CONSIDERATIONS

RESPECTING

THE RECOGNITION OF FRIENDS IN ANOTHER WORLD;

ON THE

AFFIRMED DESCENT OF JESUS CHRIST INTO HELL;

ON

PHRENOLOGY IN CONNEXION WITH THE SOUL,

AND

ON THE EXISTENCE OF A SOUL IN BRUTES.

BY

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" La maniere dont Dieu à operé, est cachée dans ses secrets.—Il nous est permis de les examiner, d'en rechercher les circonstances, de proposer quelques conjectures sur la maniere dont le tout s'est passé. Mais il y auroit de la témérité *de décider* sur une matiere que Dieu n'a pas jugé à propos de nous réveler."

CALMET, sur les Apparitions, &c. Preface.

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INTRODUCTION.

It is scarcely necessary to write a Preface in order to explain the nature of the three Essays which constitute the following pages. They are in themselves so short, that a prefatory outline would nearly equal either of them in extent. I shall therefore merely remark, that the subjects are of sufficient interest to induce the attention of a few leisure moments; the reflections from which may possibly be found not to be altogether unprofitable to the reader.

In this happy country, where all are permitted to think for themselves (that is, if they choose), without restriction from religious or sectarian prejudices, and to commit to the press their views on any subject that they may deem interesting to themselves or to others, no apology is necessary from the writer, though but a layman, for venturing on certain topics of inquiry, which to many, will appear altogether the property of the clergy. Such, however, are not his sentiments. If of any importance, they are equally so to the laity as to the clergy: and if the former would more frequently enter on the consideration of congenial subjects, and in which all are alike concerned, it is probable that much of that theological enmity of different sects of Christians now prevailing through the world, might be softened down and chastened, by dispersing the dogmas with which every sect abounds, and which, (the offspring of theological and ecclesiastical pride, from even the times of the apostles), have been the chief means of separating the Christian community, and splitting it into cliques and parties, unwarranted by Scripture. The laity, unfortunately, at all times, too ignorant, or too idle, to think seriously for themselves, have been satisfied to do that in spiritual, which they would not do in their temporal concerns, viz: to embrace every wild, vague, or enthusiastic notion, that their spiritual directors have thought proper to advance. The odium theologicum thus fostered in the breasts of those, whose province it was to preach peace and good will to all, soon assumed the spirit of party, and persecution and death early followed in the train of the predominant doctrines. Such wholesale allowance to the clergy, gave them a supremacy, that the laity have never been able to the present time, fully to shake off. It is perhaps a little moderated.—Rome is not exactly

what she was four centuries ago; her principles remain however the same, and opportunity alone is wanting to retrace and renew, the barbarities of her ancient hierarchy. Even here, in this enlightened age and country, now, we see *Americans*, professing allegiance to the United States, yet fettered hand and foot to the Papal power! Our Protestant brethren are, in like manner, though inferior in degree, made instruments of designing men, in separations and divisions of the various denominations, to carry out views, in which, as merely laymen, they have little, if any interest. If political liberty requires continual watchfulness and unremitted energy to maintain its standing; not less does that liberty require it, on which our everlasting destiny may depend. And this can be effective only, through the energy and determined opposition of the laity to *every encroachment* on their rights as church members, whether in modifications of mere ceremonies, as entering wedges of some further innovation, or in principles, that, flowing from the pulpit, may at length involve them in the vortex, and bear them on unconsciously to the precincts of Rome!

I anticipate a due degree of animadversion on the part of those from whom I may unfortunately differ. I have, however, long since, ceased to rest my absolute faith on any topic, religious or otherwise, on the simple affirmation of a fallible fellow creature. Unless his proofs are fully and fairly established on the Scriptures he professes to unfold, his assertions are but on an equality with those of his opponent,—and are to be taken for what a balance in the accounts of either may appear to be reasonable. I ask no more for the following pages, and shall be perfectly satisfied with the award of the reader whether that be favourable to, or opposed to the opinions herein advocated.

The Titles of the Essays are as follow:

CONSIDERATIONS

On the Recognition of Departed Friends in another State of Existence—and whether, in that State, they have, or have not, Cognizance of the Affairs and Transactions of this World; together with the probable Influence on their Happiness, should such be the Case.

This subject is so intimately connected with that of the state of the soul after death, whether it be in a quiescent or active state, that it may not be irrelevant to make a few preliminary remarks thereon.

The state of the soul after death, during the intervening period of its separation from the body, and that of the so called general resurrection at the day of final judgment, has not been the subject of divine revelation. It has hence, at all times, been a fruitful theme of inquiry among the learned, both laity and clergy, of every denomination; nor was its consideration neglected by philosophers of ancient times, even anterior to the Christian dispensation. All investigation has, however, failed to withdraw the veil that is spread between the living and the dead; all is shrouded in uncertainty; and each one must be content to rest for its full elucidation on his own experience, at the close of his earthly pilgrimage!

Such being the case, it may be asked, why then attempt to unfold a mystery on which God has thought it inexpedient to enlighten us? The question is probably unanswerable; and

I shall only say with St. Augustin, as quoted by Calmet, when treating on the difficulties attendant on the appearance of angels to mortals, as to the nature of the bodies in which they were seen; [Enchiridion, ch. 59,] "Quand on forme sur tout cela desquisitions, et que chacun propose ses conjectures, ces recherches *servent à exercer utilement l'esprit*, pourvû qu'on demeure dans les termes d'une recherche modeste, et que l'on ne se flatte pas sans raison de sçavoir ce que l'on ne sçait pas. Car enfin qu'est-il nécessaire d'assurer ou de nier, ou de definer ces sortes de choses, qu'on ne peut assurer sans danger, et qu'on peut ignorer sans péché, et sans aucun inconvenient." "This," says Calmet, "is not to resolve the difficulty, nor to untie the knot that embarrasses us; but God has prohibited us from knowing more."*

Without further apology, I proceed then to remark, that if the moment of death is not, in fact, the actual commencement of a future *active* state of existence to each individual, and, in so far, the actual and immediate call to the judgment seat of God, going on from the first recorded death (Abel) and through all past ages, progressing still each day, and thus to continue until time shall be no more; in which respect it may be viewed as a general, though progressive judgment: if such be not the fact, then the inquiry remains, as to what becomes

* "It is," says Calmet, prefaee, p. 6, "It is always shameful to deceive oneself, and it is hazardous in religion to believe lightly, or rashly to deny; voluntarily to remain in doubt, or to continue without reason, in superstition and illusion. It is therefore important to know how to doubt wisely, and not extend our judgment beyond our knowledge." This is perfectly just, and should influence all, in metaphysical disquisitions especially, to argue with complaceney and moderation, instead of employing an intemperate and sectarian zeal to prove that which is often incapable of proof in this world, either by reason or by Scripture itself, which is too often pressed into the service of both parties, without a shadow of foundation on either side of the disputed point.

of the soul, when the link is broken that united it to its mortal associate?*

If permitted to form an opinion on a subject so completely mysterious, (and which must therefore be altogether hypothetical) from the few instances of persons recorded in Scripture, as having been raised from the dead, the probability would seem to be in favour of the sleep or quiescence of the soul, rather than of its active independent character immediately after death. If separate or independent, and not in a quiescent state, it seems extraordinary that not one of those raised from death, has afforded the slightest intimation of what was exhibited or seen by them, when the soul was soaring at freedom, during the interval between that event and its reunion with its earthly tenement! That such actual separation between the two does occur, is fully demonstrated by the words of our Saviour to the penitent thief—"This day *thou* shalt be with me in paradise." It is obvious that his body did not disappear, and of consequence it is to the soul alone that reference is made, and that it was to be apparently in an active state.† On this point the Bible is silent; and as the individual did not return to life, from him no information could be anticipated. Not so, however, with the resuscitated corpse when thrown into the prophet's grave, who "revived, and stood upon his feet;" 2 Kings xiii. 21: nor in the case of Lazarus, after four days' sepulture, and commencing putrefac-

* "It is appointed unto men once to die, but after this the judgment;" Heb. ix. 27. If not to follow immediately after death, it might reasonably be expected that St. Paul would give some insight as to the period.

† So also Moses (Ex. xiv. 13) says, "for the Egyptians whom ye have seen to-day, ye shall see them again *no more* for ever." Yet in verse 30 it is stated, "Israel *saw* the Egyptians *dead* upon the sea shore." The souls, therefore, of the Egyptians, are obviously what Moses refers to in the 13th verse.

tion: nor in those of the son of the widow of Sarepta, of Tabitha, or the young man resuscitated (if actually dead) by St. Paul, or the child restored by Elijah! Now, if the souls of the above were not quiescent, they apparently must have seen and heard, during their temporary separation from the body, in their spiritual state, something* deserving of notice, and of being described, or at least hinted at, for the edification and instruction of friends, when reunited to the body and restored to life, and which it might reasonably be presumed they would be anxious to communicate to them! Surely the wonders witnessed, if the soul was free and active, would have been the subject of conversation, and of deep consideration, far beyond any other conceivable topic! Now, since nothing of this kind is noticed, or even hinted at, it would appear to favour the belief of the temporary rest of the soul; and if so, the question is settled. But, on the other hand, it may be asked, why should the soul remain thus inactive and quiescent (as in the instance of that of Adam) for nearly five thousand years? This state of torpidity must resemble a continuous and tranquil sleep of similar extent, and of which, when awaking, he would be altogether unconscious. This prolonged repose would appear but that of a moment, and no apparent reason can probably be assigned for a slumber thus unconscious of either good or evil! Does not, indeed, the appearance of Moses and Elias, at the transfiguration of our Saviour, altogether prohibit such a view of the case, and negative entirely the idea of the quiescent state of the soul, and consequently strengthen the opinion that the moment of death is, in fact, the instant at which the final judgment of each individual commences? Whichever side of the question how-

* As St. Paul speaks of being caught up into the third *heaven*, 2 Cor. xii. 2: τρίτου οὐρανου—into *paradise*, id. v. 4: εις τον παραδεισον —whether in the body, or out of the body, he could not tell, but hearing unspeakable words, &c.

ever is advocated, difficulties present themselves, which can only be settled by self-experience, at that awful moment!

It may not be inappropriate to advert here to that expression in the so called Apostles' Creed, "I believe in the resurrection of the *body*." This assumed fact of the resurrection of the *identical* body, (as most assuredly is the credence of nine-tenths of all who repeat it) is certainly not sustained by what St. Paul has written on the subject, 1 Cor. 15 ch.—nor by the Nicene creed, which (as well as every part of the New Testament) more correctly speaks of the resurrection of the *dead*. Now, as this body is uniformly regarded as material and mortal, whilst the soul is affirmed to be spiritual and immortal; it must necessarily follow, that if the body is *identically* raised, and becomes thereby a resident of heaven or hell, as well as the soul; it must, by its existence throughout eternity, be incontestably as immortal as the soul itself! Those who accredit this, must, we apprehend, give sufficient reasons why St. Paul says this vile body is changed, that it becomes a glorified, a spiritual body;—for, although the *peculiar* character of this newly constituted body is left by the Apostle altogether unexplained, yet if it be *changed*, as he affirms it to be, then it obviously cannot be the *same* body. Nor will it be found, that in any particular, St. Paul even remotely sanctions such an opinion.

I am induced here to notice the elaborate and highly interesting work lately published by the Rev. Dr. G. Bush, entitled "Anastasis: or the Doctrine of the Resurrection of the *Body*, rationally, and scripturally considered." I cannot too highly express my opinion of this important volume; it so completely subverts the *common* belief on the subject of that wonderful and eventful change in the destiny of every human being; that it cannot fail of producing conviction in the mind of every one who is capable of reflection; and sooner or later must lead to a change or modification of that portion of the creed, by which

such an opinion has so long been supposed to be justified. Theology and the world at large, are deeply indebted to the Reverend author of the work, for his patient and persevering investigation; it is a subject of congratulation that it has been rendered of general utility through the medium of the press.*

*I will take occasion in this note to remark, that amongst the changes that the above work is calculated to induce, are those of one or two of the *articles* of the Episcopal Church—both of which are prominent in the list—and yet seem wanting in scriptural authority. It is deserving of consideration in that church, whether, inasmuch as the sixth article contains the foundation of every part of its belief, which establishes the "Holy Scriptures" as its rule of faith,—"So that whatever is *not read therein*, nor may be *proved thereby*, is not to be required of any man that it should be believed," &c.; whether, I repeat, it ought not therefore to stand foremost on the list? it would seem to be its most appropriate location.—The two articles to which I above refer, are the 3d and 4th—the former, which I shall more fully consider at the close of these observations, adverts to our belief, that Christ "*descended into hell.*" The latter affirms, that at his resurrection, he "took again his *body*, with *flesh*, *bones*, and *all things* appertaining to the perfection of *man's* nature, *wherewith* he ascended into heaven, and *there sitteth*, *until* he return to judge all men at the last day."

Is it really proved from scripture that Christ did actually ascend to heaven, clothed with flesh, bones, and all things appertaining to the perfection of man's nature, and that for a period of more than eighteen hundred years, he has thus been located in a human form? It is much to be questioned, if by the most subtle casuistry, this can be made to appear! Jesus Christ was *once* crucified by the Jews. They were mostly ignorant of the crime that they committed, for Christ himself says, whilst on the cross, "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do." After his death, an honourable burial was permitted to his corpse, and, save the wound in his side, by a *Roman* soldier, no mutilation was inflicted on his corpse. Catholics, more savage than the Jews, like cannibals, daily devour him alive, and so have done for many centuries! How many millions of times this unholy act has been performed, might perhaps, be made with profit the subject of calculation, which, though incapable of absolute precision, would still

In cursorily treating this subject, (so much more fully and elaborately considered in the work alluded to,) I shall venture to surmise, that the reformers of our liturgy, pious and excellent as they were, and deserving of the warmest praise of every Protestant; in establishing a set of articles of religion for us, were yet but imperfectly acquainted with some important branches of medical and physical science, that if better understood, might greatly have assisted their theological investigations. Anatomy, Physiology and Chemistry were then in their infancy; but even of what was known, they appear to have been very ignorant, if we may judge of their information from various parts of their writings. A superior degree of knowledge at the present period of the world, might be appropriately employed to rectify *some* of their errors, as they rectified *many* of the Romish church;—and *our* faith, by their own showing, is no more dependant on their opinions, when not in harmony with scripture, than they themselves judged to be the case with the fathers who preceded them, under similar circumstances; or we never should have witnessed the glorious influence of the

suffice to show how often they have crucified the Lord of Life, and thereby put him to open shame. The Jews were satisfied by once depriving him of life by a cruel, but not uncommon death—but Romanists devour him alive, flesh, bones and all; they do not *sacrifice* him, but *eat him* bodily. Both alike act from ignorance, and may our Saviour pray for these, as he did for the Jews, "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do!"

But is this *body* of our Saviour, that is represented as being in heaven, (with every thing appertaining to *human* nature) truly proved to be the same which appeared on earth, by any part of scripture, or is it not rather "a fond thing vainly invented, and grounded upon no warranty of scripture, but rather repugnant to the word of God?" Although, to be sure, the Papists in number throughout the world, about two hundred millions, do at least bring him down from heaven, half that number of times *daily*, to be craunched alive between their merciless jaws!—Credat Judæus!

reformation, but should still have been "in the gall of bitterness, and in the bonds of iniquity."

A question occurs here, if the *identical* body committed to the grave, is that which arises to judgment, whether it is to be punished or rewarded, for deeds done at an anterior state of existence; since it is obvious to every one, that the particles of matter which composed it in the heyday of youth, when sins of most kinds more generally prevail, are not those that constitute it at the age of sixty or seventy.*

* If all the particles of matter that at the different periods of life have constituted a portion of our frame should be raised, (and we may ask what greater claim has the last particle deposited over those which constituted the first rudiments of the body, though long since removed, except on the principle that *possession* is nine points of the law, I cannot well perceive, especially as it may be controverted by another, *seniores*, *priores!*) then consider what gigantic bodies must appear! I have somewhere seen a calculation of the amount eaten during the life time of an individual, estimated by an *equivalent* of such a number of sheep; which is made to amount, I think, to four thousand. A goodly amount of mortality to invest the soul! But this is only for a longevity of present times. If we go back to the antediluvians, who lived ten or twelve times as long; the amount will reach to forty or fifty thousand! Some, however, have supposed, that big or little, young or old, all will rise with bodies of about thirty-three years of apparent age; being that of our Saviour at the period of his death, and in the perfect forms of men and women. St. Augustin, who knew as much of this matter as any one, is full authority for this, as well as for some further information he affords us, viz: that "Erunt autem tunc membra fœminea; non accomodata usui veteri, sed decori novo; quo non alliciatur aspicientis concupiscentia, quæ nulla erit," &c.

"Our doctors say (Sterne's Koran, p. 118,) that the dead shall rise again with *bodies*. This notion appears to be an article of faith agreeable rather to the doctrine of a Mahometan priest, than a Christian divine. It would be unphilosophic to suppose, that flesh and blood shall lose their properties after resurrection."—Many anxious inquirers also seek to know further, whether those parts that are here deemed ornamental, such as the hair of the head, will rise with the body, inasmuch as it will be so very long; as well as the nails. St. Augustin comforts

Whatever the sins of old age may be, and for which punishment is justly due, surely the justice of a gracious and heavenly father, would never condemn the materials of old age, that had never committed the sins which had prevailed in youth. Now, is not perpetual change evinced, by the *absolute* necessity of our daily food for which we petition "our Father who is in heaven?" If such were not the fact, what necessity would there be of this frequent recurrence to food of any kind? and why would not the same particles of matter fully answer every intention when we had reached our full complement of growth? But no! each particle performs its respective duty, and successively yields its place to a new one, and is thrown off as effete and useless, if not absolutely injurious to the system of which it had constituted a part.*

them by the assurance that every *superfluity* will be removed, and every *deficiency* supplied. It is surprising that these minute philosophers did not carry their inquiries into the matter of the dandriff of the hair, and other sordes of the animal economy, all of which once formed a part of its substance, and is equally entitled to their respectful consideration as those they have taken pains to look after.

The *rib* of which Eve was formed has puzzled them very greatly; having been *first* vivified in Adam, he seems to have a prior claim—and it became highly important to know to which of the two it will appertain in heaven! If Adam, as its first proprietor, demands it as his property, what becomes of Eve? It is replied, that it was primarily ordained for Eve, and not for the perfecting of Adam; in whom it was a mere superfluity, or else its place in him filled up with flesh! In like manner, abortions and monsters, 'tis affirmed, will be rendered perfect! And now, after all this fanciful and ridiculous speculation of learned saints and theologians, how will it comport with the direct affirmation of the resurrection of the *identical* body that has rotted in the grave?

* It appears to me a most extraordinary circumstance that the doctrine of the resurrection of the *body*, should have ever entered into the mind of any one who reads the scripture with due attention, and that it should continue even to this period; when the very next chapter of Genesis to that which describes the creation of man "of the

The learned and Reverend Father Dom. Aug. Calmet, has left among his writings, one, entitled "Dissertations sur les Apparitions des Anges, des Démons and des Esprits," &c. Paris, 1746, 12mo. In the 67th, p. 230, and succeeding chapters, he points out the difficulty of explaining apparitions on the hypothesis that souls, angels, &c. are purely spiritual, and after giving strong arguments against the materiality of the soul, in opposition to Locke,—yet he in a measure admits the *possibility* (as every one must do) under the power of God. "A Dieu ne plaise que nous voulions donner des bornes à la Toute-Puissance de Dieu,"—although he adds that our mind sees no proportion between these two things, thought and matter;—admitting that the subject is not known to us by revelation; nor is it demonstrated either by the cause or its effects,—and he agrees that difficulties environ whichever system is adopted.

Such is the conclusion that all must arrive at—and that neither opinion is capable of absolute demonstration, or it must long since have been finally settled. Were it a point of revelation, then it would be conclusive, and a matter of faith alone; but as a metaphysical object, it may admit of speculation, without calling forth the angry feelings of opposing theorists, who, without any scruples of Christian charity, condemn

dust of the ground," describes also his corporeal destruction "till thou return unto the ground; for out of it wast thou taken: for dust thou art and *unto dust shalt thou return.*" Can aught be more explicit—or can any theologian, even if equalling the most subtle of the schoolmen, find here the slightest support for a doctrine so evidently opposed to scripture and to true philosophy! When it is said that Adam was made of the *dust* of the earth, it is not to be taken in its strict and literal meaning—but that he was formed from those *elementary* principles, of which the universe is constituted, and into which the body is again resolved after death, through the process of putrefaction; thereby escaping into the general mass, to aid in the building up of new forms of matter, animal, vegetable and mineral.

one another to anathema, excommunication and death. Obloquy and persecution are not the certain characteristics of truth; and here it is easily seen that feeble reason can afford but little help to harmonize or settle, that which God has not thought fit to reveal to man. The deep mystery of the nature of the soul cannot be discovered by these contending opponents; but after all their vain attempts, must leave it for a final settlement in another world, when, should they meet and recognise each other, it is probable that they may decide it with more harmony than they ever enjoyed in their sublunary discussions.*

To recur, however, to Calmet, he gives at page 411, et seq. sundry instances from St. Augustin, from his treatise, "De Civitate Dei," of persons "renvoyés au monde," and then proceeds as follows:—

"St. Augustin demande ensuite si les morts ont connoissance de ce qui se passe en cette vie? Il montre que non: parceque Dieu à rétiré du monde, par example, Josias (2 Chron. xxxiv. 28) à fin qu'il ne fut pas témoin des maux qui devoient arriver à sa nation; et que nous disons tous les jours, qu'un tel est heureux d'être sorti du mŏnde pour ne pas ressentir les maux qui sont arrivés à sa famille, ou à sa patrie."

It is certain, as experience proves, that much can and has been said on both sides of the above question, as asked by St. Augustin. Agreeing with him fully in the negation assumed by him, I consider it, nevertheless, as incapable of absolute proof, as I consider all that has been said or written as to the nature of the soul itself. Still, I shall venture to make a few

* "Is it not an amazing thing (vide Koran, p. 174, ascribed to Sterne) that men shall attempt to investigate the mystery of the redemption, when, at the same time that it is propounded to us as an article of faith solely, we are told that the very angels have desired to pry into it in vain?" Will not this remark as aptly apply to the never-ending disputes as to the nature and character of the soul?

remarks on the subject, since it has a strong bearing on the views we may entertain as to the felicity which the good may be presumed to enjoy in a future state!

I must here remark, that although persuaded of the truth of the opinion given by this great man on the subject under consideration, that it is reported of him, that he "said he believed some things, because they were absurd and impossible" (Sterne's Koran, p. 81): and that this is an undoubted trait in his character, will be best exhibited from his own authority,* coupled with that of his attendant presbyters, if, indeed, a more obnoxious term could not be appropriately applied to the information to which he has ventured to give publicity.

A curious work printed at Leipsic in 1744, entitled "Historia Crypto-Socinismi, Altorfinæ quondam Academiæ infesti, Arcana," by G. G. Zeltnerus, has a part of it occupied, under the head of "Supplementa et Documenta," and divided into several chapters, the eighth of which is headed, "Confessio Fidei Joachimi Peuschelii," &c., consisting of his answers to twelve questions respecting sundry points of religion. One of those questions, p. 998, is—"An utraque symbola, Nicenum et Athanasii, sacris Lïteris in omnibus sint conformia?" The reply follows, accompanied by notes and references, many interesting, and bearing more or less on different particulars of those creeds, some not undeserving of attention. The latter

* In his "Sermones ad Fratres in Eremo," is one (at p. 17, Sermo 37th, Paris ed. of 1516, black letter) in which he says, "Ecce ego jam Episcopus Hipponensis eram, et cum quibusdam servis Christi ad Æthiopiam perrexi, ut eis sanctum Christi Evangelium prædicarem; et *videmus* ibi *multos homines et mulieres, capita non habentes!* sed oculos grossos *fixos in pectore!* Cætera membra æqualia nobis habentes." And a few lines further on he adds, "*Videmus* et in inferioribus partibus Æthiopiæ, homines unum oculum tantum in fronte habentes." Who can pretend to harbour a doubt in his mind of so wonderful a fact, when given under the immediate sanction of the greatest saint in the Romish church!

creed has happily been expunged from the Liturgy of the American Episcopal Church, yet it still deforms that of the parent church of England!*

At p. 1032 are the following questions:—

"An in Christo Domino nostro jam in statu gloriæ, vera sit humanitas, secundum quam veram carnem et sanguinem (Romanists are speaking) quæ in cæna participamus, habeat? Item: Annon Photinianum argumentum, caro et sanguis regnum Dei non possidebunt. Ergo, quia Christus sit jam in regno Dei, cum non habere carnem et sanguinem: sit purum sophisma, et quid respondendum?"

Peuschelius replies, taking, as his text, v. 12, 13, of 6th chapter of St. Paul's 2d Epistle to the Corinthians—"Meats for the belly, and the belly for meats; but God shall *destroy* both it and them." The respondent lays great stress on "God shall destroy both it and them," and then pertinently asks, "Quomodo vero hoc convenit cum eo, quod vulgo aiunt, idem numero corpus cum omnibus suis membris resurrecturum? An datur corpus absque ventre?" This, by the pious examiners, is called "Ineptiæ," because the apostle speaks not alone of the belly, but of its operations on the food, which will not take place in another life, &c. The respondent, no way

* In the Analytical Review (London, 1789, 3d Vol. p. 288) are some good remarks upon the subject of a reform of the Liturgy, in which reference is made to the reform of that of the American Episcopal Church, and at p. 294, that Liturgy, with its revision is briefly noticed, and it is there stated, that "The restoration of the Athanasian creed was also proposed to that Convention (that at Delaware in 1786) at the instance of the letter from the English archbishops, but was rejected. And, indeed, the compliance of the Convention in the other instances, (respecting the descent of Christ into hell in the Apostle's creed, &c., *which had been omitted*, but subsequently restored) was the *price to be paid* for the consecration of their bishops in England; but the conditions of the purchase reflect no honour upon either of the contracting parties!"

daunted, proceeds thus: "Vel, an venter, et cæ, quarum receptaculum est, partes, velut cor, pulmo, jecur, lien, stomachus, &c., non sunt de corporis essentia, vel ejus partes aut essentiales, aut integrales? Imo monstrum potius corporis humani, vel corpus phantasticum et marcioniticum, quam verum corpus censendum, quod ventre caret. Et dempto ac abolito ventre, quid reliquis membris fiet? an et illa abolebuntur? Sic sane persuasum mihi habeo. Aut, si manebunt, quomodo illa inter se cohærebunt et jungentur? Mirabilis sane homo, qui manibus, pedibus, auribus, oculis, capite, &c., præditus, ventre tamen caret,"—Much more is argued to the same effect, with observations on St. Paul's exposition of the modification of the body in the resurrection, not devoid of interest in considering this important doctrine, which we are taught in infancy, and continue up to the latest period of life to repeat it like parrots, without duly reflecting on its intrinsic nature.*

If those who depart this life may be supposed to have any further acquaintance with what passes in the world, we should reasonably imagine, that numerous instances of depravity, together with the generally associated misery of their immediate friends and relatives left behind them, being perpetually presented to their observation, would (if their feelings and affections at all resemble those they here possessed) inevitably tend to diminish, if not to extinguish, the felicity that we usually attach to their heavenly existence! Let each one represent to himself the parents of a large family (his own for instance), removed by death, and participating in the blissful enjoyments

* If the resurrection body is a spiritual and glorified one, as St. Paul affirms, the organs of the material body, as here existing, cannot come into operation, and, consequently, recognition must be founded on principles of a very different character from those which are required in this world.

of heaven. Imagine, now, those parents looking from their blest abode, and tracing, day by day, the footsteps of their beloved offspring in the paths of vice, and conscious of their complete secession from virtue; and assured thereby of not being able to welcome them, and reunite with them in those mansions of eternal happiness! But could those parents indeed feel happiness, even within the precincts of paradise?—Let each one answer: could aught but unutterable anguish be their portion?

Now can we for an instant accredit that the felicity of heaven is subjected to such alloy! an alloy incompatible with every idea the mind can form to itself: it seems impossible, incongruous, and inconsistent with the doctrine taught us by the Scriptures! Either, then, the feelings must differ, and be entirely changed from those experienced on earth; all memory of sublunary things must be obliterated; or all knowledge of what is passing upon earth must be precluded. This last supposition involves the overthrow of every idea of intercourse with the events of our globe, either of a general or of a partial nature!

I perceive but one way to reconcile this apparent anomaly, and obviate the dilemma which appears to attach to either side of the question, or which may afford a probable explanation of what is in itself so obscure and mysterious.

In the creation of every individual, no doubt exists, that, whatever be its nature, an *immortal** tenant is also created,

* We may be here permitted to observe, that, independently of the will of its Almighty architect, the soul is (necessarily) neither immortal nor eternal. The soul of the embryo or infant in utero, apparently must, as emanating from God, be on an equality with that of the most gifted and accomplished adult; but the organs by which, or through which its faculties can alone be fully developed, being as yet imperfect or unformed, and only reaching perfection after a period of many years, its faculties can show themselves only in the ratio in which the

pari-passu, to occupy the body whilst vitality exists! God has, in his wisdom, thought proper to withhold from us all knowledge of its character and composition; and beyond the assurance of its continued existence we know nothing, when its earthly associate has mouldered into dust, and through the agency of chemical laws been decomposed into its primitive elements, and passed into other forms of matter, to subserve still further the operations of the animal, vegetable, or mineral kingdom! Those particles of matter which constituted the persons of our first parents, have thus continued to float along the tide of time, and still continue to exist under diversified forms, claiming thereby affinity to all, yet not admitting of the absolute control of any! In evidence that the Great Being, who formed the soul for immortality, can, at his pleasure, prove that it is not so, necessarily, our gracious Saviour warns us "to fear him who can destroy both soul and body in hell." Whatever the expression may absolutely indicate, yet being coupled with the body, it would seem to apply to something of a material character, though it need not be considered as of any of the elementary matter of our globe; the destruction of the body, as material, we can comprehend, by annihilation or otherwise; but what can we conceive of the destruction of immateriality?

Be all this as it may, we are led to believe, that the soul, clothed in a spiritual and glorified body, altogether distinct from its former associate, is the only part of man that finds a

improvement of the organs takes place. "When I was a child," says St. Paul, "I spake as a child, &c., but when I became a man, I put away childish things." Even our Saviour is said to have "increased in wisdom and stature," &c. On the same principles we may reasonably conjecture that the soul of the idiot or of the insane, is, *quo ad* the soul, perfect; but its actions being developed through the medium of imperfect or diseased organization, those actions will deviate in a similar ratio from the perfect and proper standard.

passage to the region of heaven! Now, when thus unshackled by the fetters of mortality, and it returns to its Creator, it may not unreasonably be concluded, that being no longer controlled by flesh and blood, this divine emanation loses its former feelings and impressions, arising from its previous necessary dependence on corporeal organs of sense for all its former intercourse with the material world, but which now no longer appertain to it in its new and separate state of being!

If the usual means of communication (here essential to our welfare) are cut off, it follows that some new measure must be provided for its spiritual state, whether that be limited to heaven or extended to the earth, since that which previously existed, is now, as though it had never been! The spirits of the just made perfect, associated together in one blessed community, and constituting one great and extensive family of love in heaven,* must feel new impulses and trains of impressions, enlarged and expanded as the place they inhabit; forming there a different state of society from that limited connexion which bound them on earth!† Their feelings are no longer earthly. With this world having no longer any concern, they must have attained celestial feelings, for how can it be imagined that

* The views of the society of heaven, as described by Swedenborg, although they may be considered as highly fanciful, are nevertheless extremely beautiful.

† The *extensive* circle of each one's connexions and associations in this world, are pretty accurately defined by Sterne in the 7th ch. of Tristram Shandy, when speaking of the "notable good old body of a midwife"—"who had acquired, in her way, no small degree of reputation in the world," he adds "by the word *world*, need I in this place inform your worship that I would be understood to mean no more of it, than a small circle described upon the circle of the great world, of four English miles diameter, or thereabouts, of which the cottage where the good old woman lived is supposed to be the centre." And such is the magnitude of the *world* of the greater proportion of the human race!

earthly cares and thoughts can predominate, when all the *material* organs of the body ceased their functions at the cessation of vitality, and now are mouldering in the grave?

Should these blessed spirits then be permitted to revisit the earth, their feelings must be of a general, not of a limited or partial character. Were it otherwise, and former feelings still predominate, existence even in heaven would, according to our present conception, apparently be accompanied with all those partial attachments and regards, that constitute on earth, the great bond of consanguinity, and form the most important principle of domestic love and friendship! But would not the happiness of heaven be thereby frustrated? Would not similar cliques and coteries of families, of friends, and family connexions, be equally there constituted under the feelings of mortality? and would not, therefore, feuds and friendships necessarily ensue as on earth, to the diminution or to a total extinction of that celestial affection, which it may be presumed was the intention of a gracious Being, their common parent, for the happiness of all? However it may here be requisite to possess both love and friendship for our immediate families and relations; a necessity obviously essential to this state of existence, and therefore so wisely ordained by God himself for mutual comfort and support amidst the trials of this life; it seems well calculated to subvert the happiness of heaven! We are, therefore, irresistibly led to the conclusion, that a like necessity no longer existing after death, a new train of feelings is awakened, under the spiritual influence of the disembodied being! Partial, parental, filial and consanguineous, are obliterated with the obliteration of the corporeal organization to which they were essential, and yield to the influence of general love and universal affection. Should we then happily attain those blessed mansions, is it not both probable and reasonable, that we shall there, no longer recognise each other as we do at present, in the various relations of parent, husband, wife or

child, or other family or civil connexion? but that we shall all meet as one great family, in which is lost the memory of those more limited and circumscribed ties of earthly affection? Has not our Saviour taught us that in heaven, there is neither marriage nor giving in marriage? and may this not be regarded justly, as an indirect acknowledgment of the truth of the above assumed position? Of what utility indeed could marriage be in heaven? Of its absolute necessity on earth, no one can have a doubt, except a Romish Priest!* Let us for an instant admit that the feelings and affections of this mortal state are carried into heaven; and what would be the result? Here, during the short period of fifty or one hundred years, a period less than a speck in the lengthened chain of never ceasing ages;—here, even in the best regulated and most affectionate families, how frequent are the evidences of temporary forgetfulness of love and sympathy, in the little bickerings and disputes on mere trifling subjects of different opinions, imagined affronts, or pecuniary matters! How would these comport with the happiness anticipated of a never-ending eternity? But must not such result from mortal feelings—and what becomes of heaven?

Repugnant as at first sight such views may prove to mundane ideas, reflection will probably reconcile them to the mind, and convince it that happiness in heaven must prove imperfect, if shackled by the memory of past events, and worldly transactions of persons and things. Family, religious, and national associations would continue to maintain their limited and sectarian affections and hatred, to the exclusion of that expansive benevolence which kindred spirits can alone enjoy.

* And why? Because he can revel in the delights of concupiscence, unshackled by the ties and responsibilities of parental affinity. See on the subject of priestly celibacy, a small but excellent treatise by the Right Rev. Diogo Antonio Feijó, of Brazil, "On the Necessity of Abolishing a Constrained Clerical Celibacy," &c.

Is this indeed an inconsistent view of the subject under consideration, when we remember, (what all admit) that we have one common origin in Adam; and are, therefore, merely individual, though distant links of one great chain proceeding from him, and ending only with the termination of the human family! Brethren we are in fact, both spiritually and corporeally, and hence the great command, that we should love each other as ourselves—which, although of the utmost difficulty in this life, may readily be imagined to be the case in heaven, if free from the shackles of this mortal state! The former, constituted by our souls, all alike emanating from a benevolent and *heavenly* parent; the latter, deriving its source from the *earthly* father of the whole human race. The chain indeed is rusty, even from its commencement! The fall of Adam, the murder of Abel, speedily tarnished its original lustre, and wars, persecutions, and all the varied ills which spring from the unrestrained passions of man, have continued to disfigure it to the present day! What a most felicitous progeny in *corporeal identity* to meet in heaven!

I come then to the conclusion, that by the above, or by some analogous view, we can alone, I think, explain, how heavenly spirits, if permitted to investigate and watch over the affairs of man, may yet continue happy, and be altogether insensible to the misery that would otherwise await them, under the influence of memory of passed and passing events! Whether my readers shall arrive at the same conclusion, I cannot prophesy; but I will merely notice in addition for their consideration, that it is perfectly obvious, we all care as little *here* for our predecessors of the fourth, fifth and sixth generation, and so on, counting back to Adam, as we do for those who are to succeed us to the end of the world. Beyond the few dear objects of affection, immediately known to us, all are *relatively* strangers; and each generation, looking either backwards or forwards, must have ties of consanguinity equally as powerful

as our own; hence, unless our recognition, &c. in another world is *general* and unconfined, consider for a moment what a singular state of society would be that of heaven! Each generation looking to two or three links of *immediate* connexion only, we must quickly be thrown into a state of inextricable confusion, to unravel which, the Gordian knot, in comparison, would be a trifle!*

* I may help this confusion by the following statements cut out of newspapers, and which having a slight connexion with the subject under consideration, will at least amuse, if they do not instruct: of the calculations as to correctness, I have never undertaken to go through them. The writer of one of them signs himself E. J. Pierce.

Population of the World.—According to M'Gregor, the population of the world is 812,553,712, which is divided by Bell as follows:

Whites,	440,000,000
Copper coloured,	15,000,000
Mulattoes,	230,000,000
Blacks,	120,000,000

Hassell deemed the world's population to be 936,461,000, possessing the following religions:

Christians,	252,600,000
Jews,	5,000,000
Mahometans,	120,105,000
Brahminists,	140,000,000
Buddists,	313,977,000
All others,	134,490,000

The Christian World:—

Catholics,	137,000,000
Protestants,	65,000,000
Greek Church, &c.,	50,000,000

The population of Europe is estimated by Malte Brun at 214,000,000 souls. Asia is put down by Balbi at 413,844,300.

Life and Death.—The population of the earth is estimated at *one thousand millions*, and a generation lasts thirty-three years. Therefore, in thirty-three years the 1,000,000,000 must all die! Consequently, the number of deaths will be, by approximation:—Each year, 30,000,000; each day, 82,101; each hour, 3,421; each minute, 57; each second, nearly 1. If, on the other hand, as has been calcu-

I might here suggest for consultation on the subject of mutual recognition in another world, "Polwhele's Discourses on Different Subjects." London, 1788. In his 10th discourse, after giving the views of a future state from philosophy and Christianity, he infers the *certainty* of mutual recognition, from a consciousness of our identity; from the solicitude of the departed for the welfare of survivors, as deduced from La-

lated, the number of births is to that of deaths as twelve to ten, there will be born each year, 36,000,000; each day, 98,896; each hour, 4,098; each minute, 68; each second, over 1.

LEARNING.

"One of my great grandfathers was a Marblehead fisherman, and all my relations are fond of the occupation; we throw out our opinions, that are little worth, and sometimes draw up from the sea of literature the opinion of some big fish. I do not know the occupations of all my great grandfathers, and great great grandfathers, and great great great grandfathers, &c. I must have had a great many of them. Once on a long voyage I went back to the twentieth generation, and found that I must have had about 1,058,576 within the last seven centuries, and agreeably to such data, as Sir Isaac Newton used to ripen his chronological conclusions, the number of my great and great great and great great great grandfathers, &c., since the creation, (allowing it the shortest date, that the computations of the most learned divines will admit,) say 5836 years or 58 centuries 36 years, or 175 ages, the whole number of my great great great grandfathers, must have been 47,890,485,652,059,026,823,698,344,598,447,161,988,085,597,568,237,568 or forty-seven thousand eight hundred and ninety octillions, four hundred and eighty-five thousand six hundred and fifty-two septillions, fifty-nine thousand and twenty-six sextillions, eight hundred and twenty-three thousand six hundred and ninety-eight quintillions, three hundred and forty-four thousand five hundred and ninety-eight quadrillions, four hundred and forty-seven thousand one hundred and sixty-one trillions, nine hundred and eighty-eight thousand and eighty-five billions, five hundred and ninety-seven thousand five hundred and sixty-eight millions, two hundred and thirty-seven thousand five hundred and sixty-eight great grandfathers—a greater enumeration than will be intelligible to all of the present generation: what trouble there must have been in the world just to bring in a poor old fisherman's grandson!"

zarus and the rich man;* from the pleasure promised in the society of Abraham and the prophets, &c.; from the declaration of Jesus Christ to the penitent thief; from Christ being known to the apostles when transfigured;† and from the implication in St. Paul's declaration, that "they who sleep in Jesus, God will bring with him." The whole of this discourse appears, by the arguments employed, to be a mere "petitio principii"—and all the inferences deduced from merely mortal feelings and impressions, unsubstantiated by any of the positions he assumes, as is well confirmed by the review of the work in the Anal. Rev. v. 5. 1790, p. 69.

A small treatise appeared in 1838, in this city, entitled, "The Recognition of Friends in another World," of which several editions have since been given to the public. Its intention was to soothe the sorrows of the bereaved, and to multiply the joys of the happy. Its benevolent purport is unquestionable, and it required only the garb of certainty, and a solid foundation, to render it in all respects of the deepest interest. Its arguments, &c., are, however, apparently derived from Polwhele; at least they are, like his, founded on supposition, but rendered attractive by an address to the feelings, rather than to the understanding, in the hour of deep affliction. As the views I have ventured to propose are in direct opposition to those contended for in the treatise mentioned, it becomes a duty to ask those who have perused it with care, and with

* This beautiful history, if not intended for an allegorical allusion alone, seems, indeed, to present such an uncommon and unanticipated instance of Christian charity and benevolence in a wretched outcast from heaven, and an inmate of the gulf of endless wo, that it would almost tempt us to believe that his faith might have led to his forgiveness, as was the case with the penitent thief.

† This could hardly be called a case of *re*-cognition, since it would seem they equally knew both Moses and Elias, whom they never before had seen.

minds uncontrolled by personal affliction, what it proves? I think the reply must be, absolutely nothing of all it professes! All that is advanced is bare supposition, devoid of "philosophical acumen, or logical precision," as I shall attempt to demonstrate.

In the preface we are told, that "the design is to show the consonance of this doctrine with reason and Scripture," &c., so as to enable all "to give a reason of the hope that is in them." Unquestionably this is an important desideratum, but one, we fear, the treatise in question will never enable us to perform. It "does not pretend to have brought forward all the passages of Scripture which throw light upon this subject. If it has *succeeded in making it appear* that the belief of this doctrine is reasonable [it ought to be, if true!] in itself, and that the word of God allows us to indulge in it, the end will be attained."—Most assuredly; but should it be unfounded and erroneous, what then?

At p. 14, we are told, that "of the precise nature of the happiness of the blessed, &c., we know very little; nor, "with our limited faculties, could we probably comprehend them." Admitting this to be the case, why thus venture to place amongst these incomprehensible mysteries of a future state, the insignificant enjoyment of this mutable existence, derived from our personal recognition of friends here, when each day's experience proves that enjoyment to be clouded by family feuds, by interruption of friendship, and even of relationship, from motives of self-interest, of politics, and not unfrequently of religion itself, by which the most bitter enmity is awakened! With what happy associations of past feelings must not such friends and relatives meet each other in another world, if those feelings are of mortal mould! What a blessing must their recognition prove, should they chance to meet in heaven!

P. 15.—"Subjects which Scripture has *carefully concealed*

are *not to be* speculated on." Why, then, has the author ventured to indulge in those that form the basis of his book? Surely it will not be maintained that *they* are exempt from that concealment! The "blessedness of the dead" would rest on slender grounds, if dependent on a train of feelings similar to those which actuate us here below: and the quotation (Luke xx. 35, 36) intended to afford "the *clearest* and most *satisfactory* account of the happiness of the redeemed," that they "neither marry, nor are given in marriage, but are equal to angels," &c., seems to render the affirmed recognition of husband and wife extremely problematical, if, indeed, it be not an explicit denial of it! How would such recognition accord with those blissful feelings in the case of the loving partner of seven successive husbands, or hundreds of a similar character? To which of them, on meeting that numerous phalanx, would she fly and cleave to, as bone of her bone? or would she become the joint stock of seven partners? If all are *equal to* the angels, their thoughts and feelings must have changed from mortal to those of an heavenly and angelic type; and if so, they would be universal; and divided or partial affections could not there predominate.

P. 18.—"Never *again* will they be called upon to take a *final* leave," &c. If they do meet and recognise each other in the other world, the leave *here* taken obviously cannot be called *final*. "We *feel* that theirs must be indeed a blissful state, who are *conscious* that they can *never* be separated *from those they love*," &c. Now if this be true, how can we reconcile this feeling of affection with its direct opposite of intense affliction, in the inevitable remembrance (for if memory holds as to the one, so must it likewise to the other) of those dear and beloved friends and relatives, who, being blotted out, are not to be found within the precincts of heaven? Between them and those there is a great gulf! and if they can cast their view athwart that gulf, and see those friends "afar off,"

whilst they are securely placed in Abraham's bosom, witnessing thus their torments and despair; is such recognition adapted, according to mortal feelings, to heighten the ecstatic joys which we calculate on in heaven? Though accounted unworthy, yet they must still be remembered, or memory both of good and bad must be equally obliterated. If, then, it does exist, with mortal feelings still prevailing, surely the conviction of the sufferings of their friends must continue throughout eternity, and prove an equal source of unmitigated grief! But we are told that sighing and sorrow have no place in heaven, and that all tears shall be wiped from every eye. These inconsistencies are not reconciled in the treatise adverted to.

P. 21.—"Permitted to enjoy the society of an innumerable company of angels," &c. Who are these? Those so created ab initio, or those so constituted of the spirits of the just made perfect? In either case, such enjoyment must be *general*, not particular. Here would have been a most appropriate place to have fully described, and proved, if possible, the personal joys of *specific* relationship from earthly reminiscences and associations on mutual recognition! And, as further sustained in p. 22, that "such is the society, and such the blessedness of the saints in light." Now we seriously ask, where, in all that is advanced in the treatise, is to be found the slightest proof, or even a reasonable idea, of the recognition, *as such*, of earthly friends and relatives? Happily, our recognition is not to be limited by the petty, partial notions of present and terrestrial speculation. We shall, no doubt, recognise Abraham, Adam, and *every one* of his descendants, whenever met with, and enjoy the treasures of their information of past events and times, on which history has been silent or misled us. We shall, in like manner, recognise our own immediate friends and relatives, if there, but not as we now know them! They, and all the hosts of heaven, will love, and be beloved,

as kindred spirits. No longer under the fetters of *mortality*, all mundane affections, all the narrow, contracted feelings of mere human nature, cease; whilst love and peace, and universal happiness, pervade the united society of the children of one great, merciful, and beneficent Parent.

In the second chapter of the work, the recognition of saints is taken up, in which we find it proposed, whether "we shall recognise among them those whom we knew and loved on earth," and "if so, will those feelings of affection which linked us together here, be renewed and perpetuated in heaven?" Now this, as the title of the book evinces, constitutes the pith of the whole inquiry, and the point to be (not yet) proved, in order to be enabled to afford a reason of our hope, &c. So much has already been said in reply to it, that further remark would have been omitted, but that in answer to the above question, the author, p. 25, says, "that it is a natural inquiry, and if *logical accuracy* was aimed at, we should consider separately, 1. Whether the souls of the righteous in their disembodied state, and immediately after death, will know each other, or 2. Whether, this recognition (*if it occurs at all*) takes place only after the *reunion* of the soul and *body* at the resurrection day,—and 3. Whether, *if* such knowledge exists, the attachments which bind us here, will be continued hereafter." It may surely, with strict propriety, be here demanded, whether these were not the points that were to be proved? and why, with *three* such important links in the chain that was to lead to the conviction of the certainty of the main object of inquiry, they are thus passed over, and not "*considered separately*, with all *logical accuracy*?" It seems indeed a *natural inquiry*, fully arising from the very point that was to be proved, and from which the chief source of consolation was to be derived by the bereaved, for whom the work was expressly written. It may be feared, however, that such logical accuracy might not readily aid the superstructure, but rather tend

to even undermine the foundation itself, and thereby show its weakness. It is, in fact, admitted, p. 26, that "it does not necessarily follow, that the *peculiar ties* which bind us here, will be perpetuated hereafter." We erroneously imagined, that this was the very thing contended for, as the chief source of comfort to those, whose pilgrimage on earth had been rendered painful by the bereavement of some beloved object! for if otherwise, the mere recognition would seem to be of a very secondary consideration; and the proposition above advanced appears to put at rest the chief purport of the whole investigation;—accordingly, the writer seems entirely undetermined which side of the question to assume; for he immediately adds, that "in like manner, *if it be proved*, that friends will recognise each other in their *glorified bodies*, *it does not follow* as a consequence, that pure *disembodied* spirits will possess such a recognition." May we be allowed to ask what is that presumed difference between a disembodied spirit which *may not* possess recognition, and that of a glorified body that *may*, if proved? Now all these several and separate propositions, to be strictly accurate, ought (we are told) to be distinctly proved, and in this, we most heartily agree, for this was the essence of the whole work. But no; it is shortly after stated, that "this would be foreign to our present purpose." Indeed! then I have mistaken altogether the drift of the author. I considered it of the first importance that such proof should be afforded of the position laid down, as being essentially requisite to enable the reader "to give a reason for the hope that is in him." It is added, however, as a reason for omitting this, that "it would be *neither interesting* nor *instructive* to our readers to enter into all the *niceties* of the argument." This is truly extraordinary! Surely the author must think but lightly of his readers, if he deems them incapable of enjoying a metaphysical treat on a most interesting topic; and that, therefore, they ought to be satisfied with a simple assertion, a mere ipse dixit;

or a "stat pro ratione voluntas!" In fact, it is by *this slighted measure* alone, that a reader could possibly arrive at a just conclusion, and say with truth, that his reason was fully satisfied.*

In reviewing "the whole subject as one and indivisible, and in attempting to show that departed spirits, whether in the body, or out of the body, will know each other, and that the pure and holy affections of love and friendship which subsist now, will subsist for ever," I feel constrained to say, that assertions are mistaken for proof, and weak analogies for direct truths. To confirm this, I shall merely take notice of the chain, by which the whole is linked together, by pointing to the words through which the connexion may be considered as maintained.

P. 27.—"This doctrine *appears to be* perfectly consonant to reason, *for unless*," &c.

P. 28.—"The veracity of Him who cannot lie, *seems* to stand pledged."

P. 28, 29.—"*Surely* it will give us more exalted views,"—"but to know this, *it seems necessary*"—"and *if we* are permitted to know *any* of the saints in light, *we see* (verily, through a glass, darkly,) *no reason why* we may *not* know them all." "We may reasonably *suppose* that," "it *must certainly* be,"—"This *could not be unless* there was a mutual recognition," &c. "*It is* therefore in *accordance* with the *soundest principles of reason to suppose*," &c.—together with much of the same character.

Now, in all these gratuitous *suppositions*, not a shadow of proof appears, such as the reader had been led to imagine would be presented to his eager expectations; and from which

*The reader is requested to turn to the words of the Rev. John Newton, at page 27 of the treatise under consideration, as introduced from Hannah More—and judge how far they are applicable to the *body* as here existing, and as in *its* affirmed resurrection identically!

he had pleased himself to be qualified to give a satisfactory reason for his hope in the premises.

At p. 30.—At last comes the great stumbling block to all the foregoing pleasing anticipations of heavenly recognition! "But one *considerable objection* to this doctrine." Yes truly—fatal to it; and it would be no objection, if, as a matter of faith, it could be shown to be scriptural doctrine, and not the pleasing fiction of imperfect reason. The objection stated, is "the *consciousness* that some of our relations and friends *being absent*, must be in a state of suffering and woe." Surely such consciousness would be (*not merely* "at first sight" as is stated, but *in perpetuo*) "an insuperable obstacle to the persuasion that the blessed will recognise each other after death." Now, how is this most important part of the subject under consideration disposed of? Not by solid proof from revelation, by which the pro or con might be substantially settled; but by a sophistical proposition, which may possibly be regarded as proving more *against* than *for* it. "A moment's reflection will *convince* us that this objection, if *it have any weight*, (has it none?) will apply with equal force to our knowing, as we *certainly* must know, that *any part* of the human family is condemned to eternal punishment," &c. Quere? does the writer suppose that such knowledge on the part of celestial beings will tend to diminish their affliction on behalf of *their own* unfortunate relatives?* We then have given to us a statement

*With how much comparative indifference do we read in the daily papers, of massacres—of death from poison—assassination—from fires, from accidents by steam or crushing by rail-road cars, &c., so long as they do not personally affect us or our near relations! A shudder, a moment of mental sympathy, and for the most part, all is forgotten! Nay, how quickly are our dearest and nearest friends consigned to oblivion, when the first burst of affliction has passed by, after seeing their remains deposited in the tomb. Surely, with such apathy here, recognition in another world, can, to the majority of the human race, be a matter of but trifling consideration!

of the "great day of final account," in which "we shall all behold a lasting separation made between the righteous and the wicked," and "yet it *cannot be supposed*, that the condemnation of the latter, *will in the least degree*, (alas! for recognition and reminiscence!) *disturb* the felicity of the former!" "Such a supposition would be irreconcilable with the perfection of the heavenly bliss," &c. No doubt it would—and this leads us cheerfully to adopt the views suggested, of the *total absence* of recognition conformably to our *earthly* conceptions of friendship and affection, and that in heaven, heavenly feelings alone exist.*

The train of suppositions are thus continued at p. 31, et seq.—

"We cannot for a moment *think*." "And *why may it not be* the same." "*If requisite* for," &c. "We may humbly *presume*," &c. "The *probability* is," &c. "We may easily *conceive*, that it will add much to the happiness of the blessed, *to meet many* of their friends in heaven; whilst the *reflection that some* whom they loved on earth, *are not* there, *will not be permitted* to mar their felicity," &c. &c.

Here, then, we find the Gordian knot completely cut

* The reader is here referred to a short review of a Sermon by J. J. Rye, A. B., in the Analyt. Review, 1792—vol. ii, p. 196—entitled "Personal Remembrance amongst the Joys of the other World," &c.

"The consolatory doctrine of this discourse is treated by the preacher in a *popular way*, more adapted perhaps to impress the imagination with pleasing ideas, than to convey entire conviction to the understanding. At least we must think, that his argument receives little additional force, from the reference which he makes to Homer's account of the interview between Achilles and Patroclus in the shades! Those who wish to see the question more fully discussed, may consult Dr. Price's excellent dissertation upon the subject."

It is with regret I state that I have never been able to meet with Dr. Price's dissertation, and of course cannot give any of the views afforded by him.

through, by the force of theological acumen! and hasten to bring our remarks to a conclusion.

If the object in question is proved by the work we have thus considered, benevolent as it undoubtedly is intended to be, we must confess that we are altogether ignorant of the nature of proof! The exposition given, is certainly not warranted by any clear and undisputed text of Scripture, and must be viewed as a mere ad captandum appeal to the miserable finite and contracted feelings of imperfect human nature! The alleged *probabilities* from Scripture are mere suppositions—calling up Abraham from the cave of Ephron; of David and his child by Bathsheba, &c., do not surely amount to proof; nay, they are badly employed for the purpose intended; and when, in chapter 4, we are told that "the doctrine is *further proved* from the New Testament," in vain do we look for it, or recognise such proof, by the reference to St. Paul, 1 Cor. xiii. 12; to the transfiguration; to the twelve apostles sitting upon twelve thrones, &c.; or from the penitent thief, aided, as is imagined, by sundry commentators. "Is there any thing *fanciful*, it is asked, in certain proposed persons who had met on earth, recognising each other in heaven?" No, assuredly. But it is to be remembered, that this is not the great design that was to be proved; but to substantiate the recognition of *friends and relatives as such here below*, in the kingdom of heaven! It is a subject that is not established by revelation, and must, consequently, be sustained by supposition, whichsoever side of the argument may be advocated, and that adhered to that may appear most reasonable; and although as a merely metaphysical proposition, it may be allowed to interest those who are attached to such speculations, it does not seem calculated to prove of a beneficial tendency, in either its character or bearing. It may tend, for a short time, to assuage the grief of the mourner; but at a period of

calmer and more tranquillized feeling, we cannot doubt that far greater comfort may be obtained by a careful perusal of numerous passages of sacred writ, than by yielding to the pleasing reveries of this and *other* works of a like description.

ON THE DESCENT

Of Jesus Christ into Hell—as an Article of Belief of the Protestant Episcopal Church—with an Attempt to show that it cannot be proved from the Sacred Scriptures.

Having, in a preceding part of the remarks here presented to the public, pointed to two or three of the Articles of the Episcopal church, which appear to need some modification, I then mentioned my intention of more fully entering on the consideration of that, which refers to the descent of Jesus Christ into hell as being proved from Scripture, and constituting, on that score, an item in the Apostles' creed. I feel much diffidence in approaching a subject held so sacred by the church; and, but for my firm belief of its error, and of its conveying a doctrine that is not warranted by Scripture, I should have shrunk from the attempt, although it would have been utterly out of my power, in repeating that portion of the creed, to have given to any inquirer a reason for the faith in which I thus asserted my belief.

In considering this subject, the first step essential seems to be that of ascertaining the authenticity of the so called Apostles' creed; and here we at once stumble upon a heap of uncertainties as to its real author, or authors, however great may be its intrinsic merits, and its standing in the church, as may be seen under the article *Creed*, in Buck's Theological Dictionary. It is not my intention, however, to confine myself

to his concise remarks, but I shall derive my observations from a distant period. Although the authorities on which I might draw, are numerous, I shall limit myself to one alone, who appears to have consulted all previous and contemporary writers in the formation of the work he himself has left us. It is entitled, "Hermanni Witsii Exercitationes sacræ in Symbolum quod Apostolorum dicitur," &c. The edition I have is the 3d. 4to. Amst. 1697: the 1st edition was printed in 1681. Of its estimation, a judgment may be formed from what Walchius says of it, viz.—"cum ob egregium rerum adparatum; tum ob solidam illarum et perspicuam expositionem merito laudantur," &c. Bibl. Theol. Select. V. 1, p. 309.

After adverting to authors before him, Witsius proceeds to tell us, that the Romish church is so confident of its being the production of the apostles, that the calling this in question is deemed the height of temerity; although the doctors of that church cannot determine precisely at what time it was actually framed. Some assert, that it is not the production of one alone to whom the task was allotted, but that each apostle afforded a portion; the creed being thus constituted of twelve articles, and receiving the approbation of the collected council. The individual portion of each is then given from Baronius, "laudata B. Augustini auctoritate, qui de Tempore, Serm. CXV. sic scripsisse perhibetur."

"*Petrus* dixit: Credo in Deum Patrem, Omnipotentem.

Johannes dixit: Creatorem Cœli et Terræ.

Jacobus dixit: Credo et in Jesum Christum, filium ejus unicum, Dominum nostrum.

Andreas dixit: Qui conceptus est de Spiritu sancto, natus ex Maria Virgine.

Philippus ait: Passus sub Pontio Pilato, crucifixus, mortuus, et sepultus.

Thomas ait: *Descendit ad Inferos*, tertia die resurrexit à mortuis.

Bartholomæus dixit: Ascendit ad Cœlos, sedet ad dextram Dei Patris omnipotentis.

Matthæus dixit: Inde venturus est judicare vivos et mortuos.

Jacobus Alphæi: Credo et in Spiritum Sanctum, Sanctam Ecclesiam Catholicam.

Simon Zelotes: Sanctorum Communionem, Remissionem Peccatorum.

Judas Jacobi: Carnis resurrectionem.

Matthias complevit: Vitam æternam. Amen."*

All this, Witsius tells us, is attempted to be proved from the fathers and from reason, by the inscription, and from the collation of the words of the creed: the arguments by which the adherents of the opinion sustain it are stated, but are deemed unsatisfactory, and are regarded by Witsius as false, or at least uncertain, as he very conclusively shows. He adds, moreover, that in the early state of Christianity, no other creed is to be found, but that which Christ delivers, Matt. xxviii. 19—"Go ye therefore and teach all nations, baptizing them," &c.; and to this alone the ancient fathers often appealed.† By the springing up of heresies from time to time, the church was

* This formula may likewise be found, with some slight variations, in many other writers.

† Sixtus Sinensis.—At p. 42, Bibliotheca Sancta, Leyd. 1592, F., speaking of the "Symbolum Apostolorum," says that Erasmus, in his paraphrase of Matthew, declares his ignorance as to the apostles having framed it. All the orthodox fathers declare that they did; and Rufinus is quoted on the subject. It is stated that this joint production of the apostles was indited by them whilst the cloven tongues were resting on them, as the foundation of their future preaching, in order to preclude any variation by others of what they had learned from Jesus Christ; that by their united conference, each composed his part, under the influence of the Holy Spirit. St. Augustin's sentiments are then given on the matter, and the symbol, as detailed above.

unable to retain its original simplicity; whence it happened, that to the above plain command various additions were conjoined, instances of which are adduced; amongst which, is that which constitutes the object of this essay. "Constat articulum de *Descensu ad Inferos* in *multis* Symboli editionibus *non comparuisse*. Ipse Rufinus in expositione Symboli, cap. 20, testatur suo tempore eum in Symbolo Ecclesiæ Romanæ et Orientalium Ecclesiarum *defuisse*. Esse autem eum ex Symbolo Athanasii in symbolum apostolorum intrusum, ab hominibus qui non animadverterunt in eodem Symbolo desiderari articulos mortis et sepulturæ," &c. Nor was the term of "Catholic" known in the time of the apostles, nor even to Rufinus 300 years after. "Unde concludimus, non esse hoc symbolum unius auctoris, vel unius Concilii; sed *labentibus seculis*, varia occasione, à variis, multis accessionibus locupletatum: exstantibus tamen veteris fundamenti, cui reliqua super ædificata sunt, indiciis."

Witsius, though thus opposing its presumed origin from the apostles, speaks of it as being of high authority, though not of the highest, which the Romish church attaches to it; and he blames that church for employing it "pro formula quadam orationis." Three distinct formulæ exist, viz: "Decalogus, Oratio Dominica, et Symbolum. In Decalogo Deus loquitur Hominibus. In Oratione, Homo loquitur Deo. In Symbolo, Homo loquitur et Deo, et Hominibus. Uti Oratio distincta est a Lege: ita et Symbolum distinctissimum est ab Oratione."

Having concluded the inquiry of its origin, Witsius proceeds to consider its individual parts, in the order in which they appear in the creed; and at p. 318, we have his observations on the subject, "*de descensu Christi ad Inferos*, which he denies to be found in any part of Scripture. "Dicitur (says he) quidem *descendisse*, dicitur *in inferis* fuisse, sed ita junctis verbis ut *descendisse ad inferos* prædicetur, nulli legimus. He refers again to the fact, that in almost all the ancient

creeds, this article is wanting. The most ancient of those in which it is found, is the particular or private creed of Athanasius, if indeed it be his, of which doubts exist, for Vossius shows, that "ante annum sexcentesimum symbolum illud vel omnino non fuisse, vel saltem non fuisse in ecclesia notum." Moreover, those creeds that *had* the article of the descent into hell, *had not* that of his *burial*, and the reverse; both being subsequently but erroneously joined together. At the time of Rufinus, "ipsa Ecclesia Romana erat contenta meminisse *solius sepulturæ;*" and Vossius states, that "Orientales per descensum Christi ad inferos, primitus intellexisse quod occidentales vocarent sepulturam." Erasmus thought the junction of the two was made by Thomas Aquinas, who lived about An. 1250; but Witsius says he finds it in Socrates, lib. 2. (5th century.)

He soon afterwards says, that although it is true, that neither in Scripture, nor in ancient creeds, the article of the descent of Christ into hell is verbally found, it is, nevertheless, "a nobis pie creditur et asseritur, *modo senso commodo;*" and that, in its investigation, we should care less what some ancients understood of the words, than what is to be regarded as congruous to the faith, and to Scripture phrascology—and then proceeds to consider the unity of the Hebrew word SHEOL, with the Greek word *Ades*, as denoting "Sepulchrum, vel statum quorumcunque hominum in morte"—all tending to prove that the affirmed descent of Christ into *hell* is incorrect; and he judiciously adds, "Cui usui illa animæ Christi ad Tartarum profectio?" He finally notices all the places in Scripture wherein the Greek and Hebrew words, ἅδης and sheol, are employed, and demonstrates clearly, that they cannot with any propriety be forced into the construction that is put upon them by the article of the creed which he is considering.

What is above reported from Witsius, is, I think, sufficient to decide the point at issue; yet, inasmuch as we are told in

the articles of the church, that the descent of Christ into hell is "*to be thoroughly received and believed*," as it "*may be proved by most certain warrants of holy Scripture*," I consider it requires further proof of its being entirely erroneous; and indeed, the circumstance of permission being granted to modify the phrase by using "the place of departed spirits" for that of hell, shows the necessity of revision, and of a more explicit explanation; since our children are taught in the catechism, from their childhood, that doctrine in its natural acceptation; and with few exceptions, carry to their grave, their firm belief in the positive descent of their Saviour into the infernal region. Now it surely is of the utmost importance that nothing contradictory or doubtful should find a place in our esteemed Liturgy, or which may be made in any way subservient to infidelity; if, therefore, any apparent difficulty can be softened down or removed, is it not imperative to attempt it? As the Nicene creed does not assert the doctrine under consideration, why need it be retained in the Apostle's creed? All may yield a ready belief in the former, who may yet conscientiously differ from the latter. It was undoubtedly a happy improvement in the formation of a Liturgy for the American Episcopal Church, that its framers had the resolution to entirely rescind that most obnoxious Athanasian creed, by which the parent church of England is still deformed, although strongly urged to retain it by the English prelates; and it is a source of deep regret that our clergy did not equally withstand their ill-directed zeal, in insisting on the retention of the unscriptural article we are now considering, and making that a proviso for the consecration of our bishops!

Although the substitute allowed for the term *hell*, renders a meaning less obnoxious, yet we are not enlightened in any degree, as to where "the place of departed spirits" is, and why they are doomed there to remain until the final judgment. If the spirits at death, both good and bad, do indeed have such a

habitation, of unknown and undefined limitation, are we to presume them to be commingled together in one common receptacle? Now; although we may not maintain precisely the doctrine of purgatory, little difference can be drawn between the churches of England and Rome in this particular, beyond the power of the latter, by masses and absolutions, &c., to remove a soul from this temporary abode.

But if we bring ourselves to believe that in the sacred volume we can find a sanction for this especial article of our creed; we are yet unable to perceive, that, whether reading *hell*, or place of departed spirits, such words will reach the Saviour's intentions, when he said to the penitent thief, "this day thou shalt be with me in *paradise*," implying, to our imperfect comprehension, something very different from that of the preceding terms, if, as we are told, they have the same intrinsic meaning.

By paradise is meant, conformably to the lexicons, the third heaven, the dwelling of God, of the holy angels, and of the spirits of the just. Now, if it was to this place that the spirit of the thief accompanied our Saviour, the term of hell, in its common acceptation, is highly exceptionable; and yet it unquestionably is received in that acceptation, by a large majority of those who read or repeat the Apostle's creed. The use of the term hell, is even defended by *some* of our clergy, precisely on the ground, that it is the scriptural expression of the doctrine designed to be taught in it, and therefore they are dissatisfied with the alternative expression, and coincide fully with Bishop Pearson and others, who entertain no doubt of the actual and positive descent of Jesus Christ into hell.*

Some writers on the subject use the term hades, (ᾅδης) and

* Highly as all true and orthodox Churchmen are bound to venerate the lawn of Episcopacy, it by no means follows that they are equally bound, without conviction, to "pin their faith" on the sleeve of every individual whom it may chance to adorn! at least in the United States.

hell is certainly one of its meanings, as the lexicons teach us. Thus, says one of them, it is,

1. The invisible abode of the dead. 2. Hell,—the place of torment into which the fallen angels were cast,—and where the wicked are punished after death. 3. The grave, perhaps death personified. 4. A state of abasement or misery in this life. But ᾅδης is not the word that is used by our Saviour in St. Luke; it is εν τω παραδεισω.

Besides the above meanings of the word ᾅδης, there is one that is the absolute reverse of hell, viz: Heaven itself. Colomesius, a presbyter of the English Church, and librarian of the Lambeth Library, in one of his writings entitled χειμηλια, (Literaria) p. 302, 4to. Hamb. ed. 1709, has a short chapter, headed "Αδης *pro cælo* apud veteres."

"Vox ᾅδης generalis est, cum ad locum tormentorum, tum ad locum quietis. Hinc non modo pro inferis, *verum etiam pro cælo* quandoque usurpatur—author innominatus apud Suidam, παντα αναγκη, τοις μεν αγαθοις εν αδῃ εσεσθαι αμεινον τοις και κακοις κακιον. Sic Josephus et post eum Theodoretus, ᾅδιω omnibus hominibus tribuunt, impiis quidem σκοτιωτερον, piis vero φωτεινον. Adhæc asserit Hugo Brugthonus, in S. Scripturæ concentu ab Isaaco Genio latiné verso, in *multis vetustissimis codicibus* mms. orationem Dominicam *in hunc modum* inveniri, πατερ ημων ο εν αδῃ. Veteres quoque Macedones orationem hanc *nusquam aliter* precatos fuisse."

I find the above statement of Colomesius as to the use of the word ᾅδης for heaven, confirmed in an old Græco-Latin Lexicon, (1538) in which it is stated, that "ᾅδης Macedonum Dialecto, ϰερανος." If then hades implies both heaven and hell, surely, in the case of our Saviour, it ought to be employed in its best signification, especially since St. Luke particularly states that it was to paradise the thief was to accompany him. He says not a word about ᾅδης—and hence, I think the propriety of making some change in the obnoxious term in the

creed, must be obvious to every one,—since, whether the creed was framed by the apostles, or by others subsequent to them, it is certain that the words spoken by the great head of the church have been changed, if St. Luke is to be regarded as authority in the case. Now the apocalyptic injunction and anathema are precise and unqualified as to adding or diminishing aught of the sacred writings!

The words employed by Jesus Christ not being in English, but in Greek or Hebrew (most probably the latter, as being a Jew by birth; the exclamation "Eli, Eli, lama sabacthani, either in Hebrew or Syriac, being taken from the 22d psalm; his preaching no doubt to the Jews in their native language, with other analogous circumstances); it appears necessary in this investigation to refer to the particular idiom, that we may the more correctly estimate the precise meaning, and thereby vindicate, or uproot the English word that we have adopted in the creed, and which has been familiar from early infancy. We might indeed rest here, and confine the inquiry altogether to the word paradise, as employed by St. Luke; nevertheless, since that Evangelist makes use of two different words in the same chapter (23d) to express the same mode of our Saviour's death, it would appear correct to inquire further as to that which is the more immediate object of research, remarking that when *any word* has a variety of meanings,* considerable judgment is required on the part of a translator, in adopting that meaning which is most conformable to the object had in view by the original. St. Luke speaks of the malefactors, in the chapter referred to, as being crucified (εσταυρωσαν) with our

* The word *bon* in French, which at first sight appears to be so simple, nevertheless, to our surprise, on consulting the "Nouveau Dictionnaire de l'Academie Françoise, Paris ed. 1718—will present to us no less than seventy-four different significations in its employment! Surely the translator of any work into another language, ought to be well acquainted with both, and with all their idiomatic capabilities!

Saviour; yet, only six verses further on, they are said to be hanged, (κρεμασθεντων)—and the Greek expresses it thus differently. Are we, therefore, to suppose them literally hanged and not crucified, or the reverse, as fancy may dictate, without reference to the respective variations of meaning in the words? It is probable that both alike signify to suspend; and that although by hanging, crucifixion is indirectly meant, yet that crucifixion cannot, by any means, convey the act of hanging in its common acceptation. But in the expression of our Saviour to the thief, no such ambiguity exists; a single word is alone presented to us, that is, paradise, not hell, in any shape or construction; and we cannot comprehend its introduction into our translation, without entering more fully on the subject, which will amply fortify us in the persuasion that the word hell, (undoubtedly understood by the majority in its most obnoxious sense,) ought to be replaced by some other better calculated to convey the true and intrinsic meaning of the text. Even hades, being general in its signification, as embracing both heaven and hell, will scarcely supply its place;—paradise alone seems to be the most appropriate, especially as it is that used by the apostle.

Αδης, as employed by St. Peter (Acts ii.) is in our translation, hell, and infernus in the Latin. But as we believe some other of its numerous idioms might be here more appropriately made use of, we shall not be deterred from the research, although in opposition to the high authority of Bishop Pearson and others; who, though able and learned theologians, are certainly not infallible, either in their views or explanations of different parts of the apostolic creed.

St. Peter in his remarks (Acts ii. 27, 31,) refers to the* 16th Psalm—it is necessary, therefore, for us to follow in his footsteps. The Greek word αδης in the Acts, will be found to be

*Sixteenth in our English translation, but fifteenth in the Latin Vulgate! Whence this variation?

in the Hebrew שאול (sheol)—and we must consequently seek for its signification and synonymes, as being the Hebrew representation of the Greek, Latin and English term respectively made use of.

Leigh, in his "Critica Sacra," p. 238, Lond. 1672, tells us that *sheol* responds to the Greek ἅδης, by which it is invariably expressed in the Septuagint, except 2 Sam. 22, 6, where it is translated θανατος in Greek, and Infernus in the Latin. Sheol, he adds, is used in Scripture in four distinct senses.

1. Metaphorically, for hell—That is, for deep plunging into extreme sorrow, misery, and danger. Ps. lxxxvi. 13.

2. For the local place of hell, properly—Prov. xv. 11.

3. For the grave—natural and common to all—Prov. xxx. 16.

4. For the lower, deep, and remote parts of the earth, without relation to the place of punishment.—Ps. cxxxix. 8. To these, he adds,

5. For the common place or state of the dead. Ps. xxx. 3, and many other references. So ἅδης is taken 1 Cor. xv. 55, Gen. xxxvii. 35. Sheol signifieth any devouring gulf or pit, swallowing up the dead, as Numb. xvi. 33;—and he remarks, that sheol is here badly interpreted in the vulgate by infernus.

Gussetius, in his "Commentarii Ling. Hebraicæ," fol. 1702, p. 812, very nearly agrees with the above; and all that is said conspires to prove, that *hell*, in our common acceptation, is not the appropriate signification. Ἅδυσσος and γεεννα, are more frequently the representative appellations of that place of torment.

It would seem then, from all here stated, that our Saviour in his reply to the thief, could have had no intention of conveying an idea of his own descent into hell, and for the especial purpose that Pearson and others have assigned to him. Had such been the case, may it not be presumed that his language would have been different, less obscure, and liable to no misinterpretation?

Other meanings of our vernacular term hell, may be cursorily adverted to in connexion with ᾅδης, from Leigh, in the most of which he is sustained by Gussetius, and by Parkhurst, who refers to him with great respect.

Leigh informs us, that "ᾅδης, inferi—according to Bellarmine *always* signifies hell, the grave never; but learned Cameron observes that it *never*, but in one place of scripture, signifieth hell, but *constantly* either the *grave*, or the state and condition of a man deceased. Vatablus and others, on Acts ii. say that ᾅδης and Tartarus, 'non recte confunduntur. Nam ᾅδης not pertinet ad Dæmonia, sed tantum ad homines mortuos, bonos malosque, et quidem duntaxet medio tempore inter mortem et resurrectionem. *Tartara* autem Græcorum exemplo, Petrus dixit eam regionem in qua impuri spiritus ad tempus judicii, velut captivi, asseverantur." Grotius, in Luc. 8, 31.

"Ἅδης est locus visibus nostris subtractus, et *de corpore* quidem cum accipitur, sepulchrum in quo est corpus sine animo: *de animo* vero, totam illam regionem in qua est animus sine corpore significat. Itaque fuit *Dives* quidem εν ᾅδῃ; sed fuit εν ᾅδῃ etiam *Lazarus*, disterminatis ᾅδου regionibus. Nam et Paradisus et Gehenna, sive, ut loquebantur Græci, Elysii et Tartara sunt εν ᾅδῃ." Grot. in Luc. 16, 23.

The word ᾅδης, as some have remarked, signifies three things in the New Testament.

1. The sepulchre, Acts ii. 27, for, *first*, Peter makes an opposition between the *grave* into which David was shut up, and the *hell* out of which Christ was delivered; v. 29, 31. *Secondly*, Peter saith, expressly, that the words must be understood of the resurrection of Christ; v. 3. *Thirdly*, this appeareth by Paul's citing of it; Acts xiii. 34, 35. *Fourthly*, it is so expounded, Ps. xvi. 12, by many Popish writers, *inferno*, id est *sepulchro*. ☞ Here numerous references are made in proof, from the Old and New Testaments, ending

with Rev. xx. 13, 14. "Death and ἅδης are cast into the lake of fire." Now we cannot say *hell* is cast into hell, but the *grave* into hell.

2. It signifieth the place of torment; Luke xvi. 23.

3. It is taken for the *Devil* himself; Matt. xvi. 18—and so it is taken sometimes amongst profane authors. Both the Septuagint in the Old Testament, and the apostle in the New; Acts ii. 27; 1 Cor. xv. 55; do use the Greek word ἅδης, and the Latin interpreter the word infernus or inferi, and the English the word *hell*, for that which in the Hebrew text is named *sheol*. The king's translators of the Bible do render the word *sheol*, in the Old Testament, usually *hell;* Deut. xxxii. 22; Ps. ix. 17; lxxxvi. 13. Yet in divers places they call it the *pit;* Job xvii. 16; and in sundry places, the *grave;* and it cannot otherwise be well rendered, as Gen. xxxvii. 35; xlii. 38; 1 Kings ii. 6; Ps. xlix. 15; vi. 5; Isaiah xxxviii. 18. All learned Hebrecians, know that *sheol* is more proper for *grave* than *hell;* and that the Hebrews have no word proper for hell, as we take *hell;* but either they use, *figuratively*, sheol, or more certainly *Topheth* or *Gehinnom*. For sheol is in no place so necessarily to be taken for hell, but that it may also be taken for the grave. But although that Hebrew word *properly* signify a *receptacle* of the bodies after death, yet, when mention is of the wicked, by consequence it may signify hell, as day signifieth light; the night, darkness; fire, heat; peace, prosperity. Again, sheol signifieth a place which is dark and obscure, where nothing can be seen; such as the grave or pit is, in which the dead is laid; which, therefore, of Job x. 21, 22, is called the land of darkness. The Latin word *infernus* signifieth, generally, a low place: ἅδης, likewise, they translate in most places *hell;* yet in one place, 1 Cor. xv. 55, the grave.

"*Sheol*, a verbo shaal, quod petere et postulare significat, quod sepulchrum omnes mortales quasi hiantis oris vorago

petit; unde et insatiabile dictum; Prov. xx. 20; xxx. 16:* vel, quod omnes mortalitatis ratione eo feruntur, quasi ad terminum quem petunt: vel, quod qui in sepulchris conduntur, a viventibus petuntur et desiderantur."—*Amesius.*

"Ἅδης, ab ἁδῶ, vel potius ab ἀ priv. et verbo ἰδεῖν, et dicitur per synæresin pro ἀιδής, sine luce domus.—Virg. Latini Theologi *infernum*, à situ vocant, et *inferos*, quæ vox, si ab inferendo dicta est, tam *sepulchrum* quam *Gehennam* denotare potest. Ut enim in *hanc* animæ, ita in *illud* corpora inferuntur."—*Amama* Antibarb. Bibl. lib. 3. Profani vero autores *orcum* nominare solent. We, in English, call it *hell* (as some say), from the Old Saxon or German word *helle;* in which tongues, originally, *hell* signifieth *deep; leh* is low; and so it meaneth a low or deep place, and agrees with the Hebrew *sheol*, which is said, Deut. xxxii. 20, Job ii. 8, to be low and deep. *Usher* says (answer to Jesuits' challenge) Verstegan's derivation is the most probable, from being *hilled over*, that is, *hidden* or covered. For in the Old German tongue, from whence our English was extracted, *hil* signifieth to hide: and in this country (England), with them that retain the ancient language which their forefathers brought with them, to *hill the head*, is as much as to *cover the head:* so that, in the original proprietie of the word, *our hell* doth exactly answer to the Greek, ἅδης, which denoteth a place unseen."

Consult, also, Cocceius' "Comment. in Job," fol. 1644, p. 102, all tending to show that sheol means the sepulchre or

* "Ex Proverbiorum, cap. 30, inter insatiabilia, et ea quæ nunquam dicunt *sufficit, sepulchrum* et *vulva* collocantur. Quærunt hic Rabbini quæ affinitas est sepulchro (שְׁאוֹל), cum vulva. Sed responditur, quemadmodum vulva recipit semen, et postea edit aliquod vivens: ita etiam sepulchrum recipit corpora defunctorum, et postea die resurrectionis eadem reddit."—Menassah Ben Israel, de Resurrectione Mortuorum, p. 23.

grave. If, therefore, ἅδης is the Greek representative, then it must mean the same.

Should more be wanting to satisfy the reader on the subject under consideration, we refer him to Sixtinus Amama, in his work, entitled "Anti-Barbarus Biblicus," 12mo. Amst. 1628, wherein the frauds and corruptions of the Scriptures by the Romish church are fully set forth and demonstrated, by reference to the original Hebrew version, &c. From a large amount, I make a few extracts.

P. 432, on Gen. xxxvii. 35, the word sheol, in Hebrew, is said to be used indifferently both for hell and the grave (tum ad infernum quam ad sepulchrum); and hence the words infernus and ἅδης, by interpreters, are often put for the grave. As employed here in the Vulgate, it is treated as ambiguous, and as tending to establish, in the common people, the fiction of a limbus, or place of purgatory. A host of authorities are presented, in proof of the *grave* being, with scarce an exception, the appropriate meaning of sheol. More to the same effect is given at p. 578, on Numb. xvi. 33, and at p. 665, Job xiv. 14; where we are told, that "hic et quamplurimis insuper locis ubi in latino est infernus, in Belgic. *Helle*, in Ebræo esse שאל, quæ vox etiam sepulchrum significat." Also see p. 677, Job xxiv. 19, and Ps. lxxxv. 13, with final remarks at p. 894, on the fraudulent translation of the Vulgate.

I shall merely add, that Rauppius, in his "Commentarium Synopticum," 1665, in almost every place of the Scriptures in which the word sheol is employed, regards its most appropriate meaning to be the *grave*.

Bishop Newton's 57th and 60th Dissertations, in the 6th vol. of his works, London, 1767; and Bishop Hobart's "State of the Departed," are worthy of consideration; and the following, from Sterne (Koran, p. 152), gives, in few words, the full idea of the subject. He is speaking of the importance of

the number *three*, and adds, "This leads me naturally to *hades*, or ades, the old-fashioned region of distribution, according to our good or bad deeds. It consisted of three provinces, Erebus, Tartarus, and Elysium—heaven, hell, and purgatory."—This is a concise view of the precise acceptation of hades, of which hell constitutes a "province;" but not that province to which, under the name of paradise, our Saviour went, and to which also the penitent thief was to accompany him.

We trust that sufficient authority has thus been afforded, to place the object we had in view fully before the reader, viz. the utter impropriety of that part of the third article of our church wherein it is affirmed that Christ descended into hell, and that, as introduced into the Apostles' creed, it is to be firmly believed, as being capable of proof from the Scriptures. We think it is adequately shown, that whether ades or sheol be assumed as the ground of argument, both are equally unfounded, when taken as the representatives of our vernacular term of hell, and diametrically opposed to the paradise of St. Luke. If the facts and arguments adduced have any weight, they may perhaps lead to some change or modification in the parts assumed to be erroneous, that may prove acceptable to all who may coincide in opinion with the writer.

REMARKS ON PHRENOLOGY,

In its Connexion with the Soul; and as to the Existence of a Soul in Brutes. Read before the Phrenological Society of Philadelphia, in 1822.

The following essay is not given to the public at this late date from the period of its delivery before the Phrenological Society, when the subject was comparatively unknown here, and almost universally derided, with any view of affording instruction in the science; for since that time, by the learned lectures and writings of Dr. Coombe and others, its value has become properly appreciated. It is chiefly intended to point out, that few sciences are of anterior standing; and that long before Gall and Spurzheim undertook to maintain its rightful claim to rank amongst them, it had received a very extensive consideration amongst medical and other writers, of which the facts herein adduced will be deemed sufficient proof.

The use of any part of the body in a due and appropriate degree, is admitted universally to favour its improvement, both as to health and vigour, and in the perfection of its functional duties. The arms of the blacksmith have their muscles vastly augmented in size and strength, by daily employment of the ponderous sledge-hammer; the dexterity of the artisan is acquired by constant habit, and his skill in his profession thereby improved. If this be the fact in relation to merely mechanical manipulations, can it with reason be presumed that the faculties of the mind should remain stationary, when they are sub-

jected to a like activity? Memory, each one perceives to be invigorated by exercise; nor is the imagination of the poet less vividly excited and expanded by proper culture, although the adage even of "Poeta nascitur, non fit," should be granted to him. Crime itself improves by habit, and the propriety of an early and virtuous education is established by the maxim, that "nemo fuit repentè turpissimus." The whole train of the faculties, emotions and passions of the mind, appear to owe their extension, whether for good or evil, to their continued* action under the influence of a good or bad education, conformably to what is learned in the nursery, "just as the twig is bent, the tree inclines." It would seem impossible to conceive of these and other improvements taking place, with no commensurate increase of vigour in those parts respectively, by means of which they are rendered apparent. Whilst, then, the due exercise of the mind tends to the improvement of those organs in which it is located, or through which its actions are rendered effective, must it not be conceded that such improvement in the organs will coöperate in giving energy to the mind, and thereby evidence the mutual necessity of each to the other? and, like the motto of our own vast empire, the soul and body may declare, "United we stand, divided we fall."

The *regular* employment of the senses, with which it has pleased our Maker to endow us, adds much to their respective improvement. If unduly or inordinately exercised, deterioration ensues. The absence or loss of one, is in a measure

* The result of habit in improving the operations of man, is thus defined by Aristotle, in his fourteenth problem—"Consuetudinem definit Aristoteles, quod sit habitus, seu qualitas ex frequenti actione et passione impressa, propterquam promptius et diutius et cum delectatione operantur, et minus patiuntur."—Galen has written a book expressly, "de consuetudine," and Hippocrates has not been altogether silent on the subject.

compensated through the medium of one or more of the remainder, although they never can fully supply the deficiency. The fact of the eye supplying the want of the sense of hearing, is familiar to all, in the cases of the deaf and dumb. The want of sight is partially rectified by the sense of hearing and of touch; and even the conjoined loss of both hearing and of sight, has, in a very considerable measure, been overcome by the sense of touch; but in all such instances, with increase of action of the organs in which those senses are located, in vain may we anticipate it, if the intercommunication is cut off between the external organ and the sensorium. Perfect as may be the organ of sight in all its parts, and vision resulting therefrom of the highest character, the simple division of the optic nerve, *all else* remaining as before, effectually shuts out the light of day, and of every external object, which now can only be enjoyed by an act of reminiscence, or through the indirect medium of another sense.

These and similar facts necessarily led to the conclusion, that the brain was the actual source or seat of thought and sensation; and although it surpasses our limited power of research to point out the precise part in which either thought or sensation might be supposed to originate,* yet endeavours have been made to trace the nerves to their origin, with which such a mysterious influence was presumed to be associated. But whatever may be affirmed as to their *apparent* origin, no one can confidently assure us of its absolute certainty, or that

* It does not appear that the brain has been invariably considered to be the seat of the soul. In the "Excerpta Gemaræ," I. cap. 9, p. 1016, the *nose* is stated as its location; for in Gen. vii. 22, it is written, "Omne cujus in nasibus halitus erat animæ vitalis."

Tertullian considered the soul to be immortal, but that it was corporeally propagated. Some supposed the soul to be corrupted as the body became so; and the Gnostics of old taught that brutes were capable of reason, &c.

the anatomical knife has tended to demonstrate the commencement of their course. Far too imperfect is our vision, even when aided by the microscope, to trace the cords of life beyond a limited extent in the dead body; whilst, in the living, such attempt would be equally unavailing, since it would destroy that living principle on which their perfection depends; and could we even trace them to their ultimate point, we should no more comprehend their mysterious connexion with the soul, than we do at present.

If such difficulties attend our researches on points apparently within our reach, how far greater must they be, when connected with inquiries as to the intellectual faculties themselves! dependent for their existence on the agency of some mysterious and inappreciable cause, but which is active or efficient, *alone*, through the intermedium of materiality in corporeal organization! The soul, that emanation from the Deity, can be at best but very partially comprehended by man in his present imperfect state. Of its essence, or of its mode of being, we know absolutely nothing; and speculate as we may, it would seem to be impossible to determine, by finite wisdom, whether it be of an immaterial or material nature. The endless disputes on this subject by philosophers and theologians, amount not to certainty on either side; for it is a mystery that the Almighty has reserved to himself, and has considered it inexpedient to satisfy by a revelation, the restless and unbounded curiosity of man. It must, nevertheless, be admitted, that the same great Power that from nothing called into existence the fabric of the universe, and from the atomic particles of brute and inorganic matter created all the living evidences of his omnipotence, by laws depending on his pleasure, in the form and order that we see around us, varied ad infinitum to suit the great and providential ends He had in view; that Power, unquestionably, could invest the same inorganic matter with the capability of ratiocination as well as

with life. What has actually been the case will never here be solved; and hence we may conclude, that they who contend for the materiality of the soul, may maintain such opinion without being charged with opposition to the wonderful perfection and attributes of the Deity. Material or immaterial, He alone can destroy it, when once brought into existence—for such is the language of Scripture—and, indeed, independently of his will, the smallest speck of matter is eternal as himself, and indestructible by any means that man can employ. The utmost we can do by art, is merely that of modifying in a slight degree its state of existence, and that solely by the operation of laws established by himself, and with which our acquaintance is extremely limited.

It might here be a question of metaphysical inquiry at what period of the fœtal existence the soul becomes united to the body; and whether acephalous monsters, deficient as they are in the brain, are yet possessed of this incomprehensible agency; but whatever our individual opinion may be in this particular, as it is not essentially connected with the object of this essay, we pass it by; and incidentally inquire, whether the soul, as such, *differs* in different subjects? Regarding it as an emanation from the Deity, it appears to me that the question must be answered in the negative. As God is all perfect, reason would dictate that nothing short of perfection could flow from him;*

* "And God saw every thing that he had made; and behold, it was *very good*." Gen. i. 31. Surely, at this time there could have been no *original sin* existing in Adam! When David said, Ps. li. 5, "Behold, I was shapen in iniquity; and in sin did my mother conceive me," he could not mean that any original sin attached *to him* at his birth, a helpless innocent being; but his language forcibly expresses the influence of that concupiscence that is inevitably an inmate of the human race—and which is affirmed in the ninth article of our church by the terms φρόνημα σαρκὸς. How soon after birth, sin commences its ravages, it would, perhaps, be difficult to determine. Dr. Adam Clarke affirms the souls of men to differ—which is opposed to the

and hence that the soul must be uniform; or else it would imply that perfection varied. Now it seems a solecism to maintain such a proposition, if we concede the soul to be derived from the sole source of supreme wisdom, harmony and goodness; and if this is a legitimate conclusion, it leads to the further inquiry on what the *apparent* difference of the minds of men can possibly depend. Here it may be perceived, that the principles of phrenology begin to appear; and if correctly viewed, will be found alone capable of eliciting a spark of truth in the elucidation of a fact so curious and important, but which each day's experience sufficiently establishes. If, as above maintained, the soul can act (or render its actions sensible to man) only through the intermedium of material organization, and no other source or agency has, I believe, been ever suggested; it follows necessarily, that its actions must be more or less perfect, exactly in the ratio of the greater or less perfection of those organs through which they are developed. We might as readily assent to the perfection of a paralytic limb, or to that of the circulation of the blood, when the nerves or vessels are injured or destroyed, as to believe that the operations of the mind should be conspicuously perfect, when its operative agents are defective or wanting.* The various faculties regarded as innate, may truly exist, but their development is precluded altogether or in part, from the faulty or defective organization. The soul, however, is still connected with the body, and affords full evidence of its perfection, in the perfect actions of other parts, not so deteriorated.

views here supported; if, however, he is correct, the period of commencing sin in man, may also differ.

* We might unquestionably as well accredit the ability of a newborn infant to eat and digest the most solid food of perfect manhood, in the imperfect state of its digestive organs, as to suppose the soul could demonstrate its highest powers and capabilities of ratiocination, before the corporeal organization had come to maturity.

Man is occasionally born with a defect in, or a total want of some particular organ or part of the body, and consequently is in the same degree precluded from performing the appropriate actions of that part—is the deduction at all unreasonable, that if the organs of ratiocination are defective or wanting, this must equally be productive of error in them, or of a total absence of the influence their presence was intended to elicit? We daily notice individuals in whom the defect in one of the external organs of sense, is sufficient to arrest the correspondent operation of the mind, which in its perfect state it would have exhibited, and that, notwithstanding the due perfection of every other part of the organ itself, and of the soul presiding in its functions, and this demonstrates the absolute dependence of each upon the other. What could the soul, however perfect in itself, accomplish without such an intermedium with the world? What could the organ accomplish if separated from its association with its divine attendant? A simple division of the nerve of intercommunication between the two, is sufficient to render each as useless, as if they had no existence. The manifestation of the soul will in vain be looked for; in vain are the actions of the part attempted. A sense is cut off, as though it was not present; and perfect as both may be, exclusive of the simple division of the nerve, all the foreign relations of the world are immediately suspended. It is true, that, as before mentioned, in cases of this nature, some other sense is called into more active operation, and by its means, *indirectly*, the action of the defective or injured organ is in some measure supplied. The blind are thus enabled, mentally, to see through the ear and through the sense of touch. The deaf in like manner may be said to hear by means of the eye,—and the want of both hearing and seeing, is in a partial degree compensated through the sense of feeling. If such were not the case, a sense of deity, together with many of the faculties and emotions of the mind could never be called into ope-

ration, but would remain dormant, and as if never existent. The perfection of the soul within, is hereby established, though prevented from illustrating itself through corporeal and appropriate channels.

In the Edinburgh Philosophical Journal for January 7, 1822, some particulars are given by Dr. Butter, that may serve to illustrate what is above stated; it is the account of a very remarkable insensibility or imperfection of the eye in relation to certain colours, in the person of a son of Dr. Tucker, nineteen years of age. The case is not a solitary one, however extraordinary. Similar instances are recorded in the Manchester Memoirs, and in the 67th and 68th vol. of the Philos. Trans. of London. It appears from that under notice, that Mr. Tucker discovered his inability to distinguish several of the primitive colours from one another, about two years preceding; that he employed a green in place of orange in some work he was engaged in, and could not credit his mistake; nor could he distinguish any difference between threads of those two colours, when twisted around his fingers. Many leading or primitive colours he neither knows when shown to him, nor does he remember them when pointed out to him. Orange, he calls green, and green orange; red, he views as brown, and brown as red; blue silk looks to him like pink—and pink as a light blue. The seven primitive colours are associated in his mind as follows: Red is mistaken for brown; orange for green; yellow, is generally known, but sometimes is taken for orange; green is mistaken for orange, except in grass; blue for pink; indigo for purple, and violet for purple. All these anomalous impressions were equally the same, whether viewing silk, feathers, or Syme's book of colours. Other remarkable aberrations were equally conspicuous. It was not the effect of disease, for his vision had been always acute and otherwise perfect. How is this singular deviation from common vision to be explained? Surely the soul could not have been partially

imperfect; and the corporeal organ of vision, so far as could be judged, seems to have been in a healthy state. Some organic modification must however necessarily have existed in some part, by which the usual laws of the refraction of the rays of light were altered; for the faculty of vision seems perfect in itself—but was developed through the medium of imperfect organization in some of its ramifications, although inappreciable by any examination that could be made.

However this may be explained, we are led to the conclusion, that certain organs of the brain may be either altogether wanting, or may be defective in different degrees, as is perceptible in situations more obvious and external. In the first case, the faculty or faculties of the mind, so far as they depend on such a part, cannot be developed; and in the second, the development must be imperfect, in a commensurate ratio. We might, perhaps, even go so far as to suppose, that for the full perfection of any individual faculty of the mind, its location should, (as in the case of corporeal organs) be absolute and fixed, relatively to those adjoining, and that otherwise a deterioration of its operations would result.* Habit might rectify in a measure, the imperfection, but would probably never completely obviate the influence of original non-conformity. Could

* What would be the result, if one of the organs of the lower or animal propensities, should be located and manifest itself amongst those of the higher or intellectual order? Is it not probable that this might be productive of ill consequences to the perfection of the latter? In like manner, we might imagine that tumours or other affections of the brain, might displace from its regular situation some organ, and by partially or totally destroying it, in a like ratio destroy its healthy manifestation, and its regular train of associated motions with the adjoining organs. Like monstrosities of the body, such cases might be deemed the source of mental monstrosity—ascending even to madness, &c.; and if the idea be correct, perhaps it would help to explain some of the numerous and extravagant vagaries which at times spring up in the mind of man.

the external organs of sight and hearing be otherwise than injured by transposition? Why then should not the appropriate location of the internal faculties, be equally necessary to their full and perfect action? A departure from it, may possibly explain some of the apparent anomalies in phrenological research, and of the operations and aberrations of the human intellect. If all the organs essential to the appropriate functions of the soul were invariably the same, and equally perfect in form, size and location, there ought, apparently, to be no diversity in their functional performances, independently alone of what might be attributed to education; which coerces them, as it were, from habit, to stronger action, and that for good or evil, according to the character of that instruction. But is it not a well established fact, that individuals of the same family, and educated alike, do differ most remarkably in disposition, and in the capability of attaining information, or of deducing conclusions from data founded on the same basis? In fact, the same discrepancy in character, &c., is equally conspicuous in the brute creations, both in domestic and in savage life.

It has been asserted, in opposition to the opinions respecting the truths of phrenology, that the brain has an extent too limited, to enable it to afford a determinate origin to so vast an assemblage of organs, as apparently would be required to elucidate the sources or development of the numerous faculties and propensities exhibited by man; and at first, such an assertion might be considered as unanswerable. But we may observe, that it is highly probable many of them are of a compound character (as from the *seven* primitive colours all the boundless variety of nature is constituted,) and that even if this is not the case, who will venture confidently to limit precisely the exact extent or boundary of each or any of them? When we advert to the infinite minuteness of a *mite*, the ne plus ultra of ancient ideas as to the bounds of animal existence in this respect; a mere speck in creation when placed in com-

parison with the gigantic forms of the whale or the elephant,—when we observe its various movements, its progressive existence, and the rapidity of its increase in numbers; we are led at once to admit, without difficulty, that within that diminutive frame, a vast assemblage of organs essential to its animal life does actually exist, each of which is separate and distinct from the other, both in structure and in use; yet all essential to the whole, though individually, nay, collectively, too small for investigation. A muscular fabric there exists,—a circulation of some description, from which its various parts are formed and nourished, a digestive apparatus, and possibly a nervous system, to mention no more! to all which is superadded a principle of life, all thus united in a mass of matter scarcely capable of recognition by the naked eye; when we advert to these facts, we may be led to the conclusion that a great extent of boundary is not required by the Creator of the universe for the location of any or of all the organs on which the existence or development of the faculties may depend. And if we should extend this consideration to a glance at those animalculæ, known to us only through microscopic observations, the difficulty increases, although the facts are at once admitted by the inquirer after truth into those mysteries of nature. So far then, from minuteness being an insuperable obstacle in phrenological research, it rather tends to strengthen it, and will lead to the admission, that the brain is of sufficient extension to afford ample origin to all the organs of sense and of ratiocination, even if ten times more diversified than they are considered to be.

So far as I can perceive, revelation has unfolded to us nothing definitively, by which imperfect reason can venture to pronounce with certainty as to the nature of the soul; that is, and ever has been a contested point between metaphysicians, and in all probability ever will be, until the mystery is unfolded in a future state of existence. Since minds of equal eminence

have contested as to its materiality or immateriality, I am satisfied to await that event in order to arrive at its certain development. I am led, however, to draw the inference, that as it has been left undecided by the Great Author of its existence a mere speculative opinion on either side of the question, and which a divine revelation would have effectually obviated, cannot be justly considered in opposition to the strictest principles of religion; and consequently that the subject is not less appropriate to the exercise of the faculties implanted in us by our Creator, than that of any other of a metaphysical and mysterious nature. Could we possibly comprehend it, it would not be found opposed to truth, which must always be in unison with a *just* philosophy, however repugnant to early imbibed and preconceived opinions. All would lead to the salutary confirmation of the absolute dependance of man on his Creator in every possible respect in which he can be viewed. I cannot, with these impressions, therefore believe, that every one who accredits the materiality of the soul, is necessarily to be esteemed either an atheist or an infidel. Neither can I imagine that the salvation of mankind is at all connected with the views that may be had thereon; for were this the case, the truth would have been most clearly pointed out, equally with those duties we owe respectively to God and to our neighbours—among which *charity* stands preëminent, in place of anathema, imprisonment and death!*

* When we speak of materiality, allusion is always had to the constituent and diversified objects of creation that we see around us. Now, what do we actually know of all this? The ancients talked of four elements as the basis of the world. How stands that theory now? A few years ago, the earths and alkalies were regarded as elementary. How as to that in the present more enlightened age? Philosophy *now* teaches that there are some forty or fifty elementary constituents. How will this hold one hundred years hence? What do we, in fact, know of any thing around us? A few apparently (but not all fully)

Be its nature as it may, we do perceive, in its presence within us, something that approximates us to the Deity, requiring, however, the coöperation of secondary causes; that is, a most wonderful organization of vitalized material particles, all derived from brute and inorganic matter directly or remotely, to render the operations of the soul sensible and effective. Through the agency of certain external organs of sense, impressions are received and conveyed to the sensorium, productive there, of effects varying according to the nature of the recipient. These give rise to the varied operations of the mind or soul, which, without the coöperation of the external senses, could never give evidence of its existence.

Now a slight extension of these views will probably lead us to acquiesce in an opinion maintained by many writers, that animals inferior to man, are likewise possessed of that principle or essence called a soul.

Why is man defined to be a reasonable or reasoning animal? It is because he can reason from cause to effect, and can trace effects to causes; because he possesses the passions of love, hope, fear, &c.; and especially because he possesses that most important faculty of memory. But if this be the case, can any one deny to inferior animals, whom we choose to designate by the name of brutes, many, or all of the above qualities or passions, or of the faculty or power of memory? The

established principles, which in a short time may be possibly overthrown, to make place for others, that in turn will afford amusement to the philosophers of a future period! Are we warranted to be intolerant to each other on speculative, metaphysical and mysterious controversies, whilst absolutely ignorant of the nature of that tangible matter that forms both brute and animated nature? And I may further ask, whatever be the character and properties of matter, here on earth—may not the same great Architect employ in another state of existence, materials altogether different from them, and impressed by laws distinct from those that govern the systems of this material universe?

dog, our familiar associate, will sufficiently answer such denial. Acute and sensible, alive to friendship and affection, he appears on many occasions to reason from causes to their effects, and from a dread of punishment, he seems equally to retrace his ideas back to the causes that led to it on former occasions, and wisely therefore he avoids their repetition.

The faculty or power of reasoning, seems to result from a combination of ideas. The man who is persuaded of the existence of a Supreme Being, is led by a train of reasoning to view him in the wonders of creation; and by a train not much dissimilar, the dog is kept in awe of that punishment, which memory informs him was inflicted for such or such a fault, and which reflection or association of ideas leads him to anticipate a renewal of, on a repetition of the same. How evidently too, does he express the emotions or passions of joy or sorrow, of hope, fear, anger, shame, &c., according to the varied situation in which he may be placed; can man describe them by actions more expressive? Now, if these propositions are correct, must they not confirm what is above sustained, that animals do possess, in varied degrees, like man, those mental affections on which the latter sets so high an estimate, and that memory forms the basis of such powers, by which, through appropriate organs, their existence is developed?

If then it is admitted, that all which the superiority of man enables him to accomplish, is the result of reason; it must be conceded that animals, who evince by similar proofs that they can reason in a similar manner, although inferior in degree, and that they are susceptive of similar impressions; must owe such powers to a similar cause as that through which they are produced in man; and that the latter excels him in the exact ratio in which the effects and operations of the powers of ratiocination are superior in number and degree.

These remarks lead us back to a further consideration of that interesting subject, the quality or nature of the soul, which,

although I regard it as being altogether mysterious and beyond our comprehension, yet I have ventured to speak of it as not incompatible on that account with metaphysical investigation, which in every particular owes its existence to the inquiries as to this unknown agent, whatever may be its essence or character. The power of ratiocination being shown to exist in animals, though inferior to that of man, and such power in man being uniformly ascribed to the presence of a soul, it seems a legitimate and necessary consequence, that we should attribute a similar power in animals to a like agency. If then we maintain the immateriality of the *human* soul, we must unquestionably invest that of animals with the same quality. It appears the inevitable consequence of the preceding data; for so closely do the powers of ratiocination in brutes resemble those of man, so deducible are they from a similar source; that what the one is, of such like character and nature must be the other; unless we most unphilosophically and unreasonably attempt to establish two principles to effect one and the same result!

But on the contrary, should we contend that all the sagacious actions of brutes are the result of mere corporeal organization alone, and altogether unconnected with an essence so divine as that of a soul; then, as the superiority of man depends entirely on his preëminence in the same power of ratiocination, it would seem to follow, that such superiority may equally arise from a corresponding superiority of corporeal organization. Are we at all acquainted with the absolute refinement of which matter is susceptible? And refined it must be in an exquisite degree, if the rational actions of brutes are dependent upon it. We have above demonstrated the infinite tenuity of matter in the mite and microscopic animals, and in mere brute and inorganic matter we may perceive an equal diversity—as for instance, in comparing the amount of matter contained (by mere affinity of aggregation of which we know as little as we

do of the soul itself) in a cubic inch of gold, with the same bulk of hydrogen gas; calculation will demonstrate the difference to be as 100,000 to 1. Even this is trifling, if we take the odorous particles emanating from a grain of musk, diffusing themselves over a vast space for weeks or months, without any appreciable loss of weight in the musk itself—or perhaps the yet more attenuated matter of contagion, which, whatever it be, is probably, nay, we may say, *certainly* of a compound nature, and consequently composed of matter yet more attenuated; or, in fine, compare the matter of light, an atom of which is small enough to penetrate the dense cornea of the organ of vision, and the still denser medium of the diamond; yet it is itself, if our philosophy of light is true,* compounded of seven distinct and separable particles!—and then we shall, perhaps, be obliged to acknowledge that we know but little about the whole subject. Because *we*, with profound arrogance, have thought it expedient to give to inanimate matter the name of brute, inert, &c., must we, therefore, deem it absolutely impossible to be so modified by its divine Creator, that it could be rendered capable of perception and of thought! when we see on all sides, and in *ourselves*, this very matter, brute and inactive, and inorganic as it once was, through the energy of Omnipotence, vivified, and combined in organs replete with sensibility, and fitted as a receptacle for the habitation of that yet more wonderful accompaniment, a soul! The immaterialist who thus argues, confutes himself, for he cannot conceive mere abstract matter to be so exquisitely modified as to give intelligence to brutes, without granting at the same time, that, however effected, it is of a character, in all respects, similar to the power that actuates himself.

Am I wrong in supposing the opinions of those who main-

* Dr. Franklin says "I am much in the dark about light;" yet he was a profound and *enlightened* philosopher.

tain the immateriality of the soul, and affirm the absolute impossibility of its material existence, without being able to demonstrate from positive revelation on either side of the question, by which its peculiar essence may be fully established; am I wrong, I repeat, in presuming that opinion to be chiefly based on the immortality of this incomprehensible associate of material existence? Independently of the conviction entertained by them that mere matter is incapable of being rendered qualified for ratiocination, the opinion is supposed to be strengthened by the declaration, that the world and its contents are to be ultimately destroyed by fire, and, consequently, that the soul, if material, would be therein comprehended. Yet in opposition to the direct and plain expressions of St. Paul, they do not hesitate to maintain the resurrection of the same *identical* body that is deposited at death in the grave.—Why is *it* not to partake of the like destruction with all other matter in this closing catastrophe? But the great apostle speaks of the resurrection of the *dead*, not of the *body*—and every where, in so doing, especially in 1 Cor. xv. he seems clearly to shut out every idea that could lead to the popular belief, and in words so explicit, that they cannot be set aside by the sophistry of a vague and self-sufficient philosophy.

"How are the *dead* raised," asks St. Paul, "and with what body do they come?" "Thou fool," (adds he, as if anticipating the disputes that have since arisen on the subject) "Thou fool, thou sowest not that body *that shall be;*" and following up his argument, he adds, "So also is the resurrection of the *dead;* it is sown in corruption, it is raised in incorruption; it is sown a *natural* body, it is raised a *spiritual* body:—and I say unto you, that flesh and blood *cannot* inherit the kingdom of God; neither doth corruption inherit incorruption; we shall *all be changed*—the *dead* shall be raised incorruptible, and we shall be changed." If these words are true, and who can doubt them, where do we find a trace of

the *same body* in which life is brought to a close? What, in fact, would be the inevitable result of such an event? Would not heaven be peopled with every variety of disease whereby existence had been terminated? In place of beauty and complete perfection, on all sides we should encounter the most disgusting objects! "Plague, pestilence and famine," cancer, ulcers of every variety, leprosy, dropsy, decrepitude, with madness and monstrosities of all descriptions!—Are such to be the inmates of the New Jerusalem? No! "We all are changed in the twinkling of an eye." The *bodies* there, whatever be their nature and the change alluded to, *are not* those that here invested the immortal spirit, formed in the image of its Maker; and although the expressions of the apostle are at present wrapt in mystery for us, they yet proclaim the all-important doctrine of a resurrection!* But to leave this digression,—

* The following extract from a sermon of the Rev. Paul H. Maty, is given in a review of his book (Analyt. Rev. 3, p. 32, 1789), as his "Objections to the resurrection of the *same body*," which the reviewer adds, "are argumentative and philosophically conclusive: they are, perhaps, as well stated as in any part of the controversies on that subject."

"The Deists (says he) would not attempt to contradict the particular fact (the resurrection of Christ) if we did not make use of it to prove a general proposition—'As in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive.' This is what he rejects with disdain; and, it must be owned, he would do it with reason too, if, instead of resting satisfied with what has been taught us by the evangelists and apostles, we should adopt the reveries and baseless superstructures of modern philosophers. If, for instance, we should pretend our bodies will be exactly the same at the resurrection as they are now; how is it possible they should be exactly the same?—What size, what shape, what dimensions could a man have, if all the atoms that at separate times have entered into his composition, were collected into one mass? Is the world, or even the universe, large enough to supply its assembled inhabitants, of all ages, with matter? How can it be pos-

Should it be urged that corporeal organization, although capable of being wrought up to that exquisite degree that is perceptible in the action of brutes, is yet incapable of *that higher degree* of intellect perceptible in man; and that he requires the addition of an immaterial essence, called a soul, in order to produce the difference perceived between them; it may be replied, that to argue thus is to determine by our finite conceptions, what infinite Omnipotence and wisdom is able to accomplish, and to affirm positively, the precise extent to which the Almighty can go, in modifying that matter which he Himself created. Moreover, it tends to establish an additional principle, by whatever name it may be called, when, for aught we know, and indeed from all we may justly infer from all around us, one alone is quite sufficient. It is, apparently, self-evident, that if the Almighty can so modify inert and senseless matter as to render it susceptive of life and of rational perceptions and actions *in brutes* to a limited degree; we can have no cause to deny to his omnipotence, the ability still more exquisitely to modify that matter, so as to render it capable of the far superior acts of ratiocination that are conspicuous in man. "Must every thing be impossible that our insufficiency cannot account for? Are there not innumerable mysteries in nature which accident reveals, or experimental philosophy demonstrates to us daily? And shall we yet pre-

sible that elements which have passed successively through many bodies, should at the same time resume their places in each of them? Who should adjudge the particle, which, like the wife mentioned in the Gospel, has not only belonged to seven, but to seventy times seven proprietors? The ground is not tenable; thank heaven, then, that we are not obliged to defend it; let us repair to the eminence, where, indeed, we shall be impregnable; let us assert with St. Paul, that, though we shall not all die, we shall be all changed; that we shall rise again with bodies, but with different and far more glorious bodies than those we went to sleep in."

sume to limit the power of that Great Author of that very nature? What was it that created matter? What was it that gave that matter motion? What was it that to that matter and motion added sensation and life? What was it that superadded to these, consciousness, intelligence and reflection? What was it"—but enough. Sterne's Koran, p. 50.

Now if from nothing all this has been accomplished by an Almighty Power, well may we, as above, ask, "shall we presume to limit it?" Does not our Saviour tell the Pharisees, (Luke xix. 40,) "if these should hold their peace the *stones* would immediately cry out?" Did He mean this literally? It is to be so presumed, for no sense or meaning would otherwise appear to be connected with an expression so extravagant. If then power could be thus given to mere matter to speak, could not that same matter be rendered capable of ratiocination?*

The fact appears to be, that we are so tenacious of affecting to know the utmost qualities and capabilities of things, the ne-plus ultra of every object of science, fluctuating as it ever has been, that we delight to circumscribe the boundaries of Omnipotence, and thereby to affix a limitation to it! We pride ourselves moreover, in drawing thus a line of demarcation between ourselves and the beasts that perish, as we are pleased to say; although formed of like materials, and constituting in fact, the chief intervening link between us and inanimate matter. We cannot endure the idea of having an organization similar to that of brutes, by which both they and we are rendered capable of information; but fondly ascribe to ourselves a superior and spiritual essence which we deny to them, considering it impossible that any thing beneath an immaterial

* The miracle wrought in the Ass, by which he was enabled to remonstrate with his master Balaam, is assuredly as great as that which took place on the day of Pentecost.

soul can be productive of thought and reason in so high extent as man evinces, distinct in character and operation from that low and mean intelligence which we unwillingly admit in brutes. Nor is this aversion lessened by the persuasion that beasts will perish forever at the termination of their present life, inasmuch as the immaterialty of the soul is regarded as the cause that leads to a future state of endless duration, as if that which had a beginning, could not possibly be equally destroyed at the fiat of its Omnipotent Creator! What indeed are we to infer from the words of our Saviour himself, who tells us to fear Him who can destroy *both soul and body?* Be it material or immaterial, it would then appear not to be necessarily indestructible, or the expression of our Saviour must be taken in some other sense than that which the literal meaning conveys.

But the immortality of the soul is not necessarily implicated with either a material or immaterial character. In either case, that immortality must assuredly depend on the will of its Maker. If material, nothing short of that Power to which it owes its being, is capable of effecting its subsequent destruction. Alike in this respect with all created matter, every atom is eternal as Himself, except at His decree. Hence at His pleasure it may be annihilated; or if compounded of some of the varied atoms of creation, the simple decomposition or separation of those atoms will destroy at once the specific aggregation on which its essence depended. But if it be immaterial, which it must be in brutes if it is so in man, still its immortality will be dependent solely on the will of God.

It may be incidentally remarked in reference to the indestructibility of matter save by the fiat of its Creator, that we are told in Scripture, that the world and all contained therein is to be *destroyed* by fire. It is not said that it will be *annihilated;* nor have we any reason from revelation or otherwise to believe that any particle of matter will experience such a

fate. It will perhaps be readily admitted, from what we know of the agency of heat in changing the forms of bodies, and by overpowering their aggregation, thereby bringing their particles into new combinations, that a small increase of that temperature which man even is capable of producing by artificial means, would amply suffice to destroy completely the aggregation of matter, even of such as art has never yet accomplished;* and by thus overpowering the force of attraction, the whole globe and its contents would probably be converted into a gaseous state of chaotic confusion similar to that in which it first existed, and from which it was withdrawn by those affinities that were impressed upon it by Omnipotence.† Now,

* See an admirable communication "On the physical facts contained in the Bible compared with the discoveries of modern sciences," by Marcel de Serres, in the Edinb. Philosophical Journal,—and from thence printed in Littell's Living Age for May, 1845—which powerfully strengthens the preceding, &c.—See also an interesting paper by M. Simon Tyssot, in the 12th Vol. Journal Litteraire, p. 154, printed at the Hague, 1723, 12mo., in which some bold speculations on the subject of Creation, appear to forestall most of those of the present period, as deduced from the Geology of the Earth.

† "Gaseous State of the Earth.—Though the mind, accustomed to philosophical inquiries, may find it difficult to comprehend the idea that this planet once existed in a gaseous state, this difficulty will vanish upon considering the nature of the materials of which it is composed must constantly undergo. Water offers a familiar example of a substance existing on the surface of the globe, in the separate states of rock, fluid and vapour, for water consolidated into ice is as much a rock as granite or the adamant; and as we shall hereafter have occasion to remark, has the power of preserving for ages the animals and vegetables that may be therein embedded. Yet, upon an increase of temperature, the glaciers of the Alps, and the icy pinnacles of the arctic circles, disappear; and, by a degree of heat still higher, might be resolved into vapour; and by other agencies might be separated into two invisible gases, oxygen and hydrogen. Metals may, in like manner, be converted into gases; and in the laboratory of the chemist, all kinds of matter pass easily through every grade of

as such laws were the offspring of His will alone, should it please Him simply to suspend them, all action, whether chemical or mechanical, would be at an end; and *new* laws, under the same Almighty direction, would readily produce a new earth, such as we are assured will be the successor of that we now inhabit; and, which may subserve the nature of those spiritual or other beings who may be assigned for its inhabitants. Whilst apparently, a more simple view of this catastrophe than that of popular belief, it has the aspect of philosophic probability, which might even lead us to imagine that this earth, is in fact, a renewal of a preceding one, which in like manner may have had its predecessors in a regular and stated course, under the direction of the Divine Will.

Recurring from this digression, we remark, that it does not seem a *necessary* consequence, in admitting that brutes have souls of a nature somewhat similar to that of man, that they are, like his, invested with the character of immortality; or, in other words, that they will not experience the common destruction of all created matter. If God has been graciously pleased to grant that high prerogative to man, it was clearly optional, and subservient to His divine intentions, and equally so to deny it in the case of brutes. But as nothing certain is revealed on the subject, the affirmative of a future existence of the souls of brutes has been frequently and warmly maintained by many humane and philanthropic writers, under the Christian as well as under other dispensations.* The Pythagorean

transmutation, from the most dense and compact to an aëriform state. We cannot, therefore, refuse our assent to the conclusion, that the entire of our globe might be resolved into a permanently gaseous form, merely by the dissolution of the existing combinations of matter." Mantell's Wonders of Geology.

* See Rush—Medical Museum, Vol. 4, p. 229. Heartley—History of Man, Vol. 2, p. 436. Hildrop, Free Thoughts, &c. Athenian Oracle, Vol. 1. British Magazine and Review, Vol. 3, p. 357.

transmigration of the soul, and all its ramifications, appears to have had its origin in this or some analogous opinion: and when we notice the tortures, privations and miseries of the brute creation, arising from our wants or from our caprices, we can scarcely reconcile it with our ideas of the mercy and justice of their Creator, if we fail to accredit a future retribution for their present extreme and unmerited sufferings.

The following remarks of Dr. Adam Clarke, in his Commentaries on the 8th ch. of St. Paul to the Romans, are too enlightened and too closely connected with this subject, to require any apology for their introduction here.

"THE restoration of the brute creation to a state of happiness has been thought by several to be the doctrine of verses 19,—25. In the notes on those verses I have given reasons against this opinion; and have proved that the Gentiles and not the irrational part of the creation, are the persons of whom the Apostle speaks; nor can any consistent interpretation be given of the place if it be applied to the brute creation. But although this doctrine is not contained in the above verses, it

Universal Magazine, Vol. 34, p. 325. Gentleman's Magazine, Vol. 38, p. 177. Cath. M. Graham—Letters on Education. Jortin's Sermon on the Goodness of God.—Universal History, Vol. 1, p. 96—and many others.

"There was a book lately published, styled 'Of the Future Lives of Brutes,' which gave great offence to Divines. I cannot see why. The only fault I found with it was, that it was poorly written. Is there only such a proportion of salvation in the gift of Providence, that parsons need be jealous of the participation? To suppose the inferior animals of creation to be endowed with souls, must presuppose our own to be out of all dispute." Sterne's Koran, p. 115.

The celebrated physician Sennertus, "was accused of blasphemy and impiety, on pretence of having taught, that the souls of beasts are not material; for this was affirmed to be the same thing with teaching that they are as immortal as the soul of man." Biogr. Dictionary, Vol. 11. London, 1784.

does not follow that the doctrine itself is not true. Indeed there are several reasons which render the supposition very probable.

1. The brute creation never sinned against God; nor are they capable of it: and consequently, cannot be justly liable to punishment.

2. But the whole brute creation is in a state of suffering; partake of the common infirmities and privations of life as well as mankind: they suffer, but who can say that they suffer justly?

3. As they appear to be necessarily involved in the sufferings of sinful man; and yet neither through their fault nor their folly; it is natural to suppose that the Judge of all the earth, who ever does right, will find some means by which these innocent creatures shall be compensated for their sufferings.

4. That they have no compensation here, their afflictions, labours and death prove: and if they are to have any compensation, they must have it in another state.

5. God, the fountain of all goodness, must have originally designed them for that measure of happiness which is suited to the powers with which he had endowed them. But, since the fall of man, they never had that happiness: and, in their present circumstances, never can.

6. As to intelligent beings, God has formed his purposes in reference to their happiness, on the ground of their rational natures. He has decreed that they shall be happy if they will, all the means of it being placed within their power; and if they be ultimately miserable, it is the effect of their own, unconstrained choice. Therefore, His purpose is fulfilled, either in their happiness or misery; because he has purposed that they shall be happy if they please; and that misery shall be the result of their refusal.

7. But it does not appear that the brute creation are incapa-

ble of this choice; and it is evident that they are not placed in their present misery through either their choice or their sin; hence, if no purpose of God can be ultimately frustrated, these creatures must be restored to that state of happiness for which they have been made; and of which they have been deprived through the transgression of man.

8. To say, that the enjoyments which they have in this life, are a sufficient compensation, is most evidently false; for, had not sin entered into the world, they would have had much greater enjoyments, without pain, excessive labour and toil, and without death; and all those sufferings which arise from its predisposing causes. Nor does it appear that they have much happiness from eating, drinking and rest, as they have these only in the proportion in which they are necessary to their existence as the slaves of men. Therefore, allowing that they have even gratification and enjoyment in life, they have much less than they would have had, had not sin entered into the world; and, consequently, they have been deprived of the greater portion of the happiness designed for them by their bountiful Creator.

9. It is therefore obvious, that the gracious purpose of God has not been fulfilled in them; and, that as they have not lost their happiness through their own fault, both the beneficence and justice of God are bound to make them a reparation.

10. Hence it is reasonable to conclude, that, as from the present constitution of things, they cannot have the happiness designed for them in this state, they must have it in another."

Man is said to be made a little lower than the angels; we may suppose, in explanation of this, that one or more senses are superadded in the last, to the five that man enjoys, and if so, what an infinitely superior range must the faculties of the angelic host necessarily possess above us! Nor is it at all improbable, that such addition may be allotted to us in a future

state, in order to raise us to an equality with them.* In brutes, although equally possessed of five senses, how then is it that such inequality exists? If in both man and brute a soul exists (material or immaterial, for what it is in the one, it must be in the other), with senses equal in number,—(some of which are more perfect in many animals than in the human race;) why must we presumptuously shut them out from a future state, in which they might experience some compensation for their unmerited sufferings in this? Why may not a haven if not a heaven, be reserved for them, accordant with their qualifications and capacity of happiness? What is the apparently distinctive difference between them, that affords superiority to man? If we trace the faculties of each, we find some possessed by man which are denied to brutes,—among these, most prominently appears, *a sense of Deity!* It is true that a slight trace of a moral faculty appears in brutes, as evinced by a sense of shame on some occasions, quickened by the

* *Tertullian* speaks of the Elysian fields as a determinate locality, which is spoken of as Abraham's bosom, &c.; and he asks "if the souls are not there in expectation of the final judgment? and what is their state at that time? Shall we sleep then? Amongst the living, the soul does not sleep—it is for the body,"—and *Origen*, in his 7th homily on Leviticus, among other matters, when speaking of the place to which the souls of the saints go after death, says "Puto quod Sancti quique, discedentes ex hac vita, permaneant in loco aliquo in terra posito, què paradisum dicit scriptura divina, *velut in quodam eruditionis loco*, et ut ita dixerim adjutorio, *vel schola animarum:* in quo de omnibus his, quæ in terris viderant, *doceantur*, judicia quoque quædam accipiant de consequentibus et futuris, sicut in hac quoque vita positi judicia que dat futurorum, licet per speculum in ænigmate, tamen ex aliqua parte conciperant, quæ manifestius et lucidius Sanctis in suis locis et temporibus revelantur," &c.

Extracts from Bibliotheca Sancta, by Sixtus Sinensis, 1592. We perceive that Origen has here forestalled some writers of this period, in respect to the improvement and instruction of the soul, in its temporary abode between death and the final judgment.

means of memory; but *of a sense of Deity*, no evidence exists, and hence they are truly shut out from all claims as moral agents; and cannot be subject to punishment by a benevolent Creator for actions uncontrollable from such a sense, and by which, if they possessed it, they would be led to a knowledge of good and evil. Perfect then as they may be, alike with man in the number and integrity of their common senses, we may readily conclude (and by it, add strength to the fundamental principles of phrenology) that no location in their brain is afforded to that important faculty, nor organ through whose medium its actions might be developed.* Hence (as in idiots) the Deity unknown, cannot be acknowledged and duly honoured. A revelation of a resurrection and of a future state, would have been useless; although such a resurrection may ensue, and happiness enjoyed, proportioned to their inferior faculties, as here displayed.

The opinion of Dr. Clarke above stated, must evidently be associated with the existence of some spiritual or immortal essence in the brute, independent of the corporeal frame, of

* In days of yore, a soul was supposed to exist not in brutes only, but even in plants. This was a well received opinion among philosophers, perhaps as wise as those of present notoriety.

"In plantis est tantum anima *vegetativa;* in brutis est tantum anima *sensitiva;* in hominibus est tantum *una* anima, scilicet *intellectiva*, in qua *cetera* continenter," &c. *Margarita Philosophica*, 1508, 4to. Lib. ii. Chap. 15. The good folks of that distant period were more tolerant than in these enlightened days. 'Tis even stated in ch. 16 of the above work, when considering the soul as a *light*, inclosed in a lantern of horn or glass, which is bright in proportion to the clearness and cleanliness of the inclosure, though the light itself inside is unchanged, that "In stultis igitur et fatuis, anima rationalis est: cujus tamen *ob corporis indispositionem*, opera minus emicant? "Recté," replies the teacher,—"Recté, nam etsi intellectiva organica non sit: Conjuncta tamen corpori, corporalium species per sensus recipit!"

which it was the miserable tenant. What his particular views in this respect were, are not distinctly enunciated; and the extract is to be received for as much as it is worth, in connexion with the object of this essay, without further enlargement. From all that has been said, without perplexing ourselves by additional remarks on the nature and character of the soul, it would seem obvious, that, without the intermedium of corporeal organs, it would be to us, as though it had no existence; and those organs must be of a definite and determinate character; its multifarious actions of thought, word or deed, depend entirely on the nature and degree of perfection in the respective organs, through which it is manifested;—vision accomplished by an action of the soul, through the agency of the eye and its appendages, cannot, by volition, be effected through the ear, however anxious the mind might be to modify the channel of its operation. The soul is, therefore, absolutely restrained to such actions alone, which the construction of the different organs is adapted to accomplish; and those actions will be in due vigour and proportion, just according to their healthy or imperfect state. Could we see as distinctly, and observe the organs of the intellectual faculties, with equal care and precision, as the more external ones of sense, we probably would entertain a more favourable impression as to the doctrines of phrenology, if indeed it is itself insufficient to produce conviction of its truth.

It may surely claim attention, and is deserving of consideration, why, if the operations of the soul are altogether independent of corporeal organization, why, nevertheless, those operations are perfect, in the ratio of the health and perfection of the organs and their functions.* Why should they decrease

* The organs of the sensorium or brain, numerous as they are represented to be, yet they all are actuated or set in motion by one mysterious principle—the soul. This principle of all intelligence may be supposed to act occasionally through the medium or instrumentality

in perfection, exactly in the ratio in which, from age, disease or accident, those bodily organs become imperfect? Numer-

of one organ alone, sometimes through two or more, producing thereby a corresponding diversity of effect, and that beneficial or injurious according as the nature of such combinations may be harmonious or the reverse. If such be the case, the sensorium may, not inaptly, be likened to a vast organ (musical) of an equal number of stops, all called into operation through the agency of one great uniform principle, the wind, collected in a reservoir or bellows, which is distributed through appropriate channels or pipes, framed in conformity to the intentions of the maker, as a flute, a trumpet or other musical instrument. By opening one or more of those stops, alone or in combination, a concert is produced, harmonious or otherwise, according to the judicious or faulty association of the musician; that is, exactly in the ratio in which the respective notes are caused to combine. The fine and delicate notes of the flute can scarcely associate correctly with the loud and martial notes of the trumpet or the drum, or they would probably be overpowered in the louder manifestation of those instruments.

An organ may be perfect in the hands of the musician in the manifestation of a single stop alone; it becomes improved by the addition of two or more, progressively in number, up to the full extent of its construction; each in itself is perfect, yet the coöperation of all is essential to the highest state of harmony for which the instrument was intended, because all the exquisite combinations or manifestations of sound, constituting the concert, could not be known, save from the associated action of every part.

May we not affirm that thus it is with the mind or soul, and the organ by which it is developed, the brain, acting through appropriate and constituted channels? The mind is there, but should some organ be defective, or altogether wanting, through which it was intended to operate; that operation must necessarily be wanting or defective also. The intellect is consequently extensive and perfect, in the ratio of the number and perfection of the organs through which the soul performs its part:—hence the chain of intellect from that of man, down to the lowest order of animal life—improved in some by education—in others restrained to one fixed and unvaried standard, called instinct, supplying adequately all their wants, which are wisely limited to a few particulars, beyond which they have no aspirations, to perplex and worry them.

ous are the questions that present themselves as to the deterioration of the faculties of both body and mind, arising from effusion of water or blood, from tumours in the brain, from gastric and other intestinal affections, from hypochondriasis, phrenitis, apoplexy and various other diseases; and further requiring to be informed how it is, that "the soul, secure in its existence," is nevertheless compelled to follow in its operations, and to evince them to the world, precisely in the degree of perfection or imperfection which the bodily organs prescribe, when under the influence of morbid causes; or, when in health, under that of an appropriate or inappropriate education!

How could madness, idiocy or any mental disease become apparent, or even have an existence in man, but for that intimate though inscrutable connexion, and absolute dependence of the soul, on the existing state of healthy or unhealthy material organization? Surely it will not be contended that the soul is insane or idiotic, because of apparently imperfect actions through imperfect and diseased organs! Nor can it be supposed to be restored to health and original perfection, without the previous recovery of those organs. It is true we cannot at all times demonstrate the lesion of those organs; but are our imperfect observations, (so greatly owing to the imperfection of the senses themselves,) to be viewed as conclusive in opposition to facts of daily occurrence, and sufficient of themselves to establish the truth of the great and fundamental principles of phrenology? To myself, at least, it appears that every fact we are acquainted with, relating to the physiology and pathology of the brain, if properly appreciated, can but tend to add conviction of its truth; for it is sufficiently obvious that the total, or partial destruction, or merely temporary suspension, of the intellectual faculties from lesions of the brain, admit of no explanation that does not embrace the connexion and dependence of those faculties in their operations with the organization of that viscus! Any other view

of the subject would impel us to conclude, that the soul consists of separate parts, and that it is capable of subdivision; so that the monomaniac will have that portion of the soul insane, which is connected with the organ through which it exerts its action, whilst all the remaining portion of the soul may yet continue in a healthy state:—if the aberration of the individual extends to a second function or operation, a second portion of the soul must then have become deranged, and thus onwards, ad infinitum, to the highest range of perfect madness of all the separate and independent parts of this invisible and mysterious associate of the material organization! But this must surely be the case, if the doctrine of phrenology is false, which assigns locality to organs by which alone the functions of the soul are externally perceived. Can we hesitate then to admit the possibility, the probability—nay, I would add the certainty, that malformation, or temporary disease of those organs that evince irregularity, do thereby modify or distort the regular train of mental ratiocination, whilst yet the soul is in its accustomed health? The hypochondriac, who, standing in a corner, imagines himself to be a clock, and swings his arm to-and-fro as its pendulum, whilst, cluck, cluck, cluck, he gives out for its ticking:—The one who thinks his legs are glass, and carefully guards them from the slightest blow:—with hundreds of a like description, that are frequent in the records of medicine; all these are nevertheless, on other subjects perfectly rational, and argue as correctly as their neighbours and associates. Is the soul here, partially deranged, by which such strange vagaries may be thoroughly elucidated, without any reference to organic lesion of some part, by which the functions are rendered imperfect? If so, we must classify the insane as mono-maniacs—bi-maniacs—tri-maniacs, &c. according to the number of the faculties thus erroneously developing their actions! The Almighty is omnipresent throughout the *macro*-cosm of the Universe; whilst He has afforded to the soul

an omnipresence in the *micro*-cosm of man! the most wonderful work of His creative power, with a state of organization, through which its operations are effected; perfect, if those organs are in a perfect state, but defective, if under the influence of malformation or disease.*

I may perhaps strengthen all the preceding views in favour of Phrenology, by a familiar and domestic truth. It may be affirmed, that Divine Intelligence shines no where more eminently conspicuous, than in the fact, that the powers of the mind exactly quadrate with the state and age of man.† In infancy, which requires the care and attention of parental affection, the low ebb of the mental powers, calls for those exertions in its behalf, which the imperfect state of its own organs is incapable of effecting. The soul of an infant considered in the abstract, and as unconnected with its corporeal mansion, must be regarded as equally perfect and complete, as that of the most accomplished adult; but could it be equally

* These truths were in a certain extent avowed by ancient philosophers:—thus Socrates says, that while the soul is immersed in matter, it staggers, strays, frets, and is giddy, like a man in drink. *Plato's Phedon.*

† Even our blessed Saviour, in assuming the form of man, became subject to the laws of mental and corporeal improvement as established by nature; for we learn from St. Luke, ii. 52—that "Jesus increased in wisdom and stature, and in favour with God and man."

Aristotle asks, "Cur Seniores amplius mente valeamus?" and he replies as follows, "Quia natura parens instrumenta nobis duo inseruit, Manum Corpori dedit, animo mentem; cæteræ scientiæ, et artes nostra opera sunt, mentem ipsam opus esse naturæ fecundum est. Ut igitur manu non jam inde ab ortu uti possumus, sed cum eam absolvit naturæ, perfecitque procedente ætate; ita mens non protinus, sed in senectute maxime nobis contingit, atque tunc præcipue consummatur, et absolvitur. Accedit verò posterior mens, quàm manuum facultas, quoniam mentis instrumenta posteriora sunt, quam manuum, est enim mentis instrumentum scientia." And Lactantius says, "Animam crescere in pueris, vigere in juvenibus, et in senibus minui."

active and efficient, in the imperfect and partially developed state of the organs through whose channels its actions are to be effective; some of the most delightful sensations of the human breast would be altogether wanting. How could our feelings be equally wrought upon by the infant pledges of affection, if the operations of the mind, in them, were perfect as our own? The gradual unfolding of their faculties by the progressive improvement of their corporeal organization, constitutes, I apprehend, the powerful chain that binds the parent so closely to his offspring: for, we must admit, that a full and perfect intellect at birth, would subvert, or annihilate that peculiar and tender affection so natural from man, even in the savage state, and not less powerful in brutes, towards their helpless progeny! The tie that connects us to our children at the age of maturity, when the full development of their mental powers places them on an equality with ourselves, is produced assuredly, by a feeling of a far different nature from that which their infant state elicits; and it is from this very circumstance, I think, that children can never experience the same peculiar sensations for the parent, which the latter feels for them.

Before I bring this essay to a close, I will venture to add to it a fact, which, although apparently more immediately connected with physiognomy, (a branch, however, of phrenology,) is, if well founded, not undeserving of consideration, and of more extensive observation. It is *now* upwards of* forty

* The position here assumed, which I thought was altogether my own, I have latterly found to have been indirectly adverted to, in a very curious work, by Gaspar a Reies Franco, printed at Brussels 1641, Fol. p. 399, entitled "Elysius Jucundorum Quæstionum Campus," &c. One of the questions considered, is upon the subject of the similarity of persons—and numerous examples are given, many of great interest, and derived from ancient and modern writers; referring to some of these, he thus expresses himself: "Nec minus mirandum, quod, hi in-

years since the idea presented itself to me, owing to some accidental circumstance, and since that time, I have confirmed it satisfactorily to myself, by several hundred instances. I have repeatedly mentioned it to many friends and acquaintances, who have also coincided in the opinion, from their own subsequent observations.

The fact I wish to establish, is, that whenever the general physiognomy of two individuals is the same, that is, when, according to common observation, two persons are said to resemble each other, (in face) or to be alike; so, in the same degree or extent of resemblance, will their voices be found to be the same; so that, if in the dark, I should hear the voice of an individual that resembled the voice of another person with whom I was acquainted, I should have no difficulty in affirming, that on seeing his face, I should find a resemblance also in it, to that of the other. So, in like manner, should I see an unknown person, in the most distant place, whose countenance and features resembled those of a well known friend or acquaintance, I would venture to affirm at once, that in voice, he would likewise resemble him. Could we therefore be assured of the likeness of the busts and portraits of ancient heroes, kings, philosophers and other great men that have reached us, and

quibus tanta intervenit similitudo, ut nec *vultu*, *voce*, *loquela*, corpore, actionibus, aut exercitiis discerni possint, moribus quoque et animi affectibus etiam cohœreant; quæ enim inter se similia adeó sunt, eâdem temperie, aut saltem parem distante ita conveniunt, ut vitiis aut virtutibus eisdem insigniantur," &c.—with more to the like effect, by which it will be seen, that the views taken on the subject, are far more extended than I had ventured to adopt. They serve, however, to substantiate my more limited proposition. It is but lately that I have met with the facts to which I thus allude. I may add, that the author amidst his numerous references, adds one from Virgil, 8th Æneid—on Evander recognising Æneas, from the similarity of voice and face to his father Anchises.

"Et *vocem* Anchisæ magni, *vultusque* recordor!"

find individuals of similar features, we might, prima facie, recognise in their voices, the voices of their precursors.*

No doubt at first sight, this will be deemed extravagant, and devoid of foundation; but the fact is, that it has a foundation in the organization of the parts themselves, and must, therefore, be strictly true. To what shall we ascribe the *basis* of a similar set of features in different individuals of the past or present times? Evidently, the only sure and fixed basis must be the bony fabric of the face and fauces. If the muscles and covering of those bones are not dissimilarly located or attached; in other words, if the various parts, through which the air emitted from the lungs in speech, are anatomically alike in both, the appearance externally must necessarily approxi-

*The following extracts are in a measure corroborative of this opinion. The first is from "Strang's Germany in 1831;" the latter, from the Ledger of March 22d, 1845—extracted from the London Morning Herald:

"METTERNICH.—On the first glimpse which I had of the Austrian Prime Minister, I fancied I beheld the Duke of Wellington; but on a second look I discovered that his face was fuller and much less sharp and haggard than that of the hero of Waterloo. There is, however, a very singular resemblance in the great lines and character of their faces. The contour of the visage is the same in each; the expression about the mouth is not unlike; while the self-complacence which plays on both countenances, indicating a feeling of conscious superiority, is remarkably similar. With so near a resemblance of face, perhaps it is not remarkable that their political feeling should be so much akin; and if we may be permitted to quote Lavater as an authority, it is not at all surprising to find that features which are hourly affected with the sentiment that mankind ought still to be ruled by the same engine which ambition, bigotry, and heartlessness invented, should come within the prescribed limits of the similarity which that ingenious but fanciful author assigns to brother characters."

"Miss Cushman, who played *Bianca*, is a tall, commanding young lady, having a fine stage figure. The expression of her face is curious; it reminds one of Macready; a suggestion still further strengthened by the tones of her voice, and frequently by her mode of speech."

mate in each, unless prevented by some accidental cause. But, since a similarity of external configuration affords the strongest reason for concluding that the internal and unseen parts are equally similar in formation and structure; the air passing through channels of like configuration in the various passages of the mouth and fauces, must necessarily afford a similar sound, and if employed in speech, will render that alike in both cases, just as in two musical instruments of the same construction, attuned to the same pitch. Without attempting further explanation, I must repeat my firm conviction of the truth of my assertion; I have verified it too often to entertain the slightest doubt upon the subject, and submit it to the further attention of my readers. At the same time, I must request them to remember, that, as all persons do not discover resemblances with equal facility, they must not be discouraged from the pursuit, if this should be their case. No doubt, every person has at times been much surprised, that he has seen at once a striking likeness in a portrait, to the individual for whom it was painted, whilst others around, as intimately acquainted with that individual, shall deny its having any resemblance. Now, for such diversity of opinion there surely must be some adequate explanation; and I imagine this to be, its dependance greatly, if not entirely, on the accidental circumstance of the one, at the first glance at the portrait being promptly impressed by one or more features that have been happily and faithfully traced by the artist, whilst the others, unfortunately striking on a feature not accurately given, or altogether erroneous, will never see the face but under this false aspect, the first impression will always predominate; that is, the erroneous features will invariably stand forth in bold relief; whilst the exact reverse attends the other, who will invariably behold those, by which the likeness was first established in his mind. If every feature was correctly given, there could be no second opinion respecting the case, for all would see the painting uniformly. Such I appre-

hend may be the case in the above noticed physiognomical association of voice and feature, for although a strong resemblance may exist between two persons, yet still, individual features may vary, which will create doubts as to likeness, in those who do not at first attach themselves to those features that are similar.*

In conclusion, I must remark, that so far from the science of phrenology being a newly discovered one, it is, on the contrary, one of the most ancient. I have in my possession a very curious old quarto volume, printed in 1508, entitled "Margarita Philosophica"—a kind of Encyclopedia, embracing in question and answer, between the master and his pupil, every science of the day, from the letters in the horn book, up to theology and metaphysics. Among the singular engravings with which it abounds is one of a human head or skull, on which are regularly depicted by metes and boundaries, the then acknowledged faculties of the mind, in their respective localities, with a precision not unworthy of Gall or Spurzheim. Well did Solomon declare that there is "nothing new under the sun." Doubtless the science of phrenology existed in the distant epoch of the Jewish monarch, although its principles had not been fully elucidated. It is, however, perfectly demonstrable, that, neither before nor since the time of Solomon, have the organs of amativeness and of philoprogenitiveness exhibited a stronger development than in his brain; for we have scriptural assurance, that this illustrious and *wisest* of monarchs, had no less than seven hundred wives and three hundred concubines! His conscience on those points must have had but a feeble development!

* Who has not discovered likenesses to man, brutes, castles, &c., in the polished variegated slabs of our marble mantels, which others cannot always readily detect; whilst various figures of a different character are detected in the same? Each will, in all future investigation, still recognise the appearances which his imagination had first invented.

About a century after the work above mentioned, appeared a treatise by J. Heurnius, a medical writer of very superior merit, entitled "De morbis qui in singulis partibus humani capitis insidere consueverunt." At ch. x. p. 100 of this work, speaking of phrenitis and its various forms, he says "Secundo, differunt phrenitides loco affecto: nam vel totum cerebrum, vel ejus pars occupata est. Si pars cerebri, ea erit antica, postica, vel media. *Scio hic disputari*, utrum principes facultates capitis, sedes in cerebro habeant varias, necne," &c.; from which it is evident, that the doctrine of localities was then a subject of discussion. It is, however, so rational, that it can scarcely be a source of wonder, to find that even centuries before that period, the same opinion had met with supporters. Accordingly we learn that Galen, (the most renowned of the medical profession in any age, either ancient or modern,) who flourished about 200 years after our Saviour, had promulgated and sustained a similar doctrine. Heurnius refers us in proof of this, to Aph: 27 of 1st Prorrhetics; and to his 4th book, de Locis affectis, in which he says, that when the brain is affected, "apud anticos ventres suos laedi imaginationem: sin illi medios secum ventriculos trahant, perverti et cogitationem." He elsewhere inquires, why phrenitis has such varied symptoms; and why, at one time, the imagination, at another, thought or memory shall be defective? "Hoc evenit (says he) ex humoris raptu ab una in aliam cerebri partem: itaque hoc fieri ex *variarum cerebri mansionum* irritatione, et alteratione prægrandi, unde successiva opera φανταστικὰ, ἡγεμονικὰ, et μνημονευτικὰ, id est facultatum apprehendendi, judicandi, et memorandi." Further on, we find, "Si principes facultates quæ in cerebro habitant, *varias mansiones* occupant, igitur unus idemque homo poterit ingeniosus esse, vique imaginandi excellere, et etiam memorandi potentiâ alios ante-ire: at plerumque ingeniosi immemores sunt: quin non rarò memoria validè exsplendescente, torpescit imaginatio," &c.—And in

"Galeni, de Hippoc: et Plat: decretis, Lib. 5. ch. 4, we find the following: "Neque in una tantum animæ parte, neque in una facultate et judicia et affectus existere, ut Chrysippus sentit; sed, plures esse diversasque genere tum facultates, tum partes."* We need not to quote further; although we might abundantly, for the writings of Galen prove the subject to have been a favourite with him. It wanted merely a name to establish its scientific standing; and I have merely adduced the above few extracts, to prove that phrenology is not now for the first time illustrated, but that it reaches back through sixteen centuries, if not to the time of Hippocrates, who lived nearly 400 years before Galen.

I have now completed the object I had in view, of maintaining the firm belief I have long had of the truth of the great outlines and fundamental principles of phrenology, a belief unalloyed, I trust, by any slavish attachment to the vagaries to which it may have given rise. It is a science, which, though of long standing, as I have demonstrated, is nevertheless still in its infancy, and will probably so continue, until augmented elucidation shall have established a chain of facts so powerful, as to enforce a general opinion, that, so far from its consideration leading to infidelity or atheism, as many have affirmed, on the contrary it tends to magnify the power of the Deity in the manifestation of that part of His works, that is to survive "the wreck of matter and the crush of worlds!"

* "Quid enim rari habet phrenitis, quid admirationis? An quod præcipuam animæ functionem, rationem inquam, et hominis sacrarium vitiet, et perturbet?—Minimé quidem; quia phrenitis *rationem propriè non lædit*, sed *illius organum turbat et vitiat* ac optimam illius temperiem corrumpit, *unde defectu* instrumenti rationi advenit nocumentum."—Campus Elysius, p. 742.

THE END.