terrestrial sensing which he wills in relationship, as movement, with the spider-threads. But, it may be urged: if the image of the celestial body is moving, the body itself must be moving. Metaphysically, the celestial body is only "celestial" so long as it is willed celestial. When it is willed in the telescope, it is a "terrestrial" body, to the extent that what movement it manifests is terrestrial movement. If it is to move as a celestial

body, it must afford us the sensed experience of movement in relation to another celestial body. It is only "celestial" because we will it out of terrestrial relationship. When the astronomer sees it in the telescope, he wills it as a terrestrial body affording the possibility of experience of sensed movement in relation to another terrestrial body (the line in the telescope). When the astronomer gazes directly at the celestial body, he wills it out of terrestrial relationship. Then, the body does not move (unless, perchance, ideally).

The point to be noted here is that the body, *qua* body, does nothing. What does, is the astronomer's will. The astronomer can only will the body to move, as sensed experience, so soon as he constitutes the body terrestrial. Apart from this, there is no sensed movement, which, to metaphysic, is equivalent to saying that there is no movement. To call ideal movement, movement, is, to metaphysic, to confound the psychical with the sensory, as is calling an insensible line or point, a line or point. Metaphysic is much more solicitous about distinction between sensory and psychical than is empirical science.

Again, it may be urged: the astronomer moves his telescope in order to counteract the diurnal movement of the earth, when he is observing a star. It may be urged that the fact of the necessity of moving the telescope is proof of the movement of the earth. This cannot be granted. There is no metaphysical "proof" of movement but sensing, as movement. There may be practical proof, as inference from changed position of objects which, under other circumstances, we sense as moving. We do not sense the earth as moving. Then, it may be asked:

how are we to account for the necessity of moving the telescope in order to keep the star in view? Here, again, we must appeal to the causal agent, will.

We will ideal movement, as movement of the earth. This ideal movement we will in conjunction with sensed movement, as movement of the telescope. We imagine that we move the telescope because the earth moves independently of our willing it to move ideally. There is empirical, but not metaphysical, necessity (apart from God's determinism) in willing. Metaphysically, we no more will the telescope to move sensibly because we will the earth to move ideally, than *vice versa*. The earth is not proved to move because we have to move the telescope, any more than the telescope is proved to move because we will the earth to move. Metaphysically, we can predicate nothing about the earth's moving as does the telescope, merely on the ground that the telescope moves.

Then, it may be asked: why must the telescope be moved in order to keep the star in view? There is no metaphysical necessity that the telescope shall be moved. The necessity is only empirical. It is metaphysically possible to will away the ideal movement of the earth. Were this done, the earth would be ideally stationary. Then, if no ideal movement were willed to the star, we should not will sensed movement of the telescope in examining the star through the telescope.

It will be seen that, metaphysically, there is complete severance between sensed and ideal movement. The opposition between Biblical cosmology and that of empirical science occurs through the confusion, by empirical science, of ideal with sensed



experience. Celestial bodies move ideally, but not as sensed movement. To metaphysic, there is no movement but as sensed movement, just as there is no point or line, but as sensed. Practically, it is convenient and serviceable to ignore the distinction. The evil of the procedure arises when the confusion of sensory and psychical prejudices the highest concerns of humanity: religion and morality.

There is only empirically causal relationship between sensed movements of objects. The moving billiard ball causes the ball with which it comes into contact to move, only as empirical illusion. The ball that is empirically set moving has to be willed to move, just as has the ball which empirically causes the movement. Movement itself is nothing but the sensed experience, and we can only really predicate about movement by our experience as this sensing. About ideal movement we can predicate nothing but that it is an imagined analogue of the sensed experience. The necessary relationship between sensed and ideal movement is purely speculative, and, metaphysically, untenable. Of course, as illusion, the assumption of necessary relationship is practically necessary, as in other such cases earlier dealt with (choice, etc.).

What applies, in the case of movement, to celestial bodies, of course applies to the cases of bulk and distance. What is called apparent size or distance is the only metaphysically real size or distance. Ideal size or distance labours under the same metaphysical disabilities as does ideal movement. The fancifully enormous distances and sizes dealt with by astronomy have no metaphysical significance as indicating real size or distance. They are in like

illusory relationship with real (sensed) size or distance as is ideal movement with sensed movement. All these speculatively gigantic sizes, distances, orbits, paths, etc., dealt with by astronomy are ideal, and so, illusory when we confound them with sensed sizes, distances, etc. Biblical cosmology excludes these illusory contingencies. Hence arises its conflict with scientific cosmology.

The scientific empiricist is eloquent of the awe-inspiring magnitudes revealed by his illusionism. What he fails to note is the impressiveness of the fact that these magnitudes can only exist as his own fabrications, within his own mind. The converse to what has been above advanced regarding the magnitudes of the astronomer of course applies in the case of the infinitely minute. The infinitesimal magnitudes dealt with by the physicist, biologist, bacteriologist, mathematician, are the illusory opposites of the astronomer's magnitudes. The magnitude that is not sensed—whether revealed through the telescope, microscope, or beyond revelation through those instruments—is ideal, and, as such, illusory. What has been called the conflict between religion and science has arisen and persists through omission to take into account the metaphysical difference between the real, as sensing, and the illusory, as ideal re-presentation of sensing.

## CHAPTER XXV.

### VIRGIN BIRTH AND RESURRECTION.

PROFESSOR HAECKEL holds that an apocryphal gospel "probably furnishes the simple and natural solution of the 'world-riddle' of the supernatural conception and birth of Christ. The author curtly gives us in one sentence the remarkable statement which contains this solution: 'Josephus Pandera, the Roman officer of a Calabrian legion which was in Judæa, seduced Miriam of Bethlehem, and was the father of Jesus.' Other details given about Miriam (the Hebrew name for Mary) are far from doing to the credit of the 'Queen of Heaven'" *Riddle*, p. 116).

In the Lower House of Convocation, at York, there has recently been a discussion of this question of the birth of Christ. According to a report, in the *Manchester Guardian* of February 20th, 1903, Canon Lister said: "The facts of the virginal birth and of the Resurrection were the cardinal facts of their creed, but there were those who taught that these things were merely symbolic. . . . The facts of the virgin birth and of the Resurrection were now being either denied or were being regarded as matters of indifference by ministers of the Church and by applicants for ordination. . . . The whole question of faith was absolutely denied, and we were told that

the story of virginal birth was simply embroidery." Dr. Fremantle, Dean of Ripon, said: "There was a number of persons who most firmly believed in the incarnation of Christ, but who found difficulty with regard to the virgin birth. . . . He was himself a short time ago addressed on behalf of a large body of medical students, earnest Christians, who could not accept the teaching as to the virgin birth of Christ. . . . The belief that Our Lord showed Himself alive after his burial was, he believed, not doubted by any one who wished to enter the ministry, but the exact mode in which this came to pass was a most difficult question. He had not been able to satisfy himself upon it, and there was no philosophical view which had been promulgated that he could say was quite satisfactory."

Probably, Dean Fremantle has not read *Heresies*, in the fifth volume of which work I dealt with the resurrection of Christ, from the standpoint of metaphysic, and showed that, as possibility, it was merely corollary to the metaphysical demonstration of causality, and one of a typically identical class of phenomena perfectly familiar to those who had studied spiritistic records. Its metaphysical elucidation has been also incidentally given in earlier parts of the present work, dealing with apparitions. The Katie King "incarnation" is typical of the incarnation of Christ. The intensity of *rapport* between Christ and his followers was such that, in view of Christ's words to his followers, foretelling his resurrection, his failure to appear after "death," as a seen, touched, talking apparition, would have constituted, from the metaphysical standpoint, almost a deviation from the norm of contingency: we may say that the "miracle"

would have been the non-occurrence of the resurrection.

Though the virgin birth of Christ has been, by implication, dealt with in *Heresies* and in the present volume, it may be advisable to offer a few further remarks on the subject. About the metaphysical possibility of such birth there can be no doubt. The empirical contingencies attendant on sexual procreation are merely sensory and psychical incidentals to the essential act, which is suggestion to the "unborn" soul to actualise the universe as its (the soul's) body, or medium. There is no metaphysical necessity that this "pre-natal" suggestion shall emanate from two souls, rather than from one soul. Professor Haeckel's "cell-nuclei" have no more really causal significance in this pre-natal suggestion, than his "substance," as the carbon soul, has in post-natal suggestion, or than the physicist's "gravity" has, in the descent of an apple from the tree.

It is metaphysically possible that a woman, alone, may impose pre-natal suggestion on an "unborn" soul, to the result of birth. In common terms, it is metaphysically possible that a woman may conceive and bear a child without having sexual commerce with a man. It is not metaphysically possible that a man, alone, may impose such pre-natal suggestion, to the result that the suggestion is effectuated as birth, because it is not metaphysically possible for the man to will that part of the sensory universe constituting, as the sexually female organism, the necessary conjunction of sensory willings incident to actualisation, by the "unborn" soul, of its body, as sensory auto-suggestion. Though it is metaphysically possible that the man may, alone, impose pre-natal suggestion on

an unborn soul, that soul cannot effectuate the suggestion, as birth through the man, because the man cannot will those sensings consistent with the unborn soul's willing of sensings as its own body. It will be seen that the metaphysical disability is not in regard to pre-natal suggestion, by the man, to the unborn soul, but is in regard to the man's capacity to will sensings consistent with the unborn soul's willing of the universe as its (the soul's) body.

Even in normal bi-sexual procreation, it is quite possible, and probably often occurs, that pre-natal suggestion emanates from one, to the exclusion of another, of the agents. The empirical efficient (orgasm, movements, cells, etc.) are entirely distinct from the essentially procreative activity: pre-natal suggestion, involving auto-suggestion by the "unborn" soul. Apart from issues arising through this essential act of suggestion, sexual commerce is on the plane of any other satisfaction of normal appetite. The above propositions are empirically supported by the commonest facts attending procreation. In almost every case, we see ample evidence of the suggestive prepotency of one rather than another parent. A child may resemble one parent, in appearance, temperament, aptitudes, etc., to the practical exclusion of resemblance to the other parent. Again, as everybody knows, many sexual acts are entirely abortive as regards pre-natal suggestion. Facts such as these are totally inconsistent with materialistic notions of the nature of procreation. The empirical incidentals are non-essential to the causal act.

Digressing for a moment, it may be observed that the empirical confusion between pre-natal suggestion

and its unessential accompaniments leads to many false conclusions regarding what is misnamed sexual morality. At present, what is called sexual morality is a chaos of misconceptions regarding the moral issue. Instead of sexual morality, we have sexual expediency based on the fallacy that the physical act is equivalent to the essential act. In itself, the mere satisfaction of the sexual appetite is as morally indifferent as is the satisfaction of hunger or thirst. The moral issue, in regard to sexual intercourse, is only existent in regard to the consistency or inconsistency of the sexual act with justice. If the sexual act involves injustice, it is morally wrong. If it does not involve injustice, it is morally indifferent. If it involves justice, it is morally right.

The sexual expediency at present enforced by society is practically necessary. Nevertheless, the present unjust social conditions involve that this expediency is answerable for wholesale injustice, as the product of indiscriminate pre-natal suggestion. As at present constituted, society practically compels the vast majority of parents to bring children into the world pre-destined to mental and physical evil. Thus, society compels those parents to perpetrate injustice on their offspring. On the condition of pre-determining offspring to mental and physical evil, or of excluding pre-natal suggestion, justice demands the latter. Then, the gratification of the sexual appetite, without pre-natal suggestion, involves justice; with pre-natal suggestion, the gratification involves injustice. To put the matter bluntly, society's moral iniquity involves that multitudes of parents commit as flagrant wrong in bringing children into the world as those parents would commit by

sending the children out of the world—killing them, and everybody who tolerates society's iniquity participates in the wrong to those children.

What is misnamed sexual love is, as regards the sexual character of the manifestation, an animal instinct of the most primitive order, involving what may be termed a predatory form of hypnotic subjection of one to another soul. In itself, the subjection has no affinity to the higher and permanent emotional attachments constituting human love, but is probably the most blindly selfish and capricious of states. In the great majority of cases of the inceptive stage of sexual love (whether licit or illicit) there is probably little complication of the primitively animal impulse by the higher emotional impulses, and whether the latter will, later, manifest themselves may be said to be wholly problematical. What we familiarly term being in love is, in most cases, being in a morbid state of self-concentration and hypnotic rapacity, mimicking devotion to another person. The "ardent lover" is, as a rule, the ardent lover of self, eager only to possess, deceiving him or herself and others, and often discovering, to his or her cost, the gravity of the deception. While, on the one hand, it is expedient that society shall discriminate between a contract for permanent cohabitation and family responsibility, and promiscuous intercourse, it is obvious that, in view of the conditions on which the contract is commonly undertaken, there is little assurance that the enforcement shall not involve wanton oppression by society and gratuitous hardship to those who have accepted the obligation.

Thus, we find that physiology and biology are no more finally destructive of the Bible, in regard to the



birth of Christ, than physics and astronomy are destructive of the Bible, in regard to the "firmament" and "lights" to the earth. Moreover, it will be seen that those who, in these days, are solicitous about the integrity of the Biblical cosmogony and record of the birth and resurrection of Christ, must appeal to metaphysic, or be void of belief, surrendering themselves to the Bible merely as hypnotics in *fetish-rapport* with a book. Dr. Fremantle, above quoted, asserts that the fact of the resurrection of Christ is "not doubted by any one who wished to enter the ministry." It seems difficult, apart from intellectual acceptance of the metaphysic I enunciate, to apprehend on what grounds the Dean asserts this lack of doubt about the fact of the resurrection of Christ, whether in the case of people who wish to enter the ministry, or of those who care nothing about entering the ministry. If people do not doubt, they believe. If they merely acquiesce, as hypnotics, doubt is out of the question, inasmuch as doubt, as earlier shown, is merely the absence of belief. Apparently, the Dean confounds hypnotic acquiescence with the absence of doubt. As the acquiescence excludes the contingency of intellectual discrimination, it excludes doubt. The confusion is here of an intellectual manifestation: belief, with an emotional, or hypnotic manifestation: acquiescence on the ground of faith devoid of intellectual credentials. This acquiescence involves *fetish-rapport* with a book and the authority of a particular human organisation called the Church. Anybody in this helot state will hold the facts of the resurrection and virgin birth of Christ as articles of "faith" not coincident with belief. The assertion that such a person does not "doubt" the facts carries the impli-

cation that he holds them on the ground of intellectual acceptance.

The confusion of intellectual with hypnotic acceptance involves that theological attempts to meet the results of modern critical investigation of the ostensible facts on which the Christian cult is based, resolve themselves either into disingenuous efforts to evade, or into implicit or explicit confession of inability to meet, the criticism, with, in the latter case, self-surrender to the authority of precedent. If a man is hypnotic, he is beyond control by "himself," and is justified by his impotency. But this age demands that the man shall be real, not sham, hypnotic, when Christ is the hypnotist.

If a man, as hypnotic to Christ, elects to strangle his intellect and surrender himself to Christ, that is his affair, and nobody need reproach him. But if a man, professing so, to strangle his intellect and to follow Christ, does not follow Christ, but merely renders his ostensible devotion to Christ a cloak under which he may follow Christ just as far as suits his inclinations and selfish interests, then that man becomes a source of corruption which it is the business of those who accept their intellects as God's direction, to eliminate from society.

If the virgin birth and resurrection are facts to be accepted on the ground of "faith" by the hypnotic to Christ, what Christ demanded of his followers are equally facts, but self-evident without any exercise of "faith" to everybody who reads the record of Christ. Those people who comfort themselves by strangling their intellects in order to be in *fetish-rapport* with a book must, in these days, prove their *bond fides*, not merely by accepting the virgin birth and resurrection,

but by practising the specific lines of conduct imposed by Christ. If these people do thus manifest their *bonâ fides*, they will freely and joyfully renounce their personal pretensions, claims, advantages, in order to facilitate the institution of that social dispensation revealed by Meta-Christianity as conformable with Christ's teaching, as well as with the teaching of intellect.

## CHAPTER XXVI.

### FAITH AND WORKS.

As earlier indicated, Christ demanded unquestioning mechanical obedience of his followers as the fruits of hypnotic "faith." Christ himself professed to do nothing of his own initiative, but only as one in hypnotic *rappori* with God. "Verily, verily, I say unto you, The Son can do nothing of himself, but what he seeth the Father do. for what things soever he doeth these also doeth the Son likewise. For as the Father raiseth up the dead, and quickeneth them; even so the Son quickeneth whom he will. For the Father judgeth no man, but hath committed all judgment unto the Son: That all men should honour the Son, even as they honour the Father. He that honoureth not the Son honoureth not the Father which hath sent him. For as the Father hath life in himself; so hath he given to the Son to have life in himself; And hath given him authority to execute judgment also" (John v. 19, 21, 22, 23, 26, 27). Christ's hypnotic submission to God was such as Christ demanded of his followers, in regard to himself. Christ's action was conformable with this submission to God, as Christ demanded that his followers' action should be conformable with submission to him. "I can of mine own self do nothing: as I hear, I judge: and my judgment is just; because I seek not mine own will,

but the will of the Father which hath sent me" (*ibid.*, 30). So, the follower of Christ must not "seek his own will," but must obey authority outside himself: Christ, as Christ obeyed authority outside himself: God. "He that speaketh of himself seeketh his own glory: but he that seeketh his glory that sent him, the same is true, and no unrighteousness is in him" (John vii. 18).

Christ did not demand faith in himself, for himself, but merely as being what may be termed fetish through which faith might be manifested in God. "He that believeth on me, believeth not on me, but on him that sent me. And he that seeth me seeth him that sent me. For I have not spoken of myself; but the Father which sent me, he gave me a commandment, what I should say, and what I should speak" (John xii. 44, 45, 49). "I am the way, the truth, and the life: no man cometh unto the Father, but by me" (John xiv. 6). "Believest thou not that I am in the Father, and the Father in me? the words that I speak unto you, I speak not of myself: but the Father that dwelleth in me, he doeth the works" (John xiv. 10). Given this fetish-*rapport*, the follower of Christ would be able to do what Christ did. "Verily, verily, I say unto you, He that believeth on me, the works that I do shall he do also; and greater works than these shall he do; because I go unto my Father" (John xiv. 12).

The so-called miracles performed by Christ are, now, evidently of the class of spiritistic phenomena dealt with in this work, and are interpretable by the metaphysical demonstrations of causality earlier set forth. The physical miracles of Christ involved deviations from what I have termed convention of

sensing effected through Christ's will-dominance as suggesting the sensory universe, just as in the cases of Angélique Cottin, Home, Covindasamy. In the light of modern psychical investigation and meta-physical demonstration of causality, Biblical miracles range themselves in the series of "natural" phenomena. This applies to the moral and religious conversions effected by Christ, which involved deviations from willing conventions as the psychical universe, analogous to the deviations obtaining in the sensory arena. The supremacy of Christ, as a moral and religious regenerator, lies in his supremacy as teaching and practising the sacrifice of the animal self, and so illustrating, in his life and doctrine, the supreme law of submission to authority outside the empirical personality.

Dr. Fremantle and Canon Lister are solicitous about the integrity of acceptance, by "faith," of the Church-teaching of the virgin birth and resurrection of Christ. Christ himself would have placed small store on such acceptance unless as conducing to faith in himself, as authority outside the empirical personality. Failing this latter submission, the acceptance of the virgin birth and resurrection would, to Christ, rather have constituted means to damnation than salvation. Christ did not want academic faith. What he wanted was faith manifesting itself as deeds, and these deeds such as he inculcated. For Christ, the only proof of faith was deeds. "If ye have faith as a grain of mustard seed, ye shall say unto this mountain, Remove hence to yonder place; and it shall remove; and nothing shall be impossible unto you" (Matt. xvii. 20). Metaphysic entirely confirms Christ's assertion regarding the possibility of moving

the mountain. Will makes the mountain to be there; will can make the mountain not to be there.

Let us see what Christ demanded, as proof of faith. To the rich man who had obeyed the Jewish commandments and asked what he should do, further, to inherit eternal life, Christ replied: "One thing thou lackest: go thy way, sell whatsoever thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven: and come, take up the cross, and follow me" (Mark x. 21). It will be seen that renouncing his property, by the rich man, was merely to be a preliminary to following Christ. That the mere fact of being wealthy is incompatible with following Christ is distinctly and often laid down by Christ. "It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of God" (*ibid.*, 25). "No servant can serve two masters: for either he will hate the one, and love the other; or else he will hold to the one, and despise the other. Ye cannot serve God and mammon" (Luke xvi. 13).

Let us now see what Christ meant by following him. "Love your enemies, do good to them which hate you. Bless them that curse you, and pray for them which despitefully use you. And unto him that smiteth thee on the one cheek offer also the other; and him that taketh away thy cloke forbid not to take thy coat also. Give to every man that asketh of thee; and of him that taketh away thy goods ask them not again. And as ye would that men should do to you, do ye also to them likewise. For if ye love them which love you, what thank have ye? for sinners also love those that love them. And if ye lend to them of whom ye hope to receive, what thank have ye? for sinners also lend to sinners, to

receive as much again. But love ye your enemies, and do good, and lend, hoping for nothing again. Be ye therefore merciful, as your Father also is merciful. Judge not, and ye shall not be judged: condemn not, and ye shall not be condemned: forgive, and ye shall be forgiven" (Luke vi. 27-37). "If any man will come after me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross daily, and follow me. For whosoever will save his life shall lose it: but whosoever will lose his life for my sake, the same shall save it" (Luke ix. 23-24). "He that loveth his life shall lose it; and he that hateth his life in this world shall keep it unto life eternal. If any man serve me, let him follow me" (John xii. 25-26). "Ye call me Master and Lord: and ye say well; for so I am. If I then, your Lord and Master, have washed your feet; ye also ought to wash one another's feet. For I have given you an example, that ye should do as I have done to you" (John xiii. 13-15).

It will be obvious that acceptance, by faith, of any traditional doing or incident in the career of Christ is entirely subsidiary to the question of following Christ. *Fetish-rapport* with Church creeds and dogmas, without practical following of Christ, involves a like contingency as that expressed in the homely adage: Advice, without relief, is like mustard without beef. This age requires from Deans and Canons, to say nothing of the ruck of Christians, the "beef" as well as the "mustard." The time seems not very distant when the rich Christian will need to make an approach to following Christ, by unshipping the metalliferous cargo. Deans and Canons, and Archbishops and Bishops, will appear to advantage at the head of the cargo-disgorgers. Then, they may start following



Christ. It will be obvious that, on such conditions, there will be little obstruction, by Christians, to the institution of justice, as the foundation of the social system.

To Christ, there was no intrinsic merit or demerit in works. Their quality solely depended on the authority to which they involved hypnotic submission. An intellectual criterion of conduct, involving belief that intellect constituted God's direct command to the individual, was outside the purview of Christ. All were "publicans and sinners" who did not act as hypnotics to the Mosaic law, or to Christ. Christ entirely ignored the existence of any system of moral or religious law other than the Mosaic. Of Brahmanism, Buddhism, Confucianism, and other non-Mosaic cults, Christ, apparently, was completely ignorant. He looked on himself as exclusively hypnotic to God, and laid down that the only merit in human works was in their emanation through hypnotic submission to himself, as exclusive hypnotic to God. Thus, Christ compares himself to a "way," "door," through which, alone, is entrance to heaven. "I am the door: by me if any man enter in, he shall be saved" (John x. 9). "Verily, verily, I say unto you, He that entereth not by the door into the sheepfold, but climbeth up some other way, the same is a thief and a robber" (*ibid.*, 1). Similarly, Christ compares himself to bread. "I am the living bread which came down from heaven: if any man eat of this bread, he shall live for ever" (John vi. 51). The dutiful pew-occupant, of the practical order, takes Christ literally and imagines he is eating the "bread" when he puts something from the bakery into his mouth.

Obviously, all the rationalising casuistry, called

theology, involving what passes as Christianity, is entirely foreign to the essential nature of the cult as enunciated by Christ himself. Reasoners were utterly incongruous with what Christ indicated as his followers. His directions were rigid, concise, clear. All that Christ's Christian had to do was, as hypnotic machine, to obey the directions. He was not to "love" merely as emotional self-indulgence, but, because Christ directed him to love. This "love" has no necessary analogy to the common manifestation. Its essential nature may be termed a sort of professional etiquette observed in obedience to Christ. Of course, this professional "love" is not inconsistent with the normal impulse; but, in itself, the Christian "love" is quite another sort of manifestation. Loving one's neighbour as oneself, from Christ's standpoint, means essentially the same thing as the justice of Meta-Christianity—treating others according to the same standard of right as you would desire to be treated by: doing to them as you would like them to do to you. Similarly, Christ's Christian was not to bare himself for others; to succour, serve, yield to, others, from mere benevolent impulse; but from mechanical, hypnotic submission to Christ. All those emotional manifestations which we normally show as the gratification of spontaneous impulse were, in the case of Christ's Christian, to be analogous to the automatic responses of the ordinary hypnotic to the hypnotist.

For this hypnotic submission, Christ promised an unspeakably great reward. There can be no doubt that, in this aspect, Christ's appeal was, at root, to selfishness. Or, can it be doubted that, failing this appeal to selfishness, the hypnotic subjection would

have been insufficient to ensure the spread of the new cult. It seems to me that the intellectual elaboration of Christ's teaching, rendered possible through modern metaphysic and psychical research, involves elevation of that teaching and its re-statement as an ideal more completely divorced from selfishness than is the ideal of the traditional cult. The eternal bribe running through the latter cult seems to jar on the modern appreciation of the majesty of Deity, and to divert the aspirations from a really unselfish principle of right. To my apprehension, emotional Christianity, as an exclusively religious agency, has done its work for humanity, and must be supplemented by what I have propounded as Meta-Christianity. If there is one thing conspicuously absent in what is called civilisation, it is the form of love which we must rationally identify with Christianity. Whatever may have been its possibilities in ante-intellectual epochs, now, it is a dream. Indeed, if history is to be our means of judgment, this Christian love has been hardly more conspicuous in former ages than it is

## CHAPTER XXVII.

### RELIGION SMASHING WHILE YOU WAIT.

THERE can only be conflict between religion and science to those who, mistaking the illusionism of science for the demonstrably real, adopt science as the criterion by which to test the validity of religious records. Even assuming that science were the final test of the validity of religious records as elucidating what are called phenomenal facts, this would not involve that science was the final test of these records as revealing religious and moral truth. Far from being such a test of religious records in their attitude to the facts specially appropriated as its own province, by science, science is proved, by metaphysical scrutiny, to be merely a limited and vulnerable authority even in regard to those special facts. The observed phenomena, to which science has limited and provisional applicability, are now, to the familiar knowledge of everybody who has studied recent research in the spiritistic arena, but what may be termed a fragment of the world of observation. So far from elucidating these spiritistic facts, science has not the remotest applicability to them. The facts dealt with by science are merely what may be termed superficial strata, underlying which are the spiritistic facts with which science is incompetent to deal. Before science can show the

relevancy of its criticism of religious records, science must show its relevancy to those spiritistic facts. Metaphysic shows that the fundamental presuppositions of science necessarily involve that science is inherently irrelevant to those spiritistic facts.

The superficialists who apply science to discrediting religious records ignorantly overlook that science is not even a finally competent court in regard to the limited range of facts within its special arena. Ignorant of metaphysical scrutiny demonstrating this incompetency of science, these superficialists, posing as reliable teachers, are turning the masses into an atheistic rabble. Before me is a Socialist paper which, as "facts which any advertiser may verify," states its "guaranteed circulation" for four weeks, ending February 27th, 1903, as ranging from about 41,000 to 43,000 copies as the latest weekly record. In this paper, for several weeks, the editor (who made that delivery, earlier adverted to, regarding the demolition of religion by Professor Haeckel's book) has been engaged in what he seems to imagine is a serious attack on religion. Under his latest onslaught, appearing March 6th, is an announcement that 90 per cent. of the readers of the paper are "free thinkers," and that, if the editor wavers in his attack on "superstition," the 90 per cent. "will stop their subscription to the paper." The stuff appearing in this paper is typical of what passes, with the masses, as demolition of religion.

Travelling in a country district in the North, I was reading the article in question when a clergyman entered the compartment. We were the only occupants and we got chatting. I asked him whether he had seen the article. He led me to understand

that he had not before seen or heard of the paper. I handed him the paper, and he read a little and put it on the seat, remarking: "What can you do if people do not believe in God?" I suggested that the attack was on specific propositions which conflicted with science. He replied that there was no conflict: science and religion were like two trains running on different lines. I suggested that assertion to this effect was not proof, and that people took for granted that there was collision in which religion had been shattered. They supposed, I suggested, that religion was bound up with Biblical statements as to fact, and that these statements had been disproved by science. For instance, I suggested, there are the Biblical statements regarding the creation and the virgin birth of Christ; science says they are untrue, and people believe science. On such grounds people are rejecting religion. He confessed that the Biblical statements were apparently irreconcilable with science, but urged that faith and miracle were the solvents. But, I suggested, if there is more faith in science than in the records of miracle, how are faith and miracle going to help religion? He confessed that he did not see a "way out," though, in his district, he said, he had noticed no tendency to fall away from religion. I suggested that the only way to meet science was to show, by the method of science, that science was vulnerable even within its own province. But how? he asked. I said that the proof was afforded by modern metaphysic and investigation of spiritistic phenomena. There our conversation ended, as he left the train.

What such criticism as that with which we are at present concerned lacks in critical significance, it

derives as solemn buffoonery with the obvious and plausible as though they were the profound and demonstrated. The obvious appeals to everybody. The fluent scribbler or gabbler who effectively "plays to the gallery" with what it has half evolved itself is the prophet and leader of these days. The "heaw," "heaw," between the selections, of a mob of hypnotics, is music that prevents any whisper of scepticism as to the irresistible power of his own trombonic performance from disturbing the solo virtuoso. Louder and louder surges the resonance of his performance until it rivals that of those horse-power engines of destruction that one notices grinding out selections from the music-hall programmes in front of the fat-woman and five-legged calf shows. So we get, among a number of like subversals, the demolition of religion while you wait. Such a prophet will flatten religion as he will an over-venturesome fly that gets to business on his nose when the "gas" is at high pressure.

Uncritically implying that their own canons of truth, emanating through what they ignorantly imagine to be exclusively science, are finally decisive, critics of the calibre with which we are now dealing merely appropriate to themselves the infallibility which they condemn others for attributing to the Bible. Applying to these incompetents the test of metaphysic, it is obvious that their infallibility is no less a *minus* quantity than, to them, is the infallibility of the Bible. The metaphysician has no more reverence for their "evolution," biology, chemistry, physics, than these cheap critics have for Biblical cosmogony. Moreover, recognising that truth is (intellectually) merely the act of believing and its externalised

product as subject of belief; or (emotionally), what is held as hypnotic submission to authority, the meta-physician recognises that, to those who believe, or who hold by hypnotic submission, the Biblical pronouncements regarding cosmogony, they are as true, to-day, as they were to the primitive folk to whom they first came as revelation of the works of Deity; or, as are the revelations in a treatise on evolution, to the cock-sure babblers of the jargon of empirical dogma.

The authority of the Bible and of all religious records absolutely differentiates them from secular revelations, to the extent that the efficiency of such records in inspiring mankind with consciousness of a directing Power transcending their own individualities and in projecting human aspirations beyond the plane of animal impulses, has been such as we cannot conceive to have possibly emanated from any secular process of revelation. The peculiar character of religious records lies not primarily even in their ethical teaching, but in their imposition of conviction that the teaching is determined by superhuman authority. No secular revelation has accomplished or could accomplish such imposition of authority on humanity as has emanated through religious records. Though the ethics of such records may lack applicability to one or another age or race; though their "facts" may be discredited to one or another age, these records are unique as revelations of God, to humanity. Their unique character is proved by their unique influence. They have started and rendered persistent influences on humanity that time cannot obliterate and which are entirely distinct from what may be termed normal tendency. Failing these



influences, the last thing that would have occurred to a rationalising atheist like Professor Haeckel would have been to advocate the Christian type of morality. Atheists themselves are standing testimony to the unique influence of religious records.

Were the explicit and implicit ethical teachings of these records and their pronouncements as to facts renounced to-morrow, by humanity, their unique character, as revelations of God to mankind, would not be affected. They would stand out, notwithstanding the rejection, typically distinct from all secular revelation. If there were no metaphysic to confound scientific atheism, these records would confound it. That they exist is a problem that scientific atheism cannot solve by its canons of causal sequence. To account for the Hebraic, Christian, Mohammedan, Egyptian, Assyrian, Babylonian, Buddhist, Brahmanical eschatologies and ethics, and their persistent domination of the human mind, unless from the presupposition that a Power outside the limitations of human empiricism has determined them as special revelations of itself to humanity, is as futile as to try to account for modern astronomy unless from the presuppositions discovered by Kepler and Newton. The specialism of these religious records is as determinate as is the specialism emanating from Kepler and Newton. As Kepler and Newton were determined for one type of revelation, those who crystallised religious inspiration into particular forms of expression were determined for another type of revelation. The present credibility or incredibility of the pronouncements of Christ or Mohammed no more affects Christ's and Mohammed's positions as religiously inspired, than the discrediting of Newtonian

cosmology would affect Newton, as inspired in the arenas of experiment and mathematics.

Turning to the religious documents themselves, if present society discovers imperfections in them can no more affect their intrinsic character, than the discovery of flaws in Newton's conclusions now affects the character of his revelation, as mathematical physics. The religion smasher implies that, as religious records diverge from what is called scientific truth, these records are "untrue," and being untrue are spurious as revelation of God. *Ergo*, according to these critics, as there is no revelation of God but ostensibly through these records, there is no proof of God at all. By truth, this cut of critic implies some particular dogmatism happening to prevail within his range of culture, which is limited by what he calls science. He ignores, in the particular connection—though, in other connections, he retains vividly in memory—that a few centuries ago, another range of culture prevailed that ensured that those who had a hankering for "science" stood in peril of the rack. He assumes that this "science" which is so overpoweringly true to him, was as true when it involved a Bruno's penalty. Thus, he feels towards those Inquisitors much as they may be supposed to have felt towards Bruno, and, given their conditions, it is not unreasonable to suppose that our critic who now heaps so much condemnation on them would have acted as did those Inquisitors.

Indeed, it is tolerably obvious that multitudes of atheists, fond of reviling "religion," on account of its bloody methods, as well as ostensible Christians, all calling themselves Socialists and lovers of their fellows, would be quite ready, to-day, given the

power, to emulate the bloodiest deeds of "religion," in order to overcome resistance by those who objected to be despoiled, on the grounds advanced by those lovers of their fellows, of what the sufferers believed to be rightfully acquired property. If these benevolent atheists and Christians, on their present grounds, came to despoil me, I surmise there might be danger that one or more of them prematurely solved the problem of post-mundane existence, and that my fate, ultimately, had a family likeness to that of Bruno.

The sort of critic, now in question, has not troubled himself about metaphysical investigation of the nature of truth, which he confounds with subjects of belief, and implies to be only his subjects of belief. Metaphysic shows that truth is not any particular subject of belief, but is indifferently any subject of belief. The act of believing, not the mere externalisation of the act, as subject of belief, involves truth. All subjects of belief are equally true to those who hold them, as belief. We "know" nothing, except as belief. "Science" is true to the religion smasher; it is not true to the African savage. That religious records should be true, in the sense of this critic, would involve that they propounded theories of the universe at once adapted for acceptance by the modern physicist and the pre-historic Semite.

Again, taking this critic on his own ground, it has been shown, in this work, that some of the most important propositions in those religious records, on which propositions he bases his assertion that the records are "untrue," are as consistent with the truth of metaphysic as they are inconsistent with the truth of "science." Obviously, if this critic is to take his

stand on the "truth" of science, he must disqualify the "truth" of metaphysic. Then, but not before, he will be in a position to apply his criterion of "truth" to the religious records. Moreover, when he has disqualified metaphysic, he will merely be in his present position, as judge of the truth of the religious records. Though he will have validated "science" as truth for himself, he will not have touched a hair of the truth of the religious records for multitudes of devout and ignorant bigots within a mile of himself, to say nothing of those ancient Semites to whom the truth was earlier revealed. This sort of critic implies that he knows so much that there will be no getting to know anything more after he has vacated the terrestrial plane, and that there was no knowing in the world before the chick, "science," cracked the shell and began to toddle about as an egregiously pretentious religion smasher.

To empirical theorists, it is a matter of moment that they shall have "scientific" dogma about origins. As regards religion, it is immaterial how things originated, so long as we are assured that they originated through God. Inspired revealers of religion fulfilled their office, as regards the question of phenomenal manifestations, when they afforded mankind assurance that God was the motive force behind these manifestations. What may be termed a moment in the life of humanity has come, in which people, on the ground of "science," doubt or deny the truth of religious records and the existence of God. Now comes, also, metaphysic to confound the vanity and dispel the darkness of these people, and to re-invigorate, for this and coming ages, apprehension of the truth of God's self-revelation to humanity.

Religious records, as this revelation of God, empirically vary in their specific directions, accordingly as they are given to one or another age and race. This does not affect their constancy and integrity, *en masse*, as revelation. As we are of one or another race or age, we get one or another religious record as our special measure of revelation. Within recent epochs, a contingency has arisen, as what we call science, involving that a criterion is applied to these records such as was not accessible when the records were originally given to humanity. This criterion involves that we apply intellectual scrutiny to the records. This scrutiny, inadequately applied, involves what is called scepticism, and denial of God, as authority outside the empirical personality. Adequately applied, the scrutiny involves what has been set forth, in this work, as Meta-Christianity, which is an appeal to the same final authority as that to which appeal is made in the records, and raises no question as to the integrity of religious records as self-revelation of God.

On one condition, everybody is justified in abstaining from applying intellect as critic of the records, or in so applying it. The condition is that he is honest in the application or abstention. If he applies intellect as critic, he must follow intellect as direction. If he abstains from applying intellect as critic, he must follow the record as direction. In the latter case, he will be honest hypnotic in fetish-*rapport* with an avatar and book. In either case, he must obey authority outside himself, and the authority—God. If, as hypnotic, he is Christian, he must conform his action to the teaching of the Christian record; if Jew, to the Jewish record's; if Mohammedan, to that

record's; if Meta-Christian, to the metaphysical demonstration of right. In all but the last case, we must act, so far as regards the teaching, as what may be termed mechanisms controlled by the particular record and avatar with which and whom we profess to be in *fetish-rapport*. There must be no sham *rapport*. Our authority must be real—not merely a vestment to be worn or cast aside at our convenience. By our profession we shall be judged. Our flag must be nailed to the mast, and there must be no mere making “clean the outside of the cup and platter.” When, as Christian hypnotics, Meta-Christianity demands from us surrender of the spoil, we must surrender! There are our records; there is Christ; there is our profession—*aut Cæsar, aut nihil!*

The cut of religion smasher with whom we have been dealing has no authority outside himself. At root, he is anarchist, with the covert implication that if he can grab dictatorship, he is to grab it. Hence, he is prone to become agitator for particular subversions which may happen to gratify his sentiment, vanity, or notions of expediency. To principles of right, whether authenticated by religious records or by intellectual investigation, he is oblivious beyond brushing them aside, either as being relics of superstition or futile star-gazing. He can see no farther than the concrete: belly and back; land and loaves; machinery and mutton are his gods, much as they are the gods of those whom he wants or seems to want to regenerate by a critical surgical operation. He is sometimes like the clever person in the dock who excites pathetic reflections from the other clever person in the judgment-seat, regarding the misapplication of commanding abilities. He has a

"devil" rollicking within that plays havoc with his goodness and spoils his efficiency. The malignant sprite is self (capital letters). When he has exorcised that imp, he may do things that are worth doing. "He that speaketh of himself seeketh his own glory: but he that seeketh his glory that sent him, the same is true, and no unrighteousness is in him" (John vii. 18). Religion smashers and society smashers—to say nothing of Archbishops, Lord Chancellors, Chief Justices, Prime Ministers, would-be dittos, and Kaisers—of the current orders may profitably reflect on this passage. There is much in it deep down below the surface that touches their complaint.

Each of us is afflicted with the disease of speaking "of himself," that is, speaking according to his prejudice, expediency, cleverness, vanity, cunning, caprice, indifference—motors within his empirical personality. Rarely does a person speak to "his glory that sent him." We are all "sent" by God, as truly as was Christ, however far we may be from Christ in seeking His glory that sent us. But, out of the ocean of verbosity with which we are deluged by the daily press, how much can we pick out and say, this is utterance motivated by submission to God or Christ as authority for the utterance? Where is the man who, even occasionally, can conscientiously affirm: those words of mine were inspired by the authority of God or Christ? Given faith in Christ; belief and faith in God, it should be quite a common occurrence that the ordinary person could make the affirmation. Everybody knows what Christ demands and what God demands. Nobody can be in doubt as to whether his words are inspired by the authority of God or Christ. Why then, this ocean of talk,

every word of which, so far as regards its inner significance, is a dead iteration of the single syllable, self? Why, among all those acute, stupid, learned, ignorant word-spinners, can you hardly find one of whom you can pronounce: This man "seeketh his glory that sent him"?

It may be urged that there is a great deal spoken and written for the glory of Christ, in pulpits and religious literature. Outwardly, this is the case. But, the question is as regards the inner significance, as true expression of motive, of this talk and literature. Is this talk or writing, ostensibly for the glory of God through Christ, commonly anything better than the mummery of professionalism? Does the talk or writing betoken that the speaker or writer is speaking or writing "of himself," or, by authority of Christ? We all know what Christ said about riches and force, and that his authority was mainly directed against both. Is it characteristic of utterances in the pulpit and religious press that they are motivated by submission to Christ, on these prime issues? How much sermonising in the pulpit or press, unflinchingly and uncompromisingly assails these supreme evils according to the authority of Christ? Are not these issues consistently evaded and obscured in what passes as Christian literature and talk? If such be the case, what significance, except as professional mummery, has the mass of this literature and talk? Who, as a professed hypnotic to Christ, evading and obscuring these supreme issues, can be credited as not speaking or writing "of himself"? What, in view of the evasion, can we say of this ostensible following but that it is one that "draweth nigh unto me with their



mouth, and honoureth me with their lips: but their heart is far from me"? (Matt. xv. 8).

The man who speaks not "of himself" can have no truck with expediency when he speaks. The professional follower of Christ who compromises with expediency on the supreme issues raised by Christ, merely emulates the draper's counterpane, in another "line of business." His authority is "custom of the trade," not Christ.

## CHAPTER XXVIII.

### HEAVEN AND HELL; GOOD AND EVIL.

WE have earlier seen that choice is a particular feeling affording us the empirical illusion of undetermined exercise of selective discrimination. We have also seen that what is called conscience is the willing of a particular feeling of attraction to, or repulsion from, the empirical resultants (as actions) of choice. The term, responsibility, expresses the willing of a notion empirically incidental to the willing of the feelings constituting choice and conscience. Similarly, the term, justice, expresses the willing of a notion empirically incidental to the willing of the notion, responsibility. These feelings and notions, choice, conscience, responsibility, justice, constitute what may be termed the empirical elements of another notion that we call morality, which may be considered an empirical compound of choice, conscience, responsibility, justice.

The notion, justice, empirically involves the distribution of what we call reward and punishment. Metaphysically, "reward" involves suggestion of one or another feeling constituting what we call pleasure, happiness; "punishment" involves suggestion of one or another feeling constituting what we call pain, misery, and so forth. Commonly, overlooking that all experience must be auto-suggested by ourselves,

as willing our own mind independently of suggestion by other souls; or, as the result of such suggestion by other souls, we assume that the essential nature of reward or punishment is that it involves something outside our own mind, as, say, money, houses, land, or, flogging, toil, confinement. Really, these things are extrinsic to the essential nature of reward or punishment as the apportionment of pleasure or pain. It is only what I term a convention of sensing and feeling that renders pain incident, say, to the application of red-hot iron to the living body. (Home, as we have seen, could hold glowing coal in his hands without feeling pain.) This applies to all our empirical incidentals (as what we call environment) of pain and pleasure. It is probable that the torturing of religious hypnotics, called martyrs, in bygone times, involved as little absolute suffering, as handling burning coal involved to Home. What we call environment "causes" pain or pleasure, merely as conventions of feelings susceptible of complete abolition. There is no necessary, causal sequence as between willings of sensings and feelings. Absolute pain or pleasure; happiness or misery is only measurable in terms of the agent's experience. He, alone, is competent to decide on this point. What we call sympathy is, probably, in the vast majority of cases, bestowed according to totally inadequate measurements of sufferings.

We have now to apply the foregoing observations to affirmations in certain religious records, involving "eternal" rewards and punishments. In these records, we find that such contingencies are pictured in the concrete, spuriously objective terms of common experience, involving that the non-essentials (as "en-

vironment") to pleasure and pain are confounded with the feelings. Thus, for eternal reward, we get a "heaven" depicted in such terms as we might describe a gorgeous palace and surroundings conducive to sensual gratification; for eternal punishment, we get a "hell" depicted in such terms as we might imagine a place of extreme physical or mental torture. Superficial criticism of the records, confounding the incidental with the essential, ridicules the depictions and scouts the records on the ground that they contain the pictures.

The case is different when we contemplate these records as means which, for ages, had to be applied to impelling primitive mankind in the direction of submission to authority outside the empirical personality and imposing restraints on animal appetites. Then, we recognise that any mode of stating the issue of responsibility, as reward or punishment, other than the mode adopted, would have been beyond apprehension by such communities. Even at this day, and among ourselves, it is hardly possible for the mass of people to conceive of punishment or reward which shall be independent of the concrete accessories with which punishment and reward are conventionally associated. Assuming the facts of post-mundane reward and punishment, even the average person of to-day is inclined to ask what they mean in terms of his common experience, and a vast number of people would be insensible to a contingency of future punishment that did not involve something far more dreadful than anything of the sort of which they had knowledge, as man's punishment of man.

The truth of those writers of the records was not of the "scientific" order, but was the truth of those who

did not speak "of themselves," but sought His glory that "sent" them. They pronounced, as they were moved to pronounce, God's laws. So, they gave men God's light. Moreover, they put pressure on men to follow this light. So, through God, they helped men to follow the light. To render those laws operative, the writers pronounced, as they were moved to pronounce, that men would be held accountable for breach of those laws. To bring home to men what the accountability involved, the writers pronounced, as they were moved to pronounce, penalties such as could be apprehended by those to whom the message was given. Likewise, those writers pronounced, as they were moved to pronounce, such rewards for the observance of those laws as were apprehensible to those receiving the message. The object was to establish God's right, not to give men scientific definitions of post-mundane states.

But, it may be asked, how could these writers be moved, by God, to pronounce laws, when the laws were varying, and often conflicting? To one age or race, one set of laws is given; to another, another set: the Jew is told to do one thing; the Buddhist, another, and the Christian has to do things different from the duties of the Jew and Buddhist. How can the writers or speakers who have given laws to Jews, Buddhists, and Christians have been moved to pronounce by the same God? Again, suppose somebody, at this day, propounds fresh laws, as coming from God, how are we to know that these laws are not merely his own vain imaginings? What are we to say of laws laid down by rationalising atheists; of laws imposed by the legislature; of social conventions?

The distinction we have to make in regard to the

above laws is between those emanating through people who speak not "of themselves," but, "to His glory that sent them," and those laws emanating through people who merely speak "of themselves." Mere rationalists speak "of themselves." Their intellects, resting in empirical theories, can identify no authority outside themselves, and they have "emancipated" themselves from what they call superstition, as fetish-*rapport* with avatars and religious records. So, their limitations involve that they merely speak "of themselves." The legislature, as at present constituted, speaks "of itself." Those through whom emanate religious laws do not speak "of themselves," but, as we may say, in defiance of themselves. In familiar terms, they cannot help saying what they do, and are fully assured that they only say it as what may be termed automata moved by God. They are the last people in the world to take personal credit or discredit for saying what they do. They look on what comes through them much as they look on what is called a natural phenomenon, say, a storm or an earthquake. There is not a particle of egoism in their assurance that what they propound is from God. Such people have hitherto repudiated intellect as being a competent court of appeal in regard to God. This has occurred because such people could not transcend empirical scrutiny. The case is different as regards metaphysical application of intellect. On such conditions, intellect may supersede hypnotic submission as enabling people to speak not "of themselves."

But, it may still be urged, these people must be mistaken, as the laws they enunciate differ and contradict one another. If one of these people propounds

laws different and contradictory as compared with those propounded by another of them, how can both these people voice God's direction? The laws only differ and contradict, empirically, as subjects of belief. The laws are identical, in the sense that truth (as distinguished from subjects of belief) is only one thing. The laws are the same as compelling submission, as truth is the one thing as involving belief. But, it may be urged, ordinary laws compel submission. They do; but the submission is not of the sort that is yielded to religious laws. The breach of the latter laws involves offence to conscience; the breach of the former laws only involves offence to conscience to the extent that the breach involves offence to religious laws. Nobody is conscience-stricken merely through offending ordinary laws. The submission here is merely expediential.

Then, it may be asked, Do I hold that Meta-Christianity is merely a system of ordinary laws; or, that it is of the religious type? I hold that it is of the religious type, as assuredly as I hold that Christian laws, Jewish laws, Buddhist laws are of that type. I hold that Meta-Christianity is the necessary empirical metamorphosis, for this age and culture, of Christian law. It is not my law, your law, or anybody's law; it is God's law. My intellect tells me that it is this, and that it (intellect) is what God has put into me to enable me to know what is His law. This is, of course, my personal avowal; others must judge by their intellect as I have done by mine. Unlike the atheistic smasher of religion, I pretend to no infallibility; but, I unreservedly affirm that, in propounding Meta-Christianity, I have not "spoken of myself," and that, "of myself," I could no more have pro-

pounded Meta-Christianity than I could have dictated the Bible, Talmud, Koran, or the Pali and Sanskrit books of Buddhism. So far as I know, Meta-Christianity is to His glory that sent me and everybody else.

Then, it may be asked, as Meta-Christianity affirms the omnipotence of God and determinism of the creature, by God, do I hold that God will punish the creature? I no more hold that God will punish the creature, than that God has punished the creature; but, I hold that God has given the creature direction; that empirical consequences incident to the illusion of responsibility will operate hereafter as they do during the present life, and that, as God determines pain for the creature here, He may determine pain for the creature hereafter. So, I say to the creature: If you are prudently selfish, it behoves you to obey God, from fear, if you cannot from sense of duty.

What God will or will not do is past my understanding, and I cannot believe that He will do as is affirmed in certain parts of the Bible. On the other hand, what God has made me accept, as truth, is within my understanding, and that truth carries the implication that actions in this life will affect experiences in the next, for creatures to which are given the illusions of choice and responsibility and the feeling called conscience. I cannot conceive a possible state which shall be devoid of analogues to what we experience as pain and pleasure, misery and happiness. A state from which these contrasts, or analogues to them, were absent, to me would be void of all I could conceive as constituting sentient existence. Or, again, can I believe that the measure of these analogues to happiness and misery, pleasure and pain, will not be



determined by some canon of equity transcending human justice, though, in regard to which, some analogue to the illusion of human sense of responsibility on earth will bring home to the creature a sense of the equity that has been meted out to it as its post-mundane experiences.

It may be urged that the foregoing is implicitly tantamount to speculation that God will punish the creature for certain actions, and reward the creature for other actions. On such conditions, it may be urged that whatever we may think about God's rewards to the creature, we cannot reconcile with justice His punishing the creature for actions He has determined for the creature; that, on such conditions, God, according to our apprehension of justice, must perpetrate injustice. The above propositions raise issues of different orders to which it may be well to give a little consideration.

In the same sense that the supposititious critic urges that I imply that God will punish the creature, it may be urged that God, now, punishes the creature, on earth, by afflicting the creature with pain and misery. But, this affliction is necessary if the creature shall experience pleasure and happiness. Complementary contrasts, we must suppose, are necessary, that positive experiences shall exist at all. (With the question of possibility or impossibility to Omnipotence we have nothing to do in this connection. We can here only deal with possibility or impossibility within our apprehension.) To our apprehension, the experience of pleasure, in default of the experience of pain, would be impossible. Against this, it may be urged that, though the contention may apply as regards the experience of pleasure as complement to

pain, the application will fail in regard to pain, which is an experience needing no complement; that an undifferentiated state of suffering (neuralgia, for instance) would afford experience of pain though we had never known any other experience than neuralgia. This contention is not so unassailable as it appears to us as now constituted.

If we had no experience of freedom from neuralgia and the "pain" were unendurable, it would be a state from which we escaped through the illusion that we had power to determine our persistence as experiencing agents. If we were able to contrast the state from which we had escaped, with the fresh one, we might then differentiate as between pain and pleasure. Suppose, it may be asked, that the second state were more terrible than the first one, how should I interpret that contingency? Then, assuming the capacity to contrast the two states, the former would constitute pleasure; the latter, pain, from which (pain) we should escape as in the first case.

But, suppose, it may be urged, that we had the capacity for the unendurable state, but no illusion of capacity to determine our existence—what then? Then, the state would be endurable, by virtue of our enduring it. Intensity of suffering can only be measured as a relative contingency to some contrasted state. An unendurable state is only possible in relation to an endurable state. Condemn a person from a palace to the surroundings of a slum, his state may be unendurable. To the *habitué* of the slum, his state will be indifferent. Let a seeing person all at once become blind, his state may be unendurable. To the congenitally blind person, his state will be indifferent. Through contrast, alone, positive

experiences are possible. The positive immediate experience must be in contrast with a positive memorised experience, in order that either positive may exist.

We may reasonably assure ourselves that, for us, there is no possibility of recognising a state of experience without the illusion of being able to end the state. What we call suicide is always available to end the unendurable. But, it may be urged, the remedy itself may be unendurable; a person may have such repulsion to killing himself that he endures the "unendurable." Then, the latter becomes, in relation to suicide, the endurable. The only measure of absolute suffering is relational. The "balance" of action is the only evidence as to what is endurable or unendurable. Pain is only possible as relative to pleasure. "Every white will have its black, and every sweet its sour."

It may be urged that the infant may be supposed to have states of suffering without the illusion of being able to end them. As pain and pleasure, the experiential relatives of the infant can have little efficiency to determine positive experience. Again, if the infant were "left to itself," it would not come to experience of any sort. It only "lives" through the parent's suggestion, involving the infant's auto-suggestion of its body, as medium. What we call a still-birth involves failure of the parent's suggestion. Then, the "foetal" soul ceases to auto-suggest, and the body is "dead"—willed merely as a sensory complex and preter-empirical notion, by people who see or touch it.

Even to the child, absolute suffering such as would involve suicide to the adult, cannot be considered

normally possible. (There are cases on record of suicide by young children.) The normal child, like the brutes, has no illusion of being able to end its existence. Occasionally, we hear of a child killing another child. In such a case, the child has no notion of "killing." It has only a notion of giving pain, and this pain only such as it has within its experience. The child is mainly in some stage of subliminal personality rendering it analogous to the brutes, whose sufferings are probably totally different from our estimates of them. Though there are cases on record of apparent—only apparent—suicide by brutes, we cannot attribute to them, as classes of souls, the illusion of capacity to determine their existence. Failing this illusion, we cannot reasonably assume the capacity for a high absolute of suffering.

In the present connection, we are driven to refer again to empirical theories of origins. We have seen that current evolutionary theories merely involve fanciful externalisation of our mind. They tell us that man has arisen from a line of ancestors stretching back to some primordial "cell." These ancestors were all endowed with what is called the instinct of self-preservation, and, from this "instinct," all other capacities have been "evolved."

Metaphysically, as we have seen, there is no such contingency as the "evolving" of "instinct" or anything else, in the sense of the empiricist. Nothing can change into anything else; so, there can be no "evolution" outside the parish of empirical illusionism. Again, there is no such contingency as being "endowed," in the sense of the empiricist, with "instinct." Indeed, there is no such thing as

instinct, in the sense of the empiricist. What he calls instinct is capacity to receive suggestion for willing the universe in a particular way. Such capacity was "evolved" from nothing; it was created, and the first creatures that had it were what we call adults—not "cells," "embryos," "offspring," but "adult" souls endowed with pre-determined limitations for actualising the universe (willing sensings, thoughts, feelings) as the case might be. God "created," as we are told in Genesis. Things did not come about as we are told by "evolution"-illusionists. The chick is not born with an "instinct" to peck and run about. It is born with capacity to receive telepathic suggestion from the "consensus" of adult fowls actualising the fowl-universe. The first fowls were created with this capacity to actualise the universe, which they post-natally suggested to "offspring" fowls.

The capacity with which man was created, among other of his unique endowments, involved that the first man and woman were enabled to suggest, post-natally, to their offspring, at some stage of the latter's development as souls actualising the mundane universe, the knowledge that they could "die." No brutes are endowed with this capacity for post-natal suggestion. In familiar terms, no brutes have a notion of "life." Because man has this notion, he has capacity for the illusion that he can end "life."

Man commits suicide. Therefore, he is endowed with the illusion that he can end his existence. Failing that illusion, he could not commit suicide; because he could not conceive ending his existence. The Bible says that God created humanity, as "man" and "woman." "Evolution" says that God

did nothing of the sort ; that man originated from a line of ancestors. That man commits suicide is enough to show that he did not arise from a "line" of anything ; but was created man : adult—not even infant or child. In regard to the ostensible suicide of brutes, we judge about the act, in ignorance of motive, and, when we are not metaphysicians, overlook that all we know about the alleged act of brutes is what we "make" as our own mind. I contend that the motive of getting out of life is impossible to the brute. I contend that no creature but man conceives life, and that, accordingly, no creature but man can have the illusion of ability to get away from life.

Again, no creature but man has the illusion of ability to take life. Brutes fight to gratify passion or satisfy hunger. No brute fights to take life. Man, only, does that. Man could not possibly fight to take life, if he had not the illusion of being able to determine it. It may be urged that experience, as seeing his fellows die, would afford him the illusions both of being able to preserve and to end life. This will not hold. Brutes see one another die ; kill and protect one another, yet they have no notion of affecting life. What is called the "instinct of self-preservation," among brutes, is a mere verbal peg on which to hang theories of biological superficialism. Taking the term in the empiricist's sense, brutes have no "instinct" to "preserve" anything, except (in comparatively rare cases) food. The "instinct" to protect their young is a special manifestation of *soul-rapport* and of two emotions: love and pugnacity, quite foreign to any notion of preserving their young, or of affecting life. Brutes have no more notions

of preserving themselves; sacrificing themselves; affecting life, than have iron nails. This is the case with children until they have received, as post-natal suggestion from adults, the notion of life.

I vividly remember what I believe to have been the actual occasion on which, as a young child, I first received post-natal suggestion of life. My mother was nursing me as a sufferer from some trivial ailment. Suddenly, I was seized with a vague terror and grief, the like of which I had never before experienced, and I cried out passionately: "Oh, mother, will you die? Shall I never see you again?" I remember how my mother tried to coax me away from the dread image which her solicitude, no doubt, had caused her to suggest to me. From that moment dated my post-natal suggestion of life; earlier, the verbal symbol, if I heard it, could have conveyed no idea of cessation of existence.

Man is the only creature created with the capacity for illusion that he can affect life, or for the notion of life. God revealed to man that he could "die." God revealed that to no soul but the man-soul. No soul, but the man-soul, can "commit suicide." No soul, but the man-soul, can "commit murder." "Nature, red in tooth," etc., sounds pretty and accurate to the cheap critic of Divine method. "Man makes a death, which nature never made," is nearer the mark. "Nature," in the cheap critic's sense of the term, is free of taking life-blood. Man monopolises that vocation. And he carries on the business with complete nonchalance. Were he to resolve, to-day, to be as free of taking life-blood as is "nature," this social dispensation would not last till to-morrow. Were he to be honest to God, he

would be as free of taking life-blood as is "nature." Man, to gratify his own callous, sordid, purblind, ravening self, takes luxury, knowing its price is the life-blood of his fellows. No beast ever did that. "Nature" never did it. Man does it through being dishonest to God. And, by God, in this book, man shall be told what he does!

It may be urged: whether we call an experience pain or a "state," does not affect its intrinsic character. Suppose that God were to determine a single state analogous to what we called agonising neuralgia, for the creature, divesting the creature of the illusion that it could determine its existence, and eternally prolonging that existence; then, it may be urged, God would determine something like the theological "hell" for the creature. This contention has more apparent than real force. It begs the question, earlier discussed, whether an undifferentiated state involving anything analogous to our experience as pain, is possible. Of course, God has no limitations, and we can predicate about nothing as being impossible to God. On the other hand, we can only contemplate possibility that we can imagine as possibility. I, personally, can conceive no possibility of pain that shall exist otherwise than as contrast with pleasure, and, as I am not hypnotic to certain religious records, I cannot accept their pronouncements regarding either "heaven" or "hell." As to what will happen to me when I have done with this life, I trust God. Here, faith, alone, is my mainstay. Through it, I get assurance that God's will is good in a sense passing my conception.

Then, it may be urged, if I am right, God has misled creatures by compelling inspired teachers of



religion to terrify people with threats of Divine vengeance. This contention begs the question whether our "veracity," any more than our hunger or thirst, is attributable to God. That God endows us with thirst does not suggest to us that God should be thirsty. That God endows us with veracity does not involve that God's veracity need be our veracity. If God, to our undoing, were to be veracious on our plane, wherein would God help us? How can we know that part of God's design to our advantage has not involved what, to us, at this day, appears unveracity? To whom, or what, is God under obligation to manifest veracity? If God is under no obligation, what have we to do with God's veracity?

Again, what is unveracity, for us, but affirming what we believe to be false? What do we know of belief, as an attribute of God? What do we know of subjects of belief—assuming belief to be an attribute of God—held by God, as truth, warranting us in speculation about God's veracity? How can God mislead us by enabling us to believe? If one person believes one thing; another person believes the contrary, that involves merely difference in subjects of belief. God enables both people to believe. Who shall say which person God has "misdirected"? It may be urged: one of them must have been misdirected. This involves the familiar fallacy, often emphasised, of confounding truth with subjects of belief. Whatever is believed is "true." No matter what may be the empirical inconsistency between subjects of belief, each act of believing involves right direction by God. There is no absolute of "truth." Our "truth" of to-day becomes the "error" of to-morrow. But it may be urged: surely error is evil,

and God's permitting it involves His commission of evil! With this point we will deal later. Now, we had better return to the subject of pain and pleasure.

As indicated, our common measurements of suffering, by particular standards, are altogether fanciful. It is customary to measure suffering by some arbitrary standard of sensual well-being: the chronic invalid, for instance, by the standard of the normally healthy; the denizen of the hovel, by the standard of the "comfortable" classes, the assumption being that the absolute of contentment is determined by arbitrary and speculative absolutes of conditions. There are no real absolutes of conditions by which to test absolutes of contentment and misery. Mr. Crooks, the cooper M.P. for Woolwich, Mayor of Poplar, and Chairman of the Board of Guardians, whose election has been the most impressive blow to political precedent within recent years, puts the case "in a nutshell" when, as reported, he says, referring to himself and wife: "We are as poor as when we started, and as happy." No owner of a palace can get more, sensually, out of life than does Mr. Crooks. But put the owner of the palace in Mr. Crooks's place, then, probably, Mr. Crooks would get vastly more out of living, by the sensual standard, than would the novice in Mr. Crooks's position. This would arise through dislocation of ratios of absolutes, not merely through change of absolutes. So it is with the child of the slum and the child of the mansion; the chronic invalid and the healthy person: their absolutes of contentment and misery, we may reasonably assume, are not different. We are too prone to import the "personal equation" into such considerations, and to overlook the efficiency

of hypnotic *rapport* with particular modes of willing the universe (involving what we call habitual conditions, or environment) in rendering us immune to what, under other circumstances, would be suffering; and *blasé* to what, under other circumstances, would be pleasure.

The ideal of the agitator for what he calls the rights of the worker is sensual contentment, which the agitator confounds with happiness. So, he wants to deprive the affluent of a measure of sensual contentment constituting their "happiness," in order to increase the "happiness" of others who, prior to his informing them that they are "unhappy," were, broadly, as "happy" in their penury as the others are in their luxury. This agitator wants to "rob Peter to pay Paul" in a currency of "happiness" with which Paul is really as well-endowed as is Peter, but which, Paul seems to lack because sensual contentment is confounded with alteration of the ratios of absolute pleasure and pain. Really, all that would be accomplished, on such conditions, in regard to happiness, would be to plunge the affluent into misery, without materially affecting the happiness of the indigent. Confine the denizen of our slums to the conditions of the Eskimo or the Patagonian, the former would be as miserable, compared with his earlier state, as the creature of luxury would be if confined to the slum. Again, confine the savage to the conditions either of the slum-dweller or of the creature of luxury, the state of the savage would probably soon become miserable.

It is probable that, notwithstanding the great apparent inequalities in the distribution of pain and pleasure, the ratio of absolute pain to pleasure is

constant throughout social grades. In other words, what is called environment does not really affect the sum-totals of absolute pain and pleasure allotted to each person. Intermittent disturbances occur, involving what we call shocks (reverses in business; illness; death of kindred or friends); but, in most cases, these disturbing factors do not permanently affect the ratio of absolutes.

One person envies another, say, his magnificent surroundings. The "Gorgius Midas" gets but the absolute of contentment from his mansion, that the other person gets from his cottage. The factor that disturbs the normal constant is, here, the envy of the man in the cottage. If he lacks envy (or other selfish lust) his absolute of contentment, as regards his surroundings, is the same as the other person's. Again, the chronic invalid gets like absolute of contentment in regard to his states of comparative relief from suffering, as the normally healthy person gets in regard to his states of highest vigour as compared with his merely common feeling of being free from ailment. Again, as this healthy person is indifferent to his feeling of ordinary well-being, so, the chronic invalid comes to be indifferent to his ordinary ailing.

Of course, there is what may be termed a line of condition beyond which the ratio of absolutes of suffering and contentment is such as to render existence unendurable. But this "line of condition" need not be coincident with any particular "environment." The individual, alone, can determine where this line is. For one person, the line of tolerable existence may be entirely different from the line to another person. One person may end his life for what, to another person, would be a trivial incident. The

victim of famine, in India, may find living more tolerable than does the creature of luxury, in London. The only real measure of triviality or gravity, in such a case, is the individual's experience.

We sometimes hear the remark that a person does not get much happiness out of life, the ground for the remark being that the person is commonly in an apparent state of dejection and misery. The true case may be that the person experiences what is usually considered misery as tantamount to what is usually considered contentment, and that he gets the full measure of happiness in his apparent misery. He is happy because he is miserable! Such an emotional "invert" is not infrequently in evidence for the student of humanity. His happiness consists in contemplating himself as set apart to excite the commiseration of his fellows. Normal contentment, to him, is a sort of unwelcome intruder disturbing the equable flow of his misery: tantamount to annoyance to the ordinary person. Between the extreme cases of the ecstatic hypnotic, tied to the stake; insensible to the fire that consumes him; happy in his martyrdom, and the ordinary contented vessel of affliction, there are multitudes of states of hypnotic *rappor*t with conditions, determining apparently different absolutes of pain and pleasure, yet each essentially identical with another as involving a constant ratio.

It will be seen that materialistic conceptions of a "heaven" and "hell," as set forth in the Bible, have little scientific relevancy to the essential conditions of pain and pleasure; misery and happiness. A place of torment or of bliss, such as is depicted in materialistic terms, in the Bible, might involve no such experiences as we commonly associated with it. We

can identify no experience which is necessarily and immutably coincident with any particular willing of the universe, as what we call environment. There is no necessary sequence between psychical and sensory experiences. An eternal fire might consume without involving pain or misery. Transcendently beautiful surroundings might involve no pleasure or happiness. Judging by the analogy of earthly experience, a post-mundane state of pain without complementary contrast as pleasure, is impossible; as is such a state of pleasure without complementary contrast as pain. Judging by the analogy of our experience, that the creature, in a future state, should be able to experience an analogue to earthly pleasure, it would be necessary that the creature should be able to experience an analogue to earthly pain, and *vice versa*. But capacity to experience, in default of experience, is tantamount to incapacity. The capacity can only manifest itself as actual experience. Failing this experience, we can predicate nothing about capacity. Then, as, *ex hypothesi*, we cannot experience pleasure unless we experience pain, it follows that, if there is continuity between mundane and post-mundane capacity, we must experience, hereafter, complementary contrasts, as analogues of pain and pleasure. This necessity may involve such readjustments of absolutes of happiness and misery that the one or the other experience becomes, practically, the sole experience. Then, the future life would be, practically, all happiness or all misery, and might involve, for the creature, the illusion of Divine reward or punishment. Thereby, the upraising of humanity to some still higher stage of its destiny might be determined to occur. The miserable might so become sacrifice for

the happy, and take their place, as the happy, in the still higher stage of existence. This process of substitution and alternation might persist until some final stage were reached.

We do not, now, apprehend that God is punishing or rewarding us when we are miserable or happy. Nor need we, in the future life, necessarily associate punishment or reward with misery or happiness. Nevertheless, we might do this. The altered ratios might be so experienced, in conjunction with conscience and the illusions of freedom and responsibility, that we should recognise our post-mundane experiences of pain and pleasure as being judicial resultants of our earthly actions. So, we should get the illusions of Divine retribution or reward, and, corollarily, of God's injustice, as visiting us for what He had determined.

But, it may be urged: the illusion would be practically real, for us. Granted; but, our illusion would not justify us in implying that it was reality, in regard to God's dealing with us. If this illusion did involve, for us, God's injustice, it would only, after all, be illusion, just as, in its ultimate character, is the practical reality which we call freedom to choose. It is necessary that we apply, among ourselves, this practical reality of freedom. But, there is no necessity to project a like practical reality, as the illusion that God is unjust, beyond ourselves, as really applying to God. When we metaphysically scrutinise human action, we find that it is determined by God, and that our practical reality, as freedom, is illusion. When we metaphysically scrutinise justice, we find that it is a necessary issue of our demonstration that action is

determined by God, and that, consequently, we have no personal rights, except incidentally to the manifestation of justice as our duty to God. But, as from God to us, there is no question of duty. Hence there is no question of justice.

In criticising God, by the canon of our justice, we imply that God is under obligation to us, and that the fulfilment of this obligation, by God, must involve conduct to us, individually, analogous to that between ourselves as incidental to the fulfilment of our obligation to God. Thus, the implication is that God owes us His capacities for benefiting us, as we owe one another our capacities, and that God has no right to injure us, as we have no right to injure one another. Obviously, as we derive all—including knowledge of justice—from God, God owes us nothing, and our justice cannot apply to God. Accordingly, that God gives us the illusion that He acts unjustly implies no more than that God tells us that our business is to act the justice He has made us apprehend, and not presume to criticise what He has hidden from our apprehension.

God reveals to us law to control ourselves, but reveals no law to control Himself. God reveals to us ethical relationship among ourselves and duty to Him. God reveals no ethical relationship of Himself to us, as duty from Him to us. For the creature to criticise the Creator, from the standpoint of moral obligation only apprehensible\*to the creature through the Creator's determinism, is stupendous, as presumption and futility.

Earlier generations needed, the ignorant and sensual of this generation need, "heaven" and "hell" as incentives to fulfilling God's law of self-renunciation



and submission to authority outside the empirical personality. The honest intellectualist, familiar with the modern metaphysical demonstration of causality and its religious and ethical corollaries, needs no "heaven" or "hell" as inducement or compulsion to submit to what he believes to be God's direction. The Authority revealed to him, without promise of reward or threat of punishment, suffices for him, as incentive to obedience. The Meta-Christian worries neither about "heaven" nor "hell." He trusts the Authority and follows the light as best he can.

The only people who can reasonably set themselves up as critics of Deity in punishing or rewarding the creature, are atheists anxious to abolish belief in God and to escape the issue of justice emanating through the demonstration of creative determinism. Such people may say: Here is your omnipotent, omniscient, just, loving, merciful God. He determines all you do, and visits you with unutterably terrible penalties, and dowers you with lavish and unearned rewards for doing what he has determined you shall do. This God of yours is the evolutionary outcome of the disordered imagination of your savage ancestors; biology, physics, astronomy, chemistry, evolution show that you are an utterly insignificant item in a self-acting universe—the only god—and that when your moment of earth-fluttering is over, you are done for eternally. The reply of metaphysic to this cut of critic is in this work. The critic's foundations are not laid deep enough. He has yet to learn the alphabet of demolishing what he calls superstition, and to extricate himself from the suckers of an octopus which he calls science, but which, as it throttles him, is the giant superstition.

It may be asked how, from my standpoint, it comes about that God has permitted error—say, as atheism—to exist; and, it may be urged that this permission of error involves the perpetration of evil, by God. As earlier indicated, in dealing with another aspect of the same issue, such criticism is merely an example of the vain pretension to identify standards for God, by standards for ourselves. The “evil” of error, in this connection, is of the same illusive character as is the “evil” of injustice, in the other connection. “Error” is merely variation in willing subjects of belief. The believer only “errs” in respect to other believers, and to their apprehension of his “error.” To the “erring” believer, the other people “err.” Possibly, these other believers may come to accept the subjects of belief of the “erring” believer; or the latter may come to accept their subjects of belief. Then, he or they will have erred to their own apprehension. There is no such “absolute,” as error, or truth, in the popular and “scientific” sense of the term. There is merely prevalence of one or another subject of belief. This point has been often impressed earlier.

But, it may be urged, excluding the question of error as evil, surely, atheism is a bad thing from my standpoint! I, rather, hold that atheism is a good thing, for the reason that, mainly through atheistic criticism of theological theism, the latter has been compelled to discard or readjust theories about God discredited by science, and so tending to the downfall of religion—indeed, which have ensured its transient downfall. I am assured that had I not, earlier, been, as I may say, saturated with atheistic materialism, I should not have attained my present convictions regarding religion, and should, certainly, not have

written this work. About twelve years ago, in *Against Dogma and Freewill*—a work written on behalf of theistic religion, but against theology—I advanced every important contention that I now see flaunted, by the cheap critic, against what he confounds with religion, in the popular atheistic press.

The tacit implication of those who perplex themselves about what they imagine as a so-called problem of evil, is that God should have created, solely by adhering to some standard of perfection within the common experience. Then, there would have been all "best"; no "worst"! These people set themselves up as final and infallible judges of perfection. Their assurance leaves them no patience or inclination to ask themselves such questions as the following: how they could know "good," did they not know "bad"; how they could know "truth," did they not know "error"; how they could know "justice," did they not know "injustice." The resultant of the "perfection" imagined by these people would seem to be a creature on the experiential level of an oyster.

What is commonly called evil is some form of pain or misery. Metaphysically, there is no such thing as evil. There is only Divine method of effecting transitions in human motive in the direction of submission to what may be revealed, through belief, as Divine law of conduct. However this law may empirically vary, it is always the same revelation, as truth. Our empirical illusion that the law varies arises because our data for judgment, as mere empiricists, disqualify us as judges of the question of variation or constancy.

In the Bible, we get multitudes of apparently conflicting statements regarding God. In one account,

God is one thing; in another account, God is the opposite. In one account, God demands one thing; in another account, He demands the opposite. Thus: "For I am the Lord; I change not" (Malachi iii. 6). "Wherefore the Lord God of Israel saith, I said indeed that thy house, and the house of thy father, should walk before me for ever; but now the Lord sayeth, Be it far from me. . . . Behold, the days come that I will cut off thine arm, and the arm of thy father's house" (1 Samuel ii. 30-31). Again: "God is not the author of confusion, but of peace" (1 Cor. xiv. 33). "The Lord is a man of war" (Ex. xv. 3). Again: "Good and upright is the Lord" (Psalm xxv. 8). "Shall there be evil in a city, and the Lord hath not done it?" (Amos iii. 6). Again: "All they that take the sword shall perish with the sword" (Matt. xxvi. 52). "He that hath no sword, let him sell his garment and buy one" (Luke xxii. 36). Again: "Honour thy father and mother" (Eph. vi. 2). "If any man come to me, and hate not his father, and mother, and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters . . . he cannot be my disciple" (Luke xiv. 26).

A volume might be filled with empirically diametrically conflicting statements from the Bible. The point overlooked by mere empiricists, in dealing with such empirical opposites, is that submission to authority outside the empirical personality is an issue independent and exclusive of critical scrutiny of what the authority demands. So soon as we apply such criticism, we begin to repudiate the authority. The Bible pronounces as such authority analogously as a commanding officer pronounces, on the battle-field. The issue, for the private soldier, is to obey the officer,

not to criticise his command. So, to people in *fetish-rapport* with the Bible, the requirement is not criticism, but submission.

So soon as people begin to criticise the letter, they miss the spirit, and are out of *fetish-rapport* with the authority. Then, they must get some other authority, or be anarchist. They have lost God, as authority through the Bible (or other religious record). If they are to retain God, as authority, He must reveal Himself to them independently of the record. This, I contend, is only possible through metaphysic. Through metaphysic, the same critical implement (intellect) which deprives us of *fetish-rapport* with the record, as manifestation of God's direction, will afford us direct *rapport* with God. So, we shall preserve religious authority outside the empirical personality. If we move no farther than the stage called rationalist, we become anarchist. Then, our authority is only within the empirical personality. The so-called Rationalist, Agnostic, Atheist of the current order is such an anarchist. He has lost his anchorage and is adrift in an ocean of futility.

Metaphysically, the only evil that could be imagined to exist would be failure of God to determine according to His will. Then, God would fail to attain His end. But, inasmuch as all exists solely through God's will, this failure is impossible. Hence, there can be no evil (whether as error, injustice, calamity, misdirection) that is not illusion. The so-called problem of evil, as dealt with by empirical methods, is a chimera about which ingenious dialecticians weave webs of sophistical self-mystification. They imply that they are dealing with preter-empirical evil (evil in regard to God), when they are merely identifying

their own limitations with God's omnipotence and omniscience.

There is no problem of preter-empirical evil: evil as inherent to Divine determinism. The self-constituted critic of Deity lacks equipment: That he exists, is empirical evil, and it is the business of metaphysic to show him his deficiencies and enable him to apprehend that empirical evil, and evil in respect to Divine determinism, are two entirely distinct issues, of the latter of which he is incompetent to judge. The metaphysician commends, to those prone to imagine that they are competent to solve the problem of preter-empirical evil, the easier vocation of studying and solving the problem of obedience to Divine law. This will afford them a fairly ample field for the exercise of their critical abilities. When, like Pelham, they have "solved the problem," the next thing they may advantageously set about doing is to act the solution.

In all ages, man has been prone to define Deity in terms of human qualities. In the Bible, God is defined in multitudes of terms, from the most repulsive to the most adorable. The real God is behind all definition of quality, except the quality of Cause. As Cause, we can scientifically identify God. All other definitions of Deity merely degrade Him to the plane of fetish. The God of the Psalmist, whose tender mercies are over all His works, is no more the real God than is Samuel's monster who tells Saul to "go and smite Amalek and utterly destroy all that they have; slay both man and woman, infant and suckling, ox and sheep, camel and ass." The real God is that Authority outside the empirical personality to which the records taught and imposed

submission. The "truth" of the records is in regard to a supreme Authority, behind all definitions, on behalf of which Authority the records dominated the minds of ages and races. This applies to all genuinely religious records. They are in a category apart from all secular literature, as revelations of God. All such traditional records are lights to humanity, on the hypnotic plane, consistently directing man to Authority outside his empirical personality. Now, man requires such direction on the intellectual plane.

Any definition of God, in terms of human experience of quality, implies that God is what we like to make Him. If one person holds that God is loving, merciful, just; another person, with as much or little reason, may hold that God is hating, merciless, unjust; or, that He is deaf, pock-marked, limping. All that we are really concerned to know about God is that He is Creator, or ultimate Cause, in moral relationship with ourselves as giving us light whereby we may know what conduct conforms with or opposes His determinism of right, for us.

But, it may be asked: how can we identify one more than another sort of conduct with God's determinism, when God determines all conduct? The question is answered by the metaphysical identification of the nature of truth, as thoughts willed with belief. We know what conduct conforms with or opposes God's determinism, by believing that the conduct involves the conformity or opposition. Thus, we have illusions of opposition and conformity, in respect to God's determinism, as we have illusions of free choice, empirical causality, etc. We have to act on the illusions of opposition and conformity, as we have to act on the other illusions. As thinking

creatures, we can only act at all through taking the illusive as the real.

For us, as actors, conduct may oppose or conform with God's determinism. For us, as metaphysical investigators of the problem of causality, all conduct equally conforms to God's determinism. As God has given us the illusions of free choice, responsibility, good and evil, right and wrong, justice and injustice, together with the mentor, conscience, and the discriminating light, belief, we must act according to the direction of these endowments. The creative determinism identified by metaphysic transcends illusion and constitutes the foundation on which we must erect our structure of right morality. The practical manifestation of this right morality depends on the ethical illusions with which we are endowed. The metaphysical demonstration of causality affords us our fundamental moral premise. Applying, to this premise, the moral illusions with which we are endowed, we are enabled to identify what, for us, is right or wrong conduct.

Four years ago was published the first volume of *Heresies*. Readers of the foregoing chapters dealing with religion and its records, who may also have read the first volume of *Heresies*, will probably discover what may be termed a revolution of views, as between *Heresies* and the present work. Well, four years of hard metaphysical thinking and study of spiritistic phenomena are not to be denied their resultants. In writing the first volume of *Heresies*, I, perforce, considered religion and its records from the standpoint of materialistic science and a vague, undeveloped metaphysic which, as I may say, had not the strength to cut itself away from empiricism. This was the only



criterion I could then apply. Within my limitations, I consider that I then worked as efficiently for truth as I do now. Judging by the earlier criterion, my views, now, are what they were then. Had I completely attained no other test than empirical science, I should now hold, as I did then, that the Bible (or any other religious record) had no special claim, as inspiration, differentiating it from secular literature of the permanent order, and that the miraculous element in traditional religion was utterly obnoxious to intellectual acceptance. In later volumes of *Heresies*, in which I had got free of empiricism and attained essentially the metaphysic set forth in the present work, my standpoint, with regard to religious records, was correspondingly altered, and I contemplated setting forth my later views in a sixth volume of *Heresies*. However, circumstances occurred in connection with the present work, inducing me to deal with religion and ethics in it, instead of in *Heresies*.

Again, to take the wind out of the sails of critics prone to fall foul of a person who is capable of changing his views, and honest enough to "own up" when he has done so, I may here offer a few observations on an earlier work than *Heresies*.

On grounds evolutionary and biological (embracing recent theories as to the germinal origin of organisms), psychological (embracing recent discoveries apparently indicating cerebral centres governing special organic functionings and activities), I was led to advance, in *Against Dogma and Freewill and for Weismannism*, published 1892, practically all that is now being exploited in popular criticism, against religion. Indeed, I surmise that the projectiles now being hurled with, to me, somewhat comical solemnity, by the

press-critic to whose onslaught I have earlier referred, have come out of the arsenal I established eleven or twelve years ago. I trust that the "anti-toxin" of the present work may find as congenial a habitat in the psychical economy of this writer, as seems to have been found by the "toxin" of *Against Dogma*. From my standpoint of a dozen years ago, I endorse the criticism which this writer is hurling, with deadly accuracy, against what he calls religion. On the other hand, I advise him to cultivate that blessed and sadly underrated capacity to change views and "own up" when one has changed.

Another point calls for a little comment here. In the first volume of *Heresies*, I not only cast discredit on traditional religion and its records; I also assailed the attitude of various ministers of religion towards the records and the religion. As against these ministers, I now stand where I did when the criticism was written. I assailed those clerics, not for holding to the Bible and their special religion, but because, in their adopted rôle of reconciling the Bible and theological religion with science, they were, to my apprehension, inept and disingenuous. I see them, now, as I saw them then.

The man who accepts science as his final court can only be intellectually honest by rejecting traditional religion and its records. Nobody appreciates more highly than I do the efforts of honest atheists to turn the people into atheists. When I contemplate their methods against religion, and the methods of its professional exponents on behalf of religion, I am inclined to think that, if there is heaven, the atheists are the more likely to be there, and that if exalted professional exponents of religion would cease preaching

and arguing about religion, and start practising, it would be better for religion. But that cannot happen. The day of the honest hypnotic to the avatar and religious record is past. Now, the Meta-Christian must occupy the stage, if religion is to live.

In this last chapter dealing with religion, it may be well to offer a few remarks on the subject of continuity of mundane personal relationships in a post-mundane state. To most of us, a future life, devoid of the personal relationships involving emotional attachments—and even repulsions—of the mundane state will probably seem too nebulous a contingency to excite vivid interest. Probably, most people would prefer a future admixture of pain and pleasure, happiness and misery, with the opportunity of renewing earthly personal ties, to a future state of unalloyed bliss without opportunity for such renewal. Personally, though I should be delighted to miss the renewal of a goodly number of mundane relationships, I confess that I would infinitely prefer to take the “pills,” post-terrestrially, if that were the condition of my renewing earthly attachments. To others, perhaps, the contingency of again having to take the “pills” may seem too painful to be tempting, even at the price of the other renewal.

It may be possible, from the metaphysical standpoint, to offer some reasonable speculation as to the possible conditions on which earthly recognitions, as between kindred and friends, might persist in a post-mundane state. Such earthly recognitions depend (a) on *fetish-rapport* with our own mind, as pre-empirical notions and sensory complexes: in common terms, objects of sense; (b) on *soul-rapport*. Both forms of *rapport* have been earlier discussed in detail.

Again, our earthly appearance, as "living organisms," occurs through pre-natal suggestion by parental souls. This has also been earlier dealt with.

Let us suppose that every case of what we call death involves some form of suggestion, by a post-mundane soul, or souls, analogous to pre-natal suggestion, by mundane parents. Immediately a mundane soul "dies," it is, as may be figured, introduced to the post-mundane state of experience through an analogue to mundane pre-natal suggestion, by some soul (as parent, brother, sister; other kindred; friend) in the post-mundane state, with which soul the "dying" or "dead" soul had been, during the earthly life, in the strongest soul-*rapport*. The relationship so re-established might be supposed to constitute an analogue to the relationship established, at mundane birth, between parent and offspring. So, the "dead" mundane soul might be supposed to enter the post-mundane state analogously as it entered (as offspring) the mundane state, and to renew, in the post-mundane state, its earthly, personal "environment." The relative, or friend, so suggesting to the "dead" mundane soul, having been "introduced" to the post-mundane state through the same process of suggestion, the line of continuity of personal relationships on earth might be preserved in the post-mundane state.

On entering the post-mundane state, the soul might be supposed to be conditioned analogously as is the mundane soul, at birth. The fresh post-mundane denizen might be as dependent, for support and guidance, on souls familiar with the post-mundane state, as is an earthly infant on its parents. Those post-mundane souls which had actualised the post-

mundane universe might be supposed to suggest post-mundane experiences to the "novice"-soul, analogously as adults suggested mundane experiences to the infant, child, youth.

Some line of speculation like the above seems necessary if we are to try to conceive conditions on which mundane personal relationships may be preserved in a post-mundane state. Inter-suggestion, involving soul-*rappor*t, conditions mundane intimacies, attachments, repulsions. If they are to continue post-terrestrially, we have no premises from which to formulate a theory about the contingency, other than as what we know in regard to the conditions of personal relationships on earth.

In the case of mundane birth and later mundane stages, it does not seem that there is any experiential connection, as memory, with another than the mundane state, or that there is any ground for speculation regarding an ante-mundane universe. In the case of post-mundane "birth" and later post-mundane stages (imagined analogues of mundane childhood, youth, maturity) there is some ground for speculative assumption of memories of the mundane stage, with persistence of the mundane experiences of time and space, together with the consciousness-sensation, on which latter, as earlier indicated, depends the possibility of communion between post-mundane and mundane souls.

## CHAPTER XXIX.

### PRACTICAL

PEOPLE have a comfortable way of getting rid of obvious, though irksome, duties, on the ground that they are "dreams," "impracticable," "utopian." The ethical ideal of the metaphysic set forth in this work will perhaps seem to, or be imagined to seem by, such people, in the highest degree impracticable, utopian, and so forth. These disadvantages will attach to the ideal because the inclinations of these people are against realising the ideal. If they wanted to realise the ideal, the accomplishment of their desire would be a very simple matter. There is nothing inherently impracticable in the ideal. All that is needed for its realisation is the inclination to be honest to God. Given that inclination, the ideal might be realised next week, with hardly any dislocation of current activities. The obstruction is the human brute. The present chapter is intended to indicate the practical lines on which the ideal may be realised.

The ethical outcome of the metaphysic set forth in this work is that human capacity is rightfully God's trust to society, to be administered in the equal interest of each individual. Practically, this administration of capacity involves administration of the products of capacity, as what we call property. Such

administration, by society, involves society's honesty to God. The devotion of his capacities to the welfare of his fellows, by the individual, involves his honesty to God. If society fails so to administer individual capacity; if the individual fails so to devote his capacity, society and he defraud God. This is metaphysical A B C of demonstration. When any other demonstration than that of metaphysic, and disqualifying the demonstration of metaphysic, is in evidence, honesty to God will be other than that identified by metaphysic. In the meantime, the demonstration of metaphysic is final and irrefutable.

The above involves the equal distribution of all products of faculty-exercise conducing to sensual contentment, and the extirpation of all inequality in this respect. The "inefficient" have equal claim as the "efficient." The "efficiency" or "inefficiency" is determined by God, and neither the individual nor society has ethical warrant to dispose of the issue of "efficiency" or "inefficiency" unless for the equal individual welfare. This is corollary to the A B C of metaphysical demonstration. So, we get right as principle, as distinct from right as expediency. Now, we have to consider the question of expediency.

Distribution for equal individual welfare involves, practically, distribution for collective welfare. Collective welfare involves that the individual shall devote his highest efficiency to his fellows. Until the individual has passed his present stage of development, he will need special inducement to devote his highest efficiency to his fellows. Society is concerned to secure his highest efficiency. Then, society must give him special inducement. This involves difference in society's payment for service.

Whether, when society is constituted on the basis of honesty to God, the individual himself accepts the special reward of society, or renounces it and adheres to the rigid demand of justice, will be for his own decision. As regards society, it wants the individual's best, and, in the interest of the community, is ready to pay the individual according to the rule of expediency. This will involve no dishonesty of society to God. But the individual who accepts the exceptional reward—what about him? He will remain "sinner": dishonest to God, and, with the most complete rational sanction, may pray for God's forgiveness. This is another corollary of the A B C of that terribly uncompromising metaphysical demonstration. "Original sin" still clings to him, even though he takes the reward apportioned to him by a just society, if that reward involves his obtaining more than the least. No matter what society may do, he knows that his capacity is only for himself, equally with his fellows. As he knows, so may he pray, according to his illusion of choosing. When he is honest to God, he may begin to consider whether prayer is rational.

Because we are born in what may be termed an atmosphere of suggestion of dishonesty to God, we are born in "sin." We know the good and have the illusion of choosing the evil. We claim, on the credentials of choosing, to our personal advantage. Then, the illusion of choosing must be criterion of our action, as knowers of honesty to God. If a man "chooses" to do us wrong, we hold him guilty. If we "choose" to be dishonest to God, we are guilty. If we are guilty, we need forgiveness. So, prayer to God is not so unreasonable as it may seem from



superficial consideration of the demonstration of determinism.

Whoever was born honest to God, was born free from "sin." Whoever became dishonest to God, "fell." That God determined the "fall" would not alter the fact that the fall was an event for the creature, establishing what may be termed an emotional tie between the creature and God. If the original he, she, or they establishing "sin," post-natally suggested it, all conditioned by the suggestion would be "born in sin." Then, the Bible would be right, and "evolution" wrong, about sin. As God determined sin, so, also, He determined an emotional tie for the creature, involving that it should seek reconciliation with its Maker. So, we discover rational credentials for prayer, and for the various "sacrifices" up to the supreme sacrifice involving what Christians call the atonement.

"Sin," as dishonesty to God, is the truly hereditary disease. When it will be eradicated, God, only, knows. Probably, metaphysic will expedite the eradication. A big stride in the direction will be taken so soon as society performs its part as trustee for God. Let us now return to our practical considerations.

Some services involve exercise of rarer capacity of the beneficial order than do others. On the collective behalf, society may bribe the individual endowed with such exceptional, productive capacity, to exercise it to the utmost. Again, capacity to render ordinary service varies. On the collective behalf, society may bribe the individual to exercise to the utmost his capacity for ordinary service. Thus, as a condition of being honest to God, society

may retain what is called competition. This moral as well as expediential administration of individual capacity, by society, involves what I have termed faculty-nationalisation. This, I have been advocating for the last fifteen years or more. It embraces, on moral credentials, what conventional Socialism demands, on non-moral and immoral credentials. It is practicable ideal, for the human. Conventional Socialism is impracticable ideal, for the brute. Until Socialism is propagated as the ideal of honesty to God, Socialism will be futile enthusiasm. The so-called justice of conventional Socialism is merely partisan lust to overthrow the law of convention assuring on certain conditions, the material results of his faculty-exercise, to the individual. Such Socialism starts from the fundamental fallacy that the individual has the moral right to deal with his capacity as though it were his own creation, provided the capacity is of a particular order, involving, in exercise, what is arbitrarily called labour. The advocates of this Socialism appeal to no authority outside the empirical personality. They are merely egotists, speaking "of themselves," who seek to subvert the law of convention through which has arisen such social stability and order as we now possess. For this law, they would substitute a new chaos transiently gratifying their lusts, passions, sympathies, notions of expediency. At present, they call me a dreamer. It is to be hoped that they will come to recognise that I dream to more purpose than they do.

Let us now consider, a little more in detail, the practical bearing of Meta-Christianity, in its social aspect, on the law of convention, by which are meant

legal enactments and penal measures to ensure the integrity of what is called property. This law ensures that, on certain conditions settled by itself in the interest of a class, a man owns his capacities and their empirical products. The law of convention arose through organisation into what may be termed primitive property-protection leagues, of those who had managed, by any means, to seize enough plunder to render them as solicitous about the retention of what they had acquired, as about fresh acquisition. Succeeding ages added to the stability of this fence round plunder, called property, devising more and more effective measures against those who tried to practise the method by which the "property" had been originally acquired. Non-intellectual religion strengthened the fence. "Thou shalt not steal," according to this religion, meant merely: thou shalt not despoil the despoiler. He, alone, can be robbed, who owns rightfully. God, only, is such owner.

Through such means to conserve plunder empirically arose what is commonly and fallaciously called morality, differentiating the so-called honest possessor from the so-called robber. At the present day, we may be intellectually assured that, as regards credentials for acquisition and retention, there is no essential difference between the conventionally honest man and the conventional robber. We may now know that appropriation through the conventionally right exercise of capacity, as cunning, prudence, industry, foresight, special ability, in the vocations of trade, industry, professionalism, is no less dishonest appropriation than is that through conventionally wrong exercise of capacity, as cunning, prudence, industry, foresight, special ability, in the vocations

of burglar, pickpocket, forger. Before robbery, as a moral contingency, can exist, ownership, as a moral contingency, must exist. There is no such ownership, as between individuals, under the law of convention.

Though all conventional morality is based on the assumption that the law of convention confers moral ownership right, sectional aggressiveness, in these days, motivated by selfishness and encouraged by political expedientists and their followers eager to supplant opponents, or to render particular ownerships buffers to receive blows aimed indiscriminately at all ownerships, is ever more resolutely undermining the foundations of this conventional morality and subverting the law of convention. Very recently, it has been implicitly proposed in Parliament,—of course, as a mere party intrigue, by people who would not dream of seriously assailing “property,”—to expropriate an owner for refusing to pay wages to particular people to whom he objected as his servants. Here, Lord Penrhyn’s callous arrogance and obduracy are taken as adequate grounds for depriving him of the control of what is acknowledged to be his rightful property, while the workmen’s obduracy in standing out for what Lord Penrhyn will not grant is ignored as prejudicing their claim to impose their services on Lord Penrhyn. If the law of convention is right, Lord Penrhyn is right. If the law of convention involves moral right to ownership, forcible interference with control of what is owned, involves subversal of moral right. The workers’ sentiments, inclinations, interests have no more relevancy, on the conditions, to the right of Lord Penrhyn to employ whom he likes, than his

sentiments, inclinations, interests have to the workers' right to labour where they like.

The rule of passive resistance is as good for Lord Penrhyn as for the men. They have no better right to force their services on Lord Penrhyn, than he has to compel them to render him service. Whether the motive of Lord Penrhyn or of the men is detestable or the reverse has no bearing on the above point, which, in the connection, is the essential point. Assuming that the law of convention, in regard to property, is morally valid, Lord Penrhyn is morally justified in exacting his terms as the condition of opening his quarries. On the question of principle—granting the premise of the moral validity of the law of convention—Lord Penrhyn is right. Moreover, as the law of convention affirms a man's property-right in his capacity-exercise, the men are also right, on the question of principle. If they like, they can withhold their service from Lord Penrhyn. But, suppose that involves their starving! Then, they must renounce their principle, or starve. That is the cruel logic of the facts, and the ultimate resultant of the law of convention, leading back to the primitive struggle for brute predominance through which the law emanated.

Lord Penrhyn must renounce his principle; the men, theirs, or the law of convention must be stultified. Only through the adoption of one of these alternatives will the men again go to work in the quarries. Lord Penrhyn is one of those unconscious instruments of fate destined to advance what it is their main object to foil. As his Radical and Tory critics no doubt recognise, he is very efficiently working for the downfall of the law of convention in

regard to property. Socialists should strike a medal showing brawny Penrhyn arms engaged in knocking down the fences of "property."

The "rights" and "wrongs" established by the law of convention are merely the selfish expediences of particular individuals. The conventionally honest person who acquires property by exploiting his fellows, or monopolising his manual dexterity or muscular strength, as "working man," is, essentially, as much a robber as is the person who acquires property by using the bludgeon or jemmy. Each is equally a robber from God, and God is the only owner who has real "title." Each robber is equally that entity which excites the ridicule of the atheistic critic of religion: a "sinner." He is born in this "sin," because he is born in conditions ensuring the suggestion and auto-suggestion of dishonesty to God.

Metaphysical religion and ethics—Meta-Christianity—makes a clean sweep of all this spurious distinction between ethically identical actions, and exposes the hollow mockery of right on which the distinction is grounded. Meta-Christianity places beyond intellectual rejection the truths that God owns all capacity, and that society is God's trustee, empowered and duty-bound to administer capacity according to the intellectual demonstration of justice.

Let us now consider the actual procedure by which, to-morrow, society might start, and enable the individual to start, being honest to God. To-morrow, let us say, society begins operations by getting accurate returns of all incomes from every source for the preceding year. From the honest standpoint of enabling each individual to participate equally in the fullest exercise of socially efficient capacity,

society intellectually determines expedient, varying maximums and minimums of permissible income, and applies the determinations throughout all callings. Society remains, as at present, divided into two main classes: wage-payers and wage-receivers, or, what we call masters and servants. In regard to masters, society, in the present connection, is only concerned about maximums of income. When a master's income exceeds the maximum, society appropriates the excess as its (society's) price for capacity. When the master's income does not exceed the maximum, society makes no charge for his capacity. A main consideration, in determining the maximum for a master's calling would be its importance to the community. Thus, the maximums for farmers, engineers, builders, spinners, weavers (masters) would be higher than for hatters, jewellers, glovemakers, traders, theatre-proprietors. This would apply in regard to professional callings. The doctor, chemist, electrician would be allowed higher maximums than those allotted to the actor, vocalist, accountant, lawyer (the two last would find little scope for exercise of their abilities). The mere financier would be practically extirpated. Again, a prime object would be to keep maximums as close to minimums as was consistent with the extraction of best individual effort.

By income, in the above connection, is meant profit that is not expended in extending the business and so distributing the profit to the common advantage, as increasing general spending capacity. Restating this—by income is meant profit that is spent, or may be spent, on luxury. To spend above the maximum on luxury would become the sole prerogative of the

state, on behalf of the community. In the present connection, it will be seen that the implication of the term, luxury, is not the common one. Here, the term, luxury, implies the simple ability to spend, irrespective of what the expenditure may be on. Whatever the individual might be able to obtain with excess of profit over the maximum would be, in the present connection, luxury.

Society monopolises this capacity to spend over the maximum, on "luxury." What luxury the individual wants to monopolise, he must obtain within the maximum. Society might take its "luxury" by providing for the sick, aged, infirm, fatherless, widows; by providing recreation, parks; encouraging efforts in science, literature, art, philosophy too far above popular appreciation to be economically profitable to the individual; reducing ordinary taxation. Whatever society did in this way, would involve the substitution of society's luxury for that of the individual. What is now called charity is merely the appropriation of luxury, by the "charitable," through dishonesty to God. They buy the luxury of "charity" with plunder they have obtained by robbing God.

In the case of servants, society is concerned only about minimums. These might vary according to the skill, hardship, difficulty involved in following the calling. So, the minimum for the artisan or miner might be higher than for the scavenger; for the highly skilled artificer than for the ordinary artisan. So long as he paid the minimum, the master, as at present, would have full liberty to decide the servant's remuneration. Thus, society charges only the master (on condition of income beyond the maximum) for



his capacity. Beyond capacity-charge is the master, all classes pay a graduated tax on income analogous to the present income-tax. This and the price for capacity is the only pecuniary demand made by society on the individual. The object of society is, practically, to deprive the individual of unjust monopoly of specially efficient capacity. Though this monopoly, at present, involves the disparities in material well-being so characteristic of the age, their removal is merely incidental to the ethical object of society: honesty to God. Failing demonstration of the wrong of faculty-monopoly, by the individual, there would be no moral warrant for visiting the individual as the possessor of exceptionally efficient capacity and monopolist of its products. Having the moral warrant, or rather, compulsion, society abolishes the disparities by expediential readjustments of the conditions of faculty-exercise.

To each calling, a master's, or owner's maximum of income would be attached. The owner of a mine, manufactory, warehouse (as company or individual)—each would have a special maximum of income, excess to which would be confiscated, as price for capacity. It may be urged that one man may have invested £100,000 in his enterprise, another man, £100, and that it would not be fair to limit the one to the same maximum as that of the other. It would not be fair if the investor of the £100,000, or of the £100, had any moral right to have the sum to invest. As neither has the moral claim, and as society has moral claim to all capacity, without the exercise of which, the money has no value whatsoever, society is justified in expedientially ignoring what sum has been invested, and in limiting its (society's) com-

sideration to its own interest in dealing with capacity.

As the industrial or commercial master has his maximum, so has the professional, artistic, scientific, philosophical, literary worker, whether as master, or in his individual capacity. To some of these workers society will be morally bound to pay what may be termed a non-economic wage, based on a purely intellectual estimate of the value of service. Probably all the highest service in literature, science, art, thought will need to be estimated by the non-economic criterion.

Let us take a supposititious case, to illustrate the application of the principle. Say the maximum determined for the owner of a manufactory is £1000 per annum. Then, a manufacturer whose trading results, for the year, showed an income of £1,500 (that is: nett result exclusive of re-investment in extending the business) would have his capacity charged to him at the price of £500. It may be urged that nobody would exert his best capacity, after making £1000 in the business, when he knew that the surplus was to be appropriated by society. Of course, nobody would do this, under present conditions of motive. But we are now contemplating the individual as being, like society, motivated to deal honestly with God. We are contemplating the man, not the brute. It is very doubtful whether many individuals, intellectually convinced that their capacities belonged to God, and assured that their society was dealing with all capacity strictly in the interest of the community, would abstain from exerting themselves merely because they had secured the maximum of income. Even now, we know

that emulation, apart from selfish considerations, prompts many people to exert their abilities to the utmost. On the condition of social justice, we might reasonably suppose that such impulse to strive would become the rule with the vast majority of people.

On the foregoing conditions, society would leave the control of industrial and trading properties as it now is. Owners would remain owners: as free in the management of their enterprises as is now the case. Masters and men would remain in their present relationship—with the momentous reservation that there would be no motive for dissension between them. Bad passions, contentions, to mutual injury and embitterment would be swept away *en masse*. So, the productive capacity of the nation would be vastly increased. Within the particular minimum determined for the labourer, the master would have complete discretion in deciding about the value of the service.

It may be asked: what is society to do with that important class who "toil not, neither do they spin"—the "hereditary" parasites who live on rent-rolls, consols, foreign securities? A first duty of society is to extirpate this class. To what extent society allows sentiment to retard the performance of the duty will be the extent to which society gratifies itself by indulging sentiment at the expense of duty. One thing is certain: the just society cannot tolerate parasites, apart from the aged, infirm, and orphan children. These, society is morally bound to provide for. They are society's creditors who must be paid to the uttermost farthing. This payment must be society's first luxury.

The parasite of the rent-roll society says: At present, as parasite, you afford me no competitive test of the value of your capacity, and I am morally bound to estimate you as parasite. I shall be dishonest to God if I estimate you; you are dishonest to God in withholding the exercise of your capacity on behalf of your fellows. On the other hand, I am responsible for your existence as parasite, and my dereliction of duty now comes home to me. Through the parasitic condition to which I earlier condemned you, your capacities of value to me are run to waste. I will make amends to you for my earlier dereliction of duty. I will allow, free of faculty-charge, such a maximum of income from your acres, etc., as will enable you to live, as parasite, to the end of your days, in such condition as will afford you reasonable sensual indulgence. This, I concede only to you, personally. Accordingly, it behoves you, if you have children, to take such measures as will ensure that their capacities are devoted to the welfare of their fellows. With them, I shall deal exclusively according to my duty as trustee for God. No matter from what source your income may be derived, apart from industrial and trading undertakings in this country dealt with according to the maximums of business enterprises, I shall deal with you, as parasite, according to the above principle.

On the death of such owners, and assuming that they had not earlier elected to turn over to society their property, society would impose such a penalty of faculty-charge on its retention, that the heirs would be glad to be rid of it.

In regard to women, their first vocation, for the general welfare, is in bearing children, caring for

them, and managing the household. Hence, society is morally bound to provide for widows. Again, it is to the general welfare that the circumstances of women shall not be such as to depreciate their efficiency as mothers and helpmeets. Hence, it is morally incumbent on society to add such provision to the economic minimum applying to women as servants, in ordinary vocations, as shall assure adequate maintenance; and to ensure that no woman adopts a vocation unsuited to her sex. If, economically, there is no demand for a woman's services in her vocation, then society must support her until the demand arises.

In the case of men, under the condition of lack of economic demand for their special aptitude, society will be bound to provide certain fields for the productive exercise of capacity outside ordinary economic conditions (say, road-making, draining, tilling), to which would be allotted such people as were transiently excluded, through economic conditions, from their special vocations.

It would always be the object of society to keep the minimums of service-wage, in each servant-calling, as high as was consistent with the general well-being, and to ensure that efficient service to the community in economically unproductive fields (literature, thought, invention, discovery) was adequately rewarded.

Though society would be only concerned to deal, as honest trustee for God, with faculty-exercise, the practical issue of such dealing would be the elimination of owners, such as now exist, of land, mines, machinery, railways, buildings, etc. All means of production would practically become the property of

society, though they were directly administered, as at present, by the master-workers, whose initiative, discretion, directing control would be virtually as now.

The ethical position of society with regard to the present owner will be obvious. He owns by the law of convention, and deals with his property to his exclusive advantage—sells or rents it at its extreme economic value. Society acts analogously in regard to its property: his capacity. For his liberty to use this capacity, society demands from him its price, as he, on the earlier conditions, demands his price for his property. The price of society, for its property, capacity, is prohibitive of his retaining the land, machinery, etc., as owner against society. As efficient controller of the property, on behalf of society, society encourages him by permitting his maximum of income for efficient administration.

It will be seen that, on the above conditions, there is no direct, violent attack on the law of convention; there is merely supersession (as, for instance, in the case of supersession of the Jewish by the Christian law) by a fresh law. The law of convention may be said to perform the "happy despatch," or to die of senile inanition. That will be "evolution" of an impressive order! Then, we shall see the law of convention as the biologist sees the "vermiform appendage." And, it is all so simple and practical that its consummation need involve no more shock to society than does awaking, in the morning, to the current philanthropist and regenerator with a five or six figure balance on the right side of the Bible of civilisation; or, to the pushing K.C. who has not been coming through Rye on the way to Parliament.

Moreover, the "writing on the wall" seems to indicate that the consummation has started on its journey. A "sort of" efficiency seems on the way, which Mr. Arnold White, Lord Rosebery, Mr. Chamberlain, Lord Chancellors, Archbishops, and regenerators generally, have overlooked.

As already emphasised, that the law of convention has no ethical significance does not involve that, pending the institution of law that is ethically significant, the law of convention is not binding as between individuals. The individual, having no ethical *status*, as owner, has no *status* to ignore, in his personal dealings, the law of convention, so far as it constitutes others owners. In other respects than as regards property, the individual may have ethical *status* in personally affronting the law of convention.

Finally, and most importantly, the individual has, not mere *status*, but has the most ethically compulsive obligation to do all that lies in him to secure the subversal of the law of convention as regards property, and the substitution of the law of honesty to God. This duty is infinitely more compulsive than is observance of any direction of the law of convention. No conventional virtue can weigh in the scale against the evasion of this duty to God. The person who shirks it is THE MORAL CRIMINAL.

What, then, has the individual to do to-day, to-morrow, the next day, and every day, to prove his *bonâ fides* to God? As Christian, in the ministry of Christ, or out of it, he has to proclaim the dishonesty to Christ of resisting the institution of honesty to God. As Meta-Christian, in Parliament, he has to work for the institution of honesty to God. Out of Parliament, he has to spread the light: induce people,

pledged to honesty to God, to stand for election to Parliament; work to ensure their election. He has to become the Honest-to-God Party, and submerge every other party. He must become the Inevitable—the Avalanche.

The duty of each and all is plain, simple, inescapable. Nobody can say he does not know what to do, or how to do it. The alternative for each is: Act your light; be loyal to God and Christ; or, be rogue to God and Christ! Act, on behalf of God and Christ, your illusion of choice; or, act it against God and Christ! You know, and you feel that you choose. As you choose, in relation to your knowing, is your destiny.

At present, a characteristic feature of society, in this country, are crusades against the gratification of various sensual appetites (drink, smoking, illicit sexual intercourse, gambling). Those engaged in such attempts to apply force to compelling the individual to cut himself to one or another pattern of gratification or denial of his pre-natally or post-natally imposed animal propensities, determined to be expedient or inexpedient by the standard of certain prejudices, approvals, disapprovals, seem to consider themselves the exclusively moral section of the community. According to the metaphysical identification of moral right and wrong, the efforts of these ostensibly moral regenerators have no moral significance. Regarding those of these regenerators who are ignorant of the metaphysical demonstration of the nature of justice, their confusion of gratification of their own likes and dislikes, with moral right, is justified by their ignorance. Regarding others of them, aware of the ethical resultants of scientific and



metaphysical demonstrations of Creative determinism, it can only be said that they

"Compound for sins they are inclined to,  
By damning those they have no mind to,"

and that, failing effort on their part, to eradicate the social conditions to which are mainly attributable the animal excesses, to restrain which is the object of these enthusiasts, these people are hypocrites who gratify their lust, by dishonesty to God, as determinately as do the people whom they try to hector for gratifying appetites which are not the appetites of these misnamed moral enthusiasts. If these people shirk justice, while parading their pet lusts as the outcome of moral aspiration, these people are frauds or ignoramuses. The lust for "temperance" or "purity" is, essentially, as morally indifferent as is the lust for intoxicating liquor or sexual intercourse. The gratification of self is equally the determining factor in regard to each lust. Apart from the criterion of justice, there is no moral significance in gratification of the appetites for drink, gambling, or sexual intercourse. The issue of justice alone renders the gratifications morally significant. Apart from the criterion of justice, they have merely expediential significance. Those people who will not deny their lust to be dishonest to God, but who appeal to force, to compel others to deny infinitely more trivial lust, "strain at a gnat, and swallow a camel," and expose the nakedness of their moral land.

If the crusaders against drunkenness, prostitution, gambling, want to exhibit real moral stamina, they will co-operate with those engaged in upsetting a morally rotten social dispensation, and replacing it

by one based on the intellectual demonstration of honesty to God. This is the only radical remedy for the evils of drink, prostitution, and gambling. A great moral desideratum is that our professionally moral regenerators shall begin moral scouring at home. Now, Sir Wilfrid, what say you to honesty to God? It means a bigger "slump" in "drink" in six months, than the Alliance and the magistrates, alone, will effect in six centuries.

The "temperance"-man wants to shut up drink-shops in order to make people sober. The "purist" wants to shut up brothels and exterminate prostitutes in order to make people chaste. The current Socialist, in this country, according to his principal press-organ, wants the so-called "nation" to appropriate "all the ships, railways, factories, buildings, land," in order to make people sensually contented. Assuming that what these people expect, will ensue from the respective procedures they advocate, these people, according to their present credentials, have no moral *status* whatever. They are merely expedientialists, and other people who do not like the various panaceas have just as good ground for opposing the respective measures, as their advocates have for trying to enforce them. On the conditions, there are merely various partisan sections, each with its special liking, as expediential or sentimental preference.

There is no moral issue, except as between the individual, society, and God. Moral issues, as between men, only arise as incidental to duty to God. This duty involves honesty to God, which manifests itself, as between men, as justice. All questions as to human conduct have only moral significance

judged by the criterion of justice: honesty to God. For the Christian, honesty to God involves honesty to Christ, which can be manifested solely as hypnotic submission to Christ. Such submission excludes any application of force whatsoever. Accordingly, the "temperance"-man, "purist," and current Socialist are excluded, as manifesting Christ's morality.

As manifesting morality of the intellectual order, these people, at present, are also excluded. The application of force to render people sober, chaste, sensually comfortable, is only sanctioned as morally right according to the intellectual criterion, on the condition that the application of force is incident to the administration of human capacity in the equal interest of each individual. On such conditions it is morally right to apply force to rendering people sober, chaste, and sensually comfortable. Then, expediency conforms with moral principle.

But, the ostensible Christian may urge: Christ forbade unchastity; therefore, we, Christians, have Christ's sanction for repressing unchastity. Certainly, Christ forbade unchastity. Therefore, the follower of Christ must be chaste. But, perhaps more emphatically than Christ forbade unchastity, he forbade the application of force. So, while the follower of Christ must be chaste himself, he must abstain from applying force to compel others to be chaste. If he applies force, he disobeys Christ as determinately as do the unchaste. Christ, really, put as small estimate on the gratification of what we commonly call good intentions (sentimental and expedient preferences) as does the Meta-Christian. For Christ, the mere indulgence of what we commonly call good impulses was as void of moral virtue as is that in-

dulgence, from the standpoint of Meta-Christianity. The virtue, for Christ, of any motive for action was solely measurable in terms of the hypnotic submission to himself, Christ, involved in the motive. For Christ, the mere indulgence of one or another sentiment or personal preference, apart from this hypnotic submission to him, was, as often impressed, void of moral significance. The last people that Christ would have recognised as His followers, would be such people as tried to impose, by force, their personal likings on other people. Misinterpretation, on this point, of Christ, has involved all the bloody work of past ages, on ostensible behalf of His teaching, and is, even now, responsible for much oppression and violence. As Tolstoy, of all exponents of Christ's message, has most clearly recognised and impressed, its central, practical demand is non-resistance.

To the "temperance"-man, "purist," Socialist of the current orders, Christ would have said: Because you do not like drunkenness, unchastity, sensual hardship, you seek to gratify your personal inclinations by disobeying my injunction against the application of force. You are no better than the drunkard, profligate, robber. Judge not these other people, that I judge not you! Cleanse yourselves, before you presume to judge and cast out the defilement of others!

It may be urged that Christ, himself, employed force against the traffickers in the temple. To Christ, force was the prerogative of God, and he (Christ) was God's special factotum, whose actions were, essentially, God's. To Christ, dishonour to the temple was dishonour to God, and Christ's application of force to the traffickers was God's application. No

follower of Christ was sanctioned, by Christ's action, in taking the law into his own hands, as being the factotum of Christ, as Christ was so sanctioned as being the factotum of God. The follower of Christ must obey Christ's injunction against the application of force. So soon as he applies force, the follower disobeys Christ, and usurps Christ's prerogative. To what the follower of Christ conceived to be unrighteousness, the follower could only oppose passive resistance. He must not even be party to any social system applying force, whether on behalf of righteousness or unrighteousness. So soon as the follower of Christ tolerates such a social system, he connives at repudiation of Christ's principal injunction.

Christ was exclusively hypnotic to God. The contingency of the authority of intellect, as imposing inspiration from God, being equal, or superior to the authority of "faith," was not within Christ's purview. If Christ were here, to-day, conditioned by the culture of this age, it is reasonable to suppose that he would constitute intellect, instead of "faith," the criterion of his authority, as God's agent, and that, instead of enjoining on his followers nihilistic anarchism, he would demand that they should overthrow a social system based on dishonesty to God, by obeying God's direct inspiration to each one of them, through his intellect. Christ, here again, to-day, would see as much dishonour to God, in capacity-monopoly by the individual, as He saw in regard to the traffickers in the temple. He would say: Overthrow this accursed dispensation that defrauds my Father! Then, you act as my agents, as I am the Father's agent.

The Christ of tradition said the direct contrary to

the above. To him, intellect, as God's direct revelation to the creature, was non-existent. For him, the creature was inherently incapacitated from attaining, through intellect, divine credentials for the application of force. To the Christ of tradition, the present reputed Christian, exacting legal redress against his aggressor, and the present Socialist, taking his sympathies and notions of expediency as credentials for upsetting the present dispensation, would be equally repulsive. To the former, the traditional Christ would say: Turn the other cheek! Whether you resist the smiter with your own arm, or with the arm of the law, you apply force against my injunction. To the Socialist, as ostensible Christian, this Christ would say: Begone! You invoke me, as authority, in order to gratify yourself by disobeying my injunction. If I am your authority, obey my injunction! Render unto society the things that are society's, and unto God, the things that are God's!

Christ's system was entirely opposed to any form of active resistance, whether by society or the individual, to what we call wrong. The Christ ideal was to regenerate humanity from the unit, as Christ's hypnotic, renouncing force, and actively engaged solely in serving his fellows and ignoring what we call personal interests. There is no scintilla of compromise, on this point, in Christ's teaching. The utilitarian sophistry, watering down the real Christ-cult, of which plausible stuff we have so much in these days, in certain press-organs, interested, on behalf of capitalism, in trailing red-herrings for the bemuddlement of the practical person, now beginning to pry into problems going to the very root of the *status quo*, will not long earn

wages for servile hacks ready to sell their souls for black, white, red or any partisan colour from which they can obtain a stinking reward adequate to keep their worthless carcasses clothed in the vestments of "respectability," and their viscera in a state of comfortable activity. These jugglers with Christ and with God's revelation of justice will not long find special pleading for social corruption a profitable industry. What they at present maintain will soon have to bear the fire of the intellectual crucible, or be pulverised into eternal dissolution.

From the Meta-Christian standpoint, all questions of human conduct have only moral significance judged by the criterion of justice: honesty to God. Chastity and sobriety, as moral issues, only exist in relation to justice. The society that deals with human capacity according to the demand of justice, administers capacity for the equal benefit of all. It is collectively beneficial that capacity for sexual incontinence or for undue indulgence in intoxicants shall be repressed. Subject to other repressions of like anti-social inclinations, involving that all is repressed that is inconsistent with justice, the forcible repression of unchastity and drunkenness is morally justified. At present, society repudiates justice; so, there is no moral justification for society's repression of unchastity or drunkenness. The respective acts, at present, have merely expediential or sentimental significance. Their forcible repression merely involves the preponderance of one set of self-indulgences, as gratification of sentimental preferences or notions of expediency, over another set, as the gratification of inclination to sexual incontinence, or to self-intoxication.

At present, there is neither Christian nor Meta-Christian significance, as morality, in respect to any compulsions to particular lines of conduct. The compulsions are merely manifestations of particular likings. Metaphysically, morally right compulsion, by force, can exist. According to Christ, compulsion, by force, is morally wrong: that is immoral. The application of force, in any shape, by the ostensible follower of Christ, involves Christian immorality, inasmuch as it involves disobedience to Christ, than as which, no Christian immorality can exist. If the champion of "temperance" and "purity" wants moral sanction for the application of force to repressing unchastity and drunkenness, he must apply to Meta-Christianity. So it is in regard to the Socialist who wants "all the land," etc. At present, these people have no moral sanction. Each is merely indulging himself, like the conventional debauchee. To exercise forcible compulsion, with moral sanction, we must obey authority outside the empirical personality, and that authority: the God of Meta-Christianity.

Personal inclinations, sentiments, notions of expediency, benevolences, malevolences have, intrinsically, nothing to do with morality. Their gratification merely involves self-gratification by the individual. The individual is no more fulfilling moral duty by gratifying himself by "philanthropy," than by house-breaking. So-called moral reformers of the fashionable cut are, from the standpoint of Meta-Christianity, merely variants of the burglar, pickpocket, drunkard, sexual profligate. Apart from the institution of justice, by society, all these "vicious" people have as much or little moral justification as has the conventionally virtuous person.



It may be urged that the drunkard and sexual profligate injure other people, and so, wrong them. But, whoever tolerates an unjust society wrongs the drunkard and sexual profligate, in common with others who are neither the one nor the other. If one set of people wrongs another, and *vice versa*, wherein is one set warranted in applying a moral standard to another? Where all are wronging, who is to judge moral wrong? If, in this connection, we imply wrong as a moral contingency, then, it follows that we are inaccurate in confounding injury with wrong. If there is no standard of moral wrong, we can postulate nothing about it, and we must limit ourselves to the contingency of injury.

But, surely, it may be urged, the drunkard and sexual profligate, in injuring their families, must wrong them! Assuming that, in this case, the perpetration of injury is equivalent to the perpetration of wrong, we here arbitrarily exclude society as a wronging and injuring agent, limiting the contingency to the malefactor and his or her family. But, if we tax the malefactor with wrong for injuring his family, we must see how far society is answerable for the malefactor's action. Possibly, through society, the malefactor's injury to his family through drunkenness or unchastity may be as unavoidable, for him, as is catching small-pox and giving it to his family. Again, if we limit the contingency to the malefactor and his family, we must consider the factor of motive. Is the motive of any drunkard or sexual profligate to injure his family? Such motive is inconceivable. Then, if his motive is not to injure his family, and yet he does injure them, some irresistible condition must compel him to perpetrate the injury, and, if we tax him with

wrong-doing on account of the perpetration, we must investigate the irresistible condition, and see if there is no greater wrong-doer than he.

The drunkard and sexual libertine are products of pre-natal and post-natal suggestion—almost entirely of the latter. While pre-natal suggestion may be supposed to involve variable susceptibility to the imposition of post-natal suggestion, that this latter is manifested in one or another direction depends on what suggestive influences are most immediately operative, as what we call environment. Social conditions are so operative. Through them, the specially suggestible soul, pre-natally endowed with what we call hereditary predisposition (special suggestibility), may become "infected" with alcoholic or sexual excess, just as with small-pox. Meta-physically, as earlier indicated, what we call infection with a disease is suggestion of the disease. Whether the disease is small-pox, or excessive fondness for stimulants or sexual intercourse, the determining agency is the same: suggestion.

Now, let us suppose a soul endowed with a special tendency to take suggestion from those who supply, and tempt to take (suggest), intoxicants; or, from those who suggest sexual intercourse. These are the direct inciters to the suggestible soul, to manifest its special suggestibility. On the other hand, there are counter-suggestions and auto-suggestions operating—say, as the person's family, his regard for "appearances," his concern about his business—tending to neutralise, as we may say, his pre-natally imposed capacity for receiving suggestion to "drink" or be unchaste. The practical resultant, as regards that person, will depend on which set of suggestive

influences prevails. Let us suppose that the person is indigent, dissatisfied with his state, over-worked and underpaid, eager to vary the deadly monotony of his existence. Then, pre-natal suggestion "rules the roast," and there is another example wherewith the "temperance"-man and "purist" may point their morals.

Or, let us suppose that our suggestible soul is "born with a silver spoon in his mouth," and has never had anything in his noddle but the problem how to "pass time." Pre-natal and post-natal suggestion hand him his ticket, and he arrives, as infallibly as does sixpence up in the income-tax under the auspices of jingo "efficiency." Or, let us take the demi-mondaine who happens to be born in a mansion instead of in a slum, and who adorns what is called smart society. The co-operation of pre-natal and post-natal suggestion ensures that she sheds a halo of what is called tone over what Mr. Arnold White calls the morals of the poultry-yard. Then, there is the comely shop-girl, with the full modicum of pre-natally imposed suggestibility for maternity, but no chance of receiving sexual suggestion in a licit way. Her imagination is touched by the "morals of the poultry-yard" displayed in all its piquant sauciness by the strictly moral press and high-class fiction. So, another ticket for the gallinaceous destination is handed out of the booking-office of pre-natal and post-natal suggestion.

Men are unchaste mainly because women, either through penury or luxury, are compelled to be unchaste. Men and women are drunkards mainly through the compulsion of penury or luxury. Either

condition would be extirpated were society just. Woman tempts man to unchastity. Were woman chaste, man would be chaste. Woman would be chaste did social conditions permit her chastity. Social conditions do not permit this because man is dishonest to God. Man, not woman, is ultimately responsible for unchastity. He is tempted because he wills the conditions of temptation.

As so-called moral reformer, man wants chastity, not because he obeys an impersonal principle of right conduct, with which unchastity is inconsistent; but because he feels no personal inclination to unchastity; because "morality pays"; because his selfish interests in his family belongings or in exploiting his fellows seem, to him, to be prejudiced by unchastity. He sees evil in unchastity for the same reason that he sees evil in what tends to impede his liberty to commit legal robbery by using his cunning or special ability as the footpad uses his muscles; or, in what tends to deprive him of spoil he or his ancestors have accumulated by plundering their fellows. Such concern about chastity has no more relevancy to moral right than a sewer-rat's fight for offal has to the heliocentric theory. What applies, in this respect, to the conventional "purist," applies, in the main, to the conventional "temperance"-enthusiast and Socialist. Their moral significance—Christian or Meta-Christian—is *nil*.

Multitudes of people, to-day, fully aware of the only conditions on which a Creator can exist, are, to gratify their selfish lusts, conniving at what, they are assured, are supremely immoral social conditions which, if extirpated, would practically extirpate the drunkard and sexual libertine. These conventionally virtuous

people are not slaves to uncontrollable impulse, as are the drunkard and libertine. They are cold, calculating rogues to God. While they piously profess solicitude to eradicate the evil, their whole real solicitude is to obstruct the application of the only remedy.

Under present social conditions, drunkenness and unchastity are as inevitable as is death, and it is probable, looking at the matter purely from the standpoint of expediency, that their extirpation, outwardly, on present social conditions, were that possible, would mean the introduction of graver evils. A goodly number of virtuous folk see a sort of cure-all in inducing society to get itself riveted on to the safety-valve. When steam is up, it is not wise to sit on the valve. Sexual "steam" will have a way out. These virtuous valve-sitters may profitably study Meta-Christianity. Then, they will get to know how good they are, and how good they will have to be if they are to extirpate drunkenness and unchastity.

A prominent feature of current philanthropy is alms-giving, to which is attributed moral significance. As commonly manifested, it is utterly void of moral significance, and is merely a form of self-gratification, by the dispenser. I should no more think of claiming unselfishness or moral merit for alms-giving, than for gambling. Because most people like to afford others the luxury of relieving animal necessities, we constitute this servile appreciation the criterion of merit attaching to the indulgence of a particular set of emotions involving what we call generosity, liberality, sympathy, etc. The result is that sops thrown to the needy, by the affluent, are "red herrings" across the trail of justice. If the masses could only see, in its

naked deformity, the sham that passes as charity, the advent of justice would be vastly accelerated. So long as the masses concentrate their attention on bellies, backs, and pockets, instead of on intellectually verified principles, they will have to take "charity" in place of justice.

We may divide current philanthropy into three main types: the gratitude-evoking, the practical, and the conventionally moral. The first has always a close relationship to bellies and backs. The second is provocative of bad words, being mainly concerned about stopping people from doing what the philanthropist does not like them to do, and telling them to be what the philanthropist wants them to be. This is perhaps the most agreeable line of philanthropic business to adopt. It enables us to get what we want, with the fullest assurance that it is what others do not want, and that there is a celestial credit to us from the achievement. Were I a philanthropist on pleasure bent, I might exchange my present branch of the business for that of shutting up drink-shops and brothels; preaching the virtues of thrift, abstinence, and industry to the lower orders. I might combine this with another pleasurable branch of the philanthropic business, by contributing to "charities" that advertised contributions; presenting libraries; endowing colleges, and so on. This latter indulgence would, of course, depend on the healthy state of my finances ensured through exercising my wits to the same virtuous end, and with like moral credentials as those of the burglar when he applied the "jemmy."

The third sort of philanthropy is the moral amusement of clever folk called philosophers. These people exercise their ingenuity in excogitating social rules

based on what they imagine the world ought to be like a few centuries or millenniums hence. As their imaginations are of variegated patterns, it is a somewhat perplexing business to select your pet philosopher, and you are inclined to leave that business to the next generation. Take it all round, philanthropy, to the metaphysician, is a comical institution.

The indulgence of any emotion, as action, involves selfishness. As such indulgence, the action is non-moral, unless the emotion involving it also involves submission to authority outside the empirical personality. The moral quality of the emotive indulgence is not in its empirical character, as what we call benevolent or malevolent, but in its empirical character as involving submission to authority outside the empirical personality. For the Christian, the moral quality of emotive indulgence occurs as hypnotic submission to Christ. For the Meta-Christian, such quality occurs as submission to God, through manifestation of what intellect reveals as honesty to God; justice.

That people like to be served, or to serve others, is no more morally significant than is their liking for sugar or beef. The moral significance of serving others only arises so soon as the service is incident to the manifestation of honesty to God: justice—or, in the case of the Christian, to hypnotic submission to Christ. If service is not incident to the manifestation of justice, or to hypnotic submission to an avatar, service is merely self-indulgence.

The test, for this age, of the *bonâ fides* of the philanthropist is, not his readiness to indulge himself by gratifying his benevolent emotions, but his readiness to render justice. This, and only this, will establish

his claim to the title of philanthropist. Then, his love of his fellows will be something better than his love of gratifying himself.

There is no possibility, for this age, of moral service through hypnotic submission to Christ. Christian morality, if it ever did operate as a collective manifestation, is now outside contemplation as a practical possibility. The conditions of cognition essential to its practical manifestation are now extinct. It must be re-stated in terms of the existing conditions of cognition. Then, it becomes practically possible. Such re-statement involves Meta-Christianity, with its practicable ideal of honesty to God : justice.

In concluding this work, it may be well to summarise the moral contingency.

God is Creator. From a Creator proceeds all. Hence, human capacity proceeds from the Creator.

The individual owns products of capacity-exercise, as what is called property, by virtue of the law of convention (legislation and precedent). This law assumes the individual's right to exercise his capacity on his own, exclusive behalf.

But, the individual's capacity is God's property, and God's property must be administered conformably with honesty to God.

Honesty to God involves justice between men.

Justice involves that God's property shall be administered by men, according to what God reveals as itself (justice).

This revelation involves that what the possessor has not created he shall not own. Accordingly, the individual has no ownership-right in his capacity, and the law of convention, by which the individual owns product of his capacity-exercise, falls. He owns by



robbery from God. Robbery from God involves robbery from men: injustice. Society must cancel the law of convention and substitute the law of justice: honesty to God.

The law of justice demands that capacity-exercise shall be administered for the equal advantage of each individual. Practically, this involves administration of capacity-product for the collective advantage, as against the individual.

The individual knows the fact of his lack of ownership-right in capacity, through his endowment, by the Creator, with (a) intellect, involving belief; (b) the illusions of free choice and responsibility; (c) the feeling called conscience. The right exercise of these endowments involves honesty to God. Moral right only exists as honesty to God.

The individual must act on the illusion of free choice. Hence follows empirical personal responsibility for the exercise of choice. This applies to society, which is the resultant of the individual's exercise of choice. Hence, the moral responsibility of society, to God, is the same as the individual's responsibility, and corollary to it.

As regards practical manifestation of the responsibility as involving moral right, there is a difference between the individual and society. While there is no efficient, external obstruction to society's manifestation of honesty to God, society itself may be such obstruction to the manifestation by the individual. So long as society is criminal to God, the individual is debarred from practical exercise of his illusion of free choice as involving the right personal exercise of capacity. So, the individual is, perforce, dishonest to God.

So soon as society is honest to God, through administering individual capacity on the collective behalf, the individual is equally responsible, with society, for practical exercise of the illusion of free choice, conformably with honesty to God.

Society will be honest to God so soon as a number of individuals, adequate to reconstitute society, so exercise their illusion of free choice as to conform with what their intellect tells them is honesty to God. Then, each individual, unimpeded by society, will be practically free to deal with his own capacity conformably with honesty to God.

If the individual abstains from working for the institution of honesty to God, by society, the individual connives at dishonesty to God. Such connivance is equivalent to effort to ensure dishonesty to God, and of course, renders the individual equally criminal to God, as is society.

The administration, by society and the individual, of capacity, conformably with honesty to God, is consistent with (a) expediential differences in individual rewards for capacity-exercise; (b) rivalry or competition as between individuals; (c) master-*status* and servant-*status*, as at present.

Morality is an issue, primarily, between society, the individual, and God; secondarily (as incident to the prime condition), between society and the unit, and between the unit and its fellow-units, as society. There is no moral contingency at all, but as incident to the individual's moral relationship to God, revealed through intellect, conscience, and the illusions of free choice and responsibility.

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