

# CONSIDERATIONS

ON

## PHRENOLOGY,

IN CONNEXION WITH

AN INTELLECTUAL, MORAL, AND RELIGIOUS  
EDUCATION.

BY

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## P R E F A C E.

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THE following pages were written, in consequence of the extraordinary statements, and still more extraordinary demands, which have been recently made by some of the writers on phrenology.

One of these gentlemen frankly avows, that the system of phrenology is opposed to the doctrines derived from the Bible, according to the present mode of interpreting it; while another requires, that the government of a people professedly Christian, should, at the national expense, institute schools for educating children in its principles. At a time of life when the reflecting powers are weak, and the mind wholly unable to analyse its own intellectual states or emotions, children are to be taught the doctrines of phrenology, as truths, about which there can be no doubt or hesitation whatever. The system is not even allowed to be compared with others, but is to be positively inculcated, as giving the same sort of information about the mind, as an enumeration of its qualities does of matter.

The phrenologists, therefore, demand of the Legislature of England, to establish throughout the country, schools, in which children are to be educated in doctrines contrary to the received mode of interpreting the Bible. This the State is to do, while, at the same time, an order of men exists in it, whose accredited duty it is, to teach the doctrines of Revelation according to the meaning which is attached to them by the immensely greatest number of professing Christians. The request certainly goes too far, or not far enough. If the phrenologists be right, it does not go far enough; for, in that case, the present Church Establishment ought to be destroyed, and its revenues appropriated to the propagation of the newly discovered science. If, again, the system of human nature, which the phrenologists teach, be not true, the request goes too far; for, in that case, the youth of the country would be educated in a set of opinions, which, in their maturer years, they would have to unlearn. The Legislature would manifestly stultify itself, if with one hand it supported and encouraged a body of men, whose office it is to teach what is at present believed to be the Christian religion; and with the other hand appropriated funds for the education of youth in a system which is to supersede it.

Yet, this is the line of action which phrenologists recommend, and they represent all who do not agree with

them in entirely approving it, as influenced by prejudice, or actuated by selfishness. In an especial manner have they emptied the vials of their wrath on those of the clergy of the Established Church who have declared themselves opposed to this scheme of instruction. They have, without hesitation, charged them with selfishness, bigotry, and intolerance, and have described them as altogether opposed to the education of the people.

We have ventured, in the following little work, to examine the foundations on which the system of phrenology rests; and to investigate its claims to pronounce, with authority, on subjects of mental philosophy and religion. We have conducted both these inquiries with a particular reference to the question of education; and have presumed, in conclusion, to detail our own views concerning it.

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strictly so called ; resembling, in this respect, much more nearly the phenomena about which, metaphysics, ethics, and politics are conversant.

“ I have said, that the study of medicine forms one of the best preparations for the study of mind, *to such an understanding as Locke's*. To an understanding less comprehensive and less cultivated by a liberal education, the effect of this study is likely to be similar to what we may trace in the works of Hartley, Darwin, and Cabanis ; to all of whom we may, more or less, apply the sarcasm of Cicero on Aristoxenus, the musician, who attempted to explain the nature of the soul by comparing it to a harmony ; ‘ *Hic ab artificio suo non recessit.*’ In Locke's Essay not a single passage occurs, savouring of the anatomical theatre, or of the chemical laboratory.”

Had the attention of the distinguished author of the eloquent dissertation from which the above passage is taken, been called to the subject, we may confidently assert, that he would have referred to the system of Gall and Spurzheim, as still more strongly illustrating the truth of his remarks, than the works of the physicians to which he has alluded.

This system is entirely founded on the assumed dependence and subserviency of mind on matter. On every side it bears marks of being derived from the schools of anatomy. It takes for granted, not only that the mind cannot rightly perform its functions, unless possessed of an efficient and healthful instrument ; but also, that its exercise has the same effect upon the organs of the brain as if it were material. It teaches, that each faculty of the mind is attached to a separate organ of the brain, and that when one of these faculties is called into frequent

action, the corresponding organ is enlarged in the same way as the muscles of a blacksmith's arms are developed by his labour in his business.

2. The phrenologists do not seek for information concerning pneumatology, by attending to our consciousness, or reflecting on the various acts and affections of the mind. They maintain, that by pursuing such a method, it is impossible to arrive at any satisfactory conclusion; and that specific knowledge on the subject is only to be obtained by examining the protuberances on the skull.

According to them, therefore, those metaphysicians have been entirely mistaken, who have conceived that by turning our attention inward, and diligently recording the various intellectual states and mental phenomena, a knowledge of mind may be acquired, similar to that which has resulted from following an analogous plan in the material world.

The natural philosopher observes the sequences which take place in the various operations of nature: he perceives how one event invariably follows another; he marks their inseparable connexion; and, by so doing, is gradually enabled to form a theory which embraces within its generality, phenomena, which, to the casual observer, appear totally disjoined. In a similar way, the mental philosopher reflects on the susceptibilities and powers of his own mind, and though his observations encounter difficulties from which those of the other are free, he is nevertheless, in some measure, able satisfactorily to analyze many complex phenomena into their constituent elements, and to trace the law by which one

perception, or emotion, is succeeded by another state of the mind, of a totally different description.

To do so with any success he has hitherto thought it above all things necessary, constantly to keep before him the essentially different natures of matter and mind.

In the material world many operations are going on at the same time, and variously constituted substances join in the production of one result. Mind, however, is single and indivisible. Ideas, indeed, may co-exist, and not be blended; but the metaphysician cannot analyze them in the same way as the chemist separates the various elements which go to the composition of the substance which he is examining. It is memory alone that enables the inquirer into the human mind, to investigate its susceptibilities or powers; and, if he would do this successfully, he must always think of the change which subsists in an idea when remembered, and when originally suggested. He pursues a course, therefore, which is beset with many difficulties, and must advance with great caution and circumspection.

If, however, he do so, his labour is not altogether fruitless; and the cultivators in this difficult field have already brought away some proofs that their operations have not been entirely nugatory. At all events, they have succeeded in showing the limits within which our efforts ought to be directed, if we would increase our knowledge in this branch of philosophy. They have made known the futility of every endeavour to discover the way in which mind is connected with matter; and have demonstrated, that, if we would make any progress in our knowledge of the properties of either, we must always keep



before us the essential difference which subsists between them. However fine the convolutions and reticulations of matter may be, still it makes no perceptible advance towards the nature of mind; and we are not to think that, on that account, matter in any way approximates to the power of thinking, feeling, or willing. Nor can we conclude that, simply by reason of the fineness of its texture, a particular part of the human frame is the instrument by which the mind performs its operations. Still less reason have we for supposing that, because it may be folded in singular convolutions, each of these is an organ to which is attached a particular faculty of the thinking principle.

This, however, is the course which the phrenologists follow. They say, that each of the faculties of the mind has a distinct organ of the brain appropriated to it; and that these organs are externally observable by corresponding eminences on the surface of the skull. If, therefore, according to them, we would obtain an exact acquaintance with the phenomena of mind, we must not institute a mental analysis, but must confine our inquiries to an examination of the protuberances of the head.

\* 3. It is not our object to give an account of phrenology; but as we wish to make some remarks on the uses to which its advocates are desirous of applying it, we deem it necessary to state the nature of the system, and the evidences on which it rests; and this we shall do as shortly and as fairly as we can.

4. The first assertion of the phrenologists is, that the various faculties of the mind are innate; they are implanted in man at his formation, and are not the result

of the different circumstances in which he is placed, or of the wants and necessities which these circumstances may occasion. The moral disposition and intellectual powers of a man are thus determined at his birth; and the only effect of education is somewhat to modify them. We say, somewhat to modify them, because the advocates of this system maintain that some men have originally so bad a disposition implanted in them, as to render nugatory every effort to make them reputable members of society by moral training or discipline.

The next step of the disciples of Gall is, to assert that the mental faculties are dependent for their exercise on the organization of the brain. This assertion they endeavour to prove, by showing that both the moral disposition and intellectual powers depend on the brain's developement. They say, that the moral sentiments and mental powers are in exact proportion to its organization: when this is faulty, a man's character is correspondingly affected; and it is impossible for a man to resist the power which is thus exercised over his mental constitution.

Granting the truth of this second position, it would not justify the system of phrenology, unless its advocates are able to make good a third assertion. This final assertion is, that each faculty does not make use of, or is not used by, (for we do not know which form of expression is more appropriate to the system,) the whole brain, but is confined in its exercise to one particular organ. As a man sees by the eye and hears by the ear, so he perceives by one organ and considers by another.

5. This last proposition may be called the key-stone

of the whole system, and as such, the phrenologists have endeavoured to prove its truth by various arguments. They have appealed to the analogy of the other parts of the animal economy, and endeavoured to show that, as each secretion has its appropriate gland, so there is a plurality of cerebral organs corresponding to a plurality of mental faculties. They have also referred to the various degrees in which the intellectual powers are developed, in different individuals, as confirmatory of the truth of their hypothesis. They argue, that if the brain were a simple organ of the mind, in whatever individual one faculty existed in a state of energy, all the others would be correspondingly developed. For we cannot conceive one substance to be both weak and strong; and the brain, consequently, could not exhibit one faculty in its perfection, and not display all the others in an equally eminent degree.

6. They also endeavour to institute a comparison between mental and bodily fatigue; and contend that, as when a man is tired with riding, he does not on that account experience any difficulty in walking; so when one organ has been wearied by application to a particular subject, he can, with facility and pleasure, turn himself to another pursuit. If, they say, the whole brain were employed in a single operation, additional fatigue, not relaxation, would be produced by turning to a new study.

The phrenologists make use of some other arguments to establish the truth of this proposition, but those which we have mentioned are chiefly relied on by the most approved advocates of the system.

7. Now, in the first place, it is by no means so evident

as the advocates of phrenology would have us suppose, that the *brain* is the sole seat of thought and sensation. It may be a repository of stimulating power, necessary to excite the different parts of the body to action; and it may be the function of the *nerves* to convey this stimulus to the various members of the system.

“This hypothesis receives strength from the structure and arrangement of the nervous chords; for while they are admirably fitted for discharging the office of conveying a stimulus to the limbs, they cannot, without the highest difficulty, be considered as the channels of distinct volitions to particular muscles. We therefore attribute the determination of motion immediately to a power distinct from, and independent of, the visible structure:—that is to say, the mind, present throughout the body, and acting and feeling, wherever present, by its inherent faculty in relation to matter\*.”

8. Leaving, however, this hypothesis, there is nothing like direct proof that the presence of any distinct part of the brain is essentially necessary to the carrying on of the operations of the mind. “The truth is, there is not a single part of the encephalon, which has not, in one case or other, been impaired, destroyed, or found defective, without any apparent change in the sensitive, moral, or intellectual faculties. Haller has given us a copious collection of cases which bear upon this point; and a similar catalogue has been made by Dr. Ferriar, who, in a paper in the fourth volume of the Manchester Transactions, has selected many of Haller’s cases, with considerable additions from other authors. The evidence

\* *Physical Theory of another Life*. See also, BROWN’s *Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind*. Lect. xix.

afforded by this mass of facts, taken conjointly, is quite sufficient to overturn the fundamental proposition. This evidence is not impeached by the feeble attempts of Dr. Spurzheim, to evade its force by a general and vague imputation of inaccuracy against the observers, or by having recourse to the principle of duplicity of each of the organs; a principle of very dubious application in a subject of so much uncertainty as the physiology of the brain. Poor, indeed, must be his resources, when we find him betaking himself to the following argument in proof that the brain is the organ of thought, namely, that every one feels that he thinks by means of his brain. We doubt much if any one has that feeling\*."

9. With respect to the analogy which the phrenologists endeavour to establish between the various secretions of the fluids of the body and the operations of thought, it must be evident to all, that it is singularly loose and unsatisfactory. The essentially different natures of matter and mind, must, for ever, be an effectual bar to its having any weight in the determination of the controversy. And even supposing that this objection were overcome, the only deduction which could be made from it is, that the theory of phrenology is not to be rejected without examination. It cannot possibly advance a step further than this; but the advocates of the system we are now considering, in some measure show the weakness of their cause, by wishing to draw from this analogy, a positive proof that phrenology is true. Even if all the analogies drawn from the animal secretions were favourable, they would amount to no more than this: they would merely

\* *Supplement to the Encyclopædia Britannica.* See also, ABERCROMBIE *on the Intellectual Powers.*

incline the philosophical observer to inquire into the fact, whether each of the organs of the brain were appropriated to the use of a particular faculty of the mind, or the whole brain were exercised in common by all the faculties. They would not prove the first to be the case.

But in what light are we to regard the argument, when we find, that some of the organs of the body discharge offices equally diversified with those of the intellect. The stomach digests very different kinds of food. There is not one part of it appropriated to the assimilation of animal substances, and another to that of vegetables. The same ear hears and distinguishes divers kinds of sounds; just as the same retina receives the impression of different colours. May we not, therefore, conclude, that the whole mass of the brain may serve as the instrument by which the mind can perform any one of its operations?

Concerning the proof attempted to be derived from the fact, that different men exercise the several intellectual powers with various degrees of energy, we shall merely observe, that the eyes of some men are unable to distinguish between different colours, while in other respects, their vision is perfectly good. Are we, therefore, to conclude, that one part of the eye is appropriated to the distinguishing of colours, while it is the office of another portion to perceive objects? If there is any truth in the argument of the phrenologists, this ought to be the case, or else the individuals who are thus circumstanced ought to be blind.

10. This doctrine of the plurality of cerebral organs is also attempted to be supported by an analogy between muscular and mental fatigue. When one set of muscles

is wearied by continued exertion, we experience relief by calling another set into action ; and in a similar way, say the phrenologists, when one organ has been too much exercised, it may be recruited by turning the attention to another subject. But this relief would also be obtained, supposing the whole brain to be exercised on every occasion. Mere change of employment would take away the sense of fatigue. When the retina has become fatigued by looking at one colour, it is restored to alertness when another colour is presented to it. Why, then, may not the same thing take place with respect to the brain? We may, indeed, *a priori* expect that the action of this organ is more probably like that of the optic nerve, than that of the muscles, which are comparatively a very coarse substance.

It is likewise observable, that the phrenologists have failed to prove that the more energetic action of any of the organs depends upon its size. They indeed assume this ; but may we not, on the other hand, argue that it is just as likely to depend upon the fineness of the texture, or delicacy of organization ? Small eyes have been said to see with more strength, and to last longer than large ones. And why may not this be the case with the brain ? At all events it remains for the phrenologists to prove that it is not.

11. Finally, it may be observed, concerning all the arguments which are derived by the supporters of this system from anatomy and physiology, that unprofessional inquirers may justly have doubts concerning their soundness, from the small number of eminent professors of those sciences who have numbered themselves among the supporters of phrenology. From defective information,

unprofessional readers may be unable to answer the arguments of the advocates of the system, but still they may ask, Why, if these arguments are so stringent, have so few of those who are best able to judge of their validity been convinced by them ?

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## CHAPTER II.

ON THE PHRENOLOGICAL THEORY OF THE  
HUMAN MIND.

12. Later phrenologists appeal from physiology to mental phenomena. 13. Wish their system to be made the basis of a national education. 14, 15, 16. The assertion of the phrenologists, that the elder metaphysicians have mistaken modes of operation for powers of mind, considered. 17. The phrenologists' enumeration of the mental faculties. *On the knowing faculties.* 18. Not important what theory on this subject be adopted. 19, 20. Phrenologists have omitted faculties for the perception of smell and taste. 21, 22. Their errors concerning the way in which we acquire a knowledge of distance, form, and size. 23. No particular faculty necessary for the cognition of time. 24. On the cognition of existences and events. 25. On the reflecting faculties. *On the animal propensities and moral sentiments.* 26. Remarks on the phrenologists' arrangement of the mental faculties. 27. Love of home not an instinctive faculty. 28. No instinct of constructiveness. 29. No instinctive impulse to conceal. 30. Impulse to possess, and instinct of destructiveness resolvable into the desire of power. 31. On resentment. 32. On curiosity. 33. On hope. 34. Self-love, not instinctive. 35. The mistakes of phrenologists about moral powers, most important. 36, 37. Butler's theory of morals, the true one—enunciated. 38. Essential difference between his theory and that of the phrenologists.

12. THE phrenologists have felt themselves somewhat pressed by the forlorn state of their science, to which we have alluded in the last chapter; and, consequently, some of its latest advocates have shifted their ground, and appealed from anatomy and physiology to the phenomena of mind. They do not rest the defence of their theory upon those considerations, by which its discoverers endeavoured to establish it, but appeal to every man's own experience. They say that their enumeration of the faculties of the human mind is so complete and satisfac-

tory, that every unprejudiced and educated man must acknowledge its truth, on its being submitted to his consideration.

13. While, moreover, these advocates of phrenology betake themselves to another sort of evidence than its first promulgators, they immensely increase its importance. They maintain that while the older systems of metaphysics have merely served for an exercise of ingenuity, or a display of subtlety in those who have cultivated them, this system is essentially practical. They do not, therefore, bring it forward to be like other new systems of philosophy, received or rejected by inquirers, according as they are influenced by the evidence for its truth; but gravely announce it as the basis for a scheme of national education. It has hitherto been thought, that the philosophy of the human mind required so great a power of abstraction in those who made any progress in it, as to make it the last subject to which the attention of youth was to be directed. In the first years of our existence, the perceptive powers are strong, while the reflective are comparatively weak. It is not, therefore, to be expected that the generality of young people will be able to give such a degree of attention to the operations of their minds, as shall enable them fully to estimate the different degrees of evidence which are presented by rival systems of pneumatology. They have, consequently, not been encouraged to trouble themselves with them, but rather to occupy their understandings with such inquiries as were more fitted to their present degree of developement.

The phrenologists, however, proceed in a different method. They represent that the truth of their system

is so evident as to fit it for the apprehension of young children; and, consequently, maintain that it is the duty of the legislature to educate the youth of the country, at the public expense, in the principles of this science.

We feel that we are making no unwarrantable demand, when we ask, that before such a scheme be put into operation, the system of phrenology should be subjected to a most searching examination. We are very far from saying, that our acquirements fit us for the right conducting of such an inquiry; but we have, nevertheless, felt ourselves compelled, by a sense of duty, to make some remarks on the subject. In doing so, we have no favourite scheme of our own to substitute in the place of phrenology; and shall, we therefore trust, be all the more qualified to manage the investigation with fairness and impartiality.

14. The objections which the advocates of this new theory have brought against the founders of the older systems, are certainly somewhat singular. "Nothing," says one of them, "can form a more instructive proof of the non-practical character of the differing and contradictory analyses of the human mind, which metaphysicians have severally propounded, than the failure of one and all of them to systematise education. The grand obstacle has been, that modes of mental action have, in various ways, been mistaken for primitive powers of mind; in other words, operations of mind, and not the specific operating energies, have been observed\*."

Now, it may well be asked, How can we possibly come at the knowledge of the mental faculties, but by observing the modes of the mind's operations? It has been

\* SIMPSON'S *Philosophy of Education*.

rightly maintained by the advocates of the immateriality of the soul, that we know just as much of its essence, as we do of the essence of matter. We know matter by observing its qualities, and we become conscious of mind, by reflecting on its states or susceptibilities. "If I am asked, What I mean by matter? I can only explain myself by saying, it is that which is extended, figured, coloured, moveable, hard or soft, rough or smooth, hot or cold ;—that is, I can define it no other way than by enumerating its sensible qualities. It is not matter or body which I perceive by my senses ; but only extension, figure, colour, and certain other qualities, which the constitution of my nature leads me to refer to something which is extended, figured, coloured. The case is precisely similar with respect to mind. We are not immediately conscious of its existence, but we are conscious of sensation, thought, and volition ; operations, which imply the existence of something which feels, thinks, and wills\*." How, indeed, is it possible to arrive at a knowledge of the powers of the mind, but by reflecting on its operations? We only know of its existence, by being conscious of them, as we know of the existence of matter, by observing its qualities.

We cannot, therefore, think that they are the most likely to give an exact analysis of the intellectual powers and moral feelings, who ostentatiously discard the only method by which we can possibly become acquainted with them.

15. There is also another reason why it is much safer,

\* Dr. Reid, as quoted by Dr. Stewart, in *Philosophy of the Human Mind*. Vol. i.

in treating of the mind, to speak of modes of action, than of operating energies. During the first years of our existence, our thoughts and observations are much more employed about the external world, than on the microcosm within. From this cause, the objects around us involuntarily attract our attention, and it is only by a strong mental effort, that we are afterwards able to withdraw the mind from contemplating them, and fix it upon its own states and affections. When, also, this process is effected, we cannot prevent ourselves from being influenced concerning the nature of mind, by the school in which we have been educated. Although mind is essentially different from matter, we are yet insensibly led, unless constantly on our guard, to ascribe to the former the properties and qualities of the latter. This propensity is much strengthened by the language we are obliged to use, when speaking of the nature and operations of mind.

All, or most of the words which express mental affections, have been primarily derived from the world of matter, and continue to retain about them some traces of their original source. The words "affection," "impression," "imagination," "reflection," "conception," and many others, are included in this description.

Now, it will at once be conceded, by all who have any just views of the proper mode of conducting investigations in mental philosophy, that this tendency to confound the affections and powers of mind with the qualities of matter, ought to be carefully guarded against. And consequently, that mode of speaking of the mind which is calculated to strengthen this propensity, is at once to be rejected.

This effect may, with confidence, be ascribed to the favourite nomenclature of the phrenologists. By speaking of operating powers or energies, and rejecting the phrase, modes of operation, and others kindred to it, they insensibly lead their disciples to ascribe parts to mind. They induce them to forget that it is single and indivisible, and to imagine that it has separate and distinct faculties, which are individually attached to the different organs of the brain. It is needless to say, that such a mode of thinking is highly unphilosophical. Whenever we speak or think of the mind, we must remember that it is the whole thinking principle which performs the various actions, or is subject to the different emotions which are ascribed to it.

When the eye is directed in a particular way, an object, or accumulation of objects, impresses its image on the retina, and the mind perceives, or, in other words, is thrown into the state of perception. This object may suggest another somewhat akin to it, and the mind is then employed in comparing them together; and thus, a second and different state is induced. Again, this object may be beautiful, and cause the mind to assume a third state, by exciting that emotion which we feel in contemplating such an existence.

In each of these cases we see, that it is the whole mind which begins to exist in different states. One follows another in the same way as a consequent follows its antecedent in the natural world. One state may be more complex than another, and be capable of being analyzed into a greater number of simple ideas; but they all equally employ the entire mind.

Whatever objections, therefore, the phrenologists may

have to the ancient mode of treating of mental phenomena, we think that their peculiar nomenclature is liable to much more serious charges. It keeps out of sight the absolute indivisibility of mind, and tends to foster the propensity, which all young people have, to confound the states or affections of the thinking principle with the qualities of matter.

16. The reason they put forth for adopting this phraseology is, that it is more likely to make the science of mind available for purposes of education. There may, however, be another motive, which it is not so convenient for them to avow. By talking in this way, they, in some measure, conceal the absurdity of their so-called science, from careless observers. Were the truth kept steadily before all men, that, whatever manner of speaking we may use for purposes of convenience, it is the whole mind which thinks, feels, desires, hates, loves, remembers, or compares, they would hesitate very much before they adopted a system, according to which, the mind is constantly dancing backwards and forwards, from one organ to another. If the system of the phrenologists be true, when a parent is caressing his child, his soul must be residing in the back of his head; if he begins to hope for its future success, his mind advances to his crown; when again, he reasons about the means by which the child's prosperity is to be advanced, the thinking principle comes forward, and takes its place in the forehead.

The phrenologists, in some measure, blind people's eyes to this absurd consequence of their system, by speaking exclusively of mental powers and energies; and this may be one very cogent reason for their adopting this phraseology. It at once assumes that they have fathomed the

whole mystery, and at the same time, spreads a veil over the true state of the case. Nothing, therefore, can be more prudent than their trying by all means to enforce it.

17. We, however, do not feel ourselves bound to follow their recommendation in the inquiry which we are proceeding to institute into their enumeration of the faculties of man. The only knowledge which we profess to have of the mental energies or powers, is that which we obtain by attending to the susceptibilities which, consciousness informs us, our mind exhibits.

The phrenologists, on the other hand, dogmatically enumerate certain faculties, which they maintain to be original powers of the human mind, and challenge the assent of every inquirer to the truth, propriety, and entireness of their classification.

In proceeding to remark on these qualities, we beg again to remind our readers, that it is not our object to enunciate a theory of our own. We merely think, that we shall be able to show that the scheme of the phrenologist is both defective and redundant. It does not contain some qualities and active powers which clearly belong to the mind, and it mentions others which a very easy analysis will enable us to resolve into simpler elements. We wish it also to be borne in mind that, according to the phrenologists themselves, this classification of theirs is decisive of the question at issue. They declare, that no education can be worthy of the name which has not for its basis a correct knowledge of the constitution of man; and that the propriety of their own method consists in its being founded upon the only correct theory of human nature. If, therefore, this theory, on examina-



tion, turns out to be defective or unsound, the system of instruction, which is thus intimately connected with it, must share in its fortunes, and at once fall to the ground.

It is somewhat remarkable, that while the advocates of phrenology boastfully maintain that it alone gives a true account of the faculties of the mind, scarcely any two of them are agreed in their enumeration of these faculties. Gall says, there are thirty-three of them; Mr. Combe tells us, there are thirty-five; while Mr. Simpson increases the number to thirty-seven. It may, therefore, with propriety be asked, Which is right? Some of the three must be mistaken, and they all claim infallibility. Without pretending to decide amidst such high pretensions, we shall make use of the list given by Mr. Simpson, in his *Philosophy of Education*; and it is as follows:—

#### INFERIOR FEELINGS.

##### ANIMAL PROPENSITIES.

Love of life.	Instinct of destruction.
Instinct of food.	Impulse to conceal.
Instinct of sex.	Impulse to possess.
Instinct of offspring.	Impulse to construct.
Instinct of home.	Self-love.
Instinct of society.	Desire of estimation.
Instinct of courage.	Fear.

#### SUPERIOR FEELINGS.

##### MORAL SENTIMENTS.

Benevolence.	Wonder.
Justice.	Ideal perfection. Imagination.
Veneration.	Laughter at the ludicrous.
Hope.	Imitation.
Firmness.	

## INTELLECT. THE SENSES.

## KNOWING FACULTIES.

Cognition of existences.	Cognition of arrangement.
Cognition of events.	Cognition of number.
Cognition of form.	Cognition of place.
Cognition of size.	Cognition of time.
Cognition of force.	Cognition of sound.
Cognition of colour.	

## REFLECTING FACULTIES.

Comparison.	Necessary consequence.
	Language.

## ON THE KNOWING AND REFLECTING FACULTIES.

18. WE certainly do not see in what way a particular theory of those faculties, which the phrenologists call knowing and reflecting, can have much influence on education. Whether a man's opinions on these subjects be right or wrong, or whether he have thought about them at all, does not, in our opinion, materially affect his moral or intellectual character. Many individuals have drawn right conclusions from given premises, without paying attention to the process through which the mind passed in performing the operation. Still more have possessed the power of rightly determining on the form or distance of external objects, without at all being aware of the means by which they arrived at the power of doing so.

We shall not, therefore, occupy much space or time in our observations on this branch of the subject; although we fancy, that we shall not take leave of it without showing

that the phrenologists have made it an occasion of displaying several errors.

The means by which the mind is affected by external objects are the five senses, of touch, taste, smell, hearing, and sight. To these Dr. Thomas Brown has added a sixth, which he calls muscular feeling, and by which, according to him, we acquire a knowledge of resistance\*.

19. Now, it is worthy of notice, that while the phrenologists ascribe to the mind faculties, by which respectively it gains a knowledge of sound, colour, and size; they do not allow any faculty by which we perceive the sensations of taste or smell. Here, then, there is obviously a deficiency in their enumeration; for, most certainly, the mind does exist in a peculiar state, after an affection of the organs of smell or taste, as well as after an affection of the eye. If the mind can only recognise colour by means of a peculiar faculty, how comes it to be affected by taste or smell, without any such endowment appropriated to these senses? When the organ of taste comes in contact with a sapid body, a change or affection is produced in the mind as truly and really as when a ray of light strikes upon the retina. The sensation proceeding from this cause may produce great pain, or great pleasure, and we can reason on its origin just the same as on that of any of our other sensations.

20. The same also may be said of the sense of smell. It is conducive to important uses in the animal economy, and a particular class of sensations is, without hesitation, ascribed to it by every sane man.

Both these senses, moreover, are manifested in different

\* It is somewhat remarkable, that Mr. Simpson lays claim to the discovery of this sixth sense.

individuals, with different degrees of intensity. The North American Indians have a singularly acute smell, and their nostril is remarkably wide. Is there, then, with them any organ of the brain correspondingly developed?

If, again, the mind can perceive smell or taste without a particular faculty, why may it not do the same with respect to colour and sound? In this case, there must be either omission or redundancy. For, whatever reason can be given for the existence of a faculty by which we perceive the sensation of colour, may be also given for our having a particular power for the perception of smell or taste. Here, then, we hold, that there is a fault or inconsistency in the phrenologists' enumeration of the mental faculties.

21. Again, when a ray of light falls upon the retina, the mind begins to exist in a particular state, or, in other words, it perceives colour. It does this, according to the phrenologists, by means of a knowing faculty; and they also affirm, that by means of a similar instrumentality, it acquires the ideas of figure, magnitude, or distance.

The knowledge of these qualities, however, does not come to the mind in the same way as that of colour. The sensation of colour is immediately from the eye; no reasoning or other mental process is gone through in order to acquire it; but it is not so with respect to our knowledge of figure, magnitude, and distance. Since the publication of Bishop Berkeley's "New Theory of Vision," it has been universally taught by metaphysicians, that the mind does not acquire these sensations directly and immediately from the eye, but by associating with vision the knowledge acquired from other sources.

When we judge of the distance or place of an object, it is not by an immediate sensation directly conveyed to the mind from the retina, but by a much more circuitous process. In point of fact, we exercise the reflecting faculties, we institute a comparison, we deduce the conclusion by a process of reasoning.

For instance, one of the means by which we judge of the distance of an object, is the relative brightness or dimness of the visible figure. Supposing two figures to appear to us of the same size, we compare their brightness and distinctness, and in this way form a conclusion as to their distance. When, accordingly, a painter wishes to put into his picture a large and distant object, he draws it small, and uses dim and faint colours. If he made it appear bright, we should suppose that it was intended to represent a small figure in the foreground, and not a large one in the background.

When, also, the rays of light, which are reflected from a particular object, pass through an indistinct medium in their progress to the eye, the perception of magnitude becomes less accurate. In a fog, all things seem enlarged; and it is only by exercising reflection, that we are able to form a just idea of their magnitude and distance. We also make use of other means in forming a judgment on the distance of objects; but what has been already said, concerning the brightness or dimness of the figure itself, must be sufficient to show that we do not perceive distance in the same way as we recognise colour.

In the acquisition of the sensation of colour, the mind is perfectly passive. The retina is affected in a certain way by light falling upon it, and immediately the mind begins to exist in a certain state, or to experience the

sensation of colour. The phrenologists may say, if they choose, that the mind does this by a particular faculty, but the faculty is very different from that by which we perceive distance, although they put them in the same class.

The vulgar imagine, that we take cognizance of distance and colour in exactly the same way, and it seems to be the intention of phrenologists, to propagate the error in their projected national schools. This circumstance, however, does not make the theory correct.

Distance and colour are, indeed, very closely associated in the mind of every grown person, and apparently the eye is the sole source of the knowledge of each. But this is a fallacy which it ought to be the object of a good education to eradicate; and not to strengthen it, by a pretended exact enumeration of mental faculties. This last way of speaking and teaching can merely serve to conceal a man's ignorance, and to make him imagine that he knows the philosophy of mind when he really is entirely ignorant of it.

Ask a man who has been taught in this way, how he acquires the knowledge of colour, and he will tell you, by a knowing faculty; ask him, how he comes by the knowledge of distance, and he will give you the same answer. But how different is the process in the two cases! Yet phrenology, and the system of education founded upon it, give no account whatever of this difference. Can phrenology, then, be said to be a correct theory of mind? Is that to be considered the only true system of metaphysics, which gives such inadequate, incorrect, and confused accounts of mental phenomena?

22. Similar remarks may be made on the perception

of form and size. For, although these sensations, as well as that of place, are constantly associated with vision, and are occasioned the moment we open our eyes, they are not primarily obtained from sight. We do not, in fact, obtain our knowledge of them directly and immediately by the eye, but by a course of reasoning which, on account of the frequency with which it is performed, can only be observed by a scrutinising analysis, and is wholly concealed from those who do not make the modes of the mind's operations, an object of contemplation. Can that, however, be called a just and true philosophy, which teaches its disciples to suppose that these sensations are obtained in the same way as that of colour, which is doubtless impressed on the mind of a child, as soon as it opens its eyes to the light, while it is only by experience that it comes to a knowledge of them?

If our observations were to stop here, we contend, that we have amply shown the insufficiency and unscientific character, of the account which the phrenologists give of the states, susceptibilities, and acts of the mind.

23. To pass, however, to other subjects: we are told that we have a faculty by which we acquire the cognition of time; but what is time, if it is not the succession of our ideas? Can we suppose a finite and reasonable being to exist without a knowledge of it? Surely, no man can say, that we obtain our knowledge of time in a manner at all similar to that in which we gain a knowledge of colour. It rather essentially belongs to our nature; external circumstances do not impress it upon us; they are but the occasions on which it is educed.

How idle, then, is it to talk about our having a faculty by which we obtain a knowledge of it! If we

have such a faculty, we ought also to have one, by which we obtain a knowledge of our own existence. This last, however, the phrenologists do not endow us with; but they certainly have as much reason to give us it, as that by which we recognise time. Their assertion, that we have such a power, is wholly unsupported by proof; and they might, with as much propriety, give us a separate faculty for every idea which the mind is capable of conceiving.

We have previously observed that, in a practical point of view, it does not appear to us of much consequence, what theory of the intellectual powers a man thinks to be correct. A wrong one will not lead him into errors in morality; and he perceives, reflects, deduces, remembers with equal vigour, whether or no he has just views of the way in which he performs these several mental operations.

Our object, therefore, in the remarks we have made on this part of the phrenologists' classification of the mental faculties, has been simply to show its faultiness and imperfection. We do not wish to establish any theory of our own; but merely to point out, that this vaunted enumeration fails entirely in giving a satisfactory account of the mental phenomena.

When we come to speak of the desires and active powers, we shall follow a somewhat different plan; for there we think, that very important errors are involved in the phrenologists' theory, and shall, consequently, endeavour to give what we believe to be a juster account of the moral faculties.

24. Before, however, we leave the division on which we are now engaged, we wish to make an observation or



two on what the phrenologists call the cognition of existences, and cognition of events. These gentlemen tell us that we have particular faculties, by which we severally obtain a knowledge of form, size, and force, or resistance; and they are also generous enough to give us, in addition to these, a power of knowing existences. Now, really it is difficult to discover, in what way we can possibly gain a knowledge of external material existence, but by the qualities above mentioned. If we define matter, we can only do so by enumerating its qualities. It is that which resists and is extended; and when we know the *form* of any substance, we surely must have knowledge of an existence. What, then, can possibly be the employment of that faculty by which we take cognizance of existences separate from their qualities? It must certainly be superfluous. If we separate from any substance, extension, form, and resistance, what remains of it? If there be anything, it must be some quiddity of the despised schoolmen. Let any man try what he can make of a piece of wood, when he has disjoined it from these qualities; and then he will be in a right situation for forming a correct estimate of the phrenologists' classification of the mental faculties. If he cannot form any idea of such a substance, it follows as an inevitable consequence, that this cognition of existences is, at any rate, a superabundant and superfluous power.

We can only, again, obtain knowledge of an event by means of sight or hearing, and to each of these senses, faculties have been already appropriated. If we see a man writing, we acquire a knowledge of an event; but is a separate faculty employed in gaining this informa-

tion from that which is employed in perceiving the man? We see an individual performing a certain action, and we see the consequences of his employment; are we then to understand, that it is owing to a particular faculty of the mind, that we conclude, that the marks upon the paper are made by the man who is writing? They who think so, may believe in the infallibility of phrenologists; but other people will, we think, have but a very indifferent opinion of their theory.

25. With respect to what are called the reflecting faculties, we have only to observe, that as we never heard of any one who denied to man the power of comparing, or drawing inferences, so we do not think, that it is any great discovery to find out, that he has the faculty of doing so.

#### ON THE ANIMAL PROPENSITIES AND MORAL SENTIMENTS.

26. UNDER the first denomination the phrenologists classify all the propensities which, they say, man has in common with the lower animals; and arrange under the second, all the other emotions which they ascribe to him.

We certainly do not think this arrangement a happy one; but, on the contrary, are of opinion that it is liable to very serious objections. On this part of the subject, however, we do not feel ourselves required to animadvert; our concern being with the enumeration itself, not with the heads under which it is arranged. Having, therefore, made some remarks on the lower faculties, we

shall proceed afterwards to a consideration of the moral sentiments, in the classifying of which, we consider that the phrenologists have committed most serious mistakes.

27. We shall first direct our attention to that faculty, which they call the instinct of Home. It is perfectly true, that man is endowed with an instinctive love of his offspring, and with a desire of society. But we contend, that these two propensities sufficiently account for his attachment to home, without referring that emotion to an independent faculty.

On the love of offspring, very important consequences depend; for if a parent were not endowed with such a feeling, it is scarcely possible to conceive what inducement he would have effectually to protect, support, and educate his children.

And as this feeling is equally requisite in the case of man, and of the lower animals, so it exists in both, though with various degrees of intensity. While the young creature is unable to defend and provide for itself, it has a never-failing substitute in the affection towards it which God has implanted in the breasts of those who have given it birth. The lower animals, indeed, soon come to an age at which they are able to provide for themselves, and when that period arrives, the relation of parent and offspring is instantly dissolved among them. The young animal is separated from that mother, who for months has been so much attached to it, as to prefer its safety to her own, and becomes to her as though the relationship had never existed. They are wholly disjoined from each other, and if, by chance, they ever meet,

they do not recognise the intimate connexion which once subsisted between them.

It is not so with man. Of all animals he is the longest in arriving at that period of life when he can provide for himself, and the affection of his parent towards him is of corresponding duration. It arises in the breast of the mother at the same time as the substance with which she has been supplied for the support of her offspring, but lasts during the whole of her child's existence. Man is not, like the lower animals, furnished with a natural covering to protect him from the inclemency of the seasons, and with appropriate weapons to defend himself from danger, or provide himself with food. These things he must gain for himself by the exercise of reason and ingenuity; and he can only do so effectually, when he has been educated and trained to the task by others. Hence the long duration of the human parents' affection; hence, also, the unceasing care and anxiety with which nature teaches them to watch over the welfare of their children. Man is, therefore, by the very circumstances of his birth a social animal. He is born in society, and in society he lives. From the first moment of his existence he is indebted to others, both for the means of supporting life and of making it agreeable. And no sooner is he able to give any signs whatever of the nature of his feelings, than he shows a pleasure in the society of others. A child stretches out its little arms, and gives every token of satisfaction, when it sees another child. And this feeling continues in man: it grows with his growth, and strengthens with his strength. To society he is indebted for his safety and his happiness; and nature

has, accordingly, implanted in his breast a love for it, which can only be extinguished when reason itself is morbidly affected.

The gratification we derive from this source is only to be obtained in its highest intensity, when we are in the society of those in whose affection and faithfulness we can place absolute reliance. We have then no chilling emotions of restraint; we are not afraid to express the immediate sensibilities of the heart; we have no fear that our joys or sorrows should not be poured into a sympathising bosom; and consequently experience to the full, all the pleasures of social intercourse.

In no place, however, can the requisite qualifications for this delightful satisfaction be found in such perfection as at home. That word always excites in every man of true sensibility, the tenderest and kindest feelings. If he is a husband and father, it reminds him of those in whose happiness his own is most deeply involved, and whose reliance upon him is more than an ample recompense for every care and every anxiety. If he be exercising the duties of a son, his emotions are of another kind, but not the less pleasing; he thinks of his parents, to whom he owes so much; he calls to mind his brothers, with whom he has joined in the sports of childhood, and speculated, with boyish simplicity, on the occupations and pursuits of men. Is it, then, surprising that he should be attached to this place? Need we create some additional instinct, in order to account for the delightful emotions which the word *Home* excites in his breast? All the attachment he can possibly feel for the place is fully accounted for, by his affection for those who dwell within its walls.

It is, therefore, contrary to every principle of sound philosophy, to ascribe this feeling to an original faculty. The same sort of emotion is felt, when we are reminded of the dwelling-place of an intimate friend; nay, it is excited when we think of the time at which we parted from him, or turn our attention to the trifling article of use or ornament which he gave us, at parting, as a memorial of his friendship. Do the phrenologists, then, give us an original faculty for this feeling also, or do they leave it unaccounted for, in the exclusive attention which they have directed to the other?

In truth, the origin of both feelings is to be found in the principle of suggestion or association, which exercises so extensive an influence over every operation of the human mind. Home excites in us a recollection of the pleasures we have enjoyed there, as a penknife, which a friend has given us, reminds us of the gratification we have derived from his society. These pleasing feelings are, by a common illusion, transferred to the things themselves, and do not by any means spring from an original separate faculty in the mind.

28. As the instinct of home exists only in the imagination of phrenologists, so we shall find, that that of constructiveness has no better foundation. Man builds houses, and makes himself clothes, because his reason informs him, that this is the best way of defending himself from the inclemency of the seasons. Other animals have sufficient protection given them by nature, or are endowed with instinct to erect themselves habitations. These latter animals show that their propensity is instinctive, by never improving on the pattern which is followed by all their race, and by the universality, as well as same-

ness, of their operations. The sparrow was never known which did not build, for the hatching of its young, a nest exactly the same as that constructed by other sparrows, and it does it as well on the first trial, as after repeated efforts.

There have, however, been nations found in warm climates, who did not build houses of any kind; and few will deny, that all men do not erect their habitations after the same pattern. These two circumstances sufficiently point out the origin of man's custom of constructing buildings. They show, that it has sprung from the efforts of his reason, to remedy the wants and necessities of his circumstances. Deprive him of this, his distinguishing quality, and his "dwelling would be in dens of the earth, in clefts of the rocks, and in the hollows of trees\*."

So far is his being a "tool-making animal" from affording any proof of the contrary, that it is a strong confirmation of the truth of the assertion. It shows, that he was neither endowed with an instinct to construct, nor with natural instruments for that instinct to use; but had bestowed upon him the gift of reason, which more than supplied the place of both.

29. The impulse to conceal, is as gratuitous and supernumerary as any of the others. At the first dawn of reason, the child has no notion of concealing his sentiments. As soon as he acquires the power of speech, he freely employs it in communicating all his wishes, and making known every sentiment with which his young mind is affected. It is only when he has experienced the

\* HERSCHEL'S *Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy*.

inconvenience which this practice brings upon him, that he begins to keep some of his opinions to himself. He perceives, that the free communication of his thoughts sometimes excites the displeasure or anger of his attendants or parents, and he therefore gradually acquires the habit of keeping to himself such opinions as he fancies will, if made known, produce unpleasant consequences.

How, then, can it with propriety be said, that man is endowed with an impulse to conceal? He does so, because he perceives it to contribute to his ultimate advantage; but it is the very nature of instinctive feelings, to act regardless of consequences; and all the connexion they have with reason, is to be modified by its exercise. This is not the case in the act of concealing; and therefore we contend, that it does not arise from an instinctive power.

30. The impulse to possess, and the instinct of destruction, are neither of them original faculties. They are both branches of one, which exercises a great influence in the minds of all men, but which has no place in the system of the phrenologists. We allude to the desire of power.

This desire manifests itself at a very early age. The child is pleased by the noise made by another; but is still more gratified on finding, that he has the power himself of making his plaything sound. As he advances in years, he shows the influence which the desire of power has over him, by his continued exertion and untiring activity. The games of boyhood are but an unceasing display of power. Whether the boy runs or leaps, dis-



plays strength or exerts ingenuity, his satisfaction chiefly arises from the gratification of his love of power.

When he comes to manhood, he is not satisfied with exercising command over his own limbs, but desires also to have other men under his dominion. Sometimes this wish is gratified by the facility which rank or wealth gives him, of compelling men to submit to his will by the vulgar means of open force.

Men with high intellectual endowments, turn away with disgust from a display of power which merely reaches to the outward actions of those on whom it is exercised, and leaves their will free and unfettered. Such men try to control their fellows by means of mental power. They aim at making the wills of others yield to the superior force and energy of their own; and thus using them as instruments for the furtherance of their designs.

There are others, whose love of power can only be gratified in a still higher and nobler way. They will not even endeavour to make others comply with their wishes, by the exertion of that sort of force which intellectual superiority confers upon them. The only obedience with which they can be satisfied, is that which arises from the delightful emotions of gratitude and love. Their desire of power can only be effectually gratified, when, by offices of kindness, and proofs of regard, they have so entirely gained the hearts of those with whom they have to do, that a declaration of their will is eagerly looked for, in order that it may be instantly complied with.

Thus various is this pervading desire in its manifestations. It may frequently be detected in the breasts of those who do not at all suspect that they are actuated

by it; and, according to the dispositions with which it is joined, it sometimes leads to the most heroic sacrifices for the good of others, and sometimes to the perpetration of the most outrageous acts of insolent tyranny.

We have said, that it is from this emotion that a desire to possess takes its origin; and we now proceed to show how this process is effected. There are few individuals who have not had an opportunity of observing the influence which the possession of money gives to a man in society. The rich man can positively command the services of many, and many more are anxious to comply with his wishes, in the hopes of reaping future favours from him. Wealth, also, supplies him with the means of purchasing the conveniences, luxuries, and elegances of life. While he is possessed of money, he is conscious that he has the power of obtaining any of those things on which men commonly set the highest value. He, therefore, comes to love money for its own sake. At first, it was desired as the means of procuring pleasure, but in time, the affection is transferred to the thing itself; and, in some cases, it exists with such intensity, that the miser cannot part with a sixpence, though he may actually be in want of the necessities of life.

In this way, the love of power is transformed into the desire to possess money; and in a similar manner, it is sometimes changed into a desire of possessing other things. At first, the book-collector values his choicest volumes, merely as depositories, to which he can apply for information when he wants it. He may not spend much time in reading, but while he has a collection of books he has the power of doing so whenever he chooses.

Hence arises his desire of possessing them; and similar reasons impel a man to form collections of other articles, to which his taste or vanity makes him attach importance. In no case need we resort to an "impulse to possess" for a solution of the phenomenon.

It is also from the love of power, that men, especially when young, sometimes exercise cruelty towards the lower animals. "We need not," says Dugald Stewart, "search in the malevolent dispositions of our nature, for any other motive to the apparent acts of cruelty, which he (the young man) sometimes exercises over the inferior animals,—the sufferings of the animal, in such cases, either entirely escaping his notice, or being overlooked in that state of pleasurable triumph, which the wanton abuse of power communicates to a weak and unreflecting judgment\*."

31. In addition to the acts of cruelty which man commits from the simple love of power, he frequently, also, perpetrates deeds of violence from anger or resentment. This feeling arises in his breast when he conceives that he has suffered, or is threatened with an injury. It is a weapon of defence with which God has supplied him for his protection. It springs up on the first symptoms of aggression, and comes to the assistance of the weak and unarmed, long before they could avail themselves of any extraneous protection.

The object for which this emotion was implanted in the human breast, is shown by the uneasiness which its presence creates. It is not intended to have a permanent dwelling-place, but merely to reside while its presence is

\* *Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers.*

imperatively demanded. It cannot, therefore, be called an instinct of destructiveness; for in a healthy mind, it has but an occasional and momentary existence. As soon as its office is discharged, it is dismissed from its temporary abode as an unwelcome intruder; and never has any influence over a man's conduct, except when himself, or his companion, is threatened with attack.

32. While the phrenologists have been pleased to ascribe to man original faculties which he does not really possess, they have omitted others which exercise the greatest influence over the formation of his opinions, and the regulation of his conduct. It is very remarkable, seeing it is wished to found a plan of national education on the system, that among the unmentioned faculties should be found the desire of knowledge, or principle of curiosity. That man is endowed with such an emotion, is proved by the earliest actions of a child; the acquisition of knowledge forming one of the chief employments of the earliest part of our existence. Nothing can be presented to a healthy and vigorous child, which he does not eagerly handle and examine. His mind is ever on the alert, and the principle of curiosity is hourly enabling him to enlarge the sphere of his acquaintance with external nature. The strength of this principle is likewise shown, by the eagerness with which a boy listens to a tale which interests him, and the uneasiness which he manifests when the narrator stops his communication, without giving the conclusion of the story.

In after life, the gratification of this desire forms one great source of happiness to every human being; and on the direction which it receives in education, very materially depends the future character of the pupil.

The pleasure which results from its gratification, as clearly points out the reason of its being implanted in us, as the appetite for food is to be referred to the support of the body, as the final cause of its existence. By gratifying the desire for knowledge, a man obtains a separate and peculiar pleasure, just as satisfying the appetite for food diffuses a pleasing sensation throughout the system. The one is given us for the strengthening and sustentation of our bodies; the other is bestowed upon us for the enlarging and invigorating of our minds.

That plan of education must, therefore, be necessarily inefficient and imperfect, which leaves out of consideration, so important and influential a faculty as this. Such a proceeding appears somewhat akin to the performance of the tragedy of the prince of Denmark, with the part of Hamlet omitted by particular desire.

33. Hope, according to the phrenologists, is a separate moral sentiment, but it is, in reality, merely a modification of our desires. "Each of our desires," says Dr. Thomas Brown, "may exist in different forms, according to the degree of probability of the attainment of the object. When there is little, if any probability, it constitutes what is termed a mere wish; when the probability is stronger, it becomes what is called hope; with still greater probability, expectation; and with a probability that approaches certainty, confidence. This variation of the form of the desire, according to the degrees of probability, is, of course, not confined to any particular desire, but runs through all the desires which have been enumerated, and every other desire of which the mind is, or may be supposed to be, capable. Hope, therefore, important as it is to our happiness, is not to

be considered as a distinct emotion, but merely as one of the forms in which all our desires are capable of existing\*."

There are, therefore, educated persons, who do not admit the propriety of the phrenologists' enumeration of our faculties; for there are men of no mean reputation, who, instead of reckoning hope a distinct emotion, make it a modification of desire.

34. The phrenologists also inform us, that self-love is an original propensity. Its nature, however, is essentially distinct from that of the principles we have been hitherto considering. It is not instinctive, but takes its rise from man's power of contemplating the objects of his desires, and the way in which they act upon his happiness.

"Bishop Butler," says Sir James Mackintosh, "shows, admirably well, that unless there were principles of action independent of self, there could be no pleasures and no happiness for self-love to watch over. A step farther would have led him to perceive, that self-love is altogether a secondary formation; the result of the joint operation of reason and habit upon the primary principles. It could not have existed without pre-supposing original appetites and organic gratifications. Had he considered this part of the subject, he would have strengthened his case, by showing that self-love is as truly a derived principle, not only as any of the social affections, but as any of the most confessedly acquired passions. It would appear clear, that as self-love is not divested of its self-regarding character, by considering it

\* BROWN'S *Lectures*, Lecture 65.

as acquired, so the social affections do not lose any part of their disinterested character, if they be considered as formed from simpler elements. Nothing would more tend to root out the old prejudice, which treats a regard to self as analogous to a self-evident principle, than the proof, that self-love is itself formed from certain original elements, and that a living being long exists before its appearance\*."

Those, therefore, who venture to dispute the infallibility of the enumeration which the phrenologists give of the original faculties of man, have at least the comfort of reflecting, that they have on their side the authority of men who have hitherto had no mean reputation for skill in pneumatology.

So far, also, from its being impossible for a sane man to refuse assent to "their postulates as to human powers, impulses, instincts, or faculties," we have seen that they are not at all calculated to bear a rigid scrutiny, but turn out to be erroneous in divers important particulars.

On this ground alone, therefore, we contend, that there is ample reason for hesitation, before such a system be adopted as the basis for a national education.

35. When, however, we proceed to examine the moral principles of our nature, we shall find that, in this part of the subject, the errors of the phrenologists involve much more serious consequences than in any other.

In prosecuting this branch of our inquiry, we shall follow a somewhat different method from that which we

\* *Preliminary Dissertation to Encyclopædia Britannica.*

have hitherto pursued. We shall endeavour to show what is the true theory of morals, and then point out in what respects it differs from that given by the phrenologists. And we think that we shall be able to make it apparent, that the errors of their system are so great, as to render any scheme of education founded upon it totally unfit for any purpose of sound moral and religious training. We profess ourselves to be disciples of Bishop Butler in ethics, and are convinced, that he has placed moral obligation on the only certain and immoveable basis.

36. The discoveries which Butler\* made in morals, may be conveniently divided into two parts. By the one, he introduced the distinction between the final object of any desire, and the pleasure which invariably accompanies its gratification; and by the other, he vindicated the supremacy of conscience. "Private happiness or good," he says, "is all which self-love can make us desire, or be concerned about; in having this, consists its gratification. \* \* \* \* On the other hand, particular affections tend towards particular external things: these are their objects: having these is their end: in this consists their gratification: no matter whether it be, upon the whole, our interest or happiness. An action done from the former of these principles is called an interested action. An action proceeding from any of the latter, has its denomination of passionate, ambitious, friendly, revengeful, or any other, from the particular appetite or affection from which it proceeds." \* \* \* "Love of our

\* See BUTLER'S *Sermons on Human Nature*, and Dr. CHALMERS'S *Bridgewater Treatise*.



neighbour," he again says, "has just the same respect to, is no more distant from, self-love, than hatred of our neighbour, or than love or hatred of anything else."

A man, therefore, according to Butler, does not do a good action to his neighbour, for the sake of the pleasure which will result to himself, but because there is a principle or instinctive feeling implanted in him, which urges him to benevolence. This distinctive feeling occupies the same place, with respect to our performance of benevolent actions, as hunger does with reference to our taking food. We eat because we are hungry, and the consequence is, that our body is supported, and a certain pleasurable sensation diffused throughout the entire system. When, however, we come to reverse the intentions of nature, and eat for the gratification of taste, we very soon deprive ourselves of that pleasure which a healthy man derives from the satisfying of his hunger; and our bodies are not nourished by the superabundant food.

In a similar way, if we benefit others from motives of self-love, we lose the pleasure which is attached to the performance of good actions. If we would derive pleasure from the exercise of the natural inclination, pleasure must not be the actuating motive of our conduct. The pleasure attending the indulgence of any affection, is not the object of that affection. The object is one thing, the pleasure attending its attainment is another. If a man is really to enjoy the pleasures which attend benevolence, self must not be in all his thoughts; his mind must be given up to the person whom he is assisting. If self does intrude, it destroys that gratification which

he would otherwise derive from the exercise of his benevolent feeling.

Each affection has a specific object appropriated to it, and a particular gratification resulting from it. Thus, the love of fame is directed towards applause, hunger towards food, revenge towards the infliction of pain on a hated individual, ambition towards power; and there is a certain gratification arising from its object being attained by each of these affections.

37. Is there, then, to be a general confusion, and strife for mastery in each man's mind, among all these principles of action? Is there to be a perpetual contest going on, till some one vehement desire acquires strength to subdue and tyrannise over the rest? Butler's system supplies a power, in his second discovery, to allay this commotion. He brings under our notice *conscience*, which he shows to be a principle, claiming the superintendence and supremacy over all others. "That principle," he says, "by which we survey, and either approve or disapprove of our own heart, temper, and actions, is not only to be considered as what in its turn is to have some influence; which may be said of every passion, and of the lowest appetites; but likewise as being superior: as from its very nature claiming superiority over all others: insomuch that you cannot form a notion of this faculty, conscience, without taking in judgment, direction, superintendency. This is a constituent part of the idea, that is, of the faculty itself: and, to preside over and govern, from the very economy and constitution of man, belongs to it. Had it strength, as it has right: had it power, as it has manifest autho-

ity, it would absolutely govern the world." \* \* \* "This faculty was placed within us to be our proper governor; to direct and regulate all undue principles, passions, and motives to action. This is its right and office: thus sacred is its authority. And how often soever men violate and rebelliously refuse to submit to it, for supposed interest which they cannot otherwise obtain, or for the sake of passion which they cannot otherwise gratify; this makes no alteration as to the natural right and office of conscience."

38. Here is a theory of human nature, altogether different from the one presented to us by the phrenologists. For what principle is there in their system, which has the right and office to command all others? The faculty which these gentlemen choose to call conscientiousness, or justice, is of a totally different description. It puts in no claim to command; it has no right of presiding over all others. If, indeed, a man consults his happiness, according to the phrenologists, he will allow the moral sentiments and intellect to have supremacy over all his other faculties: but, then, this is a matter of expediency on the individual's part,—the moral sentiments and intellect do not claim this high office as a matter of right.

Butler, however, makes conscience to have and claim a power of superintending all the faculties and principles—the highest as well as the lowest. It is not joined in command with other faculties, but lays claim to a supremacy over all. Its place in the moral system, also, is not a matter of expediency, but of right. According to Butler, our obligation to obey the law of conscience is its being the law of our nature.

It must, we think, be evident, that the disciples of either of these systems cannot consider that education right, which is founded upon the other. The phrenologists assume, that human nature is so constituted, that the mere pleasure of exercising the superior faculties will give them supremacy over the lower, when a man is properly educated. Duty is excluded from their system; and they assert, that sentimental gratification is sufficient to enable a man to resist temptation, and keep his lower faculties in subjection to the higher.

The others again declare, that such a barrier will always be found insufficient to restrain a man within the limits of honesty and sobriety. They assert, that conscience is placed within a man's breast by his Creator, for the purpose of declaring to him what is His will: that it is an internal monitor, ever ready to vindicate its right to command, and to denounce no less a penalty than God's displeasure on all who refuse to obey it.

They accordingly maintain, that no education is for a moment to be trusted, as an instrument of moral good, which does not direct its chief efforts to enlightening man's conscience, and strengthening its power to enforce obedience to its dictates.

This, they again say, can only effectually be done, by making the Christian revelation the basis of instruction; and teaching youth, that the Bible alone can effectually enlighten the conscience, and enable it to gain power sufficient to keep in subjection man's rebellious passions and appetites.

Can it, then, be wondered at, that the advocates of such a system feel themselves called upon to protest against one which pursues quite a different method of

instruction. If they did not do so, they might be chargeable with insincerity or inconsistency; but surely, it is unfair to hold them up as enemies to education, because they wish that kind of tuition to be used, which they believe to be alone able to make men wise and good.

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## CHAPTER III.

## ON THE DOCTRINE OF THE FALL OF MAN.

39. Fall of man, the first doctrine of Christianity attacked by phrenologists. 40. Mr. Combe's statements on this subject. 41. He expects a new mode of interpreting the Bible to be discovered. 42. Two questions to be answered: (1.) By what arguments the doctrine of the fall of man has been disproved. (2.) What weight the determinations of Scripture are to have on the subject. 43. Answer to the latter question. 44. Assertions of the sacred writers, concerning astronomy and geology, of comparatively little importance. 45. They have been reconciled with modern discoveries. 46, 47. If not, the authority of the Bible on religion would not be shaken. 48. The doctrine of the fall of man, of essential importance. 49. A work which impugns this doctrine attacks the Christian religion. 50. Geology and astronomy had never been the objects of men's contemplations as theologians. 51. The fall of man, a religious doctrine. 52. A Christian justified in rejecting the phrenologists' theory, because opposed to the doctrines of his religion. 53. Inquiry into the arguments by which the theory is supported. 54. Mr. Combe's statement of them. 55, 56. By the fall of man, the power of conscience has been weakened. 57. Further statements of Mr. Combe: 58. In them, he really gives up the subject in dispute. 59. Organ and faculty, not synonymous terms. 60. Man has power to resist the tendency which a particular organization of brain gives him. 61, 62. Impossible to show, that, before the fall, the lower organs were not imperfectly developed. 63. Difficulties peculiar to the phrenological theory. 64. The doctrine of the fall, not shaken.

39. THE first doctrine of the Christian religion, against which the phrenologists especially direct their attacks, is that of human depravity. They announce, that phrenology absolutely proves the fall of man to be a groundless dogma of theologians, and, consequently, that education is alone to be approved of, which totally rejects this false and mischievous doctrine.

This annunciation is made more particularly in Mr. George Combe's Treatise on the *Constitution of Man*; and that it is in accordance with the doctrines of the sect, is shown by the praise which the professors of the science have been pleased to bestow on the work in which it is contained.

We see, therefore, what a total change the phrenologists aim at making, both in morals and religion; and we do not think it foreign to the work we have in hand, to inquire into the reasons by which the doctrine of man's fall (hitherto, almost universally received by professing Christians) is sought to be overthrown.

40. Mr. Combe does not affect to deny, that the system which he advocates is opposed to the received interpretation of Scripture. He tells us, that, "In our own country, two views of the constitution of the world and of human nature have been long prevalent, differing widely from each other, and which, if legitimately followed out, would lead to distinct practical results. The one is, that the world, including both the physical and moral departments, contains within itself the elements of improvement, which time will evolve and bring to maturity; it having been constituted by the Creator on the principle of a progressive system, like the acorn in reference to the oak. \* \* \* The other hypothesis is, that the world was perfect at first, but fell into derangement, continues in disorder, and does not contain within itself the elements of its own rectification. \* \* \* It appears to me, (he tells us,) extremely difficult to reconcile these two systems."—p. 4.

In this last opinion we perfectly coincide; but we

cannot say, that we equally agree with him, as to which system is to yield the preference to the other.

“Galileo,” he again informs us, “was told from high authority in the church, that his doctrine of the revolution of the globe was obviously at variance with Scripture, and that, therefore, it could not be true; but as his opinions were founded on palpable facts, which could be neither concealed nor denied, they necessarily prevailed. If there had been a real opposition between Scripture and nature, the only result would have been, a demonstration that Scripture, in this particular instance, was erroneously interpreted; because the evidence of physical nature is imperishable and insuperable, and cannot give way to any authority whatever. The same consequence will evidently happen in regard to phrenology.”—p. 89.

We are no longer ignorant, therefore, of what we have to expect from the diffusion of this new philosophy; our present mode of interpreting Scripture, is either to be entirely altered, or the Bible itself must suffer in the collision of the two principles. They cannot, according to the professions of phrenologists themselves, both be true; and we must be prepared to decide between the conflicting systems. Of course, Mr. Combe has not the least doubt which must ultimately prevail; but the reason he gives, why the present method of interpreting the Bible is wrong, is certainly somewhat singular. “The period,” he says, “from the revival of letters to the present day, has been the age of scholastic learning, as contra-distinguished from that of philosophy and science. Christianity stands before us, therefore, at



present, as interpreted by men who knew extremely little of the science of either external nature, or the human mind.”—p. 90.

41. We must confess, that before the publication of this new method of arriving at truth, we, with some others, had been of opinion, that the best way of getting at an author's meaning, was, by proceeding according to the rules of philology and criticism. It now, however, appears, that we have been altogether mistaken. Bentley and Porson, Michaelis and Schleusner, are no longer to be followed as guides, in arriving at the knowledge of obsolete languages. A new plan has been discovered. The Scotch, who, at one time, used to be looked upon by their southern brethren, as somewhat deficient in this branch of knowledge, have discovered a method, by which they are enabled to do without it. They (or at least those of them who are phrenologists) can now find out an author's meaning, without the school-boy assistances of grammars and lexicons. These might be of service in the “age of scholastic learning, when men knew extremely little of the science of external nature, or the human mind ;” but now, when the more advanced in the march of intellect have got even to the heights of phrenology, they are to be thrown aside as useless incumbrances and heavy baggage.

42. Before, however, old fashioned people resign themselves to the guidance of these new lights, they may be allowed to ask, by what arguments the ancient and received doctrine of the fall of man has been disproved ; and how much weight the declarations of the Bible are really to have in the determination of the question.

We shall endeavour to answer the last query first.

43. Mr. Combe decides the subject in dispute in a very summary way. He gives us to understand, that as divines have found out a method of reconciling the declarations of Scripture with the modern discoveries in astronomy and geology, although they were, at one time, supposed to be hostile to each other; so they must bestir themselves to discover a way, by which the Bible may be twisted into accordance with the opinions of these new philosophers. If they do not, the Scriptures must be given up as an inspired authority in matters relating to the conduct of men in this world; whatever may be their weight with respect to another.

And he backs these somewhat bold and confident opinions, by the authorities of Archbishop Whateley, and Professor Sedgwick; for, be it observed, that notwithstanding the boasted devotion of phrenologists to reason and pure science, they are not at all averse from appealing to the *argumentum ad verecundiam*, when doing so, suits their purpose.

44. The subjects, however, on which these two divines have given their opinions, are very different from that on which Mr. Combe is writing. It was not intended, in the Bible, to instruct men in astronomy and geology; the mention of these sciences is merely incidental to its main design. If, therefore, its declarations concerning them could not have been reconciled with modern discoveries, its authority in matters of religion would not, in our estimation, have been in the least shaken.

45. It has, indeed, long ago been shown, that there is no irreconcilable difference between the statements of modern astronomers, and the Scripture accounts of the

phenomena of the heavens. And Professor Buckland has, in his *Bridgewater Treatise*, clearly demonstrated, that the Mosaic account of the creation does not assert that the earth was first made when man was placed on it. On these subjects, therefore, the most fastidious friends of revealed religion need feel no alarm whatever. The Bible has passed through the ordeal with safety; and the truth of its statements on either of these sciences has not been at all affected.

Still, however, the process of reconciliation appears to us comparatively a matter of indifference. Had the authors of the books of the Bible shown by their narratives, that they were not men of science in the modern acceptation of the term, their authority, as inspired teachers of religion, would not, in our opinion, have been at all diminished. Their knowledge of man's relation to God, and his consequent duties, is not at all involved in the question; but would have remained as unimpeachable, if they had been convicted of ignorance on these extraneous matters, as it is now, when they have been proved to have made no wrong statements concerning them.

46. Had it, indeed, been otherwise, scoffers might have availed themselves of the discovery, and the faith of some weak believers might have been shaken. And, therefore, we are rejoiced, that the propriety of the declarations of the inspired writers, on subjects of natural philosophy, has been fully maintained and defended. If, however, Professor Buckland had failed in his well-intentioned effort, our faith would have been as firm as it is after his success.

If Joshua had believed that the "sun stood still, and

the moon stayed" absolutely, and not relatively, "until the people had avenged themselves on their enemies," we do not see, that his credit would have been at all injured as an inspired prophet of God. His not knowing astronomy would not have prevented him from being a truthful teacher of the people in righteousness. He was not commissioned to instruct mankind in the motions of the heavenly bodies, but in the ways of God; to exhort them to fear the Lord, and serve him in sincerity and truth: and this latter office, he could have perfectly and efficiently performed, although he had been wholly ignorant of astronomy.

47. The object of Moses, again, in writing the first chapter of Genesis, was to make known to mankind, the great and all important truth, that in the beginning God created the heaven and the earth. He wished to proclaim, that this material universe is not eternal or self-existent; but that it had a beginning, and that beginning was imparted to it by an omniscient and omnipotent Creator. To this Creator alone, therefore, was the fealty of man due. He was neither to worship the elements, nor the stars of heaven; and if he gave that service to the creature, which he rightfully owed to the Creator, he would sin, and render himself liable to the wrath of Almighty God.

Surely, it will not be denied by any one, that this truth is of sufficient importance to justify a prophet's being inspired to teach it.

But in order that Moses might enunciate it rightly and justly, it was not necessary for him to be instructed in the various processes through which the earth passed, before it was brought into its present condition. Moses

taught man that God created the world, and left it to human ingenuity to find out the various adaptations, by which the wisdom and goodness of the Creator are so wonderfully shown.

New proofs of these attributes are being daily drawn from the teeming womb of creation; but it is no infringement on the inspiration of Moses, that he was not acquainted with them. They are but collateral and incidental to his main design; and, therefore, we think that no anxiety need have been felt about the effect which the discoveries of geologists might have on the truth of the Mosaic narrative.

48. The fall of man, however, is a subject of quite a different kind, and is to be viewed in quite a different light. It is not mentioned as a subject incidental to the main design of the sacred volume, but itself forms the foundation, on which the whole superstructure of revelation rests. It is detailed to us, in the opening of the Bible, as the source of death and all our woe, and afterwards, the whole of the book of Scripture is but a continuous evolving of a scheme, conceived in the depths of the wisdom of God, for counteracting its deleterious consequences; till the object is at length accomplished by the sacrifice of Christ.

49. When, therefore, a work is ushered forth, the avowed intention of which is, to show that this doctrine is founded in a mistaken view of human nature, it must be regarded by every faithful Christian with very different feelings from those treatises which, as it were, incidentally glance at some doubtful assertion in the sacred volume. Archbishop Whateley, to whom Mr. Combe appeals for a confirmation of his opinions, says,

“That if it could be demonstrated, that mankind could not possibly have descended from a single pair, such a conclusion, no doubt, would go far to shake the foundation of our religion\*.” The only way, however, on Archbishop Whateley’s principles, in which this conclusion would have such a tendency, would be by its disproving the Scriptural statement concerning the fall. For obviously, if mankind were not descended from a common ancestor, the sin of Adam could not affect the whole human race.

But one of the avowed objects of Mr. Combe and other phrenologists is, to disprove what they are pleased to call the “theological dogma of the fall of man.” With but a very slender apparatus of proof, they coolly desire all men to yield up their previous convictions, and to believe, that they have discovered a system which shall entirely supersede them.

Mr. Combe’s work, therefore, comes before us with very different pretensions from those works on astronomy and geology to which he affects to compare it. Even if these works could not be reconciled with the views of the sacred writers, man’s hopes need not be shaken, nor his fears for the authority of revelation excited; and they have been fully and fairly shown not to be at variance with the declarations of the Bible. But the scheme, which we are now considering, strikes at the very foundation of the Christian’s hopes, and, if it could be shown to be true, would totally annihilate every claim of the Bible to be received as the Word of God.

50. Further, the things to which astronomy and geology refer, had never formed the subject of men’s

\* *Lectures on Political Economy.*

contemplations as theologians. They had received their notions concerning them from other and independent sources; and then imagined, that these views were confirmed by what was said in the Bible. They did not, in the first place, go to the Scriptures to learn astronomy and geology (or whatever they knew about them) but formed systems of their own, and then tried to confirm them by what they could draw from the incidental assertions of the sacred writers. And by length of time, these two sources of intelligence had become so mixed together in men's minds, that they confounded the one with the other. They fancied that their knowledge had in the first place been derived from the declarations of Moses, whereas, in truth, Moses had been originally appealed to, in confirmation of their own views. Hence, when the better-directed investigations of modern astronomers found out that the old science was faulty, its adherents, rather than be at the trouble of learning new systems, appealed to the Bible as confirmatory of the one to which they were attached.

In point of fact, before the discoveries of Galileo, Kepler, and Newton, men could not be said to know anything about astronomy, but to have confused and crude notions on the subject, which they imagined were in harmony with the Scripture narrative. From laziness, and unwillingness to be at the trouble of learning, they on the first publication of the new system called it heretical; but the Bible, on being honestly consulted, turned out to harmonize as well with the Newtonian theory as any other.

And the same thing took place with the still more modern science of geology. On accurate examination,

it was found, that the Mosaic narrative was not opposed to the new discoveries; but that these were only hostile to the narrow views of certain individuals, who fancied that their own opinions were in accordance with the Scripture system.

The truth of this account has been fully proved by Professor Pusey, in his note to Buckland's *Bridgewater Treatise*, where he shows, that some of the fathers supposed the two first verses of Genesis to contain an account of a prior and distinct act of creation, from that which is detailed in the succeeding part of the opening chapter—thus demonstrating, that the views of geologists on the subject, are not an hypothesis framed to serve a purpose, but absolutely founded on fact. When these philosophers state that a long time intervened between the act of creation related in these two verses, and the conversion of the earth into its present form, afterwards narrated;—they do not make a supposition which has never been heard of before, but bring to light an opinion, which has been seriously entertained by many of the Fathers of the Church.

51. Nothing of this sort, however, can be said about the phrenologist's theory of human nature. The fall of man is a circumstance which would never have entered into any person's head, had it not been revealed. Whatever views may at different times have prevailed on this subject, they have all been primarily derived from Scripture. The doctrine is too little flattering to man's pride, ever to have originated from his own invention.

His efforts, indeed, have been too often directed to explain it away; and its supporters have uniformly entrenched themselves behind the bulwark of Scripture



declarations. They have shown that the Mosaic narrative of the event fully accounts for the phenomena of human nature, and thus vindicated its reasonableness; but at the same time have declared, that the fact was not discovered by man, but revealed by God.

The doctrine itself, also, is not a mere speculative assertion, thrown out by the sacred writers to be either believed or rejected at the pleasure of the reader, with no ulterior consequences dependent upon his treatment of it. It must be embraced by every one who receives the Bible as the Word of God; for, to counteract its effects is the avowed object of revelation. If, consequently, it be not believed, the whole scheme of Christianity is virtually given up. It becomes an unmeaning and purposeless apparatus; and we can conceive no valid reason, why the edifice should have been constructed by the apostles and prophets, Christ Jesus being the chief corner-stone.

Whoever, moreover, has faith in the doctrine of the atonement, and through it hopes to attain to happiness here, and glory hereafter, receives Jesus as his Saviour from the effects of the fall. He looks to the sacrifice of Christ for forgiveness of his sins; and hopes, through the aid of the Holy Spirit, to mortify the deeds of the body, and to be made meet to be a partaker of the heavenly inheritance.

52. We do not, therefore, conceive that such a man would act at all inconsistently with the rules of right reason, if, when he heard of the scheme propounded by the phrenologists, he should say, that it was so utterly contrary to what in his heart he believed to be the Word of God, that he did not feel himself at liberty at all to

attend to it. It was, he might justly maintain, opposed to the specific declarations of the Bible, and the credibility of that book was founded on evidence, which was scarcely inferior in strength to mathematical demonstration. Both systems could not be true, and for his part, he was determined to abide by that which, in his own case, he had found to be so well fitted to the wants of human nature.

53. For ourselves, however, we are ready to descend from this high ground, and to meet the phrenologists on the arena they have chosen for themselves. We shall proceed to inquire into the strength of the arguments by which Mr. Combe endeavours to establish this new theory of human nature.

54. To those who think that the moral faculties of man are not now in the situation in which they were when he was created, Mr. Combe says: "Man did not make the cerebral organs which he now possesses, nor bestow on them their functions. Both organs and functions are as assuredly the direct gifts of the Creator, as is the eye, the ear, or the stomach. The science of optics is never questioned by any person that understands it, on the ground that the eye (on the structure, properties, and relations of which it depends,) is not now in the condition in which it was created. Yet to do this would be as reasonable, as to deny the truth and authority of a philosophy of mind, derived from correct observation on the constitution and relation of the mental faculties and organs. It is presumable that the Divine power, wisdom, and goodness, which instituted the eye, and adapted its structure to light, presided also over the institution and adaptations of the internal organs of the

mind. If a theologian were to maintain that these organs, or several of them, were bestowed on man in consequence of sin, or from any other cause, philosophers would remain silent to such a proposition; because they do not inquire into the motives which induced the Creator to confer on man the organs and faculties which he possesses. They limit their investigations to objects that exist, and their relations and uses. But on the ground that organs and faculties have been given by the Creator, they are entitled to maintain, that a philosophy of morals, correctly deduced from their constitution, must accord with all correct interpretations of Scripture, otherwise religion can have no substantial foundation.”  
—p. 7.

55. We have given this passage in the author's own words, and certainly, its reasoning forms but a slender apparatus by which to overthrow the present mode of interpreting the Bible.

In proceeding to examine it more particularly, we wish to direct the reader's attention to what has been before said concerning the relation which subsists between conscience, and the other active powers of our nature.

We then saw, that the objects of our desires are external, while they themselves form the subject on which the conscience is exercised. By the original constitution of man, the conscience had the power, as well as the right, to govern and pass judgment on all his other principles, desires, and propensities. It not only laid claim to the supremacy and controul over all the other faculties of our nature, but was invested with power to enforce that claim.

Now, in consequence of Adam's fall, it has lost this

power ; and we can only discover what was its original constitution, by its, from time to time, making known its alienated rights. It cannot enforce them, but it still can show, that it once had them ; and that man would then only comply with the requirements of his nature, if he conceded to it the regulation and controul of his entire system. Thus, in a civil state, the various institutions of society, and the habits of the people, may demonstrate to the philosophical observer, that the government of the country had once been monarchical, although anarchy may have superseded it. Every man may be doing what is right in his own eyes, on account of the weakness of the executive power, but still there may be divers intimations, that at one time a strong and just government presided over the destinies of the people. The rightful heir to the monarchy may be a poor and powerless individual, but still ancient customs may so far prevail, that when those who are superior in circumstances to himself come into his presence, they bow the knee and veil the face.

And thus it is in the moral constitution of man: conscience is no longer able to assert the supremacy which it once had ; but still, divers phenomena point out to the accurate observer, that at some remote period she had power to vindicate her now almost forgotten rights. Anarchy may prevail in a man's breast ; revengeful passion may reign ; lust may have dominion ;—but still periods do occur at which their emotions are compelled to acknowledge, that theirs is an usurped, not a rightful supremacy.

56. This state of man's moral nature, may be also illustrated by the phenomena which geology presents to

our observation. When the geologist takes a wide and general survey of the earth, and the strata which compose its crust, he is led to conclude, that originally these have been all horizontal, or, more properly speaking, wrapped, one over the other, like the successive coats of an onion. When, however, he directs his attention to detached portions of the globe, he finds the strata inclined to each other at various angles, and some of them, so far from being horizontal, standing in an almost vertical position. What, then, is the conclusion which he draws from these phenomena? Does he deduce from them that his former opinion was mistaken, and that they never have been disposed over each other in successive layers? He is not led to do so; but forms a theory by which he can easily account for both, seemingly contradictory, appearances. He concludes that the surface of the earth has been subjected to divers catastrophes and convulsions, which have in various places changed the inclination of its strata. When, for instance, in examining a mountain range, he finds the strata at its base not horizontal, but leaning against its sides, he does not think that they have been originally formed so, but that, by the upheaving of the hill, they have been diverted from their primitive position. Originally they have been horizontal, but the mountain pushing through them, at its rising, has altered their direction, and made them be conformable to its acclivity.

And thus it is in the moral system of man. Originally, he was created upright. His conscience, the judgments of which were in exact accordance with the will of his Creator, had supremacy over all the other principles of his nature. His affections harmonized with

its dictates; and his will inclined him to obey all its commands.

This state of things, however, no longer continues. We now only can make out by diligent observation, that this has been the original constitution of man's nature; but that a subsequent aberration has taken place. A violent convulsion has occurred in the system; and those principles, feelings, and propensities, which acted in harmonious subserviency to a right-judging and enlightened conscience, present to our view a lamentable scene of uproar and confusion.

It is to do away with the effects of this moral catastrophe, that Christianity has been revealed; and the Godlike work it performs by that "system of spiritual influences, of internal operations on the soul, and of repentant preparation for another world," which is viewed by the phrenologists with so much contempt and abhorrence.

The only objection which Mr. Combe, in the passage we have quoted from his work, makes to this view of the moral constitution of man, is, that it is contrary to the observations which he and other phrenologists have made on the organs of the brain.

We shall now pass on to the consideration of some other argument, or rather statements, by which he endeavours to overthrow what he is pleased to call the "theological dogma of the fall of man."

57. After enumerating the faculties which the phrenologists denominate the lower propensities, he makes the following triumphant conclusion:—"Theologians who enforce the corruption of human nature, would do well to consider whether man, as originally

constituted, possessed the organs of these propensities or not. If he did possess them, it will be incumbent upon them to show the objects of them in a world where there was no sorrow, sin, death, or danger. If these organs were bestowed only after the fall, the question will remain to be solved, Whether man with new organs added to his brain, and new propensities to his mind, continued the same being as when these did not form part of his constitution? Or, finally, they may consider whether the existence of these organs, and of an external world adapted to them, does not prove that man, as he now exists, is actually the same being as when he was created, and that his corruption consists in his tendency to abuse his faculties, and not to any inherent viciousness attributable to his nature itself."—p. 21.

Now this is certainly the most extraordinary challenge we ever heard or read of.

58. While Mr. Combe is loudly proclaiming to theologians the dilemma in which he has placed them, he appears to us to yield the very point in dispute. At the very time when he is declaring what a complete barrier he has erected against their opinions, he opens a channel by which the waters of truth may find entrance and sweep away his fantastic errors. When he says, "that the corruption of man's nature consists in his tendency to abuse his faculties," what does he but give up the doctrine that man's moral constitution depends upon his physical organization? He has been teaching, that the disposition of man is good or bad according to the relative size of the organs of the brain. The main object of his work is to inculcate the phrenological dogma, that, if the organs of the animal propensities greatly

preponderate over those of the moral sentiments and intellect, it is impossible but that the possessor of them must be a bad and wicked man. In the passage before us, however, he admits, that the corruption of man's nature consists in his tendency to abuse his faculties; and in so doing, we maintain, that he essentially yields the point in dispute between himself, and those who receive the Scriptural account of man's fall.

For, what is it that theologians say upon this subject? They declare that man's nature is sinful, that is, that he is naturally more inclined to that which is evil, than to that which is good; that his will is perverted, and can only be restored to its primitive uprightness by extraneous and foreign influences.

Mr. Combe admits that there is a tendency in man to abuse his faculties; and yet, he says, "that man himself can overcome this tendency;" or, in other words, that man can will one thing, and yet will its direct opposite. The tendency Mr. Combe speaks of, must be that of the will; but will is power; and how power can be made to oppose itself, we leave to phrenologists to explain.

59. In the passage we have quoted, Mr. Combe uses faculty and organ as synonymous terms; and we suppose, by this, he means, that there is no organ without its corresponding faculty, and no faculty without its corresponding organ.

But will this mode of speaking bear a strict analysis? Unless Mr. Combe means to assert that the mind is material, he must admit that there is an essential difference between these two terms. The organs, we take for granted, are indicated by particular corresponding



protuberances in the skull ; but there are not parts of the immaterial thinking principle corresponding to these separate organs, or protuberances by which they are indicated. It is the whole mind that thinks, that judges, that compares, that remembers, that perceives. The mind is essentially and absolutely simple and indivisible. The organs of the brain, therefore, can but be the instruments and means by which it works. Granting that they are indispensable to it for the performance of its several functions, it by no means follows, that it has not the power of abstaining from the use of them. If an individual has some organs more largely developed than others, there may be a probability of the man's character being formed accordingly; but still his mind has the power of resisting this tendency; and, if other circumstances are favourable, no doubt it often does resist them. It may be true, that there cannot be a great or high character whose frontal organs are not strongly developed; but many a man, nevertheless, may have a lofty and ample forehead who is not distinguished for any good quality. It may be that a man

Is one of giant structure, who could dance  
Equipped from head to foot in iron mail ;

and yet never have harness on his back ; and in a similar way, a man's brain may afford him the capability of being a poet or philosopher, and yet be neither one nor the other. It is thus we may conceive that Gray says :

Some mute inglorious Milton here may rest,  
Some Cromwell guiltless of his country's blood.

60. A man's brain, even on the principle of the phrenologists, may afford him all the potentialities of

good or evil ; and yet he may refuse to avail himself of the one, or resolutely resist the other.

And here, we say, are the effects of the fall developed. Man's will has been perverted to evil ; and it requires all the restraints and inducements which religion can supply, to keep him in the right way.

What we would ask of the phrenologists is, Whence did this tendency of man to abuse his faculties arise? Was it implanted in him at his creation, or did it spring up afterwards? Is it not much more reconcilable with every notion we can form of the attributes of God, to suppose that it was superinduced after his creation by man's own act? The phrenologists cannot prove that this evil tendency was necessarily inherent in the first man's physical organization. How, then, have his posterity come by it? After all they can say, they cannot show that the Scriptural account is impossible, or even improbable.

On the contrary, it bears every mark of truth about it. It fully accounts for all the phenomena we observe, and at the same time presents us with the only efficient remedy of the evils of our moral system.

61. Again, to return to the case which Mr. Combe brings forward, as decisive of the controversy between phrenologists and theologians. He asks these last individuals to determine, whether or not man had the organs of the lower propensities before the fall ; because, he argues, if they were added after that catastrophe, man cannot be considered the same, as he was before they formed parts of his constitution.

In the first place, we say, that those who believe in the doctrine of the corruption of man's nature, are not

under the necessity of determining, whether or not it was so altered by the fall, as to make him be considered a different being. The question appears to be merely one of nomenclature, and it matters very little to the real subject in dispute, which way it be decided. For ourselves, we should say, that he may be most properly said to continue essentially the same, notwithstanding the great change that has taken place in his moral system.

62. But to revert to the real merits of the case: the phrenologists assert, that now there are many individuals of sound minds in other respects, with the moral and intellectual organs so imperfectly developed, as to be totally unable to perform the virtues enjoined by Christianity. For ourselves, we cannot even allude to this opinion without declaring our conviction of its horrible monstrosity: but still we are entitled from it to argue, that if a man (who is not an idiot or a madman), can be without the higher or moral organs, it is conceivable that, before the fall, the organs of the lower propensities were equally imperfectly developed. If one opinion is not absurd, the other is not to be rejected as unworthy of consideration. If man, when innocent, was in such a situation as not to require for his preservation, combativeness, destructiveness, or cautiousness, why may we not conclude, that the organs of these faculties were developed, when by his altered circumstances he required their exercise. In daily life we often see, that individuals who, from ignorance of the world, are very liable to be deceived on their first entrance into it, do yet, after a little experience, acquire great caution and circumspection. Why may we not conceive that something of

the same kind took place with respect to the human race, after the fall of their common ancestor? We contend, that no valid objection can be brought against the supposition; or, at least, whatever rational argument bears against it, presses with equal force against the chief of the theories of phrenology.

63. Further, if phrenologists think to overwhelm us with this difficulty, they ought to bear in mind, that there are many weapons in the same armoury, which may be successfully used against them, and their own darling science. Mr. Combe has never been so good as specifically to inform us with what moral faculties man was at first created. He has never told us, whether he came from the hand of his Creator, with a head formed like that of a New Hollander, or with one superior in organization to that of Melancthon\*.

Whichever supposition he makes, presents equally formidable difficulties to the system of phrenology. The New Hollander, according to him, has no desire of information; but before civilization or true religion can be imparted to him, his mind must, by successive steps through a series of generations, be brought to a capacity of receiving it. But if man was at first formed in this condition, who was to raise him from his state of debasement? On Mr. Combe's supposition, he would have no desire of civilization, and therefore could not raise himself.

From the statement, with which his book commences, concerning the gradual improvement of man, Mr. Combe

\* Mr. Combe states, that Melancthon was remarkable for an almost faultless formation of head; and that the New Hollanders have an exceedingly bad cerebral developement.

ought, if he be consistent, to adopt this opinion of man's being created with the very lowest and worst organization. But by what process he will raise our common ancestor from this debased state, we confess ourselves at a loss to conceive. By the circumstances of the case, self-improvement is impossible, and it is difficult to discover by whom this primitive New Hollander is to be assisted.

If, again, Mr. Combe chooses to give up this notion, and to say that man was created with a perfect cerebral developement, what cause will he assign for his subsequent degeneracy? He must turn himself to the rejected supposition of a fall; and so account for the process, by which an intellectual and moral being sunk to a state of savage barbarism. It is nothing to the purpose to say, that the descent was gradual, for the difficulty lies in accounting for the first step in the declension.

The Scriptural narrative says, that this took place by man's own act and deed. He chose to disobey God, and consequently exposed himself to all the evils of God's displeasure. His nature became corrupt and sinful, and could only be restored to its primitive purity, by the instrumentality of its Creator.

64. We contend, that we have good reason to think, that those men are not justly chargeable with folly or stupidity, who persist in believing that this doctrine of the fall of man is true, notwithstanding the declarations of phrenologists, that they have entirely overthrown it. This we conceive to be the case, even though we argue on the supposition, that each faculty of the mind is exercised by a particular organ of the brain. When,

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however, we consider on what a slender foundation phrenology rests, and by how loose a chain of reasoning its principal positions are maintained, we cannot but express great astonishment at the presumption of the men, who arrogantly demand that a system like this should supersede the Christian revelation.

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## CHAPTER IV.

ON THE INDEPENDENT EXISTENCE AND OPERATION  
OF THE NATURAL LAWS OF CREATION.

65. Importance attached to this doctrine by Mr. Combe and Mr. Simpson. 66. Mr. C.'s definition of law. 67. Remarks on this definition. 68. Men's conduct cannot be calculated on, in consequence of the fall. 69. Instinctive principles very often govern men's conduct. 70, 71. Illustrated in the case of children. 72. No surprise expressed, because God does not interfere to preserve good men from the consequences of their own carelessness. 73. Men use most strenuous exertions to effect an object which they believe is favoured by God. 74. Universal promulgation of this doctrine of Mr. Combe's would have no practical effect. 75. Considerations on the organic and moral classes of the laws of nature. 76. Men's errors concerning their health arise from ignorance of the way in which nature acts, not from doubt about the uniformity of her operations. 77. Those only would be influenced by increased knowledge on this subject, who pay much attention to their health. 78. Case of student at College. 79. Case of those who expose themselves to danger and death from religious motives. Howard. Martyn. 80. Reference to members of the medical profession. 81. Variety of causes operating to make men careless about their health.

65. THE doctrine which Mr. Combe expounds under this title, is, he tells us, the key to the true theory of the divine government of the world, but which has not hitherto been duly appreciated; and Mr. Simpson is in such raptures with it, that he declares it to be a sublime truth, by the discovery of which Mr. Combe has obtained for himself among moralists, an elevation equal to that which is accorded to Newton among natural philosophers. It is by this latter gentleman, also, especially enjoined upon the teachers in the projected national schools, diligently to study Mr. Combe's work,

and carefully to educate in its principles, the youth committed to their charge.

We cannot, therefore, hope to form a just notion of the sort of education which it is intended to bestow upon the rising generation of these realms, without making ourselves acquainted with this theory of the independent existence and operation of the natural laws. They are put forward by phrenologists, as great discoveries in the science of morals; and, if our examination should lead us into a somewhat tedious detail, we hope that the importance of the subject will form our excuse with candid and intelligent readers.

66. "The natural laws," Mr. Combe says, "may be divided into three great and intellectual classes,—physical, organic, and moral; and the peculiarity of the new doctrine is, its inculcating that these operate independently of each other."

And, on account of the presumed importance of the discovery, he proceeds to give us a definition of law in the following terms: "A law, in the common acceptation, denotes a rule of action; it implies a subject which acts, and that the actions, or phenomena, which that subject exhibits, take place in an established and regular manner; and this is the sense in which I shall use it, when treating of physical substances and beings."

By physical beings, we presume the author means men; and certainly, if he do, his definition cannot be much commended for its lucidness; and a very little consideration will enable us to see whence its obscurity arises.

67. Law\*, in its original sense, signifies that which

\* See Appendix to ARCHBISHOP WHATELEY's *Logic*.



is laid down; and it is used with this meaning when we speak of a man's obeying a law. It signifies, a command with which a man feels himself called upon to comply. He may either comply with it or not; but if he refuse to do so, he exposes himself to certain penalties for his refusal. When, however, law is transferred to physical substances, it is used in another sense. It then denotes the statement of some general fact, the several individual instances of which, exhibit a conformity to that statement. Thus, when we say that water boils at  $212^{\circ}$  Fahr. in compliance with a law of nature, we only mean, that such is universally the case. If it did not do so, the law would not exist. In the case of physical substances, therefore, it is impossible for them not to comply with the laws of nature, for with them it is the observance which constitutes the law.

But, when we turn our attention to the moral and intellectual being, man, we find the phenomena to be different. With him the law still exists, whether he choose to comply with its injunctions or not. There is, therefore, no correct analogy between the laws by which man is governed, and those according to which the operations of nature are carried on. When the word law is applied to the latter case, it has quite a different meaning from that which it has, when used in a strictly proper sense.

Many authors of much higher reputation than Mr. Combe, have confounded the two significations of the word; and, therefore, he is not to be severely dealt with for having fallen into the error. He, however, is peculiar in having made this confusion of terms, a basis on which to erect a system of moral philosophy. His scheme is

consequently established in error, and the faultiness of its foundation shows itself at every step of the author's progress.

68. We have previously seen, that man is endowed with a moral sense, or conscience, which lays claim to supremacy over all his affections, feelings, and active principles. And we have also seen, that the power of man's conscience does not correspond to its right. By the rebellion of the subject passions, or a moral catastrophe, its determinations no longer meet with implicit obedience. The human breast is, consequently, in a state of anarchy, and man is swayed hither or thither, according to the nature of the principle which is temporarily dominant within him. Now, as Butler says, if conscience had strength as it has right, if it had power as it has manifest authority, it would absolutely govern the world. We, then, could as accurately calculate on the actions of a man, under any given circumstances, as we now can point out the line which will be followed by the resultant of known forces.

Under the supposed circumstances, man would accurately know his duty, and his will would incline him to follow it. He would always be happy, not because he always aimed at happiness, but because he followed that course of life to which his Creator had attached happiness as its inseparable accompaniment. But man does not now exist under these supposed conditions. His present constitution is the mere wreck of that with which he was endowed by his Creator. He is ignorant of his duty, and is unwilling to perform it when it is pointed out to him. The existence of the rule of right within, is oftentimes only made known by its fruitless efforts to

obtain that supremacy of which it has been deprived. Man's mind is a moral chaos. His way of life is no longer simple and uniform, but is the ever fluctuating result of a thousand independent forces. He is liable to be swayed by ambition, by anger, by love of praise, by revenge, by benevolence, and the course of his life is in that direction, which his ruling passion points out.

*Manners with fortunes, humours turn with climes,  
Tenets with books, and principles with times.*

Mr. Combe appears to flatter himself, that he has discovered a method, by the application of which, men's conduct under any given circumstances may always be calculated. His system is based upon what he calls the uniform and independent operation of the laws of nature. He takes for granted, that he has abolished the doctrine of the corruption of man; and also assumes, that men, in all their conduct, are uniformly and simply actuated by a desire of procuring for themselves the greatest possible happiness. He tacitly supposes, that whenever they act in a way contrary to the rules of right reason, they do so entirely from ignorance; and that, consequently, they only need to be instructed in these independent laws of nature, to become good and prudent individuals.

69. In all this, Mr. Combe forgets, that, in a great majority of cases, man is as much the creature of instinctive impulses as any of the lower animals. He has feelings and active powers implanted in him by nature, which govern his conduct long before he can form a notion of the final cause of their existence. This is the radical error of the doctrine we are now going to investigate; and its greatness will be more apparent on a closer examination.

We are, for instance, told, that "whenever the relation between the human body and heat, and the consequences of disregarding it, are perceived, the mind is prompted to avoid infringement, in order to shun the torture attached by the Creator to the decomposition of the human body by heat;" and we are further instructed, "that we cannot be careful not to burn ourselves, till we know that fire destroys the muscular and nervous system of man."

70. The proverb says, the burnt child dreads the fire. Are we then to understand, that the child is afraid of the fire, because he knows, that it has the power of destroying his muscular and nervous system? We rather think not. He shuns it for a quite different reason. He has, by actual experience, discovered that, when applied to his body, it hurts him, and, therefore, he is fearful of again coming into contact with it. There is a principle implanted in his nature, by which he believes, that like causes uniformly produce like effects. It is not necessary for him to be made speculatively acquainted with the theory of cause and effect, before he acts in conformity with it. Nor does his belief in the uniformity of the law, arise from experience or education. It is inherent in his mental constitution; and the only effect of subsequent experience, is to modify the universality of his belief. After being burned at the fire-place, the child dreads to come near the grate, even though there should be no fire in it. It is only by a process of natural induction, which is not the less certain from his being ignorant of its steps, that he comes to know the essential conditions of his being burned. His confidence in the uniformity of nature's proceedings, has not its origin in education or

reason, but is instinctive. At first, he generalises too much, and confounds the real cause of the consequence with the unessential and accidental circumstances attending it.

When a child has been pleased with the sound proceeding from his striking the table with his plaything, he will try again to produce the noise by hitting a soft substance; and experiment alone instructs him, that the pleasing sensation will only be produced, when his instrument comes directly in contact with wood. His first conviction arose from a principle which taught him to believe in the uniformity of nature's operations, and his experience was not sufficient to instruct him, in what circumstances it was necessary for the causes to be alike, in order that they might produce the like effect. What advantage, then, will it be to him in after life, to have the uniformity of nature's laws gravely enunciated, as a newly discovered principle?

71. By applying to the breast of his mother, the infant derives the sustenance provided for him by nature; but in the first days of his existence, he knows not that his mother only can provide him with his food. He, consequently, seeks for it at the breast of his nurse, or any other person who has him in their arms; and it is only by being disappointed in his search, that he comes to look to his mother alone for his nutriment. He has a principle implanted in him which teaches him, that because he has once obtained food from his mother, he can continue to obtain it; but it is experience which informs him, that his mother only can supply him with it. A knowledge of the laws of nature has nothing to do with either his mistakes, or their subsequent cor-

rection. If they had, he would most certainly starve, before he could discover to whom he was to look for his support.

The principle which governs the conduct of the infant, is practically the same as that by which men are actuated in their mode of carrying on the affairs of life. Mr. Combe appears to be of opinion, that men uniformly act from a prudent calculation of all the probable consequences of their conduct; and that, whenever they expose themselves to danger or damage, by transgressing the laws, to a knowledge of which he attaches so much importance, it is from ignorance of their existence, or of their mode of action. But the truth is, that it is only some very singularly endowed individuals who adopt such a line of conduct. The actuating principles of men are their desires and feelings; and, when these are strongly set upon any object, they are ready to overlook, or under-estimate the difficulties which stand in the way of its attainment. Men do not incur the danger of failure, because they hope the natural laws will be altered in their favour; but because they will not think of the obstacles which these laws present to the furtherance of their designs.

72. In pointing out the mistakes into which men have fallen, in consequence of their ignorance of the independent existence and operation of the natural laws, Mr. Combe states, "that men, on this account, wonder, that pious missionaries embarking in an unsound ship, on a message of love, should be drowned; while the greatest moral monsters are preserved, if they are careful to sail in a strong and well-found vessel."

Now we venture to say, that in the population of

London, not three sane individuals will be found, who would express any surprise at either of these occurrences. They would think that the bad men were wise in their generation, while the good were very imprudent; they would, perhaps, regret that such should be the case; and wonder that the missionaries should not have been better advised; but at this point their surprise would stop. They would not in the least complain of the dealings of God with his people, for not having providentially interfered to preserve those who were devoting themselves to his service. If missionaries ever do act so foolishly as to put to sea in an unserviceable vessel, they do not do so from a hope of being miraculously preserved; but are urged by motives similar to those of the slave trader who goes on an expedition to Africa in a ship of the same kind. In both cases, the men are under the governance of hope; and they have an undefined expectation, that the ship which has come safely to port so often, will most likely do so this time also.

In truth, men do not send bad ships to sea, from an expectation that the good objects on which they are employed will preserve them; but because their love of money, or their poverty, prevents them from providing sound ones; and they are certain, that the desire of sailors to be employed will always ensure them of a crew. When the late committee of the House of Commons sat on shipwreck, did they ever hear of men's going to sea in ill-found vessels, because they hoped that God would save them from foundering, in consequence of the benevolent objects of their voyage? Such a supposition was reserved for them to make, who exclusively arrogate to themselves the title of teachers of wisdom.

73. Further, we maintain that a confident belief that his undertaking is approved of, and favoured by God, will always make a man use very careful exertion to carry it successfully through. Did the generals of antiquity so constantly endeavour to instil into the minds of their soldiers, the belief that their cause was especially favoured by heaven, in order that they might give themselves no trouble about the matter, on account of their certainty that the victory would be gained for them by a higher power? If human nature were what the phrenologists represent it to be, such would be the effect of the conviction. But these ancient leaders were better acquainted with the active principles of man's nature, than modern phrenologists. They knew that men most strenuously exert themselves, when they have strong hopes that their exertions will not prove unsuccessful. They were convinced by practical experience, that their soldiers fought most manfully, when they believed that their cause was the cause of heaven.

And such we find universally to be the case. However convinced a Christian missionary may be, that he is engaged in an undertaking especially favoured by God, he never, on that account, embarks in an ill-founded ship. His well-founded conviction is never, with him, a reason for neglecting the lessons of prudence and circumspection. If he does neglect them, he acts from the same motives as the man who sails in an unsound vessel, on a voyage of nefarious traffic. He forgets, that every voyage the ship has made, renders her more unfit to bear the wear and tear of another; and embarks in her with the hope that, since she has so often crossed the seas in safety, she will come to her destined haven this time also.



If he is disappointed in these his expectations, his surviving friends do not wonder that he has not been especially protected by Providence; but they regret that he was deficient in a prudential regard to his own safety.

It is very probable, that the supposed missionary has never been told of the independent existence and operation of the laws of nature; but, if he had, his conduct would not have been one whit different. He never imagined that if a plank started in the midst of the ocean, the God whom he served would prevent water from coming in at the leak; but he flattered himself that the plank would not start this time.

74. In point of fact, we do not suppose that the universal promulgation of this doctrine, which Messrs. Combe and Simpson boast to be the true theory of the divine government of the world, would alter the conduct of a single human being. What possible effect, then, can result from this boasted discovery? These laws, be it remembered, are not enunciated as a speculative theory, but are gravely put forth as an active, practical principle. And yet, without knowing them, every man, every woman, every child, is led by the instinctive feelings of their nature, to act in accordance with them, just as much as if they had had them instilled into their minds by phrenological teachers. It is not the laws themselves which require to be taught, but the applications of them; and these every apprentice learns, when he is put to practise the employment, by the exercise of which he is afterwards to earn his livelihood.

The carpenter never supposes, that there is any question of morality involved in the shape of a roof; or

that the strength of a beam is at all affected by the character of him who puts it in its place. He has, indeed, very likely, never heard of the natural laws, or their independent operation; but his expertness in his business would not be one whit increased, if he were as well acquainted with them as Mr. Combe himself. He practically acts in accordance with them; and he could do no more, if they were formally instilled into his mind.

The carpenter may often err in his calculations of the capability of his materials to bear the stress he puts upon them; but, he does not make the mistake on account of his ignorance of the laws of nature. The error may equally occur in the case of a man who is perfectly acquainted with these laws. It takes its rise from a faulty estimate of the power of wood to resist pressure.

A man may, also, endanger the lives of the inhabitants of a house by building it weakly, because he will not be at the expense of building it of sufficiently sound and good materials; but he commits this crime, not from ignorance, but from knavery. A knowledge of Mr. Combe's theory, therefore, would have but little chance of making him act differently.

In the remarks we have made on what Mr. Combe calls the physical class of the natural laws, our object has been, to show, that a formal knowledge of them is a matter of no consequence to men's conduct in the actual business of life; for, that they uniformly act in accordance with these laws, though they may have never heard of them. There is a principle implanted in us, by which we believe, that like antecedents are uniformly followed by like consequents; and, when men do not act in accordance with the laws of nature, the infringement of

them arises from their mistaking similar antecedents for the same antecedents, or from their wilfully shutting their eyes to the consequences of their own actions. Ignorance of the uniformity of nature's laws, is, consequently, never the cause of their being broken ; and, if these laws were formally stated to the apprehensions of all men, infringement of them would not be one whit less frequent than it now is.

75. When we turn our attention to the organic and moral classes of these laws, another element is brought into the discussion ; for the phrenologists not only assert, that a knowledge of the way in which the body is affected by external circumstances, would make men uniformly careful of their health ; but they also broadly state, that the moral conduct of men depends upon their physical organization. This latter proposition, we regard as both false in its essence, and highly pernicious in its consequences ; but, before we proceed to examine the arguments by which it is attempted to be supported, we shall make some observations upon the effect which an acquaintance with the organic class of the laws of nature might be expected to have upon men's treatment of themselves.

76. It sometimes certainly occurs, that, from mere ignorance, men put themselves into situations which are highly prejudicial to their health. They do not know the deleterious effects which are consequent upon certain modes of life ; and, consequently, incur dangers, from which, a better acquaintance with their organic system would be a most efficient protection.

But in this case, as in that of the physical class of these laws, men's errors arise, not from any doubt about

the uniformity and independence of nature's operations, but from ignorance of the way in which she does act. We treat them, therefore, preposterously, if we suppose that, by telling them of the independent existence and operation of the laws of nature, we should enable them to escape from the bad consequences of an unhealthy mode of life.

77. In considering this subject, also, we must bear in mind, that those only would be influenced by increased physical knowledge, who are uniformly of opinion, that to be in good health is the chief end of man's existence. If they are strongly actuated by a desire to attain some other object, they will consider the state of their corporeal system a matter of minor importance. They will make what they esteem the less good, give way to the greater; and persist in a course of conduct which gives them satisfaction, although they are perfectly aware, that it is likely to induce disease or weakness.

78. When, for instance, a man gives his days and nights to study, and does not allow himself sufficient time for rest and refreshment; does he do so, because he believes that the organization of his body is different from that of other men's? or does he suppose that he will be miraculously supported, because his motive is a high and holy one? According to Mr. Combe's principles, such ought to be his persuasion; but, the fact is, his desires are strongly set upon one object, and to attain that he is content to risk sickness and ill-health. Many students at College lay the foundations of subsequent sufferings and disease, by the severe exertions they make to obtain a high place at their examination. But does Mr. Combe suppose, that these sacrifices will be at all

abated in number, by the promulgation of his exposition of the independent existence and operation of the laws of nature? If he do, he will most certainly find himself mistaken. The young men know full well the risk they are incurring; but, animated by the prospect of the prize at which they are aiming, they are content to incur all the penalties to which, by their perseverance, they are exposing themselves. Or, rather, so strongly are their minds set upon the attainment of the prize before them, that they never think of the dangers they incur. Some men have passed through as much fatigue, and have afterwards enjoyed health and strength; and they hope to be found among these favoured individuals, and not be of the large number of those who have ruined their nervous systems by the severity of their university exercises.

To suppose otherwise, would be just as absurd as to account for men's exposing themselves to wounds and death on the field of battle, by declaring, that all the individuals who did so, were convinced that the laws of nature were suspended in their favour; and if a bullet passed through their head, it would not occasion death. We need hardly say, that not the most desperate leader of a forlorn hope, ever entertained so fond an imagination. This man knows well the risk to which he exposes himself: but high animal spirits and a courageous heart, make him overlook the most threatening danger, and enable him to fix his contemplation on the honours which await him, if he return safe from his glorious enterprize.

And the same is the case with the young student at College. His decaying spirits are animated, his flagging

energies are roused, by the prospect of the reputation and advancement which will be his reward, if he succeed in his undertaking. How idle, then, must it be, to think to change such a man's purpose, by talking to him of the independent existence and operation of the organic class of the laws of nature. He is not following a course of life in ignorance of its effect upon his constitution. His own feelings inform him, that his body is suffering from the labours he is undergoing; but he refuses to listen to their authoritative intimations; and we cannot expect that he would hearken very diligently to the advice which Mr. Combe or Mr. Simpson might respectively give him.

79. Similar remarks may be made, with respect to those individuals who expose themselves to danger and death from religious motives. They are animated with a strong desire of benefitting others; and that they may win souls to Christ, are content to waste their mortal bodies with unremitting exertion.

Does Mr. Combe suppose that Howard, the philanthropist, when he exposed himself to pestilential and infectious diseases, in his personal inspection of ill-regulated gaols and hospitals, ever imagined that the laws of nature were suspended in his favour? He well knew, that his body was just as liable to catch infection as other men's; but the high and holy purpose by which he was animated, prompted him, calmly and deliberately, to undergo the risk; and, when he was finally overtaken by illness, enabled him manfully to endure it. He expressed no surprise when labouring under a fever, caught in the course of his benevolent enquiries. He did not find fault with the Providence of God, for allowing one,

whose object was so beneficent, to be cut off by disease. He took every known means to overcome his malady; but, when his constitution finally gave way, he meekly resigned his spirit into the hands of Him who had given it.

Henry Martyn, the celebrated missionary, injured his health by the severe labour he underwent before he attained the distinction of senior wranglership; and he, again, incurred pain and suffering, by the exertions he made in translating the New Testament into Hindoostanee; but he no more expected, that the consequences of too great mental effort would be prevented from occurring in the second case, than in the first. At Cambridge, he was actuated by a selfish motive, the desire of distinction; in India, he was under the impulse of a far higher principle, the wish to provide the Hindoos with the word of truth; but he did not, in this case, at all expect that he should be providentially preserved from incurring the pains to which he had voluntarily exposed himself. And when, in the end, his life was sacrificed by the labours he underwent, in his exertions to propagate Christianity in a tropical climate,—neither himself nor his friends expressed any surprise, that God did not interfere miraculously to prevent so devoted a servant from being cut off in the midst of his labours. His friends regretted his death; but, at the same time, looked upon it as what might naturally have been expected from his severe exertions.

80. Further to show the inefficacy of mere knowledge of the organic laws to make men follow that course of life which is most conducive to good health, we may refer to the case of gentlemen in the medical profession.

If Mr. Combe's statement on this branch of the subject were correct, it would result, that these gentlemen would, uniformly and carefully, abstain from every thing which might prove pernicious to their corporeal system. But do they attend to this? Do they never overload the stomach with a quantity of indigestible food? Do they never injure their physical organization by an indulgence in intoxicating liquors? These gentlemen, however, must be presumed to be well acquainted with the laws of physical organization; and if they ever violate these laws, their violation must show, that mere knowledge is not sufficient to make men do that which is most conducive to health.

The truth is, that in this case, no more than in the first, do men act from motives of prudential regard to their own welfare. Other motives are their springs of action; and to change their mode of life, not only is their mind to be informed, but their will is to be influenced. We do not, indeed, affect to deny, that, in many cases, men do things prejudicial to health from ignorance of their detrimental consequences; but oftener, far oftener, the most exact acquaintance with the human frame, would not have the least effect in making them change their habits.

81. Here also we have to observe, that when men live in such a way as to induce bad health, they do not do so from a disbelief in the uniformity and independence of nature's laws, but from ignorance of the particular application of these laws. It is practical, not theoretical information which they want. We cannot expect to alter their conduct by a statement of the laws of nature, or their modes of operation; but by informing them con-



cerning the particular subject in which they err. And even this sort of information is very often unavailing, to make men uniformly prudent as to the treatment of their bodies. This inefficacy in part arises, from the peculiarity and uncertainty of the way in which external agents act, as causes of disease. "In regard to the action of external agents as causes of disease," says Dr. Abercrombie, "we may take a single example in the effects of cold: of six individuals who have been exposed to cold in the same degree, and, so far as we can judge, under the same circumstances, one may be seized with an inflammation of the lungs, one with diarrhoea, and one with rheumatism, while three may escape without any injury." This uncertainty always has had, and always will have, a very powerful effect on the actual conduct of men. In exposing themselves to infection, each will hope, that he shall be one of the favoured division who escape unscathed by the danger.

When, moreover, a man's mind is under the influence of any commanding desire, be it good or evil, he will always under-calculate the chances of his failure, and over-calculate his probability of success. Notwithstanding the known deadliness of an African climate, men have always been found, who were ready to brave the danger of penetrating into the interior of that continent, for the sake of reward or distinction. These men have uniformly proceeded on their perilous enterprize, with a full knowledge of the numbers who have perished in the same undertaking; and, if asked, not one would have stated, that he disbelieved in the uniformity of the operations of the organic laws of nature. He would, perhaps, have said, that he hoped the strength of his constitution

would resist all the dangers to which it should be exposed, and that, if it did, how ample would be his reward! He would rest his expectations upon the chances which were in his favour. Very many perished from the effects of an African climate, but some escaped; and he hoped to be found among the survivors.

The man, in this case, does not fancy that the operation of the organic laws of nature are not uniform, but he relies upon the fact, that the mode in which they act has not yet been discovered. For anything he knows to the contrary, his constitution may be of the kind most calculated to resist the deadly influences to which he is exposing himself.

What avails it, then, to talk to such a man of the uniform and independent operation of these laws? You may as well expect to make a man an expert seaman, by telling him, that the earth was attracted to the sun by the force of gravity.

There does also appear to be so great a degree of uncertainty prevailing, as to the regimen best calculated to preserve health, that a man may well be excused for deviating into error. It very often happens, that a man who is following a course of life which is generally thought to be most prejudicial to health, attains to a green and vigorous old age. Other reasons, also, besides the uncertainty of the subject, conduce to make men unwilling to attend to this sort of advice. The high spirits of youth will not submit to be cautious; and men will not attend to the state of their health, till they are alarmed by feelings of pain and uneasiness. While they are well and strong, they go on rejoicing, and never think about taking care of their body, till the jarring of

the machinery tells them that the instrument is out of order.

Men, in fact, in this case as in others, act more from their feelings than their judgment. They gratify their wishes, and never think of the effects which shall ensue to their bodies, till the mischief has been produced. If reminded of the fact, they will very likely acknowledge that the kind of life they are pursuing is very unfavourable to their health, but still they do not give it up: and they would not be at all induced to do so by the promulgation of Mr. Combe's system. With them it is not the head which requires to be informed, but the will which needs to be influenced; and, most certainly, the phrenological theory affords no materials for such an operation.

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## CHAPTER V.

## ON THE PHRENOLOGICAL DOCTRINE, THAT THE MORAL FACULTIES OF MAN ARE DEPENDENT ON THE ORGANIZATION OF HIS BRAIN.

82. Extent to which Mr. Combe pushes this doctrine. 83. It leads to fatalism. 84. Weakness of the proofs by which it is supported. 85. Possible for a man to overcome the propensities to which he is exposed by an ill-organized brain. 86. Case of the North American savages, and New Hollanders. 87. Evidence given before a Committee of the House of Commons, on the state of the Aborigines of our Colonies, decisive of the question at issue. 88. To change a man's conduct we must endeavour to influence his will. 89. Probable effect of this parliamentary evidence on the theory of the phrenologists. *On the hereditary transmission of mental qualities.* 90. If phrenology be true, mental powers must be transmissible by descent, as well as bodily qualities. 91. Cases brought forward by Mr. Combe. 92. Remarks on these cases. 93. Considerations on a third case. 94. Sons of eminent men do not often possess the qualities for which their fathers have been remarkable. 95. Obscurity of this subject does not arise from ignorance of the functions of the brain. 96. Ridiculous application of phrenology.

82. WE now proceed to the consideration of that part of the subject which we regard as the most pernicious and dangerous.

We have seen, that Mr. Combe endeavours to prove, or rather assumes, that the laws, according to which organized bodies are governed, are the same as those according to which dead matter is acted on. In this we think he is wrong, and the difference in the two cases arises from the powerful effect which the soul has upon the body to which it is united.

Now, however, we have to follow Mr. Combe in his exposition of the phrenological system, a step further.

He not only teaches that the soul has no power over the body, but, that it is actually subordinate to the body in which it dwells. He promulgates the doctrine, that the moral and intellectual faculties of man, are entirely dependant upon the organization of his brain. He goes so far as to say, that a brain of a certain construction, is no more adequate to the manifestation of Christian virtues, than the brain of an idiot from birth to the exhibition of the intellect of a Leibnitz or a Bacon. Again he declares, "It appears to me that the native American savages, and native New Hollanders, cannot, with their present brains, adopt Christianity, or civilization."

83. We have already alluded to this part of Mr. Combe's system, and shall shortly prove, by the best evidence to be had on such a subject, that many native Americans have been converted to Christianity, although phrenologists have positively demonstrated that such a conversion is impossible. At present we wish to remark on the fatalism to which this doctrine inevitably leads, and the strange infatuation men must be under, to bring forward such a system, with the notion that it is favourable to morality. Well may Mr. Combe say, "it goes to the root of theology and morals;" for, if it be at all propagated, it must inevitably root them up altogether. It is, no doubt, very pretty and seemingly philosophical, to talk of the pleasures to be derived from exercising the intellectual faculties, and giving them the supremacy over the animal organs; but the real question is, What will the great mass of mankind think about the affair? We know, that it requires constant watchfulness and anxiety, in the best

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constituted mind, to keep the animal passions in subjection. The very terms which all men use in describing the transaction, imply labour, difficulty, care. This state of alertness, moreover, must be constant; at least, a man, if he would not allow his animal passions to get the victory, must always hold himself in readiness for active exertion.

But there is nothing to which men are more disinclined, than this state of mental discipline and exercise. To enable them, therefore, to go through the work resolutely and prosperously, every possible force and power must be called into operation. Every motive or inducement, which can be honestly used, must be brought into play, in order that the moral faculties may not be worsted in the conflict; and every temptation or opinion which has an opposite tendency, must be as carefully eschewed.

Now it becomes us well to consider, what effect the doctrine, that man's moral sentiments are dependant upon his physical organization, will have upon the contest which is, or ought to be, constantly going on within us. The consequences of the system are not to be calculated from the mode of its action, in the case of those whose conduct is likely to be modified by their station in society, or other adventitious circumstances. We must have recourse to those large masses of men, whose minds are not under such ameliorating influences; and, with such men, it may be confidently predicted, that the reception of the doctrines inculcated by the phrenologists will be most pernicious. While they are experiencing the difficulty of keeping their animal propensities under the dominion of reason, we

may expect that they will gladly avail themselves of the excuse which this system presents, for giving up the labour.

“We have discovered,” they may be expected to say, “the cause of the uneasiness we have been experiencing. We have been endeavouring to do what the constitution of our nature renders impossible. We are so formed, that, in us, the animal propensities will always have the pre-eminence. In our heads, the lower organs are largely developed, and are so powerful, that the intellect and moral feelings are unable to cope with them. Let us, therefore, give up the useless contest, and enjoy life while we may.”

If a phrenologist were to dilate to these men, on the lofty nature of the pleasures which result from acting in conformity with the moral and intellectual faculties; may it not be anticipated, that they would answer, “We know by actual experience the pleasures we derive from animal gratification; but of these other pleasures we can form no conception. You tell us, moreover, that our opinions depend upon the organization of the brain; and why should we attempt to go counter to such an overwhelming influence? By your own showing, we cannot succeed. It is, therefore, much wiser not to make the useless effort.”

We do not see how, on the principles of the phrenologists, these men are to be convicted of an error in reasoning. They are merely following out the consequences, which are legitimately deducible from the premises placed before them. Surely, a system which leads to such results, ought to be based on a strong foundation before our assent to it is demanded. The proofs ought

certainly to be very cogent, which are to compel us to resign the obligations of duty, and the inducements of immortality, for so dangerous a novelty. Surely, moreover, such a system ought to be subjected to a very rigid examination, before it is allowed to be made the ground-work of a national education.

84. And yet, the proofs of the truth of this philosophy are altogether unsatisfactory. We are told, that in the heads of all the criminals which have been examined, the organs of the animal propensities decidedly preponderate over those of the moral sentiments and intellect.

But, granting that this is the case, does it show that it is impossible for a man, by the aid of religious principle, to counteract the evil propensities to which he is subjected by having an ill-organized brain? If this cannot be demonstrated, the whole proof at once falls to the ground. If the phrenologists are not prepared to show, that an honest, benevolent, and temperate man has never existed, in whose head the organs of the animal propensities preponderated over those of the lower sentiments and intellect, the whole case falls to the ground. Before they can expect reasonable men to give credence to their system, and before that system can be of any avail for the purposes to which they wish to apply it, they must prove, that a good man has never existed with an ill-organized brain.

85. And this, we maintain, they cannot do. We maintain, that it is possible for a man, by the use of the means which God has afforded him, to overcome all the temptations to which he can be exposed by the worst possible constituted head.



Some men have stronger arms than others; but, because the muscles of a man's limbs are well developed, it does not follow that he should be continually exercising them. It may be easier and pleasanter for him than other men, to raise great weights, but that does not say that he should be always so employed. He may be induced by preponderating motives to turn himself to other employments; and the muscles of his arm may become comparatively weak, from want of exercise; while a person, with a naturally much inferior organization, may, by continually exercising the muscles of the limb in question, impart to it an almost miraculous strength and energy. And the same thing, we contend, takes place with respect to the brain. The phrenologists do not say that the brain thinks, but that the mind thinks by means of the brain. The mind, moreover, must have the power of choosing what organ it will make use of. Many extraneous forces may incline it to make use of one organ rather than another; and among these forces the size of the organ may have an influence. But still it is only one of many forces, and the final resultant of the whole, depends upon the intensity of each. If, consequently, by education, or those spiritual influences which the phrenologists so much despise, a man is led to use the organs of the moral and intellectual faculties, rather than those of the animal propensities, these latter will diminish from want of exercise, while the former will daily increase in size and vigour.

On this theory, if the affections are placed on new objects, new organs will be called into activity. And however loudly those formerly used may plead for their accustomed exercise, still, if the new desires are suf-

ciently powerful, they will enable the subject of them to resist all the clamour and all the solicitation. It is obvious, that the individuals whom Mr. Combe adduces as proving the truth of his theory, have, from their childhood, been devoted to the gratification of the animal propensities. They have never known any other enjoyment than what sprung from this polluted source; and they so long persisted in complying with the cravings of appetite, that in the end, they were destroyed by enemies whose strength they had themselves occasioned.

86. Mr. Combe expressly brings forward the native American savages, and native New Hollanders, as instances of people who cannot, with their present brains, receive Christianity and civilization. We suppose that he has appealed to these people as the cases most favourable to his theory; and adopting his statements, their condition appears fully to bear out all he has said about them.

87. There has, however, recently been much light thrown upon the condition of the native Americans, as well as other barbarians with what is called a very faulty organization of the brain. We allude to the evidence, given before a Select Committee of the House of Commons, on the Aborigines of our several colonies. This evidence does not consist of the opinions of theorists, but is composed of the observations of practical men, engaged in the work of civilizing savage tribes. The evidence of one gentleman examined before the Committee, is a complete *instantia crucis*, as to the points at issue between the phrenologists and the advocates of Christianity, as a means of civilization. Mr. Combe says, that it is manifest from the shape of the heads of the Aborigines of Ame-

rica, as well as from other evidence, that they are not fit to become Christians: that their cerebral organization is so bad, as to render it impossible for them to understand the doctrines of Christianity. And he declares, that the only way of fitting them for the reception of these doctrines, is by gradually enlarging their moral and intellectual organs, so that they shall come to desire civilization.

Now, is this phrenological theory borne out by actual facts? Phrenologists are very fond of appealing to this sort of evidence, when it is of their own choosing, and very loud in proclaiming that it is the sole foundation of their system. We trust, therefore, that they will give attention to unbiassed evidence, and not run away from the difficulty it presents to them.

Mr. Elisha Bates, a member of the Society of Friends, states:—"The Society of Friends have been engaged for many years past in efforts for the civilization and improvement of several tribes of Indians in the United States. The yearly meeting of Ohio, to which I belong, has had for a number of years, perhaps thirty or forty, the remnant of the Shawnee tribe of Indians under their care. I am myself a member of the committee that has had charge of that concern, and have been since the year 1817, at which time I emigrated to that state. The prosecution of the labours of that committee, has led us to some acquaintance with the previous measures and actions of the Society. I think that the Society of Friends, and the Indians of different tribes in the United States, have been in some sort of connexion since the year 1681, at which time William Penn addressed a letter to the Indians of Pennsylvania, and the following

year he held a treaty with some of the tribes near Philadelphia, and the result of that first communication, and of the treaty, has been a settled friendship and good understanding between the Friends and the Indians generally.

“The plan which the Society of Friends adopted in their early intercourse with the Indians, was to attempt civilization first. The religious communications, so far as I am informed, and I have made it a subject of some investigation, were those of a very general character, recognizing the being of a God, and the accountability of man, but not with special reference to the peculiar doctrines of the Christian religion. An idea seemed to have been formed, that civilization was to make way for the introduction of the doctrines of the Christian religion. Within the last few years we have had occasion to review the whole course of proceedings, and we have come to the conclusion, from a deliberate view of the past, that we erred, sorrowfully erred, in the plan which was originally adopted, in making civilization the first object, for we cannot count on a single individual that we have brought to a full adoption of Christianity.”—pp. 184-7.

“If you had to recommence the same undertaking, would you now begin with Christianity? Decidedly we should.—And that in consequence of the experience you have had? Yes; and a full conviction that the experiment has failed; and the plan now adopted is to make Christian instruction the primary object.”—p. 189.

This evidence is decisive as to one part of the question; it shows that the plan recommended by the phrenologists is quite ineffectual in the work of reclaiming savages to civilized life. The experiment has been made

by a society of men remarkable for the perseverance with which they endeavour to advance any practicable plan, and has been given up after a full trial.

The next evidence we shall quote is that of Mr. Beecham, secretary to the Wesleyan Missionary Society: "I may," he says, "be permitted to furnish an illustration or two of the principle I am now maintaining; namely, that civilization does not furnish motives sufficiently powerful to induce the heathen to renounce their former course of life. The first of the cases to which I shall refer, is derived from the experience of our Society among the Chippeway Indians in Upper Canada. \* \* \* The Governor of Upper Canada had made many attempts to induce the Indians to renounce their wandering life. \* \* \* They gave the Governor credit for very kind and benevolent intentions; yet in answer to all his applications, while they thanked him for his kindness, they uniformly told him that they preferred their own mode of life to that followed by Europeans. This, again, was the case with the Indians who are situated in the neighbourhood of the river St. Clair. The Governor made several attempts to induce them also to renounce their wandering habits, and devote themselves to civilized pursuits; but they also refused. I have here a letter from the chief himself, in his own hand-writing, in which he says, in reference to the attempts that had thus been made to promote civilization without Christianity, 'I have heard of no instance, in this part of the country, where the plan of first civilizing the heathen Indians ever succeeded.' \* \* \* In regard to the Chippeway Indians, I have to state, that they are comprehended in our missionary plans, and that the

success of our exertions among them has been very great. The chief to whom I have made reference (Peter Jones, by his baptismal name), was the first convert to Christianity. Since that time our endeavours have been attended with such success, that we have now ten very prosperous missions among the Chippeways and Mohawks, and other Indians. We have several native preachers among them. This same chief has now for some years been a preacher, and is engaged in translating the Scriptures into the Chippeway language.—He has, I believe, completed the greater part of the New Testament.”—pp. 126-131.

We know not in what way these facts will be reconciled with the phrenological theory of cerebral development, or arranged under the organic and moral classes of the laws of nature. Perhaps the phrenologists will take no notice of them, but still they are decisive against the truth of their system. Mr. Combe tells us, that from the cerebral development of the North American Indians, it is impossible for them to receive the doctrines of Christianity; and, if there were any truth in phrenology, or his discovery about the laws of nature anything else than a piece of quackery, such would certainly be the case. The experiment, however, has been tried, and, notwithstanding the decisions of phrenology, these poor savages have listened to the sound of the Gospel, and have given proof, by a change of their tempers and lives, that they have not listened to it in vain.

This conduct of theirs is, indeed, precisely that which a just theory of human nature would lead us to expect; and, by consequence, goes directly in the teeth of the anticipations of phrenologists. A just philosophy

brings us to the conclusion, that men's conduct is ultimately governed by their desires, feelings, and affections. These sometimes are in accordance with a sound judgment, and sometimes in opposition to it; but they always prove themselves to be the governing power in man's nature. When they are set upon right objects, his conduct is such as it ought to be; when they are perverted and degraded, the conduct follows the direction which they give it.

88. If, therefore, we wish to change a man's mode of life, we must endeavour to influence his will by appealing to his imagination and his feelings. As long as we set before the savage, accustomed to range at large in his native forests, merely the restraints and proprieties of civilized society, he feels no inclination to give up his habitual freedom. Nothing is presented to his mind which engages his affections; nothing is set before him which has the capability of making him disgusted with his barbarous liberty. He is, however, as amenable to the power of gratitude and love, as the most civilized European; and when he can once be made to comprehend the kindness of God, as shown in revealed religion, he is instantly brought under the influence of these feelings. He becomes a little child, and the savageness of his nature is at end. In order that a man may be a good Christian, it is not necessary for him to understand abstract principles, or to be able to follow the steps of a logical demonstration: Christianity appeals to his heart. The missionary is a bearer of glad tidings to the heathen savage; and, when his message is so much attended to as to make its object known, he has in a great measure effected his purpose. He is then able to reach the feel-

ings of his audience; and to bring them under the constraint of law, by the combined operation of love, of reverence, and of fear.

89. But whatever may be the explanation of the phenomenon, the fact is now placed beyond the reach of denial, that the phrenologists have been mistaken in their estimate of the mental capacity possessed by the aborigines of America. They said, that the heads of these savages plainly showed, by a bad cerebral development, that it was impossible for them to become converts to the Christian faith; and with a great parade of learned phrases, they tried to demonstrate, that the independent existence and operation of the laws of nature forbade their being so. The experiment has been tried: Christianity has been offered to some of these barbarians, and, notwithstanding the confident predictions of philosophers, many of them have embraced it.

The same result has followed the preaching of Christianity to the Foullahs, a tribe of Negroes who are also esteemed a race with an extremely faulty cerebral organization.

We have said, that before the phrenologists could prove what it was their object to demonstrate, it was necessary for them to show not only that all murderers and felons whose heads they had examined, had the organs of the animal faculties more strongly developed than those of the moral sentiments and intellect; but also, that the head of no one good man was ever so shaped. If it could be shown, that a good man had ever existed with a skull so formed, the phrenological theory would be at an end. The evidence before this Parliamentary Committee, has gone further than this. It has



proved, that many individuals, who, by the axioms of phrenology, ought to have been unable to adopt Christianity, have adopted it, and shown, by a change in their tempers and their lives, that they have adopted it in truth and sincerity.

Messrs. Combe and Simpson tell us, that the human understanding cannot resist evidence founded on observation; and certainly, that man might well be looked on as a singular being who should say that it could. It may, nevertheless, very justly, and very properly, refuse to admit the truth of theories founded upon a hasty and rash generalization of facts. Such a theory we hold that of phrenology to be. We say, that it presents an imperfect and faulty explanation of the phenomena of thinking; and that its conclusions are overthrown by evidence, the force of which it is impossible to resist. We say, that it is essentially refuted by the evidence given before this Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry; and that its advocates cannot escape from the difficulty, unless they prove, that the testimony of the respectable and credible men then examined, was altogether false.

Another purpose to which Mr. Combe puts his discovery about the laws of nature, is to prove by it the hereditary transmission of mental faculties.

#### ON THE HEREDITARY TRANSMISSION OF MENTAL QUALITIES.

90. It is a well-known fact, that bodily qualities, as well as liability to certain diseases, are frequently transmitted by descent. The children of a consumptive parent generally have narrow chests and weak lungs;

while healthy parents are, for the most part, blessed with a family remarkable for strength. This law, however, is by no means invariable; and we sometimes see the most capricious deviations from it. The children of the most robust parents are sometimes cut off by consumption; while those who are sprung from a weak and diseased stock, flourish in health and strength to an extreme old age.

Whatever may be the nature of this law of the hereditary transmission of physical capabilities, it must extend to mental qualities, if phrenology be true. And such seems to be Mr. Combe's conviction; for he has tried hard to prove that the powers of the mind are transmissible by descent, in the same way as the qualities of the body.

We say, he has tried hard to prove this; and we now proceed to make a few observations on the way in which he has acquitted himself of his task.

91. One case he brings forward is certainly most singularly unfortunate. He cites Captain Franklin, who says, "It has been remarked, I do not know with what truth, that the half-bred American Indians show more personal courage than the pure breeds."

This testimony is brought to show, that the children of Indian and Europeans parents are an improvement upon the barbarous race, by their partaking of the qualities of Europeans. But it obviously proves, that the offspring of such an intercourse is superior to each of its parents. The hybrid is not only braver than the Indian, but also than the European parent. If it shows anything at all, therefore, it proves that the child is like neither parent, but is an improvement upon both. The

mixture, like some chemical compounds, does not assimilate to either of its component parts, but is superior to each. How, then, does this case demonstrate, that mental qualities are transmissible by hereditary descent? It is clearly calculated to prove the direct contrary, and to show, that we cannot predict what will be the disposition of the half-blood, by being acquainted with the mental qualities of either the Indian or European progenitor.

Another case which Mr. Combe produces, is the following:—"A friend told me, that in his youth he lived in a country in which the gentlemen were much addicted to hard drinking; and that he, too frequently, took a part in their revels. Several of his sons, born at that time, although subsequently educated in a very different moral atmosphere, turned out strongly addicted to inebriety: whereas the children born after he had removed to a large town, and formed more correct habits, were not the victims of this propensity.

"Another individual of superior talents, described to me the wild and mischievous revelry in which he indulged at the time of his marriage, and congratulated himself on his subsequent domestication and moral improvement. His eldest son, born in his riotous days, notwithstanding a strictly moral education, turned out a personification of the father's actual condition at that time: and his younger children were more moral in proportion as they were removed from the period of vicious frolics."—pp. 46, 47.

92. Now, if these cases prove anything, they demonstrate that the sons of intemperate men are invariably addicted to habits of intemperance. They show that a

man's character for sobriety depends upon that of his father. Do the phrenologists mean to assert that this is actually the case; or do they mean us to conclude that it is anything approaching to the truth? We maintain, that there can hardly be a single reader of this book, who does not know the contrary from his personal experience. In the last generation, the country gentlemen of England might, with justice, be called an intemperate, hard-drinking race. It is said, that Squire Western himself is scarcely a caricature of the class from which he is taken. And will any man, with the least pretensions to candour, say, that the present country gentlemen, as a class, are chargeable with this vice? On the contrary, they are in general as remarkable for sobriety, as their fathers were for the corresponding vice.

What, then, becomes of the law of the hereditary transmission of moral qualities? With this well-known fact staring us in the face, are we to conclude that it holds good, on account of some isolated instances brought forward by Mr. Combe? The supposition is not for one moment to be thought of, by any one who is endowed with a reasonable understanding.

This law is also contradicted in a more melancholy way, by the present condition of the working classes of Great Britain. For they are but too evidently more addicted to intemperance than were their fathers. As the gentry have improved in their habits, the labouring men have deteriorated. This mournful fact, of the increased and increasing intemperance of the lower classes, is proved by parliamentary returns, and all the evidence of which such a thing is capable. Divers theories may be made to account for it. It most pro-

bably originates from the deficiency, or rather total want, of moral and religious education; as well as from the increased temptations which the present mode of employing the operatives throws in their way. One thing, however, is clearly certain, that it gives a death-blow to the theory of the hereditary transmission of moral qualities. It shows that they, as well as animal propensities, are not dependant upon descent, but upon other causes.

93. A third instance is the following: "A lady possessing a large brain and active temperament, was employed professionally as a teacher of music. Her husband also had a fine temperament, and a well constituted brain, but his talents for music were only moderate. They had several children, all of whom were produced while the mother was in the full practice of her profession, and the whole now indicate superior musical abilities. They have learned to play on several instruments as if by instinct, and highly excel. In this case, the original endowments of the mother, and her actual exercise of them, conspired to transmit them to her children." We should say, that the mother's actual exercise of her musical endowments, was the sole cause of the proficiency of her children in them. These children, from their infancy, would hear the practice of music talked of as a pleasant and honourable employment; they would be surrounded by musical instruments; they would, as it were, live in an atmosphere of music. What, then, so likely, as that they would acquire a fondness for it? What so probable, as that one of their occupations would be, an effort to produce musical sounds? They saw their mother derive credit, applause, and pleasure

from her skill in music ; they would, therefore, do their best to imitate her : and this strong effort of theirs, is quite sufficient to account for their subsequent proficiency.

94. We say that this is the most probable way of accounting for these children's love of harmony ; because we know, that in the cases of men distinguished for ability in particular arts or sciences, their sons have not by any means inherited their talents or genius. We find Sir Walter Scott, in his letters which Mr. Lockhart has recently published, repeatedly congratulating himself that none of his children showed a taste for poetry. The phrenologists, we imagine, will be ready enough to acknowledge, that all the organs which go to constitute the poetic character, were largely developed in the head of this illustrious man ; and his children were born at a time when these organs were in active operation. How is it, then, that they are not developed in his offspring ? If there be any truth in this law of hereditary transmission of mental faculties, they certainly ought to be : and the fact that they are not, goes strongly to prove the non-existence of such a law.

Other eminent poets of Britain, also, are married, and have sons, but we never heard that these children of illustrious sires are remarkable for possessing the qualities in the exercise of which their parents excel.

The second Earl of Chatham, again, was the son of the first, but it is scarcely possible to imagine two men whose characters are more opposite than were theirs. The first excelled all men in energy and decision ; while the second was lamentably remarkable for procrastination and indecisiveness. How, then, stands the law of

hereditary descent of mental qualities in this case? In the same situation as in most others; for it has no existence.

95. We need not, however, pursue this singular theory further, for Mr. Combe himself acknowledges, that the subject is still involved in obscurity. This obscurity he ascribes to ignorance of the functions of the brain; but anticipates that the time will come, when the principles of phrenology will be fully practised.

This mode of speech he appears to adopt, from a certain misgiving as to the effect which the present utter absence of everything like evidence of the hereditary transmission of mental and moral qualities must have upon the fortunes of phrenology. He, in the first place, tries to surmount the difficulty, by an attempt to prove the existence of the law; and, afterwards, perceiving the futility of the effort, endeavours to get out of the embarrassment by a promise of future enlightenment.

Whence, however, is the light to arise? As for looking for it from increased knowledge of the functions of the brain, the bare supposition is absurd. For, how is the most complete acquaintance with the contents of the skull, to alter the diversity which is so often seen to exist between the dispositions of parent and child? While this difference exists, not all the knowledge which physiologists are able to contribute, can in the least tend to remove the difficulty.

Mr. Combe feels that, if phrenology be true, there ought to be an uniform similitude between the dispositions of parent and child; and, if this be not found to be the case, the boasted science must fall to the ground. He and other phrenologists tell us, that it is not their

object to rear a system from ambitious motives, but that they are merely announcers of the truth, as it is to be discovered by observation of nature. If this be their character, Mr. Combe has now an opportunity of showing it, by confessing, that at this point the theory fails; for it does not account for the phenomena of nature.

Mr. Combe, however, does not pursue so candid a course, but makes himself a hole to creep out at, by declaring that the discrepancy arises from all past observations having been made in ignorance of the facts of phrenology. Does he, then, mean to assert, that it is impossible for a man accurately to observe the phenomena of nature, unless he knows the law on which they depend? Were men ignorant of the rise and fall of the tide, till Newton showed that they depended upon the position of the moon in her orbit? Was the rising and setting of the sun concealed from men's knowledge, while they were ignorant that it was caused by the diurnal rotation of the earth upon its axis?

As these facts were known before the discovery of the law on which they depended, so would men have perceived the similarity of the son's disposition to that of his parent, if there had been any uniform likeness between them. This circumstance is one fact, and the assumed connexion between the faculties of the mind and the organs of the brain, is another fact. They may, or may not, be connected together; but it cannot be denied that the existence of the one might be perceived without a knowledge of the other.

Not only, however, has a constant similarity not been perceived; but the dissimilarity is often so great, as to strike the most careless observer. We have, therefore,



a right to conclude, that no proof has yet been brought forward sufficient to establish the hereditary transmission of mental qualities.

96. This subject seems to have been already more than sufficiently discussed : before, however, we leave it, we shall notice one application of Mr. Combe's boasted discovery, which is pre-eminent for its exquisite absurdity. He says, "Until phrenology was discovered, no natural index to mental qualities, that could safely be relied on, was possessed; and each individual, in directing his conduct, was left to the guidance of his own sagacity. But the natural law never tended one iota to accommodate itself to that state of ignorance. Men suffered from unsuitable alliances; and they will continue to do so until they shall avail themselves of the means of judging afforded by phrenology, and act in accordance with its dictates."

We have heard of a man who wished to test the temper of a young lady whom he admired, asking her to play at chess, and, when she was losing the game, contriving to tread upon her foot, and it is much to be regretted that this prudent youth was not a phrenologist; for then he might have had a more scientific, though we doubt whether a surer mode of gaining the desired information. But is Mr. Combe not able to perceive, that the evil for which he is so anxious to provide a remedy, is occasioned by the improper motives with which people contract marriages, not by any difficulty they have in discovering the character of their future partners? It is because men form alliances for the sake of money, or rank, or some other thing of the same sort, that unhappy marriages are contracted. Of what use, then, can this

boasted examination of the skull be in the affair? Clearly not of the least. All that can be said in its favour is, that it is just as useful as any other application of phrenology.

We now take leave of Mr. Combe's discovery of the independent existence and operation of the laws of nature; and we must confess, that we are very far from agreeing with Mr. Simpson in his estimate of its importance. In some cases its applications are useless, and in others pernicious; but we have been totally unable to perceive an instance, in which it can be productive of benefit to any human creature. Its applicability to education may be better estimated, after we have discussed that important subject.

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## CHAPTER VI.

ON THE EDUCATION BEST ADAPTED TO THE WANTS  
OF THE UPPER CLASSES OF SOCIETY.

97. Right education of these classes even more important than that of the working orders. 98. The education of the English professional men, on the whole, good. 99. Phrenologists wish entirely to change it. 100. In education, the foundation ought to be proportioned to the superstructure which it is intended to raise. 101. Main object of education to discipline the mind. 102. If good mental habits are not acquired in early youth, they never can be acquired. 103—105. Value of accurate knowledge shown in the case of those who raise themselves by the force of genius. 106. Early study of Latin and Greek languages recommended. 107—111. Various reasons why Greek ought to be studied. 112. Reasons for the study of Latin. 113—118. Testimonies of eminent men in favour of a classical education. Milton. Mr. Whewell. Lord Brougham. Sir R. Peel. Sir W. Scott. Sir James Mackintosh. Coleridge. 119. Power of attention weakened by exclusively learning popular sciences. 120. Use of emulation in education. 121. Study of mathematics not to be neglected. 122. Though not calculated to give expertness in detecting fallacies. 123. Superficial nature of the phrenologists' system of education. 124. Not calculated to give the pupil a philosophical mode of thinking. 125. Information supplied by it defective and partial.

97. HOWEVER important the right education of the great mass of the people may appear in the eyes of every philanthropist, its consequence becomes immensely increased, when it is considered in connexion with that of the other classes of the community. For if a bad system of tuition should be adopted by the legislature for the instruction of its working population, while that of the upper and middle ranks remained sound and good, the latter could not be prevented from having a whole-

some and rectifying influence on the former. The false notions, and loose and illogical conclusions of the working orders, would, by a thousand unobserved channels, be corrected by the precise ideas and just deductions of those who must continue to modify their habits of thought. Should such a state of things unfortunately prevail in any country, it would no doubt occasion much mischief and great disorder. Still, however, the mischief would not be irreparable, nor the disorder desperate. Civilization would not deteriorate and finally disappear. Knowledge is power, and the greater and more correct knowledge might be expected, in the long run, to prevail, and not suffer the whole human race a second time to descend into ages of darkness.

But, if a false and unsound system of education should spread itself over a whole country; if a shallow information were to be universally diffused over a land, and no wells were to be left from which deeper draughts of knowledge might be drawn; in that case, there would be little reason to hope for an improved state of things. It might be confidently expected, that an age of sciolists would be succeeded by a generation still more superficial than themselves; till, at length, means would be wanting among such a people to verify the theorems which their ancestors had discovered; and the nation would degenerate into ignorance and barbarism. The salt which might have prevented the mass from putrefying would be taken away, and no vivifying principle be left to restore soundness to that which was decaying.

98. Now, whatever may be thought of the intellectual and moral condition of the working population of this country; and whatever may be said of the negli-

gence which has been but too much exhibited towards their condition, the same cannot be predicated of the English professional men. The philosophers, lawyers, physicians, and divines of England, have not, on the whole, been behind those of any other people; and it may be sufficient praise of English statesmen to say, that this has hitherto been the only nation in which a steady progress has been making for eight centuries, in liberty and civilization.

The system by which such men have been formed, ought not to be rashly broken up, because it may not be in accordance with what an untried theory would represent as the only efficient plan of instruction. It ought, surely, to be examined, whether there is not, after all, something in the education which has been hitherto pursued in this country, which is calculated to give those who are trained in it, powers of abstraction and investigation, which it would be difficult to convey as well by any other mode of instruction.

99. The avowed intention of the phrenologists, is nothing less than the overthrow of the method of education which has hitherto been followed in the English schools and universities; and the substituting for it another plan, founded on their own system of mental philosophy. That their theory of the mind is not altogether infallible, we think has already been shown; and this circumstance, of itself, may be a sufficient reason with many, for not exchanging the present system of education for one founded on such a basis.

100. The importance of the subject will, we hope, form an excuse for our discussing it more at large; and inquiring as shortly as we can, what constitutes a good

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intellectual, moral, and religious education. The patrons of the projected system of national schools maintain, that till the age of fourteen, the sons of all the various ranks in society should be educated on the same system : that no difference should be made between the education of the lad who is probably to pass his future life in manual labour, and him whose manhood is most likely to be spent in cultivating his intellect, and increasing his knowledge.

We must confess, that we cannot see the propriety of this mode of proceeding. In erecting an edifice, a judicious architect proportions the depth and breadth of the foundation, to the height of the building which he intends to raise upon it. He knows that the foundation which is sufficient to sustain with security a cottage, would be most likely to give way under the weight of a castle ; and proceeds accordingly, in calculating the outline of his projected erection.

We have certainly a difficulty in understanding, why a different plan is to be followed in raising the edifice of knowledge in the human mind. In this case, as well as in the other, if a great accumulation of materials be laid upon a slight and insufficient basis, the only result will be a vast and confused mass of rubbish. The possessor of a stock of ideas, acquired in this way, will not be a well-informed, much less a philosophical man, but a vain and self-sufficient pedant. There is certainly a mode of accounting for the phrenologists' method of proceeding in this matter, but we know not whether they will receive it as satisfactory :—they have not made provision for laying any foundation at all ; and, therefore, it matters not to what height the future

edifice may be intended to be raised. Every possible elevation will be equally stable and secure.

The necessity of making the foundation proportionate to the weight of knowledge it is intended to support, will be more evident, when we have satisfied ourselves as to the object of education.

101. We consider that it ought not to be the aim of a wise teacher, to put into the mind of his pupil as much information as possible; but to train his intellect in such a way as to make him a diligent, patient, and successful inquirer after truth, during the whole of his future life. He is not to endeavour to send those committed to his charge from school, with a loose and general acquaintance with the circle of modern sciences; but to direct his efforts to freeing the minds of youths from prejudices, teaching them the strength and weakness of the human understanding, and giving them habits of attention, abstraction, analysis and investigation, which, unless they are obtained with labour and diligence at an early period, can never be effectually acquired at all. He is, in fact, to consider the minds of his pupils, as instruments of which he is to teach them the use, and which he is, at the same time, to do his utmost to improve and perfect.

If, moreover, he succeeds in his object, it matters little what the means are which he employs for effecting it. Here one science is as useful as another; for if it proves an instrument by which a youth's mind is sharpened, strengthened, and rendered solid, the time he has occupied in learning it, may be reckoned well spent, though he never has occasion directly to use it during the rest of his existence.

This statement may appear startling to some, but its alarming tendency will, perhaps, be diminished on a little consideration. A rightly educated man is adding to the stock of his ideas, and increasing his positive knowledge, during the whole of his life. He is not only doing this when he reads, and professedly seeks for instruction; but he is obtaining knowledge from conversation, and from various events and circumstances which pass away totally unheeded by one whose curiosity is less enlightened.

By the habits of arrangement which he has previously formed, he can readily class the various ideas with which he thus becomes conversant, under their proper heads; and they exist in the storehouse of his mind, ready to be brought forward whenever an occasion arises which calls for their exercise. Such a man is also trained in habits of investigation; his instinctive desire of knowledge has been improved and directed to right objects; and, therefore, whenever a subject comes under his observation which appears worthy of being known, he does not allow it to pass from his attention, till he has acquired concerning it, all the information which he can obtain. He will compare it with other facts which he already knows, satisfy himself concerning the points in which it agrees with some of them, and differs from others, and thus gain a knowledge of its relations.

Although, therefore, this person may be despised by an individual who has been lectured during his boyhood on the modern sciences, as a man of limited acquirements, he will show himself immensely his superior, both in the appreciation and investigation of abstract truth, and the conducting of the actual business of life. In whatever



circumstances his future lot may be cast, he will be ready to avail himself of all the means of improvement which his situation affords; and, though he may never be able to acquire the extent of information on some subjects which the other possesses, yet that inferiority will be amply compensated, by the more efficient use which he will be able to make of what he does know.

102. It should also be remembered, that if the habits of mind of which we have been speaking are not cultivated in early youth, they never can be effectually cultivated at all. The man who, during his early youth and boyhood, has been popularly taught natural history and the modern sciences, flatters himself that he is already a philosopher, and cannot bring himself to attend to methods of inquiry which would teach him the superficial nature of his own acquirements. All that he does know, he has learned with ease and pleasure to himself; and, therefore, he turns with loathing from that science which it requires great labour and application to master. He consequently prefers to doing this, declaiming on the absurdity of such methods of proceeding; and in utter ignorance of true science, maintains that he has acquired all the knowledge which is useful.

It is, indeed, very easy to go on adding to the superstructure of knowledge, when a good foundation has been laid in youth; but it is quite another thing, in years of maturity, to destroy the edifice which has already been erected, and to build another on a new and firmer basis. All the qualities of mind which would aid us in doing so, have become dull and lethargic from want of use, and it is impossible to rouse them to any useful purpose. "A strong curiosity," says Dugald

Stewart, "properly directed, may be justly considered one of the most important elements in philosophical genius; and, accordingly, there is no circumstance of greater consequence in education than to keep the curiosity always awake, and to turn it to useful pursuits. I cannot help, therefore, disapproving greatly of a very common practice in this country, that of communicating to children general and superficial views of science and history, by means of popular introductions. In this way we rob their future studies of all that interest which can render study agreeable, and reduce the mind in the pursuits of science to the same state of listlessness and languor, as when we toil through the pages of a tedious novel after being made acquainted with the final catastrophe\*."

103. The great value of precision of thought and accuracy of knowledge, is seen in the cases of those men, who, by the force of great ability and diligence, have raised themselves from an humble station in society, to eminence in the world of science and literature. These individuals are prevented by the narrowness of their circumstances from purchasing many books, and are, therefore, compelled to make themselves thoroughly masters of one work, before they part with it in order to procure another. Their minds are thus confined to a narrow channel, and become correspondingly deep and accurate. While they labour under many and great difficulties in the acquisition of knowledge, they are, at least, preserved from the temptation to dissipation of thought, to which students, otherwise better circumstanced, are constantly exposed.

\* *Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers.*

104. It is, indeed, a much easier as well as pleasanter employment, to become generally acquainted with many branches of knowledge, than to acquire a thorough mastery of any one in particular. A young man, therefore, will always be desirous of novelty in his studies, and if his tutor will permit him, will gladly range over the whole circle of science; and flatter himself, that he is being fitted for the right discharge of the various duties of society, by his excursive and multifarious reading.

To the superficial observer, this young man will, perhaps, appear to have employed his time better, than his companion who has confined himself to thoroughly mastering one or two branches of knowledge. His inferiority, however, will become evident to all, when he is placed in a situation of trial or difficulty. He will then show a want of control over his powers of thinking; he will be surrounded by a misty vacuity which he is totally unable to dissipate, and will be incapacitated from fixing his attention so as to discover a way of escape from his embarrassment.

And if it be said, that very few, during their passage through life, are called upon to exercise such powers, we still maintain, that that is no reason why it should not be the part of a good education to cultivate them in the minds of youth. The man who has them, stands a much fairer chance of happiness than he who has merely acquired a taste for general and desultory reading. He, also, undoubtedly is higher in the scale of intellectual beings; and it cannot be denied that it is one end of a good education, to raise a man as much as possible above the wants and desires of mere animal nature.

Nothing, again, more contributes to cultivate in the youthful mind habits of humility and a due estimate of its own powers, than the inculcation of the great truth, that no really valuable acquirement can be made without the exertion of labour and self-restraint. How much soever we may flatter ourselves of the contrary, there has yet been discovered no royal road to solid and substantial learning. And that system of philosophy which would persuade us that there is, is founded in error, and its only effect must be to raise up a generation of self-sufficient sciolists, who do not even know enough to be aware of their own ignorance.

105. Man, also, has a constant tendency to think only of the material things with which he is surrounded. The savage has no idea of turning his contemplation inward upon himself. His senses are gratified by the objects around him, and he thinks of them merely as they minister to his gratification. His thoughts are occupied with what is present, and he speculates not on the past or the future. And the same is the case with children, who, unless they are taught the contrary, have no curiosity about what is not immediately present to their senses. Every man is born a savage, and it is the part of education to raise him to a state of civilization and refinement.

And how is this best to be done? Is it by teaching him while young, that his sole concern is with those objects in which his own pleasures are involved; or by directing his attention to the productions of mind, and leading his thoughts to the consideration of the world of science or art? Surely, he will be trained up a nobler and more exalted creature, if his contemplation is fixed

on those works of genius by which the history of his race has been adorned. He may never be able to rival them, but still his own soul can be kindled by the fire which there blazes, and he may feel his own mind raised by communion with those who have been exalted above their fellows. "Whatever," says Dr. Johnson, "withdraws us from the power of our senses; whatever makes the past, the distant, or the future, predominate over the present, advances us in the dignity of thinking beings." Therefore we contend, that that system of education is diligently to be eschewed, which makes the material world the primary object in our thoughts, and tends to chain us down to a contemplation of those things which directly administer to our convenience. However exalted a rank a nation may have in the scale of civilization, if such a mode of education should ever be prevalent among them, they will rapidly degenerate and sink to the lowest depths of barbarism. Each generation will be content with a more superficial acquaintance with the works of nature, than was possessed by the one preceding it; speculative science and precision of thought will be less and less cultivated, till, at length, every class of society will be reduced to the same level of ignorance, and the pursuit of abstract truth utterly disappear.

106. It becomes, therefore, a most important inquiry, What system of education is best fitted to create an opposite disposition in the mind of a people? What mode of instruction is most likely to generate in youth, a love of science for its own sake, and a power of advancing in the march of scientific discovery?

We answer, that which takes the abstract sciences for the basis of its teaching; and it ought to commence

with that branch of science which relates to the artificial forms or symbols by which the mind reasons. In other words, language is the object to which the mind of that boy is primarily to be directed, who is intended to be formed into a right-thinking man. And we, without hesitation, say, that of all languages which can be chosen for the purpose, Greek and Latin are immensely the most eligible.

Why we recommend languages to be taught at the commencement of education, is well explained by Professor Sedgwick, in the following passage of his *Discourse on the Studies of the University of Cambridge*. "Before I pass on, I may recal to your minds the wonderful ease with which a child comprehends the conventional signs of thought formed between man and man; not only learns the meaning of words descriptive of visible things, but understands by a kind of rational instinct the meaning of abstract terms, without ever thinking of the faculty by which he comes to separate them from the names of mere objects of sense. The readiness with which a child acquires a language may well be called a rational instinct; for during the time that his knowledge is built up, and that he learns to handle the instruments of thought, he knows no more of what is passing within himself, than he does of the structure of the eye or the properties of light, while he attends to the impressions on his visual sense, and gives to each impression its appropriate name. As the memory becomes stored with words, and the mind accustomed to their application, this readiness of verbal acquisition gradually decays, and at length, with some persons, almost disappears. That this is true, I need only appeal

to the experience of those who, after being long disused to such studies, have attempted to learn a language. They will tell you of their feelings of mental drudgery and intolerable fatigue, during their slow laborious progress, in acquiring what a child gains without knowing how, and a young person learns cheerfully and without a sense of toil. \* \* \* Our fathers then have done wisely, and followed nature, in making the study of languages a part of our earliest discipline."

This passage may be reckoned more than sufficient to refute the assertion of the phrenologists, "that it is to mistake the nature and operation of the faculties of the human mind, to talk of cultivating an instrument of thought previously to using it in actual thinking\*." By the way we may observe, that it is very difficult to conceive, how we are to use in actual thinking an instrument of thought which we do not know. Does a child use his vernacular tongue before he knows it? If he did, we imagine that he would be more likely to talk nonsense than the generality of his playmates. But in truth, seriously to controvert such absurd assertions as this, is almost as ridiculous as the assertion itself. It is contradicted by the experience of every man who has had anything to do, either with teaching or learning languages. Notwithstanding, therefore, the declarations of the phrenologists, we shall continue to believe, that an early period of life is the best time for acquiring this sort of information.

107. The question now presents itself, why are the Latin and Greek languages to be those to which the student's mind is especially directed? The Greek tongue

\* SIMPSON'S *Philosophy of Education*.

is universally represented by all who are acquainted with it, as the most perfect instrument of thought which has ever yet been invented or used by man. When, therefore, we consider the very great influence which language has over our ideas, this, of itself, must be a very cogent reason for teaching it in our schools and universities.

The Greek authors, moreover, are eminent above all others, for carefulness in the choice of words, and skill in the collocation of them. In these respects, they are separated by an immense interval from the writers of other nations; and in many species of composition rivalry with them has not even been attempted. The shades of meaning between the expressions which they use, are so nicely distinguished, that it is impossible to render them in any translation; and the study of them is, consequently, one of the best possible exercises for obtaining subtlety of analysis and accuracy of thinking.

It is said, that "the ancient authors themselves are all translated, to the complete and undeniable appropriation of everything but certain felicitous turns of expression, the only quality which translation cannot transfer, but which at its best is a luxury, too dearly purchased by exclusive study for one-fourth of a lifetime\*."

108. There are, however, many things which it is impossible to give in a translation, besides certain felicitous turns of expression. In all languages, there are idiomatic expressions which cannot be transferred into any other. To render accurately the meaning of one little word, the whole history of a people must sometimes be known. No two languages contain strictly

\* SIMPSON on *Education*.



equipollent words, even when they are used by nations which are cotemporary and neighbouring; but how much more must this be the case with the languages of people, differing so widely in every respect as the Grecian and English? To say, therefore, that reading an author in a translation, conveys the same information as reading him in the original, merely betrays great ignorance of the subject.

If, therefore, it be worth a man's while to become acquainted with the most perfect models of composition in poetry, oratory, history, and philosophy, he must consent to learn the language in which they have been written; for in no other way can he possibly know them.

109. And it may with confidence be said, that the labour he undergoes to effect this object, brings with it its own reward. It constitutes one of the best disciplines to which his mind can be subjected. It is declared by the phrenologists, that all languages exercise but one faculty, viz., verbal memory; but, surely, the man who seriously thinks so, must know very little of the subject on which he professes to teach others.

Is no faculty but verbal memory called into exercise, when we trace the historical meaning of a word through the successive authors by whom it has been used; and endeavour to discover the reasons for the various meanings which in its progress it has assumed? Is it verbal memory which is alone used, when we inquire into the influence which the religion, civil polity, or domestic customs of a people, had on an expression, the meaning of which we wish accurately to determine? Are not other faculties called into exercise, when we compare this expression with an analogous one in our own language?

110. What pursuit, again, we would ask, is more likely to free us from national, local, or educational prejudices, than the philosophical study of language? It inevitably brings us acquainted with the way in which a people, widely differing from ourselves, thought upon those subjects which are most interesting to human beings; and, consequently, induces us to consider and examine if our own opinions are based upon a firm and rational foundation.

111. The peculiar position of the Greeks, also, in the history of civilization, as well as their achievements in science and the arts, must always make them a subject for profitable and interesting contemplation. They united in themselves, the speculative and contemplative habits of the oriental, with the practical sagacity of the western nations; and the blending of these two seemingly opposite qualities, produced a refined excellence in their literature, which it is vain to look for in the works of any other people.

Their architecture formed in itself a complete idea, perfect in all its parts, and exactly fitted to the end it was intended to produce and fulfil.

It may be said, that we can study the remains of their buildings without being at the trouble of learning their language. But can we thus enter into the spirit and actuating principle by which such works were erected? Unless we make ourselves acquainted with the tone and temper of the people's minds, and the end to which their efforts were directed, we must be totally unfit for conceiving the ideality of the wonderful constructions which the Greeks have left us.

Nor was the taste of this people less remarkable in

their literary productions, than in their works of statuary and architecture. In almost every department of genius, they have left behind them perfect models of excellence. Many of their writers are equally remarkable for the exactness of their logic, the perfectness of their arrangement, the felicity of their illustration, and the beauty of their style. If, then, it be true, that the faculties of the mind are best trained by exercise and practice, what pursuit can be so fitted for the educating of them as the study of these immortal works? And it is absurd to say, that this end can be accomplished by reading translations of these compositions. If we would strengthen our powers of mind, and invigorate our faculties, we must enter into the spirit of each; we must make ourselves thoroughly acquainted with them; and this can only be done by studying and meditating upon them in the original.

112. Concerning the propriety and usefulness of learning the Latin language, it may be sufficient to observe, that it was not only the tongue spoken and written at Rome, but that it also formed the living language of the literary men of Europe, for several centuries. The indiscriminate censure which it was at one time the habit to cast upon the middle ages, is now rapidly giving place to a juster appreciation of the authors who flourished in them; and we must remember, that not only the writers of those times, if read at all, must be studied in the Latin language, but that modern tongues did not begin to be generally used in scientific treatises, till the end of the seventeenth century. Newton's *Principia* is written in Latin.

However much, therefore, self-sufficient men of the

present day may sneer at the barbarism of making a boy waste his time in learning Latin, his teachers may be satisfied, that by so doing they put within his hands, a key to an extensive and interesting field of knowledge, which otherwise would be hermetically sealed to his inquiries.

113. We now come to another argument, put forward by the modern doctors of education, on this subject. They say, that all the abler men who have written upon education, have condemned the system of teaching, in schools, Latin and Greek; that no reason can be given for the continuance of it; but that it is persisted in, entirely because certain influential individuals conceive their interest and reputation to be involved in it.

Mr. Simpson has, with very chivalrous hardihood, cited the mighty name of Milton as confirmatory of his own views on education. This testimony must have been brought forward by that gentleman, under the notion, that none of his readers would trouble themselves with perusing so old-fashioned a book, as the *Tractate on Education, addressed to Master Samuel Hartlib*. For in that celebrated composition the poet directs, "that they (the boys) should begin with the chief and necessary rules of some good grammar, either that now used, or any better: and while this is doing, their speech is to be fashioned to a distinct and clear pronunciation, as near as may be to the Italian, especially in the vowels. For we Englishmen being far northerly, do not open our mouths in the cold air, wide enough to grace a southern tongue; but are observed by all other nations to speak exceeding close and inward; so that to smatter Latin with an English mouth, is as ill a hearing as law French.

Next, to make them expert in the usefulest points of grammar, and withal to season them and win them early to the love of virtue and true labour, ere any flattering inducement or vain principle seize them wandering, some easy and delightful book of education should be read to them; whereof the Greeks have store, as Cebes, Plutarch, and other Socratic discourses."

We hope, therefore, that we shall not again hear the most sublime of poets, and one of the greatest of men, brought forward as a patron of the phrenological plan of education. The advocates of it, indeed, must have been sadly in want of an argument in its favour, when they betook themselves to the *Tractate on Education*.

114. To pass from Milton to authors of more recent date: Mr. Whewell, of Trinity College Cambridge, has lately published a work on the *Principles of English University Education*. He must be allowed, by all who are acquainted with the literary or philosophical world, to be at least as able to estimate the merits of modern science as an instrument of education, as Mr. Simpson, Mr. George Combe, or Dr. Caldwell. What, then, is his testimony on the subject? He strongly advocates the study of the Greek and Latin classics, and the principles of mathematics, as the most likely means of imparting to youth, just and manly habits of thought.

We refer to his work for the arguments by which he supports his views; and shall only mention here one reason why he considers the study of the Greek and Latin classics, as essential to a thoroughly liberal education.

He argues, that modern literature is so imbued with

the spirit of the ancient, that it is impossible thoroughly to understand the first without being acquainted with the second. "In thought and language," he says, "as well as in arts and products of art, we inherit an inestimable fortune from a long line of ancestors. But thoughts can be inherited, and words, in all their force, transmitted, only by those who are connected with their ancestors in the line of thought and understanding, as well as in the mere succession of time. And how is this connexion of generations, thus requisite to the transmission and augmentation of mental wealth, to be kept up? We conceive, that it can only be effectually maintained by thoroughly imbuing the minds of all who make pretensions to a liberal education, with that literature from which the chief part of our intellectual wealth is derived."

"The languages of ancient Greece and Rome," Mr. Whewell again observes, "have, through the whole history of civilization, been the means of giving distinctness to men's ideas of the analogy of language, which distinctness, as we have seen, is a main element of intellectual cultivation. The forms and processes of general grammar have been conveyed to all men's minds by the use of common models and common examples. To all the nations of modern Europe, whether speaking a Romance language or not, the Latin grammar is a standard of comparison, by reference to which speculative views of grammar become plain and familiar."

115. Mr. Whewell may be reckoned by the advocates of the new system of education, prejudiced and influenced by his situation, and therefore not a fair judge on the subject. But what will these gentlemen say to

Lord Brougham and Sir Robert Peel? These eminent statesmen, on many of the most interesting questions of the day, entertain and advocate directly opposite opinions; but they join in recommending the study of the Greek and Roman literature, as the most efficient means for rightly disciplining the mind. They have both been Rectors of the University of Glasgow; and each of them, when he was elected, made a formal address to the students, in which he strongly recommended to his hearers, to make themselves thoroughly acquainted with these literatures.

These two statesmen are both remarkable for the possession of great natural abilities, and for successful cultivation of them; are we then to conclude, that they are entirely mistaken as to the means they used for effecting this object? Or are we to think, that they wished to stunt the minds of the rising generation, and cause their own death to be regretted, as leaving a void in society which it will be impossible to supply? The phrenologists, we suppose, will consider, that these two famous men "afford a striking proof of an ignorant custom enthralling an imperfectly educated people;" in recommending that sort of education to the students of Glasgow University, which has been discovered to be a loss of time and waste of labour.

116. Lord Brougham and Sir Robert Peel have spoken of the study of the Greek and Roman literatures as men who, by their own experience, have felt their good effects upon the minds of those who diligently cultivate them. The next authority we shall cite on the subject, is that of an equally eminent man, who throughout his life regretted, that an imperfect education had

deprived him of the advantage. We allude to Sir Walter Scott; and refer to his *Life* by Mr. Lockhart, for proof of our assertion. It appears from letters of Scott, published in that work, that he felt the imperfectness of his acquaintance with classical literature, to be a deficiency which he could not supply by any exertions in after-life. Whether he was right or wrong in this opinion, it is not for us to decide; but we certainly think, that we are justified by it in citing Sir Walter, as an authority for the propriety of making the literatures of Greece and Rome, subjects of early education.

117. The next individual whose opinion we shall bring forward is Sir James Mackintosh, who says, in his *Lectures on the Law of Nature and Nations*, "I am not one of those who think that, in the system of English education, too much time and labour are employed in the study of the languages of Greece and Rome; it is a popular, but, in my humble opinion, a very shallow and vulgar objection. It would be easy, I think, to prove that too much time can scarcely be employed on these languages, by any nation which is desirous of preserving either that purity of taste, which is its brightest ornament, or that purity of morals, which is its strongest bulwark. You may be sure, gentlemen, that I am not going to waste your time by expanding the commonplaces of panegyric on classical learning. I shall not speak of the necessity of recurring to the best models for the formation of taste. When any modern poets or orators shall have excelled Homer and Demosthenes; and when any considerable number of unlettered modern writers (for I have no concern with extraordinary exceptions) shall have attained eminence, it will be time



enough to discuss the question. But I entreat you to consider the connexion between classical learning and morality, which I think as real and as close as its connexion with taste, although I do not find that it has been so often noticed\*."

This enlightened philosopher, therefore, is also to be classed among those individuals who, on account of the estimation in which they hold classical learning, are denounced by the phrenologists as foolish and prejudiced people.

118. The last testimony we shall bring forward on the subject is that of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, whose authority will be reckoned slight by no one, who is capable of appreciating his claims to the character of a profound and original thinker. "One constant blunder," (I find it so pencilled by Mr. C., on a blank page of my copy of the *Bubbles from the Brunnens*,) "of these New Broomers, these Penny Magazine sages and philanthropists, in reference to our public schools, is to confine their views to what schoolmasters teach the boys, with entire oversight of all that the boys are excited to learn from each other and of themselves, with more geniality, even because it is not a part of their compelled school knowledge. An Eton boy's knowledge of the St. Lawrence, Mississippi, Missouri, Orellana, &c., will be generally found in exact proportion to his knowledge of the Ilissus, Hebrus, Orontes, &c.; inasmuch as modern travels and voyages are more entertaining and fascinating than Cellarius; or Robinson Crusoe, Dampier, and Captain Cook, than the Periegesis. Compare the lads themselves from Eton, Harrow, &c.,

\* *Memoirs of Sir James Mackintosh*, vol. i. p. 117.

with the alumni of the New Broom Institution, and not the lists of school lessons; and be that comparison the criterion\*.”

119. In our opinion, this passage puts the subject of education in a right point of view. It shows what ought to be the aim of teachers, by pointing out the effects which different modes of tuition may be expected to have on the mental habits and pursuits of the pupils. The lad who has been trained in a system which makes the inculcation of popular views of modern discoveries its grand object, feels a total inaptitude for giving the attention requisite for acquiring a knowledge of abstract science. There is, in such pursuits, nothing striking enough to engage his curiosity. There does not appear to him, any result sufficient to recompense him for the labour necessary to obtain it. In his own opinion, he has become amply acquainted with all the wonders of natural philosophy, by a much easier process; and, therefore, he ridicules the folly of those who give themselves the trouble of investigating into reasons and first principles. Above all, does he laugh at those who spend a considerable time in acquiring an exact knowledge of the Latin and Greek languages. These people he reckons to be much inferior to himself, in useful information; and he would be much surprised to hear, that they had acquired that knowledge, by way of amusement and relaxation, which to him had been the main business of life.

It need hardly be inquired, which of these young men is likely to have the best disciplined mind, or the most distinct and precise ideas; and it is equally unnecessary to ask, which would be more qualified to dis-

\* COLERIDGE'S *Table Talk*, note in vol. ii. p. 224.

cover effectual means of extricating himself from a situation of real difficulty.

120. The passage we have quoted from Mr. Coleridge, is also valuable as setting forth the true use of the principle of emulation in education. It may be questionable whether this principle ought to be called into action in the direct business of instruction; though in this case, we think that its bad effects are much overrated, and that it very seldom degenerates into envy, or creates feelings of positive dislike between rivals. There is, however, much less room for the abuse of emulation, when it merely serves to strengthen the principle of curiosity in the mutual intercourse of the pupils with each other. When one lad sees that another is better acquainted than himself with some subject of general interest, he feels desirous of knowing as much as his friend, and consequently seeks, by every available means, to increase his own information. No method, also, contributes more to the end he has in view, than conversation about the subject in question, with those of his companions who know more about it than himself. He thus, in the most effectual way, fixes what he has recently learned in his mind; he is led also to perceive his own deficiency, and to resort to those sources of knowledge which are most likely to gratify his awakened curiosity.

121. We have hitherto spoken of that branch of science which relates to the artificial symbols of thought; and have endeavoured to point out, how much the study of it tends to strengthen, improve, and sharpen the faculties, by accustoming the mind to habits of analysis, abstraction, comparison, and reflection.

We would, however, by no means be understood as wishing to exclude from a system of education the study of mathematics. "In mathematics," Mr. Whewell says, "the student is rendered familiar with the most perfect examples of strict inference; compelled habitually to fix his attention on those conditions on which the cogency of the demonstration depends; and, in the mistaken or imperfect attempts at demonstration, made by himself or others, he is presented with examples of the most natural fallacies, which he sees exposed and corrected."

122. With the opinions contained in the first part of this sentence we perfectly agree; but we cannot say, that we so cordially assent to the assertion with which it concludes. We do not, for ourselves, think that mistakes in mathematical demonstration, present instances of the most natural fallacies, or of those which most frequently occur in treatises on morals, politics, or theology. In mathematics there is no danger of error from neglecting to use your terms in a strict and definite sense; and there is no more fertile source of mistake in the conducting of arguments, than the ambiguous meaning of words\*. Many other errors also may be mentioned which the practice of mathematical reasoning does not, of itself, enable a man to detect and avoid.

A system of education, however, which has contributed to give a young man habits of fixed attention, and has accustomed him to examine accurately each link of the chain of a demonstration, must be considered as having benefited him in no slight degree. Thus the

\* See on this subject the excellent Chapter on Fallacies, in WHATELY's *Logic*.

study of mathematics most efficiently performs, and therefore we would by no means have it neglected, or set aside.

123. The phrenologists make loud and confident professions, that theirs is the only system of education which aims at improving the mental faculties; and that all others are perfectly useless for effecting such a purpose. They tell us, that before they rose to enlighten the world, people never considered what was the specific object of education; but went on, following the track of their fathers, without ever thinking of the place to which it conducted them. They moreover proclaim, that having at length discovered the true constitution of the human mind, they have constructed a scheme of instruction conformable to it; and made it so perfect, that all other methods ought to be compelled by law to yield to its pretensions, and every class of society be forced to submit their children to a process, by means of which they may be raised in the scale of thinking beings, and brought to a standard of perfection which has never yet been approached by man.

Our readers may well desire accurately to know what this system really is; and they will perhaps be surprised to learn, that it makes no provision whatever for giving habits of attention, improving the reflective powers, or imparting skill in the detection of fallacies.

The views of the phrenologists may be best discerned, by seeing what one of the most authoritative advocates of their system says about the study of mathematics, (of course he totally and utterly condemns the study of Greek and Latin). "There is," says he, "no occasion to go deeply into mathematics; but some know-

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ledge, in addition to that of the elementary figures, imparted in the infant school, of angles, triangles, squares, parallelograms, perpendiculars, horizontals, &c., of the relations of these, and of the demonstration of these relations, may be given to the more advanced classes of the seminary. The grand object with regard to all these branches of study ought to be—and the aid of able men will be necessary to sketch out the plan for each—to render the teaching of the subject or science elementarily broad and comprehensive, leaving minute details for after voluntary study. For example, in geometry, the study should not be some books of Euclid, and then a stop, but a general notion of the science as applied to planes and solids, as a basis for after detailed study; sufficient, however, to render the subject intelligible, and of easy application to the avocations of future life, in surveying, carpentry, &c., and easily extended when more minute information is wanted\*.”

We suppose that the youths who have undergone this beautiful system of training, will reckon themselves *grounded* in the principles of mathematics. What, however, will they know about them? Will they be at all acquainted with the peculiar strictness with which one link in a chain of mathematical reasoning depends on that which precedes it? Will they be informed of the cause of this strictness? It is not even intended to teach them any such antiquated knowledge. By being so instructed, their time would be almost as much wasted, as if they learned Latin and Greek. The grand object of the system is, to render the teaching of the subject or

\* SIMPSON'S *Philosophy of Education*.

science elementarily broad and comprehensive; leaving minute details for after voluntary study.

We would rather say, that the grand object of the whole system, is to turn out a race of superficial and self-sufficient sciolists, who would, by their dogmatic assertion and real ignorance, be a perfect nuisance to every society which was afflicted with their presence. Perhaps a method of tuition could not possibly be contrived, more calculated to defeat the objects of a really liberal education. It seems ingeniously adapted to destroy, or smother, that desire of knowledge which is implanted in the mind of every man; to disable a person from comprehending or attending to a chain of strict reasoning; and to generate in his understanding, confused and indistinct notions of the objects submitted to his apprehension. In fact, if an individual, educated according to this system, ever takes the trouble to acquire a thorough knowledge of anything, it must be by his being able, through natural vigour of intellect, to throw off the trammels of a vicious tuition.

124. From the specimen we have above given, and some incidental notices we have previously made, an idea may be formed of the sort of education which it is the object of the phrenologists to impose upon the youth of these realms. It mainly consists of lessons in subjects of natural history. Specific information is given on the composition of different substances, by the teacher of the school; and the pupil's attention is excited, by the instruction being conveyed in the most amusing way. And in the same manner as the qualities of leather or india-rubber are taught, so is a knowledge imparted to the students, of the phrenological theory of the human

mind. No more doubt is allowed to be entertained on the latter subject, than on the former. The pupil's unhesitating faith is demanded by the teachers of a system of mental philosophy, which a great proportion of thinking men consider unsound and empirical.

It will be seen, that no provision is made for giving the student a philosophical mode of thinking. He is said, indeed, to be taught natural philosophy; but it is a much more appropriate way of speaking to affirm, that he is loosely instructed in natural history. He is made acquainted with the specific qualities of particular substances, but he is not instructed in their mutual relations with each other. The system has just as little to do with causes and effects, as with reasons and conclusions. The pupil's mind is made a receptacle for a number of detached facts, but he is not taught to look for any law by which they are mutually connected with each other. His head is filled with a miscellaneous assemblage of articles, like the store-room of a pawnbroker; but he may leave the seminary without having any just notions of natural philosophy, or being made acquainted with the mode in which its various propositions are bound together by a common law. The characteristics of the system are, desultoriness and superficiality; and, if pursued to any extent, its undoubted effect would be, entirely to unfit the mind for thoroughly mastering any one branch of human knowledge.

That the system is chargeable with this grievous defect, seems to have struck the mind of its strenuous advocate, Mr. Simpson; and he endeavours to get rid of the objection in the following passage:—"Although the reflective powers are in frequent requisition inciden-



tally in our curriculum, the knowing are chiefly in exercise in storing up knowledge and gaining address, and there is no period of life when they are in greater vigour than at and about puberty. It will not be a smattering which will be gained;" and this is another objection; it is forgotten that besides the infant-school grounding, eight years are proposed to be devoted to the advanced school course; "under competent instructors, no branch will be permitted to be superficially attained; there is time, and there ought to be the means, to render the acquisition of each subject complete up to the pitch of the pupil's powers. It is under the present system that every thing is superficially attained or forgotten\*."

These are the assertions by which it is endeavoured to show, that the system is not superficial; but, surely, a more abortive attempt was never made, to refute a well-founded charge. It is acknowledged, that the curriculum calls into exercise the knowing faculties rather than the reflective. It would be more proper to say, that the boy under this system of education is not treated as a reasoning creature at all. His reflecting and comparing powers are not in the least called into exercise. A great parade is made about teaching him a kind of knowledge which, if left to his own guidance, he would learn more pleasingly and effectually by reading the popular publications of the day; while not the slightest effort is made to induce him to exert the higher faculties of his mind. He would leave the school perfectly unprepared to comprehend an abstruse treatise; and not at all fitted, by previous training, for detecting

\* *Philosophy of Education.*

fallacies in reasoning, or deciding in a case of conflicting testimony.

125. And even looking to mere information, how unfurnished would his mind be, with that sort of knowledge which is most frequently required in life. He is to be imbued with certain notions of politics and political economy, but he is not taught to exercise an enlightened judgment upon the facts thus presented to him. The study of history is precluded from the seminary; and thus, that branch of information which excites the most frequent exercise of the moral powers, is not imparted to the student's apprehension.

Must not a person so educated turn out a prejudiced and self-sufficient man? Must he not be constantly liable to be led away by crude theories and unfounded opinions? He is not thoroughly grounded in any one science; and is consequently unfit to increase his information by his own exertions in after life. If he wishes really to be a philosopher, he must endeavour to forget all that has been taught him, and lay a sound foundation on which to construct a connected scheme of knowledge. He must satisfy himself, that no really valuable acquisition can be gained by man without labour, and that knowledge which is obtained with little exertion, is generally found not to be worth the small price which has been paid for it. He must begin again from first principles, and, by exertion and perseverance, acquire the mental cultivation of which he has been defrauded by a faulty and insufficient education.

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## CHAPTER VII.

ON THE EDUCATION BEST ADAPTED TO THE WANTS  
OF THE WORKING CLASSES.

126. These have not the means of improvement possessed by the other classes of society. 127. Cannot have a complete education. 128. Prudence and principle suggest the same conduct, but principle most efficacious in enforcing it. 129. The poor have a right to be instructed in religion on account of the benefits it confers. 130. No duty involved in acquiring secular knowledge. 131. Beneficial effects of pursuit of knowledge. 132. These sometimes overrated. 133. How men use their reason in their daily avocations. 134. Superior efficacy of practical principles in the working of society. 135. Peculiar danger of unrelieved study of the material world. 136. Speculative knowledge not sufficient to restrain a man's desires. 137. Great deficiency of parental authority among the poor. 138. Benefits of infant schools. 139. They ought not to supersede a mother's care. 140. Much information cannot be imparted in them. 141. Deficiency of phrenologists' system in moral and religious training. 142. Revelation the only basis on which a just knowledge of religion can be founded. 143. The Bible not wished to be made a common class-book. 144. On the mode in which the phrenologists wish to teach the nature of God. 145. Close connexion between religion and morals. 146. On the theory that the human race will ultimately be perfectly happy. 147. If true, it would be no consolation to those who are now suffering. 148. Superior efficacy of a belief in a future state of rewards and punishments. 149. Declarations of Christianity on this subject, and unfair representations of some phrenologists.

126. IN every country which is at all advanced in civilization, society may be separated into two great divisions; those who by their circumstances are raised above the necessity of manual exertion, and those who are obliged to gain their daily bread by the labour of their hands. The sum of happiness possessed by either of these classes, is not greater than that enjoyed by the

other, but their occupations and pursuits are necessarily different. To the one class a country is indebted for the production of articles of necessity, convenience, and luxury; and to the other it has a right to look as the source of refinement, civilization, and speculative knowledge. By the leisure which the wealth of the upper classes bestows upon them, they have opportunity for cultivating their intellect and taste; and by the pursuits to which some of them are especially devoted, their minds are necessarily invigorated, and rendered quick in the apprehension and appreciation of truth.

It is, therefore, no credit to these men, that, as an order, they are intellectually in advance of the working classes. In the infinitely more important subject of morality they may possibly be inferior, but, looking to their respective circumstances and advantages, we should naturally expect that the one class should be superior to the other in intellectual cultivation.

That this might be the case, and thus provision be made for the advance of a country in civilization, seems one reason why society has been constituted as it now is; and it says nothing in disproof of this statement, that there are many individuals in the richer classes of society very ignorant and very prejudiced, while, from the working orders are ever and anon rising men, who make the most astonishing achievements in literature and science. All that we contend for is, that the upper classes, having more leisure, may in general be expected to have better cultivated minds than the lower.

We have already inquired into the efficiency of the mode of education which the phrenologists wish to be adopted, as applied to those individuals who may be

expected to have, during the remainder of their lives, leisure for intellectual improvement; and we have found it not to be likely to answer the anticipations of its advocates. Its failure seemed probable from its total deficiency of means to give precise and definite habits of thought to those who were subjected to its discipline, as well as from other causes.

127. In advancing to the examination of the applicability of this mode of education to the circumstances of the working classes, some other elements enter into the discussion, to which it will be necessary shortly to allude.

In the present state of this country, it is extremely doubtful whether it will be possible to retain the children of the labouring population at school, till they are fourteen years of age\*. No man would more rejoice at the accomplishment of such a scheme than ourselves, but we certainly think that, however much its consummation is to be desired, it does not appear probable. The competition which our manufactures meet with in every part of the world, and the difficulty which all who live by manual exertion experience in maintaining themselves and families, seem to present equally formidable obstacles to keeping the children of the working classes so long unemployed in productive labour.

The question, then, which presents itself for consideration in this case, is different from that which we had before us, when we inquired into the efficacy of the proposed plan of education as applied to the children of the upper ranks of society. We are prevented from believ-

\* According to the projected system of education, all the pupils are to remain at school till they are fourteen.

ing that the working classes can ever be completely educated, that is, can ever have their minds so trained as to be fit for the investigation and appreciation of abstract truth. In questions of philosophy, they must be content to receive the results of the inquiries of others, because they will not themselves have an opportunity of examining into the grounds and reasons of them. If, consequently, the state wishes to educate them in such a way as shall be most likely to make them useful citizens and good men, it must not direct its efforts so much to the training of the understanding, as to the cultivation of moral and religious principle.

128. It is a most beautiful instance of the wisdom and goodness of God, that the conclusions of the loftiest intellect and the simple dictates of conscience prescribe to every one exactly the same line of conduct. An enlarged view of his own interest leads a man, from selfish considerations, to be honest, virtuous, and benevolent, just as truly as an enlightened conscience commands him to be so. The effects to himself are, indeed, very different, but to the society in which he lives they are exactly the same.

No man, however, is perfectly wise, and the best cultivated reason, when it is not strengthened by other forces, can never be relied on as a continuous principle of action; and, therefore, considered in this lowest point of view, as a preventive of crime, religion can never be safely omitted in any plan of education. The motives which it supplies, are alone uniformly efficient and consistent; and, consequently, however skilfully a man's intellect may be trained, he cannot be considered as completely educated, unless he has been taught to rely

upon the motives which religion supplies as his chief dissuasive from vice and inducement to virtue. But if a man's mind has been but imperfectly educated; if time has not availed for imparting to him an enlarged view of the various bearings of society, in this case religion becomes still more essential as an instrument of worldly good. A thousand intervening obstacles will tend to blind such a man to the *utility* of virtuous conduct, but religious principle is alike constraining in all circumstances and in all situations.

129. We hold it, moreover, unwise to look at the subject solely in this degrading light, and to regard religion merely as a handmaid to police. It may, indeed, be well so esteemed, for no measure will ever be so complete a preventive of crime, as the diffusion throughout a people of the principles of Christianity. But the highest and best interests of the people themselves have a right to be considered in the conducting of this argument. The poor are, by the circumstances of their situation, shut out from many sources of enjoyment which are always open to the sons of wealth; but the consolations, encouragements, and promises of religion, are offered as freely to the peasant as the peer. The Divine Founder of Christianity declared that, during his own ministry, the poor had the Gospel preached unto them; and why are we now to deprive them of the happiness of being taught in their childhood to look to its doctrines for advice and comfort?

If, again, we merely look to education as a means of enlightening the mind, and invigorating the intellectual and moral powers, what subject can be presented to man's apprehension more calculated to effect this, than the

prospects which religion holds out? What can be so high-toned as the principles which it inculcates, what so humanising as the endearments by which it persuades? It seems to realise in the mind of every peasant who cordially embraces it, the splendid visions of Plato. It teaches him to regard himself as a being in whom God is personally interested; and for whom a way has been provided, in which he may be purified from the defilements he has contracted, and fitted for the enjoyment of the happiness which has been purchased for him. It engrafts in his soul a new principle of virtue, and nourishes and cherishes the heavenly plant by every motive which can be most efficacious on the mind of man. It tells him, that he is never to be satisfied with his own attainments, but to be always improving in holiness and advancing towards perfection. How valueless and powerless, as an instrument of amendment, does all other information appear, when compared with this wisdom which is from above! Yet this is the knowledge the inculcation of which it is intended entirely to exclude from the proposed national schools. The children of the poor are to be taught the qualities of leather, and the properties of glass; but they are to be totally prevented from obtaining that knowledge which is the key to temporal and eternal happiness.

130. This knowledge, moreover, it is morally obligatory on every man to obtain, but in the acquisition of other information no duty is involved. The acquisition of secular instruction may be pleasant or advantageous, but if a man totally neglect it, he does not commit any crime. Some men, indeed, have stated, that the pursuit of knowledge is a moral duty; and in replying to them,



we shall adopt the remarks of Mr. Dugald Stewart, which appear to us particularly judicious. "Although," he says, "the desire of knowledge is not an object of self-love, it is not in itself an object of moral approbation. A person may, indeed, employ his intellectual powers with a view to his own moral improvement, or to the happiness of society, and so far he acts from a laudable principle. But to prosecute study merely from the desire of knowledge is neither virtuous nor vicious. When not suffered to interfere with other duties, it is morally innocent. The virtue or vice does not lie in the desire, but in the proper or improper regulation of it. The ancient astronomer, who, when accused of indifference with respect to public transactions, answered that his country was in the heavens, acted criminally, inasmuch as he suffered his desire of knowledge to interfere with the duties which he owed to mankind. At the same time it must be admitted, that the desire of knowledge (and the same observation is applicable to our other desires) is of a more dignified nature than those appetites which are common to us with the brutes. A thirst for science has been always considered a mark of a liberal and elevated mind; and it generally co-operates with the moral faculty in forming us to those habits of self-government, which enable us to keep our animal appetites in due subjection\*."

131. The man who is strongly actuated by a desire for knowledge, is in general raised above low and degrading pleasures; and has always before him, an occupation which is calculated to keep his mind innocently and healthfully employed, and to prevent him

\* *Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers.*

from resorting to vicious stimulants to preserve himself from ennui. He is protected from that lassitude which is the result of vacuity of mind, and which always has a tendency to drive those who are subject to its influence into intemperance and sensuality.

Considered in this point of view, intellectual education must always be regarded as a great benefit; and all good men who have themselves taken pleasure in cultivating their mental faculties, must be anxious, from principles of philanthropy, to impart to their fellow creatures a capability of obtaining similar gratification. If the desire of knowledge is not in itself an object of moral approbation, it is, when restrained within due bounds, equally far from being culpable; it is perfectly innocent, and so many of men's pleasures are pernicious and degrading, that it is always beneficial to increase the number of those which are harmless. He, therefore, must be considered as a benefactor of his species, who has successfully endeavoured to excite in the minds of others, and properly direct, the principle of curiosity.

132. It must, however, at the same time be observed, that the advantages of knowledge, and especially knowledge of the material world, have been in some cases overrated by those who have treated of the subject. By none has this mistake been carried further than by some of the writers on phrenology. They admit, theoretically, that mere knowledge of the laws of nature does not ensure their observance, but at the same time tell us, that it must never be forgotten, that although mere knowledge be not sufficient, it is a primary and indispensable requisite to regular observance; and that it is as impossible to obey the natural laws

without knowing them, as it is to perform any other complicated and important duty in ignorance of its practical details\*.

If this representation were true, a man would be incapable of breathing, unless he were perfectly acquainted with the structure and functions of the lungs; and a person who did not know the mode in which chyle was produced from his food, and afterwards mixed with the animal fluids, would be unable to derive nutriment from his dinner. The experience of every man is a sufficient refutation of such a doctrine as this.

But, in truth, so far from a theoretical acquaintance with the laws of nature being essential to the observance of them, it has really very little to do with that observance. We have already been led to observe, that men, in the daily business of life, are actuated, as it were, by certain instinctive practical feelings, and not by the conclusions of their reason. And that they are so, may be reckoned a merciful and wise dispensation of Providence; for if they had always to look to their understanding for guidance, they would be compelled a thousand times to stand still, when, by being conducted by other principles, they can confidently advance in the walk of life.

133. We do not mean to say, that *reason* is not used by men in their daily avocations, but that it is put to very different purposes from speculating on the laws of nature. Practical men use it in a much narrower sphere, and hence they become more vigorous and expert in their calling. The merchant exerts his understanding in discovering the best market for his goods,

\* COMBE'S *Constitution of Man*.

but he does not think it necessary to become acquainted with the natural cause of one market's being better than another. He is also diligent in his inquiries concerning the circumstances and character of his customers, but he does not refer to some natural law for the reason why they differ in these respects from each other.

The artisan's reason is employed in making himself as skilful as he can in his proper calling; he exercises his ingenuity in finding out the way in which he can execute his allotted task in the quickest and most expert manner; but it is not at all essential to his skill, to know the mode in which the substance about which he is employed, differs from other substances. That may be a very proper and a very interesting inquiry, but the satisfaction of it would not make him one whit cleverer as a workman. It is not essential to the practical mechanic to know the theory of the composition and resolution of forces, nor is the person who has acquired such knowledge, at all better fitted for being a good handicraftsman. Indeed, the very habits induced by a philosopher, tend to unfit him for practical skill in the arts with the theory of which he has made himself acquainted. When he comes into the world of business, he is thinking while other men are acting: while he is meditating on the best way of commencing some work, a practical man has begun and finished it. The actuating instincts of the speculatist are swallowed up in his general views, and while he is endeavouring to make some new way for himself, the man of business, by following the beaten path, has arrived at the goal of his wishes.

134. When we turn our attention to the various

workings of human society, we see still more clearly the superior efficiency of instinctive practical principles. Here, while each man is merely thinking of his own private advantage, and striving honestly to obtain a livelihood for himself, he is really contributing to the welfare of the human race. He is most probably doing so immensely more effectually by simply trying lawfully to support himself and family, than if he were to endeavour to do it from motives of public spirit. "Public spirit, either in the form of patriotism which looks to the good of a community, or in that of philanthropy which seeks the good of the whole human race, implies not merely benevolent feelings stronger than, in fact, we commonly meet with, but also powers of abstraction beyond what the mass of mankind can possess. As it is, many of the most important objects are accomplished by the joint agency of persons who never think of them, nor have any idea of acting in concert; and that, with a certainty, regularity and completeness which probably the most diligent benevolence, under the guidance of the greatest human wisdom, could never have attained\*." It is the tendency of the system which prenologists advocate, to make every human being substitute for the instinctive feelings which God has implanted in him, his own notions about the framework of society. They would have us believe, that the condition of the mass of mankind would be improved, by changing those powers by which God now carries on the affairs of the world, for others which the ingenuity of man might devise.

Of all the subjects of inquiry which can possibly be presented to the human mind, the working of society is

\* ARCHBISHOP WHATELEY'S *Lectures on Political Economy*, Lec. 4.

perhaps the most perplexed and dubious. On no other thing have so many different opinions been entertained; on no other is the truth so difficult to arrive at. But, fortunately for us, the welfare of the human race does not depend upon the framework of society's being understood, even by the philosopher; much less, therefore, is its prosperity involved in the intelligence of the mechanic. If, before a man could be happy or comfortable, it were necessary for him to understand the law according to which society is regulated, how few in this world could hope to escape from misery! This, however, is not the case. Each individual will much more effectually promote his happiness by rightly discharging his duty in the station of life in which he is placed, than by trying to find out when he is in danger of violating the social law.

135. We are, moreover, to remember, that an unrestricted and unrelieved study of the material world and the laws of nature, is not without its own appropriate and peculiar danger. Some, indeed, represent this study as of itself sufficient to make men virtuous and honest, and consequently recommend it for adoption and inculcation, as the grand means of improving the social condition of mankind.

We, however, are very far from coinciding in this opinion, and think that mere mental cultivation of any kind will never be effectual in preserving a people from crime. For while it tends to raise a man above the coarse indulgence of his appetites, it exposes and inclines him to temptations of another sort. It is an old subject of observation, that each man is tempted to be discontented with the situation in which he is placed. He has

a sort of indistinct feeling, that he should be happier if he were in another condition of life. And has not intellectual cultivation, of itself, a tendency to increase this disposition in the poor man? He is made acquainted with many articles conducive to man's enjoyment which his narrow circumstances prevent him from obtaining. He is consequently led to repine at his own poverty, and, step by step, is induced to adopt unlawful and dishonest means for the gratification of his desires.

This sort of education is calculated to assist in the developement of right principles, by raising a man above debasing gratifications; but, if relied on as in itself sufficient to regulate the conduct, will be certain to bring disappointment on its promoters. Intellectual cultivation, separate from moral and religious training, simply enlarges the sphere of a man's desires, without augmenting his power of restraining them. It increases the number of his temptations, without imparting to him any faculty by which they may be more effectually resisted. Bishop Butler says, with admirable truth: "Together with the general principle of moral understanding, we have in our inward frame various affections towards particular external objects. These affections are naturally, and of right, subject to the government of the moral principle, as to the occasions upon which they may be gratified; as to the times, degrees, and manner, in which the objects of them may be pursued; but then the principle of virtue can neither excite them nor prevent them from being excited. On the contrary, they are naturally felt when the objects of them are present to the mind, not only before all consideration whether they can be obtained by lawful means, but after it is found they

cannot. For the natural objects of affection continue so; the necessities, conveniences, and pleasures of life, remain naturally desirable, though they cannot be obtained innocently: nay, though they cannot possibly be obtained at all\*."

Now, it is very obvious, that the greater number of things a man becomes acquainted with, the more numerous must be the objects which he thinks desirable. And his wish to possess himself of such ministrants to his gratification, is not at all diminished by the fact, that he has no means of lawfully acquiring them. If, moreover, the principle of virtue has not been cultivated in a corresponding degree, he still allows his mind to dwell upon them. The longer this affection continues in his breast, the more irresistible does its power become; till at last the idea suggests itself, that the desired object may by possibility be acquired, though by unlawful and dishonest practices. While he meditates on this last notion, though at first it may have been received with a considerable degree of abhorrence, yet, by degrees, it comes to be entertained with approbation. Finally, the scheme is actually put in practice; and the individual in question falls into the abyss of crime.

It may be said in answer to this statement, that if a man's intellectual powers are properly cultivated, they will teach him that his real interest consists in remaining honest and virtuous. A conviction that his happiness will be, in the long run, more promoted by abstaining from an unlawful gratification, than by indulging it, will as effectually contribute to his morality as any other motive whatever.

\* BUTLER'S *Analogy*.



But, on the other hand, it may be urged, that although on the whole, and in the long run, a man's interest in this world is promoted by honesty and benevolence, yet a conviction of this truth can hardly be expected to be arrived at, in the vast majority of cases. Right principles and an enlarged view of utility undoubtedly coincide in the line of action which they respectively recommend ; but there are so many obstacles to a man's coming to this conviction by a course of intellectual training, that it can never be depended on. It may be arrived at by a chain of rigid reasoning, but there are so many tempting by-paths to lead the student astray, that he is but too likely to mistake his direction.

136. And even if this difficulty were overcome, and a royal road discovered to these enlarged views of a man's real interests ; still we affirm, that a speculative conviction of the fact is by no means a certain restraint on the unlawful gratification of a man's desires. If it were so, every one's honesty and temperance would be in an exact ratio to his intellectual acquirements. Morality and knowledge would go hand in hand ; and we only need inquire into the extent of a man's information, in order to know the goodness of his heart.

All observation and experience, however, show that this is not the case. When the desire after a wished-for object has been long indulged, it becomes so overpowering as to bear down all the barriers which speculative knowledge can erect against its progress. A man shuts his eyes to the consequences of his actions, and, so that he may experience a momentary gratification, is content to incur the risk of ultimate loss and misery. He does not consult his own real interests ; he does not consider

what course of conduct will most effectually promote his happiness. His attention is entirely absorbed in obtaining the object which he longs for, and he thinks no more of other things than if they did not exist. How idle, and how useless must it be, to talk to such a man of the pleasure which an exercise of the higher organs confers! Such considerations have no influence upon him whatever; his soul is occupied with one object, and so that he may acquire it, he is wholly regardless what may be the consequences.

Supposing, again, that by education, a man has been convinced that his fairest chance of happiness lies in being on the side of the law; and that on this account he is careful not to do any thing contrary to its precepts. Still, this man exists in a state of hostility to the law: he dislikes it for the strictness with which it prohibits his using dishonest acts to possess himself of the things which he desires. He stands on the watch against it, and when he thinks he can evade its injunctions, he instantly avails himself of the opportunity. He may not, at his first declension from honour, steal, but he uses acts to obtain money which strict honesty forbids. His downward course is then rapid, till he finds himself compelled, by loss of character, to resort to knavery and fraud.

It is a melancholy truth, that the fears which a just view of human nature would lead us to have for the consequences of mere intellectual cultivation, have been hitherto justified by the result. Statistical details, both in England and France, have tended to show that where this sort of education is diffused (without being accompanied by religious instruction), crimes against the person are diminished, but those against property are increased.

Men in this state of civilization do not derive the same pleasure as a barbarous people from the gratification of the revengeful passions; but their desire to possess themselves of the means of indulgence is increased by their extended acquaintance with them. There is a greater number of tempting objects on which their imaginations may be fixed; and, consequently, a greater number of by-paths to lead them from the direct road of probity.

We must, therefore, conclude, that this sort of education, when unaccompanied by any other, has not the effect of advancing the morality of a people. When, indeed, it is kept in subordination to discipline of a higher kind, intellectual cultivation is very much to be commended. By being able to turn to his books for amusement, the labouring man has within his reach a constant protection from vacuity of mind, and, consequently, has not so great a temptation to betake himself to pernicious stimulants for excitement. The mental habits, also, which are thus induced, very much tend to the improvement of the man who is subject to their influence. They make him less liable to violent bursts of rage, and render him more amenable to the voice of reason. They do not, however, of themselves, make him more moral, and in order to attain this end, we must have recourse to other means.

We must bear in mind, that childhood and youth are not only the period for intellectual cultivation, but also the time in which habits of self-restraint, submission to authority, and obligation to duty, are to be inculcated.

137. All who have endeavoured to make themselves acquainted with the actual condition and mental habits of the poor, must have been struck with the almost total

absence among them of parental authority. They seem not to have an idea that a father has a right to the obedience of his child. They consequently never attempt to enforce it. If a child has done some action which offends them, they perhaps punish him with violence, but they never try to impress upon him the duty of obedience and self-restraint. They have a sort of notion, that doing so would diminish the child's happiness, and therefore abstain from attempting it. So far do they carry this principle, that they sometimes make grievous complaints of a schoolmaster having injured their child, when he has been correcting him in a way for which he would have received the thanks of a parent in the upper or middle ranks of life.

This unfortunate prejudice of the poor has the most prejudicial effects upon their children, and vigorous attempts must be made to counteract it, by every one who has the welfare of the working classes at heart.

138. Viewed in connexion with this object, the institution of infant schools is much to be commended. They, in the most effectual way, correct the bad effects of the mistaken indulgence of parents. They also take the child out of the influence of bad example: they prevent him from being contaminated by those pernicious habits which, if left to himself, he would most likely be disposed to adopt: and they afford an opportunity of implanting in his mind, at the first dawn of reason, right principles of action. They may well, therefore, be called powerful instruments of good.

139. But, in bestowing upon them due commendation, we are not to forget, that they are at best but substitutes for that parental training which, when it can be

had, is much to be preferred. No teacher of an infant school, however well qualified for his office, can have as benign and beneficial an influence on the mind and heart of a child as a watchful and considerate mother. It is in the bosom of a well-regulated family, that the best affections and most kindly feelings spring up and flourish. It is there, that those emotions of love and good-will which may afterwards embrace within their arms the whole race of mankind, find their origin and gather strength. It is to a mother's kindness that a child looks for the gratification of all his little wants, and the alleviation of his pains; and it is consequently from her lips that he most cordially listens to lessons of morality and religion. His own dependance upon his mother's care and assiduity cannot by him be traced to its source: he finds it in existence as soon as he is able to perceive anything; and he naturally regards her as the author of every comfort which he possesses. How much greater, therefore, must be the attention which a child pays to the lessons of an affectionate mother than that which he gives to the directions of any other person. Who can have an opportunity of so effectually gaining his confidence, or so firmly fixing his love?

When, consequently, parents themselves are raised above the prejudices to which we have alluded, and their circumstances are such as to free the mother from the necessity of labour, and give her leisure for the education of her children, it is most unwise to substitute for her assiduity the superintendence of any other person. God, by implanting in the breast of the mother, feelings towards her offspring, by which no other creature can possibly be actuated, has plainly shown whom He in-

tended to be the first instructor of man ; and this arrangement will never be rashly or unnecessarily interfered with, by any one who is not wholly under the governance of some favourite theory.

In the manufacturing population, however, mothers have neither time nor talents for rightly discharging this office. As, therefore, some substitute must be found, and Infant Schools seem admirably calculated for this purpose, we hail with joy their establishment.

We are, indeed, very far from agreeing with those who think that a better infant education can be given in them than by a mother who has leisure and ability for the right discharge of the duty. We reckon them a substitute for the mother's care, when circumstances prevent her from properly educating her children ; but maintain that they are extended beyond their fitting place, when they are made to supersede, not supply, the superintendence of a parent.

140. We also are certainly of opinion, that much real information cannot be instilled into the mind of a young child. Whatever mental instruction, beyond the first rudiments of education, may be attempted to be imparted in these seminaries, will not in after-life, we suspect, be of much avail. The child, whose curiosity has been stimulated in them, and whose mind has apparently received with profit the lessons which are taught, will not at the age of ten or twelve be found much in advance of his companion, who has not had so exciting a mental diet.

There is also a danger of the desire of knowledge itself becoming so pampered and sated by constant stimulants as to be altogether obtuse to ordinary objects.

The child may become a mental epicure, and, unless the information offered to him be of a particularly pleasing kind, not give itself the trouble of attending to it.

141. But far the greatest importance is to be attached to the moral and religious training which is afforded in these schools, as well as in those of elder children; and it is here that we chiefly join issue with the phrenological advocates of the projected system of national education. It is here that the faultiness of their theory of human nature especially shows itself, because it is here that it comes into directly practical operation.

While they profess themselves to be believers in the truth of Christianity, they undisguisedly aim at excluding its doctrines from being taught in seminaries of education which are to be supported by a Christian people.

Some of them go so far as to denounce a belief in a future state of rewards and punishments, which, they say, when professed and acted on, is calculated to have a pernicious effect on the moral nature of man. Of course these philosophers regard the fall of man as an anile and foolish dogma, and consequently would have it entirely excluded from a rational education.

Others there are, who, while they professedly do not go so far, yet by their approbation of the work in which these esoteric doctrines are contained, show that their real sentiments are not very different.

These men do not openly denounce the fall of man, but, tacitly assuming the falsehood of the doctrine, regard human nature as fitted by its own powers to entertain right affections towards God. They exclude the consideration of principle entirely from the question, and make religion a

matter of feeling and sentiment. Duty, even, is not included in their theory of morals, but they suppose that the constitution of man's mind is such that he naturally prefers a virtuous to a vicious course of life.

142. They tell us, that in their proposed schools religion will be taught, for the children will be instructed to reverence and love God on account of the evidences of his mercy which may be derived from a study of the works of nature; while as they do not wish to inculcate on their pupils theology, but religion, the Bible will not be used as a text-book for instruction. Now, theology is the science which treats of the nature and attributes of God; do the phrenologists, then, not intend to teach their pupils anything concerning the character of the Being whom they are to be instructed to worship? If they do this, they will undoubtedly be guilty of teaching the young people theology; and the question then presents itself, What method is most likely to give children right notions concerning so important a subject?

God himself, so far from thinking that men are able by their wisdom to find Him out, has deemed it proper to give us a revelation, in which He tells us all that it is necessary, or perhaps possible, for us to know concerning his nature, and also instructs us in the relation which subsists between Himself and us. This revelation is not couched in a scientific or abstract form, but is strictly popular, and easy to be understood, even by children. The views, also, which it gives of the attributes of the Supreme, are strictly in accordance with all the notions which we can derive from an enlarged and general view of the works of nature.

The investigations, however, by which theologians



have come to this just conclusion, are of such a nature as totally to preclude the possibility of making them intelligible or interesting to children. If children, then, are to have any opinions at all on the subject, and not allowed to have access to the Scriptures, they must receive them on the authority of their teachers. They must be told the results of investigations which are too difficult for them to follow; and thus be taught, at their first entrance into life, to take propositions for granted, the truth of which they cannot examine for themselves.

If, however, the Bible is taken for the basis of instruction in religion, the case is altered. The teacher can then inform the children, that the truths he tells them are contained in a book which God has given us for our instruction, and which they have the power of examining for themselves.

In that book God does not reveal himself as a God of love only, but as a God of righteousness also. He wills all his creatures to be happy, but only on condition of their being holy. When, therefore, the children are taught to look upon him merely as a God of love, they are taught that which is not true. They not only are not instructed in the truth, but falsehood usurps its place in their minds.

The communications of the Bible, again, are of such a character as to be able to attract the attention of a child at the very dawn of reason. By it praise may be perfected from the mouths of babes and sucklings. It informs children as well as men, that God wills them to be happy by being good, and it points out a way in which they may become so.

143. One reason which is given for not allowing

revealed religion to be professedly taught in these schools is, that by doing so the Bible would be degraded and debased by being made a common class-book. They do not, they say, wish to exclude the Bible from education, which is by some unfairly imputed to them, but to rescue it from the ill usage of a common school, and from degradation and perversion.

Now, really, we do not know what excluding the Bible from education can mean, if it do not signify studiously keeping the children who are taught, ignorant of its revelations concerning the attributes of God, and the duties of men; and instructing them to go to other sources for information on these subjects.

It is also unfair in the phrenologists, to represent the advocates of a Biblical education, as wishing to degrade the Bible into a common class-book. They do not wish to associate the Word of God with any debasing ideas in the minds of the pupils; but they desire that they may be taught to look to the Scriptures as the grand criterion by which to determine whether men's religious sentiments are right or wrong. The teacher is to refer to the Bible as the source whence he derives his own knowledge of religion; to confirm his sentiments by an appeal to its determinations; and to tell his pupils, that in all matters of religion its authority is paramount. By Biblical education is not to be understood the mere teaching children to read the Bible; but the educating them in the principles which it inculcates, and accustoming them to look upon it as the chart by which they are to direct their course through the world. The children are to have access to the whole Bible; but their attention is to be especially directed to the most profitable parts of it.

and it is the teacher's office to point out to them what the doctrines are which are peculiar to it.

144. We are also told, that in these schools "the Creator is always kept in view, not alone as an awful Judge, seated on high watching the thoughts and actions of his creatures to reward or punish them hereafter,—a view of Him which addresses selfishness alone, and never can produce elevation of feeling, which, as the highest reach of human happiness, is its own reward,—but as the present God, the Essence of every thing around us, guiding us to temporal as well as eternal happiness, by his infinite wisdom and goodness\*."

Premising, that to plain understandings this appears exceedingly like Pantheism, and that it is very difficult to conceive how God guides us, if not by rewards and punishments, we proceed to quote a passage from Butler, which, to our own mind, conveys a complete answer to the sentimental effusion. "Against," he says, "this whole notion of moral discipline, it may be objected in another way; that so far as a course of behaviour, materially virtuous, proceeds from hope and fear, so far it is only a disciplining and strengthening of self-love. But doing what God commands, because He commands it, is obedience, though it proceeds from hope or fear. And a course of such obedience will form habits of it. And a constant regard to veracity, justice, and charity, may form distinct habits of these particular virtues; and will certainly form habits of self-government, and of denying our inclinations, whenever veracity, justice, or charity requires it. Nor is there any foundation for this great nicety, with which some affect to distinguish in this case,

\* *SIMPSON on Education.*

in order to depreciate all religion proceeding from hope or fear. For veracity, justice, charity, regard to God's authority, and to our own chief interest, are not only all three coincident; but each of them is, in itself, a just and natural motive or principle of action. And he who begins a good life from any one of them, and perseveres in it, as he is already in some degree, so he cannot fail of becoming more and more of that character, which is correspondent to the constitution of nature as moral; and to the relation, which God stands in to us as moral governor of it: nor consequently can he fail of obtaining that happiness, which this constitution and relation necessarily suppose connected with that character\*."

So much, then, for the debasing tendency of those ideas of God which lead us to regard Him as a rewarder of the good, and a punisher of the wicked.

145. In truth, man, from the very constitution of his nature, is always in danger of deviating from what is right. No mere man has ever yet been heard of who was perfectly virtuous, and to suppose that such a being will exist, betrays an inclination to speculate contrary to the universal records of history. We are not, therefore, to place confident reliance on even the strictest habits of virtue, or the loftiest conceptions of the beautiful and the good. Temptations may occur of strength sufficient to overcome them, and, when the right path of duty is once departed from, the road is prepared for other declensions.

The question consequently presents itself, Is there no extraneous source whence additional strength may be derived? We answer, that religion holds out the re-

\* BUTLER'S *Analogy*.

quired assistance. We are aware of the theoretic distinction which subsists between Theology and Moral Philosophy. The one treats of the active principles of our nature, while the other has respect to our relation with God. The one answers the question, What ought I to do? the other attempts a reply to the query, Whence am I? and what are my prospects hereafter? Practically, however, the two subjects are so closely connected, and so deeply influence each other, that they may be regarded as one. Their connexion has been compared to that which exists between pure mathematics and natural philosophy; and we might as well attempt the solution of the problem of three bodies without using analytical formulæ, as try to obtain just views of our duties without paying attention to the relation which subsists between man and his Maker. In point of fact, let a man be once convinced that there is to be a future judgment, in which the soul must give account of the actions done in the body; and the truth will, or at least ought to, have a prevailing influence over whatsoever he does in word and deed. The declaration of our Lord, "That the hour is coming in the which all that are in their graves shall hear his (the Son of man's) voice, and shall come forth; they that have done good unto the resurrection of life, and they that have done evil to the resurrection of damnation," is so awfully important, that in the mind of him who believes it, it must modify the whole moral constitution of the universe. It will be impossible for him afterwards to contemplate his existence here, separated from his existence hereafter. This world will be regarded by him as a place of discipline and probation for another; and no event can happen to him,

either adverse or prosperous, which is not viewed under the light which his eternal interests cast upon it.

Now it is professedly the design of Mr. Combe, in his work on the *Constitution of Man*, to regard him as if at death he ceased altogether to exist. Mr. Combe's work is uniformly referred to by the advocates of the projected scheme of education with approbation, and he may likewise be considered as the expounder of the esoteric doctrines of the phrenologists. We may, therefore, hope to gather from his book what kind of knowledge may be expected ultimately to be taught in their schools.

146. In words, he admits a future state of existence, but professes to form a scheme of morality; over which that, or any other truth of religion, has no influence whatever. He does not regard each individual man as in a state of improvement or deterioration; but looks at the whole human race as making successive advances in civilization and happiness. In his own words, "History exhibits the human race only in a state of progress towards the full developement of their powers, and the attainment of rational enjoyment." Had he stopped here, he would not have stated more than the truth; for man certainly developes himself in the page of history, as on the whole advancing in civilization. The progress may be sometimes very slow, and, at periods even, he seems to have grown worse, but, on the whole, he has advanced. This state of things presents a great and inexplicable difficulty to every inquirer; for it seems impossible for us with our present faculties to understand, why mankind were not placed at once in a state of society as highly civilized as it was destined ever to be.

All those who have attempted to account for this progressive condition of man have failed in their object, and frequently fallen into absurdities. Mr. Combe has avoided this error, but he has slipped into one somewhat akin to it; for he wishes his disciples to believe, that when the human race has attained to the requisite degree of knowledge and civilization, man will be perfectly happy. He seems to think, that the Creator has allowed no sources of suffering to exist among men which they have not the power of removing. When, to use his own phrase, "the combined operation of the natural laws is fully acknowledged, and practically complied with," according to his theory, man will be no longer subject to disease or anxiety; but only have to look forward to one continued scene of enjoyment.

Having premised, that this theory does not at all remove the real difficulty of the case, for it leaves the existence of evil still unaccounted for; we observe, that it may very fairly be questioned whether the capability of removing all the present sources of human misery, will ever be put within man's reach. Mr. Combe has adduced instances, no doubt, in which the draining of lands, and more commodious building of habitations, have contributed very much to diminish man's liability to disease; and he argues, that when the time comes that the constructors of towns, as well as other persons, shall be entirely under the influence of the higher faculties, and perfectly enlightened as to the natural laws, human suffering may be expected to be diminished in a corresponding degree.

There are, however, natural calamities and catastrophes which no conceivable degree of knowledge and fore-

sight can be supposed to enable man to avoid. Lisbon, in 1755, was almost entirely destroyed by an earthquake. By this awful convulsion of nature many thousand human beings were at once sent into eternity, and a still greater number reduced to extreme distress.

Now, are we to believe, that it was the predominance of the lower faculties which made the Portuguese choose the beautiful banks of the Tagus for the site of their capital? Or are we to understand, that there was some peculiarity in the nature of the country which would have shown them, if they had known the laws of nature, that an earthquake might be expected to occur there?

We do not think, that either of these suppositions is tenable; nor do we see how Mr. Combe can avoid the embarrassment which facts, like that we are considering, present to his theory, by saying that they necessarily happen according to the natural laws. It very likely is essential to the nature of the globe which we inhabit, that earthquakes should occur; but why should they happen in crowded cities? Why should there not always be some mark by which men might know on what situations they were likely to break out?

We do not suppose these questions can ever be answered; and the reason why we bring them forward is to show, that at all events such facts are entirely untouched by Mr. Combe's system. They do, we think, very fairly prove, that there is no reason to conclude that the Creator intends this earth to be a scene of complete, or even very great happiness. However much the progress of science, and the advance of civilization, may ameliorate the condition of the human race, there still will be sufficient sources of suffering to man, to justify



the assertion, "that he is born to trouble as the sparks fly upward."

147. And after all, it is but a very poor and unsatisfactory consolation to a man suffering under poverty, disease, or tyranny, to tell him that his adversities are but temporary—temporary, that is, not to himself, but to his race: he may, very possibly, never be happier or less miserable than he now is, but the time will come, thousands of years after, that no man then living will be liable to such afflictions. The wretch, we think, might very reasonably answer, What does that matter to me? Does the fact, that this earth is one day to be filled with happiness, at all lessen my misery? It rather adds to it, for why was I born into this wretched world rather than into the expected scene of universal enjoyment?

148. With what different feelings must the annunciation be received by this sufferer, that this world is but a scene of probation and discipline for another, in which the moral habits formed by patience under affliction will have full room to develop themselves in glory and felicity. In this declaration, if its truth can be proved, he must feel a personal interest. Whatever his condition may be here, however hopeless his circumstances, however dark his prospects, still he has the satisfaction to know, that a scene is approaching in which his condition will depend on his conduct in this life.

The phenomena of the material world are not the only sources of suffering to man, nor is it from them that the most perplexing solitudes arise in a well-regulated mind. It is the discordance which subsists between our moral judgments and feelings and the course of human affairs, that makes us most fondly look to a future state of retri-

bution. If indeed, we take a large and general view of the moral world, we have sufficient evidence that the Creator has attached happiness to a life of probity and virtue, rather than to one of dishonesty and vice. Still, however, so many apparent contradictions to this truth meet our observation on every side, that we gladly betake ourselves to a future state of retribution as the grand and availing solution of our difficulties. When our attention is fixed upon this, it affords a consolation in distress, and a relief from perplexity, which no other consideration can bestow.

Mr. Combe has endeavoured to show, that death is the natural termination of such a creature as man, and therefore is not revolting to the moral feelings. To the man, however, who views this life but as the introduction to another, death comes as a welcome messenger. He confidently believes, that it will relieve him from those circumstances which now most perplex and annoy him, and introduce him to a state of being where virtue and piety will meet with no obstacles to their developement. He feels that in this life moral and physical evil exists, but he rejoices to think it will be made to work for his eternal good, if by patience under suffering, and a resolute resistance to temptation, he improves his moral constitution.

149. Our convictions on this subject are not allowed to rest on the comparatively unstable foundations of evidence derived from a view of the constitution of nature. By the Gospel, "life and immortality have been brought to light." We are there informed of our true situation; and means are afforded us by the use of which the evils of our condition may be remedied. It gives us

a clue by which the gloomy labyrinth of this world's difficulties may be safely threaded; and in the all-seeing eye of a just God presents a motive for rectitude, immensely more stringent than visionary speculations about the cultivation of the higher faculties. It recommends us not to be solicitous about our situation here, for tribulation, if rightly borne, will work for us a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory. It does not advise us to withdraw ourselves from the world, but rightly and zealously to discharge our duties to society.

Mr. Combe's remarks on Christianity are so strangely mistaken, as to render him chargeable with culpable ignorance, or wilful perversion. He says:—

“Hence they have involved themselves in contradictions; for while it has been a leading principle with them, that enjoyment in a future state is to be the consequence of the believer attaining to a holy and pious frame of mind in this life, they have represented the constitution of the world to be so unfavourable to piety and virtue, that men in general, who continue attached to it, cannot attain to this right frame of spirit, or act habitually in consistency with it. They have not had philosophy sufficient to enable them to perceive that man must live in society to be either virtuous, or useful, or happy; that the social atmosphere is to the mind what air is to the lungs; and that while an individual cannot exist to virtuous ends out of society, he cannot exist in a right frame of mind in it, if the moral atmosphere with which he is surrounded be deeply contaminated with vice and error. Individual merchants, for example, cannot act habitually on Christian principles, if the maxims of their trade be not Christian, and if the world be so unfavour-

ably constituted that it does not admit of the rules of trade becoming Christian, then active life and practical religion are opposed to each other. Divines have laboriously recommended spiritual exercises as means of improvement in this life, and of salvation in the next ; but have rarely dealt with the philosophy of this world, or attempted its rectification, so as to render these exercises truly efficacious. Their minds have been infected with the first great error, that this world is irremediably defective in its constitution, and that human hope must be concentrated chiefly in the next. This may be attributed to the premature formation of a system of theology in the dawn of civilization, before the qualities of the physical world, and the elements of the moral world, and their relationship were known ; and to erroneous interpretations of Scripture, in consequence, partly, of that ignorance\*."

After perusing the above extract, it may be necessary to remind the reader, that Mr. Combe professes himself to be a friend to Christianity. We are glad that he has done so, for, certainly, from the tone and spirit of his observations we should have supposed exactly the reverse. He seems to rejoice in having come to the conclusion, that, according to the accepted exposition of Christianity, active life and practical religion are opposed to each other.

Before examining the grounds on which this singular friend to revealed religion has arrived at this determination, it may be beneficial to inquire what are his own opinions concerning the present state of the mercantile and manufacturing world. "At present," he says, "the almost

\* COMBE'S *Constitution of Man*, p. 5.

universal persuasion of civilized men is, that happiness consists in the possession of wealth, power, and external splendour. \* \* \* In consequence, each individual sets out in the pursuit of these as the chief business of his life; and, in the ardour of the chase, he recognises no limitations on the means which he may employ, except those imposed by the municipal law. \* \* \* From this moral and intellectual blindness, merchants and manufacturers, in numberless instances, hasten to be rich beyond the course of nature: that is to say, they engage in enterprises far exceeding the extent of their capacity and capital; they place their property in the hands of debtors, whose natural talents and morality are so low, that they ought never to have been entrusted with a shilling; they send their goods to sea without insuring them, or leave them uninsured in their warehouses; they ask pecuniary accommodation from other merchants, to enable them to carry on undue speculations, and become security for them in return, and both fall into misfortunes; or they live in splendour and extravagance, far beyond the limit of their capital and talents, and speedily reach ruin as their goal\*.”

Now we ask, in the name of all that is fair, what discredit is it to Christianity that it is diametrically opposed to such a system as this? Surely, revealed religion is not to be rejected, because its precepts are hostile to the maxims of such a trade. If, indeed, Mr. Combe could have shown that such a system was in strict accordance with the spirit of Christianity, or that it took its origin from the discourses of divines, he might have had reasonable cause for his hard sayings against our

\* COMBE'S *Constitution of Man*, p. 60.

religion; but as it is, he ought, if he had been candid and honest, to have signified his cordial assent to its doctrines.

The reasons of Mr. Combe's seemingly inexplicable conduct may, perhaps, be discovered in circumstances which sometimes happen in his own profession. When a quacking impostor brings before the public some medicine which he declares to be a specific cure of a prevalent disease, his first efforts are directed to prejudicing the minds of the ill-informed against the regularly-educated practitioner. He knows, that while men have a rational and proper confidence in the prescriptions of their physician, they will have nothing to do with his nostrum. He, therefore, tries to lower the character of his rivals, by calumny and misrepresentation. He is not, moreover, very particular as to the probability or consistency of his charges. He makes a host of them, on the principle, that if you throw plenty of dirt against a man, some will most probably stick.

Mr. Combe appears to have taken a leaf out of the book of these respectable members of society in his treatment of Christianity. He has made charges against it, some of which are futile, some false, and some contradictory, but they are uttered in big words and with a confident manner; there may, therefore, be individuals foolish enough to lend credence to them. We see that both divines and phrenologists find fault with the present constitution of society; both have their cures for the evil; and we perfectly agree with Mr. Combe, that before his plan is accepted, it is necessary for him to show the futility of the old one.

Has he, however, succeeded in his effort to effect

this? He says, that the teachers of Christianity have involved themselves in contradictions, because they say that the world is so hostile to piety and virtue, that those who are attached to it cannot attain to a holy and pious frame of mind. And if his own representation of the world be correct, it would be very odd, if they should preach otherwise. He declares, that at present, the almost universal persuasion of men is, that happiness consists in the possession of wealth, power, and external splendour; and does he mean his readers to understand, that such a way of thinking is favourable to piety or virtue? Divines maintain that it is not; and, consequently, exhort men not to overrate the value and importance of riches. They tell their hearers, that the possession of them has a tendency to induce a condition of mind most detrimental to men's best interests, and, consequently, warn them against being too much attached to them.

Christianity nowhere enjoins upon its members a withdrawal from the world, but, on the contrary, that there are specific duties attached to every situation in life, which all must perform who desire to please God.

It tells the rich, that their possessions are not given them for their own exclusive and selfish enjoyment, but are committed to them, with the fearful charge, "Occupy till I come." It directs men to have their attention fixed on that awful advent, and so to conduct themselves, that they may have a good account to give to the Judge of quick and dead.

There is, again, nothing in the profession of an honourable and conscientious merchant, which is incompatible with the principles of Christianity. He, like all

others, is told to do unto all men, as he would they should do unto him; not to be slothful in business; nor to allow his mind to be so entirely absorbed by it, as to make him neglect his higher duties.

In all this, we must confess, that we can see nothing unphilosophical, or unbecoming a highly cultivated mind. The conduct here recommended, appears to us to be precisely that which would most conduce to the happiness of him who pursued it, and to that of all with whom he had to do.

Mr. Combe finds fault, again, with our religion, because its ministers teach that this world is irremediably defective in its constitution, and that human hope must be concentrated on the next. But in doing this, they cannot be said to diminish human happiness, but rather to increase it by the addition of a new element. When divines declare that it is impossible to be entirely happy in this life, they do not express any peculiar opinion, but echo the common sentiments of the wisest men in all ages. In this, indeed, they are singular, that they can offer to men a well-grounded hope of future felicity on condition of their obeying the just commands of God: and He does not require of men any hard task; but simply declares, that they only shall be happy hereafter who have lived pious and holy lives here. There are, indeed, other conditions imposed by Him who has an undoubted right to do so; but they do not affect the main question at issue.

That question is, whether a future state of retribution is, or is not, calculated to make men virtuous. So strongly were the ancient sages convinced of the affirmative, that they thought it necessary to inculcate



its truth upon the people, even though they did not believe it themselves. The phrenologists, however, are of a totally different way of thinking. They are of opinion, that such a belief, even when based upon the most certain foundations, is prejudicial to morality; and, therefore, purpose to teach the youth of these realms to discharge it from their thoughts, and to substitute in its place some visionary and fantastic notion about the pleasure of cultivating the higher faculties of the mind.

We, indeed, most firmly believe, that the pious, honest, and benevolent man, is immensely the most happy character in the world; but ever-recurring experience has taught us, that this truth is not sufficient to restrain men from evil, or induce them to do what is right. There must be some stronger and more commanding motive; and that can only be found in the system which revealed religion unfolds. Hence it is, that we are convinced that all education, if not based upon religion, will be found wholly inefficacious in permanently improving the morals of a people. By religion alone can their feelings be attached to virtue; by this alone can they be enabled to resist the temptations by which they are every where assailed; by this alone can they reconcile their own suffering and helpless condition with the superintending Providence of God.

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