

THOUGHTS
ON
PHRENOLOGY:

OR,
PHRENOLOGY TESTED BY REASON AND REVELATION.

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"He that answereth a matter before he heareth it, it is folly and shame unto him." PROVERBS.

"Know what you are speaking of, and then condemn it."

"The proper study of mankind is man." POPE.

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PREFACE.

WHEN the following thoughts were committed to paper, (between two and three years ago,) they were not designed for the press, and from this circumstance, and that of the author's opinions being deduced from observation and reasoning, rather than from the study of phrenological works, (the only work into which he has ever looked being an elementary volume by Mr. Combe,) he trusts every allowance will be made for any want of arrangement, or for any phrenological error, from which he should be far from asserting them to be free.

He would not now have submitted this little work to public scrutiny, had not some persons whose opinions he appreciates encouraged him to do so, and had not continued public opposition to Phrenology seemed to require it. His reluctance, however, was far from proceeding from a want of faith in the truth of the science; it was only the fruit of that diffidence which all experience more or less in giving publicity to their thoughts.

He sincerely trusts that he has approached the subject with a temper becoming one whose object is the vindication and recommendation of *Truth*.

Is Phrenology true or false? is a question for the reader to ask himself, and the result of a candid investigation should be his only satisfactory answer; the object here contemplated is to prove the science to be true; that it is false is already the belief of most persons; the enquiry then, so far as regards the following observations, ought not to be made with a view to detect their feeblest points, but for the purpose of seeing whether they do not carry some weight; it ought not to be whether the defect of some arguments do not vitiate the conclusions drawn from the whole, but whether the effect of the whole is not a preponderance of evidence in favour of the science.

If Phrenology be true, it must be admitted by all to be of great importance, and it therefore becomes those, whose opinions would be respected and appreciated, candidly to consider whether or not the science be true. If they find it false, let them at once expose and crush it before the eyes of the world; but if true, let them candidly say so, and recommend it to the public. If Phrenology be true, its utility will be great, as it will be susceptible of application to a diversity of purposes; as an auxi-

liary to art, it would be as valuable to the painter in his portrait department, as anatomy is to the sculptor in the design of his figures; to the parent it will be found of infinite value, as it will enable him to direct and train the natural tendencies of his infant charge; and it may not be too much to say, that it would merit a conspicuous place in academic education, as it would facilitate the acquirement of what is very important, a knowledge of character.

To say the least of Phrenology, it is an accomplishment, a pleasing study, the cultivation of which brings with it a gratifying reward; it enables us to discover the extent of our own mental powers, and to watch and to direct the inclination of them; and having neglected to do so at an earlier hour, there is something amply satisfactory, at the more meditative period of one's life, to trace through lapsed years the variety of ways in which the same tendency of mind is exerted, adapting itself in each progressive step to the growth and increasing powers of the intellect, and to see how we enjoy in philosophical reflection those pleasures which were once mechanically and instinctively resorted to as childish sports.

The author does not sanguinely anticipate any important result from this humble effort of his pen, for even did the possession of superior abilities en-

courage him to look for this, still the fact of his not being a member of the medical profession must diminish his expectations, but then he does cherish the consolation, that inasmuch as the most gifted intellect could not rescue Phrenology from oblivion, if it be false; so, if it be true, it will assuredly add another luminary to the hemisphere of scientific research, without the aid of any feeble light, and in despite of the mightiest effort to quench its importance in the shallow pool of scepticism. The most successfully urged, but in reality the most unsubstantial objection to Phrenology, is that which would brand it with the stigma of being the machination of infidelity; but if it were true that Phrenology held out any hostility to true religion, there could then be no doubt of its futility and danger; and the author trusts that he should be as ardent in denouncing it, as he is willing to give it his support; but he does feel satisfied of the truth and innocency of the science, nay, of its utility, and the object at which he directs his aim is to show how unfounded is this objection that comes under the sacred sanction of religion,—to show that Phrenology does not in any degree militate against the sacredness of that holy institution, and to aid in removing that mass of prejudice, which at present obstructs the candid investigation of the science;

and if this end should be in any degree obtained, and the author could have the further and more exalted gratification of convincing any person who is already a believer in Phrenology, but an infidel in religion, of the beautiful consistency between his science and revelation, it would amply satisfy his humble expectation.

INTRODUCTION.

It is believed by ALL that man is possessed of two grand component essentials,—the immaterial essence, whether this be made up of mind, will, and soul, or of only one or more of these,—and of the material part, viz. the body. It is believed that the former of these may have an independent existence from the body, but that the suspension of its intercourse with the external world is contemporaneous with the beginning of such independent existence, or, in other words, that the immaterial part of man requires for its intercourse with the material world, certain corporeal or material exponents such as we find it furnished with, in the form of the other part of man, viz. the body.

To some functions of the man some portions of the body are so obviously adapted, such as the eye or ear for instance, that no one doubts the fact of the latter being the instrument of the former; there are some functions, however, which may not themselves be well known to every casual observer, and which, if even known, may perhaps require the skilful scrutiny of the anatomist to refer them to their appropriate bodily organs. Many functions

have, however, been each observed to have a distinct organ. Some men of undoubted eminence, through observation and considerable reflection, have pronounced that every function or *quality* of man has a distinct instrument, and that each quality of mind therefore manifests itself through the assistance of a distinct organ, which discovery is appropriately denominated the science of Phrenology.

Opponents to this doctrine, however, have not been found wanting, and at this moment, although the advocates of Phrenology are increasing, yet the number of persons who oppose it, and the zeal wherewith they do so, are great. The question then is, whether the facts produced by Phrenologists prove their observations to be correct, and whether their doctrine may not be fairly supported both by reason and argument.

“A disputable point is no man's ground.”

If it were even allowed then by Phrenologists, that their science admits of some doubt, yet in as much as doubt implies some evidence on both sides, the subject must merit a calm investigation. I purpose, then, to offer in the following pages such arguments as have occurred to myself in favour of the science, which will involve the consideration of whether the objections urged against the science of Phrenology have any weight, and whether the science itself merits the support it receives.

THOUGHTS ON PHRENOLOGY.

CHAPTER I.

PHRENOLOGY, OR A PLURALITY OF CEREBRAL ORGANS,—A LEGITIMATE DEDUCTION FROM CORRECT REASONING.

"What if the foot ordained the dust to tread,
Or hand to toll, aspired to be the head,
What if the head, the eye, the ear repined
To serve mere engines to the ruling mind?
Just as absurd for any part to claim
To be another in this general frame."

POPE.

As an object must exist before it can be acted upon, so a principle or agent must exist before it can act, and an instrument appropriate to the action must be present for the agent's use, *e. g.*, a man determines to take hold of an object, and with the hand as an instrument he actually takes hold of it;—the hand in this instance could not have taken hold of the object if the object had not existed, nor could it have taken hold of it, although it existed, had not the man determined to do so, but then the man could no more have seized the object without the instrumental assistance of the hand, than the hand

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could have seized it without the determination of the man. Admitting this postulate to be a fundamental intuitive principle of belief, the reasonableness of the doctrine, if not the necessity of a plurality of corporeal organs for the plurality of mental functions is apparent, and it would seem impracticable for any, the most inveterate sceptic, to maintain his objections to the doctrine of Phrenology on the basis of any process of sound reasoning; his arguments, (if he argues at all,) whatever they may be in appearance, must in reality be sophistical; and at least a reasoning intellect would not fail to see that it would be a gross violation of the simple dictates of common sense, not to consider some investigation an essential preface to a rejection of the science.

Before one reasons at all, it is necessary that there be some fundamental point of belief, or first truth, some element to rest upon, which all believe to be true, and which neither admits of, nor requires any proof; now I think that I may not unfairly denominate the postulate above set forth as an article of this nature, and if so, it is in effect to admit the truth of what we would establish by the following arguments, viz. that not only must the immaterial essence of mind have a bodily organ for the manifestation of itself to the external world, but that its numerous and varying *qualities* must each have a distinct and varying organ; that is, that man has one instrument for the manifestation

of that distinct function, with which he perceives simple objects, and another for the manifestation of that equally distinct power, with which he would reason on these objects when perceived; for the perceiving a simple object and the reasoning upon it, when perceived, being acts as different in their nature, the one from the other, as seeing is from feeling, man could no more exhibit his reasoning powers, through the instrument, by means of which he manifests his comprehension of simple objects, or through an instrument adapted to the manifestation of any other faculty, than he could take hold of an object with the eye, or with the leg, which is equally inappropriate for the purpose.

Whether it be admitted or not, that a bodily organ is necessary for the use of the mind, this we know, that the mind possesses one, viz. the whole body, or a part of it; but we must be satisfied of this, that if the mind has a bodily organ, that organ *is* necessary, unless we can reverse the design of creation, and suppose the body the first object of creation, and the mind but its instrument or tool, which no one of sane intellect can suppose, since the former is the offspring of the earth, and the latter a direct emanation from the Deity. It must be admitted, then, that the mind has a bodily organ, and that that organ is a necessary instrument to the mind; but it may still be urged, that the mind is but *one* living principle, and that but *one* organ is therefore necessary. The *whole* living principle,

(whether we call it mind or will, &c.) is equally but one living principle ; by parity of reason, therefore, it must be urged, that this principle requires one bodily organ, and *one* only ; let us see, then, how this is.—As a tenement for its constant presence, there is no doubt that only one body is necessary, but that body may be, and is composed of many parts, as *one* building may have many apartments, or *one* piece of machinery several distinct pieces ; and so it is that for the fulfilment of one's desire to take corporal possession of any object, which desire arises in the mind, the hand, as an instrument, is found essential ; and for the gratification of a desire to walk, the feet prove equally necessary, &c. Now here are two material members for one living principle, and these are considered necessary, because they are found to be so ; and why are they necessary, but because the *simple essence* which desires to walk or to grasp can do neither without the aid of one of these bodily organs ; the hand or leg has no more the desire or intention to walk or to grasp than they would if they were artificial, yet all regard these members as different instruments for different *feelings* emanating from one principle ; I am at a loss to know, then, by what rules of common sense it can be concluded that the other different propensities and faculties of the mind, since they sometimes act independently of each other and alone, can be expected to act without those bodily organs which, whether we view the subject philo-

sophically or analogically, seemed clearly to be required; for if these different feelings have different organs, different organs, *a priori*, must be necessary. Now, considered abstractedly, the faculty of reasoning is as different from the capacity for music, and the sentiment of benevolence is as different from an absorbing self-esteem, as is a desire to walk from a desire to take hold of an object; and if the latter require different bodily members, or organs, the former would seem to do so. Every *desire of the man* finds a bodily organ adapted to it; and we find a certain portion of the body, arms and legs, &c. adapted to certain tendencies of the man; we find, for the use of the senses, different organs situated about the head and face, the nose, eyes, &c.; and so we find for the mental operations, the brain is set apart; now, this material is deemed necessary for the immateriality of mind. Now the brain may be composed of any number of compartments or organs, and the fact of our not seeing them vary in form and size so much as the other bodily members, no more rebuts the certainty of their being organs than the circumstance of the nose or eyes, being smaller or widely different from a leg or an arm, can rebut the fact of the former being equally organs with the latter, for the nearer the resemblance *in the manifestations* of these powers, the nearer in resemblance we should expect to see the material organs; the eye, ear, nose, &c., for instance, being simple passive instruments, we find both in

size and texture they differ widely from the leg or arm, which for active purposes are flexible and powerful; but then the mental functions, such as reflection, conscientiousness, benevolence, &c. must be admitted to differ nearly as widely from each other as they do from the senses, and therefore must require different organs. That these organs do not differ so much amongst themselves as those of the senses, cannot alter the case, for all the mental functions, although they differ in quality, yet manifest themselves in the same manner, just as the eye, nose, ears, &c. differ so widely from the hand, &c. in size and compactness as altogether to occupy a space in reality not so large as one of the other organs, viz. as the leg alone, we can well imagine how these organs, when multiplied from five to thirty-five, (all these being in a smaller compass,) may be so minute and like each other, as to present a surface similar to the exterior of the head. The intellectual qualities being different, require each a distinct organ; the action of each being similar, the organs cannot be expected to differ much in point of form or resemblance. And we can well conceive why these organs are so well protected, because of the importance of the qualities with which they are inhered, and their exercise being rather deliberative or directory, than active or executive.

CHAPTER II.

AN ENDEAVOUR TO PROVE THE FOREGOING DOCTRINE.—THE BRAIN THE SEAT OF THE MIND, EMBODIED IN AN ARGUMENT ANSWERING THE OBJECTION TO PHRENOLOGY ON THE GROUND OF MATERIALISM.

" Though without bellows air could not be blown
Through bellows, say are air and bellows one?
And tell me are these more identical,
If bellows be many, and air be blown through all." ANON.

It may not be questioned, and if it is, we would prove it, that the brain is the medium, through which the manifestations of mind to the external world are especially effected; any argument which furnishes a quietus to the objection, that Phrenology sanctions the doctrine of materialism, would involve sufficient proof of this.

Phrenology is alleged to be dangerous, from the great countenance it holds out to the doctrine of materialism. Now it must either be an illogical mind, or one that has not directed its attention with sufficient intensity to the subject, that volunteers

this opinion; the reverse of it must be acknowledged by all who believe in the immortality of the soul, (and all must believe in this who would reject Phrenology, because it would seem to affect this belief,) after an impartial attention to the influence of cerebral diseases on the manifestations of mind, and a comparison of these with the phrenological view of the same point. These diseases "show us, indeed, in a very striking manner, the mind holding intercourse with the external world through the medium of the brain and the nervous system; and by certain diseases of these organs they show this intercourse impaired or suspended; but they show nothing more. In particular, they warrant nothing in any degree analogous to those partial deductions which form the basis of materialism."

Now this is believed even by anti-phrenologists, because it would be against common sense and experience not to believe it; and yet this belief may be said to sanction quite as much as Phrenology may be said to do, if not more, the doctrine of materialism. For assuming that it is admitted by all who reject Phrenology, that the mind manifests itself through the brain, if an injury to the brain interrupts such manifestation, and this points to materialism at all, it must do so as clearly if the brain be only one organ, as if it be divided into several organs. But in reality, neither of them authorizes the illogical inference deduced from the latter; viz. that it points to materialism; for when

a portion of the brain is injured, and the action of some mental function is suspended, we have no more reason to infer the extinction of that function than we have to suppose the annihilation of the soul when the whole body is destroyed. For although the mind no longer manifests itself through this deranged instrument, we have no more reason for supposing that it is at all injured, and could not manifest itself at any moment that organ may be again sound, or that the cerebral mass itself is mind, than we have any reason to suppose the optic agent injured when its organ is feeble from age, or that this organ is the agent itself; for when the former is injured, the latter perceives, through an appropriate lens, as well as it did with its own organ in its unimpaired state; nor, indeed, does Phrenology think so, for it does not say that the mind cannot exist without matter, but that it cannot manifest itself without the presence of such matter, nor, indeed, does any one think so: well then, when this portion of the brain is gone, and some mental quality is impaired, this is nothing more than to say that that mental quality has lost a material medium, and, in other words, had a material through which to act: now this is the language of personal observation and reasoning, and those who hold it object to Phrenology; and yet this is nothing more nor less than the same thing which is decried by popular indignation and by these personal observers, under the name of Phrenology, which literally does nothing

more than declare that the mental functions must have material mediums; not meaning to say, that because material instruments exist, immaterial essence cannot be there, but, on the contrary, it infers an opposite conclusion, and supposes that, because the *essence of mind* is apparent, there must be this material instrument.*

It may be said, that although the brain is injured, it may not be removed, and the mass or instrument being still there, why should not the function still act, if it is not the brain itself, or is not destroyed by such injury? But this proves nothing; we know that the hand may, through disease, be perfectly paralysed, and become quite useless, and yet it may remain in its natural size, and may even have increased; and to suppose that the quality should act if the brain remains, whether the brain be in one form or another, is just to suppose that man should still exercise his body, when that body has been ground up in a mill, provided that no part of it be lost. But no; our All-wise Creator has thought

* After writing this little work, I had the pleasure of seeing a satisfactory argument on materialism, and also an argument beautifully answering the objection, on the ground that the brain may sustain an injury without impeding the manifestation of any function, which, if it be so, is accounted for by a plurality of organs, and a *duality* of each; and it is shown how the objection recoils on the users of it; viz. that they admit the whole brain to be the medium of each quality, and yet suppose the whole brain may be destroyed without affecting the manifestation of any faculty.

proper to make an instrument in a particular form, for a certain work, and we have no right to look for the performance of that work, when the form of that instrument has been changed. But more than this we *know*, that an injury to any portion of the brain, (involving duplicate organs,) whether that portion be extracted or not, produces a feebleness or suspension in some mental quality; and this, therefore, shows us, not that if the material organ exists in substance, the mind must act: but the conclusion it justifies is this—that not only must the mental quality have a material organ, but that its vigorous exercise must depend upon the vigour and health of that organ; and we are therefore justified in coming to the unavoidable conclusion, that Phrenology is only synonymous with the result of the personal observation of the phenomena of mind, and as the latter cannot be supposed to countenance materialism, so must the inference be excluded that Phrenology can do so.

Phrenology does nothing more than represent man as possessed of certain uniform organs or material mediums, through which the immaterial essence of mind may hold intercourse with the things of the external world; and to suppose man without fixed and uniform means of communication, would be to represent him as a being possessed of no fixed or uniform principles, “not to be calculated upon as to his conduct in any instance, and not capable of being acted upon by any motive or principle, except

the blind caprice of the moment." It is, indeed, to say that any material body would have done for the tenement of the mind, as well as that which man now has, and therefore any shallow-headed animal is as fit a receptacle for his mind ; nay, is as much an intellectual being as man himself. That the mind should act through matter, and should have the formation of such matter appropriate to its action, is no more indicative of its materialism than (be it spoken with reverence) that our great Creator is visible, because he condescended to an intercourse with man through a visible flame of fire, through a seen angel, or more through the material body of man himself. We would say that materialism is the doctrine founded on those *substances* which, when brought into contact, under the same circumstances, are always the cause of the same phenomena. Now man may come in contact repeatedly with the same person or thing, and under the same circumstances each time, yet, on each occasion, the contact may witness a different result : this shows that man is not mere matter, subject to fixed laws. It shows that he has a will ; he has a mind which he exercises as he pleases, but still he exercises it within a restricted compass, and according to some principle which the occasion may call forth, although it may be quite discretionary. It is true it may be said, " that if each mental quality must have a distinct organ, we must, of course, admit that each organ must have one definite kind of

action, and cannot at one moment exhibit one action, and at another a different one; the deduction may seem to be, then, that there is no room for discretion." But we must remember that a person with an organ of benevolence and an organ of destructiveness, equally developed, would, unless under peculiar circumstances, refrain from the same kind of brutal act which a person with small benevolence, and destructiveness large, would less scrupulously perpetrate, yet it is not destructiveness that changes its nature into the quality assigned to the other organ, but a wholesome controul is exercised by the other, which would be greatly violated by an active exercise of destructiveness; this latter becomes inoperative as to any wanton cruelty, although it would be ripe for action on any occasion of legitimate warfare. But then this subjugation of the one quality to the other does not take place so certainly, as these two qualities concur in the same person; for, in some instances, one may permit a greater excitement of the inferior quality to offend (by some rash act) the superior or benevolent quality; this shows us, then, that the circumstance of each quality having a distinct organ, and, consequently, one definite tendency, does not interfere with the free-will of the individual. And it would be as well to keep this in remembrance when the argument on fatalism is under consideration.

Whoever believes in the immortality of the soul, will find that the truth of Phrenology does not tend

to affect that belief; it is the ignorance, and not the knowledge, of the science that is calculated to produce the impression that it does. It cannot be doubted, of course, that the mind of man is infused into the whole or some part of the body; and this belief is not supposed to sanction materialism; for it is an undeniable fact that it is, and, therefore, as no rational intellect doubts the immortality of the soul, no rational intellect can infer materialism from this fact of the mind's being in the whole or some part of the body. Nor, for the same reason, is it supposed to sanction materialism by its existing in one part of the body only, (*viz.* the head,) and not the whole of it, since it is *known* to exist in only this part; nor, indeed, could it be supposed to do so; for although the living principle in man sustains his whole body, yet its existing in one part of the body only, and not the whole, rather shows, from the uninhabited portion existing, as I may say, independently of it, that the material *man* is a distinct thing from the immaterial essence, and therefore rebuts an inference of their being identical, and of thereby leading to materialism. I say, that we know that the mind exists in only one part of the body; for if it were divided through the whole of the body, we should expect to see an amputation of a whole limb involve the destruction of some of the mental powers, which effect experience tells us is never the result of such an operation.

It may be said that the mind does not act through

the leg in any degree, or only in some of its effects, and that although therefore there is no reason why the loss of the leg should produce the destruction of the mind, yet the same reason does not exist why the destruction of the brain, which is the *organ* of the mind, should not destroy the mind. But then, in the very same manner in which the intelligent being uses the brain, viz. as an organ for the manifestation of mind, so it uses the leg for the manifestation of some other quality, and there is not the lowest presumption that the loss of the leg involves the destruction of that *agent* which uses it, which, on the contrary, we have positive proof is in no degree injured, since we see that after the loss of the natural member, it remains and can use an artificial limb in the same manner that it used its natural, the most that we can suppose is, that the agent is *suspended* as to the manifestation of some quality by this loss of the leg, just in the same manner as it is suspended as to the exhibition of its mental functions by the loss of the brain. We have then analogically every reason for believing, that the condition of the mind is in no way affected by the destruction of its instrument, but remains entire.

All that we see (whether the mind acts through the whole or a part of the body) is, that it acts through the assistance of an instrument, and to suppose that the mind must have an instrument is not believed to support materialism; just as with respect to some other bodily organs, the eye, for instance, is

essential for the use of the optic *agent* and the ear for the auditory sense, and yet no one infers materialism from this, or is so absurd as to suppose the eye itself to be percipient, or the ear itself to be auditory, but only regards each as an essential instrument to those agents which respectively require their presence, nor is it even suggested that both senses could act through one of these any more than one would see as well as hear through an acoustic cornet; but, on the contrary, it is believed that these different organs are necessary for these different agents, nor more is this belief once supposed to lead any hearer to this result, viz. materialism. I am at a loss then to see how Phrenology leads us any nearer to this result by referring different mental manifestations to the instrumentality of different bodily or rather material organs. In physiognomy we discover the dispositions of men from external appearances, and no one for a moment supposes that these appearances are the dispositions themselves: now Phrenology, it is true, teaches us that the mind acts differently through the cerebral organs to what it does through the *facial marks*, but it by no means tells us that it acts in any way that would lead us to suppose the brain itself to be any more the mind than these facial marks are, and therefore does not lead us any nearer to materialism than physiognomy.

Phrenology no more countenances materialism by supposing the mind to act through different

portions of the same part, than we infer materialism by supposing that it acts through one part of the body, and not the whole. We know that the body and the mind of man are closely connected, for we know that the body and the whole body dies the moment the soul leaves it; we know that one part of the body, viz. the brain, is the seat of the mind, for we know that any other part of the body may be maimed to any degree, without in any way affecting the mind, while, on the other hand, we know that a slight and partial injury to the brain will impair or suspend the mental functions; if, therefore, its being in only one part and not the whole does not favour materialism, it would be absurd to suppose that its being divided through that part can do so.

As Phrenology then cannot be said to sanction materialism, as regards this objection, there may be a plurality of organs. Let us see then if we cannot positively show that there is.

CHAPTER III.

THE SUBDIVISION OF THE BRAIN INTO A PLURALITY OF ORGANS—THE DOCTRINE SUPPORTED BY SEVERAL ARGUMENTS.

"Though reason be not proof 'tis reason still,
And more than proof just where it ought to fill." AXON.

PERHAPS we may be told that to prove that the brain is the organ of the mind is to prove a self-evident fact, and that objections are raised against the *subdivision* of the brain, and it is contended that in the exercise of any *one* mental power the whole brain is brought into operation, and that the individual power or affection is not manifested through an individual organ. This, we would first observe, like all other objections to the validity of the science, is but a vague assertion or empty opinion, for the existence of which no other reason can be given than that they hold it, because they hold it, because it seems impossible that such a thing should be, and because a merciful God would not allow one man to discover the propensities of his fellow creature. At the same time that this opinion has been formed without investigating the subject at all, that perhaps not one page *pro* has been perused, much less

weighed, while every effort has been studiously and partially exercised *con*,—every energy is in motion, and this too for the *avowed* purpose of proving the futility of the science: and, after all, without one impartial glance at the subject, a conclusion is formed without a single attempt at proof,—and what is this but an adoption of the dangerous practice of erecting individual experience as the infallible standard of truth and falsehood, and making it the consequential creator of his opinions? A habit of this character is of all others the most dangerous, for it is the child of ignorance, and therefore the more liable to error. This was the stubborn mental pride that seduced Hume to false and infidel conclusions, and the same deplorable ignorance that destroyed the reputation of a previously respected traveller in the estimation of the king of Siam, who disbelieved the fact that in some parts of the world a stream of water would change its fluid into a solid state, because the circumstance had never occurred to his observation: both proceeded on the test of very limited experience, and both fell into the same grievous error. Now when we remember that the subject under consideration is a *science*, and that, like every other science, it is made up of premises, carried through various deductions, and established and believed in, not only by satisfactory conclusions, but by those conclusions being made satisfactory and legitimate by the reasoning of men of acknowledged superiority; I say, when this is

taken into consideration, surely there cannot be a liberal or dialectical mind, which will not admit that the science is worthy of some investigation, before it can be candidly rejected as futile and unsound ; surely the opinions of a man must be known before objections can be raised, much less multiplied and magnified against them.

I think a comparison of the manifestation of the *will* through other parts of the body, with the manifestation of the mind through the brain, would furnish an argument, by way of analogy, in favour of the science. To hold an intercourse with matter, the presence of a material organ is of necessity required by the mind, and according to the requirements of the man, must be the formation of his bodily organ : for particular purposes the hand is brought into exercise ; but when it is, it is the voluntary and mysterious intention of the mind that only the hand should be ; but we do not find that the leg is also brought into motion by this exercise of the will ; and when the ear is particularly attentive to a sound, the visual, and much less the olfactory, senses are not necessarily brought into action ; and this may be applied to the brain ; if when the mind intends only to exercise one of its functions, its influence and action are felt through the whole of the brain equally, at one and the same time the whole of the brain would be as much excited as would be the whole of the rest of the body, viz. hands, feet, eyes, nose, ears, &c. when the motion

was intended only for the arms, or the auditory sense only was intended to be used ; but if this were the case, whenever the mind would reflect or exercise any of its functions, it would at the same time exercise all. Pride and humility, pain and delight, resentment and gratitude, would be at the same time felt, which would be absurd ; or it must be supposed that various and conflicting principles could be manifested through the same medium, but this would destroy the fact that an appropriate instrument must exist before an agent could act ; as the hand, or rather what I will call the *will* of the hand, could not communicate with the external matter through the medium of the leg, so neither could the *member* that would exhibit a feeling of pleasure, or conceive a thought, manifest a different thing to the material with which it comes in contact, if the different functions of mind must have each a material organ with which to manifest itself to the world.

But it is well known that one function of the mind is in action at times when the other functions are not brought into exercise ; nor can it be argued that this, and not the exercise of every function, is the very result that must be looked for, if the whole brain concurs in the manifestation of each function ; for if so, when one function is in motion, what becomes of the others, which are quite passive ; we must suppose that they are for the time removed from the brain and resident in some other part of

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the body, or are removed from the body altogether; they cannot be resident in the rest of the body, for any part of it may be injured at *any* time without involving an interruption in the manifestation of any mental function; nor can the alternative be supposed, for it is believed that an injury to the brain would at one moment present the same obstacle to any mental manifestation that the same injury would offer at another moment; and, moreover, from the very close connection which exists between mind and body, we are justified in supposing that the latter must be resident in the former so long as it is in its power to make use of it as an instrument; the whole mind, then, must be constantly the inmate of the head. Yet, since we know that the exercise of the mind produces an excitement of the brain, if the whole brain be one organ, the whole must be excited by each exercise of the mind; but how can we imagine that the whole mind being in the whole of the brain, that the latter can be excited throughout, without in some measure interrupting the composure of the whole of the former? But again, although it is impossible that the mind can manifest every function at one and the same time, yet it is by no means limited to the exercise of only one at the time, but may exhibit two or three at once, which may act in perfect harmony with each other. It must be conceded, then, that there is a great difficulty in the way of supposing that the whole cerebral mass is but *one* organ; and since this difficulty

may be easily surmounted by attributing to each function a distinct organ, I submit that there is great presumptive evidence in favour of a plurality of organs.

And why, parenthetically, I would ask, if there are not different organs, does the brute manifest the existence of some qualities and not others? nor can it be urged, as a reason for this, that the head of the brute is smaller, because we know that it possesses some qualities in vigorous ability, and is altogether destitute of others; whilst, if the whole brain was required for the exercise of each quality, the effect ought to be the general weakness of all, and not the total absence of any: and still more, the heads of different brutes differ in size, yet we find each equally excluded from the enjoyment of some particular qualities; and although the head be smaller, why should it be different in shape? why should this smallness arise, in many cases, not from a general diminution of the whole, but from a great portion of the brain being absent from some part, whilst other portions remain quite as large and in the same form as the same portions are in man, as exemplified in the heads of some large dogs? The part just over the nose, or the region attributed to locality, we find prominent and large, yet above that region we find there is scarcely any head at all; or, in other words, the intellectual region is entirely absent: now it may be said, that this may be accounted for in this way,—that as the intellect or instinct has an organ,

and that organ is the brain, of course we expect to find that organ changed in form when the immaterial essence which uses it is so different, as we find in the case of a man and a brute; and that this may be admitted without letting in the theory of a plurality of organs. Why, then, I would ask, should the head of the brute be deficient in this or that particular part, and not in another? Why should it have only (what phrenologists set apart as) the animal and perceptive organization, or should have only a part of these, and be altogether deficient in that part which is called the region of the intellect? This intellectual portion of the brain is in man, and he has the quality or qualities assigned to it. Now, if it be not a distinct part from the rest of the brain, why is it not in the brute; and the brute's instinct being perfect without it, how can it be said that it is not a distinct material body for a distinct faculty or distinct faculties, for it is the removal of one portion of the brain and some portion of the mental faculties; and how then can it be said that the brain is but one simple organ, and the mind, with its various propensities, sentiments, and faculties, is but one simple essence requiring but this one simple organ?

Nor is the case altered by supposing that the immaterial quality, which manifests itself through the brain, is naturally without this or that quality, because thus we suppose from the configuration of the head, which we have no reason to suppose our Maker

would have made so very different, in some respects, from that of man, unless the immaterial quality is also somewhat different in those respects; but then, to urge this as an objection, would be to suppose that all animals of *one tribe* must have this immaterial quality of one strength, which we know is not the case, as we find one dog much more benevolent than another; (and as we are now comparing one animal with another of the same species, we must remember that the objection, supposing it were even valid elsewhere, must now cease, viz. that the immaterial quality of one is *naturally* of a different quality to the other.) But one dog may have benevolence larger than another which may have some other quality stronger than the same quality in the former animal, and each may have some perceptive capacity, a memory of place, for instance, quite as strong as the same property in some men; now, if the whole brain be the medium of each quality, I say, that each should exhibit equal powers, inasmuch as the general smallness or largeness should produce a general feebleness or strength, and not the feebleness of some quality and strength of another. This, therefore, must lead to the conclusion that the deficiency or greater strength (in the manifestation) of this or that quality, must depend upon the condition of *some portion* of the brain, and not the whole; and, if we do not thus refer these differences in development of capacity to cerebral configuration, I am at a loss to know upon what

philosophical or physiological grounds they can be accounted for.

So then, if the mind will manifest different qualities, and these qualities are different in degree in different individuals, and one quality will manifest itself at one time, when the others are perfectly quiescent, it must have, beyond a doubt, different channels of communication: nor will it do to object to this argument on the ground that man is only one being, and yet he has different and conflicting principles within; this, if it proves any thing, only proves the validity of the science: for we do know that these conflicting principles exist, and if it is a moral impossibility that the same agent can act differently through the same organ, or that different qualities can manifest themselves differently through one and the same organ, we can only account for the fact by supposing the existence of several and different organs.

We find that if different heads are injured in the same parts, and these parts embrace duplicate organs, that the same functions of mind are impaired; if in different parts, then different functions are injured; now, how is this to be accounted for, if the mind has not different organs through which to act? If each quality has a distinct organ, we should expect to find this result; and if we find this result, it would seem to establish the fact, that each quality has such distinct organ. Whoever is of opinion, therefore, that the whole brain is the medium of

each mental manifestation, must either disprove this fact, renounce his doctrine, or account for the anomaly.

If there be one organ in common to every mental quality, then of course any injury to that organ must not be followed by the total exemption of some quality from its effects, which is felt by only one, or some, but impair each function, and each in the same degree; the injury may be to a greater extent on one occasion than on another, but then the only difference that can result from this is the greater injury to each quality, and not the extinction of one, or some, and the mere partial injury to another or others; but then, (I will not say, every man of superior ability, but,) every man of common sense and ordinary observation, knows that the result of cerebral injuries is of a different character; and not to account for the fact of one injury operating upon one, or some, and not every faculty, by the existence of a plurality of organs, is not to account for it at all, and certainly not to account for it on physiological grounds.

But it is admitted by all who object to a plurality of organs, that the brain is one organ, and the whole of it is exercised by each function of the mind; and it is further admitted by some of these opponents, that the form of the head changes by study, only it is contended that the whole of the head, and not any particular part of it, thus changes: now, this is further to admit, either that the exercise of only

one function, or *some* functions, increases the size of the head, and the whole of it ; and that the exercise of *every* function which uses the brain as an instrument, is not necessarily required, inasmuch as some of these functions differ so widely from the others, that it is impossible to suppose the exercise of all at the same time ; or it must be admitted that the exercise of *every* function is necessary for the increase of the *whole* head, only they must be brought into action at different times. If this latter be admitted, a plurality of organs must be recognised, inasmuch as each function should increase the whole brain, if the whole brain is one organ ; which it cannot be supposed to do, if all of the functions must aid in this increase, but all cannot act together, since one function must be supposed, in this case, to increase one portion of the brain, and another function another portion, which must give to each function a distinct organ. If the former be admitted, viz. that the exercise of each function increases the size of the whole head, then the following point must also unavoidably be recognised, viz. that the strength of mind depends, irrespective of temperament, upon the size of the brain, for we see that the result of study is the enlargement of the mind, and a contemporaneous increase of the head ; and in no one instance do we see the enlargement of the one without a corresponding increase of the other ; the presumption, then, is, that whenever we see the one we shall certainly see the other, and this presump-

tion is increased to positive proof when we see the manner in which this increase is produced, viz. by an excitement which is always produced by exercise, and is proportioned to the intensity of it, and increases the head whenever it is produced. There can be no instance, then, in which the head has retained one size, and the mind has increased; nor, on the same ground, can there be an instance in which the head has increased without a corresponding expansion of *mind*; we should infer, therefore, that those who admit that study increases the head, admit also, that strength of mind depends upon the size of the head. It must, then, be further admitted, (since the whole brain is the instrument of each function,) that each function is increased in the same degree in which that one is increased by the exercise of which the *head* has been thus enlarged; then, when a benevolent disposition is encouraged and increased, a selfish disposition increases in the same degree; or more, when the intellectual and moral powers alone are cultivated, *and overcome the inferior nature*, this inferior nature necessarily becomes equally powerful with the other superior qualities; but, then, this is contrary both to experience and reason, and its absurdity is so manifest, that it does not require to be proved; we are, therefore, driven unavoidably into an acknowledgment of a plurality of organs, and of the increase of each organ by the exercise of that quality alone to which it belongs. This shows us how vain is every attempt

to disprove the validity of Phrenology, and only increases our conviction, that if all objections to the science were only duly considered, they would be found so much to require the assistance of Phrenology to explain them, that nothing would tend more to prove the validity of the science than the invalidity of these objections.

If the same object be presented to two or three differently constituted minds, nothing is more common than to observe that a different thought or feeling instantaneously arises in each mind. If, for instance, a beautiful tract of country be presented to two individuals, one of whom is endowed with a great desire to acquire, and another with a fine poetical feeling, the former would immediately imagine how productive such fertile property must be, while the latter, not quite so cold and calculating, would be enraptured with the loveliness of the scenery. Now it cannot be said that this arises merely from accident, and that the same individuals, under the same circumstances, may at another time instinctively manifest the reverse of these qualities; for we well know that there is nothing more common than for a person with great acquisitiveness (we are not using the term phrenologically,) to manifest this propensity in every relation of life, and the same remark holds good with regard to the person with the fine poetical feeling; indeed, it is only from observing each of these persons manifest his tendency in a great degree, that such tendency is

determined to be great; nor can it be said, that one of these individuals may be a merchant or farmer, and the other a poet, and that, therefore, from the force of habit, we should expect such result; for our remark is well known to apply to persons not engaged in any corresponding occupation; but, suppose this to be the case, why did this merchant or poet incline to his respective avocation, if they had not each some particular tendency to this or that occupation? and to say that some persons follow their pursuits from necessity, and contrary to their taste, which inclined to some other pursuit, is only to make the case stronger, by showing that some persons have naturally a tendency to one pursuit and other persons to other pursuits; and if we take these individuals back into their school, when they may not only be studying the same branches of education, but may be in the same class, we find the same diversity in disposition or talent; I say, then, that one of these individuals must possess that quality, which he manifests most strongly, in a greater degree than he possesses the other quality, which, on the other hand, must be the stronger quality in the other individual, and therefore the *whole* brain cannot be the medium of each quality of mind; for if it be, each should be manifested in the same degree, which I say is not the case, if one quality in each mind appears to be predominant over another, and it is a proverb not the less true for being antiquated, that "*poeta*

nascitur non fit." And we must arrive at this conclusion, if even we admit that habit has some influence in this case; for in what way, I would ask, is habit supposed, in this instance, to occasion some difference in the manifestation of mind, but from the circumstance of its having *strengthened* or made *more acute* some quality of the mind, and if then the necessity of an organ, viz. the whole brain, be admitted, and the adaptation of that organ to the quality be also admitted, this organ must also have become in some degree enlarged, and must therefore now be either ill adapted to the other qualities of mind, which have not been rendered equally vigorous by habit, or those qualities must also have increased, which we know is not necessarily the case.

That God would not allow man to develop his character is an objection that must either be the creature of prejudice, must arise from an ignorance of God's word, or show the absence of a knowledge of character; the question here is not what constitutes, in our idea, consistency in the dealings of God—not what in our idea is the course our Creator should adopt towards us—but what is truth? What is the will of God, as revealed in the pages of his own written word, and expressed in the features of his own lovely work? The great error of man, as pointed out in the great sketch of his character, may be summed up with pregnant brevity in the word *pride*, and its substitute that runs

parallel with it in the same correct delineation, is *humility*: the former of these is a grave offence against the majesty of God, and consequently condemned by him; the latter is a condition in which God requires man to be, and therefore meets his approbation; but this, viz. humility, is always the effect of true self-knowledge, and at least is never known to exist without it; the acquirement of self-knowledge, then, is a duty which God requires of man. Pride is the first instigator to the breach of God's commandments, and has continued to influence man's exaggeration in guilt; it springs from an ignorance of one's self, from the creature's not knowing that there is a sphere beyond the limits of which it is impossible for him to act. Now this condition is expressly condemned by God, and the state into which he is called is to know himself; and what does this argue but, not only the existence of the power of knowing the extent of his ability, but also the innocence, nay, even the necessity, of his searching to discover it? and indeed, until an error is known, how is it to be expected that a remedy would be applied, or that one in ignorance of his disease would seek for a cure? As far as we know, it is permitted, nay enjoined by God, that man should discover the various dispositions of his own mind; various authorities of holy writ establish this position, "Examine yourselves"* "prove your

* Had God not even directly revealed to us his will respecting self-knowledge, it would not be difficult to show by

own selves" "know you not yourselves?"* "let a man examine himself" &c. and when, we would ask, could a man better guard against an evil temper, than when he knows of its existence? It will be urged, and I assent to it, that this ignorance is a spiritual ignorance of the heart, and the knowledge is a spiritual knowledge of the depravity of the heart, instilled by God's Spirit; but under this change of heart we know, that man is led to see his various tendencies, tempers, and qualities; he feels that his knowledge acquired is a knowledge of his sinfulness, but then he learns that he sins through *covetousness*, through *pride*, through idolatry of

implication what his will must have been, by arguing abstractedly on the point, for self-knowledge could be shown to be of advantage so paramount, as to render the acquirement of it not only innocent but a duty.

* "Know thyself" was a maxim held in great veneration by the ancients. "Thales, the Milesian, who was the prince of the philosophers, and flourished about A. M. 3330," and "was contemporary with Josiah, king of Judah," "is said to be the first author." It was afterwards adopted by Chylon, the Lacedemonian, and is one of those three precepts which Pliny affirms to have been consecrated at Delphos in golden letters. It was afterwards greatly admired and frequently used by others, till at length it acquired the authority of a divine oracle, and was supposed to have been given originally by Apollos himself. On which general opinion Cicero gives us this reason, "because it hath such a weight of sense and wisdom in it, as appears too great to be attributed to any man."

himself, of things, of his desiring the approval of man more than the approbation of God, through an endeavour to grasp that, (the comprehension of God, for instance,) for the attainment of which he now feels his intellect too limited, &c. This, I trust, would rebut an assertion, that God would not allow man to develop his own character, and would enable us to say with Juvenal,

“——— à cælo descendit γυνῆ: σκαυρον.”

And with regard to the discovery of another's character, if the same argument were insufficient, there is yet a stronger argument which may be brought to bear upon this point; for if, to disprove the truth of Phrenology, it be asserted that the Creator could never intend that one man should know the varied propensities, passions, feelings, dispositions, &c. of his fellow men, we have at once rising up, in contradiction of such assertion, the undeniable and indisputable evidence which, by the fairest principles of analogy, may be drawn from the art of physiognomy,—an art which, at least, almost as distinctly, although not equally with Phrenology, throws open, as it were, the heart of man to his fellow man, the face being looked upon, in most cases, as the too faithful index of his vices and his virtues, and admitted almost universally as an infallible index or criterion of a man's temper and disposition. But we know, independently of this, that man is possessed of various propensities and

intellectual powers. We also know what these propensities and powers are ; and we also see that they are different, in different individuals, (and therefore one is able, observationably, to discover the character of another,) the only requirement for the purpose being a protracted association ; this ability to discern the character of others having, therefore, been implanted in us by God himself, it is clear that God not only *permits*, but enables us to develop the character of others ; but where minds differ, we see heads of different conformations ; as the mind is inferior, so the shape of the head is more removed towards the formation of that of a brute. It would seem, then, that all heads so corresponded in formation with the character of the intelligent principles which inhabit them, that we may, in all cases, be enabled to discover such character through the aid of Phrenology. All that Phrenology does is, not to show the existence of what we do not see by observation, but only to show in what degree the different mental powers and propensities are in different heads ; we know what powers are there, and Phrenology only determines the comparative strength of these powers.

In the greatest argument ever framed in proof of the immortality of the soul, it is incidentally remarked, that we know not with what latent powers and capacities brutes may be endued. But I would observe, that although we may not know what powers brutes possess, we know that they stop, in

the manifestations of these powers, at the point at which rationality begins; but let us suppose that we do not know, from what they disclose, the extent of their powers, and that the living principle in a brute is endued with inherent powers of reasoning, there is evidently an inability, on their part, to manifest their superior powers; nor can the contrary to this be supposed, by arguing that the brute is in a state of uncivilization, and "there was once, prior to experience, as great presumption against human creatures as there is against brute creatures, arriving at that degree of understanding which they have in mature age;" we might not have known prior to experience, but *after* experience, we do know, that whenever man is placed under circumstances calculated to disclose his ability, that it is observed to be there. Whereas, after experience, we know that the brute has been placed under every circumstance calculated to develop the extent of what they could manifest, as the dog, &c.; nor can it be objected that, perhaps, they require a different field of circumstances to attract their powers, which may be of a character different to those of man, for we know that the grade of beings in the universe is what we may call *lineal*, the devolution going through the same species, and only diminishing from man. Suppose, then, that these powers do exist, and that no condition of life in which their possessor is placed can call them forth, it must be evident that there is an inadequacy of the instrument to the use

of these powers, just as there are degrees in microscopic power: we know that with some microscopes, one can see a greater distance, and with greater distinctness, than he can with another; and upon what does this difference depend but upon the instrument? for the eye or visual agent that uses it may not only be of equal strength, but it may be the same. It appears, then, that whether this power be there or not, it cannot hold an intercourse with the material world, because it requires the existence of a material organ adapted for that purpose. Since the brute, therefore, does not show this power in any relation of life, it is quite evident that there is a want of a medium through which it may manifest it, and this, of course, naturally affords the presumption, that whenever this power manifests itself, there must, of necessity, be the medium also. Man having, therefore, this power of reasoning, &c., and endued with the capacity of showing it, there must also, of necessity, exist this corresponding material organization in man.

And may we not fairly suppose that the intelligent part of man, as distinguished from his mere animal part, viz. his body, may be equal in every individual, for it is equally immortal in every one? I say equal in all; for if it were greater in some persons than in others, we should expect to find it greater in proportion as the material man is larger; but then we know that the larger man is, sometimes, not only weaker in bodily strength, but also

in mental ability, and that the very same being that was in the circumscribed form of an infant is afterwards the same unchanged being in the mature man ; for if it left the body (by death,) while it was in its infantile state, we have every reason to believe that it would be as much immortal as if it leaves the body at the period of old age. And may we not be justified in supposing that the feeble manifestation of intellect, in infancy, results from the feebleness of the material organs, since we see that the same mind acts more powerfully through its matured instrument, and that each mind can increase the manifestation of itself, as the organs are enlarged? and since, also, we see that a man uneducated keeps that intelligent principle narrower in the manifestation of itself than we know it to be naturally, and permits it to be surpassed by some other mind, which appears naturally to be less powerful, may we not conclude, then, that the intelligent principle may be of the same strength in each person? and if we do not believe in this, we have no reason to believe the contrary, inasmuch as the same analogical proof is equally strong in both cases.

And I think, in favour of this point, a strong argument is furnished in the cases of maniacs and idiots. In each of these subjects we know that the *intelligent* principle is considerably more enlarged than we observe it to be, or, in other words, that each has an intellect, although we cannot observe it ;

for I assume, and it is not in the power of created intelligence to prove the contrary, that idiotism and insanity are the effects of man's fall, and that, on the removal of the influence of sin by death, there will also be a contemporaneous repeal of the effects of sin, and that consequently, when the soul of an idiot passes from this world, its idiotism will leave it, and its disencumbered powers will then be restored to the exercise of their original strength; and may we not, therefore conclude that an idiot possesses all of the intellectual qualities; the circumstance of his not manifesting these qualities cannot offer any serious objection to the fact that he may possess them, for if so, the argument must be urged with equal force against the maniac, in which case, however, we know that it cannot be urged at all; for the maniac, although he may now no longer show any glimmering of reason, and perhaps may be more destitute of it, if possible, than the idiot, yet may, perhaps for the greater portion of his life previously, have manifested it, and have manifested it in a great degree, and so far, therefore, from our supposing that he has no reasoning powers at all, we have the strongest evidence that he does possess them, and that therefore they may be present, although the power of manifesting them no longer exists, and that consequently there is every reason for our supposing that the idiot possesses them. We have not any reason to suppose that the soul (which we see existing when the intellect is

dormant) is at all deprived of its intellectual capacities, for in some cases, after an entire hallucination, we find that, on a restitution of the body to health, there is a re-manifestation of the intellect; nor do I conceive that the case is altered from the circumstance of the body's being deranged at an earlier period in one person than in another, or that it should be deranged even at so early a period as at the birth of the individual, as we see in the case of an idiot.

And this point may be further supported, if it were necessary, by an argument drawn from the fact of the intelligent principle's being altogether deprived by the dissolution of the body, of the power of manifesting those powers which we *know* that it not only once possessed and manifested, but even now has.

Inasmuch as the idiot possesses a greater obstacle to the exercise of his intellect, than one whose body is less deformed, one of the effects of the fall may appear in the case of the one to be more fearful than in the case of the other, and the most then we can conceive is, that there will be a greater obstacle to be removed in the former than in the latter case, in order to the apparently different capacities being manifested in a parallel degree; yet the removal of the effects of sin will be entire, and will leave the soul in the possession of all the original endowments peculiar to man; and consequently we may expect to find hereafter that that shattered frame-

work, which now seems uninhabited by even one spark of intelligence, may be found to have encircled all of the finest mental attributes which have not been extinct, but have only been long slumbering under their more than ordinary ruins.

I say, then, that the idiot, although he shows no intellect, yet possesses it, and I think that this fact is established so far as it is capable of any proof; but then, if there be any reason for supposing that the idiot possesses mind in any degree greater than we observe it to be, there can be nothing in the way of our supposing that his mind is *much* greater than we observe it to be, and consequently that it may be as capacious as the most largely developed intelligent principle of which we know any thing; and if this mode of reasoning be at all applicable in the case of an idiot, which is so low in the scale of intellectual gradation, it must be applicable where the differences in the manifestation of the intelligent being is not so great, that a person therefore, who appears less talented than another, has nevertheless equal ability with him, and consequently, by parity of reason, the intelligent principles of all are equal.

Admitting, then, that the intelligent part of man is equally strong in every man, how do we account for the infinite variety of ability in man? It surely must arise from the difference in the mediums of communication—upon the difference in the strength or size of that material part of man through which it manifests itself; and such a view, irrespective of

any other argument, is sufficiently borne out by the fact, that all heads of the rational portion of nature are differently formed, and show different powers, and show a greater or inferior mind in proportion to the resemblance they bear to the *animal* creation; the mind appearing the more powerful in the ratio that the formation of the head is removed in point of resemblance from that of the brute.

Nor can it be objected that perhaps the intelligent principle is itself so deformed by the fall as to produce this diversity of talent; for we well know that the body may have so great an influence in producing it, as in the cases of cerebral diseases and injuries, when the mental powers are modified in the proportion in which the disease or injury occurs, that we may be justified in attributing this diversity to the variety in cranial formations which may be produced from natural as well as artificial causes.

But we find in one mind one particular faculty, quite as strong as the same faculty in another mind, which is in every other respect a great deal more powerful; now it is quite evident that the former head must be different in some parts and not in others, and when we proceed, and find that whenever we see the same deficiency in the manifestations of mind, we also see the same resemblance in conformation of the head; this amounts to great presumptive evidence that the different faculties of mind must require different portions of the head for their respective exercise.

It may be argued against the equality of *beings* in man, that there are degrees of happiness and misery hereafter, but in reality this proves nothing, for although it is true that the different capacities for enjoyment will be *fully* satisfied, and that there will be different capacities, yet these differences depend upon the degrees of religious improvement at which each arrives here; and in order, therefore, to prove any thing, it will be necessary to show, that one man not so much advanced in religion as another is incapable of being so much advanced, or that this man could not be less sinful than he is, which would be an absurd supposition, since, in each case, there is an abuse of one's powers, and not the proper use, and moreover, some individuals of superior intellect are more irreligious than others inferior to them in that respect, and that therefore the inferior intellect will be capable hereafter of a greater exercise of mind than the former, and if this be not admitted we have no right to believe in this at all, inasmuch as the proof is the same in both cases.

It will appear that in the foregoing pages I have endeavoured to establish the fact, that each distinct or simple function has a distinct organ, without attempting to prove how many simple functions there are. The division of the organs by Phrenologists is at least numerically correspondent with what they conceive to be the number of simple qualities of mind; even supposing then that this division is too

multiform, still this cannot alter the fact that the functions of mind are both plural and different, and that each that *is* simple must require an independent organ. And again, even supposing that some functions have been referred to organs to which, in reality, they do not belong, still this does not destroy the same fact, that there are organs which are respectively appropriate to these functions; and although, therefore, Phrenologists *may* differ and err on some of the more detailed parts of the Science of Phrenology, yet the circumstance of Phrenology's not having been yet perfectly discovered, does not make it the less true that it is a science.

On the whole then it appears (if even Phrenology has not been proved to be a valid science) that there are at least vast difficulties in the way of our supposing that the brain is but one organ. We have seen that these difficulties *are* met by the recognition of a plurality of organs, and this *circumstance* then must be admitted to be, *primâ facie*, very strong presumptive evidence in support of the truth of such doctrine. It is true that, as presumptive evidence, it may not be sufficient positively to establish the truth of the doctrine it upholds, yet it is at least amply sufficient to answer any one, who would arbitrarily reject such doctrine without any adequate evidence in support of the objection to it, and in the absence of even the suggestion of a substitution of any theory by means of which these difficulties may be solved.

I say that abstract reasoning is opposed to the idea of a single cerebral organ ; should it appear, then, on further enquiry, that reasoning is strengthened by facts, and that all force is removed from *those* objections which stand in the way of a reception of Phrenology, it cannot be too great a result for me to anticipate that a candid reader will at least conclude the perusal of these pages with strong convictions in favour of Phrenology, and approach the study of the science, should he be disposed to learn it, with at least abated prejudice and in search of truth.

CHAPTER IV.

THE SUBDIVISION OF THE BRAIN INTO A PLURALITY OF ORGANS—THE DOCTRINE SUPPORTED BY FACTS, AND THE MAPPING OUT OF THE HEAD INTO ORGANS PRACTICABLE.

"Yes, nature's road must ever be preferred,
Reason is here no guide, but still a guard;
'Tis her's to rectify, not overthrow."

POPE

I ASSUME then that it must be admitted that there are different qualities of mind, and of necessity, therefore, that there are also different material organs. The only question then is, whether it is possible to determine to what particular organ, or what particular part of the head each quality respectively belongs, and whether that organ is discoverable from without? Observation and experiment prove the existence of this ability.

Whether or not each function is traceable to its appropriate organ at all, and this relation between them is discoverable from without, is a point the truth of which must be disproved or established by facts alone.

And the objection which is urged against Phrenology, on the ground of its not standing the test of facts, must also stand or fall by the same test.

And again, before any apparent failure of facts can be considered as decisive against the truth of Phrenology, we must be satisfied that all of the facts are before us, which may have any influence in preventing an accurate development of a character. I say this; for if some characters are incorrectly given, and circumstances may exist which are calculated to produce this error, we must be certain that these circumstances do not exist, before we can, in fairness, reject, as fallacious, that system which affords the counter-balancing circumstance in its favour of some characters being correctly developed.

And it should be remembered that this ought to be conceded, at least, by those who would reject Phrenology altogether, because of that interference which they imagine is offered by these circumstances to the free and beneficial application of the science.

If a want of efficient knowledge in the Phrenologist, an unnatural thickness of some part of the skull, a frontal sinus, &c. can prevent an accuracy in disclosing particular characters, we must be satisfied that these interruptions are not the cause of any inaccuracy before we refer such inaccuracy to the incapacity of Phrenology itself.

That some persons possess such deformities as

those above, which are not observable, and which, therefore, must baffle a correct phrenological development of any particular character, cannot be considered as conclusive evidence against the truth of Phrenology, if it enable us to develop characters correctly, when these extraordinary circumstances do not exist ; nor can they, indeed, have any weight against a science which professes to treat not of that which is deformed, but of that which is natural, and which, in pronouncing a character, gives it as it imagines it would be, if the head were both healthy and natural.

If all heads were exactly alike, and one mind did not differ from another, nor could be made to do so by study, it would, perhaps, be impossible to ascertain to what particular organs the several functions belong ; we may be enabled to prove the existence of organs by the arguments above, but this is all that we could do, but it could only be by observing a deficiency in some quality, (which must, of course, only be done by observing the same faculty to be more powerful in some one else,) as this quality then must have not only a distinct organ, but an organ proportioned to the degree of power it manifests ; if the power be small, the organ must be small also. If, then, supposing all minds were alike, except that of one person, in whom the faculty of comparison was in a less degree than in the others, we should expect to find, (as this faculty, *à fortiori*, must have a distinct organ,) that one part was less conspicuously

developed than the rest of it, and when, on observing the head, we actually find this to be the case, the common intuitive principle, upon which we infer effect from cause, must determine that portion of the head to be the organ belonging to that faculty; viz. comparison. But there is a great want of resemblance both in the formation of heads and in powers of mind, attention to which, viz. comparing, distinguishing, and identifying, &c. is the science of Phrenology.

If, in our investigation, we find some one who has the organ of benevolence (or any other organ,) large, also has the quality of mind assigned to this organ large, it will afford, perhaps, but slight presumption, yet still it will afford *some* presumption, that whenever we see this organ in the same degree of prominence, we shall also see this quality, and see it in a great degree; and if we go further, and find that when this organ is small, the quality or propensity is small also, the presumption is increased, that that organ is the seat of that quality. When, in our further process, we find that in two persons having this organ large, the quality is large in both; and in two having it small, it is feeble in both; the presumption is much increased: and when we find that the cases are multiplied, by every additional observation being attended with the same effect, that when the cases are multiplied from two to a hundred, we still have the same results, this amounts, if any thing can,

to positive proof that this organ is the seat of that particular quality, and that whenever we meet with it large, (that is, large in proportion to the size of the others,) we shall, without the possibility of a doubt or failure, find the faculty large, and *vice versâ*; I say, that when the cases are multiplied indefinitely, and with the same satisfactory results, this is positive proof; for even suppose, (although we assert it to be impossible,) that we find one case attended with a different result, this, if it proved any thing, would probably prove the rule; but, at all events, it would be a monstrous absurdity, and against all true principles of reasoning, to argue from particulars to generals, and to suppose my argument inverted by it, and hence an equally extravagant absurdity to suppose the exception can govern the rule.

If then, I say, every time we see what we denominate the organ of benevolence, we find the presence of that quality attributed to it, and find it vigorous or feeble in the ratio that the organ is compressed or developed, and when we go further, and find the same result in respect of every organ and quality, is there not *positive* and palpable testimony to the truth of the doctrine of Phrenology?

From the mode of discovery just observed, we see, beyond a question, the ability of determining the respective organs of the respective qualities. Thus we find that we can discover it by observation

and comparison, &c. or, in other words, we can prove the validity of the science by facts, the most invincible of all arguments; but we may go further still, and prove it, by *trying* the particular *individual faculty*; we can test the faculty of any organ by the use of that branch of study to which it is adapted.

The influence that study exerts in the visible development of the material organ affords of itself an amplitude of proof: in intellectual pursuits the intellectual region of the brain is developed, and each particular study that is adopted increases, to the neglect of others, that particular organ to which the acquirement of that study was especially assigned; indeed, the capacity of that study was assigned to that organ, because it was observed to be capable of it. In the study of mathematics there is a proportional increase of the *mathematical organ*: if these studies are neglected, and the attention is never drawn towards pursuits involving mathematical principles, then that portion of the brain is not increased. In sensual pursuits, if any particular passion is indulged, we find the same proof to Phrenology; and to whatever function of the mind we attend, the organ answering thereto is proportionally developed. It is the observation of these that has discovered Phrenology. Phrenology has not subdivided the brain, and then looked for favourable results, but the observation of subdivision has given birth to Phrenology.

If it be asked "how do we know that the form of the head is changed by study?" the answer is, "how do you know that it is not?" We would infer, from metaphysical reasoning, that the brain would increase by study, if the mind increases by it; the degree of manifestation depends upon the size and strength of the organ, therefore the increased power of the mind, if it be manifested, must have a corresponding increase of the cerebral organ. But still we have a more substantial basis for the assertion; viz. facts. It is one of the unanswerable proofs of the truth of Phrenology, that the form of the head changes by study, and this because it is founded on facts. One of the modes of discovery is this:—Busts have been cast of men entering at the university, and on their leaving it, they have been again cast, and the change in the head has been found conformable to the nature and extent of the study. At Mr. Devile's one may receive ocular proof of this. In Mr. Devile's valuable museum I have had the pleasure of seeing no less than one hundred and forty casts forcibly and beautifully illustrative of the doctrine of change of form by study. It may be said that, if our facts are true, our argument is conclusive; then we answer, that we have investigated the facts, and found them satisfactory, and who would arrive at the same result, must adopt the same means; viz. personal observation. We cannot place casts on paper, or would

do so: to these facts, however, all are accessible, and, therefore, until they are reviewed, the truth of our statements of these facts cannot be questioned, nor, *à priori*, the conclusiveness of our argument.

CHAPTER V.

VARIOUS OBJECTIONS ANSWERED.

*"On different senses different objects strike,
Hence different passions more or less inflame,
As strong or weak the passions of the frame."*

POPE.

"WHAT knew we of mathematics," it is asked, "when man was created? It is absurd to suppose that there is an organ of mathematics." Such observations as these, for they are not arguments, deserve to be silenced, not satisfied; it is of little moment what we think; the truth is, that there are mathematics in the world; and we know, from the circumstance of the mind having created and placed them there, and that minds can and do study them with great success, that there must be a capacity for them, (whether Phrenology exist or not.) But I say, that if mathematics are acquired, there must be a capacity for them, inasmuch as it is not every one who can acquire them; and also upon the incontrovertible principle of belief, that before there can be acquisition, there must be the power to acquire. This is sufficient to silence the caviller; but it would not be difficult to satisfy him, for mathe-

matics, or, we will say, any abstruse argument, (for the objection appears to be to the name, not so much the thing,) is made up of its premises, deductions, or sequences and conclusions, and to apprehend it, therefore, it is necessary that the mind be able to observe the relative positions, to compare the several relations or sequences, to calculate, &c.; for the former of these, locality is necessary; for the second, comparison; for the third, number, &c. And so, when it is determined by Phrenologists, that one person is more likely to be guilty of the crime of infanticide than another, it is not intended to say, that there is an innate propensity to this crime, that there is a simple faculty for this crime, but that one who has the love of children in a very feeble or imperfect degree, is less able to endure, or be pacific under the petty provocations and trials imposed by the parental condition, and therefore is more likely to be guilty of the crime. Some persons are guilty of it, and, independently of Phrenology, the circumstance must be accounted for in this way, and all that Phrenology does, is only to anticipate experience, and say in what persons the love of children is weak, in what persons it is excessive. I have been asked by one opposed to Phrenology, how I account for the murder of an infant by a mother, when such infant is born under circumstances the disclosure of which would involve the parent in future disgrace and ruin? Now, I would observe that, from the truth of this case of infanticide, it appears that the parent

was capable of committing the crime, whether Phrenology accounts for this capacity or not; but it is obvious great love of approbation, self-love, destructiveness,—in short, I would say, that some combination more constraining than love of children, existed in the parent and prompted to and qualified for the dreadful deed.

Because a person would say, *phrenologically*, one person would play chess well, and another would not; it has been asked, as it has of mathematics, what knew we of chess when we were created? or, if our Creator would possibly have placed an organ of chess in one's head? The argument above is an answer to this as well as to any other objections of this flippant character.

There are some who reject Phrenology on account of the terms by which some of the organs are known, because they are considered as giving to man an innate evil propensity which he has not, such as destructiveness, &c., which, in the opinion of opponents, is identical with murder. Now, it should be remembered, that to speak of an *organ* of destructiveness cannot be more revolting than to speak of a *propensity* of destructiveness. If, then, a propensity of destructiveness be a quality of human nature, and it has an organ, we must be innocent in giving that organ the same name; it should be remembered, that all of the qualities receive the names adapted to their *primitive* nature, and not to their absurd or modified condition; and as no

quality is primarily bad, when we denominate a quality "destructiveness," we make use of a term quite as innocent as the term "benevolence." Without some degree of destructiveness and combativeness, a man would find it impossible to combat and surmount the difficulties with which he meets. If placed in some magisterial office, he could not carry out the ends of justice ; he would find himself unfit for the most ordinary occupation in life, and he would regard even the acquisition of the very necessities of life as a difficulty of an insuperable nature. The quality of destructiveness, then, is as useful and as innocent as the sentiment of benevolence. We know that some men are guilty of crime, and, as an agent must exist before it can act, we must refer each action to a distinct principle. We hear that an individual is notorious for all manner of crime and vice ; now, by crime and vice, we mean only such as human nature is capable of being guilty of, that is, only such as a man is capable of committing by the abuse of only such propensities as he possesses. One individual may murder one man in one way, and another murder another in another way, but each would be guilty of only one crime, viz. murder ; consequently, each must have that propensity, one of the abuses of which is that crime ; for if this capacity for the crime did not exist, the individual could no more commit the crime than a brute can exhibit the fruits of an intellect, without being endowed with an intellectual power. I can-

not suppose that *one* propensity, however much abused, can lead to every kind of evil of which we have any knowledge; suppose a man with an all-absorbing self-love, who has not the love of others in the smallest degree, is it possible to imagine that that man could so change his nature as to sacrifice his own interest to the interest of another? I think not, and say, therefore, that each distinct crime must be referred to a distinct quality. We hear of such and such circumstances tempting a person to the indulgence of some passion; now, these circumstances could not have tempted, had there not existed something capable of being tempted, viz. this passion; nor could this particular passion have received any impressions from any external circumstances, had it not existed, as in the instance given above; and the brute, although intellectual objects were constantly before its eyes, would receive no internal impression from them, simply because no intellectual power exists which could receive such impressions. A man may have a disposition, and not exhibit it until circumstances call it forth; but no circumstance can call forth that which a man has not. We say, then, that since some men are murderers, there must be the capacity in some men for committing murder. We do not say that there is a quality whose primitive duty it is to prompt to murder, and which cannot be controuled, but we simply say, that a man, since he does murder, can murder; and this must be the language

of all; yet, when we state that the quality of destructiveness gives this capacity to murder, there are those who object to it, and who ask if it is possible that God would have given to man a propensity to *murder*, and at the same time have delivered to him the sixth commandment?

Now, this objection arises from the error many persons make of identifying the abuse of a quality with the quality itself, and its absurdity, therefore, is very apparent. Destructiveness is by no means synonymous with murder, which is only its abuse; our vocal powers were given to us for speech, and we can and ought to say only what is innocent, yet we can and do with the same voice blaspheme God; now no one will say that speech and blasphemous language are synonymous, nor of course could be so absurd as to say that there is no vocal power, because of this abuse of it; and yet this would not be more absurd than is the assertion that destructiveness leads naturally to murder, or is no quality at all, because the murderer abuses it. We see, then, how unfounded is the above objection; and this should teach us thoroughly to sift every objection, before we attach any importance to it.

“ As fruits ungrateful to the planter's care,
On savage stocks inserted, learn to bear;
The surest virtues thus from passions shoot,
Wild nature's vigour working at the root.
What crops of wit and honesty appear
From spleen, from obstinacy, hate, or fear;

See anger, zeal, and fortitude supply,
E'en avarice, prudence ; sloth, philosophy ;
Lust, through some certain strainers well refined,
Is gentle love, and charms all womankind ;
Envy, to which the ignoble mind 's a slave,
Is emulation in the learned and brave ;
Nor virtue, male nor female can we name,
But what will grow on pride, or grow on shame."

" Fools ! who from hence into the notion fall,
That vice and virtue there is none at all ;
If white and black blend, soften, and unite
A thousand ways, is there no black and white ?"

But let us imagine that man was created with only moral sentiments and intellectual powers, still, inasmuch as he is capable of committing, (amongst other crimes,) that of murder, it is evident that he is so constituted as to be enabled to commit this crime. Now, inasmuch as these high attributes cannot, upon any principles of reason or common sense, be supposed to qualify man for the perpetration of an act, which all must allow would be in direct violation of them, it is quite clear that either murder must be benevolence *deficient*, (inasmuch as benevolence would prompt him to protect rather than injure,) or it must be benevolence *abused* ; to account for it, if it be only the latter, is impossible, because, since man would only possess those qualities which would least constitute a murderous mind, he would be, beyond all doubt, responsible for this crime, while at the same time we must suppose that

he would, of himself, be so entirely unfit for being the active cause of the crime, that he must be so wholly and altogether a passive instrument in the hand of some external agent, that he would require that very freedom in choice and action which would be essential to constitute his act that of a responsible being; and more, what we understand by an abused benevolence, is not so strictly an inadequate exercise of this quality, but that inordinate exclusive devotion of one's time to the good of others, which involves a violation of that principle which requires a man to do some proportionate good to himself, and which therefore excludes the idea of extreme injury to others.

And I am equally at a loss to conceive how murder can be a defect of benevolence, and indeed, if we try to account for it in this way, we run into a difficulty much more insurmountable than, or at least equally great with, that which it is attempted to remove, for whenever this defect was observed to be so considerable as that murder was the consequence, we should be justified in denominating such defect the quality of murder.

If a man, who would once have administered willingly to the temporal necessities of others, should at any one time withhold his succour from one who appeared to be an object worthy of his bounty, it is reasonable to suppose that he does so with some degree of pain and reluctance; if he repeats this act of indifference, this pain and reluc-

tance would in some degree, although in the lowest possible, be lessened; and if his refusal of succour grows into a habit, this pain and reluctance suffers an increasing diminution, until this aid is withheld with perhaps no reluctance at all. Now although it is true that the being innocent of good is not the being guilty of actual evil, that is, that although the inactivity of benevolence may not be a quality of murder, yet it must be supposed to amount to some quality which forms one of the many which compose the character of man; such, for instance, as selfishness, I say must be supposed to amount to some other quality, for other qualities besides moral and intellectual are observed to be in man, and if such qualities are not themselves distinct, or have distinct sources from the intellectual and moral qualities, they must be the result of certain conditions of these; and whether this quality be thus formed by the individual himself or by nature, does not alter the fact of its being there; every time, then, any lukewarmness in the exercise of benevolence is apparent, we should be justified in attributing to the individual exhibiting it, the possession of this quality. So then, whether Phrenology be a valid science or not, the rejection of it does not effect the removal of that difficulty which it is supposed to create. But it is impossible to conceive that benevolence, which is only a simple quality, and only conversant with prompting to actions which are beneficial to others, can, under any modification,

qualify for an act diametrically opposed to its very essence. Now when we see benevolence inoperative, it is evident that it is kept in abeyance by the exercise of some other controlling principle, and as the exercise of this increases the principle itself, so from the want of such exercise, benevolence itself becomes proportionally weak, yet it would be acknowledged by all that the quality such an individual possessed was the quality of benevolence, although he possessed it in a very feeble degree, and all would regard it as primarily good, and consider the excessive activity only an abuse, and the defect of it the abuse of some other quality; so then, if selfishness be the result of any other quality, it no more implies that this quality is originally bad, because it happens not to be called benevolence, than the abuse of benevolence makes benevolence itself a bad quality; the only reason why, from certain conditions of the organs, a person is pronounced to be one who is likely to offend in this or that particular way, is because, (we see it by observation,) through the fall of man we are told of his continuous inclination to evil, and we conclude, therefore, that each quality has a tendency to abuse or a capacity to be abused, and that in proportion as these qualities are strong or weak, so we may look for a corresponding excess or short-coming in the exercise of them.

I say, since it is known that man is selfish and can murder, selfishness and murder must either be themselves inherent mental qualities, or be the result of

certain conditions of other functions of the mind ; nor do I conceive but that this conclusion is inevitable ; they cannot, however, be the former, and are admitted by all to be only the latter, that is, that they are only the abuses of other mental qualities ; but we have seen that it is opposed to every thing analogous to a legitimate inference, to suppose that any modification or abuse of benevolence can either be, or be productive of such inconsistent effects ; since then it appears that there must be qualities such as self-love and destructiveness, which are innocent in themselves, but capable of abuse, and from which, when abused, these effects would seem to follow as natural consequences, the evidence in favour of their connection is so strong, that it seems to beget that degree of proof, which is irresistible, that such effects are the abuses of these qualities, that these qualities therefore exist, and that consequently man is not made up exclusively of moral sentiments and intellectual powers.

It has been urged to me as an objection, and therefore I state it, although I cannot see in what the objection consists, "that the characters which have been given for several persons do not differ materially." Now, in the first place, I have known characters developed, in some instances resembling each other, in others not bearing so close a resemblance, but in neither case was the character incorrectly developed on account of this resemblance, or the want of it, and this shows that, where it is

necessary, Phrenologists can and do give different developments, and having, therefore, in this or that instance, given one and not another character, we must, *primâ facie*, take this to be correct, for he shows that he deems it so, *expressio imius est exclusio alterius*. But why should a great difference be looked for? these characters are all given of one race of beings; one character is not of a man, and another of a brute, and therefore the question is not, whether or not there is a resemblance in the development of two or more given characters, but whether or not each development is correct; if either be inaccurate, and that inaccuracy be the result of abuse, we say capacity for abuse is not unworthiness of existence, nor proof of invalidity, for if so, the abused word of God must be brought within the application of the theory, and be sacrilegiously expunged from the gaze of the universe, few things being more abused than this; but if the inaccuracy proceeds from a want of a perfect acquaintance with the science, we would ask, why should that perfection be looked for in Phrenology, which no one is so scrupulous as to erect as the test of the truth of other sciences? Why should Phrenology be supposed to be exempt from that infirmity which more or less encumbers every thing human? And this suggests an answer to the objection urged as to the impossibility of revealing different organs upon one apparently equal surface; now why, if it is supposed doubtful

whether they can be revealed at all; if the science be true, must it be supposed that they must be revealed with unerring exactitude? Surely if it be found difficult to believe the science at all, because of its apparent difficulty, this is just a reason why we should expect to find a want of perfection in its application; and this suggests to any one, who would offer an objection, this self-examination, "Whether or not the objection is one that I would urge against any other science?" "Is it not that I dislike the science, and therefore endeavour, by objections, to put it down, without really enquiring whether or not those objections are valid?" "Have I given that impartial attention to the subject which every subject merits before it is decried; and after such investigation, does my objection really bear against the science at all?" "And if I have not given the due investigation, are not my objections useless, and do I not show my ignorance and folly, and do I not rather draw contempt on myself than do injury to the science?" "and do I not thus prove nothing so much as the weakness of my own cause?" Perhaps the objection is only against the extreme view of the science. "Is this not because I have always disbelieved the science, but some startling facts have urged upon me the belief of some part of it, the truth of which there is now no gainsaying? but as to the rest, I have not taken the trouble to see whether it be true or not; but as I do not know it I am still prejudiced against

it, and of course think it safer to object to that portion of it."

And suppose a character to be incorrectly developed; before we can fairly consider this as conclusive against the science, must we not duly consider the following points: 1st, Whether the individual giving the character has a sufficient practical knowledge of the science to qualify him for doing so? 2nd, If he is not qualified, has the head of the individual whose character has been given been tested by a correctly marked phrenological bust? 3rd, If the individual is qualified, has the character still been tested by some correct phrenological bust, to see whether the Phrenologist has erred in this instance, or whether the error is attributable to Phrenology? For we must remember, that the true question is not whether a Phrenologist has erred, but whether Phrenology is false; and 4th, and lastly, Whether the Phrenologist be qualified or not, have not many characters been correctly developed, and although, therefore, some have been incorrectly given, have we not just as strong a reason for inclining to the science as for rejecting it?

CHAPTER VI.

POWER IN MANIFESTATION OF MIND DEPENDENT ON THE EXTENT OF CEREBRAL ORGANS—OB- JECTIONS TO PHRENOLOGY ON THIS GROUND ANSWERED.

" All spread their charms, but charm not all alike,
On different senses different objects strike;
Hence different passions more or less inflame,
As strong or weak the organs of the frame." POPE.

THERE is a reason assigned for the rejection of Phrenology, which, had it not its origin in a mind of great and undoubted superiority, I should have thought unworthy of particular notice. It is said that Phrenology is untrue, because it teaches that power of mind depends upon extent of brain, whereas it is known that small insects which have small heads manifest great instinct. Firstly, Phrenology does not say that one head of greater magnitude than another, is therefore necessarily marked with greater intellect, on the contrary, we are told that the degree of intellect depends upon the *formation* of the *cerebral* mass, for instance, one head may be much larger than another, but may have the occipital or animal region greatly

preponderating, while the other may have an organization the reverse, and therefore, although much smaller, yet much more intellectual. But Phrenology does say, and it is borne out by facts, that if the organizations be similar but one head be generally larger, the larger head will exhibit the more powerful mind, unless the smaller is of a very active temperament, which is a substitute for size. But just in the same sense that Phrenology says that power of mind depends upon the extent of the brain, so any one would say that the physical strength of man depends in a great measure on the size of his bodily organs ; and no one denies this fact, that is, denies that bodily strength depends primarily on the size of the body, yet it might just as fairly be said that this cannot be true, for we find the minutest insects with bodily organs very small, yet discharging all of the functions in a manner quite as appropriate to the requirements of the insect in its sphere of action, as we find them in the case of man ; and all admit that the superior power exhibited by a man or a horse, in walking or carrying a load, is attributed to the size and strength of the leg. Now it may be urged that this fact cannot be true, for the small insects walk well and run fast, yet no one is so absurd as, on this account, to reject this fact, and yet no one is prepared to say that the insect possesses the vast power which we know to belong to the physical ability both of the man and the horse ; now we see that to the habits and necessities

of the minutest animal there is a beautiful adaptation of each corporeal member, and just so with the immaterial essence of the same creature, there is every reason why it may be and is appropriated to it, and although the cerebral organ may be very small, yet it may not be, and is not, too minute for the full guidance of the particular insect which possesses it; yet no one can say that the instinct of the insect is as powerful and comprehensive as the instinct of some larger animals, and of course has not the intellect of man. But Phrenology does not say that the cerebral mass may be so minute as to be incapable of being, in that minute form, an efficient instrument to some living principles; it may say that it may be of such dimensions as to cease to be an instrument of reasoning ability, but when it is, the person or idiot who labours under the deficiency may, although quite devoid of reason, be an instinctive animal; we know that the activity of the mind depends greatly on the temperament of the individual, and we may suppose, inasmuch as the head of an ant is of necessity small, that its temperament may be of inconceivable activity; but we have no reason for believing that the instinct of an ant, or a smaller insect, is not extremely narrow; to its physical frame, an orange is considered a world to the ant, and a drop of water a world to the animalcule, why then may not the instinct of each be fairly considered as equally circumscribed? On the whole, then, I am at a loss to conceive how the

reason given above, viz. that power of intellect depends on space of brain, can afford an objection to the science of Phrenology. But the same eminent individual who urged the objection above, says, that the head changes its form by study, but the change is occasioned by an increase of the blood-vessels, and not by the pressure of any particular part of the brain. In the first place, whilst no one knows the nature of the brain, and we see that the head does change by study, we have facts that we cannot doubt : but I would suppose that the external increase of the head is occasioned by the internal pressure of the blood-vessels ; why should that increase take place in some parts of the head, and not through the whole ; why does it occur in a very different part of the head of those who pursue intellectual engagements, to what it does in those who follow very opposite pursuits ? Admitting, then, that the blood-vessels are the active cause of this change of form, and still their action must be dependent upon the exercise or indulgence of the mind or animal, and therefore, whether the effect be produced by one solid body or another, the result is just the same, viz. that this or that particular development is occasioned by the exercise of this or that quality of the mind or propensities ; the exercise of any one function of mind produces an excitement of that portion of the brain assigned to it, and as this excitement may necessarily create a tendency of blood to the part excited, and may be the una-

voidable cause of the expansion of the blood-vessels immediately connected with it, the blood-vessels may aid in the artificial development ; but whether they do or not, I cannot see that the doctrine it is intended to subvert, is in any way affected.

As we have just above alluded to the fact that strength of mind depends, irrespective of temperament, on the extent of brain, we should not perhaps be wrong, in this place, further to illustrate this point by analogy. In the physical economy we see that the extent of physical power depends primarily on the size of the corporeal members ; for instance, take the arm, we find that the degree of manual power which any man exhibits depends on the size of the arm, and if the arm be exercised, the result is an enlargement of its size and a proportional increase of its strength. Nor can it be objected "that the analogy does not hold, inasmuch as manual strength must be supposed to depend upon the size of the arm, in a different sense to that in which we understand the power of the mind to depend upon the size of the brain, for we may suppose that the intelligent being, when removed from the body, may think or use any of its mental functions, whereas we cannot suppose that it would be able to exhibit any manual power." Now this is at best but mere conjecture, for we have no more idea of the abstract condition of the mind than we have of any other portion of our intelligent being ; nor do we know how we are connected more with one

portion of the body than we are with any other. All that we know is, that the cerebral mass and the arm are both equally instruments to one intelligent being, and as we have no reason for supposing that one function of this intelligent being is destroyed by the destruction of its organ, so we have no reason to suppose that the other is, which may not only have a posthumous existence, but may act independently of its instrument, as well as the former function; for let it be remembered, that all that we contend for is, that this intelligent being requires a material organ for its *communications* to the material world, and not for its *existence*; inasmuch as the living agent possesses a body, we must suppose that that body is designed and is necessary for its especial use, and we actually find this to be the case, as this agent being *immaterial* necessarily requires the interposition of a material organ in order to its holding an intercourse with matter. We have neither the result of observation nor of reason to teach us that we use the brain in any other way than that in which we use the arm. And, moreover, the arm is always quiescent, and is not able to move, when it is removed altogether from the influence of the agent; and whilst it is attached to the body we see it is equally unable to move, until the agent is in motion, and even then it is unable to move, unless the motion is intended expressly for it, and this just as the brain is unable to act when its agent removes from it or does not use it. We see, then,

that the arm as well as the brain is but an instrument, and consequently we have no reason to suppose that the one increases by exercise in any other sense than the other, particularly too, since we see that those organs, such as the ear, &c., the efficiency of which does not so much depend on size as peculiarity of structure, are not enlarged by the increased exercise of their agents ; we therefore think that the conclusion is justifiable, that just as physical power depends upon the size of the corporeal members, so mental power depends upon the size of its corporeal organs.

CHAPTER VII.

FATALISM : OBJECTIONS TO PHRENOLOGY ON THIS GROUND ANSWERED.

" The action of the stronger to suspend,
Reason still use, to reason still attend,
Attention habit and experience gains,
Each strengthens habit and self-love restrains."

POPE.

AT the beginning I appropriated a paragraph to the materialist. In conclusion, I address myself to the fatalist. Materialism and fatalism are equally dangerous in their effects ; the former excluding the doctrine of the immortality of the soul altogether, the latter admitting the truth of that doctrine, but denying man to be responsible.

There are some who remark that the science of Phrenology points to fatalism.

By a fatalist, we mean a person who thinks that he is either unable to controul his actions, and is, therefore, not a free agent ; or, is able to controul his actions, only the result will be the same, whether his actions be of one character or another, and who,

therefore, is a free agent, but not responsible. Now, that a man is a free agent, is a doctrine taught by the Bible, seen by observation, supported by reason, and believed by all to be true; I say, believed by all, for although there are some who pretend to believe the contrary, yet such men are now so few and unreasonable as to be considered of no weight in public estimation.

If Phrenology, therefore, countenances this doctrine of free agency, it countenances nothing more than what is true, whether or not such doctrine points to fatalism, although that it does is an inference neither drawn by Phrenology nor warranted by the doctrine; if, then, there are some *rational* creatures who arrive at the monstrous conclusion, that, notwithstanding they are free agents, they are not responsible for their actions, this is an inference drawn by these persons, and not by Phrenology, which is as silent on the point as the Bible, which is borne out by Phrenology in teaching that man is a free agent. Phrenology, therefore, if it teaches nothing opposed to the fact that man may act from choice, and consequently excludes the presumption that it points to the reverse of this, puts to silence any one who is disposed to consider that it points to fatalism; nay, even the fatalist himself, and relieves him not of his responsibility. The first question, then, is, whether, for any thing that Phrenology teaches to the contrary, a man may not act from choice and deliberation, whether the result of his actions be of ne-

cessity or not, or whether he does not act of necessity?*

The Bible teaches us that all men have the power to act from choice and deliberation, and that all men have *some* sense of right and wrong; that all men are continually prone to evil, and that no man, therefore, will ever turn to God until made to do so by God's Holy Spirit, and that the salvation of all rests upon the same foundation, and upon something altogether independent of themselves. If Phrenology, then, teaches us nothing in contravention of the fact that all have the ability to act from choice and deliberation, and that they have also *some* power of judging between right and wrong, it is in perfect harmony with the Bible. Phrenology, it is true, shows us that in some men the intellectual powers and moral sentiments preponderate, and that in other men the *propensities* prevail; and this we see by *observation*, but this does not, as I will presently show, justify the inference that Phrenology points to fatalism; for although the propensities† may predominate in some men, yet they possess *some* measure of the superior faculties, and may therefore exercise them; but, moreover, a propen-

* The doctrines of free will and of free grace may seem mysterious to man, but they are nevertheless taught by Scripture, and are therefore true.

† By the term propensities, which, unavoidably, very often occurs, is meant, not the inclinations or tendencies of the mind, but distinct qualities; in Phrenology all of the qualities being divided into intellect, sentiments, and propensities.

sity, destructiveness, for instance, as before shown, is a quality primarily good, but so corrupted by sin as to be liable to the greatest abuse, and will be more readily abused where it is one of the *reigning* qualities, but it by no means follows that it will be necessarily abused,—that a man possessing it in a great degree will *necessarily* commit murder. And so a man, in whom the superior qualities of the mind predominate, will not *necessarily* incline to what is intellectual and moral, for he possesses the propensities in some degree, and may, therefore, *à priori*, exercise them, but through sin every faculty has been corrupted, and all are liable to abuse; a man may possess veneration large, and may exercise this quality, but then the object of his veneration may be an idol, or, perhaps, benevolence is excessive, but then it may be used with indiscretion, or, if even its bounty were directed to proper objects, yet, unless exercised from proper motives, this will not be acceptable in the sight of God. But as Phrenology only treats of the constitution of the mind, and not of its actions, that is, only determines what man *can* do, and not what he has already done, or will hereafter do; if it teaches us that the constitution of the mind is such as to be capable of doing only such things as we actually find it to do, and the Bible teaches us that it has done and will do, it does quite enough to exempt itself from the charge of being at variance with that sacred volume; having shown us, then, that man has the *ability* to sin,

it is not necessary for it to show us that he has sinned or will sin, in order to be in harmony with the Bible, which teaches us that he has actually put this ability into practice. And again, although Phrenology may teach us that man has the capacity to do what the Bible teaches us that he never or only partially does, still, inasmuch as man may have a capacity without exercising it, it is not necessary for it to teach us that he has not exercised this capacity, in order to harmonize with the Bible, which teaches us that he never exercises it; for instance, although it may show us that one man may be more injurious to society than another, and that all have a sense of what is right and wrong, (that is morally, and not spiritually right and wrong,) and may act from choice and deliberation, it does not show us that man will not continually incline to evil, or that he will be continually moral hereafter; or being so, that he can atone for his past sins, or that one requires a more powerful Saviour than the other. And again, if Phrenology teaches us nothing that disagrees with any other portion of the Bible, it teaches nothing that is at all inconsistent with its doctrine of salvation, for the belief which is essential to salvation is the result of a miraculous change of the mind by a Power altogether independent of man, viz. by the Spirit of God.

When, through the aid of Phrenology, a person by looking at the head of a confirmed murderer,

pronounces his character to be of a very low order, and speaks of him as a man who is more likely and able to perpetrate some heinous crime than a man whose conduct has always been marked by acts of benevolence, he says nothing more than what all are agreed in thinking, the only difference being the manner in which they arrive at this result; the latter, from observing the ill effect, infer the existence of the capacity for it; the former, from observing the capacity, infer that such effect could follow; and those who, after experience, know the former man to be a murderer, think that he is more likely than this other man to commit murder again; and this is all the Phrenologist determines: we have no more reason, then, for inferring, as regards this, that Phrenology goes further, and determines that this man must necessarily be a murderer, or could only be guilty of heinous offences, than we have any reason for supposing that the common belief of mankind does so. Unless, then, Phrenology does this, and if, on the contrary, it shows us that he could at any one time exercise the least controul over his propensities, or that, although he cannot do this now, yet there was a time when he could have done so, it no more points to fatalism than this common belief of mankind. And suppose that Phrenology went so far as to say that this murderer, from the excitement of the moment, could not but have committed murder, yet, in order to show that this would sanction fatalism, it would be necessary

to prove that Phrenology goes still further, and shows us that this person could not have kept himself away from the influence of these circumstances, which induced him to perpetrate the crime, or that he could have no choice as to the time when he would commit it, which it by no means does, since it shows us that, with the worst combination which qualifies for murder, there is that which gives the most heartless murderer a sufficient controul over his actions to await an opportunity which may shelter him from the penalty of the law, and even to postpone the evil hour repeatedly, if he deem it advisable to do so, and perhaps in some instances to give up the commission of the crime altogether, a circumstance which shows that Phrenology considers him a free agent, and that just as he had the power to govern himself in one instance, he had the power to do so altogether, and that, consequently, he does not commit the crime of necessity, but with a degree of freedom which obviously shows him to be a free agent. A man may, however, abstain from the doing of some things from the fear of being punished, and would then be a free agent in the sense in which we may consider that a brute is one, which might of its own free will avoid this or that danger, or act in this manner in preference to another from a fear of being punished, but without that moral sense of right and wrong which would constitute either act a sin, and which, therefore, would not be responsible. Another question arises,

then, viz. whether or not, according to Phrenology, every man has not some sense of what is right and what wrong?

I need scarcely beg that it be remembered that Phrenology, by ascribing to man the ability to act from choice,* by no means intends to teach that any man can, from the finest moral and intellectual combination, perform a *spiritual* obedience, and be justified on account of any the most praiseworthy conduct, or that any unsanctified morality will be acceptable to God, but that he is only a free agent in the scriptural sense of the term, that only as a rational creature in a fallen state, he may sometimes act more morally than at other times, as is expressed in the words, "When the Gentiles which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these having not the law are a law unto themselves."

All that I have to establish then is, that Phrenology teaches nothing opposed to the fact that man is a free agent, and may have a sense of right and wrong; and this is done by showing that Phrenology recognizes in man those qualities which are necessary to constitute a free agent. As man, then, possesses these qualities, and as Phrenology recognises all of these qualities in each man, it acknowledges that he is a free agent.

It is quite unnecessary for me to show that man

* See Observations in conclusion.

may act from choice, since this is a fact which must be acknowledged by all who would reject Phrenology, on the ground of its being supposed to sanction fatalism; it is sufficient for me to state, that Phrenology recognises man to be precisely what he is, and that it consequently holds that he may act from choice, and this is done by showing that Phrenology pronounces the mind to be exactly what we should discover it to be if we were practically acquainted with it, the only difference being that, in the former case, we observe it through its organs, which it is absurd to suppose can make the mind in any way different from what it is, while, in the latter, our discovery is the fruit of experience.

It is surprising, then, that there are those who consider that Phrenology points to fatalism; for not only does it not lead to such an illogical conclusion, but it positively rebuts the assertion, and inculcates the opposite doctrine; and it is, therefore, either the ignorance of the whole, or an inference from a garbled portion of the science, that is thus taken to feed the prejudice of the sceptic. The Bible states that every one that sinneth shall be damned; now we may, from this insulated assertion, infer, that as every one has sinned, that every one will be damned; but we well know that faith and repentance are spoken of in qualification of such a sentence; and although Phrenology determines that one person is more capable of the commission of some heinous

crime than another person, yet it unequivocally shows a capacity in every individual to overcome in the degree, and to regulate the tendency of the inferior portion of his nature by the exercise of his superior, and declaring, therefore, as distinctly as language can express it, that man is both a free agent, and a responsible being, and as clearly tends to exclude the opposite inference. If we are told that this qualification has not been seen, we say that it is because the science has not been studied or is not comprehended; or if it be said that this preponderance of the inferior functions implies an incapacity for the controlling exercise of the feeble intellectual development, we still say, that this is a delusion rooted in an ignorance of the science, and, indeed, in ignorance of the philosophy of mind, and not the result of a candid investigation. But let us suppose the extinction of Phrenology, and I would observe, in recapitulation, that we know metaphysically and observationally, that a preponderance of vicious and criminal inclinations degrade some men, and prove their existence by their pernicious operation; it must, therefore, be argued, that the poverty of intellect and morality in these individuals is unable to counteract the operations of the former, and must, therefore, render man irresponsible, and, consequently, must point as rationally to fatalism as Phrenology; and yet no one disbelieves *that*, for the truth of which he has the evidence of his observation, nor questions the value and soundness of

metaphysical research; and, indeed, this observer of human nature, as such, so far from inferring irresponsibility in man from his observation, is, perhaps, the first person to draw an opposite conclusion.

Phrenology, by assigning an organ to each quality, and by accounting for the strength or feebleness of a quality, by the size or vigour of its organ, by no means intends to determine the quality to be stronger or weaker than we actually find it, whether we give it an organ or not; to assign an organ is not to circumscribe the quality; if the mental operations be narrow, they are made so by the individual or by nature, and not by the Phrenologist.

If each quality has a particular office, and will manifest only one *quality*, whether it acts through an organ or independently of one, or, in other words, if the reasoning faculties will reflect, and reflect in the same manner and in the same degree, whether they make use of an organ or not, I am at a loss to see how we can more logically infer fatalism, from the circumstance of an organ being used, than we can from the circumstance of the faculties operating without it, or why, in the one case, it should be supposed that the faculties would act more certainly, in the same manner, than they would in the other. If Phrenology did not teach us that some functions were controllable by others, and that every function was controllable by education, or if it did teach us that in some individuals

the inferior nature existed in the fullest vigour, and the superior was not to be found at all ; in short, did Phrenology say that some men were so low in the scale of rational beings, as to be in reality irrational, then every true friend to religion would have abundant reason for rejecting the science. But so far from Phrenology's embracing any doctrine which can be supposed fairly and logically to lead to fatalism, it positively, and in its very nature, excludes every theory that tends to this evil, and teaches us that moral qualities exist in every one in some degree, nay, that every quality ascribed to man by philosophy or religion exists in some measure, and that no others are to be found. It is, therefore, manifestly absurd in any one to suppose that an individual with a preponderance of one quality cannot exercise another, that an individual with a preponderance of the inferior qualities cannot exercise the superior in any degree, for in the very idea of the existence of some superior quality, is implied the power to exercise this quality, in as much as the idea of an inclination to evil, so continuous as to render the exercise of good impossible, must destroy the very notion that there is any good at all ; and since, then, Phrenology ascribes to every man some measure of each quality, it unequivocally ascribes to him the capacity of exercising each. And why should Phrenologists recommend a sound and religious education, if they do not recognize, on the one hand, a *willingness* to

yield to temptations, and on the other, the *ability* to be made to withstand them in some measure? Phrenology teaches us, therefore, that the mind is capable of exercising its superior faculties, and as it also teaches us that these faculties may be increased and strengthened by education, (by education, I mean any exercise that would give the individual intellectual and religious improvement,) and as it further teaches us, that this education of the superior faculties (superior in quality, not in degree) will overcome, in some measure, the uneducated inferior qualities, it evidently teaches us that *man* may exercise some controul over his actions, and is therefore responsible for them.

But it is argued, that the whole mind acts through the whole brain as an organ; yet no one supposes for a moment, from this circumstance, that the mind must act in only one way, or in any way that would lead us to imagine that it would point to fatalism, or that it could not be susceptible of education and improvement; the different functions of mind, then, can no more be supposed to act in only one way, from the circumstance of each acting through an organ, than the whole mind can be supposed to act in only one particular way, from the circumstance of *its* acting through an organ.

Phrenology shows that these organs do not differ in proportion in different men, more than the mental qualities possessed by different men, and that they are *equally* susceptible of change in their confor-

mation; that they prove no clog to the development of the high moral attributes, and do not of *necessity* guide the mind into a particular course of thought, and, consequently, the body into a particular course of action. We cannot imagine, then, on what ground it is asserted that Phrenology points to fatalism.

But, as it is known by common sense, so it is taught by Phrenologists, that there are persons whose intellect and moral feelings naturally preponderate; now, it might as well be argued that Phrenologists say that these persons must instinctively and unerringly move towards right, and, more than this, cannot commit wrong at all, (that is, if it be said that the preponderance of the propensities can only lean to evil,) yet propensities exist in the degree, and we know that they are indulged in to the same extent, and, in some persons who, through bad company or otherwise, chose to educate these, will eventually make them predominant; now, no one, whether he be a Phrenologist or not, can doubt that these persons are responsible, insomuch as the inferior strength of the lower qualities ought to be kept in subjection to the greater power of the superior; but then it would be absurd to suppose that one man is responsible and not another; but Phrenology particularly advances, as one of the valuable ends of its science, that just as the naturally superior portion of man may be laid prostrate to his indulged inferior nature, so by education may the opposite

effect be, in some measure, produced when the qualities of the organs are reversed; but those, of course, who reject Phrenology on the ground of fatalism, must be persuaded of the truth of that, on account of which they thus reject it. Now, one of the most prominent and consolatory doctrines of religion is, that none will eternally be saved but those who are made to turn to God by God's Holy Spirit; now, those who would have their salvation depend on the efficacy of their own works, say, that they recognise the seeds of fatalism in this truth, viz. that if man will never incline to God until made to do so by God's Spirit, he is not a free agent, and, therefore, let him do what he will, the result will be the same, and therefore he is irresponsible; but there is no one who believes his Bible, but who justly regards such language as both fallacious and dangerous; yet this points, as clearly as Phrenology does, to fatalism, that is, points to this result in the same manner as Phrenology does, viz. by being *supposed* to do so by the sceptic, who doubts his Bible altogether; just as he supposes Phrenology to lead to fatalism, who disbelieves the science, but these imagine this scriptural truth to tend to fatalism simply because they disbelieve the sacredness of the volume in which it is revealed, and just so with the phrenological fatalist; he does not reject the science because it leads to fatalism, for he tells you, in the same breath in which he condemns it, that he has never looked into and knows nothing of Phrenology,

but simply because he is prejudiced against it, he therefore, upon the most superficial of all grounds, viz. on no grounds at all, rejects a science which is supported by the highest ability, and, for all he knows, may be as true as the Bible, which perhaps he once equally rejected, and upon grounds equally unsubstantial.

CHAPTER VIII.

CONCLUSION.

CONSISTENCY BETWEEN PHRENOLOGY AND REVELATION.

It will appear that I have endeavoured in the preceding pages to show the harmony between Phrenology and Religion, so far as the former is said to be *naturally* at variance with the latter, namely, on the grounds of materialism and fatalism; and this is all that it is necessary for me to do, for these are the only two irreligious points into which Phrenology is said *necessarily* to run, Phrenology being supposed to lead to these, from its very nature and essence, that is, from its teaching the necessity of material organs, and recognising a plurality of them: I say this, for the abuses of Phrenology may be as infinite as the abuses of the Bible, and as no one would deem it necessary to remove each abuse from the latter in order to prove its validity, but would first prove the truth of this, and leave these abuses to fall by their own insufficiency, so in the case of

Phrenology a similar mode of procedure would seem to be amply necessary.

I say, then, that these are the only two points that necessarily require any consideration; one Phrenologist may deny the truth and efficacy of revelation altogether, another may believe some portion of this valuable gift, but suppose that the salvation of man will depend somewhat upon the capacities of the individual; but these are extravagant and dangerous views, which are by no means incidental to Phrenology, and which would be embraced by these respective individuals, if even Phrenology had never existed. And it cannot argue a great deal either for the logic or independence of that mind which, without searching for itself, readily believes the word of an infidel who may assert that any particular science is at variance with revelation; and be it remembered, that those who reject Phrenology from its being supposed to be at variance with revelation, do so not because *they* consider it hostile to it, but because they are told that some one else thinks so. And surely, then, if this is *avowedly* the strongest argument they bring against Phrenology, it cannot be too much for me to say, that they bring no argument at all; and, if prejudice is so rampant as to resort to *this* extreme, and gives no better argument, it would seem clear that it can have no better argument to give. I have been unable, through my professional avocations, to peruse Mr. Combe's work on the constitution of man, (or, in-

deed, any observations on Phrenology, except, as I state in the preface, one treatise on the subject, teaching its elementary principles,) and I am not, therefore, in a position to condemn it; but admitting, for the sake of argument, that it merits the attacks it has received, why, I ask, are we to go to Mr. Combe's private views to learn the doctrines of Phrenology? Several clergymen of known piety, and many lay Christians, are Phrenologists, and reprobate Mr. Combe's views as illogical and dangerous deductions; and why do we not, if we impartially desire the establishment of truth, take the testimony of these persons, who are not only numerically stronger, but are considered, in other points of view, more unexceptionable witnesses?

Phrenology may teach us, that mental functions act each through a distinct organ, and that minds are infinite in their variety, but by no system of reasoning is it possible to draw a conclusion from Phrenology against revelation, for this is something that operates altogether independently of man himself, and whatever, therefore, may be the Phrenological condition or spiritual destitution of any mind, it is in the power of God's Holy Spirit, and in his power alone, to produce its spiritual change.

One Phrenologist, who disbelieves in the fall of man, may wildly imagine that one person, whose intellect and morality preponderate, has the ability to prevent the abuse of any quality; that he has within himself those elements by means of which he may

work out his own perfection; but I, who believe in the fall of man, although embracing the truth of Phrenology, see the danger and fallacy of such a doctrine, and feel persuaded that, whether Phrenology exist or not, this individual would entertain the same view, from the circumstance of his seeing one man practically having a greater controul over himself than another man. Again, another Phrenologist, who disbelieves the fact, that the saved sinner is turned to God, by the unassisted interposition of the Holy Spirit, on observing a man with a preponderance of the lower qualities, may say that this individual will never be saved, for he does not possess the power of self-controul and self-regulation; but I should be very sorry indeed to suppose that Phrenology leads me to the adoption of the same view, and it is quite clear that this individual also would have held this view, whether he was a Phrenologist or not.

Phrenology, as before observed, merely treats of the constitution of the mind—that is, only determines what the mind *can do*, and not what it *has done*, or *will do*; and having shown, then, that it recognises a capacity in man, and in every man, to be moral or to be vicious, and as man may have a capacity without exercising it, it cannot be said to teach any thing inconsistent with the Bible, whether this teaches us that man does, or that he does not, exercise it.

If the Bible had taught us that man would not sin, inasmuch as Phrenology shows us that he may

he moral, it would be consistent with this sacred volume, as the Bible teaches that man does sin, and Phrenology teaches that he can sin,—that is, since it does not teach us that the nature of his faculties are such as not to be susceptible of abuse, or capable of being abused, by that corrupt influence which has been inherent in man ever since the fall, there is nothing in Phrenology which can be fairly and logically said to be inconsistent with this inspired book.

Every individual who is observed, whether phrenologically or practically, to possess a preponderance of the moral and intellectual qualities, indulges, in some measure, while in his natural state, his lower propensities, and sins equally with those, the proportions of whose mental endowments are reversed, and although his conduct may be characterized by the greatest amiability and honesty, yet he may be in an unconverted state, and, therefore, as far from grace as the most depraved character: now this is a fact, the truth of which is established beyond a doubt; it is a fact harmonizing with and bearing out the declaration of God's own word, that all have sinned, and come short of the glory of God, and that the inclination of the heart is to evil continually. But although the Phrenologist and the philosopher cannot disprove this, he cannot account for it either on phrenological or philosophical grounds, and without the aid of revelation cannot account for it at all. This teaches us that man has fallen, that his heart

is corrupt, and that he has within him that which gives every faculty of his soul a tendency to err, and actually causes it to sin. I say, that every man under heaven has sinned, and does sin ; that revelation furnishes the only real and philosophical reason for the fact, and that, consequently, notwithstanding the infidel Phrenologists or the infidel Philosophers may run into the difficulty of devising some inefficient solution of the question, so it be sufficient to prop up or give a bodily form to his infidel dreams, yet the only true solution can be found in the revelation of God, and that however much Phrenology may be abused by the infidel, the believer will find that it is in *his* power to make a much higher and interesting use of it ; the former, on seeing the fine moral and intellectual development, may erroneously say, that the possessor of it has within himself the power of perfecting his own condition ; the latter will say of the same individual, that he has a beautiful and extensive soil, but although its produce may be more abundant and finer than the produce of one of a less fertile character, yet even in *this* soil are tares to be found.

We observe phrenologically, and know by experience, that all men possess what are familiarly called both good and bad qualities,* and through

* That is, we do not see, phrenologically, that man has *bad* qualities, for every function is primarily good ; and as Phrenology only treats of their primitive state, it could not call any bad ; but knowing that the fall of man has given

the aid also of experience, as well as of Phrenology, we know that *education* may improve the good qualities, and from the want of it the bad will become worse. Now the only question is, whether it is possible by any earthly system to effect the entire absorption of the bad qualities into the good, or, in other words, whether it is possible to make man perfect, and whether, admitting this monstrous absurdity to be feasible, it is either sufficient to disprove the truth of revelation or to dispense with it if true, that is, to disprove the truth of man's fall, and the necessity of salvation through Christ? That man, then, has the power of arriving at perfection in this world at all, and this by his own unassisted ability, is an assertion which an appeal to experience will prove to be as groundless as it is bold; and I mean that kind of experience which involves not merely the proof of what man has not done, but of what he is not capable of doing; nor can it be objected that experience can have no weight in this case, for it is only by experience that we know what the course of nature is, and whether or not circumstances exist which may interrupt this course; consequently it is only by experience, or a knowledge of what the course of nature is, except where

every faculty a tendency to err, and from Phrenology's showing us that the mental combination is such as to be capable, under such circumstances, of manifesting both good and bad qualities, we say, through Phrenology, that he has these.

revelation teaches the contrary, that we can discover what the course of nature will be.

But, in reality, the course of nature shows us to a demonstration, that whenever man is left to himself, his inclination seems, without any interruption, to gravitate, as it were, through irresistible attraction, towards a state of degeneracy, and this, too, in the proportion that it is left to itself; nor can the contrary be supposed, by arguing analogically from the *gradual* growth of man's bodily and mental powers, from a state of infancy to maturity, because it is well known that the *evil* propensities grow with man's growth as well as the good; and that education shows that man is capable of some continuous increase in *virtue* does not alter the case; for education, be it remembered, is itself independent of the course of nature, and implies something opposed to it, and it is, in fact, so repugnant to the youthful mind, whose entire bent is to something else, from which education would draw it away, that unless man was coerced by some influence independent of the course of nature, we may imagine that all men would go without the benefit of an early education; and as we may expect that this would be the case with every man, there is every reason against our supposing that any one would arrive at that degree of improvement to which many now attain; and to say that it is according to some appointment of nature that some men do improve themselves, and force others to learn, can have little effect,

where we find that man, even where this appointment seems to be attended to, never manifests a capacity to approach to any thing like perfection. The truth is, that the language of experience is as true as it is familiar; that human nature, *left to itself*, becomes worse and worse, and the whole inclination of man is to this unrestrained condition, and, consequently, that from the course of nature, we should infer that man has not within himself the elements of his own rectification. There is no analogy, then, between that course of nature which indicates a progressive reform, and the course that seems naturally to belong to the intelligent portion of man, which seems to go in an opposite direction; and in the proportion that the presumption in favour of this analogy diminishes, it increases in favour of that occurrence, which, alone, accounts for the want of such analogy; viz. the fall of man; and when neither experience nor reason can better account for this want of analogy, this presumption is considerably increased, and leads us to act, in this case, in analogy to what we would do in parallel cases, viz. to consider the fall of man as a question of *fact*, and to be collected from the best testimony handed down to us, and therefore to embrace it as recorded in the sacred Scriptures by the pen of Inspiration. But admitting that man may be perfect in this life, and that he may become so by his own unaided efforts, the question unavoidably arises, how did man become imperfect? To assert that he was made so does not

at all prove that he was, and if it did, it does not answer another question, viz. *why* was he made so? But it is impossible to assume that man could work out his own perfection, in the face of the fact, that, through the lapse of six thousand years, he has never been able, under the most favourable circumstances, to rise beyond a certain point; that his most perfect accomplishments have been but imperfect ill. And what constitutes this perfection? the less cannot comprehend the greater, and if no man has yet discovered this state, his imperfect ability could not tell him what it is; and so far from our being justified in inferring from a progressive increase in goodness that man can attain perfection, the presumption should be the other way, for if man is to live eternally, and all that we know of him is, that he has only been on a progressive increase, from the moment of his birth, until his exit from the world, and that he has never yet during that period arrived at any condition approaching to perfection, nor manifested any probability that he ever would, the inference is, that he would *ever* continue to increase; it is true, that to let in upon this point the light of revelation, which shows us that man will be perfect hereafter, the inference would be reversed, viz., that this gradual increase is towards perfection; not, however, to be attained in this world, or to be effected by man himself; but then that revelation does teach us this cannot alter the case, for this conclusion in favour

of man's arriving at perfection is drawn altogether from the dim light of nature ; and upon the assumption that there is no revelation, and also with a reference to this world alone. The truth is, that even infidels themselves owe to revelation this idea they have of perfection.

But admitting that man may have within him the elements of his own rectification, still (inasmuch as he is now imperfect) this cannot affect the question of his fall, and admitting, then, that he is under condemnation, a point no one can *disprove*, and that he has attained this perfection, this, be it remembered, can no more atone for his past sins, than a fraudulent debtor can satisfy his past debts, by paying punctually those he may hereafter contract. The most that this imaginary perfection can be conceived to be, is a high species of morality, and this only for the theatre of this world ; it is not that spiritual, sanctified mind which alone can find a spiritual atmosphere congenial to it, and which could never enter such atmosphere, but through the imputed righteousness of Christ, so that whether or not it be possible for man to perfect his condition, is not sufficient to disprove the fact that man has fallen, and that he cannot be restored to the favour of God's offended justice, unless a penalty has been previously paid, and that therefore it does not affect the truth of the cross of Christ, nor consequently does it vitiate the doctrine of faith in Christ, brought about by the quickening power of the Spirit.

Mr. Combe may conceive that revelation is interpreted incorrectly, because it is interpreted by those who know nothing of Phrenology, but the only answer that such an assertion requires is, that revelation does not merely propound to us a remedy for an evil, the nature of which we must discover from external evidences, but contains within itself both; it informs us both of the existence and of the nature of this evil, and furnishes a remedy for it, which it applies without either foreign instruction or assistance; it is a complete history of the subject of which it treats, and consequently may be interpreted independently of any extraneous assistance.

By the aid of Phrenology we may be enabled to discover the extent of a man's mind, and so may we through the assistance of an intimate acquaintance with him, but all that we learn is a fact which has existed before, although only now known to us, viz. that the mind is of this or that extent, but this is all that we do learn. It does not teach us that man has not fallen, it does not show us that this man, with a fine display of intellect, is not a *sinner*, or that he is sure to be a *Christian*, or that that man, labouring under the disadvantages of cramped capacities, is beyond the reach of God's Spirit. It is as impossible, from the condition of the mind to determine whether it is possible for it to be acted upon by the enlightening influence of a miracle-working God, as it is impossible for us to say, by merely studying the dust of the earth,

whether it may be formed into that beautiful machinery which encircles the soul.—Revelation may teach us what it is capable of doing with the mind; the mind cannot inform us what revelation may do for it. A man may see around him endless proofs of design, and may not infer the existence of a God; but it would be a moral impossibility for him (if of sane intellect) to suppose that they positively prove that there *is not* a God. So by the aid of Phrenology a man may not be able to suppose the existence of revelation, but it would be an extravagant act to reason from it that there is not any revelation at all.

But no; the infidel abuses Phrenology; the believer therefore considers it invalid. Did illogical deductions ever enumerate amongst them a more monstrous *non sequitur*? Anatomy, that ennobling study, which a reasoning intellect would have thought could not have failed to elevate the narrowest comprehensions to the belief of a God—to lead the wondering mind from those vast and irresistible evidences of design, up to the infallible conclusion of the existence of a Designer, has been marvellously often raised up as that insurmountable barrier between belief and a God. Is anatomy not a beautiful study, is it an imposition or a mere infidel device, because the infidel abuses it? No; although some may be so blind as to err on it, anatomy is a direct pathway between reason and God, and if design and harmony constitute it such, Phrenology may be said to run parallel with it.

Unless it can be proved, then, that Phrenology shows mind to be matter, it no more offers an objection to revelation than anatomy does.

Unless those who have studied Mr. Combe's *peculiar* views have studied Phrenology sufficiently to be satisfied that these views necessarily flow from it, it is obvious that to infer from them that Phrenology is invalid, is weak, illogical, and unjust; and in support of such an assertion, a better argument cannot be adduced, than that which is furnished by those very persons who do infer the unsoundness of Phrenology, from the abuse of it by Mr. Combe, for their language is, that Mr. Combe *professes* to believe in revelation, but evidently does not from his excessive abuse of it. Now this mode of reasoning may be quite legitimate, viz. that the Bible is not false, because Mr. Combe, although professing to believe in it, endeavours to prove it false; or, in other words, that the Bible is *known* to be true, and therefore any mode of treating it by Mr. Combe, leading to a contrary conclusion, is false; why then, if this mode of reasoning is applicable in the case of the Bible, (and I admit that it is,) is it not appropriate in the case of Phrenology? Why should the very reverse be thought applicable, when that subject is under consideration which the Reviewer dislikes? Why, if Phrenology is treated by Mr. Combe in a manner which may be considered a great abuse of it, is the invalidity of Phrenology to be inferred?

surely, if prejudice cannot answer the question, reason may.

In conclusion, then, the result of the foregoing observations seem to be, that the mind, since it is immaterial, and the external world is material, requires a material organ for its intercourse with the world; that the brain is that organ, that the mind has several and distinct functions, which require each a distinct organ, that the brain is therefore composed of several and distinct organs, that the principal objections to Phrenology have no weight whatever; that there is therefore negative evidence in favour of the truth of it, and that from all abstract reasoning, we should infer that each function must have a distinct organ; and from observation, we see the conclusiveness of our inference, or, in other words, all correct reasoning coupled with observation, most unequivocally establishes the truth of Phrenology. We say that all reasoning is on the side of the truth of Phrenology, but let us suppose that we cannot, by any process of reasoning, satisfactorily prove that the science is true, no one can, at least upon any principles of reason, be satisfied that it is not true. While it must be admitted by every one who will look rationally into the subject, that the greater presumption, although it be in the lowest degree greater, is on the side of the science. Now I believe it is admitted, that in all questions of difficulty, if better evidence cannot be had, the

question is determined by the preponderance of presumption, however small such preponderance may be. I cannot see, then, why Phrenology should not be brought within the benefit of the rule, and be elevated not only above the ridicule it most unworthily receives, but into a subject of great consideration. Phrenologists are acquainted with the science, and are firmly persuaded of its truth and value; opponents are, in reality in utter ignorance of the science, and yet are persuaded of its futility and danger, and unhesitatingly reject it altogether, and some even go the length of regarding it as an imposition; now I ask upon what grounds is Phrenology thus regarded: and I leave it to the candid reader to decide whether, if either party is disposed to deceive, it is not rather that which, altogether under the influence of unsupported scepticism, and without pausing to institute one enquiry into the soundness of the subject, hurries over the reasoning and experience of decided talent, and endeavours to crush in its opening that which, if permitted to unfold itself in the atmosphere of an enlightened public, may be productive of incalculable good. To my humble ability, Phrenology has proved itself a valid science, and until the truth of the observation, the value of the facts, and the soundness of the inferences which have led me to this conclusion, shall be questioned by a resistance having a more legitimate foundation than that which disgraced the Galilean age, I shall be firmly persuaded that, when-

ever Phrenology is candidly and soberly studied, those elements of truth, and that consistency and harmony will be found in it, which will not fail to recommend it to the reasoning and moral intellect, and, further, that there is not a man of sound and rational views—there is not an intellect capable of drawing just conclusions, or of reading the provisions of nature, there is not an imagination capable of luxuriating in the loveliness of creation, nor a soul alive to the kindly instincts of nature, that will not testify, through the agency of Phrenology, to the existence of God, and the responsibility of man.

THE END.