


THE
WORKS
OF
RALPH CUDWORTH, D.D.

CONTAINING
THE TRUE INTELLECTUAL
SYSTEM OF THE UNIVERSE,
SERMONS, &c.

A NEW EDITION, WITH REFERENCES TO THE SEVERAL QUOTATIONS IN THE
INTELLECTUAL SYSTEM, AND A LIFE OF THE AUTHOR,

BY THOMAS BIRCH, M.A. F.R.S.


IN FOUR VOLUMES:
VOL. I.



OXFORD, D. A. TALBOYS.


MDCCCXIX.

141. i. 445.



Engraving.

R. Cudworth, J. J.



TO THE
RIGHT REVEREND FATHER IN GOD,
JOSEPH,
LORD BISHOP OF BRISTOL,
AND
DEAN OF ST. PAUL'S.

MY LORD,

THE value of the present work is so universally acknowledged, that to offer any thing here in recommendation of it, might seem equally to reflect upon your Lordship's judgment, as on the character of the excellent Author. It will be a sufficient honour and satisfaction to me, to have contributed in any measure to the improvement of the Intellectual System, and to the spreading a performance, one of the noblest of the last age, and at least as necessary to the present, for supporting the grand foundations of all religion and virtue, against ignorance, sophistry, and every pernicious effect of vice and sensuality upon the human understanding. Such a design, I persuade myself, wants

no apology, especially to a person whose writings display the evidence, and whose character exemplifies the beauty and dignity, of Christianity. I shall therefore only add, that, upon these accounts, I am, with the highest esteem and veneration,

MY LORD,

Your Lordship's most obedient

and most humble servant,

THOMAS BIRCH.

London, Nov. 6, 1742.

ADVERTISEMENT.

THE former Edition of the *Intellectual System*, though the most valuable treasure of the ancient theology and philosophy extant in any language, had one considerable defect, (frequent amongst even the best writers of the last age,) that the references of its numerous quotations were very few, and those obscure and imperfect. Such as were wanting are therefore supplied in the present edition with the utmost exactness, chiefly from Dr. Laurence Mosheim's Latin translation of this work; those of the Author are included in [] to render them more clear and determinate.

The dedication to the House of Commons, in 1647, of the sermon on 1 John ii. 3, 4. omitted in the second and third editions, is restored likewise from the first.

To the whole is prefixed a new life of the Author, wherein is given a very particular account of his several excellent works.

AN
ACCOUNT
OF
THE LIFE AND WRITINGS
OF
R. CUDWORTH, D. D.

DR. Ralph Cudworth was son of Dr. Ralph Cudworth, at first fellow of Emanuel College, in the University of Cambridge, and afterwards minister of St. Andrew's Church in that town, and at last rector of Aller, in Somersetshire, and chaplain to James I.^a He died in August or September, 1624.^b Though he was a man of genius and learning, he published only a supplement to Mr. W. Perkins's Commentary upon St. Paul's Epistle to the Galatians, of which, as well as several other works of that divine, he was editor.

Our Author's mother was of the family of Machell, and had been nurse to Prince Henry, eldest son of James I. and after Dr. Cudworth's death, married to Dr. Stoughton.^c Our Author himself was born at Aller, in the year 1617, and educated with great care by his father-in-law, Dr. Stoughton; and in 1630 was admitted pensioner in Ema-

^a See Dr. John Laurence Mosheim's preface to his Latin translation of Dr. Cudworth's Intellectual System. The pages of this preface are not numbered.

^b Wood, *Fasti Oxon.* vol. 1. col. 187. second edit. London, 1721.

^c Mosheim *ubi supra*.

nuel College, the Doctor giving him this testimony, "that he was as well grounded in school-learning as any boy of his age, that went to the University." July 5, 1632, he was matriculated as a student in the University, and applied himself to all parts of literature with such vigour, that in 1639, he was created master of arts with great applause. Soon after he was chosen fellow of his college, and became an eminent tutor there, and had at one time eight-and-twenty pupils; an instance scarce ever known before, even in the largest colleges of the University. Among these was Mr. W. Temple, afterwards famous for his embassies and writings. Not long after, he was presented to the rectory of North Cadbury, in Somersetshire, worth three hundred pounds per annum.

In 1642, he published *A Discourse concerning the true Notion of the Lord's Supper*. It was printed at London, in quarto, with only the initial letters of his name. Bochart, Spencer, Selden, and other eminent writers quote this discourse with great commendations; and my most ingenious and learned friend, Mr. Warburton, in a letter of excellent remarks upon our Author, which he favoured me with, styles it a masterpiece in its kind; and observes, that he has undoubtedly given the true nature and idea of the sacrament, and supported it with all his learning. The same year likewise appeared his treatise, intitled, *The Union of Christ and the Church a Shadow*, by R. C. printed at London, in quarto.

He took the degree of batchelor of divinity in the year 1644, upon which occasion he maintained at the commencement in the University the two following theses; 1. *Dantur boni et mali rationes*

æternæ et indispensabiles: II. Dantur substantiæ incorporeæ suâ naturâ immortales. Hence it appears, that even at that time he was examining and revolving in his mind those important subjects, which he so long afterwards cleared up with such uncommon penetration in his Intellectual System, and other works.

In the same year, 1644, he was appointed master of Clare Hall, in Cambridge, in the room of Dr. Paske, who had been ejected by the parliamentary visitors. In 1645, Dr. Metcalf having resigned the regius professorship of the Hebrew tongues, Mr. Cudworth was unanimously nominated Oct. 15, by the seven electors, to succeed him. From this time he abandoned all the functions of a minister, and applied himself only to his academical employments and studies, especially that of the Jewish antiquities. And we find the following passage in a manuscript letter of Mr. John Worthington, afterwards master of Jesus College, dated May 12, 1646. "Our learned friend, Mr. Cudworth, reads every Wednesday in the schools. His subject is, *Templum Hierosolymitanum.*" When his affairs required his absence from the University, he substituted Mr. Worthington in his room. March 31, 1647, he preached before the House of Commons, at Westminster, upon a day of public humiliation, a sermon upon John ii. 3, 4, for which he had the thanks of that House returned him on the same day. This sermon was printed the same year, at Cambridge, in quarto, with the following motto in the title-page, *Ἐνσίβει, ὃ τίκνον' ὁ γὰρ ἐνσέβων ἄκρω Χριστιανίζει* and with a dedication to the House of Commons, which was omitted in the second and third edi-

tions, but restored in the present. In 1651, he took the degree of doctor of divinity. Though the places, which he held in the University, were very honourable, yet he found the revenue of them not sufficient to support him; for which reason he had thoughts of leaving Cambridge entirely; and, indeed, actually retired from it, though but for a short time. This appears from two manuscript letters of Mr. Worthington, the former dated Jan. 6. 1651, where he writes thus: "If through want of maintenance, he (R. C.) should be forced to leave Cambridge, for which place he is so eminently accomplished with what is noble and exemplarily academical, it would be an ill omen." In the latter, dated Jan. 30, 1654, is this passage: "After many tossings, Dr. Cudworth is, through God's providence, returned to Cambridge, and settled in Christ's College, and by his marriage more settled and fixed." For upon the decease of Dr. Sam. Bolton, master of that college, in 1654, our Author was chosen to succeed him, and married the same year. In this station he spent the rest of his life, proving highly serviceable to the University and the whole church of England. In Jan. 1654, he was one of the persons nominated by a committee of the parliament to be consulted about the English translation of the Bible; as appears from the following passage of Whitelocke.*

"Jan. 16th. At the grand committee for religion, Ordered, that it be referred to a sub-committee to send for, and advise with, Dr. Walton, Mr. Hughes, Mr. Castell, Mr. Clark, Mr. Poulk, Dr. Cudworth, and such others as they shall think fit; and to consider of the translations and

* Memorials of the English Affairs, p. 654, edit. Lond. 1732, in fol.

impressions of the Bible, and to offer their opinions therein to this committee; and that it be especially commended to the Lord Commissioner Whitelocke to take care of this business.

"This committee, (says Whitelocke,) often met at my house, and had the most learned men in the oriental tongues to consult with in this great business, and divers excellent and learned observations of some mistakes in the translations of the Bible in English; which yet was agreed to be the best of any translation in the world. I took pains in it; but it became fruitless by the parliament's dissolution."

Our Author had a great share in the friendship and esteem of John Thurloe, Esq. secretary of state to the protectors, Oliver and Richard Cromwell, who frequently corresponded with him, and consulted him with regard to the characters of such persons in the University, as were proper to be employed in political and civil affairs. For which purpose, Dr. Cudworth wrote, among others, the following letter.*

"HONOURED SIR,

"I must, in the first place, crave your pardon for the delay of this, my second letter, thus long, (for, I suppose, you have received my former in answer to yours,) which, had not some unavoidable occasions hindered me, had come sooner to your hands. Sir, I think there are divers men in the University at this time, of singular parts and accomplishments for learning; some of which are so farre engaged in divinity, that they cannot well divert themselves to other professions or employ-

* Thurloe's Manuscript State Papers, vol. xxxviii. p. 250.

ments; others perhaps so much addicted to a contemplative life, that they could not so well apply themselves to political and civil affairs. But for those, which I conceive to be more free and undetermined, I shall here present you with a catalogue of some of their names, such as I conceive best qualified for civil employments. First, Mr. Page, a fellow of King's Colledge, an excellent Latinist, and one, that hath travelled abroad for above ten yeares together. He is above forty years of age; but how he hath been or is affected to the parliament, or present government, I cannot tell. He is now absent from the University, and, I think, at present with the Earle of Devonshire. Secondly, Dr. Bagge, fellow of Caius Colledge, and doctor of physick, a singularly good and ready Latinist; and I beleieve there is none of his yeares in England equall to him in the profession of physick. He hath excellent parts, but I know not certainly, whether being so eminent in that way, (though a very young doctor) he would put himselfe upon state-employment; neither do I fully know how he is affected. There are of Trinity Colledge severall, that are very good Latinists, and well furnisht with all the politer learning; as Mr. Valentine (a sober discreet man) and Mr. Linne (well known for an excellent poet.)

" Mr. Mildmay, of Peter-house, one, whose inclination seems to be peculiarly carried out towards political and civil employments, a scholar and a discreet man.

" Mr. Croone, of Emanuell Colledge, a young master of arts, of excellent good parts, and a general scholar.

" Mr. Miles, fellow of Clare-hall, formerly my

pupill; one that hath no mind to professe divinity, but a very good scholar, and also a junior master of arts.

"Lastly, of Christ Colledge there is a young man, that is master of arts this yeare, one Mr. Leigh, that for his standing is very well accomplished, and I doubt not, but in a very little time, would be exceedinge fitte for any such employment, as you would designe him for.

"Many more names I could set down; but these may suffice for your choice, and you may, if you thinke good, enquire further concerning any of them from some others, and, if you please, from this gentleman, whom I have for that purpose desired to present this to you, Mr. George Rust,* fellow of Christ Colledge, who can further enforme and satisfy you concerning them. He is an understanding, pious, discreet man, and himselfe I know to bee a man of exceeding good parts, and a generall scholar, but one that seemes not so willing to divert himselfe from preaching and divinity, which he hath of late intended; otherwise I know his parts are such, as would enable him for any employment.

"If you please to enquire further from him, and by him signify your further pleasure to me, I shall be ready in this or any thing else, that I am able, to expresse my selfe,

"Sir,

"Your affectionately devoted friend and servant,

"R. CUDWORTH."

Dr. Cudworth likewise recommended^b to the

* Afterwards Dean of Dromore, in Ireland.

^b Thurlow's Manuscript State Papers, vol. xliii. p. 329, of the printed Papers, vol. v. p. 522, 523.

secretary, for the place of chaplain to the English merchants at Lisbon, Mr. Zachary Cradock, afterwards provost of Eton Colledge, and famous for his uncommon genius and learning, and his abilities as a preacher.

In Jan. 1653, he wrote the following letter to Secretary Thurloe, upon his design of publishing some Latin discourses in defence of Christianity against Judaism.*

“ SIR,

“ Having this opportunity offered by Doctour Solater, who desires to waite upon you, upon your kind invitation, which I acquainted him with, I could do no lesse than accompany him with these few lines to present my service to you. I am perswaded, you will be well satisfied in his ingenuity, when you are acquainted with him. Now I have this opportunity, I shall use the freedom to acquaint you with another busines. I am perswaded by friends to publish some discourses, which I have prepared in Latine, that will be of a polemical nature in defense of Christianity against Judaisme, explaining some cheef places of scripture controverted between the Jewes and us, (as Daniel's prophecy of the 70 weekes, never yet sufficiently cleared and improved) and withall extricating many difficulties of chronologie. Which taske I the rather undertake, not onely because it is suitable to my Hebrew profession, and because I have lighted on some Jewish writings upon the argument, as have scarcely ever been seen by any Christians, which would the better inable me fully to confute them; but also because I conceive it a

* Thurloe's Manuscript State Papers, vol. lxiii. p. 43.

worke proper and suitable to this present age. However, though I should not be able myselfe to be any way instrumental to these great transactions of Providence (not without cause, hoped for of many) amongst the Jews; yet I perswade myselfe my pains may not be altogether unprofitable for the settling and establishing of Christians; or at least I shall give an account of my spending such vacant hours, as I could redeeme from my preaching and other occasions, and the perpetual distractions of the bursarship, which the statutes of this Colledge impose upon me. It was my purpose to dedicate these fruits of my studies to his highnes, (to whose noble father I was much obliged) if I may have leave, or presume so to doe; which I cannot better understand by any than yourselfe, if you shall think it convenient, when you have an opportunity to insinuate any such thing, which I permitte wholly to your prudence. I intend, God willing, to be in London some time in March, and then I shall waite upon you to receive your information. In the mean time craving pardon for this prolixity of mine, and freedom, I subscribe myselfe,

“ Your really devoted friend and humble servant,
“ R. CUDWORTH.”

Jan. 20, 1658, Christ's Coll. Cambr.

The Discourse concerning Daniel's prophecy of the seventy weeks, mentioned in this letter, and which is still extant in manuscript, is highly commended by Dr. Henry More, in his preface, sec. 18. p. xvi. to his Explanation of the grand Mystery of Godliness, printed at London, 1660; in folio, where he observes, that Dr. Cudworth in

that Discourse, which was read in the public schools of the University, had undeceived the world, which had been misled too long by the over-great opinion they had of Joseph Scaliger, and that taking Funccius's Epochæ, he had demonstrated the manifestation of the Messiah to have fallen out at the end of the sixty-ninth week, and his passion in the midst of the last; in the most natural and proper sense thereof; "which demonstration of his, is of as much price and worth in theology, as either the circulation of the blood in physic, or the motion of the earth in natural philosophy."

Upon the restoration of Charles II. he wrote a copy of verses, published in *Academiæ Cantabrigiænsis ΣΩΤΗΡΑ, sive ad Carolum II. reductione Regis ipsi, Musis per ipsum restitutis, Gratulatio*, printed at Cambridge, 1660, in quarto. In 1662, he was presented by Dr. Gilbert Sheldon, bishop of London, to the vicarage of Ashwell, in Hertfordshire,* to which he was admitted on the 1st of December that year.

In the beginning of the year 1665, he had a design to publish a discourse concerning moral good and evil, as appears from the following extracts of letters written by him and by Dr. Henry More, fellow of his college.^b

Dr. Cudworth, in a letter to Dr John Worthington, January, 1663.

"You know, I have had this designe concerning good and evil, or natural ethicks, a great while; which I begun above a year agoe, (when I

* Newcourt, Repertorium, vol. ii. p. 462.

^b Communicated by my very learned friend, Mr. John Ward, F.R.S. and professor of Rhetoric in Gresham College.

made the first sermon in the chapel about the argument) to study over anew, and dispatch a discourse about it. No man had so frequently exhorted me to it, and so earnestly, as this friend.—But about three months since unexpectedly he told me on a suddain, he had begun a discourse on the same argument. The next day in writing I imparted my mind more fully and plainly to him. Whereupon he came to me, and told me, he would speak with me about it after a day or two. So he did; and then excused the business; that he could not tell, whether I would dispatch and finish it or no, because I had been so long about it; that Mr. Fullwood and Mr. Jenks, had solicited him to do this, and that you were very glad, that he would undertake it. But now he understood I was resolved to go through with it, he was very glad of it, that he would desist, and throw his into a corner. All this I impart to you privately, because a common friend. I have not spoken to any body else but Mr. Standish, and something to Mr. Jenks and Fullwood.”

Dr. H. More, in a letter to Dr. Worthington,
Jan. 24, 1664.

“ I understand, by Mr. Standish’s letter, that he, unawares, speaking to the master* of my *Enchiridion Ethicum*, he shewed again his disgust, &c.—that, if I persisted in the resolution of publishing my book, he would desist in his, though he had most of it then ready to send up to be licensed that week. I pray you, spur him up to set his to the press. For my part, it is well known, I have no designe at all but to serve the publick;

* Dr. Cudworth.

and that I entered upon the task extremely against my own will, and yet I have finished it all but a chapter. Whether, or when, I shall publish it, I shall have leisure enough to consider."

Dr. More, in a letter to Dr. Worthington, Feb. 7, 1664.

"Some few friends at Cambridge were exceeding earnest with me to write a short ethicks, alleging no small reason for it. I did not only heartily reject them more than once, but with great zeal, if not rudeness, alleging several things, which were too long to write, indeed in a manner vilifying the project, preferring experience of life before all such fine systems; alleging also, that Dr. Cudworth had a design for the greatest curiosity of that subject. But nothing would content them but my setting upon the work, that it was uncertain, when Dr. Cudworth's would come out, and besides, mine being a small treatise, running through the whole body of ethicks, they would not interfere one with another. For my part, till I had by chance told Dr. Cudworth of my purpose, (which I did simply, thinking nothing) and how many chapters I had finished, I knew nothing either of the time, or the scope of his writing, or if he intended a general ethicks. But the effect of those friends' earnestness (to tell you plainly how the case stood) was this: a day or two after their last importunity, I, waking in the morning, and some of their weightiest allegations recurring to my mind, and also remembering, with what an excessive earnestness one of them solicited me to this work (in which I thought there might be something more than ordinary, and that

he was actuated in this business, I knew not how,) I began seriously to think with myself of the matter, and at last was so conscientiously illaqueated therein, that I could not absolutely free myself therefrom to this very day. Nor was this only an act of mere conscience, but of present self-denial. For it did very vehemently cross other great and innocent pleasures, that I promised myself in a certain order of my studies, which I had newly proposed to myself at that very time. But when I was once engaged, I proceeded not without some pleasure."

Dr. More, in a letter to Dr. Worthington, May 10, 1665.

"I thank you for your freedom both to him and to me. It never came into my mind to print this *Enchiridion*, till his book was out, unless he would have professed his like of the project. I have now transcribed it all. Mr. Jenks and Mr. Fullwood are exceeding earnest to see it, and would transcribe it for their present satisfaction. But, if they should do so, and it be known, it would, it may be, disgust Dr. Cudworth, whom I am very loth any way to grieve. But if yourself have a mind to see it, and could get a fair and true copy transcribed of it, I would willingly pay the transcriber, and the copy should be your's; for I am loth, that what I have writ on so edifying a subject should be lost."

Irreligion began now to lift up its head; but the progress of it was opposed by no person with greater force and learning than by our Author. For this purpose, in 1678, he published at London,

in folio, his *True Intellectual System of the Universe*:—The first part, wherein all the reason and philosophy of atheism is confuted, and its impossibility demonstrated. The imprimatur by Dr. Samuel Parker, chaplain to Archbishop Sheldon, is dated May 29, 1671, seven years before the publication of this work; which met with great opposition from some of the courtiers of King Charles II. who endeavoured to destroy the reputation of it, when it was first published.* Nor has it escaped the censures of writers of different parties since that time.

The first piece, which appeared against it, was from a Roman catholic, in a Letter to Mr. R. Cudworth, D. D. printed at the end of a tract, entitled, *Anti-Haman; or, an Answer to Mr. G. Burnet's Mystery of Iniquity Unveiled*; wherein is shewed the Conformity of the Doctrine, Worship, and Practice of the Roman Catholic Church, with those of the purest Times; the Idolatry of the Pagans is truly stated, and the Imputation of Pagan Idolatry clearly confuted; and the Reasons are given, why Catholics avoid the Communion of the Protestant Church. To which is annexed, a Letter to R. Cudworth, D. D. by W. E. Student in Divinity. With Leave of Superiors, 1679, in octavo. This writer attacks Dr. Cudworth's assertion, that though very few of the ancient philosophers thought God to be corporeal, as Epicurus, Strato, &c. yet, that the greatest part of them believed him to be a pure spirit, and adored the only true God, under the names of Jupiter, Minerva, Osiris and Venus. In opposition to which, his antago-

* Vide Joannis Clerici Vitam, ad ann. 1711, p. 129, edit. Amstelod. 1711, in octavo.

nist maintains,* "that although all Pagans (nay all men) had naturally a knowledge of the true God, yet those they adored, were men;" in support of which, he urges four proofs taken, 1. From the diversity of their sexes; 2. From their generation; 3. From their death; 4. From their rites. He likewise attempts to confute what Dr. Cudworth has strenuously defended throughout his book, that the unity of God was a prime article of the Pagan creed.

But let us now see, in how severe a manner he was treated, even by a Protestant divine, Mr. John Turner, in his discourse of the Messiah.^b He tells us,^c "we must conclude Dr. Cudworth to be himself a Tritheistic; a sect, for which, I believe, he may have a kindness, because he loves hard words, or something else, without either *stick* or *trick*, which I will not name, because his book pretends to be written against it." And again,^d that, "the most that charity itself can allow the Doctor, if it were to step forth, and speak his most favourable character to the world, is, that he is an Arian, a Socinian, or a Deist."

Mr. Dryden likewise tells us,^e that our Author "has raised such strong objections against the being of a God and providence, that many think he has not answered them." And the late earl of Shaftesbury, in his *Moralists*, a rhapsody,^f has the following passage:—"You know the com-

* P. 335, &c.

^b See p. 16, 17, 19, 162. edit. London, 1685, in 8vo.

^c P. 17.

^d P. 19.

^e Dedication of his translation of Virgil's *Æneid*, vol. ii. p. 378. edit. London, 1730, in 8vo.

^f Part ii. sec. 3. *Characteristics*, vol. ii. p. 292. edit. London, 1737, in 8vo.

mon fate of those, who dare to appear fair authors. What was that pious and learned man's case, who wrote the Intellectual System of the Universe? I confess, it was pleasant enough to consider, that though the whole world were no less satisfied with his capacity and learning, than with his sincerity in the cause of the Deity; yet was he accused of giving the upper hand to the Atheists, for having only stated their reasons and those of their adversaries fairly together."

Such was the treatment, which our great Author received for his immortal volume: wherein, as Mr. Warburton says,* with a boldness uncommon indeed, but very becoming a man conscious of his own integrity, and of the truth and evidence of his cause, he launched out into the immensity of the Intellectual System; and, at his first essay, penetrated the very darkest recesses of antiquity, to strip Atheism of all its disguises, and drag up the lurking monster to conviction. Where, though few readers could follow him, yet the very slowest were able to unravel his secret purpose—to tell the world—that he was an Atheist in his heart, and an Arian in his book. However, thus ran the popular clamour against this excellent person. Would the reader know the consequence? Why, the zealots inflamed the bigots:—

'Twas the time's plague, when madmen led the blind:—

The silly calumny was believed; the much-injured Author grew disgusted; his ardour slackened; and the rest and far greatest part of the defence never appeared.

The same gentleman, likewise, in his letter to

* Preface to vol. ii. of his Divine Legation of Moses, p. 10, 11, 12.

me above cited, observes, that among the other excellences of this work, "all his translations from the Greek writers are wonderfully exact, and a vast judgment and penetration shewn in explaining their sense."

In 1706, there was published at London, in two volumes, in quarto, an abridgment of the Intellectual System, under this title:—A Confutation of the Reason and Philosophy of Atheism; being in a great measure, either an abridgment or an improvement of what Dr. Cudworth offered to that purpose in his true Intellectual System of the Universe. Together with an introduction, in which, among accounts of other matters relating to this treatise, there is an impartial examination of what that learned person advanced, touching the Christian doctrine of a trinity in unity, and the resurrection of the body. By Thomas Wise, B. D. fellow of Exeter College, in Oxford, and chaplain to his Grace, the Duke of Ormond.

In the introduction, Mr. Wise styles Dr. Cudworth's book, the vastest magazine of reasoning and learning, that ever singly appeared against Atheism; and then examines his notions concerning the trinity and the resurrection of the body. With regard to the former, he observes, that Dr. Cudworth having laid down a general proposition, that the heathens universally held but one unmade independent God, comes to shew, that the Platonists, in particular, maintained an unity of the Godhead, in their three Divine hypostases, viz. Monad or Good, Mind, and Soul; notwithstanding that they owned these three hypostases to be numerically distinct, or to have distinct singular essences of their own. To vindicate the

Platonists in this point, he tells us, that the ancient orthodox Fathers of the Christian church, were generally of no other persuasion than this—that that essence or substance of the Godhead, which all the three persons, or hypostases agree in, as each of them is God, was not one singular or individual, but only one common or universal essence or substance.

“This, (says Mr. Wise,) and other assertions of the like nature in Dr. Cudworth’s Intellectual System, have made so much noise in the world, that there has hardly been a pamphlet or book written for some years about the blessed trinity, especially in England, and in the heterodox way, which does not bring in Dr. Cudworth upon the stage, and vouch his name and quotations for its purpose. While, on the other hand, the truly orthodox (though often through a misunderstanding of his sense) do aim at his doctrine, as a mark of their invectives; and others, who call themselves also by that name, entertaining no little veneration for the very words used by the ancient Fathers, especially when repeated and revived by so learned a person as Dr. Cudworth, and resolving, whatever should come of it, to stand by them, have unhappily fallen into a kind of Tritheism.” Mr. Wise therefore endeavours, as much as possible, to clear up and justify our Author’s doctrine. However, Mr. Robert Nelson, in his life of Bishop Bull,* declares, that Dr. Cudworth’s notion, with regard to the Trinity, was the same with Dr. Samuel Clarke’s, and represents it in the following terms:—That the three persons of the trinity are three distinct spiritual substances; but that the

* Sec. lxi. p. 339, 340, edit. London, 1714, in 8vo.

Father alone is truly and properly God ; that he alone, in the proper sense, is supreme ; that absolute supreme honour is due to him only ; and that he, absolutely speaking, is the only God of the universe, the Son and Spirit being God, but only by the Father's concurrence with them, and their subordination and subjection to him. But to return to Mr. Wise : he next considers our Author's opinion about the resurrection, who, as appears from several passages of his Intellectual System, thought, that the resurrection-body will not consist of the same substance with that which was buried ; and that it will not be a body of flesh, but an ethereal one ; and that the present body is only a seed of the resurrection. However, Mr. Wise shews from other passages in his works, that he has as plainly asserted the resurrection of the same numerical body, as in some places he has denied it.

In the year 1703, &c. Monsieur le Clerc gave large extracts of the Intellectual System in his *Bibliothèque Choisie*, tom. i. ii. iii. v. vii. viii. ix. which engaged him in a dispute with Monsieur Bayle, concerning Dr. Cudworth's notion of plastic natures. Monsieur Bayle, in his *Continuation des Pensées diverses sur les Comètes*,^a had observed, that "the Atheists are very much perplexed, how to account for the formation of animals, which they ascribed to a cause which was not conscious of what it did, and yet followed a regular plan, without knowing according to what plan it went to work. But Dr. Cudworth's Plastic Nature, and Dr. Grew's Vital Principle^b are

^a Tom. i. Sec. 21.

^b See Dr. Nehemiah Grew's *Cosmologia Sacra*, printed at London, 1701, in folio.

exactly in the same case; and thus they take away the whole strength of this objection against the Atheists. For if God could communicate such a plastic power, it follows, that it is not inconsistent with the nature of things, that there be such agents. They may therefore exist of themselves, will the adversary say; whence it would also follow, that the regularity which we observe in the universe, may be the effect of a blind cause, which was not conscious of what it did." Mr. Bayle, however, owned, that Dr. Cudworth and Dr. Grew were not aware of the consequence, which, according to him, followed from their system. Monsieur le Clerc returned an answer in the fifth volume of his *Bibliothèque Choisie*;^{*} wherein he observed, that the plastic or vital natures, which those two writers admit, cannot in the least favour the Atheists; because these natures are only instruments in the hand of God, and have no power or efficacy but what they receive from him, who rules and directs all their actions. That they are only instrumental causes produced and employed by the chief and First Cause; and that it cannot be said, that a palace has been built up without art, because not only hammers, rules, saws, &c. but even the arms of men, which made use of these instruments, are destitute of knowledge. It is sufficient, that the mind of the builder directed all these things, and employed them in the execution of his design. It is therefore plain, that the Atheists, who deny the being of an intelligent Cause, cannot retort the argument of Dr. Cudworth and Dr. Grew upon them. Monsieur Bayle,

^{*} P. 283, &c.

in his answer,* endeavoured to shew, that if these writers had considered the plastic natures only as instruments in the hand of God, this system would have been exposed to all the difficulties to which the Cartesian hypothesis is liable, and which they intend to avoid. That therefore we must suppose their opinion to have been, that these natures are active principles, which do not want to be continually set on and directed; but that it is sufficient, if God does but put them in a proper situation, and superintend their actions, to set them right, if it be necessary. This being the case, Monsieur Bayle pretends, that the argument may be retorted against those writers. For, says he, since when the order and regularity of this world are alleged as a proof of the being of a God, it is supposed that a being cannot produce a regular work, without having an idea of it; yet, according to Dr. Cudworth, the plastic natures, which produce plants and animals, have not the least idea of what they do. If it be answered, that they have been created with that faculty by a Being, who knows all, and whose ideas they only put in execution; the Stratonician will reply, that if they do it only as efficient causes, this is as incomprehensible as that which is objected to him; since it is as difficult for any being to perform a scheme, which it does not understand, but which another understands, as it is to perform a scheme which no being at all has any notion of. Since you acknowledge, will the Stratonician say, that God could endow some creatures with a power of producing excellent works, though without any knowledge: you must also confess,

* Hist. des Ouvrages des Scavans, Août. 1704. Art. 7, p. 390, &c.

that there is no necessary connexion between the power of producing excellent works, and the idea and knowledge of their essence, and of the manner of producing them: consequently, you ought not to assert, that these things cannot subsist separately in nature, and that nature cannot have of itself what, according to you, the plastic beings received from God. In short, Monsieur Bayle asked, whether these writers maintained, that the plastic and vital natures are only passive instruments in the hand of God, as Monsieur le Clerc seemed to suppose by his comparison of an architect. Monsieur le Clerc answered,* that, according to Dr. Cudworth, the plastic natures were not passive instruments; but that they are under God's direction, who conducts them, though we cannot explain after what manner. Nor can the Atheists, added he, retort the argument, because God is the author of the regularity and order with which the plastic natures act; whereas, according to the Atheists, matter moves of itself, without any cause to direct it, and to give it a power of moving regularly. This dispute was carried on still further, with some warmth, and a great many repetitions on both sides. But what has been said is sufficient to give the reader a notion of this controversy, for the progress of which he may consult the following books:—*Histoire des Ouvrages des Scavans*. Decemb. 1704, art. 12. *Bibliothèque Choisie*, tom. vii. art. 7. *Répons aux Questions d'un Provincial*, tom. iii. chap. 179. *Bibliothèque Choisie*, tom. ix. art. 10. *Réponse pour Mr. Bayle à Mr. Le Clerc*, p. 31, annexed to the fourth volume of the *Répons. aux Quest.*

* *Biblioth. Choisie*, tom. vi. art. 7, p. 422.

d'un Provincial.—Upon the whole, Mr. Warburton, in his letter to me above cited, is of opinion, that our Author's "Plastic Life of Nature is fully overthrown by Monsieur Bayle, whose superiority in that dispute with Monsieur le Clerc, is clear and indisputable."

Monsieur le Clerc^a expressed his wishes, that some man of learning would translate the Intellectual System into Latin; but this design, though resolved upon and attempted by several persons in Germany,^b was never executed till the year 1733, when Dr. Mosheim published his translation of it under the following title:—*Radulphi Cudworth, Theologiæ Doctoris et in Academiâ Cantabrigiensi Professoris, Systema Intellectuale hujus Universi, seu de veris Naturæ Rerum originibus Commentarii; quibus omnis eorum Philosophia, qui Deum esse negant, funditus evertitur. Accedunt reliqua ejus Opuscula.* Joannes Laurentius Moshemius, Theologiæ Doctor, serenissimi Ducis Brunsvicensis à Consiliis Rerum sanctiorum. Abbas Cœnobiorum Vallis S. Mariæ et Lapidis S. Michaelis, omnia ex Anglico Latine vertit, recensuit, variis Observationibus et Dissertationibus illustravit, et auxit. Jenæ, 2 vols. in folio. Dr. Mosheim, in his preface, represents the difficulties of translating this work to be very great; and observes some mistakes, which Monsieur Le Clerc has committed with regard to the sense of our Author in his extracts in the *Bibliothèque Choisie*. Monsieur Bourdelin, a member of the French Academy of Inscriptions and Belles Lettres, had begun a translation of the In-

^a *Biblioth. Choisie*, tom. i. p. 65.

^b See Dr. Mosheim's preface.

tellectual System into French,^a but was prevented from completing it by his death, which happened in May, 1717.

But to return to our Author: in 1678, he was installed prebendary of Gloucester.^b He died at Cambridge, June 26, 1688; and was interred in the chapel of Christ's College, with the following inscription on his monument:—

“Here lyeth the body of Dr. Ralph Cudworth, late Master of Christ's College, about thirty years Hebrew Professor, and Prebendary of Gloucester. He died the 26th of June, 1688, in the seventy-first year of his age.”

He was a man of very extensive learning, excellently skilled in the learned languages and antiquity, a good mathematician, a subtle philosopher, and a profound metaphysician. He embraced the mechanical or corpuscular philosophy; but, with regard to the Deity, intelligences, genii, ideas, and in short the principles of human knowledge, he followed Plato, and even the latter Platonists.^c A great number of writers commend his piety and modesty; and Bishop Burnet^d having observed, that Dr. Henry More studied to consider religion as a seed of a deiform nature, and in order to this, set young students much on reading the ancient philosophers; chiefly Plato, Tully, and Plotin; and on considering the Christian religion as a doctrine sent from God both to elevate and sweeten human nature, tells us, that

^a See his Eloge in Hist. de l'Academie des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres, tom. ii. p. 562, edit. Amsterdam.

^b Survey of the Cathedrals of York, &c. by Browne Willis, Esq. p. 743, edit. London, 1727, in 4to.

^c Mosheim, *ubi supra*.

^d History of his Own Time, vol. i. p. 187.

"Dr. Cudworth carried this on with a great strength of genius, and a vast compass of learning;" and that "he was a man of great conduct and prudence; upon which his enemies did very falsely accuse him of craft and dissimulation." The late earl of Shaftesbury* styles him an excellent and learned divine, of highest authority at home and fame abroad.

Besides his sermon on 1 John ii. 3, 4, above-mentioned, he published likewise another, on 1 Cor. xv. 57. the third edition of both which was printed at London, 1676, in folio.

He left several posthumous works, most of which seem to be a continuation of his Intellectual System, of which he had given the world only the first part. One of these was published by Dr. Edward Chandler, bishop of Durham, at London, in 1731, under this title, *A Treatise concerning eternal and immutable Morality*. In the preface^b to which, the Bishop observes, that in this book our Author "proves the falseness of the consequences with respect to natural justice and morality in God, which are deducible from the principles of those that maintain the second sort of Fate, denominated by him Theologic. And thus it may be reckoned to be a sequel in part of his first book against Material Fate. Had it come abroad as early as it was written, it had served for a proper antidote to the poison in some of Mr. Hobbes's, and others writings, who revived in that age the exploded opinions of Protagoras and other ancient Greeks, and took away the essential and eternal discriminations of moral good and

* *Characteristics*, vol. iii. chap. 2, p. 64.

^b P. 9, 10, 11.

evil, of just and unjust, and made them all arbitrary productions of Divine or human will. Against the ancient and modern patrons of this doctrine, no one hath writ better than Dr. Cudworth. His book is indeed a demonstration of the truth of the contrary opinion, and is drawn up with that beauty, clearness, and strength, as must delight as well as convince the reader, if I may judge of the affection of others from the effect it had on me. It will certainly give a just idea of the writer's good sense, as well as vast learning. We are not certain, that this treatise is quoted so perfect as the Author designed it; but it appears from the manuscript, that he transcribed the best part of it with his own hand, as if it was speedily to have been sent to the press."

The titles and subjects of the rest of our Author's manuscripts are as follow:

A Discourse of moral Good and Evil, in several folios, containing near 1000 pages.

Heads of the chapters of one of those books.

Chap. 1. The opinions of the ancient adversaries of natural justice explained, p. 1.

2. Objections against morality, p. 11.

3. Answers to the 1st objection, p. 29.

4. Answer to the 2d and 3d objections, p. 45.

5. Inconsistencies with a commonwealth, p. 49.

6. Justice by God's arbitrary command, p. 79.

7. The 6th and 7th objections answered, p. 112.

8. Pleasure; wherein the ancient Hedonic philosophy is explained, and it is largely debated, whether pleasure is the *summum bonum*, p. 117.

9. Answer to the 9th objection, p. 175.

10. Notion of morality settled, p. 198

11. Happiness ; and the philosophy of Epicurus concerning it examined and refuted, p. 253.

12. True happiness in Divine life, p. 296.

13. Result of the former discourse ; incorporeal substance Deity, p. 303.

14. Controversy of liberty stated. A new philosophical hypothesis, p. 336.

15. Objections against liberty. Τὸ ἀγαθὸν φαινόμενον.

16. Argument from the phenomenon of incontinency, p. 382.

Heads of another book of Morality, wherein Hobbes's philosophy is explained.

Prolegomena ; to shew, that if nothing is naturally just or unjust, nothing can be made so.—Chap. 2. Not by laws.—Chap. 3. Not by laws of nature.—Chap. 4. Not by covenants.—Chap. 5. To explain his doctrine, generally and particularly.—Chap. 6. State of nature.—Chap. 7. Laws of nature.—Chap. 8. Common representative.—Chap. 9. To discover his equivocations.—Chap. 10. About obligation.—Chap. 11. According to him, there can be no Ethic.—Chap. 12. Judgment on his politics, that no politic can be built on these principles.

A Discourse of Liberty and Necessity, in which the grounds of the Atheistical philosophy are confuted, and morality vindicated and explained. This book contains 1000 pages in folio.

Heads of the chapters of one of the books.

Chap. 1. The necessity of all human actions asserted by three sorts of men, and in different ways :—First, Some Christian theologers of the

latter age. Secondly, The old Zenonian Stoics. Thirdly, The Democritical Physiologers or Atheistical Fatalists, p. 1.

2. Christian Fatalists pleading, p. 37.

3. The Stoical Fatalists pleading, p. 70.

4. Atheistical Fatalists pleading, p. 84.

5. Answer to the phenomena objected, p. 119.

6. Of motion and sense, p. 167.

7. Of intellection, p. 196.

8. Answer to Hobbes's Reflections, p. 305.

9. Morality, p. 317.

Heads of the chapters of another book, De libero Arbitrio.

Chap. 1. Dreams.—2. Indifferences.—3. General account.—4. Particular or full account.—5. Definition and particular account.—6. An imperfection not formally in God.—7. Arguments to prove such a thing.—8. That that, which rules all, is not ἀνάγκη ἀπαραίτητος, but προνοία ἰλασμός.—9. Answer to the objection, μηδέν ἀναιτίον.—10. Contingencies.—11. Argument for necessity, taken from the nature of God.

Upon Daniel's prophecy of the LXX weeks, wherein all the interpretations of the Jews are considered and confuted, with several of some learned Christians. In two volumes, in folio.

Of the verity of the Christian religion against the Jews. Dr. Cudworth mentions this in his MSS. but it is not yet found.

A Discourse of the Creation of the World, and Immortality of the Soul, in 8vo.

Hebrew learning.

An explanation of Hobbes's notion of God, and of the extension of spirits.

Our Author had several sons, who probably died young, but he left one daughter, Damaris, who was second wife to Sir Francis Masham, of Oates, in the county of Essex, Bart.^a by whom she had a son, the late Francis Cudworth Masham, Esq.^b one of the Masters of the High Court of Chancery, and accountant-general of the said Court; and foreign apposer in the Court of Exchequer. This lady had a great friendship with Mr. Locke, who died at her house at Oates, where he had resided for several years before. She was distinguished for her uncommon genius and learning; and in the year 1696 published at London, in 12mo. without her name, *A Discourse concerning the Love of God.*^c She introduces this tract with observing, that "whatever reproaches have been made by the Romanists, on the one hand, of the want of books of devotion in the church of England, or by the dissenters, on the other, of a dead and lifeless way of preaching, it may be affirmed, that there cannot any where be found so good a collection of discourses on moral subjects, as might be made of English sermons, and other treatises of that nature, written by the divines of our church: which books are certainly in themselves of the greatest, and most general use of any; and do most conduce to that, which is the chief aim of Christianity—a good life." She then animadverts upon those who undervalue morality,^d and others, who strain the duties of it to an impracticable pitch, and pretend to ascend by

^a He died at his seat at Oates, on Sunday, the 3d of March, 1702-3, in the 77th year of his age.

^b He died May 17, 1731.

^c It contains 126 pages, besides the preface.

^d P. 2, 3.

it to something beyond or above it;^a and afterwards proceeds to consider the conduct of those who build their practical and devotional discourses upon principles which will not bear the test, but which oblige them to lay down such assertions of morality, as sober and well-disposed Christians cannot understand to be practicable.^b And here she applies herself to the examination of Mr. John Norris's^c scheme in his *Practical Discourses* and other treatises, wherein he maintains, that "mankind are obliged strictly, as their duty, to love, with desire, nothing but God only, every degree of desire of any creature whatsoever being sinful:" which assertion Mr. Norris defends upon this ground, that God, not the creature, is the immediate efficient cause of our sensations; for whatsoever gives us pleasure has a right to our love: but God only gives us pleasure, therefore he only has a right to our love. This hypothesis is considered with great accuracy and ingenuity by Lady Masham, and the bad consequences of it represented in a strong light. Her Discourse was translated into French by Mr. Peter Coste, and printed at Amsterdam, in 1705. She lies buried in the cathedral church of Bath, where a monument is erected to her memory, with the following inscription:

"Near this place lies Dame DAMARIS MASHAM, daughter of Ralph Cudworth, D. D. and second wife of Sir Francis Masham, of Oates, in the county of Essex, Bart. who to the softness and

^a P. 3, 4, 5, 6;

^b P. 7.

^c This divine borrowed his hypothesis from Father Mallebranche.

elegancy of her own sex added several of the noblest accomplishments and qualities to the other.

"She possessed these advantages in a degree unusual to either, and tempered them with an exactness peculiar to herself.

"Her learning, judgment, sagacity, and penetration, together with her candour and love of truth, were very observable to all that conversed with her, or were acquainted with those small treatises she published in her life-time, though she industriously concealed her name.

"Being mother of an only son, she applied all her natural and acquired endowments to the care of his education.

"She was a strict observer of all the virtues belonging to every station of her life; and only wanted opportunities to make these talents shine in the world, which were the admiration of her friends.

"She was born on the 18th of January, 1658, and died on the 20th of April, 1708."



THE TRUE
INTELLECTUAL SYSTEM
OF THE
UNIVERSE.



Τυμνάσιον τῆς ψυχῆς ἢ ἈΝΘΡΩΠΙΝῆς ΣΟΦΙΑ, τίτλος δὲ ἢ Ὁ ΘΕΙΑ.
ORIGENES.

TO THE

RIGHT HONOURABLE

HENEAGE LORD FINCH,

*Baron of Daventry, Lord High Chancellor of England, and
one of his Majesty's most Honourable Privy Council.*

MY LORD,

THE many favours I have formerly received from you, as they might justly challenge, whenever I had a fit opportunity, a public and thankful acknowledgment; so have they encouraged me at this time, to the presumption of this dedication to your Lordship. Whom, as your perspicacious wit and solid judgment, together with your acquired learning, render every way a most accomplished and desirable patron; so did I persuade myself, that your hearty affection to religion, and zeal for it, would make you not unwilling, to take that into your protection, which is written wholly in the defence thereof; so far forth, as its own defects, or miscarriages, should not render it incapable of the same. Nor can I think it probable, that in an age of so much debauchery, scepticism, and infidelity, an undertaking of this kind should be judged by you use-

DEDICATION.

less or unseasonable. And now, having so fit an opportunity, I could most willingly expatiate in the large field of your Lordship's praise, both that I might do an act of justice to yourself, and provoke others to your imitation. But I am sensible, that as no eloquence, less than that of your own, could be fit for such a performance; so the nobleness and generosity of your spirit is such, that you take much more pleasure in doing praiseworthy things, than in hearing the repeated echoes of them. Wherefore, instead of pursuing encomiums, which would be the least pleasing to yourself, I shall offer up my prayers to Almighty God, for the continuation of your Lordship's life and health; that so his Majesty may long have such a loyal subject and wise counsellor; the church of England such a worthy patron; the High Court of Chaucery such an oracle of impartial justice; and the whole nation such a pattern of virtue and piety. Which shall ever be the hearty desire of,

MY LORD,

Your Lordship's most humble, and

Most affectionate servant,

R. CUDWORTH.

PREFACE TO THE READER.*

THOUGH, I confess, I have seldom taken any great pleasure in reading other men's apologies, yet must I at this time make some myself. First, therefore, I acknowledge, that when I engaged the press, I intended only a discourse concerning liberty and necessity, or, to speak out more plainly, against the fatal necessity of all actions and events; which, upon whatsoever grounds or principles maintained, will, as we conceive, serve the design of Atheism, and undermine Christianity, and all religion, as taking away all guilt and blame, punishments and rewards, and plainly rendering a day of judgment ridiculous: and, it is evident, that some have pursued it of late, in order to that end. But afterwards we considered, that this, which is indeed a controversy concerning the True Intellectual System of the Universe, does, in the full extent thereof, take in other things; the necessity of all actions and events being maintained by several persons, upon very different grounds, according to that tripartite fatalism, mentioned by us in the beginning of the first chapter. For first, the Democritic Fate is nothing but the material necessity of all things without a God, in supposing senseless matter, necessarily moved, to be the only original and principal of all things; which therefore is called by Epicurus the Physiological, by us the Athe-

* Preface to the 2d edit. 4to. 1743.

istic Fate. Besides which, the Divine Fate is also bipartite: some Theists supposing God, both to decree and do all things in us (evil as well as good), or by his immediate influence to determinate all actions, and so make them alike necessary to us. From whence it follows, that his will is no way regulated or determined by any essential and immutable goodness and justice; or that he hath nothing of morality in his nature, he being only arbitrary will omnipotent. As also that all good and evil moral, to us creatures, are mere thetical or positive things; νόμος, and not φύσει, by law or command only, and not by nature. This therefore may be called the Divine Fate immoral, and violent. Again, there being other Divine fatalists, who acknowledge such a Deity, as both suffers other things, besides itself, to act, and hath an essential goodness and justice in its nature, and consequently, that there are things, just and unjust to us naturally, and not by law and arbitrary constitution only; and yet nevertheless take away from men all such liberty as might make them capable of praise and dispraise, rewards and punishments, and objects of distributive justice; they conceiving necessity to be intrinsical to the nature of every thing, in the actings of it, and nothing of contingency to be found any where: from whence it will follow, that nothing could possibly have been otherwise, in the whole world, than it is. And this may be called the Divine Fate moral (as the other immoral) and natural (as the other violent); it being a concatenation, or implexed series of causes, all in themselves necessary, depending upon a Deity moral (if we may so speak); that is, such as is essentially good,

and naturally just, as the head thereof; the first contriver and orderer of all. Which kind of Divine Fate hath not only been formerly asserted by the Stoics, but also of late by divers modern writers. Wherefore, of the three fatalisms, or false hypotheses of the universe, mentioned in the beginning of this book, one is absolute Atheism, another immoral Theism, or religion without any natural justice and morality (all just and unjust, according to this hypothesis, being mere thetical or factitious things, made by arbitrary will and command only); the third and last, such a Theism, as acknowledges not only a God, or omnipotent understanding Being, but also natural justice and morality, founded in him, and derived from him; nevertheless no liberty from necessity any where, and therefore no distributive or retributive justice in the world. Whereas these three things are (as we conceive) the fundamentals or essentials of true religion. First, that all things in the world do not float without a head and governor; but that there is a God, an omnipotent understanding Being, presiding over all. Secondly, that this God, being essentially good and just, there is *φύσει καλὸν καὶ δίκαιον*, something in its own nature immutably and eternally just and unjust; and not by arbitrary will, law, and command only. And, lastly, that there is something *ἐφ' ἡμῖν*, or, that we are so far forth principles or masters of our own actions, as to be accountable to justice for them, or to make us guilty and blameworthy for what we do amiss, and to deserve punishment accordingly. Which three fundamentals of religion are intimated by the author to the Hebrews in these words:—"He that cometh to

God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of those who seek him out." For to seek out God here, is nothing else but to seek a participation of his image, or the recovery of that nature and life of his which we have been alienated from. And these three things, namely, that all things do not float without a head and governor, but there is an omnipotent understanding Being presiding over all; that this God hath an essential goodness and justice; and that the differences of good and evil moral, honest and dishonest, are not by mere will and law only, but by nature; and consequently, that the Deity cannot act, influence, and necessitate men to such things as are in their own nature evil; and, lastly, that necessity is not intrinsical to the nature of every thing, but that men have such a liberty or power over their own actions, as may render them accountable for the same, and blameworthy when they do amiss; and, consequently, that there is a justice distributive of rewards and punishments running through the world: I say, these three (which are the most important things that the mind of man can employ itself upon), taken all together, make up the wholeness and entireness of that which is here called by us the True Intellectual System of the Universe, in such a sense as Atheism may be called a false system thereof; the word Intellectual being added, to distinguish it from the other, vulgarly so called, Systems of the World (that is, the visible and corporeal world), the Ptolemaic, Tyconic, and Copernican; the two former of which are now commonly accounted false, the latter true. And thus our prospect being now enlarged into a threefold fatalism, or

spurious and false hypothesis of the intellectual system, making all things necessary upon several grounds; we accordingly designed the confutation of them all, in three several books. The first, against Atheism (which is the Democritic Fate), wherein all the reason and philosophy thereof is refelled, and the existence of a God demonstrated; and so that *ὑλικὴ ἀνάγκη*, or material necessity of all things, overthrown. The second, for such a God, as is not mere arbitrary will omnipotent, decreeing, doing, and necessitating all actions, evil as well as good, but essentially moral, good, and just; and for a natural *discrimen honestorum et turpium*, whereby another ground of the necessity of all human actions will be removed. And the third and last, against necessity intrinsical and essential to all action, and for such a liberty, or *sui-potestas*, in rational creatures, as may render them accountable, capable of rewards and punishments, and so objects of distributive or retributive justice; by which the now only remaining ground, of the fatal necessity of all actions and events, will be taken away. And all these three under that one general title of the True Intellectual System of the Universe; each book having, besides, its own particular title: as, against Atheism; for natural justice and morality, founded in the Deity; for liberty from necessity, and a distributive justice of rewards and punishments in the world. And this we conceive may fully satisfy, concerning our general title, all those who are not extremely critical or captious, at least as many of them as ever heard of the astronomical systems of the world; so that they will not think us hereby obliged to treat of the hierarchy

of angels, and of all the several species of animals, vegetables, minerals, &c.; that is, to write *de omni ente*, of whatsoever is contained within the complexión of the universe. Though the whole scale of entity is here also taken notice of; and the general ranks of substantial beings, below the Deity (or trinity of Divine hypostases) considered; which yet, according to our philosophy, are but two; souls of several degrees (angels themselves being included within that number), and body or matter; as also the immortality of those souls proved: which notwithstanding is suggested by us, only to satisfy some men's curiosity. Nevertheless, we confess, that this general title might well have been here spared by us, and this volume have been presented to the reader's view, not as a part or piece, but a whole complete and entire thing by itself, had it not been for two reasons; first, our beginning with those three fatalisms, or false hypotheses of the Intellectual System, and promising a confutation of them all then, when we thought to have brought them within the compass of one volume; and secondly, every other page, throughout this whole volume, accordingly bearing the inscription of book the first upon the head thereof. This is therefore that, which, in the first place, we here apologize for our publishing one part or book alone by itself, we being surprised in the length thereof; whereas we had intended two more along with it. Notwithstanding which, there is no reason why this volume should be therefore thought imperfect and incomplete, because it hath not all the three things at first designed us; it containing all that belongeth to its own particular title and subject, and being

in that respect no piece, but a whole. This indeed must needs beget an expectation of the two following treatises (especially in such as shall have received any satisfaction from this first), concerning those two other fatalisms, or false hypotheses mentioned, to make up our whole Intellectual System complete; the one to prove, that God is not mere arbitrary will omnipotent, (without any essential goodness and justice) decreeing and doing all things in the world, as well evil as good, and thereby making them alike necessary to us; from whence it would follow, that all good and evil moral are mere thetical, positive, and arbitrary things; that is, not nature, but will: which is the defence of natural, eternal, immutable justice or morality. The other, that necessity is not intrinsical to the nature of every thing, God and all creatures, or essential to all action; but, that there is something *ἐφ' ἡμῖν*, or that we have some liberty or power over our own actions: which is the defence of a distributive or retributive justice, dispensing rewards and punishments throughout the whole world. Wherefore we think fit here to advertise the reader concerning these, that though they were and still are, really intended by us, yet the complete finishing and publication of them will notwithstanding depend upon many contingencies; not only of our life and health, the latter of which, as well as the former, is to us very uncertain; but also of our leisure, or vacancy from other necessary employments.

In the next place, we must apologize also for the fourth chapter; inasmuch as though, in regard of its length, it might rather be called a book, than a chapter, yet it doth not answer all the con-

tents prefixed to it. Here therefore must we again confess ourselves surprised, who, when we wrote those contents, did not suspect in the least, but that we should have satisfied them all within a lesser compass. And our design then was, besides answering the objection against the naturalty of the idea of God, from the Pagan Polytheism (we having then so fit an occasion), to give such a further account of the idolatry and religion of the Gentiles, as might prepare our way for a defence of Christianity, to be subjoined in the close; it being not only agreeable to the sense of ancient doctors, but also expressly declared in the Scripture, that one design of Christianity was to abolish and extirpate the Pagan Polytheism and idolatry. And our reasons for this intended defence of Christianity were, first, because we had observed, that some professed opposers of Atheism had either incurred a suspicion, or at least suffered under the imputation of being mere Theists, or natural religionists only, and no hearty believers of Christianity, or friends to revealed religion. From which either suspicion or imputation therefore we thought it justice to free ourselves, we having so unshaken a belief and firm assurance of the truth of the whole Christian doctrine. But, secondly, and principally, because we had further observed it to have been the method of our modern Atheists, to make their first assault against Christianity, as thinking that to be the most vulnerable: and that it would be an easy step for them, from thence, to demolish all religion and Theism. However, since the satisfying the former part of those contents had already taken up so much room, that the pursuit of the

remainder would have quite excluded our principally-intended confutation of all the atheistic grounds; the forementioned objection being now sufficiently answered, there was a necessity, that we should there break off, and leave the further account of the Pagan idolatry and religion, together with our defence of Christianity, to some other more convenient opportunity.

And now we shall exhibit to the reader's view a brief and general synopsis of the whole following work, together with some particular reflections upon several parts thereof, either for his better information concerning them, or for their vindication; some of which, therefore, will be of greater use, after the book has been read, than before. The first chapter is an account of the Atomic physiology, as made the foundation of the Democritic Fate: where the reader is to understand, that this Democritic Fate, which is one of the three false hypotheses of the Intellectual System, there mentioned, is the very self-same thing with the Atomic Atheism, the only form of Atheism, that hath publicly appeared upon the stage, as an entire philosophic system, or hath indeed been much taken notice of in the world for these two thousand years past. For, though it be true, that Epicurus, (who was also an Atomic Atheist, as is afterwards declared, having, in all probability, therefore a mind to innovate something, that he might not seem to have borrowed all from Democritus,) did by violence introduce liberty of will into his hypothesis; for the solving whereof, he ridiculously devised, that his third motion of Atoms, called by Lucretius—

——Exiguum Clinamen Principiorum:

Yet was this, as Cicero* long since observed, a most heterogeneous patch, or *assumentum* of his, and altogether as contradictory to the tenor of his own principles, as it was to the doctrine of Democritus himself. There can be nothing more absurd, than for an Atheist to assert liberty of will; but, it is most of all absurd, for an Atomic one. And, therefore, our modern Atheists do here plainly disclaim Epicurus, (though otherwise so much admired by them,) and declare open war against this liberty of will; they apprehending, that it would unavoidably introduce incorporeal substance; as also well knowing, that necessity, on the contrary, effectually overthrows all religion, it taking away guilt and blame, punishments and rewards; to which might be added also prayers and devotions.

And as there was a necessity for us here, to give some account of that ancient Atomic physiology, with which Atheism now became thus blended and complicated; so do we, in this first chapter, chiefly insist upon two things concerning it. First, that it was no invention of Democritus nor Leucippus, but of much greater antiquity; not only from that tradition transmitted by Posidonius, the Stoic, that it derived its original from one Moschus, a Phœnician, who lived before the Trojan wars, (which plainly makes it to have been Mosaical;) but also from Aristotle's affirmation, that the greater part of the ancient philosophers entertained this hypothesis; and further, because it is certain, that divers of the Italics, and particularly Empedocles, before Democritus, physiologized atomically, which is the reason he was so

* De Nat. Deor. l. i. c. 25.

much applauded by Lucretius. Besides which, it is more than a presumption, that Anaxagoras his Homœomery, or similar Atomology, was but a degeneration from the true and genuine Atomology of the acient Italics, that was an Anomœomery, or doctrine of dissimilar and unqualified atoms. Wherefore all that is true concerning Democritus and Leucippus, is only this, that these men were indeed the first atheizers of this ancient Atomic physiology, or the inventors and broachers of the Atomic Atheism. Which is Laertius his true meaning, (though it be not commonly understood,) when he recordeth of them, that they were the first, who made unqualified atoms the principles of all things in the universe without exception; that is, not only of inanimate bodies, (as the other ancient religious Atomists, the Italics, before had done,) but also of soul and mind.

And whereas, we conceive this Atomic physiology, as to the essentials thereof, to be unquestionably true, viz.—That the only principles of bodies are magnitude, figure, sight, motion, and rest; and that the qualities and forms of inanimate bodies are really nothing, but several combinations of these; causing several fancies in us; (which excellent discovery, therefore, so long ago made, is a notable instance of the wit and sagacity of the ancients;) so do we in the next place make it manifest, that this Atomic physiology, rightly understood, is so far from being either the mother or nurse of Atheism, or any ways favourable thereunto, (as is vulgarly supposed) that it is indeed the most directly opposite to it of any, and the greatest defence against the same. For, first, we have discovered, that the principle, upon

which this Atomology is founded, and from whence it sprung, was no other than this, nothing out of nothing, in the true sense thereof; or, that nothing can be caused by nothing; from whence it was concluded, that in natural generations there was no new real entity produced, which was not before: the genuine consequence whereof was two-fold; that the qualities and forms of inanimate bodies are no entities really distinct from the magnitude, figure, sight and motion of parts; and that souls are substances incorporeal, not generated out of matter. Where we have shewed, that the Pythagoric doctrine, of the pre-existence of souls, was founded upon the very same principles with the Atomic physiology. And it is from this very principle, rightly understood, that ourselves afterwards undertake to demonstrate the absolute impossibility of all Atheism. Moreover, we have made it undeniably evident, that the intrinsic constitution of this Atomic physiology also is such, as that whosoever admits it, and rightly understands it, must needs acknowledge incorporeal substance; which is the absolute overthrow of Atheism. And from hence alone it is certain to us, without any testimonies from antiquity, that Democritus and Leucippus could not possibly be the first inventors of this philosophy, they either not rightly understanding it, or else wilfully depraving the same; and the Atomic Atheism being really nothing else, but a rape committed upon the Atomic physiology. For which reason, we do by no means here applaud Plato, nor Aristotle, in their rejecting this most ancient Atomic physiology, and introducing again, that unintelligible first matter, and those exploded qualities

and forms, into philosophy. For though this were probably done by Plato, out of a disgust and prejudice against the Atomic Atheists, which made him not so well consider nor understand that physiology; yet was he much disappointed of his expectation herein, that atomology, which he exploded, (rightly understood,) being really the greatest bulwark against Atheism; and, on the contrary, those forms and qualities, which he espoused, the natural seed thereof, they, besides their unintelligible darkness, bringing something out of nothing, in the impossible sense; which we shew to be the inlet of all Atheism. And thus, in this first chapter, have we not only quite disarmed Atheism of Atomism, or shewed, that the latter, (rightly understood) affordeth no manner of shelter or protection to the former; but also made it manifest, that it is the greatest bulwark and defence against the same; which is a thing afterwards further insisted on.

As to the second chapter, we have no more to say, but only this; that here we took the liberty to reveal the arcana mysteries of Atheism, and to discover all its pretended grounds of reason, that we could find any where suggested in writings, those only excepted, that are peculiar to the Hylozoic form (which is directly contrary to the Atomic), and that to their best advantage too; nevertheless to this end, that these being afterwards all baffled and confuted, Theism might, by this means, obtain the greater and juster triumph over Atheism.

In the third chapter, we thought it necessary, in order to a fuller confutation of Atheism, to consider all the other forms thereof, besides the Ato-

mic. And here do we, first of all, make a discovery of a certain form of Atheism, never before taken notice of by any modern writers, which we call the Hylozoic: which, notwithstanding, though it were long since started by Strato, in way of opposition to the Democritic and Epicurean hypothesis, yet because it afterwards slept in perfect silence and oblivion, should have been here by us passed by silently, had we not had certain knowledge of its being of late awakened and revived by some, who were so sagacious, as plainly to perceive, that the Atomic form could never do their business, nor prove defensible, and therefore would attempt to carry on this cause of Atheism, in quite a different way, by the life and perception of matter; as also that this, in all probability, would, ere long, publicly appear upon the stage, though not bare-faced, but under a disguise. Which Atheistic hypothesis is partly confuted by us, in the close of this chapter, and partly in the fifth.

¶ In the next place, it being certain, that there had been other philosophic Atheists in the world before those Atomics, Epicurus and Democritus; we declare, out of Plato and Aristotle, what that most ancient Atheistic hypothesis was; namely, the education of all things, even life and understanding itself, out of matter, in the way of qualities, or as the passions and affections thereof, generable and corruptible. Which form of Atheism is styled by us, not only Hylopathian, but also Anaximandrian; however, we grant some probability of that opinion, that Anaximander held an Homœomery of qualified atoms, as Anaxagoras afterwards did; the difference between them

being only this, that the latter asserted an unmade mind, whereas, the former generated all mind and understanding out of those qualified atoms, hot and cold, moist and dry, compounded together; because we judged this difference not to be a sufficient ground to multiply forms of Atheism upon. And here do we give notice of that strange kind of religious Atheism, or Atheistic Theogonism, which asserted, not only other understanding beings, superior to men, called by them gods, but also, amongst those, one Supreme or Jupiter too; nevertheless native, and generated at first out of night and chaos (that is, senseless matter), as also mortal and corruptible again into the same.

Besides which, there is yet a fourth Atheistic form taken notice of, out of the writings of the ancients, (though perhaps junior to the rest, it seeming to be but the corruption and degeneration of Stoicism) which concluded the whole world, not to be an animal (as the Pagan Theists then generally supposed), but only one huge plant or vegetable, having an artificial, plantal, and plastic nature, as its highest principle, orderly disposing the whole, without any mind or understanding. And here have we set down the agreement of all the Atheistic forms (however differing so much from one another), in this one general principle, viz.—That all animality, conscious life and understanding, is generated out of senseless matter, and corruptible again into it.

Wherefore, in the close of this third chapter, we insist largely upon an artificial, regular, and plastic nature, devoid of express knowledge and understanding, as subordinate to the Deity; chiefly in way of confutation of those Cosmo-plastic and

Hylozoic Atheisms. Though we had a further design herein also, for the defence of Theism ; forasmuch as without such a nature, either God must be supposed to do all things in the world immediately, and to form every gnat and fly, as it were, with his own hands ; which seemeth not so becoming of him, and would render his providence, to human apprehensions, laborious and distracting ; or else the whole system of this corporeal universe must result only from for tuitous mechanism, without the direction of any mind ; which hypothesis once admitted, would unquestionably, by degrees, supplant and undermine all Theism. And now, from what we have declared, it may plainly appear, that this digression of our's, concerning an artificial, regular, and plastic nature, (subordinate to the Deity) is no wen, or excrescency in the body of this book ; but a natural and necessary member thereof.

In the fourth chapter, after the idea of God fully declared, (where we could not omit his essential goodness and justice; or, if we may so call it, the morality of the Deity, though that be a thing properly belonging to the second book, the confutation of the Divine Fate immoral) there is a large account given of the Pagan Polytheism ; to satisfy a very considerable objection, that lay in our way from thence, against the naturality of the idea of God, as including oneliness and singularity in it. For had that, upon inquiry, been found true, which is so commonly taken for granted, that the generality of the Pagan nations had constantly scattered their devotions amongst a multitude of self-existent and independent deities, they acknowledging no sovereign Numen ; this would

much have stumbled the naturality of the Divine idea. But now it being, on the contrary, clearly proved, that the Pagan theologers all along acknowledged one sovereign and omnipotent Deity, from which all their other gods were generated or created; we have thereby not only removed the forementioned objection out of the way, but also evinced, that the generality of mankind have constantly had a certain prolepsis or anticipation in their minds, concerning the actual existence of a God, according to the true idea of him. And this was the rather done fully and carefully by us, because we had not met with it sufficiently performed before; A. Steuchus Engubinus having laboured most in this subject, from whose profitable industry, though we shall no way detract, yet whosoever will compare what he hath written with our's, will find no just cause to think our's superfluous and unnecessary, much less, a transcription out of his. In which, besides other things, there is no account at all given of the many Pagan, poetical, and political gods, what they were; which is so great a part of our performance, to prove them really to have been but the polyonymy of one God. From whence it follows, also, that the Pagan religion, though sufficiently faulty, yet was not altogether so nonsensical, as the Atheists would represent it, out of design, that they might from thence infer all religion to be nothing but a mere cheat and imposture; they worshipping only one supreme God, in the several manifestations of his goodness, power, and providence throughout the world, together with his inferior ministers. Nevertheless, we cannot deny, that being once engaged in this subject, we thought

ourselves the more concerned to do the business thoroughly and effectually, because of that controversy lately agitated concerning idolatry (which cannot otherwise be decided, than by giving a true account of the Pagan religion), and the so confident affirmations of some, that none could possibly be guilty of idolatry, in the scripture sense, who believed one God, the creator of the whole world; whereas it is most certain, on the contrary, that the Pagan Polytheism and idolatry consisted, not in worshipping many creators, or uncreateds, but in giving religious worship to creatures, besides the Creator; they directing their devotion, (as Athanasius* plainly affirmeth of them,) *ἐν ἀγνήτῳ, καὶ πολλοῖς γυνήτοισι*, to one uncreated only; but, besides him, to many created gods. But as for the polemic management of this controversy, concerning idolatry, we leave it to other learned hands, that are already engaged in it.

Moreover, we have, in this fourth chapter, largely insisted also upon the Trinity. The reason whereof was, because it came in our way, and our contents engaged us thereunto, in order to the giving a full account of the Pagan theology, it being certain, that the Platonics and Pythagoreans, at least, if not other Pagans also, had their trinity, as well as Christians. And we could not well avoid the comparing of these two together: upon which occasion, we take notice of a double Platonic trinity; the one spurious and adulterated, of some latter Platonists; the other true and genuine, of Plato himself, Parmenides, and the ancients. The former of which, though it be opposed by us to the Christian trinity, and

* Oratione IV. contra Arianos T. I. Operum, p. 469.

confuted, yet betwixt the latter and that, do we find a wonderful correspondence; which is largely pursued in the Platonic Christian apology. Wherein, notwithstanding, nothing must be looked upon, as dogmatically asserted by us, but only offered, and submitted to the judgment of the learned in these matters; we confining ourselves in this mysterious point of the holy trinity, within the compass of those its three essentials declared:—First, that it is not a trinity of mere names and words, or of logical notions only; but of persons or hypostases.—Secondly, that none of those persons or hypostases are creatures, but all uncreated.—And, lastly, that they are all three, truly and really one God. Nevertheless we acknowledge, that we did therefore the more copiously insist upon this argument, because of our then designed defence of Christianity; we conceiving, that this parallelism, betwixt the ancient or genuine Platonic, and the Christian trinity, might be of some use to satisfy those amongst us, who boggle so much at the trinity, and look upon it as the choak-pear of Christianity; when they shall find, that the freest wits amongst the Pagans, and the best philosophers, who had nothing of superstition to determine them that way, were so far from being shy of such an hypothesis, as that they were even fond thereof. And that the Pagans had indeed such a Cabala amongst them (which some perhaps will yet hardly believe, notwithstanding all that we have said), might be further convinced, from that memorable relation in Plutarch,* of Thespesius Solensis, who,

* Libro de his, qui sero à Numine puniuntur, tom. ii. Oper. p. 562. 4.

after he had been looked upon as dead for three days, reviving, affirmed, amongst other things, which he thought he saw or heard in the mean time in his ecstasy, this of three gods in the form of a triangle, pouring in streams into one another; Orpheus his soul being said to have arrived so far; accordingly as from the testimonies of other Pagan writers we have proved, that a trinity of Divine hypostases was a part of the Orphic Cabala. True, indeed, our belief of the holy trinity is founded upon no Pagan Cabala, but only Scripture revelation; it being that, which Christians are, or should be, all baptized into. Nevertheless these things are reasonably noted by us to this end, that that should not be made a prejudice against Christianity and revealed religion, nor looked upon as such an affrightful bugbear or *mormo* in it, which even Pagan philosophers themselves, and those of the most accomplished intellectuals, and uncaptivated minds, though having neither councils, nor creeds, nor Scriptures, had so great a propensity and readiness to entertain, and such a veneration for.

In this fourth chapter, we were necessitated, by the matter itself, to run out into philology and antiquity; as also in the other parts of the book, we do often give an account of the doctrine of the ancients; which, however, some over-severe philosophers may look upon fastidiously, or undervalue and depreciate, yet as we conceived it often necessary, so possibly may the variety thereof not be ungrateful to others; and this mixture of philology, throughout the whole, sweeten and allay the severity of philosophy to them; the main thing, which the book pretends to, in the mean

time, being the philosophy of religion. But, for our parts, we neither call philology, nor yet philosophy, our mistress; but serve ourselves of either, as occasion requireth.

As for the last chapter, though it promise only a confutation of all the Atheistic grounds, yet we do therein also demonstrate the absolute impossibility of all Atheism, and the actual existence of a God. We say demonstrate, not *à priori*, which is impossible and contradictory; but by necessary inference from principles altogether undeniable. For we can by no means grant to the Atheists, that there is no more than a probable persuasion or opinion to be had of the existence of a God, without any certain knowledge or science. Nevertheless, it will not follow from hence, that whosoever shall read these demonstrations of ours, and understand all the words of them, must therefore of necessity be presently convinced, whether he will or no, and put out of all manner of doubt or hesitancy, concerning the existence of a God. For we believe that to be true, which some have affirmed, that were there any interest of life, any concernment of appetite and passion, against the truth of geometrical theorems themselves, as of a triangle having three angles equal to two right, whereby men's judgments may be clouded and bribed, notwithstanding all the demonstrations of them, many would remain at least sceptical about them. Wherefore mere speculation, and dry mathematical reason, in minds unpurified, and having a contrary interest of carnality, and a heavy load of infidelity and distrust sinking them down, cannot alone beget an unshaken confidence and assurance of so high a

truth as this, the existence of one perfect understanding Being, the original of all things. As it is certain, also, on the contrary, that minds cleansed and purged from vice may, without syllogistical reasonings, and mathematical demonstrations, have an undoubted assurance of the existence of a God, according to that of the philosopher, ἡ καθαρσις ποιεῖ ἐν γνώσει τῶν ἀπίστων εἶναι, Purity possesses men with an assurance of the best things;—whether this assurance be called a vaticination or Divine sagacity (as it is by Plato and Aristotle), or faith, as in the Scripture. For the Scripture faith is not a mere believing of historical things, and upon inartificial arguments or testimonies only; but a certain higher and Divine power in the soul, that peculiarly correspondeth with the Deity. Notwithstanding which, knowledge or science added to this faith, according to the Scripture advice, will make it more firm and stedfast, and the better able to resist those assaults of sophistical reasonings, that shall be made against it.

In this fifth chapter, as sometimes elsewhere, we thought ourselves concerned, in defence of the Divine wisdom, goodness, and perfection against Atheists, to maintain (with all the ancient philosophic Theists) the perfection of the creation also; or, that the whole system of things, taken altogether, could not have been better made and ordered than it is. And, indeed, this Divine goodness and perfection, as displaying and manifesting itself in the works of nature and providence, is supposed in Scripture to be the very foundation of our Christian faith; when that is defined to be the substance and evidence *rerum sperandarum*; that is, of whatsoever is (by a good man) to be hoped for.—

Notwithstanding which, it was far from our intention therefore to conclude, that nothing neither in Nature nor Providence could be otherwise than it is; or that there is nothing left to the free will and choice of the Deity. And though we do, in the third section, insist largely upon that ancient Pythagoric Cabala, that souls are always united to some body or other, as also, that all rational and intellectual creatures consist of soul and body; and suggest several things from reason and Christian antiquity in favour of them both; yet would we not be understood to dogmatize in either of them, but to submit all to better judgments.

Again, we shall here advertise the reader (though we have cautioned concerning it in the book itself), that in our defence of incorporeal substance against the Atheists, however we thought ourselves concerned to say the utmost that possibly we could, in way of vindication of the ancients, who generally maintained it to be unextended (which to some seems an absolute impossibility); yet we would not be supposed ourselves dogmatically to assert any more in this point than what all incorporealists agree in, that there is a substance specifically distinct from body; namely, such as consisteth not of parts separable from one another, and which can penetrate body, and lastly, is self active, and hath an internal energy, distinct from that of local motion. And thus much is undeniably evinced by the arguments before proposed. But whether this substance be altogether unextended; or extended otherwise than body, we shall leave every man to make his own judgment concerning it.

Furthermore, we think fit here to suggest, that whereas throughout this chapter and whole book, we constantly oppose the generation of souls, that is, the production of life, cogitation, and understanding, out of dead and senseless matter; and assert all souls to be as substantial as matter itself: this is not done by us, out of any fond addictedness to Pythagoric whimses, nor indeed out of a mere partial regard to that cause of Theism neither, which we were engaged in (though we had great reason to be tender of that too); but because we were enforced thereunto, by dry mathematical reason; it being as certain to us, as any thing in all geometry, that cogitation and understanding can never possibly result out of magnitudes, figures, sites, and local motions (which is all that ourselves can allow to body) however compounded together. Nor indeed in that other way of qualities, is it better conceivable how they should emerge out of hot and cold, moist and dry, thick and thin; according to the Anaximandrian Atheism. And they who can persuade themselves of the contrary, may believe, that any thing may be caused by any thing; upon which supposition we confess it impossible to us to prove the existence of a God from the phenomena.

In the close of this fifth chapter, because the Atheists do in the last place pretend, Theism and religion to be inconsistent with civil sovereignty, we were necessitated briefly to unravel and confute all the Atheistic ethics and politics (though this more properly belong to our second book intended); where we make it plainly to appear, that the Atheists artificial and factitious justice is nothing but will and words; and that they give to

civil sovereigns no right nor authority at all, but only belluine liberty and brutish force. But, on the contrary, as we assert justice and obligation, not made by law and commands, but in nature, and prove this, together with conscience and religion, to be the only basis of civil authority, so do we also maintain all the rights of civil sovereigns; giving both to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and to God the things that are God's.

And now, having made all our apologies and reflections, we have no more to add, but only the retractation or retraction of one passage (Chap. V.); where mentioning that opinion of a modern Atheistic writer, that cogitation is nothing else but local motion, we could not think Epicurus and Democritus to have sunk to such a degree, either of sottishness or impudence, as this; whereas we found cause afterwards, upon further consideration, to change our opinion herein. Forasmuch as when Epicurus derived liberty of will in men, merely from that motion of senseless atoms declining uncertainly from the perpendicular; it is evident, that, according to him, volition itself must be really local motion. As indeed in the Democritic fate, and material necessity of all things, it is implied, that human cogitations are but mechanism and motion. Notwithstanding which, both Democritus and Epicurus supposed that the world was made without cogitation, though by local motion. So that the meaning of these besotted Atheists (if at least they had any meaning) seems to have been this, that all cogitation is really nothing else but local motion; nevertheless all motion not cogitation, but only in

such and such circumstances, or in bodies so modified.

And now we are not ignorant, that some will be ready to condemn this whole labour of our's, and of others in this kind, against Atheism, as altogether useless and superfluous; upon this pretence, that an Atheist is a mere chimera, and there is no such a thing any where to be found in the world. And indeed we could heartily wish, upon that condition, that all this labour of our's were superfluous and useless. But as to Atheists, these so confident exploders of them are both unskilled in the monuments of antiquity, and unacquainted with the present age they live in; others having found too great an assurance, from their own personal converse, of the reality of them. Nevertheless, this labour of our's is not intended only for the conversion of downright and professed Atheists (of which there is but little hope, they being sunk into so great a degree of sottishness), but for the confirmation of weak, staggering, and sceptical Theists. And unless these exploders of Atheists will affirm, also, that all men have constantly an unshaken faith and belief of the existence of a God, without the least mixture of a doubtful distrust or hesitancy (which, if it were so, the world could not possibly be so bad as now it is), they must needs grant, such endeavours as these, for the confirming and establishing of men's minds in the belief of a God, by philosophic reasons, in an age so philosophical, not to be superfluous and useless.

THE TRUE
INTELLECTUAL SYSTEM
OF
THE UNIVERSE.

BOOK I.

CHAPTER I.

1. The fatal necessity of all human actions and events maintained upon three several grounds, which are so many false hypotheses of the intellectual system of the universe.—2. Concerning the mathematical or astrological Fate.—3. Concerning the opinion of those, who suppose a Fate superior to the highest Deity.—4. The moderation of this discourse.—5. The Atheistical hypothesis or Democritical Fate being founded upon the Atomical physiology: the necessity of giving an account of it, and that first briefly described.—6. The antiquity of this physiology, and the account which is given of it by Aristotle.—7. A clear and full record of the same physiology in Plato, that hath not been taken notice of.—8. That neither Democritus, nor Leucippus, nor Protagoras, nor any Atheists, were the first inventors of this philosophy; and of the necessity of being thoroughly acquainted with it, in order to the confutation of Atheism.—9. The tradition of Posidonius, the Stoic, that Moschus, an ancient Phœnician, was the first inventor of the Atomical physiology.—10. That this Moschus, the inventor of the Atomical physiology, was probably the same with Mochus, the physiologer, in Jamblichus, with whose successors, priests, and prophets, Pythagoras conversed at Sidon.—11. Other probabilities for this, that Pythagoras was acquainted with the Atomical physiology.—12. That Pythagoras's Monads were Atoms.—13. Proved plainly, that Empedocles, who was a Pythagorean, physiologized atomically.—14. The same further convinced from Plato, Aristotle, Plutarch, and Stobæus.—15. That Anaxagoras was a spurious Atomist, or unskilful imitator of that philosophy.—16. That Ecphantus, the Pythagorean, Xenocrates, Heraclides, Diodorus, and Metrodorus Chius, were all ancient assertors of the

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substance, in five particulars.—39. Two general advantages of the Atomical or mechanical physiology; first, that it renders the corporeal world intelligible.—40. The second advantage of it, that it prepares an easy and clear way for the demonstration of incorporeal substance.—41. Concluded, that the ancient Moschical philosophy consisted of two parts, Atomical physiology, and theology or pneumatology.—42. That this entire philosophy was afterwards mangled and dismembered, some taking one part of it alone, and some the other.—43. That Leucippus and Democritus, being atheistically inclined, took the Atomical physiology, endeavouring to make it subservient to Atheism; and upon what occasion they did it, and how unsuccessfully.—44. That Plato took the theology and pneumatology of the ancients, but rejected their Atomical physiology, and upon what accounts.—45. That Aristotle followed Plato herein, with a commendation of Aristotle's philosophy.

THEY, that hold the necessity of all human actions and events, do it upon one or other of these two grounds—either because they suppose, that necessity is inwardly essential to all agents whatsoever, and that contingent liberty is *πράγμα ἀνυπόστατον*, a thing impossible or contradictions, which can have no existence any where in nature; the sense of which was thus expressed by the Epicurean poet,*

—*Quod res quaque Necessum
Intestinum habeat cunctis in rebus agendis, &c.*

That every thing naturally labours under an intestine necessity:—or else, because, though they admit contingent liberty not only as a thing possible, but also as that which is actually existent in the Deity, yet they conceive all things to be so determined by the will and decrees of this Deity, as that they are thereby made necessary to us. The former of these two opinions, that contingent liberty is *πράγμα ἀνυπόστατον*, such a thing as can have no existence in nature, may be maintained

* Lucret. lib. ii. v. 289, &c.

upon two different grounds: either from such an hypothesis as this, that the universe is nothing else but body and local motion; and nothing moving itself, the action of every agent is determined by some other agent without it; and therefore that *ὕλην ἀνάγκη*, material and mechanical necessity, must needs reign over all things; or else, though cogitative beings be supposed to have a certain principle of activity within themselves, yet that there can be no contingency in their actions, because all volitions are determined by a necessary antecedent understanding.

Plotinus* makes another distribution of Fatalists, which yet in the conclusion will come to the same with the former; διττοὺς ἂν τις θέμενος τούτους οὐκ ἂν οἰ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἀποτυγχάνοι, οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀφ' ἑνὸς τινος τὰ πάντα ἀναρτῶσιν, οἱ δὲ οὐκ οὕτω. A man, (saith he) will not do amiss, that will divide all Fatalists first into these two general heads, namely, that they derive all things from one principle or not;—the former of which may be called Divine Fatalists, the latter Atheistical. Which Divine Fatalists he again subdivides into such, as first make God by immediate influence to do all things in us; as in animals the members are not determined by themselves, but by that which is the hegemonic in every one: and, secondly, such as make Fate to be an implexed series or concatenation of causes, all in themselves necessary, whereof God is the chief. The former seems to be a description of that very Fate, that is maintained by some neoteric Christians; the latter is the Fate of the Stoics.

Wherefore Fatalists, that hold the necessity of all human actions and events, may be reduced to

* Libro de Fato, Ennead. iii. lib. i. c. 2. p. 230.

these three heads: first, such as, asserting the Deity, suppose it irrespectively to decree and determine all things, and thereby make all actions necessary to us; which kind of Fate, though philosophers and other ancient writers have not been altogether silent of it, yet it has been principally maintained by some neoteric Christians, contrary to the sense of the ancient church. Secondly, such as suppose a Deity, that, acting wisely, but necessarily, did contrive the general frame of things in the world; from whence, by a series of causes, doth unavoidably result whatsoever is now done in it: which Fate is a concatenation of causes, all in themselves necessary, and is that which was asserted by the ancient Stoics, Zeno and Chrysippus, whom the Jewish Essenes seemed to follow. And, lastly, such as hold the material necessity of all things without a Deity; which Fate Epicurus^a calls τὴν τῶν φύσεων εἰμαρμένην, the Fate of the Naturalists—that is, indeed, the Atheists, the assertors whereof may be called also the Democritical Fatalists. Which three opinions concerning Fate are so many several hypotheses of the intellectual system of the universe: all which we shall here propose, endeavouring to shew the falseness of them, and then substitute the true mundane system in the room of them.

II. The mathematical or astrological Fate so much talked of, as it is a thing no way considerable for the grounds of it, so whatsoever it be, it must needs fall under one or other of those two general heads in the Plotinical distribution last mentioned, so as either to derive all things from

^a Vido Epistol. Epicuri ad Menecœum, apud Diogen. Laertium, lib. x. segm. 134, p. 659, edit. Meibomii.

one principle, or not. It seems to have had its first emersion amongst the Chaldeans from a certain kind of blind Polytheism (which is but a better sort of disguised Atheism), but it was afterwards adopted and fondly nursed by the Stoics, in a way of subordination to their Divine Fate; for Manilius, Firmicus, and other masters of that sect, were great promoters of it. And there was too much attributed to astrology also by those that were no Fatalists, both Heathen and Christian philosophers, such as were Plotinus, Origen, Simplicius, and others; who, though they did not make the stars to necessitate all human actions here below, they supposed, that Divine Providence (foreknowing all things) had contrived such a strange coincidence of the motions and configurations of the heavenly bodies with such actions here upon earth, as that the former might be prognostics of the latter. Thus Origen^a determines, that the stars do not make but signify; and that the heavens are a kind of Divine volume, in whose characters they that are skilled may read or spell out human events. To the same purpose, Plotinus,^b *Φέρεται μὲν ταῦτα ἐπὶ σωτηρία τῶν ὅλων, παρέχεσθαι δὲ καὶ ἄλλην χρεῖαν τὴν τοῦ εἰς αὐτὰ ὥσπερ γράμματα βλέποντας, τοὺς τοιαύτην γραμματικὴν εἰδότας ἀναγινώσκειν τὰ μέλλοντα ἐκ τῶν σχημάτων κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον μεθοδεύοντας τὸ σημαίνόμενον ὥσπερ εἰ τις λέγοι, ἐπειδὴ ὑψηλὸς ὄρνις σημαίνει ὑψηλὰς τινὰς πράξεις.* The motion of the stars was intended for the physical good of the whole; but they afford also another use collaterally in order to prognostication, name-

^a Vide P. Dan. Huetium Origenianor. lib. ii. c. viii. sec. v. p. 129.

^b Libro de Fato, Ennead. iii. lib. i. c. vi. p. 233. videas etiam Ennead. ii. lib. iii. c. i. p. 137, et c. vii. p. 140, 141.

ly, that they who are skilled in the grammar of the heavens may be able, from the several configurations of the stars, as it were letters, to spell out future events, by making such analogical interpretations as they use to do in augury; as when a bird flies high, to interpret this of some high and noble exploit.—And Simplicius,* in like manner, Σύμφωνός ἐστιν ἡ εἰμαρμένη περιφορὰ τῇ προβολῇ τῶν ψυχῶν τῇ κατ' αὐτὴν ἐρχομένη εἰς τὴν γένεσιν, οὐκ ἀναγκάζουσα μὲν τὰς τῶνδε ὀρέγεσθαι ἢ τῶνδε, σύμφωνος δὲ οὕσα ταῖς ὀρέξεσιν αὐτῶν. The fatal conversion of the heavens is made to correspond with the production of souls into generation at such and such times, not necessitating them to will this or that, but conspiring agreeably with such appetites and volitions of theirs.—And these philosophers were the rather inclinable to this persuasion from a superstitious conceit which they had, that the stars, being animated, were intellectual beings of a far higher rank than men. And since God did not make them, nor any thing else in the world, singly for themselves alone, but also to contribute to the public good of the universe, their physical influence seeming inconsiderable, they knew not well what else could be worthy of them, unless it were to portend human events. This indeed is the best sense that can be made of astrological prognostication; but it is a business that stands upon a very weak and tottering, if not impossible foundation.

III. There is another wild and extravagant conceit, which some of the Pagans had, who, though they verbally acknowledged a Deity, yet sup-

* Comment. in Epictetum, c. i. p. 26, edit. Salmasii.

posed a certain Fate superior to it, and not only to all their other petty gods, but also to Jupiter himself. To which purpose is that of the Greek poet Latined by Cicero,* "Quod fore paratum est, id summum exuperat Jovem;" and that of Herodotus,^b *Τὴν πεπρωμένην μοῖραν ἀδύνατον ἔστιν ἀποφυγεῖν καὶ τῷ Θεῷ*. It is impossible for God himself to avoid the destined Fate:—and *δούλος Θεὸς ἀνάγκης*,^c God himself is a servant of necessity.—According to which conceit, Jupiter in Homer^d laments his condition, in that the Fates having determined, that his beloved Sarpedon should be slain by the son of Menæti^eus, he was not able to withstand it. Though all these passages may not perhaps imply much more than what the Stoical hypothesis itself imported; for that did also in some sense make God himself a servant to the necessity of the matter, and to his own decrees, in that he could not have made the smallest thing in the world otherwise than now it is, much less was able to alter any thing: according to that of Seneca,* "Eadem necessitas et Deos alligat. Irrevocabilis divina pariter atque humana cursus vehit. Ille ipse omnium conditor ac rector scripsit quidem Fata, sed sequitur. Semper paret, semel jussit." One and the same chain of necessity ties God and men. The same irrevocable and unalterable course carries on Divine and human things. The very maker and governor of all things, that writ the fates, follows them. He did but once com-

* De Divinat. lib. ii. c. x. p. 3196, edit. Verburgii.

^b Lib. i. c. xci. p. 38. ed. Gronovii.

^c Vide Menandri et Philemonis reliquias a Jo. Clerico editas, p. 307.

^d Iliad, l. μ.

^e De Providentia, c. v. p. 195, edit. Jo. Fred. Gronovii.

mand, but he always obeys.—But if there were this further meaning in the passages before cited, that a necessity without God, that was invincible by him, did determine his will to all things; this was nothing but a certain confused and contradictory jumble of Atheism and Theism both together; or an odd kind of intimation, that however the name of God be used in compliance with vulgar speech and opinion, yet indeed it signifies nothing but material necessity; and the blind motion of matter is really the highest numen in the world. And here that of Balbus the Stoic, in Cicero,* is opportune: “Non est natura Dei præpotens et excellens, siquidem ea subjecta est ei vel necessitati vel naturæ, quæ cælum, maria, terræque reguntur. Nihil autem est præstantius Deo. Nulli igitur est naturæ obediens aut subjectus Deus.” God would not be the most powerful and excellent being, if he were subject to that either necessity or nature, by which the heavens, seas, and earth are governed. But the notion of a God implies the most excellent being. Therefore, God is not obedient or subject to any nature.—

iv. And now we think fit here to suggest, that however we shall oppose those three Fatalisms beforementioned, as so many false hypotheses of the mundane system and economy, and endeavour to exclude that severe tyranness, as Epicurus calls it, of Universal Necessity reigning over all, and to leave some scope for contingent liberty to move up and down in, without which neither rational creatures can be blameworthy for any thing they do, nor God have any object to display his justice

* De Nat. Deor. lib. ii. c. xxx. p. 3060.

upon, nor indeed be justified in his providence; yet, as we vindicate to God the glory of all good, so we do not quite banish the notion of Fate neither, nor take away all Necessity; which is a thing the Clazomenian philosopher^a of old was taxed for, affirming μηδὲν τῶν γινόμενων γίνεσθαι καθ' εἰμαρμένην, ἀλλὰ εἶναι κενὸν τοῦτο τοῦνομα. That nothing at all was done by Fate, but that it was altogether a vain name.—And the Sadduceans among the Jews have been noted for the same:^b Τὴν μὲν εἰμαρμένην ἀναιροῦσιν, οὐδὲν εἶναι ταύτην ἀξιούντες, οὔτε κατ' αὐτὴν τὰ ἀνθρώπινα τέλος λαμβάνειν, ἅπαντα δὲ ἐφ' ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς τιθέντες. They take away all Fate, and will not allow it to be any thing at all, nor to have any power over human things, but put all things entirely into the hands of men's own free will.—And some of our own seem to have approached too near to this extreme, attributing perhaps more to the power of free will, than either religion or nature will admit. But the hypothesis, that we shall recommend as most agreeable to truth, of a πρόνοια ἱάσμος, placable providence—of a Deity essentially good, presiding over all, will avoid all extremes, asserting to God the glory of good, and freeing him from the blame of evil; and leaving a certain proportionate contemperation and commixture of contingency and necessity both together in the world; as nature requires a mixture of motion and rest, without either of which there could be no generation. Which temper was observed by several of the ancients; as the Phari-

^a Anaxagoras, who was censured for this opinion by Alexander Aphrodisiensis de Fato, sec. ii. p. 11, edit. Lond. 1658, in 12mo.

^b Josephi Antiq. Judaic. lib. xiii. c. v. sec. ix. p. 649, tom. i. edit. Havercampi.

saic sect amongst the Jews, who determined,*
*τινὰ καὶ οὐ πάντα τῆς εἰμαρμένης εἶναι ἔργον, τινὰ δὲ ἐφ'
 ἑαυτοῖς ὑπάρχειν,* That some things and not all were
 the effects of Fate, but some things were left in
 men's own power and liberty:—and also by Plato^b
 amongst the philosophers, *Πλάτων ἐγκρίνει μὲν εἰμαρ-
 μένην ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ψυχῶν καὶ βίῳ, συνεισάγει δὲ
 καὶ τὴν παρ' ἡμᾶς αἰτίαν* Plato inserts something of
 Fate into human lives and actions, and he joins
 with it liberty of will also.—He doth indeed sup-
 pose human souls to have within themselves the
 causes of their own changes to a better or worse
 state, and every where declares God to be blame-
 less for their evils; and yet he^c somewhere makes
 the three fatal sisters, notwithstanding, Clotho,
 Lachesis, and Atropos, to be busy about them
 also. For according to the sense of the ancients,
 Fate is a servant of Divine Providence in the world,
 and takes place differently upon the different act-
 ings of free-willed beings. And how free a thing
 soever the will of man may seem to be to some,
 yet I conceive it to be out of question, that it may
 contract upon itself such necessities and fatali-
 ties, as it cannot upon a sudden rid itself of at
 pleasure. But whatsoever is said in the sequel
 of this discourse by way of opposition to that
 Fatalism of the neoteric Christians, is intended
 only to vindicate what was the constant doctrine
 of the Christian church in its greatest purity (as
 shall be made manifest), and not to introduce any
 new-fangled conceit of our own.

* Id. *ibid.*

^b Vide Plutarch. de Placitis Philosophorum, lib. i. c. xvii. p. 844.
 t. ii. oper. edit. Francof. 1599, fol.

^c Vide Platon, de Republica, l. x. p. 520.

v. We must now proceed to give a more full and perfect account of these three several Fates, or hypotheses of the mundane system beforementioned, together with the grounds of them, beginning first with that, which we principally intend the confutation of, the Atheistical or Democritical Fate; which, as it is a thing of the most dangerous consequence of all, so it seems to be most spreading and infectious in these latter times.

Now this Atheistical system of the world, that makes all things to be materially and mechanically necessary, without a God, is built upon a peculiar physiological hypothesis, different from what hath been generally received for many ages; which is called by some Atomical or corpuscular, by others Mechanical; of which we must therefore needs give a full and perfect account. And we shall do it first in general, briefly, not descending to those minute particularities of it, which are disputed amongst these Atomists themselves, in this manner.

The Atomical physiology supposes, that body is nothing else but *διασπαρόν ἀντίτυπον*, that is, extended bulk; and resolves, therefore, that nothing is to be attributed to it, but what is included in the nature and idea of it, viz.—more or less magnitude, with divisibility into parts, figure, and position, together with motion or rest, but so as that no part of body can ever move itself, but is always moved by something else. And consequently it supposes, that there is no need of any thing else besides the simple elements of magnitude, figure, site, and motion (which are all clearly intelligible as different modes of extended substance) to solve the corporeal phenomena by; and therefore, not

of any substantial forms distinct from the matter; nor of any other qualities really existing in the bodies without, besides the results or aggregates of those simple elements, and the disposition of the insensible parts of bodies in respect of figure, site, and motion; nor of any intentional species or shows, propagated from the objects to our senses; nor, lastly, of any other kind of motion or action really distinct from local motion (such as generation and alteration), they being neither intelligible, as modes of extended substance, nor any ways necessary. Forasmuch as the forms and qualities of bodies may well be conceived to be nothing but the result of those simple elements of magnitude, figure, site, and motion, variously compounded together, in the same manner as syllables and words in great variety result from the different combinations and conjunctions of a few letters, or the simple elements of speech; and the corporeal part of sensation, and particularly that of vision, may be solved only by local motion of bodies, that is, either by corporeal effluvia (called *simulacra*, *membranæ*, and *exuviae*) streaming continually from the surface of the objects, or rather, as the later and more refined Atomists^a conceived, by pressure made from the object to the eye, by means of light in the medium. So that^b ὡς διαβακτηρίας τοῦ ταθέντος αἵρος τὸ βλέπόμενον ἀναγγέλλεται the sense taking cognizance of the object by the subtle interposed medium, that is tense and

^a Vide Cartesii Dioptric. c. i. et ii. p. 50. tom. i. oper. ed. Amstelod. 1692, in 4to.

^b Apollodorus apud Diogenem Laertium, lib. vii. segm. 157, p. 466. vide etiam Plutarch. de Placitis Philosophor. lib. iv. c. xv. tom. ii. oper. p. 911.

stretched (thrusting every way from it upon the optic nerves), doth by that as it were by a staff touch it. Again, generation and corruption may be sufficiently explained by concretion and secretion, or local motion, without substantial forms and qualities. And, lastly, those sensible ideas of light and colours, heat and cold, sweet and bitter, as they are distinct things from the figure, site, and motion of the insensible parts of the bodies, seem plainly to be nothing else but our own fancies; passions, and sensations, however they be vulgarly mistaken for qualities in the bodies without us.

vi. Thus much may suffice for a general account of the Atomical physiology. We shall in the next place consider the antiquity thereof, as also what notice Aristotle hath taken of it, and what account he gives of the same. For though Epicurus went altogether this way, yet it is well known, that he was not the first inventor of it. But it is most commonly fathered on Democritus, who was senior both to Aristotle and Plato, being reported to have been born the year after Socrates; from whose fountains Cicero^a saith, that Epicurus watered his orchards, and of whom Sex. Empiricus^b and Laertius^c testify, that he did ἐκβάλλειν τὰς ποιότητες, cashier qualities;—and Plutarch,^d that he made the first principles of the whole universe ἀτόμους ἀπότους, καὶ ἀπαθείς, atoms devoid of all qualities and passions.—But Laertius^e

^a De Nat. Deor. lib. i. c. xliii. p. 2948. t. ix. oper.

^b Lib. ii. adv. Logicos, p. 459. Vide etiam lib. vi. adv. Musicos, p. 367. et lib. i. adv. Logicos, p. 399.

^c Lib. ix. segm. 72. p. 586.

^d Libro adversus Colotem, tom. ii. oper. p. 1110.

^e Lib. ix. segm. 30. p. 567.

will have Leucippus, who was somewhat senior to Democritus, to be the first inventor of this philosophy, though he wrote not so many books concerning it as Democritus did. Aristotle, who often takes notice of this philosophy, and ascribes it commonly to Leucippus and Democritus jointly, gives us this description of it in his *Metaphysics*:^a *Λεύκιππος δὲ καὶ ὁ ἐταῖρος αὐτοῦ Δημόκριτος στοιχεῖα μὲν τὸ πλῆρες καὶ τὸ κενόν εἶναι φασί, λέγοντες οἷον τὸ μὲν ὄν, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν, καὶ τὰς διαφορὰς αἰτίας τῶν ἄλλων φασὶ ταύτας μὲντοι τρεῖς, σχῆμά τε καὶ τάξιν καὶ θέσιν, διαφέρειν γὰρ τὸ ὄν ῥυσμῶ καὶ διαθιγῇ καὶ τροπῇ* Leucippus and his companion Democritus make the first principles of all things to be Plenum and Vacuum (body and space), whereof one is Ens, the other Non-ens, and the differences of the body, which are only figure, order, and position, to be the causes of all other things.—Which differences they call by these names, Rysmus, Diathige, and Trope. And in his book, *De Anima*,^b having declared that Democritus made fire and the soul to consist of round atoms, he describes those atoms of his after this manner, *οἷον ἐν τῷ αἱρί τὰ καλούμενα ξύσματα ἐν ταῖς διὰ τῶν θυρίδων ἀκτίσι, ὧν τὴν πανσπερμίαν στοιχεῖα λέγει Δημόκριτος τῆς ὅλης φύσεως, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ Λεύκιππος* They are (saith he,) like those ramenta or dusty particles which appear in the sun-beams, an omnifarious seminary whereof Democritus makes to be the first elements of the whole universe, and so doth Leucippus likewise.—Elsewhere^c the same Aristotle tells us, that these two philosophers explained generation and alteration, without forms

^a Lib. i. c. iv. p. 268. tom. iv. oper.

^b Lib. i. cap. ii. p. 4. tom. ii. oper.

^c De Generat. et Corrupt. lib. i. c. ii. p. 700. tom. i. oper.

and qualities, by figures and local motion: Δημόκριτος καὶ Λεύκιππος ποιήσαντες τὰ σχήματα τὴν ἀλλοίωσιν καὶ τὴν γένεσιν ἐκ τούτων ποιούσι, διακρίσει μὲν καὶ συγκρίσει γένεσιν καὶ φθορὰν, τάξει δὲ καὶ θέσει ἀλλοίωσιν: Democritus and Leucippus having made figures (or variously figured atoms), the first principles, make generation and alteration out of these; namely, generation together with corruption from the concretion and secretion of them, but alteration from the change of their order and position.—Again, he elsewhere* takes notice of that opinion of the Atomists, that all sense was a kind of touch, and that the sensible qualities of bodies were to be resolved into figures, imputing it not only to Democritus, but also to the generality of the old philosophers, but very much disliking the same:—*Δημόκριτος καὶ οἱ πλείστοι τῶν φυσιολόγων ἀτοπώτατον τι ποιούσι, πάντα γὰρ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἀπὸ ποιούσι καὶ εἰς σχήματα ἀνάγουσι τοὺς χύμους.* Democritus and most of the physiologers here commit a very great absurdity, in that they make all sense to be touch, and resolve sensible qualities into the figures of insensible parts or atoms.—And this opinion he endeavours to confute by these arguments. First, because there is contrariety in qualities, as in black and white, hot and cold, bitter and sweet, but there is no contrariety in figures; for a circular figure is not contrary to a square or multangular; and therefore there must be real qualities in bodies distinct from the figure, site, and motion of parts. Again, the variety of figures and dispositions being infinite, it would follow from thence, that the species of colours, odours, and tastes should be infinite likewise, and reducible to no

* De Sensu et Sensibili, c. iv. p. 70. tom. ii. oper.

certain number. Which arguments I leave the professed Atomists to answer. Furthermore, Aristotle somewhere also censures that other fundamental principle of this Atomical physiology, that the sensible ideas of colours and tastes, as red, green, bitter, and sweet, formally considered, are only passions and fancies in us, and not real qualities in the object without. For as in a rainbow there is really nothing without our sight, but a rorid cloud diversely refracting and reflecting the sun-beams, in such an angle; nor are there really such qualities in the diaphanous prism; when refracting the light, it exhibits to us the same colours of the rainbow; whence it was collected, that those things are properly the phantasms of the sentient, occasioned by different motions on the optic nerves; so they conceived the case to be the same in all other colours, and that both the colours of the prism and rainbow were as real as other colours, and all other colours as fantastical as they; and then by parity of reason they extended the business further to the other sensibles. But this opinion Aristotle condemns in these words: *Οἱ πρότερον φυσιολόγοι τοῦτο οὐ καλῶς ἔλεγον, λευκὸν οὔτε οὐδὲν οἰόμενοι οὔτε μέλαν ἄνευ ὀφθαλμοῦ, οὔτε χύμον ἄνευ γένεως*. The former physiologers were generally out in this, in that they thought there was no black or white without the sight, nor no bitter or sweet without the taste.—There are other passages in Aristotle concerning this philosophy, which I think superfluous to insert here; and I shall have occasion to cite some of them afterward for other purposes.

VII. But in the next place it will not be amiss to

* De Anima. lib. ii. c. i. p. 43. tom. ii. oper.

shew, that Plato also hath left a very full record of this mechanical or Atomical physiology (that hath hardly been yet taken notice of), which notwithstanding he doth not impute either to Democritus (whose name Laertius^a thinks he purposely declined to mention throughout all his writings,) or to Leucippus, but to Protagoras. Wherefore, in his Theætetus, having first declared in general,^b that the Protagorean philosophy made all things to consist of a commixture of parts (or atoms), and local motion; he represents it, in particular, concerning colours, after this manner;^c ὑπόλαβε τοίνυν οὕτωςι κατὰ τὰ ὅμματα πρῶτον, ὃ δὲ καλεῖς χρώμα λευκὸν μὴ εἶναι αὐτὸ ἑτερόν τι ἔξω τῶν σῶν ὀμμάτων, μηδ' ἐν τοῖς ὅμμασι, ἀλλὰ μέλαν τε καὶ λευκὸν καὶ ὅτιοῦν ἄλλο χρώμα ἐκ τῆς προσβολῆς τῶν ὀμμάτων πρὸς τὴν προσήκουσαν φορὰν φαίνεται γεγεννημένον, καὶ ὃ δὲ ἕκαστον εἶναι φάμεν χρώμα, οὔτε τὸ προσβάλλον οὔτε τὸ προσβαλλόμενον ἀλλὰ μεταξύ τι ἑκάστῳ ἰδίῳ γεγονὸς. First, as to that which belongs to the sight, you must conceive that which is called a white or a black colour not to be any thing absolutely existing, either without your eyes or within your eyes: but black and white, and every other colour, is caused by different motions made upon the eye from objects differently modified: so that it is nothing either in the agent nor the patient absolutely, but something which arises from between them both.—Where it follows immediately, ἢ σὺ δυσχερίσαιο ἂν ὡς οἶόν σοι φαίνεται ἕκαστον σχῆμα τοιούτων καὶ κυνὶ καὶ ὀτιοῦν ζῳῷ; Can you or any man else be confident, that as every colour appears to him, so it appears just the same to every other man and animal, any more than tastes and touches, heat and cold do?—From whence it

^a Lib. ix. segm. 40. p. 571.^b P. 118.^c Ibid. p. 119.

is plain, that Protagoras made sensible qualities not to be all absolute things existing in the bodies without, but to be relative to us, and passions in us; and so they are called presently after *τίνα ἐν ἡμῖν φάσματα*, certain fancies, seemings, or appearances in us. But there is another passage,* in which a fuller account is given of the whole Protagorean doctrine, beginning thus; Ἀρχὴ δὲ ἐξ ἧς ἂν νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν πάντα ἡρτῆται ἥδε αὐτῶν, ὡς τὸ πᾶν κίνησις ἦν, καὶ ἄλλο παρὰ τοῦτο οὐδὲν, τῆς δὲ κινήσεως δύο εἶδη, πλήθει μὲν ἄπειρον ἐκάτερον, δύναμιν δὲ τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν ἔχον, τὸ δὲ πάσχειν· ἐκ δὲ τῆς τούτων ὁμιλίας τε καὶ τρίψεως πρὸς ἄλληλα γίγνεται ἕκγονα, πλήθει μὲν ἄπειρα, δίδυμα δὲ, τὸ μὲν αἰσθητὸν, τὸ δὲ αἰσθησις αἰὲ συνεκπίπτουσα καὶ γεννωμένη μετὰ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ, &c. The principle upon which all these things depend, is this, that the whole universe is motion (of atoms) and nothing else besides; which motion is considered two ways, and accordingly called by two names, action and passion; from the mutual congress, and as it were attrition together of both which, are begotten innumerable offsprings, which though infinite in number, yet may be reduced to two general heads, sensibles and sensations, that are both generated at the same time; the sensations are seeing and hearing, and the like, and the correspondent sensibles, colours, sounds, &c. Wherefore when the eye, or such a proportionate object meet together, both the αἰσθητὸν and the αἰσθησις, the sensible idea of white and black, and the sense of seeing, are generated together, neither of which would have been produced, if either of those two had not met with the other. Καὶ τ' ἄλλα δὲ οὕτω ψυχρὸν καὶ θερμὸν καὶ πάντα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὑποληπτέον, αὐτὸ μὲν

* Lib. ix. segm. 40. p. 120.

καθ' αὐτὸ μηδὲν εἶναι, ἐν δὲ τῇ πρὸς ἄλληλα ὁμιλίᾳ, πάντα γίνεσθαι, καὶ παντοῖα ἀπὸ τῆς κινήσεως. The like is to be conceived of all other sensibles, as hot and cold, &c. that none of these are absolute things in themselves, or real qualities in the objects without, but they are begotten from the mutual congress of agent and patient with one another, and that by motion; so that neither the agent has any such thing in it before its congress with the patient, nor the patient before its congress with the agent. Ἐκ δὲ ἀμφοτέρων τοῦ ποιούντος καὶ τοῦ πάσχοντος πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα συγγιγνομένων καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἀποκτιόντων, τὰ μὲν ποῖα ἅττα γίνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ αἰσθανόμενα. But the agent and patient meeting together, and begetting sensation and sensibles, both the object and the sentient are forthwith made to be so and so qualified, as when honey is tasted, the sense of tasting and the quality of sweetness are begotten both together, though the sense be vulgarly attributed to the taster, and the quality of sweetness to the honey.—The conclusion of all which is summed up thus, οὐδὲν εἶναι αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ, ἀλλὰ τινὶ αἰτὶ γίνεσθαι, That none of those sensible things is any thing absolutely in the objects without, but they are all generated or made relatively to the sentient.—There is more in that dialogue to this purpose, which I here omit; but I have set down so much of it in the author's own language, because it seems to me to be an excellent monument of the wisdom and sagacity of the old philosophers; that which is the main curiosity in this whole business of the mechanical or Atomical philosophy being here more fully and plainly expressed, than it is in Lucretius himself, viz. that sensible things, according to those ideas that we

have of them, are not real qualities absolutely existing without us, but ἐν ἡμῖν φάσματα, fancies or phantasms in us : so that both the Latin interpreters Ficinus and Serranus, though probably neither of them at all acquainted with this philosophy, as being not yet restored, could not but understand it after the same manner ; the one expressing it thus—"Color ex aspectu motuque medium quiddam resultans est. Talis circa oculos passio ;" and the other, "Ex varia aspicientis diathesi, variaque sensilis specie colores varios et videri et fieri, ita tamen ut sint φαντασμά, nec nisi in animo subsistant." However, it appears by Plato's manner of telling the story, and the tenour of the whole dialogue, that himself was not a little prejudiced against this philosophy. In all probability the rather, because Protagoras had made it a foundation both for Scepticism and Atheism.

VIII. We have now learnt from Plato, that Democritus and Leucippus were not the sole proprietaries in this philosophy, but that Protagoras, though not vulgarly taken notice of for any such thing (being commonly represented as a Sophist only) was a sharer in it likewise ; which Protagoras, indeed, Laertius,* and others, affirm to have been an auditor of Democritus ; and so he might be, notwithstanding what Plutarch tells us,^b that Democritus wrote against his taking away the absolute nature of things. However, we are of opinion, that neither Democritus, nor Protagoras, nor Leucippus, was the first inventor of this philosophy ; and our reason is, because they were all three of them Atheists (though

* Lib. ix. segm. 50. p. 575, 576. Videas etiam A. Gellium Noct. Attic. lib. v. c. iii. et Suidam voce Πρωταγόρας.

^b Libro adversus Colotem, tom. ii. oper. p. 1108, 1109.

Protagoras alone was banished for that crime by the Athenians) and we cannot think, that any Atheists could be the inventors of it, much less that it was the genuine spawn and brood of Atheism itself, as some conceit, because, however these Atheists adopted it to themselves, endeavouring to serve their turns of it, yet, if rightly understood, it is the most effectual engine against Atheism that can be. And we shall make it appear afterwards, that never any of those Atheists, whether ancient or modern (how great pretenders soever to it) did thoroughly understand it, but perpetually contradicted themselves in it. And this is the reason, why we insist so much upon this philosophy here, not only because without the perfect knowledge of it, we cannot deal with the Atheists at their own weapon; but also because we doubt not but to make a sovereign antidote against Atheism out of that very philosophy, which so many have used as a *vehiculum* to convey this poison of Atheism by.

ix. But besides reason, we have also good historical probability for this opinion, that this philosophy was a thing of much greater antiquity than either Democritus or Leucippus. And first, because Posidonius, an ancient and learned philosopher, did (as both Empiricus^a and Strabo^b tell us) avouch it for an old tradition, that the first inventor of this Atomical philosophy, was one Moschus, a Phœnician, who, as Strabo also notes, lived before the Trojan wars.

x. Moreover, it seems not altogether improbable, but that this Moschus, a Phœnician philosopher, mentioned by Posidonius, might be the same with that Mochus, a Phœnician physiologer, in

^a Lib. ix. advers. Mathematic. p. 621.

^b Lib. xvi. p. 718.

Jamblichus, with whose successors, priests, and prophets, he affirms that Pythagoras, sometimes sojourning at Sidon (which was his native city), had conversed : which may be taken for an intimation, as if he had been by them instructed in that Atomical physiology, which Moschus, or Mochus, the Phœnician, is said to have been the inventor of. Mochus, or Moschus, is plainly a Phœnician name, and there is one Mochus, a Phœnician writer, cited in Athenæus, whom the Latin translator calls Moschus ; and Mr. Seldon approves of the conjecture of Arcerius, the publisher of Jamblichus, that this Mochus was no other man than the celebrated Moses of the Jews, with whose successors, the Jewish philosophers, priests, and prophets, Pythagoras conversed at Sidon. Some fantastic Atomists perhaps would here catch at this, to make their philosophy to stand by Divine right, as owing its original to revelation ; whereas philosophy being not a matter of faith, but reason, men ought not to affect (as I conceive) to derive its pedigree from revelation, and by that very pretence, seek to impose it tyrannically upon the minds of men, which God hath here purposely left free to the use of their own faculties, that so finding out truth by them, they might enjoy that pleasure and satisfaction, which arises from thence. But we aim here at nothing more, than a confirmation of this truth, that the Atomical physiology was both older than Democritus, and had no such atheistical original neither. And there wants not other good authority for this, that Pythagoras did borrow many things from the Jews, and translate them into his philosophy.

xī. But there are yet other considerable probabilities for this, that Pythagoras was not unacquainted with the Atomical physiology. And first from Democritus himself, who, as he was of the Italic row, or Pythagoric succession, so it is recorded of him in Laertius,* that he was a great emulator of the Pythagoreans, and seemed to have taken all his philosophy from them, inso-much that if chronology had not contradicted it, it would have been concluded, that he had been an auditor of Pythagoras himself, of whom he testified his great admiration in a book entitled by his name. Moreover, some of his opinions had a plain correspondency with the Pythagoric doctrines, forasmuch as Democritus^b did not only hold, *φέρεσθαι ἀτόμους ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ δινουμένας*, that the atoms were carried round in a vortex;—but altogether with Leucippus, *τὴν γῆν ὀχεῖσθαι περὶ τὸ μέσον δινουμένην*, that the earth was carried about the middle or centre of this vortex (which is the sun) turning in the meantime round upon its own axis. — And just so the Pythagoric opinion is expressed by Aristotle,^c *τὴν γῆν ἐν τῶν ἀστρῶν οὖσαν κύκλῳ φερόμενην περὶ τὸ μέσον νύκτα καὶ τὴν ἡμέραν ποιεῖν*. That the earth, as one of the stars (that is a planet), being carried round about the middle or centre (which is fire or the sun), did in the meantime by its circumgyration upon its own axis make day and night.—Wherefore it may be reasonably from hence concluded, that as Democritus's philosophy was Pythagorical, so Pythagoras's philosophy was likewise Democritical, or Atomical.

* Lib. ix. segm. 38. p. 570.

^b Lib. ix. segm. 44. p. 573. et segm. 30. p. 567.

^c De Cælo, lib. ii. c. xiii. p. 658. tom. i. oper.

XII. But that which is of more moment yet, we have the authority of Ecphantus, a famous Pythagorean for this, that Pythagoras's Monads, so much talked of, were nothing else but corporeal Atoms. Thus we find it in Stobæus,* *τὰς Πυθαγορικὰς Μονάδας οὗτος πρῶτος ἀπεφάνητο σωματικὰς*, Ecphantus (who himself^b asserted the doctrine of Atoms) first declared, that the Pythagoric Monads were corporeal,—i. e. Atoms. And this is further confirmed from what Aristotle^c himself writes of these Pythagoreans and their Monads, *τὰς Μονάδας ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ἔχειν μέγεθος* they suppose their Monads to have magnitude.—And from that he elsewhere^d makes Monads and Atoms to signify the same thing, *οὐδὲν διαφέρει Μονάδας λέγειν ἢ σωμαρία μικρά*. It is all one to say monades or small corpuscula.—And Gassendus^e hath observed out of the Greek epigrammatist,^f that Epicurus's Atoms were sometimes called Monads too :—

————— μέντοι Ἐπίκουρος ἴδεν
Πᾶσι τὸ κατὰ ζήτησιν καὶ τινος αἱ Μονάδες.

XIII. But to pass from Pythagoras himself; that Empedocles, who was a Pythagorean also, did physiologize atomically, is a thing that could hardly be doubted of, though there were no more proof for it than that one passage of his in his philosophic poems :^g

————— φύσιν ὁμοῦς ἔστιν ἐκείνου
Ἄλλὰ μόνον μίξας τε διαλλαχὲς τε μιν γίνεσθαι

* Eclog. Phys. lib. i. cap. xiii. p. 27. edit. Plantin. 1575. fol.

^b Stob. ubi supra, lib. i. c. xxv. p. 48.

^c Metaphys. lib. xi. c. vi. tom. iv. oper. p. 424.

^d De Anima, lib. ii. c. vi. p. 18. tom. ii. oper.

^e Physices sect. i. lib. iii. c. iv. p. 256. tom. i. oper. et in Notis ad lib. ix. Diog. Laertii, p. 70. tom. v. oper.

^f Antholog. Græcor. Epigram. lib. i. xv. p. 32. edit. Francof. 1600. fol.

^g Vide Plut. de Placitis Philos. lib. i. c. xxx. p. 885. tom. ii. oper.

Nature is nothing but the mixture and separation of things mingled ; or thus, There is no production of any thing anew, but only mixture and separation of things mingled.—Which is not only to be understood of animals, according to the Pythagoric doctrine of the transmigration of souls, but also, as himself expounds it, universally of all bodies, that their generation and corruption is nothing but mixture and separation ; or, as Aristotle^a expresses it, σύγκρισις καὶ διάκρισις, concretion and secretion of parts, together with change of figure and order. It may perhaps be objected, that Empedocles held four elements, out of which he would have all other bodies to be compounded ; and that as Aristotle affirms,^b he made those elements not to be transmutable into one another neither. To which we reply, that he did indeed make four elements, as the first general concretions of atoms, and therein he did no more than Democritus himself, who, as Laertius writes,^c did from atoms moving round in a vortex, πάντα συγκρίματα γεννᾶν πῦρ, ὕδωρ, αἶρα, γῆν, εἶναι γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα ἐξ ἀτόμων τινῶν συστήματα, generate all concretions, fire, water, air, and earth, these being systems made out of certain atoms.—And Plato further confirms the same ; for in his book *De Legibus*^d he describes (as I suppose) that very Atheistical hypothesis of Democritus, though without mentioning his name, representing it in this manner ; that by the fortuitous motion of senseless matter were first made those four elements, and then out

^a De Generat. et Corrupt. lib. ii. c. vi. p. 739. tom. i. oper.

^b Ibid. p. 734. et lib. i. c. iii. p. 699.

^c Lib. ix. segm. 44. p. 573.

^d Lib. x. p. 666. oper.

of them afterward sun, moon, stars, and earth. Now both Plutarch^a and Stobæus^b testify, that Empedocles compounded the four elements themselves out of atoms. *Ἐμπεδοκλῆς δὲ ἐκ μικροτέρων ὄγκων τὰ στοιχεῖα συγκρίνει ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἐλάχιστα, καὶ οἰοῖται στοιχεῖα στοιχείων* Empedocles makes the elements to be compounded of other small corpuscula, which are the least, and as it were the elements of the elements.—And the same Stobæus again observes,^c *Ἐμπεδοκλῆς πρὸ τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων θραύσματα ἐλάχιστα* Empedocles makes the smallest particles and fragments of body (that is, atoms), to be before the four elements.—But whereas Aristotle affirms, that Empedocles denied the transmutation of those elements into one another, that must needs be either a slip in him, or else a fault in our copies; not only because Lucretius, who was better versed in that philosophy, and gives a particular account of Empedocles's doctrine (besides many others of the ancients), affirms the quite contrary; but also because himself, in those fragments of his still preserved, expressly acknowledges this transmutation.

καὶ φθίνει εἰς ἄλλα, καὶ αὖξεται ἐν μέρει αὐτοῦ.

xiv. Besides all this, no less author than Plato affirms, that according to Empedocles, vision and other sensations were made by *ἀπορροαὶ σχημάτων*, the defluxions of figures,—or effluvia of atoms (for so Democritus's Atoms are called in Aristotle *σχήματα*, because they were bodies which had only figure without qualities), he supposing, that some

^a De Placitis Philos. lib. i. c. xvii. p. 883. tom. ii. oper. Vide etiam c. xiii. p. 883.

^b Eclog. Physic. lib. i. c. xx. p. 36.

^c Ibid. lib. i. c. xvii. p. 33.

of these figures or particles corresponded with the organs of one sense, and some with the organs of another. *“Οὐκοῦν λέγεται ἀπορροαί τινας τῶν ὄντων κατὰ Ἐμπεδοκλέα, καὶ πόρους, εἰς αὐς, καὶ δὲ ὧν αἱ ἀπορροαὶ πορεύονται, καὶ τῶν ἀπορροῶν τὰς μὲν ἀρμόττειν ἐνίοις τῶν πόρων, τὰς δὲ ἐλάττους ἢ μείζους εἶναι.”* You say, then, according to the doctrine of Empedocles, that there are certain corporeal effluvia from bodies of different magnitudes and figures, as also several pores and meatus's in us diversely corresponding with them : so that some of these corporeal effluvia agree with some pores, when they are either too big or too little for others.—By which it is evident, that Empedocles did not suppose sensations to be made by intentional species or qualities, but as to the generality, in the Atomical way ; in which notwithstanding there are some differences among the Atomists themselves. But Empedocles went the same way here with Democritus, for Empedocles's ἀπορροαὶ σχημάτων, defluxions of figured bodies,—are clearly the same thing with Democritus's εἰδώλων εἰσκρίσεις, insinuations of simulachra ; or, exuvius images of bodies.—And the same Plato adds further,^a that according to Empedocles, the definition of colour was this, ἀπορροὴ σχημάτων ὅψει σύμμετρος καὶ αἰσθητός, The defluxion of figures, or figured corpuscula (without qualities) commensurate to the sight and sensible.—Moreover, that Empedocles's physiology was the very same with that of Democritus, is manifest also from this passage of Aristotle,^c *Οἱ μὲν οὖν περὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέα καὶ Δημόκριτον λανθάνουσιν αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοὺς οὐ γενέσιν ἐξ ἀλλήλων ποιοῦντες, ἀλλὰ φαι-*

^a Plato in Menone, p. 14.

^b Ibid.

^c De Coelo, lib. iii. cap. vii. p. 680. tom. i. oper.

νομένην γένεσιν· ἐνυπάρχον γὰρ ἕκαστον ἐκκρίνεσθαι φασιν ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀγγείου τῆς γενέσεως οὐσης· Empedocles and Democritus deceiving themselves, unawares destroy all generation of things out of one another, leaving a seeming generation only: for they say, that generation is not the production of any new entity, but only the secretion of what was before inexistent; as when divers kinds of things confounded together in a vessel, are separated from one another.—Lastly, we shall confirm all this by the clear testimony of Plutarch, or the writer *De Placitis Philosophorum*:^a Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ Ἐπίκουρος καὶ πάντες ὅσοι κατὰ συναθροισμὸν τῶν λεπτομερῶν σωμάτων κοσμοποιοῦσι, συγκρίσεις μὲν καὶ διακρίσεις ἐκάγουσι, γενέσεις δὲ καὶ φθοράς οὐ κυρίως, οὐ γὰρ κατὰ ποῖον ἐξ ἀλλοιώσεως, κατὰ δὲ πόσον οὐκ συναθροισμοῦ ταύτας γίνεσθαι· Empedocles and Epicurus, and all those that compound the world of small atoms, introduce concretions and secretions, but no generations or corruptions properly so called; neither would they have these to be made according to quality by alteration, but only according to quantity by aggregation.—And the same writer sets down the order and method of the *Cosmogonia*, according to Empedocles;^b Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, τὸν μεμειβέρα πρῶτον διακριθῆναι, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ πῦρ, ἐφ' ᾧ πῆνιγῇ ἐξ ἄγαν περισφιγγομένης τῇ ρύμῃ τῆς περιφορᾶς, ἀναβλῦσαι τὸ ὕδωρ, ἐξ οὗ θυμαθῆναι τὸν αἶρα, καὶ γένεσθαι τὸν μὲν οὐρανὸν ἐκ τοῦ αἰθέρος, τὸν δὲ ἥλιον ἐκ πυρός· Empedocles writes, that ether was first of all secreted out of the confused chaos of atoms, afterwards the fire, and then the earth, which being constringed, and as it were, squeezed by the force of agitation, sent forth water bubbling out of it; from the evaporation of

^a Lib. i. c. xxiv. p. 684. oper.^b Lib. ii. cap. vi. p. 887.

which did proceed air; and from the ether was made the heavens, from fire the sun.—We see, therefore, that it was not without cause, that Lucretius^a did so highly extol Empedocles, since his physiology was really the same with that of Epicurus and Democritus; only that he differed from them in some particularities, as in excluding a vacuum, and denying such physical minima as were indivisible.

xv. As for Anaxagoras, though he philosophized by Atoms, substituting concretion and secretion, in the room of generation and corruption, insisting upon the same fundamental principle, that Empedocles, Democritus, and the other Atomists did; which was (as we shall declare more fully afterward) that nothing could be made out of nothing, nor reduced to nothing; and therefore, that there were neither any new productions, nor destructions of any substances or real entities: yet, as his Homœomeria is represented by Aristotle, Lucretius, and other authors, that bone was made of bony atoms, and flesh of fleshy, red things of red atoms, and hot things of hot atoms: these atoms being supposed to be endued originally with so many several forms and qualities essential to them, and inseparable from them, there was indeed a wide difference between his philosophy and the Atomical. However, this seems to have had its rise from nothing else but this philosopher's not being able to understand the Atomical hypothesis, which made him decline it, and substitute this spurious and counterfeit Atomism of his own in the room of it.

xvi. Lastly, I might add here, that it is record-

^a Lib. i. vers. 744, 745.

ed by good authors, concerning divers other ancient philosophers, that were not addicted to Democriticism or Atheism, that they followed this Atomical way of physiologizing, and therefore in all probability did derive it from those religious Atomists before Democritus. As for example; Ecphantus, the Syracusian Pythagorist, who, as Stobæus writes, made τὰ ἀδιαίρετα σώματα καὶ τὸ κενόν, indivisible bodies and vacuum, the principles of physiology, and as Theodoret also testifies, taught ἐκ τῶν ἀτόμων συνεστάναι τὸν κόσμον, that the corporeal world was made up of atoms; —Xenocrates,^a that made μεγέθη ἀδιαίρετα, indivisible magnitudes, the first principles of bodies; Heraclides,^b that resolved all corporeal things into ψήγματα καὶ θραύσματά τινα ἐλάχιστα, certain smallest fragments of bodies;—Asclepiades,^c who supposed all the corporeal world to be made ἐξ ἀνομοίων καὶ ἀναρμῶν ὀγκῶν, not of similar parts (as Anaxagoras) but of dissimilar and inconcinn moleculæ, i. e. atoms of different magnitude and figures; and Diodorus,^d that solved the material phænomena by ἀμεινῇ τὰ ἐλάχιστα, the smallest indivisibles of body. And lastly, Metrodorus* (not Lampsacenus, the Epicurean, but) Chius, who is reported also to have made indivisible particles and atoms the first principles of bodies. But what need we any more proof for this, that the

^a Vide Georg. Pachymer. libellum περὶ ἀτόμων γένεσιν, qui extat inter Aristotelis opera, tom. ii. cap. i. p. 819.

^b Vide Plutarch. de Placitis Philos. lib. i. cap. xiii. p. 883. tom. ii. oper.

^c Vide Sextum Empiric. Hypotypos. Pyrrhon. lib. iii. cap. iv. p. 136.

^d Sext. Empiric. lib. i. adv. Physicos, sect. 363. p. 621. vide etiam lib. iii. Hypothes. cap. iv. p. 136.

* Vide Stobæi Eclog. Physic. lib. i. cap. xiii. p. 27.

Atomical physiology was ancients than Democritus and Leucippus, and not confined only to that sect, since Aristotle himself* in the passages already cited, doth expressly declare, that besides Democritus, the generality of all the other physiologists went that way; *Δημόκριτος καὶ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν φυσιολόγων*, &c. Democritus and the most of the physiologists make all sense to be touch, and resolvesensible qualities, as the tastes of bitter and sweet, &c. into figures.—And again,^b he imputes it generally to all the physiologists that went before him, *οἱ πρότερον φυσιολόγοι*, the former physiologists (without any exception) said not well in this, that there was no black and white without the sight, nor bitter and sweet without the taste.—Wherefore, I think, it cannot be reasonably doubted, but that the generality of the old physiologists before Aristotle and Democritus, did pursue the Atomical way, which is to resolve the corporeal phænomena, not into forms, qualities, and species, but into figures, motions, and fancies.

xvii. But then there will seem to be no small difficulty in reconciling Aristotle with himself, who doth in so many places plainly impute this philosophy to Democritus and Leucippus, as the first source and original of it; as also in salving the credit of Laertius, and many other ancient writers, who do the like, Democritus having had for many ages almost the general cry and vogue for Atoms. However, we doubt not but to give a very good account of this business, and reconcile the seemingly different testimonies of these ancient writers, so as to take away all contradic-

* Lib. de Sensu et Sensibili, cap. iv. p. 70. tom. ii. oper.

^b De Animo, lib. ii. cap. i. p. 43. tom. ii. oper.

tion and repugnancy between them. For although the Atomical physiology was in use long before Democritus and Leucippus, so that they did not make it, but find it; yet these two, with their confederate Atheists (whereof Protagoras seems to have been one) were undoubtedly the first, that ever made this physiology to be a complete and entire philosophy by itself, so as to derive the original of all things in the whole universe from senseless atoms, that had nothing but figure and motion, together with vacuum, and made up such a system of it, as from whence it would follow, that there could not be any God, not so much as a corporeal one. These two things were both of them before singly and apart. For there is no doubt to be made, but that there hath been Atheism lurking in the minds of some or other in all ages; and perhaps some of those ancient Atheists did endeavour to philosophize too, as well as they could, in some other way. And there was Atomical physiology likewise before, without Atheism. But these two thus complicated together, were never before Atomical Atheism, or Atheistical Atomism. And therefore, Democritus and his comrade Leucippus, need not be envied the glory of being reputed the first inventors or founders of the Atomical philosophy atheized and adulterated.

XVIII. Before Leucippus and Democritus, the doctrine of Atoms was not made a whole entire philosophy by itself, but looked upon only as a part or member of the whole philosophic system, and that the meanest and lowest part too, it being only used to explain that which was purely corporeal in the world; besides which, they acknow-

ledged something else, which was not mere bulk and mechanism, but life and self activity, that is, immaterial or incorporeal substance; the head and summit whereof, is the Deity distinct from the world. So that there have been two sorts of Atomists in the world, the one Atheistical, the other Religious. The first and most ancient Atomists holding incorporeal substance, used that physiology in a way of subordination to theology and metaphysics. The other, allowing no other substance but body, made senseless atoms and figures, without any mind and understanding (i. e. without any God) to be the original of all things; which latter is that, that was vulgarly known by the name of Atomical philosophy, of which Democritus and Leucippus were the source.

xix. It hath been indeed of late confidently asserted by some, that never any of the ancient philosophers dreamed of any such thing as incorporeal substance; and therefore they would bear men in hand, that it was nothing but an upstart and new-fangled invention of some bigotical religionists; the falsity whereof, we shall here briefly make to appear. For though there have been doubtless, in all ages, such as have disbelieved the existence of any thing but what was sensible, whom Plato^a describes after this manner; οἱ δὲ διατρέποντες ἀνὰ πᾶν ὃ μὴ δυνατόν ταῖς χερσὶ συμπιῆσαι εἶναι, εἰς ἃρα τοῦτο οὐδὲν τὸ παράπαν ἐστὶ. That would contend, that whatsoever they could not feel or grasp with their hands, was altogether nothing;—yet this opinion was professedly opposed by the best of the ancient philosophers, and condemned for a piece of sottishness and stupidity. Wherefore, the same

^a In Sophista, p. 160.

Plato tells us, that there had been always, as well as then there was, a perpetual war and controversy in the world, and, as he calls it, a kind of gigantomachy betwixt these two parties or sects of men; the one, that held there was no other substance in the world besides body; the other, that asserted incorporeal substance. The former of these parties or sects is thus described by the philosopher; Οἱ μὲν εἰς γῆν ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀοράτου πάντα ἔλκουσι ταῖς χερσὶν ἀτεχνῶς πέτρας καὶ δρυὲς περιλαμβάνοντες, τῶν γὰρ τοιούτων ἐφαπτόμενοι πάντων, δυσχεραίνοντες τοῦτο εἶναι μόνον ὃ παρέχει προσβολὴν καὶ ἐπαφήν τινα, ταυτὸν σῶμα καὶ οὐσίαν ὀρίζόμενοι τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οὔτις φησὶ μὴ σῶμα ἔχον εἶναι, καταφρονοῦντες τὸ παράπαν, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐθέλοντες ἄλλο ἀκούειν. These (saith he) pull all things down from heaven and the invisible region, with their hands to the earth, laying hold of rocks and oaks; and when they grasp all these hard and gross things, they confidently affirm, that that only is substance, which they can feel, and will resist their touch; and they conclude, that body and substance are one and the self-same thing; and if any one chance to speak to them of something which is not body, i. e. of incorporeal substance, they will altogether despise him, and not hear a word more from him. And many such the philosopher there says he had met withal. The other he represents in this manner; Οἱ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀμφισβητοῦντες μάλα εὐλαβῶς ἀναθὲν ἐξ ἀοράτου τόπου ἀμύνονται νοητὰ ἅττα καὶ ἀσώματα εἶδη, βιαζόμενοι τὴν ἀληθεῆς οὐσίαν εἶναι. ἐν μέσῳ δὲ περὶ τὰντα ἀπλετος ἀμφοτέρων μάχη τις αἰὲν ἐνέστηκε. The adversaries of these Corporealists do cautiously and piously assault them from the invisible region, fetching all things from above by way of descent, and by strength of

reason convincing, that certain intelligible and incorporeal forms are the true or first substance, and not sensible things. But betwixt these two there hath always been (saith he) a great war and contention.—And yet in the sequel of his discourse, he adds, that those Corporealists were then grown a little more modest and shame-faced than formerly their great champions had been, such as Democritus and Protagoras; for however they still persisted in this, that the soul was a body, yet they had not, it seems, the impudence to affirm, that wisdom and virtue were corporeal things, or bodies, as others before and since too have done. We see here, that Plato expressly asserts a substance distinct from body, which sometimes he calls *οὐσίαν ἀσώματον*, incorporeal substance,—and sometimes *οὐσίαν νοητήν*, intelligible substance,—in opposition to the other which he calls *αἰσθητήν*, sensible.—And it is plain to any one, that hath had the least acquaintance with Plato's philosophy, that the whole scope and drift of it, is to raise up men's minds from sense to a belief of incorporeal things as the most excellent: *τὰ γὰρ ἀσώματα κάλλιστα ὄντα καὶ μέγιστα λόγῳ μόνον, ἄλλῃ δὲ οὐδενί, σαφῶς δέικνυνται*, as he writes in another place; for incorporeal things, which are the greatest and most excellent things of all, are (saith he) discoverable by reason only, and nothing else.—And his subterraneous cave, so famously known, and so elegantly described by him,^b where he supposes men tied with their backs towards the light, placed at a great distance from them, so that they could not turn about their heads to it neither, and therefore could see nothing but the shadows

^a In *Político*, p. 282. oper.

^b De *Repub.* lib. vii. p. 482.

(of certain substances behind them) projected from it, which shadows they concluded to be the only substances and realities, and when they heard the sounds made by those bodies that were betwixt the light and them, or their reverberated echoes, they imputed them to those shadows which they saw; I say, all this is a description of the state of those men, who take body to be the only real and substantial thing in the world, and to do all that is done in it; and therefore often impute sense, reason, and understanding, to nothing but blood and brains in us.

xx. I might also shew in the next place, how Aristotle did not at all dissent from Plato herein, he plainly asserting,* *ἄλλην οὐσίαν παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ*, another substance besides sensibles,—*οὐσίαν χωριστὴν καὶ κεχωρισμένην τῶν αἰσθητῶν*, a substance separable and also actually separated from sensibles,—*ἀκίνητον οὐσίαν*, an immoveable nature or essence—(subject to no generation or corruption) adding, that the Deity was to be sought for here: nay, such a substance, *ἣν μέγεθος οὐδὲν ἐνδέχεται ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ ἀμερῆς καὶ ἀδιαίρετός ἐστι*, as hath no magnitude at all, but is impartible and indivisible.—He also blaming Zeno (not the Stoic, who was junior to Aristotle, but an auicier philosopher of that name) for making God to be a body, in these words; *αὐτὸς γὰρ σῶμα λέγει εἶναι τὸν Θεόν· εἴτε δὲ τόδε τὸ πᾶν, εἴτε ὅτι δῆποτε αὐτὸς λέγων· ἀσώματος γὰρ ὦν πῶς ἂν σφαιροειδὴς εἴη; ὅταν οὕτως οὐτ' ἂν κινεῖτο, οὐτ' ἂν ἤρεμοι, μηδαμοῦ τε ὦν· ἐπεὶ δὲ σῶμά ἐστι, τί ἂν αὐτὸ κωλύει κινεῖσθαι*.

* Metaphys. lib. xiv. cap. vii. p. 480. tom. iv. oper. et in multis aliis locis.

* Libro de Zenone, Xenophane, et Gorgia, cap. iv. p. 844. tom. ii. oper.

Zeno implicitly affirms God to be a body, whether he mean him to be the whole corporeal universe, or some particular body; for if God were incorporeal, how could he be spherical? nor could he then either move or rest, being not properly in any place: but if God be a body, then nothing hinders but that he may be moved.— From which and other places of Aristotle, it is plain enough also, that he did suppose incorporeal substance to be unextended, and as such, not to have relation to any place. But this is a thing to be disputed afterwards. Indeed some learned men conceive Aristotle to have reprehended Zeno without cause, and that Zeno made God to be a sphere, or spherical, in no other sense, than Parmenides did in that known verse of his:^a

πάντοθεν εὐκύνου σφαίρας ἰσολιγιστοῦ ὄντος.

Wherein he is understood to describe the Divine eternity. However, it plainly appears from hence, that according to Aristotle's sense, God was *ἀσώματος*, an incorporeal substance distinct from the world.

xxi. Now this doctrine, which Plato especially was famous for asserting, that there was *οὐσία ἀσώματος*, incorporeal substance,—and that the souls of men were such, but principally the Deity; Epicurus taking notice of it, endeavoured with all his might to confute it, arguing sometimes after this manner:^b There can be no incorporeal God (as Plato maintained), not only because no man can frame a conception of an incorporeal

^a Apud Aristot. in libro jam laudato, cap. iv. p. 843. tom. ii. oper. et apud Platonem in Sophista, et veteram alios.

^b Cicero de Natur. Deor. lib. i. cap. xii. p. 2897. tom. ix. oper.

substance, but also because whatsoever is incorporeal must needs want sense, and prudence, and pleasure, all which things are included in the notion of God; and therefore, an incorporeal Deity is a contradiction.—And concerning the soul of man: *οἱ λέγοντες ἀσώματον εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν παραλόγως, &c.* They who say, that the soul is incorporeal, in any other sense, than as that word may be used to signify a subtile body, talk vainly and foolishly; for then it could neither be able to do nor suffer any thing. It could not act upon any other thing, because it could touch nothing; neither could it suffer from any thing, because it could not be touched by any thing; but it would be just like to vacuum or empty space, which can neither do nor suffer any thing, but only yield bodies a passage through it.—From whence it is further evident, that this opinion was professedly maintained by some philosophers before Epicurus's time.

XXII. But Plato and Aristotle were not the first inventors of it; for it is certain, that all those philosophers, who held the immortality of the human soul, and a God distinct from this visible world (and so properly the Creator of it and all its parts), did really assert incorporeal substance. For that a corporeal soul cannot be in its own nature immortal and incorruptible, is plain to every one's understanding, because of its parts being separable from one another; and whosoever denies God to be incorporeal, if he make him any thing at all, he must needs make him to be either the whole corporeal world, or else a part of it.—Wherefore, if God be neither of these, he must then be an incorporeal substance. Now Plato

* Vide Diog. Laert. lib. x. segm. 67, 68. p. 630.

was not the first who asserted these two things, but they were both maintained by many philosophers before him. Pherecydes Syrus, and Thales, were two of the most ancient philosophers among the Greeks; and it is said of the former of them,* that by his lectures and disputes concerning the immortality of the soul, he first drew off Pythagoras from another course of life to the study of philosophy. Pherecydes Syrus. (saith Cicero)^b “*primus dixit animos hominum esse sempiternos.*” And Thales, in an epistle,^c directed to him, congratulates his being the first, that had designed to write to the Greeks concerning Divine things; which Thales also (who was the head of the Ionic succession of philosophers, as Pythagoras of the Italic) is joined with Pythagoras and Plato, by the writer “*De Placitis Philosophorum,*”^d after this manner, οὗτοι πάντες οἱ προτεταγμένοι ἀσώματος τὴν ψυχὴν ὑποτίθενται, φύσει λέγοντες αὐτοκίνητον καὶ οὐσίαν νοητὴν. All these determined the soul to be incorporeal, making it to be naturally self-moving (or self-active) and an intelligible substance,—that is, not sensible. Now he, that determines the soul to be incorporeal, must needs hold the Deity to be incorporeal much more. “*Aquam dixit Thales esse initium rerum* (saith Cicero,) *Deum autem eam mentem, quæ ex aqua cuncta fingeret.*” Thales said that water was the first principle of all corporeal things, but that God was that mind, which formed all things out of water.

* Vide Augustin. cap. cxxxvii. p. 308. tom. ii. oper.

^b Tusculan. Quæst. lib. i. c. xvi. p. 2586. tom. viii. oper.

^c Apud Diogen. Laert. lib. i. segm. 43. p. 25.

^d Lib. iv. cap. iii. p. 908.

^e De Natur. Deor. lib. i. cap. x. p. 2894. tom. ix. oper.

—For Thales was a Phœnician by extraction, and accordingly seemed to have received his two principles from thence, water; and the Divine Spirit-moving upon the waters. The first whereof is thus expressed by Sanchoniathon,^a in his description of the Phœnician theology, χάος θολερόν, ἐρβώδες, a turbid and dark chaos;—and the second is intimated in these words, ἡράσθη τὸ πνεῦμα τῶν ἰδίων ἀρχῶν, the Spirit was affected with love towards its own principles;—perhaps expressing the force of the Hebrew word, *Merachepeth*, and both of them implying an understanding prolific goodness, forming and hatching the corporeal world into this perfection; or else a plastic power, subordinate to it. Zeno (who was also originally a Phœnician) tells us,^b that Hesiod's chaos was water; and that the material heaven as well as earth was made out of water (according to the judgment of the best interpreters) is the genuine sense of Scripture, 2 Pet. iii. 5. by which water some perhaps would understand a chaos of atoms confusedly moved. But whether Thales were acquainted with the Atomical physiology or no,^c it is plain that he asserted, besides the soul's immortality, a Deity distinct from the corporeal world.

We pass to Pythagoras, whom we have proved already to have been an Atomist; and it is well known, also, that he was a professed Incorporealist. That he asserted the immortality of the soul, and consequently its immateriality, is evi-

^a Apud Buseb. de Præparatione Evangelica, lib. ii. cap. x. p. 33.

^b Vide Scholiast. in Apollon. Argonautic. lib. iv. vers. 676. s. citatum ab Hug. Grotio, in Notis ad lib. i. de Veritate Relig. Christ. sec. xvi. p. 30, 31.

^c Vide Plutarch. de Placitis Philos. lib. i. cap. xvi. p. 883.

dent from his doctrine of pre-existence and transmigration: and that he likewise held an incorporeal Deity distinct from the world, is a thing not questioned by any. But if there were any need of proving it (because there are no monuments of his extant), perhaps it might be done from hence, because he was the chief propagator of that doctrine amongst the Greeks, concerning three hypostases in the Deity.

For, that Plato and his followers held, τρεῖς ἀρχαὶς ὑποστάσεσι, three hypostases in the Deity, that were the first principles of all things—is a thing very well known to all; though we do not affirm, that these Platonic hypostases are exactly the same with those in the Christian trinity. Now Plato himself sufficiently intimates this not to have been his own invention; and Plotinus tells us, that it was παλαιὰ δόξα, an ancient opinion before Plato's time, which had been delivered down by some of the Pythagorics. Wherefore, I conceive, this must needs be one of those Pythagoric monstrosities, which Xenophon covertly taxes Plato for entertaining, and mingling with the Socratical philosophy, as if he had thereby corrupted the purity and simplicity of it. Though a Corporealist may pretend to be a Theist, yet I never heard that any of them did ever assert a trinity, respectively to the Deity, unless it were such an one as I think not fit here to mention.

XXIII. That Parmenides, who was likewise a Pythagorean, acknowledged a Deity distinct from the corporeal world, is evident from Plato.* And Plotinus tells us also, that he was one of them that asserted the triad of Divine hypostases.

* In Parmenide.

Moreover, whereas there was a great controversy amongst the ancient philosophers before Plato's time,* between such as held all things to flow (as namely Heraclitus and Cratylus), and others, who asserted that some things did stand, and that there was *ἀκίνητος οὐσία*, a certain immutable nature—to wit, an eternal mind, together with eternal and immutable truths (amongst which were Parmenides and Melissus); the former of these were all Corporealists (this being the very reason why they made all things to flow, because they supposed all to be body), though these were not, therefore, all of them Atheists. But the latter were all both Incorporealists and Theists; for whosoever holds incorporeal substance, must needs, according to reason, also assert a Deity.

And although we did not before particularly mention Parmenides amongst the Atomical philosophers, yet we conceive it to be manifest from hence, that he was one of that tribe, because he was an eminent assertor of that principle, *οὐδὲν οὐτὶς γίγνεται οὐτὶς φθίσιται τῶν ὄντων*, that no real entity is either made or destroyed, generated or corrupted.—Which we shall afterwards plainly shew, to be the grand fundamental principle of the Atomical philosophy.

xxiv. But whereas we did evidently prove before, that Empedocles was an Atomical physiologer, it may, notwithstanding, with some colour of probability, be doubted, whether he were not an Atheist, or at least a Corporealist, because Aristotle accuses him of these following things. First,^b of making knowledge to be sense, which is, in-

* Vide Platon. in Theæteto, p. 130, 131.

^b Aristot. de Anima, lib. iii. cap. iii. p. 45. tom. ii. oper.

deed, a plain sign of a Corporealist; and, therefore, in the next place also,^a of compounding the soul out of the four elements, making it to understand every corporeal thing by something of the same within itself, as fire by fire, and earth by earth; and lastly,^b of attributing much to fortune, and affirming, that divers of the parts of animals were made such by chance; and that there were at first certain mongrel animals, fortuitously produced, that were βουγενῇ καὶ ἀνδρόπρωπα, such as had something of the shape of an ox, together with the face of a man (though they could not long continue);—which seems to give just cause of suspicion, that Empedocles atheized in the same manner that Democritus did.

To the first of these we reply, that some others, who had also read Empedocles's poems, were of a different judgment from Aristotle as to that; conceiving Empedocles not to make sense but reason the criterion of truth. Thus Empiricus informs us:^c Others say, that, according to Empedocles, the criterion of truth is not sense, but right reason; and also that right reason is of two sorts, the one θεῖος, or Divine, the other ἀνθρώπινος, or human: of which the Divine is inexpressible, but the human declarable.—And there might be several passages cited out of those fragments of Empedocles's poems yet left, to confirm this; but we shall produce only this one:

Τόλμ' ἄλ' ἔγωγε, τίς δ' ἴδμεν ἔσσαν;^d

To this sense; Suspend thy assent to the corpo-

^a Arist. lib. i. cap. ii. p. 5. tom. ii. oper.

^b Id. de Partibus Animal. lib. i. cap. i. p. 470. tom. ii. oper. et Physicor. lib. ii. cap. viii. p. 475. et 477.

^c Lib. vii. adv. Math. sec. 122. p. 396.

^d Ib. sec. 125. p. 347.

real senses, and consider every thing clearly with thy mind or reason.

And as to the second crimination, Aristotle^a has much weakened his own testimony here, by accusing Plato also of the very same thing. Πλάτων τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων ποιεῖ, γινώσκεται γὰρ ὁμοίῳ ὁμοίον, τὰ δὲ πράγματα ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν εἶναι. Plato compounds the soul out of the four elements, because like is known by like, and things are from their principles.—Wherefore it is probable, that Empedocles might be no more guilty of this fault (of making the soul corporeal; and to consist of earth, water, air, and fire) than Plato was, who, in all men's judgments, was as free from it as Aristotle himself, if not more. For Empedocles^b did, in the same manner as Pythagoras before him, and Plato after him, hold the transmigration of souls, and consequently both their future immortality and pre-existence; and therefore must needs assert their incorporeity: Plutarch^c rightly declaring this to have been his opinion; Εἶναι καὶ τοὺς μηδέπω γεγονότας καὶ τοὺς ἤδη τεθνηκότας. That as well those who are yet unborn, as those that are dead, have a being.—He also asserted human souls to be here in a lapsed state;^d μετανάστας, καὶ ξένους, καὶ φυγάδας, wanderers, strangers, and fugitives from God; declaring, as Plotinus tells us,^e that it was a Divine law, ἀμαρτανούσαις ταῖς ψυχαῖς πεσεῖν ἐνταῦθα, that souls sinning should fall down into these earthly bodies. But the fullest record of the

^a De Anima, l. i. c. ii. p. 5. tom. ii. op.

^b Diogen. Laert. lib. viii. segm. 78. p. 359. et Plut. de Solertia Animal. tom. ii. p. 984. oper.

^c Libro Adv. Colotem, p. 1113. tom. ii. oper.

^d Plutarch. de Exilio, p. 607.

^e De Animæ Descensu in Corpora, En. iv. lib. viii. cap. i. p. 468.

Empedoclean philosophy concerning the soul is contained in this of Hierocles,* Κάτεισι καὶ ἀποτίπτει τῆς εὐδαιμονος χώρας ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ὡς Ἐμπεδοκλῆς φησιν ὁ Πυθαγόρειος,—φυγὰς θεόθεν καὶ ἀλήτης Νεκῇ μαινομένη πύσσυος.—Ἀμεισι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἀρχαίαν ἔξω ἀπολαμβάνει,

Εἰ φεύξῃ τὰ περὶ γῆν καὶ τὴν ἀνθρώπου χῆρον,
ἔσθῃ φίλος τε καὶ εὖ καὶ ἄλλαν ἴδῃα κερῶν.

Εἰς ὃν οἱ ἐκπεσόντες—Ἄτης

—ἀπὸ λαιμῶνα τε καὶ σκότος ἡλάσσονται.

Ἡ δὲ ἔφεσις τοῦ φεύγοντος τὸν τῆς Ἄτης λαιμῶνα πρὸς τὸν τῆς ἀληθείας ἐπείγεται λαιμῶνα, ὃν ἀπολιπὼν τῇ ὁρμῇ τῆς πτερορρήσεως εἰς γήινον ἔρχεται σῶμα, Ὀλβίου—αἰῶνος ἀμελθείς. Man falleth from his happy state, as Empedocles the Pythagorean saith,—by being a fugitive, apostate, and wanderer from God, actuated with a certain mad and irrational strife or contention.—But he ascends again, and recovers his former state,—if he decline, and avoid these earthly things, and despise this unpleasant and wretched place, where murder, and wrath, and a troop of all other mischiefs reign. Into which place, they who fall, wander up and down through the field of Ate and darkness. But the desire of him that flees from this field of Ate carries him on towards the field of truth; which the soul at first relinquishing, and losing its wings, fell down into this earthly body, deprived of its happy life.—From whence it appears that Plato's πτερορρήσις was derived from Empedocles and the Pythagoreans.

Now, from what hath been already cited, it is sufficiently manifest, that Empedocles was so far from being either an Atheist or Corporealist, that he was indeed a rank Pythagorist, as he is here called. And we might add hereunto, what Cle-

* In Antea Pythagoræ Carmina, p. 166.

mens Alexandrinus observes,* that, according to Empedocles, ἢν ὁσίως καὶ δικάίως διαβιώσωμεν, μακάριοι μὲν ἐνταῦθα, μακαριώτεροι δὲ μετὰ τὴν ἐνθὺνδε ἀπαλλαγὴν ὅς χρόνῳ τινὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἔχοντες, ἀλλὰ ἐν αἰῶνι ἀναπαύεσθαι δυνάμενοι, Ἀθανάτοις ἄλλοισιν ὁμίεσται, ἐν δὲ τραπέζαις, &c. If we live holily and justly, we shall be happy here, and more happy after our departure hence; having our happiness not necessarily confined to time, but being able to rest and fix in it to all eternity; feasting with the other immortal beings, &c.—We might also take notice, how, besides the immortal souls of men, he acknowledged demons or angels; declaring that some of these fell from heaven, and were since prosecuted by a Divine Nemesis. For these in Plutarch† are called οἱ θεήλατοι καὶ οὐρανοπιτεῖς ἐκεῖνοι τοῦ Ἐμπεδοκλέους δαίμονες. Those Empedoclean demons lapsed from heaven, and pursued with Divine vengeance;—whose restless torment is there described in several verses of his.‡ And we might observe, likewise, how he acknowledged a natural and immutable justice, which was not topical and confined to places and countries, and relative to particular laws, but catholic and universal, and every where the same, through infinite light and space; as he expresses it with poetic pomp and bravery:

Ἄλλὰ τὸ μὲν πάντα τίμιον, διὰ τ' ἐρημιόδοτος
αἰθέρος, ἡκεῖνος τίταται, διὰ τ' ἀκλίτου αἴγλης.

And the asserting of natural morality is no small argument of a Theist.

But what then shall we say to those other things, which Empedocles is charged with by

* Stromatum, lib. v. p. 722.

† De vitando aere alieno, tom. li. oper. p. 830.

‡ Apud Plut. de Exilio, t. ii. oper. p. 607.

§ Apud Aristot. Rhetoric. lib. i. cap. xiii. p. 737. tom. iii. oper.

Aristotle, that seem to have so rank a smell of Atheism? Certainly those mongrel and biform animals, that are said to have sprung up out of the earth by chance, look as if they were more akin to Democritus than Empedocles; and probably it is the fault of the copies, that it is read otherwise, there being no other philosopher that I know of, that could ever find any such thing in Empedocles's poems.* But for the rest, if Aristotle do not misrepresent Empedocles, as he often doth Plato, then it must be granted, that he being a mechanical physiologer, as well as theologer, did something too much indulge to fortuitous mechanism; which seems to be an extravagancy, that mechanical philosophers and Atomists have been always more or less subject too. But Aristotle doth not charge Empedocles with resolving all things into fortuitous mechanism, as some philosophers have done of late, who yet pretend to be Theists and Incorporealists, but only that he would explain some things in that way. Nay, he clearly puts a difference betwixt Empedocles and the Democritic Atheists, in these words subjoined;† *Εἰαὶ δὲ τινὲς*, &c. which is as if he should have said, "Empedocles resolved some things in the fabric and structure of animals into fortuitous mechanism; but there are certain other philosophers, namely, Leucippus and Democritus, who would have all things whatsoever in the whole world, heaven, and earth, and animals, to be made by chance and the fortuitous motion of atoms, without a Deity." It seems very plain, that Empedo-

* Some verses of Empedocles, wherein he expressly maintains that opinion, are extant in *Ælian de Natura Animalium*, lib. xvi. c. xxix.

† *Physicor.* lib. ii. cap. iv. p. 470. oper.

cles's Philia and Neikos, his friendship and discord, which he makes to be the ἀρχὴ δραστήριος, the active cause,—and principle of motion in the universe, was a certain plastic power, superior to fortuitous mechanism: and Aristotle himself acknowledges somewhere as much. And Plutarch tells us,* that, according to Empedocles, the order and system of the world is not the result of material causes and fortuitous mechanism, but of a Divine wisdom, assigning to every thing οὐκ ἦν ἡ φύσις δίδωσι χώραν, ἀλλ' ἦν ἡ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν ἔργον ποθεῖ σύνταξις: not such a place as nature would give it, but such as is most convenient for the good of the whole.—Simplicius,^b who had read Empedocles, acquaints us, that he made two worlds, the one intellectual, the other sensible; and the former of these to be the exemplar and archetype of the latter. And so the writer De Placitis Philosophorum observes,^c that Empedocles made δύο ἡλίους, τὸν μὲν ἀρχέτυπον, τὸν δὲ φαινόμενον, two suns, the one archetypal and intelligible, the other apparent or sensible.—

But I need take no more pains to purge Empedocles from those two imputations of Corporealism and Atheism, since he hath so fully confuted them himself in those fragments of his still extant. First, by expressing such a hearty resentment of the excellency of piety, and the wretchedness and sottishness of Atheism in these verses:

Ὁλβιος δὲ θεῶν προσέειπεν ἱερίστατο πλοῦτον,
 Αὐλὸς δ' ἢ Σουρίστου θεῶν ἔτι διζομένην.

* Symposiac. lib. i. Quæst. ii. p. 618.

^b Commentar. ad Aristot. libr. Physicor. p. 74. b. edit. Græc. Aldinæ.

^c Lib. ii. cap. xx. p. 600. tom. ii. oper. Plutarchi.

^d Apud Clement. Alexandrin. Stromat. lib. v. cap. xiv, p. 733.

To this sense: He is happy, who hath his mind richly fraught and stored with the treasures of Divine knowledge; but he miserable, whose mind is darkened as to the belief of a God.—And, secondly, by denying God to have any human form, or members,

^a Οὐ μὲν γὰρ θροῦν' κεφαλῇ κατὰ γούνα κίμασται, &c.

Or otherwise to be corporeal,

^b Οὐκ ἔστιν πλάσασθ' οὐδ' ἐφθαλμοῖσιν ἰφατὲς
ἡμετέρους, ἢ χερσὶ λαβεῖν.

And then positively affirming what he is,

^c Ἀλλὰ φρὴν ἰσθὶ καὶ ἀβίεφατος ἔκλυτο μῶνον,
φροντίσι νόημα πάντα καταΐσσουσα θέσεν.

Only a holy and ineffable mind, that by swift thoughts agitates the whole world.—

xxv. And now we shall speak something also of Anaxagoras, having shewed before, that he was a spurious Atomist. For he likewise agreed with the other Atomists in this, that he asserted incorporeal substance in general, as the active cause and principle of motion in the universe, and particularly an incorporeal Deity distinct from the world; affirming, that there was besides atoms, Νοῦς ὁ διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος, (as it is expressed in Plato^d) An ordering and disposing mind, that was the cause of all things.—Which mind (as Aristotle tells us^e) he made to be μόνον

^a Apud Tzetz. Chiliad. xiii. Hist. eccclxiv. v. 80. et Ammonium in Comment. in Aristotel. περὶ ἡμενίας, fol. 107. edit. Aldin.

^b Apud Clem. Alexandr. Stromat. lib. v. p. 694.

^c Apud Tzetz. et Ammonium, ubi supra.

^d In Phædon. p. 393. oper.

^e De Anima, lib. i. cap. ii. p. 6. tom. ii. oper.

τῶν ὄντων ἀπλοῦν καὶ ἀμιγῆ καὶ καθαρὸν; the only simple, unmixed, and pure thing—in the world. And he supposed this to be that, which brought the confused chaos of omnifarious atoms into that orderly compages of the world that now is.

xxvi. And by this time we have made it evident, that those Atomical physiologers, that were before Democritus and Leucippus, were all of them Incorporealists: joining theology and pneumatology, the doctrine of incorporeal substance and a Deity, together with their Atomical physiology. This is a thing expressly noted concerning Ecphantus, the Pythagorean, in Stobæus,* Ἐκφάντος ἅκ μὲν τῶν ἀτόμων συνεστάναι τὸν κόσμον, δοκεῖσθαι δὲ ἀπὸ προνοίας. Ecphantus held the corporeal world to consist of atoms, but yet to be ordered and governed by a Divine providence:—that is, he joined atomology and theology both together. And the same is also observed of Arcesilaus, or perhaps Archelaus, by Sidonius Apollinaris;^b

Post hos Arcesilaus divina mente paratam
Conjicit hanc molem, confectam partibus illis,
Quas atomos vocat ipse leves.

Now, I say, as Ecphantus and Archelaus asserted the corporeal world to be made of atoms, but yet, notwithstanding, held an incorporeal Deity distinct from the same, as the first principle of activity in it; so in like manner did all the other ancient Atomists generally before Democritus, join theology and incorporealism with their Atomical

* Eclog. Physic. lib. i. cap. xxv. p. 48.

^b Carm. xv. in Epithalamio Polcmi et Araneolæ, v. 94. p. 132. edit. Savaronis.

physiology. They did atomize as well as he, but they did not atheize; but that Atheistical atomology was a thing first set on foot afterward by Leucippus and Democritus.

xxvii. But because many seem to be so strongly possessed with this prejudice, as if Atheism were a natural and necessary appendix to Atomism, and therefore will conclude, that the same persons could not possibly be Atomists, and Incorporealists or Theists, we shall further make it evident, that there is not only no inconsistency betwixt the Atomical physiology and theology, but also that there is, on the contrary, a most natural cognation between them.

And this we shall do two manner of ways; first, by inquiring into the origin of this philosophy, and considering what grounds or principles of reason they were, which first led the ancients into this Atomical or mechanical way of physiologizing. And secondly, by making it appear, that the intrinsical constitution of this physiology is such, that whosoever entertains it, if he do but thoroughly understand it, must of necessity acknowledge, that there is something else in the world besides body.

First, therefore, this Atomical physiology seems to have had its rise and origin from the strength of reason, exerting its own inward active power and vigour, and thereby bearing itself up against the prejudices of sense, and at length prevailing over them, after this manner. The ancients considering and revolving the ideas of their own minds, found that they had a clear and distinct conception of two things, as the general heads and principles of whatsoever was in the universe;

the one whereof was passive matter, and the other active power, vigour, and virtue. To the latter of which belongs both cogitation, and the power of moving matter, whether by express consciousness or no. Both which together may be called by one general name of life; so that they made these two general heads of being or entity; passive matter and bulk, and self-activity or life. The former of these was commonly called by the ancients the *τὸ πάσχον*, that which suffers and receives,—and the latter the *τὸ ποιοῦν*, the active principle,—and the *τὸ ὅθεν ἢ αἴτια δευτέρου καὶ κινήσεως*, that from whence motions springs. *Phil.*

—“In rerum natura (saith Cicero* according to the general sense of the ancients) duo quærenda sunt; unum, quæ materia sit, ex qua quæque res efficiatur; alterum, quæ res sit quæ quicque efficiat.” There are two things to be inquired after in nature; one, what is the matter out of which every thing is made; another, what is the active cause or efficient.—To the same purpose Seneca,^b “Esse debet aliquid unde fiat, deinde à quo fiat; hoc est causa, illud materia;” There must be something out of which a thing is made, and then something by which it is made; the latter is properly the cause, and the former the matter.—Which is to be understood of corporeal things and their differences, that there must be both matter, and an active power, for the production of them. And so also that of Aristotle;^c *ὅθεν αἰτίας αἰτίας μᾶς μὲν ὅθεν τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναι φάμεν τῆς κινήσεως;*

* De Finibus bonorum et malorum, lib. i. cap. vi. p. 2346. tom. viii. oper.

^b Epistol. lxxv. tom. ii. oper. p. 160.

^c Physicor. lib. ii. cap. iii. p. 463. tom. i. oper.

μίας δὲ τῆς ὕλης· That, from whence the principle of motion is, is one cause, and the matter is another.—Where Aristotle gives that name of cause to the matter also, though others did appropriate it to the active power. And the writer *De Placitis Philosophorum** expresses this as the general sense of the ancients: ἀδύνατον ἀρχὴν μίαν ὕλην τῶν ὄντων ἐξ ἧς τὰ πάντα ὑποστῆναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ποιῶν αἴτιον χρὴ υποτιθεῖναι, οἷον οὐκ ἄργυρος ἀρκεῖ πρὸς τὸ ἔκπωμα γένεσθαι ἀν μὴ καὶ τὸ ποιῶν ἦ, τουτέστιν ὁ ἀργυροκόπος, ὁμοίως καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ χαλκοῦ, καὶ τοῦ ξύλου, καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ὕλης· It is impossible, that matter alone should be the sole principle of all things, but there must of necessity be supposed also an agent or efficient cause: as silver alone is not sufficient to make a cup, unless there be an artificer to work upon it. And the same is to be said concerning brass, wood, and other natural bodies.—

Now as they apprehended a necessity of these two principles, so they conceived them to be such, as could not be confounded together into one and the same thing or substance, they having such distinct ideas and essential characters from one another; the Stoics being the only persons, who, offering violence to their own apprehensions, rudely and unskilfully attempted to make these two distinct things to be one and the same substance. Wherefore, as the first of these, viz. matter; or passive extended bulk, is taken by all for substance, and commonly called by the name of body; so the other, which is far the more noble of the two, being that, which acts upon the matter, and hath a commanding power over it, must needs be substance too, of a different kind from

* Lib. i. cap. iii. p. 876. tom. i. opor. Plutarchi.

matter or body; and therefore immaterial or incorporeal substance. Neither did they find any other entity to be conceivable, besides these two, passive bulk or extension, which is corporeal substance, and internal self-activity or life, which is the essential character of substance incorporeal; to which latter belongs not only cogitation, but also the power of moving body.

Moreover, when they further considered the first of these, the material or corporeal principle, they being not able clearly to conceive any thing else in it, besides magnitude, figure, site, and motion or rest, which are all several modes of extended bulk, concluded therefore, according to reason, that there was really nothing else existing in bodies without, besides the various complexions and conjugations of those simple elements, that is, nothing but mechanism. Whence it necessarily followed, that whatsoever else was supposed to be in bodies, was, indeed, nothing but our modes of sensation, or the fancies and passions in us begotten from them, mistaken for things really existing without us. And this is a thing so obvious, that some of those philosophers, who had taken little notice of the Atomical physiology, had notwithstanding a suspicion of it; as for example, Plotinus,* who, writing of the criterion of truth, and the power of reason, hath these words, *Καὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἃ δὲ δοκεῖ πιστὴν ἔχειν ἐναργεστάτην, ἀπιστεῖται μήποτε οὐκ ἐν τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ἔχει τὴν δοκοῦσαν ὑπόστασιν, καὶ νοῦ δεῖ ἢ διανοίας τῶν κρινόντων*. Though the things of sense seem to have so clear a certainty, yet, notwithstanding, it is doubted

* Libro, quod intelligibilia non sint extra intellectum, Ennead. v. lib. v. cap. i. p. 520.

concerning them, whether (the qualities of them) have any real existence at all in the things without us, and not rather a seeming existence only, in our own passions; and there is need of mind or understanding to judge in this case, and to determine the controversy, which sense alone cannot decide.—But the ancient physiologists concluded without any hesitancy, *οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστὶ τὸ μέλι τῷ γλυκάζεσθαι με, καὶ τὸ ἀψίνθιον τῷ πικράζεσθαι*, That the nature of honey in itself, is not the same thing with my being sweetened, nor of wormwood with that sense of bitterness which I have from it;—*διαφέρειν δὲ τὸ πάθος τοῦ ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένου, καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις, τὰ μὲν ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενα οὐ καταλαμβάνειν, μόνα δὲ εἰ ἄρα τὰ ἐαυτῶν πάθη*. But that the passion of sense differed from the absolute nature of the thing itself without; the senses not comprehending the objects themselves, but only their own passions from them.—

I say, therefore, that the ancients concluded the absolute nature of corporeal things in themselves to be nothing but a certain disposition of parts, in respect of magnitude, figure, site, and motion, which in tastes cause us to be differently affected with those senses of sweetness and bitterness, and in sight with those fancies of colours, and accordingly in the other senses with other fancies; and that the corporeal world was to be explained by these two things, whereof one is absolute in the bodies without us, the various mechanism of them; the other relative only to us, the different fancies in us, caused by the respective differences of them in themselves. Which fancies, or fantastic ideas, are no modes of the bodies without us, but of that only in ourselves, which is cogita-

live or self-active, that is, incorporeal. For the sensible ideas of hot and cold, red and green, &c. cannot be clearly conceived by us as modes of the bodies without us, but they may be easily apprehended as modes of cogitation, that is, of sensation, or sympathetical perception in us.

The result of all which was, that whatsoever is either in ourselves, or the whole world, was to be reduced to one or other of these two principles; passive matter and extended bulk, or self-active power and virtue; corporeal or incorporeal substance; mechanism or life; or else to a complication of them both together.

XXVIII. From this general account, which we have now given of the origin of the Atomical physiology, it appears, that the doctrine of incorporeal substance sprung up together with it. But this will be further manifest from that which follows. For we shall in the next place shew, how this philosophy did, in especial manner, owe its original to the improvement of one particular principle of reason, over and besides all the rest; namely, that famous axiom, so much talked of amongst the ancients,

• *De nihilo nihil, in nihilum nil posse reverti*;

That nothing can come from nothing, nor go to nothing.—For though Democritus, Epicurus, and Lucretius abused this theorem, endeavouring to carry it further than the intention of the first Atomists, to the disproving of a Divine creation of any thing out of nothing by it; “*Nullam rem à nihilo gigni divinitus unquam*,”^b and consequently of

^a Persii Satir. lili, ver. 84.

^b Lucret. lib. i, ver. 151,

a Deity : yet as the meaning of it was at first confined and restrained, that nothing of itself could come from nothing, nor go to nothing, or that according to the ordinary course of nature (without an extraordinary Divine power) nothing could be raised from nothing, nor reduced to nothing ; it is not only an undoubted rule of reason in itself, but it was also the principal original of that Atomical physiology, which, discarding forms and qualities, acknowledged really nothing else in body besides mechanism.

Wherefore, it was not in vain, or to no purpose, that Laetius, in the life of Democritus,* takes notice of this as one of his Dogmata, μηδὲν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος γίνεσθαι, μηδὲ εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν φθείρεσθαι, that nothing was made or generated out of nothing, nor corrupted into nothing ;—this being a fundamental principle, not only of his Atheism, but also of that very Atomical physiology itself, which he pursued. And Epicurus, in his epistle to Herodotus,† plainly fetches the beginning of all his philosophy from hence : Πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι οὐδὲν γίνεται ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, καὶ οὐδὲν φθίρεται εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν. Εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐγένετο τὸ ἐκφαίνόμενον ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, πᾶν ἐκ πάντος ἐγίνετ' ἂν, σπερμάτων γε οὐδὲν προσδεόμενον· καὶ εἰ ἐφθίρετο δὲ τὸ ἀφανιζόμενον εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν, πάντα ἂν ἀπολώλει τὰ πράγματα οὐκ ὄντων τῶν εἰς ἃ διελύετο. We fetch the beginning of our philosophy (saith he) from hence, that nothing is made out of nothing or destroyed to nothing ; for if things were made out of nothing, then every thing might be made out of every thing, neither would there be any need of seeds. And if whatsoever is corrupted were destroyed to no-

* Lib. ix. segm. 44. p. 572.

† Apud Diog. Laert. lib. x. segm. 38, 39. p. 619, &c.

thing, then all things would at length be brought to nothing.—Lucretius in like manner beginning here, insists more largely upon those grounds of reason hinted by Epicurus. And first, that nothing can be made out of nothing he proves thus:

- Nam si de nihilo fierent, ex omnibus rebus
Omne genus nasci posset: nil semine egeret:
E mare primum homines et terra posset oriri
Squamigerum genus, &c.
Nec fructus iidem arboribus constare solerent,
Sed mutarentur: ferre omnes omnia possent.
Præterea cur vere rosam, frumenta calore,
Vites autumnno fundi suadente videmus? &c.
Quod si de nihilo fierent, subito exorerentur
Incerto spatio atque alienis partibus anni.

In like manner he argues, to prove that nothing is corrupted into nothing:

- Huc accedit uti quicque in sua corpora rursum
Dissolvat natura; neque ad nihilum interimatres:
Nam si quid mortale a cunctis partibus esset,
Ex oculis res quæque repente erepta periret.
Præterea quæcunque vetustate amovet ætas,
Si penitus perimit, consumens materiam omnem,
Unde animale genus generatim in lumina vitæ
Redducit Venns? aut reductum Dædala tellus
Unde alit atque auget? generatim pabula præbens, &c.
- Haud igitur penitus pereunt quæcunque videntur,
Quando aliud ex alio reficit natura; nec ullam
Rem gigni patitur nisi morte adjunctam aliena.

In which passages, though it be plain, that Lucretius doth not immediately drive at Atheism, and nothing else, but primarily at the establishing of a peculiar kind of Atomical physiology, upon which indeed these Democritics afterward endeavoured to graft Atheism; yet, to take away that suspicion, we shall in the next place shew, that,

^a Lucret. lib. i. ver. 160, &c.

^b Id. lib. i. ver. 216, &c.

^c Id. lib. i. ver. 263, &c.

generally, the other ancient physiologers also, who were Theists, did likewise build the structure of their philosophy upon the same foundation, that nothing can come from nothing, nor go to nothing: as, for example, Parmenides, Melissus, Zeno, Xenophanes, Anaxagoras, and Empedocles. Of Parmenides and Melissus Aristotle thus writes,^a οὐδὲν οὐδὲ γίνεσθαι φασιν οὐδὲ φθείρεσθαι τῶν ὄντων. They say that no real entity is either generated or corrupted,—that is, made anew out of nothing, or destroyed to nothing. And Simplicius tells us,^b that Parmenides gave a notable reason for the confirmation of this assertion, that nothing in nature could be made out of nothing, αἰτίαν τοῦ δεῖν πάντως ἐξ ὄντος, γίνεσθαι τὸ γινόμενον, θανμαστώς ὁ Παρμενίδης προσέθηκεν, ὅπως γὰρ φησιν, εἰ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, τίς ἢ ἀποκλήρασις τοῦ τότε γενέσθαι ὅτε ἐγένετο, ἀλλὰ μὴ πρότερον ἢ ὕστερον. Because if any thing be made out of nothing, then there could be no cause, why it should then be made, and neither sooner nor later.—Again Aristotle^c testifies of Xenophanes and Zeno, that they made this a main principle of their philosophy, μὴ ἐνδεχέσθαι γίνεσθαι μηδὲν ἐκ μηδενός, that it cannot be, that any thing should be made out of nothing:—and of this Xenophanes, Sextus the philosopher tells us,^d

^a De Coelo, lib. iii. cap. i. p. 668. tom. i. oper.

^b Commentar. in Libros physicos Aristot. fol. 22. b. edit. Græc.

^c Libro de Xenophane, Gorgia, et Zenone, cap. i. p. 894. tom. ii. oper.

^d Dr. Cudworth was led into a mistake by Henry Stephens, who, in his *Poetis Philosophica*, p. 36, where he states this opinion of Xenophanes concerning the Deity, and produces the verses which contain it, tells us, that he had borrowed them from Sextus the philosopher, by whom he undoubtedly means Sextus Empiricus. But though this latter writer, in his *Hypotypos. Pyrrhon*, lib. i. cap. xxxiii. p. 50. gives a large account of Xenophanes's opinion concerning God; yet we du

that he held *ὅτι εἷς καὶ ἀσώματος θεός*. That there was but one God, and that he was incorporeal,—speaking thus of him :

*Εἷς θεός ἐστι θεοῖσι καὶ ἀσθενέσσιν μέγιστος,
Οὗτοι δὲ μᾶς θνητοῖσιν ἰμοῖός, αὐτὶ νῆμα.*

Aristotle^a also writes in like manner concerning Empedocles, *ἅπαντα ταῦτα κακῆνος ὁμολογεῖ ὅτι ἐκ τε μὴ ὄντος ἀμήχανόν ἐστι γενέσθαι, τό τε ὄν ἐξόλλυσθαι ἀνήνυστον καὶ ἄρρηκτον*. Empedocles acknowledges the very same with other philosophers, that it is impossible any thing should be made out of nothing, or perish into nothing.—And as for Anaxagoras, it is sufficiently known to all, that his Homœomeria, or doctrine of similar atoms (which was a certain spurious kind of Atomism) was nothing but a superstructure made upon this foundation. Besides all which, Aristotle^b pronounces universally concerning the ancient physiologers, without any exception, that they agreed in this one thing, *περὶ ταύτης ὁμογνημονοῦσι τῆς δόξης οἱ περὶ φύσεως, ὅτι τὸ γιγνόμενον ἐκ μὴ ὄντων γίγνεσθαι ἀδύνατον*. The physiologers generally agree in this (laying it down for a grand foundation) that it is impossible, that any thing should be made out of nothing.—And again, he calls this *κοινὴν δόξαν τῶν φυσικῶν*, the common opinion of naturalists ;—intimating, also, that they concluded it the greatest absurdity, that any physiologer could be guilty of, to lay down such principles, as from whence it would follow, that any

not find in any part of his writings what is quoted from him by Stephens, who should have cited to that purpose Clemens Alexandria. *Stromat. lib. v. c. xiv. p. 714.*

^a De Xenophane, &c. cap. ii. p. 836.

^b Physicor. lib. i. cap. v. p. 451. tom. i. oper.

real entity in nature did come from nothing, and go to nothing.

Now, it may well be supposed, that all these ancient physiologers (the most of which were also Theists) did not keep such a stir about this business for nothing; and therefore we are in the next place to shew, what it was that they drove at in it. And we do affirm, that one thing, which they all aimed at, who insisted upon the forementioned principle, was the establishing some Atomical physiology or other, but most of them at such as takes away all forms and qualities of bodies (as entities really distinct from the matter and substance), and resolves all into mechanism and fancy. For it is plain, that if the forms and qualities of bodies be entities really distinct from the substance, and its various modifications, of figure, site, and motion, that then, in all the changes and transmutations of nature, all the generations and alterations of body (those forms and qualities being supposed to have no real existence any where before), something must of necessity be created or-produced miraculously out of nothing; as likewise reduced into nothing in the corruptions of them, they having no being any where afterward. As for example; whenever a candle is but lighted or-kindled into a flame, there must needs be a new form of fire, and new qualities of light and heat, really distinct from the matter and substance, produced out of nothing, that is, created; and the same again reduced into nothing, or annihilated, when the flame is extinguished. Thus, when water is but congealed at any time into snow, hail, or ice, and when it is again dissolved; when wax is by liquefaction made soft and trans-

parent, and changed to most of our senses; when the same kind of nourishment taken in by animals is turned into blood, milk, flesh, bones, nerves, and all the other similar parts; when that which was in the form of bright flame, appears in the form of dark smoke; and that which was in the form of vapour, in the form of rain or water, or the like; I say, that in all these mutations of bodies, there must needs be something made out of nothing. But that in all the Protean transformations of nature, which happen continually, there should be real entities thus perpetually produced out of nothing and reduced to nothing, seemed to be so great a paradox to the ancients, that they could by no means admit of it. Because, as we have already declared, first they concluded it clearly impossible by reason, that any real entity should of itself rise out of nothing; and secondly, they thought it very absurd to bring God upon the stage, with his miraculous extraordinary power, perpetually at every turn; as also, that every thing might be made out of every thing, and there would be no cause in nature for the production of one thing rather than another, and at this time rather than that, if they were miraculously made out of nothing. Wherefore they sagaciously apprehended, that there must needs be some other mystery or intrigue of nature in this business, than was commonly dreamed of, or suspected; which they concluded to be this, that in all these transformations there were no such real entities of forms and qualities distinct from the matter, and the various disposition of its parts, in respect of figure, site, and motion (as is vulgarly supposed) produced and destroyed; but that all these feats

were done, either by the concretion and secretion of actually in-existent parts, or else by the different modifications of the same pre-existent matter, or the insensible parts thereof. This only being added hereunto, that from those different modifications of the small particles of bodies (they being not so distinctly perceived by our senses), there are begotten in us certain confused phasmata or phantasmata, apparitions, fancies, and passions, as of light and colours, heat and cold, and the like, which are those things, that are vulgarly mistaken for real qualities existing in the bodies without us; whereas, indeed, there is nothing absolutely in the bodies themselves like to those fantastic ideas that we have of them; and yet they are wisely contrived by the Author of nature for the adorning and embellishing of the corporeal world to us.

So that they conceived, bodies were to be considered two manner of ways, either as they are absolutely in themselves, or else as they are relatively to us: and as they are absolutely in themselves, that so there never was any entity really distinct from the substance produced in them out of nothing, nor corrupted or destroyed to nothing, but only the accidents and modifications altered. Which accidents and modifications are no entities really distinct from their substance; forasmuch as the same body may be put into several shapes and figures, and the same man may successively stand, sit, kneel, and walk, without the production of any new entities really distinct from the substance of his body. So that the generations, corruptions, and alterations of inanimate bodies are not terminated in the pro-

duction or destruction of any substantial forms, or real entities distinct from the substance, but only in different modifications of it. But secondly, as bodies are considered relatively to us, that so besides their different modifications and mechanical alterations, there are also different fancies, seemings, and apparitions begotten in us from them; which unwary and unskilful philosophers mistake for absolute forms and qualities in bodies themselves. And thus they concluded, that all the phenomena of inanimate bodies, and their various transformations, might be clearly resolved into these two things; partly something that is real and absolute in bodies themselves, which is nothing but their different mechanism, or disposition of parts in respect of figure, site, and motion; and partly something that is fantastical in the sentient.

That the Atomical physiology did emerge after this manner from the principle of reason, that nothing comes from nothing, nor goes to nothing, might be further convinced from the testimony of Aristotle, writing thus concerning it: *Ἐκ τοῦ γίνεσθαι ἐξ ἀλλήλων τ' ἀναίτια ἐνυπῆρχεν ἄρα· εἰ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ γινόμενον ἀνάγκη γίνεσθαι ἢ ἐξ ὄντων ἢ ἐξ μὴ ὄντων· τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν, ἐκ μὴ ὄντων γίνεσθαι ἀδύνατον, περὶ γὰρ ταύτης ὁμογνωμονοῦσι τῆς δόξης ἅπαντες οἱ περὶ φύσεως· τὸ λεῖπον ἥδε συμβαίνειν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐνόμισαν· ἐξ ὄντων μὲν καὶ ἐνυπαρχόντων γίνεσθαι, διὰ δὲ σμικρότητα τῶν ὄγκων ἐξ ἀνασθητῶν ἡμῖν.* The ancient physiologists concluded, that because contraries were made out of one another, that therefore they were before (one way or other) in-existent; arguing in this manner, that if whatsoever be made, must needs

Aristot. lib. 1. cap. v. p. 461.

be made out of something or out of nothing, and this latter (that any thing should be made out of nothing) is impossible, according to the general consent of all the ancient physiologers; then it follows of necessity, that all corporeal things are made or generated out of things that were really before and existent, though by reason of the smallness of their bulks they were insensible to us.—Where Aristotle plainly intimates, that all the ancient philosophers, whosoever insisted upon this principle, that nothing comes from, nor goes to nothing, were one way or other Atomical, and did resolve all corporeal things into *ὄγκους τινάς διὰ τῆς σμικρότητος ἀτασθητοῦς ἡμῶν*, certain molecules or corpuscula, which by reason of their smallness were insensible to us,—that is, into atoms. But yet there was a difference between these Atomists, forasmuch as Anaxagoras was such an Atomist, as did notwithstanding hold forms and qualities really distinct from the mechanical modifications of bodies. For he not being able (as it seems) well to understand that other Atomical physiology of the ancients, that, exploding qualities, solved all corporeal phenomena by mechanism and fancy; and yet acknowledging, that that principle of theirs, which they went upon, must needs be true, that nothing could of itself come from nothing, nor go to nothing, framed a new kind of atomology of his own, in supposing the whole corporeal world or mass of matter to consist of similar atoms, that is, such as were originally endued with all those different forms and qualities that are vulgarly conceived to be in bodies, some bony, some fleshy, some fiery, some watery, some white, some black, some bitter,

some sweet, and the like, so that all bodies whatsoever had some of all sorts of these atoms (which are in a manner infinite) specifically differing from one another in them. *πάν ἐν παντί μίχθαι, διότι πᾶν ἐκ παντός γίγνεται, φαίνεται δὲ διαφέρειν, καὶ πρόσθεν γινέσθαι ἕτερα ἀλλήλων ἐκ τοῦ μάλιστα ἐπιτρέχοντος διὰ τὸ πλήθος ἐν τῇ μίξει τῶν ἀπειρῶν, &c.* That all things were in every thing mingled together, because they saw, that every thing was made of every thing; but that things seemed to differ from one another, and were denominated to be this or that, from those atoms, which are most predominant in the mixture, by reason of their multiplicity:—whence he concluded, that all the generations, corruptions, and alterations of bodies were made by nothing but the concretions and secretions of in-existent and pre-existent atoms of different forms and qualities, without the production of any new form and quality out of nothing, or the reduction of any into nothing. This very account Aristotle gives of the Anaxagorean hypothesis: *τοῦτε Ἀναξαγόρας οὕτως ἀπειρα οἰσθῆναι τὰ στοιχεῖα, διὰ τὸ ὑπολαμβάνειν, τὴν κοινὴν δόξην τῶν φυσικῶν εἶναι ἀληθῆ, ὡς οὐ γινομένου οὐδενός ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος.* Anaxagoras seemeth, therefore, to make infinite atoms endued with several forms and qualities to be the elements of bodies, because he supposed that common opinion of physiologists to be true, that nothing is made of nothing.—But all the other ancient physiologists that were before Anaxagoras, and likewise those after him, who, insisting upon the same principle of nothing coming from nothing, did not Anaxagorize, as Empedocles, Democritus, and Protagoras, must needs make ὁμοιο-

• Ibid.

ἀσώματος, dissimilar molecular, and *ἀόριστος ἀσώματος*, atoms unformed and unqualified, otherwise than by magnitude, figure, and motion, to be the principles of bodies, and cashiering forms and qualities (as real entities distinct from the matter), resolve all corporeal phenomena into mechanism and fancy. Because, if no real entity can come from nothing, nor go to nothing, then one of these two things is absolutely necessary, that either these corporeal forms and qualities, being real entities distinct from the matter, should exist before generations and after corruptions, in certain insensible atoms originally such, according to the Anaxagorean doctrine; or else, that they should not be real entities distinct from the matter, but only the different modifications and mechanisms of it, together with different fancies. And thus we have made it evident, that the genuine Atomical physiology did spring originally from this principle of reason, that no real entity does of itself come from nothing, nor go to nothing.

xxix. Now we shall in the next place shew, how this very same principle of reason, which induced the ancients to reject substantial forms and qualities of bodies, and to physiologize atomically, led them also unavoidably to assert incorporeal substances; and that the souls of men and animals were such, neither generated nor corrupted. They had argued against substantial forms and qualities, as we have shewed, in this manner, that since the forms and qualities of bodies are supposed by all to be generated and corrupted, made anew out of nothing, and destroyed to nothing, that therefore they could not be real

entities distinct from the substance of matter, but only different modifications of it in respect of figure, site, and motion, causing different sensations in us; and were all to be resolved into mechanism and fancy. For as for that conceit of Anaxagoras, of pre and post-existent atoms, endued with all those several forms and qualities of bodies ingenerably and incorruptibly, it was nothing but an adulteration of the genuine Atomical philosophy, and a mere dream of his, in which very few followed him. And now they argue contrariwise for the souls of men and animals, in this manner; because they are plainly real entities distinct from the substance of matter and its modification; and men and brutes are not mere machines, neither can life and cogitation, sense and consciousness, reason and understanding, appetite and will, ever result from magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions; that therefore they are not corporeally generated and corrupted, as the forms and qualities of bodies are. Ἀδύνατον γίνεσθαι τι ἐκ μηδενός πρὸν ἄρχοντος. It is impossible for a real entity to be made or generated from nothing pre-existing. —Now, there is nothing of soul and mind, reason and understanding, nor indeed of cogitation and life, contained in the modifications and mechanism of bodies; and, therefore, to make soul and mind to rise out of body whensoever a man is generated, would be plainly to make a real entity to come out of nothing, which is impossible. I say, because the forms and qualities of bodies are generated and corrupted, made and unmade, in the ordinary course of nature, therefore they concluded, that they were not real entities distinct from the substance of body and its various modi-

fications; but because soul and mind is plainly a real entity distinct from the substance of body, its modification and mechanism; that therefore it was not a thing generated and corrupted, made and unmade, but such as had a being of its own, a substantial thing by itself. Real entities and substances are not generated and corrupted, but only modifications.

Wherefore these ancients apprehended, that there was a great difference betwixt the souls of men and animals, and the forms and qualities of other inanimate bodies, and consequently betwixt their several productions: forasmuch as in the generation of inanimate bodies there is no real entity acquired distinct from the substance of the thing itself, but only a peculiar modification of it. The form of stone, or of timber, of blood, flesh, and bone, and such other natural bodies generated, is no more a distinct substance or entity from the matter, than the form of a house, stool, or table is: there is no more new entity acquired in the generation of natural bodies, than there is in the production of artificial ones. When water is turned into vapour, candle into flame, flame into smoke, grass into milk, blood, and bones, there is no more miraculous production of something out of nothing, than when wool is made into cloth, or flax into linen; when a rude and unpolished stone is hewn into a beautiful statue; when brick, timber, and mortar, that lay together before disorderly, is brought into the form of a stately palace; there being nothing neither in one nor other of these, but only a different disposition and modification of pre-existent matter. Which matter of the universe is always substantially the same,

and neither more nor less, but only Proteanly transformed into different shapes. Thus we see, that the generation of all inanimate bodies is nothing but the change of accidents and modifications, the substance being really the same, both before and after. But in the generations of men and animals, besides the new disposition of the parts of matter and its organization, there is also the acquisition and conjunction of another real entity or substance distinct from the matter, which could not be generated out of it, but must needs come into it some other way. Though there be no substantial difference between a stately house or palace standing, and all the materials of the same ruined and demolished, but only a difference of accidents and modifications; yet, between a living man and a dead carcass, there is, besides the accidental modification of the body, another substantial difference, there being a substantial soul and incorporeal inhabitant dwelling in the one and acting of it, which the other is now deserted of. And it is very observable, that Anaxagoras himself, who made bony and fleshy atoms, hot and cold, red and green, and the like, which he supposed to exist before generations and after corruptions, always immutably the same (that so nothing might come from nothing, and go to nothing), yet he did not make any animalish atoms sensitive and rational. The reason whereof could not be, because he did not think sense and understanding to be as real entities as hot and cold, red and green; but because they could not be supposed to be corporeal forms and qualities, but

¹⁶ Vide Aristot. de Anima, lib. i. cap. ii. p. 5. tom. ii. et Metaphysic. lib. i. c. iii. tom. ii. p. 293.

must needs belong to another substance that was incorporeal. And therefore Anaxagoras could not but acknowledge, that all souls and lives did pre and post-exist by themselves, as well as those corporeal forms and qualities, in his similar atoms.

xxx. And now it is already manifest, that from the same principle of reason before mentioned, that nothing of itself can come from nothing, nor go to nothing, the ancient philosophers were induced likewise to assert the soul's immortality, together with its incorporeity or distinctness from the body. No substantial entity ever vanisheth of itself into nothing; for if it did, then in length of time all might come to be nothing. But the soul is a substantial entity, really distinct from the body, and not the mere modification of it; and, therefore, when a man dies, his soul must still remain and continue to have a being somewhere else in the universe. All the changes that are in nature, are either accidental transformations and different modifications of the same substance, or else they are conjunctions and separations, or anagrammatical transpositions of things in the universe; the substance of the whole remaining always entirely the same. The generation and corruption of inanimate bodies is but like the making of a house, stool, or table, and the un-making or marring of them again; either different modifications of one and the same substance, or else divers mixtures and separations, concretions and secretions. And the generation and corruption of animals is likewise nothing but

οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ μυστήριον, ὡς καὶ τὸ πρῶτον.

The conjunction of souls together with such particular bodies, and the separation of them again

from one another,—and so as it were the anagrammatical transposition of them in the universe. That soul and life, that is now fled and gone from a lifeless carcass, is only a loss to that particular body or compages of matter, which by means thereof is now disanimated; but it is no loss to the whole, it being but transposed in the universe, and lodged somewhere else.

XXXI. It is also further evident, that this same principle, which thus led the ancients to hold the soul's immortality, or its future permanency after death, must needs determine them likewise to maintain its *πρὸυπαρξίς*, or pre-existence, and consequently its *μετεσσωμάτωσις*, or transmigration. For that which did pre-exist before the generation of any animal, and was then somewhere else, must needs transmigrate into the body of that animal where now it is. But as for that other transmigration of human souls into the bodies of brutes, though it cannot be denied but that many of these ancients admitted it also, yet Timæus Locrus,* and divers others of the Pythagoreans, rejected it, any otherwise than as it might be taken for an allegorical description of that beastly transformation that is made of men's souls by vice. Aristotle tells us again,^b agreeably to what was declared before, *ὅτι μάλιστα φοβούμενοι διείλησαν οἱ παλαιοὶ τὸ ἐκ μηδενός γίνεσθαι τι προὔκταρχοντος*: that the ancient philosophers were afraid of nothing more than this one thing, that any thing should be made out of nothing pre-existent:—and therefore they must needs conclude, that the souls of all

* De Anima Mundi et Natura, inter Scriptores Mythologicos a Tho. Gale editos, p. 566.

^b De Generatione et Corruption, lib. i. cap. iii. p. 704. tom. i. oper.

animals pre-existed before their generations. And indeed it is a thing very well known, that, according to the sense of philosophers, these two things were always included together in that one opinion of the soul's immortality, namely, its pre-existence as well as its post-existence. Neither was there ever any of the ancients before Christianity, that held the soul's future permanency after death, who did not likewise assert its pre-existence; they clearly perceiving, that if it were once granted, that the soul was generated, it could never be proved but that it might be also corrupted. And, therefore, the assertors of the soul's immortality commonly began here: first, to prove its pre-existence, proceeding thence afterward to establish its permanency after death. This is the method used in Plato,* *ἡν ποτὲ πῦρ ἢ ψυχὴ πῦρ ἐν τῷδε τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶδα γενέσθαι, ὅτε καὶ τῶν ἀθανάτων ἐν τοῦτον ἢ ψυχὴ εἶναι*. Our soul was somewhere, before it came to exist in this present human form; and from thence it appears to be immortal, and such as will subsist after death. —And the chief demonstration of the soul's pre-existence to the ancients before Plato, was this, because it is an entity really distinct from body or matter, and the modifications of it; and no real substantial entity can either spring of itself out of nothing, or be made out of any other substance distinct from it, because nothing can be made *ἐκ μὲνός τινα ὁτιδήποτε ἢ προὔπαυτος*, from nothing either in-existing or pre-existing;—all natural generations being but the various dispositions and modifications of what was before existent in the universe. But there was nothing of soul and

* In Phædon, p. 382.

mind in-existing and pre-existing in body before, there being nothing of life and cogitation in magnitude, figure, site, and motion. Wherefore this must needs be, not a thing made or generated, as corporeal forms and qualities are, but such as hath a being in nature ingenerably and incorruptibly. The mechanism of human body was a thing made and generated, it being only a different modification of what was before existent, and having no new entity in it distinct from the substance: and the totum or compositum of a man or animal may be said to be generated and corrupted, in regard of the union and disunion, conjunction and separation of those two parts, the soul and body. But the soul itself, according to these principles, is neither a thing generable nor corruptible, but was as well before the generation, and will be after the deaths and corruptions of men, as the substance of their body, which is supposed by all to have been from the first creation, and no part of it to be annihilated or lost after death, but only scattered and dispersed in the universe. Thus the ancient Atomists concluded, that souls and lives being substantial entities by themselves, were all of them as old as any other substance in the universe, and as the whole mass of matter, and every smallest atom of it is: that is, they who maintained the eternity of the world, did consequently assert also *æternitatem animorum* (as Cicero calls it), the eternity of souls and minds. But they, who conceived the world to have had a temporary beginning or creation, held the coevity of all souls with it, and would by no means be induced to think, that every atom of senseless matter and particle of dust had such a

privilege and pre-eminency over the souls of men and animals, as to be the senior to them. Synesius, though a Christian, yet having been educated in this philosophy, could not be induced by the hopes of a bishopric to stifle or dissemble this sentiment of his mind,* *ἀμέλει τὴν ψυχὴν οὐκ ἄξιόσω ποτὲ σώματος ὑστερογενῇ νομίζω*. I shall never be persuaded to think my soul to be younger than my body.—But such, it seems, was the temper of those times, that he was not only dispensed withal as to this, but also as to another heterodoxy of his concerning the resurrection.

xxxii. It is already plain, also, that this doctrine of the ancient Atomists concerning the immateriality and immortality, the pre and post-existence of souls, was not confined by them to human souls only, but extended universally to all souls and lives whatsoever; it being a thing that was hardly ever called into doubt or question by any before Cartesius, whether the souls of brutes had any sense, cogitation, or consciousness in them or no: Now all life, sense, and cogitation was undoubtedly concluded by them to be an entity really distinct from the substance of body, and not the mere modification, motion, or mechanism of it; life and mechanism being two distinct ideas of the mind, which cannot be confounded together. Wherefore they resolved, that all lives and souls whatsoever, which now are in the world, ever were from the first beginning of it, and ever will be; that there will be no new ones produced, which are not already, and have not always been, nor any of those, which now are, de-

* Epistol. cv. p. 249. oper.

stroyed, any more than the substance of any matter will be created or annihilated. So that the whole system of the created universe, consisting of body, and particular incorporeal substances or souls, in the successive generations and corruptions, or deaths of men and other animals, was, according to them, really nothing else but one and the same thing perpetually anagrammatized, or but like many different syllables and words variously and successively composed out of the same pre-existent elements or letters.

XXXIII. We have now declared, how the same principle of reason, which made the ancient physiologists to become Atomists, must needs induce them also to be Incorporealists; how the same thing, which persuaded them, that corporeal forms were no real entities distinct from the substance of the body, but only the different modifications and mechanisms of it, convinced them likewise, that all cogitative beings, all souls and lives whatsoever, were ingenerable and incorruptible, and as well pre-existent before the generations of particular animals, as post-existent after their deaths and corruptions. Nothing now remains but only to shew more particularly, that it was *de facto* thus; that the same persons did, from this principle (that nothing can come from nothing, and go to nothing), both atomize in their physiology, taking away all substantial forms and qualities, and also theologize or incorporealize, asserting souls to be a substance really distinct from matter, and immortal, as also to pre-exist. And this we shall do from Empedocles, and first from that passage of his cited before in part:

^a "Αλλὰ δι' οὐ τίς ἐστιν, φύσις οὐδὲν ἔσται ἐκείνη
 οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐδὲ τις οὐλομένη κατάτου γένεσις (al. lect. τέλει);
 'Αλλὰ μέντοι μέγιστε διὰ διαφορῆς τε μίγνυνται
 ἔσται, φύσις δ' ἐστὶν τῆς ἀναμάρτου ἀνθρώπου.

Which I find Latined thus :

Ast aliud dico ; nihil est mortalibus ortus ;
 Est nihil interitus, qui rebus morte paratur ;
 Mistio sed solum est, et conciliatio rerum
 Mistilium ; hæc dici solita est mortalibus ortus.

The full sense whereof is plainly this, that there is no φύσις, or production of any thing, which was not before ; no new substance made, which did not really pre-exist ; and, therefore, that in the generations and corruptions of inanimate bodies, there is no form or quality really distinct from the substance produced and destroyed, but only a various composition and modification of matter. But in the generations and corruptions of men and animals, where the souls are substances really distinct from the matter, that there, there is nothing but the conjunction and separation of souls and particular bodies, existing both before and after, not the production of any new soul into being, which was not before, nor the absolute death and destruction of any into nothing.—Which is further expressed in these following verses :

^b Νήπια, αὐ γὰρ σφιν δαλιχόφρονες εἰσι μέγιστα,
 Οἱ δὲ γένεσθαι πάρος οὐκ ἔνι ἐκτείνουσιν,
 Ἦναι καταβήσονται τε καὶ ἡβήσονται ἀνέκτου.

To this sense ; that they are infants in understanding, and short-sighted, who think any thing to be

^a Apud Plutarch. advers. Colotem, p. iv. tom. ii. oper. et ex parte apud Aristot. de Generatione et Corruptione, lib. i. c. i. p. 698. tom. i. oper.

^b Apud Plutarch. adv. Colotem, p. 1113. tom. ii. oper.

made, which was nothing before, or any thing to die, so as to be destroyed to nothing.—Upon which Plutarch glosses after this manner: οὐκ ἀναρρεῖ γένεσιν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, οὐδὲ φθορὰν ἀλλὰ τὴν πάντη, τούτῳ τὴν εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν ἀπολύουσιν. Empedocles does not here destroy generation, but only such as is out of nothing; nor corruption, but such as is into nothing.—Which, as we have already intimated, is to be understood differently in respect to inanimate and animate things; for in things inanimate, there is nothing produced or destroyed, because the forms and qualities of them are no entities really distinct from the substance, but only diverse mixtures and modifications. But in animate things, where the souls are real entities really distinct from the substance of the body, there is nothing produced nor destroyed neither, because those souls do both exist before their generations, and after their corruptions; which business, as to men and souls, is again more fully expressed thus :—

Ὅτε δὲ ἀπὸς τοιαῦτα σφὸς φρεσὶ μαντεύονται,
Ὅτε ὅρρα μὲν το βίῃσι, τὸ δὲ θάνατον καλέουσιν,
Τόρρα μὲν οὐκ εἶσι, καὶ οὐρα σάρα θανά καὶ ἰσθλῆ,
Ἐπὶ δὲ πάντες θεία καὶ καὶ ἄνθρωποι οὐδὲν εἰσι.

That good and ill did first as here attend,
And not from time before, the soul descend;
That here alone we live, and when
Hence we depart, we forthwith then
Turn to our old non-entity again;
Certe ought not to be believed by wise and learned men.

Wherefore, according to Empedocles, this is to be accounted one of the vulgar errors, that men then only have a being and are capable of good

* Apud Plutarch. adv. Colotem, p. 1113. tom. ii. oper.

and evil, when they live here that which is called life; but that both before they are born, and after they are dead, they are perfectly nothing.

And besides Empedocles, the same is represented by the Greek tragedian also,* as the sense of the ancient philosophers;

ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι οὐδὲν τῶν γινόμενων,
διακρινόμενον ὅ' ἄλλο' πρὸς ἄλλο
μόρφῃ ἰτίαν ἀνιδιόν.

That nothing dies or utterly perisheth; but things being variously concreated and secreted, transposed and modified, change their form and shape only, and are put into a new dress.—

Agreeably whereunto, Plato also tells us,^b that it was παλαιὸς λόγος, an ancient tradition or doctrine before his time, τοὺς ζῶντας ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων γεγονέναι, οὐδὲν ἦττον ἢ τοὺς τεθνεώτας ἐκ τῶν ζώντων, that as well the living were made out of the dead, as the dead out of the living;—and that this was the constant circle of nature. Moreover, the same philosopher acquaints us, that some of those ancients were not without suspicion, that what is now called death, was to men more properly a nativity or birth into life, and what is called generation into life, was comparatively rather to be accounted a sinking into death; the former being the soul's ascent out of these gross terrestrial bodies to a body more thin and subtile, and the latter its descent from a purer body to that which is more crass and terrestrial. *τίς οὐδὲν εἰ τὸ ζῆν μὲν ἐστὶ*

* Euripid. in Chrysippo apud Clement. Alexandr. Stromat. lib. vi. p. 750.

^b In Phædone, p. 381.

^c This passage of Euripides is cited by many of the ancients, as Plato, Cicero, Clemens Alex. and Sextus Empiricus. See the notes of Dr.

καθαίνῃ, τὸ καθαίνῃ δὲ ζῆν' who knows whether that which is called living be not indeed rather dying; and that which is called dying, living?—

Moreover, that this was the doctrine of Pythagoras himself, that no real entity perishes in corruptions, nor is produced in generations, but only new modifications and transpositions made; is fully expressed by the Latin poet,* both as to inanimate, and to animate things. Of the first thus :

Nec perit in tanto quicquam (mihi credite) mundo,
Sed variat, faciemque novat: nascique vocatur
Incipere esse aliud, quam quod fuit ante; morique
Desinere illud idem. Cum sint huc forsitan illa,
Hæc translata illuc: summa tamen omnia constant.

Of the second, that the souls of animals are immortal, did pre-exist and do transmigrate, from the same ground, after this manner :

Omnia mutantur; nihil interit: errat et illinc,
Huc venit, hinc illuc, et quolibet occupat artus
Spiritus, etque feris humana in corpora transit,
Inque feras noster, nec tempore deperit ullo.
Utque novis facilis signatur cera figuris,
Nec manet ut fuerat, nec formas servat easdem,
Sed tamen ipsa eadem est; animam sic semper eandem
Esse, sed in varias doceo migrare figuras.

Wherefore though it be a thing, which hath not been commonly taken notice of, of late; yet we conceive it to be unquestionably true, that all those ancient philosophers, who insisted so much upon this principle, οὐδὲν οὐδὲ γίνεσθαι οὐδὲ φθείρεσθαι τῶν ὄντων that no real entity is either generated or

Potter, now Archbishop of Canterbury, on Clem. Alexand. Stromat. lib. iii. cap. iii. p. 517. et Jo. Albert Fabricius on Sextus Empiric. Hypotyph. Pyrrhon. lib. iii. cap. xxiv. p. 185.

* Ovid. Metam. lib. xv. ver. 254. et ver. 165.

corrupted,—did therein at once drive at these two things : first, the establishing of the immortality of all souls, their pre and post-existence, forasmuch as being entities really distinct from the body, they could neither be generated nor corrupted; and secondly, the making of corporeal forms and qualities to be no real entities distinct from the body and the mechanism thereof, because they are things generated and corrupted, and have no pre and post-existence. Anaxagoras, in this latter, being the only dissenter; who supposing those forms and qualities to be real entities likewise, distinct from the substance of body, therefore attributed perpetuity of being to them also, pre and post-existence, in similar atoms, as well as to the souls of animals.

And now we have made it sufficiently evident, that the doctrine of the incorporeity and immortality of souls, we might add also, of their pre-existence and transmigration, had the same original, and stood upon the same basis with the Atomical physiology; and therefore it ought not at all to be wondered at (what we affirmed before) that the same philosophers and Pythagoreans asserted both those doctrines, and that the ancient Atomists were both Theists and Incorporealists.

xxxiv. But now to declare our sense freely concerning this philosophy of the ancients, which seems to be so prodigiously paradoxical, in respect of that pre-existence and transmigration of souls; we conceive indeed, that this ratiocination of theirs from that principle, that nothing naturally or of itself, comes from nothing, nor goes to nothing, was not only firmly conclusive against sub-

stantial forms and qualities of bodies, really distinct from their substance, but also for substantial incorporeal souls, and their ingenerability out of matter, and particularly for the future immortality or post-existence of all human souls. For since it is plain, that they are not a mere modification of body or matter, but an entity and substance really distinct from it, we have no more reason to think, that they can ever of themselves vanish into nothing, than that the substance of the corporeal world, or any part thereof, can do so. For that, in the consumption of bodies by fire, or age, or the like, there is the destruction of any real substance into nothing, is now generally exploded as an idiotical conceit; and certainly it cannot be a jot less idiotical to suppose, that the rational soul in death is utterly extinguished.

Moreover, we add also, that this ratiocination of the ancients would be altogether as firm and irrefragable likewise for the pre-existence and transmigration of souls, as it is for their post-existence and future immortality, did we not (as indeed we do) suppose souls to be created by God immediately, and infused in generations. For they being unquestionably a distinct substance from the body, and no substance, according to the ordinary course of nature, coming out of nothing, they must of necessity either pre-exist in the universe before generations, and transmigrate into their respective bodies; or else come from God immediately, who is the fountain of all, and who at first created all that substance that now is in the world besides himself. Now the latter of these was a thing, which those ancient philosophers would by no means admit of; they

judging it altogether incongruous to bring God upon the stage perpetually, and make him immediately interpose every where, in the generations of men and all other animals, by the miraculous production of souls out of nothing. Notwithstanding which, if we well consider it, we shall find, that there may be very good reason on the other side for the successive Divine creation of souls; namely, that God did not do all at first, that ever he could or would do, and put forth all his creative vigour at once, in a moment, ever afterwards remaining a spectator only of the consequent results, and permitting nature to do all alone, without the least interposition of his at any time, just as if there were no God at all in the world. For this may be and indeed often hath been, the effect of such an hypothesis as this, to make men think, that there is no other God in the world but blind and dark nature. God might also, for other good and wise ends unknown to us, reserve to himself the continual exercise of this his creative power, in the successive production of new souls. And yet these souls nevertheless, after they are once brought forth into being, will, notwithstanding their juniority, continue as firmly in the same, without vanishing of themselves into nothing, as the substance of senseless matter, that was created many thousand years before, will do.

And thus our vulgar hypothesis of the new creation of souls, as it is rational in itself, so it doth sufficiently solve their incorporeity, their future immortality, or post-eternity, without introducing those offensive absurdities of their pre-existence and transmigration.

xxxv. But if there be any such, who, rather

than they would allow a future immortality or post-existence to all souls, and therefore to those of brutes, which consequently must have their successive transmigrations, would conclude the souls of all brutes, as likewise the sensitive soul in man, to be corporeal, and only allow the rational soul to be distinct from matter; to these we have only thus much to say, that they, who will attribute life, sense, cogitation, consciousness, and self-enjoyment, not without some footsteps of reason many times, to blood and brains, or mere organized bodies in brutes, will never be able clearly to defend the incorporeity and immortality of human souls, as most probably they do not intend any such thing. For either all conscious and cogitative beings are incorporeal, or else nothing can be proved to be incorporeal. From whence it would follow also, that there is no Deity distinct from the corporeal world. But though there seem to be no very great reason, why it should be thought absurd, to grant perpetuity of duration to the souls of brutes, any more than to every atom of matter, or particle of dust that is in the whole world; yet we shall endeavour to suggest something towards the easing the minds of those, who are so much burthened with this difficulty; viz. that they may, if they please, suppose the souls of brutes, being but so many particular emanations or effluxes from that source of life above, whensoever and wheresoever there is any fitly prepared matter capable to receive them, and to be actuated by them; to have a sense and fruition of themselves in it, so long as it continues such; but as soon as ever those organized bodies of theirs, by reason of their indisposition, become

incapable of being further acted upon by them; then to be resumed again and retracted back to their original head and fountain. Since it cannot be doubted, but what creates any thing out of nothing, or sends it forth from itself by free and voluntary emanation, may be able either to retract the same back again to its original source, or else to annihilate it at pleasure.

And I find, that there have not wanted some among the gentile philosophers themselves, who have entertained this opinion, whereof Porphyry is one: *λύεται ἐκάστη δύναμις ἄλογος εἰς τὴν ὅλην ζωὴν τοῦ πάντος*, every irrational power is resolved into the life of the whole.—

xxxvi. Neither will this at all weaken the future immortality or post-eternity of human souls. For if we be, indeed, Theists, and do in very good earnest believe a Deity, according to the true notion of it, we must then needs acknowledge, that all created being whatsoever owes the continuation and perpetuity of its existence, not to any necessity of nature without God, and independently upon him, but to the Divine will only. And, therefore, though we had never so much rational and philosophical assurance, that our souls are immaterial substances, distinct from the body, yet we could not, for all that, have any absolute certainty of their post-eternity, any otherwise than as it may be derived to us from the immutability and perfection of the Divine nature and will, which does always that which is best. For the essential goodness and wisdom of the Deity is the only stability of all things. And for aught we mortals know, there may be good reason, why that grace or favour of future immorta-

lity and post-eternity, that is indulged to human souls, endued with reason, morality, and liberty of will (by means whereof they are capable of commendation and blame, reward and punishment), that so they may be objects for Divine justice to display itself upon after this life, in different retributions, may, notwithstanding, be denied to those lower lives and more contemptible souls of brutes, alike devoid both of morality and liberty.

XXXVII. But if any, for all this, will still obstinately contend for that ancient Pythagoric and Empedoclean hypothesis, that all lives and souls whatsoever are as old as the first creation, and will continue to eternity, or as long as the world doth, as a thing more reasonable and probable than our continual creation of new souls, by means whereof they become juniors both to the matter of the world and of their own bodies, and whereby also (as they pretend) the Divine creative power is made too cheap and prostituted a thing, as being servile always to brutish, and many times to unlawful lusts and undue conjunctions; but especially than the continual de-creation and annihilation of the souls of brutes; we shall not be very unwilling to acknowledge thus much to them, that, indeed, of the two, this opinion is more reasonable and tolerable than that other extravagancy of those, who will either make all souls to be generated, and consequently to be corporeal, or at least the sensitive soul, both in men and brutes. For, besides the monstrosity of this latter opinion, in making two distinct souls and perceptive substances in every man, which is a thing sufficiently confuted by internal

sense, it leaves us also in an absolute impossibility of proving the immortality of the rational soul, the incorporeity of any substance, and, by consequence, the existence of any Deity distinct from the corporeal world.

And as for that pretence of theirs, that senseless matter may as well become sensitive, and, as it were, kindled into life and cogitation, as a body, that was devoid of life and heat, may be kindled into fire and flame; this seems to argue too much ignorance of the doctrine of bodies in men otherwise learned and ingenious; the best naturalists having already concluded, that fire and flame is nothing but such a motion of the insensible parts of a body, as whereby they are violently agitated, and many times dissipated and scattered from each other, begetting in the meantime those fancies of light and heat in animals. Now, there is no difficulty at all in conceiving, that the insensible particles of a body, which were before quiescent, may be put into motion; this being nothing but a new modification of them, and no entity really distinct from the substance of body, as life, sense, and cogitation are. There is nothing in fire and flame, or a kindled body, different from other bodies, but only the motion or mechanism, and fancy of it. And, therefore, it is but a crude conceit, which the Atheists and Corporealists of former times have been always so fond of, that souls are nothing but fiery or flammeous bodies. For, though heat in the bodies of animals be a necessary instrument for soul and life to act by in them, yet it is a thing really distinct from life; and a red-hot iron bath not, therefore, any nearer approximation to life

than it had before, nor the flame of a candle than the extinguished snuff or tallow of it; the difference between them being only in the agitation of the insensible parts. We might also add, that, according to this hypothesis, the souls of animals could not be numerically the same throughout the whole space of their lives; since that fire, that needs a pabulum to prey upon, doth not continue always one and the same numerical substance. The soul of a new-born animal could be no more the same with the soul of that animal several years after, than the flame of a new-lighted candle is the same with that flame that twinkles last in the socket; which, indeed, are no more the same than a river or stream is the same at several distances of time. Which reason may be also extended further to prove the soul to be no body at all, since the bodies of all animals are in a perpetual flux.

xxxviii. We have now sufficiently performed our first task, which was to shew, from the origin of the Atomical physiology, that the doctrine of incorporeal substance must needs spring up together with it. We shall, in the next place, make it manifest, that the inward constitution of this philosophy is also such, that whosoever really entertains it, and rightly understands it, must of necessity admit incorporeal substance likewise. First, therefore, the Atomical hypothesis, allowing nothing to body, but what is either included in the idea of a thing impenetrably extended, or can clearly be conceived to be a mode of it, as more or less magnitude, with divisibility, figure, site, motion, and rest, together with the results of their several combinations, cannot possibly make life and cogitation to be qualities of body; since

they are neither contained in those things before-mentioned, nor can result from any *συζυγία*, or conjugations of them. Wherefore it must needs be granted, that life and cogitation are the attributes of another substance distinct from body, or incorporeal.

Again, since according to the tenour of this physiology, body hath no other action belonging to it but that of local motion, which local motion; as such, is essentially heterokinesy, that which never springs originally from the thing itself moving, but always from the action of some other agent upon it; that is, since no body could ever move itself, it follows undeniably, that there must be something else in the world besides body, or else there could never have been any motion in it. Of which we shall speak more afterwards.

Moreover, according to this philosophy, the corporeal phenomena themselves cannot be solved by mechanism alone without fancy. Now fancy is no mode of body, and therefore must needs be a mode of some other kind of being in ourselves, that is, cogitative and incorporeal.

Furthermore, it is evident from the principles of this philosophy, that sense itself is not a mere corporeal passion from bodies without, in that it supposeth, that there is nothing really in bodies like to those fantastic ideas that we have of sensible things, as of hot and cold, red and green, bitter and sweet, and the like, which, therefore, must needs owe their being to some activity of the soul itself; and this is all one as to make it incorporeal.

Lastly, from this philosophy, it is also manifest, that sense is not the *κρίτηριον* of truth con-

cerning bodies themselves, it confidently pronouncing, that those supposed qualities of bodies, represented such by sense, are merely fantastical things; from whence it plainly follows, that there is something in us superior to sense, which judges of it, detects its fantasy, and condemns its imposture; and determines what really is and is not, in bodies without us, which must needs be a higher self-active vigour of the mind, that will plainly speak it to be incorporeal.

XXXIX. And now this Atomical physiology of the ancients seems to have two advantages or pre-eminences belonging to it, the first whereof is this, that it renders the corporeal world intelligible to us; since mechanism is a thing that we can clearly understand, and we cannot clearly and distinctly conceive any thing in bodies else. To say that this or that is done by a form or quality, is nothing else but to say, that it is done we know not how; or, which is yet more absurd, to make our very ignorance of the cause, disguised under those terms of forms and qualities, to be itself the cause of the effect.

Moreover, hot and cold, red and green, bitter and sweet, &c. formally considered, may be clearly conceived by us as different fancies and vital passions in us, occasioned by different motions made from the objects without upon our nerves; but they can never be clearly understood as absolute qualities in the bodies themselves, really distinct from their mechanical dispositions; nor is there, indeed, any more reason, why they should be thought such, than that, when a man is pricked with a pin, or wounded

with a sword, the pain which he feels should be thought to be an absolute quality in the pin or sword. So long as our sensible ideas are taken either for substantial forms or qualities in bodies without us, really distinct from the substance of the matter, so long are they perfectly unintelligible by us. For which cause, Timæus Locrus,* philosophizing (as it seemeth) after this manner, did consentaneously thereunto determine, that corporeal things could not be apprehended by us, otherwise than αἰσθήσει καὶ νόθῳ λογισμῷ, by sense and a kind of spurious or bastardly reason;—that is, that we could have no clear conceptions of them in our understanding. And, for the same reason, Plato^b himself distinguisheth betwixt such things as are νοήσαι μετὰ λόγου περιληπτά^c comprehensible by the understanding with reason,—and those which are only δόξῃ μετ' αἰσθήσεως ἀλόγου, which can only be apprehended by opinion, together with a certain irrational sense;—meaning plainly, by the latter, corporeal and sensible things. And accordingly the Platonists frequently take occasion, from hence, to enlarge themselves much in the disparagement of corporeal things, as being, by reason of that smallness of entity that is in them, below the understanding, and not having so much οὐσίαν as γένεσιν,^c essence as generation,—which, indeed, is fine fancy. Wherefore, we must either, with these philosophers, make sensible things to be ἀκατάληπτα or

* De Anima Mundi, inter Scriptor. Mytholog. a Tho. Gale editos. p. 545.

^b Vide Theætetum, p. 139. s. oper. Sophistam. p. 166, 167. et de Repub. lib. vii. p. 484.

^c Plato de Republica, ubi supra.

ἀπρόληπτα, altogether incomprehensible and inconceivable—by our human understandings (though they be able, in the meantime, clearly to conceive many things of a higher nature), or else we must entertain some kind of favourable opinion concerning that which is the ancientest of all physiologies, the Atomical or mechanical, which alone renders sensible things intelligible.

XI. The second advantage, which this Atomical physiology seems to have, is this, that it prepares an easy and clear way for the demonstration of incorporeal substances, by settling a distinct notion of body. He that will undertake to prove, that there is something else in the world besides body, must first determine what body is, for otherwise he will go about to prove, that there is something besides he knows not what. But now, if all body be made to consist of two substantial principles, whereof one is matter devoid of all form (and therefore of quantity as well as qualities), from whence these philosophers* themselves conclude, that it is incorporeal; the other, form, which, being devoid of all matter, must needs be incorporeal likewise. (And thus Sto-

* ἀσώματος
καὶ ἄλης—
Matter is incorporeal.
Plotin. p.
164.

bæus* sets down the joint doctrine both of Plato and Aristotle; ὃν τρόπον τὸ εἶδος τῆς ὕλης ἀφαιρεθὲν ἀσώματον, οὕτως καὶ τὴν ὕλην τοῦ εἶδους χωρισθέντος σώμα εἶναι, δεῖν γὰρ ἀμφοῖν τῆς συνόδου, πρὸς τὴν τοῦ σώματος ὑπόστασιν. That in the same manner, as form alone separated from matter is incorporeal, so neither is matter alone, the form being separated from it, body. But there is need of the joint concurrence of both these, matter and form together,

* Eclog. Phys. lib. i. cap. xiv. p. 29.

to make up the substance of the body.)—Moreover, if to forms qualities be likewise superadded, of which it is consentaneously also resolved by the Platonists, *ὅτι αἱ ποιότητες ἀσώματα*, that qua-

lities are incorporeal,—as if they were so many spirits possessing bodies; I say, in this way of philosophizing, the notions of body and spirit, corporeal and incorporeal, are so confounded, that it

is impossible to prove any thing at all concerning them; body itself being made incorporeal (and therefore every thing incorporeal); for whatsoever is wholly compounded and made up of incorporeals, must needs be itself also incorporeal.

Furthermore, according to this doctrine of matter, forms, and qualities in body, life and understanding may be supposed to be certain forms or qualities of body. And then the souls of men may be nothing else but blood or brains, endued with the qualities of sense and understanding; or else some other more subtle, sensitive, and rational matter, in us. And the like may be said of God himself also; that he is nothing but a certain rational, or intellectual, subtle and fiery body, pervading the whole universe; or else that he is the form of the whole corporeal world, together with the matter making up but one substance. Which conceits have been formerly entertained by the best of those ancients, who were captivated under that dark infirmity of mind, to think, that there could be no other substance besides body.

But the ancient Atomical philosophy, settling a distinct notion of body, that it is *διαστρέν ἀνέναντον*, a thing impenetrably extended,—which hath nothing belonging to it but magnitude, figure, site,

Alcibius,
cap. 11. [In-
rod. in Phi-
los. Platon.
p. 479.]

rest, and motion, without any self-moving power, takes away all confusion; shews clearly how far body can go, where incorporeal substance begins; as also, that there must of necessity be such a thing in the world.

Again, this discovering not only that the doctrine of qualities had its original from men's mistaking their own fancies for absolute realities in bodies themselves; but also, that the doctrine of matter and form sprang from another fallacy or deception of the mind, in taking logical notions, and our modes of conceiving, for modes of being, and real entities in things without us; it shewing, likewise, that because there is nothing else clearly intelligible in body, besides magnitude, figure, site, and motion, and their various conjunctions, there can be no such entities of forms and qualities really distinct from the substance of body; makes it evident, that life, cogitation, and understanding can be no corporeal things, but must needs be the attributes of another kind of substance distinct from body.

XII. We have now clearly proved these two things: first, that the physiology of the ancients, before, not only Aristotle and Plato, but also Democritus and Leucippus, was Atomical or mechanical. Secondly, that as there is no inconsistency between the Atomical physiology and theology, but indeed a natural cognation: so the ancient Atomists, before Democritus, were neither Atheists nor Corporealists, but held the incorporeity and immortality of souls, together with a Deity distinct from the corporeal world. Wherefore, the first and most ancient Atomists did not make ἀτόμους ἀρχὰς τῶν ὅλων, they never endea-

voured to make up an entire philosophy out of Atomology; but the doctrine of Atoms was to them only one part or member of the whole philosophic system, they joining thereunto the doctrine of incorporeal substance and theology, to make it up complete; accordingly, as Aristotle hath declared in his *Metaphysics*, that the ancient philosophy consisted of these two parts, *φυσιολογία* and *θεολογία* or *ἡ πρώτη φιλοσοφία*, physiology, and theology or metaphysics. Our ancient Atomists never went about, as the blundering Democritus afterwards did, to build up a world out of mere passive bulk, and sluggish matter, without any *ἀρχαὶ δραστήριοι*, any active principles, or incorporeal powers; understanding well, that thus they could not have so much as motion, mechanism, or generation in it; the original of all that motion that is in bodies springing from something that is not body, that is, from incorporeal substance. And yet, if local motion could have been supposed to have risen up, or sprung in upon this dead lump and mass of matter, nobody knows how, and without dependence upon any incorporeal being, to have actuated it fortuitously; these ancient Atomists would still have thought it impossible for the corporeal world itself to be made up, such as now it is, by fortuitous mechanism, without the guidance of any higher principle. But they would have concluded it the greatest impudence or madness, for men to assert, that animals also consisted of mere mechanism; or, that life and sense, reason and understanding, were really nothing else but local motion, and consequently, that themselves were but machines and automata. Wherefore, they joined

both active and passive principles together, the corporeal and incorporeal nature, mechanism and life, Atomology and Pneumatology; and, from both these united, they made up one entire system of philosophy, correspondent with, and agreeable to, the true and real world without them. And this system of philosophy, thus consisting of the doctrine of incorporeal substance (whereof God is the head), together with the Atomical and mechanical physiology, seems to have been the only genuine, perfect, and complete.

XLII. But it did not long continue thus; for, after a while, this entire body of philosophy came to be mangled and dismembered, some taking one part of it alone, and some another; some snatching away the Atomical physiology, without the pneumatology and theology; and others, on the contrary, taking the theology and doctrine of incorporeals, without the Atomical or mechanical physiology. The former of these were Democritus, Leucippus, and Protagoras, who took only the dead carcass or skeleton of the old Moschical philosophy, namely, the Atomical physiology; the latter, Plato and Aristotle, who took, indeed, the better part, the soul, spirit, and quintessence of it, the theology and doctrine of Incorporeals, but unbodied, and divested of its most proper and convenient vehicle, the Atomical physiology, whereby it became exposed to sundry inconveniences.

XLIII. We begin with Leucippus and Democritus; who, being atheistically inclined, quickly perceived, that they could not, in the ordinary way of physiologizing, sufficiently secure themselves against a Deity, nor effectually urge Athe-

ism upon others; forasmuch as Heraclitus and other philosophers, who held that all substance was body, as well as themselves, did, notwithstanding, assert a corporeal Deity, maintaining, that the form of the whole corporeal world was God, or else that he was *ἅλη πῶς ἔχουσα*, a certain kind of body or matter, as (for example) a methodical and rational fire, pervading (as a soul) the whole universe; the particular souls of men and animals being but, as it were, so many pieces cut and sliced out of the great mundane soul: so that, according to them, the whole corporeal universe, or mass of body, was one way or other a God, a most wise and understanding animal, that did frame all particularities within itself in the best manner possible, and providently govern the same. Wherefore, those Atheists now apprehending, upon what ticklish and uncertain terms their Atheistical philosophy then stood, and how that those very forms and qualities, and the self-moving power of body, which were commonly made a sanctuary for Atheism, might, notwithstanding, chance to prove, contrariwise, the latibulum and asylum of a Deity, and that a corporeal God (do what they could) might lie lurking under them, assaulting men's minds with doubtful fears and jealousies; understanding, moreover, that there was another kind of physiology set on foot, which, banishing those forms and qualities of body, attributed nothing to it but magnitude, figure, site, and motion, without any self-moving power; they seemed presently to apprehend some great advantage to themselves and cause from it; and therefore, greedily entertained this Atomical or mechanical physiology, and violently cutting it

off from that other part, the doctrine of Incorporeals, which it was naturally and vitally united to, endeavoured to serve their turns of it. And now joining these two things together, the Atomical physiology, which supposes, that there is nothing in body but magnitude, figure, site, and motion, and that prejudice or prepossession of their own minds, that there was no other substance in the world besides body; between them both they begat a certain mongrel and spurious philosophy, atheistically Atomical, or atomically Atheistical.

But though we have so well proved, that Leucippus and Democritus were not the first inventors, but only the depravers and adulterators of the Atomical philosophy; yet, if any will, notwithstanding, obstinately contend, that the first invention thereof ought to be imputed to them, the very principles of their Atheism seeming to lead them naturally to this, to strip and divest body of all those forms and qualities, it being otherwise impossible for them, surely and safely, to exclude a corporeal Deity; yet so, as that the wit of these Atheists was also much to be admired, in the managing and carrying on of those principles in such a manner, as to make up so entire a system of philosophy out of them, all whose parts should be so coherent and consistent together; we shall only say thus much: that if those Atheists were the first inventors of this philosophy, they were certainly very unhappy and unsuccessful in it, whilst endeavouring by it to secure themselves from the possibility and danger of a corporeal God, they unawares laid a foundation for the clear demonstration of an

incorporeal one, and were indeed so far from making up any such coherent frame as is pretended, that they were forced every where to contradict their own principles. So that nonsense lies at the bottom of all, and is interwoven throughout their whole Atheistical system; and that we ought to take notice of the invincible power and force of truth, prevailing irresistibly against all endeavours to oppress it; and how desperate the cause of Atheism is, when that very Atomical hypothesis of their's, which they would erect and build up for a strong castle to garrison themselves in, proves a most effectual engine against themselves, for the battering of all their Atheistical structure down about their ears.

XLIV. Plato's mutilation and interpolation of the old Moschical philosophy was a great deal more excusable, when he took the theology and metaphysics of it, the whole doctrine of Incorporeals, and abandoned the Atomical or mechanical way of physiologizing. Which in all probability he did, partly because those forementioned Atheists having so much abused that philosophy, adopting it as it were to themselves, he thereupon began to entertain a jealousy and suspicion of it; and partly, because he was not of himself so inclinable to physiology as theology, to the study of corporeal as of Divine things; which some think to be the reason, why he did not attend to the Pythagoric system of the corporeal world, till late in his old age. His genius was such, that he was naturally more addicted to ideas than to atoms, to formal and final than to material causes. To which may be added, that the way of physiologizing by matter, forms, and qualities, is a more huffy

and fanciful thing than the other; and lastly, that the Atomical physiology is more remote from sense and vulgar apprehension, and therefore not so easily understood. For which cause many learned Greeks of later times, though they had read Epicurus's works, and perhaps Democritus's too, yet they were not able to conceive, how the corporeal and sensible phenomena could possibly be solved without real qualities; one instance whereof might be given in Plutarch, writing against Colotes, the Epicurean. Wherefore Plato, that was a zealous assertor of an incorporeal Deity, distinct from the world, and of immortal souls, seriously physiologized only by matter, forms, and qualities, generation, corruption, and alteration; and he did but play and toy sometimes a little with atoms and mechanism; as where he would compound the earth of cubical, and fire of pyramidal atoms, and the like. For that he did therein imitate the Atomical physiology, is plain from these words of his; *πάντα οὖν δει ταῦτα διανοεῖσθαι σμικρὰ οὕτως, ὡς καθ' ἓν ἕκαστον οὐδὲν ὁρώμενον ὑφ' ἡμῶν, συναθροισθέντων δὲ πολλῶν, τοὺς ὀγκοὺς αὐτῶν ὁρᾶσθαι*. All these cubical and pyramidal corpuscula of the fire and earth, are in themselves so small, that by reason of their parvitude, none of them can be perceived singly and alone, but only the aggregations of many of them together.—

XLV. And Aristotle here trod in Plato's footsteps, not only in the better part, in asserting an incorporeal Deity, and an immoveable First Mover; but also in physiologizing by forms and qualities, and rejecting that mechanical way by atoms;

* In *Timæ.* p. 537. *oper.*

which had been so generally received amongst the ancients. Wherefore, though the genius of these two persons was very different, and Aristotle often contradicteth Plato, and really dissents from him in several particularities; yet, so much I think may be granted to those reconcilers (Porphyry, Simplicius, and others), that the main essentials of their two philosophies are the same.

Now, I say, the whole Aristotelical system of philosophy is infinitely to be preferred before the whole Democritical; though the former hath been so much disparaged, and the other cried up of late amongst us. Because, though it cannot be denied, but that the Democritic hypothesis doth much more handsomely and intelligibly solve the corporeal phenomena, yet in all those other things, which are of far the greatest moment, it is rather a madness than a philosophy. But the Aristotelic system is right and sound here, as to those greater things; it asserting incorporeal substance, a Deity distinct from the world, the naturality of morality, and liberty of will. Wherefore, though a late writer of politics does so exceedingly disparage Aristotle's Ethics, yet we shall do him this right here to declare, that his ethics were truly such, and answered their title; but that new model of ethics, which hath been obtruded upon the world with so much fastuosity, and is indeed nothing but the old Democritic doctrine revived, is no ethics at all, but a mere cheat, the undermining and subversion of all morality, by substituting something like it in the room of it, that is a mere counterfeit and changeling, the design whereof could not be any other than to debauch the world.

We add further, that Aristotle's system of phi-

losophy seems to be more consistent with piety, than the Cartesian hypothesis itself, which yet plainly supposeth incorporeal substance. Forasmuch as this latter makes God to contribute nothing more to the fabric of the world, than the turning round of a vortex or whirlpool of matter; from the fortuitous motion of which, according to certain general laws of nature, must proceed all this frame of things that now is, the exact organization and successive generation of animals, without the guidance of any mind or wisdom. Whereas Aristotle's nature is no fortuitous principle, but such as doth nothing in vain, but all for ends, and in every thing pursues the best; and therefore can be no other than a subordinate instrument of the Divine wisdom, and the manuary opificer or executioner of it.

However, we cannot deny, but that Aristotle hath been taxed by sundry of the ancients, Christians and others, for not so explicitly asserting these two things, the immortality of human souls, and providence over men, as he ought to have done, and as his master Plato did. Though to do him all the right we can, we shall observe here, that in his *Nicomachian Ethics*,* he speaks favourably for the latter; *εἰ γὰρ τις ἐπιμέλεια τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὑπὸ θεῶν γίνεται, ὥσπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ εὐλογον χαίρειν αὐτοὺς τῇ ἀρίστῃ καὶ τῇ συγγενεστάτῃ (τοῦτο γὰρ εἴη ὁ νοῦς) καὶ τοὺς ἀγαποῦντας μάλιστα καὶ τοὺς τιμῶντας ἀνταποκρίν, ὃς τῶν φίλων αὐτοῖς ἐπιμελουμένους, ὀρθῶς τε καλῶς πράττοντας.* If God take any care of human things, as it seems he doth, then it is reasonable to think also, that he is delighted with that which is the best, and nearest akin to himself (which is

* Lib. x. cap. ix. p. 185. tom. iii. oper.

mind or right reason), and that he rewards those who most love and honour it (as taking care of such things as are most pleasing to him), in doing rightly and honestly.—A very good sentence, were it not ushered in with too much of scepticism. And as for the point of the soul's immortality, it is true; that whereas other philosophers, before Aristotle, asserted the pre-existence, incorporeity, and immortality of all souls, not only the rational, but the sensitive also (which in men they concluded to be one and the same substance), according to that of Plato's *πᾶσα ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος*, every soul is immortal,—they resolving that no life nor cogitation could be corporeal; Aristotle, on the contrary, doth expressly deny the pre-existence, that is, the separability, incorporeity, and immortality, of all sensitive souls, not in brutes only, but also every where, giving his reason for it in these words; *ὅτι μὲν οὐχ οἷόν τε πᾶσας προϋπάρχειν, φανερόν ἐστιν ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων, ὅσων γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀρχῶν ἡ ἐνέργεια σωματικὴ, δῆλον ὅτι ταύτας ἄνευ σώματος ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν, οἷον βαδίζειν ἄνευ ποδῶν ὥστε καὶ θύραθεν εἰσεῖναι ἀδύνατον· οὔτε γὰρ αὐτὰς καθ' ἑαυτὰς εἰσεῖναι οἷόν τε ἀχωρίστους οὕσας, οὐτ' ἐν σώματι εἰσεῖναι.* That all souls cannot pre-exist, is manifest from hence, because those principles, whose action is corporeal, cannot possibly exist without the body, as the power of walking without the feet. Wherefore it is impossible, that these sensitive souls (pre-existing) should come into the body from without, since they can neither come alone by themselves naked and stripped of all body, they being inseparable from it: neither can they come in with a body, that is, the seed.—This is Aristotle's argument, why all sensitive souls must needs

* De Generat. et Corruptione, lib. ii. cap. iii. p. 618. tom. ii. oper.

be corporeal, because there is no walking without feet, nor seeing without eyes. But at the same time he declares, that the mind or intellect does pre-exist and come in from without, that is, is incorporeal, separable, and immortal, giving his reason for it in like manner: * *λείπεται δὲ τὸν νοῦν μόνον θύραθεν ἐπεισεῖναι, καὶ θεῖον εἶναι μόνον· οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτοῦ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ κοινωνεῖ σωματικὴ ἐνέργεια*. It remains, that the mind or intellect, and that alone (pre-existing) enter from without, and be only Divine; since its energy is not blended with that of the body's, but it acts independently upon it.—Notwithstanding which, Aristotle elsewhere^b distinguishing concerning this mind or intellect, and making it to be twofold, agent and patient, concludes the former of them only to be immortal, but the latter corruptible; *τοῦτο μόνον ἀθάνατον καὶ αἰδίων, ὁ δὲ παθητικὸς νοῦς φθαρτός*, the agent intellect is only immortal and eternal, but the passive is corruptible:—where some interpreters, that would willingly excuse Aristotle, contend, that by the passive intellect is not meant the patient, but the fantasy only, because Aristotle should otherwise contradict himself, who had before affirmed the intellect to be separable, unmixed, and inorganic, which they conceive must needs be understood of the patient. But this salvo can hardly take place here, where the passive intellect is directly opposed to the agent. Now what Aristotle's agent understanding is, and whether it be any thing in us, any faculty of our human soul or no, seems to be a thing very questionable, and has therefore caused much dispute amongst his interpreters; it being resolved by many of them to be the Divine intellect, and

* Ibid.

^b De Anima, lib. iii. cap. vi. p. 50. tom. ii. oper.

commonly by others, a foreign thing. Whence it must needs be left doubtful, whether he acknowledged any thing incorporeal and immortal at all in us. And the rather because, laying down this principle, that nothing is incorporeal, but what acts independently upon the body, he somewhere plainly determines, that there is no intellection without corporeal phantasms. That, which led Aristotle to all this, positively to affirm the corporeity of sensitive souls, and to stagger so much concerning the incorporeity of the rational, seems to have been his doctrine of forms and qualities, whereby corporeal and incorporeal substance are confounded together, so that the limits of each could not be discerned by him. Wherefore we cannot applaud Aristotle for this; but that which we commend him for, is chiefly these four things: first, for making a perfect incorporeal intellect to be the head of all; and secondly, for resolving, that nature, as an instrument of this intellect, does not merely act according to the necessity of material motions, but for ends and purposes, though unknown to itself; thirdly, for maintaining the naturalness of morality; and lastly, for asserting the *τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῶν*, autexousy, or liberty from necessity.

CHAPTER II.

In this chapter are contained all the grounds of reason for the Atheistic hypothesis.—1. That the Democritic philosophy, which is made up of these two principles, Corporealism and Atomism complicated together, is essentially Atheistical.—2. Though Epicurus, who was an Atomical Corporealist, pretended to assert a democracy of gods, yet he was, for all that, an absolute Atheist; and that Atheists commonly equivocate and disguise themselves.—3. That the Democritical philosophy is nothing else but a system of Atheology, or Atheism swaggering under the glorious appearance of philosophy. And, though there be another form of Atheism, which we call Stratonical, yet the Democritic Atheism is only considerable; all whose dark mysteries will be here revealed.—4. That we being to treat concerning the Deity, and to produce all that profane and unhalloved stuff of Atheists in order to a confutation, the Divine assistance and direction ought to be implored.—5. That there are two things here to be performed; first, to shew what are the Atheists' pretended grounds of reason against the Deity; and, secondly, how they endeavour either to solve or confute the contrary phenomena. The first of these grounds, that no man can have an idea or conception of God, and that he is an incomprehensible nothing.—6. The second Atheistic argument, that there can be no creation out of nothing, nor no omnipotence, because nothing can come from nothing; and, therefore, whatsoever substantially is, was from eternity self-existent, and uncreated by any Deity.—7. The third pretended reason against a Deity, that the strictest notion of a God implying him to be incorporeal, there can be no such incorporeal Deity, because there is no other substance but body.—8. The Atheists' pretence, that the doctrine of incorporeal substances sprung from a ridiculous mistaking of abstract names and notions for realities. They impudently make the Deity to be but the chief of spectres, and an Oberon or prince of fairies and fancies. Their fourth argument against a Deity, that to suppose an incorporeal mind to be the original of all things, is but to make a mere accident and abstract notion to be the first cause of all.—9. Their fifth argument; a confutation of a corporeal Deity from the principles of Corporealism

itself, that matter being the only substance, and all other differences of things nothing but accidents, generable and corruptible, no living understanding being can be essentially incorruptible. The Stoical God incorruptible, only by accident.—10. Their sixth ratiocination from a complication of Atomism; that the first principle of all things whatsoever in the universe is Atoms, or corpuscula devoid of all qualities, and consequently of sense and understanding (which spring up afterwards from a certain composition of them), and therefore mind or Deity was not the first original of all.—11. In the seventh place they disprove the world's animation, or its being governed by a living, understanding, animalish nature, presiding over the whole; because sense and understanding are a peculiar appendix to flesh, blood, and brains, and reason is no where to be found but in human form.—12. The eighth Atheistic ground, that God being taken by all for a most happy, eternal, and immortal animal (or living being), there can be no such thing, because all living beings are concretions of atoms, that were at first generated, and are liable to death and corruption by the dissolution of their compages. And that life is no simple primitive nature, but an accidental modification of compounded bodies, which, upon the disunion of their parts, vanissheth into nothing.—13. The ninth pretended Atheistic demonstration, that by God is meant a first cause or mover, which was not before moved by any thing else without it; but nothing can move itself, and therefore there can be no unmoved mover, nor any first in the order of causes, that is, a God.—14. Their further proof of this principle, that nothing can move itself, with an Atheistic corollary from thence, that no thinking being could be a first cause, no cogitation arising of itself without a cause; which may be reckoned a tenth argument.—15. Another mystery of Atheism, that all knowledge and mental conception is the information of the things themselves known, existing without the knower, and a passion from them; and, therefore, the world must needs be before any knowledge or conception of it, and no knowledge or conception before the world, as its cause.—16. The twelfth argumentation, that things could not be made by a God, because they are so faulty and ill made, that they were not contrived for the good of man; and that the deluge of evils, that overflows all, shews that they did not proceed from any Deity.—17. The thirteenth instance of the Atheists against a Deity, from the defect of Providence, that, in human affairs, all is Tohu and Bohu, chaos and confusion.—18. The fourteenth Atheistic ground, that it is not possible for any one being to animad-

vert and order all things in the distant places of the whole world at once: but, if it were possible, that such infinite negotiosity would be absolutely inconsistent with happiness.—19. Several bold but slight queries of Atheists, why the world was not made sooner? and what God did before? why it was made at all, since it was so long unmade? and, how the architect of the world could rear up so huge a fabric?—20. The Atheists' pretence, that it is the great interest of mankind, that there should be no God; and that it was a noble and heroic exploit of the Democritics, to chase away that affrightful spectre out of the world, and to free men from the continual fear of a Deity and punishment after death, embittering all the pleasures of life.—21. Another pretence of their's, that Theism is inconsistent with civil sovereignty, it introducing a fear greater than the fear of the leviathan; and that any other conscience allowed of besides the civil law (being private judgment), is, *ipso facto*, a dissolution of the body politic, and a return to the state of nature.—22. The Atheists' conclusion from the former premises, as set down in Plato and Lucretius, that all things sprung originally from nature and chance, without any mind or God, that is, proceeded from the necessity of material motions, undirected for ends; that infinite atoms, devoid of life and sense, moving in infinite space from eternity, by their fortuitous rencounters and entanglements, produced the system of the whole universe, and as well animate as inanimate things.

1. HAVING, in the former chapter, given an account of the genuine and primitive Atomical philosophy, which may be called the Moschical; we are, in the next place, to consider the Democritical, that is, the atheized and adulterated Atomology: which had its origin from nothing else but the joining of this heterogeneous and contradictory principle to the Atomical physiology, that there is no other substance in the world besides body. Now we say, that that philosophy, which is thus compounded and made up of these two things, Atomicism and Corporealism complicated together, is essentially Atheistical, though neither of them alone be such. For the Atomical physiology, as we have declared already, is in its

own nature sufficiently repugnant to Atheism. And it is possible for one, who holds, that there is nothing in the world besides body, to be persuaded, notwithstanding, of a corporeal Deity, and that the world was at first framed and is still governed by an understanding nature lodged in the matter. For thus some of these Corporealists have fancied the whole universe itself to be a God, that is, an understanding and wise animal, that ordered all things within itself, after the best manner possible, and providently governed the same. Indeed, it cannot be denied, but that this is a very great infirmity of mind, that such persons lie under, who are not able to conceive any other substance besides body, by which is understood that which is impenetrably extended, or else, in Plato's language, which hath *προςβολὴν καὶ ἐπαφὴν*, that thrusts against other bodies, and resists their impulse;—or, as others express it, which is *τόπου πληρωτικόν*, that so fills up place—as to exclude any other body or substance from co-existing with it therein; and such must needs have, not only very imperfect, but also spurious and false conceptions of the Deity, so long as they apprehend it to be thus corporeal; but yet it does not, therefore, follow, that they must needs be accounted Atheists. But, whosoever holds these two principles (before-mentioned) together, that there is no other substance besides body, and that body hath nothing else belonging to it but magnitude, figure, site, and motion, without qualities: I say, whosoever is that confounded thing of an Atomist and Corporealist jumbled together, he is essentially and unavoidably that which is meant by an Atheist, though he

should in words never so much disclaim it, because he must needs fetch the original of all things from senseless matter; whereas, to assert a God, is to maintain, that all things sprung originally from a knowing and understanding nature.

II. Epicurus, who was one of those mongrel things before-mentioned (an Atomical Corporealist, or Corporeal Atomist), did, notwithstanding, profess to hold a multifarious rabble and democracy of gods, such as though they were ἀνθρωπόμορφοι,* of human form,—yet were so thin and subtile, as that, comparatively with our terrestrial bodies, they might be called incorporeal; they having not so much *carnem* as *quasi-carnem*, nor *sanguinem* as *quasi-sanguinem*, a certain kind of aerial or ethereal flesh and blood; which gods of his were not to be supposed to exist any where within the world, upon this pretence, that there was no place in it fit to receive them :

* Illud item non est, ut possis credere sedes
Esse Deum sanctas, in mundi partibus ullis.

And, therefore, they must be imagined to subsist in certain intermundane spaces, and Utopian regions without the world, the deliciousness whereof is thus elegantly described by the poet :

* Quas neque concutunt venti, neque nubila nimbis
Adspargunt, neque nix acri concreta pruina
Cana cadens violat, semperque innubilis aether
Integit, et large diffuso lumine ridet.

Whereunto was added, that the chief happiness of these gods consisted “in omnium vacatione

* Vide Ciceron. de Natur. Deor. lib. i. cap. xviii. p. 2907. tom. ix. oper.

^b Lucret. lib. v. ver. 147.

^c Id. lib. iii. ver. 19.

munerum," in freedom from all business and employment,—and doing nothing at all, that so they might live a soft and delicate life. And, lastly, it was pretended, that though they had neither any thing to do with us, nor we with them, yet they ought to be worshipped by us for their own excellent natures' sake and happy state.

But whosoever had the least sagacity in him could not but perceive, that this theology of Epicurus was but romantical, it being directly contrary to his avowed and professed principles, to admit of any other being, than what was con- creted of atoms, and consequently corruptible; and that he did this upon a politic account, thereby to decline the common odium, and those dangers and inconveniences which otherwise he might have incurred by a downright denial of a God, to which purpose it accordingly served his turn. Thus Posidonius^a rightly pronounced, "Nul- los esse deos Epicuro videri; quæque is de diis immortalibus dixerit, invidiæ detestandæ gratia dixisse." Though he was partly jocular in it also, it making no small sport to him, in this manner, to delude and mock the credulous vulgar;^b "Deos jocandi causa induxit Epicurus perlucidos et perflabiles, et habitantes tanquam inter duos lucos, sic inter duos mundos propter metum rui- narum." However, if Epicurus had been never so much in earnest in all this, yet, by Gassendus's leave, we should pronounce him to have been not a jot the less an Atheist, so long as he maintain- ed, that the whole world was made *μηδενός διατά-*

^a Apud Cicéron. de Natur. Deor. lib. i. cap. xlv. p. 2949. tom. ix. oper.

^b Cicero de Divin. l. ii. c. xvii. p. 3202. tom. ix. oper.

τοῦτος ἢ διατάξωντος τὴν πᾶσαν μακαριότητα ἔχοντος μετὰ ἀφθαρσίας, without the ordering and direction of any understanding being, that was perfectly happy and immortal;—and fetched the original of all things in the universe, even of soul and mind, ἀπὸ τῶν ἀτόμων σωμάτων ἀκρονόητον καὶ τυχαίαν ἔχόντων τὴν κίνησιν, from senseless atoms fortuitously moved.—He, together with Democritus, hereby making the world to be, in the worst sense, ὠὸν τῆς νυκτός, an egg of the night,—that is, not the offspring of mind and understanding, but of dark, senseless matter, of Tohu and Bohu, or confused chaos; and deriving the original of all the perfections in the universe from the most imperfect being, and the lowest of all entities, than which nothing can be more atheistical. And as for those romantic monogramous gods of Epicurus, had they been seriously believed by him, they could have been nothing else but a certain kind of aerial and spectrous men, living by themselves, nobody knows where, without the world: *Ἐπίκουρος ὡς μὲν πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀπολείπει Θεὸν ὡς δὲ πρὸς τοῦ φύσιν πραγμάτων οὐδαμῶς* Epicurus, according to vulgar opinion, leaves a God; but, according to the nature of things, none at all.—

And as Epicurus, so other Atheists, in like manner, have commonly had their vizards and disguises; Atheism, for the most part, prudently choosing to walk abroad in masquerade. And, though some over-credulous persons have been so far imposed upon hereby, as to conclude, that there was hardly any such thing as an Atheist any where in the world, yet they that are sagacious may easily look through these thin veils and

* Vide Sext. Empir. adv. Mathemat. lib. ix. p. 566. edit. Fabricii.

disguises, and perceive these Atheists oftentimes insinuating their Atheism even then, when they most of all profess themselves Theists, by affirming, that it is impossible to have any idea or conception at all of God; and that, as he is not finite, so he cannot be infinite, and that no knowledge or understanding is to be attributed to him; which is, in effect, to say, that there is no such thing. But whosoever entertains the Democritic principles, that is, both rejects forms and qualities of body, and makes all things to be body, though he pretend never so much to hold a corporeal Deity, yet he is not at all to be believed in it, it being a thing plainly contradictory to those principles.

III. Wherefore, this mongrel philosophy, which Leucippus, Democritus, and Protagoras were the founders of, and which was entertained afterwards by Epicurus, that makes (as Laertius writes)* *ἀρχὰς τῶν ὅλων ἀτόμους*, senseless atoms to be the first principles—not only of all bodies (for that was a thing admitted before by Empedocles and other Atomists that were Theists), but also of all things whatsoever in the whole universe, and therefore of soul and mind too; this, I say, was really nothing else but a philosophical form of Atheology, a gigantical and Titanical attempt to dethrone the Deity; not only by solving all the phenomena of the world without a God, but also by laying down such principles, from whence it must needs follow, that there could be neither an incorporeal nor corporeal Deity. It was Atheism openly swaggering under the glorious appearance of wisdom and philosophy.

* Lib. x. *segm.* 41. p. 620. et alibi.

There is, indeed, another form of Atheism, which (insisting on the vulgar way of philosophizing by forms and qualities) we, for distinction sake, shall call Stratonical; such as, being too modest and shamefaced to fetch all things from the fortuitous motion of atoms, would, therefore, allow to the several parts of matter a certain kind of natural (though not animal) perception, such as is devoid of reflexive consciousness, together with a plastic power, whereby they may be able artificially and methodically to form and frame themselves to the best advantage of their respective capabilities; something like to Aristotle's nature, but that it hath no dependance at all upon any higher mind or Deity. And these Atheists may be also called Hylozoic (as the other Atomic), because they derive all things in the whole universe, not only sensitive, but also rational souls, together with the artificial frame of animals, from the life of matter. But this kind of Atheism seems to be but an unshapen embryo of some dark and cloudy brains, that was never yet digested into an entire system, nor could be brought into any such tolerable form, as to have the confidence to shew itself abroad in full and open view. But the Democritic and Atomic Atheism, as it is the boldest and rankest of all Atheisms, it not only undertaking to solve all phenomena by matter fortuitously moved, without a God, but also to demonstrate, that there cannot be so much as a corporeal Deity; so it is that alone, which, pretending to an entire and coherent system, hath publicly appeared upon the stage, and therefore doth, in a manner, only deserve our consideration,

And now we shall exhibit a full view and

prospect of it, and discover all its dark mysteries and profundities; we being much of this persuasion, that a plain and naked representation of them will be a great part of a confutation at least; not doubting but it will be made to appear, that though this monster, big swoln with a puffy shew of wisdom, strut and stalk so gigantically, and march with such a kind of stately philosophic grandeur, yet it is, indeed, but like the giant *Orgoglio*, in our English poet, a mere empty bladder, blown up with vain conceit, an *Empusa*, phantasm, or spectre, the offspring of night and darkness, nonsense and contradiction.

And yet, for all that, we shall not wrong it the least in our representation, but give it all possible advantages of strength and plausibility, that so the Atheists may have no cause to pretend (as they are wont to do, in such cases) that either we did not understand their mysteries, nor apprehend the full strength of their cause, or else did purposely smother and conceal it. Which, indeed, we have been so far from, that we must confess we were not altogether unwilling this business of their's should look a little like something, that might deserve a confutation. And whether the Atheists ought not rather to give us thanks for mending and improving their arguments, than complain that we have any way impaired them; we shall leave it to the censure of impartial judgments.

iv. Plato^a tells us, that even amongst those Pagans in his time there was generally such a religious humour, that πάντες ὅσοι κατὰ βραχὺ σωφροσύνης μετέχουσι, ἐπὶ πάσῃ ὀρμῇ καὶ σμίκρῳ καὶ μεγάλῳ πράγματι

^a In *Timæo*, p. 235.

τοῦ, Θεὸν αὐτὸν ποῦ ἐπικαλοῦσι. Whosoever had but the least of seriousness and sobriety in them, whensoever they took in hand any enterprise, whether great or small, they would always invoke the Deity for assistance and direction.—Adding moreover, that himself should be very faulty, if in his *Timæus*, when he was to treat about so grand a point, concerning the whole world, εἰ γέγονεν ἢ καὶ ἀγενής ἐστι, whether it were made or unmade,—he should not make his entrance therein by a religious invocation of the Deity. Wherefore certainly it could not be less than a piece of impiety in a Christian, being to treat concerning the Deity itself, and to produce all that profane and unhallowed stuff of Atheists out of their dark corners, in order to a confutation, and the better confirmation of our faith in the truth of his existence, not to implore his direction and assistance. And I know no reason, but that we may well do it in that same litany of Plato's, κατὰ νοῦν ἐκάνω μὲν μάλιστα, ἐπομένως δὲ ἡμῖν εἰπεῖν, that we may first speak agreeably to his own mind, or becomingly of his nature, and then consentaneously with ourselves.

v. Now there are these two things here to be performed by us, first to discover and produce the chief heads of arguments, or grounds of reason, insisted on by the Atheists, to disprove a Deity, evincing withal briefly the ineffectualness and falseness of them: and secondly, to shew how they endeavour either to confute or solve, consistently with their own principles, all those phenomena, which are commonly urged against them to prove a Deity and incorporeal substance; manifesting likewise the invalidity thereof.

The grounds of reason alleged for the Atheist-

ical hypothesis are chiefly these that follow. First, That we have no idea of God, and therefore can have no evidence of him; which argument is further flourished and descanted upon in this manner: That notion or conception of a Deity, that is commonly entertained, is nothing but a bundle of incomprehensibles, unconceivables, and impossibles; it being only a compilement of all imaginable attributes of honour, courtship, and compliment, which the confounded fear and astonishment of men's minds made them huddle up together, without any sense or philosophic truth. This seems to be intimated by a modern writer* in these words: "The attributes of God signify not true nor false, nor any opinion of our brain, but the reverence and devotion of our hearts; and therefore they are not sufficient premises to infer truth, or convince falsehood." And the same thing again is further set out, with no small pretence to wit, after this manner: "They that venture to dispute philosophically, or reason of God's nature from these attributes of honour, losing their understanding in the very first attempt, fall from one inconvenience into another, without end, and without number; in the same manner, as when one, ignorant of the ceremonies of court, coming into the presence of a greater person than he is used to speak to, and stumbling at his entrance, to save himself from falling, lets slip his cloak, to recover his cloak lets fall his hat, and with one disorder after another, discovers his astonishment and rusticity." The meaning of which, and other like passages of the same writer, seems to be this; that the attributes of God (by which his nature

* Hobbes.

is supposed to be expressed) having no philosophic truth or reality in them, had their only original from a certain rustic astonishment of mind, proceeding from excess of fear, raising up the phantasm of a Deity, as a bugbear for an object to itself, and affrighting men into all manner of confounded nonsense, and absurdity of expressions concerning it, such as have no signification, nor any conception of the mind answering to them. This is the first argument, used especially by our modern Democritics, against a Deity, that because they can have no fantastic idea of it, nor fully comprehend all that is concluded in the notion thereof, that therefore it is but an incomprehensible nothing.

VI. Secondly, another argument much insisted on by the old Democritic Atheists, is directed against the Divine omnipotence and creative power; after this manner. By God is always understood a creator of something or other out of nothing. For however the Theists be here divided amongst themselves, some of them believing, that there was once nothing at all existing in this whole space, which is now occupied by the world, besides the Deity, and that he was then a solitary being, so that the substance of the whole corporeal universe had a temporary beginning, and novelty of existence, and the duration of it hath now continued but for so many years only: others persuading themselves, that though the matter and substance at least (if not the form also) of the corporeal world, did exist from eternity, yet nevertheless, they both alike proceeded from the Deity by way of emanation, and do continually depend upon it, in the same manner as light, though co-

eval with the sun, yet proceeded from the sun, and depends upon it, being always, as it were, made anew by it; wherefore, according to this hypothesis, though things had no antecedent non-entity in time, yet they were as little of themselves, and owed all their being as much to the Deity, as if they had been once actually nothing, they being, as it were, perpetually created out of nothing by it. Lastly, others of those Theists resolving, that the matter of the corporeal universe was not only from eternity, but also self-existent and uncreated or independent upon any Deity as to its being; but yet the forms and qualities of all inanimate bodies, together with the souls of all animals in the successive generations of them (being taken for entities distinct from the matter), were created by the Deity out of nothing. We say, though there be such difference among the Theists themselves, yet they all agree in this, that God is, in some sense or other, the creator of some real entity out of nothing, or the cause of that which otherwise would not have been of itself, so that no creation out of nothing (in that enlarged sense), no Deity. Now it is utterly impossible, that any substance or real entity should be created out of nothing, it being contradictory to that indubitable axiom of reason, *de nihilo nihil*, from nothing nothing. The argument is thus urged by Lucretius, according to the minds of Epicurus and Democritus :

* Principium hinc cujus nobis exordia sumet,
Nullam rem e nihilo gigni divinitus unquam,
Quippe ita formido mortales continet omnes,
Quod multa in terris fieri coeloque tuentur,

* Lib. i. vers. 150, &c.

Quorum operum causas nulla ratione videre
 Possunt, ac fieri divino numine rentur:
 Quas ob res, ubi viderimus nil posse creari
 De nihilo, tum quod sequimur, jam tutius inde
 Perspicimus, et unde queat res quæque creari,
 Et quo quæque modo fiant opera sine divum.

It is true, indeed, that it seems to be chiefly levelled by the poet against that third and last sort of Theists before-mentioned, such as Heraclitus and the Stoics (which latter were contemporary with Epicurus), who held the matter of the whole world to have been from eternity of itself uncreated, but yet the forms of mundane things in the successive generations of them (as entities distinct from the matter) to be created or made by the Deity out of nothing. But the force of the argument must needs lie stronger against those other Theists, who would have the very substance and matter itself of the world, as well as the forms, to have been created by the Deity out of nothing. Since nothing can come out of nothing, it follows, that not so much as the forms and qualities of bodies (conceived as entities really distinct from the matter), much less the lives and souls of animals, could ever have been created by any Deity, and therefore certainly not the substance and matter itself. But all substance and real entity, whatsoever is in the world, must needs have been from eternity, uncreated and self-existent. Nothing can be made or produced but only the different modifications of pre-existent matter. And this is done by motions, mixtures, and separations, concretions and secretions of atoms, without the creation of any real distinct entity out of nothing; so that there needs no Deity for the effecting of it, according to that of Epicurus, *ἡ θεία φύσις πρὸς ταῦτα*

μηδαμὴ προσεγίσθω, no Divine power ought to be called in for the solving of those phenomena.—To conclude, therefore, if no substance, nor real entity can be made, which was not before, but all whatsoever is, will be, and can be, was from eternity self-existent; then creative power, but especially that attribute of omnipotence, can belong to nothing; and this is all one as to say, there can be no Deity.

VII. Thirdly, the Atheists argue against the stricter and higher sort of Theists, who will have God to be the creator of the whole corporeal universe and all its parts out of nothing, after this manner: that which created the whole mass of matter and body, cannot be itself body; wherefore this notion of God plainly implies him to be incorporeal. But there can be no incorporeal Deity, because by that word must needs be understood, either that which hath no magnitude nor extension at all, or else that which is indeed extended, but otherwise than body. If the word be taken in the former sense, then nothing at all can be so incorporeal, as to be altogether unextended and devoid of geometrical quantity, because extension is the very essence of all existent entity, and that which is altogether unextended is perfectly nothing. There can neither be any substance, nor mode or accident of any substance, no nature whatsoever unextended. But if the word incorporeal be taken in the latter sense, for that which is indeed extended, but otherwise than body, namely so as to penetrate bodies and co-exist with them, this is also a thing next to nothing; since it can neither act upon any

other thing, nor be acted upon by, or sensible of, any thing; it can neither do nor suffer any thing.

* Nam facere et fungi nisi corpus nulla potest res.

Wherefore, to speak plainly, this can be nothing else but empty space, or vacuum, which runs through all things, without laying hold on any thing, or being affected from any thing. This is the only incorporeal thing, that is or can be in nature, space, or place; and therefore to suppose an incorporeal Deity is to make empty space to be the creator of all things.

This argument is thus proposed by the Epicurean poet:

* ————— Quodcunque erit esse aliquid, debebit id ipsum
 Augmine vel grandi vel parvo —————
 Cui si tactus erit, quamvis levis exiguusque,
 Corporum augebit numerum summamque sequetur:
 Sin intactile erit, nulla de parte quod ullam
 Rem prohibere queat per se transire meantem,
 Scilicet hoc id erit vacuum quod inane vocamus.

Whatsoever is, is extended or hath geometrical quantity and mensurability in it; which, if it be tangible, then it is body, and fills up a place in the world, being part of the whole mass; but if it be intangible, so that it cannot resist the passage of any thing through it, then it is nothing else but empty space or vacuum.—There is no third thing besides these two, and therefore whatsoever is not body, is space or nothing:

* ————— Præter inane et corpora tertia per se,
 Nulla potest rerum in numero natura relinqui.

* Lucret. lib. i. vers. 444, &c.

* Id. lib. i. vers. 434, &c.

* Id. lib. i. vers. 446.

Thus the ancient Epicureans and Democritics argued; there being nothing incorporeal but space, there can be no incorporeal Deity.

But, because this seems to give advantage to the Theists, in making space something, or that which hath a real nature or entity without our conception, from whence it will follow, that it must needs be either itself a substance, or else a mode of some incorporeal substance; the modern Democritics are here more cautious, and make space to be no nature really existing without us, but only the phantasm of a body, and, as it were, the ghost of it, which has no reality without our imagination. So that there are not two natures of body and space; which must needs infer two distinct substances, one whereof must be incorporeal, but only one nature of body. The consequence of which will be this, that an incorporeal substance is all one with an incorporeal body, and therefore nothing.

VIII. But because it is generally conceived, that an error cannot be sufficiently confuted, without discovering τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ ψεύδους, the cause of the mistake;—therefore, the Atheists will, in the next place, undertake to shew likewise the original of this doctrine of incorporeal substances, and from what misapprehension it sprung; as also take occasion, from thence, further to disprove a Deity.

Wherefore they say, that the original of this doctrine of incorporeal substances proceeded chiefly from the abuse of abstract names, both of substances (whereby the essences of singular bodies, as of a man or a horse, being abstracted from those bodies themselves, are considered uni-

versally) as also of accidents, when they are considered alone without their subjects or substances. The latter of which is a thing, that men have been necessitated to in order to the computation or reckoning of the properties of bodies, the comparing of them with one another, the adding, subtracting, multiplying, and dividing of them; which could not be done, so long as they are taken concretely together with their subjects. But yet, as there is some use of those abstract names, so the abuse of them has been also very great; forasmuch as, though they be really the names of nothing, since the essence of this and that man is not any thing without the man, nor is an accident any thing without its substance, yet men have been led into a gross mistake by them, to imagine them to be realities existing by themselves. Which infatuation hath chiefly proceeded from scholastics, who have been so intemperate in the use of these words, that they could not make a rational discourse of any thing, though never so small, but they must stuff it with their quiddities, entities, essences, hæcceities, and the like. Wherefore, these are they, who, being first deluded themselves, have also deluded the world, introducing an opinion into the minds of men, that the essence of every thing is something without that thing itself, and also eternal; and, therefore, when any thing is made or generated, that there is no new being produced, but only an antecedent and eternal essence clothed (as it were) with a new garment of existence; as, also, that the mere accidents of bodies may exist alone by themselves without their substances. As, for example, that the life, sense, and understanding

of animals, commonly called by the names of soul and mind, may exist without the bodies or substances of them by themselves, after the animals are dead ; which plainly makes them to be incorporeal substances, as it were the separate and abstract essences of men. This hath been observed by a modern writer in these words :—
“ *Est hominum abstractorum tum in omni vita, tum in philosophia, magnus et usus et abusus. Abusus in eo consistit, quod cum videant aliqui, considerari posse, id est, inferri in rationes, accidentium incrementa et decrementa, sine consideratione corporum, sive subjectorum suorum (id quod appellatur abstrahere), loquuntur de accidentibus, tanquam possent ab omni corpore separari : hinc enim originem trahunt quorundam metaphysicorum crassi errores. Nam ex eo, quod considerari potest cogitatio, sine consideratione corporis, inferre solent non esse opus corporis cogitantis.*” It is a great abuse, that some metaphysicians make of these abstract names, because cogitation can be considered alone without the consideration of body, therefore, to conclude, that it is not the action or accident of that body that thinks, but a substance by itself.—And the same writer elsewhere observes, that it is upon this ground, that when a man is dead and buried, they say his soul (that is, his life) can walk, separated from his body, and is seen by night amongst the graves.—By which means the vulgar are confirmed in their superstitious belief of ghosts, spirits, demons, devils, fairies, and hobgoblins, invisible powers and agents, called by several names, and that by those persons whose work it ought to be, rather to free men from such super-

stitution. Which belief at first had another original, not altogether unlike the former; namely, from men's mistaking their own fancies for things really existing without them. For, as in the sense of vision, men are commonly deceived, in supposing the image behind the glass to be a real thing existing without themselves, whereas it is, indeed, nothing but their own fancy: in like manner, when the minds of men, strongly possessed with fear, especially in the dark, raise up the phantasms of spectres, bugbears, or affrightful apparitions to them, they think them to be objects really existing without them, and call them ghosts and spirits, whilst they are indeed nothing but their own fancies; so the phantasm, or fancy of a Deity (which is, indeed, the chief of all spectres), created by fear, has upon no other account been taken for a reality. To this purpose, a modern writer, "From the fear, that proceeds from the ignorance itself, of what it is that hath the power to do men good or harm, men are inclined to suppose and feign to themselves several kinds of powers invisible, and to stand in awe of their own imaginations, and in time of distress to invoke them, as also in the time of an unexpected good success to give them thanks, making the creatures of their own fancies their gods." Which, though it be prudently spoken in the plural number, that so it might be diverted and put off to the heathen gods; yet he is very simple, that does not perceive the reason of it to be the same concerning that one Deity which is now commonly worshipped; and that, therefore, this also is but the creature of men's fear and fancy, the chief of all fantastic ghosts and spectres, as it were an

Oberon or prince of fairies and fancies. This (we say) was the first original of that vulgar belief of invisible powers, ghosts, and gods; men's taking their own fancies for things really existing without them. And as for the matter and substance of these ghosts, they could not, by their own natural cogitation, fall into any other conceit, but that it was the same with that which appeareth in a dream to one that sleepeth, or in a looking-glass to one that is awake, thin aerial bodies, which may appear and vanish when they please. But the opinion, that such spirits were incorporeal and immaterial, could never enter into the minds of men by nature, unabused by doctrine; but it sprung up from those deceiving and deceived literati, scholastics, philosophers, and theologers, enchanting men's understandings, and making them believe, that the abstract notions of accidents and essences could exist alone by themselves, without the bodies, as certain separate and incorporeal substances.

To conclude, therefore, to make an incorporeal mind to be the cause of all things, is to make our own fancy, an imaginary ghost of the world, to be a reality; and, to suppose the mere abstract notion of an accident, and a separate essence, to be not only an absolute thing by itself, and a real substance incorporeal, but also the first original of all substances, and of whatsoever is in the universe. And this may be reckoned for a fourth Atheistic ground.

ix. Fifthly, the Atheists pretend further to prove, that there is no other substance in the world besides body: as also, from the principles of Corporealism itself to evince, that there can

be no corporeal Deity after this manner. No man can devise any other notion of substance, than that it is a thing extended, existing without the mind, not imaginary, but real and solid magnitude; for, whatsoever is not extended, is nowhere and nothing. So that *res extensa* is the only substance, the solid basis and *substratum* of all. Now this is the very self-same thing with body; for *ἀντίστασις*, or resistance, seems to be a necessary consequence and result from extension, and they that think otherwise can shew no reason why bodies may not also penetrate one another, as some Corporealists think they do; from whence it is inferred, that body or matter is the only substance of all things. And whatsoever else is in the world, that is, all the differences of bodies, are nothing but several accidents and modifications of this extended substance, body, or matter. Which accidents, though they may be sometimes called by the names of real qualities and forms, and though there be different apprehensions concerning them amongst philosophers, yet generally they agree in this, that there are these two properties belonging to them; first, that none of them can subsist alone by themselves, without extended substance or matter, as the basis and support of them; and, secondly, that they may be all destroyed without the destruction of any substance. Now, as blackness and whiteness, heat and cold, so likewise life, sense, and understanding, are such accidents, modifications, or qualities of body, that can neither exist by themselves, and may be destroyed without the destruction of any substance or matter. For if the parts of the body of any living animal be disunited and separated

from one another, or the organical disposition of the matter altered, those accidents, forms, or qualities of life and understanding, will presently vanish away to nothing, all the substance of the matter still remaining one where or other in the universe entire, and nothing of it lost. Wherefore, the substance of matter and body, as distinguished from the accidents, is the only thing in the world that is incorruptible and undestroyable. And of this it is to be understood, that nothing can be made out of nothing, and destroyed to nothing, i. e. that every entire thing, that is made or generated, must be made of some pre-existent matter; which matter was from eternity self-existent and unmade, and is also undestroyable, and can never be reduced to nothing. It is not to be understood of the accidents themselves, that are all makeable and destroyable, generable and corruptible. Whatsoever is in the world is but ὅλη πῶς ἔχουσα, matter so and so modified or qualified, all which modifications and qualifications of matter are in their own nature destroyable, and the matter itself (as the basis of them, not necessarily determined to this or that accident) is the only ἀγέννητον καὶ ἀνώλεθρον, the only necessarily existent. The conclusion, therefore, is, that no animal, no living understanding body, can be absolutely and essentially incorruptible, this being an incommunicable property of the matter; and, therefore, there can be no corporeal Deity, the original of all things, essentially undestroyable.

Though the Stoics imagined the whole corporeal universe to be an animal or Deity, yet this corporeal God of theirs was only by accident in-

corruptible and immortal ; because they supposed that there was no other matter, which, existing without this world, and making inroads upon it, could disunite the parts of it, or disorder its compages. Which, if there were, the life and understanding of this Stoical God, or great mundane animal, as well as that of other animals in like cases, must needs vanish into nothing. Thus, from the principles of Corporealism itself, it plainly follows, that there can be no corporeal Deity, because the Deity is supposed to be *ἀγέννητον καὶ ἀνώλεθρον*, a thing that was never made, and is essentially undestroyable, which are the privileges and properties of nothing but senseless matter.

x. In the next place, the Atheists undertake more effectually to confute that corporeal God of the Stoics and others, from the principles of the Atomical philosophy, in this manner. All corporeal Theists, who assert, that an understanding nature or mind, residing in the matter of the whole universe, was the first original of the mundane system, and did intellectually frame it, betray no small ignorance of philosophy and the nature of body, in supposing real qualities, besides magnitude, figure, site, and motion, as simple and primitive things, to belong to it ; and that there was such a quality or faculty of understanding in the matter of the whole universe, co-eternal with the same, that was an original thing uncompounded and underived from any thing else. Now, to suppose such original qualities and powers, which are really distinct from the substance of extended matter and its modifications, of divisibility, figure, site, and motion, is really to suppose so many distinct substances, which, therefore, must needs be

incorporeal. So that these philosophers fall unawares into that very thing, which they are so abhorrent from. For this quality or faculty of understanding, in the matter of the universe, original and underived from any other thing, can be indeed nothing else but an incorporeal substance. Epicurus suggested a caution against this vulgar mistake, concerning qualities, to this purpose:—
“Non sic cogitandæ sunt qualitates, quasi sint quædam per se existentes naturæ seu substantiæ, siquidem id mente assequi non licet; sed solummodo ut varii modi sese habendi corporis considerandæ sunt.”

Body, as such, hath nothing else belonging to the nature of it, but what is included in the idea of extended substance, divisibility, figure, site, motion, or rest, and the results from the various compositions of them, causing different fancies. Wherefore, as vulgar philosophers make their first matter (which they cannot well tell what they mean by it), because it receives all qualities, to be itself devoid of all quality; so we conclude, that atoms (which are really the first principles of all things) have none of those qualities in them, which belong to compounded bodies; they are not absolutely of themselves black or white, hot or cold, moist or dry, bitter or sweet, all these things arising up afterwards from the various aggregations and contextures of them, together with different motions. Which Lucretius confirms by this reason, agreeable to the tenour of the Atomical philosophy, that if there were any such real qualities in the first principles, then, in the various corruptions of nature, things would at last be reduced to nothing:

* Immutabile enim quiddam superare necesse est,
 Ne res ad nihilum redigantur funditus omnes;
 Proinde colore cave contingas semina rerum,
 Ne tibi res redeant ad nilum funditus omnes.

Wherefore, he concludes, that it must not be thought, that white things are made out of white principles, nor black things out of black principles:

* ——— Ne ex albis alba rearis
 Principiis esse, ———
 Aut ea quæ nigrant, nigro de semine nata:
 Neve alium quemvis, quæ sunt induta, colorem,
 Propterea gerere hunc credas, quod material
 Corpora consimili sint ejus tincta colore;
 Nullas enim color est omnino material
 Corporibus, neque par rebus, neque denique dispar.

Adding, that the same is to be resolved likewise concerning all other sensible qualities as well as colours:

* Sed ne forte putes solo spoliata colore
 Corpora prima manere; etiam secreta teporis
 Sunt, ac frigoris omnino, calidique vaporis
 Et sonitu sterila, et succo jejuna feruntur,
 Nec jaciunt ullum proprio de corpore odorem.

Lastly, he tells us, in like manner, that the same is to be understood also concerning life, sense, and understanding; that there are no such simple qualities or natures in the first principles, out of which animals are compounded, but that these are in themselves altogether devoid of life, sense, and understanding:

* Lucret. lib. ii. ver. 750, 751. 754, 755.

† Id. lib. ii. ver. 730, &c.

‡ Id. lib. ii. ver. 841, &c.

* Nunc ea, quæ sentire videmus cunctique, necesse 'st
 Ex insensibilibus tamen omnia conficere
 Principiis constare: heque id manifesta refutant,
 Sed magis ipsa manu ducunt, et credere cogunt,
 Ex insensibilibus, quod dico, animalia gigni.
 Quippe videre licet, viros existere vermes
 Stercore de tetro, putrorem cum sibi nacta 'st
 Intempestivis ex imbribus humida tellus.

All sensitive and rational animals are made of irrational and senseless principles, which is proved by experience, in that we see worms are made out of putrefied dung, moistened with immoderate showers.—

Some, indeed, who are no greater friends to a Deity than ourselves, will needs have that sense and understanding, that is in animals and men, to be derived from an antecedent life and understanding in the matter. But this cannot be, because if matter as such had life and understanding in it, then every atom of matter must needs be a distinct percipient animal and intelligent person by itself; and it would be impossible for any such men and animals as now are to be compounded out of them, because every man would be *variorum animalculorum acervus*, a heap of innumerable animals and percipients.

Wherefore, as all the other qualities of bodies, so likewise life, sense, and understanding arise from the different contextures of atoms devoid of all those qualities, or from the composition of those simple elements of magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions, in the same manner as from a few letters variously compounded all that infinite variety of syllables and words is made:

* Id. lib. ii. ver. 884, &c.

^a Quin etiam refert nostris in versibus ipsis
 Cum quibus et quali positura contineantur ;
 Namque eadem ocelum, mare, terras, flumina, solem
 Significant, eadem, fruges, arborum, animantes ;
 Sic ipsis in rebus item jam material
 Intervalla, viæ, connexus, pondera, plagæ,
 Concursus, motus, ordo, positura, figuræ,
 Cum permutantur, mutari res quoque debeat.

From the fortuitous concretions of senseless unknowing atoms did rise up afterwards, in certain parts of the world called animals, soul, and mind, sense and understanding, counsel and wisdom. But to think, that there was any animalish nature before all these animals, or that there was an antecedent mind and understanding, counsel and wisdom, by which all animals themselves, together with the whole world, were made and contrived, is either to run round in a senseless circle, making animals and animality to be before one another infinitely ; or else to suppose an impossible beginning of an original understanding quality in the matter. Atoms in their first coalitions together, when the world was making, were not then directed by any previous counsel or preventive understanding, which were things as yet unborn and unmade,

^b Nam certe neque consilio primordia rerum
 Ordine se quæque atque sagaci mente locarunt,
 Nec quos quæque darent motus, pepigere profecto.

Mind and understanding, counsel and wisdom, did not lay the foundations of the universe ; they are no archical things, that is, they have not the nature of a principle in them ; they are not simple, original, primitive, and primordial, but as all other

^a Id. lib. ii. ver. 1012.

^b Id. lib. i. ver. 1020.

qualities of bodies, secondary, compounded, and derivative, and therefore they could not be architectonical of the world. Mind and understanding is no God, but the creature of matter and motion.

The sense of this whole argument is briefly this. The first principle of all things in the whole universe is matter, or atoms devoid of all qualities, and consequently of all life, sense, and understanding; and therefore the original of things is no understanding nature, or Deity.

xī. Seventhly, the Democritic Atheists argue further after this manner: they who assert a Deity, suppose *ἐμψυχον εἶναι τὸν κόσμον*, the whole world to be animated,—that is, to have a living, rational, and understanding nature presiding over it. Now it is already evident from some of the premised arguments, that the world cannot be animated, in the sense of Platonists, that is, with an incorporeal soul, which is in order of nature before body, it being proved already, that there can be no substance incorporeal; as likewise that it cannot be animated neither in the Stoical sense, so as to have an original quality of understanding or mind in the matter; but yet nevertheless some may possibly imagine, that as in ourselves and other animals, though compounded of senseless atoms, there is a soul and mind, resulting from the contexture of them, which being once made, domineers over the body, governing and ordering it at pleasure; so there may be likewise such a living soul and mind, not only in the stars, which many have supposed to be lesser deities, and in the sun, which has been reputed a principal deity; but also in the whole mundane system, made up

of earth, seas, air, ether, sun, moon, and stars altogether; one general soul and mind, which, though resulting at first from the fortuitous motion of matter, yet being once produced, may rule, govern, and sway the whole, understandingly, and in a more perfect manner than our souls do our bodies; and so long as it continues, exercise a principality and dominion over it. Which, although it will not amount to the full notion of a God, according to the strict sense of Theists, yet it will approach very near unto it, and endanger the bringing in of all the same inconveniences along with it. Wherefore they will now prove, that there is no such soul or mind as this (resulting from the contexture of atoms), that presides over the corporeal universe, that so there may not be so much as the shadow of a Deity left.

It was observed before, that life, sense, reason, and understanding, are but qualities of concreated bodies, like those other qualities of heat and cold, &c. arising from certain particular textures of atoms. Now as those first principles of bodies, namely, single atoms, have none of those qualities in them, so neither hath the whole universe any (that it can be denominated from) but only the parts of it. The whole world is neither black nor white, hot nor cold, pellucid nor opaque, it containing all those qualities in its several parts. In like manner, the whole has no life, sense, nor understanding in it, but only the parts of it, which are called animals. That is, life and sense are qualities, that arise only from such a texture of atoms as produceth soft flesh, blood, and brains, in bodies organized, with head, heart, bowels, nerves, muscles, veins, arteries, and the like:

* ————— Sensus jungitur omnis
Visceribus, nervis, venis, quæcunque videmus,
Mollia mortali consistere corpore creta ;

And reason and understanding, properly so called, are peculiar appendices to human shape ;^b “ *Ratio nusquam esse potest nisi in hominis figura.*” From whence it is concluded, that there is no life, soul, nor understanding acting the whole world, because the world hath no blood nor brains, nor any animalish or human form.^c “ *Qui mundam ipsam animantem sapientemque esse dixerunt, nullo modo viderunt animi naturam, in quam figuram cadere posset.*” Therefore the Epicurean poet concludes upon this ground, that there is no Divine sense in the whole world :

^d Dispositum videtur ubi esse et crescere possit
Scorsim anima atque animus ; tanto magis inficiandum,
Totum posse extra corpus formamque animalem,
Putribus in glebis terrarum, aut solis in igni,
Aut in aqua durare, aut altis ætheris oris.
Haud igitur constant divino prædita sensu,
Quandoquidem nequeunt vitaliter esse animata.

Now if there be no life nor understanding above us, nor round about us, not any where else in the world, but only in ourselves and fellow-animals, and we be the highest of all beings ; if neither the whole corporeal system be animated, nor those greater parts of it, sun, moon, nor stars, then there can be no danger of any Deity.

XII. Eighthly, the Democritic Atheists dispute further against a Deity in this manner : the Deity

^a Id. lib. ii. ver. 903, &c.

^b Velleius apud Ciceron. de Nat. Deor. lib. i. cap. xviii. p. 2007.

^c Id. ibid. lib. i. cap. x. p. 2893. tom. ix. oper.

^d Lucret. lib. v. ver. 143, &c.

is generally supposed to be ζῶν μακάριον καὶ ἀθάνατον, a perfectly happy animal, incorruptible and immortal. Now there is no living being incorruptible and immortal, and therefore none perfectly happy neither. For, according to that Democritic hypothesis of atoms in vacuity, the only incorruptible things will be these three: first of all vacuum or empty space, which must needs be such, because it cannot suffer from any thing, since it is *plagarum expers*,

• Et manet intactum, nec ab iecta fungitur hilum.

Secondly, the single atoms, because by reason of their parvitude and solidity they are indivisible: and lastly, the *summa summarum* of all things, that is, the comprehension of all atoms dispersed every where throughout infinite space.

• ———— Quia nulla loci stat copia certum
Quo quasi res possint discedere dissoluique.

But according to that other hypothesis of some modern Atomists (which also was entertained of old by Empedocles) that supposes a plenity, there is nothing at all incorruptible, but the substance of matter itself. All systems and compages of it, all συγκρίματα and ἀθροίσματα, all concretions and coagmentations of matter divided by motion, together with the qualities resulting from them, are corruptible and destroyable: *quæ est coagmentatio rerum non dissolubilis?* Death destroys not the substance of any matter; for as no matter came from nothing, but was self eternal, so none of it

• Id. lib. v. vers. 358. Addas etiam lib. iii. vers. 814.

• Id. lib. iii. vers. 815.

• Cicero de Nat. Deor. lib. i. cap. viii. p. 2891. tom. ix. oper.

can ever vanish into nothing; but it dissolves all the aggregations of it.

* Non sic interimit mors res, ut materialia
Corpora conficiat, sed cœctum dissipat ollis.

Life is no substantial thing, nor any primitive or simple nature; it is only an accident or quality arising from the aggregation and contexture of atoms or corpuscula, which when the compages of them is disunited and dissolved, though all the substance still remain scattered and dispersed, yet the life utterly perishes and vanisheth into nothing. No life is immortal; there is no immortal soul, nor immortal animal, or Deity. Though this whole mundane system were itself an animal, yet being but an aggregation of matter, it would be both corruptible and mortal. Wherefore, since no living being can possibly have any security of its future permanency, there is none that can be perfectly happy. And it was rightly determined by our fellow-atheists, the Hedonics and Cyrenaics,^b *εὐδαιμονία ἀνύπαρτον*, perfect happiness is a mere notion,—a romantic fiction, a thing which can have no existence any where. This is recorded to have been one of Democritus's chief arguments against a Deity, because there can be no living being immortal, and consequently none perfectly happy. "Cum Democritus, quia nihil semper suo statu maneat, neget esse quicquam sempiternum, nonne Deum ita tollit omnino, ut nullam opinionem ejus reliquam faciat?"

XIII. A ninth pretended demonstration of the

^a Lucret. lib. ii. vers. 1001.

^b Diog. Laert. lib. ii. segm. 94. p. 135.

^c Cicero de Nat. Deor. lib. i. cap. xii. p. 2897.

Democritic Atheists is as followeth. By God is understood a first cause or mover, which being not before acted upon by any thing else, but acting originally from itself, was the beginning of all things. Now it is an indubitable axiom, and generally received among philosophers, that nothing can move itself, but *quicquid movetur, ab alio movetur*, whatsoever is moved, is moved by something else;—nothing can act otherwise than it is made to act by something without it, acting upon it. The necessary consequence whereof is this, that there can be no such thing as any first mover, or first cause, that is, no God. This argument is thus, urged by a modern writer,* agreeably to the sense of the ancient Democritics; “Ex eo quod nihil potest movere seipsum, non inferretur, id quod inferri solet, nempe Eternum Immobile, sed contra Eternum Motum, siquidem ut verum est, nihil moveri a seipso, ita etiam verum est nihil moveri nisi a moto.” From hence, that nothing can move itself, it cannot be rightly inferred, as commonly it is, that there is an eternal immoveable mover (that is, a God), but only an eternal moved mover; or that one thing was moved by another from eternity, without any first mover. Because as it is true, that nothing can be moved from itself; so it is likewise true, that nothing can be moved but from that which was itself also moved by something else before:—and so the progress upwards must needs be infinite, without any beginning or first mover. The plain drift and scope of this ratiocination is no other than this, to shew that the argument commonly taken from motion, to prove

* Hobbes's Element. Philosoph. part iv. sive Physic. cap. xxvi. sec. i. p. 204.

a God (that is, a first mover or cause), is not only ineffectual and inconclusive ; but also that, on the contrary, it may be demonstrated from that very topic of motion, that there can be no absolutely first mover, no first in the order of causes, that is, no God.

xiv. Tenthly, because the Theists conceive that though no body can move itself, yet a perfect cogitative and thinking being might be the beginning of all, and the first cause of motion ; the Atheists will endeavour to evince the contrary, in this manner. No man can conceive how any cogitation, which was not before, should rise up at any time, but that there was some cause for it, without the thinker. For else there can be no reason given, why this thought rather than that, and at this time rather than another, should start up. Wherefore this is universally true of all motion and action whatsoever, as it was rightly urged by the Stoics, that there can be no *κίνησις ἀνακίνητος*, no motion without a cause, i. e. no motion, which has not some cause without the subject of it, or, as the same thing is expressed by a modern writer, " Nothing taketh beginning from itself, but from the action of some other immediate agent without it." Wherefore, no thinking being could be a first cause, any more than an automaton or machine could. To this purpose, it is further argued, that these two notions, the one of a knowing understanding being, the other of a perfectly happy being, are contradictory, because all knowledge essentially implies dependance upon something else, as its cause ; " scientia et intellectus signum est potentie ab alio dependentis, id quod non est beatissimum." They conclude, that cogitation, and all

action whatsoever, is really nothing else but local motion, which is essentially heterokinesy, that which can never rise of itself, but is caused by some other agent without its subject.

xv. In the eleventh place, the Democritic Atheists reason thus: if the world were made by any antecedent mind or understanding, that is, by a Deity; then there must needs be an idea, platform, and exemplar of the whole world before it was made; and consequently actual knowledge, both in order of time and nature, before things. But all knowledge is the information of the things themselves known; all conception of the mind is a passion from the things conceived, and their activity upon it; and is therefore junior to them. Wherefore, the world and things were before knowledge and the conception of any mind, and no knowledge, mind, or Deity before the world as its cause. This argument is thus proposed by the Atheistic poet:

* Exemplum porro gignendis rebus et ipsa
Notities hominum Di vis unde insita primum,
Quid vellent facere, ut scirent, animoque viderent?
Quove modo est unquam vis cognita principiorum,
Quidnam inter sese permutato ordine possent,
Si non ipsa dedit specimen natura creandi?

How could the supposed Deity have a pattern or platform in his mind, to frame the world by, and whence should he receive it? How could he have any knowledge of men before they were made, as also what himself should will to do, when there was nothing? How could he understand the force and possibility of the principles, what they would

* Lucret. lib. v. ver. 182.

produce when variously combined together, before nature and things themselves, by creating, had given a specimen?—

xvi. A twelfth argument of the Democritic and Epicurean Atheists against a Deity is to this purpose: that things could not be made by a Deity, that is supposed to be a being every way perfect, because they are so faulty and so ill made: the argument is thus propounded by Lucretius:^a

Quod si jam rerum ignorem primordia quæ sint,
Hoc tamen ex ipais cœli rationibus ausim
Confirmare, aliisque ex rebus reddere multis,
Nequaquam nobis divinitus esse paratam
Naturam rerum, tanta stat prædita culpa.

This argument, *a cœli rationibus*, from astronomy, or the constitution of the heavens, is this: ^b that the mundane sphere is so framed, in respect of the disposition of the equator and ecliptic, as renders the greatest part of the earth uninhabitable to men and most other animals; partly by that excess of heat in the torrid zone (containing all between the tropics), and partly from the extremity of cold in both the frigid zones, towards either pole. Again, whereas the Stoical Theists contemporary with Epicurus concluded, that the whole world was made by a Deity, only for the sake of men,

* ————— Horum omnia causa
Constituisse Deum fingunt—————

it is urged on the contrary, that a great part of the habitable earth is taken up by seas, lakes, and

^a Lib. ii. ver. 177. et lib. v. ver. 196.

^b Vid. Lucret. lib. v. ver. 205, 206. et Cicer. in Somnio Scipionis cap. vi. p. 3981. tom. xi. oper.

^c Lucret. lib. ii. ver. 174, 175.

rocks, barren heaths and sands, and thereby made useless for mankind ; and that the remainder of it yields no fruit to them, unless expunged by obstinate labour ; after all which, men are often disappointed of the fruits of those labours by unseasonable weather, storms, and tempests. Again, that nature has not only produced many noxious and poisonous herbs, but also destructive and devouring animals, whose strength surpasseth that of men's ; and that the condition of mankind is so much inferior to that of brutes, that nature seems to have been but a step-mother to the former, whilst she hath been an indulgent mother to the latter. And to this purpose, the manner of men's coming into the world is thus aggravated by the poet :

* Tum porro puer, ut sævis projectus ab undis
Navita, nudus humi jacet, infans, indigus omni
Vitæ auxilio, cum primum in luminis oras
Nixibus ex alvo matris natura profudit :
Vagituque locum lugubri complot, ut æquum 'st,
Quoi tantum in vita restet transire malorum.

But on the contrary, the comparative advantages of brutes and their privileges, which they have above men, are described after this manner :

At variae crescunt pecudes, armenta, feraeque :
Nec crepitacula eis opus sunt nec quoiquam adhibenda 'st
Almæ nutricis blanda atque infracta loquela ;
Nec varias quæerunt vestes pro tempore coeli.
Denique non armis opus est, non moenibus altis,
Queis sua tutentur, quando omnibus omnia largo
Tellus ipsa parit, naturaque Dædala rerum.

And lastly, the topic of evils in general, is insisted upon by them, not those which are called

* Id. lib. v. ver. 223.

† Id. ibid.

culpa, evils of fault (for that is a thing which the Democritic Atheists utterly explode in the genuine sense of it), but the evils of pain and trouble; which they dispute concerning, after this manner. *The supposed Deity and maker of the world was either willing to abolish all evils, but not able; or he was able, but not willing; or thirdly, he was neither willing nor able; or else lastly, he was both able and willing. This latter is the only thing that answers fully to the notion of a God. Now that the supposed creator of all things was not thus both able and willing to abolish all evils, is plain, because then there would have been no evils at all left. Wherefore, since there is such a deluge of evils overflowing all, it must needs be, that either he was willing and not able to remove them, and then he was impotent; or else he was able and not willing, and then he was envious; or lastly, he was neither able nor willing, and then he was both impotent and envious.

xvii. In the twelfth place, the Atheists further dispute in this manner. If the world were made by any Deity, then it would be governed by a providence; and if there were any providence, it must appear in human affairs. But here it is plain, that all is Tohu and Bohu, chaos and confusion; things happening alike to all, to the wise and foolish, religious and impious, virtuous and vicious. (For these names the Atheist cannot choose but make use of, though, by taking away natural morality, they really destroy the things.) From whence it is concluded, that all things float up and down, as they are agitated and driven by

* Vide Lactat. de Ira Dei, cap. xiii. p. 942. edit. Walchii.

the tumbling billows of careless fortune and chance. The impieties of Dionysius,^a his scoffing abuses of religion, and whatsoever was then sacred, or worshipped under the notion of a God, were most notorious; and yet it is observed, that he fared never a jot the worse for it. “Hunc nec Olympius Jupiter fulmine percussit, nec Æsculapius misero diuturnoque morbo tabescentem interemit; verum in suo lectulo mortuus, in Tympanidis rogam illatus est, eamque potestatem, quam ipse per scelus nactus erat, quasi justam et legitimam, hæreditatis loco tradidit:” Neither did Jupiter Olympius strike him with a thunderbolt, nor Æsculapius inflict any languishing disease upon him; but he died in his bed, and was honourably interred, and that power, which he had wickedly acquired, he transmitted, as a just and lawful inheritance, to his posterity.—And Diogenes the Cynic, though much a Theist, could not but acknowledge, that Harpalus, a famous robber or pirate in those times, who, committing many villanous actions, notwithstanding lived prosperously, did thereby “Testimonium dicere contra deos,” bear testimony against the gods.^b—Though it has been objected by the Theists, and thought to be a strong argument for providence, that there were so many tables hung up in temples, the monuments of such as, having prayed to the gods in storms and tempests, had escaped shipwreck; yet, as Diagoras observed, “Nusquam picti sunt, qui naufragium fecerunt,” there are no tables extant of those of them who were shipwrecked.^c—Wherefore, it was not considered by these Theists,

^a Cicer. de Nat. Deor. lib. iii. cap. xxxv. p. 3101.

^b Id. ib. cap. xxxiv. p. 3099.

^c Ibid. cap. xxxviii. p. 3104.

how many of them that prayed as well to the gods, did notwithstanding suffer shipwreck; as also how many of those, which never made any devotional addresses at all to any Deity, escaped equal dangers of storms and tempests.

Moreover, it is consentaneous to the opinion of a God, to think, that thunder, rattling in the clouds with thunderbolts, should be the immediate significations of his wrath and displeasure: whereas it is plain that these are flung at random, and that the fury of them often lights upon the innocent, whilst the notoriously guilty escape untouched; and therefore we understand not, how this can be answered by any Theists.

▪ Cur, quibus incantum scelus aversabile cumque est,
Non facient, icti flammæ ut fulguris halent,
Pectore perfixo; documen mortalibus acre?
Et potius nullas sibi turpis conscius reit,
Volvitur in flammis innoxius, inque perditur,
Turbine cœlesti subito correptus, et igni?

Now the force of this argument appears to be very powerful, because it hath not only staggered and confounded Theists in all ages, but also hath effectually transformed many of them into Atheists. For Diagoras Melius^b himself was once a superstitious religionist, insomuch that, being a dithyrambic poet, he began one of his poems with these words, *κατὰ δαίμονα καὶ τύχην πάντα τελεῖται*, all things are done by God and fortune.—But, being injured afterwards by a perjured person, that suffered no evil nor disaster thereupon, he therefore took up this contrary persuasion, that there was no Deity. And there have been innu-

^a Lucret. lib. vi. ver. 389, &c.

^b Vide Sext. Empiric. lib. ix. adver. Mathemat. sec. liii. p. 561.

merable others, who have been so far wrought upon by this consideration, as if not absolutely to disclaim and discard a Deity, yet utterly to deny providence, and all care of human affairs by any invisible powers. Amongst whom the poet was one, who thus expressed his sense;

* Sed cum res hominum tanta caligine volvi
Aspicerem, lætosque diu florere nocentes,
Vexarique pios, rursus labefacta cadebat
Religio, causæque viam non sponte sequebar
Alterius, vacuo quæ currere semina mota
Affirnat, magnumque novas per inane figuras,
Fortuna, non arte regi; quæ numina sensu
Ambiguo vel nulla putat, vel nescia nostri,

XVIII. A thirteenth argumentation of the Democritic and Epicurean Atheists, is to this purpose: that whereas the Deity is supposed to be such a being, as both knows all that is done every where in the most distant places of the world at once, and doth himself immediately order all things; this is, first, impossible for any one being thus to animadvert and order all things in the whole universe:

† Quis regere immensi summam, quis habere profundi
Indumann validas potis est moderanter habenas?
Quis pariter coelos omneis convertere? et omneis
Ignibus ætheriis terras suffire feraceis?
Omnibus inque locis esse omni tempore præsto;
Nebibus ut tenebras faciat, coelique serena
Concutiat sonitu? &c.

And, secondly, if it were supposed to be possible, yet such infinite negotiosity would be absolutely inconsistent with a happy state; nor could

* Claudian. in Rufinum, lib. i. ver. 12, &c.

† Lucret. lib. ii. ver. 1084, &c.

such a Deity ever have any quiet enjoyment of himself, being perpetually filled with tumult and hurliburly: *οὐ συμφωνοῦσι πραγματεῖαι καὶ φροντίδες καὶ ὀργαὶ καὶ χάριτες μακαριότητι, ἀλλ' ἀσθενεία καὶ φόβος καὶ προσδεήσει τῶν πλησίων ταῦτα γίνεται.* Distraction of business and solicitous cares, displeasures and favours, do not at all agree with happiness, but they proceed from imbecility, indigency, and fear:

—*Ἐὰν τὸ μακάριον καὶ ἀφθαρτον οὔτε αὐτὸ πράγματα ἔχει, οὔτε ἄλλω παρέχει, ὥστε οὔτε ὀργαῖς οὔτε χάρισι συνέχεται, ἐν ἀσθενείᾳ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον.* That which is happy and incorruptible, would neither have itself any business to do, nor create any to others; it would neither have displeasure nor favour towards any other persons, to engage it in action; all this proceeding from indigency.—That is, favour and benevolence, as well as anger and displeasure, arise only from imbecility. That which is perfectly happy, and wanteth nothing, *ὅλον ὃν περὶ τὴν συναχὴν τῆς ἰδίας εὐδαιμονίας*, being wholly possessed and taken up in the enjoyment of its own happiness—would be regardless of the concerns of any others; and mind nothing besides itself, either to do it good or harm. Wherefore, this *curiosus et plenus negotii deus*,^c this busy, restless, and pragmatical Deity, that must needs intermeddle and have to do with every thing in the whole world, is a contradictory notion, since it cannot but be the most unhappy of all things.

xix. In the next place, the Atheists dispute further by propounding several bold queries,

^a Epicur. in Epist. ad Herodotum apud Diog. Laert. lib. x. segm. 77. p. 634.

^b Vide Diog. Laert. lib. x. segm. 139. 661.

^c Velleius apud Cicer. de Natur. Deor. lib. i. cap. xx. p. 2911.

which they conceive unanswerable, after this manner. If the world were made by a Deity, why was it not made by him sooner? or, since it was so long unmade, why did he make it at all? "*Cur mundi ædificator repente extiterit, innumerabilia ante sæcula dormierit?*" How came this builder and architect of the world to start up upon a sudden, after he had slept for infinite ages—and bethink himself of making a world? For, certainly, if he had been awake all that while, he would either have made it sooner, or not at all; because, there was either something wanting to his happiness before, or nothing: if there had been any thing wanting before, then the world could not have been so long unmade; but, if he were completely happy in himself without it, then μηδὲν ἐλλείπων κεναῖς ἐμελλεν ἐπιχειρεῖν πράξει, wanting nothing, he vainly went about to make superfluous things.—All desire of change and novelty argues a fastidious satiety, proceeding from defect and indigency:

* Quidve novi potuit tanto post, ante quietos
 Illicere, ut cuperent vitam mutare priorem?
 Nam gaudere novis rebus debere videtur
 Quoi veteres obsunt; sed quoi nil accedit ægri
 Tempore in anteacto, cum pulchre degeset ævum,
 Quid potuit novitatis amorem accendere tall?

Did this Deity, therefore, light up the stars, as so many lamps or torches, in that vast abyss of infinite darkness, that himself might thereby have a more comfortable and cheerful habitation? Why would he then content himself from eternity, to dwell in such a melancholic, horrid, and forlorn dungeon?

* Id. *ibid.* lib. i. cap. ix. p. 2891. * Lucret. lib. v. ver. 180, &c.

* *Ad, credo, in tenebris vita et morore jacebat,
Donec diluxit rerum genitilis origo?*

Was company and that variety of things, by which heaven and earth are distinguished, desirable to him? Why then would he continue solitary so long, wanting the pleasure of such a spectacle? Did he make the world and men in it to this end, that himself might be worshipped and adored, feared and honoured by them? But what could he be the better for that, who was sufficiently happy alone in himself before? Or did he do it for the sake of men, to gratify and oblige them?

————— *At quid immortalibus atque beatis
Gratia nostra queat largiri emolumentum,
Ut nostra quicquam causa gerere aggrediantur?*

Again, if this were done for the sake of men, then it must be either for wise men or for fools: if for wise men only, then all that pains was taken but for a very few; but if for fools, what reason could there be, why the Deity should seek to deserve so well at their hands? Besides this, what hurt would it have been to any of us (whether wise or foolish) never to have been made?

* *Quidve mali fuerat nobis non esse creatis?
Natus enim debet quicumque est, velle manere
In vita, donec retinebit blanda voluptas:
Qui nunquam vero vitæ gustavit amorem,
Nec fuit in numero, quid obest non esse creatum?*

Lastly,^d if this Deity must needs go about moliminously to make a world, *ἐργάτου δίκην καὶ τέκτο-*

^a Id. *ibid.* ver. 175, 176.

^b Id. *ibid.* ver. 166.

^c Id. *ibid.* ver. 177, &c.

^d Vide Ciceron. de Nat. Deor. lib. i. cap. viii. p. 2890.

now, like an artificer and carpenter,—what tools and instruments could he have to work withal? what ministers and subservient officers? what engines and machines for the rearing up of so huge a fabric? How could he make the matter to understand his meaning, and obey his beck? how could he move it, and turn it up and down? for if incorporeal, he could neither touch nor be touched, but would run through all things, without fastening upon any thing; but if corporeal, then the same thing was both materials and architect, both timber and carpenter, and the stones must hew themselves, and bring themselves together, with discretion, into a structure.

xx. In the last place, the Atheists argue from interest (which proves many times the most effectual of all arguments) against a Deity; endeavouring to persuade, that it is, first, the interest of private persons, and of all mankind in general; and, secondly, the particular interest of civil sovereigns, and commonwealths, that there should neither be a God, nor the belief of any such thing entertained by the minds of men; that is, no religion. First, they say, therefore, that it is the interest of mankind in general; because, so long as men are persuaded, that there is an understanding being infinitely powerful, having no law but his own will (because he has no superior), that may do whatever he pleases at any time to them, they can never securely enjoy themselves or any thing, nor be ever free from disquieting fear and solicitude. What the poets fable of Tantalus in hell, being always in fear of a huge stone hanging over his head, and ready every moment to tumble down upon him, is nothing to that true fear, which

men have of a Deity, and religion, here in this life, which, indeed, was the very thing mythologized in it:

^a Nec miser impendens magnūm timet aere saxum
Tantalus, (ut fama est) cassā formidine torpens:
Sed magis in vita, divum metus urget inanis
Mortales, casumque timent, quemcumque ferat fors.

For, besides men's insecurity from all manner of present evils, upon the supposition of a God, the immortality of souls can hardly be kept out, but it will crowd in after it; and then the fear of eternal punishments after death will unavoidably follow thereupon, perpetually embittering all the solaces of life, and never suffering men to have the least sincere enjoyment.

^b ——— Si certum finem esse viderent
Ærumnarum homines, aliquo ratione valerent
Religionibus, atque minis obsistere vatum.
Nunc ratio nulla est restandi, nulla facultas:
Æternas quoniam pœnas in morte timendum.
Ignoratur enim, quæ sit natura animæ,
Nata sit, an contra nascentibus insinuetur;
Et simul intereat nobiscum morte dirempta,
An tenebras Orci visat vastasque lacunas.

Wherefore it is plain, that they who first introduced the belief of a Deity and religion, whatever they might aim at in it, deserved very ill of all mankind, because they did thereby infinitely debase and depress men's spirits under a servile fear:

^c Efficiunt animos humiles, formidine divum,
Depressosque premunt ad terram:

As also cause the greatest griefs and calamities, that now disturb human life,

^a Lucret. lib. iii. ver. 998.

^b Id. lib. i. ver. 108, &c.

^c Id. lib. vi. ver. 51.

^a *Quantos tum gemitus ipsi sibi, quantoque nobis
Vulnera, quas lachrymas peperere minoribus nostris?*

There can be no comfortable and happy living, without banishing from our mind the belief of these two things, of a Deity, and the soul's immortality ;

^b *Et metus ille foras præceps Acheruntia agendus
Funditus, humanam qui vitam turbat ab imo,
Omnia suffundens mortis nigrore, neque ullam
Esse voluptatem liquidam puramque relinquit.*

It was, therefore, a noble and heroical exploit of Democritus and Epicurus, those two good-natured men, who, seeing the world thus oppressed under the grievous yoke of religion, the fear of a Deity, and punishment after death, and taking pity of this sad condition of mankind, did manfully encounter that affrightful spectre, or empusa, of a providential Deity ; and, by clear philosophic reasons, chase it away, and banish it quite out of the world ; laying down such principles, as would solve all the phenomena of nature without a God :

^c *Quæ bene cognita si teneas, natura videtur
Libera continuo, dominis privata superbis,
Ipsa sua per se sponte omnia dis agere experts.*

So that Lucretius does not, without just cause, erect a triumphal arch or monument to Epicurus, for this conquest or victory of his obtained over the Deity and religion, in this manner :

^d *Humana ante oculos foede quum vita jaceret
In terris, oppressa gravi sub religione,
Quæ caput a coeli regionibus ostendebat,
Horribili super aspectu mortalibus instans ;*

^a Id. lib. v. ver. 1185.

^c Id. lib. ii. ver. 1089.

^b Id. lib. iii. ver. 37.

^d Id. lib. i. ver. 63.

Primum Graius homo mortales tendere contra
 Est oculos ausus, primusque obistere contra;
 Quem nec fama deum nec fulmina, nec minitanti
 Murmure compressit coelum, &c.

xxi. That it is also the interest of civil sovereigns and of all commonwealths, that there should neither be Deity nor religion, the Democritic Atheists would persuade in this manner: A body politic or commonwealth is made up of parts, that are all naturally dissociated from one another, by reason of that principle of private self-love, who therefore can be no otherwise held together than by fear. Now, if there be any greater fear than the fear of the leviathan, and civil representative, the whole structure and machine of this great coloss must needs fall a-pieces and tumble down. The civil sovereign reigns only in fear; wherefore, unless his fear be the king and sovereign of all fears, his empire and dominion ceases. But, as the rod of Moses devoured the rods of the magicians, so certainly will the fear of an omnipotent Deity, that can punish with eternal torments after death, quite swallow up and devour that comparatively petty fear of civil sovereigns, and consequently destroy the being of commonwealths, which have no foundation in nature, but are mere artificial things, made by the enchantment and magical art of policy. Wherefore, it is well observed by a modern writer, That men ought not to suffer themselves to be abused by the doctrine of separated essences and incorporeal substances (such as God and the soul), built upon the vain philosophy of Aristotle, that would fright men from obeying the laws of their country, with empty names (as

of hell, damnation, fire, and brimstone), as men fright birds from the corn with an empty hat, doublet, and a crooked stick. And again: if the fear of spirits (the chief of which is the Deity) were taken away, men would be much more fitted than they are for civil obedience.

Moreover, the power of civil sovereigns is perfectly indivisible; it is either all or nothing; it must be absolute and infinite, or else it is none at all. Now it cannot be so, if there be any other power equal to it, to share with it, much less if there be any superior (as that of the Deity) to check it and control it. Wherefore, the Deity must of necessity be removed and displaced, to make room for the Leviathan to spread itself in.

Lastly, it is perfectly inconsistent with the nature of a body politic, that there should be any private judgment of good or evil, lawful or unlawful, just or unjust allowed. But conscience (which Theism and religion introduces) is private judgment concerning good and evil; and therefore the allowance of it, is contradictory to civil sovereignty and a commonwealth. There ought to be no other conscience (in a kingdom or commonwealth) besides the law of the country; the allowance of private conscience being, *ipso facto*, a dissolution of the body politic, and a return to the state of nature. Upon all these accounts it must needs be acknowledged, that those philosophers, who undermine and weaken Theism and religion, do highly deserve of all civil sovereigns and commonwealths.

XXII. Now from all the premised considerations, the Democritics confidently conclude against a Deity; that the system and compages of the uni-

verse had not its original from any understanding nature; but that mind and understanding itself, as well as all things else in the world, sprung up from senseless nature and chance, or from the unguided and undirected motion of matter. Which is therefore called by the name of nature, because whatsoever moves is moved by nature and necessity; and the mutual occurrences and rencounters of atoms, their *plagæ*, their strokes and dashings against one another, their reflections and repercussions, their cohesions, implexions, and entanglements, as also their scattered dispersions and divulsions, are all natural and necessary; but it is called also by the name of chance and fortune, because it is all unguided by any mind, counsel, or design.

Wherefore, infinite atoms of different sizes and figures, devoid of all life and sense, moving fortuitously from eternity in infinite space, and making successively several encounters, and consequently various implexions and entanglements with one another, produced first a confused chaos of these omnifarious particles, jumbling together with infinite variety of motions, which afterward, by the tugging of their different and contrary forces, whereby they all hindered and abated each other, came, as it were, by joint conspiracy, to be conglomerated into a vortex or vortexes; where, after many convolutions and evolutions, molitions and essays (in which all manner of tricks were tried, and all forms imaginable experimented), they chanced, in length of time, here to settle, into this form and system of things, which now is, of earth, water, air, and fire; sun, moon, and stars; plants, animals, and men; so that senseless atoms, fortuit-

ously moved, and material chaos, were the first original of all things.

This account of the *cosmopæia*, and first original of the mundane system, is represented by Lucretius* according to the mind of Epicurus, though without any mention of those vortices, which were yet an essential part of the old Democritic hypothesis.

Sed quibus ille modis conjectus material
Fundarit cælum, ac terram, pontique profunda,
Solis, lunæ cursus, ex ordine ponam.
Nam certo neque consilio primordia rerum
Ordine se quæque atque sagaci mente locarunt:
Nec, quos quæque darent motus, pepigere profecto.
Sed quia multa modis multis primordia rerum,
Ex infinito jam tempore percita plagis,
Ponderibusque suis consuerunt concita ferri,
Omni-modisque coire, atque omnia pertentare,
Quæcunque inter se possent congressa creare:
Propterea sit, uti magnum volgata per ævum,
Omnigenos coetus, et motus experiundo,
Tandem ea conveniant, quæ ut convenere, repente
Magnarum rerum fiant exordia sæpe,
Terræ, mariæ, et cœli, generisque animantium.

But because some seem to think that Epicurus was the first founder and inventor of this doctrine, we shall here observe, that this same Atheistic hypothesis was long before described by Plato, when Epicurus was as yet unborn; and therefore doubtless according to the doctrine of Leucippus, Democritus, and Protagoras; though that philosopher, in a kind of disdain (as it seems) refused to mention either of their names: *ἢ πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν καὶ αἶρα, φύσει πάντα εἶναι καὶ τύχῃ φασί· τέχνη δὲ οὐδὲν τούτων. καὶ τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα αὐτῶν σώματα, γῆς τε καὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης, ἀστρῶν τε πέρι, διὰ τούτων γεγόνεσθαι,*

* Lib. v. ver. 417, &c.

† Plato, de Legibus, lib. x. p. 606. oper.

παντελῶς ὄντων ἀψύχων. τύχη δὲ φερόμενα τῇ τῆς δυνάμειος ἕκαστα ἑκάστων, ἢ συμπίπτωκεν, ἀρμόττοντα οἰκείως πῶς, &c. ταύτη καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα οὕτω γεγεννηκέναι τὸν τε οὐρανὸν ὅλον καὶ πάντα ὅποσα κατ' οὐρανόν· καὶ ζῶα αὐτὰ καὶ φυτὰ ἑμπάντα, ὡρῶν πασῶν ἐκ τούτων γενομένων· οὐδὲ διὰ νοῦν (φασιν) οὐδὲ διὰ τινα θεόν, οὐδὲ διὰ τέχνην, ἀλλὰ, ὃ λέγομεν, φύσει καὶ τύχῃ, τέχνην δὲ ὑστερον ἐκ τούτων ὑστέραν γενομένην, &c. The Atheists say, that fire, water, air, and earth (i. e. the four elements) were all made by nature and chance; and none of them by art or mind (that is, they were made by the fortuitous motion of atoms, and not by any Deity), and that those other bodies, of the terrestrial globe, of the sun, the moon, and the stars (which by all, except these Atheists, were, in those times, generally supposed to be animated, and a kind of inferior Deities), were afterwards made out of the aforesaid elements, being altogether inanimate. For they being moved fortuitously, or as it happened, and so making various commixtures together, did, by that means, at length produce the whole heavens and all things in them, as likewise plants and animals here upon earth; all which were not made by mind, nor by art, nor by any God; but, as we said before, by nature and chance; art, and mind itself, rising up afterwards from the same senseless principles in animals.

CHAPTER III.

An introduction to the confutation of the Atheistic grounds, in which is contained a particular account of all the several forms of Atheism.

—1. That the grounds of the Hylozoic Atheism could not be insisted on in the former chapter, together with those of the Atomic, they being directly contrary each to other; with a further account of this Hylozoic Atheism.—2. A suggestion, by way of caution, for the preventing of all mistakes, that every Hylozoist must not therefore be condemned for an Atheist, or a mere counterfeit historical Theist.—3. That, nevertheless, such Hylozoists as are also Corporealists, can by no means be excused from the imputation of Atheism, for two reasons.—4. That Strato Lampascenus, commonly called Physicus, seems to have been the first assertor of the Hylozoic Atheism, he holding no other God but the life of nature in matter.—5. Further proved, that Strato was an Atheist, and that of a different form from Democritus, he attributing an energetic nature, but without sense and animality, to all matter.—6. That Strato, not deriving all things from a mere fortuitous principle, as the Democritic Atheists did, nor yet acknowledging any one plastic nature to preside over the whole, but deducing the original of things from a mixture of chance and plastic nature both together in the several parts of matter, must therefore needs be an Hylozoic Atheist.—7. That the famous Hippocrates was neither an Hylozoic nor Democritic Atheist, but rather an Heraclitic corporeal Theist.—8. That Plato took no notice of the Hylozoic Atheism, nor of any other than what derives the original of all things from a mere fortuitous nature; and, therefore, either the Democritical or the Anaximandrian Atheism, which latter will be next declared.—9. That it is hardly imaginable, there should have been no philosophic Atheists in the world before Democritus and Leucippus, there being in all ages, as Plato observes, some or other sick of the Atheistic disease. That Aristotle affirms many of the first philosophers to have assigned only a material cause of the mundane system, without either efficient or intending cause; they supposing matter to be the only substance, and all things else nothing but the passions and accidents of it, generable and corruptible.—10. That the doctrine of these Materialists will be more fully understood from the exceptions which Aristotle makes against them: his first exception, that they assigned no cause of motion, but introduced it into the world unaccountably.—11. Aristotle's second exception, that these Materialists did assign no cause. τὸ ἰὺ καὶ καλῶς, of well and fit, and give no account

of the orderly regularity of things. That Anaxagoras was the first Ionic philosopher who made mind and good a principle of the universe.—12. Concluded, that Aristotle's Materialists were downright Atheists, not merely because they held all substance to be body, since Heraclitus and Zeno did the like, and yet are not therefore accounted Atheists (they supposing their fiery matter to be originally intellectual, and the whole world to be an animal); but because these made stupid matter, devoid of all understanding and life, to be the only principle.—13. As also, because they supposed every thing besides the substance of matter, life and understanding, and all particular beings, to be generable and corruptible, and, consequently, that there could be no other God, than such as was native and mortal. That those ancient Theologers, who were Theogonists, and generated all the gods out of night and chaos, were only verbal Theists, but real Atheists; senseless matter being to them the highest Numen.—14. The great difference observed betwixt Aristotle's Atheistic Materialists and the Italic philosophers, the former determining all things, besides the substance of matter, to be made or generated, the latter, that no real entity was either generated or corrupted; thereupon both destroying qualities and forms of body, and asserting the ingenerability and incorporeity of souls.—15. How Aristotle's Atheistic Materialists endeavoured to baffle and elude that axiom of the Italic philosophers, that nothing can come from nothing nor go to nothing; and that Anaxagoras was the first amongst the Ionics, who yielded so far to that principle, as from thence to assert incorporeal substance, and the pre-existence of qualities and forms in similar atoms, forasmuch as he conceived them to be things really distinct from the substance of matter.—16. The error of some writers, who, because Aristotle affirms, that the ancient philosophers did generally conclude the world to have been made, from thence infer, that they were all Theists, and that Aristotle contradicts himself in representing many of them as Atheists. That the ancient Atheists did generally *νομοποιεῖν*, assert the world to have been made, or have had a beginning; as also some Theists did maintain its eternity, but in a way of dependency upon the Deity. That we ought here to distinguish betwixt the system of the world, and the substance of the matter, all Atheists asserting the matter to have been, not only eternal, but also such independently upon any other being.—17. That Plato and others concluded this Materialism, or Hylopathian Atheism, to have been at least as old as Homer, who made the ocean (or fluid matter) the father of all the gods. And that this was indeed the ancientest of all Atheisms, which, verbally acknowledging gods, yet derived the original of them all from night and chaos. The description of this Atheistic hypothesis in Aristophanes, that night and chaos first laid an egg, out of which sprung forth love, which afterwards mingling with chaos, begat heaven and earth, animals, and all the gods.—18. That, notwithstand-

ing this, in Aristotle's judgment, Parmenides, Hesiod, and others, who made love, in like manner, senior to all the gods, were to be exempted out of the number of Atheists; they understanding this love to be an active principle, or cause of motion in the universe, which therefore could not rise from an egg of the night, nor be the offspring of chaos, but must be something in order of nature before matter. Simmias Rhodius's Wings, a poem in honour of this heavenly love. This not that love which was the offspring of Penia and Poros in Plato. In what rectified sense it may pass for true theology, that love is the supreme Deity and original of all things.—19. That though Democritus and Leucippus be elsewhere taxed by Aristotle for this very thing, that they assigned only a material cause of the universe; yet they were not the persons intended by him in the fore-cited accusation, but certain ancienter philosophers, who also were not Atomists, but Hylopathians.—20. That Aristotle's Atheistic Materialists were all the first Ionic philosophers before Anaxagoras, Thales being the head of them. But that Thales is acquitted from this imputation of Atheism by several good authors (with an account how he came to be thus differently represented); and, therefore, that his next successor, Anaximander, is rather to be accounted the prince of this Atheistic philosophy.—21. A passage out of Aristotle objected, which, at first sight, seems to make Anaximander a Divine philosopher, and therefore hath led both modern and ancient writers into that mistake. That this place well considered proves the contrary, that Anaximander was the chief of the old Atheistic philosophers.—22. That it is no wonder, if Anaximander called senseless matter the *ἄτακτον*, or God, since to all Atheists that must needs be the highest Numen; also how this is said to be immortal, and to govern all; with the concurrent judgment of the Greek scholiasts upon this place.—23. A further account of the Anaximandrian philosophy, manifesting it to have been purely Atheistical.—24. What ill judges the vulgar have been of Theists and Atheists; as also that learned men have commonly supposed fewer Atheists than indeed there were. Anaximander and Democritus Atheists both alike, though philosophizing different ways. That some passages in Plato respect the Anaximandrian form of Atheism, rather than the Democritical.—25. Why Democritus and Leucippus new modelled Atheism into the Atomic form.—26. That besides the three forms of Atheism already mentioned, we sometimes meet with a fourth, which supposes the universe, though not to be an animal, yet a kind of plant or vegetable, having one plastic nature in it, devoid of understanding and sense, which disposes and orders the whole.—27. That this form of Atheism, which makes one plastic life to preside over the whole, is different from the Hylozoic, in that it takes away all fortuitousness, and subjects all to the fate of one plastic methodical nature.—28. Though it be possible, that some in all ages might have entertained this Atheistical conceit, that things

are dispensed by one regular and methodical, but unknowing senseless nature, yet it seems to have been chiefly asserted by certain spurious Heraclitics and Stoics. And, therefore, this form of Atheism, which supposes one cosmoplastic nature, may be called Pseudo-Zenonian.—29. That, besides the philosophic Atheists, there have been always enthusiastic and fanatical Atheists, though in some sense all Atheists may be said also to be both enthusiasts and fanatics, they being led by an *ἑμὴ ἀλογία*, or irrational impetus.—30. That there cannot easily be any other form of Atheism, besides those four already mentioned, because all Atheists are Corporealists, and yet all Corporealists not Atheists, but only such as make the first principle of all things not to be intellectual.—31. A distribution of Atheisms producing the former quaternio, and shewing the difference between them.—32. That they are but bunglers at Atheism who talk of sensitive and rational matter; and that the canting astrological Atheists are not at all considerable, because not understanding themselves.—33. Another distribution of Atheisms; that they either derive the original of things from a merely fortuitous principle, the unguided motion of matter, or else from a plastic and methodical, but senseless nature. What Atheists denied the eternity of the world, and what asserted it.—34. That of these four forms of Atheism, the Atomic or Democritical, and the Hylozoic or Stratonical, are the chief; and that these two being once confuted, all Atheism will be confuted.—35. These two forms of Atheism being contrary to one another, how we ought in all reason to insist rather upon the Atomic; but that afterwards we shall confute the Hylozoic also, and prove against all Corporealists, that no cogitation nor life belongs to matter.—36. That, in the meantime, we shall not neglect any form of Atheism, but confute them all together, as agreeing in one principle; as also shew, how the old Atomic Atheists did sufficiently overthrow the foundation of the Hylozoists.—37. Observed here, that the Hylozoists are not condemned merely for asserting a plastic life, distinct from the animal (which, with most other philosophers, we judge highly probable, if taken in a right sense), but for grossly misunderstanding it, and attributing the same to matter. The plastic life of nature largely explained.—38. That though the confutation of the Atheistic grounds, according to the laws of method, ought to have been reserved for the last part of this discourse; yet we having reasons to violate those laws, crave the reader's pardon for this preposterousness. A considerable observation of Plato's, that it is not only moral vitiosity, which inclines men to atheize, but also an affectation of seeming wiser than the generality of mankind; as likewise, that the Atheists, making such pretence to wit, it is a seasonable undertaking to evince, that they fumble in all their ratiocinations. That we hope to make it appear, that the Atheists are no conjurors; and that all forms of Atheism are nonsense and impossibility.

1. We have now represented the grand mysteries of Atheism, which may be also called the mysteries of the kingdom of darkness; though indeed some of them are but briefly hinted here, they being again more fully to be insisted on afterward, where we are to give an account of the Atheists' endeavours to solve the phenomenon of cogitation. We have represented the chief grounds of Atheisms in general, as also of that most notorious form of Atheism in particular, that is called Atomical. But whereas there hath been already mentioned another form of Atheism, called by us Hylozoical; the principles hereof could not possibly be insisted on in this place, where we were to make the most plausible plea for Atheism, they being directly contrary to those of the Atomical, so that they would have mutually destroyed each other. For, whereas the Atomic Atheism supposes the notion or idea of body to be nothing but extended resisting bulk, and consequently to include no manner of life and cogitation in it; Hylozoism, on the contrary, makes all body, as such, and therefore every smallest atom of it, to have life essentially belonging to it (natural perception and appetite) though without any animal sense or reflexive knowledge, as if life, and matter or extended bulk, were but two incomplete and inadequate conceptions of one and the same substance, called body. By reason of which life (not animal, but only plastical), all parts of matter being supposed able to form themselves artificially and methodically (though without any deliberation or attentive consideration) to the greatest advantage of their present respective capabilities, and therefore also sometimes by organization to improve

themselves further into sense and self-enjoyment in all animals; as also to universal reason and reflexive knowledge in men; it is plain, that there is no necessity at all left, either of any incorporeal soul in men to make them rational, or of any Deity in the whole universe to solve the regularity thereof. One main difference betwixt these two forms of Atheism is this, that the Atomical supposes all life whatsoever to be accidental, generable, and corruptible; but the Hylozoic admits of a certain natural or plastic life, essential and substantial, ingenerable and incorruptible, though attributing the same only to matter, as supposing no other substance in the world besides it.

II. Now to prevent all mistakes, we think fit here by way of caution to suggest, that as every Atomist is not therefore necessarily an Atheist, so neither must every Hylozoist needs be accounted such. For whoever so holds the life of matter, as notwithstanding to assert another kind of substance also, that is immaterial and incorporeal, is no ways obnoxious to that foul imputation. However, we ought not to dissemble, but that there is a great difference here betwixt these two, Atomism and Hylozoism, in this regard; that the former of them, namely Atomism (as hath been already declared) hath in itself a natural cognation and conjunction with Incorporeism, though violently cut off from it by the Democritic Atheists; whereas the latter of them, Hylozoism, seems to have altogether as close and intimate a correspondence with Corporealism; because, as hath been already signified, if all matter, as such, have not only such a life, perception, and self-active power in it, as whereby it can form itself to the best advantage,

making this a sun, and that an earth or planet, and fabricating the bodies of animals most artificially, but also can improve itself into sense and self-enjoyment; it may as well be thought able to advance itself higher, into all the acts of reason and understanding in men; so that there will be no need either of an incorporeal immortal soul in men, or a Deity in the universe. Nor indeed is it easily conceivable, how any should be induced to admit such a monstrous paradox as this is, that every atom of dust or other senseless matter is wiser than the greatest politician and the most acute philosopher that ever was, as having an infallible omniscience of all its own capabilities and congruities; were it not by reason of some strong prepossession, against incorporeal substance and a Deity: there being nothing so extravagant and outrageously wild, which a mind once infected with atheistical sottishness and disbelief will not rather greedily swallow down, than admit a Deity, which to such is the highest of all paradoxes imaginable, and the most affrightful bugbear. Notwithstanding all which, it may not be denied, but that it is possible for one, who really entertains the belief of a Deity and a rational soul immortal, to be persuaded, first, that the sensitive soul in men as well as brutes is merely corporeal; and then that there is a material plastic life in the seeds of all plants and animals, whereby they do artificially form themselves; and from thence afterward to descend also further to Hylezoism, that all matter, as such, hath a kind of natural, though not animal life in it: in consideration whereof, we ought not to censure every Hylozoist, professing to hold a Deity and a rational soul immortal; for

a mere disguised Atheist, or counterfeit histrionic Theist.

III. But though every Hylozoist be not therefore necessarily an Atheist, yet whosoever is an Hylozoist and Corporealist both together, he that both holds the life of matter in the sense before declared, and also that there is no other substance in the world besides body and matter, cannot be excused from the imputation of Atheism, for two reasons; first, because though he derive the original of all things, not from what is perfectly dead and stupid as the Atomic Atheist doth, but from that which hath a kind of life or perception in it, nay an infallible omniscience, of whatsoever itself can do or suffer, or of all its own capabilities and congruities, which seems to bear some semblance of a Deity; yet all this being only in the way of natural, and not animal perception, is indeed nothing but a dull and drowsy, plastic and spermatic life, devoid of all consciousness and self-enjoyment. The Hylozoists' nature is a piece of very mysterious nonsense, a thing perfectly wise, without any knowledge or consciousness of itself; whereas a Deity, according to the true notion of it, is such a perfect understanding being, as with full consciousness and self-enjoyment is completely happy. Secondly, because the Hylozoic Corporealist, supposing all matter, as such, to have life in it, must needs make infinite of those lives, (forasmuch as every atom of matter has a life of its own) co-ordinate and independent on one another, and consequently, as many independent first principles, no one common life or mind ruling over the whole. Whereas, to assert a God, is to derive all things ἀπ' ἐνός τινος, from some one principle,—or

to suppose one perfect living and understanding being to be the original of all things, and the architect of the whole universe.

Thus we see, that the Hylozoic Corporealist is really an Atheist, though carrying more the semblance and disguise of a Theist, than other Atheists, in that he attributes a kind of life to matter. For indeed every Atheist must of necessity cast some of the incommunicable properties of the Deity, more or less, upon that which is not God, namely, matter; and they, who do not attribute life to it, yet must needs bestow upon it necessary self-existence, and make it the first principle of all things, which are the peculiarities of the Deity. The Numen, which the Hylozoic Corporealist pays all his devotions to, is a certain blind she-god or goddess, called Nature, or the life of matter; which is a very great mystery, a thing that is perfectly wise, and infallibly omniscient, without any knowledge or consciousness at all; something like to that τῶν παίδων αἶνιγμα (in* Plato) • De Rep. l. 5. περὶ τοῦ εὐνούχου βολῆς τῆς νυκτερίδος, that p. 468. vulgar enigma or riddle of boys concerning an eunuch striking a bat; a man and not a man, seeing and not seeing, did strike and not strike, with a stone and not a stone, a bird and not a bird, &c. the difference being only this, that this was a thing intelligible, but humorsomely expressed; whereas the other seems to be perfect nonsense, being nothing but a misunderstanding of the plastic power, as shall be shewed afterwards.

iv. Now the first and chief assertor of this Hylozoic Atheism was, as we conceive, Strato Lampſacenus,* commonly called also Physicus, that had

* Vide Diogen. Laert. segm. 58. p. 298.

been once an auditor of Theophrastus, and a famous Peripatetic, but afterwards degenerated from a genuine Peripatetic into a new-formed kind of Atheist. For Velleius, an Epicurean Atheist in Cicero, reckoning up all the several sorts of Theists, which had been in former times, gives such a character of this Strato, as whereby he makes him to be a strange kind of Atheistical Theist, or Divine Atheist, if we may use such a contradictions expression: his words are these,

* "Nec audiendus Strato, qui Physicus

* De Nat. De. appellatur, qui omnem vim divinam in
l. 1. cap. xiii.
p. 2902. natura sitam esse censet; quæ causas

gignendi, augendi, minuendive habeat,

sed careat omni sensu." Neither is Strato, commonly called the Naturalist or Physiologist, to be heard, who places all Divinity in nature, as having within itself the causes of all generations, corruptions, and augmentations, but without any manner of sense.—Strato's Deity therefore was a certain living and active, but senseless nature. He did not fetch the original of all things, as the Democritic and Epicurean Atheists, from a mere fortuitous motion of atoms, by means whereof he bore some slight semblance of a Theist; but yet he was a downright Atheist for all that, his God being no other than such a life of nature in matter, as was both devoid of sense and consciousness, and also multiplied together with the several parts of it. He is also in like manner described by

Seneca in St. Augustine† as a kind of

† De Civ. Dei,
l. 6. c. 10.
sec. 1. p. 122.
tom. vii. oper.
ed. Benedicti.

mongrel thing, betwixt an Atheist and a Theist; "Ego feram aut Platonem, aut Peripateticum Stratonem, quorum alter deum sine corpore fecit, alter sine ani-

mo?" Shall I endure either Plato, or the Peripatetic Strato, whereof the one made God to be without a body, the other without a mind?—In which words Seneca taxes these two philosophers, as guilty of two contrary extremes; Plato, because he made God to be a pure mind, or a perfectly incorporeal being; and Strato, because he made him to be a body without a mind, he acknowledging no other Deity than a certain stupid and plastic life, in all the several parts of matter, without sense. Wherefore, this seems to be the only reason, why Strato was thus sometimes reckoned amongst the Theists, though he were indeed an Atheist, because he dissented from that only form of Atheism, then so vulgarly received, the Democritic and Epicurean, attributing a kind of life to nature and matter.

v. And that Strato was thus an Atheist, but of a different kind from Democritus, may further appear from this passage of Cicero's;*

"Strato Lampsacenus negat opera deorum se uti ad fabricandum mundum; quæcunque sint docet omnia esse effecta natura, nec ut ille, qui asperis, et lævibus, et hamatis uncinatisque corporibus concreta hæc esse dicat, interjecto inani; somnia censet hæc esse Democriti, non docentis, sed optantis." Strato denies, that he makes any use of a God, for the fabricating of the world, or the solving the phenomena thereof; teaching all things to have been made by nature; but yet not in such a manner, as he who affirmed them to be all concreated out of certain rough and smooth, hooked and crooked atoms, he judging these things to be nothing but the mere dreams and dotages of Demo-

* Acad.
Quest. 1. 4.
cap. 38.
p. 2318.
tom. viii.
oper.

critus, not teaching but wishing.—Here we see, that Strato denied the world to be made by a Deity or perfect understanding nature, as well as Democritus: and yet that he dissented from Democritus notwithstanding, holding another kind of nature, as the original of things, than he did, who gave no account of any active principle and cause of motion, nor of the regularity that is in things. Democritus's nature was nothing but the fortuitous motion of matter; but Strato's nature was an inward plastic life in the several parts of matter, whereby they could artificially frame themselves to the best advantage, according to their several capabilities, without any conscious or reflexive knowledge. “*Quicquid aut sit aut fiat, (says the same author)* naturalibus fieri, aut factum esse docet ponderibus et motibus.*” Strato teaches whatsoever is, or is made, to be made by certain inward natural forces and activities.—

VI. Furthermore it is to be observed, that though Strato thus attributed a certain kind of life to matter, yet he did by no means allow of any one common life, whether sentient and rational, or plastic and spermatic only, as ruling over the whole mass of matter and corporeal universe; which is a thing in part affirmed by Plutarch,* and

* *Advers.
Colotem.
p. 1115.
tom. ii.
oper.*

may in part be gathered from these words of his; τὸν κόσμον αὐτὸν οὐ ζῶον εἶναι φησι, τὸδε κατὰ φύσιν ἔπεσθαι τῇ κατὰ τύχην, ἀρχὴν γὰρ ἐνδιδόναι τὸ αὐτόματον, εἴτε οὕτω περαινέσθαι τῶν φυσικῶν παθῶν ἕκαστον. Strato affirmeth that the world is no animal (or god), but that what is natural in every thing, follows something fortuitous antecedent, chance first beginning, and na-

* *Ibid.*

ture acting consequently thereupon.—The full sense whereof seems to be this, that though Strato did not derive the original of all mundane things from mere fortuitous mechanism, as Democritus before him had done, but supposed a life and natural perception in the matter, that was directive of it; yet, not acknowledging any one common life, whether animal or plastic, as governing and swaying the whole, but only supposing the several parts of matter to have so many plastic lives of their own, he must needs attribute something to fortune, and make the mundane system to depend upon a certain mixture of chance and plastic or orderly nature both together, and consequently must be an Hylozoist. Thus we see, that these are two schemes of Atheism, very different from one another;* that, which fetches the original of all things from the mere fortuitous and unguided motion of matter, without any vital or directive principle; and that, which derives it from a certain mixture of chance and the life of matter both together, it supposing a plastic life, not in the whole universe, as one thing, but in all the several parts of matter by themselves; the first of which is the Atomic and Democritic Atheism, the second the Hylozoic and Stratonic.

VII. It may perhaps be suspected by some, that the famous Hippocrates, who lived long before Strato, was an assertor of the Hylozoic Atheism, because of such passages in him as these, ἀπαίδευτος ἡ φύσις ἐκ τοῦ αἵματος* παθούσα τὰ δέοντα ποιεῖν. Nature is unlearned or untaught, but it learneth from itself what things it ought to do:—and again

VI. Epidem.
sect. 5. sect. 2.
tom. ii. oper.
p. 1184.
* Al. lect.
καὶ αὐτὴ μαθεύ-
σα, τὰ δέοντα
ποιεῖ.

* Vide Lactant, de Ira Dei, cap. x. p. 918.

ἀνευρίσκει ἡ φύσις αὐτὴ ἑαυτῇ τὰς ἐφόδους, οὐκ ἐκ διανοίας;

Nature finds out ways to itself, not by ratiocination.—But there is nothing more affirmed here concerning nature by Hippocrates, than what might be affirmed likewise of the Aristotelic and Platonic nature, which is supposed to act for ends, though without consultation and ratiocination.

And I must confess, it seems to me no way misbecoming of a Theist, to acknowledge such a nature or principle in the universe, as may act according to rule and method for the sake of ends, and in order to the best, though itself do not understand the reason of what it doth; this being still supposed to act dependently upon a higher intellectual principle, and to have been first set a work and employed by it, it being otherwise nonsense. But to assert any such plastic nature, as is independent upon any higher intellectual principle, and so itself the first and highest principle of activity in the universe, this indeed must needs be, either that Hylozoic Atheism already spoken of, or else another different form of Atheism, which shall afterwards be described. But though Hippocrates were a Corporealist, yet we conceive he ought not to lie under the suspicion of either of those two atheisms; forasmuch as himself plainly asserts a higher intellectual principle, than such a plastic nature, in the universe, namely an Heraclitic corporeal God, or understanding fire, immortal, pervading the whole world, in these words; Δοκίει δέ μοι ὁ καλέομεν θερμόν,

De Princip.
aut Carnibus.
sect. 1. p.
249. tom. i.
oper.

ἀθάνατόν τε εἶναι, καὶ νοεῖν πάντα, καὶ ὀρεῖν, καὶ ἀκούειν, καὶ εἰδέναι πάντα τὰ ὄντα καὶ τὰ μέλλοντα εἶσεσθαι. It seems to me, that that

which is called heat or fire is immortal and om-

niscient, and that it sees, hears, and knows all things; not only such as are present, but also future.—Wherefore, we conclude, that Hippocrates was neither an Hylozoic nor Democritic Atheist, but an Heraclitic corporeal Theist.

VIII. Possibly it may be thought also, that Plato, in his Sophist, intends this Hylozoic atheism, where he declares it as the opinion of many, *τὴν φύσιν πάντα γεννᾶν, ἀπὸ τινος αἰτίας αὐτομάτης καὶ ἄνευ διανοίας φουούσης*. That nature generates all things from a certain spontaneous principle, without any reason and understanding.—But here the word *αὐτομάτης* may be as well rendered fortuitous as spontaneous; however, there is no necessity, that this should be understood of an artificial or methodical unknowing nature. It is true, indeed, that Plato himself seems to acknowledge a certain plastic or methodical nature in the universe, subordinate to the Deity, or that perfect mind, which is the supreme governor of all things; as may be gathered from these words of his, *τὴν φύσιν μετὰ λόγου καὶ σὺν λόγῳ καὶ νῦν τὰ πάντα διακοσμεῖν* that nature does rationally (or orderly) together with reason and mind, govern the whole universe.—Where he supposes a certain regular nature to be a partial and subordinate cause of things under the Divine intellect. And it is very probable, that Aristotle derived that whole doctrine of his concerning a regular and artificial nature, which acts for ends, from the Platonic school. But as for any such form of Atheism, as should suppose a plastic or regular, but senseless nature either in the whole world, or the several parts of matter by themselves, to be the highest principle of all things,

* P. 168. oper.

we do not conceive, that there is any intimation of it to be found any where in Plato. For in his *De Legibus*, where he professedly disputes against Atheism, he states the doctrine of it after this man-

ner, τὰ μὲν μέγιστα καὶ κάλλιστα ἀπεργάζεσθαι φύσιν καὶ τύχην, τὰ δὲ σμικρότερα τέχνην. that

nature and chance produceth all the first, greatest, and most excellent things, but that the smaller things were produced by human art.—The plain meaning whereof is this, that the first original of things, and the frame of the whole universe, proceeded from a mere fortuitous nature, or the motion of matter unguided by any art or method.

And thus it is further explained in the following words, πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν καὶ αἶρα φύσει πάντα εἶναι καὶ τύχῃ φασί· τέχνη δὲ οὐδὲν τούτων, &c. That the first elements, fire, water, air, and earth, were all made by nature and chance, without any art or method; and then, that the bodies of the sun, moon, and stars, and the whole heavens, were afterward made out of those elements, as devoid of all manner of life,—and only fortuitously moved and mingled together; and lastly, that the whole mundane system, together with the orderly seasons of the year, as also plants, animals, and men, did arise after the same manner, from the mere fortuitous motion of senseless and stupid matter. In the very same manner does Plato state this controversy again, betwixt Theists and Atheists, in his

Philebus; Πότερον, ὦ Πρωταρχε, τὰ ζῦμπαντα, P. 28. ed. Ser.

καὶ τὸδε τὸ καλούμενον ὅλον, ἐπιτροπεύειν φῶ-
μεν τὴν τοῦ ἀλόγου καὶ εἰκῇ δύναμιν, καὶ τὰ ὅπη ἐτυχεν; ἢ
τὰναντία, καθάπερ οἱ πρόσθεν ἡμῶν ἔλεγον, νοῦν καὶ φρόνη-
σιν τινα θαυμαστήν συντάττουςαν διακυβεύον; Whether
shall we say, O Protarchus, that this whole uni-

verse is dispensed and ordered, by a mere irrational, temerarious, and fortuitous principle, and so as it happens; or contrariwise (as our forefathers have instructed us) that mind, and a certain wonderful wisdom, did at first frame, and does still govern all things?—

Wherefore we conclude, that Plato took no notice of any other form of Atheism, as then set on foot, than such as derives all things from a mere fortuitous principle, from nature and chance; that is, the unguided motion of matter, without any plastic artificialness or methodicalness, either in the whole universe, or the parts of it. But because this kind of Atheism, which derives all things from a mere fortuitous nature, had been managed two manner of ways, by Democritus in the way of Atoms, and by Anaximander and others in the way of Forms and Qualities (of which we are to speak in the next place); therefore the Atheism, which Plato opposes, was either the Democritic or the Anaximandrian Atheism; or else (which is most probable) both of them together.

IX. It is hardly imaginable, that there should be no philosophic Atheists in the world before Democritus and Leucippus. Plato^a long since concluded, that there have been Atheists, more or less, in every age, when he bespeaks his young Atheist after this manner; *Ὁν σὺ μόνος οὐδὲ σοὶ φίλοι πρῶτοι καὶ πρῶτον ταύτην δόξαν περὶ θεῶν ἔσχετε, γίνονται δὲ αἰεὶ πλείους ἢ ἐλάττωες ταύτην τὴν νόσον ἔχοντες*. The full sense whereof seems to be

^a De Legibus, lib. x. p. 685.

this: Neither you, my son, nor your friends (Democritus, Leucippus, and Protagoras) are the first, who have entertained this opinion concerning the gods, but there have been always some more or less sick of this atheistic disease.—Wherefore, we shall now make a diligent search and inquiry, to see if we can find any other philosophers, who atheized before Democritus and Leucippus, as also what form of Atheism they entertained.

Aristotle, in his *Metaphysics*, speaking of the quaternio of causes, affirms, that many of those, who first philosophized, assigned only a material cause of the whole mundane system, without either intending or efficient cause. The reason whereof he intimates to have been this, because they asserted matter to be the only substance; and that whatsoever else was in the world, besides the substance or bulk of matter, were all nothing else but πάθη, different passions and affections, accidents and qualities of matter, that were all generated out of it, and corruptible again into it; the substance of matter always remaining the same, neither generated nor corrupted, but from

* Lib. 1. c. 3. eternity unmade; Aristotle's words are*
tom. iv. oper.
p. 264.

these: τῶν πρώτων φιλοσοφησάντων οἱ πλείστοι τὰς ἐν ὕλης εἶδει μόνον ᾤθησαν ἀρχὰς εἶναι πάντων, ἐξ οὗ γὰρ ἴσθιν ἅπαντα τὰ ὄντα, καὶ ἐξ οὗ γίγνεται πρῶτον, καὶ εἰς ὃ φθείρεται τελευταῖον, τῆς μὲν οὐσίας ὑπομένουσας, τοῖς δὲ πάθει μεταβαλλούσας, τοῦτο στοιχεῖον, καὶ ταύτην τῶν ὄντων τὴν ἀρχὴν φασιν εἶναι. Most of those, who first philosophized, took notice of no other principle of things in the universe, than what is to be referred to the material cause; for that,

out of which all things are, and out of which all things are first made, and into which they are all at last corrupted and resolved, the substance always remaining the same, and being changed only in its passions and qualities; this they concluded to be the first original and principle of all things.—

x. But the meaning of these old Material philosophers will be better understood by those exceptions, which Aristotle makes against them, which are two: first, that because they acknowledged no other substance besides matter, that might be an active principle in the universe, it was not possible for them to give any account of the original of motion and action. Εἰ

γὰρ ὅτι μάλιστα πᾶσα φθορά καὶ γενεαὶς ἐκ τινος, Arist. Met.
l. 1. c. 3. p.
265.
ὡς ἐνός ἢ καὶ πλειόνων ἐστίν, διὰ τί τοῦτο συμβαίνει, καὶ τί τὸ αἷτιον; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τό γε ὑποκείμενον αὐτὸ ποιεῖ μεταβάλλειν ἑαυτόν· λέγω δὲ οἶον, οὔτε τὸ ξύλον, οὔτε τὸ χαλκὸς αἷτιον τοῦ μεταβάλλειν ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν· οὐδὲ ποιεῖ τὸ μὲν ξύλον κλίνην, ὁ δὲ χαλκὸς ἀνδριάντα, ἀλλ' ἑτερόν τι τῆς μεταβολῆς αἷτιον· τὸ δὲ τοῦτο ζητεῖν ἐστὶ τὸ τὴν ἑτέραν ζητεῖν ἀρχήν, ὡς ἂν ἡμεῖς φαίμεν, ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως. Though all generation be made never so much out of something as the matter, yet the question still is, by what means this cometh to pass, and what is the active cause which produceth it? because the subject matter cannot change itself; as, for example, neither timber, nor brass, is the cause, that either of them are changed; for timber alone does not make a bed, nor brass a statue, but there must be something else as the cause of the change; and to inquire after this is to inquire after another princi-

ple besides matter, which we would call that, from whence motion springs.—In which words Aristotle intimates, that these old Material philosophers shuffled in motion and action into the world unaccountably, or without a cause; forasmuch as they acknowledged no other principle of things besides passive matter, which could never move, change, or alter itself.

xī. And Aristotle's second exception against these old Material philosophers is this: that since there could be no intending causality in senseless and stupid matter, which they made to be the only principle of all things, they were not able to assign τοῦ εὖ καὶ καλῶς αἰτίαν, any cause of well and fit,—and so could give no account of the regular and orderly frame of this mundane system; Met. I. 1. c. 3. p. 266.

τοῦ εὖ καὶ καλῶς τὰ μὲν ἔχειν, τὰ δὲ γέγονται τῶν ὄντων, ὥς οὔτε γῆν, οὔτ' ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων οὐθέν, εἰκὸς αἰτίον εἶναι· οὐδ' αὐτῷ αὐτομάτῳ, καὶ τύχῃ τεσσούτων ἐπιτρέψαι πρᾶγμα καλῶς ἔχει. That things partly are so well in the world, and partly are made so well, cannot be imputed either to earth or water, or any other senseless body; much less is it reasonable to attribute so noble and excellent an effect as this to mere chance or fortune.—Where Aristotle again intimates, that as these Material philosophers shuffled in motion into the world without a cause, so likewise they must needs suppose this motion to be altogether fortuitous and unguided; and thereby in a manner make fortune, which is nothing but the absence or defect of an intending cause, to supply the room both of the active and intending cause, that is, efficient and final. Whereupon Aristotle subjoins a commendation of Anax-

agoras, as the first of the Ionic philosophers, who introduced mind or intellect for a principle in the universe; that in this respect he alone seemed to be sober and in his wits, comparatively with those others that went before him, who talked so idly and atheistically. For Anaxagoras's principle was such, saith Aristotle, as was αἴμα τοῦ καλῶς αἰτῆς, καὶ τοιαύτη ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις γίνεσθαι, at once a cause of motion, and also of well and fit;—of all the regularity, aptitude, pulchritude, and order, that is in the whole universe. And thus it seems Anaxagoras himself had determined:

Ἀναξαγόρας τὸ αἶσιον τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ ὀρθοῦ νοῦν λέγει, Anaxagoras saith, that mind is the only cause of right and well;—this being proper to mind to aim at ends and good, and to order one thing fitly for the sake of another. Whence it was, that Anaxagoras concluded good also, as well as mind, to have been a principle of the universe, Ἀναξαγόρας ὡς κινεῖν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀρχὴν, ὃ γὰρ νοῦς κινεῖ, ἀλλὰ κινεῖ ἐνεκά τινος, ὥστε ἔσθαι. Anaxagoras makes good a principle, as that which moves; for, though mind move matter, yet it moves it for the sake of something, and being itself, as it were, first moved by good: so that good is also a principle. —And we note this the rather, to shew how well these three philosophers, Aristotle, Plato, and Anaxagoras, agreed all together in this excellent truth, that mind and good are the first principle of all things in the universe.

XII. And now we think it is sufficiently evident, that these old Materialists in Aristotle, whoever they were, were downright Atheists; not

Arist. de An.
lib. 1. c. 2. p.
5. tom. ii.
oper.

Arist. Met. I.
14. c. 10. p.
485. tom. iv.
oper.

so much because they made all substance to be body or matter, for Heraclitus first, and after him Zeno, did the like, deriving the original of all things from fire, as well as Anaximenes did from air, and Thales is supposed by Aristotle* to have done from water, and that with some little more seeming plausibility, since fire, being a more subtle and moveable body than any other, was therefore thought by some ancients to be ἀσώματότατον, the most incorporeal of all bodies, as earth was for that cause rejected by all those corporeal philosophers from being a principle, by reason of the grossness of its parts. But Heraclitus and Zeno, notwithstanding this, are not accounted Atheists, because they supposed their fiery matter to have not only life, but also a perfect understanding originally belonging to it, as also the whole world to be an animal: whereas those Materialists of Aristotle made senseless and stupid matter, devoid of all understanding and life, to be the first principle and root of all things. For, when they supposed life and understanding, as well as all other differences of things, to be nothing but mere passions and accidents of matter, generable out of it, and corruptible again into it, and indeed to be produced, but in a secondary way, from the fortuitous commixture of those first elementary qualities, heat and cold, moist and dry, thick and thin, they plainly implied the substance of matter in itself to be devoid of life and understanding. Now, if this be not Atheism, to derive the original of all things, even of life and mind itself, from

* Metaphysic. lib. i. c. iij. p. 265. tom. iv. oper.

dead and stupid matter fortuitously moved, then there can be no such thing at all.

XIII. Moreover, Aristotle's Materialists concluded every thing besides the substance of matter (which is in itself indifferent to all things), and consequently all particular and determinate beings, to be generable and corruptible. Which is a thing, that Plato takes notice of as an Atheistic principle, expressing it in these words: *ἐστὶ μὲν γὰρ οὐδέν· οὐδὲν, αἱ δὲ γίνονται*, that no- In Theet. thing ever is, but every thing is made and generated.—Forasmuch as it plainly follows, from hence, that not only all animals and the souls of men, but also if there were any gods, which some of those Materialists would not stick, at least verbally, to acknowledge (meaning thereby certain understanding beings superior to men), these likewise must needs have been all generated, and consequently be corruptible. Now, to say that there is no other God, than such as was made and generated, and which may be again unmade, corrupted, and die, or that there was once no God at all till he was made out of the matter, and that there may be none again, this is all one as to deny the thing itself. For a native and mortal God is a pure contradiction. Therefore, whereas Aristotle, in his Metaphy- Lib. 14. c. 6. p. 47. sics, tells us of certain theologers, *οἱ ἐκ νυκτὸς πάντα γεννῶντες*, such as did generate all things (even the gods themselves) out of night and chaos,—we must needs pronounce of such theologers as these, who were Theogonists, and generated all the gods (without exception) out of senseless and stupid matter, that they were but a kind of atheistical Theologers, or theological

Atheists. For, though they did admit of certain beings, to which they attributed the name of gods, yet, according to the true notion of God, they really acknowledged none at all (i. e. no understanding nature as the original of things), but Night and Chaos, senseless and stupid matter, fortuitously moved, was to them the highest of all Numens. So that this theology of theirs was a thing wholly founded in atheistical nonsense.

xiv. And now we think it seasonable here to observe, how vast a difference there was betwixt these old Materialists in Aristotle, and those other philosophers, mentioned before in the first chapter, who determined; οὐδὲν οὐδὲ γίνεσθαι οὐδὲ φθείρεσθαι τῶν ὄντων. That no real entity at all was generated or corrupted;—for this reason, because nothing could be made out of nothing. These were chiefly the philosophers of the Italic or Pythagoric succession; and their design in it was not, as Aristotle was pleased somewhere to affirm, ἀνελὼν πᾶσαν τὴν γένεσιν, to contradict common sense and experience, in denying all natural generations and alterations; but only to interpret nature rightly in them, and that in way of opposition to those Atheistic Materialists, after this manner: that in all the mutations of nature, generations, and alterations, there was neither any new substance made, which was not before, nor any entity really distinct from the pre-existing substances, but only that substance which was before, diversely modified; and so nothing produced in generations, but new modifications, mixtures, and separations of pre-existent substances.

Now this doctrine of theirs drove at these two things: first, the taking away of such qualities

and forms of body, as were vulgarly conceived to be things really distinct from the substance of extended bulk, and all its modifications of more or less magnitude, figure, site, motion, or rest. Because, if there were any such things as these, produced in the natural generations and alterations of bodies, there would then be some real entity made ἐκ μηδενός ἐνυπάρχοντος ἢ προϋπάρχοντος, out of nothing in-existent or pre-existent.—Wherefore they concluded, that these supposed forms and qualities of bodies were really nothing else but only the different modifications of pre-existent matter, in respect of magnitude, figure, site, and motion, or rest; or different concretions and secretions, which are no entities really distinct from the substance, but only cause different phas-mata, fancies, and apparitions in us.

The second thing, which this doctrine aimed at, was the establishing the incorporeity and in-generability of all souls. For, since life, cogitation, sense, and understanding, could not be resolved into those modifications of matter, magnitude, figure, site, and motion, or into mechanism and fancy, but must needs be entities really distinct from extended bulk, or dead and stupid matter; they concluded, that therefore souls could not be generated out of matter, because this would be the production of some real entity out of nothing in-existent or pre-existing; but that they must needs be another kind of substance incorporeal, which could no more be generated or corrupted, than the substance of matter itself; and, therefore, must either pre-exist in nature, before generations, or else be divinely created and infused in them.

It hath been already proved in the first chapter, that the upshot of that Pythagoric doctrine, that nothing could be generated out of nothing pre-existing, amounted to those two things mentioned, viz. the asserting of the incorporeity and ingenerability of souls, and the rejecting of those fantastic entities of forms and real qualities of bodies, and resolving all corporeal phenomena into figures or atoms, and the different apparitions or fancies caused by them. But the latter of these may be further confirmed from this passage of Aristotle's, where, after he had declared that Democritus and Leucippus made the soul and fire to consist of round atoms or figures, like those *ἐν τῷ αἰρί ζύσματα*, those *ramenta* that appear in the air when the sunbeams are transmitted through crannies; he adds, *ἔοικε δὲ καὶ τὸ παρὰ*

Nat. Ausc. l. 1. c. 2. [This reference is a mistake, for the passage is lib. 1. de Anima, cap. ii. p. 4. tom. ii. oper.]

τῶν Πυθαγορείων λεγόμενον, τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει διάνοιαν, ἔφασαν γάρ τινες αὐτῶν, ψυχὴν εἶναι τὰ ἐν τῷ αἰρί ζύσματα, οἱ δὲ, τὰ ταῦτα κινοῦν. And that which is said amongst the Pythagoreans seems to have the same sense, for some of them affirm, that the soul is

those very *ζύσματα*, *ramenta*, or atoms; but others of them, that it is that which moves them:—which latter doubtless were the genuine Pythagoreans. However, it is plain, from hence, that the old Pythagoreans physiologized by *ζύσματα*, as well as Democritus; that is, figures and atoms, and not qualities and forms.

But Aristotle's Materialists, on the contrary, taking it for granted, that matter, or extended bulk, is the only substance, and that the qualities and forms of bodies are entities really distinct from those modifications of magnitude, figure,

site, motion, or rest; and finding also, by experience, that these were continually generated and corrupted, as likewise that life, sense, and understanding were produced in the bodies of such animals, where it had not been before, and again extinguished at the death or corruption of them, concluded, that the souls of all animals, as well as those other qualities and forms of bodies, were generated out of the matter, and corrupted again into it; and, consequently, that every thing that is in the whole world, besides the substance of matter, was made or generated, and might be again corrupted.

Of this Atheistic doctrine, Aristotle speaks elsewhere, as in his book *De*

L. 3. c. 1. p. 668. tom. i. oper.

Cælo. εἰσι γὰρ τινες οἱ φασίν, οὐθέν ἀγέννητον εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων, ἀλλὰ πάντα γίνεσθαι· μάλιστα μὲν οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἡσίοδον, εἴτα δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, οἱ πρῶτοι φυσιολογήσαντες· οἱ δὲ, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα γίνεσθαι τε φασί, καὶ ρεῖν, εἶναι δὲ παγίως οὐθέν. ἐν δὲ τι μόνον ὑπομένειν, ἐξ οὗ ταῦτα πάντα μετασχηματίζεσθαι πέφυκεν. There are some who affirm, that nothing is ingenerable, but that all things are made; as Hesiod especially, and also among the rest they who first physiologized, whose meaning was, that all other things are made (or generated) and did flow, none of them having any stability; only that there was one thing (namely, matter) which always remained, out of which all those other things were transformed and metamorphosed.—Though, as to Hesiod, Aristotle afterwards speaks differently. So likewise in his *Physics*, after he had declared, that some of the ancients made air, some water, and some other matter, the principle of all things; he adds, *τοῦτο καὶ τοσαύτην

* L. 2. c. 1. p. 463. oper.

φασιν εἶναι τὴν ἅπασαν οὐσίαν· τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα πάθη γούτων, καὶ ἔξεις, καὶ διαθέσεις· καὶ τούτων μὲν ὄντων εἶναι αἰδῖαν· τὰ δὲ ἄλλα γίνεσθαι καὶ φθείρεσθαι ἡπιόρακι· This they affirmed to be all the substance or essence that was; but all other things, the passions, affections, and dispositions of it; and that this, therefore, was eternal, as being capable of no change, but all other things infinitely generated and corrupted.—

xv. But these Materialists being sometimes assaulted by the other Italic philosophers, in the manner before declared, that no real entities, distinct from the modifications of any substance, could be generated or corrupted, because nothing could come from nothing, nor go to nothing; they would not seem plainly to contradict that theorem, but only endeavoured to interpret it into a compliance with their own hypothesis, and distinguish concerning the sense of it in this manner: that it ought to be understood only of the substance of matter, and nothing else, viz. that no matter could be made or corrupted, but that all other things whatsoever, not only forms and qualities of bodies, but also souls; life, sense, and understanding, though really different from magnitude, figure, site, and motion, yet ought to be accounted only the *πάθη*, the passions and accidents of this matter, and therefore might be generated out of it, and corrupted again into it, and that without the production or destruction of any real entity, matter being the only thing that is accounted such. All this we learn from these words of

Metaph. l. 1.
c. 3. p. 264.
tom. iv. oper.

Aristotle, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὔτε γίνεσθαι οὐθὲν οἴονται, οὔτε ἀπόλλυσθαι, ὡς τῆς τοιαύτης φύσεως αἰὶ σωζομένης. ὥσπερ δὲ τὸν Σωκράτη φα-

ἢ οὐτε γίνεσθαι ἀπλῶς, ὅταν γίγνεται καλὸς ἢ μουσικὸς, οὐτε ἀπολλύεσθαι, ὅταν ἀποβάλλῃ ταύτας τὰς ἕξεις, διὰ τὸ ἐπομένειν τὸ ὑποκείμενον, τὸν Σωκράτη αὐτόν, οὕτως αὖθις τῶν ἄλλων οὐδὲν δεῖ γὰρ εἶναι τίνα φύσιν, ἢ μίαν, ἢ πλείους γὰρ, ἐξ ἧς γίγνεται τὸ ἄλλα, σωζομένης ἑκείνης. The sense whereof is this: And, therefore, as to that axiom of some philosophers, that nothing is either generated or destroyed, these Materialists admit it to be true in respect of the substance of matter only, which is always preserved the same; as, say they, we do not say, that Socrates is simply or absolutely made, when he is made either handsome or musical, or that he is destroyed when he loseth those dispositions, because the subject Socrates still remains the same; so neither are we to say, that any thing else is absolutely either generated or corrupted, because the substance or matter of every thing always continues. For there must needs be some certain nature, from which all other things are generated, that still remaining one and the same.—

We have noted this passage of Aristotle's the rather, because this is just the very doctrine of Atheists at this day; that the substance of matter or extended bulk is the only real entity, and therefore the only unmade thing, that is neither generable nor creatable, but necessarily existent from eternity; but whatever else is in the world, as life and animality, soul and mind, being all but accidents and affections of this matter (as if therefore they had no real entity at all in them), are generable out of nothing and corruptible into nothing, so long as the matter, in which they are, still remains the same. The result of which is no less than this, that there can be no other gods

or god, than such as was at first made or generated out of senseless matter, and may be corrupted again into it. And here indeed lies the grand mystery of Atheism, that every thing besides the substance of matter is made or generated, and may be again unmade or corrupted

However, Anaxagoras, though an Ionic philosopher, and therefore, as shall be declared afterward, successor to those Atheistic Materialists, was at length so far convinced by that Pythagoric doctrine, that no entity could be naturally generated out of nothing, as that he departed from his predecessors herein, and did for this reason acknowledge mind and soul, that is, all cogitative being, to be a substance really distinct from matter, neither generable out of it nor corruptible into it; as also that the forms and qualities of bodies (which he could not yet otherwise conceive of than as things really distinct from those modifications of magnitude, figure, site, and motion), must for the same cause pre-exist before generations in certain similar atoms, and remain after corruptions, being only secreted and concreted in them. By means whereof he introduced a certain spurious Atomism of his own; for whereas the genuine Atomists before his time had supposed ὄγκους ἀνομοιοῦς, dissimilar atoms,—devoid of all forms and qualities, to be the principles of all bodies, Anaxagoras substituted in the room of them his ὁμοιομέτεια, his similar atoms,—endued from eternity with all manner of forms and qualities incorruptibly.

xvi. We have made it manifest, that those Material philosophers, described by Aristotle, were absolute Atheists, not merely because they made body

to be the only substance, though that be a thing, which Aristotle himself justly reprehends

them for also in these words of his, *ὅσα* Metaph. l. 1. c. 7. p. 274.

μὲν οὖν ἐν τε τὸ πᾶν καὶ μίαν εἶναι τινα φύσιν, tom. iv. oper.

ὡς ὕλην τιθέασι, καὶ ταύτην σωματικὴν, καὶ μέ-

γεθος ἔχουσιν, δῆλον ὅτι πολλαχῶς ἀμαρτάνουσι, τῶν γὰρ

σωμάτων τὰ στοιχεῖα τιθέασι μόνον, τῶνδε ἀσωμάτων οὐ,

ὄντων καὶ ἀσωμάτων. They who suppose the world

to be one uniform thing, and acknowledge only

one nature as the matter, and this corporeal or in-

duced with magnitude, it is evident, that they err

many ways, and particularly in this, that they set

down only the elements of bodies, and not of in-

corporeal things, though there be also things in-

corporeal.—I say, we have not concluded them

Atheists, merely for this reason, because they de-

denied incorporeal substance, but because they de-

duced all things whatsoever from dead and stupid

matter, and made every thing in the world, be-

sides the bare substance of matter, devoid of all

quality, generable and corruptible.

Now we shall take notice of an objection, made

by some late writers, against this Aristotelic ac-

cusation of the old philosophers, founded upon a

passage of Aristotle's own, who else-

where, in his book *De Cælo*, speaking L. 1. c. 10. p. 632. tom. i. oper.

of the heaven or world, plainly affirms, *γενόμενον μὲν οὖν ἅπαντες εἶναι φύσιν,* that all

the philosophers before himself did assert the

world to have been made, or have had a begin-

ning.—From whence these writers infer, that

therefore they must needs be all Theists, and hold

the Divine creation of the world; and consequently,

that Aristotle contradicts himself, in representing

many of them as Atheists, acknowledging only

one material principle of the whole universe, without any intending or efficient cause. But we cannot but pronounce this to be a great error in these writers, to conclude all those, who held the world to have been made, therefore to have been Theists; whereas it is certain on the contrary, that all the first and most ancient Atheists did (in Aristotle's language) *κοσμοποιεῖν ἢ γένεσθαι τὸν κόσμον*, make or generate to the world,—that is, suppose it not to have been from eternity, but to have had a temporary beginning; as likewise that it was corruptible, and would, some time or other, have an end again. The sense of which Atheistic philosophers is represented by Lucretius in this manner :^a

Et quoniam docui, mundi mortalia templa
Esse, et nativo consistere corpore coelum,
Et quæcunque in eo fiunt, fiuntque, necesse
Esse ea dissolvi.

And there seems to be indeed a necessity, in reason, that they, who derive all things from a fortuitous principle, and hold every thing besides the substance of matter to have been generated, should suppose the world to have been generated likewise, as also to be corruptible. Wherefore, it may well be reckoned for one of the vulgar errors, that all Atheists held the eternity of the world.

Moreover, when Aristotle subjoins immediately after, *ἀλλὰ γινόμενον, οἱ μὲν αἰδίου, οἱ δὲ φθαρτόν*, that though the ancient philosophers all held the world to have been made, yet, notwithstanding, they were divided in this, that some of them supposed, for all that, that it would continue to eternity such

^a Lib. vi. ver. 43. Adde lib. v. ver. 236.

as it is, others, that it would be corrupted again; the former of these, who conceived the world to be *γενόμενον*, but *αἰδίου*, made, but eternal, were none of them Atheists, but all Theists. Such as Plato, whom Aristotle seems particularly to perstringe for this, who in his *Timæus* introduceth the supreme Deity bespeaking those inferior gods, the sun, moon, and stars (supposed by that philosopher to be animated) after this manner:

ἀ δὲ ἐμοῦ γεγόμενα, ἅλυστα, ἐμοῦ γε θέλοντος, τὸ Timæ. p. 41.
Ser.
μὲν οὖν δεθὲν πᾶν λυτὸν· τό γε μὴν καλῶς ἁρμο-

σθὲν καὶ ἔχον εἶναι, λύνειν ἐθέλειν, κακοῦ δὲ ἂ καὶ ἐπείπερ γεγενῆσθε, ἀθάνατοι μὲν οὐκ ἔστι, οὐδ' ἅλυστοι τὸ πάμπαν. οὔτι μὲν δὴ λυθήσεσθε γε, οὐδὲ τεύξεσθε θανάτου μοίρας· τῆς ἐμῆς βουλήσεως μίζονος ἔτι δεσμοῦ καὶ κυριατέρου λαχόντας. Those things, which are made by me, are indissoluble by my will; and though every thing which is compacted, be in its own nature dissolvable, yet it is not the part of one that is good, to will the dissolution or destruction of any thing that was once well made. Wherefore, though you are not absolutely immortal, nor altogether indissolvable, yet notwithstanding you shall not be dissolved, nor ever die; my will being a stronger band to hold you together, than any thing else can be to loosen you.—Philo and other Theists followed Plato in this, asserting, that though the world was made, yet it would never be corrupted, but have a post-*eternity*. Whereas all the ancient Atheists, namely, those who derived the original of things from nature and fortune, did at once deny both eternities to the world, past and future. Though we cannot say, that none but Atheists did this; for Empedocles and Heraclitus, and afterward the Stoics, did not only suppose the world likewise generated,

and to be again corrupted, but also that this had been, and would be done over and over again, in infinite vicissitudes.

Furthermore, as the world's eternity was generally opposed by all the ancient Atheists, so it was maintained also by some Theists, and that not only Aristotle,^a but also before him, by Ocellus Lucanus^b at least, though Aristotle thought not fit to take any notice of him; as likewise the latter Platonists universally went that way, yet so, as that they always supposed the world to have as much depended upon the Deity, as if it had been once created out of nothing by it.

To conclude, therefore: neither they, who asserted the world's generation and temporary beginning, were all Theists, nor they, who maintained its eternity, all Atheists; but before Aristotle's time, the Atheists universally, and most of the Theists, did both alike conclude the world to have been made; the difference between them lying in this, that the one affirmed the world to have been made by God, the other by the fortuitous motion of matter.

Wherefore, if we would put another difference betwixt the Theists and Atheists here, as to this particular, we must distinguish betwixt the system of the world and the substance of the matter. For the ancient Atheists, though they generally denied the eternity of the world, yet they supposed the substance of the matter, not only to have been eternal, but also self-existent and independent upon any other Being; they making it the first principle and original of all things, and con-

^a Physic. Auscultat. lib. viii.

^b *ὡς ἐάνθρωπος φέρων*, inter Scriptor. Mythol. a Tho. Gale editos, p. 601.

sequently the only Numen. Whereas the genuine Theists, though many of them maintained the world's eternity, yet they all concluded, both the form and substance of it to have always depended upon the Deity, as the light doth upon the sun; the Stoics with some others being here excepted.

XVII. Aristotle tells us, some were of opinion, that this Atheistic philosophy, which derives all things from senseless and stupid matter in the way of forms and qualities, was of great antiquity, and as old as any records of time amongst the Greeks; and not only so, but also that the ancient

Theologers themselves entertained it: Εἰσι Met. I. 1. c. 3.
tom. iv. oper.
p. 285. δέ τινες, οἱ καὶ τοὺς παμπάλαιους, καὶ πολὺ πρὸ

τῆς νῦν γενέσεως, καὶ πρώτους θολογήσαντας, οὕτως οἰοῦνται περὶ τῆς φύσεως διαλαβεῖν· Ὠκεανὸν τε γὰρ καὶ Τήθην ἐποίησαν τῆς γενέσεως πατέρας, καὶ τὸν ὄρκον τῶν θεῶν ὕδωρ, τὴν καλουμένην ὑπ' αὐτῶν Στύγα τῶν ποιητῶν. τιμωτάτον μὲν γὰρ τὸ πρεσβύτατον· ὄρκος δὲ τὸ τιμωτάτον ἐστίν· There are some who conceive, that even the most ancient of all, and the most remote from this present generation, and they also who first theologized, did physiologize after this manner; forasmuch as they made the Ocean and Tethys to have been the original of generation; and for this cause the oath of the gods is said to be by water (called by the poets Styx), as being that from which they all derived their original. For an oath ought to be by that, which is most honourable; and that which is most ancient, is most honourable.—In which words it is very probable, that Aristotle aimed at Plato; however, it is certain, that Plato, in his *Theætetus*,* affirms this Atheistic doctrine to have been very ancient, ὅτι πάντα ἔκγονα ροῆς τε καὶ

* P. 118.

κινήσεως, that all things were the offspring of flux and motion,—that is, that all things were made and generated out of matter; and that he chargeth Homer with it, in deriving the original of the gods themselves in like manner from the Ocean (or floating matter) in this verse of his,

Ὀκεανὸν τε θεῶν γένεσιν, καὶ μητέρα Τηθύς,

The father of all gods the Ocean is,
Tethys their mother.

Wherefore, these indeed seem to have been the ancientest of all Atheists, who, though they acknowledged certain beings superior to men, which they called by the name of gods, did notwithstanding really deny a God, according to the true notion of him, deriving the original of all things whatsoever in the universe from the ocean, that is, fluid matter, or, which is all one, from night and chaos; and supposing all their gods to have been made and generated, and consequently to be mortal and corruptible. Of which Atheistic theology Aristophanes gives us the description in his *Aves*,* after this manner: “That at first was nothing but Night and Chaos, which laying an egg, from thence was produced Love, that mingling again with Chaos, begot heaven, and earth, and animals, and all the gods.”

*Χάος ἦν, καὶ νύξ, ἱερβός τε μέλαν πρῶτον, καὶ Τάρταρος εὐρύς.
Ἰν' ὃ, οὐδ' ἀέρ, οὐδ' οὐρανὸς ἦν· ἱρήβους δ' ἐν ἀπείροισι κόλπῳ
τίσσι πρῶτιστον ὑπὸ γαίῃ νύξ ἔμειλ' ἀπὸ τοῦ ἰόν.
Ἐξ οὗ περιπλομένης ἔρως ἰβλασται· ἔρως δ' πόθινός.
Στάλβον νῦν πτερύγεσσι χρυσαῖν· εἰλὸς ἀπὸ μῶστος θύας.
Οὕτως δὲ χάρις σπέρσεται μεγάλης κούρης, κατὰ Τάρταρον εὐρύν,
Ἐπὸς τινος γένος ἡμέτερος, καὶ πρῶτον ἀνιγγομένης εἰς φῶς,
Πρῶτον δ' οὐκ ἦν γένος ἀθανάτων, πρὶν ἔρως συνίμμεν ἀπαντα.*

* Ver. 694. p. 404. edit. Kusteri.

First, all was chaos, one confused heap;
 Darkness enwrap the disagreeing deep;
 In a mixt crowd the jumbling elements were,
 Nor earth, nor air, nor heaven did appear;
 Till on this horrid vast abyss of things,
 Teeming Night, spreading o'er her coal-black wings,
 Laid the first egg; whence, after time's due course,
 Issu'd forth Love (the world's prolific source)
 Glistening with golden wings; which fluttering o'er
 Dark Chaos, gendered all the numerous store
 Of animals and gods, &c.

And whereas the poet there makes the birds to have been begotten between love and chaos before all the gods; though one might think this to have been done jocularly by him, merely to humour his plot; yet Salmasius* conceives, and not without some reason, that it was really a piece of the old Atheistic cabala, which therefore seems to have run thus: That chaos or matter confusedly moved being the first original of all, things did from thence rise up gradually from lesser to greater perfection. First, inanimate things, as the elements, heaven, earth, and seas; then brute animals; afterwards men, and last of all the gods. As if not only the substance of matter, and those inanimate bodies of the elements, fire, water, air, and earth, were, as Aristotle somewhere speaks, according to the sense of those Atheistic theologers, * *φύσει πρότερα τοῦ θεοῦ, θεοὶ δὲ καὶ ταῦτα*, first in order of nature before God, as being themselves also gods,—but also brute animals at least, if not men too. And this is the Atheistic creation of the world, gods and all, out of senseless and stupid matter, or dark chaos, as the only original Numen; the perfectly inverted order of the universe.

* De Gen. et
 Cor. lib. 2. c.
 6. p. 735.
 tom. i. oper.

* Exercitat. Plinian. in Solinum, tom. i. p. 309.

XVIII. But though this hypothesis be purely atheistical, that makes Love, which is supposed to be the original Deity, to have itself sprung at first from an egg of the night; and, consequently, that all deity was the creature or offspring of matter and chaos, or dark fortuitous nature; yet Aristotle somewhere conceives, that not only Parmenides, but also Hesiod, and some others, who did in like manner make Love the supreme deity, and derive all things from Love and Chaos, were to be exempted out of the number of those Atheistic Materialists before described; forasmuch as they seemed to understand by love, an active principle and cause of motion in the universe; which, therefore, could not spring from an egg of the night, nor be the creature of matter, but must needs be something independent on it, and in order of nature before it: ὑποπτεύσει δ' ἄν τις, Ἡσίοδον πρῶτον ζητῆσαι τὸ τοιούτον, καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος, Ἔρωτα ἢ Ἐπιθυμίαν, ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἔθηκεν ὡς ἀρχὴν, οἷον καὶ Παρμενίδης. Καὶ γὰρ οὗτος κατασκευάζων τὴν τοῦ παντὸς γίνεσιν,

Πρώτιστος μὲν (φύσιν) ἔρωτα θεῶν μάλιστα πάντων.

Ἡσίοδος δέ,

Πάντων μὲν κράτιστα χάος γένετ'· αὐτὰρ Ἰῶντα
Γαῖ' ἐρώσ-τερος,———
Ἡδ' ἔρος, ὃς πάντας μετὰκρίπει ἀθανάτους.

ὡς δέον ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ὑπάρχειν τινὰ αἰτίαν, ἥτις κινήσει καὶ συνέξει τὰ πράγματα. τούτους μὲν οὖν πῶς χρὴ διανεῖμαι περὶ τοῦ τις πρῶτος, ἐξέστω κρίνειν ὑστερον. One would suspect, that Hesiod, and if there be any other

* Aristot. Metaphys. lib. i. cap. iv. p. 267.

who made love or desire a principle of things in the universe, aimed at this very thing (namely, the settling of another active principle besides matter): for Parmenides, describing the generation of the universe, makes Love to be the senior of all the gods; and Hesiod, after he had mentioned chaos, introduced Love as the supreme Deity. As intimating herein, that besides matter, there ought to be another cause or principle, that should be the original of motion and activity, and also hold and conjoin all things together. But how these two principles are to be ordered, and which of them was to be placed first, whether Love or Chaos, may be judged of afterwards.—In which latter words Aristotle seems to intimate, that Love, as taken for an active principle, was not to be supposed to spring from Chaos, but rather to be in order of nature before it; and, therefore, by this Love of theirs must needs be meant the Deity. And, indeed, Simmias Rhodius, in his *Wings*, a hymn made in honour of this Love, that is senior to all the gods, and a principle in the universe, tells us plainly, that it is not Cupid, Venus's soft and effeminate son, but another kind of love:

Οὐτὶ γὰρ Κίπριδος υἱαῖς·
 Ὡκυμένης δ' αὐτὸς Ἔρως καλεῖμαι
 Οὐτὶ γὰρ ἔμπενα βιάζω, παράγω δὲ τιθεῖς.
 Γαῖα, θαλάσσης τε μυχρὰ, οὐρανόθεν πάς τε θεός μοι ἴσται.
 Τῶν δ' ἵγαν ἐκποφασάμεν ἀγέγιστον σπᾶντρον, ἐκρανὰ τέ σφιν θέμιστας.

I'm not that wanton boy,
 The sea-froth goddess's only joy.
 Pure heavenly Love I hight, and my
 Soft magic charms, not iron bands, fast tye
 Heaven, earth, and seas. The gods themselves do readily
 Stoop to my laws. The whole world dances to my harmony.

Moreover, this cannot be that Love neither, which is described in Plato's *Symposium* (as some learned men have conceived), that was begotten between Penia and Porus, this being not a divine but demoniac thing (as the philosopher there declares), no God, but a demon only, or of a middle nature. For it is nothing but *φιλοκαλία*, or the love of pulchritude as such, which, though rightly used, may perhaps wing and inspire the mind to noble and generous attempts, and beget a scornful disdain in it of mean, dirty, and sordid things; yet is capable of being abused also, and then it will strike downward into brutishness and sensuality. But at best it is an affection belonging only to imperfect and parturient beings; and therefore could not be the first principle of all things. Wherefore, we see no very great reason but that, in a rectified and qualified sense, this may pass for true theology; that Love is the supreme Deity and original of all things; namely, if by it be meant eternal, self-originated, intellectual Love, or essential and substantial goodness, that having an infinite overflowing fulness and fecundity, dispenses itself uninviciously, according to the best wisdom, sweetly governs all, without any force or violence (all things being naturally subject to its authority, and readily obeying its laws), and reconciles the whole world into harmony. For the Scripture telling us, that God is love, seems to warrant thus much to us, that love in some rightly qualified sense is God.

XIX. But we are to omit the fabulous age, and to descend to the philosophical, to inquire there, who they were among the professed philosophers, who atheized in that manner before described. It

is true, indeed, that Aristotle, in other places, accuses Democritus and Leucippus of the very same thing, that is, of assigning only a material cause of the universe, and giving no account of the original of motion; but yet it is certain, that these were not the persons intended by him here; those which he speaks of being *τινὲς τῶν πρώτων φιλοσοφούντων*, some of the first and most ancient philosophers of all.—Moreover, it appears by the description of them, that they were such as did not philosophize in the way of atoms, but resolved all things whatsoever in the universe into *ἕλη*, and *πάθη τῆς ἕλης*, matter, and the passions or affections, qualities and forms of matter; so that they were not Atomical, but Hylopathian philosophers. These two, the old Materialists and the Democritics, did both alike derive all things from dead and stupid matter, fortuitously moved; and the difference between them was only this, that the Democritics managed this business in the way of atoms, the other in that more vulgar way of qualities and forms: so that, indeed, this is really but one and the same Atheistic hypothesis, in two several schemes. And as one of them is called the Atomic Atheism, so the other, for distinction sake, may be called the Hylopathian.

xx. Now Aristotle tells us plainly, that these Hylopathian Atheists of his were all the first philosophers of the Ionic order and succession, before Anaxagoras. Wherefore Thales being the head, he is consentaneously thereunto by Aristotle made to be *ἀρχηγός τῆς παλαιᾶς φιλοσοφίας*, the prince and leader of this kind of Atheistical philosophy,—he deriving all things whatsoever, as Homer had done before him, from water, and ac-

knowledging no other principle but the fluid matter.

Notwithstanding which accusation of Aristotle's, Thales is far otherwise represented by good authors: Cicero^a telling us, that, besides water, which he made to be the original of all corporeal things, he asserted also mind for another principle, which formed all things out of the water; and Laertius^b and Plutarch^c recording, that he was thought to be the first of all philosophers, who determined souls to be immortal. He is said also to have affirmed,^d that God was *πρεσβύτατον πάντων*, the oldest of all things, and that the world was *ποίημα θεοῦ*, the workmanship of God.—Clemens^e likewise tells us, that being asked, *εἰ λανθάνει τὸ θεῖον πράσσειν τι ὁ ἄνθρωπος; καὶ πῶς, εἶπεν, ὅσγε οὐδε διανοούμενος*: whether any of a man's actions could be concealed from the Deity? he replied, not so much as any thought.—Moreover, Laertius^f further writes of him, that he held *τὸν κόσμον ἔμφυχον καὶ δαιμόνων πλήρη*, that the world was animated, and full of demons.—Lastly, Aristotle^g himself elsewhere speaks of him as a Theist; *καὶ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ δὲ τινες ψυχὴν μεμίχθαι φασίν. ὅθεν ἴσως καὶ Θαλῆς ὡήθη πάντα πλήρη θεῶν εἶναι*. Some think (saith he) that soul and life is mingled with the whole universe; and thence, perhaps, was that of Thales, that all things are full of gods. Wherefore, we conceive,

^a De Natur. Deor. lib. i. cap. x. p. 2894. tom. ix. oper.

^b Lib. i. segm. 24. p. 16.

^c De Placit. Philos. lib. iv. cap. ii. p. 908. tom. ii. oper.

^d Diog. Laert. lib. i. segm. 35. p. 21. et Plutarch. in Convivio septem sapientum, p. 153. tom. ii. oper.

^e Clemens Alex. Stromat. lib. v. p. 704. edit. Potteri.

^f Lib. i. segm. 27. p. 18.

^g De Anima, lib. i. cap. v. p. 17. tom. ii. oper.

that there is very good reason, why Thales should be acquitted from this accusation of Atheism. Only we shall observe the occasion of his being thus differently represented, which seems to have been this; because, as Laertius^a and Themistius^b intimate, he left no philosophic writings or monuments of his own behind him (Anaximander being the first of all the philosophic writers): whence probably it came to pass, that, in after times, some did interpret his philosophy one way, some another; and that he is sometimes represented as a Theist, and sometimes again as a downright Atheist.

But, though Thales be thus by good authority acquitted, yet his next successor, Anaximander, can by no means be excused from this imputation; and, therefore, we think it more reasonable to fasten that title upon him, which Aristotle bestows on Thales, that he was ἀρχηγός τῆς τοιαύτης φιλοσοφίας, the prince and founder of this Atheistic philosophy;—who derived all things from matter, in the way of forms and qualities; he supposing a certain infinite *materia prima*, which was neither air, nor water, nor fire, but indifferent to every thing, or a mixture of all, to be the only principle of the universe, and leading a train of many other Atheists after him, such as Hippo, surnamed ἄθεος by Simplicius and others, Anaximenes, and Diogenes Apolloniates, and many more; who, though they had some petty differences amongst themselves, yet all agreed in this one thing, that matter, devoid of understanding and life, was the first principle of

^a Lib. i. segm. 23. p. 15. ^b Orat. xxvi. p. 317. edit. Harduin.

all things; till at length Anaxagoras stopped this Atheistic current amongst these Ionic philosophers, introducing mind as a principle of the universe.

xxi. But there is a passage in Aristotle's *Physics*, which seems at first sight to contradict this again; and to make Anaximander also not to have been an Atheist, but a Divine philosopher: where, having declared that several of the ancient physiologers made *ἄπειρον*, or Infinite, to be the principle of all things, he subjoins these words, *διὸ καθάπερ λέγομεν, οὐ τάντης ἀρχῇ, ἀλλ' αὐτῇ τῶν ἄλλων εἶναι δοκεῖ. Καὶ περιέχειν ἅπαντα καὶ πάντα κυβερνᾶν, ὡς φασὶν ὅσοι μὴ ποιοῦσι παρὰ τὸ ἄπειρον ἄλλας αἰτίας, οἷον νῆυν, ἢ φιλίαν. Καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ θεῖον, ἀθάνατον γὰρ καὶ ἀνώλεθρον, ὥσπερ φησὶν ὁ Ἀναξίμανδρος καὶ οἱ πλείστοι τῶν φυσιολόγων*. Therefore, there seems to be no principle of this Infinite, but this to be the principle of other things, and to contain all things, and govern all things, as they all say, who do not make, besides infinite, any other causes, such as mind or friendship; and that this is the only real Numen or God in the world, it being immortal and incorruptible, as Anaximander affirms, and most of the physiologers.—From which place some late writers have confidently concluded, that Anaximander, with those other physiologers there mentioned, did, by Infinite, understand God, according to the true notion of him, or an Infinite Mind, the efficient cause of the universe, and not senseless and stupid matter; since this could not be said to be immortal, and to govern all things; and, consequently, that Aristotle grossly contradicts himself, in making all those Ionic philosophers before Anaxagoras to

have been mere Materialists or Atheists. And it is possible, that Clemens Alexandrinus also might from this very passage, of Aristotle's, not sufficiently considered, have been induced to rank Anaximander amongst the Divine philosophers, as he doth in his *Protreptic* to the Greeks; where, after he had condemned certain of the old philosophers as Atheistic Corporealists, he subjoins these words: **τῶν δὲ ἄλλων φιλοσόφων, ὅσοι τὰ στοιχεῖα ὑπερβάντες, ἐπολυπραγμόνησάν τι ὑψηλότερον καὶ περιττότερον, οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν τὸ ἄπειρον καθύμνησαν, ὣν Ἀναξίμανδρος ὁ Μιλήσιος ἦν, καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας ὁ Κλαζομένιος, καὶ ὁ Ἀθηναῖος Ἀρχέλαος.* But of the other philosophers, who, transcending all the elements, searched after some higher and more excellent thing, some of them praised Infinite, amongst which was Anaximander the Milesian, Anaxagoras the Clazomenian, and the Athenian Archelaus.—As if these three had all alike acknowledged an incorporeal Deity, and made an infinite mind, distinct from matter, the first original of all things.

* Clem. Prot.
p. 43. cap. v.
p. 57. tom. i.
oper.

But that forecited passage of Aristotle's alone, well considered, will itself afford a sufficient confutation of this opinion; where Anaximander, with those other physiologers, is plainly opposed to Anaxagoras, who, besides infinite senseless matter, or similar atoms, made mind to be a principle of the universe, as also to Empedocles, who made a plastic life and nature, called friendship, another principle of the corporeal world; from whence it plainly follows, that Anaximander and the rest supposed not infinite mind, but infinite matter, without either mind or plastic matter, to

have been the only original of all things, and therefore the only Deity or Numen.

Moreover, Democritus being linked in the context with Anaximander, as making both of them alike, τὸ ἄπειρον, or Infinite, to be the first principle of all; it might as well be inferred from this place, that Democritus was a genuine Theist, as Anaximander. But as Democritus's only principle was infinite atoms, without any thing of mind or plastic nature; so likewise was Anaximander's an infinity of senseless stupid matter; and, therefore, they were both of them Atheists alike, though Anaximander, in the cited words, had the honour (if it may be so called) to be only named, as being the most ancient of all those Atheistical physiologers, and the ringleader of them.

XXII. Neither ought it at all to seem strange, that Anaximander, and those other Atheistical Materialists, should call infinite matter, devoid of all understanding and life, the τὸ θεῖον, the Deity or Numen, since to all those, who deny a God (according to the true notion of him), whatsoever else they substitute in his room, by making it the first principle of all things, though it be senseless and stupid matter, yet this must needs be accounted the only Numen, and divinest thing of all.

Nor is it to be wondered at neither, that this infinite, being understood of matter, should be said to be, not only incorruptible, but also immortal, these two being often used as synonymous and equivalent expressions. For thus in Lucretius,*

* Lib. i. vers. 672.

the corruption of all inanimate bodies is called death:

————— *Mors ejus quod fuit ante;*

And again,

^a Quando aliud ex alio reficit natura, nec ullam
Rem gigni patitur, nisi morte adjutam aliena.

In like manner mortal is used by him for corruptible:

^b Nam siquid mortale a cunctis partibus esset,
Ex oculis res quæque repente crepta periret.

And this kind of language was very familiar with Heraclitus,^c as appears from these passages of his, *πυρὸς θάνατος, ἀέρι γένεσις· καὶ ἀέρος θάνατος ὕδατι γένεσις·* The death of fire is generation to air; and the death of air is generation to water;—that is, the corruption of them. And again, *ψυχῆσιν θάνατος, ὕδωρ γενέσθαι· ὕδατι δὲ θάνατος, γῆν γενέσθαι·* It is death to vapour or air, to be made water; and death to water, to be made earth.—In which Heraclitus did but imitate Orpheus, as appears from this verse of his, cited by Clemens Alexandrinus:^d

Ἔστιν ὕδωρ ψυχῆ, θάνατος δ' ὑδάτων ἀμολή·

Besides which, there are many examples of this use of the word *θάνατος*, in other Greek writers, and some in Aristotle^e himself, who, speaking of the heavens, attributes *ἀθανασία* and *ἀδιόρτης* to them, as one and the same thing; and also affirms, that the ancients therefore made heaven to be the seat of the Deity, *ὡς ὄντα μόνον ἀθάνατον*, as being only immortal,—that is, incorruptible.

^a Lib. i. vers. 264, 265.

^b Lib. i. vers. 219.

^c Vide Henr. Stephan. in Poesi Philosophic. p. 137.

^d Stromat. lib. vi. cap. ii. p. 476.

^e De Cælo, lib. i. cap. iii. p. 614, 615. tom. i. oper.

Indeed, that other expression, at first sight, would stagger one more, where it is said of this ἄπειρον, or infinite,—that it doth not only contain, but also govern all things: but Simplicius* tells us, that this is to be understood likewise of matter, and that no more was meant by it, than that all things were derived from it, and depended on it, as the first principle; ὁ δὲ λόγος τοῖς τοιούτοις περὶ τῶν φυσικῶν ἀρχῶν, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ περὶ τῶν ὑπὲρ φύσιν, εἰ δὲ καὶ περιέχειν ἔλεγον καὶ κυβερνᾶν οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ περιέχειν ὑπάρχει τῷ ὑλικῷ αἰτίῳ, ὡς διὰ πάντων χωροῦντι, τὸ δὲ κυβερνᾶν ὡς κατὰ τὴν ἐπιτηδειότητα αὐτοῦ, τῶν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ γενομένων. These philosophers spake only of natural principles, and not of supernatural; and though they say, that this infinite of theirs does both contain and govern all things, yet this is not at all to be wondered at; forasmuch as containing belongs to the material cause, as that which goes through all things, and likewise governing, as that from which all things, according to a certain aptitude of it, are made.—Philoponus^b (who was a Christian) represents Aristotle's sense in this whole place more fully, after this manner: "Those of the ancient physiologers, who had no respect to any active efficient cause, as Anaxagoras had to mind, and Empedocles to friendship and contention, supposed matter to be the only cause of all things; and that it was infinite in magnitude, ingenerable and incorruptible, esteeming it to be a certain Divine thing, which did govern all, or preside over the compages of the universe, and

* Commentar. in octo Libros Physic. Ausoniat. Aristot. lib. i. cap. iii. p. 32. edit. Aldin.

^b Comment. in iv. primos Libros Physicor. lib. i. cap. iii. a. 10. Adde cap. i. edit. Græcæ Venet. 1536. fol.

to be immortal, that is, undestroyable. This Anaximenes said to be air, Thales to be water, but Anaximander, a certain middle thing; some one thing, and some another." Καὶ οὐδὲν γε θαυμαστόν φησιν, ἐν τῇ καθ' ἡμᾶς περιόδῳ τοὺς πρώτους μὴ ἐπιστήσαντας τῇ ἐφεστηκυῖα τῶν ὅλων δυνάμει, ἐν τῶν στοιχείων, ὅπερ ἂν ὑπόπτευν ἕκαστος, αἴτιον τοῖς ἄλλοις τε εἶναι, τοῦτο ἐνός καὶ Θεόν ὑπονοήσας. And Aristotle in this passage tells us, that it is no wonder, if they, who did not attend to the active cause, that presides over the universe, did look upon some one of the elements (that which each of them thought to be the cause of all other things) as God. But as they, considering only the material principle, conceived that to be the cause of all things; so Anaxagoras supposed mind to be the principle of all things, and Empedocles, friendship and contention.—

XXIII. But to make it further appear, that Anaximander's philosophy was purely Atheistical, we think it convenient to shew what account is given of it by other writers. Plutarch, in his *Placita Philosophorum*, does at once briefly represent the Anaximandrian philosophy,

and censure it after this manner: 'Αναξί-

Lib. 1. c. 3.

p. 875. tom.

ii. oper.

μανδρός φησι, τῶν ὄντων τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναι τὸ ἄπει-

ρον, ἐκ γὰρ τούτου πάντα γίνεσθαι, καὶ εἰς τοῦτο

πάντα φθείρεσθαι, διὸ καὶ γεννᾶσθαι ἀπείρους κόσμους, καὶ

πάλιν φθείρεσθαι· λέγει οὖν διὰ τι ἄπειρόν ἐστιν, ἵνα μὴ ἐλ-

λείπη ἡ γένεσις ἡ ὑφισταμένη· ἀμαρτάνει δὲ οὗτος, τὴν μὲν

ὑλὴν ἀποφαινόμενος, τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν αἴτιον ἀναιρῶν, τὸ δὲ

ἄπειρον οὐδὲν ἄλλο, ἢ ὑλὴ ἐστίν. οὐ δύναται δὲ ἡ ὑλὴ εἶναι

ἐνέργεια, εἰ μὴ τὸ ποιοῦν ὑποκείμεται. Anaximander the

Milesian affirms Infinite to be the first principle;

and that all things are generated out of it, and

corrupted again into it ; and therefore that infinite worlds are successively thus generated and corrupted. And he gives the reason why it is infinite, that so there might be never any fail of generations. But he erreth in this, that assigning only a material cause, he takes away the active principle of things. For Anaximander's Infinite is nothing else but matter; but matter can produce nothing, unless there be also an active cause.—Where he shews also, how Anaximenes followed Anaximander herein, in assigning only a material cause of the universe, without any efficient; though he differed from him, in making the first matter to be air, and deriving all things from thence by rarefaction and condensation. Thus, we see, it is plain, that Anaximander's Infinite was no infinite mind, which is the true Deity, but

Ev. Prep.
lib. 1. p. 15.
ed. Steph.

only infinite matter, devoid of any life or active power. Eusebius is more particular in giving an account of Anaximander's *Cosmopœia*; τὸ ἀπειρον φάναι τὴν πᾶσαν αἰτίαν ἔχειν τῆς τοῦ παντος γενέσεως τε καὶ φθορᾶς, ἐξ οὗ δὴ φησι τοὺς τε οὐρανοὺς ἀποκεκρίσθαι, καὶ καθόλου τοὺς ἅπαντας ἀπείρους ὄντας κόσμους· φησὶ δὲ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ αἰδίου γόνιμον θερμοῦ τε καὶ ψυχροῦ, κατὰ τὴν γένεσιν τοῦδε τοῦ κόσμου ἀποκριθῆναι, καὶ τινα ἐκ τούτου φλογὸς σφαῖραν περιφυῆναι τῷ περὶ τὴν γῆν ἀέρι, ὡς τῷ δένδρῳ φλοῖον. ἥς τινος ἀπορραγείσης, καὶ εἰς τινας ἀποκλεισθείσης κύκλους, ὑποστήναι τὸν ἥλιον, καὶ τὴν σελήνην, καὶ τοὺς ἀστέρας· Anaximander affirms Infinite (matter) to be the only cause of the generation and corruption of all things; and that the heavens, and infinite worlds, were made out of it, by way of secretion or segregation. Also that those generative principles of heat and cold, that were contained in it from eter-

nity, being segregated, when this world was made, a certain sphere of flame or fire did first arise and encompass the air, which surrounds this earth (as a bark doth a tree), which being afterwards broken, and divided into smaller spherical bodies, constituted the sun and moon and all the stars.—

Which Anaximandrian Cosmogonia was briefly hinted at by Aristotle in these words,

*οἱ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἐνός, ἐνούσας τὰς ἐναντιότητας, ἐκ-
κρίνουσιν, ὥσπερ Ἀναξίμανδρός φησι* Phys. l. 1. c. 4.

Some philosophers generate the world by the secretion and segregation of in-existent contraries, as Anaximander speaks.—And elsewhere in his Me-

taphysics, he takes notice of Ἀναξίμανδρον τὸ μίγμα, Anaximander's mixture of things.—

Whence we conclude, that Anaximander's Infinite was nothing else but an infinite chaos of matter, in which were either actually or potentially, contained all manner of qualities; by the fortuitous secretion and segregation of which, he supposed infinite worlds to be successively generated and corrupted. So that we may now easily guess, whence Leucippus and Democritus had their infinite worlds, and perceive how near akin these two Atheistic hypotheses were. But it will not be amiss to take notice also of that particular conceit, which Anaximander had, concerning the first original of brute animals, and mankind. Of the former, Plutarch gives us this account:

Ἀναξίμανδρος ἐν ὑγρῷ γεννηθῆναι τὰ πρῶτα ζῶα, Pla. Ph. l. 5. c. 19. p. 908.

φλοιοῖς περιεχόμενα ἀκανθώδεσι, προβαίνουσης tom. II. oper.

δὲ τῆς ἡλικίας, ἀποβαίνειν ἐπὶ τὸ ξηρότερον, καὶ περιρρήγνυμένου τοῦ φλοιοῦ, ἐπὶ ὀλίγον χρόνον μεταβιῶναι.

That the first animals were generated in moisture, and encompassed about with certain thorny barks,

by which they were guarded and defended; which, after further growth, coming to be more dry and cracking, they issued forth, but lived only a short time after.—And as for the first original of men,

Eusebius represents his sense thus: 'Εξ

E. P. l. 1.

ἀλλουιδῶν ζώων ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐγεννήθη, ἐκ τοῦ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα δι' ἑαυτῶν ταχὺ νέμεσθαι, μόνον δὲ τὸν ἄνθρωπον πολυχρονίου δεῖσθαι τήρησεως, διὸ καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς οὐκ ἂν ποτε τοιοῦτον ὄντα διασωθῆναι: Men were at first generated in the bellies of other animals, forasmuch as all other animals, after they are brought forth, are quickly able to feed and nourish themselves, but man alone needs to be nursed up a long time; and therefore could not be preserved at first, in any

other way.—But Plutarch expresseth

Symp. lib. 8.

Q. 8. p. 730.

tom. ii. oper.

μανδρος ἐν ἰχθύσιν ἐγενέσθαι τὸ πρῶτον ἄνθρωπος ἀποφαίνεται, καὶ τραφέντας καὶ γενομένους ἱκανοὺς ἑαυτοῖς βοηθεῖν, ἐκβληθῆναι τηλικαῦτα καὶ γῆς λαβίσθαι. Anaximander concludes, that men were at first generated in the bellies of fishes, and being there nourished, till they grew strong, and were able to shift for themselves, they were afterward cast out upon dry land.—Lastly, Anaximander's theology is thus both represented to us,

De Nat. D.

lib. 1. c. x.

p. 2894.

tom. ix. oper.

and censured, by Velleius, the Epicurean philosopher in Cicero: "Anaximandri opinio est nativos esse deos, longis intervallis orientes occidentesque, eosque innumerabiles esse mundos: sed nos deum nisi semipiternum intelligere quī possumus?" Anaximander's opinion is, that the gods are native, rising and vanishing again, in long periods of times; and that these gods are innumerable worlds: but how can we conceive that to be a God, which is not

eternal?—We learn from hence, that Anaximander did indeed so far comply with vulgar opinion, as that he retained the name of gods; but, however, that he really denied the existence of the thing itself, even according to the judgment of this Epicurean philosopher. Forasmuch as all his gods were native and mortal, and indeed nothing else, but those innumerable worlds, which he supposed in certain periods of time to be successively generated and destroyed. Wherefore, it is plain, that Anaximander's only real Numen, that is, his first principle, that was ingenerable and incorruptible, was nothing but infinite matter, devoid of all understanding and life, by the fortuitous secretion of whose in-existent qualities and parts, he supposed, first, the elements of earth, water, air, and fire, and then, the bodies of the sun, moon, and stars, and both bodies and souls of men and other animals, and lastly, innumerable or infinite such worlds as these, as so many secondary and native gods (that were also mortal), to have been generated, according to that Atheistical hypothesis described in Plato.*

xxiv. It is certain, that the vulgar in all ages have been very ill judges of Theists and Atheists, they having condemned many hearty Theists, as guilty of Atheism, merely because they dissented from them in some of their superstitious rites and opinions. As for example; Anaxagoras the Clazomenian, though he was the first of all the Ionic philosophers (unless Thales ought to be excepted) who made an infinite mind to be a principle, that is, asserted a Deity, according to the true notion

* De Legibus, lib. x. p. 666.

of it; yet he was, notwithstanding, generally cried

Plat. Apol. down for an Atheist, merely because

Socr. p. 362. he affirmed the sun to be *μύδρον διάπυρον*,

a mass of fire, or a fiery globe, and the moon to be

an earth;—that is, because he denied them to be

animated and endued with understanding souls,

and consequently to be gods. So likewise So-

crates was both accused, and condemned, for

atheistical impiety, as denying all gods, though

nothing was pretended to be proved against him,

but only this, that he did *θεούς διδάσκειν μὴ*

Plat. Apol. *νομίζειν*, οὓς ἡ πόλις νομίζει, ἕτερα δὲ δαιμόνια

καὶνὰ εἰσφέρειν, teach that those were not true gods

which the city worshipped, and in the room thereof

introduce other new gods.—And lastly, the Christ-

ians in the primitive times, for the same reason,

were vulgarly traduced for Atheists by the Pa-

gans, as Justin Martyr declares in his Apology,*

ἄθεοι κεκλημέθα, καὶ ὁμολογοῦμεν τῶν τοιούτων νομιζομένους

θεῶν ἄθεοι εἶναι. We are called Atheists; and we

confess ourselves such, in respect of those gods

which they worship, but not of the true God.—

And as the vulgar have unjustly condemned many

Theists for Atheists, so have they also acquitted

many rank Atheists from the guilt of that crime,

merely because they externally complied with

them, in their religious worship, and forms of

speech. Neither is it only the vulgar, that have

been imposed upon herein, but also the generality

of learned men, who have been commonly so su-

perficial in this business, as that they have hardly

taken notice of above three or four Atheists, that

ever were in former times, as, namely, Diagoras,

Theodorus, Euemerus, and Protagoras; whereas

* P. 56. oper.

Democritus and Anaximander were as rank Atheists as any of them all, though they had the wit to carry themselves externally with more cautiousness. And indeed it was really one and the self-same form of Atheism, which both these entertained, they deriving all things alike, from dead and stupid matter fortuitously moved, the difference between them being only this, that they managed it two different ways; Anaximander in the way of qualities and forms, which is the more vulgar and obvious kind of Atheism; but Democritus in the way of atoms and figures, which seems to be a more learned kind of Atheism.

And though we do not doubt at all, but that Plato, in his tenth *De Legibus*, where he attacks Atheism, did intend the confutation as well of the Democritic as the Anaximandrian Atheism; yet whether it were, because he had no mind to take any notice at all of Democritus, who is not so much as once mentioned by him any where, or else because he was not so perfectly acquainted with that Atomic way of physiologizing, certain it is, that he there describes the Atheistic hypothesis more according to the Anaximandrian than the Democritic form. For when he represents the Atheistic generation of heaven and earth, and all things in them, as resulting from the fortuitous commixture of hot and cold, hard and soft, moist and dry corpuscula; this is clearly more agreeable with the Anaximandrian generation of the world, by the secretion of in-existent contrarieties in the matter, than the Democritic *Cosmopœia*, by the fortuitous concourse of atoms, devoid of all manner of qualities and forms.

Some indeed seem to call that scheme of Athe-

ism, that deduces all things from matter, in the way of qualities and forms, by the name of Peripatetic, or Aristotelic Atheism; we suppose for this reason, because Aristotle physiologized in that way of forms and qualities, educing them out of the power of the matter. But since Aristotle himself cannot be justly taxed for an Atheist, this form of Theism ought rather, as we conceive, to be denominated from Anaximander, and called the Anaximandrian Atheism.

xxv. Now the reasons, why Democritus and Leucippus new-modelled Atheism, from the Anaximandrian and Hylopathian into the Atomic form, seem to have been chiefly these:—first, because they, being well instructed in that Atomic way of physiologizing, were really convinced, that it was not only more ingenious, but also more agreeable to truth; the other, by real qualities and forms, seeming a thing unintelligible. Secondly, because they foresaw, as Lucretius intimates, that the production of forms and qualities out of nothing, and the corruption of them again into nothing, would prepare an easy way for men's belief of a Divine creation and annihilation. And lastly, because, as we have already suggested, they plainly perceived, that these forms and qualities of matter were of a doubtful nature; and therefore, as they were sometimes made a shelter for Atheism, so they might also prove, on the contrary, an asylum for Corporeal Theism; in that it might possibly be supposed, that either the matter of the whole world, or else the more subtile and fiery part of it, was originally endued with an understanding form or quality, and consequently, the whole an animal or god. Wherefore, they took another

more effectual course, to secure their Atheism, and exclude all possibility of a corporeal God, by deriving the original of all things from atoms, devoid of all forms and qualities, and having nothing in them, but magnitude, figure, site, and motion, as the first principles; it following unavoidably from thence, that life and understanding, as well as those other qualities, could be only accidental and secondary results from certain fortuitous concretions and contextures of atoms; so that the world could be made by no previous counsel or understanding, and therefore by no Deity.

xxvi. We have here represented three several forms of Atheism—the Anaximandrian, the Democritical, and the Stratonical. But there is yet another form of Atheism, different from them all, to be taken notice of, which is such, as supposes one kind of plastic and spermatic, methodical and artificial nature, but without any sense of conscious understanding, to preside over the whole world, and dispose and conserve all things, in that regular frame in which they are. Such a form of Atheism as this is hinted to us in that doubtful passage of Seneca's; "Sive animal est mundus, (for so it ought to be read, and not *anima*) sive corpus natura gubernante, ut arbores, ut sata;" whether the whole world be an animal (i. e. endued with one sentient and rational life), or whether it be only a body governed by (a certain plastic and methodical, but senseless) nature, as trees, and other plants or vegetables.—In which words are two several hypotheses of the mundane system, sceptically proposed by one, who was a Corporealist, and took it for granted that all was body. First, that the whole world,

Nat. Quest.
l. 3. sect. 29.

though having nothing but body in it, yet was notwithstanding an animal, as our human bodies are, endued with one sentient or rational life and nature, one soul or mind, governing and ordering the whole. Which corporeal Cosmo-zoism we do not reckon amongst the forms of Atheism, but rather account it for a kind of spurious Theism, or Theism disguised in a Paganic dress, and not without a complication of many false apprehensions, concerning the Deity, in it. The second is, that the whole world is no animal, but, as it were, one huge plant or vegetable, a body endued with one plastic or spermatic nature, branching out the whole, orderly and methodically, but without any understanding or sense. And this must needs be accounted a form of Atheism, because it does not derive the original of things in the universe from any clearly intellectual principle or conscious nature.

XXVII. Now this form of Atheism, which supposes the whole world (there being nothing but body in it) not to be an animal, but only a great plant or vegetable, having one spermatic form, or plastic nature, which, without any conscious reason or understanding, orders the whole, though it have some nearer correspondence with that Hylozoic form of Atheism before described, in that it does not suppose nature to be a mere fortuitous, but a kind of artificial thing; yet it differs from it in this, that the Hylozoic supposing all matter, as such, to have life essentially belonging to it, must therefore needs attribute to every part of matter (or at least every particular totum, that is one by continuity) a distinct plastic life of its own, but acknowledge no one common life, as ruling over

the whole corporeal universe; and consequently impute the original of all things (as hath been already observed) to a certain mixture of chance, and plastic or methodical nature, both together. Whereas the cosmo-plastic Atheism quite excludes fortune or chance, subjecting all things to the regular and orderly fate of one plastic or plantal nature, ruling over the whole. Thus that philosopher before mentioned concludes, that whether the world were an animal (in the Stoical sense) or whether it were a mere plant or vegetable, "*Ab initio ejus usque ad exitum,* Nat. Q. 1. 3. c. 29. *quicquid facere, quicquid pati debeat, inclusum est. Ut in semine, omnis futuri ratio hominis comprehensa est. Et legem barbæ et canorum nondum natus infans habet; totius enim corporis, et sequentis ætatis, in parvo occultoque lineamenta sunt. Sic origo mundi non magis solem et lunam, et vices syderum, et animalium ortus, quam quibus mutarentur terranea, continuit. In his fuit inundatio, quæ non secus quam hyems, quam æstas, lege mundi venit."* Whatsoever, from the beginning to the end of it, it can either do or suffer, it was all at first included in the nature of the whole; as in the seed is contained the whole delineation of the future man, and the embryo or unborn infant hath already in it the law of a beard and grey hairs; the lineaments of the whole body, and of its following age, being there described as it were in a little and obscure compendium. In like manner, the original and first rudiments of the world contained in them not only the sun and moon, the courses of the stars, and the generation of animals, but also the vicissitudes of all terrestrial things; and every deluge or inundation of wa-

ter comes to pass no less by the law of the world (its spermatic or plastic nature) than winter and summer doth.

XXVIII. We do not deny it to be possible, but that some in all ages might have entertained such an Atheistical conceit as this, that the original of this whole mundane system was from one artificial, orderly, and methodical, but senseless nature lodged in the matter; but we cannot trace the footsteps of this doctrine any where so much as among the Stoics, to which sect Seneca, who speaks so waveringly and uncertainly in this point (whether the world were an animal or a plant), belonged. And, indeed, divers learned men have suspected, that even the Zenonian and Heraclitic Deity itself, was no other than such a plastic nature or spermatic principle in the universe, as in the seeds of vegetables and animals doth frame their respective bodies orderly and artificially. Nor can it be denied, but that there hath been just cause given for such a suspicion; forasmuch as the best of Stoics, sometimes confounding God with nature, seemed to make him nothing but an artificial fire, orderly and methodically proceeding to generation. And it was familiar with them, as Laertius^a tells us, to call God σπερματικὸν λόγον τοῦ κόσμου, the spermatic reason, or form of the world.—Nevertheless, because Zeno^b and others of the chief Stoical doctors did also many times assert, that there was φύσις νοερά καὶ λογική, a rational and intellectual nature (and therefore not a plastic principle only) in the matter of the universe; as, likewise, that the whole

^a Lib. vii. segm. 136. p. 450.

^b Vide Diog. Laert. lib. vii. p. 148. p. 459.

world was an animal, and not a mere plant; therefore, we incline rather to excuse the generality of the first and most ancient Stoics from the imputation of Atheism, and to account this form of Atheism, which we now speak of, to be but a certain degeneracy from the right Heraclitic and Zenonian cabala, which seemed to contain these two things in it; first, that there was an animalish, sentient, and intellectual nature, or a conscious soul and mind, that presided over the whole world, though lodged immediately in, the fiery matter of it; secondly, that this sentient and intellectual nature, or corporeal soul and mind of the universe, did contain also under it, or within it, as the inferior part of it, a certain plastic nature, or spermatic principle, which was properly the fate of all things. For thus Heraclitus* defined Fate, *λόγον τὸν διὰ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ παντός διήκοντα, ἢ αἰθέριον σῶμα, σπέρμα τῆς τοῦ παντός γενέσεως*. A certain reason passing through the substance of the whole world, or an ethereal body, that was the seed of the generation of the universe.—And Zeno's^b first principle, as it is said to be an intellectual nature, so it is also said to have contained in it *πάντας τοὺς σπερματικούς λόγους, καθ' οὓς ἕκαστα καθ' εἰμαρμένην γίγνεται*, all the spermatic reasons and forms, by which every thing is done according to fate.—However, though this seem to have been the genuine doctrine, both of Heraclitus and Zeno, yet others of their followers afterwards divided these two things from one another, and taking only the latter of them, made the plastic

* Apud Plutarch. de Placitis Philosophor. lib. i. cap. xxviii. p. 885. tom. ii. oper.

^b Vide Plutarch. ubi supra. lib. i. cap. vii. p. 861.

or spermatic nature, devoid of all animality or conscious intellectuality, to be the highest principle in the universe. Thus Laertius tells us,* that Boethus, an eminent and famous Stoical doctor, did plainly deny the world to be an animal, that is, to have any sentient, conscious, or intellectual nature presiding over it; and, consequently, must needs make it to be but "*corpus natura gubernante, ut arbores, ut sata,*" a body governed by a plastic or vegetative nature, as trees, plants, and herbs.—And as it is possible, that other Stoics and Heraclitics might have done the like before Boethus, so it is very probable, that he had after him many followers; amongst which, as Plinius Secundus may be reckoned for one, so Seneca himself was not without a doubtful tincture of this Atheism, as hath been already shewed. Wherefore this form of Atheism, which supposes one plastic or spermatic nature, one plantal or vegetative life in the whole world, as the highest principle, may, for distinction sake, be called the Pseudo-Stoical, or Stoical Atheism.

xxix. Besides these philosophic Atheists, whose several forms we have now described, it cannot be doubted, but that there have been in all ages many other Atheists that have not at all philosophized, nor pretended to maintain any particular Atheistic system or hypothesis, in a way of reason, but were only led by a certain dull and sottish, though confident disbelief of whatsoever they could not either see or feel; which kind of Atheists may, therefore, well be accounted enthusiastical or fanatical Atheists. Though

* Lib. vii. segm. 143. p. 455.

it be true, in the meantime, that even all manner of Atheists whatsoever, and those of them, who most of all pretend to reason and philosophy, may, in some sense, be justly styled also both enthusiasts and fanatics. Forasmuch as they are not led or carried on, into this way of atheizing, by any clear dictates of their reason or understanding, but only by an ὁρμη ἄλογος, a certain blind and irrational impetus;—they being, as it were, inspired to it by that lower earthly life and nature, which is called in the Scripture oracles, τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ κόσμου, the spirit of the world, or a mundane spirit,—and is opposed to the τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ, the Spirit that is of God.—For, when the apostle speaks after this manner, “We have not received the spirit of the world, but the Spirit that is of God,” he seems to intimate thus much to us, that as some men were led and inspired by a Divine spirit, so others again are inspired by a mundane spirit, by which is meant the earthly life. Now the former of these two are not to be accounted enthusiasts, as the word is now commonly taken in a bad sense; because the Spirit of God is no irrational thing, but either the very self-same thing with reason, or else such a thing as Aristotle (as it were vaticinating concerning it) somewhere calls λόγου τι κρεῖττον, a certain better and diviner thing than reason;—and Plotinus, ρίζαν λόγου, the root of reason.—But, on the contrary, the mundane spirit, or earthly life, is irrational sottishness; and they, who are atheistically inspired by it (how abhorrent soever they may otherwise seem to be from enthusiasm and revelations), are notwithstanding really no better than a kind of bewitched enthusiasts and blind spiritati;

that are wholly ridden and acted by a dark, narrow, and captivated principle of life, and, to use their own language, in-blown by it, and by it bereft, even in speculative things, of all free reason and understanding. Nay, they are fanatics too, however that word seems to have a more peculiar respect to something of a Deity; all Atheists being that blind goddess Nature's fanatics.

xxx. We have described four several forms of Atheism:—first, the Hylopathian or Anaximandrian, that derives all things from a dead and stupid matter, in the way of qualities and forms, generable and corruptible: secondly, the Atomical or Democritical, which doth the same thing in the way of atoms and figures: thirdly, the Cosmo-plastic or Stoical Atheism, which supposes one plastic and methodical but senseless nature, to preside over the whole corporeal universe; and, lastly, the Hylozoic or Stratonical, that attributes to all matter, as such, a certain living and energetic nature, but devoid of all animality, sense, and consciousness. And as we do not meet with any other forms or schemes of Atheism besides these four, so we conceive, that there cannot easily be any other excogitated or devised; and that upon these two following considerations: first, because all Atheists are mere Corporealists, that is, acknowledge no other substance besides body or matter. For as there was never any yet known, who, asserting incorporeal substance, did deny a Deity; so neither can there be any reason, why he that admits the former should exclude the latter. Again, the same dull and earthly disbelief or confounded sottishness of mind, which makes men deny a God, must needs incline them

to deny all incorporeal substance also. Wherefore, as the physicians speak of a certain disease or madness, called hydrophobia, the symptom of those that have been bitten by a mad dog, which makes them have a monstrous antipathy to water; so all Atheists are possessed with a certain kind of madness, that may be called Pneumatophobia, that makes them have an irrational but desperate abhorrence from spirits or incorporeal substances, they being acted also, at the same time, with an Hylomania, whereby they madly doat upon matter, and devoutly worship it as the only Numen.

The second consideration is this, because, as there are no Atheists but such as are mere Corporealists, so all Corporealists are not to be accounted Atheists neither: those of them, who, notwithstanding they make all things to be matter, yet suppose an intellectual nature in that matter to preside over the corporeal universe, being in reason and charity to be exempted out of that number. And there have been always some, who, though so strongly captivated under the power of gross imagination, as that an incorporeal God seemed to them to be nothing but a God of words (as some of them call it), a mere empty sound or contradictory expression, something and nothing put together; yet, notwithstanding, they have been possessed with a firm belief and persuasion of a Deity, or that the system of the universe depends upon one perfect understanding being as the head of it; and thereupon have concluded that *ὅλη πῶς ἔχουσα*, a certain kind of body or matter is God.—The grossest and most sottish of all which Corporeal Theists seem

to be those, who contend, that God is only one particular piece of organized matter, of human form and bigness, which, endued with perfect reason and understanding, exerciseth an universal dominion over all the rest. Which hypothesis, however it hath been entertained by some of the Christian profession, both in former and later times, yet it hath seemed very ridiculous, even to many of those Heathen philosophers themselves, who were mere Corporealists, such as the Stoics, who exploded it with a kind of indignation, contending earnestly, *μη ειναι θεον ανθρωπόμορφον*, that God (though corporeal) yet must not be conceived to be of any human shape. And Xenophanes,^b an ancient philosophic poet, expresseth the childishness of this conceit after this manner :

*Ἄλλ' εἴτι χεῖρας ὕψιχεν βίαις ἢ λίκοντες,
ἢ γράψαι χεῖροισι, καὶ ἔργα τέλειν ἔπος ἀνέρος,
καὶ καθεὶν ἴλιας ὑψιφρον, καὶ νόμον ἰστέον
Τυνάδ' αἶν πρὶ καὶ αὐτὰ ἴμας ὕψιχεν ἰμάων.*

If oxen, lions, asses, and horses, had all of them a sense of a Deity, and were able to limn and paint, there is no question to be made, but that each of these several animals would paint God according to their respective form and likeness, and contend, that he was of that shape and no other.—But that other corporeal Theism seems to be of the two rather more generous and genteel, which supposes the whole world to be one animal, and God to be a certain subtile and ethereal, but intellectual matter, pervading it as a soul : which was the doctrine of others before the

^a These are the words of Clemens Alexandrinus concerning Xenophanes, *Stromat. lib. v. p. 714.*

^b *Apud Clem. Alex. ubi supra. p. 715.*

Stoics, τὸ πῦρ θεὸν ὑπελήφατον Ἰππασὸς τε ὁ Μεταπόν-
 τος καὶ ὁ Ἐφέσιος Ἡράκλειτος, Hippasus of Meta-
 pontus, and Heraclitus the Ephesian, supposed
 the fiery and ethereal matter of the world to be
 God.—However, neither these Heraclitics and
 Stoics, nor yet the other Anthropomorphites, are
 by us condemned for downright Atheists, but ra-
 ther looked upon as a sort of ignorant, childish,
 and unskilful Theists.

Wherefore we see, that Atheists are now re-
 duced into a narrow compass, since none are con-
 cluded to be Atheists, but such as are mere Cor-
 porealists; and all Corporealists must not be
 condemned for Atheists neither, but only those
 of them, who assert, that there is no conscious in-
 tellectual nature, presiding over the whole uni-
 verse. For this is that, which the adepts in
 Atheism, of what form soever, all agree in, that
 the first principle of the universe is no animalish,
 sentient, and conscious nature, but that all ani-
 mality, sense, and consciousness, is a secondary,
 derivative, and accidental thing, generable and
 corruptible, arising out of particular concretions
 of matter, organized and dissolved together with
 them.

XXXI. Now if the first principle and original of
 all things in the universe be thus supposed to be
 body or matter, devoid of all animality, sense,
 and consciousness, then it must of necessity be
 either perfectly dead and stupid, and without all
 manner of life; or else endued with such a kind
 of life only, as is by some called plastic, sperma-
 tical, and vegetative, by others the life of nature,

* Idem in Protreptico, cap. v. p. 66.

or natural perception. And those Atheists, who derive all things from dead and stupid matter, must also needs do this, either in the way of qualities and forms, and these are the Anaximandrian Atheists; or else in the way of atoms and figures, which are the Democritical. But those, who make matter endued with a plastic life to be the first original of all things, must needs suppose either one such plastic and spermatic life only in the whole mass of matter or corporeal universe, which are the Stoical Atheists; or else all matter as such to have life and an energetic nature belonging to it (though without any animal sense or self-perception), and consequently all the particular parts of matter, and every totum by continuity, to have a distinct plastic life of its own, which are the Stratonic Atheists. Wherefore, there does not seem to be any room now left for any other form of Atheism, besides these four, to thrust in.

And we think fit here again to inculcate, what hath been already intimated, that one grand difference amongst these several forms of Atheism is this, that some of them attributing no life at all to matter, as such, nor indeed acknowledging any plastic life of nature, distinct from the animal, and supposing every thing whatsoever is in the world, besides *ὅλη ἁπλοῦς*, the bare substance of matter considered as devoid of all qualities (that is, mere extended bulk), to be generated and corrupted; consequently resolve, that all manner of life whatsoever is generable and corruptible, or educible out of nothing, and reducible to nothing again; and these are the Anaximandrian and Democritic Atheisms. But the

other, which are the Stoical and Stratonical, do, on the contrary, suppose some life to be fundamental and original, essential and substantial, ingenerable and incorruptible, as being a first principle of things; nevertheless, this not to be any animal, conscious, and self-perceptive life, but a plastic life of nature only; all Atheists still agreeing in those two fore-mentioned things: first, that there is no other substance in the world besides body; secondly, that all animal life, sense, and self-perception, conscious understanding and personality, are generated and corrupted, successively educed out of nothing and reduced into nothing again.

XXXII. Indeed we are not ignorant that some, who seem to be well-wishers to Atheism, have talked sometimes of sensitive and rational matter, as having a mind to suppose, three several sorts of matter in the universe, specifically different from one another, that were originally such, and self-existent from eternity; namely, senseless, sensitive, and rational: as if the mundane system might be conceived to arise from a certain jumble of these three several sorts of matter, as it were scuffling together in the dark, without a God, and so producing bruté animals and men. But as this is a mere precarious hypothesis, there being no imaginable account to be given, how there should come to be such an essential difference betwixt matters, or why this piece of matter should be sensitive, and that rational, when another is altogether senseless; so the suggestors of it are but mere novices in Atheism, and a kind of bungling well-wishers to it. First, because, according to this hypothesis, no life would be pro-

duced or destroyed in the successive generations and corruptions of animals, but only concentered and secreted in them; and, consequently, all human personalities must be eternal and incorruptible; which is all one, as to assert the pre and post-existence of all souls from eternity to eternity, a thing that all genuine and thorough-paced Atheists are in a manner as abhorrent from, as they are from the Deity itself. And secondly, because there can be no imaginable reason given by them, why there might not be as well a certain Divine matter perfectly intellectual and self-existent from eternity, as a sensitive and rational matter. And, therefore, such an hypothesis as this can never serve the turn of Atheists. But all those that are masters of the craft of Atheism, and thoroughly catechised or initiated in the dark mysteries thereof (as hath been already inculcated), do perfectly agree in this, that all animal, sentient, and conscious life, all souls and minds, and consequently all human personalities, are generated out of matter, and corrupted again into it, or rather educed out of nothing, and reduced into nothing again.

We understand also, that there are certain canting astrological Atheists, who would deduce all things from the occult qualities and influences of the stars, according to their different conjunctions, oppositions, and aspects, in a certain blind and unaccountable manner. But these being persons devoid of all manner of sense, who neither so much as pretend to give an account of these stars, whether they be animals or not, as also whence they derive their original (which, if they did undertake to do atheistically, they must needs

resolve themselves at length into one or other of those hypotheses already proposed), therefore, as we conceive, they deserve not the least consideration. But we think fit here to observe, that such devotees to the heavenly bodies, as look upon all the other stars as petty deities, but the sun as the supreme deity and monarch of the universe, in the meantime conceiving it also to be perfectly intellectual (which is in a manner the same with the Cleanthean hypothesis) are not so much to be accounted Atheists, as spurious, paganical, and idolatrous Theists. And upon all these considerations, we conclude again, that there is no other philosophic form of Atheism, that can easily be devised, besides these four mentioned, the Anaximandrian, the Democritical, the Stoical, and the Stratonical.

XXXIII. Amongst which forms of Atheism, there is yet another difference to be observed, and accordingly another distribution to be made of them. It being first premised, that all these fore-mentioned sorts of Atheists (if they will speak consistently and agreeably to their own principles) must needs suppose all things to be one way or other necessary. For though Epicurus introduced contingent liberty, yet it is well known, that he therein plainly contradicted his own principles. And this, indeed, was the first and principal thing intended by us, in this whole undertaking, to confute that false hypothesis of the mundane system, which makes all actions and events necessary upon Atheistic grounds, but especially in the mechanic way. Wherefore, in the next place, we must observe, that though the principles of all Atheists introduce necessity, yet the

necessity of these Atheists is not one and the same, but of two different kinds; some of them supposing a necessity of dead and stupid matter, which is that, which is commonly meant by ἡλικὴ ἀνάγκη, or material necessity, and is also called by Aristotle, an absolute necessity of things; others, the necessity of a plastic life, which the same Aristotle calls an hypotheticalal necessity. For the Anaximandrian and Democritic Atheists do both of them assert a material and absolute necessity of all things; one in the way of qualities, and the other of motion and mechanism: but the Stoical and Stratonical Atheists assert a plastical and hypotheticalal necessity of things only.

Now one grand difference betwixt these two sorts of Atheisms and their necessities lies in this, that the former, though they make all things necessary, yet they suppose them also to be fortuitous; there being no inconsistency between these two. And the sense of both the Anaximandrian and Democritic Atheisms seems to be thus described by Plato,* πάντα κατὰ τύχην ἐξ ἀνάγκης συνεκείσθην. All things were mingled together by necessity according to fortune.—For that nature, from whence these Atheists derived all things, is at once both necessary and fortuitous. But the Plastic Atheisms suppose such a necessary nature for the first principle of things, as is not merely fortuitous, but regular, orderly, and methodical; the Stoical excluding all chance and fortune universally, because they subject all things to one plastic nature ruling over the whole universe, but the Stratonical doing it in part only, because they

* De Legibus, lib. x. p. 660. oper.

derive things from a mixture of chance and plastic nature both together.

And thus we see, that there is a double notion of nature amongst Atheists, as well as Theists; which we cannot better express than in the words of Balbus the Stoic, personated by Ci-

cero: "Alii naturam censent esse vim quandam sine ratione, cientem motus in corporibus necessarios; alii autem vim participem ordinis, tanquam via progredientem. Cujus solertiam, nulla ars, nulla manus, nemo opifex, consequi potest imitando; seminis enim vim esse tantam, ut id quanquam perexiguum, nactumque sit materiam, quo ali augerique possit, ita fingat et efficiat, in suo quidque genere, partim ut per stirpes alantur suas, partim ut movere etiam possint, et ex se similia sui generare." Some by nature mean a certain force without reason and order, exciting necessary motions in bodies; but others understand by it such a force, as participating of order proceeds as it were methodically. Whose exquisiteness, no art, no hand, no opificer can reach to by imitation. For the force of seed is such, that though the bulk of it be very small, yet if it get convenient matter for its nourishment and increase, it so forms and frames things in their several kinds, as that they can partly through their stocks and trunks be nourished, and partly move themselves also, and generate their like.—And again: "Sunt qui omnia naturæ nomine appellant, ut Epicurus; sed nos, cum dicimus natura constare administrarique mundum, non ita dicimus, ut glebam, aut fragmentum lapidis, aut aliquid ejusmodi, nulla coherendi natura; sed ut arborem, ut animalia, in

De Nat. De.
l. 2. cap.
xxxii. p.
3001. tom. ix.
oper.

quibus nulla temeritas, sed ordo apparet et artis quædam similitudo." There are some, who call all things by the name of nature, as Epicurus; but we, when we say that the world is administered by nature, do not mean such a nature, as is in clods of earth and pieces of stone, but such as is in a tree or animal, in whose constitution there is no temerity, but order and similitude of art.—Now, according to these two different notions of nature, the four forementioned forms of Atheism may be again dichotomized after this manner—into such as derive all things from a mere fortuitous and temerarious nature, devoid of all order and methodicalness; and such as deduce the original of things from a certain orderly, regular, and artificial, though senseless nature in matter. The former of which are the Anaximandrian and Democritic Atheisms, the latter the Stoical and Stratonical.

It hath been already observed, that those Atheisms, that derive all things from a mere fortuitous principle, as also suppose every thing, besides ὕλη ἄχροτος, the bare substance of matter—or extended bulk, to be generated and corrupted; though they asserted the eternity of matter, yet they could not, agreeably to their own hypothesis, maintain the eternity and incorruptibility of the world. And accordingly hereunto, both the Anaximandrian^a and Democritic^b Atheists did conclude the world to be *γενόμενον καὶ φθαρτόν*, such as was at first made, and should be again corrupted.—And upon this account, Lucretius concerns himself highly herein, to prove both the novelty of the

^a Vide Diog. Laert. lib. ix. segm. 44. p. 573.

^b Vide eundem lib. ii. segm. 1, 2. p. 78, 79.

world, and also its future dissolution and extinction, that

Totum nativum mortali corpore constat.

But instead of the world's eternity, these two sorts of Atheists introduced another paradox, namely an ἀπειρία κόσμων, an infinity of worlds;—and that not only successive, in that space, which this world of our's is conceived now to occupy, in respect of the infinity of past and future time, but also a contemporary infinity of coexistent worlds, at all times, throughout endless and unbounded space.

However, it is certain, that some persons Atheistically inclined, have been always apt to run out another way, and to suppose, that the frame of things, and system of the world, ever was from eternity, and ever will be to eternity, such as now it is, dispensed by a certain orderly and regular, but yet senseless and unknowing nature. And it is prophesied in Scripture, that such Atheists as these, should especially abound in these latter days of our's; “There shall come in the last days (ἐν ταῖς ἡμέραις) atheistical scoffers, walking after their own lusts, and saying; Where is the promise of his coming? For since the fathers fell asleep, all things continue as they were from the beginning of the creation.” Which latter words are spoken only according to the received hypothesis of the Jews, the meaning of these Atheists being quite otherwise, that there was neither creation nor beginning of the world; but that things had continued, such as now they are, from all eternity. As appears also from what the apostle there adds by way of confutation, that they “were wilfully ignorant of this, that by the word of 2 Pet. 3.

God the heavens were of old, and the earth standing out of the water and in the water; and that as the world, that then was, overflowing with water perished, so the heavens and earth, which now are, by the same word are kept in store, and reserved unto fire against the day of judgment and perdition of ungodly men." And it is evident, that some of these Atheists, at this very day, march in the garb of enthusiastical religionists, acknowledging no more a God than a Christ without them, and allegorizing the day of judgment and future conflagration into a kind of seemingly mystical, but really atheistical nonsense. These, if they did philosophize, would resolve themselves into one or other of those two hypotheses before mentioned; either that of one plastic orderly and methodical, but senseless nature, ruling over the whole universe; or else that of the life of matter, making one or other of these two natures to be their only God or Numen; it being sufficiently agreeable to the principles of both these Atheistic hypotheses (and no others) to maintain the world's both *antè* and post-eternity; yet so as that the latter of them, namely, the Hylozoists, admitting a certain mixture of chance together with the life of matter, would suppose, that though the main strokes of things might be preserved the same, and some kind of constant regularity always kept up in the world, yet that the whole mundane system did not in all respects continue the same, from eternity to eternity, without any variation.

Strab. l. 1.

But as Strabo tells us, that Strato Physicus maintained, the Euxine sea at first to have had no outlet by Byzantium into the Mediterranean, but that by the continual running in of ri-

vers into it, causing it to overflow, there was in length of time a passage opened by the Propontis and Hellespont; as also that the Mediterranean sea forced open that passage of the Herculean straits, being a continual isthmus or neck of land before; that many parts of the present continent were heretofore sea, as also much of the present ocean habitable land:—so it cannot be doubted, but that the same Strato did likewise suppose such kind of alterations and vicissitudes as these, in all the greater parts of the mundane system.

But the Stoical Atheists, who made the whole world to be dispensed by one orderly and plastic nature, might very well, and agreeably to their own hypothesis, maintain, besides the world's eternity, one constant and invariable course or tenor of things in it, as Plinius Secundus doth, who, if he were any thing, seems to have been one of these Atheists; “Mundum et hoc Nat. H. l. 2. c. 1. quod nomine alio cœlum appellare libuit, (cujus circumflexu reguntur cuncta) Numen esse, credi par est, æternum, immensum, neque genitum, neque interitum——Idem rerum naturæ opus, et rerum ipsa natura.” The world, and that which by another name is called the heavens, by whose circumgyration all things are governed, ought to be believed to be a Numen, eternal, immense, such as was never made, and shall never be destroyed.—Where, by the way, it may be again observed, that those Atheists, who denied a God, according to the true notion of him, as a conscious, understanding being, presiding over the whole world, did notwithstanding look upon either the world itself, or else a mere senseless plastic nature in it, as a kind of Numen or Deity,

they supposing it to be ingenerable and incorruptible. Which same Pliny, as, upon the grounds of the Stoical Atheism, he maintained against the Anaximandrians and Democritics, the world's eternity and incorruptibility; so did he likewise, in way of opposition to that ἀρετή κόσμων, that infinity of worlds—of their's, assert, that there was but one world, and that finite. In like manner we read concerning that famous Stoic, Boethus, whom Laertius affirms to have denied the world to be an animal (which, according to the language and sense of those times, was all one as to deny a God); that he also maintained, contrary to the received doctrine of the Stoics, the world's ante-eternity and incorruptibility; Philo, in his treatise περὶ ἀθαρτίας κόσμου, or the Incorruptibility of the World,—testifying the same of him.

Nevertheless it seems, that some of these Stoical Atheists did also agree with the generality of the other Stoical Theists, in supposing a successive infinity of worlds generated and corrupted, by reason of intervening periodical conflagrations; though all dispensed by such a stupid and senseless nature, as governs plants and trees. For thus much we gather from those words of Seneca before cited, where, describing this Atheistical hypothesis, he tells us, that though the world were a plant, that is, governed by a vegetative or plastic nature, without any animality, yet notwithstanding, “ab initio ejus usque ad exitum,” &c. it had both a beginning, and will have an end; and from its beginning to its end, all was dispensed by a kind of regular law, even its successive conflagrations too, as well as those inundations or deluges, which have sometimes happened. Which yet they un-

derstood after such a manner, as that in these several revolutions and successive circuits or periods of worlds, all things should be ἀπαράλλακτα, exactly alike, to what had been infinitely before, and should be again infinitely afterwards. Of which more elsewhere.

xxxiv. This quadripartite Atheism, which we have now represented, is the kingdom of darkness divided, or labouring with an intestine seditious war in its own bowels, and thereby destroying itself. Insomuch that we might well save ourselves the labour of any further confutation of Atheism, merely by committing these several forms of Atheism together, and dashing them one against another, they opposing and contradicting each other, no less than they do Theism itself. For first, those two pairs of Atheisms, on the one hand the Anaximandrian and Democritic, on the other the Stoical and Stratonical, do absolutely destroy each other; the former of them supposing the first principle of all things to be stupid matter devoid of all manner of life, and contending, that all life as well as other qualities is generable and corruptible, or a mere accidental thing, and looking upon the plastic life of nature as a figment or fantastic capricio, a thing almost as formidable and altogether as impossible as a Deity; the other, on the contrary, founding all upon this principle, that there is a life and natural perception essential to matter, ingenerable and incorruptible, and contending it to be utterly impossible to give any account of the phenomena of the world, the original of motion, the orderly frame and disposition of things, and the nature of animals, without this fundamental life of nature.

Again, the single Atheisms belonging to each of

these several pairs quarrel as much also between themselves. For the Democritic Atheism explodes the Anaximandrian qualities and forms, demonstrating that the natural production of such entities out of nothing, and the corruption of them again into nothing, is of the two rather more impossible than a Divine creation and annihilation. And, on the other side, the Anaximandrian Atheist plainly discovers, that, when the Democritics and Atomics have spent all their fury against these qualities and forms, and done what they can to solve the phenomena of nature without them another way, themselves do notwithstanding, like drunken men, reel and stagger back into them, and are unavoidably necessitated at last to take up their sanctuary in them.

In like manner, the Stoical and Stratonical Atheists may as effectually undo and confute each other; the former of them urging against the latter, that, besides that prodigious absurdity of making every atom of senseless matter infallibly wise or omniscient, without any consciousness, there can be no reason at all given by the Hylozoists, why the matter of the whole universe might not as well conspire and confederate together into one, as all the single atoms that compound the body of any animal or man; or why one conscious life might not as well result from the totum of the former, as of the latter; by which means the whole world would become an animal, or God. Again, the latter contending, that the Stoical or Cosmo-plastic Atheist can pretend no reason, why the whole world might not have one sentient and rational, as well as one plastic soul in it, that is, as well be an animal as a plant:

moreover, that the sensitive souls of brute animals, and the rational souls of men, could never possibly emerge out of one single, plastic, and vegetative soul in the whole universe: and, lastly, that it is altogether as impossible, that the whole world should have life in it, and yet none of its parts have any life of their own, as that the whole world should be white or black, and yet no part of it have any whiteness or blackness at all in it. And, therefore, that the Stoical Atheists, as well as the Stoical Theists, do both alike deny incorporeal substance but in words only, whilst they really admit the thing itself; because one and the same life, ruling over all the distant parts of the corporeal universe, must needs be an incorporeal substance, it being all in the whole, and all acting upon every part, and yet none of it in any part by itself; for then it would be many, and not one. From all which it may be concluded, that Atheism is a certain strange kind of monster, with four heads, that are all of them perpetually biting, tearing, and devouring one another.

Now, though these several forms of Atheism do mutually destroy each other, and none of them be really considerable or formidable in itself, as to any strength of reason which it hath; yet, as they are compared together among themselves, so some of them may be more considerable than the rest. For, first, as the qualities and forms of the Anaximandrian Atheist, supposed to be really distinct from the substances, are things unintelligible in themselves; so he cannot, with any colour or pretence of reason, maintain the natural production of them out of nothing, and the reduction of them again into nothing, and yet withstand a

Divine creation and annihilation, as an impossibility. Moreover, the Anaximandrian Atheism is as it were swallowed up into the Democritic, and further improved in it; this latter carrying on the same design, with more seeming artifice, greater plausibility of wit, and a more pompous show of something, where, indeed, there is nothing. Upon which account, it hath for many ages past beaten the Anaximandrian Atheism in a manner quite off the stage, and reigned there alone. So that the Democritic or Atomic Atheism seems to be much more considerable of the two, than the Anaximandrian or Hylopathian.

Again, as for the two other forms of Atheism, if there were any life at all in matter, as the first and immediate recipient of it, then in reason this must needs be supposed to be after the same manner in it, that all other corporeal qualities are in bodies, so as to be divisible together with it, and some of it be in every part of the matter; which is according to the hypothesis of the Hylozoists. Whereas, on the contrary, the Stoical Atheists supposing one life only in the whole mass of matter, after such a manner, as that none of the parts of it by themselves should have any life of their own, do thereby, no less than the Stoical Theists, make this life of theirs to be no corporeal quality or form, but an incorporeal substance; which is to contradict their own hypothesis. From whence we may conclude, that the Cosmo-plastic or Stoical Atheism is, of the two, less considerable than the Hylozoic or Stratonical.

Wherefore, amongst these four forms of Atheism, that have been propounded, these two, the Atomic or Democritical, and the Hylozoic or

Stratonical are the chief. The former of which, namely, the Democritic Atheism, admitting a true notion of body, that (according to the doctrine of the first and most ancient Atomists) it is nothing but resisting bulk devoid of all manner of life; yet, because it takes for granted, that there is no other substance in the world besides body, does, therefore, conclude, that all life and understanding in animals and men is generated out of dead and stupid matter, though not as qualities and forms (which is the Anaximandrian way), but as resulting from the contextures of atoms, or some peculiar composition of magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions; and, consequently, that they are themselves really nothing else but local motion and mechanism; which is a thing, that some time since was very pertinently and judiciously both observed and perstringed by the learned ^{Sect. 4. c. 3.} author of the *Exercitatio Epistolica*, now a reverend bishop. But the latter, namely, the Hylozoic, though truly acknowledging, on the contrary, that life, cogitation, and understanding are entities really distinct from local motion and mechanism, and that therefore they cannot be generated out of dead and stupid matter, but must needs be somewhere in the world, originally, essentially, and fundamentally: yet, because they take it also for granted, that there is no other substance besides matter, do thereupon adulterate the notion of matter or body, blending and confounding it with life, as making them but two inadequate conceptions of substance, and concluding that all matter and substance, as such, hath

* Dr. Seth Ward, Savilian Professor of Astronomy in the University of Oxford; and successively Bishop of Exeter and Salisbury.

life and perception, or understanding, natural and unconscious, essentially belonging to it; and that sense and conscious reason or understanding in animals, arises only from the accidental modification of this fundamental life of matter by organization.

We conclude, therefore, that if these two Atheistic hypotheses, which are found to be the most considerable, be once confuted, the reality of all Atheism will be *ipso facto* confuted; there being indeed nothing more requisite to a thorough confutation of Atheism, than the proving of these two things: first, that life and understanding are not essential to matter, as such; and, secondly, that they can never possibly rise out of any mixture or modification of dead and stupid matter whatsoever. The reason of which assertion is, because all Atheists, as was before observed, are mere Corporealists, of which there can be but these two sorts; either such as make life to be essential to matter, and therefore to be ingenerable and incorruptible; or else such as suppose life and every thing besides *ὅλη ἄπλοος*, the bare substance of matter, or extended bulk, to be merely accidental, generable, or corruptible, as rising out of some mixture or modification of it. And as the proving of those two things will overthrow all Atheism, so it will likewise lay a clear foundation for the demonstrating of a Deity distinct from the corporeal world.

xxxv. Now that life and perception, or understanding, should be essential to matter, as such, or that all senseless matter should be perfectly and infallibly wise (though without consciousness) as to all its own congruities and capabilities, which

is the doctrine of the Hylozoists; this, I say, is an hypothesis so prodigiously paradoxical, and so outrageously wild, as that very few men ever could have Atheistic faith enough, to swallow it down and digest it. Wherefore, this Hylozoic Atheism hath been very obscure ever since its first emersion, and hath found so few fautors and abettors, that it hath looked like a forlorn and deserted thing. Neither indeed are there any public monuments at all extant, in which it is avowedly maintained, stated, and reduced into any system. Inso-much that we should not have taken any notice of it at this time, as a particular form of Atheism, nor have conjured it up out of its grave, had we not understood, that Strato's ghost had begun to walk of late; and that among some well-wishers to Atheism, despairing in a manner of the Atomic form, this Hylozoic hypothesis began already to be looked upon, as the rising sun of Atheism, ——"Et tanquam spes altera Trojæ," it seeming to smile upon them, and flatter them at a distance, with some fairer hopes of supporting that ruinous and desperate cause.

Whereas, on the contrary, that other Atomic Atheism, as it insists upon a true notion of body, that it is nothing but resisting bulk; by which means we, joining issue thereupon, shall be fairly conducted on to a clear decision of this present controversy, as likewise to the disentangling of many other points of philosophy; so it is that, which hath filled the world with the noise of it, for two thousand years past; that, concerning which several volumes have been formerly written, in which it hath been stated and brought into a kind of system; and which hath of late obtained

a resurrection amongst us, together with the Atomic physiology, and been recommended to the world anew, under a specious shew of wit and profound philosophy.

Wherefore, as we could not here insist upon both these forms of Atheism together, because that would have been to confound the language of Atheists, and to have made them, like the Cadmean offspring, to do immediate execution upon themselves; so we were in all reason obliged to make our first and principal assault upon the Atomic Atheism, as being the only considerable, upon this account, because it is that alone, which publicly confronts the world, and like that proud uncircumcised Philistine, openly defies the hosts of the living God; intending nevertheless in the close of this whole discourse (that is, the last book), where we are to determine the right intellectual system of the universe, and to assert an incorporeal Deity, to demonstrate, that life, cogitation, and understanding do not essentially belong to matter, and all substance, as such, but are the peculiar attributes and characteristics of substance incorporeal.

xxxvi. However, since we have now started these several forms of Atheism, we shall not in the mean time neglect any of them neither. For in the answer to the second Atheistic ground, we shall confute them altogether at once, as agreeing in this one fundamental principle, That the original of all things in the universe is senseless matter, or matter devoid of all animality or conscious life.—In the reply to the fourth Atheistic argumentation, we shall briefly hint the grounds of reason, from which incorporeal substance is de-

monstrated. In the examination of the fifth, we shall confute the Anaximandrian Atheism there propounded, which is, as it were, the first sciography and rude delineation of Atheism. And in the confutation of the sixth, we shall shew, how the ancient Atomic Atheists did preventively overthrow the foundation of Hylozoism. Besides all which, in order to a fuller and more thorough confutation, both of the Cosmo-plastic and Hylozoic Atheisms, we shall in this very place take occasion to insist largely upon the plastic life of nature, giving in the first place a true account of it; and then afterwards shewing, how grossly it is misunderstood, and the pretence of it abused, by the assertors of both these Atheistic hypotheses. The heads of which larger digression, because they could not be so conveniently inserted in the contents of the chapter, shall be represented to the reader's view at the end of it.

xxxvii. For we think fit here to observe, that neither the Cosmo-plastic or Stoical, nor the Hylozoic or Stratonical Atheists, are therefore condemned by us, because they suppose such a thing as a plastic-nature, or life distinct from the animal; albeit this be not only exploded, as an absolute nonentity, by the Atomic Atheists, who might possibly be afraid of it, as that which approached too near to a Deity, or else would hazard the introducing of it; but also utterly discarded by some professed Theists of later times, who might notwithstanding have an undiscerned tang of the Mechanic Atheism hanging about them, in that their so confident rejecting of all final and intending causality in nature, and admitting of no other causes of things, as philosophical, save the mate-

rial and mechanical only ; this being really to banish all mental, and consequently Divine causality, quite out of the world ; and to make the whole world to be nothing else, but a mere heap of dust fortuitously agitated, or a dead cadaverous thing, that hath no signatures of mind and understanding, counsel and wisdom at all upon it ; nor indeed any other vitality acting in it, than only the production of a certain quantity of local motion, and the conservation of it according to some general laws ; which things the Democritic Atheists take for granted, would all be as they are,

though there were no God. And thus Aristotle describes this kind of philosophy, that it made the whole world to

consist, *ἐκ σωμάτων μόνον, καὶ μονάδων τάξιν μὲν ἔχόντων, ἀψύχων δὲ πάντων*, of nothing but bodies and monads (that is, atoms, or small particles of matter) only ranged and disposed together into such an order, but altogether dead and inanimate.—

2. For unless there be such a thing admitted as a plastic nature, that acts *ἕνεκά του*, for the sake of something, and in order to ends, regularly, artificially and methodically, it seems, that one or other of these two things must be concluded ; that either in the efformation and organization of the bodies of animals, as well as the other phenomena, every thing comes to pass fortuitously, and happens to be as it is, without the guidance and direction of any mind or understanding ; or else, that God himself doth all immediately, and, as it were, with his own hands, form the body of every gnat and fly, insect and mite, as of other animals in generations, all whose members have so much of contrivance in them, that Galen professed he could never

De Cael. l. 2.
c. 12. p. 656.
tom. i. oper.

enough admire that artifice, which was in the leg of a fly (and yet he would have admired the wisdom of nature more, had he been but acquainted with the use of microscopes): I say, upon supposition of no plastic nature, one or other of these two things must be concluded; because it is not conceived by any, that the things of nature are all thus administered, with such exact regularity and constancy every where, merely by the wisdom, providence, and efficiency of those inferior spirits, demons, or angels. As also, though it be true, that the works of nature are dispensed by a Divine law and command, yet this is not to be understood in a vulgar sense, as if they were all effected by the mere force of a verbal law or outward command, because inanimate things are not commendable nor governable by such a law. And therefore, besides the Divine will and pleasure, there must needs be some other immediate agent and executioner provided, for the producing of every effect; since not so much as a stone, or other heavy body, could at any time fall downward, merely by the force of a verbal law, without any other efficient cause; but either God himself must immediately impel it, or else there must be some other subordinate cause in nature for that motion. Wherefore, the Divine law and command, by which the things of nature are administered, must be conceived to be the real appointment of some energetic, effectual, and operative cause for the production of every effect.

3. Now to assert the former of these two things, that all the effects of nature come to pass by material and mechanical necessity, or the mere fortuitous motion of matter, without any guidance or

direction, is a thing no less irrational than it is impious and atheistical. Not only because it is utterly inconceivable and impossible, that such infinite regularity and artificialness, as is every where throughout the whole world, should constantly result out of the fortuitous motion of matter; but also because there are many such particular phenomena in nature, as do plainly transcend the powers of mechanism, of which therefore no sufficient mechanical reasons can be devised—as the motion of respiration in animals: as there are also other phenomena, that are perfectly cross to the laws of mechanism; as, for example, that of the distant poles of the equator and ecliptic, which we shall insist upon afterward. Of both which kinds there have been other instances proposed by my learned friend, Dr. More, in his *Enchiridion Metaphysicum*, and very ingeniously improved by him to this very purpose, namely, to evince, that there is something in nature besides mechanism, and consequently substance incorporeal.

Moreover, those Theists, who philosophize after this manner, by resolving all the corporeal phenomena into fortuitous mechanism, or the necessary and unguided motion of matter, make God to be nothing else in the world, but an idle spectator of the various results of the fortuitous and necessary motions of bodies; and render his wisdom altogether useless and insignificant, as being a thing wholly enclosed and shut up within his own breast, and not at all acting abroad upon any thing without him.

Furthermore, all such Mechanists as these, whether Theists or Atheists, do, according to that

judicious censure passed by Aristotle, De Part. An. l. i. c. 1. p. 473. tom. ii. oper. long since, upon Democritus, but substitute as it were *χαῖρα ἑλάνην τίκτους*, a carpenter's or artificer's wooden hand, moved by strings and wires, instead of a living hand.—They make a kind of dead and wooden world, as it were a carved statue, that hath nothing neither vital nor magical at all in it. Whereas to those, who are considerative, it will plainly appear, that there is a mixture of life or plastic nature, together with mechanism, which runs through the whole corporeal universe.

And whereas it is pretended, not only that all corporeal phenomena may be sufficiently solved mechanically, without any final, intending, and directive causality, but also that all other reasons of things in nature, besides the material and mechanical, are altogether unphilosophical, the same Aristotle ingeniously exposes the ridiculousness of this pretence after this manner: telling us, that it is just as if a carpenter, joiner, or carver should give this account, as the only satisfactory, of any artificial fabric or piece of carved imagery, *ὅτι ἐμπέ- σόντος τοῦ ὀργάνου τὸ μὲν κοῖλον ἐγένετο, τὸ δὲ ἐπίπεδον*, that because the instruments, axes and hatchets, planes and chisels, happened to fall so and so upon the timber, cutting it here and there, that therefore it was hollow in one place, and plain in another, and the like; and by that means the whole came to be of such a form.—For is it not altogether as absurd and ridiculous, for men to undertake to give an account of the formation and organization of the bodies of animals, by mere fortuitous mechanism, without any final or intending

* Ubi supra. * Vide Cartes. libr. de Homine, et de Formatione Fœtus

causality, as why there was an heart here, and brains there; and why the heart had so many and such different valves in the entrance and outlet of its ventricles; and why all the other organic parts, veins and arteries, nerves and muscles, bones and cartilages, with the joints and members, were of such a form? Because forsooth, the fluid matter of the seed happened to move so and so in several places, and thereby to cause all those differences, which are also diverse in different animals; all being the necessary result of a certain quantity of motion at first indifferently impressed upon the small particles of the matter of this universe turned round in a vortex. But, as the same Aristotle adds, no carpenter or artificer is so simple, as to give such an account as this, and think it satisfactory, but he will rather declare, that himself directed the

motion of the instruments, after such a

* De Part.
An. I. I. c. 1.

manner, and in order to such ends: * Βέλ-

τιον ὁ τέκτων, οὐ γὰρ ἱκανὸν ἔσται αὐτῷ, τὸ τοσοῦτον εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ἐμπεσόντος τοῦ ὀργάνου, &c. ἀλλὰ διότι τὴν πληγὴν ἐποίησατο τοιαύτην, καὶ τίνος ἕνεκα, ἔρει τὴν αἰτίαν, ὅπως τοιούδε ἢ τοιουδήποτε τὴν μορφήν γένηται. A

carpenter would give a better account than so, for he would not think it sufficient to say, that the fabric came to be of such a form, because the instruments happened to fall so and so, but he will tell you that it was because himself made such strokes, and that he directed the instruments and determined their motion after such a manner, to this end, that he might make the whole a fabric fit and useful for such purposes.—And this is to assign the final cause. And certainly there is scarcely any man in his wits, that will not acknowledge the reason of the different valves in the heart from the

apparent usefulness of them, according to those particular structures of their's, to be more satisfactory, than any which can be brought from mere fortuitous mechanism, or the unguided motion of the seminal matter.

4. And as for the latter part of the disjunction, that every thing in nature should be done immediately by God himself; this, as, according to vulgar apprehension, it would render Divine Providence operose, solicitous, and distractive, and thereby make the belief of it to be entertained with greater difficulty, and give advantage to Atheists; so, in the judgment of the writer *De Mundo*, it is not so decorous in respect of God neither, that he should αὐτουργεῖν ἅπαντα, set his own hand, as it were, to every work, and immediately do all the meanest and triflingest things himself drudgingly, without making use of any inferior and subordinate instruments. Εἴπερ ἄσμενον

Cap. 7.

ἦν αὐτὸν δοκεῖν Ξέρξην αὐτουργεῖν ἅπαντα, καὶ διατελεῖν ἃ βούλοιο, καὶ ἐφιστάμενον διοικεῖν, πολὺ μᾶλλον ἀπρεπὲς ἂν εἴη τῷ θεῷ. Σεμνότερον δὲ καὶ πρεπωδέστερον τὴν δύναμιν αὐτοῦ, διὰ τοῦ σύμπαντος κόσμου διηκούσαν, ἥλιον τε κινεῖν καὶ σελήνην, &c. If it were not congruous in respect of the state and majesty of Xerxes, the great king of Persia, that he should condescend to do all the meanest offices himself; much less can this be thought decorous in respect of God. But it seems far more august and becoming of the Divine Majesty, that a certain power and virtue, derived from him, and passing through the universe; should move the sun and moon, and be the immediate cause of those lower things done here upon earth.—

Moreover, it seems not so agreeable to reason

neither, that nature, as a distinct thing from the Deity, should be quite superseded or made to signify nothing, God himself doing all things immediately and miraculously; from whence it would follow also, that they are all done either forcibly and violently, or else artificially only, and none of them by any inward principle of their own.

Lastly : this opinion is further confuted by that slow and gradual process, that is in the generations of things, which would seem to be but a vain and idle pomp, or a trifling formality, if the agent were omnipotent : as also by those *ἀμαρτήματα* (as Aristotle calls them) those errors and bumbles, which are committed, when the matter is inept and contumacious ; which argue the agent not to be irresistible, and that nature is such a thing, as is not altogether incapable (as well as human art) of being sometimes frustrated and disappointed, by the indisposition of matter. Whereas an omnipotent agent, as it could dispatch its work in a moment, so it would always do it infallibly and irresistibly ; no ineptitude or stubbornness of matter being ever able to hinder such a one, or make him bungle or fumble in any thing.

5. Wherefore, since neither all things are produced fortuitously, or by the unguided mechanism of matter, nor God himself may reasonably be thought to do all things immediately and miraculously ; it may well be concluded, that there is a plastic nature under him, which, as an inferior and subordinate instrument, doth drudgingly execute that part of his providence, which consists in the regular and orderly motion of matter ; yet so as that there is also, besides this, a higher Providence to be acknowledged, which, presiding over

it, doth often supply the defects of it, and sometimes over-rule it; forasmuch as this plastic nature cannot act electively, nor with discretion. And by this means the wisdom of God will not be shut up nor concluded wholly within his own breast, but will display itself abroad, and print its stamps and signatures every where throughout the world; so that God, as Plato* (after Orpheus^b) speaks, will be not only the beginning and end, but also the middle of all things; they being as much to be ascribed to his causality, as if himself had done them all immediately, without the concurrent instrumentality of any subordinate natural cause. Notwithstanding which, in this way it will appear also to human reason, that all things are disposed and ordered by the Deity, without any solicitous care or distractionous providence.

And indeed those mechanic Theists, who, rejecting a plastic nature, affect to concern the Deity as little as is possible in mundane affairs, either for fear of debasing him, and bringing him down to too mean offices, or else of subjecting him to solicitous encumberment; and for that cause would have God to contribute nothing more to the mundane system and economy, than only the first impressing of a certain quantity of motion upon the matter, and the after conserving of it, according to some general laws; these men, I say, seem not very well to understand themselves in this. Forasmuch as they must of necessity, either suppose these their laws of motion to execute themselves, or else be forced perpetually to concern the Deity in the immediate motion of every atom of matter throughout the universe, in order to the

* De Leg. lib. iv. p. 600. oper.

^b Vide Apul. de Mundo, p. 25.

execution and observation of them. The former of which being a thing plainly absurd and ridiculous, and the latter that, which these philosophers themselves are extremely abhorrent from, we cannot make any other conclusion than this, that they do but unskilfully and unawares establish that very thing, which in words they oppose; and that their laws of nature concerning motion are really nothing else but a plastic nature, acting upon the matter of the whole corporeal universe, both maintaining the same quantity of motion always in it, and also dispensing it (by transferring it out of one body into another) according to such laws, fatally impressed upon it. Now, if there be a plastic nature, that governs the motion of matter every where, according to laws, there can be no reason given, why the same might not also extend farther to the regular disposal of that matter, in the formation of plants and animals, and other things, in order to that apt coherent frame and harmony of the whole universe.

6. And as this plastic nature is a thing, which seems to be in itself most reasonable, so hath it also had the suffrage of the best philosophers in all ages. For, first, it is well known, that Aristotle concerns himself in nothing more zealously than this, that mundane things are not effected merely by the necessary and unguided motion of matter, or by fortuitous mechanism; but by such a nature as acts regularly and artificially for ends; yet so as that this nature is not the highest principle neither, or the supreme Numen, but subordinate to a perfect mind or intellect; he affirming, that *νοὺς αἰτίον καὶ φύσις τοῦδε τοῦ παντός*, that mind, together with nature, was the cause of this universe;

—and that heaven and earth, plants and animals, were framed by them both; that is, by mind as the principal and directive cause, but by nature as a subservient or executive instrument; and elsewhere joining in like manner God and nature both together, as when he concludes, That God and nature do nothing in vain.

Neither was Aristotle the first broacher or inventor of this doctrine, Plato before him having plainly asserted the same. For in a passage already cited, he affirms, that nature, together with reason, and according to it, orders all things; thereby making nature, as a distinct thing from the Deity, to be a subordinate cause under the reason and wisdom of it. And elsewhere he resolves, that there are *ἐκπρονος φύσεως αἰτίαι, διὰ νουπρονουσίας ὁ θεὸς χρῆται*, certain causes of a wise and artificial nature, which the Deity uses as subservient to itself;—as also, that there are *ἐναίτια οὐκ ἐνεργούσιν θεὸς χρῆται*, coo-causes, which God makes use of, as subordinately co-operative with himself.

Moreover, before Plato, Empedocles philosophized also in the same manner, when, supposing two worlds, the one archetypal, the other ectypal, he made *φιλία* and *νεῖκος*, friendship and discord, to be the *ἀρχὴ δραστήριος*, the active principle and immediate operator in this lower world; he not understanding thereby, as Plutarch and some others have conceited, two substantial principles in the world, the one of good, the other of evil; but only a plastic nature, as Aristotle in sundry

* De Iside et Osiride, p. 370. tam.ii. oper.

places intimates ; which he called by that name, partly because he apprehended, that the result and upshot of nature in all generations and corruptions amounted to nothing more than mixtures and separations, or concretion and secretion of pre-existent things ; and partly because this plastic nature is that, which doth reconcile the contrarieties and enmities of particular things, and bring them into one general harmony in the whole. Which latter is a notion, that Plotinus, describing this very seminary reason or plastic nature of the world (though taking it in something a larger

En. 3. l. 2.
sec. 16. p.
267. oper.

sense than we do in this place), doth ingeniously pursue after this manner : 'Αντιθεὶς δὲ ἀλλήλοις τὰ μέρη, καὶ ποιήσας ἐνδεῶς, πολέμου καὶ μάχης σύστασιν καὶ γένουσιν ἐργάσατο· καὶ οὕτως ἐστὶν εἰς πᾶς, εἰ μὴ ἐν ἑαῖ· γινόμενον γὰρ ἐαυτῷ τοῖς μέρεσι πολέμον, οὕτως ἐν ἐστὶ καὶ φίλον, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ δράματος λόγος εἴς, ὁ τοῦ δράματος, ἔχων ἐν αὐτῷ πολλὰς μάχας· τὸ μὲν οὖν δράμα τὰ μεμαχημένα, οἷον εἰς μίαν ἀρμονίαν, ἄγει σύμφωνον.—ὥς τε μᾶλλον ἂν τις τῇ ἀρμονίᾳ τῇ ἐκ μαχομένων εἰκάσει. The seminary reason or plastic nature of the universe, opposing the parts to one another, and making them severally indigent, produces by that means war and contention. And, therefore, though it be one, yet, notwithstanding, it consists of different and contrary things. For there being hostility in its parts, it is nevertheless friendly and agreeable in the whole; after the same manner as in a dramatic poem, clashings and contentions are reconciled into one harmony. And, therefore, the seminary and plastic nature of the world may fitly be resembled to the harmony of disagreeing things.—Which Plo-

tinic doctrine may well pass for a commentary upon Empedocles, accordingly as Simplicius briefly represents his sense, Ἐμπεδοκλῆς δύο κόσμους συνίστησι, τὸν μὲν ἡνωμένον καὶ νοητὸν, τὸν δὲ διακεκριμένον καὶ αἰσθητὸν, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ κόσμῳ τὴν ἑνωσιν ὁρᾷ καὶ τὴν διάκρισιν. Empedocles makes two worlds, the one united and intelligible, the other divided and sensible; and in this lower sensible world, he takes notice both of unity and discord.—

In Arist. de Cael. l. 1. c. 10. p. 71. edit. Græc. Venet. 1526. fol.

It was before observed, that Heraclitus likewise did assert a regular and artificial nature, as the fate of things in this lower world; for his "reason passing through the substance of all things," or "ethereal body, which was the seed of the generation of the universe," was nothing but that spermatic or plastic nature which we now speak of. And whereas there is an odd passage of this philosopher's recorded,* κόσμον τόνδε οὔτε τις θεὸς οὔτ' ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησε, that neither any God nor man made this world,—which, as it is justly derided by Plutarch for its simplicity, so it looks very atheistically at first sight; yet, because Heraclitus hath not been accounted an Atheist, we therefore conceive the meaning of it to have been this, that the world was not made by any whatsoever, after such a manner as an artificer makes a house, by machines and engines, acting from without upon the matter, cumbrously and molimiously, but by a certain inward plastic nature of its own. And as Hippocrates followed Heraclitus in this (as was before declared), so did Zeno and the Stoics also; they supposing, besides an intel-

* Apud Plutarch. de Animæ Procreat. ex Timæo, tom. ii. opér. p. 1014. et apud Clement. Alexandrin. Stromat. lib. v. cap. xiv. p. 711.

lectual nature, as the supreme architect and master-builder of the world, another plastic nature as the immediate workman and operator: which plastic nature hath been already described, in the words of Balbus, as a thing, which acts not fortuitously, but regularly, orderly, and

artificially. And Laertius tells* us, it was defined by Zeno himself after this manner: *ἐστὶ δὲ φύσις ἕκαστ' ἐξ αὐτῆς κινουμένη*

κατὰ σπερματικούς λόγους, ἀποτελοῦσα τε καὶ συντηχοῦσα τὰ ἐξ αὐτῆς ἐν ὁρισμένοις χρόνοις, καὶ τοιαῦτα δρῶσα ἀφ' ὧν ἀκριβέστερ'. Nature is a habit moved from itself, according to spermatic reasons or seminal principles, perfecting and containing those several things, which in determinate times are produced from it, and acting agreeably to that from which it was secreted.—

Lastly, as the latter Platonists and Peripatetics have unanimously followed their masters herein, whose vegetative soul also is no other than a plastic nature; so the chemists and Paracelsians insist much upon the same thing, and seem rather to have carried the notion on further, in the bodies of animals, where they call it by a new name of their own—the Archeus.

Moreover, we cannot but observe here; that, as amongst the ancients they were generally condemned for downright Atheists, who acknowledged no other principle besides body or matter, necessarily and fortuitously moved, such as Democritus and the first Ionics: so even Anaxagoras himself, notwithstanding that he was a professed Theist, and plainly asserted mind to be a principle, yet, because he attributed too much to material necessity, admitting neither this

* In Vita
Zen. lib. vii.
segm. 148. p.
439.

plastic nature nor a mundane soul, was severely censured, not only by the vulgar (who unjustly taxed him for an Atheist), but also by Plato and Aristotle, as a kind of spurious and imperfect Theist, and one who had given great advantage to Atheism. Aristotle, in his *Metaphysics*, thus represents his philosophy:*

* L. i. c. 4.
pag. 267.
tom. iv. oper.

Ἀναξαγόρας τε γὰρ μηχανῇ χρῆται τῇ νῦν, πρὸς τὴν κοσμοποιάν, καὶ ὅταν ἀπορήσῃ διὰ τίν' αἰτίαν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐστὶ, τότε ἔλκει αὐτὸν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις πάντα μᾶλλον αἰτιάζεται τῶν γινομένων ἢ νοῦν. Anaxagoras useth mind and intellect, that is, God, as a machine in the *Cosmopœia*; and when he is at a loss to give an account of things by material necessity, then, and never but then, does he draw in mind or God to help him out; but otherwise he will rather assign any thing else for a cause than mind.—Now, if Aristotle censure Anaxagoras in this manner, though a professed Theist, because he did but seldom make use of a mental cause for the solving of the phenomena of the world, and only then when he was at a loss for other material and mechanical causes (which it seems he sometimes confessed himself to be), what would that philosopher have thought of those our so confident Mechanists of later times, who will never vouchsafe so much as once to be beholden to God Almighty for any thing in the economy of the corporeal world; after the first impression of motion upon the matter?

Plato, likewise, in his *Phædo*,* and elsewhere, condemns this Anaxagoras by name for this very thing, that though he acknowledged mind to be

a cause, yet he seldom made use of it for solving the phenomena; but in his twelfth *De Legibus*, he perstringeth him unnamed, as one who, though a professed Theist, had, notwithstanding, given great encouragement to Atheism, after

* P. 967.
Steph.

this manner: * Λέγοντες ὡς νοῦς εἴη ὁ διακοσμητικὸς πάνθ' ὅσα κατ' οὐρανὸν, αὐτοὶ δὲ πάλιν ἀμαρτάνοντες ψυχῆς φύσεως, ὅτι πρεσβύτερον εἴη σωμάτων, ἀπανθ' ὡς εἶπεν ἔπος, ἀνέτρεψαν πάλιν, τὰ γὰρ δὲ πρὸ τῶν ὀμμάτων πάντα, αὐτοῖς ἐφάνη, τὰ κατ' οὐραίων φερόμενα, μεστὰ εἶναι λίθων, καὶ γῆς, καὶ πολλῶν ἄλλων ἀψύχων σωμάτων, διανεμόντων τὰς αἰτίας παντὸς τοῦ κόσμου, ταῦτ' ἦν τὰ τότε ἐχειρογασμένα πολλὰς ἀθεότητος. Some of them, who had concluded that it was mind that ordered all things in the heavens, themselves erring concerning the nature of the soul, and not making that older than the body, have overturned all again; for heavenly bodies being supposed by them to be full of stones, and earth, and other inanimate things (dispensing the causes of the whole universe), they did by this means occasion much Atheism and impiety.—

Furthermore, the same Plato there tells us, that in those times of his, astronomers and physiologists commonly lay under the prejudice and suspicion of Atheism amongst the vulgar, merely for this reason, because they dealt so much in material causes: Οἱ πολλοὶ διανοοῦνται τοὺς τὰ τοιαῦτα μεταχειρισμένους, ἀστρονομία τε καὶ ταῖς μετὰ ταύτης ἀναγκαίαις ἄλλαις τέχναις, ἀθέους γίγνεται, καθωρακότας ὡς οἰόντι γιγνόμενα ἀνάγκαις τὰ πράγματα, ἀλλ' οὐ διανοίας βουλήσεως ἀγαθῶν περὶ τελουμένων. The vulgar think, that they who addict themselves to astronomy and physiology, are made Atheists thereby, they seeing as much as is possible, how things come to

pass by material necessities, and being thereby disposed to think them not to be ordered by mind and will, for the sake of good.—From whence we may observe, that, according to the natural apprehensions of men in all ages, they who resolve the phenomena of nature into material necessity, allowing of no final nor mental causality (disposing things in order to ends), have been strongly suspected for friends to Atheism.

7. But because some may pretend, that the plastic nature is all one with an occult quality, we shall here shew, how great a difference there is betwixt these two. For he that asserts an occult quality for the cause of any phenomenon, does indeed assign no cause at all of it, but only declare his own ignorance of the cause: but he that asserts a plastic nature, assigns a determinate and proper cause, nay, the only intelligible cause, of that which is the greatest of all phenomena in the world, namely, the *τὸ εὖ καὶ καλῶς*, the orderly, regular, and artificial frame of things in the universe, whereof the mechanic philosophers, however, pretending to solve all phenomena by matter and motion, assign no cause at all. Mind and understanding is the only true cause of orderly regularity; and he that asserts a plastic nature, asserts mental causality in the world; but the fortuitous Mechanists, who, exploding final causes, will not allow mind and understanding to have any influence at all upon the frame of things, can never possibly assign any cause of this grand phenomenon, unless confusion may be said to be the cause of order, and fortune or chance of constant regularity; and, therefore, themselves must resolve it into an occult quality. Nor, indeed,

does there appear any great reason, why such men should assert an infinite mind in the world, since they do not allow it to act any where at all, and therefore must needs make it to be in vain.

B. Now, this plastic nature being a thing, which is not without some difficulty in the conception of it, we shall here endeavour to do these two things concerning it: first, to set down a right representation thereof; and then afterwards to shew how extremely the notion of it hath been mistaken, perverted, and abused by those Atheists, who would make it to be the only God Almighty, or first principle of all things.

How the plastic nature is in general to be conceived, Aristotle instructs us in these words: * *εἰ ἐν ἑν ἐν τῷ ὕλῳ ἡ παντὶ γὰρ ἐκείνῳ* *ὡς ἂν τῇ φύσει ἐποικίῃ*. If the naupegeical art, that is, the art of the shipwright, were in the timber itself operatively and effectually, it would there act just as nature doth.—And the case is the same for all other arts. If the œcodomical art, which is in the mind of the architect, were supposed to be transfused into the stones, bricks, and mortar, there acting upon them in such a manner as to make them come together of themselves, and range themselves into the form of a complete edifice, as Amphion was said, by his harp, to have made the stones move, and place themselves orderly of their own accord, and so to have built the walls of Thebes; or if the musical art were conceived to be immediately in the instruments and strings, animating them as a living soul, and making them to move exactly, according to the laws of harmony, without any external impulse; these, and such like instances,

* Phys. I. 2.

o. 8, pag. 447.

tom. I. oper.

in Aristotle's judgment, would be fit iconisms or representations of the plastic nature, that being art itself acting immediately upon the matter as an inward principle in it. To which purpose the same philosopher adds, that this thing might be further illustrated by another instance or resemblance: *μάλιστα δὲ δῆλον, ὅταν τις ἰατρῆσαι αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν, τοῦτε γὰρ ἴσκειν ἢ φύσει.* Nature may be yet more clearly resembled to the medicinal art, when it is employed by the physician in curing himself.—So that the meaning of this philosopher is, that nature is to be conceived as art, acting not from without and at a distance, but immediately upon the thing itself which is formed by it. And thus we have the first general conception of the plastic nature, that it is art itself, acting immediately on the matter as an inward principle.

§. In the next place, we are to observe, that though the plastic nature be a kind of art, yet there are some considerable pre-eminences which it hath above human art; the first whereof is this, that whereas human art cannot act upon the matter otherwise than from without and at a distance, nor communicate itself to it, but with a great deal of tumult and hurliburly, noise and clatter, it using hands and axes, saws and hammers, and after this manner, with much ado, by knockings and thrustings, slowly introducing its form or idea (as, for example, of a ship or house) into the materials; nature, in the mean time, is another kind of art, which, insinuating itself immediately into things themselves, and there acting more commandingly upon the matter as an inward principle, does its work easily, cleverly, and silently. Nature is art as it were incorporated and embo-

died in matter, which doth not act upon it from without mechanically, but from within

Pl. En. 3.1.8. sec.1. p. 344. vitally and magically; οὐτε χεῖρες ἐνταῦθα,

οὐτε πόδες, οὐτε τι ὄργανον ἐπακτόν ἢ σύμφυτον,

ἄλλης δὲ δεῖ ἐφ' ἧς ποιήσει, καὶ ἣν ἐν εἶδει ποιεῖ, πάντεσσιν

δῆλον. δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ μοχλεῖν ἀφελεῖν ἐκ τῆς φυσικῆς ποιή-

σεως. ποῖος γὰρ ὠθισμός, ἢ τις μοχλεία, &c. Here are

no hands, nor feet, nor any instrument, connate

or adventitious, there being only need of matter to

work upon, and to be brought into a certain form,

and nothing else. For it is manifest that the ope-

ration of nature is different from mechanism, it

doing not its work by trusion or pulsion, by knock-

ings or thrustings, as if it were without that which

it wrought upon.—But as God is inward to every

thing, so nature acts immediately upon the matter,

as an inward and living soul, or law in it.

10. Another pre-eminence of nature above hu-

man art is this, that whereas human artists are

often to seek and at a loss, and therefore consult

and deliberate, as also upon second thoughts mend

their former work; nature, on the contrary, is ne-

ver to seek what to do, nor at a stand; and for

that reason also (besides another that will be sug-

gested afterwards) it doth never consult nor deli-

berate. Indeed Aristotle intimates, as if this had

been the grand objection of the old Atheistic phi-

losophers against the plastic nature, that because

we do not see natural bodies to consult or delibe-

rate, therefore there could be nothing of art, coun-

sel, or contrivance in them; but all came to pass

fortuitously.—But he confutes it after

this manner: "Αποπον δὲ τὸ μὴ οἰεσθαι ἕνεκά

του γίνεσθαι, εἰν μὴ ἴδωσι τὸ κινεῖν βουλευσά-

μενον, καὶ τοὶ καὶ ἡ τέχνη οὐ βουλευέται. It is

Phys. 1. 2. c. 8. p. 477. tom. 1. oper.

absurd for men to think nothing to be done for ends, if they do not see that which moves to consult, although art itself doth not consult.— Whence he concludes, that nature may act artificially, orderly, and methodically, for the sake of ends, though it never consult or deliberate. Indeed human artists themselves do not consult properly as they are artists, but whenever they do it, it is for want of art, and because they are to seek, their art being imperfect and adventitious : but art itself, or perfect art, is never to seek, and therefore doth never consult or deliberate ; and nature is this art, which never hesitates nor studies, as unresolved what to do, but is always readily prompted ; nor does it ever repent afterwards of what it had formerly done, or go about, as it were, upon second thoughts, to alter and mend its former course ; but it goes on in one constant unrepenting tenor, from generation to generation, because it is the stamp or impress of that infallibly omniscient art of the Divine understanding, which is the very law and rule of what is simply the best in every thing.

And thus we have seen the difference between nature and human art : that the latter is imperfect art, acting upon the matter from without, and at a distance ; but the former is art itself, or perfect art, acting as an inward principle in it. Wherefore, when art is said to imitate nature, the meaning thereof is, that imperfect human art imitates that perfect art of nature, which is really no other than the Divine art itself ; as, before Aristotle, Plato had declared in his *Sophist*,* in these

* P. 168. oper.

words: τὰ φύσιν λεγόμενα ποιῶνται θεῷ τέχνη. These things, which are said to be done by nature, are indeed done by Divine art. —

11. Notwithstanding which, we are to take notice in the next place, that as nature is not the Deity itself, but a thing very remote from it, and far below it, so neither is it the Divine art, as it is in itself pure and abstract, but concrete and embodied only; for the Divine art considered in itself, is nothing but knowledge, understanding, or wisdom in the mind of God. Now knowledge and understanding, in its own nature, is *κεχωρισμένον* τι, a certain separate and abstract thing,—and of so subtile and refined a nature, as that it is not capable of being incorporated with matter, or mingled and blended with it, as the soul of it. And therefore Aristotle's second instance, which he propounds as most pertinent to illustrate this business of nature by, namely, of the physician's art curing himself, is not so adequate thereunto; because when the medicinal art cures the physician, in whom it is, it doth not there act as nature, that is, as concrete and embodied art, but as knowledge and understanding only, which is art naked, abstract, and unbodied; as also it doth its work ambagiously, by the physician's willing and prescribing to himself the use of such medicaments, as do but conduce, by removing of impediments, to help that, which is nature indeed, or the inward archeus, to effect the cure. Art is defined by Aristotle* to be λόγος τοῦ ἔργου ἀνευ ὕλης, the reason of the thing without matter;—and so the Divine art or knowledge in the mind of God, is unbodied reason; but nature is *ratio mersa et confusa*,

* De Partib. Animal. lib. i. cap. i. p. 472. tom. ii. oper.

reason immersed and plunged into matter, and, as it were, fuddled in it, and confounded with it. Nature is not the Divine art archetypal, but only ectypal; it is a living stamp or signature of the Divine wisdom; which, though it act exactly according to its archetype, yet it doth not at all comprehend nor understand the reason of what itself doth. And the difference between these two may be resembled to that between the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος, the reason of the mind and conception,—called *verbum mentis*, and the λόγος προφορικὸς, the reason of external speech;—the latter of which, though it bear a certain stamp and impress of the former upon it, yet itself is nothing but articulate sound devoid of all understanding and sense. Or else we may illustrate this business by another similitude, comparing the Divine art and wisdom to an architect, but nature to a manuary opificer; the difference betwixt which two is thus set forth by Aristotle pertinently to our purpose:

τοὺς ἀρχιτέκτονας περὶ ἕκαστον τιμιωτέρους καὶ Met. l. i. c. 1.
p. 360. tom.
iv. oper. μᾶλλον εἶδέναι νομίζομεν τῶν χειροτέχνων, καὶ

σοφωτέρους, ὅτι τὰς αἰτίας τῶν ποιουμένων ἴσασιν.

οἱ δ' ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ἀψύχων ἓνα, ποιῇ μὲν, οὐκ εἰδότες δὲ ποιεῖ, οἷον καὶ τὸ πῦρ. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἀψύχα φύσει τιμὴν ποιεῖν τούτων ἕκαστον· τοὺς δὲ χειροτέχνους δὲ ἔθος. We account the architects in every thing more honourable than the manuary opificers, because they understand the reason of things done; whereas the other, as some inanimate things, only do, not knowing what they do; the difference between them being only this, that inanimate things act by a certain nature in them, but the manuary opificer by habit.—Thus nature may be called the χειροτέχνης, or manuary opificer, that acts subserviently under the archi-

tectonical art and wisdom of the Divine understanding, ἡ ποιεῖ μὲν οὐκ εἰδύια, which does do without knowing the reason of what it doth.—

12. Wherefore, as we did before observe the pre-eminences of nature above human art, so we must here take notice also of the imperfections and defects of it, in which respect it falls short of human art, which are likewise two; and the first of them is this, that though it act artificially for the sake of ends, yet itself doth neither intend those ends, nor understand the reason of that it doth. Nature is not master of that consummate art and wisdom, according to which it acts, but only a servant to it, and a drudging executioner of the dictates of it. This difference betwixt nature

En. 4. 1. 4.

c. 13. p. 467.

and abstract art or wisdom is expressed by Plotinus in these words: τί διείσι τῆς λεγομένης φύσεως φρόνησις; ὅτι ἡ μὲν φρόνησις πρῶτον, ἡ δὲ φύσις ἔσχατον, ἰνδαλμα γὰρ φρονήσεως ἡ φύσις, καὶ ψυχῆς ἔσχατον ὂν, ἔσχατον καὶ τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ ἐλλαμπόμενον λόγον ἔχει. οἷον εἰ ἐν κηρῷ βαθεῖ, δακνέιτο ὡς ἔσχατον ἐπὶ θάτερα ἐν τῇ ἐπιφανείᾳ τύπος· ἐνέργει μὲν ὄντος τοῦ ἄνω, ἰχνεὺς δὲ ἀσθενοῦς ὄντος τοῦ κάτω, ὅθεν οὐδὲ οἶδε φύσις, μόνον δὲ ποιεῖ. How doth wisdom differ from that which is called nature? verily in this manner, that wisdom is the first thing, but nature the last and lowest; for nature is but an image or imitation of wisdom, the last thing of the soul, which hath the lowest impress of reason shining upon it; as when a thick piece of wax is thoroughly impressed upon by a seal, that impress, which is clean and distinct in the superior superficies of it, will in the lower side be weak and obscure; and such is the stamp

* Plotin. libro utrum Stellæ aliquid agant. Ennead. ii. lib. iii. cap. xvii. p. 147.

and signature of nature, compared with that of wisdom and understanding, nature being a thing, which doth only do, but not know.—And elsewhere the same writer declares the difference between the spermatic λόγοι, or reasons, and knowledges or conceptions of the mind in this

manner: Πότερα δὲ οἱ λόγοι οὗτοι οἱ ἐν ψυχῇ En. 2. l. 3.
s. 17. p. 147. νοήματα; ἀλλὰ πῶς κατὰ τὰ νοήματα ποιήσει;

ὁ γὰρ λόγος ἐν ὕλῃ ποιῇ, καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν φυσικῶς, οὐ νόησις, οὐδὲ ὄρασις, ἀλλὰ δύναμις τρεπτικὴ τῆς ὕλης, οὐκ ἔδωτα, ἀλλὰ δρῶσα μόνον, οἷον τύπον καὶ σχῆμα ἐν ὕδατι. Whether are these plastic reasons or forms in the soul knowledges? but how shall it then act according to those knowledges? for the plastic reason or form acts or works in matter, and that which acts naturally is not intellection nor vision, but a certain power of moving matter, which doth not know, but only do, and makes as it were a stamp or figure in water.

And with this doctrine of the ancients, a modern judicious writer, and sagacious inquirer into nature, seems fully to agree, that nature is such a thing as doth not know, but only do; for after he had admired that wisdom and art, by which the bodies of animals are framed, he concludes that one or other of these two things must needs be acknowledged, that either the vegetative or plastic power of the soul, by which it fabricates and organizes its own body, is more excellent and Divine than the rational; or Harv. de
Gen. Ani-
mal. Ex. 49. else, “In naturæ operibus neque prudentiam nec intellectum inesse, sed ita solum videri conceptui nostro, qui secundum artes nostras et facultates, seu exemplaria a nobismetipsis mutuata, de rebus naturæ divinis judi-

camus; quasi principia naturæ activa effectus suos eo modo producerent, quo nos opera nostra artificialia solemus." That in the works of nature there is neither prudence nor understanding, but only it seems so to our apprehensions, who judge of these Divine things of nature according to our own arts and faculties, and patterns borrowed from ourselves; as if the active principles of nature did produce their effects in the same manner as we do our artificial works.—Wherefore we conclude, agreeably to the sense of the best philosophers, both ancient and modern, that nature is such a thing, as, though it act artificially, and for the sake of ends, yet it doth but ape and mimic the Divine art and wisdom, itself not understanding those ends which it acts for, nor the reason of what it doth in order to them; for which cause also it is not capable of consultation or deliberation, nor can it act electively, or with discretion.

13. But because this may seem strange at the first sight, that nature should be said to act *in* *pro* *pos* *it* *o* *n* *e*, for the sake of ends,—and regularly or artificially, and yet be itself devoid of knowledge and understanding, we shall therefore endeavour to persuade the possibility, and facilitate the belief of it, by some other instances; and first by that of habits, particularly those musical ones of singing, playing upon instruments, and dancing. Which habits direct every motion of the hand, voice, and body, and prompt them readily, without any deliberation or studied consideration, what the next following note or motion should be. If you jog a sleeping musician, and sing but the first words of a song to him, which he had either himself composed, or learned before, he will presently take it

from you, and that perhaps before he is thoroughly awake, going on with it, and singing out the remainder of the whole song to the end. Thus the fingers of an exercised lutanist, and the legs and whole body of a skilful dancer, are directed to move regularly and orderly, in a long train and series of motions, by those artificial habits in them, which do not themselves at all comprehend those laws and rules of music or harmony, by which they are governed. So that the same thing may be said of these habits, which was said before of nature, that they do not know, but only do. And thus we see there is no reason, why this plastic nature (which is supposed to move body regularly and artificially) should be thought to be an absolute impossibility, since habits do, in like manner, gradually evolve themselves in a long train or series of regular and artificial motions, readily prompting the doing of them, without comprehending that art and reason, by which they are directed. The forementioned philosopher illustrates the seminary reason and plastic nature of the universe, by this very instance : ἡ τοίνυν ἐνέργεια αὐτῆς τεχνικὴ ὡςπερ ἀνὸς ὀρχούμενος, κινούμενος εἶη. ὁ γὰρ ὀρχιστής, τῇ οὕτω τεχνικῇ ζωῇ ἔοικεν αὐτός, καὶ ἡ τέχνη αὐτὸν κινεῖ, καὶ οὕτω κινεῖ, ὡς τῆς ζωῆς αὐτῆς τοιαύτης πῶς οὕσης.

En. 3. l. 2.
c. 16. p. 267.
oper.

The energy of nature is artificial, as when a dancer moves ; for a dancer resembles this artificial life of nature, forasmuch as art itself moves him, and so moves him as being such a life in him.—And agreeably to this conceit, the ancient mythologists represented the nature of the universe, by Pan playing upon a pipe or harp, and being in love with the nymph, Echo ; as if nature did, by a kind

of silent melody, make all the parts of the universe every where dance in measure and proportion, itself being, as it were, in the mean time, delighted and ravished with the re-echoing of its own harmony. Habits are said to be an adventitious and acquired nature, and nature was before defined by the Stoics^a to be *ἔξω*, or a habit: so that there seems to be no other difference between these two, than this, that whereas the one is acquired by teaching, industry, and exercise; the other, as was expressed by Hippocrates,^b is *ἀπαιδευτος καὶ οὐκ μαθούσα*, unlearned and untaught,—and may in some sense also be said to be *αὐτοδιδακτος*, self-taught,—though she be indeed always inwardly prompted, secretly whispered into, and inspired by the Divine art and wisdom.

14. Moreover, that something may act artificially and for ends, without comprehending the reason of what it doth, may be further evinced from those natural instincts that are in animals, which without knowledge direct them to act regularly, in order both to their own good, and the good of the universe. As for example: the bees in mellification, and in framing their combs and hexagonal cells, the spiders in spinning their webs, the birds in building their nests, and many other animals in such like actions of their's, which would seem to argue a great sagacity in them, whereas, notwithstanding, as Aristotle observes,^c *οὔτε τέχνη, οὔτε ζητήσαντα, οὔτε βουλευσάμενα ποιεῖ*. They do these things, neither by art, nor by counsel, nor by any

^a Apud Diogen. Laert. lib. vii. segm. 148. p. 459.

^b Epidemicor. lib. vi. sect. v. p. 509. tom. i. edit. Vander Linden. Vide etiam eundem *πρὶ τρεπτε*. Seco: viii. p. 597. tom. i. oper.

^c Physicor. lib. ii. cap. x. p. 426. tom. i. oper.

deliberation of their own ;—and, therefore, are not masters of that wisdom, according to which they act, but only passive to the instincts and impresses thereof upon them. And indeed to affirm, that brute animals do all these things by a knowledge of their own, and which themselves are masters of, and that without deliberation and consultation, were to make them to be endued with a most perfect intellect, far transcending that of human reason ; whereas it is plain enough, that brutes are not above consultation, but below it, and that these instincts of nature in them are nothing but a kind of fate upon them.

15. There is, in the next place, another imperfection to be observed in the plastic nature, that as it doth not comprehend the reason of its own action, so neither is it clearly and expressly conscious of what it doth ; in which respect, it doth not only fall short of human art, but even of that very manner of acting, which is in brutes themselves, who, though they do not understand the reason of those actions, that their natural instincts lead them to, yet they are generally conceived to be conscious of them, and to do them by fancy ; whereas, the plastic nature in the formation of plants and animals seems to have no animal fancy, no express συναίσθησις, con-sense, or consciousness of what it doth. Thus the often commended philosopher : ἡ φύσις οὐδὲ φαντασίαν ἔχει, ἡ δὲ νόησις φαντασίας κρείττων, φαντασία δὲ μεταξύ φύσεως τύπου καὶ νοήσεως· ἡ μὲν γὰρ οὐθένος ἀντιληψιν οὐδὲ σύνεσιν ἔχει. Nature hath not so much as any fancy in it ; as intellection and knowledge is a thing superior to fancy, so fancy is superior to the impress of nature, for nature hath no

En. 4. l. 4.
s. 13. lib. ii.
de Dubitat.
Animæ.
p. 407.

apprehension nor conscious perception of any thing. In a word, nature is a thing, that hath no such self-perception or self-enjoyment in it, as animals have.

16. Now we are well aware, that this is a thing, which the narrow principles of some late philosophers will not admit of, that there should be any action distinct from local motion besides expressly conscious cogitation. For they making the first general heads of all entity to be extension and cogitation, or extended being and cogitative; and then supposing, that the essence of cogitation consists in express consciousness, must needs by this means exclude such a plastic life of nature, as we speak of, that is supposed to act without animal fancy or express consciousness. Wherefore, we conceive, that the first heads of being ought rather to be expressed thus; resisting or antitypous extension, and life, (i. e. internal energy and self-activity;) and then again, that life or internal self-activity is to be subdivided into such as either acts with express consciousness and synæsthesis, or such as is without it; the latter of which is this plastic life of nature: so that there may be an action distinct from local motion, or a vital energy, which is not accompanied with that fancy, or consciousness, that is in the energies of the animal life; that is, there may be a simple internal energy, or vital autokinesy, which is without that duplication, that is included in the nature of *συναίσθησις*, con-sense and consciousness,—which makes a being to be present with itself, attentive to its own actions, or animadversive of them, to perceive itself to do or suffer, and to have a fruition or enjoyment of itself. And indeed it must be granted,

that what moves matter or determines the motion of it vitally, must needs do it by some other energy of its own, as it is reasonable also to conceive, that itself hath some vital sympathy with that matter, which it acts upon. But we apprehend, that both these may be without clear and express consciousness. Thus the philosopher:

πᾶσα ζωὴ ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἡ φαύλη, ἐνέργεια δὲ, En. 3. l. 2.
c. 16. lib. i.
de Provid.
p. 367.
οὐχ ὡς τὸ πῦρ ἐνεργεῖ, ἀλλ' ἡ ἐνέργεια αὐτῆς,
κἂν μὴ αἰσθησίς τις παρῇ, κίνησις τις οὐκ εἰκῇ.

Every life is energy, even the worst of lives, and therefore that of nature; whose energy is not like that of fire, but such an energy, as though there be no sense belonging to it, yet is it not temerarious or fortuitous, but orderly and regular.—

Wherefore this controversy, whether the energy of the plastic nature be cogitation or no, seems to be but a logomachy, or contention about words. For if clear and express consciousness be supposed to be included in cogitation, then it must needs be granted, that cogitation doth not belong to the plastic life of nature; but if the notion of that word be enlarged, so as to comprehend all action distinct from local motion, and to be of equal extent with life, then the energy of nature is cogitation.

Nevertheless, if any one think fit to attribute some obscure and imperfect sense or perception, different from that of animals, to the energy of nature, and will therefore call it a kind of drowsy, unawakened, or astonished cogitation, the philosopher before mentioned will not very much gainsay it: Εἴτις βούληται σύνεσιν En. 3. lib. 8.
s. 3. Libro
de Natura,
contemplat.
et uno, p.
345. s.
τινα ἢ αἰσθῆσιν αὐτῇ δίδόναι, οὐχ οἷαν λέγομεν
ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τὴν αἰσθῆσιν ἢ τὴν σύνεσιν,
ἀλλ' οἷον εἴτις τὴν τοῦ ὕπνου τῇ τοῦ ἐγρηγορότος

προσεκτικῶς. If any will needs attribute some kind of apprehension or sense to nature, then it must not be such a sense or apprehension, as is in animals, but something that differs as much from it, as the sense or cogitation of one in a profound sleep differs from that of one who is awake.— And since it cannot be denied, but that the plastic nature hath a certain dull and obscure idea of that, which it stamps and prints upon matter, the same philosopher* himself sticks not to call this idea of nature, θέαμα and θεώρημα, a spectacle and contemplamen, as likewise the energy of nature towards it, θεωρία ἄφωτος, a silent contemplation; —nay, he allows, that nature may be said to be, in some sense, φιλοθεάμων, a lover of spectacles or contemplation.—

17. However, that there may be some vital energy without clear and express συναίσθησις, conscience and consciousness, animadversion, attention, or self-perception, seems reasonable upon several accounts. For, first, those philosophers themselves, who make the essence of the soul to consist in cogitation, and again, the essence of cogitation in clear and express consciousness, cannot render it any way probable, that the souls of men in all profound sleeps, lethargies, and apoplexies, as also of embryos in the womb, from their very first arrival thither, are never so much as one moment without expressly conscious cogitations; which, if they were, according to the principles of their philosophy, they must, *ipso facto*, cease to have any being. Now, if the souls of men and animals be at any time without con-

* Ubi supra.

consciousness and self-perception, then it must needs be granted, that clear and express consciousness is not essential to life. There is some appearance of life and vital sympathy in certain vegetables and plants, which, however called sensitive-plants and plant-animals, cannot well be supposed to have animal sense and fancy, or express consciousness in them; although we are not ignorant, in the mean time, how some endeavour to solve all those phenomena mechanically. It is certain, that our human souls themselves are not always conscious of whatever they have in them; for even the sleeping geometrician hath, at that time, all his geometrical theorems and knowledges some way in him; as also the sleeping musician, all his musical skill and songs; and, therefore, why may it not be possible for the soul to have likewise some actual energy in it, which it is not expressly conscious of? We have all experience, of our doing many animal actions non-attendingly, which we reflect upon afterwards; as, also, that we often continue a long series of bodily motions, by a mere virtual intention of our minds, and as it were by half a cogitation. That vital sympathy, by which our soul is united and tied fast, as it were with a knot, to the body, is a thing that we have no direct consciousness of, but only in its effects. Nor can we tell, how we come to be so differently affected in our souls, from the many different motions made upon our bodies. As, likewise, we are not conscious to ourselves of that energy, whereby we impress variety of motions and figurations upon the animal spirits of our brain in our fantastic thoughts. For, though the geometrician perceive himself to make lines,

triangles, and circles in the dust with his finger, yet he is not aware, how he makes all those same figures first upon the corporeal spirits of his brain, from whence, notwithstanding, as from a glass, they are reflected to him, fancy being rightly concluded by Aristotle^a to be a weak and obscure sense. There is also another more interior kind of plastic power in the soul (if we may so call it), whereby it is formative of its own cogitations, which itself is not always conscious of; as when, in sleep or dreams, it frames interlocutory discourses betwixt itself and other persons, in a long series, with coherent sense and apt connections, in which oftentimes it seems to be surprised with unexpected answers and repartees, though itself were all the while the poet and inventor of the whole fable. Not only our nictations for the most part when we are awake, but also our nocturnal volutations in sleep, are performed with very little or no consciousness. Respiration, or that motion of the diaphragma and other muscles which causes it (there being no sufficient mechanical account of it), may well be concluded to be always a vital motion, though it be not always animal; since no man can affirm, that he is perpetually conscious to himself of that energy of his soul, which does produce it when he is awake, much less when asleep. And, lastly, the Cartesian^b attempts to solve the motion of the heart mechanically, seem to be abundantly confuted by autopsy and experiment, evincing the systole of the heart to be a muscular constriction, caused

^a Lib. iii. de Anima, cap. iii. iv. p. 45. s. tom. ii. oper.

^b Vide Cartes. Libr. de Homine et de Formatione Fœtus, p. ii. p. 195. s.

by some vital principle, to make which, nothing but a pulsific corporeal quality in the substance of the heart itself, is very unphilosophical and absurd. Now, as we have no voluntary imperium at all upon the systole and diastole of the heart, so are we not conscious to ourselves of any energy of our own soul that causes them; and therefore we may reasonably conclude from hence also, that there is some vital energy, without animal fancy or synæsthesis, express consciousness and self-perception.

18. Wherefore, the plastic nature, acting neither by knowledge nor by animal fancy, neither electively nor hormetically, must be concluded to act fatally, magically, and sympathetically. And thus that curious and diligent inquirer into nature, before commended, resolves: "*Natura tanquam fato quodam, seu manda-* Harvey de
Gen. An.
to secundum leges operante, movet;"

Nature moveth as it were by a kind of fate or command, acting according to laws.—Fate, and the laws or commands of the Deity, concerning the mundane economy (they being really the same thing), ought not to be looked upon, neither as verbal things, nor as mere will and cogitation in the mind of God, but as an energetical and effectual principle, constituted by the Deity, for the bringing of things decreed to pass. The Aphrodisian philosopher,* with others of the ancients, have concluded, that fate and nature are but two different names for one and the same thing; and that *τότε εἰμασμένον κατὰ φύσιν καὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν εἰμασμένον*, both that which is done fatally is done naturally, and also whatever is done naturally is

* *Libr. de Fato*, sec. 6. p. 25. edit. London.

done fatally:—but that which we assert in this place is only this, that the plastic nature may be said to be the true and proper fate of matter, or the corporeal world. Now, that which acts not by any knowledge or fancy, will or appetite, of its own, but only fatally, according to laws and impresses made upon it (but differently in different cases), may be said also to act magically and sympathetically. Ἡ ἀληθινὴ μαγεία (saith the philosopher*) ἡ ἐν τῷ παντὶ φιλία καὶ νεῖκος, The true magic is the friendship and discord that is in the universe.—And again, magic is said to be founded, ἐν τῇ συμπαθείᾳ καὶ τῇ τῶν δυνάμεων τῶν πολλῶν ποικιλίᾳ πρὸς ἐν ζῶων συντελούντων, in the sympathy and variety of diverse powers conspiring together into one animal.—Of which passages, though the principal meaning seem to be this, that the ground of magical fascinations is one vital unitive principle in the universe; yet they imply also, that there is a certain vital energy, not in the way of knowledge and fancy, will and animal appetite, but fatally sympathetical and magical. As, indeed, that mutual sympathy, which we have constant experience of, betwixt our soul and our body (being not a material and mechanical, but vital thing), may be called also magical.

19. From what hath been hitherto declared concerning the plastic nature, it may appear, that though it be a thing that acts for ends artificially, and which may be also called the Divine art, and the fate of the corporeal world; yet, for all that, it is neither god nor goddess, but a low and imperfect creature. Forasmuch as it is not master

* Plotin. lib. ii. de Dubit. Animæ, Ennead. iv. lib. v. cap. xl. p. 434.

of that reason and wisdom, according to which it acts, nor does it properly intend those ends, which it acts for; nor, indeed, is it expressly conscious of what it doth, it not knowing, but only doing, according to commands and laws impressed upon it. Neither of which things ought to seem strange or incredible, since nature may as well act regularly and artificially, without any knowledge and consciousness of its own, as forms of letters compounded together may print coherent philosophic sense, though they understand nothing at all; and it may also act for the sake of those ends, that are not intended by itself, but some higher being, as well as the saw or hatchet in the hand of the architect or mechanic

doth: τὸ σκέπαρνον ἐνεκά τοῦ πελεκᾶ, ἀλλ' οὐ προλογιζόμενον, ἀλλὰ τῷ προλογιζομένῳ ὑπηρετοῦν; the axe cuts for the sake of some-

Simplie. in
Arist. Phys.
l. 2. p. 33.
edit. Græc.

thing, though itself does not ratiocinate, nor intend nor design any thing, but is only subservient to that which does so.—It is true, that our human actions are not governed by such exact reason, art; and wisdom, nor carried on with such constancy, evenness, and uniformity, as the actions of nature are; notwithstanding which, since we act according to a knowledge of our own, and are masters of that wisdom, by which our actions are directed, since we do not act fatally only, but electively and intendingly, with consciousness and self-perception, the rational life that is in us ought to be accounted a much higher and more noble perfection than that plastic life of nature. Nay, this plastic nature is so far from being the first and highest life, that it is indeed the last and lowest of all lives, it being really the same thing with the

vegetative, which is inferior to the sensitive. The difference betwixt nature and wisdom was before observed, that wisdom is the first and highest thing, but nature the last and lowest; this latter being but an umbratile imitation of the former. And to this purpose, this plastic nature is further described by the same philosopher, in these

words: *ἔστι ταίνυν οὗτος ὁ λόγος οὐκ ἄκρατος νοῦς, οὐδ' αὐτονοῦς, οὐδέγε ψυχῆς καθαρᾶς τὸ γένος· ἡρτημένος δὲ ἐκείνης, καὶ οἶον ἐκλαμψις ἐξ ἀμφοῖν νοῦ καὶ ψυχῆς, καὶ ψυχῆς κατὰ νοῦν*

διακειμένης γεννησάντων τὸν λόγον τοῦτον. The spermatic reason or plastic nature is no pure mind or perfect intellect, nor any kind of pure soul neither; but something which depends upon it, being as it were an effulgency or radiation from both together, mind and soul, or soul affected according to mind, generating the same as a lower kind of life.—

And though this plastic nature contain no small part of Divine providence in it; yet, since it is a thing that cannot act electively nor with discretion, it must needs be granted, that there is a higher and Diviner providence than this, which also presides over the corporeal world itself; which was a thing likewise insisted

upon by that philosopher: *Γίνεται τὰ ἐν τῷ παντὶ οὐ κατὰ σπερματικούς, ἀλλὰ κατὰ λόγους περιληπτικούς, καὶ τῶν προτέρων, ἢ κατὰ τοὺς τῶν σπερμαλόγων λόγους, οὐ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς σπερματικοῖς λόγοις ἐνι, καὶ τῶν γενομένων, παρὰ τοὺς σπερματικούς αὐτοὺς λόγους.*

The things in the world are not administered merely by spermatic reasons, but by perileptic (that is, comprehensive, intellectual reasons), which are in order of nature before

En. 3. l. 2.
c. 16. libr. i.
de Providen-
tia, p.
267.

En. 4. l. 4.
c. 39. libr.
ii. de Dub.
Animæ, p.
433.

the other, because in the spermiatic reasons cannot be contained that which is contrary to them, &c.—Where, though this philosopher may extend his spermiatic reasons further than we do our plastic nature in this place (which is only confined to the motions of matter), yet he concludes, that there is a higher principle presiding over the universe than this. So that it is not *ratio mersa et confusa*, a reason drowned in matter, and confounded with it,—which is the supreme governor of the world, but a providence perfectly intellectual, abstract, and released.

20. But, though the plastic nature be the lowest of all lives, nevertheless, since it is a life, it must needs be incorporeal; all life being such. For body being nothing but antitypous extension, or resisting bulk, nothing but mere outside, *aliud extra aliud*, together with passive capability, hath no internal energy, self-activity, or life belonging to it; it is not able so much as to move itself, and therefore much less can it artificially direct its own motion. Moreover, in the efformation of the bodies of animals, it is one and the self-same thing that directs the whole. That which contrives and frames the eye, cannot be a distinct thing from that which frames the ear; nor that which makes the hand, from that which makes the foot; the same thing, which delineates the veins, must also form the arteries; and that which fabricates the nerves, must also project the muscles and joints; it must be the same thing that designs and organizes the heart and brain, with such communications betwixt them; one and the self-same thing must needs have in it the entire idea, and the complete model or platform of the

whole organic body. For the several parts of matter distant from one another, acting alone by themselves, without any common directrix, being not able to confer together, nor communicate with each other, could never possibly conspire to make up one such uniform and orderly system or compages, as the body of every animal is. The same is to be said likewise concerning the plastic nature of the whole corporeal universe, in which *ἅπαντα πρὸς ἓν συντίθεται*, all things are ordered together conspiringly into one.—It must be one and the same thing, which formeth the whole, or else it could never have fallen into such an uniform order and harmony. Now that which is one and the same, acting upon several distant parts of matter, cannot be corporeal.

Indeed Aristotle is severely censured by some learned men for this, that though he talk every where of such a nature as acts regularly, artificially, and methodically, in order to the best, yet he does no where positively declare, whether this nature of his be corporeal or incorporeal, substantial or accidental; which yet is the less to be wondered at in him, because he does not clearly determine these same points concerning the rational soul neither, but seems to stagger uncertainly about them. In the mean time it cannot be denied, but that Aristotle's followers do for the most part conclude this nature of his to be corporeal; whereas, notwithstanding, according to the principles of this philosophy, it cannot possibly be such: for there is nothing else attributed to body in it, besides these three, matter, form, and accidents; neither of which can be the Aristotelic nature. First, it cannot be matter; because nature, ac-

cording to Aristotle, is supposed to be the principle of motion and activity, which matter in itself is devoid of. Moreover, Aristotle concludes,* that they, who assign only a material cause, assign no cause at all τοῦ εἶ καὶ καλῶς, of well and fit, of that regular and artificial frame of things which is ascribed to nature; upon both which accounts, it is determined by that philosopher,† that ἡ φύσις μᾶλλον ἀρχὴ καὶ αἰτία τῆς ὕλης, nature is more a principle and cause than matter;—and therefore it cannot be one and the same thing with it. Again, it is as plain, that Aristotle's nature cannot be the forms of particular bodies neither, as vulgar Peripatetics seem to conceive, these being all generated and produced by nature, and as well corruptible as generable. Whereas nature is such a thing as is neither generated nor corrupted, it being the principle and cause of all generation and corruption. To make nature, and the material forms of bodies, to be one and the self-same thing, is all one, as if one should make the seal (with the stamper too) to be one and the same thing with the signature upon the wax. And, lastly, Aristotle's nature can least of all be the accidents or qualities of bodies; because these act only in virtue of their substance, neither can they exercise any active power over the substance itself in which they are; whereas the plastic nature is a thing that domineers over the substance of the whole corporeal universe, and which, subordinately to the Deity, put both heaven and earth in this frame in which now it is. Wherefore,

* Metaphys. lib. i. cap. iii. p. 266. tom. iv. oper.

† De Partib. Animal. lib. i. cap. i. p. 475. tom. ii. oper. Vide etiam Physicor. lib. ii. cap. i. p. 462.

since Aristotle's nature can be neither the matter, nor the forms, nor the accidents of bodies, it is plain, that, according to his own principles, it must be incorporeal.

21. Now, if the plastic nature be incorporeal, then it must of necessity be either an inferior power or faculty of some soul, which is also conscious, sensitive, or rational; or else a lower substantial life by itself, devoid of animal consciousness. The Platonists seem to affirm both these together, namely, that there is a plastic nature lodged in all particular souls of animals, brutes, and men, and also that there is a general plastic or spermatic principle of the whole universe distinct from their higher mundane soul, though subordinate to it, and dependant upon it: * ἡ λεγομένη φύσις γέννημα ψυχῆς προτέρας δυνατώτερον ζωῆς, That which is called nature, is the offspring of an higher soul, which hath a more powerful life in it.—And though Aristotle do not so clearly acknowledge the incorporeity and substantiality of souls, yet he concurs very much with this Platonic doctrine, that nature is either a lower power, or faculty of some conscious soul, or else an inferior kind of life by itself, depending upon a superior soul.

And this we shall make to appear from
L. i. c. 1.
p. 470. s.
tom. ii. oper. his book *De Partibus Animalium*, after we have taken notice of some considerable preliminary passages in it in order thereunto. For having first declared, that besides the material cause, there are other causes also of natural generations, namely, these two, ἥτε οὐ ἕνεκα καὶ ὅθεν ἡ

* Plotin. Libr. de Natura, Contemplatione, et Uno, Ennead. iii. lib. viii. cap. iii. p. 345. oper.

ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως, that for whose sake (or the final cause), and that from which the principle of motion is,—or the efficient cause; he determines, that the former of these two is the principal: φαίνεται δὲ πρώτη ἢν λέγομεν ἐνεκά τινος. λόγος γὰρ οὗτος, ἀρχὴ δὲ ὁ λόγος, ὁμοίως, ἔντε τοῖς κατὰ τέχνην καὶ τοῖς φύσει συνιστηκόσιν. The chiefest of these two causes seems to be the final or the intending cause; for this is reason, and reason is alike a principle in artificial and in natural things.—Nay, the philosopher adds, excellently, that there is more of reason and art in the things of nature, than there is in those things that are artificially made by men: μάλλον δ' ἐστὶ τὸ οὐ ἐνεκα καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἐν τοῖς φύσεως ἔργοις, ἢ ἐν τοῖς τῆς τέχνης. There is more of final or intending causality, and of the reason of good, in the works of nature, than in those of human art.—After which he greatly complains of the first and most ancient physiologers, meaning thereby Anaximander, and those other Ionics before Anaxagoras, that they considered only τὴν ὕλην ἀρχήν, the material principle and cause of things,—without attending to those two other causes, the principle of motion, and that which aims at ends; they talking only of fire, water, air, and earth, and generating the whole world from the fortuitous concourse of these senseless bodies. But at length Aristotle falls upon Democritus, who, being junior to those others before-mentioned, philosophized after the same Atheistical manner, but in a new way of his own, by atoms; acknowledging no other nature, neither in the universe, nor in the bodies of animals, than that of fortuitous mechanism, and supposing all things to arise from the different compositions of magnitudes, figures,

sites, and motions. Of which Democritic philosophy he gives his censure in these following words: *εἰ μὲν οὖν τῷ σχήματι καὶ τῷ*

De Part. An.
lib. 1. c. 1.

χρῶματι ἱκαντόν ἐστι, τῶν τε ζώων καὶ τῶν μὀρίων, ὁρθῶς ἂν Δημόκριτος λέγοι, &c. If animals and their several parts did consist of nothing but figure and colour, then indeed Democritus would be in the right; but a dead man hath the same form and figure of body, that he had before, and yet for all that he is not a man; neither is a brazen or wooden hand a hand, but only equivocally, as a painted physician, or pipes made of stone, are so called. No member of a dead man's body is that which it was before, when he was alive, neither eye, nor hand, nor foot. Wherefore, this is but a rude way of philosophizing, and just as if a carpenter should talk of a wooden hand. For thus these physiologers declare the generations and causes of figures only, or the matter out of which things are made, as air and earth. Whereas, no artificer would think it sufficient to render such a cause of any artificial fabric, because the instrument happened to fall so upon the timber, that therefore it was hollow here, and plane there; but rather because himself made such strokes, and for such ends, &c.

Now, in the close of all, this philosopher at length declares, that there is another principle of corporeal things, besides the material, and such as is not only the cause of motion, but also acts artificially in order to ends, *ἔστι τι τοιοῦτον ὃ δὴ καὶ καλοῦμεν φύσιν*, there is such a thing as that which we call nature;—that is, not the fortuitous motion of senseless matter, but a plastic regular and artificial nature, such as acts for ends and good; de-

clarifying, in the same place, what this nature is; namely, that it is ψυχὴ, ἢ ψυχῆς μέρος, ἢ μὴ ἀνευ ψυχῆς, soul, or part of soul, or not without soul;—and from thence inferring, that it properly belongs to a physiologer, to treat concerning the soul also. But he concludes afterwards, οὐδὲ πᾶσα ψυχὴ φύσις, that the whole soul is not nature;—whence it remains, that, according to Aristotle's sense, nature is ἢ ψυχῆς μέρος, ἢ μὴ ἀνευ ψυχῆς, either part of a soul, or not without soul;—that is, either a lower part or faculty of some conscious soul; or else an inferior kind of life by itself, which is not without soul, but subordinate to it, and dependent on it.

22. As for the bodies of animals, Aristotle first resolves in general, that nature in them is either the whole soul, or else some part of it; φύσις ὡς ἡ κινουῖσα, καὶ ὡς τὸ τέλος τοῦ ζώου, ἥτοι πᾶσα ἢ ψυχὴ, ἢ μέρος τι αὐτῆς. Nature, as the moving principle, or as that which acts artificially for ends (so far as concerns the bodies of animals), is either the whole soul, or else some part of it.—But afterward he determines more particularly, that the plastic nature is not the whole soul in animals, but only some part of it; οὐ πᾶσα ψυχὴ φύσις, ἀλλὰ τι μέρος αὐτῆς, that is, nature in animals, properly so called, is some lower power or faculty lodged in their respective souls, whether sensitive or rational.

And that there is plastic nature in the souls of animals, the same Aristotle elsewhere affirms and proves after this manner: τί τὸ συνέχον εἰς τ' ἀναντία φερόμενα, τὸ πῦρ καὶ τὴν γῆν· διωσπασθήσεται γὰρ εἰ μή τι ἔσται τὸ κωλύ-
 σον, εἰδ' ἔστι, τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἡ ψυχὴ, καὶ τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ ἀξάνε-
 σθαι καὶ τρεφέσθαι. What is that, which, in the bo-

* De Partib. Animal. lib. i. cap. i. p. 473.

dies of animals, holds together such things as, of their own nature, would otherwise move contrary ways, and fly asunder, as fire and earth, which would be distracted and dissipated, the one tending upwards, the other downwards, were there not something to hinder them? Now if there be any such thing, this must be the soul, which is also the cause of nourishment and augmentation.—Where the philosopher adds, that though some were of opinion, that fire was that, which was the cause of nourishment and augmentation in animals, yet this was indeed but *συναίτιον πῶς, οὐ μὴν ἀπλῶς γε αἴτιον, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἡ ψυχὴ*, only the con-cause or instrument, and not simply the cause, but rather the soul.—And to the same pur-

De Resp. c. 8.
p. 141. tom.
ii. oper.

pose he philosophizeth elsewhere, *οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ πέψις δι' ἧς ἡ τροφή γίνεται τοῖς ζώοις οὔτε ἀνευ ψυχῆς, οὔτε θερμότητός ἐστι, περὶ γὰρ ἐργάζεται πάντα* Neither is concoction, by which nourishment is made in animals, done without the soul, nor without heat, for all things are done by fire.

And certainly it seems very agreeable to the phenomena, to acknowledge something in the bodies of animals superior to mechanism, as that may well be thought to be, which keeps the more fluid parts of them constantly in the same form and figure, so as not to be enormously altered in their growth by disproportionate nourishment; that, which restores flesh that was lost, consolidates dissolved continuities, incorporates the newly-received nourishment, and joins it continuously with the pre-existent parts of flesh and bone; which regenerates and repairs veins consumed or cut off; which causes dentition in so regular a manner, and that, not only in infants, but also adult

persons; that which casts off excrements, and dischargeth superfluities; which makes things seem ungrateful to an interior sense, that were notwithstanding pleasing to the taste: that nature of Hippocrates,* that is the curatrix of diseases, αἱ φύσεις τῶν νοσούντων ἰητροί, and that archeus of the chymists or Paracelsians, to which all medicaments are but subservient, as being able to effect nothing of themselves without it: I say, there seems to be such a principle as this in the bodies of animals, which is not mechanical but vital; and therefore, since entities are not to be multiplied without necessity, we may with Aristotle conclude it to be μέρος, or μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς, a certain part of the soul of those animals, or a lower unconscious power lodged in them.

23. Besides this plastic nature, which is in animals, forming their several bodies artificially, as so many microcosms, or little worlds, there must be also a general plastic nature in the macrocosm, the whole corporeal universe, that which makes all things thus to conspire every where, and agree together into one harmony. Concerning which plastic nature of the universe, the author *De Mundo*^b writes after this manner: καὶ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον διέκοσμησε μία ἢ διὰ πάντων διέκουσα δύναμις, one power passing through all things ordered and formed the whole world.—Again, he calls the same^c πνεῦμα, καὶ ἐμφυχόν, καὶ γόνιμον οὐσίαν, a spirit, and a living and generative nature;—and plainly declares it to be a thing distinct from the Deity, but subordinate to it and dependent on it. But Aristotle himself in that genuine work of his be-

* Epidemic. lib. vi. sect. v. p. 809. tom. i. oper. edit. Vander Linden.

^b Cap. v. p. 856. inter Arist. opera, tom. i. ^c Ib. cap. iv. p. 852.

fore-mentioned, speaks clearly and positively concerning this plastic nature of the universe, as well as that of animals, in these words:—

De Part. An.
lib. 1, c. 1.
p. 474. φαίνεται γὰρ ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς τεχναστοῖς ἡ τέχνη,
οὕτως ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς πράγμασιν ἄλλη τις ἀρχὴ
καὶ αἰτία τοιαύτη ἣν ἔχομεν, καθάπερ τὸ θερμὸν

καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν ἐκ τοῦ παντός· διὸ μᾶλλον εἰκὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν
γεγενῆσθαι ὑπὸ τοιαύτης αἰτίας, εἰ γέγονε, καὶ εἶναι διὰ τοιαύ-
την αἰτίαν μᾶλλον, ἢ τὰ ζῶα τὰ θνητά· τὸ γοῦν τεταγμένον
καὶ ὁρισμένον πολὺ μᾶλλον φαίνεται ἐν τοῖς οὐρανίαις, ἢ περὶ
ἡμῶν· τὸ δὲ ἄλλοτε ἄλλως, καὶ ὥς ἔτυχε, περὶ τὰ θνητὰ μᾶλ-
λον· οἱ δὲ τῶν μὲν ζώων ἕκαστον φύσει φασὶν εἶναι καὶ γενέσθαι·
τὸν δ' οὐρανὸν ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ τοῦ αὐτομάτου τοιοῦτον ἐν-
στῆναι, ἐν ᾧ ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ ἀταξίας οὐδ' ὅτιον φαίνεται. It
seemeth, that as there is art in artificial things, so
in the things of nature there is another such like
principle or cause, which we ourselves partake
of; in the same manner as we do of heat and cold,
from the universe. Wherefore, it is more probable,
that the whole world was at first made by such a
cause as this (if at least it were made) and that it
is still conserved by the same, than that mortal
animals should be so; for there is much more of
order and determinate regularity in the heavenly
bodies than in ourselves; but more of fortuitous-
ness and inconstant irregularity among these mor-
tal things. Notwithstanding which, some there
are, who, though they cannot but acknowledge,
that the bodies of animals were all framed by an
artificial nature, yet they will needs contend, that
the system of the heavens sprung merely from
fortune and chance; although there be not the least
appearance of fortuitousness or temerity in it.—
And then he sums up all into this conclusion :
ὥστε εἶναι φανερόν ὅτι ἔστι τι τοιοῦτον ὃ δὴ καὶ καλοῦμεν

φύσις. Wherefore, it is manifest, that there is some such thing as that which we call nature;—that is, that there is not only an artificial, methodical, and plastic nature in animals, by which their respective bodies are framed and conserved; but also, that there is such a general plastic nature likewise in the universe, by which the heavens and whole world are thus artificially ordered and disposed.

24. Now whereas Aristotle, in the forecited words, tells us, that we partake of life and understanding from that in the universe, after the same manner as we partake of heat and cold from that heat and cold that is in the universe; it is observable, that this was a notion borrowed from Socrates (as we understand both from Xenophon and Plato); that philosopher having used it as an argumentation to prove a Deity. And the sense of it is represented after this manner by the Latin poet:*

Principio cœlum ac terram, camposque liquentes,
Lucentemque globum lunæ, Titaniaque astra,
Spiritus intus alit, totosque infusa per artus,
Mens agitat molem, et magno se corpore miscet.
Inde hominum pecudumque genus, vitæque volantem;

From whence it may be collected, that Aristotle did suppose this plastic nature of the universe to be ἢ μέρος ψυχῆς, ἢ μὴ ἀνεν ψυχῆς, either part of some mundane soul,—that was also conscious and intellectual (as that plastic nature in animals is), or at least some inferior principle, depending on such a soul.—And indeed whatever the doctrine of the modern Peripatetics be, we make no doubt at all but that Aristotle himself held the world's animation, or a mundane soul: forasmuch as he plainly

* Virgil. *Æneid.* lib. vi. vers. 724.

declares himself concerning it elsewhere in his book *De Cælo*, after this manner:—

Lib. 2. c. 12.
p. 656. tom.
I. oper.

ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς ὡς περὶ σωμάτων μόνον αὐτῶν, καὶ μονάδων, τάξιν μὲν ἔχόντων, ἀψύχων δὲ πάντων, διανοοῦμεθα· δεῖ δὲ ὡς μετεχόντων ὑπολαμβάνειν πράξεως καὶ ζωῆς. But we commonly think of the heavens as nothing else but bodies and monads, having only a certain order, but altogether inanimate; whereas we ought, on the contrary, to conceive of them as partaking of life and action:—that is, as being indued with a rational or intellectual life. For so Simplicius* there rightly expounds the place; δεῖ δὲ ὡς περὶ ἐμψύχων αὐτῶν συλλογίζεσθαι, καὶ λογικὴν ἔχόντων ψυχὴν, ὡς καὶ πράξεως καὶ ζωῆς λογικῆς μετέχειν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ποιεῖν, καὶ κατὰ τῶν ἀλόγων ψυχῶν κατηγοροῦμεν, καὶ κατὰ τῶν ἀψύχων σωμάτων, τὸ δὲ πράττειν κυρίως κατὰ τῶν λογικῶν ψυχῶν κατηγοροῦμεν. But we ought to think of the heavens as animated with a rational soul, and thereby partaking of action and rational life. For (saith he) though ποιεῖν be affirmed not only of irrational souls, but also of inanimate bodies, yet the word πράττειν does only denominate rational beings.—But further, to take away all manner of scruple or doubt concerning this business, that philosopher before, in the same book^b ῥητῶς affirmeth, ὅτι ὁ οὐρανὸς ἐμψυχος, καὶ ἀρχὴν κινήσεως ἔχει; that the heaven is animated and hath a principle of motion within itself:—where, by the heaven, as in many other places of Aristotle and Plato, is to be understood the whole world.

There is indeed one passage in the same book *De Cælo*, which, at first sight, and slightly consi-

* Comment. in Libr. de Cælo, f. 126.

^b Aristot. de Cælo, lib. ii. cap. ii. p. 642. tom. I. oper.

dered, may seem to contradict this again; and therefore probably is that, which hath led many into a contrary persuasion, that Aristotle

denied the world's animation : ἀλλὰ μὲν L. 2. c. 1.
p. 640. tom.
I. opes.
οὔτε ὑπὸ ψυχῆς εὐλογον ἀναγκαζούσης μένειν

αἰδίων· οὐδὲ γὰρ τῆς ψυχῆς οἶον τ' εἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην ζωὴν ἄλυπον καὶ μακαρίαν· ἀνάγκη γὰρ καὶ τὴν κίνησιν μετὰ βίᾱς οὔσαν, πεφυκότος τοῦ πρώτου σώματος ἄλλως καὶ κινεῖν συνεχῶς, ἄσυχον εἶναι, καὶ πάσης ἀπηλλαγμένην ῥαστώνης ἐμφρονος· εἴγε μὴδ' ὥςπερ, τῇ ψυχῇ τῇ τῶν θνητῶν ζῶν ἐστὶν ἀνάπαυσις ἢ περὶ τὸν ὕπνον γινομένη τοῦ σώματος ἄνεσις, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον Ἰξιονός τινος μοῖραν κατέχειν αὐτὴν αἰδίων καὶ ἄφροντον· But it is not reasonable neither to think, that the heavens continue to eternity, moved by a soul necessitating, or violently compelling them. Nor indeed is it possible, that the life of such a soul should be pleasurable or happy : forasmuch as the continual violent motion of a body (naturally inclining to move another way) must needs be a very unquiet thing, and void of all mental repose, especially when there is no such relaxation as the souls of mortal animals have by sleep ; and therefore such a soul of the world as this, must of necessity be condemned to an eternal Ixionian fate.—But in these words Aristotle does not deny the heavens to be moved by a soul of their own (which is positively affirmed by him elsewhere), but only by such a soul as should violently and forcibly agitate, or drive them round, contrary to their own natural inclination, whereby, in the mean time, they tended downwards of themselves towards the centre. And his sense concerning the motion of the heavens, is truly represented by Simplicius, in this manner : τὸ δὲ ὅλον φύσικον καὶ ἐμψυχον, ὑπὸ ψυχῆς κυρίως κινεῖται, διὰ μέσης

τῆς ψυχῆς. The whole world or heaven, being as well a natural, as an animalish body, is moved properly by soul; but yet by means of nature also, as an instrument, so that the motion of it is not violent.—But whereas Aristotle there insinuates, as if Plato had held the heavens to be moved by a soul violently, contrary to their nature; Simplicius, though sufficiently addicted to Aristotle, ingenuously acknowledges his error herein, and vindicating Plato from that imputation, shews how he likewise held a plastic nature as well as a

mundane soul; and that amongst his ten

* De Leg. l. 10. instances of motion,* the ninth is that of

nature; τὴν ἑτέραν αἰὲν κινουσαν, καὶ μεταβαλλομένην ὑπὸ ἑτέρου that which always moves another, being itself changed by something else;—as the tenth, that of the mundane soul, τὴν αὐτὴν κινουσαν καὶ ἑτέρα, that which originally both moves itself and other things:—as if his meaning in that place were, that though nature be a life and internal energy, yet it acts subserviently to a higher soul as the first original mover.

But the grand objection against Aristotle's holding the world's animation is still behind; namely, from that in his *Metaphysics*,* where he determines the highest starry heaven to be moved by an immoveable mover, commonly supposed to be the Deity itself, and no soul of the world; and all the other spheres likewise to be moved by so many separate intelligences, and not by souls. To which we reply, that indeed Aristotle's first immoveable mover is no mundane soul, but an abstract intellect separate from matter, and the very Deity itself; whose manner of moving the heavens

* Lib. xiv. cap. vii. viii. ix. p. 476. s. tant. iv. oper.

is thus described by him,^a *κινεῖ δὲ ὡς ἐρῶμενον*, it moveth only as being loved.—Wherefore, besides this supreme unmoved mover, that philosopher supposed another inferior moved mover also, that is, a mundane soul, as the proper and immediate efficient cause of the heavenly motions; of which he speaks after this manner: *κινούμενον δὲ τὰλλα κινεῖ*, that which itself being moved (objectively, or by appetite and desire of the first good) moveth other things.—And thus that safe and surefooted interpreter, Alex. Aphrodisius, expounds his master's meaning, that the heaven being animated, and therefore indeed moved by an internal principle of its own, is notwithstanding originally moved by a certain immoveable and separate nature, which is above soul, *τῷ νοεῖν τε αὐτὸ, καὶ ἐρεῖν καὶ ὁρεῖν ἔχει τῆς ἀμειώσιως αὐτοῦ*, both by its contemplating of it, and having an appetite and desire of assimilating itself thereunto.—Aristotle seeming to have borrowed this notion from Plato,^b who makes the constant regular circumgyration of the heavens to be an imitation of the motion or energy of intellect. So that Aristotle's first mover is not properly the efficient, but only the final and objective cause, of the heavenly motions, the immediate efficient cause thereof being *ψυχὴ καὶ φύσις*, soul and nature.—

Neither may this be confuted from those other Aristotelic intelligences of the lesser orbs; that philosopher conceiving in like manner concerning them, that they were also the abstract minds or intellects of certain other inferior souls, which moved their several respective bodies or orbs, cir-

^a Metaph. lib. xiv. cap. viii. p. 479.

^b De Legibus, lib. x. p. 669. et alias.

cularly and uniformly, in a kind of imitation of them. For this plainly appears from hence, in that he affirms of these his inferior intelligences likewise, as well as of the supreme mover, that they do *κινεῖν ὡς τέλος*, move only as the end.

Where it is evident, that though Aristotle did plainly suppose a mundane intellectual soul, such as also contained, either in it, or under it, a plastic nature, yet he did not make either of these to be the supreme Deity; but resolved the first principle of things to be one absolutely perfect mind or intellect, separate from matter, which was *ἀκίνητος οὐσία*,* an immoveable nature,—whose essence was his operation, and which moved only as being loved, or as the final cause: of which he pronounces in this manner, *ὅτι ἐκ τού-*

Met. l. 14. αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς ἤρτηται ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις,
c. 7. p. 479.
tom. iv. oper. that upon such a principle as this, hea-

ven and nature depends;—that is, the animated heaven, or mundane soul, together with the plastic nature of the universe, must of necessity depend upon such an absolutely perfect and immoveable mind or intellect.

Having now declared the Aristotelic doctrine concerning the plastic nature of the universe, with which the Platonic also agrees, that it is, *ἢ μέρος ψυχῆς, ἢ μὴ ἀνευ ψυχῆς*, either part of a mundane intellectual soul (that is, a lower power and faculty of it), or else not without it, but some inferior thing depending on it;—we think fit to add in this place, that though there were no such mundane soul, as both Plato and Aristotle supposed, distinct from the supreme Deity, yet there might notwithstanding be a plastic nature of the

* Aristot. *Metaphysicor. lib. xiv. cap. vi. p. 477.*

universe depending immediately upon the Deity itself. For the plastic nature essentially depends upon mind or intellect, and could not possibly be without it; according to those words before cited, *ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς ἤρτηται ἡ φύσις*, nature depends upon such an intellectual principle;—and for this cause that philosopher does elsewhere join *νοῦς* and *φύσις*, mind and nature—both together.

25. Besides this general plastic nature of the universe, and those particular plastic powers in the souls of animals, it is not impossible but that there may be other plastic natures also (as certain lower lives, or vegetative souls) in some greater parts of the universe; all of them depending, if not upon some higher conscious soul, yet at least upon a perfect intellect presiding over the whole. As for example; though it be not reasonable to think, that every plant, herb, and pile of grass, hath a particular plastic life, or vegetative soul of its own, distinct from the mechanism of the body, nor that the whole earth is an animal endued with a conscious soul; yet there may possibly be, for aught we know, one plastic nature or life belonging to the whole terrestrial (or terraqueous) globe, by which all plants and vegetables, continuous with it, may be differently formed, according to their different seeds, as also minerals and other bodies framed, and whatsoever else is above the power of fortuitous mechanism effected, as by the immediate cause, though always subordinate to other causes; the chief whereof is the Deity. And this perhaps may ease the minds of those, who cannot but think it too much, to impose all upon one plastic nature of the universe.

26. And now we have finished our first task,

which was to give an account of the plastic nature, the sum whereof briefly amounts to this; that it is a certain lower life than the animal, which acts regularly and artificially, according to the direction of mind and understanding, reason, and wisdom, for ends, or in order to good, though itself do not know the reason of what it does, nor is master of that wisdom according to which it acts, but only a servant to it, and drudging executioner of the same; it operating fatally and sympathetically, according to laws and commands prescribed to it by a perfect intellect, and impressed upon it; and which is either a lower faculty of some conscious soul, or else an inferior kind of life or soul by itself; but essentially depending upon a higher intellect.

We proceed to our second undertaking; which was to shew, how grossly those two sorts of Atheists before-mentioned, the Stoical or Cosmo-plastic, and the Stratonical or Hylozoic, both of them acknowledging this plastic life of nature, do mistake the notion of it, or pervert it, and abuse it, to make a certain spurious and counterfeit God-almighty of it (or a first principle of all things), thereby excluding the true omnipotent Deity, which is a perfect mind, or consciously understanding nature, presiding over the universe; they substituting this stupid plastic nature in the room of it.

Now the chief errors or mistakes of these Atheists concerning the plastic nature, are these four following. First, that they make that to be the first principle of all, and the highest thing in the universe, which is the last and lowest of all lives; a thing essentially secondary, derivative, and de-

pendent. For the plastic life of nature is but the mere umbrage of intellectuality, a faint and shadowy imitation of mind and understanding; upon which it doth as essentially depend, as the shadow doth upon the body, the image in the glass upon the face, or the echo upon the original voice. So that if there had been no perfect mind or intellect in the world, there could no more have been any plastic nature in it, than there could be an image in the glass without a face, or an echo without an original voice. If there be *Φύσις*, then there must be *Νοῦς*: if there be a plastic nature, that acts regularly and artificially in order to ends, and according to the best wisdom, though itself not comprehending the reason of it, nor being clearly conscious of what it doth; then there must of necessity be a perfect mind or intellect, that is, a Deity, upon which it depends. Wherefore Aristotle does like a philosopher in joining *Φύσις* and *Νοῦς*, nature and mind both together; but these Atheists do very absurdly and unphilosophically, that would make a senseless and unconscious plastic nature, and therefore without any mind or intellect, to be the first original of all things.

Secondly, these Atheists augment the former error, in supposing those higher lives of sense or animality, and of reason or understanding, to rise both of them from that lower senseless life of nature, as the only original fundamental life. Which is a thing altogether as irrational and absurd, as if one should suppose the light, that is in the air or ether, to be the only original and fundamental light, and the light of the sun and stars but a secondary and derivative thing from it, and nothing

but the light of the air modiflicated and improved by condensation; or, as if one should maintain, that the sun and moon, and all the stars, were really nothing else but the mere reflections of those images, that we see in rivers and ponds of water. But this hath always been the sottish humour and guise of Atheists, to invert the order of the universe, and hang the picture of the world, as of a man, with its heels upwards. Conscious reason and understanding, being a far higher degree of life and perfection, than that dull plastic nature, which does only do, but not know, can never possibly emerge out of it; neither can the duplication of corporeal organs be ever able to advance that simple and stupid life of nature into redoubled consciousness or self-perception; nor any triplication, or indeed milleclupation of them, improve the same into reason and understanding.

Thirdly, for the better colouring of the former errors, the Hylozoists adulterate the notion of the plastic life of nature, confounding it with wisdom and understanding. And though themselves acknowledge, that no animal sense, self-perception, and consciousness belongs to it, yet they will have it to be a thing perfectly wise, and consequently every atom of senseless matter that is in the whole world, to be infallibly omniscient, as to all its own capacities and congruities, or whatsoever it-self can do or suffer; which is plainly contradictory. For, though there may be such a thing as the plastic nature, that, according to the former description of it, can do without knowing, and is devoid of express consciousness or self-perception, yet perfect knowledge and understanding, without consciousness, is nonsense and impossi-

bility. Wherefore, this must needs be condemned for a great piece of sottishness in the Hylozoic Atheists, that they attribute perfect wisdom and understanding to a stupid unconscious nature, which is nothing but *χρηστήριον*, the mere drudging instrument, or manuary opificer of a perfect mind.

Lastly, these Atheists err in this, that they make this plastic life of nature to be a mere material or corporeal thing; whereas matter or body cannot move itself, much less, therefore, can it artificially order and dispose its own motion. And though the plastic nature be indeed the lowest of all lives, yet, notwithstanding, since it is a life, or internal energy, and self-activity, distinct from local motion, it must needs be incorporeal, all life being essentially such. But the Hylozoists conceive grossly both of life and understanding, spreading them all over upon matter, just as butter is spread upon bread, or plaster upon a wall, and accordingly slicing them out in different quantities and bulks, together with it; they contending, that they are but inadequate conceptions of body, as the only substance; and consequently concluding, that the vulgarly received notion of God is nothing else but such an inadequate conception of the matter of the whole corporeal universe, mistaken for a complete and entire substance by itself, that is supposed to be the cause of all things; which fond dream or dotage of their's will be further confuted in due place. But it is now time to put a period to this long, though necessary, digression, concerning the plastic life of nature, or an artificial, orderly, and methodical nature.

XXXVIII. Plato gives an account, why he judged it necessary in those times, publicly to propose that Atheistic hypothesis, in order to a confutation, as also to produce rational arguments for the proof of a Deity, after this manner:

De Leg. lib.
10. p. 656.
oper.

Εἰ μὴ καταπαρέμεινοι ἦσαν οἱ τοιοῦτοι λόγοι ἐν τοῖς πᾶσιν, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, ἀνθρώποις, οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει τῶν ἐπαμυνόντων λόγων, ὡς εἰσὶ θεοὶ, νῦν δὲ ἀνάγκη.

Had not these Atheistic doctrines been publicly divulged, and made known in a manner to all, it would not have been needful to have confuted them, nor by reasons to prove a Deity; but now it is necessary.—And we conceive, that the same necessity at this time will justify our present undertaking likewise; since these Atheistic doctrines have been as boldly vented, and publicly asserted in this latter age of our's, as ever they could be in Plato's time; when the severity of the Athenian government must needs be a great check to such designs, Socrates having been put to death upon a mere false and groundless accusation of Atheism, and Protagoras (who doubtless was a real Atheist) having escaped the same punishment no otherwise than by flight, his books being, notwithstanding, publicly burnt in the market-place at Athens, and himself condemned to perpetual exile, though there was nothing at that time proved against him, save only

Diog. La. in
vita Prot. lib.
ix. seg. 51.
p. 576.

this one sceptical passage, in the beginning of a book of his: περὶ μὲν θεῶν οὐκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν, εἴθ' ὡς εἰσιν, εἴθ' ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶ, πολλά γὰρ τὰ χαλύνοντα εἶδέναι, ἥτε ἀδελόνης, καὶ βραχὺς ὢν ὁ βίος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. Concerning the gods, I have nothing at all to say, either that they be or be not; there being many things, that hinder the

knowledge of this matter, both the obscurity of the thing itself, and the shortness of human life. —Whereas Atheism, in this latter age of our's, hath been impudently asserted, and most industriously promoted; that very Atomic form, that was first introduced (a little before Plato's time) by Leucippus, Protagoras, and Democritus, having been also revived amongst us, and that with no small pomp and ostentation of wisdom and philosophy.

It was before observed, that there were two several forms of Atomical philosophy: first, the most ancient and genuine, that was religious, called Moschical (or, if you will, Mosaical) and Pythagorical; secondly, the adulterated Atheistic Atomology, called Leucippean or Democritical. Now, accordingly, there have been in this latter age of our's two several successive resurrections or restitutions of those two Atomologies. For Renatus Cartesius first revived and restored the Atomic philosophy, agreeably, for the most part, to that ancient Moschical and Pythagoric form; acknowledging, besides extended substance and corporeal atoms, another cogitative incorporeal substance, and joining metaphysics or theology, together with physiology, to make up one entire system of philosophy. Nor can it well be doubted, but that this physiology of his, as to the mechanic part of it, hath been elaborated by the ingenious author into an exactness at least equal with the best Atomologies of the ancients. Nevertheless, this Cartesian philosophy is highly obnoxious to censure upon some accounts; the chief whereof is this, that, deviating from that primitive Moschical Atomology, in rejecting all

plastic nature, it derives the whole system of the corporeal universe from the necessary motion of matter, only divided into particles insensibly small, and turned round in a vortex, without the guidance or direction of any understanding nature. By means whereof, though it boast of solving all the corporeal phenomena by mere fortuitous mechanism, and without any final or mental causality, yet it gives no account at all of that, which is the grandest of all phenomena, the *τὸ εἶ
καὶ καλῶς*, the orderly regularity and harmony of the mundane system.—The occasion of which miscarriage hath been already intimated; namely, from the acknowledging only two heads of being, extended and cogitative, and making the essence of cogitation to consist in express consciousness; from whence it follows, that there could be no plastic nature, and therefore either all things must be done by fortuitous mechanism, or else God himself be brought immediately upon the stage for the solving of all phenomena. Which latter absurdity our philosopher being over careful to avoid, cast himself upon the former, the banishing of all final and mental causality quite out of the world, and acknowledging no other philosophic causes, beside material and mechanical. It cannot be denied, but that even some of the ancient religious Atomists were also too much infected with this mechanizing humour; but Renatus Cartesius hath not only outdone them all herein; but even the very Atheists themselves also, as shall be shewed afterward; and, therefore, as much as in him lies, has quite disarmed the world of that grand argument for a Deity, taken from the regular frame and harmony of the universe;

To which gross miscarriage of his there might be also another added, that he seems to make matter necessarily existent, and essentially infinite and eternal. Notwithstanding all which, we cannot entertain that uncharitable opinion of him, that he really designed Atheism; the fundamental principles of his philosophy being such, as that no Atheistic structure can possibly be built upon them. But shortly after this Cartesian restitution of the primitive Atomology, that acknowledgeth incorporeal substance, we have had our Leucippus and Democritus too, who also revived and brought again upon the stage that other Atheistic Atomology, that makes ἀρχαὶ τῶν ὅλων ἀτόμους, senseless and lifeless atoms, to be the only principles of all things in the universe; thereby necessarily excluding, besides incorporeal substance and immortality of souls, a Deity and natural morality; as also making all actions and events materially and mechanically necessary.

Now there could be no satisfactory confutation of this Atheistic hypothesis, without a fair proposal first made of the several grounds of it to their best advantage, which we have therefore endeavoured in the former chapter. The answers to which Atheistic arguments ought, according to the laws of method, to be reserved for the last part of the whole treatise, where we are positively to determine the right intellectual system of the universe; it being properly our work here, only to give an account of the three false hypotheses of the mundane system, together with their several grounds. Nevertheless, because it might not only seem indecorous, for the answers to those Atheistic arguments to be so long deferred, and placed

so far behind the arguments themselves, but also prove otherwise really inconvenient, we shall therefore choose rather to break those laws of method (neglecting the scrupulosity thereof), and subjoin them immediately in this place, craving the reader's pardon for this preposterousness.

It is certain, that the source of all Atheism is generally a dull and earthy disbelief of the existence of things beyond the reach of sense; and it cannot be denied, but that there is something of immorality in the temper of all Atheists, as all atheistic doctrine tends also to immorality. Notwithstanding which, it must not be therefore concluded, that all dogmatic Atheists came to be such merely by means of gross intemperance, sensuality, and debauchery. Plato, indeed, describes one sort of Atheists in this manner: οἷ

De Leg. l. 10. p. 908. ἂν πρὸς τῇ δόξῃ, τῇ θεῶν ἔρημα εἶναι πάντα,

ἀκράτειαί τε ἡδονῶν καὶ λυπῶν προσπέσωσι, μνημαὶ τε ἰσχυραὶ καὶ μαθήσεις ὀξεῖαι παρῶσι. Such who, together with this opinion, that all things are void of gods, are acted also by intemperance of pleasures and pains, and hurried away with violent lusts, being persons otherwise endued with strong memories and quick wits.—And these are the debauched, ranting, and hectoring Atheists. But,

Ibid.

besides these, that philosopher tells us, that there is another sort of Atheists also: οἷς μὴ νομίζουσι θεοὺς εἶναι τὸ παράπαν, ἥθος φύσει προσγίνεται δίκαιον, μισοῦντές τε γίγνονται τοὺς κακοὺς, καὶ τῇ δυσχεραίνειν τὴν ἀδικίαν, οὔτε τὰς τοιαύτας πράξεις προσίενται πράττειν, τοὺς τε μὴ δίκαιους τῶν ἀνθρώπων φεύγουσι, καὶ τοὺς δίκαιους στέργουσιν. Such who, though they think there be no gods at all, yet, notwithstanding, being naturally disposed to justice and mode-

ration, as they will not do outrageous and exorbitant things themselves, so they will shun the conversation of wicked debauched persons, and delight rather in the society of those that are fair and just.—And these are a sort of externally honest or civilized Atheists. Now what that thing is, which, besides gross sensuality and debauchery, might tempt men to entertain atheistic opinions, the same philosopher also declares; namely, that it is an affectation of singularity, or of seeming wiser than the generality of mankind. For thus when Clinias had disputed honestly against Atheists, from those vulgar topics of the regularity and harmony of the universe (observable in the courses of sun, moon, and stars, and the seasons of the year), and of the common notions of mankind; in that both Greeks and barbarians generally agreed in this, that there were gods, thinking he had thereby made a sufficient confutation of Atheism, the Athenian Hesper hereupon discovers a great fear and jealousy, which he had, lest he should thereby but render himself an object of contempt to Atheists, as being a conceited and scornful generation of men.

ΑΘ. φοβοῦμαι γε ὡς μακάριε τοὺς μοχθηροὺς, μήπως ὑμῶν καταφρονήσωσιν, ὑμεῖς μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἴστε αὐτῶν πέρι, τὴν τῆς διαφορᾶς αἰτίαν, ἀλλ' ἠγείσθε ἀκρατεῖα μόνον ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐπὶ τὸν ἀκρατῆ βίον ὀρμασθαι τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν, &c. I am afraid of those wicked men the Atheists, lest they should despise you: for you are ignorant concerning them, when you think the only cause of Atheism to be intemperance of pleasures and lusts, violently hurrying men's souls on to a wicked life.—CLIN. What other cause of Atheism can there be besides this?—ATH. That

which you are not aware of, who live remotely, namely, Ἀμαθία μάλα χαλεπή δοκοῦσα εἶναι μέγιστη φρόνησις. A certain grievous ignorance, which yet, notwithstanding, hath the appearance of the greatest wisdom.—And, therefore, afterwards, when that philosopher goes about to propose the Atheistic hypothesis, he calls it, τὸν παρὰ πολλοῖς δοξαζόμενον εἶναι σοφώτατον ἀπάντων λόγων, that which to many seemeth to be the wisest and profoundest of all doctrines.—

And we find the same thing at this very day, that Atheists make a great pretence to wisdom and philosophy; and that many are tempted to maintain atheistic opinions, that they may gain a reputation of wit by it. Which, indeed, was one reason, that the rather induced us nakedly to reveal all the mysteries of Atheism, because we observed, that so long as these things are concealed and kept up in huggermugger, many will be the rather apt to suspect, that there is some great depth and profundity of wisdom lodged in them; and that it is some noble and generous truth, which the bigotic religious endeavour to smother and suppress.

Now the case being thus, it was pertinently suggested also by the forementioned philosopher,^b οὐ μικρόν γε τὸ διαφέρειν, εἰ φανείν οἱ λόγων ἀπτόμενοι ἀσεβῶν, ἄλλοις τε ἐξάγοντες, μηδὲ εὖ τοῖς λόγοις, ἀλλ' ἐξημαρτημένως χρώμενοι, That it must needs be a matter of no small moment, for any one to make it appear, that they, who maintain wicked atheistical opinions, do none of them reason rightly, but grossly fumble in all their ratiocinations.—

^a De Legib. l. x. p. 664. oper.

^b Ibid. p. 667. s.

And we hope to effect this in our present undertaking, to make it evident, that Atheists are no such conjurers, as (though they hold no spirits) they would be thought to be; no such gigantic men of reason, nor profound philosophers, but that, notwithstanding all their pretensions to wit, their Atheism is really nothing else, but ἀμαθία μάλ᾽ αὐτοῖς, a most grievous ignorance, sottishness, and stupidity of mind in them.

Wherefore we shall, in the next place, conjure down all those devils raised and displayed in their most formidable colours, in the precedent chapter; or rather we shall discover, that they are really nothing else, but what these Atheists pretend God and incorporeal spirits to be, mere fantastic spectres and impostures, vain imaginations of deluded minds, utterly devoid of all truth and reality. Neither shall we only confute those Atheistic arguments, and so stand upon our defensive posture, but we shall also assault Atheism even with its own weapons, and plainly demonstrate, that all forms of Atheism are unintelligible nonsense and absolute impossibility to human reason; as we shall likewise, over and above, occasionally insert some (as we think) undeniable arguments for a Deity.

The Digression concerning the Plastic Life of Nature, or an artificial, orderly, and methodical Nature, No. 37. Chap. iii.

“ 1. THAT neither the Hylozoic nor Cosmo-plastic Atheists are condemned for asserting an orderly and artificial plastic nature, as a life dis-

tinct from the animal, however this be a thing exploded, not only by the Atomic Atheists, but also by some professed Theists, who, notwithstanding, might have an undiscerned tang of the mechanical-atheistic humour hanging about them.

2. If there be no plastic artificial nature admitted, then it must be concluded, that either all things come to pass by fortuitous mechanism, and material necessity (the motion of matter unguided) or else that God doth *αὐτοῦργεῖν ἅπαντα*, do all things himself immediately and miraculously, framing the body of every gnat and fly, as it were with his own hands; since Divine laws and commands cannot execute themselves, nor be the proper efficient causes of things in nature. 3. To suppose all things to come to pass fortuitously, or by the unguided motion of matter, a thing altogether as irrational as it is atheistical and impious; there being many phenomena, not only above the powers of mechanism, but also contrary to the laws of it. The mechanic Theists make God but an idle spectator of the fortuitous motions of matter, and render his wisdom altogether useless and insignificant. Aristotle's judicious censure of the fortuitous Mechanists, with the ridiculousness of that pretence, that material and mechanical reasons are the only philosophical. 4. That it seems neither decorous in respect of God, nor congruous to reason, that he should *αὐτοῦργεῖν ἅπαντα*, do all things himself immediately and miraculously, nature being quite superseded and made to signify nothing. The same further confuted by the slow and gradual process of things in nature, as also by those errors and bumbles, that are committed, when the matter proves

inept and contumacious, arguing the agent not to be irresistible. 5. Reasonably inferred, that there is a plastic nature in the universe, as a subordinate instrument of Divine Providence, in the orderly disposal of matter; but yet so as not without a higher providence presiding over it, forasmuch as this plastic nature cannot act electively or with discretion. Those laws of nature concerning motion, which the mechanic Theists themselves suppose, really nothing else but a plastic nature. 6. The agreeableness of this doctrine with the sentiments of the best philosophers in all ages, Aristotle, Plato, Empedocles, Heraclitus, Hippocrates, Zeno, and the Paracelsians. Anaxagoras, though a professed Theist, severely censured, both by Aristotle and Plato, as an encourager of Atheism, merely because he used material and mechanical causes, more than mental and final. Physiologers and astronomers, why vulgarly suspected of Atheism in Plato's time. 7. The plastic nature no occult quality, but the only intelligible cause of that, which is the grandest of all phenomena, the orderly regularity and harmony of things, which the mechanic Theists, however pretending to solve all phenomena, can give no account at all of. A God, or infinite mind, asserted by them, in vain and to no purpose. 8. Two things here to be performed by us; first, to give an account of the plastic nature, and then to shew how the notion of it hath been mistaken, and abused by Atheists. The first general account of this plastic nature, according to Aristotle, that it is to be conceived as art itself acting, inwardly and immediately, upon the matter; as if harmony living in the musical instruments should move the

strings of them without any external impulse.

9. Two pre-eminences of the plastic nature above human art :—First, that whereas human art acts upon the matter from without clumsily and moliminously, with tumult and hurly-burly, nature acting on it from within more commandingly doth its work easily, cleverly, and silently. Human art acts on the matter mechanically, but nature vitally and magically.

10. The second pre-eminence of nature above human art, that whereas human artists are often to seek and at a loss, anxiously consult and deliberate, and upon second thoughts mend their former work, nature is never to seek, nor unresolved what to do, nor doth she ever repent afterwards of what she hath done, changing her former course. Human artists themselves consult not, as artists, but only for want of art ; and therefore nature, though never consulting, may act artificially. Concluded, that what is called nature is really the Divine art.

11. Nevertheless, that nature is not the Divine art, pure and abstract, but concreted and embodied in matter, *ratio mersa et confusa* ; not the Divine art archetypal, but ectypal. Nature differs from the Divine art, as the manuary opificer from the architect.

12. Two imperfections of the plastic nature, in respect whereof it falls short even of human art ; first, that though it act for ends artificially, yet itself neither intends those ends, nor understands the reason of what it doth, and therefore cannot act electively. The difference between the spermatic reasons and knowledge. Nature doth but ape or mimic the Divine art or wisdom, being not master of that reason, according to which it acts, but only a servant to it, and

drudging executioner of it. 13. Proved that there may be such a thing as acts artificially, though it-self do not comprehend that art, by which its motions are governed; first from musical habits; the dancer resembles the artificial life of nature. 14. The same further evinced from the instincts of brute animals, directing them to act rationally and artificially, in order to their own good and the good of the universe, without any reason of their own. The instincts in brutes but passive impresses of the Divine wisdom, and a kind of fate upon them. 15. The second imperfection of the plastic nature, that it acts without animal fancy, *συναίσθησις*, express con-sense, and consciousness, and is devoid of self-perception and self-enjoyment. 16. Whether this energy of the plastic nature be to be called cogitation or no, but a logomachy or contention about words. Granted, that what moves matter vitally, must needs do it by some energy of its own, distinct from local motion; but that there may be a simple vital energy, without that duplicity, which is in synæsthesis, or clear and express consciousness. Nevertheless, that the energy of nature might be called a certain drowsy, unawakened, or astonished cogitation. 17. Instances, which render it probable, that there may be a vital energy, without synæsthesis, clear and express con-sense, or consciousness. 18. The plastic nature, acting neither knowingly nor fantastically, acts fatally, magically, and sympathetically. The Divine laws and fate, as to matter, not mere cogitation in the mind of God, but an energetic and effectual principle; and the plastic nature, the true and proper fate of matter, or the corporeal world. What ma-

gic is, and that nature, which acts fatally, acts also magically and sympathetically. 19. That the plastic nature, though it be the Divine art and fate, yet for all that, it is neither god nor goddess, but a low and imperfect creature; it acting artificially and rationally no otherwise, than compounded forms of letters, when printing coherent philosophic sense; nor for ends, than a saw or hatchet in the hands of a skilful mechanic. The plastic and vegetative life of nature the lowest of all lives, and inferior to the sensitive. A higher providence than that of the plastic nature governing the corporeal world itself. 20. Notwithstanding which, forasmuch as the plastic nature is a life, it must needs be incorporeal. One and the same thing, having in it an entire model and platform, and acting upon several distant parts of matter at once coherently, cannot be corporeal; and though Aristotle no where declares whether his nature be corporeal or incorporeal (which he neither doth clearly concerning the rational soul) and his followers conclude it to be corporeal, yet, according to the very principles of that philosophy, it must needs be otherwise. 21. The plastic nature being incorporeal, must either be a lower power lodged in souls, that are also conscious, sensitive, or rational; or else a distinct substantial life by itself, and inferior kind of soul. How the Platonists complicate both these together; with Aristotle's agreeable determination, that nature is either part of a soul, or not without soul. 22. The plastic nature as to animals, according to Aristotle, a part or lower power of their respective souls. That the phenomena prove a plastic nature or archeus in animals, to make which a dis-

tingent thing from the soul, is to multiply entities without necessity. The soul endued with a plastic power, the chief formatrix of its own body, the contribution of certain other causes not excluded.

23. That besides that plastic principle in particular animals, forming them as so many little worlds, there is a general plastic nature in the whole corporeal universe, which likewise, according to Aristotle, is either a part and lower power of a conscious mundane soul, or else something depending on it. 24. That no less according to Aristotle than Plato and Socrates, ourselves partake of life from the life of the universe, as well as we do of heat and cold, from the heat and cold of the universe; from whence it appears, that Aristotle also held the world's animation, with further undeniable proof thereof. An answer to two the most considerable places of that philosopher, that seem to imply the contrary. That Aristotle's first immoveable mover was no soul, but a perfect intellect abstract from matter; but that he supposed this to move only as a final cause, or as being loved, and besides it, a mundane soul and plastic nature, to move the heavens efficiently. Neither Aristotle's nature, nor his mundane soul, the supreme Deity. However, though there be no such mundane soul, as both Plato and Aristotle conceived, yet notwithstanding there may be a plastic nature depending upon a higher intellectual principle. 25. No impossibility of some other particular plastic principles; and though it be not reasonable to think, that every plant, herb, and pile of grass, hath a plastic or vegetative soul of its own, nor that the earth is an animal; yet, that there may possibly be one plas-

tic unconscious nature in the whole terraqueous globe, by which vegetables may be severally organized and framed, and all things performed, which transcend the power of fortuitous mechanism. 26. Our second undertaking, which was to shew how grossly those Atheists (who acknowledge this plastic nature) misunderstand it and abuse the notion, to make a counterfeit God-Almighty or Numen of it, to the exclusion of the true Deity. First, in their supposing, that to be the first and highest principle of the universe, which is the last and lowest of all lives, a thing as essentially derivative from, and dependent upon a higher intellectual principle, as the echo on the original voice. 27. Secondly, in their making sense and reason in animals to emerge out of a senseless life of nature, by the mere modification and organization of matter. That no duplication of corporeal organs can ever make one single unconscious life to advance into redoubled consciousness and self-enjoyment. 28. Thirdly, in attributing perfect knowledge and understanding to this life of nature, which yet themselves suppose to be devoid of all animal sense and consciousness. 29. Lastly, in making the plastic life of nature to be merely corporeal; the Hylozoists contending, that it is but an inadequate conception of body, as the only substance; and fondly dreaming, that the vulgar notion of God is nothing but such an inadequate conception of the matter of the whole universe, mistaken for a complete and entire substance by itself, the cause of all things."

CHAPTER IV.

The idea of God declared, in way of answer to the first Atheistic argument. The grand prejudice against the naturalty of this idea, as essentially including unity or oncliness in it, from the Pagan Polytheism, removed. Proved that the intelligent Pagans generally acknowledged one supreme Deity. What their Polytheism and idolatry was; with some account of Christianity.—1. The either stupid insensibility, or gross impudence of Atheists, in denying the word GOD to have any signification, or that there is any other idea answering to it besides the mere phantasm of the sound. The disease called by the philosopher ἀπολίθωσις τοῦ νοητικοῦ, the petrification (or dead insensibility) of the mind.—2. That the Atheists themselves must needs have an idea of God in their minds, or otherwise, when they deny his existence, they should deny the existence of nothing. And that they have also the same idea of him with Theists, they denying the very same thing which the others affirm.—3. A lemma, or preparatory proposition to the idea of God, that though some things be made or generated, yet it is not possible, that all things should be made, but something must of necessity exist of itself from eternity unmade, and be the cause of those other things that are made.—4. The two most opposite opinions, concerning that which was self-existent from eternity, or unmade, and the cause of all other things made: one, that it was nothing but senseless matter, the most imperfect of all things; the other, that it was something most perfect, and therefore consciously intellectual. The assertors of this latter opinion, Theists in a strict and proper sense; of the former, Atheists. So that the idea of God in general is a perfect consciously understanding being (or mind) self-existent from eternity, and the cause of all other things.—5. Observed, that the Atheists, who deny a God, according to the true idea of him, do often abuse the word, calling senseless matter by that name, and meaning nothing else thereby but a first principle, or self-existent unmade thing. That, according to this notion of the word God, there can be no such thing as an Atheist, no man being able to persuade himself, that all things sprung from nothing.—6. In order to the more punctual declaration of the Divine idea, the opinion of those taken notice of, who suppose two self-existent unmade principles, God and matter; and so God not to be the sole, but only the chief principle.—7. That these are but imperfect and mistaken Theists. Their idea of God declared, with its defectiveness. A latitude in Theism. None to be condemned for absolute Atheists,

but such as deny an eternal unmade mind, ruling over matter.—

8. The most compendious idea of God, an absolutely perfect being. That this includes not only conscious intellectuality and necessary existence, but also omni-causality, omnipotence, and infinite power: and therefore God the sole principle of all, and cause of matter. The true notion of infinite power. Pagans acknowledged the Divine omnipotence. And that the Atheists supposed infinite power to be included in the idea of God, proved from Lucretius.—9. That absolute perfection implies something more than power and knowledge. A vaticination in men's minds of a higher good than either. That God is better than knowledge, according to Aristotle; and that there is morality in the nature of God, wherein his chief happiness consisteth. This borrowed from Plato, who makes the highest perfection, and supreme Deity, to be goodness itself, above knowledge and intellect. God, and the supreme good, according to the Scripture, love. God no soft or fond love, but an impartial law, and the measure of all things. That the Atheists supposed goodness also to be included in the idea of God. The idea of God more explicate and unfolded, a being absolutely perfect, infinitely good, wise, and powerful, necessarily existent; and not only the framer of the world, but also the cause of all things.—10. That this idea of God essentially includes unity or oneliness in it; since there can be but one supreme, one cause of all things, one omnipotent, and one infinitely perfect. This unity or oneliness of the Deity supposed also by Epicurus and Lucretius, who professedly denied a God, according to this idea.—11. The grand prejudice against the naturalness of this idea of God, as it essentially includes unity and solitariness, from the Polytheism of all nations formerly, besides the Jews, and of all the wisest men and philosophers: from whence it is inferred, that this idea of God is but artificial, and owes its original to laws and institution. An inquiry to be made concerning the true sense of the Pagan Polytheism. That the objectors take it for granted, that the Pagan Polytheists universally asserted many self-existent intellectual beings, and independent deities, as so many partial causes of the world.—12. First, the irrationality of this opinion, and its manifest repugnancy to the phenomena; which render it less probable to have been the belief of all the Pagan Polytheists.—13. Secondly, that no such thing at all appears, as that ever any intelligent Pagans asserted a multitude of eternal, unmade, independent deities. The Hesiodian gods. The Valentinian Æons. The nearest approach made thereunto by the Manichean good and evil gods. This doctrine not generally asserted by the Greek philosophers, as Plutarch affirmeth. Questioned whether the Persian evil demon, or Arimanius, were a self-existent principle, essentially evil. Aristotle's confutation and explosion of many principles, or independent deities. Faustus the Manichean's conceit, that the Jews and Christians paganized, in the opinion of monarchy, with St. Austin's judgment, concerning

the Pagans, thereupon.—14. Concluded that the Pagan Polytheism must be understood according to another equivocation in the word gods, as used for created intellectual beings, superior to men, that ought to be religiously worshipped. That the Pagans held both many gods and one God (as Onatus the Pythagorean declares himself), in different senses; many inferior deities subordinate to one Supreme.—15. Further evidence of this, that the intelligent Pagan Polytheists held only a plurality of inferior deities, subordinate to one Supreme: first, because after the emersion of Christianity, and its contest with Paganism, when occasion was offered, not only no Pagan asserted a multiplicity of independent deities, but also all universally disclaimed it, and professed to acknowledge one supreme God.—16. That this was no refinement or interpolation of Paganism, as might possibly be suspected, but that the doctrine of the most ancient Pagan theologers, and greatest promoters of Polytheism, was agreeable hereunto; which will be proved, not from suspected writings (as of Trismegist and the Sybils), but such as are indubitate. First, that Zoroaster, the chief promoter of Polytheism in the eastern parts, acknowledged one supreme Deity, the maker of the world, proved from Eubulus in Porphyry, besides his own words cited by Eusebius.—17. That Orpheus, commonly called by the Greeks the Theologer, and the father of the Grecian Polytheism, clearly asserted one supreme Deity, proved by his own words, out of Pagan records.—18. That the Egyptians themselves, the most polytheistical of all nations, had an acknowledgment amongst them of one supreme Deity.—19. That the poets, who were the greatest depravers of the Pagan theology, and, by their fables of the gods, made it look more aristocratically, did themselves notwithstanding acknowledge a monarchy, one Prince and Father of gods. That famous passage of Sophocles not to be suspected, though not found in any of his tragedies now extant.—20. That all the Pagan philosophers, who were Theists, universally asserted a mundane monarchy. Pythagoras, as much a Polytheist as any, and yet his first principle of things, as well as numbers, a monad or unity. Anaxagoras's one mind ordering all things for good. Xenophanes' one and all, and his one God the greatest among the gods.—21. Parmenides' supreme God, one immoveable. Empedocles' both many gods junior to friendship and contention, and his one God, called $\tau\acute{\omicron}\ \delta\epsilon\iota\tau\acute{\omicron}\varsigma$, senior to them. Zeno Eleates' demonstration of one God, in Aristotle.—22. Philolaus's prince and governor of all, God always one. Euclides Megarensis's God, called $\delta\epsilon\iota\tau\acute{\omicron}\ \delta\epsilon\iota\tau\acute{\omicron}\varsigma$, one the very good. Timæus Locrus's mind and good, above the soul of the world. Antisthenes' one natural God. Onatus's Corypheus.—23. Generally believed and true, that Socrates acknowledged one supreme God; but that he disclaimed all the inferior gods of the Pagans, a vulgar error. Plato also a Polytheist, and that passage, which some lay so great stress upon (that he was serious when he

began his epistles with God, but when with gods jocular), spurious and counterfeit; and yet he was, notwithstanding, an undoubted Monotheist also in another sense; an assertor of one God over all, of a maker of the world, of a first God, of a greatest of the gods. The first hypostasis of the Platonic trinity properly the King of all things, for whose sake are all things; the father of the cause and prince of the world, that is, of the eternal intellect, or λόγος.—24. Aristotle an acknowledger of many gods (he accounting the stars such), and yet an express assertor of *ἐκ ἀνάγκης*, one prince, one immoveable mover.—25. Cleanthes and Chrysippus Stoics, though they filled the whole heaven, earth, air, and sea with gods, yet, notwithstanding, they acknowledged only one God immortal, Jupiter; all the rest being consumed into him, in the successive conflagrations, and afterwards made anew by him. Cleanthes' excellent and devout hymn to the supreme God.—26. Endless to cite all the passages of the later Pagan writers and Polytheists, in which one supreme God is asserted. Excellent discourses in some of them concerning the Deity, particularly Plotinus; who, though he derived all things, even matter itself, from one supreme Deity, yet was a contender for many gods.—27. This not only the opinion of philosophers and learned men, but also the general belief of the Pagan vulgar: that there was one supreme God, proved from Maximus Tyrius. The Romans' *Deus optimus maximus*. The Pagans, when most serious, spake of God singularly. *Kyrie Eleeson* part of the Pagans' litany to the supreme God. The more civilized Pagans, at this very day, acknowledge one Supreme Deity, the maker of the world.—28. Plutarch's testimony, that, notwithstanding the variety of Paganic religions, and the different names of gods used in them, yet one reason, mind, or providence ordering all things, and its inferior ministers, were alike every where worshipped.—29. Plain that the Pagan Theists must needs acknowledge one supreme Deity, because they generally believed the whole world to be one animal, governed by one soul. Some Pagans made this soul of the world their supreme God; others an abstract mind superior to it.—30. The Hebrew doctors generally of this persuasion, that the Pagans worshipped one supreme God, and that all their other gods were but mediators betwixt him and men.—31. Lastly, this confirmed from Scripture. The Pagans knew God. Aratus' Jupiter, and the Athenians' unknown God, the true God.—32. In order to a fuller explication of the Pagan theology, and shewing the occasion of its being misunderstood, three heads requisite to be insisted on. First, that the Pagans worshipped one supreme God under many names; secondly, that besides this one God, they worshipped also many gods, which were indeed inferior deities subordinate to him; thirdly, that they worshipped both the supreme and inferior gods in images, statues, and symbols, sometimes abusively called also gods. First, that the supreme God amongst the

Pagans was polyonymous, and worshipped under several personal names, according to his several attributes and the manifestations of them, his gifts and effects in the world.—33. That, upon the same account, things not substantial were personated and deified by the Pagans, and worshipped as so many several names and notions of one God.—34. That as the whole corporeal world animated was supposed by some of the Pagans to be the supreme God, so he was worshipped in the several parts and members of it (having personal names bestowed upon them) as it were by parcels and piece-meal, or by so many inadequate conceptions. That some of the Pagans made the corporeal world the temple of God only, but others the body of God.—35. The second head proposed, that besides the one supreme God, under several names, the Pagans acknowledged and worshipped also many gods; *θεοὶ γένεσις*, made gods, created intellectual beings superior to men.—36. The Pythagoric or Platonic trinity of Divine hypostases. And the higher of the inferior deities, according to this hypothesis, Nous, Psyche, and the whole corporeal world; with particular Noes and Henades.—37. The other inferior deities, acknowledged as well by the vulgar as philosophers, of three sorts. First, the sun, moon, and stars, and other greater parts of the universe animated, called sensible gods.—38. Secondly, their inferior deities invisible, ethereal, and aerial animals, called demons. These appointed by the supreme Deity to preside over kingdoms, cities, places, persons, and things.—39. The last sort of the Pagan inferior deities, heroes and *θεοί γένεσις*, or men-gods. Eusebius taxed by Plutarch, for making all the Pagan gods nothing but dead men.—40. The third general head proposed, that the Pagans worshipped both the supreme and inferior gods in images, statues, and symbols. That first of all, before images and temples, rude stones and pillars without sculpture were erected for religious monuments, and called *βωμῶν*, or Bethels.—41. That afterwards images, statues, and symbols were used, and housed in temples. These placed in the west-end of the temples to face the east; so that the Pagans entering worshipped towards the west; one probable occasion of the ancient Christians praying towards the east. The golden calf made for a symbolic presence of the God of Israel.—42. All the parts of the entire Pagan religion represented together at once in Plato.—43. That some late writers, not well understanding the sense of Pagans, have confounded all their theology, by supposing them to worship the inanimate parts of the world as such, for gods; therefore distinguishing betwixt their animal and their natural gods. That no corporeal thing was worshipped by the Pagans otherwise, than either as being itself animated with a particular soul of its own, or as being part of the whole animated world, or as having demons presiding over it, to whom the worship was properly directed; or, lastly, as being images or symbols of Divine things.—44. That though the Egyptians be said to have worshipped

brute animals, and were generally therefore condemned by the other Pagans; yet the wiser of them used them only as hieroglyphics and symbols.—45. That the Pagans worshipped not only the supreme God, but also the inferior deities, by material sacrifices. Sacrifices or fire-offerings, in their first and general notion, nothing else but gifts and signs of gratitude, and appendices of prayer. But that animal sacrifices had afterwards a particular notion also of expiation fastened on them; whether by Divine direction, or human agreement, left undetermined.—46. The Pagans' apology for the three forementioned things. First, for worshipping one supreme God under many personal names, and that not only according to his several attributes, but also his several manifestations, gifts, and effects, in the visible world. With an excuse for those corporeal Theists, who worshipped the whole animated world as the supreme God, and the several parts of it under personal names, as living members of him.—47. Their apology for worshipping, besides the one supreme God, many inferior deities. That they worshipping them only as inferior could not, therefore, be guilty of giving them that honour which was proper to the Supreme. That they honoured the supreme God incomparably above all. That they put a difference in their sacrifices; and that material sacrifices were not the proper worship of the supreme God, but rather below him.—48. Several reasons of the Pagans, for giving religious worship to inferior created beings. First, that this honour, which is bestowed upon them, does ultimately redound to the supreme God, and aggrandize his state and majesty, they being all his ministers and attendants.—49. That as demons are mediators betwixt the celestial gods and men, so those celestial gods, and all the other inferior deities, are themselves also mediators betwixt man and the supreme God, and as it were convenient steps, by which we ought with reverence to approach him.—50. That there is an honour in justice due to all those excellent beings that are above us; and that the Pagans do but honour every thing as they ought, in that due rank and place, in which the supreme God hath set it.—51. That demons or angels being appointed to preside over kingdoms, cities, and persons, and the several parts of the corporeal universe, and being many ways benefactors to us, thanks ought to be returned to them by sacrifice.—52. That the inferior gods, demons, and heroes, being all of them able to do us either good or hurt, and being also irascible, and therefore provokable by our neglect of them, it is as well our interest as our duty to pacify and appease them by worship.—53. Lastly, that it cannot be thought, that the supreme God will envy those inferior gods that worship or honour which is bestowed upon them; nor suspected, that any of those inferior deities will factiously go about to set up themselves against the supreme God.—54. That many of the Pagans worshipped none but good demons, and that those of them, who worshipped evil ones, did it only in order to

their appeasement and mitigation, that so they might do them no hurt. None but magicians to be accounted properly devil worshippers, who honour evil demons, in order to the gratification of their revenge, lust, and ambition.—55. The Pagans plead, that those demons, who delivered oracles, and did miracles amongst them, must needs be good, since there cannot be a greater reproach to the supreme God, than to suppose him to appoint evil demons as presidents and governors over the world, or to suffer them to have so great a sway and share of power in it. The faith of Plato in Divine Providence, that the good every where prevails over the bad, and that the Delphic Apollo was therefore a good demon.—56. The Pagans' apology for worshipping the supreme God in images, statues, and symbols. That these are only schetically worshipped by them, the honour passing from them to the prototype. And that since we living in bodies cannot easily have a conception of any thing without some corporeal image or phantasm, thus much must be indulged to the infirmity of human nature (at least in the vulgar) to the worship of God, corporeally in images, to prevent their running to Atheism.—57. That though it should appear, by this apology of the Pagans, that their case were not altogether so bad as is commonly supposed, yet they cannot be justified thereby in the three particulars above-mentioned, but the Scripture condemnation of them is irrefragable, that knowing God, they did not glorify him as God, or sanctify his name; that is, worship him according to his uncommon and incommunicable, his peerless and insociable, transcendent and singular, incomparable and unresemblable nature; but mingled, some way or other, creature-worship with the worship of the Creator. First, that the worshipping of one God in his various gifts and effects, under several personal names, a thing in itself absurd, may also prove a great occasion of Atheism, when the things themselves come to be called by those names, as wine Bacchus, corn Ceres. The conclusion easily following, from thence, that the good things of nature are the only deities. But to worship the corporeal world itself animated, as the supreme God, and the parts of it as the members of God, is plainly to confound God with the creature, and not to glorify him as Creator, nor according to his separate and spiritual nature.—58. To give religious worship to demons or angels, heroes or saints, or any other intellectual creatures, though not honouring them equally with the supreme God, is to deny God the honour of his holiness, his singular, insociable, and incommunicable nature, as he is the only self-originated being, and the Creator of all; of whom, through whom, and to whom are all things. As God is such a being, that there is nothing like him, so ought the worship which is given him to be such as hath nothing like to it, a singular, separate, and incommunicate worship. They not to be religiously worshipped, that worship.—59. That the religious worship of created spirits proceeded chiefly from a fear, that if they were not worshipped, they would be pro-

voked and do hurt, which is both highly injurious to good spirits, and a distrust of the sufficiency of God's power to protect his worshippers. That all good spirits uninvoked are of themselves officiously ready to assist those, who sincerely worship and propitiate the supreme Deity, and therefore no need of the religious worship of them, which would be also offensive to them.—60. That men's praying to images and statues is much more ridiculous than children's talking to babies made of clouts, but not so innocent; they thereby debasing both themselves and God, not glorifying him according to his spiritual and unresemblable nature, but changing the glory of the incorruptible God into the likeness of corruptible man or beast.—61. The mistake of those who think none can be guilty of idolatry, that believe one God the maker of the world.—62. That from the same ground of reason, that nothing ought to be religiously worshipped besides the supreme God, or whom he appoints to represent himself (because he ought to be sanctified, and dealt withal, according to his singular nature, as unlike to every thing), it follows, contrary to the opinion of some opposers of idolatry, that there ought also to be a discrimination made between things sacred and profane, and reverence used in Divine worship. Idolatry and sacrilege allied.—63. Another Scripture charge upon the Pagans, that they were devil-worshippers; not as though they intended all their worship to evil demons or devils as such, but because their Polytheism and idolatry (unacceptable to God and good spirits) was promoted by evil spirits delivering oracles and doing miracles for the confirmation of it, they also insinuating themselves into the temples and statues, therefore the worship was looked upon as done to them. The same thing said of others besides Pagans, that they worshipped devils.—64. Proved that they were evil demons, who delivered oracles, and did miracles amongst the Pagans, for the carrying on of that religion, from the many obscene rites and mysteries, not only not prohibited, but also enjoined by them.—65. The same thing further proved from other cruel and bloody rites, but especially that of man-sacrifices. Plutarch's clear acknowledgment, that both the obscene rites and man-sacrifices, amongst the Pagans, owed their original to wicked demons.—66. That the God of Israel neither required nor accepted of man-sacrifices, against a modern Diatribist.—67. That what faith soever Plato might have in the Delphic Apollo, he was no other than an evil demon, or devil. An answer to the Pagans' argument from Divine Providence.—68. That the Pagans' religion, unsound in its foundation, was infinitely more corrupted and depraved by means of these four things:—First, the superstition of the ignorant vulgar.—69. Secondly, the licentious figments of poets and fable-mongers, frequently condemned by Plato and other wiser Pagans.—70. Thirdly, the craft of priests and politicians.—71. Lastly, the imposture of evil demons, or devils. That by means of these four things, the Pagan religion became a

most foul and unclean thing. And as some were captivated by it under a most grievous yoke of superstition, so others strongly inclined to Atheism.—72. Plato not insensible, that the Pagan religion stood in need of reformation; nevertheless, supposing many of those religious rites to have been introduced by visions, dreams, and oracles, he concluded, that no wise legislator would, of his own head, venture to make an alteration; implying, that this was a thing not to be effected otherwise than by Divine revelation and miracles. The generally-received opinion of the Pagans, that no man ought to trouble himself about religion, but content himself to worship God, *κατὰ νόμον*, according to the law of that country which he lived in.—73. Wherefore God Almighty, in great compassion to mankind, designed himself to reform the religion of the Pagan world, by introducing another religion of his own framing instead of it; after he had first made a prælude thereunto in one nation of the Israelites, where he expressly prohibited, by a voice out of the fire, in his first commandment, the Pagan Polytheism, or the worshipping of other inferior deities besides himself; and in the second, their idolatry, or the worshipping of the supreme God in images, statues, or symbols. Besides which, he restrained the use of sacrifices: as also successively gave predictions, of a Messiah to come, such as together with miracles might reasonably conciliate faith to him when he came.—74. That afterwards, in due time, God sent the promised Messiah, who was the eternal Word hypostatically united with a pure human soul and body, and so a true *θεοάνθρωπος*, or God-man; designing him for a living temple and visible statue or image, in which the Deity should be represented and worshipped; as also after his death and resurrection, when he was to be invested with all power and authority, for a prince and king, a mediator and intercessor betwixt God and men.—75. That this *θεοάνθρωπος*, or God-man, was so far from intending to require men-sacrifices of his worshippers, as the Pagan demons did, that he devoted himself to be a catharma and expiatory sacrifice for the sins of the whole world; and thereby also abolished all sacrifices or oblations by fire whatsoever, according to the Divine prediction.—76. That the Christian Trinity, though a mystery, is more agreeable to reason than the Platonic; and that there is no absurdity at all in supposing the pure soul and body of the Messiah to be made a living temple or Shechinah, image or statue of the Deity. That this religion of one God and one Mediator, or *θεοάνθρωπος*, God-man, preached to the Pagan world, and confirmed by miracles, did effectually destroy all the Pagan inferior deities, middle gods and mediators, demons and heroes, together with their statues and images.—77. That it is no way incongruous to suppose, that the Divine Majesty, in prescribing a form of religion to the world, should graciously condescend to comply with human infirmity, in order to the removing of two such grand evils as Polytheism and idolatry, and the bringing of men to

worship God in spirit and in truth.—78. That demons and angels, heroes and saints, are but different names for the same things, which are made gods by being worshipped. And that the introducing of angel and saint-worship, together with image-worship, into Christianity, seems to be a defeating of one grand design of God Almighty in it, and the paganizing of that, which was intended for the unpaganizing of the world.—79. Another key for Christianity in the Scripture, not disagreeing with the former, that since the way of wisdom and knowledge proved ineffectual as to the generality of mankind, men might, by the contrivance of the gospel, be brought to God and a holy life (without profound knowledge) in the way of believing.—80. That, according to the Scripture, there is a higher, more precious, and diviner light, than that of theory and speculation.—81. That in Christianity all the great, goodly, and most glorious things of this world are slurrd and disgraced, comparatively with the life of Christ.—82. And that there are all possible engines in it to bring men up to God, and engage them in a holy life.—83. Two errors here to be taken notice of; the first, of those who make Christianity nothing but an Antinomian plot against real righteousness, and as it were a secret confederacy with the devil. The second, of those who turn that into matter of mere notion and opinion, dispute and controversy, which was designed by God only as a contrivance, machine, or engine, to bring men effectually to a holy and godly life.—84. That Christianity may be yet further illustrated, from the consideration of the adversary or Satanical power, which is in the world. This no Manichean substantial evil principle, but a polity of lapsed angels, with which the souls of wicked men are also incorporated, and may therefore be called the kingdom of darkness.—85. The history of the fallen angels in Scripture briefly explained.—86. The concurrent agreement of the Pagans concerning evil demons or devils, and their activity in the world.—87. That there is a perpetual war betwixt two polities or kingdoms in the world, the one of light, the other of darkness; and that our Saviour Christ, or the Messiah, is appointed the head or chieftain over the heavenly militia, or the forces of the kingdom of light.—88. That there will be at length a palpable and signal overthrow of the Satanical power and whole kingdom of darkness, by *θεὸς ἀντὶ μαχαρίας*, God appearing in an extraordinary and miraculous manner; and that this great affair is to be managed by our Saviour Christ, as God's vicegerent, and a visible judge both of quick and dead.—89. That our Saviour Christ designed not to set up himself factiously against God Almighty, nor to be accounted *μᾶλλον θεῷ*, superior to God, but that when he hath done his work, and put down all adversary power, himself will then be subject to God, even the Father, that so God may be all in all.—90. Lastly, having spoken of three forms of religions, the Jewish, Christian, and the Pagan, and there remaining only a fourth, the Mahometan, in which the Divine monarchy is zealously asserted,

we may now conclude, that the idea of God (as essentially including unity in it) hath been entertained in all forms of religion. An account of that seemingly-strange phenomenon of Providence: the rise, growth, and continuance of the Mahometan religion not to be attempted by us, at least in this place.

1. HAVING in the former chapter prepared the way, we shall now proceed (with the Divine assistance) to answer and confute all those Atheistic arguments before proposed. The first whereof was this, That there is no idea of God, and therefore either no such thing existing in nature, or at least no possible evidence of it.

To affirm, that there is no idea of God, is all one as to affirm, that there is no conception of the mind answering to that word or name; and this the modern Atheists stick not to maintain, that the word God hath no signification, and that there is no other idea or conception in men's minds, answering thereunto, besides the mere phantasm of the sound. Now, for any one to go about soberly to confute this, and to prove, that God is not the only word without a signification, and that men do not every where pay all their religious devotions to the mere phantasm of a transient sound, expecting all good from it, might very well seem to all intelligent persons a most absurd and ridiculous undertaking; both because the thing is so evident in itself, and because the plainest things of all can be least proved; for *ὁ πάντα ἀπόδεικτα νομοτικῶς, αὐτὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἀναρρεῖ*.

He that thinks all things to be demonstrable, takes away demonstration itself.

Procl. in Timæ. p. 176.
edit. Græc.
Basil. 1534.
fol.

—Wherefore we shall here only suggest thus much, that since there are different words for God in several languages, and men have the same notion or conception in their minds answer-

ing to them all, it must needs be granted, that they have some other idea or conception belonging to those words, besides the phantasms of their several sounds. And indeed it can be nothing else, but either monstrous sottishness and stupidity of mind, or else prodigious impudence, in these Atheists to deny, that there is any idea of God at all in the minds of men, or that the word hath any signification.

It was heretofore observed by Epic-
Arria. l. 1. c. 5. p. 95.
 Edit. Cantabr. tetus, ἂν τις ἐνίστηται πρὸς τὰ ἄγαν ἐκφανῇ, πρὸς τοῦτον οὐ ῥαδίον ἐστὶν εὐρεῖν λόγον, δι' οὗ μεταπίσει τις αὐτόν· τοῦτο δ' οὔτε παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνου γίνεται δύναμιν, οὔτε παρὰ τὴν τοῦ διδάσκοντος ἀσθένειαν· That if any man will oppose or contradict the most evident truths, it will not be easy to find arguments wherewith to convince him. And yet this, notwithstanding, ought neither to be imputed to any inability in the teacher, nor to any strength of wit in the denier, but only to a certain dead insensibility in him.—Whereupon he further adds, that there is a double ἀπονέκρωσις, ἢ ἀπολίθωσις, mortification or petrification of the soul; the one, when it is stupified and besotted in its intellectuals; the other, when it is bedeaded in its morals as to that pudor, that naturally should belong to a man. And he concludes, that either of these states (though it be not commonly so apprehended) is a condition little less deplorable, than that of bodily death; as also that such a person is not at all to be disputed with. For ποῖον αὐτῷ πῦρ ἢ ποῖον αἶδηρον προσάγω, ἵν' αἰσθῆται ὅτι νεκρῶται; αἰσθανόμενος οὐ προσποιεῖται; ἔτι χείρων ἐστὶ τοῦ νεκροῦ, ἐκτέμνεται γὰρ τὸ αἶδημον αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ ἐντρέπτικον· What sword can one bring, or what fire, by burning or

slashing, to make such a one perceive that he is dead? But if he be sensible, and will not acknowledge it, then he is worse than dead, being castrated as to that pudor, that belongs to a man.—Moreover, that philosopher took notice, that in those times, when this denial of most evident truths proceeded rather from impudence than stupidity or sottishness, the vulgar would be apt to admire it for strength of wit and great learning; *ἀν δέ τις τοῦ αἰδῆμον ἀπονεκρωθῇ, τοῦτο ἐστὶ καὶ δύναμιν καλοῦμεν*. But if any man's pudor be deadened or mortified in him, we call this power and strength.—

Now, as this was sometimes the case of the Academics, so is it also commonly of the Atheists, that their minds are partly petrified and benumbed into a kind of sottish and stupid insensibility, so that they are not able to discern things that are most evident; and partly depudorated, or become so void of shame, as that though they do perceive, yet they will obstinately and impudently deny the plainest things that are; as this, that there is any idea answering to the word God, besides the phantasm of the sound. And we do the rather insist upon this prodigious monstrosity of Atheists in this place, because we shall have occasion afterwards more than once to take notice of it again in other instances, as when they affirm, that local motion and cogitation are really one and the self-same thing, and the like. And we conceive it to be unquestionably true, that it is many times nothing else, but either this shameless impudence, or sottish insensibility in Atheists, that is admired by the ignorant for profoundness of wit and learning; * *ἀλλὰ ταύτην δύναμιν εἶπω; μὴ γένοιτο. εἰ*

* Epictet. apud Arrian. ubi supra, p. 96.

μή καὶ τὴν τῶν Κιναιδῶν, καθ' ἣν πᾶν τὸ ἐπελθὼν ἐν μέσῳ καὶ ποιῶσι καὶ λέγουσι. But shall I call this power or wit, and commend it upon that account? no more than I will commend the impudence of the Cinædi, who stick not publicly to do and say any thing.—

II. But whatever these Atheists deny in words, it is notwithstanding evident, that even themselves have an idea or conception in their minds answering to the word God, when they deny his existence, because otherwise they should deny the existence of nothing. Nor can it be at all doubted, but that they have also the same idea of God with Theists, they denying the existence of no other thing than what these assert. And as in all other controversies, when men dispute together, the one affirming, the other denying, both parties must needs have the same idea in their minds of what they dispute about, or otherwise their whole disputation would be but a kind of Babel language and confusion; so must it be likewise in this present controversy betwixt Theists and Atheists. Neither indeed would there be any controversy at all between them, did they not both by God mean one and the same thing; nor would the Atheists be any longer Atheists, did they not deny the existence of that very same thing which the Theists affirm, but of something else.

III. Wherefore, we shall in the next place declare, what this idea of God is, or what is that thing, whose existence they that affirm, are called Theists, and they who deny, Atheists. In order whereunto, we must first lay down this lemma, or preparatory proposition—that as it is generally acknowledged, that all things did not exist from

eternity, such as they are, unmade, but that some things were made and generated or produced ; so it is not possible that all things should be made neither, but there must of necessity be something self-existent from eternity, and unmade ; because if there had been once nothing, there could never have been any thing. The reason of which is so evident and irresistible, that even the Atheists confess themselves conquered by it, and readily acknowledge it for an indubitable truth, that there must be something ἀγέννητον, something which was never made or produced—and which therefore is the cause of those other things that are made, something αὐτόφιν and αὐθυπόστατον, that was self-originated and self-existing, and which is as well ἀνώλεθρον and ἄφθαρτον, as ἀγέννητον, incorruptible and undestroyable, as ingenerable ; whose existence therefore must needs be necessary, because if it were supposed to have happened by chance to exist from eternity, then it might as well happen again to cease to be. Wherefore all the question now is, what is this ἀγέννητον and ἀνώλεθρον, αὐτόφιν and αὐθυπόστατον, this ingenerable and incorruptible, self-originated and self-existent thing, which is the cause of all other things that are made.

IV. Now there are two grand opinions opposite to one another concerning it ; for, first, some contend, that the only self-existent, unmade, and incorruptible thing, and first principle of all things, is senseless matter ; that is, matter either perfectly dead and stupid, or at least devoid of all animalish and conscious life. But because this is really the lowest and most imperfect of all beings, others on the contrary judge it reasonable,

that the first principle and original of all things should be that, which is most perfect (as Aristotle* observes of Pherecydes, and his followers, τὸ γεννῆσαν πρῶτον ἄριστον τίθεσσι, that they made the first cause and principle of generation to be the best), and then apprehending, that to be endued with conscious life and understanding is a much greater perfection than to be devoid of both,

(as Balbus in Cicero declares upon this very occasion, "Nec dubium quin quod animans sit, habeatque mentem, et rationem, et sensum, id sit melius quam id quod his careat") they therefore conclude, that the only unmade thing, which was the principle, cause, and original of all other things, was not senseless matter, but a perfect conscious understanding nature, or mind. And these are they, who are strictly and properly called Theists, who affirm, that a perfectly conscious understanding being, or mind, existing of itself from eternity, was the cause of all other things; and they, on the contrary, who derive all things from senseless matter, as the first original, and deny that there is any conscious understanding being self-existent or unmade, are those that are properly called Atheists. Wherefore, the true and genuine idea of God in general, is this, A perfect conscious understanding being (or mind) existing of itself from eternity, and the cause of all other things.

v. But it is here observable, that those Atheists, who deny a God, according to this true and genuine notion of him, which we have declared, do often abuse the word, calling senseless matter

De Nat.
Deor. l. 2.
cap. xvii. p.
2978. tom.
ix. oper.

* Metaphysicor. lib. xii. cap. iv. p. 446. tom. iv. oper.

by that name; partly perhaps as endeavouring thereby, to decline that odious and ignominious name of Atheists, and partly as conceiving, that whatsoever is the first principle of things, ingenerable and incorruptible, and the cause of all other things besides itself, must therefore needs be the divinest thing of all. Wherefore, by the word God, these mean nothing else, but that which is ἀγέννητον, unmade or self-existent, and the ἀρχή, or first principle of things. Thus it was before observed,* that Anaximander called infinite matter, devoid of all manner of life, τὸ θεῖον, or God; and Pliny, the corporeal world, endued with nothing but a plastic unknowing nature, Numen; as also others in Aristotle,† upon the same account, called the inanimate elements gods, as supposed first principles of things; θεοὶ δὲ καὶ ταῦτα, for these are also gods.—And indeed Aristotle himself seems to be guilty of this miscarriage of abusing the word God after this manner, when, speaking of love and chaos, as the two first principles of things, he must, according to the laws of grammar, be understood to call them both gods: τούτους μὲν οὖν πῶς χρὴ διανεῖμαι, περὶ τοῦ τίς πρῶτος, ἐξέστω κρίνειν ὕστερον. Concerning these two (gods) how they ought to be ranked, and which of them is to be placed first, whether love or chaos, is afterwards to be resolved.—Which passage of Aristotle's seems to agree with that of Epicharmus,‡ Ἀλλὰ λέγεται μὲν

Metaph. lib.
1. cap. 4. p.
267. tom. iv.
oper.

* Chap. iii. sec. xx.

† This is a mistake of Dr. Cudworth, for Aristotle does not speak of those philosophers, who considered the elements as gods, but of Empedocles, and his well known principles of πῦρ and αἶμα. De Generatione et Corruptione, cap. vi. p. 734. tom. i. oper.

‡ Apud Diogenem. Laert. lib. iii. segm. 10. p. 171.

χάος πρῶτον γενέσθαι θεῶν, but chaos is said to have made the first of gods ;—unless we should rather understand him thus, that chaos was said to have been made before the gods. And this abuse of the word God is a thing, which the learned Origen took notice of in his book against Celsus, where he speaks of that religious care, which ought to

L. 1. p. 19. be had about the use of words : ὁ τοίνυν
Cant.

μεγαλοφύεστερον, καὶ ὀλίγην τούτων περίνοιαν εἰληφώς, εὐλαβηθήσεται, ἅλλα ἄλλοις ἐφαρμόζειν ὀνόματα πράγμασι, μήποτε ὅμοιον πάθῃ τοῖς τὸ Θεὸς ὄνομα ἐσφαλμένως φέρουσιν, ἐπὶ ὕλην ἄψυχον. He, therefore, that hath but the least consideration of these things, will take a religious care, that he give not improper names to things, lest he should fall into a like miscarriage with those, who attribute the name of God to inanimate and senseless matter.—Now, according to this false and spurious notion of the word of God, when it is taken for any supposed first principle, or self-existent unmade thing, whatsoever that be, there neither is nor can be any such thing as an Atheist ; since whosoever hath but the least drachm of reason, must needs acknowledge, that something or other existed from eternity unmade, and was the cause of those other things that are made. But that notion or idea of God, according to which some are Atheists and some Theists, is, in the strictest sense of it, what we have already declared, A perfect mind, or consciously understanding nature, self-existent from eternity, and the cause of all other things.—The genuine Theists being those, who make the first original of all things universally to be a consciously understanding nature (or perfect mind) ; but the Atheists, properly such, as derive all things

from matter, either perfectly dead and stupid, or else devoid of all conscious and animalish life.

VI. But that we may more fully and punctually declare the true idea of God, we must here take notice of a certain opinion of some philosophers, who went as it were in a middle betwixt both the former, and neither made matter alone, nor God, the sole principle of all things; but joined them both together, and held two first principles or self-existent unmade beings, independent upon one another—God, and the matter. Amongst whom the Stoics are to be reckoned, who, notwithstanding, because they held, that there was no other substance besides body, strangely confounded themselves, being by that means necessitated to make their two first principles, the active and the passive, to be both of them really but one and the self-same substance: their doctrine to this purpose being thus declared by Cicerō: “*Naturam dividebant in res duas, ut altera esset efficiens, altera autem quasi huic se præbens, ex qua efficeretur aliquid. In eo, quod efficeret, vim esse censebant; in eo, quod efficeretur, materiam quandam; in utroque tamen utrumque. Neque enim materiam ipsam cohærere potuisse, si nulla vi contineretur, neque vim sine aliqua materia; nihil est enim, quod non alicubi esse cogatur.*” The Stoics divided nature into two things as the first principles, one whereof is the efficient or artificer, the other that which offers itself to him for things to be made out of it. In the efficient principle they took notice of active force in the patient of matter,

* Academi. Quest. lib. i. cap. vi. p. 2231. tom. viii. oper. But Cicerō in this passage does not treat of the opinion of the Stoics, but of that of Plato and his ancient followers, or the first Academics.

but so as that in each of these were both together; forasmuch as neither the matter could cohere together, unless it were contained by some active force, nor the active force subsist of itself without matter, because that is nothing, which is not somewhere.—But besides these Stoics, there were other philosophers, who, admitting of incorporeal substance, did suppose two first principles, as substances really distinct from one another, that were co-existent from eternity—an incorporeal Deity and matter; as for example, See Euseb. Prep. Ev. lib. 7. c. 2. Anaxagoras, Archelaus, Atticus, and many more; insomuch that Pythagoras himself was reckoned amongst those by Numenius, and Plato by Plutarch and Laertius.

And we find it commonly taken for granted, that Aristotle also was of this persuasion, though it cannot be certainly concluded from thence (as some seem to suppose), because he asserted the eternity of the world; Plotinus, Porphyrius, Jamblichus, Proclus, and Simplicius doing the like, and yet, notwithstanding, maintaining, that God was the sole principle of all things, and that matter also was derived from him. Neither will that

passage of Aristotle's, in his *Metaphysics*, necessarily evince the contrary: L. 1. c. 1. p. 269. tom. iv. oper. Θεός

δοκῇ τὸ αἴτιον πάντων εἶναι καὶ ἀρχὴ τις, God seems to be a cause to all things, and a certain principle;—because this might be understood only of the forms of things.

But it is plain, that Plutarch was a maintainer of this doctrine, from his discourse upon the Platonic *psychogonia** (besides other places): βλατίον

* Tom. ii. oper. p. 1014.

ὅς Πλάτωνι παρομένους τὸν μὲν κόσμον ὑπὸ θεοῦ γεγονέναι λέγειν καὶ εἶναι· ὁ μὲν γὰρ κάλλιστος πῶν γεγονότων, ὁ δὲ ἄριστος τῶν αἰτιῶν· τὴν δὲ οὐσίαν καὶ ἰλην, ἐξ ἧς γέγονεν, οὐ γενομένην, ἀλλὰ ὑποκειμένην αἰετῇ δημιουργῷ, ὡς διαθέσθαι καὶ τέλει αὐτῆς, καὶ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἐκταύσασθαι, ὡς ἐναντὶον ἢ παρασχεῖν· οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἢ γένεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ μὴ καλῶς, μὴδ' ἰκακῶς ἔχοντος, ἀπ' οὐκίας, καὶ ἱμερίου, καὶ ἀνδράντος. It is, therefore, better for us to follow Plato (than Heraclitus), and loudly to declare, that the world was made by God. For as the world is the best of all works, so is God the best of all causes. Nevertheless, the substance or matter, out of which the world was made, was not itself made; but always ready at hand, and subject to the artificer, to be ordered and disposed by him. For the making of the world was not the production of it out of nothing, but out of an antecedent bad and disorderly state, like the making of a house, garment, or statue.

It is also well known, that Hermogenes, and other ancient pretenders to Christianity, did in like manner assert the self-existence and independent production of the matter, for which cause they were commonly called Materiarii, or the Materialian heretics; they pretending by this means to give an account (as the Stoics had done before them) of the original of evils, and to free God from the imputation of them. Their ratiocination to which purpose, is thus set down by Tertullian:

“God made all things, either out of himself, or out of nothing, or out of matter.”

Adver. Hermog. p. 242. Reg.

He could not make all things out of himself, because himself being always unmade, he should then really have been the maker of nothing: and he did not make all out of nothing, because being

essentially good, he would have made *nihil non optimum*, every thing in the best manner, and so there could have been no evil in the world; but since there are evils, and these could not proceed from the will of God, they must needs arise from the fault of something, and therefore of the matter, out of which things were made." Lastly, it is sufficiently known, likewise, that some modern sects of the Christian profession, at this day, do also assert the uncreatedness of the matter. But these suppose, in like manner as the Stoics did, body to be the only substance.

VII. Now of all these, whosoever they were, who thus maintained two self-existent principles, God and the matter, we may pronounce universally, that they were neither better nor worse, than a kind of imperfect Theists.

They had a certain notion or idea of God, such as it was, which seems to be the very same with that expressed in Aristotle,* *Zōon ἄριστον αἰδίον*, an animal the best, eternal; and represented also by Epicurus in this manner,^b *Zōon πᾶσαν ἔχον μακαριότητα μετ' ἀφθαρσίας* an animal, that hath all happiness with incorruptibility.—

Wherein it was acknowledged by them, that besides senseless matter, there was also an animalish and conscious or perceptive nature, self-existent from eternity; in opposition to Atheists, who made matter either devoid of all manner of life, or at least of such as is animalish and conscious, to be the sole principle of all things. For it hath been often observed, that some Atheists attributed a kind of plastic life or nature to that

* Metaphys. lib. xlv. cap. viii. p. 479. tom. iv. oper.

^b Vide Diogen. Laert. lib. x. segm. 123. p. 654.

matter, which they made to be the only principle of the universe. And these two sorts of Atheisms were long since taken notice of by Seneca, in these words: "Universum, in quo nos quoque sumus, expers esse consilii, et aut ferri temeritate quadam, aut natura nesciente quid faciat." The Atheists make the universe, whereof ourselves are part, to be devoid of counsel; and, therefore, either to be carried on temerarily and fortuitously, or else by such a nature, as which (though it be orderly, regular, and methodical) yet is, notwithstanding, nescient of what it doth.—But no Atheist ever acknowledged conscious animality to be a first principle in the universe; nor that the whole was governed by any animalish, sentient, and understanding nature, presiding over it as the head of it; but as it was before declared, they concluded all animals and animality, all conscious, sentient, and self-perceptive life, to be generated and corrupted, or educed out of nothing, and reduced to nothing again. Wherefore they, who, on the contrary, asserted animality and conscious life to be a first principle or unmade thing in the universe, are to be accounted Theists. Thus Balbus in Cicero declares,* that to be a Theist is to assert, "Ab animantibus principiis mundum esse generatum," that the world was generated or produced at first from animant principles;—and that it is also still governed by such a nature; "Res omnes subjectas esse naturæ sentienti," that all things are subject to a sentient and conscious nature, steering and guiding of them.—

Nat. Qu.
Pref. l. i.

* De Natura Deor. l. ii. sect. xxx. p. 299. tom. ix. oper.

But to distinguish this Divine animal from all others, these definers added, that it was *ἄριστον* and *μακαριότατον*, the best and most happy animal;—and, accordingly, this difference is added to that generical nature of animality by Balbus the Stoic, to make up the idea or definition of God

complete: “*Talem esse deum certa notione animi præsentimus; primum, ut sit animans; deinde, ut in omni natura nihil illo sit præstantius.*” We presage concerning God, by a certain notion of our mind; first, that he is an animans, or consciously living being; and then, secondly, that he is such an animans, as that there is nothing in the whole universe, or nature of things, more excellent than him.—

Wherefore these Materiarian Theists acknowledged God to be a perfectly-understanding being, and such as had also power over the whole matter of the universe; which was utterly unable to move itself, or to produce any thing without him. And all of them, except the Anaxagoreans,* concluded, that he was the creator of all the forms of inanimate bodies, and of the souls of animals. However, it was universally agreed upon amongst them, that he was at least the orderer and disposer of all; and that, therefore, he might upon that account well be called the *δημιουργός*, the maker or framer of the world.

Notwithstanding which, so long as they maintained matter to exist independently upon God, and sometimes also to be refractory and contumacious to him, and by that means to be the cause of evil, contrary to the Divine will; it is

* Vide Diogen. Laert. lib. ii. segm. 9. p. 86.

Cicero de Nat.
D. l. 2. cap.
xvii. p. 2977.
tom. ix. oper.

plain, that they could not acknowledge the Divine omnipotence, according to the full and proper sense of it; which may also further appear from these queries of Seneca,* concerning God: "*Quantum Deus possit? materiam ipse sibi formet, an data utatur? Deus quicquid vult efficiat? an in multis rebus illum tractanda destituant, et a magno artifice prave formentur multa, non quia cessat ars, sed quia id, in quo exercetur, sæpe inobsequens arti est?*" How far God's power does extend? whether he makes his own matter, or only use that which is offered him; whether he can do whatsoever he will; or the materials in many things frustrate and disappoint him, and by that means things come to be ill framed by this great artificer, not because his art fails him, but because that which it is exercised upon, proves stubborn and contumacious?—Wherefore, I think, we may well conclude, that those Materialian Theists had not a right and genuine idea of God.

Nevertheless, it does not, therefore, follow, that they must needs be concluded absolute Atheists; for there may be a latitude allowed in Theism. And though, in a strict and proper sense, they be only Theists who acknowledge one God perfectly omnipotent, the sole original of all things, and as well the cause of matter as of any thing else; yet it seems reasonable, that such consideration should be had of the infirmity of human understandings, as to extend the word further, that it may comprehend within it those also, who assert one intellectual principle self-existent from eternity, the framer and governor of the whole world, though not the creator of the matter; and

* Præfat. lib. i. Quæst. Natur. tom. ii. oper. p. 486.

that none should be condemned for absolute Atheists, merely because they hold eternal uncreated matter, unless they also deny an eternal unmade mind, ruling over the matter, and so make senseless matter the sole original of all things. And this is certainly most agreeable to common apprehensions; for Democritus and Epicurus would never have been condemned for Atheists, merely for asserting eternal self-existent atoms, no more than Anaxagoras and Archelaus were (who maintained the same thing), had they not also denied that other principle of theirs, a perfect mind, and concluded, that the world was made, μηδενὸς διατάκοντος ἢ διαταξαμένου τὴν πᾶσαν ἔχοντος μακαριότητα μετ' ἀφθαρσίας, without the ordering and disposal of any understanding being, that had all happiness with incorruptibility.—

VIII. The true and proper idea of God, in its most contracted form, is this, a being absolutely perfect; for this is that alone, to which necessary existence is essential, and of which it is demonstrable. Now, as absolute perfection includes in it all that belongs to the Deity, so does it not only comprehend (besides necessary existence) perfect knowledge or understanding, but also omni-causality and omnipotence (in the full extent of it), otherwise called infinite power. God is not only ζῶν ἄριστον, and “animans quo nihil in omni natura præstantius,” as the Materiarian Theists described him, the best living being; nor, as Zeno Eleates* called him, κράτιστον πάντων, the most powerful of all things;—but he is also παγκρατής, and παντοκράτωρ, and παντεξούσιος, absolutely omni-

* Vide Aristot. Libro de Xenocrate, Zenone, et Gorgia, cap. iii. p. 840. tom. ii. oper.

potent, and infinitely powerful; and, therefore, neither matter, nor any thing else, can exist of itself independently upon God; but he is the sole principle and source, from which all things are derived.

But because this infinite power is a thing, which the Atheists quarrel much withal, as if it were altogether unintelligible, and therefore impossible; we shall here briefly declare the sense of it, and render it (as we think) easily intelligible or conceivable, in these two following steps: first, that by infinite power is meant nothing else but perfect power, or else, as Simplicius calls it, *ὅλη δύναμις*, a whole and entire power,—such as hath no allay and mixture of impotency, nor any defect of power mingled with it. And then, again, that this perfect power (which is also the same with infinite) is really nothing else but a power of producing and doing all whatsoever is conceivable, and which does not imply a contradiction; for conception is the only measure of power and its extent, as shall be shewed more fully in due place.

Now, here we think fit to observe, that the Pagan Theists did themselves also vulgarly acknowledge omnipotence as an attribute of the Deity; which might be proved from sundry passages of their writings:—

Homer. Od. 8.*

Θεὸς ἄλλων ἢ ἐν' ἄλλῃ
Ζεὺς ἀγαθὸν κακὸν τε δίδωι, δέχεται γὰρ ἅπαντα.

Deus aliud post aliud
Jupiter, bonumque malumque dat, potest enim omnia.

* Vers. 226, 227.

And again, Od. ξ.*

— θεὸς κὲ μὴ δέου, οὐδ' ἔλπον,
 *Ὅττι καὶ ὃ θέμις ἰδίαι, δέουται γὰρ ἅπαντα.

— Deus autem hoc dabit, illud omittet,
 Quodcumque ei libitum fuerit, potest enim omnia.

To this purpose also, before Homer, Linus †

Ἦδ' ἡ πάντα θεῷ ῥέοντα, καὶ δέοντα ἔσθ'.

And after him, Callimachus ‡

Ἀντικτὸν γίγαι καὶ θεῶν δυνάμει.

All things are possible for God to do, and nothing transcends his power.—

Thus also amongst the Latin poets, Virgil.
 Æn. I.

Sed pater omnipotens speluncis abdidit atris.

Again, Æn. II.

At pater Anchises oculos ad sidera lætus
 Extulit, et coelæ palmas cum voce tetendit;
 Jupiter omnipotens, precibus si flecteris ullis.

And, Æn. IV.

Talibus orantem dictis, arasque tenentem
 Audiat Omnipotens.

Ovid, in like manner, Metamorph. I.

Tum pater omnipotens missa perfrigit Olympum
 Fulmine, et excussit subjectum Pelion Ossæ.

And to cite no more, Agatho, an ancient Greek poet, is commended by Aristotle, for affirming

* Vers. 432, 433.

† Apud Jamblichum in Vita Pythag. cap. xxviii. p. 117, 118.

‡ Apud Plutarch. de Placitis Philosophor. lib. i. cap. vii. p. 880. tom. ii. oper.

nothing to be exempted from the power of God but only this, that he cannot make that not to have been, which hath been; that is, do what implies a contradiction.

*Μίση γὰρ αὐτῶν, καὶ θεὸς ἀνέλεητος,
Ἀντίτῳ ἐκείνῳ, ἅν' οὐ δύναται ποιεῖν*

Eth. Nic. I. 4.
c. 2. p. 98.
tom. iii. oper.

Hoc namque duntaxat negatum etiam Deo est,
Quas facta sunt, infecta posse reddere.

Lastly, that the Atheists themselves under Paganism looked upon omnipotence and infinite power as an essential attribute of the Deity, appears plainly from Lucretius; when he tells us, that Epicurus, in order to the taking away of religion, set himself to confute infinite power:

—Omne immensum peragravit mente animoque,
Unde refert nobis victor, quid possit uriri,
Quid noqueat: finita potestas denique quoique
Quanam sit ratione, atque alte terminus harena.
Quare religio pedibus subjecta vicissim
Obteritur, nos exæquat victoria cælo.

L. i. vers.
73, &c.

As if he should have said, Epicurus, by shewing that all power was finite, effectually destroyed religion: he thereby taking away the object of it, which is an omnipotent and infinitely powerful Deity. And this is a thing, which the same poet often harps upon again, that there is no infinite power, and consequently no Deity, according to the true idea of it. But, last of all, in his sixth book, he condemns religionists, as guilty of great folly, in asserting omnipotence or infinite power (that is, a Deity), after this manner:

Rursus in antiquas referuntur religiones,
Et dominos acres asciscunt, omnia posse,
Quos miseri credunt, ignari quid queat esse,

Quid nequeat, finita potestas denique quouque,
 Quam sit ratione, atque alte terminus hærens:
 Quo magis errantes tota regione feruntur.

Where though the poet, speaking carelessly, after the manner of those times, seems to attribute omnipotence and infinite power to gods plurally; yet, as it is evident in the thing itself, that this can only be the attribute of one supreme Deity; so it may be observed, that in those passages of the poets before cited, it is accordingly always ascribed to God singularly. Nevertheless, all the inferior Pagan deities were supposed by them to have their certain shares of this Divine omnipotence, severally dispensed and imparted to them.

ix. But we have not yet dispatched all that belongs to the entire idea of God; for knowledge and power alone will not make a God. For God is generally conceived by all to be a most venerable and most desirable being; whereas, an omniscient and omnipotent arbitrary Deity, that hath nothing either of benignity or morality in its nature, to measure and regulate its will, as it could not be truly august and venerable, according to that maxim, *sine bonitate nulla majestas*; so neither could it be desirable, it being that which could only be feared and dreaded, but not have any firm faith or confidence placed in it. Plutarch, in the life of Aristides: * τὸ Θεῖον τρισὶ δοκεῖ διαφέρειν, ἀφθαρσία, καὶ δυνάμει, καὶ ἀρετῇ· ὧν σεμνότατον ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ θεϊότατόν ἐστι· ἀφθάρτῳ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι καὶ τῷ κενῷ, καὶ τοῖς στοιχείοις συμβέβηκε· δυνάμιν δὲ σεισμοὶ καὶ κέραννοι, καὶ πνευμάτων ὄρμαι καὶ ρευμάτων ἐπιφοραὶ μεγάλην ἔχουσι, &c. God seems to excel in these three things, incorruptibility, power, and virtue; of all which the

* P. 322. tom. i. oper.

most Divine and venerable is virtue: for vacuum and the senseless elements have incorruptibility; earthquakes, and thunders, blustering winds and overflowing torrents, much of power and force. Wherefore, the vulgar being affected three manner of ways towards the Deity, so as to admire its happiness, to fear it, and to honour it; they esteem the Deity happy for its incorruptibility, they fear it and stand in awe of it for its power, but they worship it, that is, love and honour it, for its justice.—And indeed an omnipotent arbitrary Deity may seem to be in some sense a worse and more undesirable thing, than the Manichean evil god; forasmuch as the latter could be but finitely evil, whereas the former might be so infinitely. However, I think, it can be little doubted, but that the whole Manichean hypothesis, taken all together, is to be preferred before this of one omnipotent arbitrary Deity (devoid of goodness and morality) ruling all things; because there the evil principle is yoked with another principle essentially good, checking and controlling it; and it also seems less dishonourable to God, to impute defect of power than of goodness and justice to him.

Neither can power and knowledge alone make a being in itself completely happy; for we have all of us by nature *μαντευμά τι* (as both Plato and Aristotle call it) a certain divination, presage, and parturient vaticination in our minds, of some higher good and perfection than either power or knowledge. Knowledge is plainly to be preferred before power, as being that which guides and directs its blind force and impetus; but Aristotle himself declares, that there is *λόγου τι κρείττον*, which is *λόγου ἀρχή*, something better than

Eth. Eudem.
l. 7. c. 14.
p. 384. tom.
xi. oper.

reason and knowledge, which is the principle and original of all.—For (saith he) λόγου ἀρχὴ οὐ λόγος, ἀλλὰ τι κρείττον·

The principle of reason is not reason, but something better.—Where he also intimates this to be the proper and essential character of the Deity; τί οὖν αὖν κρείττον καὶ ἐπιστήμης, πλὴν ὁ Θεός; For what is there, that can be better than knowledge, but God?—Likewise the same philosopher elsewhere plainly determines, that there is morality in the nature of God; and that his happiness consisteth principally therein, and not in external things,

and the exercise of his power: ὅτι μὲν De Rep. l. 7. c. 3. p. 569. tom. iii. oper. οὖν ἐκάστῳ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἐπιβάλλει τοσοῦτον, ὅσον περ ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως, καὶ τοῦ πράττειν κατὰ ταύτας, ἔστω συνωμολογημένοι ἡμῖν, μάρτυρι τῷ Θεῷ χρωμένοις, ὃς εὐδαίμων μὲν ἐστὶ καὶ μακάριος, δὲ οὐθὲν δὲ τῶν ἑξωτερικῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἀλλὰ δὲ αὐτὸν αὐτὸς, καὶ τῷ ποιῶς τις εἶναι τὴν φύσιν. That every man hath so much of happiness, as he hath of virtue and wisdom, and of acting according to these, ought to be confessed and acknowledged by us, it being a thing, that may be proved from the nature of God, who is happy, but not from any external goods, but because he is himself (or that which he is) and in such a manner affected according to his nature;—that is, because he is essentially moral and virtuous.

Which doctrine of Aristotle's seems to have been borrowed from Plato, who in his dialogues *De Republica*,* discoursing about moral virtue, occasionally falls upon this dispute concerning the *summum bonum*, or chiefest good; wherein he concludes, that it neither consisted in pleasure, as

* De Republica, lib. vi. p. 477. oper.

such, according to the opinion of the vulgar, nor yet in mere knowledge and understanding, according to the conceit of others, who were more polite and ingenious. οἷα ὅτι τοῖς μὲν πολ-

Lib. 6.

λοῖς ἡδονὴ δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθόν, τοῖς δὲ κομψοτέ-
ροις φρόνησις· καὶ ὅτι γε οἱ τοῦτο ἡγούμενοι οὐκ ἔχουσι
δειξαι ἥτις φρόνησις, ἀλλ' ἀναγκάζονται τελευτώντες τὴν τοῦ
ἀγαθοῦ φάναι, μάλα γελοίως, οἰκιδίζοντες γὰρ, ὅτι οὐκ ἴσμεν
τὸ ἀγαθόν, λέγουσι πάλιν ὡς εἰδῶσι· You know that,

to the vulgar, pleasure seems to be the highest good; but to those, who are more elegant and ingenious, knowledge: but they, who entertain this latter opinion, can none of them declare what kind of knowledge it is, which is that highest and chiefest good, but are necessitated at last to say, that it is the knowledge of good, very ridiculously: forasmuch as herein they do but run round in a circle, and upbraiding us for being ignorant of this highest good, they talk to us at the same time, as knowing what it is. And thereupon he adds, Καλῶν ἀμφοτέρων ὄντων, γνώσεώς τε καὶ ἀληθείας, ἄλλο καὶ κάλλιον ἐστὶ τοῦτο ἡγούμενος αὐτὸ, ὁρθῶς ἡγήσεται. Ἐπιστήμην δὲ καὶ ἀλήθειαν, ὥσπερ φῶς τε καὶ ὄψιν ἡλιοειδῆ μὲν νομίζεν ὁρθόν, ἡλίον δὲ ἡγεῖσθαι οὐκ ὁρθῶς, οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀγαθοειδῆ μὲν νομίζειν ἀμφοτέρα ὁρθόν, ἀγαθὸν δὲ ἡγεῖσθαι ὁπότερον αὐτῶν οὐκ ὁρθόν, ἀλλ' ἐστὶ μείζονος τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἕξιν τιμητέον. That though knowledge and truth be both of them excellent things, yet he that shall conclude the chief good to be something which transcends them both, will not be mistaken. For as light, and sight, or the seeing faculty, may both of them rightly be said to be soliform things, or of kin to the sun, but neither of them to be the sun itself; so knowledge and truth may likewise both of them be said to be

boniform things, and of kin to the chief good, but neither of them to be that chief good itself; but this is still to be looked upon as a thing more august and honourable.—In all which of Plato's there seems to be little more, than what may be experimentally found within ourselves; namely, that there is a certain life, or vital and moral disposition of soul, which is much more inwardly and thoroughly satisfactory, not only than sensual pleasure; but also than all knowledge and speculation whatsoever.

Now whatever this chiefest good be, which is a perfection superior to knowledge and understanding; that philosopher resolves, that it must needs be first and principally in God, who is therefore called by him, Ἰδέα τ' ἀγαθοῦ, the very idea or essence of good.—Wherein he trod in the footsteps of the Pythagoreans, and particularly of Timæus Locrus,^b who, making two principles of the universe, mind and necessity, adds, concerning the former, *τοῦτέων τὸν μὲν τὰς τ' ἀγαθοῦ φύσιος εἶμεν, θεόν τε οὐνομαίνεσθαι ἀρχάν τε τῶν ἀρίστων*. The first of these two is of the nature of good, and it is called God, the principle of the best things.—Agreeably with which doctrine of their's, the Hebrew Cabalists also make a Sephirah in the Deity, superior both to Binah and Chochmah (understanding and wisdom), which they call Chether, or the crown. And some would suspect this Cabalistic learning to have been very ancient among the Jews, and that Parmenides was imbued with it, he calling God in like manner *στεφάνην*, or the crown.—For which,

^a Vide Platon. de Republica, lib. ii. p. 431. et Philebum, p. 77, &c.

^b Libro de Anima Mundi, cap. i. p. 543. inter Scriptores Mytholog.

^a Tho. Gale editor.

Velleius in Cicero* (representing the several opinions of philosophers concerning God), perstringes him amongst the rest; “*Parmenides commentitium quiddam coronæ similitudine efficit, Stephanem appellat, continentem ardore lucis orbem, qui cingit cælum, quem appellat deum.*”

But all this while we seem to be to seek, what the chief and highest good superior to knowledge is, in which the essence of the Deity principally consists; and it cannot be denied, but that Plato sometimes talks too metaphysically and cloudily about it; for which cause, as he lay open to the lash of Aristotle, so was he also vulgarly perstringed for it, as appears by that of Amphys the poet in Laertius:^b

Τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν εἰ, τι ποτ' ἔστιν, ὃ σὺ πυχάνειν
Μάλας διὰ ταύτης, ἔττες ὅλα τοῦτ' ἐγὼ,
ἢ τὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος Ἀγαθόν.

What good that is, which you expect from hence, I confess, I less understand, than I do Plato's good.—Nevertheless, he plainly intimates these two things concerning it: first, that this nature of good, which is also the nature of God, includes benignity in it, when he gives this account of God's both making the world, and after such a manner—“*Because he was good, and that which is good, hath no envy in it; and therefore he both made the world, and also made it as well, and as like to himself as was possible.*”—And, secondly, that it comprehends eminently all virtue and justice, the Divine Nature being the first pattern hereof; for which cause virtue is defined

* De Natura Deorum, lib. i. cap. x. p. 2895. oper. tom. ix.

† Lib. iii. segm. 27. p. 181.

‡ Vide Platon. in Timæo, p. 527.

to be, an assimilation to the Deity. Justice and honesty are no factious things, made by the will and command of the more powerful to the weaker, but they are nature and perfection, and descend downward to us from the Deity.

But the Holy Scripture, without any metaphysical pomp and obscurity, tells us plainly, both what is that highest perfection of intellectual beings, which is *κρείττον λόγου καὶ ἐπιστήμης*, better than reason and knowledge,—and which is also the source, life, and soul of all morality; namely, that it is love or charity. Though I speak with the tongue of men and angels, and have not love, I am but *χαλκός ἢ ὡν, ἢ κύμβαλον ἀλαλάζον*, as sounding brass, or a tinkling cymbal;—which only makes a noise without any inward life. And though I have prophecy, and understand all mysteries and all knowledge, and though I have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not love, I am nothing; that is, I have no inward satisfaction, peace, or true happiness. And though I bestow all my goods to feed the poor, and give my body to be burned, and have not love, it profiteth me nothing; I am for all that utterly destitute of all true morality, virtue, and grace. And accordingly it tells us also, in the next place, what the nature of God is—that he is properly neither power nor knowledge (though having the perfection of both in him), but love. And certainly whatever dark thoughts, concerning the Deity, some men in their cells may sit brooding on, it can never reasonably be conceived, that that which is *ικανώτατον πάντων καὶ αὐταρκέστατον*, the most self-sufficient and self-happy being,—should have any narrow and selfish designs abroad, with-

out itself, much less harbour any malignant and despightful ones towards its creatures. Nevertheless, because so many are apt to abuse the notion of the Divine love and goodness, and to frame such conceptions of it, as destroy that awful and reverential fear that ought to be had of the Deity, and make men presumptuous and regardless of their lives; therefore we think fit here to superadd, also, that God is no soft nor fond and partial love, but that justice is an essential branch of this Divine goodness; God being, as the writer *De Mundo*^a well expresses it, νόμος ἰσοκλής, an impartial law;—and as Plato,^b μέτρον πάντων, the measure of all things.—In imitation whereof, Aristotle concludes also, that a good man (in a lower and more imperfect sense) is μέτρον too, an impartial measure of things and actions.

It is evident, that the Atheists themselves, in those former times of Paganism, took it for granted, that goodness was an essential attribute of the Deity, whose existence they opposed (so that it was then generally acknowledged for such, by the Pagan Theists), from those argumentations of their's, before-mentioned, the 12th and 13th, taken from the topic of evils, the pretended ill frame of things, and want of providence over human affairs. Which, if they were true, would not at all disprove such an arbitrary Deity (as is now fancied by some) made up of nothing but will and power, without any essential goodness and justice. But those arguments of the Atheists are directly levelled against the Deity, according to the true notion or idea of it; and could they be made good,

^a Cap. vi., p. 865. tom. i. oper. Aristotelis.

^b De Legibus, lib. iv. p. 601.

would do execution upon the same. For it cannot be denied, but that the natural consequence of this doctrine, that there is a God essentially good, is this, that therefore the world is well made and governed. But we shall afterwards declare, that though there be evil in the parts of the world, yet there is none in the whole; and that moral evils are not imputable to the Deity.

And now we have proposed the three principal attributes of the Deity. The first whereof is infinite goodness with fecundity; the second, infinite knowledge and wisdom; and the last, infinite active and perceptive power. From which Divine attributes, the Pythagoreans and Platonists seem to have framed their trinity of archical hypotheses, such as have the nature of principles in the universe, and which, though they apprehended as several distinct substances, gradually subordinate to one another, yet they many times extend the τὸ Θεῖον so far, as to comprehend them all within it. Which Pythagoric trinity seems to be intimated

by Aristotle in these words: καθάπερ γὰρ De Cael. l. 1. c. 1. p. 610. tom. i. oper. φασὶ καὶ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι τὸ πᾶν καὶ τὰ πάντα τοῖς ἑσσι διώμεσθαι. As the Pythagoreans also say, the universe, and all things, are determined and contained by three principles.—Of which Pythagoric trinity more afterwards. But now we may enlarge and fill up that compendious idea of God premised, of a being absolutely perfect, by adding thereunto (to make it more particular) such as infinitely good, wise, and powerful, necessarily existing, and not only the framer of the world, but also the cause of all things. Which idea of the Deity is sufficient, in order to our present undertaking.

Nevertheless, if we would not only attend to what is barely necessary for a dispute with Atheists, but also consider the satisfaction of other free and devout minds, that are hearty and sincere lovers of this most admirable and most glorious being, we might venture for their gratification to propose yet a more full, free, and copious description of the Deity, after this manner.—God is a being absolutely perfect, unmade, or self-originated, and necessarily existing; that hath an infinite fecundity in him, and virtually contains all things; as also an infinite benignity or overflowing love, uninviciously displaying and communicating itself; together with an impartial rectitude, or nature of justice; who fully comprehends himself, and the extent of his own fecundity, and therefore all the possibilities of things, their several natures and respects, and the best frame or system of the whole; who hath also infinite active and perceptive power; the fountain of all things, who made all that could be made, and was fit to be made, producing them according to his own nature (his essential goodness and wisdom), and therefore according to the best pattern, and in the best manner possible, for the good of the whole; and reconciling all the variety and contrariety of things in the universe into one most admirable and lovely harmony. Lastly, who contains and upholds all things, and governs them after the best manner also, and that without any force or violence, they being all naturally subject to his authority, and readily obeying his law. And now we see, that God is such a being, as that, if he could be supposed not to be, there is

nothing whose existence a good man could possibly more wish or desire.

x. From the idea of God thus declared, it evidently appears, that there can be but one such being, and that *Μόνος*, unity, oneliness, or singularity is essential to it; forasmuch as there cannot possibly be more than one Supreme, more than one Omnipotent, or infinitely powerful Being, and more than one cause of all things besides itself. And however Epicurus, endeavouring to pervert and adulterate the notion of God, pretended to satisfy that natural prolepsis or anticipation in the minds of men, by a feigned and counterfeit asserting of a multiplicity of co-ordinate deities, independent upon one Supreme, and such as were also altogether unconcerned either in the frame or government of the world, yet himself, notwithstanding, plainly took notice of this idea of God, which we have proposed, including unity or oneliness in it (he professedly opposing the existence of such a Deity); as may sufficiently appear from that argumentation of his, in the words before cited:

Lib. 2. p. 198. Lamb.	Quis regere immensi summam, quis habere profundi Inde manu validas potis est moderanter habenas? Quis pariter ocelos omnes convertere, et omnes Ignibus aetheriis terras suffire feraces? Omnibus inque locis esse omni tempore præsto?
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Where he would conclude it to be a thing utterly impossible, for the Deity to animadvert, order, and dispose all things, and be present every where in all the distant places of the world at once; which could not be pretended of a multitude of co-ordinate gods, sharing the govern-

ment of the world amongst them; and, therefore, it must needs be levelled against a Divine monarchy, or one single, solitary, supreme Deity, ruling over all. As, in like manner, when he pursues the same argument further in Cicero, to this purpose, that though such a thing were supposed to be possible, yet it would be, notwithstanding, absolutely inconsistent with the happiness of any being, he still proceeds upon the same hypothesis of one sole and single

Deity: "Sive ipse mundus Deus est, quid potest esse minus quietum, quam nullo puncto temporis intermisso, versari circum axem cœli admirabili celeritate? sive in ipso mundo Deus inest aliquis, qui regat, qui gubernet, qui cursus astrorum, mutationes temporum, hominum commoda vitasque tueatur; nã ille est implicatus molestis negotiis et operosis."

De Nat. D.
l. 1. cap. xx.
p. 2909. tom.
ix. oper.

Whether you will suppose the world itself to be a God, what can be more unquiet, than without intermission perpetually to whirl round upon the axis of the heaven with such admirable celerity? or whether you will imagine a God in the world distinct from it, who does govern and dispose all things, keep up the courses of the stars, the successive changes of the seasons, and orderly vicissitudes of things, and contemplating lands and seas, conserve the utilities and lives of men; certainly he must needs be involved in much solicitous trouble and employment.—For, as Epicurus here speaks singularly, so the trouble of this theocracy could not be thought so very great to a multitude of co-ordinate deities, when parcelled out among them, but would rather seem to be but a sportful and delightful divertisement

to each of them. Wherefore it is manifest, that such an idea of God, as we have declared, including unity, oneliness and singularity in it, is a thing, which the ancient Atheists, under the times of Paganism, were not unacquainted with, but principally directed their force against. But this may seem to be anticipated in this place, because it will fall in afterwards more opportunely to be discoursed of again.

XI. For this is that, which lies as the grand prejudice and objection against that idea of God, which we have proposed, essentially including *μόνωσιν*, singularity or oneliness in it, or the real existence of such a Deity, as is the sole monarch of the universe; because all the nations of the world heretofore (except a small and inconsiderable handful of the Jews), together with their wisest men, and greatest philosophers, were generally looked upon as Polytheists, that is, such as acknowledged and worshipped a multiplicity of gods. Now one God, and many gods, being directly contradictions to one another, it is therefore concluded from hence, that this opinion of monarchy, or of one supreme God, the maker and governor of all, hath no foundation in nature, nor in the genuine ideas and prolepses of men's minds, but is a mere artificial thing, owing its original wholly to private fancies and conceits, or to positive laws and institutions, amongst Jews, Christians, and Mahometans.

For the assoiling of which difficulty (seeming so formidable at first sight), it is necessary that we should make a diligent inquiry into the true and genuine sense of this Pagan Polytheism. For since it is impossible, that any man in his wits

should believe a multiplicity of gods, according to that idea of God before declared, that is, a multiplicity of supreme, omnipotent, or infinitely powerful beings; it is certain, that the Pagan Polytheism, and multiplicity of gods, must be understood according to some other notion of the word gods, or some equivocation in the use of it. It hath been already observed, that there were some time amongst the Pagans such, who, meaning nothing else by gods but understanding beings superior to men, did suppose a multitude of such deities, which yet they conceived to be all (as well as men) native and mortal, generated successively out of matter, and corrupted again into it, as Democritus's idols were. But these Theogonists, who thus generated all things whatsoever, and therefore the gods themselves universally, out of night and chaos, the ocean or fluid matter (notwithstanding their using the name gods) are plainly condemned both by Aristotle and Plato for downright Atheists, they making senseless matter the only self-existent thing, and the original of all things.

Wherefore there may be another notion of the word gods, as taken for understanding beings superior to men, that are not only immortal, but also self-existent and unmade. And, indeed, the assertors of a multiplicity of such gods as these, though they cannot be accounted Theists in a strict and proper sense (according to that idea of God before declared), yet they are not vulgarly reputed Atheists neither, but looked upon as a kind of middle thing betwixt both, and commonly called Polytheists. The reason whereof seems to be this, because it is generally apprehended to be

essential to Atheism, to make senseless matter the sole original of all things, and consequently to suppose all conscious intellectual beings to be made or generated. Wherefore they, who, on the contrary, assert (not one but) many understanding beings unmade and self-existent, must needs be looked upon as those who, of the two, approach nearer to Theism than to Atheism, and so deserve rather to be called Polytheists than Atheists.

And there is no question to be made, but that the urgers of the forementioned objection against that idea of God, which includes oneliness and singularity in it, from the Pagan Polytheism, or multiplicity of gods, take it for granted, that this is to be understood of many unmade self-existent deities, independent upon one Supreme, that are so many first principles in the universe, and partial causes of the world. And certainly, if it could be made to appear, that the Pagan Polytheists did universally acknowledge such a multiplicity of unmade, self-existent deities, then the argument fetched from thence, against the naturality of that idea of God proposed (essentially including singularity in it), might seem to have no small force or validity in it.

XII. But, first, this opinion of many self-existent deities, independent upon one Supreme, is both very irrational in itself, and also plainly repugnant to the phenomena. We say, first, it is irrational in itself, because self-existence and necessary existence being essential to a perfect being, and to nothing else, it must needs be very irrational and absurd to suppose a multitude of imperfect understanding beings self-existent, and no perfect one. Moreover, if imperfect under-

standing beings were imagined to exist of themselves from eternity, there could not possibly be any reason given, why just so many of them should exist, and neither more nor less, there being indeed no reason why any at all should. But if it be supposed, that these many self-existent deities happened only to exist thus from eternity, and their existence, notwithstanding, was not necessary, but contingent; the consequence hereof will be, that they might as well happen again to cease to be, and so could not be incorruptible. Again, if any one imperfect being whatsoever could exist of itself from eternity, then all might as well do so, not only matter, but also the souls of men, and other animals; and, consequently, there could be no creation by any Deity, nor those supposed deities therefore deserve that name. Lastly, we might also add, that there could not be a multitude of intellectual beings self-existent, because it is a thing, which may be proved by reason, that all imperfect understanding beings or minds do partake of one perfect mind, and suppose also omnipotence or infinite power; were it not, that this is a consideration too remote from vulgar apprehension, and therefore not so fit to be urged in this place.

Again, as this opinion of many self-existent deities is irrational in itself, so is it likewise plainly repugnant to the phenomena of the world. In which, as Macrobius writes, *omnia sunt connexa*, all things conspire together into one harmony, and are carried on peaceably and quietly, constantly and evenly, without any tumult or hurly-burly, confusion or disorder, or the least appear-

* In Somn. Scip. lib. i. cap. xiv. p. 75.

ance of schism and faction; which could not possibly be supposed, were the world made and governed by a rabble of self-existent deities, co-ordinate, and independent upon one Supreme.

Wherefore this kind of Polytheism was *obiter* thus confuted by Origen: κόσμῳ οὖν βέλτιον τὸ ἐκ τῶν ὁραμένων παιθόμενον τοῖς κατὰ τὴν εὐταξίαν τοῦ κόσμου σίβην τὸν δημιουργόν αὐτοῦ ἐνὸς ὄντος ἑνα, καὶ συμπνέοντος αὐτοῦ ὅλην ἑαυτῷ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μὴ δυναμένου ὑπὸ πολλῶν δημιουργῶν γεγονέναι, ὡς οὐδ' ὑπὸ πολλῶν ψυχῶν συνέχεσθαι ὅλον τὸν οὐρανὸν κινουσῶν; How much better is it, agreeably to what we see in the harmonious system of the world, to worship one only maker of the world, which is one, and conspiring throughout with its whole self, and therefore could not be made by many artificers, as neither be contained by many souls, moving the whole heaven?—Now since this opinion is both irrational in itself, and repugnant to the phenomena, there is the less probability, that it should have been received and entertained by all the more intelligent Pagans.

XIII. Who, that they did not thus universally look upon all their gods as so many unmade self-existent beings, is unquestionably manifest from hence, because ever since Hesiod's and Homer's time at least, the Greekish Pagans generally acknowledged a theogonia, a generation, and temporary production of the gods; which yet is not to be understood universally neither, forasmuch as he is no Theist, who does not acknowledge some self-existent deity. Concerning this theogonia, Herodotus writeth after this manner: ὅθεν γὰρ ἐγένετο ἕκαστος τῶν θεῶν, εἴτε αἰὶ ἦσαν πάντες, ὁκοῖοί τε τινες τὰ εἶδεα, οὐκ

Contr. Cels.
l. 1. p. 18.
edit. Cantabrig.
brig.

Euter. p. 53.
lib. 2. cap.
53. p. 109.
edit. Gronov.

ἡπιστάτο μέχρι οὗ πρώην τε καὶ χθές, ὡς εἰπεῖν λόγῳ·
 Ἡσίοδον γάρ καὶ Ὅμηρον ἡλικίην τετρακοσίοισι ἔτεσι
 δοκῶ μὲν πρεσβυτέρους γενέσθαι, καὶ οὐ πλείοσι. οὗτοι δὲ
 εἰσὶ οἱ ποιήσαντες Θεογονίαν Ἑλλήσι, καὶ τοῖσι θεοῖσι τὰς
 ἐπωνυμίας δόντες. Whence every one of the gods
 was generated, or whether they all of them ever
 were, and what are their forms, is a thing that
 was not known till very lately; for Hesiod and
 Homer were (as I suppose) not above four hun-
 dred years my seniors. And these were they,
 who introduced the theogonia among the Greeks,
 and gave the gods their several names:—that is,
 settled the Pagan theology. Now, if before He-
 siod's and Homer's time, it were a thing not known
 or determined amongst the Greeks, whether their
 gods were generated, or all of them existed from
 eternity; then it was not universally concluded
 by them, that they were all unmade and self-ex-
 istent. And though, perhaps, some might in those
 ancient times believe one way, and some another,
 concerning the generation and eternity of their
 gods; yet it does not follow, that they, who
 thought them to be all eternal, must there-
 fore needs suppose them to be also unmade or
 self-existent. For Aristotle, who asserted the
 eternity of the world, and consequently also of
 those gods of his, the heavenly bodies, did not,
 for all that, suppose them to be self-existent
 or first principles, but all to depend upon one
 principle or original Deity. And, indeed, the
 true meaning of that question in Herodotus, whe-
 ther the gods were generated or existed all of
 them from eternity, is (as we suppose) really no
 other than that of Plato's, εἰ γέγονεν ὁ κόσμος ἢ ἀγε-
 νῆς ἐστι. Whether the world were made or unmade?

—and whether it had a temporary beginning, or existed such as it is from eternity; which will be more fully declared afterwards. But ever since Hesiod's and Homer's time, that the theogonia or generation of the gods was settled, and generally believed amongst the Greeks, it is certain, that they could not possibly think all their gods eternal, and therefore much less unmade and self-existent.

But though we have thus clearly proved, that all the Pagan gods were not universally accounted by them so many unmade self-existent deities, they acknowledging a theogonia, or a generation of gods; yet it may be suspected, notwithstanding, that they might suppose a multitude of them also (and not only one) to have been unmade from eternity and self-existent. Wherefore we add, in the next place, that no such a thing does at all appear neither, as that the Pagans or any others did ever publicly or professedly assert a multitude of unmade self-existent deities. For, first, it is plain concerning the Hesiodian gods, which were all the gods of the Greekish Pagans, that either there was but one of them only self-existent, or else none at all. Because Hesiod's gods were either all of them derived from chaos (or the floating water), love itself being generated likewise out of it (according to that Aristophanic tradition before-mentioned); or else love was supposed to be a distinct principle from chaos, namely, the active principle of the universe, from whence, together with chaos, all the theogonia and cosmogonia was derived. Now, if the former of these were true, that Hesiod supposed all his gods universally to have been generated and

sprung originally from chaos, or the ocean ; then it is plain, that notwithstanding all that rabble of gods mustered up by him, he could be no other than one of those Atheistic Theogonists before-mentioned, and really acknowledged no God at all, according to the true idea of him ; he being not a Theist, who admits of no self-existent Deity. But if the latter be true, that Hesiod supposed love to be a principle distinct from chaos, namely. the active principle of the universe, and derived all his other gods from thence, he was then a right pagan Theist, such as acknowledged indeed many gods, but only one of them unmade and self-existent, all the rest being generated or created by that one. Indeed, it appears from those passages of Aristotle, before cited P. 116. 112. by us, that that philosopher had been sometimes divided in his judgment concerning Hesiod, where he should rank him, whether among the Atheists or the Theists. For in his book *De Cælo* he ranks him amongst those, who made all things to be generated and corrupted, besides the bare substance of the matter, that is, amongst the absolute Atheists, and looked upon him as a ringleader of them ; but in his *Metaphysics*, upon further thoughts, suspects, that many of those, who made love the chiefest of the gods, were Theists, they supposing it to be a first principle in the universe, or the active cause of things, and that not only Parmenides, but also Hesiod, was such. Which latter opinion of his is by far the more probable, and therefore embraced by Plutarch,* who somewhere determines Hesiod to have asserted one θεὸν ἀγέννητον, or unmade Deity ; as also by the ancient schol-

* De Placitis Philosophor. lib. i. cap. vi. p. 880.

liast upon him, writing thus, that Hesiod's love was ὁ οὐράνιος ἔρως, ὃς καὶ Θεός· ὁ γὰρ ἐξ Ἀφροδίτης νεώτερός ἐστιν· The heavenly love, which is also God; that other love, that was born of Venus, being junior.—But Joannes Diaconus; ἔρωτα δὲ ἐνταῦθα νοητέον, οὐ τὸν τῆς Ἀφροδίτης παῖδα, πῶς γὰρ τῆς μητρὸς μήπω γεγονύας οὗτος παράγεται; ἀλλ' ἄλλον τινα πρεσβυγενῆ ἔρωτα. οἶμαι δὲ τὴν ἐγκατασταρμένην φυσικῶς κινητικὴν αἰτίαν ἐκάστω τῶν ὄντων. By love here (saith he), we must not understand Venus's son, whose mother was as yet unborn, but another more ancient love, which I take to be the active cause or principle of motion, naturally inserted into things.—Where, though he do not seem to suppose this love to be God himself, yet he conceives it to be an active principle in the universe derived from God, and not from matter. But this opinion will be further confirmed afterward.

The next considerable appearance of a multitude of self-existent deities, seems to be in the Valentinian thirty gods and æons, which have been taken by some for such; but it is certain, that these were all of them, save one, generated; they being derived by that fantastic deviser of them, from one self-originated deity, called Bythus. For thus

Epiphanius informs us, *τριάκοντα γὰρ καὶ ἑκατὸν Θεοὺς καὶ Αἰῶνας καὶ Οὐρανούς βούλεται*

παρεῖσθαι, ὧν ὁ πρῶτός ἐστι Βυθός· This (Valentinus) would also introduce thirty gods and æons, and heavens, the first of which is Bythus;—he meaning thereby an unfathomable depth and profundity; and therefore, this Bythus was also called by him, ὁ ἀνοράτω καὶ ἀκατονόμαστος πατήρ, the highest and ineffable Father.

We do indeed acknowledge, that there have

been some, who have really asserted a duplicity of gods, in the sense declared, that is, of animalish or perceptive beings self-existent; one as the principle of good, and the other of evil. And this Ditheism of theirs seems to be the nearest approach, that was ever really made to Polytheism; unless we should here give heed to Plutarch,* who seems to make the ancient Persians, besides their two gods, the good and the evil, or Oromasdes and Arimanius, to have asserted also a third middle deity, called by them, Mithras; or to some ecclesiastic writers, who impute a trinity of gods to Marcion^b (though Tertullian^c be yet more liberal, and increase the number to an ennead). For those, that were commonly called Tritheists, being but mistaken Christians and Trinitarians, fall not under this consideration. Now, as for that forementioned Ditheism, or opinion of two gods, a good and an evil one, it is evident, that its original sprung from nothing else, but first a firm persuasion of the essential goodness of the Deity, together with a conceit, that the evil that is in the world, was altogether inconsistent and unreconcilable with the same; and that, therefore, for the solving of this phenomenon, it was absolutely necessary to suppose another animalish principle self-existent, or an evil god. Wherefore, as these Ditheists, as to all that which is good in the world, held a monarchy, or one sole principle and original; so it is plain, that had it not been for this business of evil (which they conceived could not

* De Iside et Osiride, tom. ii. p. 369.

^b Vide Euseb. Hist. Eccles. lib. v. cap. xiii. p. 177. et auctores illos quos Jo. Bapt. Cotelerius laudat ad Constit. Apost. p. 339. tom. i. Patrum Apostol.

^c Libro i. adversus Marcionem, cap. xvi. p. 237, 238.

be solved any other way) they would never have asserted any more principles or gods than one.

The chiefest and most eminent assertors of which ditheistic doctrine of two self-existent animalish principles in the universe, a good god and an evil demon, were the Marcionites and the Manicheans; both of which, though they made some slight pretences to Christianity, yet were not by Christians owned for such. But it is certain, that besides these, and before them too, some of the professed Pagans also entertained the same opinion, that famous moralist, Plutarchus Chæronensis being an undoubted patron of it; which in his book *De Iside et Osiride* he represents, with some little difference, after this manner; μεμιγμένη

P. 371. Παρ. γὰρ ἡ τοῦδε τοῦ κόσμου γένεσις καὶ σύστασις ἐξ ἐναντίων, οὐ μὲν ἰσοσθενῶν δυνάμεων, ἀλλὰ τῆς βελτίονος τὸ κράτος ἐστίν· ἀπολείσθαι δὲ τὴν φαύλην παντάπασιν ἀδύνατον, πολλὴν μὲν ἐμπεφυκυῖαν τῷ σώματι, πολλὴν δὲ τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦ παντός, αἱ πρὸς τὴν βελτίονα δυσμαχοῦσαν. The generation and constitution of this world is mixed of contrary powers or principles (the one good, the other evil), yet so as that they are not both of equal force, but the better of them more prevalent: notwithstanding which, it is also absolutely impossible for the worser power or principle to be ever utterly destroyed, much of it being always intermingled in the soul, and much in the body of the universe, there perpetually tugging against the better principle.

Indeed, learned men of later times have, for the most part, looked upon Plutarch here, but either as a bare relater of the opinion of other philosophers, or else as a follower only, and not a leader in it. Notwithstanding which, it is evident,

that Plutarch was himself heartily engaged in this opinion, he discovering no small fondness for it, in sundry of his other writings; as, for example, in his Platonic questions, where he thus declares himself concerning it, ἡ τὸ πολλάκις ὑφ' p. 1003. Par. ἡμῶν λεγόμενον ἀληθές ἐστίν, ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἄνους tom. ii. oper. ψυχὴ, καὶ τὸ ἄμορφον σῶμα, συνυπῆρχον ἀλλήλοις αἰεὶ, καὶ τὸ οὐδέτερον αὐτῶν γένεσιν ἔχει οὐδὲ ἀρχὴν or else that which is often affirmed by us is true, that a mad irrational soul, and an unformed disorderly body, did co-exist with one another from eternity, neither of them having any generation or beginning.—And in his *Timæan Psychogonia* he does at large industriously maintain the same, there and elsewhere* endeavouring to establish this doctrine, as much as possibly he could, upon rational foundations. As, first, that nothing can be made or produced without a cause; and therefore there must of necessity, be some cause of evil also, and that a positive one too; he representing the opinion of those as very ridiculous, who would make the nature of evil to be but ἐπισώδιον, an accidental appendix to the world, and all that evil which is in it, to have come in only by the bye, and by consequence, without any positive cause. Secondly, that God being essentially good could not possibly be the cause of evil, where he highly applauds Plato for removing God to the greatest distance imaginable from being the cause of evil. Thirdly, that as God could not, so neither could ὅλη ἄποιος, matter in itself devoid of all form and quality, be the cause of evil, noting this to have been the subterfuge of the Stoics. Upon which account

* Libro de Iside et Osiride, p. 369, et Psychogon. p. 1014, 1015. tom. ii. oper.

he often condemns them, but uncertainly, sometimes as such, who assigned no cause at all of evils, and sometimes again as those, who made God the cause of them. For in his *Psychogonia*^a he concludes, that unless we acknowledge a substantial evil principle, αἱ Στοιχαὶ καταλαμβάνουσιν ἡμᾶς ἀπορίαι, τὸ κακὸν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἀναίτιως καὶ ἀγεννήτως ἐπεισάγοντες, ἐπὶ τῶν γε ὄντων οὔτε τὸ ἀγαθόν, οὔτε τὸ ἄποιον, εἰκός ἐστιν οὐσίαν κακοῦ καὶ γένεσιν παρασχεῖν. The Stoical difficulties will of necessity overtake and involve us, who introduce evil into the world from nothing, or without a cause, since neither that which is essentially good (as God), nor yet that which is devoid of all quality (as matter), could possibly give being or generation to it.—But in his book against the Stoics,^b he accuses them as those, who made God, essentially good, the cause of evil. Αὐτοὶ τὴν κακῶν ἀρχὴν ἀγαθὸν ὄντα τὸν θεὸν ποιοῦσι, οὐ γὰρ ἡ ὕλη τὸ κακὸν ἐξ αὐτῆς παρέσχηκεν, ἄποιος γὰρ ἐστι καὶ πάσας ὅσας δέχεται διαφορὰς, ὑπὸ τοῦ ποιοῦντος αὐτὴν καὶ σχηματίζοντος ἐσχηκεν ὥστε ἀνάγκη τὸ κακὸν, εἰ μὲν οὐδὲν, ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, εἰ δὲ διὰ τὴν κινούσαν ἀρχὴν ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ γέγονος ὑπάρχειν. Themselves make God being good the principle and cause of evil, since matter, which is devoid of quality, and receives all its differences from the active principle that moves and forms it, could not possibly be the cause thereof. Wherefore, evil must of necessity, either come from nothing, or else it must come from the active and moving principle, which is God.—Now from all these premises joined together, Plutarch concludes, that the phenomenon of evil could no otherwise possibly be solved, than by supposing a substantial principle for it, and a certain irra-

^a P. 1015. tom. ii. oper.^b P. 1076. tom. ii. oper.

tional and maleficent soul or demon, unmade, and co-existing with God and matter from eternity, to have been the cause thereof. And accordingly he resolves, that as whatsoever is good in the soul and body of the universe, and likewise in the souls of men and demons, is to be ascribed to God as its only original; so whatsoever is evil, irregular and disorderly in them, ought to be imputed to this other substantial principle, a ψυχὴ ἄνοητος καὶ κακοποιός, an irrational and maleficent soul or demon,—which insinuating itself every where throughout the world, is all along intermingled with the better principle: * καὶ μὴ πᾶν εἶναι ἔργον τοῦ θεοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν, so that neither the soul of the universe, nor that of men and demons, was wholly the workmanship of God, but the lower, brutish, and disorderly part of them the effect of the evil principle.

But, besides all this, it is evident, that Plutarch was also strongly possessed with a conceit, that nothing substantial could be created (no not by Divine power) out of nothing pre-existing; and, therefore, that all the substance of whatsoever is in the world, did exist from eternity unmade; so that God was only the orderer or the methodizer and harmonizer thereof. Wherefore, as he concluded, that the corporeal world was not created by God out of nothing, as to the substance of it, but only the pre-existing matter, which before moved disorderly, was brought into this regular order and harmony by him; in like manner he resolved, that the soul of the world (for such a thing is always supposed by him) was not made by God out of nothing neither, nor out of any thing inani-

* Plutarch, de Animæ. Procreat. ex Timæo, p. 1027.

mate and soul-less pre-existing, but out of a pre-existing disorderly soul, was brought into an orderly and regular frame; ἀκοσμία γὰρ ἦν τὰ
De Psychog.
p. 1014. Pär. πρὸ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου γενέσεως, ἀκοσμία δὲ οὐκ ἀσώματος οὐδὲ ἀκίνητος, οὐδὲ ἄψυχος, ἀλλὰ ἄμορφον μὲν καὶ ἀσύστατον τὸ σωματικόν, ἐμπληκτον δὲ καὶ ἄλογον τὸ κινητικὸν ἔχουσα· τοῦτο δὲ ἦν ἀναρμοστία ψυχῆς οὐκ ἔχούσης λόγον· ὁ γὰρ θεὸς οὔτε σῶμα τὸ ἀσώματος, οὔτε ψυχὴν τὸ ἄψυχον ἐποίησεν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἀρμόνικον ἄνδρα, &c. There was unformed matter before this orderly world was made, which matter was not incorporeal, nor unmoved or inanimate, but body discomposed and acted by a furious and irrational mover, the deformity whereof was the disharmony of a soul in it, devoid of reason. For God neither made body out of that which was no body, nor soul out of no soul. But as the musician, who neither makes voice nor motion, does by ordering of them, notwithstanding, produce harmony; so God, though he neither made the tangible and resisting substance of body, nor the fantastic and self-moving power of soul, yet taking both those principles pre-existing (the one of which was dark and obscure, the other turbulent and irrational), and orderly disposing and harmonizing of them, he did by that means produce this most beautiful and perfect animal of the world.—And further, to the same purpose: οὐχὶ σώματος ἀπλῶς, οὐδὲ ὄγκου καὶ ὕλης, ἀλλὰ συμμετρίας περὶ σῶμα καὶ κάλλους καὶ ὁμοιότητος, ἦν ὁ θεὸς πατὴρ καὶ δημιουργός· ταῦτα δεῖ διανοεῖσθαι καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς, ὡς τὴν μὲν οὔτε ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ γενομένην οὔτε κόσμου ψυχὴν οὔσαν, ἀλλὰ τινα φανταστικῆς καὶ δοξαστικῆς, ἀλόγου δὲ καὶ ἀτάκτου φορᾶς καὶ ὀρμῆς δύνάμιν αὐτοκίνητον καὶ ἀκίνητον· τὴν δὲ αὐτὸς ὁ θεὸς διαρμολάμενος, προσήκουσιν ἀριθμοῖς καὶ λόγοις, ἐγκατέστησεν ἡγεμόνα τοῦ κόσμου

γεγονότος γεννητὴν οὖσαν. God was not the cause or maker of body simply, that is, neither of bulk nor matter, but only of that symmetry and pulchritude which is in body, and that likeness which it hath to himself; which same ought to be concluded also concerning the soul of the world, that the substance of it was not made by God neither; nor yet that it was always the soul of this world, but at first a certain self-moving substance, endowed with a fantastic power, irrational and disorderly, existing such of itself from eternity, which God, by harmonizing, and introducing into it fitting numbers and proportions, made to be the soul and prince of this generated world.—According to which doctrine of Plutarch's, in the supposed soul of the world, though it had a temporary beginning, yet was it never created out of nothing, but only that, which pre-existed disorderly, being acted by the Deity, was brought into a regular frame. And therefore he concludes, ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ μετασχοῦσα καὶ λογισμοῦ καὶ ἁρμονίας, οὐκ ἔργον ἐστὶ τοῦ θεοῦ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ μέρος, οὐδ' ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ γέγονεν. Soul partaking of mind, reason, and harmony, is not only the work of God, but also a part of him; nor is it a thing so much made by him, as from him, and existing out of him.—And the same must he likewise affirm concerning all other souls, as those of men and demons, that they are either all of them the substance of God himself, together with that of the evil demon; or else certain deliberations from both, (if any one could understand it) blended and confounded together; he not allowing any new substance at all to be created by God out of nothing pre-existent. It was observed in the beginning of this chapter,

that Plutarch was an assertor of two *αὐθιγότερα* or self-existent principles in the universe, God and matter; but now we understand, that he was an earnest propugnator of another third principle (as himself calls it) besides them both, viz. a *ψυχὴ ἄνοος καὶ κακουργός*, a mad, irrational, and maleficent soul or demon:—so that Plutarch was both a Triarchist and a Ditheist, an assertor of three principles, but of two gods; according to that forementioned notion of a God, as it is taken for an animalish or perceptive being self-existent.

We are not ignorant, that Plutarch endeavours with all his might to persuade this to have been the constant belief of all the Pagan nations, and of all the wisest men and philosophers that ever were amongst them. “For this (saith he, in his book *De Iside et Osiride*) is a most ancient opinion, that hath been delivered down from theologers and law-makers, all along to poets and philosophers; and though the first author thereof be unknown, yet hath it been so firmly believed every where, that the footsteps of it have been imprinted upon the sacrifices and mysteries or religious rites, both of Barbarians and Greeks; namely, that the world is neither wholly ungoverned by any mind or reason, as if all things floated in the streams of chance and fortune, nor yet that there is any one principle steering and guiding all, without resistance or control; because there is a confused mixture of good and evil in every thing, and nothing is produced by nature sincere. Wherefore it is not one only dispenser of things, who, as it were, out of several vessels distributeth those several liquors of good and evil, mingling them together, and

• Tom. ii. oper. p. 369.

dashing them as he pleaseth ; but there are two distinct and contrary powers or principles in the world, one of them always leading as it were to the right hand, but the other tugging a contrary way. Insomuch that our whole life, and the whole world, is a certain mixture and confusion of these two ; at least this terrestrial world below the moon is such, all being every where full of irregularity and disorder. For if nothing can be made without a cause, and that which is good cannot be the cause of evil, there must needs be a distinct principle in nature, for the production of evil as well as good. And this hath been the opinion of the most and wisest men, some of them affirming θεοὺς εἶναι δύο καθάπερ ἀντιτέχνους, that there are two gods as it were of contrary crafts and trades, one whereof is the maker of all good, and the other of all evil ; but others calling the good principle only a God, and the evil principle a demon, as Zoroaster the magician." Besides which Zoroaster and the Persian magi, Plutarch pretends, that the footsteps of this opinion were to be found also in the astrology of the Chaldeans, and in the mysteries and religious rites, not only of the Egyptians, but also of the Grecians themselves ; and, lastly, he particularly imputes the same to all the most famous of the Greek philosophers, as Pythagoras, Empedocles, Heraclitus, Anaxagoras, Plato, and Aristotle ; though his chiefest endeavour of all be to prove, that Plato was an undoubted champion for it: Ἀλλὰ De Psychog.
ταυτὸ Πλάτων οὐκ ἔπαθε τοῖς ὕστερον, οὐδὲ πα- p. 1015. P.
ριδῶν, ὡς ἐκεῖνοι, τὴν μεταξὺ τῆς ὕλης καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ τριτην
ἀρχὴν καὶ δύναμιν, ὑπόμεινε τῶν λόγων τὸν ἀτοκώτατον,
ἐπεισόδιον οὐκ οἶδα ὅπως ποιῶντα τῶν κακῶν φύσιν ἀπ' αὐ-

τομάτου κατὰ συμβεβηκός. Ἐπικούρου μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲ ἀκα-
 ρες ἐγκλίνας τὴν ἄτομον συγχωροῦσιν, ὡς ἀναίτιον ἐπει-
 ἄγοντι κίνησιν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, αὐτοὶ δὲ κακίαν καὶ κακοδαι-
 μονίαν τοσαύτην, ἑτέρας τε περὶ σῶμα μυρίας ἀτοπίας καὶ
 δυσχερείας, αἰτίαν ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς οὐκ ἔχουσας, κατ' ἐπακο-
 λούθησιν γεγρονέναι λέγουσιν· ὁ δὲ Πλάτων οὐχ' οὕτως·
 ἀλλὰ τὴν ὕλην διαφορὰς ἀπάσης ἀπαλλάττων, καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ
 τὴν τῶν κακῶν αἰτίαν ἀπωτάτω τιθέμενος. But Plato was
 not guilty of that miscarriage of later philoso-
 phers, in overlooking the third power, which is
 between the matter and God, and thereby falling
 into the grossest of all absurdities, that the na-
 ture of evils was but an accidental appendix to
 the world, and came into it merely by chance, no-
 body knows how. So that those very philoso-
 phers, who will by no means allow to Epicurus
 the smallest declension of his atoms from the
 perpendicular, alleging, that this would be to
 introduce a motion without a cause, and to bring
 something out of nothing, themselves do, not-
 withstanding, suppose all that vice and misery,
 which is in the world, besides innumerable other
 absurdities and inconveniences about body, to
 have come into it, merely by accidental conse-
 quence, and without having any cause in the first
 principles. But Plato did not so; but divesting
 matter of all qualities and differences, by means
 whereof it could not possibly be made the cause
 of evils, and then placing God at the greatest
 distance from being the cause thereof, he conse-
 quently resolved it into a third unmade principle
 between God and the matter, an irrational soul,
 or demon, moving the matter disorderly.—

Now, because Plutarch's authority passeth so
 uncontrolled, and his testimony in this particular

seems to be of late generally received as an oracle, and consequently the thing taken for an unquestionable truth, that the Ditheistic doctrine of a good and evil principle was the Catholic or universal doctrine of the Pagan Theists, and particularly that Plato, above all the rest, was a professed champion for the same; we shall therefore make bold to examine Plutarch's grounds for this so confident assertion of his; and principally concerning Plato. And his grounds for imputing this opinion to Plato, are only these three, which follow. First, because that philosopher, in his *Politicus*,^a speaks of a necessary and innate appetite, that may sometimes turn the heavens a contrary way, and by that means cause disorder and confusion: Secondly, because, in his tenth *De Legibus*, he speaks of two kinds of souls, whereof one is beneficent, but the other contrary: and, lastly, because in his *Timæus* he supposeth the matter to have been moved disorderly before the world was made; which implies, that there was a disorderly and irrational soul consisting with it as the mover of it, matter being unable to move itself. But as to the first of these allegations, out of Plato's *Politicus*, we shall only observe, that that philosopher, as if it had been purposely to prevent such an interpretation of his meaning there as this of Plutarch's, inserts these very words:^b μήτ' αὖ δύο τινε θεῶ, φρονούντε ἑαυτοῖς ἐναντία στρέφειν αὐτόν. Neither must any such thing be supposed, as if there were two gods, contrarily minded to one another, turning the heavens sometimes one way, and sometimes another.—Which

^a P. 176. oper.^b Ibid. p. 175.

plain declaration of Plato's sense, being directly contrary to Plutarch's interpretation, and this Dithiestic opinion, might serve also for a sufficient confutation of his second ground from the tenth *De Legibus*,* as if Plato had there affirmed, that there were two souls moving the heavens, the one beneficent, but the other contrary; because this would be all one as to assert two gods, contrarily minded to one another. Notwithstanding which, for a fuller answer thereunto, we shall further add, that this philosopher did there, first, only distribute souls in general into good and evil, those moral differences properly belonging to that rank of beings, called by him souls, and first emerging in them, according to this premised doctrine, τῶν ἀγαθῶν αἰτία ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τῶν καλῶν, καὶ κακῶν καὶ αἰσχροῦν, δικαίων τε καὶ ἀδίκων. Soul is the cause of good and evil, honest and dishonest, just and unjust.—But then, afterwards, making inquiry concerning the soul of the world or heaven, what kind of soul that was, he positively

P. 898.

Steph.

concludes, that it was no other than a soul endued with all virtue. ΑΘ. ἐπεὶ δὲ ψυχὴ μὲν ἐστὶν ἡ περιάγουσα ἡμῖν πάντα, τὴν δὲ οὐρανοῦ περιφορὰν ἐξ ἀνάγκης περιάγειν φατέον, ἐπιμελουμένην καὶ κοσμουσαν, ἥτοι τὴν ἀρίστην ψυχὴν ἥτοι τὴν ἐναντίαν. ΚΛ. Ὡς ἔειπε, ἀλλὰ ἐκ γε τῶν εἰρημέκων οὐδ' ὅσιον ἄλλως λέγειν, ἢ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ἔχουσαν ψυχὴν μίαν ἢ πλείους περιάγειν αὐτά.—ΑΘ. Hosp. Since it is soul that moves all things, we must of necessity affirm, that the heaven or world is moved by some soul or other, adorning and disposing of it, whether it be the best soul, or the contrary. CLIN. O Hospes, it

* P. 669. oper.

is certainly not holy nor pious to conclude otherwise, than that a soul endued with all virtue, one or more, moves the world.—And as for the last thing urged by Plutarch, that before the world was made, the matter is said by Plato^a to have been moved disorderly, we conceive, that that philosopher did therein only adhere to that vulgarly-received tradition, which was originally Mosaical, that the first beginning of the Cosmopœia was from a chaos, or matter confusedly moved, afterward brought into order. And now we think it plainly appears, that there is no strength at all in any of Plutarch's fore-mentioned allegations, nor any such monster to be found any where in Plato, as this substantial evil principle or god, a wicked soul or demon, unmade and self-existent from eternity, opposite and inimicous to the good God, sharing the empire and dominion of the world with him. Which opinion is really nothing else but the deifying of the devil, or prince of evil spirits, making him a cor rival with God, and entitling him to a right of receiving Divine honour and worship.

And it is observable, that Plutarch himself confesseth this interpretation, which he makes of Plato, to be new and paradoxical, or an Psychog. p. 1012. invention of his own: καὶ διὰ τὸ πλείστοις

τῶν ἀπὸ Πλάτωνος ὑπερναντιοῦσθαι δέομενον παραμυθίας, such as because it was contrary to the generally-received opinion of Platonists, himself thought to stand in need of some apology and defence.—To which purpose, therefore, he adds

again: P. 1014. πρῶτον οὖν ἣν ἔχω περὶ τούτων διάνοιαν, ἐκθήσομαι πιστούμενος τῷ εἰκότι, καὶ παραμυθούμενος, ὥς

^a In Timæo, cap. xiv. p. 527.

ἐνιστι, τὸ ἀληθὲς τοῦ λόγου, καὶ παράδοξον. I will (saith he) declare mine own opinion first concerning these things, confirming it with probabilities, and, as much as possibly I can, aiding and assisting the truth and paradoxicalness thereof. Moreover, Proclus upon the *Timæus* takes notice of no other philosophers that ever imputed this doctrine to Plato, or indeed maintained any such opinion of two substantial principles of good and evil, but only Plutarch and Atticus (though, I confess, Chalcidius cites Numenius also to the same purpose). Proclus's words are

P. 116.

these: οἱ μὲν περὶ Πλούταρχον τὸν Χερωνία καὶ Ἀττικὸν προεῖναι φασὶ τὴν ἀκόσμητον ὕλην πρὸ τῆς γενέσεως, προεῖναι δὲ καὶ τὴν κακεργάτιν ψυχὴν τὴν τοῦτο κινούσαν, πόθεν γὰρ ἡ κίνησις ἦν, ἢ ἀπὸ ψυχῆς; εἰ δὲ ἄτακτος ἡ κίνησις, ἀπὸ ἀτάκτου ψυχῆς. Plutarchus Chæronensis and Atticus maintain, that before the generation and formation of the world, there was unformed and disorderly matter existing (from eternity) together with a maleficent soul: for whence, say they, could that motion of the matter, in Plato's *Timæus*, proceed, but from a soul? and if it were a disorderly motion, it must then needs come from a disorderly soul.—And as Proclus tells us, that this opinion of theirs had been before confuted by Porphyrius and Jamblichus, as that which was both irrational and impious, so doth he there likewise himself briefly refel it in these two propositions: First, that *πᾶσα ψυχὴ γέννημά ἐστι τοῦ θεοῦ*, every soul is the offspring of God,—and there can be no soul, nor any thing else, besides God, self-existing; and, Secondly, *τὸ κακὸν διαιώνιον ποιεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἄτοπον, οὐ γὰρ ὁμότιμον τῷ θεῷ τὸ ἄθεον, οὔτε ἐπίσης ἀγέννητον*,

οὔτε ὅλως ἀντιδιηρημένον. It is absurd to make evil alike eternal with good, for that which is godless cannot be of like honour with God, and equally unmade, nor indeed can there be any thing at all positively opposite to God.—

But because it may probably be here demanded, what account it was then possible for Plato to give of the original of evils, so as not to impute them to God himself, if he neither derived them from ὕλη ἀποιος, unqualified matter (which Plutarch has plainly proved to be absurd), nor yet from a ψυχὴ ἄνους, an irrational and maleficent soul of the world, or demon, self-existent from eternity; we shall, therefore, hereunto briefly reply, that though that philosopher derived not the original of evils from unqualified matter, nor from a wicked soul, or demon unmade, yet did he not therefore impute them to God neither, but, as it seemeth, to the necessity of imperfect beings. For as Timæus Locrus had before Plato determined, that the world was made by God and necessity, so does Plato himself accordingly declare in his Timæus, * ὅτι μεμιγμένη τοῦδε τοῦ κόσμου γένεσις ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ νοῦ συστάσεως, νοῦ δὲ ἀνάγκης ἄρχοντος. That the generation of this world is mixed, and made up of a certain composition of mind and necessity both together, yet so, as that mind doth also (in some sense) rule over necessity.—Wherefore, though, according to Plato, God be properly and directly the cause of nothing else but good, yet the necessity of these lower imperfect things does unavoidably give being and birth to evils. For, first, as to moral evils (which are the chiefest), there is a necessity, that there should be higher and lower

* P. 533. oper.

inclinations in all rational beings, vitally united to bodies, and that as autexousious, or free-willed, they should have a power of determining themselves more or less either way ; as there is also a necessity, that the same liberty of will (essential to rational creatures), which makes them capable of praise and reward, should likewise put them in a possibility of deserving blame and punishment. Again, as to the evils of pain and inconvenience ; there seems to be a necessity, that imperfect terrestrial animals, which are capable of the sense of pleasure, should in contrary circumstances (which will also sometimes happen, by reason of the inconsistency and impossibility of things) be obnoxious to displeasure and pain. And, lastly, for the evils of corruptions and dissolutions ; there is a plain necessity, that if there be natural generations in the world, there should be also corruptions ; according to that of Lucretius* before cited,

*Quando aliud ex alio reficit natura, nec ullam
Rem gigni patitur, nisi morte adjutam aliena.*

To all which may be added, according to the opinion of many, that there is a kind of necessity of some evils in the world for a condiment (as it were) to give a relish and haut-goust to good ; since the nature of imperfect animals is such, that they are apt to have but a dull and sluggish sense, a flat and insipid taste of good, unless it be quickened and stimulated, heightened and invigorated, by being compared with the contrary evil. As also, that there seems to be a necessary use in the world of the κακά ἀκούσια, those involuntary evils of pain and suffering, both for the exercise of virtue, and

* Lib. i. vers. 284.

the quickening and exciting the activity of the world, as also for the repressing, chastising and punishing of those κακά ἐκούσια, those voluntary evils of vice and action.—Upon which several accounts, probably, Plato concluded, that evils could not be utterly destroyed, at least in this lower world, which, according to him, is the region of lapsed souls: ἀλλ' οὐτ' ἀπολείσθαι In Theæt., p. 176. Steph. τὰ κακά δυνατόν, ὦ Θεόδωρε, (ὑπεναντίον γάρ τι τῷ ἀγαθῷ αἰεὶ εἶναι ἀνάγκη) οὐτ' ἐν θεοῖς αὐτὰ ἰδρύνσθαι, τήνδε θνητὴν φύσιν, καὶ τύνδε τὸν τόπον περιπολεῖν ἐξ ἀνάγκης· διὸ πειρᾶσθαι χρὴ ἐνθένδε ἐκίσει, φεύγειν ὅτι τάχιστα· φυγὴ δὲ ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν, ὁμοίωσις δὲ δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι. But it is neither possible (O Theodorus) that evils should be quite destroyed (for there must be something always contrary to good), nor yet that they should be seated amongst the gods, but they will of necessity infest this lower mortal region and nature. Wherefore, we ought to endeavour to flee from hence with all possible speed; and our flight from hence is this, to assimilate ourselves to God as much as may be; which assimilation to God consisteth in being just and holy with wisdom.—Thus, according to the sense of Plato, though God be the original of all things, yet he is not to be accounted properly the cause of evils, at least moral ones (they being only defects), but they are to be imputed to the necessity of imperfect beings, which is that ἀνάγκη πολλὰ τῷ θεῷ δυσμαχοῦσα καὶ ἀφηνιάζουσα, that necessity, which doth often resist God, and as it were shake off his bridle.—Rational creatures being, by means thereof, in a capability of acting contrary to God's will and law, as well as their own true nature and good; and other things hindered of that

perfection, which the Divine goodness would else have imparted to them. Notwithstanding which, mind, that is, God, is said also by Plato to rule over necessity, because those evils, occasioned by the necessity of imperfect beings, are over-ruled by the Divine art, wisdom, and providence, for good; Typhon and Arimanius (if we may use that language) being, as it were, outwitted by Osiris and Oromasdes, and the worst of all evils made, in spite of their own nature, to contribute subserviently to the good and perfection of the whole; καὶ τοῦτο μεγίστης τέχνης ἀγαθοποιεῖν τὰ κακὰ, and this must needs be acknowledged to be the greatest art of all, to be able to bonify evils, or tincture them with good.—

And now we have made it to appear (as we conceive) that Plutarch had no sufficient grounds to impute this opinion, of two active perceptive principles in the world (one the cause of good, and the other of evil) to Plato. And as for the other Greek philosophers, his pretences to make them assertors of the same doctrine seem to be yet more slight and frivolous. For he concludes

* οἱ πυθαγόρειοι οὐδαμῶς τὸ κακὸν ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς παραλαμβάνουσιν.
The Pythagoreans nowhere admitted evil amongst the principles.
Syrianus in Aristot. Metaphys. MS. p. 218.

the * Pythagoreans to have held two such substantial principles of good and evil, merely because they sometimes talked of the ἐναντιότητες and συστοιχίαι, the contrarieties and conjugations of things, such as finite and infinite, dextrous and sinistrous, even and odd, and the like. As also, that Heraclitus entertained the same opinion, because he spake of παλίντροπος ἀρμονία κόσμου, a versatile harmony of the world,—whereby things reciprocate forwards and backwards, as when a

bow is successively intended and remitted ; as likewise because he affirmed all things to flow, and war to be the father and lord of all. Moreover, he resolves,* that Empedocles's friendship and contention could be no other than a good and evil god ; though we have rendered it probable, that nothing else was understood thereby but an active spermatic power in this corporeal world, causing vicissitudes of generation and corruption. Again, Anaxagoras is entitled by him to the same philosophy, for no other reason, but only because he made mind and infinite matter two principles of the universe. And, lastly, Aristotle himself cannot escape him from being made an assertor of a good and evil god too, merely because he concluded form and privation to be two principles of natural bodies. Neither does Plutarch acquit himself any thing better, as to the sense of whole nations, when this doctrine is therefore imputed by him to the Chaldeans, because their astrologers supposed two of the planets to be beneficent, two maleficent, and three of a middle nature ; and to the ancient Greeks, because they sacrificed not only to Jupiter Olympius, but also to Hades, or Pluto, who was sometimes called by them the infernal Jupiter. We confess, that his interpretation of the traditions and mysteries of the ancient Egyptians is ingenious, but yet there is no necessity for all that, that by their Typhon should be understood a substantial evil principle, or god self-existent, as he contends. For it being the manner of the ancient Pagans (as shall be more fully declared afterwards) to physiologize in their theology, and to personate all the several things in

* De Iside et Osiride, p. 370.

nature; it seems more likely, that these Egyptians did, after that manner, only προσωποποιεῖν, personate that evil and confusion, tumult and hurliburly, constant alteration and vicissitude of generations and corruptions, which is in this lower world, (though not without a Divine providence) by Typhon.

Wherefore, the only probability now left is that of the Persian Magi, that they might indeed assert two such active principles of good and evil, as Plutarch and the Manicheans afterwards did; and we must confess, that there is some probability of this, because, besides Plutarch, Laetius^a affirms the same of them, δύο κατ' αὐτοὺς εἶναι ἀρχάς, ἀγαθὸν δαίμονα καὶ κακόν, that there are two principles according to the Persian Magi, a good demon and an evil one;—he seeming to vouch it also from the authorities of Hermippus, Eudoxus, and Theopompus. Notwithstanding which, it may very well be questioned, whether the meaning of those Magi were not herein misunderstood, they perhaps intending nothing more by their evil demon than such a Sataulical power as we acknowledge; that is, not a substantial evil principle, unmade and independent upon God, but only a polity of evil demons in the world, united together under one head or prince. And this, not only because Theodorus in Photius^b calls the Persian Arimanius by that very name, Satanas; but also because those very traditions of their's, recorded by Plutarch himself, seem very much to favour this opinion,

they running after this manner: ἐπεισι δὲ χρόνος εἰμαρμένος, ἐν ᾧ τὸν Ἀρειμάνιον λοιμὸν ἐπάγοντα καὶ λιμὸν, ὑπὸ τούτων ἀνάγκη φθαρῆναι παντά-

^a In Prooemio, segm. 8. p. 6.

^b Bibliothec. Cod. lxxxi. p. 199.

πασι καὶ ἀφανισθῆναι, τῆς δὲ γῆς ἐπιπέδου καὶ ὁμαλῆς γενομένης, ἓνα βίον καὶ μίαν πολιτείαν ἀνθρώπων μακαρίων καὶ ὁμογλώσσων ἀπάντων γενέσθαι. That there is a fatal time at hand, in which Arimanius, the introducer of plagues and famines, must of necessity be utterly destroyed; and when, the earth being made plane and equal, there shall be but one life, and one polity of men, all happy and speaking the same language.—Or else, as Theopompus* himself represented their sense, τέλος ἀπολείπεσθαι τὸν Ἄδην, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἀνθρώπους εὐδαίμονας ἔσεσθαι, μήτε τροφῆς δεομένους, μήτε σκίαν ποιούντας· τὸν δὲ ταῦτα μηχανησάμενον θεὸν ἡρεμεῖν καὶ ἀναπαύεσθαι χρόνῳ καλῶς μὲν οὐ πολὺν τῷ θεῷ, ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπῳ κοιμωμένῳ μέτριον. That in conclusion Hades shall be utterly abolished, and then men shall be perfectly happy, their bodies neither needing food, nor casting any shadow; that God, which contrived this whole scene of things, resting only for the present a certain season, which is not long to him, but like the intermission of sleep to men.—For since an unmade and self-existent evil demon, such as that of Plutarch's and the Manicheans', could never be utterly abolished or destroyed; it seems rather probable, that these Persian Magi did, in their Arimanius, either προσωποποιεῖν, personate evil only, as we suppose the Egyptians to have done in Typhon; or else understand a Satanical power by it: notwithstanding which, they might possibly sacrifice thereunto (as the Greeks did to evil demons) for its appeasement and mitigation; or else, as worshipping the Deity itself, in the ministers of its wrath and vengeance.

However, from what hath been declared, we

* Apud Plutarch. de Iside et Osiride, p. 370. tom. ii. oper.

conceive it does sufficiently appear, that this di-theistic doctrine of a good and evil god (or a good god and evil demon both self-existent), asserted by Plutarch and the Manicheans, was never so universally received amongst the Pagans as the same Plutarch pretendeth. Which thing may be yet further evidenced from hence, because the Manicheans professed themselves not to have derived this opinion from the Pagans, nor to be a subdivision under them, or schism from them, but a quite different sect by themselves. Thus, Faustus in

St. Augustin: "*Pagani bona et mala, tetra et splendida, perpetua et caduca, mutabilia et certa, corporalia et divina, unum habere principium dogmatizant.*"

Contra Faust.
lib. 20. c. 3.
p. 237. tom.
viii. oper.
edit. Bened.
dict.

His ego valde contraria censeo, qui bonis omnibus principium fateor Deum, contrariis vero Hylen (sic enim mali principium et naturam theologus noster appellat.)" The Pagans dogmatize, that good and evil things, foul and splendid, perishing and perpetual, corporeal and Divine, do all alike proceed from the same principle. Whereas we think far otherwise, that God is the principle of all good, but Hyle (or the evil demon) of the contrary, which names our theologer (Manes) confounds together.—And afterwards Faustus there again determines, that there were indeed but two sects of religion in the world, really distinct from one another, viz. Paganism and Manicheism.* From whence it may be concluded, that this doctrine of two active principles of good and evil, was not then looked upon as the generally-received doctrine of the Pagans. Wherefore, it seems reasonable to think, that Plutarch's imputing it so

* Apud Augustin. ubi supra.

universally to them, was either out of design, thereby to gain the better countenance and authority to a conceit, which himself was fond of; or else, because he being deeply tinctured, as it were, with the suffusions of it, every thing which he looked upon seemed to him coloured with it. And indeed, for aught we can yet learn, this Plutarchus Chæronensis, Numenius, and Atticus, were the only Greek philosophers, who ever in public writings positively asserted any such opinion.

And probably St. Athanasius is to be understood of these, when, in his oration *contra Gentes*,^{*} he writes thus concerning this opinion: Ἑλλήνων οὖν τινὲς πλανηθέντες τῆς ὁδοῦ, καὶ τὸν Χριστὸν οὐκ ἐγνωκότες, ἐν ὑποστάσει καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὴν εἶναι τὴν κακίαν ἀπεφάναντο· ἁμαρτάνοντες κατὰ δύο ταῦτα, ἢ τὸν δημιουργὸν ἀποστεροῦντες τοῦ εἶναι ποιητὴν τῶν ὄντων, οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἴη τῶν ὄντων κύριος, εἴγε κατ' αὐτοὺς ἡ κακία καθ' ἑαυτὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔχει καὶ οὐσίαν, ἢ πάλιν θέλοντες αὐτὸν ποιητὴν εἶναι τῶν ὄλων, ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ δώσουσιν εἶναι, ἐν γὰρ τοῖς οὖσιν καὶ τὸ κακὸν κατ' αὐτοὺς ἐστὶ. Some of the Greeks, wandering out of the right way, and ignorant of Christ, have determined evil to be a real entity by itself, erring upon two accounts: because they must of necessity either suppose God not to be the maker of all things, if evil have a nature and essence by itself, and yet be not made by him; or else that he is the maker and cause of evil; whereas it is impossible, that he, who is essentially good, should produce the contrary.—After which that father speaks also of some degenerate Christians, who fell into the same error; οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν αἱρέσεων ἐκπεσόντες τῆς ἐκκλησιαστικῆς διδασκαλίας, καὶ περὶ τὴν

^{*} Tom. i. p. 6. oper.

πίστιν ναυαγήσαντες, καὶ οὗτοι μὲν ὑπόστασιν τοῦ κακοῦ παραφρονέουσιν εἶναι. Some heretics, forsaking the ecclesiastical doctrine, and making shipwreck of the faith, have in like manner falsely attributed a real nature and essence to evil.—Of which heretics, there were several sects before the Manicheans, sometime taken notice of and censured by Pagan philosophers themselves; as by Celsus,* where he charges Christians with holding this opinion, that there is ἐναντίος τῷ μεγάλῳ θεῷ θεὸς κατηραμένος, an execrable god contrary to the great God;—and by Plotinus, writing a whole book against such Christians (the ninth of his second Ennead), which, by Porphyrius, was inscribed, πρὸς τοὺς Γνωστικούς, Against the Gnostics.—

But if, notwithstanding all that we have hitherto said to the contrary, that which Plutarch so much contends for should be granted to be true, that the Pagan theologers generally asserted two self-existent principles (a good God, and an evil soul or demon), and no more, it would unavoidably follow from thence, that all those other gods, which they worshipped, were not looked upon by them as so many unmade self-existent beings, because then they should have acknowledged so many first principles. However, it is certain, that if Plutarch believed his own writings, he must of necessity take it for granted, that none of the Pagan gods (those two principles of good and evil only excepted) were by their theologers accounted unmade or self-existent beings. And as to Plutarch himself, it is unquestionably manifest, that though he were a Pagan, and a worshipper of all those many gods of their's, but

* Apud Origen. contra Celsum, lib. vi. p. 303.

especially amongst the rest, of the Delian Apollo (whose priest he declares himself to have been), yet he supposed them all (except only one good God, and another evil soul of the world) to be no self-existent deities, but θεοὶ γεννητοί,* generated or created gods only. And the same is to be affirmed of all his Pagan followers, as also of the Manicheans, forasmuch as they, besides their good and evil god (the only unmade, self-existent beings acknowledged by them), worshipped also innumerable other deities.

Hitherto we have not been able to find amongst the Pagans, any who asserted a multitude of unmade, self-existent deities: but, on the contrary, we shall now find one, who took notice of this opinion of πολλαὶ ἀρχαί, many principles, so far forth as to confute it; and that is Aristotle, who was not occasioned to do that neither, because it was a doctrine then generally received, but only because he had a mind odiously to impute such a thing to the Pythagoreans and Platonists, they making ideas (sometimes called also numbers) in a certain sense, the principles of things. Nevertheless, the opinion itself is well confuted by that philosopher from the phenomena, after this manner: Οἱ δὲ λέγοντες τὸν

ἀριθμὸν πρῶτον τὸν μαθηματικόν, καὶ οὕτως αἰετὴν ἄλλην ἐχόμενην οὐσίαν καὶ ἀρχὰς ἐκάστης ἄλλας,

ἐπισοδιῶδι τὴν τοῦ παντός οὐσίαν ποιοῦσιν &c. They who say that mathematical number is the first, and suppose one principle of one thing, and another of another, would make the whole world to be like an incoherent and disagreeing poem, where things do not all mutually contribute to one ano-

Arist. Met.
l. 14. c. 10.
pag. 486.
tom. iv. oper.

* Vide Rualdum in Vita Plutarchi, cap. ix.

ther, nor conspire together to make up one sense and harmony : but the contrary (saith he) is most evident in the world ; and, therefore, there cannot be many principles, but only one.—From whence it is manifest, that though Aristotle were a worshipper of many gods, as well as the other Pagans (he somewhere representing it as very absurd to sacrifice to none but Jupiter), yet he was no Polytheist, in the sense before declared, of many unmade, self-existent deities, nor indeed any Ditheist neither, no assertor of two understanding principles, a good and evil god (as Plutarch pretended him to be) ; he not only here exploding that opinion of *πολλὰ ἀρχαί*, many principles, but also expressly deriving all from one ; and in that very chapter affirming, that good is a principle, but not evil. But as for the Platonists and Pythagoreans there perstringed by him, though it be true, that they made ideas in some sense principles, as the paradigms of things ; yet, according to Aristotle's own confession, even in that same chapter, they declared also, that there was *ἄλλη ἀρχὴ κυριώτερα*, another principle more excellent or superior ; which is indeed that, that was called by them the *τὸ ἐν*, or *μονάς*, unity itself, or a monad, that is, one most simple deity.

Though we did before demonstrate, that the Pagan gods were not all supposed by them to be unmade, self-existent beings, because they acknowledged a theogonia, a generation and temporary production of gods ; yet, forasmuch as it might be suspected, that they held notwithstanding a multitude of unmade deities, we have now made the best inquiry that we could concerning this : and the utmost that we have been able yet

to discover, is, that some few of the professed Pagans, as well as of pretended Christians, have indeed asserted a duplicity of such gods (viz. understanding beings unmade), one good, and the other evil, but no more. Whereas, on the contrary, we have found, that Aristotle did profess-
 edly oppose this opinion of many principles, or unmade gods, which certainly he durst never have done, had it then been the generally-received opinion of the Pagans. And though it be true, that several of the ancient Christians, in their disputes with Pagans, do confute that opinion of many unmade deities; yet we do not find, for all that, that any of them seriously charge the Pagans with it, they only doing it occasionally and *ex abundanti*. But we should be the better enabled to make a clear judgment concerning this controversy, whether there were not amongst the Pagan deities a multitude of supposed unmade beings, if we did but take a short survey of their religion, and consider all the several kinds of gods worshipped by them; which may, as we conceive, be reduced to these following heads:—In the first place, therefore, it is certain, that many of the Pagan gods were nothing else but dead men (or the souls of men deceased), called by the Greeks Heroes, and the Latins Manes; such as Hercules, Liber, Æsculapius, Castor, Pollux, Quirinus, and the like. Neither was this only true of the Greeks and Romans, but also of the Egyptians, Syrians, and Babylonians. For which cause the Pagan sacrifices are, by way of contempt, in the Scripture,* called the sacrifices of the dead; that is, not of dead or lifeless statues, as some

* Psalm cvi. 28.

would put it off, but of dead men: which was the reason why many of the religious rites and solemnities, observed by the Pagan priests, were mournful and funeral; accordingly as, it
Chap. vi.
ver. 31. is expressed in Baruch concerning the Babylonians:—" Their priests sit in their temples, having their clothes rent, and their heads and beards shaven, and nothing upon their heads; they roar and cry before their gods, as men do at the feast, when one is dead." Some of which rites are therefore thought to have been interdicted to the Israelitish priests. And the same thing is noted likewise by the poet concerning the Egyptians:

Et quem tu plangens, hominem testaris, Osirin:

and intimated by Xenophanes the Colophonian,^b when he reprehensively admonished the Egyptians after this manner: *εἰ θεοὺς νομίζουσι μὴ θνητοῖν, εἰ δὲ θνητοῖσι μὴ θεοὺς νομίζουσιν*, That if they thought those to be gods, they should not so lament them; but if they would lament them, they should no longer think them gods.—Moreover, it is well known, that this humour of deifying men was afterwards carried on further, and that living men (as emperors) had also temples and altars erected to them; nay, human polities and cities were also sometimes deified by the Pagans, Rome itself being made a goddess. Now, no man can imagine, that those men-gods and city-gods were looked upon by them as so many unmade, self-existent deities, they being not indeed so much

^a Lucan. Pharsal. lib. viii. vers. 133.

^b Vide Plutarch. de Superstit. p. 171. tom. ii. oper. et Aristot. Rhetoric. lib. ii. cap. xxiii. p. 789. tom. iii. oper.

as φύσει γέννητοὶ θεοὶ, gods made or generated by nature, but rather artificially made by human will and pleasure. Again, another sort of the Pagan deities were all the greater parts of the visible mundane system, or corporeal world, as supposed to be animated—the sun, the moon, and the stars, and even the earth itself, under the names of Vesta and Cybele, the mother of the gods, and the like. Now it is certain, also, that none of these could be taken for unmade, self-existent deities neither, by those who supposed the whole world itself to have been generated, or had a beginning, which, as Aristotle^a tells us, was the generally-received opinion before his time. There was also a third sort of Pagan deities, ethereal and aerial animals invisible, called demons, genii, and lares, superior indeed to men, but inferior to the celestial or mundane gods before-mentioned. Wherefore, these must needs be looked upon also by them but as γέννητοὶ θεοὶ, generated or created gods, they being but certain inferior parts of the whole generated world.

Besides all these, the Pagans had yet another sort of gods, that were nothing but mere accidents or affections of substances, which therefore could not be supposed by them to be self-existent deities, because they could not so much as subsist by themselves. Such as were virtue, piety, felicity, truth, faith, hope, justice, clemency, love, desire, health, peace, honour, fame, liberty, memory, sleep, night, and the like; all which had their temples or altars erected to them. Now this kind of Pagan gods cannot well be conceived to have been any thing else, but the several and

^a Lib. i. de Cœlo, cap. x. p. 632. tom. i. oper.

various manifestations of that one Divine force, power, and providence, that runs through the whole world (as respecting the good and evil of men), fictitiously personated, and so represented as so many gods and goddesses.

Lastly, there is still another kind of Pagan gods behind, having substantial and personal names, which yet cannot be conceived neither to be so many understanding beings, unmade and independent upon any supreme, were it for no other reason but only this, because they have all of them their particular places and provinces, offices and functions severally, as it were, assigned to them, and to which they are confined; so as not to interfere and clash with one another, but agreeably to make up one orderly and harmonious system of the whole; one of those gods ruling only in the heavens, another in the air, another in the sea, and another in the earth and hell; one being the god or goddess of learning and wisdom, another of speech and eloquence, another of justice and political order; one the god of war, another the god of pleasure; one the god of corn, and another the god of wine, and the like. For how can it be conceived, that a multitude of understanding beings, self-existent and independent, could thus of themselves have fallen into such an uniform order and harmony; and, without any clashing, peaceably and quietly sharing the government of the whole world amongst them, should carry it on with such a constant regularity? For which cause, we conclude also, that neither those *dii majorum gentium*, whether the twenty *Selecti*, or the twelve *Consentes*, nor yet that triumvirate of gods, amongst whom Homer

shares the government of the whole world, according to that of Maximus Tyrius,

τριχθὰ Ὀμήρῳ δέδασται τὰ πάντα, Ποσειδὼν Diss. 16.
 μὲν ἔλαχε, πολὺν δὲλα ναίμεν αἰεὶ, Ἄδης δὲ ἔλαχε ζόφον
 ἡρώεσσα, Ζεὺς δὲ οὐρανόν· The sea being assigned to

Neptune, the dark and subterraneous parts to Pluto, but the heaven to Jupiter; which three are sometimes called also the celestial, marine, and terrestrial Jupiter; nor, lastly, that other Roman and Samothracian trinity of gods, worshipped altogether in the capitol, Jupiter, Minerva, and Juno; I say, that none of all these could reasonably be thought by the Pagans themselves, to be so many really distinct, unmade, and self-existent deities.

Wherefore the truth of this whole business seems to be this, that the ancient Pagans did physiologize in their theology; and whether looking upon the whole world animated, as the supreme God, and consequently the several parts of it as his living members; or else, apprehending it at least to be a mirror, or visible image of the invisible Deity, and consequently all its several parts, and things of nature, but so many several manifestations of the Divine power and providence, they pretended, that all their devotion towards the Deity ought not to be huddled up in one general and confused acknowledgment of a supreme invisible Being, the creator and governor of all; but that all the several manifestations of the Deity in the world, considered singly and apart by themselves, should be made so many distinct objects of their devout veneration. And, therefore, in order hereunto, did they προσωποποιεῖν, speak of the things in nature, and

the parts of the world, as persons,—and consequently as so many gods and goddesses; yet so, as that the intelligent might easily understand the meaning, that these were all really nothing else but so many several names and notions of that one Numen, divine force and power, which runs through the whole world, multiformly displaying itself therein. To this purpose, Balbus in Cicero; “Videtisne ut a physicis rebus tracta ratio sit ad commentitios et fictos deos?” See you not, how from the things of nature fictitious gods have been made?—And Origen seems to insist upon this very thing (where Celsus upbraids the Jews and Christians for worshipping one only God), shewing, that all that seeming multiplicity of Pagan gods could not be understood of so

L. 1. p. 18. many distinct substantial independent
edit. Cantab. deities: δεικνύτω τοίνυν, πῶς αὐτοὺς δύναται
παραστήσαι τὸ πλῆθος τῶν καθ’ Ἑλλήνας θεῶν, ἢ τοὺς
λοιπῶς βαρβάρους· Δεικνύτω ὑπόστασιν καὶ οὐσίαν Μνη-
μοσύνης γεννώσης ἀπὸ Διὸς τὰς Μούσας, ἢ Θέμιδος τὰς
Ὠρας, ἢ τὰς Χάριτας αἰεὶ γυμνὰς παρατησάτω δύνασθαι
κατ’ οὐσίαν ὑφίστηκίαι, ἀλλ’ οὐ δύνησται τὰ Ἑλλήνων
ἐναυπλάσματα (σωματοποιεῖσθαι δοκοῦντα ἀπὸ τῶν πραγμά-
των) δεικνύναι Θεούς. To this sense: Let Celsus,
therefore, himself shew, how he is able to make
out a multiplicity of gods (substantial and self-
existent) according to the Greeks and other bar-
barian Pagans; let him declare the essence and
substantial personality of that memory, which by
Jupiter generated the Muses, or of that Themis,
which brought forth the hours; or let him shew
how the Graces, always naked, do subsist by
themselves. But he will never be able to do this,

* De Natur. Deor. lib. ii. cap. xxviii. p. 2096. tom. ix. oper.

nor to make it appear, that those figments of the Greeks (which seem to be really nothing else but the things of nature turned into persons) are so many distinct (self-existent) deities.—Where the latter words are thus rendered in a late edition; “Sed *numquam poterit* (Celsus) *Græcorum figmenta, quæ validiora fieri videntur, ex rebus ipsis deos esse arguere;*”—which we confess we cannot understand; but we conceive the word *σωματοποιεῖσθαι*, there turned *validiora fieri*, is here used by Origen in the same sense with *προσωπιοποιεῖσθαι*: so that his meaning is, as we have declared, that those figments of the Greeks and other barbarian Pagans (which are the same with Balbus’s *commentitii et ficti Dii*), are really nothing else but the things of nature, figuratively and fictitiously personated, and consequently not so many distinct substantial deities, but only several notions and considerations of one God, or supreme Numen, in the world.

Now this fictitious personating, and deifying of things, by the Pagan Theologers, was done two manner of ways; one, when those things in nature were themselves without any more ado, or change of names, spoken of as persons, and so made gods and goddesses, as in the many instances before proposed: another, when there were distinct proper and personal names accommodated severally to those things, as of Minerva to wisdom, of Neptune to the sea, of Ceres to corn, and of Bacchus to wine. In which latter case, those personal names properly signify the invisible Divine powers, supposed to preside over those several things in nature; and these are therefore properly those gods and goddesses, which are *δαίμονες*

ἰάων,* the givers and dispensers of the good things; and the removers of the contrary; but they are used improperly also for the things of nature themselves, which, therefore, as manifestations of the Divine power, goodness, and providence personated, are sometimes also abusively called gods and goddesses. This mystery of the Pagan Polytheism, is thus fully declared by Moschopulus: *In Hesiod. P. 1.*

Ἰστέον ὅτι πάντα οἱ Ἕλληνες ἃ δύνανται ἔχοντα ἰώρουν, οὐκ ἄνευ ἐπιστασίας θεῶν τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν ἐνεργεῖν ἐνόμιζον, ἐνὶ δὲ ὀνόματι τό τε τὴν δύναμιν ἔχον, καὶ τὸν ἐπιστατοῦντα τούτῳ θεὸν ἐνόμαζον· ὅθεν Ἡφαίστον ἐκάλουν τότε διακονικὸν τοῦτο πῦρ, καὶ τὸν ἐπιστατοῦντα ταῖς διὰ τούτου ἐνεργουμέναις τέχναις, καὶ Δῆμητράν τὸν σίτον καὶ τοὺς καρποὺς, καὶ τὴν δωρουμένην τούτους θεὸν, καὶ ἐπιστατοῦσαν αὐτοῖς, καὶ Ἀθηνᾶν τὴν φρόνησιν, καὶ τὴν ἐφορον τῆς φρονήσεως θεόν· καὶ τὸν Διώνυσον τὸν οἶνον καὶ τὸν δίδοντα τοῦτον θεόν· ὃν καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ δίδοναι τὸν οἶνον ὁ Πλάτων παράγει, καὶ Διδοίνυσον τοῦτον ποιεῖ εἶτα καὶ Διώνυσον· καὶ Ἐλευθυίας τοὺς τόκους, καὶ τὰς ἐφορώσας τοὺς τόκους θεάς· καὶ Ἀφροδίτην τὴν συνουσίαν καὶ ἐπιστατοῦσαν ταύτῃ θεόν· κατὰ τοῦτο καὶ Μούσας ἔλεγον τάσ τε λογικὰς τέχνας, οἷον ῥητορικὴν, ἀστρονομίαν, κωμωδίαν, τραγωδίαν, καὶ τὰς ἐφόρους καὶ παρόχους τούτων θεάς. We must know, that whatsoever the Greeks (or Pagans) saw to have any power, virtue, or ability in it, they looked upon it as not acting according to such power, without the providence, presidency, or influence of the gods; and they called both the thing itself, which hath the power, and the deity presiding over it, by one and the same name: whence the ministerial fire used in mechanic arts, and the god presiding over those arts that work by fire, were both alike called Hephæstus, or Vul-

* Hesiod. in Theogon. vers. 111.

can ; so the name Demetra, or Ceres, was given as well to corn and fruits, as to that goddess which bestows them ; Athena, or Minerva, did alike signify wisdom, and the goddess which is the dispenser of it ; Dionysius, or Bacchus, wine, and the god that giveth wine ; (whence Plato etymologizes the name from giving of wine.) In like manner, they called both the child-bearing of women, and the goddesses that superintend over the same, Eilithyia, or Lucina ; Coitus, or copulation, and the deity presiding over it, Aphrodite or Venus. And, lastly, in the same manner, by the Muses they signified both those rational arts, rhetoric, astronomy, poetry, and the goddesses, which assist therein or promote the same.—Now, as the several things in nature and parts of the corporeal world are thus metonymically and catachrestically called gods and goddesses, it is evident, that such deities as these could not be supposed to be unmade or self-existent, by those, who acknowledged the whole world to have been generated and had a beginning. But as these names were used more properly, to signify invisible and understanding powers, presiding over the things in nature, and dispensing of them, however they have an appearance of so many several distinct deities ; yet they seem to have been all really nothing else, but as Balbus in Cicero* expresses it, “*Deus pertinens per naturam cujusque rei*,” God passing through, and acting in the nature of every thing ; —and consequently, but several names, or so many different notions and considerations of that one supreme Numen, that Divine force, power,

* *De Natur. Deor. lib. ii. cap. xxviii. p. 2996. tom. ix. oper.*

and providence, which runs through the whole world, as variously manifesting itself therein.

Wherefore, since there were no other kinds of Gods amongst the Pagans, besides these already enumerated, unless their images, statues, and symbols, should be accounted such (because they were also sometimes abusively called gods) which could not be supposed by them to have been unmade or without a beginning, they being the workmanship of men's own hands; we conclude universally, that all that multiplicity of Pagan gods, which makes so great a show and noise, was really either nothing but several names and notions of one supreme Deity, according to its different manifestations, gifts, and effects in the world, personated; or else many inferior understanding beings, generated or created by one Supreme: so that one unmade self-existent Deity, and no more, was acknowledged by the more intelligent of the ancient Pagans (for of the sottish vulgar, no man can pretend to give an account, in any religion), and, consequently, the Pagan Polytheism (or idolatry) consisted not in worshipping a multiplicity of unmade minds, deities, and creators, self-existent from eternity, and independent upon one Supreme; but in mingling and blending, some way or other, unduly, creature-worship with the worship of the Creator.

And that the ancient Pagan Theists thus acknowledged one supreme God, who was the only Θεὸς ἀγέννητος, unmade or unproduced Deity, (I say, Theists, because those amongst the Pagans, who admitted of many gods, but none at all unmade, were absolute Atheists) this may be unde-

niably concluded from what was before proved, that they acknowledged omnipotence or infinite power to be a Divine attribute. Because upon the hypothesis of many unmade self-existent deities, it is plain, that there could be none omnipotent, and consequently no such thing as omnipotence *in rerum natura*: and therefore omnipotence was rightly and properly styled by Macrobius, *summi Dei omnipotentia*, it being an attribute essentially peculiar to one supreme and sole self-existent Deity. And Simplicius, likewise a Pagan, confuted the Manichean hypothesis of two self-existent deities from hence also, because it destroyed omnipotence: ἀναγκάζονται δύο λέγοντες τῶν ὄλων ἀρχὰς (τὸ τε ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν) καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν παρ' αὐτοῖς λεγόμενον Θεὸν, μηκέτι πάντων αἰτίων λέγειν, μηδὲ ὡς παντοκράτορα δικαίως ἀνυμνεῖν, μηδὲ δύναμιν αὐτῷ τὴν ἀκροτάτην καὶ ὅλην ἀνατιθέναι, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἡμῖν τῆς ὅλης δυνάμεως, εἴπερ ἄρα καὶ τοῦτο. For they, who assert two principles of the universe (one good, the other evil) are necessitated to grant, that the good principle, called by them God, is not the cause of all things, neither can they praise it as omnipotent, nor ascribe a perfect and whole entire power to it, but only the half of a whole power at most, if so much.—Over and besides all which, it hath been also proved already, that the ancient Atheists under Paganism directed themselves principally against the opinion of monarchy, or of one supreme Deity ruling over all; from whence it plainly appears, that it was then asserted by the Pagan Theists.

And we think it here observable, that this was a thing so generally confessed and acknowledged,

In Epict. c.
4. Potius in
cap. xxiv.
p. 164. edit.
Salmas.

* In Somn. Scipion. lib. i. cap. xvii. p. 87.

that Faustus the Manichean took up this conceit, that both the Christians and Jews paganized in the opinion of monarchy, that is, derived this doctrine of one Deity, the sole principle of all things, only by tradition from the Pagans, and, by consequence, were no other than schisms or sub-

divided sects of Paganism. "*Vos desciscentes a gentibus (saith he) monarchiæ opinionem primo vobiscum divulsistis, id est, ut omnia credatis ex deo. Estis*

sane schisma, nec non et priores vestri Judæi. De opinione monarchiæ, in nullo etiam ipsi dissentiunt a paganis. Quare constat vos atque Judæos schisma esse gentilitatis. Sectas autem si quæras, non plures erunt quam duæ, Gentium et nostra." You revolting from the Gentiles, broke off their opinion of monarchy, and carried it along with you, so as to believe all things to come from God. Wherefore, you are really nothing but a schism of Paganism, or a subdivided branch of it, and so are your predecessors the Jews; who differ nothing from Pagans neither in this opinion of monarchy. Whence it is manifest, that both Christians and Jews are but schisms of Gentilism. But as for sects of religion, really differing from another, there are but these two, that of the Pagans, and that of our's, who altogether dissent from them.—Now though this be false and foolish, as to the Christians and Jews deriving that opinion of monarchy, only by way of tradition, from the Pagans, which is a thing founded in the principles of nature; yet it sufficiently shews this to have been the general sense of the Pagans, that all their gods were derived from one sole, self-existent Deity; so that they neither acknowledged

S. Aug. contra Faust. l. 20. cap. iv. p. 237. tom. viii. oper.

a multitude of unmade deities, nor yet that duplicity of them, which Plutarch contended for (one, good, and the other evil), who accordingly denied God to be the cause of all things, writing thus in his Defect of Oracles,* *οἱ μὲν οὐδενὸς ἀπλῶς τὸν Θεόν, οἱ δὲ ὁμοῦ τι πάντων αἰτίον ποιοῦντες, ἀστοχοῦσι τοῦ μετρίου καὶ πρέποντος*, They are guilty of one extreme, who make God the cause of nothing, and they of another, who make him the cause of all things.—But this paradox was both late started amongst the Greeks, and quickly cried down by the succession of their philosophers, and therefore prejudiceth not the truth of Faustus's general assertion concerning the Pagans. Which is again fully confirmed by St. Austin in his reply: “Siquis ita dividat, ut dicat eorum, quæ aliqua religione detinentur, aliis placere unum Deum colendum, aliis multos; per hanc differentiam et pagani a nobis remoti sunt, et Manichæi cum paganis deputantur, nos autem cum Judæis. Hic forte dicatis, quod multos deos vestros ex una substantia perhibetis; quasi pagani multos suos, non ex una asserant, quamvis diversa illis officia, et opera, et potestates illis attribuant; sicut etiam apud vos alius deus expugnat gentem tenebrarum, alius ex ea capta fabricat mundum,” &c. If one should make another distribution of religionists, into such as worship either one God, or many gods; according to this division, the Pagans will be removed from us Christians, and joined with you Manicheans. But, perhaps, you will here say, that all your many gods are derived from one substance; as if the Pagans did not also derive

L. 20. cap.
10. p. 241.
tom. viii.
oper.

* Tom. ii. oper. p. 414.

all their gods from one, though attributing several offices, works, and powers to them; in like manner as amongst you, one god expugns the nation of darkness, another god makes a world out of it, &c.—And again, afterwards, he writes further

to the same purpose: “*Discat ergo S. Aug. contra Faustum l. 20. c. 19. p. 246.* Faustus monarchiæ opinionem non ex gentibus nos habere, sed gentes non usque adeo ad falsos deos esse dilapsas, ut opinionem amitterent unius veri dei, ex quo est omnis qualiscunque natura.” Let Faustus therefore know, that we Christians have not derived the opinion of monarchy from the Pagans; but that the Pagans have not so far degenerated, sinking down into the worship of false gods, as to have lost the opinion of one true God, from whom is all whatsoever nature.—

xiv. It follows, from what we have declared, that the Pagan Polytheism, or multiplicity of gods, is not to be understood in the sense before expressed, of many *θεοὶ ἀγέννητοι καὶ αὐθιγρόστατοι*, many unproduced and self-existent deities, but according to some other notion or equivocation of the word gods. For God is *τῶν πολλὰχῶς λεγόμενον*, one of those words, that hath been used in many different senses,—the Atheists themselves acknowledging a God and gods, according to some private senses of their own (which yet they do not all agree in neither), and Theists not always having the same notion of that word; forasmuch as angels in Scripture are called gods in one sense, that is, as understanding beings superior to men, immortal, holy, and happy; and the word is again sometimes carried down lower to princes and magistrates; and not only so, but also to

good men as such, when they are said to be made partakers of the Divine nature.* And thus that learned philosopher and Christian, Boethius,† “*Omnis beatus deus; sed natura quidem unus, participatione vero nihil prohibet esse quamplurimos.*” Every good and happy man is a god, and though there be only one god by nature, yet nothing hinders but that there may be many by participation.—But then again, all men and angels are alike denied to be gods in other respects, and particularly as to religious worship: “Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and him only shalt thou serve.” Now this is that, which seems to be essentially included in the Pagan notion of the word God or gods, when taken in general—namely, a respect to religious worship. Wherefore, a God in general, according to the sense of the Pagan Theists, may be thus defined, An understanding Being superior to men, not originally derived from senseless matter, and looked upon as an object for men’s religious worship. But this general notion of the word God is again restrained and limited by differences, in the division of it. For such a God as this may be either *ἀγέννητος*, ingenerate or unproduced, and consequently self-existent; or else *γεννητός*, generated or produced, and dependent on some higher Being as its cause. In the former sense, the intelligent Pagans, as we have declared, acknowledged only one God, who was therefore called by them *ὁ θεὸς κατ’ ἐξοχὴν*, according to that of Thales in Laertius,‡ *πρεσβύτατον τῶν ὄντων ὁ θεός, ἀγέννητον γὰρ* God is the oldest of all things, be-

* 2 Peter i. 4.

† De Consolat. Philos. lib. iii. p. 72. s.

‡ Lib. i. segm. 35. p. 21. s.

cause he is unmade or unproduced, and the only thing that is so ;—but in the latter, they admitted of many gods, many understanding beings, which, though generated or produced, yet were superior to men, and looked upon as objects for their religious worship. And thus the Pagan Theists were both Polytheists and Monotheists in different senses, they acknowledged both many gods, and one God ; that is, many inferior deities, subordinate to one Supreme. Thus Onatus the Pythagorean, in Stobæus, declares himself :

Ecl. Phys.

l. 1. p. 4. edit. δόκει δὲ μοι, καὶ μὴ εἰς εἰ μὲν ὁ θεός, ἀλλ' εἰς μὲν

Plantin.

ὁ μέγιστος, καὶ καθ' ὑπέρτερος, καὶ ὁ κρατῶν τῷ παντός· οἱ δ' ἄλλοι πολλοὶ διαφέροντες κατὰ δύναμιν, βασιλεύει δὲ πάντων αὐτῶν ὁ καὶ κράτει καὶ μεγέθει καὶ ἀρετῇ μείζων· οὗτος δὲ καὶ εἶη ὁ περιέχων τὸν σύμπαντα κόσμον· τοὶ δ' ἄλλοι οἱ θεόντες εἰσὶ κατ' οὐρανὸν σὺν τε τῷ παντός περιαγῆσαι, κατὰ λόγον ὑποθέοντες τῷ πρώτῳ καὶ νοητῷ.

It seemeth to me, that there is not only one God, but that there is one the greatest and highest God, that governeth the whole world, and that there are many other gods besides him differing as to power, that one God reigning over them all, who surmounts them all in power, greatness, and virtue. That is that God, who contains and comprehends the whole world ; but the other gods are those, who, together with the revolution of the universe, orderly follow that first and intelligible God.—Where it is evident, that Onatus's πολλοὶ θεοὶ, or many gods, were only the heavenly bodies, or animated stars. And partly from those words cited, but chiefly others, which follow after in the same place (that will be produced elsewhere), it plainly appears, that in Onatus's time, there were some who acknowledged one only God, denying

all those other gods, then commonly worshipped. And indeed Anaxagoras seems to have been such an one; forasmuch as asserting one perfect mind ruling over all (which is the true Deity), he effectually degraded all those other Pagan gods, the sun, moon, and stars from their godships, by making the sun nothing but a globe of fire, and the moon earth and stones, and the like of the other stars and planets. And some such there were also amongst the ancient Egyptians, as shall be declared in due place. Moreover, Proclus, upon Plato's *Timæus*, tells us, P. 206. that there hath been always less doubt and controversy in the world concerning the one God, than concerning the many gods. Wherefore Onatus here declares his own sense, as to this particular, viz. that besides the one supreme God, there were also many other inferior deities, that is, understanding beings, that ought to be religiously worshipped.

But because it is not impossible, but that there might be imagined one supreme Deity, though there were many other *θεοὶ ἀγέννητοι*, unmade and self-existent gods besides, as Plutarch supposed before, one supreme God, together with a *ψυχὴ ἄνους*, an irrational soul or demon unmade, inferior in power to it; therefore, we add, in the next place, that the more intelligent Pagans did not only assert one God, that was supreme and *κράτιστος πάντων*, the most powerful of all the gods, but also, who, being omnipotent, was the principle and cause of all the rest, and therefore the only *θεὸς ἀγέννητος καὶ ἀθνηόστατος*, the only unproduced and self-existent Deity.—*Maximus Tyrius* affirms this to have been the general sense of all the Pagans, that there

Diss. 1. p. 5.
edit. Lugd.
1631. in 8vo.

was θεός αἰς πάντων βασιλεὺς καὶ πατήρ, καὶ θεοὶ πολλοὶ, θεῶν παῖδες, συνέρχοντες θεῷ, one God the king and father of all, and many gods, the sons of God, reigning together with God.—Neither did the poets imply any thing less, when Ζεὺς was so often called by the Greeks, and Jupiter by the Latians, πατήρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε, and *hominum pater atque deorum*, or *hominum factorque deorum*, and the like. And, indeed, the theogonia of the ancient Pagans before-mentioned, was commonly thus declared by them universally, γεννητοὺς τοὺς θεοὺς εἶναι, that the gods were generated, or, as Herodotus* expresseth it, ὅτι ἕκαστος τῶν θεῶν ἐγένετο, that every one of the gods was generated or produced;—which yet is not so to be understood, as if they had therefore supposed no God at all unmade or self-existent (which is absolute Atheism), but that the οἱ θεοί, the gods, as distinguished from the ὁ θεός, or τὸ θεόν, from God, or the supreme Deity, were all of them universally made or generated.

But to the end, that we may now render this business yet something more easy to be believed, that the intelligent Pagans did thus suppose all their gods save one to have been made or generated, and consequently acknowledged only one θεὸν ἀγέννητον καὶ αὐθυπόστατον, one unproduced and self-existent Deity,—we shall in this place further observe, that the theogonia of these ancient Pagans, their genesis and generation of gods, was really one and the same thing with the cosmogonia, the genesis and generation of the world, and indeed both of them understood of a temporary production both of these gods and the world. And this we shall first prove from Plato, in

* Histor. lib. ii. cap. llii. p. 109.

his Timæus; where he, being to treat of the cosmogonia, premiseth this distinction concerning two heads of Being—that some were eternal and never made, and some again made or generated; the former whereof he calls *οὐσία*, or essence, the latter *γένεσις*, or generation; adding also this difference betwixt them, that the eternal and immutable things were the proper objects of science and demonstration, but the other generated things of faith and opinion only;

Page 29.

ὁ, τι γὰρ πρὸς γένεσιν οὐσία, τοῦτο πρὸς πίστιν ἀλήθεια, for what essence is to generation, the same is certainty of truth or knowledge to faith.—And thereupon he declares, that his reader was not to expect the same evidence and certainty of truth from him, where he was now to treat of things generated (namely, the gods, and the visible world), as if he had been to discourse about things immutable and eternal, in these words:

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εἰν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, πολλά πολλῶν εἰπόντων περὶ θεῶν καὶ τῆς τοῦ παντός γενέσεως, &c. If, therefore, O Socrates, many things having been spoken by many men, concerning the gods and the generation of the universe, we be not able to discourse demonstratively concerning the same, you ought not at all to wonder at it, or be displeased with us; but, on the contrary, to rest well satisfied with our performance, if upon this argument we do but deliver probabilities.—Where the gods are by Plato plainly referred to *γένεσις*, and not to *οὐσία*; to generation, and not to eternal or immutable essence, as they are also joined with the generation of the world, as being but a part thereof. Neither is this at all to be wondered at in Plato, since first the whole visible world was

no less to him than it was to the other Pagans, a God; he calling it θεὸν εὐδαίμονα, a happy God, and before it was yet made, θεὸν ἐσόμενον, a God about to be made.—Not as if Plato accounted the senseless matter of this corporeal world, whether as perfectly dead and stupid, or as endued with a plastic nature only, to be a God (for no inanimate thing was a God to Plato), but because he supposed the world to be an animal, endued with an intellectual soul, and indeed the best of all animals compounded of soul and

body: οὕτως οὖν δὴ κατὰ λόγον τὸν εἰκότα δαί-
 Page 30. λέγειν, τόνδε τὸν κόσμον ζῶον ἔμφυχον ἔννοον

τε τῇ ἀληθείᾳ διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ γενέσθαι πρόνοιαν. Wherefore we are thus, according to probability, to conclude, that this world was really made by the providence of God an intellectual animal;—whence from an animal forthwith it became a God. So that here we are to take notice of two gods in Plato, very different from one another: one a generated god, this whole world animated; and another that God, by whose providence this world was generated, and thus made an animal and a god; which latter must needs be an unmade, self-existent Deity, and not belong to γένεσις, but to οὐσία, not to generation, but to immutable essence. Again, those greater parts of the world, the sun, the moon, and the stars (as supposed also to be animated with particular souls of their own) were as well accounted by Plato, as by the other Pagans, gods, he plainly calling them there ὁρατοὶ καὶ γεννηταὶ θεοὶ, visible and generated gods.—Besides which celestial gods, the earth itself also is supposed by him to be either a god or goddess, according to those ancient copies of the *Timæus*

used both by Cicero and Proclus: *Γῆν δὲ, τροφὸν μὲν ἡμετέραν, εἰλουμένην δὲ περὶ τὸν διὰ παντός πόλον τεταμένον, φύλακα καὶ δημιουργὸν νυκτός τε καὶ ἡμέρας, ἐμπεχρήσατο, πρώτην καὶ πρεσβυτάτην θεῶν, ὅσοι ἐντὸς οὐρανοῦ γεγόνασι*. God fabricated the earth also, which is our nurse, turning round upon the axis of the world, and thereby causing and maintaining the succession of day and night, the first and oldest of all the gods generated within the heavens.—Where, since that philosopher seems the rather to make the earth an animal and a God, because of its diurnal circumgyration upon its own axis, we may conclude, that afterwards, when in his old age (as Plutarch^a records from Theophrastus), he gave entertainment also to that other part of the Pythagoric hypothesis, and attributed to the earth a planetary annual motion likewise about the sun (from whence it would follow, that, as Plotinus^b expresseth it, the earth was *ἐν τῶν ἀστέρων*, one of the stars), he was therefore still so much the more inclined to think the earth to be a god as well as the other planets, or at least as the moon; that having been formerly represented in the Orphic tradition but as another habitable earth. For these verses of Orpheus are recorded by Proclus,^c to that purpose:

*Μένετο δ' ἄλλος γαῖαν ἀνέμενον, ἦν τε Σελήνη
Ἀέμετο κλέχουσα, ἐνυχθήσκει δὲ τε Μῆνος,
ἢ πᾶσι οἷσι' ἔχει, πᾶσι δόττω, πᾶσι μάλιστα.*

The sense whereof is this: That God in the coa-

^a In Question. Platonic. p. 1006. oper. vide etiam eundem in *Numæ*, tom. i. oper. p. 312.

^b Lib. ii. de Dub. Animæ, Ennead iv. lib. iv. cap. xii. §. 414.

^c Comment. in *Timæum* Platonic, lib. iv. p. 283. vide etiam lib. v. p. 292.

mogonia, or cosmopœia, besides this earth of our's, fabricated also another vast earth, which the immortal gods call Selene, but mortal men Mene, or the moon; that hath many hills and valleys, many cities and houses in it.—From whence Proclus, though as it seems a stranger to the Pythagoric system, yet being much addicted to these Orphic traditions, concluded the moon to be, γῆν αἰθεραίαν, an ethereal earth.—

After all this, Plato, that he might be thought to omit nothing in his Timæan cosmogonia, speaks also of the *genesis ortus*, or generation of the poetic gods, under the name of demons, such as Tethys and Phorcys, Saturn and Rhea, Jupiter and Juno, and the like; which seem to be really nothing else but the other inanimate parts of the world and things of nature, θεοποιήματα, that is, fictitiously personated and deified (as is elsewhere declared). Which whole business was a thing set off by those poets with much fiction and physiological allegory. And though Plato, out of a seeming compliance with the laws of his city, pretends here to give credit to this poetic theogonia, as tradition delivered down from the sons of the gods, who must not be supposed to have been ignorant of their parents; yet, as Eusebius well observeth, he doth but all the while silyly jeer it, plainly insinuating the fabulosity thereof, when he affirmeth it to have been introduced not only *ἀνευ ἀναγκαίων ἀποδείξεων*,^b without necessary demonstrations, but also *ἀνευ εἰκόνων*, without so much as probabilities. Nevertheless,

^a Preparat. Evangelic. lib. ii. cap. vii. p. 75, 76.

^b Plat. in Timæo, cap. xxvi. p. 249.

Proclus,* suspecting no such matter, but taking Plato in all this to have been in very good earnest, interprets these poetic gods or demons mentioned by him, to be the gods below the moon (notwithstanding that the earth was mentioned before by Plato), calling them *γενεσιούργους θεούς*, the gods that cause generation, and seeming to understand thereby the animated elements; Jupiter being here not taken, as he is often elsewhere, for the supreme God, but only for the animated ether, as Juno for the animated air. And upon this occasion he runs out into a long dispute, to prove, that not only the stars were animated, but also all the other sublunary bodies or elements: *εἰ γὰρ ὅλος ὁ κόσμος θεὸς εὐδαίμων, ἔστι οὐδὲν ἔστι τῶν συμπληρούντων αὐτὸν μορίων ἄθεον, καὶ ἀπρονόητον, εἰ δὲ καὶ θεοῦ πάντα μετέχει καὶ προνοίας, θείαν ἔλαχε φύσιν, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ οἰκεῖται τάξεις θεῶν ἐφεστήκασιν αὐτοῖς, εἰ γὰρ καὶ ὁ οὐρανὸς διὰ μέσων ψυχῶν καὶ νόων μετέχει τῆς μιᾶς ψυχῆς, καὶ τοῦ ἐνὸς νοῦ, τί χρὴ περὶ τούτων οἴεσθαι τῶν στοιχείων· πῶς οὐ πολλῶ μᾶλλον ταῦτα διὰ δὴ τινων μέσων θείων τάξεων μετέληχε τῆς μιᾶς τοῦ κόσμου θεότητος.* For if the whole world be a happy God, then none of the parts of it are godless, or devoid of providence; but if all things partake of God and Providence, then are they not unfurnished of the Divine nature; and if so, there must be some peculiar orders of gods presiding over them. For if the heavens by reason of particular souls and minds partake of that one soul and one mind; why should we not conclude the same concerning the elements, that they also, by certain intermedious orders of gods, partake of that one Divinity of the whole world?—Wherefore, a little be-

* In *Timæum* Platon. lib. iv. p. 267.

fore, the same Proclus highly condemns certain ancient physiologers whom he supposeth Aristotle to have followed: πολλοῖς τῶν φυσιο-

P. 285.

λόγων ἄψυχα εἰκῇ φερόμενα, καὶ ἀπρονόητα ταῦτα εἶναι τὰ στοιχεῖα νενόμισται· τὰ μὲν γὰρ οὐρανία διὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτοῖς τάξιν, νοῦν καὶ θεῶν μετέχειν ὁμολόγουν, τὴν δὲ γένεσιν, ὡς πολυμετάβολον, καὶ ἀόριστον, καὶ ἀπρονόητον ἀπέλιπον, οἷα δὲ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης ὕστερον ἐδόξασε, ταῖς οὐρανίαις περιφοραῖς μόνως ἐπιστήσας, τὰς ἀκινήτους αἰτίας· εἴτε ὀκτὼ εἶεν, εἴτε πλείους· ἄψυχα δὲ τὰ στοιχεῖα ταῦτα καταλείπων· The elements were thought by most of the ancient physiologers to be inanimate, and to be moved fortuitously without providence. For though they acknowledged the heavenly bodies, by reason of that order that appears in them, to partake of mind and gods; yet they left this sublunary world (or genesis) to float up and down without providence. And these Aristotle afterwards followed, appointing immoveable intelligences to preside over the celestial spheres only (whether eight or more) but leaving all the lower elements dead and inanimate.

Lastly, besides all those other mundane gods before-mentioned, as generated together with the world, though Proclus seems to be of another opinion, yet it is manifest, that Plato doth not there in his *Timæus* altogether forget those properly called demons (elsewhere so much insisted upon by him), but in the very next following words he plainly insinuates them, after this manner: ὅσοι φαίνονται καθ' ὅσον ἂν ἐθέλωσι θεοὶ, the gods, which appear visibly to us as often as they please, or which can appear and disappear at pleasure—speaking also of their genesis or generation as

* In *Timæo*, cap. xxvi. p. 248.

part of the cosmogonia; and then again afterwards calling them *νέοι θεοί*, junior gods, he describes them as those whose particular office it was to superintend and preside over human affairs, **καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν ὅτι κάλλιστα καὶ ἄριστα τὸ θνητὸν διακυβεύειν ζῶον, ὅτι μὴ κακῶν αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ γέγνητο αἴτιον*, and to govern this mortal animal, man, after the best manner possible, so that he should no otherwise fail of doing well or being happy, than as he became a cause of evil and misery to himself, by the abuse of his own liberty.—

And thus much out of Plato's *Timæus*; but the same thing might be proved also out of his other writings, as particularly from that passage in his tenth book of *Laws*,^b where he takes notice again of the theogonia of the ancients, and that as it had been depraved and corrupted by a great mixture of impious and immoral fables. *Εἰσὶν ἡμῖν ἐν γραμμασι λόγοι κείμενοι. Οἱ μὲν ἐν τισι μέτροις, οἱ δὲ καὶ ἄνευ μέτρων λέγοντες περὶ θεῶν, οἱ μὲν παλαιότατοι, ὡς γέγονεν ἡ πρώτη φύσις οὐρανοῦ τῶν τε ἄλλων προϊόντες δὲ τῆς ἀρχῆς οὐ πολὺ θεογονίαν διεξέρχονται, γενόμενοι τε ὡς πρὸς ἀλλήλοις ὁμίλησαν.* There are (saith he) extant among us Athenians, certain stories and traditions, very ancient, concerning the gods, written partly in metre, and partly in prose, declaring how the heaven, and the other gods were at first made, or generated, and then, carrying on their fabulous theogonia farther, how these generated gods afterward conversed with one another, and ingendering after the manner of men, begat other gods.—Where that philosopher, taking off his vizard, plainly discovers his great dislike of that whole fabulous theogonia (how-

* In *Timæo*, cap. xxix. p. 252.

^b P. 664.

ever he acknowledges elsewhere; that it did contain *τρονοίαι*,* that is, physiological allegories under it), as a thing that was destructive of all piety and virtue, by reason of its attributing all human passions and vices to the gods. However, it plainly appears from hence, that the theogonia, and the cosmogonia were one and the same thing, the generation of the gods being here the generation of the heaven, and of the sun, moon, and stars, and the like.

Moreover, this same thing is sufficiently manifest also even from Hesiod's own theogonia, which doubtless was that which Plato principally aimed at; and if it were not absolutely the first, yet it is the most ancient writing now extant, in that kind. For there, in the beginning of that poem, Hesiod^b invokes his muses after this manner:—

Χαίρετε, τίμα Δίος, ὅτε δὲ ἱερὰ θεῶν ἀοιδῶν
 ἔλκετε δ' ἀθανάτων λαῶν γένος αἰὲν ἰόντων,
 Οἱ τῆς ἔχθρας καὶ Οὐρανὸν ἀσπερίοντες,
 Νικητὲς δὲ δουρῶν, οἷς θ' ἀμύμονε ἔτρεψε Πόντος.
 Εἰσάγετε δ', ὡς τὰ πρῶτα θεοὶ καὶ γαῖα γενόιντο,
 Καὶ Ποσειδά, καὶ Πόντος ἀπῆρτος ἄδματι δῖος,
 Ἄστρα τε λαμπυρόντα, καὶ Οὐρανὸς εὐχὴν ὠκεῖον,
 Οἱ τ' ἐν τῷ ἔχθρῳ θεοὶ δουρῶν ἰόντων.

Salvete natæ Jovis, date vero amabilem cantilenam:
 Celebrate quoque immortalium divinum genus semper existentium,
 Qui tellure prognati sunt, cœlo stellato,
 Nocteque caliginosa, quos item salus nutrit pontus.
 Dicite insuper, ut primum dii et terra facti fuerint,
 Et flumina, et pontus immensus sæstu fervens,
 Astraque fulgentia, et cœlum latum superne,
 Et qui ex his nati sunt, dii, datores bonorum.

Where we see plainly, that the generation of the gods is the generation of the earth, heaven,

* Vide Platon. de Republ. lib. ii. p. 430.

^b Theogon. vers. 104.

stars, seas, rivers, and other things begotten from them (as probably amongst the rest demons and nymphs, which the same Hesiod speaks of elsewhere). But immediately after this invocation of the muses, the poet begins with Chaos, and Tartara; and Love, as the first principles; and then proceeds to the production of the earth and of night out of chaos; of the ether and of day from night; of the starry heavens, mountains, and seas, &c. All which genesis or generation of gods is really nothing but a poetical description of the cosmogonia; as throughout the sequel of that whole poem all seems to be physiology, veiled under fiction and allegories. And thus the ancient scholia upon that book begin, *ιστίον ὅτι ἡ περὶ τῆς Θεογονίας λόγος φυσικὴν διήγησιν τῶν ὄντων ὑπαγορεύει*, We must know, that the whole doctrine of the theogonia contains under it, in way of allegory, a physiological declaration of things;—Hesiod's gods being not only the animated parts of the world, but also all the other things of nature, fictitiously personated and deified, or abusively called gods and goddesses.

Neither was this only the doctrine of the Greeks, that the world was thus made or generated, and that the generation of the world was a theogonia, or a generation of gods (the world itself and its several parts being accounted such by them), but also in like manner of the other Barbarian Pagans. For Diogenes Laertius hath recorded *in Proem.* concerning the Persian Magi, *ἀποφαίνει* *p. 2.* *σθαί περὶ τε οὐσίας θεῶν καὶ γενέσεως, οὗς καὶ πῦρ εἶναι καὶ γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ.** That they did both assert the being and generation of gods, and also that these gods

* Vide etiam Herodot. Hist. lib. i. cap. cxxxi. p. 56;

were fire, and earth, and water;—that is, that the animated elements were gods (as Proclus also before declared), and that these, together with the world, were generated, or had a beginning. And

In the Persian sacrifices, *μύσας* *ἀπὸ τῶν ἑνὸς ἐκ τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ*, one of the Magi standing by sung the Theogonia, (i. e. the Cosmogonia.) Herod. in Clio. ii. 132. lib. i. p. 55.

both Laertius and Diodorus represent it as the opinion of the ancient Egyptians, that the world was generated, or had a temporary production; as also, that the sun and moon, and other parts of the world, were gods. But whereas the same Diodorus writes of certain Egyptian gods, *οἱ γένεσιν αἰδίων ἐσχηκότες*, which had an eternal generation;—he seems to mean thereby only the celestial gods, the

sun, moon, and stars, as distinct from those other heroes and men-gods, which are again thus described by him: *οἱ θνητοὶ ὑπάρξαντες, διὰ δὲ σύνεσιν καὶ κοινὴν ἀνθρώπων εὐεργεσίαν, τετυχηκότες τῆς ἀθανασίας*: Who, though naturally mortal, yet, by reason of their wisdom, virtue, and beneficence toward mankind, had been advanced to immortality.—

And by this time we think it doth sufficiently appear, that the theogonia of the ancients is not to be understood merely of their heroes and men-gods, or of all their gods, as supposed to have been nothing else but mortal men, (*Dii mortali-bus nati matribus*, as Cotta in Cicero* speaks) who, according to the more vulgar signification of the word, had been generated (*humano more*), as some, otherwise learned men, have seemed to suppose; but that it extends to all the inferior Pagan gods, some whereof were parts of the visible world animated, as the sun, moon, stars, and earth; so that their theogonia was the very same thing with the

* De Natur. Deor. lib. iii. cap. xviii. p. 3075. tom. ix. oper.

cosmogonia, or at least a part thereof. Notwithstanding which, we deny not, but that there was also, in the pagan fables of the gods, a certain mixture of history and herology interserted, and complicated all along together with physiology.

We are, in the next place, to observe, that both this theogonia and cosmogonia of the ancient Pagans, their generation of the world and gods, is to be understood of a temporary production of them, whereby they were made *ἐκ μὴ ὄντων*, or from an antecedent non-existence brought into being. For this was the general tradition amongst the Pagans, that the world was made out of an antecedent chaos, as shall be afterwards further declared. And Aristotle^a affirmeth, that before his time, this genesis and temporary production of the world had been universally entertained by all, and particularly, that Plato was an assertor of the same. Nevertheless, the generality of the latter Platonists^b endeavour, with all their might, to force a contrary sense upon his *Timæus*: which is a thing, that Plutarch long since observed after this manner; *οἱ πλείστοι τῶν χρωμένων Πλά-*

τωνι, φοβούμενοι, καὶ παραλυπούμενοι, πάντα De Psychog.
Plat. p. 1013.

μηχανῶνται, καὶ παραβιάζονται καὶ στρέφουσιν,
ὥς τι δαῖνόν καὶ ἄρρητον οἰόμενοι δεῖν περικαλύπτειν καὶ ἀρνέ-
σθαι, τὴν τε τοῦ κόσμου τὴν τε τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτοῦ γένεσιν καὶ
σύστασιν, οὐκ ἐξ αἰδίου συνιστάτων, οὐδὲ τὸν ἄπειρον χρόνον
οὕτως ἔχόντων. The most of Plato's followers, being infinitely troubled and perplexed in their minds, turn themselves every way, using all manner of arts, and offering all kind of violence to his text, as conceiving, that they ought, by all

^a De Cœlo, lib. i. cap. x. p. 632. tom. i. oper.

^b Vide Proclum in *Timæum* Platon.

means possible, to hide and conceal that opinion (as infand and detestable) of the generation of the world, and of the soul of it, so as not to have continued from eternity, or through a succession of infinite time.—Notwithstanding which, we conceive it to be undeniably evident, that Plato, in his *Timæus*, doth assert the genesis of the world in this sense; to wit, of a temporary production of it, and as not having existed from eternity, or without beginning. First, because, in the entrance of that discourse,* he opposeth these two things to one another, τὸ αἰὶ ὄν, that which always is,—and τὸ γένεσθαι ἔχον, that which is generated or made;—and therefore, in affirming the world to have been generated, he must needs deny the eternity thereof. Again, the question is so punctually stated by him afterwards, as that there is no possibility of any subterfuge left, πότερον ἦν αἰὲ γένεσθαι ἀρχὴν ἔχων οὐδεμίαν, ἢ γέγονεν, ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τινος ἀρχάμενος; Whether the world always were, having no beginning or generation, or whether it was made or generated, having commenced from a certain epocha?—To which the answer is, γέγονεν, that it was made, or had a beginning.—Moreover, this philosopher there plainly affirms also,^b that time itself was made, or had a beginning, χρόνος δ' οὖν μετ' οὐρανοῦ γέγονεν, ἵνα ἅμα γεννηθέντες, ἅμα καὶ λυθῶσιν, ἃν ποτε λύσις τις αὐτῶν γένηται. Time was made together with the heaven, that, being both generated together, they might be both dissolved together likewise, if at least there should ever be any dissolution of them.—Besides which, he plainly declares, that before this orderly world was produced, the matter of it did move disorderly;^c πᾶν ὅσον ἦν ὁρατὸν, παραλαβὼν,

* Cap. xii. p. 235.

^b Cap. xx. p. 245.^c *Timæi*, cap. xiv. p. 237.

οὐκ ἡσυχίαν ἔχον, ἀλλὰ κινούμενον πλημμελῶς καὶ ἀτάκτως, εἰς τάξιν αὐτὸ ἤγαγεν ἐκ τῆς ἀταξίας. God taking all that matter, which was, (not then resting, but moving confusedly and disorderly) he brought it into order out of confusion.—Which is no more than if he should have said, God made this world out of an antecedent chaos; which, as we said before, was the constant tradition of the ancient Pagans. Now, as to authority, we may well conclude, that Aristotle was better able to understand both Plato's philosophy and Greek, than any of those junior Platonists, who lived hundreds of years after. And yet we are not quite destitute of other suffrages besides Aristotle's neither; not only Philo, the Jew,^a but also Plutarch^b and Atticus,^c who were both of them Platonic Pagans, voting on this side, besides Alexander Aphrodisius,^d a judicious Peripatetic. The only objection considerable is from what Plato himself writes in his third and sixth book of Laws; in the former whereof, Clinias and the Athenian Hospes discourse together after this manner, concerning the original or first beginning of commonwealths: Πολιτείας δ' ἀρχὴν τίνα ποτὲ φῶμεν γεγονέναι; P. 676. Steph. ΚΛ. Λέγεις δὲ πόθεν; ΑΘ. Οἶμαι μὲν ἀπὸ χρόνου μήκους τε καὶ ἀπειρίας, καὶ τῶν μεταβολῶν ἐν τῷ τοιοῦτῳ. ΚΛ. Πῶς λέγεις; ΑΘ. Φέρε, ἀφ' οὗ πόλεις τ' εἰσὶ καὶ ἄνθρωποι πολιτευόμενοι, δοκεῖς ἂν ποτε κατανοῆσαι χρόνον, πλήθος ὅσον γέγονεν; ΚΛ. Οὐκ οὐν ῥᾶν γε οὐδαμῶς. ΑΘ. Τὸ δὲ γε ὡς ἀπειρόν τι καὶ ἀμήχανον ἂν εἴη. ΚΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν τοῦτό γε. ΑΘ. Μῶν γε οὖν οὐ μυρίαί μιν ἐπὶ μυρίαί ηἰμῖν

^a In Libro, quod mundus sit incorruptibilis, p. 941. oper.

^b In Libro de Animæ Procreat, p. 1013, 1014. tom. ii. oper.

^c Apud Euseb. Præpar. Evangel. lib. xv. cap. vi. p. 801.

^d Comment. in Libros Metaphys. Aristot. p. 181. ed. Latin. Paris. 1508. fol.

γεγόναι πόλεις ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τοῦ πλῆθους λόγον, οὐκ ἐλάττους ἐφθαρμέναι; πεπολιτευμέναι δ' αὖ πάσας πολιτείας πολλάκις ἑκάσταχού; καὶ τότε μὲν ἐξ ἐλαττόνων, μείζους, τότε δὲ ἐκ μείζονων, ἐλάττους· καὶ χειρόρους ἐκ βελτιόνων γεγόναι, καὶ βελτίους ἐκ χειρόνων.

ATH. What beginning shall we say there was of commonwealths? CL. Whence would yourself

derive them? ATH. I suppose from a great length and infinity of time, through successive changes.

CL. I understand not well what you mean.

ATH. Thus therefore, do you think, that you are able to determine what length or quantity of time there hath been since cities and polities of men first began? CL. This is by no means easy to be done.

ATH. Wherefore, there is a kind of infinity and inestimability of this time. CL. It is very true.

ATH. Have there not then been innumerable cities constituted within this time, and as many

again destroyed, of all several forms; they being changed from greater to lesser, and from lesser to greater, from better to worser, and from worser to better?—Now, we say, that if Plato intended here

to assert an absolute infinity of time past, then it must needs be granted, that in his old age, when he wrote his book of Laws, he changed his opinion from what it was before when he wrote his

Timæus; and if so, he ought in all reason to have retracted the same, which he does not here do; but in very truth, the meaning of this philosopher in those words cited, seems to be this; not that there was an absolute infinity of time past, (as

Proclus contends, taking advantage of that word ἀπερία) but only that the world had lasted such a length of time, as was in a manner inestimable to

us, or uncomputable by us; there having hap-

pened, as he addeth, in the mean time, several successive destructions and consumptions of mankind, by means of various accidents, as particularly one most remarkable deluge and inundation of waters. The latter place, in his sixth book of Laws, runs thus : ἡ τῶν ἀνθρώπων

P. 781.

γένεσις ἢ τὸ παράπαν ἀρχὴν οὐδεμίαν ἔληχεν, οὐδ' ἔτι ποτὲ γε τελευτήν· ἀλλ' ἦν τε αἰεὶ καὶ ἔσται πάντως· ἢ μῆκος τι τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀπ' οὗ γέγονεν, ἀμύχανον ἂν χρόνον ὅσον γεγονὸς ἂν εἴη. Either the generation of men had no beginning at all, and will have no end, but always was and always will be ; or else there has been an inestimable length of time from the beginning of it.—Which place affordeth still more light to the former ; for we may well conclude, that by ἀπειρόν τι καὶ ἀμύχανον, there was not meant an absolute infinity of time, but only such as had a very remote or distant beginning, because ἀμύχανον here is plainly taken in that sense. We conceive, therefore, that this was Plato's opinion in his old age, when he wrote his book of Laws, that though the world had a beginning, yet it had continued a very long time not computable by us ; or at least he thought fit to declare himself after that manner, perhaps by reason of the clamours of Aristotle, or some others against his Timæus, that so he might thereby somewhat mollify that opinion of the novelty of the world, by removing the epocha and date thereof to so great a distance.

Nqw, it is very true, what we have several times before suggested, that there have been amongst the Pagans, both Theogonists and Cosmogonists too, that were Atheists ; they abusing the word gods several ways ; some of them, as Anaximander, understanding thereby inanimate worlds suc-

cessively generated out of senseless matter, and corrupted again into it; others, as Anaximenes and Democritus, allowing, that there were certain animals and understanding beings superior to men, but such only as were native and mortal, in like manner as men, and calling these by the name of gods. Of the former of which two philosophers, St. Austin* gives us this account: "Anaximenes omnes rerum causas infinito aëri dedit, nec deos negavit aut tacuit, non tamen ab ipsis aërem factum, sed ipsos ex aëre ortos credidit:" Anaximenes made infinite air to be the first original and cause of all things; and yet was he not therefore silent concerning the gods, much less did he deny them; nevertheless, he did not believe the air to have been made by the gods, but the gods to have been all generated out of the air.—These were therefore such Theogonists, as supposed all the gods without exception to be generable and corruptible, and acknowledged no θεὸν ἀγέννητον at all, no understanding being unmade and self-existent; but concluded senseless matter to be the only ἀγέννητον and original of all things, which is absolute Atheism. Notwithstanding which, it is certain, that all the Pagan Theogonists were not Atheists, (no more than all their Cosmogonists Theists) but that there was another sort of Theogonists amongst them, who supposed indeed all the inferior mundane gods to have been made or generated in one sense or other; but asserted one θεὸν ἀγέννητον καὶ αὐθιπόστατον, one supreme unmade self-existent Deity, who was the cause of them all: which Theogonists, for distinction sake from those other Atheistic ones, may be called Divine.

* De Civitate Dei, lib. viii. cap. ii. p. 147. tom. vii. oper.

And that Plato was such a Divine Theogonist, is a thing, as we conceive, out of question; but if there had been any doubt concerning it, it would have been sufficiently removed from those passages before cited out of his *Timæus*. To which, nevertheless, for fuller satisfaction sake, may be added these two following: the first, page 34: οὗτος δὲ πᾶς ὄντως αἰὲ λογισμὸς θεοῦ, περὶ τὸν ποτὲ ἐσόμενον θεὸν λογισθεῖς. For thus it ought to be read ὄντως; as it is also in Aldus's edition; and not ὄντως, as in Stephens, following an error in that of Ficinus. And accordingly the words are thus rendered by Cicero: "Hæc Deus is, qui semper erat, de aliquando futuro deo cogitans, lævem eum effecit; et undique æquabilem," &c. This was the ratiocination or resolution of that God, which always is, concerning that god, which was sometime about to be made, that he should be smooth and spherical, &c.—Where again, it presently follows in Cicero's version, "Sic Deus ille æternus hunc perfecte beatum deum procreavit;" thus that eternal God procreated this perfectly happy god, the world.—Where there is plainly mention made of two gods, one a generated god, the animated world, called elsewhere in Plato θεῖον γεννητόν; and another eternal and unmade God, *innatus et infectus Deus*, who was the cause of the world's generation or production; or, to keep close to Plato's own language, one God who belonged to genesis; or that head of being, which he calls generation, and therefore must needs have an antecedent cause of his existence, since nothing can be made without a cause; and another God, that was truly and properly οὐσία, immutable essence, who was the cause of that generated god the universe, and

therefore of all things. The other passage of Plato's is, (page 41, of his *Timæus*,) ἐπεὶ οὖν πάντες ὅσοι τε περιπολοῦσι φανερώς, καὶ ὅσοι φαίνονται καθ' ὅσον ἂν ἰθέλωσι θεοὶ, γένεσιν ἔσχον, λέγει πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὁ τοῦδε τοῦ πᾶν γεννήσας, τάδε, Θεοὶ θεῶν, ἃν ἐγὼ δημιουργός, πατήρ τε ἔργων, ἃ δὲ ἐμοῦ γεγόμενα. When therefore all the gods, both those which move visibly about the heavens, and those which appear to us as often as they please (that is, both the stars and demons), were generated or created, that God, which made this whole universe, bespake these generated gods after this manner: Ye gods of gods (whom I myself am the maker and father of) attend.—Where the words θεοὶ θεῶν, notwithstanding Proclus's other differing conjectures, seem to have been very well rendered by Cicero: *Dii, qui deorum sata orti estis*, Ye gods, which are the progeny or offspring of the gods.—And the gods, whose offspring these generated gods (the animated stars and demons) are said to be, must needs be those αἰδίοι θεοὶ, those eternal gods, elsewhere mentioned in the same *Timæus*, as where the philosopher calls the world, τῶν αἰδίων θεῶν γεγονὸς ἄγαλμα, a generated or created image of the eternal gods;—as Cicero also is to be understood of these, when he speaks of the world's being made by the gods, and by the counsel of the gods. Now, these eternal gods of Plato, called by his followers θεοὶ ὑπερκόσμιοι, the supramundane gods,—though, according to that stricter notion of the word γένεσις, as it is used both in Plato and Aristotle, for a temporary production of things, ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, they were indeed all ἀγέννητοι, because they never were not, and had no beginning of their existence; yet, not-

* *Timæi*, cap. xxi. p. 246. s.

withstanding were they not therefore supposed by that philosopher to be all αὐτόγονοι and αὐθυπόστατοι, so many self-originated and self-subsistent beings, or first principles, but only one of them such, and the rest derived from that one: it being very true, as we conceive, what Proclus affirms, ὅτι ὁ Πλάτων ἐπὶ μίαν ἀρχὴν ἀνάγει πάντα, that Plato re-
In Timæ.
p. 116.
 duces all things to one principle,—even matter itself; but unquestionable, that he deriveth all his gods from one. Wherefore, all those eternal gods of Plato (one only excepted), though they were not γέννητοι, or generated in one sense, that is, κατὰ χρόνον, as to a temporary beginning, yet were they, notwithstanding, as Proclus distinguisheth, γέννητοι ἀπ' αἰτίας, generated in another sense, as produced from a superior cause, there being only one such ἀγέννητος, one ingenerate or unproduced Deity. Thus, according to Plato, there were two sorts of secondary or inferior and derivative gods; first, the θεοὶ ἐγκόσμιοι, or mundane gods, such as had all of them a temporary generation with the world, and of whom Plato's theogonia and γενέσεις θεῶν is properly to be understood; and secondly, the ὑπερκόσμιοι and αἰδίοι θεοί, the supramundane and eternal gods, which were all of them also, save only one, produced from that one, and dependent on it as their cause. But of these inferior eternal gods of the Platonists and Pythagoreans we are to speak again afterwards. In the mean time it is evident, that in that passage of Plato's before cited, there is plain mention made both of θεοὶ γένεσιν ἔχοντες, of *dii orti*, gods who were made or generated with the world, and of ὁ τὸδε τὸ πᾶν γεννήσας, of one God, who was the maker of them, and of the whole universe, who

therefore is himself every way ἀγέννητος, unmade or unproduced.—And accordingly, he afterwards subjoins, καὶ ὁ μὲν δὴ ταῦτα πάντα διατάξας, ἔμενεν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ κατὰ τρόπον ἥθει· μένους δὲ νοήσαντες οἱ παῖδες τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς τάξιν, ἐπειθοντο αὐτῇ. which Cicero thus renders: “Atque is quidem (Deus) qui cuncta composuit, constanter in suo manebat statu; qui autem erant ab eo creati (dii) cum parentis ordinem cognovissent, hunc sequebantur,” &c. Then that god, who framed all things, remained constantly in his former state; and his sons, or the gods that were created by him, observed his order and appointment.—

Neither was Plato singular in this; but the generality of the other Pagan Theists, who were more intelligent, all along agreed with him herein, as to the generation of the mundane gods; and so were both Theists and Theogonists, they indeed understanding nothing else by their theogonia, or generation of gods, than a Divine cosmogonia, or creation of the world by God; forasmuch as they supposed the world itself as animated, and its several parts to be gods. So that they asserted these three things: first, a cosmogonia, the generation of the world, that it was not from eternity, but had a novelty or beginning; secondly, that this cosmogonia, or generation of the world, was also a theogonia, or generation of gods, the world itself and several of its parts animated being esteemed such; and lastly, that both these gods and the world were made and produced by one θεὸς ἀγέννητος καὶ ἀντογενής, one unproduced and self-originated Deity.—All which particulars we may here briefly exemplify in *P. Ovidius Naso*, whose paganism sufficiently appears from his *Fastorum* and all his

other writings, and who also went off the stage before Christianity appeared on it, and may well be presumed to represent the then generally received doctrine of the Pagans. First, therefore, as for the generation and novelty of the world, and its first production out of a chaos, we have it fully acknowledged by him in these following verses :

Ante mare et terras, et, quod tegit omnia, coelum,	Metam. l. 1.
Unus erat toto naturæ vultus in orbe,	[vers. 5.]
Quem dixere chaos, rudis indigestaque moles,	
Nec quicquam nisi pondus iners, congestaque eodem	
Non bene junctarum discordia semina rerum.	
Nullus adhuc mundo præbebat lumina Titan,	
Nec nova crescendo reparabat cornua Phoebe,	
Nec circumfuso pendebat in aëre tellus,	
Ponderibus librata suis ; nec brachia longo	
Margine terrarum porrexerat Amphitrite.	
Quaque erat et tellus, &c.	

Which, in Mr. Sandys's English, with some little alteration, speaks thus :—

Before that sea, and earth, and heaven was fram'd,
 One face had nature, which they chaos nam'd.
 No Titan yet the world with light adorns,
 Nor waxing Phebe fills her wained horns ;
 Nor hung the self-poiz'd earth in thin air plac'd,
 Nor Amphitrite the vast shore embrac'd ;
 Earth, air, and sea confounded, &c.

In the next place, when there was a world made out of this chaos, that this cosmogonia, or generation of the world, was also a theogonia, or generation of gods, is plainly intimated in these verses :

Neu regio foret ulla suis animalibus orba,
 Astra tenent cœleste solum, formæque deorum.

To this sense,

That nought of animals might unfurnish'd lie,
 The gods, in form of stars, possess the sky.

And that all this was effected, and this orderly mundane system produced out of a disorderly confused chaos, not by a fortuitous motion of matter, or the jumbling of atoms, but by the providence and command of one unmade Deity, which was also that, that furnished all the several parts of the world with respective animals, the sea with fishes, the earth with men, and the heaven with gods; is thus declared also by the poet:—

Hanc Deus et melior litem natura diremit,
Nam cœlo terras, et terris abscidit undas:
Et liquidum spisso secrevit ab aëre cœlum, &c.
Sic ubi dispositam, quisquis fuit ille deorum,
Congeriem secuit, sectamque in membra redegit;
Principio terram, ne non æqualis ab omni
Parte foret, magni speciem glomeravit in orbis:
Tum freta diffudit, rapidisque tumescere ventis
Jussit, &c.
Sic onus inclusum numero distinxit eodem
Cura Dei, &c.

This strife (with better nature) God decides,
He earth from heaven, the sea from earth divides:
He ether pure extracts from grosser air.
All which unfolded by his prudent care,
From that blind mass; the happily disjoin'd
With strifeless peace, he to their seats confin'd, &c.
What God soever this division wrought,
And every part to due proportion brought,
First, lest the earth unequal should appear,
He turn'd it round in figure of a sphere.
Then seas diffus'd, commanding them to roar
With ruffling winds, and give the land a shore.
To those he added springs, ponds, lakes immense,
And rivers whom their winding borders fence.

Where, though that learned paraphrast supposed (and not without some probability neither) that *Deus et melior natura*, God and the better nature, —were one and the self-same thing, yet we rather conceived them to be distinct, but one of them subordinate to the other as its instrument, God

and the plastic nature; accordingly as Aristotle writes in his *Physics*, Νοῦς καὶ Φύσις αἰτίον τοῦδε τοῦ παντός, That mind and nature were both together the cause of this universe.—

Nevertheless, we cannot but observe in this place, that though that poet speaks more than once of God singularly, as also calls him *mundi fabricator*, and *ille opifex rerum*, and *mundi melioris origo*; yet notwithstanding, where he writes of the making of man, Pagan-like, he affirms him, though to have been made by God, yet according to the image or likeness of the gods, which govern all things.

Sanctius his animal, mentisque capacius altæ,
Deerat adhuc, et quod dominari in cætera posset;
Natus homo est: sive hunc divino semine fecit,
Ille opifex rerum, mundi melioris origo:
Sive recens tellus, seductaque nuper ab alto
Æthere, cognati retinebat semina coeli.
Quam satus Iapeto, mistam fluvialibus undis,
Finxit in effigiem moderantum cuncta deorum.

The nobler being, with a mind possesseth,
Was wanting yet, that should command the rest,
That Maker, the best world's original,
Either him fram'd of seed celestial;
Or earth, which late he did from heaven divide,
Some sacred seeds retain'd to heaven allied:
Which with the living stream Prometheus mixt,
And in that artificial structure fixt
The form of all the all-ruling deities.

And because some may probably be puzzled with this seeming contradiction, that one God should be said to be the maker of the whole world and of man, and yet the government of all should be attributed to gods plurally, and man said to be made in the image and likeness of the gods; we shall therefore add here, that according to the tenor of the Pagan theology, the inferior and minor gods

were supposed also to have all of them their several share in the government of things below them: for which cause they are called not only by Maximus Tyrius,* *συνάρχοντες θεῶ*, co-rulers with God, but also by Plato himself, *τῇ μεγίστῃ δαίμονι συνάρχοντες*, the co-governors and co-reign-ers with the supreme God. So that the govern-ment of this inferior world was by the Pagans often attributed to them jointly, the supreme and inferior gods both together, under that one gene-ral name of gods. But the chief of those infe-rior deities, in whose image man is also said to have been made, as well as in the likeness of the supreme, were either those celestial gods and animated stars before mentioned by the poet, or else the eternal gods of Plato, which were looked upon likewise as co-makers of the world subor-dinate.

Besides Ovid, we might instance here in many more of the Pagan Theogonists clearly acknow-ledgeing in like manner one unmade Deity, which generated both the world and all the other gods in it; as, for example, Strabo, who, affirming that the world was *τῆς φύσεως ἅμα καὶ τῆς προνοίας ἔργον*, the joint work both of nature and providence,—

as it was before ascribed by Ovid to

L. 17. p. 809. Deus et melior natura, adds concern-
ing Providence or the Deity in this manner: *Τὸ δὲ τῆς προνοίας, ὅτι βεβούληται καὶ αὐτὴ ποικιλοτέρα τις οὔσα, καὶ μυρίων ἔργων δημιουργός, ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις ζωᾷ γεννᾶν, ὡς πολὺ διαφέροντα τῶν ἄλλων· καὶ τούτων τὰ κράτιστα Θεούς τε καὶ ἀνθρώπους, ὧν ἔνεκεν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα συνέστηκε. Τοῖς μὲν οὖν Θεοῖς ἀπέδειξε τὸν οὐρανὸν, τοῖς δ' ἀνθρώποις τὴν γῆν.* That having a multiform fe-

* Dissertat. i. p. 5. edit. Lugd. 1631. 8vo.

cundity in it, and delighting in variety of works, it designed principally to make animals as the most excellent things, and amongst them chiefly those two noblest kinds of animals, gods and men; for whose sakes the other things were made; and then assigned heaven to the gods, and earth to men, the two extreme parts of the world for their respective habitations.—Thus also Seneca in Lactantius,* speaking concerning God: “*Hic cum prima fundamenta molis pulcherrimæ jaceret, et hoc ordiretur, quo neque majus quicquam novit natura nec melius; ut omnia sub du-cibus irent, quamvis ipse per totum se corpus intenderat, tamen ministros regni sui deos genuit.*” God, when he laid the foundations of this most beautiful fabric, and began to erect that structure, than which nature knows nothing greater or more excellent; to the end that all things might be carried on under their respective governors orderly, though he intended himself through the whole, as to preside in chief over all, yet did he generate gods also, as subordinate ministers of his kingdom under him.—We shall forbear to mention the testimonies of others here, because they may be more opportunely inserted elsewhere; only we shall add, as to Hesiod and Homer, that though they seem to have been sometimes suspected, both by Plato and Aristotle, for Atheistic Theogonists, yet, as Aristotle did, upon maturer thoughts, afterwards change his opinion concerning both of them, so it is most probable, that they were no Atheists, but Divine Theogonists; such as supposed indeed many generated gods, but one supreme unmade Deity, the maker both

* Divin. Institut. lib. i. cap. v. p. 40.

of the world and them. And this not only for the grounds before alleged concerning Hesiod, and because both of them do every where affirm even their generated gods to be immortal (which no Atheists did), but also for sundry other reasons, some of which may be more conveniently inserted elsewhere. Moreover, it hath been already intimated, that the generated gods of Hesiod and Homer extend farther than those of Plato's; they being not only the animated parts of the world, but also all the other things of nature fictitiously personated, and improperly or abusively called gods and goddesses; whereof a farther account will be afterwards given.

Neither ought it at all to be wondered at, if these Divine Theogonists amongst the Pagans did many times, as well as those other atheistic ones, make Chaos and the Ocean senior to the gods, and Night the mother of them. The former of these being not only done by Hesiod and Homer, but also by the generality of the ancient Pagan Theists in Epicharmus;^a and the latter by Orpheus,^b an undoubted Theist, in his hymn of the Night:

Νύκτα θεῶν γενέτρισαν ἀνθρώπων, ἡδὲ καὶ ἀστέρας

Noctem concebro genetricem hominum deumque.

They not understanding this absolutely and universally of all the gods without exception, as the other Atheistic Theogonists did, as if there had been no unmade Deity at all, but Chaos and Night (that is, senseless matter blindly and fortu-

^a Apud Diog. Laert. lib. iii. segm. 10. p. 170.

^b P. 99. oper. Vide etiam eundem in Argonautic. vers. 339. p. 24. et Proclum in Timæum Platonis, lib. ii. p. 63.

itously moved,) had been the sole original of all things, but only of the οἱ Θεοί, the gods, so called by way of distinction from God, or the supreme Deity; that is, the inferior mundane gods generated together with the world. The reason whereof was, because it was a most ancient, and in a manner universally received tradition amongst the Pagans, as hath been often intimated, that the cosmogonia, or generation of the world, took its first beginning from a chaos (the Divine Cosmogonists agreeing herein with the Atheistic ones); this tradition having been delivered down from Orpheus and Linus (amongst the Greeks), by Hesiod and Homer, and others; acknowledged by Epicharmus; and embraced by Thales, Anaxagoras, Plato, and other philosophers, who were Theists; the antiquity whereof was thus declared by Euripides:*

Οὐκ ἑμῶς ὁ μῦθος, ἀλλ' ἑμῶς μητρὶς πάρος,
 Ὡς οὐρανὸς τε γαῖα τ' ἦν μορφῇ μίᾳ,
 Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐχωρίσθησαν Ἀλλήλων δίχῃ,
 Τίκτουσι πάντα, καὶ δίδωκαν εἰς φάος,
 Τὰ δένδρα, πτνὰ, θύρας, οὓς δ' ἄλγαν τρέφει,
 Γένος τε θνητῶν.

Non hic meus, sed matris est sermo meæ,
 Figura ut una fuerit et cœli et soli,
 Secreta quæ mox ut receperunt statum,
 Cuncta ediderunt hæc in oras luminis;
 Peras, volucres, arbores, ponti gregem,
 Homines quoque ipsos.

Neither can it reasonably be doubted, but that it was originally Mosaical, and indeed at first a Divine revelation, since no man could otherwise pretend to know what was done before mankind

* In Menalippe apud Diodor. Sicul. lib. i. cap. iv. et Eusebium Præparat. Evangel. lib. i. cap. v. p. 20.

had any being. Wherefore those Pagan Cosmogonists, who were Theists, being Polytheists and Theogonists also, and asserting, besides the one supreme unmade Deity, other inferior mundane gods, generated together with the world (the chief whereof were the animated stars), they must needs, according to the tenor of that tradition, suppose them, as to their corporeal parts at least, to have been juniors to Night and Chaos, and the offspring of them, because they were all made out

Sympos. l. 4.
Qu. 5. [p. 670.
Iom. ii. oper.] of an antecedent dark chaos. Τὴν μυγα-

λὴν ἐκτεθειάσθαι λέγουσιν (saith Plutarch), ὑπὸ Αἰγυπτίων τυφλὴν οὔσαν, ὅτι τὸ σκότος τοῦ φωτός ἡγουντο πρεσβύτερον. The *mus araneus* being blind, is said to have been deified by the Egyptians, because they thought, that darkness was older than light.—And the case was the same concerning their demons likewise, they being conceived to have their corporeal vehicula also; for which cause, as Porphyrius* from Numenius writeth, the ancient Egyptians pictured them in ships or boats floating upon the water: τοὺς δὲ Αἰγυπτίους διὰ τοῦτο τοὺς δαίμονας ἅπαντας οὐκ ἐστάναι ἐπὶ στερεοῦ, ἀλλὰ πάντας ἐπὶ πλοίου. The Egyptians therefore represented all their demons, as not standing upon firm land, but in ships upon the water.—But as for the incorporeal part or souls of those inferior gods, though these Divine Theogonists could not derive their original from Chaos or matter, but rather from that other principle called Love, as being divinely created, and so having God for their father, yet might they, notwithstanding, in another sense, fancy Night to have been their mother too, inasmuch as they were

* De Autro Nymphar. p. 56. edit. Cantab.

all made ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, from an antecedent non-existence or nothing, brought forth into being. For which cause there seems to have been in Orpheus a dialogue betwixt the Maker of the world and Night.* For that this ancient cabala, which derived the cosmogonia from Chaos and Love, was at first religious and not atheistical, and Love understood in it not to be the offspring of Chaos, may be concluded from hence, because this Love as well as Chaos was of a Mosaical extraction also, and plainly derived from that Spirit of God, which is said in Scripture to have moved upon the waters, that is, upon the chaos; whether by this Spirit be to be meant God himself, as acting immediately upon the matter, or some other active principle derived from God and not from matter (as a mundane soul or plastic nature). From whence also it came, that, as Porphyrius testifieth, the ancient Pagans thought the water

to be divinely inspired: ἡγοῦντο γὰρ προσ-
 ζάνειν τῇ ὕδατι τὰς ψυχὰς θεοπνόμεναι ὥς φησιν

De Ant.
 Nymph. p.
 256.

ὁ Νουμήνιος διὰ τοῦτο λέγων καὶ τὸν προφήτην εἰρηκέναι, ἐμφέρεσθαι ἐπάνω τοῦ ὕδατος θεοῦ πνεῦμα. They thought, that souls attended upon the water, or resorted thereunto, as being divinely inspired, as Numenius writeth, adding the prophet also therefore to have said, that the Spirit of God moved upon the water.—

And that this cabala was thus understood by some of the ancient Pagan Cosmogonists themselves, appears plainly, not only from Simmias Rhodius and Parmenides, but also from these following verses of Orpheus, or whoever was the writer of those Argonautics, undoubtedly ancient,

* Apud Proclum et alios.

where Chaos and Love are thus brought in together:—

P. 17. ed. Πρῶτα μὲν ἀρχαίου Χάος μελήφατον ὕμνη,
Steph. ὧς ἐπάρμειψι φύσει, ὡς τ' αἰγανὸς εἰς πέρας ἔλθε,
 Γῆς τ' αἰγυστήριον γένεσσι, σπέρματά τε θαλάσσης,
 Πρεσβύτατόν τε καὶ αὐτοτελὲς πολύμητιν Ἔρωτα,
 Ὅσσα τ' ἔφυκεν ἅπαντα, διέκριτο δ' ἄλλον ἀπ' ἄλλου

To this sense: We will first sing a pleasant and delightful song concerning the ancient Chaos, how heaven, earth, and seas were framed out of it; as also concerning that much-wise and sagacious Love, the oldest of all, and self-perfect, which actively produced all these things, separating one thing from another.—Where this Love is not only called πολύμητις, of much counsel or sagaciousness, which implies it to have been a substantial and intellectual thing, but also πρεσβύτατος, the oldest of all, and therefore senior to Chaos, as, likewise, αὐτοτελὲς, self-perfect or self-originated.—From whence it is manifest, that, according to the Orphic tradition, this Love, which the cosmogonia was derived from, was no other than the eternal unmade Deity (or an active principle depending on it) which produced this whole orderly world, and all the generated gods in it, as to their material part, out of Chaos and Night. Accordingly, as Aristotle determines in his Me-

L. 1. c. 6. taphysics, not only in the place before
P. 849. cited, but also afterward: ἕτεροι δὲ τινες, ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως, ὅσοι ἡ Νοῦν ἢ Ἔρωτα ποιοῦσιν ἀρχήν. Others, besides the material cause of the world, assign an efficient, or cause of motion; namely, whosoever make either Mind (and intellect) or Love a principle.—Wherefore we conclude, that that other Atheistic cabala, or Aristo-

phanic tradition before-mentioned, which accordingly, as Aristotle also elsewhere declareth concerning it, did *ἐκ νυκτός πάντα γεννᾶν*, generate all things whatsoever, even the gods themselves universally, out of Night and Chaos, making Love itself likewise to have been produced from an egg of the Night; I say, that this was nothing else but a mere depravation of the ancient Mosaic cabala, as also an absolutely impossible hypothesis, it deriving all things whatsoever in the universe, besides the bare substance of senseless matter, in another sense than that before-mentioned, out of nonentity or nothing; as shall be also farther manifested afterwards.

We have now represented the sense and generally received doctrine of the ancient Pagan theologers, that there was indeed a multiplicity of gods, but yet so that one of them only was *ἀγέννητος*, ingenerate or unmade, by whom all the other gods, together with the world, were made, so as to have had a novity of being, or a temporary beginning of their existence; Plato and the Pythagoreans here only differing from the rest in this, that though they acknowledged the world and all the mundane gods to have been generated together in time, yet they supposed certain other intelligible and supramundane gods also, which however, produced from one original Deity, were nevertheless eternal or without beginning. But now we must acknowledge, that there were amongst the Pagan Theists some of a different persuasion from the rest, who therefore did not admit of any theogonia in the sense before declared, that is, any temporary generation of gods, because they acknowledged no cosmogonia, no

temporary production of the world, but concluded it to have been from eternity.

That Aristotle was one of these is sufficiently known; whose inferior gods, therefore, the sun, moon, and stars, must needs be ἀγεννητοι, or ingenerate, in this sense, so as to have had no temporary production, because the whole world to him was such. And if that philosopher be to be believed, himself was the very first, at least of all the Greeks, who asserted this ingenerateness or eternity of the world; he affirming, that all before him did γεννᾶν τὸν κόσμον, and κοσμοποιεῖν, generate or make the world; that is, attribute a temporary production to it, and consequently to all those gods also, which were a part thereof. Notwithstanding which, the writer *De Placitis Philosophorum*,^b and Stobæus,^c impute this dogma of the world's eternity to certain others of the Greek philosophers before Aristotle (besides Ocellus Lucanus,^d who is also acknowledged by Philo to have been an assertor thereof). And indeed Epicharmus, though a Theist, seems plainly to have been of this persuasion, that the world was unmade, as also that there was no theogonia, nor temporary production of the inferior gods, from these verses of his,^e according to Grotius's correction:—

Excerpt. 'Αλλ' αὖ τὰ θεοὶ πάντας, ἐποίησαν ὃ' αὖ πάντα
p. 478. Τὰ δὲ δ' αὖ παρ' ὅθ' ἔμας, διὰ δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν αἰ.

^a De Coelo, lib. i. cap. x. p. 623. tom. i. oper.

^b Lib. ii. cap. iv. p. 886.

^c Eclog. Physic. lib. i. cap. xxiv. p. 44.

^d De Mundi Æternitate, inter Scriptor. Mytholog. a Tho. Gale editos.

^e Apud Diogen. Laert. lib. iii. segm. x. p. 170.

Ἄλλὰ λίγεται μὲν χάος πρῶτον γήσθαι τῶν θεῶν
 Πῶς δὲ; ἐμάχων γ' ἀπὸ μηδὲ τινος ὃ, τι πρῶτον μέλει·
 Οὐκ ἂν ἴμενοι πρῶτον οὐδὲν, οὐδὲ μὲν Δία δεύτερον,
 Τῶν δὲ γ' ὅν ἄμμεν νῦν λέγομεν ἂν εἶναι μέλλαι τάδε.

Nempe Di semper fuerunt, atque nunquam intercident:
 Hæc quæ dico semper nobis rebus in iisdem se exhibent.
 Extitisse sed deorum primum perhibetur chaos:
 Quinam vero? nam de nihilo nil pote primum existere.
 Ergo nec primum profecto quicquam, nec fuit alterum:
 Sed quæ nunc sic appellantur, alia fient postmodum.

Where, though he acknowledges this to have been the general tradition of the ancient Theists, that Chaos was before the gods, and that the inferior mundane gods had a temporary generation, or production with the world; yet, notwithstanding, does he conclude against it, from this ground of reason—because nothing could proceed from nothing; and, therefore, both the gods, and indeed whatsoever else is substantial in the world, was from eternity unmade, only the fashion of things having been altered.

Moreover, Diodorus Siculus affirms the Chaldeans likewise to have asserted this L. 2. p. 82.
 dogma of the world's eternity, οἱ δ' οὖν
 Χαλδαῖοι τὴν μὲν τοῦ κόσμου φύσιν αἰδιδόν φασιν εἶναι, καὶ μήτε
 ἐξ ἀρχῆς γένεσιν ἐσχηκέναι, μήθ' ὕστερον φθορὰν ἐπιδέξεσθαι.
 The Chaldeans affirm the nature of the world to be eternal, and that it was neither generated from any beginning, nor will ever admit corruption.—Who, that they were not Atheists for all that (no more than Aristotle), appears from those following words of that historiographer: τὴν τε τῶν ὅλων
 τάξιν τε καὶ διακόσμησιν, θείᾳ τινι προνοίᾳ γεγονέναι, καὶ
 νῦν ἕκαστα τῶν ἐν οὐρανῷ γινομένων, οὐχ ὥς ἔτυχεν, οὐδ' αὐτομάτως,
 ἀλλ' ὥρισμένη τινι καὶ βεβαίως κεκυρωμένη θεῶν κρίσει, συντελεῖσθαι. They believe also, that the order

and disposition of the world is by a certain Divine Providence, and that every one of those things, which come to pass in the heavens, happens not by chance, but by a certain determinate and firmly ratified judgment of the gods.—However, it is a thing known to all, that the generality of the later Platonists stiffly adhered to Aristotle in this; neither did they only assert the corporeal world, with all the inferior mundane gods in it, to be ἀγεννήτους, or ingenerate, and to have existed from eternity, but also maintained the same concerning the souls of men, and all other animals (they concluding that no souls were younger than body or the world); and because they would not seem to depart from their master, Plato, therefore did they endeavour violently to force this same sense upon Plato's words also.

Notwithstanding which, concerning these later Platonists, it is here observable, that though they thus asserted the world, and all inferior gods and souls, to have been ἀγεννήτους, according to that stricter sense of the word declared, that is, to have had no temporary generation or beginning, but to have existed from eternity; yet by no means did they therefore conceive them to be αὐτογενεῖς καὶ αὐθυποστάτους, self-originated, and self-existing, but concluded them to have been all

derived from one sole self-existent Deity
Eu. S. l. 2. c. 1. as their cause; which, therefore, though not in order of time, yet of nature was before them. To this purpose, Plotinus: νοῦν πρὸ αὐτοῦ εἶναι οὐχ ὡς χρόνῳ πρότερον αὐτοῦ ὄντα, ἀλλ' ὅτι παρὰ νοῦ ἔστι καὶ φύσει πρότερος ἐκεῖνος, καὶ αἴτιον τούτου, ἀρχέ-
 τυπον οἶον καὶ παράδειγμα εἰκόνοσ'· καὶ δι' ἐκεῖνον ὄντος καὶ ὑποστάontos αἰὲν τόνδε τὸν τρόπον. Mind or God was

before the world, not as if it existed before it in time, but because the world proceeded from it, and that was in order of nature first as the cause thereof, and its archetype or paradigm; the world also always subsisting by it and from En. 2. 1. 9. it.—And again elsewhere to the same c. 3.

purpose, οὐ τοίνυν ἐγένετο, ἀλλ' ἐγένετο καὶ γενήσεται, ὅσα γενητὰ λέγεται, οὐ δὲ φθαρήσεται, ἀλλ' ἡ ὅσα ἔχει εἰς αἶ. The things, which are said to have been made or generated, were not so made, as that they ever had a beginning of their existence, but yet they were made, and will be always made (in another sense); nor will they ever be destroyed otherwise than as being dissolved into those simple principles, out of which some of them were compounded.—Where, though the world be said never to have been made as to a temporary beginning, yet, in another sense, is it said to be always made, as depending upon God En. 5. 1. 8. perpetually as the emanative cause c. 12.

thereof. Agreeably whereunto, the manner of the world's production from God is thus declared by that philosopher; οὐκ ὁρθῶς οἱ φθείρουσι καὶ γεννῶσιν αὐτὸν, ὅστις γὰρ τρόπος τῆς ποιήσεως ταύτης, οὐκ ἐθέλουσι συνιέναι, οὐδ' ἴσασιν, ὅτι ὅσον ἐκεῖνα ἐλλάμπει, οὐ μήποτε τὰ ἄλλα ἐλλείπει. They do not rightly, who corrupt and generate the world, for they will not understand what manner of making or production the world had, to wit, by way of effulgency or eradiation from the Deity. From whence it follows, that the world must needs have been so long as there was a God, as the light was coeve with the sun.—So likewise Proclus* concludes,

* There are still extant eighteen arguments of his, wherein he attacks the Christian doctrine of the world's being created by God in

that the world was αἰ γιγνόμενος, καὶ ἐλλαμπόμενος ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄντος, always generated or eradicated from God—and therefore must needs be eternal, God being so. Wherefore these latter Platonists supposed the same thing concerning the corporeal world, and the lower mundane gods, which their master Plato did concerning his higher eternal gods; that though they had no temporary production, yet they all depended no less upon one supreme Deity, than if they had been made out of nothing by him. From whence it is manifest, that none of these philosophers apprehended any repugnancy at all betwixt these two things; existence from eternity, and being caused or produced by another. Nor can we make any great doubt, but that if the latter Platonists had been fully convinced of any contradictory inconsistency here, they would readily have disclaimed that their so beloved hypothesis of the world's eternity; it being so far from truth what some have supposed, that the assertors of the world's eternity were all Atheists, that these latter Platonists were led into this opinion no otherwise than from the sole consideration of the Deity; to wit, its ἀγαθειδῆς βούλησις, καὶ γόνιμος δύναμις,

P. 116. its essential goodness, and generative power, or emanative fecundity—as Proclus plainly declares upon the *Timæus*.

Now, though Aristotle were not acted with any such divine enthusiasm as these Platonists seem to have been, yet did he notwithstanding,

time; in answer to which, John Philoponus wrote the same number of books against the eternity of the world. Vide Jo. Alberti Fabricii Biblioth. Græc. lib. v. c. xxvi. §. xiii. p. 522.

after his sober manner, really maintain the same thing; that though the world, and inferior mundane gods, had no temporary generation, yet were they nevertheless all produced from one supreme Deity as their cause. Thus Simplicius represents that philosopher's sense: *Ἀριστοτέλης οὐ*

γίνεσθαι ἀξιοῖ τὸν κόσμον, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἄλλον

τρόπον ὑπὸ Θεοῦ παράγεσθαι. Aristotle would

not have the world to have been made

(so as to have had a beginning), but yet

nevertheless to have been produced from God after

some other manner.—And again afterward; *Ἀρισ-*

τοτέλης τὸ αἶτιον τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τῆς αἰδίου κινήσεως αὐτοῦ

θεὸν λέγων, ὁμῶς ἀγέννητον αὐτὸν ἀποδείκνυσαι. Aristotle,

though making God the cause of the heaven and

its eternal motion, yet concludes it notwithstanding

to have been ingenerate or unmade;—that is,

without beginning. However, we think fit here

to observe, that though Aristotle do for the

most part express a great deal of zeal and confidence

for that opinion of the world's eternity, yet

doth he sometimes for all that seem to flag a little,

and speak more languidly and sceptically about

it; as, for example, in his book *de Partibus Ani-*

malium, where he treats concerning an artificial

nature: *μᾶλλον εἰκὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν γεγενῆσθαι,*

ὑπὸ τοιαύτης αἰτίας, εἰ γέγονε, καὶ εἶναι διὰ τοιαύτην

αἰτίαν, μᾶλλον ἢ ζῶα τὰ θνητά. It is more

likely, that the heaven was made by such a cause

as this (if it were made), and that it is maintained

by such a cause, than that mortal animals should

be so; which yet is a thing more generally ac-

knowledged.—Now it was before declared, that

Aristotle's artificial nature was nothing but the

mere executioner or opificer of a perfect Mind;

In Arist.
Phys. l. 8.
p. 320. b.
edit. Aldi.

L. 1. c. 1.
[p. 474.
tom. 2.
oper.]

that is, of the Deity; which two therefore he sometimes joins together in the *Cosmopœia*, affirming that Mind and nature, that is, God and nature, were the cause of this universe.

And now we see plainly, that though there was a real controversy amongst the Pagan theologers (especially from Aristotle's time downward), concerning the *Cosmogonia* and *Theogonia*, according to the stricter notion of those words, the temporary generation or production of the world and inferior gods, or whether they had any beginning or no; yet was there no controversy at all concerning the self-existency of them, but it was universally agreed upon amongst them, that the world, and the inferior gods, however supposed by some to have existed from eternity, yet were nevertheless all derived from one sole self-existent Deity as their cause; *ὑπὸ θεοῦ παραγόμενοι ἢ ἀλλαμπόμενοι*, being either eradicated or produced from God.—Wherefore it is observable, that these Pagan Theists, who asserted the world's eternity, did themselves distinguish concerning the word *γενητόν* *ortum, natum, et factum*, as that which was equivocal: and though in one sense of it, they denied, that the world and inferior gods were *γενητοί*, yet notwithstanding did they in another sense clearly affirm the same. For the word

Simplic. in Arist. Phys. fol. 365. *γενητόν* (say they) strictly and properly taken, is *τὸ ἐν μέρει χρόνου τὴν εἰς τὸ εἶναι*

παρόδον λαχάν, that which in respect of time passed out of non-existence into being—or *ὁ τὸ πρότερον μὴ ὄν, ὕστερον δὲ ὄν*, that which being not before, afterwards was.—Nevertheless they acknowledge, that in a larger sense this word *γενητόν* may be taken also for *τὸ ὁπωσούν ἀπ' αἰτίας*

ὑφιστάμενον, that which doth any way depend upon a superior being as its cause.—And there must needs be the same equivocation in the word ἀγένητον, so that this in like manner may be taken also, either χρονικῶς, for that which is ingenerate in respect of time, as having no temporary beginning; or else for that which is ἀπ' αἰτίας ἀγένητον, ingenerate or unproduced from any cause:—in which latter sense, that word ἀγένητον, or unmade, is of equal force and extent with αὐθυπόστατον or αὐτογενές, that which is self-subsistent or self-originated;—and accordingly it was used by those Pagan Theists, who concluded ὅτι ὕλη ἀγένητος, i. e. that matter was unmade—that is, not only existed from eternity without beginning, but also was self-existent, and independent upon any superior cause. Now, as to the former of these two senses of those words, γενητόν and ἀγένητον, the generality of the ancient Pagans, and together with them Plato, affirmed the world, and all the inferior gods, to be γενητούς, to have been made in time—or to have had a beginning; (for whatever the latter Platonists pretend, this was undoubtedly Plato's notion of that word, and no other, when he concluded the world to be γενητόν, forasmuch as himself expressly opposes it to αἰδίων, that which is eternal.) But, on the contrary, Aristotle, and the latter Platonists, determined the world, and all the inferior gods, to be in this sense ἀγενήτους, such as had no temporary beginning—but were from eternity. However, according to the latter sense of those words, all the Pagan theologers agreed together, that the world, and all the inferior gods, whether having a beginning, or existing from eternity,

were notwithstanding *γενητοί ἀπ' αἰτίας*, produced or derived from a superior cause;—and that thus there was only one *θεός ἀγέννητος*, one unproduced and self-existent Deity—who is said by them to be *αἰτίας κρείττων καὶ πρεσβύτερος*, superior to a cause, and older than any cause, he being the cause of all things besides himself. Thus Crantor, and his followers in Proclus, zealous assertors of the

world's eternity, determined, *γενητὸν λέγεσθαι τὸν κόσμου ὡς ἀπ' αἰτίας ἄλλης παραγόμενον, καὶ οὐκ ὄντα αὐτόγονον οὐδὲ αὐθυπόστατον* that the world (with all the inferior mundane gods in it), notwithstanding their being from eternity, might be said to be *γενητοί*, that is *οἰσθαι*, or made, as being produced from another cause, and not self-originated or self-existing.

In like manner Proclus himself, that grand champion for the world's eternity, plainly acknowledged, notwithstanding, the generation of the gods and world in this sense, as being produced from a superior cause: *λέγομεν θεῶν γενήσεις, τὴν ἀρρήτον αὐτῶν πρόσοδον ἐνδεικνύμενοι, καὶ τὴν τῶν δευτέρων ἐτερότητα, πρὸς τὰς αἰτίας αὐτῶν*. We call it the generations of the gods, meaning thereby, not any temporary production of them, but their ineffable procession from a superior first cause.—Thus also Salustius, in his book *de Diis et Mundo*,* where he contends the world to have been from eternity, or without beginning, yet concludes both it, and the other inferior gods, to have been made by one supreme Deity, who is called by him, *ὁ πρῶτος Θεός*, the first God.—For, saith he,

In Time,
p. 25.
[Vide etiam
eundem in
Introductione
in Theologi-
am Platoni-
cam; lib. 1.
c. xxviii.
p. 66, and p.
68. et lib. vi.
c. 2. p. 341.]

* Cap. xiii. p. 269. inter Scriptor. Mythologic. A Tho. Gale editos.

μεγίστης τῆς δυνάμεως οὐσης, οὐκ ἀνθρώπους ἔδει καὶ ζῶα μόνα ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ θεούς τε καὶ δαίμονας. God, or the first cause, having the greatest power, or being omnipotent, ought therefore to make not only men, and other animals, but also gods and demons. And accordingly this is the title of his 18th chapter: πῶς τὰ αἰδία λέγεται γίνεσθαι, how eternal things may be said to be made or generated.—It is true, indeed (as we have often declared), that some of the Pagan Theists asserted God not to be the only ἀγένητον καὶ ἀυθυπόστατον, the only unmade and self-existent being—but that matter also was such; nevertheless, this opinion was not so generally received amongst them, as is commonly supposed: and though some of the ancient fathers confidently impute it to Plato, yet there seems to be no sufficient ground for their so doing; and Porphyrius, Jamblichus, Proclus, and other Platonists, do not only professedly oppose the same as false, but also as that which was dissonant from Plato's principles. Wherefore, according to that larger notion of the word ἀγένητον, as taken synonymously with αὐτογενές and ἀυθυπόστατον, there were many of the Pagan theologers, who agreed with Christians in this, ὅτι αὐτὸ ἀγένητον ὁ Θεός, καὶ οὐσία αὐτοῦ ὡς ἂν εἴποι τις ἡ ἀγεννησία, that God is the only ingenerate or unmade being, and that his very essence is ingenerability or innascibility;—all other things, even matter itself, being made by him. But all the rest of them (only a few Ditheists excepted), though they supposed matter to be self-existent, yet did they conclude, that there was only εἰς Θεὸς ἀγένητος, only one unmade or unproduced God—and that all their other

gods were *γεννητοι*, in one sense or other, if not as made in time, yet at least as produced from a superior cause.

Nothing now remaineth, but only that we shew, how the Pagans did distinguish, and put a difference, betwixt the one supreme unmade Deity, and all their other inferior generated gods. Which we are the rather concerned to do, because it is notorious, that they did many times also confound them together, attributing the government of the whole world to the gods promiscuously, and without putting any due discrimination betwixt the supreme and inferior (the true reason whereof seems to have been this, because they supposed the supreme God, not to do all immediately, in the government of the world, but to permit much to his inferior ministers); one instance of which we had before in Ovid, and innumerable such others might be cited out of their most sober writers. As, for example, Cicero, in his first book of Laws,^a “*Deorum immortalium vi, ratione, potestate, mente, numine, natura omnis regitur;*” the whole nature, or universe, is governed by the force, reason, power, mind, and divinity of the immortal gods.—And again in his second book,^b “*Deos esse dominos ac moderatores omnium rerum, eaque quæ geruntur, eorum geri judicio atque numine; eosdemque optime de genere hominum mereri, et qualis quisque sit, quid agat, quid in se admittat, qua mente, qua pietate religiones colat, intueri; priorumque et impiorum habere rationem; a principio civibus suasum esse*

^a Lib. i. cap. vii. p. 3303. oper. tom. ix.

^b Lib. ii. cap. viij. p. 3343.

debet:" the minds of citizens ought to be first of all imbued with a firm persuasion, that the gods are the lords and moderators of all things, and that the conduct and management of the whole world is directed and overruled by their judgment and Divine power; that they deserve the best of mankind, that they behold and consider what every man is, what he doth and takes upon himself, with what mind, piety, and sincerity, he observes the duties of religion; and, lastly, that these gods have a very different regard to the pious and the impious.—Now such passages as these abounding every where in Pagan writings, it is no wonder, if many, considering their theology but slightly and superficially, have been led into an error, and occasioned thereby to conclude the Pagans not to have asserted a Divine monarchy, but to have imputed both the making and governing of the world to an aristocracy or democracy of co-ordinate gods, not only all eternal, but also self-existent and unmade. The contrary whereunto, though it be already sufficiently proved, yet it will not be amiss for us here in the close, to shew how the Pagans, who sometimes jumble and confound the supreme and inferior gods all together, do notwithstanding at other times many ways distinguish between the one supreme God, and their other many inferior gods.

First, therefore, as the Pagans had many proper names for one and the same supreme God, according to several particular considerations of him, in respect of his several different manifestations and effects in the world; which are oftentimes mistaken for so many distinct deities (some supposing them independent, others subordinate);

so had they also, besides these, other proper names of God, according to that more full and comprehensive notion of him, as the Maker of the whole world, and its supreme Governor, or the sole Monarch of the universe. For thus the Greeks called him Ζεύς and Ζῆν, &c. the Latins Jupiter and Jovis, the Babylonians Belus and Bel, the Persians Mithras and Oromasdes, the Egyptians and Scythians (according to Herodotus) Ammoun and Pappæus. And Celsus in Origen concludes it to be a matter of pure indifferency, to call the supreme God by any of all these names, either

Lib. 5. c. Ζεύς, or Ammoun, or Pappæus, or the
Celsum. like; Κέλσος οἶεται μηδὲν διαφέρειν, Δία
p. 261.

*Υψιστον, καλεῖν ἢ Ζῆνα, ἢ Ἀδωναῖον, ἢ Σαβα-
ωθ, ἢ (ὡς Αἰγύπτιοι) Ἀμμουν, ἢ (ὡς Σκύθαι) Παππαῖον.
Celsus thinks it to be a matter of no moment, whether we call the highest and supreme God, Adonai and Sabaoth, as the Jews do; or Dia and Zena, as the Greeks; or, as the Egyptians, Ammoun; or, as the Scythians, Pappæus.—Notwithstanding which, that pious and jealous father expresseth a great deal of zeal against Christians then using any of those Pagan names. “But we will rather endure any torment (saith he) than confess Zeus (or Jupiter) to be God; being well assured, that the Greeks often really worship, under that name, an evil demon, who is an enemy both to God and men. And we will rather suffer death, than call the supreme God Ammoun, whom the Egyptian enchanters thus invoke: λεγέτωσαν δὲ καὶ Σκύθαι τὸν Παππαῖον Θεὸν εἶναι τὸν ἐπὶ πᾶσιν· ἀλλ’ ἡμεῖς οὐ πεισόμεθα, τιθέντες μὲν τὸν ἐπὶ πᾶσι θεόν, ὡς δὲ φίλον τῷ λαῷ τὴν Σκυθῶν ἱερμίαν, καὶ τὸ ἔθνος αὐτῶν καὶ διάλεκτον, οὐκ ὀνομάζοντες τὸν Θεόν, ὡς κυρίως

ὀνόματι τῷ Παππαῖον. Σκυθιστὶ γὰρ τὸ προσηγορικὸν τὸν Θεόν, καὶ Αἰγυπτιστὶ, καὶ πάσῃ διαλέκτῳ ἢ ἕκαστος ἐντέθραπται, ὀνομάζων, οὐχ ἁμαρτήσεται. And though the Scythians call the supreme God Pappæus, yet we, acknowledging a supreme God, will never be persuaded to call him by that name, which it pleased that demon. (who ruled over the Scythian desert, people, and language) to impose. Nevertheless, he that shall use the appellative name for God, either in the Scythian, Egyptian, or any other language which he hath been brought up in, will not offend." Where Origen plainly affirms the Scythians to have acknowledged one supreme God, called by them Pappæus, and intimates, that the Egyptians did the like, calling him Ammoun. Neither could it possibly be his intent to deny the same of the Greeks and their Zeus, however his great jealousy made him to call him here a demon; it being true in a certain sense, which shall be declared afterward, that the Pagans did oftentimes really worship an evil demon, under those very names of Zeus and Jupiter, as they did likewise under those of Hammon and Pappæus.

In the mean time we deny not, but that both the Greeks used that word Zeus, and the Latins Jupiter, sometimes φυσικῶς, for the ether, fire or air, some accordingly etymologizing Ζεὺς from Ζῆω, others Δεὺς from Δεύω: whence came those forms of speech, *sub Jove*, and *sub Dio*. And thus Cicero, "Jovem Ennius nuncupat ita dicens.

Aspice hoc sublime candens, quem invocant omnes Jovem.

Hunc etiam augures nostri cum dicunt

De Nat. D.
l. 2. 223.
Lamb. [c. 25.
p. 2992.
tom. 9.
oper.]

Jove fulgente, Jove tonante; dicunt enim in cœlo fulgente, tonante," &c. The reason of which speeches seems to have been this, because in ancient times some had supposed the animated heaven, ether and air, to be the supreme Deity. We grant, moreover, that the same words have been sometimes used *ιστορικῶς* also, for a hero or deified man, said by some to have been born in Crete, by others in Arcadia. And Callimachus,* though he were very angry with the Cretians for affirming Jupiter's sepulchral monument to have been with them in Crete, as thereby making him mortal:

Κῆρτις δὲλ' ἑλθούσαι, καὶ γὰρ τάφον, ὃ δῖος, οἶτο
Κῆρτις ἐκταφέναι· οὐ δ' οὐ δῖος, ἔστι γὰρ αἰετ'.

Cretes semper mendaces, tuum enim, rex sepulchrum
Extraxerunt: tu vero non es mortuus, semper enim es.

Himself nevertheless (as Athenagoras^b and Origen^c observe) attributed the beginning of death to him, when he affirmed him to have been born in Arcadia; ἀρχὴ γὰρ θανάτου ἡ ἐπὶ γῆς γένεσις, because a terrene nativity is the beginning of death.—Wherefore this may pass for a general observation here: that the Pagan theology was all along confounded with a certain mixture of physiology and herology or history blended together. Nevertheless it is unquestionable, that the more intelligent of the Greekish Pagans did frequently understand by Zeus that supreme unmade Deity, who was the maker of the world, and of all the

* Hymno in Jovem, vers. 8, 9.

^b In Legation. pro Christianis, cap. 26. p. 121.

^c Contra Celsum, lib. iii, p. 137.

inferior gods. Porphyrus in Eusebius thus

declares their sense, τὸν Δία, τὸν Νοῦν PREF. EV.
l. 3. c. 9.
p. 100.
κόσμον ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, ὃς τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐδημιούρ-
γησεν, ἔχων τὸν κόσμον. By Zeus the

Greeks understand that Mind of the world, which framed all things in it, and containeth the whole world.—Agreeable whereunto is that of Maximus Tyrius,* Κάλει τὸν μὲν Δία, νοῦν πρεσβύτατον, καὶ ἀρχικώτατον, ᾧ πάντα ἔπεται καὶ πιθαρχεῖ. By Jupiter you are to understand that most ancient and princely Mind, which all things follow and obey.—And Eusebius himself, though not forward to grant any more than needs he must to

Pagans, concludes with this acknowledgment hereof: ἔστω ὁ Ζεὺς μηκέθ' ἢ PREF. EV.
l. 3. c. 13.
[p. 119.]
πυρώδης καὶ αἰθέριος οὐσία, ὥσπερ τοῖς παλαιοῖς ἐνομίζετο, κατὰ τὸν Πλούταρχον, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς ὁ ἀνωτάτω Νοῦς, ὁ τῶν ὅλων δημιουργός. Let Jupiter therefore be no longer that fiery and ethereal substance, which the ancient Pagans, according to Plutarch, supposed him to be; but that highest Mind, which was the maker of all things.—But Phornutus^b by Jupiter understands the Soul of the world, he writing thus concerning him; ὥσπερ δὲ ἡμεῖς ἀπὸ ψυχῆς διοικούμεθα, οὕτω καὶ ὁ κόσμος ψυχὴν ἔχει τὴν συνέχουσαν αὐτὸν, καὶ αὐτὴ καλεῖται Ζεὺς, αἰτία οὖσα τοῖς ζῶσι τοῦ ζῆν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο βασιλεύειν ὁ Ζεὺς λέγεται τῶν ὅλων. As we ourselves are governed by a soul, so hath the world in like manner a Soul, that containeth it; and this is called Zeus, being the cause of life to all things that live; and therefore Zeus or Jupiter is said to reign over all

* Dissert. 29. p. 290.

^b Libro de Natura Deor. cap. 2. inter Scriptores Mythologicos a Tho. Gale editos.

things.—However, though these were two different conceptions amongst the Pagans concerning God, some apprehending him to be an abstract mind separate from the world and matter, but others to be a soul of the world only; yet nevertheless they all agreed in this, that Ζεὺς or Jupiter was the supreme moderator or governor of all.

P. 396. edit.
Steph.

And accordingly Plato, in his *Cratylus*, taking these two words, Ζῆνα and Δία, both together, etymologizeth them as one, after this manner: συντιθέμενα εἰς ἓν δηλοῖ τὴν φύσιν τοῦ θεοῦ, οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἡμῖν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν ὅστις ἐστὶν αἰτίως μᾶλλον τοῦ ζῆν, ἢ ὁ ἄρχων τε καὶ βασιλεὺς τῶν πάντων· συμβαίνει οὖν ὁρθῶς ὀνομάζεσθαι οὕτως, τῷ Θεὸς εἶναι δι' ὃν ζῆν αἰεὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ζῶσιν ὑπάρχει, διεληπται δὲ δίχα (ὥσπερ λέγω) ἐν ὃν τὸ ὄνομα, τῷ Δίᾳ καὶ Ζηνί. These two words compounded together declare the nature of God; for there is nothing, which is more the cause of life, both to ourselves and all other animals, than he, who is the Prince and King of all things; so that God is rightly thus called, he being that by whom all things live. And these are really but one name of God, though divided into two words.—But because it was very obvious then to object against this position of Plato's, that Zeus or Jupiter could not be the Prince of all things, and first Original of life, from the *Theogonia* of Hesiod and other ancient Pagans, in which himself was made to have been the son of Κρόνος, or Saturn; therefore this objection is thus preoccupied by Plato, τοῦτον δὲ, Κρόνου υἱόν, ὑβριστικόν· μὲν ἂν τιμὴν δόξαι εἶναι ἀκούσαντι ξαίφνης. Whosoever shall hear this (saith he), will presently conclude it to be contumelious to this Zeus or Jupiter (as he hath been described by us),

to be accounted the son of Chronos or Saturn.— And in answer hereunto, that philosopher stretcheth his wits to salve that poetic Theogonia, and reconcile it with his own theological hypothesis; and thereupon he interprets that Hesiodian Ζεύς or Jupiter into a compliance with the third hypostasis of his Divine triad, so as properly to signify the superior Soul of the world; *εὐλογον δὲ, μεγάλης τινὸς διανοίας ἐκγονον εἶναι τὸν Δία. Κρόνος γὰρ τὸ καθαρόν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀκήρατον τοῦ Νοῦ· ἔστι δὲ αὗτος Οὐρανοῦ υἱός, ὡς λόγος.* Nevertheless it is reasonable to suppose Zeus or Jupiter to be the offspring of some great mind; and Chronos or Saturn signifieth a pure and perfect mind eternal; who again is said to be the son of Uranus or Cœlius.— Where it is manifest, that Plato endeavours to accommodate this poetic trinity of gods, Uranus, Chronos, and Zeus, or Cœlius, Saturn, and Jupiter, to his own trinity of Divine hypostases, *τ' αγαθόν, νοῦς, and ψυχή*, the first good, a perfect intellect, and the highest soul.—Which accommodation is accordingly further pursued by Plotinus in several places, as Enn. 5. l. 1. c. 4. and Enn. 5. l. 8. c. 13. Nevertheless, these three archical hypostases of the Platonic trinity, though looked upon as substances distinct from each other, and subordinate, yet are they frequently taken all together by them for the whole supreme Deity. However, the word Ζεύς is by Plato severally attributed to each of them; which Proclus thus observed upon the *Timæus*: *λέγωμεν ὅτι πολλοὶ μὲν εἰσι τάξεις καὶ παρὰ Πλάτωνι τοῦ Διός· Ἄλλος γὰρ ὁ δημιουργὸς Ζεύς, ὡς ἐν Κρατύλῳ γέγραπται, καὶ ἄλλος ὁ Πρῶτος τῆς Κρονίας τριάδος, ὡς ἐν Γοργίᾳ λέγεται, καὶ ἄλλος ὁ ἀπόλυτος, ὡς ἐν τῷ Φαῖδρῳ*

THE
WORKS
OF
RALPH CUDWORTH, D.D.

CONTAINING
THE TRUE INTELLECTUAL
SYSTEM OF THE UNIVERSE,
SERMONS, &c.

A NEW EDITION, WITH REFERENCES TO THE SEVERAL QUOTATIONS IN THE
INTELLECTUAL SYSTEM, AND A LIFE OF THE AUTHOR,

BY THOMAS BIRCH, M. A. F. R. S.

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THE TRUE
INTELLECTUAL SYSTEM

or

THE UNIVERSE.

CHAP. IV. CONTINUED.

As for the vulgar of the Greekish Pagans, whether they apprehended God to be νοῦν ἐξηρημένον τοῦ κόσμου, a mind or intellect separate from the world, or else to be a soul of the world only ; —it cannot be doubted, but that by the word Zeus they commonly understood, the supreme Deity in one or other of those senses, the father and king of gods ; he being frequently thus styled in their solemn nuncupations of vows, Ζεῦ πάτερ, Ζεῦ ἄνα, O Jupiter father, and O Jupiter king. As he was invoked also Ζεῦ βασιλεῦ in that excellent prayer of an ancient poet, not without cause commended in Plato's Alcibiades ;*

Ζεῦ Βασιλεῦ, τὰ μὲν ἱεθλὰ καὶ εὐχαρίστας καὶ ἀνύκτους
ἄμμι δῶου, τὰ δὲ διὰ καὶ εὐχαρίστας ἀπαλέξαι

O Jupiter king, give us good things, whether we

* In Alcibiad. secundo, sive de Precatione, p. 40.

pray or pray not for them; but withhold evil things from us, though we should pray never so earnestly for them.—But the instances of this kind being innumerable, we shall forbear to mention any more of them: only we shall observe, that Zeus Sabazius was a name for the supreme God, sometime introduced amongst the Greeks, and derived in all probability from the Hebrew Sabaoth, or Adonai Tsebaoth, the Lord of hosts (that is, of the heavenly hosts) or the supreme governor of the world. Which therefore Aristophanes took notice of as a strange and foreign god, lately crept in amongst them, that ought to be banished out of Greece; these several names of God being then vulgarly spoken of as so many distinct deities, as shall be more fully declared afterward. We shall likewise elsewhere shew, that besides Ζεύς, Πάτερ also was used by the Greeks as a name for that God, who is the supreme moderator and governor of the whole world.

That the Latins did in like manner, by Jupiter and Jovis, frequently denote the supreme Deity, and Monarch of the universe, is a thing unquestionable; and which does sufficiently appear from those epithets, that were commonly given to him, of *optimus* and *maximus*, the best and the greatest; as also of *omnipotens*, frequently bestowed upon him by Virgil and others. Which word Jupiter or Jovis, though Cicero* etymologize it a *juvando*, or from *juvans pater*, as not knowing how to do it otherwise; yet we may rather conclude it to have been of an Hebraical extraction, and derived from that Tetragrammaton, or name of God,

* De Nat. Deor. lib. ii. cap. xxv. p. 2902, tom. ix. oper.

consisting of four consonants; whose vowels (which is to be pronounced with) though they be not now certainly known, yet must it needs have some such sound as this, either Jovah or Javoh, or 'Ιένω, or 'Ιάω, or the like; and the abbreviation of this name was Jah. For as the Pagan nations had, besides appellatives, their several proper names for God, so also had the Hebrews theirs, and such as being given by God himself, was most expressive of his nature, it signifying eternal and necessary existence.

But, in the next place, we shall suggest, that the Pagans did not only signify the supreme God, by these proper names, but also frequently by the appellatives themselves, when used not for a God in general, but for the God, or God *κατ' ἑξοχὴν*, and by way of eminency. And thus *ὁ θεός* and *θεός*, are often taken by the Greeks, not for *θεῶν τις*, a God, or one of the gods, but for God, or the supreme Deity. We have several examples hereof in passages before cited occasionally in this very chapter, as in that of Aristotle's, *τί οὖν ἂν κρείττον καὶ ἐπιστήμης πλὴν ὁ θεός*; what is there, therefore, that can be better than knowledge, but only God?—As also that other of his, that happiness consisteth principally in virtue, *ἔστω συνομιλογούμενον ἡμῖν μάρτυρι τῷ θεῷ χρωμένοις*, it is a thing, that ought to be acknowledged by us from the nature of God.—So likewise in that of Thales, *πρεσβύτατον πάντων ὁ θεός, ἀγέννητον γάρ* God is the oldest of all things, because he is unmade;—and that of Maximus Tyrius, *πολλοὶ θεοὶ παῖδες θεοῦ καὶ συνάρχοντες θεῷ*, many gods, the sons of God, and co-reigners together with God.—Besides which, there have been others also mentioned, which we

shall not here repeat. And innumerable more instances of this kind might be added; as that of Antiphanes,^a θεὸς οὐδενὶ ἔοικεν, διόπερ αὐτὸν οὐδεὶς ἐκμαθεῖν ἐξ εἰκότος δύναται, God is like to nothing, for which cause he cannot be learnt by any from an image:—this of Socrates,^b εἰ ταύτη φίλον τῷ θεῷ ταύτη γινέσθω, if God will have it so, let it be so.—And that of Epictetus,^c σὺ μόνον μέμνησο τῶν καθολικῶν, τί ἐμόν, τί οὐκ ἐμόν; τί θέλει με ποιεῖν ὁ Θεός νῦν; do thou only remember these catholic and universal principles, what is mine, and what is not mine? what would God have me now to do? and what would he have me not to do?—But we shall mention no more of these, because they occur so frequently in all manner of Greek writers, both metrical and prosaical.

Wherefore we shall here only add, that as the singular θεός was thus often used by the Greeks for God κατ' ἐξοχήν, or in way of eminency, that is, for the supreme Deity; so was likewise the plural θεοὶ frequently used by them for the inferior gods, by way of distinction from the supreme. As in that usual form of prayer and exclamation, ὦ Ζεῷ καὶ Θεοῖ, O Jupiter and the gods;—and that form of obtestation, πρὸς Διὸς καὶ Θεῶν, by Jupiter and the gods.—So in this of Euripides:^d—

Ἄλλ' ἴσθις, ἴσθις καὶ τις ἑγγαλῆ λόγος,
Ζεὺς καὶ Θεοὶ, βέβητα λυόμεναις πάθῃ.

Est, (sint licet qui rideant) est Jupiter,
Superique, casus qui vident mortalium.

^a Apud Hug. Grot. Excerpt. veter. Tragic. et Comicor. p. 632.

^b Apud Platon. in Critone, p. 370.

^c Apud Arrian. in Epictet. lib. iv. p. 385. edit. Cantabrig.

^d Vide Grotii Excerpta veter. Tragicor. et Comicor. p. 417.

In which passages, as Jupiter is put for the supreme God, so is Θεοὶ likewise put for the inferior gods, in way of distinction from him. Thus also, Θεός, and Θεοὶ, are taken both together in Plato's Phædo, Θεός for the supreme unmade and incorruptible Deity, and Θεοὶ for the inferior gods only, ὁ δὲ γε Θεός (οἶμαι) ἔφη

P. 105.

ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ τῆς ζωῆς εἶδος παρὰ πάντων ἀνὸμολογηθῆναι, μηδέποτε ἀπόλλυσθαι. Παρὰ πάντων μέντοι νῆ Δι' (ἔφη) ἀνθρώπων γε, καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον, ὡς ἐγώ μαι, παρὰ Θεῶν. I suppose, said Socrates, that God, and the very species, essence or idea, of life will be granted by all to be incorruptible.

Doubtless by all men (said Cebes) but much more, as I conceive by the gods.—But a further instance will be propounded afterward of the word Θεοὶ, thus used, by way of distinction, for the inferior gods only; as it was before declared, that the theogonia, or generation of gods was accordingly understood by the Greeks universally of the οἱ Θεοὶ, that is, the inferior gods.

Plato de Rep. οὐχ ὑπὸ θεῶν ποτὶ ἀμολαίται, ὅς ἂν περιθυσίῃσιν ἰδίᾳ διαίῃ γίνεσθαι καὶ ἐπιτηδίων ἀρετῶν, εἰς ὅσον δυνατόν ἀθρόω ἡμολύσθαι οἶν. He will never be neglected of the gods, who endeavours, as much as it is possible for a man, to be like to God, p. 613.

Moreover, as the word Θεός was taken κατ' ἑξοχὴν, or, by way of eminency, for the supreme God, so was Δαίμων likewise. As for example, in this passage of Callimachus, before cited imperfectly:*

Εἰ Θεὸν εἶσδα,
"ὦ δ' ὅτι καὶ μέγας Δαίμων, πᾶν δυνατόν

— Si Deus est tibi notus,
Hoc etiam noris, omnia posse Deum.

Where Θεός and Δαίμων are used both alike sig-

* Vide Fragmenta Callimachi a Rich. Bentleio collecta, p. 372.

nanter, for the supreme God. And thus also in that famous passage of another poet :

Τῷ γὰρ ἄλλῳ,
Εἰν ἄλλ' καὶ γὰρ, κατὰ μέγα Δίατο Δαίμων.

Homer, likewise, in one and the same place,* seems to use Θεός and Δαίμων both together, after the same manner, for the supreme God :

Ὅσσον' ἀνὰ ἰθάλη, πρὸς Δαίμονα ποτὶ μάχισθαι,
Ὅν καὶ Διὸς τιμῇ, τάχα ἢ μέγα πῆμα κολέει.

Quoties homo vult, adverso numine, cum viro pugnare,
Quem Deus honorat, mox in eum magna clades devolvitur.

Again we conceive, that Jupiter, or the supreme God, was sometimes signified amongst the Pagans by that expression, θεὸς αὐτός, *Deus ipse*, as in that of Homer's ninth Iliad :^b

Οὐδ' εἰ κέν μοι ὑποστάιν Θεὸς αὐτός,
Γῆρας ἀποχέρας Δίονι νῆα ἱβάσσει.

Neque si mihi promitteret Deus ipse,
Senectutem abradens, effecturum me juvenem pubescentem.

Contra Jal. l. i. And thus St. Cyril of Alexandria in-
i. [p. 27. edit. terprets Homer here, οὐ γὰρ που φησὶν, εἰ
Spanh.] So θεῶν τις ὑπόσχοιτό μοι τοῦ μὲν γήρως ἀπεμ-
Justin. Mart. καὶ Θεῶν τις ὑπόσχοιτό μοι τοῦ μὲν γήρως ἀπεμ-
ad Græ. col. p. 22. [ed. Co- πολλὴν, παλινάγειτον δὲ τὴν νεότητα, τετήρηκε δὲ
lon.] τὸ χρῆμα μόνω τῷ ἐπὶ πάντα θεῷ, &c. τὸ γὰρ τοι
Θεὸς αὐτός, οὐκ ἐφ' ἓνα τῶν ἐν μύθοις πεπλασμένων τινὰ, αὐτὸν
δὲ δὴ μόνον κατασημνείειν ἂν τὸν ἀληθῶς ὄντα Θεόν. Ho-
mer doth not say, if any of the gods would pro-
mise me freedom from old age, and restitution of
youth, but he reserves the matter only to the su-
preme God; neither doth he refer it to any of the

* Iliad, lib. i. ver. 98.

^b Ver. 448.

fictitious poetic gods, but to the true God alone. —The same language was also spoken in the laws of the twelve tables :^a “ Deos adeunto caste, opes amovento: si secus faxint, Deus ipse vindex erit.” Let the gods be worshipped chastely, superfluity of riches and pomp being removed: if men do otherwise, God himself will be the avenger.—Where, though the word *gods* be used generally, so as to comprehend both the supreme and inferior gods under it, yet *Deus ipse, God himself*, denotes the supreme God only. In like manner, ὁ δαίμων αὐτός also seems to be taken for the supreme God, in that of Euripides :^b

Δόρυ μὲν ὁ δαίμων αὐτός, ἔρως ἑστὶν θεός,

which was thus rendered by Horace:

—— Ipse Deus, simulatque volet, me solvet.

Notwithstanding which, δαίμων and δαίμονες are often distinguished from θεός and θεοί, they being put for an inferior rank of beings below the gods vulgarly called demons; which word in a large sense comprehends also heroes under it. For though these demons be sometimes called gods too, yet were they rather accounted ἡμίθεοι demi-gods, than gods. And thus θεοὶ καὶ δαίμονες, gods and demons, are frequently joined together, as things distinct from one another; which notion of the word Plato refers to, when he concludes Love not to be a god, but a demon only. But of these demons we are to speak more afterward.

Furthermore, the Pagan writers frequently un-

^a Vide Ciceron. de Legibus, lib. ii. cap. viii. p. 3345. tom. ix. oper.

^b In Bacchis, ver. 497.

derstand the supreme God by the τὸ Θεῖον, when the word is used substantively. As, for example, in this of Epicharmus ;*

οὐδὲν διαφέρει τὸ θεῖον τοῦτο γινώσκων οὐδὲ
 αὐτὸς ἰσθ' ἡμῶν ἐνέτης· ἀθανάτ' ἔστιν οὐδὲν θεῖον.

Res nulla est Deum quæ lateat, scire quod te convenit:
 Ipse est noster introspector, tum Deus nil non potest.

So likewise in this of Plato's,^b πόρρω ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης ἴδνται τὸ θεῖον, God is far removed both from pleasure and grief.—And Plotinus calls the supreme God, τὸ ἐν τῷ παντὶ θεῖον, the Divinity that is in the universe.—But because the instances hereof are also innumerable, we shall decline the mentioning of any more, and instead of them, only set down the judgment of that diligent and impartial observer of the force of words, Henricus Stephanus,^c concerning it; “*Reddatur etiam τὸ θεῖον sæpe Deus, sed ita tamen, ut intelligendum sit, non de quolibet Deo ab ipsis etiam profanis scriptoribus dici, verum de eo quem intelligerent, cum θεὸν dicebant quasi κατ' ἐξοχὴν ad differentiam eorum, qui multi appellatione θεῶν includebantur, summum videlicet supremumque Numen, et quasi dicas θεὸν θεῶν ὑπατον καὶ ἀριστον, ut loquitur de Jove Homerus.*”

Lastly, as τὸ θεῖον, so likewise was τὸ δαιμόνιον used by the Greeks for the supreme Numen, or that Divinity, which governs the whole world. Thus, whereas it was commonly said, (accord-

* Apud Clement. Alexandrin. Stromat. lib. v. p. 708. The translation is by Grotius in Excerpt. veter. Tragicor. et Comicor. p. 481.

^b Epist. iii. p. 708.

^c In Thesaur. Græcæ Linguae, tom. i. p. 1534.

ing to Herodotus*) *ὅτι τὸ θεῖον φθονερὸν*, that God was envious;—the meaning whereof was, that he did not commonly suffer any great human prosperity to continue long, without some check or counterbuff; the same proverbial speech is expressed in Aristotle, *φθονερὸν τὸ δαιμόνιον*. And in this sense the word seems to be used in Isocrates ad *Demonicum*, *τίμα τὸ δαιμόνιον αἰεὶ μὲν, μάλιστα δὲ μετὰ τῆς πόλεως*, worship God always, but especially with the city, in her public sacrifices.—And doubtless it was thus taken by Epictetus, in this passage of his, *μία ὁδὸς ἐπὶ εὐροίαν, τοῦτο καὶ ὕθρον, καὶ μεθ' ἡμέραν καὶ νύκτωρ, ἔστω πρόχειρον, ἀπόστασις τῶν ἀπροαιρέτων, τὸ μηδὲν ἴδιον ἡγεῖσθαι, τὸ παραδοῦναι πάντα τῷ δαιμονίῳ, καὶ τῇ τύχῃ*. There is but one way to tranquillity of mind and happiness: let this therefore be always ready at hand with thee, both when thou wakest early in the morning, and all the day long, and when thou goest late to sleep; to account no external things thine own, but to commit all these to God and fortune.—And there is a very remarkable passage in Demosthenes^b (observed by Budæus) that must not be here omitted; in which we have *οἱ θεοὶ* plainly for the inferior or minor gods only, and *τὸ δαιμόνιον* for the supreme God, both together; *εἴσονται οἱ θεοὶ καὶ τὸ δαιμόνιον, τὸν μὴ τὰ δίκαια ψηφισάμενον*. The gods and the Deity will know or take notice of him that gives not a righteous sentence;—that is, both the inferior gods and the supreme God himself. Wherefore we see, that the word *δαιμόνιον*, as to its grammatical form, is

* Lib. iii. cap. xli. p. 176. He cites this from an Epistle of Amasis to the tyrant Polycrates.

^b *Orat. περὶ περικοχίας*, p. 266. edit. Græc. Basil. 1532. fol.

not a diminutive, as some have conceived, but an adjective substantived; as well as τὸ θεῖον is. Nevertheless in Pagan writings, δαιμόνιον also, as well as δαίμων, from whence it is derived, is often used for an inferior rank of beings below the gods, though sometimes called gods too; and such was Socrates' δαιμόνιον, so commonly known. But the grammar of this word, and its proper signification in Pagan writers, cannot better be manifested, than by citing that passage of Socrates' own, in his Apology, as written by Plato; who, though generally supposed to have had a demon, was notwithstanding by Melitus accused of atheism; *ἔστιν ὅστις ἀνθρώπων, ὃ Μέλιτε, ἀνθρώπεια μὲν νομίζει πράγματα εἶναι, ἀνθρώπους δὲ οὐ νομίζει; ἢ ὅστις ἵππους μὲν οὐ νομίζει, ἵππικὰ δὲ πράγματα, &c. οὐκ ἔστιν, ὃ ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐπὶ τοιούτῳ ἀποκρίναι, ἔσθ' ὅστις δαιμόνια μὲν νομίζει πράγματα εἶναι, δαίμονας δὲ οὐ νομίζει; οὐκ ἔστιν· ἀλλ' οὖν δαιμόνιά γε νομίζω κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον· εἰ δὲ καὶ δαιμόνια νομίζω, καὶ δαίμονας δήπου πολλὴ ἀνάγκη νομίζειν με ἔσθιν. τοὺς δὲ δαίμονας οὐχὶ ἦτοι θεοὺς γε ἡγοῦμεθα εἶναι, ἢ θεῶν παῖδας, &c.* Is there any one, O Melitus, who acknowledging, that there are human things, can yet deny, that there are any men? or confessing that there are equine things, can nevertheless deny, that there are any horses? If this cannot be, then no man, who acknowledges demonial things, can deny demons. Wherefore I being confessed to assert δαιμόνια, must needs be granted to hold δαίμονας also. Now do we not all think, that demons are either gods, or at least sons of the gods? Wherefore for any one to conceive, that there are demons, and yet no gods, is altogether as absurd,

P. 27. Steph.
[There are
several omis-
sions in this
quotation
from Plato,
and some el-
terations.]

as if any should think, that there are mules, but yet neither horses nor asses.—However, in the New Testament, according to the judgments of Origen, Eusebius, and others of the ancient fathers, both those words δαίμονας and δαιμόνια are alike taken, always in a worsèr sense, for evil and impure spirits only.

But over and besides all this, the Pagans do often characterize the supreme God by such titles, epithets, and descriptions, as are incommunicably proper to him; thereby plainly distinguishing him from all other inferior gods. He being sometimes called by them ὁ Δημιουργός, the opifex, architect, or maker of the world; ὁ ἡγεμὼν τοῦ παντός καὶ Ἀρχηγέτης, the prince and chief ruler of the universe; ὁ Πρῶτος and ὁ Πρωτίστος θεός (by the Greeks) and (by the Latins) *Primus Deus*, the first God; ὁ Πρῶτος Νοῦς, the first Mind; ὁ μέγας θεός, the great God; ὁ μέγιστος δαίμων, and ὁ μέγιστος θεῶν, the greatest God, and the greatest of the gods; ὁ ὕψιστος, the Highest; and ὁ ὑπαρὸς θεῶν, the Supreme of the gods; ὁ ἀνωτάτω θεός, the uppermost, or most transcendent God; *Princeps ille Deus*, that chief or principal God; θεός θεῶν, the God of gods; and Ἀρχὴ Ἀρχῶν, the Principle of principles; Τὸ πρῶτον αἰτίον, the First Cause; Ὁ ρόδο τὸ πᾶν γεννήσας, he that generated or created this whole universe; ὁ κρατεῖν τοῦ παντός, he that ruleth over the whole world; *Summus Rector et Dominus*, the supreme Governor and Lord of all; ὁ ἐνὶ πᾶσι θεός, the God over all; ὁ θεός ἀγέννητος, ἀτογενής, ἀυτοφύης, ἀυθιπόστατος, the ingenerate or unmade, self-originated and self-subsisting Deity; Μονάς, a Monad; Τὸ ἐν καὶ αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν, Unity and Goodness itself; Τὸ ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας, and τὸ ὑπερού-

σιον, that which is above essence or super-essential; *Τὸ ἐπέκεινα νοῦ*, that which is above mind and understanding; "Summum illud et æternum, neque mutabile neque interituum,"—that supreme and eternal Being, which is immutable and can never perish; *Ἀρχή, καὶ τέλος, καὶ μέσον πάντων*, the beginning and end and middle of all things; *Ἐν καὶ πάντα*, one and all things; *Deus unus et omnes*, one God and all gods: and, lastly, to name no more, *ἡ Πρόνοια*, or Providence, as distinguished from *Φύσις*, Nature, is often used by them also as a name for the supreme God, which, because it is of the feminine gender, the impious and atheistical Epicureans therefore took occasion to call God, ridiculously and jeeringly, "*Anum fatidicam Pronœam*." Now all these, and other such-like expressions, being found in the writings of professed Pagans (as we are able to shew) and some of them very frequently, it cannot be denied, but that the Pagans did put a manifest difference betwixt the supreme God, and all other inferior gods.

xv. What hath been now declared, might, as we conceive, be judged sufficient, in order to our present undertaking; which is to prove, that the more intelligent of the ancient Pagans, notwithstanding that multiplicity of gods worshipped by them, did generally acknowledge one supreme, omnipotent, and only unmade Deity. Nevertheless, since men are commonly so much prepossessed with a contrary persuasion, (the reason whereof seems to be no other than this, that because the notion of the word God, which is now

* Vide Ciceron. de Natur. Deor. lib. i. cap. viii. p. 2890. tom. ix. oper.

generally received amongst us Christians, is such as does essentially include self-existence in it, they are therefore apt to conceit, that it must needs do so likewise amongst the Pagans ;) we shall endeavour to produce yet some further evidence for the truth of our assertion. And, first, we conceive this to be no confirmation thereof, because after the publication of Christianity, and all along during that tugging and contest, which was betwixt it and Paganism, none of the professed champions for Paganism and antagonists of Christianity, (when occasion was now offered them) did ever assert any such thing as a multiplicity of understanding deities unmade (or creators) but on the contrary, they all generally disclaimed it, professing to acknowledge one supreme self-existent Deity, the maker of the whole universe.

It is a thing highly probable, if not unquestionable, that Apollonius Tyanæus, shortly after the publication of the gospel to the world, was a person made choice of by the policy, and assisted by the powers, of the kingdom of darkness, for the doing of some things extraordinary, merely out of design to derogate from the miracles of our Saviour Christ, and to enable Paganism the better to bear up against the assaults of Christianity. For amongst the many writers of this philosopher's life, some, and particularly Philostratus, seem to have had no other aim in this their whole undertaking, than only to dress up Apollonius in such a garb and manner, as might make him best seem to be a fit cor rival with our Saviour Christ, both in respect of sanctity and miracles. Eunapius* therefore telling us, that he mistitled his book, and

* In *Vitis Sophistarum*, Proœm. p. 6, 7. edit. Plantin.

that instead of Ἀπολλωνίου βίος, the life of Apollonius, he should have called it Θεοῦ εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἐπιδημίαν, the coming down, and converse of God with men; forasmuch as this Apollonius (saith he) was not a bare philosopher or man, ἀλλά τι θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπου μέσον, but a certain middle thing betwixt the gods and men.—And that this was the use commonly made by the Pagans of this history of Apollonius, namely to set him up in way of opposition and rivalry to our Saviour Christ, appears sundry ways. Marcellinus, in an Epistle of his to St. Austin,* declares this as the grand objection of the Pagans against Christianity, (therefore desiring St. Austin's answer to the same;) “Nihil aliud Dominum, quam alii homines facere potuerunt, fecisse vel egisse mentiuntur; Apollonium siquidem suum nobis, et Apuleium, aliosque magicæ artis homines, in medium proferunt, quorum majora contendunt extitisse miracula.” The Pagans pretend, that our Saviour Christ did no more than what other men have been able to do, they producing their Apollonius and Apuleius, and other magicians, whom they contend to have done greater miracles.—And it is well known, that Hierocles, to whom Eusebius gives the commendation of a very learned man, wrote a book against the Christians (entitled, Φιλαλήτης, or Λόγοι φιλαλήτης) the chief design whereof was to compare this Apollonius Tyanaeus with, and prefer him before, our Saviour Christ: Ἄνω καὶ κάτω θρυλλοῦσι, σιμνύοντες τὸν Ἰησοῦν, ὡς τυφλοῖς ἀναβλέψαι τε παρασχόντα, καὶ τινὰ τοιαῦτα δράσαντα θαυμάσια. They are Hierocles' own words in Eusebius: “The Christians (saith

* Inter Epistol. Augustin. Epist. cxxxvi. tom. ii. oper. p. 304. edit. Benedict.

he) keep a great deal of stir, crying up of one Jesus, for restoring sight to the blind, and doing some such other wonders." And then mentioning the thaumaturgi or wonder-workers amongst the Pagans, but especially Apollonius Tyanæus, and insisting largely upon his miracles, he adds in the close of all, *τίνας οὖν ἕνεκα τούτων ἐμνήσθην; ἵνα ἐξῇ συγκρίνειν τὴν ἡμετέραν ἀκριβῆ καὶ βεβαίαν ἐφ' ἑκάστη κρῖσαι, καὶ τὴν τῶν Χριστιανῶν κοφύτητα· ἕπερ ἡμεῖς μὲν τὸν τοιαῦτα πεποιηκότα, οὐ θεόν, ἀλλὰ θεοῖς κεχαρισμένον ἄνδρα ἡγοῦμεθα· οἱ δὲ δι' ὀλίγας τερατείας τινες τὸν Ἰησοῦν Θεὸν ἀναγορεύουσι.* To what purpose now have we mentioned all these things? but only that the solid judgment of us [Pagans] might be compared with the levity of the Christians; forasmuch as we do not account him a god who did all these miracles, but only a person beloved of the gods; whilst they declare Jesus to be a God, merely for doing a few wonders.—Where, because Eusebius is silent, we cannot but subjoin an answer out of Lactantius (which indeed he seems to have directed against those very words of Hierocles, though not naming of him) it being both pertinent and full; “Apparet nos sapientiores esse, qui mi- De Just. l. 1.
rabilibus factis non statim fidem divini- t. c. v.
tatis adjunximus, quam vos, qui ob exigua portenta Deum credidistis.—Disce igitur, si quid tibi cordis est, non solum idcirco a nobis Deum creditum Christum, quia mirabilia fecit, sed quia vidimus in eo facta esse omnia, quæ nobis annuntiata sunt, vaticinia prophetarum. Fecit mirabilia; magnum putassemus, ut et vos nuncupatis; et Judæi tunc putaverunt: si non illa ipsa facturum Christum, prophetæ omnes uno spiritu prædicassent. Itaque Deum credimus, non magis ex factis,

operibusque mirandis ; quam ex illa ipsa cruce, quam vos sicut canes lambitis ; quoniam simul et illa prædicta est. Non igitur suo testimonio, (cui enim de se dicenti potest credi ?) sed prophetarum testimonio, qui omnia quæ fecit ac passus est, multo ante cecinerunt ; fidem divinitatis accepit ; quod neque Apollonio neque Apuleio neque cuiquam magorum potest aliquando contingere." It is manifest, that we Christians are wiser than you Pagans, in that we do not presently attribute divinity to a person merely because of his wonders ; whereas a few portentous things, or extraordinary actions, will be enough with you to make you deify the doer of them (and so indeed did some of them, however Hierocles denies it, deify Apollonius). Let this writer against Christianity therefore learn, (if he have any understanding or sense in him) that Christ was not therefore believed to be a God by us Christians, merely because of his miracles, but because we saw all those things done by and accomplished in him, which were long before predicted to us by the prophets. He did miracles, and we should therefore have suspected him for a magician (as you now call him, and as the Jews then supposed him to be) had not all the prophets with one voice foretold, that he should do such things. We believe him therefore to be God, no more for his miracles than from that very cross of his, which you so much quarrel with, because that was likewise foretold. So that our belief of Christ's divinity is not founded upon his own testimony (for who can be believed concerning himself?) but upon the testimony of the prophets, who sang long before of all those things, which he both did and suffered. Which is such

a peculiar advantage and privilege of his, as that neither Apollonius nor Apuleius, nor any other magician, could ever share therein.—Now, as for the life and morals of this Apollonius Tyanæus, as it was a thing absolutely necessary for the carrying on of such a diabolical design, that the person made use of for an instrument should have some colourable and plausible pretence to virtue; so did Apollonius accordingly take upon him the profession of a Pythagorean; and indeed act that part externally so well, that even Sidonius Apollinarius,* though a Christian, was so dazzled with the glittering show and lustre of his counterfeit virtues, as if he had been enchanted by this magician so long after his death. Nevertheless, whosoever is not very dim-sighted in such matters as these, or partially affected, may easily perceive, that this Apollonius was so far from having any thing of that Divine Spirit which manifested itself in our Saviour Christ, (transcending all the philosophers that ever were) that he fell short of the better moralized Pagans; as for example Socrates, there being a plain appearance of much pride and vain-glory (besides other foolery) discoverable both in his words and actions. And this Eusebius^b undertakes to evince from Philostratus's own history (though containing many falsehoods in it) οὐδ' ἐν ἐπιστάσει καὶ μετρίοις ἀνδράσιν ἄξιον ἐγκρίναι, οὐχ' ὅπως τῷ σωτῆρι ἡμῶν Χριστῷ παρατιθέναι τὸν Ἀπολλώνιον, that Apollonius was so far from deserving to be compared with our Saviour Christ, that he was not fit to be ranked amongst the moderately and indifferently honest men.—Wherefore, as to his reputed

* Epistolar. lib. viii. Epist. iii. p. 462, 463.

^b Advers. Hieroclem, cap. iv. p. 431.

miracle, if credit be to be given to those relations, and such things were really done by him, it must for this reason also be concluded, that they were done no other wise than by magic and necromancy; and that this Apollonius was but an archimago or grand magician. Neither ought this to be suspected for a mereslander cast upon him by partially affected Christians only, since, during his lifetime, he was generally reputed, even amongst the Pagans themselves, for no other than a γόης,* or infamous enchanter, and accused of that very crime before Domitian the emperor:† as he was also represented such by one of the Pagan writers of his life, Mœragenes, senior to
 Con. Oed. l. 6. p. 302. Philostratus, as we learn from Origen:

περὶ μαγείας φαμέν, ὅτι ὁ βουλόμενος ἐξετάσαι, πότερον ποτε καὶ φιλόσοφοι ἢ λωτρί εἰσω αὐτῷ, εἰ μὴ, ἀναγνώτω τὰ γεγραμμένα Μοιραγίναι τῶν Ἀπολλωνίου τοῦ Τυανέως μέγου καὶ φιλοσόφου ἀπομνημονευμάτων. ἐν οἷς ὁ μὴ Χριστιανὸς, ἀλλὰ φιλόσοφος, ἔφησεν ἄλῃναι ὑπὸ τῆς ἐν Ἀπολλωνίῳ μαγείας, οὐκ ἀγενεῖς τινας φιλοσόφους, ὥς πρὸς γόητα αὐτὸν εἰσελθόντας. ἐν οἷς, οἶμαι, καὶ περὶ Εὐφράτου πάνυ διηγήσατο, καὶ τινος Ἐπικουρείου. As concerning the infamous and diabolical magic, he that would know whether or no a philosopher be temptable by it, or illaqueable into it, let him read the writings of Mœragenes concerning the memorable things of Apollonius Tyanæus the magician and philosopher; in which he that was no Christian, but a Pagan philosopher himself, affirmeth some not ignoble philosophers to have been taken with Apollonius's magic, including (as I sup-

* This is related by Philostratus in Vita Apolloniū, lib. ii. cap. xviii. p. 156.

† Philostrat. ubi supra, lib. viii. cap. vii. p. 327.

pose) in that number Euphrates and a certain Epicurean.—And no doubt but this was the reason, why Philostratus * derogates so much from the authority of this Mœragenes, affirming him to have been ignorant of many things concerning Apollonius (ὅς γὰρ Μοιραγένης τε προσηύκτων, &c.) Because Mœragenes had thus represented Apollonius in his true colours as a magician; whereas Philostratus's whole business and design was, on the contrary, to vindicate him from that imputation: the truth whereof, notwithstanding, may be sufficiently evinced, even from those very things that are recorded by Philostratus himself. And here by the way we shall observe, that it is reported by good historians, that miracles were also done by Vespasian at Alexandria, "Per eos menses (they are the words Hist. l. iv. p. 111. of Tacitus) multa miracula evenere, quis cœlestis favor, et quædam in Vespasianum inclinatio numinum ostenderetur. Ex plebe Alexandrina quidam, oculorum tabe notus, genus ejus advolvitur, remedium cæcitatis exposcens gemit; monitu Serapidis dei, quem dedita superstitionibus gens ante alios colit; precabaturque principem, ut genas et oculorum orbes dignaretur respergere oris excremento. Alius manu æger, eodem deo auctore, ut pede ac vestigio Cæsaris calcaretur orabat." At that time many miracles happened at Alexandria, by which was manifested the heavenly favour and inclination of the Divine powers towards Vespasian. A plebeian Alexandrian, that had been known to be blind, casts himself at the feet of Vespasian,

* Ibid. lib. i. cap. iii. p. 6, 6.

begging with tears from him a remedy for his sight, (and that according to the suggestion of the god Serapis) that he would deign but to spit upon his eyes and face. Another having a lame hand (directed by the same oracle) beseeches him but to tread upon it with his foot.—And after some debate concerning this business, both these things being done by Vespasian, “*statim conversa ad usum manus, et cæco reluxit dies* ;” the lame hand presently was restored to its former usefulness, and the blind man recovered his sight : both which things (saith the historian) some who were eye-witnesses do to this very day testify, when it can be no advantage to any one to lie concerning it.—And that there seems to be some reason to suspect, that our archimago Apollonius Tyanæus might have some finger in this business also, because he was not only familiarly and intimately acquainted with Vespasian, but also at that very time (as Philostratus* informeth us) present with him at Alexandria, where he also did many miracles himself. However, we may here take notice of another stratagem and policy of the devil in this, both to obscure the miracles of our Saviour Christ, and to weaken men’s faith in the Messiah, and baffle the notion of it ; that whereas a fame of prophecies had gone abroad every where, that a king was to come out of Judea and rule over the whole world, (by which was understood no other than the Messiah) by reason of these miracles done by Vespasian, this oracle or prediction might the rather seem to have its accomplishment in him, who was first proclaimed emperor in

* Ubi supra, lib. v. cap. xxvii. p. 209. et lib. viii. cap. vii. sect. ii. p. 329.

Judea, and to whom Josephus* himself basely and flatteringly had applied it. And since this business was started and suggested by the god Serapis, that is, by the devil (of whose counsel probably Apollonius also was); this makes it still more strongly suspicious, that it was really a design or policy of the devil, by imitating the miracles of our Saviour Christ, both in Apollonius and Vespasian, to counterwork God Almighty in the plot of Christianity, and to keep up or conserve his own usurped tyranny in the Pagan world still. Nevertheless, we shall here shew Apollonius all the favour we can, and therefore suppose him not to have been one of those more foul and black magicians, of the common sort, such as are not only grossly sunk and debauched in their lives, but also knowingly do homage to evil spirits as such, for the gratification of their lusts; but rather one of those more refined ones, who have been called by themselves Theurgists, such as being in some measure freed from the grosser vices, and thinking to have to do only with good spirits; nevertheless, being proud and vain-glorious, and affecting wonders, and to transcend the generality of mankind, are, by a Divine nemesis, justly exposed to the illusions of the devil or evil spirits, cunningly insinuating here, and aptly accommodating themselves to them. However, concerning this Apollonius, it is undeniable, that he was a zealous upholder of the Pagan Polytheism, and a stout champion for the gods, he professing to have been taught by the Samian Pythagoras's ghost, how to worship these gods, invisible as

* De Bello Judaico, lib. v. cap. v. sect. iv. p. 390. tom. ii. oper.

well as visible,* and to have converse with them. For which cause he is styled by Vopiscus,^b *amicus verus deorum*, a true friend of the gods;—that is, a hearty and sincere friend to that old Pagan religion, now assaulted by Christianity, in which not one only true God, but a multiplicity of gods, were worshipped. But, notwithstanding all this, Apollonius himself was a clear and undoubted assertor of one supreme Deity; as is evident from his apologetic oration in Philostratus,^c prepared for Domitian: in which he calls him, τὸν τῶν ὅλων, and τὸν πάντων δημιουργὸν θεόν, that God, who is the maker of the whole universe, and of all things. —And, as he elsewhere in Philostratus declares both the Indians and Egyptians to have agreed in this theology, insomuch that though the Egyptians condemned the Indians for many other of their opinions, yet did they highly applaud this doctrine of theirs, τῆς μὲν ὅλων γενέσεώς τε καὶ οὐσίας θεὸν δημιουργὸν εἶναι, τοῦδε ἐνθυμηθῆναι ταῦτα, αἰτιον τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι αὐτὸν, that God was the maker both of the generation and essence of all things, and that the cause of his making them was his essential goodness:—so doth he himself very much commend this philosophy of Jarchas, the

Philos. p. 142.
[lib. iii. cap. xxxv.] Indian brachman, viz. that the whole world was but one great animal, and might be resembled to a vast ship, wherein there are many inferior subordinate governors, under one supreme, the oldest and wisest; as also expert mariners of several sorts, some to attend upon the deck, and others to climb the masts and

* Vide Philostrat. ubi supra, lib. i. cap. xxxii. p. 40.

^b In Vita Aurel. cap. xxiv. p. 578. edit. Obrechtii.

^c Ubi supra, lib. viii. cap. vii. sect. vii. p. 337.

order the sails, *το δὲ τῆς μὲν πρώτης καὶ τελευταίας ἔσσαν ἀποδοτέον διὰ γενέτορι τοῦδε τοῦ ζώου, τὴν δὲ ἐπ' ἑκλήν, τοῖς οἱ τὰ μέρη αὐτοῦ κυβερνώσι· καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ἀποδοχόμενα, ἐπεὶ πολλοὺς μὲν φάσκουσιν ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ θεοὺς εἶναι, πολλοὺς δὲ ἐν θαλάττῃ, πολλοὺς δὲ ἐν πῆγαις τε καὶ νάμασι, πολλοὺς δὲ καὶ περὶ γῆν, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ γῆν τινάς.* In which the first and highest seat is to be given to that God, who is the generator or creator of this great animal; and the next under it to those gods, that govern the several parts of it respectively: so that the poets were to be approved of here, when they affirm, that there are many gods in the heavens, many in the seas, many in the rivers and fountains, many also upon the earth, and some under the earth.—Wherein we have a true representation of the old Paganic theology, which both Indians, and Egyptians, and European poets, (Greek and Latin) all agree in; that there is one supreme God, the maker of the universe, and under him many inferior generated gods, or understanding beings (superior to men) appointed to govern and preside over the several parts thereof, who were also to be religiously honoured and worshipped by men. And thus much for Apollonius Tyanæus.

The first Pagan writer against Christianity was Celsus, who lived in the times of Adrian, and was so professed a Polytheist, that he taxes the Jews for having been seduced by the frauds of Moses into this opinion of one God; *ὅτι τῷ ἡγῆ- Orig. p. 17.*
σεμένῳ σφῶν ἐπόμενοι Μωϋσῇ ἀπὸλοι καὶ πό- 18.
μνες, ἀγροίκους ἀπάραις ψυχᾶγωγῆθεντες, ἐνὰ ἐνδομῶν εἶναι
θεόν· Those silly shepherds and herdsmen, following Moses their leader, and being seduced by his rustic frauds, came to entertain this belief,

that there was but one only God.—Nevertheless, this Celsus himself plainly acknowledged, amongst his many gods, one supreme, whom he sometimes calls τὸν πρῶτον θεόν, the first God;—sometimes τὸν μέγιστον θεόν, the greatest God;—and sometimes τὸν ὑπερουράνιον θεόν, the supercelestial God,—and the like: and he doth so zealously assert the Divine omnipotence, that he casts an imputation upon the Christians of derogating from the same,

Orig. l. vi. p. 303.

in that their hypothesis of an adversary power; σφάλονται δὲ ἀσεβέστατα ἅττα, καὶ περὶ τήνδε τὴν μέγιστην ἄγνοιαν ὁμοίως ἀπὸ θείων αἰνεγμάτων πεπλανημένην, ποιοῦντες τῷ θεῷ ἐναντίον τινὰ, διάβολόν τε καὶ γλώττην Ἑβραίᾳ Σατανᾶν ὀνομάζοντες τὸν αὐτόν. ἄλλως μὲν οὖν παντελῶς θνητὰ ταῦτα, καὶ οὐδ' ὅσα λέγειν, ὅτι δὲ ὁ μέγιστος Θεὸς, βουλόμενός τι ἀνθρώποις ὠφελεῖσαι, τὸν ἀντιπράσσοντα ἔχει, καὶ ἄδυνατεῖ. The Christians are erroneously led into most wicked opinions concerning God, by reason of their great ignorance of the Divine enigms; whilst they make a certain adversary to God, whom they call the devil, and in the Hebrew language Satan; and affirm, contrary to all piety, that the greatest God, having a mind to do good to men, is disabled or withstood by an adversary resisting him.

Orig. con. Cels. l. viii. p. 419.

—Lastly, where he pleads most for the worship of demons, he concludes thus concerning the supreme God: Θεοῦ δὲ οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς ἀπολειπτέον, οὔτε μὲθ' ἡμέραν, οὔτε νύκτωρ, οὔτ' ἐς κοινόν, οὔτ' ἰδίᾳ, λόγῳ τε ἐν παντὶ καὶ ἔργῳ διηγεκῶς, ἀλλά γε καὶ μετὰ τῶνδε, καὶ χωρὶς, ἢ ψυχὴ αἰεὶ τετάσθω πρὸς τὸν Θεόν. But God is by no means any where to be laid aside, or left out; neither by day nor by night, neither in public nor in private, either in our words or actions; but in every thing our mind ought constantly to be

directed towards God.—A saying, that might very well become a Christian.

The next and greatest champion for the Pagan cause in books and writings was that famous Tyrian philosopher Malchus, called by the Greeks Porphyrius; who published a voluminous and elaborate treatise (containing fifteen books) against the Christians; and yet he notwithstanding was plainly as zealous an assertor of one supreme Deity, and one only ἀγέννητον, unmade or self-existent principle of all things, as any of the Christians themselves could be; he strenuously opposing that forementioned doctrine of Plutarch and Atticus concerning three unmade principles, a good God, an evil soul or demon, and the matter, and endeavouring to demonstrate, that all things whatsoever, even matter itself, was derived from one perfect understanding Being, or self-originated Deity. The sum of whose argumentation to which purpose we have represented by Proclus upon the Timæus, (vol. i. 216.)

After Porphyrius, the next eminent antagonist of Christianity and champion for Paganism, was Hierocles, the writer of that book, entitled in Eusebius) φιλαλήθης, or a lover of the truth;—which is noted to have been a modester inscription than that of Celsus's ἀληθὲς λόγος, or true oration.—For if Eusebius Pamphili were the writer of that answer to this Philalethes now extant, as we both read in our copies and as Photius also read; then must it needs be granted, that Hierocles, the author of it, was either contemporary with Porphyrius, or else but little his junior. Moreover, this Hierocles seems plainly to be the person intended by Lactantius in these following words:

De Just. l. ii. "Alius eandem materiam mendacibus
c. ii. [p. 358.] scripsit; qui erat tum e numero judi-
cum, et qui auctor in primis faciendæ persecu-
tionis fuit: quo scelere non contentus, etiam
scriptis eos, quos afflixerat, insecutus est. Com-
posuit enim libellos duos, non contra Christianos,
ne inimice insectari videretur, sed ad Christianos,
ut humane ac benigne consulere videretur. In
quibus ita falsitatem scripturæ sacræ arguere co-
natus est, tanquam sibi esset tota contraria.—
Præcipue tamen Paulum Petrumque laceravit,
cæterusque discipulos, tanquam fallaciæ semi-
natores; quos eosdem tamen rudes et indoctos
fuisse testatus est."—Another hath handled the
same matter more smartly, who was first himself
one of the judges, and a chief author of the per-
secution; but, being not contented with that
wickedness, he added this afterwards, to perse-
cute the Christians also with his pen; he compos-
ing two books, not inscribed against the Christ-
ians, (lest he should seem plainly to act the part
of an enemy) but to the Christians, (that he might
be thought to counsel them humanely and benign-
ly :) in which he so charges the holy Scripture
with falsehood, as if it were all nothing else but
contradictions; but he chiefly lashes Paul and
Peter, as divulgers of lies and deceits, whom
notwithstanding he declares to have been rude
and illiterate persons.—I say, though Hierocles,
for some cause or other, be not named here by
Lactantius in these cited words, or that which
follows, yet it cannot be doubted, but that he
was the person intended by him, for these two
reasons: First, because he tells us afterward,
that the main business of that Christiano-

mastix was to compare Apollonius with our Saviour Christ. "Cum facta Christi mirabilia destrueret, nec tamen negaret, voluit ostendere, Apollonium vel paria, vel etiam majora fecisse. Mirum quod Apuleium prætermiserit, cujus solent et multa et mira memorari. Et ex hoc insolentiam Christi voluit arguere, quod deum se constituerit: ut ille verecundior fuisse videretur, qui cum majora faceret (ut hic putat) tamen id sibi non arrogaverit." That he might obscure the miracles of our Saviour Christ, which he could not deny, he would undertake to shew, that equal or greater miracles were done by Apollonius. And it was a wonder he did not mention Apuleius too, of whose many and wonderful things the Pagans used to brag likewise. Moreover, he condemns our Saviour Christ of insolency, for making himself a god, affirming Apollonius to have been the modester person, who, though he did (as he supposes) greater miracles, yet arrogated no such thing to himself.—The second reason is, because Lactantius also expressly mentions the very title of Hierocles' book, viz. Philalethes. "Cum talia ignorantia suæ deliramenta fudisset cumque veritatem penitus excidere connixus est, ausus est libros suos nefarios, ac Dei hostes, *φιλαλήθεις* annotare:" Though pouring out so much folly and madness, professedly fighting against the truth, yet he presumed to call these his wicked books and enemies of God, Philaletheis, or friends to truth.—From which words of Lactantius, and those foregoing, where he affirms this Christiano-mastix to have written ^{Dr. Pearson,} two books, the learned prefacer to the ^{bp. of Chester,} late edition of Hierocles, probably concludes,

that the whole title of Hierocles' book was this, λόγοι φιλαλήθεις πρὸς Χριστιανούς. And I conceive, that the first of those two books of Hierocles insisted upon such things as Porphyrius had before urged against the Christians; but then in the second, he added this *de novo* of his own, to compare Apollonius with our Saviour Christ; which Eusebius only takes notice of. Wherefore Epiphanius telling us,* that there was one Hierocles, a prefect or governor of Alexandria, in those persecuting times of Diocletian, we may probably conclude, that this was the very person described in Lactantius, who is said to have been first of the number of the judges, and a principal actor in the persecution; and then afterward to have written this Philalethes against the Christians, wherein, besides other things, he ventured to compare Apollonius Tyanæus with our Saviour Christ. Now, if this Hierocles, who wrote the Philalethes in defence of the Pagan gods against the Christians, were the author of those two other philosophic books, the Commentary upon the Golden Verses, and that *De Fato et Providentia*, it might be easily evinced from both of them, that he was notwithstanding an assertor of onesupreme Deity. But Photius^b tells us, that that Hierocles, who wrote the book concerning Fate and Providence, did therein make mention of Jamblichus, and his junior Plutarchus Atheniensis: from whence Jonsius taking it for granted, that it was one and the same Hierocles, who wrote against the Christians, and *De Fato*, infers, that it could

* Hieroc. lxxviii. Meletian. §. ii. tom. i. oper. p. 717.]

^b Biblioth. Cod. coxiv. p. 554.

not be Eusebius Pamphili, who answered the Philalethes, but that it must needs be some other Eusebius much junior. But we finding Hierocles' Philalethes in Lactantius, must needs conclude, on the contrary, that Hierocles, the famous Christiano-mastix, was not the same with that Hierocles, who wrote *De Fato*. Which is further evident from *Æneas Gazeus* in his *Theophrastus*; where first he mentions one Hierocles, P. 7.
an Alexandrian, that had been his mas- [edit. Barth.]
ter, whom he highly extols, ἀλλ' εἰπέ μοι, ἔτι παρ'
ὑμῖν εἰσὶν οἱ τῆς φιλοσοφίας δεκνύντες τὰς τελετὰς, οἷος ἦν
Ἱεροκλῆς ὁ διδάσκαλος; but tell me, I pray you, are
there yet left amongst you in Egypt any such ex-
pounders of the arcane mysteries of philosophy,
as Hierocles our master was?—And this we sup-
pose to be that Hierocles, who wrote concerning
Fate and Providence, (if not also upon the *Golden
Verses*.) But afterward, upon occasion of *Apollonius* the
Cappadocian, or Tyanæan, he mentions
another Hierocles distinct from the former;
namely him, who had so boasted of *Apollonius's*
miracles, in these words: ὁ Ἀπολλώνιος τὰ ψευδῆ
λέγων ἐλέγχεται. Ἱεροκλῆς δὲ οὐκ ὁ διδάσκαλος,
P. 24.
ἀλλ' ὁ προβαλλόμενος τὰ θαυμάσια, ἄπιστον καὶ
τοῦτο προσέθηκεν. Thus *Apollonius* is convinced of
falsehood; but Hierocles (not our master) but he
that boasts of the miracles (of *Apollonius*) adds
another incredible thing.—And though it be prob-
able, that one of these was the author of that
commentary upon the *Golden Verses*, (for that it
should be written by a Christian is but a dream)
yet we cannot certainly determine, which of them
it was. However, that this Hierocles, who was
the mastix of Christianity, and champion for the

gods, was notwithstanding a professed assertor of one supreme Deity, is clearly manifest also from Lactantius, in these following words: "*Quam tandem nobis attulisti veritatem? nisi quod assertor deorum eos ipsos ad ultimum prodidisti: prosecutus enim summi dei laudes, quem regem, quem maximum, quem opificem rerum, quem fontem bonorum, quem parentem omnium, quem factorem altoremque viventium confessus es, ademisti Jovi tuo regnum; eumque summa potestate depulsum in ministrorum numerum redegit. Epilogus ergo te tuus arguit stultitiæ, vanitatis, erroris. Affirmas deos esse; et illos tamen subjecit et mancipas ei deo, cujus religionem conaris evertere.*" Though you have entitled your book *Philalethes*, yet what truth have you brought us therein, unless only this, that being an assertor of the gods, (contradicting yourself) you have at last betrayed those very gods? For in the close of your book, prosecuting the praises of the supreme God, and confessing him to be the king, the greatest, the opifex of the world, the fountain of good, the parent of all things, the maker and conservator of all living beings, you have by this means dethroned your Jupiter, and, degrading him from his sovereign power, reduced him into the rank of inferior ministers. Wherefore your epilogue argues you guilty of folly, vanity and error, in that you both assert gods, and yet subject and mancipate them under that one God, whose religion you endeavour to overthrow. —Where we must confess we understand not well Lactantius's logic; forasmuch as Hierocles' Zeus, or Jupiter, was one and the same with his supreme God (as is also here intimated); and

though he acknowledged all the other gods to be but his inferior ministers, yet nevertheless did he contend, that these ought to be religiously worshipped, which was the thing that Lactantius should have confuted. But that, which we here take notice of, is this; that Hierocles, a grand persecutor of the Christians, and the author of that bitter invective against them, called Philalethes, though he were so strenuous an assertor of Polytheism, and champion for the gods, yet did he nevertheless at the same time clearly acknowledge one supreme Deity, calling him the king, (that is, the monarch of the universe) the greatest, the opifex of the world, the fountain of good, the parent of all things, and the maker and conservator of all life.

But the greatest opposer of Christianity every way was Julian the emperor, who cannot reasonably be suspected to have disguised or blanched Paganism, because he was an emperor, and had so great an animosity against Christianity, and was so superstitiously or bigotically zealous for the worship of the gods; and yet this very Julian, notwithstanding, was an unquestionable assertor of one supreme Deity. In his book Cyrii. cont. Jul. 4. p. 115. [edit. Spanhem.] written against the Christians, he declares the general sense of the Pagans

after this manner: οἱ γὰρ ἡμέτεροι φασίν, τὸν δημιουργὸν πάντων μὲν εἶναι κοινὸν πατέρα καὶ βασιλέα, νενημῆσθαι δὲ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν ἰθυῶν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, ἐθνάρχαις καὶ πολιούχοις θεοῖς, ὃν ἕκαστος ἐπιτροπτεύει τὴν ἑαυτοῦ λῆξιν οἰκείως αὐτῷ· ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἐν μὲν τῷ πατρὶ πάντα τέλεια, καὶ ἐν πάντα, ἐν δὲ τοῖς μεριστοῖς, ἄλλη παρ' ἄλλῃ κρεττὴ δύναμις, &c.—Our theologians affirm the Maker of all to be a common

father and king; but that the nations, as to particular things, are distributed by him to other inferior gods, that are appointed to be governors over countries and cities, every one of which administers in his own province agreeably to himself. For whereas in the common father all things are perfect, and one is all, in the particular or partial deities one excels in one power, and another in another. Afterward, in the same book he contends, that the Pagans did entertain righter opinions concerning the supreme God

P. 146. [p. 148. than the Jews themselves: *ὡς εἰ μὲν ὁ edit. Spanhem.]*

προσεχῆς εἶη τοῦ κόσμου δημιουργὸς ὁ κρητυττόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ Μωσέως, ἡμεῖς ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ βελτίους ἔχομεν δόξας, οἱ κοινὸν μὲν ἐκείνον ὑπολαμβάνοντες ἀπάντων δεσπύτην, ἐθνάρχας δὲ ἄλλους, οἱ τυγχάνουσι μὲν ὑπ' ἐκείνον, εἰσὶ δὲ ὥσπερ ἑπαρχοὶ βασιλέως, ἕκαστος τὴν ἑαυτοῦ διαφερόντως ἐπανορθούμενος φροντίδα, καὶ οὐ καθίσταμεν αὐτὸν, οὐδὲ ἀντιμερίτην τῶν ὑπ' αὐτὸν θεῶν καθισταμένων. If that God, who is so much spoken of by Moses, be the immediate opificer of the whole world, we Pagans entertain better opinions of him, who suppose him to be the common Lord of all; but that there are other governors of nations and countries under him, as prefects or presidents appointed by a king; we not ranking him amongst those partial governors of particular countries and cities, as the Jews do.—From both which places it is evident that, according to Julian's theology, all those other gods, whose worship he contended so much for, were but the subordinate ministers of that one supreme God, the maker of all.

The same thing might be further manifested from Julian's oration made in praise of the sun, as

a great God in this visible world; he therein plainly acknowledging another far more glorious Deity, which was the cause of all things; εἰς μὲν ὁ τῶν ὅλων δημιουργός, πολλοὶ δὲ οἱ κατ' οὐρανὸν περιπολοῦντες δημιουργικοὶ θεοί. There is one God, P. 262.

the maker of all things; but besides him ^[Edit. Petav. Spanhemii vero p. 140.] there are many other demiurgical gods moving round the heavens—in the midst of which is the sun. Where we have a clear acknowledgment of one supreme God, and of many inferior deities, both together. Moreover, in the same oration,* he declareth, that the ancient poets, making the sun to have been the offspring of Hyperion, did by this Hyperion understand nothing else but the supreme Deity; τὸν πάντων ὑπερέχοντα, πάντων ἐπέκεινα, περὶ ὃν πάντα, καὶ οὐ ἕνεκα πάντα ἐστὶν, him who is above all things, and about whom, and for whose sake, are all things.—Which supreme Deity is thus more largely described by him in the same oration (where he calls him the king of all things): οὗτος τοίνυν, εἴτε τὸ

^{P. 248.} ἐπέκεινα τοῦ νοῦ καλεῖν αὐτὸν θέμις· εἴτε ἰδέαν ^[p. 132. edit. Spanhem.] τῶν ὄντων ὃ δὴ φημὶ τὸ νοητὸν σύμπαν· εἴτε ἔν, ἐπειδὴ πάντων τὸ ἐν δοκεῖ ὡς πρεσβύτατον· εἴτε δὲ Πλάτων εἰωθεν ὀνομάζειν τὸ ἀγαθόν· αὕτη δὲ οὖν ἡ μονοειδὴς τῶν ὄλων αἰτία, πᾶσι τοῖς οὖσιν ἐξηγουμένη κάλλους τε, καὶ τελειότητος, ἐνώσεώς τε, καὶ δυνάμεως ἀμηχάνου· κατὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῇ μένουσαν πρωτουργὸν οὐσίαν, ἥλιον θεὸν μέγιστον ἀνέφηνεν, &c. This God, whether he ought to be called that, which is above mind and understanding, or the idea of all things, or the one (since unity seems to be the oldest of all things) or else, as Plato was wont to call him, the good; I say, this uni-

* P. 136. edit. Spanhem.

form cause of all things, which is the original of all pulchritude and perfection, unity and power, produced from himself a certain intelligible sun, every way like himself, of which the sensible sun is but an image.—For thus Dionysius Petavius rightly declares the sense of Julian in this oration;

P. 274.

“Vanissimæ hujus et loquacissimæ disputationis mysterium est; a principe ac primario Deo, νοητὸν quendam et archetypum solem editum fuisse; qui eandem prorsus σχέση et τάξιν in genere τῶν νοητῶν habeat, quam in αἰσθητοῖς ille, quem videmus, solaris globus obtinet. Tria itaque discernenda sunt, princeps ille Deus, qui τὰ γὰθὸν a Platone dicitur, ὁ νοητὸς ἥλιος, ὁ φαινόμενος δίσκος. The mystery of this most vain and loquacious disputation is this, that from the first and chief Deity was produced a certain intelligible and archetypal sun, which hath the same place or order in the rank of intelligible things, that the sensible sun hath in the rank of sensibles. So that here are three things to be distinguished from one another; first, the supreme Deity, which Plato calls the good; secondly, the intelligible sun, or eternal intellect; and lastly, the corporeal or sensible sun (animated).—Where, notwithstanding, we may take notice, how near this Pagan philosopher and emperor, Julian, approached to Christianity, though so much opposed by him, in that he also supposed an eternal mind or intellect, as the immediate offspring of the first fountain of all things; which seems to differ but a little from the Christian λόγος. However, it is plain, that this devout restorer of Paganism, and zealous contender for the worship of the gods, asserted no multiplicity of indepen-

dent self-existent deities, but derived all his gods from one.

As for those other philosophers and learned men, who, in those latter times of the declining of Paganism, after Constantine, still stood out in opposition against Christianity; such as Jamblichus, Syrianus, Proclus, Simplicius, and many others, it is unquestionably evident concerning them all, that they clearly acknowledged one supreme Deity as the original of all things. Maximus Madaurensis, a confident and resolved Pagan in St. Austin's time, expressed both his own and the general sense of Pagans after

this manner: * "Equidem unum esse Deum summum, sine initio, naturæ ceu patrem magnum atque magnificum, quis tam demens, tam mente captus neget esse certissimum? Hujus nos virtutes per mundanum opus diffusas multis vocabulis invocamus, quoniam nomen ejus cuncti proprium videlicet ignoramus. Ita fit, ut dum ejus quasi quædam membra carptim variis supplicationibus prosequimur, totam colere profecto videamur." Truly

* Ep. 43.
[inter August.
Epistol.
epist. 16.
p. 15. tom. ii.
oper. edit.
Benedict.]

that there is one supreme God, without beginning, as the great and magnificent father of nature; who is so mad or devoid of sense as not to acknowledge it to be most certain? His virtues diffused throughout the whole world (because we know not what his proper name is) we invoke under many different names. Whence it comes to pass, that whilst we prosecute, with our supplications, his, as it were, divided members severally, we must needs be judged to worship the whole Deity.—And then he concludes his epistle

thus: "Dii te servant, per quos et eorum, atque cunctorum mortalium, communem patrem, universi mortales, quos terra sustinet, mille modis, concordia discordia venerantur." The gods keep thee, by and through whom, we Pagans, dispersed over the whole world, do worship the common father, both of those gods, and all mortals, after a thousand different manners, nevertheless with an agreeing discord.—Longi-

Ep. 21. [Inter
Epist. Augus-
tin. epist. 234.
p. 647.]

nianus, likewise, another more modest Pagan philosopher, upon the request of the same St. Austin, declares his sense concerning the way of worshipping God, and arriving to happiness, to this purpose: "Per minores deos perveniri ad summum Deum non sine sacris purificatoriis;"* that we are to come to the supreme God by the minor or inferior gods, and that not without purifying rites and expiations:—he supposing, that besides a virtuous and holy life, certain religious rites and purifications were necessary to be observed in order to that end. In which epistle, the supreme God is also styled by him "unus, universus, incomprehensibilis, ineffabilis et infatigabilis Creator."

Moreover, that the Pagans generally disclaimed this opinion of many unmade self-existent deities, appeareth plainly from Arnobius, where he brings them in complaining, that they were falsely and maliciously accused by some Christians as guilty thereof, after this manner:

Lib. i. p. 19.

"Frustra nos falso et calumnioso inces-
sitis et appetitis crimine, tanquam inficias eamus

* These words are not Longinianus's, but the argument of the epistle prefixed to it.

Deum esse majorem; cum a nobis et Jupiter nominetur, et optimus habeatur et maximus: cumque illi augustissimas sedes, et capitolia constituerimus immania." In vain do you Christians calumniate us Pagans, and accuse us, as if we denied one supreme omnipotent God; though we both call him Jupiter, and account him the best and the greatest, having dedicated the most august seats to him, the vast capitols.—Where Arnobius, in way of opposition, shews first, how perplexed and entangled a thing the Pagans' theology was, their poetic fables of the gods nonsensically confounding herology together with theology; and that it was impossible, that that Jupiter of theirs, which had a father and a mother, a grandfather and a grandmother, should be the omnipotent God. "Nam Deus omnipotens, mente una omnium, et communi mortalitatis assensu, neque genitus scitur, neque novam in lucem aliquando esse prolatus; nec ex aliquo tempore cœpisse esse, vel sæculo. Ipse enim est fons rerum, sator sæculorum ac temporum. Non enim ipsa per se sunt, sed ex ejus perpetuitate perpetua, et infinita semper continuatione procedunt. At vero Jupiter (ut vos fertis) et patrem habet et matrem, avos et avias, nunc nuper in utero matris suæ formatus," &c. You Pagans confound yourselves with contradictions; for the omnipotent God, according to the natural sense of all mankind, was neither begotten nor made, nor ever had a beginning in time, he being the fountain and original of all things. But Jupiter (as you say) had both father and mother, grandfathers and grandmothers, and was but lately formed in the womb; and therefore he cannot be

the eternal omnipotent God.—Nevertheless, Arnobius afterward considering (as we suppose) that these poetic fables were by the wiser Pagans either totally rejected, or else some way or other allegorized, he candidly dismisseth this advantage, which he had against them, and grants their Jupiter to be the true omnipotent Deity, and consequently that same God, which the Christians worshipped; but from thence infers, that the Pagans therefore must needs be highly guilty, whilst worshipping the same God with the Christians, they did hate and persecute them after that manner. “*Sed sint, ut vultis, unum, nec in aliquo, vi numinis, et majestate distantes; ecquid ergo injustis persequimini nos odii? Quid, ut omnis pessimi, nostri nominis inhorrescitis mentione, si, quem Deum colitis, eum et nos? aut quid in eadem causa vobis esse contenditis familiares Deos, inimicos atque infestissimos nobis? etenim, si una religio est nobis vobisque communis, cessat ira cœlestium.*” But let it be granted, that (as you affirm) your Jupiter, and the eternal omnipotent God are one and the same; why then do you prosecute us with unjust hatreds, abominating the very mention of our names, if the same God that you worship be worshipped by us? Or if your religion and ours be the same, why do you pretend, that the gods are propitious to you, but most highly provoked and incensed against us?—Where the Pagan defence and reply is, “*Sed non idcirco Dii vobis infesti sunt, quod omnipotentem colatis Deum; sed quod hominem natum, et quod personis infame est vilibus, crucis supplicio interemptum, et Deum fuisse contenditis, et superesse adhuc creditis, et quotidianis*

supplicationibus adoratis:" But we do not say, that the gods are therefore displeased with you Christians, because you worship the omnipotent God; but because you contend him to be a god, who was not only born a mortal man, but also died an ignominious death, suffering as a malefactor; believing him still to survive, and adoring him with your daily prayers.—To which Arnobius retorts in this manner: "Tell us now, I pray you, who these gods are, who take it as so great an injury and indignity done to themselves, that Christ should be worshipped? Are they not Janus and Saturn, Æsculapius and Liber, Mercurius the son of Maia, and the Theban or Tyrian Hercules, Castor and Pollux, and the like?" "Hic ergo Christum coli, et a nobis accipi, et existimari pro numine, vulneratis accipiunt auri-bus? et obliti paulo ante sortis et conditionis suæ, id, quod sibi concessum est, impertiri alteri nolunt? hæc est justitia cœlitum? hoc deorum judicium sanctum? Nonne istud livoris est et avaritiæ genus? non obtrectatio quædam sordens, suas eminere solummodo velle fortunas, aliorum res premi et in contempta humilitate calcari? natum hominem colimus; quid enim, vos hominem nullum colitis natum? non unum et alium? non innumeros alios? quinimo non omnes quos jam templis habetis vestris, mortalium sustulistis ex numero, et cœlo sideribusque donastis? Concedamus interdum manum vestris opinionationibus dantes, unum Christum fuisse de nobis, mentis, animæ, corporis, fragilitatis et conditionis unius; nonne dignus a nobis est tantorum obmunerum gratiam, Deus dici, Deusque sentiri? Si enim

vos Liberum, quod reperit usum vini; si quod panis, Cererem; si *Æsculapium*, quod herbarum; si *Minervam*, quod oleæ; si *Triptoleum*, quod aratri; si denique *Herculem*, quod feras, quod fures, quod multiplicium capitum superavit compescuitque natrices, divorum retulistis in cælum: honoribus quantis afficiendus est nobis, qui ab erroribus nos magnis in sinuata veritate traduxit?" &c. Are these the gods, who are so much offended with Christ's being worshipped, and accounted a god by us? they, who being forgetful of their former condition, would not have the same bestowed upon another, which hath been granted to themselves? Is this the justice of the heavenly powers? this the righteous judgment of gods? or is it not rather base envy and covetousness, for them thus to engross all to themselves? We worship indeed one, that was born a man: what then? do you worship no such? not one, and another, and innumerable? and are not almost all your gods such as were taken from out of the rank of men, and placed among the stars? and will you account that damnable in us, which yourselves practise? Let us for the present yield thus much to your infidelity, and grant, that Christ was but an ordinary man, of the same rank and condition with other mortals; yet might we not for all that (according to your principles) think him worthy, by reason of the great benefits we received from him, to be accounted a god? For if you have advanced into the number of your *Divi*, *Bacchus* or *Liber* for inventing the use of wine, *Ceres* of corn, *Æsculapius* of herbs, *Minerva* of the olive, *Triptolemus* of the plough,

and Hercules for subduing beasts, thieves, and monsters; with how great honours ought he to be affected by us, who by the insinuation of Divine truth hath delivered us from such great errors of mind? &c.—Which argumentation of Arnobius, though it were good enough *ad homines*, to stop the mouths of the Pagans, there being more reason, that Christ should be made a god, for the benefits that mankind receive from him, than that Bacchus, or Ceres, or Hercules should be so; yet as the same Arnobius himself seems to intimate, it is not sufficient without something else superadded to it, for the justification of Christianity. Neither indeed was that the chief quarrel, which the Pagans had with the Christians, that they had deified one, who was crucified, (though the cross of Christ was also a great offence to them) but that they condemning the Pagans, for worshipping others besides the supreme omnipotent God, and decrying all those gods of theirs, did themselves notwithstanding worship one mortal man for a god. This Celsus urges in Origen, *εἰ μὲν δὴ μηδένα ἄλλον ἐθεράπευον οὗτοι πλὴν ἑνα Θεόν, ἣν ἂν τις αὐτοῖς ἴσως πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἀτενὴς λόγος. νυνὶ δὲ τὸν ἑναγχοῦσαν* Lib. viii. p. 385.
φανέντα τουτον ὑπερθησκεύουσι, καὶ ὁμῶς οὐδὲν πλημμελεῖν νομίζουσι περὶ τὸν Θεόν, εἰ καὶ ὑπερέτης αὐτοῦ θεραπευθήσεται If these Christians themselves worshipped no other but one God, or the pure Divinity, then might they perhaps seem to have some just pretence of censuring us; but now they themselves give Divine honour to one that lately rose up, and yet they persuade themselves, that they do not at all offend God in worshipping that supposed

minister of his.—Which, as Origen makes there a reply to it, so shall it be further considered by us afterwards.

As for the judgment of the fathers in this particular, Clemens Alexandrinus was not only of this opinion, that the Pagans (at least the Greekish) did worship the true God, and the same God with the Christians, (though not after a right manner) but also endeavours to confirm it

Strom. 6. from the authority of St. Peter: "That
p. 635. [c. v. the Greeks knew God, Peter intimates
p. 759. edit. Potteri.] in his predication. There is one God,

saith he, who made the beginning of all things, and hath power over their end, &c. Worship this God, not as the Greeks do. Wherein he seemeth to suppose the Greeks to worship the same God with us, though not according to the right tradition received by his Son. He does not enjoin us not to worship that God, which the Greeks worship, but to worship him otherwise than they do; altering only the manner of the worship, but not the object, or preaching another God. And what that is, not to worship God as the Greeks do, the same Peter intimated in those words: They worship him in images of wood and stone, brass and iron, gold and silver, and sacrifice to the dead also, as to gods." Where he adds further out of St. Peter's predication, "Neither worship God as the Jews do," &c. "The one and only God (saith Clemens) is worshipped by the Greeks Paganically, by the Jews Judaically, but by us newly and spiritually. For the same God, who gave the two testaments to the Jews and Christians, gave philosophy to the Greeks, δι' ἧς ὁ παντοκράτωρ παρ' Ἑλλήσι δοξάζεται, by

which the omnipotent God is glorified amongst the Greeks.

Lactantius Firmianus also, in many places, affirms the Pagans to have acknowledged one supreme Deity; "*Summum Deum et philosophi et poetæ, et ipsi denique, qui deos colunt, sæpe fatentur:*" That there is one supreme Deity, both philosophers and poets, and even the vulgar worshippers of the gods themselves, frequently acknowledge.—From whence he concludes, that all the other Pagan gods were nothing but the ministers of this one supreme, and creatures made by him, (he then only blaming them for calling them gods, and giving them religious worship)—lib. i. When he had declared, that it was altogether as absurd to suppose the world to be governed by many independent gods, as to suppose the body of a man to be governed by many minds or souls independent; he adds: "*Quod quia intelligunt isti assertores deorum, ita eos præesse singulis rebus ac partibus dicunt, ut tantum unus sit rector eximius. Jam ergo cæteri non dii erunt, sed satellites ac ministri, quos ille unus, maximus et potens omnium, officiis his præfecit, ut ipsi ejus imperio et nutibus serviant. Si universi pares non sunt, non igitur dii omnes sunt. Nec enim potest hoc idem esse, quod servit et quod dominatur. Nam si Deus est nomen summæ potestatis incorruptibilis esse debet, perfectus, impassibilis, nulli rei subiectus. Ergo dii non sunt, quos parere uni maximo Deo necessitas cogit.*" Which because the assertors of gods well understand, they affirm these gods of theirs so to preside over the seve-

De Ira Dei.

p. 727.

[cap. xi.

p. 934.]

Lib. i. p. 16.

[cap. iii. p.

25.]

ral parts of the world, as that there is only one chief rector or governor. Whence it follows, that all their other gods can be no other thing than ministers and officers, which one greatest God, who is omnipotent, hath variously appointed and constituted, so as to serve his command and beck. Now, if all the Pagan gods be not equal, then can they not be all gods; since that which ruleth, and that which serveth, cannot be the same. God is a name of absolute power, and implies incorruptibility, perfection, impassibility, and subjection to nothing.

P. 28. [cap. v. Wherefore these ought not to be called
p. 40.]

gods, whom necessity compels to obey one greatest God.—Again, in the same book, “*Nunc satis est demonstrare, summo ingenio viros attigisse veritatem ac prope tenuisse; nisi eos retrorsum infatuata pravis opinionibus consuetudo rapnisset, qua et deos alios esse opinabantur, et ea, quæ in usum hominis Deus fecit, tanquam sensu prædita essent, pro diis habenda et colenda credebant.*” It is now sufficient to have shewn,

that the more ingenious and intelligent Pagans came very near to the truth, and would have fully reached it, had not a certain customary infatuation of evil opinions snatched them away to an acknowledgment of other gods, and to a belief, that those things, which God made for the use of men, as endued with sense (or animated) ought to be accounted gods and worshipped;

P. 39. [c. vii. namely, the stars.—And afterward,
p. 51.]

“*Quod si cultores deorum eos ipsos se colere putant, quos summi Dei ministros appellamus, nihil est quod nobis faciant invidiam, qui unum Deum dicamus, multos negemus.*” If the worshippers of the gods think, that they worship

no other than the ministers of the one supreme God, then there is no cause, why they should render us as hateful, who say, that there is one God, and deny many gods.—

Eusebius Cæsariensis likewise gives us this account of the Pagans' creed, or the tenor of their theology, as it was then

Prep. Evang.
lib. iii. c. xiii.
[p. 121.]

held forth by them; *ἓνα γὰρ ὄντα θεόν, παντοίαις δυνάμεσι, τὰ πάντα πληροῦν, καὶ διὰ πάντων διήκειν, καὶ τοῖς πᾶσιν ἐπιστατεῖν ἁσώματως δὲ καὶ ἀφανῶς ἐν πᾶσιν ὄντα, καὶ διὰ πάντων διήκοντα· καὶ τοῦτον εἰκότως διὰ τῶν δεδηλωμένων εἶβειν φασί.* The Pagans declare themselves in this manner, that there is one God, who with his various powers filleth all things, and passeth through all things, and presideth over all things; but being incorporeally and invisibly present in all things, and pervading them, he is reasonably worshipped by or in those things that are manifest and visible.—Which passage of Eusebius will be further considered afterward, when we come to give a more particular account of Paganism.

What St. Austin's sense was^a concerning the theology of the Pagans, hath been already declared; namely, "That they had not so far degenerated as to have lost the knowledge of one supreme God, from whom is all whatsoever nature; and that they derived all their gods from one." We shall now, in the last place, conclude with the judgment of Paulus Orosius, who was his contemporary: "*Philosophi dum intentio mentis studio quærent scrutanturque omnia, unum Deum authorem omnium repererunt, ad quem unum omnia referrentur; unde etiam nunc Pagani, quos jam declarata veritas de contu-*

His. l. vi. c. i.
[p. 416. edit.
Fabricii.]

^a Lib. xx. contra Faustum Manich. cap. xix. p. 246. tom. vi. oper.

inacia magis quam de ignorantia convincit, cum a nobis discutiuntur, non se plures sequi, sed sub uno Deo magno, plures ministros venerari fatentur. Restat igitur de intelligentia veri Dei, per multas intelligendi suspiciones, confusa dissensio quia de uno Deo omnium pene una est opinio." The philosophers of the Gentiles, whilst with intent study of mind they inquired and searched after things found, that there was one God, the author of all things, and to which one all things should be referred. Whence also the Pagans at this very day, whom the declared truth rather convinceth of contumacy than of ignorance, when they are urged by us, confess themselves not to follow many gods, but only under one God to worship many ministers. So that there remaineth only a confused dissension concerning the manner of understanding the true God, because about one God there is almost one and the same opinion of all.

And by this time we think it is sufficiently evident, that the Pagans, (at least after Christianity) though they asserted many gods, they calling all understanding beings superior to men by that name, (according to that of St. Jerome, "*Deum quicquid supra se esset, Gentiles putabant;*") yet they acknowledged one supreme, omnipotent and only unmade Deity.

xvi. But because it is very possible, that some may still suspect all this to have been nothing else but a refinement and interpolation of Paganism, after that Christianity had appeared upon the stage; or a kind of mangonization of it, to render it more vendible and plausible, the better able to defend itself, and bear up against the assaults of

Christianity ; whilst in the mean time the genuine doctrine of the ancient Pagans was far otherwise : although the contrary hereunto might sufficiently appear from what hath been already declared, yet however, for the fuller satisfaction of the more strongly prejudiced, we shall, by an historical deduction made from the most ancient times all along downwards, demonstrate, that the doctrine of the greatest Pagan Polytheists, as well before Christianity as after it, was always the same ; that, besides their many gods, there was one supreme, omnipotent and only unmade Deity.

And this we shall perform, not as some^a have done, by laying the chief stress upon the Sibylline oracles, and those reputed writings of Hermes Trismegist, the authority whereof hath been of late so much decried by learned men ; nor yet upon such oracles of the Pagan deities,^b as may be suspected to have been counterfeited by Christians ; but upon such monuments of Pagan antiquity, as are altogether unsuspected and indubitate. As for the Sibylline oracles, there may (as we conceive) be two extremes concerning them ; one, in swallowing down all that is now extant under that title as genuine and sincere, whereas nothing can be more manifest, than that there is much counterfeit and supposititious stuff in this Sibylline farrago, which now we have. From whence, besides other instances of the like kind, it appears too evidently to be denied, that some pretended Christians of former times have been for pious and religious frauds, and endeavoured to uphold

^a Augustinus Eugubinus, Mutius Pansa, and others.

^b These oracles are produced by Justin Martyr, in *Orat. ad Græcos* et Eusebius in *Præpar. Evang.* and others.

the truth of Christianity by figments and forgeries of their own devising. Which, as it was a thing ignoble and unworthy in itself, and argued that those very defenders of Christianity did themselves distrust their own cause; so may it well be thought, that there was a policy of the devil in it also, there being no other more effectual way than this, to render all Christianity (at least in after-ages) to be suspected. Insomuch that it might perhaps be questioned, whether the truth and divinity of Christianity appear more in having prevailed against the open force and opposition of its professed enemies, or in not being at last smothered and oppressed by these frauds and forgeries of its seeming friends and defenders. The other extreme may be, in concluding the whole business of the Sibylline oracles (as any ways relating to Christianity) to have been a mere cheat and figment; and that there never was any thing in those Sibylline books, which were under the custody of the Quindecimviri, that did in the least predict our Saviour Christ, or the times of Christianity. For notwithstanding all that the learned Blondel^a hath written, it seems to be undeniably evident from Virgil's fourth Idyllium, that the Cumean Sibyl was then supposed to have predicted a new flourishing kingdom or monarchy, together with a happy state of justice or righteousness to succeed in the latter age of the world:

Ultima Cumæi venit jam carminis ætas,
Magnus ab integro seclorum nascitur ordo.
Jam redit et virgo, redeunt Saturnia regna,
Jam nova progenies cœlo delabitur alto, &c.

^a In his Treatise of the Sibyls, printed in French at Paris, 1649, in 4to.

Moreover, it is certain, that in Cicero's time the Sibylline prophecies were interpreted by some in favour of Cæsar, as predicting a monarchy; "Sibyllæ versus observamus, quos illa Cic. Div. lib. ii. [cap. liv. p. 3238. tom. ix. oper.] furens fudisse dicitur. Quorum interpres nuper falsa quadam hominum fama

dicturus in senatu putabatur, eum, quem revera regem habebamus, appellandum quoque esse regem, si salvî esse vellemus." We take notice of the verses of the Sibyl, which she is said

to have poured out in a fury or prophetic frenzy, the interpreter whereof was lately thought to have been about to declare in the senate-house, that if we would be safe, we should acknowledge him for a king, who really was so.

—Which interpretation of the Sibylline oracles (after Cæsar's death) Cicero was so much offended with (he also looking upon a Roman monarchy as a thing no less impossible than undesirable), that upon this occasion he quarrels with those very Sibylline oracles themselves, as well as the readers and expounders of them, after this manner: "Hoc si est in libris, in quem ho-

minem, et in quod tempus est? Callide De Div. lib. ii. [ubi supra.] enim, qui illa composuit, perfecit, ut, quodcunque accidisset, prædictum videretur, hominum et temporum definitione sublata. Adhibuit etiam latebram obscuritatis, ut iidem versus alias in aliam rem posse accommodari viderentur. Non esse autem illud carmen furentis, tum ipsum poema declarat, (est enim magis artis et diligentiae quam incitationis et motus) tum vero ea quæ ἀπορρηχic dicitur, cum deinceps ex primis versuum literis aliquid connectitur. Quamobrem Sibyllam quidem sepositam et conditam habeamus, ut, id, quod

proditum est a majoribus, injussu senatus ne legantur quidem libri." If there be any such thing contained in the Sibylline books, then we demand, concerning what man is it spoken, and of what time? For whoever framed those Sibylline verses, he craftily contrived, that whatsoever should come to pass, might seem to have been predicted in them, by taking away all distinction of persons and times. He also purposely affected obscurity, that the same verses might be accommodated sometime to one thing, and sometime to another. But that they proceeded not from fury and prophetic rage, but rather from art and contrivance, doth no less appear otherwise, than from the acrostic in them. Wherefore let us shut up the Sibyl, and keep her close, that, according to the decree of our ancestors, her verses may not be read without the express command of the senate.—And lastly, he addeth, "Cum antistitibus agamus, ut quidvis potius ex illis libris quam regem proferant, quem Romæ posthac nec dii nec homines esse patientur." Let us also deal with the quindecimviri and interpreters of the Sibylline books, that they would rather produce any thing out of them, than a king; whom neither gods nor men will hereafter suffer at Rome. Where, though Cicero were mistaken as to the event of the Roman government, and there were doubtless some predictions in these Sibylline books of a new kingdom or monarchy to be set up in the world; yet that the Roman empire was not the thing intended in them, doth manifestly appear from that description in Virgil's forementioned eclogue; wherein there is accordingly another completion of them expected, though flatteringly applied to Saloni-

nus. Wherefore we conclude, that the kingdom, and happy state, or golden age, predicted in the Sibylline oracles, was no other than that of the Messiah, or our Saviour Christ, and the times of Christianity. Lastly, in that other passage of Cicero's, concerning the Sibylline oracles: "Valent ad deponendas potius quam ad suscipiendas religiones;" let them be made use of rather for the extinguishing than the begetting of religions and superstitions;—there seems to be an intimation, as if, of themselves, they rather tended to the lessening than increasing of the Pagan superstitions; and therefore may probably be thought to have predicted a change of that Pagan religion, by the worship of one sole Deity to be introduced. Neither ought it to seem a jot more strange, that our Saviour Christ should be foretold by the Pagan Sibyl, than that he was so clearly predicted by Balaam the Aramitic sorcerer. However, those things in the Sibylline verses might have been derived, some way or other, from the Scripture-prophecies; which there is indeed the more probability of, because that Sibylline prophet made use of those very same figures and allegories in describing the future happy state, that are found in the Scripture. As for example:

* ——— Næc magnos metuent armenta leones;
Occidet et serpens, &c.

Now, as Cicero seems to complain, that in his time these Sibylline oracles were too much exposed to view, so is it very probable, that notwithstanding they were to be kept under the guard of the quindecimviri, yet many of them

* Virgil. Eclog. iv. ver. 22. 24.

might be copied out, and get abroad; and thereby an occasion be offered to the ignorantly-zealous Christians, who were for officious lies and pious frauds, to add a great deal more of their own forging to them. Neither indeed is it imaginable, how any such cheat as this should either at first have been attempted, or afterward have proved successful; had there not been some foundation of truth to support and countenance it. Besides which it is observable, that Celsus, who would have had the Christians rather to have made the Sibyl than our Saviour Christ a God; taking notice of their using of those Sibylline testimonies against the Pagans, did not tax them for counterfeiting the whole business of these Sibylline oracles, but only for inserting many things of their own into

Orig. c. Cels. them; *ὑμεῖς δὲ καὶ τὴν Σίβυλλαν, ἣ χροῦνται τινες*
lib. vii. p. 368. *ὑμῶν, εἰκοτὼς ἂν μᾶλλον προσεστήσασθε, ὡς τοῦ*

θεοῦ παῖδα, νῦν δὲ παρεγγράφειν μὲν εἰς τὰ ἐκείνης, πολλὰ καὶ
βλάσφημα εἰκὴ δύνασθε You Christians might much

rather have acknowledged even the Sibyl for the offspring of God; but now you can boldly insert into her verses many, and those maledicent things of your own.—Where Origen, that he might vindicate, as well as he could, the honour of Christians, pleads in their defence, that Celsus, for all that, could not shew what they had foisted into those Sibylline verses; because, if he had been able to have produced more ancient and incorrupt copies, in which such things were not found, he would certainly have done it. Notwithstanding which, it is likely, that there were other ancient copies then to be found, and that Celsus might have met with them too, and that from thence he took occasion to write as he did. However, this

would not justify the present Sibylline books, in which there are forgeries plainly discoverable without copies. Nevertheless it seems, that all the ancient Christians did not agree in making use of these Sibylline testimonies, thus much being intimated by Celsus himself, in the forecited words, *ἡ χροῖται τινες ἡμῶν*, which some of you make use of;—as they did not all acknowledge the Sibyl to have been a prophetess neither: since, upon Celsus' mentioning a sect of Christians called Sibyllists, Origen tells us, that these were such as using the Sibylline testimonies were called so in way of disgrace by other Christians, who would not allow the Sibyl to have been a prophetess; they perhaps conceiving it derogatory to the Scriptures. But though there may be some of the ancient Sibylline verses still left in that farrago which we now have, yet it being impossible for us to prove which are such, we shall not insist upon any testimonies at all from thence, to evince, that the ancient Pagans acknowledged one supreme Deity. Notwithstanding which, we shall not omit one Sibylline passage, which we find recorded in Pausanias^b (from whence, by the way, it appears also, that the Sibylline verses were not kept up so close, but that some of them got abroad), he telling us, that the defeat of the Athenians at Ægos Potamos was predicted by the Sibyl in these words (amongst others):

*Καὶ τίς Ἄθῃαισι βασιλῆα κίθη θῆναι
Ζεὺς ἱφίστασθαι, ὡς ἀπὸς ἐπὶ πύργῳ, &c.*

*Ac tum Cecropidis inctum gemitusque ciebit
Jupiter altitonans, rerum cui summa potestas, &c.*

^a Orig. contra Celsum, lib. v. p. 272.

^b In Phocicis, lib. x. cap. ix. p. 820. edit. Kuhnii.

Whereto might be added also that of another ancient Peliadean prophetess, in the same writer,* wherein the Divine eternity and immutability is plainly declared :

Ζεὺς ἔσθι, Ζεὺς ἔσθι, Ζεὺς ἔσθι, ὃ μὲν αἰὲς Ζεῦ.

Jupiter est, fuit, atque erit: O bone Jupiter aīme.

Besides these Sibylline prophecies, there are also other oracles of the Pagan deities themselves, in which there was a clear acknowledgment of one supreme and greatest God. But as for such of them, as are said to have been delivered since the times of Christianity, when the Pagan oracles began to fail, and such as are now extant only in Christian writings, however divers of them are cited out of Porphyrius's book of oracles; because they may be suspected, we shall not here mention any of them. Nevertheless, we shall take notice of one oracle of the Clarian Apollo, that is recorded by Macrobius,* in which one supreme Deity is not only asserted, but is also called by that Hebrew name (or Tetragrammaton) Jao :

Θεός τοι τὸν πάντων ἑστῶτα θεὸν Ἰαώην ἰδόν.

You are to call the highest and supreme of all the gods, Jao—though it be very true, that that Clarian devil there cunningly endeavoured to divert this to the sun, as if that were the only supreme Deity and true Jao. To which might be added another ancient oracle (that now occurs) of the Dodonean Jupiter,^b together with the interpretation of Themistocles, to whom it was delivered; wherein he was commanded πρὸς τὸν ὀμώθυμον τοῦ

* Ibid. cap. xii. p. 828.

^b Saturnal. lib. i. cap. xviii. p. 290.

^c Apud Plutarch. in Vita Themistocli, tom. i. oper. p. 225.

θεῶν βασιλεῖν, to repair to him, who was called by the same name with God; which Themistocles apprehended to be the king of Persia, μεγάλους γὰρ ἀμφοτέρους εἶναι τε καὶ λέγεσθαι βασιλέας, because both he and God were alike called (though in different respects and degrees) the great king or monarch.

But as for those writings, commonly imputed to Hermes Trismegist, that have been generally condemned by the learned of this latter age, as wholly counterfeit and supposititious, and yet on the contrary are asserted by Athanasius Kircherus* for sincere and genuine; we shall have occasion to declare our sense concerning them more opportunely afterward.

The most ancient theologers, and most eminent assertors of Polytheism amongst the Pagans, were Zoroaster in the eastern parts, and Orpheus amongst the Greeks. The former of which was of so great antiquity, that writers cannot well agree about his age. But that he was a Polytheist is acknowledged by all, some affirming it to be signified in his very name, as given him after his death; it being interpreted by them a worshipper of the stars.^b Neither is it to be doubted, but that *ster* or *ester*, in the Persian language, did signify a star, as it hath been observed also by learned men concerning sundry other words, now familiar in these European languages, that they derived their original from the Persian. Notwithstanding which, it may be suspected, that this was here but a Greek termination; the word being not only in

* In *Cedipo Aegyptiaco et Obelisco Pamphilio*, p. 35.

^b Thus it was explained by Dinon and Hermodorus, as we are informed by Laertius in his *proem. segm. 8. p. 6.* of which opinion is likewise Scaliger, with others of the moderns.

the oriental languages written *zertoost* and *zardust*, but also in Agathias, *zarades*. However, Zoroaster's Polytheism is intimated by Plato;* where his magic is defined to have been nothing else but *θεῶν θεράτεια*, the worship of the gods.—Whence by the way we learn also, that the word *μαγία*, or magic, was first taken in a good sense, De Abet. lib. iv. p. 165. which is confirmed by Porphyrius, *τα- πάγε μὲν τοῖς Πέρσαις, οἱ περὶ τὸ θεῶν σοφοὶ καὶ τοῦτοῦ θεράποντες, Μάγοι μὲν προσαγορεύοντες*. Amongst the Persians, those who were skilful in the knowledge of the Deity, and religious worshippers of the same were called magi.—And as magic is commonly conceived to be founded in a certain vital sympathy that is in the universe, so did these ancient Persian magi and Chaldeans (as Psellus tells us^b) suppose *συμπάθη εἶναι τὰ ἄνω τοῖς κάτω*, that there was a sympathy betwixt the superior and inferior beings;—but it seems the only way at first by them approved, of attracting the influence and assistance of those superior invisible powers, was by piety, devotion, and religious rites. Nevertheless, their devotion was not carried out only to one omnipotent God, but also to many gods; neither is it to be questioned but that this Divine magic of Zoroaster shortly after degenerated in many of his followers into the theurgical magic, and at length into *γοητεία*, downright sorcery and witchcraft; the only thing which is now vulgarly called magic. But how many gods soever this Zoroaster worshipped, that he ac-

* In Alcibiade i. oper. p. 32.

^b In brevi dogmat. Chaldaicorum declaratione, published at the end of Seryatius Gallæus's edition of the Sibylline Oracles, Amst, 1689, in 4to.

known notwithstanding one supreme Deity, appeareth from the testimony of Eubulus, cited by Porphyrius in his *De Antro Nym-*

P. 254.

pharum, *πρῶτα μὲν, ὡς ἔφη Εὐβουλος, Ζω-
ροάστρου αὐτοφυῆς σπηλαίου ἐν τοῖς πλησίον ὄρεσι τῆς
Περσίδος, ἀνθηρὸν καὶ πηγὰς ἔχον, ἀνιερῶσαντος εἰς
τιμὴν τοῦ πάντων ποιητοῦ καὶ πατρὸς Μίθρου, εἰκόνα
φέροντος αὐτῷ τοῦ σπηλαίου τοῦ κόσμου, ὃν ὁ Μίθρας
ἐδημιούργησε* Zoroaster, first of all, as Eubulus
testifieth, in the mountains adjoining to Persis,
consecrated a native orbicular cave, adorned
with flowers, and watered with fountains, to the
honour of Mithras, the maker and father of all
things: this cave being an image or symbol to him
of the whole world, which was made by Mith-
ras.—Which testimony of Eubulus is the more to
be valued, because, as Porphyrius elsewhere* in-
formeth us, he wrote the history of Mithras at
large in many books; from whence it may be pre-
sumed, that he had thoroughly furnished himself
with the knowledge of what belonged to the Per-
sian religion. Wherefore, from the authority of
Eubulus, we may well conclude, also, that not-
withstanding the sun was generally worshipped
by the Persians as a god, yet Zoroaster, and the
ancient magi, who were best initiated in the Mith-
raic mysteries, asserted* another Deity,
superior to the sun, for the true Mithras,
such as was πάντων ποιητὴς καὶ πατὴρ, the
maker and father of all things, or of the
whole world—whereof the sun is a part.
However, these also looked upon the
sun as the most lively image of this Deity, in which
it was worshipped by them; as they likewise wor-

* That Mith-
ras, which
was called ὁ
κρυπτός θεός,
the hidden
God—was
not the visi-
ble sun.

* De Abstin. lib. iv. sect. xvi. p. 165.

shipped the same Deity symbolically in fire, as Maximus Tyrius informeth us;^a agreeable to which is that in the magic oracles:^b

————— πάντα σὺν ἑνὶ πυρὶ ἐκγεγῆατα.

All things are the offspring of one fire; that is, of one supreme Deity.—And Julian the emperor was such a devout sun-worshipper as this, who acknowledged, besides the sun, another incorporeal Deity, transcendent to it. Nevertheless, we deny not, but that others amongst the Persians, who were not able to conceive of any thing incorporeal, might, as well as Heraclitus, Hippocrates, and the Stoics amongst the Greeks, look upon the fiery substance of the whole world (and especially the sun) as animated and intellectual, to be the supreme Deity, and the only Mithras, according to that inscription,^c Deo Soli Invicto Mithræ.—However, Mithras, whether supposed to be corporeal or incorporeal, was unquestionably taken by the Persians for the supreme Deity, according to that of Hesychius, Μίθρας, ὁ πρῶτος ἐν Πέρσαις θεός, Mithras, the first god among the Persians—who was therefore called in the inscription^d Omnipotent, Omnipotenti Deo Mithræ. Which first, supreme and omnipotent God was acknowledged by Artabanus, the Persian, in his conference with Themistocles, in these words:

Plut. Themist. ἡμῖν δὲ πολλῶν νόμων καὶ καλῶν ὄντων, κάλλιστος οὗτός ἐστι τὸ τιμᾶν βασιλεία, καὶ προσκυνεῖν εἰκόνα θεοῦ τοῦ τὰ πάντα σώζοντος. Amongst

^a Vide Dissertat. xxxviii. p. 371.

^b Commonly ascribed to Zoroaster, sect. ii. vers. 29. in Stanley's History of Philosophy.

^c Vide Aiton. Van Dale Dissert. ix. ad Antiquit. et Marmora, p. 16.

^d Apud Gruter. Thesaur. Inscript. p. 34. n. 5.

those many excellent laws of ours, the most excellent is this, that the king is to be honoured and worshipped religiously, as the image of that God, which conserveth all things.—Scaliger^a with some others (though we know not upon what certain grounds) affirm, that *mither*, in the Persian language, signified *great*, and *mithra*, *greater* or *greatest*; according to which, Mithras would be all one with *Deus major* or *maximus*^b, the greatest God. Wherefore we conclude, that either Herodotus was mistaken, in making the Persian Mithras the same with Mylitta or Venus, (and perhaps such a mistake might be occasioned from hence, because the word *mader* or *methet* in the Persian language signified *mother*, as *mylitta* in the Syrian did); or else, rather, that this Venus of his is to be understood of the *Ἀφροδίτη οὐράνια*, the heavenly Venus or Love; and thus indeed is she there called in Herodotus, *Urania*; by which, though some would understand nothing else but the moon, yet we conceive the supreme Deity, true heavenly Love (the mother and nurse of all things) to have been primarily signified therein.

But Zoroaster and the ancient magi are said to have called the supreme God also by another name, viz. Oromasdes or Ormisdas; however Oromasdes, according to Plato,^c seems to have been the father of Zoroaster. Thus, besides Plutarch and others, Porphyrius, in the life of Pythagoras, *παρήναι μάλιστα δ' ἀληθεύειν, τοῦτο γὰρ μόνον δύνασθαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ποιεῖν θεῶ* P. 191.
[p. 41. edit.
Kuster.]

^a De Emendat. Temporum, lib. vi. cap. de Hebdom. Daniel, p. 568.

^b Hist. lib. i. cap. cxxxi. p. 55.

^c In Alcibiade, tom. i. oper. p. 32.

παραπλησίους, ἐπὶ καὶ παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὡς παρὰ τῶν Μάγων ἐπυνθάνετο, ὃν Ὀρομάζην καλοῦσιν ἐκεῖνοι, εἰκέναι τὸ μὲν σῶμα φωτὶ τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν ἀληθείᾳ. Which we would understand thus: Pythagoras exhorted men chiefly to the love of truth, as being that alone which could make them resemble God, he having learned from the magi, that God, whom they call Oromasdes, was as to corporeals most like to light, and as to incorporeals to truth.—Though perhaps some would interpret these words otherwise, so as to signify Oromasdes to have been really compounded of soul and body, and therefore nothing else but the animated sun, as Mithras is commonly supposed also to have been. But the contrary hereunto is plainly implied in those Zoroastrian traditions or fables concerning Oromasdes, recorded in Plutarch,^a ὅτι ἀπέστηκε τοῦ ἡλίου τοσοῦτον, ὅσον ὁ ἥλιος τῆς γῆς ἀφέστηκε, that Oromasdes was as far removed from the sun, as the sun was from the earth.—Wherefore Oromasdes was, according to the Persians, a deity superior to the sun; God properly as the fountain of light and original of good, and the same with Plato's *ἀγαθόν*, or first good.—From whom the Persians, as Scaliger informs us, called the first day of every month Ormasda, probably because he was the beginning of all things. And thus Zoroaster and the ancient magi acknowledged one and the same supreme Deity, under the different names of Mithras and Oromasdes.

But it is here observable, that the Persian Mithras was commonly called *Τριπλάσιος*, threefold or treble.—Thus Dionysius,^b the Pseudo-Areopagite,

^a De Iside et Osir. p. 370. tom. ii. oper.

^b Epistol. vii. ad Polycarpum, p. 91. tom. ii. oper.

καὶ εἰσὶν Μάγοι τὰ μνημόσυνα τοῦ τριπλάσιου Μίθρου τελοῦσιν. The Persian magi to this very day celebrate a festival solemnity in honour of the triplasian (that is, the threefold or triplicated) Mithras. And something very like to this is recorded in Plutarch* concerning Oromasdes also, ὁ μὲν Ὀρομάζης τρίς ἑαυτὸν αὐξήσας, Oromasdes thrice augmented or triplicated himself;—from whence it further appears, that Mithras and Oromasdes were really one and the same Numen. Now the scholiasts upon Dionysius pretend to give a reason of this denomination of the Persian Mithras, Triplasion, or threefold, from the miracle done in Hezekiah's time, when the day was increased, and almost triplicated; as if the magi then observing the same had thereupon given the name of Τριπλάσιος, or threefold, to their god Mithras, that is, the sun, and appointed an anniversary solemnity for a memorial thereof. But learned men have already shewn the foolery of this conceit; and therefore it cannot well be otherwise concluded, but that here is a manifest indication of a higher mystery, viz. a trinity in the Persian theology; which Gerardus I. Vossius^b would willingly understand, according to the Christian hypothesis, of a Divine triunity, or three hypostases in one and the same Deity, whose distinctive characters are goodness, wisdom, and power. But the magical or Zoroastrian oracles seem to represent this Persian trinity more agreeably to that Pythagoric or Platonic hypothesis, of three distinct substances subordinate one to another,

* De Iside et Osiride, p. 370. tom. ii. oper.

^b De Orig. et Progressu Idololat. lib. ii. cap. ix. p. 131.

the two first whereof are thus expressed in the following verses:*

Πάντα γὰρ ἔκτισεν πατήρ, καὶ τῷ παραδίδοται
 Δευτέρῳ, ὃν πρῶτον αὐτὸς ἵδμεν ἀνθρώπων.

To this sense: The Father, or first Deity, perfected all things, and delivered them to the second Mind, who is that, whom the nations of men commonly take for the first.—Which oracle Pselus^b thus glosseth upon; τὴν πᾶσαν κτίσιν δημιουργήσας ὁ τῆς τριάδος πρῶτος πατήρ, παρέδωκε ταύτην τῷ νῷ ὅτινα νοῦν τὸ ἕμπαν γένος τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἀγνοοῦντες τὴν πατρικὴν ὑπεροχὴν πατὴρ, Θεὸν πρῶτον καλοῦσι. The first Father of the Trinity having produced this whole creation, delivered to it Mind or Intellect; which Mind, the whole generation of mankind, being ignorant of the paternal transcendency, commonly call the first God.—After which, Pselus takes notice of the difference here betwixt this magical or Chaldaic theology, and that of Christians: Πλὴν τὸ παρ' ἡμῶν δόγμα ἐναντίως ἔχει, ὡς αὐτὸς ὁ πρῶτος νοῦς, ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ μεγάλου πατρὸς, τὴν κτίσιν πᾶσαν ἐδημιούργησεν, &c. But our Christian doctrine is contrary hereunto, namely thus: that the first Mind or Intellect, being the Son of the great Father, made the whole creation. For the Father, in the Mosaic writings, speaks to his Son the idea of the creation; but the Son is the immediate opifex thereof.—His meaning is, that according to this Persian or Chaldaic theology, the first hypostasis of the Divine Triad was the δημιουργός, or immediate architect of the world—whereas,

* In Oraculis Zoroastri adscriptis, sect. ii. ver. 27, 28. apud Stanley, ubi supra.

^b He and Plotino wrote commentaries on the oracles of Zoroaster.

according to the Christian as well as Platonic doctrine, he is the second. For which cause, Pletho framed another interpretation of that magic oracle, to render it more conformable both to the Christian and Platonic doctrine; ὁ γὰρ πατήρ πάντα ἐξέτελεισε, τὰ νοητὰ δηλαδή εἶδη (ταῦτα γὰρ ἴσθι τὰ ἐκτετελεσμένα τε καὶ τέλεια) καὶ τῷ μετ' ἐαυτὸν δευτέρῳ θεῷ παρέδωκεν, ἄρχων δηλαδή καὶ ἡγισθαι αὐτῶν, &c. The Father perfected all things, that is, the intelligible ideas (for these are those things which are complete and perfect), and delivered them to the second God, to rule over them. Wherefore whatsoever is produced by this God, according to its own exemplar and the intelligible essence, must needs owe its original also to the highest Father. Which second God, the generations of men commonly take for the first, they looking up no higher than to the immediate architect of the world.—According to which interpretation of Pletho's (the more probable of the two) the second hypostasis in the magic (or Persian) trinity, as well as in the Platonic and Christian, is the immediate opifex or architect of the world; and this seems to be properly that which was called Mithras in Eubulus.

But, besides these two hypostases, there is also a third mentioned in a certain other magic or Chaldaic oracle, cited by Proclus, under the name of Psyche, or the mundane soul;

Μετὰ δὲ Πατρὸς Διατάξ,
Ψυχὴ ἐνὶ κόσμῳ.

After (or next below) the paternal Mind, I Psyche dwell.—Now the paternal Mind, as Psellus informs us, is the second hypostasis before mentioned: ὁ πατρικὸς νοῦς, ὁ δεύτερος δηλαδή Θεός, καὶ τῆς

ψυχῆς προσεχῆς δημιουργός. The paternal Mind is the second God, and the immediate demiurgus or opifex of the soul. Wherefore though both those names, Oromasdes and Mithras, were frequently used by the magi for the τὸ θεῖον, or whole Deity in general, yet this being triplasian, or threefold, according to their theology, as containing three hypostases in it; the first of those three seems to have been that which was most properly called Oromasdes, and the second Mithras. And this is not only confirmed by Pletho, but also with this further superaddition to it, that the third hypostasis of that Persian trinity was that which they called Arimanius; he gathering as much even from Plutarch* himself: *φασὶ περὶ Ζωροάστρου, ὡς τριχῇ τὰ ὄντα διέλοι· καὶ τῇ μὲν πρώτῃ αὐτῶν μορφῇ, Ὀρομάζην ἐφιστήν· τοῦτον δ' εἶναι, τὸν ἐπὶ τῶν λογίων πατέρα καλούμενον· τῇδε ἑσχάτῃ Ἀρειμάνην· Μίθραν δὲ τῇ μέσῃ, καὶ τοῦτον δ' εἶναι τὸν Δεύτερον Νοῦν καλούμενον ἐπὶ τῶν λογίων.* They say, that Zoroaster made a threefold distribution of things, and that he assigned the first and highest rank of them to Oromasdes, who in the oracles is called the Father; the lowest to Arimanes; and the middle to Mithras, who in the same oracles is likewise called the second Mind.—Whereupon he observes, how great an agreement there was betwixt the Zoroastrian and the Platonic trinity, they differing in a manner only in words. And the middle of these, namely, the eternal Intellect, that contains the ideas of all things, being, according to the Platonic hypothesis, the immediate δημιουργός and architect of the world, this probably was that Mithras, as we have already intimated, who is called in

* De Iside et Osir. p. 370.

Eubulus, the demiurgus of the world, and the maker and father of all things. Now, if that third hypostasis of the magic or Chaldaic oracles be the same with that which the Persians call Arimanius, then must it be upon such an account as this, because this lower world (wherein are souls vitally united to bodies, and lapsable) is the region, where all manner of evils, wickedness, pains, corruption and mortality reign. And herewith Hesychius seemeth to agree: Ἀρειμάνης (saith he) ὁ Ἄϊδος παρὰ Πέρσαις, Arimanius among the Persians is Hades—that is, either Orcus or Pluto; wherein he did but follow Theopompus, who in Plutarch calls Arimanius likewise Hades or Pluto: which it seems was as well the third in the Persian Trinity (or triplasian Deity) as it was in the Homerican. And this was that Arimanius, whom the Persian king in Plutarch, upon Themistocles' flight, addressed his devotion to;

κατενέμενος αἰὲν τοῖς πολεμίοις τοιαύτας φρένας
 δίδοναι τὸν Ἀρειμάνιον, ὅπως λαβύνοσι τοὺς ἀρίσ-
 τούς τῶν ἑαυτῶν, he prayed, that Arimanius

12 Vit.
 Them.
 [p. 326.]

would always give such a mind to his enemies, as thus to banish and drive away their best men from them.—And indeed from that which Plutarch affirms, διὸ καὶ Μίθρην Πέρσαι τὸν Μεσίτην ὀνομάζουσι, that the Persians from their god Mithras, called any mediator, or middle betwixt two, Mithras; it may be more reasonably concluded, that Mithras, according to the Persian theology, was properly the middle hypostasis of that triplasian or triplicated Deity of theirs, than that he should be a middle self-existent god or mediator betwixt two adversary gods unmade, one good, and the other evil, as Plutarch would suppose.

Notwithstanding which, if that, which the same Plutarch and others do so confidently affirm, should be true, that Zoroaster and the ancient magi made good and evil, light and darkness, the two substantial principles of the universe; that he asserted an evil demon co-eternal with God, and independent on him, in the very same manner that Plutarch himself and the Manicheans afterward did: yet however it is plain, that in this way also Zoroaster and the magi acknowledged one only fountain and original of all good, and nothing to be independent upon that one good principle or God, but only that, which is so contrary to his nature and perfection, as that it could not proceed from him, namely, evil. But we have already discovered a suspicion, that the meaning of those ancient magi might possibly be otherwise; they philosophizing only concerning a certain mixture of evil and darkness, together with good and light, that was in the composition of this lower world, and personating the same; as also perhaps taking notice especially therein of evil demons (who are acknowledged likewise in the magic oracles, and called *θῆρες χθονός*, beasts of the earth—and *χθόνιοι κύνες*, terrestrial dogs;) the head of which might be sometimes called also emphatically *ὁ πονηρὸς δαίμων Περσῶν*, the evil demon of the Persians—as being the very same with the devil: all which was under the immediate presidency or government of that God, called by them Arimanius, Hades, or Pluto, the third hypostasis in the triplasian Deity of the Persians. Which suspicion may be yet further confirmed from hence, because the Persian theologers, as appears by the inscriptions, expressly

acknowledged the Divine omnipotence, which they could not possibly have done, had they admitted of a Manichean substantial evil principle, co-eternal with God, and independent on him. Besides which, it is observable, that whereas the Gnostics in Plotinus's time asserted this world to have been made, not so much from a principle essentially evil and eternal, as from a lapsed soul, to weigh down the authority of Plato, that was against them, did put Zoroaster in the other scale, producing a book entitled ἀποκαλύψεις Ζωροάστρου, or the Revelations of Zoroaster—Porphyrus tells us,* that himself wrote purposely to disprove those Zoroastrian revelations, as new and counterfeit, and forged by those Gnostics themselves; therein implying also the doctrine of the ancient Zoroaster no way to have countenanced or favoured that Gnostic heresy. Moreover, the tenets of these ancient magi, concerning that duplicity of principles, are by writers represented with great variety and uncertainty. That account, which Theodorus in Photius^b (treating of the Persian magic) gives thereof, as also that other of Eudemus in Damascius,^c are both of them so nonsensical, that we shall not here trouble the reader with them: however, neither of them suppose the Persian Arimanius, or Satanas, to be an unmade self-existing demon. But the Arabians, writing of this Altauwiah, or Persian duplicity of good and evil principles, affirm, that according to the most approved magi, light was Kadiman, the most ancient and first God, and that darkness

* In Vita Plotini, cap. xvi. p. 118. edit. Fabricii.

^b Biblioth. Cod. lxxxi. p. 199.

^c ἐπεὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἀρχὴν, a work never yet printed.

was but a created God; they expressly denying the principle of evil and darkness to be coeve with God, or the principle of good and light. And Abulfeda represents the Zoroastrian doctrine (as the doctrine of the magi reformed) after

Pocock Spec. Hist. Ar. p. 146, 147, 148. this manner: "That God was older than darkness and light, and the creator of them, so that he was a solitary being,

without companion or corival; and that good and evil, virtue and vice, did arise from a certain commixture of light and darkness together, without which this lower world could never have been produced; which mixture was still to continue in it, till at length light should overcome darkness: and then light and darkness shall each of them have their separate and distinct worlds, apart from one another."

If it were now needful, we might still make it further evident, that Zoroaster, notwithstanding the multiplicity of gods worshipped by him, was an assertor of one supreme, from his own description of God, extant in Eusebius. Θεός ἐστιν ὁ πρῶ-

Præp. Ev. τος ἄφθαρτος, αἰδίδιος, ἀγέννητος, ἀμερής, ἀνομοιώ-
l. i. τος, ἡνίοχος παντὸς καλοῦ, ἀδωροδέκτης, ἀγα-
[esp. x. p. 42.] θῶν ἀγαθώτατος, φρονίμων φρονιμώτατος, ἐστὶ δὲ

καὶ πατὴρ εὐνομίας καὶ δικαιοσύνης, αὐτοδίδακτος, τελειός, καὶ ἱεροῦ φυσικοῦ μόνος ὑπερῆς. God is the first incorruptible, eternal, unmade, indivisible, most unlike to every thing, the head or leader of all good, unbribable, the best of the good, the wisest of the wise; he is also the father of law and justice; self-taught, perfect, and the only inventor of the natural holy.—Which Eusebius tells us, that this Zoroastrian description of God was contained *verbatim* in a book entitled, A holy

Collection of the Persian Monuments; as, also that Ostanès (himself a famous magician and admirer of Zoroaster) had recorded the very same of him in his Octateuchon.

Now we having, in this discourse concerning Zoroaster and the magi, cited the oracles, called by some magical, and imputed to Zoroaster, but by others Chaldaical; we conceive it not improper to give some account of them here. And indeed if there could be any assurance of the antiquity and sincerity of those reputed oracles, there would then need no other testimony to prove, that either Zoroaster and the Persian magi, or else at least the Chaldeans, asserted not only a Divine monarchy, or one supreme Deity the original of all things, but also a trinity consistently with the same.

And it is certain, that those oracles are not such novel things as some would suspect, they being cited by Synesius,* as then venerable, and of great authority, under the name of *ἱερὰ λόγια*, holy oracles;—and there being, of this number, some produced by him, that are not to be found in the copies of Psellus and Pletho; from whence it may be concluded, that we have only some fragments of these oracles now left. And that they were not forged by Christians, as some of the Sibylline oracles undoubtedly were, seems probable from hence, because so many Pagan philosophers make use of their testimonies, laying no small stress upon them; as for example Damascius, out of whom Patritius hath made a considerable collection of such of these oracles as are wanting in Psellus and Pletho's copies. And

* De Insomniis, passim.

we learn from Photius,* that whereas Hierocles' book of Fate and Providence was divided into seven parts, the drift of the fourth of them was this, τὰ λεγόμενα λόγια, εἰς συμφωνίαν συνάγειν, οἷς Πλάτων ἰδογμάτισε, to reconcile the reputed oracles with Plato's doctrines.—Where it is not to be doubted, but that those reputed oracles of Hierocles were the same with these magic or Chaldaic oracles; because these are frequently cited by philosophers under that name of λόγια, or oracles. Proclus upon

the Timæus, ὑπό τε Πλάτωνος, καὶ Ὀρφείως, P. 97. καὶ Λογίων, ποιητῆς καὶ πατρὸς ὑμνεῖται τοῦ παντός, πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε· γεννῶν μὲν τὰ πλήθη τῶν θεῶν, ψυχὰς δὲ πέμπων εἰς γενέσεις ἀνδρῶν. The maker of the universe is celebrated both by Plato and Orpheus and the oracles, as the father of gods and men, who both produceth multitudes of gods and sends down souls for the generations of men.—And as there are other fragments of these cited by Proclus elsewhere under the name of λόγια or oracles, so doth he sometimes give them that higher title of θεοπαράδοτος θεολογία, and μυσταγωγία, the theology that was of Divine tradition or revelation.—Which magnificent encomium was bestowed in like manner upon Pythagoras's philosophy by Jamblichus,^b that being thought to have been derived in great part from the Chaldeans and the magi; ἐκ θεῶν αὐτῆς παραδοθείσης τὸ κατ' ἀρχάς. This philosophy of Pythagoras having been first divinely delivered, or revealed by the gods, ought not to be handled by us without a religious invocation of them.—And that Porphyrius was not unacquainted with these oracles neither, may be

* Biblioth. Cod. cexiv. p. 553.

^b In Vita Pythag. cap. i. p. 1, 2. ed. Kusteri.

concluded from that book of his, entitled *περὶ τῆς ἐκ λόγων φιλοσοφίας*, concerning the philosophy from oracles;—which consisting of more parts, one of them was called, *τὰ τῶν Χαλδαίων λόγια*, the oracles of the Chaldeans:—which, that they were the very same with those we now speak of, shall be further proved afterward. Now, though Psellus affirms, that the Chaldean dogmata contained in those oracles were some of them admitted both by Aristotle and Plato; yet does he not pretend these very Greek verses themselves to have been so ancient. But it seems probable from Suidas, that Julian, a Chaldean and Theurgist, the son of Julian a philosopher (who wrote concerning Demons and Telesiurgics), was the first, that turned those Chaldee or magic oracles into Greek verse; *Ἰουλιανὸς, ἐπὶ Μάρκου Ἀντονίνου τοῦ βασιλέως, ἔγραψε θεουργικὰ, τελειστικά, λόγια δι' ἑπῶν*. Julian, in the time of Marcus Antoninus the emperor, wrote the Theurgic and telestic oracles in verse.—For that there is something of the Theurgical magic mixed together with mystical theology in these oracles, is a thing so manifest from that operation about the Hecateine circle, and other passages in them, that it cannot be denied; which renders it still more unlikely that they should have been forged by Christians. Nevertheless, they carry along with them (as hath been already observed) a clear acknowledgment of a Divine Monarch, or one supreme Deity, the original of all things; which is called in them the Father, and the paternal Principle, and that Intelligible, *ὃ δὲ χρὴ σε νοεῖν νόον ἄνθε*, that cannot be apprehended otherwise than by the flower of the mind;—as also that

* Orasulor. sect. iii. vers. 58.

“one fire, from whence all things spring: Psellus thus glossing upon that oracle, “all things were the offspring of one fire,” πάντα τὰ ὄντα τᾷτε νοητὰ, καὶ αἰσθητὰ, ἀπὸ μόνου Θεοῦ τὴν ὑπόστασιν λαβόν, καὶ πρὸς μόνον Θεὸν ἐπιστρέφονται, &c. ἀπταιστον οὖν τὸ λόγιον, καὶ πληρεῖς τοῦ ἡμετέρου δόγματος. All things, whether intelligible or sensible, receive their essence from God alone, and return back again only to him; so that this oracle is irreprehensible, and full of our doctrine.—And it is very observable, that these very same oracles expressly determined also that matter was not ἀγέννητος, unmade or self-existent—but derived in like manner from the Deity. Which we learn from Proclus upon Plato’s *Timæus*, where, when he had positively asserted, that there is ἐν πάντων αἴτιον, one thing the cause of all things;—and τὰγαθὸν πάντων αἴτιον ὄν, εἶναι καὶ ὕλης αἴτιον, that the supreme good, being the cause of all things, is also the cause of matter—he confirms this assertion of his from the authority of the oracles, ἀπὸ ταύτης καὶ τῆς τάξεως

P. 118. καὶ τὰ λόγια παράγει τὴν πολυποικίλον ὕλην, ἐνδὲν ἄρδην θρώσκει γενεαίς πολυποικίλου ὕλης. From this order also do the oracles deduce the generation of the matter, in these words; from thence (that is, from one supreme Deity) altogether proceeds the genesis of the multifarious matter.—Which unquestionably was one of those very magic or Chaldee oracles;^b and it may be further proved from hence, because it was by Porphyrius set down amongst them, as appears from *Aeneas Gazeus* in his *Theophrastus*;^c οὐ γὰρ ἀγέννητος οὐδὲ ἀναρχος ἡ ὕλη, τοῦτό σε καὶ Χαλδαῖοι διδάσκουσι, καὶ ὁ Πορφύριος ἐπιγράφει δὲ καθόλου τὸ βιβλίον ὃ εἰς μέσον

^a Sect. ii. ver. 69.

^b Sect. i. ver. 20.

^c P. 56.

προάγει, τῶν Χαλδαίων τὰ λόγια, ἐν οἷς γεγονέναι τὴν ὅλην ἰσχυρίζεται. Neither was matter void of generation or beginning, which the Chaldeans and Porphyrius teach thee; he making this the title of a whole book published by him, The Oracles of the Chaldeans; in which it is confirmed that matter was made.—

Moreover, that there was also in these magic or Chaldee oracles a clear signification of a Divine triad, hath been already declared. But we shall here produce Proclus's* testimony for it too; οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἡ Θεοπαράδοτος Θεολογία, φησὶ συμπληρῶσθαι τὸν κόσμον, ἐκ τῶνδε τῶν Τριῶν· λέγει γοῦν ἡ ψυχὴ περὶ τοῦ Διὸς ἐπέκεινα τοῦ δημιουργήσαντος τὸ πᾶν. Thus the divinely delivered (or inspired) theology affirmeth the whole world to have been completed from these three; Psyche, or the mundane soul, therein speaking concerning that Zeus or Jupiter, who was above the maker of the world, in this manner, &c.—For we have already declared, that Proclus's *θεοπαράδοτος θεολογία*, his theology of Divine tradition or revelation—is one and the same thing with the *λόγια*, or oracles. To which testimony of Proclus we might also superadd that oracle cited out of Damascius by Patritius;

παντὶ γὰρ ἐν κόσμῳ λάμπει Τριάς, ὡς Μόνας ἄρχη.

In the whole world shineth forth a triad or trinity, the head whereof is a monad or perfect unity—than which nothing can be plainer.

XVII. And now we pass out of Asia into Europe, from Zoroaster to Orpheus. It is the opinion of some eminent philologers of latter times, that there never

G. I. Vossius
D. Ar. Po.
o. xiii.

* Comment. in Timæum, Plat. p. 116.

was any such man as Orpheus, but only in Fairy-land; and that the whole history of Orpheus was nothing but a mere romantic allegory, utterly devoid of all truth and reality. But there is nothing alleged for this opinion from antiquity, save only this one passage of Cicero's concerning

De Nat. D. Aristotle: "Orpheum poetam docet Aristoteles nunquam fuisse;" Aristotle teach-

eth, that there never was any such man as Orpheus the poet:—in which notwithstanding Aristotle seems to have meant no more than this, that there was no such poet as Orpheus senior to Homer, or that the verses vulgarly called Orphical were not written by Orpheus. However, if it should be granted, that Aristotle had denied the existence of such a man, there seems to be no reason at all, why his single testimony should here preponderate against that universal consent of all antiquity, which is for one Orpheus, the son of Oeager, by birth a Thracian, the father or chief founder of the mythical and allegorical theology amongst the Greeks, and of all their most arcane religious rites and mysteries; who is commonly supposed to have lived before the Trojan war (that is, in the time of the Israelitish judges), or at least to have been senior both to Hesiod and Homer; and also to have died a violent death, most affirming him to have been torn in pieces by

De Rep. l. x. women. For which cause, in that vision

lib. iv. p. 162. of Herus Pamphylus in Plato, Orpheus's soul being come down again into another body, is said to have chosen rather that of a swan (a reputed musical animal) than to be born again of a woman, by reason of that great hatred, which he had conceived of all womankind, for

his suffering such a violent death from them. And the historic truth of Orpheus was not only acknowledged by Plato, but also by Isocrates, senior to Aristotle likewise (in his oration in the praise of Busiris^a); and confirmed by that sober historiographer Diodorus Siculus,^b he giving this account of Orpheus, That he was a man, who diligently applied himself to literature, and having learned τὰ μυθολογούμενα, or the mythical part of theology, travelled into Egypt, where he attained to further knowledge, and became the greatest of all the Greeks in the mysterious rites of religion, theological skill, and poetry. To which Pausanias addeth, that he gained great authority, οὐκ ἀπιστῶμενός εὐρεῖσθαι ἔργων ἀνοσιῶν καθαρ- Lib. ix. p. 586.
μοδε, νόσων τε ἰάματα, καὶ τροπὰς μνημάτων θείων

as being believed to have found out expiations for wicked actions, remedies for diseases, and appeasements of the Divine displeasure.—Neither was this history of Orpheus contradicted by Origen;^c when Celsus gave him so fit an occasion, and so strong a provocation to do it, by his preferring Orpheus before our Saviour Christ. To all which may be added, in the last place, that it being commonly concluded from the Greek word *Σπονδαία*, that the Greeks derived their *Teletæ* and mysteries of religion from the Thracians, it is not so reasonable to think with the learned Vossius,^d that Xamolxis was the founder of them (and not Orpheus), this Xamolxis being by most reported to have been Pythagoras's servant, and consequently too much a junior; and though Herodot-

^a P. 452.^b Lib. iv. cap. xxv. p. 221.^c Advers. Cels. lib. vii. p. 368.^d De Artis Poetic. Natur. cap. xiii.

tus * attribute more antiquity to him, yet did he conceive him to have been no other than a demon, who appearing to the Thracians, was worshipped by them; whereas in the meantime, the general tradition of the Greeks derived the Thracian religious rites and mysteries from Orpheus and no other, according to this of Suidas; λέγεται ὡς Ὀρφῆς Θράξ, πρῶτος ἐτέχνολόγησε τὰ Ἑλλήνων μυστήρια, καὶ τὸ τιμᾶν θεὸν θρησκεύειν ἐκάλεσεν, ὡς Θρακίας οὔσης τῆς εὐρέσεως. It is commonly said, that Orpheus the Thracian was the first inventor of the religious mysteries of the Greeks, and that religion was from thence called Threskeia, as being a Thracian invention.—Wherefore though it may well be granted, that by reason of Orpheus's great antiquity, there have been many fabulous and romantic things intermingled with this history; yet there appears no reason at all, why we should disbelieve the existence of such a man.

But though there were such a man as Orpheus, yet it may very well be questioned for all that, whether any of those poems, commonly entitled to him, and called Orphical, were so ancient, and indeed written by him. And this the rather, because Herodotus declares it as his own opinion, that Hesiod and Homer were the ancientest of all the Greek poets, οἱ δὲ πρότερον ποιηταὶ λεγόμενοι τούτων L. ii. p. 53. τῶν ἀνδρῶν γενέσθαι ὑστέρον ἰγένοντο, and that [cap. liii. p. 109.] those other poets, said to have been before them, were indeed juniors to them;—meaning hereby, in all probability, Orpheus, Musæus and Linus. As also because Aristotle seems plainly to have followed Herodotus in this, he mentioning the Orphic poems (in his book of the soul) after

* Hist. lib. iv. cap. xcvi. p. 252, 253.

this manner, τὰ Ὀρφικὰ καλούμενα ἔπη, the L. i. c. vii. § 7. verses that are called Orphical.—Besides which Cicero* tells us, that some imputed all the Orphic poems to Cercops, a Pythagorean; and it is well known, that many have attributed the same to another of that school, Onomacritus, who lived in the times of the Pisistratidæ: wherefore we read more than once in Sextus Empiricus of Ὀνομάκριτος ἐν τοῖς Ὀρφικοῖς, Onomacritus in the Orphics.—Suidas also reports, that some of the Orphic poems were anciently ascribed to Theognetus, others to Timocles, others to Zopyrus, &c. From all which Grotius seems to Proleg. in Flor. Stob. have made up this conclusion: That the Pythagorics entitled their own books to Orpheus and Linus, just in the same manner as ancient Christians entitled theirs, some to the Sibyls, and others to Hermes Trismegist.—Implying therein, that both the Orphic poems and doctrine owed their very being and first original only to the Pythagoreans. But on the other side Clemens Alexandrinus,^b affirmeth, that Heraclitus the philosopher borrowed many things from the Orphic poems. And it is certain, that Plato^c does not only very much commend the Orphic hymns for their suavity and deliciousness, but also produce some verses out of them, without making any scruple concerning their author. Cicero himself, notwithstanding what he cites out of Ari- De N. De. L. p. 201. Lamb. stotle to the contrary, seems to acknow- ledge Orpheus for the most ancient poet, he writing

* De Natur. Deor. lib. i. cap. xxxviii. p. 2940. tom. ix. oper.

^b Stromat. lib. vi. cap. li. p. 752.

^c Vide Plat. de Legib. l. viii. p. 623, et Cratylum, p. 265. Io, p. 144. et in Convivio, p. 318.

thus of Cleanthes: "In secundo libro de natura deorum, vult Orphei, Musæi, Hesiodi, Homerique fabellas accommodare ad ea, quæ ipse de diis immortalibus scripserat, ut etiam veterrimi poetæ, qui hæc ne suspicati quidem sint, Stoici fuisse videantur." Cleanthes, in his second book of the nature of the gods, endeavours to accommodate the fables of Orpheus, Musæus, Hesiod, and Homer, to those very things, which himself had written concerning them; so that the most ancient poets, who never dreamed of any such matter, are made by him to have been Stoics.—Diodorus Siculus^a affirmeth Orpheus to have been the author of a most excellent poem: and Justin Martyr,^b Clemens Alexandrinus,^c Athenagoras,^d and others, take it for granted, that Homer borrowed many passages of his poems from the Orphic verses, and particularly that very beginning of his Iliad—

Μῆνιν ἄειδε, θεά —————

Lastly, Jamblichus testifieth, that by most writers Orpheus was represented as the ancientest of all the poets; adding, moreover, what dialect he

De V. Pyth. wrote in, αἱ πλείους τῶν ἱστοριῶν ἀποφαίνουσι, c. xxxiv. κεχρῆσθαι τῇ Δωρικῇ διαλέκτῳ καὶ τὸν Ὀρφέα, [p. 195, 196.] πρεσβύτερον ὄντα τῶν ποιητῶν. Most of the

historiographers declare, that Orpheus, who was the ancientest of all the poets, wrote in the Doric dialect.—Which, if it be true, then those Orphic fragments, that now we have, (preserved in the writings of such as did not Dorize) must

^a Lib. iv. cap. xxv. p. 221.

^b Cohertat. ad Græcos, p. 17. oper.

^c Stromat. lib. vi. cap. li. p. 738. 751.

^d Legat. pro Christianis, cap. xv. p. 64, 65.

have been transformed by them out of their native idiom. Now as concerning Herodotus, who supposing Homer and Hesiod to have been the ancientest of all the Greek poets, seemed therefore to conclude the Orphic poems to have been pseudepigraphons; himself intimates, that this was but a singular opinion, and as it were paradox, of his own, the contrary thereunto being then generally received. However Aristotle probably might therefore be the more inclinable to follow Herodotus in this, because he had no great kindness for the Pythagoric or Orphic philosophy. But it is altogether irrational and absurd to think, that the Pythagorics would entitle their books to Orpheus, as designing to gain credit and authority to them thereby, had there been no such doctrine before, either contained in some ancient monument of Orpheus, or at least transmitted down by oral tradition from him. Wherefore the Pythagorics themselves constantly maintain, that before Pythagoras's time, there was not only an Orphic cabala extant, but also Orphic poems. The former was declared in that ancient book called *Ἱερός λόγος*, or The holy Oration—if we may believe Proclus upon the *Timæus*: *Πυθαγόρειος ὃν ὁ Τιμαῖος, ἔπειτα ταῖς Πυθαγορείων ἀρχαῖς· αὗται δὲ εἰσὶν αἱ Ὀρφικαὶ* P. 291. *παράδοσις· Ἄ γὰρ Ὀρφεὺς δι' ἀπορρήτων λόγων μυστικῶς παραδίδωκε, ταῦτα Πυθαγόρας ἐξέμαθεν ὀργιαστὴς ἐν Λεβήθοις τοῖς Θρησίοις, Ἀγλαοφήμεν τελεστικά μεταδιδόντος· Ταῦτα γὰρ φησὶν ὁ Πυθαγόρας ἐν τῷ Ἱερῷ λόγῳ.* *Timæus* being a Pythagorean, follows the Pythagoric principles, and these are the Orphic traditions; for what things Orpheus delivered mystically, (or in arcane allegories,) these Py-

thagoras learned when he was initiated by Aglaophemus in the Orphic mysteries, Pythagoras himself affirming as much in his book, called *The holy Oration*.—Where Proclus, without any doubt or scruple, entitles the book inscribed Ἱερός λόγος, or *The holy Oration*, to Pythagoras himself. Indeed, several of the ancients have resolved Pythagoras to have written nothing at all; as Fla. Josephus, Plutarch, Lucian, and Porphyrius; and Epigenes in Clemens Alex. affirms, that the Ἱερός λόγος, or *holy Oration*, was written by Cercops, a Pythagorean. Nevertheless, Diogenes Laertius thinks them not to be in good earnest, who deny Pythagoras to have written any thing; and he tells us, that Heraclides acknowledged this Ἱερός λόγος, or *holy Oration*, for a genuine and indubitate foetus of Pythagoras. Jamblichus is also of the same opinion, as the most received; though confessing some to have attributed that book to Telauges, Pythagoras's son. But whoever was the writer of this Hieros Logos, whether Pythagoras himself, or Telauges, or Cercops, it must needs be granted to be of great antiquity, according to the testimony whereof, Pythagoras derived much of his theology from the Orphic traditions.

Strom. l. i. Moreover, Ion Chius in his Trigrammi p. 333.

[p. 397. edit. testified, as Clemens Alexandrinus in Potteri.]

formeth us, that Pythagoras himself referred some poems to Orpheus as their author; which is also the general sense of Platonists as well as Pythagoreans. Wherefore upon all accounts it seems most probable, that either Orpheus himself wrote some philosophic or theologic poems, though certain other poems might be also fathered on him, because written in the

same strain of mystical and allegorical theology, and as it were in the same spirit, with which this Thracian prophet was inspired; or, at least, that the Orphic doctrine was first conveyed down by oral cabala or tradition from him, and afterwards, for its better preservation, expressed in verses, that were imputed to Orpheus, after the same manner as the Golden Verses written by Lysis were to Pythagoras. And Philoponus^a intimates this latter to have been Aristotle's opinion concerning the Orphic verses; he glossing thus upon those words of Aristotle before cited; *καλουμένοις εἶπε, ὅτι μὴ δοκεῖ Ὀρφείως τὰ ἔπη, ὡς καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν τῇ περὶ φιλοσοφίας λέγει. Αὐτοῦ γὰρ εἰσὶ, τὰ δόγματα, ταῦτα δὲ φασιν Ὀνομάκριτον ἐν ἔπεισι καταθεῖναι.* Aristotle calls them the reputed Orphic verses, because they seem not to have been written by Orpheus himself, as the same Aristotle affirmeth in his book of philosophy. The doctrine and opinions of them indeed were his, but Onomacritus is said to have put them into verse.—However, there can be no doubt at all made, but that the Orphic verses, by whomsoever written, were some of them of great antiquity (they being much older than either Aristotle, Plato, or Herodotus) as they were also had in great esteem amongst the Pagans; and therefore we may very well make a judgment of the theology of the ancient Pagans from them.

Now that Orpheus, the Orphic doctrine, and poems, were Polytheistical, is a thing acknowledged by all. Justin Martyr^b affirms, that Orpheus asserted three hundred and sixty gods; he also bestows upon him this honourable title (if it

^a Comment. in Aristot. lib. iii. de Anima, fol. 2. edit. Græcæ, Venet. 1553. fol.

^b Apolog. ii. pro Christianis, p. 104.

may be so accounted) of πολυθεότητος πατήρ καὶ πρῶτος διδάσκαλος, the father and first teacher of Polytheism amongst the Greeks—he supposing,* that Homer derived his Polytheism from him;

Ὅμηρος τῆς πολυθεότητος Ὀρφέως ζηλώσας δόξαν, μυθωδῶς μὲν πλειόνων θεῶν μέμνηται, ἵνα μὴ δόξῃ τῆς Ὀρφέως ἀπάρδειν ποιήσεως. Homer emulating Orpheus's Polytheism, did himself therefore fabulously write

of many gods, that he might not seem to dissent from his poems, whom he had so great a veneration for.—With which also agreeth the testimony of Athenagoras :^b Ὀρφεὺς καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα θεῶν πρῶτος ἔξευρεν, καὶ τὰς γενέσεις διεξῆλθε, καὶ ὅσα ἑκάστοις πέπρακται εἶπε, ᾧ καὶ Ὅμηρος τὰ πολλὰ καὶ περὶ θεῶν μάλιστα ἔπεται.

Orpheus first invented the very names of the gods, declaring their generations, and what was done by each of them; and Homer for the most part follows him therein.—Indeed, the whole mythical

theology, or fables of the gods, together with the religious rites amongst the Greeks, are commonly

supposed to have owed their first original to no other but Orpheus. In which Orphic fables, not

only the things of nature, and parts of the world, were all theologized, but also all manner of hu-

man passions, imperfections, and vices (accord-

ing to the literal sense) attributed to the gods.

Insomuch that divers of the Pagans themselves

took great offence at them; as for example Iso-

crates, who concludes that a divine Nemesis or vengeance was inflicted upon

Orpheus for this impiety, Ὀρφεὺς ὁ μάλιστα τῶν τοιούτων λόγων ἀφάρμενος, διασπασθεὶς τὸν βίον ἐτελεύτησε,

In Iau. Basil.
[p. 452.]

* Cohort. ad Græcor. p. 17.

^b Apolog. pro Christian. cap. xv. p. 64.

Orpheus, who was most of all guilty in this kind, died a violent death.—Also Diog. Laertius for this cause made a question, whether he should reckon Orpheus amongst the philosophers or no: and others have concluded, that Plato ought to have banished Orpheus likewise out of his commonwealth, for the same reason that he did Homer;* which is thus expressed—for not lying well concerning the gods.—And here we may take notice of the monstrosity and extravagancy of Orpheus's fancy, from what Damascius^b and others tell us, that he made one of his principles to be δράκοντα κεφαλὰς ἔχοντα προσπεφυκυίας ταύρου καὶ λέοντος, ἐν μέσῳ δὲ θεοῦ πρόσωπον, καὶ ἐπὶ ὤμων πτερὰ, a dragon, having the heads both of a bull and a lion, and in the midst the face of a god, with golden wings upon his shoulders—which forsooth must be an incorporeal deity and Hercules, with which nature (called Ananche and Adrastea) was associated. Nevertheless the generality of the Greekish Pagans, looking upon this Orpheus, not as a mere fanciful poet and fabulator, but as a serious and profound philosopher, or mystical theologer, a person transcendently holy and wise; they supposed all his fables of the gods to be deep mysteries and allegories, which had some arcane and recondite sense under them; and therefore had a high veneration for him, as one who did ἀληθέστερον θεολογεῖν (as Athenagoras writes)^c more truly theologise than the rest—and was indeed divinely inspired. Insomuch, that Celsus would rather have had the Christians to have taken Orpheus for a god, than our Saviour Christ, p. 367.

* De Legibus, lib. ii. p. 429.

^b περί πρῶτον ἀρχῶν, a MS. cited above.

^c Apol. pro Christian, cap. xv. p. 64.

ἄνδρα ὁμολογουμένως οἰεῖν χρησάμενον πνεύματι, καὶ αὐτὸν βίαιως ἀποθανόντα, as being a man unquestionably endued with a holy spirit, and one, who also (as well as the Christians' Jesus) died a violent death.

But that Orpheus, notwithstanding all his Polytheism, or multiplicity of gods, acknowledged one supreme unmade Deity, as the original of all things, may be first presumed from hence, because those two most religious philosophic sects, the Pythagoreans and Platonists, not only had Orpheus in great esteem, he being commonly called by them ὁ Θεολόγος, the theologer, but were also thought in great measure to have owed their theology and philosophy to him, as deriving the same from his principles and traditions. This hath been already intimated, and might be further proved. Pythagoras, as we are informed by Porphyrius and Jamblichus,^a learned something from all these four, from the Egyptians, from the Persian magi, from the Chaldeans, and from Orpheus, or his followers. Accordingly,

MS. Coll. Caj.
Cant. p. 14.
[in Comment.
ad lib. iii. xiii.
xiv. Metaphys.
Aristot. fol.
59.] Syrianus makes Ὀρφικαὶ καὶ Πυθαγορικαὶ ἀρχαί, the Orphic and Pythagoric principles to be one and the same.—And

as we understand from Suidas,^b the same Syrianus wrote a book entitled, Συμφωνία Ὀρφέως, Πυθαγόρου καὶ Πλάτωνος, the Harmony of Orpheus, Pythagoras and Plato.—Proclus, besides the place before cited, frequently insists upon this elsewhere, in his commentary upon the Timæus, as p. 63. Πυθαγόρειον δὲ καὶ τὸ ταῖς Ὀρφικαῖς ἐπεσθαι γενεαλογίαις. Ἀνωθεν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς Ὀρφικῆς

^a De Vita Pythag. cap. xxviii. p. 122.

^b Voce Συμφωνία tom. iii. Lexic. p. 410. edit. Kusteri.

παραδόσιως διὰ Πυθαγόρου καὶ εἰς Ἑλλήνας ἢ περὶ θεῶν ἐπιστήμη προῆλθεν. It is Pythagorical to follow the Orphic genealogies. For from the Orphic tradition downward by Pythagoras was the knowledge of the gods derived to the Greeks.—And that the Orphic philosophy did really agree and symbolize with that which afterward was called Pythagoric and Platonic, and was of the same strain with it, may be gathered from that of Plato in his *Cratylus*, where he speaks concerning the etymology of the Greek word *σῶμα*: *δοκοῦσι μέντοι μοι μάλιστα θέσθαι οἱ ἀμφὶ Ὀρφέα τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα, ὡς δίκην διδούσης τῆς ψυχῆς, τοῦτον δὲ περιβόλον* P. 400. 109b. *ἔχειν, ἵνα σώζηται, δεσμοτηρίου εἰκόνα· εἶναι οὖν τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἕως ἂν ἐκτίσῃ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα τὸ σῶμα.* Orpheus and his followers seem to me to have given the best etymology of this word *σῶμα* (from *σώζεσθαι*) that the soul is here in a state of punishment, its body being a prison to it, wherein it is kept in custody till its debts or faults be expiated, and is therefore called *σῶμα*.—Now these three philosophies, the Platonic, Pythagoric, and Orphic, symbolizing so much together, it is probable, that as the Platonic and Pythagoric, so the Orphic likewise derived all their gods from one self-existent Deity.

Which may be further manifested from that epitome of the Orphic doctrine made long since by Timotheus the chronographer in his *Cosmopœia*, still extant in Cedrenus* and Eusebii *Chronica*, and imperfectly set down by Suidas (upon the word Orpheus) as his own, or without mentioning the author's name:—*Ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀνεδείχθη*

* In *Chronograph.* fol. 46.

τῷ κόσμῳ ὁ αἰθήρ, ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ δημιουργηθείς· First of all, the ether was made by God, and after the ether a chaos; a dark and dreadful night then covering all under the whole ether. Σημαίνων τὴν νύκτα προτερεῖν, Orpheus hereby signifying (saith Timotheus) that night was senior to day, or that the world had a beginning; Εἰρηκὼς ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ ἐκθέσει, ἀκατάληπτόν τινα καὶ πάντων ὑπέρτατον εἶναι, προγενέστερόν τε καὶ δημιουργὸν πάντων, καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ αἰθέρος, καὶ πάντων τῶν ὑπ' αὐτὸν τὸν αἰθέρα· He having declared also in his explication, that there was a certain incomprehensible Being, which was the highest and oldest of all things, and the maker of every thing, even of the ether itself, and all things under the ether. But the earth being then invisible by reason of the darkness, a light breaking out through the ether illuminated the whole creation; this light being said by him to be that highest of all beings, (before mentioned) which is called also counsel and life.—Ταῦτα τὰ τρία ὀνόματα (to use Suidas's words here) μίαν δύναμιν ἀπεφύνατο, καὶ ἐν κράτος τοῦ δημιουργοῦ πάντων θεοῦ, τοῦ πάντα ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος παραγαγόντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι· These three names in Orpheus (light, counsel and life) declaring one and the same force and power of the God, who is the maker of all, and who produceth all out of nothing into being, whether visible or invisible.—To conclude with Timotheus: Ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς Ὀρφεὺς ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ βίβλῳ συνέταξεν, ὅτι διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν τριῶν ὀνομάτων μίας θεότητος, τὰ πάντα ἐγένετο καὶ αὐτὸς ἐστι τὰ πάντα· And the same Orpheus in his book declared, that all things were made by one Godhead in three names, and that this God is all things.

But that Orpheus asserted one supreme Deity,

as the original of all things, is unquestionably evident from the Orphic verses themselves; of which notwithstanding, before we mention any in way of proof, we shall premise this observation, or rather suspicion of our own, that there seem to be some Orphic verses supposititious, as well as there were Sibylline; they being counterfeited either by Christians or Jews. For we must freely profess, for our own part, that we cannot believe all that to be genuine, which is produced by ancient fathers as Orphical; that is, either to have been written by Orpheus himself, or else by Onomacritus, or any other Pagan of that antiquity, according to the Orphic cabala or tradition.

As, for example, this concerning Moses ;*

Ὁς λόγος ἀρχαῖος, ἐκ ἰδρυμένης διδάσκει,
'Εκ θεῶν γένεσσι λαβὼν κατὰ Νηλεῖα θεομήτην

Ut habet sermo antiquorum, ut ex-aqua-ortus descripsit,
Accepta divinitus lege, quæ duplicia præcepta continet.

And this that is commonly understood of Abraham,

Ὁ καὶ γὰρ τις τοῖς θεοῖς δοτὴν, μέγιστον κρείνεται,
Εἰ μὴ μωυσαϊκῆς τις ἀποφύλαξι φύλου ἀναθεῖ
Χαλδαίων, Περὶ γὰρ ἴσθ' ἄστροιο πορείας.

Non enim quispiam mortalium videre posset eum, qui hominibus
imperat,

Nisi Unigenitus quidam profectus ab antiqua origine gentis
Chaldaeorum; sciebat enim astri cursum.

The manifest forgery of which might make one suspect also some other passages, such as this concerning the Divine Logos ;

Εἰς δὲ λόγος θεῖος βλάψας, τούτῳ προσέειπεν,
'Ἰδοὺ μετὰ δυνάμει καὶ ἐν κέντρῳ.

Wherefore it being not ingenuous to lay stress up-

* Apud Euseb. Præparat. Evangel. lib. xiii. cap. xii. p. 664, 665.

on that for the proof of any thing, which ourselves believe not to be sincere and genuine; we shall here cite no Orphic verses for the acknowledgment of one supreme Deity, but only such as we find attested in Pagan writings. As first of all

P. 95. that copy produced by Proclus upon the Timæus :

Τούτα σὺν τῷ παντὶ Διὸς πάλιν ἑνὸς ἐτίχθη
 Αἰθέρος οὐραίου καὶ οὐρανοῦ ἀγλαῶν ὕψος,
 Πόντου τ' ἀτρυγέτου, γαίης τ' ἱερῆος εὐχῆ,
 Ὀκεανὸς τε μέγας, καὶ πάντα τάρταρα γαίης,
 Καὶ ποταμοὶ, καὶ πόντος ἀπείροτος, ἅλλα τε πάντα
 Πάντες τ' ἀθάνατοι μάκαρες θεοὶ, καὶ δὴ θείαι,
 Ὅσα δ' ἐν γαστρὶ, καὶ ὕστερον ὀσπύῳ ἐμείλlec,
 Ἐγγίστε Ζεὺς δ' ἐν γαστρὶ σύμῃ σφύρει.

To this sense : Wherefore, together with the universe, were made within Jupiter the height of the ethereal heaven, the breadth of the earth and sea, the great ocean, the profound Tartara, the rivers and fountains, and all the other things, all the immortal gods and goddesses. Whatsoever hath been, or shall be, was at once contained in the womb of Jupiter.—

Proclus understands this of the ideas of all things being in God, before the world was produced, that is, in order of nature only, he supposing them in time coeve. However, it is plain, that all things are said to be contained in the womb and fecundity of one self-originated Deity, not only all the other gods and goddesses, but every thing else whatsoever.

Again Proclus, in the same place, ushers in another copy of Orphic verses (which are also found in the writer De Mundo) after this manner :
 τῶν δὲ ἰδεῶν πλήρης ὢν, διὰ τούτων ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὰ ὅλα περιέ-

ληφε, ὡς καὶ τοῦτο ἐνδεικνύμενος ὁ θεολόγος ἐπήγαγε. The demiurgus, or maker of the world, being full of ideas, did by these comprehend all things within himself, as that theologer also declareth in these following verses :

Ζεὺς πρῶτος γένετο, Ζεὺς ἑσπέρης ἀρχιμήτωρ
 Ζεὺς κεφαλὴ, Ζεὺς μέσσα· Διὸς δ' ἐν πάντα τίτνυται·
 Ζεὺς ἄρσεν γένετο, Ζεὺς ἀμβροτὸς ἑπλετο νόμῳ·
 Ζεὺς πυθμὴν γαίης τε καὶ οὐρανοῦ ἑσπερίωντος·
 Ζεὺς πνεὺν πάντων· Ζεὺς ἀκαμάτου πυρὸς ὀρμή·
 Ζεὺς πάντου βῆζα· Ζεὺς ἥλιος ἰδὲ σελήνη·
 Ζεὺς βασιλεὺς· Ζεὺς αὐτὸς ἀπάντων ἀρχιγένητος·
 *Εν πρώτῳ, εἰς Δαίμονα γένετο, μέγας ἀρχὸς ἀπάντων.

Which likewise in plain prose is this:—The high thundering Jove is both the first and the last; Jove is both the head and middle of all things; all things were made out of Jupiter; Jove is both a man and an immortal maid; Jove is the profundity of the earth and starry heaven; Jove is the breath of all things; Jove is the force of the untameable fire; Jove the bottom of the sea; Jove is sun, moon, and stars; Jove is both the original and king of all things: there is one power, and one God, and one great ruler over all.—

Where though there be many strange expressions, yet this seems to be the strangest of them all, that Jupiter should be said to be both a man and an immortal maid. But this is nothing but a poetic description of ἀρρενόθηλος, male and female together.—And it was a thing very familiar with all the mystical theologers amongst the Pagans, to call God ἀρρενόθηλον, male and female together;—they signifying thereby emphatically—the divine fecundity, or the generative and creative power of the Deity;—that God was able from himself alone to produce all things. Thus Damascius,

Where probably that one verse,

Kal Mētēs, prōtos genētēs, kal 'Eras wolutēthēs,

though truly Orphical, and indeed divine, it (signifying, that Mind and Love were the first begetters and original of all things) was notwithstanding clapped in unduly out of some other place. But from all these citations it plainly appears, that, according to the Orphic theology, though there were many gods and goddesses too admitted, yet there was one original and king of them all, one supreme Deity acknowledged. We are not ignorant, that some of the ancient and learned fathers,* conceiving it contradictory, for Orpheus at the same time to assert both many gods and one God, apprehended this to be a convenient salvo for this difficulty, to suppose, that Orpheus had by fits and turns been of different humours and persuasions; first a rank Polytheist, asserting three hundred gods and more; and then afterwards a converted Monotheist, they being the rather led into this opinion, by reason of certain counterfeit Orphic verses in Aristobulus, made probably by some ignorant Jew; wherein Orpheus is made to sing a palinodia or recantation, for his former error and Polytheism. But we must crave leave, with all due respect, to dissent from reverend antiquity in this; it plainly appearing from that first Orphic excerption in Proclus, that Orpheus at the same time acknowledged both one unmade Deity (the original of all things) and many generated gods and goddesses, that were all contained in it.

* Justin. Martyr in Cohortat. ad Græcos, p. 15. et Apol. ii. pro Christian. p. 104. Clemens Alexandr. in Protreptico, cap. vii. p. 63. et Cyrillus Alexandr. lib. i. advers. Julian. p. 25.

Having now made it sufficiently evident from such Orphic fragments, as have been acknowledged by Pagan writers, and by them cited out of Orpheus's hymns and rhapsodies, that the opinion of monarchy, or one self-existent Deity, the original of all things, was an essential part of the Orphic theology or cabala; we shall here further observe, that besides this opinion of monarchy, (but consistently with the same) a trinity also of Divine hypostases subordinate was another part of this Orphic cabala. Proclus upon Plato's *Timæus*,

P. 93.

making an inquiry into Plato's demiurgus, or opifex of the world, gives us an account, amongst other Platonists, of the doctrine of Amelius (who was contemporary with Plotinus, and who is said to have taken notice of what St. John the evangelist had written concerning the *Logos*, as agreeing with the Platonic and Pythagoric hypothesis*) after this manner: 'Αμέλιος δὲ τρίτον ποιεῖ τὸν Δημιουργόν, καὶ Νοῦς τρεῖς, Βασιλεῖς τρεῖς, τὸν ὄντα, τὸν ἔχοντα, τὸν ὀρῶντα· διαφέρουσι δὲ οὗτοι, ὅτι ὁ μὲν πρῶτος Νοῦς ὄντως ἐστὶν ὁ ἔστιν· ὁ δὲ δεύτερος, ἐστὶ μὲν τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ νοητόν, ἔχει δὲ τὸ πρὸ αὐτοῦ, καὶ μετέχει πάντως ἐκείνου, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δεύτερος· ὁ δὲ τρίτος, ἐστὶ μὲν τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ οὗτος νοητόν· (πᾶς γὰρ νοῦς τῷ συζυγοῦντι νοητῷ ὁ αὐτός ἐστιν) ἔχει δὲ τὸ ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ· καὶ ὁρᾷ τὸ πρῶτον· ὅσα γὰρ πλείω ἢ ἀπόστασις, τοσούτῳ τὸ ἔχον ἀμωρότερον. This passage being very remarkable, we thought fit to set it down at large, and shall here translate it.—Amelius makes a threefold demiurgus or opifex of the world, three minds and three kings; him that is, him that bath, and him that beholds. Which three minds differ thus, in that the first is

* Vide Euseb. *Præparat. Evang. lib. xi. cap. xviii. xix. p. 640.*

essentially that, which he is (or all perfection:) the second is its own intelligible, but hath the first (as something distinct from it) and indeed partakes thereof, and therefore is second. The third is also that intelligible of its own, (for every mind is the same thing with its correspondent intelligible) but hath that which is in the second, and beholds the first. For how much soever every being departs from the first, so much the obscurer is it.—After which Proclus immediately subjoins, *τούτους οὖν τοὺς τρεῖς νόους καὶ δημιουργοὺς ὑποτίθεται, καὶ τοὺς παρὰ τῷ Πλάτῳ, τρεῖς βασιλέας, καὶ τοὺς παρ' Ὀρφεὶ τρεῖς, Φάνητα, καὶ Οὐρανόν, καὶ Κρόνον, καὶ ὁ μάλιστα παρ' αὐτῷ δημιουργὸς ὁ Φάνης ἐστίν.* Amelius therefore supposeth these three minds and demiurgic principles of his to be both the same with Plato's three kings and with Orpheus's trinity of Phanes, Uranus, and Chronus; but Phanes is supposed by him to be principally the demiurgus. Where though Proclus (who had some peculiar fancies and whimsies of his own, and was indeed a confounder of the Platonic theology, and a mingler of much unintelligible stuff with it) does himself assert a monad or unity, superior to this whole trinity; yet does he seem nevertheless rightly to contend against Amelius, that it was not the first hypostasis neither in the Platonic nor Orphic trinity, that was chiefly and properly the demiurgus or opifex of the world, but the second. And thus Proclus's master Syrianus* had before determined, that in the Orphic theology, the title of Opifex did properly belong to Orpheus's *πρωτόγονος θεός*, or first-begotten God, which was the same with Plato's *Νοῦς* or Divine

* Comment. in Libr. aliquot Metaphys. Aristot. p. 33.

Intellect.—Agreeably whereunto Proclus's conclusion is, *τίς μὲν οὖν ὁ δημιουργὸς ἐστὶ καὶ ὅτι Νοῦς θεῖος τῆς ὅλης ποιήσεως αἴτιος, εἰρήσθω διὰ τούτων· καὶ ὅπως ὑπὸτε Ὀρφείως καὶ Πλάτωνος, ὁ αὐτὸς ἀνυμνείται δημιουργὸς Ζεὺς, ἀπὸ τούτων ὑπεμνήσθω.* Thus much may suffice to have declared, who is the demiurgus of the world, namely, that it is the Divine Intellect, which is the proper and immediate cause of the whole creation; and that it is one and the same demiurgical Jupiter, that is praised both by Orpheus and Plato.—Now, besides this, it is observable, that Damascius in his book *περὶ ἀρχῶν*,* or concerning the principles (not yet published) giving an account of the Orphic theology, tells us, amongst other things, that Orpheus introduced *τρίμορφον θεόν*, a triform deity.—To all which may be added what was before cited out of Timotheus the chronographer, that God had three names light—counsel and life; and that all things were made by one Deity under these three several names. Where Cedrenus, the preserver of that excellent fragment of antiquity, concludes in this manner: *ταῦτα Τιμόθεος συνεγράψατο ὁ χρονογράφος, λέγων τὸν Ὀρφεά πρὸ τοσούτων χρόνων εἰπόντα, Τριάδα ὁμοούσιον δημιουργῆσαι τὰ πάντα.* These things Timotheus the chronographer wrote, affirming Orpheus, so long ago, to have declared, that all things were made by a coessential or consubstantial Trinity.—Which, though otherwise it might be looked upon suspiciously, because that Timotheus was a Christian (especially in regard of that word *ὁμοούσιον*) yet by comparing it with what we have before alleged out of Pagan writers, it appears, that so far as

* Vide Wolfii Excerpta ex hoc Opere Damascii, §. xliii. in Anecd. Græcis, tom. iii. p. 252, 253.

concerns an Orphic trinity, it was not altogether vainly written, or without ground by him.

But we have not yet done with Orpheus and the Orphic theology, before we have made one further reflection upon it, so as to take notice of that strong and rank haut-goust, which was in it, of making God to be all. As for example, if we may repeat the forecited passages, and put in the name of God, instead of Ζεύς, or Jupiter; Διὸς πάλιν ἐντὸς ἐτύχθη, this universe, and all things belonging to it, were made within God.—Ζηνὸς δ' ἐνὶ γαστέρι σὺρ' ὅρα πεφύκει, all things were contained together in the womb of God:—Ζεὺς κεφαλῇ, Ζεὺς μέσσα, God is the head and middle of all things:—Ζεὺς πνυθμὴν γαίης, &c. God is the basis of the earth and heaven; God is the depth of the sea; God is the breath of all (or the air that we breathe); God is the force of the untameable fire; God is sun, moon, and stars.—Ἐν δὲ δέμας βασιλειον, there is one kingly (or divine) body—and

Πάντα γὰρ ἐν μεγάλῳ Ζητὸς ταῦτε σώματι κεῖται,

for all these things lie in the great body of God. And thus was the Orphic theology before represented also by Timotheus* the chronographer, διὰ τῆς θεότητος πάντα ἐγένετο, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐστὶ πάντα, all things were made by God, and himself is all things.

But further to prove, that the ancient Greekish Pagans were indeed of such a religious humour as this, to resolve all things into God, and to make God all, we shall here cite a remarkable testimony of Plutarch's, out of his Defect of Oracles: δνὸ πάσης γενέσεως αἰτίας ἐχούσης, οἱ μὲν σφόδρα παλαιοὶ

* Apud Cedren. et Malalam, in Histor. Chron. tom. i. p. 92.

θεολόγοι καὶ ποιηταὶ τῇ κρείττονι μόνῃ τὸν νοῦν
 P. 436. προσέχεν εἰλοντο, τοῦτο δὴ τὸ κοινὸν ἐπιφθε-
 γόμενοι πᾶσι πράγμασι,

Zōs ἀρχὴ, Ζεὺς μέσσα, Διὸς δ' ἐκ πάντα πίλονται.

ταῖς δ' ἀναγκαίαις καὶ φυσικαῖς οὐκ ἔτι προσήσαν αἰτίαις· οἱ δὲ νεώτεροι τούτων καὶ φυσικοὶ προσαγορευόμενοι τούναντίον· ἐκείνοις, τῆς καλῆς καὶ θείας ἀποπλανηθέντες ἀρχῆς, ἐν σώμασι καὶ πάθεσι σωμάτων, πληγαῖς τε καὶ μεταβολαῖς καὶ κράσει τιθενται τὸ σύμπαν. Whereas there are two causes of all generation (the Divine and the natural) the most ancient theologers and poets attended only to the more excellent of these two (the Divine cause) resolving all things into God, and pronouncing this of them universally, that God was both the beginning and middle, and that all things were out of God. Insomuch that these had no regard at all to the other natural and necessary causes of things. But on the contrary their juniors, who were called *Physici* (or naturalists) straying from this most excellent and Divine principle, placed all in bodies, their passions, collisions, mutations and commixtures together.—Where by the most ancient theologers and poets, Plutarch plainly meant Orpheus and his followers, it being an Orphic verse that is here cited by him, whereby he gives also an acknowledgment of their antiquity. But by their juniors, who are called *Physici*, he could understand no other than those first Ionic philosophers, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Hippo, and the rest, whom those degenerate Italics afterward followed, atomizing atheistically, Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus. So that here we have another confirmation also of what was before asserted by us, that the Ionic philosophers after Thales, and

before Anaxagoras, were generally atheistical. And indeed from them the word φυσικοί, or Naturalists, came to be often used as synonymous with ἄθεοι, or Atheists. Now these two are here condemned by Plutarch for two contrary extremes; the one, who resolved all into natural and necessary causes, that is, into matter, motion, and qualities of bodies, leaving out the Divine Cause, as guilty of Atheism; the other, who altogether neglecting the natural and necessary causes of things, resolved all into the Divine Cause, as it were swallowing up all into God, as guilty of a kind of fanaticism. And thus we see plainly, that this was one grand arcanum of the Orphic cabala, and the ancient Greekish theology, that God is all things.

Some fanatics of latter times* have made God to be all, in a gross sense, so as to take away all real distinction betwixt God and the creature, and indeed to allow no other being besides God; they supposing the substance of every thing, and even of all inanimate bodies, to be the very substance of God himself, and all the variety of things, that is in the world, to be nothing but God under several forms, appearances and disguises. The Stoics anciently made God to be all, and all to be God, in somewhat a different way; they conceiving God properly to be the active principle of the whole corporeal universe, which yet (because they admitted of no incorporeal substance) they supposed, together with the passive or the matter, to make up but one and the same complete substance. And others, who acknowledged God to be an incorporeal sub-

* Rob. Fludd, M. D. in the Preface to his *Philosophia Mosaica*; and Jacob Behmen.

stance, distinct from the matter, have notwithstanding made all to be God also, in a certain sense; they supposing God to be nothing but a soul of the world, which, together with the matter, made up all into one entire Divine animal. Now the Orphic theologers cannot be charged with making God all, in that first and grossly fanatic sense; as if they took away all real distinction betwixt God and the creature, they so asserting God to be all, as that notwithstanding they allowed other things to have distinct beings of their own. Thus much appearing from that riddle, which in the Orphic verses was proposed by the maker of the world to Night;

Proclus in
[lib. ii. p. 112.]

Πᾶς δὲ μὲν ἓν τι τὰ πάντα ἵεναι, καὶ χωρὶς ἑασθαι;

How can all things be one, and yet every thing have a distinct being of its own?—Where *Ἐν τι τὰ πάντα*, all things one, or one all things—seems to be the supreme Deity, or Divine Intellect, as Proclus also interprets it, *τὰ ὅλα περιέχων ὁ Ζεὺς καὶ πάντα μοναδικῶς καὶ νοερώς, κατὰ τούτους χρησμοδός, μετὰ τῆς νυκτὸς ὑφίστησι, καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐγκόσμια θεῶν, καὶ τὰς μοίρας τοῦ παντός*. Jupiter, who containeth the universe, and all things within himself, unitively and intellectually, according to these Orphic oracles, gives a particular subsistence of their own also to all the mundane gods, and other parts of the universe.—And this is *χωρὶς ἑασθαι*, in that fore-cited Orphic verse, Every thing apart by itself—the whole produced or created universe, with all its variety of things in it; which yet are Orphically said to be God also in a certain other sense, that shall be declared afterward. Nor can the Orphic theologers be charged with making God all in the se-

second Stoical sense, as if they denied all incorporeal substance, they plainly asserting, as Damascius and others particularly note, θεὸν ἀσώματον, an incorporeal Deity.—But as for the third way, it is very true, that the Orphic theologers did frequently call the world, the body of God, and its several parts his members, making the whole universe to be one Divine animal; notwithstanding which, they supposed not this animated world to be the first and highest God, but either δεύτερον θεόν, as the Hermaic or Trismegistic writers call it, the second God—or else, as Numenius and others of the Platonists speak, τρίτον θεόν, the third God;—the soul thereof being as well in the Orphic as it was in the Pythagoric and Platonic trinity, but the third hypostasis; they supposing two other Divine hypostases superior thereunto, which were perfectly secrete from matter. Wherefore, as to the supreme Deity, these Orphic theologers made him to be all things, chiefly upon the two following accounts: first, because all things coming from God, they inferred, that therefore they were all contained in him, and consequently were in a certain sense himself; thus much being declared in those Orphic verses cited by Proclus^a and others,

πάντα γὰρ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ, αὐτὸς φῶς ἐκ πνεύματος
 μέλλων ἀπὸ γενέας προρίπτει, ἀναδίδωκε δὲ μέζον.

Which Apuleius^b thus renders,

Namque sinit occultans, dulces in luminis oras
 Cuncta tulit, sacro versans sub pectore curas.

The sense whereof is plainly this: That God at

^a Comment. in Timæum Platon, lib. ii. p. 96.

^b Libro de Mundo, p. 25.

first hiding or occultly containing all things within himself, did from thence display them, and bring them forth into light, or distinct beings of their own, and so make the world.—The second is, because the world produced by God, and really existing without him, is not therefore quite cut off from him, nor subsists alone by itself as a dead thing, but is still livingly united to him, essentially dependent on him, always supported and upheld, quickened and enlivened, acted and pervaded by him; according to that Orphic passage,* *Ἐν δ' αὐταῖς αὐτὸς περιπίσσεται*, God passes through and intimately pervades all things.

Now it is very true, that some Christian theologians also have made God to be all, according to these latter senses; as when they affirm the whole world to be nothing else but *Deum explicatum*, God expanded or unfolded—and when they call the creatures, as St. Jerome and others often do, *radix Deitatis*, the rays of the Deity.—Nay, the Scripture itself may seem to give some countenance also hereunto, when it tells us, that “of Col. i. 16. him, and through him, and to him are all things;” which in the Orphic theology was thus expressed; God is the beginning, and middle, and end of all things; that *ἐν αὐτῷ ἐκτίσθη τὰ πάντα*, all things were made in him, as in the Orphic verses, —*Διὸς ἐντὸς ἐρύχθη*; that *τὰ πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ Col. i. 17. συνέστηκε*, “all things consist in him;” that, “in him we live, and move, and have our being;” that God doth *ζωοποιεῖν πάντα*, “quicken 1 Tim. vi. 13. all things,” and that he ought to be

* Apud Justin. Martyr. in Cohortat. ad Gentes, et in Apol. ii. et apud Clement. Alexandrin. Euseb. &c.

made πάντα ἐν πᾶσι, "all in all;" which ^{1 Cor. xv. 28.} supposeth him in some sense to be so.

Notwithstanding which, this is a very ticklish point, and easily liable to mistake and abuse: and, as we conceive it was the mistake and abuse of this one thing, which was the chief ground and original of the both seeming and real Polytheism, not only of the Greekish and European, but also of the Egyptian and other Pagans, as will be more particularly declared afterwards; they concluding, that because God was all things, and consequently all things God, that therefore God ought to be worshipped in all things, that is, in all the several parts of the world, and things of nature, but especially in those animated intellectual beings, which are superior to men. Consentaneously whereunto, they did both θεολογεῖν ἅπαντα, theologize or deify all things—looking upon every thing as having ὑπερφυσικόν τι, something supernatural—or a kind of divinity in it; and also bestow several names upon God, according to all the several parts of the world, and things of nature, calling him in the starry heaven and ether, Jupiter; in the air, Juno; in the winds, Æolus; in the sea, Neptune; in the earth and subterraneous parts, Pluto; in learning, knowledge and invention, Minerva and the Muses; in war, Mars; in pleasure, Venus; in corn, Ceres; in wine, Bacchus; and the like.

However, it is unquestionably evident from hence, that Orpheus with his followers, that is, the generality of the Greekish Pagans, acknowledged one universal and all-comprehending Deity, one that was all; consequently could not admit of many self-existent and independent deities.

XVIII. Having treated largely concerning the two most eminent Polytheists amongst the ancient Pagans, Zoroaster and Orpheus, and clearly proved, that they asserted one supreme Deity; we shall in the next place observe, that the Egyptians themselves also, notwithstanding their multifarious Polytheism and idolatry, had an acknowledgment amongst them of one supreme and universal Numen.

There hath been some controversy amongst learned men, whether Polytheism and idolatry had their first rise from the Egyptians, or the Chaldeans, because the Pagan writers for the most part give the precedency here to the Egyptians; Lucian himself, who was by birth a Syrian, and a diligent inquirer into the antiquities of his own country, affirming that the Syrians and Assyrians received their religion and gods first from the Egyptians; and before Lucian, Herodotus,* the father of history, reporting likewise, that the Egyptians were the first that erected temples and statues to the gods. But whether the Egyptians or Chaldeans were the first Polytheists and idolaters, there is no question to be made, but that the Greeks and Europeans generally derived their Polytheism and idolatry from the Egyptians. Herodotus affirms in one place,^b that the Greeks received their twelve gods from thence; and in another,^c that *σχέδον καὶ πάντα τὰ ὀνόματα τῶν θεῶν ἐξ Αἰγύπτου ἐλήλυθεν εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα*, almost all the names of the gods came first out of Egypt into Greece.—

Dea Syria,
p. 1059.
[tom. ii. oper.
p. 656, 657.]

* Lib. ii. cap. iv. p. 90.

^b Ibid. et lib. iv. cap. i. p. 108.

^c Lib. iv. cap. i. p. 108.

In what sense this might be true of Ζεύς itself, though the word be originally Greekish, shall be declared afterwards : but it is probable, that Herodotus had here a farther meaning, that the very names of many of the Greekish gods were originally Egyptian. In order to the confirmation of which, we shall here propound a conjecture concerning one of them, viz. Ἀθηνᾶ, called otherwise by the Greeks Pallas, and by the Latins Minerva. For, first, the Greek etymologies of this word seem to be all of them either trifling and frivolous, or violent and forced. Plato in his *Cratylus** having observed, that according to the ancient allegorical interpreters of Homer, Ἀθηνᾶ was nothing else but νοῦς, or διάνοια, mind or understanding, personated and deified, conceived, that the first imposers of that name, intending to signify thereby Divine wisdom, called it Ἀθηνᾶ, as θεοῦ νόησιν, the understanding of God, or the knowledge of Divine things—as if the word had been at first Θεονόη, and thence afterward transformed into Ἀθηνᾶ.—But being not fully satisfied himself with this etymology, he afterward attempts another, deriving the word from νόησις ἐν τῷ ᾧθει, knowledge concerning manners, or practical knowledge—as if it had been at first Ἡθεονόη, and from thence changed into Ἀθηνᾶ.—Others of the Greeks have deduced this word ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀθρεῖν, because it is the property of wisdom, to collect all into one, supposing that it was at first Ἀθροηνᾶ. Others would fetch it from θῆλυς and alpha privative, because Minerva, or wisdom, though she be a goddess, yet hath nothing of feminine imperfection in her. Others again would etymologize it,

* P. 267.

ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ πεφυκέναι θήνεσθαι καὶ ὑποτάττεσθαι τὴν ἀρετὴν, because virtue or wisdom is of such a noble and generous temper, as that it scorns to subject itself to any base and unworthy servitude. Lastly, others would derive it, ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰθέρος, affirming it to have been at first Αἰθερονεία.* From all which uncertainty of the Greeks concerning the etymon of this word Ἀθηνᾶ, and from the frivolousness or forcedness of these conjectures, we may rather conclude that it was not originally Greekish, but exotical, and probably, according to Herodotus, Egyptian. Wherefore let us try, whether or no we can find any Egyptian word, from whence this Ἀθηνᾶ might be derived. Plato in his Timæus,^b making mention of Sais, a city in Egypt, where Solon sometimes sojourned, tells us, οἱ τῆς πόλεως θεὸς ἀρχηγός ἐστιν, Αἰγυπτιστὶ μὲν τοῦνομα Νηῖθ, Ἑλληνιστὶ δὲ, ὡς ὁ ἐκείνων λόγος, Ἀθηνᾶ, that the president or tutelary God of that city was called in the Egyptian language Neith, but in the Greeks, as the same Egyptians affirm, Ἀθηνᾶ.—Now, why might not this very Egyptian word Neith, by an easy inversion, have been at first turned into Thien, or Θήν, (men commonly pronouncing exotic words ill-favouredly) and then by additional alphas at the beginning and end, transformed into Ἀθηνᾶ? This seems much more probable than either Plato's Θεονόη, or Ἡθονόη, or any other of those Greek etymologies beforementioned. And as the Greeks thus derived the names of many of their gods from the Egyptians, so do the Latins seem to have done the like, from this one instance of the word

* Vidē Phornut. in Libro de Natur. Deor. Cap. xx. p. 185. inter Scripser. Mytholog. à Tho. Gale editos.

^b P. 524. Oper.

Neptune; which though Varro^a would deduce a *nubendo*, as if it had been *Nuptunus*, because the sea covers and hides the land, and Scaliger with others, ἀπὸ τοῦ νίπτειν, from washing—this being the chief use of water; yet as the learned Borchart^b hath observed, it may with greater probability be derived from the Egyptian word Nephthus, Plutarch telling us,^c ὅτι Νέφθον καλοῦσι τῆς γῆς τὰ ἔσχατα καὶ παράρτια καὶ ψάοντα τῆς θαλάσσης, that the Egyptians called the maritime parts of land, or such as border upon the sea, Nephthus.—Which conjecture may be further confirmed from what the same Plutarch elsewhere^d writes, that as Isis was the wife of Osiris, so the wife of Typhon was called Nephthus. From whence one might collect, that as Isis was taken sometimes for the earth, or the goddess presiding over it, so Nephthus was the goddess of the sea. To which may be further added out of the same writer, that Nephthus was sometimes called by the Egyptians Ἀφροδίτη, or Venus, probably because Venus is said to have risen out of the sea. But whatever may be thought of these etymological conjectures, certain it is, that no nation in the world was ever accounted by the Pagans more devout, religious and superstitious, than the Egyptians, and consequently none was more polytheistical and idolatrous. Isocrates, in his praise of Busiris, gives them a high encomium for their sanctity; and Herodotus^e affirmeth of them, that they were θεοσεβέες περισσῶς ἔόντες μάλιστα πάντων ἀνθρώπων, exceedingly more

^a Vide Vossium de Origine et Progressu Idololatriæ, lib. ii. cap. lxxvii. p. 259.

^b In Phaleg. lib. i. cap. ii. p. 9, 10. et lib. iv. cap. xxx. p. 283.

^c De Iside et Osiride, p. 366.

^d Ibid. p. 355.

^e Lib. ii. cap. xxxvii. p. 102.

religious and more devout worshippers of the Deity than all other mortals.—Wherefore they

Ensch. Pr.

Ev. l. ix. c. x.

p. 412.

were highly celebrated by Apollo's oracle, (recorded by Porphyrius) and preferred before all other nations for teach-

ing rightly *αἰτεῖν οὐδὲν μακάριον*, that hard and difficult way, that leadeth to God and happiness.—

But in the Scripture,* Egypt is famous for her idols, and for her spiritual whoredoms and fornications; to denote the uncleanness whereof she is sometimes joined with Sodom. For the Egyptians, besides all those other gods, that were worshipped by the Greeks and other barbarians; besides the stars, demons and heroes; and those artificial gods, which they boasted so much of their power of making, viz. animated statues; and this peculiar intoxication of their own, which rendered them infamous and ridiculous even amongst all the other Pagans, that they worshipped brute animals also, in one sense or other;

Juv. Sat. 23.

*Quis nescit, Volusi Bithyricæ, qualia demens
Ægyptus portenta colat? Crocodilon adorat
Pars hæc, illa pavet saturam serpentibus Ibin.*

Concerning which Origen against Celsus thus

Lib. iii. p. 121.

[These words
are not Ori-
gen's, but
Celsus's.]

writeth; *παρ' οἷς προσιόντι μὲν ἐστὶ λαμπρὰ
τεμένη, καὶ ἄλσῃ, καὶ προφυλαίων μεγέθη τε
καὶ κάλλη καὶ νεῶ θαυμάσιοι, καὶ σκηναὶ περί-
εργον, καὶ θρησκείαι μάλα δεισιδαίμονες
καὶ μυστηριώτιδες· ἥδη δὲ εἰσιόντι, καὶ ἐνδοτέρῳ γενομένῳ,
θεωρεῖται προσκυννόμενος αἰλουρος, ἢ πίθηκος, ἢ κροκόδειλος,
ἢ τράγος, ἢ κύων.* To him, that cometh to be a
spectator of the Egyptian worship, there first
offer themselves to his view most splendid and

* *Revelat. xii. 8.*

stately temples, sumptuously adorned together with solemn groves, and many pompous rites and mystical ceremonies; but as soon as he enters in, he perceives, that it was either a cat, or an ape, a crocodile, or a goat, or a dog, that was the object of this religious worship.—

But notwithstanding this multifarious Polytheism and idolatry of these Egyptians, that they did nevertheless acknowledge one supreme and universal Numen, may first be probably collected from that fame, which they had anciently over the whole world for their wisdom. The Egyptians are called by the Elei in Herodotus, *σέβητατοι ἄνθρωποι*, the wisest of men;—and it is a commendation, that is given to one ^b in the same writer, that he excelled the Egyptians in wisdom, who excelled all other mortals. Thus it is set down in the Scripture for Moses's encomium, that he was “learned in all the wisdom of the Egyptians;”^c and the transcendency of Solomon's wisdom is likewise thus expressed by the writer of the Book of Kings,^d that it excelled “the wisdom of all the children of the east country, and all the wisdom of Egypt.” Where by the children of the east are chiefly meant the Persian magi, and the Chaldeans; and there seems to be a climax here, that Solomon's wisdom did not only excel the wisdom of the magi, and of the Chaldeans, but also that of the Egyptians themselves. From whence it appears, that in Solomon's time Egypt was the chief school of literature in the whole world, and that the Greeks were then but

^a Lib. ii. cap. cix. p. 151.

^b Ramsinitus, king of Egypt. Herod. lib. ii. cap. cxxi. p. 135.

^c Acts vii. 22.

^d 1 Kings iv. 29.

little or not at all taken notice of, nor had any considerable fame for learning. For which cause, we can by no means give credit to that of Philo, in the life of Moses, ^a that besides the Egyptian priests, learned men were sent for by Pharaoh's daughter out of Greece to instruct Moses. Whereas it is manifest from the Greekish monuments themselves, that for many ages after Solomon's time, the most famous of the Greeks travelled into Egypt to receive culture and literature, as Lycurgus, Solon, Thales, and many others, amongst whom were Pythagoras and Plato. Concerning the former of which Isocrates writes, ^b that coming into Egypt, and being there instructed by the priests, he was the first that brought philosophy into Greece; and the latter of them is perstringed by Xenophon, ^c because *Αἰγύπτου ἠγάσθη καὶ τῆς Πυθαγόρου παραώδους σοφίας*, not contented with that simple philosophy of Socrates (which was little else besides morality) he was in love with Egypt, and that monstrous wisdom of Pythagoras.—Now, as it is not probable, that the Egyptians, who were so famous for wisdom and learning, should be ignorant of one supreme Deity, so is it no small argument to the contrary, that they were had in so great esteem by those two divine philosophers, Pythagoras and Plato. We grant, indeed, that after the Greeks began to flourish in all manner of literature, the fame of the Egyptians was not only much eclipsed (so that we hear no more of Greeks travelling into Egypt upon the former account), but also that

^a Lib. i. p. 605.

^b In Encomio Busiridis, p. 450.

^c In fragmento Epistolæ ad Æschinem, apud Euseb. Præpar. Evangel. lib. xiv. cap. xii. p. 745.

their ardour towards the liberal sciences did by degrees languish and abate; so that Strabo^a in his time could find little more in Egypt besides the empty houses and palaces, in which priests, formerly famous for astronomy and philosophy, had dwelt. Nevertheless, their arcane theology remained more or less amongst them unextinct to the last, as appears from what Origen, Porphyrius, and Jamblichus have written concerning them.

The learning of the Egyptians was either historical, or philosophical, or theological. First the Egyptians were famous for their historic learning and knowledge of antiquity, they being confessed in Plato^b to have had so much ancients records of time than the Greeks, that the Greeks were but children or infants compared with them. They pretended to a continued and uninterrupted series of history from the beginning of the world downward, and therefore seem to have had the clearest and strongest persuasions of the Cosmogonia. Indeed, it cannot be denied, but that this tradition of the world's beginning was at first in a manner universal among all nations. For concerning the Greeks and Persians we have already manifested the same; and as Sanchoniathon testifieth the like concerning the Phœnicians, so does Strabo likewise of the Indian Brachmans, affirming, that they did L. xv. 715. agree with the Greeks in many things, and particularly in this, *ὅτι γενητὸς ὁ κόσμος καὶ φθαρετός*, that the world was both made and should be destroyed.—And though Diodorus^c affirm the con-

^a Lib. xvii. p. 764.

^b In Timæo. p. 524.

^c Lib. ii. p. 83. edit. Hanov. 1604.

trary of the Chaldeans, yet we ought in reason to

Euseb. Chron. assent rather to Berosus, * in respect of
p. 6.

his greater antiquity, who represents the sense of the ancient Chaldeans after this manner :
γενέσθαι χρόνον ἐν ᾧ τὸ πᾶν σκότος καὶ ὕδωρ—τὸν δὲ Βῆλον, διὰ Δία μεθερμηνεύουσι, μέσον ταμόντα τὸ σκότος, χωρίσαι γῆν καὶ οὐρανὸν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, καὶ διατάξαι τὸν κόσμον—ἀποτελέσαι δὲ τὸν Βῆλον καὶ ἄστρα καὶ ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ τοὺς πέντε πλανήτας. That there was a time, when all was darkness and water, but Bell (who is interpreted Jupiter) cutting the darkness in the middle, separated the earth and heaven from one another, and so framed the world ; this Bell also producing the stars, the sun, and the moon, and the five planets.—From which testimony of Berosus, according to the version of Alexander Polyhistor, by the way it appears also, that the ancient Chaldeans acknowledged one supreme Deity, the maker of the whole world, as they are also celebrated for this in that oracle of Apollo, which is cited out of Porphyry by Eusebius,

Euseb. Præp.
Evang. l. ix.
c. x.

Μοῦνα Χαλδαῖοι σοφίαν λόγον, ἡ δ' αὖ Ἑβραίων,
ἀντογάθλων ἅπαντα τεβαζόμενοι βίβ' ἀγνῶς.

Where the Chaldeans are joined with the Hebrews, as worshipping likewise in a holy manner one self-existent Deity. Wherefore, if Diodorus were not altogether mistaken, it must be concluded, that in the latter times, the Chaldeans (then perhaps receiving the doctrine of Aristotle) did desert and abandon the tradition of their ancestors concerning the Cosmogonia. But the Egyptians, however they attributed more antiquity

* Apud Georg. Syncell. in Chronico, p. 29.

to the world than they ought, yet seem to have had a constant persuasion of the beginning of it, and the firmest of all other nations: they (as Kircher tells us *) therefore picturing Horus, or the world, as a young man beardless, not only to signify its constant youthful and flourishing vigour, but also the youngness and newness of its duration. Neither ought it to be suspected, that though the Egyptians held the world to have had a beginning, yet they conceived it to be made by chance without a God, as Anaximander, Democritus, and Epicurus afterward did; the contrary thereunto being so confessed a thing, that Simplicius, a zealous contender for the world's eternity, affirms the Mosaic history of its creation by God to have been nothing else but *μύθοι Αιγύπτιοι*, Egyptian fables.—The place is so considerable, that I shall here set it down in the author's own

language: *Εἰ δὲ τὸν τῶν Ἰουδαίων νομοθέτην* Simpl. in Arist. Phys. l. viii. fol. 268. col. 1.
ἐνδείκνυται λέγοντα, ἐν ἀρχῇ ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν· ἡ δὲ γῆ ἦν ἀόρατος καὶ ἀκατασκεύαστος· καὶ σκότος ἐπάνω τῆς ἀβύσσου, καὶ πνεῦμα θεοῦ ἐπεφέρετο ἐπάνω τοῦ ὕδατος. εἰτα ποιήσαντος αὐτοῦ τὸ φῶς, καὶ διαχωρίσαντος ἀνὰ μέσον τοῦ φωτός καὶ ἀνὰ μέσον τοῦ σκότους, ἐπήγαγε, καὶ ἐκάλεσεν ὁ θεὸς τὸ φῶς ἡμέραν, καὶ τὸ σκότος νύκτα· καὶ ἐγένετο ἑσπέρα καὶ ἐγένετο πρωὶ ἡμέρα μία· εἰ οὖν ταύτην τοῦ χρόνου νομίζει γενέσθαι τὴν ἀπὸ χρόνου, ἐννοεῖτω ὅτι μυθικὴ τίς ἐστιν ἡ παράδοσις, καὶ ἀπὸ μύθων Αἰγυπτίων εἰλημισμένη. If Grammaticus here mean the lawgiver of the Jews, writing thus, [In the beginning God made heaven and earth, and the earth was invisible and unadorned, and darkness was upon the deep, and the Spirit of God moved upon the water;] and then afterward when

* In *Oedipo Aegyptiaco*.

he had made light, and separated the light from the darkness, adding, [And God called the light day, and the darkness night, and the evening and the morning were the first day :] I say, if Grammaticus think this to have been the first generation and beginning of time ; I would have him to know, that all this is but a fabulous tradition, and wholly drawn from Egyptian fables.—

As for the philosophy of the Egyptians, that besides their physiology, and the pure and mixed mathematics (arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy), they had another higher kind of philosophy also concerning incorporeal substances, appears from hence, because they were the first assertors of the immortality of souls, their pre-existence and transmigration, from whence their incorporeity is necessarily inferred. Thus He-

rodotus : *πρῶτοι τόνδε τὸν λόγον Αἰγύπτιοι*
Euterp. 123.

εἰσι οἱ εἰπόντες, ὡς ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ ἀθάνατός ἐστι τοῦ σώματος δὲ καταφθίνοντος, ἐς ἄλλο ζῶον αἰεὶ γινόμενον ἐσθύνεται, &c. The Egyptians were the first assertors of the soul's immortality, and of its transmigration, after the death and corruption of this body, into the bodies of other animals successively, viz. until it have run round through the whole circuit of terrestrial, marine, and volatile animals, after which, they say, it is to return again into a human body ; they supposing this revolution or apocatastasis of souls to be made in no less space than that of three thousand years.—But whether Herodotus were rightly catechised and instructed in the Egyptian doctrine as to this particular or no, may very well be questioned ; because the Pythagoreans, whom

he there tacitly reprehends for arrogating the first invention of this to themselves, when they had borrowed it from the Egyptians, did represent it otherwise; namely, that the descent of human souls into these earthy bodies was first in way of punishment, and that their sinking lower afterward into the bodies of brutes, was only to some a further punishment for their future degeneracy; but the virtuous and pious souls should after this life enjoy a state of happiness in celestial or spiritual bodies. And the Egyptian doctrine is represented after the same manner by Porphyrius in Stobæus,* as also in the Hermetic or Trismegistic writings. Moreover, Chalcidius reports, that Hermes Trismegist, when he was about to die, made an oration to this purpose: That he had here lived in this earthly body but an exile and stranger, and was now returning home to his own country; so that his death ought not to be lamented, this life being rather to be accounted death.—Which persuasion the Indian Brachmans also were imbued withal, whether they received it from the Egyptians (as they did some other things) or no; *τὸν μὲν ἐνθάδε βίον, ὡς ἂν ἀκμὴν κομμένων εἶναι, τὸν δὲ θάνατον γένεσιν εἰς τὸν ὄντως βίον*, that this life here is but the life of embryo's, and that death [to good men] is a generation or birth into true life.—And this may the better be Strabo, l. xv. p. 715. believed to have been the Egyptian doctrine, because Diodorus himself hath some passages sounding that way; as that the Egyptians lamented not the death of good men, but applauded their happiness, *ὡς τὸν αἰῶνα διατρέβειν μέλ-*

* Eclog. Phys. lib. ii. cap. vii. p. 200.

λόντες καθ' ἑδου μετὰ τῶν εὐσεβῶν, as being to live ever in the other world with the pious.—However, it being certain from this Egyptian doctrine of pre-existence and transmigration, that the Egyptians did assert the soul's incorporeity, it cannot reasonably be doubted, but that they acknowledged also an incorporeal Deity. The objection against which, from what Porphyrius writeth concerning Chæremôn, will be answered afterward.

Doncella Viventium Diversaria appellant, Diod.

We come in the last place to the theology of the Egyptians. Now it is certain, that the Egyptians besides their vulgar and fabulous theology (which is for the most part that which Diódorus Siculus* describes) had another ἀπόρρητος θεολογία, arcane and recondite theology—that was concealed from the vulgar, and communicated only to the kings, and such priests and others, as were thought capable thereof; these two theologies of theirs differing, as Aristotle's Exoterics and Acroamatics. Thus much is plainly declared by Origen, whose very name was Egyptian, it being interpreted Horo-genitus (which Horus was an Egyptian God), upon occasion of

Lib. i. p. 11.

Celsus's boasting that he thoroughly understood all that belonged to Christianity: "Celsus (saith he) seemeth here to me to do just as if a man travelling into Egypt, where the wise men of the Egyptians, according to their country-learning, philosophize much about those things, that are accounted by them Divine, whilst the idiots in the mean time hearing only certain fables, which they know not the meaning of, are very much pleased therewith: Celsus, I say, doth as

* Lib. i. p. 33.

if such a sojourner in Egypt, who had conversed only with those idiots, and not been at all instructed by any of the priests in their arcane and recondite mysteries, should boast, that he knew all that belonged to the Egyptian theology." Where the same Origen also adds, that this was not a thing proper neither to the Egyptians only to have such an arcane and true theology, distinct from their vulgar and fabulous one, but common with them to the Persians, Syrians, and other Barbarian Pagans; *ὃ δὲ εἶπον περὶ Αἰγυπτίων σοφῶν τε καὶ ἰδιωτῶν δυνατόν εἶπέν καὶ περὶ Περσῶν, &c.* What we have now affirmed (saith he) concerning the difference betwixt the wise men and the idiots amongst the Egyptians, the same may be said also of the Persians, amongst whom the religious rites are performed rationally by those, that are ingenious, whilst the superficial vulgar look no further in the observation of them, than the external symbol or ceremony. And the same is true likewise concerning the Syrians and Indians, and all those other nations, who have, besides their religious fables, a learning and doctrine.—Neither can it be dissembled, that Origen in this place plainly intimates the same also concerning Christianity itself; namely, that besides the outside and exterior cortex of it (in which notwithstanding there is nothing fabulous) communicated to all, there was a more arcane and recondite doctrine belonging thereunto, which all were not alike capable of; he elsewhere observing this to be that wisdom, that St. Paul spake amongst the perfect. From whence he concludes, that Celsus vainly boasted, *πάντα γὰρ οἶδα*, for I know all things belonging to Christianity—when he was ac-

quainted only with the exterior surface of it. But concerning the Egyptians, this was a thing most notorious and observed by sundry other writers; as, for example, Clemens of Alexandria, a man also well acquainted with the affairs of

Strom. l. v. Egypt; Αἱγύπτιοι οὐ τοῖς ἐπιτυχοῦσι τὰ παρὰ
p. 508. σφίσιν ἀνετίθεντο μυστήρια, οὐδὲ μὴν βεβήλους

τὴν τῶν θείων εἶδῃσιν ἐξέφερον, ἀλλ' ἢ μόνοις γε τοῖς μέλλουσιν ἐπὶ τὴν βασιλείαν προϊέναι, καὶ τῶν ἱερέων τοῖς κριθέειν εἶναι δοκιμωτάτους, ἀπὸ τε τῆς τροφῆς, καὶ τῆς παιδείας, καὶ τοῦ γένους. The Egyptians do not reveal their religious mysteries promiscuously to all, nor communicate the knowledge of Divine things to the profane, but only to those, who are to succeed in the kingdom, and to such of the priests, as are judged most fitly qualified for the same, upon account both of their birth and education.—With which agreeth also the testimony of Plutarch, he adding a further confirmation thereof from the

De Is. et Os. Egyptian sphinges : ὁ ἐκ μαχίμων ἀποδεδειγ-
354. μένος [βασιλεύς] εὐθὺς ἐγένετο τῶν ἱερέων, καὶ

μετεῖχε τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἐπικεκρυμμένης τὰ πολλὰ μύθοις καὶ λόγοις, ἀμυδράς ἐμφάσεις τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ διαφάσεις ἔχουσιν· ὥσπερ ἀμέλει καὶ παραδηλοῦσιν αὐτοὶ πρὸ τῶν ἱερέων τὰς σφίγγας ἐπικεικῶς ἰστάντες, ὡς αἰνιγματώδη σοφίαν τῆς θεολογίας αὐτῶν ἐχούσης. When amongst the Egyptians there is any king chosen out of the military order, he is forthwith brought to the priests, and by them instructed in that arcane theology, which conceals mysterious truths under obscure fables and allegories. Wherefore they place sphinges before their temples, to signify, that their theology contained a certain arcane and enigmatical wisdom in it.—And this meaning of the sphinges in the Egyptian temples is confirmed likewise by

Clemens Alexandrinus,* διὰ τοῦτό τοι καὶ Αἰγύπτιοι πρὸ πῶν ἱερῶν τὰς σφίγγας ἰδρύνονται, ὡς αἰνιγματώδους τοῦ περὶ θεοῦ λόγον, καὶ ἀσαφεῖς ὄντος. Therefore do the Egyptians place sphinges before their temples, to declare thereby, that the doctrine concerning God is enigmatical and obscure.—Notwithstanding which, we acknowledge, that the same Clemens gives another interpretation also of these sphinges, or conjecture concerning them, which may not be unworthy to be here read; τάχα δὲ καὶ ὅτι φιλεῖν τε δεῖ καὶ φοβέσθαι τὸ θεῖον· ἀγαπᾶν μὲν ὡς προσήκεις καὶ εὐμένεις τοῖς ὁσίοις, δεδιέναι δὲ ὡς ἀπαραίτητος δίκαιον τοῖς ἀνοσίοις, θηρίον γὰρ ὅμου καὶ ἀνθρώπου ἡ σφίγξ αἰνίσσεται τὴν εἰκόνα. But perhaps the meaning of those Egyptian sphinges might be also to signify, that the Deity ought both to be loved and feared; to be loved as benign and propitious to the holy, but to be feared as inexorably just to the impious, the sphinx being made up of the image both of a man and a lion.—Moreover, besides these sphinges, the Egyptians had also Harpocrates and sigalions in their temples, which are thus described by the poet;†

Quique premunt vocem, digitoque silentia suadent:

they being the statues of young men pressing their lips with their finger. The meaning of ^{De Is. c.} which Harpocrates is thus expressed by ^{Ois.} Plutarch: τὸν δὲ Ἀρποκράτην, οὐ θεὸν ἀτελῆ καὶ νήπιον, ἀλλὰ τοῦ περὶ θεῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις λόγον νιαροῦ καὶ ἀτελοῦς καὶ ἀδιαρθρώτου προστάτην καὶ σωφρονιστήν, διὸ τῇ στόματι τὸν δάκτυλόν ἔχει προσκειμένον, ἐχεμυθίας καὶ σιωπῆς σύμβολον. The Harpocrates of the Egyptians is not to be taken for an imperfect and infant God, but

* Stromat. lib. v. cap. iv. p. 664.

† Ovid, Metam. lib. ix.

for the president of men's speech concerning the gods, that is but imperfect, balbutient and inarticulate, and the regulator or corrector of the same; his finger upon his mouth being a symbol of silence and taciturnity.—It is very true, that some Christians have made another interpretation of this Egyptian Harpocrates, as if the meaning of it had been this: that the gods of the Egyptians had been all of them really nothing else but mortal men, but that this was a secret, that was to be concealed from the vulgar. Which conceit, however it be witty, yet it is devoid of truth; and doubtless the meaning of those Egyptian Harpocrates was no other than this, that either the supreme and incomprehensible Deity was to be adored with silence, or not spoken of without much caution and circumspection; or else that the arcane mysteries of theology were not to be promiscuously communicated, but concealed from the profane vulgar. Which same thing seems to have been also signified by that yearly feast kept by the Egyptians in honour of Thoth or Hermes, when the priests eating honey and figs pronounced those words, γλυκὴ ἡ ἀλήθεια, truth is sweet—as also by that amulet, which Isis was fabled to have worn about her, the interpretation whereof was φώνη ἀληθής,* true speech.

This ἀπόρρητος θεολογία, this arcane and recondite theology of the Egyptians, was concealed from the vulgar two manner of ways, by fables or allegories, and by symbols or hieroglyphics. Eusebius informs us, that Porphyrius wrote a book *Περὶ τῆς ἀλληγορουμένης Ἑλλήνων καὶ Αἰγυπτίων θεολογίας*, concerning the allegorical theology both

* De Iside et Osiride, p. 378.

of the Greeks and Egyptians.—And here by the way we may observe, that this business of allegorizing in matters of religion had not its first and only rise amongst the Christians, but was a thing very much in use among the Pagan theologers also: and therefore Celsus in Origen^a commends some of the Christians for this, that they could allegorize ingeniously and handsomely. It is well known, how both Plutarch^b and Synesius^c allegorized those Egyptian fables of Isis and Osiris, the one to a philosophical, the other to a political sense. And the Egyptian hieroglyphics, which were figures not answering to sounds or words, but immediately representing the objects and conceptions of the mind, were chiefly made use of by them to this purpose, to express the mysteries of their religion and theology, so as that they might be concealed from the profane vulgar. For which cause the hieroglyphic learning of the Egyptians is commonly taken for one and the same thing with their arcane theology, or metaphysics. And this the author of the questions and answers ad Orthodoxos^d tells us was anciently had in much greater esteem amongst the Egyptians, than all their other learning; and that therefore Moses was as well instructed in this hieroglyphic learning and metaphysical theology of theirs, as in their mathematics. And, for our parts, we doubt not, but that the *Mensa Isiaca* lately published, containing so many strange and uncouth hieroglyphics in it, was something of this ἀπόρρητος θεολογία, this arcane

^a Lib. i. p. 14. edit. Cantab.

^b De Iside et Osiride.

^c De Providentia, p. 89. oper.

^d Inter Justinii Martyris Opera, Question. et Respon. xxv p. 496.

theology of the Egyptians, and not mere history, as some imagine; though the late confident Oedipus seems to arrogate too much to himself, in pretending to such a certain and exact interpretation of it. Now as it is reasonable to think, that in all those Pagan nations, where there was another theology besides the vulgar, the principal part thereof was the doctrine of one supreme and universal Deity, the Maker of the whole world; so can it not well be conceived, what this ἀρρητός and ἀπόρρητος and ἀνεγμάρωδης θεολογία, this arcane, and mysterious, and enigmatic theology of the Egyptians, so much talked of, should be other than a kind of metaphysics concerning God, as one perfect incorporeal Being, the original of all things.

We know nothing of any moment, that can be objected against this, save only that, which Porphyrius, in his Epistle to Anebo, an Egyptian priest, writeth concerning Chæremón :^{*}

Πρ. Εὐ. lib. iii. c. iv. Χαίρημων μὲν γάρ, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι, οὐδ' ἄλλο τι πρὸ τῶν βρωμένων κόσμων ἡγοῦνται, ἐν ἀρχῇ λόγων τιθέμενοι τοὺς Αἰγυπτίων, οὐδ' ἄλλους θεοὺς, πλὴν τῶν πλανητῶν λεγομένων, καὶ τῶν συμπληροῦντων τὸν ζωδιακόν, &c. Chæremón and others acknowledge nothing before this visible and corporeal world, alleging for the countenance of their opinion such of the Egyptians, as talk of no other gods but the planets, and those stars, that fill up the zodiac, or rise together with them, their decans, and horoscopes, and robust princes, as they call them; whose names are also inserted into their almanacks or ephemerides, together with the times of

* This Epistle is prefixed to Jamblichus de Mysteriis Ægyptior, published at Oxford by Dr. T. Gale.

their risings and settings, and the prognostics or significations of future events for them. For he observed, that those Egyptians, who made the sun the demiurgus or architect of the world, interpreted the stories of Isis and Osiris, and all those other religious fables, into nothing but stars, and planets, and the river Nile, *καὶ ὁλως πάντα εἰς τὰ φυσικά, καὶ οὐδὲν εἰς ἀσωμάτους καὶ ζώσας οὐσίας ἐρμηνεύειν*, and referred all things universally into natural or inanimate, nothing into incorporeal and living substances.—Which passage of Porphyrius concerning Chæremon, we confess, Eusebius lays great stress upon, endeavouring to make advantage of it, first against the Egyptians, and then against the Greeks and other Pagans, as deriving their religion and theology from them: "It is manifest from hence, (saith he) that the very arcane theology of the Egyptians deified nothing but stars and planets, and acknowledged no incorporeal principle or demiurgic reason as the cause of this universe; but only the visible sun." And then he concludes in this manner: "See now what is become of this arcane theology of the Egyptians, that deifies nothing but senseless matter or dead inanimate bodies." But it is well known, that Eusebius took all advantages possible, to represent the Pagans to the worst, and render their theology ridiculous and absurd; nevertheless what he here urgeth against the Egyptians, is the less valuable, because himself plainly contradicts it elsewhere, declaring, that the Egyptians acknowledged a demiurgic reason and intellectual architect of the world, which consequently was the maker of the sun; and confessing the same of the other Pagans also. Now to affirm, that the Egypt-

ians acknowledged no other deity than inanimate matter and the senseless corporeal world, is not only to deny that they had any ἀπόρρητος θεολογία, any arcane theology at all (which yet hath been sufficiently proved) but also to render them absolute Atheists. For if this be not Atheism, to acknowledge no other deity besides dead and senseless matter, then the word hath no signification. Chæremón indeed seems to impute this opinion (not to all the Egyptians) but to some of them; and it is very possible, that there might be some Atheists amongst the Egyptians also, as well as amongst the Greeks and their philosophers. And doubtless this Chæremón himself was a kind of astrological Atheist; for which cause we conclude, that it was not Chæremón the Stoic, from whom notwithstanding Porphyrius in his book of Abstinence citeth certain other things concerning the Egyptians; but either that Chæremón, whom Strabo made use of in Egypt, or else some other of that name. But that there ever was or can be any such religious Atheists, as Eusebius with some others imagine, who though acknowledging no Deity, besides dead and senseless matter, notwithstanding devoutly court and worship the same, constantly invoking it and imploring its assistance, as expecting great benefit to themselves thereby; this we confess is such a thing, as we have not faith enough to believe, it being a sottishness and contradictory nonsense, that is not incident to human nature. Neither can we doubt, but that all the devout Pagans acknowledged some living and understanding deities or other; nor easily believe, that they ever worshipped any inanimate or senseless bodies, otherwise than as some way

referring to the same, or as images and symbols of them. But as for that passage in Porphyrius's Epistle concerning Chæremon, where he only propounds doubts to Anebo, the Egyptian priest, as desiring further information from him concerning them, Jamblichus hath given us a full answer to it, under the person of Abammo, another Egyptian priest, which notwithstanding hath not hitherto been at all taken notice of, because Ficinus and Scutellius, not understanding the word Chæremon to be a proper name, ridiculously turned it in their translations, *optarem* and *gauderem*, thereby also perverting the whole sense. The words in the Greek MS. (now in the hands of my learned friend Mr. Gale) run thus: * *Χαιρήμων δὲ καὶ οἱτινες ἄλλοι τῶν περὶ τὸν κόσμον ἅπτονται πρώτων αἰτίων, τὰς τελευταίας ἀρχὰς ἐξηγοῦνται, ὅσαι τε τοὺς πλανήτας, καὶ τὸν Ζωδιακόν, τοὺς δὲ δεκανοὺς, καὶ ὠροσκοπούς, καὶ τοὺς λεγομένους κραταιοὺς ἡγεμόνας παραδιδούσι, τὰς μεριστὰς τῶν ἀρχῶν διανομὰς ἀναφαίνουσι· τότε ἐν τοῖς ἀλμηνικιακοῖς μέρος τι βραχυτάτον περιέχει τῶν Ἑρμαϊκῶν διατάξεων, καὶ τὰ περὶ ἀστέρων ἢ φάσεων, ἢ κρύψεων, ἢ σελήνης αὐξήσεων, ἢ μειώσεων ἐν τοῖς ἐσχάτοις εἶχε τὴν ἐν Αἰγυπτίῳ αἰτιολογίαν φυσικά τε οὐ λέγουσιν εἶναι πάντα Αἰγύπτιοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ζωὴν, καὶ τὴν νοεράν ἀπὸ τῆς φύσεως διακρίνουσιν· οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῦ παντός μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῶν, νοῦν τε καὶ λόγον προστησάμενοι καθ' ἑαυτοὺς εἶπας, οὕτως δημιουργεῖσθαι φασὶ τὰ γινόμενα.* But Chæremon and those others, who pretend to write of the first causes of the world, declare only the last and lowest principles, as likewise they who treat of the planets, the zodiac, the decans, the horoscopes, and the robust princes. And those things, that are in the Egyptian alma-

* Jamblich. de Myster. Egyptior. sect. viii. cap. iv. p. 160.

nack (or ephemerides) contain the least part of the Hermaical institutions, namely the phases and occultations of the stars, the increase and decrease of the moon, and the like astrological matters; which things have the lowest place in the Egyptian ætiology. Nor do the Egyptians resolve all things into (senseless) nature, but they distinguish both the life of the soul and the intellectual life from that of nature, and that not only in ourselves, but also in the universe; they determining mind and reason first to have existed of themselves, and so this whole world to have been made. Wherefore they acknowledge before the heaven, and in the heaven, a living Power, and place pure mind above the world, as the Demiurgus and architect thereof.—From which testimony of Jamblichus, who was but little junior to Porphyrius, and contemporary with Eusebius, and who had made it his business to inform himself thoroughly concerning the theology of the Egyptians, it plainly appears, that the Egyptians did not generally suppose (as Chæremon pretended concerning some of them) a senseless inanimate nature to be the first original of all things, but that as well in the world as in ourselves, they acknowledged soul superior to nature, and mind or intellect superior to soul, this being the Demiurgus of the world. But we shall have afterward occasion more opportunely to cite other passages out of this Jamblichus's Egyptian mysteries to the same purpose.

Wherefore there is no pretence at all to suspect, that the Egyptians were universally Atheists and Anarchists, such as supposed no living un-

derstanding Deity, but resolved all into senseless matter, as the first and highest principle; but all the question is, whether they were not Polyarchists, such as asserted a multitude of understanding deities, self-existent or unmade. Now, that monarchy was an essential part of the arcane and true theology of the Egyptians A. Steuchus Eugubinus, and many other learned men, have thought to be unquestionably evident from the Hermetic or Trismegistic writings, they taking it for granted, that these are all genuine and sincere. Whereas there is too much cause to suspect, that there have been some pious frauds practised upon these Trismegistic writings, as well as there were upon the Sibylline; and that either whole books of them have been counterfeited by pretended Christians, or at least several spurious and supposititious passages here and there inserted into some of them. Isaac Casaubon,* who was the first discoverer, has taken notice of many such in that first Hermetic book, entitled, Pœmander; some also in the fourth book, inscribed Crater, and some in the thirteenth called the Sermon in the Mount concerning Regeneration; which may justly render those three whole books, or at least the first and last of them, to be suspected. We shall here repeat none of Casaubon's condemned passages, but add one more to them out of the thirteenth book, or Sermon in the Mount, which, however omitted by him, seems to be more rankly Christian than any other; λέγε μοι τοῦτο, τίς ἐστι γενεσιουργὸς τῆς παλιγγενεσίας; ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ παῖς, ἄνθρωπος εἷς, θελήματι θεοῦ. Tell me this

* Exercitat. i. in Baron. Num. xviii. p. 54.

also, who is the cause or worker of regeneration? The Son of God, one man by the will of God.—Wherefore, though Ath. Kircherus * contend with much zeal for the sincerity of all these Trismegistic books; yet we must needs pronounce of the three forementioned, at least Pœmander properly so called, and the Sermon in the Mount, that they were either wholly forged and counterfeited by some pretended Christians, or else had many spurious passages inserted into them. Wherefore, it cannot be solidly proved from the Trismegistic books after this manner, as supposed to be all alike genuine and sincere, that the Egyptian Pagans acknowledged one supreme and universal Numen: much less can the same be evinced from that pretended Aristotelic book, *De secretiore parte divinæ sapientiæ secundum Ægyptios*—greedily swallowed down also by Kircherus, but unquestionably pseudepigraphous.

Notwithstanding which, we conceive, that though all the Trismegistic books, that now are or have been formerly extant, had been forged by some pretended Christians, as that book of the arcane Egyptian wisdom was by some philosopher, and imputed to Aristotle; yet would they, for all that, upon another account, afford no inconsiderable argument to prove, that the Egyptian Pagans asserted one supreme Deity, viz. because every cheat and imposture must needs have some basis or foundation of truth to stand upon; there must have been something truly Egyptian in such counterfeit Egyptian writings, (and therefore this at least of one supreme Deity)

* In *Obelisco Pamphylio*, p. 35, and in *Oedipo Ægyptiaco Class.* xii. cap. iii.

or else they could never have obtained credit at first, or afterwards have maintained the same. The rather, because these Trismegistic books were dispersed in those ancient times, before the Egyptian Paganism and their succession of priests were yet extinct; and therefore had that, which is so much insisted upon in them, been dissonant from the Egyptian theology, they must needs have been presently exploded as mere lies and forgeries. Wherefore, we say again, that if all the Hermaic or Trismegistic books, that are now extant, and those to boot, which being mentioned in ancient fathers have been lost, as the *τὰ γυνικά*, and the *τὰ διζόδικα*, and the like; had been nothing but the pious frauds and cheats of Christians, yet must there needs have been some truth at the bottom to give subsistence to them; this, at least, that Hermes Trismegist, or the Egyptian priests, in their arcane and true theology, really acknowledged one supreme and univocal Numen.

But it does not follow, that, because some of these Hermaic or Trismegistic books now extant were counterfeit or supposititious, that therefore all of them must needs be such; and not only so, but those also, that are mentioned in the writings of ancient fathers, which are now lost. Wherefore, the learned Casaubon seems not to have reckoned or concluded well, when from the detection of forgery in two or three of those Trismegistic books at most, he pronounces of them all universally, that they were nothing but Christian cheats and impostures. And probably he was led into this mistake, by reason of his too securely following that vulgar error, (which yet had been confuted by Patricius) that all that was

published by Ficinus, under the name of *Hermes Trismegist*, was but one and the same book, *Pœmander*, consisting of several chapters; whereas they are all indeed so many distinct and independent books, whereof *Pœmander* is only placed first. However, there was no shadow of reason, why the *Asclepius* should have fallen under the same condemnation, nor several other books superadded by *Patricius*, they being unquestionably distinct from the *Pœmander*, and no signs of spuriousness or bastardy discovered in them. Much less ought those *Trismegistic* books cited by the fathers, and now lost, have been condemned also unseen. Wherefore, notwithstanding all that *Casaubon* has written, there may very well be some *Hermetic* or *Trismegistic* books genuine, though all of them be not such; that is, according to our after-declaration, there may be such books, as were really *Egyptian*, and not counterfeited by any *Christian*, though perhaps not written by *Hermes Trismegist* himself, nor in the *Egyptian* language. And as it cannot well be conceived, how there should have been any counterfeit *Egyptian* books, had there been none at all real; so that there were some real and genuine, will perhaps be rendered probable by these following considerations.

That there was anciently, amongst the *Egyptians* such a man as *Thoth*, *Theuth*, or *Taut*, who, together with letters, was the first inventor of arts and sciences, as arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and of the hieroglyphic learning, (therefore called by the *Greeks* *Hermes*, and by the *Latins* *Mercurius*) cannot reasonably be denied; it being a thing confirmed by general fame

in all ages, and by the testimonies not only of Sanchoniathon^a a Phœnician historiographer, who lived about the times of the Trojan war, and wrote a book concerning the theology of the Egyptians, and Manetho's Sebennyta,^b an Egyptian priest, contemporary with Ptol. Philadelphus; but also of that grave philosopher Plato, who is said to have sojourned thirteen years in Egypt, that in his *Philebus*^c speaks of him as the first inventor of letters, (who distinguished betwixt vowels and consonants determining their several numbers) there calling him either a god or divine man; but in his *Phædrus*^d attributeth to him also the invention of arithmetic, geometry and astronomy, together with some ludicrous recreations, making him either a god or demon: *ἤκουσα περὶ Ναύκρατιν τὴν Αἰγύπτου, γενέσθαι τῶν ἐκεί παλαιῶν τινὰ θεῶν, οὗ καὶ τὸ ὄρνειον τὸ ἱερὸν δὲ καὶ καλοῦσιν Ἰβιν, αὐτῷ δὲ ὄνομα τῷ δαίμονι εἶναι Θεῦθ' I have heard (saith he) that about Naucratis, in Egypt, there was one of the ancient Egyptian gods, to whom the bird Ibis was sacred, as his symbol or hieroglyphic; the name of which demon was Theuth.—In which place the philosopher subjoins also an ingenious dispute betwixt this Theuth, and Thamus, then king of Egypt, concerning the convenience and inconvenience of letters; the former boasting of that invention ὡς μνήμης καὶ σοφίας φάρμακον as a remedy for memory, and great help to wisdom—but the latter contending, that it would rather beget oblivion, by the neglect of memory, and therefore was not so properly μνήμης as ὑπομνήσεως*

^a Apud Euseb. Præpar. Evang. lib. i. cap. ix. p. 31, 32.

^b Apud Georg. Syncellum in Chron. p. 40.

^c P. 76.

^d P. 356.

φάρμακον, a remedy for memory, as reminiscence, or the recovery of things forgotten—adding, that it would also weaken and enervate men's natural faculties by slugging them, and rather beget δόξαν σοφίας, than ἀλήθειαν, a puffy conceit and opinion of knowledge—by a multifarious rabble of indigested notions, than the truth thereof. Moreover, since it is certain, that the Egyptians were famous for literature before the Greeks, they must of necessity have some one or more founders of learning amongst them, as the Greeks had: and Thoth is the only or first person celebrated amongst them upon this account, in remembrance of whom the first month of the year was called by that name. Which Thoth is generally supposed to have lived in the times of the patriarchs, or considerably before Moses; Moses himself being said to have been instructed in that learning, which owed its original to him.

Again, besides this Thoth, or Theuth, who was called the first Hermes, the Egyptians had also afterwards another eminent advancer or restorer of learning, who was called δεύτερος Ἑρμῆς, the second Hermes—they perhaps supposing the soul of Thoth, or the first Hermes, to have come into him by transmigration; but his proper Egyptian name was Siphœas, as Syncellus* out of Manetho informs us: Σιφωᾶς, ὁ καὶ Ἑρμῆς, υἱὸς Ἡφαίστου, Siphœas, (who is also Hermes) the son of Vulcan.—This is he, who is said to have been the father of Tat, and to have been surnamed Τρισημέγιος, Ter Maximus, (he being so styled by Manetho, Jamblichus, and others.) And he is placed by Eusebius^b in the fiftieth year after the Israelitish

* In Chron. p. 124.

^b In Chronico, p. 556.

Exitus, though probably somewhat too early. The former of these two Hermes was the inventor of arts and sciences; the latter, the restorer and advancer of them: the first wrote in hieroglyphics upon pillars, ἐν τῇ Συριγγικῇ γῇ, (as the learned Valesius^a conjectures it should be read, instead of Σηραδικῇ^b) which Syringes what they were, Am. Marcellinus^b will instruct us. The second interpreted and translated those hieroglyphics, composing many books in several arts and sciences; the number whereof set down by Jamblichus^c must needs be fabulous, unless it be understood of paragraphs or verses. Which Trismegistic or Hermetic books were said to be carefully preserved by the priests in the interior recesses of their temples.

But besides the hieroglyphics written by the first Hermes, and the books composed by the second, (who was called also Trismegist) it cannot be doubted, but that there were many other books written by the Egyptian priests successively in several ages. And Jamblichus informs us, in the beginning of his mysteries—That Hermes, the God of eloquence, and president or patron of all true knowledge concerning the gods, was formerly accounted common to all the priests, insomuch, that τὰ αὐτῶν τῆς σοφίας εὐρήματα αὐτῷ εἰνενθίσαν, Ἐρμοῦ πάντα τὰ οἰκεία συγγράμματα ἐπονομάζοντες, they dedicated the inventions of their wisdom to him, entitling their own books to Hermes Trismegist.—Now though one reason hereof might probably have been thought to have been

^a Not. ad Ammian. Marcellin. lib. xxii. p. 339.

^b Hist. lib. xxii. cap. xv. p. 339.

^c De Myst. Ægyptior. sect. viii. cap. i. p. 157.

this, because those books were supposed to have been written according to the tenor of the old Hermetic or Trismegistic doctrine; yet Jamblichus here acquaints us with the chief ground of it, namely this: that though Hermes was once a mortal man, yet he was afterwards deified by the Egyptians, (which is testified also by Plato) and made to be the tutelar god, and fautor of all arts and sciences, but especially theology; by whose inspiration therefore all such books were conceived to have been written. Nay, further, we may observe, that in some of the Hermaic or Trismegistic books now extant, Hermes is sometimes put for the Divine wisdom or understanding itself. And now we see the true reason, why there have been many books called Hermetical and Trismegistical; some of which, notwithstanding, cannot possibly be conceived to have been of such great antiquity, nor written by Hermes Trismegist himself, viz. because it was customary with the Egyptian priests to entitle their own philosophic and theologic books to Hermes. Moreover, it is very probable, that several of the books of the Egyptian priest of latter times were not originally written in the Egyptian language, but the Greek; because, at least from the Ptolemaic kings downward, Greek was become very familiar to all the learned Egyptians, and in a manner vulgarly spoken, as may appear from those very words, Hermes, Trismegist, and the like, so commonly used by them, together with the proper names of places; and because the Coptic language to this very day hath more of Greek than Egyptian words in it; nay, Plutarch ventures to etymologize those old Egyptian names, Isis, Osi-

mis, Horus and Typhon, from the Greek, as if the Egyptians had been anciently well acquainted with that language.

Now, that some of those ancient Hermaic books, written by Hermes Trismegist himself, or believed to be such by the Egyptians, and kept in the custody of their priests, were still in being, and extant amongst them, after the times of Christianity, seems to be unquestionable from the testimony of that pious and learned father, Clemens Alexandrinus, he giving this particular account of them, after the mentioning of their opinion concerning the transmigration of souls: "The Egyptians follow a certain peculiar philosophy of their own, which may be best declared by setting down the order of their religious procession. First, therefore, goes the precentor, carrying two of Hermes's books along with him; the one of which contains the hymns of the gods, the other directions for the kingly office. After him follows the horoscopus, who is particularly instructed in Hermes's astrological books, which are four. Then succeeds the hierogrammateus, or sacred scribe, with feathers upon his head, and a book and rule in his hands, to whom it belongeth to be thoroughly acquainted with the hieroglyphics, as also with cosmography, geography, the order of the sun and moon and five planets, the chorography of Egypt, and description of Nile. In the next place cometh the stolistes, who is to be thoroughly instructed in those ten books, which treat concerning the honour of the gods, the Egyptian worship, sacrifices, first-fruits, prayers, pomps, and festivals. And last of all marcheth

Strom. 6. p.

633.

[esp. iv. p.

757. edit.

Potteri.]

the prophet, who is president of the temple and sacred things, and ought to be thoroughly versed in those other ten books called sacerdotal, concerning laws, the gods, and the whole discipline of the priests. Wherefore, amongst the books of Hermes, there are forty-two accounted most necessary; of which thirty-six, containing all the Egyptian philosophy, were to be learned by those particular orders beforementioned; but the other six, treating of medicinal things, by the pastophori.—From which place we understand, that at least forty-two books of the ancient Hermes Trismegist, or such reputed by the Egyptians, were still extant in the time of Clemens Alexandrinus, about two hundred years after the Christian epocha.

Furthermore, that there were certain books really Egyptian, and called Hermaical or Trismegistical, (whether written by the ancient Hermes Trismegist himself, or by other Egyptian priests of latter times, according to the tenor of his doctrine, and only entitled to him) which, after the times of Christianity, began to be taken notice of by other nations, the Greeks and Latins, seems probable from hence, because such books are not only mentioned and acknowledged by Christian writers and fathers, but also by Pagans and philosophers. In Plutarch's discourse *De Iside et Osiride*, we read thus of them: *Ἐν δὲ ταῖς Ἑρμοῦ λεγομέναις βίβλοις, ἱστοροῦσι γεγράφθαι, περὶ τῶν ἱερῶν ὀνομάτων, ὅτι τὴν μὲν ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ ἡλίου περιφορᾶς τεταγμένην δύναμιν, Ὄρον, Ἕλληνες δὲ Ἀπόλλωνα καλοῦσι, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ πνεύματος, οἱ μὲν Ὅσιριν, οἱ δὲ Σάραριν, οἱ δὲ Σωθὶ Αἰγυπτιστί.* In the books called Hermes's, or Hermaical, it is reported to have been written con-

cerning sacred names, that the power appointed to preside over the motion of the sun is called by the Egyptians Horus (as by the Greeks Apollo) and that, which presides over the air and wind, is called by some Osiris, by others Sarapis, and by others Sothi, in the Egyptian language.—Now these sacred names in Plutarch seem to be several names of God; and therefore, whether these Hermaic books of his were the same with those in Clemens Alexandrinus, such as were supposed by the Egyptians to have been written by Hermes Trismegist himself, or other books written by Egyptian priests, according to the tenor of this doctrine; we may by the way observe, that, according to the Hermaical or Trismegistic doctrine, one and the same Deity was worshipped under several names and notions, according to its several powers and virtues, manifested in the world; which is a thing afterwards more to be insisted on. Moreover, it hath been generally believed, that L. Apuleius Madaurensis, an eminent Platonic philosopher, and zealous assertor of Paganism, was the translator of the Asclepian dialogue of Hermes Trismegist out of Greek into Latin; which therefore hath been accordingly published with Apuleius's works. And Barthius affirms, that St. Austin does somewhere expressly impute this version to Apuleius; but we confess we have not yet met with the place. However, there seems to be no sufficient reason, why Colvius should call this into question from the style and Latin. Again, it is certain, that Jamblichus doth not only mention these Hermaic books, under the name of τὰ φερόμενα ὡς Ἑρμοῦ, the books that are carried up and down as Hermes's, or vulgarly

imputed to him; but also vindicate them from the imputation of imposture. Not as if there were any suspicion at all of that, which Causaubon is so confident of, that these Hermaic books were all forged by Christians; but because some might then possibly imagine them to have been counterfeited by philosophers; wherefore it will be convenient here to set down the whole passage of Jamblichus* concerning it, as it is in the Greek MS. διευκρινθέντων οὖν τούτων οὕτως, καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς συγγραμμασιν οἷς λέγει ἐπιτετυχηκέναι, σαφὲς ἐστὶν ἡ διάλυσις· τὰ μὲν γὰρ φερόμενα, ὡς Ἑρμοῦ, Ἑρμαϊκὰς περιέχει δόξας, εἰ καὶ τῇ τῶν φιλοσόφων γλώττῃ πολλάκις χοῖται· μεταγέγραπται γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς Αἰγυπτίας γλώττης ὑπ' ἀνδρῶν φιλοσοφίας οὐκ ἀπίεως ἐχόντων. Χαιρήμων δὲ, &c. These things being thus discussed and determined, the solution of that difficulty, from those books which Porphyrius saith he met withal, (namely the Hermaics, and those writings of Chæremon) will be clear and easy. For the books vulgarly imputed to Hermes do really contain the Hermaic opinions and doctrines in them, although they often speak the language of philosophers; the reason whereof is, because they were translated out of the Egyptian tongue by men not unacquainted with philosophy. But Chæremon and those others, &c.—Where it is first observable, that Jamblichus doth not affirm these Hermaic books to have been written by Hermes Trismegist himself, he calling them only τὰ φερόμενα ὡς Ἑρμοῦ, the books that were carried about as Hermes's.—But that which he affirmeth of them is this, that they did really contain the Hermaical opinions, and de-

* Sect. viii. cap. iv. p. 160. edit. Gale.

rive their original from Egypt.—Again, whereas some might then possibly suspect, that these Hermaic books had been counterfeited by Greek philosophers, and contained nothing but the Greek learning in them, because they speak so much the philosophic language; Jamblichus gives an account of this also, that the reason hereof was because they were translated out of the Egyptian language by men skilled in the Greek philosophy—who therefore added something of their own phrase and notion to them. It is true, indeed, that most of these Hermaic books, which now we have, seem to have been written originally in Greek; notwithstanding which, others of them, and particularly those that are now lost, as τὰ Γενικά, and the like, might, as Jamblichus here affirmeth, have been translated out of the Egyptian tongue, but by their translators disguised with philosophic language, and other Grecanic things intermixed with them. Moreover, from the forecited passage of Jamblichus we may clearly collect, that Porphyrius in his epistle to Anebo, the Egyptian priest (of which epistle there are only some small fragments left*) did also make mention of these Hermaic writings; and whereas he found the writings of Chæremon to be contradictory to them, therefore desired to be resolved by that Egyptian priest, whether the doctrine of those Hermaic books were genuine and truly Egyptian or no. Now, Jamblichus in his answer here affirmeth, that the doctrine of the ancient Hermes, or the Egyptian theology, was as to the substance truly represented in those books, (vul-

* These fragments are prefixed to Dr. Gale's edition of Jamblichus de Myst. Egyptior.

garly imputed to Hermes) but not so by Chæremôn. Lastly, St. Cyril of Alexandria informs us, that there was an edition of these Hermaic or Trismegistic books (compiled together) formerly made at Athens under this title, *Ἑρμαϊκὰ πεντεκαίδεκα βιβλία*, fifteen Hermaic books.—Which Hermaics, Casaubon, conceiving them to have been published before Jamblichus's time, took them for those Salamihiaca, which he found in the Latin translations of Jamblichus, made by Ficinus and Scutellius; whereas, indeed, he was here abused by those translators, there being no such thing to be found in the Greek copy. But the word *ἀλμηνικακά*, (not understood by them) being turned into Salamihiaca, Casaubon therefore conjectured them to have been those Hermaic books published at Athens, because Salamin was not far distant from thence. Now, it cannot be doubted, but that this edition of Hermaic books at Athens was made by some philosopher or Pagans, and not by Christians; this appearing also from the words of St. Cyril himself, where, having spoken of Moses and the agreement of Hermes with him, he adds, *πεποιήται δὲ καὶ τοῦτου μύησιν, ἐν ἰδίᾳ συγγραφαίς, ὁ συνθετικῶς Ἀθήνησι τὰ ἐπικλην Ἑρμαϊκὰ πεντεκαίδεκα βιβλία*. Of which Moses also, who compiled and published the fifteen Hermaic books at Athens, makes mention in his own discourse—(annexed thereunto.) For thus we conceive that place is to be understood, that the Pagan publisher of the Hermaic books himself took notice of some agreement, that was betwixt Moses and

* Exercit. I. in Baronii Annal. p. 55.

Hermes. But here it is to be noted, that because Hermes and the Hermaic books were in such great credit, not only among the Christians, but also the Greek and Latin Pagans, therefore were there some counterfeit writings obtruded also under that specious title; such as that ancient botanic book mentioned by Galen, and those Christian forgeries of later times, the *Pœmander* and *Sermon on the Mount*; which being not cited by any ancient father or writer, were both of them doubtless later than Jamblichus, who discovers no suspicion of any Christian forgeries in this kind.

But Casaubon, who contends, that all the theologic books imputed to Hermes Trismegist were counterfeited by Christians, affirms all the philosophy, doctrine and learning of them (excepting what only is Christian in them) to be merely Platonical and Grecanical, but not at all Egyptian: thence concluding, that these books were forged by such Christians, as were skilled in the Platonic or Grecanic learning. But first, it is here considerable, that since Pythagorism, Platonism and the Greek learning in general was in great part derived from the Egyptians, it cannot be concluded, that whatsoever is Platonical or Grecanical, therefore was not Egyptian. The only instance, that Casaubon insists upon, is this dogma in the Trismegistic books, that nothing in the world perisheth, and that death is not the destruction, but change and translation of things only—which, because he finds amongst some of the Greek philosophers, he resolves to be peculiar to them only, and not common with the Egyptians. But since the chief design and tendency

of that dogma was plainly to maintain the immortality, pre-existence and transmigration of souls, which doctrine was unquestionably derived from the Egyptians; there is little reason to doubt but that this dogma was itself Egyptian also. And Pythagoras, who was the chief propagator of this doctrine amongst the Greeks, οὐδὲν οὐδὲ γίνεσθαι οὐδὲ φθείρεσθαι τῶν ὄντων, that no real entity (in generations and corruptions) was made or destroyed—according to those Ovidian verses before cited,

Ne perit in toto quicquam, mihi credite, mundo,
Sed variat faciemque novat. Nascique vocatur
Incipere esse aliud, &c.

did in all probability derive it, together with its superstructure, (the pre-existence and transmigration of souls, at once from the Egyptians. But it is observable, that the Egyptians had also a peculiar ground of their own for this dogma (which we do not find insisted upon by the Greek philosophers) and it is thus expressed in the eighth of Ficinus's Hermetic books or chapters; εἰ δεύτερος θεὸς ὁ κόσμος, καὶ ζῶν ἀθάνατον, ἀδύνατόν ἐστι τοῦ ἀθανάτου ζῶου μέρος τι ἀποθανεῖν· πάντα δὲ τὰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ μέρη ἐστὶ τοῦ κόσμου, μάλιστα δὲ ὁ ἄνθρωπος τὸ λογικὸν ζῶον. If the world be a second god and an immortal animal, then is it impossible, that any part of this immortal animal should perish or come to nothing; but all things in the world are parts of this great mundane animal, and chiefly man, who is a rational animal.—Which same notion we find also insisted on in the Asclepian dialogue; "Secundum deum hunc crede, o Asclepi, omnia gubernantem, omniaque mundana illustrantem animalia. Si enim animal,

mundus, vivens, semper et fuit et est et erit, nihil in mundo mortale est: viventis enim unicujusque partis, quæ in ipso mundo, sicut in uno eodemque animale semper vivente, nullus est mortalitatis locus." Where though the Latin be a little imperfect, yet the sense is this: You are to believe the world, O Asclepius, to be a second god governing all things, and illustrating all mundane animals. Now if the world be a living animal, and immortal, then there is nothing mortal in it, there being no place for mortality as to any living part or member of that mundane animal, that always liveth.—Notwithstanding which, we deny not, but that though Pythagoras first derived this notion from the Egyptians, yet he and his followers might probably improve the same farther (as Plato tells us, that the Greeks generally did what they received from the Barbarians) namely, to the taking away the qualities and forms of bodies, and resolving all corporeal things into magnitude, figure and motion. But that there is indeed some of the old Egyptian learning contained in these Trismegistic books now extant, shall be clearly proved afterwards, when we come to speak of that grand mystery of the Egyptian theology (derived by Orpheus from them) that God is all. To conclude Jamblichus's judgment in this case ought without controversy to be far preferred before Casaubon's, both by reason of his great antiquity, and his being much better skilled, not only in the Greek, but also the Egyptian learning; that the books imputed to Hermes Trismegist did *Ἑρμαϊκὰς περιέχεν δόξας*, really contain the Hermaic opinions, though they spake

sometimes the language of the Greek philosophers.

Wherefore, upon all these considerations, we conceive it reasonable to conclude, that though there have been some Hermaic books counterfeited by Christians, since Jamblichus's time, as namely the Poëmander and the Sermon on the Mount concerning Regeneration, neither of which is found cited by any ancient father; yet there were other Hermaic books, which though not written by Hermes Trismegist himself, nor all of them in the Egyptian language, but some of them in Greek, were truly Egyptian, and did, for the substance of them, contain the Hermaic doctrine. Such probably were those mentioned by the ancient fathers, but since lost, as the *τὰ Γενικά*, which seems to have been a discourse concerning the cosmogonia, and the *τὰ διὰ ἑξῶς*, and the like. And such also may some of these Hermaic books be, that are still extant; as to instance particularly, the Asclepian dialogue, entitled in the Greek *ὁ τέλειος λόγος*, the perfect oration—and in all probability translated into Latin by Apuleius. For it can hardly be imagined, that he who was so devout a Pagan, so learned a philosopher, and so witty a man, should be so far imposed upon by a counterfeit Trismegistic book, and mere Christian cheat, as to bestow translating upon it, and recommend it to the world, as that which was genuinely Pagan. But, however, whether Apuleius were the translator of this Asclepian dialogue or no, it is evident, that the spirit of it is not at all Christian, but rankly Pagan; one instance whereof we have, in its glorying of a power, that men

have of making gods; upon which account St. Austin^a thought fit to concern himself in the confutation of it. Moreover, it being extant and vulgarly known before Jamblichus's time, it must needs be included in his τὰ φερόμενα ὡς Ἑρμοῦ, and consequently receive this attestation from him, that it did contain not merely the Greekish, but the Hermaical and Egyptian doctrine.

There are indeed some objections made against this, as first, from what we read in this P. 607.
dialogue, concerning the purgation of Col.

the world, partly by water and partly by fire; “Tunc ille Dominus et pater Deus, primpotens, et unus gubernator mundi, intuens in mores fac-taque hominum, voluntate sua (quæ est dei benignitas) vitiis resistens, et corruptelæ errorem revocans, malignitatem omnem vel alluvione diluens, vel igne consumens, ad antiquam faciem mundum revocabit.” When the world becomes thus degenerate, then that Lord and Father, the supreme God, and the only governor of the world, beholding the manners and deeds of men, by his will (which is his benignity) always resisting vice, and restoring things from their degeneracy, will either wash away the malignity of the world by water, or else consume it by fire, and restore it to its ancient form again.—But since we find in Julius Firmicus,^b that there was a tradition amongst the Egyptians, concerning the apocatastasis of the world, partim per κατακλυσμὸν, partim per ἐκπύρωσιν, partly by inundation and partly by conflagration—this objection can signify nothing. Wherefore

^a De Civitate Dei, lib. viii. cap. xxiii. p. 102. tom. vii. oper.

^b Matheseos, lib. iii. cap. i. p. 34.

there is another objection, that hath some more plausibility, from that prophecy, which we find in this Asclepius, concerning the overthrow of the Egyptian Paganism (ushered in with much lamentation) in these words; "Tunc terra ista, sanctissima sedes delubrorum, sepulchrorum erit mortuorumque plenissima:" then this land of Egypt, formerly the most holy seat of the religious temples of the gods, shall be every where full of the sepulchres of dead men. The

Civ. D. l. viii.

c. xxi. [p. 166.

tom. vii.

oper.]

sense whereof is thus expressed by St. Austin: "Hoc videtur dolere, quod memoriæ martyrum nostrorum templis eorum delubrisque succederent; ut ii, qui hæc legunt, animo a nobis averso atque perverso, putent a Paganis deos cultos fuisse in templis, a nobis autem coli mortuos in sepulchris." He seems to lament this, that the memorials of our martyrs should succeed in the place of their temples; that so they, who read this with a perverse mind, might think, that by the Pagans the gods were worshipped in temples, but by us (Christians) dead men in sepulchres.—Notwithstanding which, this very thing seems to have had its accomplishment too soon after, as may be gathered from these passages of

De Cur. G. A.

l. viii. [p. 544.

tom. ii. oper.]

Theodoret: καὶ γὰρ αὐτῶν τῶν καλουμένων θεῶν τὴν μνήμην, ἐκ τῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐξήλειψαν (οἱ μάρτυρες) διανοίας. Now the martyrs have utterly abolished and blotted out of the minds of men the memory of those, who were formerly called gods.—And again, τοὺς γὰρ οἰκείους νεκροὺς ὁ δεσπότης ἀντεισῆξε τοῖς ὑμετέροισι θεοῖς, καὶ τοὺς μὲν φρονήδους ἀπέφηνε, τούτοις δὲ τὸ ἐκείνων ἀπένειμε γέρας, &c. Our Lord hath now brought his dead (that is, his martyrs) into the room and place

(that is, the temples) of the gods; whom he hath sent away empty, and bestowed their honour upon these his martyrs. For now instead of the festivals of Jupiter and Bacchus, are celebrated those of Peter and Paul, Thomas and Sergius, and other holy martyrs.—Wherefore this being so shrewd and plain a description in the Asclepian Dialogue of what really happened in the Christian world, it may seem suspicious, that it was rather a history, written after the event, than a prophecy before it, as it pretends to be: it very much resembling that complaint of Eunapius Sardianus in the life of *Ædesius*,^a when the Christians had demolished the temple of Serapis in Egypt, seizing upon its riches and treasure, that instead of the gods, the monks then gave Divine honour to certain vile and flagitious persons deceased, called by the name of martyrs. Now if this be granted, this book must needs be counterfeit and supposititious. Nevertheless, St. Austin entertained no such suspicion concerning this Asclepian passage, as if it had been a history written after the fact, that is, after the sepulchres and memorials of the martyrs came to be so frequented; he supposing this book to be unquestionably of greater antiquity. Wherefore he concludes it to be a prophecy or prediction made *instinctu fallacis spiritus*, by the instinct or suggestion of some evil spirit;—they sadly then presaging the ruin of their own empire. Neither was this Asclepian Dialogue only ancients than St. Austin, but it is cited by Lactantius Firmianus^b also under the name of *ὁ τέλειος λόγος*, the perfect oration—as was

^a In *Vitis So phistatrum*, p. 8ⁱ, 85. edit. Plantin.

^b *Divinar. Instit. lib. iv. cap. vi. p. 418.*

said before, and that as a thing then reputed of great antiquity. Wherefore, in all probability, this Asclepian passage was written before that described event had its accomplishment. And indeed if Antoninus the philosopher (as the fore-mentioned Eunapius* writes) did predict the very same thing, that after his decease, that magnificent temple of Serapis in Egypt, together with the rest, should be demolished, καὶ τὰ ἱερὰ τῶν θεῶν γενήσεσθαι, and the temples of the gods turned into sepulchres—why might not this Egyptian or Trismegistic writer receive the like inspiration or tradition; or at least make the same conjecture? III

But there is yet another objection made against the sincerity of this Asclepian dialogue, from Lactantius's citing a passage out of it for the second person in the Trinity; the Son of God; Hermes in eo libro (saith Lactantius) qui ὁ τέλειος λόγος inscribitur, his usus est verbis, ὁ κύριος καὶ ὁ πάντων ποιητής, ἐν θεῷ καθεῖν νομομίκαμεν, ἐπεὶ τὸν δεύτερον ἐποίησε θεὸν, ὁρατὸν καὶ αἰσθητὸν (αἰσθητὸν δὲ φημι οὐ διὰ τὸ αἰσθῆσθαι αὐτόν, ἀλλ' ὅτι γὰρ τοῦτου οὐκ ἔστι πῶτερον αὐτὸς αἰσθῆσθαι, ἀλλ' ὅτι εἰς αἰσθητὸν ὑποκίπτει, καὶ εἰς νοῦν) ἐπεὶ τοῦτον ἐποίησε, πρῶτον, καὶ μὴ νοῦν, καὶ ἕνα, καλὸς δὲ ἐφάνη αὐτῷ, καὶ πληρῆστατος πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἡγήσατο τε καὶ πάντα ἐφίλησεν ὡς ἴδιον τόκον.

Which we find in Apuleius's Latin translation thus rendered; "Dominus et omnium

conformator, quem recte Deum dicimus, a se secundum deum fecit, qui videri et sentiri possit; quem secundum [deum] sensibilem ita dixerim, non ideo quod ipse sentiat (de hoc enim an ipse sentiat annon alio dicemus tempore) sed eo quod videntium sensus incurrit;) quoniam ergo

* Ubi supra, p. 76.

hunc fecit ex se primum, et a se secundum, visusque est ei pulcher, utpote qui est omnium bonitate plenissimus, amavit eum ut divinitatis sue prolem" (for so it ought to be read, and not *patrem*, it being *τόκον* in the Greek). The Lord and Maker of all, whom we rightly call God, when he had made a second God, visible and sensible (I say, sensible, not actively, because himself hath sense; for concerning this, whether he have sense or no, we shall speak elsewhere but passively, because he incurs into our senses), this being his first and only production, seemed both beautiful to him, and most full of all good, and therefore he loved him dearly as his own offspring.—Which Lactantius, and after him St. Austin,* understanding of the perfect Word of God, or eternal *Λόγος*, made use of it as a testimony against the Pagans for the confirmation of Christianity; they taking it for granted, that this Hermaic book was genuinely Egyptian, and did represent the doctrine of the ancient Hermes Trismegist. But Dionysius Petavius,† and other later writers, understanding this place in the same sense with Lactantius and St. Austin, have made a quite different use of it, namely, to infer from thence, that this book was spurious and counterfeited by some Christian. To which we reply, first, that if this Hermaic writer had acknowledged an eternal *Λόγος*, or Word of God, and called it a second God and the Son of God, he had done no more in this than Philo the Jew did, who speaking of this same *Λόγος* expressly calls it *δεύτερον θεόν* and *πρωτό-*

* Vide Librum contra quinque Hæreses, cap. iii. p. 3. tom. viii. oper. Append.

† Dogmat. Theol. tom. ii. lib. ii. de Trinit. cap. ii. §. 5. p. 20.

γονον υἱὸν θεοῦ, the second God and the first-begotten Son of God. Notwithstanding which, those writings of Philo's are not at all suspected. And

Origen affirms, that some of the ancient ^{In Gen. Hom. 14.} philosophers did the like; "Multi philosophorum veterum, unum esse deum, qui cuncta creavit, dixerunt; atque in hoc consentiunt legi. Aliquantum autem hoc adjiciunt, quod Deus cuncta per verbum suum fecerit et regat, et verbum Dei sit, quo cuncta moderentur; in hoc non solum legi, sed et evangelio quoque consona scribunt." Many of the old philosophers

(that is, all besides a few atheistic ones) have said, that there is one God who created all things, and these agree with the law: but some add further, that God made all things by his Word, and that it is the Word of God, by which all things are governed; and these write consonantly not only to the law, but also to the gospel.—But whether Philo* derived this doctrine from the Greek philosophers, or from Egyptians and Hermes Trismegist, he being an Alexandrian, may well be a ^{Con. Jul. lib. i.} question. For St. Cyril doth indeed cite ^{p. 33.}

several passages out of Hermaic writings then extant to this very purpose. We shall only set down one of them here; ὁ κόσμος ἔχει ἄρχοντα ἐπικείμενον δημιουργὸν λόγον τοῦ πάντων δεσπότου, ὃς μετ' ἐκείνου πρώτη δύναμις, ἀγέννητος, ἀπέραντος, ἐξ ἐκείνου προκίνησας, καὶ ἐπικείται, καὶ ἄρχει τῶν δι' αὐτοῦ δημιουργηθέντων· ἔστι δὲ τοῦ παντελείου πρόγονος καὶ τέλειος καὶ γόνιμος υἱός. The world hath a governor set over it, that Word of the Lord of all which was the maker of it; this is the first power

* Vide Joan. Clerici Comment in xviii. priora Commata Evangel. Joannis in Hammondi Nov. Test. tom. i. p. 396. et Epist. Critic. viii. p. 223.

after himself, uncreated, infinite, looking out from him, and ruling over all things that were made by him; this is the perfect and genuine Son of the first omniperfect Being.—Nevertheless the author of the *τελειος λόγος*, or Asclepian Dialogue, in that forecited passage of his, by his second God, the son of the first, meant no such thing at all as the Christian Logos, or second person of the Trinity, but only the visible world. Which is so plain from the words themselves, that it is a wonder how Lactantius and St. Austin could interpret them otherwise, he making therein a question, whether this second God were [actively] sensible or no. But the same is farther manifested from other places of that Dialogue, as this for example: "*Æternitatis Dominus Deus primus est, secundus est mundus;*" The Lord of eternity is the first God, but the second God is the world.—And again, "*Summus qui dicitur Deus rector gubernatorque sensibilis Dei, ejus qui in se complectitur omnem locum, omnemque rerum substantiam;*" The supreme God is the governor of that sensible god, which contains in it all place and all the substance of things.—And that this was indeed a part of the Hermaic or Egyptian theology, that the visible world animated was a second god, and the son of the first God, appears also from those Hermaic books published by Ficinus, and vulgarly called *Pœmander*, though that be only the first of them. There hath been one passage already cited out of the eighth book, *δεύτερος θεός ὁ κόσμος*, the world is a second god.—After which followeth more to the same purpose; *πρῶτος γὰρ πάντων ὄντως, αἰδῖος καὶ ἀγέννητος, καὶ δημιουργὸς τῶν ὅλων θεός. δεύτερος δὲ ὁ κατ' εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ*

ὡς αὐτοῦ γινόμενος καὶ ὡς αὐτοῦ συνεχόμενος καὶ περιεχόμενος καὶ ἀθανατίζόμενος ὡς ὡς ἰδίου πατρός· The first God is that eternal unmade maker of all things; the second is he that is made according to the image of the first, which is contained, cherished, or nourished and immortalized by him, as by his own parent, by whom it is made an immortal animal.— So again in the ninth book, *πατήρ ὁ θεὸς τοῦ κόσμου, καὶ ὁ μὲν κόσμος υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ*, God is the father of the world, and the world is the son of God.— And in the twelfth, *ὁ δὲ σῶμας κόσμος οὗτος ὁ μέγας θεὸς καὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος αἰῶνος*, this whole world is a great god; and the image of a greater.—

As for the other Hermetic or Trismegistic books, published partly by Ficinus and partly by Patricius, we cannot confidently condemn any of them for Christian cheats or impostures, save only the *Pœmander*, and the Sermon in the Mount concerning Regeneration, the first and thirteenth of Ficinus's chapters or books. Neither of which books is cited by any of the ancient fathers, and therefore may be presumed not to have been extant in Jamblichus's time, but more lately forged; and that probably by one and the self-same hand, since the writer of the latter (the Sermon in the Mount) makes mention of the former (that is, the *Pœmander*) in the close of it. For that, which Casaubon objects against the fourth of Ficinus's books or chapters (entitled the *Crater*), seems not very considerable, it being questionable, whether by the *Crater* any such thing were there meant as the Christian Baptism. Wherefore, as for all the rest of those Hermaic books, especially such of them as being cited by ancient fathers, may be presumed to

have been extant before Jamblichus's time; we know no reason why we should not concur with that learned philosopher in his judgment concerning them, that though they often speak the language of philosophers, and were not written by Hermes Trismegist himself, yet they do really contain *δόξαι Ἑρμιαῖαι*, Hermaical opinions, or the Egyptian doctrine. The ninth of Ficinus's books mentions the Asclepian Dialogue, under the Greek title of *ὁ τέλειος λόγος*, pretending to have been written by the same hand; *χρὺς δ' Ἀσκληπία, τὸν τέλειον ἐποδίδωκε λόγον, νῦν δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἔμεναι ἀνέλυσθαι ἐκείνου, καὶ τὸν περὶ αἰσθήσεως λόγον δεξιλλῶ*. The meaning of which place (not understood by the translator) is this: I lately published (O Asclepius) the book entitled *ὁ Τέλειος λόγος* (or the perfect oration) and now I judge it necessary, in pursuit of the same, to discourse concerning sense.—Which book, as well as the perfect oration, is cited by Lactantius. As is also the tenth of Ficinus, called the Clavia, which does not only pretend to be of kin to the ninth, and consequently to the Asclepius likewise, but also to contain in it an epitome of that Hermaic book called *τὰ γενικά*, mentioned in Eusebius's Chronicon, *τὸν χρὺς λόγον, ὃ Ἀσκληπιά σοι ἀπέθηκεν, τὸν δὲ σήμερον δικαίον ἐστὶ τῇ Τάτῃ ἀναθῆναι, ἐπεὶ καὶ τῶν Γενικῶν λόγων, τῶν πρὸς αὐτὸν λελαλημένων ἐστὶν ἐπιτομή*. My former discourse was dedicated to thee, O Asclepius, but this to Tatius, it being an epitome of those Genica that were delivered to him. Which Genica are thus again afterward mentioned in the same book, *οὗς ἤκουσας ἐν τοῖς Γενικοῖς, ὅτι*

^a Vide Divin. Instit. lib. ii. cap. xv. p. 254.

^b Vide Scalig. ad Græca Eusebii, p. 409.

ἀπὸ μιᾶς ψυχῆς τῆς τοῦ παντός πᾶσαι αἱ ψυχαὶ εἰσιν;
 Have you not heard in the Genica, that all souls are derived from one soul of the universe?—Neither of which two places were understood by Ficinus. But doubtless this latter Hermaic book had something foisted into it, because there is a manifest contradiction found therein; forasmuch as that transmigration of human souls into brutes, which in the former part thereof is asserted after the Egyptian way, ὡς καταδικη ψυχῆς κακῆς, as the just punishment of the wicked—is afterwards cried down and condemned in it, as the greatest error. And the eleventh and twelfth following books seem to us to be as Egyptian as any of the rest; as also does that long book entitled κόρη κόσμου, the thirteenth in Patricius. Nay, it is observable, that even those very books themselves, that are so justly suspected and condemned for Christian forgeries, have something of the Hermaical or Egyptian philosophy, here and there interspersed in them. As, for example, when in the Pœmander God is twice called ἀρρενόθηλος, male and female together:—this seems to have been Egyptian (and derived from thence by Orpheus) according to that elegant passage in the Asclepian Dialogue concerning God: “Hic ergo, qui solus est omnia, utriusque sexus fecunditate plenissimus, semper voluntatis suæ pregnans, parit semper quicquid voluerit procreare:” he therefore, who alone is all things, and most full of the fecundity of both sexes, being always pregnant of his own will, always produceth whatsoever he pleaseth.—Again, when death is thus described in it, παραδιδόναι τὸ σῶμα εἰς ἀλλοίωσιν καὶ τὸ εἶδος, ὃ εἶχες, εἰς ἀφανὲς γίνεσθαι, to be nothing else but the

change of the body, and the form or life's passing into the invisible.—This agreeth with that in the eleventh book or chapter: τὴν μεταβολὴν θάνατον εἶναι, διὰ τὸ μὲν σῶμα διαλύεσθαι, τὴν δὲ ζωὴν εἰς τὸ ἀφανὲς χωρεῖν: That death is nothing but a change, it being only the dissolution of the body, and the life or soul's passing into the invisible or inconspicuous.—In which book it is also affirmed of the world, γίνεσθαι μέρος αὐτοῦ καθ' ἑκάστην ἡμέραν ἐν τῷ ἀφανῷ, that every day some part or other of it goes into the invisible, or into Hades;—that is, does not utterly perish, but only disappears to our sight, it being either translated into some other place, or changed into another form.—And accordingly it is said of animals, in the twelfth book, διαλύεται, οὐχ ἵνα ἀπόληται, ἀλλ' ἵνα νέα γένηται, that they are dissolved by death, not that they might be destroyed, but made again anew.—As it is also there affirmed of the world, that it doth πάντα ποιῆν καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἀποποιῆν, make all things out of itself, and again unmake them into itself; καὶ διαλύων πάντα ἀνανεοῖ, and that dissolving all things it doth perpetually renew them.—For that nothing in the whole world utterly perisheth, as it is often declared elsewhere in these Trismegistic writings, so particularly in this twelfth book of Ficinus, σὺμπας ὁ κόσμος ἀμετάβλητος, τὰ δὲ μέρη αὐτοῦ πάντα μεταβλητὰ, οὐδὲν δὲ φθαρτὸν ἢ ἀπολλύμενον. The whole world is unchangeable, only the parts of it being alterable; and this so, as that none of these neither utterly perisheth, or is absolutely destroyed;—πῶς μέρος τι δύναται φθαρῆναι τοῦ ἀφθάρτου, ἢ ἀπολίσθαι τι τοῦ θεοῦ; for how can any part of that be corrupted, which is incorruptible, or any thing of God perish or go to nothing?—all which, by Casaubon's leave, we take to have been originally

Egyptian doctrine, and thence in part afterward transplanted into Greece. Moreover, when in the *Pemander* God is styled more than once *φῶς καὶ ζωὴ*, light and life—this seems to have been Egyptian also, because it was Orphical. In like manner the appendix to the Sermon in the Mount, called *ὑμνοδία κρυπτή*, or the occult cantion, hath some strains of the Egyptian theology in it, which will be afterward mentioned.

The result of our present discourse is this; that though some of the Trismegistic books were either wholly counterfeited, or else had certain supposititious passages inserted into them by some Christian hand, yet there being others of them originally Egyptian, or which, as to the substance of them, do contain Hermaical or Egyptian doctrines (in all which one supreme Deity is every where asserted) we may well conclude from hence, that the Egyptians had an acknowledgment amongst them of one supreme Deity. And herein several of the ancient fathers have gone before us; as first of all Justin Martyr,* *Ἀμμων πάγκρυφον τὸν θεὸν ὀνομάζει, Ἑρμῆς δὲ σαφῶς καὶ φανερῶς λέγει, θεὸν ἀοηταί μὲν ἔστι χαλεπὸν, φράσαι δὲ ἀδύνατον*. Ammon in his books calleth God most hidden; and Hermes plainly declareth, that it is hard to conceive God, but impossible to express him.—Neither doth it follow that this latter passage is counterfeit, as Casaubon concludes, because there is something like it in Plato's *Timæus*, there being doubtless a very great agreement betwixt Platonism and the ancient Egyptian doctrine.—Thus again St. Cyprian: "*Hermes quoque Trismegistus unum Deum loquitur, eum*

De Idol. van.
[p. 226.
oper.]

* Cohortat. ad Græcos, p. 37. oper.

que ineffabilem et inestimabilem constitetur;" Hermes Trismegist also acknowledgeth one God, confessing him to be ineffable and inestimable;—which passage is also cited by St. Austin.* Lactantius likewise; "Thoth antiquissimus et instructissimus omni genere doctrine, adeo ei in multarum rerum et artium scientia Trismegisti cognomen imponeret; hic scripsit libros et quidem multos, ad cognitionem divinarum rerum pertinentes, in quibus majestatem summi et singularis Dei asserit, iisdemque nominibus appellat, quibus nos, Deum et patrem. Ac ne quis nomen ejus requireret; ἀνώνυμος esse dixit." Thoth (that is Hermes) the most ancient and most instructed in all kind of learning (for which he was called Trismegist) wrote books, and those many belonging to the knowledge of Divine things, wherein he asserts the majesty of one supreme Deity, calling him by the same names that we do, God and Father; but (lest any one should require a proper name of him) affirming him to be anonymous.—Lastly, St. Cyril^b hath much more to the same purpose also: and we must confess, that we have the rather here insisted so much upon these Hermaic or Trismegistic writings, that in this particular we might vindicate these ancient fathers from the imputation either of fraud and imposture, or of simplicity and folly.

But that the Egyptians acknowledge, besides their many gods, one supreme and all-comprehending Deity, needs not be proved from these

* De Baptismo contra Donatistas, lib. vi. §. lxxxvii. p. 126. tom. ix. oper.

^b Contra Julianum, lib. i. p. 31.

Trismegistic writings (concerning which we leave others to judge as they find cause) it otherwise appearing, not only because Orpheus (who was an undoubted assertor of monarchy, or one first principle of all things) is generally affirmed to have derived his doctrine from the Egyptians; but also from plain and express testimonies. For besides Apollonius Tyanæus's

Vol. ii. p. 22.

affirmation concerning both Indians and Egyptians, before cited, Plutarch throughout his whole book *De Iside et Osiride*, supposes the Egyptians thus to have asserted one supreme Deity, they commonly calling him τὸν πρῶτον θεόν, the first God.—Thus in the beginning of that book he tells us, that the end of all the religious rites and mysteries of that Egyptian goddess Isis, was ἡ τοῦ πρώτου, καὶ κυρίου, καὶ νοητοῦ γνώσις, ὃν ἡ θεὸς παρακαλεῖ ζητεῖν, παρ' αὐτῇ καὶ μετ' αὐτῆς ὄντα καὶ συνόντα the knowledge of that first God, who is the Lord of all things, and only intelligible by the mind, whom this goddess exhorteth men to seek, in her communion.—After which he declareth, that this first God of the Egyptians was accounted by them an obscure and hidden Deity, and accordingly he gives the reason, why they made the crocodile to be a

P. 381. symbol of him: μόνου δὲ φασιν ἐν ὕδασι δαιτυμένον, τὰς ὄψεις ὑμένα λεῖον καὶ διαφανὴ παρακαλύπτειν, ἐκ τοῦ μετώπου κατερχόμενον, ὥστε βλέπειν μὴ βλέπόμενον. ὃ τῇ πρώτῃ θεῷ συμβέβηκεν. Because they say the crocodile is the only animal, which, living in the water, hath his eyes covered by a thin transparent membrane, falling down over them, by reason whereof it sees and is not seen; which is a thing that belongs to the first God, to see all

things, himself being not seen.—Though Plutarch in that place gives also another reason why the Egyptians made the crocodile a symbol of the Deity; οὐ μὲν οὐδέ ὁ κροκόδειλος αἰτίας πιθανῆς ἀμοιροῦσαν ἔσχηκε τιμὴν, ἀλλὰ μίμημα θεοῦ λέγεται γιγνόμεναι μόνος μὲν ἀγλωσσος ὢν, φωνῆς γὰρ ὁ θεὸς λόγος ἀπροσδεής ἐστι, καὶ δι' ἀφύφον βαίνων κελεύθον καὶ δίκης τὰ θνητὰ ἄγει κατὰ δίκην. Neither were the Egyptians without a plausible reason for worshipping God symbolically in the crocodile, that being said to be an imitation of God, in that it is the only animal without a tongue. For the Divine λόγος, or reason, standing not in need of speech, and going on through a silent path of justice in the world, does without noise righteously govern and dispense all human affairs.—In like manner, Horus Apollo in his Hieroglyphics* tells us, that the Egyptians acknowledging a παντοκράτωρ and κοσμοκράτωρ, an omnipotent Being, that was the governor of the whole world,—did symbolically represent him by a serpent, ἐν μέσῳ αὐτοῦ οἶκον μέγαν δεικνύοντες, ὁ γὰρ βασιλεὺς οἶκος αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, they picturing also a great house or palace within its circumference, because the world is the royal palace of the Deity.—Which writer also gives us another reason, why the serpent was made to be the hieroglyphic of the Deity; τὸ εἰς τροφῇ χρῆσθαι τῷ ἑαυτοῦ σώματι, Lib. i. c. ii. σημαίνει, τὸ πάντα ὅσα ἐκ τῆς θείας προνοίας [p. 5.] ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ γεννᾶται, ταῦτα πάλιν καὶ τὴν μείωσιν εἰς αὐτὸν λαμβάνειν.—Because the serpent feeding as it were upon its own body, doth aptly signify, that all things generated in the world by Divine Providence are again resolved into him.—And Philo Byblius,^b

* Lib. i. cap. lxi. p. 75.

^b Apud Euseb. Præpar. Evangel. lib. i. cap. x. p. 41.

from Sanchoniathon, gives the same reason why the serpent was deified by Taut, or the Egyptian *Hermes*, ὅτι ἀθάνατον καὶ εἰς αὐτὸν ἀναλύεται, because it is immortal, and resolved into itself.—Though sometimes the Egyptians added to the serpent also a hawk, thus complicating the hieroglyphic of the Deity; according to that of a famous Egyptian priest in Eusebius, * τὸ πρῶτον ὃν θεότατον, ὅς ἐστι ἱέρακος ἔχων μορφήν, that the first and divinest being of all is symbolically represented by a serpent having the head of a hawk.—And that a hawk was also sometimes used alone for a hieroglyphic of the Deity, appeareth from that of Plutarch, † that in the porch of an Egyptian temple at Sais, were engraven these three hieroglyphics; a young man, an old man, and a hawk; to make up this sentence, that both the beginning and end of human life dependeth upon God, or Providence. But we have two more remarkable passages in the forementioned *Horus Apollo*, concerning the Egyptian theology, which must not be permitted; the first this, παρ' αὐτοῖς τοῦ παντός κόσμου τὸ διηκόν ἐστι πνεῦμα, that according to them, there is a spirit passing through the whole world, to wit, God.—And again, δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς, εἶχα θεοῦ μηδὲν ἄλλως συνεστάναι, it seemeth to the Egyptians, that nothing at all consists without God.—In the next place, Jamblichus was a person, who had made it his business to inform himself thoroughly concerning the theology of the Egyptians, and who undertakes to give an account thereof, in his answer to Porphyrius's epistle to Anebo, an Egyptian

* Præpar. Evang. lib. i. cap. x. p. 41.

† De Iside et Osiride, p. 363.

* Lib. i. cap. lxiv. p. 77. and lib. i. cap. xiii. p. 27.

priest; whose testimony therefore may well seem to deserve credit. And he first gives us a summary account of their theology after this manner: "χωριστός, ἐξηρημένος, μετέωρος, καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὸν ὑπερηπλωμένος τῶν ἐν τῇ κόσμῳ δυνάμεων τε καὶ στοιχείων, ὁ τῆς γενέσεως καὶ φύσεως ὅλης, καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς στοιχείοις δυνάμεων πασῶν, αἰτίας θεός· ἅτε δὴ ὑπέρχων τούτου, αὐλός, καὶ ἀσώματος, καὶ ὑπερφύης, ἀγέννητός τε καὶ ἀμέριστος, ὅλος ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ ἀναφανείς, προηγείται πάντων τούτων, καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ τὰ ὅλα περιέχει, καὶ διότι μὲν συνελήφε πάντα, καὶ μεταδίδωσιν· That God, who is the cause of generation and the whole nature, and of all the powers in the elements themselves, is separate, exempt, elevated above, and expanded over, all the powers and elements in the world. For being above the world, and transcending the same, immaterial, and incorporeal, supernatural, unmade, indivisible, manifested wholly from himself, and in himself, he ruleth over all things, and in himself containeth all things. And because he virtually comprehends all things, therefore does he impart and display the same from himself.—According to which excellent description of the Deity, it is plain, that the Egyptians asserting one God that comprehends all things, could not possibly suppose a multitude of self-existent deities. In which place, also, the same Jamblichus* tells us, that as the Egyptian hieroglyphic for material and corporeal things was mud or floating water, so they pictured God "in loto arbore sedentem super lutum;" sitting upon the lote-tree above the watery mud.—"Quod innuit Dei eminentiam altissimam, qua fit ut nullo modo attingat lutum ipsum. Demonstratque Dei

* Jamblich. de Myster. Egyptior. sect. vii. cap. ii. p. 151.

* Ibid. p. 151.

imperium intellectuale, quia loti arboris omnia sunt rotunda tam frondes quam fructus," &c. Which signifies the transcendent eminency of the Deity above the matter, and its intellectual empire over the world; because both the leaves and fruit of that tree are round, representing the motion of intellect.—Again, he there adds also, that the Egyptians sometimes pictured God sitting at the helm of a ship. But afterward, in the

Seg. viii. c. i.

same book, he sums up the queries, which Porphyrius had propounded to the Egyptian priest, to be resolved concerning them, in this manner: βούλει σοι δηλωθῆναι, τί τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον ἡγοῦνται εἶναι Αἰγύπτιοι; πότερον νοῦν ἢ ὑπὲρ νοῦν; καὶ μόνον ἢ μετ' ἄλλου ἢ ἄλλων; καὶ πότερον ἀσώματον ἢ σωματικόν, καὶ εἰ τῷ δημιουργῷ τὰ αὐτὰ, ἢ πρὸ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ; καὶ εἰ ἐξ ἐνὸς τὰ πάντα ἢ ἐκ πολλῶν; καὶ εἰ ὕλην ἴσασιν ἢ σώματα ποιά πρῶτον; καὶ εἰ ἀγένητον ὕλην ἢ γενητὴν; You desire to be resolved, what the Egyptians think to be the first cause of all; whether intellect or something above intellect? and that whether alone or with some other? whether incorporeal or corporeal? whether the first principle be the same with the Demiurgus and architect of the world, or before him? whether all things proceed from one or many? whether they suppose matter, or qualified bodies, to be the first? and if they admit a first matter, whether they assert it to be unmade or made?—In answer to which Porphyrian queries, Jamblichus thus begins: καὶ πρῶτον μὲν, ὃ πρῶτον ἡρώτησας, περὶ τοῦ τοῦ ἄκουε· πρὸ τῶν ἄντως ὄντων καὶ τῶν ὅλων ἀρχῶν, ἐστὶ θεὸς εἰς· πρῶτος, καὶ τοῦ πρῶτου θεοῦ καὶ βασιλέως, ἀκίνητος· ἐν μονότητι τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἐνότητος μένων· οὔτε γὰρ νοητὸν αὐτῷ ἐπιπλέκεται, οὔτε ἄλλό τι· I shall first reply to that you first demanded, that, according to the Egyptians,

before all entities and principles there is one God, who is in order of nature before (him that is commonly called) the first God and King; immovable; and always remaining in the solitariness of his own unity, there being nothing intelligible, nor any thing else complicated with him, &c.—In which words Jamblichus, and those others that follow after, though there be some obscurity (and we may perhaps have occasion further to consider the meaning of them elsewhere), yet he plainly declares, that according to the Egyptians, the first Original of all things was a perfect unity above intellect; but intimating withal, that besides this first unity, they did admit of certain other Divine hypostases (as a perfect intellect, and mundane soul) subordinate thereunto, and dependent on it, concerning which he thus writeth afterward; *τὴν πρὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, καὶ τὴν ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ ζωτικὴν δύναμιν γινώσκουσι, καθαρὸν τε νοῦν ὑπὲρ τὸν κόσμον προτιθέασιν*. The Egyptians acknowledge, before the heaven, and in the heaven, a living power (or soul) and again they place a pure mind or intellect above the world.—But that they did not acknowledge a plurality of coordinate and independent principles is further declared by him after this manner; *καὶ οὕτως ἄνωθεν ἄχρὶ τῶν τελευταίων ἢ περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν Αἰγυπτίως πραγματεία, ἀφ' ἐνὸς ἀρχεται, καὶ προέεισι εἰς πλῆθος, τῶν πολλῶν αὐθις ἀφ' ἐνὸς διακυβερνωμένων, καὶ πανταχοῦ τοῦ ἀορίστου φύσεως ἐπικρατουμένης ὑπὸ τινὸς ὁρισμένου μέτρου, καὶ τῆς ἀνωτάτω ἐνιαίας πάντων αἰτίας*. And thus the Egyptian philosophy, from first to last, begins from unity; and thence descends to multitude; the many being always governed by

^a Cap. iv. p. 160.

^b Sect. viii. cap. iii. p. 159.

the one; and the infinite or undeterminate nature every where mastered and conquered by some finite and determined measure; and all ultimately by that highest Unity, that is the first cause of all things.—Moreover, in answer to the last Porphyrian question concerning matter, whether the Egyptians thought it to be unmade and self-existent or made, Jamblichus thus replies: ἤλην δὲ παρήγαγεν ὁ θεὸς ἀπὸ οὐσιώτητος ὑποσχισθείσης ὑλότητος. That according to Hermes and the Egyptians, matter was also made or produced by God: “ab essentialitate succisa ac subscissa materialitate,”

P. 117. as Scutellius turns it. Which passage of

Jamblichus, Proclus upon the *Timæus* (where he asserts that God was ἀρρητος αἰτία τῆς ὕλης, the ineffable cause of matter) takes notice of in this manner: καὶ ἡ τῶν Αἰγυπτίων παράδοσις τὰ αὐτὰ περὶ αὐτῆς φησιν· ὁ γὰρ τοι θεὸς Ἰάμβλιχος ἰστόρησεν, ὅτι καὶ Ἑρμῆς ἐκ τῆς οὐσιώτητος τὴν ὑλότητα παράγεισθαι βούλεται, καὶ δὴ καὶ εἰκὸς καὶ τοῦτον τὸν Πλάτωνα τὴν τοιαύτην περὶ τῆς ὕλης δόξαν εἶχεν. And the tradition of the Egyptians agreeth herewith, that matter was not unmade or self-existent, but produced by the Deity: for the divine Jamblichus has recorded, that Hermes would have materiality to have been produced from essentiality, (that is, the passive principle of matter from that active principle of the Deity :) and it is very probable from hence, that Plato was also of the same opinion concerning matter; viz. because he is supposed to have followed Hermes and the Egyptians. Which indeed is the more likely, if that be true, which the same Proclus affirmeth concerning Orpheus, ὥς τε καὶ Ὀρφεὺς κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἀπὸ τῆς πρωτότης τῶν νοητῶν ὑποστάσεως παράγει τὴν ὕλην, that Orpheus also did,

after the same manner, deduce or derive matter from the first hypostasis of intelligibles, that is, from the supreme Deity. We shall conclude here in the last place with the testimony of Damascius, in his book of Principles,* writing after this manner concerning the Egyptians: Αἱγυπτίους δὲ ὁ μὲν Εὐδήμος οὐδὲν ἀκριβὲς ἱστορεῖ· οἱ δὲ Αἱγύπτιοι καθ' ἡμᾶς φιλόσοφοι γεγονότες, ἐξήνεγκαν αὐτῶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν κικρυμένην, εὐρόντες ἐν Αἱγυπτίῳ δὴ τισι λόγοις· ὥς εἶπαι κατ' αὐτοὺς ἢ μὲν μία τῶν ὅλων ἀρχὴ σκότος ἄγνωστον ὑμνουμένη, καὶ τοῦτο τρεῖς ἀναφωνούμενον οὕτως· Eudemus hath given us no exact account of the Egyptians; but the Egyptian philosophers, that have been in our times, have declared the hidden truth of their theology, having found in certain Egyptian writings, that there was, according to them, one Principle of all things, praised under the name of the unknown darkness, and that thrice repeated:—which unknown darkness is a description of that supreme Deity, that is incomprehensible.

But that the Egyptians amongst their many gods did acknowledge one supreme, may sufficiently appear also, even from their vulgar religion and theology; in which they had first a peculiar and proper name for him as such. For as the Greeks called the supreme God Ζεύς, the Latins Jupiter or Jovis, so did the Egyptians call him Hammon or Ammon, according to Herodotus,^b whose testimony to this purpose hath been already cited, and confirmed by Origen,^c who was an Egyptian born. Thus also Plutarch in his book *De Iside*,^d

* Vide Wolfii Anecd. Græc. tom. iii. p. 230.

^b Lib. ii. cap. xlii. p. 105.

^c Or rather Celsus in Origen *contra Celsum*, lib. v. p. 261.

^d Tom. ii. oper. p. 354.

τῶν πολλῶν νομιζόντων, ἴδιον παρ' Αἰγυπτίους ὄνομα τοῦ Διὸς εἶναι, τὸν Ἀμοῦν, ὃ παράγοντες ἡμεῖς Ἀμμωνα λέγομεν. It is supposed by most, that the proper name of Zeus, or Jupiter (that is, the supreme Deity) amongst the Egyptians is Amous, which the Greeks pronounce Hammon. To the same purpose Hesychius, Ἀμμοῦς ὁ Ζεὺς, Ἀριστοτέλης, Ammous, according to Aristotle, is the same with Zeus. Whence it came to pass, that by the Latin writers Hammon was vulgarly called Jupiter Hammon. Which Hammon was not only used as a proper name for the supreme Deity by the Egyptians, but also by the Arabians and all the Africans, according to that of Lucan, *

Quamvis Æthiopum populis Arabumque beatis
Gentibus, atque Indis, unus sit Jupiter Ammon.

Wherefore not only Marmarica (which is a part of Africa, wherein was that most famous temple of this Ammon) was from thence denominated Ammonia, but even all Africa, as Stephanus informs us, was sometimes called Ammonis from this god Ammon, who hath been therefore styled Ζεὺς Αἰθιοκός, the Lybian Jupiter. ^b

Indeed it is very probable, ^c that this word Hammon or Ammon was first derived from Ham or Cham, the son of Noah, whose posterity was chiefly seated in these African parts, and from whom Egypt was called, not only in the Scripture, "the land of Ham," but also by the Egyptians themselves, as Plutarch testifieth, Χῆμια, or Che-

* Lib. ix. ver. 517, 518.

^b Vide Voss. de Idolatr. lib. ii. c. xi. p. 134, 135, et Sam. Bochart. in Phaleg. lib. i. cap. i. p. 6, 7.

^c Vide Bochart. ubi supra lib. iv. cap. i. p. 204, 205. et lib. i. cap. i. p. 6, 7, et Marsham. in Canon. Chron. Sæcul. i. p. 30.

mia, and as St. Jerome, Ham; and the Coptites also to this very day call it Chemi. Nevertheless this will not hinder, but that the word Hammon, for all that, might be used afterwards by the Egyptians, as a name for the supreme God, because, amongst the Greeks Ζεύς in like manner was supposed to have been at first the name of a man or hero, but yet afterwards applied to signify the supreme God. And there might be such a mixture of herology or history, together with theology, as well amongst the Egyptians as there was amongst the Greeks. Nay, some learned men* conjecture, and not without probability, that the Zeus of the Greeks also was really the very same with that Ham or Cham, the son of Noah, whom the Egyptians first worshipped as an hero or deified man; there being several considerable agreements and correspondences between the poetic fables of Saturn and Jupiter, and the true Scripture story of Noah and Cham; as there is likewise a great affinity betwixt the words themselves; for as Cham signifies heat or fervour, so is Ζεύς derived by the Greek grammarians from Ζέω. And thus will that forementioned testimony of Herodotus in some sense be verified, that the Greeks received the names of most of their gods, even of Ζεύς himself, from the Egyptians.

Perhaps it may be granted also, that the sun was sometimes worshipped by the Egyptians under the name of Hammon; it having been in like manner sometimes worshipped by the Greeks under the name of Zeus. And the word very well agreeth herewith, חַמָּה in the Hebrew language signifying not only heat, but the sun; from whence חַמָּה

* Vide Bochart. ubi supra, lib. i. cap. i. p. 7, 8.

Chammanim, also was derived. Nevertheless, it will not follow from hence, that therefore the visible sun was generally accounted by the Egyptians the supreme Deity, no more than he was amongst the Greeks: but, as we have often occasion to observe, there was in the Pagan religion a confused jumble of herology, physiology, and theology all together. And that the notion of this Egyptian god Ammon was neither confined by them to the sun, nor yet the whole corporeal world or nature of the universe (as some have conceived), is evident from hence, because the Egyptians themselves interpreted it, according to their own language, to signify that which was hidden and obscure, as both Manetho, an ancient Egyptian priest, and Hecateus (who wrote concerning the philosophy of the Egyptians) in Plutarch agree: * *Μανηθὼς μὲν ὁ Σεβεννίτης τὸ κεκρυμμένον οἶται καὶ τὴν κρύψιν ὑπὸ ταύτης δηλοῦσθαι τῆς φωνῆς· Ἐκαταῖος δὲ Ἀβδερίτης φησὶ τούτῳ καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους τῷ ῥήματι χρῆσθαι τοὺς Αἰγυπτίους, ὅταν τινὰ προσκαλοῦνται, προσκλητικὴν γὰρ εἶναι τὴν φωνήν· διὸ τὸν πρῶτον θεὸν ὡς ἀφανῆ καὶ κεκρυμμένον ὄντα, προσκαλοῦμενοι καὶ παρακαλοῦντες, ἐμφανῆ γενέσθαι καὶ δῆλον αὐτοῖς, Ἀμοῦν λέγουσι·* Manetho Sebennites conceives the word Amoun to signify that which is hidden; and Hecateus affirmeth, that the Egyptians use this word, when they call any one to them that was distant or absent from them: wherefore the first God, because he is invisible and hidden, they as it were inviting him to approach near, and to make himself manifest and conspicuous to them, call him Amoun.—And, agreeably hereunto, Jamblichus † gives us this account of the true notion of this Eyp-

* De Iside et Osiride, p. 354. tom. ii. oper.

† De Myst. Ægypt. sect. viii. c. iii. p. 159.

tian god Ammon : ὁ δημιουργικὸς νοῦς, καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας προστάτης, καὶ σοφία ἐρχόμενος μὲν ἐπὶ γένεσιν, καὶ τὴν ἀφανῆ τῶν κεκρυμμένων λόγων δύναμιν εἰς φῶς ἄγων, Ἀμμὼν κατὰ τὴν τῶν Αἰγυπτίων γλῶσσαν λέγεται. The demiurgical Intellect, and President of Truth, as with wisdom it proceedeth to generation, and produceth into light the secret and invisible powers of the hidden reasons, is, according to the Egyptian language, called Hammon.—Wherefore we may conclude, that Hammon, amongst the Egyptians, was not only the name of the supreme Deity, but also of such a one as was hidden, invisible and incorporeal.

And here it may be worth our observing, that this Egyptian Hammon was in all probability taken notice of in Scripture, though vulgar interpreters have not been aware thereof. For thus we understand that of Jeremy xli. 25. “The Lord of hosts, the God of Israel saith, behold I will ~~xxx~~ ~~xxx~~ (that is, not the multitude of Noe, but) Ammon (the God) of Noe, and Pharaoh and Egypt with her (other) gods and kings, and all that trust in him; I will deliver them into the hands of those that seek their lives, and into the hands of Nebuchadnezzar, king of Babylon.” For the understanding of which place, we must observe, that according to the language of those ancient Pagans, when every country or city had their peculiar and proper names, for the gods presiding over them or worshipped by them, the several nations and places were themselves commonly denoted and signified by the names of those their respective gods. With which kind of language the Scripture itself also complieth; as when the Moabites are called in it—the people of Chemosh, (Numbers xxi.) and when the gods of

Damascus are said to have smitten Ahaz, because the Syrians smote him. (2 Chron. xxviii.) Accordingly whereunto also, whatsoever was done or attempted against the several nations or countries, is said to have been done or attempted against their gods. Thus Moab's captivity is described, Jeremy xlviii. "Thou shalt be taken, and Chemosh shall go into captivity." And the overthrow of Babylon is predicted after the same manner, in the prophecy of Isaiah, chap. xlv. "Bell boweth down, Nebo stoopeth, themselves are gone into captivity." And also the same is threatened in that of Jeremy, ch. li. "I will visit Bell in Babylon, and will bring out of his mouth that which he hath swallowed up, and the nations shall not flow unto him any more, for the wall of Babylon shall be broken down." Now Bell, according to Herodotus,* was a name for the supreme god amongst the Babylonians, as well as Ammon was amongst the Egyptians; who notwithstanding by both of them was worshipped after an idolatrous manner. And therefore, as in these latter places, by the visiting and punishing of the Babylonians, so in that former place of Jeremy, by the visiting of Ammon, and the gods of Egypt, is understood the visiting of the Egyptians themselves; accordingly as it is there also expressed. No was, it seems, the metropolis of all Egypt; and therefore Ammon, the chief god of those ancient Egyptians, and of that city, was called Ammon of No. As likewise the city No is denominated from this god Ammon in the Scripture, and called both No-Ammon and Ammon-No.

* This seems to be a mistake for Diodorus Siculus, who mentions it, lib. ii. p. 89.

The former in the prophecy of Nahum, chap. iii. "Art thou better than No-Ammon?" or that No in which the god Ammon is worshipped? Which is not to be understood of the oracle of Ammon in Marnarica, as some have imagined* (they taking No for an appellative, and so to signify habitation;) it being unquestionably the proper name of a city in Egypt. The latter in that of Ezekiel, chap. xxx. "I will pour out my fury upon Sin, the strength of Egypt, and will cut off Hammon-No." In which place as by Sin is meant Pelusium, so Hammon-No, by the Seventy, is interpreted Diospolis, the city of Jupiter; that is, the Egyptian Jupiter, Hammon. Which Diospolis was otherwise called the Egyptian Thebes, (anciently the metropolis of all Egypt) but whose proper name, in the Egyptian language, seems to have been No; which from the chief god there worshipped was called both No-Ammon and Hammon-No; as that god himself was also denominated from the city, Ammon of No. And this is the rather probable, because Plato In Phædro, [p. 356. oper.] tells us expressly, that Ammon was anciently the proper or chief god of the Egyptian Thebes or Diospolis, where he speaks of Theuth or Thoth, the Egyptian Hermes, in these words: βασιλεύς δ' αὖ τότε ὄντος Αἰγύπτου ὅλης Θαμοῦ, περὶ τὴν μεγάλην πόλιν τοῦ ἄνω τόπου, ὃν οἱ Ἕλληνες Αἰγυπτίας Θήβας καλοῦσι καὶ τὸν θεὸν Ἀμμωνα. Thamus was then king over all Egypt, reigning in that great city (the metropolis thereof) which the Greeks call the Egyptian Thebes, and whose God was Ammon. But whereas the prophet

* Voss. de Idol. lib. i. cap. xxxii. p. 89.

Nabum (who seems to have written after the completion of that judgment upon No, predicted both by Jeremy and Ezekiel) describes the place, as situate among the rivers, and having the sea for its wall and rampart; whence many learned men^a have concluded, that this was rather to be understood of Alexandria than Diospolis (notwithstanding that Alexandria was not then in being, nor built till a long while after, in Alexander the Great's time): this may very well, as we conceive, be understood of Egypt in general, whose metropolis this No was; that it was situate amongst the rivers, and had the seas for its wall and rampart, the Red and Mediterranean. And thus much for the Egyptian Jupiter, or their supreme Deity, called by them Hammon.

There is an excellent monument of Egyptian antiquity preserved by Plutarch^b and others, from whence it may be made yet further evident, that the Egyptians did not suppose a multitude of unmade, self-existent deities, but acknowledged one supreme, universal and all-comprehending Numen. And it is that inscription upon the temple at Sais; *Ἐγώ εἰμι πᾶν τὸ γεγονός, καὶ ὄν, καὶ ἐσόμενον, καὶ τὸν ἐμὸν πέπλον οὐδεὶς πω θνητὸς ἀπεκάλυψεν*, I am all that hath been, is, and shall be, and my peplum or veil no mortal hath ever yet uncovered.—Which though perhaps some would understand thus, as if that Deity therein described were nothing but the senseless matter of the whole corporeal universe, according to that opinion of Chæremon beforementioned and confuted; yet it

^a The Chaldean Interpreter, St. Jerome, Drusius, and many others, Vid. Voss. ubi *supra*.

^b De Iside et Osir. p. 354. tom. ii. oper.

is plain, that this could not be the meaning of this inscription: first, because the god here described is not a mere congeries of disunited matter, or aggregation of divided atoms, but it is some one thing, which was all: according to that other inscription upon an altar dedicated to the goddess Isis, which we shall also afterward make use of, "Tibi, una, quæ es omnia;" To thee, who being one, art all things.—Again, in the Deity here described, there is both a veil or outside, and also something hidden and recondite; the sense seeming to be this: I am all that was, is, and shall be; and the whole world is nothing but myself veiled; but my naked and unveiled brightness no mortal could ever yet behold or comprehend. Which is just as if the sun should say, I am all the colours of the rainbow (whose mild and gentle light may easily be beheld) and they are nothing but my simple and uniform lustre, variously refracted and abated; but my immediate splendour and the brightness of my face no mortal can contemplate, without being either blinded or dazzled by it. Wherefore this description of the Deity may seem not a little to resemble that description, which God makes of himself to Moses, "Thou shalt see my back parts, but my face shall not be seen." Where there is also something exterior and visible in the Deity, and something hidden and recondite, invisible and incomprehensible to mortals. And Philo thus glosseth upon those words: αὐταρκές ἐστι σοφῶν, τὰ ἀκόλουθα καὶ ὅσα μετὰ τὸν Θεὸν γινῶναι, τὴν δὲ ἡγεμονικὴν οὐσίαν ὁ βουλόμενος καταθεάσασθαι, τῷ περιανγί τῶν ἀκτίρων πρὶν ἰδεῖν πηρὸς ἔσται. It is sufficient for

<sup>Ἀφανὲς ἔμεν
καὶ ἑμφανὲς</sup>
Proclus of this
Egyptian God,
that it was
both invisible
and manifest.
In *Timæe*.
p. 30.

P. 474. [i-
bro de Pro-
fusis.]

a wise man to know God *a posteriori*, or from his effects; but whosoever will needs behold the naked essence of the Deity, will be blinded with the transcendent radiancy and splendour of his beams.—Whereas, according to Philo, the works of God, as manifesting the attributes of his power, goodness and wisdom, are called the back parts of the Deity; so are they here in this inscription called the peplum, the veil and exterior garment of it, or else God himself veiled. Wherefore it is plain, that the Deity here described cannot be the mere visible and corporeal world as senseless and inanimate, that being all outside and exposed to the view of sense, and having nothing hidden or veiled in it. But, thirdly, this will yet be more evident, if we do but take notice of the name of this God, which was here described, and to whom that temple was dedicated; and that was in the Egyptian language Neith, the same with *Ἀθηνᾶ* amongst the Greeks, and Minerva amongst the Latins; by which is meant wisdom or understanding: from whence it is plain, that the inscription is to be understood not of such a god as was merely senseless matter (which is the god of the Atheists) but a mind. Athenagoras* tells us, that the Pagan theologers interpreted τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν, or Minerva, to be τὴν φρόνησιν διὰ πάντων διήκουσαν, wisdom or mind passing and diffusing itself through all things—than which there cannot be a better commentary on this inscription. Wherefore it may be here observed, that those Pagans, who acknowledged God to be a mind, and incorporeal being secrete from

Neith, in
Procl. upon
Plato's Tim.
p. 30.

* Legat. pro Christianis, cap. xix. p. 86.

matter, did notwithstanding frequently consider him, not abstractly by himself alone, but concretely together with the result of his whole fecundity, or as displaying the world from himself, and diffusing himself through all things, and being in a manner all things. Accordingly, we learned before from Horus Apollo, that the Egyptians by God meant a spirit diffusing itself through the world, and intimately pervading all things; and that they supposed that nothing at all could consist without God. And after this manner, Jamblichus in his *Mysteries** interprets the meaning of this Egyptian inscription: for when he had declared that the Egyptians did, both in their doctrine and their priestly hierurgies, exhort men to ascend above matter, to an incorporeal Deity, the maker of all, he adds, *ὑψηλίστατο δὲ καὶ ταύτην τὴν οὐδὸν ὁ Ἑρμῆς, ἡρμήνευσε δὲ Βίβλος προφήτης Ἀμμων βασιλεῦ, ἐν αὐτοῖς εὐροὴν ἀνάγεγραμμένην, ἐν ἱερογλυφικοῖς γράμμασι κατὰ Σάιν τὴν ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ, τότε τοῦ Θεοῦ ὄνομα παρέδωκε τὸ διῆκον δι' ὅλου τοῦ κόσμου*. Hermes also propounded this method, and Bythis, the prophet, interpreted the same to King Ammon, having found it written in hieroglyphic letters in the temple of Sais in Egypt; as he also there declared the name of that God, who extends or diffuses himself through the whole world.—And this was Neith, or Athena, that God thus described, “I am all that was, is, and shall be, and my peplum or veil no mortal could ever uncover.” Where we cannot but take notice also that whereas the Athena of the Greeks was derived from

μία τῶν θεῶν πάλαι ἱσοῦς τῆς τοῦ Σάους καὶ τοῦ Ἀθηνῶν Sais and Athens had one and the same tutelary god. Procl. in Tim. p. 30. Where also

* De Myster. Egypt. sect. viii. cap. v. p. 164.

Theopompas
affirmeth the
Athenians to
have been a
colony of the
Saites.

the Egyptian Neith, that she also was famous for her peplum too, as well as the Egyptian goddess. "Peplum (saith Servius) est proprie palla picta foeminea, Minervæ consecrata;" Peplum is properly a womanish pall or veil, embroidered all over, and consecrated to Minerva.—Which rite was performed at Athens, in the great Panathenaics, with much solemnity, when the statue of this goddess was also by those noble virgins of the city, who embroidered this veil, clothed all over therewith. From whence we may probably conclude, that the statue of the Egyptian Neith also, in the temple of Sais, had likewise, agreeably to its inscription, such a peplum or veil cast over it, as Minerva or Arthemis at Athens had; this hieroglyphically to signify, that the Deity was invisible and incomprehensible to mortals, but had veiled itself in this visible corporeal world, which is, as it were, the peplum, the exterior variegated or embroidered vestment of the Deity. To all which considerations may be added, in the last place, what Proclus hath recorded, that there was something more belonging to this Egyptian inscription, than what is mentioned by Plutarch; namely these words: *καὶ ὃν ἔτεκεν κέρον*, *ἄλιος ἐγένετο*, and the sun was the fruit or offspring, which I produced:—from whence it is manifest, that, according to the Egyptians, the sun was not the supreme Deity, and that the God here described, was, as Proclus also observeth, *δημιουργικὸς θεός*, a demiurgical Deity, the Creator of the whole world, and of the sun. Which supreme incorporeal Deity was, notwithstanding, in their theo-

In Time.
p. 39.

logy said to be all things, because it diffused itself through all.

Wherefore, whereas Plutarch * cites this passage out of Hecatæus, concerning the Egyptians, τὸν πρῶτον θεὸν τῷ Παντὶ τὸν αὐτὸν νομίζουσιν, that they take the first God, and the universe, for one and the same thing ;—the meaning of it cannot be, as if the first or supreme God of the Egyptians were the senseless corporeal world, Plutarch himself in the very next words declaring him to be ἀφανὴ καὶ κεκρυμμένον, invisible and hidden—whom therefore the Egyptians, as inviting him to manifest himself to them, called Hammon ; as he elsewhere affirmeth, That the Egyptians' first God, or supreme Deity, did see all things, himself being not seen.—But the forementioned passage must needs be understood thus, that according to the Egyptians, the first God, and τὸ Πάν, or the universe, were synonymous expressions, often used to signify the very same thing ; because the first supreme Deity is that, which contains all things, and diffuseth itself through all things. And this doctrine was from the Egyptians derived to the Greeks, Orpheus declaring, ἐν τι τὰ πάντα, that all things were one—and after him Parmenides and other philosophers, ἐν εἶναι τὸ πᾶν, that one was the universe or all—and that τὸ πᾶν was ἀκίνητον, that the universe was immoveable—they meaning nothing else hereby, but that the first supreme Deity was both one and all things, and immoveable. And thus much is plainly intimated by Aristotle in these words : εἰσὶ δὲ τινες οἱ περὶ τοῦ παντός ὡς ἂν μᾶς οὐσας φύσιν ἀκίνησαντο. Metaph. l. i.
[cap. v. p. 270
tom. iv. oper.]

There are some, who pronounced concerning the whole universe, as being but

* De Iside et Osir. p. 364. tom. ii. oper.

one nature—that is, who called the supreme Deity τὸ πᾶν, or the universe—because that virtually contained all things in it.

Nevertheless τὸ πᾶν, or the universe, was frequently taken by the Pagan theologers also, as we have already intimated, in a more comprehensive sense, for the Deity, together with all the extent of its fecundity, God as displaying himself in the world; or, for God and the world both together; the latter being looked upon as nothing but an emanation or efflux from the former. And thus was the word taken by Empedocles in Plutarch,* when he affirmed, οὐ τὸ πᾶν εἶναι τὸν κόσμον, ἀλλ' ὀλίγον τι τοῦ παντός μέρος, that the world was not the universe, but only a small part thereof.—And according to this sense was the god Pan understood both by the Arcadians and other Greeks, not for the mere corporeal world as senseless and inanimate, nor as endued with a plastic nature only (though this was partly included in the notion of Pan also) but as proceeding from a rational and intellectual principle, diffusing itself through all; or for the whole system of things, God and the world together, as one Deity. For that the Arcadic Pan was not the corporeal world alone, but chiefly the intellectual ruler and governor of the same, appears from this testimony of Macrobius;† “Hunc Deum Arcades colunt, appellantes τὸν τῆς ὕλης κύριον, non sylvarum dominum, sed universæ substantiæ materialis dominatorem:” the Arcadians worship this god Pan (as their most ancient and honourable god) calling him the Lord of Hyle, that is, not the Lord of the woods,

* De Placit. Philos. lib. i. cap. v. p. 879.

† Saturnal, lib. i. cap. xxi. p. 807.

but the Lord or dominator over all material substance. And thus does Phornutus^a likewise describe the Pan of the other Greeks, not as the mere corporeal world, senseless and inanimate; but as having a rational and intellectual principle for the head of it, and presiding over it; that is, for God and the world both together, as one system; the world being but the efflux and emanation of their Deity. The lower parts of Pan (saith he) were rough and goatish, because of the asperity of the earth; but his upper parts of a human form, because the ether being rational and intellectual, is the Hegemonic of the world:" adding hereunto, that "Pan was feigned to be lustful or lascivious, because of the multitude of spermiatic reasons contained in the world, and the continual mixtures and generations of things; to be clothed with the skin of a libbard, because of the bespangled heavens, and the beautiful variety of things in the world; to live in a desert, because of the singularity of the world; and, lastly, to be a good demon, by reason of the *ὑποστάσις αὐτοῦ λόγος*, that supreme mind, reason, and understanding, that governs all in it." Pan therefore was not the mere corporeal world senseless and inanimate, but the Deity as displaying itself therein, and pervading all things. Agreeable to which, Diodorus Siculus^b determines, that Πάν and Ζεὺς were but two several names for one and the same Deity (as it is well known, that the whole universe was frequently called by the Pagans Jupiter, as well as Pan). And Socrates

^a Libro de Natura Deor. cap. xxvii. p. 263. inter Scriptor. Mythol.
^b Tho. Gale editos.

^c Lib. i. p. 7.

himself in Plato* directs his prayer, in a most devout and serious manner, to this Pan; that is, not the corporeal world or senseless matter, but an intellectual principle ruling over all, or the supreme Deity diffusing itself through all; he therefore distinguishing him from the inferior gods: *ὦ φίλε Παν, καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσοι τῇδε θεοὶ, δαίητέ μοι καλῶ γενέσθαι τάνδ' ὅθεν τὰζῶθεν δὲ ὅσα ἔχω, τοῖς ἐντὸς εἶναι μοι φίλια.* O good (or gracious) Pan, and ye other gods, who preside over this place, grant that I may be beautiful or fair within, and that those external things, which I have, may be such as may best agree with a right internal disposition of mind, and that I may account him to be rich, that is wise and just.—The matter of which prayer, though it be excellent, yet it is paganically directed to Pan (that is, the supreme god) and the inferior gods both together. Thus we see, that as well according to the Greeks, as the Egyptians, the first or supreme God, and τὸ πᾶν, or the universe, were really the same thing.

And here we cannot but by the way take notice of that famous and remarkable story of Plutarch's in his *Defect of Oracles*, concerning demons lamenting the death of the great Pan.—In the time of Tiberius (saith he) certain persons embarking from Asia for Italy, towards the evening sailed by the Echinades, where being becalmed, they heard from thence a loud voice calling one Thamous, an Egyptian mariner amongst them, and after the third time commanding him, when he came to the Palodes, to declare, that the great Pan was dead. He with the advice of his company resolved, that if they had a quick

* In *Phædro*, p. 358. oper.

gale, when they came to the Palodes, he would pass by silently; but if they should find themselves there becalmed, he would then perform what the voice had commanded: but when the ship arrived thither, there neither was any gale of wind nor agitation of water. Whereupon Thamous looking out of the hinder deck towards the Palodes, pronounced these words with a loud voice, *ὁ μέγας Πάν τέθνηκε*, the great Pan is dead— which he had no sooner done, but he was answered with a choir of many voices, making a great howling and lamentation, not without a certain mixture of admiration. Plutarch, who gives much credit to this relation, adds, how solicitous Tiberius the emperor was, first, concerning the truth thereof; and afterwards, when he had satisfied himself therein, concerning the interpretation; he making great inquiry amongst his learned men, who this Pan should be. But the only use, which that philosopher makes of this story, is this, to prove that demons, having bodies as well as men, (though of a different kind from them, and much more longeve) yet were notwithstanding mortal; he endeavouring from thence to solve that phenomenon of the defect of oracles, because the demons, who had formerly haunted those places, were now dead. But this being an idle fancy of Plutarch's, it is much more probably concluded by Christian writers, that this thing coming to pass in the reign of Tiberius, when our Saviour Christ was crucified, was no other than a lamentation of evil demons (not without a mixture of admiration) upon account of our Saviour's death happening at that very time; they not mourning out of love for him that was dead, but as sadly

presaging evil to themselves from thence, as that which would threaten danger to their kingdom of darkness, and a period to that tyranny and domination which they had so long exercised over mankind; according to such passages of scripture as these: "Now is the prince of this world judged; and having spoiled principalities and powers (by his death upon the cross) he triumphed over them in it." Now our Saviour Christ could not be called Pan, according to that notion of the word, as taken for nothing but the corporeal world devoid of all manner of life, or else as endued only with a plastic nature; but this appellation might very well agree to him, as Pan was taken for the λόγος προεστώς τοῦ κόσμου, that reason and understanding, by which all things were made, and by which they are all governed; or for φρόνησις διὰ πάντων δεικνύσα, that Divine wisdom, which diffuseth itself through all things.—Moreover, Pan being used not so much for the naked and abstract Deity, as the Deity as it were embodied in this visible corporeal world, might therefore the better signify God manifested in the flesh, and clothed with a particular human body (in which respect alone he was capable of dying). Neither indeed was there any other name, in all the theology of the Pagans, that could so well besit our Saviour Christ as this.

We have now made it manifest, that according to the ancient Egyptian theology, (from whence the Greekish and European were derived) there was one intellectual Deity, one mind or wisdom, which as it did produce all things from itself, so doth περιέχειν τὸ ὅλον, contain and comprehend the whole—and is itself in a manner all things. We

think fit in the next place to observe, how this point of the old Egyptian theology, viz. God's being all things, is every where insisted upon throughout the Hermaic or Trismegistic writings. We shall begin with the Asclepian Dialogue or the *τέλειος λόγος*, translated into Latin by Apuleius; in the entrance of which, the writer having declared, "*Omnia unius esse, et unum esse omnia*," that all things were of one, and that one was all things, he afterwards adds this explication thereof: "*Nonne hoc dixi, Omnia unum esse, et unum omnia, utpote quia in creatore fuerint omnia, antequam creasset omnia? Nec immerito unus est dictus omnia, cujus membra sunt omnia. Hujus itaque, qui est unus omnia, vel ipse est Creator omnium, in tota hac disputatione curato meminisse.*" Have we not already declared, that all things are one, and one all things? forasmuch as all things existed in the Creator, before they were made; neither is he improperly said to be all things, whose members all things are. Be thou therefore mindful in this whole disputation of him, who is one and all things, or was the creator of all. And thus afterwards does he declare, that all created things were in the Deity before they were made; "*Idcirco non erant quando nata non erant, sed in eo jam tunc erant unde nasci habuerant*;" they did not properly then exist before they were made, and yet at that very time were they in him, from whom they were afterwards produced. Again, he writes thus concerning God: "*Non spero totius majestatis effectorem, omnium rerum patrem vel dominum, uno posse quamvis e multis composito nomine nuncupari. Hunc voca potius omni nomine, siquidem sit unus et omnia*;

ut necesse sit aut omnia ipsius nomine, aut ipsum omnium nomine nuncupari. Hic ergo solus omnia," &c. I cannot hope sufficiently to express the author of majesty, and the father and lord of all things, by any one name, though compounded of never so many names. Call him therefore by every name, forasmuch as he is one and all things; so that of necessity, either all things must be called by his name, or he by the names of all things.—And when he had spoken of the mutability of created things, he adds;

P. 612. Col. v.

"Solus deus ipse in se, et a se, et circum se, totus est plenus atque perfectus; isque sua firma stabilitas est; nec alicujus impulsu, nec loco moveri potest, cum in eo sint omnia, et in omnibus ipse est solus." God alone, in himself, and from himself, and about himself, is altogether perfect; and himself is his own stability. Neither can he be moved or changed, by the impulse of any thing, since all things are in him, and he alone is in all things.—Lastly, to omit other places, "Hic

P. 617.

sensibilis mundus receptaculum est omnium sensibilium specierum, qualitatum, vel corporum; quæ omnia sine Deo vegetari non possunt: Omnia enim Deus, et a Deo omnia, et sine hoc, nec fuit aliquid, nec est, nec erit; omnia enim ab eo, et in ipso, et per ipsum.—Si totum animadvertes, vera ratione perdisces, mundum ipsum sensibilem, et quæ in eo sunt omnia, a superiore illo mundo, quasi vestimento, esse connecta." This sensible world is the receptacle of all forms, qualities, and bodies, all which cannot be vegetated and quickened without God: for God is all things, and all things are from God, and all things the effect of his will; and without

God there neither was any thing, nor is nor shall be; but all things are from him, and in him, and by him—and if you will consider things after a right manner, you shall learn, that this sensible world, and all the things therein, are covered all over with that superior world (or Deity) as it were with a garment.—As for the other Trisemicistic books of Ficinus's edition, the third of them, called *ιερός λόγος*, is thus concluded; *τό γάρ θεόν ἢ πᾶσα κοσμική σύγκρασις, φύσει ἀναθεωρουμένη· ἐν γάρ τῷ θεῷ καὶ ἡ φύσις συγκαθίστηται*. The Divinity is the whole mundane compages, or constitution; for nature is also placed in the Deity.—In the fifth book, written upon this argument, *ὅτι ἀφανὴς θεὸς φανερώτατός ἐστι*, that the invisible God is most manifest—we read thus: *οὐδὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἐν παντὶ ἐκείνῳ, ὃ οὐκ ἐστὶν αὐτός, ἐστὶν αὐτός καὶ τὰ ὄντα· καὶ μὴ ὄντα· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὄντα αὐτὸς ἐφάνερωσε· τὰ δὲ μὴ ὄντα ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ*. For there is nothing in the whole world, which he is not; he is both the things that are, and the things that are not; for the things that are, he hath manifested; but the things that are not, he contains within himself.—And again, *οὗτος δ' ἀσώματος καὶ ὁ πολυσώματος· μᾶλλον δὲ παντὸς σώματος οὐδὲν ἐστὶν, ὃ οὗτος οὐκ ἐστὶ· πάντα γὰρ αὐτῷ ἐστὶ, καὶ ὁμοίως ἐστὶ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο αὐτὸς ὀνόματα ἔχει πάντα, ὅτι ἑνὸς ἐστὶ πατρός· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὄνομα οὐκ ἔχει, ὅτι πάντων ἐστὶ πατήρ*. He is both incorporeal and omnicorporeal, for there is nothing of any body, which he is not; he is all things that are, and therefore he hath all names, because all things are from one father; and therefore he hath no name, because he is the Father of all things.—And in the close of the same book: *ὑπὲρ τίνος σε ὑμνήσω, ὑπὲρ ὧν ἐποίησας, ἢ ὑπὲρ ὧν οὐκ ἐποίησας; ὑπὲρ ὧν ἐφάνερωσας, ἢ ὑπὲρ ὧν ἐκρίβας; διὰ τί*

δε καὶ ὑμνήσω σε; ὥς ἐμαυτοῦ ὦν; ὡς ἔχων τι ἴδιον; ὡς ἄλλος
 ὦν; σὺ εἰ γὰρ ὁ ἰᾶν ὦ· σὺ εἰ δὲ ποιῶ· σὺ εἰ δὲ ἂν λέγω· σὺ γὰρ
 πάντα εἰ, τὸ ἄλλο οὐδέν ἐστιν ὃ μὴ εἰ· σὺ πᾶν τὸ γεγόμενον,
 σὺ τὸ μὴ γεγόμενον· For what shall I praise thee?
 for those things which thou hast made, or for
 those things which thou hast not made? for
 those things which thou hast manifested, or for
 those things which thou hast hidden and con-
 cealed within thyself? And for what cause shall
 I praise thee? because I am my own, as having
 something proper, and distinct from thee? thou
 art whatsoever I am; thou art whatsoever I
 do, or say, for thou art all things, and there is
 nothing which thou art not; thou art that which
 is made, and thou art that which is unmade.—
 Where it is observable, that before things were
 made, God is said κρύπτειν, to hide them within
 himself:—but when they are made, φανερῶν, to
 manifest and reveal them from himself.—Book the
 eighth, νόησον ὅτι ὁ μὲν κόσμος ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ἐν τῷ
 θεῷ, ἀρχὴ δὲ καὶ περιοχὴ καὶ σύστασις πάντων ὁ θεός· Un-
 derstand that the whole world is from God, and in
 God; for God is the beginning, comprehension and
 constitution of all things.—Book the ninth, μᾶλλον
 δὲ λέγω ὅτι οὐκ αὐτὸς αὐτὰ ἔχει, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἀποφαίνο-
 μαι, αὐτὸς ἅπαντ' ἐστιν· οὐκ ἔξωθεν αὐτὰ προσλαμβάνων, ἔξω
 δὲ ἐπιδιδούς· I would not say, that God hath all
 things, but rather declare the truth, and say that he
 is all things; not as receiving them from without,
 but as sending them forth from himself.—Again, af-
 terward in the same book, καὶ οὐκ ἔσται πότε χρόνος,
 ὅτε ἀπολειφθήσεται τι τῶν ὄντων· ὅταν δὲ λέγω τῶν ὄντων,
 λέγω τοῦ θεοῦ· τὰ γὰρ ὄντα ὁ θεὸς ἔχει, καὶ οὔτε αὐτοῦ οὐδέ-
 ἑστις, οὔτε αὐτὸς οὐδενός· There shall never be a time,
 when any thing that is shall cease to be; for

when I say any thing that is, I say any thing of God; for God hath all things in him, and there is neither any thing without God, nor God without any thing.—Book the tenth, τί γάρ ἐστι θεὸς καὶ πατήρ, καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἢ τὸ τῶν πάντων εἶναι οὐκ ἐπὶ ὄντων· ἀλλὰ ὑπαρξίς αὐτῇ τῶν ὄντων; What is God, but the very being of all things that yet are not, and the subsistence of things that are?—And again, ὁ θεός, καὶ πατήρ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν, τῷ εἶναι τὰ πάντα, God is both the father and good, because he is all things.—Book the eleventh, αὐτουργὸς γὰρ ὧν αἱ εἰς εἰσιν ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ, αὐτὸς ὧν ὁ ποιῶν· εἰ γὰρ χωρισθείη αὐτοῦ, πάντα μὲν συμπεσεῖσθαι, πάντα δὲ τεθνήξασθαι ἀνάγκη· God acting immediately from himself is always in his own work, himself being that which he makes; for if that were never so little separated from him, all would of necessity fall to nothing and die.—Again, πάντα εἰσιν ἐν τῷ θεῷ, οὐχ ὡς ἐν τόπῳ κείμενα, all things are in God, but not as lying in a place.—And further, since our own soul can by cogitation and fancy become what it will, and where it will, any thing, or in any place, τοῦτον οὖν τὸν τρόπον νοήσον τὸν θεόν, ὥσπερ νοήματα πάντα ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔχει, τὴν κόσμον αὐτὸν ὅλον· You may consider God in the same manner, as containing the whole world within himself, as his own conceptions and cogitations.—And in the close of that chapter, that, which is also thence cited by St. Cyril,* is to the same purpose; ἀόρατος ὁ θεός; εὐφύμησον καὶ τίς αὐτοῦ φανερώτερος· δι' αὐτὸ τοῦτο πάντα ἐπαίτησεν, ἵνα διὰ πάντων αὐτὸν βλέπῃς· τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τοῦ θεοῦ· τοῦτο δὲ αὐτοῦ ἁρετὴ, τὸ αὐτὸν φαίνεσθαι διὰ πάντων· Is God invisible? speak worthily of him, for who is more manifest than he? for this very reason did he make all

* Advers. Julian, lib. ii. p. 52. edit. Spanhem.

things, that thou mightest see him through all things. The mind is seen in thinking, but God in working or making.—Book the twelfth, ἤκουσα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ δαίμονος λέγοντος (ἐκεῖνος γὰρ μόνος, ὃ τέκνον, ἀληθῶς ὡς πρωτόγονος θεός, τὰ πάντα κατιδὼν, θεῖους λόγους ἐφθίγγατο) ἤκουσα γοῦν αὐτοῦ ποτε λέγοντος, ὅτι ἐν ἑστὶ τὰ πάντα. I have heard the good demon (for he alone, as the first-begotten God, beholding all things, spake divine words); I have heard him sometimes saying, that one is all things.—Again, in the same chapter, ὁ δὲ σύμπας κόσμος οὗτος ἡνωμένος ἐκείνῳ, καὶ συναίῳ τὴν τάξιν, καὶ βούλησιν τοῦ πατρὸς, πλήρωμά ἐστι τῆς ζωῆς· καὶ οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ἐν τούτῳ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ αἰῶνος, οὔτε τοῦ παντὸς, οὔτε τῶν κατὰ μέρος, ὃ οὐχὶ ζῇ, νεκρὸν γὰρ οὐδὲ ἐν, οὔτε γίγνεται, οὔτε ἐστίν, οὔτε ἔσται ἐν κόσμῳ. This whole world is intimately united to him, and observing the order and will of its father, hath the fulness of life in it; and there is nothing in it through eternity (neither whole nor part) which does not live; for there neither is, nor hath been, nor shall be, any thing dead in the world.—The meaning is, that all things vitally depend upon the Deity, who is said in Scripture to quicken and enliven all things· τοῦτό ἐστιν ὁ θεός, τὸ πᾶν ἐν δὲ τῷ παντὶ, οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ὃ μὴ ἔστιν· ὅθεν οὔτε μέγεθος, οὔτε τόπος, οὔτε ποιότης, οὔτε σχῆμα, οὔτε χρόνος περὶ τὸν θεόν ἐστι· πᾶν γὰρ ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ πᾶν διὰ πάντων καὶ περὶ πάντα. This is God, the universe or all. And in this universe there is nothing which he is not: wherefore there is neither magnitude, nor place, nor quality, nor figure, nor time about God, for he is all or the whole (but those things belong to parts).—And the Arcane Cantion, though that thirteenth book, to which it is subjoined, be supposititious, yet harps much upon this point

of the Egyptian theology, that God is all: ὑμνεῖν μέλλω τὸν τῆς κτίσεως κύριον, καὶ τὸ πᾶν, καὶ τὸ ἓν. I am about to praise the Lord of the creation, the all and the one.—And again, All the powers that are in me praise the one and the all.—Book the fifteenth, εἰάν τις ἐπιχειρήσῃ τὸ πᾶν καὶ ἓν χωρῆσαι, τὸ πᾶν τοῦ ἑνὸς λύσας, ἀπολέσει τὸ πᾶν, πάντα γὰρ ἓν εἶναι δεῖ. If any one go about to separate the all from the one, he will destroy the all, or the universe, for all ought to be one.—Book the sixteenth, ἄρξομαι τοῦ λόγου ἔνθεν, τὸν θεὸν ἐπικαλεσάμενος, τὸν τῶν ὅλων δεσπότην, καὶ ποιητὴν, καὶ πατέρα, καὶ περιβόλον, καὶ πάντα ὄντα τὸν ἓν, καὶ ἓν ὄντα τὰ πάντα· τὸ πάντων γὰρ τὸ πλῆρωμα ἓν ἐστὶ, καὶ ἓν ἐνί· I will begin with a prayer to him, who is the Lord and maker and father and bound of all things; and who being all things, is one; and being one, is all things; for the fulness of all things, is one and in one.—And again, μέρη τοῦ Θεοῦ πάντα ἐστὶν· εἰ δὲ πάντα μέρη, πάντα ἅρα ὁ Θεός· πάντα οὖν ποιῶν, ἑαυτὸν ποιῷ. All things are parts of God, but if all things be parts of God, then God is all things; wherefore he making all things, doth, as it were, make himself.—

Now, by all this we see, how well these Trismegistic books agree with that ancient Egyptian inscription in the temple of Sais, That God is all that was, is, and shall be.—Wherefore the Egyptian theology thus undoubtedly asserting one God that was all things; it is altogether impossible, that it should acknowledge a multitude of self-existent and independent deities.

Hitherto we have taken notice of two several Egyptian names for one and the same supreme Deity; Hammon and Neith: but we shall find, that, besides these, the supreme God was some-

times worshipped by the Egyptians under other names and notions also; as of Isis, Osiris, and Serapis. For, first, though Isis have been taken by some for the moon, by others for the whole earth, by others for Ceres or corn, by others for the land of Egypt (which things, in what sense they were deified by the Egyptians, will be elsewhere declared), yet was she undoubtedly taken also sometimes for an universal and all-comprehending Numen. For Plutarch^{*} affirms, that Isis and Neith were really one and the same god among the Egyptians, and therefore the temple of Neith or Minerva at Sais, where the forementioned inscription was found, is called by him the temple of Isis; so that Isis, as well as Neith or Minerva among the Egyptians, was there described, as that God, who is all that was, is, and shall be, and whose veil no mortal hath ever uncovered; that is, not a particular God, but an universal and all-comprehending Numen. And this may be yet further confirmed from that ancient inscription and dedication to the goddess Isis, still extant at Capua:

TIBI.
VNA. QVÆ.
ES. OMNIA.
DEA. ISIS.

Where the goddess Isis is plainly declared to be *ἐν καὶ πάντα*, one and all things,—that is, an universal and all-comprehending Deity. And with this agreeth also that oration of this goddess Isis in Apuleius; “*En adsum tuis comota, Luci, precibus, rerum natura parens, elementorum omnium domina, seculorum*

Metam. l. xii.
[*Lib.* xi. p.
243.]

^{*} De Iside et Osir. p. 354, tom. ii. oper.

progenies initialis: summa numinum, regina marium, prima cœlitum, deorum dearumque facies uniformis; quæ cœli luminosa culmina, maris salubria flamina, inferorum deplorata silentia, nuptibus meis dispenso. Cujus numen unicum multiformi specie, ritu vario, nomine multijugo totus veneratur orbis." Behold, here am I, moved by thy prayers, Lucius, that nature, which was the parent of things; the mistress of all the elements; the beginning and original of ages; the sum of all the divine powers; the queen of the seas; the first of the celestial inhabitants; the uniform face of gods and goddesses; which with my becks dispense the luminous heights of the heavens, the wholesome blasts of the sea, and the deplorable silences of hell; whose only divine power the whole world worships and adores, in a multiform manner, and under different rites and names.—From which words it is plain, that this goddess Isis was not the mere animated moon (which was rather a symbol of her) but that she was an universal Deity, comprehensive of the whole nature of things; the one supreme God, worshipped by the Pagans under several names, and with different rites. And this is the plain meaning of those last words, *Numen unicum*, &c. that the whole world worshippeth one and the same supreme God, in a multiform manner, with various rites and under many different names.—For, besides the several names of the other Pagans there mentioned, the Egyptians worshipped it under the names of Hammon, Neith, and others that shall be afterwards declared. And thus was Isis again worshipped and invoked, as the *unicum numen*, or only divine power; by Apuleius himself, in these

following words: "Tu sancta humani generis sospitatrix perpetua, dulcem matris affectionem miseris tribuis, fatorum inextricabiliter contorta retractas litia, fortunæ tempestates mitigas, et stellarum noxios meatus cohibes: Te superi colunt, observant inferi. Tu rotas orbem, luminas solem, regis mundum, calcas Tartarum. Tibi respondent sydera, gaudent numina, serviunt elementa: tuo nutu spirant flamina," &c. Thou holy and perpetual saviour of mankind, that art always bountiful in cherishing mortals, and dost manifest the dear affections of a mother to them in their calamities, thou extricatest the involved threads of fate, mitigatest the tempests of fortune, and restrainest the noxious influences of the stars; the celestial gods worship thee, the infernal powers obey thee; thou rollest round the heavens, enlightenest the sun, governest the world, treadest upon Tartarus, or hell; the stars obey thee, the elements serve thee, at thy beck the winds blow, &c.—Where Isis is plainly supposed to be an universal Numen and supreme monarch of the world. Neither may this hinder, that she was called a goddess, as Neith also was; these Pagans making their deities to be indifferently of either sex, male or female. But much more was Osiris taken for the supreme Deity, whose name was sometimes said to have signified in the Egyptian language, *πολύφθαλμος*, that which had many eyes—sometimes *κράτος ἐνεργούν και ἀγαθοποιόν*, an active and beneficent force—(and whose hieroglyphic was an eye and a sceptre); the former signifying providence and wisdom, and the latter power and ma-

jesty (as Plutarch tells us),^a who also is thus described in Apuleius: "Deus deorum magnorum potior, et majorum summus, et summorum maximus, et maximorum regnator, Osiris." That God who is the chiefest of the greater gods, and the greatest of the chiefest, and which reigneth over the greatest.—Wherefore the same Apuleius^b also tells us, that Isis and Osiris were really one and the same supreme Numen, though considered under different notions, and worshipped with different rites, in these words; "Quanquam connexa, imo vero unica, ratio Numinis, religionisque esset, tamen teletæ discrimen esse maximum." Though Isis and Osiris be really one and the same Divine power, yet are their rites and ceremonies very different.—The proper notion of Osiris being thus declared by Plutarch,^c τὸ πρῶτον καὶ κυριώτατον πάντων, ὃ ἔαγαθὸν πάντων ἐστί, that first and highest of all beings, which is the same with good.—Agreeably whereunto, Jamblichus^d affirmeth, ἀγαθῶν ποιητικὸς ὢν Ὁσίρις κέκληται, that God, as the cause of all good, is called Osiris by the Egyptians.—Lastly, as for Serapis, though Origen^e tells us, that this was a new upstart deity, set up by Ptolemy in Alexandria, yet this god in his oracle^f to Nicocreon, the king of Cyprus, declares himself also to be an universal Numen, comprehending the whole world, in these words: οὐράνιος κόσμος κεφαλὴ, &c. to this sense: The starry

^a De Iside et Osiride, p. 354, et p. 371. tom. ii. oper.

^b Metamorphos. lib. xi. p. 256.

^c Ibid. p. 256.

^d De Iside et Osir. p. 372.

^e De Myster. Egypt. sect. viii. cap. iii. p. 159.

^f Advers. Celz. lib. v. p. 257. ed. Cantabr.

^g Apud Macrobiū Saturnal. lib. i. cap. xx. p. 299.

heaven is my head, the sea my belly, my ears are in the ether, and the bright light of the sun is my clear piercing eye." And doubtless he was worshipped by many under this notion. For as Philarchus^a wrote thus concerning him, *Σαράπις ὁνοματὶ τοῦ τοῦ πάντων κοσμοῦντος*, That Serapis was the name of that God, which orders and governs the whole world;—so doth Plutarch^b himself conclude, that Osiris and Serapis were *ἑμφω ἐνὸς θεοῦ καὶ ἰαῦς διττάμεως*, both of them names of one God, and the same Divine power.—Accordingly whereunto Diodorus Siculus^c determines, that these three, *Hammōn*, *Osiris*, and *Serapis*, were but different names for one and the same Deity, or supreme God. Notwithstanding which, Porphyrius,^d it seems, had a very ill conceit of that power which manifested itself in the temple of this god Serapis, above all the other Pagan gods, he suspecting it to be no other than the very prince of evil demons or devils: *Τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς δαίμονας οὐκ εὐχόμενος τὸν Σαράπιν ὑποπτεύομεν· οὐδ' ἐκ τῶν συμβολῶν μόνον ἀναγινώσκοντες*, &c. We do not vainly or without ground suspect and conjecture, that the evil demons are under Serapis as their prince and head: this appearing (saith he) not only from those rites of appeasement used in the worship of this god, but also from the symbol of him, which was a three-headed dog, signifying that evil demon which ruleth in those three elements, water, earth, and air.—Neither indeed can it be doubted, but that it was an evil demon or devil, that delivered oracles in this

^a De Iside et Osir. p. 362.

^b Ibid. p. 361, 362.

^c Vide lib. i. cap. xxv. p. 21.

^d Libro de Philosophia et Oraculis apud Euseb. Præpar. Evang. lib. iv. cap. xxiii. p. 175.

temple of Serapis as well as elsewhere among the Pagans, however he affected to be worshipped as the supreme God.

Besides all this, Eusebius himself from Porphyrius informs us, that the Egyptians acknowledged one intellectual Demiurgus, or maker of the world, under the name of Cneph, whom they worshipped in a statue of human form, and a blackish sky-coloured complexion; holding in his hand a girdle and a sceptre, and wearing upon his head a princely plume, and thrusting forth an egg out of his mouth. The reason of which hieroglyphic is thus given, ὅτι λόγος δυσεύρετος

καὶ κεκρυμμένος, καὶ οὐ φανός, καὶ ὅτι ζωοποιός, Præp. l. iii.
c. xi. p. 115.

καὶ ὅτι βασιλεύς, καὶ ὅτι νοερώς κινεῖται. διὸ ἡ τοῦ πτεροῦ φύσις ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ κεῖται. Because that wisdom and reason, by which the world was made, is not easy to be found out, but hidden and obscure. And because this is the fountain of life and king of all things; and because it is intellectually moved, signified by the feathers upon his head. Moreover, by the egg thrust out of the mouth of this God, was meant the world, created by the eternal λόγος, and from this Cneph was said to be generated or produced another God, whom the Egyptians call Phtha, and the Greeks Vulcan—of which Phtha more afterward. That the Egyptians were the most eminent assertors of the cosmogonia, or temporary beginning of the world, hath been already declared; for which cause the scholiast upon Ptolemy thus perstringeth them, περιττῶς εἰώθασι λέγειν γένεσιν Αἰγύπτιοι κόσμου, the Egyptians were wont to talk perpetually of the genesis or creation of the world.—And Ascle-

Scal. Emend.
Temp. l. v. de
condit. mundi. **Myriogenesis**, affirms, that according to the Egyptian tradition, the sun was made in **Libra**. But, that the Egyptians did not suppose the world to have been made by chance, as Epicurus and other atheistical philosophers did, but by an intellectual Demiurgus called by them **Cneph**, is evident from this testimony of Porphyrius. Which **Cneph** was looked upon by them as an unmade and eternal Deity, and for this very cause the inhabitants of Thebais refused to wor-

De Is. et
Osir.
[p. 357.] ship any other god besides him, as Plutarch informs us in these words: *εἰς δὲ τὰς τροφὰς τῶν τιμωμένων ζώων, τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους συντεταγμένα τελεῖν, μόνους δὲ μὴ διδόναι τοὺς Θεβαῖδας κατοικοῦντας, ὡς θυγὸν θεὸν οὐδένα νομίζοντες, ἀλλὰ ὃν καλοῦσιν αὐτοὶ Κνήφ, ἀγέννητον ὄντα καὶ ἀθάνατον*. Whilst the other Egyptians paid their proportion of tax imposed upon them, for the nourishment of those sacred animals, worshipped by them, the inhabitants of Thebais only refused, because they would acknowledge no mortal god, and worshipped him only, whom they call **Cneph**, an unmade and eternal Deity.—

Having now made it undeniably manifest, that the Egyptians had an acknowledgment amongst them of one supreme universal and unmade Deity, we shall conclude this whole discourse with the two following observations: First, That a great part of the Egyptian Polytheism was really nothing else but the worshipping of one and the same supreme God, under many different names and notions, as of Hammon, Neith, Isis, Osiris, Serapis, Cneph, to which may be added Phtha, and those

other names in Jamblichus, of Eicton and Emeph. And that the Pagans universally over the whole world did the like, was affirmed also by Apuleius, in that forecited passage of his: "*Numen unicum, multiformi specie, ritu vario, nomine multijugo, totus veneratur orbis,*" the whole world worshippeth one only supreme Numen in a multiform manner, under different names, and with different rites.—Which different names for one and the same supreme God might therefore be mistaken by some of the sottish vulgar amongst the Pagans, as well as they have been by learned men of these later times, for so many distinct, unmade, and self-existent deities.

Nevertheless, here may well be a question started, whether amongst those several Egyptian names of God, some might not signify distinct Divine hypostases subordinate; and particularly, whether there were not some footsteps of a trinity to be found in the old Egyptian theology? For since Orpheus, Pythagoras, and Plato, who all of them asserted a trinity of Divine hypostases, unquestionably derived much of their doctrine from the Egyptians, it may reasonably be suspected, that these Egyptians did the like before them. And indeed Athanasius Kircherus makes no doubt at all hereof, but tells us that, in the Pamphylian obelisk, that first hieroglyphic of a winged globe, with a serpent coming out of it, was the Egyptian hieroglyphic of a triform Deity, or trinity of Divine hypostases; he confirming the same, from the testimony of Abenephios, an Arabian writer, and a Chaldaic fragment imputed to Sanchoniathon; the globe being said to signify the first incomprehensible Deity, without beginning or end,

self-existent; the serpent the Divine wisdom and creative virtue; and lastly, the wings that active spirit, that cherisheth, quickeneth, and enliveneth all things. How far credit is to be given to this, we leave others to judge; but the clearest footsteps that we can find any where of an Egyptian trinity is in Jamblichus's book, written concerning their mysteries; which whole place therefore is worth the setting down: Κατ' ἄλλην δὲ τάξιν προστάττει [Ἑρμῆς] θεὸν τὸν Ἥμηφ, τῶν ἐπουρανίων θεῶν ἡγοούμενον, ὃν φησιν νοῦν εἶναι αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν νοοῦντα, καὶ τὰς νοήσεις εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἐπιστρέφοντα. Τοῦτον δὲ ἐν ἡμέραις, καὶ ὁ φησὶ τὸ πρῶτον μάγευμα, προστάττει, ὃν καὶ Εἰκτὼν ἐπονομάζει, ἐν ᾧ τὸ πρῶτόν ἐστι νοοῦν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον νοητὸν, ὃ δὴ καὶ διὰ σιγῆς μόνῃς θεραπεύεται. Ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις——— ὁ δημιουργικὸς νοῦς καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας προστάτης, καὶ σοφίᾳ ἐρχόμενος μὲν εἰς γένεσιν, καὶ τὴν ἀφανῆ τῶν κεκρυμμένων λόγων δύναμιν εἰς φῶς ἄγων, Ἀμῶν κατὰ τὴν τῶν Αἰγυπτίων γλώσσαν λέγεται, συντελών δὲ ἀψευδῶς ἕκαστα καὶ τεχνικῶς μετ' ἀληθείας Φθὰ, Ἕλληνες δὲ εἰς Ἥφαιστον μεταλαμβάνουσι τὸν Φθὰ, τῷ τεχνικῷ μόνον προσβάλλοντες, ἀγαθῶν δὲ ποιητικὸς ὢν Ὅσιρις κέκληται, καὶ ἄλλας δὲ ἄλλας δυνάμεις τε καὶ ἐνεργείας ἐπωνυμίας ἔχει. According to another order or method, Hermes

* Or Cae-ph. places the god Emeph, * as the prince and ruler over all the celestial gods, whom he affirmeth to be a mind, understanding himself, and converting his cogitations or intellections into himself. Before which

* Or Cae-ph. Emeph, * he placeth one indivisible, whom he calleth Eicton, in which is the first intelligible, and which is worshipped only by silence. After which two, Eicton and

* Or Cae-ph. Emeph, * the demiurgic mind and president of truth, as with wisdom it proceedeth to generations, and bringeth forth the hidden powers

of the occult reasons into light, is called in the Egyptian language Ammon; as it artificially affects all things with truth, Phtha (which Phtha, the Greeks, attending only to the artificialness thereof, call Hephestus or Vulcan); as it is productive of good, Osiris, besides other names that it hath, according to its other powers and energies.—In which passage of Jamblichus* we have plainly three Divine hypostases, or universal principles subordinate, according to the Hermaic theology; first, an indivisible unity called Eicton; secondly, a perfect mind, converting its intellections into itself, called Emeph or Hemphtha; and thirdly, the immediate principle of generation, called by several names, according to its several powers, as Phtha, Ammon, Osiris, and the like: so that these three names with others, according to Jamblichus, did in the Egyptian theology signify, one and the same third Divine hypostasis. How well these three Divine hypostases of the Egyptians agree with the Pythagoric or Platonic trinity, of, first, τὸ ἓν or τὰγαθόν, unity and goodness itself—secondly, νοῦς, mind—and thirdly, ψυχή, soul—I need not here declare. Only we shall call to mind what hath been already intimated, that that reason or wisdom, which was the Demiurgus of the world, and is properly the second of the forementioned hypostases, was called also among the Egyptians, by another name, Cneph; from whom was said to have been produced or begotten the god Phtha, the third hypostasis of the Egyptian trinity; so that Cneph and Emeph are all one. Wherefore we have here plainly an Egyp-

* De Mystor. Egypt. sect. viii. cap. iii. p. 158, 159.

tian trinity of Divine hypostases subordinate, Eicton, Eneph (or Cneph), and Phtha. We know not what to add more to this of Jamblichus concerning an Egyptian trinity, unless we should insist upon those passages, which have been cited by some of the fathers to this purpose out of Hermaic or Trismegistic books, whereof there was one before set down out of St. Cyril; or unless we should again call to mind that citation out of Damascius,* *μία τῶν ὅλων ἀρχή σκότος ἄγνωστον ὑμνουμένη καὶ τοῦτο τρίς ἀναφωνούμενον οὕτως*, that, according to the Egyptians, there is one principle of all things praised under the name of the unknown darkness, and this thrice repeated.—Agreeably to which, Augustinus Steuchus produces another passage out of the same philosophic writer; that the Egyptians made *πρώτην ἀρχὴν σκότος ὑπὲρ πᾶσαν νόησιν, σκότος ἄγνωστον, τρίς τοῦτο ἐπιφημίζοντες*, the first principle of all to be darkness above all knowledge and understanding (or unknown darkness), they thrice repeating the same.—Which the forementioned Steuchus takes to be a clear acknowledgment of a trinity of Divine hypostases in the Egyptian theology.

Our second observation is this; That the Egyptian theology as well as the Orphic (which was derived from it) asserting one incorporeal Deity, that is, all things; as it is evident, that it could not admit a multitude of self-existent and independent deities, so did the seeming Polytheism of these Egyptians proceed also in great measure from this principle of theirs not rightly understood; they being led thereby, in a certain sense, *θεωροῦν*,

* Vide Wolfii Anecd. Græcæ, p. 260.

to personate and deify the several parts of the world, and things of nature, bestowing the names of gods and goddesses upon them. Not that they therefore worshipped the inanimate parts of the world as such, much less things not substantial, but mere accidents, for so many real, distinct, personal deities; but because, conceiving that God, who was all things, ought to be worshipped in all things (such especially as were most beneficial to mankind), they did, according to that Asclepian and Trismegistic doctrine beforementioned, call God by the name of every thing, or every thing by the name of God. And that the wiser of them very well understood, that it was really one and the same simple Deity, that was thus worshipped amongst them by piecemeal, in the several parts of the world, and things of nature, and under different names and notions, with different ceremonies, is thus declared by *De Is. et Os.* Plutarch; Ἑλληνικὸν ἡ Ἰσίς ἐστι, καὶ ὁ Τυφὼν ^{351.}

πολέμιος τῇ θεῇ, καὶ δι' ἀγνοίαν καὶ ἀπάτην τετυφωμένος, καὶ διασπῶν καὶ ἀφανίζων τὸν ἱερὸν λόγον, ὃν ἡ θεὸς συνάγει καὶ συντίθησι; καὶ παραδίδωσι τοῖς τελουμένοις θειώσεως. Isis is a Greek word, which signifies knowledge; and Typhon is the enemy to this goddess; who being puffed up by ignorance and error, doth distract and discerp the holy doctrine (of the simple Deity), which Isis collects together again, and makes up into one, and thus delivers it to those who are initiated into her sacred mysteries, in order to deification.—In which words Plutarch intimates, that the Egyptian fable of Osiris being mangled and cut in pieces by Typhon, did allegorically signify the discription and distraction of the simple Deity, by reason of the weakness

and ignorance of vulgar minds (not able to comprehend it altogether at once), into several names and partial notions, which yet true knowledge and understanding, that is, Isis, makes up whole again, and unites into one.

xix. It is well known, that the poets, though they were the prophets of the Pagans, and, pretending to a kind of Divine inspiration, did otherwise embue the minds of the vulgar with a certain sense of religion, and the notions of mortality, yet these notwithstanding were the grand depravers and adulterators of the Pagan theology. For this they were guilty of upon several accounts. As, first, their attributing to the gods, in their fables concerning them, all manner of human imperfections, passions, and vices. Which abuse of theirs the wiser of the Pagans were in all ages highly sensible of and offended with, as partly appears from these free passages vented upon the stage;

Eurip. in Iocæ.
[Ex Florilegio Stobæi
apud Hugon.
Grotium in
Excerpt. veterum Comico-
cor. et Tragicor. p. 334.]

Καὶ γὰρ, ὅστις ἂν θεῶν
κακὸς παύσῃ, ζυμῶσιν αἱ θεοί
πάντες αὖθις δίκαιον, τοὺς νόμους ὑμῶν βροτῶν
γράφοντας αὐτοὺς ἀμάρταν ἐφελκόμενα;

Si quis est mortalium
Qui scelera patrat, exigunt poenam dei:
At nonne iniquum est, vos, suas leges quibus
Gens debet hominum, jure nullo vivere?

To this sense: Since mortal men are punished by the gods for transgressing their laws, is it not unjust, that ye, gods, who write these laws, should yourselves live without law?—And again:

οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπους κακῶς
ἀίγειν δίκαιον, εἰ τὰ τῶν θεῶν κατὰ
μιμήμεθα, ἀλλὰ τοὺς διδάσκοντας τάδε·

— Nulla nos posthac notet
 Censura, siquando ista, quæ superos decent,
 Imitamur homines. Culpa ad auctores redit.

Let men no longer be blamed for imitating the evil actions of the gods; for they can only be justly blamed, who teach men to do such things by their examples.—

Secondly, The poets were further guilty of depraving the religion and theology of the Pagans, by their so frequently personating and deifying all the things of nature and parts of the world, and calling them by the names of those gods, that were supposed to preside over them; that is, of the several Divine powers manifested in them. This Plutarch * taxes the poets with, where giving directions for young men's reading of their writings, he thus seasonably cautions against the danger of it; τοῦτο δὲ ἀναγκαῖον, καὶ χρήσιμον, εἰ μέλλομεν ἐκ τῶν ποιημάτων ὠφεληθῆσθαι καὶ μὴ βλαβηῖσθαι, τὸ γινώσκειν πῶς τοῖς τῶν θεῶν ὀνόμασιν οἱ ποιηταὶ χρῶνται. —χρῶνται δὲ τοῖς τῶν θεῶν ὀνόμασι οἱ ποιηταί, ποτὲ μὲν αὐτῶν ἐκείνων ἐφαπτόμενοι τῇ ἐννοίᾳ, ποτὲ δὲ δυνάμεις τινας, ὧν οἱ θεοὶ δωτηῖρές εἰσι καὶ καθηγέμονες, ὁμωνύμως προσαγορεύοντες. It is very profitable and necessary, if we would receive good from the writings of the poets, and not hurt, that we should understand how they use the names of the gods in different senses. Wherefore the poets sometimes use the names of the gods properly, as intending to signify thereby the gods themselves, and sometimes again they use them improperly and equivocally, for those powers which the gods are the givers and dispensers of, or the things which they preside over.—

* De audiendis Pootis, p. 22. tom. ii. oper.

As for example, Vulcan is sometimes used by the poets for that god or divine power which presides over fire and the arts that operate by fire, and sometimes again the word is taken by them for fire itself. So Mars, in like manner, is sometimes used for the god which presides over military affairs, and sometimes again it signifies nothing else but war. An instance whereof is there given by Plutarch out of Sophocles;

Τυφλὸς γὰρ, ὃ γυναικεῖ, οὐδ' ἴπῳ Ἄρτι
 Σὺς πρὸς ὅσῳ πάντα τυφλάζει κακῷ·

Mars (O Mulieres) cæcus hirsuto suis
 Velut ore frendens, cuncta commiscet mala.

And we might give this other instance of the same from Virgil,

———— Furit toto Mars impius orbe.

For the God of war, that is, the divine providence that presides over military affairs, could not be called impious or wicked, but it is war itself that is there so styled.

Indeed, we shall afterward make it appear, that the first original of this business proceeded from a certain philosophic opinion amongst the Pagans, that God was diffused throughout the whole world, and was himself in a manner all things, and therefore ought to be worshipped in all things: but the poets were principally the men, who carried it on thus far, by personating the several inanimate parts of the world and things of nature, to make such a multitude of distinct gods and goddesses of them. Which humour, though it were chiefly indulged by them, ψυχαιγωγίας ἕνεκεν, only for the delight and pleasure of the reader—

besides gratifying their own poetic fancies; yet was it a matter of dangerous consequence, as the same Plutarch gravely and soberly advises, in his book *De Iside*, it begetting in some gross and irrational superstition (that is, in our Christian language, idolatry), and carrying others on to downright impiety and Atheism. But this will be afterward also again insisted on.

Wherefore, in the next place, we shall observe, that the poets did also otherwise deprave the theology of the Pagans, so as to make it look somewhat more aristocratically, and this principally two manner of ways; first, by their speaking so much of the gods in general and without distinction, and attributing the government of the whole world to them in common, so as if it were managed and carried on, *communi consilio deorum*, by a common council and republic of gods,—wherein all things were determined by a majority of votes, and as if their Jupiter, or supreme god, were no more amongst them, than a speaker of a house of lords or commons, or the chairman of a committee. In which they did indeed attribute more to their inferior deities, than, according to their own principles, they ought.

And secondly (which is the last depravation of the Pagan theology by these poets), by their making those, that were really nothing else but several names and notions of one and the same supreme Deity, according to its several powers manifested in the world, or the different effects produced by it, to be so many really distinct persons and gods; insomuch as sometimes to be at odds and variance with one another, and even with Jupiter himself. This St. Basil seems to

take notice of, in his oration, How young men may be profited by the writings of the Greeks; πάντων δὲ ἥκιστα περὶ Θεῶν τι διαλεγόμενοις (ποιηταῖς) προσέξομεν, καὶ μάλιστα ὅταν ὡς περὶ πολλῶν τε αὐτῶν διεξιῶσι, καὶ τούτων οὐδὲ ὁμονοούντων. But least of all will we give credit to the poets, where they discourse concerning the gods, and speak of them as many (distinct and independent) persons, and that not agreeing amongst themselves neither, but siding several ways, and perpetually quarrelling with one another.—

Notwithstanding all which extravagances and miscarriages of the poets, we shall now make it plainly to appear, that they really asserted, not a multitude of self-existent and independent deities, but one only unmade Deity, and all the other, generated or created gods. This hath been already proved concerning Orpheus, from such fragments of the Orphic poems, as have been owned and attested by Pagan writers: but it would be further evident, might we give credit to any of those other Orphic verses, that are found cited by Christians and Jews only (and we cannot reasonably conclude all these to be counterfeit and supposititious), amongst which we have this for one,^a

Εἷς ἐστ' αὐτογενὴς, ἐκ ἑαυτοῦ πάντα τέλειται,

There is one only unmade God, and all other gods and things are the offspring of this one.—Moreover, when God, in the same Orphic fragments, is styled Μητρο-πάτωρ, both father and mother of

^a P. 10. Edit. Oxon. Joh. Potteri.

^b Apud Clement. Alexandr. in Cohortat. ad Gentes, cap. vii. p. 64. Vide etiam Euseb. Præpar. Evangel. lib. xiii. cap. xii. et Theodoret. de curandis Græcorum affect, serm. i. tom. ii. oper. p. 475.

all things—(accordingly as it was observed before) that both the Orphic and Egyptian theology made the supreme Deity especially to be ἀρρηνόθηλον, hermaphroditical, or male and female together; this, as Clemens Alexandrinus* rightly interprets the meaning of it, was to signify τὴν ἐκ μὴ ὄντων γένεσιν, the production of things out of nothing,—or from the Deity alone, without any pre-existent self-existent matter.

But we shall pass from Orpheus to Homer. Now it is certain, that Homer's gods were not all eternal, unmade, and self-existent, he plainly declaring the contrary concerning the gods in general; that they had a genesis, that is, a temporary production, as in that forecited verse of his,^b

Ἄλλαντι τε θεῶν γένεσσι, &c.

The ocean from whence the gods were generated;—where, by gods are meant all the animated parts of the world superior to men, but principally (as Eustathius observes) the stars, θεῶν ἀντὶ ἀστέρων, gods(saith he) are here put for stars.—And, as the same philologer further adds, the gods or stars do by a synecdoche signify all things, or the whole world, ἀντὶ τοῦ πάντων ὡς ἀπὸ μέρους, a part being put for the whole;—accordingly as the same poet elsewhere^c declares his sense, speaking likewise of the ocean,

Ὅς γένεσις πάντας τίνασται,

Which was the original of all things—or from whence (not only the gods, but also) all other things were generated. Wherefore the full mean-

* Stromatam, lib. v. p. 724.

^b Ibid. α. ver. 201, 202.

^c Ibid. ver. 246.

ing of Homer was this: that the gods or stars, together with this whole visible world, had a temporary production, and were at first made out of the ocean, that is, out of the watery chaos. So that Homer's theogonia, as well as Hesiod's, was one and the same thing with the cosmogonia; his generation of gods the same with the generation or creation of the world, both of them having, in all probability, derived it from the Mosaic cabala, or tradition. And Eustathius tells us, that, according to the ancients, Homer's ἀσπιδοποιία, described Il. σ. was αἰνίγμα τῆς κοσμογενείας, an obscure signification of the cosmogonia,—or cosmogonia.

Nevertheless, though οἱ θεοὶ or the gods in general be by Homer thus generated from the ocean or watery chaos, yet this is to be understood only of the inferior gods, and he is supposed to be distinguished from them, who in the same poet is frequently called, ὁ θεὸς κατ' ἐξοχήν, God, by way of eminency (to whom he plainly ascribes omnipotence), and Ζεὺς, or Jupiter, whom he styleth κάρτιστον πάντων, the most powerful of all, and πρῶτα θεῶν, the first and chiefest of the gods, and ὑπατον θεῶν and κρειόντων, the highest of gods and governors, and whom he affirmeth infinitely to transcend the gods, Il. θ.^a

Τίττον ἰγὲ πρὶ τ' εἰμὶ θεῶν, πρὶ τ' εἰμὶ ἀνθρώπων.

And to reign as well over gods as men, Il. α.^b

ὅς τε θεῶσι καὶ ἀνθρώποισι ἀνάσσει.

Lastly, whom he maketh to be πατέρα θεῶν, the father of the gods as well as men—that is, nothing

^a Ver. 27.

^b Ver. 281.

less than the creator of them and the whole world: He, therefore, who thus produced the gods and stars out of the ocean or watery chaos, must needs be excluded out of that number of gods, so as not to have been himself generated or made out of it. Thus have we before observed, that οἱ θεοὶ, or the gods in general, are frequently taken, both by Homer and other Greek writers, in way of distinction from ὁ θεός, or Jupiter, that is, for the inferior gods only.

It is true, indeed, that others of the Pagan gods, besides Jupiter, were by the Latins in their solemn rites and prayers styled *pateres*, fathers; and as Jupiter is nothing else but Jovis pater, contracted into one word, so was Mars called by them Marspiter, and Saturnus, Janus, Neptunus, and Liber had the like addition also made to their names, Saturnuspater, Januspater, Neptunuspater, Liberpater: and not only so, but even their very heroes also (as for example, Quirinus) had this honourable title of father bestowed on them; all which appeareth from those verses of Lucilius,*

Ut nemo sit nostrum, quin aut pater optimus divum,
Aut Neptunus pater, Liber, Saturnus pater, Mars,
Janus, Quirinus pater nomen dicatur ad unum.

Notwithstanding which, here is a great difference to be observed, that though those other gods were called fathers, yet none of them was ever called, either by the Greeks πατήρ θεῶν, or by the Latins, *pater optimus divum*, save only Ζεὺς or Jupiter, the supreme Deity.

And that Homer was thus generally understood by the Pagans themselves to have asserted

* Apud Lactant. Divin. Instit. lib. iv. cap. iii. p. 408.

a Divine monarchy, or one supreme Deity ruling over all, may further appear from these following citations. Plutarch, in his Platonic questions,* *καὶ Ξενοκράτης Δία Ὑπατον καλεῖ, πρότερον δὲ Ὅμηρος τὸν τῶν ἀρχόντων ἀρχοντα θεόν, ὕπατον κρειόντων προσεῖπε* Zenocrates called Jupiter, Hypaton, or the highest; but before him Homer styled that God, who is the prince of all princes, ὕπατον κρειόντων, the highest of rulers or governors.—Again, the same

P. 371.

Plutarch, de Iside et Osiride, *Τὸν δὲ Ὅσιριν αὖ πάλιν ὀφθαλμῷ καὶ σκήπτρῳ γράφουσι, ὃν τὸ μὲν τὴν πρόνοιαν ἐμφαίνει, τὸ δὲ τὴν δύναμιν ὥς Ὅμηρος τὸν ἀρχοντα καὶ βασιλεύοντα πάντων Ζῆν ὕπατον καὶ μήστωρα καλῶν, ἔοικε τῷ μὲν ὑπάτῳ τὸ κρατὸς αὐτοῦ, τῷ δὲ μήστωρι τὴν εὐβουλίαν καὶ τὴν φρόνησιν σημαίνειν* The Egyptians, when they described Osiris by those hieroglyphics of an eye and a sceptre, did by the former of them signify providence, and by the latter power; as Homer, when he calls that Ζεὺς, or Jupiter, who ruleth and reigneth over all things ὕπατον and μήστωρα, seems by the word ὕπατον

to denote his power and sovereignty, but by μήστωρα his wisdom and knowledge:

—To Plutarch may be added Proclus, who, upon Plato's Timæus, having proved that, according to that philosopher, there was τοῦ κόσμου παντὸς εἷς καὶ ὅλος δημιουργός, one only maker of the whole world—affirms the same likewise of that divine poet Homer (as he there styles him), *ὃς καὶ διὰ πάσης ποιήσεως ὕπατον κρειόντων καὶ πατέρα ἀνδρῶν καὶ θεῶν αὐτὸν ἀνυμνεῖ, καὶ πᾶσιν εὐφημεῖ τοῖς δημιουργικοῖς νοήμασιν* That he also throughout all his poesy praises Jupiter as the highest of all rulers,

P. 96. [lib. ii.
in Timæum
Platon.]

* P. 1007. tom. ii. oper.

and the father both of gods and men, and attributes all demiurgical notions to him.—Whereupon he concludes in this manner: οὕτω τοῖσιν ἐπέμψαν τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν θεολογίαν ἀπεφύναμεν, τῷ Διὶ τὴν ἅλῃν δημιουργίαν ἀπονέμουςαν. And thus we have made it manifest, that all the Greekish theology universally ascribes to Ζεὺς, or Jupiter, the maker of all things.—Lastly, Aristotle himself confirmeth the same with his testimony, where he writes of the paternal authority after this manner:

ἡ τῶν τέκνων ἀρχὴ βασιλική· διὸ καλῶς Ὅμηρος
τὸν Δία προσηγόρευσεν ἐπὶ τῶν,

De Rep. l. i.
c. xii. [p. 412.
tom. iii. oper.]

———— Πατὴρ ἀνθρώπων καὶ θεῶν τι,

τὸν βασιλέα τούτων· φύσει γὰρ τὸν βασιλέα διαφέρειν μὲν δεῖ, τῷ γένει δ' εἶναι τὸν αὐτόν· ὅπερ πέπονθε τὸ πρεσβύτερον πρὸς τὸ νεώτερον, καὶ ὁ γεννήσας πρὸς τὸ τέκνον. The paternal power or authority over children is a kingly authority: wherefore Homer, when he intended to set forth Jupiter's kingly power over all, very well called him the father of men and gods. For he, that is king by nature, ought both to differ from those that he reigneth over, and also to be of the same kind with them; as the senior is to the junior, and he that begetteth to his offspring.—Where Aristotle's sense seems to be this, that Jupiter had therefore a natural and not acquired kingly power over all the gods, because they were all his offspring and begotten by him, as well as men. In which passage therefore Aristotle plainly acquits and frees Homer from all suspicion of Atheism.

As for Hesiod, if we had not already sufficiently proved from his Theogonia, that all his gods (that is, his inferior deities) were generated

and made, as well as men, it might be made unquestionably evident from this verse of his in his Opera,*

ὅμοθεν γάρλασι θεοὶ σθένος ἄνθρωποι.

When the gods and mortal men, were both together, alike made or generated.—Where the word *ὅμοθεν* is thus interpreted by the Greek scholiasts, ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς ῥίζης and ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γένους, i. e. the gods and men were both alike made from the same root or stock.—And though it followeth immediately after,

*Χρυσὴ μὲν πρῶτα γένος μέγαντι ἀνθρώποις
Ἀθάνατοι ποίησαν, δάμνεια δάμναι ἔχοντες,*

That first of all a golden age of men was made by the immortal gods; yet Moschopolus there notes, Ἀθάνατοι ποίησαν, ὁ Ζεὺς μόνος ἐποίησεν, ὡς ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων φανερόν γίνεται λέγει δὲ πάντας τοὺς θεούς, τὸ τοῦ ἐνός ἔργον ἐπὶ πάντας τοὺς ὁμοειδῆς ἀναφέρων. The immortal gods made; the true meaning (saith he) is, that Jupiter alone made this first golden age of men; as may be proved from other places in the same poet; and though he speak of the gods in general, yet doth he but transfer that, which was the work of one upon all of the like kind. And there are several other instances of this poet's using *θεοὶ* for *θεός*, gods for god.—But it is possible, that Hesiod's meaning might be the same with Plato's,^b that though the inferior mundane gods were all made at first by the supreme God, as well as men, yet they being made something

* Ver. 108, 109, 110.

^b In *Timæo*, p. 530, oper.

sooner than men, did afterward contribute also to the making of men.

But Hesiod's Theogonia, or generation of gods, is not to be understood universally neither, but only of the inferior gods, that Ζεύς or Jupiter being to be expected out of the number of them, whom the same Hesiod, as well as Homer, makes to be the father of gods, as also the king of them, in these words:

Αὐτὸς γὰρ πάντων βασιλεὺς καὶ ἀρχαῖός ἐστιν
Ἀθανάτων.

And attributes the creation of all things to him, as Proclus writeth upon this place,

ἢ ὅτι τὰ διὰ θεοὺς ἀνθρώποις ἔμμεν, &c.

By whom all mortal men are, δι' ὃν πάντα, καὶ οὐκ αὐτομάτως πάντα τῷ Διὶ προσαναπλάττει, by whom all things are, and not by chance; the poet, by a synecdoche, here ascribing the making of all to Jupiter.—Wherefore Hesiod's Theogonia is to be understood of the inferior gods only, and not of Ζεύς or Jupiter, who was the father and maker of them (though out of a watery chaos) and himself therefore αὐτοφυής, self-existent or unmade.

In like manner, that Pindar's gods were not eternal, but made or generated, is plainly declared by him in these words;

Ἐν ἀνδρῶν, ἢ θεῶν γένος ἱε
Μῆτις δὲ πρῶτα
Ματρὶς ἀμφότεροι.

Nem. Od. vi.
[p. 120. edit.
Schmidii.]

Unum Hominum, unum Deorum genus,
Et ex una spiramus
Matre utrique.

^a Apud Clement. Alexandr. in Cohortat. ad Gentes, cap. vii. p. 63. tom. i. edit. Potteri.

^b Hesiodi Opera et Dies, ver. 3.

There is one kind both of gods and men, and we both breathe from the same mother, or spring from the same original.—Where by the common mother both of gods and men, the scholiast understands the earth and chaos, taking the gods here for the inferior deities only, and principally the stars.*

This of Pindar's therefore is to be understood of all the other gods, that they were made as well as men out of the earth or chaos, but not of that supreme Deity, whom the same Pindar elsewhere calls θεῶν κράτιστον, the most powerful of the gods—and τὸν πάντων κύριον, the Lord of all things—and παντὶ αἴτιον, the Cause of every thing—and ἀριστοτέχνην θεόν, that God who is the best artificer, or was the framer of the whole world—and as Clemens Alexandrinus tells us,^b τὸ πᾶν, or the universe.—Which God also, according to Pindar, Chiron instructed Achilles to worship principally, above all the other gods.

Pyth. Od. vi.
[p. 360.]

—μέγιστα μὲν Κρόνου,
βαρυπᾶν στυγερᾶν κέρανῶν τε πύτων,
θεῶν σέβεισθαι.

The sense of which words is thus declared by the scholiast, ἐξαιρέτως τὸν μεγαλόφωνον καὶ ἀστραπῶν καὶ κέρανῶν δεσπότην Δία παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους θεοὺς τιμᾶν καὶ σέβεισθαι. That he should honour and worship the loud-sounding Jupiter, the lord of thunder and lightning, transcendentally above all the other gods.—Which by the way confutes the opinion of those, who contend, that the supreme God, as such, was not at all worshipped by the Pagans.

* Vide Clement. Alexand. Stromat. lib. v. p. 710.

^b Ibid. p. 726.

However, this is certain concerning these three, Homer, Hesiod, and Pindar, that they must of necessity either have been all absolute Atheists, in acknowledging no eternal Deity at all, but making senseless Chaos, Night and the Ocean, the original of all their gods without exception, and therefore of Jupiter himself too, that king and father of them; or else assert one only eternal unmade self-existent Deity, so as that all the other gods were generated or created by that one. Which latter doubtless was their genuine sense; and the only reason, why Aristotle and Plato might possibly sometime have a suspicion of the contrary, seems to have been this—their not understanding that Mosaic cabala, which both Hesiod and Homer followed, of the world's, that is, both heaven and earth's, being made at first out of a watery chaos; for thus is the tradition declared by St. Peter, Ep. ii. ch. iii.

There might be several remarkable passages to the same purpose, produced out of those two tragic poets, Æschylus and Sophocles; which yet, because they have been already cited by Justin Martyr, Clemens Alexandrinus, and others; to avoid unnecessary tediousness, we shall here pass by. Only we think fit to observe concerning that one famous passage of Sophocles,*

Εἰς ταῖς ἀλθολαίαν, εἰς ἕνα θεός,
 "Ος οὐρανὸν ἔ' ἔκτισε καὶ γαῖαν μακρὰν,
 Πόντον τε χάσιν αἰθέρα, κἀκμυρὸν ἕλαν, &c.

Unus profecto, unus est tantum Deus,
 Coeli solique machinam qui condidit,
 Vadumque ponti coernlum, et vim spiritus, &c.

* Ex Stobœi Eclog. apud Hugon. Grot. in Excerpt. veter. Comicor. et Tragic. p. 148.

There is in truth one only God, who made heaven and earth, the sea, air, and winds, &c.—After which followeth also something against image worship; that though this be such as might well become a Christian, and be no where now to be found in those extant tragedies of this poet (many whereof have been lost) yet the sincerity thereof cannot reasonably be at all suspected by us, it having been cited by so many of the ancient fathers in their writings against the Pagans, as particularly Athenagoras, Clemens Alexandrinus, Justin Martyr, Eusebius, Cyril and Theodoret; of which number Clemens tells us,^a that it was attested likewise by that ancient Pagan historiographer Hecateus. But there are so many places to our purpose in Euripides, that we cannot omit them all in his Supplices we have this, wherein all men's absolute dependence upon Jupiter, or one supreme Deity, is fully acknowledged.^b

ὦ Ζεῦ, τί δῖτα τοὺς θαλασσίους βροτῆς
φρονεῖν λίσσεται; σὺ γὰρ ἰσχυρότατος,
δραμὴν τι τοιαύτην, ἢ ἐν σὺ πυχρότης θέλων.

Miseros quid homines, O deum rex et pater,
Sapere arbitramur? Pendet e nutu tuo
Res nostra, facimusque illa quæ visum tibi.

We have also this excellent prayer to the supreme Governor of heaven and earth, cited out of the same tragedian :^c

Ζεῦ, τῶ πάντων μέλει, χεῖρ
Πάσαν τι φέρω Ζεὺς ἔνι Ἀἴθρῃ
Ὀνομαζόμενος στήθεσις——
Σὺ γὰρ ἐν τε θεῶς τοῖς οὐρανίοις,

^a Stromat. lib. v. p. 717.

^b Ver. 734, 735, 736.

^c Apud Clement. Alexand. Stromat. lib. v. p. 688. Vide Hug. Grotii Excerpta, p. 431.

Συῦπτερος τὸ Διὸς μεταχειρίζου,
 χθονίαν δ' Ἀΐδης μετίχως ἀρχῆς·
 Πάμφαν μὲν φῶς ἡγχαλῆς, ἀνέστη
 τοῖς βουλαιμένοις δόξαν προμαθεῖν,
 πᾶσιν ἰσθλασθῆναι, τίς μὲν ἦν νᾶσθαι,
 τίνα δὲ μάλιστα εἰ δύναμιν
 εἰρήν μὲν χθονὶ ἀνέπαυλας.

Tibi (canotorum domino) vinum,
 Salsamque molam fero, seu Ditis.
 Tu sive Jovis nomine gaudes:
 Tu namque deos superos inter
 Sceptrum tractas sublime Jovis;
 Idem regnum terrestre tenes,
 Te lucem animis infundo virum,
 Qui scire volunt, quo sata mentis
 Lucta sit ortu, quæ causa mali;
 Cui coelicolum rite litando
 Requiem sit habere laborum.

Where we may observe that Ζεύς and Ἄϊδης, Jupiter and Pluto, are both of them supposed to be names equally belonging to one and the same supreme God. And the sum of the prayer is this, That God would infuse light into the souls of men, whereby they might be enabled to know, what is the root, from whence all their evils spring, and by what means they may avoid them.—

Lastly, There is another devotional passage, cited out of Euripides,* which contains also a clear acknowledgment of one self-existent Being that comprehends and governs the whole world:

Σὺ τὸν αὐτοφυῆ, τὸν ἐν αἰθέρι
 ῥύμβην πάντων φύσιν ἐμπλέκας,
 ὅτι περὶ μὲν φῶς, περὶ δ' ὕψους
 Νύξ ἀνιδρύχου, ἀνιπτόν τ' ἀνέστη
 ὄχλος ἰνδύεχθαι ἀμφιχρησίου.

Thou self-sprung Being, that dost all enfold,
 And in thine arms heaven's whirling fabric hold!

* Apud Clement. Alexand. ubi supra, p. 717.

Who art encircled with resplendent light,
And yet ly'st mantled o'er in shady night!
About whom, the exultant starry fires
Dance nimbly round in everlasting gyres.

For this sense of the third and fourth verses, which we think the words will bear, and which agrees with that Orphic passage,

————— περί γὰρ πῦρος ἐκκίεσθαι,

That God being in himself a most bright and dazzling light, is respectively to us, and, by reason of the weakness of our understanding, covered over with a thick cloud; as also with that in the Scripture, "clouds and darkness are round about him:" I say, this sense we chose rather to follow, as more rich and august, than that other vulgar one, though grammatically and poetically good also: That successive day and night, together with a numberless multitude of stars, perpetually dance round about the Deity.

Aristophanes in the very beginning of his *Plutus* distinguisheth betwixt Ζεύς and θεοί, Jupiter and the gods;

Ὡς ἀρχαίον πρῶτον ἔστι δὲ Ζεῦ καὶ θεοί, &c.

And we have this clear testimony of Terpander, cited by Clemens Alexandrinus,^a Ζεῦ πάντων ἀρχῶ, Ζεῦ πάντων ἀγῆτωρ, Thou Jupiter, who art the original of all things; thou Jupiter, who art the governor of all.—And these following verses are attributed to Menander:^b

^a Stromat. lib. vi. p. 784.

^b Apud Euseb. Justinum Martyr. et Clement. Alexan. Which last ascribes them to Diphilus.

*Tū lra wōrtos nīqas yonōdōrtos
Kal wōrtos, tūrtos dōrtos tūrtos mōrtos,
'Ayadōrtos tūrtos dōrtos kal wōrtos'*

Rerum universarum imperatorem et patrem,
Solum perpetuo colere suppliciter decet,
Artificem tantæ et largitorem copiarum.

Where men are exhorted to worship the supreme God only, as the sole author of all good, or at least transcendently above all the other gods. There are also two remarkable testimonies, one of Hermesianax, an ancient Greek poet, and another of Aratus, to the same purpose; which shall both be reserved for other places.

Wherefore we pass from the Greek to the Latin poets, where Ennius first appears, deriving the gods in general (who were all the inferior deities) from Erebus and Night, as supposing them all to have been made or generated out of Chaos, nevertheless acknowledging one, who was

———Divumque hominumque pater, rex,

both Father and King of gods and men—that is, the maker or creator of the whole world, who therefore made those gods together with the world out of chaos, himself being unmade.

Plautus in like manner sometimes distinguisheth betwixt Jupiter and the gods, and plainly acknowledgeth one omniscient ^{Cap. Act. ii.} ^{So. 2.} Deity,

Est profecto Deus, qui quas nos gerimus, auditque et videt.

Which passage very much resembles that of Manlius Torquatus in Livy, “ Est cœleste numen, es magne Jupiter;” a strong asseveration of one supreme and universal Deity. And the same Plau-

tus in his Rudens clearly asserts one supreme Monarch and Emperor over all, whom the inferior gods are subservient to ;

Qui gentes omnes mariaque et terras movet,
Ejus sum civis civitate coelitus ;
Qui est imperator divum atque hominum Jupiter,
Is nos per gentes alium alia disparat,
Hominum qui facta, mores, pietatem et fidem
Noscamus.—
Qui falsas lites falsis testimoniis
Petunt, quique in jure abjurant pecuniam,
Eorum referimus nomina exscripta ad Jovem.
Cotidie Ille scit, quis hic quaerat malum.
Iterum Ille eam rem judicatam judicat.
Bonos in aliis tabulis exscriptos habet.
Atque hoc scelesti illi in animum inducunt suum
Jovem se placare posse donis, hostiis ;
Sed operam et sumptum perdunt, quia
Nihil Ei acceptum est a perjuria supplicii.

Where Jupiter, the supreme monarch of gods and men, is said to appoint other inferior gods under him, over all the parts of the earth, to observe the actions, manners and behaviours of men every where ; and to return the names both of bad and good to him. Which Jupiter judges over again all unjust judgments, rendering a righteous retribution to all. And though wicked men conceit, that he may be bribed with sacrifices, yet no worship is acceptable to him from the perjurious.—Notwithstanding which, this poet afterward jumbles the supreme and inferior gods all together, after the usual manner, under that one general name of gods, because they are all supposed to be co-governors of the world ;

Facilius, siqui pius est, a Diis supplicans,
Quam qui scelestus est, inveniet veniam sibi.

Poen. Act. v.
Sc. 4.

Again the same poet elsewhere brings in Hanno the Carthaginian with this form

of prayer addressing himself to Jupiter or the supreme God ;

Jupiter, qui genus colis alisque hominum, per quem vivimus
Vitale serum ; quem penes spes vitæque sunt hominum omnium,
Da diem hunc sospitem, quæso, rebus meis agendis.

In the next place, we have these verses of Valerius Soranus, an ancient and eminent poet, full to the purpose, recorded by Varro :

Jupiter omnipotens, regum rex ipse denique,
Progenitor genitrixque deum, Deus UNUS et OMNIS.

To this sense : Omnipotent Jupiter, the King of kings and gods, and the progenitor and genitrix, the both father and mother of those gods ; one God and all gods.—Where the supreme and omnipotent Deity is styled “progenitor et genitrix deorum,” after the same manner as he was called in the Orphic theology *μητροπάτωρ* and *ἀρρενόθηλος*, that expression denoting the gods and all other things to have been produced from him alone, and without any pre-existent matter. Moreover, according to the tenor of this Ethnic theology, that one God was all gods and every god, the Pagans supposed, that whenever any inferior deity was worshipped by them, the supreme was therein also at once worshipped and honoured.

Though the sense of Ovid hath been sufficiently declared before, yet we cannot well omit some other passages of his, as that grateful and sensible acknowledgment,

Quod loquor et spiro, coelumque et lumina solis
Aspicio (possumne ingratus et immemor esse ?)
Ipse dedit.^b

^a De Lingua Latina. p. 71. edit. 1581, in 8vo.

^b Metamorph. lib. xiv. ver. 172.

And this in the third of his *Metamorph.*

*Ille pater rectorque deum, cui dextra trisulcis
Ignibus armata est, qui nutu concutit orbem.*

Virgil's theology also may sufficiently appear from his frequent acknowledgment of an omnipotent Deity, and from those verses of his before cited out of *Æn.* 6. wherein he plainly asserts one God to be the original of all things, at least as a soul of the world; Servius Honoratus there paraphrasing thus: "*Deus est quidam divinus spiritus, qui per quatuor fusus elementa gignit universa;*" God is a certain spirit, which, infused through the four elements, begetteth all things:—Nevertheless, we shall add from him this also of Venus's prayer to Jupiter, *Æn.* 1.

—————*O qui res hominumque deumque
Æternis regis imperiis, et fulmine terras!*

Which Venus again, *Æn.* 10. bespeaks the same Jupiter after this manner:

O pater, O hominum divumque æterna potestas!

Where we have this annotation of Servius: "*divumque æterna potestas, propter aliorum numinum discretionem;*" Jupiter is here called the eternal power of the gods, to distinguish him from all the other gods—that were not eternal, but made or generated from him.

Neither ought Horace to be left out, in whom we read to the same purpose, lib. i. od. xii.

*Quid prius dicam solitis parentis
Laudibus? qui res hominum et deorum,
Qui mare et terras, variisque mundum
Temperat horis.*

*Unde nil majus generatur ipso,
Nec viget quicquam simile aut secundum:
Proximos illi tamen occupavit
Pallas honores.*

And again, lib. iii. od. iv.

Qui terram inertem, qui mare temperat
Ventosum, et urbes, regnaque tristia;
Divosque, mortalesque turmas,
Imperio regit UNUS æquo.

Where from those words of Horace, "*solitis parentis laudibus*," it appears, that the one supreme Deity, the parent and maker of all things, was then wont to be celebrated by the Pagans as such above all the other gods. And whereas those Pagans vulgarly ascribed the government of the seas particularly to Neptune, of the earth and Hades or Inferi (which are here called *tristia Regna*) to Pluto, these being here attributed by Horace to one and the same supreme and universal Deity; it may well be concluded from thence, that Jupiter, Neptune and Pluto, were but three several names or notions of one supreme Numen, whose sovereignty notwithstanding was chiefly signified by Jupiter. Which same is to be said of Pallas or Minerva too, that signifying the eternal Wisdom, that it was but another name of God also, though looked upon as inferior to that of Jupiter, and next in dignity to it; unless we should conclude it to be a second Divine hypostasis, according to the doctrine of the Pythagoreans and Platonists (probably not unknown to Horace) as also to that Scripture cabala, "I was set up from everlasting, or ever the earth was; when there were no depths, I was brought forth," &c. But of this more afterward.

Lastly, We shall conclude with Manilius, who lived in the same Augustean age, and was a zealous opposer of that Atheistical hypothesis of Epi-

curus and Lucretius, as appears from these verses of his;

^a Quis credat tantas operum sine numine moles,
Ex minimis cæcoque creatum federe mundum?

Wherefore he also plainly asserts one supreme Deity, the framer and governor of the whole world, in this manner, lib. ii.

^b Namque canam tacita naturam mentē potentem
Infusumque Deum cœlo, terrisque, frætoque,
Ingentem æquali moderantem federe molem,
Totumque alterno consensu vivere mundum,
Et rationis agi motu; quum SPIRITUS UNUS
Per cunctas habitet partes, atque irriget orbem,
Omnia pervolitans, corpusque animale figuret, &c.

And again,

Hoc opus immensi constructum corpore mundi
Vis animæ divina regit, sacroque meatu
Conspirat Deus et tacita ratione gubernat.

And lib. iv. ^c

——— Faciem cœli non invidet orbi
Ipse Deus, vultusque suos, corpusque recludit,
Semper volvendo, sequē ipsum inculcat et offert;
Ut bene cognosci possit, monstretque videndo,
Qualis eat, doceatque suas attendere leges.
Ipse vocat nostros animos ad sydera mundus,
Neo patitur, quia non condit, sua jura latere.

Where notwithstanding we confess, that the whole animated world, or rather the Soul thereof, is, according to the Stoical doctrine, made by Manilius to be the supreme Numen.

xx. We now pass from the poets of the Pagans to their philosophers. A modern writer ^d concerning the religion of the Gentiles, affirmeth this to have been the opinion of very eminent philosophers, That even all the minor gods of the Pa-

^a Lib. i. ver. 492, 493.

^b Ver. 61, &c.

^c Ver. 915.

^d Sir Edward Herbert, *De Religione Gentilium*, cap. xiv. p. 228.

gans did exist of themselves from eternity unmade, they giving many reasons for the same. But how far from truth this is, will (as we conceive) appear sufficiently from the sequel of this discourse. And we cannot conclude otherwise, but that this learned writer did mistake that opinion of Aristotle and the latter Platonists, concerning the eternity of the world and gods, as if they had therefore asserted the self-existence of them; the contrary whereunto hath been already manifested. Wherefore we shall now make it unquestionably evident, by a particular enumeration, that the generality of the Pagan philosophers, who were Theists, however they acknowledged a multiplicity of gods, yet asserted one only self-existent Deity, or a universal Numen, by whom the world and all those other gods were made. There being only some few Ditheists to be excepted, (such as Plutarch and Atticus,) who, out of a certain softness and tenderness of nature, that they might free the one good God from the imputation of evils, would needs set up, besides him, an evil soul or demon also in the world self-existent, to bear all the blame of them.

And indeed Epicurus is the only person that we can find amongst the reputed philosophers, who, though pretending to acknowledge gods, yet professedly opposed monarchy, and verbally asserted a multitude of eternal, unmade, self-existent deities; but such as had nothing at all to do, either with the making or governing of the world. The reason whereof was, because he would by no means admit the world to have been made by any mind or understanding. Wherefore he concluded,

Naturam rerum, haud divina mente coortam;

Laeret. l. iii.
[ver. 150.]

That there was no God the δημιουργός or framer of the world.—But nevertheless, that he might decline the odium of being accounted an Atheist, he pretended to assert a multitude of gods unmade and incorruptible, such as were unconcerned in the fabric of the world. Wherein first it is evident, that he was not serious and sincere, because he really admitting no other principles of things in his philosophy, besides atoms and vacuum, agreeably thereunto could acknowledge no other gods than such as were compounded out of atoms, and therefore corruptible. And thus does Origen declare the doctrine of Epicurus, not indeed as he pretended to hold it, but as, according to the tenor of his principles, he must have held it, had he really asserted any gods at all, οἱ τοῦ Ἐπικούρου

Lib. iv. cont.
Cels. p. 169. θεοὶ, σύνθετοι ἐξ ἀτόμων τυγχάνοντες, καὶ τὸ ὄν ἐν τῇ συνστάσει ἀναλυτοὶ, πραγματεύονται τὰς φθοροποιόδας ἀτόμους ἀποσείσθαι; Epicurus's gods being

compounded of atoms, and therefore by their very constitution corruptible, are in continual labour and toil, struggling with their corruptive principles.—Nevertheless if Epicurus had in good earnest asserted such a commonwealth of gods, as were neither made out of atoms, nor yet corruptible; so long as he denied the world to have been made by any mind or wisdom (as we have already declared) he ought not to be reckoned amongst the Theists, but Atheists.

Thales the Milesian was one of the most ancient Greek philosophers, and that he admitted a plurality of gods in some sense, is evident from that saying of his cited by Aristotle,* πάντα θεῶν

* De Anima, lib. i. cap. viii. p. 17. tom. ii. oper.

πλήρη, all things are full of gods. But that notwithstanding he asserted one supreme and only unmade or self-existent Deity, is also manifest from that other apothegm of his in Laertius,* *πρεσβύτατον πάντων ὁ θεός, ἀγέννητον γάρ* God is the oldest of all things, because he is unmade. From whence it may be concluded, that all Thales's other gods were generated, and the offspring of one sole unmade Deity.

Pherecydes Syrus was Thales's contemporary, of whom Aristotle in his *Metaphysics* ^b hath recorded, that he affirmed *τὸ γεννῆσαν πρῶτον ἄριστον*, that the first principle, from whence all other things were generated, was the best or an absolutely perfect being; so as that in the scale of nature, things did not ascend upwards from the most imperfect to the more perfect beings, but, on the contrary, descend downwards from the most perfect to the less perfect. Moreover, Laertius informs us,^c that this was the beginning of one of Pherecydes's books, *Ζεὺς μὲν καὶ χρόνος εἰς αἰὶ, καὶ χθὼν ἦν* Jupiter, and time, and the earth always were.—Where, notwithstanding, in the following words, he makes the earth to be dependent upon Jupiter; though some reading *κρόνος* here instead of *χρόνος*, seem to understand him thus, that Jupiter and Saturn, really one and the same Numen, was always from eternity. However, there is in these words an acknowledgment of one single and eternal Deity.

Pythagoras was the most eminent of all the ancient philosophers, who, that he was a Polytheist

* Lib. i. segm. xxxv. p. 21.

^b Lib. xii. cap. iv. p. 446. tom. iv. oper.

^c Lib. i. segm. cxix. p. 76.

as well as the other Pagans, may be concluded from that beginning of the Golden Verses (though not written by him,)

Ἀθανάτους μὲν πρῶτα θεοὺς νόμος, ὡς δίδασκεται,
 Τίμα, καὶ σέβου ἥρωας· ἑταῖδ' ἥρωας ἀγαυούς·
 Τούς τε καταχθονίους σέβε δαίμονας, ἔταμα μέγιστον.

Wherein men are exhorted in the first to worship the immortal gods, and that accordingly as they were appointed by law; after them the heroes, and last of all the terrestrial demons. And accordingly Laertius* gives this account of Pythagoras's piety; τιμάς θεοῖς δεῖν νομίζειν καὶ ἥρωσιν, μὴ τὰς ἴσας. That he conceived men ought to worship both the gods and the heroes, though not with equal honour.—And who these gods of Pythagoras were, the same writer also declareth,^b ἡλιὸν τε καὶ σελήνην καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀστέρας εἶναι θεούς. That they were, in part at least, the sun, and moon, and stars.

Notwithstanding which, that Pythagoras acknowledged one supreme and universal Numen, which therefore was the original of all those other gods, may partly appear from that prayer in the Golden Verses, which, whether written by Philolaus or Lysis, or some other follower of Pythagoras, were undoubtedly ancient and agreeable to his doctrine.

Salmās. Præf. Ζεῦ πάτερ, ἢ πολλῶν τε μακρῶν λόγωνος ἀναπταῖς
 in Tab. Ceb. Εἰ πάντων ἐλπίς ὡς τῶν δαίμονι χρεώνται
 Arab.

Jupiter alme, malis jubeas vel solvier omnes:
 Omnibus utantur vel quonam dæmone monstra.

Upon which Hierocles^c thus writeth: τὸν ποιητὴν

* Lib. viii. segm. xxxiii. p. 514. Vide etiam segm. xxiii. p. 506.

^b Segm. xxvii. p. 509.

^c Comment. in Aurea Carmina Pythag. p. 200. edit. Needhami.

καὶ πατέρα τοῦδε τοῦ παντός ἔθος ἦν τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις τῷ τῷ Διός, καὶ Ζηνός, ὀνόματι σεμνύναν· δι' ὃν γὰρ τὸ εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ζῆν, τοῖς πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει, τοῦτον δίκαιον ἀπὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας ὀνομάζεσθαι. It was the manner of the Pythagoreans to honour the Maker and Father of this whole universe with the name of Dis and Zen, it being just, that he, who giveth being and life to all, should be denominated from thence.—And again afterward: τὸ τοῦ Διός ὄνομα σύμβολόν ἐστι, καὶ εἰκὼν ἐν φωνῇ δημιουργικῆς οὐσίας, τῷ τοῖς πρώτους θεμένους τοῖς πράγμασι τὰ ὀνόματα διὰ σοφίας ὑπερβολὴν, ὥσπερ τινες ἀγαλματοποιούς ἀρίστους, διὰ τῶν ὀνομάτων, ὡς δὲ εἰκόνων, ἐμφανίσαι αὐτῶν τὰς δυνάμεις. This very name Zeus is a convenient symbol or image of the demiurgical nature. And they, who first gave names to things, were by reason of a certain wonderful wisdom of theirs a kind of excellent statuariers; they by those several names, as images, lively representing the natures of things. Moreover, that this Pythagoric prayer was directed to the supreme Numen and King of gods, Jamblichus thus declares in his Protreptics, ^a ἐν δὲ τούτοις μία μὲν ἀρίστη παράκλησις εἰς τὴν θεῖαν εὐδαιμονίαν ἡ μεμιγμένη ταῖς ἐνχαῖς καὶ ἀνακλήσεσι τῶν θεῶν, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦ βασιλέως αὐτῶν Διός. Here is an excellent exhortation of these Golden Verses to the pursuit of Divine felicity, mingled together with prayers and the invocation of the gods, but especially of that Jupiter, who is the King of them.—Moreover, the same might further appear from those Pythagoric fragments, ^b that are still extant; as that of Ocellus Lucanus, and others, who were moralists,

^a Cap. iii. p. 10. edit. Arcerii.

^b These are published by Dr. Thomas Gale in his Opuscula Veter. Moral et Mytholog. Amsterd. 1688. in 8vo.

in which as gods are sometimes spoken of plurally, so also is God often singularly used for that supreme Deity, which containeth the whole.

But this will be most of all manifest from what hath been recorded concerning the Pythagoric philosophy, and its making a monad the first principle. It is true, indeed, that the writer *De Placitis Philosophorum* doth affirm Pythagoras to have asserted two substantial principles self-existent, a monad and a dyad; by the former of which, as God is confessed to have been meant, so the latter of them is declared with some uncertainty, it being in one place interpreted to be a demon, or a principle of evil;* *Πυθαγόρας τῶν ἀρχῶν τὴν μὲν μονάδα θεόν, καὶ τὰγαθόν, ἥτις ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ ἐνός φύσις, αὐτὸς ὁ νοῦς· τὴν δ' ἀόριστον δυνάδα δαίμονα, καὶ τὸ κακόν, &c.* Pythagoras's first principle is God and Good, which is the nature of unity, and a perfect mind; but his other principle of duality is a demon or evil.—But in another place expounded to be

matter: *πάλιν τὴν μονάδα καὶ τὴν ἀόριστον*
Lib. i. cap. iii.
 [p. 876. tom. ii. oper.] *δυνάδα ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς· σπεύδει δὲ αὐτῷ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν αἴτιον καὶ ἰδικόν, (ὅπερ ἐστὶ νοῦς ὁ θεός) ἡ δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ παθητικόν τε καὶ ὑλικόν (ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὁ ὁρατὸς κόσμος)* Pythagoras's principles were a monad and infinite duality: the former of them an active principle, Mind or God; the latter passive and matter. And Plutarch, in some other writings of his, declares that the first matter did not exist alone by itself dead and inanimate, but acted with an irrational soul; and that both these together made up that wicked demon of his. And, doubtless, this book *De Placitis Philosophorum* was either writ-

* *De Placit. Philos. lib. i. cap. vii. p. 881.*

ten by Plutarch himself, or else by some disciple and follower of his according to his principles. Wherefore this account, which is therein given of the Pythagoric doctrine, was probably infected with that private conceit of Plutarch's, that God and a wicked demon, or else matter, together with an irrational soul, self-existent, were the first principles of the universe. Though we do acknowledge that others also, besides Plutarch, have supposed Pythagoras to have made two self-existent principles, God and matter, but not animate, nor informed, as Plutarch supposed, with any irrational or wicked soul.

Notwithstanding which, it may well be made a question, whether Pythagoras by his dyad meant matter or no; because Malchus or Porphyrius, in the life of Pythagoras, thus interprets those two Pythagoric principles of unity and duality;

τὸ αἰτίον τῆς συμπνοίας καὶ τῆς συμπαθείας, καὶ τῆς σωτηρίας τῶν ὅλων τοῦ κατὰ ταῦτα καὶ Pl. 203.
 ὡσαύτως ἔχοντος, ἐν προσηγόρευσαν, καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἐν τοῖς
 κατὰ μέρος ἐν τοιούτων ὑπάρχει, ἡνωμένον τοῖς μέρει καὶ
 συμπνοῦν, κατὰ μετουσίαν τοῦ πρώτου αἰτίου· τὸν δὲ τῆς
 ἑτερότητας καὶ ἀνισότητος καὶ παντός τοῦ μεριστοῦ καὶ ἐν
 μεταβολῇ καὶ ἄλλοτε ἄλλως ἔχοντος διουειδῆ λόγον καὶ
 δυνάδα προσηγόρευσαν· The cause of that sympathy,
 harmony, and agreement, which is in things, and
 of the conservation of the whole, which is always
 the same and like itself, was by Pythagoras
 called unity or a monad (that unity, which is in
 the things themselves, being but a participation of
 the first cause); but the reason of alterity, ine-
 quality and unconstant irregularity in things, was
 by him called a dyad.—Thus, according to Por-
 phyrius, by the Pythagoric dyad is not so much

meant matter, as the infinite and indeterminate nature, and the passive capability of things. So that the monad and dyad of Pythagoras seem to have been the same with Plato's *τέρας* and *ἀπειρον*, his finite and infinite in his *Philebus*; the former of which two only is substantial, that first most simple being, the cause of all unity, and the measure of all things.

However, if Pythagoras's dyad be to be understood of a substantial matter, it will not therefore follow, that he supposed matter to be self-existent and independent upon the Deity, since, according to the best and most ancient writers, his dyad was no primary but a secondary thing only, and derived from his Monad, the sole original of all things. Thus Diogenes Laertius tells us,^a that Alexander, who wrote the successions of philosophers, affirmed he had found in the Pythagoric Commentaries, *ἀρχὴν μὲν τῶν πάντων, μονάδα· ἐκ δὲ τῆς μονάδος, ἀόριστον δυάδα, ὡς ἂν ἔλην τῇ μονάδι αὐτῇ ὅτι ἐκαστῇ*: that a Monad was the principle of all things, but that from this Monad was derived infinite duality, as matter for the Monad to work upon, as the active cause.—With which agreeth Hermias,^b affirming this to be one of the greatest of all the Pythagoric mysteries, that a Monad was the sole principle of all things. Accordingly whereunto, Clemens Alexandrinus cites this passage^c out of Thearidas, an ancient Pythagorean, in his book concerning nature, *Ἄ ἀρχὰ τῶν ὄντων, ἀρχὰ μὲν ὄντως ἀληθινὰ, μία*

^a Lib. viii. segm. xxv. p. 507.

^b Irisione Philos. Gentilis, sec. xvi. p. 225.

^c Dr. Cudworth does not cite this passage as it is in Clemens Alexandr. but as it is given by Euseb. *Preparat. Evangel.* lib. v. cap. xxiv.

Κεῖνα γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ τέ ἐστιν ἐν καὶ μόνον, the true principle of all things was only one; for this was in the beginning one alone.—Which words also seem to imply the world to have had a novity of existence or beginning of duration. And, indeed, however Ocellus Lucanus writes, yet that Pythagoras himself did not hold the eternity of the world, may be concluded from what Porphyrius^a records of him, where he gives an account of that his superstitious abstinence from beans; ὅτι τῆς πρώτης ἀρχῆς καὶ γενέσεως ταραττομένης, καὶ πολλῶν ἅμα συνηγεμένων καὶ συσπυρομένων καὶ συσσηπομένων ἐν τῇ γῇ, κατ' ὀλίγον γενέσις καὶ διάκρισις συνέστη, ζώων τε ὁμοῦ γενομένων, καὶ φυτῶν ἀναδιδόμενων, τότε δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς σηπεδόνης, ἀνθρώπους συστήναι καὶ κυάμους βλαστήναι. That at the beginning things being confounded and mingled together, the generation and secretion of them afterward proceeded by degrees, animals and plants appearing; at which time, also, from the same putrefied matter, sprung up both men and beans.—

Pythagoras is generally reported to have held a trinity of Divine hypostases: and, therefore, when St. Cyril^b affirmeth Pythagoras to have called God ψύχωσιν τῶν ὅλων κύκλων, καὶ πάντων κινήσιν, the animation of the whole heavens, and the motion of all things—adding, that God was not, as some supposed, ἐκτὸς τῆς διακοσμήσεως, ἀλλ' ἐν αὐτῇ ὅλος ἐν ὅλῳ, without the fabric of the world, but whole in the whole—this seems properly to be understood of that third Divine hypostasis of the Pythagoric trinity, namely, the eternal Psyche.

^a In vita Pythag. p. 43. edit. Kusteri.

^b Contra Julian. lib. i. p. 30.

Again, when God is called in Plutarch, ^a according to Pythagoras, αὐτὸς ὁ νοῦς, mind itself—this seems to be meant properly of his second hypostasis; the supreme Deity, according to him, being something above mind or intellect. In like manner, when in Cicero, ^b Pythagoras's opinion concerning the Deity is thus represented: "Deum esse animum per naturam rerum omnium intentum et commeantem, ex quo animi nostri carperentur;" that God was a mind passing through the whole nature of things, from whom our souls were, as it were, decerped or cut out—and again, "ex universa mente divina delibato esse animos nostros;" this in all probability was to be understood also either of the third or second Divine hypostasis, and not of the first, which was properly called by him τὸ ἐν and μόνας, a [p. 267. tom. unity and monad; and also, as Plutarch ^c tells us, τὸ ἀγαθόν, goodness itself.—Aristotle plainly affirmeth, that some of the ancient theologers amongst the Pagans made ἔρως, or Love, to be the first principle of all things, that is, the supreme Deity; and we have already shewed, that Orpheus was one of these. For when ἔρως πολυτερεπής and πολύμητις, delightful Love, and that, which is not blind, but full of wisdom and counsel—is made by him to be αὐτοτελές and προεβύρατον, self-perfect and the oldest of all things—it is plain, that he supposed it to be nothing less than the supreme Deity. Wherefore, since Pythagoras is generally affirmed to have followed the Orphic principles, we may from hence pre-

^a De Placit. Philosoph. lib. i. cap. vii. p. 881.

^b De Natur. Deor. lib. i. cap. xi. p. 2895. tom. ix. oper.

^c De Placit. Philos. lib. i. cap. vi. p. 881.

sume, that he did it in this also. Though it be very true, that Plato, who called the supreme Deity *τάγαθόν*, as well as Pythagoras, did dissent from the Orphic theology in this, and would not acknowledge Love for a name of the supreme Deity; as when in his Symposium in the person of Agatho he speaks thus: *Φαίδρω πολλά ἄλλα ὁμολογῶν, τοῦτο οὐχ ὁμολογῶ, ὡς Ἔρως Κρόνου καὶ Ἰαπετοῦ ἀρχαιότερος ἐστίν· ἀλλὰ φημὶ νεώτατον αὐτὸν εἶναι θεῶν, καὶ αἰεὶ νέον*. Though I should readily grant to Phædrus many other things, yet I cannot consent to him in this, that Love was older than Saturn and Iapet; but, on the contrary, I do affirm him to be the youngest of the gods, as he is always youthful. They, who made Love older than Saturn as well as Iapet, supposed it to be the supreme Deity: wherefore Plato here, on the contrary, affirms Love not to be the supreme Deity or Creator of all, but a creature; a certain junior god; or, indeed, as he afterward adds, not so much a god as a demon, it being a thing which plainly implies imperfection in it. "Love (saith he) is a philosopher, whereas *θεῶν οὐδείς φιλοσοφεῖ, οὐδ' ἐπιθυμεῖ σοφὸς γενέσθαι, ἐστὶ γάρ*, no god philosophizeth, nor desires to be made wise, because he is so already.—Agreeably with which doctrine of his, Plotinus* determines, that Love is peculiar to that middle rank of beings called souls; *πάσα ψυχὴ, ἀφροδίτη. καὶ τοῦτο αἰνίσσεται καὶ τὰ τῆς ἀφροδίτης γενέθλια, καὶ ὁ ἔρως ὁ μετ' αὐτῆς γενόμενος· ἐρᾷ οὖν κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσα ψυχὴ θεοῦ, ἐνωθῆναι θέλουσα, ὥσπερ παρθένος καλὴ πρὸς καλὸν ἄνδρα· ὅταν δὲ εἰς γένεσιν ἔλθουσα, οἷον μνηστείαις ἀπατηθῇ, ἄλλον ἀρξαμένη θνητὸν ἔρωτα, ἐρημία πατρὸς ἐβρίζεται, &c.* Every soul is a Venus, which is also intimated by Venus's

* Libro de Bono vel Uno, Luncad. vi. lib. ix. cap. xii. p. 768.

nativity, and Love's being begotten with her : wherefore the soul being in its right natural state loves God, desiring to be united with him, which is a pure, heavenly and virgin love ; but when it descends to generation, being courted with these amorous allurements here below, and deceived by them, it changeth that its Divine and heavenly love for another mortal one : but if it again shake off these lascivious and wanton loves, and keep itself chaste from them, returning back to its own father and original, it will be rightly affected as it ought.—But the reason of this difference betwixt the Orpheists and Plato, that the former made Love to be the oldest of all the gods, but the latter to be a junior god or demon, proceeded only from an equivocation in the word love. For Plato's Love was the daughter of Penia, that is, poverty and indigency, together with a mixture of Πόρος, or riches ; and being so as it were compounded of plenty and poverty, was in plain language no other than the love of desire, which, as Aristotle affirmeth, is μετὰ λύπης, accompanied with grief and pain. But that Orphic and Pythagoric love was nothing else but πόρος and εὐπορία, infinite riches and plenty, a love of redundancy and overflowing fulness, delighting to communicate itself, which was therefore said to be the oldest of all things and the most perfect, that is, the supreme Deity ; according to which notion also, in the Scripture itself, God seems to be called love, though the word be not there ἔως, but ἀγάπη. But, to say the truth, Parmenides's love (however made a principle somewhere by Aristotle*) seems to be neither exactly

* Physicor. lib. i. cap. ii. iii. p. 446. tom. i. oper. Adde Metaph. lib. i. cap. v. p. 269.

the same with the Orphic, nor yet with the Platonic love, it being not the supreme Deity, and yet the first of the created gods; which appears from Simplicius's* connecting these two verses of his together in this manner:

Ἐν δὲ μὲν τοῖς δαίμονι ἐκ πάντων ἀρχῆς,

τοῖς καὶ θεῶν ἀρχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ, λέγει,

Πρότερον μὲν ἔστι θεὸς μετὰ τὸν αἰῶνα

In the midst of these elements is that God, which governeth all things, and whom Parmenides affirmeth to be the cause of gods, writing thus: God first of all created Love, before the other gods.—Wherefore by this Love of Parmenides is understood nothing else, but the lower soul of the world, together with a plastic nature, which though it be the original of motion and activity in this corporeal world, yet is it but a secondary or created god; before whose production, necessity is said by those Ethnic theologers to have reigned: the true meaning whereof seems to be this, that before that Divine Spirit moved upon the waters, and brought things into an orderly system, there was nothing but the necessity of material motions, unguided by any orderly wisdom or method for good (that is, by Love) in that confused and floating chaos.

But Pythagoras, it seemeth, did not only call the supreme Deity a monad, but also a tetrad or tetractys; for, it is generally affirmed, that Pythagoras himself was wont to swear hereby: though Porphyrius and Jamblichus and others write, that the disciples of Pythagoras swore by Pythagoras, who had delivered to them the doctrine or cabala of this Tetractys. Which Te-

* Commentar. in Aristot. Phys. p. 152. edit. Græc. Aldin.

tractys also in the Golden Verses is called *πηγή αἰνάνου φύσεως*, the fountain of the eternal nature, an expression, that cannot properly belong to any thing but the supreme Deity. And thus Hierocles,* *οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ὃ μὴ τῆς τετρακτύος, ὡς ῥίζης, καὶ ἀρχῆς ἡρτηται. ἔστι γάρ, ὡς ἔφαμεν, δημιουργὸς τῶν ὅλων, καὶ αἰτία ἡ Τέτρας, Θεὸς νοητὸς, αἴτιος τοῦ οὐρανίου, καὶ αἰσθητοῦ Θεοῦ.* There is nothing in the whole world, which doth not depend upon the Tetractys, as its root and principle. For the Tetrad is, as we have already said, the Maker of all things; the intelligible God, the cause of the heavenly and sensible god, that is, of the animated world or heaven.—Now the latter Pythagoreans and Platonists endeavour to give reasons, why God should be called Tetras or Tetractys, from certain mysteries in that number four, as for example; first, because the tetrad is *δύναμις δεκάδος*, the power of the decad—it virtually containing the whole decad in it, which is all numbers or beings; but the bottom of this mystery is no more than this, that one, two, three, four, added all together, make up ten. Again, because the tetrad is an arithmetical mediety betwixt the monad and the hebdomad; which monad and hebdomad are said to agree in this, that as the monad is ingenit or unmade, it being the original and fountain of all numbers, so is the hebdomad said to be, not only *παρθένος*, but *ἀμήτωρ*, a motherless, as well as virgin number.—Wherefore the tetrad lying in the middle betwixt the ingenit monad, and the motherless virgin hebdomad; and it being both begotten and begetting, say they, must needs be a very mys-

* Comment. in Aurea Carmina Pythag. p. 170, 171.

terious number, and fitly represent the Deity. Whereas, indeed, it was therefore unfit to represent the Deity, because it is begotten by the multiplication of another number; as the hebdomad therefore doth not very fitly symbolize with it neither, because it is barren or begets nothing at all within the decad, for which cause it is called a virgin. Again, it is further added, that the tetrad fitly resembles that, which is solid, because, as a point answers to a monad, and a line to a dyad, and a superficies to a triad, (the first and most simple figure being a triangle;) so the tetrad properly represents the solid, the first pyramid being found in it. But, upon this consideration, the tetrad could not be so fit a symbol of the incorporeal Deity, neither as of the corporeal world. Wherefore these things being all so trifling, slight and fantastical; and it being really absurd for Pythagoras to call his Monad a Terad; the late conjecture of some learned men amongst us* seems to be much more probable, that Pythagoras's Tetractys was really nothing else but the Tetragrammaton, or that proper name of the supreme God amongst the Hebrews, consisting of four letters or consonants. Neither ought it to be wondered at, that Pythagoras (who besides his travelling into Egypt, Persia and Chaldea, and his sojourning at Sidon, is affirmed by Josephus, Porphyrius and others, to have conversed with the Hebrews also) should be so well acquainted with the Hebrew Tetragrammaton, since it was not unknown to the Hetrurians and Latins, their Jove being certainly

* Selden de Diis Syris Syntagm. ii. cap. i. p. 209, 210. et Theophilus Gale in his Court of the Gentiles, part ii. lib. ii. cap. viii. p. 147. edit. Oxon. 1672, in quarto.

nothing else. And, indeed, it is the opinion of some philologists, that even in the Golden Verses themselves, notwithstanding the seeming repugnancy of the syntax, it is not Pythagoras, that is sworn by, but this Tetractys or Tetragrammaton; that is, Jova or Jehovah, the name of God, being put for God himself, according to that received doctrine of the Hebrews יהוה יהוה יהוה that God and his name were all one—as if the meaning of those words,

καὶ μὴ τὴν ἀμετέρεσσι ψυχῇ παραδόντα Τετρακτὺν
Παγὺν ἀνθρώπου φύσεως. —————

were this: By the Tetragrammaton or Jovah, who hath communicated [himself or] the fountain of the eternal nature to our human souls; for these, according to the Pythagoric doctrine, were said to be * *ex mente divina carptæ et delibatæ*, i. e. nothing but derivative streams from that first fountain of the Divine mind.

Wherefore we shall now sum up all concerning Pythagoras in this conclusion of St. Cyril's: ἰδὼν Con. Jal. l. i. δὴ σαφῶς, ἓνα τε εἶναι λέγει τὸν τῶν ὅλων Θεόν, [p. 30.] καὶ πάντων ἀρχὴν ἐργάτην τε τῶν αὐτοῦ δυνάμεων, φωστῆρα καὶ ψύχων, ἧτοι ζωοποιήσιν τῶν ὅλων καὶ κύκλων πάντων κίνησιν· παρῆκται δὲ τὰ πάντα παρ' αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι κίνησιν λαχόντα φαίνεται· Behold we see clearly, that Pythagoras held there was one God of the whole universe, the principle and cause of all things, the illuminator, animator, and quickener of the whole, and original of motion; from whom all things were derived, and brought out of non-entity into being.

Next to Pythagoras, in order of time, was Xenophanes the Colophonian, the head of the Eleatic sect of philosophers, who, that he was

* Cic. de Natur. Deor. lib. i. cap. xi. p. 2696. oper.

an assertor both of many gods and one God, sufficiently appears from that verse of his before cited, and attested both by Clemens Alexandrinus,^a and Sextus the philosopher ;

Εἰς θεὸς ἓν τι πάντες καὶ ἀνθρώποις μέγιστος·

There is one God, the greatest both amongst gods and men.—Concerning which greatest God, this other verse of Xenophanes is also vouched ;

Καὶ ἀπένανθι παυεῖ νόον, φρενὶ πάντα κραδαίνει·

That he moveth the whole world without any labour or toil, merely by mind.—Besides which, Cicero^b and others tell us, that this Xenophanes philosophizing concerning the supreme Deity, was wont to call it *ἐν καὶ πᾶν*, one and all—as being one most simple being, that virtually containeth all things. But Xenophanes's Theosophy, or Divine philosophy, is most fully declared by Simplicius out of Theophrastus in this man-

ner : *Μίαν δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν, ἥτοι ἐν τὸ ὄν καὶ πᾶν,* In Aristot. Phys. p. 5, 6.
καὶ οὔτε πεπερασμένον οὔτε ἄπειρον, οὔτε κινούμενον οὔτε ἡρεμούν, *Ξενοφάνην τὸν Κολοφώνιον τὸν Παρμενίδου διδάσκαλον ὑποτίθεσθαι φησιν ὁ Θεόφραστος· ὁμολογῶν ἑτέρας εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς περὶ φύσεως ιστορίας, τὴν μνήμην τῆς τούτου δόξης. τὸ γὰρ ἐν τούτῳ καὶ πᾶν τὸν Θεὸν ἔλεγεν ὁ Ξενοφάνης· ὃν ἓνα μὲν δείκνυσιν ἐκ τοῦ πάντων κράτιστον εἶναι· πλείονων γὰρ φησιν ὄντων, ὁμοίως ἀνάγκη ὑπάρχειν πᾶσι τὸ κρατεῖν· τὸ δὲ πάντων κράτιστον καὶ ἄριστον, Θεός· ἀγέννητον δὲ ἐδείκνυνεν ——— καὶ οὔτε δὴ ἄπειρον οὔτε πεπερασμένον εἶναι· διότι ἄπειρον μὲν τὸ μὴ ὄν, ὡς οὔτε ἀρχὴν ἔχον μήτε μέσον μήτε τέλος· περαίνειν δὲ πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ πλείω· παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ τὴν κίνησιν ἀφαιρεῖ καὶ τὴν*

^a Stromat. lib. v. p. 714.

^b In Acad. Quæst. lib. iv. cap. xxxvii. p. 2316. tom. viii. oper.

ἡρεμίαν ἀκίνητον μὲν, &c. Theophrastus affirmeth, that Xenophanes the Colophonian, Parmenides's master, made one principle of all things, he calling it one and all, and determining it to be neither finite nor infinite (in a certain sense) and neither moving nor resting. Which Theophrastus also declares, that Xenophanes in this did not write as a natural philosopher or physiologer, but as a metaphysician or theologer only; Xenophanes's one and all being nothing else but God. Whom he proved to be one solitary being from hence, because God is the best and most powerful of all things; and there being many degrees of entity, there must needs be something supreme to rule over all. Which best and most powerful Being can be but one. He also did demonstrate it to be unmade, as likewise to be neither finite nor infinite (in a certain sense;) as he removed both motion and rest from God. Wherefore, when he saith, that God always remaineth or resteth the same, he understands not this of that rest which is opposite to motion, and which belongs to such things as may be moved; but of a certain other rest, which is both above that motion and its contrary.—From whence it is evident, that Xenophanes supposed (as Sextus the philosopher also affirmeth) God to be incorporeal, a being unlike to all other things, and therefore of which no image could be made. And now we understand, that Aristotle* dealt not ingenuously with Xenophanes, when from that expression of his, that God was σφαίροειδής, or spheriform—he would infer, that Xenophanes made God to be a body, and nothing else but the

* Vid. libr. de Xenophane, Zenone et Gorgia, cap. iv. p. 843, 844.

round corporeal world animated; which yet was repugnant also to another physical hypothesis of this same Xenophanes, ἀπείρους ἡλίους εἶναι καὶ σελήνας, that there were infinite suns and moons;—by which moons he understood planets, affirming them to be all habitable earths, as Cicero tells us.* Wherefore, as Simplicius resolves, God was said to be σφαιροειδής, or spheriform—by Xenophanes only in this sense, as being πανταχόθεν ὁμοίος, every way like and uniform.—However, it is plain, that Xenophanes asserting one God, who was all, or the universe, could not acknowledge a multitude of partial, self-existent deities.

Heraclitus was no clear, but a confounded philosopher (he being neither a good naturalist nor metaphysician) and therefore it is very hard, or rather impossible, to reconcile his several opinions with one another. Which is a thing the less to be wondered at, because, amongst the rest of his opinions, this also is said to have been one, that contradictories may be true: and his writings were accordingly, as Plato intimates, stuffed with unintelligible, mysterious nonsense. For, first, he is affirmed to have acknowledged no other substance besides body, and to have maintained,† that all things did flow, and nothing stand, or remain the same; and yet in his epistles (according to the common opinion of philosophers at that time) doth he suppose the pre- and post-existence of human souls in these words:‡ τάρχα

* Vid. Acad. Quæst. lib. iv. cap. xxxix. p. 2319. tom. viii. oper.

† Vide sext. Empiric. Hypotypos. lib. i. cap. xxix. p. 53.

‡ Vide Platon. in Convivio, p. 321.

§ Vide Epistol. Græcas ab Eilhardo Lubino editas. Heidelberg. 1601. in octavo. p. 54, 55.

καὶ ψυχὴ μαρτυρεῖται ἀπολύνειν ἑαυτῆς ἤδη ποτὶ ἐκ τοῦ δεσποτέρου τούτου· καὶ σιομένου τοῦ σώματος ἐκκέντυσα, ἀνεμυμήσκειται τὰ πατρία χωρία, ἐνθιν κατελθοῦσα περιβάλλετο ῥέον σῶμα τεθνωὺς τούτου, ὃ δοκᾷ, &c. My soul seemeth to vaticinate and presage its approaching dismissal and freedom from this its prison; and looking out, as it were, through the cracks and crannies of this body, to remember those its native regions or countries, from whence descending it was clothed with this flowing mortal body; which is made up and constipated of phlegm, choler, serum, blood, nerves, bones and flesh.—And, not only so, but he also there acknowledgeth the soul's immortality, which Stoics, allowing its permanency after death, for some time at least, and to the next conflagration, did deny; δύνεται τὸ σῶμα εἰς τὸ εἰμαρμένον, ἀλλὰ οὐ ψυχὴ δύνεται· ἀλλὰ ἀθάνατον οὐσα χρήμα, εἰς οὐρανὸν ἀναπτήσεται μετάρσιος· δέκονται δὲ με αἰθήρῃσι δόμοι, καὶ πολετεύσομαι οὐκ ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀλλ' ἐν θεοῖς. This body shall be fatally changed to something else; but my soul shall not die or perish, but, being an immortal thing, shall fly away mounting upwards to heaven; those ethereal houses shall receive me, and I shall no longer converse with men, but gods.—Again, though Heraclitus asserted the fatal necessity of all things, yet notwithstanding was he a strict moralist, and upon this account highly esteemed by the Stoics, who followed him in this and other things; and he makes no small pretence to it himself in his epistle to Hermodorus,* καὶ ἔμοιγε πολλοὶ καὶ δυσχερέστατοι ἄθλοι κατόρθωνται· νενίκηκα ἡδονὰς, νενίκηκα χρήματα, νενίκηκα φιλοτιμίαν, κατεπάλαισα δαλίαν, κατεπάλαισα κολακίαν·

* Apud Lubinum, ubi supra, p. 50.

οὐκ ἀντιλέγει μοι φόβος, οὐκ ἀντιλέγει μοι μέθη· φοβεῖται με λύπη, φοβεῖται με ὀργή· κατὰ τούτων αὐτῶν καὶ αὐτὸς ἵστα-
φάνωμαι, ἐμπαῖω ἐπιτάττων, οὐχ ὑπ' Εὐρυσθέως· I have
also had my difficult labours and conflicts as well
as Hercules; I have conquered ambition; I have
subdued cowardice and flattery; neither fear nor
intemperance can controul me; grief and anger
are afraid of me, and fly away from me. These
are the victories, for which I am crowned, not by
Eurystheus, but as being made master of my-
self.—Lastly, though Heraclitus made fire to be
the first principle of all things, and had some odd
passages imputed to him, yet notwithstanding
was he a devout religionist, he supposing, that
fiery matter of the whole universe *animantem esse
et Deum*, to be an animal and God.—And as he
acknowledged many gods, according to that
which Aristotle* recordeth of him, that when
some passing by had espied him sitting in a smoky
cottage, he bespake them after this manner, *In-
troite, nam et hic dii sunt*, Come in, I pray, for
here there are gods also;—he supposing all places
to be full of gods, demons and souls: so was he
an undoubted assertor of one supreme Numen,
that governs all things, and that such as could
neither be represented by images, nor confined to
temples. For after he had been accused of im-
piety by Euthycles, he writes to Hermodorus
in this manner:ᾠ ἀλλ', ὦ ἀμαθεῖς ἄνθρωποι, διδάξατε
πρῶτον ἡμᾶς τί ἐστὶν ὁ θεός; τοῦ δ' ἐστὶν ὁ θεός; ἐν
ταῖς ναοῖς ἀποκεκλισμένος; εὐσεβεῖς γε, οἳ ἐν σκότει
τῶν θεῶν ἰδρύεσθε——ἀπαίδευτοι, οὐκ ἴστε ὅτι οὐκ ἴστι

* De Partib. Animal. lib. i. cap. v. p. 481. tom. ii. oper.

ᾠ Apud Lubin. ubi supra, p. 60.

θεός χειρόκμητος· οὐδὲ ἐξ ἀρχῆς βάσιν ἔχει· οὐδὲ ἔχει
 ἓνα περίβολον· ἀλλ' ὅλος ὁ κόσμος αὐτῷ ναός ἐστι, ζώας·
 καὶ φεαίς καὶ ἄστροις περικυκλῆνός· But O you un-
 wise and unlearned! teach us first what God is,
 that so you may be believed in accusing me of
 impiety: tell us where God is. Is he shut up
 within the walls of temples? is this your piety to
 place God in the dark, or to make him a stony
 God? O you unskilful! know ye not, that God
 is not made with hands, and hath no basis or sal-
 crum to stand upon, nor can be inclosed within
 the walls of any temple; the whole world, varie-
 gated with plants, animals and stars being his
 temple?— And again, ἀρ' οὐκ εἰμὶ εὐσεβής, Εὐθύκλες;
 ὃς μόνος οἶδα θεόν; εἰν δὲ μὴ ἰδρυθῇ θεοῦ βωμός, οὐκ ἔστι
 θεός; εἰν δὲ ἰδρυθῇ μὴ θεοῦ, θεός ἐστιν; ὥστε λίθοι θεῶν
 μάρτυρες· ἔργα δὲ μαρτυρεῖν, οἷα ἡλίου· νύξ αὐτῷ καὶ ἡμέρα
 μαρτυροῦσιν· ὥραι αὐτῷ μάρτυρες, γῇ ὅλη καρποφοροῦσα,
 μάρτυς· σελήνης ὁ κύκλος, ἐκείνου ἔργον, οὐράνιος μαρτυρία.
 Am I impious, O Euthycles, who alone know
 what God is? is there no God without altars? or
 are stones the only witnesses of him? No, his
 own works give testimony to him, and principally
 the sun; night and day bear witness of him; the
 earth bringing forth fruits, declares him; the cir-
 cle of the moon, that was made by him, is a hea-
 venly testimony of him.

In the next place, Anaxagoras, the Clazome-
 nian philosopher, comes to be considered, whose
 predecessors of the Ionic order (after Thales) as
 Anaximander, Anaximenes and Hippo, were (as
 hath been already observed) Materialists and
 Atheists; they acknowledging no other substance
 besides body, and resolving all things into the

motions, passions, and affections of it. Whence

was that cautious advice given by Jam- Symh. xxvii.

blichus, *προσέμα τὴν Ἰταλικὴν φιλοσοφίαν τὴν* p. 159. (peti-

ταῖς αἰσθήμασι καθ' αὐτὰ θεωροῦσαν, τῆς Ἰονικῆς us in Orat. pre-

τῆς τὰ σώματα προηγουμένως ἐπισκοποῦμένης trept. ad phi-

Prefer the Italic philosophy, which contemplates losoph. p. 159

incorporeal substances by themselves, before the

Ionic, which principally considers bodies.—And

Anaxagoras was the first of these Ionics, who

went out of that road; for seeing a necessity of

some other cause, besides the material (matter

being not able so much as to move itself, and

much less if it could, by fortuitous motion, to

bring itself into an orderly system and compages;)

he therefore introduced mind into the Cosmopœia,

as the principal cause of the universe;

which mind is the same with God. Orat. xv. [p.

Thus Themistius, speaking of Anaxa- 317. edit.

goras, *νοῦν καὶ θεὸν πρῶτος ἐπαγαγόμενος τῇ κοσμοποιᾷ;* Handisii.]

καὶ οὐ πάντα ἀνάγκης φύσεως τῶν σωμάτων He was

the first (that is, amongst the Ionic philosophers)

who brought in mind and God to the Cosmopœia;

and did not derive all things from senseless bo-

dies. And to the same purpose Plutarch, in the

life of Pericles, *τοῖς ὅλοις πρῶτος οὐ τέχνην οὐδ' ἀνάγκην,*

διακοσμήσειν ἀρχὴν, ἀλλὰ νοῦν ἐπέστηκε καθαρόν καὶ

ἄκατον The other Ionic philosophers before

Anaxagoras made fortune and blind necessity;

that is, the fortuitous and necessary motions of

the matter, to be the only Original of the world;

but Anaxagoras was the first, who affirmed a pure

and sincere mind to preside over all. Anaxago-

ras therefore supposed two substantial self-exist-

ent principles of the universe, one an infinite Mind or God, the other an infinite Homoiomery of matter, or infinite atoms; not unqualified, such as those of Empedocles and Democritus, which was the most ancient and genuine atomology; but similar, such as were severally endued with all manner of qualities and forms, which physiology of his therefore was a spurious kind of Atomism. Anaxagoras indeed did not suppose God to have created matter out of nothing, but that he was *κίνησις ἀρχή*, the principle of its motion, and also *τὸ εὖ καὶ καλῶς αἰτία*, the regulator of this motion for good—and consequently the cause of all the order, pulchritude, and harmony of the world: for which reason this Divine principle was called also by him, not only mind, but good; it being that, which acts for the sake of good. Wherefore according to Anaxagoras, first, the world was not eternal, but had a beginning in time; and before the world was made, there was from eternity an infinite congeries of similar and qualified atoms, self-existent, without either order or motion: secondly, the world was not afterward made by chance, but by Mind or God, first moving the matter, and then directing the motion of it so, as to bring it into this orderly system and compages. So that *νοῦς* was *κοσμοποιός*, Mind, the first maker of the world, and *νοῦς βασιλεὺς οὐρανοῦ τε καὶ γῆς*, Mind, that which still governs the same, the king and sovereign monarch of heaven and earth. Thirdly, Anaxagoras's Mind and God was purely incorporeal; to which purpose his words recorded by Simplicius are very remarkable;

In Arist. Phys.
I. i. fol. 33.
c. ii.

Νοῦς μέμικται οὐδενὶ χρήματι· ἀλλὰ μόνος αὐτός
ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἐστίν, εἰ μὴ γὰρ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἦν, ἀλλὰ

τίψ ἐμῆμκτο ἄλλω, μετῆχεν ἂν ἀπάντων χρημάτων, εἰ ἐμῆμκτο τίψ· ἐν παντί γάρ παντός μοῖρα ἔνιστιν· ὥστερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐμοὶ λέλεκται· καὶ ἀνικώλυν αὐτὸν τὰ συμμειγμένα, ὥστε μηδενὸς χρημάτων κρατεῖν ὁμοίως, ὡς καὶ μόνον· ἔάντα ἑφ' ἑαυτοῦ· ἔστι γὰρ λεπτότατόν τε πάντων χρημάτων, καὶ καθαρότατον· καὶ γνώμην γε περὶ παντός πᾶσαν ἵσχει καὶ ἰσχύει μέγιστον· Mind is mingled with nothing, but is alone by itself and separate; for if it were not by itself secrete from matter, but mingled therewith, it would then partake of all things, because there is something of all in every thing; which things mingled together with it, would hinder it, so that it could not master or conquer any thing, as if alone by itself: for mind is the most subtile of all things, and the most pure, and has the knowledge of all things, together with an absolute power over all.—Lastly, Anaxagoras did not suppose a multitude of unmade minds, coexistent from eternity, as so many partial causes and governors of the world, but only one infinite Mind or God, ruling over all.

Indeed, it may well be made a question, whether or no, besides this supreme and universal Deity, Anaxagoras did acknowledge any of those other inferior gods, then worshipped by the Pagans? because it is certain, that though he asserted infinite Mind to be the maker and governor of the whole world, yet he was accused by the Athenians for Atheism, and besides a mulct imposed upon him, banished for the same; the true ground whereof was no other than this, because he affirmed the sun to be nothing but a mass of fire, and the moon and earth, having mountains and valleys, cities and houses in it; and probably con-

cluded the same of all the other stars and planets, that they were either fires, as the sun, or habitable earths, as the moon; wherein, supposing them not to be animated, he did consequently deny them to be gods. Which his ungodding of the sun, moon and stars, was then looked upon by the vulgar as nothing less than absolute Atheism; they being very prone to think, that if there were not many understanding beings superior to men, and if the sun, moon, and stars were not such, and therefore in their language gods, there was no God at all. Neither was it the vulgar only, who condemned Anaxagoras for this, but even those two grave philosophers, Socrates and Plato, did the like; the first^a in his apology made to the Athenians, where he calls this opinion of Anaxagoras absurd; the second in his book of Laws, where he complains of this doctrine as a great inlet into

Atheism, in this manner: *ἡμοῦ καὶ σοῦ, ὅταν*

De Leg. l. 1. 3. τεκμηρία λέγωμεν ὡς εἰσὶ θεοὶ, τὰντα αὐτὰ προσ-
p. 886. φέρουτες, ἡλιὸν τε καὶ σελήνην καὶ ἀστρα καὶ γῆν,

ὡς θεοὺς καὶ θεῖα ὄντα, ὑπὸ τῶν σοφῶν τούτων ἀναπεισμένοι
ἀν λέγοιεν, ὡς γῆν τε καὶ λίθους ὄντα αὐτὰ, καὶ οὐδὲν
τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων φροντίζεν δυνάμενα. When
 you and I, endeavouring by arguments to prove,
 that there are gods, speak of the sun and moon,
 stars and earth, as gods and Divine things, our
 young men presently, being principled by these
 new philosophers, will reply; That these are no-
 thing but earth and stones (senseless and inani-
 mate bodies) which therefore cannot mind nor
 take notice of any human affairs.—Where we may
 observe these two things; first, that nothing was

^a Or rather Plato, p. 362.

accounted truly and properly a god amongst the Pagans, but only what was endued with life and understanding. Secondly, that the taking away of those inferior gods of the Pagans, the sun, moon, and stars, by denying them to be animated, or to have life and understanding in them, was, according to Plato's judgment, then the most ready and effectual way to introduce absolute Atheism.

Moreover, it is true, that though this Anaxagoras were a professed Theist, he asserting an infinite self-existent Mind to be the maker of the whole world, yet he was severely taxed also by Aristotle and Plato, as one not thorough-paced in Theism, and who did not so fully, as he ought, adhere to his own principles. For whereas, to assert Mind to be the maker of the world, is really all one as to assert final causality for things in nature, as also that they were made after the best manner; Anaxagoras, when he was to give his particular account of the phenomena, did commonly betake himself to material causes only, and hardly ever make use of the mental or final cause, but when he was to seek and at a loss; then only bringing in God upon the stage. Socrates's discourse concerning this in Plato's *Phædo* is very well worth our taking notice of: "Hearing one sometime read (saith he) out of a book of Anaxagoras, *ὡς νοῦς ἐστιν ὁ διακοσμοῦν τε καὶ πάντων αἰτίας*, that Mind was the order and cause of all things, I was exceedingly pleased herewith, concluding, that it must needs follow from thence, that all things were ordered and disposed of as they should, and after the best manner possible; and therefore the causes even of the

things in nature (or at least the grand strokes of them) ought to be fetched from the τὸ βέλτιον, that which is absolutely the best. But when afterward I took Anaxagoras's book into my hand, greedily reading it over, I was exceedingly disappointed of my expectation, finding therein no other causes assigned, but only from airs, and ethers, and waters, and such-like physical and material things. And he seemed to me to deal, just as if one having affirmed, that Socrates did all by mind, reason and understanding, afterward undertaking to declare the causes of all my actions, as particularly of my sitting here at this time, should render it after this manner; because, forsooth, my body is compounded of bones and nerves, which bones, being solid, have joints in them at certain distances, and nerves of such a nature, as that they are capable of being both intended and remitted: wherefore, my bones being lifted up in the joints, and my nerves some of them intended and some remitted, was the cause of the bending of my body, and of my sitting down in this place. He in the mean time neglecting the true and proper cause hereof, which was no other than this; because it seemed good to the Athenians to condemn me to die, as also to myself most just, rather to submit to their censure, and undergo their punishment, than by flight to escape it; for certainly otherwise these nerves and bones of mine would not have been here now in this posture, but amongst the Megarensians and Boeotians, carried thither ἐκ δόξης τοῦ βελτίου, by the opinion of the best; had I not thought it better to submit to the sentence of the city, than to escape the same by flight. Which kind of phi-

losophers (saith he) do not seem to me, to distinguish betwixt the true and proper cause of things, and the cause *sine qua non*, that without which they could not have been effected. And such are they, who devise many odd physical reasons for the firm settlement of the earth, without any regard to that Power, which orders all things for the best, (as having *δαμονίαν ἰσχύιν*, a Divine force in it); but thinking to find out an Atlas far more strong and immortal, and which can better hold all things together; *τὸ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ δέον, οὐδὲν ἔνδεον καὶ ἐνέχεν*. Good and fit, being not able, in their opinions, to hold, or bind any thing."

From which passage of Plato's we may conclude, that though Anaxagoras was so far convinced of Theism, as in profession to make one infinite Mind the cause of all things, matter only excepted; yet he had notwithstanding too great a tang of that old material and atheistical philosophy of his predecessors, still hanging about him, who resolved all the phenomena of nature into physical, and nothing into mental or final causes. And we have the rather told this long story of him, because it is so exact a parallel with the philosophic humour of some in this present age, who pretending to assert a God, do notwithstanding discard all mental and final causality from having any thing to do with the fabric of the world; and resolve all into material necessity and mechanism, into vortices, globuli and striate particles, and the like. Of which Christian philosophers we must needs pronounce, that they are not near so good Theists as Anaxagoras himself was, though so much condemned by Plato and Aristotle; forasmuch as he did not only as-

sert God to be the cause of motion, but also the governor, regulator and methodizer of the same, for the production of this harmonious system of the world, and therefore τοῦ εὖ καὶ καλῶς αἰρίαυ, the cause of well and fit.—Whereas these utterly reject the latter, and only admitting the former, will needs suppose heaven and earth, plants and animals, and all things whatsoever in this orderly compages of the world, to have resulted merely from a certain quantity of motion, or agitation; at first impressed upon the matter, and determined to vortex.

xxx1. The chronology of the old philosophers having some uncertainty in it, we shall not scrupulously concern ourselves therein, but in the next place consider Parmenides, Xenophanes's auditor, and a philosophic poet likewise, but who, conversing much with two Pythagoreans, Aménias and Diochætes, was therefore looked upon as one, that was not a little addicted to the Pythagoric sect. That this Parmenides acknowledged many gods, is evident from what has been already cited out of him; notwithstanding which, he plainly asserted also one Supreme, making him, as Simplicius tells us, αἰρίαυ θεῶν, the cause of all those other gods—of which Love is said to have been first produced. Which supreme Deity Parmenides, as well as Xenophanes, called ἐν τὸ πᾶν, one that was all—or the universe; but adding thereunto of his own, that it was also ἀκίνητον, immovable.

Now, though it be true, that Parmenides's writings being not without obscurity, some of the ancients, who were less acquainted with metaphysical speculations, understood him physically,

as if he had asserted the whole corporeal universe to be all but one thing, and that immoveable, thereby destroying, together with the diversity of things, all motion, mutation and action; which was plainly to make Parmenides not to have been a philosopher, but a madman: yet Simplicius, a man well acquainted with the opinions of ancient philosophers, and who had by him a copy of Parmenides's poems, (then scarce, but since lost) assures us, that Parmenides dreamt of no such matter, and that he wrote *ὁ περὶ τοῦ φυσικοῦ στοιχείου, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ὄντως ὄντος, ὃς περὶ τῆς θείας ὑπεροχῆς*, not concerning a physical element or principle, but concerning the true Ens; or the Divine transcendency—adding, that though some of those ancient philosophers did not distinguish τὰ φυσικὰ ἀπὸ τῶν ὑπὲρ φύσιν, natural things from supernatural—yet the Pythagoreans, and Xenophanes, and Parmenides, and Empedocles, and Anaxagoras, did all διακρίνειν, handle these two distinctly—καίπερ τῇ ἀσαφείᾳ λαμβάνοντες τοὺς πολλοὺς; however, by reason of their obscurity, it was not perceived by many—for which cause they have been most of them misrepresented, not only by Pagans, but also by Christian writers. For, as the same Simplicius informs us, Parmenides propounded two several doctrines, one after another; the first concerning theological and metaphysical things, called by him ἀλήθειαν, truth;—the second concerning physical and corporeal things, which he called δόξαν, opinion.—The transition betwixt which was contained in these verses of his;

Ἐν τῷ σοι πάλιν πιστὸν λόγον ἰδὲ νόημα
Ἄμφις ἀληθείας δόξας δ' ἀπὸ τοῦδε βροτάτους
Μένειναι· νόμον ἡμῶν ὅστις ἀπατρεῖν ἀκούειν...

In the former of which doctrines, Parmenides asserted one immoveable principle; but in the latter, two moveable ones, fire and earth. He speaking of souls also as a certain middle or vinculum betwixt the incorporeal and the corporeal world, and affirming, that God did τὰς ψυχὰς πέρσεν ποτὶ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ ἐμφανοῦς εἰς τὸ ἀίθερ, ποτὶ δὲ ἐνὶ κελύειν, sometimes send and translate souls from the visible to the invisible regions, and sometimes again, on the contrary, from the invisible to the visible.—From whence it is plain, that when Parmenides asserted his one and all immoveable, he spake not as a physiologer, but as a metaphysician and theologer only. Which indeed was a thing so evident, that Aristotle* himself, though he had a mind to obscure Parmenides's sense, that he might have a fling at him in his *Physica*, yet could not altogether dissemble it. For when he thus begins, "There must of necessity be either one principle or many; and if there be but one, then must it either be immoveable, as Parmenides and Melissus affirm, or else moveable, ὥστε οἱ φυσικοί, as the naturalists or physiologers;" he therein intimates, that when Parmenides and Melissus made one immoveable the principle of all things, they did not write this as physiologers. And afterward he confesses, that this controversy, whether there were one immoveable principle, does not belong to natural philosophy, but to some other science. But this is more plainly declared by him elsewhere,^b writing concerning Parmenides and Melissus after this manner: εἰ καὶ τ' ἄλλα λέγουσι καλῶς, ἀλλ' οὐ φυσικῶς γε

* *Physicæ Auscultat.* lib. i. cap. ii. p. 446. tom. i. oper.

^b *De Cœlo*, lib. iii. cap. i. p. 668.

δα. νομίζαν λέγειν, τὸ γὰρ εἶναι ἅτα τῶν ὄντων ἀγένετα καὶ ὅλως ἀκίνητα, μᾶλλον ἐστὶν ἑτέρας καὶ προτέρας, ἢ τῆς φυσικῆς ἐπισκέψεως. Though it be granted, that Parmenides and Melissus otherwise said well, yet we must not imagine them to have spoken physically. For this, that there is something unmade and immoveable, does not so properly belong to physics, as to a certain other science, which is before it.

Wherefore Parmenides, as well as Xenophanes's master, by his one and all, meant nothing else but the supreme Deity, he calling it also immoveable. For the supreme Deity was by these ancient philosophers styled, first τὸ ἐν and μονάς, a unity and monad—because they conceived, that the first and most perfect being, and the beginning of all things, must needs be the most simple. Thus Eudorus in Simplicius^a declares their sense; ἀρχὴν ἔφασαν εἶναι τῶν πάντων τὸ ἐν, ὡς καὶ τῆς ὕλης καὶ τῶν ὄντων πάντων, ἐξ αὐτοῦ γεγενημένων, τοῦτο δὲ εἶναι τὴν ὑπεράνω θεόν. These ancients affirmed, that the one, or unity, was the first Principle of all; matter itself, as well as other things, being derived from it; they meaning by this one that highest or supreme God, who is over all.—And Syrianus to the same purpose,^b οἱ θεῶι ἐκείνοι ἄνδρες, τὸ ἐν Θεὸν ἔλεγον, ὡς ἐνώσεως τοῖς ὅλοις αἰτίον, καὶ παντὸς τοῦ ὄντος καὶ πάσης ζωῆς. Those Divine men called God the One, as being the cause of unity to all things, as likewise he was of being and life. And Simplicius concludes, that Parmenides's ἐν ὄν, one Ens, was a certain Divine principle, superior to

^a Comment. in Physic. Aristot. p. 39. edit. Græc. Aldin.

^b Ex MS. Commen in libr. aliquot. Metaphysic. Aristotel.

mind or intellect, and more simple. *λείπεται οὖν τὸ νοητὸν πάντων αἰτίον, δι' ὃ καὶ ὁ νοῦς ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ νοεῖν, ἐν ᾧ πάντα κατὰ μίαν ἑνωσιν συνηρημένως κατελήπται, καὶ ἡνωμένως, τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ Παρμενίδειον ἐν ὄν.* It remaineth, therefore, that that Intelligible, which is the cause of all things, and therefore of mind and understanding too, in which all things are contained and comprehended compendiously, and in a way of unity; I say, that this was Parmenides' one Ens or Being.

In the next place, Parmenides, with the others of those ancients, called also his *ἐν ὄν, τὸ πᾶν*, his one Ens or first most simple Being, all, or the universe—because it virtually contained all things, and, as Simplicius writes, *πάντα διακεκρωμένως ἐμφαίνεται ἀπ' αὐτοῦ*, all things are from this one, distinctly displayed.—For which cause, in Plato's Parmenides, this one is said to be *ἐνὶ πάντα πολλὰ ὄντα νεμεμημένον*, distributed into all things, that are many.—But that Parmenides by his *ἐν τὸ πᾶν*, one and all—or the universe, did not understand the corporeal world, is evident from

In Phys.
f. 17. 2. hence, because he called it *ἀδιαίρετον*, or indivisible—and, as Simplicius observes, supposed it to have no magnitude; because that, which is perfectly one, can have no parts.

Wherefore it may be here observed, that this expression of *ἐν τὸ πᾶν*, one being all—bath been used in very different senses: for as Parmenides and Xenophanes understood it of the supreme Deity, that one most perfect and most simple Being was the original of all things; so others of them meant it atheistically, concerning the most imperfect and lowest of all beings, matter or body, they affirming all things to be nothing but

one and the same matter diversely modified. Thus much we learn from that place of Aristotle in his *Metaphysics*: ὅσοι μὲν οὖν ἐν τε τὸ πᾶν καὶ μίαν εἶναι τινα φύσιν ὡς ὕλην τιθέασι, καὶ ταύτην σωματικὴν καὶ μέγεθος ἔχουσιν, δῆλον ὅτι πολ- L. i. c. vii.
[p. 274. 10m.
iv. oper.]
λαχῶς ἀμαρτάνουσι. They who affirm one

to be all in this sense, as if all things were nothing but one and the same matter, and that corporeal and endued with magnitude, it is manifest, that they err sundry ways.—But here is a great difference betwixt these two to be observed, in that the atheistical assertors of one and all (whether they meant water or air by it, or something else) did none of them suppose their one and all to be immoveable, but moveable: but they, whose principle was one and all immoveable (as Parmenides, Melissus and Zeno) could not possibly mean any thing else thereby, but the Deity; that there was one most simple, perfect and immutable Being incorporeal, which virtually contained all things, and from which all things were derived. But Heraclitus, who is one of those, who are said to have affirmed ἐν εἶναι τὸ πᾶν, that one was all, or that the universe was but one thing—might possibly have taken both those senses together (which will also agree in the Stoical hypothesis) that all things were both from one God, and from one fire; they being both alike corporeal Theists, who supposed an intellectual fire to be the first Principle of all things.

And though Aristotle in his *Physics* quarrels very much with Parmenides and Melissus, for making one immoveable Principle; yet in his *Metaphysics* himself doth plainly close with it, and own it as very good divinity, that there is one in-

corporeal and immoveable Principle of all things, and that the supreme Deity is an immoveable na-

ture: *εἴπερ ὑπάρχει τις οὐσία τοιαύτη, λέγω δὲ*

L. vi. o. i. &
l. xlii. o. vii.

χωριστὴ καὶ ἀκίνητος, ὅπερ πειράσομαι δεικνύναι, ἐνταῦθα ἂν εἴη πᾶν καὶ τὸ θεῖον, καὶ αὐτὴ ἂν εἴη

πρῶτη καὶ κυριότατη ἀρχή. If there be any such sub-

stance as this, that is separate (from matter, or incorporeal) and immoveable (as we shall afterwards endeavour to shew that there is), then the Divinity ought to be placed here, and this must be acknowledged to be the first and most proper principle of all.—But lest any should suspect, that Aristotle, if not Parmenides also, might, for all that, hold many such immoveable principles, or many eternal, uncreated and self-existent beings, as so many partial causes of the world; Simplicius assures us, *μη γέγονται δόξαν πολλὰς καὶ ἀκινήτους τὰς ἀρχὰς λέγουσαν, i. e.* that though divers of the ancient philosophers asserted a plurality of moveable principles (and some indeed an infinity), yet there never was any opinion entertained amongst philosophers, of many, or more than one, immoveable principles.—From whence it may be concluded, that no philosopher ever asserted a multitude of unmade, self-existent minds, or independent deities, as co-ordinate principles of the world.

Indeed, Plotinus seems to think, that Parmenides in his writings, by his *τὸ ὄν*, or Ens, did frequently mean a perfect mind or intellect, there being no true entity (according to him) below that which understands; (which mind, though incorporeal, was likened by him to a sphere, because it comprehends all within itself, and because in-

* In Phys. Aristotel. fol. xvii.

tellection is not from without, but from within); but that when again he called his On or Ens one, he gave occasion thereby to some to quarrel with him, as making the same both one and many; intellect being that, which contains the ideas of all things in it. Wherefore Parmenides's whole philosophy (saith he) was better digested and more exactly and distinctly set down in Plato's Parmenides, where he acknowledgeth three unities subordinate, or a trinity of Divine hypostases; *ὁ παρὰ Πλάτωνι Παρμενίδης, ἀκριβέστερόν λέγων, διαιρεῖ ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, τὸ πρῶτον ἓν, ὁ κυριώτερον ἓν, καὶ δεύτερον ἓν πολλά λέγων· καὶ τρίτον ἓν καὶ πολλά· καὶ σύμφωνος οὗτος καὶ αὐτός ἐστι ταῖς Τρισίν.* Parmenides, in Plato, speaking more exactly, distinguishes three Divine unities subordinate; the first of that which is perfectly and most properly one; the second of that, which was called by him one-many; the third of that, which is thus expressed, one and many. So that Parmenides did also agree in this acknowledgment of a trinity of Divine or archical hypostases.—Which observation of Plotinus is, by the way, the best key, that we know of, for that obscure book of Plato's Parmenides. Wherefore Parmenides thus asserting a trinity of Divine hypostases, it was the first of those hypostases that was properly called by him *ἓν, τὸ πᾶν*, one the universe or all: that is, one most simple Being, the fountain and original of all. And the second of them (which is a perfect intellect) was, it seems, by him called, in way of distinction, *ἓν πολλά* or *πάντα*, one-many or one all things—by which all things are meant the intelligible ideas of things, that are all contained together in one perfect Mind. And of those was Parmenides to be

understood also, when he affirmed, that all things did stand, and nothing flow; not of singular and sensible things, which, as the Heraclitics rightly affirmed, do indeed all flow; but of the immediate objects of the mind, which are eternal and immutable: Aristotle himself acknowledging, that no generation nor corruption belongeth to them, since there could be no immutable and certain science, unless there were some immutable, necessary and eternal objects of it. Wherefore, as the same Aristotle also declares, the true mean-

ing of that controversy betwixt the Heraclitics and Parmenideans, Whether all things did flow, or some things stand?

was the same with this, Whether there were any other objects of the mind, besides singular sensibles, that were immutable? and, consequently, whether there were any such thing as science or knowledge which had a firmitude and stability in it? For those Heraclitics, who contended, that the only objects of the mind were singular and sensible things, did with good reason consequently thereupon deny, that there was any certain and constant knowledge, since there can neither be any definition of singular sensibles, (as Aristotle^a writes) nor any demonstration concerning them. But the Parmenideans, on the contrary, who maintained the firmitude and stability of science, did as reasonably conclude thereupon, that besides singular sensibles, there were other objects of the mind, universal, eternal and immutable, which they called the intelligible ideas, all originally contained in one archetypal mind or understanding, and from thence participated by infe-

^a Metaph. lib. i. cap. vi. p. 272. tom. iv. oper.

rior minds and souls. But it must be here acknowledged, that Parmenides and the Pythagoreans went yet a step further, and did not only suppose those intelligible ideas to be the eternal and immutable objects of all science, but also, as they are contained in the Divine intellect, to be the principles and causes of all other things. For thus Aristotle declares their sense; αἰτία τὰ εἶδη τοῖς ἄλλοις; and again, τὸ τὶ ἦν εἶναι Met. I. l. c. vi. καὶ ἅσπερ τῶν ἄλλων τὰ εἶδη παρέχονται, τοῖς δὲ [p. 273. tom. iv. oper.] εἶδαι τὸ εἶν. The ideas are the causes of all other things; and the essence of all other things below is imparted to them from the ideas, as the ideas themselves derive their essence from the first unity: those ideas in the Divine understanding being looked upon by these philosophers, as the paradigms and patterns of all created things. Now these ideas being frequently called by the Pythagoreans Numbers, we may from hence clearly understand the meaning of that seemingly-monstrous paradox or puzzling Griphus of theirs, that ^a Numbers were the causes and principles of all things, or that all things were made out of Numbers; it signifying indeed no more than this, that all things were made from the ideas of the Divine intellect, called Numbers; which themselves also were derived from a monad or unity: Aristotle somewhere^b intimating this very account of that assertion, τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς αἰτίους εἶναι τοῖς ἄλλοις τῆς οὐσίας, that Numbers were the causes of the essence of other things—namely, because τὰ εἶδη ἀριθμοὶ, the ideas were numbers. Though we are not ignorant, how the Pythagoreans made also

^a Aristot. Metaphys. lib. i. cap. vi. p. 272.

^b Ibid.

all the numbers within the decad, to be symbols of things. But besides these two Divine Hypostases already mentioned, Parmenides seems to have asserted also a third, which, because it had yet more alterity, for distinction's sake was called by him, neither ἐν τῷ πᾶν, one the universe or all—nor ἐν πᾶσι, one-all things—but ἐν καὶ πᾶσι, one and all things:—and this is taken by Plotinus to be the eternal Psyche, that actively produceth all things, in this lower world, according to those Divine ideas.

In Arist. Phys. fol. vii. xvii. xxxi. But that Parmenides, by his one-all immoveable, really understood nothing else but the supreme Deity, is further unquestionably evident from those verses of his cited by Simplicius, but not taken notice of by Stephanus in his Poesis Philosophica, of which we shall only set down some few here.

—Ὡς ἀθάνατος ἰὼν καὶ ἀκίνητος ἵσταται,
 Οὐδέποτε γὰρ οὐδ' ἵσταται, ἰσὺν οὐκ ἔστιν ἡμῶν πᾶσι
 Ἐν στυγίᾳ. Τίνα γὰρ γένον διζήσαι αὐτοῦ;
 Αἰνὸς δὲ δούλοιο μεγάλου ἐν νύμφῃσι θεομῆν,
 Ταῦτόν τ' ἐν ταυτῇ τε μέντω, καὶ αὐτὸ τε μέντω. &c.

In which, together with those that follow, the supreme Deity is plainly described as one single, solitary, and most simple being, unmade or self-existent, and necessarily existing, incorporeal and devoid of magnitude, altogether immutable or unchangeable, whose duration therefore was very different from that of ours, and not in a way of flux or temporary succession, but a constant eternity, without either past or future. From whence it may be observed, that this opinion of a standing eternity, different from that flowing succes-

sion of time, is not so novel a thing as some would persuade, nor was first excogitated by Christian writers, schoolmen or fathers, it being at least as old as Parmenides; from whom it was also afterward received and entertained by the best of the other Pagan philosophers; however it hath been of late so much decried, not only by atheistical writers, but other precocious and conceited wits also, as nonsense and impossibility. It is well known, that Melissus held forth the very same doctrine with Parmenides, of one Immoveable, that was all, which he plainly affirmed to be incorporeal likewise, as Parmenides did; καὶ ὁ Μελισσος ἐν εἶν φησι, δαίν αὐτὸ σῶμα μὴ ἔχειν, εἰ δὲ ἔχει πάχος, ἔχει ἂν μόρια. Melissus also declared, that his one Ens must needs be Simplio. Ar. Phys. l. 19. devoid of body, because if it had any

crassities in it, it would have parts.—But the only difference that was between them was this, that Parmenides called this one immoveable that was all πεπερασμένον, finite or determined,—but Melissus ἀπειρον, infinite—which difference notwithstanding was in words only, there being none at all as to the reality of their sense: whilst each of them endeavoured, in a different way, to set forth the greatest perfection of the Deity; there being an equivocation in those words finite and infinite, and both of them signifying in one sense perfection, but in another imperfection. And the disagreeing agreement of these two philosophers with one another, Parmenides and Melissus, as also of Xenophanes with them both concerning the Deity, is well declared by Simplicius after this manner; οὐδὲν δὲ ἴσως χείρον ὀλίγον Ar. Phys. l. 7. παρὲξ πάντε, τοῖς φιλομαθεστέροις ἐπιδιδῆται, πῶς

καίτοι διαφέρειν δοκοῦντες οἱ παλαιοὶ περὶ τὰς τῶν ἀρχῶν δόξας, ἑναρμονίως ὁμῶς συμφέρονται· Καὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν περὶ τῆς νοητῆς καὶ πρώτης ἀρχῆς διελέχθησαν, ὡς Ξενοφάνης καὶ Παρμενίδης καὶ Μέλισσος· ὁ μὲν Παρμενίδης ἐν λέγων καὶ πεπερασμένον· ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸ ἐν τοῦ πλήθους προὔπαρχειν, καὶ τὸ πᾶσιν ὅρου καὶ πέρας αἴτιον, κατὰ τὸ πέρας μᾶλλον ἢ περὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀπειρίαν ἀφορίζεσθαι, καὶ τὸ πάντῃ τε τέλειον τὸ τέλος τὸ οἰκεῖον ἀπειληφός, πεπερασμένον εἶναι, μᾶλλον δὲ τέλος τῶν πάντων ὡς ἀρχή· τὸ γὰρ ἀτελές ἐνδὲς ὄν, οὐπὼ πέρας ἀπέληφε· Μέλισσος δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀμετάβλητον ὁμοίως καὶ αὐτὸς ἐθεάσατο, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἀνέκλειπτον τῆς οὐσίας, καὶ τὸ ἀπειρον τῆς δυνάμεως, ἀπειρον αὐτὸ ἀπέφηνε, ὥσπερ καὶ ἀγένητον· πλὴν ὁ μὲν Ξενοφάνης ὡς πάντων αἴτιον, καὶ πάντων ὑπερανέχον, καὶ κινήσεως αὐτὸ καὶ ἡρεμίας καὶ πάσης ἀντιστοιχείας ἐπέκεινα τίθησιν, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ Πλάτων ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ ὑποθέσει· ὁ δὲ Παρμενίδης, τὸ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχον αὐτοῦ, καὶ πάσης μεταβολῆς, τάχα δὲ καὶ ἐνεργείας καὶ δυνάμεως ἐπέκεινα, θεασάμενος, ἀκίνητον αὐτὸ ἀνυμνεῖ· Perhaps it will not be improper for us to digress a little here, and to gratify the studious and inquisitive reader, by shewing, how those ancient philosophers, though seeming to dissent in their opinions concerning the principles, did notwithstanding harmoniously agree together. As, first of all, they who discoursed concerning the intelligible and first principle of all, Xenophanes, Parmenides and Melissus; of whom Parmenides called it one finite and determined; because as unity must needs exist before multitude, so that, which is to all things the cause of measure, bound and determination, ought rather to be described by measure and finitude than infinity; as also that which is every way perfect, and hath attained its own end, or rather is the end of all things (as it was the beginning) must needs be of a determi-

nate nature; for that which is imperfect and therefore indigent, hath not yet attained its term or measure. But Melissus, though considering the immutability of the Deity, likewise yet, attending to the inexhaustible perfection of its essence, the unlimitedness and unboundedness of its power, declareth it to be infinite, as well as ingent or unmade. Moreover, Xenophanes looking upon the Deity, as the cause of all things, and above all things, placed above motion and rest, and all those antitheses of inferior beings, as Plato likewise doth in the first hypothesis of his Parmenides; whereas Parmenides and Melissus, attending to its stability and constant immutability, and its being perhaps above energy and power, praised it as immoveable.—From which of Simplicius it is plain, that Parmenides, when he called God *πεπερασμένον*, finite and determined—was far from meaning any such thing thereby, as if he were a corporeal Being of finite dimensions, as some have ignorantly supposed; or as if he were any way limited as to power and perfection; but he understood it in that sense, in which *πέρας* is taken by Plato, as opposite to *ἄπειρα*, and for the greatest perfection; and as God is said to be *πέρας καὶ μέτρον πάντων*, the term and measure of all things.—But Melissus calling God *ἄπειρον*, infinite—in the sense before declared, as thereby to signify his inexhaustible power and perfection, his eternity and incorruptibility, doth therein more agree with our present theology, and the now received manner of speaking. We have the rather produced all this, to shew how curious the ancient philosophers were in their inquiries after God, and how exact in their descriptions of him.

Wherefore however Anaximander's Infinite were nothing but eternal senseless matter (though called by him the τὸ θεῖον, the divinest thing of all) yet Melissus's ἀείρον, or Infinite, was the true Deity.

With Parmenides and Melissus fully agreed Zeno Eleates also, Parmenides's scholar, that one immoveable was all, or the original of all things; he meaning thereby nothing else but the supreme Deity. For though it be true, that this Zeno did excogitate certain arguments against the local motion of bodies, proceeding upon the hypothesis of the infinite divisibility of body, one of which was famously known by that name of Achilles, because it pretended to prove, that it was impossible (upon the hypothesis) for the swift-footed Achilles ever to overtake the creeping snail; (which arguments of his, whether or no they are well answered by Aristotle,* is not here to our purpose to inquire) yet all this was nothing else but *lusus ingenii*, a sportful exercise of Zeno's wit, he being a subtile logician and disputant, or perhaps an endeavour also to shew, how puzzling and perplexing to human understanding, the conception even of the most vulgar and confessed phenomena of nature may be. For that Zeno Eleates, by his one Immoveable that was all, meant not the corporeal world, no more than Melissus, Parmenides, and Xenophanes, is evident from Aristotle writing thus concerning him; τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐν ᾧ τὸν θεὸν λέγει, οὔτε κινεῖσθαι, οὔτε κινητὸν εἶναι, Zeno by his one Ens, which neither was moved, nor moveable, meaneth God. Moreover the same Aristotle informs us, that this Zeno endeavoured

* Physic. lib. vi. cap. xiv. p. 359. tom. i. oper.

to demonstrate, that there was but one God, from that idea, which all men have of him, as that which is the best, the supreme and most powerful of all, or as an absolutely perfect

Being: *εἰ δ' ἴσθιν ὁ θεὸς ἀπάντων κράτιστον, ἵνα* De Xenoph. Ze. et Gor. [cap. iii. p. 840. tom. I. oper.]

φασὶ προσήκειν αὐτόν· If God be the best of all things, then he must needs be one.—

Which argument was thus pursued by him; *τοῦτο θεὸς καὶ θεοῦ δύναμις κρατεῖν ἀλλὰ μὴ κρατεῖσθαι ὥστε καθὼ μὴ κρείττον, κατὰ τοσούτον οὐκ εἶναι θεόν· πλειόνων οὖν ὄντων, πᾶ μὲν εἶεν τὰ μὲν ἀλλήλων κρείττους, τὰ δὲ ἥττους, οὐκ ἂν εἶναι θεούς· πεφυκέναι γάρ θεὸν μὴ κρατεῖσθαι ἴσων δὲ ὄντων, οὐκ ἂν ἔχαν θεὸν φύσιν δαῖν εἶναι κράτιστον· τὸ δὲ ἴσον, οὔτε βέλτιον οὔτε χεῖρον εἶναι τοῦ ἴσου ὥστ' εἴπερ εἴη τε, καὶ τοιούτων εἴη θεός, ἵνα μόνον εἶναι τὸν θεὸν οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδὲ πάντα δύνασθαι ἂν βούλοιτο·* This is God, and the power of God, to prevail, conquer, and rule over all. Wherefore, by how much any thing falls short of the best, by so much does it fall short of being God. Now if there be supposed more such beings, whereof some are better, some worse, those could not be all gods, because it is essential to God not to be transcended by any; but if they be conceived to be so many equal gods, then would it not be the nature of God to be the best, one, equal being, neither better nor worse than another: wherefore if there be a God, and this be the nature of him, then can there be but one. And indeed otherwise he could not be able to do whatever he would.

Empedocles is said to have been an emulator of Parmenides also, which must be understood of his metaphysics, because in his physiology (which was atomical) he seems to have trans-

cended him. Now that Empedocles acknowledged one supreme and universal Numen, and that incorporeal too, may be concluded from what

P. 26. hath been already cited out of his philosophic poems. Besides which the writer De Mundo* (who, though not Aristotle, yet was a Pagan of good antiquity) clearly affirmeth, that Empedocles derived all things whatsoever from one supreme Deity; τὰ γὰρ δι' αἵρος ἅπαντα, καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς, καὶ τὰ ἐν ὕδατι, θεοῦ λέγοντ' ἂν οὕτως ἔργα εἶναι, τοῦ τὸν κόσμον ἐπέχοντος· ἐξ οὗ κατὰ τὸν φυσικὸν Ἐμπεδοκλέα,

πάνθ' ὅσα τ' ἔν, ὅσα τ' ἔσσι, ἢ ὅσα τι ἔσται ἑλόντα, &c.

All the things, that are upon the earth, and in the air and water, may truly be called the works of God, who ruleth over the world. Out of whom, according to the physical Empedocles, proceed all things that were, are, and shall be, viz. plants, men, beasts and gods. Which notwithstanding we conceive to be rather true as to Empedocles' sense than his words; he affirming, as it seems, in that cited place, that all these things were made, not immediately out of God, but out of contention and friendship; because Simplicius, who was furnished with a copy of Empedocles's poems, twice brings in that cited passage of his in this connexion:

Ἐν δὲ κότῳ διάμερφα καὶ ἀνέχον πάντα πύσσονται,
 Σιν δ' ἔβη ἐν φιλότῳ καὶ ἀλλήλοισι ποθεῖται,
 Ἐκ τῶν γὰρ πάντα ὅσα' ἔν, ὅσα τι ἔστι, καὶ ἔσται,
 Διόνηα τι βιβλάσονται, καὶ ἄνδρες ἠδὲ γυναῖκες,
 Θῆρες τ', αἰετοὶ τε, καὶ ὕδατοβρίμμονες ἰχθύες,
 Καὶ τι θεῶν δολιχάιωνος τιμῆσι φέρεσται.

* Cap. vi. p. 863. tom. i. oper. Aristot.

Things are divided and segregated by contention, but joined together by friendship; from which two (contention and friendship) all that was, is, and shall be, proceeds; as trees, men and women, beasts, birds and fishes; and, last of all, the long-lived and honourable gods.—Wherefore the sense of Empedocles's words here was this; that the whole created world, together with all things belonging to it, viz. plants, beasts, men and gods, was made from contention and friendship. Nevertheless, since, according to Empedocles, contention and friendship did themselves depend also upon one supreme Deity, which he with Parmenides and Xenophanes called *Tò êν*, or the very one—the writer, *De Mundo*, might well conclude, that, according to Empedocles, all things whatsoever, and not only men, but gods, were derived from one supreme Deity. And that this was indeed Empedocles's sense, appears plainly from Aristotle in his *Metaphysics*, *τίθησι μὲν γὰρ [Ἐμπεδοκλῆς] ἀρχὴν τινα τῆς φύσεως τὸ νεῖκος, δόξειε δ' αὖ οὐθὲν ἥττον καὶ τοῦτο γεννᾶν ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἑνός*. *Ἄπαντα γὰρ ἐκ τούτου τ' ἄλλα ἐστὶ πλὴν ὁ Θεός· λέγει γούρ,*

L. iii. c. iv.
[p. 295. tom.
iv. oper.]

ἔξ αὐτοῦ πάντα τ' ἔν, ἔνα τ' ἑσθ', ἔνα τ' ἑσται ὁλοσόν, &c.

Empedocles makes contention to be a certain principle of corruption and generation: nevertheless, he seems to generate this contention itself also from the very one (that is, from the supreme Deity). For all things, according to him, are from this contention, God only excepted; he writing after this manner, from which (that is, contention and friendship) all the things that have

been, are, and shall be (plants, beasts, men and gods) derived their original.—For Empedocles it seems supposed, that were it not for *vākos*, discord or contention, all things would be one: so that, according to him, all things whatsoever proceeded from contention or discord, together with a mixture of friendship, save only the supreme God, who hath therefore no contention at all in him, because he is essentially *τὸ ἐν*, unity itself and friendship.—From whence Aristotle takes occasion to quarrel with Empedocles, as if it would follow from his principles, that the supreme and most happy God was the least wise of all, as being not able to know any thing besides himself, or in

the world without him; *δεὸ καὶ συμβαίνει*
Met. l. iii. c. iv. [p. 295. τὸν ἐνδαιμονέστατον θεὸν ἥττον φρόνημον
tom. iv. oper.] εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων, αἱ γὰρ γνωρίζει τὰ στοιχεῖα
πάντα, τὸ γὰρ νῆκος αὐκ ἔχει· ἡ δὲ γνώσις τοῦ ὁμοίου τῷ
ὁμοίῳ.

Γὰρ μὲν γὰρ (φρεσὶ) γαῖαν ἐκτέταται, ὕδατι δ' ὕδαρ, &c.

This therefore happens to Empedocles, that, according to his principles, the most happy God is the least wise of all other things, for he cannot know the elements, because he hath no contention in him; all knowledge being by that, which is like; himself writing thus: We know earth by earth, water by water, air by air, and fire by fire; friendship by friendship, and contention by contention.—But to let this pass; Empedocles here making the gods themselves to be derived from contention and friendship, the supreme Deity, or most happy God, only excepted, (who hath no contention in him, and from whom contention and friendship themselves were derived) plainly acknowledged both one unmade Deity, the

original of all things under the name of τὸ ἐν, the very one—and many other inferior gods, generated or produced by him; they being juniors to contention, or discord, as this was also junior to unity, the first and supreme Deity. Which gods of Empedocles, that were begotten from contention (as well as men and other things) were doubtless the stars and demons.

Moreover, we may here observe, that, according to Empedocles's doctrine, the true original of all the evil, both of human souls and demons (which he supposed alike lapsable) was derived from that νεῖκος, discord and contention, that is necessarily contained in the nature of them, together with the ill use of their liberty, both in this present and their pre-existent state. So that Empedocles here trod in the footsteps of Pythagoras, whose praises he thus loudly sang forth in his poems;

*Ὡς δὲ τις ἐν νύκτι ἀνὰ πύλαια εἶδ' ἑλκός,
 *ὣς δὲ μέντοι πρῶτον ἐκείνου πλοῦτος,
 Περὶ τὸν τι μέλυσσε σφῆς ἐκείνου ἔργον, &c.

Porphyr. de
 Vit. Pyth. p.
 194. [ed.
 Cantab. p. 35.
 ed. Kusteri.]

Horum de numero quidam præstantia norat
 Plurima, mentis opes amplas sub pectore servans,
 Omnia vestigans sapientum docta reperta, &c.

xxii. Before we come to Socrates and Plato, we shall here take notice of some other Pythagoreans, and eminent philosophers, who clearly asserted one supreme and universal Numen, though doubtless acknowledging withal other inferior gods. Philo in his book De Mundi Opificio, writing of the hebdomad or septenary number, and observing, that, according to the Pythagoreans, it was called both a motherless and a virgin number, because

it was the only number within the decad, which was neither generated, nor did itself generate, tells us, that therefore it was made by them a symbol of the supreme Deity, οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι τὸν ἀριθμὸν τοῦτον ἐξομοιοῦσι τῷ ἡγεμόνι τῶν συμπάντων. The Pythagoreans likened this number to the Prince and Governor of all things, or the supreme Monarch of the universe—as thinking it to bear a resemblance of his immutability: which fancy of theirs was taken notice of by us. However, Philo hereupon occasionally cites this remarkable testimony of Philolaus the Pythagorean; Ἐστὶ γὰρ, φησὶν, ἡγεμὼν καὶ ἄρχων πάντων ὁ Θεός, εἰς αἰὲ ὦν, μόνιμος, ἀκίνητος, αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ὅμοιος, ἕτερος τῶν ἄλλων. God (saith he) is the Prince and Ruler over all, always one, stable, immoveable, like to himself, but unlike to every thing else.—To which may be added what in Stobæus is further recorded out of the same Philolaus; ἦν ὁδε ὁ κόσμος ἐξ αἰῶνος, καὶ εἰς αἰῶνα διαμενεῖ, εἰς ὑπὸ ἐνός *Eccl. Phys.* τῷ συγγενέῳ καὶ κρατίστῳ κυβερνώμενος. This *p. 4.* world was from eternity, and will remain to eternity, one governed by one, which is cognate and the best.—Where notwithstanding he seemeth, with Ocellus, to maintain the world's pre-eternity. And again, διὸ καὶ καλῶς ἔχειν ἔλεγε, κόσμον ἡμεν ἐνέργειαν αἰδίου θεῷ τε καὶ γενέσιον. Wherefore, said Philolaus, the world might well be called the eternal energy or effect of God, and of successive generation.

Jamblichus, in his *Protreptics*, cites a passage out of Archytas, another Pythagorean, *C. iv. p. 20.* to the same purpose; ὅστις ἀναλύσαι οἷός τί ἐστι πάντα τὰ γένηα ὑπὸ μίαν τε καὶ αὐτὴν ἄρχαν, οὗτος δοκεῖ μοι καλὰν σκοπίαν εὐρηκέναι, ἀφ' οὗ δυνατός ἐσσεῖται τὸν

Θεὸν κατορμεῖσθαι, &c. Whosoever is able to reduce all kinds of things under one and the same principle, this man seems to me to have found out an excellent specula, or high station, from whence he may be able to take a large view and prospect of God, and of all other things; and he shall clearly perceive, that God is the beginning and end, and middle of all things, that are performed according to justice and right reason.—Upon which words of Archytas, Jamblichus thus glosseth: “Archytas here declares the end of all theological speculation to be this, not to rest in many principles, but to reduce all things under one and the same head.” Adding, τοιαύτη ἐπιστήμη τοῦ ἐνός, τέλος ἐστὶ πάσης θεωρίας, that this knowledge of the first Unity, the Original of all things, is the end of all contemplation.—Moreover, Stobæus cites this out of Archytas’s book of principles, viz. That besides matter and form, ἀνάγκαι· Ecl. Ph. p. 82. τίταν τινὰ εἶμεν αἰτίαν, τὰν κινάσσοισαν ἐνιστώτων πραγμάτων ἐπὶ τὰν μορφῶν, τὰντα δὲ τὰν πρῶταν δυνάμει, καὶ καθυπερτάταν εἶμεν, ὀνομάζεσθαι δὲ Θεόν, &c. There is another more necessary cause, which moving, brings the form to the matter; and that this is the first and most powerful cause, which is fitly called God. So that there are three principles, God, matter, and form; God the artificer and mover, and matter that which is moved, and form the art introduced into the matter.—In which same Stobean excerption, it also follows afterward, δεῖ νόψ τι κρείσσον εἶναι, νόψ δὲ κρείσσον ἐστὶ ὕπερ ὀνομάζομεν Θεόν. That there must be something better than mind; and that this thing better than mind is that which we (properly) call God.

Ocellus also in the same Stobæus thus writeth:

P. 32. [lib. i. συνέχει τὰ μὲν σκάνεα ζωὰ, ταύτας δ' αἴτιον
cap. xvi.] ψυχὰς τὸν δὲ κόσμον ἁρμονία, ταύτας δ' αἴτιον
ὁ Θεός· τοὺς δ' οἴκως καὶ τὰς πόλεις ὁμόνοια, ταύτας δ'
αἴτιος νόμος. Life contains the bodies of animals,

the cause of which life is the soul; concord contains houses and cities, the cause of which concord is law; and harmony contains the whole world, the cause of which mundane har-

mony is God.—And to the same pur-
P. 45. pose Aristæus, ὡς ὁ τεχνίτης ποτὶ τὰν τέχ-
ναν, οὕτως Θεὸς ποτὶ ἁρμονίαν, as the artificer is to
art, so is God to the harmony of the world.—

There is also this passage in the same Stobæus
cited out of an anonymous Pythagorean: Θεὸς μὲν

P. 8. ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ καὶ πρῶτον, θεὸς δὲ ὁ κόσμος, God
is the principle, and the first thing; and
the world (though it be not the supreme God) yet
is it Divine.

Timæus Locrus, a Pythagorean senior to Plato,
in his book concerning Nature, or the Soul of the
world (upon which Plato's Timæus was but a
kind of commentary), plainly acknowledgeth both
one supreme God, the maker and governor of
the whole world, and also many other gods, his
creatures and subordinate ministers; in the close
thereof,* writing thus concerning the punishment
of wicked men after this life: ἀπαντα δὲ ταῦτα ἐν
δευτέρᾳ περιόδῳ ἡ Νέμεσις συνδιέκρινε, σὺν δαίμοσι παλαμ-
ναίοις χθονίοις τε, τοῖς ἐπόπταις τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων· οἷς ὁ
πάντων ἀγεμὼν Θεὸς ἐπέτρεψε διοικῆσιν κόσμῳ συμπλη-
ρωμένῳ ἐκ θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων, τῶν τε ἄλλων ζώων, ὅσα
δεδαμούργηται ποτ' εἰκόνα τὰν ἀρίστην εἰδὸς ἀγενάτω καὶ

* Timæus de Anima Mundi, p. 566. inter Scriptor. mythologic.
a Tho. Gale editos.

αἰώνιος. All these things hath Nemesis decreed to be executed in the second circuit by the ministry of vindictive terrestrial demons, that are overseers of human affairs; to which demons that supreme God, the ruler over all, hath committed the government and administration of the world. Which world is completed and made up of gods, men, and other animals, all created according to the best pattern of the eternal and unmade idea.—In which words of Timæus there are these three several points of the Pagan theology contained; first, that there is one supreme God, eternal and unmade, the creator and governor of the whole world, and who made it according to the best pattern or exemplar of his own ideas and eternal wisdom. Secondly, that this world created by God is compounded and made up of other inferior gods, men, and brute animals. Thirdly, that the supreme God hath committed the administration of our human affairs to demons and inferior gods, who are constant inspectors over us, some of which he also makes use of for the punishment of wicked men after this life. Moreover, in this book of Timæus Locrus the supreme God is often called ὁ Θεός, and sometimes ὁ δαίμων, God in way of eminency;—sometimes Νόος mind—sometimes τ' ἀγαθόν, the very Good—sometimes ἀρχὴ τῶν ἀρίστων, the Principle of the best things—sometimes δαμιουργός τοῦ βελτίονος, the Maker of the better—(evil being supposed not to proceed from him;) sometimes κράτιστον αἴτιον, the best and most powerful Cause—sometimes ἀρχαγός καὶ γενέτωρ πάντων, the Prince and Parent of all things.—Which God, according to him, is not the soul of the world neither, but the creator

thereof, he having made the world an animal, and a secondary generated god;* *δηλούμενος ὡς ἄριστον γένημα ποιῆν, τοῦτον ἐποίησεν θεὸν γενετὸν, οὐποκα φθαρησόμενον ὑπ' ἄλλῃ αἰτίᾳ, ἔξω τῷ αὐτὸν συντεταγμένῳ θεῷ, εἵποκα δὴλετο αὐτὸν διαλύειν.* God willing to make the world the best that it was capable of, made it a generated god, such as should never be destroyed by any other cause, but only by that God himself, who framed it, if he should ever will to dissolve it. But since it is not the part of that which is good to destroy the best of works, the world will doubtless ever remain incorruptible and happy, the best of all generated things, made by the best cause, looking not at patterns artificially framed without him, but the idea and intelligible essence, as the paradigms, which whatsoever is made conformable to, must needs be the best, and such as shall never need to be mended.—Moreover, he plainly declares, that this generated god of his, the world, was produced in time, so as to have a beginning, *πρὶν ὡρανὸν γενέσθαι, λόγῳ ἦσθην ἰδέα τε καὶ ὕλα, καὶ ὁ Θεὸς δαμιουργὸς τοῦ βελτίονος,* before the heaven was made, existed the idea, matter, and God the opifex of the best.—Wherefore, whatever Ocellus and Philolaus might do, yet this Timæus held not the world's eternity; wherein he followed not only Pythagoras himself (as we have already shewed) but also the generality of the first Pythagoreans, of whom Aristotle pronounces without exception, *γενῶσι γὰρ τὸν κόσμον,* that they generated the world.—

Timæus indeed in this book seems to assert the

Met. l. i. c. vii.
[p. 276. tom.
iv. oper.]

pre-eternity of the matter, as if it were a self-existent principle together with God; and yet Clemens Alexandrinus cites a passage

out of him looking another way, *ἀλλ' ἀντικρὺς καὶ μίαν ἀρχὴν καὶ παρ' Ἑλλήνων ἀκούσαι ποθεῖς*; *Τίμαιος ὁ Λοκρὸς ἐν τῇ φυσικῇ συγγράμ- Strom. v. p. 604. p. 718. edit. Potteri.*

ματι κατὰ λέξιν ὠδέ μοι μαρτυρήσει. Μία ἀρχὴ πάντων ἔστιν ἀγέννητος, εἰ γὰρ ἐγένετο, οὐκ ἂν ἦν ἐν ἑτὶ ἀρχά, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνα ἀρχά, ἐξ ἧς ἐγένετο. Would you hear of one only

principle of all things amongst the Greeks? Timæus Locrus, in his book of Nature, will bear no witness thereof; he there in express words writing thus: There is one principle of all things un-

made; for if it were made, it would not be a principle, but that would be the principle, from whence it was made.—Thus we see, that Timæus Locrus asserted one eternal and unmade God, the maker of the whole world, and besides this, another generated god, the world itself animated, with its several parts; the difference betwixt both which gods is thus declared by him: * *Θεὸν δὲ, τὸν μὲν αἰώνιον νόος ὁρῶ μόνος, τῶν ἀπάντων ἀρχαγὸν καὶ γενέτορα τούτων, τὸν δὲ γενατὸν ὅψι ὁρώμετες, κόσμον δὲ τόνδε, καὶ τὰ μέρη αὐτῷ ὁκόσα ὠράνια ἐντὶ.*

That eternal God, who is the prince, original, and parent of all these things, is seen only by the mind; but the other generated god is visible to our eyes, viz. this world, and those parts of it which are heavenly;—that is, the stars, as so many particular gods contained in it. But here it is to be observed, that the eternal God is not only so called by Timæus, as being without beginning, but also as having a distinct

* P. 549.

kind of duration from that of time, which is properly called *Æon*, or *Eternity*, he therein following *Parmenides*, εἰκὼν δὲ ἐστὶ τῷ ἀγενάτῳ χρόνῳ, ὃν αἰῶνα ποταγορεύομεν· ὡς γὰρ ποτ' αἰδίου παράδειγμα τὸν ἰδάνικον κόσμον ὅδε ὠρανὸς ἐγενάθη, οὕτως ὡς ποτ' παράδειγμα τὸν αἰῶνα ὅδε χρόνος σὺν κόσμῳ ἰδαμιουργήθη· Time is but an image of that unmade duration, which we call eternity: wherefore, as this sensible world was made according to that exemplar or pattern of the intelligible world, so was time made together with the world, as an imitation of eternity.

P. 233. It hath been already observed, that

Onatus, another *Pythagorean*, took notice of an opinion of some in his time, that there was one only God, who comprehended the whole world, and no other gods besides, or at least, none such as was to be religiously worshipped; himself in the mean time asserting, that there was both one God and many gods; or, besides one supreme and universal Numen, many other inferior and particular deities, to whom also men ought to pay religious worship. Now his further account of both these assertions is contained

Stob. Eccl. in these following words: τοὶ δὲ λέγοντες
Phys. p. 5. ἓνα θεὸν εἶμεν, ἀλλὰ μὴ πολλῶς ἀμαρτάνοντι· τὸ γὰρ μέγιστον ἀξίωμα τῆς θείας ὑπεροχῆς οὐ συνθεοροῦντι· λέγω δὲ τὸ ἄρχεν καὶ καθηγέσθαι τῶν ὁμοίων, καὶ κράτιστον καὶ καθυπέρτερον εἶμεν τῶν ἄλλων· τοὶ δ' ἄλλοι θεοὶ ποτὶ τὸν προτὸν καὶ νοητὸν οὕτως ἔχοντι ὥσπερ χορευτὰ ποτὶ κορυφαῖον, καὶ στρατίωτα ποτὶ στραταγὸν, καὶ λοχίτα, καὶ ἐντεταγμένοι ποτὶ ταξιάρχαν καὶ λοχαγέταν, ἔχοντε φύσιν, ἔπασθαι καὶ ἐπακολουθεῖν τῷ καλῶς καθηγεμένῳ· κοινὸν μὲν τῶν αὐτῶν τὸ ἔργον ἐστὶ, καὶ τῷ ἄρχοντι, καὶ τῶν ἀρχομένων, ἀλλ' οὐκέτι δύναντο συντετάχθαι τοὶ ἀρχόμενοι

ποτὶ τὸ ἔργον, ἀπολειφθέντες ἀγεμόνος· ὥσπερ οὐδὲ χορευταὶ ποτὶ συναιδίαν, οὐδὲ στρατιῶται ποτὶ στρατηγίαν, ἀπολειφθέντες ἀγεμόνος, τοὶ μὲν στραταγῶ, τοὶ δὲ κορυφαίῳ· They who maintain, that there is only one God, and not many gods, are very much mistaken, as not considering aright, what the dignity and majesty of the Divine transcendency chiefly consisteth in, namely, in ruling and governing those which are like to it (that is, gods) and in excelling or surmounting others, and being superior to them. But all those other gods which we contend for, are to that first and intelligible God but as the dancers to the Coryphæus or Choragus, and as the inferior common soldiers to the captain or general; to whom it properly belongeth, to follow and comply with their leader and commander. The work indeed is common, or the same to them both, to the ruler, and them that are ruled; but they that are ruled could not orderly conspire and agree together into one work, were they destitute of a leader; as the singers and dancers could not conspire together into one dance and harmony, were they destitute of a Coryphæus; nor soldiers make up one orderly army, were they without a captain or commander.

And as the supreme God is here called by Onatus the Coryphæus of the gods, so is he in like manner by the writer De Mundo* styled the Coryphæus of the world, or the Præcentor and Præsultor of it, in these words: καθάπερ ἐν χορῶ, κορυφαίου κατάρξαντος, συνεπηγεῖ πᾶς ὁ χορὸς ἀνδρῶν, ἐστὶ καὶ γυναικῶν, ἐν διαφόροις φωναῖς ὀξυτέραις καὶ βαρυτέραις, μίαν ἁρμονίαν ἐμμελῶ κεραινύντων· οὕτως ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ τὸ σῶμπαν

* Cap. vi. p. 861, 862. tom. i. oper. Aristotel.

διέποντος θεοῦ· κατὰ γὰρ τὸ ἀνωθεν ἐνδύσιμον ὑπὸ τοῦ φερωνύμως ἂν κορυφαίου προσαγορευθέντος, κινεῖται μὲν τὰ ἄστροι αἰὲ καὶ ὁ σύμπας οὐρανός· As in a chorus, when the Coryphæus or Præcentor hath begun, the whole choir compounded of men, and sometimes of women too, followeth, singing every one their part, some in higher and some in lower notes, but all mingling together into one complete harmony; so in the world God, as the Coryphæus, the Præcentor and Præsultor, beginning the dance and music, the stars and heavens move round after him, according to those numbers and measures which he prescribes them, altogether making up one most excellent harmony.

It was also before^a observed, that Ecphantus the Pythagorean, and Archelaus the successor of

P. 26. Anaxagoras (who were both of them

Atomists in their physiology) did assert the world to have been made at first, and still to be governed by one Divine mind; which is more than some Atomists of ours in this present age, who notwithstanding pretend to be very good Theists, will acknowledge. We shall, in the next place, mention Euclides Megarensis, the head of that sect called Megaric, and who is said to have been Plato's master for some time after Socrates's death; whose doctrine is thus set down by Laertius:^b οὗτος ἐν τῷ ἀγαθὸν ἀπεφαίνετο, πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι καλούμενον· ὅτε μὲν γὰρ Φρόνησιν, ὅτε δὲ Θεόν, καὶ ἄλλοτε Νοῦν, καὶ τὰ λοιπά. τὰ δὲ ἀντικείμενα τῷ Ἀγαθῷ ἀνῆρει, μὴ εἶναι φάσκων· Which we understand thus: That Euclides (who followed Xenophanes and Parmenides) made the first principle of all things to be one

^a Cap. l. §. xxvii.

^b Lib. ii. segm. cvi. p. 142.

the very Good, called sometimes Wisdom, sometimes God, sometimes Mind, and sometimes by other names; but that he took away all that is opposite to good, denying it to have any real entity—that is, he maintained, that there was no positive nature of evil, or that evil was no principle. And thus do we also understand that of Cicero,* when he represents the doctrine of the Megarics after this manner, “*Id bonum solum esse, quod esset Unum, et Simile, et Idem, et Semper;*” to wit, that they spake this concerning God, That good or goodness itself is a name properly belonging to him, who is also one, and like, and the same, and always; and that the true good of man consisteth in a participation of, and conformity with this first Good. Which doctrine Plato seems to have derived from him, he in like manner calling the supreme Deity by those two names, τὸ ἓν and τὸ ἀγαθόν, the One and the Good, and concluding true human felicity to consist in a participation of the first Good, or of the Divine Nature.

In the next place we shall take notice of Antisthenes, who was the founder also of another sect, to wit, the Cynic; for he, in a certain physiological treatise, is said to have affirmed, “*Esse populares deos multos,*” Cic. De N. D. l. i. [cap. xiii.] “*sed naturalem unum;*” That though there were many popular gods, yet there was but one natural God—or, as it is expressed in Lactantius, “*Unum esse naturalem Deum, quamvis gentes et urbes suos habeant populares;*” De Ira D. c. xi. That there was but one natural God, though nations and cities had their several popular

* Academ. Quæst. lib. iv. cap. xlii. p. 2325. tom. viii. oper.

ones:—Wherefore Velleius the Epicurean in Cicero^a quarrels with this Antisthenes, as one, who destroyed the nature of the gods, because he denied a multitude of independent deities, such as Epicurus pretended to assert. For this of Antisthenes is not so to be understood, as if he had therein designed to take away all the inferior gods of the Pagans, which had he at all attempted, he would doubtless have been accounted an Atheist, as well as Anaxagoras was; but his meaning was, only to interpret the theology of the Pagans concerning those other gods of theirs, that were or might be looked upon as absolute and independent; that these, though many popular gods, yet indeed were but one and the same natural God, called by several names. As for example, when the Greeks worshipped Zeus, the Latins Jovis, the Egyptians Hammon, the Babylonians Bel, the Scythians Pappæus; these were indeed many popular gods, and yet nevertheless all but one and the same natural God. So again, when in the self-same Pagan cities and countries, the respective laws thereof made mention of several gods, as supreme and absolute in their several territories, as Jupiter in the heavens, Juno in the air, Neptune in the sea; or as being chief in several kind of functions, as Minerva for learning, Bellona for war, &c. (for this Aristotle takes notice of in his book against Zeno,^b *κατὰ τὸν νόμον, πολλὰ κρείττους ἀλλήλων οἱ θεοί*, That according to the laws of cities and countries, one god was best for one thing, and another for another)—

^a De Natur. Deor. lib. i. cap. xiii. p. 2898. tom. ix. oper.

^b Cap. iv. p. 762. tom. ii. oper.

Antisthenes here declared concerning these also, that they were indeed many popular, or civil gods, but all really one and the same natural God.

To Antisthenes might be added Diogenes Sinopensis, of whom it is recorded by Laertius,* that observing a woman too superstitiously worshipping the statue or image of a god, endeavouring to abate her superstition, he thus bespake her; οὐκ εὐλαβῆ, ὦ γύναι, μή ποτε Θεοῦ ὀπίσθεν ἐστῶτος (πάντα γάρ ἐστιν αὐτοῦ πλήρη) ἀσχημονήσης; Take you not care, O woman, of not behaving yourself unseemly in the sight of that God who stands behind you; for all things are full of him—thereby giving her occasion, more to mind and regard that supreme and universal Numen, that filleth the whole world and is every where.

XXIII. It hath been frequently affirmed, that Socrates died a martyr for one only God, in opposition to those many gods of the Pagans: and Tertullian,^b for one, writeth thus of him, “Propterea damnatus est Socrates, quia deos destruebat;” Socrates was therefore condemned to die, because he destroyed the gods.—And, indeed, that Socrates asserted one supreme God, the maker and governor of the whole world, is a thing not at all to be doubted. In his discourse with Aristodemus, in Xenophon’s first book of Memoirs,^c he convinced him, that the things of this world were not made by chance, but by mind and counsel; οὕτω γε σκοπούμενῳ πάντο ἔοικε ταῦτα

* Lib. vi. segm. xxxvii. p. 333.

^b In Apologet. cap. xiv. p. 144. edit. Havercamp.

^c P. 573. oper. These words are not Socrates’s to Aristodemus, but Aristodemus’s to Socrates.

σοφοῦ τινος δημιουργοῦ, καὶ φιλοζώου τεχνήματι, I am now convinced from what you say, that the things of this world were the workmanship of some wise artificer, who also was a lover of animals.—

And so he endeavoured to persuade him, that that mind and understanding, which is in us, was derived from some mind and understanding in the universe, as well as that earth and water, which is in us, from the earth and water of the universe: * σὺ δὲ σπαντὸν φρόνιμόν τι δοκεῖς ἔχειν, ἄλλοθι δὲ οὐδαμοῦ οὐδὲν φρόνιμον εἶναι, εἰδώς ὅτι γῆς τε μικρὸν μέρος ἐν τῷ σώματι πολλῆς οὐσῆς ἔχεις, καὶ ὕγρου βραχὺ, πολλοῦ ὄντος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δῆπου μεγάλων ὄντων ἑκάστου μικρὸν μέρος λαβόντι τὸ συνήρμοσταί σοι; νοῦν δὲ μόνον ἄρα οὐδαμοῦ ὄντα αἰ εὐτυχῶς πως δοκεῖς συναρπάσαι; Do you think that you only have wisdom in yourself, and that there is none any where else in the whole world without you? though you know that you have but a small part in your body of that vast quantity of earth which is without you; and but little of that water and fire, and so of every other thing, that your body is compounded of, in respect of that great mass and magazine of them, which is in the world. Is mind and understanding therefore the only thing, which you fancy you have, some way or other, luckily got and snatched unto yourself, whilst there is no such thing any where in the world without you; all those infinite things thereof being thus orderly disposed by chance?—And when Aristodemus afterward objected, that he could not see any artificer that made the world, as he could those artificers which made all other human things,

* P. 574.

Socrates thus replies: οὐδὲ γὰρ τὴν σεαυτοῦ σέγε ψυχὴν ὁρᾷς, ἢ τοῦ σώματος κυρία ἐστίν· ὥστε κατὰ γε τοῦτο ἔξεστί σοι λέγειν, ὅτι οὐδὲ γινώμη ἀλλὰ τύχῃ πάντα πράττεις· Neither do you see your own soul, which rules over your body; so that you might for the same reason conclude yourself to do nothing by mind and understanding neither, but all by chance, as well as that all things in the world are done by chance.—Again, when he further disputed in this manner against the necessity of worshipping the Deity; οὐχ ὑπερορῶ τὸ δαιμόνιον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ἐκείνον μεγαλοπρεπέστερον ἡγούμαι, ἢ ὡς τῆς ἐμῆς θεραπείας προσδεῖσθαι· I despise not the Deity, O Socrates, but think him to be a more magnificent Being than that he should stand in need of my worship of him:—Socrates again answers, ὅση μεγαλοπρεπέστερον ἄξιοί σε θεραπεύειν, τοσούτῃ μᾶλλον τιμιπτόν αὐτό· How much the more magnificent and illustrious that Being is, which takes care of you, so much the more, in all reason, ought it to be honoured by you.—Lastly, Aristodemus discovering his disbelief of Providence, as a thing, which seemed to him incredible, if not impossible, that one and the same Deity should be able to mind all things at once, Socrates endeavours to cure this disbelief of his in this manner: * ὦ ἀγαθὲ, κατάμαθε, ὅτι καὶ ὁ σὸς νοῦς ἐνὼν τὸ σὸν σῶμα ὅπως βούλεται μεταχειρίζεται· οἶσθαι οὖν χρὴ καὶ τὴν ἐν παντὶ φρόνησιν τὰ πάντα ὅπως ἂν αὐτῇ ἡδὺ ἢ οὕτω τίθισθαι· καὶ μὴ τὸ σὸν μὲν ὄμμα δύνασθαι, ἐπὶ πολλὰ στάδια ἐξικνεῖσθαι, τὸν δὲ τοῦ Θεοῦ ὀφθαλμὸν ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἅμα πάντα ὁρᾶν. Consider, friend, I pray you, if that mind, which is in your body, does order and dispose it every

way as it pleases; why should not that wisdom, which is in the universe, be able to order all things therein also, as seemeth best to it? And if your eye can discern things several miles distant from it, why should it be thought impossible for the eye of God to behold all things at once? Lastly, if your soul can mind things both here and in Egypt, and in Sicily; why may not the great mind or wisdom of God be able to take care of all things, in all places?—And then he concludes, that if Aristodemus would diligently apply himself to the worship of God, he should at length be convinced, *ὅτι τοσούτον καὶ τοιοῦτόν ἐστι τὸ θεῖον, ὥστ' ἅμα πάντα ὁρᾶν, καὶ πάντα ἀκοῦν, καὶ πανταχοῦ παρῆναι, καὶ ἅμα πάντων ἐπιμελείσθαι*. That God is such and so great a Being, as that he can, at once, see all things, and hear all things, and be present every where, and take care of all affairs. —Moreover, Socrates, in his discourse with Euthydemus, in Xenophon's fourth book, speaks thus concerning that invisible Deity, which governs the whole world; * *οἱ γὰρ ἄλλοι θεοὶ ἡμῖν τὰ ἀγαθὰ διδόντες, οὐδὲν τούτων εἰς τὸ ἐμφανὲς ἰόντες διδόνασιν, καὶ ὁ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον συντάττων τε καὶ συνέχων, ἐν ᾧ πάντα καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ ἐστί, &c.* οὗτος τὰ μέγιστα μὲν πράττων ὁρᾶται, τόδε οἰκονομῶν ἀόρατος ἡμῖν ἐστίν· ἐννοεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ πᾶσι φανερός δοκῶν εἶναι ἥλιος, οὐκ ἐπιτρέπει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἑαυτὸν ἀκριβῶς ὁρᾶν, ἀλλ' ἐάν τις αὐτὸν ἀναιδῶς ἐγγχερῇ θεῖσθαι, τὴν ὄψιν ἀφαιρεῖται. The other gods giving us good things, do it without visibly appearing to us; and that God, who framed and containeth the whole world (in which are all good and excellent things) and who con-

tinually supplieth us with them, he, though he be seen to do the greatest things of all, yet notwithstanding is himself invisible and unseen. Which ought the less to be wondered at by us, because the sun, who seemeth manifest to all, yet will not suffer himself to be exactly and distinctly viewed, but if any one boldly and impudently gaze upon him, will deprive him of his sight: as also because the soul of man, which most of all things in him partaketh of the Deity, though it be that which manifestly rules and reigns in us, yet is it never seen: ἃ ἤ καὶ κατονοοῦντα μὴ καταφρονεῖν τῶν ἀοράτων, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν γινόμενων τὴν δύναμιν αὐτοῦ καταμανθάνοντα, ἡμῶν τὸ δαμόνιον. Which particulars he that considers, ought not to despise invisible things, but to honour the supreme Deity, taking notice of his power from his effects. Where we have τὸ δαμόνιον, as also before τὸ Θεόν, plainly put for the supreme Deity. And we did the rather set down these passages of Socrates here, concerning God and Providence, that we might shame those, who, in these latter days of ours, are so atheistically inclined, if at least they have any pudor or shame left in them.

But, notwithstanding Socrates's thus clear acknowledging one supreme and universal Numen, it doth not therefore follow, that he rejected all those other inferior gods of the Pagans, as is commonly conceived. But the contrary thereunto appeareth from these very passages of his now cited, wherein there is mention made of other gods besides the supreme. And how conformable Socrates was to the Pagan religion and worship, may appear from those last dying words of his,

(when he should be most serious,) after he had drunk the poison, wherein he required his friends to offer a votive cock for him to Æsculapius: for

which Origen thus perstringeth him, *Cont. Cels.* l. ix. p. 277.

καὶ τηλικαῦτα φιλοσοφήσαντες περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τὴν διαγωγὴν τῆς καλῶς βεβιωκίας διεξιθόντες, καταλιπόντες τὸ μέγεθος ὧν αὐτοῖς ὁ Θεὸς ἐφάνερωσεν, εὐτελῆ φρονοῦσι καὶ σμικρὰ, ἀλεκτρονίονα τῷ Ἀσκληπιῷ ἀποδιδόντες. And they, who had philosophised so excellently concerning the soul, and discoursed concerning the happiness of the future state to those who live well, do afterward sink down from these great, high, and noble things, to a superstitious regard of little, small, and trifling matters, such as the paying of a cock to Æsculapius.—Where, notwithstanding, Origen doth not charge Socrates with such gross and downright idolatry, as he does elsewhere,* for his sacrificing to the Pythian Apollo, who was but an inferior demon. And perhaps some may excuse Socrates here, as thinking, that he looked upon Æsculapius no otherwise than as the supreme Deity, called by that name, as exercising his providence over the sickness and health or recovery of men, and that therefore he would have an eucharistic sacrifice offered to him in his behalf, as having now cured him, at once, of all diseases by death. However Plato^b informs us, that Socrates, immediately before he drank his poison, did εὐχεσθαι τοῖς θεοῖς, τὴν μετοίκησιν τὴν ἐνθένδε ἐκείσε εὐτυχῇ εἶναι. pray (not to God, but to the gods, that is, to the supreme and inferior gods both together, as in

* Vide Orig. advers. Celsum, lib. vii. p. 335.

^b In Phædone, p. 402. oper.

Plato's Phædrus he did to Pan, and the other tutelar gods of that place) that his translation from hence into the other world might be happy to him. And Xenophon, in his *Memoirs*,^a informs us, that Socrates did, both in his words and practice, approve of that doctrine of the Pythian Apollo, That the rule of piety and religion ought to be the law of every particular city and country, he affirming it to be a vanity for any man to be singular herein. Lastly, in his own apology, as written by Plato, he professes to acknowledge the sun, moon and stars for gods; condemning the contrary doctrine of Anaxagoras, as irrational and absurd. Wherefore we may well conclude this opinion, of Socrates's being condemned for denying the many gods of the Pagans, or of his being a martyr for one only God, to be nothing but a vulgar error.

But if you therefore demand, what that accusation of impiety really was, which he was charged with, Socrates himself, in Plato's *Euthyphro*, will inform you, that it was for his free and open condemning those traditions concerning the gods, wherein wicked, dishonest and unjust actions were imputed to them. For when Euthyphro, having accused his own father as guilty of murder (merely for committing a homicide into prison, who happened to die there) would justify himself from the examples of the gods, namely Jupiter and Saturn, because Jupiter, the best and justest of the gods, had committed his father Saturn to prison for devouring his sons, as Saturn himself also had castrated his father Cælius

^a Lib. iv. p. 634. oper.

^b P. 49.

for some miscarriages of his, Socrates thus be-
 speaks him ; * *Ἀπρίε, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, τοῦτ' ἐστίν οὗ ἕνεκα*
τὴν γραφήν φοβεῖται, ὅτι τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐκείδαν τις περὶ τῶν
θεῶν λέγει, δυσχερὲς πῶς ἀποδέχομαι, &c. Is not
 this the very thing, O Euthyphro, for which I
 am accused? namely, because when I hear any
 one affirming such matters as these concerning the
 gods, I am very loath to believe them, and stick
 not publicly to declare my dislike of them? And
 can you, O Euthyphro, in good earnest think,
 that there are indeed wars and contentions among
 the gods, and that those other things were also
 done by them, which poets and painters com-
 monly impute to them? such as the peplum or
 veil of Minerva, which in the Panathenaics is with
 great pomp and ceremony brought into the acro-
 polis, is embroidered all over with?—Thus we
 see, that Socrates, though he asserted one su-
 preme Deity, yet he acknowledged, notwithstand-
 ing, other inferior created gods, together with
 the rest of the Pagans, honouring and worshipping
 them; only he disliked those poetic fables con-
 cerning them (believed at that time by the vulgar,)
 in which all manner of unjust and immoral ac-
 tions were fathered on them; which, together
 with the envy of many, was the only true rea-
 son, why he was then accused of impiety and
 Atheism.

It hath been also affirmed by many, that Plato
 really asserted one only God and no more, and
 that therefore, whensoever he speaks of gods
 plurally, he must be understood to have done
 this, not according to his own judgment, but only

in a way of politic compliance with the Athenians, and for fear of being made to drink poison in like manner as Socrates was. In confirmation of which opinion, there is also a passage cited out of that thirteenth epistle of Plato's to Dionysius, wherein he gives this as a mark, whereby his serious epistles, and such as were written according to the true sense of his own mind, might by his friends be distinguished from those which were otherwise; *τῆς μὲν γὰρ σπουδαίας ἐπιστολῆς Θεὸς ἄρχεται, οἱ δὲ τῆς ἥττον·* When I begin my epistles with God, then may you conclude I write seriously; but not so when I begin with gods.—And this place seems to be therefore the more authentic, because it was long since produced by Eusebius to this very purpose, namely, to prove, that Plato acknowledged one only God; *ὁ μὲν γὰρ εἶπεν ἕνα Θεὸν εἰδώς, οἱ καὶ συνήθως Ἕλλησι, τῇ τῶν πλείωνων εἰωσθε χρησθαι προσηγορίᾳ, καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς πρὸς Διονύσιον ἐπιστολῆς, ἐν ᾗ σύμβολα δίδοντες, τῶν τε θεῶν σπουδῆς ἀντὶ γραφομένων, καὶ τῶν ἄλλως ἀπερρίμμενων·* It is manifest, that Plato really acknowledged one only God, however, in compliance with the language of the Greeks, he often spake of gods plurally, from that epistle of his to Dionysius, wherein he gives this symbol or mark, whereby he might be known to write seriously, namely, when he began his epistles with God, and not with gods.

Notwithstanding which, we have already manifested, out of Plato's *Timæus*, that he did in good earnest assert a plurality of gods; by which gods of his are to be understood animated or intellectual beings superior to men, to whom there is an honour and worship from men due; he therein

Pamp. Ev.
L. xli. c. xij.
[p. 550.]

P. 40. Ser. declaring, not only the sun and stars,
 but also the earth itself (as animated) to
 be a god or goddess. For though it be now read
 in our copies *πρεσβυτάτην σωμάτων*, that the earth
 was the oldest of all the bodies within the hea-
 vens;—yet it is certain, that anciently it was read
 otherwise, *πρεσβυτάτην θεῶν*, the oldest of the gods—
 not only from Proclus and Cicero, but also from
 Laertius* writing thus: γῆν δὲ πρεσβυτάτην μὲν εἶναι
 τῶν ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ θεῶν, γενέσθαι δὲ δημοσύργημα, ὡς νόκτα
 καὶ ἡμέραν ποιεῖν, οὖσαν δ' ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου, κινεῖσθαι περὶ τὸ
 μέσον. Though Plato's gods were for the most part
 fiery yet did he suppose the earth to be a god or
 goddess too, affirming it to be the oldest of all the
 gods within the heavens, made or created to distin-
 guish day and night, by its diurnal circumgyration
 upon its own axis, in the middle or centre of the
 world.—For Plato, when he wrote his *Timæus*,
 acknowledged only the diurnal motion of the
 earth, though afterwards he is said to have ad-
 mitted its annual too. And the same might be
 further evinced from all his other writings, but
 especially his book of *Laws* (together with his
Epinomis) said to have been written by him in his
 old age, in which he much insists upon the god-
 ships of the sun, moon and stars; and complains;
 that the young gentlemen of Athens were then so
 much infected with that Anaxagorean doctrine,
 which made them to be nothing but inanimate
 stones and earth; as also he approves of that then
 vulgarly-received custom of worshipping the ri-
 sing and setting sun and moon, as gods, to which,
 in all probability, he conformed himself: *Ἀναγλ-*

* III. *segm.* 75. p. 211.

λατός τε ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης, καὶ πρὸς δυσμὰς
 ἰόντων, προσκλίσεις ἅμα καὶ προσκυνήσεις Ἑλ- De Leg. x.
[p. 664. op.]
 λήνων τε καὶ Βαρβάρων πάντων, ἐν συμφοραῖς
 πάντοιας ἐχομένων καὶ ἐν ἐνπραγίαις, ὡς ὅτι μάλιστα
 ὄντων, καὶ οὐδαμῇ ὑποψίαν ἐυδεδόντων ὡς οὐκ ἂσι θεοί.
 The prostrations and adorations, that are used
 both by the Greeks and all Barbarians, towards the
 rising and setting sun and moon (as well in their
 prosperities as adversities), declare them to be un-
 questionably esteemed gods.—Wherefore we can-
 not otherwise conclude; but that this thirteenth
 epistle of Plato to Dionysius, though extant, it
 seems, before Eusebius's time, yet was supposi-
 tious and counterfeit by some zealous but igno-
 rant Christian: as there is accordingly a *Nothévera*;
 or brand of bastardy, prefixed to it in all the edi-
 tions of Plato's works.

However, though Plato acknowledged and
 worshipped many gods, yet is it undeniably evi-
 dent, that he was no Polyarchist, but a Monar-
 chist, an assertor of one supreme God, the only
 αὐτοφύης, or self-originated Being—the maker of
 the heaven and earth, and of all those other gods.
 For, first, it is plain, that, according to Plato,
 the soul of the whole world was not itself eternal;
 much less self-existent, but made or produced by
 God in time, though indeed before its body, the
 world, from these words of his; τὴν ψυχὴν
 οὐχ ὡς νῦν ὑτέραν ἐπιχειροῦμεν λέγειν, οὕτως Plat. Tim. p.
34. [p. 528.
oper.]
 ἐμπανήσατο καὶ ὁ Θεὸς νεώτεραν, ὁ δὲ καὶ
 γένεσθαι καὶ ἀρετῇ προτέραν καὶ πρεσβυτέραν ψυχὴν σώματος,
 ὡς δεσπότιν καὶ ἀρξουσάν ἀρξομένου συνιστήσατο. God
 did not fabricate or make the soul of the world,
 in the same order that we now treat concern-

ing it, that is, after it, as junior to it; but that, which was to rule over the world, as its body, being more excellent, he made it first, and senior to the same.—Upon which account Aristotle quarrels with Plato as contradicting himself, in that he affirmed the soul to be a principle, and yet supposed it not to be eternal, but made together with the heaven: ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ Πλάτ. *Arist. Met.* τὴν γὰρ οὐρανὸν τε λέγειν, ἣν οἷται ἀρχὴν εἶναι ἐνίοτε *l. xiv. a. v. (p. 478. tom. iv. opus.)* αὐτὸ ἐαυτὸ κινεῖν, ὥστερον γὰρ καὶ ἅμα τῷ σώ-
 ραντῃ ἢ ψυχῇ. Neither is it possible for Plato here to extricate himself, who sometimes declares the soul to be a principle, as that which moves itself, and yet affirms it again not to be eternal, but made together with the heaven.—For which cause some Platonists conclude, that Plato asserted a double Psyche, one the third hypostasis of his trinity, and eternal; the other created in time, together with the world, which seems to be a probable opinion. Wherefore, since, according to Plato, the soul of the world, which is the chief of all his inferior gods, was not self-existent, but made or produced by God in time, all those other gods of his, which were but parts of the world, as the sun, moon, stars and demons, must needs be so too. But, lest any should suspect, that Plato might, for all that, suppose the world and its gods not to have been made by one only unmade God, but by a multitude of co-ordinate, self-existent principles, or deities conspiring; we shall observe, that the contrary hereunto is plainly declared by him, in way of answer to that query whether or no there were many and infinite worlds, (as some philosophers had maintain-

or only one? he resolving it thus, *κότερον οὐν ὀρθῶς*

ἓνα οὐρανὸν προειρήκαμιν, ἢ πολλοὺς καὶ ἀπείρους Tim. p. 31.

λέγειν ἢ ὁρθότερον; ἓνα, εἴπερ κατὰ τὸ παλαιόν [p. 487.
edit. Ficini.]

δείγμα δεδημιουργημένος ἔσται τὸ γὰρ περιέχον

πάντα ὅποσα νοητὰ ζῶα, μὴ ἑτέρου δευτέρου οὐκ ἂν ποτ' εἴη,

ἔς. ἓνα οὖν τῷδε κατὰ τὴν μόνωσιν, ὁμοιον ἢ τῇ παντέλει ζῶει,

διὰ ταῦτα οὐτε δύο, οἷον ἀπείρους ἐποίησεν ὁ ποιῶν κόσμον,

ἀλλ' εἰς ἑδὲ μονογενὲς οὐρανὸς γεγενῆς, ἔστι τε καὶ ἔσται.

Whether have we rightly affirmed, that there is only one heaven, (or world) or is it more agreeable to reason, to hold many or infinite? We say there is but one, if it be made agreeable to its intellectual paradigm, containing the ideas of all animals and other things in it; for there can be but one archetypal animal, which is the paradigm of all created beings: wherefore, that the world may agree with its paradigms in this respect of solitude or oneliness, therefore is it not two, nor infinite, but one only begotten.—His meaning is, that there is but one archetypal Mind, the Demiurgus, or maker of all things that were produced, and therefore but one world.

And this one God, which, according to Plato, was the maker of the whole world, is frequently called by him, in his Timæus and elsewhere, ὁ Θεός, God, or the God—by way of excellency; sometimes ὁ Δημιουργός, the Architect or Artificer of the world;—sometimes ὁ Ποιτὴς καὶ Πατὴρ τοῦδε τῶν πάντων, the Maker and Father of this universe—whom it is hard to find out, but impossible to declare to the vulgar: again, ὁ ἐπὶ πάνσι Θεός, the God over all;—τῆς Φύσεως κτιστής, the Creator of nature—τοῦ πάντος Ἀρχή, the sole Principle of the universe—πάντων Αἰτίον, the Cause of all things—Νοῦς πάντων βασιλεὺς, Mind, the King of all things—

Νεὺς αὐτοκράτωρ, πάντα κοσμών, διὰ πάντων ἰών, that sovereign Mind, which orders all things, and passes through all things—τοῦ παντός Κυβερνήτης, the Governor of the whole—τὸ δὲ ἀεί, γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον, that which always is, and was never made—ὁ πρῶτος Θεός, the first God—ὁ μέγιστος Δαίμων, and ὁ μέγιστος θεῶν, the greatest God, and the greatest of the gods—ὁ ἄλιον γεννήσας, he that generated or produced the sun—ὁ γῆν, οὐρανὸν, καὶ θεούς, [p. 511.] καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ καὶ τὰ ἐν ᾗδου, καὶ ἐνὶ γῆς ἅπαντα ἐργάζεται, he that makes earth, and heaven, and the gods; and doth all things, both in heaven and hell, and under the earth—again, he by whose efficiency the things of the world ὕστερον ἐγένετο, πρότερον οὐκ ὄντα, were afterwards [p. 168.] made when they were not before; or from an antecedent non-existence brought forth into being.—This philosopher somewhere intimating, that it was as easy for God to produce those real things, the sun, moon, stars and earth, &c. from himself, as it is for us to produce the images of ourselves and whatsoever else we please; only by interposing a looking-glass. Lastly, he is called D. Rep. I. x. ὃς πάντα τὰ τε ἄλλα ἐργάζεται, καὶ ἑαυτὸν, he that [p. 561.] causeth or produceth both all other things, and even himself—the meaning whereof is this: he, that is αὐτοφυής; (as the same Plato also calls him), a self-originated Being, and from no other cause besides himself, but the cause of all other things.—Neither doth Lactantius Firmianus* himself refuse to speak of God after this very manner; *se ipsum fecit*, and that he was “*ex se ipso procreatus, et propterea talis, qualem*

* *Instit. Divin.* lib. i. cap. vii. p. 53. et lib. ii. cap. viii. p. 214.

se esse voluit;" that he made himself—and that being procreated from himself, he therefore was every way such as he willed himself to be. Which unusual and bold strain of theology is En. vi. l. viii. p. 749, [esp. xiv. p. 750.] very much insisted upon by Plotinus, in his book *Περὶ τοῦ θελήματος τοῦ ἑνὸς*, con-

cerning the will of the first One, or unity; he there writing thus of the supreme God, αἴτιον ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ παρ' αὐτοῦ, καὶ δι' αὐτὸν αὐτός; He is the cause of himself, and he is from himself, and himself is for himself.—And again, αὐτός ἐστιν οὗτος ὁ ποιῶν ἑαυτόν, καὶ κύριος ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ οὐχ ὥς τις ἕτερος ἐθέλησε γενόμενος, ἀλλ' ὥς θέλει αὐτός. This is he, who is the maker of himself, and is lord over himself; (in a certain sense) for he was not made that, which another willed him to be, but he is that, which he willeth himself to be.—Moreover, αὐτός

ἂν τοῦτο ὅσπερ ἡγάπησε, τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶν ὑποστήσας P. 751. αὐτόν, εἴπερ ἐνέργεια μένουσα ὥστε ἐνέργημα αὐτός, ἀλλὰ ἄλλου μὲν οὐδενός, ἑαυτοῦ ἄρα ἐνέργημα αὐτός, οὐκ ἄρα ὥς συμβέβηκέν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ὥς ἐνεργεῖ αὐτός καὶ ὥς αὐτός ἐθέλει, &c. The Supreme Deity loving himself as a pure light, is himself what he loved; thus, as it were, begetting and giving subsistence to himself, he being a standing energy. Wherefore, since God is a work or energy, and yet he is not the work or energy of any other being, he must needs be (in some sense) his own work or energy; so that God is not that, which he happened to be, but that which he willeth himself to be. Thus also a little before, ἀνακτίων P. 748.

εἰς ἐν τὴν βούλησιν καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν· τὸ δὲ θέλει παρ' αὐτοῦ, ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸ εἶναι παρ' αὐτοῦ, ὥστε αὐτὸν πεποιηκέναι αὐτόν, ὁ λόγος ἀνεῦρεν· εἰγὰρ ἡ βούλησις παρ' αὐτοῦ, καὶ οἷον ἔργον αὐτοῦ, αὕτη δὲ ταυτὸν τῇ ὑποστάσει

αὐτοῦ αὐτὸς ἂν οὕτως ὑποστήσας ἂν εἴη αὐτὸν, ὥστε οὐχ ὥστερ' ἐτυχεν εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὥστερ' ἐβουλήθη αὐτός. We must of necessity make will and essence the same in the first Being. Wherefore, since his willing is from himself, his being must needs be from himself too; the consequence of which ratiocination is this, that He made himself. For if his volition be from himself, and his own work, and this be the same with his hypostasis or substance; he may be then said to have given subsistence to himself. Wherefore he is not what he happened to be, but what he willed himself to be. But, because this is so unusual a notion, we shall here set down yet one or two passages more of this philosopher's

P. 747. concerning it; οὐκ ἔξω τῆς βουλήσεως αὐτοῦ

ἡ οὐσία, ἀλλὰ συνέστιν αὐτοῦ τῇ οἰον οὐσίῃ ἡ θέλησις· καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτὸν λαβεῖν, ἀνευ τοῦ θέλειν αὐτοῦ, ὅπερ ἔστι· καὶ σύνδρομος αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ, θέλων αὐτὸς εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο ὃν ὥστερ' θέλει· καὶ ἡ θέλησις καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν· καὶ ταύτῃ οὐχ ἔττον, ὅτι μὴ ἄλλο αὐτὸς ὥστερ' ἐτυχεν, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ ὡς ἐβουλήθη ἂν· τί γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἡθέλησεν, ἢ τοῦτο ὃ ἔστι· καὶ γὰρ εἰ παθοίμεθα εἰσεῖναι αὐτῷ ὅτι θεοὶ γενέσθαι, καὶ ἐξέρχαι αὐτῷ ἀλλάξασθαι τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν εἰς ἄλλο, μήτε ἂν ἄλλο τι γενέσθαι βουληθῆναι, μήτ' ἂν αὐτοῦ τι μέμψασθαι, ὡς ὑπὸ ἀνάγκης τοῦτο ὃν ὃ ἔστι, τῷ αὐτὸν εἶναι, ὅπερ αὐτὸς αἰεὶ ἡθέλησεν καὶ θέλει· ἔστι γὰρ οὕτως ἡ ἀγαθοῦ φύσις, θέλησις αὐτοῦ.

The essence of the supreme God is not without his will, but his will and essence are the same; so that God conceiveth with himself, himself being willing to be as he is, and being that which he willeth; and his will and himself being one and the same. For himself is not one thing (as happening to be that which he is) and that he would will to be another: for what could God will to be, but that which he is? And if we should sup-

pose, that it were in his own choice to be what he would, and that he had liberty to change his nature into whatsoever else he pleased, it is certain that he would neither will to be any thing else besides what he is, nor complain of himself as being now that which he is out of necessity, he being indeed no other but that, which himself hath willed, and doth always will to be. For his will is his essential goodness; so that his will doth not follow his nature, but concur with it; in the very essence of this good there being contained his choice, and willing of himself to be such. Lastly,

Πάν ἄρα βούλησις, καὶ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ μὴ βουλόμενον, P. 755.
οὐδὲ τὸ πρὸ βουλήσεως ἄρα· πρῶτον ἄρα ἡ βούλη-
σις αὐτοῦ, καὶ τὸ ὡς ἐβούλετο ἄρα καὶ οἷον ἐβούλετο, καὶ τὸ
τῇ βουλήσει ἐκόμενον δ' ἡ τοιαύτη βούλησις ἐγέννα· ἐγέννα δὲ
οὐδὲν ἔτι ἐν αὐτῷ. God is all will, nor is there any
thing in him which he doth not will, nor is his being
before his will, but his will is himself, or he himself
the first will. So that he is as he would himself,

and such as he would, and yet his will did not generate or produce any thing that was not before.—
And now we may in all probability conclude, that Lactantius derived this doctrine from Plato and Plotinus; which, how far it is to be either allowed of or excused, we leave others to judge; only we shall observe, that, as the word *αὐτογενὲς*, frequently attributed to God by Christians as well as Pagans,* seems to imply as much; so the scope and drift of Plotinus, in all this, was plainly no other, than partly to set forth the self-existence of the supreme Deity after a more lively

* Vide Dionys. Palav. Dogmat. Theolog. de Trinitate, lib. v. cap. v. §. xiv. p. 294. tom. ii.

manner, and partly to confute that odd conceit, which some might possibly entertain of God, as if he either happened, by chance, to be what he is, or else were such by a certain necessity of nature, and had his being imposed upon him; whereas, he is as much every way what he would will and choose to be, as if he had made himself by his own will and choice. Neither have we set down all this, only to give an account of that one expression of Plato's, that God causeth himself and all things—but also to shew how punctually precise, curious and accurate some of these Pagans were in their speculations concerning the Deity.

To return therefore to Plato: though some have suspected that trinity, which is commonly called Platonic, to have been nothing but a mere figment and invention of some later Platonists; yet the contrary hereunto seems to be unquestionably evident, that Plato himself really asserted such a trinity of universal and Divine hypostases, which have the nature of principles. For, first, whereas, in his tenth book of Laws, he professedly opposing Atheists, undertakes to prove the existence of a Deity, he does notwithstanding there ascend no higher than to the Psyche, or universal mundane soul, as a self-moving principle, and the immediate, or proper cause of all that motion, which is in the world. And this is all the god that there he undertakes to prove. But in other places of his writings he frequently asserts, above the self-moving Psyche, an immoveable and standing Nous or intellect, which was properly the Demiurgus, or architectonic framer of the whole world. And, lastly, above this multiform Intel-

lect, he plainly asserts yet a higher hypostasis, one most simple and most absolutely perfect Being; which he calls τὸ ἐν, in opposition to that multiplicity, which speaks something of imperfection in it, and τ'ἀγαθόν, goodness itself, as being above mind and understanding; the first intelligible, and an infinite fecundity together with overflowing benignity. And accordingly in his second epistle to Dionysius does he mention a trinity of Divine hypostases all together. Now the words ὁ θεός and τὸ θεῖον, God and the Divinity—in Plato, seem sometimes to comprehend this whole trinity of Divine hypostases, as they are again sometimes severally applied to each of them, accordingly as we have already observed, that Zeus or Jupiter in Plato is not always taken for the first and highest hypostasis in his trinity, but sometimes the second hypostasis of mind or intellect is meant thereby, and sometimes again his third hypostasis of the universal and eternal Psyche; nevertheless the first of these three hypostases is that, which is properly called by the Platonists πηγή τῆς θεότητος, the fountain of the Godhead, and by Plato himself* ὁ πάντων βασιλεὺς, περὶ ὃν πάντα ἐστὶ, οὗ ἕνεκα πάντα, καὶ ὁ αἴτιον πάντων τῶν καλῶν. The King of all things, about whom are all things, and for whose sake are all things, and the cause of all good and excellent things.

And this first Divine hypostasis, which in Plato's theology is properly αὐτόθεος, the original Deity—is largely insisted upon by that philosopher in the sixth of his Politics, under the name

* Epist. ii. ad Dionys. p. 707. oper.

and title of τ' ἀγαθόν, the Good—but principally there illustrated by that resemblance of the sun, called by that philosopher also, a heavenly god, and said to be the offspring of this highest Good, and something analogous to it in the corporeal world; ὅ, τί περ αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ τόπῳ, πρὸς τε νοῦν καὶ τὰ νοούμενα, τοῦτο τοῦτον ἐν τῷ ὁρατῷ πρὸς τε ὄψιν καὶ τὰ ὁρώμενα. This is the same in the intelligible world to intellect (or knowledge) and intelligibles, that the sun is in the sensible world to sight and visibles. For, as the sun is not sight, but only the cause of it; nor is that light, by which we see, the same with the sun itself, but only ἡλιοειδές, a sun-like thing; so neither is the supreme and highest Good (properly) knowledge, but the cause of knowledge; nor is intellect (precisely considered as such) the best and most perfect being, but only ἀγαθοειδές, a boniform thing. Again, As the sun gives to things not only their visibility, but also their generation; so does that highest Good, not only cause the cognoscibility of things, but also their very essences and beings.—Οὐκ οὐσίας ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας, πρὸςβεία καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέχοντος, this highest Good being not itself properly essence, but above essence, transcending the same, both in respect of dignity and power.—Which language and conceit of Plato's some of the Greek fathers seem to have entertained, yet so as to apply it to the whole Trinity, when they call God ὑπερούσιον, or superessential.—But the meaning of that philosopher was, as we conceive, no other than this, that this highest Good hath no particular characteristic upon it, limiting and determining of it, it being the hidden and incomprehensible source of all

things. In the last place, we shall observe, that this first Divine hypostasis of the Platonic trinity is by that philosopher called *τοῦτε ἡγεμόνος καὶ αἰτίου πάντων πατήρ*, the Father of the prince, and cause of all things.—Wherein we cannot but take notice of an admirable correspondency betwixt the Platonic philosophy and Christianity, in that the second hypostasis of both their trinities (called also sometimes *Λόγος* by the Platonists as well as *Νοῦς*) is said to be the immediate cause of all things; and the Demiurgus, the architect, maker or artificer of the whole world.

Now, to Plato we might here join Xenophon, because he was his equal, and a Socratic too, (though it seems there was not so good correspondence betwixt them;) which Xenophon, however in sundry places of his writings he acknowledge a plurality of gods, yet doth he give plain testimony also of one supreme and universal Numen; as this particularly,* *ὁ πάντα σείων καὶ ἀρμεύων, ὡς μὲν μέγας τις, καὶ δυνατός φανερός, ὁποῖος δ' ἐστὶ μορφήν ἀφανής*. He that both agitates all things, and establisheth the frame of the whole world, though he be manifest to be great and powerful, yet is he, as to his form, inconspicuous.

xxiv. In the next place we come to Aristotle: who, that he acknowledged more gods than one (as well as the other Pagans) appears from his using the word so often plurally. As particularly in this passage of his Nicomachian Ethics; *ἡ δὲ τέλει εὐδαιμονία, ὅτι θεωρητικὴ τις ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια*, L. x. c. viii. *καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἂν φανεῖν τοὺς γὰρ μάλιστα ὑπεύλη-* [p. 183. tom. iii. oper.] *φαιμεν μακαρίους καὶ εὐδαίμονας εἶναι πράξεις δὲ*

* Vide Clement. Alexandria. in Cohort. ad Gentes, cap. vi. p. 61, et Stromat. lib. v. p. 417.

ποιᾶς ἀπονείμει χρεὼν αὐτοῖς; πότερά τας δικάσας; ἢ γελοῖαι φανοῦνται συναλλάττοντες καὶ παρακαταθήκας ἀποδιδόντες, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα; ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀνδρείους; ὑπομένοντας τὰ φοβερά καὶ κινδυνεύοντας, ὅτι καλόν ἢ τὰς ἐλευθερίους; τίνοι δὲ δώσουσι; ἄτοπον δ' εἰ καὶ ἔσται αὐτοῖς νόμισμα, ἢ τι τοιοῦτον· εἰ δὲ σώφρονες τί ἂν εἴεν; ἢ φορτικὸς ὁ ἔπαινος, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχουσι φαύλας ἐπιθυμίας· διεξιοῦσι δὲ πάντα φαίνουσι· ἂν τὰ περὶ τὰς πράξεις μικρὰ καὶ ἀνάξια θεῶν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ζῆν τε πάντες ὑπελήφασιν αὐτούς· καὶ ἐνεργεῖν ἅρα, οὐ γὰρ τὸ καθεῦδειν, ὥσπερ τὸν Ἐνδυμῶνα· τῷ δὲ ζῶντι τὸ πράττειν ἀφηρημένῳ, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον τὸ ποιεῖν, τί λείπεται πλὴν θεωρίας·

That perfect happiness is a speculative or contemplative energy, may be made manifest from hence, because we account the gods most of all happy. Now what moral actions can we attribute to them? Whether those of justice amongst one another; as if it were not ridiculous to suppose the gods to make contracts and bargains among themselves and the like. Or else those of fortitude and magnanimity; as if the gods had their fears, dangers and difficulties to encounter withal. Or those of liberality; as if the gods had some such thing as money too, and there were among them indigent to receive alms. Or, lastly, shall we attribute to them the actions of temperance? But would not this be a reproachful commendation of the gods, to say, that they conquer and master their vicious lusts and appetites? Thus running through all the actions of moral virtue, we find them to be small, and mean, and unworthy of the gods. And yet we all believe the gods to live, and consequently to act; unless we should suppose them perpetually to sleep, as Endymion did. Wherefore if all moral actions, and therefore much more mechanical operations, be taken away from that

which lives and understands, what is there left to it besides contemplation? To which he there adds a further argument also of the same thing: Because other animals, who are deprived of contemplation, partake not of happiness. For to the gods all their life is happy; to men so far forth, as it approacheth to contemplation; but brute animals, that do not at all contemplate, partake not at all of happiness.—Where Aristotle plainly acknowledges a plurality of gods, and that there is a certain higher rank of beings above men. And by the way we may here observe, how from those words of his, ζῆν τε πάντες ὑπελάβησι θεούς, all men suppose the gods to live—and from what follows in him, that opinion of some late writers may be confuted, that the Pagans generally worshipped the inanimate parts of the world as true and proper gods: Aristotle here telling us, that they universally agreed in this, that the gods were animals, living and understanding beings, and such as are therefore capable of contemplation. Moreover, Aristotle in his Politics, writing of the means to conserve a tyranny, as he calls it, sets down this for one amongst the rest; ἐν δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς φαίνεται αἰὲν σπουδάζοντα διαφερόντως, ἥτιόν τε L. v. c. xi. γὰρ φοβοῦνται, τὸ παθεῖν τι παράνομον ὑπὸ τῶν τοιοῦτων; ἐὰν δεισιδαίμονα νομίζωσιν εἶναι τὸν ἄρχοντα καὶ φροντίζειν τῶν θεῶν· καὶ ἐπιβουλεύουσιν ἥττον, ὥς συμμάχους ἔχοντι καὶ τοὺς θεούς. For a prince or monarch to seem to be always more than ordinarily sedulous about the worship of the gods: because men are less afraid of suffering any injustice from such kings or princes, as they think to be religiously disposed, and devoutly affected towards the gods. Neither will

they be so apt to make conspiracies against such, they supposing, that the gods will be their abettors and assistants.—Where the word *δαιδαίμων* seems to be taken in a good sense, and in way of commendation for a religious person; though we must confess, that Aristotle himself does not here write so much like a *δαιδαίμων*, as a mere politician. Likewise in his first book *De Cælo*, he writeth thus; πάντες ἄνθρωποι περὶ θεῶν ἔχουσιν ὑπόλη-
α. iii. p. 415. ψα, καὶ πάντες τὸν ἀμωρότερον τῷ θεῷ τόπον ἀπο-
 tom. i. oper.] δόξαν, καὶ βάρβαροι καὶ Ἕλληνες, ὡς τῷ ἀθανάτῳ
 τὸ ἀθάνατον συννηρημένον, ἄντι οὖν ἐστὶ τι θεῖον, ὡς περ
 καὶ ἑστὶ, &c. All men have an opinion or persuasion that there are gods. And they, who think so, as well barbarians as Greeks, attribute the highest place to that which is Divine, as supposing the immortal heavens to be most accommodate to immortal gods. Wherefore, if there be any Divinity, as unquestionably there is, the body of the heavens must be acknowledged to be of a different kind from that of the elements.—And in the following book he tells us again, That it is most agreeable τῇ μαντείᾳ περὶ τῶν θεῶν, to that vaticination, which all men have in their minds concerning the gods, to suppose the heaven to be a quintessence distinct from the elements, and therefore incorruptible.—Where Aristotle affirmeth, that men have generally μαντείαν, a vaticination in their minds concerning gods; to wit, that themselves are not the highest beings, but that there is a rank of intellectual beings, superior to men; the chief of which is the supreme Deity; concerning whom there is indeed the greatest μαντία, or vaticination of all.

We acknowledge it to be very true, that Aristotle does not so much insist upon demons, as

Plato and the generality of Pagans in that age did; and probably he had not so great a belief of their existence; though he doth make mention of them also, as when in his *Metaphysics*,* speaking of bodies compounded of the elements, he instanceth in ζῶα τε καὶ δαίμονες, animals and demons—and elsewhere he insinuates them to have airy bodies, in these words; ἐπεκρίσθη γὰρ αὐ.τις, καὶ δαί τινα αἰρίαν, ἢ ἐν τῷ αἵρε ψυχὴ τῶς ἐν τοῖς ζώοις βαλρίων ἐστὶ, καὶ ἀθανατωτέρα, some perhaps would demand a reason, why the soul that is in the air, is better and more immortal De An. l. i.
[cap. viii. p.
17. tom. ii.
oper.] than that in animals,—However, whether Aristotle believed these lower demon gods or no, it is certain, that he acknowledged a higher kind of gods, namely, the intelligences of all the several spheres, if not also the souls of them and the stars; which spheres being, according to the astronomy then received, forty-seven in number, he must needs acknowledge at least so many gods. Besides which, Aristotle seems also to suppose another sort of incorporeal gods, without the heavens, where, according to him, there is neither body, nor place, nor vacuum, nor time; in these words; οὐτ' ἐν τόπῳ τὰ κε πέφυκεν, οὔτε χρόνος αὐτὰ ποιεῖ γράσκειν, οὐδ' ἐστὶν οὐδένος De Cael. l. i.
o. ix. [p. 631.
tom. i. oper.] πύδμια μεταβολή, τῶν ὑπὲρ τὴν ἑξωτάτω τεταγ-
μένην φερών, ἀλλ' ἀμελλόσιμα καὶ ἀπαθῆ, τὴν ἀρίστην ἔχοντα ζῶην καὶ ἀνταρκαστάτην διατελεῖ τὸν ἄγαντα αἰῶνα. They, who exist there, are such as are neither apt to be in a place, nor to wax old with time, nor is there any change at all in those things above the highest sphere; but they being impassible and unalterable, lead the best and

* Lib. vi. cap. viii. p. 329. tom. vi. oper.

most self-sufficient life, throughout all eternity.—But this passage is not without suspicion of being supposititious.

Notwithstanding all which, that Aristotle did assert one supreme and universal Numen, is a thing also unquestionable. For though it be granted, that he useth the singular *θεός*, as likewise *τὸ θεῖον* and *τὸ δαιμόνιον*, many times indefinitely, for a god in general, or any Divine being; and that such places as these have been oftentimes mistaken by Christian writers, as if Aristotle had meant the supreme God in them; yet it is nevertheless certain, that he often useth those words also emphatically, for one only supreme God. As in that of his *Metaphysics*, *ὁ, τι*

γὰρ θεός δοκεῖ τὸ αἴτιον πᾶσιν εἶναι καὶ ἀρχή
L. i. [cap. ii. p. 263. tom. iv, oper.] l. i. c. lii. *τις.* God seemeth to be a cause and certain principle to all things.—And
[p. 10. tom. ii. oper.] also in this *De Anima*, where he speaks

of the soul of the heavens, and its circular motion: *ἀλλὰ μὲν οὐδ' ὅτι βέλτιον λέγεται ἔχσῃ τὸν θεὸν διὰ τοῦτο κύκλῳ ποιεῖν φέρεσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν, ὅτι βέλτιον αὐτῇ τὸ κινεῖσθαι τοῦ μένιν, κινεῖσθαι δὲ οὕτως ἢ ἄλλως.* Neither is that a good cause of the circular motion of the heavens, which they (that is, the Platonists) call the *τὸ βέλτιον*, because it is better that it should be so than otherwise; as if God therefore ought to have made the soul of the world such, as to move the heaven circularly, because it was better for it to move so than otherwise: but this being a speculation that properly belongs to some other science, we shall no further pursue it in this place.—Thus afterwards again, in the same book, *συμβαίνει δὲ Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ γε καὶ*

* Lib. i. cap. vii. p. 16. tom. ii. oper.

ἄφρονέστατον εἶναι τὸν θεόν, μόνος γὰρ τῶν στοιχείων ἐν οὐ
 γνωρί, τὸ Νεῦκος, τὰ δὲ θνητὰ πάντα, ἐκ πάντων γὰρ
 ἕκαστον. It follows from Empedocles's princi-
 ples, that God must needs be the most unwise
 of all, he alone being ignorant of that (out of
 which all other things are compounded) νείκος,
 or contention—(because himself is nothing but
 φιλία, unity and friendship)—whereas mortal ani-
 mals may know or conceive all things, they
 being compounded of all. Which same passage
 we have again also, in his *Metaphysics*,* from
 whence it was before cited to another purpose.
 To these might be added another place out of
 his book of *Generation and Corruption*,^b τὸ ὅλον
 συνεπλήρωσεν ὁ θεός, ἐντελεχῇ ποιήσας γένεσιν. God
 hath filled up the whole, or universe, and con-
 stantly supplies the same, having made a con-
 tinual successive generation.—Lastly, τὸ δαιμόνιον
 is sometimes plainly used by Aristotle also, not
 for the Divinity in general, or any thing that is
 Divine, but for that one supreme Deity, the go-
 vernor of the whole world. Thus in that passage
 of his *Rhetoric to Alexander*, τοῦτό ἐστιν ὃ
 διαφέρομεν τῶν λοιπῶν ζώων, ἡμεῖς οἱ μεγίστης
 τιμῆς ὑπὸ τοῦ δαιμονίου τετυχηκότες. This is
 that, wherein we men differ from other animals,
 having received the greatest honour from God,
 that though they be endued with appetite and
 anger and other passions, as well as we, yet we
 alone are furnished with speech and reason.

Over and besides which, Aristotle in
 his *Metaphysics* (as hath been already
 observed) professedly opposeth that im-

Lib. xiv. c. x.
 Par. [p. 484.
 tom. iv. oper.]

* Lib. iii. cap. iv. p. 295. tom. iv. oper.

^b Lib. ii. cap. x. p. 741. tom. i. oper.

aginary opinion of many independent principles of the universe; that is, of many unmade self-existent deities; he confuting the same from the phenomena, because *ἅπαντα πρὸς ἓν συντέτακται*, all things are plainly co-ordered to one—the whole world conspiring into one agreeing harmony; whereas if there were many principles or independent deities, the system of the world must needs have been *ἑπισοδιώδης*, incoherent and in-conspiring—like an ill-agreeing drama, botched up of many impertinent interjections. Whereupon Aristotle concludes after this manner, *τὰ δὲ ὄντα οὐ βούλεται κακῶς πολιτεῖνέσθαι*.

Οὐκ ἔχοντες Πολυθεῖαν, Ἐς Καίμινος

But things will not be ill administered—(which was then it seems a kind of proverbial speech) and according to Homer, the government of many is not good, (nor could the affairs of the world be evenly carried on under it) wherefore there is one prince or monarch over all. From which passage of Aristotle's it is evident, that though he asserted *Πολυθεΐαν*, a multiplicity of gods—in the vulgar sense, as hath been already declared, yet he absolutely denied *Πολυκοιρανίην* and *Πολυαρχίαν*, a polyarchy or mundane aristocracy—that is, a multiplicity of first principles and independent deities. Wherefore though Aristotle doated much upon that whimsy of his, of as many intelligibles, or eternal and immoveable minds (now commonly called intelligences) as there are moveable spheres of all kinds in the heavens (which he sticks not also sometimes to call principles); yet must he of necessity be interpreted to have de-

rived all these from one supreme universal Deity, which, as Simplicius expresseth it, is Ἀρχὴ ἀρχῶν, the principle of principles;—and which comprehends and contains those inferior deities under it, after the same manner as the *primum mobile*, or highest sphere, contains all the lesser spheres within it: because otherwise there would not be αὐτὸς Κοίρατος, one prince or monarch over the whole; but the government of the world would be a polytocracy or aristocracy of gods, concluded to be an ill government. Moreover, as Plotinus represents Aristotle's sense, it is not conceivable, that so many independent principles should thus constantly conspire,

Enn. 5. 1. 1.
c. vii. [cap. 10.
p. 490, 491.]

εἰς ἓν ἔργον τὴν τοῦ παντὸς οὐρανοῦ συμφωνίαν, into one work, that agreeable symphony and harmony of the whole heaven.—As there could not be any reason neither, why there should be just so many of these intelligences as there are spheres, and no more; and it is absurd to suppose, κατὰ συντυχίαν τὰς ἀρχὰς εἶναι, that the first principles of the universe happened by chance.

Now this highest principle, as it is ἀκίνητος οὐσία, an immoveable essence—is by Aristotle in the first place supposed to be ἀρχὴ κινήσεως, the principle of motion in the universe—or at least of that chiefest motion of the *primum mobile* or highest sphere (which according to the astronomy of those times seems to have been the sphere of fixed stars), by whose rapid circutegyratation, all the other spheres and heavens were imagined to be carried round, from east to west. And accordingly the supreme Deity is by Aristotle called τὸ πρῶτον κινεῖν ἀκίνητον, the first immoveable mover—or the mover of the pri-

Met. 1. xiv.
c. viii. p. 1003.
[p. 481. tom.]

^{iv. oper.] Met.} *mundum mobile*, and whole heaven. Which
^{l. xiv. o. viii.} first mover being concluded by him to
^{[p. 483. tom.} be but one, he doth from thence infer
^{lv. oper.]} the singularity of the heaven or world, *ἐν μὲν ἄρα τῇ λόγῳ καὶ ἀριθμῷ, τὸ πρῶτον κινεῖν ἀκίνητον ὄν· καὶ τὸ κινούμενον ἄρα αἰεὶ καὶ συνεχῶς ἐν μόνον. εἰς ἄρα οὐρανὸς μόνος*. There is one numerically first immoveable mover and no more; and therefore there is but one moveable neither, that is, but one heaven or world.—In which doctrine of Aristotle's, there seems to be a great difference, betwixt his philosophy and that of Plato's; in that Plato makes the principle of motion in the heavens and whole world to be a self-moving soul, but Aristotle supposeth it to be an immoveable mind or intellect. Nevertheless, according to Aristotle's explication of himself, the difference betwixt them is not great, if any at all; Aristotle's immoveable mover being understood by him, not to move the heavens efficiently, but only objectively and finally, *ὡς ἐρώμενον*, as being loved.—Which conceit of his Proclus upon Plato's *Timæus* perstringeth
^{p. 167.} after this manner; *τῶν παλαιῶν οἱ μὲν τὸν κόσμον ἐπιστρέφαντες ἐπὶ τὸν νοῦν, καὶ διὰ τοῦ ἔρωτος, τοῦ περὶ τὸ πρῶτον ὀρεκτὸν, δόντες αὐτῷ τὴν κίνησιν, οὐδὲν ἔφασαν ἀπὸ τοῦ νοῦ καθήκειν εἰς αὐτὸν, ἐν ἴσῳ προστάξαντες αὐτὸν τοῖς ἔρασμοις μὲν τῶν αἰσθητῶν, μηδὲν δὲ γεννητικὸν ἔχουσιν ἐν τῇ ἑαυτῶν φύσει*. Some of the ancients converting the world to mind (or intellect) and making it move only by love of that first desirable, acknowledged nothing at all to descend down from Mind (or God) upon the world; but equalized the same with other amiable things, amongst sensibles, that have nothing generative in their nature.—Where Proclus seems

to suppose Aristotle to have attributed to God no efficiency at all upon the world; the contrary whereunto shall be evidently proved afterwards. In the mean time it is certain, that Aristotle, besides his immoveable mover of the heavens, which moveth only finally, or as being loved, must needs suppose another immediate mover of them, or efficient cause of that motion; which could be nothing but a soul, that, enamoured with this supreme Mind, did, as it were in imitation of it, continually turn round the heavens. Which seems to be nothing but Plato's doctrine disguised; that philosopher affirming, likewise, the circular motions of the heavens, caused efficiently by a soul of the world in his *Timæus*,^a to be τὴν περὶ νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν μάλιστα οὔσαν, a motion, that is most agreeable to that of mind or wisdom:—And again, in his *Laws*,^b τὴν τοῦ νοῦ περιόδον πάντως ὡς δυνατόν, οἰκιστάτην καὶ ὁμοίαν, that which of all corporeal motions only resembles the circuit of intellect.—Which Platonic conceit found entertain-
De Consol.
 ment with Boetius, who writing of the l. iii. Met. 9. soul of the world, represents it thus;

*Quæ cum secta duos motum glomeravit in orbes,
 In semet reditura meat, mentemque profundam
 Circuit, et simili convertit imagine cœli.*

Wherefore, as well according to Plato's hypothesis, as Aristotle's, it may be affirmed of the supreme Deity in the same Boetius's language, that,

Stabilisque manens dat cuncta moveri.

Being itself immoveable, it causeth all other things to move.—The immediate efficient cause of which motion also, no less according to Aristotle than

^a Cap. xvii. p. 241. edit. Fabricii.

^b Lib. x. p. 669.

Plato, seems to have been a mundane soul; however, Aristotle thought not so fit to make this soul a principle; in all probability, because he was not so well assured of the incorporeity of souls, as of minds or intellects.

Nevertheless this is not the only thing, which Aristotle imputed to his first and highest indmoveable principle, or the supreme Deity, its turning round of the *primum mobile*, and that no otherwise than as being loved, or as the final cause thereof, as Proclus supposed; but he, as well as

Met. I. xiv. Anaxagoras, asserted it to be also *τὸ εὖ καὶ καλῶς αἰτίαν*, the cause of well and

fit—or *τὸ οὐκ ἄνευ τοῦ εὖ*, that without which there could be no such thing as well—that is, no order no aptitude, proportion and harmony in the universe: he declaring excellently, that *εἰ μὴ ἔσται παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἄλλα, οὐκ ἔσται ἀρχὴ καὶ τάξις, ἀλλ' αὖ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀρχή*, unless there were something else in the world besides sensibles, there could be neither beginning nor order in it, but one thing would be the principle of another infinitely, or without end.

—And again, in another place already cited,* *τοῦ δὲ καὶ καλῶς, ἰσῶς οὔτε πῦρ οὔτε γῆν, &c. οὐδ' αὐτῷ αὐτομάτῃ καὶ τύχῃ τοσούτων ἐπιγρῆναι πρᾶγμα καλῶς ἔχει*, it is not at all likely, that either fire or earth, or any such body, should be the cause of that well and fit that is in the world; nor can so noble an effect as this be reasonably imputed to chance or fortune.—Wherefore himself, agreeably with Anaxagoras, concludes, that it is *Νοῦς* or Mind, which is properly *αἴτιος τοῦ καλῶς καὶ ὀρθῶς*, the cause of well and right—and accordingly does he frequently

* Ibid. lib. vii. cap. iii. p. 266. tom. 8. oper.

call the supreme Deity by that name. He affirming, likewise, that the order, pulchritude and harmony of the whole world dependeth upon that one highest and supreme Being in it, after the same manner as the order of an army dependeth upon the general or emperor, who is not for the order, but the order for him. Which highest Being of the universe is therefore called by him also, conformably to Plato, τὸ ἀγαθὸν κεχωρισμένον, the separate good of the world—in way of distinction from that intrinsic or inherent good of it, which is the order and harmony itself: Ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ καὶ ποτέρως

Met. l. xiv. ἔχει ἢ τοῦ ὅλου φύσις τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἀρίστον; καὶ ποτέρως κεχωρισμένον τι, καὶ αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό; ἢ ἰν' ὀπερ.

cap. x. [P. 484. tom. vi. oper.]
 τὴν τάξιν; ἢ ἀμφοτέρως ὥσπερ στρατεύμα; καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ τάξει τὸ εὖ καὶ ὁ στρατηγός, καὶ μᾶλλον οὗτος, σὺ γὰρ αὐτός διὰ τὴν τάξιν, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνη διὰ τοῦτόν ἐστιν πάντα γὰρ συντετακταί πως. It is to be considered also, what is the good and best of the universe; whether its own order only? or something separate and existing by itself? or rather both of them together? As the good of an army consisteth both in its order, and likewise in its general or emperor, but principally in this latter, because the emperor is not for the order of the army, but the order of the army is for him; for all things are co-ordered together with God, and respectively to him.—Wherefore since Aristotle's supreme Deity, by what name soever called, whether mind or good, is the proper efficient cause of all that well and fit, that is in the universe, of all the order, pulchritude, and harmony thereof; it must needs be granted, that besides its being the final cause of

* Ibid. lib. xiv. cap. x. p. 484, 485. tom. vi. oper.

motion, or its turning round the heavens by being loved, it was also the efficient cause of the whole frame of nature and system of the world. And thus does he plainly declare his sense, where he applauds Anaxagoras for maintaining

Met. I. I. c. iii.
[p. 266. tom.
iv. oper.] *Νοῦν εἶναι καὶ τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τῆς τάξεως πάσης*
αἰτίον, that mind is the cause not only

of all order, but also of the whole world:—

Met. I. I. xiv.
c. vii. [p. 479.
tom. iv. oper.] and when himself positively affirms, *ἐκ*
τοιαύτης ἀρχῆς ἤρτηται ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις,

that from such a principle as this depends the heaven, and nature.—Where by heaven is meant the whole world, and by nature that artificial nature of his before insisted on, which doth nothing in vain, but always acteth for ends regularly, and is the instrument of the

De Part. An.
I. I. Divine mind. He also somewhere affirmeth, that if the heavens or world

were generated, that is, made in time, so as to have had a beginning, then it was certainly made, not by chance and fortune, but by such an artificial nature as is the instrument of a perfect mind.

And in his *Physics*, where he contends for the world's ante-eternity, he concludes, nevertheless,

Lib. II. c. vi.
[p. 474. tom. I.
oper.] *ἀνάγκη νοῦν αἰτίον καὶ φύσιν εἶναι τοῦδε παντός*,
that mind together with nature must of

necessity be the cause of this whole universe.—For though the world were never so much coeternal with mind, yet was it in order of nature after it, and junior to it as the effect thereof, himself thus generously resolving, *εὐλογώτατόν*

Ar. de An. I. I.
c. vii. [p. 16.
tom. II. oper.] *εἶναι νοῦν προγενέστατον, καὶ κύριον κατὰ φύσιν*
τά δὲ στοιχεῖα φασὶ πρῶτα τῶν ὄντων εἶναι, that

though some (that is, the Atheists) affirm the elements to have been the first beings,

yét it was the most reasonable thing of all to conclude, that mind was the oldest of all things; and senior to the world and elements; and that, according to nature, it had a princely and sovereign dominion over all.—Wherefore, we think it now sufficiently evident, that Aristotle's supreme Deity does not only move the heavens as being loved, or is the final cause of motion, but also was the efficient cause of this whole mundane system, framed according to the best wisdom, and after the best inanner possible.

For perhaps it may not be amiss here to observe, that God was not called Mind by Aristotle; and those other ancient philosophers, according to that vulgar sense of many in these days of ours; as if he were indeed an understanding or perceptive Being, and that perfectly omniscient, but yet nevertheless such, as acted all things arbitrarily, being not determined by any rule or nature of goodness, but only by his own fortuitous will. For, according to those ancient philosophers, that, which acts without respect to good, would not be so much accounted *mens* as *dementia*, mind, as madness or folly; and to impute the frame of nature or system of the world, together with the government of the same, to such a principle as this, would have been judged by them all one, as to impute them to chance or fortune. But Aristotle and those other philosophers who called the supreme God *Noûs* or Mind, understood thereby that, which of all things in the whole world is most opposite to chance, fortune, and temerity; that which is regulated by the *τὸ εὖ καὶ καλῶς*, the well and fit—of every thing, if it be not rather the very rule, measure and essence

of fitness itself; that which acteth all for ends and good, and doth every thing after the best manner, in order to the whole. Thus Socrates in that place before cited out of Plato's *Phædo*, interprets the meaning of that opinion, That mind made the world, and was the cause of all things:

ὑποθέμεν, εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, τὸν νοῦν πάντα κοσμεῖν, καὶ ἕκαστον τιθεῖναι τὰντι ὅτι αὐτὸν βέλτεστα ἔχει. That therefore every thing might be concluded to have been disposed of after the best manner possible.—And

accordingly Theophrastus, Aristotle's scholar and successor, describeth God after this manner, *τὸ πρῶτον καὶ θεώτατον, πάντα τὰ ἄριστα βουλόμενος*, that first and divinest Being of all, which willeth all the best things.—Whether of these two hypotheses concerning God, one of the ancient Pagan philosophers; that God is as essentially goodness as wisdom, or, as Plotinus after Plato calls him, decency and fitness itself; the other, of some late professors of Christianity, that he is nothing but arbitrary will, omnipotent and omniscient; I say, whether of these two is more agreeable to piety and true Christianity, we shall leave it to be considered.

Lastly, it is not without probability, that Aristotle did, besides the frame of nature, and fabric of the world, impute even the very substance of things themselves also to the Divine efficiency (nor indeed can there well be any doubt of any thing, save only the matter); partly from his affirming God to be a cause and principle to all things, and partly from his commending this doctrine of Anaxagoras, *ἀμα τῷ καλῶς, αὐτὸν καὶ ἀρχὴν εἶναι τῶν ὄντων νοῦν*, that mind

was, together with well and fit, the cause and principle of things themselves.—However,

Met. l. i. c.

iii. [p. 366.]

tom. iv. opor.]

that Aristotle's inferior gods, at least, and therefore his intelligences of the lesser spheres, which were incorporeal substances, were all of them produced or created by one Supreme, may be further confirmed from this definition of his in his rhetoric, τὸ δαίμονιον οὐδὲν ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ἢ θεός, L. II. c. xiii. p. 785. tom. iii. oper. ἢ θεοῦ ἔργον, the Divinity is nothing but either God or the work of God.—Where θεός is unquestionably used in way of eminency for the supreme Deity, as in those other places of Aristotle's before cited, to which sundry more might be added; as, πάντα ἔχει τὰ γὰρ ὁ θεός, Mag. Mor. l. ii. c. xv. p. 255. tom. iii. oper. καὶ ἔστιν αὐτάρκης, God possesseth all good things, and is self-sufficient:—and again where he speaks of things, that are more than praise-worthy, τοιοῦτον δὲ εἶναι τὸν θεόν, Eth. Nic. l. i. c. xii. p. 18. tom. iii. oper. καὶ τὰ γὰρ καὶ τ' ἄλλα ἀναρᾶσθαι, such are God and Good, for to these are all other things referred.—But here Aristotle affirming, That there is nothing Divine, but either God himself, or the work and effect of God, plainly implies, that there was no multitude of self-existent deities, and that those intelligences of the lesser stars or spheres, however eternal, were themselves also produced or caused by one supreme Deity.

Furthermore, Aristotle declares, that this speculation concerning the Deity Met. I. vi. c. i. p. 346. tom. iv. oper. does constitute a particular science by itself, distinct from those other speculative sciences of physiology, and the pure mathematics; so that there are in all three speculative sciences, distinguished by their several objects, physiology, the pure mathematics, and theology, or metaphysics: the former of these, that is, physiology, being con-

versant *περὶ ἀχώριστα μὲν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀκίνητα*, about things both inseparable from matter, and moveable;—the second (viz. geometry, or the pure mathematics) *περὶ ἀκίνητα μὲν, ἀλλ' οὐ χωριστά, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐν ἑλῃ*, about things immoveable, indeed, but not really separable from matter, so as to exist alone by themselves;—but the third and last, *περὶ χωριστὰ καὶ ἀκίνητα*, concerning things both immoveable and separable from matter—that is, incorporeal substances immoveable: this philosopher there adding, *εἰ μὴ ἔσσι τις ἕτερα οὐσία παρὰ τὰς φύσει συνεστηκυίας, ἢ φυσικῇ ἂν εἴη πρώτη ἐπιστήμη, εἰ δέ ἔστι τις οὐσία ἀκίνητος, αὕτη προτέρα, καὶ φιλοσοφία πρώτη*: that if there were no other substance besides these natural things, which are material and moveable, then would physiology be the first science; but if there be any immoveable substance, the philosophy thereof must needs in order of nature be before the other.—Lastly, he concludes, that as the speculative sciences in general are more noble and excellent than the other, so is theology or metaphysics the most honourable of all the speculatives. Now the chief points of the Aristotelic theology, or metaphysical doctrine concerning God, seem to be these four following. First, that though all things be not ingent or unmade, according to that in his book

Met. I. xiv. o. against Xenophanes,* *ἀρ' ἀνάγκη ἀγένετα*
 vi. [p. 477. *πάντα εἶναι, ἢ οὐδὲν κωλύει γεγονέναι ἕτερα ἐξ*
 tom. iv. oper.] *ἑτέρων*: there is no necessity, that all things should be unmade, for what hinders but that some things may be generated from other things?—Yet there must needs be something eternal and unmade, as likewise incorruptible; be-

* De Xenophane, Zenone, et Georgis, cap. ii. p. 800. tom. ii. oper.

cause *ἡ πᾶσαι οὐσίαι φθαρταί, πάντα φθαρτά*. If all substances were corruptible, then all might come to nothing.—Which eternal, unmade (or self-existent) and incorruptible substance, according to Aristotle, is not senseless matter, but a perfect mind. Secondly, that God is also an incorporeal substance, *κεχωρισμένη τῶν αἰσθητῶν*, separate from sensibles—and not only so, *Met. I. xiv. c. vii. [p. 180. tom. iv. oper.]* but, according to Aristotle's judgment likewise, *ἀδιαίρετος*, and *ἄμερος*, and *ἄμεγέθης*, indivisible, and devoid of parts, and magnitude.—Nor can it be denied, but that besides Aristotle, the generality of those other ancients, who asserted incorporeal substance, did suppose it likewise to be unextended, they dividing substances (as we learn from Philo) into *διασπαστικαί, καὶ ἀδιάσπαστοι οὐσίαι*, distant and indistant, or extended and unextended substances.—Which doctrine, whether true or no, is not here to be discussed. Thirdly, *τὸ αὐτὸν νοῦς καὶ νοητὸν*, that in God intellect is really the same thing with the intelligibles.—Because the Divine Mind being (at least in order of nature) senior to all things, and architectonical of the world, could not look abroad for its objects, or find them any where without itself, and therefore must needs contain them all within itself. Which determination of Aristotle's is no less agreeable to Theism than to Platonism; whereas, on the contrary, the Atheists, who assert mind and understanding as such, to be in order of nature junior to matter and the world, do therefore, agreeably to their own hypothesis, suppose all intellection to be by way of passion from corporeal things without, and no mind or intellect to contain its intelligibles, or immediate objects

within itself. Lastly, that God being an immovable substance, his οὐσία is ἐνέργεια, his essence and act or operation the same; *Met. lib. xiv. c. vi.* δεῖ ἄρα εἶναι οὐσίαν τοιαύτην ἥς ἡ οὐσία ἐνέργεια, there must therefore needs be some such principle as this, whose essence is act or energy.—From which theorem Aristotle indeed endeavours to establish the eternity of the world, that it was not made *ἐκ νυκτός, καὶ ὁμοῦ πάντων, καὶ ἐκ μὴ ὄντος*, from night, and a confused chaos of things, and from nothing;—that is, from an antecedent non-existence, brought forth into being; because God, who is an immoveable nature, and whose essence is act or energy, cannot be supposed to have rested or slept from eternity, doing nothing at all, and then, after infinite ages, to have begun to move the matter, or make the world. Which argumentation of Aristotle's, perhaps, would not be inconsiderable, were the world, motion, and time, capable of existing from eternity, or without beginning. Of which more elsewhere. However, from hence it is undeniably evident, that Aristotle, though asserting the world's eternity, nevertheless derived the same from God, because he would prove this eternity of the world from the essential energy and immutability of the Deity.

We shall now conclude all concerning Aristotle with this short summary, which himself gives us of his own creed and religion, agreeably to the

tradition of his Pagan ancestors: *Met. lib. xiv. c. viii. [p. 483.]* δίδοται ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχαίων καὶ παλαιῶν, ὅτι θεοὶ τέ εἰσιν οὗτοι, καὶ περιέχει τὸ θεῖον τὴν ὅλην φύσιν τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ μυθικῶς ἤδη προσήχθαι πρὸς τὴν παιδείαν πολλῶν, καὶ τὴν εἰς τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὸ συμφέρον χαρῶσθαι ἐνθρονοποιεῖς τε γὰρ τούτους καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ὁμοίους

ταῖς λέγουσι, καὶ τοῦτοις ἕτερα ἀκόλουθα καὶ παραπλήσια
 It hath been delivered down to us from very an-
 cient times, that the stars are gods also; besides
 that supreme Deity, which contains the whole
 nature. But all the other things were fabulously
 added hereunto, for the better persuasion of the
 multitude, and for utility of human life and poli-
 tical ends, to keep men in obedience to civil laws.
 As, for example, that these gods are of human
 form, or like to other animals; with such other
 things as are consequent hereupon.—In which
 words of Aristotle these three things may be taken
 notice of. First, that this was the general per-
 suasion of the civilized Pagans from all known
 antiquity downwards, that there is one τὸ θεῖον,
 which comprehends the whole nature. Where
 τὸ θεῖον, is by Aristotle plainly taken for the su-
 preme Deity. And his own sense concerning
 this particular is elsewhere thus declared after
 the same manner, where he speaks of order, har-
 mony, and proportion; θεὸς γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο In Poli.
 δυνάμει ἐργον, ἥτις καὶ τόδε συνέχει τὸ πᾶν;
 this is the work of Divine power, which also
 contains this universe.—Which Divinity contain-
 ing and comprehending the whole nature and
 universe, must needs be a single and solitary Be-
 ing, according to that expression of Horace be-
 fore cited:

Nec viget quicquam simile aut secundum,

That, which hath nothing like it, nor second to
 it.—The next thing is, that, according to the Pa-
 gan tradition, besides this universal Numen, there
 were certain other particular and inferior deities
 also; that is, understanding beings superior to

men; namely, the animated stars or spheres, according to the vulgar apprehension, though Aristotle's philosophy would interpret this chiefly of their immoveable minds or intelligences. Lastly, that all the rest of the Pagan religion and theology, those two things only excepted, were fabulous and fictitious, invented for the better persuasion of the vulgar to piety, and the conserving of them in obedience to civil laws; amongst which this may be reckoned for one, that those gods are all like men or other animals; and therefore to be worshipped in images and statues of those several forms; with all that other fabulous farrago, which dependeth hereupon. Which being separated from the rest, the *παρσιος δοξα*, or ancient tradition of their Pagan progenitors—would remain comprised within those two particulars above-mentioned; namely, that there is one supreme Deity, that contains the whole universe, and that, besides it, the animated stars or their minds are certain inferior gods also.

To Aristotle may be here subjoined Speusippus and Xenocrates, his equals and corivals, they being Plato's successors; together with Theophrastus, his own scholar and successor. Concerning the former of which it is recorded in *Cl. De N. D. lib. i. c. 10*, that agreeably with Plato, he asserted "*vim quandam, qua omnia reguntur, eamque animalem*," one animal and intellectual force, by which all things are governed;—by reason whereof, Velleius the Epicurean complains of him, as thereby endeavouring "*evellere ex animis cognitionem deorum*," to pluck out of the minds of men the notion of gods;—as indeed both he and Plato did destroy those

Epicurean gods, which were all supposed to be independent, and to have no sway or influence at all upon the government of the world; whereas neither of them denied a plurality of subordinate and dependent deities, generated or created by One Supreme, and by him employed as his ministers in the economy of the universe: for had they done any such thing as this, they would certainly have been then condemned for Atheists. And Xenocrates's theology is thus represented in Stobæus: τὴν Μονάδα καὶ τὴν Διάδα θεούς, τὴν Eol. Phys. lib. i. c. iii. [p. 17.] πρῶτον ὡς ἄρρενα πατὸς ἔχουσαν τάξιν, ἥντινα προσ- αγορεύει καὶ Ζῆνα, καὶ Περικτὸν, καὶ Νοῦν, ὅστις ἐστὶν αὐτῷ πρῶτος θεός· τὴν δὲ θήλειαν μητὸς θεῶν δίκην, τῆς ἐντὸς τοῦ οὐρανοῦ λήξεως ἡγουμένην, ἥτις ἐστὶν αὐτῷ ψυχὴ τοῦ παντός, &c. That both a monad and dyad were gods, the one masculine, having the order of a father, which he calleth Zen and Mind, and which is also to him the first God; the other feminine, as it were the mother of the gods, which is to him the Soul of the universe:—besides which he acknowledgeth the heaven to be Divine, that is, animated with a particular soul of its own, and the fiery stars to be celestial gods, as he asserted also certain sublunary gods, viz. the invisible demons. Where, instead of the Platonic trinity, Xenocrates seems to have acknowledged only a duality of Divine hypostases; the first called a Monad and Mind; the second a Dyad and Soul of the universe. And, lastly, we have this testimony of Theophrastus, besides others, cited out of his Metaphysics; θεία γὰρ πάντων ἀρχή, δι' ἧς ἅπαντα καὶ εἰσι καὶ διαμένει, there is one Divine Principle of all things, by or from which all things subsist and remain.

xxv. The Stoics and their chief doctors, Zeno, Cleanthes and Chrysippus, were no better naturalists and metaphysicians than Heraclitus, in whose footsteps they trode; they in like manner admitting no other substance besides body, according to the true and proper notion thereof, as that which is not only *διασπαρόν*, distant and extended—but also *ἀντίρροον*, resisting and impenetrable.—So that, according to these Stoics, the souls not only of other animals, but of men also, were properly corporeal, that is, substances impenetrably extended; and which differed from that other part of theirs, commonly called their body, no otherwise than that they were *σῶμα ἁραιότερον καὶ λεπτομερέστερον*, a more thin and subtle body—and *πνεῦμα ἰσθερμον*, a hot and fiery spirit—it being supposed by these philosophers, that cogitation, reason, and understanding, are lodged only in the fiery matter of the universe. And though the generality of these Stoics acknowledged human souls to have a certain permanency after death, and some of them till the next conflagration, (unless perhaps they should be crushed and broken all to pieces, in their passage out of the body, by the downfall of some tower, steeple, or the like upon them) yet did they all conclude against their immortality, there being nothing at all immortal with them (as shall be afterwards declared) save only Jupiter, or the one supreme Deity. And as for the punishment of the wicked souls after death, though some of them seem to have utterly exploded the same, as a mere figment of poets,

* These are the words of Chrysippus, preserved by Mutarch, *Libro de Repugnantiis Stoicorum*, p. 1052. tom. ii. oper.

(inasmuch, that Epictetus * himself denies there was any Acheron, Cocytus, or Phlegethon) yet others granted, that as the better souls after death did mount up to the stars, their first original, so the wicked wandered up and down here in certain dark and miry subterraneous places, till at length they were quite extinct. Nevertheless, they seem to have been all of this persuasion, that the frightening of men with punishments after death was no proper nor accommodate means to promote virtue, because that ought to be pursued after for its own sake, or the good of honesty, as vice to be avoided for that evil of turpitude which is in it, and not for any other external evil consequent thereupon. Wherefore Chrysippus reprehended Plato for subjoining to his republic such affrightful stories of punishments after death :

φησὶν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀποτρέπειν τῷ ἀπὸ τῶν θεῶν φόβῳ, τῆς ἀδικίας, τὸν Κέφαλον* εὐδιάβλητόν

Plat. de
Stoic. Rep.
p. 1040.

τ' εἶναι καὶ πρὸς τοῦναντίον ἐξάγοντα πολλοὺς περισπασμοὺς καὶ πιθανότηας ἀντιπικτούσας, τὸν περὶ τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ καλῶν λόγον, ὡς οὐδὲν διαφέροντα τῆς Ἀκκοῦς καὶ τῆς Ἀλφίτου, δι' ὧν τὰ παῖδάρια τοῦ κακοσχολεῖν αἱ γυναῖκες ἀμύρουσι. Chrysippus affirmeth, that Plato (in the person of Cephalus) does not rightly deter men from injustice by the fear of Divine punishment and vengeance after death; since this opinion (of torments after death) is liable to much exception, and the contrary is not without probabilities; so that it seems to be but like to women's frightening of children from doing unhappy tricks, with those bugbears of Acco and Alphito.—But how fondly these Stoics doated upon that hypothesis, that all

* Arrian. in Epictet. lib. iii. cap. xiii. p. 293.

was body, may appear from hence, that they maintained even accidents and qualities themselves to be bodies; for voice and sound, night and day, evening and morning, summer and winter, nay, calends and nones, months and years, were bodies with them. And, not only so; but also the qualities of the mind itself, as virtue and vice, together with the motions and affections of it, as anger and envy, grief and joy; according to that passage in Seneca, * "*Corporis bona sunt corpora; corpora ergo sunt et quæ animi, nam et hic corpus est:*" The goods of a body are bodies; now the mind is a body, and therefore the goods of the mind are bodies too.—And with as good logic as this did they further infer, that all the actions, passions, and qualities of the mind, were not only bodies, but also animals likewise: † "*Animam constat animal esse, cum ipsa efficiat, ut simus animalia; virtus autem nihil aliud est quam animus taliter se habens, ergo animal est:*" It is manifest, that the soul is an animal, because it is that, by which we are made animals; now virtue and vice are nothing else but the soul so and so affected or modified, and therefore these are animals too.—Thus we see what fine conclusions these doaters upon body (though accounted great masters of logic) made; and how they were befooled in their ratiocinations and philosophy.

Nevertheless, though these Stoics were such sottish Corporealists, yet were they not for all that Atheists; they resolving, that mind or understanding, though always lodged in corporeal substance,

* Epist. cvi. p. 399. tom. ii. oper.

† Seneca, Epist. cxiii. p. 422. tom. ii. oper.

yet was not first of all begotten out of senseless matter, so or so modified, but was an eternal un-made thing, and the maker of the whole mundane system. And, therefore, as to that controversy so much agitated amongst the ancients, whether the world were made by chance, or by the necessity of material motions, or by mind, reason and understanding; they avowedly maintained, that it was neither by chance nor by material necessity, but *Divina Mente*, by a Divine and eternal Mind every way perfect. From which one eternal Mind they also affirmed human souls to have been derived, and not from senseless matter; "*Prudentiam et mentem a diis ad homines pervenisse*,"* that mind and wisdom descended down to men from the Deity.—And that "*Ratio nihil aliud est, quam in corpus humanum pars divini spiritus mersa*;"^b Reason is nothing else but part of the Divine spirit merged into a human body:—so that these human souls were to them no other than *μέρη θεῶν καὶ ἀποσπάσματα*,^c certain parts of God, or decerptions and avulsions from him.—Neither were the reasons, by which these Stoics would prove the world to have had a Divine original, at all contemptible, or much inferior to those which have been used in these latter days; they being such as these: first, that it is no more likely this orderly system of the world should have been made by chance, than that Ennius's Annals or Homer's Iliads might have resulted from the fortuitous projection or tumbling out of so many

* Cicero de Nat. Deor. lib. ii. cap. xxxi. p. 3000. tom. ix. oper.

^b Senec. Epist. lxxvi. p. 168. tom. ii. oper.

^c Arrian. in Epict. lib. i. cap. xiv. p. 123.

forms of letters, confounded all together; there being as much continued and coherent sense, and as many several combinations in this real poem of the world, as there is in any fantastic poem made by men. And since we see no houses or cities, no books or libraries any where made by the fortuitous motions of matter, it is a madness to think, that this admirable compages of the whole world should first have resulted from thence. Again, there could not possibly be such an agreeing and conspiring cognation of things, and such a universal harmony throughout the whole world, as now there is, "*nisi ea uno divino et continuato spiritu continerentur*," were they not all contained by one and the same Divine spirit:—which is the most obvious argument for the unity or onelivess of the Deity. They reasoned also from the scale of nature, or the gradual perfection of things in the universe, one above another; that therefore there must be something absolutely perfect, and that either the world itself, or something presiding over it, was *a principio sapiens*,* wise from the beginning,—or rather without beginning, and from eternity. For as in the growth of plants and animals, "*Natura suo quodam itinere ad ultimum pervenit*," nature by a continual progress, and journeying forwards, arrives at length to the greatest perfection, which those things are respectively capable of;—and as those arts of picture and architecture aim at perfection; "*ita in omni natura necesse est absolvi aliquid et perfici*," so in the nature of the whole universe there must needs be something absolutely perfect

* Cicero de Nat. Deor. lib. ii. cap. xiii. p. 2973. tom. ix. oper.

reached unto.—“*Necesse est præstantem aliquam esse naturam, qua nihil est melius;*” since there is such a gradual ascent and scale of perfections in nature, one above another, there must needs be some most excellent and perfect Being, than which nothing can be better—at the top of all, as the head thereof. Moreover, they disputed Socratically, after this manner; * “*Unde arripuit homo vitam, mentem et rationem?*” Whence did man snatch life, reason, or understanding? Or from what was it kindled in him? For is it not plain, that we derive the moisture and fluidity of our bodies from the water that is in the universe, their consistency and solidity from the earth, their heat and activity from the fire, and their spirituousity from the air? “*Illud autem, quod vincit hæc omnia, rationem, mentem et consilium, &c. ubi invenimus? unde sustulimus? An cætera mundus habebit omnia? Hoc unum quod plurimi est non habebit?*” But that which far transcendeth all these things, our reason, mind and understanding, where did we find it? or from whence did we derive it? Hath the universe all those other things of ours in it, and in a far greater proportion? and hath it nothing at all of that, which is the most excellent thing in us? “*Nihil quod animi, quodque rationis est expers, id generare ex se potest animantes compotesque rationis, mundus autem generat animantes compotes rationis:*” Nothing that is devoid of mind and reason, can generate things animant and rational; but the world generateth such, and therefore itself (or that which contains it, and presides over it) must needs be animant and rational, or intellectual.—Which argumentation is further

* *Id. ibid. cap. vi. vii. viii. ix.*

set home by such similitudes as these; "Si ex oliva modulate canentes tibiæ nascerentur, non dubitares, quin esset in oliva tibicinis quædam scientia. Quid si platani fidiculas ferrent numerose sonantes, idem scilicet censeret in platanis inesse musicam. Cur igitur mundus non animans sapiensque judicetur, cum ex se procreet animantes atque sapientes?" If from the olive-tree should be produced pipes sounding harmoniously, or from the plane-tree fiddles, playing of their own accord musically, it would not at all be doubted, but that there was some musical, either skill or nature, in those trees themselves: why therefore should not the world be concluded to be both animant and wise (or to have something in it which is so) since it produceth such beings from itself?—And though perhaps some may think that of Cotta's here to have been a smart and witty repartee,* "Quærit Socrates, unde animam arripuerimus, si nulla fuerit in mundo? Et ego quæro, unde orationem? unde numeros? unde cantus? nisi verò loqui solem cum luna putemus, cum propius accesserit: aut ad harmoniam canere mundum, ut Pythagoras existimat." Socrates demandeth, whence we snatched soul, life, and reason, if there were none in the world? and I demand (saith he) whence did we snatch speech, music, and numbers? Unless perhaps you will suppose the sun to confabulate with the moon, when he approaches near her in the Syzygiæ; or the world to sound harmonically, as Pythagoras conceived.—Yet this, how smart soever it may seem, was really but an empty flash of academic wit, without any solidity at all in it, as shall be manifested afterward:

* Id. *ibid.* lib. iiii. cap. xi. p. 3064. tom. ix. oper.

Lastly, the Stoics endeavoured to prove the existence of a God after this manner: "*Ut nulla pars corporis nostri est, quæ non sit minor quam nosmetipsi sumus, sic mundum universum pluris esse necesse est quam partem aliquam universi:*" As there is no part of our body, which is not inferior in perfection to ourselves, so must the whole universe needs be supposed to be better and more perfect than any of the parts thereof.—Wherefore since it is better to be endued with life and understanding, than to be devoid thereof, and these are pure perfections; they being in some measure in the parts, must needs be much more in the whole. "*Nullius sensu carentis pars potest esse sentiens;*" no part of that, which is utterly dead and stupid, can have life and understanding in it.—And it is a madness for any man to suppose "*Nihil in omni mundo melius esse quam se,*" that there is nothing in the whole world better than himself, or than mankind—which is but a part thereof. Now Cotta here again exercises his jeering academic wit after the same manner as before; "*Hoc si placet, jam efficies, ut mundus optime librum legere videatur, &c. Isto modo etiam disertus, mathematicus, musicus, omni denique doctrina refertus, postremo philosophus erit mundus.*" By this same argument you might as well prove, that the world is also book-learned, an orator, a mathematician, a musician, and last of all a philosopher.—But neither this objection of his nor that former have any firmitude at all in them: because though an effect cannot be better or more perfect than its cause, nor a part than the whole; and, therefore, whatsoever there is of pure perfection in any effect, it must needs be more in the cause; yet as to those

things there mentioned by Cotta (which have all a plain mixture of imperfection in them) as they could not therefore formally exist in that which is absolutely perfect, so is it sufficient, that they are all eminently and virtually contained therein.

By such argumentations as these (besides that taken from the topic of prescience and divination) did the ancient Stoics endeavour to demonstrate the existence of a God, or a universal Numen, the maker and governor of the whole world; and that such a one, as was not a mere plastic or methodical and senseless, but a conscious and perfectly intellectual nature. So that the world to them was neither a mere heap and congeries of dead and stupid matter fortuitously compacted together; nor yet a huge plant or vegetable, that is, endued with a spermatic principle only; but an animal informed and enlivened by an intellectual soul. And though, being Corporealists, they sometimes called the whole world itself or mundane animal, God; and sometimes the fiery principle in it, as intellectual, and the hegemonic of the mundane soul; yet was the God of the Stoics properly, not the very matter itself, but that great soul, mind and understanding, or in Seneca's language, that *ratio incorporalis*, that rules the matter of the whole world. Which stoical God was also called as well *Τάχαθον* as *Νοῦς*, good as mind—as that which is a most moral, benign, and beneficent being; according to that excellent Cleanthean description of him, in Clemens Alexandrinus.*

Τάχαθον ἱερωτὴς μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλος δὲ,
 Τετραγώνου, ὀκταγώνου, ὅρου, σφαίρης,
 Κεντρὸν αὐτοῦ, χρονοῦ, καλὸν, δίκαιον, &c.

* In Protreptico, cap. vi. p. 61. and Stromat. lib. v. p. 716.

But this maker and governor of the whole world was most commonly named by the Stoics Zeus and Zen, or Jupiter; some of them concluding, that therefore there was but one Zeus or independent Deity, because the whole world was but one animal governed by one soul; and others of them endeavouring, on the contrary, to prove the unity and singularity of the world from the oneness of this Zeus, or the supreme Deity, supposed and taken for granted, and because there is but one fate and providence. Which latter consequence Plutarch would by no means allow of, he writing thus concerning it, where he pleads for a plurality of worlds; *καὶ μὴν τάγε* D. De. Or. *ἄλλα τῶν Στωϊκῶν τίς ἂν φοβηθείη, πυνθανομέ-* P. 425.
νων πῶς Εἰμαρμένη μία μένει καὶ Πρόνοια, καὶ οὐ πολλὰ
Δίαι καὶ Ζῆναι ἔσονται, πλείονων ὄντων κόσμων; τίς γὰρ
ἀνάγκη πολλοὺς εἶναι Δίαι, ἂν πλείονες ᾧσι κόσμοι, καὶ μὴ
καθ' ἑκάστου ἄρχοντα πρῶτον καὶ ἡγεμόνα τοῦ ὅλου δαδν,
οἷος ὁ παρ' ἡμῖν κύριος πάντων καὶ πατὴρ ἐκονομεζόμε-
νος, &c. Neither is it at all considerable, what the Stoics here object against a plurality of worlds, they demanding, how there could be but one Fate, and one Providence, and one Jove, (or independent Deity) were there many worlds? For what necessity is there, that there must be more Zens or Joves than one, if there were more worlds? and why might not that one and the same God of this universe, called by us the Lord and Father of all, be the first prince, and highest governor in all those worlds? Or what hinders, but that a multitude of worlds might be all subject to the fate and providence of one Jupiter, or supreme God; himself inspecting and ordering them every one; and imparting principles and spermatic

reasons to them, according to which all things in them might be governed and disposed? For can many distinct persons in an army or chorus be reduced into one body or polity? and could not ten or fifty, or a hundred worlds in the universe, be all governed by one reason, and be ordered together in reference to one principle?—In which place these two things are plainly contained; first, that the Stoics unquestionably asserted one supreme Deity, or universal monarch over the whole world; and, secondly, that Plutarch was so far from giving any entertainment to the contrary opinion, that he concluded, though there were ten or fifty, or a hundred worlds, yet they were all subject to one supreme, solitary, and independent Deity.

But, however, though these Stoics thus unquestionably asserted one sole independent and universal Numen, the monarch over the whole world; yet did they, notwithstanding, together with the other Pagans, acknowledge a plurality of gods; they concluding πάντα μετὰ εἶναι θεῶν καὶ δαιμόνων, that all things were full of gods and demons.—And so far were they from falling short of the other Pagans, as to this Polytheism or multiplicity of gods, that they seem rather to have surpassed and outstripped them therein. Plutarch making mention of their τοσούτον πλῆθος θεῶν, their so great multitude of gods;—and affirming them, ἐμπεληκέναι τῷ λόγῳ θεῶν τὸν οὐρανόν, τὴν γῆν, τὸν αἶρα, τὴν θάλατταν, to have filled the whole heaven, earth, air, and sea with gods.—Nevertheless, they plainly declare, that all this their multiplicity of gods (one only excepted) was generated or created in

time by that one, called Zeus or Jupiter, who was not only the spermatic reason, but also the soul and mind of the whole universe; and who from himself produced the world, and those gods, out of non-existence into being. And, not only so, but that also in the successive conflagrations they are all again resolved and swallowed up into that one. Thus Plutarch, in his defect of oracles, writing of the mortality of de-

P. 420.

mons, τοὺς Στωικοὺς γινώσκουμεν, οὐ μόνον κατὰ δαιμόνων ἦν λέγω δόξαν ἔχοντας, ἀλλὰ καὶ θεῶν, ὄντων τοσούτων τὸ πλῆθος· ἐνὶ χρωμένους αἰδίῳ καὶ ἀφάρτῳ, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους καὶ γεγενῆσθαι καὶ φθαρῆσθαι νομίζοντας· We know the

Stoics to maintain this opinion, not only concerning demons, but also the gods themselves, that they are mortal. For though they own such a multitude of gods, yet do they acknowledge only one of them eternal and incorruptible; affirming concerning all the rest, that as they were made in time, so they shall be again corrupted and destroyed.—Plutarch himself there defends the mortality of demons, but this only as to their corporeal part, that they die to their present bodies, and transmigrate into others, their souls in the mean time remaining immortal and incorruptible; but the Stoics maintained the same as well concerning gods as demons; and that in such a manner, as that their very souls, lives, and personalities, should be utterly extinguished and destroyed. To the same purpose Plutarch again writeth, in his book of Common Notions against the Stoics, Χρῦσιππος καὶ Κλεάνθης ἑμπεπλη-

P. 1075.

κάτες (ὡς ἱππος εἰπεῖν) τῇ λόγῳ θεῶν, τὸν οὐρανόν, τὴν γῆν, τὸν αἶρα, τὴν θάλατταν, οὐδένα τῶν τοσούτων ἀφάρτον, οὐδὲ αἰδίον ἀπολελοίπασσι, πλὴν πόνου τοῦ Διὸς· εἰς δὲ

πάντας καταναλίσκουσι τοὺς ἄλλους, &c. ταῦτα δὲ οὐχ ὡς ἅλλα πολλὰ τῶν ἀτόπων συλλογιζόμενα ἔχει τὰς ὑποθέσεις αὐτῶν, καὶ τοῖς δόγμασιν ἔπεται, ἀλλὰ αὐτοὶ μέγα βοῶντες ἐν τοῖς περὶ θεῶν, καὶ προνοίας, εἰμαρμένης τε καὶ φύσεως γράμμασι, διαρρήδην λέγουσι, τοὺς θεοὺς ἅπαντας εἶναι γεγονότας καὶ φθαρσομένους ὑπὸ πυρὸς, τριτοὺς κατὰ αὐτοὺς, ὥσπερ κηρίνους ἢ καττερτίνους ὄντας. Chrysippus and Cleanthes, having filled the whole heaven, earth, air and sea with gods, leave not one of these their so many gods incorruptible nor eternal, save Jupiter only, into whom they consume all the rest; thereby making him to be a helluo and devourer of gods; which is as bad as if they should affirm him to be corruptible, it arguing as much imperfection for one to be nourished and preserved by the consumption of other things into him, as for himself to die. Now this is not only gathered by way of consequence from the other principles of the Stoics, but it is a thing, which they expressly assert, and with a loud voice proclaim in all their writings concerning the gods, providence, fate and nature; that all the gods were generated, (or made in time) and that they shall be all destroyed by fire; they supposing them to be meltable, as if they were waxen or leaden things.—This indeed is essential to the stoical doctrine, and from their principles inseparable and unavoidable; forasmuch as they held all to be body, and that in the successive conflagrations all corporeal systems and compages shall be dissolved by fire; so that no other deity can then possibly remain safe and untouched, save Jupiter alone, the fiery principle of the universe, animated or intellectual. Here therefore there is a considerable difference to be observed betwixt these Stoics and other Pagan

Theists; that whereas the others for the most part acknowledged their gods to have been made in time by one supreme universal Numen, but yet nevertheless to be immortal, and to continue to eternity; the stoical Pagans maintained, that all their other gods, save Jupiter alone, were not only γεγονότες, but also φθαρσόμενοι, such as should be as well corrupted as they were generated, and this so also, as that their very personalities should be utterly abolished and annihilated; all the stoical gods in the conflagration being as it were melted and confounded into one.

Wherefore during the intervals of the successive conflagrations, the Stoics all agreed, that there is no more than one God (Zeus or Jupiter) left alone, (there being then indeed nothing else besides himself) who afterwards produceth the whole mundane system, together with all the gods, out of himself again. Chrysippus in Plutarch affirmeth, *εοικέναι τῷ μὲν ἀνθρώπῳ τὸν* P. 1077.

Δία καὶ τὸν κόσμον, τῇ δὲ ψυχῇ τὴν Πρόνοιαν, [De Repugn. Stoicor.]

ὅταν οὖν ἐκπύρωσις γένηται μόνον ἀφθαρτον ὄντα
*τὸν Δία τῶν θεῶν, ἀναχωρεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν πρόνοιαν, εἴτα ὁμοῦ γε-
 νομένους, ἐπὶ μιᾷ τῆς τοῦ αἰθέρος οὐσίας διατελεῖν ἀμφοτέ-
 ρους,* that as Jupiter and the world may be re-
 sembled to a man, so may providence be to the
 soul: when therefore there shall be a conflagra-
 tion, Jupiter of all the gods being alone incor-
 ruptible and then remaining, will retire and with-
 draw himself into providence; and so both to-
 gether remain in that same ethereal substance.—
 Where notwithstanding Jupiter and Providence
 are really but one and the same thing. And Sene-
 ca writeth thus concerning the life of a wise man

in solitude: "Qualis futura est vita sapientis, si sine amicis relinquatur, in custodiam conjectus, aut in desertum littus ejectus? Qualis est Jovis, cum resoluta mundo, et diis in unum confusis, paulisper cessante natura, acquiescit sibi, cogitationibus suis traditus:"

If you ask, What would be the life of a wise man either in a prison or desert? I answer, the same with that of Jupiter, when the world being resolved, and the gods all confounded into one, and the course of nature ceasing, he resteth in himself, conversing with his own cogitations.—

Arrianus's Epictetus, likewise, speaking of the same thing, ironically introduces Jupiter, bemoaning himself in the conflagration, as now left

quite alone, after this manner; Τάλας ἐγώ, Arr. l. iii. c. xiii. [p. 291.] οὔτε τὴν Ἥραν ἔχω, οὔτε τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν, οὔτε τὸν Ἀπόλλωνα, οὔτε ὅλως ἢ ἀδελφόν, ἢ υἱόν, ἢ συγγενή. Alas! I am now left all alone; I have neither Juno, nor Minerva, nor Apollo with me; neither brother nor son, nor nephew, nor kinsman (neither God nor goddess) to keep me company.—He adding also, according to the sense of the Stoics, that in all these successive conflagrations, ὁ Ζεὺς αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ σύνεστι, καὶ ἡσυχάζει ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ ἐννοεῖ τὴν διοίκησιν ἑαυτοῦ, οἷα ἐστὶ, καὶ ἐν ἐπινοίαις γίνεται πρεπούσας ἑαυτῷ, Jupiter, being left alone, converseth only with himself, and resteth in himself, considering his own government, and being entertained with thoughts becoming himself.—And thus have we made it unquestionably evident, that the Stoics acknowledged only one independent and self-existent Deity, one universal Numen, which was not only the creator of all the other gods, but also, in certain alternate vicissitudes of time, the decreator of

them; he then swallowing them up, and devouring them all into himself, as he had before produced them together with the world out of himself.

It is granted, that these Stoics as well as the other Pagans did religiously worship more gods than one, that is, more understanding beings superior to men. For it was Epictetus's^a own exhortation, εὐχου θεοῖς, Pray to the gods.—And the same philosopher^b thus describeth the disposition of a person rightly affected; θέλω εἰδέναι τί μοι καθήκον πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς, I would willingly know, what is my duty, first to the gods, and then to my parents, and other relations.—And they are M. Antoninus's precepts,^c Αἰδοῦ θεοὺς, revere the gods, and^d ἐν ᾧ πανσι θεοὺς ἐπικαλοῦ, in every thing implore the aid and assistance of the gods.—And accordingly in that close of his first book,^e himself does thankfully ascribe many particular benefits to the gods in common; παρὰ τῶν θεῶν τὸ ἀγαθὸν πάντων, &c. I owe to the gods, that I had good progenitors and parents, &c.—Where, amongst the rest, he reckons up this for one, that he never was any great proficient, either in poetry or rhetoric; because these would probably (had he succeeded in his pursuit of them) have hindered him from the attainment of far better things. And after all his enumeration, he concludeth thus: πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα θεῶν βοηθῶν καὶ τύχης δέεται, for all these things need the assistance of the gods and fortune, viz. because they are not in our own power.

^a Apud Arrian, lib. i. Dissert. i. p. 84.

^b Ibid. lib. iii. cap. xvii. p. 222.

^c Lib. vi. §. 30. p. 190.

^d Lib. vi. §. 23. p. 183.

^e Lib. i. §. 17. p. 30.

Neither can it be denied, but that they did often derogate from the honour of the supreme God, by attributing such things to the gods in common, (as the donors of them,) which plainly belong to the supreme God only. As when Epictetus

L. iii. c. xiv. makes reason in men to be a gift of the gods; ἡμῖν οὖν λόγος ἐπὶ ἀτυχίᾳ καὶ κακοδαιμονίᾳ. [apud Arrian. p. 329.]

δίδεται ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν; is reason therefore given us by the gods merely to make us miserable and unhappy?—And when he again imputes virtue to them; hast thou overcome thy lust, thine

L. iv. c. iii. intemperance, thine anger? πόσῳ μείζων [p. 388.]

αἰτία θυσιᾶς, ἢ ὑπαρξία ἢ ὑπαρχία, ταῦτα ἐκ σοῦ αὐτοῦ γίνεται καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν θεῶν, how much greater cause then hast thou of offering sacrifice, than if thou hadst got a consulship or prætorship? for those things come only from thyself and from the gods.—Though the reason of these speeches of theirs seems to have been no other than this, because they took it for granted, that those understanding beings, superior to men, called by them gods, were all of them the instruments and ministers of the supreme God in the government of the world; and had therefore some kind of stroke or influence, more or less, upon all the concerns of mankind. Whence it came to pass also, that they often used those words God and gods promiscuously and indifferently: as one and the same celebrated speech of Socrates is sometimes expressed singularly, *εἰ ταύτη τῷ θεῷ φίλον*; if God will have it so, let it be so, (Arr. Epict. l. i. c. xxix. l. iv. c. iv.) and sometimes again plurally, *εἰ ταύτη φίλον τοῖς θεοῖς*, if the gods will have it so.

Wherefore, notwithstanding the many gods of those Stoics, they worshipped for all that one Su-

preme, that is, one universal Numen, that contains and comprehends the whole world, who was variously described by them, sometimes as the nature and reason of the whole world;

ἡ τῶν ὅλων φύσις πρεσβυτάτη θεῶν, the nature, Anton. l. ix. §. 1. p. 264.

of the whole, the oldest of all the gods—and *ἡ τὰ ὅλα διοικοῦσα φύσις*, that nature which governs all things—*ὁ τὴν τῶν ὅλων οὐσίαν διοικῶν λόγος*, Ant. l. vii. §. 18. [p. 213.]

that reason which governs the substance of all—*ὁ διὰ τῆς οὐσίας διήκων λόγος*, Ant. l. vi. §. 1. [p. 170.]

καὶ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ αἰῶνος κατὰ περιόδους τεταγμένας οἰκονομῶν τὸ πᾶν, that reason which passes through the substance of the universe, and through all eternity orders and dispenses all according to appointed periods.—Sometimes is he called

ἡ τῶν ὅλων αἰτία, the cause of all things—Ant. l. v. §. 24.

sometimes *τὸ τοῦ κόσμου ἡγεμονικόν*, the hegemonic and ruling principle of the

whole world—and *ὁ ἡγεμὼν τοῦ κόσμου*, the prince of the world.—Again, *ὁ διοικῶν τὰ ὅλα*, Ant. l. vii. §. 47. [sec. 75. p. 236.]

the governor of the whole—as in this of Epictetus; *ὁ καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς τὴν αὐτοῦ γνώμην ὑποτάττει τῷ διοικοῦντι τὰ ὅλα, καθάπερ* L. i. c. xii. [apud Arrian. p. 118.]

οἱ ἀγαθοὶ πολῖται νόμῳ τῆς πόλεως; a good man submits his mind to the Governor of the

whole universe, as good citizens do theirs to the law of the city.—Also *ὁ διατάσσων*, the orderer of

all—in this other religious passage of the same philosophers, *τὸ παιδεύεσθαι, τουτίστι; μαν-* Ep. p. 119. Cant.

θάνειν ἕκαστα οὕτω θάλειν ὥς γίνεται πῶς δὲ γίνεται; ὥς διέταξεν αὐτὰ ὁ διατάσσων; to be instructed is to will things to be as they are made: and

how are they made? as that great Disposer of all hath appointed.—Again, the supreme God is

sometimes called by them *τὸ περιέχον τὰ ὅλα νοερόν*,

that intellectual principle, which contains the whole, as in this instruction of M. Antoninus;

L. viii. §. 45. *μη̄ μόνον συμπνεῖν τῷ περιέχοντι ἀέρι, ἀλλὰ καὶ*
[sect. 54. *συμφρονεῖν τῷ περιέχοντι πάντα νοεῶν*, that, as
p. 258.]

our bodies breathe the common air, so should our souls suck and draw in vital breath from that great Mind, that comprehends the universe, becoming as it were one spirit with the same.—He

Anton. p. 125. *ἰσὶ καὶ τοῦ ὅλου νοῦς καὶ*
[lib. v. §. 30. *διάνοια*, the mind and understanding of
p. 164.]

the whole world, *μία πάντων πηγὴ νοερά*, one intellectual fountain of all things; and, lastly,

Ant. p. 257, to name no more, *θεὸς εἷς διὰ πάντων, καὶ οὐσία μία, καὶ νόμος εἷς*, one God through all, one substance, and one law.—Which supreme God

Apion. l. vii. *ἦν κοινὸς τοῖς ἑσπερίοις καὶ τοῖς ἡγεμονίοις*,
§. 7. [sect. together with the generality of the other
p. 210.] Pagans, *ὁ Θεός*, or God—emphatically,

and in way of eminency, as in this of Epictetus,* *μηδὲν ἄλλο θέλει, ἢ ἃ ὁ Θεὸς θέλει, καὶ τίς σε κωλύσει*: will nothing but what God willeth, and then who can be able to hinder thee?—And, again, *θέλησον*

L. ii. c. xviii. *καλῶς φανῆναι τῷ θεῷ, ἐπιδήμιον καθαρός μετὰ*
[p. 225.] *καθαροῦ σεαυτοῦ γενέσθαι καὶ μετὰ τοῦ θεοῦ*,

affect to seem fair to God, desire to be pure with thy pure self, and with God.—Also where^b he speaks of the regular course of things in nature, *τεταγμένως, καθάπερ ἐκ προστάγματος Θεοῦ, ὅταν ἐκεῖνος εἴπῃ τοῖς φυτοῖς ἀνθεῖν ἀνθεῖ, ὅταν εἴπῃ βλαστάνειν βλαστάνει* that it proceedeth orderly, every thing as it were obeying the command of God: when he bids the plants to blossom, they blossom; and when to

* Apud Arrian. lib. ii. cap. xxvii. p. 221.

^b Apud Arrian. lib. i. cap. xiv. p. 122, 123.

bring forth fruit, they bring forth fruit.—To which innumerable other instances might be added. And Zeus or Jupiter was the proper name of this supreme God Epict. p. 251. [apud Arrian. lib. ii. c. xxi.] amongst the Stoics also; whence the government of the whole world is called by them *Διὸς διοίκησις*, the government or economy of Jupiter.—Lastly, this supreme God is sometimes distinguished by them from the other gods, expressly and by name; as in this of Epictetus, *ἐγὼ δ' ἔχω τίνι ὑποταγέσθαι, τίνι πείθεσθαι, τῷ θεῷ καὶ τοῖς μετ' ἐκείνων*, I have, whom I ought to be subject to, whom to obey, God and those, who are next after him—that is, the supreme and inferior gods. So, likewise, when he exhorteth not to desire things out of our own power: *ἀλλὰ τῷ Διὶ χάρισαι αὐτὰ, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις θεοῖς, ἐκείνοις παράδος, ἐκείνοι κυβερνάτωσαν*. Let Jupiter alone with these things, and the other gods, deliver them L. ii. c. xvii. [p. 221.] up to be ordered and governed by them.—And so again, where he personates one, that places his happiness in those things without him: *κάθημαι καὶ στένω, καὶ ἐν δυνάμει λαιδοῦμαι, τὸν Δία καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἄλλους*; I then shall sit lamenting, and speaking evil of every one, even Jupiter himself and the other gods.

And it must in reason be supposed, that this Jupiter, or universal Numen of the world, was honoured by these Stoics far above all their other particular gods; he being acknowledged by them to have been the maker or creator of them as well as the whole world, and the only eternal and immortal God: all those other gods, as hath been already declared, being as well corruptible, mor-

tal, and annihilable, as they were generated or created. For though Cicero's Lucilius Balbus, where he pretends to represent the doctrine of the Stoics, attribute the very first original of the world to a plurality of gods, in these words: "Dico igitur providentia deorum mundum et omnes mundi partes, et initio constitutas esse, et omni tempore administrari;" yet unquestionably Cicero forgot himself herein, and rather spake the language of some other Pagans, who, together with the generation of the world, held indeed a plurality of eternal (though not independent) deities, than of the Stoics, who asserted one only eternal God; and supposed, in the reiterated conflagrations, all the gods to be melted and confounded into one; so that Jupiter being then left alone, must needs make up the world again, as also all those other gods out of himself. And thus does Zeno in Laertius^a describe the *Cosmopœia*, τὸν θεὸν κατ' ἀρχὰς, καὶ πρὶν ὅντα, that God at first being alone by himself, converted the fiery substance of the world by degrees into water, that is, into a crasser chaos; out of which water, himself afterwards, as the spermatæc reason of the world, formed the elements and whole mundane system. And Cicero himself elsewhere, in his *De Legibus*,^b attributes the first original of mankind cautiously, not to the gods in common, but to the supreme God only; "Hoc animal providum, &c. quem vocamus hominem, præclara quadam conditione generatum esse, a SUMMO DEO:" and this, rather

^a Lib. vii. segm. 136. p. 450.

^b Lib. i. cap. viii. p. 136. tom. ix. oppr.

according to the sense of the Stoics, than of the Platonists, whose inferior generated gods also (being first made) were supposed to have had a stroke in the fabrefaction of mankind, and other animals. Thus Epictetus plainly ascribes the making of the whole world to God, or the one supreme Deity, where he mentions the Galileans, that is, the Christians, their contempt of death, though imputing it only to custom in them, and not to right knowledge; (as M. Antoninus likewise ascribes the same to *ψιλή παράταξις*, *L. xi. 4.* [p. mere obstinacy of mind) *ὑπὸ μανίας μὲν.* 319.]

δύναται τις οὕτω διατεθῆναι, καὶ ὑπὸ ἔθους οἱ Γαλιλαῖοι, ὑπὸ λόγου δὲ καὶ ἀποδείξεως οὐδεὶς δύναται μαθεῖν, ὅτι ὁ Θεὸς πάντα πεποίηκε τὰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν κόσμον.

Can some be so affected out of madness, *L. iv. c. vii.* and the Galileans out of custom? and [p. 500.]

can none attain thereunto by reason and true knowledge, namely, because God made all things in the world, and the whole world itself perfect and unhinderable; but the parts thereof for the use of the whole, so that the parts ought therefore to yield and give place to the whole. Thus does he again elsewhere demand, *τὸν ἥλιον τίς πεποίηκε, καρπούς δὲ τίς, &c.* Who made the sun? Who the fruits of the earth? Who the seasons of the year? Who the agreeable fitness of things? Wherefore thou having received all from another, even thy very self, dost thou murmur and complain against the donor of them, if he take away any one thing from thee? Did he not bring thee into the world? shew thee the light? bestow sense and reason upon thee?—Now the sun was the chief of the inferior Stoical gods, and therefore he being made by another, all the rest of their gods

must needs be so too. And thus is it plainly ex-

pressed in this following citation: *εἰ τις*
L. i. c. iii. [p. 90. vide etiam
 lib. i. cap. xiv. p. 124.] *τῷ δόγματι τούτῳ συμπαθεῖν κατ' ἀξίαν δύναιτο,*
ὅτι γεγόναμεν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πάντες προηγουμένως

καὶ ὁ θεὸς πατὴρ ἐστὶ τῶν τ' ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν θεῶν, οὐδὲν ἄγετες, οὐδὲ ταπεινὸν ἐνθυμηθήσεται περὶ ἑαυτοῦ. If any one could be thoroughly sensible of this, that we are all made by God, and that as principal parts of the world, and that God is the father both of men and gods, he would never think meanly of himself, knowing that he is the son of Jupiter also.—Where *θεός* is plainly put for the supreme God, and *θεοὶ* for the inferior gods only. Again, he thus attributes the making of man and government of the whole world to God, or Jupiter only.

L. iii. c. xxiv. [p. 328.] *Ὁ θεός πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἐπὶ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐποίησε, &c. τὴν δὲ οὐσίαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦ*

κακοῦ, ὥσπερ ἄξιον τὸν κηδόμενον ἡμῶν, καὶ πατρικῶς προϊστάμενον ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις. God made also men to this end, that they might be happy, and as became him, who had a fatherly care of us, he placed our good and evil in those things, which are in

L. iii. c. xxiv. [p. 331.] *ἡμῶν.* our own power. And *τῷ ὄντι κακῶς διοικεῖται*

καὶ τὰ ὅλα, εἰ μὴ ἐπιμελεῖται ὁ Ζεὺς τῶν ἑαυτοῦ πολιτῶν, ἵν' ὧσιν ὅμοιοι αὐτῷ εὐδαιμονες, things would not be well governed, if Jupiter took no care of his own citizens, that they also might be happy like himself.

And that these Stoics did indeed religiously worship and honour the supreme God above all their other gods, may appear from sundry instances. As first, from their acknowledging him to be the sovereign legislator, and professing subjection and obedience to his laws, accounting this to be their greatest liberty. Thus Epictetus,

εἰς ἐμὲ οὐδεὶς ἐξουσίαν ἔχει, ἡλευθέρωμαι ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἔγνωκα αὐτοῦ τὰς ἐντολάς, οὐκ ἔτι οὐδεὶς δουλαγωγῆσαι με δύναται. L. iv. c. vii. No man hath power over me, I am made free by God, (by becoming his subject) I know his commandments, and no man can bring me under bondage to himself.—
 And again, ταῦτα ἐπιτηδεύων θέλω εὐρεθῆναι, L. iii. c. v. ἢν' εἰπὲν δύναμαι τῷ Θεῷ, μήτι παρέβην σοῦ τὰς ἐντολάς, &c. These things would I be found employing myself about, that I may be able to say to God, Have I transgressed any of thy commandments? Have I used my faculties and anticipations (or common notions) otherwise than thou requirest?

Again, from their acknowledging him to be the supreme governor of the whole world, and the orderer of all things in it by his fate and providence, and their professing to submit their wills to his will in every thing; Epictetus somewhere* thus bespeaks the supreme God: μήτι ἐμεμφάμην σοῦ τὴν διοίκησιν; ἐνόησα ὅτι ἡδέλησας, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ ἐκὼν. πένης ἐγενόμην σοῦ θείοντος ἀλλὰ χαίρων· οὐκ ἤρξα, ὅτι σὺ οὐκ ἡδέλησας, οὐδέ ποτ' ἐπιδύμησα ἀρχῆς· μήτι με τοῦτου ἕνεκα στυγνότερον εἶδες; μὴ οὐ προσήλθύν σοι φαίδρῳ τῷ προσώπῳ, ἔτοιμος εἶμι ἐπιτάσσεις, εἶμι σημαίνεις; νῦν με θέλεις ἀπελθεῖν ἐκ τῆς πανηγύρεως; ἄπειμι· χάριν σοι ἔχω πᾶσαν, ὅτι ἡξίωσάς με συμπανηγυρίσαι σοι, καὶ ἰδεῖν ἔργα τὰ σά, καὶ τῇ διοικήσει σοῦ συμπαρακολουθῆσαι· ταῦτά με ἐνθυμούμενοι, ταῦτα γράφοντα, ταῦτα ἀναγινώσκοντα καταλάβοι ἂν θάνατος. Did I ever complain of thy government? I was sick when thou wouldest have me to be, and so are others, but I was so willingly. I was poor also at thy appointment, but rejoicing; I never bore any magistracy, or had any dignity, because

* Apud Arrian. lib. iii. cap. v. p. 274.

thou wouldest not have me, and I never desired it. Didst thou ever see me the more dejected or melancholy for this? Have I appeared before thee at any time with a discontented countenance? Was I not always prepared and ready for whatsoever thou requirest? Wilt thou now have me to depart out of this festival solemnity? I am ready to go; and I render thee all thanks for that thou hast honoured me so far as to let me keep the feast with thee, and behold thy works, and observe thy economy of the world. Let death seize upon me no otherwise employed, than thus thinking and writing of such things.—He likewise exhorts

others after this manner: *τόλμησον ἀνα-
[p. 217.]* βλέψας πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι χρῶ μοι λοιπὸν

εἰς ὃ ἂν θέλῃς, ὁμογνωμοῦν σοι, ἴσως εἰμὶ οὐδὲν παραιτοῦμαι τῶν σοι δοκούντων, ὅπου θέλεις ἄγε, ἥν θέλῃς ἐσθῆτα περιδies, ἄρχειν με θέλεις, ιδιωτεύειν, μένειν, φεύγειν, πνεύσθαι, πλουτεῖν; ἐγὼ σοι ὑπὲρ πάντων τούτων πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ὑπολογήσομαι, δείξω τὴν ἐκάστου φύσιν ὅσα ἐστίν. Dare to lift up thine eyes to God and say, Use me hereafter to whatsoever thou pleaseth. I agree, and am of the same mind with thee, indifferent to all things. I refuse nothing that shall seem good to thee. Lead me whither thou pleasest. Let me act what part thou wilt, either of a public or private person, of a rich man or a beggar. I will apologise for thee as to all these things before men. And I will also shew the nature of every one of them.

The same is likewise manifest from their pretensions to look to God, and refer all to him; expecting aid and assistance from him, and placing their confidence in him. Thus also Epictetus,

Ἐγὼ μὲν ἔχω ταύτην ἐπιβολὴν ἀποτελέσαι ἡμᾶς L. ii. c. xix.
λευθέρους, εὐδαιμονοῦντας, εἰς τὸν θεὸν ἀφορῶν [p. 231.]

τας; ἐν παντὶ μικρῇ καὶ μεγάλῃ. My design is this, to render you free and undisturbed, always looking at God, as well in every small as greater matter.—

Again the same Stoic concludes, οὐκ ἔστιν L. ii. c. xvi.
ἄλλως ἐκβαλεῖν λύπην, φόβον, ἐπιθυμίαν, &c. [p. 218.]

εἰ μὴ πρὸς μόνον τὸν θεὸν ἀποβλέποντα, ἐκείνῳ μόνῳ προσ-
κεινονδόντα, τοῖς ἐκείνου προστάγμασι καθωσσωμένον. A

man will never be able otherwise to expel grief, fear, desire, envy, &c. than by looking to God alone, and being devoted to him, and the observance of his commandments.—And he affirmeth of Hercules, that this great piece of piety was so

long since observed by him, τὸν Δία αὐτοῦ L. iii. c. xxiv.
πατέρα ἱκάλει, καὶ πρὸς ἐκείνον ἀφορῶν ἔπραττεν [p. 330.]

ἃ ἔπραττε that as he called Jupiter, or the supreme God, his father, so did he whatsoever he did, looking at him.—Thus M. Antoninus speaketh of a double relation that we all have; one πρὸς τοὺς συμβιοῦντας, to those that live with us;—

and another, πρὸς τὴν θείαν αἰτίαν ἀφ' ἧς συμβ- L. viii. §. 23.
βῆναι πᾶσιν πάντα, to that Divine cause, [sec. 27.
p. 247.]

from which all things happen to all.—As likewise he affirmeth, οὐκ ἀνθρώπινόν τι L. iii. §. 11.
ἔστιν τῆς ἐπὶ τὰ θεῖα συναναφορᾶς εὐπράξεως, [sec. 13.
p. 87.]

that no human thing is well done with-
out a reference to God.—And he excellently ex-

horteth men, ἐνὶ τέρπον, καὶ προσαναπαύον, L. vi. §. 5.

ἢ ἀπὸ πράξεως κοινωνικῆς μεταβαίνειν ἐπὶ [sec. 7.
p. 172.]

πράξιν κοινωνικὴν σὺν μνήμῃ τοῦ Θεοῦ. To be delighted and satisfied with this one thing; in doing one action after another, tending to a common good, or the good of human society; together with the remembrance of God.—Lastly, he

declareth his own confidence in the supreme

Deity in these words; *θαράτῳ τῷ διοικούντι,*
L. vi. §. 8.
[sec. 10.
p. 174.] I trust and rely upon the governor of
 the whole world.

This may be concluded also from their thank-
 ing one supreme God for all, as the author of all
 good, and delightfully celebrating his praises.
 Epictetus declares it to be the duty of a good
 man, *χάριν ἔχειν ὑπὲρ πάντων τῷ θεῷ* to thank God
 for all things.—And elsewhere he speaketh thus :

L. iv. c. vii.
[p. 401.] *εἰ νοῦν εἶχομεν, ἀλλό τι ἔδει ἡμᾶς ποιεῖν, καὶ κοινῇ*
L. i. c. xvi.
[p. 127.] *καὶ ἰδίᾳ, ἢ ὑμνεῖν τὸ θεῖον, καὶ εὐφημεῖν, καὶ ἔπε-*
λρχεσθαι τὰς χεῖρας; οὐκ ἔδει καὶ σκάπτοντας,
καὶ ἀροῦντας, καὶ ἐσθίουντας, ᾄδειν τὸν ὕμνον τὸν
εἰς θεόν; μέγας ὁ θεὸς ὅτι ἡμῖν παρέσχεν ὄργανα ταῦτα, δι' ὧν
τὴν γῆν ἐργασόμεθα· μέγας ὁ θεὸς ὅτι χεῖρας ἔδωκεν, &c.
ὅτι αὐξέσθαι λεληθότως, ὅτι καθιεύδοντας ἀναπνεῖν ταῦτα ἐφ'
ἐκάστου εὐφημεῖν ἔδει, καὶ τὸν μέγιστον καὶ θεότατον ὕμνον
ἰφθυμεῖν, ὅτι τὴν δύναμιν ἔδωκε τὴν παρακολουθητικὴν τού-
των· τί οὖν; &c. εἰ γοῦν ἀηδῶν ἡμῖν, ἐποίησεν τὰ τῆς ἀηδόνος,
εἰ κύκνος, τὰ τοῦ κύκνου, νῦν δὲ λογικός εἰμι, ὑμνεῖν μὲ
δεῖ τὸν θεόν. Had we understanding, what should
 we do else but both publicly and privately
 praise God, bless him, and return thanks to him?
 Ought not they, who dig, plough, and eat, con-
 tinually sing such a hymn to God as this; Great
 is that God, who gave us these organs to cul-
 tivate the earth withal; great is that God,
 who gave us hands, &c. who enabled us to grow
 indiscernibly, to breathe in our sleep. But the
 greatest and divinest hymn of all is this, to praise
 God for the faculty of understanding all these
 things. What then if for the most part men be
 blinded, ought there not to be some one, who
 should perform this office, and sing a hymn to

God for all? If I were a nightingale, I would perform the office of a nightingale; or a swan, that of a swan: but now, being a reasonable creature, I ought to celebrate and sing aloud the praises of God, that is, of the supreme Deity.

Lastly, the same is evident from their invoking the supreme God as such, addressing their devotions to him alone without the conjunction of any other gods; and particularly imploring his assistance against the assaults of temptations, L. ii. c. xviii. [apud Arrian. p. 226.] called by them fancies. To this purpose is that of Epictetus, μέγας ὁ ἀγών

ἔστι, θεῶν τὸ ἔργον, ὑπὲρ βασιλείας, ὑπὲρ ἐλευθερίας, τοῦ θεοῦ μέμνησο, ἐκείνον ἐπικαλοῦ βοηθὸν καὶ παραστάτην, ὡς τοὺς Διοσκόρους ἐν χειμῶνι οἱ πλείοντες. This is a great conflict or contention, a Divine enterprise; it is for liberty and for a kingdom. Now remember the supreme God; call upon him as thy helper and assistant, as the mariners do upon Castor and Pollux in a tempest.—He commends also this form of devotional address, or Divine ejaculation, which was part of Cleanthes's litany, to be used frequently upon occasion, Ἄγου δὴ με, ὦ Ζεῦ, καὶ σὺ ἡ πεπρωμένη ὅποι ποθ' (ὕμιν) εἰμὶ διατεταγμένος, ὡς ἔφομαι γε ἄοκνος· ἦν δέ γε μὴ θέλω, οὐδὲν ἤττον ἔφομαι. Lead me, O Jupiter, and thou Fate, whithersoever I am by you destined; and I will readily and cheerfully follow; who, though I were never so reluctant, yet must needs follow.—Where Jupiter and Fate are really but one and the same supreme Deity, under two Ep. 106. [edit. tom. ii. oper. p. 402.] several names. And therefore the sense of this devotional ejaculation was no

* Vide Arrian. lib. iii. cap. xxvi. p. 366.

less truly and faithfully than elegantly thus rendered by Seneca :

Duc me parens, celsique dominator poli,
Quocunque placuit, nulla parendi est mora,
Assum impiger : fac molle, comitabor gemens,
Malusque patiar, quod pati licuit bono.

But because many are so extremely unwilling to believe, that the Pagans ever made any religious address to the supreme God as such, we shall here set down an excellent and devout hymn of the same Cleanthes to him ; the rather, because it hath been but little taken notice of. And, the more to gratify the reader, we shall subjoin an elegant translation thereof into Latin verse, which he must owe to the muse of my learned friend Dr. Duport.

Steph. Poes.
Philos. p. 49.
[ex Stobæi
Bolog. Physic.]

Κύδιον' Ἀθανάτων, σπουδαίνουμε, παγκρατὲς αἰὲ,
Ζεὺς, φύσεως ἀρχὴν, νόμον πάντα κυβερνῶν,
Χαῖρε·—Σὲ γὰρ πᾶσι θέμις θνητοῖσι προσευδᾶν·
Ἐν τοῦ γὰρ γένος ἱσμεν, ἔχου μίσημα λαχόντες
Μῶτον, ὅσα ζῶσι τε καὶ ἔσται θνῶτ' ἐπὶ γαῖαν·
Τῷ δὲ καθυμνεῖται καὶ σὺν κράτος αἰὲν ἀείναι.
Σοὶ δὲ πᾶς οὗτος κόσμος ἑλισσόμενος περὶ γαῖαν
Παίδεται, ἥ καὶ ἄγχι, καὶ ἑκὼν ὑπὸ σοῦ κρατίζεται.
Τοῖς ἔχεις ὑπερβολὴν ἀπείρου ἐνὶ χερσὶν
Ἀμφότα, πυρόντα, δειζόντα κεραιῶν·
Τῷ γὰρ ὑπὸ πλόης φύσεως πάντα ἑρέμονται,
Ὅτι σὺ παντοδύνης κισθὲν λόγῳ, ὅς διὰ πάντων
Θαυτῇ μινύμενος·
Ὅς τίς ποτε γεγαῶς ὑπατος βασιλεὺς διὰ πατρίδος
Οὐδὲ τι γίγνεται ἔργον ἐπὶ χροῖ σὺ δίχα, θέλω,·
Οὐτα κατ' αἰθέριον οὐρανὸν πόλιν, οὐτ' ἐπὶ πύργῳ,
Πλὴν ὅπου μίξουσιν ἡλαὶ σφετέρων ἀνάλαις·
Καὶ ποταμοὶ τὰ ἄκρομα καὶ οὐ φίλα σοὶ φίλα ἱερῶν.
Ὡς γὰρ εἰς τὴν πάντα συνέχευμας ἱερὰ καυέουσιν,
Ἄποδ' ἔτα χροῖσθαι πάντων λόγῳ αἰὲν ἔόντων.
Ὅν φέροντες ἑῶσι σοὶ θνητῶν καλοὶ εἰσιν,
Δύσμοροι, ὅττ' ἀγαθὸν μὲν αἰὲν κτῆσις ἀποδόντες,
Οὐτ' ἱσχυῶσι θεῷ κινῆν τιμῇ, οὐτε κλύουσιν
Ὅτι καὶ ἀπὸ θύμῳ σὺν τῷ βίῳ ἱσθλὸς ἔχεται

Ἀντὶ δ' αὖ ἐγμῶσιν ἄνω καλοῦ ἄλλας ἐν' ἄλλα
 Οἱ μὲν ὑπὲρ βῆχης σκυυλὸν δυσέχριστον ἔχοντες,
 Οἱ δ' ἐπὶ καρδοσύνης τετραμμένοι οἰδὲν κίσσῳ.
 Ἄλλω δ' αἰς ἀποσιν, καὶ σώματος ἰδία ἔργα,
 Ἄλλὰ Ζεὺς πάντας, καλαστέφεις, ἀρχαίεσσιν,
 Ἀνθρώπων βίῳ ἀπιροσύνης ἀπὸ λυγρῆς,
 Ἦν σὺ πάτερ σάδασον ἰσχυρῆς ἄνω, δις δὲ κυρῶσαι
 Γνώμης, ἥ πῶτοντος σὺ δίκης μετὰ πάντα κυβερῶς·
 Ὅφρ' ἂν τιμωθέντες ἀμειβόμεσθα σε τιμῇ,
 Ὑμνοῦντες τὰ σὸ ἔργα διπλοῦς, ὡς ἐπείκου
 Θῆκεν ἰόντ'· ἰσχυροῦντι βρονταῖς γέρας ἄλλοτε μύζῃσιν,
 Οὔτε Στωρ, ἢ κενὸν δαί ὧμον ἐν δίκῃ ὑμνοῦν·

Magne pater divum, cui nomina multa, sed una
 Omnipotens semper virtus, tu Jupiter autor
 Naturæ, certa qui singula lege gubernas!
 Rex salve. Te nemp̄ licet mortalibus ægris
 Cunctis compellare; omnes tua namque propago
 Nos sumus, æternæ quasi imago vocis et echo
 Tantum, quotquot humi spirantes repimus; ergo
 Te cantabo, tuum et robur sine fine celebrans.
 Quippe tuo hic totus, terram qui circuit, orbis
 Paret (quoquo agis) imperio, ac obtemperat ultro
 Invictis totum manibus tibi tale ministrum,
 Anceps, ignitum, haud moriturum denique fulmen.
 Ictu etenim illius tota et natura tremiscit;
 Illo et communem rationem dirigis, et quæ
 Mundi agitat molem, magno se corpore miscens:
 Tantus tu rerum dominus, rectorque supremus.
 Nec sine te factum in terris, Deus, aut opus ullum,
 Æthere nec dio fit, nec per cœrula ponti,
 Errore acta suo, nisi quæ gens impia patrat.
 Confusa in sese tu dirigis ordine certo;
 Auspice te ingratas et inest sua gratia rebus;
 Fœlice harmonia, tu scilicet, omnia in unum
 Sic bona mixta malis compingis, ut una resurgat
 Cunctorum ratio communis et usque perennans:
 Quam refugit, spernitque hominum mens læva malorum.
 Heu miseri! bona qui quæerunt sibi semper et optant,
 Divinam tamen hanc communem et denique legem,
 Nec spectare oculis, nec fando attendere curant:
 Cui si parerent poterant traducere vitam
 Cum ratione et mente bonam: nunc sponte feruntur
 In mala præcipites, trahit et sua quemque voluptas.
 Hunc agit ambitio, laudisque immensa cupido,
 Illum et avarities, et amor vesanus habendi,
 Blanda libido alium, venerisque licentia dulcis;

Sic alio tendunt alii in diversa ruentes.
 At tu, Jupiter alme, tonans in nubibus atris,
 Da sapere, et mentem miseris mortalibus aufer
 Insanam, hanc tu pelle pater; da apprehendere posse
 Consilium, fretus quo tu omnia rite gubernas:
 Nos ut honorati pariter, tibi demus honorem,
 Perpetuis tua facta hymnis præclara canentes,
 Ut fas est homini; nec enim mortalibus ullum,
 Nec superis, majus poterit contingere donum,
 Quam canere æterno communem carmine legem.

xxvi. It would be endless now to cite all the testimonies of other philosophers and Pagan writers of latter times, concerning one supreme and universal Numen. Wherefore we shall content ourselves only to instance in some of the most remarkable, beginning with M. Tull. Cicero; whom though some would suspect to have been a sceptic as to Theism, because in his *De Natura Deorum* he brings in Cotta the academic, as well opposing Q. Lucil. Balbus the Stoic, as C. Velleius the Epicurean; yet from sundry other places of his writings, it sufficiently appears, that he was a dogmatic and hearty Theist; as for example, this in his second book *De Divin*:^a “*Esse præstantem aliquam æternamque naturam, et eam suspiciendam admirandamque hominum generi, pulchritudo mundi, ordoque rerum cælestium cogit confiteri*,” that there is some most excellent and eternal nature, which is to be admired and honoured by mankind, the pulchritude of the world, and the order of the heavenly bodies compel us to confess.—And this in his oration *De haruspicum responsis*:^b “*Quis est tam vecors, qui cum suspexerit in cælum, Deos esse non sentiat, et ea quæ tanta mente fiunt, ut vix quisquam arte*

^a Cap. lxxii. p. 3255. tom. ix. oper.

^b Cap. x. p. 2333. tom. v. oper.

ulla, ordinem rerum ac vicissitudinem persequi possit, casu fieri putet?" Who is so mad or stupid, as when he looks up to heaven, is not presently convinced, that there are gods? or can persuade himself, that those things, which are made with so much mind and wisdom, as that no human skill is able to reach and comprehend the artifice and contrivance of them, did all happen by chance?—To which purpose more places will be afterwards cited. However, in his philosophic writings it is certain, that he affected to follow the way of the new academy, set on foot by Carneades; that is, to write sceptically, partly upon prudential accounts, and partly for other reasons intimated by himself in these words:

"Qui requirunt quid quaque de re ipsi De N. D. l. i. [cap. v. p. 2866.] sentiamus curiosius id faciunt quam necesse est. Non enim tam autoritatis in disputando quam rationis momenta quaerenda sunt. Quinetiam obest plerumque iis, qui discere volunt, auctoritas eorum, qui se docere profitentur. Desinunt enim suum iudicium adhibere, idque habent ratum, quod ab eo, quem probant, iudicatum vident:" they who would needs know, what we ourselves think concerning every thing, are more curious than they ought, because philosophy is not so much a matter of authority as of reason; and the authority of those, who profess to teach, is oftentimes a hinderance to the learners, they neglecting by that means to use their own judgment, securely taking that for granted, which is judged by another whom they value.—Nevertheless, Cicero in the close of this discourse *De Natura Deorum* (as St. Austin* also observeth)

* De Civitate Dei, lib. iv. cap. xxx. p. 88. tom. vii. oper.

plainly declares himself to be more propense and inclinable to the doctrine of Balbus, than either that of Velleius or Cotta; that is, though he did not assent to the Stoical doctrine or theology in every point (himself being rather a Platonist than a Stoic), yet he did much prefer it before, not only the Epicureism of Velleius, but also the scepticism of Cotta. Wherefore Augustinus Steuchus, and other learned men, quarrel with sundry passages of Cicero's upon another account, not as Atheistical, but as seeming to favour a multitude of independant gods; he sometimes attributing not only the government of the world, and the making of mankind, but also the first constitution and fabric of the whole world, to gods plurally. As when he writeth thus: "Ut perpetuus mundi esset ornatus, magna adhibita cura est a providentia deorum:" for the perpetual adorning of the world, great care hath been taken by the providence of the gods.—And "a diis immortalibus hominibus provisum esse," &c. that the immortal gods have provided for the convenience of mankind, appears from the very fabric and figure of them.—And that place before cited, De N. D. 225. "Dico igitur providentia deorum mundum et omnes mundi partes initio constitutas esse;" I say, that the world and all its parts were at first constituted by the providence of the gods.—And, lastly, where he states the controversy of that book De N. D. thus: "Utrum dii nihil agant, nihil moliantur? An contra ab his et a principio omnia facta, et constituta sint, et ad infinitum tempus regantur atque moveantur?" Whether the gods do nothing at all,

De N. D. 225.

P. 195. Lamb.

^b De Natur. Deor. lib. iii.

but are void of care and trouble? Or whether all things were at first made and constituted, and ever since are moved and governed, by them?—Notwithstanding which, it is evident, that this learned orator and philosopher plainly acknowledged the monarchy of the whole, or one supreme and universal Numen over all. And that first from his so often using the word God in the singular, emphatically and by way of eminency; as “*Ipsi Deo nihil minus gratum, quam non omnibus patere ad se placandum et colendum viam:*” Nothing can be less grateful to God himself, than that there should not be a liberty open to all (by reason of the costliness of sacrifices) to worship and appease him;—and—“*Nisi juvante Deo, tales non fuerant Curius, Fabricius,*” &c. Curius and Fabricius had never been such men as they were, had it not been for the Divine assistance.—Again, “*Commoda, quibus utimur, lucemque qua fruimur, spiritalisque quem ducimus, a Deo nobis dari atque impertiri videmus.*” We must needs acknowledge, that the benefits of this life, the light which we enjoy, and the spirit which we breathe, are imparted to us from God.—And, to mention no more, in his version of Plato’s *Ti-mæus*, “*Deos alios in terra, alios in luna, alios in reliquis mundi partes spargens Deus quasi serebat;*” God distributing gods to all the parts of the world, did as it were sow some gods in the earth, some in the moon, &c.—Moreover, by his making such descriptions of God as plainly imply his oneness and singularity, as in his *Orat. pro Mi-*

2 Leg. p. 335.
[cap. x. p. 335.
tom. ix. oper.]

D. N. D. l. ii.
[cap. lxvi. p.
3048.]

Pro S. Ros.
[cap. xlv. p.
449. tom. iii.
oper.]

P. 556. Lamb. lone: "Est, est profecto illa vis; neque
[cap. xxxi. p.
2826. tom iii.
oper.]

litate nostra, inest quiddam, quod vigeat et sentiat, et non inest in hoc tanto naturæ tamque præclaro motu. Nisi forte idcirco esse non putant, quia non apparet nec cernitur: proinde quasi nostram ipsam mentem, qua sapimus, qua providemus, qua hæc ipsa agimus et dicimus, videre, aut plane qualis et ubi sit, sentire possumus." There is, there is certainly such a Divine force in the world; neither is it reasonable to think, that in these gross and frail bodies of ours there should be something which bath life, sense, and understanding, and yet no such thing in the whole universe; unless men will therefore conclude, that there is none, because they see it not: as if we could see our own mind (whereby we order and dispose all things, and whereby we reason and speak thus), and perceive what kind of thing it is, and where it is lodged.—Where, as there is a strong asseveration of the existence of a God, so is his singularity plainly supplied, in that he supposes him to be one mind or soul acting and governing the whole world, as our mind doth our body. Again, in his Tusculan Questions, "Nec vero deus ipse alio modo in-

L. i. p. 126
[cap. xxvii. p.
2604. tom.
viii. oper.]

telligi potest, nisi mens soluta quædam, et libera, segregata ab omni concretionem mortali, omnia sentiens et movens." Neither can God himself be understood by us otherwise than as a certain loose and free Mind, segregated from all mortal concretion, which both perceives and moves all things.—So

Tusc. Q. L. i. again in the same book, "Hæc igitur et
p. 126. [cap.
xxix. p. 2606.] alia innumerabilia cum cernimus, possumusne dubitare, quin his præsit aliquis

vel effector, si hæc nata sunt ut Platoni videtur; vel si semper fuerint, ut Aristoteli placet, moderator tanti operis et muneris?" When we behold these and other wonderful works of nature, can we at all doubt, but that there presideth over them, either one maker of all, if they had a beginning, as Plato conceiveth; or else, if they always were as Aristotle supposeth, one moderator and governor? And in the third *De Legibus*, "Sine imperio nec domus ulla, nec civitas, nec gens, nec hominum universum genus stare, nec rerum natura omnis, nec ipse mundus potest. Nam et hic deo paret, et huic obediunt maria terræque, et hominum vita jussis supremæ legis obtemperat:" Without government, neither any house, nor city, nor nation, nor mankind in general, nor the whole nature of things, nor the world itself, could subsist. For this also obeyeth God, and the seas and earth are subject to him, and the life of man is disposed of by the commands of the supreme law.—Elsewhere he speaks of "Dominans ille nobis Deus, qui nos vetat hinc injussu suo demigrare," that God, who rules over all mankind, and forbids them to depart hence without his leave; of "Deus, cujus numini parent omnia;" that God, whose Divine power all things obey.—We read also in Cicero of "summus" or "supremus Deus," the supreme God—to whom the first making of man is properly imputed by him; of "summi rectoris et domini Nomen," the Divine power of the supreme Lord and governor;—of "Deus præpotens," and "rerum omnium præpotens Ju-

P. 343. [cap. i.
p. 3389. tom.
ix. oper.]

Tusc. Q. i. l.
[cap. xxx. p.
2609.]

De Div.
[lib. i. cap.
i. iii. p. 5127.
tom. ix. oper.]

piter^a:" the most powerful God, and Jupiter,
 who hath power over all things;—of "*Princeps*
ille Deus, qui omnem hunc mundum
regit, sicut animus humanus id corpus
cui præpositus est;" that chief or prin-
 cipal God, who governs the whole world
 in the same manner as a human soul go-
 verneth that body which it is set over.—Where-
 fore, as for those passages before objected, where
 the government of the world, as to the concern-
 ments of mankind at least, is ascribed by Cicero
 to gods plurally, this was done by him and other
 Pagans, upon no other account but only this;
 because the supreme God was not supposed by
 them to do all things himself immediately in the
 government of the world, but to assign certain
 provinces to other inferior gods, as ministers un-
 der him; which therefore sharing in the eco-
 nomy of the world, were looked upon as co-go-
 vernors thereof with him. Thus when Balbus in
 Cicero, to excuse some seeming defect of Provi-
 dence, in the prosperities of wicked and the ad-
 versities of good men, pretended, "*non animad-*
vertere omnia. Deos, ne reges quidem;" that the
 gods did not attend to all things, as neither do
 kings;—Cotta amongst other things re-
 plied thus: "*Fac divinam mentem esse*
distentam, cælum versantem, terram tu-
entem, maria moderantem, cur tam multos deos
nihil agere et cessare patitur? Cur non rebus hu-
manis aliquos otiosos deos præfecit, qui a te,
Balbe, innumerabiles explicati sunt?" Should it
 be granted, that the Divine Mind (or supreme

Somm. Scip.
[cap. iv. p.
3977.] de
Leg. [lib. i.
cap. vii. p.
3304.]

De N. D. l. iii.
[cap. xxxix.
p. 3107. tom.
ix. oper.]

^a De Divinat. lib. ii. cap. xviii. p. 3204. tom. ix. oper.

^b Vide Somnium Scipion. cap. iii. p. 3973. tom. x. oper.

Deity) were distracted with turning round the heavens, observing the earth, and governing the seas, yet why does he let so many other gods to do nothing at all? Or why does he not appoint some of those idle gods over human affairs, which, according to Balbus and the Stoics, are innumerable?—Again, when the immortal gods are said by Cicero to have provided for the convenience of mankind in their first constitution, this doubtless is to be understood according to the Platonic hypothesis, that the gods and demons being first made by the supreme God, were set at work and employed by him afterward in the making of man and other mortal animals. And, lastly, as to that, which hath the greatest difficulty of all in it, when the whole world is said by Cicero to have been made by the providence of the gods, this must needs be understood also of those eternal gods of Plato's, according to whose likeness or image the world and man are said to have been made; that is, of the trinity of Divine hypostases called by Amelius Plato's three minds and three kings, and by others of the Platonists, the first and second and third god, and the *τὸ πρῶτον αἶτιον*, and *τὸ δεύτερον αἶτιον*, &c. the first and second cause, &c. And, it may be here observed, what we learn from St. Cyril, that some Pagans endeavoured to justify this language and doctrine of theirs, even from the Mosiac writings themselves; *Contra Jul. L. i.*
θεοὺς ἑτέροις ὑποτοπήσαντες τὸν τῶν ὅλων φᾶναι
θεόν, ποιῶμεν ἄνθρωπον κατ' εἰκόνα ἡμετέραν καὶ καθ'
ὁμοίωσιν, they suspecting, that the God of the universe, being about to make man, did there bespeak the other gods (*τοῖς μεθ' ἑαυτὸν δευτέροις καὶ ἐν μέοσιν οὔσι*, which were secondary and inferior to him),

after this manner, "Let us make man according to our own image and likeness"—which St. Cyril and other Christian writers understand of the Trinity. Now those eternal gods of Plato, according to whose image the world and man are said by him to have been made, and which (though one of them was properly called the Demiturgus) yet had all an influence and causality upon the making of it, were (as hath been already observed) not so many independant and self-originated deities, but all derived from one first Principle. And therefore Cicero following Plato in this is not to be suspected, upon that account, to have been an assertor of many independent gods, or partial creators of the world; especially since, in so many other places of his writings, he plainly owns a Divine monarchy.

We pass from M. Tullius Cicero to M. Terentius Varro his equal, a man famous for polymathy or multifarious knowledge, and reputed unquestionably (though not the most eloquent, yet) the most learned of all the Romans, at least as to antiquity. He wrote one-and-forty books concerning the antiquities of human and Divine things; wherein he transcended the Roman pontifices themselves, and discovered their ignorance as to many points of their religion. In which books he distinguished three kinds of theology, the first mythical or fabulous, the second physical or natural, and the last civil or popular: the first being most accommodate to the theatre or stage; the second to the world, or the wiser men in it; the third to cities or the generality of the civilized vulgar. Which was agreeable also to the doctrine of Scævola, that learned pontifex, concerning

three sorts of gods, poetical, philosophical, and political. As for the mythical and poetical theology, it was censured after this manner by Varro:

"In eo sunt multa contra dignitatem et naturam immortalium ficta. In hoc enim est, ut deus alius ex capite, alius ex femore sit, alius ex guttis sanguinis natus. In hoc ut dii furati sint, ut adulteraverint, ut servierint homini: Denique, in hoc omnia diis attribuuntur, quæ non modo in hominem, sed etiam in contemptissimum hominem cadere possunt." That, according to the literal sense, it contained many things contrary to the dignity and nature of immortal beings; the genealogy of one god being derived from the head, of another from the thigh, of another from drops of blood: some being represented as thieves, others as adulterers, &c. and all things attributed to the gods therein, that are not only incident to men, but even to the most contemptible and flagitious of them.—And as for the second, the natural theology, which is the true, this Varro conceived to be above the capacity of vulgar citizens; and that therefore it was expedient, there should be another theology calculated, more accommodate for them, and of a middle kind betwixt the natural and the fabulous, which is that which is called civil. For he affirmed, "multa esse vera, quæ vulgo scire non sit utile, et quædam, quæ tametsi falsa sint, aliter existimare populum expediat;" that there were many things true in religion, which it was not convenient for the vulgar to know; and again, some things, which, though false, yet it was expedient they should be believed by them.—As Scævola, the

Aug. de Civ.
D. l. vi. c. v.
[p. 116. tom.
vii. oper.]

Aug. Civ. D.
l. iv. c. xxxi.
[p. 87.]

Roman pontifex, in like manner, would not have the vulgar to know, that the true God had neither sex, nor age, nor bodily members. "Expedire igitur existimat (saith St. Austin of him)

Civ. D. l. iv.
c. xxvii.
[p. 84.] falli in religione civitates, quod dicere etiam in libris rerum divinarum ipse Varro non dubitat." Scævola therefore

judgeth it expedient, that cities should be deceived in their religion; which also Varro himself doubteth not to affirm in his books of Divine Things.—Wherefore this Varro, though disapproving the fabulous theology, yet out of a pious design, as he conceived, did he endeavour to assert, as much as he could, the civil theology then received amongst the Romans, and to vindicate the same from contempt: yet nevertheless so, as that "si eam civitatem novam constitueret, ex naturæ

Civ. D. l. iv.
c. xxxi.
[p. 87.] potius formula, deos et deorum nomina se fuisse dedicaturum, non dubitet confiteri;" if he were to constitute a new

Rome himself, he doubts not to confess, but that he would dedicate gods and the names of gods after another manner, more agreeably to the form of nature or natural theology.—Now what Varro's own sense was concerning God, he freely declared in those books of Divine Things; that he was the great soul and mind of the whole world. Thus

Civ. D. l. iv.
c. ix. [cap.
xxxii. p. 87.] St. Austin, "Hi soli Varroni videntur animadvertisse quid esset deus, qui crederunt eum esse animam, motu ac ratione mundum gubernantem:" These alone seem

to Varro to have understood what God is, who believed him to be a soul, governing the whole world by motion and reason.—So that Varro plainly asserted one supreme and universal Numen, he erring only in this (as St. Austin con-

ceives) that he called him a soul, and not the creator of soul, or a pure and abstract mind. But as Varro acknowledged one universal Numen, the whole animated world, or rather the soul thereof, which also he affirmed to be called by several names, as in the earth, Tellus; in the sea, Neptune, and the like: so did he also admit (together with the rest of the Pagans) other particular gods, which were to him nothing but parts of the world animated with superior souls to men: "A Civ. D. l. vii. c. vi. [p. 129.] summo circuitu cœli, usque ad circulum lunæ, æthereas animas esse astra ac stellas, eosque cœlestes deos, non modo intelligi esse, sed etiam videri: inter lunæ vero gyrum et nimborum cacumina æthereas esse animas, sed eas animo non oculis videri; et vocari heroas, et lares, et genios:" That from the highest circuit of the heavens to the sphere of the moon there are ethereal souls or animals, the stars which are not only understood, but also seen to be celestial gods; and between the sphere of the moon and the middle region of the air, there are æreal souls or animals, which though not seen by our eyes, yet are discovered by our mind, and called heroes, lares, and genii.—So that, according to Varro, the only true natural gods were, as himself also determined, "anima mundi, ac partes ejus;" first, the great Soul and Mind of the whole world, which comprehendeth all; and, secondly, the parts of the world animated superior to men. Which gods also he affirmed to be worshipped *castius*, more purely and chastely, without images, as they were by the Romans for one hundred and seventy years: he concluding "qui primi simulacra deorum populi posuerunt, eos civitatibus suis et metum dempsisse et

De Civ. D.
l. iv. c. xxii.
[p. 87.]

errorem addidisse; prudenter existimans (saith St. Austin) deos facile posse in simulachrorum stoliditate contemui;" that those nations, who first set up images of the gods, did both take away fear from their cities, and add error to them; he wisely judging, that the foppery of images would easily render their gods contemptible.

L. Annæus Seneca, the philosopher, was contemporary with our Saviour Christ and his apostles, who, though frequently acknowledging a plurality of gods, did nevertheless plainly assert one Supreme, he not only speaking of him singularly, and by way of eminency, but also plainly describing him as such; as when he calls him "Formatorem universi; rectorem et arbitrum et

Nat. Q. l. ii.
c. xlv. [p.
537. tom. ii.
oper.]

custodem mundi; ex quo suspensa sunt omnia; animum ac spiritum universi; mundani hujus operis dominum et artificem; cui nomen omne convenit; ex quo nata sunt omnia; cujus spiritu vivimus; totum suis partibus inditum, et se sustentem suavi; cujus consilio huic mundo providetur, ut inconcussus eat, et actus suos explicet; cujus decreto omnia fiunt; divinum spiritum per omnia maxima et minima æquali intentione diffusum; deum potentem omnium; deum illum

P. 442. Lips.

maximum potentissimumque, qui ipse vehit omnia; qui ubique et omnibus præsto est; cæli et deorum omnium deum; a quo ista numina, quæ singula adoramus et colimus, suspensa sunt:" and the like. The framer and former of the universe, the governor, disposer, and keeper thereof; him, upon whom all things depend; the mind and spirit of the world; the artificer and lord of this whole mundane fabric; to whom every name belongeth; from whom all things spring; by whose

spirit we live; who is in all his parts, and sustaineth himself by his own force; by whose counsel the world is provided for, and carried on in its course constantly and uninterruptedly; by whose decree all things are done; the Divine spirit, that is diffused through all things both great and small with equal intention; the God, whose power extends to all things; the greatest and most powerful God, who doth himself support and uphold all things; who is present every where to all things; the God of heaven, and of all the gods, upon whom are suspended all those other Divine powers, which we singly worship and adore.—Moreover, we may here observe from St. Austin, that this Seneca in a book of his Civ. D. I. vi. c. x. [p. 122.] against superstitions (that is now lost) did not only highly extol the natural theology, but also plainly censure and condemn the civil theology then received amongst the Romans, and that with more freedom and vehemency than Varro had done the fabulous or theatrical and poetical theology. Concerning a great part whereof he pronounced, that a wise man would observe such things, “*tanquam legibus jussa, non tanquam diis grata;*” only as commanded by the laws (he therein exercising civil obedience), but not at all as grateful to the gods.

M. Fabius Quintilianus, though no admirer of Seneca, yet fully agreed with him in the same natural theology, and sets down this as the generally-received notion or definition of God: “*Deum esse spiritum omnibus partibus immis-* L. vii. c. iii. *tum,*” that God is a spirit mingled with and diffused through all the parts of the world;—he from thence inferring Epicurus to be an

Atheist, notwithstanding that he verbally asserted gods, because he denied a God according to this generally-received notion, he bestowing upon his gods a circumscribed human form, and placing them between the worlds. And the junior Pliny, though he were a persecutor of the Christians, he

Ep. 97. concluding, "qualecunque esset quod
[lib. x.] faterentur, pervicaciam certe et inflexibilem obstinationem debere puniri;" that whatsoever their religion were, yet notwithstanding their stubbornness and inflexible obstinacy ought to be punished;—and who compelled many of them to worship the images of the emperor, and to sacrifice and pray to the statues of the Pagan gods, and lastly, to blaspheme Christ; yet himself plainly acknowledged also one supreme universal Numen, as may sufficiently appear from his panegyric oration to Trajan, where he is called "Deus ille, qui manifestus ac præsens cœlum ac sydera insidet;" that God, who is present with, and in-

* And Mundi
parens, and
Parens homi-
num deorum-
que.

habits the whole heaven and stars:—himself making a solemn prayer and supplication to him, both in the beginning and close thereof, and sometimes speaking of him therein singularly and in way of eminency, as in these words: "Occultat utrorumque semina Deus, et plerumque bonorum malorumque causæ sub diversa specie latent:" God hideth the seeds of good and evil, so that the causes of each often appear disguised to men.—L. Apuleius also, whose pretended miracles the Pagans endeavoured to confirm their religion by,* as well as they did by those of Apollonius, doth in sundry

* Vide Augustin. Epist. cxxviii, p. 317. tom. ii. oper.

places of his writings plainly assert one supreme and universal Numen: we shall only here set down one: "Cum summus deorum De Philos. p. 278. Colo. cuncta hæc non solum cogitationum ratione consideret; sed prima, media, et ultima obeat; compertaque intimæ providentiæ ordinationis universitate et constantia regat:" Since the highest of the gods does not only consider all these things in his mind and cogitation, but also pass through and comprehend within himself the beginning, middle, and end of all things, and constantly govern all by his occult providence. Lastly, Symmachus, who was a zealous stickler for the restitution of Paganism, declared the Pagans to worship one and the same God with the Christians, but in several ways; he conceiving, that there was no necessity God should be worshipped by all after the same manner. "Æquum est, quicquid omnes colunt, UNUM putari: eadem spectamus astra; commune cælum est; idem nos mundus involvit; quid interest, qua quisque prudentia verum requirat? Uno itinere non potest perveniri ad tam grande secretum." We ought in reason to think, that it is one and the same thing, which all men worship; as we all behold the same stars, have the same common heaven, and are involved within the same world. Why may not men pursue one and the same thing in different ways? One path is not enough to lead men to so grand a secret.—The scene whereof is thus elegantly expressed by Prudentius:

Uno omnes sub sole siti, vegetamur eodem
Aëre, communis cunctis viventibus aura.

P. 285. [Contra Symmachum lib. ii. ver. 85.]

Sed quid sit qualisque dens, diversa secuti
 Querimus, atque viis longe distantibus unum
 Imus ad occultum; suus est mos cuique genti,
 Per quod iter properans eat ad tam grande profundum.

P. 308.

[ver. 842.] And again afterward,

Secretum sed grande nequit rationis opertæ
 Quæri aliter, quam si sparsis via multiplicetur
 Tramitibus, et centenos terat orbita calles,
 Quæsitura deum variata indage latentem.

And the beginning of Prudentius's confutation
 is this,

* Longe aliud verum est. Nam multa ambago viarum
 Anfractus dubios habet, et perplexius errat.
 Sola errore caret simplex via, nescia flecti
 In diverticulum, bivis nec pluribus anceps, &c.

We shall now instance also in some of the latter
 Greek writers. Though the author of the book
 De Mundo were not Aristotle, yet that he was a
 Pagan, plainly appears from some passages there-
 of; as where he approves of sacrificing to the
 gods, and of worshipping heroes and dead men:
 as also because Apuleius would not otherwise
 have translated so much of that book, and incor-
 porated it into his De Mundo. He therefore does
 not only commend this of Heraclitus, ἐκ πάντων ἐν,
 καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς πάντα, that there is one harmonious system
 made out of all things, and that all things are de-
 rived from one;—but doth himself also write ex-
 cellently concerning the supreme God, whom he

calleth τὴν τῶν ὅλων συνεκτικὴν αἰτίαν, the
 cause, which containeth all things—and
 τὸ τοῦ κόσμου κυριώτατον, the best and most

C. vi. [p. 858.
 tom. i. oper.
 Aristot.]

excellent part of the world ;—he beginning after this manner: Ἀρχαῖος μὲν οὖν τις λόγος καὶ πατριός ἐστι πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις, ὡς ἐκ θεοῦ τὰ πάντα, καὶ διὰ θεοῦ ἡμῖν συνέστηκε· οὐδεμία δὲ φύσις, αὐτὴ καθ' ἑαυτὴν αὐτάρκης, ἐρημωθείσα τῆς ἐκ τούτου σωτηρίας· It is an ancient opinion or tradition, that hath been conveyed down to all men from their progenitors, that all things are from God, and consist by him ; and that no nature is sufficient to preserve itself, if left alone, and devoid of the Divine assistance and influence.—Where we may observe, that the Apuleian Latin version, altering the sense, renders the words thus : “ Vetus opinio est, atque in cogitationes omnium hominum penitus incidit, Deum esse : originis non habere auctorem ; Deumque esse salutem et perseverantiam earum, quas effecerit, rerum.” So that whereas, in the original Greek, this is said to be the general opinion of all mankind, That all things are from God, and subsist by him, and that nothing at all can conserve itself in being without him ;—Apuleius, correcting the words, makes the general sense of mankind to run no higher than this ; “ That there is a God, who hath no author of his original, and who is the safety and preservation of all those things, that were made by himself. From whence it may be probably concluded, that Apuleius, who is said to have been of Plutarch's progeny, was infected also with those paradoxical opinions of Plutarch's, and consequently did suppose all things not to have been made by God, nor to have depended on him (as the writer De Mundo affirmeth), but that there was something besides God, as namely the matter and an evil principle, uncreated and self-existent. Afterwards the same writer De Mundo elegantly

illustrates, by similitudes, how God, by one simple motion and energy of his own, without any labour or toil, doth produce and govern all the variety of motions in the universe; and how he doth *συνέχειν τὴν τῶν ὅλων ἁρμονίαν τε καὶ σωτηρίαν*, contain the harmony and safety of the whole.—And, lastly, he

concludes, *ὅπερ ἐν νηὶ κυβερνήτης, ἐν ἄρματι δὲ ἡνίοχος, ἐν χορῷ κορυφαῖος, ἐν πόλει νόμος, ἐν στρατοπέδῳ ἡγεμὼν, τοῦτο θεὸς ἐν κόσμῳ*, that what a pilot is to a ship, a charioteer to a chariot, the Coryphæus to a choir, law to a city, and a general to an army; the same is God to the world:—there being only this difference, that whereas the government of some of them is toilsome and solicitous, the Divine government and steerage of the world is most easy and facile; for as this writer adds, “God, being himself immoveable, moveth all things; in the same manner as law, in itself immoveable, by moving the minds of the citizens, orders and disposes all things.”

Plutarchus Chæronensis (as hath been already declared) was unluckily engaged in two false opinions, the first of matter's being ingenite or uncreated, upon this pretence, because nothing could be made out of nothing; the second of a positive substantial evil principle, or an irrational soul and demon self-existent, upon this ground, because * *τὴν κακίαν γεγονέναι κατὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ πρόνοιαν, ὥσπερ τὸ φαῦλον ἐπίγραμμα κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ποιητοῦ βούλησιν, πᾶσαν ἐπίνοιαν ἀτοκίας ὑπερβάλλει*: there is no greater absurdity imaginable, than that evil should proceed from the providence of God, as a bad epigram from the will of the poet.—In which respect he was before called by us a Ditheist. Plutarch was

* De Fato, p. 572, tom. ii. oper.

also a worshipper of the many Pagan gods, himself being a priest of the Pythian Apollo. Notwithstanding which, he unquestionably asserted one sole Principle of all good, the cause of all things (evil and matter only excepted,) the framer of the whole world, and maker of all the gods in it; who is therefore often called by him, God, in way of eminency, as when he affirmeth * *ἀεὶ γεωμετρῶν τὸν θεόν*, that God doth always act the geometrician;—that is, do all things in measure and proportion: and again, *πάντα καθ' ἀρμονίαν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ κατασκευάζεσθαι*, that all things are made by God, according to harmony;—and that *ὁ θεὸς ἀρμονικὸς καλεῖται καὶ μουσικὸς*, God is called a harmonist and musician:—and he hath these epithets given him, *ὁ μέγας θεός*, the great God—and *ὁ ἀνωτάτω θεός*, the highest or uppermost God—and *ὁ πρῶτος θεός*, the first God—and *ὁ ἀγέννητος θεός*, the unmade self-existent God;—all the other Pagan gods, according to him, having been made in time, together with the world. He is likewise styled by Plutarch, *πέλαγος τοῦ καλοῦ*, the sea of pulchritude:—and his standing and permanent duration, without any flux of time, is excellently described by the same writer, in his book concerning the Delphic inscription. Lastly, Plutarch affirmeth, that men generally pray to this supreme God for whatsoever is not in their own power, *ὅσα μὴ παρ' ἡμῶν ἐστὶν, εὐχόμεθα τὸν θεὸν διδόναι*.

Dio Chrysostomus, a sophist, Plutarch's equal, though an acknowledger of many gods, yet nevertheless asserteth *βασιλεύεσθαι τὸ ὅλον*, that p. 199. the whole world is under a kingly power [Ed. Morell.]

* Vide Plutarch. Sympos. lib. viii. Quest. ii. p. 718. tom. ii. oper.

† Vide eund. de Musica, p. 1147. tom. ii. oper.

or monarchy,—he calling the supreme God, some-

P. 210. time, τὸν κοινὸν ἀνθρώπων καὶ θεῶν βασιλέα τε καὶ ἄρχοντα, καὶ πρύτανιν καὶ πατέρα, the common King of gods and men, their governor and father; τὸν πάντων κρατοῦντα θεόν, the God that rules

P. 203. over all; τὸν πρῶτον καὶ μέγιστον θεόν, the first and greatest God; τὸν κορυφαῖον προεστῶτα τῶν ὅλων, καὶ κατευθύνοντα τὸν ἅπαντα οὐρανὸν καὶ κόσμον, &c. the chief President over all things, who orders and guides the whole heaven and

P. 446. world, as a wise pilot doth a ship; τὸν τοῦ ζύμπαντος ἡγεμόνα οὐρανοῦ, καὶ τῆς ὅλης δεσπότην οὐσίας, the Ruler of the whole heaven, and Lord of the whole essence—and the like. And he affirming that there is a natural prolepsis in the

P. 201. minds of men concerning him: Περί δὲ θεῶν τῆς τε καθόλου φύσεως, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦ πάντων ἡγεμόνος, πρῶτον μὲν καὶ ἐν πρώτοις δόξα καὶ ἐπίνοια κοινῇ τοῦ ζύμπαντος ἀνθρωπίνου γένους· ὁμοίως μὲν Ἕλληνας, ὁμοίως δὲ Βαρβάρων, ἀναγκαῖα καὶ ἔμφυτος ἐν παντὶ τῷ λογικῇ γιγνομένη κατὰ φύσιν, ἀνευ θνητοῦ διδασκάλου καὶ μυσταγωγῶ· Concerning the nature of the gods in general, but especially of that supreme Ruler over all, there is an opinion in all human kind, as well Barbarians as Greeks, that is naturally implanted in them as rational beings, and not derived from any mortal teacher.—The meaning whereof is this; that men are naturally possessed with a persuasion, that there is one God, the supreme Governor of the whole world, and that there are also below him, but above men, many other intellectual beings, which these Pagans called gods.

That Galen was no Atheist, and what his religion was, may plainly appear from this one passage out of his third book *De Usu Partium*, to

omit many others : Ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἴσως εἰ ἐπί- P. 402. [cap.
πλεον τοιούτων μνημονεύοιμι βοσκημάτων, οἱ x. tom. ii.
σωφρονοῦντες ὀρθῶς ἂν μοι μέμψοιντο, καὶ μαι- oper. edit. Ba-
σίλει- iii.]

νεῖν φαῖεν ἱερὸν λόγον, ὃν ἐγὼ τοῦ δημιουργήσαντος ἡμᾶς ἕμ-
νον ἀληθινὸν συντίθημι, καὶ νομίζω τοῦτ' εἶναι τὴν ὄντως εὐσε-
βειαν· οὐχὶ εἰ ταύρων ἑκατόμβας αὐτῷ παμπόλλους καταθύ-
σαιμι, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα μυρία μύρα θυμάσαιμι καὶ κασίας, ἀλλ' εἰ
γνοίην μὲν αὐτὸς πρῶτος, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐξηγησαί-
μην, οἷος μὲν ἐστὶ τὴν σοφίαν, οἷος δὲ τὴν δύναμιν, ὅποῖος δὲ
τὴν χρηστότητα· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐθέλειν κοσμεῖν ἅπαντα τὸν ἐνδεχό-
μενον κόσμον καὶ μηδενὶ φθονεῖν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, τῆς τελευτάτης
χρηστότητος ἐγὼ δεῖγμα τίθεμαι, ταύτῃ μὲν ὡς ἀγαθὸς ἡμῖν ὑμ-
νεῖσθαι· τὸ δ' ὡς ἂν μάλιστα κοσμηθεῖη, πᾶν ἐξευρεῖν, ἄκρας
σοφίας· τὸ δὲ καὶ δρᾶσαι πᾶνθ' ὅσα προείλετο, δυνάμειος ἀπτή-
τον. Should I any longer insist upon such brutish
persons as those, the wise and sober might justly
condemn me, as defiling this holy oration, which
I compose as a true hymn to the praise of Him
that made us ; I conceiving true piety and reli-
gion towards God to consist in this, not that I
should sacrifice many hecatombs, or burn much
incense to him, but that I should myself first ac-
knowledge, and then declare to others, how great
his wisdom is, how great his power, and how
great his goodness. For that he would adorn the
whole world after this manner, envying to nothing
that good, which it was capable of, I conclude
to be a demonstration of most absolute goodness,
and thus let him be praised by us as good. And
that he was able to find out, how all things might
be adorned after the best manner, is a sign of the
greatest wisdom in him. And, lastly, to be able to
effect and bring to pass all those things, which he
had thus decreed, argues an insuperable power.

Maximus Tyrius, in the close of his first dis-

sertation, gives us this short representation of his own Theology: Βούλομαι δέ σοι δείξαι τὸ λεγόμενον σαφεστέρα εἰκόνι. Ἐννόει μεγάλην ἀρχὴν καὶ βασιλείαν ἑρῶ- μένην πρὸς μίαν ψυχὴν βασιλέως τοῦ ἀρίστου καὶ πρεσβυτά- του συμπάντων νενευκότων ἐκόντων· ὅρον δὲ τῆς ἀρχῆς οὐχ Ἄλυν ποταμόν, οὐδὲ Ἑλλήσποντον, οὐδὲ τὴν Μαίωτιν, οὐδὲ τὰς ἐπὶ τῷ ὠκεανῷ ἥϊονας, ἀλλὰ οὐρανὸν καὶ γῆν τὸν μὲν ἄνω τὴν δ' ἑνερθε· βασιλεῖα δὲ αὐτὸν δὴ τὸν μέγαν ἀτρεμοῦντα, ὥσπερ νόμον παρέχοντα τοῖς πειθομένοις, σωτηρίαν ὑπάρχουσαν αὐτῶν, καὶ κοινωνοὺς τῆς ἀρχῆς, πολλοὺς μὲν ὁρατοὺς θεοὺς, πολλοὺς δὲ ἀφανεῖς· τοὺς μὲν περὶ τὰ πρόθυρα αὐτὰ εἰλου- μένους, οἷον εἰσαγγελίας τινὰς καὶ βασιλεῖς συγγενεστά- τους, ὁμοτραπέζους αὐτοὺς καὶ συνεσιόους· τοὺς δὲ τούτων ὑπηρέτας, τοὺς δὲ ἔτι τούτων καταδειστέρους· διαδοχὴν ὁρᾷς καὶ τάξιν ἀρχῆς καταβαίνουσιν ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ μέχρι γῆς. I will now more plainly declare my sense by this similitude: imagine in your mind a great and powerful kingdom or principality, in which all the rest freely and with one consent conspire to direct their actions, agreeably to the will and command of one supreme King, the oldest and the best: and then suppose the bounds and limits of this empire not to be the river Halys, nor the Hellespont, nor the Meotian lake, nor the shores of the ocean; but heaven above, and the earth beneath. Here then let that great king sit immove- able, prescribing laws to all his subjects, in which consist their safety and security: the con- sorts of his empire being many, both visible and invisible gods; some of which, that are nearest to him, and immediately attending on him, are in the highest royal dignity, feasting as it were at the same table with him: others again are their ministers and attendants; and a third sort, inferior to them both. And thus you see, how the

order and chain of this government descend down by steps and degrees, from the supreme God to the earth and men.—In which resemblance, we have a plain acknowledgment of one supreme God, the monarch of the whole world, and three subordinate ranks of inferior gods, as his ministers, in the government of the world; whom that writer also calls θεοὺς θεοῦ παῖδας καὶ φίλους, gods, the sons and friends of God.

Aristides, the famous Adrianean sophist and orator, in his first oration or hymn vowed to Jupiter, after he had escaped a great tempest, is so full to the purpose, that nothing can be more: he, after his proem, beginning thus: Ζεὺς τὰ πάντα ἐποίησε, καὶ Διὸς ἐστὶν ἔργα ὅσα ἐστὶ πάντα, καὶ ποταμοὶ, καὶ γῆ, καὶ θάλαττα, καὶ οὐρανός· καὶ ὅσα τούτων μεταξύ ἄνω, καὶ ὅσα ὑπὸ ταῦτα· καὶ θεοὶ καὶ ἄνθρωποι, καὶ ὅσα ψυχὴν ἔχει, καὶ ὅσα εἰς ὄψιν ἀφικνεῖται, καὶ ὅσα δεῖ νοῆσαι λαβεῖν. Ἐποίησε δὲ πρῶτος αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν· οὐ Κρήτης ἐν εὐώδεσιν ἄντροις τραφεῖς· οὐδ' ἐμέλλησεν αὐτὸν Κρόνος καταπιεῖν· οὐτ' ἀντ' ἐκείνου λίθον κατέπιεν, οὐδ' ἐκινδύνευσε Ζεὺς, οὐδὲ μήποτε κινδυνεύσει· οὐδ' ἔστι πρεσβύτερον οὐδὲν Διὸς· οὐ μᾶλλον γε ἢ υἱὲς τε πατέρων πρεσβύτεροι γένοιτ' αὖ, καὶ τὰ γιγνόμενα τῶν ποιούντων· ἀλλ' ὅδε ἐστὶ πρῶτός τε καὶ πρεσβύτατος, καὶ ἀρχηγέτης τῶν πάντων· αὐτὸς ἐξ αὐτοῦ γενόμενος· ὁπότε δὲ ἐγένετο, οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ἀλλ' ἦν τε ἄρα ἐξ ἀρχῆς καὶ ἔσται εἰσαὶ, αὐτοπάτωρ τε καὶ μείζων ἢ ἐξ ἄλλου γεγενέσθαι. Καὶ ὥσπερ τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν ἄρα ἐκ τῆς κεφαλῆς ἔφυσε, καὶ γάμον οὐδὲν προσεδέσθη εἰς αὐτήν, οὕτως ἔτι πρότερον αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ ἐποίησε, καὶ οὐδὲν προσεδέσθη ἑτέρου εἰς τὸ εἶναι· ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τούναντίον πάντα εἶναι αὖ ἐκείνου ἥρξατο, καὶ οὐκ ἔστι χρόνον εἰπεῖν· ὅτε γὰρ χρόνος ἦν πω τότε ὅτε μηδὲ ἄλλο μηδέν· δημιουργοῦ γὰρ ἔργον οὐδὲν ἔστι πρεσβύτερον· οὕτω δὲ ἀρχὴ μὲν ἀπάντων Ζεὺς καὶ ἐκ Διὸς πάντα, ἅτε δὴ ὦν χρόνου τε κρείττων, καὶ οὐδένα

ἔχων τὸν ἀντικείμενον, αὐτός τε ὁμοῦ καὶ ὁ κόσμος ἦν, οὕτω
 ταχὺ πάντα ἐποίησε, ἐποίησε δὲ ὧδε, &c. Jupiter made all
 things, and all things whatsoever exist are the
 works of Jupiter; rivers, and earth, and sea, and
 heaven, and what are between these, and gods and
 men and all animals, whatsoever is perceivable
 either by sense or by the mind. But Jupiter first of

all made himself; for he was not educated
 in the flowery and odoriferous caves of
 Crete, neither was Saturn ever about
 to devour him, nor instead of him did

he swallow down a stone. For Jupiter was never
 in danger, nor will he be ever in danger of any
 thing. Neither is there any thing older than Ju-
 piter, no more than there are sons older than their
 parents, or works than their opificers. But he is
 the first and the oldest, and the prince of all
 things, he being made from himself; nor can it be
 declared when he was made, for he was from the
 beginning, and ever will be his own father, and
 greater than to have been begotten from one an-
 other. As he produced Minerva from his brain,
 and needed no wedlock in order thereunto, so
 before this did he produce himself from himself,
 needing not the help of any other thing for his
 being. But, on the contrary, all things began to be
 from him, and no man can tell the time; since
 there was not then any time when there was no-
 thing else besides, and no work can be older than
 the maker of it. Thus was Jupiter the beginning
 of all things, and all things were from Jupiter,
 who is better than time, which had its beginning
 together with the world.—And again: Ὡς δὲ καὶ θεῶν

ὅσα φύλα ἀπορροήν τῆς Διὸς τοῦ πάντων πατρὸς δυνάμει
 ἕκαστα ἔχει, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς κατὰ τὴν Ὀμήρου σείραν, ἅπαντα

εἰς αὐτὸν διήρτηται, καὶ πάντα ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἐξήπται· ἔρωτά τε καὶ ἀνάγκην δύο τούτῳ συναγωγασάτω καὶ ἰσχυροτάτῳ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις ἐγένησεν, ὅπως αὐτῷ τὰ πάντα συνέχοιεν, &c. ἐποίηι θεοὺς μὲν, ἀνθρώπων ἐπιμελητὰς, ἀνθρώπους δὲ θεῶν θεραπευτὰς τε καὶ ὑπηρέτας, &c. πάντα δὲ πανταχοῦ Διὸς μεστὰ, καὶ ἀπάντων θεῶν ἐνεργεσίαι, Διὸς εἰσιν ἔργον, &c.

All the several kinds of gods are but a defluxion and derivation from Jupiter; and, according to Homer's chain, all things are connected with him and depend upon him. He, amongst the first, produced love and necessity, two the most powerful holders of things together, that they might make all things firmly to cohere. He made gods to be the curators of men, and he made men to be the worshippers and servers of those gods. All things are every where full of Jupiter, and the benefits of all the other gods are his work, and to be attributed to him, they being done in compliance with that order, which he had prescribed them.

It is certain, that all the latter philosophers after Christianity, whether Platonists or Peripatetics, though for the most part they asserted the eternity of the world, yet universally agreed in the acknowledgment of one supreme Deity, the cause of the whole world, and of all the other gods. And as Numenius, Plotinus, Amelius, Porphyrius, Proclus, Damascius, and others, held also a trinity of Divine hypostases, so had some of those philosophers excellent speculations concerning the Deity, as particularly Plotinus; who, notwithstanding that he derived matter and all things from one Divine principle, yet was a contender for many gods. Thus in his book in-

Ex. ii. pp. ix. scribed against the Gnostics: Χρη' ως ἀρισ-
 ο. ix. [p. 207.] τον μὲν αὐτὸν πειρᾶσθαι γίνεσθαι, μὴ μόνον δὲ αὐτὸν
 νομίζειν ἀριστον δύνασθαι γενέσθαι; οὕτω γὰρ οὕτω ἀριστος,
 ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνθρώπους ἄλλους ἀρίστους, ἔτι καὶ δαίμονας ἀγα-
 θούς εἶναι· πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον θεούς, τοὺς τε ἐν τῷδε ὄντας
 κακεῖ βλέποντας· πάντων δὲ μάλιστα τὸν ἡγεμόνα τοῦδε τοῦ
 παντός, ψυχὴν μακαριωτάτην· ἐντεῦθεν δὲ ἤδη καὶ τοὺς νοη-
 τοὺς ὑμνεῖν θεούς, ὑφ' ἅπασιν δὲ ἤδη, τὸν μέγαν τὸν ἐκεῖ βασι-
 λέα· καὶ ἐν τῷ πλήθει μάλιστα τῶν θεῶν, τὸ μέγα αὐτοῦ ἐν-
 δεκνυμένους. Οὐ γὰρ τὸ συστῆλαι εἰς ἓν, ἀλλὰ τὸ δαΐζειν
 πολὺ τὸ θεῖον ὅσον ἔδειξεν αὐτός, τοῦτάστι δύνανται θεοῦ εἰδόν-
 των, ὅταν μένων ὅς ἐστι, πολλοὺς ποιῇ, πάντας εἰς αὐτὸν
 ἀνηρτημένους, καὶ δι' ἐκείνον καὶ παρ' ἐκείνου ὄντας· καὶ ὁ κόσ-
 μος ὅδε δι' ἐκείνου ἐστὶ κακεῖ βλέπει, καὶ πᾶς, καὶ θεῶν ἕκαστος.
 Every man ought to endeavour, with all his might,
 to become as good as may be, but yet not to
 think himself to be the only thing that is good,
 but that there are also other good men in the
 world, and good demons, but much more gods;
 who, though inhabiting this inferior world, yet
 look up to that superior; and, most of all, the
 prince of this universe, that most happy soul.
 From whence he ought to ascend yet higher,
 and to praise those intelligible gods, but above
 all that great King and Monarch; declaring his
 greatness and majesty by the multitude of gods
 which are under him. For this is not the part
 of them, who know the power of God, to contract
 all into one, but to shew forth all that Divinity,
 which himself hath displayed, who, remaining
 one, makes many depending on him; which are
 by him and from him. For this whole world is
 by him, and looks up perpetually to him, as also
 doth every one of the gods in it.—And Themistius,
 the Peripatetic (who was so far from being a

Christian, that, as Petavius probably conjectures, he perstrings our Saviour Christ under the name of Empedocles, for making himself a god), doth not only affirm, that one and the same supreme God was worshipped by Pagans, and the Christians, and all nations, though in different manners; but also, that God was delighted with this variety of religions: *Orat. xii. [p. 156. edit. Hardouin.]*
*Ταύτη νόμιζε γάννυσθαι τῇ ποικιλίᾳ τὸν τοῦ παν-
 τὸς ἀρχηγέτην· ἄλλως Σύρους ἐθέλει πολιτεύεσ-
 θαι, ἄλλως Ἑλληνας, ἄλλως Αἰγυπτίους, καὶ οὐδ' αὐτοὺς
 Σύρους ὁμοίως, ἀλλ' ἤδη κατακεκερμάτισται εἰς μικρά.* The author and prince of the universe seems to be delighted with this variety of worship; he would have the Syrians worship him one way, the Greeks another, and the Egyptians another; neither do the Syrians (or Christians) themselves all agree, they being subdivided into many sects.

We shall conclude, therefore, with this full testimony of St. Cyril, in his first book against Julian: *Ἀπασιν ἐναργές, ὅτι καὶ τοῖς τὰ Ἑλλή-*

P. 23.

*νων φιλοσοφεῖν εἰωθόσιν, ἓνα μὲν ἑδῶκει Θεὸν εἶναι
 συνωμολογεῖν, τὸν τῶν ὅλων δημιουργόν, καὶ πάντων ἐπέ-
 κεινα κατὰ φύσιν αὐτοῖ, νοητούς τε καὶ αἰσθητούς.* It is manifest to all, that amongst those, who philosophize in the Greek way, it is universally acknowledged that there is one God, the maker of the universe, and who is by nature above all things; but that there have been made by him, and produced into generation, certain other gods (as they call them) both intelligible and sensible.

XXVII. Neither was this the opinion of philosophers and learned men only, amongst the Pagans, but even of the vulgar also. Not that we pretend to give an account of all the most sottish

vulgar amongst them, who as they little considered their religion, so probably did they not understand that mystery of the Pagan theology (hereafter to be declared), that many of their gods were nothing but several names and notions of one supreme Deity, according to its various manifestations and effects; but because, as we conceive, this tradition of one supreme God did run current amongst the generality of the Greek and Latin Pagans at least, whether learned or unlearned. For we cannot make a better judgment concerning the vulgar and generality of the ancient Pagans, than from the poets and mythologists, who were the chief instructors of them. Thus Aristotle in his *Politics*, writing of music, judgeth of men's opinions concerning the

gods from the poets: Σκοπεῖν δ' ἐξέστι τὴν
L. viii. c. v. [p. 607.] tom. iii. oper.] ὑπόληψιν ἣν ἔχομεν περὶ τῶν θεῶν, οὐ γὰρ ὁ

Ζεὺς αὐτὸς ᾄδει καὶ κιθαρίζει τοῖς ποιηταῖς. We may learn what opinion men have concerning the gods, from hence, because the poets never bring in Jupiter singing or playing upon an instrument. —Now we have already proved from sundry testimonies of the poets, that (however they were de-pravers of the Pagan religion, yet) they kept up this tradition of one supreme Deity, one king and father of gods: to which testimonies many more might have been added, as of Seneca the tragedian, Statius, Lucan, Silius Italicus, Persius and Martial, but that we then declined them, to avoid tediousness. Wherefore we shall here content ourselves only to set down this affirmation of Dio Chrysostomus, concerning the theology of the

poets: Οὗτοι δ' οὖν πάντες οἱ ποιηταὶ κατὰ ταῦ-
Orat. xxxvi. p. 447. τα, τὸν πρῶτον καὶ μέγιστον θεὸν πατέρα κα-

λοῦσι συλλήβδην ἅπαντος τοῦ λογικοῦ γένους, καὶ δὴ καὶ βασιλέα· οἷς πειθόμενοι οἱ ἄνθρωποι Διὸς βασιλέως ἰδρύνονται βωμούς· καὶ δὴ καὶ πατέρα αὐτὸν οὐκ ὀκνοῦσι προσαγορεύειν ἐν ταῖς εὐχαῖς· All the poets call the first and greatest God, the father, universally, of all the rational kind; as also the king thereof. Agreeably with which of the poets, do men erect altars to Jupiter king, and stick not to call him father in their devotions.

Moreover, Aristotle himself hath recorded this in his Politics,* πάντες λέγουσι θεοὺς βασιλεύεσθαι, that all men affirmed the gods to be under a kingly power; or, that there is one supreme King and Monarch over the gods.—And Maximus Tyrius declareth, that as well the unlearned as the learned, throughout the whole Pagan world, universally agreed in this, that there was one supreme God, the father of all the other gods:

Εἰ συναγαγὼν ἐκκλησίαν τῶν τεχνῶν τούτων, Diss. i. p. 4, 5. κελεύεις ἅπαντας ἀθρώπους διὰ ψηφίσματος ἐνὸς ἀποκρίνασθαι περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ, οἷε ἄλλο μὲν αὖ τὸν γραφεῖα εἰπεῖν, ἄλλο δὲ καὶ τὸν ἀγαλματοποιόν, καὶ τὸν ποιητὴν ἄλλο, καὶ τὸν φιλόσοφον ἄλλο; ἄλλ' οὐδὲ μὰ Δία τὸν Σκύθη, οὐδὲ τὸν Ἑλληνα, οὐδὲ τὸν Πέρσην, ἢ τὸν Ὑπερβόρειον· ἀλλὰ ἴδοις αὖ ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἄλλα, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλα, καὶ οὐ ταῦτα ψηφίζομένους τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, πάντας δὲ πᾶσι διαφερομένους· οὐ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶσιν, οὐ τὸ κακὸν ὅμοιον, οὐ τὸ αἰσχρὸν, οὐ τὸ καλόν· νόμος μὲν γὰρ δὴ καὶ δίκη ἄνω καὶ κάτω φέρεται διασπώμενα καὶ σπαρασσόμενα· μὴ γὰρ ὅτι γένος γένει ὁμολογεῖ ἐν τούτοις, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πόλις πόλει, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ οἶκος οἴκῳ, οὐδὲ ἀνὴρ ἀνδρὶ, οὐδὲ αὐτὸς αὐτῷ· ἐν τοσούτῃ δὲ πολέμῳ καὶ στάσει καὶ διαφωνίᾳ, ἕνα ἴδοις αὖ ἐν πάσῃ γῇ ὁμόφωνον νόμον καὶ λόγον, ὅτι ΘΕΟΣ Εἰς Παντῶν ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥΣ ΚΑΙ ΠΑΤΗΡ, καὶ θεοὶ πολλοὶ θεοῦ παῖδες,

* Lib. iv. cap. xv. p. 510. tom. iii. oper.

συνάρχοντες θεῷ· ταῦτα δὲ ὁ Ἕλλην λέγει καὶ ὁ Βάρβαρος λέγει, καὶ ὁ ἡπειρώτης καὶ ὁ θαλάττιος, καὶ ὁ σοφὸς, καὶ ὁ ἄσοφος·

If there were a meeting called of all these several trades and professions, a painter, a statuary, a poet, and a philosopher, and all of them were required to declare their sense concerning God, do you think, that the painter would say one thing, the statuary another, the poet another, and the philosopher another? No, nor the Scythian neither, nor the Greek, nor the Hyperborean. In other things we find men speaking very discordantly to one another, all men as it were differing from all. The same thing is not good to all nor evil, honest nor dishonest. For law and justice itself are different every where; and not only one nation doth not agree with another therein, but also not one city with another city, nor one house with another house, nor one man with another man, nor, lastly, any one man with himself. Nevertheless, in this so great war, contention, and discord, you may find every where throughout the whole world, one agreeing law and opinion, that THERE IS ONE GOD THE KING AND FATHER OF ALL, and many gods, the sons of God, co-reigners together with God. These things both the Greek and the Barbarian alike affirm, both the inhabitants of the continent and of the sea-coast, both the wise and the unwise.—Nothing can be more full than this testimony of Maximus Tyrius, that the generality of the Pagan world, as well vulgar and illiterate as wise and learned, did agree in this, that there was one supreme God, the creator and governor of all. And to the same purpose was that other testimony before

Orat. xii. p.
201.

cited out of Dio Chrysostomus, περὶ δὲ
θεῶν τῆς τε καθόλου φύσεως, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦ

πάντων ἡγεμόνος, δόξα καὶ ἐπίνοια κοινῇ τοῦ ζῦμπαντος ἀνθρωπίνου γένους, ὁμοίως δὲ Ἑλλήνων, ὁμοίως δὲ Βαρβάρων, &c. that concerning the nature of the gods in general, but especially concerning that Prince of all things, there was one agreeing persuasion in the minds of all mankind, as well Barbarians as Greeks.—Where Dio plainly intimates also, that there was a more universal consent of nations in the belief of one God than of many gods.

It hath been already observed, that the several Pagan nations had vulgarly their peculiar proper names for the one supreme God. For as the Greeks called him Zeus or Zen, the Latins Jupiter or Jovis, so did the Egyptians, Africans, and Arabians, Hammon. Which Hammon therefore was called by the Greeks the Zeus of the Africans, and by the Latins their Jupiter. Whence is that in Cicero's *De Natura Deorum*, * "*Jovis Capitolini nobis alia species, alia Afris Ammonis Jovis,*" the form of the capitoline Jupiter with us Romans is different from that of Jupiter Ammon with the Africans."—The name of the Scythian Jupiter also, as Herodotus tells us, was Pappæus or father. The Persians likewise had their Ζεὺς πατὴρ, as Xenophon styles him, their country Zeus or Jupiter (namely Mithras or Oromasdes), who in the same Xenophon is distinguished from the sun, and called in Cyrus's proclamation in the Scripture, "the Lord God of heaven, who had given him all the kingdoms of the earth." Thus the Babylonian Bel is declared by Berosus (a priest of his) to have been that God, who was the maker of heaven and earth. And learned men conceive, that Baal (which is the same with Bel, and sig-

* Lib. i. cap. xxix. p. 2923. tom. lx. oper.

nifies Lord) was first amongst the Phenicians also a name for the supreme God, the creator of heaven and earth, sometimes called Beel samen, the Lord of heaven: as likewise that Molech, which signifies king, was, amongst the Ammonites, the king of their gods; and that Marnas (the chief God of the Gazites, who were Philistines) and signifies the Lord of men, was that from whence the Cretians derived their Jupiter, called the father of gods and men.

Origen^a indeed contended, that it was not lawful for Christians to call the supreme God by any of those Pagan names, and probably for these reasons, because those names were then frequently bestowed upon idols, and because they were contaminated and defiled by absurd and impure fables. Nevertheless, that learned father does acknowledge the Pagans really to have meant *τὸν θεὸν ἐν ᾧ πάντες*, the God over all—by those several names: which yet Lactantius Firmianus would by no means allow of as to the Roman Jupiter, worshipped in the capitol, he endeavouring to confute it after this manner: “*Vana est persuasio eorum, qui nomen Jovis summo Deo tribuunt. Solent enim quidam errores suos hac excusatione defendere; qui convicti de uno Deo, cum id negare non possunt, ipsum colere affirmant, verum hoc sibi placere ut Jupiter nominetur, quo quid absurdius? Jupiter enim sine contubernio conjugis filiaque, colitur non solet. Unde quid sit apparet, nec fas est id nomen eo transferri, ubi nec Minerva est ulla nec Juno.*” It is a vain persuasion of those, who would give the name of Jupiter to the supreme God. For some

^a L. i. c. xi.
[p. 76.]

^a Contra Celsum, lib. i. p. 18.

are wont thus to excuse their errors, when they have been convinced of one God, so as that they could not contradict it, by saying, that themselves worshipped him, he being called by them Jupiter: than which what can be more absurd? since Jupiter is not worshipped without the partnership of his wife and daughter. From whence it plainly appears what this Jupiter is, and that the name ought not to be transferred thither, where there is neither any Minerva nor Juno.—The ground of which argumentation of Lactantius was this, because the great capitoline temple of Jupiter had three sacella or lesser chapels in it, all contained under one roof, Jupiter's in the middle, Minerva's on the right hand, and Juno's on the left; according to that of the poet;

Trina in Tarpeio fulgent consortia templo.

Which Juno, according to the poetic theology, is said to be the wife of Jupiter, and Minerva his daughter, begotten not upon Juno, but from his own brain. Where it is plain, that there is a certain mixture of the mythical or poetical theology, together with the natural, as almost every where else there was, to make up that civil theology of the Pagans. But here (according to the more recondite and arcane doctrine of the Pagans) these three capitoline gods, Jupiter, Minerva, and Juno, as well as some others, may be understood to have been nothing else but several names and notions of one supreme Deity, according to its several attributes and manifestations; Jupiter signifying the Divine power and sovereignty, as it were seated and enthroned in the heavens; Minerva, the Divine wisdom and understanding; and Juno the

same deity, acting in these lower parts of the world. Unless we would rather, with Macrobius,^a physiologize them all three, and make Minerva to be the higher heaven, Jupiter the middle ether, and Juno the lower air and earth, all animated; that is, one God, as acting differently in these three regions of the world. Which yet seems not so congruous, because it would place Minerva above Jupiter.

Nevertheless it may justly be suspected, as G. I. Vossius^b hath already observed, that there was yet some higher and more sacred mystery in this capitoline trinity aimed at; namely, a trinity of Divine hypostases. For these three Roman or capitoline gods were said to have been first brought into Italy out of Phrygia by the Trojans, but before that into Phrygia by Dardanus, out of the Samothracian island; and that within eight hundred years after the Noachian flood, if we may believe Eusebius. And as these were called by the Latins *Dii Penates*, which Macrobius thus interprets,^c “*Dii per quos penitus spiramus, per quos habemus corpus, per quos rationem animi possidemus,*” that is, the gods, by whom we live, and move, and have our being;—but Varro in Arnobius, “*Dii, qui sunt intrinsecus, atque in intimis penetralibus cœli,*” the gods, who are in the most inward recesses of heaven;—so were they called by the Samothracians *Κάβειροι*, or *Cabiri*, that is, as Varro^d rightly interprets the word, *θεοὶ δυνατοί*, or *divi potentes*, the powerful and mighty gods.—Which

^a Saturnal. lib. iii. cap. iv. p. 391, 392.

^b De Theolog. Gentili, lib. viii. cap. xii. p. 750, 751.

^c Saturnal. lib. iii. cap. iv. p. 391.

^d Advers. Gentes, lib. iii. p. 155.

^e De Lingua Latin. lib. iv. p. 66.

Cabiri being plainly the Hebrew ככירים, gives just occasion to suspect, that this ancient tradition of the three Divine hypostases (unquestionably entertained by Orpheus, Pythagoras, and Plato amongst the Greeks, and probably by the Egyptians and Persians) sprung originally from the Hebrews; the first of these Divine hypostases, called Jove, being the fountain of the godhead; and the second of them, called by the Latins Minerva (which, as Varro * interprets it, was, that wherein "ideæ et exempla rerum," the ideas and first exemplars or patterns of things were contained), fitly expressing the Divine Logos; and the third Juno, called "amor ac delictum Jovis," well enough answering (as Vossius thinks) to the Divine Spirit.

De Theol.
Gen. l. viii.
c. xii.

But Lactantius hath yet another objection against the Roman Jupiter's being the supreme God; "Quid? quod hujus nominis proprietas non divinam vim sed humanam exprimit? Jovem enim Junonem que a Juvando esse dictos Cicero interpretatur. Et Jupiter quasi Juvans pater dicitur. Quod nomen in Deum minime convenit, quia juvare hominis est, &c. Nemo sic deum precatur, ut se adjuvet, sed ut servet, &c. Ergo non imperitus modo, sed etiam impius est, qui nomine Jovis virtutem summæ potestatis imminuit." What if we add, that the propriety of this word Jupiter does not express a Divine, but only a human force? Cicero deriving both Jove and Juno alike *a juvando*, that is, from helping: for *juvans pater*, or a helping father, is not a good description of God; forasmuch as it pro-

P. 63.

* Apud Augustinum de Civitate Dei, lib. vii. cap. xxviii. p. 141. tom. vii. oper.

perly belongeth to men to help. Neither doth any one pray to God to help him only, but to save him. Nor is a father said to help his son, whom he was the begetter of, &c. Wherefore he is not only unskilful, but impious also, who, by the name of Jove or Jupiter, diminishes the power of the supreme God.—But as this of Lactantius seems otherwise weak enough; so is the foundation of it absolutely ruinous, the true etymon of Jupiter (though Cicero knew not so much) being without peradventure, not *juvans pater*, but *Jovis pater*, Jove, the father of gods and men; which *Jovis* is the very Hebrew Tetragrammaton (however these Romans came by it) only altered by a Latin termination. Wherefore, as there could be no impiety at all in calling the supreme God Jove or Jovis, it being that very name which God himself chose to be called by; so neither is there any reason, why the Latins should not as well mean the supreme God thereby, as the Greeks did unquestionably by Zeus, which will be proved afterwards from irrefragable authority.

Especially if we consider, that the Roman vulgar commonly bestowed these two epithets upon that capitoline Jupiter (that is, not the senseless statue, but that God who was there worshipped in a material statue) of *Optimus* and *Maximus*, the best and the greatest; they thereby signifying him to be a Being infinitely good and powerful. Thus Cicero in his *De Nat. Deorum*,* “Jupiter a poetis dicitur divum atque hominum pater, a majoribus autem nostris optimus, maximus.” That same Jupiter, who is by the poets styled the father of gods and men, is by our ancestors called the best,

* Lib. ii. cap. xxv. p. 2992. tom. ix. oper.

the greatest.—And in his *Orat. pro S. Roscio*,* “*Jupiter optimus maximus, cujus nutu et arbitrio cælum, terra, mariaque reguntur;*” Jupiter the best, the greatest, by whose beck and command, the heaven, the earth, and the seas are governed. As also the junior Pliny, in his panegyric oration, “*Parens hominum deorumque, optimi prius, deinde maximi nomine colitur;*” the father of men and gods is worshipped under the name, first of the best, and then of the greatest.—Moreover Servius Honoratus informs us, that the pontifices in their public sacrifices were wont to address themselves to Jupiter in this form of words; “*Omnipotens Jupiter, seu quo alio nomine appellari volueris;*” Omnipotent Jupiter, or by what other name soever thou pleasest to be called.—From whence it is plain, that the Romans, under the name of Jupiter, worshipped the omnipotent God. And, according to Seneca, the ancient Etrurians, who are by him distinguished from philosophers, as a kind of illiterate superstitious persons (in these words, “*Hæc adhuc Etruscis et philosophis communia sunt, in illo dis-* Nat. Q. i. c. xli. *sentiant*”) had this very same notion answering to the word Jupiter, namely, of the supreme Monarch of the universe. For, first, he sets down their tradition concerning thunderbolts in this manner: “*Fulmina dicunt a Jove mitti, et tres illi manubias dant. Prima (ut aiunt) monet et placata est, et ipsius consilio Jovis mittitur. Secundam quidem mittit Jupiter, sed ex consilii sententia; duodecim enim deos advocat, &c. Tertiam idem Jupiter mittit, sed adhibitis in consilium diis, quos superiores et involutos vo-*

* Cap. xlv. p. 948. tom. iii. oper.

cant, quæ vastat," &c. The Hetrurians say, that the thunderbolts are sent from Jupiter, and that there are three kinds of them; the first gentle and monitory, and sent by Jupiter alone; the second sent by Jupiter, but not without the counsel and consent of the twelve gods, which thunderbolt doth some good, but not without harm also; the third sent by Jupiter likewise, but not before he hath called a council of all the superior gods; and this utterly wastes and destroys both private and public states.—And then does he make a commentary upon this old Hetrurian doctrine, that it was not to be taken literally, but only so as to impress an awe upon men, and to signify, that Jupiter himself intended nothing but good, he inflicting evil not alone, but in partnership with others, and when the necessity of the case required. Adding, in the last place, "*Ne hoc quidem crediderunt (Etrusci) Jovem qualem in capitolio, et in cæteris ædibus colimus, mittere manu sua fulmina; sed eundem, quem nos, Jovem intelligunt, custodem rectoremque universi, animum ac spiritum, mundani hujus operis dominum et artificem, cui nomen omne convenit.*" Neither did these Hetrurians believe, that such a Jupiter, as we worship in the capitol and in the other temples, did fling thunderbolts with his own hands, but they understood the very same Jupiter, that we now do, the keeper and governor of the universe, the mind and spirit of the whole, the lord and artificer of this mundane fabric, to whom every name belongeth.—And, lastly, that the vulgar Romans afterward, about the beginning of Christianity, had the same notion of Jupiter, as the supreme God, evidently appears from what

Tertullian hath recorded in his book *Ad Scapulam*,^a that when Marcus Aurelius in his German expedition, by the prayers of the Christian soldiers made to God, had obtained refreshing showers from heaven in a great drought, “*Tunc populus adclamans JOVI DEO DEORUM, QUI SOLUS POTENS EST, in Jovis nomine Deo nostro testimonium reddidit:*” that then the people with one consent crying out, Thanks be to JUPITER THE GOD OF GODS, WHO ALONE IS POWERFUL, did thereby in the name of Jove or Jupiter give testimony to our God.—Where, by the way, we see also, that Tertullian was not so nice as Lactantius, but did freely acknowledge the Pagans by their Jupiter to have meant the true God.

As nothing is more frequent with Pagan writers, than to speak of God singularly, they signifying thereby the one supreme Deity, so that the same was very familiar with the vulgar Pagans also, in their ordinary discourse and common speech, hath been recorded by divers of the fathers. Tertullian in his book *De Testimonio Animæ*,^b and his *Apologet.*^c instanceth in several of these forms of speech then vulgarly used by the Pagans; as “*Deus videt, Deo commendo, Deus reddet, Deus inter nos judicabit, Quod Deus vult, Si Deus voluerit, Quod Deus dederit, Si Deus dederit,*” and the like. Thus also Minutius Felix:^d “*Cum ad cælum manus tendunt, nihil aliud quam Deum dicunt, Et magnus est, et Deus verus est, &c. vulgi iste naturalis sermo, an Christiani confitentis oratio?*” When they stretch out their hands to

^a Lib. iv.

^b Cap. ii. p. 35. oper. edit. Venet.

^c Cap. xvii. p. 175.

^d In Octavio, cap. xviii. p. 171. edit. Gronov.

heaven, they mention only God ; and these forms of speech, He is great, and God is true ; and, If God grant (which are the natural language of the vulgar), are they not a plain confession of Christianity ? And, lastly, Lactantius, * “ Cum jurant, et cum optant, et cum gratias agunt, non deos multos, sed Deum nominant ; adeo ipsa veritas, cogente natura, etiam ab invitis pectoribus erumpit : ” When they swear, and when they wish, and when they give thanks, they name not many gods, but God only ; the truth, by a secret force of nature, thus breaking forth from them, whether they will or no.—And again : “ Ad Deum confugiunt, a Deo petitur auxilium, Deus ut subveniat oratur. Et si quis ad extremam mendicandi necessitatem redactus, victum precibus exposcit, Deum solum obtestatur, et per ejus divinum atque unicum numen hominum sibi misericordiam querit. ” They fly to God, aid is desired of God, they pray that God would help them ; and when any one is reduced to extremest necessity, he begs for God’s sake, and by his Divine power alone implores the mercy of men.—Which same thing is fully confirmed also by Proclus upon Plato’s *Timæus* ; where he observes, that the one supreme God was more universally believed throughout the world in all ages, than the many inferior gods :

P. 286. τάχα δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἂν εἶποις, ὅτι δὴ αἱ ψυχαὶ τῶν
 ἑαυταῖς προσεχαστέρων θάττον ἐπιλανθάνονται, τῶν
 δὲ ὑπερτέρων ἀρχῶν μᾶλλον μνημονεύουσι· Δρωσι γὰρ μᾶλ-
 λον εἰς αὐτοὺς δι’ ὑπεροχὴν δυνάμεως, καὶ δοκοῦσιν αὐταῖς πα-
 ρεῖναι δι’ ἐνέργειαν· ὃ δὴ καὶ περὶ τὴν ὄψιν γίγνεται τὴν ἡμετέραν·
 πολλὰ γὰρ τῶν ἐν γῇ κειμένων οὐχ ὁρῶντες, ὁμῶς αὐτὴν ὁρᾶν
 δοκῶμεν τὴν ἀπλανή, καὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἀστέρας, διότι καταλάμ-

* Institut. Divin. lib. ii. cap. i. p. 159.

πουσιν ἡμῶν τὴν ὄψιν τῷ ἑαυτῶν φωτί. Μᾶλλον οὖν καὶ τὸ ὁμ-
μα τῆς ψυχῆς, λήθην ἴσχει καὶ ἀορασίαν τῶν προσεχιστέρων, ἢ
τῶν ἀκωτέρων καὶ θειοτέρων ἀρχῶν· οὕτω τὴν πρωτίστην ἀρχὴν
πᾶσαι θρησκείαι καὶ αἱρέσεις συγχωροῦσιν εἶναι, καὶ θεὸν πάντες
ἄνθρωποι ἐγκαλοῦσι βοηθόν· θεοὺς δὲ εἶναι μετ' αὐτήν, καὶ πρό-
νοιαν ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἐν τῷ παντί, οὐ πᾶσαι πιστεύουσι· ἐναργέ-
τερον γὰρ αὐταῖς καταφαίνεται τὸ ἐν τοῦ πλήθους· And
perhaps you may affirm, that souls do sooner lose
their knowledge of those things, which are lower
and nearer to them, but retain a stronger remem-
brance of those higher principles; because these
do act more vigorously upon them, by reason of
the transcendency of their power, and by their
energy seem to be present with them. And the
same thing happens as to our bodily sight; for
though there be many things here upon earth,
which none of us see, yet every one observes that
highest sphere, and takes notice of the fixed stars
in it, because these strongly radiate with their light
upon our eyes. In like manner does the eye of
our soul sooner lose the sight and remembrance of
the lower than of the higher and diviner principles.
And thus all religions and sects acknowledge that
one highest Principle of all, and men every where
call upon God for their helper; but that there are
gods, after and below that highest Principle, and
that there is a certain providence descending down
from these upon the universe, all sects do not be-
lieve; the reason whereof is, because the one or
unity appears more clearly and plainly to them,
than the many or a multitude.

Moreover, we learn from Arrianus's Epictet-
us, that that very form of prayer, which hath been
now so long in use in the Christian church, *Kyrie*
Eleeson, "Lord, have mercy upon us," was an-

ciently part of the Pagans' litany to the supreme God, either amongst the Greeks, or the Latins,

L. ii. c. vii. [p. 186.] or both, τὸν θεὸν ἐπικαλούμενοι (saith Epictetus), δέόμεθα αὐτοῦ, Κύριε ἐλέησον, invok-

ing God, we pray to him after this manner, Lord, have mercy upon us. Now this Epictetus lived in the times of Adrian the emperor; and that this passage of his is to be understood of Pagans, and not of Christians, is undeniably manifest from the context, he there speaking of those, who used *auguria*, or divination by birds. Moreover, in the writings of the Greekish Pagans, the supreme God is often called Κύριος, or Lord. For, not to urge that passage of the τέλειος λόγος, or Asclepias Dialogue, cited by Lactantius, * where we read of ὁ Κύριος καὶ πάντων ποιητής, the Lord and maker of all—Menander in Justin Martyr ^b styleth the supreme God τὸν ὄντα πάντων Κύριον γενικώτατον, the most universal Lord of all.—And Osiris in Plutarch is called ἀπάντων Κύριος, the Lord of all things.—And this is also done absolutely, and without any objection, and that not only by the LXX. and Christians, but also by Pagan writers. Thus in Plutarch's de Iside et Osiride, we read of τοῦ πρώτου, καὶ ΚΥΠΙΟΥ, καὶ νοητοῦ γνῶσις, the knowledge of the first intelligible, and the Lord—that is, of the supreme God. And Oromasdes is called ὁ Κύριος, the Lord, in Plutarch's life of Alexander; as Νους De An. l. i. c. vii. [p. 16. tom. ii. oper.] also, Κύριος, by Aristotle, that is, the supreme Ruler over all.—Thus likewise Plato in his sixth epistle ad Hermiam, &c. styles his first Divine hypostasis, or the absolutely supreme Deity, τοῦ ἡγεμόνος καὶ αἰτίου πατέρα Κύριον, the father of the prince, and cause of the

* Instit. Div. lib. ii. cap. vi. p. 419. ^b De Monarch. Dei, p. 108.

world (that is, of the eternal intellect) the LORD. Again, Jamblichus writeth thus of the supreme God, Δεῖν ὁμολογεῖται παρὰ τοῦ κυρίου ἄγαθον

ζῆτεῖν, It is confessed, that every good thing ought to be asked of the Lord.— that is, the supreme God; which words

Vit. Pyth. p. 89.
[cap. xviii.
p. 72. ed.
Kusteri.]

are afterwards repeated in him also, p. 129. but depraved in the printed copy thus, Δεῖν δὲ ὁμολογεῖν περὶ τοῦ κυρίου τ' ἄγαθόν ἐστι. Lastly, Clemens Alexandrinus* tells us, that the supreme God was called not by one only name, but by divers diversely, namely, ἢ το Ἐν,, ἢ τ' Ἀγαθόν, ἢ Νοῦν, ἢ αὐτὸ τὸ Ὀν, ἢ Πατέρα, ἢ Θεόν, ἢ Δημιουργόν ἢ Κύριον, either the One, or the Good, or Mind, or the very Ens, or the Father, or the Demiurgus, or the Lord.—Wherefore, we conclude, that this Kyrie Eleeson, or Domine Miserere, in Arrianus, was a Pagan litany or supplication to the supreme God. Though from Mauritius the emperor's Stratagemata it appears, that in his time a Kyrie Eleeson was wont to be sung also by the Christian armies before battle.

Rigalt. Gloss.

And that the most sottishly superstitious and idolatrous of all the Pagans, and the worshippers of never so many gods amongst them, did notwithstanding generally acknowledge one supreme Deity over them all, one universal Numen, is positively affirmed, and fully attested by Aurelius Prudentius, in his Apotheosis, in these words;

Ver. 254.

Ecquis in Idolio recubans inter sacra mille,
Ridiculosque deos venerans, sale, cespite, thure,
Non putat esse Deum summum, et super omnia solum?
Quamvis Saturnis, Junonibus, et Cytheræis,

* Stromat. lib. v. p. 605.

Portentisque aliis, fumantes consecret aras;
 Attamen in coelum quoties suspexit, in uno
 Constituit jus omne Deo, cui serviat ingens
 Virtutum ratio, variis instructa ministria.

We are not ignorant, that Plato in his *Cratylus*^a where he undertakes to give the etymologies of words, and amongst the rest of the word *θεοί*, writeth in this manner concerning the first and most ancient inhabitants of Greece; "that they seemed to him, like as other Barbarians at that time, to have acknowledged no other gods than such as were visible and sensible, as the sun, and the moon, and the earth, and the stars, and the heaven. Which they perceiving to run round perpetually, therefore called them *θεοὶ*, from *θεω*, that signifies to run. But that when afterward they took notice of other invisible gods also, they bestowed the same name of *θεοί* upon them likewise." Which passage of Plato's Eusebius somewhere^b would make use of, to prove, that the Pagans universally acknowledged no other gods but corporeal and inanimate; plainly contrary to that philosopher's meaning, who as he no where affirms, that any nation ever was so barbarous, as to worship senseless and inanimate bodies, as such, for gods, but the contrary; so doth he there distinguish from those first inhabitants of Greece, and other Barbarians, the afterward civilized Greeks, who took notice of invisible gods also. However, if this of Plato should be true, that some of the ancient Pagans worshipped none but visible and sensible gods (they taking no notice of any incorporeal beings), yet does it not therefore follow, that

^a P. 263. oper.

^b *Præparat. Evangel. lib. i. cap. ix. p. 29.*

those Pagans had no notion at all amongst them of one supreme and universal Numen. The contrary thereunto being manifest, that some of those Corporealists looked upon the whole heaven and ether animated as the highest God, according to that of Euripides cited by Cicero,

Vides sublime fasum, immoderatum aethera,
Qui tenero terram circumvecta amplectitur;
Hunc summum habeto divum, hunc perhibeto
Jovem.

De N. D.
p. 223. [Ib.
li. c. xxv.
p. 2993.]

As also that others of them conceived, that subtile fiery substance, which permeates and pervades the whole world (supposed to be intellectual) to be the supreme Deity, which governs all; this opinion having been entertained by philosophers also, as namely, the Heraclitics and Stoics. And, lastly, since Macrobius,* in the person of Vettius Prætextatus, refers so many of the Pagan gods to the sun; this renders it not improbable, but that some of these Pagans might adore the animated sun, as the sovereign Numen, and thus perhaps invoke him in that form of prayer there mentioned,† *Ἡλιε παντοκράτωρ, κόσμον πνεῦμα*, O omnipotent sun, the mind and spirit of the whole world, &c.—And even Cleanthes himself, that learned Stoic, and devout religionist, is suspected by some to have been of this persuasion.

Nevertheless, we think it opportune here to observe, that it was not Macrobius's design, in those his Saturnalia, to defend this either as his own opinion, or as the opinion of the generality of Pagans, that the animated sun was absolutely the highest Deity, (as some have conceived) nor

* Saturnal. lib. i. cap. xvii. p. 270.

† Ibid. cap. xxiii. p. 313.

yet to reduce that multiplicity of Pagan gods, by this device of his, into a seeming monarchy and nearer compliance with Christianity; he there plainly confining his discourse to the "*dii duntaxat, qui sub cœlo sunt,*" that is, the lower sort of mundane gods;—and undertaking to shew, not that all of these neither, but only that many of them were reducible to the sun, as polyonymous, and called by several names, according to his several virtues and effects. For, what Macrobius's own opinion was, concerning the supreme Deity, appeareth plainly from his other writings, particularly this passage of his commentary upon Scipio's dream, where the highest sphere and starry hea-

L. i. c. xvii.
[p. 87.] ven was called *Summus Deus*, the supreme God—"Quod hunc extimum globum, summum Deum vocavit, non ita accipiendum est, ut iste prima causa, et Deus ille omnipotentissimus existimetur; cum globus ipse, quod cœlum est, animæ sit fabrica, anima ex mente processerit, mens ex Deo, qui vere summus est, procreata sit. Sed summum quidem dixit ad cæterorum ordinem, qui subjecti sunt; Deum vero, quod non modo immortale animal ac divinum sit, plenum inclytæ ex illa purissima menterationis, sed quod et virtutes omnes, quæ illam primæ omnipotentiam summitatis sequantur, aut ipse faciat, aut contineat; ipsum denique Jovem veteres vocaverunt, et apud theologos Jupiter est mundi anima." That the outmost sphere is here called the supreme God, is not so to be understood, as if this were thought to be the first Cause, and the most omnipotent God of all: for this starry sphere being but a part of the heaven, was made or produced by soul. Which soul also proceeded from

a perfect mind or intellect; and again, mind was begotten from that God, who is truly supreme. But the highest sphere is here called the supreme God, only in respect to those lesser spheres or gods, that are contained under it; and it is styled a God, because it is not only an immortal and Divine animal, full of reason derived from that purest Mind, but also because it maketh or containeth within itself all those virtues, which follow that omnipotence of the first summity. Lastly, this was called by the ancients Jupiter, and Jupiter to theologers is the soul of the world.—Wherefore, though Macrobius, as generally the other Pagans, did undoubtedly worship the sun as a great god, and probably would not stick to call him Jupiter, nor *πρωτογενής* neither (in a certain sense) omnipotent, or the governor of all, nor perhaps Deum Summum, as well as the starry heaven was so styled in Scipio's dream, he being the chief moderator in this lower world; yet nevertheless, it is plain, that he was far from thinking the sun to be *primum causam*, or *omnipotentissimum Deum*; the first Cause, or the most omnipotent God of all. He acknowledging above the sun and heaven, first, an eternal Psyche, which was the maker or creator of them both; and then, above this Psyche, a perfect mind or intellect; and, lastly, above that mind a God, who was *vere summus*, truly and properly supreme, the first Cause, and the most omnipotent of all gods. Wherein Macrobius plainly Platonized, asserting a trinity of archical or Divine hypotheses. Which same doctrine is elsewhere also further declared by him after this manner: “Deus,

Somn. Scip.
 l. i. c. xiv.
 [p. 73.]

qui prima causa est, et vocatur unus omnium, quæque sunt, quæque videntur esse, principium et origo est. Hic superabundanti majestatis fecunditate de se mentem creavit. Hæc mens, quæ *Novus* vocatur, qua patrem inspicit, plenam similitudinem servat auctoris, animam vero de se creat posteriora respiciens. Rursus anima partem, quam intuetur, induitur, ac paulatim regrediente respectu in fabricam corporum, in corporea ipsa degenerat:” God, who is, and is called the first Cause, is alone the fountain and original of all things, that are or seem to be; he by his superabundant fecundity produced from himself mind, which mind, as it looks upward towards its father, bears the perfect resemblance of its author, but as it looked downward, produced soul. And this soul again, as to its superior part, resembles that mind, from whence it was begotten; but working downwards, produced the corporeal fabric, and acteth upon body.—Besides which, the same Macrobius tells us,* that “*Summi et principis omnium Dei nullum simulachrum finxit antiquitas, quia supra animam et naturam est, quo nihil fas est de fabulis pervenire; de diis autem cæteris, et de anima, non frustra se ad fabulosa convertunt:*” The Pagan antiquity made no image at all of the highest God, or prince of all things, because he is above soul and nature, where it is not lawful for any fabulosity to be intromitted. But as to the other gods, the soul of the world, and those below it, they thought it not inconvenient here to make use of images, and fiction or fabulosity.—From all

* Ibid. lib. i. cap. ii. p. 9.

which it plainly appears, that neither Macrobius himself, nor the generality of the ancient Pagans, according to his apprehension, did look upon the animated sun as the absolutely supreme and highest Being.

And perhaps it may not be amiss to suggest here, what hath been already observed, that the Persians themselves also, who of all Pagan nations have been most charged with this, the worshipping of the sun as the supreme Deity, under the name of Mithras, did notwithstanding, if we may believe Eubulus* (who wrote the history of Mithras at large), acknowledge another invisible Deity superior to it (and which was the maker thereof, and of the whole world), as the true and proper Mithras. Which opinion is also plainly confirmed, not only by Herodotus, distin-

L. i. N. 131.

guishing their Jupiter from the sun, but also by Xenophon in sundry places, as particularly where he speaks of Cyrus's being admonished in a dream of his approaching death, and thereupon addressing his devotion by sacrifices and prayers first to the Ζεύς πατρώος, the Persian Jupiter—and then to the sun, and the other gods. Εἶθ' οὖν

Cyri. Inst.

Δαί τε πατρώω καὶ ἡλίω καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις θεοῖς ἐπὶ

L. viii. p. 184.

τῶν ἄκρων, ὡς Πέρσαι θύουσιν, ὡς ἐπευχόμενος, Ζεῦ πατρώε καὶ ἡλίε καὶ πάντες θεοί, δέχεσθε τὰδε χαριστήρια, &c. He

sacrificed to their country (or the Persian) Jupiter, and to the sun, and to the other gods, upon the tops of the mountains, as the custom of the Persians is; praying after this manner: Thou, our country Jupiter (that is, thou Mithras or Oromasdes), and thou sun, and all ye other gods; ac-

* Apud Porphy. de Antro Nymphar. p. 253, &c.

cept, I pray you, these my eucharistic sacrifices, &c.—And we find also the like prayer used by Darius in Plutarch, *Ζεῦ πατρὶ Περσῶν*, Thou our country Jupiter, or supreme God of the

De Fort. Alex.
l. ii.

Persians.—Moreover, Herodotus and Curtius record, that in the Persian pomp and procession there was wont to be drawn a chariot sacred to Jupiter, distinct from that of the sun. But Cyrus's proclamation, in the book of Esdras, putteth all out of doubt; since that Lord God of heaven, who is there said to have given Cyrus all the kingdoms of the earth, and commanded him to build him a house at Jerusalem, cannot be understood of the sun.

The Ethiopians in Strabo's time may well be looked upon as Barbarians; and yet did they not only acknowledge one supreme Deity, but also such as was distinct from the world, and therefore invisible; he writing thus concerning them:

Ἐθὶὼν νομίζουσι τὸν μὲν ἀθάνατον, τοῦτον δὲ εἶναι τὸν αἰῶνα τῶν πάντων, τὸν δὲ θνητὸν, ἀνώνυμον

ἔναι, ὡς δ' ἐκποπολὺ τοὺς εὐεργέτας καὶ βασιλικούς θεούς νομίζουσι. They believe, that there is one immortal God, and this the cause of all things; and another mortal one, anonymous; but for the most part they account their benefactors and kings gods also.—And though Cæsar affirm of the ancient Germans, "*Deorum numero eos solos ducunt, quos cernunt, et quorum opibus aperte juvantur, Solem, et Vulcanum, et Lunam;*" yet is he contradicted by Tacitus, who coming after him, had better information: and others have recorded,

that they acknowledged one supreme God, under the name of Thau first, and then of Thautes, and Theutates. Lastly, the generality of the Pagans at this very day, as the Indians, Chinese, Siamenses and Guineans, the inhabitants of Peru, Mexico, Virginia, and New England (some of which are sufficiently barbarous), acknowledge one supreme or greatest God; they having their several proper names for him, as Parmiscer, Fetisso, Wiracocha, Pachacamac, Vitziliputzti, &c. though worshipping withal other gods and idols. And we shall conclude this with the testimony of Josephus Acosta: "*Hoc commune apud omnes pene Barbaros est, ut Deum quidem omnium rerum supremum et summe bonum fateantur; spirituum vero quorundam perversorum non obscura opinio sit, qui e nostris Barbaris Zupay vocari solent. Igitur et quis ille summus, idemque sempiternus rerum omnium opifex, quem illi ignorantes colunt, per omnia doceri debent; mox quantum ab illo, illiusque fidelibus ministris angelis, absint gens pessima cacodæmonum.*" This is common almost to all the Barbarians, to confess one supreme God over all, who is perfectly good; as also they have a persuasion amongst them of certain evil spirits, which are called by our Barbarians Zupay. Wherefore they ought to be first well instructed, what that supreme and eternal maker of all things is, whom they ignorantly worship; and how great a difference there is betwixt those wicked demons and his faithful ministers, the angels.

xxviii. It hath been already declared, that according to Themistius and Symmachus, two zeal-

See Sched. de
Diss Germ.
[Syngr. l. cap.
xii. p. 291.]

De proc. Is-
dor. Sal. l. v.
479.

ous Pagans, one and the same supreme God was worshipped in all the several Pagan religions throughout the world, though after different manners. Which diversity of religions, as in their opinion it was no way inconvenient in itself, so neither was it ungrateful nor unacceptable to Almighty God, it being more for his honour, state, and grandeur, to be worshipped with this variety, than after one only manner. Now, that this was also the opinion of other ancients Pagans before them, may appear from this remarkable testimony of Plutarch's in his book De Iside, where defending the Egyptian worship (which was indeed the main design of that whole book); but withal declaring, that no inanimate thing ought to be looked upon or worshipped as a god, he writeth thus:

P. 377. οὐ γὰρ οὖν οὐδὲ ἀψυχον ἀνθρώποις ὁ θεός, τοὺς δὲ

δωρουμένους ἡμῖν καὶ παρέχοντας αἰέναν καὶ διαρκῆ, θεοὺς ἐνομίσαμεν, οὐχ ἑτέροις παρ' ἑτέροις, οὐδὲ Βαρβάρους καὶ Ἑλλήνας, οὐδὲ νοτίους καὶ βορείους· ἀλλὰ ὥσπερ ἥλιος, καὶ σελήνη, καὶ οὐρανός, καὶ γῆ, καὶ θάλασσα, κοινὰ πᾶσιν, ὀνομάζεται δὲ ἄλλως ὑπ' ἄλλων, οὕτως ἘΝΟΣ ΛΟΓΟΥ τοῦ ταῦτα κοσμοῦντος καὶ ΜΙΑΣ ΠΡΟΝΟΙΑΣ ἐπιτροπενούσης, καὶ δυνάμεων ἐπουργῶν ἐπὶ πάντα τεταγμένων, ἑτέροι παρ' ἑτέροις κατὰ νόμον γεγόνασι τιμαὶ καὶ προσηγορίαι· καὶ συμβόλοις χρῶνται καθιερώμενοι, οἱ μὲν ἀμυδροῖς, οἱ δὲ τρανωτέροις, ἐπὶ τὰ θία νόησιν ὁδηγοῦντες οὐκ ἀκινδύνως. No inanimate thing ought to be esteemed for a god, but they, who bestow these things upon us, and afford us a continual supply thereof for our use, have been therefore accounted by us gods. Which gods are not different to different nations; as if the Barbarians and the Greeks, the southern and the northern inhabitants of the globe, had not

any the same, but all other different gods. But as the sun, and the moon, and the heaven, and the earth, and the sea, are common to all, though called by several names in several countries; so ONE REASON ordering these things, and ONE PROVIDENCE dispensing all, and the inferior subservient ministers thereof, having had several names and honours bestowed upon them by the laws of several countries, have been every where worshipped throughout the whole world. And there have been also different symbols consecrated to them, the better to conduct and lead on men's understandings to Divine things; though this hath not been without some hazard or danger of casting men upon one or other of these two inconveniences, either superstition or Atheism.—Where Plutarch plainly affirms, that the several religions of the Pagan nations, whether Greeks or Barbarians, and among these the Egyptians also, as well as others, consisted in nothing else, but the worshipping of one and the same supreme Mind, reason, and providence, that orders all things in the world, and of its *ὑπουργοὶ δυνάμεις ἐπὶ πάντα τεταγμένοι*, its subservient powers or ministers, appointed by it over all the several parts of the world; though under different names, rites, and ceremonies, and with different symbols.

Moreover, that Titus Livius was of the very same opinion, that the Pagan gods of several countries, though called by several names, and worshipped with so great diversity of rites and ceremonies, yet were not for all that different, but the same common to all, may be concluded from this passage of his where he writeth of Hannibal: “Nescio ^{L. xxviii. c.} ^{xi.} [p. 679.]
an mirabilior fuerit in adversis, quam se-

cundis rebus. Quippe qui mistos ex colluvione omnium gentium, quibus alius ritus, alia sacra, alii PROPE dii essent, ita uno vinculo copulaverit, ut nulla seditio exstiterit." I know not whether Hannibal were more admirable in his adversity or prosperity; who having a mixt colluvies of all nations under him, which had different rites, different ceremonies, and almost different gods from one another, did notwithstanding so unite them all together in one common bond, that there happened no sedition at all amongst them.—Where Livy plainly intimates, that though there was as great diversity of religious rites and ceremonies among the Pagans, as if they had worshipped several gods, yet the gods of them all were really the same, namely, one supreme God, and his ministers under him. And the same Livy elsewhere declares this to have been the general opinion of the Romans and Italians likewise at that time; where he tells us how they quarrelled with Q. Fulvius Flaccus, for that when being censor, and building a new temple in Spain, he uncovered another temple dedicated to Juno Lacinia amongst the Brutii, and taking off the marble tiles thereof, sent them into Spain to adorn his new-erected temple withal; and how they accused him thereupon publicly in the senate-house in this manner, "Quod Doc. v. ruinis templorum templa ædificaret, tanquam non iidem ubique dii immortales essent, sed spoliis aliorum alii colendi exornandique." That with the ruins of temples he built up temples; as if there were not every where the same immortal gods; but that some of them might be worshipped and adorned with the spoils of others.*

* Lib. xlii. cap. iii. p. 1113.

The Egyptians were doubtless the most singular of all the Pagans, and the most oddly discrepant from the rest in their manner of worship; yet nevertheless, that these also agreed with the rest in those fundamentals of worshipping one supreme and universal Numen, together with his inferior ministers, as Plutarch sets himself industriously to maintain it, in that forementioned book *De Iside*; so was it further cleared and made out (as Damascius informs us) by two famous Egyptian philosophers, Asclepiades and Heraiscus, in certain writings of theirs, that have been since

lost: Αἰγυπτίους δὲ ὁ μὲν Εὐδήμος οὐδὲν ἀκριβὲς Damasc. de
 ἱστορεῖ. Οἱ δὲ Αἰγύπτιοι καθ' ἡμᾶς φιλόσοφοι Princ. M. S.
 γεγονότες, ἐξήνεγκαν αὐτῶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν κεκρυμ- [Vide Wolfii,
 μένην, εὐρόντες ἐν Αἰγυπτίαις δὴ τισι λόγοις, Anecdota
 ὡς εἴη κατ' αὐτοὺς ἡ μὲν μία τῶν ὅλων ἀρχή, Grecæ, tom.
 σκοτός ἄγνωστον, &c. iii. p. 260.] ἰστέον δὲ καὶ ἐκεῖνο περὶ τῶν Αἰγυπ-

τιῶν, ὅτι διαμετρικοὶ εἰσι πολλαχοῦ, τῶν καθ' ἑνωσιν ὑφεστώτων· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ νοητὸν διηρήκασιν εἰς πολλῶν θεῶν ἰδιότητας, ὡς ἔξεστι μαθεῖν τοῖς ἐκείνων συγγράμμασιν ἐντυχούσιν τοῖς βουλομένοις· λέγω δὲ τῇ Ἡραίσκου ἀναγραφῇ, τοῦ Αἰγυπτίου καθόλου λόγου, πρὸς τὸν Πρόκλον γραφεύῃ τὸν φιλόσοφον, καὶ τῇ ἀρξαμένη γραφεῖσθαι συμφωνίᾳ ὑπὸ Ἀσκληπιάδου τῶν Αἰγυπτίων πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους θεολόγους· Though Eudemus hath given us no certain account of the Egyptians, yet the Egyptian philosophers of latter times have declared the hidden truth of their theology, having found in some Egyptian monuments, that, according to them, there is one principle of all things, celebrated under the name of the unknown darkness, and this thrice repeated, &c. Moreover, this is to be observed concerning these Egyptians, that they are wont to divide and multiply things, that are one

and the same. And accordingly have they divided and multiplied the first Intelligible, or the one supreme Deity, into the properties of many gods; as any one may find, that pleases to consult their writings: I mean that of Heraiscus, entitled, the Universal doctrine of the Egyptians, and inscribed to Proclus the philosopher; and that symphony or harmony of the Egyptians with other theologers, begun to be written by Asclepiades, and left imperfect.—Of which work of Asclepiades the Egyptian Suidas also maketh mention upon the word Heraiscus; *ὁ δὲ Ἀσκληπιάδης ἐπὶ πλείον ἐν τοῖς Αἰγυπτίοις βιβλίοις ἀναγραφείς, ἀκριβέστερος ἦν ἀμφὶ θεολογίαν τὴν πάτριον, ἀρχὰς τε αὐτῆς καὶ μέσα διεσκεμμένος, ὡς ἔξεσται εἰδέναι σαφῶς ἀπὸ τῶν ὕμνων, ὧν συγγέγραφεν εἰς τοὺς Αἰγυπτίων θεοὺς, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς πραγματείας, ἣν ᾤρησε γράφειν περιέχουσιν τῶν θεολογιῶν ἀπασῶν συμφωνίαν*. But Asclepiades having been more conversant with ancient Egyptian writings, was more thoroughly instructed, and exactly skilled in his country theology; he having searched into the principles thereof, and all the consequences resulting from them; as manifestly appeareth from those hymns, which he composed in praise of the Egyptian gods, and from that tractate begun to be written by him (but left unfinished), which containeth the symphony of all theologies.—Now, we say that Asclepiades's symphony of all the Pagan theologers, and therefore of the Egyptian with the rest, was their agreement in those two fundamentals expressed by Plutarch; namely, the worshipping of one supreme and universal Numen, Reason and Providence, governing all things; and then of his subservient ministers (the instruments of providence) appointed by him over

all the parts of the world : which being honoured under several names, and with different rites and ceremonies, according to the laws of the respective countries, caused all that diversity of religions that was amongst them. Both which fundamental points of the Pagan theology were in like manner acknowledged by Symmachus,* the first of them being thus expressed : “*Æquum est quicquid omnes colunt, unum putari*,” that all religions agreed in this, the worshipping of one and the same supreme Nūmen :—and the second thus ; “*Varios custodes urbibus mens divina distribuit*,” that the Divine Mind appointed divers guardian and tutelar spirits under him, unto cities and countries.—He there adding also, that “*suus cuique mos est, suum cuique jus*,” that every nation had their peculiar modes and manners in worshipping of these ;—and that these external differences in religion ought not to be stood upon, but every one to observe the religion of his own country. Or else these two fundamental points of the Pagan theology may be thus expressed ; first, that there is one self-originated Deity, who was the δημιουργός, or maker of the whole world ;—secondly, that there are besides him other gods also, to be religiously worshipped (that is, intellectual beings superior to men) which were notwithstanding all made or created by that Ed. Phys. c. i one. [lib. i. p. 4.] Stobæus thus declareth their sense : τὸ πλῆθος τῶν θεῶν ἔργον ἐστὶ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ, ἅμα τῷ κόσμῳ γινόμενον, that the multitude of gods is the work of the Demiurgus, made by him, together with the world.

* Epistolar. lib. x. Epist. lx. p. 442.

XXIX. And that the Pagan theologers did thus generally acknowledge one supreme and universal Numen, appears plainly from hence, because they supposed the whole world to be an animal. Thus the writer De Placitis Philos. and out of him

Plot. l. ii. c. iii. Stobæus, οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι πάντες ἐμψυχον τὸν
Stob. Ecl. κόσμον καὶ προνοίᾳ διοικούμενον. Λεῦκιππος
Phya. c. xxv. δὲ καὶ Δημόκριτος καὶ Ἐπικούροσ, καὶ ὅσοι τὰ

ἄτομα εἰσηγούνται καὶ τὸ κενόν, οὔτε ἐμψυχον οὔτε προνοίᾳ διοικεῖσθαι, φύσει δὲ τινι ἀλόγῳ. All others assert the world to be an animal, and governed by providence; only Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus, and those, who make atoms and vacuum the principles of all things, dissenting, who neither acknowledge the world to be animated, nor yet to be governed by providence, but by an irrational nature.—Where, by the way, we may observe the fraud and juggling of Gassendus, who takes occasion from hence highly to extol and applaud Epicurus, as one who approached nearer to Christianity than all the other philosophers, in that he denied the world to be an animal; whereas, according to the language and notions of those times, to deny the world's animation, and to be an Atheist or to deny a God, was one and the same thing; because all the Pagans, who then asserted Providence, held the world also to be animated: neither did Epicurus deny the world's animation upon any other account than this, because he denied Providence. And the ground, upon which this opinion of the world's animation was built, was such as might be obvious even to vulgar understandings; and it is thus expressed by Plotinus, according to the sense of the ancients:

ἀπορον τὸν οὐρανὸ ἀψύχον λέγειν, ἡμῶν, ρὶ Ep. iv. l. iii.
 μέρος σώματος ἔχοντες τοῦ παντός, ψυχὴν ἔχον- e. vii. [de Du-
 ταν· πῶς γὰρ ἂν τὸ μέρος ἔσχεν, ἀψύχον τοῦ lib. i. p. 576.]
 παντός οὗτος; it is absurd to affirm, that the hea-
 ven or world is inanimate, or devoid of life and
 soul, when we ourselves, who have but a part of
 the mundane body in us, are endued with soul.
 For how could a part have life and soul in it, the
 whole being dead and inanimate?—Now, if the
 whole world be one animal, then must it needs be
 governed by one soul, and not by many. Which
 one soul of the world, and the whole mundane
 animal, was by some of the Pagan theologers (as
 namely the Stoics) taken to be the *πρῶτος θεός*, the
 first and highest God of all.

Nevertheless, others of the Pagan theologers,
 though asserting the world's animation likewise,
 yet would by no means allow the mundane soul
 to be the supreme Deity; they conceiving the
 first and highest God to be an abstract and im-
 moveable mind, and not a soul. Thus the Pane-
 gyrist, cited also by Gyraldus, invokes the su-
 preme Deity doubtfully and cautiously, *Hist. Door.*
 as not knowing well what to call him, p. 12.
 whether soul or mind: “Te, summe rerum sator,
 cujus tot nomina sunt, quot gentium linguas esse
 voluisti; quem enim te ipse dici velis, scire non
 possumus: sive in te quædam vis mensque divina
 est, quæ toto infusa mundo omnibus miscearis
 elementis, et sine ullo extrinsecus accedente vigo-
 ris impulsu, per te ipse movearis; sive aliqua
 supra omne cælum potestas es, quæ hoc opus to-
 tum ex altiore naturæ arce despicias: Te, inquam,
 oramus,” &c. Thou supreme Original of all things,
 who hast as many names as thou hast pleased

there should be languages; whether thou beest a certain Divine force and soul, that infused into the whole world art mingled with all the elements, and without any external impulse moved from thyself; or whether thou beest a power elevated above the heavens, which lookest down upon the whole work of nature, as from a higher tower; thee we invoke, &c.—And as the supreme Deity was thus considered only as a perfect mind superior to soul, so was the mundane soul and whole animated world called by these Pagans frequently *δεύτερος θεός*, the second god.—Thus in the Asclepian Dialogue or Perfect Oration, is the Lord and maker of all said to have made a second god visible and sensible, which is the world.

But, for the most part, they who asserted a God, superior to the soul of the world, did maintain a trinity of universal principles, or Divine hypostases subordinate; they conceiving that as there was above the mundane soul a perfect mind or intellect, so that mind and intellect, as such, was not the first principle neither, because there must be *νοητόν* in order of nature before *νοῦς*, an intelligible before Intellect. Which first intelligible was called by them *τὸ ἐν* and *τάγαθόν*, the One and the Good, or unity and goodness itself substantial, the cause of mind and all things. Now as the *tagathon*, or highest of these three hypostases, was sometimes called by them *ὁ πρῶτος θεός*, the first God—and *νοῦς* or intellect *ὁ δεύτερος θεός*, the second god;—so was the mundane soul and animated world called *τρίτος θεός*, the third god.—Thus Numenius in Proclus upon Plato's

P. 93. *Τίμαιος*, *Νουμήνιος μὲν γὰρ τρεῖς ἀνυπόθετος*

θεός, πατέρα μὲν καλεῖ τὸν πρῶτον, ποιητὴν δὲ
 τὸν δεύτερον, κόσμη δὲ τὸν τρίτον· ὁ γὰρ κόσμος P. 93.
 κατ' αὐτὸν ὁ τρίτος ἐστὶ θεός, ὡς ὁ κατ' αὐτὸν δημιουργός
 διττός, ὅτε πρῶτος καὶ ὁ δεύτερος θεός, τὸ δὲ δημιουργούμενον,
 ὁ τρίτος. Numenius praising three gods, calls the
 father the first God, the maker the second, and
 the work the third. For the world, according to
 him, is the third god; as he supposes also two
 artificers, the first and the second God.—Plotinus
 in like manner speaks of this also, as very fa-
 miliar language amongst those Pagans, Ep. 3. 1. 7.
 καὶ ὁ κόσμος θεός, ὥσπερ σύνηθες λέγειν, τρίτος, §. 6.
 and the world, as is commonly said, is [P. 296.]
 the third god.

But neither they, who held the supreme Deity
 to be an immoveable mind or intellect, superior
 to the mundane soul (as Aristotle and Xenocra-
 tes), did suppose that mundane soul and the
 whole world to have depended upon many such
 immoveable intellects self-existent, as their first
 Cause, but only upon one: nor they, who ad-
 mitting a trinity of Divine hypostases, made the
 supreme Deity properly to be a monad above
 mind or intellect, did conceive that intellect to
 have depended upon many such monads, as first
 principles co-ordinate, but upon one only. From
 whence it plainly appears, that the Pagan theo-
 logers did always reduce things under a monarchy,
 and acknowledge not many independent deities,
 but one universal Numen (whether called soul, or
 mind, or monad) as the head of all. Though it
 hath been already declared, that those Pagans,
 who were trinitarians, especially the Platonists,
 do often take those their three hypostases sub-
 ordinate (a monad, mind, and soul) all together,

for the *τὸ θεῖον*, or one supreme Numen ; as supposing an extraordinary kind of unity in that trinity of hypostases, and so as it were a certain latitude and gradation in the Deity.

Where by the way two things may be observed concerning the Pagan theologers : First, that according to them generally the whole corporeal system was not a dead thing, like a machine or automaton artificially made by men, but that life and soul was mingled with and diffused through it all : insomuch that Aristotle himself taxes those, who made the world to consist of nothing but monads or atoms altogether dead and inanimate, as being therefore a kind of Atheists. Secondly, that how much soever some of them supposed the supreme Deity and first Cause to be elevated above the heaven and corporeal world, yet did they not therefore conceive, either the world to be quite cut off from that, or that from the world, so as to have no commerce with it, nor influence upon it ; but as all proceeded from this first Cause, so did they suppose that to be closely and intimately united with all those emanations from itself (though without mixture and confusion), and all to subsist in it, and be pervaded by it. Plutarch, in his Platonic Questions, propounds this amongst the rest,

P. 100. par.

Τί δὴ ποτε τὸν ἀνωτάτω θεὸν πατέρα πάντων καὶ ποιητὴν προσεῖπεν ; Why Plato called the highest God the father and maker of all?—To which he answers in the first place thus ; *τῶν μὲν θεῶν γεννητῶν καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πατὴρ ἐστὶ, ποιητὴς δὲ τῶν ἀλόγων καὶ τῶν ἀψύχων*. That perhaps he was called the father of all the generated gods, and of men, but the maker of the irrational and inanimate things of the

world.—But afterward he adds, that this highest God might therefore be styled the father of the whole corporeal world also, as well as the maker, because it is no dead and inanimate thing, but endued with life: ἐμφύχου γὰρ γένεσις ἢ γένεσις ἐστὶ καὶ ποιητοῦ μὲν, οἷος οἰκοδόμος ἢ ὑφάντης, ἢ λύρας δημιουργὸς ἢ ἀνδριάντος, ἀπὴλλακται τὸ γενόμενον ἔργον· ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ γεννήσαντος ἀρχὴ καὶ δύναμις ἐγκέκραται τῷ τεκνωθέντι, καὶ συνέχει τὴν φύσιν, ἀπόσπασμα καὶ μόριον οὖσαν τοῦ τεκνώσαντος. Ἐπεὶ τοίνυν οὐ πεπλασμένοις ὁ κόσμος, οὐδὲ συνηρμοσμένοις ποιήμασιν ἔοικεν, ἀλλ' ἐστὶν αὐτῷ μοῖρα πολλὴ ζωότητος καὶ θεϊότητος, ἣν ὁ θεὸς ἐγκατέσπειρεν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ τῇ ὕλῃ καὶ κατέμιζεν, ἐκότως ἅμα πατήρ τε τοῦ κόσμου ζῶον γεγονότος, καὶ ποιητῆς ἐπονομάζεται. Generation is the making or production of something animate. And the work of an artificer, as an architect or statuary, as soon as it is produced, departeth and is removed from the maker thereof, as having no intrinsic dependance upon him; whereas from him, that begetteth, there is a principle and power infused into that which is begotten, and mingled therewith, that containeth the whole nature thereof, as being a kind of avulsion from the begetter. Wherefore since the world is not like to those works, that are artificially made and compacted by men, but hath a participation of life and divinity, which God hath inserted into it, and mingled with it, God is therefore rightly styled by Plato, not only the maker, but also the father, of the whole world as being an animal.—

To the same purpose also Plotinus: γενόμενος δὲ οἷον οἶκος τις καλὸς καὶ ποικίλος, οὐκ ἀπεμήθη τοῦ πεποιηκότος, οὐδ' αὖ ἐκοίνωσεν αὐτόν· ἔχει γὰρ ψυχὴν κρατούμενος οὐ κρατῶν, καὶ ἐχόμενος ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔχων, καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀνεχούσῃ αὐτόν, καὶ οὐκ ἄμοι-

ποῦ ἐστὶν αὐτῆς, ὡς ἂν ἐν ὅλῳ διατεταρτισμένης ᾖ.

The world being made as a large and stately edifice, was neither cut off and separated from its maker, nor yet mingled and confounded with him. Forasmuch as he still remaineth above, presiding over it; the world being so animated, as rather to be possessed by soul, than to possess it, it lying in that great Psycho, which sustaineth it, as a net in the waters, all moistened with life.— Thus Plotinus, supposing the whole corporeal world to be animated, affirmeth it neither to be cut off from its maker (by which maker he here understands the mundane soul), itself to be immersed into its body, the world, after the same manner as our human souls are into these bodies; but so to preside over it, and act it, as a thing elevated above it. And though, according to him, that second Divine hypostasis of nous or intellect be in like manner elevated above this mundane soul; and again, that first hypostasis or supreme Deity (called by him unity and goodness), above Intellect; yet the corporeal world could not be said to be cut off from these neither; they being all three (monad, mind, and soul) closely and intimately united together.

xxx. The Hebrews were the only nation, who before Christianity for several ages professedly opposed the Polytheism and idolatry of the Pagan world. Wherefore it may be probably concluded, that they had the right notion of this Pagan Polytheism, and understood what it consisted in, viz. Whether in worshipping many unmade, self-originated deities, as partial creators of the world; or else in worshipping, besides the supreme God, other created beings superior to men? Now Philo

plainly understood the Pagan Polytheism after this latter way; as may appear from this passage of his in his book concerning the Confusion of Languages, where speaking of the supreme God (the Maker and Lord of the whole world), and of his *δυνάμεις ἀφανοὶ*, his innumerable assistant powers—both visible and invisible, he adds, *καταπλάγνυ-
τες οὖν τινὲς τὴν ἑκατέρου τῶν κόσμων φύσιν, οὐ* Pag. 345.
*μόνον ὅλους ἐξεθείωσαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ κάλλιστα τῶν ἐν αὐ-
τοῖς μερῶν, ἥλιον, καὶ σελήνην, καὶ τὸν σύμπαντα οὐρανόν,
ἅπερ οὐδὲν αἰδεσθέντες θεοὺς ἐκάλεσαν, ὡς τὴν ἐπίνοιαν κατ-
ὰ τὴν Μωϋσῆος φησι κύριε κύριε βασιλεῦ τῶν θεῶν, ἰνδαῖον
τῆς παρ' ὑπερέχοντος ἀρχοντος διαφορᾶς.* Wherefore some
men being struck with admiration of both these
worlds, the visible and the invisible, have not on-
ly deified the whole of them, but also their several
parts, as the sun, and the moon, and the whole
heaven, they not scrupling to call these gods.
Which notion and language of theirs Moses re-
spected in those words of his, Thou Lord, the
king of gods; he thereby declaring the trans-
cendency of the supreme God above all those his
subjects called gods.—To the same purpose Philo
writeth also in his Commentary upon the Deca-
logue, *πάσαν οὖν τὴν τοιαύτην τερθρείαν ἀπώ-
σάμενοι, τοὺς ἀδελφοὺς φύσει μὴ προσκυνῶμεν, εἰ* Pag. 753.
*καὶ καθαρωτέρας καὶ ἀθανατωτέρας οὐσίας ἔλαχον, ἀδελφεῖ
ἢ ἀλλήλων τὰ γενόμενα, καθ' ὃ γέγονεν, ἐπεὶ καὶ πατὴρ πάν-
των ὁ ποιητὴς τῶν ὅλων· καὶ πρῶτον τοῦτο καὶ ἱερώτατον
παράγγελμα στηλιτεύσωμεν ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἵνα τὸν ἀγνωστάτω νομί-
ζωμεν τε καὶ τιμῶμεν θεόν.* Wherefore removing all such
imposture, let us worship no beings, that are by
nature brothers and german to us, though en-
dued with far more pure and immortal essences
than we are. For all created things, as such,

have a kind of german and brotherly equality with one another, the Maker of all things being their common father. But let us deeply infix this first and most holy commandment in our breasts, to acknowledge and worship one only highest God:

—And again afterwards, ὅσοι μὲν ἡλίου, καὶ σελήνης, καὶ τοῦ σύμπαντος οὐρανοῦ τε καὶ κόσμου, καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς ὁλοσχεριστάτων μερῶν ὡς θεῶν πρόπολοιτε καὶ θεραπεύεσθαι, διαμαρτάνουσι, τοὺς ὑπηκόους τοῦ ἄρχοντος σεμνύνοντες. They, who worship the sun, and the moon, and the whole heaven and world, and the principal parts of them as gods, err, in that they worship the subjects of the prince; whereas the prince alone ought to be worshipped. Thus, according to Philo, the Pagan Polytheism consisted in giving religious worship, besides the supreme God, to other created understanding beings, and parts of the world, more pure and immortal than men.

Flavius Josephus, in his *Judaic Antiquities*, extolling Abraham's wisdom and piety, writeth thus concerning him; πρῶτος οὖν τολμᾷ θεὸν ἀποφύνασθαι δημιουργόν τῶν ὅλων ἓνα, which some would understand in this manner, that Abraham was the first, who publicly declared, that there was one God, the Demiurgus or maker of the whole world;—as if all mankind besides, at that time, had supposed the world to have been made not by one, but by many gods. But the true meaning of those words is this; that Abraham was the first, who, in that degenerate age, publicly declared, that the maker of the whole world was the one only God, and alone to be religiously worshipped; accordingly, as it follows afterwards in the same writer, ὃ καλῶς ἔχει μόνῳ τὴν τε

* Lib. i. cap. vii. p. xxviii. tom. i. oper. edit. Havercamp.

μὴν καὶ τὴν εὐχαριστίαν ἀπονέμειν, to whom alone men ought to give honour and thanks.—And the reason hereof is there also set down; τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν, εἰ καὶ τι πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν συντελεῖ, κατὰ προσταγὴν τὴν τούτου παρέχειν ἕκαστον καὶ οὐ κατ' οἰκίαν ἰσχύν· Because all those other beings, that were then worshipped as gods, whatsoever any of them contributed to the happiness of mankind, they did it not by their own power, but by his appointment and command;—he instancing in the sun and moon, and earth and sea, which are all made and ordered by a higher Power and Providence, by the force whereof they contribute to our utility. As if he should have said, that no created being ought to be religiously worshipped, but the Creator only. And this agreeth with what we read in Scripture concerning Abraham, that he called upon the name of the Lord, אל על, the God Gen. xxi. 23.] of the whole world—that is, he worshipped no particular created beings, as the other Pagans at that time did, but only that supreme universal Numen, which made and containeth the whole world. And thus Maimonides interprets that place, וַיִּקְרָא אַבְרָהָם אֶל־עַלְיוֹן De Idol. c. i. §. 7. [p. 7. edit. Voss.] Abraham began to teach, that none ought to be religiously worshipped, save only the God of the whole world.—Moreover, the same Josephus afterwards in his twelfth book* brings in Aristæus (who seems to have been a secret proselyted Greek) pleading with Ptolemæus Philadelphus, in behalf of the Jews, and their liberty, after this manner; τὴν βασιλείαν σου διέποντος, τοῦ θεμένου τοὺς νόμους αὐτοῖς. τὸν γὰρ ἅπαντα συντησάμενον θεόν, καὶ οὗτοι

* Cap. 2. §. 2. p. 586. tom. i. oper.

καὶ ἡμεῖς σιβόμεθα, Ζῆνα καλοῦντες αὐτὸν, ἐτόλμωε ἀπὸ τοῦ
σώμασιν ἐμφοῦν τὸ ζῆν, τὴν ἐπίκλησιν αὐτοῦ νοήσαντες.

It would well agree with your goodness and magnanimity, to free the Jews from that miserable captivity, which they are under; since the same God, who governeth your kingdom, gave laws to them, as I have by diligent search found out. For both they and we do alike worship the God, who made all things, we calling him Zene, because he gives life to all. Wherefore, for the honour of that God, whom they worship after a singular manner, please you to indulge them the liberty of returning to their native country.—Where Aristæus also, according to the sense of Pagans, thus concludes; Know, O king, that I intercede not for these Jews, as having any cognation with them, πάντων δὲ ἀνθρώπων δημιουργημα ὄντων τοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ γινώσκων αὐτὸν ἡδόμενον τοῖς εὐποιοῦσιν, ἐπὶ τούτῳ καὶ σε παρακαλῶ, but all men being the workmanship of God, and knowing, that he is delighted with beneficence, I therefore thus exhort you.

As for the latter Jewish writers and Rabbins, it is certain, that the generality of them supposed the Pagans to have acknowledged one supreme and universal Numen, and to have worshipped all their other gods only as his ministers, or as mediators between him and them: Maimonides in Halacoth * עב"ם describeth the rise of the Pagan Polytheism in the days of Enosh, after this manner: זימן אברהם מלך בני האדם שעת גדל ונבעדה עצת חמ: אחרי החדד ואנוש עצמו מן המעים וזהו היה שעתם: אמר וזאיל וזאיל ברא כוכבים אלו ואלגלים להנחת את העולם ונתנם במדום חלק להם בברד חם שמשם השמשם לפנ

* i.e. De Idololatria, cap.i. §. 1. p. iii.

דאזיס זאם לשבחם ולפארום ולחלוק לחם כבוד ודאז רצון וזאל ברוך
 דאז לגדל ולכבוד מי שנרלו וכבודו כמו שהמלך ודאז, לכבוד
 דעמדות לפניו ודאז כבודו של מלך In the days of Enosh,
 the sons of men grievously erred, and the wise
 men of that age became brutish (even Enosh
 himself being in the number of them); and their
 error was this, that since God had created the
 stars and spheres to govern the world, and plac-
 ing them on high, had bestowed this honour up-
 on them, that they should be his ministers and
 subservient instruments, men ought therefore to
 praise them, honour them, and worship them;
 this being the pleasure of the blessed God, that
 men should magnify and honour those, whom him-
 self hath magnified and honoured, as a king will
 have his ministers to be revered, this honour re-
 dounding to himself.—Again, the same Maimo-
 nides in the beginning of the second chapter of
 that book writeth thus; עיקר הצו העבודה דהוה שלא
 לעבוד אחד מכל הברואים לא מלאך ולא גלגל ולא כוכב ולא
 אחד מן היסודות ולא אחד מכל הברואים כדון ואם עליו
 שחשבו ידע שהם הוא האלהים הוא עובר הנבואה דהוה
 על ידו שעבר אנוש ואנוש דהוה תולדה דהוה עבר עבודה דהוה
 The foundation of that commandment against
 strange worship (now commonly called idolatry)
 is this, that no man should worship any of the
 creatures whatsoever, neither angel, nor sphere,
 nor star, nor any of the four elements, nor any
 thing made out of them. For though he, that
 worships these things, knows, that the Lord is
 God; and superior to them all, and worships those
 creatures no otherwise than Enosh and the rest
 of that age did, yet is he nevertheless guilty of
 strange worship or idolatry.—And that, after the
 times of Enosh also, in succeeding ages, the Poly-
 theism of the Pagan nations was no other than

this, the worshipping (besides one supreme God) of other created beings, as the ministers of his providence, and as middles or mediators betwixt him and men, is declared likewise by Maimonides (in his *More Nevochim*) to have been the P. 1. c. xxxvi. universal belief of all the Hebrews or

Jews: ואתה יודע כי כל מי שכר שעבוד זרה לא יעבדה דעת שאין אלה בלעדיו יה ולאדמה מעלם כלל מן העבדים ולא ידמה מן הנאים שהצורה אשר יעשה מן המתכות או מן האבנים והעצים שהצורה והיא היה אשר בראה השמים והארץ אבל אמנם ועבדה על צד שהוא דמיון לדבר שהוא אמצעי בתם ובין האלה וזה ממה שלא יחלוק בו אחד מבעלי תורתנו You know, that whosoever committeth idolatry, he doth it not as supposing, that there is no other God besides that which he worshippeth, for it never came into the minds of any idolaters, nor never will, that that statue, which is made by them of metal, or stone, or wood, is that very God, who created heaven and earth; but they worship those statues and images only as the representation of something, which is a mediator between God and them.—Moses Albelda, the author of the book entitled, עלת תמיד Gnolath Tamid, resolves all the Pagan Polytheism and idolatry into these two principles, one of which respected God, and the other men themselves:

הא שרעני לזה מצדו ית ואומדום כי הוא נבזה מעל נבזה ואם לדבוק בו רך עי תאמצעוים כמנהג תמלך בו שהרצים לשאול שאלה מה ממנו ישאלה עי אמצעי ולכן עשים אותה העא כדי להוריד השפע האלתי על ידה: הב שרעני מצד עצמם וזה כי היות האדם נשמו אינו יכול להתבחד מעצמו אם לא ישים נגדו דבר מזה מוחש יעדרו ויעדרו להבין עצמי כדי שתדבק בו השגחתו יתבוד The idolaters first argued thus in respect of God; that since he was of such transcendent perfection above men, it was not possible for men to be united to, or have com-

munion with him, otherwise than by means of certain middle beings or mediators; as it is the manner of earthly kings, to have petitions conveyed to them by the hands of mediators and intercessors. Secondly, they thus argued also in respect of themselves; that being corporeal, so that they could not apprehend God abstractly, they must needs have something sensible to excite and stir up their devotion and fix their imagination upon.—Joseph Albo, in the book called *Ikkarim*, concludes that Ahab, and the other idolatrous kings of Israel and Judah worshipped other gods upon those two accounts mentioned by Maimonides and no otherwise, namely, that the supreme God was honoured by worshipping of his ministers, and that there ought to be certain middles and mediators betwixt him and men : אהאב P. S. c. xviii.
חורו ממלכי ישראל ויהודה היו טועין אחד הכוהן
הגלגל זה משתי צדדין שאמרו גם שלמה טעה בזה עם היותם
מאמינים במציאות השם ואחוריו אם כשהיו חושבים לנוד
אח השם בזה ואם כשהיו חושבין לעשות סמור ואמצעים
Ahab, and other kings of Israel and Judah, and even Solomon himself, erred in worshipping the stars, upon those two accounts already mentioned out of Maimonides, notwithstanding that they believed the existence of God and his unity; they partly conceiving that they should honour God in worshipping of his ministers, and partly worshipping them as mediators betwixt God and themselves.—And the same writer determines the meaning of that first commandment, (which is to him the second) “Thou shalt have no other gods before my face,” to be this לדבם אותם אמצעים ביני ובינך או שתחשוב לדבם אותי בעבודתם Thou shalt not set up other inferior gods

as mediators betwixt me and thyself, or worship them so, as thinking to honour me thereby.—
R. David Kimchi (upon 2 Kings xvii.) writeth thus concerning that Israelitish priest, who, by the King of Assyria's command, was sent to Samaria to teach the new inhabitants thereof to worship the God of that land (of whom it is afterwards said, that they both feared the Lord, and served their idols;) **אם יאמרו להם שלא יהיו עוברים עבודה זרה כלל לא היו ממעינים שהוא דבר שנולד בו כל האומות מקדם הוא אצלם כמו משכיל ראשון אך אמר להם שהיו עוברים את אלהיהם כמו שהיו עוברים ובלבד שתהא כוונת האל בלבם כי אלא האלהים לא ורעו ולא ישיבי כי אם ברצון האל אלא שעוברים אותם לחיותם אמצעים בינם ובין חבורא**
 If he should have altogether prohibited them their idolatry, they would not have hearkened to him, that being a thing, which all those eastern people were educated in from their very infancy, inso-much that it was a kind of first principle to them. Wherefore he permitted them to worship all their several gods, as before they had done; only he required them to direct the intention of their minds to the God of Israel (as the supreme), for those gods could do them neither good nor hurt, otherwise than according to his will and pleasure; but they worshipped them to this purpose, that they might be **MEDIATORS** betwixt them and the Creator. In the book *Nitzachon*, all the Polytheism and idolatry of the Pagans is reduced to these three heads; first, **עברו מקרתי תשם לכבודי** When they worshipped the ministers of God, as thinking to honour him thereby;—and, secondly, **עברו אותם שהוא מליצים בעדם** When they worshipped them as orators and intercessors for them with God;—and, lastly, **עברו לען ואבן לזכור** When

they worshipped statues of wood and stone for memorials of him. And though it be true, that Isaak Abrabanel (upon 2 Kings xvii.) does enumerate more species of Pagan idolatry, even to the number of ten, yet are they all of them but so many several modes of creature-worship; and there is no such thing amongst them to be found, as the worshipping of many unmade independent deities, as partial creators of the world.

Moreover, those rabbinic writers commonly interpret certain places of the Scripture to this sense, that the Pagan idolaters did notwithstanding acknowledge one supreme Deity, as that (Jeremy x. 7.) "Who is there that will not fear thee, thou King of nations? For amongst all their wise men, and in all their kingdoms, there is none like unto thee; though they are become all together brutish, and their worshipping of stocks is a doctrine of vanity:" for Maimonides thus glosseth upon those words: כלומר הכל יודעים שאותה הוא לבדך אבל טעותם וחסלותם שמדמים שהם הכול רצונך הוא As if he should say, all the Gentiles know, that thou art the only supreme God, but their error and folly consisteth in this, that they think this vanity of worshipping inferior gods, to be a thing agreeable to thy will.—And thus also Kimchi in his Commentaries, מי לא יראך מפני חננים העיברים האלילים ואין להם שידאוך כי אתה מלך עליהם בכל חכמי חננים ובכל מלכותם אומרים מאין כבוד יאמרו עובדים הכוכבים אלא לדחותם אמנעיים בינך ובנינו ואמר חכמי הנגים כי הם יודעים כי הפל איך בלום ואם יעברו הכוכבים לא יעברום אלא מפני שהם משדחך לה ותם אמנעיים Who will not fear thee? It is fit, that even the nations themselves, who worship idols, should fear thee, for thou art their King; and indeed amongst all the wise men of the

nations, and in all their kingdoms, it is generally acknowledged, that there is none like unto thee. Neither do they worship the stars otherwise than as mediators betwixt thee and them. Their wise men know, that an idol is nothing; and though they worship stars, yet do they worship them as thy ministers, and that they may be intercessors for them. Another place is that, Malachi i. 11. which though we read in the future tense, as a prophecy of the Gentiles, yet the Jews understand it of that present time, when those words were written, "From the rising of the sun to the going down thereof, my name is great among the Gentiles; and in every place incense is offered to my name, and a pure oblation, for my name is great amongst the Gentiles, saith the Lord of Hosts. But you profane it, &c.—Upon which words R.

Solomon glosseth thus, *מי שיש לו ע"י ידע שהוא אלה*, שהוא על כלם יבכל מקום מתגדלים לשמי אפ האומות The Pagan Polytheists and idolaters know, that there is one God superior to all those other gods and idols worshipped by them; and in every place are there free-will offerings brought to my name, even amongst the Gentiles. And Kimchi agreeth with him herein, *אפ על פי שהגויס עוברים לצבא השמים פורים בי שאני המבה הראשונה אלא שעוברים אותם שדיו אמעיים בני יבינם* Although the Pagans worshipped the host of heaven, yet do they confess me to be the first Cause, they worshipping them only as in their opinion certain mediators betwixt me and them.—Whether either of these two places of Scripture does sufficiently prove what these Jews would have, or no; yet, however, is it evident from their interpretations of them, that themselves supposed the Pagans to have acknowledged one

supreme Deity, and that their other gods were all but his creatures and ministers. Nevertheless, there is another place of Scripture, which seems to sound more to this purpose, and accordingly hath been thus interpreted by Rabbi Solomon and others, Psal. lxxv. 6. where God is called **מבטח כל קצו ארצות רחוקים** The confidence of all the ends of the earth, and of them that are afar off in the sea—that is, even of all the Pagan world.

Thus we see plainly, that the Hebrew doctors and rabbins have been generally of this persuasion, that the Pagan nations anciently, at least the intelligent amongst them, acknowledged one supreme God of the whole world; and that all their other gods were but creatures and inferior ministers; which were worshipped by them upon these two accounts, either as thinking, that the honour done to them redounded to the supreme; or else that they might be **מלצין** and **מסדדים**, their mediators, and intercessors, orators, and negotiators with him. Which inferior gods of the Pagans were supposed by these Hebrews to be chiefly of two kinds, angels, and stars or spheres. The latter of which the Jews, as well as Pagans, concluded to be animated and intellectual: for thus Maimonides expressly; **בל הכוכבים והגלגלים** Jesode Hatto-
tah o. iii. §. 9. בולן בעלי נפש וריעה השכל הם חם חיים ועומרים וכמרין את כי שאמר חיה העולם בל אחד ואחר רפי גולו ולפי מעלדו משבחין ומפאדים ליצורם כמו המל אכים The stars and spheres are every one of them animated, and endued with life, knowledge and understanding. And they acknowledge him, who commanded and the world was made, every one of them, according to their degree and excellency, praising and honouring him, as the angels do. And this they would

confirm from that place of Scripture, Neh. ix. 6. "Thou, even thou, art Lord alone; thou hast made heaven, the heaven of heavens with all their host, the earth with all things that are therein, the seas and all that is therein, and thou preservest them all; and the host of heaven worshippeth thee:" the host of heaven being commonly put for the stars.

xxxI. But, lastly, this same thing is plainly confirmed from the Scriptures of the New Testament also; that the Gentiles and Pagans, however Polytheists and idolaters, were not unacquainted with the knowledge of the true God, that is, of the one only self-existent and omnipotent Being, which comprehendeth all things under him: from whence it must needs follow, that their other many gods were all of them supposed to have been derived from this one, and to be dependent on him.

For first, St. Paul, in his Epistle to the Romans,* tells us, that these Gentiles or Pagans did *τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐν ἀδικίᾳ κατέχουσιν*, hold the truth in unrighteousness, or unjustly detain and imprison the same.—Which is chiefly to be understood of the truth concerning God, as appears from that which follows, and therefore implies the Pagans not to have been unfurnished of such a knowledge of God, as might and ought to have kept them from all kinds of idolatry, however by their default it proved ineffectual to that end; as

is afterwards declared; *οὐκ ἔδοκίμασαν τὸν Θεὸν ἔχειν ἐν ἐπιγνώσει*, they liked not to retain God in the agnition, or practical knowledge of him.—Where there is a distinction to be ob-

* Cap. i. 25.

served betwixt γνώσις and ἐπίγνωσις, the knowledge and the agnition of God—the former whereof, in this chapter, is plainly granted to the Pagans, though the latter be here denied them, because they lapsed into Polytheism and idolatry; which is the meaning of these words: μετήλ-

λαξαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν τοῦ θεοῦ ἐν τῷ ψεύδει, they V. 25.
changed the truth of God into a lie.—Again, the same apostle there affirmeth, that the τὸ γνωστόν τοῦ θεοῦ φανερόν ἐστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς, that, which may be known of God, was manifest within them, God himself having shewed it unto them.—There is something of God unknowable and incomprehensible by all mortals, but that of God, which is knowable, his eternal power and Godhead, with the attributes belonging thereunto, is made manifest to all mankind from his works. “The invisible things of him, from the creation of the world, being clearly seen and understood by the things that are made.” Moreover, this apostle expressly declareth the Pagans to have known God, in that censure, which he giveth of

them: διότι γινόντες τὸν θεόν, οὐχ ὡς Θεὸν ἑδοξ- V. 21.
ασαν, that when they knew God, they glorified him not as God;—because they fell into Polytheism and idolatry. Though the apostle here instanceth only in the latter of those two, their “changing the glory of the incorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible man, and to birds and beasts, and creeping things.” The reason whereof is, because this idolatry of the Pagans, properly so called, that is, their worshipping of stocks and stones, formed into the likeness of man or beast, was generally taken amongst the Jews for the grossest of all their re-

religious miscarriages. Thus Philo plainly declares : *De Decal.* ὅσοι μὲν ἡλίου, καὶ σελήνης, καὶ τοῦ
 p. 753. σύμπαντος οὐρανοῦ τε καὶ κόσμου, καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐ-
 τοῖς ὀλοσχεριστάτων μερῶν ὡς θεῶν πρόπολοι τε καὶ θερα-
 πηταί, διαμαρτάνουσι μὲν (πῶς γὰρ αὐ, τοὺς ὑπεκῶους τοῦ
 ἀρχοντος σιμνύοντες) ἤττον δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἀδικοῦσι, τῶν
 ξύλα καὶ λίθους, ἀργυρὸν τε καὶ χρύσον, καὶ τὰς παραπλησί-
 ως ὕλας μορφωσάντων, &c. Whosoever worship the
 sun, and moon, and the whole heaven, and world,
 and the chief parts thereof, as gods, do unquestion-
 ably err, (they honouring the subjects of the
 prince) but they are guilty of the less iniquity and
 injustice than those, who form wood and stone,
 gold and silver, and the like matters, into statues,
 to worship them, &c.—of which assertion he af-
 terwards gives this account : τὸ γὰρ κάλλιστον ἔρεσμα
 τῆς ψυχῆς ἐξέκοψαν, τὴν περὶ τοῦ ζῶντος αἰε θεοῦ προσήκου-
 σαν ὑπόληψιν, because these have cut off the most
 excellent fulcrum of the soul, the persuasion of
 the ever-living God, by means whereof, like un-
 ballasted ships, they are tossed up and down per-
 petually, nor can be ever able to rest in any safe
 harbour.—And from hence it came to pass, that
 the Polytheism of the Pagans, their worshipping
 of inferior gods (as stars and demons) was vul-
 garly called also by the Jews and Christians idol-
 atry, it being so denominated by them a *famosiore*
specie. Lastly, the apostle plainly declares, that
 the error of the Pagan superstition universally
 consisted (not in worshipping many independent
 gods and creators, but) in joining creature wor-
 ship, as such, some way or other, with the wor-
 ship of the Creator : ἐπεβάσθησαν καὶ ἐλάτρευ-
 σαν τῇ κτίσει παρὰ τὸν κτίσαντα, which words
 are either to be thus rendered : They [religiously]

worshipped the creature, besides the Creator"—that preposition being often used in this sense, as for example, in this of Aristotle, where he affirmeth concerning Plato, that he did τὸ ἐν καὶ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς παρὰ τὰ πράγματα ποιῆσαι, (not make numbers to be the things themselves, as the Pythagoreans had done, but) unity and numbers to be besides the things;—or τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ, numbers to exist by themselves, besides the sensibles: he by numbers meaning, as Aristotle himself there expounds it, τὰ εἶδη, the ideas contained in the first Intellect (which was Plato's second Divine hypostasis) as also by τὸ ἐν, ὃ τοῖς εἶδεσι παρέχεται τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, that *ipsam unum*, or unity, which gives being to those ideas—is understood Plato's first Divine hypostasis. Or else the words ought to be translated thus: "And worshipped the creature above or more than the Creator," that preposition παρὰ being sometimes used comparatively so as to signify excess, as for example in Luke xiii. 2. "Think you that these Galileans were ἀμαρτωλοὶ παρὰ πάντας τοὺς Γαλιλαίους, sinners beyond all the Galileans?" And, (ver. 4.) "Think you, that those eighteen, upon whom the tower of Siloam fell, were ὀφειλταὶ παρὰ πάντας, debtors above all the men, that dwelt in Jerusalem?" According to either of which interpretations, it is supposed, that the Pagans did worship the true God, the Creator of the whole world; though they worshipped the creature also, besides him, or (perhaps in some sense) above him, and more than him also. But as for that other interpretation of παρὰ τὸν κτίσαντα, which Beza chose rather to follow, that "they worshipped the creature, the Creator being wholly passed by," this is no true

Met. 1. i.
o. vi. [p. 272.
tom. iv.
oper.]

literal version, but only a gloss or commentary upon the words, made according to a certain pre-conceived and extravagant opinion, that the Pagans did not at all worship the supreme God or Creator, but universally transfer all their worship upon the creature only. But in what sense the Pagans might be said to worship the creatures above or beyond, or more than the Creator, (because it is not possible, that the creature, as a creature, should be worshipped with more internal and mental honour than the Creator thereof, looked upon as such) we leave others to inquire. Whether or no, because when religious worship, which properly and only belongeth to the Creator, and not at all to the creature, is transferred from the Creator upon the creature, according to a Scripture interpretation and account, such may be said to worship the creature more than the Creator? Or whether because some of these Pagans might more frequently address their devotions to their inferior gods (as stars, demons, and heroes) as thinking the supreme God, either above their worship, or incomprehensible, or inaccessible by them? Or, lastly, whether because the image and statue-worshippers among the Pagans (whom the apostle there principally regards) did direct all their external devotion to sensible objects and creaturely forms? However, it cannot be thought, that the apostle here taxes the Pagans merely for worshipping creatures above the Creator, as if they had not at all offended, had they worshipped them only in an equality with him; but doubtless their sin was, that they gave any religious worship at all to the creature, though in way of aggravation of their crime it be

said, that they also worshipped the creature more than the Creator. Thus we see plainly, that the Pagan superstition and idolatry (according to the true Scripture notion of it) consisted not in worshipping of many creators, but in worshipping the creatures together with the Creator.

Besides this we have in the Acts of the Apostles an oration, which St. Paul made at Athens in the Areopagitic court, beginning after this manner: "Ye men of Athens, I perceive, that ye are every way more than ordinarily religious;" for the word *δεισιδαιμονεστέρους* seems to be taken there in a good sense, it being not only more likely, that St. Paul would in the beginning of his oration thus *captare benevolentiam*, conciliate their benevolence, with some commendation of them, but also very unlikely, that he would call their worshipping of the true God by the name of superstition, for so it followeth: "for as I passed by and beheld your sacred things (or monuments) I found an altar with this inscription, *Ἀγνώστῳ Θεῷ*, TO THE UNKNOWN GOD." It is true, that both Philostratus^a and Pausanias^b write, that there were at Athens *Ἀγνώστων Θεῶν βωμοί*, altars of unknown gods:—but their meaning in this might well be, not that there were altars dedicated to unknown gods plurally, but that there were several altars, which had this singular inscription: TO THE UNKNOWN GOD. And that there was at least one such, besides this Scripture record, is evident from that dialogue in Lucian's works entitled *Philopatris*,^c where Critias useth this form of oath, *Νῆ τὸν Ἀγνώστον ἐν Ἀθήναις*, No, by the un-

^a De Vita Apollonii, lib. vi. cap. iii. p. 232.

^b Lib. v. p. 199.

^c Cap. ix. p. 122. edit. Gesneri.

known god at Athens:—and Triephton in the close of that dialogue speaketh thus: * *Ἡμεῖς δὲ τὸν ἐν Ἀθήναις ἄγνωστον ἐφευρόντες, καὶ προσκυνήσαντες, χεῖρας εἰς οὐρανὸν ἐκτείναντες, τούτῳ εὐχαριστήσομεν, ὡς κατεξωθέντες, &c.* But we having found out that unknown God at Athens, and worshipped him, with hands stretched up to heaven, will give thanks to him, as having been thought worthy to be made subject to this power.—Which passages, as they do unquestionably refer to that Athenian inscription either upon one or more altars, so does the latter of them plainly imply, that this unknown God of the Athenians was the supreme Governor of the world. And so it follows in St. Paul's oration: *ὃν οὖν ἀγνοοῦντες εὐσεβίζετε, τοῦτον ἐγὼ καταγγέλλω ὑμῖν*, Whom therefore you ignorantly worship (under this name of the unknown God) him declare I unto you, the God that made the world, and all things in it, the Lord of heaven and earth.—From which place we may upon firm Scripture authority conclude these two things: first, that by the unknown God of the Athenians was meant the only true God, he who made the world and all things in it; who in all probability was therefore styled by them *ἄγνωστος Θεός*, the unknown God—because he is not only invisible, but also incomprehensible by mortals; of whom Josephus against Appion^b writeth thus, that he is *δυνάμει μόνον ἡμῖν γινώσκτος, ὁποῖος δὲ κατὰ οὐσίαν ἄγνωστος*, knowable to us only by the effects of his power, but, as to his own essence, unknowable or incomprehensible.—But when in Dion Cassius the God of the Jews is said to be *ἄρρητος καὶ ἀεὶ ἀόρατος*, not only invisible, but also ineffable, and when he is called

* Cap. xxiii. p. 203.

^b Lib. ii. cap. xv. p. 482.

in Lucan, *Incertus Deus*, an uncertain God—the reason hereof seems to have been, not only because there was no image of him, but also because he was not vulgarly then known by any proper name, the Tetragrammaton being religiously forbidden amongst the Jews in common use, that it might not be profaned. And what some learned men have here mentioned upon this occasion, of the Pagans sometimes sacrificing *προσηκοντι θεῷ*, to the proper and convenient God—without signifying any name, seems to be nothing to this purpose; that proceeding only from a superstitious fear of these Pagans (supposing several gods to preside over several things) lest they should be mistaken in not applying to the right and proper God, in such certain cases, and so their devotion prove unsuccessful and ineffectual. But that this unknown God is here said to be ignorantly worshipped by the Athenians, is to be understood chiefly in regard of their Polytheism and idolatry. The second thing, that may be concluded from hence, is this, that these Athenian Pagans did *εὐσεβεῖν*, religiously worship the true God, the Lord of heaven and earth—and so we have a Scripture confutation also of that opinion, that the Pagans did not at all worship the supreme God.

Lastly, St. Paul, citing this passage out of Aratus, a heathen poet, concerning Zeus or Jupiter,

Ταῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος ἐσμὲν————

For we are his offspring—and interpreting the same of the true God, “in whom we live and move, and have our being;” we have also here a plain Scripture acknowledgment, that by the Zeus of the Greekish Pagans was sometimes at least meant.

the true God. And, indeed, that Aratus's Zeus was neither a man born in Crete nor in Arcadia, but the Maker and supreme Governor of the whole world, is evident both from the antecedent and the subsequent verses. For Aratus's phenomena begins thus :

Ἐν Διὶ ἀρχέμεσθαι

(which in Tully's version is " ab Jove musarum primordia") and then follows a description of this Zeus or Jupiter:

τὸν οὐδὲν ἄνθρωπος ἴσμεν
 Ἄρῃται μυσταὶ δὲ Διὸς πᾶσαι μὲν ἀγροίαι,
 Πᾶσαι δ' ἀνθρώπων ἀγοραί, μυστὴ δὲ θάλασσα,
 καὶ λιμένες· πάντα δὲ Διὸς ἀρχήμεσθαι πάντες·
 τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος ἐσμεν.

To this sense: Him, of whom we men are never silent; and of whom all things are full, he permeating and pervading all, and being every where; and whose beneficence we all constantly make use of and enjoy: for we also are his offspring.—Where Theon the scholiast writeth thus: πάντι προπύοντως ὁ Ἀράτος τὴν τῶν ἀστρον διεξιέναι μέλλων θεῶν, τὸν πατέρα τούτων καὶ δημιουργόν; Δία, ἐν πρώτοις προσφωνεῖ· Δία δὲ νῦν τὸν Δημιουργόν ἀκουστίον· Aratus being about to declare the position of the stars, doth, in the first place, very decorously and becomingly invoke Zeus, the father and maker of them: for by Zeus is here to be understood the Demiurgus of the world—or, as he afterwards expresseth it, ὁ τὰ πάντα δημιουργήσας θεός, the God who made all things.—Notwithstanding which, we must confess, that this scholiast there adds, that some of these passages of the poet, and even that cited by the apostle, τοῦ γὰρ γένος ἐσμεν, may be understood also in another sense, of the Ζεὺς φυσικός, the phy-

sical Jupiter; that is, the air; but without the least shadow of probability, and for no other reason, as we conceive, but only to shew his philological skill. However, this is set down by him, in the first place, as the genuine and proper sense of those words: Πρὸς τὸ πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε· εἰ γὰρ αὐτὸς ταῦτα ἔδημιούργησε. πρὸς τὸ ταῖς ἀνθρώποις βιωφιλὲς, αὐτοῦ ἂν κληθεῖμεν, αὐτὸν πατέρα καὶ δημιουργὸν ἐπιγραφόμενοι· This agreeth with that title of Jupiter, when he is called the father of gods and men: for if he made us, and all these other things for our use, we may well be called his, and also style him our father and maker."—And that this was the only notion, which the poet here had of Zeus or Jupiter, appears undeniably also from the following words; as,

————— ἰδ' ἵππος ἀσδρόμεος.
Δίξιν σημαίνει

Who, as a kind and benign father, sheweth lucky signs to men;—which to understand of the air were very absurd. And,

Αὐτὸς γὰρ τάς σήματ' ἐν οὐρανῷ ἱστῆκεν,
"Ἄστρα διακρίνας" ἐκείφατο δ' εἰς ἑνιαυτὸν
"Ἄστρας"

For he also hath fastened the signs in heaven, distinguishing constellations, and having appointed stars to rise and set at several times of the year.—And from this,

Τῷ μὲν αἰὶ πρῶτον τε καὶ ὕστατον ἑλίσσονται,

Therefore is he always propitiated and placated both first and last.—Upon which the scholiast thus: ἴσως δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν σπονδῶν, τῷ τὴν μὲν πρώτην σπονδὴν εἶναι θεῶν τῶν Ὀλυμπίων, δευτέραν δὲ ἡρώων, καὶ τρίτην Διὸς σωτήρος· This perhaps refers to the libations, in

that the first of them was for the heavenly gods; the second for heroes, and the last for Jupiter the Saviour.—From whence it plainly appears also, that the Pagans in their sacrifices (or religious rites) did not forget Jupiter the Saviour, that is, the supreme God.

Lastly, from his concluding thus;

Χαῖρε κέντρει μέγα θεῶμα, μέγ' ἀσπόμενον θεῶμα

Where the supreme God is saluted, as the great wonder of the world, and interest of mankind.

Wherefore it is evident from Aratus's context, that by his Zeus or Jupiter was really meant the supreme God, the maker of the whole world; which being plainly confirmed also by St. Paul and the Scripture, ought to be a matter out of controversy amongst us. Neither is it reasonable to think, that Aratus was singular in this, but that he spake according to the received theology of the Greeks, and that not only amongst philosophers and learned men, but even the vulgar also. Nor do we think, that that prayer of the ancient Athenians, commended by M. Antoninus for its simplicity, is to be understood otherwise,

L. v. §. 3. [S. 8. p. 146.] Ὅσον ὕσον ὃ φίλε Ζεῦ, κατὰ τῆς ἀρούρας τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν πεδίων, Rain, rain, O good

(or gracious) Jupiter, upon the fields and pastures of the Athenians:—upon which the Emperor thus: ἤτοι οὐ δεῖ εὐχεσθαι, ἢ οὕτως ἀπλῶς καὶ ἐλευθέρως. We should either not pray at all (to God) or else thus plainly and freely.—And since the Latins had the very same notion of Jupiter, that the Greeks had of Zeus, it cannot be denied, but that they commonly by their Jupiter also understood the one supreme God, the Lord of heaven and earth. We

know nothing, that can be objected against this from the Scripture, unless it should be that passage of St. Paul,* "In the wisdom of God the world by wisdom knew not God." But the meaning thereof is no other than this, that the generality of the world before Christianity, by their natural light, and contemplation of the works of God, did not attain to such a practical knowledge of God, as might both free them from idolatry, and effectually bring them to a holy life.

xxxii. But in order to a fuller ex-
plication of this Pagan theology, and P. 314, 315,
giving yet a more satisfactory account concerning it, there are three heads requisite to be insisted on; first, that the intelligent Pagans worshipped the one supreme God under many several names; secondly, that besides this one God, they worshipped also many gods, that were indeed inferior deities subordinate to him; thirdly, that they worshipped both the supreme and inferior gods, in images, statues and symbols, sometimes abusively called also gods. We begin with the first, that the supreme God amongst the Pagans was polyonymous, and worshipped under several personal names, according to several notions and considerations of him, from his several attributes and powers, manifestations, and effects in the world.

It hath been already observed out of P. 114, 115.
Origen, that not only the Egyptians, but
also the Syrians, Persians, Indians, and other barbarian Pagans, had, beside their vulgar theology, another more arcane and recondite one, amongst their priests and learned men; and that the same was true concerning the Greeks and Latins also,

* 1 Corinths. i. 21.

is unquestionably evident from that account, that hath been given by us of their philosophic theology; where, by the vulgar theology of the Pagans, we understand not only their mythical or fabulous, but also their political or civil theology, it being truly affirmed by St. Austin concerning

both these, "*Et civilis et fabulosa ambæ fabulosæ sunt, ambæque civiles;*" That both the fabulous theology of the Pagans was in part their civil, and their civil was fabulous.—And by their more arcane or

Civ. D. l. iv.
c. viii.
[lib. v. cap.
viii. p. 120.
tom. vii.
oper.]

recondite theology, is doubtless meant that, which they conceived to be the natural and true theology. Which distinction of the natural and true theology, from the civil and political, as it was acknowledged by all the ancient Greek philosophers, but most expressly by Antistines, Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics; so was it owned and much insisted upon, both by Scævola, that famous Roman Pontifex, and by Varro, that most learned antiquary; they both agreeing, that the civil theology then established by the Roman laws was only the theology of the vulgar, but not the true; and that there was another theology besides it, called by them natural, which was the theology of wise men and of truth: nevertheless granting a necessity, that in cities and commonwealths, besides this natural and true theology (which the generality of the vulgar were incapable of) there should be another civil or political theology, accommodate to their apprehensions; which civil theology differed from the natural, only by a certain mixture of fabulosity in it, and was therefore looked upon by them as a middle, betwixt the natural and the fabulous or poetical theology.

Wherefore it was acknowledged, that the vulgar theology of the Pagans, that is, not only their fabulous, but even their civil also, was oftentimes very discrepant from the natural and true theology; though the wise men amongst them, in all ages, endeavoured as much as they could, to dissemble and disguise this difference, and by allegorizing the poetic fables of the gods, to bring that theology into some seeming conformity with the natural and philosophic; but what they could not in this way reconcile, was by them excused upon the necessity of the vulgar.

The fabulous theology both of the Greeks and Romans did not only generate all the other gods, but even Jupiter himself also, their supreme Numen, it assigning him both a father and a mother, a grandfather and a grandmother. And though the Romans did not plainly adopt this into their civil theology, yet are they taxed by St. Austin^a for suffering the statue of Jupiter's nurse to be kept in the capitol for a religious monument. And however this differed nothing at all from that atheistic doctrine of Evemerus,^b That all the gods were really no other than mortal men,—yet was it tolerated and connived at by the politicians, in way of necessary compliance with the vulgar, it being so extremely difficult for them to conceive any such living being or animal, as was never made, and without beginning. Insomuch, that Callimachus,^c who would by no means admit of Jupiter's sepulchre, either in Crete or Arcadia (but looked upon it as a foul reproach to him) for this reason,

^a De Civitate Dei, lib. vii. cap. vii. p. 119.

^b Apud Augustin. ubi supra.

^c Hymno in Jovem, ver. 9.

Zē' d' Sāng' hōi yāq' aiā,

Because he was immortal and could never die ;— did notwithstanding himself attribute a temporary generation and nativity to him, as Origen * and others observe. Nevertheless, the generality of the more civilized and intelligent Pagans, and even of the poets themselves, did all this while constantly retain thus much of the natural and true theology amongst them, that Jupiter was the father both of gods and men ; that is, the maker of the whole world, and consequently himself without father, eternal and unmade, according to that Peleadean oracle before cited out of Pausanias,

Zēq' hō, Zēq' hōi, Zēq' hōi hōi—

Again, the civil theology of the Pagans, as well as the poetic, had not only many fantastic gods in it, but also an appearance of a plurality of independent deities ; it making several supreme in their several territories and functions ; as one to be the chief ruler over the heavens, another over the air and winds, another over the sea, and another over the earth and hell ; one to be the giver of corn, another of wine ; one the god of learning, another the god of pleasure, and another the god of war ; and so for all other things. But the natural theology of the Pagans (so called) though it did admit a plurality of gods too, in a certain sense, that is, of inferior deities subordinate to one supreme ; yet did it neither allow of more independent deities than one, nor own any gods at all, but such as were natural, that is, such as had a real existence in nature and the world without,

* Advers. Celsum, lib. iii. p. 137.

and not in men's opinion only. And these Varro* concluded to be no other than, first, the Soul of the world, and then the animated parts thereof superior to men; that is, one supreme universal Numen unmade, and other particular generated gods, such as stars, demons, and heroes. Wherefore all the other gods besides these are frequently exploded by Pagan writers (as Cicero and others) under the name of *dii poetici*, that is, not philosophical, but poetical gods; and *dii commentitii* and *fictitii*, that is, not natural and real, but feigned and fictitious gods.—They in the mean time giving this account of them, that they were indeed nothing else but so many several names and notions of one supreme Numen, according to his several powers and various manifestations, and effects in the world; it being thought fit by the wisdom of the ancient Pagan theologers, that all those manifold glories and perfections of the Deity should not be huddled up, and as it were crowded and crumpled together, in one general acknowledgment of an invisible Being, the maker of the world, but that they should be distinctly and severally displayed, and each of them adored singly and apart; and this too (for the greater pomp and solemnity) under so many personal names. Which perhaps the unskilful and sottish vulgar might sometimes mistake, not only for so many real and substantial, but also independent and self-existent deities.

We have before proved, that one and the same supreme God, in the Egyptian theology, had several proper and personal names given him, ac-

* Apud Augustin. de Civitate Dei, lib. v. cap. iv. v. p. 116. tom. vii. oper. et lib. vii. cap. v. vi. p. 128.

cording to several notions of him, and his several powers and effects; Jamblichus himself, in that passage already cited, plainly affirming thus much;

De Myst. Æ. ὁ δημιουργικός νοῦς, &c. τὴν ἀφανῆ τῶν κεκρυμ-
gypt.
[sect. 8. cap. μένων λόγων δυνάμιν εἰς φῶς ἄγων, Ἀμμὼν κατὰ
iii. p. 159.] τὴν τῶν Αἰγυπτίων γλώσσαν λέγεται, συντελῶν

δὲ ἀψευδῶς ἕκαστα καὶ τεχνικῶς Φθᾶ, ἀγαθῶν δὲ ποιητικὸς
 ὢν Ὅσιρις κέκληται, καὶ ἄλλας δι' ἄλλας δυνάμεις τε καὶ
 ἐνεργείας, ἐπωνυμίας ἔχει· the demiurgical Mind and
 president of Truth, as with wisdom it proceedeth
 to generation, and bringeth forth the hidden power
 of the occult reasons, contained within itself, into
 light, is called in the Egyptian language Ammon;
 as it artificially effects all things with truth, Phtha;
 as it is productive of good things, Osiris; besides
 which it hath also several other names, according
 to its other powers and energies:—as, namely,
 Neith, (or according to Proclus's copy, Νηϊθᾶς,
 Neithas) the tutelar god of the city Sais, from
 whence probably the Greek Ἀθηνᾶ was derived,
 (the Athenians being said to have been at first a
 colony of these Saites) and this is the Divine
 wisdom diffusing itself through all. So likewise
 Serapis, which though some would have to be the
 sun, is by others plainly described as an universal
 Numen. As Aristides in his eighth oration upon

P. 95. this god Serapis; Οἱ μὲν δὲ τῆς μεγάλης
 πρὸς Αἰγύπτῳ πόλεως πολῖται, καὶ ἑνὰ τοῦτον
 ἀνακαλοῦσι Δία· ὅτι οὐκ ἀπολέλειπται δυνάμει περιττῇ, ἀλλὰ
 διὰ πάντων ἤκει, καὶ τὸ πᾶν πεπλήρωκε· τῶν γὰρ ἄλλων θεῶν
 διήρηται αἱ δυνάμεις τε καὶ τιμαί, καὶ ἄλλους ἐπ' ἄλλα ἄνθρω-
 ποι καλοῦσιν, ὃ δὲ ὥσπερ κορυφαῖος πάντων, ἀρχὰς καὶ πέ-
 ρατα ἔχει. They, who inhabit the great city in
 Egypt, call upon this god Serapis as their only
 Jupiter, he being supposed to be no way defective

in power, but to pervade all things, and to fill the whole universe. And whereas the powers and honours of the other gods are divided, and some of them are invoked for one thing, and some for another; this is looked upon by them as the Coryphæus of all the gods, who contains the beginning and end of all things, and who is able to supply all wants.—Cneph is also described by Eusebius^a as that Divine Intellect, which was the Demiurgus of the world, and which giveth life to all things, as he is by Plutarch^b said to be ἀγέννητος, or unmade—so that this was also another Egyptian name of God; as likewise was Emeph and Eicton in Jamblichus;^c though these may be severally distinguished into a trinity of Divine hypostases. Lastly, when Isis, which was sometimes called Multimammea, and made all over full of breasts, to signify her feeding all things, thus describes herself in Apuleius,^d “Summa numinum, prima cœlitum, deorum dearumque facies uniformis, cujus numen unicum multiformi specie, ritu vario, nomine multijugo totus veneratur orbis;” as she plainly makes herself to be the supreme Deity, so doth she intimate, that all the gods and goddesses were compendiously contained in her alone, and that she (*i. e.* the supreme God) was worshipped under several personal names, and with different rites, over the whole Pagan world.—Moreover, this is particularly noted concerning the Egyptians by^e Damas-

^a Ex Porphyrio, Præpar. Evangel. lib. iii. cap. xi. p. 115.

^b De Iside et Osiride, p. 357. oper.

^c De Myster. Ægypt. §. 8. cap. iii. p. 158.

^d Metamorph. lib. xii. p. 258, 259. edit. Elmenhorsti.

^e MS. ἀπὸ πάντων ἀρχῶν.

cus, the philosopher, that τὸ νοητὸν διηγήκασιν εἰς πολλῶν θεῶν ἰδιότητας, they multiplied the first Intelligible (or the supreme Deity) breaking and dividing the same into the names and properties of many gods.—Now, the Egyptian theology was in a manner the pattern of all the rest, but especially of those European theologies, of the Greeks and Romans.

Who likewise, that they often made many gods of one, is evident from their bestowing so many proper and personal names upon each of those inferior gods of theirs; the sun, and the moon, and the earth; the first whereof, usually called Apollo, had therefore this epithet of πολυνώνυμος, commonly given to him, the god with many names.—Which many proper names of his Macrobius insisteth upon in his Saturnalia, though probably making more of them than indeed they were. And the moon was not only so called, but also Diana, and Lucina, and Hecate, and otherwise; insomuch that this goddess also hath been styled Polyonymous as well as her brother, the sun. And, lastly, the earth, besides those honorary titles, of bona dea, and magna dea, and mater deorum, the good goddess, and the great goddess, and the mother of the gods, was multiplied by them into those many goddesses, of Vesta, and Rhea, and Cybele, and Ceres, and Proserpina, and Ops, &c. And for this cause was she thus described by Æschylus;*

Καὶ γὰρ πολλὰν ὀνομασίαν μορφῇ μία*

Et Tellus multorum nominum facies una.

* In Prometheo victo, p. 29. edit. Guil. Canteri, Antwerp. 1580. 12mo.

Now if these inferior gods of the Pagans had each of them so many personal names bestowed upon them, much more might the supreme God be polyonymous amongst them; and so indeed he was commonly styled, as that learned grammarian Hesychius intimates, upon that word Πολυώνυμον, τὴν μονάδα οὕτως ἐκάλουν, καὶ ἐπίθετον Ἀπόλλωνος, they called the Monad thus, and it was also the epithet of Apollo—where, by the Monad, according to the Pythagoric language, is meant the supreme Deity, which was thus styled by the Pagans πολυώνυμον, the Being that hath many names.—And accordingly Cleanthes thus beginneth that forecited hymn of his to him,

Κύδιστ' ἀθάνατον, πολυώνυμε,

Thou most glorious of all the immortal gods, who art called by many names.—And Zeno, his master, in Laertius,* expressly declareth, ὁ Θεὸς πολλαῖς προσηγορίαις ὀνομάζεται κατὰ τὰς δυνάμεις, God is called by many several names, according to his several powers and virtues—whose instances shall be afterwards taken notice of. Thus also the writer De Mundo;† Εἷς δὲ ὢν πολυώνυμός ἐστι, κατονομαζόμενος τοῖς πάθεσι πᾶσιν ἅπερ αὐτὸς νεοχμεῖ. God, though he be but one, is polyonymous, and variously denominated from his several attributes, and the effects produced by him. “Quæcunque voles (saith Seneca) illi propria nomina aptabis, vim aliquam effectumque cœlestium rerum continentia. Tot appellationes ejus pos-

De Ben. l. i.

[cap. vii. p.

477. tom. i.

oper.]

sunt esse quot munera.” You may give God whatso-

* Lib. vii. segm. 147. p. 468.

† Cap. vii. p. 868. tom. i. oper. Aristot.

ever proper names you please, so they signify some force and effect of heavenly things. He may have as many names as he hath manifestations, offices and gifts.—Macrobius,^a also, from the authority of Virgil, thus determines, “*unius Dei effectus varios pro variis censendos esse* (or, as Vossius corrects it, *censeri*) *numinibus*,” that the various effects of one God were taken for several gods—that is, expressed by several personal names; as he there affirmeth, the divers virtues of the sun to have given names to divers gods, because they gave occasion for the sun to be called by several proper and personal names. We shall conclude with that of Maximus Madaurensis,^b before cited out of St. Austin: “*Hujus virtutes per mundanum opus diffusas nos multis vocabulis invocamus, quoniam nomen ejus proprium ignoramus. Ita fit, ut dum ejus quasi quædam membra carptim variis supplicationibus prosequimur, totum colere profecto videamur.*” The virtues of this one supreme God, diffused throughout the whole world, we (Pagans) invoke under many several names, because we are ignorant what his proper name is. Wherefore we thus worshipping his several divided members, must needs be judged to worship him whole, we leaving out nothing of him.—With which latter words seemeth to agree that of the poet, wherein Jupiter thus bespeaks the other gods;

*Cœlicolæ, in ea membra, Dei; quos nostra potestas
Officiis divisa facit.*

Where it is plainly intimated, that the many Pa^t

^a Saturnal. lib. i. cap. xvii. p. 272.

^b Epist. ad Augustin. vide Augustin. oper. tom. ii. epist. xvi. p. 15.

gan gods were but the several divided members of the one supreme Deity, whether because, according to the Stoical sense, the real and natural gods were all but parts of the mundane soul; or else because all those other fantastic gods were nothing but several personal names, given to the several powers, virtues, and offices of the one supreme.

Now the several names of God, which the writer De Mundo^a instanceth in, to prove him polyonymous, are first of all such as these; Βρονταῖος, and Ἀστραπαῖος, the Thunderer and Lightner; Ὑέτιος, the Giver of rain, Ἐπικάρπιος, the Bestower of fruits, Πολιεύς, the Keeper of cities, Μελίχιος, the Mild and Placable—under which notion they sacrificed no animals to him, but only the fruits of the earth; together with many other such epithets, as Φίλιος, Ξένιος, Στράτιος, Τροπαιούχος, Καθάριστος, Παλαμναῖος, &c. and, lastly, he is called Σωτήρ and Ἐλευθέριος, Saviour and Assertor.—Answerably to which, Jupiter had many such names given him also by the Latins, as Victor, Invictus, Opitulus, Stator; the true meaning of which last, (according to Seneca)^b was not that, which the historians pretend, “quod post votum susceptum, acies Romanorum fugientium stetit,” because once after vows and prayers offered to him, the flying army of the Romans was made to stand—“sed quod stant beneficio ejus omnia,” but because all things by means of him stand firm and are established.—For which same reason he was called also by them (as St. Austin informs us)^c

^a Cap. vii. p. 866. tom. i. oper. Aristot.

^b De Benefic. lib. iv. cap. vii. p. 427. tom. i. oper.

^c De Civit. Dei. lib. vii. cap. xi. p. 131.

Centupeda, as it were, standing firm upon an hundred feet; and Tigillus, the beam, prop, and supporter of the world.—He was styled also by the Latins (amongst other titles) *Almus* and *Ru-*

minis, i. e. He that nourisheth all things as it were with his breasts.—Again, that

RomaMamma. writer *De Munde* addeth another sort of names, which God was called by; as

Acad. Q. l. i. [cap. vii. p. 2233. tom. viii. oper.] *Ἀνάγκη*, Necessity—because he is an immoveable essence, though Cicero gives another reason for that appellation; “*Interdum Deum necessitatem appellant, quia nihil aliter esse possit, atque ab eo constitutum sit;*” they sometimes call God Necessity, because nothing can be otherwise, than as it is by him appointed.—Likewise *Εἰμαρμένη*, because all things are by him connected together, and proceed from him unhinderably. *Πεπρωμένη*, because all things in the world are by him determined, and nothing left infinite (or undetermined). *Μοῖρα*, because he makes an apt division and distribution of all things. *Ἀδράστεια*, because his power is such, as that none can possibly avoid or escape him. Lastly, that ingenious fable, (as he calls it) of the three fatal sisters, Clotho, Lachesis, and Atropos, according to him, meant nothing but God neither, ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ἐστὶν οὐν ἄλλό τι, πλὴν ὁ Θεός, καθάπερ καὶ ὁ γενναῖος Πλάτων φησί;—all this is nothing else but God, as the noble and generous Plato also intimates, when he affirmeth God to contain the beginning, and middle, and end of all things.—And both Cicero and Seneca tell us, that, amongst the Latins, God was not only called *Fatum*, but also *Natura*, and *Fortuna*. “*Quid aliud est natura (saith Seneca)*

* Ut supra.

quam Deus, et divina ratio, toti mundo et partibus ejus inserta?" What is nature else, but God and the Divine Reason, inserted into the whole world and all its several parts?—He adding, that God and nature were no more two different things, than Annæus and Seneca. And, "Nonnunquam Deum (saith Cicero) Fortunam appellant quod efficiat multa improvisa, et nec opinata nobis, propter obscuritatem ignoracionemque causarum;" they sometimes call God also by the name of Fortune, because he surpriseth us in many events, and bringeth to pass things unexpected to us, by reason of the obscurity of causes and our ignorance.—Seneca thus concludes concerning these, and the like names of God, "Omnia ejusdem Dei nomina sunt, varie utentis sua potestate;" these are all names of one and the same God, variously manifesting his power.

But concerning most of these forementioned names of God, and such as are like to them, it was rightly observed by St. Austin, that ^{C. D. l. vii.} they had no such appearance or shew ^{c. xi.} of many distinct gods; "Hæc omnia ^[p. 131.] cognomina imposuerunt uni Deo, propter causas potestatesque diversas, non tamen propter tot res, etiam tot deos eum esse coegerunt," &c. Though the Pagans imposed all these several names upon one God, in respect of his several powers, yet did they not therefore seem to make so many gods of them; as if Victor were one god, and Invictus another god, and Centupeda another god, and Tigillus another, and Ruminus another, &c. Wherefore there are other names of God used

* Acad. Quest. lib. i. cap. vii. p. 2233. tom. viii. oper.

amongst the Pagans, which have a greater show and appearance of so many distinct deities, not only because they are proper names, but also because each of them had their peculiar temples appropriated to them, and their different rites of worship. Now these are of two sorts; first, such as signify the Deity according to its universal and all-comprehending nature; and, secondly, such as denote the same only according to certain particular powers, manifestations, and effects of it in the world. Of the first kind there are not a few. For, first of all, PAN, as the very word plainly implies him to be a universal Numen, and as he was supposed to be the Harmostes of the whole world, or to play upon the world as a musical instrument, according to that of Orpheus* (or Onomacritus)

Ἀρμωστὴν κόσμου κρείκτον φιλοπαίγμονα μολπῇ,

So have we before shewed, that by him the Arcadians and Greeks meant, not the corporeal world inanimate, nor yet as endued with a senseless nature only, but as proceeding from an intellectual principle or Divine spirit, which framed it harmoniously; and as being still kept in tune, acted and governed by the same. Which therefore is said to be the universal pastor and shepherd of all mankind, and of the whole world, according to that other Orphic passage,

Βόσκειν ἀνθρώπων γένος, καὶ ἀσέβητος γαῖαν.

Pascens humanum genus, ac sine limite terram.

And this Pan Socrates, in Plato's *Phædrus*,

* In Hymno in Panem, p. 109. edit. Eschenbach.

plainly invokes as the supreme Numen. Pan therefore is the one only God (for there cannot possibly be more than one Pan, more than one all or universe) who contained all within himself, displayed all from himself, framing the world harmoniously, and who is in manner all things.

Again, JANUS, whom the Romans first invoked in all their sacrifices and prayers, and who was never omitted, whatsoever god they sacrificed unto, was unquestionably many times taken for a universal Numen, as in this of Martial,*

—————Nitidique sator pulcherrime mundi.

And again in this of Ovid ;

Fast. 1.
[v. 117.]

Quicquid ubique vides, cœlum, mare, nubila, terras,
Omnia sunt nostra clausa patentque manu:
Me penes est unum vasti custodia mundi.

From which passages it also appears, that Janus was not the mere senseless and inanimate matter of the world, but a principle presiding over it. And without doubt all the beginnings of things were therefore referred to this Janus, because he was accounted the most ancient god, and the beginning of all things. St. Austin concluding him to be the same with Jupiter, therefore quarrels with the Pagans, (that is, with their civil theology, for thus making two gods of one: “ Cum ergo Janus mundus sit, et Jupiter mundus sit, C. D. I. vii. unusque sit mundus, quare duo dii sunt c. x. [p. 131.] Janus et Jupiter? Quare seorsum habent templa, seorsum aras, diversa sacra, dissimilia simulacra? Si propterea, quia alia vis est primordiorum, alia

* Epigr. lib. x. epigr. xxviii. p. 411.

causarum, ex illa Jani, ex ista Jovis nomen accepit: nunquid si unus homo in diversis rebus duas habeat potestates, aut duas artes, (quia singularum diversa vis est) ideo duo dicuntur artifices?" &c. Since therefore Janus is the world, and Jupiter is the world, and there is but one world, how can Janus and Jupiter be two gods? Why have they their temples apart, their altars apart, distinct sacred things, and statues of different forms? If because the force of beginnings is one, and the force of causes another, he is therefore called Janus from the former, and Jupiter from the latter; I ask whether or no, if one man have two several arts about different things, he therefore be to be called two artificers? Or is there any more reason, why one and the same god, having two powers, one over the beginnings of things, and another over the causes, should therefore be accounted two gods?—Where, when Jupiter and Janus are both said to be the world, this is to be understood properly not of the matter, but the soul or mind of the world, as St. Austin himself elsewhere declares; "Sit Jupiter corporei hujus mundi animus, qui universam istam molem, ex quatuor elementis constructam atque compactam, implet et movet;" Let Jupiter be the mind of this corporeal world, which both filleth and moveth that whole bulk, compounded and made up of the four elements.—Nevertheless, as the soul and body both together are called the man, so was the whole animated world, by the Pagans, called God. Now the forementioned argumentation of St. Austin, though it be good against the Pagans' civil theology, yet their other arcane and natural

C. D. l. iv.
c. xi.
[p. 76.]

theology was unconcerned in it, that plainly acknowledging all to be but one God, which for certain reasons was worshipped under several names, and with different rites. Wherefore Janus and Jupiter, being really but different names for one and the same supreme God, that conjecture of Salmasius seems very probable, that the Romans derived their Janus from Ζανός, the Ætolian Jupiter.

GENIUS was also another of the twenty select Roman gods; and that this was likewise a universal Numen, containing the whole nature of things, appears from this of Festus,* “Genium appellabant Deum, qui vim obtineret rerum omnium generandarum;” They called that God, who hath the power of begetting or producing all things, Genius.—And St. Austin also plainly declareth Genius to be the same with Jupiter; that is, to be but another name for the one supreme God; “Cum alio loco [Varro] dicit, Genium esse uniuscujusque animum rationalem; talem autem mundi animum Deum esse, ad hoc idem utique revocat, ut tanquam universalis Genius, ipse mundi animus esse credatur. Hic est igitur, quem appellant Jovem.”—And afterwards, “Restat ut eum singulariter et excellenter dicant deum Genium, quem dicunt mundi animum; ac per hoc Jovem.” When Varro elsewhere calleth the rational mind of every one, a genius, and affirmeth such a mind of the whole world, to be God; he plainly implieth, that God is the universal Genius of the world, and that Genius and Jupiter are the same. And though Genius be sometimes used for the mind of every man, yet the god

* De Verborum Significat. lib. vii. p. 292. edit. Godofredi.

Genius, spoken of by way of excellency, can be no other than the mind of the whole world, or Jupiter.

Again, that CHRONOS or SATURN was no particular Deity, but the universal Numen of the whole world, is plainly affirmed by Dionysius of Halicarnassus, where commending the fertility of Italy, he writeth thus: οὐδὲν οὖν θαυμαστὸν τοὺς πα-

Rom. Ant.
l. i. p. 24.
Steph.

λαίους ἱερὰν ὑπολαβεῖν τοῦ Κρόνου τὴν χώραν ταύτην, τὸν μὲν δαίμονα τοῦτον οἰομένους εἶναι πάσης εὐδαιμονίας δοτῆρα, καὶ πληρωτὴν ἀνθρώποις· εἴτε Χρόνον αὐτὸν δεῖ καλεῖν, ὥς Ἕλληνες ἀξιοῦσιν, εἴτε Κρόνον ὥς Ῥωμαῖοι, πᾶσαν δὲ περιεληφότα τὴν τοῦ κόσμου φύσιν, ὁπότερον ἂν τις ὀνομάσῃ. Wherefore it is no wonder, if the ancients thought this country to be sacred to Saturn, they supposing this god to be the giver and perfecter of all happiness to men; whether we ought to call him Chronos, as the Greeks will have it, or Cronos, as the Romans; he being either way such a god, as comprehends the whole nature of the world.—But the word Saturn was Hetrurian (which language was originally Oriental) and being derived from *ἄρσι* signifies *hidden*; so that by Saturn was meant that hidden principle of the universe, which containeth all things; and he was therefore called by the Romans *Deus Latius*, the hidden God—as the wife of Saturn in the pontifical books is *Latia Saturni*, and the land itself (which in the Hetrurian language was *Saturnia*) is in the Roman *Latium*; from whence the inhabitants were called *Latins*, which is as much as to say, the worshippers of the hidden God. Moreover, that Saturn could not be inferior to Jupiter, according to the fabulous theology, is plain from hence, because

he is therein said to have been his father. But then the question will be, how Saturn and Jupiter could be both of them one and the same universal Numen? To which there are several answers. For, first, Plato, who propounds this difficulty in his *Cratylus*, solves it thus; that by Jupiter here is to be understood the soul of the world, which, according to his theology, was derived from a perfect and eternal mind or intellect (which *Chronos* is interpreted to be) as *Chronos* also depended upon *Uranus* or *Cælus*, the supreme heavenly God, or first original Deity.—So that Plato here finds his trinity of Divine hypostases, archical and universal, *Τάγαθόν*, *Νοῦς* and *Ψυχή*, in *Uranus*, *Chronos* and *Zeus*; or *Cælus*, *Saturn* and *Jupiter*. Others conceive, that, according to the plainer and more simple sense of *Hesiod's Theogonia*, that *Jupiter*, who, together with *Neptune* and *Pluto*, is said to have been the son of *Saturn*, was not the supreme Deity, nor the soul of the world neither, but only the *Æther*, as *Neptune* was the sea, and *Pluto* the earth. All which are said to have been begotten by *Chronos* or *Saturn*, the son of *Uranus*; that is as much as to say, by the hidden virtue of the supreme heavenly God. But the writer, *De Mundo*,* though making *Jupiter* to be the first and supreme God, yet (taking *Chronos* to signify immensity of duration or eternity) will have *Jupiter* to be the son of *Chronos* in this sense, because he doth *δέχεται ἐξ αἰῶνος ἀτέλειονος εἰς ἕτερον αἰῶνα*, continue from one eternity to another—so that *Chronos* and *Zeus* are to him in a manner one and the same thing. But we are apt to think, that no ingenious and learned Pa-

* Cap. vii. p. 800. tom. i. oper. Aristot.

gan, who well understood the natural theology, would deny, but that the best answer of all to this difficulty is this, that there is no coherent sense to be made of all things in the fabulous theology. St. Austin,* from Varro, gives us this account of Saturn, that it is he, who produceth from himself continually the hidden seeds and forms of things, and reduceth or receiveth them again into himself; which some think to have been the true meaning of that fable concerning Saturn, his devouring his male children, because the forms of these corporeal things are perpetually destroyed, whilst the material parts (signified by the female) still remain. However, it is plain, that this was but another Pagan adumbration of the Deity, that being also sometimes thus defined by them, as St. Austin likewise informs

c. d. l. iv. us, "Sinus quidam naturæ in seipso
c. xii. continens omnia," a certain bosom, or
[p. 77.] deep hollow, and inward recess of nature,

which containeth within itself all things.— And St. Austin himself concludes, that according to this Varronian notion of Saturn likewise, the Pagans' Jupiter and Saturn were really but one and the same Numen. De Civ. D. l. vii. c. xiii. Wherefore we may with good reason affirm, that Saturn was another name for the supreme God amongst the Pagans, it signifying that

Thus in that
old inscription,
OPTIMUS
MAXIMUS CO-
LUS ET ER-
NUS JUPITER.

secret and hidden power, which comprehends, pervades, and supports the whole world; and which produceth the seeds or seminal principles and forms of all things from itself. As also Uranus or Coelus

* De Civit. Dei. lib. vii. cap. xiii. p. 132. tom. vii. oper.

was plainly yet another name for the same supreme Deity; (or the first Divine hypostasis) comprehending the whole.

In the next place, though it be true, that Minerva be sometimes taken for a particular god, or for God according to a particular manifestation of him in the Æther, (as shall be shewed afterwards;) yet was it often taken also for the supreme God, according to his most general notion, or as a universal Numen diffusing himself through all things. Thus hath it been already proved, that Neith or Neithas was the same amongst the Egyptians, as Athena amongst the Greeks, and Minerva amongst the Latins; which that it was a universal Numen, appears from that Egyptian inscription in the temple of this god, "I am all that was, is, and shall be." And accordingly Athenagoras tells us,* that Athena of the Greeks was *ἡ φρόνησις διὰ πάντων διέκονσα*, Wisdom passing and diffusing itself through all things—as in the book of Wisdom it is called *ἡ πάντων τεχνίτις*, the Artifex of all things, and is said *διέκειν καὶ χωρεῖν διὰ πάντων*, to pass and move through all things.—Wherefore this Athena or Minerva of the Pagans was either the first supreme Deity, a perfect and infinite mind, the original of all things; or else a second Divine hypostasis, the immediate offspring and first-begotten of that first original Deity. Thus Aristides in his oration upon Minerva,† *πάντα μὲν οὖν τὰ κάλλιστα παρὶ Ἀθηναίων τε καὶ ἐξ Ἀθηναίων κεφάλαιον δὲ ἐπέειπεν, τοῦ πάντων δημιουργοῦ καὶ βασιλέως παῖς ἐστὶ μόνη δὴ μόνου· οὐ γὰρ εἶχεν ἐξ ὅτου ὁμοτίμου ποιήσειεν αὐτήν· ἀλλ' ἀναχωρήσας αὐτὸς εἰς αὐτόν, αὐτὸς ἐξ αὐτοῦ γεννᾷ τε καὶ τέκτει τὴν θεόν· ὥστε ἐστὶ*

* Legat. pro Christianis, cap. xix. p. 86.

† Pag. 192.

μόνη βεβαίως γνησία τοῦ πατρὸς, ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ὁμολογοῦντος ἑαυτῷ τοῦ γένους γενομένη, &c. Wherefore all the most excellent things are in Minerva, and from her: but, to speak briefly of her, this is the only immediate offspring of the only maker and king of all things; for he had none of equal honour with himself, upon whom he should beget her, and therefore retiring into himself, he begot her and brought her forth from himself: so that this is the only genuine offspring of the first father of all.—And again, Πίνδαρος δ' αὐ φησί, δεξιὰν κατὰ χεῖρα τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτὴν καθέζομένην, τὰς ἐντολὰς τοῖς θεοῖς ἀποδέχεσθαι· ἀγγέλου μὲν γάρ ἐστι μείζων, ἢ δὲ τῶν ἀγγέλων ἄλλοις ἄλλα ἐπιτάττει· πρώτη παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς παραλαμβάνουσα, ἀντ' ἐξηγητοῦ τινος οὕσα τοῖς θεοῖς, καὶ εἰσαγωγίως ὅταν καὶ τούτου δέη. Pindar also affirmeth concerning Minerva, that sitting at the right hand of her father, she there receiveth commands from him to be delivered to the gods. For she is greater than the angels, and commandeth them some one thing and some another, accordingly as she had first received of her father; she performing the office of an interpreter and introducer to the gods, when it is needful.—Where we may observe, by the way, that this word angel came to be in use amongst the Pagans from Jews and Christians, about this very age that Aristides lived in; after which we meet with it frequently in the writings of their philosophers. Lastly, Aristides thus concludeth his oration upon Minerva; σχεδὸν γὰρ δύνανται τοῦ Διὸς εἶναι λέγων τις αὐτὴν ἐκ τούτων, οὐκ ἂν ἁμαρτάνοι· ὥστε τί δὴ μικρολογεῖσθαι τὰς ἐν μέρει πράξεις αὐτῆς δηγοῦμενον, ὅπου ἔξοσι τὰ τοῦ Διὸς ἔργα κοινὰ τοῦ Διὸς εἶναι φῆσαι καὶ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς. He that from what we have said will determine, that Minerva is as it

were the power and virtue of Jupiter himself, will not err. Wherefore (not to enumerate all the minute things belonging to Minerva) we conclude thus concerning her, that all the works of Jupiter are common with Jupiter and Minerva. Wherefore that conceit, which the learned and industrious Vossius* sometimes seems to favour, that the Pagans' universal Numen was no other than a senseless nature, or spermatie reason of the whole world, undirected by any higher intellectual principle (which is indeed no better than downright Atheism), is plainly confuted from hence, they making wisdom and understanding, under these names of Neith, Athena, and Minerva, to be either the absolutely supreme Deity, or the first begotten offspring of it.

To Minerva may be added Apollo, who, though often taken for the sensible sun animated, and so an inferior deity, yet was not always understood in this sense, nor indeed then when he was reckoned amongst the twelve consentes, because the sun was afterwards added to them, in the number of the eight select gods. And that he was sometimes taken for the supreme universal Numen, the maker of the sun and of the whole world, is plainly testified by Plutarch (who is a competent witness in this case, he being a priest of this Apollo), writing thus concerning him in his *De defectu oraculorum*: Εἴτε ἡλῖός ἐστιν εἴτε κύριος ἡλίου, Pag. 413.
καὶ πατὴρ, καὶ ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ὁρατοῦ πάντως, οὐκ
ἐκὸς ἀπαξιῶν φωνῆς τοὺς νῦν ἀνθρώπους, οἷς ἀλτὶς ἐστὶ
γενέσεως καὶ τροφῆς, καὶ τοῦ εἶναι καὶ φρονεῖν. Whether Apollo be the sun, or whether he be the lord and father of the sun, placed far above all sen-

* De Idololat. lib. vii. cap. i. p. 718.

sible and corporeal nature, it is not likely that he should now deny his oracles to them, to whom himself is the cause of generation and nourishment, of life and understanding.

Moreover, Urania Aphrodite, the heavenly Venus or Love, was a universal Numen also, or another name of God, according to his more general notion, as comprehending the whole world; it being the same with that *Ἔρως*, or Love, which Orpheus, and others in Aristotle, made to be the first original of all things; for it is certain, that the ancients distinguished concerning a double Venus and Love. Thus Pausanias in Plato's

P. 103. Symposium: *Ἡ μὲν γὰρ πον πρεσβυτέρα καὶ αἰμώτερ Οὐρανοῦ θυγάτηρ, ἣν δὲ καὶ οὐρανίαν ἐπονομάζομεν· ἡ δὲ νεωτέρα, Διὸς καὶ Διώνης, ἣν δὲ πάνδημον καλούμεν· ἀναγκαῖον δὲ καὶ Ἔρωτα, τὸν μὲν τῇ ἐτέρα συναργόν, πάνδημον ὁρθῶς καλεῖσθαι, τὸν δὲ, οὐράνιον.* There are two Venuses, and therefore two Loves; one the older and without a mother, the daughter of Uranus or heaven, which we call the heavenly Venus; another younger, begotten from Jupiter and Dione, which we call the vulgar Venus: and accordingly are there of necessity two Loves, answering to these two Venuses, the one vulgar and the other heavenly.—The elder of these two Venuses is in Plato said to be senior to Japhet and Saturn, and by Orpheus* the oldest of all things, and *πρῶτος γενέτωρ*, the first begetter of all.—Upon which account, perhaps, it was called by the oriental nations Mylitta or Genitrix, as being the fruitful mother of all. This was also the same with Plato's *τὸ πρῶτον καλόν*, the first fair;—the cause of all pulchritude, order and harmony,

* In Hymno in Venerem, p. 151. oper.

in the world. And Pausanias * the writer tells us that there were temples severally erected to each of these Venuses or Loves, the heavenly and the vulgar; and that Urania, or the heavenly Venus, was so called, ἐπὶ ἔρωτι καθαρῷ καὶ ἀπηλαμένῳ πόθου σωμάτων, because the love belonging to it was pure, and free from all corporeal affection:—which, as it is in men, is but a participation of that first Urania, or heavenly Venus and Love, God himself. And thus is Venus described by Euripides in Stobæus, ^b as the supreme Numen :

Τὴν Ἀφροδίταν οὐχ ἔστι θεὸς θεῶν;
 Ἄλλ' οὐδ' ἂν εἴποις, οὐδὲ μετρίως ἂν,
 "Ὅσα νείκεα καὶ ἔφ' ὅσῳ διέχονται·
 Αὐτὴ τρέφει δι' ἡμῶν καὶ πάντας θεοῦς, &c.

Thus also by
 Æschylus, Ἐφ'
 μὴ ἀγνὸς αἰσά-
 νος, &c. Ἐφ' οὗ
 γαίαν λαμβάν-
 νει, &c.—τὴν

To this sense: Do you not see how great a god this Venus is? But you are never able to declare her greatness, nor to measure the vast extent thereof. For this is she, which nourisheth both thee and me, and all mortals, and which makes heaven and earth friendly to conspire together, &c.—But by Ovid this is more fully expressed, in his *Fastorum* :^c

Illa quidem totam dignissima temperat orbem,
 Illa tepet nullo regna minora Deo :
 Juraque dat coelo, terræ, natalibus undis ;
 Perque suos initus continet omne genus.
 Illa deca omnes (longum enumerare) creavit;
 Illa satq; causas authoribusque dedit,

Where all the gods are said to have been created or made by Venus, that is, by the one supreme Deity. But, lastly, this is best of all performed by Severinus Boetius; a Christian philosopher ^{De Cons. l. ii.} and poet, in this manner :
^{Met. 9.}

* In Boeotic. lib. ix. cap. xvi. p. 742.

^b Eclog. Phys. lib. i. cap. xvii. p. 97.

^c Lib. ix. ver. 94.

Quod mundus stabili fide
 Concordes variat vices,
 Quod pugnantia semina
 Foedus perpetuum tenent;
 Quod Phœbus roseum diem
 Curru provehit aureo; &c.
 Hanc rerum seriem ligat,
 Terras ac pelagus regens,
 Et cœlo imperitans, AMOR, &c.
 Hic si freena remiserit,
 Quicquid nunc amat invicem,
 Bellum continuo geret.
 Hic sancto populos quoque
 Junctos foedere continet;
 Hic et conjugii sacrum
 Castis nectit amoribus, &c.
 O felix hominum genus,
 Si vestros animos AMOR,
 Quo cœlum regitur, regat.

And to this Urania, or heavenly Venus, was near of kin also that third Venus in Pausanias called *Ἀνοοτροπία*, and by the Latins Venus verticordia, pure and chaste Love—expulsive of all unclean lusts, to which the Romans consecrated a statue, as Valerius M. tells us, (l. viii. c. xv.) “quo facilius virginum mulierumque mentes a libidine ad pudicitiam converterentur;” to this end, that the minds of the female sex might then the better be converted from lust and wantonness to chastity.—We conclude, therefore, that Urania, or the heavenly Venus, was sometimes amongst the Pagans a name for the supreme Deity, as that which is the most amiable being, and first pulchritude, the most benign and fecund begetter of all things, and the constant harmonizer of the whole world.

Again, though Vulcan, according to the most common and vulgar notion of him, be to be reckoned amongst the particular gods, yet had he also another more universal consideration.

For Zeno in Laertius^a tells us, that the supreme God was called Ἡφαίστος, or Vulcan, κατὰ τὴν εἰς τὸ τεχνικὸν πῦρ διάτασιν τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ αὐτοῦ, as his hegemonic acted in the artificial fire.—Now Plutarch^b and Stobæus^c testify, that the Stoics did not only call nature, but also the supreme Deity itself (the Architect of the whole world), τεχνικὸν πῦρ, an artificial fire—they conceiving him to be corporeal. And Jamblichus^d making Phtha to be the same supreme God, amongst the Egyptians, with Osiris and Hammon, or rather, more properly, all of them alike the soul of the world, tells us, that Hephæstus, in the Greekish theology, was the same with this Egyptian Phtha; Ἕλληνες εἰς Ἡφαιστον μεταλαμβάνουσι τὸν Φθᾶ, τῷ τεχνικῷ μόνον προσβάλλοντες, amongst the Greeks Hephæstus (or Vulcan) answers to the Egyptian Phtha.—Wherefore as the Egyptians by Phtha, so the Greeks by Hephæstus, sometimes understood no other than the supreme God, or at least the soul of the world, as artificially framing all things.

Furthermore, Seneca gives us yet *De Ben.* l. iv. other names of the supreme Deity, according to the sense of the Stoics; “Hunc et liberum patrem, et Herculem, ac Mercurium nostri putant, Liberum Patrem, quia omnium parens, &c. Herculem, quod vis ejus invicta sit; Mercurium, quia ratio penes illum est, numerusque, et ordo, et scientia.” Furthermore, our philosophers take this auctor of all things to be Liber Pater, Hercules, and Mercury; the first, be-

^a Lib. vii. segm. 147. p. 458.

^b De Placit. Philos. lib. i. cap. vii. p. 881. oper.

^c Eclog. Phys. lib. i. cap. ii. p. 17.

^d De Myst. Egyptior. sect. 8. cap. iii. p. 159.

cause he is parent of all things, &c. the second, because his force and power are unconquerable, &c. and the third, because there is in and from him reason, number, order, and knowledge.—And now we see already, that the supreme God was sufficiently polyonymous amongst the Pagans; and that all these, Jupiter, Pan, Janus, Genius, Saturn, Cælus, Minerva, Apollo, Aphrodite Urania, Hephæstus, Liber Pater, Hercules, and Mercury, were not so many really distinct and substantial gods, much less self-existent and independent ones; but only several names of that one supreme, universal, and all-comprehending Numen, according to several notions and considerations of him.

But, besides these, there were many other Pagan gods called by Servius *dii speciales*, special or particular gods;—which cannot be thought neither to have been so many really distinct and substantial beings (that is, natural gods), much less self-existent and independent, but only so many several names or notions of one and the same supreme Deity, according to certain particular powers and manifestations of it. It is true, that some late Christian writers against the Polytheism and idolatry of the Pagans, have charged them with at least a trinity of independent gods, viz. Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto, as sharing the government of the whole world amongst these three, and consequently acknowledging no one universal Numen. Notwithstanding which, it is certain, that, according to the more arcane doctrine and cabala of the Pagans, concerning the natural true theology, these three considered as distinct and independent gods, were accounted but *dii poetici*

et commentitii, poetical and fictitious gods—and they were really esteemed no other than so many several names and notions of one and the same supreme Numen, as acting variously in those several parts of the world, the heavens, the sea, the earth, and hell. For, first, as to Pluto and Hades, called also by the Latins Orcus, and Dis (which latter word seems to have been a contraction of *Dives* to answer the Greek *Plutō*), as Balbus in Cicero attributes to him, “*omnem vim terrentem*,” all terrene power,—so others commonly assign him the regimen of separate souls after death. Now it is certain, that, according to this latter notion, it was by Plato understood no otherwise than as a name for that part of the Divine Providence, which exercises itself upon the souls of men after death. This Ficinus observed upon Plato’s *Cratylus*: “*Animadvertite præ cæteris, Plutonium hic significare præcipue providentiam divinam ad separatas animas pertinentem.*” You are to take notice, that by Pluto is here meant that part of Divine Providence, which belongeth to separate souls.—For this is that, which, according to Plato, “binds and detains pure souls in that separate state, with the best *vinculum* of all, which is not necessity, but love and desire; they being ravished and charmed as it were with those pure delights, which they there enjoy.” And thus is he also to be understood in his book of *Laws*, writing in this manner concerning Pluto; *lib. viii. (p. Kai ou̐ δυσχεραντέον πολεμικοῖς ἀνθρώποις τὸν θεόν, ἀλλὰ τιμητέον, ὡς ὄντα αἰεὶ τῷ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γίνα ἄριστον· κοινὴν γάρ ψυχὴν καὶ σῶματι; διὰ τοῦ σείως οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ κρείττον, ὡς ἐγὼ φαίην ἂν, σπουδῇ λαβόν*

* De Natut. Deor. lib. ii. cap. xxvii. p. 2904. oper.

Neither ought military men to be troubled or offended at this God Pluto, but highly to honour him, as who always is the most beneficent to mankind. For I affirm, with the greatest seriousness, that the union of the soul with this terrestrial body is never better than the dissolution or separation of them.—Pluto, therefore, according to Plato, is nothing else but a name for that part of the Divine Providence, that is exercised upon the souls of men, in their separation from these earthly bodies. And upon this account was Pluto styled by Virgil,* the Stygian Jupiter. But by others Pluto, together with Ceres, is taken in a larger sense, for the manifestation of the Deity in this whole terrestrial globe; and thus is the writer De Mundo^b to be understood, when he tells us, that God or Jupiter is οὐράνιος τε καὶ χθόνιος, πάντας ἐκόντων αὖν φύσεως τε καὶ τύχης, ἅτε πάντων αὐτὸς αἴτιος αὖν^c both celestial and terrestrial, he being denominated from every nature, forasmuch as he is the cause of all things.—Plato therefore is Ζεὺς χθόνιος or καταχθόνιος, the terrestrial (also as well as the Stygian and subterranean) Jupiter; and that other Jupiter, which is distinguished both from Pluto and Neptune, is properly Ζεὺς οὐράνιος, the heavenly Jupiter—God as manifesting himself in the heavens. Hence is it, that Zeus and Hades, Jupiter and Pluto, are made to be one and the same thing, in that passage, which Julian^c cites as an oracle of Apollo, but others impute to Orpheus,

Εἰς Ζεὺς, εἰς Αἴδης,

Jupiter and Pluto are one and the same God. As

* Æneid. lib. vii. ver. 327.

^b Cap. vii. p. 869. oper. Aristot.

^c Orat. iv. in Regem Solum, p. 136.

also that Euripides, in a place before produced, is so doubtful whether he should call the supreme God (τὸν πάντων μεδόντα, that takes care of all things here below) Zeus or Hades :

Zeus, αἰὲρ Ἄϊδος
Ὀυρανὸς ὅλος οὐρανός

Whether thou hadst rather be called Jupiter or Pluto.

Lastly, Hermesianax the Colophonian poet, in those verses of his (afterwards to be set down) makes Pluto in the first place (with many other Pagan gods) to be really one and the same with Jupiter.

That Neptune was also another name of the supreme God, from another particular consideration of him, namely, as acting in the seas (at least according to the arcane and natural theology of the Pagans), is plainly declared by divers of the ancients. Xenocrates in Stobæus,^a and Zeno in Laertius,^b affirm, that God as acting in the water is called Posidone or Neptune. To the same purpose Balbus in Cicero: “Sed tamen his ^{De N. D. l. ii.} fabulis spreto ac repudiatis, Deus per- ^{[cap. xviii.} tinens per naturam cujusque rei, per ter- ^{p. 2996.]} ras Ceres, per maria Neptunus, alii per alia, poterunt intelligi, qui qualesque sint,” &c. But these poetic fables concerning the gods being despised and rejected, it is easy for us to understand, how God passing through the nature of every thing, may be called by several names, as through the earth Ceres (and Pluto), through the seas Neptune, and through other parts of the world by other names:—so that all these titular gods were

^a Eclog. Physic. lib. i. cap. ix. p. 56.

^b Lib. vii. segm. 147. p. 458.

but so many several denominations of one supreme

Deity. And Cotta afterward thus represents the sense of this theology: "Ne-

tunum esse dicis animum cum intelligentia per mare pergentem, idem de Cerere." Your meaning is, Neptune is a mind, which with understanding passes through the sea, and the like of Ceres through the earth.—Lastly, to name no more,

Maximus Tyrius agreeth also herewith,

Diact. 30.
[cap. xxix. p. καλεῖ τὸν μὲν Δία τοῦν πρεσβύτατον, &c.: τὸν δὲ 290.]

Ποσειδῶν, πνεῦμα διὰ γῆς καὶ θαλάττης ἰδὼν, οἰκονομῶν πάντων τῆς σάσις καὶ τὴν ἁρμονίαν. You are to call Jupiter that princely mind, which all things follow and obey, &c. and Neptune that spirit, which passing through the earth and sea, causes their state and harmony.

Lastly, That these three, Jupiter, Neptune and Pluto, were not three really distinct substantial beings, but only so many several names for one supreme God (according to the true and natural theology of the Pagans), is thus plainly declared by Pausanias in his *Corinthiacs*;* he there expounding the meaning of a certain statue of Jupiter with three eyes (called the country Jupiter of the Trojans) in this manner: τρεῖς δὲ ὀφθαλμοὺς ἔχει ἐπὶ τῇδε ἂν τις τέκμαίροιστο αὐτόν· Δία γὰρ ἐν οὐρανῷ βασιλεύειν, αὐτὸς μὲν λόγος κοινὸς πάντων ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπων. Ὃν δὲ ἄρχειν φασὶν ὑπὸ γῆς, ἔστιν ἔπος τῶν Ὀμηρῶν Δία ὀνομάζον καὶ τοῦτον,

Ζεὺς τὸ καταχθόνιος, καὶ ἱκανὴ Περσεφόνεια.

Αἰσχρόλος δὲ ὁ Εὐφορίωνες καλεῖ Δία καὶ τὸν ἐν θαλάσσῃ· Τρεῖς οὖν ὁρῶντα ἐποίησεν ὀφθαλμοῖς ὅστις δὴ οὖν ὁ ποιήσας,

* Lib. ii. cap. xxiv. p. 106.

ἄτι ἐν ταῖς τριῶν ταῖς λεγόμεναις ἀρχαῖς ἀρχόντα τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον θεόν. Now that this statue of Jupiter was made to have three eyes, one may guess this to have been the reason; because first the common speech of all men makes Jupiter to reign in the heaven. Again, he that is said to rule under the earth, is in a certain verse of Homer called Zeus or Jupiter too, namely, the infernal or subterraneous Jupiter, together with Proserpina. And, lastly, Æschylus, the son of Euphion, calls that God, who is the king of the sea also, Jupiter. Wherefore this statuary made Jupiter with three eyes, to signify, that it is one and the same God, which ruleth in those three several parts of the world, the heaven, the sea, and the earth. — Whether Pausanias were in the right or no, as to his conjecture concerning this three-eyed statue of Jupiter, it is evident, that himself, and other ancient Pagans, acknowledged Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto, to be but three several names, and partial considerations of one and the same God, who ruleth over the whole world. And since both Proserpina and Ceres were really the same with Pluto, and Salacia with Neptune; we may well conclude, that all these, Jupiter, Neptune, Salacia, Pluto, Proserpina, and Ceres, though several poetical and political gods, yet were really taken but for one and the same natural and philosophical God.

Moreover, as Neptune was a name for God, as manifesting himself in the sea, and ruling over it, so was Juno another name of God, as acting in the air. This is expressly affirmed both by Xenocrates in Stobæus,^a and Zeno in Laertius.^b

^a Ubi supra.

^b Ubi supra.

And St. Austin^a propounding this query, why Juno was joined to Jupiter as his wife and sister? makes the Pagans answer thus to it, "Quia Jovem (inquit) in æthere accipimus, in aëre Junonem;" because we call God in the ether Jupiter, in the air Juno.—But the reason, why Juno was feminine and a goddess, is thus given by Cicero,^b "Effæminarunt autem eum, Junonique tribuerunt, quod nihil est aëre mollius;" they effeminated the air, and attributed it to Juno a goddess, because nothing is softer than it.—Minerva was also sometimes taken for a special or particular god, and then was it nothing (as Zeno informs us) but a name for the supreme God, as passing through the (higher) ether: which gave occasion to St.

C. D. l. iv.

c. x.

[p. 74.]

Austin thus to object against the Pagan theology: "Si ætheris partem superiorem Minerva tenere dicitur, et hac occasione fingere poetas, quod de Jovis capite nata sit, cur non ergo ipsa potius deorum regina deputatur, quod sit Jove superior?" If Minerva be said to possess the highest part of the ether; and the poets therefore to have feigned her to have been begotten from Jupiter's head, why is not she rather called the queen of the gods, since she is superior to Jupiter?—Furthermore, as the supreme God was called Neptune in the sea, and Juno in the air, so by the same reason may we conclude, that he was called Vulcan in the fire. Lastly, as the sun and moon were themselves sometime worshipped by the Pagans for inferior deities, they being supposed to be animated with particular souls of their own; so was the supreme

^a De Civit. Dei, lib. iv. cap. x. p. 74.

^b De Natur. Deor. lib. ii. cap. xxvi. p. 2994. tom. ix. oper.

God also worshipped in them both (as well as in other parts of the world), and that under those names of Apollo and Diana. Thus the Pagans, appointing a God to preside over every part of the world, did thereby but make the supreme God polyonymous, all those gods of theirs being indeed nothing but several names of him. Which theology of the ancient Pagans, Maximus Tyrius, treating concerning Homer's philosophy (after he had mentioned his tripartite empire of the world, shared between Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto), thus declareth: Εὐροῖς δ' ἂν καὶ ἄλλας παρ' Dissert. xvi. p. 163. Ὀμήρῳ ἀρχὰς καὶ γενέσεις παντοδαπῶν ὀνομάτων. ὧν ὁ μὲν ἀνόητος ὡς μύθων ἀκούει, ὁ δὲ φιλόσοφος ὡς πραγμάτων. ἔστιν αὐτῷ καὶ ἀρετῆς ἀρχή· ἀλλ' Ἀθηνᾶ λέγεται, &c. You may find also in Homer other principles and the originals of several names: which the ignorant hear as fables, but a philosopher will understand as things and realities. For he assigns a principle of virtue and wisdom, which he calls Minerva; another of love and desire, which he calls Venus; another of artificialness, and that is Vulcan, who rules over the fire. And Apollo also with him presides over dancings, the muses over songs, Mars over war, Æolus over winds, and Ceres over fruits.—And then does he conclude thus, Καὶ οὐδὲν μέρος Ὀμήρῳ ἄθεον, οὐδὲ δυνάστου ἄπορον, οὐδὲ ἀρχῆς ἔρημον, ἀλλὰ πάντα μετὰ θεῶν ὀνομάτων, καὶ θεῶν λόγων, καὶ θείας τέχνης. So that no part neither of nature, nor of the world, is to Homer godless (or void of a God) none destitute of a ruler, or without a superior government; but all things full of Divine names, and of Divine reason, and of Divine art.—Where his θεῖα ὀνόματα, his Divine names—are

nothing but several names of God, as manifesting himself variously in the several things of nature, and the parts of the world, and as presiding over them.

Wherefore, besides those special gods of the Pagans, already mentioned, that were appointed to preside over several parts of the world, there are others, which are but several names of the supreme God neither, as exercising several offices and functions in the world, and bestowing several gifts upon mankind: as when in giving corn and fruits, he is called Ceres; in bestowing wine, Bacchus; in men's recovery of their health, Æsculapius; in presiding over traffic and merchandizing, Mercury; in governing military affairs, Mars; in ordering the winds, Æolus; and the like.

That the more philosophic Pagans did thus really interpret the fables of the gods, and make their many poetical and political gods to be all of them but one and the same supreme natural God, is evident from the testimonies of Antisthenes, Plato, Xenocrates, Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus (who allegorized all the fables of the gods accordingly), and of Scævola the Roman Pontifex, of Cicero, Varro, Seneca, and many others. But that even their poets also did sometimes venture to broach this arcane theology, is manifest from those fragments preserved of Hermetianax the Colophonian amongst the Greeks, and of Valerius Soranus amongst the Latins; the former thus enumerating the chief Pagan gods, and declaring them to be all but one and the same Numen:

Παύτα, Παύτα, Δαίμονες, Κίονες, Ἑσπερες,
Τελονες, Νηπες, Τελαια, καὶ Κουροχαιρες.

Ἐγὼ δ' ἠφαιμένους τε καὶ τὸν Πάν, Ζεὺς τε καὶ Ἥρα,
Ἀργεῖμιν, καὶ ἱκέσθην Ἀπόλλων, εἰς θεὸς ἵσταν

Pluto, Persephone, Ceres, et Venus alma, et Amores,
Tritones, Nereus, Tethys, Neptunus et ipsa,
Mercurius, Juno, Vulcanus, Jupiter, et Pan,
Diana, et Phoebus Jaculator, sunt Deus unus.

The latter * pronouncing universally, that Jupiter Omnipotens is

————— Deus unus et omnes,

one God, and all gods. Whether by his Jupiter he here meant the soul of the world only, as Varro would interpret him, agreeably to his own hypothesis, or whether an abstract mind superior to it; but probably he made this Jupiter to be all gods, upon these two accounts; first, as he was the begetter and creator of all the other natural gods, which were the Pagans' inferior deities (as the stars and demons); secondly, as that all the other poetical and political gods were nothing else but several names and notions of him.

We shall add, in the last place, that St. Austin, making a more full and particular enumeration of the Pagan gods, and mentioning amongst them many others besides the select Roman gods (which are not now commonly taken notice of), does pronounce universally of them all, according to the sense of more intelligent Pagans, that they were but one and the same Jupiter: "Ipse in æthere sit Jupiter, ipse in aëre Juno, ipse in mari Neptunus, in inferioribus etiam maris ipse Salacia, in terra Pluto, in terra inferiore Proserpina, in fociis domesticis Vesta, in

De Civ. D.
l. iv. c. xi.
[p. 76.]

* Apud Augustin. de Civit. Dei, lib. vii. cap. ix. p. 131.

fabrorum fornace Vulcanus, in divinantibus Apollo, in merce Mercurius, in Jano initiator, in Termino terminator, Saturnus in tempore, Mars et Bellona in bellis, Liber in vineis, Ceres in frumentis, Diana in silvis, Minerva in ingeniis. Ipse sit postremo etiam illa turba quasi plebeiorum deorum, ipse præsit nomine Liberi virorum seminibus, et nomine Liberæ fœminarum. Ipse sit Diespiter, qui partum perducit ad diem: ipse sit dea Mena, quam præfecerunt menstruis fœminarum, ipse Lucina, quæ a parturientibus invocatur, ipse opem ferat nascentibus, excipiens eos sinu terræ, et vocetur Opis. Ipse in vagitu os aperiat, et vocetur, Deus Vagitanus. Ipse levet de terra, et vocetur dea Levana. Ipse cunas tueatur et vocetur dea Cunina. Sit ipse in deabus illis, quæ fata nascentibus canunt, et vocantur Carmentes. Præsit fortuitis, voceturque Fortuna. In Diva Rumina mammam parvulis immulgeat. In Diva Potina potionem immisceat. In Diva Educa escam præbeat. De pavore infantium Paventia nuncupetur. De spe quæ venit Venilia; de voluptate Volupia. De actu Agenoria. Destimulis, quibus ad nimium actum homo impellitur, dea Stimula nominetur. Strenua dea sit, strenuum faciendo. Numeria quæ numerare doceat; Camæna quæ canere. Ipse sit et Deus Consus præbendo consilia; et Dea Sentia sententias inspirando. Ipse dea Juventas, quæ post prætextam excipiat juvenilis ætatis exordia. Ipse sit Fortuna Barbata, quæ adultos barba induit, quos honorare voluerit. Ipse in Jugatino Deo conjuges jungat; et cum virgini uxori zona solvitur, ipse invocetur et dea Virginensis invocetur. Ipse sit Mutinus, qui est apud Græcos Priapus, si non pudet. Hæc omnia quæ dixi,

et quæcunque non dixi, hi omnes dii deæque sit unus Jupiter; sive sint, ut quidam volunt, omnia ista partes ejus, sicut eis videtur, quibus eum placet esse mundi animum; sive virtutes ejus, quæ sententiâ velut magnorum multorumque doctorum est." Let us grant, according to the Pagans, that the supreme God is in the ether Jupiter; in the air Juno; in the sea Neptune; in the lower parts of the sea Salacia; in the earth Pluto; in the inferior parts thereof Proserpina; in the domestic hearths Vesta; in the smiths' forges Vulcan; in divination Apollo; in traffic and merchandize Mercury; in the beginnings of things Janus; in the ends of them Terminus; in time Saturn; in wars Mars and Bellona; in the vineyards Liber; in the corn-fields Ceres; in the woods Diana; and in wits Minerva. Let him be also that troop of plebeian gods; let him preside over the seeds of men under the name of Liber, and of women under the name of Libera; let him be Diespiter, that brings forth the birth to light; let him be the goddess Menæ, whom they have set over women's monthly courses; let him be Lucina, invoked by women in child-bearing; let him be Opis, who aids the new-born infants; let him be Deus Vagitanus, that opens their mouths to cry; let him be the goddess Levana, which is said to lift them up from the earth; and the goddess Cunina, that defends their cradles; let him be the Carmentes also, who foretel the fates of infants; let him be Fortune, as presiding over fortuitous events; let him be Diva Rumina, which suckles the infant with the breasts; Diva Potina, which gives it drink; and Diva Educa, which affords it meat; let him be called the god-

dess Parentia, from the fear of infants; the goddess Venilia, from hope; the goddess Volupia, from pleasure; the goddess Agenoria, from acting; the goddess Stimula, from provoking; the goddess Strenua, from making strong and vigorous; the goddess Numeria, which teacheth to number; the goddess Camana, which teaches to sing; let him be Deus Consus, as giving counsel; and Dea Sentia, as inspiring men with sense; let him be the goddess Juventas, which has the guardianship of young men; and Fortuna Barbata, which upon some more than others liberally bestoweth beards; let him be Deus Jugatinus, which joins man and wife together; and Dea Virginensis, which is then invoked, when the girdle of the bride is loosed; lastly, let him be Mutinus also (which is the same with Priapus amongst the Greeks), if you will not be ashamed to say it. Let all these gods and goddesses, and many more (which I have not mentioned), be one and the same Jupiter, whether as parts of him, which is agreeable to their opinion, who hold him to be the soul of the world; or else as his virtues only, which is the sense of many and great Pagan doctors.

But that the authority and reputation of a late learned and industrious writer, G. I. Vossius, may not here stand in our way, or be a prejudice to us, we think it necessary to take notice of one passage of his, in his book *De Theologia Gentili*, and freely to censure the same; where, treating concerning that Pagan goddess Venus, he writeth thus: “*Ex philosophica de diis doctrina. Venus est vel Luna (ut vidimus) vel Lucifer, sive Hesperus. Sed ex poetica ac civili, supra hos cælos*

De Theolog. Gentili, lib. ii. cap. xxxi. p. 172.

statuuntur mentes quadam a syderibus diversæ: quomodo Jovem, Apollinem, Junonem, Venerem, cæterosque Deos Consentes, considerare jubet Apuleius. Quippe eos (inquit), natura visibus nostris denegavit: necnon tamen intellectu eos mirabundi contemplamur, acie mentis acrius contemplantes. Quid apertius hic, quam ab eo per Deos Consentes intelligi, non corpora cœlestia vel subcœlestia, sed sublimiorem quandam naturam, nec nisi animis conspicuam?" According to the philosophic doctrine concerning the gods, Venus is either the moon, or Lucifer, or Hesperus; but according to the poetic and civil theology of the Pagans, there were certain eternal minds, placed above the heavens, distinct from the stars: accordingly as Apuleius requires us to consider Jupiter and Apollo, Juno and Venus, and all those other gods called Consentes; by affirming of them, that though nature had denied them to our sight, yet notwithstanding, by the diligent contemplation of our minds, we apprehend and admire them. Where nothing can be more plain (saith Vossius) than that the Dii Consentes were understood by Apuleius, neither to be celestial nor subcelestial bodies, but a certain higher nature perceptible only to our minds. Upon which words of his we shall make these following remarks; first, that this learned writer seems here, as also throughout that whole book of his, to mistake the philosophic theology of Scævola and Varro, and others, for that which was physiological only (which physiological theology of the Pagans will be afterwards declared by us). For the philosophic theology of the Pagans did not deify natural and sensible bodies only, but the

principal part thereof was the asserting of one supreme and universal Numen, from whence all their other gods were derived. Neither was Venus, according to this philosophic and arcane theology, taken only for the moon, or for Lucifer, or Hesperus, as this learned writer conceives, but, as we have already proved, for the supreme Deity also, either according to its universal notion, or some particular consideration thereof. Wherefore the philosophic theology, both of Scævola and Varro, and others, was called natural, not as physiological only (in another sense), as real and true; it being the theology neither of cities, nor of stages, or theatres, but of the world, and of the wise men in it: philosophy being that properly, which considers the absolute truth and nature of things. Which philosophic theology therefore was opposed, both to the civil and poetical, as consisting in opinion and fancy only. Our second remark is, that Vossius does here also seem incongruously to make both the civil and poetical theology, as such, to philosophize; whereas the first of these was properly nothing but the law of cities and commonwealths, together with vulgar opinion and error; and the second nothing but fancy, fiction, and fabulosity. "*Poetarum ista sunt,*" saith Cotta in Cicero; "*nos autem philosophi esse volumus, rerum auctores, non fabularum.*" Those things belong to poets, but we would be philosophers, authors of things (or realities), and not of fables.—But the main thing which we take notice of in these words of Vossius is this, that they seem to imply the Consentes, and select, and other civil and poetical gods of

the Pagans, to have been generally accounted so many substantial and eternal minds, or understanding beings supercelestial and independent; their Jupiter being put only in an equality with Apollo, Juno, Venus, and the rest. For which, since Vossius pretends no other manner of proof than only from Apuleius's *De Deo Socratis*, who was a Platonic philosopher; we shall here make it evident, that he was not rightly understood by Vossius neither: which yet ought not to be thought any derogation from this eminent philologer (whose polymathy and multifarious learning are readily acknowledged by us), that he was not so well versed in all the niceties and punctilios of the Platonic school. For though Apuleius does in that book, besides those visible gods the stars, take notice of another kind of invisible ones, such as the twelve Consentes, and others, which (he saith) we may "*animis conjectare, per varias utilitates in vita agenda, animadversas in iis rebus, quibus eorum singuli curant,*" make a conjecture of by our minds from the various utilities in human life, perceived from those things, which each of these take care of:—yet that he was no bigot in this civil theology, is manifest from hence, because in that very place, he declares as well against superstition, as irreligious profaneness. And his design there was plainly no other, than to reduce the civil and poetical theologies of the Pagans into some handsome conformity and agreement with that philosophical, natural, and real theology of theirs, which derived all the gods from one supreme and universal Numen: but this he endeavours to do in the Platonic way, himself being much addicted to that philosophy. "Hos

deos in sublimi ætheris vertice locatos, Plato existimat veros, incorporeales, animales sine ullo neque fine neque exordio, sed prorsus ac retro æternos, corporis contagione sua quidem natura remotos, ingenio ad summam beatitudinem porrecto, &c. Quorum parentem, qui omnium rerum dominator atque auctor est, solum ab omnibus nexibus patiendi aliquid gerendive, nulla vice ad alicujus rei mutua obstrictum, cur ego nunc dicere exordiar? Cum Plato cœlesti facundia præditus, frequentissime prædicet, hunc solum majestatis incredibili quadam nimietate et ineffabili, non posse penuria sermonis humani quavis oratione vel modice comprehendere." All these gods placed in the highest ether Plato thinks to be true, incorporeal, animal, without beginning or end, eternal, happy in themselves without any external good. The parent of which gods, who is the Lord and author of all things, and who is alone free from all bonds of doing and suffering, why should I go about in words to describe him? since Plato, who was endued with most heavenly eloquence, equal to the immortal gods, does often declare, that this highest God, by reason of his excess of majesty, is both ineffable and incomprehensible.—From which words of Apuleius it is plain, that, according to him, the twelve Consentes, and all the other invisible gods were derived from one original Deity, as their parent and author. But then if you demand, what gods of Plato these should be, to which Apuleius would here accommodate the civil and poetic gods contained in those two verses of Ennius,

Juno, Vesta, Minerva, Ceres, Diana, Venus, Mars,
Mercurius, Jovī, Neptunus, Vulcanus, Apollo,

And the rest of this kind, that is, all their other gods (properly so called) invisible? we reply, that these are no other than Plato's ideas, or first paradigms and patterns of things in the archetypal world, which is the Divine Intellect (and his second hypostasis) derived from his first original Deity, and most simple monad. For as Plato writeth in his *Timæus*: *Ἀνάγκη τόνδε τὸν κόσμον, εἰκόνα τινὸς εἶναι*, This sensible world must needs be the image of another intelligible one. And again afterwards, *τίμι τῶν ζώων αὐτὸν εἰς ὁμοίωτα ὁ ξυνιστὰς ξυνίστησι; τῶν μὲν οὖν ἐν* Plato in Tim. p. 30. [cap. xv. p. 238.] *μέρους εἶδει πεφυκότων μηδενὶ καταξιώσωμεν ἀτε-* *λεῖ γὰρ ἰουκὸς οὐδὲν ποτ' ἂν γένοιτο καλόν. οὐ δ' ἔστι τᾶλλα ζῶα καθ' ἓν καὶ κατὰ γένη μέρη, πάντων ὁμοιώτατον αὐτῇ εἶναι τιθώμεν. τὰ γὰρ δὴ νοητὰ ζῶα πάντα ἐκείνο ἐν ταυτῇ περιλαβὼν ἔχει, καθάπερ ὁδε ὁ κόσμος ἡμᾶς, ὅσα τε ἄλλα θρόμματα συνίστηκεν ὁρατά.* What animal was the pattern; according to whose likeness he that made this great animal of the world, formed it? Certainly, we must not think it to be any particular animal, since nothing can be perfect, which is made according to an imperfect copy. Let us therefore conclude it to be that animal, which containeth all other animals in it as its parts. For that intelligible world containeth all intelligible animals in it, in the same manner as this sensible world doth us, and other sensible animals.—Wherefore Plato himself, here and elsewhere, speaking obscurely of this intelligible world, and the ideas of it, no wonder, if many of his Pagan followers have absurdly made so many distinct animals and gods of them. Amongst whom Apuleius accordingly would refer all the

civil and poetic gods of the Pagans (I mean their gods, properly so called invisible) to this intelligible world of Plato's, and those several ideas of it. Neither was Apuleius singular in this, but others of the Pagan theologers did the like; as, for example, Julian in his book against the

Christians: Θεοὺς ὀνομάζει Πλάτων τοὺς ἑμφα-

S. Cyril.

cont. Jul.

l. ii. p. 65.

νεῖς, ἥλιον, καὶ σελήην, ἄστρα καὶ οὐρανόν, ἀλλ'

οὗτοι τῶν ἀφανῶν εἰσὶν εἰκόνες· ὁ φαινόμενος τοῖς

ὀφθαλμοῖς ἥλιος, τοῦ νοήτου καὶ μὴ φαινομένου· καὶ πάλιν, ἡ φαινόμενη τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ἡμῶν σελήνη, καὶ τῶν ἄστρον ἕκαστον, εἰκόνες εἰσὶ τῶν νοητῶν· ἱκύνουσιν οὖν τοὺς ἀφανεῖς θεοὺς ἐνυπάρχοντας καὶ συνυπάρχοντας, καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ γεννηθέντας, καὶ προελθόντας, ὁ Πλάτων οἶδεν· εἰκότως οὖν φησὶν ὁ δημιουργὸς ὁ παρ' αὐτῷ, θεοί, πρὸς τοὺς ἀφανεῖς λέγων, θεῶν, τῶν ἑμφανῶν δηλονότι· κοινὸς δὲ ἀμφότερων δημιουργὸς οὗτός ἐστιν, ὁ τεχνησάμενος οὐρανὸν καὶ γῆν, καὶ θάλασσαν, καὶ ἄστρα γενήσας τὰ τούτων ἀρχέτυνα· Plato, indeed, speaketh of certain visible gods, the sun, and the moon, and the stars, and the heaven; but these are all but images of other invisible gods; that visible sun, which we see with our eyes, is but an image of another intelligible and invisible one: so likewise the visible moon, and every one of the stars, are but the images and resemblances of another moon, and of other stars intelligible. Wherefore Plato acknowledged also these other invisible gods, inexisting and coexisting with the Demiurgus, from whom they were generated and produced. That Demiurgus in him thus bespeaking these invisible and intelligible gods; Ye gods of gods, that is, ye invisible gods, who are the gods and causes of the visible gods. There is one common maker therefore of both these kinds

of gods ; who first of all made a heaven, earth, sea, and stars, in the intelligible world, as the archetypes and paradigms of these in the sensible.—Where St. Cyril in his Confutation writeth thus ; “Εουκα δὲ διὰ τούτων ὁ γενοῦς ἡμῖν Ἰουλιανός, τὰς ἰδέας βούλεισθαι καταδηλοῦν, ἅς, ποτὲ μὲν οὐσίας, καὶ ὑφυστάνας καθ’ ἑαυτὰς δύσχυρίζεται Πλάτων, ποτὶ δὲ καὶ ἐννοίας εἶναι θεοῦ διορίζεται· πλὴν ὅπως περ ἂν ἔχοι, καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῦ μαθηταῖς ἀπαράδεκτον εἶναι φασὶ τὸν ἐπὶ τῷδε λόγον οἱ τὰυτα τεχνῆται· τὰ γὰρ εἶδη χαίρειν, φησὶν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης, περιέσματα γὰρ ἐστὶ, καὶ εἰ ἐστὶν, οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸν λόγον. This our excellent Julian, by his intelligible and invisible gods, seems here to mean those ideas, which Plato sometimes contends to be substances, and to subsist alone by themselves, and sometimes again determineth to be nothing but notions or conceptions in the mind of God. But however the matter be, the skilful in this kind of learning affirm, that these ideas have been rejected by Plato’s own disciples ; Aristotle discarding them as figments, or at least such, as being mere notions, could have no real causality and influence upon things.—But the meaning of this Pagan theology may be more fully understood from what the same St. Cyril thus further objecteth against it : Προσπελάγει δὲ ὅτι καὶ τῶν ἐμφανῶν καὶ τῶν κρυπτῶν δημιουργός ἐστιν ὁ τῶν ὅλων θεός, ὁ γῆν καὶ οὐρανὸν τεχνῆσάμενος, ὅτε τοῖνυν, καὶ αὐτὸς διωμολόγηται ἐν ἀρχῇ, ταύτων τε ἀκρίβειαν· γενεσιουργός ἐστιν ὁ ἀγέννητος θεός, πῶς ἔξ’ αὐτοῦ γεγενῆσθαι φησὶν αὐτοῦς, συνπαράχειν τε καὶ ἐνπάρχειν αὐτῷ, πῶς, εἰπέ μοι, τῷ ἀγεννήτῳ θεῷ συνπαράξει τὸ γεννητὸν ; ἐνπάρχει δὲ κατὰ ποῖον τρόπον ; ἡμεῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀγέννητον ὄντα τὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγον, συνπαράχων ἀναγκαίως τῷ φέμεντι δύσχυρίζόμεθα, καὶ ἐνπάρχειν μὲν αὐτῷ, προελθεῖν δὲ γεννητῶς ἔξ’ αὐτοῦ· ὁ δὲ γε τῆς Πλάτωνος εὐρίσκει-

πᾶς συνήγορος ἀκριβῆς, ἀγέννητον μὲν εἶναι φησὶ τὸν ἀνωτάτω θεόν· ἐκπαρκεῖν δὲ καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ γεννηθῆναι καὶ προελθεῖν τοὺς παρ' αὐτοῦ γεγυῖντας, τὰ πάντα κινεῖν καὶ συγχέειν.

The sense whereof seems to be this: Julian addeth, that the God of the universe, who made heaven and earth, is alike the Demiurgus, both of these sensible, and of the other intelligible things. If therefore the ingenite God be alike the creator of both, how can he affirm those things, that are created by him, to coexist with and inexist in him? How can that, which is created, coexist with the ingenite God? but much less can it inexist in him. For we Christians indeed affirm, that the unmade Word of God doth of necessity coexist with and inexist in the Father, it proceeding from him, not by way of creation, but of generation. But this defender of Platonic trifles, acknowledging the supreme God to be ingenite, affirmeth, notwithstanding, those things, which were made and created by him, to inexist in him; thus mingling and confounding all things.—Where, notwithstanding, Julian and the Platonic Pagans would in all probability reply, that those ideas of the intelligible and archetypal world (which is the first Noûs, or Intellect) proceeding from the highest hypostasis, and original Deity, by way of necessary and eternal emanation, are no more to be accounted creatures, than the Christian Λόγος; and therefore might, with as little absurdity, be said to exist with and in that first original Deity. But besides, the same Julian, elsewhere in that book of his, accommodates this Platonic notion also to the Pagan gods in particular, in like manner as Apuleius had done before, he writing of Æsculapius

after this canting way : 'Ο γὰρ Ζεὺς, ἐν μὲν Cyp. C. Ed. L. vi. p. 200. τοῖς νοητοῖς ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ τὸν Ἀσκληπιὸν ἐγέννησεν, αἷς δὲ τὴν γῆν διὰ τῆς ἡλίου γονίμου ζωῆς ἐξέφηνεν· οὗτος ἐπὶ γῆς ἐξ οὐρανοῦ ποιησάμενος πρόοδον, ἐνοειδῶς μὲν ἐν ἀνθρώπου μορφῇ περὶ τὴν Ἐπίδαυρον ἐφάνη, &c. Jupiter, amongst the intelligible things, generated out of himself Æsculapius, and by the generative life of the sun manifested him here upon earth, he coming down from heaven, and appearing in a human form, first about Epidaurus, and from thence extending his salutary power or virtue over the whole earth.—Where Æsculapius is, first of all, the eternal idea of the medicinal art or skill generated by the supreme God in the intelligible world; which afterward, by the vivific influence of the sun, was incarnated, and appeared in a human form at Epidaurus. This is the doctrine of that Julian, who was so great an opposer of the incarnation of the eternal Logos in our Saviour Jesus Christ. Neither was this doctrine of many intelligible gods, and powers eternal (of which the archetypal world consisteth), first invented by Platonic Pagans, after the times of Christianity, as some might suspect; but that there was such a thing extant before amongst them also, may be concluded from this passage of Philo's : De Confas. l. ccxlv. Par. Εἰς ὧν ὁ θεὸς ἀμνηστέου περὶ αὐτὸν ἔχει δυνάμεις ἐρωγὰς καὶ σωτηρίας τοῦ γενομένου πάσης· δι' αὐτῶν τῶν δυνάμεων, ὁ ἀσώματος καὶ νοητὸς ἐπάγει κόσμος, τὸ τοῦ φαινομένου τοῦδε ἀρχέτυπον, ἰδέας ἀοράτους εὐσταθείας, ἀσκηρὸς σάμασιν ὁραταῖς· καταπλαγάντες οὖν τῶς τὴν ἐκτέρου τῶν κόσμων φύσιν, οὐ μόνον ὅλους ἐξελείψαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ κάλλιστα τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς μερῶν, ἡλίον, καὶ σελήνην, καὶ τὸν σάμπαντα οὐρανὸν, ἅπερ οὐδὲν αἰδεσθέντες θεοὺς ἐκάλεσαν. Though God be but one, yet hath he

about himself innumerable auxiliary powers, all of them salutiferous, and procuring the good of that which is made, &c. Moreover, by these powers, and out of them, is the incorporeal and intelligible world compacted, which is the archetype of this visible world, that consisting of invisible ideas, as this doth of visible bodies. Wherefore, some admiring, with a kind of astonishment, the nature of both these worlds, have not only deified the whole of them, but also the most excellent parts in them, as the sun, and the moon, and the whole heaven, which they scruple not at all to call gods.—Where Philo seems to speak of a double sun, moon, and heaven, as Julian did, the one sensible, the other intelligible. Moreover, Plotinus himself sometimes complies with this notion, he calling the ideas of the Divine Intellect *νοητὸς θεός*, intelligible gods;—as in that place before cited, where he exhorteth men, ascending upward above the soul of the world, *θεός ὑμῶν νοητός*, to praise the intelligible gods—that is, the Divine intellect, which, as he elsewhere* writeth, is both *εἰς καὶ πολλοί*, one and many.

We have now given a full account of Apuleius's sense in that book *De Deo Socratis*, concerning the civil and poetical Pagan gods; which was not to assert a multitude of substantial and eternal deities or minds independent in them, but only to reduce the vulgar theology of the Pagans, both their civil and poetical, into some conformity with the natural, real, and philosophic theology; and this according to Platonic principles. Wherein many other of the Pagan Platonists, both before and after Christianity, con-

* Vide *Ennead. v. lib. viii. cap. ix. p. 556.*

curred with him; they making the many Pagan invisible gods to be really nothing but the eternal ideas of the Divine Intellect (called by them the parts of the intelligible and archetypal world), which they supposed to have been the paradigms and patterns, according to which this sensible world, and all particular things therein, were made, and upon which they depended, they being only participations of them. Wherefore, though this may well be looked upon as a monstrous extravagancy in these Platonic philosophers, thus to talk of the Divine ideas, or the intelligible and archetypal paradigms of things, not only as substantial, but also as so many several animals, persons, and gods; it being their humour thus upon all slight occasions to multiply gods: yet nevertheless must it be acknowledged, that they did at the very same time declare all these to have been derived from one supreme Deity, and not only so, but also to exist in it; as they did likewise at other times, when unconcerned in this business of their Pagan Polytheism, freely acknowledge all these intelligible ideas to be really nothing else but *voluntaria*, conceptions in the mind of God—or the first Intellect (though not such slight accidental and evanid ones, as those conceptions and modifications of our human souls are); and, consequently, not to be so many distinct substances, persons, and gods (much less independent ones), but only so many partial considerations of the Deity.

What a rabble of invisible gods and goddesses the Pagans had, besides those their *dii nobiles*, and *dii majorum gentium*, their noble and greater gods (which were the *consentes* and *selecti*),

hath been already shewed out of St. Austin, from Varro, and others; as namely, Dea Mena, Deus Vagitanus, Dea Levana, Dea Cunina, Diva Rumina, Diva Potina, Diva Educa, Diva Faventina, Dea Venilia, Dea Agenoria, Dea Stimula, Dea Strenua, Dea Numeria, Deus Consus, Dea Sentia, Deus Jugatinus, Dea Virginensis, Deus Mutinus. To which might be added more out of other places of the same St. Austin, as Dea Deverra, Deus Domiducus, Deus Domitius, Dea Manturna, Deus Pater Subigus, Dea Mater Prema, Dea Pertunda, Dea Rusina, Dea Collatina, Dea Vallonia, Dea Seia, Dea Segetia, Dea Tutilina, Deus Nodotus, Dea Volutina, Dea Patelena, Dea Hostilina, Dea Flora, Dea Lacturtia, Dea Matura, Dea Runcina. Besides which, there are yet so many more of these Pagan gods and goddesses extant in other writers, as that they cannot be all mentioned or enumerated by us; divers whereof have very small, mean, and contemptible offices assigned to them, as their names for the most part do imply; some of which are such, as that they were not fit to be here interpreted. From whence it plainly appears, that there was *μὴδὲν ἄθεον*, nothing at all without a God—to these Pagans, they having so strong a persuasion, that Divine Providence extended itself to all things, and expressing it after this manner, by assigning to every thing in nature, and every part of the world, and whatsoever was done by men, some particular god or goddess by name, to preside over it. Now, that the intelligent Pagans should believe in good earnest, that all these invisible gods and goddesses of theirs were so many several substantial minds, or understanding beings eternal and unmade, really exist-

ing in the world, is a thing in itself utterly incredible. For how could any possibly persuade themselves, that there was one eternal unmade mind or spirit; which, for example, essentially presided over the rockings of infant's cradles, and nothing else? another over the sweeping of houses? another over ears of corn? another over the husks of grain? and another over the knots of straw and grass, and the like? And the case is the very same for those other noble gods of theirs (as they call them), the consentes and selecti; since there can be no reason given, why those should, all of them, be so many substantial and eternal spirits self-existent or unmade, if none of the other were such. Wherefore, if these be not all so many several substantial and eternal minds, so many self-existing and independent deities, then must they, of necessity, be either several partial considerations of the Deity, viz. the several manifestations of the Divine Power and Providence personated, or else inferior ministers of the same. And thus have we already shewed, that the more high-flown and Platonic Pagans (as Julian, Apuleius, and others) understood these consentes and select gods, and all the other invisible ones, to be really nothing else but the ideas of the intelligible and archetypal world (which is the Divine Intellect); that is, indeed, but partial considerations of the Deity, as virtually and exemplarily containing all things: whilst others of them, going in a more plain and easy way, concluded these gods of theirs to be all of them but several names and notions of the one supreme Deity, according to the various manifestations of its power in the world; as Seneca* ex-

* De Beneficiis, lib. iv. cap. viii. p. 427, 428.

pressly affirmeth, not only concerning Fate, Nature, and Fortune, &c. but also Liber Pater, Hercules, and Mercury (before mentioned by him), that they were "omnia ejusdem Dei nomina, varientis sua potestate," all names of one and the same God, as diversely using his power;—and as Zeno in Laetius* concludes of all the rest: or else (which amounts to the same thing), that they were the several powers and virtues of one God fictitiously personated and deified; as the Pagans in Eusebius apologize for themselves, that they

Pr. Ev. l. iii. did θεοποιεῖν τὰς ἀοράτους δυνάμεις αὐτοῦ τοῦ
c. xlii. p. 121. ἐπὶ πᾶσιν, deify nothing but the invisible

powers of that God, which is over all.—Nevertheless, because those several powers of the supreme God were not supposed to be all executed immediately by himself, but by certain other ὑποσχηματιζόμεναι δυνάμεις, subservient ministers under him, appointed to preside over the several things of nature, parts of the world, and affairs of mankind (commonly called demons); therefore were those gods sometimes taken also for such subservient spirits or demons collectively; as perhaps in this of Epictetus:

L. i. c. i. Πότε ὁ Ζέφυρος πνεύσει; ὅταν αὐτῷ δοξῇ, ὃ βέλ-
p. 85. τιστε; ἢ τῷ Αἰόλῳ; σὲ γὰρ οὐκ ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς
[apud Arrian.] ταμίαν τῶν ἀνέμων, ἀλλὰ τὸν Αἰόλον. When
will Zephyrus, or the west wind, blow? When
it seemeth good to himself or to Æolus; for God
hath not made thee steward of the winds, but
Æolus.

But for the fuller clearing of the whole Pagan theology, and especially this one point thereof, that their Πολυθεία was in great part nothing else but Πολυανωμία, their Polytheism, or multiplicity

* Lib. vii. begm. 147. p. 496.

of gods—nothing but the polyonymy of one god, or his being called by many personal proper names, two things are here requisite to be further taken notice of; first, that, according to the Pagan theology, God was conceived to be diffused throughout the whole world, to permeate and pervade all things, to exist in all things, and intimately to act all things. Thus we observed before out of Horus Apollo, ^a that the Egyptian theologers conceived of God, as τοῦ παντός κόσμου τὸ διήκον πνεῦμα, a spirit pervading the whole world;—as likewise they concluded ^b δὲχαι θεοῦ μηδὲν ὅλως συνεστάναι, that nothing at all consisted without God.—Which same theology was universally entertained also amongst the Greeks. For thus Diogenes the Cynic, in Laetius, ^c αὐτοῦ πάντα πλήρη, all things are full of him.—And Aristotle, or the writer De Plantis, makes God not only to comprehend the whole world, but also to be an inward principle of life in animals; τίς οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἢ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦ ζώου; τί ἄλλο, εἰ μὴ τὸ εὐγενὲς ζῶον, ὃ τὸν εὐρανὸν περιοδεύει, τὸν ἥλιον, τὰ ἄστρα, καὶ τοὺς πλανήτας. What is the principle in the life or soul of animals? Certainly no other than that noble animal (or living being) that encompasses and surrounds the whole heaven, the sun, the stars, and the planets.—Sextus Empiricus thus represents the sense of Pythagoras, Empedocles, and all the Italic philosophers; μὴ μόνον ἡμῖν πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς εἶναι τινα κοινωνίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἄλογα τῶν ζώων· ἐν γὰρ ὑπαρχειν πνεῦμα τὸ διὰ παντός κόσμον διήκον, ψυχῆς τρόπον, τὸ καὶ ἐνοῦν ἡμᾶς πρὸς ἐκεῖνα. That we

Lib. i. cap. i.
[tom. iv.
oper. Arist.
p. 492.]

Adv. Mathematicum. p. 331.
[Lib. i. Adv. vers. Phisic. §. 127. p. 580.]

^a Hieroglyph. lib. i. cap. ixiv. p. 77. ^b Ibid. lib. i. cap. xiii. p. 26.

^c Lib. vi. segm. 37. p. 333.

men have not only a conjunction amongst ourselves with one another, but also with the gods above us, and with brute animals below us; because there is but one spirit, which, like a soul, pervades the whole world, and unites all the parts thereof together.—Clemens Alexandrinus writeth thus of the Stoics, διὰ πάσης ὕλης, καὶ διὰ τῆς

Protrept. p. ἀρμολάτης τὸ θεῖον διήκειν λέγουσι; they af-
44. [cap. v. firm, that God doth pervade all the mat-
p. 58. tom. ter of the universe, and even the most
oper.] vile parts thereof—which that father seems to dis-
like; as also did Tertullian, * when he represented
their doctrine thus; “Stoici volunt Deum sic
per materiam decurreris, quomodo mel per fa-
vos;” the Stoics will have God so to run through
the matter, as the honey doth the combs. Stra-
bo testifies of the ancient Indian Brachmans, περι
lib. xv. p. πολλῶν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ὁμοδοξεῖν, ὅτι γὰρ γενετὸς
730. ὁ κόσμος καὶ φθαρτός λέγειν κἀκείνους, ὅτε δι-
ακῶν αὐτὸν καὶ ποιῶν θεός, δι’ ὅλου διαπεφοίτηκεν αὐτοῦ
That in many things they philosophized after the
Greekish manner, as when they affirm, that the
world had a beginning, and that it would be cor-
rupted, and that the maker governor thereof per-
vades the whole of it.—The Latins also fully
agreed with the Greeks in this; for though Seneca
somewhere^b propounds this question, “Utrum
extrinsecus operi suo circumfusus sit Deus, an
toti inditus?” Whether God be only extrinsically
circumfused about his work, the world, or in-
wardly insinuating do pervade it all? yet himself
elsewhere^c answers it, when he calls God “Di-

* Advers. Hermogen. cap. xlv. p. 149.

^b De Otio Sapientis, cap. xxxi. p. 347. tom. i. oper.

^c De Consol. ad Helviam. cap. viii. p. 106.

vinum spiritum per omnia, maxima, ac minima, æquali intentione diffusum :” a Divine spirit, diffused through all things, whether smallest or greatest, with equal intention. God, in Quintilian’s theology, is “spiritus omnibus partibus immistus ;” and “Ille fusus per omnes rerum naturæ partes spiritus,” a spirit which insinuates itself into, and is mingled with, all the parts of the world ; and that spirit, which is diffused through all the parts of nature.—Apuleius^b likewise affirmeth “Deum omnia permeare,” that God doth permeate all things ; and that “nulla res est tam præstantibus viribus, quæ viduata Dei auxilio, sui natura contenta sit ;” there is nothing so excellent or powerful, as that it could be content with its own nature alone, void of the Divine aid or influence. And again, “Dei præstantiam, non jam cogitatio sola, sed oculi, et aures, et sensibilis substantia comprehendit ;” that God is not only present to our cogitation, but also to our very eyes and ears, in all these sensible things.—Servius, agreeably with this doctrine of the ancient Pagans, determineth, that “nulla pars elementi sine Deo est,” that there is no part of the elements devoid of God.—And that the poets fully closed with the same theology, is evident from those known passages of theirs, “Jovis omnia plena,”^c and *μεν-
ται δὲ Διὸς πᾶσαι μὲν ἀγυαί,*^d &c. i. e. “All the things of nature, and parts of the world, are full of God ;”—as also from this of Virgil :

Virg. Georg.
l. iv. [var.
222.]

^a Instit. Orator. lib. vii. cap. iii. p. 412.

^b De Mando, p. 68. edit. Elmenhorstii.

^c Virgil. Eclog. iii.

^d Arati Phænomen. apud Clement. Alexand. Stromat. lib. v. p. 708.

Deum namque ire per omnes
Terrasque, tractusque maris, coelumque profundum.

Lastly, We shall observe, that both Plato and Anaxagoras, who neither of them confounded God with the world, but kept them both distinct, and affirmed God to be οὐδενὶ μεμιγμένον, *Cratyl.* p. 413. unmingled with any thing;—nevertheless concluded, αὐτὸν πάντα κοσμεῖν τὰ πράγματα διὰ πάντων ἰόντα, that he did order and govern all things passing through and pervading all things;—which is the very same with that doctrine of Christian theologers,* τὸν θεὸν διὰ πάντων ἀμιγῶς διήκειν, that God permeates and passes through all things, unmingledly.—Which Plato also there, in his *Cratylus*, plainly making δίκαιον to be a name for God, etymologizeth it from διὰ ἰόν, i. e. passing through all things, and thereupon gives us the best account of Heraclitus's theosophy, that is any where extant (if not rather a fragment of Heraclitus's own) in these words; ὅσοι γὰρ ἡγοῦνται τὸ πᾶν εἶναι ἐν πορείᾳ, τὸ μὲν πολὺ αὐτοῦ ὑπολαμβάνουσι τοιοῦτόν τι εἶναι, οἷον οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ χωρεῖν· διὰ δὲ τούτου παντὸς εἶναι τι διεξιόν, δι' οὗ πάντα τὰ γιγνόμενα γίνεσθαι· εἶναι δὲ τάχιστον τοῦτο καὶ λεπτότατον, οὐ γὰρ ἂν δύνασθαι ἄλλως διὰ τοῦ ὄντος εἶναι παντὸς, εἰ μὴ λεπτότατόν τε ἦν, ὥστε αὐτὸ μηδὲν στέγειν, καὶ τάχιστον, ὥστε χρῆσθαι ὥσπερ ἐστῶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἐπεὶ δὲ οὖν ἐπιτροπενεῖ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα διαῖον, τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα ἐκλήθη ὀρθῶς δίκαιον, εὐστομίας ἕνεκα, τὴν τοῦ κ' δύναμιν προσλαβόν· They who affirm the universe to be in constant motion, suppose a great part thereof to do nothing else but move and change; but that there is something, which passes through and pervades this whole universe, by which all those things that are

* Joh. Damascen. de orthodoxa fide, lib. i. cap. xiii. p. 149. tom. i. oper. edit. Lequien.

made, are made: and that this is both the most swift and most subtile thing; for it could not otherwise pass through all things, were it not so subtile, that nothing could keep it out or hinder it; and it must be most swift, that it may use all things, as if they stood still, that so nothing might escape it. Since therefore this doth preside over, and order all things, permeating and passing through them, it is called *δικαίων*, quasi *διῶν*; the letter cappa being only taken in for the more handsome pronounciation.—Here we have therefore Heraclitus's description of God, namely this; τὸ λεπτότατον καὶ τὸ τάχιστον, διὰ παντός διεξὼν, δι' οὗ πάντα τὰ γινόμενα γίνονται, that most subtile and most swift substance, which permeates and passes through the whole universe, by which all things that are made, are made.—Now, saith Plato, some of these Heraclitics say, that this is fire, others that it is heat; but he, deriding both these conceits, concludes, with Anaxagoras, that it is a perfect mind, unmixed with any thing; which yet permeating and passing through all things, frames, orders, and disposes all.

Wherefore this being the universally-received doctrine of the Pagans, that God was a spirit or substance diffused through the whole world, which permeating and inwardly acting all things, did order all; no wonder if they called him, in several parts of the world and things of nature, by several names; or, to use Cicero's language, * no wonder, if "Deus pertinens per naturam cujusque rei, per terras Ceres, per maria Neptunus," &c. if God, pervading the nature of every thing, were in the earth called Ceres, in the sea Neptune, in the air

* De Natur. Deor. lib. ii. cap. xxviii. p. 2996. oper.

Juno, &c.—And this very account does Paulus Orosius (in his historic work against the Pagans, dedicated to St. Austin) give of the original of the L. vi. c. i. Pagan Polytheism; “*Quidam, dum in* [p. 416.] *multis Deum credunt, multos Deos, indiscreto timore, finxerunt;*” that some, whilst they believe God to be in many things, have therefore, out of an indiscreet fear, feigned many gods:—in which words he intimates, that the Pagans’ many gods were really but several names of one God as existing in many things, or in the several parts of the world, as the same ocean is called by several names, as beating upon several shores.

Secondly, The Pagan theology went sometimes yet a strain higher, they not only thus supposing God to pervade the whole world, and to be diffused through all things (which as yet keeps up some difference and distinction betwixt God and the world), but also himself to be in a manner all things. That the ancient Egyptian theology, from whence the theologies of other nations were derived, ran so high as this, is evident from that excellent monument of Egyptian antiquity, the Saitic inscription often mentioned, “I am all that was, is, and shall be.” And the Trismegistic books insisting so much every where upon this notion, that God is all things (as hath been observed) renders it the more probable, that they were not all counterfeit and supposititious; but that, according to the testimony of Jamblichus, they did at least contain *δόξας Ἑρμαϊκὰς*, some of the old Theistical or Hermaical philosophy in them. And from Egypt, in all probability, was this doctrine by Orpheus derived into Greece, the Orphic verses themselves running much upon this strain, and the Orphic

theology being thus epitomized by Timotheus, the chronographer; "That all things were made by God, and that himself is all things." To this purpose is that of Æschylus,

Ζαῖς ἔστω αἰθέρ, Ζαῖς δὲ γῆ, Ζαῖς δ' αἰετός·
Ζαῖς τοι τὰ πάντα, χαῖται τῶν δ' ἰσ' ἐνέριον

Grot. Exc.
p. 57.

Et terra, et æther, et poli arx est Jupiter,
Et cuncta solus, et aliquid sublimius.

And again,

Περὶ μὲν ὅς τις φαίνεται
"ἀετλοσσω ἡμέῃ· πᾶσι δ' ἴδω, πᾶσι δὲ γινώσκω·
καὶ θεοῖν αὐτὸς γένεται παρεμφερής,
"Ἀήμω, τέλει τε, ἀστραυῶ, βροντῇ, βροχῇ·

Ib. p. 58.

Nunc ut implacabilis
Apparet ignis : nunc tenebris, nunc aquæ
Par ille cerni : simulat interdum feram,
Tonitrua, ventos, fulmina, et nubila.

As also this of Lucan, amongst the Latins,

Superos quid querimas ultra?
Jupiter est quodcumque vides, quocumque moveris.

Lib. ix.
v. 580.

Whereunto agree also these passages of Seneca the philosopher,* "Quid est Deus? Quod vides totum, et quod non vides, totum." And^b "Sic solus est omnia; opus suum et extra et intra tenet;" What is God? he is all that you see, and all that you do not see. And he alone is all things, he containing his own work not only without, but also within.—Neither was this the doctrine only of those Pagans, who held God to be the soul of the world, and consequently the whole animated world to be the supreme Deity, but of those

* Natural. Quæst. lib. i. Præfat. p. 485. tom. i. oper.

^b De Benefic. lib. iv. cap. viii. p. 247.

others also, who conceived of God as an abstract mind, superior to the mundane soul, or rather as a simple monad, superior to mind also; as those philosophers, Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Melissus, who described God to be one and all things, they supposing, that, because all things were from him, they must needs have been first in a manner in him, and himself all things. With which agreeth the author of the Asclepian Dialogue, when he maketh *Unus omnia*, and *Creator omnium*, One all things and the Creator of all things, to be but equivalent expressions; and when he affirmeth, that before things were made, “in eo jam tunc erant, unde nasci habuerunt;” they then existed in him from whom afterwards they proceeded.—So likewise the other Trismegistic books, when they give this account of God’s being both all things that are, and all things that are not, τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὄντα ἐφάνερωσε, τὰ δὲ μὴ ὄντα ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ, because those things, that are, he hath manifested from himself, and those things, that are not, he still containeth within himself;—or, as it is elsewhere expressed, he doth κρύπτειν, hide them and conceal them in himself. And the Orphic verses gave this same account likewise of God’s being all things, Πάντα τὰδε κρύψας, &c. because he first concealed and hid them all within himself before they were made, and thence afterward from himself displayed them, and brought them forth into light: or because

——— Ζῶνς δ’ ἐν γαστρὶ σὺντα σπέρματι.

before they were produced, they were all contained together in the womb of God.

Now this was not only a further ground of that

seeming Polytheism amongst the Pagans, which was really nothing but the polyonymy of one God, and their personating his several powers; but also of another more strange and puzzling phenomena in their theology, namely, their personating also the parts of the world inanimate, and things of nature, and bestowing the names of gods and goddesses upon them. It was before observed out of Moschopulus, that the Pagans did ἐν ὀνόματι τότε τὴν δύναμιν ἔχον, καὶ τὸν

P. 239.

ἐπιστατοῦντα τοῦτω θεὸν ὀνομάζειν, call the things in nature, and the gods, which presided over them, by one and the same name.—As for example, they did not only call the god, which presideth over those arts that operate by fire, Hephæstus or Vulcan, but also fire itself: and Demeter or Ceres was not only taken by them for that god, who was supposed to give corn and fruits, but also for corn itself. So Dionysus or Bacchus did not only signify the god that giveth wine, but also wine itself. And he instancing further in Venus, and Minerva, and the Muses, concludes the same universally

L. v. [p. 236.]

of all the rest. Thus Arnobius, in his book against the Pagans, “in usu sermonis vestri, Martem pro pugna appellatis, pro aqua Neptunum, Liberum Patrem pro vino, Cererem pro pane, Minervam pro stamine, pro obscœnis libidinis Venerem.” Now we will not deny, but that this was sometimes done metonymically, the efficient cause and the ruling or governing principle, being put for the effect, or that which was ruled and governed by it. And thus was war frequently styled Mars; and that of Terence may be taken

De Fa. et Os. also in this sense, "Sine Cerere et Libero friget Venus." And Plutarch (who declares his great dislike of this kind of language conceives, that there was no more at first in it than this; ὥστε ἡμεῖς τὸν εἰνούμενον βιβλία Πλάτωνος, ἀνέισθαί φαμεν Πλάτωνα, καὶ Μένανδρος τὸν ὑποκρίεσθαι τὰ Μενάνδρου ποιήματα ὑποτιθέμενον, οὕτως ἐκείνοι, τοῖς τῶν θεῶν ὀνόμασι τὰ τῶν θεῶν δῶρα καὶ ποιήματα καλεῖν οὐκ ἐφείδοντο, τιμῶντες ὑπὸ χρείας καὶ σεμνύνοντες. As we, when one buys the books of Plato, commonly say, that he buys Plato; and when one acts the plays of Menander, that he acts Menander; so did the ancients not spare to call the gifts and effects of the gods, by the names of those gods respectively, thereby honouring them also for their utility.—But he grants, that afterward this language was by ignorant persons abused, and carried on further, and that not without

great impiety; οἱ δὲ ὑστεροὶ ἀπαιδεύτως δεχόμενοι καὶ ἀμαθῶς ἀναστρέφοντες, ἐπὶ τοῖς θεοῖς τὰ πάθη τῶν καρπῶν καὶ τὰς παρουσίας τῶν ἀναγκαίων καὶ ἀποκρύψεις, θεῶν γενέσεις καὶ φθοράς, οὐ προσαγορεύοντες μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ νομίζοντες, αἰόπων καὶ παρανόμων καὶ τεταραγμένων δοξῶν αὐτοὺς ἐνέπλησαν. Their followers mistaking them, and thereupon ignorantly attributing the passions of fruits (their appearances and occultations) to the gods themselves, that preside over them, and so not only calling them, but also thinking them to be the generations and corruptions of the gods, have by this means filled themselves with absurd and wicked opinions.—Where Plutarch well condemns the vulgar both amongst the Egyptians and Greeks, for that, in their mournful solemnities, they sottishly attributed to the gods the passions

belonging to the fruits of the earth, thereby indeed making them to be gods. Nevertheless the inanimate parts of the world, and things of nature, were frequently deified by the Pagans, not only thus metonymically, but also in a further sense, as Cicero plainly declares; "Tum illud, quod erat a Deo natum, nomine ipsius Dei nuncupabant, ut cum fruges Cere-
p. 222.
[cap. xxiii.
p. 2987.]
 rem appellamus, vinum autem Liberum: tum autem res ipsa, in qua vis inest major, sic appellatur, ut ea ipsa res nominetur Deus." Both that which proceeds from God, is called by the name of a god, as corn is sometimes thus called Ceres, and wine Liber; and also whatsoever hath any greater force in it, that thing itself is often called a god too. Philo also thus represents the religion of the Pagans, as first deifying corporeal inanimate things, and then bestowing those proper personal names upon them: ἐκτεθειώκασι
De Decal.
p. 751, 752.
 γὰρ οἱ μὲν τὰς τέσσαρας ἀρχάς, γῆν, καὶ ὕδωρ, καὶ αἶρα, καὶ πῦρ· οἱ δ' ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πλανήτας, καὶ ἀπλανεῖς ἀστέρας· οἱ δὲ μόνον τὸν οὐρανόν, οἱ δὲ σύμπαντα κόσμον· τὸν δ' ἀνωτάτῳ καὶ πρεσβύτατον, τὸν γενετήν, τὸν ἄρχοντα τῆς μεγάλης πόλεως, τὸν στρατιάρχην τῆς ἀπτήτου στρατιᾶς, τὸν κυβερνήτην ὡς οἰκονομῇ σωτηρίως αἰεὶ ἅπαντα, παρεκαλύψαντο, ψευδωνύμους προσρήσεις ἐκείνοις ἐπιφημίσαντες, ἑτέρας ἑτεροὶ καλοῦσι γὰρ τὴν γῆν Κόρην, Δήμητρα, Πλούτων· τὴν δὲ θάλασσαν Ποσειδῶνα, δαίμονας ἐναλίους ὑπάρχους αὐτῷ προσαναπλάττοντες, &c. Ἦραν δὲ τὸν αἶρα, καὶ τὸ πῦρ Ἥφαιστον, καὶ ἥλιον Ἀπόλλωνα, καὶ σελήνην Ἀρτεμιν, &c. Some have deified the four elements, the earth, the water, the air and the fire: some the sun and the moon, and the planets and fixed stars: others the heaven, others the whole world. But that

highest and most ancient Being, the parent of all things, the chief prince of this great city, and the emperor of this invincible army, who governeth all things salutiferously, him have they covered, concealed, and obscured, by bestowing counterfeit personal names of gods upon each of these things. For the earth they called Proserpina, Pluto, and Ceres; the sea Neptune, under whom they place many demons and nymphs also as his inferior ministers; the air Juno; the fire Vulcan; the sun Apollo; the moon Diana, &c. and dissecting the heaven into two hemispheres, one above the earth, the other under it, they call these the Dioscuri, feigning them to live alternately one one day, and the other another.—We deny not here, but that the four elements, as well as the sun, moon, and stars, were supposed by some of the Pagans to be animated with particular souls of their own, (which Ammianus Marcellinus* seems principally to call “*spiritus elementorum*,” the spirits of the elements—worshipped by Julian) and upon that account to be so many inferior gods themselves. Notwithstanding which, that the inanimate parts of these were also deified by the Pagans, may be concluded from hence; because Plato, who in his *Cratylus* etymologizeth Dionysius from giving of wine, and elsewhere calls

De Leg.
p. 788.

the fruits of the earth τὰ Διμήτρος δῶρα, the gifts of Ceres—doth himself nevertheless, in compliance with this vulgar speech, call wine and water as mingled together in a glass (or cup) to be drunk, gods: where he affirmeth,

De Leg.
l. vi.

that a city ought to be δίκην κρατῆρος κεκραμένην, οὗ μαινόμενος μὲν οἶνος ἐγκεχυμένος ζεῖ,

* Vide lib. xxi. cap. i. p. 263.

κολαζόμενος δὲ ὑπὸ νήφοντος ἐτέρου θεοῦ, καλὴν κοινωνίαν λαβὼν, ἀγαθὸν πόμα καὶ μέτριον ἀπεργάζεται, so tempered, as in a cup, where the furious wine poured out bubbles and sparkles, but being corrected by another sober god, (that is, by water) both together make a good and moderate potion.—Cicero also tells us, that before the Roman admirals went to sea, they were wont to offer up a sacrifice to the waves. But of this more afterward. However, it is certain, that mere accidents and affections of things in nature were by these Pagans commonly personated and deified; as Time, in Sophocles' *Electra*,* is a god; Χρόνος γὰρ ἡμαρῆς Θεός; for Time is an easy god—and Love, in Plato's *Symposium*, where it is wondered at, that no poet had ever made a hymn τῷ Ἔρωτι τηλικούτῳ ὄντι καὶ τοσούτῳ θεῷ, to Love, being such and so great a god.—Though the same Plato, in his *Philebus*, when Protarchus had called Pleasure a goddess too, was not willing to comply so far there with vulgar speech; τὸ δ' ἐμὸν δέος, ὦ Πρωταρχε, αἰὶ πρὸς τὰ τῶν θεῶν ὀνόματα οὐκ ἔστι κατ' ἀνθρώπου, ἀλλὰ πέρα τοῦ μεγίστου φόβου· καὶ νῦν τὴν μὲν Ἀφροδίτην, ὅπη ἐκείνη φίλον, ταύτην προσαγορεύω, τὴν δὲ ἡδονὴν οἶδα ὡς ἔστι ποικίλον· My fear, O Protarchus, concerning the names of the gods is extraordinary great: wherefore, as to Venus, I am willing to call her what she pleases to be called; but Pleasure, I know, is a various and multiform thing.—Wherefore, it cannot be denied, but that the Pagans did in some sense or other deify or theologize all the parts of the

* Ex Stobæo apud Hug. Grot. Excerpt. veter. Comicor. et Tragie. p. 66.

world, and things of nature. Which we conceive to have been done at first upon no other ground than this, because God was supposed by them, not only to permeate and pervade all things, to be diffused through all, and to act in and upon all, but also to be himself in a manner all things; which they expressed after this way, by personating the things of nature severally, and bestowing the names of gods and goddesses upon them. Only we shall here observe, that this was done especially (besides the greater parts of the world) to two sorts of things; first, such in which human utility was most concerned: thus Cicero, "Mul-

N. D. I. lib. p. 222. *tæ aliæ naturæ deorum ex magnis beneficiis eorum, non sine causa, et a Græcæ sapientibus, et a majoribus nostris, constitutæ nominatæque sunt:*" Many other natures of gods

have been constituted and nominated, both by the wise men of Greece, and by our ancestors, merely for the great benefits received from them.—The reason whereof is thus given by him; "Quia quicquid magnam utilitatem generi afferret humano, id non sine divina bonitate erga homines fieri arbitrabantur:" Because they thought, that whatsoever brought any great utility to mankind, this was not without the Divine goodness.—Secondly, such as were most wonderful and extraordinary, or surprising; to which that of Seneca seems pertinent, "Magnorum fluminum capita veneramur; subita et ex abdito vasti

Ep. 41. [p. 101. tom. ii. oper.] *amnis eruptio aras habet: coluntur aquarum calentium fontes; et stagna quædam vel opacitas vel immensa altitudo sacrauit."* We adore the rising heads and springs of great rivers; every sudden and plentiful eruption

of waters out of the hidden caverns of the earth hath its altars erected to it; and some pools have been made sacred for their immense profundity and opacity.

Now this is that, which is properly called the physiological theology of the Pagans, their personating and deifying (in a certain sense) the things of nature, whether inanimate substances, or the affections of substances. A great part of which physiological theology was allegorically contained in the poetic fables of the gods. Eusebius, indeed, was of opinion, that those poetic fables were at first only historical and herological, but that afterwards some went about to allegorize them into physiological senses, thereby to make them seem the less impious and ridiculous:

τοιαύτη ἦν τὰ τῆς παλαιᾶς θεολογίας, ἣν μεταβα- Pr. Ev. l. iii.
λόντες νέοι τινές, χθές καὶ πρώην ἐπιφνέοντες, λο- c. vi. [lib. ii.
γικώτερόν τε φιλοσοφεῖν ἀνχοῦντες, τὴν δὲ φυσι- cap. vi. p. 73.]

κώτεραν τῆς περὶ θεῶν ἱστορίας δόξαν εἰσηγήσαντο, σεμνο-
τέρας εὐρεσιολογίας τοῖς μύθοις προσεπινοήσαντες, &c. θερα-
πεύσαι δὲ οὖν ὁμῶς οἶδε τὸ πατρικὸν ἀμάρτημα προθυμηθέν-
τες, ἐπὶ φυσικὰς διηγήσεις καὶ θεωρίας τοὺς μύθους μετεσκευά-
σαντο. Such was the ancient theology of the Pagans (namely, historical, of men deceased, that were worshipped for gods) which some late upstarts have altered, devising other philosophical and physiological senses of those histories of their gods, that they might thereby render them the more specious, and hide the impiety of them. For they being neither willing to abandon those fopperies of their forefathers, nor yet themselves able to bear the impiety of these fables (concerning the gods) according to the literal sense of them have gone about to cure them thus by physiolo-

gical interpretations.—Neither can it be doubted, but that there was some mixture of herology and history in the poetic mythology; nor denied, that the Pagans of latter times, such as Porphyrius and others, did excogitate and devise certain new allegorical senses of their own, such as never were intended; Origen, before both him and I. iii. c. ccl. p. 123. Porphyry, noting this of the Pagans, that when the absurdity of their fables concerning the gods was objected and urged against them, some of them did *περὶ τούτων ἀπολογούμενοι ἐπ' ἀλληγορίας καταφεύγουσιν*, apologizing for these things, betake themselves to allegories.—But long before the times of Christianity, those first Stoics, Zeno, Cleanthes and Chrysippus, were famous for the great pains which they took in allegorizing these poetic fables of the gods. Of which Cotta in Cicero* thus; “*Magnam molestiam suscepit et minime necessariam primus Zeno, post Cleanthes, deinde Chrysippus, commentitiarum fabularum reddere rationem, et vocabulorum, cur quidque ita appellatum sit, causas explicare. Quod cum facitis, illud profecto confitemini, longe aliter rem se habere atque hominum opinio sit; eos, qui Dii appellantur, rerum naturas esse, non figuras Deorum.*” Zeno first, and after him Cleanthes and Chrysippus, took a great deal more pains than was needful, to give a reason of all those commentitious fables of the gods, and of the names that every thing was called by. By doing which they confessed, that the matter was far otherwise than according to men's opinion, inasmuch as they, who are called gods in them, were nothing but

* De Nat. Deor. lib. ii. cap. xxiv. p. 3089. tom. ix. oper.

the natures of things. From whence it is plain, that, in the poetic theology, the Stoics took it for granted, that the natures of things were personated and deified, and that those gods were not animal, nor indeed philosophical, but fictitious, and nothing but the things of nature allegorized. Origen also gives us a taste of Chrysippus's thus allegorizing, in the interpreting an obscene picture or table of Jupiter and Juno, in Samos; λέγει γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ συγγράμμασιν ὁ σεμνὸς φιλόσοφος, ὅτι τοὺς σπερματικούς λόγους τοῦ θεοῦ ἡ ὕλη παραδειγματίζει, ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῇ, εἰς κατακόσμησιν τῶν ἄλων· ὕλη γὰρ ἡ ἐν τῇ κατὰ τὴν Σάμον γραφῇ, ἡ Ἥρα, καὶ ὁ θεὸς ὁ Ζεὺς. This grave philosopher, in his writings, saith, that matter having received the spermatie reasons of God, containeth them within itself for the adorning of the whole world; and that Juno, in this picture in Samos, signifies Matter, and Jupiter God.—Upon which occasion that pious father adds, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δὴ ἡμεῖς, καὶ διὰ τοὺς τοιούτους μύθους καὶ ἄλλους μυρίους, οὐδὲ μέχρι ὀνόματος θέλομεν Δία καλεῖν τὸν ἐπὶ πᾶσι θεόν, ἀλλὰ καθαρὰν εὐσέβειαν εἰς τὸν δημιουργὸν ἀσκοῦντες, οὐδὲ μέχρι ὀνόματος χραίνομεν τὰ θεῖα. For the sake of which, and innumerable other such-like fables, we will never endure to call the God over all by the name of Jupiter, but, exercising pure piety towards the Maker of the world, will take care not to defile Divine things with impure names.—And here we see again, according to Chrysippus's interpretation, that Hera or Juno was no animal nor real god, but only the nature of matter personated and deified; that is, a mere fictitious and poetic god. And we think it is unquestionably evident from Hesiod's Theogonia; that many of these poetic fables, accord-

ing to their first intention, were really nothing else but physiology allegorized; and consequently those gods nothing but the natures of things personated and deified. Plato himself, though no friend to these poetic fables, plainly intimates as

p. 378. much, in his second De Rep. καὶ θεομα-

[p. 430.] χίας ὅσας Ὅμηρος πεποιήκεν, οὐ παραδεκτέον

εἰς τὴν πόλιν, οὐτ' ἐν ὑπονοίαις πεποιημένας, οὐτ' ἀνευ ὑπονοιών· ὁ γὰρ νέος, οὐχ οἷός τε κρίναν ὁ, τι τε ὑπόνοια

καὶ ὁ μή· The fightings of the gods, and such

other things, as Homer hath feigned concerning

them, ought not to be admitted into our common-

wealth, whether they be delivered in way of alle-

gory, or without allegories; because young men

are not able to judge when it is an allegory, and

when not.—And it appears from Dionysius Ha-

licarnass. that this was the general opinion con-

cerning the Greekish fables, that some of them

were physically, and some tropologically alle-

gorical: μηδὲς ὑπολάβοι με ἀγνοεῖν, ὅτι τῶν

L. ii. p. 68. Ἑλληνικῶν μύθων εἰσὶ τινες ἀνθρώποις χρήσιμοι,

οἱ μὲν ἐπιδεικνύμενοι τὰ τῆς φύσεως ἔργα δι' ἀλληγορίας, οἱ

δὲ παραμυθίας ἕνεκα συγκείμενοι τῶν ἀνθρωπείων συμφορῶν,

&c. Let no man think me to be ignorant, that

some of the Greekish fables are profitable to

men, partly as declaring the works of nature by

N. D. I. ii. allegories, partly as being helpful for

p. 223. human life, &c. Thus also Cicero, "Alia

[cap. xxiv. p. 2990.] quoque ex ratione, et quidem physica,

magna fluxit multitudo Deorum, qui induti specie

humana fabulas poetis suppeditaverunt, hominum

autem vitam superstitione omni refercerunt."

Eusebius,* indeed, seems sometimes to cast it

as an imputation upon the whole Pagan theology,

* Præpar. Evang. lib. iii. cap. i.

that it did *θεάζειν τὴν ἀψυχὸν οὐσίαν*, deify the inanimate nature—but this is properly to be understood of this part of their theology only, which was physiological, and of their mythology or poetic fables of the gods allegorized; it being otherwise both apparently false, and all one as to make them downright Atheists. For he that acknowledges no animant God, as hath been declared, acknowledges no God at all, according to the true notion of him; whether he derive all things from a fortuitous motion of matter, as Epicurus and Democritus did, or from a plastic and orderly, but senseless nature, as some degenerate Stoics, and Strato the Peripatetic; whose Atheism seems to be thus described by Manilius:^a

Aut neque terra patrem novit, nec flamma, nec ær,
 Aut humor, faciuntque Deum per quatuor artus,
 Et mundi struxere globum, prohibeatque requiri
 Ultra se quidquam.

Neither ought this physiological theology of the Pagans, which consisted only in personating and deifying inanimate substances, and the natures of things, to be confounded (as it hath been by some late writers) with that philosophical theology of Scævola, Varro and others, (which was called natural also, but in another sense, as true and real) it being indeed but a part of the poetical first, and afterward of the political theology, and owing its original much to the fancies of poets, whose humour it was perpetually to personate things and natures. But the philosophic theology, properly so called, which, according to Varro,^b was that, “de qua multos libros philo-

^a Astronomic. lib. i. ver. 137.

^b Apud Augustin. de Civit. Dei. lib. v. cap. v. p. 116. tom. vii. oper.

sophi reliquerunt;" as it admitted none but animal gods, and such as really existed in nature, (which therefore were called natural) namely one supreme, universal Numen, a perfect soul or mind comprehending all, and his *ὑπουργοὶ δυνάμεις*, other inferior understanding beings his ministers created by him, such as stars and demons, so were all those personated gods, or natures of things, deified in the arcane theology, interpreted agreeably thereunto.

St. Austin often takes notice of the Pagans thus mingling, and, as it were, incorporating physiology with their theology, he justly condemning the same: as in his forty-ninth epistle; "*Neque illinc excusant impii sua sacrilega sacra et simulachra, quod eleganter interpretantur quid quæque significant: omnis quippe illa interpretatio ad creaturam refertur, non ad creatorem, cui uni debetur servitus religionis, illa quæ uno nomine Latrìa Græce appellatur.*" Neither do the Pagans sufficiently excuse their sacrilegious rites and images from hence, because they elegantly (and ingeniously) interpret, what each of those things signifieth. For this interpretation is referred to the creature, and not to the Creator, to whom alone belongeth religious worship, that which by the Greeks is called Latrìa.—And again in his book *De Civ. D. l. vi. c. viii.* "*At enim habent ista physiologicas quasdam (sicut aiunt) id est, naturalium rationum interpretationes. Quasi vero nos in hac disputatione physiologiam quæramus, et non theologiam; id est, rationem naturæ, et non Dei. Quamvis enim qui verus Deus est, non*

† Epist. cii. Quæst. iii. §. xx. p. 212. tom. ii. oper. edit. Benedictin.

opinione sed natura sit Deus; non tamen omnis natura Deus est." But the Pagans pretend, that these things have certain physiological interpretations, or according to natural reasons; as if in this disputation we sought for physiology, and not theology, or the reason of nature, and not of God. For although the true God be not in opinion only, but in nature God, yet is not every nature God.—But certainly the first and chief ground of this practice of theirs, thus to theologize physiology, and deify (in one sense or other) all the things of nature, was no other than what has been already intimated, their supposing God to be not only diffused through the whole world, and in all things, but also in a manner all things; and that therefore he ought to be worshipped in all the things of nature, and parts of the world.

Wherefore these personated gods of the Pagans, or those things of nature deified by them, and called gods and goddesses, were for all that by no means accounted, by the intelligent amongst them, true and proper gods. Thus Cotta in Cicero: "Cum fruges Cererem, vinum Li-
berum dicimus, genere nos quidem ser-
monis utimur usitato: sed ecquem tam
De N. D. I. III.
p. 345. [c. xvi.
p. 3071.
tom. ix.]

amentem esse putas, qui illud, quo vescatur, Deum esse credat?" Though it be very common and familiar language amongst us, to call corn Ceres, and wine Bacchus, yet who can think any one to be so mad, as to take that to be really a god, which he feeds upon?—The Pagans really accounted that only for a god, by the worshipping and invoking whereof they might reasonably expect benefit to themselves, and therefore nothing was truly and properly a god to them, but what

was both substantial, and also animant and intellectual. For Plato writes, that the atheistic wits of his time therefore concluded the sun and moon, and stars, not to be gods, because they were nothing but earth and stones (or a certain fiery matter) devoid of all understanding and sense; and for this cause, οὐδὲν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων φροντίζον δυνάμενα, unable to take notice of any human affairs.—And Aristotle affirmeth concerning the gods in general, ζῆν τε πάντες ὑπελήφασιν αὐτοὺς, καὶ ἐνεργεῖν ἄρα, &c. that all men conceived them to live, and consequently to act, since they cannot be supposed to sleep perpetually as Endymion did.—The Pagans universally conceived the gods to be happy animals; and Aristotle there concludes the happiness of them all to consist in contemplation. Lucretius himself would not debar men of that language (then vulgarly received amongst the Pagans) of calling the sea Neptune, corn Ceres, wine Bacchus, and the Earth the mother of the gods too, provided that they did not think any of these, for all that, to be truly and really gods:

L. ii. p. 165. Hic signis mare Neptunum, Cereremque vocare
[ver. 654. Constituit fruges, et Bacchi nomine abuti
p. 380. ed. Mavolt, quam laticis proprium proferre vocamen;
Havercamp.] Concedamus, ut hic terrarum dictitet orbem
Esse deum matrem, dum non sit re tamen apse.

And the reason, why the earth was not really a goddess, is thus given by him;

Terra quidem vero caret omni tempore sensu.

Because it is constantly devoid of all manner of sense.—Thus Balbus in Cicero tells us, that the first thing included in the notion

N. D. I. ii.
p. 220.

* Magn. Moral. lib. v. cap. viii. p. 184. tom. iii. oper.

or idea of a god is this: "Ut sit animans," That it be animant;—or endued with life, sense, and understanding. And he conceiving the stars to be undoubtedly such, therefore concludes them to be gods: "Quoniam tenuissimus est æther, et semper agitatur et viget, necesse est, quod animal in eo gignatur, idem quoque sensu acerrimo esse. Quare cum in æthere astra gignantur, consentaneum est in iis sensum inesse et intelligentiam. Ex quo efficitur in deorum numero astra esse ducenda."—

Because the ether is most subtile, and in continual agitation, that animal, which is begotten in it, must needs be endued with the quickest and sharpest sense. Wherefore since the stars are begotten in the ether, it is reasonable to think them to have sense and understanding; from whence it follows, that they ought to be reckoned in the number of gods.—And Cotta in the third D. N. D.

book affirms, that all men were so far P. 241. D. from thinking the stars to be gods, that "multi ne animantes quidem esse concedant," many would not so much as admit them to be animals—plainly intimating, that unless they were animated, they could not possibly be gods. Lastly, Plu- De Is. et Os. P. 377.

condemns that whole practice of giving the names of gods and goddesses to inanimate things, as absurd, impious, and atheistical; *δυσὰς καὶ ἀθίους ἐπιποιῦσι δόξας, ἀναισθητοῖς, καὶ αἰσχύοις, καὶ φθειρομένοις ἀναγκάως ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων δοκίμων καὶ χρωμένων φύσει καὶ πράγμασιν ὀνόματα θεῶν ἐπιφέροντες· ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ αὐτὰ νοῆσαι θεοὺς οὐκ ἔστιν· οὐ γὰρ αὖν οὐδὲ αἰσχύον ἀνθρώπου ὁ θεός·* They, who give the names of gods to senseless and inanimate natures and things, and such as are destroyed by men in the use of them, beget

most wicked and atheistical opinions in the minds of men; since it cannot be conceived, how these things should be gods, for nothing, that is inanimate, is a god.—And now we have very good reason to conclude, that the distinction or division of Pagan gods (used by some) into animal and natural (by natural being meant inanimate) is utterly to be rejected, if we speak of their true and proper gods; since nothing was such to the Pagans but what had life, sense and understanding. Wherefore those personated gods, that were nothing but the natures of things deified, as such, were but “*dii commentitii et fictitii*,” counterfeit and fictitious gods—or, as Origen calls them in that place before cited, τὰ Ἑλλήνων ἀναπλάσματα, σωματοποιεῖσθαι δοκοῦντα ἀπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων, figments of the Greeks (and other Pagans) that were but things turned into persons and deified.—Neither can there be any other sense made of these personated and deified things of nature, than this, that they were all of them really so many several names of one supreme God, or partial considerations of him, according to the several manifestations of himself in his works. Thus, according to the old Egyptian theology before declared, God is said to have both no name, and every name; or, as it is expressed in the Asclepian Dialogue, “*Cum non possit uno quamvis e multis composito nomine nuncupari, potius omni nomine vocandus est, siquidem sit unus et omnia; ut necesse sit, aut omnia ipsius nomine, aut ipsum omnium nomine nuncupari.*” Since he cannot be fully declared by any one name, though compounded of never so many, therefore is he rather to be called by every name, he being both one and all things:

so that either every thing must be called by his name, or he by the name of every thing.—With which Egyptian doctrine Seneca^a seemeth also fully to agree, when he gives this description of God, “Cui nomen omne convenit,” He to whom every name belongeth—and when he further declares thus concerning him, “Quæcunque voles illi nomina aptabis;” and, “Tot appellationes ejus possunt esse, quot munera,” You may give him whatsoever names you please, &c.—and, There may be as many names of him as there are gifts and effects of his;—and, lastly, when he makes God and nature to be really one and the same thing, and every thing we see to be God. And the writer *De Mundo*^a is likewise consonant hereto, when he affirmeth, that God is *πάσης ἐναντίος φύσεως ἅτε πάντων αὐτὸς αἴτιος ὢν*, or, may be denominated from every nature, because he is the cause of all things.—We say, therefore, that the Pagans in this their theologizing of physiology, and deifying the things of nature and parts of the world, did accordingly call every thing by the name God, or God by the name of every thing.

Wherefore these personated and deified things of nature were not themselves properly and directly worshipped by the intelligent Pagans (who acknowledged no inanimate thing for a god) so as to terminate their worship ultimately in them; but either relatively only to the supreme God, or else at most in way of complication with him, whose effects and images they are; so that they were not so much themselves worshipped, as God was worshipped in them. For these Pagans pro-

^a De Benefic. lib. iv. cap. vii. p. 427, tom. i. oper.

^a Cap. vii. p. 869. tom. i. oper. Aristot.

Julian, Orat. 4 [p. 148.] fessed, that they did τὸν οὐρανὸν μὴ παρ-
 ἔργως, μηδὲ ὥσπερ τὰ βοσκήματα θεωρεῖν, look

upon the heaven (and world) not slightly and superficially; nor as mere brute animals, who take notice of nothing, but those sensible phantasms, which from the objects obtrude themselves upon them—or else, as the same Julian, in that oration,

again more fully expresseth it, τὸν οὐρανὸν
 P. 286. οὐχ ὥσπερ ἵππους καὶ βόας ὁρᾶν, ἅτι τῶν ἀλό-

γων καὶ ἀμαθῶν ζῶων· ἀλλὰ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ φανεροῦ τὴν ἀφανῆ πολυπραγμονεῖν φύσιν· Not view and contemplate

the heaven and world, with the same eyes that oxen and horses do, but so as from that, which is visible to their outward senses, to discern and discover another invisible nature under it.—That is, they professed to behold all things with religious eyes, and to see God in every thing, not only as pervading all things, and diffused through all things, but also as being in a manner all things. Wherefore they looked upon the whole world as a sacred thing, and as having a kind of divinity in it; it being, according to their theology, nothing but God himself visibly displayed. And thus was God worshipped by the Pagans, in the whole corporeal world taken all at once together, or in the universe, under the name of Pan. As they also commonly conceived of Zeus and Jupiter, after the same manner; that is, not abstractly only (as we now use to conceive of God) but concretely, together with all that which proceedeth and emaneth from him, that is, the whole world. And as God was thus described in that old Egyptian monument, to be “all that was, is, and shall be;” so was it before observed out of Plutarch, that the Egyptians took the first God, and the

universe, for one and the same thing; not only because they supposed the supreme God virtually to contain all things within himself, but also because they were wont to conceive of him, together with his overflowing, and all the extent of his fecundity, the whole world displayed from him, all at once, as one entire thing. Thus likewise do the Pagans in Plato confound τὸν μέγιστον θεόν, and ὅλον τὸν κόσμον, the greatest De Leg. l. vii. p. 821.

God, and the whole world together, as being but one and the same thing. And this notion was so familiar with these Pagans, that Strabo himself, writing of Moses, could not con- L. xvi. p. 761.

ceive of his God, and of the God of the Jews, any otherwise than thus; τὸ περιέχον ἡμᾶς ἅπαντας, καὶ γῆν, καὶ θάλατταν, ὃ καλοῦμεν οὐρανὸν καὶ κόσμον, καὶ τὴν τῶν ὅλων φύσιν, namely, that which containeth us all, and the earth, and the sea, which we call the heaven and world, and the nature of the whole.—By which, notwithstanding, Strabo did not mean the heaven or world inanimate, and a senseless nature, but an understanding Being, framing the whole world, and containing the same which was conceived together with it: of which therefore he tells us, that, according to Moses, no wise man would go about to make any image or picture, resembling any thing here amongst us. From whence we conclude, that when the same Strabo,* writing of the Persians, affirmeth of them, that they did τὸν οὐρανὸν ἡγεῖσθαι Δία, take the heaven for Jupiter; and also Herodotus^b before him, that they did κύκλον πάντα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ Δία καλεῖν, call the whole circle of the heaven Jupiter—that is, the supreme God; the meaning of neither of them was, that the body of the heaven inanimate was to them the

* Lib. xv. p. 697.

^b Lib. i. cap. cxxxi. p. 55.

highest God, but that though he were an understanding nature, yet framing the whole heaven or world, and containing the same, he was at once conceived together with it. Moreover, God was worshipped also by the Pagans, in the several parts of the world, under several names; as, for example, in the higher and lower ether, under those names of Minerva and Jupiter; in the air, under the name of Juno; in the fire, under the name of Vulcan; in the sea, under the name of Neptune, &c. Neither can it be reasonably doubted, but that when the Roman sea-captains sacrificed to the waves, they intended therein to worship that God, who acteth in the waves, and whose wonders are in the deep.

But, besides this, the Pagans seemed to apprehend a kind of necessity of worshipping God, thus, in his works, and in the visible things of this world, because the generality of the vulgar were then unable to frame any notion or conception at all of an invisible Deity; and, therefore, unless they were detained in a way of religion, by such a worship of God as was accommodate and suitable to the lowness of their apprehensions, would unavoidably run into Atheism. Nay, the most philosophical wits amongst them confessing God to be incomprehensible to them, therefore seemed themselves also to stand in need of some sensible props, to lean upon. This very account is given by the Pagans, of their practice, in Eusebius; *ἀσωμάτως καὶ ἀφανῶς ἐν πᾶσιν ὄντα* Pr. Ev. l. iii. *Θεὸν, καὶ διὰ πάντων διέκοντα, καὶ τοῦτον εἰκότως διὰ τῶν δεδηλωμένων σέβειν φασί*, that God being incorporeally and invisibly present in all things, and pervading or passing through all things, it was reasonable, that men should worship him, by

and through those things that are visible and manifest.—Plato likewise represents this as the opinion of the generality of Pagans De Leg. l. vii. p. 821. [p. 640.] in his time, τὸν μέγιστον θεὸν, καὶ ὅλον τὸν

κόσμον φάμεν οὔτε ζητεῖν δεῖν, οὔτε πολυπραγματεῖν, τὰς αἰτίας ἐρευνῶντας· οὐ γὰρ οὐδ' ὅσιον εἶναι· That as for the greatest God, and the whole world, men should not busily and curiously search after the knowledge thereof, nor pragmatically inquire into the causes of things, it being not pious for them so to do.—The meaning whereof seems to be no other than this, that men ought to content themselves to worship God in his works, and in this visible world, and not trouble themselves with any further curious speculations concerning the nature of that, which is incomprehensible to them. Which though Plato professeth his dislike of, yet does that philosopher himself elsewhere plainly allow of worshipping the first invisible God in those visible images, which he hath made of himself, the sun and moon, and stars. Maximus Ty- Dissert. i. [p. 12.] rius doth indeed exhort men to ascend

up, in the contemplation of God, above all corporeal things; τέλος τῆς ὁδοῦ οὐχ ὁ οὐρανός, οὐδὲ τὰ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ σώματα, (καλὰ μὲν γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ θεοπέτσια, ἅτε ἐκείνου ἔγγονα ἀκριβῆ καὶ γνήσια, καὶ πρὸς τὸ κάλλιστον ἡρμοσμένα) ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτων ἐπέκεινα ἔλθειν δεῖ, καὶ ὑπερκεῖναι τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, ἐπὶ τὸν ἀληθῆ τόπον, &c. The end of your journey (saith he) is not the heaven, nor those shining bodies in the heaven; for though those be beautiful and Divine, and the genuine offspring of that supreme Deity, framed after the best manner, yet ought these all to be transcended by you, and your head lifted up far above the starry heavens, &c.—Nevertheless, he closes his

discourse thus:· εἰ δὲ ἰσχυροῦς πρὸς τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ δημιουργοῦ θέαν, ἀρκεῖ σοι τὰ ἔργα ἐν τῷ παρόντι ὄραν, καὶ προσκυνεῖν τὰ ἔγγονα, πολλὰ καὶ παντοδαπὰ ὄντα, οὐχ ὅσα ὁ Βοιωτίας ποιητὴς λέγει· οὐ γὰρ τρισμύριοι μόνον θεοὶ θεοῦ παῖδες καὶ φίλοι, ἀλλ' ἀληπτοὶ ἀριθμῷ· τοῦτο μὲν κατ' ὁρᾶνδ' αἱ ἀστέρων φύσεις, &c. But if you be too weak and unable to contemplate that father and maker of all things; it will be sufficient for you for the present to behold his works, and to worship his progeny or offspring, which is various and manifold. For there are not only, according to the Bæotian poet, thirty thousand gods, all the sons and friends of the supreme God, but innumerable. And such in the heaven are the stars, in the ether demons, &c.—Lastly, Socrates himself also did not only allow of this way of worshipping God, (because himself is invisible) in his works that are visible, but also commend the same to Euthyde-

Xenoph. Memor. I. iv. [p. 633.]

mus; ὅτι δὲ γε ἀληθῆ λέγω, καὶ σὺ γνώσῃ, ἂν μὴ ἀναμένῃς, ἕως ἂν τὰς μορφὰς τῶν θεῶν ἴδῃς, ἀλλ' ἐξαρκῇ σοι, τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν ὁρῶντι σέβεσθαι καὶ τιμᾶν τοὺς θεούς· That I speak the truth, yourself shall know, if you will not stay expecting, till you see the forms of the gods themselves, but count it sufficient for you beholding their works to worship and adore them.—Which afterward he particularly applies to the supreme God, who made and containeth the whole world, that being invisible, he hath made himself visible in his works, and consequently was to be worshipped and adored in them. Whether Socrates and Plato, and their genuine followers, would extend this any further than to the animated parts of the world, such as the sun, moon, and stars were to them, we cannot

certainly determine. But we think it very probable, that many of those Pagans, who are charged with worshipping inanimate things, and particularly the elements, did notwithstanding direct their worship to the spirits of those elements, as Ammianus Marcellinus tells us Julian did, that is, chiefly the souls of them, all the elements being supposed by many of these Pagans to be animated, (as was before observed concerning Proclus;) and partly also those demons, P. 236, 237. which they conceived to inhabit in them, and to preside over the parts of them; upon which account it was said by Plato, and others of the ancients, that πάντα θεῶν πλήρη, all things are full of gods and demons.

xxxiii. But that these physiological gods, that is, the things of nature personated and deified, were not accounted by the Pagans true and proper gods, much less independent and self-existent ones, may further appear from hence, because they did not only thus personate and deify things substantial, and inanimate bodies, but also mere accidents and affections of substances. As, for example, first, the passions of the mind; τὰ πάθη θεοὺς ἐνόμισαν, ἢ θεοὺς ἐτίμησαν, saith St. Greg. Nazianzen,* They accounted the passions of the mind to be gods—or at least worshipped them as gods; that is, built temples or altars to their names. Thus was Hope, not only a goddess to the poet Theognis,^b

* Ελπίς ἐν ἀνθρώποις μὴν θεὸς ἐσθλὴ ἵσται,
 ἄλλαν δ' ὀλυμπιῶν ἐκπελομένην ἴδαν

(where he fancifully makes her to be the only Nu-

^a Orat. xxxiv. tom. i. oper. p. 546.

^b In Sententiis, ver. 1131, 1132, p. 115.

men, that was left to men in heaven, as if the other gods had all forsaken those mansions and the world;) but also had real temples dedicated to her at Rome, as that consecrated by Attilius in the Forum Olitorium, and others elsewhere, wherein she was commonly pictured or feigned, as a woman, covered over with a green pall, and holding a cup in her hand.^a Thus also Love and Desire were gods or goddesses too, as likewise were care, memory, opinion, truth, virtue, piety, faith, justice, clemency, concord, victory, &c. Which victory was, together with virtue, reckoned up amongst the gods of Plautus in the prologue of his *Amphitryo*; and, not only so, but that there was an altar erected to her also, near the entrance of the senate-house at Rome, which having been once demolished, Symmachus earnestly endeavoured the restoration thereof; in the reign of Theodosius; he amongst other things writing thus concerning it,^b “*Nemo colendam neget, quam profitetur optandam;*” Let no man deny that of right to be worshipped, which he acknowledgeth to be wished for, and to be desirable.—Besides all which, Echo was a goddess to these Pagans too, and so was Night (to whom they sacrificed a cock) and Sleep and Death itself, and very many more such affections of things, of which Vossius has collected the largest catalogue, in his eighth book *De Theologia Gentili*. And this personating and deifying of accidental things was so familiar with these Pagans, that, as St. Chrysostom hath observed, St. Paul was therefore said by some of the vulgar

^a Vide Vossium, de Idololatr. lib. viii. cap. x. p. 748.

^b Epistolar. lib. ix. Epist. lxi. p. 441.

Athenians to have been a setter forth of strange gods, "when he preached to them Jesus and the resurrection," because they supposed him, not only to have made Jesus a God, but also Anastasis, or resurrection, a goddess too. Nay, this humour of theologizing the things of nature transported these Pagans so far, as to deify evil things also, that is, things both noxious and vicious.

Of the former Pliny thus: "*Inferi quo-* H. N. l. ii. c. vii.
que in genera describuntur, morbique,

et multæ etiam pestes, dum esse placatas trepido metu cupimus. Ideoque etiam publice febri fanum in palatio dedicatum est, Orbonæ ad ædem Iarium ara, et malæ fortunæ Exquiliis." So great is the number of these gods, that even hell, or the state of death itself, diseases and many plagues are numbered amongst them, whilst with a trembling fear we desire to have these pacified. And therefore was there a temple publicly dedicated in the palace to the Fever, as likewise altars elsewhere erected to Orbona, and to evil fortune.—

Of the latter, Balbus in Cicero; "*Quo ex* N. D. l. ii. cap. xxiii. p. 2988. tom. ix. oper.
genere Cupidinis et Voluptatis, et Lu-
bentina Veneris, vocabula consecrata

sunt, vitiosarum rerum et non naturalium." Of which kind also are those names of lust, and pleasure, and wanton venery, things vicious, and not natural, consecrated and deified.—Cicero, in his book of Laws,* informs us, that at Athens there were temples dedicated also to contumely and impudence, but withal giving us this censure of such practices; "*Quæ omnia ejus-* Gruter's edition a little otherwise,
modi detestanda et repudianda sunt," All which kind of things are to be detested

* Lib. ii. cap. xi. p. 3354. tom. ix. oper.

and rejected, and nothing to be deified, but what is virtuous or good.—Notwithstanding which, it is certain, that such evil things as these were consecrated to no other end, than that they might be deprecated. Moreover, as these things of nature, or natures of things, were sometimes deified by the Pagans plainly and nakedly in their own appellative names, so was this again sometimes done disguisedly, under other counterfeit proper names : as pleasure was deified under the names of Volupia, and of Lubentina Venus ; time, (according to the opinion of some) under the name of Cronos or Saturn, which as it produceth all things, so devours all things into itself again ; prudence or wisdom, likewise, under the names of Athena or Minerva. For it is plain, that Origen, *Cels. l. viii. gen.* understood it thus, when Celsus *p. 421.*

not only approved of worshipping God Almighty, in the sun, and in Minerva, as that which was lawful, but also commended it as a thing highly pious ; he making this reply ; *εὐφημοῦμεν ἥλιον ὡς καλὸν θεοῦ δημιούργημα, &c. Ἀθηνᾶν μέντοι μετὰ ἡλίου τασσομένην, ἐμυθοποίησαν οἱ Ἕλληνων λόγοι, εἴτ' ἐν ὑπονοίαις, εἴτε χωρὶς ὑπονοιῶν, φάσκοντες ἐκ τῆς τοῦ Διὸς γεγενῆσθαι κεφαλῆς, καθωπλισμένην, &c.* We speak well of the sun, as a good work of God's, &c. but as for that Athena or Minerva, which Celsus here joineth with the sun, this is a thing fabulously devised by the Greeks, (whether according to some mystical, arcane, and allegorical sense, or without it) when they say that she was begotten out of Jupiter's brain all armed.—And again afterwards, *ἵνα δὲ καὶ τροπολογῆται καὶ λέγεται φρόνησις εἶναι ἡ Ἀθηνᾶ,* If it be granted, that by Athena or Minerva be tropologically meant

prudence, &c.—Wherefore, not only according to the poetical, but also to the political and civil theology of the Pagans, these accidental things of nature, and affections of substances, personated, were made so many gods and goddesses; Cicero himself in his book of Laws approving of such political gods as these: “Benevero, quod mens, pietas, virtus, fides, con-^{L. ii. [cap. xi. p. 335.]}secratur manu; quarum omnium Romæ dedicata publice templa sunt, ut illa, qui habeant (habent autem omnes boni) deos ipsos in animis suis collocatos putent.” It is well, that mind, piety, virtue, and faith, are consecrated, (all which have their temples publicly dedicated at Rome) that so they, who possess these things, (as all good men do) may think, that they have the gods themselves placed in their minds.—And himself makes a law for them in his own commonwealth, but with a cautionary provision, that no evil and vicious things be consecrated amongst them: “Ast olla, propter quæ datur homini adscensus in cælum, mentem, virtutem, pietatem, fidem, earumque laudum delubra sunt. Nec ulla vitiorum solemnia obeunto.” Let them also worship those things, by means whereof men ascend up to heaven; and let there be shrines or temples dedicated to them. But let no religious ceremonies be performed to vicious things.

Notwithstanding all which, according to that theology of the Pagans, which was called by Varro natural, (whereby is meant not that which was physiological only, but that which is true and real) and by Scævola philosophical; and which is by both opposed, not only to the poeti-

cal and fabulous, but also to the political and civil: I say, according to this theology of theirs, these accidental things of nature deified could by no means be acknowledged for true and proper gods; because they were so far from having any life and sense in them, that they had not so much as *ὑπόστασιν καὶ οὐσίαν*, any real subsistence or substantial essence of their own. And thus does Origen dispute against Minerva's godship, as tropologically interpreted to prudence, *ἵνα*

Fig. 422.

δὲ καὶ τροπολογῆται καὶ λέγεται φρόνησις εἶναι ἡ Ἀθηνᾶ, παραστησάτω τις αὐτῆς τὴν ὑπόστασιν καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, ὡς ὑφ' ἑσθηκείας κατὰ τὴν τροπολογίαν ταύτην. If Athena or Minerva be tropologized into prudence, then let the Pagans shew what substantial essence it hath, or that it really subsists according to this tropology.—Which is all one, as if he should have said, let the Pagans then shew, how this can be a god or goddess, which hath not so much as any substantial essence, nor subsists by itself, but is a mere accidental affection of substances only. And the same thing is likewise urged by Origen, concerning other such kind of gods of theirs, as Memory the mother of the muses, and the Graces all naked, in his first book; where Celsus contended for a multiplicity of gods against the Jews; that these things having not *ὑπόστασιν καὶ οὐσίαν*, any substantial essence or subsistence, could not possibly be accounted gods, and therefore were nothing else but *ἑλλήνων ἀναπλάσματα σωματοποιηθέντα ἀπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων*, mere figments of the Greeks, things made to have human bodies, and so personated and deified.—And we think, there cannot be a truer commen-

tary upon this passage of Origen's, than these following verses of Prudentius, in his second book against Symmachus ;

Page 285.

*Desine, si pudor est, gentilis ineptia, tandem
Res incorporeas simulatis fingere membris :*

Let the Gentiles be at last ashamed, if they have any shame in them, of this their folly, in describing and setting forth incorporeal things with counterfeit human members.—Where accidents and affections of things, such as victory was, (whose altar Symmachus there contended for the restoration of) are by Prudentius called “*res incorporeæ*,” incorporeal things—accordingly as the Greek philosophers concluded, that *ποιότητες*, were *ἀσώματα*, qualities incorporeal.—Neither is it possible, that the Pagans themselves should be insensible hereof; and accordingly we find, that Cotta in Cicero doth for this reason utterly banish and explode these gods out of the philosophic and true theology :

N. D. I. III.
[cap. xxiv. p.
3088.]

“*Num censes igitur subtiliore ratione opus esse ad hæc refellenda? Nam mentem, fidem, spem, virtutem, honorem, victoriam, salutem, concordiam, cæteraque ejusmodi, rerum vim habere videmus, non deorum. Aut enim in nobismet insunt ipsis, ut mens, ut spes, ut fides, ut virtus, ut concordia; aut optandæ nobis sunt, ut honos, ut salus, ut victoria. Quare autem in his vis deorum sit, tum intelligam, cum cognovero.*” Is there any need, think you, of any great subtilty to confute these things? For mind, faith, hope, virtue, honour, victory, health, concord, and the like, we see them to have the force of things, but not of gods. Because they either exist in us, as mind,

hope, virtue, concord; or else they are desired to happen to us, as honour, health, victory (that is, they are nothing but mere accidents or affections of things), and therefore how they can have the force of gods in them cannot possibly be understood.—And again, afterwards he affirmeth, “*Eos, qui dii appellantur, rerum naturas esse, non figuras deorum,*” that those, who, in the allegorical mythology of Pagans, are called gods, are really but the natures of things, and not the true figures or forms of gods.

Wherefore since the Pagans themselves acknowledged, that those personated and deified things of nature were not true and proper gods; the meaning of them could certainly be no other than this, that they were so many several names, and partial considerations of one supreme God, as manifesting himself in all the things of nature. For that *vis* or force, which Cicero* tells us, was that in all these things, which was called God or deified, is really no other, than something of God in every thing that is good. Neither do we otherwise understand those following words of Balbus

in Cicero, “*Quarum rerum, quia vis erat tanta, ut sine Deo regi non posset, ipsa res deorum nomen obtinuit:*” Of which

N. D. I. ii.
[cap. xxiii.
p. 2988.]

things because the force is such, as that it could not be governed without God, therefore have the things themselves obtained the names of gods;—that is, God was acknowledged and worshipped in them all, which was paganically thus signified,

Nat. H. I. ii.
c. vii.

by calling of them gods. And Pliny, though no very divine person, yet being ingenious, easily understood this to be the mean-

* De Natur. Deor. lib. ii. cap. xxiii. p. 2988. tom. ix. oper.

ing of it; "*Fragilis et laboriosa mortalitas in partes ista digessit, infirmitatis suæ memor, ut portionibus quisque coleret, quo maxime indigeret;*" frail and toilsome mortality has thus broken and crumbled the Deity into parts, mindful of its own infirmity; that so every one, by parcels and pieces, might worship that in God, which himself most stands in need of.—Which religion of the Pagans, thus worshipping God, not entirely all together at once, as he is one most simple Being, unmixed with any thing, but as it were brokenly, and by piece-meals, as he is severally manifested in all the things of nature, and the parts of the world, Prudentius thus perstringeth in his second book against Symmachus;

Tu, me præterito, meditaris numina mille,	N. 236.
Quæ similes parere meis virtutibus, ut me	[p. 289.]
Per varias partes minuas, cui nulla recidi	
Pars aut forma potest, quia sum substantia simplex,	
Neo pars esse queo.	

From which words of his we may also conclude, that Symmachus, the Pagan, who determined, that it was one thing, that all worshipped, and yet would have victory, and such-like other things, worshipped as gods and goddesses, did by these and all those other Pagan gods beforementioned, understand nothing but so many several names, and partial considerations of one supreme Deity, according to its several virtues or powers: so that when he sacrificed to Victory, he sacrificed to God Almighty, under that partial notion, as the giver of victory to kingdoms and commonwealths. It was before observed out of Plutarch, that the Egyptian fable of Osiris being mangled and cut in pieces by Typhon, did allego-

That Osiris
was the an-

preme Deity,
see the Egyp-
tian inscrip-
tion, in Theo.
Smyrn. Ma-
them. c. xlvii.
ἡγεμονία
ἡγεμονίας
Οὐρανός, Osiris
the most ancient
king of all
things.

rically signify the same thing, viz. the one simple Deity's being as it were divided (in the fabulous and civil theologies of the Pagans) into many partial considerations of him, as so many nominal and titular gods; which Isis, notwithstanding, that is true knowledge and wisdom, according to the natural or philosophic theology, unites all together into one. And that not only such gods as these, Victory, Virtue, and the like, but also those other gods, Neptune, Mars, Bellona, &c. were all really but one and the same Jupiter, acting severally in the world, Plautus himself seems sufficiently to intimate in the prologue of his *Amphitryo* in these words;

Nam quid ego memorem, ut alios in tragœdiis
Viri, Neptunum, Virtutem, Victoriâ,
Martem, Bellonam, commemorare quæ bona
Vobis fecissent? Quis benefactis meus pater,
Deum retractor, architectus omnibus.

Whereas there was before cited a passage out of G. I. Vossius's book *De Theolog. Gent.* which we could not understand otherwise than thus, that the generality of the Pagans by their political (or civil) gods, meant so many eternal minds independent and self-existent; we now think ourselves concerned to do Vossius so much right, as to acknowledge, that we have since met with another place of his in that same book, wherein he either corrects the former opinion, or else declares himself better concerning it, after this manner: That the Pagans generally conceived their political gods to be so many substantial minds (or spirits) not independent and self-existent, nor indeed eter-

nal neither, but created by one supreme Mind of God, and appointed by him to preside over the several parts of the world, and things of nature, as his ministers. Which same thing he affirmeth also of those deified accidents and affections, that by them were to be understood so many substantial minds or spirits created, presiding over those several things, or dispensing of them. His words in the beginning of his eighth book, * (where he speaks concerning these affections and accidents deified by the Pagans) are as followeth: "*Hujusmodi deorum prope immensa est copia. Ac in civili quidem theologia considerari solent, tanquam mentes quædam, hoc honoris a summo Deo sortitæ, ut affectionibus istis præessent. Nempe crediderunt Deum, quem optimum, max. vocabant, non per se omnia curare, quo pacto, ut dicebant, plurimum beatitudini ejus decederet, sed, instar regis, plurimos habere ministros et ministras, quorum singulos huic illive curæ præfecisset. Sic justitia, quæ et Astræa ac Themis, præfecta erat actibus cunctis, in quibus justitia attendere-tur; Comus curare creditus est comessationes; et sic in cæteris id genus diis, nomen ab ea affectione sortitis, cujus cura cuique commissæ crederetur. Quo pacto si considerentur, non aliter different a spiritibus sive angelis bonis malisque, quam quod hi revera a Deo conditi sint; illæ vero mentes, de quibus nunc loquimur, sint figmentum mentis humanæ, pro numero affectionum, in quibus vis esse major videretur, comminiscantis mentes affectionibus singulis præfectas. Facile autem sacerdotes sua commenta persuadere simplicioribus potuerunt, quia satis videretur verisi-*

* Pag. 735.

mile, summæ illi menti, deorum omnium regi, innumeras servire mentes, ut eo perfectior sit summi dei beatitudo, minusque curis implicetur ; inque tot famulantium numero, summi numinis majestas magis eluceat. Ac talis quidem opinio erat theologiæ civilis." Of such gods as these there was an innumerable company amongst the Pagans. And in their civil theology they were wont to be considered ; as certain minds (or spirits) appointed by the supreme God, to preside over the affections of things ; they supposing, that God, whom they called the best, and the greatest, did not immediately himself take care of every thing, since that must needs be a distraction to him, and a hinderance of his happiness ; but that he had, as a king, many he and she ministers under him, which had their several offices assigned to them. Thus justice, which was called also Astræa and Themis, was by them thought to preside over all those actions, in which justice was concerned ; and Comus over all revellings ; and the like. Which gods, if considered after this manner, will no otherwise differ from angels, good and bad, than only in this, that these latter are beings really created by God, but the former the figments of men only ; they, according to the number of affections, that have any greater force in them, devising and imagining certain minds to preside over each of them, And the vulgar might therefore be the more easily led into this persuasion by their priests, because it seemed reasonable to them, that that supreme Mind, who is the King of all the gods, should have many other minds as his subservient ministers under him, both to free him from solicitous care, and also to add to his grandeur and

majesty. And such was the doctrine of the civil theology. Where, though Vossius speak particularly of that kind of Pagan gods, which were nothing but affections and accidents deified, (which no man in his wits could possibly suppose to be themselves true and proper gods, they having no subsistence of their own) that these by the generality of the vulgar Pagans were conceived to be so many created minds or spirits, appointed by the supreme God, to preside as his ministers over those several affections of substances; yet does he plainly imply the same of all those other political gods of these Pagans likewise, that they were not looked upon by them, as so many unmade, self-existent, and independent beings, but only as inferior minds or spirits, created by the supreme God, and by him appointed to preside over the several parts of the world, and things of nature; and having their several offices assigned to them. Wherefore, as to the main, we and Vossius are now well agreed, viz. that the ancient Pagans asserted no such thing as a multitude of independent deities; so that there only remain some particular differences of smaller moment betwixt us.

Ourselves have before observed, that *Æolus* was probably taken by *Epictetus* in *Arrianus*, (not indeed for one, but) for many created ministers of the supreme God, or demons collectively, appointed by him to preside over the winds, in all the several parts of the world. And the Pagans in *St. Austin* seem to interpret those deified accidents, and things of nature, after the same manner, as the names of certain unknown gods or demons, (one or more) that were appointed to preside over them respectively, or to dispense

Civ. D. l. iv. the same. "Quoniam sciebant majores

c. xxiv.

[p. 83. tom.

vii. oper.]

nostri nemini talia, nisi aliquo Deo largiente concedi, quorum deorum nomina non inveniebant, earum rerum nominibus appellabant deos, quas ab iis sentiebant dari; aliqua vocabula inde flectentes; sicut a bello Bellonam nuncupaverunt, non Bellum; sicut a cunis Cuni-
nam, non Cunam; sicut a segetibus Segetiam, non Segetem; sicut a pomis Pomonam, non Pomum; sicut a bobus Bobonam, non Bovem. Aut certe nulla vocabuli declinatione sicut res ipsæ nominantur; ut Pecunia dicta est dea, quæ dat pecuniam, non omnino pecunia dea ipsa putata: Ita virtus, quæ dat virtutem, honor qui honorem, concordia quæ concordiam, victoria quæ victoriam dat. Ita, inquiunt, cum felicitas dea dicitur, non ipsa quæ datur, sed numen illud attenditur, a quo felicitas datur." Because our forefathers knew well, that these things do not happen to any, without the special gift and favour of some god; therefore were those gods, whose names they knew not, called from the names of those very things themselves, which they perceived to be bestowed by them, there being only a little alteration made in them; as when the god, that causeth war, was called not Bellum, but Bellona; the god, which presideth over infants cradles, not Cuna, but Cuni-
nina; that which giveth corn, Segetia; and that which affordeth apples, Pomona, &c. But, at other times, this was done without any declension of the word at all, they calling both the thing, and the god, which is the bestower of it, by one and the self-same name. As Pecunia doth not only signify money, but also the goddess, which giveth

money; Virtus, the goddess, which giveth virtue; Honor, the god, that bestoweth honour; Concordia, the goddess, that causeth concord; Victory, the goddess, which affordeth victory. So also when Felicity is called a goddess, by it is not meant that thing, which is given, but that Divine power, from whence it is given.—Here, I say, the Pagans may seem to have understood, by those deified things of nature, certain inferior gods or demons (one or more) the ministers of the supreme God, appointed by him to preside over those several things respectively, or to dispense the same. Neither can we deny, but that in so much ignorance and diversity of opinions, as there was amongst the Pagans, some might possibly understand those political gods, and deified things also, after the way of Vossius, for so many single minds or spirits, appointed to preside over those several things respectively throughout the whole world, and nothing else. Nevertheless, it seemeth not at all probable, that this should be the general opinion amongst the civilized Pagans, that all those gods of theirs were so many single created minds or spirits, each of them appointed to preside over some one certain thing every where throughout the whole world, and nothing else. As, for example, that the goddess Victory was one single created she-spirit, appointed to bestow victory, to whosoever at any time enjoyed it, in all parts of the world; and so, that the goddess Justice should be such another single mind or spirit, created to dispense justice every where, and meddle with nothing else. And the like of all these other accidental things, or affections deified, as virtue, honour, concord, felicity, &c.

And Lactantius Firmianus, taking notice of that profession of the Pagans, to worship nothing but one supreme God, and his subservient ministers, generated or created by him, (according to that of Seneca in his exhortations, "*Genuisse regni sui ministros Deum*;" That the supreme God had generated other inferior ministers of his kingdom under him," which were called by them also gods) plainly denies all the Pagan gods save one, to be the created ministers of that one supreme, he making this reply; "*Verum hi neque dii sunt, neque deos se vocari, aut coli volunt, &c. Nec tamen illi sunt, qui vulgo coluntur, quorum et exiguus et certus est numerus.*" But these ministers of the Divine kingdom, or subservient created spirits, are neither gods, nor would they be called gods, or honoured as such, &c. Nor indeed are they those gods, that are now vulgarly worshipped by the Pagans, of which there is but a small and certain number.—That is, the Pagan gods are reduced into certain ranks, and the number of them is determined by the utilities of human life; of which their noble and select gods are but a few. Whereas, saith he, the ministers of the supreme God are, according to their own opinion, not twelve nor twenty, nor three hundred and sixty, but innumerable, stars and demons.

Moreover, Aristotle, in his book against Zeno, (supposing the idea of God to be this, the most powerful of all things, or the most perfect Being) objecteth thus, that according to the laws of cities and countries, (that is, the civil theology) there seems to be no one absolutely powerful Being,

De F&L. Rel.
c. vii. [In-
stit. Divin.
lib. i. cap.
vii. p. 51.]

Arist. in
Zen. Gor. p.
1246. [cap.
iv. p. 841.
tom. ii.
opor.]

but one god is supposed to be most powerful as to one thing, and another as to another: *εἴπερ ἅπαντα ἐπικράτιστον τὸν θεὸν λαμβάνει τοῦτο δυνατώτατον καὶ βέλτιστον λέγων, οὐ δοκεῖ τοῦτο κατὰ τὸν νόμον, ἀλλὰ πολλὰ κρείττους εἶναι ἀλλήλων οἱ θεοί· οὐκ οὖν ἐκ τοῦ δοκοῦντος εἴληφε ταύτην κατὰ τοῦ θεοῦ τὴν ὁμολογίαν* Whereas Zeno takes it for granted, that men have an idea in their minds of God, as one the most excellent and most powerful Being of all; this doth not seem to be according to law, (that is, the civil theology) for there the gods are mutually better one than another, respectively as to several things; and therefore Zeno took not this consent of mankind, concerning God, from that which vulgarly seemeth.—From which passage of Aristotle's we may well conclude, that the many political gods of the Pagans were not all of them vulgarly looked upon as the subservient ministers of one supreme God; and yet they generally acknowledging, (as Aristotle himself confesseth) a monarchy, and consequently not many independent deities, it must needs follow, as Zeno doubtless would reply, that these their political gods were but one and the same supreme natural God, as it were parcelled out, and multiplied: that is, receiving several denominations, according to several notions of him, and as he exerciseth different powers, and produceth various effects. And this we have sufficiently proved already to have been the general sense of the chief Pagan doctors; that these many political and popular gods were but the polyonymy of one natural God, that is, either partial considerations of him, or his various powers and virtues, effects and manifes-

tations in the world, severally personated and deified.

And thus does Vossius himself afterwards confess also, that, according to the natural theology, the many Pagan gods were but so many several denominations of one God; though this learned philologer doth plainly straiten and confine the notion of this natural theology too much, and improperly call the God thereof the nature of things; however, acknowledging it such a nature, as was endued with sense and understanding. His words

are these: "*Dispar vero sententia theologorum naturalium, qui non aliud numen agnoscebant, quam naturam rerum, eoque omnia gentium numina referebant, &c. Nempe mens eorum fuit, sicut natura esset occupata circa hanc vel illam affectionem, ita numina nominaque deorum variare. Cum igitur ubicunque vim aliquam majorem viderent, ita divinum aliquid crederent; eo etiam devenere, ut immanem deorum dearumque fingerent catervam. Sagaciores interim hæc cuncta, unum esse numen aiebant; puta rerum naturam, quæ licet una foret, pro variis tamen effectis varia sortiretur nomina, vario etiam afficeretur cultu.*" But the case is very different as to the natural theologers, who acknowledged no other god, but the nature of things, and referred all the Pagan gods to that. For they conceived, that as nature was occupied about several things, so were the Divine powers and the names of gods multiplied and diversified. And wherever they saw any greater force, there did they presently conceit something Divine, and by that means came they at length to feign an in-

L. viii. c. i.

numerable company of gods and goddesses. But the more sagacious in the mean time affirmed all these to be but one and the same God; to wit, the nature of things, which, though really but one, yet according to its various effects, both received divers names, and was worshipped after different manners.—Where Vossius calls the supreme God of these natural theologers the nature of things, as if the natural theology had been denominated from physics, or natural philosophy only; whereas we have already shewed, that the natural theology of Varro and Scævola, was of equal extent with the philosophic; whose only Numen, that it was not a blind and unintelligible nature of things, doth sufficiently appear from that history thereof before given by us: as also that it was called natural in another sense, as real, and as opposite to opinion, fancy, and fabulosity, or what hath no reality of existence any where in the world. Thus does St. Austin distinguish betwixt “*natura deorum*,” the true nature of the gods—and “*hominum instituta*,” the institutes of men concerning them.—As also he sets down the difference betwixt the civil and natural theology, according to the mind of Varro, in this manner: “*Fieri potest, ut in urbe, secundum falsas opiniones ea colantur et credantur, quorum in mundo vel extra mundum natura sit nusquam.*” It may come to pass, that those things may be worshipped and believed in cities, according to false opinions, which have no nature or real existence any where, either in the world, or without it.—Wherefore, if instead of this nature of things, which was properly the god of none

C. D. I. vi.
c. v. [p. 116.
tom. vii.]

but only of such atheistic philosophers, as Epicurus and Strato, we substitute that great Mind or Soul of the whole world, which pervadeth all things, and is diffused through all (which was the true God of the Pagan Theists); this of Vossius will be unquestionably true concerning their natural theologers, that, according to them, those many poetical and political gods beforementioned were but one and the same natural or real god; who, in respect of his different virtues, powers, and effects, was called by several names, and worshipped after different manners; yet nevertheless so, as that, according to those theologers, there were really also many other inferior ministers of this one supreme God (whether called minds or demons), that were supposed to be the subservient executioners of all those several powers of his. And accordingly we had before this full and true account of the Pagans' natural theology set down out of Prudentius :^a

In uno
Constituit jus omne Deo, cui serviat ingens
Virtutum ratio, variis instructa ministris.

viz. That it acknowledged one supreme omnipotent God, ruling over all, who displayeth and exerciseth his manifold virtues and powers in the world (all severally personated and deified in the poetic and civil theologies), together with the subservient ministry of other inferior created minds, understanding beings, or demons, called also by them gods.

^a In Apotheosi, ver. 191.

It is very true, as we have already declared, that the more high-flown Platonic Pagans did reduce those many poetical and political gods, and therefore doubtless all the personated and deified things of nature too, to the Platonic ideas, or first paradigms and patterns of things in the archetypal world, which they affirmed to have been begotten from the supreme Deity, that is, from the first hypostasis of the Platonic trinity; and which were commonly called by them *νοητοὶ θεοὶ*, intelligible gods,—as if they had been indeed so many distinct substances and persons. And, as we have also proved out of Philo, that this high-flown Paganic theology was ancients than either Julian or Apuleius; so do we think it not unworthy our observation here, that the very same doctrine is, by Celsus, imputed also to the Egyptian theologers, as pretending to worship brute animals no otherwise than as symbols of those eternal ideas: *Καὶ φησί γε ἡμᾶς τῶν μὲν Αἰγυπτίων καταγελᾶν, καὶ τοὶ πολλὰ καὶ οὐ φανῶν παρεχόντων αἰνίγματα, ἐπὶ ἰδεῶν αἰδίων καὶ οὐχ (ὡς δοκοῦσι οἱ πολλοὶ) ζώων ἐφημερίων τιμὰς εἶναι τὰ τοιαῦτα διδάσκωσιν.* Celsus also addeth, that we Christians deride the Egyptians without cause, they having many mysteries in their religion, forasmuch as they profess, that perishing brute animals are not worshipped by them, but the eternal ideas.—According to which of Celsus it should seem, that this doctrine of eternal ideas, as the paradigms and patterns of all things here below in this sensible world, was not proper to Plato, nor the Greeks, but common with them to the Egyptians also. Which eternal ideas, however

supposed to have been generated from that first Divine hypostasis of the Platonic and Egyptian trinity, and called intelligible gods, were nevertheless acknowledged by them all to exist in one Divine intellect, according to that of Plotinus,* *οὐκ ἔξω τοῦ νοῦ τὰ νοητά*, that the intelligibles exist no where of themselves, without Mind or Intellect;—which Mind or Intellect being the second Divine hypostasis, these intelligible and invisible gods (however generated from God), yet are therefore said by Julian, in his book against the Christians, both to coexist with God, and to inexist in him. To which purpose also is this other pas-

sage of Julian's in his sixth oration :

P. 347. Πάντα γὰρ αὐτός ἐστιν, εἴτερ καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ παρ' ἑαυτῷ ἔχοι τῶν ὁπωσοῦν ὄντων τὰς αἰτίας· εἴτε ἀθανάτων ἀθανάτους· εἴτε ἐκυήρων οὐ θνητὰς οὐδὲ ἐκκρήρας, αἰδιόους δὲ καὶ μενούσας αἰεὶ, αἱ καὶ τούτους εἰσὶν αἰτίαι τῆς ἀεγγενείας. For God is all things, forasmuch as he containeth within himself the causes of all things that any way are ; whether of immortal things immortal ; or of corruptible and perishing things, not corruptible but eternal also, and always remaining ; which therefore are the causes of their perpetual generation, and new production.—Now these causes of all things contained in God are no other than the Divine ideas. Wherefore, from hence it plainly appears, that these Platonic and Egyptian Pagans, who thus reduced their multiplicity of gods to the Divine ideas, did not therefore make them to be so many minds or spirits, really distinct from the

* Ennead. v. lib. v. p. 519.

supreme God (though dependent on him too), but indeed only so many partial considerations of one God, as being all things, that is, containing within himself the causes of all things. And accordingly we find in Origen, that, as the Orig. c. Cels. p. 109. Egyptian theologers called their religious animals, symbols of the eternal ideas, so did they also call them symbols of God. *Τὰ τῶν Αἰγυπτίων σεμνολογούντων καὶ τὰ περὶ τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων, καὶ φασκόντων εἶναι τινὰ αὐτὰ καὶ Θεοῦ σύμβολα.* Celsus applauds the Egyptian theologers talking so magnificently and mysteriously of those brute animals worshipped by them, and affirming them to be certain symbols of God.

And now we have given some account of the Polyonymy of the one supreme God, in the theologies of the Pagans; or of his being called by many proper personal names, carrying with them an appearance of so many several gods. First, that God had many several names bestowed upon him, from many different notions and partial considerations of him, according to his universal and all-comprehending nature. Janus, as the beginning of the world, and the first original of the gods. Whom therefore that ancient lyric poet, Septimius Apher, accordingly thus invoked ;*

O cate rerum Sator ! o PRINCIPIUM DEORUM !
Stridula cui limina, cui cardinei tumultus,
Cui reserata pangunt aurea claustra mundi :

Genius, as the great mind and soul of the whole world. Saturn, as that hidden source and prin-

* Apud Terentium Maurum de Litteris, &c. inter Grammaticos veteres a Putschio editos, p. 2396.

ciple, from which all forms and lives issue forth and into which they again retire ; being there laid up as in their secret storehouse : or else, as one of the Egyptian or Hermaic writers expresseth it, that which doth πάντα ποιῶν καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἀποποιῶν, make all things out of itself, and unmake them into itself again ;—this Hetrurian Saturn, answering to the Egyptian Hammon, that likewise signified hidden, and is accordingly thus interpreted by Jamblichus,* ὁ τὴν ἀφανῇ τῶν κεκρυμμένων λόγων δύναμιν εἰς φῶς ἄγων, he that bringeth forth the secret power of the hidden reasons of things (contained within himself) into light.—God was also called Athena or Minerva, as wisdom diffusing itself through all things : and Aphrodite Urania, the heavenly Venus or Love. Thus Phanes, Orpheus's supreme God (so called according to Lactantius),^b “ Quia cum adhuc nihil esset, primus ex infinito apparuerit ;” because when there was yet nothing, he first appeared out of that infinite abyss ;—but according to Proclus, because he did ἐκφαίνων τὰς νοητὰς ἐνάδας, discover and make manifest the intelligible unities (or ideas) from himself ;—though we think the conjecture of Athanasius Kircherus^c to be more probable than either of these, that Phanes was an Egyptian name) ; this Phanes, I say, was in the Orphic and Egyptian theology, as Proclus upon Plato's Timæus informs us, styled ἀβρὸς ἔρως, tender and soft Love.—And Pherecydes Syrus^d likewise affirmed, εἰς ἔρωτα μεταβλησθαι

* De Mysteriis Ægyptior. sect. 8. cap. iii. p. 159.

^b Institut. Divin. lib. i. cap. v. p. 31.

^c In Œdipo Ægyptiaco, p. 498.

^d Apud Proclum in Comment. in Timæum Platon. lib. iii. p. 156.

τὸν Δία μέλλοντα δημιουργεῖν, that Jupiter was turned all into love, when he went about to make the world.—Besides which, there were other such names of the supreme God, and more than have been mentioned by us: as for example, Summanus amongst the ancient Romans, that afterward grew obsolete: of which St. Austin thus; “*Romani veteres nescio quem Summanum, cui nocturna fulmina tribuebant, coluerunt magis quam Jovem, ad quem diurna fulmina pertinebant. Sed postquam Jovi templum insigne ac sublime constructum est, propter ædis dignitatem, sic ad eum multitudo confluit, ut vix inveniatur, qui Summani nomen, quod audiri jam non potest, se saltem legisse meminerit.*” The ancient Romans worshipped I know not what god, whom they called Summanus more than they did Jupiter. But after that a stately and magnificent temple was erected to Jupiter, they all betook themselves thither; insomuch that the name of Summanus, now not at all heard, is scarcely to be found in ancient writings.

Again, as the Pagans had certain other gods, which they called special; so were these but several names of that supreme God also, according to particular considerations of him, either as presiding over certain parts of the world, and acting in them; or as exercising certain special powers and virtues in the world; which several virtues and powers of one God, personated and deified by the Pagans, though they had an appearance also of many distinct gods, yet were they really nothing but several denominations of one supreme God; who as yet is considered as a thing distinct from the world and nature.

C. D. l. iv.
c. xxiii. (p.
82. tom. vii.
oper.)

But lastly, as God was supposed by these Pagans, not only to pervade all things, and to fill all things, but also, he being the cause of all things, to be himself in manner all things; so was he called also by the name of every thing, or every thing called by his name: that is, the several things of nature and parts of the world were themselves verbally deified by these Pagans, and called gods and goddesses. Not that they really accounted them such in themselves, but that they thought fit in this manner to acknowledge God in them, as the author of them all. For thus the Pagans in St. Austin: * “*Usque adeone, inquit, majores nostros insipientes fuisse credendum est, ut hæc nescirent munera divina esse, non deos?*” Can you think, that our Pagan ancestors were so sottish, as not to know, that these things are but Divine gifts, and not gods themselves?—And Cicero also tells us, that the meaning of their thus deifying these things of nature, was only to signify, that they acknowledged the force of all things to be Divine, and to be governed by God; and that whatsoever brought any great utility to mankind, was not such without the Divine goodness. They conceiving also, that the invisible and incomprehensible Deity, which was the cause of all things, ought to be worshipped in all its works and effects, in which it had made itself visible, accordingly as they declare in that place

of Eusebius before cited in part; *μη τὰ*
Fr. Evan. l. iii. c. xiii. [p. 121.] *ὁρώμενα σώματα ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης καὶ ἀστρον,*
μηδέγε τὰ αἰσθητὰ μέρη τοῦ κόσμου φήσουσι
θιοποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἐν τούτοις ἀοράτους δυνάμεις, αὐτοῦ δι

* Ubi supra.

τοῦ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν· ἵνα γὰρ ὄντα θεόν, παντοίας δυνάμει τα πάντα πληροῦν, καὶ διὰ πάντων διήκειν, καὶ τοῖς πᾶσιν ἐπιστατεῖν· ἀσωμάτως δὲ καὶ ἀφανῶς ἐν πᾶσιν ὄντα, καὶ διὰ πάντων διήκοντα, καὶ τοῦτον εἰκότως διὰ τῶν δεδηλωμένων σέβειν· that they did not deify those visible bodies of the sun, and moon, and stars, nor the other sensible parts of the world themselves, but those invisible powers of the God over all, that were displayed in them. For they affirm, that that God, who is but one, but yet filleth all things with his various powers, and passes through all things, forasmuch as he is invisibly and incorporeally present in all, is reasonably to be worshipped in and by those visible things.

Athanasius bishop of Alexandria, in his book against the Greeks, reduces all the false gods of the Pagans under two general heads; the first, poetical, fictitious, or fantastical gods; the second, creatures or real things of nature deified by them. His words are these: *Εἰ γὰρ δὴ τοὺς παρὰ ποιηταῖς λεγομένους θεοὺς, οὐκ εἶναι θεοὺς ὁ λόγος ἔδειξε, καὶ τοὺς τὴν κτίσιν θεοποιούντας ἤλεγξε πλανωμένους, &c.* Since this reason or discourse of ours hath sufficiently convinced, both the poetical gods of the Pagans to be no gods at all; and also that they, who deify the creatures, are in a great error; and so hath confuted the whole Pagan idolatry, proving it to be mere ungodliness and impiety; there is nothing now but the true piety left; he, who is worshipped by us Christians, being the only true God, the Lord of nature, and the Maker of all substances.—From whence we may observe, that, according to Athanasius, the Pagan poetic gods were no real things in nature, and therefore they

could be no other, than the several notions and the powers of the one supreme God deified, or several names of him. So that Athanasius's poetic gods, or οἱ παρὰ ποιηταῖς μυθεύόμενοι θεοί, gods fabulously devised by the poets—were chiefly those two kinds of Pagan gods, first mentioned by us; that is, the various considerations of the one supreme Numen, according to its general notion, expressed by so many proper names; and, secondly, his particular powers diffused through the world, severally personated and deified. Which, considered as so many distinct deities, are nothing but mere fiction and fancy, without any reality. And this do the Pagans themselves

in Athanasius acknowledge: Ἰσως γὰρ ὡς
 P. 14. [tom. i. oper. p. 17.] αὐτοὶ φασι, καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα πέπλασται, καὶ οὐκ
 ἔστι μὲν ὅλως Ζεὺς, οὐδὲ Κρόνος, οὐδὲ Ἥρα,

οὐδὲ Ἄρης· πλάττονται δὲ τούτους, ὡς ὄντας, οἱ ποιηταὶ πρὸς ἀπάτην τῶν ἀκουόντων· They say, that the names of those gods are merely fictitious, and that there does no where really exist any such Jupiter, or Saturn, or Juno, or Mars; but that the poets have feigned them to be so many persons existing, to the deception of their auditors.—Notwithstanding which that third sort of Pagan gods also mentioned by us, which were inanimate substances and the natures of things deified, may well be accounted poetical gods likewise; because though those things themselves be real and not feigned, yet is their personation and deification mere fiction and fancy: and however the first occasion thereof sprung from this theological opinion or persuasion, that God, who is in all things, and is the cause of all things, ought to be worshipped in all things, especially

he being himself invisible? yet the making of those things themselves therefore to be so many persons and gods, was nothing but poetic fiction and phantastry, according as their old mythology and allegorical fables of the gods run much upon this strain.

END OF VOL. II.

THE
WORKS
OF
RALPH CUDWORTH, D.D.

CONTAINING
THE TRUE INTELLECTUAL
SYSTEM OF THE UNIVERSE,
SERMONS, &c.

A NEW EDITION, WITH REFERENCES TO THE SEVERAL QUOTATIONS IN THE
INTELLECTUAL SYSTEM, AND A LIFE OF THE AUTHOR,

BY THOMAS BIRCH, M.A. F.R.S.


IN FOUR VOLUMES:
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MDCCCXXIX.

141. i. 447.



THE TRUE
INTELLECTUAL SYSTEM
OF
THE UNIVERSE.

CHAP. IV. CONTINUED.

XXXIV. **H**ITHERTO have we declared the sense of the Pagans in general, those also being included, who supposed God to be a being elevated above the world, that they agreed in these two things: First, the breaking and crumbling, as it were, of the simple Deity, and parcelling out of the same into many particular notions and partial considerations, according to the various manifestations of its power and providence in the world; by the personating and deifying of which severally they made, as it were, so many gods of one. The chief ground whereof was this: because they considered not the Deity according to its simple nature, and abstractly only, but concretely also with the world, as he displayeth himself therein, pervadeth all, and diffuseth his virtues through all. For as the sun, reflected by grosser vapours, is sometimes multiplied, and the same object beheld through a polyedrous glass, by reason of those many super-

2 OF THOSE PAGAN THEOLOGERS WHO MADE

ficies, being represented in several places at once, is thereby rendered manifold to the spectator; so one and the same supreme God, considered concretely with the world, as manifesting his several powers and virtues in it, was multiplied into several names, not without the appearance of so many several gods. Whereas πολυώνυμον with those ancient Pagans, was the same thing with πολυδύναμον, that which hath many names, all one with that which hath many powers: according to this of Callimachus* concerning Diana,

Δίς μιν παρθένῳ αἰόνα, ἅπαντα, φιλέοντα,
καὶ Πολυώνυμον

And this of Virgil concerning Alecto,†

— Tota nomina mille,
Mille nocendi artes.

And accordingly the many Pagan gods are, in Plato's Cratylus, interpreted as the many powers of one God diffused through the world. And the Pagan theologers seemed to conceive this to be more suitable to the pomp, state and grandeur of the supreme God, for him to be considered diffusively, and called by many names, signifying his many several virtues and powers (polyonymy being by them accounted an honour) rather than to be contracted and shrunk all up into one general notion of a perfect mind, the maker or creator of the whole world. The second thing, in which the Pagans agreed, is their personating and deifying also the parts of the world, and things of nature themselves, and so making them so many gods and goddesses too. Their meaning therein being declared to be really no other than this;

* Hymn. in Dianam, ver. 5, 6.

† Æneid. lib. vii. ver. 324.

that God, who doth not only pervade all things, but also was the cause of all things, and therefore himself is in a manner all things, ought to be worshipped in all the things of nature and parts of the world: as also, that the force of every thing was Divine, and that in all things, that were beneficial to mankind, the Divine goodness ought to be acknowledged.

We shall now observe, how both those fore-mentioned principles, of God's pervading all things, and his being all things, which were the chief grounds of the seeming Polytheism of the Pagans, were improved and carried on further by those amongst them, who had no higher notion of the supreme Deity, than as the soul of the world. Which opinion, that it found entertainment amongst so many of them, probably might be from hence, because it was so obvious for those of them, that were religious, to conceive, that as themselves consisted of body and soul, so the body of the whole world was not without its soul neither; and that their human souls were as well derived from the life and soul of the world, as the earth and water in their bodies was from the earth and water of the world. Now whereas the more refined Pagans, as was before observed, suppose God to pervade and pass through all things *ἀμυγς*, unmixedly—these concluded God to be (according to that definition of him in Quinctilian, taken in a rigid sense) "*Spiritum omnibus partibus immistum*;" a spirit unmingled with all the parts of the world—or else in Manilius's language,

Infusumque Deum cœlo, terrisque fœtoque,

6 THE PARTS OF THE WORLD CONSIDERED

principally act in some one part of the body,^a which therefore hath been called the *hegemonicon* and *principale*, some taking this to be the brain, others the heart, but Strato in Tertullian^a ridiculously, the place betwixt the eyebrows; so the Stoics did suppose the great Soul or Mind of the world, to act principally in some one part thereof (which what it was notwithstanding they did not all agree upon), as the hegemonicon or principale; and this was sometimes called by them emphatically God. But nevertheless they all acknowledged this mundane soul, as the souls of other animals, to pervade, animate, or enliven and actuate, more or less, its whole body, the world. This is plainly declared by Laertius in the life of Zeno:^b Τὸν δὲ κόσμον διοικίσθαι κατὰ νοῦν καὶ πρόνοιαν, εἰς ἅπαν αὐτοῦ μέρος διήκοντος τοῦ νοῦ, καθάπερ ἐφ' ἡμῶν τῆς ψυχῆς· ἀλλ' ἤδη δι' ὧν μὲν πολλόν, δι' ὧν μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἕως κεχώρηκεν, ὡς διὰ τῶν ὁσίων καὶ τῶν ἰσχυρῶν· δι' ὧν δὲ ὡς τοῦς, ὡς διὰ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ· οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον ζῶν ὄντα καὶ ἐμψυχον καὶ λογικόν, ἔχειν ἡγεμονικόν μὲν τὸν αἰθέρα, ἢ τὸν οὐρανόν, ἢ τὸν ἥλιον· ὁ καὶ πρῶτον θεὸν λέγουσιν αἰσθητικῶς ὥσπερ κεχώρηκεναι, διὰ τῶν ἐν αἵματι, καὶ διὰ τῶν ζώων ἀπάντων καὶ φυτόν, διὰ δὲ τῆς γῆς αὐτῆς καθ' ἑξῆς. The Stoics affirm, that the world is governed by mind and providence, this mind passing through all the parts of it, as the soul doth in us: which yet doth not act in all parts alike, but in some more, in some less; it passing through some parts only as a habit (as through the bones and nerves), but through others as mind or understanding (as through that which is called the hegemonicon or principale). So

^a De Anima, cap. xv. p. 169.

^b Lib. vii. segm. 138, 139. p. 452.

the whole world being a living and rational animal, hath its hegemonicon or principal part too, which according to Antipater is the ether, to Posidonius the air, to Cleanthes the sun, &c. And they say also, that this first God is, as it were, sensibly diffused through all animals and plants, but through the earth itself only as a habit.—Wherefore the whole world, being thus acted and animated by one Divine Soul, is itself, according to these Stoics, also the supreme God. Thus Didymus in Eusebius, *ἅλον δὲ τὸν κόσμον* P. Ev. l. xv. *προσαγορεύουσι θεόν*, the Stoics call the ^{c. xxv. [p. 817.] l. v.} whole world God;—and Origen against ^{p. 235.} Celsus, *σαφῶς δὲ τὸν ἅλον κόσμον λέγουσιν εἶναι θεόν*, *Ἑλληνικοὶ μὲν τὸν πρῶτον* The Greeks universally affirm the world to be a god, but the Stoics, the first and chief God.—And accordingly Manilius,*

Qua pateat mundum divino numine verti
Atque ipsum esse Deum:

Whereby it may appear the world to be governed by a Divine Mind, and also itself to be God.—As likewise Seneca,† the philosopher, “Totum hoc, quo continemur, et unum est, et Deus est;” this whole world, within which we are contained, is both one thing and God.—Which is not to be understood of the mere matter of the world, as it is nothing but a heap of atoms, or as endued with a plastic and senseless nature only; but of it as animated by such a soul, as besides sense was originally endued with perfect understanding; and as deriving all its godship from thence. For

* Lib. i. ver. 484, 485.

† Epistol. xcii. p. 323. tom. ii. opera. Vide etiam Epist. xcv. p. 365.

c. d. l. vii. thus Varro in St. Austin declares both
c. vi. his own and the Stoical sense concerning this point, "Dicit idem Varro, adhuc de naturali theologia præloquens, Deum se arbitrari esse animam mundi (quem Græci vocant κόσμον) et hunc ipsum mundum esse Deum. Sed sicut hominem sapientem, cum sit ex corpore et animo, tamen ab animo dici sapientem; ita mundum Deum dici ab animo, cum sit ex animo et corpore." The same Varro discoursing concerning natural theology, declareth, that, according to his own sense, God is the soul of the world (which the Greeks call Cosmos), and that this world itself is also God. But that this is so to be understood, that as a wise man, though consisting of soul and body, yet is denominated wise only from his mind or soul; so the world is denominated God, from its mind or soul only, it consisting both of mind and body.

Now if the whole animated world be the supreme God, it plainly follows from thence, that the several parts and members thereof must be the parts and members of God; and this was readily acknowledged by Seneca;* "Membra sumus corporis magni;" We are all members of one great body:—and^b "Totum hoc Deus est, socii ejus et membra sumus;" this whole world is God, and we are not only his members, but also his fellows or companions—as if our human souls had a certain kind of fellowship also with that great Soul of the universe. And accordingly, the Soul of the world, and the whole mundane animal, was frequently worshipped by the Pagans, in these its several members; the chief parts of

* Epist. xc. p. 356.

^b Epist. xcii. p. 323.

the world, and the most important things of nature, as it were by piece-meal. Nevertheless it doth not at all follow from thence, that these were therefore to them really so many several gods; for then not only every man, and every contemptible animal, every plant and herb, and pile of grass, every river and hill, and all things else whatsoever, must be so many several gods. And that the Pagans themselves did not take them for such, Origen observes against that assertion of Celsus, "That if the whole were
L. v. p. 234.
 God, then the several parts thereof must

needs be gods," or divine too: *ὡς εἶναι θεῶν οὐ μόνον ἀνθρώπους, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάντα τὰ ἄλογα ζῶα, μέρη ὄντα τοῦ κόσμου, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ τὰ φυτὰ· εἰ δὲ μέρη τοῦ κόσμου καὶ οἱ ποταμοὶ, καὶ τὰ ὄρη, καὶ αἱ θάλασσαι· ἅρ' ἐπὶ ὅλος ὁ κόσμος θεὸς ἐστίν, ἤδη καὶ οἱ ποταμοὶ καὶ αἱ θάλασσαι θεοὶ εἰσιν· ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοῦτο φήσουσιν Ἕλληνες· τοὺς δ' ἐκιστα-
 τούντας (εἰ ἄρα δαίμονας, ἢ θεοὺς, ὡς ἐκεῖνοι ὀνομάζουσι) ποταμοὺς καὶ θαλάσσαις, τούτους ἀν' λέγουεν θεοὺς. Καὶ τὸ καθολικὸν Κέλσου γίνεται καὶ καθ' Ἕλληνας ψευδός, ὅτι ἴαντι ὅλον ἢ Θεός, πάντως τὰ μέρη τούτου ἐστὶ θεῶν· κατὰ τοῦτο γὰρ θεῶν ἐστὶ ζῶα, καὶ μυῖαι, καὶ σκνίφες, καὶ σκώλη-
 κες, καὶ πᾶν τὸ τῶν ὀφειῶν εἶδος, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ τῶν ὀρνέων, καὶ τὸ τῶν ἰχθύων· ἅπερ οὐδ' οἱ λέγοντες Θεὸν εἶναι τὸν κόσμον, φήσουσιν.* From hence it would follow, that

not only men must be divine and gods, but also all brute animals too (they being parts of the world) and plants to boot. Nay, rivers, and mountains, and seas, being parts of the world likewise (if the whole world be God), must, according to Celsus, needs be gods also. Whereas the Greeks themselves will not affirm this; but they would only call those spirits or demons, which preside over these rivers and seas, gods.

Wherefore this universal assertion of Celsus is false, even according to the Greeks themselves; that if the whole be God, then all the parts thereof must needs be divine, or gods. It following from thence, that flies, and gnats, and worms, and all kinds of serpents, and birds, and fishes, are all divine animals, or gods: which they themselves, who assert the world to be God, will not affirm.—

Wherefore, though it be true, that the Pagans did many times personate and deify the chief parts of the world, and things of nature, as well as they did the several powers and virtues of the mundane soul, diffused through the whole world; yet did not the intelligent amongst them therefore look upon these, as so many true and proper gods, but only worship them as parts and members of one great mundane animal; or rather, worship the Soul of the whole world, their supreme Deity, in them all, as its various manifestations. This St. Austin intimates, when writing against Faustus, the Manichean, he prefers even the Pagan gods before the Manichean: “*Jam vero cœlum, et terra, et mare, et aër, et sol, et luna, et cætera sydera omnia, hæc manifesta oculis apparent, atque ipsis sensibus præsto sunt. Quæ cum Pagani tanquam deos colunt, vel tanquam PARTES UNIUS MAGNI DEI (nam universum mundum quidam eorum putant MAXIMUM DEUM) ea colunt, quæ sunt. Vos autem, cum ea colatis, quæ omnino non sunt, propinquiore essetis veræ pietati, si saltem Pagani essetis, qui corpora colunt, etsi non colenda, tamen vera.*” Now the heaven, earth, sea, and air, sun, moon, and stars,

* Lib. xx. contra Faustum, cap. v. p. 238. tom. viii. oper.

are things all manifest and really present to our senses; which, when the Pagans worship as gods, or as PARTS OF ONE GREAT GOD (for some of them think the whole world to be the GREATEST GOD), they worship things that are; so that you, worshipping things that are not, would be nearer to true piety than you are, were you Pagans, and worshipped bodies too; which though they ought not to be worshipped, yet are they true and real things.—But this is further insisted upon La. iv. c. xi. by the same St. Austin, in his book [p. 76.]

De C. D. where, after that large enumeration of the Pagan gods before set down, he thus convinces their folly in worshipping the several divided members, parts and powers, of the one great God, after that manner personated: “*Hæc omnia quæ dixi, et quæcunque non dixi (non enim omnia dicenda arbitratus sum) hi omnes dii deæque sit unus Jupiter; sive sint, ut quidam volunt; omnia ista partes ejus, sive virtutes ejus, sicut eis videtur, quibus eum placet esse mundi animum; quæ sententia velat magnorum, multorumque doctorum est. Hæc, inquam, si ita sunt, quod quale sit, nondum interim quæro, quid perderent, si unum Deum colerent prudentiori compendio? Quid enim ejus contemneretur, cum ipse coleretur? Si autem metuendam sit, ne prætermissæ sive neglectæ partes ejus irascerentur; non ergo, ut volunt, velut unius animantis hæc tota vita est, quæ omnes simul continet deos, quasi suas VIRTUTES, vel MEMBRA, vel PARTES: sed suam quæque pars habet vitam a cæteris separatam, si præter alteram irasci altera potest, et alia placari, alia concitari. Si autem dicitur omnia simul, id est, totum ipsum Jovem potuisse offendi, si*

PARTES ejus non etiam singillatim minutatimque colerentur, stulte dicitur. Nulla quippe earum prætermitteretur, cum ipse unus, qui haberet omnia, coleretur." All these things, which we have now said, and many more, which we have not said (for we did not think fit to mention all), all these gods and goddesses, let them be one and the same Jupiter: whether they will have them to be his **PARTS**, or his **POWERS**, and **VIRTUES**, according to the sense of those, who think God to be the soul or mind of the whole world; which is the opinion of many and great doctors. This, I say, if it be so, which, what it is, we will not now examine; what would these Pagans lose, if in a more prudent compendium, they should worship one only God? For what of him could be despised, when his whole self was worshipped? But if they fear, lest his parts pretermitted, or neglected, should be angry, or take offence; then it is not, as they pretend, the life of one great animal, which at once contains all the gods, as his virtues, or members, or parts, but every part hath its own life by itself, separate from the rest, since one of them may be angry, when another is pleased, and the contrary. But if it should be said, that altogether, that is, the whole Jupiter might be offended, if his parts were not worshipped all of them severally and singly; this would be foolishly said, because none of the parts can be pretermitted, when he, that hath all, is worshipped.

Thus do the Pagans in Athanasius* also declare, that they did not worship the several parts of the world, as really so many true and proper

* Orat. contra Græcos, p. 31, tom. i. oper.

gods, but only as the parts, or members, of their one supreme God, that great mundane animal (or whole animated world) taken all together as one thing; ἀλλ' ἴσως διαιρούμενα μὲν, καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὰ λαμβανόμενα, ἐπιδεῖν αὐτὰ καὶ αὐτοὶ συνομολογοῦσιν, ὁμοῦ δὲ πάντα συνάπτοντες, καὶ ὡς ἐν ἀποτελοῦντες μέγα σῶμα, τὸ ὅλον Θεὸν εἶναι φήσουσι. But the Pagans themselves will acknowledge, that the divided parts of the world, taken severally, are but indigent and imperfect things; nevertheless do they contend, that as they are by them joined all together into one great body (enlivened by one soul), so is the whole of them truly and properly God.—And now we think it is sufficiently evident, that though these Pagans verbally personated and deified, not only the several powers and virtues of the one supreme God, or mundane soul, diffused throughout the whole world, but also the several parts of the world itself and the natures of things; yet their meaning herein was not to make these in themselves really so many several true and proper gods (much less independent ones), but to worship one supreme God (which to them was the whole animated world) in those his several parts and members, as it were by piece-meal, or under so many inadequate conceptions.

The Pagans therefore were plainly divided in their natural theology, as to their opinions concerning the supreme God; some of them conceiving him to be nothing higher than a mundane soul: whereas others of them, to use Origen's language, did ὑπερβαίνειν πᾶσαν τὴν αἰσθητὴν φύσιν, καὶ μηδαμοῦ αὐτῆς νομίζειν ἴδρυσθαι τὸν Θεόν, ἅνω καὶ δὲ ὑπέρ Cont. Cel. τὰ σώματα ζητεῖν αὐτόν, transcend all the sen- p. 260. sible nature, and thinking God not at all to be

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seated there, looked for him above all corporeal things.—Now the former of these Pagans worshipped the whole corporeal world, as the body of God; but the latter of them, though they had higher thoughts of God, than as a mundane soul, yet supposing him to have been the cause of all things, and so at first to have contained all things within himself, as likewise that the world, after it was made, was not cut off from him, nor subsisted alone by itself, as a dead thing, but was closely united to him, and livingly dependent on him: these, I say, though they did not take the world to be God, or the body of God, yet did they also look upon it as θεῖον, as that which was Divine and sacred; and supposed, that God was to be worshipped in all, or that the whole world was to be worshipped as his image or temple. Thus Plutarch, though much disliking the deifying of inanimate things, doth himself nevertheless approve of worshipping God in the whole corporeal world, he affirming it to be ἱερὸν ἀγνῶτατον καὶ θιονειότερατον, a most holy, and most god-becoming temple.—And the ancient Persians, or magi, who by no means would allow of worshipping God in any artificial temples made with men's hands, did notwithstanding thus worship God, *sub dio*, and upon the tops of mountains, in the whole corporeal world, as his natural temple, as Cicero testifieth: “Nec sequor magos Persarum, quibus auctoribus Xerxes inflammasse templa Græciæ dicitur, quod parietibus includerent deos, quibus omnia deberent esse patentia ac libera, quorumque hic mundus omnis templum esset et domicilium:” Neither do I adhere to the

^a De Iside et Osir. p. 382.

Persian magi, by whose suggestion and persuasion Xerxes is said to have burnt all the temples of the Greeks, because they inclosed and shut up their gods within walls, to whom all things ought to be open and free, and whose temple and habitation this whole world is.—And, therefore, when Diogenes Laertius writeth thus of these magi, that they did θεοὺς ἀποφαινεσθαι πῦρ καὶ γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ, τῶν δὲ ζώων καταγινώσκον, make fire and earth and water to be gods, but condemn all statues and images—we conceive the meaning hereof to be no other than this, that as they worshipped God in no temple, save only that of the whole world, so neither did they allow any other statues or images of him, than the things of nature, and parts of the world, such as fire, and earth, and water, called therefore by them, in this sense and no other, gods. For thus are they clearly represented by Clemens Alexandrinus, and that according to the express testimony of Dino; *Θέων ἐν ὑπαίθρῳ τοὺς* Protrept. p. 43. [cap. v. p. 56. edit. Potteri.]
Μάγους ὁ Δίνων λέγει, θεῶν ἀγάλματα μόνα τὸ
πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ νομίζοντας. Οὐκ ἐπικραυγήμεν
οὐδὲ τῶν τούτων ἄγνοιαν. Εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα ἀποφαι-
νεν οἰσῆναι τῆς πλάνης, ἀλλ' εἰς ἑτέραν καταλισθαίνουσιν
ἐπάτην. Ἀγάλματα μὲν θεῶν οἱ ξύλα καὶ λίθους ὑπεκρίβασιν,
δοσιὲρ Ἕλληνες· οὐδὲ μὲν Ἰβίδας καὶ Ἰχνημόνας, καθάπερ
Αἰγύπτιοι· ἀλλὰ πῦρ τε καὶ ὕδωρ εἰς φιλόσοφος· *Dionon*
 affirmeth, that the Persian magi sacrificed under the open heavens, they accounting fire and water to be the only statues and images of the gods. For I would not here conceal their ignorance neither, who, thinking to avoid one error, fall into another; whilst they allow not wood and stones to be the images of the gods, as the Greeks do,

* *Protr. oper. segm. 6. p. 6.*

nor Ichneumones and Ibides, as the Egyptians, but only fire and water, as philosophers.—Which difference betwixt the Pagan theologers, that some of them looked upon the whole world as God, or as the body of God, others only as the image, or the temple of God, is thus taken notice of by Macrobius upon Scipio's dream, where the world was called a temple. "*Bene autem un-*
Lib. i. c. xiv.
versus mundus Dei templum vocatur, propter illos, qui æstimant, nihil esse aliud Deum, nisi cælum ipsum, et cœlestia ista quæ cernimus. Ideo ut summi omnipotentiam Dei ostenderet posse vix intelligi, nunquam posse videri, quicquid humano subjicitur aspectui templum ejus vocavit; ut qui hæc veneratur ut templa, cultum tamen maximum debeat conditori; sciatque quisquis in usum templi hujus inducitur, ritu sibi vivendum sacerdotis." The whole world is well called here the temple of God, in way of opposition to those who think God to be nothing else but the heaven itself, and those heavenly things which we see (or the whole sensible world animated): wherefore Cicero, that he might shew the omnipotence of the first supreme God to be such as could scarcely be understood, but not at all perceived by sense, he calleth whatsoever falleth under human sight, his temple; that so he, that worshippeth these things as the temple of God, might in the mean time remember, that the chief worship is due to the maker and creator of them; as also that himself ought to live in the world like a priest or mysta, holily and religiously.—And thus we see, that the Pagans were universally Cosmolatræ, or world-worshippers, in one sense or other; not that they worshipped the world as

a dead and inanimate thing, but either as the body of God, or at least as the temple or image of him. Neither of which terminated their worship in that, which was sensible and visible only, but in that great Mind or Soul, which framed and governeth the whole world understandingly; though this was called also by them (not the nature of things, but) φύσις κοινή, the common nature, and φύσις τοῦ παντός, or τῶν ὅλων, the nature of the universe, because it contained under it the spermatie reasons, or plastic principles, of the whole world.

Furthermore, these Pagan Theists universally acknowledging the whole world to be an animal, and that mundane animal also to be a god; those of them, who supposed it not to be the first and highest God, did consequently all conceive it, as hath been already observed, to be either a second, or at least a third god. And thus Origen,* σαφῶς δὴ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον λέγουσιν εἶναι Θεόν, Στωϊκοὶ μὲν τὸν Πρῶτον, οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ Πλάτωνος τὸν Δεύτερον, τινὲς δὲ αὐτῶν τὸν Τρίτον. The Greeks do plainly affirm the whole world to be a god; some of them, as the Stoics, the first God; others, as the Platonists, (to whom may be added the Egyptians also) the second god; though some of these Platonists call it the third god. Those of the Platonists, who called the mundane animal, or animated world, the second god, looked upon that whole Platonic trinity of Divine hypostases (Τάγαθόν, Νοῦς and Ψυχὴ) all but as one first God: but those others of them, who called it a third god, supposed a great distinction betwixt those three hypostases, and made so many several gods

* Contra Celsum, lib. i. p. 235.

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of them ; the first, a monad, or simple goodness ; the second, mind or intellect ; the third, Psyche, or the universal soul, which also without any more ado they concluded to be the immediate soul of this corporeal world, existing likewise from eternity with it. Now this second god, which was the whole animated world, as well to the Egyptians as the Platonists, was by them both said to be, not only the temple and image, but also the Son of the first God. That the

P. 329, 330, 331. Egyptians called the animated world the Son of God, hath been already

proved ; and that the other Pagans did the like also, is evident from this of Celsus, where he pretends, that the Christians called their Jesus the Son of God, in imitation of those ancient

Orig. contra Cels. p. 308. Pagans, who had styled the world so :

Ὅπόθεν δὲ καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐπῆλθεν αὐτοῖς, Θεοῦ υἱὸν καλεῖν, σημαίνω· Ἄνδρες παλαιοὶ, τόνδε δὲ τὸν κόσμον, ὡς ἐκ Θεοῦ γεγόμενον, παῖδά τε αὐτοῦ καὶ ἡθεὶον προσείπον. Πάνυ γὰρ ὁμοίος οὗτός τε καὶ ὁ υἱὸς Θεοῦ· Whence these Christians came to call their Jesus the Son of God, I shall now declare ; namely, because our ancestors had called the world, as made by God, the Son of God, and God. Now is there not a goodly similitude (think you) betwixt these two sons of God, theirs and ours?—Upon which

Orig. contra Cels. p. 308. words of his, Origen writeth thus : *ὥσθι δὲ υἱὸν Θεοῦ ἡμᾶς λέγειν, παραποιήσαντας τὰ*

περὶ τοῦ κόσμου, ὡς ἐκ Θεοῦ γεγόμενον, καὶ υἱοῦ ὄντος αὐτοῦ καὶ Θεοῦ· Celsus supposed us Christians to have borrowed this appellation of the Son of God from the Pagans, they calling the world, as made by God, the Son of God, and God.—Wherefore these Pagans, who looked upon the whole ani-

mated world only as the second God, and Son of God, did unquestionably also worship the first God, in the world, and that probably by personating and deifying his several parts and members too. Thus do we understand, what that was, which gave occasion to this mistake of late writers, that the Pagans worshipped the inanimate parts of the world, as such, for true and proper gods; viz. their not perceiving, that they worshipped these only, as the parts or living members of one great mundane animal, which was to them, if not the first God, yet at least the second God; the temple, image, and Son, of the first God.

And now have we, as we conceive, given a full account of the seeming Polytheism of the Pagans, not only in their poetical and fabulous, but also their political or civil, theology; the former of which was nothing but fancy and fiction, and the conforming of Divine to human things; the latter nothing but vulgar opinion and error, together with the laws and institutes of statesmen and politicians, designed principally to amuse the vulgar, and keep them the better in obedience and subjection to civil laws. Besides which, the intelligent Pagans generally acknowledged another theology, which was neither fiction, nor mere opinion and law, but nature and philosophy, or absolute truth and reality; according to which natural and philosophic theology of theirs, there was only one unmade self-originated Deity, and many other created gods, as his inferior ministers. So that those many poetical and political gods could not possibly be looked upon otherwise, than either as the created ministers of one

supreme God, whether taken singly or collectively; or else as the polyonymy and various denomination of him, according to several notions and partial conceptions of him; and his several powers and manifestations of the world personated and deified. Which latter we have already proved to have been the most generally-received opinion of the Pagan theologers; according to that of Euclides* the philosopher, ἐν Ταῖσιν πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι καλούμενον, there is one supreme Good (or highest Deity) called by many names:—and, according to that of Antisthenes before cited, That the many popular gods were but one and the same natural God, viz. as Lactantius adds, L. l. c. v. “Summæ totius artifex,” The maker of the whole world.

We shall conclude with repeating what hath been already suggested, that though the intelligent Pagans did generally disclaim their fabulous theology; St. Austin telling us, that when the absurdities thereof were urged against them, they would commonly make such replies as these: C. D. l. iv. c. “Absit, inquit, fabularum est ista x. [p. 75.] garrulitas;” and again, “Rursus, inquit, ad fabulas redis;” Far be it from us (say they) to think so or so, this is nothing but the garrulity of idle fables; and, You would bring us again to fables.—And though they owned another theology besides their civil, which was the natural and philosophical, as the only true; yet did they notwithstanding acknowledge a kind of necessity, that, in those times at least, there should be, besides the natural and philosophical theology, which the vulgar were not so capable

* Apud Diogen. Laert. lib. ii. segm. 106. p. 142.

of, another theology framed and held forth, that might be more accommodate to their apprehensions. Thus that Roman pontifex, Scævola, in St. Austin, declareth,* “*Expedire existimat falli in religione civitates,*” That it was expedient (as he thought) that cities and commonwealths should be deceived in their religion, or have something false or fabulous intermingled with it;—he giving this reason for the same, because the natural and philosophic theology contained many things in it, which, though true, yet would be hurtful for the vulgar to know; as, for example, “*Quod verus Deus nec sexum habeat, nec ætatem, nec definita corporis membra;*” That the true God hath neither sex, nor age, nor bodily members; and that Hercules and Æsculapius, &c. were not gods, but men, obnoxious to the same infirmities with others—and the like. And the learned Varro, in his book of religions,^b publicly maintained the same doctrine: “*Varro de religionibus loquens, evidenter dicit, multa esse vera, quæ vulgo scire non sit utile; multaque, quæ tametsi falsa sint, aliter existimare populum expediat: et ideo Græcos teletas et mysteria taciturnitate parietibusque clausisse,*” &c. That there were many things true in religion, which it was not convenient for the vulgar to know; as likewise many things false, of which it was expedient they should think otherwise: and that for this cause, the Greeks inclosed their teletæ or mysteries within walls, and kept them under a seal of secrecy.—Upon which of Varro St. Austin thus noteth: “*Hic certe totum consilium prodidit sapientium, per*

* De Civit. Dei, lib. iv. cap. xxvii. p. 84. tom. vii. oper.

^b Apud Augustin. ubi supra, p. 88.

quos civitates et populi regerentur:” Varro here plainly discovers and betrays the whole counsel and secrecy of statesmen and politicians, by whom cities and nations were governed, and their very arcanum of government, namely this, That people were to be deceived in their religion, for their own good, and the good of their governors.—The same father there adding, That evil demons were much gratified with this doctrine, and liked this fraud and imposture very well, which gave them an advantage to rule and tyrannize, as well over the deceivers as the deceived.—Lastly, Strabo also,* though otherwise a grave and sober writer, speaks freely and broadly to the same purpose; οὐ γὰρ ὁχλὸν τε γυναικῶν καὶ πάντων χυδαίων πλήθους ἐπαγάγειν λόγῳ δυνατόν φιλοσόφῳ, καὶ προσκαλέσασθαι πρὸς εὐσεβείαν καὶ ὁσιότητα καὶ πίστιν; ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ διὰ δεισδαιμονίας, τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ἄνεν μυθοποιίας καὶ τερατίας. It is not possible, that women, and others of the vulgar sort, should be conducted and carried on towards piety, holiness, and faith, merely by philosophic reason and truth; but this must be done by superstition, and that not without the help of fables and prodigious or wonderful narrations.—From whence it is plain, that Strabo did not only allow a necessity of a civil theology, besides the natural and philosophical; but also of a fabulous and poetical one too. And this is a thing the less to be wondered at in these Pagans, because some Christians also seem to acknowledge a kind of truth herein; Synesius himself writing after this manner:† τὸ δὲ ῥᾶστον καταγελάσεται ὁ δῆμος· δέεται γὰρ τερατίας. That, which is

* Lib. i. p. 18.

† In Encomio Calvitiei, p. 73. oper. edit. Potavii.

easy and ordinary, will be contemned by the vulgar, or common people; and therefore there is need of something strange and prodigious in religion for them. Flavius Josephus making this free acknowledgment, concerning the wise men among the Greeks,

C. Ap. l. ii.
[§. xvi. p.
482. tom. ii.
edit. Haver-
camp.]

ταῦτα περὶ θεοῦ φρονεῖν οἱ σοφώτατοι δοκοῦσι παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησι, That they held the same things concerning God which the Jews did—adds notwithstanding afterwards, εἰς πλῆθος δόξαις προκαταλημμένον, τὴν ἀλήθειαν τοῦ δόγματος ἐξευγχεῖν οὐκ ἐτόλμησαν, that they were afraid to declare the truth of this their doctrine to the vulgar, prepossessed with other opinions.—And indeed they did not think it safe to declare the natural and true theology promiscuously to all; Plato^a himself intimating as much in these words: τὸν ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα τοῦδε τοῦ παντός, εἰς πάντας ἀδύνατον λέγειν. That as it was hard to find out the maker of this universe, so neither, being found out, could he be declared to the vulgar.—Wherefore since God was so hard to be understood, they conceived it necessary, that the vulgar should be permitted to worship him in his works, by parts and piece-meal, according to the various manifestations of himself; that is, should have a civil theology at least, distinct from the natural and philosophical, if not another fabulous one too.

xxxv. We have now dispatched the first of those three heads proposed to be insisted on, viz. that the Pagans worshipped one and the same supreme God, under many personal names, so that much of their Polytheism was but seeming and fantastical, and indeed nothing but the

^a In Timæo, cap. xiii. p. 286. edit. Fabricii.

24 THE PAGANS HAD A REAL POLYTHEISM,

polyonymy of one supreme God, they making many poetical and political gods of that one natural God; and thus worshipping God by parts and piece-meal, according to that clear acknowledgment of Maximus Madaurensis* before cited: “Unius summi Dei virtutes, per mundanum opus diffusas, nos multis vocabulis invocamus; et dum ejus quasi quædam membra carptim variis supplicationibus prosequimur, totum colere videmur.” The virtues of the one supreme God diffused throughout the whole world, we (Pagans) invoke under many several names; and so prosecuting, with our supplications, his as it were divided members, must needs be thought to worship him whole, we leaving out nothing of him.—We shall proceed to the second head proposed, that besides this polyonymy of one supreme God in the poetical and civil theology of the Pagans, which was their seeming and fantastic Polytheism, they had another real Polytheism also; they acknowledging in their natural and philosophic theology likewise a multiplicity of gods, that is, of substantial understanding beings, superior to men, really existing in the world. Which though they were called by them gods, yet were they not therefore supposed to be ἀγέννητοι and αὐτογενεῖς, unmade and self-existent, or independent beings—but all of them (one only excepted) γεννητοὶ θεοὶ, generated gods—according to the larger notion of that word before declared; that is, though not κατὰ χρόνον, yet at least, ἀπ’ αἰτίας γεννητοὶ, though not as made in time, yet as produced from a superior cause.—Plutarch propounding

Vol. i. p. 500.

* Apud. Augustin. Epist. xvi. p. 15. tom. ii. oper.

this for one amongst his Platonic questions, why ὁ ἀνωτάτω Θεός, the highest and supreme God—was called by Plato, both the father and maker of all things, gives this reply to it in the words before cited; ἡ τῶν μὲν θεῶν τῶν γεννητῶν καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πατὴρ ἐστὶν (ὡς Ὅμηρος ἐπονομάζει), ποιητὴς δὲ τῶν ἀλόγων καὶ ἀψύχων, that perhaps he was said to be the father of all the generated gods, and of men (as he is also styled in Homer), but the maker of all other irrational and inanimate beings.—From which passage of Plutarch's it plainly appears, that the ὁ ἀνωτάτω Θεός, the one highest God—being every way ἀγέννητος, unmade and unproduced—was thought to be the maker or father of all the other gods, therefore called γεννητοί. Which is further plainly declared elsewhere by the same Plutarch in these words:

Πλάτωνος πατέρα καὶ ποιητὴν τοῦτε κόσμου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων γεννητῶν, τὸν ἀγέννητον καὶ αἰδίου

Sympos. l.
viii. c. i. [p.
718.]

Θεὸν ἐπονομάζοντος. Plato calleth the one unmade and eternal God the father and maker of the world, and of all other things generated.—And though some of those many gods of Plato's were by him also called αἰδίοι, or eternal—yet were they likewise γεννητοί too, in another sense, that is, produced and derived, by way of emanation, from that one, who is every way ἀγέννητος, unde- rived and independent upon any other cause.—

And thus Proclus universally pro- nounces: Τὸ εἶναι θεοί, πάντες οἱ θεοὶ διὰ τὸν πρῶτον ἔχουσι θεόν. All the gods owe their being gods to the first God—he adding, that he is therefore called πηγὴ τῆς θεότητος, the fountain of the Godhead.—

Theol. p. l.
iii. c. vii. [p.
132.]

Wherefore the many gods of the intelligent

Pagans were derived from one God, and but *ὑπουργοὶ δυνάμεις* (as Plutarch somewhere calls them), the subservient powers, or ministers of the one supreme, unmade Deity.—Which (as hath been before observed) was frequently called by these Pagans Θεός, God—κατ' ἑξοχὴν, or in way of eminency; as likewise were those other inferior, or generated gods, in way of distinction from him, called θεοὶ, the gods.—And accordingly

the sense of Celsus is thus represented
L. iv. p. 200.

in Origen: Θεοὺς δημιουργοὺς εἶναι πάντων σωμάτων, μόνης ψυχῆς ἔργον οὐσης Θεοῦ. That the gods were the makers of the bodies of all animals, the souls of them only being the work of God.—Moreover, these inferior gods are styled

L. xlii. by Ammianus Marcellinus, *substantiales potestates*, substantial powers—

probably in way of distinction from those other Pagan gods, that were not substantial, but only so many names and notions of the one supreme God, or his powers severally personated and deified, which substantial powers of Am. Marcellinus* (as divination and prophecy was, by their means, imparted to men), were all said to be subject to that one sovereign Deity called Themis; “whom (saith he) the ancient theologers seated in *cubili et solio Jovis*,” in the bed-chamber and throne of Jupiter—as indeed some of the poets have made her to be the wife of Jupiter, and others his sister. And Anaxarchus

in Plutarch styles her *πάρεδρον τοῦ Διός*, Jupiter's assessor—though that philosopher abused the fable, and grossly depraved the meaning of it, as if it signified πάν

Vit. Alex.
[p. 596. tom.
i. oper.]

* Histor. lib. xxi. cap. i. p. 283.

τὸ πρᾶξθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ κρατοῦντος θεοῦ εἶναι καὶ δίκαιον,
 that whatsoever is done by the sovereign Power,
 is therefore just and right—whereas the true
 moral thereof was this, that justice or righteous-
 ness sits in council with God, and in his mind
 and will prescribes laws to nature and the whole
 world. Themis therefore was another name of
 God, amongst the Pagans, according to his uni-
 versal consideration, besides those beforemen-
 tioned: and when Plato, in his book of Laws,
 would have men to swear by the names of those
 three gods, Jupiter, Apollo, and Themis; De Dea The-
 mide, p. 39.
 these were but so many several partial
 notions of the one supreme Deity; the meaning
 thereof being no other than this, as Pighius ob-
 serveth, “*Timore divino, veritate ipsa, ac æqui-
 tate sanciri debere juramenta. In Jove enim
 summi numinis potestatem, falsi ac perjurii vin-
 dicem; in Apolline veritatis lumen; in Themide,
 jus, fas, atque licitum esse intelligitur. Est enim
 Themis ipsa lex æterna atque universalis, mundo
 ac naturæ præscripta;*” or, according to Cicero,
 “*Ratio recta summi Jovis.*” And Ficinus, in
 his commentary as to the main agreeth herewith.
 So that, when the Pagan theologers affirmed the
 Numen of Themis to preside over the spirits of
 the elements, and all those other substantial
 powers, from whom divination was participated
 to men; their meaning therein was clearly no
 other than this; that there was one supreme
 Deity ruling over all the other gods, and that
 the Divine Mind, which prescribeth laws to na-
 ture and the whole world, and contains all the
 fatal decrees in it, according to the evolution of

* Lib. xii. p. 686. oper.

which things come to pass in the world, was the fountain, from whence all divination proceeded; as these secrets were more or less imparted from thence to those inferior created spirits. The philosophy of the Pagan theology amongst the Greeks was plainly no other than this; that there is one unmade self-existent Deity, the original of all, and that there are many other substantial powers or spirits, created by it, as the ministers of its providence in the world: but there was much of poetry, or poetic fancy, intermingled with this philosophy, as the flourish to it, to make up their Pagan theology.

Thus, as hath been before declared, the Pagans held both one God, and many gods, in different senses; one unmade self-existent Deity, and many generated or created gods; Onatus the Pythagorean declaring, that they, who asserted one only God, and not many, "understood not what the dignity and majesty of the Divine transcendency consisted in, namely, in ruling over gods;" and Plotinus conceiving, that the supreme God was most of all glorified, not by being "contracted into one," but "by having multitudes of gods, derived from him, and dependent on him;" and that the honour done to them redounded unto him. Where there are two things to be distinguished; first, that, according to the Pagan Theists, God was no solitary being; but that there were multitudes of gods, or substantial powers, and living understanding natures, superior to men, which were neither self-existent, nor yet generated out of matter, but all generated or

* Libro $\omega\pi\epsilon\ \theta\epsilon\omega\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \theta\epsilon\omega\omega$, apud Stobæum in Eclog. physic. lib. i. cap. i. p. 4.

created from one supreme. Secondly, that forasmuch as these were all supposed to have some influence, more or less, upon the government of the world, and the affairs of mankind, they were therefore all of them conceived to be the due objects of men's religious worship, adoration and invocation; and accordingly was the Pagan devotion scattered amongst them all. Nor were the gods of the oriental Pagans neither mere dead statues and images, as some would conclude from the Scripture, but living understanding beings, superior to men (though worshipped in images) according to that reply of the Chaldeans in Daniel to Nebuchadnezzar, when he required them to tell his dream: "There is none other, that can shew this thing before the king, except those gods, whose dwelling is not with flesh;" that is, the immortal gods, or who are exalted above the condition of human frailty. Though some conceive, that these words are to be understood of a peculiar sort of gods; namely, that this was such a thing, as could not be done by those demons and lower aërial gods, which frequently converse with men, but was reserved to a higher rank of gods, who are above human converse. Now, as to the former of these two things, that God is no solitary being, but that there are multitudes of understanding beings superior to men, the creatures and ministers of one supreme God; the Scriptures both of the Old and New Testament fully agree with the Pagans herein. "Thousand thousands ministered unto him, and ten thousand times ten thousand stood before him;" and "Ye are come to an innumerable company of angels." But the latter of them, that

Dan. vii. 10.
Heb. xii. 22.

religious worship and invocation doth of right belong to these created spirits, is constantly denied and condemned in these writings, that being a thing peculiarly reserved to that one God, who was the creator of heaven and earth. And thus is that prophecy of Jeremy to be understood, expressed in the Chaldee tongue, that so the Jews might have it in readiness for those Chaldean idolaters, when they came into Babylon: "Thus

shall ye say unto them, The gods, that
Jer. x. 11.

have not made the heavens and the earth, shall perish from the earth, and from under these heavens." That is, there shall come a time, when none shall be religiously worshipped any where upon the face of the whole earth, save only that God, who made the heavens and the earth, and he without images too. Which prophecy, but in part yet fulfilled, shall then have its com-

plete accomplishment, when "the kingdoms of this world shall become the kingdoms of our Lord and of his Christ." And thus is the controversy rightly stated betwixt the

Pagans and the Christians by Lactantius: "Sed fortasse quærat aliquis a nobis, quod apud Ciceronem quærit
L. i. [cap. vii. p. 50, 51.]

Hortensius; Si Deus unus est, quæ esse beata solitudo queat? Tanquam nos, qui unum esse dicimus, desertum ac solitarium esse dicamus. Habet enim ministros, quos vocamus nuntios. Et est istud verum, quod dixisse Senecam supra retuli; genuisse regni sui ministros Deum. Verum hi neque dii sunt, neque deos se vocari aut coli volunt; quippe, qui nihil præter jussum ac voluntatem Dei faciant." As if we who say, there is but one God, therefore made a solitary

and deserted Deity. Whereas we acknowledge, that God hath his ministers, whom we call angels: and we grant that to be true, which was before cited out of Seneca, that God hath generated or created ministers of his kingdom. But these are neither gods, nor would they be called gods, nor worshipped; forasmuch as they only execute the will and command of God.—And again afterward to the same purpose: “*Si eos multitudo delectat, non duodecim dicimus, nec trecentos sexaginta quinque (ut Orpheus) sed innumerabiles, et arguimus eorum errores in diversum, qui tam paucos putant. Sciant tamen quo nomine appellari debeant; ne Deum verum violent, cujus nomen exponunt, dum pluribus tribuunt,*” &c. If multitude delight them, we say not, that there are twelve, nor yet three hundred sixty-five, as Orpheus, but innumerable. And we tax their error, on the contrary, who think them to be so few. Nevertheless, let them know, by what name they ought to be called, lest they violate the true God, whose name is profaned, when it is given to many.—From which passages of Lactantius it plainly appeareth, that the main controversy between the Christians and the Pagans was then only this: Whether or no, the created ministers of the supreme God might be called gods, and religiously worshipped. But this Pagan objection against the solitary Deity of the Christians is by some ancient Christian writers also otherwise answered; namely, from those three hypostases or persons of the Trinity; they affirming, upon that account, that though Christians did not acknowledge such a multitude of gods as the Pagans, yet did they not therefore

make God a solitary and sterile being, before the creation. neither, as the Jews did; but went in a middle way betwixt Jews and Pagans, they interpreting Moses's *faciamus hominem*, to this sense.

XXXVI. We shall now shew particularly what these many gods of the Pagans were. It hath been often observed, that the Pagans were divided in their philosophic or natural theology, as to their opinions concerning the supreme God; some of them thinking, τὸ Θεῖον ἐκχρημένον εἶναι τῆς ὅλης φύσεως, that the supreme Deity was an abstract being, elevated above nature and the whole world—but others, that he was nothing higher than an *anima mundi*, or soul of the world.—Now the former of these two were chiefly amongst the Greeks, the Pythagoreans and the Platonists, who had accordingly several distinctions amongst them concerning their gods, as between the ὑπερκόσμιοι θεοὶ and the ἐγκόσμιοι, the supermundane and the mundane gods—the θεοὶ αἰδίοι and the γεννητοὶ, the eternal and the generated gods; that word *latter* being now taken in a narrower and more confined sense, for such as were made in time, or had a beginning of their existence: and, lastly, the νοητοὶ θεοὶ and the αἰσθητοὶ, the intelligible and the sensible gods. And the ὑπερκόσμιοι, αἰδίοι and νοητοὶ θεοὶ, supermundane, eternal, and intelligible gods, of these Pythagoreans and Platonists, were first of all, and principally, those τρεῖς ἀρχικαὶ ὑποστάσεις, (as Plotinus calls them) those three divine hypostases, that have the nature of principles in the universe, viz. Tagathon or Hen, Nous and Psyche, or Monad, Mind and Soul. That this trinity was not first of all a mere invention of Plato's, but

much ancients than he, is plainly affirmed by Plotinus in these words : *Καὶ εἶναι τοὺς λό- γους τοῦσδε μὴ καινοὺς, μὴ δὲ νῦν, ἀλλὰ πάλαι μὲν εἰρησθαι μὴ ἀναπεπταμένως, τοὺς δὲ νῦν λόγους ἐξηγητὰς ἐκείνων γεγονέναι· μαρτυροῖς πύθωσαμένοις τὰς δόξας ταύτας παλαιὰς εἶναι, τοῖς αὐτοῦ τοῦ Πλάτωνος γράμμασιν· ἥπτετο μὲν οὖν καὶ Παρμενίδης πρότερον τῆς τοιαύτης δόξης·* That these doctrines are not new, nor of yesterday, but have been very anciently delivered, though obscurely (the discourses now extant being but explications of them), appears from Plato's own writings; Parmenides before him having insisted on them.

Now it is well known, that Parmenides was addicted to the Pythagoric sect, and therefore probable, that this doctrine of a Divine triad was one of the arcanums of that school also. Which is further confirmed from hence, because Numenius a famous Pythagorean entertained it as such. And Moderatus (as Simplicius informeth us) plainly affirmeth this trinity of principles to have been a Pythagoric cabala: *οὗτος γὰρ κατὰ τοὺς Πυθαγορείους τὸ μὲν Πρῶτον ἐν ὑπὲρ τὸ ὄν καὶ πᾶσαν οὐσίαν ἀποφαίνεται· τὸ δὲ Δεύτερον ἐν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ ὄντως ὄν καὶ νοητὸν, τὰ εἶδη φησὶν εἶναι· τὸ δὲ Τρίτον ὅπερ ἐστὶ ψυχικόν, μετέχει τοῦ ἐνὸς καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν·* This (Moderatus) declareth, that, according to the Pythagoreans, the first one or unity is above all essence; that the second one, which is that, which truly is, and intelligible, according to them, is the ideas; and that the third, which is psychical or soul, partaketh both of the first unity and of the ideas.—Lastly, we have Jamblichus's testimony also in Proclus to the same purpose; *τρῆς εἶναι θεοὺς τούτους καὶ παρὰ τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις ὑμνουμένους·* That there were three gods also praised by the Pytha-

goreans.—Now we have before shewed, that Pythagoras's philosophy was derived from the Orphic cabala, which Proclus* in another place thus fully testifieth; *ἅπαντα γὰρ ἡ παρ' Ἐλ-*
Theol. Plat.
l. i. c. v.
[p. 13.] *λθισι Θεολογία τῆς Ὀρφικῆς ἐστὶ μυσταγωγίας*
ἐκγονος· πρῶτον μὲν Πυθαγόρου παρὰ Ἀγλαοφύ-
μον τὰ περὶ θεῶν ὄργια διδαχθέντος· Δευτέρου δὲ Πλάτωνος
ὑποδεξαμένου τὴν παντελῆ περὶ τούτων ἐπιστήμην, ἐκ τε τῶν
Πυθαγορείων καὶ Ὀρφικῶν γραμμάτων· All the theology of the Greeks was derived from the Orphic Mystagogia; Pythagoras being first instructed by Aglaophemus in the Orphic Orgia, or mysteries concerning the gods; and Plato being the next, who received a perfect knowledge of all these Divine things, both out of the Pythagoric and the Orphic writings.—And that a trinity was part of that Orphic cabala, we have already proved out of Amelius, he affirming (in Proclus) that Plato's three kings were the same with Orpheus's trinity, of Phanes, Uranus, and Cronus. Moreover, since all these three, Orpheus, Pythagoras, and Plato, travelling into Egypt, were there initiated in that arcane theology of the Egyptians (called Hermaical) it seemeth probable (as was before observed) that this doctrine of a Divine triad was also part of the arcane theology of the Egyptians. It hath been also noted, that there were some footsteps of such a trinity in the Mithraic mysteries amongst the Persians, derived from Zoroaster; as likewise that it was expressly contained in the magic or Chaldean oracles, of whatsoever authority they may be. Moreover, it hath been signified, that the Samothracians had very anciently a certain trinity of gods, that were the

* Comment. in Timæam Platon. lib. ii. p. 94.

highest of all their gods, and that called by a Hebrew name too, Cabbirim, or the mighty gods: and that from thence the Roman capitoline trinity of gods was derived; the second whereof was Minerva, which among the Latins, as Athena amongst the Greeks, was understood to signify the Divine wisdom. Lastly, the ternary, or triad, was not only accounted a sacred number amongst the Pythagoreans, but also, as containing some mystery in nature, was therefore made use of by other Greeks and Pagans, in their religious rites: as Aristotle informeth us: *διὸ κατὰ τῆς φύσεως εἰληφότερες ὥσπερ νόμους ἐκείνης, καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἀγιστείας τῶν θεῶν χρῶμεθα τῷ ἀριθμῷ τούτῳ*. De Caelo, l. i. c. v. [cap. i. p. 610. tom. i. oper.]

Wherefore from nature, and as it were observing her laws, have we taken this number of three, making use of the same in the sacrifices of the gods, and other purifications.—

Now since it cannot well be conceived, how such a trinity of Divine hypostases should be first discovered merely by human wit and reason, though there be nothing in it (if rightly understood) that is repugnant to reason; and since there are in the ancient writings of the Old Testament certain significations of a plurality in the Deity, or of more than one hypostasis, we may reasonably conclude that, which Proclus asserteth of this trinity, as it was contained in the Chaldaic Oracles, to be true, that it was at first *θεοπαράδοτος θεολογία*, a theology of Divine tradition or revelation—or a Divine cabala, viz. amongst the Hebrews first, and from them afterward communicated to the Egyptians and other nations. Neither ought it to be thought any considerable objection to the contrary, because the Platonists, Pythagoreans, and

other Pagan theologers, did not express this their trinity, in the very words of the Athanasian Creed, nor according to the form of the Nicene council. Forasmuch as this mystery was gradually imparted to the world, and that first but sparingly to the Hebrews themselves, either in their written or oral cabala; but afterwards more fully under Christianity, the whole frame whereof was built thereupon. Nevertheless was it not so distinctly and precisely determined, nor so punctually and scrupulously stated among the Christians neither, till after the rising up of heresies concerning it. Nor when all was done, did the orthodox themselves at first universally agree, in the signification of the word *ὁμοούσιος*, coessential or consubstantial.—Nor, lastly, is it a thing at all to be wondered at, that in such a difficult and mysterious point as this, there should be some diversity of apprehensions amongst the reputed orthodox Christians themselves; and much less therefore amongst Pagans and philosophers. However, we freely acknowledge, that as this Divine cabala was but little understood by many of those who entertained it among the Pagans, so was it by divers of them much depraved and adulterated also.

For first, the Pagans universally called this, their trinity of gods, *τὸν Πρῶτον, τὸν Δεύτερον, and τὸν Τρίτον θεόν*, the first, the second, and the third god;—as the more philosophical amongst them called it also a trinity of causes, and a trinity of principles, and sometimes a trinity of opificers. In *Time. Plat.* Thus is this cabala of the trinity styled *p. 93.* in Proclus, *ἡ τῶν Τριῶν θεῶν παράδοσις*, the tradition of the three gods.—And accordingly is

it said of Numenius by him, that *τρεις αν-* In Timæ. Plat. υμνήσας θεούς, he did τραγωδῶν καλεῖν, πάππον, p. 93.
έκγονον, απόγονον, having praised the three gods, tragically or affectedly called them, the grandfather, the son, and the nephew;—Numenius thereby intimating, that as the second of these gods was the offspring of the first god, so the third, called the nephew of the first, was derived both from him and from the second; from the first as the grandfather, and from the second as the father of him. Harpocration, likewise, Atticus, and Amelius, are said by Proclus to have entertained this same cabala or tradition of the three gods, the latter of these styling them *βασιλέας τρεις,* and *τρίτον δημιουργόν,* three kings, and three opificers, or makers of the whole world. In like manner Plotinus, speaking of the second of these Eten. 5. 1. v. ο. iii. [p. 522.] three hypostases, (that is, *νοῦς,* the first mind or intellect) calls him *δευτέρον Θεόν,* the second god; *Καὶ Θεὸς αὐτῇ ἡ φύσις, καὶ Θεὸς Δεύτερος, προφαίνων* *ἑαυτὸν, πρὶν ὁρᾶν ἐκείνον· ὁ δὲ ὑπερκάθηται καὶ ὑπερδρυνταὶ ἐπὶ καλῆς οὕτως οἶον κρηπίδος, ἣ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἐξήρηται· ἔδει γὰρ ἐκείνον βαίνοντα μὴ ἐπ' ἀψύχου τινός, μὴ δ' αὖ ἐπὶ ψυχῆς εὐθὺς βεβηκέναι, ἀλλ' εἶναι αὐτῷ κάλλος ἀμήχανον πρὸ αὐτοῦ προϊόν·* And this nature is God, I say a second God, offering himself to view, before that other God can be seen, who is seated above, this being as it were the glorious throne of him. For it is not fit, that he should be immediately seated in any that is inanimate; nor in mere soul neither; but that there should be such an immense pulchritude and splendour shining before him, like the pomp and procession before the great king.—He also elsewhere mentions all these three gods together, making this world to be an image of

Ex. 2. l. iii. c. them all: Εικότως οὖν λέγεται οὗτος ὁ κόσμος
xviii. [p. 148.] εἰκὼν, αἰεὶ εἰκονιζόμενος· ἐστηκότων μὲν τοῦ πρώ-

του, καὶ δευτέρου, τοῦ δὲ τρίτου, ἐστηκότος μὲν καὶ αὐτοῦ,
ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ ὄλῃ, καὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκός κινουμένου· Where-

fore this world may well be called an image, it
depending upon that above (as an image in a
glass), which is threefold. Whereof the first and

second God always stand immoveably; the third
likewise is in itself stable too, but accidentally

moved, by reason of the mobility of matter and
things below it.—And that we may here give a

taste of the mystical theology and enthusiasm of
these Platonists too, Porphyrius in the life of Plo-

tinus* affirmeth, that both Plotinus and himself
had sometimes experience of a kind of ecstatic

union with the first of these three gods, that which
is above mind and understanding: πολλάκις ἐνάγοντι

ἑαυτὸν εἰς τὸν πρῶτον καὶ ἐπέκεινα θεὸν ταῖς ἐννοαῖς, ἐφάνη
ἐκεῖνος ὁ μήτε μορφήν, μή τέ τινα ἰδέαν ἔχων, ὑπὲρ δὲ νοῦν.

καὶ πᾶν τὸ νοητὸν ἰδρυμένος· ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ Πορφύριος ἀπαξ
λέγω πλησιάσαι καὶ ἐνωθῆναι· Plotinus often endea-

vouring to raise up his mind to the first and
highest God, that God sometimes appeared to

him, who hath neither form nor idea, but is placed
above intellect, and all that is intelligible; to

whom I Porphyrius affirm myself to have been
once united in the sixty-eighth year of my age.—

And again afterward, τέλος ἀντὶ καὶ σκοπὸς ἦν, τὸ
ἐνωθῆναι καὶ πελάσαι τῷ ἐπὶ πᾶσι θεῷ, ἔτυχεν δὲ τετράκις που

ὅτε συνῆμην αὐτῷ τοῦ σκοποῦ τούτου· Plotinus's chief
aim and scope was, to be united to and conjoined

with the supreme God, who is above all; which
scope he attained unto four several times, whilst

myself was with him, by a certain ineffable energy.

* Cap. xxiii. p. 137. in Fabricii Biblioth. Græc. lib. iv. cap. xxvi.

—That is Plotinus aimed at such a kind of rapturous and ecstatic union with the *Tò êν*, and *Τ' αγαθόν*, the first of the three highest gods, (called the one and the good) as by himself is described towards the latter end of this last book,* where he calls it *ἑαφ' ἑν*, and *καρποῦσθαι ἐπιστήμης κρείττονα*, and *τὸ ἑαυτῶν κέντρον τῷ ὅλῳ πάντων κέντρῳ συνέναν*, a kind of factual union, and a certain presence better than knowledge, and the joining of our own centre, as it were, with the centre of the universe.—Thus we see, that the Platonic trinity is a trinity of gods, of which three gods therefore, the second and the third must of necessity be inferior gods, because otherwise they would be three independent gods; whereas the Pagan theology expressly disclaims a plurality of independent and self-originated deities.

But since, according to the principles of Christianity, which was partly designed to oppose and bear down the Pagan Polytheism, there is one only God to be acknowledged; the meaning whereof notwithstanding seems to be chiefly directed against the deifying of created beings, or giving religious worship to any, besides the uncreated, and the creator of all: moreover, since in the Scripture, which is the only true rule and measure of this Divine cabala of the trinity, though the *λόγος* or Word be said to have been with God, (that is, God the Father) and also itself to be God, (that is, not a creature) yet is it no where called another, or second God. Therefore cannot we Christians entertain this Pagan language of a trinity of Gods, but must call it either a trinity of Divine hypostases, or subsist-

* De Banq vel Uno, Ennead. vi. lib. ix. cap. x. p. 772.

ences, or persons, or the like. Nevertheless it is observable, that Philo,* though, according to his Jewish principles, he was a zealous opposer of the Pagan Polytheism and idolatry, yet did he not, for all that, scruple to call the Θεῖον λόγον, the divine Word, after the Platonic way, Δεύτερον Θεόν, a second God; as not suspecting this to clash with the principles of his religion, or that second commandment of the decalogue, "Thou shalt have no other gods before my face;" possibly because he conceived, that this was to be understood of creature-gods only: whereas his second God, the divine λόγος or Word, is declared by him to be αἰδῖος, eternal, and therefore, according to the Jewish theology, uncreated. However, this language of a second and third God is not so excusable in a Jew, as it might be in a Pagan; because the Pagans, according to the principles of their religion, were so far from having any scrupulosity against a plurality of gods, (so long as there was only one fountain of the Godhead acknowledged) that they rather accounted it an honour to the supreme God, as hath been already shewed, that he should have many other, not only titular gods under him, but also such as were religiously worshipped: wherefore, besides this second and third God, they also did luxuriate in their other many creature-gods. And indeed St. Austin doth upon this account seem somewhat to excuse the Pagans for this their trinity of gods, and principles, in these words: c. D. l. x. c. "Liberis enim verbis loquuntur philosophi, nec in rebus ad intelligendum difficillimis offensionem religionum aurium perti-

* Vide Eusebium, Præpar. Evangel. lib. vii. cap. xiii. p. 323.

mescunt. Nobis autem ad certam regulam loqui fas est, ne verborum licentia, etiam in rebus, quæ in his significantur, impiam gignat opinionem. Nos autem non dicimus duo vel tria principia, cum de Deo loquimur; sicut nec duos deos vel tres, nobis licitum est dicere, quamvis de unoquoque loquentes, vel de Filio, vel de Spiritu Sancto, etiam singulum quemque Deum esse fateamur." The philosophers use free language; nor in these things, which are extremely difficult to be understood, did they at all fear the offending of any religious and scrupulous ears. But the case is otherwise with us Christians; for we are tied up to phrases, and ought to speak according to a certain rule, lest the licentious use of words should beget a wicked opinion in any concerning those things, that are signified by them.—That is, though this might be in a manner excusable in the Pagans, because each of those three hypostases is God, therefore to call them severally gods, and all of them a trinity of gods and principles; they having no such rule then given them to govern their language by as this; "That though the Father be God, the Son God, and the Holy Ghost God, yet are they not three Gods, but one God:" yet is not this allowable for us Christians, to speak of a second or third God or principle, or to call the holy Trinity a trinity of Gods, notwithstanding that when we speak of the Father, or of the Son, or of the Holy Ghost severally, we confess each of them to be God.

And indeed when the Pagans thus spake of a first, second, and third god, and no more, though having innumerable other gods besides, they did,

by this language, plainly imply, that these three gods of theirs, were of a very different kind from all the rest of their gods; that is, not *θεοὶ γεννητοὶ*, but *αἰῶνοι*, not created, but eternal and uncreated ones. And that many of them did really take this whole trinity of gods for the *τὸ Θεῖον* in general, the Divine Numen, and sometimes call it the first God too, in way of distinction from their generated gods, will be shewed afterward. So that the *Πρῶτος Θεός*, the first God, was used in different senses by these Pagans, sometimes in a larger sense, and in way of opposition to all the *γεννητοὶ θεοὶ*, the generated or created gods, or the gods, that were made in time, together with the world; and sometimes again, more particularly, in way of distinction from those two other Divine hypostases eternal, called by them the second and third god. Which first of the three gods is also frequently by them called *Θεός*, God, emphatically and by way of excellency, they supposing a gradual subordination in these principles.

Neither was this trinity of Divine subsistences only thus ill-languaged by the Pagans generally, when they called it a trinity of gods; but also the cabala thereof was otherwise much depraved and adulterated by several of the Platonists and Pythagoreans. For first, the third of these three hypostases, commonly called Psyche, is by some of them made to be *ψυχὴ ἐγκόσμιος*, the immediate soul of the corporeal world, informing, acting and enlivening it, after the same manner as the souls of other animals do their respective bodies; insomuch that this corporeal world itself, as together with its soul it makes up one complete animal, was frequently called the third god.

This Proclus^a affirmeth of Numenius the Pythagorean, ὁ γὰρ κόσμος κατ' αὐτὸν ὁ τρίτος ἐστὶ θεός, That the world, according to him, was the third god.— And Plotinus, being a great reader of this Numenius, seems to have been somewhat infected by him with this conceit also, though contrary to his own principles, from those words before cited out of him,^b ὁ κόσμος θεός, ὡςπερ συνήθες λέγειν, τρίτος, the world, as is commonly said, is the third god.

Now, if the world be not a creature, then is there no created being at all, but all is God. But not only Timæus Locrus, but also Plato himself, calls it θεῖον γέννητόν, that is, a created god, the word γέννητόν being here put for that, which, after it once was not, is brought into being; which is the proper notion of a creature. So that the animated world is, by Plato, made to be only the chief of all the γέννητοὶ θεοὶ, that is, the creature-gods. Wherefore it is plain, that in this trinity of some Platonists and Pythagoreans, wherein the world is made to be the third god, there is a confused jumble of created and uncreated beings together. For the first of those gods is the father and fountain of all, or the original of the god-head. And the second, forasmuch as he is called by them, both ποιητής, and δημιουργός, the maker and the opificer of the whole world, he therefore can be no creature neither: whereas the third, which is said to be the world, was by Numenius himself also expressly called both ποίημα and τὸ δημιουργούμενον, the work, or thing made, that is

^a Comment. in Timæum Platon. lib. ii. p. 93.

^b This is a mistake, for Dr. Cudworth had not cited these words before, but they are to be found in Plotinus, Ennead. iii. lib. v. cap. vi. p. 296.

plainly, the creature of both the former. Proclus thus fully represents his sense; Πατέρα μὲν καλεῖ τὸν πρῶτον, ποιητὴν δὲ τὸν δεύτερον, ποίημα δὲ τὸν τρίτον· ὥστε ὁ κατ' αὐτὸν δημιουργὸς διττός, ὅτε πρῶτος καὶ ὁ δεύτερος θεός, τὸ δὲ δημιουργούμενον ὁ τρίτος. Numenius called the first of the three gods the father, the second of them the maker, and the third the work, or thing made; so that, according to Numenius, there were two opificers, or creators of the world, the first and the second god; and the world itself, (that is, the thing made and created by them both) is said to be the third god.

And that this notion of the Trinity is an adulterated one, may be also further concluded from hence, because, according to this hypothesis, they might have said, that there were three hundred and more gods, as well as that there are three; since all the other *γεννητοὶ θεοὶ*, generated gods—might have come into the number too, as well as the world, they being parts thereof, and gods that differ not in kind from it, but only in degree. Wherefore these philosophers ought not to have made a trinity of gods, distinguished from all the rest, but rather first to have distributed their gods into *θεοὶ αἰδίοι* and *γεννητοὶ*, that is, eternal or uncreated, and created gods, and then to have subdivided those created gods into the whole world, and the parts thereof animated.

But because it may be here alleged in favour of this spurious hypothesis of the Trinity, that the world was accounted the third god, only by accident, in respect of its soul, which is properly that third god; though Numenius, with others, plainly affirm the world itself, as *ποίημα* and *δητ*

* Comment. in Timæum Platon, lib. ii. p. 83.

μιουργούμενον, as the work and thing made, to be the third; we shall therefore reply to this, that even the soul of the mundane animal itself, according to Timæus, and Plato, and others, is affirmed to be γεννητός θεός, a generated god—that is, such as was produced from non-existence into being, and therefore truly and properly a creature. Which Aristotle* observing, therefore took occasion to tax Plato as contradicting himself, in making the soul of the world a principle, that is, the third god, and yet supposing it to be ὅσπερ καὶ ἅμα τῷ οὐρανῷ, not eternal, but made or created together with the heaven—of which something before. Wherefore we conclude, that this ancient cabala of the Trinity was depraved and adulterated by those Platonists and Pythagoreans, who made either the world itself, or else ψυχὴν ἐγκόσμιον, an informing soul of the world—to be the third hypostasis thereof, they mingling created and uncreated beings together, in that which themselves, notwithstanding, call a trinity of causes and of principles.

And we think it highly probable, that this was the true reason, why Philo, though he admitted the second hypostasis of the Platonic and Pythagoric (if not Egyptian) Trinity, called by him θεὸς λόγος, the divine Word—and styled δεύτερος θεός, the second god—and, as Eusebius^b adds, δεύτερον αἷτιον, the second cause—yet he would not Platonize or Pythagorize any further, so as to take in that third god, or cause, supposed by many of them to be the soul of the whole world,

* Vide Metaphys. lib. i. cap. vii. p. 278. tom. iv. oper. et Physic. Auscultat. lib. viii. cap. i. p. 578. tom. i. oper.

^b Præparat. Evang. lib. vii. cap. xiii.

as an animal; because he must then have offered violence to the principles of his own religion, in making the whole created world a god; which practice is, by him, condemned in the Pagans. It is true, that he somewhere sticks not to call God also the soul of the world, as well as the mind thereof, whether he meant thereby τὸν πρὸ τοῦ λόγου θεόν, that God, who is before the Word—or else rather the Word itself, the second God (according to him the immediate creator and governor of the same); nevertheless, he does not seem to understand thereby such a deeply immersed soul, as would make the world an animal, and a god, but a more elevated one; that is, ψυχὴν ὑπερκόσμιον, a super-mundane soul.

To this first depravation of that θεοπαράδοτος θεολογία, that theology of Divine tradition—and ancient cabala of the Trinity, by many of the Platonists and Pythagoreans, may be added another, that some of them declaring the second hypostasis of their Trinity to be the archetypal world, or τὸν ἐκ τῶν ἰδεῶν παγέντα κόσμον, as Philo calls it,* the world that is compounded and made up of ideas—and containeth in it all those kinds of things intelligibly, that are in this lower world sensibly; and further concluding, that all these several ideas of this archetypal and intelligible world, are really so many distinct substances, animals and gods, have thereby made that second hypostasis not to be one God, but a congeries and heap of gods. These are those gods commonly called by them νοητοὶ θεοὶ, intelligible gods—not as before in way of distinction from the

P. 357.

αἰσθητοὶ, the sensible gods—(which is a

* De Opificio Mundi, p. 4.

more general notion of the word), but from those other gods of theirs (afterwards to be insisted on also) called νοετοὶ θεοὶ, intellectual gods.—Proclus upon Plato's *Politia** concludes, that there is no idea of evil, for this reason, because if there were, καὶ ἡ τῶν κακῶν ἰδέα θεὸς ἔσται, ἐκείνῃ πάσα ἰδέα θεὸς ὡς Παρμενίδης εἶπεν, that very idea of evil also would itself be a god, because every idea is a god, as Parmenides hath affirmed.—Neither was Plotinus himself, though otherwise more sober, altogether uninfected with this fantastic conceit of the ideas being all of them gods, he writing thus concerning the second God, the first Mind or Intellect: *γενόμενον δὲ ἤδη* En. v. l. i. c. vii. [p. 489.] τὰ ὄντα σὺν αὐτῷ γεννησάι, πᾶν μὲν τὸ τῶν ἰδεῶν κάλλος, πάντας δὲ θεοὺς νοητοὺς, that he being begotten by the first God (that is, by way of emanation, and from eternity), generated all entities together with himself, the pulchritude of the ideas, which are all intelligible gods.—Apuleius* also (as hath been already noted) grossly and fulsomely imputes the same to Plato, in these words; "Quos deos Plato existimat, veros, incorporales, animales, sine ullo neque fine neque exordio, sed prorsus ac retro æviter-nos, ingenio ad summam beatitudinem porrecto," &c.—And he with Julian and others reduce the greater part of the Pagan gods to these ideas of the intelligible, or archetypal world, as making Apollo, for example, to be the intelligible sun, the idea of the sensible; and Diana the intelligible moon, and the like for the rest. Lastly, it hath been observed also, that the Egyptian theologers pretended, in like manner, to worship these

* De Deo Socratis, p. 43.

intelligible gods, or eternal ideas, in their religious animals, as symbols of them.

Philo indeed Platonized so far, as to suppose God, to have made an archetypal and intelligible world, before he made this corporeal and sensible:

De Mus. Opif. Βουλευθεὶς (ὁ Θεός) τὸν ὁρατὸν τούτου κόσμον
P. 6. [P. 3, 4.] δημιουργῆσαι, προεξετύπου τὸν νοητὸν, ἵνα χρώ-

μενος ἀσωμάτῳ καὶ θεοειδεστάτῳ παραδείγματι, τὸν σωμα-
τικὸν ἀπεργάσῃται, πρεσβυτέρου νεώτερον ἀπεικόνισμα, τοσ-
αῦτα περιέχοντα αἰσθητὰ γένη, ὅσα περ ἐν ἐκείνῳ νοητά.
τὸν δὲ ἐκ τῶν ιδεῶν συνειστώτα κόσμον ἐν τόπῳ τινὶ ὑπονοεῖν
ἀδύνατον. God intending to make a visible world,
first formed an intelligible one; that so having
an incorporeal and most godlike pattern before
him, he might make the corporeal world agree-
ably to the same, this younger an image of that
older, that should contain as many sensible kinds
in it, as the other did intelligible. But it is not
possible (saith he) to conceive this world of ideas
to exist in any place.—Nay, according to him,
Moses himself philosophized also after the same
manner in his *Costmopæia*, describing, in the first
five verses of Genesis, the making of an intelli-

ble heaven and earth before the sensible:

P. 6. πρῶτον οὖν παρὰ τοῦ νοητοῦ κόσμου ὁ ποιῶν
ἐπρίει οὐρανὸν ἀσώματον καὶ γῆν ἀόρατον, καὶ αἶρος ἰδέαν
καὶ κενόν, εἰθ' ὕδατος ἀσώματου οὐσίαν καὶ πνεύματος,
καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἐβδόμου φωτός, ὃ πάλιν ἀσώματον ἦν
καὶ νοητὸν ἡλίου παράδειγμα, &c. The Creator
first of all made an incorporeal heaven and
an invisible earth; the ideas of air and vacuum;
incorporeal water and air; and last of all light,
which was also the incorporeal and intelli-
gible paradigm of the sun and stars, and that
from whence their sensible light is derived.—

But Philo does not plainly make these ideas of the intelligible and archetypal world to be so many distinct substances and animals, much less gods; though he somewhere* takes notice of those, who, admiring the pulchritude of both these worlds, did not only deify the whole of them, but also their several parts; that is, the several ideas of the intelligible world also, as well as the greater parts of the sensible, an intelligible heaven and earth, sun and moon; they pretending to worship those Divine ideas in all these sensible things. Which high-flown Platonic notion, as it gave sanctuary and protection to the grossest and foulest of all the Pagan superstitions and idolatries, when the Egyptians would worship brute animals, and other Pagans all the things of nature (inanimate substances, and mere accidents), under a pretence of worshipping the Divine ideas in them; so did it directly tend to absolute impiety, irreligion, and Atheism; there being few that could entertain any thoughts at all of those eternal ideas, and scarcely any who could thoroughly persuade themselves that these had so much reality in them, as the sensible things of nature; as the idea of a house in the mind of an architect hath not so much reality in it as a material house made up of stones, mortar, and timber; so that their devotion must needs sink down wholly into those sensible things, and themselves naturally at length fall into this atheistic persuasion, That the good things of nature are the only deities.

Here therefore have we a multitude of Pagan gods supermundane and eternal (though all de-

* De Confusione Linguar. p. 345.

pending upon one supreme), the gods by them properly called νοῦτοι, intelligible—or the Divine ideas. And we cannot but account this for another depravation of the ancient Mosaic cabala of the Trinity, that the second hypostasis thereof is made to be the archetypal world, and all the Divine ideas, as so many distinct substances, animals, and gods; that is, not one god, but a whole world of gods.

But over and besides all this, some of these Platonists and Pythagoreans did farther deprave and adulterate the ancient Hebrew or Mosaic cabala of the Trinity (the certain rule, whereof is now only the Scriptures of the New Testament), when they concluded, that as from the third hypostasis of their Trinity, called ἡ πρώτη ψυχή, the first soul—there were innumerable other particular souls derived, namely, the souls of all inferior animals, that are parts of the world; so in like manner, that from their second hypostasis, called ὁ πρῶτος νοῦς, the first mind or intellect—there were innumerable other μερικοί Νόες, particular minds—or intellects substantial derived, superior to the first soul; and not only so, but also, that from that first and highest hypostasis of all, called τὸ ἓν, and Τάγαθόν, the one, and the good—there were derived likewise many particular Ἐνάδες, and Ἀγαθήτητες, unities and goodnesses substantial—superior to the first intellect. Thus Proclus in his Theologic Institutions, Μετὰ δὲ τὸ ἓν. N. xxi. [cap. xxi. p. 426.] ἔφα τὸ πρῶτον, ἐνάδες καὶ μετὰ νοῦν τὸν πρῶτον, νοῦς καὶ μετὰ τὴν ψυχὴν τὴν πρώτην, ψυχαὶ καὶ μετὰ τὴν ὅλην φύσιν, φύσεις. After the first One (and from it), there are many particular henades or unities; after the first Intellect and from it, many particu-

lar noes, minds, or intellects; after the first Soul, many particular and derivative souls; and lastly, after the universal Nature, many particular natures, and spermatic reasons.—Where it may be *obiter* observed, that these Platonists supposed, below the universal Psyche, or mundane soul, a universal *φύσις*, or substantial nature also; but so as that besides it there were other particular *λόγοι σπερματικοί*, seminal reasons—or plastic principles also.

As for these noes, and that besides the first universal Mind or Intellect, there are other particular minds or intellects substantial, a rank of beings not only immutably good and wise, but also every way immoveable, and therefore above the rank of all souls, that are self-moveable beings; Proclus was not singular in this, but had the concurrence of many other Platonists with him; amongst whom Plotinus may seem to be one, from this passage of his besides others, *ὅτι ἀθάνατοι δὲ αἱ ψυχαὶ, καὶ νοῦς πᾶς, ἐν ἄλλοις δὲ πλεονέκτων εἰσὶν* that souls are immortal, and every mind or intellect, we have elsewhere largely proved.—Upon which words Ficinus thus: “*Hic, p. 553. [Enchiridion] et supra et infra sæpe, per verba Plotini notabis, plures esse mentium animarum-que substantias inter se distinctas, quamvis inter eas unio sit mirabilis.*” Here, and from many other places, before and after, you may observe, that, according to Plotinus, there are many substantial minds distinct from souls, though there be a wonderful union betwixt them.—Moreover, that there was also above these noes, or immoveable but multiform minds, not only one perfect Monad, and first Good, but also a rank

of many particular henades or monades, and agathotetes; was, besides Proclus and others,

In Eriot.
Ench. p. 9.

asserted by Simplicius also: ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ τὸ ἀγαθὸν πάντα παράγει, τῷτε πρῶτα, καὶ τὰ μέσα, καὶ τὰ ἑσχατά· ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν πρῶτα καὶ ἑαυτῷ παράγει, μία ἀγαθότης πολλὰς ἀγαθότητας, καὶ μία ἑνὴς ἢ ὑπὲρ πάσας, πολλὰς ἐνάδους. The highest good (saith he) produceth all things from himself, in several ranks and degrees; the first, the middle, and the last or lowest of all. But the first and the next to himself doth he produce like himself, one goodness many goodnesses, and one unity or henade many henades.—And that by these henades and autoagathotetes he means substantial beings, that are conscious of themselves, appears also from

E. 11.

these following words: ἐὰ μὲν οὖν πρῶτα τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ πρώτου ἀγαθοῦ παραγομένων, διὰ τὸ πρὸς αὐτὸ ὁμοφύες, οὐκ ἐξέστη τοῦ εἶναι ἀγαθὰ, ἀκίνητα ὄντα καὶ ἀμετέβλητα, καὶ ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ αἰὲ μακαριότητι ἰδρυμένα, οὐκ ἐνδεῖ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ὅτι αὐτοαγαθότητες εἰσιν. Those beings, which are first produced from the first good, by reason of their sameness of nature with him, are immoveably and unchangeably good, always fixed in the same happiness, and never indigent of good or falling from it, because they are all essential goodnesses.—Where afterward he adds something concerning the νόες also, that though these were a rank of lower beings, and not αὐτοάγαθα, not essentially goodnesses, but only by participation; yet, being by their own nature also immoveable, they can never degenerate, nor fall from that participation of good. Notwithstanding which, we must confess, that some of these Platonists seem to take the word henades sometimes in another sense, and to understand

nothing else thereby but the intelligible idea beforementioned; though the ancient Platonists and Pythagoreans were not wont to call these unities, but numbers.

And now have we discovered more of the Pagans' inferior gods, supermundane and eternal, viz: besides those *νομοὶ θεοί*, those intelligible gods—troops of henades and autozathotetes, unities and goodnesses; and also of noes, immoveable minds or intellects; or, as they frequently call them, *θεοὶ ἰδιώται*, and *θεοὶ νομοί*, henadical (or monadical) gods, and intellectual gods.

But since these noes, or νομοὶ θεοί, are said to be all of them in their own nature a rank of beings above souls, and therefore superior to that first Soul, which is the third hypostasis of this Trinity: as all those henades or *ἑνάδες θεοί*, those simple monadical gods, are likewise yet a higher rank of beings above the noes, and therefore superior to the second hypostasis also, the first Mind; and yet all these henades and nous, however supposed by these philosophers to be eternal, forasmuch as they are particular beings only, and not universal, cannot be placed higher than in the rank of creatures; it follows from hence unavoidably, that both the second and third hypostases of this Trinity, as well the first Mind as the first Soul, must be accounted creatures also; because no created being can be superior to any thing uncreated. Wherefore Proclus, and some others of those Platonists, plainly understood this Trinity no otherwise, than as a certain scale or ladder of beings in the universe; or a gradual descent of things from the first or highest, by steps downward, lower and lower, so

far as to the souls of all animals. For which cause, Proclus, to make up this scale complete, adds to these three ranks and degrees, below that third of souls, a fourth of natures also; under which there lies nothing but the passive part of the universe, body and matter. So that their whole scale of all that is above body was indeed not a Trinity, but a quaternity, or four ranks and degrees of beings, one below another; the first of henades or unities, the second of noes, minds or intellects; the third of souls; and the last of natures; these being, as it were, so many orbs and spheres, one within and below another. In all which several ranks of being, they supposed one first universal, and unparticipated, as the head of each respective rank, and many particular or participated ones: as one first universal Henade, and many secondary particular henades; one first universal Nous, Mind, or Intellect; and many secondary and particular noes or minds; one first universal Soul, and many particular souls; and lastly, one universal Nature, and many particular natures. In which scale of beings, they deified, besides the first *Tò êv*, and *Tὰγαθόν*, One, and good—not only the first Mind, and the first Soul, but also those other particular henades and noes universally; and all particular souls above human: leaving out, besides them and inferior souls, that fourth rank of natures, because they conceived, that nothing was to be accounted a god, but what was intellectual and superior to men. Wherein, though they made several degrees of gods, one below another, and called some *αἰδιόους* and some *γεννητούς*, some eternal, and some generated—or made in time; yet

did they no where clearly distinguish betwixt the Deity properly so called, and the creature, nor shew how far in this scale the true Deity went; and where the creature began. But as it were melting the Deity by degrees, and bringing it down lower and lower, they made the juncture and commissure betwixt God and the creature so smooth and close, that where they indeed parted was altogether undiscernible; they rather implying them to differ only in degrees, or that they were not absolute but comparative terms, and consisted but in more and less. All which was doubtless a gross mistake of the ancient cabala of the Trinity.

This is therefore that Platonic Trinity which we oppose to the Christian, not as if Plato's own Trinity, in the very essential constitution thereof, were quite a different thing from the Christian; itself in all probability having been at first derived from a Divine or Mosaic cabala; but because this cabala (as might well come to pass in a thing so mysterious and difficult to be conceived) hath been by divers of these Platonists and Pythagoreans misunderstood, depraved, and adulterated, into such a Trinity, as confounds the differences between God and the creature, and removes all the bounds and land-marks betwixt them; sinks the Deity lower and lower by degrees (still multiplying of it, as it goes), till it have at length brought it down to the whole corporeal world; and when it hath done this, is not able to stop there neither, but extends it further still to the animated parts thereof, stars and demons; the design or direct tendency thereof being nothing else, but to lay a foundation for infinite

Polytheism, cosmolatry (or world-idolatry), and creature-worship. Where it is by the way observable, that these Platonic Pagans were the only public and professed champions against Christianity; for though Celsus were suspected by Origen to have been indeed an Epicurean, yet did he at least personate a Platonist too. The reason whereof might be, not only because the Platonic and Pythagoric sect was the divinest of all the Pagans, and that which approached nearest to Christianity and the truth (however it might by accident therefore prove the worst, as the corruption of the best thing), and by that means could with greatest confidence hold up the bucklers against Christianity and encounter it; but also because the Platonic principles, as they might be understood, would, of all other, serve most plausibly to defend the Pagan Polytheism and idolatry.

Concerning the Christian Trinity, we shall here observe only three things; first, that it is not a Trinity of mere names or words, nor a Trinity of partial notions and inadequate conceptions of one and the same thing. For such a kind of Trinity as this might be conceived in that first Platonic hypostasis itself, called *τὸ ἓν* and *ταύτῃς*, the one and the good—and perhaps also in that first person of the Christian Trinity; namely, of goodness, and understanding or wisdom, and will or active power, three inadequate conceptions thereof. It is true, that Plotinus was so high-flown, as to maintain, that the first and highest principle of all, by reason of its perfect unity and simplicity, is above the multiplicity of knowledge and understanding, and therefore does not so much as *νοεῖν* *ἑαυτοῦ*, in a proper sense, understand itself: not-

withstanding which, this philosopher himself adds, that it cannot therefore be said to be ignorant nor unwise neither; these expressions belonging only to such a being, as was by nature Envi. l. vii. c. intellectual, νοῦς μὲν γὰρ μὴ νοῦν, ἀνόητος; 37. [p. 719.] Intellectus, nisi intelligat, demens merito judicatur.—And he seems to grant, that it hath a certain simple clarity and brightness in it, superior to that of knowledge; as the body of the sun has a certain brightness superior to that secondary light, which streameth from it; and that it may be said to be *νόησις αὐτῇ*, knowledge itself—that does not understand, as motion itself does not move. But this can hardly be conceived by ordinary mortals, that the highest and most perfect of all beings should not fully comprehend itself, the extent of its own fecundity and power, and be conscious of all that proceedeth from it, though after the most simple manner. And therefore this high-flown conceit of Plotinus (and perhaps of Plato himself too) has been rejected by latter Platonists, as fantastical and unsafe: for thus Simplicius, *ἀλλὰ καὶ γινώσκον ἔχειν ἀνάγκη τὴν ἀκροτάτην, οὐ γὰρ ἂν τι τῶν ἐκ αὐτοῦ παραγομένων ἀγνοήσκειν* In Epist. p. 235. But it must needs have also the most perfect knowledge, since it cannot be ignorant of any thing, that is produced from itself.—And St. Austin,* in like manner, confutes that assertion of some Christians, that the λόγος, or eternal Word, was that very wisdom and understanding, by which the Father himself was wise; as making it nothing but an inadequate conception of God. But this opinion, that the Christian Trinity is but a Trinity of words, or mere logical notions and inadequate

* De Trinit. lib. vi. cap. ii. iii. p. 598, 599. tom. viii. oper.

conceptions of God, hath been plainly condemned by the Christian church in Sabellius and others. Wherefore we conclude it to be a Trinity of hypostases, or subsistences, or persons.

The second thing, that we observe concerning the Christian Trinity, is this: that though the second hypostasis, or person thereof, were begotten from the first, and the third proceedeth both from the first and second; yet are neither this second, nor third, creatures; and that for these following reasons. First, because they were not made *ἐκ ὀνόματος*, as Arius maintained, that is, from an antecedent non-existence brought forth into being, nor can it be said of either of them, "*Erat quando non erant*," that once they were not, but their going forth was from eternity—and they were both coeve and coeternal with the Father. Secondly, because they were not only eternal emanations (if we may so call them) but also necessary, and therefore are they both also absolutely undestroyable and unannihilable. Now, according to true philosophy and theology, no creature could have existed from eternity, nor be absolutely undestroyable; and therefore that, which is both eternal and undestroyable, is *ipso facto* uncreated. Nevertheless, because some philosophers have asserted (though erroneously) both the whole world's eternity, and its being a necessary emanation also from the Deity, and consequently, that it is undestroyable; we shall therefore further add, that these second and third hypostases or persons of the holy Trinity are not only therefore uncreated, because they were both eternal and necessary emanations, and likewise are unannihilable; but also because they are universal, each of them comprehending

the whole world, and all created things under it: which universality of theirs is the same thing with infinity; whereas all other beings, besides this holy Trinity, are particular and finite. Now we say, that no intellectual being, which is not only eternal, and necessarily existent, or undestroyable, but also universal, or infinite, can be a creature.

Again, in the last place, we add, that these three hypostases, or persons, are truly and really one God. Not only because they have all essentially one and the same will, according to that of Origen, *θρησκεύομεν οὖν τὸν πατέρα τῆς ἀληθείας, καὶ τὸν υἱὸν τῆν ἀλήθειαν, ὄντα δύο τῇ ὑποστάσει πρᾶγμα, ἐν δὲ τῇ ῥημονίᾳ καὶ τῇ συμφωνίᾳ καὶ τῇ ταυτότητι τῆς βουλῆσεως* C. Cel. p. 386. [l. viii.] We worship the Father of truth, and the Son the truth itself, being two things as to hypostasis; but one in agreement, consent, and sameness of will:—but also because they are physically (if we may so speak) one also; and have a mutual *περιχώρησις*, and *ἐνπαράξις*, inexistence and permeation of one another—according to that of our Saviour Christ, “I am in the Father, and the Father in me; and the Father that dwelleth in me, he doeth the works.” We grant, indeed, that there can be no instance of the like unity or oneness found in any created beings; nevertheless, we certainly know from our very selves, that it is not impossible for two distinct substances, that are of a very different kind from one another, the one incorporeal, the other corporeal, to be so closely united together, as to become one animal and person; much less therefore should it be thought impossible for these three Divine hypostases to be one God.

We shall conclude here with confidence, that

the Christian Trinity, though there be very much of mystery in it, yet is there nothing at all of plain contradiction to the undoubted principles of human reason, that is, of impossibility, to be found therein, as the Atheists would pretend, who cry down all for nonsense and absolute impossibility, which their dull stupidity cannot reach to, or their insatuated minds easily comprehend, and therefore even the Deity itself. And it were to be wished, that some religionists and Trinitarians did not here symbolize too much with them, in affecting to represent the mystery of the Christian Trinity as a thing directly contradictions to all human reason and understanding; and that perhaps out of design to make men surrender up themselves and consciences, in a blind and implicit faith, wholly to their guidance; as also to debauch their understandings by this means, to the swallowing down of other opinions of theirs, plainly repugnant to human faculties. As who should say, he that believes the Trinity (as we all must do, if we will be Christians), should boggle at nothing in religion never after, nor scrupulously chew or examine any thing; as if there could be nothing more contradictions, or impossible to human understanding propounded, than this article of the Christian faith.

But, for the present, we shall endeavour only to shew, that the Christian Trinity (though a mystery, yet) is much more agreeable to reason, than that Platonic, or Pseudo-Platonic Trinity before described; and that in those three particulars then mentioned. For, first, when those Platonists and Pythagoreans interpret their third God, or last hypostasis of their Trinity, to be either the world,

or else a *ψυχὴ ἐγκόσμος*, such an immediate soul thereof, as, together with the world its body, make up one animal god; as there is plainly too great a leap here betwixt their second and third hypostasis, so do they debase the Deity therein too much, confound God and the creature together, laying a foundation, not only for cosmolatry, or world-idolatry in general, but also for the grossest and most sottish of all idolatries, the worshipping of the inanimate parts of the world themselves, in pretence as parts and members of this great mundane animal, and sensible god.

It is true, indeed, that Origen and some others of the ancient Christian writers have supposed, that God may be said, in some sense, to be the soul of the world. Thus in that book *Περὶ Ἀρχῶν*, “Sicut corpus nostrum unum ex multis ^{L. II. c. 1.} membris aptatum est, et ab una anima continetur, ita et universum mundum, velut animal quoddam immane, opinandum puto; quod quasi ab una anima, virtute Dei ac ratione teneatur. Quod etiam a sancta Scriptura indicari arbitror per illud, quod dictum est per prophetam; Nonne cælum et terram ego repleo, dicit Dominus? et cælum mihi sedes, terra autem scabellum pedum meorum; et quod Salvator, cum ait, non esse jurandum neque per cælum, quia sedes Dei est, neque per terram, quia scabellum pedum ejus. Sed et illud quod ait Paulus, Quoniam in ipso vivimus et movemur et sumus. Quomodo enim in Deo vivimus, et movemur, et sumus, nisi quod in virtute sua universum constringit et continet mundum?” As our own body is made up of many members, and contained by one soul, so do I conceive, that the whole world is to be looked

upon as one huge, great animal, which is contained, as it were, by one soul, the virtue and reason of God. And so much seems to be intimated by the Scripture in sundry places; as in that of the prophet, "Do not I fill heaven and earth?" And again, "Heaven is my throne, and the earth my footstool." And in that of our Saviour, "Swear not at all, neither by heaven, because it is the throne of God, nor by the earth, because it is his footstool." And, lastly, in that of Paul to the Athenians, "For in him we live, and move, and have our being." For how can we be said to live, and move, and have our being in God, unless because he, by his virtue and power, does constringe and contain the whole world? and how can heaven be the throne of God, and the earth his footstool, unless his virtue and power fill all things both in heaven and earth?—Nevertheless, God is here said by Origen to be but *quasi anima*, as it were the soul of the world:—as if he should have said, that all the perfection of a soul is to be attributed to God, in respect of the world; he quickening and enlivening all things, as much as if he were the very soul of it, and all the parts thereof were his living members. And perhaps the whole Deity ought not to be looked upon, according to Aristotle's notion thereof, merely as *ἀκίνητος οὐσία*, an immoveable essence;—for then it is not conceivable, how it could either act upon the world, or be sensible of any thing therein; or to what purpose any devotional addresses should be made by us to such an unaffectible, inflexible, rocky, and adamantine Being. Wherefore all the perfection of a mundane soul may perhaps be attributed to God, in some sense, and he called, *quasi anima mundi*, as it were the soul thereof:—

though St. Cyprian would have this properly to belong to the third hypostasis or person of the Christian Trinity, viz. the Holy Ghost. But there is something of imperfection also plainly cleaving and adhering to this notion of a mundane soul, besides something of Paganity likewise, necessarily consequent thereupon, which cannot be admitted by us. Wherefore God, or the third Divine hypostasis, cannot be called the soul of the world in this sense, as if it were so immersed therein; and so passive from it, as our soul is immersed into, and passive from its body; nor as if the world, and this soul together, made up one entire animal, each part whereof were incomplete alone by itself. And that God, or the third hypostasis of the Christian Trinity, is not to be accounted, in this sense, properly the soul of the world, according to Origen himself, we may learn from these words of his; "Solius Dei, id est, ^{παρ' ἑαυτῶν} Patris, et Filii, et Spiritus Sancti, natu- ^{l. i. c. 6.} ræ, id proprium est; ut sine materiali substantia, et absque ulla corporeæ adjectionis societate, intelligatur subsistere." It is proper to the nature of God alone, that is, of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, to subsist without any material substance, or body, vitally united to it.—Where Origen affirming, that all created souls and spirits whatsoever, have always some body or other vitally united to them; and that it is the property only of the three persons of the holy Trinity, not to be vitally united to any body, as the soul thereof; whether this assertion of his be true or no (which is a thing not here to be discussed), he does plainly hereby declare, that God, or the third hypostasis of the Trinity, is not to be

accounted, in a true and proper sense, the soul of the world.

And it is certain, that the more refined Platonists were themselves also of this persuasion; and that their third God, or Divine hypostasis, was neither the whole world (as supposed to be animated) nor yet *ψυχὴ ἐγκόσμος*, the immediate soul of this mundane animal—but only *ψυχὴ ὑπερκόσμος*, a supermundane soul;—that is, such a thing as though it preside over the whole world, and take cognizance of all things in it, yet it is not properly an essential part of that mundane animal, but a being elevated above the same. For thus Pro-

In Timæ. p. 93, 94. clus plainly affirmeth, not only of Ame-

lius, but also of Porphyrius himself, who likewise pretended to follow Plotinus therein;

μετὰ δὲ τὸν Ἀμέλιον ὁ Πορφύριος οἰόμενος τῷ Πλωτίνῳ συνάδειν, τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν τὴν ὑπερκόσμιον ἀποκαλεῖ δημιουργόν, τὸν δὲ νοῦν αὐτῆς, πρὸς ὃν ἀπέστραπται, τὸ αὐτοζῶον, ὡς εἶναι τὸ παράδειγμα τοῦ δημιουργοῦ κατὰ τοῦτον.

After Amelius, Porphyrius, thinking to agree with Plotinus, calls the supermundane soul the immediate opificer or maker of the world, and that mind or intellect, to which it is converted, not the opificer himself, but the paradigm thereof.

—And though Proclus there makes a question, whether or no this was Plotinus's true meaning, yet Porphyrius is most to be credited herein, he having had such intimate acquaintance with him. Wherefore, according to these three Platonists, Plotinus, Amelius, and Porphyrius, the third hypostasis of the Platonic Trinity is neither the world, nor the immediate soul of the mundane animal; but a certain supermundane soul, which also was *δημιουργός*, the opificer and creator of the world,—

and therefore no creature. Now the corporeal world being supposed, by these Platonists also, to be an animal, they must therefore needs acknowledge a double soul, one *ψυχὴν ἐγκόσμιον*, the immediate soul of this mundane animal, and another *ψυχὴν ὑπερκόσμιον*, a supermundane soul, which was the third in their trinity of gods, or Divine hypostases, the proper and immediate opificer of the world. And the same, in all probability, was Plato's opinion also; and therefore that soul, which is the only Deity, that in his book of *Laws* he undertakes to prove, was *ψυχὴ ὑπερκόσμιος*, a supermundane soul, and not the same with that *ψυχὴ ἐγκόσμιος*, that mundane soul, whose genesis, or generation, is described in his *Timæus*; the former of them being a principle and eternal; and the latter made in time, together with the world, though said to be older than it, because in order of nature before it. And thus we see plainly, that though some of these Platonists and Pythagoreans either misunderstood, or depraved the cabala of the trinity, so as to make the third hypostasis thereof to be the animated world, which themselves acknowledged to be *ποίημα* and *δημιουργούμενον*, a creature and thing made; yet others, of the refined of them, supposed this third hypostasis of their trinity to be not a mundane, but a supermundane soul, and *δημιουργόν*, not a creature, but the Creator or opificer of the whole world.

And as for the second particular proposed, it was a gross absurdity in those Platonists also, to make the second, in their trinity of gods, and hypostasis, not to be one God, or hypostasis, but a multitude of gods and hypostasis; as also was that a monstrous extravagancy of theirs, to suppose

the ideas, all of them, to be so many distinct substances and animals. Which, besides others, Ter-

tullian in his book *De Anima* thus imputes
P. 330. Rig.

to Plato: "Vult Plato esse quasdam substantias invisibiles, incorporeales, supermundiales, divinas, et æternas, quas appellat ideas, id est, formas et exempla, et causas naturalium istorum manifestorum, et subjacentium corporalibus; et illas quidem esse veritates, hæc autem imagines earum." Plato conceiveth, that there are certain substances, invisible, incorporeal, supermundial, divine, and eternal; which he calls ideas, that is, forms, exemplars, and causes of all these natural and sensible things; they being the truths, but the other the images.—Neither can it be denied, but that there are some odd expressions in Plato, sounding that way, who therefore may not be justified in this, nor I think in some other conceits of his, concerning these ideas: as when he contends, that they are not only the objects of science, but also the proper and physical causes of all things here below; as, for example, that the ideas of similitude and dissimilitude are the causes of the likeness and unlikeness of all things to one another by their participation of them. Nevertheless, it cannot be at all doubted, but that Plato himself, and most of his followers, very well understood, that these ideas were, all of them, really nothing else but the *noēmata*, or conceptions, of that one perfect Intellect, which was their second hypostasis; and, therefore, they could not look upon them in good earnest, as so many distinct substances existing severally and apart by themselves out of any mind, however they were guilty of some extravagant expressions concerning them.

Wherefore, when they called them *οὐσίαι*, essences or substances, (as they are called in Philo *ἀναγκαιόταται οὐσίαι*, the most necessary essences,) their true meaning herein was only this, to signify, that they were not such accidental and evanid things, as our conceptions are; they being the standing objects of all science, at least, if not the causes also of existent things. Again, when they were by them sometimes called animals also, they intended only to signify thereby, that they were not mere dead forms, like pictures drawn upon paper, or carved images and statues. And thus Amelius,* the philosopher, plainly understood that passage of St. John the Evangelist, concerning the eternal λόγος, he pointing the words otherwise than our copies now do, *ὁ γέγονεν ἐν αὐτῷ ζωὴ ἦν*, that, which was made, in him was life: this philosopher glossing after this manner upon it, *ἐν ᾧ τὸ γινόμενον ζῶν, καὶ ζῶν, καὶ ὃν πεφυκέναι*, in whom whatsoever was made, was living, and life, and true being.—Lastly, no wonder, if from animals these ideas forthwith became gods too, to such men as took all occasions possible to multiply gods; in which there was also something of that scholastic notion, “*Quicquid est in Deo, est Deus*,” Whatsoever is in God, is God.—But the main thing therein was a piece of Paganic poetry; these Pagan theologers being generally possessed with that poetic humour of personating things and deifying them. Wherefore, though the ideas were so many titular gods to many of the Platonic Pagans, yet did Julian himself, for example, who made the most of them, suppose them all *συννέμαρ*—

*Apud Euseb. Præpar. Evangel. lib. ix. cap. xix. p. 540.

χυν καὶ ἐνυτάρχυν, to co-exist with God and in-exist in him—that is, in the first mind, or second hypostasis of their trinity.

Lastly, Whereas Proclus, and others of the Platonists, intermingle many particular gods with those three universal principles or hypostases, of their Trinity, as *noes*, minds, or intellects, superior to the first soul; and henades and agathotetes, unities and goodnesses superior to the first intellect too; thereby making those particular beings, which must needs be creatures, superior to those hypostases, that are universal and infinite, and by consequence creaturizing of them: this hypothesis of theirs, I say, is altogether absurd and irrational also; there being no created beings essentially good and wise, but all by participation, nor any immoveable natures amongst them, whose οὐσία is their ἐνέργεια, their essence, their operation; but all mutable and changeable, and probably, as Origen and others of the fathers add, lapsible and peccable. “Nulla

encl. 1. c. viii. p. 685.

natura est, quæ non recipiat bonum et malum, excepta Dei natura, quæ bonorum omnium fons est; et Christi sapientia, sapientiæ enim fons est, et sapientia utique stultitiâ recipere non potest; et justitia est, quæ nunquam profecto injustitiâ capiet; et verbum est vel ratio, quæ utique irrationalis effici non potest; sed et lux est, et lucem certum est, quod tenebræ non comprehendunt. Similiter et natura Spiritus Sancti, quæ sancta est, non recipit pollutionem; naturaliter enim vel substantialiter sancta est. Siqua autem alia natura sancta est, ex assumptione hoc vel inspiratione Spiritus Sancti habet, ut sanctificetur, non ex sua natura hoc possidens,

sed ut accidens ; propter quod et decidere potest, quod accidit." There is no nature, which is not capable both of good and evil, excepting only the nature of God, who is the fountain of all good, and the wisdom of Christ ; for he is the fountain of wisdom, and wisdom itself never can receive folly ; he is also justice itself, which can never admit of injustice ; and the reason and word itself, which can never become irrational ; he is also the light itself, and it is certain, that darkness cannot comprehend this light, nor insinuate itself with it. In like manner the nature of the Holy Ghost is such, as can never receive pollution, it being substantially and essentially holy. But whatsoever other nature is holy, it is only such in way of participation and by the inspiration of this Holy Spirit ; so that holiness is not its very nature and essence, but only an accident to it ; and whatsoever is but accidental may fail. All created beings therefore having but accidental goodness and wisdom, may degenerate and fall into evil and folly.—Which of Origen's is all one, as if he should have said, there is no such rank of beings as autoagathotetes, essential goodnesses, there being only one Being essentially good, or goodness itself. Nor no such particular created beings existing in nature as the Platonists call noes neither, that is, minds or intellects immoveable, perfectly and essentially wise, or wisdom itself, whose *ousia* is their *energeia*, whose essence is their operation, and who consequently have no flux at all in them, nor successive action ; (only the eternal word and wisdom of God being such) who also are absolutely ununitable to any bodies. It is true, that Origen did sometimes

make mention of νοε, minds or intellects, but it was in another sense, he calling all souls, as first created by God, and before their lapse, by that name; which was as much as if he should have said, though some of the Platonists talk much of their νοε, yet is there nothing answerable to that name, according to their notion of them; but the only νοε really existing in nature, are un-fallen, but peccable souls; he often concluding, that the highest rank of created beings are indeed no better than those, which the Platonists commonly call ψυχαι, or souls. By which souls he understood first of all, beings in their own nature self-moveable and active; whereas the νοε of the Platonists are altogether immoveable and above action. And then again, such beings or spirits incorporeal, as exist not abstractly and separately from all matter, as the νοε of the Platonists were supposed to do, but are vitally unitable to bodies, so as, together with those bodies, to compound and make up one animal. Thus, I say, Origen conceived even of the highest angelical, and arch-angelical orders, that they were all of them ψυχαι, souls, united to bodies, but such as were pure, subtle, and ethereal: however, he supposed it not impossible for them to sink down into bodies, more gross and seculent. And it is certain, that many of the ancient Christian writers concurred with Origen herein, that the highest created spirits were no naked and abstract minds, but souls clothed with some corporeal indument. Lastly, Origen's souls were also supposed to be, all of them, endowed with *liberum arbitrium*, or free will, and consequently to be self-improvable and self-impairable; and

no particular created spirits to be absolutely in their own nature impeccable, but lapsible into vicious habits: whereas the Platonic noes are supposed to be such beings, as could never fall nor degenerate. And the generality of the Christian writers seemed to have consented, or conspired with Origen in this also, they supposing him, who is now the prince of devils, to have been once an angel of the highest order. Thus does St. Jerome* determine; "Solus Deus est, in quem peccatum non cadit; cætera, cum sint liberi arbitri, possunt in utramque partem suam flectere voluntatem." God is the only being, that is absolutely incapable of sin; but all other beings, having free-will in them, may possibly turn their will to either way;—that is, to evil as well as to good. It is certain, that God, in a sense of perfection, is the most free agent of all, neither is contingent liberty universally denied to him; but here it is made the only privilege of God, that is, of the holy Trinity, to be devoid of *liberum arbitrium*, namely, as it implieth imperfection, that is, peccability and lapsibility in it.

It is true, that some of the Platonic philosophers suppose, that even in that rank of beings, called by them souls, though they be not essentially immutable, but all self-moveable and active, yet there are some of them of so high a pitch and elevation, as, that they can never degenerate, nor sink down into vicious habits. Thus Simplicius for one; ἀλλὰ αἱ μὲν πρῶται τῶν ψυχῶν, αἶρε In Epist. p. 12, 13. προσεχῶς ὑπὸ αὐτοαγάθων παραχθείσαι, καὶ ἔσχόν τι πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ὑφειμένον, διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἀγαθόητες, ἀλλὰ ὀρέγεσθαι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, πλὴν ὡς συγγενεῖς πρὸς αὐτὸ,

* Epistol. cxli.

συμφωνῶς πρὸς αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀναποσπασταί, ὁρτίζονται, καὶ τὴν αἴρεσιν μουσεδαῖς πρὸς ἐκεῖνα καταμένην ἔχουσα, οὐδέποτε ἀποκλίσασθαι πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον· καὶ ἕπερ ἡ προαίρεσις αὐτ' ἄλλου τινός ἐστιν αἴρεσις, τάχα οὐκ αὖ ἐστὶ προαίρεσις ἐκείνη; ἢ μήτις αὐτὴν προαίρεσιν εἰς τὰ πρῶτα ἀγαθὰ εἰρημίνην καλεῖ. But the first and highest of souls, which were immediately produced from what are essentially good, although they have some abatement in them, they being not goodnesses essentially, but desirous of good, nevertheless are they so near a-kin to that highest good of all, as that they do naturally and indivulsively cleave to the same, and have their volitions always uniformly directed towards it, they never declining to the worser. Insomuch that if proæresis be taken for the chusing of one thing before another, perhaps there is no such thing as proæresis to be imputed to them, unless one should call the chusing of the first goods proæresis.—By these higher souls Simplicius must needs understand, either the souls of the sun, moon, and stars, or else those of the superior orders of demoniac or angelic beings. Where though he make a question, whether proæresis or deliberation belong to them, yet does he plainly imply, that they have none at all of that lubricous *liberum arbitrium* or free-will belonging to them, which would make them capable of vice and immorality as well as virtue.

But whatever is to be said of this, there seems to be no necessity at all for admitting that asser-tion of Origen's, that all rational souls whatsoever, even those of men and those of the highest angelical orders, are universally of one of the same nature, and have no fundamental or essential difference in their constitution; and conse-

quently that all the difference, that is now betwixt them, did arise only from the difference of their demeanor, or use of that power and liberty, which they all alike once had. So that thrones, and dominions, and principalities, and powers, were all made such by their merits; and human souls, though now sunk so low, yet are not absolutely incapable of commencing angels, or ascending to those highest altitudes: as it is not impossible, according to him, neither, but that the highest angels also, the seraphim and cherubim might, in length of time, not only degenerate into devils; but also sink down into human bodies; his reason for which monstrous paradox is only this, that the Divine justice cannot otherwise well be salved, but God must needs be a *ὑποσώζων*, an acceptor of persons, should he have arbitrarily made such vast differences amongst intellectual beings. Which ground he also extendeth so far, as to the human soul of our Saviour Christ himself, as being not partially appointed to that transcendent dignity of its hypostatic union, but by reason of its most faithful adherence to the Divine word and wisdom, in a pre-existent state, beyond all other souls; which he endeavours thus to prove from the Scripture: “*Quod dilectionis perfectio, et affectus sinceritas, ei inseparabilem cum Deo fecerit unitatem, ita ut non fortuita fuerit, aut cum personæ acceptione, animæ ejus assumptio, sed virtutum suarum sibi merito delata; audi ad eum prophetam dicentem, Dillexisti justitiam et odisti iniquitatem; propterea unxit te Deus, Deus tuus, oleo lætitiæ præ participibus tuis: dilectionis ergo merito ungitur oleo lætitiæ anima Christi, id est,*

cum verbo Dei unum efficitur. Ungi namque oleo lætitiæ, non aliud intelligitur quam Spiritu Sancto repleti. Præ participibus autem dixit; quia non gratia spiritus sicut prophetis ei data est, sed ipsius verbi Dei in ea substantialis inerat plenitudo." That the perfection of love, and sincerity of Divine affection, procured to this soul its inseparable union with the Godhead, so that the assumption of it was neither fortuitous nor partial; or with prosopolepsy (the acception of persons) but bestowed upon it justly for the merit of its virtues; hear (saith he) the prophet thus declaring to him, "Thou hast loved righteousness and hated iniquity: therefore hath God, even thy God, anointed thee with the oil of gladness above thy fellows." The soul of Christ therefore was anointed with the oil of gladness, or made one with the word of God, for the merits of love and faithful adherence to God, and no otherwise. For to be anointed with the oil of gladness here properly signifies nothing else, but to be replenished with the Holy Ghost. But when it is said, that he was thus anointed above his fellows, this intimateth, that he had not the Holy Ghost bestowed upon him, only as the prophets and other holy men had, but that the substantial fulness of the word of God dwelt in him.—But this reason of Origen's seems to be very weak; because if there be a rank of souls below human, specifically differing from the same, as Origen himself must needs confess, (he not allowing the souls of brutes to have been human souls lapsed, as some Pythagoreans and Platonists conceited, but renouncing and disclaiming that opinion, as monstrously absurd and irrational) there can be

no reason given, why there might not be as well other ranks and orders of souls superior to those of men, without the injustice of prosopolepsy; as, besides Simplicius, Plotinus and the generality of other Platonists conceived.

But least of all can we assent to Origen, when from this principle, that souls, as such, are essentially endowed with *liberum arbitrium*, or free-will, and therefore never in their own nature impeccable, he infers those endless circuits of souls upwards and downwards, and so makes them to be never at rest, denying them any fixed state of holiness and happiness by Divine grace; such as wherein they might be free from the fear and danger of ever losing the same. Of whom St. Austin* therefore thus: "Illum et propter alia nonnulla, et maxime propter alternantes sine cessatione beatitudines et miserias; et statutis seculorum intervallis ab istis ad illas, atque ab illis ad istas itus ac reditus interminabiles, non immerito reprobavit ecclesia; quia et hoc quod miserieors videbatur, amisit, faciendo sanctis veras miserias, quibus penas luerent, et falsas beatitudines, in quibus verum ac secturum, hoc est, sine timore certum sempiterni boni gaudium non haberent." The church hath deservedly rejected Origen, both for certain other opinions of his, and especially for those his alternate beatitudes and miseries, without end, and for his infinite circuits, ascents and descents of souls, from one to the other, in restless vicissitudes and after periods of time. Forasmuch as hereby he hath quite lost that very title of pitiful, or merciful, which otherwise he seemed to have deserved, by making so many true miseries for

* De Civitate Dei, lib. xxi. cap. xvii. p. 481. tom viii. oper.

the best of saints, in which they should successively undergo punishment and smart; and none but false happiness for them, such as wherein they could never have any true or secure joy, free from the fear of losing that good which they possess. —For this Origenical hypothesis seems directly contrary to the whole tenor of the gospel, promising eternal and everlasting life to those, who believe in Christ, and perseveringly obey him; (1 John ii.) "This is the promise, that he hath promised us, even eternal life:" and Tit. i. 2. "In hope of eternal life, which God, that cannot lie, hath promised." And, "God so loved the world, that he gave his only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life:" and lest all this should be taken for a periodical eternity only, (John iii. 26.) "He that believeth in me, shall never die." And possibly this might be the meaning of St. Paul, (2 Tim. i. 10.) when he affirmeth of our Saviour Christ, that "he hath abolished death, and brought life and immortality to light, through the gospel;" not because he was the first, who had discovered, and published to the world, the soul's immortality, which was believed before, not only by all the Pharisaic Jews, but also by the generality of Pagans too; but because these, for the most part, held their endless circuits and transmigrations of souls: therefore was he the first, who brought everlasting life to light, and gave the world assurance, in the faith of the gospel, of a fixed and permanent state of happiness, and a never-fading crown of glory to be obtained; "Him that overcometh will I make a pillar in the temple of my God, and he shall go no more out." Apoc. iii. 12.

Now the reason, why we mentioned Origen here, was because he was a person, not only thoroughly skilled in all the Platonic learning, but also one, who was sufficiently addicted to those dogmata, he being commonly conceived to have had too great a kindness for them; and, therefore, had there been any solidity of reason for either those particular henades or noes of theirs, created beings above the rank of souls, and consequently, according to the Platonic hypothesis, superior to the universal Psyche also (which was the third hypostasis in their trinity, and seems to answer to the Holy Ghost in the Christian); Origen was as likely to have been favourable thereto as any other. But it is indeed manifestly repugnant to reason, that there should be any such particular, that is, created henades, and *αὐτογενήματα*, essential goodnesses—superior to the Platonic first Mind; or any such noes, and *αὐτογενήματα*, essential wisdoms—superior to their universal Psyche; it being all one, as if, in the Christian Trinity, besides the first person, or the Father, one should suppose a multitude of particular paternities superior to the second; and also, besides the second person, the Son, or Word, a multitude of particular sons, or words, all superior to the third person, the Holy Ghost. For this is plainly to make a breach upon the Deity, to confound the Creator and creature together; and to suppose a company of such creaturely gods, as imply a manifest contradiction in the very notion of them.

Wherefore, we shall here observe, that this was not the Catholic doctrine of the Platonic school, that there were such henades and noes, but only a private opinion of some doctors amongst them,

and that of the latter sort too. For, first, as for those henades, as there are not the least footsteps of them to be found any where in Plato's writings, so may it be plainly gathered from them, that he supposed no such thing. Forasmuch as, in his second epistle, where he describes his trinity,* he doth not say of the first, *περὶ τὸ πρῶτον τὰ πρῶτα*, about the first are the first—as he doth of the second, *δεύτερον περὶ τὰ δεύτερα*, and of the third, *τρίτον περὶ τὰ τρίτα*, about the second are the second, and about the third the third—but of the first he saith; *περὶ τὸν πάντων Βασιλέα πάντ' ἐστὶ, καὶ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα πάντα, καὶ ἐκείνο αἴτιον πάντων τῶν καλῶν*, about the king of all things are all things, and for his sake are all things; and he is the cause of all things, that are good.—Wherefore here are no particular henades and autoagathotetes, unities and goodnesses; about the first *Τὸ Ἐν* and *Τὸ ἀγαθόν*, One and Good; but all good things are about him, he being both the efficient and final cause of all. Moreover Plotinus, throughout all his works, discovers not the least suspicion neither of these henades and agathotetes, this language being scarcely to be found any where in the writings of any Platonists senior to Proclus; who also, as if he were conscious, that this *assumentum* to the Platonic theology were not so defensible a thing, doth himself sometime, as it were, tergiversate and decline it, by equivocating in the word henades, taking them for the ideas, or the intelligible gods before mentioned. As perhaps Synesius also uses the word, in his first hymn, when God is called by him

*Ἐπερίτερον ἑνὸς ἀγῆν,
Μηδέν μιν ἑνὸς τι πρῶτον,*

* P. 707. oper.

the first Henad of Henades, and the first Monad of Monades; that is, the first idea of good, and cause of all the ideas.—And as for the particular noes, minds or intellects, these indeed seem to have crept up somewhat before Plotinus's time; he, besides the passage before cited, elsewhere giving some intimations of them, as *Enn.*

Enn. i. v. c. iv. Ἀλλὰ πῶς ψυχαὶ πολλαὶ καὶ νοῖ

πολλοί; but how can there be many souls, and many minds, and not only one, but many entia?

—From which, and other places of his, Ficinus concluded Plotinus, himself really to have asserted, above the rank of souls, a multitude of other substantial beings, called *νόες* or *νοῖ*, minds or intellects. Nevertheless, Plotinus speaking of them so uncertainly, and making such an union betwixt all these noes and their particular respective souls, it may well be questioned, whether he really took them for any thing else but the heads and summities of those souls; he supposing, that all souls have a mind in them, the participation of the first Mind; as also unity too, the participation of the first Unity; whereby they are capable of being conjoined with both: *δεῖ νοῦν ἐν ἡμῖν*

εἶναι, καὶ νοῦ ἀρχὴν, καὶ αἰτίαν, καὶ θεόν ὡς περ τὸ *Enn. i. v. c. xi. [lib. i. p. 492.]*

κέντρον ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἔστιν ἔχει δὲ καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν
ἐν τῷ κύκλῳ σημείων ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ αἱ γραμμαὶ τὸ ἴδιον προσ-
φέρουσι πρὸς τοῦτο· τῷ γὰρ τοιούτῳ τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν ἡμεῖς ἐφαπ-
τόμεθα, καὶ σύνεσμεν, καὶ ἀνηρτήμεθα ἐνιδρύμεθα δὲ, οἳ ἂν
συννεύωμεν ἐκεῖ. There must needs be mind in us, as also the principle and cause of mind, God. Not as if he were divided; but because, though remaining in himself, yet he is also considered in many as capable to receive him. As the centre, though it remain in itself, yet is it also in every line drawn

from the circumference, each of them, by a certain point of its own, touching it. And by some such thing in us it is, that we are capable of touching God, and of being united to him, when we direct our intention towards him.—And in the next chapter he adds, ἔχοντες τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐκ ἀντιλαμβάνομεθα, ἀλλ' ἀργούμεν ταῖς τοιαύταις ἐνεργείαις τὰ πολλὰ· οἱ δ' οὐδ' ὅλως ἐνεργοῦσιν· ἐκεῖνα μὲν ἐστὶν ἐν ταῖς ἰασιῶν ἐνεργείαις αἱ, νοῦς δὲ καὶ τὸ πρὸ νοῦ ἐν ἑαυτῷ, &c. That though we have these things in us, yet do we not perceive them, being for the most part idle and asleep, as to these higher energies; as some never at all exercise them. However, those do always act; mind, and that which is before mind, unity; but every thing, which is in our souls, is not perceived by us, unless come to the whole, when we dispose ourselves towards it, &c.—Where Plotinus seems to make the noes, or minds, to be nothing else but something in souls, whereby they partake of the first Mind. And it is said of Porphyrius, who was well acquainted with Plotinus's philosophy, that he quite discarded and rejected these noes or intellects, as substances really distinct from the first Mind, and separate from souls. And it is certain, that such minds as these are nowhere plainly mentioned by Plato, he speaking only of minds in souls, but not of any abstract and separate minds, save only one. And though some might think him to have given an intimation of them in his διύτερον περὶ τὰ δεύτερα, (beforementioned) his second about the second things, or second things about the second—yet by these may very well be understood the ideas; as by the third things about the third, all created beings. Wherefore we may conclude, that this Platonic, or rather

Pseudo-Platonic trinity, which confounds the differences betwixt God and the creature, and that probably in favour of the Pagan Polytheism and idolatry, is nothing so agreeable to reason itself, as that Christian Trinity before described, which distinctly declares, how far the Deity goes, and where the creature begins; namely, that the Deity extends so far as to this whole Trinity of hypostases; and that all other things whatsoever, this Trinity of persons only excepted, are truly and properly their creatures, produced by the joint concurrence and influence of them all, they being really but one God.

But, it is already manifest, that all the forementioned depravations and adulterations of that Divine cabala of the Trinity, and that spurious trinity, described, (which, because asserted by some Platonists, was called Platonical, in way of distinction from the Christian) cannot be justly charged, neither upon Plato himself, nor yet upon all his followers universally. But, on the contrary, we shall now make it appear, that Plato and some of the Platonists retained much of the ancient genuine cabala, and made a very near approach to the true Christian Trinity; forasmuch as their three hypostases, distinguished from all their other gods, seem to have been none of them accounted creatures, but all other things whatsoever the creatures of them.

First, therefore, we affirm, that Plato himself does, in the beginning of his *Timæus*, very carefully distinguish betwixt God and the creature, he determining the bounds between them after this manner: "Ἔστιν οὖν δι' κατ' ἐμὴν δόξαν πρῶτον θεῶν

* Cap. xii. p. 236. edit. Fabricii.

ρατίον τάδε· τί τὸ ὄν μὲν αἰὶ, γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον· καὶ τί τὸ
 γιγνόμενον μὲν, ὄν δὲ οὐδέποτε· τὸ μὲν δὴ, νοήσει μετὰ λόγον
 περιληπτὸν, αἰὶ κατὰ ταῦτα ὄν· τὸ δ' αὖ δόξῃ μετ' αἰσθητικῶς
 αλόγου, δοξαστὸν, γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, ὁρῶς δὲ οὐ-
 δέποτε ὄν· πᾶν δὲ αὖ τὸ γιγνόμενον, ὑπ' αἰτίου τινός ἐξ
 ἀνάγκης γίνεσθαι· We being here to treat concern-
 ing the universe, judge it necessary to begin with
 a distinction betwixt that, which always is, and
 hath no ortus, or generation; and that, which is
 made, but never truly is. The former of which,
 being always like itself and the same, is compre-
 hensible by intellection with reason, or is the ob-
 ject of knowledge; the latter of them, that which
 is made and perisheth, but never truly is, is not
 properly knowable, but opinable only, or the ob-
 ject of opinion, together with irrational sense.
 Now every thing, that is made, must of necessity
 be made by some cause.—The reason, why Plato,
 being to treat of the universe, begins here with
 this distinction, was, as Proclus* well observes,
 because ἐν ταῖς κοιναῖς ἡμῶν ἐννοίαις ἀπόκειται, τὸ εἶναι τι
 αἰὶ ὄν· it is either one of our common notions, or a
 thing mathematically demonstrable, that there
 must be something eternal, or which was never
 made, but always was, and had no beginning.—
 And it is evident by sense and experience, that all
 things are not such, but that some things are made
 and perish again, or generated and corrupted.
 Now the latter Platonists, being strongly pos-
 sessed with a prejudice of the world's eternity, or
 that it had no beginning, have offered strange vio-
 lence to Plato's text in this place, and wrested
 his words to quite a different sense from what he
 intended; as if by his τὸ γιγνόμενον, that which is

* Comment. in Timæum Platon. lib. I. p. 10.

made—he did not at all mean that, which had a beginning, but only that, whose duration is flowing and successive, or temporary, which might notwithstanding be without beginning; and as if he supposed the whole corporeal world to be such, which though it hath a successive and temporary duration, yet was without any beginning. And the current ran so strong this way, that even Boethius, that learned Christian philosopher, was himself also carried away with the force thereof, he taking it for granted, likewise, that Plato held the eternity of the world in this sense, that is, its being without beginning: “Non recte quidam Consol. Phil. l. v. Pro. 5. (saith he) qui cum audiunt visum Platoni mundum hunc nec habuisse initium temporis, nec habiturum esse defectum, hoc modo conditori conditum mundum fieri coeternum putant. Aliud est enim, per interminabilem duci vitam, quod mundo Plato tribuit; aliud interminabilis vitæ totam pariter complexum esse præsentiam; quod divinæ mentis proprium esse manifestum est. Neque Deus conditis rebus antiquior videri debet, temporis quantitate, sed simplicis potius proprietate naturæ.” Some, when they hear Plato to have held, that the world had no beginning, nor shall never have an end, do not rightly from thence infer, that Plato therefore made the world coeternal with God, because it is one thing always to be, and another thing to possess an endless life all at once, which is proper to the Divine mind. Neither ought God to be thought older than the world, in respect of time, but only in respect of the simplicity of his nature.—To which purpose he adds afterwards, “Itaque si digna rebus nomina velimus imponere, Platonem sequentes, Deum

quidem æternum, mundum vero dicemus esse perpetuum." Therefore, if we would give proper names to things agreeable to their natures, following Plato, we should say, that God was eternal; but the world only perpetual.—But as this doctrine of the latter Platonists quite frustrates Plato's design in this place, which was to prove or assert a God; because, if the world had no beginning, though its duration be never so much successive, yet would it not follow from thence, that therefore it must needs have been made by some other cause; so is it directly contrary to that philosopher's own words, himself there declaring, that by his τὸ γινόμενον, *ortum*, or that which is made—he did not understand only that, whose duration is successive, but also τὸ γενέσθαι ἀρχὴν ἔχον, that which had a beginning of its generation—and τὸ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τινος ἀρχαίμενον, that which begun from a certain epocha of time—or that which once was not, and therefore must needs be brought into being by some other cause. So that Plato there plainly supposed all temporary beings once to have had a beginning of their duration, as he declareth in that very *Timæus* of his, that Time itself was not eternal, or without beginning, but made together with the heaven or world;—and from thence does he infer, that there must of necessity be another eternal Being, viz. such as hath both a permanent duration, and was without beginning, and was the cause both of time and the world: forasmuch as nothing can possibly be made without a cause; that is, nothing, which once was not, could of itself come into being, but must be produced by some other thing; and so at last we must needs come to something, which

had no beginning. Wherefore Plato, thus taking it for granted, that whatsoever hath a temporary and flowing duration, was not without beginning; as also that whatsoever was without beginning, hath a permanent duration or standing eternity; does thus state the difference betwixt uncreated and created beings, or betwixt God and creature; namely, that creature is that, whose duration being temporary or successive, once had a beginning; and this is his *τὸ γιγνόμενον μὲν, ὃν δὲ οὐδέποτε*, that which is made, but never truly is,—and that which *ἐκ αἰῶνος τινός ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίγνεται*, must of necessity be produced by some cause—but that whatsoever is without beginning, and hath a permanent duration, is uncreated or Divine; which is his *τὸ ὄν μὲν αἰεὶ, γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον*, that which always is, and hath no generation, nor was ever made.—Accordingly as God is styled in the Septuagint translation of the Mosaic writings, *ὁ ὢν*, he that truly is.

Now as for this *αἰδῖος οὐσία* or *φύσις*, this eternal nature—which always is, and was never made, Plato speaks of it, not singularly only, as we Christians now do, but often in the Paganic way plurally also; as when, in this very *Timæus*, he calls the world *τῶν αἰδῖων θεῶν γεγονὸς ἄγαλμα*, a made or created image of the eternal gods.—By which eternal gods he there meant doubtless that *τὸ πρῶτον*, and *τὸ δεύτερον*, and *τὸ τρίτον*, that first, and second, and third, which, in his second epistle to Dionysius, he makes to be the principles of all things; that is, his trinity of Divine hypostases, by whose concurrent efficiency, and according to whose image and likeness, the whole world was made; as Plotinus also plainly declareth in these words of his before cited: *οὗτος μὲν ὁ κόσμος εἰκὼν αἰ*

εἰκονιζόμενος, ἰσθηκότων μὲν τοῦ πρώτου καὶ τοῦ δευτέρου, καὶ τοῦ τρίτου. This world is an image always iconized, or perpetually renewed (as the image in a glass is) of that first, second, and third principle, which are always standing—that is, fixed in eternity, and were never made. For thus Eusebius records, that the ancient interpreters of Plato expounded this first, second, and third of his in the forementioned epistle, of a trinity of gods; ταῦτα Pr. Ev. l. xi. αἱ τῶν Πλάτωνα διασαφεῖν περὶ τοῦ α. xx. [p. 541.] πρῶτον θεὸν ἀνάγουσιν, ἐπεὶ τὸ Δεύτερον αἶτιον; καὶ Τρίτον τὴν τοῦ κόσμου Ψυχὴν, Θεὸν Τρίτον καὶ αὐτὴν ὀριζόμενοι εἶναι. These things do the interpreters of Plato refer to the first God, and to the second cause; and to the third the soul of the world, they calling this also the third god.—Wherefore we think there is good reason to conclude, that those eternal or uncreated gods of Plato in his *Timæus*, whose image or statue this whole generated or created world is said by him to be, were no other than his trinity of Divine hypostases, the makers or creators thereof. And it was before (as we conceive) rightly guessed, that Cicero also was to be understood of the same eternal gods, as Platonizing, when he affirmed, “*A diis omnia a principio facta*,” that all things were at first made by the gods—and “*a providentia deorum mundum et omnes mundi partes constitutas esse*,” that the world and all its parts were constituted by the providence of the gods.*

But that the second hypostasis in Plato's trinity, viz. mind or intellect, though said to have been generated, or to have proceeded by way of emanation from the first called *Tagathon*, the

* Plat. *Timæus*, p. 52D. oper.

Good, was notwithstanding unquestionably acknowledged to have been eternal, or without beginning, might be proved by many express testimonies of the most genuine Platonists: but we shall here content ourselves only with two, one of Plotinus writing thus concerning it, Enn. 5. l. i. c. vi. ἐκποδὼν δὲ ἡμῖν ἔστω γενεαίς ἢ ἐν χρόνῳ, τὸν λόγον περὶ τῶν αἰὶ ὄντων ποιούμενους; &c: Let all temporal generation here be quite banished from our thoughts, whilst we treat of things eternal, or such as always are, we attributing generation to them only in respect of causality and order, but not of time.—And though Plotinus there speaks particularly of the second hypostasis or nous, yet does he afterwards extend the same also to the third hypostasis of that trinity, called Psyche, or the mundane soul; which is there said by him likewise to be the word of the second, as that second was the word of the first; Καὶ τὸ γεννώμενον ἀπὸ κρείττονος Νοῦ, Νοῦν εἶναι, καὶ κρείττον ἀνάντων Νοῦς, ὅτι τ' ἄλλα μετ' αὐτὸν, οἷον καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ λόγος τοῦ, καὶ ἐνέργειά τις, ὥστερ' αὐτὸς ἐκείνου. That which is generated from what is better than mind, can be no other than mind, because mind is the best of all things, and every thing else is after it, and junior to it, as Psyche or soul, which is in like manner the word of mind, and a certain energy thereof, as mind is the word and energy of the first Good.—The other testimony is of Porphyrius, cited by St. Cyril out of the fourth book of his philosophic history, where he sets down the doctrine of Plato after this manner :

8. Cyril. c.
εἰπόντος Πλάτωνος περὶ τοῦ Ἀγαθοῦ οὕτως ἀπὸ Jul. l. i. p.
δὲ τούτου τρόπον τινὰ ἀνθρώποις ἀνεπινόητον νοῦν 32.
γενέσθαι τε ὅλον καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὸν ὑφεστῶτα, ἐν ᾧ δὲ τὰ ὄντως

ὄντα, καὶ ἡ πᾶσα οὐσία τῶν ὄντων· ὁ δὲ καὶ πρῶτως καλὸν καὶ αὐτόκαλον, παρ' ἑαυτοῦ τῆς καλλονῆς ἔχον τὸ εἶδος· προῆλθε δὲ προαιώνιος ἀπ' αἰτίου τοῦ θεοῦ ὠρημένος, αὐτογέννητος ὢν καὶ αὐτοπάτωρ· οὐ γὰρ ἐκείνου κινουμένου πρὸς γένεσιν τὴν τούτου ἢ πρόοδος γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ τούτου παρελθόντος αὐτογόνως ἐκ θεοῦ, παρελθόντος δὲ οὐκ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τινος χρονικῆς, οὕτω γὰρ χρόνος ἦν· ἀλλὰ οὐδὲ χρόνου γενομένου πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐστὶ τι ὁ χρόνος, ἄχρονος γὰρ αὐτὸς καὶ μόνος αἰώνιος ὁ νοῦς· Plato thus declareth concerning the first Good, that from it was generated a certain mind incomprehensible to mortals; in which subsisting by itself, are contained the things that truly are, and the essences of all beings. This is the first fair, and pulchritude itself, which proceeded or sprung out of God from all eternity as its cause, but notwithstanding after a peculiar manner, as self-begotten, and as its own parent. For it was not begotten from that, as any way moved towards its generation; but it proceeded from God as it were self-begottenly. And that not from any temporal beginning, there being as yet no such thing as time: nor when time was afterward made, did it any way affect him; for mind is always timeless, and alone eternal.—Here, besides the eternity of mind or intellect, the second Divine hypostasis in the Platonic trinity, there are other strange and unusual expressions concerning it; for though it be acknowledged to have been generated from the first original Deity, yet it is called αὐτοπάτωρ and αὐτογέννητος, its own parent, and its own offspring, and said to have sprung out αὐτογόνως, self-begottenly.

Now because this is so great a riddle or mystery, it is worth the while to consider its true meaning and the ground thereof; which is thus

declared by Porphyrius. Mind, though it sprung from the first Good or supreme Deity from eternity, yet it is said to be self-begotten, because it did not spring from that, as any ways moved towards its generation, but as always standing still or quiescent. Which doctrine was before delivered by Plotinus after this manner: οὐ En. 5. 1. 1. c. κινηθέντος φάτεον γίνεσθαι, εἰ γὰρ κινηθέντος vi. [p. 487.] αὐτοῦ τι γίγναιτο, τρίτον ἀπ' ἐκείνου τὸ γινόμενον. μετὰ τῇ κίνησει ἂν γίγναιτο, καὶ οὐ δεύτερον· δὲ οὖν ἀκινήτου ὄντος, εἴτι δεύτερον μετ' αὐτὸ, οὐ προσενύσαντος, οὐδὲ βουληθέντος, οὐδὲ ὁλίως κινηθέντος, ὑποστήναι αὐτό. That, which was immediately generated from the first, did not proceed from it as any ways moved towards its generation, because then it would not have been the second, but the third after that motion. Wherefore, if there be any second after that first Good, it must needs proceed from that first, as remaining immoveable, and not so much as actively consenting thereto, nor willing it, which would be motion.—Now this in Porphyrius's language is paraphrased to be, a being produced from the first Good or original Deity, αὐτογόνως, self-begottenly—or in a way of self-generation. But the plain meaning thereof seems to be no other than this: that though this second Divine hypostasis did indeed proceed from the first God, yet was it not produced thence after a creaturely, or in a creating way, by the arbitrary will and command thereof, or by a particular fiat of the supreme Deity, but by way of natural and necessary emanation. Neither was Porphyrius singular in this language, we finding the very same expression, of αὐτοπάτωρ and αὐτόγονος, self-parent and self-begotten, in Jamblichus's Mysteries;

where it is likewise by him applied not to the first Principle of all, but to a second Divine hypostasis,* ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ἐνὸς τούτου, ὁ αὐτάρκης θεὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐξέλαμψε, διὸ καὶ αὐτοπάτωρ καὶ αὐτόγονος. From this one, the self-sufficient God made himself to shine forth into light; and therefore is he called Sui-Pater, and Seipso-genitus, his own father, and self-begotten.—But of this God or Divine hypostasis in Jamblichus more afterward. We cannot justify such kind of language as this in the Christian Trinity, because we have no warrant for it from the Scripture; though we are not ignorant that some late divines have ventured to call the Christian Logos after the same manner αὐτόθεον, and *ex seipso Deum*, God from himself.

Dionysius Petavius having rightly declared the doctrine of Arius, after this manner, that the Father was the only eternal God, and that the Son, or Word, was a creature made by him in time, and out of nothing; that is, after he had not been produced into being; subjoins these

De Trin. l. i.
c. viii. § 2.
[tom. ii.
Dogmat.
Theolog.
p. 38.]

words: "In ea vero professione, quod supra memoravi, planissime constat, germanum Platonicum Arium exstitisse." From the profession of this doctrine, it is most undeniably manifest (what was before affirmed) that Arius was a german or genuine disciple of Plato's.—But from what we have now cited out of Plato himself, and others of his most genuine followers, it is certain, that Petavius (though otherwise learned and industrious) was herein grossly mistaken, and that Arius was no Platonist at all. And, indeed, for either Plato or Plotinus to have denied the eternity of

* Jamblich. de Mysterior. Egyptior. sect. viii. cap. ii. p. 158.

that second hypostasis of his, called Nous, or Logos, and the son of the first, would have been all one as if they should have denied the eternity of wisdom and understanding itself; because, according to them, this second hypostasis is essentially nothing but *αὐτοσοφία*, original wisdom itself—and, consequently, that very wisdom, by which God himself is wise. Which how far, or in what sense it is true, we do not here dispute. Nevertheless, Athanasius seems to have been fully of the same opinion with them herein, from this passage of his: *Καὶ σοφία καὶ ἀλήθειά· ἔστιν ὁ Κύριος, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλης σοφίας δεύτερος, ἀλλὰ μόνος οὗτος δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα πεποιήκει ὁ πατήρ, &c.* De Sent. Dion. tom. i. p. 567. Our Lord is both wisdom and truth, neither is he second from any other wisdom; but it is he alone, by whom the Father made all things. And again, *οὔτε γὰρ λόγος ἔστιν ὁ τοῦ λόγου πατήρ*, for the Father of the Word is not properly himself the Word. And *οὐκ ἦν λόγος ὁ τὸν λόγον προέμενος, ἦν γὰρ ὁ λόγος πρὸς τὸν Θεόν. Σοφία γεγέννηται ὁ Κύριος· οὐκ ἦν οὖν σοφία ὁ τὴν σοφίαν ἀνέας· ἐγὼ γὰρ ἤμην, φησὶν, ἧ προσέχαιρεν*. That was not Word, which produced the Word; for the Word was with God. The Lord is Wisdom; therefore that was not Wisdom, which produced Wisdom, that speaks thus of herself, “His delight was with me.”—But those latter words he citeth with approbation out of Dionysius, bishop of Alexandria. And the same Athanasius affirmeth Arius, on the contrary, to have maintained, that there was another Word and Wisdom senior to that Word and Wisdom in our Saviour Christ. To conclude, no Platonist in the world ever denied the eternity of that nous, or universal mind, which is the second hypos-

tasis of their trinity; but, on the contrary, as hath been already observed, some of them seemed rather to attribute too much to it, in calling it *αὐτογάτωρ* and *αὐτόγονος*, its own parent and its own offspring, as that which was self-begotten, though this but in a certain mystical sense; they otherwise not denying it to have proceeded also from the first Good, and to be the offspring thereof.

P. 119.

[som. i.
oper. in
Disput. cum
Ario.]

Wherefore Plato, who supposed the world not to have been eternal, asserting the eternity of that second hypostasis of his trinity, thereby plainly made it to be no creature, according to Athanasius's own doctrine: *εἰ αἰδιός ἐστιν ὁ υἱός, οὐκ ἔν κτίσμα, εἰ δὲ κτίσμα τὸ γέννηται, οὐκ ἔν αἰδιός*. If the Son be eternal, he was no creature; and, on the contrary, if he be a creature, he was not eternal.—

Neither is there any force at all in that testimony of Macrobinus,* which Petavius urgeth to the contrary; wherein the first Cause is said *de se mentem creasse*, to have created Mind from itself;—and again this Mind, *animam se creasse*, to have created from itself soul;—because it is certain, that these ancient Pagans did not then so strictly confine that word *create*, (as we Christians now do) to that narrow sense and notion, of the production of things in time; but used it generally for all manner of production or efficacy. But the chief ground of Petavius's mistake herein, besides his prejudice against Platonism in general, was his not distinguishing betwixt that spurious trinity of some Platonists, wherein the third hypostasis was the whole animated world, (which gave him occasion to write thus: “Tertius

* In Somn. Scipion. lib. i. cap. xiv. p. 73.

vero Deus manifeste creatus ab iisdem Platoniciis putatur, quem et *ποίημα* nominant;") and that other doctrine of those, who made it not to be the world itself, that is a creature, but the Opificer or creator thereof.

But we grant, that there may be some more reason to make a question, whether Plato himself held the eternity of the mundane soul (commonly said to be the third hypostasis of his trinity) or no; because in his *Timæus*, though he acknowledged it to be senior to the world, yet does he seem to attribute a temporary generation, or nativity to it. Nevertheless, it is no way probable, that Plato's third principle of all things, in his epistle to Dionysius, and that *Psyche*, or soul of his, which is the only God, and in his tenth *De Legibus* he goes about to prove against the Atheists, should ever not have been; and therefore it is most reasonable to compound this business, thus, by supposing, with Plotinus and others, that Plato held a double *Psyche*, or soul, one *ἐγκόσμιον*, or mundane—which is, as it were, the concrete form of this corporeal world; whereby this world is properly made an animal, and a second, or created god; another *ὑπερκόσμιον*, supramundane, or separate; and which is not so much the form, as the artificer of the world. The first of which two Plotinus, calling it the heavenly *Venus*, thus describeth: τὴν δὲ *ἐν. 3. 1. 7.* οὐρανίαν λεγομένην, ἐκ Κρόνου νοῦ ὄντος ἐκείνου, c. ii. [p. 293.] ἀνάγκη ψυχὴν θειοτάτην εἶναι, εὐδὲς ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἀκέραιον ἀκέραιον, μέλασαν ἄνω ὡς μὴ δὲ εἰς τὰ τῶδε ἐλθεῖν, μήτε ἐδελέσασαν, μήτε δυναμένην, ὅτι ἦν φύσεως μὴ κατὰ τὰ κάτω φύσαν βαίνειν. Χωριστὴν οὖσαν τινὰ ὑπόστασιν, καὶ ἀμέτοχον ὕλης οὐσίαν· ὅθεν αὐτὴν τοῦτω ἠνίσταντο, τῷ ἀμήτορα εἶναι, ἣν δὲ

καὶ θεὸν ἂν τις δικαίως, οὐ δαίμονα εἴποι, ἁμικτον οὖσαν, καὶ καθαράν ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς, &c. ὁθεν οὐδ' ἂν ἐκπέσοι, νοῦ ἐξηρημένη πολὺ μᾶλλον, ἢ ἥλιος ἂν ἔχοι ἐξ αὐτοῦ, ὅσον αὐτὸν περιλάμπει φῶς, εἰς αὐτὸν συνηρημένον ἐφεπομένη δὲ τῷ Κρόνῳ, ἢ εἰ βούλει τῷ πατρὶ τοῦ Κρόνου Οὐρανῷ, ἐνήργησέ τε πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ ἠκίωσθη, καὶ ἐρασθεῖσα ἔρωτα ἐγέννησεν. This heavenly Venus, which they affirm to have been begotten from Saturn, that is, from a perfect mind or intellect, must needs be that most divine soul (the third archical hypostasis) which being immediately begotten, pure from that which is pure, always remains above, so that it neither can, nor will, ever descend down to these lower things, so as to be immersed in them; it being of such a nature, as is not inclinable to sink, or lapse downward. A certain separate substance, which doth not at all partake of matter, as the fable intimated, when it called it motherless; and therefore may it well be styled by us, not a demon, but a god. Whence it comes to pass, that this soul can never fall, it being much more closely united and connected with that immoveable Mind or Intellect, than that light, which is circumfused about the sun, is connected with the sun. This Venus therefore following Chronus, or rather the father of Chronus, Uranus, acting towards it, and being enamoured with it, be- gat love, Χωριστὴν δὲ ἐκείνην τὴν ψυχὴν λέγοντες, τὴν πρώτως ἐλάμπουσαν τῷ οὐρανῷ, χωριστὸν καὶ τὸν ἔρωτα τοῦτον θεσόμεθα. Moreover, as we call this soul itself separate, so is this love of it, or begotten by it, a separate love.—After which, he speaks of another soul of the world, which is not separate from it, but closely conjoined therewith, he calling it a lower Venus and Love; namely, that

other Venus, which in the fable is said to have been begotten from Jupiter himself (the superior soul of the world) and Dione, a watery nymph. We conclude, therefore, that though this lower mundane soul, might, according to Plato, have a temporary production together with the world, or before it; yet that other superior and most divine soul, which Plotinus calls the heavenly Venus and Love, the son of Chronus without a mother, and which was truly the third hypostasis of Plato's trinity, was eternal, and without beginning. And thus, according to the forementioned principle of Athanasius, none of these three hypostases of Plato's trinity were creatures, but all of them divine and uncreated.

Which, to make yet more evident, we shall further observe, first, that Plato himself, in that second epistle of his to Dionysius, after he had mentioned his first, second, and third; that is his trinity of Divine hypostases, immediately subjoins these words: *Ἡ οὖν ἀνθρωπίνη ψυχὴ περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἀρτίζεται μαθεῖν καὶ ἅτα ἐστὶ, βλέπουσα εἰς τὰ αὐτῆς συγγενῆ, ὧν οὐδὲν ἰκανῶς ἔχει τοῦ δὴ βασιλείας περὶ καὶ ὧν εἶπον, οὐδὲν ἐστὶ τοιοῦτο*. The mind of man (as parturient) has always a great desire to know what these things are, and to that end does it look upon things cognate to it, which are all insufficient, imperfect and heterogeneous. But in that King of all things, and in the other, second and third, which I spake of, there is nothing of this kind; that is, nothing like to these created things.

Secondly, The three hypostases of Plato's trinity are not only all eternal, but also necessarily existent, and absolutely undestroyable. For the first of them can no more exist without the second, nor

the first and second without the third, than original light can exist without its splendour, coruscation, or effulgency. And Plotinus, writing against some Gnostics in his time, who would make more of these Divine hypostases, or principles, than three, concludes, that there can be neither more of them, nor fewer, in this manner; οὐ τοίνυν δεῖ ἐφ' ἑτέρας ἀρχὰς εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο προσησαμένους, εἴτα
 E. 2. 1. ix. c. 1. [p. 199.] νοῦν μετ' αὐτὸ καὶ νοοῦν πρῶτως, εἴτα ψυχὴν μετὰ νοῦν· αὕτη γὰρ τάξις κατὰ φύσιν, μήτε πλείω τίθισθαι ἐν τῷ νοητῷ, μήτε ἐλάττω· εἴτε γὰρ ἐλάττω, ἢ ψυχὴν καὶ νοῦν ταῦτο φήσουσιν, ἢ νοῦν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἕτερα ἀλλήλων εἰδείχθη πολλαχῇ. λοιπὸν δὲ ἐπισκέψασθαι ἐν τῷ παρόντι, εἰ πλείω τούτων, &c. Wherefore we ought not to entertain any other principles; but having placed first the simple good, to set Mind, or the supreme Intellect next after it, and then the universal Soul in the third place. For this is the right order, according to nature, neither to make more intelligibles, (or universal principles) nor yet fewer than these three. For he, that will contract the number, and make fewer of them, must of necessity either suppose Soul and Mind to be the same, or else Mind and the first Good. But that all these three are diverse from one another, hath been often demonstrated by us. It remains now to consider, that if there be more than these three principles, what natures they should be, &c.—

Thirdly, As all these three Platonic hypostases are eternal and necessarily existent, so are they plainly supposed by them, not to be particular, but universal beings; that is, such as do περιέχεν τὸ ὅλον, contain and comprehend the whole world under them—and preside over all things; which is all one as to say, that they are each of them in-

finite and omnipotent. For which reason are they also called, by Platonic writers, ἀρχαὶ and αἰτία, and δημιουργοί, principles, and causes, and opificers of the whole world. First, as for Νοῦς, Mind, or understanding; whereas the old philosophers before Plato, as Anaxagoras, Archelaus, &c. and Aristotle after him, supposed Mind and Understanding to be the very first and highest principle of all; which also the magic or Chaldee oracles take notice of, as the most common opinion of mankind.

“Οὗ πάντων κολέσεται ἰθὺς ἀνδρῶν,

That Mind is generally by all men looked upon, as the first and highest God—Plato considering, that unity was, in order of nature, before number and multiplicity; and that there must be Νοητὸν before Νοῦς, an Intelligible before Intellect—so that knowledge could not be the first; and, lastly, that there is a good transcending that of knowledge; made one most simple Good, the fountain and original of all things, and the first Divine hypostasis; and mind or intellect only the second next to it, but inseparable from it, and most nearly cognate with it. For which cause, in his *Philebus*,* though he agrees thus far with those other ancient philosophers, ὡς αἰεὶ τοῦ παντός Νοῦς ἀρχεῖ, that Mind always rules over the whole universe—yet does he add afterward, ὅτι Νοῦς ἐστὶ γεννάσσης τοῦ πάντων αἰτίου, that Mind is P. 30. (not absolutely the first principle, but) cognate with the cause of all things; and that therefore it rules over all things, with, and in a kind of subordination to that first principle, which is Tagathon,

* *Oper.* p. 80. edit. Ficini.

or the highest Good: where, when Plato affirms, that Mind, or his second Divine hypostasis, is *γενούσσης* with the first, it is all one as if he should have said, that it is *συγγενής*, and *ὁμοειδής*, and *ὁμογενής*, with it; all which words are used by Athanasius, as synonymous with *ὁμοούσιος*, coessential, or consubstantial. So that Plato here plainly and expressly agrees, or symbolizes, not with the doctrine of Arius, but with that of the Nicene council, and Athanasius; that the second hypostasis of the Trinity, whether called Mind, or Word, or Son, is not *ἑτερούσιος*, but *γενούσσης* or *ὁμοούσιος*, coessential or consubstantial with the first; and therefore not a creature.

And then, as for the third hypostasis, called Psyche, or the superior mundane soul, Plato in his *Cratylus*, bestowing the name of Zeus, that is, of the supreme God upon it, and etymologizing the same from *ζῆν*, adds these words concerning it; οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἡμῖν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν, ὅστις ἐστὶν αἰτίος μᾶλλον τοῦ ζῆν, ἢ ὁ ἀρχὼν τε καὶ βασιλεὺς τῶν πάντων. There is nothing, which is more the cause of life to us and other animals, than this prince and king of all things; and that therefore God was called by the Greeks Zeus, because it is by him that all animals live.—And yet that all this was properly meant by him of the third hypostasis of his trinity, called Psyche, is manifest from those words of his that follow; where he expounds the poetic mythology beforementioned, making Zeus to be the son of Chronos; εὐλογον δὲ, μεγάλης τινὸς διανοίας ἐκγονον εἶναι τὸν Δία, it is agreeable to reason, that Zeus should be the progeny or offspring of a certain great mind.—Now *ἐκγονος* and *γενούσσης* are equivalent terms also; and therefore Plato here

makes the third hypostasis of his trinity likewise to be *ὁμοούσιος*, coessential with the second; as he elsewhere made the second coessential with the first.

It is true, that by the *δημιουργός*, or opificer in Plato, is commonly meant nous or intellect, his second hypostasis; (Plotinus affirming as much, *δημιουργός ὁ νοῦς Πλάτωνι*, The demiurgus to Plato is intellect.) Nevertheless, both Eu. v. l. l. [cap. vii. p. 489.] Amelius, and Plotinus, and other Platonists, called his third hypostasis also *δημιουργόν*, the artificer or opificer of the whole world; some of them making him to be the second from Mind or Intellect; others the third from the first Good, the supreme cause of all things; who was by Atticus and Amelius styled Demiurgus also. Wherefore, as was before suggested, according to the genuine and ancient Platonic doctrine, all these three hypostases were the joint-creators of the whole world, and of all things besides themselves; as Ficinus more than once declares the tenor thereof, "*Hi Tres uno quodam consensu omnia producant*," These three with one In Plot. Ed. l. l. ii. common consent produce all things—and before him Proclus,* *πάντα ἀνήρτηται τοῦ ἐνός διὰ νοῦ μέν καὶ ψυχῆς*, all things depend upon the first One, by Mind and Soul—and accordingly we shall conclude in the words of Porphyrius, that the true and real Deity, according to Plato, extends to three Divine hypostases, the last whereof is Psyche or Soul.

From all which it appears, that Arius did not so much Platonize, as the Nicene fathers and Athanasius; who, notwithstanding, made not

* Comment in *Timæum* Platon. lib. i. p. 66.

Plato, but the Scripture, together with reason deducing natural consequences therefrom, their foundation. And that the Platonic trinity was a certain middle thing also betwixt the doctrine of Sabellius and that of Arius, it being neither a trinity of words only, or logical notions, or mere modes, but a trinity of hypostases; nor yet a jumbled confusion of God and creature (things heterousious) together; neither the second nor third of them being creatures, or made in time, but all eternal, infinite, and creators.

But that it may yet more fully appear, how far the most refined Platonic and Parmenidian, or Pythagoric trinity, doth either agree or disagree with the Scripture doctrine, and that of the Christian church in several ages; we shall here further observe two things concerning it. The first whereof is this, that though the genuine Platonists and Pythagoreans supposed none of their three archical hypostases to be indeed creatures, but all of them eternal, necessarily existent and universal or infinite, and consequently creators of the whole world; yet did they nevertheless assert an essential dependence of the second hypostasis upon the first, as also of the third both upon the first and second; together with a gradual subordination in them. Thus Plotinus, writing of the generation of the eternal Intellect, which is the second in the Platonic trinity, and answers to the Son or Word in the Christian: Τὸ δὲ αἰ
ENN. v. l. i. c. vi. [p. 487.] τελειον, αἰ καὶ αἰδιον γεννᾷ, καὶ ΕΑΑΤΤΟΝ δὲ
 ἑαυτοῦ γεννᾷ. Τί οὖν χρὴ περὶ τοῦ τελειοτάτου λέγειν; μηδὲν
 ἀπ' αὐτοῦ γεννᾶν, ἢ τὰ μέγιστα μετ' αὐτόν. Μέγιστον δὲ μετ'
 αὐτὸν Νοῦς καὶ Δεύτερον. Καὶ γὰρ ὁρᾷ ὁ Νοῦς ἐκείνου, καὶ
 δέχεται αὐτοῦ μόνον· ἐκείνος δὲ τούτου οὐδέν. Καὶ τὸ γεννώμε-

νοῦν ἀπὸ κρείττονος νοῦ, νοῦν εἶναι· Καὶ κρείττων ἅπαντων ὁ
 Νοῦς, ὅτι τ' ἄλλα μετ' αὐτόν. Ὅλον καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ λόγος νοῦ
 καὶ ἡ ἐνέργειά τις. That which is always perfect, ge-
 nerates what is eternal, and that which it gene-
 rates, is always less than itself. What shall we
 therefore say of the most absolutely perfect Being
 of all? Does that produce nothing from itself?
 or rather does it not produce the greatest of all
 things after it? Now the greatest of all things
 after the most absolutely perfect Being, is mind
 or intellect; and this is second to it. For mind
 beholdeth this as its father, and standeth in need
 of nothing else besides it: whereas that first Prin-
 ciple standeth in need of no mind or intellect.
 What is generated from that, which is better than
 mind, must needs be mind or intellect; because
 mind is better than all other things, they being all
 in order of nature after it and junior to it; as
 Psyche itself, or the first Soul; for this is also the
 word or energy of mind, as that is the word and
 energy of the first Good.—Again, the same is more
 particularly declared by him, concerning the third
 hypostasis called Psyche, that as it essentially
 dependeth upon the second, so is it gradually
 subordinate, or some way inferior to it. *Ψυχὴν*
γὰρ γεννᾷ Νοῦς, νοῦς ὢν τέλειος. Καὶ γὰρ τέ-
λειον ὄντα, γεννᾷν ἴδει, καὶ μὴ δύνανται οὔσαν τοσ-
αύτην ἄγονον εἶναι· Κρείττον δὲ οὐχ οἶόντι ἦν εἶναι, οὐδ' ἐν-
ταῦθα τὸ γεννώμενον, ἀλλ' ἘΛΑΤΤΟΝ ὄν, εἶδολον εἶναι αὐτοῦ·
 Perfect Intellect generates soul; and it being per-
 fect, must needs generate, for so great a power
 could not remain sterile. But that, which is here
 begotten also, cannot be greater than its begetter;
 but must needs be inferior to it, as being the image
 thereof.—Elsewhere the same philosopher, calling

P. 554. the first hypostasis of this trinity Ura-
 [Euseb. v. nus, the second Chronos, and the third
 lib. viii. Zeus (as Plato had done before) and
 cap. xliii.]

handsomely allegorizing that fable, concludes in this manner concerning Chronos, or the second of these; *μεταξὺ ὧν πατὴρ τε ἀμείνων, καὶ ἡττονος υἱός,* That he is in a middle state or degree betwixt his father, who is greater, and his son, who is less and inferior.—Again, the same thing is by that philo-

P. 513. sopher thus asserted in general, *ἐν τοῖς*

[Euseb. v. *γεννωμένοις, οὐκ ἔστι πρὸς τὸ ἄνω, ἀλλὰ πρὸς*
 lib. iii. cap. *τὸ κάτω χωρεῖν.* In the things generated
 xvi.]

from eternity, or produced by way of natural emanation, there is no progress upwards, but all downwards, and still a gradual descent into greater multiplicity.—We shall cite but only one passage more out of this philosopher, which containeth something of argumentation in it also: *οὐ ταῦτόν τὸ*

[E. v. l. iii. c. *ἐξ ἐκείνου ἐκείνῳ, εἰ οὐκ μὴ ταῦτόν, οὐδέ γε βέλτων*
 xv. [p. 512.]

That which is generated, or emanateth, immediately from the first and highest Being, is not the very same thing with it, as if it were nothing but that repeated again and ingeminated; and as it is not the same, so neither can it be better than it.—From whence it follows, that it must needs be gradually subordinate and inferior to it.

Which gradual subordination and essential dependence of the second and third hypostasis upon the first is by these Platonics illustrated several ways. Ficinus resembles it to the circulations of water, when some heavy body falling into it, its superficies is depressed, and from thence every way circularly wrinkled. “*Alius (saith he) sic ferme profluit ex alio, sicut in aqua circulus dependet a circulo;*” one of these Divine hypostases

doth in a manner so depend upon another, as one circulation of water depends upon another.—Where it is observable also, that the wider the circulating wave grows, still hath it the more subsidence and detumescence, together with an abatement of celerity, till at last all becomes plain and smooth again. But, by the Pagan Platonists themselves, each following hypostasis is many times said to be *ἵχνος καὶ τόπος*, a print, stamp or impression, made by the former, like the signature of a seal upon wax. Again, it is often called by them *εἰκὼν*, and *εἰδωλον*, and *μίμημα*, an image, and representation, and imitation; which if considered in *audibles*, then will the second hypostasis be looked upon as the echo of an original voice; and the third as the repeated echo, or echo of that echo: as if both the second and third hypostases were but certain replications of the first original Deity with abatement; which though not accidental or evanid ones, but substantial, yet have a like dependence one upon another, and a gradual subordination. Or if it be considered in *visibles*, then will the second hypostasis be resembled to the image of a face in a glass, and the third to the image of that image reflected in another glass, which depend upon the original face, and have a gradual abatement of the vigour thereof. Or else the second and third may be conceived as two *parhelii*, or as a second and third sun. For thus does Plotinus call the universal Psyche, or third hypostasis, *εἰκόνα νοῦ σώζουσαν τι φῶς ἐκείνου*, the image of mind (which is the second) retaining much of the splendour thereof.—Which similitude of theirs, notwithstanding, they would

* Ennead. v. lib. i. cap. vi. p. 487.

not have to be squeezed or pressed hard; because they acknowledge, that there is something of dissimilitude in them also, which then would be forced out of them. Their meaning amounts to no more than this, that as an image in a glass is said *ἐτέρου εἶναι*, essentially to belong to something else, and to depend upon it; so each following hypostasis doth essentially depend upon the former or first, and hath a subordination to it. But we meet with no expression in any of these Pagan Platonists so unhandsome and offensive, as that of Philo's, in his second book of allegories, *σκία δὲ θεοῦ ὁ Λόγος αὐτοῦ ἐστίν, ὃ καθάπερ ὄργανον προσχρησάμενος ἐκοσμοποίη*, The word is the shadow of God, which he made use of, as an instrument, in the making of the world.—Notwithstanding which, the same writer doth call him elsewhere, more honourably, a second god, and the son of the first God. As in the same place he doth also declare, that this shadow and image of God is itself the archetype of other things, *αὕτη δὲ ἡ σκία, καὶ ὡσανεὶ ἀπεικόνισμα, ἐτέρων ἐστὶν ἀρχέτυπον, ὥσπερ ὁ θεὸς παράδειγμα τῆς εἰκόνος, ἥ σκίαν νυνὶ κέκληκα, οὕτως ἡ εἰκὼν ἄλλο γίνεται παράδειγμα*. This shadow, and as it were image (of the first God) is itself the archetype and pattern of other things below it. As God is the pattern of this image, (which we call his shadow;) so is this image itself another pattern or paradigm also.—But this dependance and subordination of the Divine hypostasis is most frequently illustrated in Platonic writings, by the *ἐκλαμψις* or *ἀπανάγασμα*, the effulgency or out-shining of light and splendour from the sun, and other luminous bodies; the nous, or second hypostasis

* P. 79. Oper.

being resembled to that radious effulgency, which immediately encompassing them, is beheld together with them, and, as the astronomers tell us, augments their apparent diameter, and makes it bigger than the true, when they are beheld through telescopes, cutting off those luxuriant and circumambient rays. And the third hypostasis is resembled to the remoter and more distant splendour, which circling still gradually decreaseth. Thus Plotinus, *πῶς οὖν καὶ τί δέ νῶσαι περὶ ἐκεῖνο μένον, περιλαμψὲν ἐξ αὐτοῦ μὲν, ἐξ αὐτοῦ δὲ μένοντος, οἷον ἡλίου τὸ περὶ αὐτὸ λαμπρὸν, ὡς περὶ περιθίου, ἐξ αὐτοῦ αἰὲ γεννώμενον μένοντος.* P. 487. [Ennead. v. lib. i. cap. vi.]
How should we consider this second hypostasis, otherwise than as the circumfused splendour, which encompasseth the body of the sun; and from that always remaining is perpetually generated anew.

But this essential dependence, and gradual subordination of hypostasis, in the Platonic trinity, will yet more fully appear from those particular distinctive characters, which are given to each of them. For the first of these is often said to be *Ἐν πρὸ πάντων*, one before all things—a simple unity, which virtually containeth all things. And as Plotinus writes, *οὕτως εἶχε πάντα ὡς μὴ διακεκρυμένα, τὰ δὲ ἐν δευτέρῳ διεκρίετο τῷ λόγῳ* P. 513. [Ennead. v. lib. iii. cap. xv.]
This so containeth all things, as not being yet secrete and distinct; whereas in the second they are discerned and distinguished by reason—that is, they are actually distinguished in their ideas; whereas the first is the simple and secund power of all things. Wherefore the second was called by Parmenides *Ἐν πάντα*, one actually all things—that is, in their distinct ideas. And the

third, according to the same philosopher, as Plotinus* tells us, was *Ἐν καὶ πάντα*, one and all things;—as having still more multiplicity and alterity in it. One effectively all things. That which doth actively display, and produce into being, what was virtually or potentially contained in the first; and ideally or exemplarily in the second. Accordingly, the first of these is sometimes said to be *Πάντα ἐνικῶς*, all things unitively;—the second *Πάντα νοεῶς*, all things intellectually;—and the third, *Πάντα ψυχικῶς*, all things animally;—that is, self-moveably, actively and productively. Again, the first of these is commonly styled *Τάγαθόν*, the Good, or Goodness itself, above mind and understanding—and also *ὑπερούσιον*, above essence—in-
effable and incomprehensible. And sometimes also *φῶς ἀπλῶν*, a simple light—the second *Νοῦς*, *Λόγος*, *Σοφία*, Unity and Goodness—only by participation, or *Ἀγαθοειδής*, Boniform—but essentially and formally; mind, or understanding, reason and wisdom, all-comprehending, or infinite knowledge. The third, *Ψυχὴ*, self-moveable soul—goodness and wisdom by participation, but essentially and formally, infinite self-activity, or effectiveness; infinite, active, perceptive, and animadversive power. Sometimes it is styled also *Ἀφροδίτη* and *Ἔρως*, Venus and Love; but differently from that of the First Good, which is Love too; but a love of redundancy, or overflowing fulness and fecundity:

Plot. 494. [En- *ὄν γὰρ τέλειον, τῷ μηδὲν ζητεῖν, μὴ δὲ ἔχειν, μὴ
nead. v. lib. ii. δὲ δεῦσθαι, οἷον ὑπερερρύνῃ, καὶ τὸ ὑπερπλήρες
cap. i.]*

αὐτοῦ πεποίηκε πάντα, That which being absolutely perfect, and seeking, or wanting nothing, as it were, overflowed; and by its exuberant re-

* Enead. v. lib. i. cap. viii. p. 490. oper.

dundancy produced all things.—Whereas this latter is a love of infinite activity. Of the first; it is said, by Plotinus, that it is ἀνεργητός, above all manner of action—for which cause, the making of the world is not properly ascribed to him, though he be the original fountain of all: according to that of Numenius, *Καὶ γὰρ οὔτε δημιουργεῖν ἔστι χρεὸν τὸν πρῶτον, καὶ τοῦ δημιουργοῦντος Θεοῦ (τοῦ υἱοῦ) χρὴ εἶναι, καὶ νομίσασθαι πατέρα τὸν πρῶτον θεόν*. Neither is it fit to attribute the architecture of the world to the first God, but rather to account him the father of that god, who is the artificer.—Who again speaks further to the same purpose thus: *τὸν μὲν πρῶτον Θεὸν ἄργον εἶναι ἔργων ἑμπάντων καὶ βασιλέα*. It is to be acknowledged, that the first God is void of all manner of work or action, he being the King of all things.—Of the second, to whom the energy of intellection is attributed, it is said, notwithstanding, that his οὐσία in his ἐνέργεια, his essence, his operation; and that he is ἀκίνητος οὐσία, though a multiform, yet an immoveable nature. He therefore is properly called the demiurgus, as the contriving architect, or artificer, in whom the archetypal world is contained, and the first paradigm, or pattern of the whole universe. But the third is a kind of moveable deity, τὸ περὶ νοῦν κινούμενον (as Plotinus speaks) καὶ νοῦ φῶς, καὶ ἔχρος ἐξορηγμένον ἐκείνου. That, which moveth about mind, or intellect, the light or effulgency thereof, and its print or signature, which always dependeth upon it, and acteth according to it.—This is that, which reduces both the fecundity of the first simple good, and also the immoveable wisdom and architectonic contrivance of the second into act or energy. This is the

Eus. Pr. Ev.
l. xi. c. xviii.
[p. 537.]

immediate, and, as it were, manuary opificer of the whole world, and τὸ ἡγεμονοῦν τοῦ παντός, that which actually governs, rules, and presideth over all.—Amélius, in that passage of his before cited out of Proclus, calling these three Divine hypostases three minds, and three kings, styles the first of them Τὸν ὄντα, Him that is—the second Τὸν ἔχοντα, Him that hath—and the third Τὸν ὁρῶντα, Him that beholds.—In which expressions, though peculiar to himself, he denotes an essential dependance, and gradual subordination in them.

Now that which is most liable to exception, in this Platonic scale or gradation of the Deity, seems to be the difference betwixt the first and the second. For whereas the essential character of the second is made to be understanding, reason, and wisdom, it seems to follow from hence, that either the first and the second are really nothing else but two different names, or inadequate conceptions of one and the same thing; or else, if they be distinct hypostases, or persons, that the first of them must needs be ἄνους and ἄλογος, devoid of mind, reason, and wisdom—which would be very absurd. To which all the reply we can make, is as follows: First, that this is indeed one peculiar arcanum of the Platonic and Pythagoric theology, (which yet seems to have been first derived from Orpheus and the Egyptians, or rather from the Hebrews themselves) that whereas the Pagan theologers generally concluded, νοῦν πάντων προγενέστατον, that Mind and Understanding, properly so called, was the oldest of all things—the highest principle and first original of the world; those others placed something above it, and consequently made it to be not the first, but

the second; which they did chiefly upon these three following grounds. First, because understanding, reason, knowledge, and wisdom, cannot be conceived, by us mortals, otherwise than so as to contain something of multiplicity in them; whereas it seems most reasonable to make the first principle of all, not to be number or multitude, but a perfect monad, or unity. Thus Plotinus,

ἀόριστον μὲν νόησις ὡς περ ὄψις, ὁρίζομένη
 δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ· διὸ καὶ εἴρηται ἐκ τῆς ἀορίστου
 δυνάδου καὶ τοῦ ἐνὸς τὰ εἶδη καὶ οἱ ἀριθμοί· τοῦτο

P. 518.

[Ennead. v.
lib. iv. c. ii.]

γὰρ ὁ νοῦς· διὸ οὐχ ἀπλοῦς, ἀλλὰ πολλὰ, &c. Intellection, as well as vision, is in its own nature an indefinite thing, and is determined by the intelligible: therefore it is said, that ideas, as numbers, are begotten from infinite duality and unity; and such is intellect, which consequently is not simple, but many, it contemplating many ideas; and being compounded of two, that which is understood; and that which understands.—And again else-

where, τὸ πρὸ τοῦ κόσμου νοητοῦ, οὔτε νοῦς οὔτε
 κόσμος νοητός, ἀπλούστερον δέ· οὐ γὰρ ἐκ πολλοῦ
 πολὺ, ἀλλὰ τὸ πολὺ τοῦτο ἐξ οὐ πολλοῦ, &c.

P. 514.

[Ennead. v.
lib. iii. c. xvi.]

The principle of every thing is more simple than the thing itself. Wherefore the sensible world was made from Intellect, or the Intelligible; and before this, must there needs be something more simple still. For many did not proceed from many; but this multiform thing, Intellect, proceeded from that, which is not multiform, but simple, as number from unity.—To this purpose does he also argue in these words: εἰ τὸ νοοῦν τι

P. 535.

πλήθος, δεῖ ἐν τῷ μὴ πλήθει τὸ νοεῖν μὴ εἶναι· ἦν
 δὲ τοῦτο τὸ πρῶτον· ἐν τοῖς ὑστέροις ἄρα αὐτοῦ τὸ
 νοεῖν, καὶ νοῦς ἔσται· If that which understands be

[Ennead. v.
lib. vi. c. iii.]

many, or contain multitude in it, then that which contains no multitude, does not properly understand; and this is the first thing: but intellection and knowledge properly so called are to be placed among things, which follow after it, and are second.—And he often concludes, ἐν τῇ δευτέρῃ φύσει εἶναι τὸ γινώσκειν. That knowledge (properly so called, by reason of its multiplicity) belongs to the second rank of being, and not the first.—Another ground or reason is, because, in order of nature, there must be Νοητὸν before Νοῦς, something Intelligible before Intellect; and from hence does

P. 536. Plotinus conclude, τὸ νοεῖν οὐ πρῶτον, οὔτε τῷ εἶναι, οὔτε τῷ τίμειον εἶναι· ἀλλὰ δεύτερον, καὶ γεγνημένον, ἐπειδὴ ὑπέστη τὸ ἀγαθόν. καὶ γεγνημένον ἐκίνησε πρὸς αὐτὸ, &c. That to understand is not the first, neither in essence, nor in dignity, but the second; a thing in order of nature, after the first Good, and springing up from thence, as that which is moved with desire towards it.—Their third and last ground or reason is, because intellection and knowledge are not the highest Good, that therefore there is some substantial thing, in order of nature superior to intellect. Which consideration Plato much insisteth upon, in his sixth book De Republica. Now upon these several accounts do

Plot. p. 512. the Platonists confidently conclude, ὅτι
[Euseb. v. Θεὸς κρείττων λόγου καὶ νοῦ καὶ αἰσθήσεως, παρα-
lib. iii. c. xiv. σχὼν ταῦτα οὐκ αὐτὸς ὢν ταῦτα· that the supreme Deity is more excellent and better than the λόγος (Reason, or the Word) Intellect and Sense, he affording these things, but not being these him-

P. 514. [cap. self.—And τὸ γεγνημένον ἐξ αὐτοῦ λόγος πολὺς
xvi.] καὶ πᾶς· τὸ δὲ ἦν δηλονότι οὐ λόγος· πῶς οὖν ἐξ οὐκ λόγου λόγος· καὶ πῶς τὸ ἀγαθοῦδες ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ· that,

which was generated from the first principle, was Logos (Word or Reason) manifold; but the first principle itself was not Word: if you demand, therefore, how Word, or Reason, should proceed from that which is not Word or Reason? we answer, as that, which is boniform, from goodness itself.—With which Platonic and Pythagoric doctrine exactly agreeth Philo the Jew also,* *ὁ πρό τοῦ Λόγου, Θεὸς κρείσσω ἐστὶν ἢ πᾶσα λογικὴ φύσις, τῷ δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν πάντων ἐν τῇ βελτίστῃ καὶ τινὶ ἐξαιρέτῃ καθιστῶτι ἰδέεσθαι, οὐδὲν θέμις ἦν γένητον ἐξομωθῆναι* that God, which is before the Word or Reason, is better and more excellent than all the rational nature; neither is it fit, that any thing, which is generated, should be perfectly like to that, which is originally from itself and above all.—And, indeed, we should not have so much insisted upon this, had it not been by reason of a devout veneration, that we have for all the Scripture-mysteries; which Scripture seems to give no small countenance to this doctrine, when it makes in like manner an eternal Word and Wisdom to be the second hypostasis of the Divine Triad, and the first-begotten Son, or offspring of God the Father. And Athanasius, as was before observed, very much complieth here also with the Platonic notion, when he denies, that there was any λόγος or σοφία, any Reason or Wisdom—before that Word and Son of God, which is the second hypostasis of the holy Trinity. What then? shall we say, that the first hypostasis or person in the Platonic trinity (if not the Christian also) is *ἄνοος* and *ἄλογος*, senseless and irrational—and altogether devoid of mind and understanding? Or would not this be to

* Apud Euseb. *Præpar. Evang.* lib. vii. cap. xiii. p. 323.

introduce a certain kind of mysterious Atheism ; and, under pretence of magnifying and advancing the supreme Deity, monstrously to degrade the same? For why might not senseless matter as well be supposed to be the first original of all things, as a senseless, incorporeal being? Plotinus, therefore, who rigidly and superstitiously adheres to Plato's text here, which makes the first and highest principle of all to be such a being, as, by reason of its absolute and transcendent perfection, is not only above understanding, knowledge, and reason, but also above essence itself (which therefore he can find no other names for, but only Unity and Goodness substantial); and, consequently, knowledge and wisdom to be but a second, or postnate thing, though eternal; but, notwithstanding, does seem to labour under this metaphysical profundity; he sometimes endeavours to solve the difficulty thereof after this manner, by distinguishing of a double light; the one simple and uniform, the other multiform, or manifold; and attributing the former of these to the supreme Deity only, (whose simple original light he resembles to the luminous body of the sun itself;) the latter of them to the second hypostasis, as being the *ἐκλαμψις* or *ἀπαύγασμα*, the circumambient fulgor, or outshining splendour of that sun. Thus Enn. v. l. vi. c. 4. * *τὸ παρέχον τοῦτο τὸ φῶς, φῶς ἐστὶν ἀπλοῦν*, that from which this multiform light of *Νοῦς*, or Intellect (the second hypostasis,) is derived, is *φῶς ἀπλοῦν*, another most simple light.—As he elsewhere accordingly writeth of the first Principle, or supreme Deity, that it is *ἐν νοήσει ἑτέρωως ἢ κατὰ τὴν νοῦ νόησιν*, in knowledge or under-

standing, but of a different kind from that understanding of the second hypostasis, called Intellect. — Sometimes again, this philosopher subtilly distinguisheth betwixt νόησις αὐτή, intelligence itself, and τὸ νοοῦν, or τὸ ἔχον τὴν νόησιν, that which doth understand, or which hath intelligence in it; making the first principle to be the former of these two, and the second hypostasis of their trinity to be the latter: οὐδ' ἡ νόησις νοεῖ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔχον τὴν νόησιν, δύο οὖν πάλιν αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ νοοῦντι γίνεταί· τοῦτο δὲ οὐδαμῇ δύο. Intelligence itself doth not understand, but that which hath intelligence: for in that, which doth understand, there is a kind of duplicity. But the first principle of all hath no duplicity in it.—Now that duplicity, which he fancies to be in that, which hath intelligence, is either the duplicity of him, that hath this intelligence, and of the intelligence itself, as being not the same; or else of him, and the τὸ νοητὸν, the intelligible, or object of his intellection—intellect supposing an intelligible in order of nature before it. And from this subtilty would he infer, that there is a certain kind of imperfection and indigence in that which doth understand, or hath intelligence, ἐνδεὲς τὸ νοοῦν, ὥσπερ τὸ ὁρῶν, That which understandeth is indigent as that which seeth.—But perhaps this difficulty might be more easily solved, and that according to the tenor of the Platonic hypothesis too, by supposing the abatement of their second hypostasis to consist only in this, that it is not essentially τ' ἀγαθόν, goodness itself, but only ἀγαθοειδής, boniform, or good by participation—it being essentially no higher than Νοῦς, Λόγος and Σοφία, Mind, Reason, and Wisdom—for which cause it is called by those names, as

the proper characteristic thereof. Not as if the first were devoid of wisdom, under pretence of being above it; but because this second is not essentially any thing higher. As, in like manner, the third hypostasis is not essentially wisdom itself, standing or quiescent, and without motion or action; but wisdom as in motion, or wisdom moving and acting.

The chief ground of this Platonic doctrine of an essential dependance, and therefore gradual subordination, in their trinity of Divine hypostases, is from that fundamental principle of their theology, that there is but one Original of all things; and *μία πηγή τῆς θεότητος*, only one Fountain of the Godhead; from whence all other things, whatsoever, whether temporal or eternal, created or uncreated, were altogether derived. And therefore this second hypostasis of their trinity, since it must accordingly derive its whole being from the first, as the *ἀπαύρασμα* from the *φῶς*, the splendour from the original light—must of necessity have also an essential dependance upon the same; and, consequently, a gradual subordination to it.

For though they commonly affirm their second hypostasis to have been begotten from their first, and their third from their second; yet do they by no means understand thereby any such generation as that of men; where the father, son, and grandson, when *adulti* at least, have no essential dependance one upon another, nor gradual subordination in their nature, but are all perfectly coequal, and alike absolute. Because this is but an imperfect generation, where that, which is begotten, doth not receive its whole being originally from

that which did beget, but from God and nature; the begetter being but either a channel or an instrument, and having been himself before begotten or produced by some other. Whereas the first Divine hypostasis is altogether unbegotten from any other, he being the sole principle and original of all things, and therefore must the second needs derive its whole essence from him, and be generated after another manner, namely, in a way of natural emanation, as light is from the sun; and, consequently, though coeternal, have an essential dependance on him, and gradual subordination to him.

Moreover, the Platonists would recommend this their gradation in the Deity, or trinity of hypostases subordinate, from hence; because by this means there will not be so vast a chasm and hiatus betwixt God and the highest creatures, or so great a leap and jump in the creation, as otherwise there must needs be: nor will the whole Deity be screwed up to such a disproportionate height and elevation, as would render it altogether incapable of having any intercourse or commerce with the lower world; it being, according to this hypothesis of theirs, brought down by certain steps and degrees nearer and nearer to us. For if the whole Deity were nothing but one simple monad, devoid of all manner of multiplicity, as God is frequently represented to be, then could it not well be conceived by us mortals, how it should contain the distinct ideas of all things within itself, and that multiform platform and paradigm of the created universe, commonly called the archetypal world. Again, were the Deity only an immoveable mind; as Aristotle's god is

ἀκίνητος οὐσία, an absolutely immoveable substance — whose essence and operation are one and the same; and, as other theologers affirm, that whatsoever is in God, is God; it would be likewise utterly inconceivable, not only, how there should be any liberty of will at all in God (whereas the same theologers, contradicting themselves, zealously contend notwithstanding, that all the actions of the Deity are not necessary, and but few of them such), but also, how the Deity should have any commerce or intercourse with the lower world; how it should quicken and actuate the whole, be sensible of all the motions in it, and act *pro re nata* accordingly; all which the instincts and common notions of mankind urge upon them. Neither can they be denied, without raising the very foundations of all religion, since it would be to no more purpose, for men to make their devotional addresses to such an immoveable, inflexible, and unaffected Deity, than to a senseless adamantine rock. But these difficulties (as the Platonists pretend) are all removed by that third hypostasis in their trinity; which is a kind of moveable deity. And thus are all the phenomena of the Deity, or the different common notions in the minds of men concerning it, though seemingly repugnant and clashing with one another, yet, in their opinion, fairly reconciled and solved by this trinity of Divine hypostases subordinate.

Lastly, They pretend also, that according to this hypothesis of theirs, there may be some reasonable satisfaction given to the mind of man, both why there are so many Divine hypostases, and why there could be no more: whereas, according to other ways, it would seem to have

been a mere arbitrary business; and that there might have been either but one solitary Divine hypostasis, or but a duality of them; or else they might have been beyond a trinity, numberless.

The second thing, which we shall observe concerning the most genuine Platonical and Parmenidian trinity, is this; that though these philosophers sometimes called their three Divine hypostases, not only τρεῖς φύσεις, three natures, and three principles, and three causes, and three opificers, but also three gods, and a first, and second, and third god; yet did they often, for all that, suppose all these three to be really one Θεῶν, one Divinity, or Numen. It hath been already proved from Origen and others, that the Platonists most commonly called the animated world the second god, though some of them, as for example Numenius, styled it the third god. Now those of them, who called the world the second god, attributed indeed (not more, but) less divinity to it, than those, who would have it to be the third god. Because these latter supposed, that soul of the world to be the third hypostasis of their trinity; but the other taking all these three Divine hypostases together, for one supreme and first God, called the world the second god; they supposing the soul thereof to be another soul inferior to that first Psyche, which was properly their third hypostases. Wherefore this was really all one, as if they should have called the animated world the fourth god; only by that other way of reckoning, when they called it a second god, they intimated, that though those three Divine hypostases were frequently called three gods, yet were they, notwithstanding, really all but one Θεῶν, Divinity or Numen; or, as Plo-

tinus speaks, τὸ ἐν τῇ παντὶ θεῶν, the Divinity which is in the whole world.—Thus when God is so often spoken of in Plato singularly, the word is not always to be understood of the first hypostasis only, or the Tagathon, but many times plainly of the πρῶτον, and δεύτερον, and τρίτον, the first, and second, and third all together; or that whole Divinity, which consisteth or is made up of these three hypostases. And this will further appear from hence, because when the whole world is said in Plato to be the image of the eternal gods, as also by Plotinus, of the first, second, and third, by whom it is always produced anew, as the image in a glass is; this is not to be understood, as if the world being tripartite, each third part thereof was severally produced or created by one of those three; nor yet can it be conceived, how there could be three really distinct creations of one and the same thing. Wherefore the world having but one creation, and being created by those three Divine hypostases; it follows, that they are all three really but one Creator and one God. Thus when, both in Plato and Plotinus, the lives and souls of all animals, (as stars, demons and men) are attributed to the third hypostasis, the first and great Psyche, as their fountain and cause after a special manner; accordingly as in our Creed, the Holy Ghost is styled “the Lord and giver of life;” this is not so to be understood, as if therefore the first and second hypostases were to be excluded from having any causality therein. For the first is styled by Plato also, αἴτιον πάντων τῶν καλῶν the cause of all good things—and therefore doubtless chiefly of souls; and the second is called by him and others too, αἴτιον and

δημιουργός, the cause and artificer of the whole world.—We conclude, therefore, that souls being created by the joint concurrence and influence of these three hypostases subordinate, they are all really but one and the same God. And thus it is expressly affirmed by Porphyrius in St. Cyril,^a ἄχρι τριῶν ὑποστάσεων τὴν τοῦ προελθεῖν οὐσίαν εἶναι διὰ τὸν μὲν ἀνωτάτω θεὸν τὸ ἀγαθόν, μετ' αὐτὸν δὲ καὶ δεύτερον, τὸν δημιουργόν· τρίτην δὲ καὶ τὴν τοῦ κόσμου ψυχὴν· ἄχρι γὰρ ψυχῆς τὴν θεότητα προελθεῖν· that the essence of the Divinity proceeds or propagates itself (by way of descent downwards) unto three hypostases or subsistences. The highest God is the Tagathon, or supreme Good; the second next after him is the Demiurgus so called, the architect or artificer of the world; and the soul of the world, that is the third: for the Divinity extendeth so far as to this soul.—Here we plainly see, that though Porphyrius calls the three Divine hypostases three gods; yet does he at the very same time declare, that ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ οὐσία and θεότης, the essence of the Godhead and the Divinity extends itself to all these three hypostases, including the third and last also (which they call the mundane soul) within the compass of it. And, therefore, that even according to the Porphyrian theology itself, (which could not be suspected to affect any compliance with Christianity) the three hypostases in the Platonic trinity are ὁμοούσιοι, coessential, both as being each of them God, and as being all one God. St. Cyril himself also acknowledging as much; where he writeth thus of the Platonists:^b τρεῖς ἀρχικὰς ὑποστάσεις ὑποτιθέμενοι καὶ αἰτοῖ, καὶ μέχρι τριῶν ὑποστάσεων τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ Θεοῦ προσήκειν ἰσχυρισάμενοι· That sup-

^a Contra Julian. lib. viii. p. 271.

^b Ibid. p. 270.

posing three hypostases, which have the nature of principles (in the universe), they extend the essence of God to all these three hypostases.

Indeed, many conceive, that the Platonists making the three hypostases of their trinity to be thus gradually subordinate one to another, could not, for that very reason, acknowledge them to be one Divinity : but the Platonists themselves do, upon this very account, and no other, declare all these three to be one Divinity, because they have an essential dependance and gradual subordination in them ; the second being but the image of the first, and the third the image both of the first and second. Whereas, were these three supposed to be perfectly coequal, and to have no essential dependance one upon another, they could not by these Platonists be concluded to be any other than three co-ordinate gods, having only a general or specific identity ; and so no more one, than three men are one man : a thing, which the Platonic theology is utterly abhorrent from, as that which is inconsistent with the perfect monarchy of the universe, and highly derogatory from the honour of the supreme God and first Cause. For example, should three suns appear in the heaven all at once, with coequal splendour, and not only so, but also be concluded, that though at first derived (or lighted and kindled) from one, yet they were now all alike absolute and independent ; these three could not so well be thought to be one sun, as three that should appear gradually differing in their splendour, two of them being but the *parheli* of the other, and essentially depending on it ; forasmuch as the second would be but the reflected image of the first, and

the third but the second refracted. At least those three coequal suns could not so well be thought to be one thing, as the sun, and its first and secondary splendour, (which can neither be beheld without the sun, nor the sun without them) might be accounted one and the same thing.

The Platonists, therefore, first of all suppose such a close and near conjunction betwixt the three hypostases of their trinity, as is no where else to be found in the whole world. To this purpose Plotinus: ὁρᾷ δὲ αὐτὸν, οὐ χωρισθεῖς, ἀλλ' En. v. l. i. c.
 ὅτι μετ' αὐτὸν καὶ μεταξὺ οὐδέν· ὡς οὐδὲ ψυχῆς vi. [p. 488.]
 καὶ νοῦ· ποθεῖ δὲ πᾶν τὸ γεννησάν καὶ τοῦτο ἀγαπᾷ, καὶ μάλιστα ὅταν ᾧσι μόνοι, τὸ γεννησάν καὶ τὸ γεγεννημένον· ὅταν δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀριστον ᾧ τὸ γεννησάν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης σύνεστιν αὐτῷ, ὡς τῇ ἐτερότητι μόνον κεχωρίσθαι· Intellect is said to behold the first Good; not as if it were separated from it, but only because it is after it, but so as that there is nothing between them; as neither is there betwixt intellect and soul. Every thing, which is begotten, desires and loves that which begat it; especially when these two (that which begat, and that which is begotten) are alone, and nothing besides them. Moreover, when that which begot, is absolutely the best thing, that, which is immediately begotten from it, must needs cohere intimately with it and so as to be separated from it only by alterity.—Which is all one as if he should have said, that these three Divine hypostases are so intimately conjoined together, and united with one another, as that they are *tantum non*, only not—the very self-same. Again, the Platonists further declare, that these three hypostases of their trinity are ἀδιαίρετοι, absolutely indivisible and inseparable, as the ἀπαύγασμα is ἀδιαί-

peron from the φῶς, the splendour indivisibly conjoined with the light or sun.—Which similitude also Athanasius often makes use of to the same purpose. Thirdly, these Platonists seem likewise to attribute to their three Divine hypostases just such an Ἐμπεριχώρησις, circuminsession, or mutual in-being, as Christians do. For as their second and third hypostases must needs be in the first, they being therein virtually contained; so must the first likewise be in the second and third; they being as it were but two other editions thereof; or itself gradually displayed and expanded. But to speak particularly, the first must needs be in the second, the Tagathon in the Nous, and so both of them really one and the same God; because the common notions of all mankind attribute understanding and wisdom to the Deity; but according to the principles of Plato, Plotinus, and others, the Deity does not properly understand any where but in the second hypostasis, which is the mind and wisdom of it. And the emperichoresis of the second or third hypostases was thus intimated by Plato also; Σοφία μὴν καὶ Πηλεβ. p. 30. Νοῦς ἀνεψυχῆς οὐκ ἂν ποτε γενεοίσθην. Οὐκοῦν [p. 80.] ἐν μὲν τῇ τοῦ Διὸς ἑστῇ φύσει, βασιλικὴν μὲν ψυχὴν, βασιλικὸν δὲ νοῦν ἐγγίγνεσθαι. Where having spoken of that Divine wisdom and mind, which orders all things in the world, he adds: "But wisdom and mind can never be without soul (that is, cannot act without it): wherefore, in the nature of Jupiter, is at once contained both a kingly mind and a kingly soul." Here he makes Jupiter to be both the second and third hypostases of his trinity, Nous and Psyche; and, consequently, those two to be but one God. Which Nous is

also said to be both the *γενέστας*, i. e. of the same kind, and coessential with the first Cause of all things. To conclude: as that first Platonic hypostasis, which is itself said to be above mind and wisdom, is properly wise and understanding in the second; so do both the first and the second move and act in the third. Lastly, all these three hypostases, Tagathon, Nous, and Psyche, are said by the Platonists to be one *Θεῖον*, or Divinity; just in the same manner as the centre, immoveable distance, and moveable circumference of a sphere, or globe, are all essentially one sphere. Thus Plotinus expressly, writing of the third hypostasis, or Psyche: *σεμνὸν γὰρ τι καὶ ἡ* P. 409. [Rom. *ψυχὴ ἡ τοιαύτη, οἷον κύκλος προσαρμοστών κέν-* iv. lib. iv. *τρον, εὐθὺς μετὰ κέντρον αὐξηθεὶς, διάστημα ἀδιά-* cap. xvi.] *στατον· οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει ἕκαστα, εἰ τ' αγαθόν τις καὶ τὸ κέντρον τάξει, τὸν νοῦν κατὰ κύκλον ἀκίνητον, ψυχὴν δὲ κατὰ κύκλον κινούμενον ἂν τάξει.* For this Psyche, or third hypostasis, is a venerable and adorable thing also; it being the circle fitted to the centre, an indistant distance (forasmuch as it is no corporeal thing). For these things are just so, as if one should make the Tagathon, or first Good, to be the centre of the universe; in the next place, Mind or Intellect to be the immoveable circle, or distance; and, lastly, Soul to be that, which turns round, or the whole moveable circumference, acted by love, or desire.—These three Platonic hypostases, therefore, seem to be really nothing else but infinite goodness, infinite wisdom, and infinite active love and power, not as mere qualities or accidents, but as substantial things, that have some kind of subordination one to another; all concurring together to make up one *Θεῖον*, or Divinity, just as

the centre, immoveable distance, and moveable circumference, concurrently make up one sphere.

We have now given a full account of the true and genuine Platonic and Parmenidian or Pythagoric trinity; from which it may clearly appear, how far it either agreeth or disagreeeth with the Christian. First, therefore, though some of the latter Platonists have partly misunderstood, and partly adulterated that ancient cabala of the Trinity, as was before declared, confounding therein the differences between God and the creature, and thereby laying a foundation for infinite Polytheism; yet did Plato himself, and some of his genuine followers (though living before Christianity) approach so near to the doctrine thereof, as in some manner to correspond therewith, in those three fundamentals beforementioned. First, in not making a mere trinity of names and words, or of logical notions and inadequate conceptions of one and the same thing; but a trinity of hypostases, or subsistences, or persons. Secondly, in making none of their three hypostases to be creatures, but all eternal, necessarily existent and universal; infinite, omnipotent, and creators of the whole world, which is all one, in the sense of the ancients, as if they should have affirmed them to be *homousian*. Lastly, in supposing these three Divine hypostases, however sometimes paganically called three gods, to be essentially one Divinity. From whence it may be concluded, that as Arianism is commonly supposed to approach nearer to the truth of Christianity than Photinianism, so is Platonism undoubtedly more agreeable thereunto than Arianism; it being a certain middle thing betwixt that and Sabel-

lianism, which in general was that mark, that the Nicene council also aimed at.

Notwithstanding which, there is a manifest disagreement also betwixt the Platonic trinity, as declared, and the now received doctrine in the Christian church; consisting in a different explanation of the two latter points mentioned. First, because the Platonists dreamed of no such thing at all, as one and the same numerical essence, or substance of the three Divine hypostases. And, secondly, because, though they acknowledged none of those hypostases to be creatures, but all God; yet did they assert an essential dependance of the second and third upon the first, together with a certain gradual subordination; and therefore no absolute coequality. And this is the true reason, why so many late writers have affirmed Platonism to symbolize with Arianism, and the latter to have been indeed nothing else but the spawn of the former; merely because the Platonists did not acknowledge one and the same numerical essence, or substance of all their three hypostases, and asserted a gradual subordination of them; but chiefly for this latter ground. Upon which account some of the ancients also have done the like, as particularly St. Cyril (*contra Jul. lib. i.*); he writing thus concerning Plato: *Τεθωρήκε μὲν οὖν οὐχ ὁγίως εἰσάπαν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς τὰ Ἀρείου πεφρονηκόσιν, ἐν ἴσῳ διαιρεῖ, καὶ ὑφίστησιν, ὑποκαθεμένας τε ἀλλήλαις τὰς ὑποστάσεις εἰσφέρει.* P. 34.
Plato did not thoroughly perceive the whole truth of the Trinity, but, in like manner with those who follow Arius, divided the Deity, or made a gradation in it, and introduced subordinate hypostases:—as elsewhere the same pious father

also taxes the Platonists, for not declaring the three hypostases of their trinity to be, in his sense, homoousian, that is, absolutely coequal. But though we have already proved, that Platonism can by no means be confounded with Arianism, because it directly confronted the same in its main essentials, which were, *Erat quando non erat*, or the second hypostasis being made ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, together with its being mutable and lapsable; since, according to Platonism, the Nous is essentially both eternal and immutable: yet that the most refined Platonism differed from the now-received doctrine of the Christian church, in respect of its gradual subordination, is a thing so unquestionably evident, as that it can by no means be dissembled, palliated, or excused.

Over and besides which, it cannot be denied, but the best of Plato's followers were sometimes also further extravagant in their doctrine of the Trinity, and spake at random concerning it, and inconsistently with their own principles; especially where they make such a vast and disproportionate distance betwixt the second and third hypostases thereof; they not descending gradually and orderly, but as it were tumbling down from the former of them to the latter. Thus Plotinus himself, when having spoken magnificently of that soul of the world, which is his third hypostasis, Enn. v. l. i. he subjoins immediately, ομοειδὲς δὲ καὶ ἡμετέρα, καὶ ὅταν ἀνευ τῶν προσελθόντων σκοπῆς, λαβὼν κεκαθαυμένην, εὐρήσεις τὸ αὐτὸ τίμιον ὃ ἦν ψυχὴ. That this soul of ours is also uniform (or of the same species) with that mundane soul; for if any one (saith he) will consider it as in itself pure and naked, or stripped from all things adventitious to

it, he shall find it to be in like manner venerable.—Agreeably whereunto doth this same philosopher elsewhere call that mundane soul *προσβυρίαν* καὶ ἀδελφὴν, that is, but the elder sister of our human souls.—Which, as it rankly savours of philosophic pride and arrogancy, thus to think so magnificently of themselves, and to equalize in a manner their own souls with that mundane soul; so was it a monstrous degradation of that third hypostasis of their trinity, and little other than an absolute creaturizing of the same. For if our human soul be *ὁμοειδής*, of the same kind or species with the third hypostasis of the trinity; then is it not only *ὁμότιμος*, of like honour and dignity, but also, in the language of the Christian church, *ὁμοούσιος*, coessential with our human souls (as our Saviour Christ, according to the Arians in Athanasius, is said to be *ὁμοούσιος ἡμῶν* Tom. i. p. 552. *τῶν ἀνθρώπων*, coessential with us men). [libro. de Sententia Dionys.] From whence it will follow, that either that must be a creature, or else our human souls Divine. Wherefore, unless these Platonists would confine the Deity wholly to their first hypostasis, which would be monstrously absurd for them, to suppose that first eternal Mind and Wisdom, by which the world was made, to be a creature; they must of necessity make a vast leap or jump betwixt the second and third of their hypostases; the former of them being that perfect Wisdom, which was the Architect or Demiurgus of the world, whilst the latter is only the elder sister of all human souls. Moreover these Platonists, by their thus bringing down the third hypostasis of their trinity so low, and immersing it so deeply into the corporeal world, as if it were the inform-

ing Soul thereof, and making it to be but the elder sister of our created souls, did doubtless therein designedly lay a foundation for their Polytheism and creature-worship (now vulgarly called idolatry) that is, for their cosmolatry, astrolatry, and demonolatry. For thus much is plainly intimated

P. 483. in this following passage of Plotinus : *διὰ*
 [Ennead. v. ταύτην ὁ κόσμος ὅδε θεός· ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ ἥλιος θεός
 lib. i. cap. ii.] *ὅτι ἐμφυχός, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἄστροα* This whole

corporeal world is made a god by the soul thereof. And the sun is also a god, because animated ; as likewise are all the stars therefore gods.—Where he afterwards adds, *τὴν δὲ θεοῖς αἰτίαν τοῦ θεοῖς εἶναι, ἀνάγκη προεσβυτέραν θεὸν αὐτῶν εἶναι* That which is to these gods, or goddesses, the cause of their being gods, must needs itself be the elder god or goddess.—So that this third hypostasis of the Platonic trinity, called the mundane soul, is but a kind of sister goddess with the souls of the sun, moon, and stars, though elder indeed than they ; they being all made goddesses by her. Where there is a confused jumble of things contradictory together ; that Soul of the world being at once supposed to be a sister to other souls, and yet, notwithstanding, to deify them ; whereas this sisterly relation and consanguinity betwixt them would, of the two, rather degrade and creaturize that mundane soul, which is their third god, or Divine hypostasis, than advance and deify those particular created souls. Here therefore we see the inconvenience of these Platonic *βαθμοί*, stories, stairs and gradations in the Deity, that it is a thing liable to be much abused to creature-worship and idolatry, when the distances are made so wide, and the lowest of the Deity is supposed to differ but gradually only

from the highest of created beings. And because Porphyrius trod in Plotinus's footsteps here, as elsewhere, this was, in all probability, the true reason, why the Arians (as Socrates recordeth*) were by Constantine called Porphyrianists; not because their trinities were exactly the same, but because Arius and Porphyrius did both of them alike (though upon different grounds) make their trinity a foundation for creature-worship and idolatry. But, nevertheless, all this (as many other things) was but heedlessly and inadvertently written by Plotinus; he, as it were, drowsily nodding all the while, as it was also but supinely taken up by Porphyrius after him: it being plainly inconsistent with the genuine tenor of both their hypotheses, thus to level the third hypostasis of the trinity with particular created souls, and thereby to make so disproportionate a distance, and so vast a chasm, betwixt it and the second. For Plotinus himself, when in a more sober mood, declares, that third hypostasis not to be the immediate, informing soul of the corporeal world, but a higher separate soul, or superior Venus, which also was the Demiurgus, the maker, both of other souls and of the whole world. As Plato had before expressly affirmed him to be the Inspirer of all life, and Creator of souls, or the Lord and Giver of life: and likewise declared, that amongst all those things, which are ἀνθρωπίνης ψυχῆς συγγενῆ, congenerous and cognate with our human souls—there is οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον, nothing any where to be found at all like unto it.—So that Plato, though he were also a star-worshipper and idolater, upon other grounds, yet in all probabi-

* Vide lib. i. cap. ix. p. 32.

lity would be not at all have approved of Plotinus's *ὁμοειδής δὲ καὶ ἡμεῖς*, our souls being of the same species with that third hypostasis of the Divine triad; but rather have said, in the language of the Psalmist, "It is he that hath made us, and not we ourselves; we are his people, and the sheep of his pasture."

Notwithstanding all which, a Christian Platonist, or Platonic Christian, would, in all probability, apologize for Plato himself, and the ancient and most genuine Platonists and Pythagoreans, after this manner. First, that since they had no Scriptures, councils, nor creeds, to direct their steps in the darkness of this mystery, and to confine their language to a regular uniformity; but theologized all freely and boldly, and without any scrupulosity, every one according to his own private apprehensions; it is no wonder at all, if they did not only speak, many times unadvisedly, and inconsistently with their own principles, but also plainly wander out of the right path. And that it ought much rather to be wondered at, that living so long before Christianity, as some of them did, they should in so abstruse a point, and dark a mystery, make so near an approach to the Christian truth afterward revealed, than that they should any where fumble or fall short of the accuracy thereof: they not only extending the true and real Deity to three hypostases, but also calling the second of them, *λόγον*, reason or word too, (as well as *νοῦν*, mind or intellect) and likewise the Son of the first hypostasis, the Father; and affirming him to be the *δημιουργός* and *αἰτίον*, the artificer and cause of the whole world; and, lastly, describing him, as the Scripture doth, to be the

image, the figure and character, and the splendour or brightness of the first. This, I say, our Christian Platonist supposes to be much more wonderful, that this so great and abstruse a mystery, of three eternal hypostases in the Deity, should thus by Pagan philosophers, so long before Christianity, have been asserted, as the principal and original of the whole world; it being more indeed than was acknowledged by the Nicene fathers themselves; they then not so much as determining, that the Holy Ghost was an hypostasis, much less that he was God.

But particularly as to their gradual subordination of the second hypostasis to the first, and of the third to the first and second; our Platonic Christian, doubtless, would therefore plead them the more excusable, because the generality of Christian doctors, for the first three hundred years after the apostles' times, plainly asserted the same; as Justin Martyr, Athenagoras, Tatianus, Irenæus, the author of the *Recognitions*, Tertullian, Clemens Alexandrinus, Origen, Gregorius Thaumaturgus, Dionysius of Alexandria, Lactantius, and many others. All whose testimonies, because it would be too tedious to set down here, we shall content ourselves only with one of the last mentioned: "*Et Pater et Filius Deus est; Inest. l. iv. c. xxi. [p. 614.]* sed ille quasi exuberans fons, hic tanquam defluens ex eo rivus: Ille tanquam sol, hic tanquam radius a sole porrectus." Both the Father and the Son is God; but he as it were an exuberant fountain, this as a stream derived from him: he like to the sun, this like to a ray extended from the sun.—And though it be true that Atha-

nasius,^a writing against the Arians, does appeal to the tradition of the ancient church, and amongst others cites Origen's testimony too; yet was this only for the eternity and divinity of the Son of God, but not at all for such an absolute coequality of him with the Father, as would exclude all dependance, subordination, and inferiority; those ancients so unanimously agreeing therein, that they are by Petavius^b therefore taxed for Platonism, and having by that means corrupted the purity of the Christian faith, in this article of the Trinity. Which how it can be reconciled with those other opinions of ecclesiastic tradition being a rule of faith, and the impossibility of the visible church's erring in any fundamental point, cannot easily be understood. However, this general tradition or consent of the Christian church, for three hundred years together after the apostles' times, though it cannot justify the Platonists, in any thing discrepant from the Scripture, yet may it in some measure doubtless plead their excuse, who had no Scripture-revelation at all, to guide them herein; and so at least make their error more tolerable or pardonable.

Moreover, the Platonic Christian would further apologize for these Pagan Platonists after this manner: That their intention in thus subordinating the hypostases of their trinity was plainly no other, than to exclude thereby a plurality of co-ordinate and independent gods, which they sup-

^a Vide Epistol. de Synodi Nicenæ contra Hæresin Arian. Decrētis, tom. i. oper. p. 277.

^b Vide lib. i. de Trinitate, cap. iii. p. 20. et cap. iv. p. 24. tom. ii. Dogmat. Theolog.

posed an absolute coequality of them would infer. And that they made only so much subordination of them, as was both necessary to this purpose, and unavoidable; the juncture of them being in their opinion so close, that there was *μηδὲν μεταξὺ*, nothing intermedious—or that could possibly be thrust in between them. But now again, on the other hand, whereas the only ground of the coequality of the persons in the holy Trinity is, because it cannot well be conceived, how they should otherwise all be God; since the essence of the Godhead, being absolute perfection, can admit of no degrees; these Platonists do on the contrary contend, that notwithstanding that dependance and subordination, which they commonly suppose in these hypostases, there is none of them, for all that, to be accounted creatures, but that the general essence of the Godhead, or the uncreated nature, truly and properly belongeth to them all: according to that of Porphyrius before cited, *ἀρχὴ τριῶν ὑποστάσεων τὴν θεῶν προελθεῖν οὐσίαν*, the essence of the Godhead proceedeth to three hypostases.—Now these Platonists conceive, that the essence of the Godhead, as common to all the three hypostases of their trinity, consisteth (besides perfect intellectuality) in these following things: First, in being eternal, which, as we have already shewed, was Plato's distinctive character betwixt God and the creature. That whatsoever was eternal, is therefore uncreated; and whatsoever was not eternal, is a creature: he by eternity meaning, the having not only no beginning, but also a permanent duration. Again, in having not a contingent but necessary existence, and therefore being absolutely

undestroyable; which perhaps is included also in the former. Lastly, in being not particular, but universal *ἐν καὶ πάντα*, one and all things, or that which comprehends the whole; which is all one as to say, in being infinite and omnipotent, and the creator of the whole world. Now, say these Platonists, if any thing more were to be added to the general essence of the Godhead besides this, then must it be self-existence, or to be underived from any other, and the first original, principle, and cause of all: but if this be made so essential to the Godhead, or uncreated nature, as that whatsoever is not thus originally of itself, is therefore *ipso facto* to be detruded and thrust down into the rank of creatures; then must both the second and third hypostases, as well in the Christian as the Platonic Trinity, upon this supposition, needs be creatures, and not God; the second deriving its whole being and godship from the first; and the third, both from the first and second; and so neither first nor second being the cause of all things. But it is unquestionable to these Platonists, that whatsoever is eternal, necessarily existent, infinite, and omnipotent, and the creator of all things, ought therefore to be religiously worshipped and adored as God, by all created beings. Wherefore this essence of the Godhead, that belongeth alike to all the three hypostases, being, as all other essences, perfectly indivisible, it might be well affirmed, according to Platonic grounds, that all the three Divine hypostases (though having some subordination in them) yet in this sense are coequal, they being all truly and alike God or uncreated. And the Platonists thus distinguishing betwixt *οὐσία* and *ὑπόστασις*, the essence

of the Godhead, and the distinct hypostases or personalities thereof, and making the first of them to be common, general, and universal; are not without the consent and approbation of the orthodox fathers herein; they determining, likewise, that in the Deity, essence or substance differs from hypostasis, as τὸ κοινὸν from τὸ κατ' ἑαστὸν, that which is common and general, differs from that which is singular and individual.—Thus, besides many others, St. Cyril,* ἣν ἔχει διαφορὰν τὸ γένος, ἢ εἶδος, ὑπὲρ τὸ ἀτοκόν, ταύτην ἢ οὐσίαν πρὸς τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔχει. The essence or substance of the Deity differs from the hypostasis, after the same manner as a genus or species differs from an individuum,—So that, as well according to these fathers as the Platonists, that essence or substance of the Godhead, which all the three persons agree in, is not singular, but generical or universal; they both supposing each of the persons also to have their own numerical essence. Wherefore, according to this distinction, betwixt the essence or substance of the Godhead, and the particular hypostases, (approved by the orthodox fathers) neither Plato, nor any intelligent Platonist, would scruple to subscribe that form of the Nicene council, that the Son or Word, is ὁμοούσιος, coessential, consubstantial, and coequal with the Father. And we think it will be proved afterwards, that this was the very meaning of the Nicene council itself, that the Son was therefore coessential or consubstantial with the Father, merely because he was God, and not a creature.

* This seems to be a mistake for Theophrastus, in whom we find these very words: Dialog. i. advers. Hæres. tom. ii. oper. p. 297. Though the same thing is said in other words in St. Cyril: Dialog. i. de Trinitate, p. 408. tom. v. oper. ed. Auberti.

Besides which, the genuine Platonists would doubtless acknowledge also all the three hypostases of their trinity to be homouousian, coessential or consubstantial, yet in a further sense than this; namely, as being all of them one Θεῶν or Divinity. For thus, besides that passage of Porphyrius before cited, may these words of St. Cyril be understood concerning them; * μέχρι τριῶν υποστάσεων τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ θεοῦ προσήκειν ἰσχυρίζονται. That, according to them, the essence of God extendeth to three hypostases, or comprehendeth three hypostases in it:—that is, not only so as that each of these three is God; but also, that they are not so many separate and divided gods, but all of them together one God or Divinity. For though the Platonists, as Pagans, being not so scrupulous in their language, as we Christians are, do often call them three gods, and a first, second, and third god; yet, notwithstanding, as philosophers, did they declare them to be one Θεῶν or Divinity; and that, as it seems, upon these several accounts following: First, because they are indivisibly conjoined together, as the splendour is indivisible from the sun. And then, because they are mutually inexistent in each other, the first being in the second, and both first and second in the third. And, lastly, because the entireness of the whole Divinity is made up of all these three together, which have all μίαν ἐνέργειαν, one and the same energy or action *ad extra*. And therefore as the centre, radius distance, and moveable circumference, may be all said to be coessential to a sphere; and the root, stock, and boughs, or branches, coessential to an entire tree: so, but in

* Contra Julian, lib. viii. p. 270.

much a more perfect sense, are the Platonic Tagathon, Nous, and Psyche, coessential to that *ἐν τῷ παντὶ θεῷ*, that Divinity in the whole universe. Neither was Athanasius a stranger to this notion

of the word *ὁμοούσιος* also, he affirming τὰ ^{De Sent.} κλήματα ὁμοούσια καὶ ἀδιαίρετα εἶναι τῆς ἀμπέ- ^{Dionys. p. 556. [tom. i. oper.]} λου, that the branches are coessential

with, and indivisible from, the vine;—and illustrating the Trinity by that similitude. Neither must it be thought, that the whole Trinity is one, after the very same manner that each single person thereof is in itself one, for then should there be a Trinity also in each person. Nor that it is so called undivided, as if three were not three in it; (which were to make the mystery contemptible:) but because all the three hypostases, or persons, are indivisibly and inseparably united to each other, as the sun and the splendour, and really but one God. Wherefore, though there be some subordination of hypostases, or persons, in Plato's trinity, (as it is commonly represented) yet this is only *ad intra* within the Deity itself, in their relation to one another, and as compared amongst themselves; but, *ad extra*, outwardly, and to us, are they all one and, the same God, concurring in all the same actions; and, in that respect, without any inequality, because in identity there can be no inequality.

Furthermore, the Platonic Christian would, in favour of these Platonists, urge also, that, according to the principles of Christianity itself, there must of necessity be some dependance and subordination of the persons of the Trinity, in their relation to one another; a priority and posteriority, not only *τάξεως*, but also *ἀξιώματος*, of dignity as

well as order, amongst them. First, because that which is originally of itself, and underived from any other, must needs have some superiority and pre-eminence over that, which derives its whole being and godship from it, as the second doth from the first alone, and the third from the first with the second. Again, though all those three hypostases, or persons, be alike omnipotent, *ad extra*, or outwards, *ad intra*, inwards, or within the Deity itself, are they not so; the Son being not able to beget the Father, nor the Holy Ghost to produce either Father or Son; and therefore neither of these two latter is absolutely the cause of all things, but only the first. And upon this account was that first of these three hypostases (who is the original fountain of all) by Macrobius* styled; omnipotentissimus Deus, the most omnipotent God; he therein implying the second and third hypostases, Nous and Psyche, to be omnipotent too, but not in a perfect equality with him, as within the Deity they are compared together; however, *ad extra*, or outwardly, and to us, they being all one, are equally omnipotent. And Plotinus writeth also to the same purpose: *ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ ἐστι τὸ πρῶτον, καὶ δύναμις ἡ πρώτη, διὰ πάντων τῶν ὄντων δυνατώτατον εἶναι, &c.* If the first be absolutely perfect, and the first Power, then must it needs be the most powerful of all beings; other powers only imitating and partaking thereof.—And accordingly hereunto would the Platonic Christian further pretend, that there are sundry places in the Scripture, which do not a little favour some subordination and priority, both of order and dignity, in the persons of the holy

P. 517. [Eun.
v. lib. iv.
cap. i.]

τίλειόν ἐστι τὸ πρῶτον, καὶ δύναμις ἡ πρώτη, διὰ πάντων τῶν ὄντων δυνατώτατον εἶναι, &c.

* In Somnium Scipion. lib. i. cap. xvii. p. 87.

Trinity; of which none is more obvious than that of our Saviour Christ, "My Father is greater than I:" which, to understand of his humanity only, seemeth to be less reasonable, because this was no news at all, that the eternal God, the creator of the whole world, should be greater than a mortal man, born of a woman. And thus do divers of the orthodox fathers, as Athanasius himself, St. Basil, St. Gregory Nazianzen and St. Chrysostom, with several others of the Latins, interpret the same to have been spoken, not of the humanity, but the Divinity of our Saviour Christ. Insomuch that Petavius himself, expounding the Athanasian Creed, writeth in this manner: "Pater major Filio, rite et ca- De Tri-
p. 863.
tholice pronuntiatus est a plerisque ve-
terum; et origine prior sine reprehensione dici solet." The Father is, in a right catholic manner, affirmed, by most of the ancients, to be greater than the Son; and he is commonly said also, without reprehension, to be before him in respect of original.—Whereupon he concludeth the true meaning of that Creed to be this, that no person in the Trinity is greater or less than other, in respect of the essence of the Godhead common to them all: "Quia vera Deitas in nullo esse aut minor aut major potest;" because the true Godhead can be no where greater or less:—but that, notwithstanding, there may be some inequality in them, as they are *hic Deus*, and *hæc persona*; this God, and that person.—It is true, indeed, that many of those ancient fathers do restrain and limit this inequality only to the relation of the persons one to another, as the Father's begetting, and the Son's being begotten by the Father, and the Holy

Ghost proceeding from both; they seeming to affirm, that there is otherwise a perfect equality amongst them. Nevertheless several of them do extend this difference further also; as, for example, St. Hilary, a zealous opposer of the Arians, he in his book of Synods writing thus: "Siquis unum dicens Deum, Christum autem Deum, ante secula Filium Dei, obsecutum Patri in creatione omnium, non confitetur, anathema sit." And again, "Non exæquamus vel conformamus Filium Patri, sed subjectum intelligimus." And Athanasius himself, who is commonly accounted the very rule of orthodoxy in this point, when he doth so often resemble the Father to the *ἥλιος*, or to the *φῶς*, the sun, or the original light, and the Son to the *ἀπαύγασμα*, the splendour or brightness of it, (as likewise doth the Nicene council and the Scripture itself;) he seems hereby to imply some dependance of the second upon the first, and subordination to it; especially when he declareth, that the three persons of the Trinity are not to be looked upon as three principles, nor to be resembled to three suns, but to the sun, and its splendour, and its derivative light: οὐδὲ γὰρ τρεῖς ἀρχὰς εἰσάγομεν, ἐπεὶ μηδὲ τριῶν ἡλίων ὑπεθέμεθα τὴν εἰκόνα, ἀλλὰ ἥλιον καὶ ἀπαύγασμα, καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐξ ἡλίου ἐν τῷ ἀπαυγασματι φῶς· οὕτω μίαν ἀρχὴν οἶδαμεν. For it appears from the similitude used by us, that we do not introduce three principles (as the Marcionists and Manicheans did) we not comparing the Trinity to three suns, but only to the sun and its splendour; so that we acknowledge only one principle.—As also where he approves of this of Dionysius of Alexandria, ὁ δὲ γε Θεός

Cont. Ar. Or.
iv. p. 467.
[tom. i. oper.]

splendour, and its derivative light: οὐδὲ γὰρ τρεῖς ἀρχὰς εἰσάγομεν, ἐπεὶ μηδὲ τριῶν ἡλίων ὑπεθέμεθα τὴν εἰκόνα, ἀλλὰ ἥλιον καὶ ἀπαύγασμα,

καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐξ ἡλίου ἐν τῷ ἀπαυγασματι φῶς· οὕτω μίαν ἀρχὴν οἶδαμεν. For it appears from the similitude used by us, that we do not introduce three principles (as the Marcionists and Manicheans did) we not comparing the Trinity to three suns, but only to the sun and its splendour; so that we acknowledge only one principle.—As also where he approves of this of Dionysius of Alexandria, ὁ δὲ γε Θεός

αἰώνιον ἔστι φῶς, οὔτε ἀρχάμενον, οὔτε ἄλξόν ποτε· οὐκοῦν αἰώνιον πρόσκειται καὶ σύνεστιν αὐτῷ τὸ ἀπαύγασμα, ἀναρχὸν καὶ ἀειγενὲς προφαινόμενον αὐτοῦ· God is an eternal light, which never began, and shall never cease to be; wherefore there is an eternal splendour also coexistent with him, which had no beginning neither, but was always generated by him, shining out before him.—For if the Son of God be as the splendour of the sun ἀειγενής, always generated—then must he needs have an essential dependance upon the Father, and subordination to him. And this same thing further appears from those other resemblances, which the same Dionysius maketh of the Father and the Son, approved in like manner also by Athanasius; viz. to the fountain and the river; to the root and the branch; to the water and the vapour; for so it ought to be read, ὕδατος, and not πνεύματος, as appeareth from his book of the Nicene synod, where he affirmeth the Son to have been begotten of the essence or substance of the Father: ὡς τοῦ φωτός ἀπαύ- γασμα, ὡς ὕδατος ἀτμός, as the splendour of the light, and as the vapour of the water;—adding: οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ἀπαύγασμα, οὔτε ἡ ἀτμός, αὐτὸ τὸ ὕδωρ ἐστίν, ἢ αὐτὸς ὁ ἥλιος· οὔτε ἀλλότριον, ἀλλὰ ἀπέρροιαν τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς οὐσίας· For neither the splendour nor the vapour is the very sun and the very water; nor yet is it alien from it, or a stranger to its nature; but they are both effluxes from the essence or substance of them; as the Son is an efflux from the substance of the Father, yet so as he is no way diminished or lessened thereby. Now all these similitudes, of the fountain and the river,

P. 565. [lib. de Santanis Dionys. contra Arian. tom. i.]

P. 275. [tom. i. oper.]

the root and the branch, the water and the vapour, (as well as that of the sun and the splendour) seem plainly to imply some dependance and subordination. And Dionysius doubtless intended them to that purpose, he asserting, as Photius informeth us, an inferiority of power and glory in the second, as likewise did Origen before him; both whose testimonies, notwithstanding, Athanasius maketh use of, without any censure or reprehension of them. Wherefore, when Athanasius, and the other orthodox fathers, writing against Arius, do so frequently assert the equality of all the three persons, this is to be understood in way of opposition to Arius only, who made the Son to be unequal to the Father, as *ἑτεροούσιον*, of a different essence from him—one being God and the other a creature; they affirming, on the contrary, that he was equal to the Father, as *ὁμοούσιος*, of the same essence with him;—that is, as God, and not a creature. Notwithstanding which equality, there might be some subordination in them, as *hic Deus* and *hæc persona* (to use Petavius's language), this God and that person.

And thus does there seem not to be so great a difference betwixt the more genuine Platonists and the ancient orthodox fathers, in their doctrine concerning the Trinity, as is by many conceived. However, our Platonic Christian would further add, that there is no necessity at all from the principles of Platonism itself, why the Platonists should make any other or more subordination in their Trinity, than the most severely-orthodox fathers themselves. For, according to the common hypothesis of the Platonists, when the cha-

racter of the first hypostasis is supposed by them to be infinite goodness; of the second, infinite wisdom; and of the third, infinite active love and power, (these not as accidents and qualities, but as all substantial) it is more easy to conceive, that all these are really but one and the same God, than how there should be any considerable inferiority in them. But, besides this, there is another Platonic hypothesis (which St. Austin hinteth from Porphyrius, though he professeth he did not well understand it) where the third hypostasis is made to be a certain middle betwixt the first and second.

De Civ. D.
l. x. c. xxiii.
Cum dicit
medium, non
postponit, sed
interponit.

And this does Proclus also sometimes follow, calling the third in like manner μέσση δύναμιν, a middle power, and σχεῖν ἀμφοῖν, the relation of both the first and second to one another.—Which agreeth exactly with that apprehension of some Christians, that the third hypostasis is as it were the nexus betwixt the first and second, and that love, whereby the Father and Son love each other. Now, according to this latter Platonic hypothesis, there would seem to be not so much a gradation or descent, as a kind of circulation in the Trinity. Upon all which considerations, the Platonic Christian will conclude, that though some junior Platonists have adulterated the notion of the Trinity, yet either there is no such great difference betwixt the genuine Platonic Trinity, rightly understood, and the Christian; or else, that as the same might be modelled and rectified, there need not to be.

But though the genuine Platonists do thus suppose the three hypostases of their Trinity to be all of them, not only God, but also one God, or μία

θεότης, one entire Divinity;—upon which latter account, the whole may be said also by them, to have one singular or numerical essence: yet notwithstanding must it be acknowledged, that they no where suppose each of these three hypostases to be numerically the very same, or to have no distinct singular essences of their own; this being, in their apprehensions, directly contradictory to their very hypothesis itself, and all one as if they should affirm them, indeed not to be three hypostases, but only one. Nevertheless, the Christian Platonist would here also apologize for them after this manner; that the ancient orthodox fathers of the Christian church were generally of no other persuasion than this; that that essence or substance of the Godhead, which all the three persons or hypostases agree in, as each of them is God, was not one singular and individual, but only one common and universal essence or substance; that word substance being used by them as synonymous with essence, and applied to universals likewise, as it is by the Peripatetics, when they call a man, or animal in general, *substantiam secundam*, a second substance.—Now this is evident from hence, because these orthodox fathers did commonly distinguish in this controversy of the Trinity, betwixt *Οὐσία* and *ὑπόστασις*, the essence or substance of the Godhead—and the hypostases or persons themselves, after this manner; namely, that the hypostasis or person was singular and individual, but the essence or substance common and universal. Thus does Theodoret pronounce of these fathers in general,

Dial. i. adv.

HER. [tom. ii. κατάγει τὴν τῶν πατέρων διδασκαλίαν, ἣν ἔχει
oper. p. 297.] διαφορὰν τὸ κοινὸν ὑπὲρ τὸ ἰδίον, ἢ τὸ γένος ὑπὲρ

τὸ εἶδος ἢ τὸ ἀτομον, ταύτην ἔχει Ἡ Ο΄ΥΣΙ΄Α πρὸς ΤΗΝ
 ΥΠΟ΄ΣΤΑΣΙΝ. According to the doctrine of the
 fathers, as that which is common differs from that
 which is proper, and the genus from the species
 or individuum, so doth essence or substance, dif-
 fer from hypostases; that is to say, that essence
 or substance of the Godhead, which is common
 to all the three hypostases, or whereby each of
 them is God, was concluded by the fathers, not
 to be one singular or individual, but one general
 or universal essence and substance; Theodoret,
 notwithstanding, there acknowledging, that no
 such distinction was observed by other Greek
 writers betwixt those two words οὐσία and ὑπόστα-
 σις, essence or substance and hypostasis, as that
 the former of them should be restrained to uni-
 versals only, generical or specifical essences or
 substances; but that this was peculiar to the
 Christian fathers, in their doctrine concerning the
 Trinity. They in the mean time not denying,
 but that each hypostasis, prosopon, or person, in
 the Trinity, might be said in another sense, and in
 way of opposition to Sabellius, to have its own
 singular, individual, or existent essence also; and
 that there are thus, τρεῖς οὐσίαι, three sin-
 gular existent essences in the Deity, as
 well as τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις, three hypostases;
 an hypostasis being nothing else to them but an
 existent essence: however, for distinction's sake,
 they here thought fit thus to limit and appropriate
 the signification of these two words, that a singu-
 lar and existent essence should not be called es-
 sence, but hypostasis; and by οὐσία, essence or
 substance, should be meant that general or uni-
 versal nature of the Godhead only, which is com-

Greg. Nyssen.
 adv. Euseb.
 l. xii. [p. 301.
 tom. ii. oper.]

mon, to all those three singular hypostases or persons, or in which they all agree. We might here heap up many more testimonies for a further con-

firmation of this; as that of St. Basil: *ὁν ἔχει λόγον τὸ κοινὸν πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον, τοῦτον ἔχει ἡ οὐσία πρὸς τὴν ὑπόστασιν*. What common is to proper, the same is essence or sub-

stance (in the Trinity) to the hypostases.—But we shall content ourselves only with this full

acknowledgment of D. Petavius: “In hoc uno Græcorum præsertim omnium judicia concordant, *οὐσίαν*, id est, essen-

tiam sive substantiam, aut naturam (quam *φύσιν* vocant) generale esse aliquid et com-

mune, ac minime definitum; *ὑπόστασιν* vero pro-

prium, singulare, et circumscriptum, quod ex illo communi et peculiaribus quibusdam notis

ac proprietatibus veluti componitur.” In this

one thing do the judgments and opinions of all

the Greeks especially agree, that *Usia*, essence or

substance, and nature, which they call *Physis* (in

the Trinity), is something general, common and

undetermined; but hypostasis is that, which is

proper, singular, and circumscribed, and which

is, as it were, compounded and made up of that

common essence or substance, and certain pecu-

liar notes and properties, or individuating cir-

cumstances.

But, besides this, it is further certain, that not

a few of those ancient fathers, who were there-

fore reputed orthodox, because they zealously

opposed Arianism, did entertain this opinion also,

that the three hypostases or persons of the Trinity,

had not only one general and universal essence of

the Godhead, belonging to them all, they being

all God; but were also three individuals, under one and the same ultimate species, or specific essence and substance of the Godhead; just as three individual men (Thomas, Peter, and John), under that ultimate species of man; or that specific essence of humanity, which have only a numerical difference from one another. Wherefore an hypostasis, or person (in the Trinity) was accordingly thus defined by some of these fathers (viz. Anastasius and Cyril*) to be "*Essentia cum suis quibusdam proprietatibus ab iis, quæ sunt ejusdem speciei, numero differens*;" an essence or substance, with its certain properties (or individuating circumstances), differing only numerically from those of the same species with it.—This doctrine was plainly asserted and industriously pursued (besides several others both of the Greeks and Latins), especially by Gregory Nyssen, Cyril of Alexandria, Maximus the Martyr, and Damascen; whose words, because Petavius^b hath set them down at large, we shall not here insert. Now these were they, who principally insisted upon the absolute coequality and independent coordination of the three hypostases or persons in the Trinity, as compared with one another. Because, as three men, though one of them were a father, another a son, and the third a nephew, yet have no essential dependance one upon another, but are naturally coequal and unsubordinate, there being only a numerical difference betwixt them; so did they in like manner conclude, that the three hypostases, or persons of the Deity

* Vide Exposition. Compendiar. Fidei Orthodox. in Bibliothec. Patrum, p. 677. tom. xv. edit. Paris, 1645.

^b Lib. iv. de Trinit. cap. ix. §. iv. tom. ii. Dogmat. Theolog.

(the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost), being likewise but three individuals, under the same ultimate species or specific essence of the Godhead, and differing only numerically from one another, were absolutely coequal, unsubordinate, and independent: and this was that, which was commonly called by them their *ὁμοουσιότης*, their co-essentiality or consubstantiality. Wherefore it is observable, that St. Cyril, one of these theologians, finds no other fault at all with the Platonic trinity, but only this, that such an *ὁμοουσιότης*, such a coessentiality or consubstantiality as this, was not acknowledged therein; *ἐλλοίπει* Cont. Jul. l. viii. p. 270. *δ' ἂν πρὸς τοῦτο αὐτοῖς οὐδέν, εἰ τὸν τῆς ὁμοουσιότητος λόγον ἐφαρμόττειν ἤθελον ὑποστάσει ταῖς τρεῖν, ἵνα καὶ μία νοοῖτο τῆς θεότητος φύσις, τὸ τρίχιδες οὐκ ἔχουσα πρὸς ἑτερότητα φύσεων, καὶ τὸ γὰρ δὴ δὲν ἀλλήλων ἐν μέσῳ ὑπάρσθαι ὑποστάσεις.* There would have been nothing at all wanting to the Platonic trinity for an absolute agreement of it with the Christian, had they but accommodated the right notion of coessentiality or consubstantiality to their three hypostases; so that there might have been but one specific nature or essence of the Godhead, not further distinguishable by any natural diversity, but numerically only, and so no one hypostasis any way inferior or subordinate to another. — That is, had these Platonists complied with that hypothesis of St. Cyril and others, that the three persons of the Trinity were but three independent and co-ordinate individuals, under the same ultimate species or specific essence of the Godhead, as Peter, Paul, and John, under that species or common nature of humanity, and so taken in this coessentiality or consubstantiality

of theirs, then had they been completely orthodox. Though we have already shewed, that this Platonic trinity was, in another sense, homocousian; and perhaps it will appear afterwards, that it was so also in the very sense of the Nicene fathers and of Athanasius. Again, these theologers supposed the three persons of their trinity to have really no other than a specific unity or identity; and because it seems plainly to follow from hence, that therefore they must needs be as much three gods as three men are three men; these learned fathers endeavoured with their logic to prove, that three men are but abusively and improperly so called three, they being really and truly but one, because there is but one and the same specific essence or substance of human nature in them all; and seriously persuaded men to lay aside that kind of language. By which same logic of theirs, they might as well prove also, that all the men in the world are but one man, and that all Epicurus's gods were but one god neither. But not to urge here, that, according to this hypothesis, there cannot possibly be any reason given, why there should be so many as three such individuals in the species of God, which differ only numerically from one another, they being but the very same thing thrice repeated; and yet that there should be no more than three such neither, and not three hundred, or three thousand, or as many as there are individuals in the species of man; we say, not to urge this, it seems plain, that this trinity is no other than a kind of tritheism, and that of gods independent and co-ordinate too. And therefore some would think, that the ancient and genuine Platonic trinity,

taken with all its faults, is to be preferred before this trinity of St. Cyril and St. Gregory Nyssen, and several other reputed orthodox fathers; and more agreeable to the principles both of Christianity and of reason. However, it is evident from hence, that these reputed orthodox fathers, who were not a few, were far from thinking the three hypostases of the Trinity to have the same singular existent essence, they supposing them to have no otherwise one and the same essence of the Godhead in them, nor to be one god, than three individual men have one common specific essence of manhood in them, and are all one man. But as this trinity came afterwards to be decreed for tritheistic; so in the room thereof started there up that other trinity of persons numerically the same, or having all one and the same singular existent essence; a doctrine, which seemeth not to have been owned by any public authority in the Christian church, save that of the Lateran council* only.

And that no such thing was ever entertained by the Nicene fathers and those first opposers of Arianism, might be rendered probable in the first place from the free confession and acknowledgment of D. Petavius (a person well acquainted with ecclesiastic antiquity); and for this reason especially, because many are much led by such new names and authorities: "In eo præcipuam vim collocasse patres, ut æqualem patri natura excellentiaque filium esse defenderent, citra expressam SINGULARITATIS mentionem, licet ex eo conjicere.

De Trin. l. iv.
c. xiii. [s. vii.
p. 248. tom.
ii. Dogmat.
Theolog.]

* The fourth general Lateran council held in 1215, under Pope Innocent III.

Etenim Nicæni isti præsules, quibus nemo melius Arianae sectæ areada cognovit, nemo, quæ re opprimenda maxime foret, acris dijudicare potuit, nihil in professionis suæ formula spectarunt aliud, nisi ut æqualitatem illam essentia, dignitatis, æternitatis astruerent. Testatur hoc *ὁμοούσιος* vox ipsa, quæ arx quædam fuit catholici dogmatis. Hæc enim æqualitatem potius essentia, quam SINGULARITATEM significat, ut capite quinto docui. Deinde cetera ejusdemmodi sunt in illo decreto, ut, &c. The chief force, which the ancient fathers opposed against the Arian heretics, was in asserting only the equality of the Son with the Father, as to nature or essence, without any express mention of the SINGULARITY of the same. For those Nicene bishops themselves, who did understand best of any the secrets of the Arian faction, and which way it should especially be oppaigned, aimed at nothing else, in their confession of faith; but only to establish that equality of essence, dignity, and eternity, between them. This does the word *homousios* itself declare, it signifying rather equality, than SINGULARITY, of essence, as we have before shewed. And the like do those other passages in the same decree; as, That there was no time when the Son was not; and, That he was not made of nothing, nor of a different hypostasis, or essence.—Thus does Petavius clearly confess, that this same singularity of numerical essence was not asserted by the Nicene council, nor the most ancient fathers, but only an equality or sameness of genetical essence; or else that the Father and Son agreed only in one common essence or substance of the Godhead, that is, the eternal and uncreated nature.

But the truth of this will more fully appear from these following particulars: First, because these orthodox anti-arian fathers did all of them zealously condemn Sabellianism, the doctrine whereof is no other than this, that there was but one hypostasis, or singular individual essence, of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; and, consequently, that they were indeed but three several names, or notions, or modes, of one and the self-same thing. From whence such absurdities as these would follow, that the Father's begetting the Son was nothing but one name, notion, or mode of the Deity's begetting another; or else the same Deity, under one notion, begetting itself under another notion. And when again the Son, or Word, and not the Father, is said to have been incarnated, and to have suffered death for us upon the cross, that it was nothing but a mere logical notion or mode of the Deity, that was incarnate and suffered, or else the whole Deity under one particular notion or mode only. But should it be averred notwithstanding, that this trinity, which we now speak of, was not a trinity of mere names and notions, as that of the Sabellians, but of distinct hypostases or persons; then must it needs follow (since every singular essence is an hypostasis according to the sense of the ancient fathers) that there was not a trinity only, but a quaternity of hypostases, in the Deity. Which is a thing, that none of those fathers ever dreamed of.

Again, the word *homŏousios*, as was before intimated by Petavius, was never used by Greek writers otherwise than to signify the agreement of things, numerically differing from one another in some common nature or universal essence, or

their having a generical unity or identity, of which sundry instances might be given. Nor indeed is it likely, that the Greek tongue should have any name for that, which neither is a thing in nature, nor falls under human conception, viz. several things having one and the same singular essence. And, accordingly, St. Basil interprets the force of this word thus: ἀναρῇ τὴν ταυτότητα τῆς In Epist. [Epist. ccc. p. 1070. tom. ii. oper.] ὑποστάσεως, οὐ γὰρ αὐτῷ τί ἐστὶν αὐτῷ ὁμοούσιον, ἀλλ' ἕτερος ἕτερον. That it plainly takes away the sameness of hypostasis, that is, of singular numerical essence (this being that, which the ancient fathers meant by the word hypostasis): for the same thing is not homooousios, coessential or consubstantial with itself, but always one thing with another.—Wherefore as τὸ ὁμοούσιον and συγγένεια are used by Plotinus as synonymous, in these words concerning the soul, θέλων En. iv. l. vii. c. x. [p. 464.] μὲν διὰ συγγένειαν καὶ τὸ ὁμοούσιον, that it is full of Divine things, by reason of its being cognate or congenerous, and homooousios with them; so doth Athanasius in like manner use them, when he affirmeth τὰ κλήματα εἶναι Epist. de Sent. Dion. p. 556. [tom. i. oper.] ὁμοούσια καὶ συγγενῇ τῆς ἀμπέλου, that the branches are homooousios (coessential or consubstantial) and congenerous with the vine, or with the root thereof.—Besides which, the same father uses ὁμογενής, and ὁμοειδής, and ὁμοφυής, indifferently for ὁμοούσιος, in sundry places; none of which words can be thought to signify an identity of singular essence, but only of generical or specific. And thus was the word homooousios plainly used by the council of Chalcedon,* they affirming, that our Saviour Christ was ὁμοούσιος τῷ

* Vide tom. ii. Concilior. p. 456. edit. Harduini.

παρὶ κατὰ τὴν θεότητα, καὶ ὁμοούσιος ἡμῖν κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα, coessential or consubstantial with the Father, as to his Divinity; but coessential or consubstantial with us men, as to his humanity.—

Where it cannot reasonably be suspected, that one and the same word should be taken in two different senses in the same sentence, so as, in the first place, to signify a numerical identity, but, in the second, a generical or specific only. But, lastly, which is yet more, Athanasius himself speaketh in like manner of our Saviour Christ's

being *homŏousios* with us men: *αὐτὸν ὁμοούσιόν ἐστιν ἡμῖν υἱόν, καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡμῶν ἔχει γένεσιν, ὅτι κατὰ τοῦτο ὁ υἱὸς ἀλλοτρίως κατ' οὐσίαν τοῦ πατρὸς, ὥστε καὶ ἡ ἀμπέλως τοῦ γεωργῶν*

If the Son be coessential or consubstantial (or of the same essence or substance) with us men, he having the very same nature with us, then let him be in this respect a stranger to the essence or substance of the Father, even as the vine is to the essence of the husbandman.—And again, a little after, in the same epistle, ἡ λέγων μὴ εἶναι τὸν λόγον ἴδιον, τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς οὐσίας, ἀφραίνει ταύτον ὁμοούσιον ἡμῶν εἶναι τῶν ἀνθρώπων. Or did Dionysius,

think you, when he affirmed the Word not to be proper to the essence of the Father, suppose him therefore to be coessential or consubstantial with us men? —From all which it is unquestionably evident, that Athanasius did not, by the word *homŏousios*, understand that which hath the same singular and numerical essence with another, but the same common generical or specific only; and, consequently, that he conceived the Son

Thus also in his first epistle to Serapion, *ἡμεῖς γὰρ οὐκ ἔχοντες ὁμοούσιοι ἵσμεν ἀλλήλων*. We men being alike, and having the same-ness of nature, are consubstantial with one another. And, p. 170, *ὅτι καὶ οὐ μὴν οὐκ ἂν τις λέ-*

γὰρ, τῆς αἰνίας
ἀγαποῦ τοῦ
ἀποθέμενου, καὶ

τι οὐκ ἔστιν τοῦ
κατασκευασ-
τοῦ αὐτοῦ οἴ-
κου, ὡς καὶ
ὁ θεοὺς οὐκ
ἐστὶν τοῦ
κατασκευασ-
τοῦ αὐτοῦ
οἴκου.
It were mad-
ness to say,
that a house
is coessential
or consubstan-
tial with the
builder, or a
ship with the
shipwright;
but it is pro-
per to say,
that every
son is coes-
sential or
consubstan-
tial with his
father.

De Synodis,
[con Fide
Orientalium,
§. lxxvi. p.
1193. oper.]

much insist upon against Arius; namely, an equality of nature, as the Son and Father are both of them alike God, that essence of the Godhead (which is common to all the three persons) being, as all other essences, supposed to be indivisible. From which equality itself also does it appear, that they acknowledged no identity of singular essence, it being absurd to say, that one and the self-same thing is equal to itself. And with this equality of essence did some of these orthodox fathers themselves imply, that a certain inequality of the hypostases or persons also, in their mutual relation to one another, might be consistent. As for example, St. Austin writing

Cont. Serm.
Arian. c. xviii.
[p. 451. tom.
viii. oper.]

thus against the Arians: "Patris, ergo et Filii, et Spiritus Sancti, etiamsi disparem cogitant potestatem, naturam saltem consteantur æqualem:" Though they conceive the power of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, to be unequal, yet let them, for all that, confess their nature at least to be equal.—And

3. Cont. Euseb.
[p. 79.
tom. ii. oper.
edit. Par.
1615.]

St. Basil likewise: "Though the Son be in order second to the Father, because produced by him, and in dignity also, (forasmuch as the Father is the cause and principle of his being) yet is he not, for all that, second in nature, because there is one Divinity in them both."—And that this was indeed the meaning, both of the Nicene fathers, and of Athanasius, in their Homoiousiotes, their coessentiality or consubstantiality, and coequality of the Son with the Father; namely, their having both the same common essence of the Godhead; or that the Son was no creature, as Arius contended, but truly God or uncreated likewise, will

appear undeniably from many passages in Athanasius; of which we shall here mention only some few. In his epistle concerning the Nicene council, he tells us how the Eusebian faction subscribed the form of that council, though afterward they recanted it: πάντων τε υπογράφαντων

P. 251.

υπέγραψαν καὶ οἱ περὶ Εὐσέβιον τοῦτοις τοῖς ῥήμασιν ὡς αἰτιῶνται νῦν οὗτοι· λέγω δὲ τῷ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας, καὶ τῷ ὁμοουσίῳ, καὶ ὅτι μήτε κτίσμα ἢ ποίημα, μήτε τῶν γεννητῶν ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ υἱός· ἀλλὰ γέννημα καὶ τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς οὐσίας ὁ λόγος. All the rest subscribing, the Eusebianists themselves subscribed also to these very words, which they now find fault with; I mean, of the essence or substance, and coessential, or consubstantial, and that the Son is no creature or facture, or any of the things made, but the genuine offspring of the essence or substance of the Father.—Afterwards he declareth, how the Nicene council at first intended to have made use only of Scripture words and phrases against the

Arians: τῆς συνόδου βουλομένης τὰς μὲν τῶν

P. 267.

Ἀρειανῶν τῆς ἀσεβείας λέξεις ἀνελῶν τὰς δὲ τῶν

γραφῶν ὁμολογουμένας φωνὰς γράψαι, ὅτι τε υἱός ἐστιν οὐκ ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ, καὶ λόγος ἐστὶ καὶ σοφία, ἀλλ' οὐ κτίσμα οὐδὲ ποίημα· ἴδιον δὲ ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς γέννημα.

As that Christ was the Son of God, and not from nothing, but from God, the word and wisdom of God; and consequently, no creature or thing made.

But when they perceived, that the Eusebian faction would evade all those expressions by equivocation, ἠναγκάσθησαν λοιπὸν λευκότερόν τιπεῖν τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ. καὶ γράψαι ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Θεοῦ εἶναι τὸν υἱόν, ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ κοινὸν καὶ ἴσον, τοῦ τε υἱοῦ καὶ τῶν γεννητῶν νομίζεσθαι. They conceived themselves necessitated, more plainly to declare, what they

meant by being from God, or out of him; and therefore added, that the Son was out of the substance of God, thereby to distinguish him from all created beings.—Again, a little after, in the same epistle, he adds: ἡ σύνοδος τοῦτο νοοῦσα, καλῶς ὁμοούσιον ἔγραψεν, ἵνα τῇτε τῶν αἵρετικῶν κακοήθειαν ἀναστρέψῃ· καὶ δείξωσιν ἄλλον εἶναι τῶν γενητῶν τὸν λόγον· καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο γράψαντες εὐθὺς ἐπήγαγον· τοὺς δὲ λέγοντας ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ θεοῦ, ἢ κτιστὸν ἢ τρεπτόν ἢ ποιήμα· ἢ ἐξ ἑτέρας οὐσίας, τούτους ἀναθεματίζει ἡ ἁγία καὶ καθολικὴ Ἐκκλησία· The synod perceiving this, rightly declared, that the Son was homoousios with the Father; both to cut off the subterfuges of heretics, and to shew him to be different from the creatures. For after they had decreed this, they added immediately, They who say, that the Son of God was from things that are not, or made, or mutable, or a creature, or of another substance or essence, all such does the holy and catholic church anathematize. Whereby they made it evident, that these words, Of the Father, and co-essential or consubstantial with the Father, were opposed to the impiety of those expressions of the Arians, that the Son was a creature, or thing made, and mutable, and that he was not before he was made; which he that affirmeth, contradicteth the synod, but whosoever dissents from Arius, must needs consent to these forms of the synod.—In this same epistle, to cite but one pas-

sage more out of it, χαλκός, σίλβιν καὶ χρυσός, &c. ἀλλ' ἑτεροφνῇ καὶ ἑτεροῦσια ἀλλήλων· εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ υἱὸς οὕτως ἐστίν, ἔστω κτίσμα ὡς περ καὶ ἡμεῖς, καὶ μὴ ὁμοούσιος, εἰ δὲ υἱὸς ἐστὶ λόγος, σοφία, εἰκὼν τοῦ πατρὸς, ἀπαύγασμα, εἰκότως ὁμοούσιος ἂν εἴη· Brass and gold, silver and tin, are alike in their shining and

colour; nevertheless in their essence and nature are they very different from one another. If therefore the Son be such, then let him be a creature as we are, and not coessential (or consubstantial); but if he be a Son, the word, wisdom, image of the Father, and his splendour, then of right should he be accounted coessential and consubstantial.—Thus, in his epistle concerning Dionysius, we have *ἵνα τῶν γνησίων εἶναι τὸν υἱόν*, and *μὴ ὁμοούσιον τῷ πατρὶ* the Son's being one of the creatures, and his not being coessential or consubstantial with the Father—put for synonymous expressions, which signify one and the same thing. P. 561.

Wherefore it seemeth to be unquestionably evident, that when the ancient orthodox fathers of the Christian church maintained, against Arius, the Son to be homoousion, coessential or consubstantial with the Father, though that word be thus interpreted, Of the same essence or substance, yet they universally understood thereby, not a sameness of singular and numerical, but of common or universal, essence only; that is, the generic or specific essence of the Godhead; that the Son was no creature, but truly and properly God. But if it were needful, there might be yet more testimonies cited out of Athanasius to this purpose. As from his epistle De Synodis Arimini et Seleuciæ, where he writeth thus, concerning the difference betwixt those two words; *Ὁμοούσιον*, of like substance—and *Ὁμοούσιον*, of the same substance—*Οἶδατε γὰρ καὶ ὑμεῖς ὅτι τὸ ὅμοιον οὐκ ἐπὶ τῶν οὐσιῶν, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ σχημάτων καὶ ποιότητων λέγεται ὅμοιον ἐπὶ γὰρ τῶν οὐσιῶν οὐχ* P. 929.

* P. 928. tom. i. oper.

Ὁμοιότης, ἀλλὰ ταυτοῦτε ἀν λεχθείη· ἄνθρωπος γοῦν ἀνθρώπῳ ὁμοιος λέγεται οὐ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν—τῇ γὰρ οὐσίᾳ Ὁμοφυεῖς εἰσὶ καὶ πάλιν ἄνθρωπος καὶ οὐκ Ἀνόμοιος λέγεται ἀλλ' Ἐτεροφυής· Οὐ κοῦν τὸ Ὁμοφυές καὶ Ὁμοούσιον, το δὲ Ἐτεροφυές καὶ ἑτερούσιον· For even yourselves know, that similitude is not predicated of essences, or substances, but of figures and qualities only. But of essences or substances, identity or sameness is affirmed, and not similitude. For a man is not said to be like to a man, in respect of the essence or substance of humanity, but only as to figure or form; they being said, as to their essence, to be congenerous, of the same nature or kind with one another. Nor is a man properly said to be unlike to a dog, but of a different nature or kind from him. Wherefore that, which is congenerous, of the same nature, kind, or species, is also homousion, coessential or consubstantial (of the same essence or substance), and that, which is of a different nature, kind or species, is heterousion, (of a different essence or substance.)—Again, Athanasius, in that fragment of his against the hypocrisy of Meletius, &c. concerning consubstantiality, writeth in this manner: * Ὁ τοίνυν ἀναίρων τὸ εἶναι τὸν υἱὸν ὁμοούσιον τῷ πατρὶ, λέγων δὲ ὅμοιον, ἀναστὰς τὸ εἶναι Θεόν· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ὁ ἐξηγούμενος τὸ Ὁμοούσιον, ὡς ὅμοιον τῇ οὐσίᾳ, ἑτέραν τὴν οὐσίαν λέγει, Θεῷ δὲ ὁμοιωμένην· οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ τὸ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας, εἶναι προπάντως λέγα μὴ φρονῶν ὁμοούσιον, ὡς ἄνθρωπος ἐκ τῆς ἀνθρώπου οὐσίας· εἰ δὲ μὴ ὡς ἄνθρωπος ἐκ ἀνθρώπου κατὰ οὐσίαν, ἐκ Θεοῦ ὁ υἱός, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐν ὁμοιώματι καθάπερ ἀνδρίας ἀνθρώπῳ· ἢ ὡς ἄνθρωπος Θεῷ, δηλός ἐστιν ὁ τοιοῦτος ὁμοούσιον μὲν λέγων, ὁμοούσιον δὲ οὐ φρονῶν· Οὐ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν συνήθειαν βούλεται τὸ Ὁμοούσιον ἀκούεσθαι, ὅπερ ἐστίν, περὶ μιᾶς καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς

* Tom. i. oper. p. 572.

ουσίας· ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν συνήθειαν, καὶ ἵνα διαβάλλῃ ταύτην, Ἑλληνικὴν ῥῆσιν εἰρηκέναι τὸ ὁμοούσιον ῥῆμα τοῦ ἐν Ἑλλήσιν ἱθους ἐπ' οὐδενὶ ἑτέρῳ κείμενον ἢ ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτὴν φύσιν παραστήσαι, &c. He that denies the Son to be homoousion, consubstantial with the Father, affirming him only to be like to him, denies him to be God. In like manner, he, who retaining the word homoousion or consubstantial, interprets it notwithstanding only of similitude or likeness in substance, affirmeth the Son to be of another different substance from the Father, and therefore not God; but like to God only. Neither doth such a one rightly understand those words, "Of the substance of the Father," he not thinking the Son to be so consubstantial, or of the essence and substance of the Father, as one man is consubstantial; or of the essence or substance of another who begat him. For he who affirmeth, that the Son is not so of God, as a man is of a man, according to essence or substance; but that he is like him only as a statue is like a man, or as a man may be like to God, it is manifest, that such a one, though he use the word homoousios, yet he doth not really mean it. For he will not understand it, according to the customary signification thereof, for that, which hath one and the same essence or substance; this word being used by Greeks and Pagans in no other sense, than to signify that, which hath the same nature; as we ought to believe concerning the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. —Where we see plainly, that though the word homoousios be interpreted, That which hath one and the same essence or substance, yet is this understood of the same common nature, and as one man is of the same essence or substance with an-

other. We might here also add to this the concurrent testimonies of the other orthodox fathers; but, to avoid tediousness, we shall omit them, and only insert some passages out of St. Austin to the same purpose. For he, in his first book, *contra Maxim.* (chap. xv.) writeth thus: "Duo veri homines, etsi nullus eorum filius sit alterius, unius tamen et ejusdem sunt substantiæ. Homo autem alterius hominis verus filius nullo modo potest nisi ejusdem cum patre esse substantiæ, etiamsi non sit per omnia similis patri. Quocirca verus Dei filius, et unius cum patre substantiæ est, quia verus filius est; et per omnia est patri similis, quia est Dei filius." Two true men, though neither of them be son to the other, yet are they both of one and the same substance. But a man, who is the true son of another man, can by no means be of a different substance from his father, although he be not in all respects like unto him. Wherefore the true Son of God is both of one substance with the Father, because he is a true Son, and he is also in all respects like to him, because he is the Son of God. Where Christ, or the Son of God, is said to be no otherwise of one substance with God the Father, than here amongst men the son is of the same substance with his father, or any one man with another. Again, the same St. Austin, in his *Respons. ad Sermonem Arianorum*,^a expresseth himself thus:

To the same purpose is that in his second book, chap. vi.
 "Diversa quidem substantia
 "Ariani nos vocitant homopousianos; quia
 contra eorum errorem, Græco vocabulo
 ὁμοούσιον defendimus, Patrem, Filium, et
 Spiritum Sanctum; id est, unius ejusdem-

^a Cap. xvi. §. ii. p. 503. tot. viii. oper. ed. Benedict.

^b Cap. xxxvi. p. 458. tom. viii. oper.

que substantiæ, vel, ut expressius dicamus, essentiæ (quæ οὐσία Græce appellatur) quod planius dicitur unius ejusdemque naturæ. Et tamen si quis istorum, qui nos homoousianos vocant, filium suum non cujus ipse esset, sed diversæ diceret esse naturæ, exheredari ab ipso mallet filius, quam hoc putari. Quanta igitur impietate isti cæcantur, qui cum confiteantur unicuique Dei filium, nolunt ejusdem naturæ cujus pater est confiteri, sed diversæ atque imparis, et multis modis rebusque dissimilis, tanquam non de Deo natus, sed ab illo de nihilo sit creatus; gratia filius, non natura." The Arians call us homoousians, because, in opposition to their error, we defend the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, to be in the language of the Greeks homoousios, that is, of one and the same substance; or, to speak more clearly, essence, this being in Greek called οὐσία, which is yet more plainly thus expressed, of one and the same nature. And yet there is none of their own sons, who thus call us homoousians, who would not as willingly be disinherited, as be accounted of a different nature from his father. How great impiety therefore are they blinded with, who, though they acknowledge, that there is one only Son of God, yet will not confess him to be of the same nature with his Father, but different and unequal, and many ways unlike him, as if he were not born of God, but created out of nothing by him, himself being a creature, and so a son, not by nature, but grace only.—Lastly (to name no more places) in his first book De Trinitate, he hath these words: "Si filius creatura non est, ejusdem cum

est Deus Pater, et Homo Mater: non tamen diversa substantia est Deus Pater et Deus Filius: sicut non est diversa substantia, Homo Mater, et Homo Filius.

patre substantiæ est. Omnis enim substantia, quæ Deus non est, creatura est; et quæ creatura non est, Deus est. Et si non est filius ejusdem substantiæ, cujus est pater, ergo facta substantia est." If the Son be not a creature, then is he of the same substance with the Father; for whatever substance is not God, is creature; and whatever is not creature, is God. And therefore, if the Son be not of the same substance with the Father, he must needs be a made and created substance, and not truly God.

Lastly, That the ancient orthodox fathers, who used the word homooousios against Arius, intended not therein to assert the Son to have one and the same singular or individual essence with the Father, appeareth plainly from their disclaiming and disowning those two words, Ταυτοούσιον and Μονοούσιον. Concerning the former of which, Epiphanius thus: Καὶ οὐ λέγομεν Ταυτοούσιον, ἵνα [Hæres. Anomæor. p. 920. μὴ ἡλέξῃ παρὰ τισι λεγομένη, Σαβελλίῳ ἀπεικαστομ. i. ep.] θῇ· Ταυτόν δὲ λέγομεν τῇ θεότητι, καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ, καὶ τῇ δυνάμει. We affirm not the Son to be tautoousion, (one and the same substance with the Father) lest this should be taken in way of compliance with Sabellius; nevertheless do we assert him to be the same in Godhead, and in essence, and in power.—Where it is plain, that when Epiphanius affirmed the Son to be the same with the Father in Godhead and essence, he understood this only of a generical or specifical, and not of a singular or individual sameness; namely, that the Son is no creature, but God also, as the Father is: and this he intimates to be the true and genuine sense of the word homooousios; he therefore rejecting that other word tautoousios, because it would be lia-

ble to misinterpretation, and to be taken, in the Sabellian sense, for that, which hath one and the same singular and individual essence, which the word homoiousios could not be obnoxious to. And as concerning that other word monoiousios, Athanasius himself, in his Exposition of Faith, thus expressly condemns it: οὐτε γὰρ νομινοῦμεν, ὡς οἱ Σαβέλλιοι Μονοούσιον καὶ οὐχ' Ὁμοούσιον. We do not think the Son to be really one and the same with the Father, as the Sabellians do, and to be monoiousios, and not homoiousios; they thereby destroying the very being of the Son.—Where ousia, essence or substance, in that fictitious word monoiousios, is taken for singular or existent essence, the whole Deity being thus said, by Sabellius, to have only one singular essence or hypostasis in it: whereas in the word homoiousios is understood a common or universal, generical or specific essence; the Son being thus said to agree with the Father in the common essence of the Godhead, as not being a creature. Wherefore Athanasius here disclaimeth a monoiousian trinity, as Epiphanius did before a tautoousian; both of them a trinity of mere names and notions, or inadequate conceptions of one and the same singular essence or hypostasis; they alike distinguishing them from the homoiousian trinity, as a trinity of real hypostases or persons, that have severally their own singular essence, but agree in one common and universal essence of the Godhead, they being none of them creatures, but all uncreated, or creators. From whence it is plain that the ancient orthodox fathers asserted no such thing as one and the same singular or numerical essence, of the several per-

sons of the Trinity; this, according to them, being not a real trinity, but a trinity of mere names, notions, and inadequate conceptions only, which is thus disclaimed and declared against by Athanasius; * *Τριάς δέ ἐστιν οὐχ ἕως ὀνόματος μόνου, καὶ φωνασίας λέξεως, ἀλλὰ ἀληθεία καὶ ὑπάρξει Τριάς*. The Trinity is not a trinity of mere names and words only, but of hypostases, truly and really existing.—But the homousian Trinity of the orthodox went exactly in the middle, betwixt that monousian trinity of Sabellius, which was a trinity of different notions or conceptions only of one and the self-same thing, and that other heterousian trinity of Arius, which was a trinity of separate and heterogeneous substances (one of which only was God, and the other creatures); this being a trinity of hypostases or persons numerically differing from one another, but all of them agreeing in one common or general essence of the Godhead, or the uncreated nature, which is eternal and infinite. Which was also thus particularly declared by Athanasius; *οὔτε ἑλαττόν τι*

Ad Serap. φρονεῖ ἡ καθολικὴ Ἐκκλησία, ἵνα μὴ εἰς τοὺς νῦν Ἐρ. p. 202. κατὰ Καίαν Ἰουδαίους, καὶ εἰς Σαβέλλιον περι-

πίσιν· οὔτε πλεον ἐκινεῖ, ἵνα μὴ εἰς τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν πολυθεότητα κατακυλισθῇ. The catholic church doth neither believe less than this homousian Trinity, lest it should comply with Judaism, or sink into Sabellianism; nor yet more than this, lest, on the other hand, it should tumble down into Arianism, which is the same with Pagan Polytheism and idolatry;—it introducing in like manner the worshipping of creatures together with the Creator.

And now, upon all these considerations, our Platonic Christian would conclude, that the ortho-

* *Epistol. ad Serapion. tom. i. oper. p. 202.*

dox Trinity of the ancient Christian church did herein agree with the genuinely Platonic trinity, that it was not monousian, one sole singular essence, under three notions, conceptions, or modes only, but three hypostases or persons. As, likewise, the right Platonic trinity does agree with the Trinity of the ancient orthodox Christians in this, that it is not heterousian, but homousian, coessential, or consubstantial; none of their three hypostases being creatures, or particular beings, made in time; but all of them uncreated, eternal, and infinite.

Notwithstanding all which, it must be granted, that though this homousiotes, or coessentiality of the three persons in the Trinity, does imply them to be all God, yet does it not follow from thence of necessity that they are therefore one God. What then? shall we conclude, that Athanasius himself also entertained that opinion before mentioned and exploded, of the three persons in the Trinity being but three individuals under the same species (as Peter, Paul, and Timothy); and having no other natural unity or identity than specific only? Indeed, some have confidently fastened this upon Athanasius, because, in those Dialogues of the Trinity,* published amongst his works, and there entitled to him, the same is grossly owned; and in defence thereof this absurd paradox maintained, that Peter, Paul, and Timothy, though they be three hypostases, yet are not to be accounted three men; but only then when they dissent from one another, or disagree in will or opinion. But it is certain, from several passages in those dialogues themselves, that they could not be written by Athanasius; and there hath been also another

* Dialog. I. p. 160. tom. ii. oper.

father found for them, to wit, Maximus the martyr. Notwithstanding which, thus much must not be denied by us, that Athanasius, in those others his reputedly-genuine writings, does sometime approach so near hereunto, that he lays no small stress upon this homoonsiotes, this coessentiality and common nature of the Godhead, to all the three persons, in order to their being one God. For thus, in that book entitled, Concerning the common Essence of the Three Persons, and the chapter inscribed, *Ὅτι οὐκ εἰσὶ τρεῖς θεοί*, That there are not three gods—doth Athanasius lay his foundation here. When to that question proposed, How it can be said, that the Father is God, the Son God, and the Holy Ghost God, and yet that there are not three gods? the first reply which he makes is this: *ὅπου κοινὰ τὰ τῆς φύσεως, κοινὸν καὶ ὄνομα τῆς ἀξίας· οἷον ὁ θεὸς τὰ εἰς πλήθη διηρημένα ἀπὸ μιᾶς φύσεως, ἐνὶ ὀνόματι καλεῖ· καὶ ὅτε ὀργίζεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, τὸν πάντα ἄνθρωπον τῇ ὀργῇ ὑποκείμενον, ἓνα ἄνθρωπον καλεῖ· καὶ ὅτι διαλλάσσεται τῷ κόσμῳ, ὡς ἐνὶ ἀνθρώπῳ διαλλάσσεται·* Where there is a communion of nature, there is also one common name of dignity bestowed. And thus doth God himself call things, divided into multitudes from one common nature, by one singular name. For both when he is angry with men, doth he call all those, who are the objects of his anger, by the name of one man; and when he is reconciled to the world, is he reconciled thereto as to one man.—The first instances, which he gives hereof, are in Gen. the sixth, 3d and 7th verses; “My Spirit shall not always strive with man, and I will destroy man whom I have created.”—Upon which, Athanasius makes this reflection; *καίτοι οὐκ ἦν εἷς, ἀλλὰ μυριάδες ἄπειροι· ἀλλὰ τῷ ὀνόματι τῆς φύσεως, τὸν πάντα ἄνθρωπον ἓνα ἰκά-*

λεσεν ἄνθρωπον διὰ τὸ κοινὸν τῆς οὐσίας· Though there was not then only one man, but infinite myriads of men, nevertheless by the name of one nature, doth the Scripture call all those men one man, by reason of their community of essence or substance.—Again, he commenteth in like manner upon that other Scripture pas-

P. 213, 214.

sage, Exodus xv. 1. "The horse and his rider hath he thrown into the sea;" Ὅτε ἐξῆλθε Φαραὼ κατὰ τὴν θάλασσαν, πίπτων μετὰ μυρίων ἀρμάτων ἐν τῇ θαλάσσῃ, καὶ ἦσαν πολλοὶ ἄνθρωποι οἱ βυθισθέντες μετ' ἐκείνου, καὶ ἵπποι πολλοί· ὁ δὲ Μωσῆς εἰδὼς, ὅτι πάντων τῶν βυθισθέντων μία ἐστὶν ἡ φύσις, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἵππων καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν λέγει, ἵππον καὶ ἀναβάτην ἔρριψεν εἰς θάλασσαν· τὰ πλήθη τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐκάλεσεν ἓνα ἄνθρωπον, καὶ τὰ πλήθη τῶν ἵππων ἐκάλεσεν ἵππον ἓνα, διὰ τὴν κοινωνίαν τῆς φύσεως· When Pharaoh went out to the Red Sea, and fell, with infinite chariots in the same; and there were many men, that were drowned together with him, and many horses; yet Moses knowing, that there was but one common nature of all those, that were drowned, speaketh thus both of the men and horses; The Lord hath thrown both the horse and the rider into the sea: he calling such a multitude of men but one singular man, and such a multitude of horses but one horse.—Whereupon

Athanasius thus concludeth; εἰ οὖν ἐν τοῖς

P. 214.

ἀνθρώποις, ὅπου συγκέχυνται τὰ τῆς φύσεως· ὅπου διάφορα τὰ τῆς μορφῆς καὶ δυνάμεως καὶ βουλῆς· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν οὔτε γνώμη ἴση, οὔτε μορφή, οὔτε ἰσχὺς· καὶ διαφοροὶ γλῶτται, διὸ καὶ ἄνθρωποι μέροπες λέγονται· ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ κοινὸν τῆς φύσεως πάντα ἡ οἰκουμένη εἰς ἄνθρωπος ἐκλήθη· ὅπου δὲ ἀμέριστος ἡ ἀξία, μία βασιλεία, μία δύναμις, καὶ βουλὴ, καὶ ἐνέργεια, ἰδιάζουσα τὴν τριάδα ἀπὸ τῆς κτίσεως, Ἐνα λέγω. Θεόν. If therefore amongst men, where

the things of nature are confounded, and where there are differences of form, power and will (all men, not having the same disposition of mind, nor form, nor strength), as also different languages (from whence men are called by the poets Mero-pes), nevertheless, by reason of the community of nature, the whole world is called one man; might not that Trinity of persons, where there is an undivided dignity, one kingdom, one power, one will, and one energy, be much rather called one God?—But though it be true, that Athanasius in this place (if at least this were a genuine *foetus* of Athanasius) may justly be thought to attribute too much to this *κοινὸν τῆς φύσεως καὶ οὐσίας*, a common nature, essence, or substance—of all the three persons, as to the making of them to be truly and properly one God; and that those Scripture passages are but weakly urged to this purpose: yet it is plain, that he did not acquiesce in this only, but addeth other things to it also, as their having not only one will, but also one energy or action, of which more afterwards. Moreover,

P. 467. Athanasius elsewhere plainly implieth, that this common essence or nature of the Godhead is not sufficient alone to make all the three hypostases one God. As in his fourth oration against the Arians, where he tells us, that his Trinity of Divine hypostases cannot therefore be accounted three gods, nor three principles, because they are not resembled by him to three original suns, but only to the sun, and its splendour, and the light from both. Now, three suns, according to the language of Athanasius, have *κοινὸν τῆς φύσεως καὶ οὐσίας*, a common nature, essence, and substance—and therefore are coessen-

tial or consubstantial; and since they cannot be accounted one sun, it is manifest, that, according to Athanasius, this specific identity or unity, is not sufficient to make the three Divine hypostases one God. Again, the same Athanasius, in his Exposition of Faith,* writeth thus; οὗτε τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις μεμερισμένες καθ' ἑαυτάς, ὥσπερ σωματοφυαῖς ἐν ἀνθρώποις, ἐστὶ λογίσασθαι, ἵνα μὴ πολυθεῖαν ὡς τὰ ἔθνη φρονήσωμεν. Neither do we acknowledge three hypostases, divided or separate by themselves (as is to be seen corporeally in men) that we may not comply with the Pagan Polytheism.—From whence it is evident, that neither three separate men, though coessential to Athanasius, were accounted by him to be one man, nor yet the community of the specific nature and essence of the Godhead can alone, by itself, exclude Polytheism from the Trinity. Wherefore, the true reason, why Athanasius laid so great a stress upon this homousiotes, or coessentiality of the Trinity, in order to the unity of the Godhead in them, was not because this alone was sufficient to make them one God, but because they could not be so without it. This Athanasius often urges against the Arians, as in his fourth oration, where he tells them, πολλοὺς ἂν εἰσάγουν [θεοὺς] διὰ τὸ ἑτεροειδὲς αὐτῶν, that they must needs introduce a plurality of gods, because of the heterogeneity of their trinity.—And again afterwards determining, that there is ἐν εἶδος τῆς θεότητος, one species of the Godhead in Father, Son, and Spirit, he adds; οὗτε καὶ ἕνα διὰ τῆς τριάδος ὁμολογοῦμεν εἶναι τὸν θεόν· καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον εὐσεβέστερον λέγομεν τῆς πολυθεοῦς τῶν αἰρετικῶν θεότητος, ὅτι τὴν μίαν ἐν τριάδι θεότητα φρονούμεν· εἰ γάρ

* Tom. i. oper. p. 241.

* P. 468.

μη οὕτως ἔχει, ἀλλ' ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων ποίημα καὶ κτίσμα ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος——ἀνάγκη λέγειν αὐτοὺς δύο θεοὺς, ἓνα μὲν κτιστὴν, τὸν δὲ ἕτερον κτιστόν· And thus do we acknowledge one only God in the Trinity; and maintain it more religiously, than those heretics do, who introduce a multiform deity, consisting of divers species; we supposing only one universal Godhead in the whole. For if it be not thus, but the Son be a creature, made out of nothing, however called god by these Arians, then must he and his Father of necessity be two gods; one of them a creator, the other a creature.

—In like manner, in his book of the Nicene council, he affirmeth, concerning the

P. 275.

Arians, *τρῆς θεοὺς τρόπον τινὰ κηρύττουσιν εἰς τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις ἕνας, ἀλλήλων παντάπασι κεχωρισμέναις, διαφοῦντες τὴν ἁγίαν μονάδα*, that they make in a manner three gods, dividing the holy monad into three heterogeneous substances, separate from one another.—Whereas the right orthodox Trinity, on the contrary, is elsewhere thus described by

Ep. ad Serap. him; *Τριάς τοίνυν ἁγία καὶ τελεία ἐστὶν, ἐν πα-*
P. 202.

τρὶ, καὶ νῦν, καὶ τῷ ἁγίῳ πνεύματι θεολογούμενη, οὐδὲν ἀλλότριον ἢ ἕξωθεν ἐπιμιγνύμενον ἔχουσα, οὐδὲ ἐκ δημιουργοῦ καὶ γεννητοῦ συνεσταμένη, ἀλλ' ὅλη τοῦ κτίζειν καὶ δημιουργεῖν οὐσα. The holy and perfect Trinity theologised in the Father, Son, and Spirit, hath nothing alien, foreign, or extraneous intermingled with it; nor is it compounded of heterogeneous things, the creator and creature joined together.

—And whereas the Arians interpreted that of our Saviour Christ, “I and my Father are one,” only in respect of consent or agreement of will, Athanasius shewing the insufficiency hereof, concludeth thus, *ἀνάγκη λοιπὸν κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν νοεῖν καὶ τὴν υἱοῦ καὶ*

πατρός ἐνότητι, wherefore, besides this consent of will, there must of necessity be another unity of essence or substance also, acknowledged in the Father and the Son.—Where by unity of essence or substance, that Athanasius did not mean a unity of singular and individual, but of general or universal essence only, appears plainly from these following words: τὰ μὲν γὰρ γενητὰ καὶ

συμφωνίαν ἔχῃ πρὸς τὸν πεποιηκότα, ἀλλ' ἐν Ep. de Syn.
κινήσει καὶ μετουσίᾳ ταύτην ἔχει, ὥστερ ὁ μὴ φυν- Arim, et Sol.
P. 923.

λάξας ἐκβέβληται τῶν οὐρανῶν, ὁ δὲ υἱὸς ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας ὧν γέννημα, οὐσία καὶ ἐν ἐστὶν αὐτὸς καὶ ὁ γεννήσας πατήρ· for those things, which are made or created, though they may have an agreement of will with their Creator, yet have they this by participation only, and in a way of motion; as he, who retaining not the same, was cast out of heaven. But the Son, being begotten from the essence or substance of the Father, is essentially or substantially one with him.—So that the opposition here is betwixt unity of consent with God in created beings, which are mutable, and unity of essence in that, which is uncreated, and immutably of the same will with the Father. There are also many other places in Athanasius, which though some may understand of the unity of singular essence, yet were they not so by him intended, but either of generic or specific essence only, or else in such other sense as shall be afterwards declared. As, for example, in his fourth oration, τὴν μίαν

ἐν τριάδι θεότητα φρονοῦμεν, we acknowledge P. 168.
only one Godhead in the Trinity;—where the following words plainly imply this to be understood, in part at least, of one common or general essence of the Godhead; εἰ γὰρ μὴ οὕτως ἔχῃ, ἀλλ' ἐξ

οὐκ ὄντων ποίημα καὶ κτίσμα ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος, &c. Because if it be not so, but the Word be a creature, made out of nothing, he is either not truly God, or if he be called by that name, then must they be two gods, one a creator, the other a creature.—Again,

P. 456. when in the same book it is said, ἐν ἑσὶν ὁ υἱὸς καὶ ὁ πατὴρ τῇ ιδιότητι καὶ οὐκ ἐσότητι τῆς φύσεως, καὶ τῇ ταυτότητι τῆς μιᾶς θεότητος. That the Son and the Father are one thing in the propriety of nature, and in the sameness of one Godhead;—it is evident from the context, that this is not to be understood of a sameness of singular essence, but partly of a common and generical one, and partly of such another sameness or unity, as will be hereafter expressed. Lastly, when the three hypostases are somewhere* said by him to be μία οὐσία, one essence or substance—this is not to be understood neither in that place, as if they had all three the same singular essence, but in some of those other senses beforementioned.

But though Athanasius no where declare the three hypostases of the Trinity to have only one and the same singular essence, but, on the contrary, denies them to be monousian;* and though he lay a great stress upon their εἰδικὴ ἐνότης, their specific or generico unity, and coessentiality, in order to their being one God, forasmuch as without this they could not be God at all; yet doth he not rely wholly upon this, as alone sufficient to that purpose, but addeth certain other considerations thereunto, to make it out, in manner as followeth. First, that this Trinity is not a trinity of principles, but that there is only one principle or fountain of the Godhead in it, from which the

* Vide Question. vi. p. 442. tom. ii. oper. Athanas.

other are derived. Thus doth he write in his fifth oration, * *μία ἀρχή, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο εἰς θεός*, there is but one principle, and accordingly but one God.—Again, in his book against the Sabellianists, οὐκ εἰσὶ δύν θεοί, ὅτι μὴδὲ δύο πατέρες, μὴδὲ ἐκγενομένους P. 656.
τοῦ γεννήσαντος ἢ γεγενημένου· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχὴς ἀπέργεν δύν, δύο κερέται. Θεός, αὕτη Μαρκίωνος ἢ δυνάμειρα. There are not two gods, both because there are not two fathers, and because that, which is begotten, is not of a different essence from that which begat. For he that introduceth two principles, preacheth two gods; which was the impiety of Marcion.—Accordingly, the same Athanasius declareth, *τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ πατρὸς ἀρχὴν καὶ ῥίζαν καὶ πηγὴν εἶναι τοῦ υἱοῦ*, that Et Syn. Arim. De Sol. p. 920.
the essence or substance of the Father is the principle, and root, and fountain of the Son.—And in like manner doth he approve of this doctrine of Dionysius, *ὅτι πηγὴ τῶν ἀγαθῶν πάντων ἐστὶν ὁ θεός, παρὰ δὲ ἐκ αὐτοῦ προχέομενος ὁ υἱός*. That God (the Father) is the first fountain of all good things, but the Son a river poured out from him,—To the same purpose is it also, when he compareth the Father and the Son to the water and the vapour arising from it; to the light and the splendour; to the prototype and the image. And he concludeth the unity of the Godhead from hence, in this manner: *τὴν θείαν τριάδα εἰς ἓνα ὡςπερ εἰς κορυφὴν τινα, τὸν θεὸν τῶν ὅλων* De Syn. Nic. P. 275.
τὸν παντοκράτορα λέγω, συγκεφαλαιῶσθαι καὶ συνάγεσθαι πάντα ἀνάγκη. The Divine Trinity must needs be collected and gathered up together, under that omnipotent God of the whole world, as under one head.—But the chief force of this consideration

is only to exclude the doctrine of the Marcionists, who made more independent and self-existent principles and gods. Notwithstanding which, it might still be objected, that the Christian Trinity is a trinity of distinct subordinate gods; in opposition whereunto, this argument seems only to prepare the way to what follows; namely, of the close conjunction of these three hypostases into one God: forasmuch, as were they three independent principles, there could not be any coalescence of them into one.

In the next place, therefore, Athanasius further addeth, that these three Divine hypostases are not *μεμερισμένοι* and *κεχωρισμένοι*, separate and disjoined beings, but *ἀδιαίρετοι*, indivisibly united to one another. Thus in his fifth oration; * *πατέρα καὶ υἱὸν ἐν ὅντας τῇ θεότητι, καὶ τῷ ἐξ αὐτοῦ, ἀμέριστον, καὶ ἀδιαίρετον καὶ ἀχώριστον εἶναι τὸν λόγον ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς*. The Father and the Son are both one thing in the Godhead, and in that the Word, being begotten from him, is indivisibly and inseparably conjoined with him.—Where, when he affirmeth the Father and the Son to be one in the Godhead, it is plain, that he doth not mean them to have one and the same singular essence, but only geuerical and universal; because in the following words he supposes them to be two, but indivisibly and inseparably united together. Again, in his book *De Sent. Dionys.* *ἔστιν ἀδιαίρετος τοῦ πατρὸς ὁ υἱός, ὡς ἔστι τὸ ἀπαύγασμα πρὸς τὸ φῶς*, the Son is indivisible from the Father; as the splendour is from the light.—And afterwards, in the same book, he insisteth further upon this point, according to the sense of Dionysius, after this manner; ^b *ὁ δὲ*

* P. 529.

b P. 566.

ἴδιον καὶ ἀδιαίρετον τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς οὐσίας τον υἱὸν εἶναι διδάσκει, ὡς ἔστιν ὁ λόγος πρὸς τὸν νοῦν καὶ ποταμὸς πρὸς τὴν πηγὴν· εἰ μὲν οὖν διαίρειν καὶ ἀποξενοῦν τὸν λόγον καὶ τὸν νοῦν τίς δύναται, ἢ τὸν ποταμὸν καὶ τὴν πηγὴν μερίσαι καὶ τειχίσαι διελεῖν, ἢ τὸ ἀπαύγασμα ἅμα διελεῖν ἀπὸ τοῦ φωτός, &c. Dionysius teacheth, that the Son is cognate with the Father, and indivisible from him, as reason is from the mind, and the river from the fountain. Who is there, therefore, that would go about to alienate reason from the mind, and to separate the river from the fountain, making up a wall between them? or to cut off the splendour from the light?—Thus also in his epistle to Serapion, that the Holy Ghost is not a creature, ἡ δὲ

λίτῳσαν πρῶτον αὐτοὶ τοῦ ἀπαυγίσματος τὸ φῶς, P. 194.
ἢ τὴν σοφίαν τοῦ σοφοῦ, ἢ μὴ ἀπάτῳσαν, πῶς

ἔστι ταῦτα. Let these men first divide the splendour from the light, or wisdom from him that is wise; or else let them wonder no more how these things can be.—Elsewhere Athanasius calls the whole Trinity τριάδα ἀδιαίρετον καὶ ἡνωμένην πρὸς ἑαυτήν, a Trinity undivided and united to itself.—Which Athanasian indivisibility of the Trinity is not so to be understood, as if three were not three in it; but, first of all, that neither of these could be without the other, as the original light or sun could not be without the splendour, nor the splendour without the original light, and neither one nor the other of them without a diffused derivative light. Wherefore God the Father being an eternal sun, must needs have also an eternal splendour, and an eternal light. And, secondly, that these are so nearly and intimately conjoined together, that there is a kind of συνέχμα, continuity, betwixt them; which yet is not to be un-

derstood in the way of corporeal things, but so as is agreeable to the nature of things incorporeal.

Thirdly, Athanasius ascendeth yet higher, affirming the hypostases of the Trinity not only to be indivisibly conjoined with one another, but also to have a mutual inexistence in each other, which later Greek fathers* have called *ἐμπεριχώρησιν*, their circuminsestion. To this purpose does

P. 665. [Item. he cite the words of Dionysius, ἀπόρροια
i. oper. Libro γὰρ νοῦ λόγος, καὶ ἀπὸ καρδίας διὰ στόματος
de Sentent. ἐξαχστεύεται, ἕτερος γινόμενος τοῦ ἐν καρδίᾳ λό-
Dionys. p. 665.]

γὰρ νοῦ λόγος, καὶ ἀπὸ καρδίας διὰ στόματος ἐξαχστεύεται, ἕτερος γινόμενος τοῦ ἐν καρδίᾳ λόγου. καὶ οὕτως ἐστὶν ἑκάτερος ἐν ἑκατέρῳ, ἕτερος ὡν θατέρου, καὶ ἐν εἶναι ὄντες δύο· οὕτω καὶ ὁ πατὴρ καὶ ὁ λόγος ἐν, καὶ ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἐλήχθησαν εἶναι· for reason is the efflux of the mind, which in men is derived from the heart into the tongue, where it is become another reason or word, differing from that in the heart; and yet do these both mutually exist in each other, they belonging to one another; and so though being two, are one thing. Thus are the Father and the Son one thing, they being said to exist in each other.—And Athanasius further illustrates this also by certain similitudes; as that again of the original light and the splendour, he affirming *φῶς εἶναι ἐν τῷ ἀπαυγασματι, καὶ ἀπαύγασμα ἐν τῷ ἡλίῳ*, that the original light is in the splendour, and again the splendour in the sun;—and also that of the prototype and the image, or the king and his picture; which he thus insisteth upon:

Orat. ix. p. ἐν τῇ εἰκόνι τοῦ βασιλέως τὸ εἶδος καὶ ἡ μορφή
467. ἐστὶ, καὶ ἐν τῷ βασιλεῖ τὸ ἐν τῇ εἰκόνι εἶδος ἐστίν·

In the picture is contained the form and figure of the king, and in the king the form and figure of

* See Petav. lib. iv. de Trinitate, cap. xvi. p. 263. tom. ii. Dogmat. theol.

the picture. And therefore if any one, when he had seen the picture, should afterward desire to see the king, the picture would by a *prosopopœia* bespeak him after this manner: *ἐγὼ καὶ* Orat. iv. p.

ὁ βασιλεὺς ἐν ἐσμεν, ἐγὼ γὰρ ἐν ἐκείνῳ εἰμι, καὶ ἐν ἐμοὶ καὶ ὁ ὄψας ἐν ἐμοὶ, τοῦτο ἐν ἐκείνῳ βλέπεις, καὶ ὁ εἰδὼς ἐν ἐκείνῳ, τοῦτο βλέπεις ἐν ἐμοὶ· ὁ γὰρ προσκυνῶν τὴν εἰκόνα, ἐν αὐτῇ προσκυνεῖ τὸν βασιλέα· I and the king am one, for I am in him, and he is in me; and what you take notice of in me, the same may you observe in him also; and what you see in him, you may see likewise in me: he, therefore, that worshipping the image, therein worshipping the king, the image being nothing but the form of the king.—Elsewhere, in the fourth oration, he thus insisteth upon this particular: *ἔστι γὰρ ὁ* P. 456.

υἱὸς ἐν τῷ πατρὶ, ὥσπερ νοεῖν ἔξεστιν, ἐπειδὴ σὺμπαν τὸ εἶναι τοῦ υἱοῦ, τοῦτο τῆς πατρὸς οὐσίας ἰδίον ἐστίν, ὡς ἐκ φωτὸς ἀπαύγασμα, καὶ ἐκ πηγῆς ποταμὸς, ὥστε τὸν ὁρῶντα τὸν υἱὸν ὁρᾶν τὸ τοῦ πατρὸς ἰδίον. Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἐν τῷ υἱῷ, ἐπειδὴ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς ἰδίον, τοῦτο ὁ υἱὸς ἐκγχεῖται ὡν, ὡς ἐν τῷ ἀπαυγασματι ὁ ἥλιος, καὶ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ὁ νοῦς, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποταμῷ ἡ πηγὴ. The Son is in the Father, as may be conceived from hence; because the whole being of the Son is proper to the essence of the Father, he being derived from it, as the splendour from the light, and the river from the fountain: so that he, who sees the Son, sees that which is the Father's own and proper. Again, the Father is in the Son, because that which is the Father's own and proper, that is the Son; accordingly as the sun is also in the splendour, the mind in reason, and the fountain in the river.—What cavils the Arians had against this doctrine, Athanasius also informs us: *ἤρξαντο δια-*

Orat. iv. [p. 453.] σὺν εἶναι τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ Κυρίου λεγόμενον, Ἐγὼ ἐν τῷ πατρὶ, καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἐν ἐμοί· λέγοντες, πῶς δύναται οὗτος ἐν ἐκείνῳ, καὶ ἐκεῖνος ἐν τούτῳ χωρεῖν; ἢ πῶς ὅλας δύναται ὁ πατὴρ μείζων ὢν, ἐν τῷ υἱῷ ἐλάττωσι ὄντι χωρεῖν; καίτοι τί θαυμαστόν ἐστι ὁ υἱὸς ἐν τῷ πατρὶ, ὅπου γε καὶ περὶ ἡμῶν γέγραπται, Ἐν αὐτῷ γὰρ ζῶμεν καὶ κινούμεθα καὶ ἐσμέν. Here the Arians begin to quarrel with that of our Lord, "I am in the Father, and the Father in me;" objecting, How is it possible, that both the former should be in the latter, and the latter in the former? or how can the Father, being greater, be received in the Son, who is lesser? And yet what wonder is it if the Son should be in the Father; since it is written of us men also; that "in him we live, and move, and have our being?"—In way of reply whereunto, Athanasius first observes, that the ground of this Arian cavillation was the grossness of their apprehensions, and that they did τὰ ἀσώματα σωματικῶς ἐκλαμβάνειν, conceive of incorporeal things after a corporeal manner.—And then does he add, οὐ γὰρ ὡς ἐκείνοι νομίζουσιν, ἀντεμβιβαζόμενοι εἰς ἀλλήλους εἰσιν, ὥστε ἐν ἀγγείαις κεναῖς ἐξ ἀλλήλων πληρουμένοις, ὥστε τὸν μὲν υἱὸν πληροῦν τὸ κοῖλον τοῦ πατρὸς, τὸν δὲ πατέρα πληροῦν τὸ κοῖλον τοῦ υἱοῦ, καὶ ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν μὴ εἶναι πλήρη καὶ τέλειον. For the Father and Son are not, as they suppose, transvasated and poured out one into another, as into an empty vessel; as if the Son filled up the concavity of the Father, and again, the Father that of the Son; and neither of them were full or perfect in themselves. For all this is proper to bodies: wherefore though the Father be, in some sense, greater than the Son; yet notwithstanding may he be in him after an incorporeal manner.—And he replieth to their last cavil thus: "That

the Son is not so in the Father, as we ourselves are said to live and move, and be in God ;" αὐτὸς γὰρ ὡς ἐκ πηγῆς τοῦ πατρὸς ἐστὶ ζωὴ, ἐν ᾧ τὰ πάντα ζωογονεῖται καὶ συνέστηκεν, οὐ γὰρ ἡ ζωὴ ἐν ζωῇ ζῇ, &c. For he himself, from the fountain of the Father, is that life, in whom all things are quickened and consist ; neither does he, who is the life, live in another life, which were to suppose him not to be the life itself.—"Nor (saith he) must it be conceived, that the Father is no otherwise in the Son, than he is in holy men corroborating of them ; for the Son himself is the power and wisdom of God, and all created beings are sanctified by a participation of him in the Spirit." Wherefore this perichoresis, or mutual in-being of the Father and the Son, is to be understood after a peculiar manner, so as that they are really thereby one ; and what the Son and Holy Ghost doth, the Father doth in them, according to that of Athanasius,* ἡ τοῦ υἱοῦ θεότης τοῦ πατρὸς θεότης ἐστὶ καὶ οὕτως ἐν τῷ υἱῷ τὴν τῶν πάντων πρόνοιαν ποιεῖται. The Godhead of the Son is the Godhead of the Father ; and so the Father exercises a providence over all things in the Son.

Lastly, The same Athanasius, in sundry places, still further supposes those three Divine hypostases to make up one entire Divinity, after the same manner as the fountain and the stream make up one entire river ; or the root, and the stock, and the branches, one entire tree. And in this sense, also, is the whole Trinity said by him to be μία θεότης, and μία φύσις, and μία οὐσία, and εἰς θεός, one Divinity, and one nature, and one essence, and one God.—And accordingly the word homooousios seems here to be taken by Athanasius in a

* Pag. 457.

further sense, besides that before mentioned; not only for things agreeing in one common and general essence, as three individual men are coessential with one another; but also for such as concurrently together make up one entire thing, and are therefore jointly essential thereunto. For when he affirmeth, τὸ φυτόν εἶναι ῥίζης ὁμοφυῆς, and τὰ κλήματα ὁμοούσια τῆς ἀμπέλου, that the tree is congenerous or homogeneous with the root, and the branches coessential with the vine;—his meaning is, that the root, stock, and branches, are not only of one kind, but also all together make up the entire essence of one plant or tree. In like manner, those three hypostases, the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are not only congenerous and coessential, as having all the essence of the Godhead alike in them, but also as concurrently making up one entire Divinity. Accordingly whereunto, Athanasius further concludes, that these three Divine hypostases have not a consent of will only, but essentially one and the self-same will, and that they do also jointly produce *ad extra*, μίαν ἐνέργειαν, one and the self-same energy, operation, or action; nothing being peculiar to the Son, as such, but only the economy of the incarnation: Ὁμοία ἐαυτῇ

Ep. ad Serap. καὶ ἰδιαίτερός ἐστι τῇ φύσει ἡ Τριάς· καὶ μία ταύτης ἡ ἐνέργεια· ὁ γὰρ Πατήρ διὰ τοῦ Λόγου, ἐν τῷ Πνεύματι τῷ ἁγίῳ τὰ πάντα ποιεῖ· καὶ οὕτως ἡ ἑνότης τῆς ἁγίας Τριάδος σώζεται· καὶ οὕτως ὡς Θεὸς ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ κερνύσσεται ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων, καὶ διὰ πάντων, καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν· ἐπὶ πάντων μὲν ὡς πατήρ, ὡς ἀρχὴ καὶ πηγὴ· διὰ πάντων δὲ διὰ τοῦ Λόγου· ἐν πᾶσι δὲ, ἐν τῷ πνεύματι τῷ ἁγίῳ· The Trinity is like itself, and by nature indivisible, and there is one energy or action of it; for the Father by the Word, in the Holy Ghost, doth all things.

And thus is the unity of the holy Trinity conserved, and one God preached in the church: namely, such as is above all, and by or through all, and in all. Above all, as the Father, the principle and fountain; though all, by the Word; and in all, by the Holy Spirit.—And elsewhere he writeth often to the same purpose. Thus have we given a true and full account, how, according to Athanasius, the three Divine hypostases, though not monousios, but homousios only, are really but one God or Divinity. In all which doctrine of his there is nothing but what a true and genuine Platonist would readily subscribe to. From whence it may be concluded, that the right Platonic trinity differs not so much from the doctrine of the ancient church, as some late writers have supposed.

Hitherto hath the Platonic Christian endeavoured partly to rectify and reform the true and genuine Platonic trinity, and partly to reconcile it with the doctrine of the ancient church. Nevertheless, to prevent all mistakes, we shall here declare, that wheresoever this most genuine Platonic trinity may be found to differ, not only from the Scripture itself, (which yet notwithstanding is the sole rule of faith) but also from the form of the Nicene and Constantinopolitan councils; and further from the doctrine of Athanasius too, in his genuine writing, (whether it be in their inequality, or in any thing else) it is there utterly disclaimed and rejected by us. For as for that Creed, commonly called Athanasian, which was written a long time after by some other hand; since at first it derived all its authority, either from the name of Athanasius, to whom it

was entitled, or else because it was supposed to be an epitome and abridgment of his doctrine; this (as we conceive) is therefore to be interpreted according to the tenor of that doctrine, contained in the genuine writings of Athanasius. Of whom we can think no otherwise, than as a person highly instrumental and serviceable to Divine Providence, for the preserving of the Christian church from lapsing, by Arianism, into a kind of paganick and idolatrous Christianity; in religiously worshipping of those, which themselves concluded to be creatures; and by means of whom especially, the doctrine of the Trinity, (which before fluctuated in some loose uncertainty) came to be more punctually stated and settled.

Now the reason why we introduced the Platonic Christian here thus apologizing was, first, because we conceived it not to be the interest of Christianity, that the ancient Platonic trinity should be made more discrepant from the Christian, than indeed it is. And, secondly, because, as we have already proved, the ancient and genuine Platonic trinity was doubtless anti-Arian, or else the Arian trinity anti-Platonic; the second and third hypostases, in the Platonic trinity, being both eternal, infinite, and immutable. And as for those Platonic *βαθμολ*, or gradations, so much spoken of, these (by St. Cyril's^a leave) were of a different kind from the Arian, there being not the inequality of creatures in them to the Creator. Wherefore Socrates, the ecclesiastick historian, not without cause wonders, how those two presbyters, Georgius and Timotheus, should adhere to the Arian faction, since they were ac-

^a Advers. Julian. lib. viii. p. 270. et lib. i. p. 34.

counted such great readers of Plato and L. vii. c. vi.
Origen; θαυμάσαι οὖν μοι ἔπεισι, πῶς οὗτοι οἱ [p. 343.]
ἄνδρες, τῇ Ἀρειανῶν θρησκείᾳ παρέμειναν, ὧν ὁ μὲν Πλάτωνα
αἰεὶ μετὰ χεῖρας εἶχεν, ὁ δὲ τὸν Ὠριγένην ἀνέπνευεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ
Πλάτων τὸ Δεύτερον καὶ τὸ Τρίτον αἶτιον, ὡς αὐτὸς ὀνομά-
ζειν εἴωθεν, ἀρχὴν ὑπάρχειας, εἰληφέναι φησί· καὶ Ὠριγένης
συναίδιον πανταχοῦ ὁμολογεῖ τὸν υἱὸν τῷ πατρὶ· It seems
to me wonderful, how those two persons should
persist in the Arian persuasion; one of them having
always Plato in his hands, and the other con-
tinually breathing Origen. Since Plato no where
affirmeth his first and second cause (as he was
wont to call them) to have had any beginning of
their existence; and Origen every where confess-
eth the Son to be coeternal with the Father.

Besides which, another reason for this apology
of the Christian Platonist was, because as the Pla-
tonic Pagans after Christianity did approve of the
Christian doctrine concerning the Logos, as that
which was exactly agreeable with their own; so
did the generality of the Christian fathers, be-
fore and after the Nicene council, represent the
genuine Platonic trinity as really the same thing
with the Christian, or as approaching so near to
it, that they differed chiefly in circumstances, or
the manner of expression. The former of these is
evident from that famous passage of Amelius con-
temporary with Plotinus, recorded by Eusebius,
St. Cyril, and Theodoret; Καὶ οὗτος ἄρα
ἦν ὁ Λόγος, καθ' ὃν αἰεὶ ὄντα, τὰ γινόμενα ἐγί-
νετο, ὡς ἂν καὶ ὁ Ἡράκλειτος ἀξιῷσει, καὶ νῆ Δι' Pr. Ev. l. xi.
c. ix. [cap.
xix. p. 540.]
ὃν ὁ Βάρβαρος ἀξιοῖ ἐν τῇ τῆς ἀρχῆς τάξει τε καὶ ἀξία καθισ-
τηκότα, πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν εἶναι, καὶ Θεὸν εἶναι· δι' οὗ πάνθ' ἀπ-
λῶς γεγενῆσθαι· ἐν ᾧ τὸ γινόμενον ζῶν καὶ ζωὴν καὶ ὃν πε-
φυκέναι· καὶ εἰς τὰ σώματα πίπτειν καὶ σάρκα ἐνδυσάμενον,

φανταζομαι ἀνθρώπου, μετὰ καὶ τοῦ τεχνικῶτα διακνέειν τῆς φύσεως τὸ μεγαλειὸν ἀμέλει· καὶ ἀναλυθέντα πάλιν ἀποθνήσκει, καὶ Θεὸν εἶναι, οἷος ἦν πρὸ τοῦ εἰς τὸ σῶμα, καὶ τὸν ἀνθρώπου καταχθῆναι· And this was the Logos or Word, by whom existing from eternity, according to Heraclitus, all things were made, and whom that barbarian also placeth in the rank and dignity of a principle, affirming him to have been with God, and to be God ; and that all things were made by him, and that whatsoever was made, was life and being in him. As also, that he descended into a body, and, being clothed in flesh, appeared as a man, though not without demonstration of the Divinity of his nature. But that afterwards being loosed or separated from the same, he was deified, and became God again, such as he was before he came down into a mortal body.—In which words, Amelius speaks favourably also of the incarnation of that eternal Logos. The same is further manifest from what St. Austin writeth concerning a Platonist in his time : “Initium sancti evangelii, cuinomen est secundumJohannem, quidam Platonicus, sicut a sancto sene Simpliciano, qui postea Mediolanensi ecclesiae praesedit episcopus, solebamus audire, aureis literis conscribendum, et per omnes ecclesias in locis eminentissimis proponendum esse dicebat.” We have often heard from that holy man Simplicianus, afterward bishop of Milan, that a certain Platonist affirmed, the beginning of St John’s Gospel deserved to be writ in letters of gold, and to be set up in all the most eminent places throughout the Christian churches.—And the latter will sufficiently appear from these following testimonies : Justin Martyr, in his apology affirmeth of

De Civ. Dei.

l. x. c. xxix.

[p. 202. tom.

vii. oper.]

evangelii, cuinomen est secundumJohannem, quidam Platonicus, sicut a sancto

Plato, *δεντρίαν χώραν τῇ παρὰ Θεοῦ λόγῳ δέ-* reg. 99.
δοσε τὴν δὲ τρίτην τῇ λεχθέντι ἐπιφύεσθαι τῇ [Apol. 2.]
ὑδατι πνεύματι, &c. That he gave the second place to
 the Word of God; and the third to that Spirit,
 which is said to have moved upon the waters.—
 Clemens Alexandrinus, speaking of that passage
 in Plato's second epistle to Dionysius, concerning
 the first, second, and third, writeth thus: *οὐκ*
ἄλλως ἐγωγε ἔξακούω, ἢ τὴν ἁγίαν τριάδα μηνύ- Num. 1. v.
εσθαι, τρίτον μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὸ ὄνομα πνεῦμα· τὸν p. 598. [p.
υἱὸν δὲ δυνάτερον, δι' οὗ πάντα ἐγένετο κατὰ βού- 7:0. edit. Pot-
λησιν τοῦ πατρὸς· I understand this no otherwise,
 than that the holy Trinity is signified thereby,
 the third being the Holy Ghost, and the second
 the Son, by whom all things were made, ac-
 cording to the will of the Father.—Origen also
 affirmeth the Son of God to have been plainly
 spoken of by Plato, in his epistle to Hermias and
 Coriscus, *ὁ πάντ' ἐπαγγελλόμενος εἶδέναι Κέλ-* L. vi. c. Cels.
τος καὶ πολλὰ τῶν Πλάτωνος παρατιθέμενος, [p. 280.]
οἶμαι, σιωπᾷ τὸν περὶ υἱοῦ Θεοῦ λόγον, τὸν παρὰ Πλά-
τωνι λεγόμενον ἐν τῇ πρὸς Ἑρμείαν καὶ Κορίσκον ἐπιστολῇ·
 Celsus, who pretendeth to know all things, and
 who citeth so many other passages out of Plato,
 doth purposely (as I suppose) dissemble and con-
 ceal that, which he wrote concerning the Son of
 God, in his epistle to Hermias and Coriscus;
 where he calls him the God of the whole uni-
 verse, and the prince of all things, both present
 and future; afterwards speaking of the Father of
 this prince and cause.—And again, elsewhere in
 that book, he writeth to the same pur- Cont. Cels. 1.
 pose: *ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἔβωλετο τὸ παρὰ Πλάτωνι ἐν* vi. p. 308.

* The following are not Origen's words, but Dr. Cudworth's, who thus explains the passage of Plato cited by Origen.

ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς λελεγμένον, οὐ ἐν τοῖς ἀνωτέρω ἐμνήσθημεν, περὶ τοῦ διακοσμήσαντος τόδε τὸ πᾶν, ὡς ὄντος υἱοῦ, θεοῦ, παρατίθεσθαι· ἵνα μὴ καὶ αὐτὸς ὑπὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος, ὃν πολλὰ κίς ἐπέμνηνεν, ἀναγκασθῇ παραδέξασθαι, ὅτι ὁ μὲν δημιουργὸς τοῦδε τοῦ παντός, υἱὸς ἐστὶ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὁ δὲ πρῶτος καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶσι θεὸς πατὴρ ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ. Neither would Celsus (here speaking of Christians making Christ the Son of God) take any notice of that passage in Plato's epistle beforementioned, concerning the framer and governor of the whole world, as being the Son of God; lest he should be compelled by the authority of Plato, whom he so often magnifieth, to agree with this doctrine of ours, that the Demiurgus of the whole world is the Son of God; but the first and supreme Deity, his Father.—Moreover, St. Cyprian, or whoever were the author of the book inscribed *De Spiritu Sancto*, affirmeth the Platonists first and universal Psyche, to be the same with the Holy Ghost in the Christian theology, in these words: "*Hujus sempiterna virtus et divinitas, cum in propria natura, ab inquisitoribus mundi antiquis philosophis proprie investigari non posset; subtilissimis tamen intuiti conjecturis compositionem mundi, et distinctis elementorum affectibus, præsentem omnibus animam adfuisse dixerunt; quibus, secundum genus et ordinem singulorum, vitam præberet et motum, et intransgressibiles figeret metas, et stabilitatem assignaret; et universam hanc vitam, hunc motum, hanc rerum essentiam, animam mundi vocaverunt.*" In the next place, Eusebius Cæsariensis gives a full and clear testimony of the concordance and agreement of the Platonic, at least as to the main, with the Christian Trinity, which he will have to have been

Fr. Ev. I. xi.
c. xx. [p.
541.]

the cabala of the ancient Hebrews, thus: τῶν παρ' Ἑβραίοις λογίων μετὰ τὸν περὶ πατρός καὶ Υἱοῦ λόγον, ἐν τρίτῃ τάξει τὸ Ἅγιον Πνεῦμα καταλογόντων· καὶ τὴν γε·άγιαν καὶ μακαρίαν Τριάδα τοῦτον ὑποταθιμέναν τὸν τρόπον, ὡς ἂν τῆς τρίτης δυνάμεως πᾶσαν ὑπερβεβηκυίας γενητὴν φέσσαν· ὥσαν πρώτην μὲν τῶν διὰ τοῦ Υἱοῦ συστασῶν ποιεῶν ὑποσώων, τρίτην δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου Αἰτίαν· θία ὅπως καὶ ὁ Πλάτων ταυτὰ τοια ἠνέξατο διὰ τῆς πρὸς Διονύσιον ἐπιστολῆς, &c. The oracles of the Hebrews, placing the Holy Ghost after the Father, and the Son in the third rank, and acknowledging a holy and blessed Trinity after this manner, so as that this third power does also transcend all created nature, and is the first of those intellectual substances, which proceed from the Son, and the third from the first cause: see how Plato enigmatically declareth the same things in his epistle to Dionysius, in these words, &c. These things the interpreters of Plato refer to a first god, and to a second cause, and to a third the soul of the world, which they call also the third god. And the Divine Scriptures in like manner rank the holy Trinity of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, in the place or degree of a principle.—But it is most observable what Athanasius affirmeth of the Platonists; that though they derived the second hypostasis of their trinity from the first, and the third from the second, yet they supposed both their second and third hypostases to be uncreated; and therefore does he send the Arians to school thither, who, because there is but one Ἀγέννητος, one self-originated Being—would unskilfully conclude, that the Word or Son of God must therefore needs be a creature. Thus in his book concerning the decrees of the Nicene council; ἐχρήσαυτο Pl. 272.

παρ' Ἑλλήνων λοιπὸν τὴν λέξιν τοῦ Ἀγεννήτου ἵνα προφάσιν καὶ τούτου τοῦ ὀνόματος, ἐν τοῖς γενητοῖς πάλιν καὶ τοῖς κτίσμασι συναριθμῶσι τὸν τοῦ θεοῦ Λόγον· δι' οὗ αὐτὰ τὰ γενητὰ γέγονεν· εἰ μὲν οὖν ἀγνοοῦντες τὸ ὄνομα οὕτως ἀναισχυντοῦσιν, ἔδει μαθεῖν αὐτοὺς παρὰ τῶν αὐτοῖς δεδοκότων αὐτὸ, ὅτι καὶ οὗ λέγουσιν ἐκ τοῦ Ἀγαθοῦ Νοῦν, καὶ τὸν ἐκ τοῦ Νοῦ ψυχὴν κατὰ γινώσκοντες τὸ ἐξ ὧν εἰσιν, οὐκ ἐφοβήθησαν· ὅμως καὶ αὐτὰ εἰπεῖν Ἀγένητα· εἰδότες ὅτι καὶ τοῦτο λέγοντες οὐκ ἐλαττοῦσι τὸ πρῶτον ἐξ οὗ καὶ ταῦτα πέφυκε· καὶ ἡ καὶ αὐτοὺς οὕτω λέγειν, ἢ μηδὲν λέγειν περὶ ὧν οὐκ ἴσασιν· The Arians borrowing the word Agennetos from the Pagans, (who acknowledge only one such) make that a pretence to rank the Word or Son of God, who is the creator of all, amongst creatures or things made: Whereas they ought to have learned the right signification of that word Agennetos from those very Platonists, who gave it them: who, though acknowledging their second hypostasis of Nous or Intellect, to be derived from the first called Tagathon, and their third hypostasis or Psyche from the second; nevertheless doubt not to affirm them both to be ageneta or uncreated, knowing well, that hereby they detract nothing from the majesty of the first, from whom these two are derived. Wherefore, the Arians either ought so to speak as the Platonists do, or else to say nothing at all concerning these things; which they are ignorant of. In which words of Athanasius, there is a plain distinction made betwixt ἀγέννητος and ἀγένητος, that is, unbegotten and uncreated; and the second person of the Trinity, the Son or Word of God, though acknowledged by him not to be Ἀγέννητος, unbegotten, (he being begotten of the Father, who is the only Agennetos) yet is he here said to be Ἀγένητος, uncreated; he declaring

the Platonists thus to have affirmed the second and third hypostases of their trinity, not to be creatures, but uncreated. Which signal testimony of Athanasius, concerning the Platonic trinity, is a great vindication of the same. We might here further add St. Austin's confession also, that God the Father, and God the Son, were by the Platonists

acknowledged in like manner, as by the Christians; though, concerning the Holy Ghost, he observes some difference betwixt Plotinus and Porphyrius, in that the former did postponere animæ naturam paterno intellectui; the latter, interponere: Plotinus did postpone his Psyche, or soul, after the paternal Intellect; but Porphyrius interponed it betwixt the Father and the Son, as a middle between both.—It was before observed, that St. Cyril of Alexandria affirmeth nothing to be wanting to the Platonic trinity, but only that homœousiotes of his and some other fathers in that age, that they should not only all be God, or uncreated, but also three coequal individuals, under the same ultimate species, as three individual men; he conceiving that gradual subordination, that is in the Platonic trinity, to be a certain tang of Arianism. Nevertheless, he thus concludeth,* *πλὴν οὐκ ἠγνόηκεν ὁλοσφύτως τὸ ἀληθές*, that Plato notwithstanding was not altogether ignorant of the truth, but that he had the knowledge of the only-begotten Son of God, as likewise of the Holy Ghost, called by him Psyche; and that he would have every way expressed himself rightly, had he not been afraid of Anitus and Melitus, and that poison, which Socrates

* Advers. Julian. lib. i. p. 34.

drunk. Now, whether this were a fault or no in the Platonists, that they did not suppose their hypostases to be three individuals under the same ultimate species, we leave to others to judge. We might here add the testimony of Chalcidius, because he is unquestionably concluded to have been a Christian; though his language indeed be too much paganical, when he calls the three Divine hypostases, a chief, a second, and a third

P. 277. [cap. god : "Istius rei dispositio talis mente
vii. §. 186. p.
346, 347. concipienda est; originem quidem rerum
edit. Fabricii.] esse summum et ineffabilem Deum; post
providentiam ejus secundum Deum, latorem legis
utriusque vitæ tam æternæ quam temporariæ;
tertium esse porro substantiam, quæ secunda
mens intellectusque dicitur, quasi quædam custos
legis æternæ. His subjectas esse rationabiles
animas, legi obsequentes, ministras vero potes-
tates, &c. Ergo summus Deus jubet, secundus
ordinat, tertius intimat. Animæ vero legem
agunt." This thing is to be conceived after this
manner; that the first Original of things is the
supreme and ineffable God; after his providence,
a second god, the establisher of the law of life
both eternal and temporary; and the third (which
is also a substance, and called a second mind or
intellect) is a certain keeper of this eternal law.
Under these three are rational souls, subject to
that law, together with the ministerial powers,
&c. So that the sovereign or supreme God com-
mands, the second orders, and the third executes.
But souls are subject to the law.—Where Chal-
cidius, though seeming indeed rather more a
Platonist than a Christian, yet acknowledgeth no
such beings as henades and noes; but only three

Divine hypostases, and under them rational souls. But we shall conclude with the testimony of Theodoret in his book *De Principio* : * τὴν Πλάτωνος διανοιαν ἀναπτύσσοντας ὁ Πλάτωνος καὶ ὁ Νουμηνίος, τρία φασὶν αὐτὸν εἶρησθαι ὑπέρχονα καὶ αἰδία, τ' ἀγαθόν, καὶ νοῦν, καὶ τοῦ παντός τὴν ψυχὴν· ὃν μὲν ἡμεῖς Πατέρα καλοῦμεν τ' ἀγαθὸν ὀνομάζοντες, Νοῦν δὲ ὃν ἡμεῖς Λόγον προσαγορεύομεν, τὴν δὲ τὰ πάντα ψύχουσαν καὶ ζωοποιούσαν δύναμιν, Ψυχὴν καλοῦντα, ἢ Πνεῦμα ἅγιον οἱ θεοὶ προσαγορεύουσι λόγοι· καὶ ταῦτα δὲ ἐκ τῆς Ἑβραίων φιλοσοφίας καὶ θεολογίας συνέληπται. Plotinus and Numenius, explaining Plato's sense, declare him to have asserted three super-temporals or eternals, Good, Mind or Intellect, and the Soul of the universe; he calling that Tagathon which to us is Father; that Mind or Intellect, which to us is the Son or Word; and that Psyche, or a power animating and enlivening all things, which our Scriptures call the Holy Ghost. And these things (saith he) were by Plato purloined from the philosophy and theology of the Hebrews.

Wherefore, we cannot but take notice here of a wonderful providence of Almighty God, that this doctrine of a trinity of Divine hypostases should find such admittance and entertainment in the Pagan world, and be received by the wisest of all their philosophers, before the time of Christianity; thereby to prepare a more easy way for the reception of Christianity among the learned Pagans: which that it proved successful accordingly, is undeniably evident from the monuments of antiquity. And the junior Platonists, who were most opposite and adverse to Christianity, became at length so sensible hereof, that besides

* Tom. ii. oper. p. 496.

their other adulterations of the Trinity before-mentioned, for the countenancing of their polytheism and idolatry, they did, in all probability for this very reason, quite innovate, change, and pervert, the whole cabala, and no longer acknowledge a trinity, but either a quaternity, or a quinary, or more of Divine hypostases; they first of all contending, that before the Trinity, there was another supreme and highest hypostasis, not to be reckoned with the others, but standing alone by himself. And we conceive the first innovator in this kind to have been Jamblichus, who, in his Egyptian Mysteries,* where he seems to make the Egyptian theology to agree with his own hypotheses, writeth in this manner: *πρὸ τῶν ὧτως ὄντων καὶ τῶν ὀλίγων ἀρχῶν, ἰστέ θεὸς ὡς πρῶτος καὶ τοῦ πρώτου θεοῦ καὶ βασιλεὺς: ὁ δὲ νῦντος ἐν μονότητι τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἐνότητος μένων· ὧς γὰρ κοινὴς αὐτῇ ἐκτελέσσας, οὐτε ἄλλο τι παράδειγμα δι' ἰδρυταί τοῦ αὐτοπάτορος αὐτογόνου καὶ μονοπάτορος θεοῦ τοῦ ὄντος ἐγαθὸν· μῆλον γὰρ τε καὶ πρῶτον καὶ πηγὴ τῶν πάντων, καὶ πνεμὴν τῶν νοουμένων πρώτων ἰδεῶν ὄντων: ἀπὸ δὲ τούτου ἐκείνου, ὁ ἀντάρκης θεός, αὐτὸν ἐξέλαμψε, διὸ καὶ ἀντοπάτωρ καὶ ἀντάρκης· ἀρχὴ γὰρ αὐτοῦ καὶ θεὸς θεῶν· μονὴ ἐκ τοῦ ἐνός, προσόνος καὶ ἀρχὴ τῆς αἰτίας. Before those things, which truly are, and the principles of all, there is one God superior to the first God and king, immovable, and always remaining in the solitude of his own unity; there being nothing intelligible; not any thing else mingled with him; but he being the paradigm of that God truly good, which is self-begotten and his own parent. For this is greater, and before him, and the fountain of all things, the foundation of all the first intelligible ideas. Wherefore, from this one did that self-sufficient*

* Sect. viii. cap. ii. p. 158.

God, who is autopatēr, or his own parent, cause himself to shine forth; for this is also a principle, and the God of gods, a monad from the first one, before all essence.—Where, so far as we can understand, Jamblichus's meaning is, that there is a simple unity in order of nature, before that Tagathōa, or monad, which is the first of the three Divine hypostases. And this doctrine was In Timæ. lib. ii. p. 93. afterwards taken up by Proclus, he de-

claring it in this manner; πανταχοῦ ὁ Πλάτων ἀπὸ τοῦ πλήθους ἐπὶ τὰς ἐνάδας ἀναστρέχειν εἰωθεν· μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ πρὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος κατὰ τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων τάξιν πρὸ τοῦ πλήθους ἐν αἰεὶ ἵσται, καὶ πᾶσα θεὰ τάξις ἀπὸ μονάδος ἀρχεται· δεῦ μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τριάδος προῖναι τὸν ἀριθμὸν τὸν θεῖον, ἀλλὰ πρὸ τῆς τριάδος ἢ μονάδος ἵσται μὲν οὐκ καὶ οἱ δαιμονουργοὶ τρεῖς ἀλλὰ τις ὁ πρὸ τῶν τριῶν εἰς, οὐδεμία γὰρ τῶν θεῶν τάξιν ἐκ πλήθους ἀρχεται· οὐκ ἄρα ἀπὸ τριάδος ἀρχεσθαι δεῖ τὸν δαιμονουργικὸν ἀριθμὸν, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ μονάδος· Plato every where ascends from multitude to unity; from whence also the order of the many proceeds; but before Plato, and according to the natural order of things, one is before multitude, and every Divine order begins from a monad. Wherefore, though the Divine number proceed in a trinity, yet before this trinity must there be a monad. Let there be three demiurgical hypostases; nevertheless, before these must there be one, because none of the Divine orders begins from multitude. We conclude, that the demiurgical number does not begin from a trinity, but from a monad, standing alone by itself before that trinity.—Here Proclus, though endeavouring to gain some countenance for this doctrine out of Plato, yet, as fearing lest that should fail him, does he fly to the order of nature, and from thence would infer, that before

the trinity of demiurgic hypostases, there must be a single monad or hebad, standing alone by itself, as the head thereof. And St. Cyril of Alexandria, who was junior to Jamblichus, but senior to Proclus, seems to take notice of this innovation in the Platonic theology, as a thing then newly crept up, and after the time of Por-

ph. 271.

phyry : ἀλλ' οἱ γε προσημνένοι καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο ἀντιλέγουσι, φάσκοντες μὴ δεῖν τ' ΑΓΑΘΟΝ συναριθμῆν τοῖς ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἐξήρῃσθαι γὰρ ἀπὸ πάσης κοινωνίας διὰ τὸ εἶναι ἀπλὸν πάντη καὶ ἄδεκτον τινὸς συμβάσεως· Ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ΝΟΥ, (ἀρχὴ γὰρ οὗτος) τὴν τριάδα μίαν σωθῆναι. But those beforementioned contradict this doctrine (of Porphyrius and the ancient Platonists), affirming that the Tagathon ought not to be connumerated or reckoned together with those which proceed from it, but to be exempted from all communion, because it is altogether simple, and incapable of any commixture or consociation with any other. Wherefore these begin their trinity with Nous or Intellect, making that the first.—The only difference here is, that Jamblichus seems to make the first hypostasis of the trinity after a monad to be Tagathon, but St. Cyril, Nous. However, they both meant the same thing, as also did Proclus after them. Wherefore, it is evident, that when, from the time of the Nicene council and Athanasius, the Christian doctrine of the Trinity came to be punctually stated and settled, and much to be insisted upon by Christians, Jamblichus, and other Platonists, who were great antagonists of the same, perceiving what advantage the Christians had from the Platonic trinity, then first of all innovated this doctrine, introducing a quaternity of Divine hypostases, instead of a trinity, the

first of them being not co-ordinate with the other three, nor consociated or reckoned with them; but all of them, though subordinate, yet universal, and such as comprehend the whole; that is, infinite and omnipotent; and therefore none of them creatures. For it is certain, that before this time, or the age that Jamblichus lived in, there was no such thing at all dreamed of by any Platonist, as an unity before and above the Trinity, and so a quaternity of Divine hypostases; Plotinus positively determining, that there could neither be more nor fewer than three; and Proclus himself acknowledging the ancient tradition, or cabala, to have run only of three gods; and Numinus, who was senior to them both, writing thus of Socrates, *Τρεῖς θεοὺς τιθε- μένοι Σωκράτους*, that he also (before Plato) asserted three gods;—that is, three Divine hypostases, and no more, as principles; therein following the Pythagoreans.

Basch. P. E.
l. xiv. c. v.
[p. 723.]

Moreover, the same Proclus, besides his henades and noes beforementioned, added certain other fantastic trinities of his own also; as this, for example, of the first essence, the first life, and the first intellect (to omit others); whereby that ancient cabala and *θεοπαράδοτος θεολογία*, theology of Divine tradition—of three archical hypostases, and no more, was disguised, perverted, and adulterated.

But, besides this advantage from the ancient Pagan Platonists and Pythagoreans admitting a trinity into their theology, in like manner as Christianity doth (whereby Christianity was the more recommended to the philosophic Pagans), there is another advantage of the same extending

even to this present time, probably not unintended also by Divine Providence; that, whereas bold and conceited wits, precipitately condemning the doctrine of the Trinity for nonsense, absolute repugnancy to human faculties, and impossibility, have thereupon some of them quite shaken off Christianity, and all revealed religion, professing only Theism; others have frustrated the design thereof, by paganizing it into creature-worship or idolatry; this ignorant or conceited confidence of both may be returned, and confuted from hence, because the most ingenious and acute of all the Pagan philosophers, the Platonists and Pythagoreans, who had no bias at all upon them, nor any Scripture revelation, that might seem to impose upon their faculties, but followed the free sentiments and dictates of their own minds, did notwithstanding not only entertain this trinity of Divine hypostases eternal and uncreated, but were also fond of the hypothesis, and made it a main fundamental of their theology.

It now appears from what we have declared, that as to the ancient and genuine Platonists and Pythagoreans, none of their trinity of gods, or Divine hypostases, were independent, so neither were they *γεννητοὶ θεοί*, creature-gods,—but uncreated; they being all of them not only eternal, and necessarily existent and immutable, but also universal, that is infinite and omnipotent; causes, principles, and creators of the whole world. From whence it follows, that these Platonists could not justly be taxed for idolatry, in giving religious worship to each hypostasis of this their trinity. And we have the rather insisted so long upon this Platonic trinity, because we shall make use of this

doctrine afterwards, in our defence of Christianity, where we are to shew, that one grand design of Christianity being to abolish the Pagan idolatry, or creature-worship, itself cannot justly be charged with the same from that religious worship given to our Saviour Christ, and the Trinity (the Son and Holy Ghost), they being none of them, according to the true and orthodox Christianity, creatures; however the Arian hypothesis made them such. And this was indeed the grand reason, why the ancient fathers so zealously opposed Arianism, because that Christianity, which was intended by God Almighty for a means to extirpate Pagan idolatry, was thereby itself paganized and idolatized, and made highly guilty of that very thing, which it so much condemned in the Pagans, that is, creature-worship. This might be proved by sundry testimonies of Athanasius, Basil, Gregory Nyssen, Gregory Nazianzen, Epiphanius, Chrysostom, Hilary, Ambrose, Austin, Faustinus, and Cyril of Alexandria; all of them charging the Arians as guilty of the very same idolatry with the Gentiles or Pagans, in giving religious worship even to the Word and Son of God himself (and consequently to our Saviour Christ), as he was supposed by them to be but a creature. But we shall content ourselves here only to cite one remarkable passage out of Athanasius, in his fourth oration against the

P. 468, 469.

Arians: διὰ τί οὖν οἱ Ἀρειμανῖται τοιαῦτα λογιζόμενοι καὶ ποῦντες, οὐ συναριθμοῦσιν ἑαυτοὺς μετὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων, καὶ γὰρ ἐρέκειναι ὥσπερ οὗτοι τῇ κτίσει λατρεύουσι κατὰ τὸν κτίσαντα τὰ πάντα Θεόν——εἰ δὲ οἱ μὲν Ἕλληνες ἐν ἀγενήτῳ καὶ πολλοῖς γενητοῖς λατρεύουσιν, οὗτοι δὲ ἐνὶ γενητῷ καὶ ἀγενήτῳ, οὐδ' οὕτω διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων· ὁ γὰρ παρ'

αὐτῶν λεγόμενος εἰς γενητός ἐκ πολλῶν ἐστὶ, καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ δὲ πάλιν τῶν Ἑλλήνων τὴν αὐτὴν τῷ ἐνὶ ταύτῃ φύσει ἔχουσι, καὶ οὕτως γὰρ κἀκεῖνοι κτίσματα εἰσιν ἄθλιοι καὶ πλείον ὅσον ἐβλάβησαν κατὰ Χριστοῦ φρονούντες· ἐξέκτισον γὰρ τῆς ἀληθείας· καὶ τὴν μὲν Ἰουδαίων προδοσίαν ὑπερέβησαν ἀρνούμενοι τὸν Χριστόν· τοῖς δὲ Ἕλλησι συγκυλίωνται, κτίσμασι καὶ διαφόροις θεοῖς λατρεύοντες οἱ θεοστυγεῖς· Why therefore do not these Arians, holding this, reckon themselves amongst the Pagans or Gentiles, since they do in like manner worship the creature, besides the Creator? For though the Pagans worship one uncreated and many created gods, but these Arians only one uncreated and one created, to wit, the Son or Word of God; yet will not this make any real difference betwixt them; because the Arians' one created is one of those many Pagan gods; and those many gods of the Pagans or Gentiles have the same nature with this one, they being alike creatures. Wherefore these wretched Arians are apostates from the truth of Christianity, they betraying Christ more than the Jews did, and wallowing or tumbling in the filth of Pagan idolatry; worshipping creatures, and different kinds of gods:—where, by the way, we may take notice that when Athanasius affirmeth of the Arians, what St. Paul doth of the Pagans, that they did τῇ κτίσει λατρεύειν παρὰ τὸν κτίσαντα, his meaning could not well be, that they worshipped the creature more than the Creator; forasmuch as the Arians constantly declared, that they gave less worship to Christ the Son or Word of God, he being by them accounted but a creature, than they did to the Father the Creator; but either that they worshipped the creature besides the Creator, or the creature instead of the Creator, or in the room of

him, who was alone of right to be religiously worshipped. Again, when the same Athanasius declareth, that the Greeks, Gentiles, or Pagans, did universally worship *ἐν ἀγέννητῳ*, only one uncreated,—he seems to imply, that the Platonic trinity of hypostases, affirmed by him to be all uncreated, were by them looked upon only as one entire Divinity.

But the principal things, which we shall observe from this passage of Athanasius, and those many other places of the fathers, where they parallel the Arians with the Pagans, making the former guilty of the very same idolatry with the latter; even then, when they worshipped our Saviour Christ himself, or the Word and Son of God, as he was by them supposed to be nothing but a creature, are these following; first, that it is here plainly declared by them, that the generality of the Pagans did not worship a multitude of independent gods, but that only one of their gods was uncreated or self-existent, and all their other many gods looked upon by them as his creatures. This, as it is expressly affirmed by Athanasius here, that the Greeks or Pagans did *ἐν ἀγέννητῳ καὶ πολλοῖς γυνητοῖς λατρεύον*, worship only one uncreated, and many created gods;—so is it plainly implied by all those other forementioned fathers, who charge the Arians with the guilt of Pagan idolatry: because, had the Pagans worshipped many uncreated and independent gods, it would not therefore follow, that the Arians were idolaters, if the Pagans were. But that this was indeed the sense of the fathers, both before and after the Nicene council, concerning the Pagan polytheism and idolatry, that it consisted not in wor-

shipping many uncreated and independent gods, but only one uncreated and many created, hath been already otherwise manifested; and it might be further confirmed by sundry testimonies of them; as this of St. Gregory Nazianzen in his 37th oration; *Τὶ δαὶ οὐχὶ καὶ παρ' Ἑλλήνων φαίεν ἅν Μία Θεότης, ὡς οἱ τὰ τελευταῖα παρ' ἐκείνους Φιλοσόφουντες;* What then, would some say, is there not one Divinity also amongst the Pagans, as they, who philosophize more fully and perfectly amongst them, do declare?—And that full and remarkable one of Irenæus, where he plainly affirmeth of the Gentiles; “*Ita creaturæ potius quam Creatori serviebant, et his quoniam sunt dii, ut primum deitatis locum attribuerent uni alicui et summo fabricatori hujus universitatis Deo:*” that they so served the creature, and those who are not gods, rather than the Creator; that notwithstanding they attributed the first place of the Deity to one certain supreme God, the maker of this universe.—The second thing is, that Athanasius, and all those other orthodox fathers, who charged the Arians with Pagan idolatry, did thereby plainly imply, these not to be incapable of idolatry, who worship one sovereign Numen, or acknowledge one supreme Deity, the maker of the whole world; since not only the Arians unquestionably did so, but also, according to these fathers the very Pagans themselves. The third thing is, that, in the judgment of Athanasius, and all the orthodox anti-Arian fathers, to give religious worship to any created being whatsoever, though inferior to that worship which is given to the supreme God, and therefore, according to the mo-

den distinction, not *ἀετρεία*, but *δοῦλα*, is absolutely idolatry. Because it is certain, that the Arians gave much an inferior worship to Christ, the Son, or Word of God, whom they contended to be a mere creature, made in time, mutable and defectible, than they did to that eternal God, who was the Creator of him. As those fathers imply, the Pagans themselves to have given much an inferior worship to their πολλοὶ γέννητοὶ θεοί, their many gods,—whom themselves looked upon as creatures, than they did ἐν ἀγνώσει, to that one uncreated God.

Now if the Arians, who zealously contended for the unity of the Godhead, were nevertheless, by the fathers, condemned as guilty of idolatry, for bestowing but an inferior kind of religious worship upon Christ, the Son or Word of God himself, as he was supposed by them to be a creature; then certainly cannot they be excused from that guilt, who bestow religious worship upon these other creatures, angels and souls of men, though inferior to what they give to the supreme omnipotent God, the creator of all. Because the Son or Word of God, however conceived by these Arians to be a creature, yet was looked upon by them as the first, the most glorious, and most excellent of all creatures, and that by which, as an instrument, all other creatures, as angels and souls, were made; and therefore, if it were idolatry in them, to give an inferior kind of religious worship to this Son and Word of God himself, according to their hypothesis, then can it not possibly be accounted less, to bestow the same upon those other creatures, made by him, as angels and men deceased. Besides which, the Word and

Son of God, however supposed by these Arians to be a creature, yet was not really such ; and is in Scripture unquestionably declared to be a true object of religious worship (" Worship him, all ye gods") ; so that the Arians, though formally idolaters, according to their own false hypothesis, yet were not materially and really so : whereas these religious angel and saint-worshippers must be as well materially as formally such. And here it is observable, that these ancient fathers made no such distinction of religious worship, into Latria, as peculiar to the supreme God, it being that whereby he is adored as self-existent and omnipotent, or the Creator of all ; and Doulia, such an inferior religious worship, as is communicable to creatures : but concluded of religious worship, universally, and without distinction, that the due object of it all was the Creator only, and not any creature. Thus Athanasius plainly in his third oration : " *ὡς γὰρ ὡς τῷ δόξῃ ὑπερέχοντι προσκυνεῖτο, ἴδει καὶ ἑκάστου τῶν ὑποβιβηκότων, τὸν ὑπερέχοντα προσκυνεῖν· ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔστιν οὕτως, κτίσματι γὰρ κτίσμα οὐ προσκυνᾷ, ἀλλὰ κτίσμα θεόν.*" If the Son or Word of God were to be worshipped (though a creature) because transcending us in glory and dignity, then ought every inferior being to worship what is superior to it : whereas the case is otherwise ; for a creature doth not religiously worship a creature, but only God the Creator.—Now they, who distinguish religious worship into Latria and Doulia, must needs suppose the object of it in general to be that, which is superior to us, and not the Creator only ; which is here contradicted by Athanasius. But because it was objected against

these orthodox fathers by the Arians, that the humanity of our Saviour Christ, which is unquestionably a creature, did share in their religious worship also; it is worth the while to see what account Athanasius gives of this: οὐ

κτίσμα προσκυνούμεν, μὴ γένοιτο· Ἐθνικῶν γὰρ ^{Ad Adelph. p. 157. [Tom. I. super.]} καὶ Ἀρειανῶν ἡ τοιαύτη πλάνη· ἀλλὰ τὸν Κύριον

τῆς κτίσεως σαρκωθέντα τὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγον προσκυνούμεν· εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἡ σὰρξ αὐτῆ καθ' ἑαυτὴν μέρος ἐστὶ τῶν κτισμάτων, ἀλλὰ Θεοῦ γέγονε σῶμα καὶ οὔτε τὸ τοιοῦτον σῶμα, καθ' ἑαυτὸ διακρούντες ἀπὸ τοῦ Λόγου, προσκυνούμεν, οὔτε τὸν Λόγον προσκυνῆσαι θέλοντες, μακρύνομεν αὐτὸν ἀπὸ τῆς σαρκός· ἀλλ' αἰδόντες, τὸ, ὃ Λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο, τοῦτον καὶ ἐν σαρκὶ γενόμενον ἐπιγινώσκομεν Θεόν· We give no religious worship to any creature, far be it from us; for this is the error of the Pagans and of the Arians; but we worship the Word of God, the Lord of the creation incarnated. For though the flesh of Christ, considered alone by itself, were but a part of the creatures, nevertheless was it made the body of God. And we neither worship this body by itself alone, divided from the Word, nor yet, intending to worship the Word, do we remove it at a great distance from this flesh; but knowing that of the Scripture, "the Word was made flesh," we look upon this Word even in the flesh as God.

—And again to the same purpose, Καὶ γρ

P. 160.

πισκίτωσαν ὅτι τὸν Κύριον ἐν σαρκὶ προσκυνούμεν, οὐ κτίσματι προσκυνούμεν, ἀλλὰ τὸν κτίστην, ἐνδυσάμενον τὸ κτιστὸν σῶμα. Let these Arians know at length, that we, who worship the Lord in flesh, worship no creature, but only the Creator clothed with a creaturely body.—And for the same cause was it, that Nestorius afterwards, dividing the Word from the flesh, the Divinity of Christ from

the humanity, and not acknowledging such an hypostatic union betwixt them as he ought, but, nevertheless, religiously worshipping our Saviour Christ, was therefore branded by the Christian church with the name of *Ἀνθρωπολάτρης*, a man-worshipper, or idolater.—To conclude, they who excuse themselves from being idolaters no otherwise than because they do not give that very same religious worship to saints and angels, which is peculiar to God Almighty, and consists in honouring him as self-existent, and the Creator of all things, but acknowledge those others to be creatures; suppose that to be necessary to idolatry, which is absolutely impossible, viz. to acknowledge more omnipotents, as creators of all, than one, or to account creatures as such creators; as they imply all those to be incapable of idolatry, who acknowledge one supreme God the creator of the whole world; which is directly contradictory to the ancient church.

Hitherto, in way of answer to an atheistic objection against the naturality of the idea of a God, as including oneliness in it, from the Pagan Polytheism, have we largely proved, that at least the civilized and intelligent Pagans generally acknowledged one sovereign Nūten; and that their polytheism was partly but fantastical, nothing but the polyonymy of one supreme God, or the worshipping him under different names and notions, according to his several virtues and manifestations; and that though, besides this, they had another natural and real polytheism also, yet this was only of many inferior or created gods subordinate to one supreme *Ἀγέτωρ*, or uncreated.

Which, notwithstanding, is not so to be understood, as if we did confidently affirm, that the opinion of many independent deities never to have so much as entered into the mind of any mortal. For since human nature is so mutable and depravable, as that, notwithstanding the constant idea and prolepsis of God in the minds of men, some unquestionably do degenerate and lapse into Atheism; there can be no reason, why it should be thought absolutely impossible, for any ever to entertain that false conceit of more independent deities. But as for independent gods invisible, we cannot trace the footsteps of such a polytheism as this any where, nor find any more than a Dithaeism, of a good and evil principle: only Philo and others seem to have conceived, that amongst the ancient Pagans, some were so grossly sottish, as to suppose a plurality of independent gods visible, and to take the sun, and moon, and all the stars, for such. However, if there were any such, and these writers were not mistaken, as it frequently happened, it is certain, that they were but very few; because, amongst the most barbarian Pagans at this day, there is hardly any nation to be found, without an acknowledgment of a sovereign Deity, as appears from all those discoveries which have been made of them, since the improvement of navigation.

Wherefore, what hath been hitherto declared by us, might well be thought a sufficient answer to the forementioned atheistic objection against the idea of God. Notwithstanding which, when we wrote the contents of this chapter, we intended a farther account of the natural and real Polytheism of the Pagans, and their multifarious idolatry,

chiefly in order to the vindication of the truth of Christianity against Atheists ; forasmuch as one grand design hereof was unquestionably to destroy the Pagan Polytheism and idolatry, which consisted in worshipping the creature besides the Creator.

But we are very sensible, that we have been surprised in the length of this chapter, which is already swelled into a disproportionate bigness ; by means whereof we cannot comprehend, within the compass of this volume, all that belongs to the remaining contents, together with such a full and copious confutation of the atheistic grounds, as was intended. Wherefore we shall here divide the chapter, and reserve those remaining contents, together with a further confutation of Atheism, if need be, for another volume, which, God affording life, health, and leisure, we intend shall follow. Only subjoining, in the mean time, a short and compendious confutation of all the atheistic arguments proposed.

The reader will observe that the foregoing paragraph refers to the 4to. edit. of 1743, as published by Dr. Cadworth.

A
CONFUTATION
OF
ATHEISM.

CHAP. V.

HAVING in the second chapter revealed all the dark mysteries of Atheism, and produced the utmost strength of that cause; and in the third made an introduction to the confutation of those Atheistic grounds, by representing all the several forms and schemes of Atheism, and shewing both their disagreements amongst themselves, and wherein they all agree together against Theists; we have been hitherto prevented of that full and copious confutation of them, intended by us, by reason of that large account given of the Pagan Polytheism: which yet was no impertinent digression; neither, it removing the grand objection against the naturality of the idea of God, as including oneness in it; as also preparing a way for that defence of Christianity, designed by us against Atheists. Wherefore, that we may not here be quite excluded of what was principally intended, we shall subjoin a contracted and compendious confutation of all the premised Atheistic principles. The first whereof was this, that either men have no idea of God at all, or else none but such as is compounded and made up of impossible and contradictory notions; from whence these Athe-

ists would infer him to be an inconceivable nothing. In answer whereunto, there hath been something done already, it being declared in the beginning of the fourth chapter, what the idea of God is, viz. a perfect understanding nature, necessarily self-existent, and the cause of all other things. And as there is nothing either unconceivable or contradictory in this idea, so have we shewed, that these confounded Atheists do not only, at the same time when they verbally deny an idea of God, implicitly acknowledge and confess it, forasmuch as otherwise, denying his existence, they should deny the existence of nothing; but also that they agree with Theists in this very idea; it being the only thing that Atheists contend for, that the first original and head of all things is no perfect understanding nature, but that all sprung from Tohu and Bohu, or dark and senseless matter fortuitously moved. Moreover, we have not only thus declared the idea of God, but also largely proved, and made it clearly evident, that the generality of mankind in all ages have had a prolepsis or anticipation in their minds, concerning the real and actual existence of such a being; the Pagans themselves, besides their other many gods (which were understanding beings superior to men), acknowledging one chief and sovereign Numen, the maker of them all, and of the whole world. From whence it plainly appears, that those few Atheists, that formerly have been, and still are, here and there up and down in the world, are no other than the monsters and anomalies of human kind. And this alone might be sufficient to repel the first Atheistic assault, made against the idea of God.

Nevertheless, that we may not seem to dissemble any of the Atheists' strength, we shall here particularly declare all their most colourable pretences against the idea of God, and then shew the folly and invalidity of them. Which pretences are as follow : first, That we have no idea nor thought of any thing not subject to corporeal sense ; nor the least evidence of the existence of any thing, but from the same. Secondly, That Theists themselves acknowledging God to be incomprehensible, he may be from thence inferred to be a nonentity. Thirdly, That the Theists' idea of God, including infinity in it, is therefore absolutely inconceivable and impossible. Fourthly, That theology is an arbitrary complement of inconsistent and contradictory notions. And, lastly, That the idea and existence of God owes all its being, either to the confounded nonsense of astonished minds, or else to the fiction and imposture of politicians.

We begin with the first: That we can have no idea, conception, or thought, of any thing, not subject to sense ; nor the least evidence of the existence of any thing, but from the same. Thus a modern Atheistic writer ; " Whatsoever we can conceive, hath been perceived first by sense, either at once or in parts ; and a man can have no thought representing any thing not subject to sense." From whence it follows, that whatsoever is not sensible and imaginable, is utterly unconceivable, and to us nothing. Moreover, the same writer adds, that " the only evidence, which we have of the existence of any thing, is from sense ;" the consequence whereof is this, that there being

* Hobbes's Leviathan, part i. cap. 1.

no corporeal sense of a Deity, there can be no evidence at all of his existence. Wherefore, according to the tenor of the Atheistic philosophy, all is resolved into sense, as the only criterion of truth, accordingly as Protagoras in Plato's *Theætetus** concludes knowledge to be sense; and a late writer of our own, determines sense to be original knowledge. Here have we a wide ocean before us, but we must contract our sails. Were sense knowledge and understanding, then he, who sees lights and colours, and feels heat and cold, would understand light and colours, heat and cold, and the like of all other sensible things: neither would there be any philosophy at all concerning them. Whereas the mind of man remaineth altogether unsatisfied concerning the nature of these corporeal things, even after the strongest sensations of them, and is but thereby awakened to a further philosophic inquiry and search about them, what this light and colours, this heat and cold, &c. really should be; and whether they be indeed qualities in the objects without us, or only phantasms and sensations in ourselves. Now it is certain, that there could be no suspicion of any such thing as this, were sense the highest faculty in us; neither can sense itself ever decide this controversy; since one sense cannot judge of another, or correct the error in it; all sense as such (that is, as fancy and apparition) being alike true. And had not these Atheists been notorious dunces in that atomic philosophy which they so much pretend to, they would clearly have learned from thence, that sense is not knowledge and understanding, nor the criterion of truth as to sensible

things themselves; it reaching not to the essence or absolute nature of them, but only taking notice of their outside, and perceiving its own passions from them, rather than the things themselves; and that there is a higher faculty in the soul, of reason and understanding, which judges of sense; detects the fantasy and imposture of it; discovers to us that there is nothing in the objects themselves, like to those forementioned sensible ideas; and resolves all sensible things into intelligible principles; the ideas whereof are not foreign and adventitious, and mere passive impressions upon the soul from without, but native and domestic to it, or actively exerted from the soul itself; no passion being able to make a judgment either of itself, or other things. This is a thing so evident, that Democritus himself could not but take notice of it, and acknowledge it, though he made not a right use thereof; he in all probability continuing notwithstanding a confounded and besotted Atheist; Sextus Empiricus having recorded this of him: "Εν τοῖς κανόσι δύο φησὶν εἶναι γνώσεις, τὴν μὲν διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων, τὴν δὲ διὰ τῆς διανοίας· ὧν τὴν μὲν διὰ τῆς διανοίας γνώσιν κατάγει, προσμαρτυρῶν αὐτῇ τὸ πιστὸν εἰς ἀληθείας κρίσιν, τὴν δὲ διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων σκοτὴν ὀνομάζει, ἀφαιρούμενος αὐτῆς τὸ πρὸς διάγνωσιν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἀπλανές· λέγει δὲ κατὰ λέξιν, Γνώμης δὲ δύο εἰσὶν ἰδέαι· ἡ μὲν γνησίη· ἡ δὲ σκοτὴ· καὶ σκοτὴς μὲν, τὰ δὲ σὺμπαντα, ὄψις, ἀκοή, ὄσμη, γεῦσις, ψεῦσις· ἡ δὲ γνησίη ἀποκεκρυμμένη δὲ ταύτης· Democritus in his Canons affirmeth, that there are two kinds of knowledges; one of the senses, and another by the mind. Of which that by the mind is only accounted knowledge, he bearing witness to the faithfulness and firmness thereof

* Lib. vii. advers. Mathematic. §. 138, 139. p. 400.

for the judgment of truth. The other by the senses he calleth dark, denying it to be a rule and measure of truth. His own words are these: There are two species of knowledge, the one genuine, the other dark and obscure. The dark and obscure knowledge is seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching. But the genuine knowledge is another more hidden and recondit.—To which purpose there is another fragment also of this Democritus preserved by the same Sextus: *Νόμῳ γλυκὺ, καὶ νόμῳ πικρὸν, νόμῳ θερμὸν, νόμῳ ψυχρὸν· νόμῳ χρομή· αἰτία δὲ ἄτομα καὶ κενόν· ὅπερ νομίζεται μὲν εἶναι καὶ δοξάζεται τὰ αἰσθητὰ, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ταῦτα.* Bitter and sweet, hot and cold, are only in opinion or fancy. Colour is only in opinion; atoms and vacuum alone in truth and reality. That which is thought to be are sensibles; but these are not according to truth, but atoms and vacuum only. Now the chief ground of this rational discovery of the ancient Atomists, that sensible things, as heat and cold, bitter and sweet, red and green, are no real qualities in the objects without, but only our own fancies, was because in body there are no such things intelligible, but only magnitude, figure, site, motion, and rest. Of which we have not only sensible ideas, passively impressed upon us from without, but also intelligible notions, actively exerted from the mind itself. Which latter, notwithstanding, because they are not unaccompanied with sensible phantasms, and by many unskillfully confounded with them. But, besides these, we have other intelligible notions, or ideas, also which have no genuine phantasms at all belonging to them. Of which who-

* Id. *ibid.* §. 135. p. 390.

soever doubts, may easily be satisfied and convinced, by reading but a sentence or two that he understands in any book almost that shall come next to his hand; and reflexively examining himself, whether he have a phantasm, or sensible idea, belonging to every word or no. For whoever is modest and ingenuous will quickly be forced to confess, that he meets with many words, which though they have a sense or intelligible notion, yet have no genuine phantasm belonging to them. And we have known some, who were confidently engaged in the other opinion, being put to read the beginning of Tully's Offices, presently non-plussed and confounded in that first word *quamquam*; they being neither able to deny, but that there was a sense belonging to it, nor yet to affirm, that they had any phantasm thereof, save only of the sound or letters. But to prove that there are cogitations not subject to corporeal sense, we need go no further than this very idea or description of God; a substance absolutely perfect, infinitely good, wise, and powerful, necessarily self-existent, and the cause of all other things. Where there is not one word unintelligible to him, that hath any understanding in him, and yet no considerative and ingenuous person can pretend, that he hath a genuine phantasm, or sensible idea, answering to any one of those words, either to substance, or to absolutely perfect, or to infinitely, or to good, or to wise, or to powerful, or to necessity, or to self-existence, or to cause; or indeed to all, or other, or things. Wherefore it is nothing but want of meditation, together with a fond and sottish dotage upon corporeal sense, which hath so far imposed upon some, as to make them be-

lieve, that they have not the least cogitation of any thing not subject to corporeal sense; or that there is nothing in human understanding, or conception, which was not first in bodily sense; a doctrine highly favourable to Atheism. But since it is certain, on the contrary, that we have many thoughts not subject to sense, it is manifest, that whatsoever falls not under external sense, is not therefore unconceivable, and nothing. Which whosoever asserts, must needs affirm life and cogitation itself, knowledge or understanding, reason and memory, volition and appetite, things of the greatest moment and reality, to be nothing but mere words without any signification. Nay, fancy and sense itself, upon this hypothesis, could hardly escape from becoming nonentities too, forasmuch as neither fancy nor sense falls under sense, but only the objects of them; we neither seeing vision, nor feeling taction, nor hearing audition, much less hearing sight, or seeing taste, or the like. Wherefore, though God should be never so much corporeal, as some Theists have conceived him to be; yet since the chief of his essence, and as it were his inside, must by these be acknowledged to consist in mind, wisdom and understanding, he could not possibly, as to this, fall under corporeal sense (sight or touch) any more than thought can. But that there is substance incorporeal also, and therefore in itself altogether insensible, and that the Deity is such, is demonstrated elsewhere.

We grant, indeed, that the evidence of particular bodies, existing *hic et nunc*, without us, doth necessarily depend upon the information of sense; but yet, nevertheless, the certainty of this very evi-

dence is not from sense alone, but from a complication of reason and understanding together with it. Were sense the only evidence of things, there could be no absolute truth and falsehood, nor certainty at all of any thing; sense, as such, being only relative to particular persons, seeming and fantastical, and obnoxious to much delusion. For if our nerves and brain be inwardly so moved, and affected, as they would be by such an object present, when indeed it is absent, and no other motion or sensation in the mean time prevail against it and obliterate it; then must that object of necessity seem to us present. Moreover, those imaginations, that spring and bubble from the soul itself, are commonly taken for sensations by us when asleep, and sometimes in melancholic and fanciful persons also when awake. That Atheistic principle, that there is no evidence at all of any thing as existing, but only from corporeal sense, is plainly contradicted by the atomic Atheists themselves, when they assert atoms and vacuum to be the principles of all things, and the exuvius images of bodies to be the causes both of sight and cogitation: for single atoms, and those exuvius images, were never seen nor felt; and vacuum, or empty space, is so far from being sensible, that these Atheists themselves allow it to be the one only incorporeal. Wherefore they must here go beyond the ken of sense, and appeal to reason only for the existence of these principles: as Protagoras, one of them in Plato, professedly doth; ἄθρη περισκοπῶν μή τις τῶν Theat. p. 155. αἰνῆτων ἐπακούη· εἰσὶ δὲ οὗτοι, οἱ οὐδὲν ἄλλο Steph. αἰόμενοι εἶναι, ἢ οὐ ἂν δύνωνται ἀπρὶς ταιν χερσὶν λαβεῖσθαι, πᾶν τὸ αἰσάρον οὐκ ἀποδεχόμενοι, ὡς ἐν οὐσίας μέμει· Have

a care that none of the profane and uninitiated in mysteries overhear you. By the profane I mean (saith he) those, who think nothing to exist but what they can feel with their fingers, and exclude all that is invisible out of the rank of being.— Were existence to be allowed to nothing, that doth not fall under corporeal sense, then must we deny the existence of soul and mind in ourselves and others, because we can neither feel nor see any such thing. Whereas we are certain of the existence of our own souls, partly from an inward consciousness of our own cogitations, and partly from that principle of reason, that nothing cannot act. And the existence of other individual souls is manifest to us, from their effects upon their respective bodies, their motions, actions, and discourse. Wherefore, since the Atheists cannot deny the existence of soul or mind in men, though no such thing fall under external sense, they have as little reason to deny the existence of a perfect mind, presiding over the universe, without which it cannot be conceived, whence our imperfect ones should be derived. The existence of that God, whom no eye hath seen nor can see, is plainly proved by reason from his effects, in the visible phenomena of the universe, and from what we are conscious of within ourselves.

The second pretence of Atheists against the idea of God, and consequently his existence, is, because Theists themselves acknowledging God to be incomprehensible, it may be from thence inferred, that he is a nonentity. Which argumentation of the Atheists supposes these two things: first, that what is incomprehensible is altogether unconceivable; and then, that what is unconceivable is

nothing. The latter of which two, perhaps, may be granted to them, that what is so utterly inconceivable is nothing, as that no man can frame any manner of idea or conception of it, is therefore either in itself, or at least to us, nothing. Because though that of Protagoras be not true, in his sense, πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπον *Plato Theæt.* εἶναι, τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστι, τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων, [p. 118.] ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν: That man is the measure of all things, either as existing or not existing—he meaning indeed nothing else thereby, but that there was no absolute truth or falsehood of any thing, but all was relative to particular persons, and fantastical or seeming only. And though it must not be granted, that whatsoever any man's shallow understanding cannot easily and fully comprehend, is therefore presently to be expunged out of the catalogue of beings; which is the reason, or rather infidelity of the anti-trinitarians; yet is there notwithstanding some truth in that of Aristotle, that ψυχὴ πῶς πάντα, the rational soul or mind is in a manner all things;—it being able to frame some idea and conception or other of whatsoever is in the nature of things, and hath either an actual or possible existence, from the very highest to the lowest. Mind and understanding is, as it were, a diaphanous and crystalline globe, or a kind of notional world, which hath some reflex image, and correspondent ray, or representation in it, to whatsoever is in the true and real world of being. And upon this account may it be said, that whatsoever is in its own nature absolutely inconceivable, is indeed a nonentity.

But the former is absolutely denied by us, that whatsoever is incomprehensible is inconceivable;

and therefore when we affirm, that God is incomprehensible, our meaning is only this, that our imperfect minds cannot have such a conception of his nature, as doth perfectly master, conquer, and subdue, that vast object under it ; or at least is so fully adequate and commensurate to the same, as that it doth every way match and equalize it. Now it doth not at all follow from hence, because God is thus incomprehensible to our finite and narrow understandings, that he is utterly inconceivable by them, so that they cannot frame any idea at all of him, and he may therefore be concluded to be a nonentity. For, it is certain, that we cannot fully comprehend ourselves, and that we have not such an adequate and comprehensive knowledge of the essence of any substantial thing, as that we can perfectly master and conquer it. It was a truth, though abused by the Sceptics, that there is *ἀκατάληπτόν τι*, something incomprehensible—in the essence of the lowest substances. For even body itself, which the Atheists think themselves so well acquainted with, because they can feel it with their fingers, and which is the only substance, that they acknowledge either in themselves or the universe, hath such puzzling difficulties and entanglements in the speculation of it, that they can never be able to extricate themselves from. We might instance also in some accidental things, as time and motion. Truth is bigger than our minds, and we are not the same with it, but have a lower participation only of the intellectual nature, and are rather apprehenders than comprehenders thereof. This is indeed one badge of our creaturely state, that we have not a perfectly comprehensive knowledge, or such as is

adequate and commensurate to the essences of things ; from whence we ought to be led to this acknowledgment, that there is another perfect Mind or understanding Being above us in the universe, from which our imperfect minds were derived, and upon which they do depend. Wherefore if we can have no idea or conception of any thing, whereof we have not a full and perfect comprehension, then can we not have an idea or conception of the nature of any substance. But though we do not comprehend all truth, as if our mind were above it, or master of it, and cannot penetrate into, and look quite through the nature of every thing, yet may rational souls frame certain ideas and conceptions, of whatsoever is in the orb of being proportionate to their own nature, and sufficient for their purpose. And though we cannot fully comprehend the Deity, nor exhaust the infiniteness of its perfection, yet may we have an idea or conception of a being absolutely perfect ; such a one as is *nostro modulo conformis*, agreeable and proportionate to our measure and scantling—as we may approach near to a mountain, and touch it with our hands, though we cannot encompass it all round, and enclasp it within our arms. Whatsoever is in its own nature absolutely inconceivable, is nothing ; but not whatsoever is not fully comprehensible by our imperfect understandings.

It is true, indeed, that the Deity is more incomprehensible to us than any thing else whatsoever, which proceeds from the fulness of its being and perfection, and from the transcendency of its brightness ; but for the very same reason may it be said also, in some sense, that it is more know-

able and conceivable than any thing. As the sun, though by reason of its excessive splendour, it dazzle our weak sight, yet it is notwithstanding far more visible also, than any of the *nebulosæ stellæ*, the small misty stars. Where there is more of light, there is more of visibility ; so where there is more of entity, reality, and perfection, there is there more of conceptibility and cognoscibility ; such an object filling up the mind more, and acting more strongly upon it. Nevertheless, because our weak and imperfect minds are lost in the vast immensity and redundancy of the Deity, and overcome with its transcendant light and dazzling brightness, therefore hath it to us an appearance of darkness and incomprehensibility ; as the unbounded expansion of light, in the clear transparent ether, hath to us the apparition of an azure obscurity ; which yet is not an absolute thing in itself, but only relative to our sense, and a mere fancy in us.

The incomprehensibility of the Deity is so far from being an argument against the reality of its existence, as that it is most certain, on the contrary, that were there nothing incomprehensible to us, who are but contemptible pieces, and small atoms of the universe ; were there no other being in the world, but what our finite and imperfect understandings could span or fathom, and encompass round about, look through and through, have a commanding view of, and perfectly conquer and subdue under them ; then could there be nothing absolutely and infinitely perfect, that is, no God. For though that of Empedocles be not true in a literal sense, as it seems to have been

taken by Aristotle,* *γαῖα μὲν γὰρ γαῖαν*, &c. that by earth we see earth, by water water, and by fire fire; and understand every thing by something of the same within ourselves: yet is it certain, that every thing is apprehended by some internal congruity in that which apprehends, which perhaps was the sense intended by that noble philosophic poet. Wherefore it cannot possibly otherwise be, but that the finiteness, scantness, and imperfection, of our narrow understandings must make them asymmetral, or incommensurate, to that which is absolutely and infinitely perfect.

And nature itself plainly intimates to us, that there is some such absolutely perfect Being, which though not inconceivable, yet is incomprehensible to our finite understandings, by certain passions, which it hath implanted in us, that otherwise would want an object to display themselves upon; namely those of devout veneration, adoration, and admiration, together with a kind of ecstasy and pleasing horror; which, in the silent language of nature, seems to speak thus much to us, that there is some object in the world, so much bigger and vaster than our mind and thoughts, that it is the very same to them, that the ocean is to narrow vessels; so that when they have taken into themselves as much as they can thereof by contemplation, and filled up all their capacity, there is still an immensity of it left without, which cannot enter in for want of room to receive it, and therefore must be apprehended after some other strange and mysterious manner, viz. by their being as it were plunged into it, and swallowed up or lost in it. To conclude, the Deity is indeed incompre-

* De Anima, lib. i, cap. ii. p. 3. tom. ii. oper.

hensible to our finite and imperfect understandings, but not inconceivable; and therefore there is no ground at all for this atheistic pretence, to make it a nonentity.

We come to the third atheistic argumentation; That because infinity (which according to theology is included in the idea of God, and pervadeth all his attributes) is utterly inconceivable, the Deity itself is therefore an impossibility and nonentity. To this sense sound sundry passages of a modern writer; as, "Whatsoever we know, we learn from our phantasms; but there is no phantasm of infinite, and therefore no knowledge or conception of it." Again, "Whatsoever we imagine is finite, and therefore there is no conception or idea of that which we call infinite. No man can have in his mind an image of infinite time, or of infinite power. Wherefore the name of God is used not to make us conceive him, but only that we may honour him." The true meaning whereof (as may be plainly gathered from other passages of the same writer) is thus to be interpreted; That there is nothing of philosophic truth and reality in the idea or attributes of God; nor any other sense in those words, but only to signify the veneration and astonishment of men's own confounded minds. And, accordingly, the word infinite is declared to signify nothing at all in that which is so called (there being no such thing really existing), but only the inability of men's own minds, together with their rustic astonishment and admiration. Wherefore when the same writer determines, that God must not be said to be finite, this being no good courtship nor compliment; and yet the word infinite signifieth nothing in the thing itself, nor

hath any conception at all answering to it; he either does plainly abuse his reader, or else he leaves him to make up this conclusion, That since God is neither finite nor infinite, he is an inconceivable nothing. In like manner, another learned well-willer to Atheism declareth, That he, who calleth any thing infinite, doth but "*rei quam non capit, attribuere nomen, quod non intelligit,*" attribute an unintelligible name to a thing inconceivable; because all conception is finite, and it is impossible to conceive any thing that hath no bounds or limits. But that, which is mistaken for infinite, is nothing but a confused chaos of the mind, or an unshaken embryo of thought; when men going on farther and farther, and making a continual progress, without seeing any end before them; being at length quite weary and tired out with this their endless journey, they sit down, and call the thing by this hard and unintelligible name, infinite.—And from hence does he also infer, that because we can have no idea of infinite, as to signify any thing in that which is so called, we therefore cannot possibly have "*germanam ideam Dei,*" any true and genuine idea or notion of God.—Of which they, who understand the language of Atheists, know very well the meaning to be this; that there is indeed no such thing, or that he is a non-entity.

Now since this exception against the idea of God, and consequently his existence, is made by our modern and neoteric Atheists; we shall, in the first place, shew how contradictory they are herein to their predecessors, the old philosophic Atheists; and consequently, how inconsistent and disagreeing Atheists in several ages have been

with one another. For whereas these modern Atheists would have this thought a sufficient confutation of a Deity, that there can be nothing infinite; it is certain, that the ancient philosophic Atheists were so far from being of this persuasion, that some of them, as Anaximander expressly made *ἄπειρον*, or Infinite, the principle of all things; that is, infinitely extended and eternal matter, devoid of all life and understanding. For though Melissus's *ἄπειρον*, or Infinite, which he made the first principle, was a most perfect Being eminently containing all things (as hath been already shewed) and therefore the true Deity; Anaximander's *ἄπειρον*, or Infinite, yet however called *Θεῖον*, or Divine by him, (it being the only divinity which he acknowledged) was nothing but senseless matter, an atheistic infinite. Wherefore both Theists and Atheists in those former times did very well agree together in this one point, that there was something or other infinite, as the first principle of all things; either infinite mind, or infinite matter; though this latter atheistic infinity of extended matter be indeed repugnant to conception (as shall be proved afterwards) there being no true infinite, but a perfect Being, or the holy Trinity. Furthermore, not only Anaximander, but also after him Democritus and Epicurus, and many others of that atheistic gang, heretofore asserted likewise a numerical infinity of worlds, and therefore much more than an infinity of atoms, or particles of matter. And though this numerical infinity of theirs were also inconceivable and impossible; yet does it sufficiently appear from hence, that these ancient philosophic Atheists were so far from being abhorrent from infinity, as

a thing impossible, and a non-entity, that they were on the contrary very fond thereof; and therefore never went about to disprove a Deity after this manner, because there can be nothing infinite.

But, in the next place, we shall make it manifest, that these modern Atheists do no less contradict plain reason and their very selves also, than they do their predecessors in that impiety, when they thus go about to disprove the existence of a God, because there can be nothing infinite, neither in duration, nor in power, nor in any other regard. For, first, though it should be doubted whether there be a God or no; yet must it needs be acknowledged to be as indubitable as any thing in all geometry, that there was something or other infinite in duration, or eternal, without beginning: because, if there had been once nothing at all, there could never have been any thing; that common notion, or principle of reason, having here an irresistible force, that nothing could ever come from nothing. Now, if there were never nothing, but always something, then must there of necessity be something infinite in duration, and eternal without beginning. Wherefore it cannot be accounted less than extreme sottishness and stupidity of mind in these modern Atheists, thus to impugn a Deity from the impossibility of infinite duration without beginning. But, in the next place, we must confess it seems to us hardly conceivable, that any Atheist whatsoever could possibly be so prodigiously sottish, or so monstrously infatuated, as really to think, that once there was nothing at all, but that afterwards senseless matter happened (nobody knows how) to come into

being, from whence all other things were derived. According to which hypothesis it would follow also, that matter might as well some time or other happen again to cease to be, and so all things vanish into nothing. To conclude, therefore, these Atheists must of necessity be guilty of one or other of these two things; either of extreme selfishness and stupidity in acknowledging neither God, nor matter, nor any thing, to have existed infinitely from eternity without beginning; or else, if they do acknowledge the pre-eternity of matter, or its infinite past duration without beginning, then, of the most notorious impudence, in making that an argument against the existence of a God, which themselves acknowledge to matter.

Nevertheless we shall here readily comply with these modern Atheists thus far, as to grant them these two following things: First, That we can have no proper and genuine phantasm of any infinite whatsoever, because we never had corporeal sense of any, neither of infinite number nor of infinite magnitude, and therefore much less of infinite time or duration, and of infinite power; these two latter things, time and power, themselves not falling under corporeal sense. Secondly, That as we have no phantasm of any infinite, so neither is infinity fully comprehensible by our human understandings, that are but finite. But since it is certain, even to mathematical evidence, that there was something infinite in duration, or without beginning, insomuch that no intelligent Atheist, upon mature consideration, will ever venture to contradict it; we shall from hence extort from these Atheists an acknowledgment of the falseness of these two theorems of theirs, that whatso-

ever we have no phantasm or sensible idea of, as also whatsoever is not fully comprehensible by us, is therefore a pure non-entity or nothing; and enforce them to confess, that there is something really existing in nature, which we have neither any phantasm of, nor yet can fully comprehend with our imperfect understandings.

Nay, we will yet go further in compliance with them, and acknowledge likewise, that as for those infinities, of number, of corporeal magnitude; and of time or successive duration, we have not only no phantasm, nor full intellectual comprehension of them, but also no manner of intelligible idea, notion, or conception. For though it be true, that number be somewhere said by Aristotle^a to be infinite, yet was his meaning there only in such a negative sense as this, that we can never possibly come to an end thereof by addition, but may in our minds still add number to number infinitely; which is all one as if he should indeed have affirmed, that there can be no number actually and positively infinite, according to Aristotle's own definition of infinite, elsewhere given,^b namely, that to which nothing can be added; no number being ever so great, but that one or more may still be added to it. And as there can be no infinite number, so neither can there be any infinity of corporeal magnitude; not only because if there were, the parts thereof must needs be infinite in number, but also because, as no number can be so great, but that more may be added to it; so neither can any body or magnitude be ever so vast, but that

^a Metaphys. lib. xi. cap. xi. p. 434. tom. iy. oper. et Phys. Auscultat. lib. iii. cap. v. p. 486. tom. i. oper. et cap. viii. p. 491.

^b Phys. Auscultat. lib. iii. cap. ix. p. 492. tom. i. oper.

more body or magnitude may be supposed still further and further; this addition of finites never making up infinite. Indeed, infinite space, beyond the finite world, is a thing which hath been much talked of; and it is by some supposed to be infinite body, but by others to be an incorporeal infinite; through whose actual distance notwithstanding (mensurable by poles and miles) this finite world might roll and tumble infinitely. But as we conceive, all that can be demonstrated here is no more than this, but how vast soever the finite world should be, yet there is a possibility of more and more magnitude and body, still to be added to it, further and further, by Divine power infinitely; or that the world could never be made so great, no not by God himself, as that his own omnipotence could not make it yet greater. Which potential infinity, or indefinite increasableness of corporeal magnitude, seems to have been mistaken for an actual infinity of space. Whereas, for this very reason, because more could be added to the magnitude of the corporeal world infinitely, or without end, therefore is it impossible, that it should ever be positively and actually infinite; that is, such as to which nothing more can possibly be added. Wherefore we conclude concerning corporeal magnitude, as we did before of number, that there can be no absolute and actual infinity thereof; and that how much vaster soever the world may be, than according to the supposition of vulgar astronomers, who make the starry sphere the utmost wall thereof; yet is it not absolutely infinite, such as really hath no bounds or limits at all, nor to which nothing more could, by Divine power, be added. Lastly, We affirm like-

wise concerning time, or successive duration, that there can be no infinity of that neither, no temporal eternity without beginning : and that not only because there would then be an actual infinity and more than an infinity of number ; but also because, upon this supposition, there would always have been an infinity of time past, and consequently an infinity of time past, which was never present. Whereas all the moments of past time must needs have been once present ; and, if so, then all of them, at least save one, future too ; from whence it will follow, that there was a first moment, or beginning of time. And thus does reason conclude, neither the world, nor time itself, to have been infinite in their past duration, nor eternal without beginning.

Here will the Atheist think presently, he hath got a great advantage to disprove the existence of a God ; “ *Nonne, qui æternitatem mundi sic tollunt, eadem opera etiam mundi conditori æternitatem tollunt ?* ” Do not they, who thus destroy the eternity of the world, at the same time destroy also the eternity of the Creator ? For if time itself were not eternal, then how could the Deity, or any thing, be so ?—the Atheist securely taking it for granted, that God himself could not be otherwise eternal, than by a successive flux of infinite time ; but we say, that this will on the contrary afford us a plain demonstration of the existence of a Deity. For since the world and time itself were not infinite in their past duration, but had a beginning, therefore were they both certainly made together by some other Being, who is, in order of nature, senior to time, and so without time, before time ; he being above that successive flux,

and comprehending in the stability and immutable perfection of his own being, his yesterday, and to-day, and for ever. Or thus; Something was of necessity infinite in duration, and without beginning; but neither the world, nor motion, nor time, that is, no successive being was such; therefore is there something else; whose being and duration is not successive and flowing, but permanent to whom this infinity belongeth. The Atheists here can only smile, or make faces, and shew their little wit in quibbling upon *nunc-stans*; or a standing *now* of eternity; as if that standing eternity of the Deity (which with so much reason hath been contended for by the ancient genuine Theists) were nothing but a pitiful small moment of time standing still, and as if the duration of all beings whatsoever must needs be like our own; whereas the duration of every thing must of necessity be agreeable to its nature: and, therefore, as that, whose imperfect nature is ever flowing like a river, and consists in continual motion and changes one after another, must needs have accordingly a successive and flowing duration, sliding perpetually from present into past, and always posting on towards the future, expecting something of itself, which is not yet in being, but to come; so must that, whose perfect nature is essentially immutable, and always the same, and necessarily existent, have a permanent duration, never losing any thing of itself once present; as sliding away from it, nor yet running forwards to meet something of itself before, which is not yet in being; and it is as contradictory for it ever to have begun, as ever to cease to be.

Now whereas the modern Atheists pretend to

have proved, that there is nothing infinite, neither in duration nor otherwise, and consequently no Deity, merely because we have no sense nor phantasm of infinite, nor can fully comprehend the same; and therefore will needs conclude, that the words infinite and eternal signify nothing in the thing itself, but either men's own ignorance and inability to conceive, when, or whether, that which is called eternal, began; together with the confounded nonsense of their astonished minds, and their stupid veneration of that, which their own fear and fancy has raised up as a bug-bear to themselves; or else the progress of their thoughts further and further backward indefinitely, (though they plainly confute themselves in all this, by sometimes acknowledging matter and motion infinite and eternal, which argues either their extreme sottishness or impudence :) we have shewed, with mathematical evidence and certainty, that there is really something infinite in duration, or eternal; by which therefore cannot be meant men's own ignorance, or the confounded nonsense of their devotion, nor yet the idle progress of their minds further and further indefinitely, which never reaches infinite, but a reality in the thing itself, namely this,—that it never was not, nor had any beginning. Moreover, having demonstrated concerning this infinity and eternity, without beginning, that it cannot possibly belong to any successive being, we confidently conclude against these Atheists also, that it was not matter and motion, or this mundane system, but a perfect immutable nature, of a permanent duration (that is, a God), to whom it belonged. To sum up all, therefore, we say, that

infinite and eternal are not words, that signify nothing in the thing itself, nor mere attributes of honour, compliment, and flattery, that is, of devout and religious nonsense, error, and falsehood ; but attributes belonging to the Deity, and to that alone, of the most philosophic truth and reality. And though we, being finite, have no full comprehension and adequate understanding of this infinity and eternity (as not of the Deity), yet can we not be without some notion, conception, and apprehension thereof, so long as we can thus demonstrate concerning it, that it belongs to something, and yet to nothing neither, but a perfect immutable nature. But the notion of this infinite eternity will be yet further cleared in the following explanation and vindication of infinite power.

For the Atheists principally quarrel with infinite power, or omnipotence, and pretend, in like manner, this to be utterly inconceivable and impossible, and subjected in nothing. Thus a modern atheistic writer concludes, that since no man can conceive infinite power, this is also but an attribute of honour, which the confounded nonsense of astonished minds bestows upon the object of their devotion, without any philosophic truth and reality. And here have our modern Atheists indeed the suffrage and agreement of the ancient philosophic Atheists also with them, who, as appears from the verses before cited out of Lucretius, concerned themselves in nothing more, than asserting all power to be finite, and omnipotence, or infinite power, to belong to nothing.

First, therefore, it is here observable, that this omnipotence, or infinite power, asserted by Theists, has been commonly either ignorantly mistaken,

or wilfully misrepresented by these Atheists, out of design to make it seem impossible and ridiculous, as if by it were meant a power of producing and doing any thing whatsoever, without exception, though never so contradictory; as a late atheistic person, seeming to assert this Divine omnipotence and infinite power really and designedly, notwithstanding abused the same with this sceptic irony, That God by his omnipotence, or infinite power, could turn this tree into a syllogism. Children, indeed, have sometimes such childish apprehensions of the Divine omnipotence; and Ren. Cartesius* (though otherwise an acute philosopher) was here no less childish, in affirming, that all things whatsoever, even the natures of good and evil, and all truth and falsehood, do so depend upon the arbitrary will and power of God, as that, if he had pleased, twice two should not have been four; nor the three angles of a plain triangle equal to two right ones, and the like; he only adding, that all these things, notwithstanding, when they were once settled by the Divine decree, became immutable; that is, I suppose, not in themselves, or to God, but unto us: than which no paradox of any old philosopher was ever more absurd and irrational. And certainly, if any one did desire to persuade the world that Cartesius, notwithstanding all his pretences to demonstrate a Deity, was indeed but an hypocritical Theist, or personated and disguised Atheist, he could not have a fairer pretence for it out of all his writings than from hence; this being plainly to destroy the Deity, by making one attribute thereof

* Vide Respons. ad Objectiones sextas, §. vi. p. 160. edit. Amstel. 1685. in 4to.

to devour and swallow up another; infinite will and power, infinite understanding and wisdom. For to suppose God to understand, and to be wise only by his will, is all one as to suppose him to have really no understanding at all. Wherefore we do not affirm God to be so omnipotent, or infinitely powerful, as that he is able to destroy or change the intelligible natures of things at pleasure; this being all one as to say, that God is so omnipotent and infinitely powerful, that he is able to destroy, or to baffle and befool his own wisdom and understanding, which is the very rule and measure of his power. We say not, therefore, that God by his omnipotence, or infinite power, could make twice two not to be four, or turn a tree into a syllogism; but we say, that omnipotence, or infinite power, is that which can produce and do all whatsoever is possible, that is, whatsoever is conceivable, and implies no manner of contradiction; the very essence of possibility being no other than conceptibility. And thus has the point been stated all along, not only by Christian Theists, but even the ancient Pagan theologians themselves, that omnipotence, or infinite power, is that which can do all things, that do not imply a contradiction, or which are not inconceivable. This appearing from that of Agatho, cited before out of Aristotle,* That nothing is exempted from the Divine power, but only to make *παραγυλῶ ἀγέ-
νῃτα*, what hath been done to be undone, or the like hereunto. Now infinite power being nothing else but a power of doing whatsoever is conceivable, it is plainly absurd to say, that a power of doing nothing but what is conceivable is inconceivable.

* Lib. vi. ad Nicomach. cap. ii. p. 98. tom. iii. oper.

But, because the Atheists look upon infinity as such a desperate and affrightful thing, we shall here render it something more easy, and take off that frightful vizard from it, which makes it seem such a *monstrum*, or bug-bear to them, by declaring, in the next place, that infinity is really nothing else but perfection. For infinite understanding and knowledge is nothing else but perfect knowledge, that which hath no defect or mixture of ignorance with it, or the knowledge of whatsoever is knowable. So, in like manner, infinite power is nothing else but perfect power, that which hath no defect or mixture of impotency in it; a power of producing and doing all whatsoever is possible, that is, whatsoever is conceivable. Infinite power can do whatsoever infinite understanding can conceive, and nothing else; conception being the measure of power, and its extent, and whatsoever is in itself inconceivable being therefore impossible. Lastly, infinity of duration or eternity, is really nothing else but perfection, as including necessary existence and immutability in it: so that it is not only contradictory to such a Being to cease to be or exist, but also to have had a newness or beginning of being, or to have any flux or change therein, by dying to the present, and acquiring something new to itself, which was not before. Notwithstanding which, this being comprehends the differences of past, present, and future, or the successive priority and posteriority of all temporary things: and because infinity is perfection, therefore can nothing, which includeth any thing of imperfection, in the very idea and essence of it, be ever truly and properly infinite, as number, corporeal mag-

lutely perfect, we having a notion or idea of the latter, must needs have of the former. From whence we learn also, that though the word infinite be in the form thereof negative, yet is the sense of it, in those things which are really capable of the same, positive, it being all one with absolutely perfect; as likewise the sense of the word finite is negative, it being the same with imperfect. So that finite is properly the negation of infinite, as that which in order of nature is before it; and not infinite the negation of finite. However, in those things which are capable of no true infinity, because they are essentially finite, as number, corporeal magnitude, and time, infinity being there a mere imaginary thing, and a non-entity, it can only be conceived by the negation of finite; as we also conceive nothing by the negation of something; that is, we can have no positive conception thereof.

We conclude, to assert an infinite Being, is nothing else but to assert a Being absolutely perfect, such as never was not, or had no beginning, which could produce all things possible and conceivable, and upon which all other things must depend. And this is to assert a God; one absolutely perfect Being, the Original of all things: God, and Infinite, and absolutely Perfect, being but different names for one and the same thing.

We come now to the fourth atheistic objection, That theology is nothing but an arbitrary complement of inconsistent and contradictory notions. Where, first, we deny not, but that as some theologers (or bigotical religionists) of later times extend the Divine omnipotence to things contradictory and impossible, as to the making of one

and the same body, to be all of it in several distant places at once ; so may others sometimes unskilfully attribute to the Deity things inconsistent or contradictions to one another, because seeming to them to be all perfections. As, for example, though it be concluded generally by theologers, that there is a natural justice and sanctity in the Deity, yet do some notwithstanding contend, that the will of God is not determined by any antecedent rule or nature of justice and sanctity in the Deity, yet do some notwithstanding contend, that the will of God is not determined by any antecedent rule or nature of justice, but that whatsoever he could be supposed to will arbitrarily, would therefore be *ipso facto* just ; which is called by them the Divine sovereignty, and looked upon as a great perfection ; though it be certain, that these two things are directly contradictory to one another, viz. That there is something *per se*, in its own nature just and unjust, or a natural sanctity in God ; and that the arbitrary will and command of the Deity is the only rule of justice and injustice. Again, some theologers determining, That whatsoever is in God, is God, or essential to the Deity ; they conceiving such an immutability to be a necessary perfection thereof, seem thereby not only to contradict all liberty of will in the Deity, which themselves notwithstanding contend for in a high degree, that all things are arbitrarily determined by Divine decree ; but also to take away from it all power of acting *ad extra*, and of perceiving or animadverting things done successively here in the world. But it will not follow from these and the like contradictions of mistaken theologers, that therefore theology itself is contra-

dicious, and bath nothing of philosophic truth at all in it; no more than because philosophers also hold contradictory opinions, that therefore philosophy itself is contradictory, and that there is nothing absolutely true or false, but (according to the Protagorean doctrine) all seeming and fantastical.

But in the next place we add, that though it be true, that the nature of things admits of nothing contradictory, and that whatsoever plainly implies a contradiction, must therefore of necessity be a non-entity; yet is this rule, notwithstanding, obnoxious to be much abused, when whatsoever men's shallow and gross understandings cannot reach to, they will therefore presently conclude to be contradictory and impossible. As, for example, the Atheists and Materialists cannot conceive of any other substance besides body, and therefore do they determine presently, that incorporeal substance is a contradiction in the very terms, it being as much as to say, incorporeal body: * wherefore when God is said by theologers to be an incorporeal substance, this is to them an absolute impossibility. Thus a modern writer: "The universe, that is, the whole mass of all things, is corporeal; that is to say, body. Now every part of body is body, and consequently every part of the universe is body; and that which is not body, is no part thereof. And because the universe is all, that which is no part of it, nothing. Therefore when spirits are called incorporeal, this is only a name of honour, and it may with more piety be attributed to God

* Hobbes's *Leviath.* cap. xxxiv.

himself, in whom we consider, not what attribute best expresseth his nature, which is incomprehensible, but what best expresseth our desire to honour him." Where incorporeal is said to be an attribute of honour; that is, such an attribute, as expresseth only the veneration of men's minds, but signifieth nothing in nature, nor hath any philosophic truth and reality under it; a substance incorporeal being as contradictory as something and nothing. Notwithstanding which, this contradiction is only in the weakness and childishness of these men's understandings, and not the thing itself; it being demonstrable, that there is some other substance besides body, according to the true and genuine notion of it. But because this mistake is not proper to Atheists only, there being some Theists also, who labour under this same infirmity of mind, not to be able to conceive any other substance besides body, and who therefore assert a corporeal Deity; we shall in the next place shew, from a passage of a modern writer, what kind of contradictions they are, which these Atheists impute to all theology, namely, such as these; that it supposes God to perceive things sensible, without any organs of sense; and to understand and be wise without any brains. "Pious men (saith he) attribute to God Almighty, for honour's sake, whatsoever they see honourable in the world, as seeing, hearing, willing, knowing, justice, wisdom, &c. But they deny him such poor things, as eyes, ears and brains, and other organs, without which we worms neither have, nor can conceive, such faculties to be: and so far they do well. But when they dispute of God's actions philosophically, then do they consider

them again, as if he had indeed such faculties. This is not well, and thence is it, that they fall into so many difficulties. We ought not to dispute of God's nature. He is no fit subject of our philosophy. True religion consisteth in obedience to Christ's lieutenants, and in giving God such honour, both in attributes and actions, as they in their several lieutenancies shall ordain." Where the plain and undisguised meaning of the author seems to be this : That God is no subject of philosophy, as all real things are ; (accordingly as he declareth elsewhere, that " *Religio non est philosophia, sed lex ;*" Religion is not a matter of philosophy, but only of law and arbitrary constitution)—he having no real nature of his own, nor being any true inhabitant of the world or heaven, but (as all other ghosts and spirits) an inhabitant of men's brains only, that is, a figment of their fear and fancy, or a mere political scare-crow. And therefore such attributes are to be given to him, without any scrupulosity, as the civil law of every country shall appoint, and no other ; the wise and nasute very well understanding, that all this business of religion is nothing but mere pageantry, and that the attributes of the Deity indeed signify neither true nor false, nor any thing in nature, but only men's reverence and devotion towards the object of their fear : the manner of expressing which is determined by civil law. Wherefore to say, that God sees all things, and yet hath no eyes ; and that he hears all things, and yet hath no ears ; and that he understands, and is wise, and yet hath no

* De Homine, cap. xiv.

brains; and whatsoever else you will please to say of him, as attributes of honour, and only as signifying devotion, is thus far well enough. But when men, not understanding the true cabala, will needs go further, they mistaking attributes of honour for attributes of nature, and of philosophic truth, and making them premises to infer absolute truth, and convince falsehood from, or matters to dispute and reason; that is, when they will needs suppose such a thing as a God really to exist in the world, then do they involve themselves in all manner of contradiction, nonsense, and absurdity; as, for example, to affirm seriously, that this God really sees all things in the world, and yet hath no eyes; and that he indeed hears all things, and yet hath no ears; and, lastly, that he understands and is wise, and yet hath no brains, which things are all absolutely contradictory, unconceivable and impossible. The sum of all is this, that when religion and theology, which is indeed nothing but law and fantasy, is made philosophy, then is it all mere jargon and insignificant nonsense. And now we see what those contradictions are, which the Atheists charge upon theology; such as owe all their being only to the grossness, sottishness, and brutishness of these men's own apprehensions. From whence proceedeth likewise, this following definition of knowledge and understanding,* That it is nothing but a tumult of the mind, raised by external things, pressing the organical parts of man's body. "O ye brutish among the people, when will ye understand? and ye fools, when will ye be wise? He that planted the ear, (and gave man's soul a power of hearing thereby) shall

* *Leviathan*, cap. xxix. et *Elementa de Cive*, cap. xv.

not he (though himself have no ears) hear? He that formed the eye (and gave the human soul a power of seeing, by it as an instrument) shall not he (though himself have no eyes) see? Lastly, he that teacheth man knowledge, (or gave him an understanding mind, besides brains) shall not he (though himself be without brains) know and understand?"

It is certain, that no simple idea, as that of a triangle or a square, of a cube or sphere, can possibly be contradictory to itself; and therefore much less can the idea of a perfect Being (which is the compendious idea of God), it being more simple than any of the other. Indeed this simple idea of a perfect Being is pregnant of many attributes; and therefore, the idea of God, more fully declared by them all, may seem to be in this respect a compounded idea, or one idea and conception, consisting or made up of many; which, if they were really contradictory, would render the whole a non-entity. As, for example, this; a plain triangle, whose three angles are greater than two right ones, it being contradictory and unconceivable, is therefore no true idea, but a non-entity. But all the genuine attributes of the Deity, of which its entire idea is made up, are things as demonstrable of a perfect Being, as the properties of a triangle or a square are of those ideas respectively, and therefore cannot they possibly be contradictory, neither to it, nor to one another, because those things, which agree in one third, must needs agree together amongst themselves.

Nay, the genuine attributes of the Deity, namely such as are demonstrable of an absolute perfect

Being, are not only not contradictory, but also necessarily connected together, and inseparable from one another. For there could not possibly be one thing infinite in wisdom only, another thing infinite only in power, and another thing only infinite in duration or eternal. But the very same thing, which is infinite in wisdom, must needs be also infinite in power, and infinite in duration, and so *vice versa*. That, which is infinite in any one perfection, must of necessity have all perfections in it. Thus are all the genuine attributes of the Deity not only not contradictory, but also inseparably concatenate; and the idea of God no congeries either of disagreeing things; or else of such, as are unnecessarily connected with one another.

In very truth, all the several attributes of the Deity are nothing else but so many partial and inadequate conceptions of one and the same simple perfect Being, taken in as it were by piecemeal, by reason of the imperfection of our human understandings, which could not fully conceive it all together at once; and therefore are they really all but one thing, though they have the appearance of multiplicity to us. As the one simple light of the sun, diversely refracted and reflected from a rorid cloud, hath to us the appearance of the variegated colours of the rainbow.

Wherefore the attributes of God are no bundle of unconceivables and impossibles, huddled up together; nor attributes of honour and compliment only, and nothing but the religious nonsense of astonished minds, expressing their devotion towards what they fear; but all of them attributes of nature, and of most severe philosophic

truth. Neither is the idea of God an arbitrary complement of things unnecessarily connected, and separable from one another; it is no factitious, nor fictitious thing, made up by any feigning power of the soul, but it is a natural and most simple uncompounded idea; such as to which nothing can be arbitrarily added, nor nothing detracted from. Notwithstanding which, by reason of the imperfection of human minds, there may be, are, different apprehensions concerning it. For as every one, that hath a conception of a plain triangle in general doth not therefore know, that it includes this property in it, to have three angles equal to two right ones; nor doth every one, who hath an idea of a rectangular triangle, presently understand, that the square of the subtense is equal to the squares of both the sides; so neither doth every one, who hath a conception of a perfect Being, therefore presently know all that is included in that idea. Moreover, men may easily mistake things for absolute perfections, which are not such, as hath been partly already shewed.

And now, whereas the Atheists pretend, in the next place, to give an account of that supposed contradictionsness in the idea and attributes of God, namely, that it proceeded principally from fear, or the confounded nonsense of men's astonished minds, huddling up together all imaginable attributes of honour, courtship, and compliment, without any philosophic truth, sense, or signification; as also, in part, from the fiction and imposture of politicians: all this hath been already prevented, and the foundation thereof quite taken away, by our shewing, that there is nothing in the genuine idea of God and his attributes, but what is demon-

strable of a perfect Being, and that there cannot be the least either added to that idea, or detracted from it, any more than there can be any thing added to or detracted from the idea of a triangle, or of a square. From whence it follows unavoidably, that there cannot possibly be any thing either contradictory or arbitrary in the Divine idea, and that the genuine attributes thereof are attributes of necessary philosophic truth : namely, such as do not only speak the piety, devotion, and reverence of men's own minds, but declare the real nature of the thing itself. Wherefore, when a modern atheistic writer affirmeth of all those, who reason and conclude concerning God's nature from his attributes, "That, losing their understanding in the very first attempt, they fall from one inconvenience (or absurdity) to another without end ; after the same manner, as when one, ignorant of court ceremonies, coming into the presence of a greater person than he was wont to speak to, and stumbling at his entrance, to save himself from falling, lets slip his cloak ; to recover his cloak, lets fall his hat ; and so, with one disorder after another, discovers his rusticity and astonishment : " we say, that, though there be something of wit and fancy in this, yet, as it is applied to theology, and the genuine attributes of the Deity, there is not the least of philosophic truth. However, we deny not but that some, either out of superstition, or else out of flattery, (for thus are they styled by St. Jerome,* " *stulti adulescentes Dei*," foolish flatterers of God Almighty)—have sometimes attributed such things to him as are incongruous to his nature, and, under a pretence

* Comment. in Habacuc. lib. i. p. 148. tom. vi. oper.

of honouring him, by magnifying his power and sovereignty, do indeed most highly dishonour him; they representing him to be such a Being as is no way amiable or desirable.

But the Atheists are most of all concerned to give an account of that unquestionable phenomenon—the general persuasion of the existence of a God in the minds of men, and their propensity to religion in all ages and places of the world; whence this should come, if there be really no such thing in nature: and this they think to do in the last place, also, partly from men's own fear, together with their ignorance of causes, and partly from the fiction of law-makers and politicians, they endeavouring thereby to keep men in civil subjection under them; where we shall first plainly and nakedly declare the Atheist's meaning, and then manifest the invalidity and foolery of these pretences to solve the forementioned phenomenon.

First, therefore, these Atheists affirm, That mankind, by reason of their natural imbecility, are in perpetual solicitude, anxiety and fear, concerning future events, or their good and evil fortune to come; and this passion of fear inclining men to imagine things formidable and fearful, and to suspect or believe the existence of what really is not; I say, that this distrustful fear and jealousy in the minds of men, concerning their future condition, raises up to them the phantasm of a most affrightful spectre, an invisible understanding Being, arbitrarily governing and swaying the affairs of the whole world, and at pleasure tyrannizing over mankind. And when men's exorbitant fear and fancy has thus raised up to

itself such a mormo, or bug-bear, such an affrightful spectre, as this, a thing that is really no inhabitant of the world, or of heaven, but only of men's brains, they afterward stand in awe of this their own imagination, and tremblingly worship this creature and figment of their own fear and fancy, as a thing really existing without them, or a God; devising all manner of expressions of honour and reverence towards it, and anxiously endeavouring, by all ways conceivable, to propitiate and atone the same. And thus have they brought upon themselves a most heavy yoke of bondage, and filled their lives with all manner of bitterness and misery.

Again, to this fear of future events the Atheists add also ignorance of causes, as a further account of this phenomenon of religion, so generally entertained in the world. For mankind (say they) are naturally inquisitive into the causes of things; and that not only of the events of their own good and evil fortune, but also of the phenomenon of the world, and the effects of nature: and such is their curiosity, that wheresoever they can discover no visible and natural causes, there are they prone to feign and imagine other causes, invisible and supernatural. As it was observed of the tragic dramatists that, whenever they could not well extricate themselves, they were wont to bring in a god upon the stage: and as Aristotle^a recordeth of Anaxagoras, that he never betook himself to Mind, or Understanding, that is, to God for a cause, but only when he was at a loss for other natural and necessary causes. From whence these Atheists would infer, that nothing but ignorance of causes

^a Metaphys. lib. i. cap. iv. p. 267. tom. iv. oper.

made Anaxagoras to assert a Deity. Wherefore it is no wonder (say they) if the generality of mankind, being ignorant of the causes almost of all events and effects of nature, have, by reason of their natural curiosity and fear, feigned or introduced one invisible power or agent omnipotent, as the supreme cause of all things; they betaking themselves thereto, as to a kind of refuge, asylum, or sanctuary for their ignorance.

These two accounts of the phenomenon of religion, from men's fear and solicitude about future events, and from their ignorance of causes, together with their curiosity, are thus joined together by a modern writer: "Perpetual fear of future evils always accompanying mankind, in the ignorance of causes, as it were in the dark, must needs have for object something. And therefore when there is nothing to be seen, there is nothing to accuse for their evil fortune, but some power or agent invisible." Moreover, it is concluded, that from the same originals sprang, not only that vulgar opinion of inferior ghosts and spirits also, subservient to the supreme Deity (as the great ghost of the whole world, apparitions being nothing but men's own dreams and fancies taken by them for sensations), but also men's taking things casual for prognostics, and their being so superstitiously addicted to omens and portents, oracles, and divinations and prophecies; this proceeding likewise from the same fantastic supposition, that the things of the world are disposed of, not by nature, but by some understanding and intending agent or person.^b

^a Hobbes, *Leviath*, cap. xii.

^b This is levelled against Hobbes *De Homine*, cap. xiii. and *Leviathan*, cap. xii.

But lest these two forementioned accounts of that phenomenon of religion, and the belief of a Deity, so epidemical to mankind, should yet seem insufficient; the Atheists will superadd a third to them, from the fiction and imposture of civil sovereigns, crafty law-makers, and designing politicians; who perceiving a great advantage to be made, from the belief of a God and religion, for the better keeping of men in obedience and subjection to themselves, and in peace and civil society with one another (when they are persuaded, that besides the punishments appointed by laws, which can only take place upon open and convicted transgressors, and are often eluded and avoided, there are other punishments; that will be inflicted even upon the secret violators of them, both in this life and after death, by a Divine, invisible, and irresistible hand) have thereupon dexterously laid hold of men's fear and ignorance, and cherished those seeds of religion in them (being the infirmities of their nature) and further confirmed their belief of ghosts and spirits, miracles and prodigies, oracles and divinations, by tales or fables, publicly allowed and recommended; according to that definition of religion given by a modern writer,* "Fear of power invisible, feigned by the mind, or imagined from tales publicly allowed, religion; not allowed, superstition." And that religion, thus nursed up by politicians, might be every way compliant with, and obsequious to, their designs, and no way refractory to the same; it hath been their great care to persuade the people, that their laws were not merely their own inventions, but that themselves were only the inter-

* *Leviathan*, cap. vi.

preters of the gods therein, and that the same things were really displeasing to the gods, which were forbidden by them; God ruling over the world no otherwise, than in them, as his vicegerents; according to that assertion of a late writer, *Tract. Theol. Polit. [Ben. Spinoza, cap. ix. p. 214.]* "Deum nullum regnum in homines habere, nisi per eos, qui imperium tenent," that God reigneth over men, only in the civil sovereigns.—This is therefore another atheistic account of religion's so generally prevailing in the world, from its being a fit engine of state, and politicians generally looking upon it as an *arcanum imperii*, a mystery of government—to possess the minds of the people with the belief of a God, and to keep them busily employed in the exercises of religion, thereby to render them the more tame and gentle, apt to obedience, subjection, peace, and civil society.

Neither is all this the mere invention of modern Atheists, but indeed the old atheistic cabal, as may appear partly from that known passage of the poet,* That the gods were first made by fear—and from Lucretius's so frequently insisting upon the same, according to the mind of Epicurus. For in his first book he makes "terrorem animi, et tenebras," terror of mind, and darkness—the chief causes of Theism; and in his sixth, he further pursues the same grounds, especially the latter of them, after this manner:

Lamb. 528. Cætera quæ fieri in terris cœloque tuentur.
[var. 49.] Mortales, pavidis quom pendent mentibu' sæpe,
Efficiunt animos humiles formidine diyum;
Depressosque premunt ad terram, propterea quod
IGNORANTIA CAUSARUM conferre decorum
Cogit ad imperium res; et concedere regnum, et,

* Petron. in Fragment. p. 676. edit. Burman.

Quorum operum causas nulla ratione videre
Possent, hæc fieri divino numine rentur.

To this sense; Mortals, when with trembling minds they behold the objects both of heaven and earth, they become depressed and sink down under the fear of the gods; ignorance of causes setting up the reign and empire of the gods. For when men can find no natural causes of these things, they suppose them, presently, to have been done by a Divine power.

And this ignorance of causes is also elsewhere insisted upon by the same poet, as the chief source of religion, or the belief of a God.

Præterea cœli rationes ordine certo,
Et varia annorum cernebant tempora verti;
Nec poterant quibus id fieret cognoscere causas.
Ergo PERFUGIUM sibi habebant, omnia divis
Tradere, et ipsorum nutu facere omnia flecti.

Lib. v. Lamb.
p. 500. [ver.
1182.]

Moreover, when a modern writer declares the opinion of ghosts to be one of those things, in which consisteth the natural seeds of religion: as also that this opinion proceedeth from the ignorance how to distinguish dreams, and other strong fancies from vision and sense; he seemeth herein to have trod likewise in the footsteps of Lucretius, giving, not obscurely, the same account of religion in his fifth book.*

Nunc quæ causa deum per magnas numina gentes
Pervolgarit, et ararum compleverit urbes, &c.
Non ita difficile est rationem reddere verbis.
Quippe etenim jam tum divum mortalia secla
Egregias animo facies vigilante videbant,
Et magis in somnis, mirando corporis aucto.
His igitur sensum tribuebant, &c.

That is, How the noise of the gods came thus to

* Ver. 1160.

ring over the whole world, and to fill all places with temples and altars, is not a thing very difficult to give an account of; it proceeding first from men's fearful dreams, and their phantasms when awake, taken by them for visions and sensations. Whereupon they attributed not only sense to these things as really existing, but also immortality and great power. For though this were properly an account only of those inferior and plebeian gods, called demons and genii, yet was it supposed, that the belief of these things did easily dispose the minds of men also to the persuasion of one supreme omnipotent Deity over all.

Lastly, that the ancient Atheists, as well as the modern, pretended, the opinion of a God and religion to have been a political invention, is frequently declared in the writings of the Pagans; as in this of Cicero,* "Ii, qui dixerunt totam de diis immortalibus opinionem fictam esse ab hominibus sapientibus, reipublicæ causa, ut quos ratio non posset, eos ad officium religio duceret; nonne omnem religionem funditus sustulerunt?" They, who affirmed the whole opinion of the gods to have been feigned by wise men for the sake of the commonwealth, that so religion might engage those to their duty, whom reason could not, did they not utterly destroy all religion?—And the sense of the ancient Atheists is thus represented

by Plato; Θεούς, ὧ μακάριε, εἶναι πρῶτον φασί. De Leg. l. x. [p. 666.] οὐ γὰρ οὗτοι τέχνη, οὐ φύσει, ἀλλὰ τισὶ νόμοις· καὶ

τούτους ἄλλους ἄλλοις, ὅπη ἕκαστοι συνωμολόγησαν νομοθετούμενοι. They first of all affirm, that the gods are not by nature, but by art and laws only; and that from thence it comes to pass, that they are

* De Nat. Deor. lib. i, cap. xlii. p. 2945. tom. ix. oper.

different to different nations and countries, accordingly as the several humours of their law-makers did chance to determine.—And before Plato, Critias, one of the thirty tyrants of Athens, plainly declared religion at first to have been a political intrigue, in those verses of his recorded by Sextus the philosopher, beginning to this purpose; “that there was a time at first, when men’s life was disorderly and brutish, and the will of the stronger was the only law: after which they consented and agreed together to make civil laws;” that so the disorderly might be punished. Notwithstanding which, it was still found, that men were only hindered from open but not from secret injustices: whereupon some sagacious and witty person was the author of a further invention, to deter men as well from secret as from open injuries:

Ἐρρώθην αὖτ' ἂν τὸ βίον ἀτακίστατον
 ὥς ἔστι δαίμων ἀφ' οὗτος βάλλον βίον,
 Νῦν τ' ἀσέβων καὶ θλίβων, φρονέοντα
 ἴφ' αὖ πᾶσι μὲν τὸ λεχθὲν ἐν βροτοῖς ἀσέβωνται,
 ἀφ' οὗτος δὲ πᾶσι ἰδὼν δυνάσταιται.

Namely, by introducing or feigning a God immortal and incorruptible, who hears, and sees, and takes notice of all things.—Critias then concluding his poem in these words;

Οὗτος δὲ πᾶσι δαίμων ἀσέβωνται πᾶσι
 ὁρῶντος πᾶσι δαίμωνται ἀσέβωνται.

And in this manner do I conceive, some one at first to have persuaded mortals to believe, that there is a kind of gods.^b

^a Lib. viii. adversa. Mathemat. §. 54. p. 562.

^b To these passages of the ancients, wherein the origin of all religion is ascribed to state-policy, add Seneca, Quæst. Natur. lib. ii. cap. xlii. p. 536. tom. ii. oper. and Sextus Empiric. lib. viii. adversa. Mathemat. p. 551.

Thus have we fully declared the sense of the Atheists, in their account of the phenomenon of religion and the belief of a God ; namely, that they derive it principally from these three springs or originals ; first, from men's own fear and solicitude concerning future events, or their good and evil fortune. Secondly, from their ignorance of the causes both of those events, and the phenomena of nature ; together with their curiosity. And, lastly, from the fiction of civil sovereigns, law-makers and politicians. The weakness and foolery of all which we shall now briefly manifest. First, therefore, it is certain, that such an excess of fear, as makes any one constantly and obstinately to believe the existence of that, which there is no manner of ground neither from sense nor reason for, tending also to the great disquiet of men's own lives, and the terror of their minds, cannot be accounted other than a kind of crazedness or distraction. Wherefore, the Atheists themselves acknowledging the generality of mankind to be possessed with such a belief of a Deity, when they resolve this into such an excess of fear ; it is all one, as if they should affirm, the generality of mankind to be frightened out of their wits, or crazed and distempered in their brains : none but a few Atheists, who being undaunted and undismayed have escaped this panic terror, remaining sober and in their right senses. But, whereas the Atheists thus impute to the generality of mankind, not only light-minded credulity and phantastry, but also such an excess of fear, as differs nothing at all from crazedness and distraction or madness ; we affirm, on the contrary, that their supposed courage, stayedness and sobriety, is

really nothing else but the dull and sottish stupidity of their minds; dead and heavy incredulity, and earthly diffidence or distrust; by reason whereof they will believe nothing but what they can feel or see.

Theists indeed have a religious fear of God, which is consequent from him, or their belief of him (of which more afterwards); but the Deity itself, or the belief thereof, was not created by any antecedent fear, that is, by fear concerning men's good and evil fortune; it being certain, that none are less solicitous concerning such events, than they who are most truly religious. The reason whereof is, because these place their chief good in nothing that is *ἀλλότριον*, *aliene*, or in another's power—and exposed to the strokes of fortune; but in that which is most truly their own, namely, the right use of their own will. As the Atheists, on the contrary, must needs, for this very reason, be liable to great fears and solitudes concerning outward events, because they place their good and evil in the *πάθος ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης*, the passion of pleasure and pain;—or at least, denying natural honesty, they acknowledge no other good but what belongs to the animal life only, and so is under the empire of fortune. And that the Atheists are indeed generally timorous and fearful, suspicious and distrustful things, seems to appear plainly from their building all their politics, civil societies, and justice (improperly so called), upon that only foundation of fear and distrust.

But the grand error of the Atheists here is this, that they suppose the Deity, according to the sense of the generality of mankind, to be nothing but a mormo, bug-bear, or terriculum, an af-

frightful, hurtful, and most undesirable thing: whereas men every where invoke the Deity in their straits and difficulties for aid and assistance, looking upon it as exorable and placable; and by their trust and confidence in it, acknowledge its goodness and benignity. Synesius affirms, that though men were otherwise much divided in their opinions, yet ἀγαθὸν τὸν Θεὸν ὑμνοῦσιν ἅπαντες ἀπανταχοῦ καὶ σοφοὶ καὶ ἄσοφοι, they all every where, both wise and unwise, agree in this, that God is to be praised, as one who is good and benign.

If among the Pagans there were any who understood that proverbial speech, φθονερὸν τὸ δαίμονιον, in the worst sense, as if God Almighty were of an envious and spiteful nature;—these were certainly but a few ill-natured men, who therefore drew a picture of the Deity according to their own likeness. For the proverb, in that sense, was disclaimed and cried down by all the wiser Pagans; as Aristotle, who affirmed the poets to have lied in this, as well as they did in many

Metaph. l. i.
o. 2. [p. 263.
tom. iv. oper.]

οὐτε τὸ θεῖον
φθονερὸν ἡδέως
ταὶ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ
πολλὰ λείδου-
σαι δοῦναι.

o. de Herod.
Malign. [p.
857. tom. ii.
oper.]

other things; and Plutarch, who taxeth Herodotus for insinuating τὸ θεῖον πᾶν φθονερὸν τε καὶ παραχῶδες, the Deity universally (that is, all the gods) to be of an envious and vexatious or spiteful disposition;—whereas himself appropriated this only to that evil demon or principle asserted by him, as appeareth from the life of P. Æmilius,* written by him, where he affirmeth, not that τὸ θεῖον πᾶν φθονερὸν, the Deity universally was of an envious nature:—but, that there is a certain deity or demon, whose proper

* Tom. ii. oper. p. 273.

task it is, to bring down all great and over-swelling human prosperity, and so to temper every man's life, that none may be happy in this world, sincerely and unmixedly, without a check of adversity ;—which is, as if a Christian should ascribe it to the devil. And Plato * plainly declares the reason of God's making the world at first, to have been no other than this, ἀγαθὸς ἦν, ἀγαθῷ δὲ οὐδεὶς περὶ οὐδενὸς οὐδέποτε ἐγγίγνεται φθόνος ; because he was good, and there is no manner of envy in that which is good.—From whence he also concluded, πάντα ὅτι μάλιστα ἐβουλήθη γενέσθαι παραπλήσια αὐτῷ, that God therefore willed all things should be made the most like himself ;—that is, after the best manner. But the true meaning of that ill-languaged proverb seems, at first, to have been no other, than what, besides Hesiod, the Scripture itself also attributes to God Almighty, that he affecteth to humble and abase the pride of men, and to pull down all high, towering, and lofty things, whether as noxious and hurtful to the men themselves, or as in some sense invidious to him, and derogatory from his honour, who alone ought to be exalted, and no flesh to glory before him. And there hath been so much experience of such a thing as this in the world, that the Epicurean poet himself could not but confess, that there was some hidden force or power, which seemed to have a spite to all over-swelling greatnesses, and affect to cast contempt and scorn upon the pride of men ;

Usque adeo res humanas vis abdita quædam
Obterit, et pulchros fasces, sævasque secures,
Proculcare, ac ludibrio sibi habere videtur.

Lamb. 503.
[lib. v. ver.
1232.]

* In Timæo, cap. xiv. p. 237. edit. Fabricii.

Where he plainly reeled and staggered in his Atheism, or else was indeed a Theist, but knew it not; it being certain, that there can be no such force as this, "in regno atomorum," in the reign or empire of senseless atoms.—And as for those among Christians, who make such a horrid representation of God Almighty, as one who created far the greatest part of mankind, for no other end or design, but only this, that he might recreate and delight himself in their eternal torments; these also do but transcribe or copy out their own ill-nature, and then read it in the Deity; the Scripture declaring on the contrary, that God is love. Nevertheless these very persons, in the mean time, dearly hug and embrace God Almighty in their own conceit, as one that is fondly good, kind, and gracious to themselves; he having fastened his affections upon their very persons, without any consideration of their dispositions or qualifications.

It is true, indeed, that religion is often expressed in the Scripture by the fear of God, and fear hath been said to be "*prima mensura Deitatis*," the first measure of the Divinity in us,—or the first impression, that religion makes upon men in this obnoxious and guilty state, before they have arrived to the true love of God and righteousness. But this religious fear is not a fear of God, as a mere arbitrary omnipotent Being, much less as hurtful and mischievous (which could not be disjoined from hatred); but an awful regard of him, as of one who is essentially just, and as well a punisher of vice and wickedness, as a rewarder of virtue; Lucretius himself, when he describes this religious fear of men, confessing it to be conjoined

with a conscience of their duty, or to include the same within itself;

Tunc populi gentesque tremunt, &c. P. 503. [lib. v.
Ne quod ob admissam foede dictamine superbe, vers. 1223.]
Poenarum grave sit solvendi tempus adactum.

And this is the sense of the generality of mankind, that there being a natural difference of good and evil moral, there is an impartial justice in the Deity, which presideth over the same, and inclines it as well to punish the wicked, as to reward the virtuous: Epicurus himself acknowledging thus much, ἐνθεν καὶ μεγίστας βλάβας οἴονται, τοῖς κακοῖς ἐκ θεῶν ἐπάγεσθαι, καὶ ὠφελείας τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, Theists suppose, that there are both great evils inflicted upon the wicked from the gods; and also great rewards by them bestowed upon the good.—And this fear of God is not only beneficial to mankind in general, by repressing the growth of wickedness, but also wholesome and salutary to those very persons themselves, that are thus religiously affected, it being preservative of them both from moral evils, and likewise from the evils of punishment consequent thereupon. This is the true and genuine fear of religion, which when it degenerates into a dark kind, of jealous and suspicious fear of God Almighty, either as a hurtful, or as a mere arbitrary and tyrannical Being, then is it looked upon as the vice or extreme of religion, and distinguished from it by that name of δεισιδαιμονία, superstition.—Thus is the character of a superstitious man given by Plutarch, οἷται θεοὺς εἶναι, λυπηροὺς δὲ καὶ βλαβεροὺς, that he thinks there are gods, but that they are noxious and hurtful; and ἀνάγκη καὶ μισῖν τὸν δεισιδαίμονα, καὶ φοβεῖσθαι

Ep. ad Menec.
p. 46. Gass.
[tom. v. oper.
vide etiam
Diog. Laert.
lib. x. §. 124.
p. 665.]

περὶ δεισιδαμ.
[p. 165. tom.
ii. oper.]

rov; θεός, a superstitious man must needs hate God, as well as fear him.—“The true fear of God (as the son of Sirach speaks) is the beginning of

his love, and faith is the beginning of
Chap. xxv. 12. cleaving to him.” As if he should have

said, The first entrance into religion is an awful regard to God as the punisher of vice; the second step forwards therein is faith or confidence in God, whereby men rely upon him for good, and cleave to him; and the top and perfection of all religion is the love of God above all, as the most amiable Being. Christianity, the best of religions, recommendeth faith to us, as the inlet or introduction into all true and ingenuous piety; for “he that cometh to God, must not only believe that he is,

but also that he is a rewarder of those
Heb. xi. 6. that seek him.” Which faith is better de-

fined in the Scripture than by any scholastic, to be the substance of things (that are to be) hoped for, and the evidence of things not seen; that is, a confident persuasion of things that fall not under sight (because they are either invisible or future), and which also are to be hoped for. So that religious fear consisteth well with faith, and faith is near of kin to hope, and the result of both faith and hope is love; which faith, hope and love, do all suppose an essential goodness in the Deity. God is such a being, who, if he were not, were of all things whatsoever most to be wished for; it being indeed no way desirable (as that noble Emperor concluded) for a man to live in a world void of a God and providence. He that believes a God, believes all that good and perfection in the universe which his heart can possibly wish or desire. It is the interest of none, that there should

be no God, but only of such wretched persons as have abandoned their first and only true interest of being good, and friends to God, and are desperately resolved upon ways of wickedness.

The reason why the Atheists do thus grossly mistake the notion of God, and conceive of him differently from the generality of mankind, as a thing which is only to be feared, and must consequently be hated, is from nothing but their own vice and ill-nature. For, first, their vice so far blinding them, as to make them think, that the moral differences of good and evil have no foundation in nature, but only in law or arbitrary constitution (which law is contrary to nature, nature being liberty, but law restraint); as they cannot but really hate that which hinders them of their true liberty and chief good, so must they needs interpret the severity of the Deity so much spoken of against wickedness, to be nothing else but cruelty and arbitrary tyranny. Again, it is a wretched ill-natured maxim, which these Atheists have, that there is "*nulla naturalis charitas*," no natural charity,—but that "*omnis benevolentia* Cic. de N. D. l. i. 213. Lamb. *oritur ex imbecillitate et metu*," all bene- [cap. xliii. p. 2948. oper.] volence ariseth only from imbecility and fear;—that is, from being either obnoxious to another's power, or standing in need of his help. So that all that is now called love and friendship amongst men, is, according to these, really nothing, but either a crouching under another's power, whom they cannot resist, or else "*mercatura quædam utilitatum*," a certain kind of merchandizing for utilities.—And thus does Cic. ibid. Cotta in Cicero declare their sense; "Ne homines quidem ceusetis, nisi imbecilli essent, fu-

turos beneficos aut benignos ;" You conceive that no man would be any way beneficent or benevolent to another, were it not for his imbecility or indigence.—But as for God Almighty, these Atheists conclude, that upon the supposition of his existence, there could not be so much as this spurious love or benevolence in him neither towards any thing: because by reason of his absolute and irresistible power, he would neither stand in need of any thing, and be devoid of all fear. Thus the

forementioned Cotta: "*Quid est præstantius bonitate et beneficentia? Quæcum carere Deum vultis, neminem Deo nec Deum nec hominem carum, neminem ab eo amari vultis. Ita fit, ut non modo homines a diis, sed ipsi dii inter se ab aliis alii negligantur.*" What is there more excellent than goodness and beneficence? which when you will needs have God to be utterly devoid of, you suppose, that neither any god nor man is dear to the supreme God, or beloved of him. From whence it will follow, that not only men are neglected by the gods, but also the gods amongst themselves are neglected by one another.—Accordingly a late pretender to politics, who in this manner discards all natural justice and charity, determines concerning God,* "*Regnandi et puniendi eos, qui leges suas violant, jus Deo esse a sola potentia irresistibili ;*" that he has no other right of reigning over men, and of punishing those who transgress his laws, but only from his irresistible power.—Which indeed is all one as to say, that God has no right at all of ruling over mankind, and imposing commands upon them, but

* Hobbes, Elem. de Cive, cap. xv. §. 4. p. 112. et alias.

what he doth in this kind, he doth it only by force and power, right and might (or power) being very different things from one another, and there being no *jus* or *right* without natural justice; so that the word *right* is here only abused. And consentaneously hereunto the same writer further adds,* “*si jus regnandi habeat Deus ab omnipotentia sua, manifestum est obligationem ad præstandam ipsi obedientiam incumbere hominibus propter imbecillitatem;*” that if God’s right of commanding be derived only from his omnipotence, then it is manifest, that men’s obligations to obey him lie upon them only from their imbecility.—Or, as it is further explained by him, “*homines ideo Deo subjectos esse, quia omnipotentes non sunt, aut quia ad resistendum satis virium non habent;*” that men are therefore only subject to God, because they are not omnipotent, or have not sufficient power to resist him.—Thus do we see plainly, how the Atheists, by reason of their vice and ill-nature (which make them deny all natural justice and honesty, all natural charity and benevolence), transform the Deity into a monstrous shape; such an omnipotent Being, as, if he were, could have nothing neither of justice in him, nor of benevolence towards his creatures; and whose only right and authority of commanding them would be his irresistible power; whom his creatures could not place any hope, trust, and confidence in, nor have any other obligation to obey, than that of fear and necessity, proceeding from their imbecility, or inability to resist him. And such a Deity as this is indeed

* Ibid. §. 7. p. 114.

a mormo or bug-bear, a most formidable and affrightful thing.

But all this is nothing but the Atheists' false imagination, true religion representing a most comfortable prospect of things from the Deity; whereas on the contrary, the atheistic scene of things is dismal, hopeless, and forlorn, that there should be no other good, than what depends upon things wholly out of our own power, the momentary gratification of our insatiate appetites, and the perpetual pouring into a "*dolium pertusum*," a perforated and leaking vessel:—that ourselves should be but a congeries of atoms, upon the dissolution of whose compages our life should vanish into nothing, and all our hope perish: that there should be no providence over us, nor any kind and good-natured being above to take care of us, there being nothing without us but dead and senseless matter. True, indeed, there could be no spiteful design in senseless atoms, or a dark unconscious nature. Upon which ac-

De Superst.
[p. 164. tom.
ii. oper.]

count, Plutarch would grant, that even this atheistic hypothesis itself, as bad as it is, were, notwithstanding, to be preferred before that of an omnipotent, spiteful, and malicious being (if there can be any such hypothesis as this), a monarchy of the Manichean evil principle, reigning all alone over the world, without any cor-rival, and having an undisturbed empire. Nevertheless it is certain also, that there could be no faith nor hope neither in these senseless atoms, both necessarily and fortuitously moved, no more than there could be faith and hope in a whirlwind, or in a tempestuous sea, whose merciless waves are inexorable, and deaf to all cries and suppli-

cations. For which reason Epicurus^a himself confessed, that it was better to give credit to the fable of gods (as he calls it), than to serve the atheistic fate, or that material necessity of all things, introduced by those atheistic philosophers, Leucippus and Democritus: *κρείττον ἢ τῷ περὶ θεῶν μύθῳ κατακολουθεῖν, ἢ τῇ τῶν φυσικῶν ἐιμαρμένῃ· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐλπίδα παραιτήσεως ὑπογράφει θεῶν διὰ τμῆς· ἡ δὲ ἀπαράτητον ἔχει τὴν ἀνάγκην*. Because there is hopes, that the gods may be prevailed with by worship and prayer; but the other (necessity) is altogether deaf and inexorable.—And though Epicurus thought to mend the matter, and make the atheistic hypothesis more tolerable, by introducing into it (contrary to the tenor of those principles) liberty of will in men; yet this, being not a power over things without us, but ourselves only, could alter the case very little. Epicurus himself was in a panic fear, lest the frame of heaven should sometime upon a sudden crack, and tumble about his ears, and this fortuitous complement of atoms be dissolved into a chaos;

^b ————— *Tris talia texta*

*Una dies dabit exitio; multosque per annos
Sustentata ruet moles et machina mundi.*

And what comfort could his liberty of will then afford him, who placed all his happiness in security from external evils? *Τέλος τοῦ μὴ νομίζειν θεοὺς, μὴ φοβεῖσθαι* (saith Plutarch): The atheistic design in shaking off the belief of a God, was to be without fear;—but by means hereof, they framed such a system of things to themselves, as under which they could not have

*De Superst.
[p. 165. tom.
ii. oper.]*

^a Vide Diog. Laert. lib. x. segm. 134. p. 660.

^b Lucret. lib. v. ver. 95.

the least hope, faith, or confidence. Thus running from fear did they plunge themselves into fear; for they, who are without hope, can never be free from fear. Endless of necessity must the fears and anxieties of those men be, who shake off that one fear of God that would only preserve them from evil, and have no faith nor hope in them. Wherefore we might conclude upon better grounds than the Atheists do of Theism, that Atheism (which hath no foundation at all in nature nor in reason) springs first from the imposture of fear. For the faith of religion being the substance or confidence of such things not seen as are to be hoped for; atheistic infidelity must needs, on the contrary, be a certain heavy diffidence, despondence, and misgiving of mind, or a timorous distrust and disbelief of good to be hoped for, beyond the reach of sense; namely, of an invisible Being omnipotent, that exerciseth a just, kind, and gracious providence, over all those who commit their ways to him, with an endeavour to please him, both here in this life and after death. But vice, or the love of lawless liberty, prevailing over such unbelieving persons, makes them by degrees more and more desirous, that there should be no God; that is, no such hinderer of their liberty; and to count it a happiness to be freed from the fear of him, whose justice (if it were) they must needs be obnoxious to.

And now have we made it evident, that these Atheists, who make religion and the belief of a God to proceed from the imposture of fear, do first of all disguise the Deity, and put a monstrous, horrid, and affrightful vizard upon it, transforming it into such a thing, as can only be feared

and hated ; and then do they conclude concerning it (as well indeed they may), that there is no such thing as this really existing in nature, but that it is only a mormo or bug-bear, raised up by men's fear and fancy. Of the two, it might better be said, that the opinion of a God sprung from men's hope of good, than from their fear of evil ; but really it springs neither from hope nor fear (however in different circumstances it raises both those passions in our minds) ; nor is it the imposture of any passion, but that whose belief is supported and sustained by the strongest and clearest reason, as shall be declared in due place. But the sense of a Deity often preventing ratiocination in us, and urging itself more immediately upon us, it is certain, that there is also, besides a rational belief thereof, a natural prolepsis or anticipation in the minds of men concerning it, which, by Aristotle, is called *Μαυραία*, a vaticination.

Thus have we sufficiently confuted the first atheistic pretence to solve the phenomenon of religion, and the belief of a God, so generally entertained, from the imposture of fear. We come now to the second, That it proceeded from the ignorance of causes also, or men's want of philosophy ; they being prone, by reason of their innate curiosity, where they find no causes to make or feign them ; and from their fear, in the absence of natural and necessary causes, to imagine supernatural and Divine ; this also affording them a handsome cover and pretext for their ignorance : for which cause these Atheists stick not to affirm of God Almighty, what some philosophers do of occult qualities, that he is but “ *perfugium et asylum*

ignorantiæ," a refuge and shelter for men's ignorance;—that is, in plain and downright language, the mere sanctuary of fools.

And these two things are here commonly joined together by these Atheists, both fear, and ignorance of causes, as which jointly concur in the production of Theism; because, as the fear of children raises up bug-bears, especially in the dark, so do they suppose in like manner the fear of men, in the darkness of their ignorance of causes especially, to raise up the mormo, spectre, or phantasm of a God; which is thus intimated by the Epicurean poet,•

—Omnia cæcis

In tenebris metuunt.

Steph. Poe.
Phil. 158. ex
Sexto. [vide
Sextum Em-
pir. lib. viii.
advers. Ma-
themat. i. 24.
p. 554.]

And accordingly Democritus gave this account of the original Theism or religion, ὁρῶντες τὰ ἐν τοῖς μετέωροις παθήματα οἱ παλαιοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καθάπερ βροντὰς καὶ ἀστραπὰς καὶ κεραυνούς, ἡλίου τε καὶ σελήνης ἐκλείψεις, ἰδεματοῦντο θεοὺς οἰόμενοι τούτων αἰτίους; that when, in old times, men observed strange and affrightful things in the meteors and the heaven, as thunder, lightning, thunderbolts, and eclipses, they not knowing the causes thereof, and being terrified thereby, presently imputed them to the gods.—And Epicurus declares this to have been the reason, why he took such great pains in the study of physiology, that, by finding out the natural and necessary causes of things, he might be able to free both himself and others from the terror of a God, which would otherwise invade and assault them; the importunity of men's minds, whenever they are at a loss for natural

• Lucret. lib. ii. ver. 64, 65.

causes, urging them so much with the fear, suspicion, and jealousy, of a Deity.

Wherefore the Atheists thus dabbling in physiology, and finding out, as they conceive, material and mechanical causes for some of the phenomena of nature, and especially for such of them as the unskilful vulgar sometimes impute to God himself, when they can prove eclipses (for example) to be no miracles, and render it probable, that thunder is not the voice of God Almighty himself, as it were roaring above in the heavens, merely to affright and amaze poor mortals, and make them quake and tremble; and that thunderbolts are not there flung by his own hands, as the direful messengers of his wrath and displeasure; they presently conclude triumphantly thereupon, concerning nature or matter, that it doth

* *Ipsa sua per se, sponte, omnia Diis agere experts,*

do all things alone of itself without a God.—But we shall here make it appear in a few instances, as briefly as we may, that philosophy, and the true knowledge of causes, leads to God; and that Atheism is nothing but ignorance of causes and of philosophy.

For, first, no Atheist, who derives all from senseless atoms, or matter, is able to assign any cause at all of himself, or give any true account of the original of his own soul or mind, it being utterly inconceivable and impossible, that soul and mind, sense, reason, and understanding, should ever arise from irrational and senseless matter, however modified; or result from atoms, devoid of all manner of qualities, that is, from mere mag-

* *Lucret. lib. ii. ver. 109.*

nitude, figure, site, and motion of parts: for though it be indeed absurd to say (as these Atheists allege) that laughing and crying things are made out of laughing and crying principles,

^a Et ridere potest non ex ridentibu' factus,

yet does it not therefore follow, that sensitive and rational beings might result from a composition of irrational and senseless atoms ; which, according to the Democritic hypothesis, have nothing in them but magnitude, figure, site, and motion, or rest, because laughing and crying are motions, which result from the mechanism of human bodies, in such a manner organized ; but sense and understanding are neither local motion, nor mechanism. And the case will be the very same, both in the Anaximandrian or Hylopathian, and in the Stratonian or Hylozoic Atheism ; because sense and conscious understanding could no more result, either from those qualities of heat and cold, moist and dry, contempered together ; or from the mere organization of inanimate and senseless matter, than it could from the

^b Concursus, motus, ordo, positura, figurae,

of atoms devoid of all manner of qualities. Had there been once nothing but senseless matter, fortuitously moved, there could never have emerged into being any soul or mind, sense or understanding ; because no effect can possibly transcend the perfection of its cause. Wherefore Atheists, supposing themselves, and all souls and minds, to have sprung from stupid and senseless matter, and all that wisdom, which is any where in the

^a Lucret. lib. ii. ver. 985.

^b Id. lib. i. ver. 686.

world, both political and philosophical, to be the result of mere fortune and chance, must needs be concluded to be grossly ignorant of causes; which had they not been, they could never have been Atheists. So that ignorance of causes is the seed, not of Theism, but of Atheism; true philosophy, and the knowledge of the cause of ourselves, leading necessarily to a Deity.

Again, Atheists are ignorant of the cause of motion in bodies also; by which, notwithstanding, they suppose all things to be done; that is, they are never able to solve this phenomenon so long as they are Atheists, and acknowledge no other substance besides matter or body. For, first, it is undeniably certain, that motion is not essential to all body, as such, because that no particles of matter could ever rest; and consequently there could have been no generation, nor no such mundane system produced as this is, which requires a certain proportionate commixture of motion and rest; no sun, nor moon, nor earth, nor bodies of animals; since there could be no coherent consistency of any thing, when all things fluttered and were in continual separation and divulsion from one another. Again, it is certain likewise, that matter or body, as such, hath no power of moving itself freely or spontaneously neither, by will or appetite; both because the same inconvenience would from hence ensue likewise, and because the phenomena or appearances do plainly evince the contrary. And as for that prodigiously absurd paradox of some few hylozoic Atheists, that all matter, as such, and therefore every smallest particle thereof, hath not only life essentially belonging to it, but also perfect wisdom and knowledge,

together with appetite, and self-moving power, though without animal sense or consciousness: this, I say, will be elsewhere in due place further confuted. But the generality of the ancient Atheists, that is, the Anaximandrians and Democritics, attributed no manner of life to matter, as such; and therefore could ascribe no voluntary or spontaneous motion to the same, but fortuitous only; according to that of the Epicurean poet already cited,

Nam certe neque consilio, primordia rerum
Ordine se quæque, atque sagaci mente locarunt;
Nec quos quæque darent motus pepigere profecto.

Wherefore these Democritics, as Aristotle somewhere^b intimates, were able to assign no other cause of motion, than only this, That one body moved another from eternity infinitely, so that there was no *πρῶτον κινούν*, no first unmoved mover,—ever to be found; because there is no beginning nor first in eternity. From whence probably, that doctrine of some atheistic Stoics in Alex.

Aphrodisius was derived, That there is no first in the rank and order of causes.

—In the footsteps of which philosophers a modern writer seemeth to have trodden, when declaring himself after this manner; “ Si quis ab effectu quocunque, ad causam ejus immediatam, atque inde ad remotiorem, ac sic perpetuo ratiocinatione ascenderit, non tamen in æternum procedere poterit, sed defatigatus aliquando deficiet.” If any one will from whatsoever effect ascend upward to its immediate cause, and from

^a Lib. i. ver. 1020.

^b Vide *Physic.* lib. viii. cap. i. §. 3. p. 796. tom. i. oper. et §. 27. p. 579.

^c Hobbes, *Elem. Philosoph.* part iv. cap. xxvi. p. 204.

thence to a remoter, and so onwards perpetually, in his ratiocination; yet shall he never be able to hold on through all eternity; but at length being quite tired out with his journey, be forced to desist, or give over.—Which seems to be all one as if he should have said, one thing moved or caused another infinitely from eternity, in which there being no beginning, there is consequently no first mover or cause to be reached unto. But this infinite progress of these Democritics, in the order of causes, and their shifting off the cause of motion, from one thing to another, without end or beginning, was rightly understood by Aristotle,* to be indeed the assigning of no cause of motion at all, *ὡς ἀνθρώπων ἔστι, ὅτι μὴτι ἔσται κατὰ φύσιν κινεῖν πρῶτον*, they acknowledging (saith he) no first mover according to nature, must needs make an idle progress infinitely;—that is, in the language of this philosopher, assign no cause at all of motion. Epicurus therefore, to mend the matter, though according to the principles of the atomic physiology, he discarded all other qualities, yet did he notwithstanding admit this one quality of gravity or ponderosity in atoms, pressing them continually downwards in infinite space. In which, as nothing could be more absurd nor unphilosophical than to make upwards and downwards in infinite space, or a gravity tending to no centre, nor place of rest; so did he not assign any cause of motion neither, but only in effect affirm, the atoms therefore to tend downwards, because they did so; a quality of gravity, signifying only an endeavour to tend downwards, but why or wherefore, nobody knows. And it is all one as if Epicurus should

* Physic. Auscultat. lib. vii. cap. ii. p. 365. tom. i. oper.

have said, that atoms moved downwards by an occult quality; he either betaking himself to this as an asylum, a sanctuary, or refuga, for his ignorance; or else indeed, more absurdly, making his very ignorance itself (disguised under that name of a quality) to be the cause of motion. Thus the Atheists universally either assigned no cause at all for motion, as the Anaximandrians and Democritics; or else no true one, as the Hylozoists; when, to avoid incorporeal substance, they would venture to attribute perfect understandings, appetite or will, and self-moving power, to all senseless matter whatsoever. But since it appears plainly, that matter or body cannot move itself, either the motion of all bodies must have no manner of cause; or else must there of necessity be some other substance besides body, such as is self-active and hylarchical, or hath a natural power of ruling over matter. Upon which latter account Plato rightly determined, that cogitation, which is self-activity or autokinesy, was, in order of nature, before the local motion of body, which is heterokinesy. Though motion considered passively in bodies, or taken for their translation, or change of distance and place, be indeed a corporeal thing, or a mode of those bodies themselves moving; yet, as it is considered actively for the *vis movens*, that active force, which causes this translation, or change of place, so is it an incorporeal thing; the energy of a self-active substance upon that sluggish matter or body, which cannot at all move itself. Wherefore, in the bodies of animals, the true and proper cause of motion, or the determination thereof at least, is not the matter itself organized, but the soul either as cogitative, or plasticly

self-active; vitally united thereunto, and naturally ruling over it. But in the whole world it is either God himself, originally impressing a certain quantity of motion upon the matter of the universe, and constantly conserving the same, according to that of the Scripture, "In him we live and move" (which seems to have been the ^{Acts. xvii. 28.} sense also of that noble Agrigentine poet and philosopher,* when he described God to be only "a pure or holy mind, that with swift thoughts agitates the whole world"); or else it is instrumentally an inferior created spirit, soul, or life of nature; that is, a subordinate hylarchical principle, which hath a power of moving matter regularly, according to the direction of a superior perfect Mind. And thus do we see again, that ignorance of causes is the seed of Atheism, and not of Theism; no Atheists being able to assign a true cause of motion, the knowledge whereof plainly leadeth to a God.

Furthermore, those Atheists, who acknowledge no other principle of things but senseless matter fortuitously moved, must needs be ignorant also of the cause of that grand phenomenon, called by Aristotle, the *τὸ εὖ καὶ καλῶς*, the well and fit in nature;—that is, of the most artificial frame of the whole mundane system in general, and of the bodies of animals in particular, together with the conspiring harmony of all. For they, who boasted themselves able to give natural causes of all things whatsoever, without a God, can give no other cause at all of this phenomenon, but only that the world happened by chance to be thus made as it is. Now, they, who make fortune

* Empedocles, cujus versus duos vide apud Ammonium Comm. in librum Aristot. *περὶ Ἐμπειρίας*, p. 107. edit. Aldinæ.

and chance to be the only cause of this so-admirable phenomenon, the most regular and artificial frame and harmony of the universe, they either make the mere absence and want of a cause, to be a cause, fortune and chance being nothing else but the absence or want of an intending cause; or else do they make their own ignorance of a cause, and they know not how, to be a cause; as the author of the *Leviathan*^a interprets the meaning hereof: "Many times (saith he) men put for cause of natural events their own ignorance, but disguised in other words; as when they say, that fortune is the cause of things contingent; that is, of things whereof they know no cause." Or they affirm, against all reason, one contrary to be the cause of another, as confusion to be the cause of order, pulchritude, and harmony; chance and fortune, to be the cause of art and skill; folly and nonsense, the cause of the most wise and regular contrivance: or lastly, they deny it to have any cause at all, since they deny an intending cause, and there cannot possibly be any other cause of artificialness and conspiring harmony, than mind and wisdom, counsel and contrivance.

But because the Atheists here make some pretences for this their ignorance, we shall not conceal any of them, but bring them all to light; to the end that we may discover their weakness and foolery. First, therefore, they pretend, that the world is not so artificially and well made, but that it might have been made much better, and that there are many faults and flaws to be found therein; from whence they would infer, that it was not made by a perfect God, he being supposed by

^a Cap. xi. et alias.

Theists to be no bungler, but a perfect Mind, or a Being infinitely good and wise, who therefore should have made all things for the best.

But this being already set down by itself, as a twelfth atheistic objection against a Deity, we must reserve the confutation thereof for its proper place. Only we shall observe thus much here by the way; that those Theists of later times, who, either because they fancy a mere arbitrary Deity; or because their faith in the Divine Goodness is but weak; or because they judge of things according to their own private appetites and selfish passions, and not with a free uncaptivated universality of mind, and an impartial regard to the good of the whole; or because they look only upon the present scene of things, and take not the future into consideration, nor have a comprehensive view of the whole plot of Divine Providence together; or lastly, because we mortals do all stand upon too low a ground; to take a commanding view and prospect upon the whole frame of things; and our shallow understandings are not able to fathom the depths of the Divine wisdom, nor trace all the methods and designs of Providence; grant, that the world might have been made much better than now it is; which indeed is all one as to say, that it is not well made: these neoteric Christians (I say) seem hereby to give a much greater advantage to the Atheists, than the Pagan Theists themselves heretofore did, who stood their ground, and generously maintained against them, that Mind being the maker of all things, and not fortune or chance, nor arbitrary self-will, and irrational humour omnipotent, the *τὸ βέλτιστον*, that which is absolutely the best in every case, so far as the necessity of

things would admit, and in compliance with the good of the whole, was the measure and rule both of nature and Providence.

Again, the atomic Atheists further allege; that though there be many things in the world, which serve well for uses, yet it does not at all follow, that therefore they were made intentionally and designedly for those uses; because, though things happen by chance to be so or so made, yet may they serve for something or other afterward, and have their several uses consequent. Wherefore all the things of nature happened (say they) by chance to be so made as they are, and their several uses notwithstanding were consequent, or following thereupon. Thus the Epicurean poet;

Lucret. l. iv. ————— Nil ideo natum est in corpore, ut uti
p. 567. Lamb. Possemus, sed quod natum est id procreat usum.
[vers. 834,
835.]

Nothing in man's body was made out of design for any use; but all the several parts thereof, happening to be so made as they are, their uses were consequent thereupon.—In like manner the

old atheistic philosophers in Aristotle
concluded, τοὺς ὀδόντας ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀναστῆλαι,
τοὺς μὲν ἱμπεροσθίους ὀξείας, ἐπιτεθειμένους πρὸς τὸ
δαίρειν, τὸν δὲ γομφίον πλατεῖς, καὶ χρησίμους πρὸς τὸ
λεαίνειν τὴν τροφήν· ὥστε οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ
συμπεσεῖν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων μερῶν, ἐν ὅσας
δοκεῖ ὑπάρχειν τὸ ἕνεκα τούτου. That the former teeth
were made by material or mechanical necessity,
thin and sharp, by means whereof they became
fit for cutting; but the jaw-teeth thick and broad,
whereby they became useful for the grinding of
food. But neither of them were intended to be

such, for the sake of these uses, but happened by chance only. And the like concerning all the other parts of the body, which seem to be made for ends.—Accordingly the same Aristotle represents the sense of those ancient Atheists, concerning the other parts of the universe, or things of nature, that they were all likewise made such, by the necessity of material (or mechanical) motions undirected, and yet had nevertheless their several uses consequent upon this their accidental structure. *Τί κωλύει τὴν φύσιν μὴ ἔνεκα τοῦ ποιεῖν, μηδ' ὅτι βέλτιον, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἔειπε ὁ Ζεὺς, οὐχ ὅπως τὸν σίτον αὐξήσῃ, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης, &c.* What hinders but that nature might act without any respect to ends or good and better, as Jupiter, or the heaven, raineth not intentionally to make the corn grow, but from necessity? because the vapours, being raised up into the middle region, and there refrigerated and condensed, must needs descend down again in the form of water. But this happens by mere chance, and without any intention, that the grain is made to grow thereby; as the contrary sometimes happens by the excess of it.

But to this we reply, that though a thing, that happens accidentally to be so or so made, may afterward, notwithstanding, prove often serviceable for some use or other; yet, when any thing consisteth of many parts, that are all artificially proportioned together, and with much curiosity accommodated one to another, any one of which parts having been wanting, or otherwise in the least placed and disposed of, would have rendered the whole altogether inept for such a use; then may we well conclude it not to have been made by chance, but by counsel and design, intentionally,

for such uses. As, for example, the eye, whose structure and fabric consisting of many parts (humours and membranes), is so artificially composed, no reasonable person, who considers the whole anatomy thereof, and the curiosity of its structure, can think otherwise of it, but that it was made out of design for the use of seeing; and did not happen accidentally to be so made, and then the use of seeing follow; as the Epicurean poet would fain persuade us,

P. 367. Lamb. Lumina ne facias oculosque olera creata,
[Lib. iv. ver. 823.] Prospicere ut possimus.

You are by all means to take heed of entertaining that so dangerous opinion (to Atheism), that eyes were made for the sake of seeing, and ears for the sake of hearing.—But for a man to think, that not only eyes happened to be so made, and the use of seeing unintended followed; but also, that in all the same animals, ears happened to be so made too, and the use of hearing followed them; and a mouth and tongue happened to be so made likewise, and the use of eating, and (in men) of speaking, was also accidentally consequent thereupon; and feet were in the same animals made by chance too, and the use of walking followed; and hands made in them by chance also, upon which so many necessary uses depend; besides innumerable other parts of the body, both similar and organical, none of which could have been wanting, without rendering the whole inept or useless; I say, to think, that all these things should happen by chance to be thus made in every one and the same animal, and not designed by mind or

counsel, that they might jointly concur and contribute to the good of the whole; this argues the greatest insensibility of mind imaginable. But this absurd and ridiculous conceit hath been long since so industriously confuted; and the folly thereof manifested by that learned Pagan philosopher and physician, Galen, in his book of the Use of Parts, that it would be altogether superfluous to insist any more upon it.*

Wherefore, that the former teeth are made thin and sharp, and the jaw-teeth thick and broad, by chance only, and not for use, was one of the Democritic dotages; as also, that nothing in the clouds and meteors was intended for the good of this habitable earth, within whose atmosphere they are contained, but all proceeded from material and mechanical necessity. Which conceit, though Cartesius seem to have written his whole book of Meteors in favour of, he beginning it with the derision of those, who "seat God in the clouds, and imagine his hands to be employed in opening and shutting the cloisters of the winds, in sprinkling the flowers with dews, and thunder-striking the tops of mountains;" and closing his discourse with this boast, that he had now made it manifest, there was no need to fly to miracles, (that is, to bring in a God upon the stage) to solve those phenomena; yet were it easy enough to demonstrate the defectiveness of those his mechanical undertakings in sundry particulars, and to evince that all those things could not be carried on with such constant regularity, by mere fortuitous mechanism, without any superior principle to guide and steer them. Nevertheless, we acknowledge,

* Vide Lactant, de Opificio Dei, cap. vi. p. 1003.

that God and nature do things every where, in the most frugal and compendious way, and with the least operoseness; and therefore that the mechanic powers are not rejected, but, taken in, so far as they could comply serviceably with the intellectual model and platform; but still so, as that all is supervised by one understanding and intending Cause, and nothing passes without his approbation, who, when either those mechanic powers fall short, or the stubborn necessity of matter proves uncompliant, does overrule the same, and supply the defects thereof, by that which is vital; and that without setting his own hands immediately to every work too, there being a subservient minister under him, an artificial nature, which, as an Archæus of the whole world; governs the fluctuating mechanism thereof, and does all things faithfully, for ends and purposes, intended by its director.

But our atomic Atheists still farther allege, that though it might well seem strange, that matter fortuitously moved should, at the very first jump, fall into such a regular frame as this is, having so many aptitudes for uses, so many correspondences between several things, and such an agreeing harmony in the whole; yet ought it not to seem a jot strange, if atoms, by motion, making all possible combinations and contextures, and trying all manner of conclusions and experiments, should, after innumerable other freaks, and discongruous forms produced, in length of time fall into such a system as this is. Wherefore they affirm, that this earth of ours, at first, brought forth divers monstrous and irregular shapes of animals;

Orba pedum partim, manuum viduata vicissim;
 Multa sine ore etiam, sine voltu cæca reperta.

Lucret. l. v.
 p. 476. Lamb.
 [var. 826.]

Some without feet, some without hands, some with a mouth and face, some wanting fit muscles and nerves for the motion of their members.—And the old philosophic Atheists were so frank and lavish herein, that they stuck not to affirm, amongst those monstrous shapes of animals, there were once produced centaurs, and scyllas, and chimæras; βουγενῆ καὶ ἀνδρόπρωρα, mixedly boviniform and hominiform—biform and triform animals. But Epicurus, a little ashamed of this, as that which must needs look oddly and ridiculously, and seeming more cautious and castigate, pretends to correct the extravagancy of this fancy;

Sed neque centauri fuerunt, neque tempore in ullo
 Esse queat duplici natura, et corpore bino,
 Ex alienigenis membris compacta potestas.

Lucret. l. v.
 p. 479.
 [var. 876.]

Nevertheless, there were not then any centaurs, nor biform and triform animals;—he adding, that they, who feigned such things as these, might as well fancy rivers flowing with golden streams, and trees germinating sparkling diamonds, and such vastly gigantean men, as could stride over seas, and take up mountains in their clutches, and turn the heavens about with the strength of their arms. Against all which, notwithstanding, he gravely gives such a reason, as plainly overthrows his own principles;

Res sic quæque suo ritu procedit, et omnes
 Foedere naturæ certo discrimina servant.

P. 480.
 [var. 920.]

Because things, by a certain covenant of nature, always keep up their specific differences, without

being confounded together:—For what covenant of nature can there be in infinite chance? or what law can there be set to the absolutely-fortuitous motions of atoms, to circumscribe them by? Wherefore it must be acknowledged, that, according to the genuine hypothesis of the atomic Atheism, all imaginable forms of inanimate bodies, plants, and animals, as centaurs, scyllas and chimæras, are producible by the fortuitous motions of matter, there being nothing to hinder it, whilst it doth

* *Omnimodis coire, atque omnia pertentare,
Quæcumque inter se possint congressa creare;*

put itself into all kind of combinations, play all manner of freaks, and try all possible conclusions and experiments.

But they pretend, that these monstrous irregular shapes of animals were not therefore now to be found, because by reason of their inept fabric, they could not propagate their kind by generation, as neither indeed preserve their own individuals. Thus does Lucretius declare the sense of Epicurus;

Lamb. p. 476.
[lib. v. ver. 844.]

Quoniam natura absterruit auctum,
Nec potuerit caput ætatis tangere florem,
Nec reperire cibum, nec jungi per venoris res.

And that this atheistic doctrine was older than Epicurus, appeareth from these words of Aris-

Nat. Anso.
l. ii. c. viii.
[p. 475. tom.
i. oper.]

totle; ὅπου μὲν οὖν ἅπαντα συνέβη, ταῦτα μὲν
ἔσωθ' ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου συστάνα ἐπιτηδείως
ὅσα δὲ μὴ οὕτως, ἀπώλετο, καθάπερ Ἐμπε-

Lucret. lib. v. ver. 191.

δοκλῆς λέγει τὰ βουγενῆ καὶ ἀνδρόπρωπα· When animals happened at first to be made, in all manner of forms, those of them only were preserved, and continued to the present time, which chanced to be fitly made (for generation), but all the others perished, as Empedocles affirmeth of the partly-ox and partly-man-animals.—Moreover, the ancient both Anaximandrian and Democritic Atheists concluded, that, besides this one world of ours, there were other infinite worlds (they conceiving it as absurd to think, there should be but one only world in infinite space, as that, in a vast ploughed and sowed field, there should grow up only one ear of corn, and no more); and they would have us believe, that amongst these infinite worlds (all of them fortuitously made) there is not one of a thousand, or, perhaps, of ten thousand, that hath such regularity, concinnity, and harmony in it, as this world that we chanced to emerge in. Now it cannot be thought strange (as they suppose), if, amongst infinite worlds, one or two should chance to fall into some regularity. They would also confidently assure us, that the present system of things, in this world of ours, shall not long continue such as it is, but after a while fall into confusion and disorder again;

* ————Mundi naturam totius ætas
Mutat, et ex alio terram status excipit alter,
Quod potuit nequeat, possit quod non tulit ante:

The same wheel of fortune, which, moving upward, hath brought into view this scene of things that now is, turning round, will, some time or

* Lucret. lib. v. ver. 832.

other, carry it all away again, introducing a new one in its stead:—and then shall we have Centaurs, and Scyllas and Chimæras again, all manner of inept forms of animals, as before.

But because men may yet be puzzled with the universality and constancy of this regularity, and its long continuance through so many ages, that there are no records at all of the contrary any where to be found; the atomic Atheist further adds, that the senseless atoms, playing and toying up and down, without any care or thought, and from eternity trying all manner of tricks, conclusions, and experiments, were at length (they know not how) taught, and by the necessity of things themselves, as it were, driven, to a certain kind of trade of artificialness and methodicalness; so that though their motions were at first all casual and fortuitous, yet in length of time they became orderly and artificial, and governed by a certain law, they contracting as it were upon themselves, by long practice and experience, a kind of habit of moving regularly; or else being, by the mere necessity of things, at length forced so to move, as they should have done, had art and wisdom directed them. Thus Epicurus in his epistle to

Herodotus,^a ἀλλὰ μὲν ὑποληπτέον καὶ τὴν φύσιν πολλὰ καὶ παντοῖα ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων διδαχθῆναι τε καὶ ἀναγκασθῆναι. It must be held, that nature is both taught and necessitated by the things themselves:—or else, as Gassendus interprets the words, “quadam veluti naturali necessariaque doctrina sensim imbuta;”—by little

^a Apud Diog. Laert. lib. x. segm. 75. p. 633.

and little imbued with a certain kind of natural and necessary doctrine.

To which atheistic pretences we shall briefly reply, first, That it is but an idle dream, or rather impudent forgery, of these Atheists, that heretofore there were in this world of ours all manner of monstrous and irregular shapes of animals produced, Centaurs, Scyllas, and Chimæras, &c. and indeed at first none but such; there being not the least footstep of any such thing appearing in all the monuments of antiquity, and traditions of former times: and these Atheists being not able to give any manner of reason, why there should not be such produced as well at this present time, however the individuals themselves could not continue long, or propagate by generation; or at least why it should not happen, that, in some ages or countries, there were either all Androgyna, of both sexes, or else no animal but of one sex, male or female only; or, lastly, none of any sex at all. Neither is there any more reason to give credit to these Atheists, when (though enemies to divination) they would prophesy concerning future times, that, in this world of ours, all shall some time fall into confusion and nonsense again. And, as their infinity of worlds is an absolute impossibility, so, to their bold and confident assertion concerning those supposed other worlds, as if they had travelled over them all, that, amongst ten thousand of them, there is hardly one, that hath so much regularity in it as this world of ours, it might be replied, with equal confidence, and much more probability of reason, that were every planet about this sun of ours a habitable earth, and every fixed star a sun, having

likewise its several other planets or habitable earths moving round about it, and not any one of these desert or uninhabited, but all peopled with animals; we say, were this so extravagant supposition true, that there would not be found any one ridiculous or inept system amongst them all, but that the Divine art and wisdom (which being infinite, can never be defective, nor any where idle) would exercise its dominion upon all, and every where impress the sculptures and signatures of itself.

In the next place we affirm, That the fortuitous motions of senseless atoms, trying never so many experiments and conclusions, and making never so many combinations and aggregate forms of things, could never be able to produce so much as the form or system of one complete animal, with all the organic parts thereof so artificially disposed (each of these being as it were a little world), much less the system of this great world, with that variety of animals in it; but least of all could it constantly continue such regularity and artificialness every where: for, that the fortuitous motions of irrational, senseless, and stupid matter should in length of time grow artificial, and contract a habit of acting as regularly and methodically, as if perfect art or wisdom had directed them, this is the most prodigious nonsense imaginable, and can be accounted no other than atheistic fanaticism.

It is no more possible, that the fortuitous motion of dead and senseless matter should ever from itself be taught and necessitated to produce such an orderly and regular system as the frame of this whole world is, together with the bodies of ani-

mals, and constantly to continue the same, than that a man perfectly illiterate, and neither able to write nor read, taking up a pen into his hand, and making all manner of scrawls, with ink upon paper, should at length be taught and necessitated, by the thing itself, to write a whole quire of paper together, with such characters, as being deciphered by a certain key, would all prove coherent philosophic sense; or than that we ourselves writing down the mere letters of the alphabet, transposedly, any how, as it happens, without the least thought, either of words or sense, after our scribbling a long time together what was altogether insignificant, should at length have been taught and necessitated by the thing itself, without the least study and consideration of our own, to write this whole volume. Or, to use another instance, this is no more possible, than that ten or a dozen persons, altogether unskilled in music, having several instruments given them, and striking the strings or keys thereof, any how, as it happened, should, after some time of discord and jarring, at length be taught and necessitated to fall into most exquisite harmony, and continue the same uninterruptedly for several hours together.

Wherefore, if it be ridiculous for one, that hath read over the works of Plato or Aristotle, or those six books of T. Lucretius Carus, *De Natura Rerum*, to contend, that possibly the letters of those books might be all put together by chance, or scribbled at random, without the least thought or study of the writer, he having also no manner of philosophic skill in him; or for one, that hears ten or a dozen persons playing in concert upon instruments of music, and making ravishing har-

mony, to persuade himself, that none of those players had, for all that, the least of musical art or skill in them, but struck the strings as it happened; it must needs be much more ridiculous and absurd, to suppose this artificial system of the whole world to have resulted from the fortuitous motion of senseless atoms, without the direction of any art or wisdom, there being much more of sense, art, and philosophy therein, than in any philosophic volume or poem ever written by men; and more of harmony and proportion, than in any composition of vocal music. We conclude there-

fore with Aristotle, ἀδύνατον δὲ ταῦτα τοῦτον

Nat. Auso. l.
ii. c. viii. [p.
475. tom. i.
oper.]

ἔχειν τὸν τρόπον that it is absolutely impossible things should have come to pass after this manner;—that is, by mere fortune and chance, and without the direction of any Mind or God. The Divine Mind and Wisdom hath so printed its seal or signature upon the matter of the whole corporeal world, as that fortune and chance could never possibly have counterfeited the same.

Notwithstanding all which, the ancient Atheists would undertake, by their wonderful skill in logic, to demonstrate, that the frame of nature could not possibly be made by any intending cause, and for the sake of ends and uses; as, for example, that eyes could not be first of all made intentionally for the use of seeing, nor ears intentionally for the use of hearing, and so for the rest; because, forsooth, these things were all of them, in order of time and nature, before their several uses. The argument is seriously propounded by Lucretius, after this manner:—

Nec fuit ante, videre, oculorum lumina nata, Lamb. p. 367.
 Nec dictis orare, prius quam lingua creata est; [lib. iv. ver.
 Sed potius longe linguae præcessit origo 834.]
 Sermonem, multoque creatæ sunt prius aures,
 Quam sonus est auditus; et omnia denique membra
 Ante fuere, ut opinor, eorum quam fuit usus.
 Haud igitur potuere utendi crescere causa.

To this sense : There was no such thing as seeing before eyes were made, nor hearing before ears, nor speaking before the tongue. But the original of the tongue much preceded speech : so likewise eyes and ears were made before there was any seeing of colours or hearing of sounds. In like manner, all the other members of the body were produced before their respective uses. And therefore they could not be made intentionally, for the sake of those uses.—The force of which argument consisteth in this proposition : That whatsoever is made for the sake of another thing, must exist in time after that other thing, for whose sake it was made : or, That, for which any thing is made, must not only be, in order of nature, but also of time, before that which is made for it.—And this that Epicurean poet endeavours to prove by sundry instances;

At contra conferre manu certamina pugnae,
 Ante fuit multo quam lucida tela volarent, &c.

Ibid.

Darts were made for the sake of fighting, but fighting was before darts, or else they had never been invented. Bucklers were excogitated and devised, for the keeping off of blows and strokes, but the declining of strokes was before bucklers. So were beds contrived for the sake of resting and sleeping, but resting and sleeping were older than beds, and gave occasion for the in-

vention of them. Cups were intended and designed for the sake of drinking, which they would not have been, had there not been drinking before.—According to the force of which instances, the poet would infer, that whosoever affirms eyes to have been made for the sake of seeing, must suppose, in like manner, there was some kind of seeing or other before eyes. But since there was no seeing at all before eyes, therefore could not eyes be made for the sake of seeing. And this is the atheistic demonstration, that the parts of men's bodies, and other things of nature, could not be made by any intending cause, for the sake of ends and uses.

But it is evident, that this logic of Atheists differs from that of all other mortals, according to which, the end, or that for which any thing is made, is only in intention before the means, or that which is made for it, but in time and execution after it. And thus was the more effectual way of fighting and doing execution, for whose sake darts were invented, in time after darts, and only in intention before them. It is true, indeed, that fighting in general was before darts, sleeping before beds, and drinking before cups; and thereby did they give occasion for men to think of means for the more effectual fighting, and more commodious sleeping and drinking; men being commonly excited from the experience of things, and the sense of their needs and wants, to excogitate and provide fit means and remedies. But it doth not therefore follow, that the Maker of the world could not have at once beforehand a preventive knowledge of whatsoever would be useful and for the good of animals, and so make them

intentionally for those uses. Wherefore the argument should have been framed thus; Whatsoever any thing is made for, as the end, that must needs be, in the knowledge and intention of the maker, before the existence of that which is made for it. And, therefore, if eyes were made for the sake or end of seeing, seeing must of necessity be in the knowledge and intention of the maker of eyes, before there were any eyes actually existing. But there could be no knowledge of seeing before there were any eyes. Wherefore eyes could not be made for the sake of seeing.

And this indeed is the genuine scope and drift of the premised atheistic argument, however it were disguised by them in their manner of propounding it. The reason whereof was, because they took it for granted, that all knowledge, as such, is derived by sense from the things themselves known pre-existing. From whence it follows, that there could be no knowledge of vision or seeing, before there was actual seeing and eyes; and so they think it to be demonstrated, that eyes could not be made by any Deity for the sake of seeing before there was seeing; no more than spectacles by men for the sake of eyes, before there were eyes. Thus does the Epicurean poet conclude triumphantly;

[L. iii. p. 368.
lib. iv. ver.
851.]

*Ille quidem seorsum sunt omnia, quæ prius ipsa
Nata, dedere suæ post notitiam utilitatis.
Quo genere imprimis sensus et membra videmus.
Quare etiam atque etiam procul est, ut credere possis,
Utilitatis ob officium potuisse creari.*

That is, The members of men's bodies, and organs of sense, were first made by themselves, and

then did they afterward give the notice or knowledge of their several utilities ; none of which could have been had before. Wherefore we affirm again and again, that it is impossible these things should have been made designedly for their uses.

So that the controversy is at last resolved wholly into this ; Whether or no, all knowledge and understanding, as such, universally does arise from things antecedently existing without the knower ? Which being asserted by Atheists, they conclude from thence, that the things of the world could not be made by the previous counsel, contrivance, and intention of any understanding Deity, but that they all blundered out themselves, one after another, according to the train or sequel of the fortuitous motions of matter ; and that from thence knowledge and understanding, counsel and intention, sprung up afterward, as junior to things, and the world. But this being already made the eleventh atheistic argument against a Deity, *viz.* That all knowledge and mental conception is the information of the things themselves known, existing before and without the knower, and a passion from them ; and therefore that the world must needs be before any knowledge or conception of it, and no knowledge or conception before the world, as its cause—we shall refer the answer to it, and confutation of it, to its proper place ; where we shall plainly demonstrate, that knowledge or understanding is not, in its own nature, ectypal, but archetypal ; and that it is older than the world and the Maker of all things.

But the Atheists yet further urge, against the proving of a God from the *τὸ εἶ καὶ καλῶς*, the regular frame of the whole world in general, and

the artificial structure of the bodies of animals, after this manner; That it is altogether unreasonable to suppose, there should be no cause in nature for the phenomena thereof, especially for those things, which are daily generated, as the bodies of animals; but (as by the tragic poets) a god should be introduced, as it were from a machine, forcibly to solve them. And, indeed, though there were a god, yet they think he ought not to be detruded to such mean offices as this, viz. to make the body of every the most contemptible animal, as it were with his own hands miraculously; nor ought nature or the world to be supposed so imperfect, as if it must be bungled and botched up every where after this manner. It is nature, therefore, which is the cause of these natural productions and generations. Which nature, that it doth not intend nor act designedly for ends and uses, appears not only from hence, because it never consults or deliberates (which Aristotle^a intimates to have been the reason, why some of old denied the things of nature to have been made for ends), but also because it hath no animal sense or consciousness, no understanding or appetite. Wherefore this opinion of intending, and final causality in nature, can be accounted no other than an *idolum specus* (as some^b affect to phrase it), or a prejudice of men's minds, when they apply their own properties to things without them, and think, because themselves intend, and act for ends, that therefore nature doth the like. And they might as well say, that nature laughs and cries, speaks

^a Vide de Nat. Auscultat. lib. ii. cap. viii. p. 477. tom. i. oper.

^b Lord Bacon in his Novum Organum, p. ii. §. 53. p. 47.

and walks, syllogizes and philosophizes, because themselves do so. But, as a modern philosopher concludeth, "The universe, as one aggregate of things natural, hath no intention belonging to it." And, accordingly, were all final causes rightly banished by Democritus out of physiology, as Aristotle* recordeth of him, τὸ οὐ ἕνεκα αἰεὶς λέγειν, πάντα ἀνάγει οἷς χρῆται ἡ φύσις. That he reduced all things to natural and necessary causes, altogether rejecting final.

To all which we briefly reply: That there are indeed two extremes here to be avoided; the one, of those, who derive all things from the fortuitous motions of senseless matter, which is the extreme of the atomic Atheists; the other, of bigotical religionists, who will needs have God αὐτουργεῖν ἅπαντα, to do all things himself immediately—as if all in nature were miracle. But there is a middle betwixt both these extremes; namely, to suppose, that besides God, and in subordination to him, there is a nature (not fortuitous, but) artificial and methodical, which governing the motion of matter, and bringing it into regularity, is a secondary or inferior cause of generations. Now, this *natura artificiosa*, this artificial nature, though itself indeed do not understand the reason of what it doth, nor properly intend the ends thereof, yet may it well be conceived to act regularly for the sake of ends understood and intended by that perfect Mind, upon which it depends. As the manuary opificers understand not the designs of the architect, but only drudgingly perform their several tasks imposed by him; and as types

* De Generat. Animal. lib. v. cap. viii. p. 713. tom. ii. oper.

or forms of letters, composed together, print coherent philosophic sense, which themselves understand nothing of. (Upon which artificial or spermatic nature, we have largely insisted before, in the Appendix to the third chapter.) And thus, neither are all things performed immediately and miraculously by God himself; neither are they all done fortuitously and temerarily, but regularly and methodically, for the sake of ends, though not understood by nature itself, but by that higher Mind, which is the cause of it, and doth, as it were, continually inspire it. Some, indeed, have unskilfully attributed their own properties, or animal idiopathies to inanimate bodies; as when they say, that matter desires forms, as the female doth the male; and that heavy bodies descend down by appetite towards the centre, that so they may rest therein; and that they sometimes again ascend in discretion, to avoid a vacuum. Of which fanciful extravagances, if the Advancer of Learning be understood, there is nothing to be reprehended in this following passage of his; “*Incredibile est quantum agmen idolorum philosophiæ immiserit naturalium operationum ad similitudinem actionum humanarum reductio* :” It is incredible, how many errors have been transfused into philosophy, from this one delusion, of reducing natural actions to the mode of human; or of thinking, that nature acteth as a man doth.—But if that of his be extended further, to take away all final causes from the things of nature, as if nothing were done therein for ends intended by a higher mind, then is it the very spirit of Atheism and infidelity. It is no idol of the cave or den (to use that affected language),

that is, no prejudice or fallacy imposed upon ourselves, from the attributing our own animalish properties to things without us, to think, that the frame and system of this whole world was contrived by a perfect understanding Being or Mind (now also presiding over the same), which hath every where printed the signatures of its own wisdom upon the matter. As also, that though nature itself do not properly intend, yet it acteth according to an intellectual platform prescribed to it, as being the manuary opificer of the Divine architectonic art, or this art itself as it were transfused into the matter, and embodied in it. Thus Cicero's^a Balbus long since declared concerning it, that it was not "*vis quædam sine ratione, ciens motus in corporibus necessarios; sed vis particeps ordinis, tanquam via progrediens, cujus solertiam nulla ars, nemo artifex consequi potest imitando:*" Not a force unguided by reason, exciting necessary motions in bodies temerarily; but such a force, as partakes of order, and proceeds as it were methodically; whose cunning or ingeniosity no art or human opificer can possibly reach to by imitation.—For it is altogether unconceivable, how we ourselves should have mind and intention in us, were there none in the universe, or in that highest principle, from whence all proceeds. Moreover, it was truly affirmed by Aristotle,^b that there is much more of art in some of the things of nature, than there is in any thing artificially made by men; and therefore intention, or final and mental causality, can no more be secluded from the consideration of natural, than it can

^a De Natur. Deor. lib. ii. cap. xxxii. p. 3001. tom. ix. oper.

^b Vide Natur. Auscult. lib. ii. cap. x. p. 476. tom. i. oper.

from that of artificial things. Now it is plain, that things artificial, as a house or clock, can neither be understood, nor any true cause of them assigned, without design or intention for ends and good. For to say, that a house is stones, timber, mortar, iron, glass, lead, &c. all put together, is not to give a definition thereof, or to tell what indeed it is, it being such an apt disposition of all these materials, as may make up the whole fit for habitation, and the uses of men. Wherefore this is not sufficiently to assign the cause of a house neither, to declare out of what quarry the stones were dug, nor in what woods or forests the timber was felled, and the like : nor, as Aristotle addeth, *εἰς τὸν τοῖχον γεγενῆσθαι ἐξ ἀνάγκης νομίζουσι*, Nat. Auso. l. ii. o. ix. [p. 478. tom. i. oper.] *ὅτι τὰ μὲν βαρὺα κάτω πέφυκε φέρισθαι, τὰ δὲ κοῦφα ἐπιπολῆς* διὸ οἱ λίθοι μὲν κάτω καὶ θεμέλια, *ἡ δὲ γῆ ἄνω διὰ τὴν κουφότητα, ἐπιπολῆς δὲ μάλιστα τὰ ξύλα* *κουφότατα γάρ*· If any one should go about thus to give an account of a house from material necessity (as the atheistic philosophers then did of the world and the bodies of animals), that the heavier things being carried downward of their own accord, and the lighter upward ; therefore the stones and foundation lay at the bottom, and the earth for the walls, being lighter, was higher ; and the timber, being yet lighter, higher than that ; but above all the straw, or thatch, it being the lightest of all.—Nor, lastly, if, as the same Aristotle elsewhere* also suggesteth, one should further pretend, that a house was therefore made such, *ἐμπεισόντος τοῦ ὀργάνου*, &c. merely because the hands of the labourers, and the axes, and hammers, and trowels, and other instruments, chanced all to be moved

* De Partib. Animal. lib. i. cap. i. p. 473. tom. ii. oper.

so and so; we say, that none of all these would be to assign the true cause of a house, without declaring, that the architect first framed in his mind a model or platform of such a thing to be made out of those materials, so aptly disposed into a foundation, walls, roof, doors, rooms, stairs, chimneys, windows, &c. as might render the whole fit for habitation, and other human uses. And no more certainly can the things of nature (in whose very essence final causality is as much included) be either rightly understood, or the causes of them assigned, merely from matter and mechanism, or the necessary and unguided motion thereof, without design or intention for ends and good. Wherefore to say,* that the bodies of animals became such, merely because the fluid seed, by motion, happened to make such traces, and beget such stamina and lineaments, as out of which that compages of the whole resulted; is not to assign a cause of them, but to dissemble, smother, and conceal their true efficient cause, which is the wisdom and contrivance of that Divine Architect and Geometer, making them every way fit for the inhabitation and uses of their respective souls. Neither indeed can we banish all final, that is, all mental causality, from philosophy or the consideration of nature, without banishing at the same time reason and understanding from ourselves, and looking upon the things of nature with no other eyes than brutes do. However, none of the ancient Atheists would ever undertake to assign necessary causes for all the parts of the bodies of animals, and their efformation,

* This seems to be levelled against Des Cartes' book *De formatione Foetus*.

from mere matter, motion, and mechanism; those small and pitiful attempts in order thereunto, that have been made by some of them in a few instances (as that the *spina dorsi*^a came from the flexure of the bodies of animals, when they first sprung out of the earth, the intestines from the flux of humours excavating a crooked and winding channel for itself, and that the nostrils were broken open by the eruption of breath); these, I say, only shewing the unfeasableness and impossibility thereof. And therefore Democritus was so wise, as never to pretend to give an account in this way of the formation of the foetus, he looking upon it as a thing absolutely desperate; nor would he venture to say any more concerning it (as Aristotle^b informeth us) than ὅτι αὐτὸς αἰὲν ἐξ ἀνάγκης γάρταί, that it always cometh so to pass of necessity—but stopped all further inquiry concerning it after this manner, τὸ ἰσχυρὸν τὸ διὰ τί, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων τιπὸς, τὸ ζητεῖν εἶναι τοῦ ἀπείρου ἀρχὴν, that to demand, about any of these things, for what cause it was thus, was to demand a beginning of infinite.—As if all the motions from eternity had an influence upon, and contribution to, whatsoever corporeal thing was now produced; And Lucretius, notwithstanding all his swaggering and boasting, that he and Epicurus were able to assign natural and necessary causes for every thing without a God, bath no where so much as one word concerning it. We conclude therefore that Aristotle's judgment concerning final causes in philosophy is much to be preferred before that

^a Vide Aristot. de Partib. Animal. lib. i. cap. i. p. 471, 472.

^b De Generat. Animal. lib. ii. cap. vi. p. 629. tom. ii. oper.

Nat. Anse. of Democritus, καὶ ἀμφω μὲν τῷ φυσικῷ
 l. ii. c. ix. λεκτέαι αἱ αἰτίαι, μᾶλλον δὲ, ἢ τινὸς ἕνεκα αἰτίον
 [p. 478. γὰρ τοῦτο τῆς ὕλης, ἀλλ' οὐχ αὕτη τοῦ τέλους,
 tom. i. oper.] that both kinds of causes (material and final) ought
 to be declared by a physiologer, but especially
 the final: the end being the cause of the matter,
 but the matter not the cause of the end.—And
 thus do we see plainly, that the atomic Atheists
 are utterly ignorant of the cause τοῦ εὖ καὶ καλῶς,
 of the regular and artificial frame of the things in
 nature,—and consequently the whole mundane
 system, the true knowledge whereof necessarily
 leadeth to a God.

But it is prodigiously strange, that these Athe-
 ists should, in this their ignorance and sottishness,
 be justified by any professed Theists and Christ-
 ians of later times, who atomizing in their physio-
 logy also, would feign persuade us in like manner,
 that this whole mundane system, together with
 plants and animals, was derived merely from the
 necessary and unguided motion of the small par-
 ticles of matter, at first turned round in a vortex,
 or else jumbled all together in a chaos, without
 any intention for ends and good, that is, without
 the direction of any mind; God in the mean time
 standing by, only as an idle spectator of this *lusus*
atomorum, this sportful dance of atoms—and of
 the various results thereof. Nay, these mechanic
 Theists have here quite outstripped and outdone
 the atomic Atheists themselves, they being much
 more immodest and extravagant than ever those
 were; for the professed Atheists durst never ven-
 ture to affirm, that this regular system of things
 resulted from the fortuitous motions of atoms at
 the very first, before they had for a long time to-

gether produced many other inept combinations or aggregate forms of particular things, and nonsensical systems of the whole. And they supposed also, that the regularity of things here in this world would not always continue such neither, but that some time or other confusion and disorder would break in again. Moreover, that, besides this world of ours, there are at this very instant innumerable other worlds irregular, and that there is but one of a thousand, or ten thousand, amongst the infinite worlds, that have such regularity in them. The reason of all which is, because it was generally taken for granted, and looked upon as a common notion, that τῶν ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ τοῦ αἰρούμενου, οὐδὲν αἰὲν οὕτω γίνεται, as Aristotle expresseth it,* that none of those things, which are from fortune or chance, come to pass constantly and always alike. —But our mechanic or atomic Theists will have their atoms never so much as once to have fumbled in these their fortuitous motions, nor to have produced any inept system, or incongruous forms at all; but from the very first all along, to have taken up their places, and have ranged themselves so orderly, methodically, and discreetly, as that they could not possibly have done it better, had they been directed by the most perfect wisdom. Wherefore these atomic Theists utterly evacuate that grand argument for a God, taken from the phenomenon of the artificial frame of things, which hath been so much insisted on in all ages, and which commonly makes the strongest impression of any other upon the minds of men, they leaving only certain metaphysical arguments for a Deity; which, though never so good, yet, by rea-

* Natur. Auscult. lib. ii. cap. iv. p. 469. tom. i. oper.

son of their subtilty, can do but little execution upon the minds of the generality, and even amongst the learned do sometimes beget more of doubtful disputation and scepticism, than of clear conviction and satisfaction; the Atheists in the mean time laughing in their sleeves, and not a little triumphing, to see the cause of Theism thus betrayed by its professed friends and assertors, and the grand argument for the same totally slurred by them; and so their work done, as it were, to their hands, for them.

Now, as this argues the greatest insensibility of mind, or sottishness and stupidity in pretended Theists, not to take the least notice of the regular and artificial frame of things, or of the signatures of the Divine art and wisdom in them, nor to look upon the world, and things of nature, with any other eyes than oxen and horses do; so are there many phenomena in nature, which, being partly above the force of these mechanic powers, and partly contrary to the same, can therefore never be solved by them, nor without final causes, and some vital principle. As for example, that of gravity, or the tendency of bodies downward, the motion of the diaphragma in respiration, the systole and diastole of the heart, which was before declared to be a muscular constriction and relaxation, and therefore not mechanical but vital. We might also add, amongst many others, the intersection of the plains of the equator and ecliptic, or the earth's diurnal motion, upon an axis not parallel with that of the ecliptic, nor perpendicular to the plain thereof. For though *Cartesius**

* *Vide Principia ejus Philosoph. part iii. §. 155. p. 136. et part iv. §. 2. p. 137.*

would needs imagine this earth of ours once to have been a sun, and so itself the centre of a lesser vortex, whose axis was then directed after this manner, and which therefore still kept the same site or posture, by reason of the striate particles, finding no fit pores or traces for their passage through it, but only in this direction; yet does he himself confess, that because these two motions of the earth, the annual and diurnal, would be much more conveniently made upon parallel axes, therefore, according to the laws of mechanism, they should perpetually be brought nearer and nearer together, till at length the equator and the ecliptic come to have their axes parallel to one another, which, as it hath not yet come to pass, so neither hath there been, for these last two thousand years (according to the best observations and judgments of astronomers), any nearer approach made of them to one another. Wherefore the continuation of these two motions of the earth, the annual and diurnal, upon axes different or not parallel, is resolvable into nothing, but a final and mental cause, or the *τὸ βέλτιστον*, because it was best it should be so, the variety of the seasons of the year depending hereupon. But the greatest of all the particular phenomena is the organization and formation of the bodies of animals, consisting of such variety and curiosity, which these mechanic philosophers being no way able to give an account of from the necessary motion of matter, unguided by mind for ends, prudently therefore break off their system there, when they should come to animals, and so leave it altogether untouched. We acknowledge indeed, that there is a posthumous piece

extant, imputed to Cartesius, and entitled, *De la Formation du Fœtus*, wherein there is some pretence made to solve all this by fortuitous mechanism. But as the theory thereof is wholly built upon a false supposition, sufficiently confuted by the learned Harvey, in his book of *Generation*, "that the seed doth materially enter into the composition of the egg;" so is it all along precarious and exceptionable; nor does it extend at all to the differences, that are in several animals, or offer the least reason, why an animal of one species or kind might not be formed out of the seed of another.

It is here indeed pretended by these mechanic Theists, that final causes therefore ought not to be of any regard to a philosopher, because we should not arrogate to ourselves to be as wise as God Almighty is, or to be privy to his secrets. Thus in *the Metaphysical Meditations*;^a "Atque ob hanc unicam rationem totum illud causarum genus, quod a fine peti solet, in rebus physicis nullum usum habere existimo; non enim absque temeritate me puto, investigare posse fines Dei." And again likewise in the *Principles of Philosophy*:^b "Nullas unquam rationes circa res naturales a fine, quem Deus aut natura in iis faciendis sibi proposuit, admittimus, quia non tantum nobis debemus arrogare, ut ejus consiliorum participes esse possimus." But the question is not, whether we can always reach to the ends of God Almighty, and know what is absolutely best in every case, and accordingly make conclusions, that therefore the thing is, or ought to be so; but, whether any thing at all were made by God for

^a *Meditat. iv.* p. 26. edit. Amstelod. 1685.

^b *Vide part i. §. 28. p. 8. et part iii. §. 2, 3, p. 50.*

ends and good, otherwise than would of itself have resulted from the fortuitous motion of matter. Nevertheless, we see no reason at all, why it should be thought presumption, or intrusion into the secrets of God Almighty, to affirm, that eyes were made by him for the end of seeing (and accordingly so contrived as might best conduce thereunto), and ears for the end of hearing, and the like. This being so plain, that nothing but sottish stupidity, or atheistic incredulity (masked perhaps under a hypocritical veil of humility), can make any doubt thereof. And therefore Aristotle* justly reprehended Anaxagoras for that absurd aphorism of his, *διὰ τὸ χεῖρας ἔχειν, φρονιμώτατον εἶναι τῶν ζώων τὸν ἄνθρωπον*, that man was therefore the wisest (or most solert) of all animals, because he chanced to have hands. He not doubting to affirm on the contrary, *εὐλογον διὰ τὸ φρονιμώτατον εἶναι τῶν ζώων χεῖρας ἔχειν ἢ γὰρ φύσις αἰὶ διανέμει καθάπερ ἄνθρωπος φρόνιμος, τῷ δυναμένῳ χρῆσθαι ἕκαστον· προσήκει γὰρ τῷ ὄντι αὐλητῇ δοῦναι μᾶλλον αὐλούς, ἢ τῷ αὐλούς ἔχοντι προσθεῖναι αὐλητικὴν* that it was far more reasonable to think, that because man was the wisest (or most solert and active) of all animals, therefore he had hands given him. For nature (saith he) distributeth, as a wise man doth, what is suitable to every one; and it is more proper to give pipes to one that hath musical skill, than upon him, that pipes, to bestow musical skill.

Wherefore these mechanic Theists would further allege, and that with some more colour of reason, that it is below the dignity of God Almighty to condescend to all those mean and trivial offices, and to do the things of nature himself

* De Partib. Animal. lib. iv. cap. x. p. 559, 560. tom. ii. oper.

immediately : as also, that it would be but a botch in nature, if the defects thereof were every where to be supplied by miracle. But to this also the reply is easy, that though the Divine wisdom itself contrived the system of the whole world for ends and good, yet nature, as an inferior minister, immediately executes the same ; I say, not a dead, fortuitous, and merely mechanical, but a vital, orderly, and artificial nature. Which nature, asserted by most of the ancient philosophers, who were Theists, is thus described by Proclus : *ἡ*
Stroph. Ptole. φύσις ἐσχάτη μὲν ἐστὶ τῶν τὸ σωματοειδὲς τοῦτο
Philos. καὶ αἰσθητὸν δημιουργούντων αἰτίων, καὶ τὸ πέρας
 τοῦ τῶν ἀσωμάτων οὐσιῶν πλάτους· πλήρης δὲ λόγου καὶ
 δυναμειῶν δι' ὧν κατευθύνει τὰ ἐγκόσμια· τοιαύτη δὲ οὖσα
 πρὸς ἡλῶθεν ἀπὸ τῆς ζωογόνου θεᾶς,

Νάτως δ' ἀμφὶ θεᾶς φύσις ἀεὶ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ

ἀφ' ἧς πᾶσα ζωὴ πρόεισιν, ἡ τε νοερά καὶ ἡ ἀχώριστος τῶν
 δικαιουμένων ἐκρηγμένη δ' ἐκείθεν καὶ ἀπηρωρημένη, ποιεῖ
 διὰ πάντα ἀκωλότως, καὶ πάντα ἐμπνέει, δι' ἣν τὰ ἀβύχωντα
 ψυχῆς μετέχει τινός, καὶ τὰ φθειρόμενα μένει διαϊωνίως ἐν
 τῷ κόσμῳ, ταῖς ἐν αὐτῇ τῶν εἰδῶν αἰτίαις συνεχόμενα·

Ἀρχὴ δ' αὖ φύσις ἀναμάτη κόσμου τε καὶ ἔργου,

φησὶ τὸ λόγιον,

Οὐρανὸς ὅρα θιν' ὀρέμεν αἰθῆρ κατασφύρον·

Kaὶ τὰ ἐξῆς· Nature is the last of all causes, that fabricate this corporeal and sensible world, and the utmost bound of incorporeal substances. Which, being full of reasons and power, orders and presides over all mundane affairs. It proceeding (according to the Magic Oracles) from that supreme goddess, the Divine wisdom, which is the fountain of all life, as well intellectual, as that which is concrete with matter. Which wisdom this nature

* Comment. in Timæum Platon. lib. i. p. 4. edit. Græc.

always essentially depending upon, passeathrough all things unhinderably; by means whereof even inanimate things partake of a kind of life, and things corruptible remain eternal in their species, they being contained by its standing forms or ideas, as their causes. And thus does the oracle describe nature, as presiding over the whole corporeal world, and perpetually turning round the heavens.—Here have we a description of one universal, substantial life, soul, or spirit of nature, subordinate to the Deity: besides which the same Proclus elsewhere* supposeth other particular natures, or spermatic reasons, in those words of his: Μετὰ τὴν ψυχὴν τὴν πρώτην, ψυχαὶ καὶ μετὰ τὴν ὅλην φύσιν, φύσεις. After the first soul, are there particular souls, and after the universal nature, particular natures. Where it may be observed, by the way, that this Proclus, though he were a superstitious Pagan, much addicted to the multiplying of gods (subordinate to one supreme) or bigotic Polytheist, who had a humour of deifying almost every thing, and therefore would have this nature, forsooth, to be called a goddess too; yet does he declare it not to be properly such, but abusively only (viz. because it was no intellectual thing), as he saith the bodies of the sun, moon, and stars, supposed to be animated, were called gods too, they being the statues of the gods. This is the meaning of those words: Καὶ θεὸς μὲν τῷ ἐκθεῶσθαι, καὶ οὐκ αὐτόθεν ἔχονσα τὸ εἶναι θεός· καὶ γὰρ τὰ θεῖα σῶματα, θεοὺς καλοῦμεν, ὡς ἀγάλματα τῶν θεῶν. Nature is a god or goddess, not as having godship properly belonging to it, but as the Divine bodies are called gods, because they are statues of the gods.

* Ibid. p. 118.

Wherefore we cannot otherwise conclude concerning these our mechanic Theists, who will thus needs derive all corporeal things from a dead and stupid nature, or from the necessary motions of senseless matter, without the direction of any mind or intention for ends and good; but that they are indeed cousins-german to Atheists, or possessed, in a degree, with a kind of atheistic enthusiasm, or fanaticism, they being so far forth inspired with a spirit of infidelity, which is the spirit of Atheism.

But these mechanic Theists are again counter-balanced by another sort of Atheists, not mechanical nor fortuitous; namely, the Hylozoists, who are unquestionably convinced, that "*opera naturæ sunt opera intelligentiæ*," the works of nature are works of understanding; and that the original of these corporeal things was not dead and stupid matter fortuitously moved: upon which account Strato derided Democritus's rough and crooked atoms, as mere dreams and dotages. But these notwithstanding, because they would not admit of any other substance besides matter, suppose life and perception essentially to belong to all matter as such; whereby it hath a perfect knowledge of whatsoever itself could do or suffer (though without animal consciousness), and can form itself to the best advantage, sometimes improving itself by organization to sense in brutes, and to reason and reflexive understanding in men. Wherefore, according to the principles of these Hylozoists, there is not any need of a God at all; that is, of one perfect mind or understanding being presiding over the whole world; they concluding accordingly, the opinion of a God to be only a mistaking

of the inadequate conception of matter in general, its life and energetic nature taken alone abstractly, for a complete substance by itself. Nevertheless these hylozoic Atheists are no way able, by this hypothesis of theirs neither, to solve that phenomenon of the regularity and harmony of the whole universe; because every part of matter being, according to them, a distinct percipient by itself, whose knowledge extendeth only to its own concernment; and there being no one thing presiding over all, the things of the whole world (*ἐν ᾧ πάντα συντάκται*, in which all things are co-ordered together—) could never have fallen into one such agreeing and conspiring harmony.

And as for those other Cosmo-plastic Atheists, who suppose the whole world to be as it were but one huge plant, tree, or vegetable, or to have one spermatic, plastic, and artificial nature only, orderly and methodically disposing the whole, but without sense and understanding; these can no way do the business neither, that is, solve the fore-mentioned phenomenon, it being utterly impossible, that there should be any such artificial and regular nature, otherwise than as deriving from, and depending upon, a perfect mind or wisdom.

And thus do we see plainly, that no Atheists whatsoever can solve the phenomena of nature, and this particularly of the regular frame and harmony of the universe; and that true philosophy, or the knowledge of causes, necessarily leadeth to a God.

But besides these phenomena of cogitation, or soul and mind in animals, local motion in bodies, and the artificial frame of things for ends and uses, together with the conspiring harmony of the

whole, which can no way be solved without a Deity; we might here further add, that the fortuitous; that is, the Anaximandrian and Democritic Atheists, who universally asserted the novelty of this mundane system, were not able to give any tolerable account neither of the first beginning of men, and those greater animals, that are no other-wise begotten, than in the way of generation, by the commixture of male and female.

Aristotle, in his book of the Generation of Animals, writeth thus: *Περὶ τῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τετραπόδων γενέσεως, ὑπολάβαι τὰς ἀν, εἴπερ ἐγγίνοντό ποτε γηγενεῖς, ὥσπερ φασί τινες, δύο τρόπων γίνεσθαι τὸν ἕτερον ἢ γὰρ ὡς σκώληκος συνισταμένου τὸ πρῶτον, ἢ ἐξ ὣν.* If men and four-footed animals were ever generated out of the earth, as some affirm, it may be probably conceived to have been one of these two ways, either that they were produced, as worms; out of putrefaction, or else formed in certain eggs,—growing out of the earth. And then, after a while, he concludes again, * *εἴπερ ἦν τις ἀρχὴ τῆς γενέσεως πᾶσι τοῖς ζώοις, εὐλογον δεῖν ταῦτα εἶναι τὴν ἑτέραν*, that if there were any beginning of the generation of all animals, it is reasonable to think it to have been one of these two forementioned ways. It is well known, that Aristotle, though a Theist, elsewhere affirmeth the world's eternity; according to which hypothesis of his, there was never any first male nor female in any kind of animals, but one begat another infinitely, without any beginning: a thing utterly repugnant to our human faculties, that are never able to frame any conception of such an infinity of number and time, and of a successive generation from eternity. But here

* Ibid. p. 666.

Aristotle himself seems staggering, or sceptical, about it, "if men were ever generated out of the earth, and if there were any beginning of the generation of animals;" as he doth also, in his *Topics*, propound it for an instance of a thing disputable; Πότερον ὁ κόσμος αἰδιος ἢ οὐ; Whether the world were eternal or no? he ranking it amongst *περὶ ὧν λόγον μὴ ἔχομεν ὄντων μεγάλων*, those great things, for which we can give no certain reason one way nor another. Now (saith he) if the world had a beginning, and if men were once *γηγενεῖς*, or *αὐτόχθονες*, earth-born—then must they have been, in all probability, either generated, as worms, out of putrefaction, or else out of eggs; he supposing (it seems) those eggs to have grown out of the earth. But the generality of Atheists in Aristotle's time, as well as Theists, denying this eternity of the mundane system, as not so agreeable with their hypothesis, because so constant and invariable an order in the world, from eternity, hath not such an appearance or semblance of chance, nor can be easily supposed to have been without the providence of a perfect mind presiding over it, and senior to it (as Aristotle conceived) in nature, though not in time; they therefore, in all probability, concluded likewise, men at first to have been generated one of these two ways, either out of putrefaction, or from eggs; and this by the fortuitous motion of matter, without the providence or direction of any deity. But, after Aristotle, Epicurus fancied those first men and other animals to have been formed in certain wombs or bags growing out of the earth;

Crescebant uteri terræ radicibus apti;

Lucret. lib. v. ver. 800.

And this no otherwise than by the fortuitous motion of atoms also.

But if men had been at first formed after this manner, either in wombs or eggs (growing out of the earth), or generated out of putrefaction, by chance; then could there be no reason imaginable, why it should not sometimes so happen now, the motions of atoms being as brisk and vigorous as ever they were, and so to continue to all eternity: so that there is not the least ground at all for that precarious fancy and pretence of Epicurus, that the earth, as a child-bearing woman, growing old, became at length effete and barren. Moreover, the men thus at first excluded out of bags, wombs or egg-shells, or generated out of putrefaction, were supposed by these Atheists themselves to have been produced, not in a mature and adult, but an infant-like, weak, and tender state, just such as they are now born into the world; by means whereof they could neither be able to feed and nourish themselves, nor defend themselves from harms and injuries. But when the same Epicurus^b would here pretend also, that the earth, which had been so fruitful a mother, became afterward, by chance too, as tender and indulgent a nurse of this her own progeny, and sent forth streams or rivers of milk after them out of those gaps of her wounded surface, which they had before burst out of, as Critolaus long since
In Philo. Quod
Mund. Inconv.
[p. 945.] observed, he might as well have feigned the earth to have had breasts and nipples too, as wombs and milk; and then what should hinder, but that she might have arms and

^a Vide Lucret. lib. v. ver. 823, 824. et lib. ii. ver. 1149.

^b Vide Lucret. lib. v. ver. 810.

hands also, and swaddling-bands to boot? Neither is that less precarious, when the same atheistic philosopher adds, that in this imaginary state of the new-born world, there was for a long time neither any immoderate heat nor cold, nor any rude and churlish blasts of wind, the least to annoy or injure those tender earth-born infants and nurselings. All which things being considered, Anaximander^a seems of the two to have concluded more wisely, that men, because they require a longer time than other animals to be hatched up in, were at first generated in the bellies of fishes, and there nourished up for a good while, till they were at length able to defend and shift for themselves, and then were disgorged, and cast up upon dry land. Thus do we see, that there is nothing in the world so monstrous, nor prodigiously absurd, which men, atheistically inclined, will not rather imagine, and swallow down, than entertain the notion of a God.

Wherefore here is “*dignus vindice nodus*,” and this phenomenon of the first beginning of mankind, and other greater animals, cannot be solved otherwise than according to the Mosaic history, by admitting of *θεὸν ἀπὸ μηχανῆς*, a God out of a machine, —that is, an extraordinary manifestation of the Deity, in forming man, and other animals, male and female, once out of the earth; and that not in a rude, tender, and infant-like state, but mature and adult, that so they might be able immediately to shift for themselves, multiply and propagate their kind by generation: and this being once done, and now no longer any necessity of such an extraordinary way of proceeding, then putting a

^a Vide Censorium de Die Natali, cap. iv. p. 26. edit. Lindenbrogii.

stop immediately thereunto, that so no more *terrigene*; nor *autochthones*; earth-born men,—should be any longer produced. For all these circumstances being put together, it plainly appears, that this whole phenomenon surpasses not only the mechanical, but also the plastic powers; there being much of discretion in it, which the latter of these cannot arrive to neither, they always acting fatally and necessarily. Nevertheless, we shall not here determine, whether God Almighty might not make use of the subservient ministry of angels or superior spirits, created before man, in this first extraordinary efformation of the bodies of animals out of the earth, in a mature and adult state; as Plato, in his *Timæus*^a, introduceth the supreme God (whom he supposeth to be the immediate Creator of all immortal souls) thus bespeaking the junior gods, and setting them a work in the fabrication of mortal bodies: *Τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ὑμεῖς, ἀθανάτων θνητὸν προσυφαίνοντες, ἀπεργάζεσθε ζωὰ καὶ γεννᾶτε*. It is your work now to adaptate the mortal to the immortal, and to generate or make terrestrial animals:—he afterwards adding^b, *μετὰ τὸν σπóρον, τοῖς νέοις παρέδωκε θεὸς, σώματα πλάττειν θνητὰ*, that after the sowing of immortal souls (the supreme God) committed to these junior gods the task of forming mortal bodies.—Which of Plato's some conceive to have been derived from that of Moses, "Let us make man after our own image."

Moreover, these Atheists are no more able to solve that other common and ordinary phenomenon neither, of the conservation of the species of all animals, by keeping up constantly in the world a due numerical proportion between the

^a §. 27. p. 250.

^b §. 22. p. 252.

sexes of male and female. For did this depend only upon fortuitous mechanism, it cannot well be conceived, but that, in some ages or other, there should happen to be either all males or all females; and so the species fail. Nay, it cannot well be thought otherwise, but that there is in this a providence also, superior to that of the plastic or spermatic nature, which hath not so much of knowledge and discretion allowed to it, as whereby to be able alone to govern this affair.

Lastly, there are yet other phenomena, no less real, though not physiological, which Atheists can no way solve; as that of natural justice, and honesty, duty and obligation; the true foundation both of ethics and politics; and the *τὸ εἰς ἑμᾶς*, liberty of will,—properly so called; not that of fortuitous determination, when there is a perfect equality or indifferency of eligibility in objects; but that whereby men deserve commendation and blame, rewards and punishments, and so become fit objects for remunerative justice to display itself upon, a main hinge upon which religion turneth; (though those two be not commonly so well distinguished as they ought). For when Epicurus (an absolute Atheist), departing here from Democritus, pretended to solve this by his "*exiguum clinamen principiorum*," this attempt of his was no other than a plain delirancy, or atheistic frenzy in him.

And now have we already preventively confuted the third atheistic pretence also, to solve the phenomenon of religion and the belief of a God, so generally entertained; namely, from the fiction and imposture of politicians: we having not only manifested, that there is a natural pro-

lepis and anticipation of a God, in the minds of men, as the object of their fear, preventing reason; but also that the belief thereof is sustained and upheld by the strongest reason; the phenomena of nature being no way solvable, nor the causes of things assignable, without a Deity; so that religion being founded, both upon the instincts of nature, and upon solid reason, cannot possibly be any fiction or imposture of politicians. Nevertheless, we shall speak something particularly to this also. The Atheists therefore conceive, that though those infirmities of human nature, men's fear and ignorant credulity, do much dispose and incline them to the belief of a God, or else of a rank of beings superior to men (whether visible or invisible), commonly called by the Pagans, gods; yet would not this be so generally entertained as it is, especially that of the one supreme Deity, the first Original of all things, and Monarch of the universe, had it not been for the fraud and fiction of law-makers and civil foreigners, who, the better to keep men in peace and subjection under them, and in a kind of religious and superstitious observation of their laws, and devotion to the same, devised this notion of a God, and then possessed the minds of men with a belief of his existence, and an awe of him.

Now, we deny not, but that politicians may sometimes abuse religion, and make it serve for the promoting of their own private interests and designs; which yet they could not do so well neither, were the thing itself a mere cheat and figment of their own, and had no reality at all in nature, nor any thing solid at the bottom of it. But since

religion obtains so universally every where, it is not conceivable, how civil sovereigns throughout the whole world, some of which are so distant, and have so little correspondence with one another, should, notwithstanding, all so well agree in this one cheating mystery of government, or piece of state-cozenage; nor, if they could, how they should be able so effectually to possess the generality of mankind (as well wise as unwise) with such a constant fear, awe, and dread, of a mere counterfeit thing, and an invisible nothing; and which hath not only no manner of foundation neither in sense nor reason, but also (as the Atheists suppose) tends to their own great terror and disquietment, and so brings them at once under a miserable vassalage both of mind and body. Especially since men are not generally so apt to think, that how much the more they have of power and dignity, they have therefore so much the more of knowledge and skill in philosophy and the things of nature, above others. And is it not strange, that the world should not all this while have suspected or discovered this cheat and juggle of politicians, and have smelt out a plot upon themselves, in the fiction of religion, to take away their liberty, and enthrall them under bondage; and that so many of these politicians, and civil sovereigns themselves also, should have been unacquainted herewith, and as simply awed with the fear of this invisible nothing, as any others? All other cheats and juggles, when they are once never so little detected, are presently thereupon dashed quite out of countenance, and have never any more the confidence to obtrude themselves upon the world. But though the Atheists have,

for these two thousand years past, been continually buzzing into men's ears, that religion is nothing but a mere state-juggle and political imposture; yet hath not the credit thereof been the least impaired thereby, nor its power and dominion over the minds of men abated: from whence it may be concluded, that it is no counterfeit and fictitious thing, but what is deeply rooted in the intellectual nature of man; a thing solid at the bottom, and supported by its own strength. Which yet may more fully appear from Christianity, a religion founded in no human policy, nor tending to promote any worldly interest or design; which yet by its own, or the Divine force, hath prevailed over the power and policy, the rage and madness, of all civil states, Jewish and Pagan, and hath conquered so great a part of the persecuting world under it; and that not by resisting, or opposing force, but by suffering deaths and martyrdoms in way of adherence to that principle, "That it is better to obey God than men." Which thing was thus presignified in the prophetic Scripture; "Why do the heathen rage, and the people imagine a vain thing? The kings of the earth set themselves, and the rulers take counsel together, against the Lord, and against his Christ," &c. "He that sitteth in the heavens shall laugh; the Lord shall have them in derision. Then shall he speak unto them in his wrath," &c. "Yet have I set my King upon my holy hill of Sion. I will give thee the heathen for thine inheritance, and the uttermost parts of the earth for thy possession. Be wise now therefore, O ye kings," &c.

* Acts v. 29. b Psal. ii. 1.

But that Theism, or religion, is no gullery or imposture, will be yet further made unquestionably evident. That the generality of mankind have agreed in the acknowledgment of one supreme Deity, as a being eternal and necessarily existent, absolutely perfect and omnipotent, and the maker of the whole world, hath been already largely proved in the foregoing discourse. To which purpose is this of Sextus the philosopher : * *Κοινὴν γὰρ πρόληψιν ἔχουσι πάντες ἄνθρωποι περὶ Θεοῦ, καθ' ἣν μακάριόν τι ἐστὶ ζῶον καὶ ἀφθαρτον καὶ τέλειον ἐν εὐδαιμονίᾳ, καὶ παντός κακοῦ ἀνεπίδεκτον*. All men have this common prolepsis concerning God, that he is a living being; incorruptible, perfectly happy, and incapable of all manner of evil.—And the notion of that God, which Epicurus opposed, was no other than this, “An understanding Being, having all happiness, with incorruptibility, that framed the whole world.” Now, I say, that if there be no such thing as this existing, and this idea of God be a mere fictitious thing, then was it altogether arbitrary. But it is inconceivable, how the generality of mankind (a few Atheists only excepted) should universally agree in one and the same arbitrary figment. This argumentation hath been formerly used by some Theists, as appeareth from the forementioned Sextus : *Τετέως δὲ ἐστὶν ἄλογον, τὸ κατὰ τύχην πάντας τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐπιβάλλειν ιδιώμασιν, ἀλλὰ μὴ φυσικῶς οὕτως ἐκκινῶσθαι*. It is altogether irrational to think, that all men should by chance light upon the same properties (in the idea of God) without

* Lib. i. advers. Physicos, sive lib. viii. advers. Mathemat. sect. 1. §. 33. p. 556. ed. Fabricii.

Adv. Math.

314.

[p. 557.]

being naturally moved thereunto. Neither is that any sufficient account, which the Atheists would here give, that statesmen and politicians everywhere thus possessed the minds of men with one and the same idea; the difficulty still remaining, how civil sovereigns and law-makers, in all the distant parts of the world, and such as had no communication nor intercourse with one another, should universally jump in one and the same fictitious and arbitrary idea.

Moreover, were there no God, it is not conceivable how that forementioned idea should ever have entered into the minds of men, or how it could have been formed in them. And here the Atheists again think it enough to say, that this notion or idea was put into the minds of the generality of mankind by law-makers and politicians, telling them of such a being, and persuading them to believe his existence; or that it was, from the first feigner or inventor of it, propagated all along and conveyed down by oral tradition. But this argues their great ignorance in philosophy, to think, that any notion or idea is put into men's minds from without, merely by telling, or by words; we being passive to nothing else from words but their sounds and the phantasms thereof, they only occasioning the soul to excite such notions as it had before within itself (whether innate or adventitious) which those words, by the compact and agreement of men, were made to be signs of; or else to reflect also further upon those ideas of their own, consider them more distinctly and compare them with one another. And though all learning be not the remembrance of what the

soul once before actually understood, in a pre-existent state, as Plato somewhere would have it, according to that of Boëtius,*

*Quod si Platonis musa personat verum,
Quod quisque discit, immemor recordatur:*

yet is all human teaching but maieutical, or obstetricious; and not the filling of the soul as a vessel, merely by pouring into it from without, but the kindling of it from within; or helping it so to excite and awaken, compare and compound, its own notions, as whereby to arrive at the knowledge of that, which it was before ignorant of: as the thing was better expressed by the forementioned philosophic poet, in these words,

*Hæret profecto semen introrsum veri,
Quod excitatur ventilante doctrina.*

Wherefore the mere telling of men, there is a God, could not infuse any idea of him into their minds; nor yet the further giving this definition of him, that he is a being absolutely perfect, eternal, and self-existent, make them understand any thing of his nature, were they not able to excite notions or ideas from within themselves, correspondent to those several words. However, the difficulty still remains, how those civil sovereigns and law-makers, or how Critias's very first inventor of that cheat of a god, could form that idea within themselves; since upon supposition of his nonexistence, it is the idea of nothing, or of a nonentity. And this was judiciously hinted also by the same Sex-

* De Consolat. Philos. lib. iii. p. 79, 80.

Adv. Math. 313, 314. [p. 556.] *tus ; οὗ δὲ διαμφοδοκούντες φασιν, ὅτι νομοθέται τινες ἐνεποίησαν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, τὴν περὶ Θεοῦ δόξαν, μὴ εἰδότες, ὅτι τὸ ἀρχῆθεν ἄριστον αὐτοῦ περιμένει, ζητήσαντος ἂν τινος, πόθεν δὲ οἱ νομοθέται, μηδενὸς πρότερον παραδόντος, ἦλθον εἰς ἐπίνοιαν θεοῦ :* The Atheists affirming, that certain law-makers first put this notion of a God into the minds of men, do not consider, that they still remain entangled in the difficulty, if any one further demands of them; how those law-makers themselves could first form that idea?—From whence it is afterwards concluded, ὡς τοῖων θεοῦ, οὐδὲ κατὰ τινα νομοθεσίαν, παρεδίξαντο οἱ παλαῖοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἶναι Θεόν; that therefore the notion of a God sprung not from the arbitratious fiction of law-makers and politicians.

But some Atheists will yet further reply, that there is a feigning power in the human soul, whereby it can frame ideas or conceptions of such things, as actually never were nor will be, as of a centaur, or of a golden mountain; and that by such a feigning power as this, the idea of God, though there be no such thing existing, might be framed. And here we deny not but that the human soul hath a power of compound-ing ideas and things together, which exist severally, and apart in nature, but never were, nor will be, in that conjunction: and this indeed is all the feigning power that it hath. For the mind cannot make any new cogitation, which was not before, but only compound that which is. As the painter cannot feign colours, but must use such as exist in nature; only he can variously

* Ibid. p. 557.

compound them together, and by his pencil draw the figures and lineaments of such things as no where are; as he can add to the head and face of a man the neck, shoulders, and body, of a horse. In like manner, that more subtile painter or limner, the mind and imagination of man, can frame compounded ideas of things, which no where exist, but yet his simple colours, notwithstanding, must be real; he cannot feign any cogitation which was not in nature, nor make a positive conception of that which is absolutely nothing; which were no less than to make nothing to be something, or create something out of nothing. And though the whole of these fictitious ideas (as of a golden mountain) does not any where actually exist, yet forasmuch as it doth not absolutely imply a contradiction for it so to do, therefore hath it also a possible entity too; and otherwise it could not be conceivable. As a triangular square, for example, being a contradictory thing; hath not so much as a possible entity, and therefore is not conceivable as such (though both a triangle and a square severally be conceivable); it being mere nonsense, nothing, and no idea at all. Nay, we conceive, that a Theist may presume with reverence to say, that God Almighty himself, though he can create more or fewer really existent things, as he pleaseth, and could make a whole world out of nothing, yet can he not make more cogitation or conception, than is, or was before contained in his own infinite mind and eternal wisdom, nor have a positive idea of any thing, which hath neither actual nor possible entity.

But the idea of God is not a compilement or aggregation of things, which exists scatteredly

and apart in the world; for then would it be a mere arbitrary thing, and it might be what every one pleased, one adding more things together, and another fewer, but each of them writing the name or title of God, as bungling painters did under these their several figments: whereas we have already proved, that the idea of God is one most simple idea of an absolutely perfect being, though having several partial and inadequate conceptions, so that nothing can be added to it, nor detracted from it, there being nothing included therein but what is demonstrable of a perfect being, and therefore nothing at all arbitrary.

Moreover, many of those partial conceptions contained in the entire idea of God are no where else to be found in the whole world, existing singly and apart; and therefore, if there be no God, they must needs be absolute nonentities; as immutability, necessary existence, infinity, and perfection, &c. So that the painter, that makes this idea, must here feign colours themselves, or create new cogitation and conception out of nothing, upon the atheistic supposition.

Lastly, if there be no God now existing, it is impossible that ever there should be any, and so the whole idea of God would be the idea of that, which hath no possible entity neither; whereas those other fictitious ideas, made by the mind of men, though they be of such things as have no actual existence, yet have they all a possible entity, as was said before.

But that we may conceal nothing of the Atheists' strength, we must here acknowledge, that some of them have yet pretended further, that besides this

power of compounding things together, the human soul hath also another ampliating, or increasing and improving power; by both which together, though there be no God existing, nor yet possible, the idea of him may be fictitiously made; those partial ideas, which are no where else to be found, arising, as they say, from a *μετάβασις ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων*, a transition and gradual procession, from men, in way of amplification, augmentation, and improvement.—Thus do we read in Sextus :

Τὸ αἰδίου εἶναι τὸν Θεόν, καὶ ἀφθαρτον, καὶ τέλειον Adv. Math. p. 317. [lib. viii. seu adv. Physic. lib. I. sect. 2. §. 46. p. 559, 560.]
 ἐν εὐδαιμονίᾳ, παρήλθῃ κατὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πὼν μετάβασιν· ὥς γὰρ τὸν κοινὸν ἄνθρωπον αὐξήσαντες τῇ φαντασίᾳ, νόησιν ἔχομεν Κύκλω- πορ, οὕτως ἄνθρωπον εὐδαιμόνα νοήσαντες καὶ μακάριον καὶ συνεπληρωμένον πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, εἴτα ταῦτα ἐπιτίναντες, τὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐκείνοις ἄκρον ἐνοήσαμεθ Θεόν· καὶ πάλιν πολυχρόνιον τινα φαντασιωθέντες ἄνθρωπον οἱ παλαιοὶ, ἐκπύξῃσαν τὸν Χρόνον εἰς ἄπειρον, εἴτα ἐντεύθεν εἰς ἐννοιαν αἰδίου παραγενόμενοι, ἔφασαν καὶ αἰδίου εἶναι τὸν Θεόν. The ideas of the eternity, incorruptibility, and perfect happiness, of the Deity, were fictitiously made by way of transition from men; for as, by increasing a man of an ordinary stature in our imagination, we fictitiously make the phantasm of a Cyclops; so when beholding a happy man, that aboundeth with all good things, we amplify, intend, and, as it were, swell the same in our minds higher and higher, we then arrive at length to the idea of a being absolutely happy, that is, a God. So did the ancients, taking notice of a very longeve man, and increasing this length of age further and further infinitely, by that means frame the notion or idea of eternity, and attribute the same to God.

But to this we reply, first, that, according to the principles of the Atheists themselves, there could not possibly be any such amplifying and feigning power of the soul, as whereby it could make more than is; because they suppose it to have no active power at all, but all our conceptions to be nothing but mere passions from the objects without; according to that of Protagoras

in Plato's *Theætetus*; Οὐτε γὰρ τὸ μὴ οὖτα

P. 167. Serr. δυνατὸν δοξάζειν, οὔτε ἄλλα παρ' ἢ ἃν πάσχει

It is neither possible for a man to conceive that which is not; nor any more or otherwise, than he suffers.—Again, as Sextus the philosopher also intimates, the Atheists are here plainly guilty of that fallacy or error in ratiocination, which is commonly called a circle, or *ἡ ἀλλήλων*. For whereas they could not otherwise judge the greatest perfection and happiness, which ever they had experience of in men, to be imperfect, than by unanticipated idea of perfection and happiness, with which it was in their minds compared (by virtue of which idea also it comes to pass, that they are able to amplify those lesser perfections of men further and further, and can take occasion, from imperfect things, to think of that which is absolutely perfect): that is, whereas these Atheists themselves first make the idea of imperfection from perfection; they, not attending to this, do again go about to make up the notion or idea of that which is absolutely perfect (by way of amplification) from that which is imperfect. But that men have a notion of absolute perfection in them, by which, as the rule or measure, they

* Vide lib. viii. adv. Mathematic. sect. 2. §. 47. p. 560.

(comparing other things therewith) judge them to be imperfect, and which is therefore in order of nature first, may appear from hence, because all theologers, as well Pagan as Christian, give this direction, for the conceiving of God; that it should principally be done "per viam remoti-
onis," by way of remotion of all imperfection from him.—Thus Alcinoüs : * *Πρώτη μὲν αὐτοῦ νόησις ἢ κατὰ ἀφαίρεσιν*. The first way of conceiving of God is by remotion or abstraction.—We add, in the last place, that finite things put together can never make up infinite, as may appear from that instance of human longevity proposed; for, if one should amplify that never so much, by adding of more and more part, time or years to it; yet would he never thereby be able to arrive at eternity without beginning. God differs not from these imperfect created things in degrees only, but in the whole kind. And though infinite space may perhaps be here objected, as a thing taken for granted, which being nothing but extension or magnitude, must therefore consist, or be made up, of finite parts, as it was before declared, we have no certainty of any more than this, that the finite world might have been made bigger, and bigger infinitely, or without end; which infinity of magnitude is but like that of number, potential; from whence it may be inferred as well of the one as the other, that it can never be actually infinite. Wherefore, were there no infinitely-perfect being in nature, the idea thereof could never be made up by any amplifying power of the soul, or by the addition of finites. Neither is that of any mo-

* Introduct. in Doctrin. Platon. cap. x. p. 602. printed at the end of Dan. Heinsius's edit. of Maximus-Tyrus.

ment which Gassendus so much objecteth here to the contrary, that though there were no God, or infinite being, yet might the idea of him as well be feigned by the mind, as that of infinite worlds, or of infinite matter, was by some philosophers : for infinite worlds, and infinite matter, are but words ill put together, infinity being a real thing in nature (and no fiction of the mind), as well as the world or matter, but yet proper to the Deity only. But it is no wonder, if they, who denied a God, yet retaining this notion of infinity, should misapply the same, as they did also other properties of the Deity, to matter.

To conclude this ; our human soul cannot feign or create any new cogitation, nor conception, that was not before, but only variously compound that which is ; nor can it ever make a positive idea of an absolute nonentity, that is, such as hath neither actual nor possible existence : much less could our imperfect beings create the entity of so vast a thought, as that of an infinitely-perfect being, out of nothing ; this being indeed more than for God Almighty, or a perfect being, to create a real world out of nothing ; because there is no repugnancy at all in the latter, as there is in the former. We affirm therefore, that were there no God, the idea of an absolutely or infinitely perfect being could never have been made or feigned, neither by politicians, nor by poets, nor philosophers, nor any other. Which may be accounted another argument for a Deity.

But that religion is no figment of politicians,

* In Disquisit. Metaphys. seu dubitationibus et instantiis ad Cartesii Metaphys. dubit. iv. p. 336. tom. iii. oper.

will further unquestionably appear from that, which now shall follow. As the religion of an oath is a necessary vinculum of civil society; so obligation in conscience, respecting the Deity as its original, and as the punisher of the violation thereof, is the very foundation of all civil sovereignty: for pacts and covenants (into which some would resolve all civil power), without this obligation in conscience, are nothing but mere words and breath; and the laws and commands of civil sovereigns do not make obligation, but presuppose it, as a thing in order of nature before them, and without which they would be invalid. Which is a truth so evident, that the writer *De Cive* could not dissemble it (though he did not rightly understand this natural obligation), but acknowledgeth it in these words; "*Obligatio ad obedientiam civilem, cujus vi leges civiles validæ sunt, omni lege civili prior est.*"—*Quod si quis princeps summus legem civilem in hanc formulam conciperet, Non rebellabis, nihil efficeret. Nam nisi prius obligentur cives ad obediendum, hoc est, ad non rebellandum, omnis lex invalida est; et si prius obligentur est superflua.*" The obligation to civil obedience, by the force of which all the civil laws become valid, is before those civil laws. And if any prince should make a law to this purpose, That no man should rebel against him, this would signify nothing, because unless they, to whom it is made, were before obliged to obey, or not to rebel, the law is invalid; and if they were, then is it superfluous.—Now this previous obligation to civil obedience cannot be derived (as the fore-mentioned writer *De Cive*, and of the *Leviathan*

*Imper. c. xiv.
sect. 21.
[p. 109.]*

supposes) from men's private utility only ; because every man being judge of this for himself, it would then be lawful for any subject to rebel against his sovereign prince, and to poison or stab him, whensoever he could reasonably persuade himself, that it would tend to his own advantage, or that he should thereby procure the sovereignty. Were the obligation to civil obedience made only by men's private utility, it would as easily be dissolved by the same. It remaineth therefore, that conscience, and religious obligation to duty, is the only basis, and essential foundation, of a polity or commonwealth ; without which there could be no right or authority of commanding in any sovereign, nor validity in any laws. Wherefore religious obligation cannot be thought to be the fiction or imposture of civil sovereigns, unless civil sovereignty itself be accounted a fiction and imposture, or a thing which hath no foundation in nature, but is either wholly artificial or violent.

Moreover, had a religious regard to the Deity been a mere figment or invention of politicians, to promote their own ends, and keep men in obedience and subjection under them, then would they doubtless have so framed and contrived it, as that it should have been every way flexible and compliant ; namely, by persuading the world, that whatsoever was commanded by themselves, was agreeable to the Divine will, and whatever was forbidden by their laws, was displeasing to God Almighty, and would be punished by him ; God ruling over the world no otherwise than by and in these civil sovereigns, as his vicegerents, and as the only prophets and interpreters of his will to

men. So that the civil law of every country, and the arbitrary will of sovereigns, should be acknowledged to be the only measure of just and unjust (there being nothing naturally such), the only rule of conscience and religion: for, from religion thus modelled, civil sovereigns might think to have an absolute power, or an infinite right of doing or commanding whatsoever they pleased, without exception, nothing being unlawful to them, and their subjects being always obliged, in conscience, without the least scruple, to obey.

But this is but a mere *larva* of religion, and would be but a mocking of God Almighty; and indeed this is the only religion that can be called a political figment. Neither could the generality of mankind be ever yet thus persuaded, that the arbitrary will of civil sovereigns was the only rule of justice and conscience; and that God Almighty could command nothing, nor reveal his will concerning religion to mankind otherwise than by these, as his prophets and interpreters. True religion and conscience are no such waxen things, servilely addicted to the arbitrary wills of men, but immorigerous, stiff, and inflexible; they respecting the Deity only, his eternal or everlasting laws, and his revealed will; with which whensoever human laws clash (a thing not impossible) they conclude, that then God ought to be obeyed and not men. For which cause the profane politicians declare open war against this religion, as a thing utterly inconsistent with civil sovereignty because it introduces a fear greater than the fear of the Leviathan, namely, that of him, who can

inflict eternal punishments after death ; as also because it clashes with that monstrous, infinite, and unlimited power of theirs, which is such a thing, as is not attributed by genuine Theists to God Almighty himself ; a power of making their mere arbitrary will the rule of justice, and not justice the rule of their will. Thus does a modern writer of politics condemn it for seditious doctrine, tending to the dissolution of a commonwealth ; That subjects may make a judgment of good and evil, just and unjust ;

Lev. p. 168.

or have any other conscience besides the law of the land. As also this, That subjects may sin in obeying the commands of their sovereign. He likewise adds, That

De Civ. l. xii.
sect. 2.
[p. 83.]

it is impossible a commonwealth should stand, where any other than the sovereign hath a power of giving greater rewards than life, and of inflicting greater punishments than death.

Lev.
o. xxxviii.
p. 238.

Now, eternal life is a greater reward than the life present, and eternal torment than the death of nature. Wherefore, God Almighty being the dispenser of eternal rewards and punishments, this is all one as if he should have said, It is impossible a commonwealth should stand, where the belief of a God, who can punish with eternal torments after this life, is entertained. Thus does the same writer declare, That if the

Lev. p. 8.

superstitious fear of spirits (whereof God is the chief), and things depending thereupon, were taken away, men would be much more fitted than they are for civil obedience : and that they, who assert the immortality of souls, or their capability of receiving punishments after death,

fright men from obeying the laws of their country, with empty names, as men fright birds from the corn, with an empty doublet, a hat, and a crooked stick. And accordingly he concludes, that civil sovereigns do not only make justice, but religion also; and that no Scripture or Divine revelation can oblige, unless it be first made law, or stamped with their authority. Now, since that which can make religion and gods must itself needs be greater than all gods, it follows, according to the tenor of this doctrine, that the civil sovereign is in reality the supreme Numen; or else at least, that the Leviathan (the king over all the children of pride) is the highest deity next to senseless omnipotent matter; the one of these being the Atheists' natural, the other their artificial god. Nevertheless we shall here observe by the way, that whilst these atheistic politicians thus endeavour to swell up the civil sovereign, and to bestow upon him an infinite right, by removing to that end out of his way natural justice, conscience, religion, and God himself, they do indeed thereby absolutely divest him of all right and authority, since the subject is now no longer obliged in conscience to obey him: and so instead of true right and authority, they leave him nothing but mere brutish force. Wherefore, since Theism and true religion are thus plainly disowned and disclaimed by these politicians, as altogether inconsistent with their designs, they cannot be supposed to have been the figments of civil sovereigns, or the mere creatures of political art. And thus have we abundantly confuted those three atheistic pretences, to solve the phenomenon of religion; from fear,

and the ignorance of causes, and the fiction of politicians.

But since, besides those ordinary phenomena beforementioned, which are no way solvable by Atheists, there are certain other phenomena extraordinary, that either immediately prove a God and Providence, or else that there is a rank of understanding beings, invisible, superior to men, from whence a Deity may be afterwards inferred; namely, these three especially, apparitions, miracles, and prophecies (where the Atheists obstinately denying matter of fact and history, will needs impute these things, either to juggling fraud and knavery; or else to men's own fear and fancy, and their ignorance how to distinguish dreams, and other strong imaginations, from vision and sense; or lastly, to certain religious tales or legends, allowed by the public authority of civil sovereigns, for political ends): we shall here suggest something briefly, to vindicate the historic truth of those phenomena against Atheists.

First, therefore, as for apparitions, though there be much of fabulosity in these relations, yet can it not reasonably be concluded, that there is nothing at all of truth in them; since something of this kind hath been averred in all ages, and many times attested by persons of unquestionable prudence, and unsuspected veracity. And whereas the Atheists impute the original of these things to men's mistaking both their dreams, and their waking fancies, for real visions and sensations; they do hereby plainly contradict one main fundamental principle of their own philosophy, that sense is the only ground of certainty, and the criterion of all truth: for if prudent and intelli-

gent persons may be so frequently mistaken, in confounding their own dreams and fancies with sensations, how can there be any certainty of knowledge at all from sense? However, they here derogate so much both from sense, and from human testimonies, as that if the like were done in other cases, it would plainly overthrow all human life.

Wherefore other Atheists, being apprehensive of this inconvenience, of denying so many sensible appearances, and testimonies, or relations of fact, have chose rather to acknowledge the reality of apparitions; nevertheless concluding them to be things caused and created, by the power of imagination only: as if the strength of imagination were such, that it could not only create fancies, but also real sensible objects, and that at a distance too from the imaginers, such as whereby the sense of others shall be for the time affected, though they quickly vanish away again. From which prodigious paradox, we may take notice of the fanaticism of some Atheists, and that there is nothing so monstrously absurd, which men infected with atheistic incredulity will not rather entertain into their belief, than admit of any thing that shall the least hazard or endanger the existence of a God. For, if there be once any invisible ghosts or spirits acknowledged as things permanent, it will not be easy for any to give a reason, why there might not be one supreme ghost also, presiding over them all and the whole world.

In the last place therefore we shall observe, that Democritus was yet further convinced by these relations of apparitions, so as to grant, that there

was a certain kind of permanent beings, and independent upon the imagination, superior to men, which could appear in different forms, and again disappear at pleasure, called by him idols, or images ; he supposing them to be of the same nature with those exuvius effluxes, that stream continually from the surface of bodies : only he would not allow them to have any thing immortal at all in them, but their concretions to be at length all dissolvable, and their personalities then to vanish into nothing. Thus Sextus the philosopher :

Adv. Math. Δημόκριτος εἰδωλά τινά φησιν ἐκτελαίνει τοῖς
p. 311. [lib. viii. §. 19.] ἀνθρώποις, καὶ τούτων τὰ μὲν εἶναι ἀγαθοποιά,
p. 552.] τὰ δὲ κακοποιά· ἐνθεν καὶ εὐχεται εὐλόγων τυχεῖν

εἰδῶλων· εἶναι δὲ ταῦτα μεγάλα τε καὶ ὑπερμεγέθη, καὶ δόσφρατα μὲν, οὐκ ἄφρατα δὲ, προσημαίνειν τε τὰ μέλλοντα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, θεωρούμενα καὶ φωνὰς ἀφιέντα. Democritus affirmeth, that there are certain idols or spectres, that do often approach to men, some of which are beneficent, and some maleficent. Upon which account he wisheth, that it might be his good hap to meet with fortunate idols. And he addeth, that these are of a vast bigness, and very longeve, but not incorruptible ; and that they sometimes do foreshignify unto men future events, both visibly appearing to them, and sending forth audible voices.—Now, though Democritus were much blamed for this concession of his by his fellow Atheists, as giving thereby too great an advantage to Theists : yet, in his own opinion, did he sufficiently secure himself against the danger of a God from hence, by supposing all these idols of his to be corruptible, they being indeed nothing but certain finer concretions of atoms, a kind of aërial and ethereal animals, that were all body,

and without any immortal soul, as he supposed men also to be : so that a God could be no more proved from them, than from the existence of men. For thus he adds in Sextus: "ὅθεν τούτων αὐτῶν φαντασίαν λαβόντες οἱ παλαιοὶ, ὑπενόησαν εἶναι Θεόν, μηδενὸς ἄλλου παρὰ ταῦτα ἔντος Θεοῦ, τοῦ ἀφθαρτον φύσιν ἔχοντος." Men, in ancient times, having a sense of these apparitions or idols, fell from thence into the opinion of a God, although there be, besides these idols, no other God, that hath an incorruptible nature.—However, though Democritus continued thus grossly atheistical, yet was he further convinced than our modern Atheists will be, that the stories of apparitions were not all fabulous, and that there are not only terrestrial, but also ærial and ethereal animals ; nor this earth of ours alone peopled and inhabited, whilst all those other vast regions above lie desert, solitary, and waste. Where it may be observed again, that divers of the ancient fathers, though they agreed not so far with Democritus, as to make the angelical beings to be altogether corporeal, yet did they likewise suppose them to have their certain subtile ethereal or ærial bodies. In which respect St. Austin, in his 115th epistle,* calleth angels *æthereos*, and devils, *æcreos animantes*. Thus Psellus in his Dialogue : Περὶ ἐνεργείας δαιμόνων· ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀσώματον, ὡς γυνναῖς, τὸ δαιμόνιον ἴσθι φύλον, μετὰ σώματος p. 44, 45. edit. Gualmini.] δέ γε, καὶ ἀμφὶ σώματος διατέτυφε· Καὶ τοῦτο ἴσθι μὲν καὶ παρ' αὐτῶν μαθεῖν τῶν σεμνῶν πατέρων· Καὶ Βασιλεὺς δὴ ὁ θεὸς, οὐ δαίμοσι μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἀχράντοις ἀγγέλοις, ἐνῆναι σώματα διατίθεται, οἷά τινα πνεύματα λεπτὰ καὶ αἰρώδη καὶ ἄχραντα, καὶ ἐξῆς. But you are to know, that demons or devils are not

* Epist. ix. ad Nebridium, p. 9. tom. ii. oper. edit. Benedict.

altogether incorporeal, but that they are joined to bodies, and so converse with bodies; which may be learned also from the fathers, the divine Basil contending, that there are bodies, not only in devils, but also in the pure angels themselves, as certain subtile, airy, defecate spirits. Where afterwards he shews, how the *συνφύεις ἀγγέλοις σῶμα*, that body which is connate with angels,—differs from that which devils are united to, in respect of the radiant splendour of the one, and the dark fuliginous obscurity of the other. Moreover, that devils are not without bodies, he endeavours further to confirm from the words of our Saviour, that they shall be punished with fire; which (saith he) were a thing impossible, were they all of them incorporeal. And some perhaps will attempt to prove the same concerning angels too, from those other words of our Saviour, where, speaking of the resurrection state, he affirmeth, that they, who shall be accounted worthy thereof, shall neither marry nor be given in marriage, but be *ἰσάγγελοι*,* equal to the angels:—which comparative expression of men, as to their bodies with angels, would be thought not so proper, were the angels absolutely devoid of all body. But of this we determine not.

To this phenomenon of apparitions might be added those two others of magicians or wizards, demoniacs or *energumēni*; both of these proving also the real existence of spirits, and that they are not mere fancies, and imaginary inhabitants of men's brains only, but real inhabitants of the world. As also, that among those spirits there are some foul, unclean, and wicked ones (though not made such by God, but by their own apostacy), which is

* Luke xx. 34. 36.

some confirmation of the truth of Christianity, the Scripture insisting so much upon these evil demons or devils, and declaring it to be one design of our Saviour Christ's coming into the world, to oppose these confederate powers of the kingdom of darkness, and to rescue mankind from the thralldom and bondage thereof. As for wizards and magicians, persons who associate and confederate themselves in a peculiar manner with these evil spirits, for the gratification of their own revenge, lust, ambition, and other passions; besides the Scriptures, there hath been so full an attestation given to them by persons unconcerned in all ages, that those our so-confident exploders of them, in this present age, can hardly escape the suspicion of having some hankering towards Atheism. But as for the demoniacs and *energumeni*, it hath been wondered, that there should be so many of them in our Saviour's time, and hardly any, or none, in this present age of ours. Certain it is, from the writings of Josephus, in sundry places, that the pharisaic Jews were then generally possessed with an opinion of these *δαμονιζόμενοι*, demoniacs, men possessed with devils, or infested by them. And that this was not a mere phrase or form of speech only amongst them for persons very ill affected in their bodies, may appear from hence, that Josephus* declares it as his opinion concerning the demons or devils, that they were *πονηρῶν ἀνθρώπων πνεύματα τοῖς ζῶσιν εἰσδύμενα*, the spirits or souls of wicked men deceased getting into the bodies of the living. From hence it was, that the Jews, in our Saviour's time, were

* De Bello Judaico, lib. vii. cap. vi. § 3. p. 417. tom. ii. edit. Havercampii.

not at all surprised with his casting out of devils, it being usual for them also to exercise the same; an art which they pretended to have learned from

Solomon. Of whom thus Josephus: Πα-
Ant. Jud. lib. viii. c. ii. [p.] 419, 420.] ρέσχε δ' αὐτῷ μαθεῖν ὁ θεός, καὶ τὴν κατὰ τῶν

δαιμόνιον τέχνην, εἰς ὠφέλειαν καὶ θεραπείαν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· ἐπαδάς τε συντάξας αἰς παρηγορεῖται τὰ νοσήματα, καὶ τρόπους ἐξορκώσεων κατέλειπε, οἷς ἐνδούμενα, τὰ δαιμόνια ὡς μηκέτ' ἐπανελθεῖν, ἐκδιώκουσι. Καὶ αὕτη μέχρι νῦν ἡ θεραπεία πλεῖστον ἰσχύει. God also taught Solomon an art against demons and devils, for the benefit and cure of men; who composed certain incantations, by which diseases are cured, and left forms of exorcisms, whereby devils are expelled and driven away. Which method of curing prevails much amongst us at this very day.—Notwithstanding which, we think it not at all probable what a late atheistic writer^a hath asserted, that the heads of the Jews were then all of them so full of demons and devils, that they generally took all manner of bodily diseases, such as fevers and agues, and dumbness and deafness, for devils. Though we grant, that this very thing was imputed by Plotinus afterward to the Gnostics, that they supposed all diseases to be devils, and therefore not to be cured by physic, but expelled by words or charms. Thus he, En. ii. lib. ix. c. xiv.^b Νῦν δὲ ὑποστητούμενοι τὰς νόσους δαιμόνια εἶναι, καὶ ταῦτα ἐξαιρεῖν λόγῳ φάσκοντες δύνασθαι, καὶ ἐπαγγελλόμενοι, σμενότεροι μὲν ἂν εἶναι δόξαν παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς, οἱ τὰς παρὰ τοῖς μάγοις δυνάμεις θαυμάζουσι, τοὺς μὲντοι εὐφρονούντας οὐκ ἂν πείθουσι, ὡς αἱ αἱ νόσοι τὰς αἰτίας ἔχουσι, ἢ πλησμοναῖς, ἢ ἐνδείαις, &c. δηλοῦσι δὲ καὶ αἱ θεραπείαι αὐτῶν, γαστροὺς γὰρ ρυτίσης ἢ φαρμάκου δοθέντος, διεχώρησε κάτω τὸ νόσημα· καὶ

^a Hobbes. See Leviathan, cap. xl.

^b P. 212. oper.

αἵματος ἀφραγμένου καὶ ἰνδία δὲ ἰάσαστο· ἡ φανήσας τοῦ δαιμονίου, καὶ τοῦ φαρμάκου ποιήσαντος τίκεσθαι. Now when they affirm diseases to be demons or devils, and pretend, that they can expel them by words, undertaking to do the same, they hereby indeed render themselves considerable to the vulgar, who are wont not a little to admire the powers of magicians. But they will not be able to persuade wise men, that diseases have no natural causes, as from repletion, or imitation, or putrefaction, or the like; which is a thing manifest from their cure, they being oftentimes removed by purgation, and bleeding, and abstinence; unless perhaps these men will say, that the devil is by this means starved, and made to pine away.—Nor can we think, that the Jews, in our Saviour's time, either suppose all madmen to be demoniacs, or all demoniacs madmen (though this latter seems to be asserted by an eminent writer of our own), we reading of devils cast out from others besides madmen; and of a woman, which had a spirit of infirmity only, and was bowed together, and could not lift up herself, which is said by our Saviour Christ to have been bowed by Satan. Wherefore the sense of the Jews formerly seems to have been this, that when there was any unusual and extraordinary symptoms in any bodily distemper, but especially that of madness, this being looked upon as something more than natural, was imputed by them to the possession or infestation of some devil. Neither was this proper to the Jews only at that time, to suppose evil demons to be the causes of such bodily diseases as had extraordinary symptoms, and especially madness; but the Greeks, and other gentiles also, were imbued with the same persuasion;

as appeareth from Apollonius Tynæus's curing a laughing demoniac* at Athens, he ejecting that evil spirit by threats and menaces, who is said, at his departure, to have tumbled down a royal porch in the city with great noise; as also,^b from his freeing the city of Ephesus from the plague, by stoning an old ragged beggar, said by Apollonius to have been the plague, which appeared to be a demon, by his changing himself into the form of a shagged dog.

But that there is some truth in this opinion, and that at this very day evil spirits, or demons, do sometimes really act upon the bodies of men, and either inflict or augment bodily distempers and diseases, hath been the judgment of two very experienced physicians, Sennertus and Fernelius. The former in his book *De Mania*, lib. i. cap. xv. writing thus; "*Etsi sine ulla corporis morbosa dispositione, Deo permittente, hominem obsidere et occupare dæmon possit, tamen quandoque morbis, et præcipue melancholicis, sese immiscet dæmon; et forsân frequentius hoc accidit, quam sæpe creditur.*" Although the devil may, by Divine permission, possess men without any morbid disposition, yet doth he usually intermingle himself with bodily diseases, and especially those of melancholy; and perhaps this cometh to pass oftener than is commonly believed or suspected.—The other in his *De abditis Rerum Causis*, where, having attributed real effects upon the bodies of men to witchcraft and enchantment, he addeth, "*Neque solum morbos, verum etiam dæmonas, scelerati homines in corpora immittunt. Hi qui-*

* Vide Philostrat. de Vita Apollonii Tyanæi, lib. x. cap. xx. p. 157.

^b Id ibid. lib. iv. cap. x. p. 147.

dem visuntur furoris quadam specie distorti ; hoc uno tamen a simplici furore distant, quod summe ardua obloquantur, præterita et occulta renuntient, assidentiumque arcana reserent." Neither do these wicked magicians only inflict diseases upon men's bodies, but also send devils into them; by means whereof they appear distorted with a kind of fury and madness, which yet differs from a simple madness (or the disease so called) in this, that they speak of very high and difficult matters, declare things past and unknown, and discover the secrets of those that sit by.—Of which he subjoins two notable instances of persons, well known to himself, that were plainly demoniacal, possessed or acted by an evil demon ; one whereof shall be afterwards mentioned. But when maniacal persons do not only discover secrets, and declare things past, but future also, and, besides this, speak in languages which they had never learned ; this puts it out of all doubt and question, that they are not mere madmen, or *maniaci*, but demoniacs or *energumeni*. And that since the time of our Saviour Christ there have been often such, may be made evident from the records of credible writers. Psellus in his book *Περὶ Ἑνεργείας Δαιμόνων*, *De Operat. Dæm.* avers it of a certain maniacal woman, that though she knew nothing but her own mother-tongue, yet, when a stranger, who was an Armenian, was brought into the room to her, she spake to him presently in the Armenian language: Ἡμεῖς δὲ τεθηπότες ἦμεν, ὅτι κατ' Ἀρμενίων ἐφθέγγετο, γυνή μηδέποτε μηδ' εἰς ὄψιν ἀφαιγμένη τούτοις, μηδὲ κερκίδος εἰδὺνᾶ πλεον οὐδέν. We all stood amazed when we heard a woman, that had never seen an Armenian

before in all her life, nor had learnt any thing but the use of her distaff, to speak the Armenian language readily.—Where the relater also affirmeth the same maniacal person to have foretold certain future events, which happened shortly after to him-

self: *Σὺ δὲ, στραφεὶς πρὸς ἐμὲ, μεγάλων ἐν χρόνῳ*
 P. 65. [p. 99.] *συμφορῶν ὑποστήσῃ· χολᾷ γάρ σοι δεινῶς τὰ δαι-*

μόνια παραλύοντι τὰς αὐτῶν λατρείας· ἀμέλει τοι καὶ χαλε-
ποὺς ἐπιρράβησιν καὶ βαρεῖς κινδύνους, οὓς οὐκ ἂν διαφεύ-
ξασθαι δυνήθῃς, εἰ μή τις δύναμις κρείττων, ἢ κατὰ δαίμονας,
ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἐξέλῃ· Then looking upon me, she (or rather the demon) said, Thou shalt suffer wonderful pains and torments in thy body, for the demons are extremely angry with thee for opposing their services and worship; and they will inflict great evils upon thee, out of which thou shalt not be able to escape, unless a power, greater than that of demons, exempt thee from them. All which things (saith he) happened shortly after to me, and I was brought very low, even near to death, by them; but was by my Saviour wonderfully delivered.—Whereupon Psellus concludes,

Τίς οὖν ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ἰωρακῶς, ἐρεῖ τὰς μανίας πάσας,
ὅλης πλημμελοῦς κινήσεις, ἀλλὰ πάθη τραγικὰ δαιμόνων·

Who is there therefore that, considering this oracle or prediction, will conclude (as some physicians do) all kind of madnesses to be nothing but the exorbitant motions of the matter or humours, and not the tragic passions of the demons.—But because this instance is remoter from our present times, we shall set down another remarkable one of a later date, out of the forementioned Ferne-lius, who was an eye-witness thereof. A young man of a noble family, who was strangely convulsed in his body, having sometimes one member,

and sometimes another, violently agitated, inso-much that four several persons were scarcely able to hold them ; and this at first without any distemper at all in his head, or crazedness in brain. To whom Fernelius, with other skillful physicians, being called, applied all manner of remedies ; blisters, purgations, cupping-glasses, fomentations, unctions, plasters, and strengthening medicines ; but all in vain. The reason whereof is thus given by the same Fernelius : “ Quoniam omnes longe aberamus a cognitione veri, nam mense tertio primum deprehensus dæmon quidam totius mali author, voce, insuetisque verbis ac sententiis tum Latinis tum Græcis (quanquam ignarus linguæ Græcæ laborans esset), se prodens ; is multa assidentium maximaque medicorum secreta detegebat, ridens, quod irritis pharmacis corpus hoc pene jugulassent.” Because we were all far from the knowledge of the truth ; for in the third month, it was first plainly discovered to us, that it was a certain demon who was the author of all this mischief ; he manifesting himself by his speech, and by unusual words and sentences, both in Greek and Latin (though the patient were altogether ignorant of Greek tongue) : and by his revealing many of the secrets of those who stood by, especially of the physicians, whom also he derided for tormenting the patient in that manner with their frustraneous remedies.—Here therefore have we an unquestionable instance of a demoniac in these latter times of ours, and such an one, who at first, for two months together, had no manner of madness or mania at all upon him, though afterward the demon possessing his whole body, used his tongue, and spake therewith.

Fernelius concludes his whole discourse in this manner: "These things do I produce, to make it manifest, that evil demons (or devils) do sometimes enter into the very bodies of men, afflicting and tormenting them after an unheard-of manner; but that at other times, though they do not enter into and possess their whole body, yet partly by exagitating and disturbing the profitable humours thereof, partly by traducing the noxious into the principal parts, or else by obstructing the veins and other passages with them, or disordering the structure of the members, they cause innumerable diseases." There are many other instances of this kind, recorded by modern writers unexceptionable, of persons either wholly demoniacal, and possessed by evil demons (this appearing from their discovering secrets, and speaking languages which they had never learnt), or else otherwise so affected and infested by them, as to have certain unusual and supernatural symptoms; which, for brevity's sake, we shall here omit. However, we thought it necessary thus much to insist upon this argument of demoniacs, as well for the vindication of Christianity, as for the conviction of Atheists; we finding some so staggering in their religion, that from this one thing alone of demoniacs (they being so strongly possessed, that there neither is nor ever was any such) they are ready enough to suspect the whole gospel, or New Testament itself, of fabulosity and imposture.

We come now to the second head proposed, of miracles and effects supernatural. That there hath been something miraculous or above nature, sometimes done even among the Pagans (whether

by good or evil spirits), appears not only from their own records, but also from the Scripture itself. And it is well known, that they pretended (besides oracles) to miracles also, even after the times of Christianity; and that not only in Apollonius Tyanæus, and Apuleius, but also in the Roman emperors themselves, as Vespasian and Adrian, but especially in the temple of *Æsculapius*; thus much appearing from that Greek table therein hung up at Rome,* in which amongst other things this is recorded; "that a blind man being commanded by the oracle to kneel before the altar, and then passing from the right side thereof to the left, to lay five fingers upon the altar, and afterwards lifting up his hand, to touch his eyes therewith; all this being done accordingly, he recovered his sight, the people all applauding, that great miracles were done under the Emperor Antoninus," &c. But we have in the Scripture an account of miracles, both greater in number, and of a higher nature; done especially by Moses, and our Saviour Christ and his apostles.

Wherefore it seems, that there are two sorts of miracles or effects supernatural. First, such as though they could not be done by any ordinary and natural causes here amongst us, and in that respect may be called supernatural; yet might notwithstanding be done, God permitting only, by the ordinary and natural power of other invisible created spirits, angels or demons. As for example, if a stone or other heavy body should ascend upwards, and then hang in the air, without any visible either mover or supporter, this would be to us a miracle or effect supernatural;

* Vide Gruteri Inscription, tom. i. p. lxxi.

and yet according to vulgar opinion, might this be done by the natural power of created invisible beings, angels, or demons; God only permitting, without whose special providence it is conceived they cannot thus intermeddle with our human affairs. Again, if a perfectly illiterate person should readily speak Greek or Latin, this also would be to us a miracle, or effect supernatural; for so is the apostles speaking with tongues accounted; and yet in demoniacs is this sometimes done by evil demons, God only permitting. Such also amongst the Pagans was that "*miraculum cotis*" (as Apuleius calls it), that miracle of the whetstone, done by Accius Navius, when, at his command, it was divided into two with a razor.* But, secondly, there is another sort of miracles, or effects supernatural, such as are above the power of all second causes, or any natural created being whatsoever, and so can be attributed to none but God Almighty himself, the author of nature, who therefore can control it at pleasure.

As for that late theological politician, who, writing against miracles, denies as well those of the former as of this latter kind, contending that a miracle is nothing but a name, which the ignorant vulgar gives to "*opus naturæ insolitum*," any unwonted work of nature, or to what themselves can assign no cause of;—as also, that if there were any such thing done contrary to nature, or above it, it would rather weaken than confirm our belief of the Divine existence; we find his discourse every way so weak, groundless, and inconsiderable, that we could not think it here to deserve a confutation.

* Vide Livium, lib. i. cap. xxxvi. p. 67.

* Vide Spinozæ Tractat. Theologico-politic. cap. vi.

But of the former sort of those miracles, is that to be understood, Deut. xiii. "If there arise amongst you a prophet, or dreamer of dreams, and giveth thee a sign or a wonder, and the sign or wonder come to pass whereof he spake unto thee, saying, Let us go after other gods, and serve them; thou shalt not hearken to the words of that prophet, or dreamer of dreams; for the Lord your God proveth you, to know whether you love the Lord your God with all your heart; and with all your soul." For it cannot be supposed, that God Almighty would himself purposely inspire any man to exhort others to idolatry, and immediately assist such an one with his own supernatural power of doing miracles, in confirmation of such doctrine. But the meaning is, that by the suggestion of evil spirits, some false prophets might be raised up to tempt the Jews to idolatry; or at least, that by the assistance of them, such miracles might be wrought in confirmation thereof, as those sometimes done by the Egyptian sorcerers or magicians, God himself not interposing in this case to hinder them, for this reason, that he might hereby prove and try their faithfulness towards him. Forasmuch as both, by the pure light of nature, and God's revealed will, before confirmed by miracles, idolatry, or the religious worship of any but God Almighty, had been sufficiently condemned. From whence it is evident, that miracles alone (at least such miracles as these) are no sufficient confirmation of a true prophet, without consideration had of the doctrine taught by him. For though a man should have done never so many true and real miracles amongst the Jews, and yet should persuade

to idolatry, he was by them confidently to be condemned to death for a false prophet.

Accordingly in the New Testament do we read, that our Saviour Christ forewarned his disciples, that "false prophets and false Christs should arise, and shew great signs or wonders, insomuch that, if it were possible, they should seduce the very elect." And St. Paul foretelleth concerning the man of sin, or antichrist,^a "that his coming should be after the working of Satan, with all power, and signs, and wonders (or miracles) of a lie." For we conceive, that by *τίμαρα ψεύδους* in this place, are not properly feigned and counterfeit miracles, that is, mere cheating and juggling tricks, but true wonders and real miracles (viz. of the former sort mentioned), done for the confirmation of a lie; as the doctrine of this man of sin is there afterwards called; for otherwise how could his coming be said to be "according to the working of Satan, with all power?" In like manner also, in St. John's Apocalypse, where the coming of the same man of sin, and the mystery of iniquity, are again described, we read chap. xiii. of a two-horned beast like a lamb, "that he shall do great wonders, and deceive those, that dwell on the earth, by means of those miracles, which he hath power to do, in the sight of the beast." And again, chap. xvi. "of certain unclean spirits like frogs, coming out of the mouth of the dragon, and of the beast, and of the false prophet, which are the spirits of devils working miracles, that go forth to the kings of the earth." And, lastly, chap. xix. "of the false prophet, that wrought miracles before the beast." All which seem to be un-

^a Luke. xxiv. 24.

^b 2 Thess. ii. 9.

derstood, not of feigned and counterfeit miracles only, but of true and real also, effected by the working of Satan, in confirmation of a lie, that is, of idolatry, false religion, and imposture; God Almighty permitting it, partly in way of probation or trial of the faithfulness of his own servants, and partly in way of just judgment and punishment upon those, who "receive not the love of the truth, that they might be saved;" as the apostle declareth.* Wherefore those miracles, pretended, for divers ages past, to have been done before the relics of saints and images, &c. were they all true, could by no means justify or warrant that religious worship by many given to them; because true and real miracles, done in order to the promoting of idolatry, are so far from justifying that idolatry, that they are themselves condemned by it to be *τέρατα ψευδούς*, the miracles of a lie,—done by the working of Satan.

But as for the miracles of our Saviour Christ, had they been all of them only of the former kind, such as might have been done, God permitting, by the natural power of created spirits, and their assistance; yet forasmuch as he came in the name of the Lord, teaching neither idolatry, nor any thing contrary to the clear light and law of nature, therefore ought he, by reason of those miracles, to have been received by the Jews themselves, and owned for a true prophet, according to the doctrine of Moses himself: who, both in the 13th and 18th chapters of Deuteronomy, plainly supposeth, that God would in no other case permit any false prophet to do miracles by the assistance of evil spirits, save only in that of idolatry

* Thess. ii. 10.

(which is always understood of what is plainly discoverable by the light of nature to be false, or evil). The reason whereof is manifest, because if he should, this would be an invincible temptation, which it is inconsistent with the Divine goodness to expose men unto. And our Saviour Christ was unquestionably that one eximious prophet, which God Almighty by Moses promised to send unto the Israelites, upon occasion of their own desire made to him at Horeb. "Let me not hear again the voice of the Lord my God, nor let me see this great fire any more, that I die not."

Deut. xviii. Whereupon the Lord said, "They have well spoken that which they have spoken; I will raise them up a Prophet from among their brethren, like unto thee, and put my words in his mouth, and he shall speak unto them all that I shall command him; and whosoever will not hearken to the words which he shall speak in my name, I will require it of him." Which is all one as if he should have said, I will no more speak to them with thunder and lightning, nor reveal my will with a terrible voice out of flaming fire; but the next great manifestation of myself, or further revelation of my will, shall be by a Prophet from amongst their own brethren, I putting my words into his mouth, and speaking to them by him. Whose words they shall be as much obliged to hearken to, as if I had spoken them (as before) from the top of the fiery mount. And that they may have no colour for their disbelieving this great prophet especially, or their disobeying of him, I plainly declare, that whosoever cometh in my name, and does true and real miracles, shall be acknowledged undoubtedly for a true prophet

sent by me, and accordingly believed and obeyed ; and none rejected under the notion of false prophets, but only such, as either do not real miracles, or else if they do, come in the name of other gods, or exhort to idolatry. Nevertheless, our Saviour Christ wrought other miracles also, of a higher nature, by the immediate power of God Almighty himself ; as for example, when before himself he raised Lazarus, who had been dead four days, to life, since it cannot be conceived to be in the power of created spirits (whether bad or good), whenever they please, to bring back the souls of men deceased to their bodies again, or change the laws of nature and fate. However, it must not be thought, that God will ever set this seal of his to a lie, or that which is plainly contrary to the light and law of nature.

The conclusion is, that though all miracles promiscuously do not immediately prove the existence of a God, nor confirm a prophet, or whatsoever doctrine ; yet do they all of them evince, that there is a rank of invisible understanding beings, superior to men, which the Atheists commonly deny. And we read of some such miracles also, as could not be wrought, but by a power perfectly supernatural, or by God Almighty himself. But to deny and disbelieve all miracles, is either to deny all certainty of sense, which would be indeed to make sensation itself miraculous ; or else monstrously and unreasonably to derogate from human testimonies and history. The Jews would never have so stiffly and pertinaciously adhered to the ceremonial law of Moses, had they not all along believed it to have been unquestionably confirmed by miracles ; and that the Gen-

tiles should at first have entertained the faith of Christ without miracles, would itself have been the greatest of miracles.

The last extraordinary phenomenon proposed was that of divination, oracles, prophecies, or predictions of future events, otherwise unforeknowable to men; which either evince a God, or at least that there are understanding beings superior to men. For if there be presension or foreknowledge of such future events, as are to human understanding alone altogether unforeknowable, then is it certain, that there is some more perfect understanding, or knowledge in the world, than that of men. And thus is that maxim of the ancient Pagan Theists,* in the genuine and proper sense thereof, unquestionably true; "*Si divinatio est, dii sunt;*" If there be divination, or presension of future events (undiscoverable by men), then are there gods:—which, in their language, was no more than to say, understanding beings superior to men.

Wherefore we must here distinguish of oracles and predictions, after the same manner as we did before of miracles, that they may be of two kinds. First, such as might proceed only from the natural presaging power of created spirits superior to men, whether called angels or demons. For these being supposed to have not only clearer understandings than men, and a greater insight into nature, but also by reason of their agility and invisibility, opportunity of knowing things remotely distant, and of being privy to men's secret machinations and consultations; it is easily conceivable

* The Stoics. Vide Cicron. de Divinat. lib. i. cap. v, vi. p. 3113, 3114. tom. ix. oper.

that many future events nigh at hand, which cannot be foreknown by men, may be (probably at least) foreseen by them; and that without any miraculous Divine revelation, their causes being already in being. As men learned in astronomy can foretel eclipses of the sun and moon, which to the vulgar are altogether unforeknowable; and as princes or statesmen, that are furnished with great intelligence, foreign and domestic, can presage more of war and peace, either at home or abroad, and of the events of kingdoms, than ignorant plebeians. And such were those predictions, which Democritus, though otherwise much addicted to Atheism, allowed of; Cicero writing thus of him: "*Plurimis locis, gravis* De Div. lib. I. c. iii. p. 3111. tom. ix. oper. *auctor Democritus præsentationem rerum futurarum comprobat;*" Democritus, a grave writer, doth in many places approve of the presension of future events.—The reason whereof was, because he supposed certain understanding beings superior to men, called by him idols, which having a larger comprehension of things, and other advantages of knowledge, could therefore foretel many future events, that men were ignorant of. And though perhaps it may be thought, that Democritus would not have entertained this opinion of the foreknowledge of human events, had he not asserted the necessity of all human actions and volitions, but held liberty of will, as Epicurus afterwards did (as if this were inconsistent with all manner of presage, and probable or conjectural foreknowledge); yet is it certain, that there is not so much contingency in all human actions, by reason of this liberty of will, as heretofore was by Epicurus, and still is by many sup-

posed; it being plain, that men act according to an appearance of good, and that in many cases and circumstances it may be foreknown, without any Divine revelation, what such or such persons would do. As for example, that a voluptuous person, having a strong temptation to satisfy his sensual appetite, and that without incurring any inconvenience of shame or punishment, would readily close with the same. Besides which, such invisible spirits, as angels or demons, may sometimes predict also what themselves cause and effect.

Secondly, There is another sort of predictions of future events, which cannot be imputed to the natural presaging faculty of any such created spirits, but only to the supernatural prescience of God Almighty, or a Being infinitely perfect: as when events remotely distant in time, and of which there are yet no immediate causes actually in being, which also depend upon many circumstances, and a long series of things, any one of which being otherwise would alter the case; as likewise upon much uncertainty of human volitions, which are not always necessarily linked and concatenated with what goes before, but often loose and free; and upon that contingency that arises from the indifferency or equality of eligibility in objects. Lastly, such things as do not at all depend upon external circumstances neither, nor are caused by things natural antecedent, but by some supernatural power; I say, when such future events as these are foretold, and accordingly come to pass, this can be ascribed to no other but such a being as comprehends, sways, and governs all, and is, by a pe-

cular privilege or prerogative of its own nature, omniscient. Epicurus, though really he therefore rejected divination and prediction of future events, because he denied Providence; yet did he pretend this farther reason also against it, because it was a thing absolutely inconsistent with liberty of will, and destructive of the same; ἡ μαντικὴ ἀνύπαρκτος· εἰ δὲ καὶ ὑπαρκτικὴ, οὐδὲν Diog. Laert. in V. Epic. [lib. x. segm. 135. p. 660.] Divination is a thing, which hath no existence, nor possibility in nature: and if there were such a thing, it would take away all liberty of will, and leave nothing in men's own power.—Thus also Carneades, in Cicero*, maintained, “Ne Apollinem quidem futura posse dicere, nisi ea, quorum causas natura ita contineret, ut ea fieri necesse esset;” that Apollo himself was not able to foretel any future events, other than such, as had necessary causes in nature antecedent.—And some Christian Theists of later times have, in like manner, denied to God Almighty all foreknowledge of human actions, upon the same pretence, as being both inconsistent with men's liberty of will, and destructive thereof. For, say they, if men's actions be free, then are they un-foreknowable, they having no necessary causes; and again, if there be any foreknowledge of them, then can they not be free, they being *ipso facto* necessitated thereby. But as it is certain that prescience does not destroy the liberty of man's will, or impose any necessity upon it, men's actions being not therefore future, because they are foreknown, but therefore fore-

* De Fato, cap. xiv. p. 3281. tom. ix. oper.

known, because future; and were a thing never so contingent, yet upon supposition that it will be done, it must needs have been future from all eternity: so is it extreme arrogance for men, because themselves can naturally foreknow nothing, but by some causes antecedent, as an eclipse of the sun or moon, therefore to presume to measure the knowledge of God Almighty according to the same scantling, and to deny him the prescience of human actions, not considering, that, as his nature is incomprehensible, so his knowledge may well be looked upon by us as such too; that which is past our finding out, and too wonderful for us. However, it must be acknowledged for an undoubted truth, that no created being can, naturally, and of itself, foreknow any future events, otherwise than in and by their causes antecedent. If therefore we shall find, that there have been predictions of such future events as had no necessary antecedent causes; as we cannot but grant such things therefore to be foreknowable, so must we needs from thence infer the existence of a God, that is, a Being supernatural, infinitely perfect and omniscient, since such predictions as these could have proceeded from no other cause.

That there is foreknowledge of future events to men naturally unforeknowable, hath been all along the persuasion of the generality of mankind.

De Div. l. i. Thus Cicero: "Vetus opinio est, jam usque ab heroicis ducta temporibus, eaque et populi Romani, et omnium gentium firmata consensu, versari quendam inter homines divinationem, quam Græci *μαντικήν* appellant, id est,

præsentationem et scientiam rerum futurarum."

This is an old opinion derived down all along from the heroic times (or the mythical age), and not only entertained amongst the Romans, but also confirmed by the consent of all nations, that there is such a thing as divination, and presension or foreknowledge of future events.—And the same writer elsewhere, in the person of Balbus :

"*Quamvis nihil tam irridet Epicurus,* De N. D. l. ii. p. 239. Lamb. [cap. lxx. p. 3046. tom. ix. oper.]
quam prædictionem rerum futurarum,
mihi videtur tamen vel maxime confir-
mare, Deorum providentia consuli rebus

humanis. Est enim profecto divinatio; quæ multis locis, rebus, temporibus apparet, cum in privatis tum maxime in publicis. Multa cernunt aruspices, multa augures provident, multa oraculis providentur, multa vaticinationibus, multa somniis, multa portentis." Although Epicurus deride nothing more than the prediction of future things; yet does this seem to me to be a great confirmation of the providence of the gods over human affairs, because there is certainly divination, it appearing in many places, things, and times, and that not only private, but especially public. Soothsayers foresee many things, the augurs many; many things are declared by oracles, many by prophecies, many by dreams, and many by portents.—And indeed that there were even amongst the Pagans predictions of future events, not discoverable by any human sagacity, which accordingly came to pass, and therefore argue a knowledge superior to that of men, or that there are certain invisible understanding beings or spirits, seems to be undeniable from history. And that the augurs themselves were

sometimes not unassisted by these officious genii; is plain from that of Attius Navius beforementioned, as the circumstances thereof are related by historians; that Tarquinius Priscus having a mind to try what there was in this skill of augury,* "dixit ei se cogitare quiddam; id possetne fieri, consuluit. Ille augurio acto, posse respondet. Tarquinius autem dixit se cogitasse cotem novacula posse præcidi; tum Attium jussisse experiri; ita cotem in comitium illatam, inspectante et rege et populo, novacula esse discissam;" told Navius, that he thought of something, and he would know of him, whether it could be done or no. Navius having performed his auguring ceremonies, replied, that the thing might be done. Whereupon Priscus declared what his thought was, namely, that a whetstone might be cut in two with a razor. Navius willed them to make trial: wherefore a whetstone being brought immediately into the court, it was in the sight of the king and all the people divided with a razor.— But the predictions amongst those Pagans were, for the most part, only of the former kind, such as proceeded merely from the natural presaging faculty of these demons; this appearing from hence, because their oracles were often expressed ambiguously, so as that they might be taken either way; those demons themselves, it seems, being then not confident of the event; as also, because they were sometimes plainly mistaken in the events. And from hence it was, that they seldom ventured to foretel any events remotely distant, but only what were nigh at hand, and

* Cicero de Divinat. lib. ii. cap. xvii. p. 3129. tom. ix. oper.

shortly to come to pass; and therefore might be probably conjectured of from things then in being. Notwithstanding which, we acknowledge, that there are some few instances of predictions amongst the Pagans, of the other kind. Such as that intimated by Cicero in his book of Divination,^a where he declareth the doctrine of Diodorus concerning necessity and contingency; “non necesse fuisse Cypselum regnare Corinthi, quamquam id millesimo ante anno Apollinis oraculo editum esset:” that it was not necessary Cypselus the tyrant should reign at Corinth, though that were a thing predicted by Apollo’s oracle a thousand years before. As also this recorded by Varro,^b of Vectius Valens, an augur in the time of Romulus, who when Rome was a building, from the flying of twelve vultures presaged, that the continuance of that city would be for twelve hundred years: which seems to have been accordingly fulfilled, in the year of our Lord four hundred and fifty-five, immediately after the death of the third Valentinian (whom some make to be the last real emperor of the west or Rome), when Gensericus the Vandal took the city the second time and fired it. But above all, that of the sibyls; of whose prophecies such things are recorded by pagan writers, as makes it very suspicious, that they did foretel the coming of our Saviour Christ, and the times of Christianity. But were these; and the like pagan prophecies, real, then must they needs have had some higher original than the natural presaging faculty of their demons

^a It should be, *De Fato*, cap. vii. p. 3269.

^b In the Fragments of the 18th book of his *Antiquitates Rerum Humanarum*.

especially those of the sibyls ; who, for aught we know, might be as well assisted supernaturally to predict our Saviour Christ, amongst the Pagans in the west, as Balaam was in the east.

But here the Scripture triumpheth over Paganism, and all its oracles and divinations ; there being contained in it so many unquestionable predictions of events to follow a long time after, and such as can be imputed to nothing but the supernatural foreknowledge and omniscience of God Almighty. As for example, those concerning the Messiah, or our Saviour Christ, delivered by Jacob, Moses, David, Isaias, Jeremy, Daniel, and most of the prophets : foretelling sundry particular circumstances of his coming, and that grand event, which followed after, of the Gentiles or Pagans' so general reception and entertainment of Christianity ; that is, the belief of the Messiah promised to the Jews ; together with the shaking off of their gods and idols. Amongst which Scripture prophecies, concerning our Saviour Christ, we must needs reckon for one, and none of the least considerable neither, that of Daniel's weeks, or of four hundred and ninety years, to commence from the going forth of the word, or the decree made by Artaxerxes the son of Xerxes, in the seventh year of his reign, for the return of the people of Israel, priests and Levites, to Jerusalem ; and to terminate in the death of the Messiah and the preaching of the gospel to the Jews only : though we are not ignorant, how some learned men, both of the former and latter times, have stretched their wits, they sometimes using no small violence to divert this prophecy another way. For that these prophecies, concerning our

Saviour Christ, could have no other original than the immediate supernatural revelation of God Almighty, is evident from the thing itself; it being such as depended on no natural causes, much less upon those constellations of the astrological Atheists,* but only upon his own secret will and counsel.

But besides these prophecies concerning our Saviour Christ, there are others contained in the Scripture, concerning the fates and successions of the chief kingdoms, empires, and polities of the world; as of the rise of the Persian monarchy; of its fall and conquest by the Macedonian Alexander; of the quadripartite division of this Greekish empire after Alexander's death; of the succession of the Seleucidæ and Lagidæ, a prophetic history, so agreeable with the events, that it was by Porphyrius^b pretended to have been written after them; and, lastly, of the rise and continuance of the Roman empire. For notwithstanding the endeavours of some to pervert all those Scripture prophecies that extend to the present times, it is clearly demonstrable, that this was Daniel's fourth ten-horned beast, or the legs and toes of Nebuchadnezzar's statue, that fourth empire, strong as iron, which came at length to be broken or divided into ten or many principalities, called in the prophetic language, and according to the *eichon*, horns; amongst whom was to start up another horn with eyes, speaking great words against the Most High, and making war with the saints, and prevailing against them, for

* Cardan, &c.

^b Vide Hieronymum Comment. in Daniel. tom. v. oper. p. 481.

a time, times, and half a time. Which prophecy of Daniel's is the ground-work of St. John's Apocalypse, it being there further insisted upon, filled up, and enlarged, with the addition of several particulars; so that both Daniel and John have each of them, from their respective ages, set down a prophetic calendar of times, in a continued series, (the former more compendiously and generally, the latter more copiously and particularly), to the very end of the world.

And thus do we see plainly, that the Scripture-prophecies evince a Deity; neither can these possibly be imputed by Atheists, as other things, to men's fear and fancy, nor yet to the fiction of politicians. Nor do they only evince a Deity, but confirm Christianity also; partly as predicted by them in its several circumstances, a grand one whereof was the Gentiles' reception of it; and partly as itself predicting future events, this spirit of prophecy being the testimony of Jesus. Both which Scripture-prophecies, of Christ in the Old Testament, and from him in the New, are of equal if not greater force to us in this present age, for the confirmation of our faith, than the miracles themselves recorded in the Scripture; we having now certain knowledge ourselves of many of those events, and being no way able to suspect, but that the prophecies were written long before.

To conclude; all these extraordinary phenomena of apparitions, witchcraft, possessions, miracles, and prophecies, do evince that spirits, angels or demons, though invisible to us, are no fancies, but real and substantial inhabitants of the world; which favours not the atheistic hypothe-

is : but some of them, as the higher kind of miracles and predictions, do also immediately enforce the acknowledgment of a Deity ; a being superior to nature, which therefore can check and control it ; and which comprehending the whole, foreknows the most remotely distant and contingent events.

And now have we not only fully answered and confuted all the atheistic pretences against the idea of God, tending to disprove his existence ; but also occasionally proposed several solid and substantial arguments for a Deity : as, that all successive things, the world, motion, and time, are in their own nature absolutely incapable of an ante-eternity ; and, therefore, there must of necessity be something else of a permanent duration, that was eternal without beginning : that no Atheist, according to his principles, can possibly give any account of the original of his own soul or mind : that the phenomenon of motion cannot be solved without an incorporeal principle, presiding over the whole : that the *τὸ εὖ καὶ καλῶς*, the artificial, regular, and orderly frame of things— together with the harmony of the whole, demonstrate an understanding and intending cause of the world, that ordered things for ends and good. Besides, that there are several other phenomena, both ordinary and extraordinary, which Atheists, being no way able to solve, are forced to deny.

True indeed, some of the ancient Theists have themselves affirmed, that there could be no demonstration of a God : which assertion of theirs hath been by others misunderstood into this sense, as if there were therefore no certainty at all to be

had of God's existence, but only a conjectural probability; no knowledge or science, but only faith and opinion. Whereas the true meaning of these ancient Theists, who denied that there could be any demonstration of a God, was only this, That the existence of a God could not be demonstrated *a priori*, himself being the first cause of all things. Thus doth Alexander Aphrodisius, in his *Physical Doubts and Solutions*, after he had propounded an argument for a God, according to Aristotelic principles, from motion,

declare himself, ἡ δαῖς κατὰ ἀνάλυσιν, οὐ γὰρ οἶόντε τῆς πρώτης ἀρχῆς ἀπόδειξιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ διὰ ἀπὸ τῶν ὑστέριων τε καὶ φανερῶν ἀρξαμένους,

κατὰ τὴν πρὸς ταῦτα συμφωνίαν ἀναλύσει χρωμένους συστήσαι τὴν ἐκείνου φύσιν· that this argument or proof of his was in way of analysis only; it being not possible, that there should be a demonstration of the first principles of all. Wherefore (saith he) we must here fetch our beginning from things that are after it, and manifest; and thence, by way of analysis, ascend to the proof of that first nature, which was before them.—

And to the same purpose Clemens Alexandrianus,

having first affirmed, ὡς δυσμεταχειριστότατος ὁ περὶ θεοῦ λόγος· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἀρχὴ παντός πράγματος δυσεύρετος, πάντως πού ἡ πρώτη καὶ πρεσβυτάτη ἀρχὴ δύσδεκτος, ἥτις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀπασιν αἰτία τοῦ γενέσθαι, καὶ γενομένους εἶναι· that God is the most difficult thing of all to be discoursed of; because; since the principle of every thing is hard to find out, the first and most ancient principle of all, which was the cause to all other things of their being made, must needs be the hardest of all to be declared or manifested;—he

afterwards subjoins, Ἀλλὰ οὐδὲ ἐπιστήμη λαμβάνεται τῇ ἀποδεικτικῇ· αὕτη γὰρ ἐκ προτέρων καὶ γνωριμωτέρων συνίσταται· τοῦ δὲ ἀγεννήτου οὐδὲν προῦπάρχει· But neither can God be apprehended by any demonstrative science: for such science is from things before in order of nature, and more knowable; whereas nothing can exist before that which is altogether unmade.—And certain it is, that it implies a contradiction, that God, or a perfect being, should be thus demonstrated by any thing before him as his cause. Nevertheless it doth not therefore follow, that there can be no certainty at all had of the existence of a God, but only a conjectural probability; no knowledge, but faith and opinion only. For we may have a certain knowledge of things, the διότι whereof cannot be demonstrated *a priori*, or from antecedent necessary causes: as for example, that there was something eternal of itself, without beginning, is not at all demonstrable by any antecedent cause, it being contradictions to such a thing to have a cause. Nevertheless upon supposition only, that something doth exist, which no man can possibly make any doubt of, we may not only have an opinion, but also certain knowledge, from the necessity of irrefragable reason, that there was never nothing, but something or other did always exist from eternity, and without beginning. In like manner, though the existence of a God or perfect being cannot be demonstrated *a priori*, yet may we notwithstanding, from our very selves (whose existence we cannot doubt of), and from what is contained in our own minds, or otherwise consequent from him, by undeniable principles of reason, necessarily infer his exist-

ence. And whensoever any thing is thus necessarily inferred from what is undeniable and indubitable, this is a demonstration, though not of the *quod*, yet of the *quod* of it; that the thing is, though not why it is. And many of the geometrical demonstrations are no other.

It hath been asserted by a late eminent philosopher,* that there is no possible certainty to be had of any thing, before we be certain of the existence of a God essentially good; because we can never otherwise free our minds from the importunity of that suspicion, which with irresistible force may assault them; that ourselves might possibly be so made, either by chance, or fate, or by the pleasure of some evil demon, or at least of an arbitrary omnipotent deity, as that we should be deceived in all our most clear and evident perceptions; and therefore in geometrical theorems themselves, and even in our common notions. But when we are once assured of the existence of such a God as is essentially good, who therefore neither will nor can deceive; then, and not before, will this suspicion utterly vanish, and ourselves become certain, that our faculties of reason and understanding are not false and imposturous, but rightly made. From which hypothesis it plainly follows, that all those Theists, who suppose God to be a mere arbitrary being, whose will is not determined by any nature of goodness or rule of justice, but itself is the first rule of both (they thinking this to be the highest perfection, liberty, and power), can never be reasonably certain of the truth of any thing, not so much as that two and two are four; because,

* Des Cartes. See his *Meditat. Metaphys.* iv. p. 26. and v. p. 81.

so long as they adhere to that persuasion, they can never be assured, but that such an arbitrary omnipotent deity might designedly make them such, as should be deceived in all their clearest perceptions.

Now though there be a plausibility of piety in this doctrine, as making the knowledge of a God essentially good so necessary a præcognitum to all other science, that there can be no certainty of truth at all without it; yet does that very supposition, that our understanding faculties might possibly be so made, as to deceive us in all our clearest perceptions (wheresoever it is admitted), render it utterly impossible ever to arrive to any certainty concerning the existence of a God essentially good; forasmuch as this cannot be any otherwise proved, than by the use of our faculties of understanding, reason, and discourse. For to say, that the truth of our understanding faculties is put out of all doubt and question, as soon as ever we are assured of the existence of a God essentially good, who therefore cannot deceive; whilst this existence of a God is in the mean time itself no otherwise proved, than by our understanding faculties; that is, at once to prove the truth of God's existence from our faculties of reason and understanding, and again to prove the truth of those faculties from the existence of a God essentially good: this, I say, is plainly to move round in a circle, and to prove nothing at all; a gross oversight, which the forementioned philosopher seems plainly guilty of.

Wherefore, according to this hypothesis, we are of necessity condemned to eternal scepticism, both concerning the existence of a God, when,

after all our arguments and demonstrations for the same, we must at length gratify the Atheists with this confession in the conclusion, that it is possible notwithstanding there may be none; and also concerning all other things, the certainty whereof is supposed to depend upon the certainty of the existence of such a God as cannot deceive.

So that if we will pretend to any certainty at all concerning the existence of a God, we must of necessity explode this new sceptical hypothesis of the possibility of our understandings being so made, as to deceive us in all our clearest perceptions; by means whereof we can be certain of the truth of nothing, and to use our utmost endeavour to remove the same. In the first place therefore we affirm, that no power, how great soever, and therefore not Omnipotence itself, can make any thing to be indifferently either true or false, this being plainly to take away the nature both of truth and falsehood, or to make them nothing but words, without any signification. Truth is not factitious; it is a thing which cannot be arbitrarily made, but is. The Divine will and Omnipotence itself (now supposed by us) hath no imperium upon the Divine understanding; for if God understood only by will, he would not understand at all. In the next place we add, that though the truth of singular contingent propositions depends upon the things themselves existing without, as the measure and archetype thereof; yet, as to the universal and abstract theorems of science, the terms whereof are those reasons of things, which exist no where but only in the mind itself (whose noemata and ideas they are) the measure and rule of truth concerning them

can be no foreign or extraneous thing without the mind, but must be native and domestic to it, or contained within the mind itself, and therefore can be nothing but its clear and distinct perception. In these intelligible ideas of the mind, whatsoever is clearly perceived to be, is; or, which is all one, is true. Every clear and distinct perception is an entity or truth, as that, which is repugnant to conception, is a nonentity or falsehood. Nay, the very essence of truth here is this clear perceptibility, or intelligibility; and therefore can there not be any clear or distinct perception of falsehood: which must be acknowledged by all those, who, though granting false opinions, yet agree in this, that there can be no false knowledge. For the knowledge of these universal abstract truths is nothing but the clear and distinct perception of the several ideas of the mind, and their necessary relations to one another: wherefore, to say, that there can be no false knowledge, is all one as to say, that there can be no clear and distinct perceptions of the ideas of the mind false. In false opinions, the perception of the understanding power itself is not false, but only obscure. It is not the understanding power or nature in us, that erreth, but it is we ourselves, who err, when we rashly and unwarily assent to things not clearly perceived by it. The upshot of all is this, that since no power, how great soever, can make any thing indifferently to be true; and since the essence of truth in universal abstract things is nothing but clear perceptibility, it follows, that Omnipotence cannot make any thing, that is false, to be clearly perceived to be, or create such minds and understanding faculties,

as shall have as clear conceptions of falsehoods, that is, of nonentities, as they have of truths or entities. For example, no rational understanding being, that knows what a part is, and what a whole, what a cause and what an effect, could possibly be so made, as clearly to conceive the part to be greater than the whole, or the effect to be before the cause, or the like. Wherefore, we may presume with reverence to say, that there could not possibly be a world of rational creatures made by God, either in the moon, or in some other planet, or elsewhere, that should clearly and distinctly conceive all things contrary to what are clearly perceived by us; nor could our human faculties have been so made, as that we should have as clear conceptions of falsehoods as of truths. Mind or understanding faculties in creatures may be made more or less weak, imperfect, and obscure, but they could not be made false, or such as should have clear and distinct conceptions of that which is not, because every clear perception is an entity; and though Omnipotence can make something out of nothing, yet can it not make something to be nothing, nor nothing something. All which is no more than is generally acknowledged by theologians, when they affirm, that God Almighty himself cannot do things contradictions; there being no other reason for this assertion, but only this, because contradictionsness is repugnant to conception. So that conception and knowledge are hereby made to be the measure of all power, even Omnipotence, or infinite power itself, being determined thereby; from whence it follows, that power hath no dominion over understanding, truth

and knowledge; nor can infinite power make any thing whatsoever to be clearly conceivable. For could it make contradictory things clearly conceivable, then would itself be able to do them; because whatsoever can be clearly conceived by any, may unquestionably be done by infinite power.

It is true indeed, that sense, considered alone by itself, doth not reach to the absoluteness either of the natures, or of the existence of things without us, it being, as such, nothing but seeming, appearance, and fancy. And thus is that saying of some ancient philosophers to be understood, that *πάντα φαντασία ἐλπίς*, every phantasy is true—namely, because sense and fancy reach not to the absolute truth and falsehood of things, but contain themselves only within seeming and appearance; and every appearance must needs be a true appearance. Notwithstanding which, it is certain, that sense often represents to us corporeal things otherwise than indeed they are, which though it be not a formal, yet is it a material falsity. Wherefore sense in the nature of it is not absolute, but *πρὸς τὸ*, or *κατὰ*, relative to the sentient. And by sense alone, without any mixture of reason or understanding, we can be certain of no more concerning the things without us, but only this, that they so seem to us. Hence was that of the ancient atomic philosophers in Plato, *Ἡ αὐτὴ διαχυρίσται* Themt. p. 154.
ἀνὴρ ὡς οἷόν σοι φαίνεται ἕκαστον χροῶμα, τοιούτων [p. 119. edit. Ficini.]
καὶ κυνὶ καὶ ὄρνει ζῶντι. Neither you nor any man else can be certain, that every other man and brute animal hath all the very same phantasms of colours, that himself hath.—Now were there no other perception in us but that of sense

(as the old atheistic philosophers concluded knowledge to be sense), then would all our human perceptions be merely seeming, fantastical and relative; and none of them reach to the absolute truth of things. Every one in Protagoras's language would then τὰ αὐτοῦ μόνον δοξάζειν, think or opine only his own things—all his truths being private and relative to himself. And that Protagorean aphorism were to be admitted also in the sense of that philosopher, that πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος, every man is the measure of all things to himself; and, that no one man's opinion was righter than another's,—but τὸ φαινόμενον ἑκάστω, that which seemed to every one, was to him true, to whom it seemed—all truth and perception being but seeming and relative. But here lies one main difference betwixt understanding, or knowledge, and sense; that whereas the latter is fantastical and relative only; the former reacheth beyond fancy and appearance to the absoluteness of truth. For as it hath been already declared, whatsoever is clearly and distinctly perceived in things abstract and universal, by any one rational being in the whole world, is not a private thing, and true to himself only that perceived it: but it is, as some Stoics have called it, ἀληθὲς καθολικόν, a public, catholic and universal truth: it obtains every where, and, as Empedocles sang of natural justice,

Διὰ τ' ἐκρημαίνοντες
 Αἰεὶ γὰρ, καὶ αἰὲς τίταται, διὰ τ' ἀπείνου αἰγῆς.

It is extended throughout the vast ether, and

^a Vide Platon. in Theæteto, p. 118.

^b Apud Aristot. Rhetoric. lib. i. cap. xiii. p. 737. tom. lii. oper.

through infinite light or space.—And were there indeed infinite worlds, all thickly peopled with rational animals, it would be alike true to every one of them. Nor is it conceivable, that Omnipotence itself could create any such understanding beings, as could have clear and distinct perceptions of the contrary to all that is perceived by us, no more than it could do things contradictory. But in all probability, because sense is indeed but seeming, fantastical and relative, this is the reason, that some have been so prone and inclinable to suspect the like of understanding, and all mental perception too, that this also is but seeming and relative; and that therefore men's minds or understandings might have been so made, by an arbitrary omnipotent deity, as clearly and distinctly to perceive every thing that is false. But, if notwithstanding all that hath been said, any will still sing over the old song again; that all this, which hath been hitherto declared by us, is indeed true, if our human faculties be true, or rightly made; but we can go no farther than our faculties; and whether these be true or no, no man can ever be certain; we have no other reply to make, but that this is an over-stiff and heavy adherence to a prejudice of their own minds; that not only sense, but also reason and understanding, and all human perception, is merely seeming or fantastical, and relative to faculties only, but not reaching to the absoluteness of any truth; and that the human mind hath no criterion of truth at all within itself.

Nevertheless, it will probably be here further objected, that this is too great an arrogance, for created beings to pretend to an absolute certainty

of any thing, it being the sole privilege and prerogative of God Almighty to be infallible, who is therefore styled in Scripture, ὁ μόνος σοφός, the only wise;—to which we briefly answer, that the Deity is the first original fountain of wisdom and truth, which is said to be the brightness of the everlasting light, the unspotted mirror of the power of God, and the image of his goodness. The Divine Word is the archetypal pattern of all truth; it is ignorant of nothing, and knoweth all things infallibly. But created beings have but a derivative participation hereof, their understandings being obscure, and they erring in many things, and being ignorant of more. And it seems to be no derogation from Almighty God to suppose, that created minds, by a participation of the Divine mind, should be able to know certainly that two and two make four; that equals added to equals will make equals: that a whole is greater than the part; and the cause before the effect; and that nothing can be made without a cause; and such-like other common notions, which are the principles from whence all their knowledge is derived. And indeed, were rational creatures never able to be certain of any such thing as this at all, what would their life be but a mere dream or shadow? and themselves but a ridiculous and pompous piece of fantastic vanity? Besides, it is no way congruous to think, that God Almighty should make rational creatures, so as to be an utter impossibility of ever attaining to any certainty of his own existence; or of having more than an hypothetical assurance thereof, if our faculties be true (which possibly may be otherwise), then is there a God. We shall conclude this discourse

against the Cartesian scepticism with that of Origen's, *Μόνον τὸν ὅντα βέβαιον ἐστὶν*, Knowledge is the only thing in the world, which creatures have, that is in its own nature firm;—they having here something of certainty, but no where else.

Wherefore we having now that, which Archimedes required, some firm ground and footing to stand upon, such a certainty of truth in our common notions, as that they cannot possibly be false; without which, nothing at all could be proved by reason: we shall in the next place endeavour, not to shake or dissettle any thing thereby (which was the undertaking of that geometrician), but to confirm and establish the truth of God's existence, and that from the very idea of him, hitherto made good and defended against all the assaults of Atheists.

It is well known, that Cartesius* hath lately made a pretence to do this, with mathematical evidence and certainty, and he dispatches the business briefly after this manner: God, or a perfect being, includeth necessary existence in his very idea; and therefore he is. But though the inventor of this argument, or rather the reviver of that, which had been before used by some scholastics, affirmeth it to be as good a demonstration for the existence of a God, from his idea, as that in geometry, for a triangle's having three angles equal to two right, is from the idea of a triangle; yet nevertheless it is certain, that, by one means or other, this argument hath not hitherto proved so fortunate and successful, there being many, who cannot be made sensible of any efficacy therein, and not a

* Vide Principia ejus Philosophiæ, part i. §. 13. p. 4. et Meditat. Metaphysic. v. p. 31. et alias.

few, who condemn it for a mere sophism. As for ourselves, we neither have any mind to quarrel with other men's arguments *pro Deo*; nor yet would we be thought to lay stress, in this cause, upon any thing which is not every way solid and substantial. Wherefore we shall here endeavour to set down the utmost that possibly we can, both against this argument, and for it, impartially and candidly; and then, when we have done, leave the intelligent readers to make their own judgment concerning the same.

Against it in this manner; first, because we can frame an idea in our own minds of an absolutely-perfect being, including necessary existence in it, it will not at all follow from thence, that therefore there is such a perfect being really existing without our minds; we being able to frame in our minds the ideas of many other things, that never were, nor will be. All that can be certainly inferred from the idea of a perfect being seems to be this, that if it contain nothing which is contradictory to it, then it is not impossible but that there might be such a being actually existing. But the strength of this argument, not lying merely in this, that because we have an idea of a perfect being, therefore it is; but because we have such an idea of it as includeth necessary existence in it, which the idea of nothing else besides doth; therefore may it be here further objected in this manner: That though it be very true, that a perfect being doth include necessary existence in it, because that cannot be every way perfect, whose existence is not necessary, but contingent; yet will it not follow from hence, that therefore there is such a perfect being actually existing;

but all that can be deduced from it, will be no more than this, that whatsoever hath no necessary and eternal existence, is no absolutely perfect being. And again, that if there be any absolutely perfect being, then was its existence always necessary, and will be always such; that is, it did both exist of itself, from all eternity, without beginning, and must needs exist to eternity incorruptibly; it being never able to cease to be. It seems indeed no more to follow, that because a perfect being includes necessary existence in its idea, therefore there is such a perfect being actually existing; than because a perfect being includes necessary omniscience and omnipotence in it, that therefore there is such a perfect omniscient and omnipotent being: all that follows in both cases, being only this; that if there be any being absolutely perfect, then it is both omniscient and omnipotent, and it did exist of itself necessarily, and can never cease to be. Wherefore here lies a fallacy in this argumentation, when from the necessity of existence affirmed only hypothetically, or upon a supposition of a perfect being, the conclusion is made concerning it absolutely. As some would prove the necessity of all human events, as for example of Adam's sinning, in this manner, that it always was true before, that either Adam would eat the forbidden fruit, or not eat it; and if he would eat it, he would certainly eat it, and not contingently; and again, if he would not eat it, then would he certainly and necessarily not eat it: wherefore whether he will eat it, or not eat it, he will do either necessarily, and not contingently. Where it is plain, that an absolute necessity is wrongly inferred in the conclusion from an hy-

pothetical one in premises. In like manner, when upon supposition of an absolutely perfect being, it is affirmed of it, that its existence must not be contingent, but necessary, and from thence the conclusion is made absolutely, that there is such a perfect being; this seems to be the very same fallacy. From the idea of a perfect being including necessary existence in it, it follows undeniably, that if there be any thing absolutely perfect, it must exist necessarily, and not contingently: but it doth not follow, that there must of necessity be such a perfect being existing; these two propositions carrying a very different sense from one another. And the latter of them, that there must of necessity be a God, or perfect being existing, seems to be a thing altogether indemonstrable, it implying, that the existence of God, or a perfect being, may be proved *a priori*, or from some antecedent necessary cause; which was before declared to be a thing contradictions and impossible.

And now in justice are we obliged to plead the best we can also on the defensive side. Thus, therefore, the idea of God, or an absolutely perfect being, including in it not an impossible, nor a contingent, but a necessary schesis, or relation to existence, it follows from thence absolutely, and without any *ifs* and *ands*, that he doth exist. For as of things contradictions, having therefore in the idea of them an impossible schesis to existence, we can confidently conclude, that they never were, nor will be; and as of other things not contradictions or impossible, but imperfect only, which therefore have a contingent schesis to existence, we can pronounce also, that possibly they

might be, or might not be: in like manner, a perfect being including in the idea of it a necessary schesis to existence, or an impossible one to non-existence, or containing existence in its very essence; we may by parity of reason conclude concerning it, that it is neither impossible to be, nor yet contingent to be, or not to be; but that it certainly is, and cannot but be; or that it is impossible it should not be. And indeed when we say of imperfect beings, implying no contradiction in them, that they may possibly either be, or not be, we herein tacitly suppose the existence of a perfect being, because nothing which is not, could be possible to be, were there not something actually in-being, that hath sufficient power to cause or produce it. True, indeed, we have the ideas of many things in our minds, that never were, nor will be; but these are only such as include no necessary, but contingent existence in their nature; and it does not therefore follow, that a perfect being, which includes necessity of existence in its idea, may, notwithstanding, not be. Wherefore this necessity of existence, or impossibility of nonexistence, contained in the idea of a perfect being, must not be taken hypothetically only or consequentially after this manner, that if there be any thing absolutely perfect, then its existence both was, and will be necessary; but absolutely, that though contradictory things cannot possibly be, and things imperfect may possibly either be, or not be, yet a perfect being cannot but be; or it is impossible that it should not be. For otherwise were the force of the argumentation merely hypothetical, in this manner; If there be a perfect being, then its existence both was, and

will be necessary; this would plainly imply, that a perfect being, notwithstanding that necessity of existence included in its nature, might either be, or not be, or were contingent to existence; which is a manifest contradiction, that the same thing should exist both contingently and necessarily. And this hypothetical absurdity will more plainly appear, if the argument be expressed in other words, as that necessity of existence, and impossibility of nonexistence, and actual existence, belong to the very essence of a perfect being; since it would be then ridiculous, to go about to evade in this manner, that if there be a perfect being, then it is, and cannot but be. Which identical proposition is true of every thing else, but absurd. Wherefore there is something more to be inferred from the necessity of existence included in the idea of a perfect being than so; which can be nothing else but this, that it absolutely and actually is. Moreover, no Theists can be able to prove, that God, or a perfect being (supposed by them to exist), might not happen by chance only to be; if from the necessity of existence included in the idea of God, it cannot be inferred, that he could not but be. Notwithstanding which, here is no endeavour (as is pretended) to prove the existence of a God, or perfect being, *a priori*, neither, or from any necessary cause antecedent; but only from that necessity, which is included within itself, or is concomitant and concurrent with it; the necessity of its own perfect nature. And now we shall leave the intelligent and impartial reader to make his own judgment concerning the fore-mentioned Cartesian argument for a Deity, drawn from its idea, as including necessity of existence

in it, that therefore it is ; whether it be merely sophistical, or hath something of solidity and reality in it. However, it is not very probable, that many Atheists will be convinced thereby, but that they will rather be ready to say, that this is no probation at all of a Deity, but only an affirmation of the thing in dispute, and a mere begging of the question ; that therefore God is, because he is, or cannot but be.

Wherefore we shall endeavour to make out an argument, or demonstration for the existence of a God, from his idea, as including necessary existence in it, some other ways : and, first, we shall make an offer towards it in this manner. Though it will not follow from hence, because we can frame an idea of any thing in our minds, that therefore such a thing really existeth ; yet nevertheless, whatsoever we can frame an idea of, implying no manner of contradiction in its conception, we may certainly conclude thus much of it, that such a thing was not impossible to be ; there being nothing to us impossible, but what is contradictory and repugnant to conception. Now, the idea of God, or perfect being, can imply no manner of contradiction in it, because it is only the idea of such a thing ; as hath all possible and conceivable perfections in it ; that is, all perfections, which are neither contradictory in themselves, nor to one another. And they, who will not allow of this consequence, from the idea of a perfect being, including necessity of existence in it, that it doth therefore actually exist, yet cannot deny, but that this at least will follow, from its implying no manner of contradiction in it, that it is therefore a thing possible, or not impossible to be.

For thus much being true of all other contingent things, whose idea implieth no contradiction, that they are therefore possible; it must needs be granted of that, whose very idea and essence containeth a necessity of existence in it, as the essence of nothing else but a perfect being doth. And this is the first step, that we now make in way of argumentation, from the idea of God, or a perfect being, having nothing contradictions in it, that therefore God is at least possible, or no way impossible to have been. In the next place, as this particular idea of that, which is possible, includeth necessity of existence in it; from these two things put together at least, the possibility of such a being, and its necessary existence (if not from the latter alone) will it according to reason follow, that he actually is. If God, or a perfect being, in whose essence is contained necessary existence, be possible, or no way impossible to have been; then he is: because upon supposition of his nonexistence, it would be absolutely impossible that he should ever have been. It does not thus follow concerning imperfect beings, that are contingently possible, that if they be not, it was therefore impossible for them ever to have been; for that which is contingent, though it be not, yet might it for all that possibly have been. But a perfect necessarily existent being, upon the bare supposition of its nonexistence, could no more possibly have been, than it could possibly hereafter be; because if it might have been, though it be not, then would it not be a necessary existent being. The sum of all is this, a necessary existent being, if it be possible, it is; because, upon supposition of its nonexistence, it

would be impossible for it ever to have been. Wherefore God is either impossible to have been, or else he is. For if God were possible, and yet be not, then is he not a necessary but contingent being ; which is contrary to the hypothesis.

But because this argumentation may perhaps run the same fate also with the former, and, by reason of its subtlety, do but little execution neither, if not be accounted sophistical too ; men being generally prone to distrust the firmness and solidity of such thin and subtle cobwebs (as these and the like may seem to be), or their ability to support the weight of so great a truth ; and to suspect themselves to be illaquetted, and circumvented in them : therefore shall we lay no stress upon this neither, but proceed to something which is yet more plain and downright, after this manner. Whatsoever we can frame an idea of in our minds, implying no manner of contradiction, this either actually is, or else if it be not, it is possible for it to be. But, if God be not, he is not possible hereafter to be ; therefore he is. The reason and necessity of the minor is evident ; because, if God be not, and yet possible hereafter to be, then would he not be an eternal and necessarily existent being, which is contradictory to his idea. And the ground of the major, upon which all the weight lies, hath been already declared, where we proved before, that if there were no God, or perfect being, we could never have had any conception or idea of him in our minds, because there can be no positive conception of an absolute nothing, that which hath neither actual nor possible existence. Here the posture of the argument is only inverted ; because we have an

idea of God, or a perfect being, implying no manner of contradiction in it, therefore must it needs have some kind of entity or other, either an actual or possible one; but God, if he be not, is not possible to be, therefore he doth actually exist.

But perhaps this argumentation also, how firm and solid soever, may prove less convictive of the existence of a God to the generality; because whatever is received, is received according to the capacity of the recipient: and though a demonstration be never so good in itself, yet is it more or less such to particular persons, according to their ability to comprehend it; therefore shall we, in the next place, form yet a plainer demonstration for a God from the idea of him, including necessary existence in it: it being first premised, that unquestionably something or other did exist from all eternity, without beginning. For it is certain, that every thing could not be made, because nothing could come from nothing, or be made by itself; and therefore if once there had been nothing, there could never have been any thing. Whence it is undeniable, that there was always something, and consequently there was something unmade, which existed of itself from all eternity. Now all the question is, and indeed this is the only question betwixt Theists and Atheists; since something did certainly exist of itself from all eternity, what that thing is, whether it be a perfect, or an imperfect being? We say, therefore, that whatsoever existed of itself from eternity, and without beginning, did so exist naturally and necessarily, or by the necessity of its own nature. Now, nothing could exist of itself from eternity, naturally and necessarily, but that

which containeth necessary and eternal self-existence in its own nature. But there is nothing which containeth necessary eternal existence in its own nature or essence, but only an absolutely perfect being; all other imperfect things being in their nature contingently possible, either to be, or not to be. Wherefore since something or other must and doth exist of itself naturally and necessarily from eternity unmade, and nothing could do this, but what included necessary self-existence in its nature or essence; it is certain, that it was a perfect being, or God, who did exist of himself from eternity, and nothing else; all other imperfect things which have no necessary self-existence in their nature, deriving their being from him. Here therefore, are the Atheists infinitely absurd and unreasonable, when they will not acknowledge that, which containeth independent self-existence, or necessity of existence (which indeed is the same with an impossibility of nonexistence), in its nature and essence, that is, a perfect being, so much as to exist at all; and yet in the mean time assert that, which hath no necessity of existence in its nature, the most imperfect of all beings, inanimate body and matter, to have existed of itself necessarily from all eternity.

We might here add, as a farther confirmation of this argument, what hath been already proved, that no temporary successive being (whose duration is in a continual flux, as if it were every moment generated anew), and therefore neither our own souls, nor the world, nor matter moving, could possibly have existed from eternity, and independently upon any other thing, but must have had a beginning, and been caused by something

else; namely, by an absolutely perfect being, whose duration therefore is permanent, and without any successive generation, or flux.

But besides all these arguments, we may otherwise from the idea of God (already declared) be able both exactly to state the controversy betwixt Theists and Atheists, and satisfactorily to decide the same. In order whereunto there is yet something again to be premised; namely this, that as it is certain every thing was not made, but something existed of itself from eternity unmade; so is it likewise certain, that every thing was not unmade neither, nor existed of itself from eternity, but something was made and had a beginning. Where there is a full agreement betwixt Theists and Atheists, as to this one point, no Atheist asserting every thing to have been unmade, but they all acknowledging themselves to have been generated, and to have had a beginning; that is, their own souls and personalities, as likewise the lives and souls of all other men and animals. Wherefore, since something certainly existed of itself from eternity, but other things were made, and had a beginning (which therefore must needs derive their being from that which existed of itself unmade), here is the state of the controversy betwixt Theists and Atheists, whether that, which existed of itself from all eternity, and was the cause of all other things, were a perfect being and God, or the most imperfect of all things whatsoever, inanimate and senseless matter. The former is the doctrine of Theists, as Aristotle affirmeth of those Met. l. xii. c. 5. [cap. iv. p. 446. tom. iv.] ancients, who did not write fabulously concerning the first principles, οὗτον Φερε- οφθρ.] κύδης, καὶ ἕτεροί τινες, τὸ γεννησαν πρῶτον τὸ Ἀριστον

τεθείαι, καὶ οἱ Μάγοι καὶ τῶν ὑστέρων δὲ σφῶν, οἷον
Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τε καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας; As namely, Phe-
 ricides, and the Magi, and Empedocles and Anaxa-
 goras, and many others; that they agreed in this,
 that the first original of all things was the best,
 and most perfect. — Where by the way we may
 observe also, that, according to Aristotle, the an-
 cient magi did not acknowledge a substantial
 evil principle, they making that, which is the best
 and most perfect being, alone by itself, to be the
 first begetter of all. This, I say, is the hypothe-
 sis of Theists, that there is one absolutely perfect
 being, existing of itself from all eternity, from
 whence all other lesser perfections, or imperfect
 beings, did gradually descend, till at last they
 end in senseless matter, or inanimate body. But
 the atheistic hypothesis, on the contrary, makes
 senseless matter the most imperfect thing, to be
 the first principle, or the only self-existent being,
 and the cause of all other things; and consequent-
 ly all higher degrees of perfections that are in the
 world, to have climbed up or emerged by way of
 ascent from thence; as life, sense, understanding,
 and reason, from that which is altogether dead
 and senseless. Nay, as it was before observed,
 there hath been amongst the ancient Pagans, a
 certain kind of religious Atheists, such as acknow-
 ledging verbally a God, or soul of the world pre-
 siding over the whole, supposed this notwithstand-
 ing to have first emerged also, out of senseless
 matter, night and chaos; and therefore doubtless
 to be likewise dissolvable again into the same.
 And of these is that place in Aristotle Mol. i. xii. c.
 to be understood, *βασιλεύειν καὶ ἀρχεῖν φα-* 4. [p. 446.
σιν οὐ τοὺς πρώτους οἶον Νύκτα, καὶ Οὐρανόν, ἢ tom. iv. oper.]

Χάος, ἢ καὶ Ὠκεανόν, ἀλλὰ τὸν Δία· They suppose, not the first things, as Night, and the Heaven, and Chaos, and the Ocean, but Jupiter (or God) to rule and govern all.—Where it is intimated, that the Heaven, Night, Chaos, and the Ocean, according to these, were seniors to Jupiter, or in order of nature before him; they apprehending that things did ascend upward from that, which was most imperfect, as Night and Chaos, to the more perfect, and at length to Jupiter himself, the mundane soul, who governeth the whole world, as our soul doth our body. Which same opinion is afterwards again taken notice of, and reprehended Met. I. xii. c. by Aristotle in these words; οὐκ ὀρθῶς 5. Da Vall. δ' ὑπολαμβάνει οὐδ' εἰς παρεκάλει τὰς τοῦ ὅλου [p. 448. tom. iv. oper.] ἀρχάς, τῶν ζώων καὶ φυτῶν· ὅτι ἐξ ἀορίστον δὲ αὐτὰ τελειότερα· ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἄνθρωπον γέννῃ, καὶ οὐκ ἔστι σπέρμα πρῶτον· Nor would he think rightly, who should resemble the principle of the universe to that of animals and plants: where, from indeterminate and imperfect things (as seeds) do always arise the more perfect. For even here also is the case otherwise than they suppose; for it is a man that generates a man; nor is the seed the first.

The controversy being thus clearly stated betwixt Theists and Atheists, it may now with great ease, and to the full conviction of all minds unprejudiced and unprepossessed with false principles, be determined; it being on the one hand undeniably evident, that lesser perfections may naturally descend from greater, or at least from that which is absolutely perfect, and which virtually containeth all; but, on the other hand, utterly impossible, that greater perfections, and higher degrees of being, should rise and ascend

out of lesser and lower, so as that, which is the most absolutely imperfect of all things, should be the first fountain and original of all ; since no effect can possibly transcend the power of its cause. Wherefore it is certain, that in the universe things did not thus ascend and mount, or climb up from lower perfection to higher ; but, on the contrary, descend and slide down from higher to lower : so that the first original of all things was not the most imperfect, but the most perfect being. But to speak more particularly ; it is certain, notwithstanding all the vain pretences of Lucretius, and other Atheists, or semi-Atheists, to the contrary, that life and sense could never possibly spring out of dead and senseless matter, as its only original, either in the way of atoms (no composition of magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions, being ever able to produce cogitation), or in the way of qualities, since life and perception can no more result from any mixture of elements, or combinations of qualities of heat and cold, moist and dry, &c. than from unqualified atoms. This being undeniably demonstrable from that very principle of reason, which the Atheists are so fond of, but misunderstanding abuse (as shall be manifested afterward), that nothing can come from nothing. Much less could understanding and reason in men ever have emerged out of stupid matter, devoid of all manner of life. Wherefore we must needs here freely declare against the darkness of that philosophy, which hath been sometimes unwarily entertained by such as were no Atheists, that sense may rise from a certain modification, mixture, or organization of dead and senseless matter ; as also that understanding and reason may result from sense : the plain consequence of both

which is, that senseless matter may prove the original of all things; and the only Nomen. Which doctrine therefore is, doubtless, a main piece of the philosophy of the kingdom of darkness. But this darkness hath been of late, in great measure dispelled by the light of the atomic philosophy, restored, as it was in its first genuine and virgin state, undeflowered as yet by Atheists; this clearly shewing, how far body and mechanism can go, and that life and cogitation can never emerge out from thence; it being built upon that fundamental principle, as we have made it evident in the first chapter, that *Nothing can come from nothing*. And Strato and the hylozoic Atheists were so well aware, and so sensible of this, that all life and understanding could not possibly be generated or made, but that there must be some fundamental and substantial, or eternal unmade life and knowledge, that they therefore have thought necessary to attribute life, and perception (or understanding), with appetite, and self-moving power, to all matter as such, that so it might be thereby fitly qualified to be the original of all things; than which opinion as nothing can be more monstrous, so shall we elsewhere evince the impossibility thereof. In the mean time, we doubt not to aver, that the argument proposed is a sufficient demonstration of the impossibility of Atheism; which will be further manifested in our answer to the second atheistic objection against a Divine creation, because nothing can come from nothing.

But this controversy betwixt Theists and Atheists may be yet more particularly stated from the idea of God, as including mind or understanding in it essentially, viz. Whether mind be eter-

nal and unmade, as being the maker of all; or else, Whether all mind were itself made or generated, and that out of senseless matter? For, according to the doctrine of the Pagan Theists, mind was *πρωτεύωντος, καὶ Κύριος κατὰ φύσιν*, the oldest of all things, senior to the world and elements, and by nature hath a princely and lordly dominion over all.—But, according to those Atheists, who make matter, or body, devoid of all life and understanding, to be the first principle, mind must be *ὑστερογενής*, a post-nate thing—younger than the world; a weak, umbratile, and evanid image, and next to nothing.

And the controversy, as thus stated, may be also clearly and satisfactorily decided. For, first, we say, that as it is certainly true, that if there had been once nothing at all, there could never have been any thing; so is it true likewise, that if once there had been no life in the whole universe, but all had been dead, then could there never have been any life or motion in it; and if once there had been no mind, understanding, or knowledge, then could there never have been any mind or understanding produced. Because, to suppose life and understanding to rise and spring up out of that which is altogether dead and senseless, as its only original, is plainly to suppose something to come out of nothing. It cannot be said so of other things, as of the corporeal world and matter, that if once they had not been, they could never possibly have been; because, though there had been no world nor matter, yet might these have been produced from a perfect, omnipotent incorporeal being, which in itself eminently containeth all

things. Dead and senseless matter could never have created or generated mind and understanding, but a perfect omnipotent mind could create matter. Wherefore, because there is mind, we are certain, that there was some mind or other from eternity without beginning; though not because there is body, that therefore there was body or matter from eternity unmade. Now these imperfect minds of ours were by no means themselves eternal or without beginning, but from an antecedent nonexistence brought forth into being; but since no mind could spring out of dead and senseless matter, and all minds could not possibly be made, nor one produced from another infinitely; there must of necessity be an eternal unmade mind, from whence those imperfect minds of ours were derived. Which perfect omnipotent mind was as well the cause of all other things, as of human souls.

But before we proceed to any further argumentation, we must needs take notice here, that the Atheists suppose no small part of their strength to lie in this very thing, namely, their disproving a God from the nature of understanding and knowledge: nor do they indeed swagger in any thing more than this. We have already set it for the eleventh atheistic argument, that knowledge being the information of the things themselves known, and all conception the action of that which is conceived, and the passion of the conceiver; the world and all sensible things must needs be before there could be any knowledge or conception of them, and no knowledge or conception before the world as its cause. Or more briefly thus: the world could not be

made by knowledge and understanding, because
 • there could be no knowledge or understanding
 of the world, or of any thing in it, before it was
 made. For, according to these Atheists, things
 made knowledge, and not knowledge things; they
 meaning by things here such only as are sensible
 and corporeal. So that mind and understand-
 ing could not be the creator of the world and
 these sensible things, itself being the mere crea-
 ture of them; a secondary derivative result from
 them, or a fantastic image of them; the young-
 est and most creaturely thing in the whole world.
 Whence it follows, that to suppose mind and un-
 derstanding to be the maker of all things would
 be no better sense, than if one should suppose
 the images in ponds and rivers to be the makers
 of the sun, moon, and stars, and other things re-
 presented in them. And upon such a ground as
 this, does a modern writer presume to determine,
 that knowledge and understanding are not to be
 attributed to God Almighty, because they im-
 ply imperfection, and dependance upon corporeal
 things without: "*Quoniam scientia et* De Civ. Rel.
intellectus in nobis nihil aliud sunt, o. xv. sect. 14.
quam suscitatus a rebus externis organa promen-
tibus animi tumultus, non est putandum aliquid
tale accidere Deo. Signum enim potentie ab alio
dependentis." Which is again Englished Lev. c. xxxi.
 thus: Knowledge and understanding
 being in us nothing else but a tumult in the mind;
 raised by external things, that press the organ-
 ical parts of man's body; there is no such thing
 in God, nor can they be attributed to him, they
 being things, which depend upon natural causes.—
 Where this writer thus denying knowledge and

understanding to God, upon pretence, that it speaks imperfection, and dependance upon external corporeal things (it being nothing but a tumult raised by the motions and pressures of them), he must needs absolutely deny the first principle of all things to be any knowing understanding nature, unless he had asserted some other kind of knowledge distinct from that of men, and clearly attributed the same to God Almighty. Hitherto the sense of Atheists.

Now we shall, for the present, only so far forth concern ourselves in confuting this atheistic doctrine, as to lay a foundation thereby for the demonstration of the contrary, namely, the existence of a God, or a mind before the world, from the nature of knowledge and understanding. First, therefore, it is a sottish conceit of these Atheists, proceeding from their not attending to their own cogitations, that not only sense, but also knowledge and understanding in men, is but a tumult, raised from corporeal things without, pressing upon the organs of their body; or else, as they declare themselves more distinctly, nothing but the activity of sensible objects upon them, and their passion from them. For if this were true, then would every thing, that suffered and reacted motion, especially polite bodies, as looking-glasses, have something both of sense and of understanding in them. It is plain, that there comes nothing to us from bodies without us, but only local motion and pressure. Neither is sense itself the mere passion of those motions; but the perception of their passions in a way of fancy. But sensible things themselves (as, for example, light and colours) are not known or understood

either by the passion, or the fancy of sense, nor by any thing merely foreign and adventitious, but by intelligible ideas exerted from the mind itself; that is, by something native and domestic to it: nothing being more true, than this of Boetius,^a that, "*Omne, quod scitur, non ex sua, sed ex comprehendentium natura, vi, et facultate cognoscitur;*" Whatsoever is known, is known not by its own force and power, but by the force and power, the vigour and activity, of that thing itself, which knows or comprehends it.—Wherefore, besides the phantasms of singular bodies, or of sensible things existing without us (which are not mere passions neither), it is plain, that our human mind hath other cogitations or conceptions in it; namely, the ideas of the intelligible natures and essences of things, which are universal, and by and under which it understands singulars. It is a ridiculous conceit of a modern atheistic writer, that universals are nothing else but names, attributed to many singular bodies, because whatsoever is singular. For though whatsoever exists without the mind be singular, yet is it plain, that there are conceptions in our minds objectively universal. Which universal objects of our mind, though they exist not as such any where without it, yet are they not therefore nothing, but have an intelligible entity for this very reason, because they are conceivable; for since nonentity is not conceivable, whatsoever is conceivable, and an object of the mind, is therefore something. And as for axiomatical truths, in which something is affirmed or denied, as these are not all passions

^a Vide Consolat. Philosoph. lib. v. p. 131.

from bodies without us; (for what local motions could impress this common notion upon our minds, that things which agree in one third, agree amongst themselves, or any other?) so neither are these things only gathered by induction from repeated and reiterated sensations; we clearly apprehending at once, that it is impossible they should be otherwise. Thus Aristotle* ingeniously: Οὐδὲ ἐπιστάσθαι δι' αἰσθητικῶς ἐστίν, ὅτι καὶ ἡ ἦν αἰσθάνεσθαι, ὅτι τὸ τρίγωνον δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἔχει τὰς γωνίας, ἐζητούμεν ἂν ἀποδείξιν, καὶ οὐχ ὡς φασὶ τινες ἐπιστάμεθα· αἰσθάνεσθαι μὲν γὰρ ἀνάγκη καθ' ἕκαστον, ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμη τῷ καθόλου γνωρίζειν ἐστίν. It is evident, that there is no knowledge (of the universal theorems of geometry) by sense. For if we could perceive by sense, that the three angles of a triangle were equal to two right; yet should we not rest satisfied in this, as having therefore a sufficient knowledge hereof; but would seek further after a demonstration of it: sense reaching only to singulars, but knowledge to universals.—When from the universal idea of a triangle, which is neither here, nor there, nor any where, without our mind, but yet hath an intelligible entity, we see a plain necessity, that its three angles must be equal to two right; then do we know the truth of this universal theorem, and not before: as also we understand, that every singular triangle (so far as it is true) hath this property in it. Wherefore the knowledge of this, and the like truths, is not derived from singulars, nor do we arrive to them in way of ascent from singulars to universals; but, on the contrary, having first found them in the universals, we afterward

* Analytic. posterior. lib. i. p. 226. tom. i. oper.

descending, apply them to singulars : so that our knowledge here is not after singular bodies, and secondarily or derivatively from them, but in order of nature before them, and proleptical to them.

Now these universal conceptions, some of which are also abstract (as life, sense, reason, knowledge, and the like), many of them are of such things, whose singulars do not at all fall under sense; which therefore could never possibly be impressed upon us from singular bodies by local motion: and again some such, as though they belong to corporeal and sensible things, yet, as their accuracy cannot be reached to by sense, so neither did they ever exist in that matter of this lower world, which here encompasseth us, and therefore could not be stamped upon us from without: as for example, the ideas of a perfect straight line, and a plain superficies, or of an exact triangle, circle, sphere, or cube; no material thing here amongst us being terminated in so straight lines, but that even by microscopes there may be discovered much irregularity and deformity in them; and very probable it is, that there are no perfectly straight lines, no such triangles, circles, spheres, or cubes, as answer to the exactness of our conceptions, in any part of the whole material universe, nor never will be. Notwithstanding which, they are not absolute nonentities, since we can demonstrate things concerning them, and though they never were nor will be, yet are they possible to exist, since nothing can be conceived, but it either is, or else is possible to be. The human mind therefore hath a power of framing ideas and conceptions, not only of what actually is, but also of

things, which never were, nor perhaps will be, they being only possible to be. But when, from our conceptions, we conclude of some things, that though they are not, yet they are possible to be, unless there be something actually in being, which hath sufficient power to produce it; we do implicitly suppose the existence of a God or omnipotent being thereby, which can make whatsoever is conceivable, though it yet be not to exist; and therefore material triangles, circles, spheres, cubes, mathematically exact.

The result of what we have hitherto said is this, that since singular bodies are not the only objects of our mind and cogitation, it having also universal and abstract ideas of the intelligible natures or essences of things (some of which are such, whose singulars do not at all fall under sense; others, though they belong to bodies, yet sense can never reach to them, nor were they ever in matter); moreover, since our mind can conceive of things, which no where actually exist, but are only possible, and can have such a demonstrative science of universal truths, as sense can never ascend to: that therefore human knowledge and understanding itself is not the mere image and creature of singular bodies only; and so derivative, or ectypal from them, and in order of nature junior to them, but that, as it were hovering aloft over all the corporeal universe, it is a thing independant upon singular bodies, or proleptical to them, and in order of nature before them.

But what account can we then possibly give of knowledge and understanding, their nature and original? since there must be *νοητόν*, that which

is intelligible—in order of nature, before *view*, or intellection.—Certainly no other than this, that the first original knowledge is that of a perfect being, infinitely good and powerful, comprehending itself, and the utmost extent of its own fecundity and power, that is, the possibilities of all things; their ideas, with their several relations to one another; all necessary and immutable truths. Here therefore is there a knowledge before the world and all sensible things, that was archetypal and paradigmatical to the same. Of which one perfect mind and knowledge all other imperfect minds (being derived from it) have a certain participation; whereby they are enabled to frame intelligible ideas, not only of whatsoever doth actually exist, but also of such things as never were nor will be, but are only possible, or objects of Divine power.

Wherefore, since it is certain, that even human knowledge and understanding itself is not a mere passion from sensible things, and singular bodies existing without (which is the only foundation of that forementioned atheistic argument, that things made knowledge, and not knowledge things), and consequently it must needs have some other original: moreover, since knowledge and understanding apprehend things proleptically to their existence (mind being able to frame conceptions of all possible entities and modifications), and therefore in their nature do plainly suppose the actual existence of a perfect being, which is infinitely fecund and powerful and could produce all things possible or conceivable; the first original Knowledge, or Mind, from whence all other knowledges and minds are derived, being that of an absolutely

perfect and omnipotent Being, comprehending itself, and the extent of its own power, or of its communicability, that is, the ideas of all possibilities of things, that may be produced by it, together with their relations to one another, and their necessary immutable truths; accordingly as wisdom and un-

derstanding are described to be, *ἀτμὶς τῆς*
Wisd. c. vii.

τοῦ θεοῦ δυνάμεως, ἀπόρροια τῆς τοῦ παντοκράτορος δόξης, ἑσποτρυον τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνεργείας, καὶ εἰκὼν τῆς ἀγαθότητος αὐτοῦ, the breath (or vapour) of the power of God, and an efflux (or emanation) from the glory of the Almighty, a clear mirror (or looking-glass) of his active energy or virtue, and the image of his goodness:—I say, the result of all is this, that the nature of knowledge and understanding is so far from being a ground of disproving a Deity (as the Atheists ignorantly pretend), that it affordeth a firm demonstration to us, on the contrary, of the existence of a God, a perfect omnipotent being, comprehending itself, and the extent of its own power, or all possibilities of things; a mind before the world, and senior to all things; no ectypal, but archetypal thing, which comprehended in it, as a kind of intellectual world, the paradigm or platform, according to which this sensible world was made.

And this may be further confirmed from what is generally acknowledged, and indeed cannot reasonably be denied by any, viz. that there are eternal verities, such as were never made, nor can ever be destroyed, or cease to be: as for example, such common notions as these, that equals added to equals make equals; that the cause is in order of nature before the effect, &c. together with all geometrical theorems; as Aristotle himself de-

clareth, he writing in his *Ethics* * after this manner : *περὶ αἰδίων οὐδεὶς βουλευεται, οἷον περὶ τῆς διαμέτρου καὶ τῆς πλευρᾶς ὅτι ἀσύμμετροι*. Concerning eternal (and immutable) things no man does consult ; as for example, concerning the diameter or diagonal of a square, whether it should be incommensurable to the sides, or no.—Where he plainly affirmeth this geometrical theorem, that the diameter or diagonal of a square is incommensurable to the sides, to be an eternal truth. Neither are there such eternal truths as these only in mathematics, and concerning quantity, but also in ethics concerning morality ; there being here *αἰώνια δίκαια*, as Justin Martyr calls them, things eternally just—which were not made such at certain times by law and arbitrary command, but, being such in their own nature immutably, were from everlasting to everlasting, and (as it is said of that eternal Word, which comprehends all truth) the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever.^b For of these is that famous passage of Sophocles in his *Antigona*,^c

Οὐ γάρ τι ἦνγε πρὸχθις, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ ὦντα
 Ζῇ ταῦτα, καὶδὲν εἶδεν ἔξ ὅτου ἠφείη.

These are not things of to-day, or yesterday, but they ever live, and no man knows their date, or from whence they came.—No man can declare the time, when all common notions, and geometrical truths, were first made and generated out of nothing, or brought out of antecedent nonexistence into being. Certain it is, that such truths as these, that the diameter and sides of a square are

* *Ethicor.* ad *Nicomach.* lib. iii. cap. v. p. 39. tom. iii. oper.

^b *Heb.* xiii. 8.

^c *Ver.* 467, 468.

incommensurable, or that the power of the hypotenuse in a rectangular triangle is equal to the powers of both the sides, were not made by any man's thinking, or by those first geometricians, who discovered or demonstrated the same; they discovering and demonstrating only that which was. Wherefore these truths were before there was any man to think of them, and they would continue still to be, though all the men in the world should be annihilated: nay, though there were no material squares and triangles any where in the whole world neither, no, nor any matter at all: for they were ever without beginning before the world, and would of necessity be ever after it, should it cease to be.

Now, if there be eternal truths, which were never made, and could not but be, then must the "*rationes rerum*," the simple reasons of things also, or their intelligible natures and essences, out of which those truths are compounded, be of necessity eternal likewise. For how can this be an eternal truth, that the diameter of a square is incommensurable with the sides, if the *rationes*, the reasons of a square, diameter, and sides, or their intelligible essences, were not themselves eternal? These are therefore called by Plato (a man of much meditation, and no contemptible philosopher) not only αἰ ταῦτα καὶ ἀσάυτως ἔχοντα, things which are always the same, and unchangeable—but also τὰ μὴ γιγνόμενα, ἀλλ' αἰὶ ὄντα, things which were never made, but always are—and sometimes, μήτε γιγνόμενα, μήτε ἀπολλύμενα, things that were neither made, nor can be destroyed—sometimes, τὰ ἀγέννητα καὶ ἀνώλεθρα, things ingenerable and incorruptible. —Of which Cicero

thus: "Hæc Plato negat gigni, sed semper esse, et ratione et intelligentia contineri." These things Plato affirmeth to have been never made, but always to be, and to be contained in reason and understanding.—And, though perhaps it may seem strange, even Aristotle^b himself also, notwithstanding his so often clashing with Plato's ideas, here really agreeth in the main, that the forms and species, or the universal intelligible essences of things, which are the proper and immediate objects of science, were eternal and never made: thus in his *Metaphysics*, *Τὸ εἶδος οὐδεὶς ποιεῖ οὐδὲ γινῆσθαι*, No man makes the form, or species of a thing, nor was it ever generated; and again, *Τοῦ σφαῖρα εἶναι οὐκ ἔστι γένεσις*, There is no generation of the essence of a sphere;—and, *Ἄνευ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τὰ εἶδη*, The forms or species of things are without any generation or corruption.—And he sometimes calleth these objects of science *ἀκίνητον οὐσίαν*^c or *φύσιν*, an immutable essence of nature.—Lastly, where he writeth against the Heraclitics, and those other sceptics, who denied all certainty of science he first discovers the ground of their error herein to have been this, that they supposed singular bodies, or sensibles existing without, to be the only things or objects of the mind, or knowledge: ^d *Αἴτιον τῆς δόξης τούτοις, ὅτι περὶ τῶν ὄντων τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐσκόπουν, τὰ δὲ ὄντα ὑπέλαβον εἶναι τὰ αἰσθητὰ μόνον, ἐν δὲ τούτοις πολλὴ ἡ τοῦ ἀορίστου φύσεως ἐνυπάρχει—ἔτι δὲ πᾶσαν ὁρῶντες ταύτην κινουμένην τὴν φύσιν, κατάγει τοῦ μεταβάλλοντος οὐδὲν ἀληθεύμενον, περιίγει τὸ πάντως*

^a De Oratore ad Brutum, cap. li. p. 685. tota. iii. oper.

^b Vide *Metaphysic.* lib. vii. cap. viii. p. 361. et lib. xiv. cap. iii. p. 473. tom. iv. oper.

^c Ibid. lib. xiv. cap. li. p. 472. et cap. vi. p. 477.

^d Ibid. lib. iv. cap. v. p. 313.

πάντα μετάβαλλον, οὐκ ἐκδέχεσθαι ἀληθείαν. The original of these men's mistake was this, because truth was to be looked for in things, and they conceived the only things to be sensibles, in which it is certain there is much of the indeterminate nature. Wherefore they, perceiving all the nature of sensibles to be moveable, or in perpetual flux and mutation, since nothing can possibly be verified or constantly affirmed concerning that; which is not the same but changeable; concluded, that there could be no truth at all, nor certainty of science; those things, which are the only objects of it, never continuing the same.—And then he subjoins, in way of opposition to this sceptical doctrine of theirs, and the forementioned ground thereof, Ἀξιόσωμεν αὐτοὺς ὑπολαμβάνειν καὶ ἄλλην οὐσίαν εἶναι τῶν ὄντων, ἣ οὔτε κίνησις ὑπάρχει οὔτε φθορά οὔτε γενεαίσις τὸ παράπαν. We would have these men therefore to know, that there is another kind of essence of things, besides that of sensibles, to which belongeth neither motion, nor corruption, nor any generation at all.—By which essences of things, they have no generation nor corruption, he could understand nothing else but those intelligible natures, species, and ideas, which are the standing and immutable objects of science. And certain it is, that there could be no constant and immutable science at all, were there no other objects of the mind, but singulars and sensibles, because these are all mutable. Wherefore the proper and immediate objects of the geometrical science are no singular and material triangles, squares, spheres, and cubes, &c. not only because none of these are found mathematically exact, and because geometers, in all the several distant ages and

places of the world, could not have the same singular bodies before them, but also because they do none of them continue immutably the same; all corporeal things being more or less in perpetual motion and mutation; whereas, that of which any geometrical theorem is verified and demonstrated, must be immutably and unalterably the same. The triangles and circles, spheres and cubes, of Euclid, Archimedes, Pappus, Apollonius, and all other ancient and modern geometicians, in all the distant places and times of the world, were both indivisibly one and the same, and also perfectly immutable and incorruptible, the science of geometry being such. For which cause it is affirmed also of these mathematical things, by the forementioned Aristotle, ^{Met. I. xii. o.} that they are no where as in a place, as ^{v. [pag. 448.} all singular bodies are, ^{tom. iv. oper.]} Ἄριστον δὲ καὶ τὸν τόπον ἅμα τοῖς στερεοῖς τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς ποιῆσαι, ὁ μὲν γὰρ τόπος τῶν καθ' ἑκάστον ἴδιος διὰ χωριστὰ τόπων· τὰ δὲ μαθηματικά, οὐ ποῦ. It is absurd to make mathematical things to be in a place, as solid bodies are; for place belongeth only to singulars, which are therefore separable from one another by place; but mathematical things are not any where.—Because they being universal and abstract, are only in minds: nevertheless, for the same reason are they also every where, they being in every mind that apprehends them. Lastly, these intelligible essences and ideas of things are called also by Philo, ἀναγκαστικαὶ οὐσίαι, the most necessary essences;—as being not only eternal, but having likewise necessary existence belonging to them: for though there be no absolute necessity, that there should

* Legis Allogor. lib. i. p. 68. oper.

be matter or body, yet is there an absolute necessity that there should be truth.

If therefore there be eternal intelligibles or ideas, and eternal truths, and necessary existence do belong to them; then must there be an eternal mind necessarily existing, since these truths and intelligible essences of things cannot possibly be any where but in a mind. For by the essences of things, when they are said to be eternal, must not be meant their very substances, as if every thing were in itself eternal and uncreated; or that God in creation, did only, as a modern writer abusively expresseth it, "sartoris instar, vestire essentias rerum nova existentia," clothe the antecedent essences of things with a new garment of existence;—but only their *esse cognitum*, their possible and intelligible natures,—as they were objects of infinite power and understanding before they were made. There must be a mind senior to the world, and all sensible things, and such as at once comprehends in it the idea of all intelligibles, their necessary schemes and relations to one another, and all their immutable truths; a mind, which doth not *ὅτι μὲν νοεῖν, ὅτι δὲ οὐ νοεῖν* (as Aristotle writeth of it), sometimes understand, and sometimes not understand, as if it were sometimes awake, and sometimes asleep, or like an eye, sometimes open, and sometimes shut; but *ὁλοῦ ἐνέργεια*, such a mind as is essentially act and energy, and hath no defect in it. And this, as we have already declared, can be no other than the mind of an omnipotent and infinitely perfect being, comprehending itself, and the extent of its own power, or how far itself is communicable, that is, all the possibi-

^b Vide Metaphys. lib. xiv. cap. ix. p. 483.

lities of things, that may be made by it, and their respective truths; mind and knowledge, in the very nature of it, supposing the actual existence of an omnipotent or infinitely powerful being, as its *verreën*, or intelligible;—it being nothing but the comprehension of the extent of infinite or Divine power, and the measure of the same.

And from hence it is evident also, that there can be but one only original mind, or no more than one understanding being self-existent; all other minds whatsoever partaking of one original mind; and being, as it were, stamped with the impression or signature of one and the same seal. From whence it cometh to pass, that all minds, in the several places and ages of the world, have ideas or notions of things exactly alike, and truths indivisibly the same. Truths are not multiplied by the diversity of minds that apprehend them; because they are all but ectypal participations of one and the same original or archetypal mind and truth. As the same face may be reflected in several glasses; and the image of the same sun may be in a thousand eyes at once beholding it; and one and the same voice may be in a thousand ears listening to it: so when innumerable created minds have the same ideas of things, and understand the same truths, it is but one and the same eternal light, that is reflected in them all ("that light which enlighteneth every man that cometh into the world"); or the same voice of that one everlasting Word, that is never silent, re-echoed by them. Thus was it concluded by Themistius, that one man by teaching, could not possibly beget in the mind of another the very same notions, conceptions, and knowledges, which himself had in his

own mind, εἰ μὴ τὸ αὐτὸν ἦν τὸ νόημα τοῦ διδάσκοντος καὶ τοῦ μανθάνοντος; were not the minds both of the teacher and of the learner, as it were, printed and stamped alike.—As also that men could not possibly so confer together as they do, presently apprehending one another's meaning, and raising up the very same senses in their minds, and that merely by occasion of words and sounds, εἰ μήτις ἦν Ἐἷς Νόος οὗ πάντες ἐκοινωνοῦμεν, were there not some one mind which all men did partake of.—As for that anti-monarchical opinion of many understanding beings, or minds, self-originated, and independent (none of which therefore could be omnipotent), it is neither conceivable, how such should all agree in the same truths, there being no common measure of truth betwixt them, no more than any common rule of their wills; nor indeed how they should have any knowledge or understanding at all, properly so called, that being the comprehension of the possibilities of things, or of the extent of infinite power: whereas, according to this hypothesis, there is no infinite power at all, the power of each of those many supposed principles or deities being limited and finite, and therefore indeed not creative of any thing neither, since that, which could create one thing, could create all, and consequently would have all depending upon it. We conclude therefore, that from the nature of mind and knowledge it is demonstrable, that there can be but one original and self-existent mind, or understanding being, from which all other minds were derived. And now have we, more copiously than we designed, confuted the first atheistic argument; we having not only asserted the idea of God, and fully answered

and refelled all the atheistic pretences against the same ; but also from this very idea of God, or a perfect being, demonstrated his existence. We shall dispatch the following atheistic objections with more brevity.

WE come, in the next place, to the Achilles of the Atheists, their invincible argument against a Divine creation and omnipotence ; because, " Nothing could come from nothing." It being concluded from hence, that whatsoever substantially or really is, was from all eternity of itself unmade or uncreated by any deity. Or else thus ; by God is always understood a creator of some real entity or other out of nothing ; but it is an undoubted principle of reason and philosophy, an undeniable common notion, that " Nothing can be made out of nothing," and therefore there can be no such creative power as this. And here we shall perform these three things ; first, we shall shew, that, in some senses, this is indeed an unquestionable truth, and common notion, that " Nothing can come from nothing," and what those senses are. Secondly, we shall make it evident, that in the sense of this atheistic objection, it is absolutely false, that " Nothing can come from nothing," or be made out of nothing ; and that a Divine creation and omnipotence can be no way impugned from the forementioned principle rightly understood. Thirdly, and lastly, we shall prove, that as from this principle or common notion, " Nothing out of nothing," there can be no execution at all done against Theism, or a Divine crea-

tion ; so from the very same, rightly understood, the impossibility of all Atheism may be demonstratively proved, it bringing something out of nothing in an impossible sense, as also the existence of a God evinced.

We grant therefore, in the first place, that this is in some sense an undoubted principle of reason, or an undeniable common notion, that " Nothing can come from nothing." For, first, it is unquestionably true, that " Nothing, which once was not, could ever of itself come into being ;" or, that " Nothing could bring itself out of nonexistence into being ;" that " Nothing can take beginning of existence from itself ;" or, that " Nothing can be made or produced without an efficient cause." And from hence, as hath been already intimated, it is demonstratively certain, that every thing was not made, but that there is something necessarily self-existent, and which could not but be. For had every thing been made, then must something of necessity have been made out of nothing by itself ; which is impossible.

Again ; As nothing, which was not, could ever of itself come into being, or be made, without an efficient cause ; so is it certain likewise, that nothing can be efficiently caused or produced by that, which hath not in it at least equal (if not greater) perfection, as also sufficient power to produce the same. We say, nothing which was not, could ever be brought into being by that which hath not formally equal perfection in it ; because no thing can give what it hath not, and therefore so much of the perfection or entity of the effect, as is greater than that of the supposed cause, so much thereof must needs come from nothing, or be made

without a cause. Moreover, whatsoever hath equal perfection to another thing, could not therefore cause or produce that other thing ; because it might either have no active power at all, as matter hath not, it being merely passive, or else no sufficient active and productive power. As for example, though it be not impossible, that motion, which once was not, should be produced ; yet is it impossible, that it should be ever produced without a sufficient cause. Wherefore, if there were once no motion at all in the whole world, nor no life, or self-active power, in any thing, but all were dead ; then is it certain, that there could never possibly arise any motion or mutation in it to all eternity. There being no sufficient cause to produce the same ; since nothing can produce motion but that which hath life or self-activity in it ; and if motion, or any thing else, should begin to be, without a sufficient cause, then must it needs be caused by itself, or of itself come into being : which is a thing impossible. Now no imperfect being whatsoever hath a sufficient emanative power to create any other substance, or produce it out of nothing ; the utmost that can be done by imperfect beings, is only to produce new accidents and modifications ; as human souls can produce new cogitations in themselves, and new local motion in bodies. No imperfect being is substantially emanative, or can produce another substance out of nonexistence. Therefore, for any substance to be brought into being by an imperfect substance, which hath not sufficient emanative or creative power, is a thing plainly impossible ; it being all one as to say, that a substance might of itself come out of nothing into being.

And thus is it granted, that no substance could be created, or brought out of nonexistence into being, but by the sole efficiency of an absolutely perfect being, which hath both greater perfection (it eminently containing all things in it), and also a sufficient emanative or creative power.

And now have we given an account of two senses, wherein it is impossible for "any thing to come from nothing;" one, for a thing, which was not, to bring itself into being, or to be made without an efficient cause. Another, for a thing to be efficiently caused by that, which hath not at least equal perfection in it, or a sufficient emanative or productive power. Both which senses of this axiom respect the efficient cause; and thus was it frequently understood by divers of the ancients, and particularly by Cicero.* We shall now propound a third sense, wherein this axiom is also verified, that "Nothing can be made out of nothing," respecting chiefly the material cause. For since no imperfect natural being hath any creative power, or can efficiently produce any new substance, or real entity, which was not before, into being, but only act upon pre-existing matter by motion, and modify the same, and since matter, as such, being merely passive, cannot cause any thing that was not before, or will not result from the composition or modification of it; it follows undeniably, that in all natural generations and productions out of pre-existent matter (without a Divine creation), there can never be any new substance or real entity brought out of nonexistence into being. And this was that very thing, and no other, which the ancient physiologers meant,

* Vide lib. ejus de Fato.

when (as Aristotle, tells us) they so much insisted upon this principle, *Τὸ γιγνόμενον ἐκ μὴ ὄντων γίνεσθαι ἀδύνατον*, That it was impossible, that any real entity should be (naturally) made or generated out of nothing ;—or, as it is also otherwise expressed, *Οὐδὲν οὐδὲ γίνεσθαι οὐδὲ φθείρεσθαι τῶν ὄντων*, that no real entity was either generated or corrupted.—That is, that in natural generations, corruptions, and alterations (where God is supposed not miraculously to interpose), there is no creation of any new substance, or real entity, out of nothing, nor annihilation, or destruction of any into nothing.

We are not ignorant, that the generality of modern writers have interpreted this doctrine of the old physiologers in Aristotle into quite different sense ; as designing therein to take away all Divine creation out of nothing (or nonexistence) ; they making all things to have sprung out of matter (existing of itself from eternity) either without a God, or else rather (because Parmenides and Empedocles, and other assertors of this doctrine, were undoubted Theists) with him. So that God could not create any new entity out of nothing, but only make things out of pre-existing unmade matter, as a carpenter doth a house, or a weaver a piece of cloth. And thus it is commonly taken for granted, that no Pagan philosopher ever went so far, as to acknowledge a Divine creation of any thing out of nothing, in the sense of Christian theologers. And here we grant indeed, that, besides the Stoics, there have been some other philosophic Theists amongst the Pagans of this per-

* Natural. Auscultat. lib. i. p. 451. tom. i. oper. vide etiam. cap. viii. p. 457, et alias.

^b Ibid. lib. i. cap. viii. p. 457.

suation, that nothing was, nor could be made by God, otherwise than out of something pre-existing ; as Plutarchus Chæronensis for one, who in a place already cited positively affirmeth,* *τὸν μὲν κόσμον ὑπὸ θεοῦ γεγόναι, τὴν δὲ οὐσίαν καὶ ἕλπην ἐξ ἧς γέγονεν, οὐ γενομένην, ἀλλὰ ὑποκειμένην αἰὲν τῷ δημιουργῷ*; that though the world were indeed made by God, yet the substance or matter, out of which it was made, was not made.—And then he subjoins this very reason for it, *οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος γίνεσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐκ τοῦ μὴ καλῶς, μηδ' ἱκανῶς ἔχοντος, ὡς οἰκίας καὶ ἱματίου καὶ ἀνδριάντος* because there can be no making of any thing out of nothing, but only out of something pre-existing, not rightly ordered, or sufficiently disposed ; as in a house, garment, or statue.—From which conceit of Plutarch's, though he were otherwise ingenious, it may well be supposed, that the dull Bæotic air had too much effect upon him. However, neither Plutarch nor the Stoics, as we conceive, are for this to be accounted absolute and downright Atheists, but only imperfect, mongrel, and spurious Theists. And therefore were Atheists never so much able to prove, that there could be no creation out of nothing pre-existing, which they cannot at all do ; yet would not this overthrow Theism in general, there being a latitude therein. Nevertheless, it will undeniably appear from what shall follow, that those ancient Italics and Pythagorics were so far from intending here any such thing, to deduce all things out of matter, either without or with a God, as that they plainly designed the very contrary ; namely, to prove that no new real entity could be made out of matter, and particularly that souls

* Libro de Procreat. Animæ ex Timæo, p. 1014. tom. ii. oper.

could not be generated out of the same; which therefore of necessity must, according to them, have another Divine original, and be made by God, not out of matter, but out of nothing pre-existing; since it could not be supposed by any, that all souls existed of themselves from eternity unmade. And indeed all those Pagan philosophers, who asserted the incorporeity of souls, must of necessity, in like manner, suppose them not to have been made out of pre-existing matter, but by God out of nothing. Plutarch being only here to be excepted, by reason of a certain odd hypothesis which he had, that was peculiarly his own, of a third principle, besides God and matter, a disorderly soul, or evil demon self-existent, who therefore seems to have supposed all particular human souls to have been made neither out of nothing, nor yet out of matter or body pre-existing, but out of a certain strange commixture of the substance of that evil soul and God blended together: upon which account does he affirm souls to be, not so much *ἔργον* as *μέρος θεοῦ*, not so much the work of God, as a part of him.—And now let any one judge, whether upon Plutarch's account, there be not yet further reason to complain of this Bæotic air. Wherefore we conclude, that those old physiologists in Aristotle, who insisted so much upon that principle, that no real entity could be made or generated out of nothing, acted only as physiologists therein, and not as theologers or metaphysicians; they not opposing a Divine creation out of nothing pre-existing, but only contending, that no new entity could be made out of matter, and that in natural generations and corruptions there was no creation or annihilation of any thing.

But what the true scope and meaning of these physiologers indeed was, will more plainly appear from that use or improvement which themselves made of this philosophic principle; and this was twofold. For, first, it is certain, that upon this foundation, they all of them endeavoured to establish a peculiar kind of physiology, and some atomology or other, either a homœomery, a similar or dissimilar atomology. For Anaxagoras looking upon this maxim of the Italic philosophers, that nothing could be physically made out of nothing, or no real entity generated or corrupted, as an undoubted principle of reason; and being also not able to conceive otherwise of the forms and qualities of bodies, than that they were real entities, distinct from the substance of matter, or its modifications; concluded, that therefore in generations, corruptions, and alterations, these were not created out of nothing, and annihilated into nothing, but that every thing was naturally made, *ἐκ προϋπαρχόντων καὶ ἐνυπαρχόντων*, out of pre-existent, and in-existent things;—and consequently that there were, in all things, similar atoms and particles of every kind, though by reason of their parvitude insensible to us, and every thing seemed to be only that which was most predominant and conspicuous in it. To wit, that bone was made out of bony atoms, and flesh out of fleshy, hot things out of hot atoms, and cold things out of cold, black out of black, and white out of white, &c. and nothing out of nothing, but every thing out of pre-existing similar atoms. Thus was the sense of Anaxagoras plainly declared by Aristotle,* that because contraries

Natural. Auscultat. lib. cap. v. p. 451. tom. i. oper.

were made out of one another, they were therefore before in-existent. For since every thing must of necessity be made, either out of something, or out of nothing, and all physiologists agree, that it is impossible for any thing to be made out of nothing; it follows unavoidably, that whatsoever is generated, must be generated out of things pre-existing and in-existing, though by reason of their parvitude insensible to us; that is, out of similar or homogeneal atoms, of which there are some of all kinds in every thing; every thing being mingled in every thing. Here therefore have we the Anaxagorean homœomery, or similar atomology, built upon this principle of reason, as its foundation, that "Nothing can naturally be made or generated out of nothing."

But the Italics or Pythagorics, as well before Anaxagoras as after him (with whom also hitherto concurred Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus, those atheizers of the Italic physiology), did with much better reason from the same fundamental principle conclude, that since these forms and qualities of bodies were unquestionably generated and corrupted, they were therefore no entities really distinct from the substance of matter, or its modifications, but only different dispositions or modifications of the insensible parts thereof, causing in us different phantasms: and this was the first original of the dissimilar atomology. In matter or body therefore, as such, there was nothing else to these philosophers conceivable, but only magnitude of parts, figure, site, and motion, or rest; and these were those few elements, out of which in-existing, and variously combined together, they supposed all those

forms and qualities of bodies (commonly so called) in generations to result, without the production of any new real entity out of nothing. For as out of a few letters in the alphabet of every language, differently placed and combined, do result innumerable syllables, words, and sounds, signifying all the several things in heaven and earth; sometimes from all the very same letters, neither more nor fewer, but only transposed, are begotten very different phantasms of sounds in us, but without the production of any new real entity out of nothing: in the very same manner, from those fewer letters in the alphabet of the corporeal nature, variously combined, or from the different modifications of matter, in respect of magnitude of parts, figure, site, and motion, are made up and spelled out all those syllables of things, that are in the whole world, without the production of any new real entity. Many times the very same numerical matter, neither more nor less, only differently modified, causing very different phantasms in us, which are therefore vulgarly supposed to be forms and qualities in the things; as when the same water is successively changed and transformed into vapour, snow, hail, and ice. And to this very purpose is the forementioned similitude elegantly pursued by the Epicurean poet, in these following verses;

L. ii. p. 191. Quin etiam refert nostris in versibus ipsis,
 Lamb. Cum quibus et quali sint ordine quæque locata.
 [ver. 1012.] Namque eadem cælum, mare, terras, flumina, solem,
 Significant, eadem fruges, arbusta, animantes.
 Sic ipsæ in rebus item jam materiai
 Concursus, motus, ordo, positura, figura,
 Cum permutantur, mutari res quoque debent.

For were those supposed forms and qualities,

produced in generations and alterations, entities really distinct from the substance of matter, or its different modifications, in respect of the magnitude, figure, site, and motion of parts (there being no such things before in-existing, as Anaxagoras supposed); then would they materially proceed from nothing, which is a thing impossible. And this dissimilar atomology of the ancient Italics, so far as to these material forms and qualities, seems to be undoubtedly the only true physiology; it being built upon this sure principle of reason, that because nothing can give what it hath not, therefore no new substance of real entity can be materially produced in the generations and alterations of nature as such, but only modifications. As when an architect builds a house, or a weaver makes a piece of cloth, there is only a different modification of the pre-existent matter.

This is the first improvement which the ancient Italic philosophers made of this principle, that "Nothing can be (physically and materially) generated out of nothing;" or that "No real entity is naturally generated or corrupted;" that therefore the forms and qualities of bodies were no real entities, but only different modifications. But besides this, there was also another thing, which these philosophers principally aimed at herein, as a corollary deducible from the same principle concerning souls; that since the souls of animals, especially human, are unquestionably entities really distinct from matter, and all its modifications (no magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions, being ever able to beget cogitation or consciousness, much less a power of understanding eternal verities); that therefore these could not

be generated out of matter, nor corrupted into the same. Because forms and qualities are continually generated and corrupted, made out of nothing, and reduced to nothing again; therefore are they no entities really distinct from matter, and its different modifications: but because souls, at least human, are unquestionably entities really distinct from matter, and all its modifications; therefore can they not possibly be generated out of matter, nor corrupted into the same. For if human souls were generated out of matter, then must some real entity be materially produced of nothing, there being nothing of life and cogitation in matter; which is a thing absolutely impossible. Wherefore, these philosophers concluded concerning souls, that being not generated out of matter, they were insinuated or introduced into bodies in generations. And this was always a great controversy betwixt Theists and Atheists concerning the human soul, as Lucretius expresseth it;*

Nata sit, an contra nascentibus insinuetur,

Whether it were made or generated out of matter (that is, indeed, out of nothing), or else were *θύραθεν*, from without,—insinuated into bodies in generations? Which latter opinion of theirs supposes souls as well to have existed before the generations of all animals, as to exist after their deaths and corruptions; there being properly nothing of them generated, but only their union with those particular bodies. So that the generations, and corruptions, or deaths of animals, according to this hypothesis, are nothing but an anagrammatical transposition of things in the universe, pre

and post-existent souls being sometimes united to one body, and sometimes to another. But it doth not therefore follow, because these ancient philosophers held souls to be thus ingenerable, and to have pre-existed before the generation of animals, that therefore they supposed all souls to have existed of themselves from eternity unmade: this being a thing which was never asserted any more by Theist than Atheist; since even those philosophic Theists, who maintained *æternitatem animorum*, the eternity of human minds and souls,—together with the worlds, did notwithstanding assert their essential dependence upon the Deity, like that of the lights upon the sun; as if they were a kind of eternal effulgency, emanation, or irradiation, from an eternal sun. Even Proclus himself, that great champion for the eternity of the world and souls in this very case, when he writes against Plutarch's self-existent evil soul, expressly declaring, that *πᾶσα ψυχὴ γένημά ἐστι τοῦ θεοῦ*, there is no self-existent soul; but every soul whatsoever is the work, effect, and production, of God.—Wherefore, when they affirmed souls to be ingenerable, their meaning was no more than this, that they were not mere accidental things, as forms and qualities are, nor any more generated out of matter, than matter itself is generated out of something else; upon which account, as Aristotle informs us, souls were called also by them, *ἀρχαί*, principles,—as well as matter, they being both of them substances in the universe alike original; that is, neither of them made out of the other. But they did not suppose them to be ἀγε-

* Comment. in Timæum Platon. lib. ii. p. 116.

† Vide lib. i. de Anima. cap. ii. p. 5. tom. ii. oper.

ἄχροις, ingenerate or unmade—in the other sense, as if they had been self-originated, and independent, as Plutarch's second and third principles, his evil soul, and matter, were by him imagined to be; but so doubtless, as that if the world had had any beginning, they should then have been all created together with it out of nothing pre-existing. But as for the perpetual creation of new souls, in the successive generations of animals, this indeed is a thing which these philosophers were extremely abhorrent from, as thinking it incongruous, that souls, which are in order of nature senior to bodies, should be in order of time juniors to them; as also not reasonable, that Divine creation (as it were prostituted) should without end perpetually attend and wait upon natural generations, and be intermingled with them.

But as for this pre-existence of souls, we have already declared our own sense concerning it, in the first chapter. Though we cannot deny, but that, besides Origen,^a several others of the ancient fathers before the fifth council, seem either to have espoused it, or at least to have had a favour and kindness for it; insomuch that St. Augustine^b himself is sometimes staggering in this point, and thinks it to be a great secret, whether men's souls existed before their generations or no; and somewhere concludes it to be a matter of indifferency, wherein every one may have his liberty of opening either way without offence. Wherefore, all that can be certainly affirmed in this case is, that human souls could not possibly

^a Vide Petr. Dan. Huetium in Origenianis, lib. ii. Quest. vi. §. 4. p. 93. et §. 10. p. 97.

^b Vide Hep. Noris. Vindic. Augustian. cap. iv. p. 101.

be generated out of matter, but were some time or other created by God Almighty out of nothing pre-existing, either in generations or before them. Lastly, as for brute animals, we must confess, that if they be not mere machines or *automata*, as some seem inclinable to believe, but conscious and thinking beings; then from the same principle of reason it will likewise follow, that their souls cannot be generated out of matter neither, and therefore must be derived from the fountain of all life, and created out of nothing by him; who since he can as easily annihilate as create, and does all for the best, no man need at all to trouble himself about their permanency or immortality.

And now have we given a full and particular account of all the several senses wherein this axiom must be acknowledged to be undeniably true, that "Nothing can possibly be made out of nothing," or "come from nothing;" namely, these three. First, that "Nothing, which was not, could ever bring itself into being, or efficiently produce itself;" or, that "Nothing can possibly be made without an efficient cause." Secondly, that "Nothing, which was not, could be produced, or brought into being, by any other efficient cause, than such as hath at least equal perfection in it, and a sufficient active or productive power." For if any thing were made by that, which hath not equal perfection, then must so much of the effect, as transcendeth the cause, be indeed made without a cause (since nothing can give what it hath not), or be caused by itself, or by nothing. Again, to suppose a thing to be produced by that which hath no sufficient productive power, is really to suppose it also to be produced from itself with-

out a cause, or from nothing. Where it is acknowledged by us, that no natural, imperfect created being can create, or emanatively produce a new substance, which was not before, and give it its whole being. Hitherto is the axiom verified in respect of the efficient cause. But in the third place, it is also true in respect of the material likewise. Not that "nothing could possibly be ever made" by any power whatsoever, but only out of pre-existent matter; and consequently, that matter itself could be never made, but was self-existent. For the falsity of this is sufficiently evident from what hath been already declared concerning human souls, their being undoubtedly substances incorporeal, which therefore could never be generated out of matter; and it will be further manifested afterwards. But the third and last sense is this; that "Nothing, which is materially made out of things pre-existing (as some are), can have any other real entity," than what was either before contained in or resulteth from the things themselves so modified. Or, that there can be no new entities or substances naturally generated out of matter; and therefore that all natural generations are really nothing else but mixtures, or new modifications of things pre-existing.

These, I say, are all the senses wherein it is impossible, that any thing should be made out of nothing, or come from nothing; and they may be all reduced to this one general sense, that "Nothing can be made out of nothing causally;" or, that "Nothing cannot cause any thing, either efficiently or materially." Which as it is undeniably true, so is it so far from making any thing against a Divine creation, or the exist-

ence of a God, that the same may be demonstratively proved, and evinced from it, as shall be shewed afterward.

But there is another sense, wherein things may be said to be made ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, or out of nothing, —when those words are not taken causally, but only so as to signify the *terminus a quo*, or term from which—they are made, to wit, an antecedent nonexistence. And then the meaning of this proposition, that “Nothing can possibly be made out of nothing,” will be this; that *nothing, which once was not*, could by any power whatsoever be afterwards brought into being. And this is the sense insisted on in this second atheistic argumentation, framed according to the principles of the Democritic or Epicurean Atheism; that no real entity, which once was not, could by any power whatsoever be made, or brought out of nonexistence into being; and consequently, that no creative power out of nothing can possibly belong to any thing, though supposed never so perfect.

In answer whereunto, we shall perform these two things; first, we shall make it appear, that “Nothing out of nothing,” taken in this sense declared, is so far from being a common notion, that it is not at all true. And secondly, we shall prove, that if it were true, yet would it of the two make more against Atheism, than it does against Theism, and therefore ought by no means to be used by Atheists, as an argument against a Deity. First, therefore, it is unquestionably certain, that this cannot be universally true, that nothing, which once was not, could possibly be made or brought out of nonexistence into being; because

if it were true, then could there be no such thing as making or causing at all; no action nor motion, and consequently no generation nor mutation in the corporeal universe, but the whole world would belike a stiff immoveable adamantine rock; and this would doubtless be a better argument against motion than any of Zeno's was. But we have all experience within ourselves of a power of producing new cogitations in our own minds, new intellectual and moral habits, as also new local motion in our bodies, or at least new determinations thereof, and of causing thereby new modifications in bodies without us. And therefore are the Atheists forced to restrain the sense of this proposition to substantial things only, that though there may be new accidents and modifications produced out of nothing, yet there can be no new substances made; however they be not able in the mean time to give any reason, why one of those should be in itself more impossible than the other, or why no substance should be makeable. But that some are so staggered with the seeming plausibility of this argument, is chiefly upon these following accounts. First, by reason of the confusion of their own conceptions; for, because it is certain, that "nothing can possibly be made out of nothing," in one sense, to wit, causally; they not distinguishing senses, nor being aware of the equivocation, that is, in this *ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων*, out of nothing,—inadvertently give their assent to those words in a wrong sense; that no substance (as matter) could possibly be brought out of non-existence into being. Secondly, by reason of their unskilful arguing from artificial things; when, because nothing can be artificially made but out

of pre-existing matter, as a house or garment, and the like (there being nothing done in the production of these things, but only a new modification of what before substantially was), they over hastily conclude, that no power whatsoever could produce any thing otherwise than out of pre-existing matter, and that matter itself therefore could not possibly be made. In which conceit they are again further confirmed from hence, because the old physiologers maintained the same thing concerning natural generations likewise, that nothing was in them produced ἐκ οὐκ ὅτιον, out of nothing—neither: or that there was no new substance or entity made in them really distinct from the pre-existing matter and its modifications; they unwarily extending this beyond the bounds of physics into metaphysics, and unduly measuring, or limiting infinite power accordingly. Lastly, because it is undeniably certain concerning ourselves, and all imperfect created beings, that none of these can create any new substance which was not before; men are therefore apt to measure all things by their own scantling, and to suppose it universally impossible, according to human reason, for any power whatsoever thus to create; whence it follows, that theology must in this be acknowledged to be contradictory to the principles of natural light and understanding. But since it is certain, that imperfect created beings can themselves produce some things out of nothing pre-existing, as new cogitations, and new local motion, new modifications and transformations of things corporeal; it is very reasonable to think, that an absolutely-perfect being could do something more, that is, create new substances out of nothing, or

give them their whole being. And it may well be thought to be as easy for God, or an omnipotent being, to make a whole world, matter and all, *ἐκ οὐκ ὄντος*, out of nothing—as it is for us to create a thought, or to move a finger, or for the sun to send out rays, or a candle light; or lastly, for any opaque body to produce the image of itself in glasses or water, or to project a shadow; all these imperfect things being but the energies, rays, images, or shadows, of the Deity. For a substance, which once was not, to be made by God, or a being infinitely perfect, this is not for it to be made out of nothing, in the impossible sense, it coming from him who is all. Nor can it be said to be impossible, for any thing whatsoever to be made by that, which hath not only infinitely greater perfection, but also a sufficient active power to produce the same, it being substantially emanative. It is true, indeed, that infinite power itself cannot do things in their own nature impossible; and this is therefore the only thing which the Atheists have to prove, that it is in itself absolutely impossible, for a substance (though not for an accident or modification) to be produced out of nonexistence into being. Whereas nothing is in itself absolutely impossible but what implies a contradiction; and though it be contradictory for a thing to be, and not be, at the same time; yet is there no manner of contradiction at all in this, for any imperfect contingent being, which before was not, afterwards to be. Wherefore, this being in itself no way impossible, it must be acknowledged to be a due object of infinite power, or that which may be done by a perfect omnipotent being existing.

If nothing could be made *ex nihilo*, out of nothing,—in this latter sense, that is, *nothing which before was not*, afterwards brought into being; then must the reason hereof be, because no substance or real entity can be caused by any other substance, so as to receive and derive its whole being from it: and consequently whatsoever substance or real entity is in the whole world, was not only from eternity without beginning, but also existed of itself necessarily and independently upon any thing else. But, first, it hath been already declared, that it is repugnant to the human faculties, that any temporary successive being whatsoever, or that time itself, should be eternal without beginning because upon that hypothesis there would always have been an infinity of time past; and if so, then See Eschir. Met. c. 2. would there of necessity have been time past, which was never present. But, to make every substantial thing, not only to have existed from eternity without beginning (which hath yet been done by some mistaken Theists), but also to have existed independently upon any thing else as its cause, or original, and therefore of itself necessarily; this, I say, is itself to make “something to come from nothing in the impossible sense,” to wit, causally. For as when some Atheists affirm, that “Nothing could ever move itself,” and yet suppose notwithstanding, that there hath been motion from all eternity, they plainly make this motion (however supposed to be eternal) to come from nothing in the impossible sense: so, in like manner, they, who suppose things to have existed of themselves necessarily, which have no self-existence, and necessary existence contained in their

nature (as nothing but a perfect being hath), do make this necessary existence of such things to have come from nothing. Wherefore though it be certain, that something did exist of itself necessarily from all eternity, namely, a perfect being (whose necessary existence is therefore not from nothing, because essentially included in its own nature), yet is it certain, likewise, that there can be but one such thing; necessity of existence being natural and essential to no more. But as for all other things, which are in their own nature contingently possible to be or not to be, reason pronounces of them, that they could not exist of themselves necessarily, but were caused by something else; and derived their original from that one absolutely-perfect, and necessarily-existent being. So that Plato's* distinction must needs be here allowed of betwixt two kinds of beings, τὸ μὲν αἰὲν ὄν, γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον, that which always is, and was never made, nor had beginning;—and τὸ γινώμενον μὲν, ὃν δὲ οὐδέποτε, that which was made, or had beginning, but never truly is;—it having not a permanent, but successive or flowing duration. Accordingly whereunto, Aristotle also affirmeth, That there is no necessity all things should be unmade or self-originated; but some things might be made from others unmade.

Lastly, We shall disprove the truth of this assertion, that whatsoever substantially and really is, did exist of itself from all eternity unmade, after this manner. Because it would follow from thence, that not only matter, and unqualified atoms (as the Democritic Atheists suppose), but

* Vide Phædon, p. 384, 385. et de Repub. lib. vi. p. 479.

† Vide lib. ii. de Coelo. cap. ii. p. 674. tom. i. oper.

also souls, especially human, must needs have existed of themselves too, from eternity unmade. For as no man can be so sottish, as to conceive himself, or that which thinketh in him, his own soul or mind, and personality to be no real entity, whilst every clod of earth is such; so is it certain, that mind can never be generated out of dead and senseless matter or body, nor result, as a modification thereof, out of magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions, and therefore must needs be a thing really distinct from it, or substance incorporeal; the Democritic Atheists being here grossly deceived in thinking, that because forms and qualities of bodies may be resolved into these forementioned elements of matter, and consequently concluded to be no entities really distinct from the substance thereof, but only different modifications of the same, that therefore the like may be said of souls too, the rational not excepted. Wherefore, if no substance or real entity could ever be brought out of nonexistence into being, or be caused by any thing else, then must all human souls and personalities, as well as matter and atoms, have existed not only from eternity, without beginning, but also of themselves independently upon any other thing. But the Atheists are so abhorrent from this eternity of human souls, that they will by no means admit of their post-existence or immortality; they apprehending that if any living understanding being should prove immortal, they could not sufficiently secure themselves against the possibility and danger of a God. Some Theists, indeed, have asserted *æternitatem animorum*, not only the pre-existence, but also the eternity of all human minds,

together with the world, as Cicero more than once doth; who also, in his book of Divination,* thus further declares himself concerning it: "*Animus, quia vixit ab omni æternitate, versatusque est cum innumerabilibus animis, omnia, quæ in natura rerum sunt, videt.*" Our mind, because it hath existed from all eternity, and conversed with innumerable minds, seeth all things that are in nature:—and again, "*Cum animi hominum semper fuerint futuri sint.*" Since the minds of men ever were, and ever will be.—Nevertheless none of these ever maintained, that human minds, and their distinct personalities, were thus all, of themselves, independently upon any thing as their cause or original. And, as it was before demonstrated from the nature of knowledge and understanding (it comprehending the possibilities of all things, and therefore supposing infinite power), that there can be but one mind, or understanding being, self-existent, all minds partaking of that one mind; so is it hardly possible for any one in good earnest to entertain such a conceit as this, that his own particular soul, mind, and personality, and consequently all human souls, though subject to such laws of fate as now they are, did not only pre-exist before their respective bodies, and were from eternity without beginning, but also existed of themselves necessarily and independently upon any thing else. Wherefore, if human souls, minds, and personalities, being unquestionably substantial things and really distinct from matter (which therefore could not possibly be generated out of it), did not all exist from eternity of themselves, necessarily and independently, it is certain, that

* Lib. i. cap. li. p. 3174. tom. ix. oper.

they must derive their whole being from the Deity, or be created ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, out of nothing,—or nonexistence by it. And if human souls were unquestionably thus created, it cannot reasonably be doubted, but that matter or body itself was created likewise out of nothing, or caused by the Deity: forasmuch as that, which created one thing out of nothing, could create every thing; and there is really more of substance, that is, a higher degree of entity, in minds and souls, conscious self-moving and understanding beings, than in senseless matter, or unactive bulk.

But forasmuch as this doctrine of a Divine creation out of nothing pre-existing lies under no small prejudice upon this account, because it is so generally taken for granted, that none of the Pagan Theists, who are supposed to have kept close to the simple light of nature, did ever acknowledge in the Deity any such creative power out of nothing, or that God was the cause of any substance; we must of necessity here declare this, how common soever it be, to be a great mistake. For besides that Plato, in his *Sophist*,* having defined the efficient or effective power in general after this manner, ποιητικὴν πᾶσαν ἔφαμεν εἶναι δύναμιν, ἥτις ἀν αἰρία γίγνηται τοῖς μὴ πρότερον οὖσιν ὕστερον γίγνεσθαι, to be a power or casuality, whereby that, which was not before, was afterwards made to be;—and then dividing this efficiency into Divine and human, he immediately subjoins concerning the former, Ζῶα δὲ πάντα, &c. μὴν ἄλλου τινὸς ἢ θεοῦ δημιουργοῦντος φήσομεν ὕστερον γίγνεσθαι, πρότερον οὐκ ὄντα; Shall we not then say, that all animals, and other things, were by the Divine efficiency alone, after they had not

* Pag. 168. oper. edit. Ficini.

been made to be?—Where thus much at least is certain, that Plato did not at all question the possibility of a thing's being made out of nothing in this sense; that is, brought into being, after it had not been, by a Divine power. But because it may be thought that he meant this no further than of the first compages of animals, in which notwithstanding every thing, souls, and all, might be made out of pre-existing matter; we shall here further add, what in his *Timæus** he declareth concerning the soul, τὴν ψυχὴν οὐχ ὡς νῦν ὑστέραν ἐπιχειροῦμεν λέγειν, οὕτως ἐμνησανήσατο καὶ ὁ θεὸς νωτέραν, οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀρξασθαι πρεσβύτερον ὑπὸ νωτέρου εἶσιν, ὁ δὲ καὶ γενέσκει καὶ ἀρετῇ προτέραν καὶ πρεσβυτέραν ψυχὴν σώματος, ὡς δεσποτὶν καὶ ἀρξουσιν ἀρξομένου συνιστήσατο· that God did not make it after body, and junior to it; since it was not fit that the elder should be ruled or governed by the younger; but he made soul before body, older than it, and superior to it, as well in respect of time as dignity.—Which notion is further pursued by him in his tenth de *Legibus*:^b Ὁρθῶς ἄρα καὶ κυρίως ἀληθέστατά τε καὶ τελειώτατα εἰρηκότες ἂν ἤμεν, ψυχὴν μὲν προτέραν γεγονέναι σώματος ἡμῖν· σῶμα δὲ δεύτερόν τε καὶ ὑστέρον ψυχῆς ἀρχούσης ἀρχόμενον κατὰ φύσιν. Wherefore it was rightly, properly, and most truly affirmed by us, that soul was made first, as that which ruleth; but body afterward, as that which is to be ruled and governed thereby.—From whence also he draws this consecretary, ὡς εἰ ἡ ψυχὴ φανείη πρεσβύτερα σώματος οὖσα, καὶ τὰ ψυχῆς τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἔσοιτο πρεσβύτερα· τρόποι καὶ ἥθη καὶ βουλήσεις καὶ λογισμοὶ καὶ δόξαι ἀληθεῖς, ἐπιμέλειαί τε καὶ μνήμαι, πρότερα μῆκους σωμάτων καὶ πλάτους καὶ βάθους, εἴη γεγονότα ἂν, εἴπερ καὶ ψυχὴ σώματος· that if the soul be older than

* Pag. 528. οπερ.

^b Pag. 669.

the body, then must the things of the soul also be older than those of the body; and therefore cogitation, and the several species of it, must be, in order of nature, not only before local motion, but also before longitude, latitude, and profundity of bodies.—From whence it is plain, that Plato's first *γένεσις*, or production of souls by God, could not be out of any pre-existing body or matter, they being affirmed by him to be before, not only this and that particular body, but all body whatsoever, before longitude, latitude, and profundity. Which may be further confirmed from hence, because in his *Sophist** he plainly condemns that opinion of some, *τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτὴν σῶμά τι κεκτῆσθαι*, that the soul itself had something of body in it;—and he often elsewhere declares the soul to be incorporeal. It is certain also, that not only Plato, but all those other Pagan philosophers too, who asserted the incorporeity and immortality of human souls, could not possibly conceive souls to have been made out of pre-existent matter, but either *ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων*, out of nothing,—they being not eternal, but having a newness of being (as Plato himself seemed to suppose); or else, if they were conceived to be eternal by them (which was the opinion of most of the junior Platonists, yet), to have derived their whole substance from the Deity, and always to depend upon it; as eternal light would depend upon an eternal sun. Plutarch and his followers being only here to be excepted, who would neither have souls made out of nothing by God, nor yet out of corporeal matter pre-existing (they being themselves incorporeal); but out of a strange commixture of the substance of God him-

* Pag. 170.

self with the substance of a certain disorderly soul, self-existent and uncreated; of which we have spoken already. But that the genuine Platonists did universally suppose, that one substance might be caused by another, and derive its whole being from it, is undeniably evident from hence, because their second Divine hypostasis or substance (though eternal) was according to them derived from, or begotten by, their first, and their third hypostasis or substance produced both from the first and second; and other inferior orbs of being, as the particular souls of demons and men, from that whole trinity of Divine hypostases jointly concurring. And as for matter or body itself, it is certain also, that Proclus and other Platonists expressly denied it to have been *ἀγέννητον*, unmade or self-existent,—and conceived it to have derived its whole being from the Deity; who accordingly is styled by Proclus,^a *ἄρρητος αἴτια τῆς ὕλης*, the ineffable Cause of matter.—In like manner have we already shewed, that, according to the Chaldee oracles, matter itself was also caused or produced by the Deity, to which purpose is this verse cited by Proclus,^b *Ἐνθεν ἄδην θρώσκα γένισαι πολυποικίλου ὕλης*. From whence (that is, from the Deity) abundantly springs forth the generation of the multiform matter.—The metre here requiring, that it should be read *ἄδην*, and not *ἄροδην*, as it is in Proclus's copy. Moreover, Jamblichus hath recorded in his Mysteries,^c that Hermes, and the old Egyptian theologers likewise, held matter not to be *ἀγέννητον*, that is, self-existent,

^a Comment. in Timæum Platon. lib. ii. p. 116. ^b Ibid. p. 118.

^c De Mysteriorum Ægyptiorum. sect. v. cap. xxiii. p. 138. sect. viii. cap. iii. p. 160.

unmade, or undervived—from the Deity, Thus Hierocles in Photius: *ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ἀντιλαμβανόμενος τὴν οὐσίαν* but to have been caused by it. Whence does Proclus^a conclude it probable, that Plato was of the same persuasion also; as likewise Orpheus before had been, he deriving this, as is supposed, with other things, from the Egyptians. It is true, indeed, that many of these philosophers asserted matter, souls, and the whole world, to have been eternal without beginning, and consequently not created *ἐκ οὐκ ὄντων*, in that stricter sense, that is, out of an antecedent nonexistence in time. Notwithstanding which, they did suppose them to have received their whole being from the Deity, and to have depended on it every jot as much, as if, having once not been, they had afterward been made by it. And that, which gives to any substance its whole being, though from eternity, so that it never was not; the same upon supposition, that it once had not been, could unquestionably have produced it, *ἐκ οὐκ ὄντων*, out of nothing,—or an antecedent nonexistence.

We have now sufficiently disproved the truth of that assertion, that " Nothing could be made out of nothing," in the atheistic sense thereof; viz. that " Nothing, which before was not, could afterwards possibly be made to be:" though this should not be extended so far, as to accidental things, and modifications, but restrained and confined only to substantials; " That no substance whatsoever could have a newness of being, or be caused by any other substance:" but whatsoever substantial thing any where is in the world, the same did exist of

^c Comment in *Timaeum* Platon. lib. ii.

itself from eternity, and independently upon any thing else; nothing but different modifications being made or produced. Which same assertion has been also sometimes otherwise thus expressed; "Nothing can be made but out of pre-existing substance:" the meaning hereof being this, that nothing can be made, but new accidental modifications of what before substantially was; no substance itself being makeable or producible by any other substance, neither in time (so as to have a newness or beginning of being), nor yet from eternity. Where the Atheists and some others taking it for granted, that there is no other substance besides body, or matter, do further limit and restrain the sense of that proposition in this manner; "Nothing can be made but out of pre-existing matter;" that is, nothing can be made but out of corporeal substance pre-existing. An *idolum specus* (if I may use that language) which in all probability had its first original chiefly from men's measuring the extent of all power by their own production of artificial things. Because, forsooth, a carpenter or architect cannot make a house, but out of pre-existing timber, bricks, and stones; nor a tailor a garment, but out of pre-existing cloth; nor a cook, puddings or pies, but out of pre-existing materials or ingredients; that therefore no power whatsoever, no, not that of God Almighty, can extend any further, than to the new-modifying of pre-existent matter, but not to the production or causing of any substance. We shall in the next place make it appear, that were this assertion true, That no substance or real entity, which once was not, could be caused or produced, yet would it notwithstanding, of the two, more impugn Atheism

than Theism (it being possible for falsehoods, though not for truths, to disagree), forasmuch as the Atheists do bring more out of nothing, or non-existence, than the Theists do; and therefore ought not to make this an objection against Theism. For though, according to the true and genuine theology, God, or a perfect being, be supposed to be the only necessary self-existent thing, and the cause of all other substance, and consequently to have produced all imperfect things, not only souls, but also matter itself, ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, out of nothing,—or an antecedent nonexistence; yet is there, by reason of the weakness of human understandings, a latitude in Theism. Wherefore some there are, who though imposed upon by that *idolum specus*, or imprisoned in it, that “nothing can possibly be made, but out of pre-existing matter,” by the new modification thereof; do notwithstanding devoutly worship a Deity, according to their notion of it, a perfectly understanding being unmade; though not the creator of matter, yet the maker of the whole world out of it, and the supreme governor of the same; they thus supposing two principles in the universe, an active and a passive one, God and matter. Besides which, it is not impossible for others to think, that though matter or body be not the only substance, but human souls are incorporeal, yet the substance of these souls was not created out of nothing, no more than that of body, but they were made either out of some pre-existing common soul (as their intelligible matter), or out of the substance of the Deity itself; or else existed of themselves from eternity unmade: and yet nevertheless may these acknowledge one supreme understanding being

self-existent also, though neither the creator of matter, nor of souls, yet the supreme governor and orderer of all. And it is certain, that Plutarch's god was no better than this; and yet was that Pagan, notwithstanding, a devout religionist in his kind, as well as a hearty moralist. And such a Theism or theology, as either of those forementioned (though not genuine and sincere, but imperfect and mongrel things), would perhaps be to the Atheists little less troublesome and uneasy than the truth. Thus have we shewed, that this principle, "That nothing can come out of nothing," or be made, otherwise than out of pre-existing substance or matter, though it be indeed contradictory to the true and genuine theology, yet it is not absolutely inconsistent with all manner of religion; there being certain spurious or imperfect forms of Theism built upon this foundation. But now, on the contrary, we shall make it manifest, that this very principle, made use of by the Atheists, is in truth and reality contradictory to all manner of Atheism, and destructive of the same; the Atheists universally generating and corrupting real entities, and substantial things, that is, producing them out of nothing, or nonexistence, and reducing them to nothing again: forasmuch as they make all things whatsoever, the bare substance of matter only excepted (which to them is either no determinate thing, or else nothing but mere bulk, or resisting and divisible magnitude), to come out of nothing, and to go to nothing. Thus does Aristotle,* in a place before cited, declare the atheistic sense: *Εἰσὶ γὰρ τινες, οἳ φασὶν οὐδὲν ἐγένεσθαι εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων, ἀλλὰ πάντα γίνεσθαι*. There are

* De Caelo, lib. iii. cap. i. p. 288. tom. i. oper.

certain men, who affirm, that nothing is unmade, but all things generated or made.—Whose sense is afterwards more distinctly thus proposed by him, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα γίνεσθαι τε καὶ ρεῖν, εἶναι δὲ παγίως οὐδέν· ἐν δὲ τι μόνον ὑπομένειν, ἐξ οὗ ταῦτα πάντα μετασχηματίζεσθαι πέφυκεν· that all other things are generated and flow, and none of them firmly is (they being perpetually educed out of nothing, and reduced to nothing), but that there is only one thing which remaineth; namely that, out of which all the other are made, by the transformation thereof.—Which one thing (to wit, matter) as the same Aristotle further adds, they affirmed to be the only substance, and from eternity unmade; but all other things whatsoever, being but πάθη καὶ ἔξεις καὶ διαθέσεις, passions, affections, and dispositions thereof, γίνεσθαι καὶ φθείρεσθαι ἀπειράκις, to be generated and corrupted infinitely;—that is, to be produced out of nothing, or nonexistence, and reduced again to nothing without end. And doubtless, this is the true meaning of that passage in Plato's tenth de Legibus,* not understood by the Latin interpreters; where, being to represent the atheistic hypothesis of the system of the universe, he discovereth their grand arcanum, and that, which they accounted, σοφώτατον ἀπάντων λόγων, the wisest and most mysterious of all doctrines,—after this manner; λέγουσί ποῦ τινες ὡς πάντα ἐστὶ τὰ πράγματα γιγνόμενα καὶ γινόμενα, καὶ γενησόμενα· τὰ μὲν φύσει, τὰ δὲ τέχνῃ, τὰ δὲ διὰ τύχης. Certain men affirm, that all things are made, and have been made, and will be made; some by nature, and some by art, and some by fortune or chance.—For unquestionably here, Plato's λέγουσί ποῦ τινες ὡς πάντα ἐστὶ τὰ πράγματα

* Pag. 666. oper.

γιγνόμενα, certain men affirm, that all things are generated or made, &c.—is the very same with Aristotle's *εἰς γὰρ τινες, οἱ φασιν, οὐδὲν ἀγέννητον εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων, ἀλλὰ πάντα γίνεσθαι*, certain men affirm, that there is nothing unmade, but that all things are made or generated.—And perhaps this of Aristotle's was taken out of that of Plato's: which yet nevertheless is so to be understood as it is afterwards explained by Aristotle; all things whatsoever, the bare substance of matter only excepted. Wherefore it is certain, that either there is no real entity in the whole world, besides the bare substance of matter; that is, besides divisible and separable extension, or resisting magnitude; and consequently that life and cogitation, sense and consciousness, reason and understanding, all our own minds, and personalities, are no real entities; or else, that there are, according to the atheistic hypothesis, real entities produced out of nothing, and reduced to nothing again. Whereas Theists suppose all the greatest perfections in the universe, as life and understanding, to have been eternal and unmade in a perfect being, the Deity, and neither brought out of nothing or nonexistence; nor reducible to nothing; only imperfect beings to have been made out of nothing, or produced out of nonexistence, by this one perfect being or Deity: the Atheists, on the contrary, supposing the lowest and most imperfect of all beings, matter, bulk, or divisible and resisting extension, to be the only self-existent and unmade thing, conclude all the greatest perfections in the universe, life, cogitation, and understanding, to be made out of nothing or nonexistence, as also to be reduced to nothing again. Indeed the hylozoic Atheists,

being sensible somewhat of this inconvenience of making all life and understanding out of nothing, and that there must of necessity be some fundamental life and perception, which is not accidental but substantial, and which was never generated, and cannot be corrupted, have therefore attributed a kind of life and perception to all matter, as such. Notwithstanding which, even these also, forasmuch as they deny to matter animal sense, and consciousness, suppose all animal life or sense, and conscious understanding, to be generated and corrupted, produced out of nothing, and reduced to nothing again. Neither can life, cogitation, and understanding, be reckoned amongst the modes of matter, that is, of magnitude, or divisible and antitypous extension, since they may be conceived without the same: whereas modes cannot be conceived without their substance. Standing, sitting, and walking, cannot be conceived without a body, and that fitly organized too; and therefore are they nothing but different modes of such a body. When that human body, which before did stand, doth afterwards sit, or walk, no man can think, that here is the miraculous production of any new real entity out of nothing; nor when the same matter, which was square or cubical, is made spherical or cylindrical. But when there is life and understanding, which was not before, then is there unquestionably a new real entity produced. But the Democritic and Epicurean Atheists themselves, according to the tenor of the atomic physiology, acknowledge no other modes of matter or body, but only more or less magnitude of parts, figure, site, motion, or rest. And upon this very account do they explode qualities, considered as

entities really distinct from these modes ; because in the generation and alteration of them, there would be real entities made out of nothing, or without a cause : whereupon they resolve these qualities into mechanism and fancy. But life, cogitation, and understanding, are things which have more real entity in them, and can no way be solved by mechanism and fancy ; wherefore undoubtedly they are no modes of matter or body, but attributes of another kind of substance incorporeal. All cogitative beings, especially human souls, and personalities, are unquestionably substantial things ; and yet do the Atheists bring these, and consequently themselves, out of nothing or nonexistence, and reduce them to nothing again. The conclusion is ; that these very Atheists, who contend against Theists, that " Nothing can be made out of nothing," do themselves bring all things out of nothing or nonexistence, and perpetually reduce them to nothing again ; according to whose principles, as once there was no life nor understanding at all in the universe, so may there be none again. They who deny a God, because there can be no creative power belonging to any thing, do themselves notwithstanding attribute to matter (though a mere passive, sluggish, and unactive thing) a creative power of things substantial (as human souls and personalities) out of nothing. And thus is that formidable argument of the Atheists, that there can be no God, because nothing can be made out of nothing, not only proved to be false, but also retorted upon these Atheists themselves, they bringing all things besides senseless and unqualified matter out of nothing.

We have now declared, first, in what sense this

proposition is unquestionably true, that nothing can be made out of nothing, or come from nothing; viz. causally, that nothing which before was not, could afterward be made without a cause, and a sufficient cause. Or more particularly these three ways; first, that nothing which before was not, could afterward be brought into being by itself, or without an efficient cause. Secondly, that nothing which once was not, could be made or produced efficiently by any thing, which had not at least equal perfection in it, and a sufficient active or productive power; and consequently that no new substance can be made, but by a perfect being, which only is substantially emanative. Thirdly and lastly, that when things are made out of pre-existing matter, as in artificial productions, and natural generations, there can be no new real entity produced, but only different modifications of what before substantially was; the material cause, as such, efficiently producing nothing. And thus was this axiom understood by Cicero, that "Nothing could be made out of nothing," viz. causally, in his book *de Fato*,* where he reprehendeth Epicurus for endeavouring to avoid fate, and to establish liberty of will by that absurd figment of atoms declining uncertainly from the perpendicular. "*Nec cum hæc ita sint, est causa, cur Epicurus fatum extimescat, et ab atomis petat præsidium, easque de via deducat; et uno tempore suscipiat res duas inenodabiles, unam, ut sine causa fiat aliquid, ex quo existet, ut de nihilo quippiam fiat; quod nec ipsi, nec cuiquam physico placet.*" Nor is there for all that any reason, why Epicurus should be so much afraid of fate, and

* Cap. ix. p. 3273. tom. ix. oper.

seek refuge in atoms, he supposing them, in their infinite descents, to decline uncertainly from the perpendicular, and laying this as a foundation for liberty of will; whereby he plunged himself at once into two inextricable difficulties, the first whereof was the supposing of something to be made without a cause, or, which is all one, out of nothing; a thing that will neither be allowed by any physiologer, nor could Epicurus himself be pleased or satisfied therewith.—The reason whereof is, because it was a fundamental principle of the atomic philosophy, that “Nothing (in this sense) could be made out of nothing.” Moreover, we have in the next place declared, in what other sense this proposition, that “Nothing can be made out of nothing,” is false, namely, when this out of nothing is not taken causally, but so as to signify the *terminus* from which; that nothing can be made out of an antecedent nonexistence: that no real entity or substance which before was not, could by any power whatsoever be afterwards brought into being: or, that nothing can possibly be made, but out of something pre-existing, by the new modification thereof. And it appears from that of Cicero, that the true and genuine sense of this proposition, “*De nihilo nihil fit*” (according to the mind of those ancient physiologers, who laid so great stress thereupon), was not, that nothing could by any power whatsoever be brought out of nonexistence into being; but only, that “nothing could be made without a cause.” Nor did they here by *cause* mean the material only, in this sense, as if nothing could possibly be made but out of pre-existing matter; Epicurus being taxed by Cicero, for introducing that his third motion

of atoms, or *clinamen principiorum*,* out of nothing, or without an efficient cause; as indeed all motion also was, to those atomic Atheists in this sense, from nothing. Nevertheless, we have also shewed, that if this proposition, "Nothing out of nothing," in that atheistic sense (as levelled against a Deity), were true; yet would it of the two more impugn Atheism itself, than it does Theism; the Atheists generating and corrupting all things, the substance of matter only excepted, all life, sense, and understanding, human souls, minds and personalities, they producing these, and consequently themselves, out of nothing, and resolving them all to nothing again. We shall now in the third and last place, make it manifest, that the Atheists do not only bring real entities and substantial things out of nothing in the second sense, that is, out of an antecedent nonexistence (which yet is a thing possible only to God, or a perfect being), but also that they bring them out of nothing in the absolutely impossible sense; that is, suppose them to be made without a cause, or "nothing to be the cause of something."

But we must prepare the way hereunto, by setting down, first, a brief and compendious sum of the whole atheistic hypothesis. The Atheists therefore, who contend, that nothing can be made, but only new accidents, or modifications of pre-existing substance; taking it for granted, that there is no other substance besides body or matter, do conclude accordingly that nothing can be made, but out of pre-existing matter or body. And then they add hereunto, that matter being the only substance, the only unmade self-existent

* Vide Lucret. lib. ii. ver. 282.

thing, whatsoever else is in the world, besides the bare substance of this matter, was made out of it, or produced by it. So that there are these three things contained in the atheistic hypothesis; first, that no substance can be made or caused by any thing else, but only new modifications. Secondly, that matter or body is the only substance; and therefore whatsoever is made, is made out of pre-existing matter. Thirdly, and lastly, that whatsoever there is else in the whole world besides the substance of matter, it is made or generated out of matter. And now we shall demonstrate the absolute impossibility of this atheistic hypothesis, from that very principle of the ancient physiologers, that "Nothing can be made out of nothing," in the true sense thereof; it not only bringing real entities, and substantial things, out of an antecedent nonexistence (though nothing but an infinitely-perfect being neither can thus create), but also producing them without a cause.

First, therefore, when they affirm matter to be the only substance, and all things else whatsoever to be made out of that alone, they hereby plainly suppose all things to be made without an efficient cause, which is to bring them out of nothing, in an impossible sense. For though it be not true, that nothing can be made, but out of pre-existing matter (and consequently that God himself, supposed to exist, could in this respect do no more than a carpenter or tailor doth); I say, though it be not universally true, that every thing that is made must have a material cause (so that the quaternio of causes in logic is not to be extended to all things caused whatsoever); yet is it certain

that nothing, which once was not, could possibly be made without an efficient cause. Wherefore, if there be any thing made, which was not before, there must of necessity, besides matter, be some other substance existing, as the efficient cause thereof; forasmuch as matter alone could not make any thing; as marble cannot make a statue, nor timber and stones a house, nor cloth a garment. This is our first demonstration of the impossibility of the atheistic hypothesis; it supposing all things, besides the bare substance of matter, to be made out of matter alone, without any other active principle or Deity, or to be made without an efficient cause; which is to bring them from nothing, in an impossible sense. To which may be added, by way of appendix, that whereas the Democritic and Epicurean Atheists admit of no other efficient causality in nature, than only local motion, and allow to matter or body, their only substance, no self-moving power, they hereby make all the motion that is in the whole world to be without a cause, and from nothing: action without any subject or agent, and the efficiency of all things without an efficient.

In the next place, should we be so liberal as to grant to the atomic Atheists motion without a cause, or permit Strato and the hylozoic Atheists to attribute to matter a self-moving power; yet do we affirm, that this matter and motion both together could not possibly produce any new real entity which was not before; matter, as such, efficiently causing nothing, and motion only changing the modifications of matter, as figure, place, site, and disposition of parts. Wherefore, if matter, as such, have no animal sense and conscious

understanding, essentially belonging to it (which no Atheists as yet have had the impudence to assert); then can no motion or modification of matter, no contexture of atoms, possibly beget sense and understanding, soul and mind; because this would be to bring something out of nothing, in the impossible sense, or to suppose something to be made by itself without a cause. Which may serve also for a confutation of those imperfect and spurious Theists, who will not allow to God Almighty (whether supposed by them to be corporeal or incorporeal) a power of making any thing, but only out of pre-existent matter, by the new-modifying thereof; as a carpenter makes a house out of pre-existing timber and stone, and a tailor a garment out of pre-existing cloth. For since animal life and understanding are not by them supposed to belong at all to matter, as such; and since they cannot result from any modifications or contextures thereof, it would plainly follow from hence, that God could not possibly make animals, or produce sense and understanding, souls and minds, which nevertheless these Theists suppose him to have done; and therefore ought in reason to acknowledge him, not only to be the maker of new modifications of matter. (and one, who built the world only as a carpenter doth a house), but also of real entities distinct from the same.

And this was the very doctrine (as we have already declared) of the most ancient atomic physiologists; not that every thing whatsoever might be made out of pre-existing matter; but, on the contrary, that in all natural generations there is no real entity produced out of the matter, which was

not before in it, but only new modifications; and consequently, that souls and minds being not mere modifications of matter in respect of magnitude, figure, site, and motion, could never be produced out of it, because they must then of necessity come from nothing; that is, be made either by themselves without a cause, or without a sufficient cause. It hath also been before noted out of Aristotle, how the old atheistic materialists being assaulted by those Italic philosophers after that manner, that nothing, which was not before in matter, besides its modifications, could possibly be produced out of it, because nothing can come out of nothing, and consequently, that in all natural generations and corruptions, there is no real entity made or destroyed; endeavoured, without denying the words of that proposition, to evade after this manner; *διὰ τοῦτο οὔτε γίνεσθαι οὐδὲν οἰόνται, οὔτε ἀπόλλυσθαι, ὡς τῆς τοιαύτης φύσεως ἀσπαζομένης, ὥσπερ δὲ τὸν Σωκράτην, &c.* That there is indeed nothing generated or corrupted (in some sense), forasmuch as the same substance of matter always remains, it being never made or destroyed. For, as men do not say, that Socrates is made, when he is made musical or handsome; nor destroyed, when he loseth these dispositions, because the subject Socrates was before, and still remaineth; so neither is any substantial thing, or real entity in the world, made or destroyed in this sense; because matter, which is the substance of all, perpetually remains;—and all other things whatsoever are but *πάθος καὶ ἔξινος καὶ διαθέσεως*, passions and affections, and dispositions thereof,—as musicalness and unmusicalness, in respect of Socrates. Which is all one, as if they should say,

that all things whatsoever, besides matter, being but accidents thereof, are generated out of it, and corruptible into it, without the production of any real entity out of nothing, or the deduction of any into nothing, so long as the substance of matter, which is the only real entity, remains always the same. Wherefore, though life, sense, and understanding, all souls and minds, be generated out of matter; yet does it not follow from thence, that therefore there is any real entity made or produced, because these are nothing but accidents, and modifications of matter. This was the subterfuge of the old hylopathian Atheists.*

Now it is true indeed, that whatsoever is in the universe, is either substance, or accidents; and that the accidents of any substance may be generated and corrupted, without the producing of any real entity out of nothing, and reducing of any into nothing; forasmuch as the substance still remains entirely the same. But the Atheists taking it for granted, that there is no other substance besides body or matter, do therefore falsely suppose that, which is really incorporeal substance, or else the attributes, properties, and modes thereof, to be the mere accidents of matter, and consequently conclude these to be generable out of it, without the production of any real entity out of nothing. We say, therefore, that it does not at all follow, because the same numerical matter (as for example a piece of wax) may be successively made spherical, cubical, cylindrical, pyramidal, or of any other figure; and the same man may successively stand, sit, kneel, and walk; both without the production of any thing

* Vide Aristot. *Metaphys.* lib. i. cap. iii. p. 264. tom. iv. oper.

out of nothing; or because a heap of stones, bricks, mortar, and timber lying all together disorderly and confusedly, may be made into a stately palace, and that without the miraculous creation of any real entity out of nothing; that therefore the same may be affirmed likewise of every thing else, besides the bare substance of matter, as namely, life and understanding, soul and mind, that though there be no such thing in matter itself, yet the production of them out of matter would be no production of something out of nothing. One ground of which mistake hath been from men's not rightly considering what the accidents of a substance are, and that they are indeed nothing but the modes thereof. Now, a mode is such a thing as cannot possibly be conceived, without that whereof it is a mode; as standing, sitting, kneeling, and walking, cannot be conceived, without a body organized, and therefore are but modes thereof; but life and cogitation may be clearly apprehended without body, or any thing of extension; nor indeed can a thought be conceived to be of such a length, breadth, and thickness, or to be hewed and sliced out into many pieces, all which laid together, as so many small chips thereof, would make up again the entireness of that whole thought. From whence it ought to be concluded, that cogitation is no accident, or mode of matter, or bulky extension, but a mode or attribute of another substance, really distinct from matter, or incorporeal. There is indeed nothing else clearly conceivable by us in body or bulky extension, but only more or less magnitude of parts, figures, site, motion, or rest; and all the different bodies that are in the whole world, are but several com-

bizations or syllables, made up out of these few letters : but no magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions, can possibly spell or compound life and sense, cogitation and understanding, as the syllables thereof; and therefore to suppose these to be generated out of matter, is plainly to suppose some real entity to be brought out of nothing, or something to be made without a cause; which is impossible.

But that which hath principally confirmed men in this error, is the business of sensible qualities and forms, as they are vulgarly conceived to be distinct entities, from those forementioned modifications of matter, in respect of magnitude of parts, figure, site, motion, or rest. For since these qualities and forms are unquestionably generated and corrupted, there seems to be no reason, why the same might not be as well acknowledged of life, sense, cogitation, and understanding, that these are but qualities or accidents of matter also (though of another kind), and consequently may be generated out of it, without the making of any real thing out of nothing. But the Democritic and Epicurean Atheists themselves have, from the principles of the atomic philosophy, sufficiently confuted and rectified this mistake concerning sensible qualities; they exploding and banishing them all, as conceived to be entities really distinct from the forementioned modifications of matter, and that for this very reason, because the generation of them would, upon this supposition, be the production of something out of nothing, or without a cause; and concluding them therefore to be really nothing else but mechanism, or different modifications of matter, in respect of the magni-

tude of parts, figure, site, and motion, or rest; they only causing different fancies and apparitions in us. And, in very truth, this vulgar opinion of real qualities of bodies seems to have no other original at all, than men's mistaking their own fancies, passions, and affections, for things really existing in the objects without them. For as sensible qualities are conceived to be things distinct from the forementioned modifications of matter, so are they really nothing but our own fancies, passions, and affections; and consequently no accidents or modifications of matter, but accidents and modifications of our own souls, which are substances incorporeal. Now if these Democritic and Epicurean Atheists themselves concluded, that real qualities, considered as distinct from the modifications of matter, could not possibly be generated out of it, because this would be the production of something out of nothing; they ought certainly much more to have acknowledged the same, concerning life and cogitation, sense and understanding, that the generation of these out of senseless matter would be an impossible production of something out of nothing; and consequently, that these are therefore no corporeal things, but the attributes, properties, or modes of substance incorporeal; since they can no way be resolved into mechanism and fancy, or the modifications of matter, as the vulgar sensible qualities may, and ought to be. For though the Democritics and Epicureans did indeed suppose all human cogitations to be caused or produced by the incursion of corporeal atoms upon the thinker; yet did never any of them arrive to such a degree, either of sottishness or impudence, as a modern

writer* hath done, to maintain, that cogitation, intellection, and volition, are themselves really nothing else but local motion or mechanism, in the inward parts of the brain and heart; or that "*mens nihil aliud præterquam motus in partibus quibusdam corporis organici,*" that mind itself is nothing but motion in some parts of the organized body;—who therefore, as if Cartesius had not been sufficiently paradoxical, in making brute animals (though supposed by him to be devoid of all cogitation) nothing but mere machines, and not contented herewith, hath advanced much further, in making this prodigious conclusion, that all cogitative beings, and men themselves, are really nothing else but machines and automata; whereas he might as well have affirmed heaven to be earth, colour to be sound, number to be figure, or any thing else in the world to be any thing, as cogitation and local motion to be the very self-same thing. Nevertheless, so strong was the atheistic intoxication in those old Democritic and Epicureans, that though denying real qualities of bodies, for this very reason, because "Nothing could be produced out of nothing," they notwithstanding contradicting themselves, would make sense, life, and understanding, to be qualities of matter, and therefore generable out of it; and so unquestionably produced real entities out of nothing, or without a cause.

Moreover, it is observable, that Epicurus having a mind to assert contingent liberty in men, in way of opposition to that necessity of all human

* Hobbes. vide *Physic. cap. xxv. et Leviathan, part i. cap. i. et ii.*

actions, which had been before maintained by Democritus and his followers, plainly acknowledges, that he could not possibly do this, according to the grounds of his own philosophy, without supposing something of contingency in the first principles, that is, in the motion of those atoms, out which men and other animals are made:

———Si semper motus connectitur omnia,
 Et vetere exoritur semper novus ordine certo,
 Nec declinando faciunt primordia motus
 Principium quoddam, quod fati foedera rumpat,
 Ex infinito ne causam causa sequatur;
 Libera per terras unde hæc animantibus extat,
 Unde est hæc, inquam, fati avolsa voluntas?

L. li. p. 134.
 Lamb. [ver.
 251.]

The reason for which is afterwards thus expressed by him, *quoniam de nihilo nil fit*, because nothing can be made out of nothing.—Upon which account he therefore ridiculously feigned, besides his two other motions of atoms from *pondus* and *plagæ*, weight and strokes,—a third motion of them which he calls *clinamen principiorum*, a contingent and uncertain declination,—every way from the perpendicular; out of design to solve this phenomenon of free-will in men, without bringing something out of nothing, according as he thus subjoineth,

Quare in sensibus quoque idem fateare necesse est,
 Esse aliam præter plagas et pondera causam
 Motibus, unde hæc est nobis innata potestas;
 De NIMILo quoniam FIARI NIL posse videmus.
 Ponderus enim prohibet, ne plagis omnia fiant
 Externa quasi vi. Sed ne mens ipsa necessum
 Intestinum habeat cunctis in rebus agenda,
 Et devicta quasi cogatur ferro patique,
 Id facit exiguum CLINAMEN PRINCIPIORUM,
 Nec ratione loci certa, nec tempore certo.

Lucret. lib. ii. ver. 263.

Now if Epicurus himself conceived, that liberty of will could not possibly be generated in men out of matter or atoms, they having no such thing at all in them (that is, no contingent uncertainty in their motion), without bringing of something out of nothing; which was contrary to the fundamental principles of the atomic philosophy), though this were intolerably absurd in him, thus to suppose contingency, and a kind of free-will in the motions of senseless atoms, so that indeed he brought his liberty of will out of nothing); certainly sense and understanding, soul and mind, in animals and men, could not possibly be generated out of atoms or matter, devoid of all sense and understanding; for the very same reason, *quoniam de nihilo nil fit*, because nothing can be made out of nothing. For unquestionably, were all life and understanding, all souls and minds, generated out of dead and senseless matter; and were there no substantial or essential life and understanding in the whole universe; then must it of necessity be all made out of nothing, or without a cause, and consequently real entities and substantial things be made out of nothing, which is absolutely impossible. For though we do not say, that life and cogitation, sense and understanding, abstractly considered, are substances; yet do we affirm them to be entities really distinct from matter, and no modifications or accidents thereof, but either accidents and modifications, or rather essential attributes, of substance incorporeal, as also that souls and minds, which are the subjects of them, are indeed substantial things. Wherefore, we cannot but here again condemn the darkness of that philosophy,

which educes not only species visible and audible (entities perfectly unintelligible), and real qualities, distinct from all the modes of body, and even substantial forms too (as they call them), but also sensitive souls themselves, both in men and brutes, *ex potentia materiæ*, out of the power of the matter;—that is, indeed, out of nothing. Forasmuch as this prepares a direct way to Atheism; because, if life and sense, cogitation and consciousness, may be generated out of dead and senseless matter, then might this well be supposed the first original of all things; nor could there reasonably be any stop made at rational souls, especially by these men, who also conclude them to be *rasæ tabulæ*, mere white sheets of paper,—that have nothing at all in them, but what is scribbled upon them by corporeal objects from without; there being nothing in the understanding or mind of man, which was not before in sense: so that sense is the first original knowledge, and understanding but a secondary and derivative thing from it, more umbratile and evanid.

Hitherto have we demonstrated, that all things whatsoever could not possibly be made out of matter, and particularly that life and sense, mind and understanding, being no accidents or modes of matter, could not by motion be generated out of it, without the production of real entities out of nothing. But because some may possibly imagine, that matter might otherwise than thus by motion, by a miraculous efficiency, produce souls and minds, we shall add in the last place, that nothing can efficiently produce any real entity or substantial thing that was not before, unless it

have at least equal perfection to it, and a substantially emanative or creative power. But scarcely any man can be so sottish, as to imagine that every atom of dust hath equal perfection in it to that of the rational soul in man, or to attribute a creative power to all matter (which is but a passive thing), whilst this is in the meantime denied by him to a perfect being; both these assertions also, in like manner as the former, producing real entities out of nothing causally. And thus have we demonstrated the impossibility and nonsense of all Atheism, from this very principle, by which the Atheists would assault Theism in the true sense thereof, that Nothing can be made without a cause, or that Nothing cannot be the cause of any thing.

Now, if there be no middle betwixt Atheism and Theism, and all things must of necessity either spring from senseless matter, or else from a perfect understanding being; then is this demonstration of the impossibility of Atheism a sufficient establishment of the truth of Theism; it being such a demonstration of a God, as the geometers call a deduction *ad impossibile*, which they allow of for good, and frequently make use of. Thus, either there is a God; or else matter must needs be acknowledged to be the only self-existent thing, and all things else whatsoever to be made out of it; but it is impossible, that all things should be made out of senseless matter: therefore is there a God. Nevertheless, we shall here, for further satisfaction, shew how the existence of a God may be directly demonstrated also from this very principle, which the Atheists endeavour to take sanctuary in, and from thence to impugn

Theism, *De nihilo nihil*, that Nothing can be made out of nothing causally, or that Nothing cannot be the cause of any thing.

In the first place, therefore, we shall fetch our beginning from what hath been already often declared, that it is mathematically certain, that Something or other did exist of itself from all eternity, or without beginning, and unmade by any thing else. The certainty of which proposition dependeth upon this very principle, as its foundation, that Nothing can come from nothing, or be made out of nothing, or that Nothing, which once was not, can of itself come into being without a cause; it following unavoidably from thence, that if there had been once nothing, there could never have been any thing. And having thus laid the foundation, we shall in the next place make this further superstructure, that because something did certainly exist of itself from eternity unmade, therefore is there also actually a necessarily-existent being. For to suppose, that any thing did exist of itself from eternity, by its own free-will and choice, and therefore not necessarily, but contingently, since it might have willed otherwise; this is to suppose it to have existed before it was, and so positively to have been the cause of itself; which is impossible, as hath been already declared. When a thing therefore is said to be of itself, or the cause of itself, this is to be understood no otherwise, than either in a negative sense, as having nothing else for its cause; or because its necessary eternal existence is essential to the perfection of its own nature. That therefore, which existed of itself from eternity, independently upon any thing else, did not so exist contin-

gently, but necessarily ; so that there is undoubtedly something actually in being, whose existence is and always was necessary. In the next place, it is certain also, that nothing could exist necessarily of itself, but what included necessity of existence in its own nature. For to suppose any thing to exist of itself necessarily, which hath no necessity of existence in its own nature, is plainly to suppose that necessary existence of it to come from nothing, since it could neither proceed from that thing itself, nor yet from any thing else. Lastly, there is nothing, which includes necessity of existence in its very nature and essence, but only an absolute perfect being. The result of all which is, that God, or a perfect being, doth certainly exist ; and that there is nothing else, which existed of itself from eternity, necessarily and independently ; but all other things whatsoever derived their being from him, or were caused by him, matter or body itself not excepted.

That which hath staggered some Theists here, and made them so inclinable and prone to believe, that matter also existed from eternity unmade, is partly (as hath been already intimated) an idiotical conceit, that because nothing can be artificially made by men, otherwise than out of pre-existing matter, as houses and garments, puddings and pies ; therefore there could be no other making of any thing, by any power whatsoever : though even men themselves can produce something out of no pre-existent matter, as cogitations and local motion. And the same partly proceedeth also from certain false opinions entertained concerning matter. For some Theists

have supposed ὕλην ἀσώματον, an incorporeal first matter;—out of which incorporeal matter, together with an incorporeal form joined to it, they conceived the essence of body to have been compounded, and made. And no wonder, if these same fanciful philosophers have further added also hereunto, that from this incorporeal matter, by an incorporeal form, were begotten likewise incorporeal qualities of body. Now it is not conceivable, what else should be meant by this incorporeal *hyle*, or matter, but only a metaphysical notion of the potentiality, or possibility of things, respectively to the Deity; which, because it is indeed eternal, and as much unmade as God himself is, it being nothing but the Divine power considered passively or the reverse of it; therefore, in all probability, were these philosophers so prone to think the physical matter of this corporeal universe to have been eternal and unmade. Neither was this incorporeal *hyle*, or matter, a novel opinion, entertained only by some junior Platonists, but older than Aristotle himself, as appeareth plainly from these following words of his in his *Metaphysics*: Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὡς ὕλην τὴν ἀρχὴν λέγουσιν, ἢ ἄντι σῶμα, ἢ ἄντι ἀσώματον τιθῶσιν. Some speak of the principle as matter; whether they suppose this matter to be body, or to be incorporeal.—But this incorporeal matter in physiology can be accounted no better than a kind of metaphysical nonsense. Again, others seem to have been the more prone to think matter or body to have been self-existent and unmade, because they both conceived it to be really the same

Li. i. c. vi. [p. 273. tom. iv. oper.]
 Thus Porphyry.
 τῆς ὕλης τὰ
 ἢ ἄντι τὸν
 ἀρχαίαν τὴν
 ἀσώματον, &c.
 Materies Proprietates, secundum Veteres, hæc sunt;
 Quod sit Incorporeum, &c.
 [In Sentent. ad Intelligibilia docentibus. §. xxi. p. 226. ed. Cantab.]

thing with space, and also took it for granted, that space was infinite and eternal, and consequently necessarily existent. In answer whereunto, we reply, first, that though space and distance should be granted to be positively infinite, or to have no bounds nor limits at all, as also to have been eternal; yet according to the opinion of some, would it not follow from thence, that matter was infinite, eternal, and necessarily existent; not as if space or distance could exist alone by itself, an accident without a substance, it being plainly impossible, that nothing should have any accidents, modifications, and attributes, or be mensurable by yards and poles; but because this space is by them supposed, not to be the extension of body, but the infinite and unbounded extension of the Deity. But, in the next place, if space be concluded to be certainly nothing else but the extension and distance of body, or matter, considered in general (without respect to this or that particular body), and abstractly in order to the conception of motion, and the mensuration of things (for space thus considered, is necessarily immoveable, as to the parts thereof respectively; as the two extremes of a yard distance can never possibly come nearer to one another); then do we say, that there appeareth no sufficient ground for this positive infinity of space, we being certain of no more than this, that be the world, or any figurative body, never so great, it is not impossible, but that it might be still greater and greater, without end. Which indefinite increasableness of body and space seems to be mistaken for a positive infinity thereof. Whereas for this very reason, because it can

never be so great, but that more magnitude may still be added to it, therefore can it never be positively infinite. Nor is there perhaps so great an absurdity in this, that another world could not possibly be made a mile distant from this, forasmuch as there being nothing between them, they must needs touch; or that this finite world could have no mountains and valleys in the exterior surface of it, since it might be either spherical, cubical, or cylindrical, or of any other regular figure, whatsoever the maker pleased to form it in. To conclude therefore, by space without the finite world, is to be understood nothing but the possibility of body, farther and further, without end, yet so as never to reach to infinity; and such a space as this was there also, before this world was created, a possibility of so much body to be produced. But space and actual distance, as really measurable by yards and poles, though it may be greater and greater without end, yet can it not be positively infinite, so as that there could be no more added to it; and therefore there can be no argument from hence, to prove the necessary existence of matter.

Moreover, the existence of a Deity might be further demonstrated from this common notion, That nothing can come from nothing causally; because, if there were no God, as we could not have had any idea of him, or a perfect being, since it must have come from nothing, and have been the idea or conception of nothing; so neither could there have been indeed any knowledge or understanding at all. For singular bodies existing without us cannot enter into us, and put understanding in us; nor is there any thing but

local motions propagated from them to our organs of sense. The mind must have its immediate intelligibles within itself, for otherwise it could not possibly understand any thing; which intelligences and their relations to one another, or verities, are (as was said before) eternal. Moreover, the mind can frame ideas or conceptions, not only of things actually existing, but also of all possibilities; which plainly implies and supposes the actual existence of a being infinitely powerful, that could produce them. So that the proper object of mind and understanding is a perfect being, and all the extent of its power; which perfect being, comprehending itself and the extent of its own power; or the possibilities of all things, is the first original mind, of which all other minds partake. Wherefore, were there no perfect omnipotent being, comprehending itself, and its own power, or all the possibilities of things; the intelligible objects of the mind and ideas must have come from nothing.

However, it hath been already proved from this principle, Nothing from nothing, that the powers of sense and understanding, or the entities of soul and mind, could never have resulted from any modifications of senseless matter whatsoever. Wherefore, since it is mathematically certain, that our human souls and persons could not possibly have been generated out of matter, one of these two things will undeniably follow; that either they must all have existed of themselves, from eternity unmade; or else have been created *ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων*, out of an antecedent nonexistence,—by a perfect understanding being unmade, or at least have derived their whole substance from it. So that it

is altogether as certain, that there is a God, as that our human souls and persons did not all exist from eternity of themselves. And that there must be some eternal unmade mind, hath been already demonstrated also from the same principle, Nothing out of nothing. Thus, have we abundantly confuted the second atheistic argumentation, that there can be no omnipotence, nor Divine creation, because nothing can be made out of nothing; we have plainly shewed, that this very principle, in the true sense thereof, affordeth a demonstration for the contrary.

THE six following atheistic argumentations, driving at these two things, first, the disproving of an incorporeal and then of a corporeal Deity (from both which, the Atheists conceive, it must follow of necessity, that there can be none at all); we shall take them all together, and, in order to the confutation of them, perform these three things. First, we shall answer the atheistic argumentations against an incorporeal Deity (contained in the third and fourth heads). Secondly, we shall shew that from the very principles of the atheistic corporealism (as represented in the fifth and sixth heads), incorporeal substance is demonstrable. And, lastly, that there being undeniably incorporeal substance, the two following atheistic argumentations also, against a corporeal Deity (in the seventh and eighth sections), prove altogether insignificant.

We begin with the first of these; to shew the invalidity of the atheistic argumentations against an

incorporeal Deity. It hath been already observed, that though all Corporealists be not therefore of necessity Atheists, yet Atheists universally have been Corporealists; this being always their first and grand postulatum, That there is no other substance besides body. Thus Plato long ago de-

clared concerning them: *Διςχυρίζονται τευ-*

Soph. p. 178.

Fig. [p. 160.]

το εἶναι μόνον ὃ παρέχει προσβολὴν καὶ ἐπαφὴν τινα, ταυτὸν σῶμα καὶ οὐσίαν ὀριζόμενοι· τῶν δὲ

ἄλλων εἴτις φησὶ μὴ σῶμα ἔχον εἶναι, καταφρονούντες τοπαράπαν, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐθέλοντες ἄλλο ἀκούειν. They contend strongly, that that only really is, which is tangible, or can resist their touch; concluding body and substance to be one and the self-same thing: and if any one should affirm, that there is any thing incorporeal, they will presently cry him down, and not bear a word more from him.—For there can be no doubt, but that the persons here intended by Plato were those very Atheists which himself spake of afterward in the same dialogue: * *Μὲν τῶν πολλῶν δόγματι καὶ ῥήματι χρώμενοι φήσαμεν, τὴν φύσιν αὐτὰ πάντα γενεῆν ἀπὸ τινος αἰτίας αὐτομάτης, καὶ ἄνευ διανοίας φύσεως; ἢ μετὰ λόγου καὶ ἐπιστήμης θείας, ἀπὸ θεοῦ γιγνομένης.* Whether shall we assent to that opinion now-a-days entertained by so many, that nature generateth all things from a certain fortuitous cause, without the direction of any mind or understanding? or rather, that it produceth them, according to reason and knowledge, proceeding from God?—Indeed the philosopher there tells us, that some of these atheistic persons began then to be somewhat ashamed of making prudence, and justice, and other moral virtues, corporeal things, or bodies: *Ἀποκρίνονται τὴν μὲν*

ψυχὴν αὐτὴν δοκεῖν σφίσι σῶμά τι κεκτῆσθαι, φρόνησιν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον ὧν ἠρώτηκας, αἰσχύνονται τὸ τολμᾶν, ἢ μηδὲν τῶν ὄντων αὐτὰ ὁμολογεῖν, ἢ πάντ' εἶναι σώματα δεῖσχυρίζεσθαι. Though they affirm concerning the soul itself, that this seems to them to be corporeal; yet, concerning prudence, and those other virtues mentioned, some have now scarcely the confidence to maintain these to be either bodies or nothing.—But this (saith he) was indeed no less than the quite giving up of the cause of Atheism; εἰ γάρ τι καὶ σμικρὸν ἐβέλουσι τῶν ὄντων συγχωρεῖν ἀσώματον, ἐξαρκῆ because, if it be but once granted, that there is never so little incorporeal, this will be sufficient to overthrow the atheistic foundation.—Wherefore he concludes, that such as these were but mongrel and imperfect Atheists; ἐπὶ τούτων οὐδ' ἂν ἐν ἐπαισχυνθεῖεν, οἱ γὰρ αὐτῶν σπαρτὶ καὶ αὐτόχθονες, ἀλλὰ διατείνουσι ἂν, πᾶν ὃ μὴ δυνατοὶ ταῖς χερσὶ συμπίεζαν, ὡς ἄρα τοῦτο οὐδὲν τοπαράπαν ἐστὶ for they, who are thorough-paced and genuine Atheists indeed, will boggle at neither of those forementioned things, but contend, that whatsoever they cannot grasp with their hands, is altogether nothing.—That is, that there is no other substance nor entity in the world, but only body, that which is tangible, or resists the touch. Aristotle also representeth the atheistic hypothesis after the same manner: Τοῦτο καὶ τοσαύτην φασὶν εἶναι τὴν ἅπασαν οὐσίαν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα πάθη τούτων They affirm, that matter, or body, is all the substance that is; and that all other things are but the passions and affections thereof.—And again, in his *Metaphysics*: Ἐν τῷ Met. l. i. c. vii. p. 274. tom. iv. oper.] πᾶν, καὶ μίαν εἶναι τινα φύσιν, ὡς ὕλην τιθεῖσιν, καὶ ταύτην σωματικὴν καὶ μέγεθος ἔχουσαν. These men maintain all to be one, and that there is but

one only nature, as the matter of all things, and this corporeal, or endued with magnitude.—And now we see plainly, that the ancient Atheists were of the very same mind with these in our days, that body, or that which is tangible and divisible, is the only substantial thing ; from whence it follows that an incorporeal substance would be the same with an incorporeal body, *i. e.* an impossibility, and that there can be no incorporeal Deity.

But in the management of this cause, there hath been some disagreement amongst the Atheists themselves. For, first, the Democritics and Epicureans, though consenting with all the other Atheists, in this, that whatsoever was unextended, and devoid of magnitude, was therefore nothing (so that there could neither be any substance, nor accident, or mode of any substance, unextended); did notwithstanding distinguish concerning a double nature. First, that which is so extended, as to be impenetrable, and tangible, or resist the touch, which is body. And, secondly, that which is extended also, but penetrably and intangibly; which is space or vacuum: a nature, according to them, really distinct from body, and the only incorporeal thing that is. Now since this space, which is the only incorporeal, can neither do nor suffer any thing, but only give place or room to bodies to subsist in, or pass through; therefore can there not be any active, understanding, incorporeal Deity. This is the argumentation of the Democritic Atheists.

To which we reply, that if space be indeed a nature distinct from body, and a thing really incorporeal, as they pretend, then will it undeniably follow from this very principle of theirs, that there

must be an incorporeal substance ; and (this space being supposed by them also to be infinite) an infinite incorporeal Deity. Because, if space be not the extension of body, nor an affection thereof, then must it of necessity be, either an accident existing alone by itself, without a substance, which is impossible ; or else the extension, or affection, of some other incorporeal substance that is infinite. But here will Gassendus step in, to help out his good friends the Democritics and Epicureans at a dead lift ; and undertake to maintain, that though space be indeed an incorporeal thing, yet it would neither follow of necessity from thence, that it is an incorporeal substance or affection thereof ; nor yet that it is an accident existing alone by itself, without a substance ; because this space is really neither accident nor substance, but a certain middle nature or essence betwixt both. To which subterfuge of his, that we may not quarrel about words, we shall make this reply ; that unquestionably, whatsoever is, or hath any kind of entity, doth either subsist by itself, or else is an attribute, affection, or mode of something, that doth subsist by itself. For it is certain, that there can be no mode, accident, or affection of nothing ; and consequently, that nothing cannot be extended, nor measurable. But if space be neither the extension of body, nor yet of substance incorporeal, then must it of necessity be the extension of nothing, and the affection of nothing ; and nothing must be measurable by yards and poles. We conclude therefore, that from this very hypothesis of the Democritic and Epicurean Atheists, that space is a nature distinct from body, and positively infinite, it follows undeniably, that there must be

some incorporeal substance, whose affection its extension is; and because there can be nothing infinite, but only the Deity, that it is the infinite extension of an incorporeal Deity; just as some learned Theists and Incorporealists have asserted. And thus is the argument of these Democritic and Epicurean Atheists, against an incorporeal Deity, abundantly confuted; we having made it manifest, that from that very principle of their own, by which they would disprove the same, it is against themselves demonstrable.

To which it might be here further added, that Epicurus, who professedly opposed Plato's incorporeal God, as an impossibility, did notwithstanding manifestly contradict himself, when he asserted such a democracy of monogrammous gods, as were not compounded of atoms and vacuum (though, according to him, the only principles of body), that so they might be incorruptible; nor yet could touch or be touched, but were penetrable, as is declared in those verses of Lucretius,*

Tenuis enim natura deum, longeque remota
Sensibus a nostris, animi vix mente videtur.
Quæ quoniam manuum tactum suffugit et ictum,
Tactile nil nobis quod sit, contingere debet.
Tangere enim non quit, quod tangi non licet ipsum.

(though tangibility and impenetrability were elsewhere made by him the very essence of body); and, lastly, such as had not *corpus*, but *quasi corpus*, and therefore must needs be really incorporeal. Though there is no doubt to be made, but that Epicurus colluded in all this; himself not believing a jot of it, nor any such gods at all.

But other Atheists there were, who concluding

* Lib. v. ver. 149.

likewise, that whatsoever was unextended was nothing, were sensible of the inconvenience of making space thus to be a thing really distinct from body (from whence it would follow unavoidably that it was an affection of incorporeal substance); and therefore acknowledged, not two natures of extended things, but as we had it before in Aristotle, *μὴν τινὰ φύσιν καὶ ταύτην σωματικὴν*, one only nature, and that bodily;—space being therefore to them, either a mere imaginary thing, that hath no reality without our minds, but only a phantasm of our own, and, in their modern language, a kind of ghost, apparition, or spectre of a body; or else, indeed, the very extension of body itself, considered in general, and abstractly, from this or that singular body, moveable. And these men therefore framed their argumentation against an incorporeal Deity after this manner: nothing truly is, but what is extended, or hath a certain magnitude (because that which is unextended, and hath no magnitude, is no where, and consequently nothing). But whatsoever is extended, and in a place, is body. Therefore is there no other substance besides body; and consequently there can be no incorporeal Deity. Or else, to put the argument into a more approveable syllogistic form; whatsoever is extended, is body, or corporeal; but whatsoever is, is extended. Therefore whatsoever is, is body, or corporeal: and by consequence, there can be no incorporeal Deity.

To which argumentation the assertors of incorporeal substance have replied two manner of ways. For, first, the generality of the ancient Incorporealists taking it for granted, that whatsoever was extended in magnitude, and had parts

one without another, was divisible, as also probably impenetrable by any thing else extended, because there can be no penetration of dimensions; and therefore no one magnitude can be imbibed or swallowed up into another, but must of necessity stand without it, adding so much to the quantity thereof: they readily gave their assent to that proposition, That whatsoever is extended into longitude, latitude and profundity, is body. But being strongly persuaded of the existence of some other substance besides body, they denied that other proposition of theirs, That whatsoever is, is extended; or what is unextended, is nothing: maintaining, that besides body, or extended substance, there was another substance incorporeal, which therefore was ἀδιάστατος, and ἀμεγέθης, and ἀποσος, and ἀμερής, and ἀδιάπτωτος, unextended, and devoid of quantity and magnitude, without parts, and indivisible.—That Plato himself philosophized after this manner, might be proved from sundry passages of his writings; as that in his tenth De Legibus, where he affirmeth, that the soul itself, and those things which belong to it, as cogitative, are πρότερα μήκους, σωματέων καὶ βάθους καὶ πλάτους, in order of nature, before the longitude; and latitude, and profundity of bodies.—Where, doubtless, his meaning was not, as if there were longitude, latitude, and profundity in souls, but of a different kind from that longitude, latitude, and profundity of bodies; and before it; but that longitude, latitude, and profundity, being the essential properties of body only, soul and cogitation, as devoid of these, was in order of nature before them. Again, from that in his Timæus, where speaking

of place, space, and matter, he condemneth this for a vulgar error, That whatsoever is, must of necessity be in some place or other, and what is in no place, is nothing. Τρίτον δὲ αὖ γένος τὸ τῆς χώρας, ἔδραν παρέχον ὅσα ἔχει γένεσιν πᾶσιν.—πρὸς ὃ δὲ καὶ ὀνειροπολοῦμεν βλέποντες, καὶ φάμεν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι παν, τὸ οὐ ἄπαν ἐν τινι τόπῳ, καὶ κατέχει χώραν τινά· τὸ δὲ μήτε ἐν γῇ, μήτε πον, κατ' οὐρανόν, οὐδὲν εἶναι. The third kind is that of space, which gives room to all things that are generated. And when we look upon this, we dreamingly affirm, that every thing that is, must of necessity be in some place; and possess a certain room and space, and that whatsoever is not somewhere, either in earth or in heaven, is nothing. Which drowsy or dreaming imagination (saith he), like a ghost, continually haunteth and possesseth men, and that even then, when they think of that true and awakened nature of the Deity.—Whereas this philosopher himself, discoursing elsewhere of God, under the title of πολὺ πῆλαγος τοῦ καλοῦ, the vast sea of pulchritude, —describeth him after this manner; οὐδέπου ὄν, ἢ ἐν γῇ, ἢ ἐν οὐρανῷ, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ, μεθ' αὐτοῦ, μορφοῦς αἰὲ ὄν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα καλὰ ἐκείνου μετέχοντα· as that which is not any where, either in earth, or in heaven, but itself alone by itself, and with itself, all other beautiful things partaking of it.—And as for Aristotle's sense in this particular; that he here departed not, as he did in some other things, from his master Plato, may appear from that whole chapter, or section, at the end of his Physics, spent upon this very subject, to prove ὅτι τοῦ ἀμερέως ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, καὶ μηδὲν ἔχει μέγεθος, that his first Immoveable Mover (which is God Almighty) must of necessity be devoid of parts, or indivi-

sible, and have no magnitude at all.—The conclusion of which section, and his whole book of *Physics*,* is this: *Διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων, φανερόν ὅτι ἀδύνατον τὸ πρῶτον κινεῖν καὶ ἀκίνητον ἔχειν τι μέγεθος· εἰ γὰρ μέγεθος ἔχει, ἀνάγκη ἦτοι πεπερασμένον αὐτὸ εἶναι, ἢ ἄπειρον· ἄπειρον μὲν οὖν ὅτι οὐκ ἐνδέχεται μέγεθος εἶναι, δέδεικται πρότερον ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς· ὅτι δὲ τὸ πεπερασμένον ἀδύνατον ἔχειν ἄπειρον δύναμιν, δέδεικται νῦν· φανερόν τοίνυν, ὅτι ἀδιαίρετόν ἐστι, καὶ ἀμερές, καὶ οὐδὲν ἔχον μέγεθος.* These things being thus determined, it is manifestly impossible, that the first Mover should have any magnitude. For if it hath magnitude, that must of necessity be either finite or infinite. But that there can be no infinite magnitude, was before demonstrated in the *Physics*; and that nothing, which hath a finite magnitude, can have infinite power, hath been now proved. Wherefore it is plain, that the first Mover is indivisible, and devoid of parts, and hath no magnitude at all.—Which same doctrine is again taught and asserted by Aristotle, in his *Metaphysics*: *Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν οὐσία τις αἰδῖος καὶ ἀκίνητος, καὶ* P. 14. c. vii.
[p. 480. tom. iv. oper.] *κεχωρισμένη τῶν αἰσθητῶν, φανερόν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων. δέδεικται δὲ καὶ ὅτι μέγεθος οὐδὲν ἐνδέχεται ἔχειν ταύτην τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀλλὰ ἀμερές καὶ ἀδιαίρετός ἐστι· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔχει δύναμιν ἄπειρον πεπερασμένον, καὶ ὅλως οὐκ ἐστὶν οὐδὲν ἄπειρον.* From what hath been declared, it is manifest, that there is an eternal and immoveable substance, separate from sensibles; as also, that this substance cannot possibly have any magnitude, but is devoid of parts, and indivisible. Because no finite thing can have infinite power, and there is no such thing possible as infinite

* P. 608. tom. i. oper.

magnitude.—Neither doth Aristotle appropriate this to the supreme Deity, “to be thus devoid of magnitude and of parts; and consequently indivisible;” he somewhere attributing the same also to all other immaterial or incorporeal things, and particularly to the human mind, ἀδιαίρετον πᾶν τὸ μὴ ὕλην ἔχον, ὥσπερ ὁ ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς, every thing, that is devoid of matter, is indivisible, as the human mind.—And the like doth he assert, at once, both concerning the mundane and the human soul, that they are no magnitudes, though ridiculously (after his manner) imputing the contrary opinion to Plato: Οὐ καλῶς τὸ λέγειν τὴν ψυχὴν μέγεθος εἶναι. ^{De An. l. i. c. iii. [p. 9, 10. tom. ii. oper.]} Ὁ δὲ νοῦς εἰς καὶ συνεχής, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ νόησις· ἡ δὲ νόησις τὰ νοήματα ταῦτα δὲ τῷ ἐφεξῆς ἐν, ὡς ὁ ἀριθμὸς, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὡς τὸ μέγεθος· διόπερ οὐδὲ νοῦς οὕτω συνεχής. ἀλλ’ ἦτοι ἀμερὲς, ἢ οὐχ ὡς τὸ μέγεθος τι συνεχής· πῶς γὰρ δὲ καὶ νοήσει μέγεθος ὧν, ὅτῳ οὖν τῶν μορίων τῶν αὐτοῦ; μορίων δὲ ἦτοι κατὰ μέγεθος, ἢ κατὰ στιγμήν· εἰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ στιγμήν, αὐταὶ δ’ ἀπειροί, δηλὸν ὡς οὐδέποτε διέξεισιν· εἰ δὲ κατὰ μέγεθος, πολλάκις ἢ ἀπειράκις νοήσει τὸ αὐτό. Ἐπεὶ δὲ πῶς νοήσει τὸ ἀμερὲς μεριστῶ· It is not rightly affirmed either of the mundane, or rational soul, that they are magnitudes. For the Intellect is one and continuous, as Intellection is, which is the same with the Intelligibles. But these are one, not as magnitudes, but as numbers. Wherefore the Intellect is not so continuous; but either devoid of parts, or not continuous as magnitude. For how, being magnitude, could it understand with any of its parts, whether conceived as points, or as lesser magnitudes; since either way there would be an innu-

* Metaphys. l. xiv. cap. ix. p. 484. tom. iv. oper.

merable company of intellections; moreover, how can it conceive any thing that is indivisible by what is divisible?—Furthermore, in this same book *De Anima*,* Aristotle stiffly denies souls in general either to be in a place, or to be locally moved, otherwise than by accident, as they are said to be moved together with the motion of the body. Thus Simplicius: *Ὅρα ὡς πανταχοῦ τὰς σωματικὰς ἀποκλείεται τῆς ψυχῆς κινήσεις.* See how Aristotle doth every where remove, or exclude from the soul, corporeal (or local) motions.—And again:

Fol. 6. *Ἀναγορεύει μὴ κινεῖσθαι τὰ σώματα τῆς κινήσεως αἴτια καὶ πρῶτα καὶ μετὰ καὶ ἐσχατὰ ᾗ, Αἰσ-*

totle will by no means allow any incorporeal things whatsoever, whether of the first, second, or lowest rank (they being all the causes of motion), themselves to be moved.—Philoponus likewise: *Ὅρα ὡς πρὸς τὰς σωματικὰς κινήσεις ἀποβάλλων, οὕτως αὐτῇ ἀκίνητον εἶναι φησι· τῶν γὰρ τὸ ἐν τόπῳ σωματικόν ἐστίν.* You see how Aristotle, respecting corporeal motions, pronounces of the soul, that it is immovable. For whatsoever is in a place (and moveable) is body.—Lastly, in that passage before cited, Aristotle plainly makes the essence of corporeal substance, as opposed to incorporeal, to consist in magnitude.

Besides Plato and Aristotle, we might here instance in sundry other of the ancient Incorporealists, who clearly maintained the same doctrine. Philo doth not only assert in general a double es-

* Lib. i. cap. iv. p. 12. tom. ii. oper.

† Comment. in Libros Aristot. de Anima, fol. 6. ed. Græc. Franc. Asulani, Venet. 1527. fol.

‡ Comment. in Libros tres Aristot. de Anima, fol. 13. ed. Græc. Venet. 1563. fol.

sence or substance, ἀδιάστατον, and διαστηματικὴν, a distant, and indistant one;—but somewhere writeth thus concerning the Deity: Ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ De Confus. Lib. p. 339.

πεπληρωται τὰ πάντα, περιέχοντος οὐ περιεχο-
 μένου, ὃ πανταχοῦ τε καὶ οὐδαμοῦ συμβέβηκεν εἶναι μόνῃ·
 οὐδαμοῦ μὲν, ὅτι καὶ χώραν καὶ τόπον αὐτὸς τοῖς σώμασι
 συγγεγέννηκε· τὸ δὲ πεποιηκὸς ἐν οὐδενὶ τῶν γεγονότων
 θίμης εἶπεν περιέχασθαι· πανταχοῦ δὲ, ὅτι τὰς δυνάμεις αὐ-
 τοῦ διὰ γῆς καὶ ὕδατος ἀέρος τε καὶ οὐρανοῦ τένειας, &c.
 All things are filled with God, as containing them, but not as being contained by them, or in them; to whom alone it belongeth to be both every where, and no where. No where, because himself created space and place, together with bodies, and it is not lawful to include the Creator within any of his creatures. And every where, because he extendeth his virtues and powers throughout earth and water, air and heaven, and leaveth no part of the world destitute thereof; but, collecting all things together under himself, hath bound them fast with invisible bonds.—But none hath more industriously pursued this business than Plotinus, who every where asserts body and magnitude to be one and the same thing; and that, besides this, there is another substance incorporeal, which, consequently, is ἀποσος, and ἀμεγέθης, and ἀμερής, devoid of quantity, and of magnitude, and of parts, locally distant from one another; ὃ ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ οὐσίᾳ τὸ ποσὸν εἶναι ὑπερβέβηκεν, it having in its nature transcended the imperfection of quantity.—And who hath also written two whole books* upon this very subject, τὸ ὅν ἐν καὶ ταντοῦ ἀριθμῷ ἅμα πανταχοῦ εἶναι ὅλον; that one and the self-same numerical thing may be all of it en-

* Lib. iv. et v. Ennead. vi.

tirely every where.—Wherein his principal design was to prove, that the Deity is not part of it here, and part of it there; and so much thereof in one place, and so much in another (as if the very substance of it were mensurable by yards and poles); but the whole undivided Deity every where; *Πρὸ τῶν ἐν τόπῳ ἀπάντων* (saith he); “God is before all things, that are in a place.” And * *θαν-*
P. 667.
[lib. iv. *μάζειν οὐ δεῖ, εἰ αὐτὸ μὴ ὄν ἐν τόπῳ, παντὶ τῷ ἐν*
cap. ix.] *τόπῳ ὄντι, ὅλως πάρεστι, φησὶ γὰρ ὁ λόγος, ὡς*
ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ τόπον οὐκ εἰληχότι, ᾧ πάρεστι, τοῦτῳ ὅλον
παρεῖναι, it is not at all to be wondered at, that God, being not in a place, should be present to every thing, that is in a place, wholly and entirely; reason pronouncing, that he, having no place, must therefore of necessity be ὅλως, all of him indivisibly present to whatsoever he is present.—Neither is this, saith he, a thing only deduced by reason, but that, which is before reason, suggested by the instincts of mankind; *τὸ ἐν καὶ ταυτὸν ἀριθμῷ, πανταχοῦ ἅμα ὅλον εἶναι, κοινὴ ἐννοία φησιν εἶναι, ὅταν πάντες κινούμενοι αὐτοφύως λέγωσι, τὸν ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν Θεόν, ὡς ἓνα καὶ τὸν αὐτόν* that one and the same numerical substance (to wit, of the Deity) is at once entirely every where; is agreeable to the common notions, as sentiments of mankind, when we do so often by the instincts of nature speak of that God, who is in every one of us, supposing him to be one and the same in all.—Where the philosopher subjoins, *Καὶ ἔστι πάντων βεβαιωτάτη ἀρχή, ἣν ὥσπερ αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν φθέγγονται, &c.* And this is the firmest of all principles, that, which our souls do, as it were, naturally and of themselves speak; and which is not collected by reason, but comes

* Lib. iv. *Ennead.* vi. cap. iii. p. 647.

forth from them before ratiocination.—Moreover, he often affirmeth of the human soul, or rather takes it as a thing for granted, that this is the whole or all of it, in every part of the body, that is, undividedly: *Ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς, τὸ αὐτὸ*

ἀριθμῷ, τὸ ἐν τῷ ποδὶ, καὶ τῇ χειρὶ ὑπάρχει.

P. 644.

As for the human soul, it is one and the same numerically in the hand, and in the foot.—And again: *Εἰρά πως ἐν ποδὶ καὶ χειρὶ τὴν αὐτήν, τὴν δὲ ἐν τῇ δὲ μέρει τοῦ παντός, οὐ τὴν αὐτήν τὴν ἐν τῷδε.* Since we commonly suppose our own soul to be the same, both in our foot and in our hand, why should we not, in like manner, acknowledge that of the mundane soul, or Deity,—which is in one part of the universe, to be the same with that in another? In like manner, Simplicius,* proving that body is not the first principle, because there must of necessity be something self-moving, and what is so, must needs be incorporeal, writeth thus: *Τὸ δὲ τοιαῦτον ἀμερές εὐθὺς ἀνάγκη εἶναι καὶ ἀδιάστατον, μεριστὸν γὰρ καὶ διαστατὸν ὑπάρχον, οὐ δύναται ὅλον ὅλῳ ἐαυτῷ ἐφαρμόττειν, ὥς τὸ ὅλον εἶναι κινεῖν, καὶ ὅλον τὸ αὐτὸ κινούμενον.* Because what is such, must of necessity be indivisible, and indistant; for were it divisible, and distant, it could not all of it be conjoined with its whole self; so that the whole should both actively move, and be moved.—Which same thing seems further evident in the soul's being all conscious of itself; and reflexive of its whole self; which could not be, were one part of it distant from another. Again, the same philosopher expressly denieth the soul, though a self-moving substance, to be at all locally moved, otherwise than by accident, in respect of the

* Ubi supra, fol. 7.

body, which is moved by it, οὐ τὰς σωματικὰς κινήσεις (κατὰ γὰρ ἐκείνας ἀκίνητόν ἐστι) ἀλλὰ τὰς ψυχικὰς, αἷς ὀνόματά ἐστι ἀσκηπῆσθαι, βουλευῆσθαι, διανοεῖν, δοξάζειν, κινεῖ τὰ σώματα κατὰ τὰς σωματικὰς κινήσεις. The soul, being not moved by corporeal, or local motions (for in respect of these it is immoveable), but by cogitative ones only, (the names whereof are Consultation and Deliberation, &c.) by these moveth bodies locally.—And that this was really Plato's meaning also, when he determined the soul to be a self-moving substance, and the cause of all bodily motion; that moving itself in a way of cogitation, it moved bodies locally (notwithstanding that Aristotle would not take notice of it), sufficiently appears from his own words, and is acknowledged by the Greek scholiasts themselves upon Aristotle's *De Anima*. Thus again Simplicius elsewhere: Ἐπεὶ δ' οὐκ ἐν τόπῳ ψυχὴ, οὐδ' ἀκινῆτο, τὰς τῶν ἐν τόπῳ ὄντων κινήσεις. Since the soul is not in a place, it is not capable of any local motion.

We should omit the testimonies of any more philosophers, were it not that we find Porphyrius so full and express herein, who makes this the very beginning of his ἀφορμαὶ πρὸς τὰ νοητά, his manuduction to intelligibles;—πάν σῶμα ἐν τόπῳ, οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν καθ' ἑαυτὴ ἀσωμάτων ἐν τόπῳ, that though every body be in a place, yet nothing, that is properly incorporeal, is in a place:—and who afterwards further pursues it in this manner:

P. 229, 230. [S. xxviii. ed. Cantab.] Οὐδὲ τοπικῶς διέρχεται τὸ ἀσώματον, ὅπου βού-

λεται· ὅγκῳ γὰρ συνυφίσταται τόπος· τὸ δ' ἀόγκον παντελῶς καὶ ἀμέγεθες, ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ὅγκῳ ἀκράτητον, τοπικῆς τε κινήσεως ἄμορον, διαβῆσι τοίνυν ποῖα ἔχει ἐνρίσκεται, ὅπου καὶ διάκειται· καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἔργων αὐτοῦ φανερά

ἢ κίνησις αὐτοῦ γίνεσθαι. Neither does that, which is incorporeal, move locally by will, place being relative only to magnitude and bulk. But that, which is devoid of bulk and magnitude, is likewise devoid of local motion. Wherefore, it is only present by a certain disposition and inclination of it to one thing more than another; nor is its presence there discernible otherwise, than by its operations and effects.—Again, concerning the three Divine hypostases he writeth thus; ὁ

P. 231.

Θεός πανταχοῦ ὅτι οὐδαμοῦ, καὶ ὁ νοῦς πανταχοῦ ὅτι οὐδαμοῦ, καὶ ψυχὴ πανταχοῦ ὅτι οὐδαμοῦ, &c. The supreme God is therefore every where, because he is no where; and the same is true also of the second and third Divine hypostases, Nous and Psyche. The supreme God is every where and no where, in respect of those things which are after him, and only his own, and in himself. Nous, or intellect, is in the supreme God, every where and no where, as to those things that are after him. Psyche, or the mundane soul, is both in intellect and the supreme God, and every where and no where, as to bodies. Lastly, body is both in the soul of the world and in God.—Where he denies God to be locally in the corporeal world, and thinks it more proper to say, that the corporeal world is in God, than God in it; because the world is held and contained in the Divine power, but the Deity is not in the locality of the world. Moreover, he further declares his sense after this manner: Οὐδ' εἰ κενὸν ὅν τι ἐπικνηθεὶς ἀσώματος, ἐν κενῷ εἶόν τε εἶναι Νοῦν, σώματος μὲν γὰρ δεκτικὸν αὖ εἶναι τὸ κενόν. Νοῦ δὲ ἐνέργειαν χωρῆσαι ἀμήχανον, καὶ τόπον δοῦ-

* In Appendice sententiarum, sive graduum ad intelligibilia, § 45. p. 278. ed. Cantab.

ναί ἐνεργεῖα. Nor, if there were conceived to be such an incorporeal space, or vacuum (as Democritus and Epicurus supposed), could Mind, or God, possibly exist in this empty space (as coextended with the same), for this would be only receptive of bodies, but it could not receive the energy of mind or intellect, nor give any place or room to that, that being no bulky thing.—And again : * Ὁ μὲν κόσμος ἐν τῷ νῷ διαστατικῶς παρίσται, τὸ δὲ ἀσώματον τῷ κόσμῳ ἀμερῶς καὶ ἀδιαστάτως· τὸ δὲ ἀμερὲς ἐν διαστατῷ ὅλον γίνεται κατὰ πᾶν μέρος, ταυτὸν ὃν καὶ ἐν ἀριθμῷ· αὐτὸ ἀμερῶς παρίσται καὶ ἀπληθύντως καὶ ἀτόπως, κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν, τῷ μεριστῷ, καὶ πεπληθυνμένῳ, καὶ ὄντι ἐν τόπῳ. The corporeal world is distantly present to the intelligible (or the Deity); and that is indivisibly and indistantly present with the world. But when that, which is indistant and unextended, is present with that which is distant and extended; then is the whole of the former one and the same numerically in every part of the latter. That is, it is indivisibly and unmultipliedly, and illocally there (according to its own nature) present with that, which is naturally divisible, and multipliable, and in a place.—Lastly, he affirmeth the same likewise of the human soul, that this is also οὐσία ἀμεγέθης, a substance devoid of magnitude,—and which is not locally present to this or that body, but by disposition and energy; and therefore the whole of it in every part thereof undividedly. †

And as for the Christian writers, besides Origen, who was so famous an assertor of incorpo-

* Par. ii. Sententiarum ad intelligibilia docentium, §. 36. p. 241.

† Vide par. i. Sententiar. §. 18. p. 225.

real substance, that (as Socrates recordeth) the Egyptian monks and Anthropomorphites threatened death to Theophilus the Alexandrian bishop, unless he would at once execrate and renounce the writings of Origen, and profess the belief of a corporeal God of human form; and who also maintained incorporeal substance to be unextended, as might be proved from sundry passages, both of his book against Celsus, and that *Peri Archon*; we say (besides Origen, and others of the Greeks), St. Austin amongst the Latins clearly asserted the same; he maintaining in his book *De Quantitate Animæ*,^b and elsewhere, concerning the human soul, that being incorporeal, it hath no dimensions of length, breadth, and profundity, and is *illocabilis*, no where as in a place. We shall conclude with the testimony of Boethius, who was both a philosopher and a Christian: "*Quædam sunt (saith he) communes animi conceptiones, per se notæ, apud sapientes tantum; ut incorporalia non esse in loco.*" There are certain common conceptions, or notions of the mind, which are known by themselves amongst wise men only; as this, for example, that incorporeals are in no place.—From whence it is manifest, that the generality of reputed wise men were not formerly of this opinion, "*quod nusquam est, nihil est,*" that what is no where, or in no certain place, is nothing;—and that this was not

^a *Histor. Eccles. lib. vi. cap. vii. p. 310.*

^b It is published in the first volume of the Benedictine edition of St. Augustine's works.

^c Dr. Cudworth seems to have quoted this passage from memory out of Boethius's book, intitled, "*Quomodo Substantiæ in eo, quod sint, bonæ sint, cum non sint Substantialia bona,*" p. 167.

looked upon by them as a common notion, but only as a vulgar error.

By this time we have made it unquestionably evident, that this opinion of incorporeal substance being unextended, indistant, and devoid of magnitude, is no novel or recent thing, nor first started in the scholastic age; but that it was the general persuasion of the most ancient and learned assertors of incorporeal substance, especially that the Deity was not part of it here, and part of it there, nor the substance thereof measurable by yards and poles, as if there were so much of it contained in one room, and so much and no more in another, according to their several dimensions; but that the whole undivided Deity was at once in every part of the world, and consequently no where locally after the manner of bodies. But, because this opinion seems so strange and paradoxical, and lies under so great prejudices, we shall in the next place shew, how these ancient Incorporealists endeavoured to acquit themselves in repelling the several efforts and plausibilities made against it. The first whereof is this, that to suppose incorporeal substances unextended and divisible is to make them absolute parvities, and by means of that, to render them all (even the Deity itself) contemptible: since they must of necessity be either physical minimums, that cannot actually be divided further by reason of their littleness (if there be any such thing), or else mere mathematical points, which are not so much as mentally divisible: so that thousands of these incorporeal substances, or spirits, might dance together at once upon a needle's point. To which it was long

since thus replied by Plotinus: Οὐχ οὕτω
 δὲ ἄμερος ὡς μακρόν· ὅτι γὰρ οὐδὲν ἦντον καὶ
 μεριστὸν ἔσται· καὶ οὐ παντὶ αὐτὸ ἐφαρμόσει· οὐδ'
 ἂν αὐξομένη τὸ αὐτὸ συνέσται· ἀλλ' οὐδ' οὕτως ὡς σημείον,
 οὐ γὰρ ἐν σημείῳ ὁ ὄγκος, ἀλλ' ἄπειρα ἐν αὐτῷ, οὐδ' ὡς
 ἐφαρμόσει. God, and all other incorporeal sub-
 stances, are not so indivisible, as if they were
 parvitutes, or little things, as physical points; for
 so would they still be mathematically divisible;
 nor yet as if they were mathematical points nei-
 ther, which indeed are no bodies nor substances,
 but only the *termini* of a line. And neither of
 these ways could the Deity *congruere* with the
 world; nor souls with their respective bodies, so as
 to be all present with the whole of them.—Again,
 he writeth particularly concerning the
 Deity thus: Οὐτε οὕτως ἄμερος, ὡς τὸ σμι-
 κρώτατον, μέγιστον γὰρ ἀπάντων, οὐ μέγεθαι,
 ἀλλὰ δυνάμει·—ληπτέον δὲ καὶ ἄπειρον αὐτὸν, οὐ τῷ
 αἰδεζητήν, ἢ τοῦ μεγέθους, ἢ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀπει-
 λήπτῳ τῆς δυνάμεως. God is not so indivisible, as if
 he were the smallest or least of things, for he is
 the greatest of all, not in respect of magnitude,
 but of power. Moreover, as he is indivisible, so
 is he also to be acknowledged infinite; not as if
 he were a magnitude, or a number, which could
 never be passed through, but because his power
 is incomprehensible.—Moreover, the same philo-
 sopher condemneth this for a vulgar error, pro-
 ceeding from sense and imagination, that what-
 soever is unextended, and indistant, must there-
 fore needs be little; he affirming, on the contrary,
 the vulgar to be much mistaken, as to
 true greatness and littleness: Μέγα νομί-
 ζοντες τὸ αἰσθητὸν, ἀπορούμεν, πῶς ἐν μεγάλῳ

P. 656.

[Ennead. vi.
lib. iv. cap.
xiii.]

P. 764.

[Ennead. vi.
lib. ix.]

P. 645.

[Ennead. vi.
lib. iv. cap. ii.]

καὶ τοσούτῃ ἐκείνη ἡ φύσις ἐκτείνεται· τὸ δὲ ἐστὶ τοῦτο· τὸ λεγόμενον μέγα μικρόν· ὃ δὲ νομίζεται μικρόν εἶναι μέγα. ἐπεὶ ὅλον ἐπὶ πᾶν τοῦτου μέρος φθάνει, μᾶλλον δὲ τοῦτο πανταχόθεν τοῖς αὐτοῦ μέρεσιν· ἐπ' ἐκεῖνο ἰὸν εὐρίσκει αὐτὸ πανταχοῦ πᾶν καὶ μείζον αὐτοῦ. We commonly, looking upon this sensible world as great, wonder how that (indivisible and unextended) nature of the Deity can every where comply, and be present with it. Whereas that, which is vulgarly called great, is indeed little; and that, which is thus imagined to be little, is indeed great. Forasmuch as the whole of this diffuseth itself through Sent. p. 243. [§. xxxvi.] every part of the other; or rather, this whole corporeal universe, in every one of its parts, findeth that whole and entire, and therefore greater than itself.—To the same purpose also Porphyrius: Τὸ ὄντως ὄν οὔτε μέγα, οὔτε μικρόν ἐστι· (τὸ γὰρ μέγα καὶ μικρόν κυρίως ὄγκου ἴδια) ἐκβεβηκὸς δὲ τὸ μέγα καὶ μικρόν· καὶ ὑπὲρ τὸ μέγιστον καὶ ὑπὲρ τὸ ἐλάχιστον, ταῦτο καὶ ἐν ἀριθμῷ ὄν· εἰ καὶ εὐρίσκεται ἅμα ὑπὸ παντὸς μεγίστου, καὶ ὑπὸ παντὸς ἐλαχίστου εὐρισκόμενον· μήτε ἄρα ὡς μέγιστον αὐτὸ ὑπονόησις· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀπορήσεις, πῶς μέγιστον ὄν τοῖς ἐλαχίστοις ὄγκοις πάρεστι, μὴ μειωθὲν, ἢ συσταλὲν· μήτε ὡς ἐλάχιστον, εἰ δὲ μὴ, πάλιν ἀπορήσεις, πῶς ἐλάχιστον ὄν τοῖς μεγίστοις ὄγκοις πάρεστι, μὴ πολλαπλασιασθὲν, ἢ αὐξηθὲν. The Deity, which is the only true being, is neither great nor little (forasmuch as great and little properly belong to corporeal bulk, or magnitude); but it exceedeth both the greatness of every thing that is great, and the littleness of whatsoever is little (it being more indivisible, and more one with itself, than any thing that is little, and more powerful than any thing that is great); so that it is above both the greatest and the least; it being found all one and the same

by every greatest, and every smallest thing participating thereof. Wherefore you must neither look upon God as the greatest thing (that is, in a way of quantity), for then you may well doubt, how being the greatest, he can be all of him present with every least thing, neither diminished, nor contracted; nor yet must you look upon him as the least thing neither: for if you do so, then will you be at a loss again, how, being the least thing, he can be present with all the greatest bulks; neither multiplied, nor augmented.—In a word, the sum of their answer amounts to this, that an incorporeal unextended Deity, is neither a physical point, because this hath distance in it, and is mentally divisible; nor yet a mathematical one, because this, though having neither magnitude nor substance in it, hath, notwithstanding, site and position; a point being, according to Aristotle,* a monad having site and position. It is not to be conceived as a parvitude, or very little thing, because then it could not *congruere* with all the greatest things; nor yet as a great thing, in a way of quantity and extension; because then it could not be all of it present to every least thing. Nor does true greatness consist in a way of bulk or magnitude, all magnitude being but little; since there can be no infinite magnitude, and no finite magnitude can have infinite power, as Aristotle before urged. And to conclude, though some, who are far from Atheists, may make themselves merry with that conceit of thousands of spirits dancing at once upon a needle's point; and though the Atheists may endeavour to rogue and ridicule all incorpo-

* De Anima, lib. ii. cap. vi. p. 13. vide etiam Metaphys. lib. xiii. cap. xii. p. 471. tom. iv. oper.

real substance in that manner, yet does this run upon a clear mistake of the hypothesis, and make nothing at all against it; forasmuch as an unextended substance is neither any parvitude, as is here supposed (because it hath no magnitude at all), nor hath it any place, or site, or local motion, properly belonging to it; and therefore can neither dance upon a needle's point, nor any where else.

But in the next place, it is further objected, that what is neither great nor little, what possesses no space, and hath no place nor site amongst bodies, must therefore needs be an absolute non-entity, forasmuch as magnitude or extention is the very essence of being or entity, as such; so that there can be neither substance nor accident unextended. Now, since whatsoever is extended is bodily, there can therefore be no other substance, besides body, nor any thing incorporeal, otherwise than as that word may be taken for a thin and subtile body; in which sense fire was, by some in Aristotle,* said to be *μάλιστα τῶν στοιχείων ἀσώματον*, and *ἀσωματώτατον*, the most incorporeal of all the elements;—and Aristotle^b himself useth the word in the same manner, when he affirmeth, that all philosophers did define the soul by three things, motion, sense, and incorporeity; several of those there mentioned by him understanding the soul to be no otherwise incorporeal, than as *σῶμα λεπτομερές*, a thin and subtile body.—In answer to which objection, we may remember, that Plato, in the passage before cited, declareth this to be but a vulgar error, that what-

* De Anima, lib. i. cap. ii. p. 6. tom. ii. oper.

^b Ibid.

soever doth not take up space, and is in no place, is nothing. He intimating the original hereof to have sprung from men's adhering too much to those lower faculties of sense and imagination, which are able to conceive nothing but what is corporeal. And accordingly Plotinus: *Ἡ* P. 656.

*μὲν αἰσθησις, ἣ προσέχοντες ἀπιστοῦμεν τοῖς λε-
γομένοις, λέγει ὅτι ὧδε καὶ ὧδε· ὁ δὲ λόγος τὸ ὧδε καὶ ὧδε
φησιν, οὐκ ἐκταθεῖσαν ὧδε καὶ ὧδε γεγονέναι, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐκτα-
θεῖν πᾶν αὐτοῦ μετεληφέναι, ὅντος ἀδιαστάτου αὐτοῦ.* Sense,
indeed, which we attending to, disbelieve these
things, tells us of here and there; but reason
dictates, that here and there is so to be under-
stood of the Deity, not as if it were extendedly
here and there, but because every extended thing,
and the several parts of the world, partake every
where of that, being indistant and unextended.—

To the same purpose Porphyrius: *Δεῖ τοί-
νυν ἐν ταῖς σκέψεσι κατακρατοῦντας τῆς ἐκατέρου* 'Λφ. p. 342.

*ιδιότητος μὴ ἐπαλλάττειν τὰς φύσεις· μᾶλλον δὲ τὰ προσ-
όντα τοῖς σώμασιν, ἢ τοιαῦτα, μὴ φαντάζεσθαι καὶ δοξάζειν
περὶ τὸ ἀσώματον· τῶν μὲν γὰρ σωμάτων, ἐν συνηθείᾳ πᾶς·
ἐκείνων δὲ μόλις ἐν γνώσει γίνεται. ἀοριστῶν περὶ αὐτὰ, ἕως
ἀν' ὑπὸ φαντασίας κρατῆται·* We ought therefore, in our
disquisitions concerning corporeal and incor-
poreal beings, to conserve the property of each,
and not to confound their natures; but especial-
ly to take heed, that our fancy and imagination
do not so far impose upon our judgments, as to
make us attribute to incorporeals what properly
belongeth to bodies only. For we are all accus-
tomed to bodies; but as for incorporeals, scarcely
any one reaches to the knowledge of them;
men always fluctuating about them, and diffiding
them, so long as they are held under the power of

their imagination.—Where afterwards he propoundeth a form for this, how we should think of incorporeals, so as not to confound their natures with corporeals; ἐν ἀπείροις μέρεσι τοῦ διαστατοῦ παρὸν ὅλον τὸ ἀδιάστατον, οὔτε μερισθὲν πάρεστι, τῷ μέρει διδόν μέρος, οὔτε πληθυνθὲν τῷ πλήθει παρέχον ἑαυτὸ πολλά πλησιάσθην· ἀλλ' ὅλον πᾶσι τε τοῖς μέρεσι τοῦ ὀγκωμένου, ἐνί τε ἐκάστῳ τοῦ πλήθους, ἀμερῶς καὶ ἀπληθύντως καὶ ὡς ἐν ἀριθμῷ· τὸ δὲ μερικῶς καὶ διηρημένως ἀπολαμβάνει αὐτοῦ. That the indistant and unextended Deity is the whole of it present in infinite parts of the distant world, neither divided, as applying part to part; nor yet multiplied into many wholes, according to the multiplicity of those things that partake thereof. But the whole of it (one and the same in number) is present to all the parts of the bulky world, and to every one of those many things in it, undividedly and unmultipliedly; that in the mean time partaking thereof dividedly.—It was granted therefore by these ancients, that this unextended and indistant nature of incorporeals is ἀφάνταστον, a thing altogether unimaginal;—and this was concluded by them to be the only reason, why so many have pronounced it to be impossible, because they attended only to sense and imagination, and made them the only measure of things and truth; it having been accordingly maintained by divers of them (as Porphyrius tells us), that imagination and intellection are but two different names for one and the same thing: Ὀνόματος διαφορᾶς προστεθείσης τῇ τοῦ νοῦ ὑποστάσει, καὶ τῆς φαντασίας, ἢ γὰρ ἐν λογικῇ ζωῇ φαντασία ἐδίδокτο αὐτοῖς νόησις, There is a difference of names only, and no more, betwixt mind and fancy; fancy and imagination,

in rational animals, seeming to be the same thing with intellection.—But there are many things, which no man can have any phantasm or imagination of, and yet are they, notwithstanding, by all unquestionably acknowledged for entities, or realities; from whence it is plain, that we must have some other faculties in us, which extend beyond fancy and imagination. Reason indeed dictates, that whatsoever can either do or suffer any thing, must therefore be undoubtedly something; but that whatsoever is unextended, and hath no distant parts one without another, must therefore needs be nothing, is no common notion, but the spurious suggestion of imagination only, and a vulgar error. There need to be no fear at all, lest a Being infinitely wise and powerful, which acts upon the whole world, and all the parts thereof, in framing and governing the same, should prove a nonentity, merely for want of bulk and extension; or, because it swells not out into space and distance, as bodies do, therefore vanish into nothing. Nor do active force and power, as such, depend upon bulk and extension; because then whatsoever had the greater bulk, would have the greater activity. There are therefore two kinds of substances in the universe; the first corporeal, which are nothing but *ὄγκοι*, bulks, or tumours,—devoid of all self-active power; the second incorporeal, which are *δυνάμεις*, substantial powers, vigours, and activities;—which, though they act upon bulk and extension, yet are themselves unbulky, and devoid of quantity and dimensions; however, they have a certain *βάθος* in them in another sense, an essential profundity, according to this of Simpli-

1a. Ar. Phys. cius: Μεριστή μὲν ἀπλῶς ἡ σωματικὴ οὐσία πᾶσα, p. 3. ἄλλων ἀλλαχοῦ τῶν μερίων κειμένων· ἀμέριστος δὲ εἰλικρινῶς ἡ νοερά, πολὺ δὲ βάθος ἔχουσα. All corporeal substance is simply divisible, some parts of it being here, and some there; but intellectual substance is indivisible, and without dimensions, though it hath much of depth and profundity in it in another sense.—But that there is something ἀφάνταστον, unimaginable,—even in body itself, is evident, whether you will suppose it to be infinitely divisible, or not, as you must of necessity suppose one or other of these. And that we ought not always to pronounce of corporeal things themselves according to imagination, is manifest from hence; because, though astronomical reasons assure us, that the sun is really more than a hundred times bigger than the whole earth, yet can we not possibly, for all that, imagine the sun of such a bigness, nor indeed the earth itself half so big, as we know it to be. The reason whereof is, partly because we never had a sense or sight of any such vast bigness at once; as that of either of them; and partly because our sense always representing the sun to us, but ὡς πεδίαον, as of a foot diameter;*—and we being accustomed always to imagine the same according to the appearance of sense, are not able to frame any imagination of it, as very much bigger. Wherefore, if imagination be not to be trusted, nor made the criterion or measure of truth, as to sensible things themselves, much less ought it to be, as to things insensible. Besides all which, the ancient Incorporealists argued after this manner, that it

* Vide Cicero. Acad. Question. lib. iv. cap. xxvi. p. 2294. tom. viii. oper.

is as difficult for us to conceive a substance whose duration is unextended or unstretched out in time, into past, present, and future, and therefore without beginning; as that which is unextended as to parts, place, or space, in length, breadth, and thickness; yet does reason pronounce, that there must needs be not only a duration without beginning, but also *ἄχρονος αἰών*, a timeless eternity,—or a permanent duration, differing from that successive flux of time (which is one of Plato's* *γεννητά*, things generated,—or that had a beginning), this parity of reason is by Plotinus thus insisted on: *Δὲ οὐδ' ἐν χρόνῳ*, P. 669. [Ekd. *ἄλλα παντός χρόνου ἔξω, τοῦ μὲν χρόνον σκιδνα-* read. vi. lib. *μένον αἰεὶ πρὸς διάστασιν, τοῦ δ' αἰῶνος ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ* v. cap. xi.] *μένοντος καὶ κρατοῦντος, καὶ πλείονος ὄντος ἐν δυνάμει αἰδίδω,* *τοῦ ἐπὶ πολλὰ δοκοῦντος ἵνα χρόνον.* For the same reason, that we deny local extension to the Deity, must we also deny temporal distance to the same; and affirm, that God is not in time, but above time, in eternity. Forasmuch as time is always scattered and stretched out in length and distance, one moment following after another; but eternity remaineth in the same, without any flux; and yet nevertheless outgoeth time, and transcendeth the flux thereof, though seeming to be stretched and spun out more into length. Now, the reason, why we cannot frame a conception of such a timeless eternity, is only, because ourselves are essentially involved in time, and accordingly are our conceptions chained, fettered, and confined, to that narrow and dark dungeon, that ourselves are imprisoned in; notwithstand-

* In *Timæo*, p. 520. oper.

ing which, our freer faculties, assuring us of the existence of a being, which far transcendeth ourselves, to wit, one that is infinitely perfect; we have, by means hereof, *μαρτυρίαν τινα*, a certain vaticination,—of such a standing timeless eternity, as its duration.

But as for that conceit, of immaterial or incorporeal bodies, or that God and human souls are no otherwise incorporeal than as *σῶμα λεπτομερές*, a thin and subtile body,—such as wind or vapour, air or ether; it is certain, that, according to the principles of the most ancient atomic philosophy (before it was atheized), there being no such real quality of subtilty or tenuity (because this is altogether unintelligible), but this difference arising wholly from motion, dividing the insensible parts, and every way agitating the same, together with a certain contexture of those parts; it is not impossible, but that the finest and most subtile body that is, might become as gross, hard, heavy, and opaque, as flesh, earth, stones, lead, or iron; and again, that the grossest of these bodies, by motion, and a different contexture of parts, might not only be crystallized, but also become as thin, soft, and fluid, as the finest ether. So that there is no specific difference betwixt a thick and thin, a gross and fine, an opaque and pellucid, a hard and soft body, but accidental only; and therefore is there no reason, why life and understanding should be thought to belong to the one rather than to the other of them. Besides which, the reasons of the ancient Incorporealists (afterwards to be produced) will evince, that the human soul and mind cannot possibly be any body whatsoever, though never so fine, thin, and subtile,

whose parts are by motion dividable, and separable from one another.

But it is further objected against this unextended nature, of incorporeal substances, as they are said to be all in the whole, and all in every part of that body, which they are united into, or act upon; that this is an absolute contradiction and impossibility, because if the whole of the Deity be in this one point of matter, then can there be nothing at all of it in the next adjoining, but that must needs be another whole, and nothing the same with the former. In like manner, if the whole human soul be in one part of this organized body, then can there be none at all of it in any other part thereof; and so not the whole in the whole. To which objection the ancient Incorporealists made this two-fold reply: first, in way of concession, That this is indeed an absolute contradiction for an extended substance, or body to be all of it in every one part of that space, which the whole occupieth. Thus Plotinus:

Σώματι ἀδύνατον ἐν πλείοσι τὸ αὐτὸ ὅλον εἶναι, En. 4. 1. vii.

καὶ τὸ μέρος ὅπερ τὸ ὅλον ὑπάρχειν. It is im- p. 460.

possible for a body, or extended substance, to be one and the same, all of it in every part of that space which it possesses; and for every part thereof to be the same with the whole.—But, secondly, as for an unextended and indistant substance, which hath no parts one without another, it is so far from being a contradiction, that it should be all of it in every part of that body, which it acts upon; that it is impossible it should be otherwise, only a part in a part thereof, so that an equal quantity of both should coexist together, because this is to suppose an unex-

tended substance to be extended. We say it is contradictory to the nature of that substance, which is supposed to be ἀμεγέθης, ἄπορος, ἀδιάστατος, ἀμερής, ἀδιαίρετος, devoid of magnitude, and of quantity, and of parts indistant, and indivisible;—that it should be otherwise united to, or conjoined with, an extended body, than after this way, which is looked upon as such conjuring; namely, that the whole of it should be present with, and act upon every part thereof. Thus

P. 662. Plotinus: Οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγμα-

τος, καὶ τῆς οὐσίας ἀλλότριον οὐδέν, οὐδ' ἐκ τῆς ἑτέρας φύσεως ἐκύσας. This form of doctrine, concerning Incorporeals, is necessarily taken from the thing itself (viz. the nature of them as unextended), and hath nothing in it alien from that essence, as confounding the corporeal nature therewith.—Whatsoever is unextended and indistant, cannot possibly coexist with an extended substance, point by point, and part by part, but it must of necessity be ὅλον ἐν καὶ ταυτὸν ἀριθμῶ, all of it, one and the same numerically;—that is (like itself), undividedly, in every part of that which it acts upon. Wherefore the word ὅλον, in this form, when it is said, that the whole Deity is in every part of the world, and the whole soul in every part of the body, is not to be taken in a positive sense, for a whole consisting of parts, one without another, but in a negative only, for μὴ μεμερισμένον, an whole undivided;—so that the meaning thereof is no more than this, that the Deity is not dividedly in the world, nor the soul dividedly in the body, a part here and a part

P. 662. there; but the Τὸ Θεῶν is πανταχοῦ ὅλον μὴ μεμερισμένον, every where all of it, undi-

videdly.—Thus again Plotinus: Εἰ οὖν πανταχοῦ θεός, οὐχ' οἷόν τε μεμερισμένον· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐτι πανταχοῦ αὐτὸς εἴη, ἀλλ' ἕκαστον αὐτοῦ μέρος, τὸ μὲν ὧδ', τὸ δὲ ὧδ' ἔσται, αὐτὸς οὐχ' εἰς ἐτι ἔσται, ὥσπερ εἰ τμηθεῖν τι μέγεθος εἰς πολλά, καὶ τὰ μέρη πάντα, οὐκ ἐτι τὸ ὅλον ἐκεῖνο ἔσται· πρὸς τούτοις δὲ καὶ σῶμα· εἰ δὲ ταῦτα ἀδύνατα, πάλιν ἂν ἀνεφάνη τὸ ἀπιστούμενον, ἐν φύσει ἀνθρώπου, ὁμοῦ θεὸν νομίζειν καὶ πανταχοῦ τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα ὅλον εἶναι· If therefore God be every where, it cannot possibly be, that he should be so dividedly; because then himself would not be every where, but only a part of him here, and a part of him there, throughout the world; himself being not one undivided thing. Moreover, this would be all one, as if a magnitude were cut and divided into many parts, every one of which parts could not be that whole magnitude.—Lastly, this would be the very same, as to make God a body.—Now if these things be impossible, then must that so-much-disbelieved thing (looked upon as such a puzzling *griphus*, or rather as contradictory nonsense) be an undoubted truth, according to the common notions of mankind, that God is every where; to wit, that he is all of him the same whole, undividedly, every where. The sum of all is, that though it be an absolute contradiction, for a body, or *quantum*, to be ὁμοῦ πᾶν, all of it in every part of that space,—which the whole is in; yet it is no contradiction at all for an unextended and indistant being, to be all of it undividedly, in every part of that body it acts upon; but, on the contrary, it would be flatly contradictory to it, to say, that it is only part of it in a part; this being to divide an indivisible thing into parts.

The fourth and last objection against incorpo-

real and unextended substance is from that illocality and immobility (which will follow thereupon) of human souls, and other finite particular spirits, such as demons or angels; that this is not only itself very absurd, to suppose these finite and particular beings, to be thus illocal and immovable, no where, and every where (from whence it would seem to follow, that they might act the whole corporeal universe, or take cognizance of all things therein every where); but also, that this conceit is contradictory to the very principles of religionists themselves, and plainly confuted by the same; they acknowledging universally, that human souls (at death) departing out of this body, do locally move from thence into a certain other place, called Hades, Hell, or Inferi. Now the latter part of this objection is first to be answered. And this is indeed a thing, which the ancient assertors of incorporeal substance, as unextended, were not unaware of; that the vulgarly-received tradition, of human souls (after death) going into hades, might be objected against them. For the satisfying whereof, Plotinus suggesteth

these two things; first, *Τὸ μὲν εἰς Ἄδου γίνεσθαι, εἰ μὲν ἐν τῷ Ἀϊδεῖ τὸ χωρὶς λέγεται*
En. 6. l. iv.
 [cap. xvi. p.
 659.]

That if by hades be meant nothing but τὸ ἀσὺς, the invisible (as many times it is), then is there no more signified by the soul's going into hades, than its no longer being vitally united to this earthy body, and but acting apart by itself, and so hath it nothing of place necessarily included in it. Secondly: *Εἰ δὲ τινα χεῖρω τόπον· τί θαυμαστόν; ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν οὐ τὸ σῶμα ἡμῶν ἐν τῷ τόπῳ κάκεινη λέγεται ἐκεῖ· ἀλλ' οὐκ ὄντος ἐτι σώματος; ἢ τὸ εἶδωλον εἰ μὴ ἀποσπασθείη, πῶς οὐκ ἐκεῖ οὐ τὸ εἶδωλον* But if by hades

be understood a certain worser place (as sometimes it also is), what wonder is this? since now where our body is, there in the same place is our soul said to be also? But you will reply, How can this be, when there is now no longer any body left? We answer, that if the idol of the soul be not quite separated from it, why should not the soul itself be said to be there also, where its idol is? Where, by the idol of the soul, Plotinus seems to mean an airy or spirituous body, quickened and vitalized by the soul, adhering to it after death. But when the same philosopher supposes this very idol of the soul to be also separable from it, and that so as to subsist apart by itself too, this going alone into hades, or the worser place, whilst that liveth only in the intelligible world (where there is no place nor distance), lodged in the naked Deity, having nothing at all of body hanging about it, and being now not a part but the whole, and so situate neither here nor there; in this high flight of his, he is at once both absurdly paradoxical, in dividing the life of the soul as it were into two, and forgot the doctrine of his own school, which, as himself elsewhere intimateth, was this; *τὴν ἡμετέραν*

ψυχὴν τὸδε μὲν σῶμα καταλείψειν, οὐ πάντα δὲ En. 4. l. iii. c. iv. [p. 374.]

ἔξω σώματος ἕσθαι that our soul, though it shall quit this body, yet shall it never be dis-united from all body. Wherefore Porphyrius answering the same objection, though he were otherwise much addicted to Plotinus, and here uses his language too, yet does he in this depart from him, adhering to the ancient Pythagoric tradition; which, as will appear afterwards, was Λφ. p. 235. this, "That human souls are always

united to some body or other." "Ὡςπερ τὸ ἐπὶ γῆς εἶναι ψυχῇ ἐστίν, οὐ τὸ γῆς ἐπιβαίνειν, ὡς τὰ σώματα· τὸ δὲ προεστάναι σώματος, ὃ γῆς ἐπιβαίνει· οὕτω καὶ ἐν ᾧδου εἶναι ἐστὶ ψυχῇ, ὅταν προεστήκει εἰδῶλον, φύσιν μὲν ἔχοντος εἶναι ἐν τόπῳ, σκοτεῖ δὲ τὴν υπόστασιν κεκτημένου· ὥστε εἰ ὁ Ἄδης ὑπόγειός ἐστι τόπος σκοτεινός, ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν ᾧδου γίνεται ἐφελκομένη τὸ εἰδῶλον· ἐξελεύσῃ γὰρ αὐτῇ τοῦ στερεοῦ σώματος, τὸ Πνεῦμα συνομαρτεῖ, ὃ ἐκ τῶν σφαιρῶν συνελέξατο· ἐπεὶ δὲ διήκει τὸ βαρὺ πνεῦμα, καὶ ἔνυγρον, ἄχρι τῶν ὑπογείων τόπων, οὕτω καὶ αὕτη λέγεται χωρεῖν ὑπὸ γῆν· οὐχ ὅτι ἡ αὕτη οὐσία μεταβαίνει τόπους, καὶ ἐν τόποις γίνεται· ἀλλ' ὅτι τῶν πεφυκότων σωμάτων, τόπους μεταβαίνειν, σχέσις ἀναδέχεται· As the soul's being here upon earth (saith he) is not its moving up and down upon it, after the manner of bodies, but its presiding over a body, which moveth upon the earth; so is its being in hades nothing but its presiding over that idol, or enlivened vaporous body, whose nature it is to be in a place, and which is of a dark subsistence. Wherefore, if hades be taken for a subterraneous and dark place, yet may the soul nevertheless be said to go into hades, because when it quits this gross earthy body, a more spirituous and subtile body, collected from the spheres (or elements) doth still accompany it. Which spirit being moist and heavy, and naturally descending to the subterraneous places, the soul itself may be said in this sense to go under the earth also with it, not as if the substance thereof passed from one place to another, but because of its relation and vital union to a body which does so. Where Porphyrius addeth, contrary to the sense of Plotinus; That the soul is never quite naked of all body, but hath alway some body or other joined with it suitable and agreeable to its own present

disposition (either a purer or impurer one). But that at its first quitting this gross earthy body, the spirituous body, which accompanieth it (as its vehicle), must needs go away fouled and incrassated with the gross vapours and steams thereof, till the soul afterwards by degrees purging itself, this becometh at length a dry splendour, which hath no misty obscurity, nor casteth any shadow.

But because all this doctrine of the ancient Incorporealists, concerning the human soul's being always (after death) united to some body or other, is more fully declared by Philoponus than by any other that we have yet met withal, we shall here excerpt some passages out of him about it. First, therefore, he declareth this

for his own opinion, agreeable to the ^{Procem. in} Aristot. de ^{An.} sense of the best philosophers; τὴν μὲν

λογικὴν χωριστήν, τὴν δὲ ἄλογον, τούτου μὲν χωριστήν, ἄλλου μὲντοι τινὸς σώματος ἀχώριστον, λέγω δὲ τοῦ Πνευματικοῦ, ἔστιν ἀληθὴς δόξα, ὡς δείξομεν that the rational soul, as to its energy, is separable from all body; but the irrational part, or life thereof, is separable only from this gross body, and not from all body whatsoever, but hath (after death) a spirituous or airy body, in which it acteth;—this I say is a true opinion, as shall be afterwards proved by us. And again: Ἡ δὲ ἄλογος οὐκ ἔτι ἐν τούτῳ ἔχει τὸ εἶναι, ἐπιδιαμένει γὰρ καὶ μετὰ ἔξοδον τὴν ἐκ τούτου τῆς ψυχῆς, Ὅχημα καὶ ὑποκείμενον ἔχουσα τὸ πνευματικὸν σῶμα· ὃ καὶ αὐτὸ ἔστι μὲν ἐκ τῶν τεσσάρων, λέγεται δὲ ἐκ τοῦ πλεονάζοντος τοῦ αἵματος ὡπερ καὶ τοῦτο γῆινον, λέγεται ἐκ τοῦ πλεονάζοντος. The irrational life of the soul hath not all its being in this gross earthy body, but remaineth after the soul's departure out

of it, having for its vehicle and subject, the spirituous body; which itself is also compounded out of the four elements, but receiveth its denomination from the predominant part, to wit, air; as this gross body of ours is called earthy, from what is most predominant therein.—Thus do we see, that, according to Philoponus, the human soul after death does not merely exercise its rational powers, and think only of metaphysical and mathematical notions, abstract things, which are neither in time nor place, but exerciseth also its lower sensitive and irrational faculties, which it could not possibly do, were it not then vitally united to some body; and this body then accompanying the soul he calls pneumatical, that is (not spiritual in the Scripture-sense, but), spirituous, vaporous, or airy. Let us therefore, in the next place, see what rational account Philoponus can give of this doctrine of the ancients, and of his own opinion agreeable thereunto:

Proœm. in Aristot. de An. Ἡ ψυχὴ ἡ ἡμετέρα, μετὰ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ του ἐξόδου, ὁμολογεῖται, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀποδείκνυται, εἰς ἄδου ἀφικνεῖσθαι, καὶ ποιναὶς ἐκεῖ τῶν οὐ καλῶς βεβιωμένων παρέχειν· οὐ γὰρ μόνον τοῦ εἶναι ἡμῶν φροντίζει ἡ πρόνοια, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ εὖ εἶναι· διὸ οὐκ ἀμελεῖται ἡ ψυχὴ εἰς τὸ παρὰ φύσιν ἐξολισθήσασα, ἀλλὰ τυγχάνει τῆς προσήκουσας ἐπιμελείας· καὶ ἐπειδὴ τὸ ἀμαρτάνειν αὐτῇ διὰ γλυκυθυμίαν ἐγένετο, ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ τὸ καθαρθῆναι δι' ἀλγύνσεως αὐτῇ γενήσεται· κἀνταῦθα γὰρ τὰ ἐναντία τῶν ἐναντίων ἰάματα. διὰ τοῦτο ἀλγύνεται ἡ καθαιρομένη ἐν τοῖς ὑπὸ γῆν δικαιοτηρίοις διὰ κολάσεως· Ἀλλ' εἰ σώματος ἡ ψυχὴ ἀδύνατον αὐτὴν παθεῖν· πῶς οὖν κολάζεται; ἀνάγκη οὖν πᾶσα σῶμά τι αὐτῆς ἐξῆφθαι, ὃ διακρινόμενον ἀμέτρως ἢ συγκρινόμενον, ὑπὸ ψύξεως ἢ καύσεως ἀμέτρου, ἀλγύνει τὴν ψυχὴν διὰ τὴν συμπάθειαν· ποῖον οὖν σῶμά ἐστι τὸ ἐξημένον αὐ-

της ; οὐ δὴπον τοῦτο ἀνελύθη γὰρ εἰς τὰ ἐξ ὧν συνέστηκεν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο, τὸ Πνευματικόν, ὃ λέγομεν, ἐν τούτῳ οὖν εἰσι πάντως διὰ τοῦτο ὡς ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ, θυμὸς καὶ ἐπιθυμία· καὶ τὰ ἐξῆς· Our human soul (in those who are not purged and cleansed in this life), after its departure out of this body, is acknowledged, or rather demonstrated, to go into hades, there to receive punishment for its evil actions past. For Providence does not only take care of our being, but also of our well-being. Therefore is the soul, though lapsed into a preternatural state, yet not neglected by Providence, but hath a convenient care taken of it, in order to its recovery. And since sinning had its original from the desire of pleasure, it must of necessity be cured by pain : for here also contraries are the cures of contraries. Therefore the soul being to be purged, is punished and pained in those subterraneous judicatories and prisons, in order to its amendment. But if the soul be incorporeal, it is impossible for it to suffer. How then can it be punished ? There must of necessity be some body joined with it ; which, being immoderately constringed or agitated, concreted or secreted, and discordantly moved by heat and cold, or the like, may make the soul sensible of pain, by reason of sympathy, as it is here in this life. What body therefore is that, which is then conjoined with the soul, after the dissolution of that earthy body into its elements ? Certainly it can be no other than this pneumatical, or spirituous body, which we now speak of ; for in this are seated, as their subject, the irascible and concupiscible passions, and they are inseparable from the same ; nor could they be in the soul disunited from all body : and

that soul which is freed from these, would be forthwith freed from generation; nor would it be concerned in those subterraneous judicatories and prisons, but be carried up aloft to the higher celestial regions, &c.—After which he endeavours further to confirm this opinion from the vulgar phenomena: Δῆλον δὲ ἐτι μᾶλλον ὅτι τί ἐστι τὸ πνευματικὸν σῶμα, καὶ τούτου ἀχώριστα θυμὸς καὶ ἐπιθυμία, ἐξ αὐτῆς τῶν πραγμάτων ἐνεργείας· πόθεν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς τάφοις τὰ σκιοειδῆ φαίνονται φαντάσματα; οὐ γὰρ δῆγε ἡ ψυχὴ ἐσχημάτισται, ἢ ὅλως ἐστὶν ὁρατὴ· ἀλλὰ φασὶ τὰς ἀκαθάρτους ψυχὰς, μετὰ τὴν ἔξοδον τούτου τοῦ σώματος πλανᾶσθαι ἐπὶ τινα χρόνον μετὰ τοῦ Πνεύματος, καὶ τοῦτο παραδεικνύει περὶ τοὺς τάφους· διοφροντιστέον εὐζωίας· ὑπὸ τούτου γὰρ φασὶ τοῦ πνεύματος, παχυνθέντος ἐκ μοχθηρᾶς διαίτης, κατασπᾶσθαι περὶ τὰ πάθη τὴν ψυχὴν. Furthermore, that there is such a pneumatical (spirituous, vaporous, or airy) body, which accompanieth souls unpurged after death, is evident also from the phenomena themselves. For what account can otherwise be given of those spectres and phantoms, which appear shadow-like about graves or sepulchres, since the soul itself is neither of any figure, nor yet at all visible? Wherefore these ancients say, that impure souls, after their departure out of this body, wander here, up and down, for a certain space, in their spirituous, vaporous, and airy body, appearing about sepulchres, and haunting their former habitations. For which cause there is great reason, that we should take care of living well, as also of abstaining from a fonder and grosser diet; these ancients telling us likewise, that this spirituous body of ours, being fouled and incrassated by evil diet, is apt to render the soul, in this life also, more obnoxious to

the disturbances of passions.—And here Philoponus goes on to gratify us with a further account of some other of the opinions of these ancients, concerning this spirituous or airy body, accompanying the soul after death: Ἐχει γάρ τι καὶ αὐτὸ, φασί, τῆς φυτικῆς ζωῆς, καὶ γὰρ τρέφεσθαι. τρέφεσθαι δὲ οὐχ οὕτως ὡς τοῦτο τὸ σῶμα, ἀλλὰ δι' ἀτμῶν οὐ διὰ μορίων, ἀλλ' ὅλον δι' ὅλου, φέρε εἰπεῖν, ὡς οἱ σπόγγοι, δέχονται τοὺς ἀτμούς· διὰ τοῦτο φροντίζουσιν οἱ σπουδαῖοι τῆς λεπτοτέρας διαίτης καὶ ξηροτέρας, διὰ τὸ μὴ παχύνεσθαι τὸ πνεῦμα ἀλλὰ λεπτύνεσθαι· πρὸς τοῦτο καὶ τοὺς καθαρούς φασί παραλαμβάνειν· τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ τὸ σῶμα ὕδατι πλύνεται, ἐκείνῳ δὲ καθαροῖς διὰ τῶν ἀτμῶν, διὰ γὰρ ἀτμῶν τινῶν τρέφεται τινῶν δὲ καθαίρεται· οὐ διωργανῶσθαι δὲ φασιν αὐτό, ἀλλ' ὅλον δι' ὅλου ἐνεργεῖν, κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις, καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι· διὸ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης φησὶν ἐν τοῖς μετὰ τὰ φυσικά, ὅτι ἡ κυρίως αἰσθησις μία, καὶ τὸ κυρίως αἰσθητήριον ἓν· They further add, that there is something of a plantal and plastic life also, exercised by the soul, in those spirituous or airy bodies after death; they being nourished too, though not after the same manner, as these gross earthy bodies of ours are here, but by vapours; and that not by parts or organs, but throughout the whole of them (as sponges), they imbibing every where those vapours. For which cause, they, who are wise, will in this life also take care of using a thinner and dryer diet, that so that spirituous body (which we have also at this present time within our grosser body) may not be clogged and incrassated, but attenuated. Over and above which, those ancients made use of cathartics, or purgations, to the same end and purpose also: for as this earthy body is washed by water, so is that spirituous body cleansed by

cathartic vapours ; some of these vapours being nutritive, others purgative. Moreover, these ancients further declared concerning this spirituous body, that it was not organized, but did the whole of it, in every part throughout, exercise all functions of sense, the soul hearing, and seeing, and perceiving all sensibles, by it every where. For which cause, Aristotle himself affirmeth, in his *Metaphysics*, that there is properly but one sense, and but one sensory ; he, by this one sensory, meaning the spirit, or subtile airy body, in which the sensitive power doth all of it, through the whole, immediately apprehend all variety of sensibles. And if it be demanded, how it comes then to pass, that this spirit appears organized in sepulchres, and most commonly of human form, but sometimes in the form of some other animals ? to this those ancients replied, That their appearing so frequently in human form proceedeth from their being incrassated with evil diet, and then, as it were, stamped upon with the form of this exterior ambient body in which they are, as crystal is formed and coloured like to those things, which it is fastened in, or reflects the image of them ; and that their having sometimes other different forms proceedeth from the fantastic power of the soul itself, which can at pleasure transform this spirituous body into any shape : for being airy, when it is condensed and fixed, it becometh visible ; and again invisible, and vanishing out of sight, when it is expanded and rarified.

Now, from these passages cited out of Philoponus, it further appeareth, that the ancient assertors of the soul's immortality did not suppose

human souls, after death, to be quite stripped stark naked from all body ; but that the generality of souls had then a certain spirituous, vaporous, or airy body accompanying them, though in different degrees of purity or impurity respectively to themselves. As also, that they conceived this spirituous body (or at least something of it) to hang about the soul also here in this life, before death, as its interior indument or vestment, which also then sticks to it, when that other gross earthly part of the body is, by death, put off as an outer garment. And some have been inclinable to think (by reason of certain historic phenomena) these two to be things so distinct, that it is not impossible for this spirituous body, together with the soul, to be locally separated from the other grosser body, for some time before death, and without it. And indeed thus much cannot be denied, that our soul acteth, not immediately only upon bones, flesh, and brains, and other such-like gross parts of this body, but first and chiefly upon the animal spirits, as the immediate instruments of sense and fancy, and that, by whose vigour and activity the other heavy and unwieldy bulk of the body is so nimbly moved. And therefore we know no reason but we may assent here to that of Porphyrius,* τὸ αἷμα νομὴ καὶ τροφή ἐστὶ τοῦ πνεύματος, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα ὄχημα τῆς ψυχῆς ; that the blood is the food and nourishment of the spirit (that is, that subtle body called the animal spirits), and that this spirit is the vehicle of the soul, or the more immediate seat of life.

Nevertheless, the same Philoponus there add-

* Vide lib. de Antro. Nymphar. p. 257. 259.

eth, that, according to these ancients, besides the terrestrial body, and this spirituous and airy body too, there is yet a third kind of body, of a higher rank than either of the former (peculiarly belonging to such souls after death, as are purged and cleansed from corporeal affections, lusts, and passions), called by them σῶμα αὐγοαδες, and οὐράκιον, and αἰθέριον, &c. a luciform, and celestial, and ethereal body. The soul (saith he) continueth either in the terrestrial or the aërial body so long ἕως ἑαυτὴν καθήρασαι ἀνεχθῇ, τῆς γενέσεως ἀπαλλαγείσα· τότε τοῖνον καὶ τὸν θυμόν, καὶ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἀποτίθεται, μετὰ τούτου τοῦ ὀχήματος, τοῦ πνεύματος λέγω· εἶναι δὲ τι καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἄλλοτι αἰδίως αὐτῆς ἐξημμένον, σῶμα οὐράκιον καὶ διὰ τοῦτο αἰδίον, ὃ φασιν Αὐγοαδες ἢ Ἀστροαδες· τῶν γὰρ ἐγκοσμίων οὖσαν ἀνάγκη πάντως ἔχειν τινὰ κληρον, ὃν διοικεῖ, μέρος ὄντα τοῦ κόσμου· καὶ ἐὶ ἀεικίνητός ἐστι, καὶ δεῖ αὐτὴν αἰεὶ ἐνεργεῖν, δεῖ ἔχειν αἰδίως ἐξημμένον τὸ σῶμα, ὃ αἰεὶ ζωοποιήσει· διὰ ταῦτα οὖν τὸ αὐγοαδες φασὶ σῶμα αὐτὴν αἰεὶ ἔχειν, until that, having purged itself, it be carried aloft, and freed from generation. And then doth it put off both the irascible and concupiscible passions at once, together with this second vehicle, or body, which we call spirituous. Wherefore these ancients say, that there is another heavenly body always conjoined with the soul, and eternal, which they call luciform, and star-like: for it being a mundane thing, must of necessity have some part of the world as a province allotted to it, which it may administer. And since it is always moveable and ought always to act, it must have a body eternally conjoined with it, which it may always enliven. And for these causes do they affirm the soul always to have a luciform body.—Which lu-

cid and ethereal body of the soul is a thing often mentioned by other writers also; as Pro-
clus, in his commentary upon the Ti- P. 290.

maeus: Καὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ψυχῆς ἐκέρηται τι τοιοῦτον ὄχημα αἰθέριον, ὡς αὐτὸς φησὶ· ἐμβιβάσαι γοῦν εἰς ὄχημα καὶ αὐτὴν φησὶ τὸν δημιουργόν· καὶ γὰρ πᾶσαν ψυχὴν ἀνάγκη πρὸ τῶν θνητῶν σωμάτων, αἰδίῳ καὶ εὐκίνητῳ χρῆσθαι σώματι, ὡς κατ' οὐσίαν ἔχουσιν τὸ κινεῖν. The human soul hath also (saith he) such an ethereal vehicle belonging to it, as Plato himself intimates, when he affirmeth the Demiurgus at first to have placed it in a chariot. For of necessity every soul, before this mortal body, must have an eternal and easily moveable body, it being essential to it to move.—And elsewhere the same Proclus:

Ἄνω μένοντες οὐδὲν δεόμεθα τούτων τῶν μεριστῶν P. 164.
ὀργάνων· ἃ ἡμῖν συνήρτηται κατελθοῦσιν εἰς γένεσιν, ἀλλ' ἀρκεῖ τὸ ὄχημα τὸ Αὐγοειδές, πᾶσας ἔχον ἡνωμένας τὰς αἰσθήσεις. Whilst we remain above, we have no need of these divided organs, which now we have descending into generation; but the uniform, lucid, or splendid vehicle is sufficient, this having all senses united together in it.—Which doctrine of the unorganized, luciform, and spirituous vehicles, seems to have been derived from Plato, he, in his Epinomis, writing thus concerning a good and wise man after death; ὃν καὶ δυσχρηρίζομαι παίζων καὶ σπουδάζων ἅμα; εἴνπερ θανάτῳ, τὴν αὐτοῦ μοῖραν ἀναπλήσει, μήτε μετέξειν ἐτι πολλῶν τότε, καθάπερ νῦν αἰσθήσεων, μᾶς μοίρας μετεληφότες μόνον, καὶ ἐκ πολλῶν ἓνα γεγονότα εὐδαίμονα εἶσεσθαι· of whom, whether I be in jest or earnest, I constantly affirm, that when dying he shall yield to fate, he shall no longer have this variety of senses, which now we have, but one uniform body, and live a happy life.—Moreover,

Hierocles^a much insisteth upon this, αὔγοιδὲς σῶμα, luciform and ethereal body,—ὁ καὶ ψυχῆς λεπτὸν ὄχημα οἱ χρησμοὶ καλοῦσι, which also (saith he) the oracles call the thin and subtle vehicle or chariot of the soul; he meaning, doubtless, by these oracles, the magical or Chaldaic oracles before mentioned. And amongst those now extant under that title, there seems to be a clear acknowledgment of these two vehicula of the soul, or interior induments thereof; the spirituous and the luciform body, the latter of which is there enigmatically called ἐπίπεδον, or a plain superficies in these words: ^b Μὴ Πνεῦμα μολύνῃς, μηδὲ βαθύνῃς τὸ Επίπεδον. Take care not to defile or contaminate the spirit; nor to make the plain superficies deep.—For thus Psellus glosseth upon that oracle: Δύο χιτῶνας ἐπεδύουσι τὴν ψυχὴν οἱ Χαλδαῖοι· καὶ τὸν μὲν Πνευματικὸν ὠνόμασαν, ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἐξυφανθέντα αὐτῇ· τὸν δὲ Αὔγοιδῇ, λεπτὸν καὶ ἀναφῇ, ὅνπερ Ἑπίπεδον· The Chaldaic philosophers bestow upon the soul two interior tunics or vestments, the one of which they called pneumatical, or the spirituous body, which is weaved out, as it were, to it, and compounded of the gross sensible body (it being the more thin and subtle part thereof); the other the luciform vestment of the soul, pure and pellucid, and this is that which is here called the plain superficies.—Which, saith Pletho,^c is not so to be understood, as if it had not three dimensions (forasmuch as it is a body also), but only to denote the subtlety and tenuity thereof. Wherefore, when the aforesaid Hierocles^d also calls this luciform and

^a Comment in aurea Pythagor. Carmina, p. 214, 215.

^b Oracul. Zoroastr. sect. 10. vers. 275, p. 394, ed. Clerici.

^c Comment. in hoc Oraculum.

^d Ubi supra, p. 222.

ethereal body, τὸ Πνευματικὸν Ὅχημα τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς, the spiritual vehicle of the rational soul—he takes not the word πνευματικόν, in that sense wherein it is used by Philoponus and others, as if he intended to confound this ethereal body with that other spirituous or airy body, and to make but one of them, but rather styles it spiritual, in a higher sense (and which cometh near to that of the Scripture), as being a body more suitable and cognate with that highest and divinest part of the soul, mind, or reason, than the other terrestrial body is (which, upon that account, is called also, by the same Hierocles,* as well as it is by St. Paul,^b σῶμα ψυχικόν, the animal or natural body). So that this spiritual body of Hierocles is not the airy, but the ethereal body, and the same with Synesius's,^c θεοπείσιον σῶμα, Divine body.—And that this distinction of two interior vehicles or tunics of the soul, besides that outer vestment of the terrestrial body (styled in Plato τὸ ὀστρεώδες, the crustaceous, or ostraceous body)—is not a mere figment of the latter Platonists since Christianity, but a tradition derived down from antiquity, appeareth plainly from Virgil, in his sixth *Æneid*, where, though not commonly understood, he writeth first of the spirituous or airy body, in which unpurged souls receive punishment after death, thus:

Quin et supremo cum lumine vita relinquit,
Non tamen omne malum miseris, nec funditus omnes
Corporeæ excedunt pestes; penitusque necesse est
Multa diu concreta modis inolescere miris.
Ergo exercentur pœnis, veterumque malorum
Supplicia expendant; alias panduntur inanes
Suspensæ ad ventos; aliis sub gurgite vasto
Infectum eluitur scelus, aut exuritur igni.

* Ubi supra, p. 214. ^b Cor. xv. 44. ^c D Insomniis, p. 140 oper.

And then again of the other pure ethereal and fiery body, in this manner :

*Donec longa dies perfecto temporis orbe
Concretam exemit labem, purumque reliquit
Æthereum sensum, atque aural simplicis ignem.*

Now, as it was before observed, that the ancient assertors of the soul's immortality, supposing it to have, besides this terrestrial body, another spirituous or airy body, conceived this not only to accompany the soul after death, but also to hang about it here in this life, as its interior vest or tunicle (they probably meaning hereby the same with that, which is commonly called the animal spirits, diffused from the brain, by the nerves, throughout this whole body); in like manner it is certain, that many of them supposing the soul, besides those two forementioned, to have yet a third luciform, or ethereal body, conceived this in like manner to adhere to it even in this mortal life too, as its inmost clothing or tunicle; yet, so as that they acknowledged the force thereof to be very much weakened and abated, and its splendour altogether obscured by the heavy weight and gross steams or vapours of the terrestrial body. Thus Suidas, upon the word *Αἰγροειδής*, tells us out of Isidore, *ὡς ἔχει ἡ ψυχὴ Αἰγροειδὲς Ὀχῆμα, λεγόμενον ἀστροειδὲς τε καὶ αἰδίων· καὶ τοῦτο μὲν τὸ Αἰγροειδὲς σῶμα τῷδε ἀποκέκλεισται ἐνίῳις μὲν εἴρω τῆς κεφαλῆς* that, according to some philosophers, the soul hath a certain luciform vehicle, called also star, or sun-like, and eternal; which luciform body is now shut up within this terrestrial body (as a light in a dark lantern), it being supposed by some of them to be included within the head, &c.—With

which agreeeth Hierocles: Ἐν τῷ θνητῷ ἡμῶν
 σώματι, τὸ Αὐγουδὲς ἔγκειται, προσπνίου τῷ P. 393.
[p. 214. edit.
Needhami.]
 αἰφύχῃ σώματι ζωὴν, καὶ τὴν ἀρμονίαν αὐτοῦ
 συνέχον· The splendid or luciform body lieth in
 this mortal body of ours, continually inspiring it
 with life, and containing the harmony thereof.—
 The ground of which opinion was, because these
 philosophers generally conceived the human soul
 to have pre-existed before it came into this earthly
 body, and that either from eternity, or else from
 the first beginning of the world's creation; and
 being never without a body, and then in a perfect
 state, to have had a lucid and ethereal body,
 either coeternal, or coeve with it (though in or-
 der of nature junior to it), as its chariot or vehicle;
 which being incorruptible, did always insepara-
 bly adhere to the soul, in its after-lapses and de-
 scents, into an aëreal first, and then a terrestrial
 body; this being, as it were, the vinculum of
 union betwixt the soul and them. Thus Pletho^a
 declares their sense: Διὰ δὲ τοιαύτου σώματος τῷ δήποτε
 τῷ θνητῷ τήνγε ἀνθρωπίνην ψυχὴν συγγίγνεσθαι, ὅλου ὅλη
 τῷ τοῦ ἐμβρύου ζωτικῷ πνεύματι διὰ συγγένειαν ἐπιπλεκο-
 μένου ἅτε πνεύματος τινος καὶ αὐτοῦ ὄντος. By this ethe-
 real body is our human soul connected with its
 mortal body; the whole thereof being implicated
 with the whole vital spirit of the embryo, for as
 much as this itself is a spirit also.—But long be-
 fore Pletho was this doctrine declared and as-
 serted by Galen; as agreeable both to
 Plato's and his own sense; he first pre-
 mising, that the immediate organ or in-
 strument of sight was αὐγουδὲς, a luci-
 form and ethereal spirit:—Διόντως οὖν ἐροῦμεν αὐ-

Dog. Hip. et
 Plat. l. vii.
 [cap. xiii.
 p. 1043.
 tom. i. oper.]

^a In Orac. Chald.

γοειδὲς μὲν εἶναι τὸ τῆς ὀφθαλμοῦ ὄργανον, αἰροειδὲς δὲ τὸ τῆς ἀκοῆς, ἀρμωειδὲς δὲ τὸ τῆς ὁσμῆς, καὶ τὸ μὲν τῆς γαστρὸς ὑγρὸν, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἀφῆς γαῖον, &c. Wherefore we may reasonably affirm, that the organ of sight is a luciform or ethereal body; as that of hearing is aërial; that of smelling vaporous; that of taste moist or watery; and that of touch earthy; like being perceived by like.—And he accordingly thus understanding those known verses of Empedocles, which, as Aristotle otherwise interprets them, are nonsense: Καὶ τοῦτ' ἄρ' ἦν ὃ βούλεται δηλοῦν ὁ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἐν οἷς φησι, Γαίῃ μὲν γὰρ γαῖαν, &c. αἰσθανόμεθα γὰρ ὄντως τῷ μὲν γεωδαιτέρῳ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων, τῆς γαῖας φύσεως, τῷ δ' αὐροειδέστῳ τῆς ὀφθαλμοῦ, τῆς αὐροειδοῦς. And this was that, which Empedocles meant to signify, in those famous verses of his; it being certain, that by the most earthy of our senses, the touch, we perceive the earthy nature of sensibles; and by the most luciform, viz. that of sight, the passions of light; by that, which is aëreal, sounds; by that, which is moist and sponge-like, tastes; and lastly, by the organ of smelling, which is the extremity of those former cavities of the brain, as replenished with vapours, odours,—After which he writeth of the essence or substance of the soul, in this manner: Εἰ δὲ καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς οὐσίας ἀποφῆναι χρὴ, δυοῖν θάτερον ἀναγκαῖον εἶπεν, ἢ τοῦτ' εἶναι τὸ οἶον Αὐροειδὲς, καὶ Αἰθερωειδὲς σῶμα λεκτέον αὐτῇ, εἰς ὃ καὶ μὴ βούλωνται κατ' ἀκολουθίαν ἀφικνουῦνται στοιχείοι, ἢ αὐτῇ μὲν ἀσώματον ὑπάρχειν οὐσίαν, ὅχημά τε τὸ πρῶτον αὐτῆς εἶναι ταῦτ' ὁ σῶμα, δι' οὗ μέσου τὴν πρὸς τ' ἄλλα σώματα κοινωνίαν λαμβάνει τοῦτα μὲν οὖν αὐτὸ δι' ὅλον λεκτέον ἡμῖν ἐκτετασθαι τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου· τῇ δὲ γε πρὸς αὐτὸ κοινωνίαν τὸ κατὰ τὰς ὀφθαλμοῦ αὐτῶν πνεῦμα φωτοειδὲς γίνεσθαι. And if we should

now declare any thing concerning the essence or substance of the soul, we must needs affirm one or other of these two things; that either itself is this luciform and ethereal body (which the Stoics, whether they will or no, by consequence will be brought unto, as also Aristotle himself), or else that the soul is itself an incorporeal substance; but that this luciform ethereal body is its first vehicle, by which, as a middle, it communicates with the other bodies. Wherefore we must say, that this ethereal lucid body is extended throughout the whole brain; whence is that luciform spirit derived, that is the immediate instrument of sight.—Now from hence it was, that these philosophers, besides the moral purgation of the soul, and the intellectual or philosophical, recommended very much a mystical or teletic way of purifying this ethereal body in us, by diet and cathartics. Thus the forementioned Hierocles: * *Ἐπειδὴ καὶ τῷ Αὐγοειδεῖ ἡμῶν σῶματι πρόσθεν σῶμα θνητὸν ὄν, καθαρεύσαι δεῖ καὶ ταῦτο, &c.* Since to our lucid or splendid body, this gross mortal body is come by way of accession, we ought to purify the former also, and free it from sympathy with the latter.—And again afterwards: *Αἱ τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς καθάρσεις καὶ τοῦ Αὐγοειδοῦς ὀχήματος προμηθεύονται, ὅπως ἂν αὐταῖς ὑπόπτερον καὶ ταῦτο γινόμενον μὴ ἐμποδῶν ἴσχηται πρὸς τὴν ἄνω πορείαν, καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς.* Together with the purgations of the rational soul, the purification of the luciform or ethereal vehicle is also to be regarded; that this being made light, and elate or wingy, might no way hinder the soul's ascent upward: but he that endeavours to purify the mind only, neglecting

P. 294.
[p. 214. ed.
Needham.]

* Ibid. p. 216.

the body, applies not himself to the whole man.—Whereupon he concludes: Τὴν Τελεστικὴν ἐνέργειαν λέγω, Τὴν τοῦ Ἀνγούιδους καθαρκτικὴν δύναμιν. I therefore call this the telestic or mystic operation; which is conversant about the purgation of the lucid or ethereal vehicle.—And whereas philosophy was by Plato and Socrates^a defined to be a continual exercise of dying (which Pliny^b thought to be nothing but an hypochondriacal or atrabilarian distemper in them, in those words of his, which Salmasius, and other critics, can by no means understand, “est etiam quidam morbus, per sapientiam mori:” that the dying by wisdom or philosophy, is also but a certain kind of bodily disease or over-grown melancholy)—though they supposed this principally to consist in a moral dying to corporeal lusts and passions; yet was the design thereof partly mystical and telestic also, it driving at this further thing, that when they should put off this terrestrial body, they might at once die also to the spirituous or æreal; and then their soul have nothing left hanging about it, but only the pure ethereal body, its light-winged chariot: in Virgil’s language is

———Parumque relinqui
Æthereum sensum, atque aurai simplicis ignem.

Notwithstanding which, the Pythagoreans and Platonists seem not to have been all of them of this persuasion, that the same numerical ethereal body, which the soul was at first created with, continueth still about it, and adhereth to it inseparably to all eternity, during its descents into

^a Vide Platon. in Phædon. p. 378.

^b Hist. Natur. lib. vii. cap. 50.

other grosser bodies; but rather to have supposed, that, according to the moral disposition of the soul, it always finds or makes a cognate and suitable body correspondently pure or impure; and consequently, that by moral virtue and philosophy, it might again recover that celestial body, which was lost by its fall and descent hither. This seemeth to have been Porphyrius's^a sense, in these words of his: *Ὡς ἂν διατέθῃ ἡ ψυχὴ, ἐκρίσκει σῶμα τάξει καὶ τοῖς οἰκείοις διωρισμένον διὸ καθαρώτερον μὲν διακειμένη συμφύτον τὸ ἐγγὺς τοῦ αἰθέρου σῶμα, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ αἰθέριον.* However the soul be in itself affected, so does it always find a body suitable and agreeable to its present disposition; and therefore to the purged souls does naturally accrue a body, that comes next to immateriality; that is, an ethereal one.—And probably Plato^b was of the same mind, when he affirmed the soul to be always in a body, but sometimes of one kind, and sometimes of another.

Now from what hath been declared, it appeareth already, that the most ancient assertors of the incorporeity and immortality of the human soul supposed it, notwithstanding, to be always conjoined with a body. Thus Hierocles plainly: *Ἡ λογικὴ οὐσία συμφυὲς ἔχουσα σῶμα,* P. 289.
[p. 120. edit.
Needham.]
οὕτω παρὰ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ εἰς τὸ εἶναι παρῆλθεν,
ὥς μήτε τὸ σῶμα εἶναι αὐτὴν, μήτε ἀνεῖν σώματος· ἀλλ' αὐτὴν μὲν ἀσώματον, ἀπεκραινοῦσθαι δὲ εἰς σῶμα τὸ ὅλον αὐτῆς ἔδος. The rational nature having always a cognate body, so proceeded from the Demiurgus, as that neither itself is body, nor yet can it be with-

^a In Sententiis ad Intelligibilia ducentibus, §. 32. p. 233.

^b De Legibus, lib. x.

^c P. 214.

out body; but though itself be incorporeal, yet its whole form, notwithstanding, is terminated in a body.—Accordingly whereunto, the definition, ^{p. 290.} which he gives of a man, is this, *ψυχὴ λογικὴ μετὰ συμφυοῦς ἀθανάτου σώματος*, a rational soul, together with a cognate immortal body.—He concluding there afterwards, that this enlivened terrestrial body, or mortal man, is nothing but *εἶδωλον ἀνθρώπου*,* the image of the true man,—or an accession thereunto, which is therefore separable from the same. Neither doth he affirm this only of human souls, but also of all other rational beings whatsoever, below the supreme Deity, and above men, that they always naturally actuate a body. Wherefore a demon or angel (which words are used as synonymous by Hierocles) is also defined by him after the same manner, *ψυχὴ λογικὴ μετὰ φωτεινῶν σώματος*, a rational soul together with a lucid body.—And accordingly Proclus upon Plato's *Timæus*^b affirmeth, *πάντα δαίμονα τῶν ἡμετέρων κρείττονα ψυχῶν, καὶ νοεράν ἔχειν ψυχὴν, καὶ ὄχημα αἰθέριον*: that every demon, superior to human souls, hath both an intellectual soul and an ethereal vehicle; the entireness thereof being made up or compounded of these two things.—So that there is hardly any other difference left betwixt demons or angels, and men, according to these philosophers, but only this, that the former are lapsable into aëreal bodies only, and no further; but the latter into terrestrial also.* Now Hiero-

* P. 214. ^b Lib. v. p. 320.

* Vide Porphy. de Abstinent. ab Esu Animal. lib. ii. §. 38. p. 61. et alios.

cles positively affirmeth. this to have been the true cabala, and genuine doctrine of the ancient Pythagoreans, entertained afterwards by Plato; *Καὶ τοῦτο τῶν Πυθαγορείων ἦν δόγμα, ὃ δὴ Πλάτων ὕστερον ἐξέφηνεν, ἀπεκάσας ἐν μὲν τῇ δυνάμει ὑποπτερου ζεύγους τε καὶ ἡμιόχου, πᾶσαν θείαν τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνην ψυχὴν.* And this was the doctrine of the Pythagoreans, which Plato afterwards declared; he resembling every, both human and Divine soul (that is, in our modern language, every created rational being) to a winged chariot, and a driver or charioteer, both together:—meaning by the chariot, an enlivened body; and by the charioteer, the incorporeal soul itself acting it.

And now have we given a full account; in what manner the ancient assertors of incorporeal substance, as unextended, answered that objection against the illocality and immobility of particular finite spirits, demons, or angels, and human souls; that these being all naturally incorporate, however in themselves and directly immoveable, yet were capable of being in sense moved, by accident, together with those bodies, respectively, which they are vitally united to. But as for that pretence, that these finite spirits, or substances incorporeal, being unextended, and so having in themselves no relation to any place, might therefore actuate and inform the whole corporeal world at once, and take cognizance of all things therein; their reply hereunto was, that these being essentially but parts of the universe, and therefore not comprehensive of the whole, finite or particular, and not universal beings (as the three hypostases of the Platonic trinity are), the sphere of

* Ubi supra, p. 213.

their activity could not possibly extend any farther, than to the quickening and enlivening of some certain parts of matter and the world, allotted to them, and thereby of becoming particular animals; it being peculiar to the Deity, or that incorporeal substance, which is infinite, to quicken and actuate all things.

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
THE
WORKS
OF
RALPH CUDWORTH, D.D.

CONTAINING
THE TRUE INTELLECTUAL
SYSTEM OF THE UNIVERSE,
SERMONS, &c.

A NEW EDITION, WITH REFERENCES TO THE SEVERAL QUOTATIONS IN THE
INTELLECTUAL SYSTEM, AND A LIFE OF THE AUTHOR,

BY THOMAS BIRCH, M.A. F.R.S.

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THE TRUE
INTELLECTUAL SYSTEM
OF
THE UNIVERSE.

CHAP. V. CONTINUED.

BUT it would be no impertinent digression here, (as to the main scope of our present undertaking) should we briefly compare the forementioned doctrine and cabala of the ancient Incorporealists (the Pythagoreans and Platonists) with that of Christianity : and consider the agreement, or disagreement, that is betwixt them. First, therefore, here is a plain agreement of these best and most religious philosophers with Christianity in this : That the most consummate happiness, and highest perfection, that human nature is capable of, consisteth not in a separate state of souls, stripped naked from all body, and having no manner of converse with matter, as some high-flown persons in all ages have been apt to conceit. For such amongst the philosophers (and Platonists too) was Plotinus ; the unevenness and unsafeness of whose temper may sufficiently appear from hence, that as he conceived human souls might possibly ascend to so high a pitch, as quite to shake off

2 THE SOUL'S HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST

commerce with all body ; so did he on the other hand again imagine, that they might also descend and sink down so low, as to animate not only the bodies of brutes, but even of trees and plants too: two inconsistent paradoxes; the latter whereof is a most prodigious extravagancy, which yet Empedocles, though otherwise a great wit, seems to have been guilty of also, from those verses of his in Athenæus;*

ἦδη γὰρ ποτ' ἐγὼ γούρω μοῖρα το αἶρος τε,
θάματος τ', οἰανός τε καὶ εἰς ἄλ' ἑλλενος ἰχθύος.

And amongst the Jews, the famous Maimonides was also of this persuasion, it being a known aphorism of his, in his great work, דבא אן ניה דבא אן ניה: That in the world to come, or state of consummate happiness, there shall be nothing at all of body, but pure incorporeity.— Upon which account, being accused as a denier of the resurrection, (an article as well of the Jewish as of the Christian faith) he wrote that book entitled Iggereth Teman, purposely to purge himself, and to reconcile those two assertions together, which he doth after such a manner, as that there should be indeed a resurrection, at the first coming of the Jewish Messias, of some certain persons, to live here awhile upon the earth, eat and drink, marry and be given in marriage, and then die again; after which, in the world to come, they should for ever continue pure souls, ununited to any body. In which it may be well suspected, that the design Maimonides drove at, was against Christianity; which, notwithstanding, as to this particular, hath the

* Deipnosophist, lib. viii. p. 510.

concurrent suffrages of the best philosophers, that the most genuine and perfect state of the human soul, which in its own nature is immortal, is to continue for ever, not without, but with a body; and yet our high-flown enthusiasts generally (however calling themselves Christians), are such great spiritualists, and so much for the inward resurrection, (which we deny not to be a Scripture notion also; as in that of St. Paul, "If ye be risen with Christ," &c. And again, "If by any means I might attain to the resurrection of the dead,") as that they quite allegorize away, together with the other parts of Christianity, the outward resurrection of the body; and, indeed, will scarcely acknowledge any future immortality, or life to come, after death, their spirituality thus ending in Sadducism and infidelity, if not at length in downright Atheism and sensuality.

But, besides this, there is yet a further correspondence of Christianity with the forementioned philosophic cabala, in that the former also supposes the highest perfection of our human souls, not to consist in being eternally conjoined with such gross bodies as these we now have, unchanged and unaltered: for as the Pythagoreans and Platonists have always complained of these terrestrial bodies, as prisons, or living sepulchres of the soul; so does Christianity seem to run much upon the same strain, in these Scripture expressions: "In this we groan earnestly, desiring to be clothed upon with our house which is from heaven:" and again, "We that are in this tabernacle do groan, being burdened, not for that we would be un-

* Col. iii. 1.

c 2 Cor. v. 2.

b Phil. iii. 2.

d 2 Cor. v. 4.

4. THE AGREEMENT OF CHRISTIANITY.

clothed (that is, stripped quite naked of all body), but so clothed upon, that mortality might be swallowed up of life:" and, lastly, ^a "Ourselves also, which have the first-fruits of the Spirit, groan within ourselves, waiting for the adoption (sonship or inheritance), namely, the redemption of our bodies;" that is, the freedom of them from all those evils and maladies of theirs, which we here lie oppressed under. Wherefore we cannot think, that the same heavy load and luggage, which the souls of good men, being here burdened with, do so much groan to be delivered from, shall, at the general resurrection, be laid upon them again, and bound fast to them, to all eternity: for, of such a resurrection as this, Plotinus (though perhaps mistaking it for the true Christian resurrection), might have some cause to affirm, that it would be but *ἀνάστασις εἰς ἄλλον ὕπνον*, a resurrection to another sleep;—the soul seeming not to be thoroughly awake here, but, as it were, soporated with the dull steams and opiotic vapours of this gross body. For thus the author of the Book of Wisdom, ^b "The corruptible body presseth down the soul, and the earthly tabernacle weigheth down the mind, that museth upon many things." But the same will further appear, from that account, which the Scripture itself giveth us of the resurrection: and first, in general, when St. Paul, answering that query of the philosophic infidel, "How are the dead raised, or with what body do they come?" replieth in this manner, "Thou fool (that is, thou who thinkest to puzzle or baffle the Christian article of the resurrection, which thou understandest not), that which thou sowest is not quickened (to the production of any

^a Rom. viii. 23.

^b Chap. ix. 16.

thing), except it first die to what it was." And "thou sowest not that body that shall be, but bare grain," as of wheat, or of barley, or the like; but God (in the ordinary course of nature), giveth it a body, as it hath pleased him (that is, a stalk, and an ear, having many grains with husks in it, and therefore neither in quantity nor quality the same with that, which was sowed under ground), nor does he give to all seeds one and the same kind of body neither, but to every seed its own correspondent body; as to wheat one kind of ear, and to barley another. As if he should have said: Know that this present body of ours is to be looked upon but as a kind of seed of the resurrection-body, which therefore is accordingly in some sense the same, and in some sense not the same with it. Besides which general account, the particular oppositions, which the Scripture makes betwixt the present and future body, seem very agreeable to those of the philosophic cabala: for, first, the present body is said^a to be sowed "in corruption," but the future "raised in incorruption." For the children of the resurrection cannot die any more.^b And then "mortality shall be swallowed up of life."^c Wherefore the Christian resurrection-body, as well as that of the philosophic cabala, is *σῶμα ἀθάνατον*, and *ἀίδιον* too, (2 Cor. v. 1.) an immortal and eternal body. Again, the body sowed is said^d to be a dishonourable, ignominious, and inglorious body; and therefore called also by St. Paul, *τὸ σῶμα τῆς ταπεινώσεως ἡμῶν*, the body of our humility, or humiliation;—a body agreeable to this lapsed state of the soul, but the body, which

^a 1 Cor. xv. 42.^b Luke xx. 36.^c 1 Cor. xv. 54.^d 1 Cor. xv. 43.^e Phil. iii. 21.

shall be raised, shall be a glorious body; and σύμμορφον τῷ σώματι τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ, "conformable to that glorious body of Christ;" who, when but externally transfigured, his face "did shine as the sun," and his "raiment was white as the light." The glory of a body consisteth only in the comeliness of its proportion, and the splendour thereof: thus is there "one glory of the sun, another glory of the moon, and another glory of the stars;" that is, a different splendour of them. Wherefore the future body of the righteous, according to the Scripture also, as well as the philosophic cabala, will be σῶμα φωτεινόν, and σῶμα ἀνγυειδές, and σῶμα ἀστρουειδές, a glorious, splendid, luciform, and star-like body:—(Wisdom iii. 7.) ἐν καιρῷ ἐπισκοπῆς αὐτῶν ἐκλάμψουσι, "The righteous, in the time of their visitation, shall shine forth."—(Dan. xii. 2, 3.) "They, that be wise, shall shine as the brightness of the firmament; and they, that turn many to righteousness, as the stars for ever and ever." And (Matt. xiii. 43.) "Then shall the righteous shine forth as the sun in the kingdom of their Father." And therefore probably this future glorious resurrection-body is that "inheritance of the saints in light," which the Scripture speaks of, Col. i. 12. Moreover, there is another difference betwixt this present and that future body of the righteous, wherein St. Paul^b and Hierocles^c do well agree; the first being called by both of them σῶμα ψυχικόν, "an animal body"—the second σῶμα πνευματικόν, "a spiritual body."—Which latter expression, in Scripture, not only denotes the subtilty and tenuity thereof; but also as this present body is called an "animal body," because it is suit-

^a 1 Cor. xv. 41.

^b 1 Cor. xv. 44.

^c Comment. in aurea Pythag. carmina, p. 214. edit. Needhami.

able and agreeable to that animal life, which men have common with brutes, so is that future called spiritual, as bearing a fit proportion and correspondency to souls renewed in the spirit of their mind, or in whom the Divine Spirit dwelleth and acteth, exercising its dominion. "There is an animal body, and there is a spiritual body." And, "the first Adam was made a living soul, the last Adam a quickening spirit." And thus are *ψυχικοί*, in the Scripture, taken for *οἱ πνεῦμα μὴ ἔχοντες*, "they who have not the Spirit." And *ἡ ψυχικός ἄνθρωπος οὐ δέχεται τὰ τοῦ πνεύματος τοῦ θεοῦ*, "the animal man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God." Which Spirit is also said, in Scripture, to be the earnest of that our future inheritance, (Eph. i. 14.) and the earnest of this spiritual and heavenly body, (2 Cor. v. 5.) It is also said to be that, by which (efficiently) these mortal bodies shall be quickened. (Rom. viii. 11.) "If the Spirit of him, that raised up Jesus from the dead, dwell in you; he, that raised up Christ from the dead, shall also quicken your mortal bodies by his Spirit, that dwelleth in you." Neither doth Hierocles fall much short of this Scripture notion of a spiritual body, when he describes it to be that *δὲ τῇ νοερᾷ τελειότητι τῆς ψυχῆς συνάπ- p. 297.*
τεται, which is agreeable to the intellectu- [p. 217. edit.
 al perfection of the soul.—This spiritual Needham.]
 body is that, which the ancient Hebrews called *כנפי תנין* eagle's wings—we reading thus in the Gemara of the Sanhedrin, (c. 11. fol. 92. col. 2.)
אם תאמר אותו שנים שעמד תקבת לדורש בזה את תעלים צורקים מה הן עשר תקבה צורה לזה כנפים כנשמן על פני המים
 If you ask, What shall become of the righteous, when God shall renew the world? the answer is,

* 1 Cor. xv. 45.

* 1 Cor. ii. 14.

God shall make them wings like eagles, whereby they shall fly upon the face of the waters.—Again, as this present body is called, in Scripture, an *earthly* body, so is the future body of the righteous styled by St. Paul, as well as the Pythagoreans, a *heavenly* body, and they, who shall then be possessors thereof, *ἐπουράνιοι ἄνθρωποι*, heavenly men—(1 Cor. xv.) “As is the heavenly, such are they that are heavenly.” Besides which, as philosophers supposed both demons (or angels), and men, to have one and the same *σῶμα αὐγαιδὲς, οὐράνιον* and *αἰθέριον*, or a like lucid, heavenly and ethereal body; so from that of our Saviour, when he affirmeth, that they, who “shall be accounted worthy to obtain that world, and the resurrection from the dead, will neither marry, nor be given in marriage; nor can die any more; for they are *ἰσαγγελοι*, equal to the angels.”—From hence, I say, we may venture to call this resurrection-body of the just also an angelical or isangelical body; and the rather because the ancient Hebrews (as we learn from Nachmonides, in Shaar Haggemul), styled it *לבושת תנאים* the angelical clothing of the soul;—and Tertullian himself, “angelificatam carnem,” angelified flesh.—But, lastly, St. Paul is not only positive in his doctrine here, but also negative; “Now this I say, brethren, that flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God; neither doth corruption inherit incorruption.” Which place being undoubtedly not to be allegorized, it may be from thence inferred, that the happy resurrection-body shall not be this foul and gross body of ours only varnished and gilded over on the outside of it, it re-

Thus St. Austin, *Corpora angelica; and Qualia sunt angelorum.*

maining still nasty, sluttish, and ruinous within, and having all the same seeds of corruption and mortality in its nature, which it had before, though by perpetual miracle kept off, it being as it were by violence defended from being seized upon and devoured by the jaws of death; but that it shall be so inwardly changed in its nature, as that the possessors thereof cannot die any more. But all this, which hath been said of the resurrection-body, is not so to be understood, as if it belonged universally to all, that shall be raised up at the last day, or made to appear upon the earth in their own persons, at that great and general assizes: that they shall have all alike (wicked as well as good) such glorious, spiritual and celestial bodies: but it is only a description of the ἀνάστασις τῆς ζωῆς, the resurrection of life;—which is emphatically called also by our Saviour Christ, ἀνάστασις ἡ ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν, the resurrection from the dead,—or to a happy immortality; as they, who shall be thought worthy thereof, are likewise styled by him υἱοὶ ἀναστάσεως, the children of the resurrection.—Of which resurrection only it is that St. Paul treateth in that fifteenth chapter of his to the Corinthians. And we say, that this Christian resurrection of life is the vesting and settling of the souls of good men in their glorious, spiritual, heavenly and immortal bodies. The complete happiness of a man, and all the good that can be desired by him, was by the heathen poet thus summed up: “Ut sit mens sana in corpore sano,” That there be a sound mind in a sound body:—and the Christian happiness seems to be all comprised in these two things; first, in being inwardly regenerated and renewed

* Luke xx. 25.

in the spirit of their mind, cleansed from all pollution of flesh and spirit, and made partakers of the Divine life and nature; and then, secondly, in being outwardly clothed with glorious, spiritual, celestial and incorruptible bodies. The Scripture plainly declareth, that our souls are not at home here, in this terrestrial body, and these earthly mansions, but that they are strangers and pilgrims therein; which the patriarchs also confessing, plainly declared, that they sought a country, not that which they came out from, but a heavenly one. From which passages of Scripture some indeed would infer, that souls being at first created by God pure, pre-existed, before this their terrene nativity, in celestial bodies; but afterwards straggled and wandered down hither, as Philo for one,^a ἀπολειποῦσα μὲν γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ τὸν οὐράνιον τόπον, καθάπερ εἰς ξένην χώραν ἤλθετο σῶμα. Our soul (saith he), having left its heavenly mansion, came down into this earthly body, as a strange place.—But thus much is certain, that our human souls were at first intended and designed by God Almighty, the maker of them, for other bodies and other regions, as their proper home and country, and their eternal resting-place: however, to us, that “be not first, which is spiritual, but that which is natural, and afterward that which is spiritual.” Now, though some, from that of St. Paul,^b where he calls this happy resurrection-body, οἰκητήριον ἡμῶν τὸ ἐξ οὐρανοῦ, that house of ours, that is from heaven—or which cometh out of heaven—would infer, that therefore it will not be taken out of graves and charnel-

^a De Agricult. p. 197, et in libro, quis divinarum rerum hæres, p. 519, et alias.

^b 2 Cor. v. 1.

houses ; they conceiving, also, that the individuation and sameness of men's persons does not necessarily depend upon the numerical identity of all the parts of matter, because we never continue thus the same, our bodies always flowing like a river, and passing away by insensible transpiration ; and, it is certain, that we have not all the same numerical matter, and neither more nor less, both in infancy and in old age, though we be for all that the self-same persons : yet, nevertheless, according to the best philosophy, which acknowledges no essential or specifical difference of matter, the foulest and grossest body that is, merely by motion may not only be crystallized, but also brought into the purity and tenuity of the finest ether. And, undoubtedly, that same numerical body of our Saviour Christ, which lay in the sepulchre, was after his resurrection thus transformed into a spiritual and heavenly body ; the subtilty and tenuity whereof appeared from his entering in when the doors were shut, and his vanishing out of sight ; however its glory were for the time suspended, partly for the better convincing his disciples of the truth of his resurrection, and partly because they were not then able to bear the splendour of it. We conclude, therefore, that the Christian mystery, of the resurrection of life, consisteth not in the soul's being reunited to these vile rags of mortality, these gross bodies of ours, (such as now they are ;) but in having them changed into the likeness of Christ's glorious body, and in this mortal's putting on immortality.

Hitherto have we seen the agreement, that is betwixt Christianity and the old philosophic cabala, concerning the soul, in these two things :

12 THE MYSTERY OF THE RESURRECTION;

First, that the highest happiness and perfection of the human soul consisteth not in a state of pure separation from all body; and, secondly, that it does not consist neither in an eternal union with such gross terrestrial bodies, as these unchanged; the soul being not at home, but a stranger and pilgrim in them, and oppressed with the load of them: but that at last, the souls of good men shall arrive at glorious, spiritual, heavenly and immortal bodies. But now, as to that point, whether human souls be always united to some body or other, and consequently when by death they put off this gross terrestrial body, they are not thereby quite divested, and stripped naked of all body, but have a certain subtle and spirituous body, still adhering to them, and accompanying them? or else; whether all souls, that have departed out of this life, from the very beginning of the world, have ever since continued in a state of separation from all body, and shall continue forwards till the day of judgment or general resurrection? we must confess, that this is a thing not so explicitly determined, or expressly decided in Christianity, either way. Nevertheless, it is first of all certain from Scripture, that souls departed out of these terrestrial bodies are therefore neither dead nor asleep, till the last trump and general resurrection, but still alive and awake; our Saviour Christ affirming, that they all live unto God; the meaning whereof seems to be this, that they, who are said to be dead, are dead only unto men here upon earth; but neither dead unto themselves, nor yet unto God, their life being not extinct, but only disappearing to us, and withdrawn from our sight; for

Death, called
sleep in Scrip-
ture, only
nar' sleep-
prophets.

as much as they are gone off this stage, which we still continue to act upon. And thus it is said also of our Saviour Christ himself, and that after his resurrection too, that "he liveth unto God." (Rom. vi. 10.) From whence it is evident, that they, who are said to live to God, are not therefore supposed to be less alive, than they were, when they lived unto men. Now it seemeth to be a privilege or prerogative proper to the Deity only, to live and act alone, without vital union or con-^{unio deo, l. ii. [cap. ii. p. 69. oper.]}junction with any body. "Quærendum (saith Origen), si possibile est, penitus incorporeas remanere rationabiles creaturas, cum ad summum sanctitatis ac beatitudinis venerent? An necesse est eas semper conjunctas esse corporibus?" It is worth our inquiry, whether it be possible for rational creatures to remain perfectly incorporeal, and separate from all body, when they are arrived to the highest degree of holiness and happiness? or whether they be always of necessity conjoined with some bodies;—and afterward he plainly affirmeth it to be impossible: "Vivere præter corpus ullam aliam naturam, præter Patrem, et Filium, et Spiritum Sanctum:" For any other nature, besides the Father, and the Son, and Holy Ghost, to live quite without a body.—Indeed, if this were most natural to the human soul, and most perfective of it, to continue separate from all body, then doubtless (as Origen implied), should the souls of good men, rather after the day of judgment, continue in such a state of separation to all eternity. But, on the contrary, if it be natural to souls to enliven and inform some body or other, (though not always a terrestrial one) as our inward sense inclines us to think, then can it

not seem so probable, that they should, by a kind of violence, be kept so long in an unnatural or preternatural state of nakedness and separation from all body, some of them even from Adam till the day of judgment.

Again, the Scripture also intimates, that souls departed out of this life have a knowledge of one another, and are also capable of the punishment of sense or pain: "Fear him (saith our Saviour) who, after he hath killed, hath power to cast into hell," (Luke xii.) And the soul of the rich man is said to be immediately after death in torments, before the day of judgment; as likewise to have known Abraham and Lazarus. And it seems neither agreeable to our common notions, nor yet to piety, to conclude, that the souls of wicked men, departing out of this life, from the beginning of the world in their several ages, till the day of judgment, have all of them no manner of punishment inflicted on them, save only that of remorse of conscience and future expectation. Now it is not conceivable, how souls after death should know and be knowable, and converse with one another, and have any punishment of sense or pain inflicted on them, were they not vitally united

De An. p. 309. to some bodies. And thus did Tertullian

Rigal.

[cap. vii.

p. 165.]

reason long ago: "*Dolet apud inferos anima cujusdam, et punitur in flamma, et cruciatur in lingua, et de digito animæ felicioris implorat solatium roris. Imaginem existimas, exitum illum pauperis lætantis, et divitis mœrentis. Et quid illic Lazari nomen, si non in veritate res est? Sed etsi imago credenda est, testimonium erit veritatis. Si enim non habet anima corpus, non caperet imaginem corporis. Nec mentiretur*

de corporalibus membris scriptura, si non erant. Quid est autem illud, quod ad inferna transfertur, post divortium corporis? quod detinetur, et in diem judicii reservatur? Ad quod et Christus moriendo descendit? puto ad animas patriarcharum? Incorporalitas animæ ab omni genere custodiæ libera est; immunis a pœna et a fovea. Per quod enim puniatur aut foveatur, hoc erit corpus. Igitur si quid tormenti sive solatii anima præcepit in carcere, vel diversorio inferum, in igni vel in sinu Abrahæ, probata erit corporalitas animæ. Corporalitas enim nihil patitur, non habens per quod pati possit: aut si habet, hoc erit corpus. In quantum enim omne corporale passibile est; in tantum quod passibile est, corporale est." We read in Scripture of a soul tormented in hell, punished with flames, and desirous of a drop of water to cool his tongue. You will say, perhaps, that this is parabolical and fictitious. What then does the name of Lazarus signify there, if it were no real thing? But if it be a parable never so much, yet must it, notwithstanding, as to the main, speak agreeably to truth. For if the soul (after death) have no body at all, then can it not have any corporeal image, shape, or figure. Nor can it be thought, that the Scripture would lie concerning corporeal members, if there were none. But what is that, which, after its separation from this body, is carried down into hell, and there detained prisoner, and reserved till the day of judgment? And what is that, which Christ dying descended down unto? I suppose to the souls of the patriarchs. But incorporeality is free from all custody or imprisonment, as also devoid of pain and pleasure. Wherefore, if souls be sensible of pain after death, and tormented

with fire, then must they needs have some corporeity; for incorporeality suffers nothing. And as every corporeal thing is passive or patible, so again whatsoever is passive is corporeal. "Tertullian would also confirm this from a vision or revelation of a certain sister-prophet; (miracles and prophecy being said by him not to be then altogether extinct,) "*Inter cætera ostensa est mihi anima corporaliter, et spiritus videbatur, tenera et lucida, et aërii coloris, et formæ per omnia humanæ.*" There was (said she) amongst other things, a soul corporeally exhibited to my view, and it was tender and lucid, and of aëreal colour, and every way of human form.—Agreeably to which, Tertullian himself addeth; "*Effigiem non aliam animæ humanæ deputandam præter humanam, et quidem ejus corporis, quod unaquæque circumtulit.*" There is no other shape to be assigned to a human soul but human; and, indeed, that of the body, which is before carried about.—It is true, indeed, that Tertullian here drives the business so far, as to make the soul itself to be corporeal, figurate, and colorate, and after death to have the very same shape, which its respective body had before in this life; he being one of those, who were not able to conceive of any thing incorporeal, and therefore, being a religionist, concluded God himself to be a certain body also. But the reasons, which he here insisteth on, will indeed extend no further than to prove, that the soul hath after death some body vitally united to it, by means whereof it is both capable of converse, and sensible of pain, forasmuch as body alone can have no sense of any thing.

* Ubi supra, cap. ix. p. 166.

And this is that, which Irenæus from the same Scripture gathereth; not that the soul is a body, but that it hath a body, after death, conjoined with it, and that of the same form and figure with that body, which it had before here in this life: “Ple-

nissime autem Dominus docuit, non l. li. c. lxiij.
solum perseverare, non de corpore in [cap. xxxiv. p. 168. edit. Massueti.]
corpus transgredientes animas, sed et

characterem corporis, in quo etiam adaptantur custodire eundem; et meminisse eas operum, quæ egerunt hic, et a quibus cessaverunt; in enarratione, quæ scribitur de Divite et de Lazaro, qui refrigerabatur in sinu Abrahæ; in qua ait Divitem cognoscere Lazarum post mortem; et manere in suo ordine unumquemque ipsorum.”

Our Lord hath most plainly taught us, that souls do not only continue after death, without passing out of one body into another; but also, that they keep the character of body, wherein they are then also adapted, the same, which they had before; as likewise, that they remember the actions and omissions of their life past; in that enarration, which is written concerning the rich man and Lazarus, who was refreshed in Abraham’s bosom; wherein he affirmeth the rich man to have known both Lazarus and Abraham after death, as also each of them to remain in their own order.—And thus again in the following chapter: C. lxxij.

“Perhæc manifestissime declaratum est, [cap. xxxiv. p. 168.]
et perseverare animas; et non de corpore

in corpus exire; et habere hominis figuram; (ut etiam cognoscantur) et meminisse eorum, quæ hic sint; et dignam habitationem unamquamque gentem percipere, etiam ante judicium.” By these things it is most manifestly declared, that souls

do both persevere after death, and that they do not transmigrate out of one body into another, and that they have a human figure or shape (whereby they may be known); as also they remember the things here upon the earth, and their own actions; and, lastly, that each kind of good and bad have their distinct and suitable habitations assigned them, even before the judgment.—Now, that Irenæus did not here mean, that souls are themselves bodily substances, and consequently have a certain character, form, and figure of their own, but only that they have certain bodies conjoined with them, which are figurate, is first of all evident from the words themselves: “*characterem corporis, in quo etiam adaptantur, custodire eundem;*” the natural sense whereof is this, that they keep the character of body (wherein they are then also adapted after death) the same with that, which these bodies before had here in this life.—And it is further manifest from hence, because he elsewhere plainly declareth souls themselves to be incorporeal; as in his fifth book and seventh chapter,* “*Flatus autem vitæ incorporealis est,*” but the breath of life is incorporeal.—

Furthermore, Origen was not only of the same persuasion, that souls after death had certain subtle bodies united to them, and that those bodies of theirs had the same εἶδος χαρακτηρίζον, characterising form—which these their terrestrial bodies before had; but also thinks, that this, together with the soul's immortality, may be sufficiently proved from the frequent apparitions or ghosts of departed souls; in way of opposition to Celsus, endeavouring to invalidate the Scripture testimonies

* P. 300.

concerning the apparitions of our Saviour Christ, and imputing them either to magical imposture, or fanatic frenzy, or the disciples mistaking their own dreams and fancies for visions and sensations, after the Epicurean way,* *ταῦτο δὲ οὐδὲν ἥττον κατασκευαστικόν ἐστιν ἀναγκαίου δόγματος, ὡς ἄρα ἡ ψυχὴ ὑφέστηκε τῶν ἀποθανόντων· καὶ οὐ μάτην πεπίστευκε περὶ τῆς ἀθανασίας αὐτῆς, ὁ τοῦτο τὸ δόγμα ἀνελήφως· ὡς καὶ Πλάτων ἐν τῷ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς λέγει, σκιοειδῆ φαντάσματα περὶ μνημεῖα τισὶ γεγονέναι τῶν ἤδη τεθνηκότων.* Though this might seem to have been smartly opposed by Celsus, yet are those very apparitions of ghosts, notwithstanding, a sufficient argument or proof of a certain necessary opinion, that souls do subsist after death. Neither did Plato vainly conclude the immortality and permanency of the soul, besides other things, from those shadow-like phantasms of the dead, that have appeared to many about graves and monuments.—Whereupon he giveth this further account of these apparitions; *τὰ μὲν οὖν γινόμενα περὶ ψυχῆς τεθνηκότων φαντάσματα ἀπὸ τινος ὑποκειμένου γίνεται, τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὑφέστηκυῖαν ἐν τῷ καλουμένῳ Ἀυγοειδῶ Σώματι ψυχῆν.* For these apparitions of the dead are not mere groundless imaginations, but they proceed from souls themselves, really remaining and surviving after death, and subsisting in that, which is called a luciform body.—Where, notwithstanding Origen takes this *Ἀυγοειδὲς Σῶμα*, or luciform body, in a larger sense than the Greek philosophers were wont to do; namely, so as to comprehend under it that airy or vaporous body also, which belongeth to unpurged souls, who do therein most frequently appear after death; whereas it is thought proper to the purged souls to be clothed

* Adv. Celsum, lib. ii. p. 97.

with the luciform body only. Besides which, the same Origen tells us, that the thing, which St. Thomas the apostle disbelieved, was not our Saviour's appearing after death, as if he had thought it impossible for ghosts or souls departed visibly to appear, but only his rising and appearing in that same solid body, which had been before crucified, and was laid in the sepulchre; συγκατετίθετο μὲν γὰρ ἑκείνος τῇ φασκούσῃ αὐτὸν ἑωρακέναι, ὡς οὐκ ἀδυνατοῦ ὄντος, τοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ τεθυηκότος ὀφθῆναι· οὐκ ἐτι δ' ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι τὸ ἐν σώματι αὐτὸν ἀντιτύπῃ ἐγγεῖρθαι. Thomas also, as well as the other apostles, assented to the woman affirming, that she had seen Jesus; as not thinking it at all impossible for the soul of a dead man to be seen: but he did not believe him to have risen and appeared in that self-same solid body, which before he lived in; for which cause he said, not only, unless I see him; but added also, "And unless I shall put my finger into the print of the nails, and thrust my hand into his side, I will not believe."—Where again Origen subjoins, Ταῦτα δ' ἐλέγετο ὑπὸ τοῦ Θωμᾶ, κρίνοντος ὅτι δύναται Ὁφθαλμοῖς αἰσθητοῖς φανῆναι ψυχῆς Σῶμα πάντα τῷ πρότερόν· εἶδει, —μέγεθος τε, καὶ ὅμματα καλ' ἰουκίας, καὶ φωνήν,

Πολλὰκι δὲ καὶ τοῖα περὶ χροῦ αἵματ' ἔχούσης.

These things were said by Thomas, not as doubting at all, but that the body of a soul departed (to wit, condensed) might be seen with the eyes of sense; every way resembling that form which it had before in this life, both in respect of bigness, figure, colour, and voice; and oftentimes also in the same customary garments.—Wherefore, according to Origen, the Jews were at that time

generally possessed with this opinion, that souls after death had certain bodies united to them, wherein they might visibly appear; neither is that of any great moment to the contrary, which a learned critic objecteth, that Josephus, writing of their opinions, maketh no mention hereof; he omitting, besides this, other considerable dogmata of theirs also, as that of the resurrection. However this at least is certain from hence, that Origen himself took it for granted, that human souls departed were not altogether naked or unclothed, but clothed with a certain subtile body, wherein they could also visibly appear; and that in their pristine form.

Moreover, it might be here observed also, that when upon our Saviour's first apparition to his disciples, it is said, that they were affrighted, as supposing that they had seen a spirit; our Saviour does not tell them, that a spirit or ghost had no body at all, wherein it could visibly appear; but (as rather taking that for granted),* that a spirit had no flesh and bones (no σῶμα σαρκὸς), no such solid body as they might find him to have; bidding them therefore handle him, to remove that scruple of theirs. As if he should have said, Though spirits or ghosts, and souls departed, have bodies (or vehicles), which may by them be so far condensed, as sometimes to make a visible appearance to the eyes of men; yet have they not any such solid bodies as those of flesh and bone; and therefore by feeling and handling may you satisfy yourselves, that I am not a mere spirit, ghost, or soul, appearing, as others have frequently done, without a miracle; but that I appear in that very

* Luke xxiv. 37.

same solid body, wherein I was crucified by the Jews, by miraculous Divine power, raised out of the sepulchre, and now to be found no more there. Agreeable to which of our Saviour Christ is that of Apollonius in Philostratus;* λαβού μοι, ἔφη, καὶ μὲν διαφύγω σε, εἰδωλόν εἰμι· εἰ δὲ ὑπομείναμι ἀπτόμενος, πείθῃ καὶ ζῆν τέ με, καὶ μὴ ἀποβεβληκέναι τὸ σῶμα· Touch me and handle me, and if you find me to avoid the touch, then may you conclude me to be a spirit or ghost (that is, a soul departed); but if I firmly resist the same, then believe me really to live, and not yet to have cast off the body.—And, indeed, though spirits or ghosts had certain subtile bodies, which they could so far condense, as to make them sometimes visible to men; yet is it reasonable enough to think, that they could not constipate or fix them into such a firmness, grossness, and solidity, as that of flesh and bone is, to continue therein; or at least, not without such difficulty and pain, as would hinder them from attempting the same. Notwithstanding which, it is not denied, but that they may possibly sometimes make use of other solid bodies, moving and acting them, as in that famous story of Phlegon's,^b where the body vanished not, as other ghosts use to do, but was left a dead carcass behind. Now, as for our Saviour Christ's body, after his resurrection, and before his ascension; which notwithstanding its solidity in handling, yet sometimes vanished also out of his disciples' sight: this probably, as Origen conceived, was purposely conserved for a time, in a certain middle state, betwixt the crassities of a

* In Vita Apollonii Tyanci, lib. ix. cap. xii. p. 355.

^b In Libello de Rebus Mirabilibus, cap. i. in Jac. Gronovii Thesouro Antiq. Græcar. tom. viii. p. 2694.

mortal body, and the spirituality of a perfectly glorified, heavenly, and ethereal body.

But there is a place of Scripture, which, as it hath been interpreted by the generality of the ancient fathers, would naturally imply, even the soul of our Saviour Christ himself, after his death, and before his resurrection, not to have been quite naked from all body, but to have had a certain subtile or spirituous clothing, and it is this of St.

Peter; *θανατωθεὶς μὲν σαρκὶ, ζωοποιηθεὶς δὲ τῷ πνεύματι, ἐν ᾧ καὶ τοῖς ἐν φυλακῇ πνεύμασι πο-* 1 Pet. iii. 18.
19.

ρευθεὶς ἐκήρυξε. Which being understood by those ancients of our Saviour Christ's descending into Hades or hell, is accordingly thus rendered in the

vulgar Latin, "Put to death in the flesh, but quickened in the spirit: in which (spirit) also, he went and preached to those

spirits that were in prison," &c. — So

that the word *πνεύματι*, or spirit here,

according to this interpretation, is to be

taken for a spirituous body; the sense

being this, That when our Saviour Christ

was put to death in the flesh, or the

fleshly body, he was quickened in the

spirit, or a spirituous body: in which (spirituous

body) also, he went and preached to those spirits

that were in prison, &c.—And doubtless it would

be said, by the assertors of this interpretation,

that the word spirit could not here be taken for

the soul of our Saviour Christ, because this being

naturally immortal, could not properly be said to

be quickened and made alive. Nor could he, that

is, our Saviour Christ's soul, be so well said to go,

in this spirit neither, that is, in itself, the soul in

the soul, to preach to the spirits in prison. They

Of this St. Au-
stin, in his 12th
book, De Gen.
ad Lit. c. 33.
Et Christi qui-
dem animam
venisse usque
ad ea loca, in
quibus pecca-
tores crucian-
tur, ut eos sol-
vere, quos esse
solvendos oc-
culta nobis aq-
justitia iudica-
bat, non imme-
rito creditur.

would add also, that spirit here could not be taken for the Divine Spirit neither, which was the efficient cause of the vivification of our Saviour's body at his resurrection; because then there would be no direct opposition betwixt being put to death in the flesh, and quickened in the spirit; unless they be taken both alike materially. As also the following verse is thus to be understood; that our Saviour Christ went in that spirit, wherein he was quickened, when he was put to death in the flesh, and therein preached to the spirits in prison. By which spirits in prison also would be meant, not pure incorporeal substances, or naked souls, but souls clothed with subtile spirituous bodies; as that word may be often understood elsewhere in Scripture. But thus much we are unquestionably certain of from the Scripture, that not only Elias, whose terrestrial body seems to have been, in part at least, spiritualized, in his ascent in that fiery chariot, but also Moses appeared visibly to our Saviour Christ and his disciples upon the mount, and therefore (since piety will not permit us to think this a mere prestigious thing) in real bodies; which bodies also seem to have been *Ἀνυοειδῆ*, luciform or lucid, like to our Saviour's then transfigured body.

Again, there are sundry places of Scripture, which affirm, that the regenerate and renewed have here in this life a certain earnest of their future inheritance; which is their spiritual or heavenly body; as also the quickening of their mortal bodies is therein attributed to the efficiency of the spirit dwelling in them. Which is a thing that hath been taken notice of by some of the ancients, as Irenæus: "*Nunc autem partem aliquam spiritus*

ejus sumimus, ad perfectionem et præparationem incorruptelæ, paulatim assuescentes capere et portare Deum. Quod

l. v. c. viii. (p. 301. edit. Mansueti.)

et pignus dixit apostolus; hoc est, partem ejus honoris, qui a Deo nobis promissus est.—Si ergo pignus hoc habitans in nobis jam spirituales efficit, et absorbetur mortale ab immortalitate.”—Now have we a part of that spirit for the preparation and perfection of incorruption; we being accustomed by little and little to receive and bear God. Which also the apostle hath called an earnest; that is, a part of that honour which is promised to us from God. If therefore this earnest (or pledge), dwelling in us hath made us already spiritual, the mortal is also swallowed up by immortality.—And Novatian,* “Spiritus Sanctus id agit in nobis, ut ad æternitatem et ad resurrectionem immortalitatis corpora nostra perducatur, dum illa in se assuefacit cum cœlesti virtute misceri.” This is that which the Holy Spirit doth in us, namely, to bring and lead on our bodies to eternity, and the resurrection of immortality; whilst in itself it accustometh us to be mingled with the heavenly virtue. Moreover, there are some places, also, which seem to imply, that good men shall, after death, have a further inchoation of their heavenly body, the full completion whereof is not to be expected before the resurrection or day of judgment. We know, that ^b “if our earthly house of this tabernacle were dissolved, we have a building of God, a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens. For in this we groan earnestly.” And, verse 5. “He that hath wrought

* De Trinitate, cap. xxix. p. 450, ad calcem Operum Tertulliani.

^b 2 Cor. v. 1.

us for the self-same thing is God, who also hath given us the earnest of the Spirit." Now how these preludiums and prelibations of an immortal body can consist with the soul's continuance after death, in a perfect separation from all manner of body, till the day of judgment, is not so easily conceivable.

Lastly, It is not at all to be doubted, but that Irenæus, Origen, and those other ancients, who entertained that opinion of souls being clothed after death with a certain thin and subtile body, suspected it not in the least to be inconsistent with that of the future resurrection; as it is no way inconsistent for one, who hath only a shirt or waistcoat on, to put on a suit of clothes, or exterior upper-garment. Which will also seem the less strange, if it be considered, that even here in this life, our body is, as it were, two-fold, exterior and interior; we having, besides the grossly tangible bulk of our outward body, another interior spirituous body, the soul's immediate instrument, both of sense and motion; which latter is not put into the grave with the other, nor imprisoned under the cold sods. Notwithstanding all which that hath been here suggested by us, we shall not ourselves venture to determine any thing in so great a point, but sceptically leave it undecided.

The third and last thing in the forementioned philosophic or Pythagoric cabala is concerning those beings superior to men, commonly called by the Greeks demons, which Philo* tells us are the same with angels amongst the Jews, and accordingly are those words, demons and angels,

* De Iasomniis, p. 586.

by Hierocles* and Simplicius, and other of the latter Pagan writers, sometimes used indifferently as synonymous); viz. That these demons or angels are not pure, abstract, incorporeal substances, devoid of vital union with any matter; but that they consist of something incorporeal, and something corporeal, joined together: so that, as Hierocles writeth of them, τὸ μὲν ἄνω αὐτῶν ἀσώματος οὐσία, τὸ δὲ κάτω σωματική, They have a superior and an inferior part in them; and their superior part is an incorporeal substance; their inferior corporeal.—In a word, that they all, as well as men, consist of soul and body, united together, there being only this difference betwixt them, that the souls of these demons or angels never descend down to such gross and terrestrial bodies, as human souls do; but are always clothed either with aërial or ethereal ones. And, indeed, this Pythagoric cabala was universal, concerning all understanding beings, besides the supreme Deity, or trinity of Divine hypostases; that is, concerning all the Pagan inferior gods; that they are no other than souls vitally united to some bodies, and so made up of incorporeal and corporeal substance, joined together. For thus Hierocles plainly expresseth himself in the forecited place; ἡ λογικὴ οὐσία παρὰ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ εἰς τὸ εἶναι οὕτω παρήλθεν, ὡς μήτε τὸ σῶμα εἶναι αὐτὴν μήτε ἄνευ σώματος, &c. The rational nature (in general) was so produced by God, as that it neither is body, nor yet without body; but an incorporeal substance, having a cognate or congenite body.—Which same thing was elsewhere also thus declared by him, ἔστι γάρ

* Comment. in Aurea Pythagor. Carmina, sect. 67, p. 210.

† Ibid. 210.

p. 17. [p. 19.] πᾶς μὲν ὁ λογικὸς διάκοσμος, μετὰ τοῦ συμπε-
 φικότες αὐτῷ ἀφθάρτου σώματος, εἰκὼν ὅλου
 τοῦ δημιουργοῦ, the whole rational order, or rank
 of being, with its congenite immortal body, is the
 image of the whole Deity, the maker thereof.—
 Where, by Hierocles's rational nature or essence,
 and by the whole rational order, is plainly meant all
 understanding beings created, of which he acknow-
 ledgeth only these three kinds and degrees; first,
 the immortal gods, which are to him the animated
 stars; secondly, demons, angels, or heroes; and
 thirdly, men, called also by him καταχθόνιοι δαίμο-
 νες, terrestrial demons;—he pronouncing of them
 all, that they are alike incorporeal substances,
 together with a congenite immortal body; and
 that there is no other understanding nature than
 such, besides the Supreme Deity, which is com-
 plete in itself, without the conjunction of any body.
 So that, according to Hierocles, the ancient Py-
 thagoric cabala acknowledged no such entities at
 all, as those intelligences of Aristotle, and the noes
 of some high-flown Platonists (that is, perfectly
 unbodied minds); and much less any rank of he-
 nades, or unities, superior to these noes. And,
 indeed, such particular created beings as these,
 could neither have sense or cognizance of any
 corporeal thing existing without them (sense, as
 Aristotle hath observed, resulting from a complica-
 tion of soul and body, as weaving results from
 a complication of the weaver and weaving instru-
 ments): nor yet could they act upon any part of
 the corporeal universe. So that these immovable
 beings would be but like adamantine statues, and
 things unconnected with the rest of the world,
 having no commerce with any thing at all but the

Deity; a kind of insignificant metaphysical gazers or contemplators. Whereas the Deity, though it be not properly *ψυχὴ ἐγκόσμιος*, a mundane soul,—such as, together with the corporeal world, as its body, makes up one complete and entire animal; yet because the whole world proceeded from it, and perpetually dependeth on it, therefore must it needs take cognizance of all, and act upon all in it; upon which account it hath been styled by these Pythagoreans, *ψυχὴ ὑπερκόσμιος*; (not a mundane, but) a supra-mundane soul. Wherefore this ancient Pythagoric cabala seems to be agreeable to reason also, that God should be the only incorporeal being in this sense, such whose essence is complete, and life entire within itself, without the conjunction or appendage of any body; but that all other incorporeal substances created should be completed and made up by a vital union with matter, so that the whole of them is neither corporeal nor incorporeal, but a complication of both; and all the highest and divinest things in the universe, next to the Supreme Deity, are animals consisting of soul and body united together. And after this manner did the ancient assertors of incorporeal substance, as unextended, decline that absurdity objected against them, of the illocality of all finite created spirits, that these being incorporeal substances, vitally clothed with some body, may, by reason of the locality and mobility of their respective bodies, truly be said to be here and there, and to move from place to place.

Wherefore we are here also to shew what agreement or disagreement there is betwixt this part of the Pythagoric cabala and the Christian philoso-

phy. And, first, it hath been already intimated, that the very same doctrine with this of the ancient Pythagoreans was plainly asserted by Origen. Thus, in his first book, *Peri Archon*, c. vi. "*Solius Dei (saith he) id est Patris, et Filii, et Spiritus Sancti, naturæ id proprium est, ut sine materiali substantia, et absque ulla corporeæ adjectionis societate, intelligatur subsistere.*" It is proper to the nature of God only, that is, of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, to subsist without material substance, or the society of any corporeal adjection.—Again, l. ii. c. ii. "*Materialem substantiam opinione quidem et intellectu solum separari, a naturis rationalibus, et pro ipsis, vel post ipsas effectam videri; sed nunquam sine ipsa eas vel vixisse, vel vivere: solius namque trinitatis incorporea vita existere recte putabitur.*" Material substance in rational natures is indeed separable from them in conception and understanding, it seeming to be made for them, and in order of nature after them; but it is not really and actually separable from the same; nor did they ever, nor can they, live without it: for a life perfectly incorporeal is rightly deemed to belong to the trinity only.—So also, in his fourth book, and his *Anacephalæosis*, "*Semper erunt rationabiles naturæ, quæ indigent indumento corporeo. Semper ergo erit natura corporea, cujus indumentis uti necesse est rationabiles creaturas. Nisi quis putet se posse ostendere, quod natura rationabilis absque ullo corpore vitam degere possit. Sed quam difficile id sit, et quam prope impossibile intellectui nostro, in superioribus ostendimus.*" There always will be rational natures, which stand in need of a corporeal indument.

Wherefore there will be always corporeal nature, as a necessary indument or clothing for these rational creatures. Unless any one could shew, that it is possible for the rational nature to live without a body. Which how difficult and almost impossible it is to our understanding, hath been already declared.—Aquinas affirmeth^a Origen, in this doctrine of his, to have followed the opinion of certain ancient philosophers; and undoubtedly it was the old Pythagoric cabala, which the learned Origen here adhered to; that ἡ λογικὴ οὐσία, as it is in Hierocles, and πᾶς ὁ λογικὸς διάκοσμος, the rational nature made by God;—that is, all created understanding beings are neither body, nor yet without body, but have always a cognate or congenite body, as their vehicle or indument. So that angels or demons, as well according to Origen as Hierocles, are all of them incorporeal substances, not naked and abstract, but clothed with certain subtile bodies, or animals compounded and made up of soul and body together.

Wherefore Huëtius,^b and other learned men, seem not well to have understood Origen here, but to have confounded two different opinions together, when they suppose him to have asserted angels, and all understanding creatures, not to *have* bodies, but to *be* bodies, and nothing else; and, consequently, that there is no incorporeal substance at all besides the Deity: whereas Origen only affirmeth, that nothing besides the Trinity could subsist and live alone, “absque ulla corporeæ adjectionis societate,” without the society of any corporeal adjection;—and that the

^a In Summa Theolog. part i. Quæst. li. p. 1.

^b In Origenianis, lib. ii. Quæst. v. p. 68.

material nature is only a necessary indument or clothing of all rational or understanding creatures. And in this sense is it, that an incorporeal life is said by him to be proper only to the Trinity; because all other understanding beings are animals compounded of soul and body together. But that Origen acknowledged even our human soul itself to be incorporeal, as also that there is something in angels incorporeal, might be made evident from sundry passages in his writings: as this particularly in his sixth book against Celsus; *ἡμεῖς ἀσώματον οὐσίαν οὐκ ἔσμεν ἐκπυρουμένην, οὐδ' εἰς πῦρ ἀναλυομένην τὴν ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴν, ἢ τὴν ἀγγέλων ἢ θρόνων, &c. ὑπόστασιν*. We do not think an incorporeal substance to be combustible, nor that the soul of man can be resolved into fire, or the substance of angels, thrones, dominions, principalities, or powers.—Where, by the substance of angels, he doubtless meant the souls of them; Origen's sense being thus declared by St. Jerome: * “in libris *περὶ ἀρχῶν*, angelos, et thronos, et dominationes, et potestates, et rectores mundi et tenebrarum, et omne nomen quod nominatur, dicit, animas esse eorum corporum, quæ vel desiderio vel ministerio susceperint:” that in his book of principles he affirmeth, angels, and thrones, and dominions, and powers, and the governors of the darkness of this world, and every name that is named (in St. Paul), to be all of them the souls of certain bodies, such as either by their own desire and inclination, or the Divine allotment, they have received.—Now there can be no question made, but that he, who supposed

* Epist. lxi. ad Pammachium de Erroribus Johan. Hierosolymitani, tom. ii. oper. p. 118.

the souls of men to be incorporeal, in a strict philosophic sense, and such as could not suffer any thing from fire, did also acknowledge something incorporeal in angels. And thus doth he somewhere declare himself, in that book, *Peri Archon*,* “*Per Christum creata dixit (Paulus) omnia visibilia et invisibilia; per quod declaratur, esse etiam in creaturis quasdam invisibiles, secundum proprietatem suam, substantias; sed hæ, quamvis ipsæ non sunt corporeæ, utuntur tamen corporibus, licet ipsæ sunt corporea substantia meliores. Illa vero substantia trinitatis neque corpus, neque in corpore, esse credenda est; sed in toto incorporea.*” When Paul affirmeth all things, visible and invisible, to have been created by Christ, or the *Λόγος*, he intimated, that even amongst the creatures, there are some properly invisible substances. Which invisible substances created, though they be not bodies, yet do they use bodies, themselves being better than corporeal substance. But the substance of the Trinity is neither body, nor yet in body, but altogether incorporeal.—Wherefore angelical and human souls are not, as Huetius supposeth, called incorporeal by Origen, only as subtile bodies sometimes are by the more simple and unskilful, but in a strict philosophic sense; only he supposed them to differ from the Deity in this, that though they be not bodies, yet they are always in bodies, or clothed with bodies; whereas the Deity is in both senses incorporeal, it having not so much as any corporeal indument. So that there is here no contradiction at all to be found in Origen, he constantly asserting angels to have

*Lib. iv. cap. ii.

something incorporeal in them as their superior part, and not in that vulgar sense of a subtile body, but in the philosophic; nevertheless, to have also a corporeal indument or clothing, as their outside or lower part, and in that regard only he calling them corporeal.

It is true, indeed, that there were, amongst the ancient fathers, some, who were so far from supposing angels to be altogether incorporeal, that they ran into the other extreme, and concluded them to have nothing at all incorporeal in them, but to be mere bodies. But these either asserted that there was no such thing at all as any incorporeal substance; and that not only angels, and human souls, but also God himself was a body: or at least they concluded, that nothing created was incorporeal; and that God, though himself incorporeal, yet could create nothing but bodies. These are here the two extremes; one, that angels have nothing corporeal at all belonging to them; the other, that they are altogether corporeal, or have nothing incorporeal in them: a middle betwixt both which is the Origenic hypothesis, the same with the Pythagoric; that in angels there is a complication of incorporeal and corporeal substance both together, or that they are animals consisting of soul and body. We shall now make it appear, that the greater part of the ancient fathers were for neither of the two forementioned extremes, either that angels were wholly incorporeal, or that they were wholly corporeal; but rather for the middle hypothesis, that they had bodies, and yet were not bodies, but, as other terrestrial animals, spirits or souls, clothed with ethereal or aërial bodies. And that

the generality of the ancient and most learned fathers did not conceive angels to be mere unbodied spirits, is unquestionably evident from hence, because they agreed with the Greek philosophers in that conceit, that evil demons, or devils, were therefore delighted with the blood and nidours of sacrifices, as having their more gross, airy, and vaporous bodies nourished and refreshed with those vapours, which they did, as it were, luxuriate and gluttonize in. For thus does Porphyrius write concerning them, in his book *De Abstinencia*,^a οὗτοι οἱ χαίροντες λαβῇ τε, κνίσσῃ τε, δι' ὧν αὐτῶν τὸ σωματικὸν καὶ πνευματικὸν πιάνεται· ζῇ γὰρ τοῦτο ἀτμοῖς καὶ ἀναθυμιάμασι· These are they, who take pleasure in the incense, fumes, and nidours of sacrifices, wherewith their corporeal and spiri-
tuous part is as it were pinguified; for this lives, and is nourished, by vapours and fumigations. And that, before Porphyrius, many other Pagan philosophers had been of the same opinion, appeareth from this of Celsus: Χρὴ γὰρ οὐκ ἴσως οὐκ ἀπιστεῖν ἀνδράσι σοφοῖς, οἱ δὲ φασί, [p. 417.] διότι τῶν μὲν περιγείων δαμόνων τὸ πλεῖστον γενέσει συν-
τετηκός, καὶ προσηλωμένον αἵματι καὶ κνίσσῃ, &c. We ought to give credit to wise men, who affirm, that most of these lower and circumterreneous demons are delighted with geniture, blood, and nidour, and such-like things, and much gratified therewith; though they be not able to do any thing more in way of recompence, than sometimes perhaps to cure the body, or to foretel good and evil fortunes to men and cities.—Upon
which account himself, though a zea-
lous Pagan, persuadeth men to moderation in

*Contra Cels.
l. vii. p. 334.*

^a Lib. ii. §. xlii. p. 86.

the use of these sacrifices, as principally gratifying the inferior and worser demons only. In like manner Origen frequently insisteth upon the same thing, he affirming, that devils were not only delighted with the idolatry of the Pagans in their sacrifices, but also ἀπὸ τῶν θυσιῶν ἀναθυμία-
μασι καὶ ταῖς ἀπὸ τῶν αἱμάτων καὶ ὀλοκαυτωμάτων ἀποφο-
ραῖς τρέφεσθαι τὰ σώματα φιληδονούντων τοῖς τοκούτοις.
That their very bodies were nourished by the vapours and fumes arising from them, and that these evil demons therefore did as it were de-
lciate and epicorize in them. And before Origen, most of the ancient fathers, as Justin Martyr, Athenagoras, Tatianus, Tertullian, &c. and also many others after him, endeavour to disparage those material and bloody sacrifices upon the same account, as things, whereby evil demons were principally gratified. We shall only cite

one passage to this purpose out of St. Basil, or whoever were the author of that Commentary upon Isaiah, because there is something philosophic in it:

C. i. [§. 25.
p. 398. tom. i.
oper. Basilii
in Append.]

δαίμοσι διὰ τὸ φιληδονοῦν καὶ ἐμπαθεῖς, αἱ θυσίαι φέρουσι τινα ἡδονὴν καὶ χρειὰν ἐκθυμώμεναι, διὰ τῆς καύσεως ἐξατμίζο-
μενον τοῦ αἵματος, καὶ οὕτω διὰ τῆς τοιαύτης λεπτοποιήσεως
εἰς τὴν σύντασιν αὐτῶν ἀνάλαμβανόμενον· ὅλοι γάρ δι' ὧν
τρέφονται τοῖς ἀτμοῖς, οὐ διὰ μασσήσεως καὶ κοιλίας, ἀλλ'
ὥς αἱ τρίχες πάντων ζώων καὶ ὀνυχες, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα εἰς
ὅλην ἑαυτῶν τὴν οὐσίαν, τὴν τροφήν καταδιχεται. Sacri-
fices are things of no small pleasure and advan-
tage to demons; because the blood, being eva-
porated by fire, and so attenuated, is taken into the compages and substances of their bodies: the whole of which is throughout nourished with vapours, not by eating, and stomachs, or such-

like organs, but as the hairs and nails of all animals, and whatsoever other things receive nourishment into their whole substance.—And thus do we see it undeniably manifest, that many of the ancient fathers supposed devils to have bodies; neither can it at all be doubted, but that they concluded the same of angels too, these being both of the same kind, and differing but as good and evil men. And though they do not affirm this of good angels, but of devils only, that they were thus delighted and nourished with the fumes and vapours of sacrifices, and that they epicurized in them; yet was not the reason hereof, because they conceived them to be altogether incorporeal, but to have pure ethereal or heavenly bodies; it being proper to those gross and vaporous bodies of demons only to be nourished and refreshed after that manner. And now, that all these ancient fathers did not suppose either angels or devils to be altogether corporeal, or to have nothing but body in them, may be concluded from hence, because many of them plainly declared the souls of men to be incorporeal; and therefore it cannot be imagined, that they should so far degrade angels below men, as not to acknowledge them to have any thing at all incorporeal.

But we shall now instance in some few, amongst many of these ancients, who plainly asserted both devils and angels to be spirits incorporate, and not to be mere bodies, but only to have bodies; that is, to consist of soul and body, or corporeal and incorporeal substance joined together. That angels themselves have bodies, is every where declared by St. Austin in his writings; he affirming, that the bodies of good men,

Psalm. lxxxv.

after the resurrection, shall be "*qualia sunt angelorum corpora*," such as are the bodies of angels;

—and that they shall be "*corpora angelica*, in *societate angelorum*," angelical

bodies, fit for society and converse with angels—and declaring the difference betwixt the bodies of angels and of devils in this manner: "*Dæmones*,

De Gen. ad. Lat. l. iii. c. x. [§ 15. p. 114. tom. iii.] *antequam transgredierentur, cœlestia corpora gerebant, quæ conversa sint ex pœna*

in aëream qualitatem, ut jam possint ab igne pati;" That though devils, before the transgression, had celestial bodies, as angels now have, yet might these afterwards, in way of punishment, be changed into aërial ones, and such as now may suffer by fire.—Moreover, the same St. Austin somewhere* calleth good angels by the name of "*animæ beatæ atque sanctæ*," happy and holy souls.

—And though it be true, that in his *Retractions* he recalleth and correcteth this, yet was this only a scrupulosity in that pious father concerning the mere word, because he no where found in Scripture angels called by the name of souls; it being far from his meaning, even there, to deny them to be incorporeal spirits joined with bodies. And certainly he, who every where concludes human souls to be incorporeal, cannot be thought to have supposed angels to have nothing at all but body in them. Again, Claudianus Mamertus,^b writing against Faustus, who made angels to be mere bodies without souls, or any thing incorporeal, maintaineth, in way of opposition, not that they are mere incorporeal spirits, without bodies (which is the other extreme), but

* *De Musica*, lib. vi. cap. xvii. §. 59. p. 401. tom. i. oper.

^b *De Statu Animæ*, lib. iii. cap. vii. p. 178. edit. Barthii.

that they consist of corporeal and incorporeal, soul and body joined together; he writing thus of devils: "Diabolus ex duplici diversa que substantia constat; et corporeus est et incorporeus." The devil consisteth of a double and different substance; he is corporeal, and he is also incorporeal.—And again of angels: "Patet ^{L. iii.} beatos angelos, utriusque substantiæ, et incorporeos esse in ea sui parte, qua ipsis visibilis Deus; et in ea itidem parte corporeos, qua hominibus sunt ipsi visibiles." It is manifest, that the blessed angels are of a two-fold substance; that they are incorporeal in that part of theirs, wherein God is visible to them, and again corporeal, in that other part, wherein themselves are visible to men. Moreover, Fulgentius writeth concerning angels in this manner: "Plane ex ^{L. iii. De Trin. p. 119 oper. edit. Sirmoa-di.]} duplici eos esse substantia asserunt mag- ni et docti viri. Id est, ex spiritu incorporeo, quo a Dei contemplatione nunquam recedunt; et ex corpore, per quod ex tempore hominibus apparent. Corpora vero æthereæ, id est, ignea, eos dicunt habere; dæmones vero corpus aëreum." Great and learned men affirm angels to consist of a double substance; that is, of a spirit incorporeal, whereby they contemplate God; and of a body, whereby they are sometimes visible to men: as also, that they have etherial or fiery bodies, but devils aërial.—And perhaps this might be the meaning of Joannes Thessalonicensis, in that dialogue of his, read and approved of in the seventh council, and therefore the meaning of that council itself too, when it is thus declared, νοερὸν μὲν αὐτοῦς ἡ καθολικὴ ἐκκλησία γινώσκει, οὐ μὴν ἄσωμάτων πάντη καὶ ἀοράτους, λεπτοσωμάτων δὲ καὶ ἀερώδεις, ἡ

πυρώδεις, &c. That the catholic church acknowledges angels to be intellectual, but not altogether incorporeal and invisible; but to have certain subtile bodies, either airy or fiery.—For it being there only denied, that they were altogether incorporeal, one would think the meaning should not be, that they were altogether corporeal; nor indeed could such an opinion be fastened upon the catholic church; but that they were partly incorporeal, and partly corporeal; this being also sufficient in order to that design, which was driven at in that council. However Psellus,* who was a curious inquirer into the nature of spirits, declares it not only as his own opinion, but also as agreeable to the sense of the ancient fathers, ὡς οὐκ ἀσώματον τὸ δαιμόνιον ἐστὶ φύλον, μετὰ σώματος δὲ γε. That the demoniac or angelic kind of beings is not altogether incorporeal, or bodiless, but that they are conjoined with bodies, or have cognate bodies belonging to them.—Who there also further declares the difference betwixt the bodies of good angels and of evil demons, after this manner: τὸ μὲν

P. 33. [p. 48.] γὰρ ἀγγελικόν, αὐγὰς τινὰς ἐξανίσχον ζένας, τοῖς ἐκτὸς ὀφθαλμοῖς ἐστὶν ἀφώρητόν τε καὶ ἀνυπόστατον· τὸ δαιμόνιον δὲ, εἰ μὲν τοιοῦτον δήποτε ἦν, οὐκ οἶδα εἰπεῖν, ἵκειν δ' οὖν, ἑωσφόρον Ἡσαίου τὸν ἐκπεσόντα κατονομάζοντος· νῦν δὲ ἀλλὰ ζοφῶδες οἶον καὶ ἀμαυρόν ἐστι, καὶ τοῖς ὀμμασι λυπηρόν, γυμνωθέν τοῦ συζύγου φωτός· καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀγγελικόν παντάπασιν ἐστὶν αὔλον· διὸ καὶ διὰ πάντα ἐστὶ στερεοῦ διαδύνον καὶ διόν, καὶ τῆς ἡλιακῆς ἀκτίνος ὃν ἀπαθέστερον· τὴν μὲν γὰρ διὰ σωμάτων διαφανῶν ἰοῦσαν, ἀποστέγει τὰ γεώδη καὶ ἀλαμπῇ ὡς καὶ κλάσιν ὑπομένειν, ἅτε δὴ ἔνυλον ἔχουσαν. τῷ δὲ οὐδὲν ἐστὶ πρόσαντες, οἷα μηδεμίαν ἔχοντι πρὸς μηδὲν ἀντίθεσιν. τὰ δὲ δαιμόνια σώματα, καὶν ὑπὸ λεπτότητος

* Dialog. de Operationibus Dæmonum, p. 44.

ἀφανῆ καθέστηκεν, ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐνυλά τῃ, καὶ ἐμπαθῇ, καὶ μά-
 λισθ' ὅσα τοὺς ὑπὸ γῆν ὑποδέδωκε τόπους· ταῦτα γὰρ τοσαύτων
 ἔχει τὴν σύστασιν, ὡς καὶ ἀφαῖς ὑποκίπτειν, καὶ πληττόμενα
 ὀδυνᾶσθαι, καὶ πυρὶ προσμυλῆσαντα καίεσθαι· The an-
 gelical body sending forth rays and splendours,
 such as would dazzle mortal eyes, and cannot be
 borne by them; but the demoniac body, though it
 seemeth to have been once such also, (from Isa-
 iah's calling him, that fell from heaven, Lucifer,)
 yet is it now dark and obscure, foul and squallid,
 and grievous to behold, it being deprived of its
 cognate light and beauty. Again, the angelical
 body is so devoid of gross matter, that it can pass
 through any solid thing, it being indeed more im-
 passible than the sun-beams; for though these can
 permeate pellucid bodies, yet are they hindered
 by earthy and opaque, and refracted by them:
 whereas the angelical body is such, as that there
 is nothing so imporous or solid, that can resist or
 exclude it. But the demoniac bodies, though, by
 reason of their tenuity, they commonly escape our
 sight, yet have they, notwithstanding, gross matter
 in them, and are patible, especially those of them
 which inhabit the subterraneous places; for these
 are of so gross a consistency and solidity, as that
 they sometimes fall also under touch; and, being
 stricken, have a sense of pain, and are capable of
 being burnt with fire.—To which purpose, the
 Thracian there addeth more afterward from the
 information of Marcus the monk, a person formerly
 initiated in the diabolic mysteries, and of great
 curiosity; τὸ δαιμόνιον ἄρα πνεῦμα διόλον ὃν P. 94.
 κατὰ φύσιν αἰσθητικὸν κατὰ πᾶν ἑαυτοῦ μέρος, [p. 142.]
 ἀμέσως ὁρᾷ τε καὶ ἀκούει, καὶ τὰ τῆς ἀφῆς ὑπομένει πάθη,
 διαιρούμενον ὀδυνᾶται κατὰ τῶν σωμάτων τὰ στεριά· ταύτῃ

τούτων διενεγκόν, ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τῶν διαιρεθέντων, μόλις ἢ σόδαμῶς σὺλονται, τὰ δὲ διαιρούμενον εὐθὺς συμφύεται, καθάπερ αἶρος ἢ καὶ ὕδατος μόρια μεπαξὺ τινος ἐμπίπτοντα στερεοῦ· ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ θάττον ἢ λόγος τουτὶ τὸ πνεῦμα συμφύεται, πλὴν ἀνιάται κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ γίνεσθαι τὴν διαίρεσιν. The demoniac spirit or subtile body, being every part of it capable of sense, does immediately see and hear, and is also obnoxious to the affections of touch; insomuch that being suddenly divided or cut in two, it hath a sense of pain, as the solid bodies of other animals have; it differing from them only in this, that those other bodies, being once discontinued, are not easily consolidated together again; whereas the demoniac body, being divided, is quickly reintegrated by coalescence, as air or water: nevertheless it is not without a sense of pain at that time, when it is thus divided, &c.—Moreover, the same Marcus affirmeth the bodies of the demons to be nourished also, though in a different manner from ours; τρέφονται οἱ μὲν δι' ἐσπνοῆς, ὡς τὸ ἐν ἀρτηρίαις καὶ ἐν νεύροις πνεῦμα· οἱ δὲ δι' ὑγρότητος, ἀλλ' οὐ στόματι καθ' ἡμᾶς, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ στόγγοι καὶ ὀστρακοῦδερμα, σπῶντες μὲν τῆς παρακειμένης ὑγρότητος ἕξωθεν.* They are some of them nourished by inspiration, as the spirit contained in the nerves and arteries; others by sucking in the adjacent moisture, not as we do by mouths, but as sponges and testaceous fishes.—And now we may venture to conclude, that this opinion of angels being not mere abstract incorporeal substances, and unbodied minds, but consisting of something incorporeal, and something corporeal, that is, of soul or spirit, and body joined together, is not only more agreeable to reason, but hath also had more suf-

frages amongst the ancient fathers, and those of greater weight too, than either of those two other extremes, viz. That angels are mere bodies, and have nothing at all incorporeal in them; or else, that they are altogether incorporeal, without any bodily indument or clothing.

Notwithstanding which, this latter opinion hath indeed prevailed most in these latter ages; time being rightly compared to a river, which quickly sinks the more weighty and solid things, and bears up only the lighter and more superficial. Though there may be other reasons given for this also; as partly because the Aristotelic philosophy, when generally introduced into Christianity, brought in its abstract intelligences along with it; and partly because some spurious Platonists talking so much of their henades and noes, their simple monads and immoveable unbodied minds, as the chief of their generated and created gods; probably some Christians might have a mind to vie their angels with them: and, lastly, because angels are not only called in Scripture spirits, but also by several of the ancients said to be incorporeal; whilst this, in the mean time, was meant only either in respect of that incorporeal part, soul or mind, which they supposed to be in them, or else of the tenuity and subtilty of their bodies or vehicles. For this account does Psellus give hereof: καὶ τοῖς p. 30. 33.

ἡμετέροις καὶ τοῖς θύραθεν, εἰωθός ἐστι, τὰ παχύ- [p. 47.]

τερά τῶν σωμάτων σωματώδη λέγειν. ὁ δὲ λεπτομερὲς ἐστὶ καὶ τὴν ὄψιν διαφνέανον καὶ τὴν ἀφὴν ἀσώματον, οὐ μόνον οἱ καθ' ἡμᾶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀξιοῦσι λέγειν. It is usual both with Christian writers, and Pagans too, to call the grosser bodies corporeal, and those, which, by reason of their subtilty,

avoid both our sight and touch, incorporeal. And before Psellus, Joannes Thessalonicensis, in his dialogue, approved in the seventh council ;* *ἢ δὲ που εὖροις ἀσωμάτων καλουμένους τοὺς ἀγγέλους ἢ δαίμονας, ἢ ψυχὰς, ὡς μὴ ὄντας ἐκ συμμίξεως τῶν ὑλικῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων, καὶ τοιαῦτα σώματα παχέα καὶ ἀντίτυκα, οἷα ἡμεῖς περικείμεθα, οὕτως αὐτοὺς προσηγόρευσαν*. If you find angels, or demons, or separate souls, called sometimes incorporeal, you must understand this in respect of the tenuity of their bodies only ; as not consisting of the grosser elements, nor being so solid and antitypous as those, which we are now imprisoned in. And, before them both, Origen, in the proeme of his *Peri Archon*, where, citing a passage out of an ancient book, intituled, *The Doctrine of Peter*, wherein our Saviour Christ is said to have told his disciples, that he was not *δαμόνιον ἀσωματον*, an incorporeal demon—though, rejecting the authority of that book, he thus interprets those words : “*Non idem sensus ex isto sermone ἀσωμάτων indicatur, qui Græcis vel Gentilibus auctoribus ostenditur, quum de incorporea natura a philosophis disputatur. In hoc enim libello, incorporeum dæmonium dixit, pro eo, quod ipse ille quicumque est habitus vel circumscriptio dæmonici corporis, non est similis huic nostro crassiori, vel visibili corpori ; sed secundum sensum, ejus qui composuit illam Scripturam, intelligendum est, quod dixit ; non esse tale corpus, quale habent dæmones, quod est naturaliter subtile, et velut aura tenue ; et propter hoc vel imputatura multis, vel dicitur incorporeum ; sed habere se corpus solidum et palpabile.*”—The word *ἀσωμά-*

* In *Actis Concilii vii. Oecum. seu Nicæni ii. Action. v. p. 293. tom. iv. Concilior. edit. Harduini.*

tion, or incorporeal, is not to be taken here in that sense, wherein it is used by the Greek and Gentile writers, when they philosophized concerning the incorporeal nature. But a demon is here said to be incorporeal, because of the disposition of the demoniac body, not like to this gross and visible body of ours. So that the sense is, as if Christ should have said, I have not such a body as the demons have, which is naturally subtle, thin and soft, as the air, and therefore is either supposed to be by many, or at least called incorporeal; but the body, which I now have, is solid and palpable.—Where we see plainly, that angels, though supposed to have bodies, may, notwithstanding, be called incorporeal, by reason of the tenuity and subtilty of those bodies, comparatively with the grossness and solidity of these our terrestrial bodies. But that indeed which now most of all inclineth some to this persuasion, that angels have nothing at all corporeal hanging about them, is a religious regard to the authority of the third Lateran council, having passed its approbation upon this doctrine; as if the Oecumenical (so called) or second Nicene, wherein the contrary was before owned and allowed, were not of equal force, at least to counterbalance the other.

But though this doctrine of angels, or all created understanding beings superior to men, having a corporeal indument or clothing, does so exactly agree with the old Pythagoric cabala; yet have we reason to think, that it was not therefore merely borrowed or derived from thence by the ancient fathers; but that they were led into it by the Scripture itself. For, first, the historic phenomena of angels in the Scripture are such, as

cannot well be otherwise solved, than by supposing them to have bodies; and then not to lay any stress upon those words of the Psalmist,* “who maketh his angels spirits, and ministers a flame of fire,” (though, with good reason, by the ancient fathers interpreted to this sense) because they may possibly be understood otherwise, as sometime they are by rabbinical commentators; nor to insist upon those passages of St. Paul,^b where he speaks of the tongues of angels, and of the voice of an archangel, and such-like; there are several other places in Scripture, which seem plainly to confirm this opinion. As, first, that of our Saviour before-mentioned to this purpose, Luke xx. 35. “They who shall be accounted worthy to obtain that world, and the resurrection from the dead, neither marry nor are given in marriage, neither can they die any more; for they are equal unto the angels.” For were angels utterly devoid of all bodies, then would the souls of good men, in a state of separation, and without any resurrection, be rather equal to angels, than after a resurrection of their bodies. Wherefore the natural meaning of these words

De Gen. ad
lit. l. iii. seems to be this, (as St. Austin hath interpreted them) that the souls of good men, after the resurrection, shall have “*corpora angelica*,” angelical bodies—and “*qualia sunt angelorum corpora*,” such bodies as those of angels are.—Wherein it is supposed, that angels also have bodies, but of a very different kind from those of ours here. Again, that of St. Jude, where he writeth thus of the devils; “the angels, which kept not their first estate (or rather according to the vulgar Latin, “*suum principatum*,” their own

* Psalm civ. 4.

^b 1 Cor. xiii. 1. 1 Thess. iv. 16.

principality) but left their proper habitation (or dwelling-house) hath he reserved in everlasting chains, under darkness, unto the judgment of the great day." In which words it is first implied, that the devils were created by God pure, as well as the other angels, but that they kept not τὴν αὐτῶν ἀρχήν, their own principality—that is, their lordly power and dominion over their worse and inferior part, they having also a certain duplicity in their nature, of a better and worser principle, of a superior part, which ought to rule and govern, and of an inferior, which ought to be governed: nor is it indeed otherwise easily conceivable, how they should be capable of sinning. And this inferior part in angels seems to have a respect to something that is corporeal or bodily in them also, as well as it hath in men. But then, in the next place, St. Jude addeth, as the immediate result and natural consequence of these angels sinning, that they thereby left or lost τὸ ἴδιον οἰκητήριον, suum proprium domicilium—that is, not only their dwelling-place at large, those ethereal countries and heavenly regions above, but also their proper dwelling-house, or immediate mansion; to wit, their heavenly body. Forasmuch as that heavenly body, which good men expect after the resurrection, is thus called by St. Paul,* τὸ οἰκητήριον ἡμῶν τὸ ἐξ οὐρανοῦ, our habitation or dwelling-house, that is from heaven.—The heavenly body is the proper house or dwelling, clothing or indument, both of angelical and human souls; and this is that, which makes them fit inhabitants for the heavenly regions. This, I say, was the natural consequence of these angels sinning, their leaving

* 2 Cor. v. 1.

or losing their pure and heavenly body, which became thereupon forthwith obscured and incrasated; the bodies of spirits incorporate always bearing a correspondent purity or impurity to the different disposition of their mind or soul. But then again, in the last place, that, which was thus in part the natural result of their sin, was also, by the just judgment of God, converted into their punishment; for their ethereal bodies being thus changed into gross, aërial, feculent and vaporous ones, themselves were immediately hereupon, as St. Peter in the parallel place expresseth it, * *ραπαουσθῆναι*, cast down into Tartarus—and there imprisoned or reserved in chains under darkness, until the judgment of the great day. Where it is observable, that the word *ραπαουσθῆναι*, used by St. Peter, is the very same that Apollodorus and other Greek writers frequently make use of in a like case, when they speak of the Titans being cast down from heaven; which seems to have been really nothing else but this fall of angels poetically mythologized. And by Tartarus here, in all probability, is meant this lower caliginous air or atmosphere of the earth, according to that of St.

De Gen. ad
lit. l. iii. c. x.
[p. 114.
tom iii.
oper.]

Austin, concerning these angels: "Post peccatum in hanc sunt detrusi caliginem, ubi tamen et aër;" that, after their sin, they were thrust down into the misty darkness of this lower air.—And here are they, as it were, chained and fettered also by that same weight of their gross and heavy bodies, which first sunk them down hither; this not suffering them to reascend up, or return back, to those bright ethereal regions above. And being thus for the pre-

* 2 Pet. ii. 4.

sent imprisoned in this lower Tartarus, or caliginous air or atmosphere, they are indeed here kept and reserved in custody, unto the judgment of the great day, and general assizes; however they may, notwithstanding, in the mean time, seem to domineer and lord it for a while here. And, lastly, our Saviour's* "Go ye cursed into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels," seems to be a clear confirmation of devils being bodied; because, first, to allegorize this fire into nothing but remorse of conscience, would endanger the rendering of other points of our religion uncertain also; but to say, that incorporeal substances, united to bodies, can be tormented with fire, is, as much as in us lieth, to expose Christianity, and the Scripture, to the scorn and contempt of all philosophers and philosophic wits. Wherefore Psellus lays no small stress upon this p. 37.
place; *εἰμὶ μὲν παρὰ τῶν τοῦ Σωτῆρος λόγων* [p. 52.]

πεπεισμένος ταῦτα, πυρὶ κολασθῆσεσθαι φασκότων τοὺς δαίμονας· ὁ πῶς οἷον παθεῖν ἀσώματους ὄντας; τὸ γὰρ ἀσώματον ἀμήχανον παθεῖν ὑπὸ σώματος ἀνάγκη γοῦν σώμασιν αὐτοὺς τὴν κόλασιν ὑποδέχεσθαι πεφυκόσι πάσχειν. I am also convinced of this, that demons have bodies, from the words of our Saviour, affirming, that they shall be punished with fire: which how could it be, were they altogether incorporeal? it being impossible for that, which is both itself incorporeal, and vitally ununited to any body, to suffer from a body. Wherefore of necessity it must be granted, by us Christians, that devils shall receive punishment of sense and pain hereafter, in bodies capable of suffering.

Now if angels in general, that is, all created

* Matth. xxv. 41.

beings superior to men, be substances incorporeal, or souls vitally united to bodies, though not always the same, but sometimes of one kind, and sometimes of another, and never quite separate from all body; it may seem probable from hence, that though there be other incorporeal substances besides the Deity, yet "*vita incorporea*," a life perfectly incorporeal in the fore-mentioned Origenic sense, or "*sine corporeæ adjectionis societate vivere*," to live altogether without the society of any corporeal adjection,—is a privilege properly belonging to the holy Trinity only: and consequently, therefore, that human souls, when by death they are divested of these gross earthly bodies, they do not then live and act completely, without the conjunction of any body, and so continue till the resurrection or day of judgment; this being a privilege, which not so much as the angels themselves, and therefore no created finite being, is capable of; the imperfection of whose nature necessarily requires the conjunction of some body with them, to make them up complete: without which, it is unconceivable, how they should either have sense or imagination. And thus doth Origen, consentaneously to his own principles, conclude; ἡ τῇ

Cont. Cels. i. vii. p. 353. *ἐαυτῆς φύσει ἀσώματος καὶ ἀόρατος ψυχὴ, ἐν παντὶ σωματικῷ τόπῳ τυγχάνουσα, δέεται σώματος οἰκείου τῇ φύσει τοῦ τόπου ἐκείνου· ὅπερ ὅπου μὲν φορεῖ, ἀπεκδυσαμένη πρότερον ἀναγκαῖον μὲν, περισσὸν δὲ ὡς πρὸς τὰ δεύτερα· ὅπου δὲ ἐπενδυσαμένη ἢ πρότερον εἶχε, δεομένη κρείττονος ἐνδύματος εἰς τοὺς καθαρωτέρους καὶ αἰθερίους καὶ οὐρανίους τόπους·* Our soul, which in its own nature is incorporeal and invisible, in whatsoever corporeal place it existeth, doth always

stand in need of a body, suitable to the nature of that place respectively; which body it sometimes beareth, having put off that, which before was necessary, but is now superfluous for the following state; and sometimes again putting on something to what before it had, now standing in need of some better clothing, to fit it for those more pure, ethereal and heavenly places. But, in what there follows, we conceive, that Origen's sense having not been rightly understood, his words have been altered and perverted; and that the whole place ought to be read thus: Καὶ ἐνεδύσατο μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν τῆδε γένεσιν ἐρχομένην, τὸ χρήσιμον πρὸς τῶν ἐν τῇ ἐστέρας τῆς κυύσεως, ἕως ἣν ἐν αὐτῇ: ἐνεδύσατο δὲ ὑπ' ἐκεῖνο, ὃ ἦν ἀναγκαῖον τῷ ἐκτὸς γῆς μέλonti διαζῆν· εἴτα πάλιν οὗτος τινὸς σκῆνους, καὶ ἐπιγείου οἰκίας ἀναγκαίας πρὸς τῷ σκῆνει, καταλίσσεται μὲν φασιν οἱ λόγοι τὴν ἐπίγειον οἰκίαν τοῦ σκῆνους, τὸ δὲ σκῆνος ἐπενδύσασθαι οἰκίαν ἀχειροποίητον, αἰώνιον ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς· λέγουσι δὲ οἱ τοῦ θεοῦ ἄνθρωποι, τὸ μὲν φθαρτὸν ἐνδύσασθαι αὐτὸ ἀφθαρσίαν· The sense whereof is this: The soul descending hither into generation, put on first that body, which was useful for it whilst to continue in the womb; and then again afterward such a body, as was necessary for it to live here upon the earth in. Again, it having here a two-fold kind of body, the one of which is called σκῆνος, by St. Paul, (being a more subtile body, which it had before), the other the superinduced earthly house, necessarily subservient to this *skenos* here; the Scripture oracles affirm, that the earthly house of this *skenos* shall be corrupted or dissolved, but the *skenos* itself, superindue or put on a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens;" the same declaring, that "the corruptible shall put

on incorruption, and the mortal immortality." Where it is plain, that Origen takes that σκῆνος, in St. Paul (1 Cor. v. 1.) for a subtile body, which the soul had before its terrene nativity, and which continues with it after death; but in good men will, at last, superindue, or put on (without death) the clothing of immortality. Neither can there be a better commentary upon this place of Origen, than those Excerpta out of Methodius the martyr, in Photius,* though seeming to be vitiated also; where, as we conceive, the sense of Origen and his followers is first contained in

Thus Origen
plainly, in his
fifth book,
(p. 244.)

That there is
διαφορά ἐνταύτῃ
οἰκίας, ἡ δὲ ἐστὶ
τὸ σκῆνος κατὰ
ἀνομίαν, καὶ
τοῦ σκῆνους, ἡ δὲ οὐ
ἐστὶς ἀκατα-
στροφῆς, οὐδὲ
ἀπολείπειν, μὴ
ἀποδοῦναι,
ἀλλὰ τὸ σκῆνος
ἐπενδύσασθαι.

A difference
betwixt the
earthly house,
in which the
soul is, that
will be dis-
solved; and
the σκῆνος it-
self, wherein
good men
groan, being
burdened, not
that they would
put it off, but
put on immor-
tality upon it.

those words: ἕτερον τὸ σκῆνος, καὶ τοῦ σκῆ-
νους ἡ οἰκία, καὶ ἕτερον ἡμεῖς ὧν ἐστὶ τὸ σκῆνος,

That in St. Paul the τὸ σκῆνος is one
thing, and the earthly house of this
σκῆνος another thing; and we, that is,
our souls, a third thing, distinct from
both. And then it is further declared

in this that follows: τῆς ζωῆς καταλυθείσης
τῆς ἀκυμόρου τὴν πρὸ τῆς ἀναστάσεως ἔξουσιν
οἰκήσιν αἱ ψυχαὶ παρὰ τῷ θεῷ, ἕως ἂν ἀνακαίνο-
ποιηθῶσιν ἡμῖν ἁπτωτον ἀναλάβωμεν τὴν οἰκίαν·
ὅθεν καὶ στενάζομεν μὴ θέλοντες τὸ σῶμα ἀπεκδύ-
σασθαι, ἀλλ' ἐπ' αὐτῷ τὴν λοιπὴν ἐπενδύσασθαι
ζωὴν· τὸ γὰρ οἰκητήριον τὸ ἐξ οὐρανοῦ, ὃ ἐπεν-
δύσασθαι ἐπιθυμοῦμεν, ἡ ἀθανασία.

That this
short life of our earthly body being de-
stroyed, our soul shall then have, before
the resurrection, a dwelling from God,
until we shall at last receive it renewed,

restored, and so made an incorruptible house.
Wherefore in this we groan, desirous not to put
off all body, but to put on life or immortality

upon the body which we shall then have. For that house, which is from heaven, that we desire to put on, is immortality.—Moreover, that the soul is not altogether naked after death, the same Origen endeavours to confirm further from that of our Saviour, concerning the rich man and Lazarus; ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ κολαζόμενος πλούσιος, καὶ ὁ ἐν κόλποις Ἀβραάμ πένης ἀναπαυόμενος, πρὸ τῆς παρουσίας τοῦ σωτῆρος, καὶ πρὸ τῆς συντελείας τοῦ αἰῶνος, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πρὸ τῆς ἀναστάσεως, διδάσκουσιν ὅτι καὶ νῦν ἐν τῇ ἀπαλλαγῇ σώματι χρῆται ἡ ψυχὴ. The rich man punished, and the poor man refreshed in Abraham's bosom, before the coming of our Saviour, and before the end of the world, and therefore before the resurrection, plainly teaches, that even now also after death, the soul useth a body.—He thinketh the same also to be further proved from the visible apparition of Samuel's ghost, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ Σαμουὴλ φαινόμενος, ὡς δηλὸν ἐστὶν ὁρατὸς ὢν, παρίστησιν ὅτι σῶμα περιέκειτο. Samuel also visibly appearing after death, maketh it manifest, that his soul was then clothed with a body.—To which he adds in Photius,* τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἅμα τῇ ἀπαλλαγῇ σχῆμα, ὁμοειδὲς τῷ παλαιῷ καὶ γήινῳ σώματι, &c. That the exterior form and figure of the soul's body after death doth resemble that of the gross terrestrial body here in this life; all the histories of apparitions making ghosts, or the souls of the dead, to appear in the same form which their bodies had before.—This, therefore, as was observed, is that, which Origen understands by τὸ σκῆνος in St. Paul; not this gross terrestrial body, but a certain middle body betwixt it and the heavenly, which the soul after death carries away with it. Now, this opinion of the learned Ori-

* Apud Phot. ubi supra, p. 930.

gen's was never reckoned up by the ancient fathers, or his greatest adversaries, in the catalogue of his errors; nor does Methodius the martyr, who was so great an anti-Origenist, where he mentions this Origenic opinion in Photius, seem to tax it otherwise, than as Platonical, implying the soul to be incorporeal. Methodius himself, on the contrary, contending, not that the soul hath a body conjoined with it after death, as a distinct thing from it, but that itself is a body; ὁ θεὸς μόνος ᾄδεται ἀσώματος ὢν, αἱ δὲ ψυχαὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ καὶ πατρὸς τῶν ὅλων, σώματα νοερά ὑπάρχουσαι, ἕς λόγῳ θεωρητὰ μέλη διακεκύσμηται, ταύτην λαβοῦσαι τὴν διατύπωσιν· ὅθεν καὶ ἐν τῷ ᾄδῃ, καὶ γλῶσσαν, καὶ δάκτυλον, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα μέλη ἰσχυροῦνται ἔχειν· οὐχ ὡς σώματος ἑτέρου συνυπάρχοντος αὐταῖς ψυχαῖς ἀειδοῦς· ἀλλ' ὅτι αὐταὶ φύσει αἱ ψυχαὶ πάντος ἀπογυμνωθεῖσαι περιβλήματος τοιαῦται κατὰ τὴν εὐσίαν ὑπάρχουσι. God alone is praised as incorporeal and invisible; but souls are made by him (who is the father of all things), intellectual bodies, ornamentally branched out (as it were) into members distinguishable by reason, and having the same form and signature with the outward body. Whence it is, that in Hades (or hell) we read of a tongue, and a finger, and other members; not as if there then were another invisible body coexisting with these souls, but because the souls themselves are in their own nature (when stripped naked of all clothing), according to their very essence such. We say, therefore, if one of these two opinions must needs be entertained, that either the soul itself is a body, or else that it hath a body after death; the latter of them, which was Origen's, ought certainly much to be preferred before the former,

whether held in Tertullian's sense, that all substance, and consequently God himself, is body; or else in that of Methodius, that all created substance is such, God alone being incorporeal.

But we have already shewed, that Origen was not singular in this opinion, Irenæus before him having asserted the same thing, that souls after death are adapted to certain bodies (where the word in the Greek probably was *προσάπτονται*), which have the same character with these terrestrial ones; and Philoponus after him, who was no Pagan, but a Christian philosopher, dogmatizing in like manner. We might here add, that Joannes Thessalonicensis, in that dialogue of his, read in the seventh synod,* seemeth to have been of the same persuasion also, when he affirmeth of souls, as well as angels and demons, that they were *ὁραθέντες παρὰ πλειόνων αἰσθητῶς πλεονάκις, τῷ αἰδεῖ τῶν οἰκείων αὐτῶν σωμάτων*, often seen by many sensibly, in the form of their own bodies. However, it is a thing, which Psellus took for granted, where, speaking of devils, insinuating their temptations into men's souls, by affecting immediately the fantastic spirit, he writeth after this manner: *ὁ λέγων, πόρρωθεν μὲν ὦν, ἰσχυρο-*

P. 94.

πέρας δαίται κραυγῆς, ἀγγοῦ δὲ γεγόμενος, εἰς τὸ [p. 72.] τοῦ ἀκούοντος οὓς ψιθυρίζων ὑποφωνεῖ καὶ εἰ ἐνῆν αὐτῷ συνεγγίσει πνεύματι τῆς ψυχῆς, οὐδενὸς ἂν ἰδεῖσθαι φόβου, ἀλλ' ἦν ὁ κατὰ βούλησιν λόγος ἀψόφῳ κελεύθῳ πρὸς τὸ δεχόμενον ἐγγυόμενος, ὃ φασὶ καὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐξιούσαις τῶν σωμάτων εἶναι καὶ γὰρ καὶ ταύτας ἀπλήκτως ὁμιλεῖν ἀλλήλαις. When one man speaks to another from afar off, he must (if he would be heard), make a loud cry or noise; whereas, if he stood near to

* Vide Concil. edit. Harduini. tom. iv. p. 293, 294.

him, he might softly whisper into his ear. But could he immediately approach to the spirit (or subtile body of the soul), he should not then need so much as to make a whisper, but might silently, and without noise, communicate whatsoever thoughts of his own to him, by motions made thereupon. And this is said to be the way that souls, going out of these bodies, converse together; they communicating their thoughts to one another without any noise. For Psellus

here plainly supposeth souls after death to have πνεῦμα, that is, a certain subtile body, adhering to them, by motions

upon which they may silently converse with each other. It is true, indeed, that St. Austin, in his twelfth book *De Genesi ad Literam*, does not himself close with this opinion, of the soul's having a body after death, but much less of its being a body: nevertheless does he seem to leave every man to his own liberty therein, in these words: "*Si autem quæritur, dum anima de corpore exierit, utrum ad aliqua loca corporalia feratur, an ad incorporea corporalibus similia; an vero nec ad ipsa, sed ad illud, quod et corporibus et similitudinibus corporum est excellentius; cito quidem responderim; ad corporalia loca eam vel non ferri nisi cum aliquo corpore, vel non localiter ferri. Jam utrum habeat aliquod corpus, ostendat, qui potest; ego autem non puto. Spiritalem enim arbitror esse, non corporalem; ad spiritalia vero pro meritis fertur, aut ad loca pœnalia similia corporibus.*" But if it be demanded, when the soul goes out of this body, whether it be carried into any corporeal places, or to incorporeals like to corporeals, or else to neither, but

*De Genesi ad
Literam, c.
xxxii. [p. 239.
tom. iii. oper.]*

to that, which is more excellent than both bodies, and the likenesses of bodies? the answer is ready; that it cannot be carried to corporeal places, or not locally carried any whither, without a body. Now whether the soul have some body, when it goes out of this body, let them that can shew; but, for my part, I think otherwise. For I suppose the soul to be spiritual, and not corporeal; and that, after death, it is either carried to spiritual things, or else to penal places, like to bodies, such as have been represented to some in ecstacies, &c.—Where St. Austin himself seems to think the punishment of souls, after death, and before the resurrection, to be fantastical, or only in imagination: whereas there could not be then so much as fantastic punishments neither, nor any imagination at all in souls, without a body, if that doctrine of Aristotle's* be true, that fancy or imagination is nothing else but a weaker sense; that is, a thing, which results from a complication of soul and body both together. But it is observable, that in the forecited place that, which St. Austin chiefly opposed, was the soul's being a body, as Tertullian, Methodius, and others had asserted; but as for its having a body, he saith only this: "Ostendat qui potest," let him that can shew it; he granting, in the mean time, that the soul cannot be locally carried any whither at all after death, nor indeed be in any place without a body. However, the same St. Austin, as he elsewhere condemneth the opinion of those, who would take the fire of hell metaphorically, acknowledg-

* De Anima, lib. iii. cap. ix. p. 53. tom. ii. oper.

De Civ. D.
lib. xxi. c.
xxvi. [s. iv. p.
490. tom. vii.
oper.]

ing it to be real and corporeal; so does he somewhere think it not improbable, but after death, and before the resurrection, the souls of men may suffer from a certain fire, for the consuming and burning up of their dross: "Post istius sane corporis mortem, donec ad illum veniatur, qui post resurrectionem corporum futurus est damnationis et remunerationis ultimus dies; si hoc temporis intervallo, ejusmodi ignem dicuntur perpeti, quem non sentiant illi, qui non habuerint tales mores et amores in hujus corporis vita, ut eorum ligna, et scænum, et stipula consummantur; alii vero sentiunt, qui ejusmodi secum ædificia portaverunt, &c. non redarguo, quia forsitan verum est." If in this interval of time, betwixt the death of the body, and the resurrection, or day of judgment, the souls of the dead be said to suffer such a fire as can do no execution upon those, who have no wood, hay, nor stubble, to burn up, but shall be felt by such, as have made such buildings or superstructures, &c. I reprehend it not, because perhaps it is true.—The opinion here mentioned, is

thus expressed by Origen, in his fifth book against Celsus, which very place St. Austin seems to have had respect to: οὐ συνιδὸν δτι ὡσπερ Ἑλλήνων τισὶν ἔδοξε, τὸ πῦρ καθάρσιον ἐπάγεται τῷ κόσμῳ· εἰκὸς δ' δτι καὶ ἐκάστῃ τῶν δεομένων τῆς διὰ τοῦ πυρὸς δίκης καίοντος μὲν καὶ οὐ κατακαίοντος τοὺς μὴ ἔχοντας ὕλην δεομένην ἀναλίσθαι ὑπ' ἐκείνου τοῦ πυρὸς· καίοντος δὲ καὶ κατακαίοντος τοὺς ἐν τῇ διὰ τῶν πράξεων καὶ λόγων καὶ νοημάτων τροπικῶς λεγομένη οἰκοδομῇ ξύλα, χόρτον, ἢ καλήμην οἰκοδομοῦσιν· Celsus did not understand, that this fire, as well according to the Hebrews and Christians, as to some of the Greeks,

will be purgatory to the world; as also to every one of those persons, who stand in need of such punishment and remedy by fire: which fire can do no execution upon those, who have no combustible matter in them, but will be felt by such, as in the moral structure of their thoughts, words, and actions, have built up wood, hay and stubble.—Now since souls cannot suffer from fire, nor any thing else in way of sense or pain, without being vitally united to some body, we may conclude, that St. Austin, when he wrote this, was not altogether abhorrent from souls having bodies after death.

Hitherto have we declared, how the ancient assertors of incorporeal substance, as unextended, did repel the assaults of Atheists and Corporealists made against it; but especially how they quitted themselves of that absurdity, of the illocality and immobility of finite created spirits, by supposing them always to be vitally united to some bodies, and consequently, by the locality of those their respective bodies, determined to here and there; according to that of Origen: *ἡ ψυχὴ ἡμῶν δεῖται σώματος, διὰ τὰς τοιαύτας μεταβάσεις*, our soul stands in need C. Cels. l. v. p. 244. of a body in order to local motions.—

We shall in the next place declare, what grounds of reason there were, which induced those ancients to assert and maintain a thing so repugnant to sense and imagination, and consequently to all vulgar apprehension, as a substance in itself unextended, indistant, and indivisible, or devoid of magnitude and parts. Wherein we shall only represent the sense of these ancient Incorporealists, so far as we can, to the best advantage, in order to their vindication, against Atheists and

Materialists: ourselves in the mean time not asserting any thing, but leaving every one, that can, to make his own judgment; and so either to close with this, or that other following hypothesis, of extended incorporeals.

Now it is here observable, that it was a thing formerly taken for granted on both sides, as well by the assertors as the deniers of incorporeal substance, that there is but one kind of extension only: and, consequently, that whatsoever hath magnitude and parts, or one thing without another, is not only intellectually and logically, but also really and physically divisible or discernible, as likewise antitypous and impenetrable; so that it cannot coexist with a body in the same place; from whence it follows, that whatsoever arguments do evince, that there is some other substance besides body, the same do therefore demonstrate, according to the sense of these ancients (as well Corporealists as Incorporealists), that there is something unextended, it being supposed by them, both alike, that whatsoever is extended is body. Nevertheless we shall here principally propound such considerations of theirs, as tend directly to prove, that there is something unextendedly incorporeal; and that an unextended deity is no impossible idea; to wit, from hence, because there is something unextended even in our very selves. Where, not to repeat the forementioned ratiocination of Simplicius, that whatsoever can act and reflect upon its whole self, cannot possibly be extended, nor have parts distant from one another; Plotinus first

P. 460.

[Euseb. 4.

lib. vii. cap. v.]

argues after this manner: τί τοίνυν φήσου-
σιν, οἱ τὴν ψυχὴν σῶμα εἶναι λέγοντες, πρῶτον
μὲν περὶ ἐκάστου μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς ἐν ταῖ

αὐτῷ σώματι, πότερον ἑκαστον ψυχὴν, οἷα ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ ὅλη; καὶ πάλιν τοῦ μέρους τὸ μέρος; οὐδὲν ἄρα τὸ μέγεθος συνεβάλλετο τῇ οὐσίᾳ αὐτῆς· καίτοι ἔδει γε ποσοῦ τινος· ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅλον πολ-
λαχῇ, ὅπερ σώμασι παρῆναι ἀδύνατον, ἐν πλείοσι τὸ αὐτὸ ὅλον εἶναι, καὶ τὸ μέρος ὅπερ τὸ ὅλον ὑπάρχειν· εἰ δὲ ἑκα-
στον τῶν μερῶν, οὐ ψυχὴν φήσουσιν, ἐξ ἀψύχων ψυχὴ αὐταῖς ὑπάρξει· What then will they say, who contend, that the soul is a body (or extended) whether or no will they grant concerning every part of the soul in the same body (as that of it which is in the foot, and that in the hand, and that in the brain, &c.) and again every part of those parts, that each of them is soul, such as the whole? If this be consented to, then it is plain, that mag-
nitude, or such a quantity, would confer nothing at all to the essence of the soul, as it would do were it an extended thing; but the whole would be in many parts or places, which is a thing, that cannot possibly belong to body; that the same whole should be in more, and that a part should be what the whole is. But if they will not grant every part of their extended soul to be soul, then, according to them, must the soul be made up, and compounded of soul-less things.—Which ar-
gument is elsewhere thus propounded by him; εἰ δὲ ἑκαστον ζῶν ἔχοι, καὶ ἐν ἀρκεί· εἰ δὲ μη-
δενὸς αὐτῶν ζῶν ἔχοντος ἡ σύνοδος πεποίηκε En. 4. l. vii. c. ii. [p. 457.]
ζῶν, ἄτοπον· μᾶλλον δὲ ἀδύνατον συμφόρησιν σωμάτων ζῶν ἐργάζεσθαι, καὶ νοῦν γεννᾶν τὰ ἀνόητα· If every one of the parts of this extended soul or mind has life in it, then would any one of them alone be sufficient. But to say, that though none of the parts alone have life in them, yet the conjunction of them altogether maketh life, is absurd; it being impossible, that life and soul

should result from a congeries of life-less and soul-less things, or that mind-less things put together should beget mind.—The sum of this argumentation is this; that either every part of extended soul is soul, and of an extended mind, mind; or not. Now, if no part of a soul, as supposed to be extended alone, be soul, or have life and mind in it, then is it certain, that the whole, resulting from all the parts, could have no life nor mind, because nothing can (casually), come from nothing. It is true, indeed, that corporeal qualities and forms, according to the Atomic physiology, result from a composition and contexture of atoms or parts, each of which, taken alone by themselves, have nothing of that quality or form in them,

* ————— Ne ex albis alba rearis;
Aut ea, quæ nigrant, nigro de semine nata.

You are not to think that white things are made out of white principles, nor black things out of black; but the reason of the difference here is plain, because these qualities and forms are not entities really distinct from the magnitude, figure, site, and motion of parts, but only such a composition of them, as cause different fancies in us; but life and understanding, soul and mind, are entities really distant from magnitude, figure, site, and motion of parts: they are neither mere fancies nor syllables of things, but simple and uncompounded realities. But if every supposed part of a soul, be soul, and of a mind, mind, then would all the rest of it besides any one part be superfluous; or indeed every supposed part

* Lucret. ii. ver. 730. 732.

thereof would be the same with the whole: from whence it follows, that it could not be extended, or have any real parts at all, since no part of an extended thing can possibly be the same with the whole.

Again, the same philosopher endeavours further to prove, that the human soul itself is unextended and indivisible, from its energies and operations, and that as well those of sensation as of intellection. First, therefore, from external sensations, he reasons in this manner: *εἴτε μέλλει αἰσθάνεσθαι τινος ἐν αὐτῷ δεῖ εἶναι, καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ παντός* p. 461. *ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι· καὶ εἰ διὰ πολλῶν αἰσθητηρίων* [cap. vi.] *πλείω τὰ αἰσίουτα, ἢ πολλαὶ περὶ ἐν ποίότητες, καὶ δι' ἐνός ποικίλον, οἷον πρόσωπον· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλο μὲν ῥινός ἄλλο δὲ ὀφθαλμῶν, ἄλλα ταῦτ' ὁμοῦ πάντων· καὶ εἰ τὸ μὲν δι' ὀμμάτων τὸ δὲ δι' ἀκοῆς, ἐν τῷ δεῖ εἶναι εἰς ὃ ἄμφω ἢ πῶς ἂν εἴποι ὅτι ἕτερα ταῦτα, μὴ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ὁμοῦ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐλθόντων·* That, which perceiveth in us, must of necessity be one thing, and by one and the same indivisible perceive all; and that, whether they be more things, entering through several organs of sense, as the many qualities of one substance, or one various and multiform thing, entering through the same organ, as the countenance or picture of a man. For it is not one thing in us, that perceives the nose, another thing the eyes, and another thing the mouth; but it is one and the self-same thing, that perceiveth all. And when one thing enters through the eye, another through the ear, these also must of necessity come all at last to one indivisible, or else they could not be compared together, nor one of them affirmed to be different from another; the several sentiments of them meeting no where together

in one. He concludes, therefore, that this one thing in us, that sensibly perceives all things, may be resembled to the centre of a circle, and the several senses to lines drawn from the circumference, which all meet in that one centre. Wherefore, that which perceives and apprehends all things in us, must needs be really one and the very same; that is, unextended and indivisible. Which argument is yet further pursued by him, more particularly thus: If that, which sensibly perceiveth in us be extended, so as to have distant parts one without another; then one of these three things must needs be affirmed, that either every part of this extended substance of the soul perceives a part of the object only, or every part of it the whole object, or else all comes to some one point, which alone perceives both the several parts of the object, and the whole, all the other being but as circumferential lines leading to this centre. Now of the former of these three, Plotinus thus: *μεγέθει ὄντι τούτῳ, συμμερίζοιτο ἂν ὥστε ἄλλο ἄλλου μέρος, καὶ μηδὲν ἡμῶν ὅλου τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἀντίληψιν ἔχειν ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐγὼ μὲν ἄλλου· σὺ δὲ ἄλλου αἰσθῶιο.* If the soul be a magnitude, then must it be divided together with the sensible object, so that one part of the soul must perceive one part of the object, and another, another; and nothing in it, the whole sensible; just as if I should have the sense of one thing, and you of another. Whereas it is plain by our internal sense, that it is one and the self-same thing, which perceives both the parts and the whole. And of the second, he writeth in this manner: *εἰ δὲ ὁτιοῦν πάντῳ αἰσθήσεται· εἰς ἄπειρα διαιρεῖσθαι τοῦ μεγέθους πεφυκός, ἀπείρους καὶ αἰσθήσεις καθ'*

ἑκαστον αἰσθητὸν συμβῆσθαι γίνεσθαι ἑκάστῳ ὅλον τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀνέλπους ἐν τῷ ἡγεμονοῦντι ἡμῶν εἰκόνας. But if every part of the extended soul perceive the whole sensible object, since magnitude is infinitely divisible, there must be in every man infinite sensations and images of one and the same object.—

Whereas we are intimately conscious to ourselves, that we have but only one sensation of one object at the same time. And as for the third and last part of this disjunction, that what sensibly perceives in every one, is but one single point, either mathematical or physical; it is certain, first, that a mathematical point, having neither longitude, latitude, nor profundity, is no body nor substance, but only a notion of our own mind, or a mode of conceiving in us. And then, as for a physical point or minimum, a body so little, that there cannot possibly be any less, Plotinus asserting the infinite divisibility of body, here explodes the thing itself. However, he further intimates, that if there were any such physical minimum, or absolutely least body or extensum, this could not possibly receive upon it a distinct representation and delineation of all the several parts of a whole visible object at once, as of the eyes, nose, mouth, &c. in a man's face or picture, or of the particularities of an edifice; nor could such a parvitude or atom as this be the cause of all animal motions. And this was one of Aristotle's* arguments, whereby he would prove unextended incorporeals, πῶς τῷ ἀμερεῖ τὸ μεριστόν. If the soul were indivisible as a point, how could it perceive that which is divisible?—that is, take notice of all the distinct parts of an

* De Anima, lib. i. cap. iii. p. 10. tom. ii. oper.

extended object, and have a description of the whole of them at once upon itself? The sum of the whole argumentation is this, that if the soul be an extended substance, then must it of necessity be either a physical point or minimum, the least extensum that can possibly be, (if there be any such least, and body or extension be not infinitely divisible), or else it must consist of more such physical points, joined together. As for the former of these, it hath been already declared to be impossible, that one single atom or smallest point of extension, should be able distinctly to perceive all the variety of things: to which might be added, that to suppose every soul to be but one physical minimum, or smallest extensum, is to imply such an essential difference in matter or extension, as that some of the points thereof should be naturally devoid of all life, sense, and understanding, and others again naturally sensitive and rational. Which absurdity, though it should be admitted, yet would it be utterly unconceivable, how there should come to be one such sensitive and rational atom in every man and no more, and how this should constantly remain the same, from infancy to old age, whilst other parts of matter transpire perpetually. But as for the latter, if souls be extended substances, consisting of more points, one without another, all concurring in every sensation; then must every one of those points, either perceive a point and part of the object only, or else the whole. Now, if every point of the extended soul perceive only a point of the object, then is there no one thing in us, that perceives the whole, or which can compare one part

with another. But if every point of the extended soul perceive the whole object at once, consisting of many parts, then would there be innumerable perceptions of the same object in every sensation; as many as there are points in the extended soul. And from both those suppositions, it would alike follow, that no man is one single percipient or person, but that there are innumerable distinct percipients and persons in every man. Neither can there be any other supposition made, besides those three forementioned; as, that the whole extended soul should perceive both the whole sensible object, and all its several parts, no part of this soul in the mean time having any perception at all by itself; because the whole of an extended being is nothing but all the parts taken together; and if none of those parts have any life, sense, or perception in them, it is impossible that there should be any in the whole. But in very truth, to say, that the whole soul perceiveth all, and no part of it any thing, is to acknowledge it not to be extended, but to be indivisible, which is the thing that Plotinus contends for.

And that philosopher here further insists upon internal sensations also, and that *Συμπάθεια*, or *Ὁμοπάθεια*, that sympathy, or homopathy, which is in all animals to the same purpose: it being one and the same thing in them, which perceives pain, in the most distant extremities of the body, as in the sole of the foot, and in the crown of the head; and which moves one part to succour, and relieve another labouring under it, which could not possibly be by traduction of all to one physical point, as the centre, for divers reasons;

Ἐι τοίνυν κατὰ διάδοσιν οὐχ οἰόντε τὴν αἰσθησίν
 P. 462. τοῦ τοιοῦτου γίνεσθαι, μὴ δὲ σώματος ὅγκου

ὄντος, ἄλλου παθόντος, ἄλλο γινώσκειν ἔχειν (παντὸς γὰρ
 μεγέθους τὸ μὲν ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο ἴστί) δεῖ τοιοῦτον τίθεσθαι
 τὸ αἰσθανόμενον, οἷον πανταχοῦ αὐτοῦ ἑαυτῷ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι·
 τοῦτο δὲ ἄλλῃ τινὶ τῶν ὄντων ἢ σώματι ποιεῖν προσήκει·

Since therefore these sympathetic senses cannot possibly be made by traduction, at last to one thing; and body being bulky or out-swelling extension, one part thereof suffering, another cannot perceive it (for in all magnitude, this is one thing and that another), it followeth, that what perceives in us, must be every where, and in all the parts of the body, one and the same thing with itself. Which therefore cannot be itself body, but must of necessity be some other entity or substance incorporeal.—The conclusion is, that in men and animals there is one thing indivisibly the same, that comprehendeth the whole outside of them, perceiveth both the parts and the whole of sensible objects, and all transmitted through several senses, sympathizeth with all the distant parts of the body, and acteth entirely upon all. And this is properly called, I myself, not the extended bulk of the body, which is not one, but many substances, but an unextended and indivisible unity, wherein all lines meet and concentre, not as a mathematical point or least *extensum*, but as one self-active, living power, substantial or inside-being, that containeth, holdeth, and connecteth all together.

Lastly, The forementioned philosopher endeavours yet further to prove the human soul to be unextended and devoid of magnitude, and indivisible, from its rational energies or operations,

its νοητῶν νοήσεις, and ἀμεγέθων ἀντιλήψεις, intellections of intelligibles, and apprehensions of things devoid of magnitude, πῶς γὰρ μέγεθος ὃν τὸ μὴ μέγεθος νοήσει; καὶ τῷ μεριστῷ τὸ μὴ μεριστόν. For how could the soul (saith he), if it were a magnitude, understand that, which hath no magnitude? and with that, which is divisible, conceive that which is indivisible?—Now, it is certain, that we have notions of many things, which are ἀφάνταστα, altogether unimaginal, and therefore have nothing of length, breadth, and thickness in them, as virtue, vice, &c. ἀμέγεθες δὲ οἶμαι καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ ἡ τούτων ἄρα νόησις. Plot. p. 463. ὥστε καὶ προσιόντα καὶ τῷ ἀμερεῖ αὐτῆς ὑποδέχεται, καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ ἐν ἀμερεῖ κείσεται. Justice and honesty, and the like, are things devoid of magnitude, and therefore must the intellections of them needs be such too. So that the soul must receive these by what is indivisible, and lodge them in that which is divisible.—We have also a notion, not only of mere latitude or breadth, indivisible as to thickness; and of longitude or a line, indivisible both as to breadth and thickness; but also of a mathematical point, that is every way indivisible, as to length, breadth and thickness. We have a conception of the intention of powers and virtues, wherein there is nothing of extension or magnitude. And indeed all the abstract essences of things, (or the αὐτοέκαστα) which are the first objects of intellection, are indivisible: εἰ δὲ τῶν ἐν ᾧ εἰδῶν τὰς νοήσεις φήσουσιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ χωριζομένων γε γίνονται τοῦ νοῦ χωρίζοντος, οὐ γὰρ μετὰ σαρκῶν, &c. And though we apprehend forms, that are in matter too, yet do we apprehend them as separated and abstracted from the same; there being

nothing of flesh in our conception of a man, &c.—Nay, the soul conceives extended things themselves, unextendedly and indivisibly; for as the distance of a whole hemisphere is contracted into a narrow compass in the pupil of the eye, so are all distances yet more contracted in the soul itself, and there understood indistantly; for the thought of a mile distance, or of ten thousand miles, or semidiameters of the earth, takes up no more room in the soul, nor stretches it any more, than does the thought of a foot or inch, or indeed of a mathematical point. Were that, which perceiveth in us, a magnitude, then could it not be *ἴσον παντὶ αἰσθητῷ*, equal to every sensible—and alike perceive both lesser and greater magnitudes than itself: but least of all could it perceive such things as have no magnitude at all. And this was the other part of Aristotle's argumentation, to prove the soul and mind to be unextended and indivisible,* *πῶς γὰρ νοήσει τὸ ἀμερὲς μεριστῶ*; for how could it perceive, that which is indivisible by what is divisible?—he having before demanded, how it could apprehend things divisible, and of a great extension, by a mere point, or absolute parvitude. Where the soul; or that which perceives and understands, is, according to Aristotle, neither divisible, as a continued quantity, nor yet indivisible, either as a mathematical, or as a physical point, and absolute parvitude; but as that, which hath in itself no out-swelling distance, nor relation to any place, otherwise than as it is vitally united to a body, which (wherever it be), it always sympathizes with and acts upon.

* De Anima, lib. i. cap. iii. p. 10. tom. ii. oper.

Besides which, these ancient assertors of unextended incorporeals would, in all probability, confirm that opinion from hence, because we cannot only conceive extension without cogitation, and again, cogitation without extension; from whence it may be inferred, that they are entities really distinct and separable from one another, (we having no other rule to judge of the real distinction and separability of things, than from our conceptions), but also are not able to conceive cogitation with extension. We cannot conceive a thought to be of such a certain length, breadth, and thickness, mensurable by inches and feet, and by solid measures. We cannot conceive half, or a third part, or a twentieth part of a thought, much less of the thought of an indivisible thing; neither can we conceive every thought to be of some certain determinate figure, either round or angular; spherical, cubical, or cylindrical, or the like. Whereas, if whatsoever is unextended be nothing, thoughts must either be mere non-entities, or else extended too into length, breadth, and thickness; divisible into parts, and mensurable; and also (where finite) of a certain figure. And, consequently, all verities in us (they being but complex axiomatical thoughts), must of necessity be long, broad, and thick, and either spherically, or angularly figurate. And the same must be affirmed of volitions likewise, and appetites or passions, as fear and hope, love and hatred, grief and joy; and of all other things belonging to cogitative beings (souls and minds), as knowledge and ignorance, wisdom and folly, virtue and vice, justice and injustice, &c. that these are either all of them ab-

solute non-entities, or else extended into three divisions of length, breadth, and profundity, and measurable not only by inches and feet, but also by solid measures, as pints and quarts; and last of all (where they are finite as in men), figurate. But if this be absurd, and these things belonging to soul and mind (though doubtless as great realities at least, as the things which belong to bodies), be unextended, then must the substances of souls and minds themselves be unextended also. Thus Plotinus of mind; *Νοῦς οὐ διασπᾶς ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ*, mind is not distant from itself:—and indeed were it so, it could not be one thing (as it is), but many; every conceivable part of distant and unextended substance being a substance by itself. And the same is to be said of the human soul, though it act upon distant parts of that body, which it is united to, that itself, notwithstanding, is not scattered out into distance, nor dispersed into multiplicity, nor infinitely divisible; because then it would not be one single substance, or monad, but a heap of substances. Soul is no more divisible than life; of which the forementioned philosopher thus: *ἀραγε τῇ ζωῇ μεριεῖς; ἀλλ' εἰ τὸ πᾶν ἦν ζωῇ, τὸ μέρος ζωῇ οὐκ ἔσται*. Will you divide a life into two? then the whole of it being but a life, the half thereof cannot be a life.—Lastly, if soul and mind, and the things belonging to them, as life and cogitation, understanding and wisdom, &c. be outspread into distance, having one part without another; then can there be no good reason given, why they should not be as well really and physically, as intellectually divisible; and one part of them separable from another: since, as Plotinus, *παν-*

τὸς μεγέθους τὸ μὲν ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο. In all magnitude or extension, this is one thing, and that another.—At least, no Theist ought to deny, but that the Divine power could cleave or divide a thought, together with the soul, wherein it is, into many pieces; and remove them to the greatest distances from one another (forasmuch as this implies no manner of contradiction, and whatsoever is conceivable by us, may be done by infinite power), in which case neither of them alone would be soul or mind, life or thought, but all put together make up one entire mind, soul, life, and thought.

Wherefore, the sense of the ancient Incorporalists seems to have been as follows: That there are in nature two kinds of substances specifically differing from one another; the first, Ὀγκοί, bulks, or tumours, a mere passive thing; the second, Δυνάμεις, self-active powers or virtues, or φύσις δραστήριος, the energetic nature. The former of these is nothing else but magnitude or extension, not as an abstract notion of the mind, but as a thing really existing without it. For when it is called *res extensa*, the meaning is not, as if the *res* were one thing, and the extension thereof another, but that it is extension or distance, really existing, or the thing thereof (without the mind) and not the notion. Now, this in the nature of it is nothing but *aliud extra aliud*, one thing without another,—and therefore perfect alterity, disunity, and divisibility. So that no extensum whatsoever, of any sensible bigness, is truly and really one substance, but a multitude or heap of substances, as many as there are parts, into which it is divisible. Moreover,

one part of this magnitude always standing without another, it is an essential property thereof to be antitypous or impenetrable; that is, to jostle or shoulder out all other extended substance from penetrating into it, and coexisting with it, so as to possess and take up the same room and space. One yard of distance, or of length, breadth, and thickness, cannot possibly be added to another, without making the whole extension double to what it was before, since one of them must of necessity stand without the other. One magnitude cannot imbibe or swallow up another, nor can there be any penetration of dimensions. Moreover, magnitude or extension, as such, is mere outside or outwardness; it hath nothing within, no self-active power or virtue; all its activity being either keeping out, or hindering, any other extended thing from penetrating into it: (which yet it doth merely by its being extended, and therefore not so much by any physical efficiency as a logical necessity), or else local motion, to which it is also but passive; no body or extension, as such, being able to move itself, or act upon itself.

Wherefore, were there no other substance in the world besides this magnitude or extension, there could be no motion or action at all in it; no life, cogitation, consciousness; no intellection, appetite, or volition, (which things do yet make up the greatest part of the universe), but all would be a dead heap or lump: nor could any one substance penetrate another, and coexist in the same place with it. From whence it follows, of necessity, that besides this outside bulky extension, and tumourous magnitude, there must

be another kind of entity, whose essential attribute or character is life, self-activity, or cogitation. Which first, that it is not a mere mode or accident of magnitude and extension, is plain from hence, because cogitation may be as well conceived without extension, as extension without cogitation; whereas no mode of any thing can be conceived without that, whereof it is a mode. And since there is unquestionably much more of entity in life and cogitation, than there is in mere extension or magnitude, which is the lowest of all being, and next to nothing; it must needs be imputed to the mere delusion and imposture of imagination, that men are so prone to think this extension or magnitude to be only substance, and all other things besides the mere accidents thereof, generable out of it, and corruptible again into it. For though that secondary and participated life (as it is called) in the bodies of animals be indeed a mere accident, and such as may be present or absent without the destruction of its subject; yet can there be no reason given, why the primary and original life itself should not be as well a substantial thing, as mere extension and magnitude. Again, that extension and life, or cogitation, are not two inadequate conceptions neither, of one and the self-same substance, considered brokenly and by piecemeal; as if either all extension had life and cogitation essentially belonging to it, (as the Hylozoists conclude) or at least all life and cogitation had extension; and, consequently, all souls and minds, and even the Deity itself, were either extended life and cogitation, or living and thinking extension; (there being nothing in nature unextended, but extension the only

entity; so that whatsoever is devoid thereof, is, *ipso facto*, absolutely nothing :) this, I say, will also appear from hence, because, as hath been already declared, we cannot conceive a life, or mind, or thought, nor any thing at all belonging to a cogitative being, as such, (as wisdom, folly, virtue, vice, &c.) to be extended into length, breadth, and thickness, and to be mensurable by inches, feet, and yards. From whence it may be concluded, that extension, and life or cogitation, are no inadequate conceptions of one and the self-same thing, since they cannot be complicated together into one, but that they are distinct substances from each other. Lives and minds are such tight and compact things in themselves, and have such a self-unity in their nature, as that they cannot be lodged in that, which is wholly scattered out from itself into distance, and dispersed into infinite multiplicity; nor be spread all over the same, as coextended with it. Nor is it conceivable, how all the several parts of an extended magnitude should jointly concur and contribute to the production of one and the same single and indivisible cogitation; or how that whole heap or bundle of things should be one thinker.* A thinker is a monad, or one single substance, and not a heap of substances; whereas no body or extended thing is one, but many substances; every conceivable or smallest part thereof being a real substance by itself.

But this will yet further appear, if we consider what kind of action cogitation is. The action of an extended thing, as such, is nothing but local motion, change of distance, or translation from place to place, a mere outside and superficial

thing; but it is certain, that cogitation (fancy, intellection, and volition) are no local motions; nor the mere fridging up and down of the parts of an extended substance, changing their place and distance; but it is unquestionably an internal energy; that is, such an energy, as is within the very substance or essence of that, which thinketh, or in the inside of it. From which two kinds of energies we may now conclude, that there are also two kinds of entity or substance in nature; the one mere outside, and which hath nothing within it; the other such a kind of entity, as hath an eternal energy; acteth from itself, and within itself, and upon itself; an inside thing, whose action is within the very essence or substance thereof; it being plain, that the cogitative or thinking nature is such a thing, as hath an essential inside or profundity. Now, this inside of cogitative beings, wherein they thus act or think internally within themselves, cannot have any length, breadth, or thickness in it; because if it had, it would be again a mere outside thing. Wherefore had all cogitative beings (souls and minds) extension and magnitude never so much belonging to them, as some suppose them to have, yet could this, for all that, be nothing but the mere outside of their being; besides which, they must of necessity have also an unextended inside, that hath no outswelling tumour, and is not scattered into distance, nor dispersed into multiplicity, which therefore could not possibly exist a part in a part of the supposed extension, as if one half of a mind or thought were in one half of that extension, and another in another; but must of necessity be all undividedly, both in the whole

of it, and in every part. For had every twentieth or hundredth part of this extensum not the whole of a life or mind in it, but only the twentieth or hundredth part thereof, then could none of them have any true life or mind at all, nor consequently the whole have any. Nor indeed is it otherwise conceivable, how a whole quantity of extended substance should be one thing, and have one personality, one I myself in it all, were there not one indivisible thing presiding over it, which held it all together, and diffused itself through all. And thus do we see, how this whole in the whole and in every part (do men what they can) will, like a ghost, still haunt them and follow them every where. But now it is impossible, that one and the self-same substance should be both extended and unextended. Wherefore in this hypothesis of extended understanding spirits, having one part without another, there is an undiscerned complication of two distinct substances, extended and unextended, or corporeal and incorporeal, both together; and a confusion of them into one. Where, notwithstanding, we must acknowledge, that there is so much of truth aimed at, as that all finite incorporeal substances are always naturally united to some bodies; so that the whole of these created animals is completed and made up of both these together, an extended inside, and an unextended outside, both of them substances indeed really distinct, but yet vitally united each to other.

The sum of all is, that there are two kinds of substances in nature, the first extension of magnitude, really existing without the mind, which is a thing, that hath no self unity at all in it, but is

infinite alterity and divisibility, as it is also mere outside and outwardness, it having nothing within, nor any other action belonging to it, but only locally to move, when it is moved. The second, life and mind, or the self-active cogitative nature, an inside being, whose action is not local motion, but an internal energy, within the substance or essence of the thinker himself, or in the inside of him; which, therefore, though unextended, yet hath a certain inward recess, βάθος, or essential profundity. And this is a thing, which can act all of it entirely upon either a greater or lesser quantity of extended substance or body, and its several parts, penetrating into it, and coexisting in the same place with it. Wherefore it is not to be looked upon either as a mathematical, or as a physical point, as an absolute parvitude, or the least extensum possible, it having not only such an essential inside, bathos, or profundity in it, wherein it acteth and thinketh within itself, but also a certain amplitude of active power *ad extra*, or a sphere of activity upon body. Upon which account, it was before affirmed by Plotinus, that an unextended incorporeal is a thing bigger than body, because body cannot exist otherwise than a point of it in a point of space; whereas this one and the same indivisible can at once both comprehend a whole extensum within it, and be all of it in every part thereof. And, lastly, all finite incorporeals are always naturally united to some body or other; from both which together is completed and made up in every created understanding being one entire animal, consisting of soul and body, and having something incorporeal, and something corporeal in it, an unextended inside, and an ex-

tended outside, by means whereof it is determined to here and there, and capable of moving locally, or changing place.

Thus have we represented the sense of the ancient unextended Incorporealists to the best advantage that we could, in way of answer to the premised atheistic argument against incorporeal substance, and in order to the vindication of them from the contempt of Atheists; and we do affirm, that the forementioned arguments of theirs do evince, that there is some other substance besides body, which therefore, according to the principles of these Atheists themselves, must be acknowledged to be unextended, it being concluded by them, that whatsoever is extended is body. But whether they do also absolutely prove, that there is *οὐσία ἀμεγέθης, ἀδιάστατος, ἀμερής*, and *ἀδιαίρετος*, a substance devoid of magnitude, indistant, without parts, and indivisible; this we shall leave others to make a judgment of. However, it is certain, that Atheists, who maintain the contrary, must needs assert, that every thought, and whatsoever belongeth to soul, mind, (as knowledge, virtue, &c.) is not only mentally and mathematically divisible, so that there may be half, a third part, or a quarter of a thought, and the rest, supposed; but also physically separable, or discernible, together with the soul, wherein it is. They must also deny, that there is any internal energy at all, or any other action besides that outside superficial action of local motion, and consequently make all cogitation nothing but local motion or translation. And, lastly, they must maintain, that no substance can coexist with any other substance (as soul with body) otherwise than by

juxta-position only, and by possessing the pores, or filling up the intervals thereof, as a net with the water.

And this is the first answer to the forementioned atheistic argument against incorporeal substance; That though whatsoever is extended be body, yet every thing is not extended; but that life, or mind and cogitation, are an unextended, indistant, and indivisible nature. But, as we have already intimated, there are other learned assertors of incorporeal substance, who, lest God and spirits, being thus made unextended, should quite vanish into nothing, answer that atheistic argumentation after a different manner, by granting to these Atheists that proposition, that whatsoever is, is extended; and what is unextended, is nothing; but then denying that other of theirs, that whatsoever is extended, is body; they asserting another extension, specifically differing from that of bodies: for, whereas corporeal extension is not only impenetrable, so as that no one part thereof can enter into another, but also both mentally and really divisible; one part being in its nature separable from another; they affirm, that there is another incorporeal extension, which is both penetrable, and also indiscerpible, so that no one part thereof can possibly be separated from another, or the whole; and that to such an incorporeal extension as this belongeth life, cogitation, and understanding, the Deity having such an infinite extension; but all created spirits a finite and limited one, which also is in them supposed to be contractable and dilatable. Now it is not our part here to oppose Theists, but Atheists: wherefore we shall leave these two sorts of Incorporealists to dispute

it out friendly amongst themselves; and indeed therefore with the more moderation, equanimity, and toleration of dissent mutually, because it seemeth, that some are in a manner fatally inclined to think one way in this controversy, and some another. And whatever the truth of the case be, it must be acknowledged, that this latter hypothesis may be very useful and serviceable to retain some in Theism, who can by no means admit of a Deity, or any thing else, unextended; though, perhaps, there will not be wanting others also, who would go in a middle way betwixt these two, or compound them together, by supposing the Deity to be indeed altogether unextended, and all of it every where; but finite incorporeals, or created spirits, to have an unextended inside, a life or mind, diffusing itself into a certain amplitude of outward extension, whereby they are determined to a place, yet so as to be all in every part thereof; which outward extension is therefore not to be accounted body, because penetrable, contractable, and dilatable, and because no one part thereof is separable from the rest, by the rushing or incursion of any corporeal thing upon them. And thus is the Atheist's argument against incorporeal substance answered two manner of ways; first, that there is something unextended; and, secondly, that if there were none, yet must there of necessity be a substance otherwise extended than body is, so as to be neither antitypous nor discernible. And ourselves would not be understood here dogmatically to assert any thing in this point, save only what all Incorporealists do agree in, to wit, that besides body, which is impenetrably and divisibly extended, there is in nature another substance, that

is both penetrable of body and indiscerpible, or which doth not consist of parts separable from one another. And that there is at least such a substance as this, is unquestionably manifest from what hath been already declared.

But the Atheist will, in the next place, give an account of the original of this error (as he calls it) of incorporeal substance, and undertake to shew from what mistake it proceeded, which is yet another pretended confutation thereof; namely, that it sprung partly from the abuse of abstract names and notions, men making substances of them; and partly from the scholastic essences, distinct from the things themselves, and said to be eternal. From both which delusions and dotages together the Atheists conceive, that men have been first of all much confirmed in the belief of ghosts and spirits, demons and devils, invisible beings called by several names. Which belief had also another original, men's mistaking their own fancies for realities. The chief of all which affrightful ghosts and spectres, according to these Atheists, is the Deity, the Oberon, or prince of fairies and fancies. But then, whereas men, by their natural reason, could not conceive otherwise of these ghosts and spirits, than that they were a kind of thin, aerial bodies, their understandings have been so enchanted by these abstract names (which are indeed the names of nothing) and those separate essences and quiddities of scholastics, as that they have made incorporeal substances of them; the atheistic conclusion is, that they, who assert an incorporeal Deity, do really but make a scholastic separate essence, or the mere abstract notion of an accident, a substantial thing, and

a ghost or spirit presiding over the whole world.

To which our reply in general first of all is, That all this is nothing but idle romantic fiction; the belief of a Deity, and substance incorporeal, standing upon none of those imaginary foundations. And then, as for that impudent atheistic pretence, that the Deity is nothing but a figment or creature of men's fear and imagination, and therefore the prince of fairies and fancies; this hath been already sufficiently confuted in our answer to the first atheistic argumentation, where we have also over and above shewed, that there is not only a natural prolepsis or anticipation of a God in the minds of men, but also, that the belief thereof is supported by the strongest and most substantial reason, his existence being indeed demonstrable, with mathematical evidence, to such as are capable, and not blinded with prejudice, nor enchanted by the witchcraft of vice and wickedness, to the debauching of their understandings. It hath been also shewed, that the opinion of other ghosts and spirits, besides the Deity, sprung not merely from fear and fancy neither, as children's bugbears, but from real phenomena; true sensible apparitions, with the histories of them in all ages, without which the belief of such things could never have held up so generally and constantly in the world. As, likewise, that there is no repugnancy at all to reason, but that there may be as well ærial and etherial, as there are terrestrial animals; and that the dull and earthy stupidity of men's minds is the only thing, which makes them so prone to think, that there is no understanding nature supe-

rior to mankind, but that in the world all is dead about us; and to disbelieve the existence of any thing, which themselves cannot either see or feel. Assuredly, the Deity is no fancy, but the greatest reality in the world, and that, without which there could be nothing at all real, it being the only necessary existent; and, consequently, Atheism is either mere sottishness, or else a strange kind of irreligious fanaticism.

We now further add, that the belief of ghosts and spirits incorporeal; and, consequently, of an incorporeal Deity, sprung neither from any ridiculous mistake of the abstract names and notions of mere accidents for substances, nor from the scholastic essences, said to be eternal. For, as for the latter, none of those scholastics ever dreamed, that there was any universal man, or universal horse, existing alone by itself, and separate from all singulars; nor that the abstract metaphysical essences of men, after they were dead, subsisting by themselves, did walk up and down amongst graves, in airy bodies: it being absolutely impossible, that the real essence of any thing should be separable from the thing itself, or eternal, when that is not so. And were the essences of all things looked upon by these scholastics as substances incorporeal, then must they have made all things (even body itself) to be ghosts, and spirits, and incorporeal; and accidents also (they having their essences too) to be substantial. But in very truth, these scholastic essences, said to be eternal, are nothing but the intelligible essences of things, or their natures as conceivable, and objects of the mind. And, in this sense, it is an acknowledged truth, that the

essences of things (as, for example, of a sphere or triangle) are eternal, and such as were never made; because there could not otherwise be eternal verities concerning them. So that the true meaning of these eternal essences is indeed no other than this, that knowledge is eternal; or that there is an eternal Mind, that comprehendeth the intelligible natures and ideas of all things, whether actually existing, or possible only, their necessary relations to one another, and all the immutable verities belonging to them. Wherefore, though these eternal essences themselves be no ghosts nor spirits, nor substances incorporeal, they being nothing but objective entities of the mind, or noemata, and ideas; yet does it plainly follow from the necessary supposition of them (as was before declared) that there is one eternal unmade Mind, and perfect incorporeal Deity, a real and substantial Ghost or Spirit, which comprehending itself, and all the extent of its own power, the possibility of things, and their intelligible natures, together with an exemplar or platform of the whole world, produced the same accordingly.

But our atheistic argumentator yet further urges, that those scholastics and metaphysicians, who, because life or cogitation can be considered alone abstractly, without the consideration of body, therefore conclude it not to be the accident or action of a body, but a substance by itself (and which also, after men are dead, can walk amongst the graves); that these, I say, do so far abuse those abstract names and notions of mere accidents, as plainly to make substances incorporeal of them. To which therefore we reply also, that were the abstract notions of accidents in general made

incorporeal substances, by those philosophers aimed at, then must they have supposed all the qualities or affections of bodies, such as whiteness and blackness, heat and cold, and the like, to have been substances incorporeal also; a thing yet never heard or thought of. But the case is far otherwise as to conscious life or cogitation, though it be an abstract also; because this is no accident of body, as the Atheist (serving his own hypothesis) securely takes it for granted, nor indeed of any thing else, but an essential attribute of another substance, distinct from body (or incorporeal); after the same manner, as extension or magnitude is the essential attribute of body, and not a mere accident.

And now, having so copiously confuted all the most considerable atheistic grounds, we are necessitated to dispatch those that follow, being of lesser moment, with all possible brevity and compendiousness. The four next, which are the fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth atheistic arguments, pretend to no more than only this, to disprove a corporeal Deity; or from the supposition, that there is no other substance in the world besides body, to infer the impossibility of a God; that is, of an eternal unmade Mind, the maker and governor of the whole world: all which therefore signify nothing at all to the assertors of a Deity incorporeal, who are the only genuine Theists. Nevertheless, though none but Stoics, and such other Corporealists, as are notwithstanding Theists, be directly concerned in an answer to them, yet shall we, first, so far consider the principles of the atheistic Corporealism, contained in those two heads, the fifth and sixth, as

from the absolute impossibility of these hypotheses to demonstrate a necessity of incorporeal substance, from whence a Deity will also follow.

Here, therefore, are there two atheistic hypotheses, founded upon the supposition, that all is body: the first, in the way of qualities, generable and corruptible, which we call the Hylopathian; the second, in the way of unqualified atoms, which is the Atomic, Corporealism, and Atheism. The former of these was the most ancient, and the first sciography, or rude delineation of Atheism. For Aristotle * tells us, that the most ancient Atheists were those, who supposed matter or body, that is, bulky extension, to be the only substance, and unmade thing, that, out of which all things were made, and into which all things are again resolved; whatsoever is else in the world being nothing but the passions, qualities, and accidents thereof, generable and corruptible, or producible out of nothing, and reducible to nothing again. From whence the necessary consequence is, That there is no eternal unmade life or understanding, or that mind is no god, or principle in the universe, but essentially a creature.

And this Hylopathian Atheism, which supposeth whatsoever is in the universe to be either the substance of matter and bulk, or else the qualities and accidents thereof, generable and corruptible, hath been called also by us Anaximandrian. Though we deny not, but that there might be formerly some difference amongst the Atheists of this kind; nor are we ignorant, that Simplicius and others conceive Anaximander to have as-

* Metaphys. lib. i. cap. iii. p. 204. tom. iv. oper.

serted, besides matter, qualities also eternal and unmade, or an homæomery, and similar atomology, just in the same manner as Anaxagoras afterward did, save only that he would not acknowledge any unmade mind or life; Anaximander supposing all life and understanding whatsoever, all soul and mind, to have risen up, and been generated from a fortuitous commixture of those similar atoms, or the qualities of heat and cold, moist and dry, and the like, contempered together. And we confess, that there is some probability for this opinion. Notwithstanding which, because there is no absolute certainty thereof, and because all these ancient Atheists agreed in this, that life and understanding are either first and primary, or else secondary qualities of body, generable and corruptible; therefore did we not think fit to multiply forms of Atheism, but rather to make but one kind of Atheism of all this, calling it indifferently, Hylopathian, or Anaximandrian.

The second atheistic hypothesis is that form of Atheism described under the sixth head, which likewise supposing body to be the only substance, and the principles thereof devoid of life and understanding, does reject all real qualities, according to the vulgar notion of them, and generate all things whatsoever, besides matter, merely from the combinations of magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions, or the contextures of unqualified atoms, life and understanding not excepted; which, therefore, according to them, being no simple primitive and primordial thing, but secondary, compounded, and derivative, the mere creature of matter and motion, could not possibly be a God,

or first principle in the universe. This is that atomic Atheism called Democritical; Leucippus and Democritus being the first founders thereof. For though there was, before them, another atomology, which made unqualified atoms the principles of all bodies, it supposing, besides body, substance incorporeal; yet were these, as Laetius * declareth, the first that ever made ἀρχαὶ τῶν ὅλων ἀτόμους, senseless atoms, the principles of all things whatsoever, even of life and understanding, soul and mind.

Indeed it cannot be denied, but that from these two things granted, that all is body, and that the principles of body are devoid of all life and understanding, it will follow unavoidably, that there can be no corporeal Deity. Wherefore the Stoics, who professed to acknowledge no other substance besides body, and yet nevertheless had a strong persuasion of the existence of a God, or an eternal unmade Mind, the maker of the whole world, denied that other proposition of the atheistic Corporealists, that the principles of all bodies were devoid of life and understanding, they asserting an intellectual fire, eternal and unmade, the maker of the whole mundane system; which postulatam, of a living intellectual body eternal, were it granted to these Stoics, yet could not this their corporeal god, notwithstanding, be absolutely incorruptible, as Origen often incul-

L. i. c. Cels. cateth: Ὁ Θεὸς τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς ἐστὶ σῶμα, οὐκ αἰδουμένους λέγειν αὐτὸν τρεπτόν, καὶ δι' ὅλων ἀλλοιωτόν καὶ μεταβλητόν, καὶ ἀπαξᾶπλῶς δυνάμενον φθαρεῖναι, παρὰ τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι τὸ φθεῖρον αὐτόν. God

* Lib. ix. segm. 44. p. 573,

to the Stoics is a body, and therefore mutable, alterable, and changeable; and he would indeed be perfectly corruptible, were there any other body to act upon him. Wherefore he is only happy in this, that he wants a corrupter or destroyer.—And thus much was therefore rightly urged by the atheistic argumentator, that no corporeal Deity could be absolutely in its own nature incorruptible, nor otherwise than by accident only immortal, because of its divisibility. For were there any other matter without this world, to make inroads and incursions upon it, or to disunite the parts thereof, the life and unity of the Stoical corporeal god must needs be scattered and destroyed. And therefore of this Stoical god does the same Origen thus further write; *Ὁ τῶν Στωϊκῶν Θεὸς, ὅτε σῶμα τυγχάνων, ὅτε μὲν ἡγεμονικὸν ἔχει τὴν ὅλην οὐσίαν, ὅταν ἡ ἐκπύρωσις ἢ ὅτε δὲ ἐπὶ μέρους γίνεται αὐτῆς, ὅταν ἡ διακόσμησις· οὐδὲ γὰρ δεδύνηται οὗτοι τραυῶσαι τὴν φυσικὴν τοῦ θεοῦ ἔννοιαν, ὡς πάντῃ ἀφθάρτου καὶ ἀπλουῖ, καὶ ἀσυνθέτου, καὶ ἀδιαίρετου.* The god of the Stoics being a body, hath sometimes the whole for its hegemonic in the conflagration; and sometimes only a part of the mundane matter. For these men were not able to reach to a clear notion of the Deity, as a being every way incorruptible, simple, uncompounded, and indivisible.—Notwithstanding which, these Stoics were not therefore to be ranked amongst the Atheists, but far to be preferred before them, and accounted only a kind of imperfect Theists.

But we shall now make it evident, that in both these atheistic corporealisms (agreeing in those two things, that body is the only substance, and that the principles of body are not vital), there is

an absolute impossibility; not only because, as Aristotle^{*} objecteth, they supposed no active principle; but also because their bringing of life and understanding (being real entities) out of dead and senseless matter is also the bringing of something out of nothing. And, indeed, the atomic Atheist is here of the two rather the more absurd and unreasonable, forasmuch as he, discarding all real qualities, and that for this very reason, because nothing can come out of nothing, doth himself, notwithstanding, produce life, sense, and understanding (unquestionable realities) out of mere magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions; that is, indeed, out of nothing. Wherefore there being an absolute impossibility of both these atheistic hypotheses (neither of which is able to solve the phenomenon of life and understanding), from that confessed principle of theirs, that matter, as such, hath no life nor understanding belonging to it, it follows unavoidably, that there must be some other substance besides body or matter, which is essentially vital and intellectual: Οὐ γὰρ πάντα χοῦται ἐκ αὐτῶ ζωῇ, because all things cannot possibly have a peregrine, adventitious, and borrowed life—but something in the universe must needs have life naturally and originally. All life cannot be merely accidental, generable, and corruptible, producible out of nothing, and reducible to nothing again, but there must of necessity be some substantial life, which point (that all life is not a mere accident, but that there is life substantial) hath been of late, with much reason and judgment, insisted upon, and urged by the writer of the Life of Na-

* Metaphysic. lib. i. cap. iii. p. 265. tom. iv. oper.

ture. Neither must there be only such a substantial life, as is naturally immortal for the future, but also such as is eternal, and was never made; all other lives and minds whatsoever (none of which could possibly be generated out of matter) being derived from this eternal unmade fountain of life and understanding.

Which thing the hylozoic Atheists being well aware of, namely, that there must of necessity be both substantial and eternal unmade life, but supposing also matter to be the only substance, thought themselves necessitated to attribute to all matter, as such, life and understanding, though not animalish and conscious, but natural only; they conceiving, that, from the modification thereof alone by organization, all other animalish life, not only the sensitive in brutes, but also the rational in men, was derived. But this hylozoic Atheism, thus bringing all conscious and reflexive life or animality, out of a supposed senseless, stupid, and unconscious life of nature in matter, and that merely from a different accidental modification thereof, or contexture of parts, does again plainly bring something out of nothing, which is an absolute impossibility. Moreover, this hylozoic Atheism was long since, and in the first emission thereof, solidly confuted by the atomic Atheists, after this manner: If matter, as such, had life, perception, and understanding belonging to it, then of necessity must every atom, or smallest particle thereof, be a distinct percipient by itself; from whence it will follow, that there could not possibly be any such men and animals as now are compounded out of them, but every man and animal would be a heap of innumerable per-

cipients, and have innumerable perceptions and intellections; whereas it is plain, that there is but one life and understanding, one soul or mind, one perceiver or thinker, in every one. And to say, that these innumerable particles of matter do all confederate together; that is, to make every man and animal to be a multitude or commonwealth of percipients, and persons, as it were, clubbing together, is a thing so absurd and ridiculous, that one would wonder, the hylozoists should not rather choose to recant that their fundamental error of the life of matter, than endeavour to seek shelter and sanctuary for the same under such a pretence. For though voluntary agents and persons may many of them resign up their wills to one, and by that means have all but as it were one artificial will, yet can they not possibly resign up their sense and understanding too, so as to have all but one artificial life, sense, and understanding; much less could this be done by senseless atoms, or particles of matter supposed to be devoid of all consciousness or animality. Besides which, there have been other arguments already suggested, which do sufficiently evince, that sense and understanding cannot possibly belong to matter any way, either originally or secondarily, to which more may be added elsewhere.

And now, from these two things, that life and understanding do not essentially belong to matter as such, and that they cannot be generated out of dead and senseless matter, it is demonstratively certain, that there must be some other substance besides body or matter. However, the Anaximandrian and Democritic Atheists taking it for granted, that the first principles of

body are devoid of all life and understanding, must either acknowledge a necessity of some other substance besides body, or else deny the truth of that axiom, so much made use of by themselves, That nothing can come out of nothing. And this was our second undertaking, to shew, that from the very principles of the atheistic Corporealism, represented in the fifth and sixth heads, incorporeal substance is against those Atheists themselves demonstrable.

Our third and last was this; That there being undeniably substance incorporeal, the two next following atheistic argumentations, built upon the contrary supposition, are therefore altogether insignificant also, and do no execution at all. The first of which (being the seventh) impugning only such a soul of the world, as is generated out of matter, is not properly directed against Theism neither, but only such a form of Atheism (sometime beforementioned) as indeed cometh nearest to Theism. Which, though concluding all things to have sprung originally from senseless matter, Night and Chaos; yet supposes things from thence to have ascended gradually to higher and higher perfection; first, inanimate bodies, as the elements, then birds and other brute animals (according to the forementioned Aristophanic tradition, with which agreeth this of Lucretius, *

Principio genus alituum, variaeque volucres;)

afterward men, and in the last place gods; and that not only the animated stars, but Jupiter, or a soul of the world, generated also out of Night

* Lib. v. ver. 797.

and Chaos, as well as all other things. We grant, indeed, that the true and real Theists amongst the ancient Pagans also held the world's animation, and whosoever denied the same were therefore accounted absolute Atheists. But the world's animation, in a larger sense, signifies no more than this, that all things are not dead about us, but that there is a living sentient and understanding nature eternal, that first framed the world, and still presideth over it: and, it is certain, that in this sense all Theists whatsoever must hold the world's animation. But the generality of Pagan Theists held the world's animation also in a stricter sense; as if the world were truly and properly an animal, and therefore a god, completed and made up of soul and body together, as other animals are. Which soul of this great world-animal was to some of them the highest or supreme Deity, but to others only a secondary god, they supposing an abstract mind superior to it. But God's being the soul of the world in this latter Paganic sense, and the world's being an animal or a god, are things absolutely disclaimed and renounced by us. However, this seventh atheistic argument is not directed against the soul of the world in the sense of the Paganic Theists neither (this being, as they think, already confuted), but in the sense of the atheistic Theogonists; not an eternal unmade soul or mind, but a native or generated one only, such as resulted from the disposition of matter, and contexture of atoms, the offspring of Night and Chaos; the Atheists here pretending, after their confutation of the true and genuine Theism, to take away all shadows thereof also, and so to

free men from all manner of fear of being obnoxious to any understanding being, superior to themselves. Wherefore we might here omit the confutation of this argument, without any detriment at all to the cause of Theism: nevertheless, because this in general is an atheistic assertion, that there is no life and understanding presiding over the whole world, we shall briefly examine the supposed groupds thereof, which alone will be a sufficient confutation of it. The first of them therefore is this, that there is no other substance in the world besides body; the second, that the principles of bodies are devoid of all life and understanding; and the last, that life and understanding are but accidents of bodies resulting from such a composition or contexture of atoms, as produceth soft flesh, blood, and brains, in bodies organized, and of human form. From all which the conclusion is, that there can be no life and understanding in the whole, because it is not of human form, and organized, and hath no blood and brains. But neither is body the only substance, nor are life and understanding accidents resulting from any modification of dead and lifeless matter; nor is blood or brains that, which understandeth in us, but an incorporeal soul or mind, vitally united to a terrestrial organized body; which will then understand with far greater advantage, when it comes to be clothed with a pure, spiritual, and heavenly one. But there is in the universe also a higher kind of intellectual animals, which, though consisting of soul and body likewise, yet have neither flesh, nor blood, nor brains, nor parts so organized as ours are. And the most perfect mind and intel-

lect of all is not the soul of any body, but complete in itself, without such vital union and sympathy with matter. We conclude, therefore, that this passage of a modern writer,* "We worms cannot conceive, how God can understand without brains," is *vox pecudis*, the language and philosophy rather of worms or brute animals, than of men.

The next, which is the eighth atheistic argument, is briefly this: That whereas the Deity by Theists is generally supposed to be a living being perfectly happy, and immortal or incorruptible; there can be no such living being immortal, and consequently none perfectly happy. Because all living beings whatsoever are concretions of atoms, which as they were at first generated, so are they again liable to death and corruption; life being no simple primitive nature, nor substantial thing, but a mere accidental modification of compounded bodies only, which upon the disunion of their parts, or the disordering of their contexture, vanisheth again into nothing. And there being no life immortal, happiness must needs be a mere significant word, and but a romantic fiction. Where first, this is well, that the Atheists will confess, that according to their principles, there can be no such thing at all as happiness, because no security of future permanency; all life perpetually coming out of nothing, and whirling back into nothing again. But this atheistic argument is likewise founded upon the former error, that body is the only substance, the first principles whereof are devoid of all life and understanding;

* Hobbes.

whereas it is certain, that life cannot possibly result from any composition of dead and lifeless things; and therefore must needs be a simple and primitive nature. It is true, indeed, that the participated life in the bodies of animals (which yet is but improperly called life, it being nothing but their being actuated by a living soul) is a mere accidental thing, generable and corruptible; since that body, which is now vitally united to a living soul, may be disunited again from it, and thereby become a dead and lifeless carcass; but the primary or original life itself is substantial, nor can there be any dead carcass of a human soul. That which hath life essentially belonging to the substance of it, must needs be naturally immortal, because no substance can of itself perish, or vanish into nothing. Besides which, there must be also some, not only substantial, but also eternal unmade life, whose existence is necessary, and which is absolutely unannihilable by any thing else; which therefore must needs have perfect security of its own future happiness; and this is an incorporeal Deity. And this is a brief confutation of the eighth atheistic argument.

BUT the Democritic Atheist proceeds, endeavouring further to disprove a God from the phenomena of motion and cogitation, in the three following argumentations. First, therefore, whereas Theists commonly bring an argument from motion, to prove a God, or first unmoved Mover, the Atheists contend, on the contrary, that from the very nature of motion, the impossibility of

any such first unmoved Mover is clearly demonstrable. For, it being an axiom of undoubted truth concerning motion, that whatsoever is moved is moved by some other thing; or that nothing can move itself; it follows from thence unavoidably, that there is no *æternum Immobile*, no eternal unmoved Mover; but, on the contrary, that there was *æternum Motum*, an eternal Moved; or, that one thing was moved by another, from eternity infinitely, without any first mover or cause, because, as nothing could move itself, so could nothing ever move another, but what was itself before moved by something else.

To which we reply, That this axiom, whatsoever is moved, is moved by another, and not by itself, was by Aristotle, and those other philosophers, who made so much use thereof, restrained to the local motion of bodies only; that no body, locally moved, was ever moved originally from itself, but from something else. Now it will not at all follow from hence, that therefore *nihil movetur nisi a moto*, that no body was ever moved, but by some other body—that was also before moved by something else; or, that of necessity one body was moved by another body, and that by another, and so backwards, infinitely, without any first unmoved or self-moving and self-active mover, as the Democritic Atheist fondly conceits; for the motion of bodies might proceed (as unquestionably it did) from something else, which is not body, and was not before moved. Moreover, the Democritic Atheist here also, without any ground, imagines, that were there but one push once given to the world, and no more, this motion would from thenceforward always

continue in it, one body still moving another to all eternity. For though this be indeed a part of the Cartesian hypothesis, that, according to the laws of nature, a body moving will as well continue in motion, as a body resting in rest, until that motion be communicated and transferred to some other body; yet is the case different here, where it is supposed, not only one push to have been given to the world at first, but also the same quantity of motion or agitation to be constantly conserved and maintained. But to let this pass, because it is something a subtile point, and not so rightly understood by many of the Cartesians themselves, we say, that it is a thing utterly impossible, that one body should be moved by another infinitely, without any first cause or mover, which was self-active, and that not from the authority of Aristotle* only, pronouncing οὐτε δυνατόν ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως ἵεναι εἰς ἄπειρον, &c. That in the causes of motion, there could not possibly be an infinite progress—but from the reason there subjoined by Aristotle, because εἴπερ μὴδὲν ἐστὶ τὸ πρῶτον, ὅλως αἴτιον οὐδὲν ἐστὶ, if there were no first unmoved mover, there could be no cause of motion at all.—For were all the motion, that is in the world, a passion from something else, and no first unmoved active mover, then must it be a passion from no agent, or without an action, and consequently proceed from nothing, and either cause itself, or be made without a cause. Now the ground of the Atheist's error here is only from hence, because he taketh it for granted, that there is no other substance besides body, nor any other action but local

* Physic. Auscult. lib. viii. cap. v. p. 537. tom. i. oper.

motion; from whence it comes to pass, that, to him, this proposition, No body can move itself, is one and the same with this, Nothing can act from itself, or be self-active.

And thus is the atheistic pretended demonstration against a God, or first cause, from motion, abundantly confuted; we having made it manifest, that there is no consequence at all in this argument, that because no body can move itself, therefore there can be no first unmoved mover; as also having discovered the ground of the Atheist's error here, their taking it for granted, that there is nothing but body; and, lastly, having plainly shewed, that it implies a contradiction there should be action and motion in the world, and yet nothing self-moving or self-active: so that it is demonstratively certain from motion, that there is a first cause, or unmoved mover. We shall now further add, that from the principle acknowledged by the Democritic Atheists themselves, That no body can move itself, it follows also undeniably, that there is some other substance besides body, something incorporeal, which is self-moving and self-active, and was the first unmoved mover of the heavens or world. For if no body from eternity was ever able to move itself, and yet there must of necessity be some active cause of that motion, which is in the world (since it could not cause itself), then is there unquestionably some other substance besides body, which having a power of moving matter, was the first cause of motion, itself being unmoved.

Moreover, it is certain from hence also, that there is another species of action, distinct from local motion, and such as is not *heterokinesy*,

but *autokinesy*, or self-activity. For since the local motion of body is essentially *heterokinesy*, not caused by the substance itself moving, but by something else acting upon it, that action, by which local motion is first caused, cannot be itself local motion, but must be *autokinesy*, or self-activity, that which is not a passion from any other agent, but springs from the immediate agent itself, which species of action is called cogitation. All the local motion, that is in the world, was first caused by some cogitative or thinking being, which not acted upon by any thing without it, nor at all locally moved, but only mentally, is the immoveable mover of the heavens, or vortices: So that cogitation is, in order of nature, before local motion, and incorporeal before corporeal substance, the former having a natural *imperium* upon the latter. And now have we not only confuted the ninth atheistic argument from motion, but also demonstrated against the Democritic Atheists from their own principle, that there is an incorporeal and cogitative substance, the first immoveable mover of the heavens, and vortices; that is, an incorporeal Deity.

But the Democritic Atheist will yet make a further attempt to prove, that there can be nothing self-moving or self-active, and that no thinking being could be a first cause; he laying his foundation in this principle, that nothing taketh its beginning from itself, but from the action of some other agent without it. From whence he would infer, that cogitation itself is *heterokinesy*; the passion of the thinker, and the action of something without it, no cogitation ever rising up of itself without a cause; and that cogitation

is indeed nothing but local motion or mechanism, and all living understanding beings machines, moved from without; and then make this conclusion, that therefore no understanding being could possibly be a first cause: he further adding also, that no understanding being, as such, can be perfectly happy neither, as the Deity is supposed to be, because dependent upon something without it: and this is the tenth atheistic argumentation.

Where we shall first consider that, which the Democritic Atheist makes his fundamental principle, or common notion to disprove all auto-kinesy, or self-activity by, that nothing taketh beginning from itself, but from the action of some other thing without it. Which axiom, if it be understood of substantial things, then is it indeed acknowledged by us to be unquestionably true, it being the same with this, That no substance, which once was not, could ever possibly cause itself, or bring itself into being; but must take its beginning from the action of something else: but then it will make nothing at all against Theism. As it is likewise true, that no action whatsoever, (and therefore no cogitation) taketh beginning from itself, or causeth itself to be, but is always produced by some substantial agent; but this will no way advantage the Atheist neither. Wherefore, if he would direct his force against Theism, he ought to understand this proposition thus, that no action whatsoever taketh beginning from the immediate agent (which is the subject of it), but from the action of some other thing without it; or, that nothing can move or act otherwise, than as it is moved and acted

upon by something else. But this is only to beg the question, or to prove the thing in dispute, identically, that nothing is self-active, because nothing can act from itself. Whereas it is in the mean time undeniably certain, that there could not possibly be any motion or action at all in the universe, were there not something self-moving or self-active, forasmuch as otherwise all that motion or action would be a passion from nothing, and be made without a cause.

And whereas the Atheists would further prove, that no cogitation taketh its beginning from the thinker, but always from the action of some other thing without it, after this manner; because it is not conceivable, why this cogitation, rather than that, should start up at any time, were there not some cause for it, without the thinker: here, in the first place, we freely grant, that our human cogitations are indeed commonly occasioned by the incursions of sensible objects upon us; as also, that the concatenations of those thoughts and phantasms in us, which are distinguished from sensations (whether we be asleep or awake) do many times depend upon corporeal and mechanical causes in the brain. Notwithstanding which, that all our cogitations are obtruded and imposed upon us from without; and that there is no transition in our thoughts at any time, but such as had been before in sense (which the Democritic Atheist avers), this is a thing which we absolutely deny. For, had we no mastery at all over our thoughts, but they were all like tennis-balls, banded and struck upon us, as it were, by rackets from without; then could we not steadily and constantly carry on any designs and purposes of

life. But on the contrary, that of Aristotle* is most true (as will be elsewhere further proved), that man, and all rational beings, are in some sense ἀρχὴ πράξεων, a principle of actions, subordinate to the Deity; which they could not possibly be, were they not also a principle of cogitations, and had some command over them; but these were all as much determined by causes without, as the motions of the weathercock are. The rational soul is itself an active and bubbling fountain of thoughts; that perpetual and restless desire, which is as natural and essential to us, as our very life, continually raising up and protruding new and new ones in us; which are as it were offered to us. Besides which, we have also a further self-recollective power, and a power of determining and fixing our mind and intention upon some certain objects, and of ranging our thoughts accordingly. But the Atheist is here also to be taught yet a further lesson, that an absolutely perfect mind (such as the Deity is supposed to be), doth not (as Aristotle writeth of it) ὅτε μὲν νοεῖν ὅτε δὲ οὐ νοεῖν, sometimes understand, and sometimes not understand—it being ignorant of nothing, nor syllogizing about any thing, but comprehending all intelligibles with their relations and verities at once within itself; and its essence and energy being the same. Which notion, if it be above the dull capacity of Atheists, who measure all perfection by their own scantling, this is a thing that we cannot help.

But as for that prodigious paradox of Atheists, that cogitation itself is nothing but local motion

* Vide lib. iii. ad Nicomach. cap. iii. p. 37. tom. iii. et Magnor. Moral. lib. i. cap. ix. et cap. xii. p. 202. 204.

or mechanism, we could not have thought it possible, that ever any man should have given entertainment to such a conceit, but that this was rather a mere slander raised upon Atheists; were it not certain from the records of antiquity, that whereas the old religious Atomists did, upon good reason, reduce all corporeal action (as generation, augmentation, and alteration) to local motion, or translation from place to place (there being no other motion besides this conceivable in bodies); the ancient atheizers of that philosophy (Leucippus and Democritus) not contented herewith, did really carry the business still on further, so as to make cogitation itself also nothing but local motion. As it is also certain, that a modern atheistic pretender to wit hath publicly owned this same conclusion, that mind is nothing else but local motion in the organic parts of man's body. These men have been sometimes indeed a little troubled with the fancy, apparition, or seeming of cogitation that is, the consciousness of it, as knowing not well what to make thereof; but then they put it off again, and satisfy themselves worshipfully with this, that fancy is but fancy, but the reality of cogitation nothing but local motion; as if there were not as much reality in fancy and consciousness, as there is in local motion. That, which inclined these men so much to this opinion, was only because they were sensible and aware of this, that if there were any other action besides local motion admitted, there must needs be some other substance acknowledged besides body. Cartesius indeed undertook to defend brute animals to be nothing else but machines; but then he supposed that there

was nothing at all of cogitation in them, and consequently nothing of true animality or life, no more than is in an artificial automaton, as a wooden eagle, or the like: nevertheless, this was justly thought to be paradox enough. But that cogitation itself should be local motion, and men nothing but machines; this is such a paradox, as none but either a stupid and besotted, or else an enthusiastic, bigotical, or fanatic Atheist, could possibly give entertainment to. Nor are such men as these fit to be disputed with any more than a machine is.

But whereas the atheistic objector adds also, over and above, in the last place, that no understanding being can be perfectly happy neither, and therefore not a god, because essentially dependent upon something else without it; this is all one, as if he should say, that there is no such thing as happiness at all in nature; because it is certain, that without consciousness or understanding nothing can be happy (since it could not have any fruition of itself); and if no understanding being can be happy neither, then must the conclusion needs be that of the Cyrenaics, that *εὐδαιμονία ἀνυπαρκτον*, happiness is a mere chimera—a fantastic notion or fiction of men's minds: a thing, which hath no existence in nature. These are the men, who afterward argue from interest also against a God and religion; notwithstanding that they confess their own principles to be so far from promising happiness to any, as that they absolutely cut off all hopes thereof. It may be further observed also, in the last place, that there is another of the Atheist's dark mysteries here likewise couched, that there is no scale or ladder of

entity and perfection in nature, one above another; the whole universe, from top to bottom, being nothing but one and the same senseless matter, diversely modified. As also that understanding, as such, rather speaks imperfection; it being but a mere whiffling, evanid, and fantastic thing; so that the most absolutely perfect of all things in the universe is grave, solid, and substantial senseless matter: of which more afterward. And thus in the tenth atheistic argumentation also confuted.

But the Democritic and Epicurean Atheists will make yet a further assault from the nature of knowledge, understanding, after this manner: If the world were made by a God, or an antecedent mind and understanding, having in itself an exemplar or platform thereof, before it was made, then must there be actual knowledge, both in order of nature and time, before things; whereas things, which are the objects of knowledge and understanding, are unquestionably in order of nature before knowledge; this being but the signature of them, and a passion from them. Now, the only things are singular sensibles or bodies. From whence it follows, that mind is the youngest and most creaturely thing in the world; or that the world was before knowledge, and the conception of any mind; and no knowledge or mind before the world as its cause. Which is the eleventh atheistic argumentation.

But we have prevented ourselves here in the answer to this argument (which would make all knowledge, mind, and understanding junior to the world, and the very creature of sensibles), having already fully confuted it; and clearly

proved, that singular bodies are not the only things, and objects of the mind, but that it containeth its immediate intelligibles within itself; which intelligibles also are eternal, and that mind is no fantastic image of sensibles, nor the stamp and signature of them, but archetypal to them; the first mind being that of a perfect being, comprehending itself, and the extent of its own omnipotence, or the possibilities of all things. So that knowledge is older than all sensible things; mind senior to the world, and the architect thereof. Wherefore we shall refer the reader, for an answer to this argument, to the preceding volume, where the existence of a God (that is, a mind before the world) is demonstrated also from this very topic, viz. the nature of knowledge and understanding.

We shall in this place only add; that as the Atheists can no way solve the phenomenon of motion, so can they much less that of cogitation, or life and understanding. To make which yet the more evident, we shall briefly represent a syllabus or catalogue of the many atheistic hallucinations or delirations concerning it. As, first, that senseless matter being the only substance, and all things else but accidental modifications thereof; life and mind is all a mere accidental thing, generable and corruptible, producible out of nothing and reducible to nothing again; and that there is no substantial life or mind any where. In opposition to which, we have before proved, that there must of necessity be some substantial life, and that human souls being lives substantial, and not mere accidental modifications of matter, they are consequently in their own nature immor-

tal, since no substance of itself ever vanisheth into nothing.

Again, the Democritics, and other Atheists conclude, that life and mind are no simple and primitive natures, but secondary and compounded things; they resulting from certain concretions and contextures of matter, and either the commixtures and contemporations of qualities, or else the combinations of those simple elements of magnitude; figure, site, and motion; and so being made up of that, which hath nothing of life or mind in it. For as flesh is not made out of fleshy particles, nor bone out of bony (as Anaxagoras of old dreamed), so may life, as they conceive, be as well made out of lifeless principles, and mind out of that which hath no mind or understanding at all in it: just as syllables pronounceable do result from combinations of letters, some of which are mutes, and cannot by themselves be pronounced at all, others but semi-vocal. And from hence do these Atheists infer, that there could be no eternal unmade life or mind, nor any that is immortal or incorruptible; since upon the dissolution of that compages or contexture of matter, from whence they result, they must needs vanish into nothing. Wherefore according to them, there hath probably sometime heretofore been no life nor understanding at all in the universe, and there may possibly be none again. From whence the conclusion is, that mind and understanding is no god, or principle in the universe; it being essentially factitious, native, and corruptible; or, as they express it in Plato,* *θνητὸς ἐκ θνητῶν*, mortal from mortal things—as also, that the souls of

* De Legibus, lib. x. p. 666.

men cannot subsist separately after death, and walk up and down in airy bodies; no more than the form of a house or tree, after the dissolution thereof, can subsist by itself separately, or appear in some other body. But all this foolery of Atheists hath been already confuted, we having before shewed, that life and understanding are active powers, vigours, and perfections, that could never possibly result from mere passive bulk, or dead and senseless matter, however modified and compounded; because nothing can come effectively from nothing. Neither is there any consequence at all in this, that because flesh is not made out of fleshy principles, nor bone out of bony, red out of red things, nor green out of green; therefore life and understanding may as well be compounded out of things dead and senseless: because these are no syllables or complexions, as the others are, nor can either the qualities of heat and cold, moist and dry; or else magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions, however combined together, as letters spell them out, and make them up; but they are simple and primitive things. And accordingly it hath been proved, that there must of necessity be some eternal unmade life and mind. For though there be no necessity, that there should be any eternal unmade red, or green, because red and green may be made out of things not red nor green, they, and all other corporeal qualities (so called) being but several contextures of matter, or combinations of magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions, causing those several fancies in us: and though there be no necessity, that there should be eternal motion, because, if there were once no mo-

tion at all in matter, but all bodies rested, yet might motion have been produced by a self-moving or self-active principle: and, lastly, though there be no necessity, that there should be eternal unmade matter or body neither, because had there been once no body at all, yet might it be made or produced by a perfect omnipotent incorporeal being: nevertheless, is there an absolute necessity, that there should be eternal unmade life, and mind, because were there once no life nor mind at all, these could never have been produced out of matter altogether lifeless and mindless. And though the form of a house cannot possibly exist separately from the matter and substance thereof, it being a mere accidental thing, resulting from such a compages of stone, timber, and mortar, yet are human souls and minds no such accidental forms of compounded matter, but active substantial things, that may therefore subsist separately from these bodies, and enliven other bodies of a different texture. And however some, that are no Atheists, be over prone to conceive life, sense, cogitation, and consciousness, in brutes, to be generated out of dead, senseless, and unthinking matter, (they being disposed thereunto by certain mistaken principles, and ill methods of philosophy) nevertheless is this unquestionably in itself a seed of Atheism; because if any life, cogitation, and consciousness, may be produced out of dead and senseless matter, then can no philosophy hinder, but that all might have been so.

But the Democritic Atheists will yet venture further to deny, that there is any thing in nature self-moving or self-active, but that whatsoever

moveth and acteth, was before moved by something else, and made to act thereby; and again, that from some other thing, and so backward infinitely; from whence it would follow, that there is no first in the order of causes, but an endless retroinfinity. But as this is all one, as to affirm, that there is no such thing at all as life in the world, but that the universe is a compages of dead and stupid matter, so has this infinity in the order of causes been already exploded for an absolute impossibility.

Nevertheless, the Atheists will here advance yet an higher paradox; that all action whatsoever, and therefore cogitation, fancy, and consciousness itself, is really nothing else but local motion, and consequently not only brute-animals, but also men themselves mere machines, which is an equal, either sottishness or impudence, as to assert a triangle to be a square, or a sphere a cube, number to be figure, or any thing else to be any thing: and it is really all one as to affirm, that there is indeed no such thing in ourselves as cogitation; there being no other action in nature, but local motion and mechanism.

Furthermore, the Democritic and Epicurean Atheists universally agree in this, that not only sensations, but also all the cogitations of the mind, are the mere passions of the thinker, and the actions of bodies existing without upon him; though they do not all declare themselves after the same manner herein. For first, the Democritics conclude, that sense is caused by certain grosser corporeal effluvia, streaming from the surfaces of bodies continually, and entering through the nerves; but that all other cogitations of mind

and men's either sleeping or waking imaginations proceed from another sort of simulachra, idols, and images of a more fine and subtile contexture; coming into the brain, not through those open tubes, or channels of the nerves, but immediately through all the smaller pores of the body: so that, as we never have sense of any thing, but by means of those grosser corporeal images, obtruding themselves upon the nerves, so have we not the least cogitation at any time in our mind neither, which was not caused by those finer corporeal images, and exuvius membranes, or effluvia, rushing upon the brain or contexture of the soul. * *Λεύκιππος καὶ Δημόκριτος τὴν Αἰσθησιν καὶ τὴν Νόησιν Εἰδῶλων ἔξωθεν προϊόντων μηδὲν γὰρ ἐμβάλλειν μηδετέραν χωρὶς τοῦ προσπίπτοντος.* Leucippus and Democritus determined, that as well Noesis as Aisthesis, mental cogitation as external sensation, was caused by certain corporeal idols, coming from bodies without; since neither sensation nor cogitation could otherwise possibly be produced.—And thus does Laertius^b also represent the sense of these atheistic philosophers, that the effluvia from bodies called idols were the only causes, τῶν κατὰ ψυχὴν κινήματων καὶ βουλημάτων ἐκάσταν καὶ ἡθῶν καὶ παθῶν, of all the motions, passions, and affections, and even the very volitions of the soul.—So that as we could not have the least sensation, imagination, nor conception of any thing otherwise than from those corporeal effluvia, rushing upon us from bodies without, and begetting the same in us, at such a time; so neither

* Plutarch de Placit. Philos. lib. iv. cap. viii. p. 899. tom. ii. oper.

^b Laertius does not ascribe this opinion to Leucippus, but only to Democritus, lib. ix. segm. 44. p. 573.

could we have any passion, appetite, or volition; which we were not in like manner corporeally passive to. And this was the ground of the Democritic fate, or necessity of all human actions, maintained by them, in opposition to the *τὸ ἐκ ἑμῶν*, or liberty of will, which cannot be conceived without self-activity, and something of contingency; they supposing human volitions also, as well as all the other cogitations, to be mechanically caused and necessitated from those effluvious images of bodies coming in upon the willers. And, however Epicurus sometime pretended to assert liberty of will against Democritus, yet, forgetting himself, did he also here securely philosophize after the very same manner;

Laërt. l. iv.
p. 358. 360.
[ver. 726.]

Nunc age, quæ moveant animum res, accipe paucis;
Quæ veniunt veniant in mentem, percipe paucis,
Principio hoc dico rerum simulachra vagari, &c.

But others there were amongst the ancient Atomists; who could not conceive sensations themselves to be thus caused by corporeal effluvia, or exuvius membranes streaming from bodies continually, and that for divers reasons alleged by them; but only by a pressure from them upon the optic nerve, by reason of a tension of the intermedium air, or ether, (being that which is called light;) whereby the distant object is touched and felt, *οἷον διὰ βακτηρίας*,* as it were by a staff. Which hypothesis concerning the corporeal part of sense is indeed much more iuge-

* Vide Plutarch: de Placit. Philos. lib. iv. cap. xv. p. 911. tom. ii. oper. et Laert. lib. vii. segm. 157. p. 406.

nious, and agreeable to reason, than the former. But the atheizers of this atomology, as they supposed sense to be nothing else, but such a pressure from bodies without; so did they conclude imagination and mental cogitation to be but the relics and remainders of those motions of sense formerly made, and conserved afterwards in the brain (like the tremulous vibrations of a clock or bell, after the striking of the hammer, or the rolling of the waves after that the wind is ceased); melting, fading, and decaying insensibly by degrees. So that, according to these, knowledge and understanding is nothing but failing and decaying sense, and all our volitions but mechanic motions, caused from the actions, or trusions of bodies upon us. Now, though it be true, that in sensation there is always a passion antecedent made upon the body of the sentient from without; yet is not sensation itself this very passion, but a perception of that passion: much less can mental conception be said to be the action of bodies without, and the mere passion of the thinker; and least of all volitions such, there being plainly here something *ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ*, in our own power,—(by means whereof we become a principle of actions, accordingly deserving commendation, or blame), that is, something of self-activity.

Again, according to the Democritic and Epicurean Atheists, all knowledge and understanding is really the same thing with sense; the difference between these two, to some of them, being only this, that what is commonly called sense, is primary and original knowledge, and knowledge but secondary, or fading and decaying sense; but to others, that sense is caused by

those more vigorous idols, or effluvia from bodies, intronitted through the nerves; but understanding and knowledge by those more weak and thin, umbratile and evanid ones, that penetrate the other smaller pores of the body: so that both ways understanding and knowledge will be but a weaker sense. Now, from this doctrine of the atheistic Atomists, that all conception and cogitation of the mind whatsoever, is nothing else but sense and passion from bodies without, this absurdity first of all follows unavoidably; that there cannot possibly be any error, or false judgment, because it is certain, that all passion is true passion, and all sense or seeming, and appearance, true seeming and appearance. Wherefore, though some sense and passion may be more obscure than other, yet can there be none false, itself being the very essence of truth. And thus, Protagoras, one of these atheistic Atomists, having first asserted, that knowledge is nothing else but sense, did thereupon admit this as a necessary consequence, that *πᾶσα δόξα ἀληθής*,* every opinion is true; because it is nothing but seeming and appearance, and every seeming and appearance is truly such; and because it is not possible for any one to opine that which is not, or to think otherwise than he suffers.—Wherefore Epicurus, being sensible of this inconvenience, endeavoured to dissolve this phenomenon, of error and false opinion, or judgment, consistently with his own principles, after this manner; that though all knowledge be sense, and all sense true, yet may error arise notwithstanding, *ex*

* Vide Platon. in Theæteto, p. 118. and Lact. lib. ix. scgm. 51. p. 540.

animi opinatu,* from the opinionation of the mind, adding something of its own, over and above, to the passion and fancy of sense. But herein he shamefully contradicts himself; for if the mind, in judging and opining, can superadd any thing of its own, over and above to what it suffers, then is it not a mere passive thing, but must needs have a self-active power of its own, and consequently will prove also incorporeal; because no body can act otherwise than it suffers, or is made to act by something else without it. We conclude, therefore, that since there is such a thing as error, or false judgment, all cogitations of the mind cannot be mere passions; but there must be something of self-activity in the soul itself, by means whereof it can give its assent to things not clearly perceived, and so err.

Again, from this atheistic opinion, That all knowledge is nothing else but sense, either primary or secondary, it follows also, that there is no absolute truth nor falsehood, and that knowledge is of a private nature, relative and fantastical only, or mere seeming, that is, nothing but opinion; because sense is plainly seeming, phantasy, and appearance; a private thing, and relative to the sentient only. And here also did Protagoras,^b according to his wouted freedom, admit this consequence, that knowledge being sense, there was no absoluteness at all therein; and that nothing was true otherwise, than *τοῦτε καὶ τοῖ*, to this and to that man so thinking;—that every man did but *τὰ ἑαυτοῦ μόνον δοξάζειν*, opine only his own things;—that *πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον*

* Vide Lucret. l. iv. ver. 464.

^b Vide Platon. in Theæteto, p. 116. 119. 122. 126. 129.

ἄνθρωπος, every man was the measure of things and truth to himself;—and, lastly, τὸ φαινόμενον ἐκάστῳ τούτῳ καὶ εἶναι ὃ φαίνεται, that whatsoever seemed to every one, was true to him, to whom it seemed.—Neither could Democritus himself, though a man of more discretion than Protagoras, dissemble this consequence from the same principle asserted by him, that understanding is fantastical, and knowledge but opinion; he owning it sometimes before he was aware, as in these words of his: * γινώσκειν χρὴ ἄνθρωπον τῷδε τῷ κανόνι, ὅτι αἰτίας ἀπὸλλεκται. We ought to know man, according to this rule, that he is such a thing, as hath nothing to do with absolute truth.—And again, αἰτή (or ἐτεῖ) οὐδὲν ἴσμεν περὶ οὐδενός, ἀλλ' ἐπιρρομήν ἐκάστοισιν ἡ δόξις. We know nothing absolutely concerning any thing; and all our knowledge is opinion.—Agreeably to which, he determined, that men's knowledge was diversified by the temper of their bodies, and the things without them.^b And Aristotle judiciously observing both these doctrines, That there is no error or false judgment, but every opinion true; and again, That nothing is absolutely true, but relatively only; to be really and fundamentally one and the same, imputeth them both together to Democritus, in these words of his: ^c οὐδὲν εἶναι ἀληθές· ὅλως δὲ διὰ τὸ ὑπολαμβάνειν φρόνησιν μὲν τὴν αἴσθησιν, τὸ φαινόμενον κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀληθές εἶναι. Democritus held, that there was nothing absolutely true; but because he thought know-

* Vide Sextum Empiric. lib. vii. advers. Mathematic. seu i. advers. Logicos. §. 137. p. 399, 400.

^b Ibid. p. 399.

^c Aristot. Metaphysic. lib. iv. cap. v. p. 312. tom. iv. oper.

ledge or understanding to be sense, therefore did he conclude, that whatsoever seemed according to sense, must of necessity be true (not absolutely but relatively), to whom it so seemed.—These gross absurdities did the atheistic Atomists plunge themselves into, whilst they endeavoured to solve the phenomenon of cogitation, mind, or understanding, agreeably to their own hypothesis. And, it is certain, that all of them, Democritus himself not excepted, were but mere blunderers in that atomic physiology, which they so much pretended to, and never rightly understood the same; forasmuch as that, with equal clearness, teaches these two things at once, that sense indeed is fantastical and relative to the sentient; but that there is a higher faculty of understanding and reason in us, which thus discovers the phantasm of sense, and reaches to the absoluteness of truth, or is the criterion thereof.

But the Democritic and Epicurean Atheists will further conclude, that the only things or objects of the mind are singular sensibles, or bodies existing without it; which therefore must needs be, in order of nature, before all knowledge, mind, and understanding whatsoever, this being but a fantastic image or representation of them. From whence they infer, that the corporeal world, and these sensible things, could not possibly be made by any mind or understanding, because essentially junior to them, and the very image and creature of them. Thus does Aristotle observe,* concerning both Democritus and Protagoras, that they did *ὑπολαμβάνειν τὰ ὄντα*

* Metaphysicor. lib. iv. cap. v. p. 313. tom. iv. oper.

ἀόρατα εἶναι τὰ αἰσθητά, suppose the only things or objects of the mind to be sensibles; and that this was the reason why they made knowledge to be sense, and therefore relative and fantastical. But we have already proved, that mind and understanding is not the fantastic image of sensibles or bodies, and that it is in its own nature not ectypal, but archetypal and architectonical of all; that it is senior to the world, and all sensible things, it not looking abroad for its objects any where without, but containing them within itself; the first original Mind being an absolutely perfect Being, comprehending itself, and the extent of its own omnipotence, or all possibilities of things, together with the best plat-form of the whole, and producing the same accordingly.

But it being plain that there are, besides singulars, other objects of the mind universal, from whence it seems to follow, that sensibles are not the only things; some modern atheistic wits have therefore invented this further device to maintain the cause, and carry the business on, that universals are nothing else but names or words, by which singular bodies are called; and, consequently, that in all axioms and propositions, sententious affirmations and negations (in which the predicate at least is universal), we do but add or subtract, affirm or deny, names of singular bodies; and that reason or syllogism is nothing but the reckoning or computing the consequences of these names or words. Neither do they want the impudence to affirm, that besides those passions or fancies, which we have from things by sense, we know nothing at all of any

thing but only the names, by which it is called; than which there cannot be a greater sottishness or madness: for if geometry were nothing but the knowledge of names, by which singular bodies are called, as itself could not deserve that name of a science, so neither could its truths be the same in Greek and in Latin; and geometricians, in all the several distant ages and places of the world, must be supposed to have had the same singular bodies before them, of which they affirmed and denied those universal names.

In the last place, the Epicurean and Anaximandrian Atheists, agreeably to the premised principles, and the tenor of their hypothesis, do both of them endeavour to depreciate and undervalue knowledge or understanding, as a thing, which hath not any higher degree of perfection or entity in it than is in dead and senseless matter; it being, according to them, but a passion from singular bodies existing without, and therefore both junior and inferior to them; a tumult raised in the brain, by motions made upon it from the objects of sense; that which essentially includeth in it dependance upon something else; at best but a thin and evanid image of sensibles, or rather an image of those images of sense, a mere whiffling and fantastic thing; upon which account they conclude it not fit to be attributed to that, which is the first root and source of all things, which therefore is to them no other than grave and solid senseless matter, the only substantial, self-existent, independent thing, and consequently the most perfect and Divine. Life and understanding, soul and mind, are to them no simple and primitive natures, but secondary

and derivative, or syllables and complexions of things, which sprung up afterwards, from certain combinations of magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions, or contemperations of qualities, textures either of similar or dissimilar atoms. And as themselves are juniors to senseless matter and motion, and to those inanimate elements, fire, water, air and earth, the first and most real productions of nature and chance, so are their effects, and the things that belong to them, comparatively with those other real things of nature, but slight, ludicrous, and umbratile, as landscape in picture, compared with the real prospect of high mountains, and low valleys, winding or meandrous rivers, towering steeples, and the shady tops of trees and groves; as they are, accordingly, commonly disparaged under those names of notional and artificial. And thus was the sense of the ancient Atheists represented by

Plato; *φασί, τὰ μὲν Μέγιστα καὶ Καλλίστα*
De Leg. l. x. p. 889. *ἀπεργάζεσθαι Φύσιν καὶ Τύχην, τὰ δὲ Σμικρό-*
[p. 663, 666.] *τερα Τέχνην· ἣν δὲ παρὰ φύσειως λαμβάνουσιν*
τὴν τῶν μεγάλων καὶ πρώτων γένεσιν ἔργων, πλάττειν καὶ
τεκταίνεσθαι πάντα τὰ σμικρότερα, ἃ δὲ τεχνικὰ προσα-
γορεύομεν. They say, that the greatest and most excellent things of all were made by senseless nature and chance; but all the smaller and more inconsiderable, by art, mind, and understanding; which taking from nature those first and greater things as its ground-work to act upon, doth frame and fabricate all the other lesser things, which are therefore commonly called artificial.— And the mind of these Atheists is there also further declared by that philosopher after this manner: The first, most real, solid and substan-

tial things in the whole world, are those elements, fire, water, air, and earth, made by senseless nature and chance, without any art, mind, or understanding: and next to these the bodies of the sun, moon, and stars, and this terrestrial globe, produced out of the aforesaid inanimate elements, by unknowing nature, or chance likewise, without any art, mind, or God.—The fortuitous concourse of similar or dissimilar atoms, begetting this whole system and compages of heaven and earth: *τίχην δὲ ὑστερον ἐκ τούτων ὑστερον γενομένην, αὐτὴν θνητὴν ἐκ θνητῶν ὑστερα γεγεννηκέναι παιδείας τινας, ἀληθείας οὐ σφόδρα μετεχούσας, ἀλλ' εἰδωλ' ἄττα ἐγγυαῖν αὐτῶν, οἷον ἡ γραφικὴ καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς.* But that afterwards art or mind, and understanding, being generated also in the last place out of those same senseless and inanimate bodies or elements (it rising up in certain smaller pieces of the universe, and particular concretions of matter called animals), mortal from mortal things, did produce certain other ludicrous things, which partake little of truth and reality, but are mere images, umbrages, and imitations, as picture and landscape, &c. but, above all, those moral differences of just and unjust, honest and dishonest, the mere figments of political art, and slight umbratile things, compared with good and evil natural, that consist in nothing, but agreement and disagreement with sense and appetite: *τὰ γὰρ καλὰ, φύσει μὲν ἄλλα, νόμῳ δὲ ἕτερα, τὰ δὲ δίκαια οὐδὲ τοιαυτὰν φύσει.* For, as for things good and honest, those, that are such by nature, differ from those, which are such by law; but as for just and unjust, there is, by nature no such thing at all.—The upshot and conclusion of all is, that there is no

such scale or ladder in nature as Theists and metaphysicians suppose, no degrees of real perfection and entity one above another, as of life and sense above inanimate matter, of reason and understanding above sense; from whence it would be inferred, that the order of things in nature was in way of descent from higher and greater perfection, downward to lesser and lower, which is indeed to introduce a God. And that there is no such scale or ladder of perfection and entity, they endeavour further to prove from hence, because, according to that hypothesis, it would follow, that every the smallest and most contemptible animal that could see the sun, had a higher degree of entity and perfection in it, than the sun itself; a thing ridiculously absurd; or else, according to Cotta's* instance; "*Idcirco formicam anteponebam esse huic pulcherrimæ urbi, quod in urbe sensus sit nullus, in formica non modo sensus, sed etiam mens, ratio, memoria.*" That therefore every ant or pismire were far to be preferred before this most beautiful city of Rome; because in the city there is no sense; whereas an ant hath not only sense, but also mind, reason, and memory;—that is, a certain sagacity superior to sense. Wherefore they conclude, that there is no such scale or ladder in nature, no such climbing stairs of entity and perfection, one above another, but that the whole universe is one flat and level, it being indeed all nothing but the same uniform matter, under several forms, dresses, and disguises; or variegated by diversity of accidental modifica-

* Apud Cicero, de Natur. Deor. lib. iii. cap. ix. p. 3061. tom. ix. pp. 11.

tions; one of which is that of such beings as have fancy in them, commonly called animals; which are but some of sportful or wanton natures, more trimly artificial and finer *gammens*, or pretty toys; but by reason of this fancy they have no higher degree of entity and perfection in them, than is in senseless matter: as they will also be all of them quickly transformed again into other seemingly dull, unthinking and inanimate shapes. Hitherto the sense of Atheists.

But the pretended grounds of this atheistic doctrine (or rather madness), have been already also confuted over and over again. Knowledge and understanding is not a mere passion from the thing known, existing without the knower, because to know and understand, as Anaxagoras* of old determined, is *καταν*, to master and conquer the thing known, and consequently not merely to suffer from it, or passively to lie under it, this being *κατασθέναι*, to be mastered and conquered by it. The knowledge of universal theorems in sciences is not from the force of the thing known existing without the knower, but from the active power, and exerted vigour or strength of that, which knows. Thus Severinus, Boethius; "Videsne, ut in cognoscendo, cuncta sua potius facultate, quam eo-
Cons. I. v. pro. 4. [lib. v. p. 132.]
 rum, quæ cognoscuntur, utantur? Neque id injuria, nam cum omne judicium judicantis actus existat, necesse est, ut suam quisque operam, non ex aliena, sed ex propria potestate perficiat." See you not how all things, in knowing, use their own power and faculty rather than that of the thing known? For since judgment

* Apud Aristot. de Anima, lib. iii. cap. v. p. 49. tom. ii. oper.

is the action of that which judgeth, every thing must of necessity perform its own action, by its own power, strength, and faculty, and not by that of another.—Sense itself is not a mere passion, or reception of the motion from bodies without the sentient, for if it were so, then would a looking-glass, and other dead things see; but it is a perception of a passion made upon the body of the sentient, and therefore hath something of the soul's own self-activity in it. But understanding, and the knowledge of abstract sciences is neither primary sense, nor yet the fading and decaying remainders of the motions thereof, but a perception of another kind, and more inward than that of sense; not sympathetic, but unpassionate, the noemata of the mind being things distinct from the phantasmata of sense and imagination; which are but a kind of confused cogitations. And though the objects of sense be only singular bodies, existing without the sentient, yet are not these sensibles therefore the only things and cogitables; but there are other objects of science, or intelligibles, which the mind containeth within itself. That dark philosophy of some, tending so directly to Atheism, that there is nothing in the mind or understanding, which was not at first in corporeal sense, and derived in way of passion from matter, was both elegantly and solidly confuted by

Boethius's philosophic muse after this manner:

Quondam porticus attulit,
Obscuros nimirum senes,
Qui sensus et imagines
E corporibus extimis,
Credant mentibus imprimi;

Ut quondam celeri stylo
 Mos est æquore pagine
 Quæ nullas habeat notas,
 Pressas figere literas.
 Sed mens si propriis vigena
 Nihil motibus explicat,
 Sed tantum patiens jacet
 Notis subdita corporum,
 Cassasque in speculi vicem
 Rerum reddit imagines,
 Unde hæc sic animis viget,
 Cernens omnia notio?
 Quæ vis singula prospicit?
 Aut quæ cognita dividit?
 Quæ divisa recolligit?
 Alternumque legens iter,
 Nunc summis caput inserit,
 Nunc decedit in infima;
 Tum sese referens sibi
 Veris falsa redarguit?
 Hæc est efficiens magis,
 Longe causa potentior
 Quam quæ materiæ modo
 Impressas patitur notas.
 Præcedit tamen excitans
 Et vires animi movens,
 Vivo in corpore passio.
 Cum vel lux oculos ferit,
 Vel vox auribus instrepat:
 Tum mentis vigor excitus,
 Quas intus species tenet,
 Ad motus similes vocans,
 Notia applicat exteris.

It is true indeed, that the *Noûron*, or thing understood, is, in order of nature, before the intellection and conception of it; and from hence was it, that the Pythagoreans and Platonists concluded, that *Noûs*, mind or intellect, was not the very first and highest thing in the scale of the universe, but that there was another Divine hypostasis, in order of nature before it, called by them *Εν* and *Τ' ἀγαθόν*, one and the good—as the *Noûron* or intelligible thereof.

But as those three archical hypostases of the Platonists and Pythagoreans are all of them really but one $\Theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma$ or Divinity, and the first of those three (superior to that which is properly called by them mind or intellect), is not supposed therefore to be ignorant of itself; so is the first Mind or Understanding no other, than that of a perfect Being, infinitely good, fecund, and powerful, and virtually containing all things; comprehending itself and the extent of its own goodness, fecundity, virtue, and power; that is, all possibilities of things, their relations to one another, and verities; a mind before sense and sensible things. An omnipotent understanding Being, which is itself its own intelligible, is the first Original of all things. Again, that there must of necessity be some other substance besides body or matter, and which, in the scale of nature, is superior to it, is evident from hence, because otherwise there could be no motion at all therein, no body being ever able to move itself. There must be something self-active and hylarchical, something that can act both from itself, and upon matter, as having a natural imperium, or command over it. Cogitation is, in order of nature, before local motion. Life and understanding, soul and mind, are no syllables or complexions of things, secondary and derivative, which might therefore be made out of things devoid of life and understanding; but simple, primitive, and uncompounded natures: they are no qualities or accidental modifications of matter, but substantial things. For which cause souls or minds can no more be generated out of matter, than matter itself can be generated out

of something else; and therefore are they both alike (in some sense), principles, naturally ingenerable and incorruptible, though both matter, and all imperfect souls and minds, were at first created by one perfect, omnipotent, understanding Being. Moreover, nothing can be more evident than this, that mind and understanding hath a higher degree of entity or perfection in it, and is a greater reality in nature, than mere senseless matter or bulky extension. And, consequently, the things which belong to souls and minds, to rational and intellectual beings as such, must not have less, but more reality in them, than the things which belong to inanimate bodies. Wherefore, the differences of just and unjust, honest and dishonest, are greater realities in nature, than the differences of hard and soft, hot and cold, moist and dry. He, that does not perceive any higher degree of perfection in a man than in an oyster, nay, than in a clod of earth or lump of ice, in a piece of paste or pie-crust, hath not the reason or understanding of a man in him. There is unquestionably a scale or ladder of nature, and degrees of perfection and entity, one above another, as of life, sense, and cogitation, above dead, senseless, and unthinking matter; of reason and understanding above sense, &c. And if the sun be nothing but a mass of fire, or inanimate subtile matter agitated, then hath the most contemptible animal that can see the sun, and hath consciousness and self-enjoyment, a higher degree of entity and perfection in it, than that whole fiery globe; as also than the materials (stone, timber, brick and mortar), of the most stately structure, or city. Not-

withstanding which, the sun in other regards, and as its vastly extended light and heat hath so great an influence upon the good of the whole world, plants and animals, may be said to be a far more noble and useful thing in the universe, than any one particular animal whatsoever. Wherefore there being plainly a scale or ladder of entity, the order of things was unquestionably, in way of descent, from higher perfection downward to lower; it being as impossible for a greater perfection to be produced from a lesser, as for something to be caused by nothing. Neither are the steps or degrees of this ladder (either upward or downward) infinite; but as the foot, bottom, or lowest round thereof, is stupid and senseless matter, devoid of all life and understanding; so is the head, top, and summit of it a perfect omnipotent Being, comprehending itself, and all possibilities of things. A perfect understanding Being is the beginning and head of the scale of entity; from whence things gradually descend downward; lower and lower, till they end in senseless matter. *Νοῦς πάντων προγενέστατος*, Mind is the oldest of all things,—senior to the elements, and the whole corporeal world; and likewise, according to the same ancient Theists, it is *Κύριος κατὰ φύσιν*, by nature lord over all—or hath a natural imperium and dominion over all, it being the most hegemonical thing. And thus was it also affirmed by Anaxagoras, *Νοῦς βασιλεὺς οὐρανοῦ τε καὶ γῆς*, that Mind is the sovereign King of heaven and earth.

We have now made it evident, that the Epicurean and Anaximandrian Atheists, who derive the original of all things from senseless matter,

devoid of all manner of life, can no way solve the phenomenon of cogitation (life and understanding, soul and mind), no more than they can that of local motion. And the reason why we have insisted so much upon this point, is, because these Atheists do not only pretend to solve this phenomenon of cogitation without a God, and so to take away the argument for a Deity from thence, but also to demonstrate the impossibility of its existence, from the very nature of knowledge, mind, and understanding. For if knowledge be, in its own nature, nothing but a passion from singular bodies existing without the knower; and if life and understanding, soul and mind, be junior to body, and generated out of senseless matter, then could no mind or understanding Being possibly be a god, that is, a first principle, and the maker of all things. And though modern writers take little or no notice of this, yet did Plato anciently make the very state of the controversy betwixt Theists and Atheists principally to consist in this very thing, viz. Whether life and understanding, soul and mind, were juniors to body, and sprung out of senseless matter, as accidental modifications thereof, or else were substantial things, and in order of nature before it. For after the passages before cited, he thus concludeth: *κινδυνεύει ὁ λέγων ταῦτα, πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν καὶ αἶρα, πρῶτα ἡγείσθαι τῶν πάντων εἶναι, καὶ τὴν φύσιν διοράζειν ταῦτα αὐτὰ, ψυχὴν δὲ ἐκ τούτων ὁσπερ ἐκ τοῦ ἐν κινδυνεύειν, ἀλλὰ οὕτως σημαίνειν ταῦτα ἡμῖν τῇ ἀδύῳ. Ἄρ' οὖν πρὸς Διὸς οἶον πηγὴν τινα ἀνοήτου δόξης ἀνενεργήκαμεν ἀνθρώπων, ὅποσοι τῶν περὶ φύσεως ἐφῆσαντο ζητημάτων* These men seem to suppose fire, wa-

ter, air, and earth, to be the very first things in the universe, and the principles of all, calling them only nature; but soul and mind to have sprung up afterwards out of them. Nay, they do not only seem to suppose this, but also in express words declare the same. And thus (by Jupiter) have we discovered the very fountain of that atheistic madness of the ancient physiologists, to wit, their making inanimate bodies senior to soul and mind.—And accordingly that philosopher addresses himself, to the confutation of Atheism, no otherwise than thus, by proving soul not to be junior to senseless body, or inanimate matter, and generated out of it; *
 ὃ πρῶτον γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς αἴτιον πάντων, τοῦτο οὐ πρῶτον, ἀλλὰ ὕστερον ἀπεφάνηται εἶναι γεγονός, οἱ τῶν ἀσεβῶν ψυχὴν ἀπεργασάμενοι λόγοι· ὃ δὲ ὕστερον πρότερον· ὅθεν ἡμαρτήκασι περὶ θεῶν τῆς ὄντως οὐσίας· ψυχὴν ἡγροῦσθαι κινδυνεύουσι μὲν ὀλίγου ἑμπαντες, οἷον τε ὃν τυγχάνει καὶ δύναμιν ἣν ἔχει· τῶν τε ἄλλων αὐτὰς περὶ καὶ δὴ καὶ γενέσεως, ὡς ἐν πρώτοις ἐστὶ, σωματῶν ἐμπροσθεν πάντων γενομένη, καὶ μεταβολῆς πάσης ἀρχή· That which is the first cause of the generation and corruption of all things, the atheistic doctrine supposes not to have been first made; but what is indeed the last thing, to be the first. And hence is it, that they err concerning the essence of the gods. For they are ignorant what kind of thing soul is, and what power it hath, as also especially concerning its generation and production, that it was first of all made before body, it being that, which governs the motions, changes, and transformations thereof. But if soul be first in order of nature before body, then must those things, which

* Ibid. p. 667.

are cognate to soul, be also before the things which appertain to body; and so mind and understanding, art and law, be before hard and soft, heavy and light; and that, which these Atheists call nature (the motion of inanimate bodies), junior to art and mind, it being governed by the same.—Now that soul is in order of nature before body, this philosopher demonstrates only from the topic or head of motion, because it is impossible that one body should move another infinitely, without any first cause or mover; but there must of necessity be something self-moving and self-active, or which had a power of changing itself, that was the first cause of all local motion in bodies. And this being the very notion of soul, that it is such a thing, as can move or change itself (in which also the essence of life consisteth), he thus inferreth,* *ικανότατα δέδεικται ψυχὴ τῶν πάντων πρεσβυτάτη, γενομένη τε ἀρχὴ κινήσεως*. It is therefore sufficiently demonstrated from hence, that soul is the oldest of all things in the corporeal world, it being the principle of all the motion and generation in it.—And his conclusion is,^b *ὁρθῶς ἄρα εἰρηκότες αὖ ἡμεν ψυχὴν μὲν πρότερον γεγονέναι σώματος ἡμῶν, σῶμα δὲ δεύτερον τε καὶ ὑστερον, ψυχῆς ἀρχούσης, ἀρχόμενον κατὰ φύσιν*. It hath been therefore rightly affirmed by us, that soul is older than body, and was made before it, and body younger and junior to soul; soul being that, which ruleth, and body that which is ruled. From whence it follows, that the things of soul also are older than the things of body; and therefore cogitation, intellection, volition, and appetite, in order of nature before length, breadth,

* Ibid. p. 668.

^b P. 669.

and profundity.—Now it is evident, that Plato in all this understood, not only the mundane soul, or his third Divine hypostasis, the original of that motion, that is in the heavens and the whole corporeal universe, but also all other particular lives and souls whatsoever, or that whole rank of beings called soul; he supposing it all to have been at first made before the corporeal system, or at least to have been in order of nature senior to it, as superior and more excellent (that which ruleth being superior to that which is ruled), and no soul or life whatsoever, to be generated out of senseless matter.

Wherefore we must needs here condemn that doctrine of some professed Theists and Christians of latter times, who generate all souls, not only the sensitive in brutes, but also the rational in men, out of matter; forasmuch as hereby, not only that argument for the existence of a God, from souls, is quite taken away, and nothing could hinder, but that senseless matter might be the Original of all things, if life and understanding soul and mind, sprung out of it; but also the Atheist will have an advantage to prove the impossibility of a God from hence; because if life and understanding, in their own nature, be factitious, and generable out of matter, then are they no substantial things, but accidental only; from whence it will plainly follow, that no mind could possibly be a God, or first cause of all things, it being not so much as able to subsist by itself. Moreover, if mind, as such, be generable, and educible out of nothing, then must it needs be in its own nature corruptible also, and reducible to nothing again; whereas the Deity is both an un-

made and incorruptible being. So that there could not possibly be, according to this hypothesis, any other God, than such a Jupiter, or soul of the world, as the atheistic Theogonists acknowledged, that sprung out of Night, Chaos, and Nonentity, and may be again swallowed up into that dark abyss. Senseless matter, therefore, being the only unmade and incorruptible thing, and the fountain of all things, even of life and understanding, it must needs be acknowledged to be the only real Numen.

Neither will the case be much different, as to some others, who, though indeed they do not professedly generate the rational, but only the sensitive soul, both in men and brutes; yet do nevertheless maintain the human soul itself to be but a mere blank, or white sheet of paper, that hath nothing at all in it, but what was scribbled upon it by the objects of sense; and knowledge, or understanding, to be nothing but the result of sense, and so a passion from sensible bodies existing without the knower. For hereby, as they plainly make knowledge and understanding to be, in its own nature, junior to sense, and the very creature of sensibles; so do they also imply the rational soul, and mind itself, to be as well generated as the sensitive, wherein it is virtually contained; or to be nothing but a higher modification of matter, agreeably to that Leviathan-doctrine, that men differ no otherwise from brute animals, than only in their organization, and the use of speech or words.

In very truth, whoever maintaineth, that any life or soul; any cogitation or consciousness, self-perception and self-activity, can spring out of

dead, senseless and unactive matter, the same can never possibly have any rational assurance; but that his own soul had also a like original, and consequently is mortal and corruptible. For if any life and cogitation can be thus generated, then is there no reason, but that all lives may be so, they being but higher degrees in the same kind; and neither life, nor any thing else, can be in its own nature indifferent, to be either substance or accident, and sometimes one and sometimes the other; but either all life, cogitation and consciousness, is accidental, generable and corruptible, or else none at all.

That, which hath inclined so many to think the sensitive life, at least, to be nothing but a quality, or accident of matter, generable out of it, and corruptible into it, is that strange Protean transformation of matter into so many seemingly unaccountable forms and shapes, together with the scholastic opinion thereupon of real qualities; that is, entities distinct from the substance of body, and its modifications, but yet generable out of it, and corruptible into it; they concluding, that as light and colours, heat and cold, &c. according to those fancies, which we have of them, are real qualities of matter, distinct from its substance and modifications; so may life, sense, and cogitation, be in like manner qualities of matter also, generable and corruptible. But these real qualities of body, in the sense declared, are things, that were long since justly exploded by the ancient Atomists, and expunged out of the catalogue of entities, of whom Laertius^a hath recorded, that they did *ἐκβάλλειν τὰς ποιότητας*, quite

^a Lib x. segm. xlv. p. 261.

cashier and banish qualities out of their philosophy—they resolving all corporeal phenomena, and therefore those of heat and cold, light and colours, fire and flame, &c. intelligibly, into nothing but the different modifications of extended substance, viz. more or less magnitude of parts, figure, site, motion or rest, (or the combinations of them,) and those different fancies caused in us by them. Indeed there is no other entity, but substance and its modifications. Wherefore the Democritics and Epicureans did most shamefully contradict themselves, when, pretending to reject and explode all those entities of real qualities, themselves nevertheless made life and understanding such real qualities of matter, generable out of it, and corruptible again into it.

There is nothing in body or matter, but magnitude, figure, site, and motion or rest: now it is mathematically certain, that these, however combined together, can never possibly compound, or make up life or cogitation; which therefore cannot be an accident of matter, but must of necessity be a substantial thing. We speak not here of that life (improperly so called) which is, in vulgar speech, attributed to the bodies of men and animals; for it is plainly accidental to a body to be vitally united to a soul, or not. Therefore is this life of the compound corruptible and destroyable, without the destruction of any real entity: there being nothing destroyed, nor lost to the universe, in the deaths of men and animals, as such, but only a disunion, or separation made of those two substances, soul and body, one from another. But we speak here of

the original life of the soul itself, that this is substantial, neither generable nor corruptible, but only creatable and annihilable by the Deity. And it is strange, that any men should persuade themselves, that that, which rules and commands in the bodies of animals, moving them up and down, and hath sense or perception in it, should not be as substantial, as that stupid and senseless matter, that is ruled by it. Neither can matter (which is also but a mere passive thing) efficiently produce soul, any more than soul matter; no finite, imperfect substance being able to produce another substance out of nothing. Much less can such a substance, as hath a lower degree of entity and perfection in it, create that, which hath a higher. There is a scale, or ladder of entities and perfections in the universe, one above another, and the production of things cannot possibly be in way of ascent from lower to higher, but must of necessity be in way of descent from higher to lower. Now to produce any one higher rank of being from the lower, as cogitation from magnitude and body, is plainly to invert this order in the scale of the universe from downwards to upwards, and therefore is it atheistical; and by the same reason, that one higher rank or degree in this scale is thus unnaturally produced from a lower, may all the rest be so produced also. Wherefore we have great reason to stand upon our guard here, and to defend this post against the Atheists; that no life, or cogitation, can either materially or efficiently result from dead and senseless body; or that souls, being all substantial and immaterial things, can neither be

generated out of matter, nor corrupted into the same, but only created or annihilated by the Deity.

The grand objection against this substantiality of souls sensitive, as well as rational, is from that consequence, which will be from thence inferred, of their permanent subsistence after death, their perpetuity, or immortality. This seeming very absurd, that the souls of brutes also should be immortal, or subsist after the deaths of the respective animals: but especially to two sorts of men; first, such as scarcely in good earnest believe their own soul's immortality; and secondly, such religionists, as conclude, that if irrational, or sensitive souls subsist after death, then must they needs go presently either into heaven or hell. And R. Cartesius was so sensible of the offensiveness of this opinion, that though he were fully convinced of the necessity of this disjunction, that either brutes have nothing of sense or cogitation at all, or else they must have some other substance in them, besides matter, he chose rather to make them mere senseless machines, than to allow them substantial souls. Wherein, avoiding a lesser absurdity or paradox, he plainly plunged himself into a greater; scarcely any thing being more generally received, than the sense of brutes. Though in truth all those, who deny the substantiality of sensitive souls, and will have brutes to have nothing but matter in them, ought consequently, according to reason, to do as Cartesius did, deprive them of all sense. But, on the contrary, if it be evident from the phenomena, that brutes are not mere senseless machines or automata, and only like clocks or watches, then

ought not popular opinion and vulgar prejudice so far to prevail with us, as to hinder our assent to that, which sound reason and philosophy clearly dictates, that therefore they must have something more than matter in them. Neither ought we, when we clearly conceive any thing to be true, as this, That life and cogitation cannot possibly rise out of dead and senseless matter, to abandon it, or deny our assent thereunto, because we find it attended with some difficulty not easily extricable by us, or cannot free all the consequences thereof from some inconvenience or absurdity, such as seems to be in the permanent subsistence of brutish souls.

For the giving an account of which, notwithstanding, Plato and the ancient Pythagoreans proposed this following hypothesis; That souls, as well sensitive as rational, being all substantial, but not self-existent (because there is but one fountain and principle of all things), were therefore produced or caused by the Deity. But this, not in the generations of the respective animals; it being indecorous, that this Divine, miraculous, creative power should constantly lackey by, and attend upon natural generations; as also incongruous, that souls should be so much juniors to every atom of dust, that is in the whole world; but either all of them from eternity, according to those, who denied the novelty of the world; or rather, according to others, who asserted the cosmogonia, in the first beginning of the world's creation. Wherefore, it being also natural to souls, as such, to actuate and enliven some body, or to be, as it were, clothed therewith; these, as soon as created, were immediately invested with cer-

tain thin and subtile bodies, or put into light æthærial or ærial chariots and vehicles ; wherein they subsist, both before their entrance into other gross terrestrial bodies, and after their egress out of them. So that the souls, not only of men, but also of other animals, have sometimes a thicker, and sometimes a thinner indument or clothing. And thus do we understand Boëthius, not only of the rational, but also of the other inferior sensitive souls, in these verses of his ;*

*Tu causis animas paribus vitasque minores
Provehis, et levibus sublimes curribus aptans,
In cœlum terramque seras.*

Where his light chariots, which all lives or souls, at their very first creation by God, are placed in, and in which being wafted, they are both together, as it were, sowed into the gross terrestrial matter, are thin, ærial and æthærial bodies. But this is plainly declared by Proclus upon the *Timæus*, after he had spoken of the souls of demons and men, in this manner ; καὶ γὰρ πᾶσαν ψυχὴν ἀνάγκη πρὸ τῶν θνητῶν σωμάτων, αἰδίους καὶ ἐκινήτους τισὶ χρῆσθαι σώμασιν, ὡς κατ' οὐσίαν ἔχουσιν τὸ κινεῖν. *L. v. p. 290.* And every soul must of necessity have, before these mortal bodies, certain eternal and easily moveable bodies, it being essential to them to move.—There is indeed mention made by the same Proclus, and others, of an opinion of ἀλογοὶ δαίμονες, irrational or brutish demons, or demoniac ærial brutes ; of which he sometimes speaks doubtfully, as εἴπερ γὰρ εἰσιν ἀλογοὶ δαίμονες, ὡς οἱ θεουργοί, *L. iv. p. 288.* If there be any irrational demons, as the Theurgists affirm.—But the dispute, doubt, or controversy here only was,

* De Consolat. Philosoph. lib. iii. p. 69.

Whether there were any such irrational demons immortal, or no. For thus we learn from these words of Ammonius upon the Porphyrian *Isagoge*; οἱ μὲν γὰρ φασιν εἶναι τι δαιμονίων ἀλόγων γένος ἀθάνατον, οἱ δὲ φασὶ καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον γένος θνητὸν εἶναι. Some affirm, that there is a certain kind of irrational demons immortal; but others, that all these irrational or brutish demons are mortal.—Where, by irrational demons immortal, seem to be understood such, as never descend into terrestrial bodies (and these are there disclaimed by Ammonius); but the mortal ones, such as act also upon gross terrestrial bodies, obnoxious to death and corruption. As if Ammonius should have said; There are no other brutish, or irrational demons; than only the souls of such brute animals as are here amongst us, sometimes acting only aerial bodies. Thus, according to the ancient Pythagoric hypothesis, there is neither any new substantial thing now made, which was not before; nor yet any real entity destroyed into nothing; not only no matter, but also no soul nor life; God, after the first creation, neither making any new substance, nor yet annihilating any thing made. He then creating nothing, that was not fit to be conserved in being, and which could not be well used and placed in the universe; and afterward never repenting him of what he had before done. And natural generations and corruptions being nothing but accidental mutations, concretions and secretions, or anagrammatical transpositions of pre- and post-existing things, the same souls and lives being sometimes united to one body, and sometimes to another; sometimes in thicker, and sometimes in thinner clothing; and

sometimes in the visible, sometimes in the invisible (they having aërial, as well as terrestrial vehicles); and never any soul quite naked of all body. And thus does Proclus complain of some, as spurious Platonists, οἱ φθείροντες τὸ ὕχνημα ἀναγκάζονται ποτε παντὸς σώματος ἔξω ποιεῖν τὴν ψυχὴν, Who, destroying the thinner vehicles of souls, were therefore necessitated sometimes to leave them in a state of separation from all body, or without any corporeal indument.—Which Cabala, probably derived from the Egyptians by Pythagoras, was before fully represented by us out of Ovid; though that transmigration of human souls there, into ferine bodies, hath not been by all acknowledged, as a genuine part thereof. And the same was likewise insisted upon by Virgil, Georg. l. iv. as also owned and confirmed by Macrobius for a great truth; *Somn. Scip. l. ii. c. xii. [p. 161.]* “Constat secundum veræ rationis assertionem, quam nec Cicero nescit, nec Virgilius ignorat, dicendo,

* Nec mortì esse locum; —

Constat, inquam, nihil intra vivum mundum perire, sed eorum, quæ interire videntur, solam mutari speciem.” It is manifest, according to reason and true philosophy, which neither Cicero nor Virgil were unacquainted with (the latter of these affirming, that there is no place at all left for death); I say, it is manifest, that none of those things, that to us seem to die, do absolutely perish within the living world, but only their forms changed.—

* Georg. lib. iv. vers. 221.

Now, how extravagant soever this hypothesis seem to be, yet is there no question, but that a Pythagorean would endeavour to find some countenance and shelter for it in the Scripture; especially that place, which hath so puzzled and non-plussed interpreters, Rom. viii. 19, &c. "For the earnest expectation of the creature waiteth for the manifestation of the sons of God. For the creature was made subject unto vanity, not willingly, but by reason of him, who hath subjected the same in hope; because the creature itself also shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption, into the glorious liberty of the children of God. For we know, that the whole creation groaneth, and travaileth in pain together until now. And not only they, but ourselves also, which have the first-fruits of the Spirit, groan within ourselves, waiting for the adoption, even the redemption of our bodies." Where it is first of all evident, that the *κτίσις*, creature, or creation spoken of, is not the very same with the *τέκνα* or *υἱοὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ*, the children or sons of God—but something distinct from them. Wherefore, in the next place, the Pythagorean will add, that it must of necessity be understood, either of the inanimate creature only, or of the lower animal creation, or else of both these together. Now, though it be readily acknowledged, that there is a *prosopopœia* here, yet cannot all those expressions, for all that, without difficulty and violence, be understood of the inanimate creation only, or senseless matter; viz. that this hath *ἀποκατάδοκίαν*, an earnest expectation—of some future good to itself; that it is now made subject *ματαιότητι*, to vanity—frustration and disappointment of desire; and *φθορᾷ*, to cor-

ruption and death—and that οὐχ ἐκούσα, not willingly—but reluctantly; and yet ἐπ’ ἐλπίδι too, in hope—notwithstanding, of some further good to follow afterward; and that it doth in the mean time σπαστάζειν and συμπίνειν, groan and travail in pain together, till it be at length delivered from “the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God.” Moreover, in the generations and corruptions of senseless bodies, as of minerals and vegetables, or when, for example, oil is turned into flame, flame into smoke, water into vapour, vapour into snow or hail, grass into milk, milk into blood and bones, and the like; there is, I say, in all this, no hurt done to any thing, nor any real entity destroyed, all the substance of matter still remaining entirely the same, without the least diminution, and only accidental transformations thereof made. All this is really nothing, but local motion; and there is no more toil nor labour to an inanimate body in motion, than in rest; it being altogether as natural for a body to be moved by something else, as of itself to rest. It is all nothing, but change of figure, distance, site, and magnitude of parts, causing several sensations, fancies, and apparitions in us. And they, who would have the meaning of this place to be, That all such-like mutations, and alternate vicissitudes in inanimate bodies, shall at length quite cease; these groaning in the mean time, and travailing in pain to be delivered from the toilsome labour of such restless motion, and to be at ease and quiet; by taking away all motion thus, out of a fond regard to the ease and quiet of senseless matter, they would thereby, *ipso facto*, petrify the whole corporeal

universe, and consequently the bodies of good men also after the resurrection, and congeal all into rocky marble or adamant. And as vain is that other conceit of some, that the whole terrestrial globe shall at last be vitrified, or turned into transparent crystal, as if it also groaned in the mean time for this. For whatsoever change shall be made of the world in the new heaven and the new earth to come, it is reasonable to think, that it will not be made for the sake of the senseless matter, or the inanimate bodies themselves, to which all is alike; but only for the sake of men and animals, the living spectators and inhabitants thereof, that it may be fitter, both for their use and delight. Neither indeed can those words, for the creature "itself shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God," be understood of any other, than animals; forasmuch as this liberty of the children of God, here meant, is their being clothed, instead of mortal, with immortal bodies; of which no other creatures are capable, but only such as consist of soul and body. And that *πᾶσα κτίσις*, that whole creation—which is said afterward to groan and travail in pain together, may be well understood of all that of the creation, which can groan, or be sensible of evil or misery. Wherefore, the Pythagorean would interpret this place of the lower animal creation only, which is sensible of good and evil; that as this was unwillingly, or against its own inclination (after the fall of man, or lapse of souls) made subject to vanity, and the bondage of corruption, pain, misery, and death, in those gross terrestrial bodies; in the manifestation of the sons of God,

when they, instead of these mortal bodies, shall be clothed with celestial and immortal ones, then shall this creature also have its certain share in the felicity of that glorious time, and partake in some measure of such a liberty, by being freed in like manner from these their gross terrestrial bodies, and now living only in thin aërial and immortal ones; and so a period put to all their miseries and calamities by him, who made not death, neither hath pleasure in the destruction of the living, but created whatsoever liveth to this end, that it might have its being, and enjoy itself. But however thus much is certain, that brute animals, in this place, cannot be quite excluded; because the *πᾶσα κτίσις*, the whole creation—will not suffer that: and therefore a Pythagorist would conclude it a warrantable inference from this text of Scripture, that that whole rank in the creation of irrational and brutish animals below men shall not be utterly annihilated in the consummation of things, or future renovation of the world, quite stripped of all this furniture, men being then left alone in it; but that there shall be a continuation of this species or rank of being. And not only so neither; as if there should still be a constant succession of such alternate generations and corruptions, productions or births, and deaths of brute animals, to all eternity; but also, that the individuals themselves shall continue the same, forasmuch as otherwise there would be none at all delivered from the bondage of corruption. And lastly, that these very souls of brutes, which at this time groan and travail in pain, shall themselves be made partakers of that liberty of the children of God; since otherwise they should be

with child, or parturient of nothing; groaning not for themselves, but others. But enough of this Pythagoric hypothesis, which, supposing all manner of souls, sensitive as well as rational, to be substantial things, and therefore to have a permanency after death, in their distinct natures, allows them certain thin aërial ochemata, or vehicles, to subsist in, when these gross terrestrial ones shall fail them.

But let these aërial vehicles of the souls of brutes go for a whimsey, or mere figment; nor let them be allowed to act or enliven any other than terrestrial bodies only, by means whereof they must needs be, immediately after death, quite destitute of all body; they subsisting nevertheless, and not vanishing into nothing, because they are not mere accidents, but substantial things; we say, that in this case, though the substances of them remain, yet must they needs continue in a state of insensibility and inactivity, unless perhaps they be again afterward united to some other terrestrial bodies. Because, though intellection be the energy of the rational soul alone, without the concurrence of body, yet is the energy of the sensitive, always conjoined with it; sense being, as Aristotle* hath rightly determined, a complication of soul and body together, as weaving is of the weaver and weaving instruments. Wherefore we say, that if the irrational and sensitive souls in brutes, being substantial things also, be after death quite destitute of all body, then can they neither have sense of any thing, nor act upon any thing, but must continue

* De Anima, lib. ii. cap. vi. p. 27. tom. ii. oper.

for so long a time, in a state of insensibility and inactivity. Which is a thing therefore to be thought the less impossible, because no man can be certain, that his own soul in sleep, lethargies, and apoplexies, &c. hath always an uninterrupted consciousness of itself; and that it was never without thoughts, even in the mother's womb. However, there is little reason to doubt, but that the sensitive souls of such animals, as lie dead or asleep all the winter, and revive or awake again, at the approaching warmth of summer, do for that time continue in a state of inactivity and insensibility. Upon which account, though these souls of brutes may be said in one sense to be immortal, because the substance of them, and the root of life in them, still remains; yet may they, in another sense, be said also to be mortal, as having the exercise of that life, for a time at least, quite suspended. From whence it appears, that there is no reason at all for that fear and suspicion of some, that if the souls of brutes be substantial, and continue in being after death, they must therefore needs go either to heaven or hell. But as for that supposed possibility of their awakening again afterward, in some other terrestrial bodies, this seemeth to be no more, than what is found by daily experience in the course of nature, when the silk-worm, and other worms, dying, are transformed into butterflies. For there is little reason to doubt, but that the same soul, which before acted the body of the silk-worm, doth afterward act that of the butterfly: upon which account it is, that this hath been made by Christian theologers an emblem of the resurrection.

Hitherto have we declared two several opinions, concerning the substantial souls of brutes supposed therefore to have a permanent subsistence after death; one of Plato's and the Pythagoreans; that when they are divested of these gross terrestrial bodies, they live, and have a sense of themselves, in thin aërial ones; the other of such, as exploding these aërial vehicles of brutes, and allowing them none but terrestrial bodies, affirm the substances of them, surviving death, to continue in a state of inactivity and insensibility, sleep, silence, or stupor. But now, to say the truth, there is no absolute necessity, that these souls of brutes, because substantial, should therefore have a permanent subsistence after death to all eternity; because, though it be true, that no substance once created by God will of itself ever vanish into nothing, yet it is true also, that whatsoever was created by God out of nothing, may possibly by him be annihilated and reduced to nothing again. Wherefore, when it is said, that the immortality of the human soul is demonstrable by natural reason, the meaning hereof is no more than this, that its substantiality is so demonstrable; from whence it follows, that it will naturally no more perish or vanish into nothing, than the substance of matter itself: and not that it is impossible either for it, or matter, by the Divine power to be annihilated. Wherefore the assurance that we have of our own souls' immortality, must depend upon something else besides their substantiality, namely, a faith also in the Divine Goodness, that he will conserve in being, or not annihilate, all such substances created by him, whose permanent subsistence is neither inconsistent with

his own attributes, nor the good of the universe, as this of rational souls unquestionably is not; they having both morality and liberty of will, and thereby being capable of rewards and punishments, and consequently fit objects for the Divine justice to display itself upon. But, for aught we can be certain, the case may be otherwise as to the souls of brute animals, devoid both of morality and liberty of will, and therefore incapable of reward and punishment; that though they will not naturally of themselves vanish into nothing, yet, having been created by God in the generations of the respective animals, and had some enjoyment of themselves for a time, they may by him again be as well annihilated in their deaths and corruptions; and if this be absolutely the best, then doubtless is it so. And to this seemeth agreeable the opinion of Porphyrius,* amongst the philosophers, when he affirmed every irrational power or soul to be resolved into the life of the whole; that is, retracted and resumed into the Deity, and so annihilated as to its creaturely nature: though possibly there may be another interpretation of that philosopher's meaning here, viz. that all the sensitive souls of brutes are really but one and the same mundane soul, as it were, outflowing and variously displaying itself, and acting upon all the several parts of matter, that are capable to receive it, but at their deaths retiring again back into itself. But we have sufficiently retunded the force of that objection against the ingenerability of all souls, and the substantiality of those of brutes also, from their conse-

* Vide *Sententias ad Intelligibilia ducentes*, par. i. § xxii. p. 227. § xxiv. p. 228. et alias.

quent permanence after death ; we having shewed, that, notwithstanding this their substantiality, there is no absolute necessity of their perpetuity after death, and permanency to all eternity, or else, that if they do continue to subsist (God annihilating no substance), unless they have aërial vehicles to act, they must remain in a state of inactivity and insensibility, silence or sleep.

Now therefore, if no souls, no life, nor cogitation, could possibly be ever generated out of dead and senseless matter, they being not mere accidents, but substantial things, which must in this case have come from nothing ; then, either all souls existed of themselves from eternity, or else there must of necessity be some eternal unmade life and mind, from whence all the other lives and minds were derived. And that this was the doctrine of the ancient Theists, That no soul or mind, no life or understanding, was ever generated out of matter, but all produced by the Deity, the sole fountain of life and understanding, might be here proved, were it needful, at large, by sundry testimonies ; but it may sufficiently appear from those verses of Virgil, first in his sixth *Æneid*, where, after he had spoken of God, as a spirit and mind diffused throughout the whole world, he addeth,

• Inde hominum pecudumque genus, vitæque volantum,
Et quæ marmoreo fert monstra sub æquore pontus,

That from thence are the lives of all men and beasts, birds flying in the air, and monsters swimming in the sea.—And again in his *Georgics*, where, after these words,

• Vers 728.

* ————Deum namque ire per omnes
Terrasque, tractusque maris, cœlumque profundum,

That God passeth through all tracts of earths,
seas, and heavens,—he subjoineth,

Hinc pecudes, armenta, viros, genus omne ferarum,
Quemque sibi tennes nascentem arcessere vitas.
Scilicet huc reddi deinde, et resoluta referri,
Omnia, nec morti esse locum.

And from hence, not only men, but also all manner of brute animals and beasts, when produced into this world, do every one derive their lives or souls, as also at their deaths they render the same back again to him, in whose hand or custody they remain undestroyed; so that there is no place any where in the world left for death.—This was therefore undoubtedly the genuine doctrine of the ancient Theists, however some of late have deviated and swerved from it; that no life was generated out of matter, but all created by the Deity, or derived from it, the sole fountain of lives and souls.

And it is a truth so evident, that life being substantial, and not a mere accidental thing generated and corrupted, there must therefore of necessity be some eternal unmade life and mind, from whence all other lives and minds are derived, that the Hylozoic Atheists themselves (in this far wiser than the Atomics) were fully convinced thereof; nevertheless being strongly possessed with that atheistic prejudice, that there is no other substance besides body, they attribute this first original unmade life and understanding to all

* Lib. iv. verso 221.

matter as such (but without animal consciousness) as an essential part thereof, or inadequate conception of it. From which fundamental life of nature in matter, modified by organization, they fancy the lives of all animals and men to have proceeded. So that though the modified lives of animals and men, as such, according to them, be accidental things, generated and corrupted, produced out of nothing, and reduced to nothing again; yet this fundamental life of matter, which is the basis, upon which they stand, being substantial, is also eternal and incorruptible. These Hylozoists therefore, to avoid a Deity, suppose every atom of senseless matter to have been, from all eternity, infallibly omniscient, that is, to know all things without either error or ignorance, and to have a knowledge before sense, and undervived from sensibles (quite contrary to the doctrine of the atomic Atheists, who make all knowledge, sense, or the product thereof), though without any animal consciousness and self-perception.

But, as nothing can be more prodigiously absurd, than thus to attribute infallible omniscience to every atom of matter; so is it also directly contradictory to suppose perfect knowledge, wisdom, or understanding, without any consciousness or self-perception, consciousness being essential to cogitation: as also, that the substantial and fundamental life in men and other animals should never perish, and yet notwithstanding their souls and personalities in death utterly vanish into nothing. Moreover, this hypothesis can never possibly solve the phenomenon of men and animals neither; not only because no organization or modification of matter whatsoever could ever

produce consciousness and self-perception in what was before unconscious; but also because every smallest atom thereof being supposed to be a percipient by itself, and to have a perfect life and understanding of its own, there must be in every one man and animal, not one, but a heap or commonwealth of innumerable percipients. Lastly, whereas these hylozoic Atheists make every atom of matter omniscient, but nothing at all omnipotent, or assert perfect knowledge, without any perfect power, a knowledge without sense, and undervived from sensibles; we demand of them, where the intelligibles or objects of this knowledge are? and whence the ideas thereof are derived? For since they proceed not in a way of passion from sensibles existing without, nor could result from those atoms neither, as comprehending themselves, they must needs come from nothing, and many of them, at least, be the conceptions of nothing. There cannot possibly be any other original, by the wit of man devised, of knowledge and understanding, than from an absolutely perfect and omnipotent Being, comprehending itself, and the extent of its own infinite power, or all possibilities of things, that is, all intelligibles. But there can be but one such omnipotent Being, and therefore no more than one original, and eternal unmade mind, from whence all the other minds are derived. Wherefore this hylozoic Atheism is nothing but the breaking and crumbling of the simple Deity, one perfect understanding Being, into matter, and all the several atoms of it.

And now have we made it manifest, that these Atheists are so far from being able to disprove a God from this topic of cogitation, knowledge, or

understanding, that they cannot possibly solve the phenomenon thereof, without a God; it indeed affording invincible arguments of his existence. For, first, if no life or cogitation, soul or mind, can possibly spring out of matter or body, devoid of life and understanding, and which is nothing but a thing extended into length, breadth, and thickness; then is it so far from being true, that all life and understanding is junior to senseless matter, and the offspring thereof, that of necessity either all lives and souls were self-existent from eternity, or else there must be one perfect unmade life and mind, from whence all other imperfect ones were derived: there must be an eternal knowledge before sense and sensibles; which is that that hath printed the stamps and signatures of itself, upon the matter of the whole world. Indeed nothing can be more certain than this, that all knowledge and understanding in ourselves is not a mere passion from singular sensibles or bodies existing without us, as the forementioned Atheists also conclude; (from whence they would again infer, that knowledge, as such, is in its own nature junior to sensibles, and the mere creature of them, and consequently no creator;) there being nothing, which comes to us from the objects of sense without, but only local motion and pressure, and there being other objects of the mind, besides singular sensibles; not only all universals, but also such intelligibles, as never were, nor can be in sense. Now, if our human knowledge and understanding be not a passion from things existing without us; then can it have no other original than in way of participation, from a perfect mind, the mind of an infinitely fecund and powerful

Being, comprehending itself, and in itself all things; all the possibilities of things before they were made, their respects, and the verities belonging to them. So that a perfect omnipotent Being, together with the possibilities of things contained in it, is the first *Noῦρον*, intelligible, or object of mind and understanding, by which all other singulars are understood. And were there no such perfect, infinitely fecund, and powerful Being, there could have been no mind or understanding at all. As also, were there no perfect mind, viz. that of an omnipotent Being comprehending itself, and all possibilities of things virtually contained in it; all the knowledge, and intelligible ideas of our imperfect minds, must needs have sprung from nothing. And thus is the existence of a God again demonstrated from that phenomenon of knowledge or understanding.

HAVING quite routed and vanquished the Atheists' main body, we shall now blow away the remainder of their weaker and scattered forces, viz. their objections against Providence, their queries, and their arguments from interest, with a breath or two. Their first objection is against Providence, as to the fabric of the world, from the faultiness of the mundane system, intellectually considered, and in order to ends; "*Quia tanta stat prædita culpa;*"* That because it is so ill-made,—therefore it could not be made by a God. Where the Atheist takes it for granted, that whosoever asserts a God, or a perfect mind,

* *Lucret. lib. ii. vers. 183.*

to be the original of all things, does therefore *ipso facto* suppose all things to be well made, and as they should be. And this doubtless was the sense of all the ancient Theologers, however some modern Theists deviate therefrom; these concluding the perfection of the Deity not at all to consist in goodness, but in power and arbitrary will only. As if to have a will determined by a rule or reason of good, were the virtue of weak, impotent, and obnoxious beings only, or of such as have a superior over them to give law to them; that is, of creatures; but the prerogative of a being irresistibly powerful, to have a will absolutely indifferent to all things, and undetermined by any thing but itself, or to will nothing because it is good, but to make its own arbitrary or contingent and fortuitous determination the sole reason of all its actions, nay, the very rule or measure of goodness, justice, and wisdom itself. And this is supposed by them to be the liberty, sovereignty, and dominion of the Deity. Wherefore such Theists as these would think themselves altogether unconcerned in these atheistic objections against Providence, or in defending the fabric of the world, as faultless, they being as ready as the Atheists themselves, to acknowledge, that the world might really have been much better made than it now is; only that it must be said to be well, because so made, but pretending nevertheless, that this is no impeachment at all of the existence of a God, "*Quia Deus non tenetur ad optimum,*" because God is no way bound or obliged to the best;—he being indeed, according to them, nothing but arbitrary will omnipotent. But what do these Theists here else, than whilst

they deny the fortuitous motion of senseless matter to be the first original of all things, themselves in the mean time enthrone fortuitousness and contingency in the will of an omnipotent Being, and there give it an absolute sovereignty and dominion over all? So that the controversy betwixt the Atheists and these Theists seems to be no other than this, whether senseless matter fortuitously moved, or a fortuitous will omnipotent, such as is altogether undetermined by goodness, justice, and wisdom, be the sovereign Numen, and original of all things. Certainly we mortals could have little better ground for our faith and hope, in such an omnipotent arbitrary will as this, than we could have in the motions of senseless atoms furiously agitated, or of a rapid whirlwind. Nay, one would think, that of the two it should be more desirable to be under the empire of senseless atoms, fortuitously moved, than of a will altogether undetermined by goodness, justice, and wisdom, armed with omnipotence; because the former could harbour no hurtful or mischievous designs against any, as the latter might. But this irrational will, altogether undetermined by goodness, justice, and wisdom, is so far from being the highest liberty, sovereignty, and dominion, the greatest perfection, and the divinest thing of all, that it is indeed nothing else but weakness and impotency itself, or brutish folly and madness. And therefore those ancients, who affirmed, that Mind was Lord over all, and the supreme King of heaven and earth, held at the same time, that Good was the sovereign monarch of the universe, Good reigning in Mind, and together with it, because Mind is that, which

orders all things for the sake of Good; and whatsoever doth otherwise, was, according to them, not Νοῦς, but Ἀνοία, not Mens, but Dementia, and consequently no god. And thus does Cel-

sus in Origen declare the nature of God, οὐ γὰρ
 P. 240. τῆς πλημελοῦς ὀρέξεως, οὐδὲ τῆς πεπλανημένης
 ἀκοσμίας, ἀλλὰ τῆς ὁρθῆς καὶ δικαίας φύσεως
 Θεός ἐστιν ἀρχαγέτης. God is not the president or
 head of irregular and irrational lust or appetite;
 and of loose erratic disorderliness, but of the
 just and righteous nature.—And though this were
 there misapplied by him against the Christian
 doctrine of the resurrection (not understood), yet
 is the passage highly approved by Origen; he
 adding farther, in confirmation thereof, and that
 as the general sense of Christians too,* φαμὲν ὅτι οὐ
 δύναται ἀσχερὰ ὁ Θεός, ἐπεὶ ἴσται ὁ Θεός δυνάμενος μὴ εἶναι
 Θεός, εἰ γὰρ αἰσχερὸν τι ἐρᾷ ὁ Θεός, οὐκ ἴσται Θεός. We
 Christians (who hold the resurrection) say as well
 as you, that God can do nothing, which is in
 itself evil, inept, or absurd; no more than he is

So likewise, p.
 247. ἀλλὰ καὶ
 καὶ ἡμεῖς οὕτως
 εἰς τι περὶ αὐτοῦ
 γινώσκοντες παρ'
 ἐαυτῶν ἔργα
 σαρκαλῶς ἴσται ὁ
 Θεός. Accord-
 ing to us also,
 God can do no-
 thing, that is
 absurd, or be-
 sides reason.

* P. 265.
 [Libro de
 Provid. Ba-
 need. iiii.
 Lib. ii. cap.
 xlii.]
 P. 743.
 [Euseb. vi.]

able not to be God. For if God do any
 evil, he is no God.—And again,^b οὐδὲν
 μὴ πρέπον ἑαυτῷ ὁ Θεός βούλεται, ἀπερορετικὸν
 τυγχάνον τοῦ εἶναι αὐτὸν Θεόν, God willeth
 nothing unbecoming himself, or what is
 truly indecorous; forasmuch as this is
 inconsistent with his Godship.—And to
 the same purpose Plotinus,^c ποιεῖ τὸ Θεῖον
 ὡς πέφυκε, πέφυκε δὲ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ οὐσίαν, ἣ
 τὸ καλὸν ἐν ταῖς ἐνεργείαις αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον
 συνεκφέρει, εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐκεί ταῦτα, πῶς ἂν εἴη.
 The Deity acteth according to its own
 nature and essence; and its nature and

* P. 240.

^b P. 247.

essence displayeth goodness and justice: lib. viii. cap. ix.]
 for if these things be not there, where
 should they else be found?—And again, else-
 where, Θεός ὅτις ἔχον εἶναι, οὐ τοίνυν οὕτω συνέβη,
 ἀλλ' ἴδμεν οὕτω τὸ δ' ἴδμεν τοῦτο, ἀρχὴ τῶν ὅσα ἴδμεν. God
 is essentially that which ought to be; and there-
 fore he did not happen to be such as he is: and
 this first *ought to be* is the principle of all things
 whatsoever, that ought to be.—Wherefore the
 Deity is not to be conceived, as mere arbitrariness,
 humour, or irrational will and appetite omni-
 potent (which would indeed be but omnipotent
 chance), but as an overflowing fountain of love and
 goodness, justly and wisely dispensing itself, and
 omnipotently reaching all things. The will of
 God is goodness, justice, and wisdom; or deco-
 rousness, fitness, and ought itself, willing; so that
 the Τὸ Βέλτιστον, that, which is absolutely the best,
 is νόμος ἀπαράβατος, an indispensable law to it,
 because its very essence.—God is μέτρον πάντων,
 an impartial balance,—lying even, equal and in-
 different to all things, and weighing out heaven
 and earth, and all the things therein, in the most
 just and exact proportions, and not a grain too
 much or too little of any thing. Nor is the Deity
 therefore bound or obliged to do the best, in
 any way of servility (as men fondly imagine this
 to be contrary to his liberty), much less by the law
 and command of any superior (which is a con-
 tradiction), but only by the perfection of its own
 nature, which it cannot possibly deviate from, no
 more than ungod itself. In conclusion, therefore,
 we acknowledge the Atheist's argument to be
 thus far good; that if there be a God, then of
 necessity must all things be well made, and as

they should be; *et vice versa*. But no Atheist will ever be able to prove, that either the whole system of the world could have been better made, or that so much as any one thing therein is made ineptly.

There are indeed many things in the frame of nature, which we cannot reach to the reasons of, they being made by a knowledge far superior and transcendent to that of ours, and our experience and ratiocination but slowly discovering the intricacies and contrivances of Providence therein; witness the circulation of the blood, the milky and lymphatic vessels, and other things (without which the mechanic structure of the bodies of animals cannot be understood), all but so lately brought to light; wherefore we must not conclude, that whatsoever we cannot find out the reason of, or the use, that it serveth to, is therefore ineptly made. We shall give one instance of this; the *intestinum cæcum*, in the bodies of men and other animals, seems, at first sight, to be but a mere botch or bungle of nature, and an odd impertinent appendix; neither do we know, that any anatomist or physiologer hath given a rational account thereof, or discovered its use: and yet there being a valve at the entrance of it, these two both together are a most artificial contrivance of nature, and of great advantage for animals, to hinder the regurgitation of the fæces upward towards the ventricle.

The first atheistic instance of the faultiness of things, in the frame of nature, is from the constitution of the heavens, and the disposition of the equator and ecliptic, intersecting each other in an angle of three-and-twenty degrees and upwards; whereby, as they pretend, the terrestrial globe is

rendered much more uninhabitable than otherwise it might be.^a But this is built upon a false supposition of the ancients, that the torrid zone, or all between the tropics, was utterly uninhabitable by reason of the extremity of heat. And it is certain, that there is nothing, which doth more demonstrate a Providence than this very thing, it being the most convenient site or disposition, that could be devised; as will appear, if the inconveniences of other dispositions be considered, especially these three; first, If the axes of those circles should be parallel, and their plains coincident; secondly, If they should intersect each other in right angles; and thirdly (which is a middle betwixt both), If they should cut one another in an angle of forty-five degrees. For it is evident, that each of these dispositions would be attended with far greater inconveniences to the terrestrial inhabitants, in respect of the length of days and nights, heat and cold. And that these two circles should continue thus, to keep the same angular intersection, when physical and mechanic causes would bring them nearer together; this is a farther eviction of a Providence also.

In the next place, the Atheist supposes, that, according to the general persuasion of Theists, the world and all things therein were created only for the sake of man,^b he thinking to make some advantage for his cause from hence. But this seemeth, at first, to have been an opinion only of some straight-laced Stoics, though afterward indeed recommended to others also, by

^a Vide Lucret. lib. v. vers 201.

^b Id. lib. ii. vers. 174, 175.

Thus Plato,
~~philos. p. 103.~~
 "Hoc, non est
 Hoc, non est
 De Legib.
 p. 903.

we ought not to monopolize the Divine goodness to ourselves, there being other animals superior to us, that are not altogether unconcerned neither in this visible creation; and it being reasonable to think, that even the lower animals likewise, and whatsoever hath conscious life, was made partly also, to enjoy itself. But Atheists can be no fit judges of worlds being made well or ill, either in general, or respectively to mankind, they having no standing measure for well and ill, without a God and morality, nor any true knowledge of themselves, and what their own good or evil consisteth in. That was at first but a froward speech of some sullen discontented persons, when things falling not out agreeably to their own private, selfish, and partial appetites, they would revenge themselves, by railing upon nature (that is, Providence), and calling her a stepmother only to mankind, whilst she was a fond, partial, and indulgent mother to other animals; and though this be elegantly set off by Lucretius,^b yet is there nothing but poetic flourish

^b Lib. v. vers. 223.

in it all, without any philosophic truth; the advantages of mankind being so notoriously conspicuous above those of brutes.

But as for evils in general, from whence the Atheist would conclude the God of the Theist to be either impotent or envious; it hath been already declared, that the true original of them is from the necessity of imperfect beings, and the impossibility of things; but that the Divine art and skill most of all appeareth in bonifying these evils, and making them, like discords in music, to contribute to the harmony of the whole, and the good of particular persons.

Moreover, a great part of those evils, which men are afflicted with, is not from the reality of things, but only from their own fancy and opinions, according to that of the moralist, ^a Ταράσσει τοὺς ἀνθρώπους οὐ τὰ πράγματα, ἀλλὰ τὰ περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων δόγματα. It is not things themselves, that disturb men, but only their own opinions concerning things.—And therefore it being much in our own power to be freed from these, Providence is not to be blamed upon the account of them. Pain is many times nearly linked with pleasure, according to that Socratic fable, ^b That when God could not reconcile their contrary natures (as he would) he tied them head and tail together. And good men know, that pain is not the evil of the man, but only of the part so affected (as Socrates also), Τὸ ἀλγὺν ἐν τῇ γαλμῇ μένει, It goes no further than the leg where it is.—But this is many times very serviceable to free us from

^a Epictet. in Eschiridio, cap. v. Vide etiam M. Antoninum, lib. iv. §. 3. p. 97. et lib. v. §. xix. p. 159.

^b Apud Platon. in Phædone, p. 376.

the greater evils of the mind; upon which all our happiness dependeth. To the Atheists, who acknowledge no *malum culpæ*, no evil of fault (turpitude, or dishonesty), death is the greatest and most tragical of all evils. But though this, according to their forlorn hypothesis, be nothing less than an absolute extinction of life; yet, according to the doctrine of the genuine Theists, which makes all souls substantial, no life of itself (without Divine annihilation) will ever quite vanish into nothing, any more than the substance of matter doth. And the ancient Pythagoreans and Platonists have been here so kind, even to the souls of brutes also, as that they might not be left in a state of inactivity and insensibility after death, as to bestow upon them certain subtile bodies, which they may then continue to act in. Nor can we think otherwise, but that Aristotle, from this fountain, derived that doctrine of his in his second book, De Gen. An. c. 3. * where, after he had declared the sensitive soul to be inseparable from body, he addeth πάσης οὖν ψυχῆς δύναμις ἑτέρου σώματος ἔοικε κεκοινωνηκέναι καὶ θειότερον τῶν καλουμένων στοιχείων· ὥς δὲ διαφέρουσι τιμιότητι αἱ ψυχὰ καὶ ἀντιμὴ ἀλλήλων, οὕτω καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη διαφέρει φύσει· All souls therefore seem to have another body, and diviner than that of the elements; and as themselves differ in dignity and nobility, so do these bodies of theirs differ from one another.—And afterward calling this subtile body πνεῦμα, or a spirit, he affirmeth it to be, ἀνάλογον τῷ τῶν ἀστροῶν στοιχείῳ, analogous to the element of the stars.—Only as Galen, and St. Austin, and others, have conceived, Aristotle deviated here from the

* P. 618. tom. ii. oper.

Pythagoreans in this, that he supposed the sensitive soul itself to be really nothing else, but this very subtile and star-like body, and not a distinct substance from it, using it only as a vehicle. Nevertheless, he there plainly affirmeth the mind or rational soul to be really distinct from the body, and to come into it from without pre-existing; and consequently should acknowledge also its after-immortality. But whatsoever Aristotle's judgment were (which is not very material) it is certain, that dying to the rational or human soul is nothing but a withdrawing into the tiring-house, and putting off the clothing of this terrestrial body. So that it will still continue after death, to live to God, whether in a body, or without it. Though according to Plato's express doctrine, the soul is never quite naked of all body, he writing thus; αἰ ψυχὴ ἐκτεταγμένη σώματι, τότε μὲν ἄλλῃ τότε δὲ ἄλλῃ the soul is always conjoined with a body, but sometimes of one kind, and sometimes of another—

De Leg. x.
p. 903.
[p. 672.]

which many Christian doctors also, as is before declared, have thought highly probable. However, our Christian faith assures us, that the souls of good men shall at length be clothed with spiritual and heavenly bodies, such as are, in Aristotle's language, ἀνάλογα τῇ τῶν ἀστρῶν στοιχείῳ, analogous to the element of the stars.—Which Christian resurrection, therefore, to life and immortality, is far from being, as Celsus* reproached it, σκολῆκων ἐλπίς, the mere hope of worms.—And thus much shall suffice, in way of confutation, of the first atheistic objection against Providence, which is the twelfth argumentation propounded in the second chapter.

* Apud Origin. contra Celsum, lib. v. p. 240.

The thirteenth atheistic argument, or second objection against Providence, is from the seeming confusion of human affairs; that all things fall alike to all; the innocent and the nocent, the pious and the impious, the religious and the profane: nay, that many times the worser causes and men prevail against the better, as is intimated in that passage of the poet,^a though in the person of a Theist,

Victrix causa Deo placuit, sed victa Catoni;

And that the unjust and ungodly often flow in all kind of prosperity, whilst the innocent and devout worshippers of the Deity, all their lives long, conflict with adversity. Whereas, were there a God and providence, as they conceive, profane and irreligious persons would be presently thunder-struck from heaven, or otherwise made remarkable objects of Divine vengeance, as also the pious miraculously protected and rescued from evil and harms.

Now we grant indeed, that this consideration hath too much puzzled and staggered weak minds in all ages. Because^b "sentence against an evil work is not executed speedily, therefore is the heart of the sons of men fully set in them to do evil." And the Psalmist himself^c was sometime much perplexed with this phenomenon, the prosperity of the ungodly, who "set their mouths against heaven, and whose tongue walketh through the earth;" so that he was tempted to think, "he had cleansed his heart in vain, and washed his

^a Lucan. lib. i. vers. 131.

^b Eccles. viii. 11.

^c Psal. lxxiii.

hands in innocency;" (till at length, entering into the sanctuary of God, his mind became illuminated; and his soul fixed in a firm trust and confidence upon Divine Providence; "Whom have I in heaven but thee," &c. "My flesh and my heart faileth; but God is the strength of my heart, and my portion for ever.") For, as some will from hence be apt to infer, That there is no God at all, but that blind chance and fortune steer all, ("the fool hath said in his heart, There is no God;") so will others conclude, That though there be a God, yet he either does not know things done here below, ("how does God know? and is there knowledge in the Most High?") or else will not so far humble himself, or disturb his own ease and quiet, as to concern himself in our low human affairs.

Thus did some in Plato from hence conclude, *ἡ δὲ φύσις τοῦ θεοῦ, τὸν δι' ἀσθενείας ἀπεκρίνεται πρὸς μὲν τὸν Διὸς.* De Leg. x. [p. 664.]

First of all therefore, we here say, that it is altogether unreasonable to require, that Divine Providence should miraculously interpose upon every turn in punishing the ungodly, and preserving the pious, and thus perpetually interrupt the course of nature (which would look but like a botch or bungle, and a violent business), but rather carry things on *ἀφ' ὧν κελύθῃ*, in a still and silent path, and shew his art and skill in making things of themselves fairly unwind, and clear up at last into a satisfactory close. Passion and self-interest is blind, or short-sighted; but that, which steers the whole world, is no fond, pettish, impatient, and passionate thing, but an impartial, disinterested, and uncaptivated nature. Nevertheless, it is certain, that sometimes we have not wanted in-

* Psal. xiv. 1.

* Psal. lxxii. 2.

stances, in cases extraordinary, of a θεὸς ἀνέμηναν, God appearing, as it were, miraculously upon the stage,—and manifesting himself in taking immediate vengeance upon notorious malefactors, or delivering his faithful servants from imminent dangers or evils threatened; as the same is often done also by a secret and undiscerned overruling of the things of nature. But it must be granted, that it is not always thus, but the periods of Divine Providence here in this world are commonly longer, and the evolutions thereof slower; according to that of Euripides,* which yet has a taint of profaneness in the expression,

Μέλας γὰρ θεῶν ἔστι τὰς ἀνθρώπων φύσει,

The Deity is slow or dilatory, and this is the nature of it. For it is not from slackness and remissness in the Deity, but either from his patience and long-suffering, he willing, that men should repent, or else to teach us patience by his example (as Plutarch^b suggesteth), or that all things may be carried on with more pomp and solemnity; or lastly, for other particular reasons, as Plutarch^c ventures to assign one, why it might not be expedient for Dionysius the tyrant, though so profane and irreligious a person, to have been cut off suddenly. But wicked and ungodly persons oftentimes fail not to be met withal at last, and at the long-run, here in this life, and either in themselves or posterity, to be notoriously branded with the marks of Divine displeasure: according to that of the poet,^d “*Raro antecedentem sceles-*

* In *Oreste*, vers. 420.

^b De sera Numinis Vindicta, tom. ii. oper. p. 550.

^c Ibid. p. 557.

^d Horat. *Odor.* lib. iii. od. ii.

tum," &c. It is seldom, that wickedness altogether escapes punishment, though it come slowly after, limping with a lame foot;—and those proverbial speeches amongst the Pagans,*

Ὅτι θεῶν ἀλεῦσι μέλαι, ἀλεῦσι δὲ λευκά.

Mills of the gods do slowly wind,
But they at length to powder grind.

and, "Divine justice steals on softly with woollen feet, but strikes at last with iron hands."

Nevertheless we cannot say, that it is always thus neither, but that wicked persons may possibly sometimes have an uninterrupted prosperity here in this life, and no visible marks of Divine displeasure upon them: but, as the generously virtuous will not envy them upon this account, nor repine at their own condition, they knowing that *οὐδὲν κακὸν τῷ ἀγαθῷ οὐδ' αὖ τῷ φαύλῳ ἀγαθόν*, There is neither any thing truly evil to the good, nor good to the evil;—so are they so far from being staggered herewith in their belief of a God and providence, that they are rather the more confirmed in their persuasions of a future immortality and judgment after death, when all things shall be set straight and right, and rewards and punishments impartially dispensed. That of Plutarch† therefore is most true here, *εἰς οὗν ὁ λόγος ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ τὴν πρόνοιαν ἅμα καὶ τὴν διαμονὴν τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ψυχῆς βεβαιῶν, καὶ θάτερον οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπολιπεῖν ἀναιροῦντα θάτερον*, That there is a necessary connexion betwixt those two things, Divine Providence, and the permanence or immortality of human souls, one and the same

* Vide Plutarch, ubi supra, p. 548.

† Vide Platon, in Apolog. Socratis, p. 369. et de Republic. lib. x. p. 518.

‡ Ubi supra, p. 560.

reason confirming them both; neither can one of these be taken alone without the other.—But they, who, because judgment is not presently executed upon the ungodly, blame the management of things as faulty, and Providence as defective, are like such spectators of a dramatic poem, as when wicked and injurious persons are brought upon the stage, for awhile swaggering and triumphing, impatiently cry out against the dramatist, and presently condemn the plot; whereas, if they would but expect the winding up of things, and stay till the last close, they should then see them come off with shame and sufficient punishment.* The evolution of the world, as Plotinus calls it,^b is ἀληθέστερον ποίημα, a truer poem;—and we men histrionical actors upon the stage, who, notwithstanding, insert something of our own into the poem too; but God Almighty is that skilful dramatist, who always connecteth that of ours, which went before, with what of his follows after, into good coherent sense, and will at last make it appear, that a thread of exact justice did run through all, and that rewards and punishments are measured out in geometrical proportion.

Lastly, It is in itself fit, that there should be somewhere a doubtful and cloudy state of things, for the better exercise of virtue and faith. For, as there could have been no Hercules, had there not been monsters to subdue; so, were there no such difficulties to encounter with, no puzzles and entanglements of things, no temptations and trials to assault us, virtue would grow languid,

* Vide Plutarch, ubi supra, p. 554.

^b Ennead. iii. lib. ii. cap. xvi. p. 267. oper.

and that excellent grace of faith want due occasions and objects to exercise itself upon. Here have we therefore such a state of things, and this world is, as it were, a stage erected for the more difficult part of virtue to act upon, and where we are to live by faith, and not by sight; that faith, which is "the substance of things to be hoped for, and the evidence of things not seen;" a belief in the goodness, power, and wisdom of God, when all things are dark and cloudy round about us. "The just shall live by his faith."

We have now sufficiently confuted the second atheistic objection also, against Providence, as to the conduct and economy of human affairs. Nevertheless this is a large field, and much more might be said in defence of Providence, both as to these and other instances, had we room here to expatiate in. Wherefore, for a supplement of what remains, we shall refer the reader to the writings of others, who have professedly undertaken apologies for Providence, both as to the fabric and economy of the world; but especially the learned and ingenious author* of the *Divine Dialogues*. Only we shall here add some few considerations, not so much for the confutation of Atheists, as for the better satisfaction of such religionists, who, too easily concluding, that all things might have been much better than they are, are thereupon apt to call in question the Divine attribute of goodness in its full extent, which yet is the only foundation of our Christian faith.

First therefore we say, that in judging of the works of God, we ought not to consider the parts of the world alone by themselves; and then,

* Dr. Henry More.

because we could fancy much finer things, there-upon blame the Maker of the whole. As if one should attend only to this earth, which is but the lowest and most dreggy part of the universe; or blame plants, because they have not sense; brutes, because they have not reason; men, because they are not demons or angels; and angels, because they are not gods, or want Divine perfection. Upon which account, God should either have made nothing at all, since there can be nothing besides himself absolutely perfect, or else nothing but the higher rank of angelical beings, free from mortality, and all those other evils, that attend mankind, or such fine things as Epicurus's gods were feigned to be, living in certain delicious regions, * where there was neither blustering winds, nor any lowering clouds, nor nipping frosts, nor scorching heat, nor night, nor shadow, but the calm and unclouded ether, always smiling with gentle serenity, whereas were there but one kind of thing (the best) thus made, there could have been no music nor harmony at all in the world, for want of variety. But we ought, in the first place, to consider the whole, whether that be not the best, that could be made, having all that belongeth to it; and then the parts in reference to the whole, whether they be not, in their several degrees and ranks, congruous and agréable thereunto. But this is a thing, which hath been

P. 256.

[Lib. ii. de
Providentia,

Euseb. iii.

lib. ii. cap. iii.]

so well insisted upon by Plotinus, that we cannot speak better to it, than in his words: "Ὅλον γὰρ τὸ ἐποίησε πάγκαλον, καὶ αὐταρκες, καὶ φίλον αὐτῷ, καὶ τοῖς μέρεσι τοῖς αὐτοῦ, τοῖς τε κυριώτεροις καὶ τοῖς ἐλάττωσιν ὡσάντως προσ-

* Vide Lucret. lib. iii. ver. 19.

φοροῖς· ὁ τοίνυν ἐκ τῶν μερῶν τὸ ὅλον αἰτιώμενος, ἀποκοτ
 ἂν εἴη τῆς αἰτίας· τὰ τε γὰρ μέρη πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ὅλον δεῖ σκοπεῖν
 εἰ σύμφωνα καὶ ἀρμόττοντα ἐκείνῳ, καὶ τὸ ὅλον σκοποῦμενον,
 μὴ πρὸς μέρη ἅττα μικρὰ βλέπειν· τοῦτο γὰρ οὐ τὸν κόσμον
 αἰτιώμενον ἀλλὰ τινα τῶν αὐτοῦ χωρὶς λαβόντα, οἷον εἰ,
 καὶ τὰ ἐξῆς· God made the whole most beautiful,
 entire, complete; and sufficient; all agreeing
 friendly with itself and its parts; both the nobler
 and the meaner of them being alike congruous
 thereunto. Whosoever, therefore, from the parts
 thereof, will blame the whole, is an absurd and
 unjust censurer. For we ought to consider the
 parts, not alone by themselves, but in reference to
 the whole, whether they be harmonious and agree-
 able to the same. Otherwise we shall not blame the
 universe, but some of its parts only, taken by
 themselves; as if one should blame the hair or
 toes of a man, taking no notice at all of his Divine
 visage and countenance; or omitting all other
 animals, one should attend only to the most con-
 temptible of them; or, lastly, overlooking all
 other men, consider only the most deformed
 Thersites. But that, which God made, was the
 whole as one thing; which he that attends to
 may hear it speaking to him after this manner:
 ‘God Almighty hath made me, and from thence
 came I, perfect and complete, and standing in
 need of nothing, because in me are contained all
 things; plants, and animals, and good souls, and
 men happy with virtue, and innumerable demons,
 and many gods. Nor is the earth alone in me
 adorned with all manner of plants, and a variety
 of animals; or does the power of soul extend
 at most no further than to the seas; as if the
 whole air, and ether, and heaven, in the mean

time, were quite devoid of soul, and altogether unadorned with living inhabitants. Moreover, all things in me desire good, and every thing reaches to it, according to its power and nature. For the whole depends upon that first and highest Good, the gods themselves, who reign in my several parts, and all animals, and plants, and whatsoever seems to be inanimate in me. For some things in me partake only of being, some of life also, some of sense, some of reason, and some of intellect above reason. But no man ought to require equal things from unequal; nor that the finger should see, but the eye; it being enough for the finger to be a finger, and to perform its own office."—And again, afterwards, *ὥςπερ τεχνίτης οὐ πάντα τὰ ἐν τῷ ζῳῳ ὀφθαλμοὺς ποιεῖ, οὕτως οὐδ' ὁ λόγος πάντα θεοὺς ἐργάζεται· ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν θεοὺς, τὰ δὲ δαίμονας δεινέραν φῶσιν, εἴτε ἀνθρώπους, καὶ ζῶα ἱερέη, οὐ φθάνω· ἀλλὰ λόγῳ ποικίλιαν νοερὰν ἔχοντι· ἡμεῖς δὲ ὥσπερ αἱ ἀπειροὶ γραφικῆς τέχνης αἰτιῶνται, ὡς οὐ καλὰ πᾶσι χρώματα πανταχοῦ, ὁ δ' ἄρα τὰ προσήκοντα ἀπέδωκεν ἑκάστῳ τόπῳ· ἢ εἴ τις δοῦμα μέμφοιτο, ὅτι μὴ πάντες ἥρωες ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ τὰ ἕξῃ.* As an artificer would not make all things in an animal to be eyes; so neither has the Divine λόγος, or spermatic reason of the world, made all things gods; but some gods, and some demons, and some men, and some lower animals; not out of envy, but to display its own variety and fecundity. But we are like unskilful spectators of a picture, who condemn the limner, because he hath not put bright colours every where; whereas he had suited his colours to every part respectively, giving to each such as belonged to it. Or else are we like those, who would blame a comedy or tragedy, because they were not all kings or heroes, that

acted in it, but some servants and rustic clowns introduced also, talking after their rude fashion. Whereas the dramatic poem would neither be complete, nor elegant and delightful, were all those worser parts taken out of it.

Again, We cannot certainly conclude, that the works of God and his creation do not transcend those narrow limits, which vulgar opinion and imagination sets them, that commonly terminates the universe, but a little above the clouds, or at most supposes the fixed stars, being all fastened in one solid sphere, to be the utmost wall, or arched roof, and rolling circumference thereof. Much less ought we, upon such groundless suppositions, to infer, that the world might therefore have been made much better than it is, because it might have been much more roomy and capacious. We explode the atheistic infinity of distant worlds; nor can we admit that Cartesian, seemingly more modest, indefinite extension of one corporeal universe, which yet really, according to that philosopher's meaning, hath *nullos fines*, no bounds nor limits at all. For we persuade ourselves, that the corporeal world is as incapable of a positive infinity of magnitude, as it is of time; there being no magnitude so great, but that more still might be added to it. Nevertheless, as we cannot possibly imagine the sun to be a quarter, or an hundredth part so big as we know it to be; so much more may the whole corporeal universe far transcend those narrow bounds, which our imagination would circumscribe it in. The new celestial phenomena, and the late improvements of astronomy and philosophy made thereupon, render it so probable, that even this dull earth of

ours is a planet, and the sun a fixed star in the centre of that vortex, wherein it moves, that many have shrewdly suspected, that there are other habitable globes, besides this earth of ours, (which may be sailed round about in a year or two) as also more suns, with their respective planets, than one. However, the distance of all the fixed stars from us being so vast, that the diameter of the great orb makes no discernible parallax in the site of them; from whence it is also probable, that the other fixed stars are likewise vastly distant from one another: this, I say, widens the corporeal universe to us, and makes those "*flammaria mœnia mundi*," as Lucretius calls^b them those flaming walls of the world, to fly away before us. Now, it is not reasonable to think, that all this immense vastness should lie waste, desert, and uninhabited, and have nothing in it that could praise the Creator thereof, save only this one small spot of earth. "In my father's house (saith our Saviour) are many mansions." And Baruch, (chapter iii. appointed by our church to be read publicly) "Oh Israel, how great is the house of God, and how large is the place of his possession? Great and hath no end, high and unmeasurable." Which yet we understand not of an absolute infinity, but only such an immense vastness, as far transcends vulgar opinion and imagination.

We shall add but one thing more, that, to make a right judgment of the ways of Providence, and the justice thereof, as to the economy of mankind, we must look both forwards and backwards, or besides the present, not only upon the future, but also the past time. Which rule is likewise thus,

^b Lib. i. ver. 73, 74.

set down by Plotinus; οὐδ' ἐκείναι ἀποβλή-
 τέων τὸν λόγον, ὅς οὐ πρὸς τὸ παρὸν ἐκάσταντε P. 246.
[Ennead. iii.
lib. ii. cap.
xiii.]
 φησὶ βλέπειν· ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰς πρόσθεν περιόδους,
 καὶ αὖ τὸ μέλλον· Neither is that doctrine
 of the ancients to be neglected, that, to give an
 account of Providence, we ought to look back,
 upon former periods, as well as forward to what
 is future.—Indeed he, and those other philoso-
 phers, who were religious, understood this so, as
 to conclude a pre-existent state of all particular
 souls, wherein they were at first created by God
 pure, but by the abuse of their own liberty dege-
 nerated, to be a necessary hypothesis, for the
 solving that phenomenon of the depraved state
 of mankind in general here in this life. And not
 only so, but they endeavoured in like manner to
 give an account also of those different conditions
 of particular persons as to morality, from their
 infancy, and their other different fates here, deriv-
 ing them all ἐκ τῶν προβεβημένων, from their several
 demeanors heretofore in a pre-existent state.—
 And there have not wanted Christian doctors,
 who have complied with these philosophers in
 both. But our common Christianity only agrees
 thus far, as to suppose a kind of imputative pre-
 existence in Adam, in whom all were created
 pure, and so consequently involved in his after
 miscarriage; to solve the pravity of human nature;
 upon which account we are all said to be φύσει
 τέκνα ὀργῆς, * by nature children of wrath.—But as
 for the different conditions of persons, and their
 several fates, more disadvantageous to These Hierocles,
 εἰς ἀμελῆσαι
 ὁ ἀγαθὸς πῶς
 γινώσκουσιν, καὶ
 some than others, this indeed the gene-
 rality of Christian doctors have been

* Eph. ii. 3.

καλῶν με-
τημέτων ἰδιό-
τηται στίγματα,
157.

content to resolve only into an occult,
but just Providence. And thus does
Origen himself sometimes modestly pass

it over, as in his third book against

* P. 134.

Celsus,* πολλοὺς καὶ τὰ τῆς ἀνατροφῆς τοιούτως
γεγένηται, ὡς μηδὲ φαντασίαν ἐπιτραπῆναι τῶν κρείττονων λα-
βεῖν· ἀλλ' αἰεὶ καὶ ἐκ πρώτης ἡλικίας ἦτοι ἐν παιδικοῖς εἶναι
ἀκολάστον ἀνδρῶν, ἢ δεσποτῶν ἢ ἐν ἄλλῃ τινὶ κωλυοσθ
τὴν ψυχὴν ἀναβλέπειν κακοδαιμονίᾳ· τὰς δὲ περὶ τούτων
αἰτίας πάντως μὲν εἰκὸς εἶναι, ἐν τοῖς τῆς προνοίας λόγοις·
ἵσταται δὲ αὐτὰς εἰς ἀνθρώπους οὐκ εὐχερί· It hap-
peneth to many, so to have been brought up from
their very childhood, as that, by one means or
other, they could have no opportunity at all of
thinking of the better things, &c. And it is very
probable, that there are causes of these things in
the reasons of Providence, though they do not
easily fall under human notice.

But there is yet a third atheistic objection
against Providence behind, That it is impossible
any one Being should animadvert and order all
things in the distant places of the world at once;
and, were this possible, yet would such infinite
negotiosity be very uneasy and distracting to it,
and altogether inconsistent with happiness. Nor
would a Being, irresistibly powerful, concern it-
self in the good or welfare of any thing else, it
standing in need of nothing, and all benevolence
and good-will arising from indigency and imbe-
cility. Wherefore such a Being would wholly be
taken up in the enjoyment of itself, and its own
happiness, utterly regardless of all other things.

To which the reply is, first, That though our-
selves, and all created beings, have but a finite
animadversion, and narrow sphere of activity;

yet does it not therefore follow, that the case must be the same with the Deity, supposed to be a Being infinitely perfect, ἀτελοδύναμος, that hath no manner of defect—either of knowledge or power in it. But this is a mere *idolum specus*, an idol of the cave or den—men measuring the Deity by their own scantling and narrowness. And, indeed, were there nothing at all but what we ourselves could fully comprehend, there could be no God. Were the sun an animal, and had life coextended with its rays and light, it would see and perceive every atom of matter, that its outstretched beams reached to, and touched. Now all created beings are themselves, in some sense, but the rays of the Deity, which therefore cannot but feel and sensibly perceive all these its own effluxes and emanations. Men themselves can order and manage affairs in several distant places at once, without any disturbance; and we have innumerable notions of things in our mind, that lie there easily together, without crouding one another, or causing any distraction to us.*

Nevertheless, the minds of weak mortals may here be somewhat eased and helped, by considering what hath been before suggested; that there is no necessity God Almighty should ἀνθρώποις πάντα γένει ἀπαντα, do all things himself immediately and drudgingly—but he may have his inferior ministers and executioners under him, to discharge him of that supposed encumberment. As, first of all, an artificial plastic nature, which, without knowledge and animal consciousness; disposes the matter of the universe according to the plat-

* Vide Xenophontem de Memorabilib. Socratis, lib. i. p. 575.

form or idea of a perfect mind, and forms the bodies of all animals. And this was one reason, why we did before insist so much upon this artificial, regular, and methodical nature, namely, that Divine Providence might neither be excluded from having an influence upon all things in this lower world, as resulting only from the fortuitous motions of senseless matter, unguided by any mind; nor yet the Deity be supposed to do every thing itself immediately and miraculously, without the subservient ministry of any natural causes, which would seem to us mortals, to be not only a violent, but also an operose, cumbersome, and moliminous business. And thus did Plato* acknowledge, that there were *ἐμφορονος φύσεως αἰτίαι* *αὐτὴ ὑπερβούσις χρῆται ὁ Θεός* certain causes of a prudent, that is, artificial and orderly nature, which God makes use of, as subservient to himself in the mundane economy.—Besides which, those instincts also impressed upon animals, and which they are passive to, directing them to act for ends, either not understood, or not attended to by them, in order to their own good and the good of the universe, are another part of that Divine Fate, which, inserted into things themselves, is the servant and executioner of Providence. Above all which, there are yet other knowing and understanding ministers of the Deity, as its eyes and hands; demoniac or angelic beings, appointed to preside over mankind, all mundane affairs, and the things of nature; they having their several distinct offices and provinces assigned them. Of which also Plato thus; *τούτοις ἰσχυ-*

* In *Timæo*, §. xxxvi. p. 256.

ἀρχοντας προστεταγμένοι ἑκάστοις, ἐπὶ τὸ σμικρὸν
 τῶν αὐτῶν πάντων καὶ πράξεως. There are P. 903. (De
 Legibus, lib.
 x. p. 671.)
 certain rulers or presidents appointed by
 the supreme God, who governs the whole world,
 over all the several things and parts therein, even
 to the smallest distribution of them.—All which
 inferior causes are constantly overlooked and su-
 pervised by the watchful eye of God Almighty
 himself, who may also sometimes extraordinarily
 interpose.

We need not, therefore, restrain and confine Di-
 vine Providence to a few greater things only, as
 some do, that we may thereby consult the ease of
 the Deity, and its freedom from distraction; but
 may and ought to extend it to all things whatso-
 ever, small as well as great. And, indeed, the
 great things of the world cannot well be ordered
 neither, without some regard to the small and
 little: "οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄνευ σμικρῶν τοὺς μεγάλους φασὶν οἱ
 λιθολόγοι λίθους εὖ κείσθαι" as architects affirm, that
 great stones cannot be well placed together in a
 building without little.—Neither can generals of
 armies, nor governors of families, nor masters of
 ships, nor mechanic artificers, discharge their se-
 veral functions, and do their works respectively
 as they ought, did they not mind small things
 also, as well as the great. Μὴ τοίνυν (saith the
 forementioned philosopher)^b τόνγε Θεὸν ἀξιόσομεν
 ποτε θνητῶν δημιουργῶν φαυλότερον, οἱ τὰ προσήκοντα
 αὐτοῖς ἔργα, ὅσῳ περ ἂν ἀμείνους ᾖσι, τόσῳ ἀκριβέστερα
 καὶ τελειώτερα μίᾳ τέχνῃ σμικρὰ καὶ μεγάλα ἀπεργάζονται.
 Let us not therefore make God Almighty inferior
 to mortal opificers, who, by one and the same art,
 can order small things as well as great; and so

^a Plato de Legib. lib. x. p. 671.

^b Ibid.

suppose him to be supine and negligent.—Nevertheless, the chief concernment and employment of Divine Providence in the world is the economy of souls, or government of rational beings, which is by Plato contracted into this compendium ;

P. 908. οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἔργον τῷ περτευτῇ λείπεται πλὴν με-
[P. 672.] ταθεῖναι τὸ μὲν ἀμεινον γινόμενον ἥθος εἰς βελτίον
τόπου χεῖρον δὲ εἰς τὸν χείρονα, &c. There is no other work left for the supreme Governor of all, than only to translate better souls into better places and conditions, and worser into worser—or, as he after addeth, to dispose of every one in the world in such a manner, as might best render *νικῶσαν ἀρετὴν, ἡττωμένην δὲ κακίαν*, virtue victorious, and triumphant over vice.—And thus may the slow and imperfect wits of mortals be satisfied, that Providence to the Deity is no moliminous, laborious, and distractions thing.

But that there is no higher spring of life in rational animals, than contracted self-love, and that all good-will and benevolence arises only from indigency and imbecility, and that no being whatsoever is concerned in the welfare of any other thing, but only what itself stands in need of ; and, lastly, therefore, that what is irresistibly powerful, and needs nothing, would have no manner of benevolence, nor concern itself in the good and welfare of any thing whatsoever ; this is but another idol of the Atheists' den, and only argues their bad nature, low-sunk minds, and gross immorality. And the same is to be said also of that other maxim of theirs,* That what is perfectly happy would have nothing at all to do, but only enjoy its own ease and quiet: whereas there is nothing

* Vide Diogen. Laert. lib. x. Scgm. 139. p. 661.

more troublesome to ourselves than this ἀπραξία, this having nothing to do—and the activity of the Deity, or a perfect being, is altogether as easy to it as its essence.

The atheistic queries come next to be answered; which, being but three, are naturally to be disposed in this order: First, If there were a God, or perfect Being, who therefore was sufficiently happy in the enjoyment of himself, why would he go about to make a world? Secondly, If he must needs make a world, why did he not make it sooner? this late production thereof looking, as if he had but newly awaked out of a long sleep throughout infinite past ages, or else had in length of time contracted a satiety of his solitude. Thirdly and lastly, What tools or instruments? what machines or engines had he? Or how could he move the matter of the whole world, especially if incorporeal? because then he would run through all things, and could not lay hold nor fasten upon any thing.

To the first therefore we say, That the reason, why God made the world, was from his own overflowing and communicative goodness, that there might be other beings also happy, besides him, and enjoy themselves. Nor does this at all clash with God's making of the world for his own glory and honour; though Plotinus* were so shy of that, γελοῖον ἵνα τιμῶται, καὶ μεταφερόντων ἀπὸ τῶν ἀγαλματοποιῶν τῶν ἐνταῦθα, it is ridiculous to say, that God made the world, that he might be honoured; this being to transfer the affections of human artificers and statuaries upon him.—But the

* Libro contra Gnosticos, Ennead. ii. lib. ix. cap. iv. p. 202.

chief reason of his saying so was, because that philosopher conceived the world to have proceeded, not so much from the will of the Deity, as the necessity of its nature. Though this be true also, that God did not make the world merely to ostentate his skill and power, but to communicate his goodness, which is chiefly and properly his glory, as the light and splendour of the sun is the glory of it: But the Atheist demands, What hurt had it been for us never to have been made? and the answer is easy, We should then never have enjoyed any good, or been capable of happiness; and had there been no rational creatures at all made, it must have been either from impotent sterility in the Deity, or else from an invidious, narrow, and contracted selfishness, or want of benignity, and communicative goodness; both which are inconsistent with a perfect Being. But the argument may be thus retorted upon these Atheists; What hurt would it be for us to cease to be, or become nothing? And why then are these Atheists, as well as others, so unwilling to die?

But then in the next place they urge: Why was not the world made sooner, since this goodness of God was without date, and from everlasting? But this question may be taken in two different senses; either, Why was not the world from eternity, as God and his goodness are eternal? or else, secondly, If the world could not be from eternity, yet, notwithstanding, why was it not sooner, but so lately made? In both which queries the atomic Atheists take it for granted, that the system of the world was not from eternity, but had a beginning. Now we say, that the reason, why the world was not made from eter-

nity, was not from any defect of goodness in the Divine will, but because there is an absolute impossibility in the thing itself; or because the necessity and incapacity of such an imperfect being hindered. For we must confess, that, for our parts, we are prone to believe, that could the world have been from eternity, it should certainly have been so. And just thus does Philo-
 P. 4.
 loponus, in his confutation of Proclus's [Edit. Trin-
 cavoli.] arguments for the world's eternity, de-

clare himself, and no otherwise: Καὶ ἡμεῖς ἄρα μὴ εἶναι τὸν κόσμον αἰδίων ὑποτιθέμεθα, οὔτε τὸ εἶναι τὸν Θεὸν αἰεὶ ἀγαθὸν ἀφαιρούμεθα, οὔτε ἀσθένειαν τῆς δημιουργικῆς αὐτοῦ κατηγοροῦμεν δυνάμεως· ἀλλὰ μὴ δύνασθαι αἰε εἶναι τὸν κόσμον δι' αὐτὴν τὴν τοῦ γενομένου φύσιν ὑποτιθέμεθα. Ourselves also supposing the world not to have been eternal, do neither ascribe this to any defect either of goodness or of power in the Deity, but only to the impossibility of the thing itself.—Where, in the following words, he gives a two-fold account of this impossibility of the world's eternity; ὅτι τε τὸ ἀπειρον κατ' ἐνέργειαν ὑποστῆναι, ἢ διεξίτητον εἶναι τὴν ἀδύνατον καὶ ὅτι συναἰδιον εἶναι τῷ ποιῶντι τὸ γινόμενον φύσιν οὐκ ἔχει. First, because there can be nothing actually infinite, and yet run through, as all the past duration of the world hath been; and, secondly, because that, which is made, or brought into being by another, as a distinct thing from it, cannot be co-eternal with its maker.—Where it is probable that Philoponus, being a Christian, designed not to oppose the eternal generation of the Son of God, but only to assert that nothing, which was properly made or created by God, and nothing, which was not itself God, could be from eternity, or without beginning. And now we see, how

those atheistic exceptions against the novelty of the Divine creation, as if God must therefore either have slept from eternity, or else have at length contracted a satiety of his former solitude, and the like, do of themselves quite vanish into nothing. But then, as to the second sense of the question, Why the world, though it could not possibly be from eternity, yet was no sooner, but so lately made? we say, that this is an absurd question; both because time was made together with the world, and there was no sooner or later before time; and also because whatsoever had a beginning, must of necessity be once but a day old. Wherefore the world could not possibly have been so made by God in time, as not to be once but five or six thousand years old, and no more; as now it is.

And as for the third and last query; How God could move and command the matter of the whole world, especially if incorporeal? we reply, first, that all other things being derived from God, as their only fountain and original, and essentially depending on him, who, by his absolute power also, could annihilate whatsoever he created; he must needs have a despotic power over all; and every thing whatsoever be naturally subject and obsequious to him. And since no body can possibly move itself, that, which first moved matter, must of necessity be incorporeal; nor could it by local motion, as one body moves another, or as engines and machines move by trusion or pulsion, they being before moved, but must do it by another kind of action, such as is not local motion, nor heterokinesy, but autokinesy; that is, by cogitation. Wherefore, that conceit of the Atheists,

that an incorporeal Deity could not possibly move the matter of the world, because it would run through it, and could not fasten or lay hold thereupon, is absurd, because this moves matter not mechanically but vitally, and by cogitation only. And that a cogitative being, as such, hath a natural imperium over matter, and power of moving it, without any engines or machines, is unquestionably certain, even from our own souls; which move our bodies, and command them every way, merely by will and thought. And a perfect mind, presiding over the matter of the whole world, could much more irresistibly, and with infinitely more ease, move the whole corporeal universe, merely by will and cogitation, than we can our bodies.

The last head of atheistic argumentation is from interest. And, first, the Atheists would persuade, that it is the interest of mankind in general, and of every particular person, that there should be no God, that is, no Being infinitely powerful, that hath no law, but its own will; and therefore may punish whom he pleases eternally after death.

To which our first reply is, that if there be a God, and souls be immortal, then is it not any man's thinking otherwise that will alter the case, nor afford the Atheists any relief against those two imagined evils of theirs. For things are sullen, and will be as they are, whatever we think them, or wish them to be; and men will at last discover their error, when perhaps it may be too late. Wishing is no proving; and therefore this atheistic argument from interest is no argu-

ment at all against the existence of a God, it being nothing but the ignorant wish and vain desire of besotted Atheists.

In the next place, this wish of Atheists is altogether founded upon a mistaken notion of God Almighty too, that he is nothing but arbitrary will omnipotent; which indeed is not the most desirable thing. But as it hath been often declared, the will of God is the will of goodness, justice, and wisdom itself omnipotent. His will is not mere will, such as hath no other reason besides itself; but it is law, equity, and chancery; it is the *τὸ δεῖον*, or Ought itself—decreeing, willing, and acting. Neither does God punish any out of a delight in punishment, or in the evil and suffering of the persons punished; but to those, who are not *ἀνίατοι*, altogether incurable, *δίκην ἰατρικά*, his punishment is physic—in order to their recovery and amendment; so that the source and fountain thereof is goodness to the persons themselves punished. But to such as are incurable, the punishment inflicted on them is intended for the good of the whole. So that this attribute of justice in God doth not at all clash with the attribute of goodness, it being but a branch thereof, or particular modification of the same. Goodness and justice in God are always complicated together; neither his goodness being fondness, nor his justice cruelty; but he being both good in punishing, and just in rewarding and dispensing benefits. Wherefore, it can be the interest of none, that there should be no God nor immortality, unless perhaps of such desperately and incurably wicked persons, who abandoning their

true interest of being good, having thereupon no other interest now left them, than not to be, or become nothing.

To be without a God, is to be without hope in the world; for Atheists can have neither faith, nor hope, in senseless matter, and the fortuitous motions thereof. And though an understanding being have never so much enjoyment of itself for the present, yet could it not possibly be happy, without immortality, and security of the future continuance thereof. But the Atheists conclude, that there is nothing immortal, and that all life perisheth and vanisheth into nothing; and consequently also, that *εὐδαιμονία ἀνθρώπων*, happiness is a thing that hath no existence in nature, a mere figment and chimera, or idle wish and vain dream of mortals. Wherefore it cannot be the interest of mankind, that this hypothesis should be true, which thus plainly cuts off all hope from men, and leaves them in an utter impossibility of being ever happy.

God is such a being, as if he could be supposed not to be, there is nothing, which any, who are not desperately engaged in wickedness, no, not Atheists themselves, could possibly more wish for or desire. To believe a God, is to believe the existence of all possible good and perfection in the universe; it is to believe, that things are as they should be, and that the world is so well framed and governed, as that the whole system thereof could not possibly have been better. For peccability arises from the necessity of imperfect free-willed beings, left to themselves, and therefore could not by omnipotence itself have been excluded; and though sin actual might perhaps have been kept out by

force and violence, yet, all things computed; it was doubtless most for the good of the whole; that it should not be thus forcibly hindered: There is nothing, which cannot be hoped for, by a good man, from the Deity; whatsoever happiness his being is capable of, and such things, as "eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor can now enter into the heart of man to conceive." Infinite hopes lie before us, from the existence of a Being infinitely good and powerful, and our own souls' immortality; and nothing can hinder or obstruct these hopes, but our own wickedness of life. To believe a God, and do well, are two the most hopeful, cheerful, and comfortable things, that possibly can be. And to this purpose is that of Linus, *

Ἐλευσέναι γὰρ θέλω, ἵνα οἷα ἔστω ἄδιδυ' Ἀθηνῶν

Ἰδέναι γάρ τοι οὐδὲν μέλει, καὶ Ἀθηνῶν, οἰδίσ.

Wherefore, as for Democritus and Epicurus, whose encomiums the Atheists here so loudly sing forth, we say, that however they have made so great a noise in the world, and have been so much cried up of late, yet were they really no better than a couple of infatuated sophists, or witty fools, and debauchers of mankind.

And now come we to the last atheistic argumentation, wherein they endeavour to recommend their doctrine to civil sovereigns, and to persuade them, that Theism or religion is absolutely inconsistent with their interest; their reasons for which are these three following. First, because the civil sovereign reigns only in fear; and therefore, if there be any power and fear greater than the

* Apud Jamblichum de Vita Pythagor. cap. xxvii. p. 117, 118.

power and fear of the Leviathan, civil authority can signify little. Secondly, because sovereignty is in its own nature absolutely indivisible; and must be either infinite, or none at all; so that Divine laws (natural and revealed) superior to it, circumscribing it, would consequently destroy it. Wherefore religion and Theism must of necessity be displaced, and removed out of the way, to make room for the Leviathan to roll and tumble in. Thirdly and lastly, private judgment of good and evil, just and unjust, is also contradictory to the very being of a body politic; which is one artificial man, made up of many natural men united under one head, having one common reason, judgment, and will, ruling over the whole. But conscience, which religion introduceth, is private judgment of good and evil, just and unjust, and therefore altogether inconsistent with true politics; that can admit of no private consciences, but only one public conscience of the law.

In way of answer to the first of which, we must here briefly unravel the atheistic ethics and politics. The foundation whereof is first laid in the villanizing of human nature; as that, which has not so much as any the least seeds, either of politicalness or ethicalness at all in it; nothing of equity and philanthropy (there being no other charity or benevolence any where, according to them, save what resulteth from fear, imbecility, and indigency); nothing of public and common concern, but all private and selfish; appetite and utility, or the desires of sensual pleasure, and honour, dominion, and precellency before others,

being the only measures of good in nature. So that there can be nothing naturally just or unjust, nothing in itself sinful or unlawful, but every man by nature hath *jus ad omnia*, a right to every thing—whatsoever his appetite inclineth him unto, or himself judgeth profitable; even to other men's bodies and lives. “*Si occidere cupis, jus habes;*” if thou desirest to kill, thou hast then naturally a right thereunto;—that is, a liberty to kill without any sin or injustice. For *jus* and *lex*, or *justitia*, right and law, or justice, in the language of these atheistic politicians, are directly contrary to one another; their right being a belluine liberty, not made, or left by justice, but such as is founded in a supposition of its absolute nonexistence. Should therefore a son not only murder his own parents, who had tenderly brought him up, but also exquisitely torture them, taking pleasure in beholding their rueful looks, and hearing their lamentable shrieks and outcries, there would be nothing of sin or injustice at all in this, nor in any thing else; because justice is no nature, but a mere factitious and artificial thing, made only by men and civil laws. And, according to these men's apprehensions, nature has been very kind and indulgent to mankind herein, that it hath thus brought us into the world, without any fetters or shackles upon us, free from all duty and obligation, justice and morality, these being to them nothing but restraints and hinderances of true liberty. From all which it follows, that nature absolutely dissociates and segregates men from one another, by reason of the inconsistency of those appetites of theirs, that are all carried

out only to private good, and consequently, that every man is, by nature, in a state of war and hostility against every man.

In the next place, therefore, these atheistic politicians further add, that though this their state of nature, which is a liberty from all justice and obligation, and a lawless, loose, or belluine right to every thing, be in itself absolutely the best; yet nevertheless by reason of men's imbecility, and the equality of their strengths, and inconsistency of their appetites, it proves by accident the worst; this war with every one making men's right or liberty to every thing indeed a right or liberty to nothing; they having no security of their lives, much less of the comfortable enjoyment of them. For as it is not possible, that all men should have dominion (which were indeed the most desirable thing, according to these principles), so the generality must needs be sensible of more evil in such a state of liberty with an universal war against all, than of good. Wherefore, when men had been a good while hewing, and slashing, and justling against one another, they became at length all weary hereof, and conceived it necessary by art to help the defect of their own power here, and to choose a lesser evil for the avoiding of a greater; that is, to make a voluntary abatement of this their infinite right, and to submit to terms of equality with one another, in order to a sociable and peaceable cohabitation: and not only so, but also for the security of all, that others should observe such rules as well as themselves, to put their necks under the yoke of a common coercive power, whose will, being the will of them all, should be the

very rule, and law, and measure of justice to them.

Here therefore these atheistic politicians, as they first of all slander human nature, and make a villain of it; so do they, in the next place, reproach justice and civil sovereignty also, making it to be nothing but an ignoble and bastardly brat of fear; or else a lesser evil, submitted to merely out of necessity, for the avoiding of a greater evil, that of war with every one, by reason of men's natural imbecility. So that, according to this hypothesis, justice and civil government are plainly things not good in themselves, nor desirable (they being a hinderance of liberty, and nothing but shackles and fetters), but by accident only, as necessary evils: and thus do these politicians themselves sometimes distinguish betwixt good and just, that "*bonum amatur per se, justum per accidens*;" good is that, which is loved for itself, but just by accident.—From whence it follows unavoidably, that all men must of necessity be *ἀκέραις δίκαιοι*, unwillingly just,—or not with a full and perfect, but mixed will only; just being a thing that is not sincerely good, but such as hath a great dash or dose of evil blended with it. And this was the old atheistic generation of justice, and of a body politic, civil society, and sovereignty. For though a modern writer affirm this hypothesis (which he looks upon as the only true scheme of politics) to be a new invention, as the circulation of the blood, and no older than the book *De Cive*, yet is it certain, that it was the commonly-received doctrine of the atheistic politicians and philosophers before Plato's time; who

represents their sense concerning the original of justice and civil society in this manner: ὁ πρῶτος ἔφην ἱεῖν, περὶ τούτου ἄκουε, τί τε ὃν τυγχάνει καὶ ὅθεν γέγονε δικαιοσύνη· πεφυκέναι γὰρ δὴ φασι, τὸ μὲν ἀδικεῖν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖσθαι κακόν· πλεονὶ δὲ κακῷ ὑπερβάλλειν τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἢ ἀγαθῷ τὸ ἀδικεῖν· ὥστε ἐπειδὴν ἀλλήλους ἀδικῶσί τε καὶ ἀδικῶνται, καὶ ἀμφοτέρων γίνονται, τοῖς μὴ δυναμένοις τὸ μὲν ἐκφεύγειν, τὸ δὲ αἰρεῖν, δοκεῖ λυσιτελεῖν ἐκινθίσθαι ἀλλήλους, μὴτ' ἀδικεῖν, μὴτ' ἀδικεῖσθαι· καὶ ἐντεῦθεν δὴ ἀρξασθαι νόμους τίθεσθαι, καὶ ὀνομάσαι τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου ἐπίταγμα νόμιμόν τε καὶ δίκαιον· I am to declare first what justice is, according to the sense of these philosophers, and from whence it was generated. They say, therefore, that by nature, lawless liberty, and to do that which is now called injustice and injury to other men, is good; but to suffer it from others, is evil. But of the two there is more of evil in suffering it, than of good in doing it: whereupon when men had clashed a good while, doing and suffering injury, the greater part, who by reason of their imbecility were not able to take the former without the latter, at length compounded the business amongst themselves, and agreed together by pacts and covenants, neither to do nor suffer injury, but to submit to rules of equality, and make laws by compact, in order to their peaceable cohabitation, they calling that, which was required in those laws, by the name of just.—And then is it added: καὶ εἶναι ταύτην γένεσιν τε καὶ οὐσίαν δικαιοσύνης, μεταξὺ οὖσαν τοῦ μὲν ἀρίστου ὄντος, εἰάν ἀδικῶν μὴ διδῶν δίκην, τοῦ δὲ κακίστου, εἰάν ἀδικούμενος τιμωρεῖσθαι ἀδύνατος ᾖ· τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ἐν μέσῳ ὃν τούτων ἀμφοτέρων, ἀγαπᾶσθαι, οὐχ ὡς ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀρρώστια τοῦ ἀδικεῖν τιμώμενον·

De Rep. l. ii.
p. 358, 359.
[P. 442. edit.
Mabli.]

And this is, according to these philosophers, the generation and essence of justice, as a certain middle thing betwixt the best and the worst. The best, to exercise a lawless liberty of doing whatsoever one please to other men without suffering any inconvenience from it; and the worst to suffer evil from others, without being able to revenge it. Justice, therefore, being a middle thing betwixt both these, is loved, not as that which is good in itself, but only by reason of men's imbecility, and their inability to do injustice. Forasmuch as he, that had sufficient power, would never enter into such compacts, and submit to equality and subjection. As for example, if a man had Gyges's magical ring, that he could do whatsoever he listed, and not be seen or taken notice of by any, such an one would certainly never enter into covenants, nor submit to laws of equality and subjection.—Agreeably whereunto, it hath been concluded also by some of these old atheistic philosophers, that justice was *ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν*, not properly and directly one's own good, the good of him that is just, but another man's good, partly of the fellow-citizens, but chiefly of the ruler, whose vassal he is.—And it is well known, that after Plato's time, this hypothesis concerning justice, that it was a mere factitious thing, and sprung only from men's fear and imbecility, as a lesser evil, was much insisted on by Epicurus also.

But let us in the next place see, how our modern atheistic philosophers and politicians will manage and carry on this hypothesis, so as to consociate men by art into a body politic, that are naturally dissociated from one another, as

also make justice and obligation artificial; when there is none in nature. First of all, therefore, these artificial justice-makers, city-makers, and authority-makers, tell us, that though men have an infinite right by nature, yet may they alienate this right, or part thereof, from themselves, and either simply renounce it, or transfer the same upon some other person; by means whereof it will become unlawful for themselves, afterwards, to make use thereof. Thus a late writer,* men "may by signs declare, *Velle se non licitum sibi amplius fore, certum aliquid facere, quod jure antea fecisse poterant*; That it is their will, it shall no longer be lawful for them, to do something, which before they had a right to do;" and this is called by him, a simple renunciation of right. And, further, saith he, they "may declare again, *Velle se non licitum sibi amplius fore alicui resistere*, &c. That it is their will, it shall be no longer lawful for them, to resist this or that particular person, whom before they might lawfully have resisted;" and this is called a translation of right. But if there be nothing in its own nature unlawful, then cannot this be unlawful for a man afterwards, to make use of such liberty, as he had before in words renounced or abandoned. Nor can any man, by his mere will, make any thing unlawful to him, which was not so in itself; but only suspend the exercise of so much of his liberty as he thought good. But, however, could a man by his will oblige himself, or make any thing unlawful to him, there would be nothing got by this, because then might he, by his will, disoblige himself again, and make the same law-

* Hobbes, *Elem. de Civ.* cap. ii. §. 4.

ful as before. For what is made merely by will, may be destroyed by will. Wherefore, these politicians will yet urge the business further, and tell us, that no man can be obliged but by his own act, and that the essence of injustice is nothing else but *dati repetitio*,^a the taking away of that, which one had before given. To which we again reply, that were a man naturally unobliged to any thing, then could he no way be obliged to stand to his own act, so that it should be really unjust and unlawful for him, at any time, upon second thoughts, voluntarily to undo, what he had before voluntarily done. But the Atheists here plainly render injustice a mere ludicrous thing, when they tell us,^b that it is nothing but such an absurdity in life, as it is in disputation, when a man denies a proposition, that he had before granted; which is no real evil in him as a man, but only a thing called an absurdity, as a disputant. That is, injustice is no absolute evil of the man; but only a relative incongruity in him, as a citizen. As when a man speaking Latin, observes not the laws of grammar, this is a kind of injustice in him, as a Latinist or grammarian; so when one, who lives in civil society, observes not the laws and conditions thereof, this is, as it were, the false Latin of a citizen, and nothing else. According to which notion of injustice, there is no such real evil or hurt in it, as can any way withstand the force of appetite and private utility, and oblige men to civil obedience, when it is contrary to the same. But these political jugglers and enchanters will here cast yet a further mist before men's eyes with their pacts and covenants.

^a Id. *ibid.* cap. iii. §. 3.

^b Id. *ibid.*

For men by their covenants, say they, may unquestionably oblige themselves, and make things unjust and unlawful to them, that were not so before. Wherefore, injustice is again defined by them, and that with more speciousness, to be the breach of covenants. But though it be true, that if there be natural justice, covenants will oblige; yet, upon the contrary supposition, that there is nothing naturally unjust, this cannot be unjust neither, to break covenants. Covenants, without natural justice, are nothing but mere words and breath (as indeed these atheistic politicians themselves, agreeably to their own hypothesis, call them); and therefore can they have no force to oblige. Wherefore, these justice-makers are themselves at last necessitated to fly to laws of nature, and to pretend this to be a law of nature, that men should stand to their pacts and covenants. Which is plainly to contradict their main fundamental principle, that by nature nothing is unjust or unlawful; for, if it be so, then can there be no laws of nature; and if there be laws of nature, then must there be something naturally unjust and unlawful. So that this is not to make justice, but clearly to unmake their own hypothesis, and to suppose justice to have been already made by nature, or to be in nature; which is a gross absurdity in disputation, to affirm what one had before denied. But these their laws of nature are indeed nothing but juggling equivocation, and a mere mockery; themselves again acknowledging them to be no laws, because law is nothing but the word of him who hath command over others; but only conclusions or theorems concerning what conduces to the conservation

and defence of themselves, upon the principle of fear; that is, indeed the laws of their own timorous and cowardly complexion: for they who have courage and generosity in them, according to this hypothesis, would never submit to such sneaking terms of equality and subjection, but venture for dominion; and resolve either to win the saddle, or lose the horse. Here therefore do our atheistic politicians plainly dance round in a circle; they first deriving the obligation of civil laws, from that of covenants, and then that of covenants from the laws of nature; and, lastly, the obligation both of these laws of nature, and of covenants themselves, again, from the law, command, and sanction, of the civil sovereign; without which neither of them would at all oblige. And thus is it manifest, how vain the attempts of these politicians are, to make justice artificially; when there is no such thing naturally (which is indeed no less than to make something out of nothing); and by art to consociate into bodies politic those whom nature had dissociated from one another; a thing as impossible, as to tie knots in the wind or water; or to build up a stately palace or castle out of sand. Indeed the ligaments, by which these politicians would tie the members of their huge Leviathan, or artificial man, together, are not so good as cobwebs; they being really nothing but mere will and words: for if authority and sovereignty be made only by will and words, then is it plain, that by will and words they may be unmade again at pleasure.

Neither indeed are these atheistic politicians themselves altogether unaware hereof, that this their artificial justice and obligation can be no

firm vinculum of a body politic, to consociate those together, and unite them into one, who are naturally dissociated and divided from one another; they acknowledging, that "covenants without the sword, being but words and breath, are of no strength to hold the members of their Leviathan, or body politic, together." Wherefore, they plainly betake themselves at length from art to force and power, and make their civil sovereign really to reign only in fear.^a And this must needs be their meaning, when they so constantly declare all obligation, just and unjust, to be derived only from law; they by law there understanding a command directed to such as by reason of their imbecility are not able to resist: so that the will and command of the more powerful obliges by the fear of punishment threatened.^b Now, if the only real obligation to obey civil laws be from the fear of punishment, then could no man be obliged to hazard his life for the safety of his prince and country; and they, who could reasonably promise themselves impunity, would be altogether disobliged, and consequently might justly break any laws for their own advantage. An assertion so extravagant, that these confounded politicians themselves are ashamed plainly to own it, and therefore disguise it what they can by equivocation; themselves sometimes also confessing so much of truth, that "*pœna non obligat, sed obligatum tenet*,"^c punishment does not oblige, but only hold those to their duty, who were before obliged.—Furthermore, what is made by power

^a Hobbes, *Leviathan*, cap. xvi.

^b *Id.* *Element. de Cive*, cap. xv. §. 5.

^c *Id.* *ibid.* cap. xiv. §. 2.

and force only, may be unmade by power and force again. If civil sovereigns reign only in the fear of their own sword, then is that right of theirs, so much talked of, indeed nothing else but might, and their authority, force; and consequently successful and prosperous rebellion, and whatsoever can be done by power, will be *ipso facto* thereby justified. Lastly, were civil sovereigns, and bodies politic, mere violent and contra-natural things, then would they all quickly vanish into nothing, because nature will prevail against force and violence; whereas men constantly every where fall into political order, and the corruption of one form of government is but the generation of another.

Wherefore, since it is plain, that sovereignty and bodies politic can neither be merely artificial nor yet violent things, there must of necessity be some natural bond or vinculum to hold them together, such as may both really oblige subjects to obey the lawful commands of sovereigns, and sovereigns in commanding to seek the good and welfare of their subjects; whom these atheistic politicians (by their infinite and belluine right) quite discharge from any such thing. Which bond or vinculum can be no other than natural justice; and something of a common and public; of a cementing and conglutinating nature, in all rational beings; the original of both which is from the Deity. The right and authority of God himself is founded in justice; and of this is the civil sovereignty also a certain participation. It is not the mere creature of the people, and of men's wills, and therefore annihilable again by their wills at pleasure; but hath a stamp of Divi-

nity upon it, as may partly appear from hence, because that *jus vitæ et necis*, that power of life and death—which civil sovereigns have, was never lodged in singulars, before civil society; and therefore could not be conferred by them. Had not God and nature made a city; were there not a natural conciliation of all rational creatures, and subjection of them to the Deity, as their head (which is Cicero's,* “*una civitas deorum atque hominum*,” one city of gods and men)—had not God made ἀρχὴν καὶ ἀρχεσθαι, ruling and being ruled—superiority and subjection, with their respective duty and obligation; men could neither by art, or political enchantment, nor yet by force, have made any firm cities or polities. The civil sovereign is no Leviathan, no beast, but a God (“I have said, Ye are gods”): he reigns not in mere brutish force and fear, but in natural justice and conscience, and in the right and authority of God himself. Nevertheless, we deny not, but that there is need of force and fear too, to constrain those to obedience, to whom the conscience of duty proveth ineffectual. Nor is the fear of the civil sovereign's own sword alone sufficient for this neither, unassisted by religion, and the fear of an invisible Being omnipotent, who seeth all things, and can punish secret as well as open transgressors, both in this life and after death. Which is a thing so confessedly true, that Atheists have therefore pretended religion to have been at first a mere political figment. We conclude, therefore, that the civil sovereign reigneth not, merely in the fear of his own power and sword; but first

* De Natur. Deor. lib. ii. cap. lxii. p. 3043. tom. ix. oper.

† Psalm lxxxii. 6.

in the justice and authority, and then in the power and fear also of God Almighty. And thus much for the first atheistic pretence, from the interest of civil sovereigns.

To their second, that sovereignty is essentially infinite, and therefore altogether inconsistent with religion, that would limit and confine it, we reply; that the right and authority of civil sovereigns is not, as these our atheistic politicians ignorantly suppose, a mere belluine liberty, but it is a right essentially founded in the being of natural justice, as hath been declared. For authority of commanding is such a right, as supposes obligation in others to obey, without which it could be nothing but mere will and force. But none can be obliged in duty to obey, but by natural justice; commands, as such, not creating obligation, but presupposing it. For, if persons were not before obliged to obey, no commands would signify anything to them. Wherefore, the first original obligation is not from will, but nature. Did obligation to the things of natural justice, as many suppose, arise from the will and positive command of God, only by reason of punishments threatened, and rewards promised; the consequence of this would be, that no man was good and just, but only by accident, and for the sake of something else; whereas the goodness of justice or righteousness is intrinsical to the thing itself, and this is that which obligeth (and not any thing foreign to it), it being a different species of good from that of appetite, and private utility, which every man may dispense withal. Now there can be no more infinite justice, than there can be an infinite rule, or an infinite measure. Justice is

essentially a determinate thing; and therefore can there not be an infinite *ius*, right or authority. If there be any thing in its own nature just and obliging, or such as ought to be done; then must there of necessity be something unjust, or unlawful, which therefore cannot be obligingly commanded by any authority whatsoever. Neither ought this to be thought any impeachment of civil authority, it extending universally to all, even to that of the Deity itself. The right and authority of God himself, who is the supreme sovereign of the universe, is also in like manner bounded and circumscribed by justice. God's will is ruled by his justice, and not his justice ruled by his will; and therefore God himself cannot command, what is in its own nature unjust. And thus have we made it evident, that infinite right and authority of doing and commanding any thing without exception, so that the arbitrary will of the commander should be the very rule of justice itself to others, and consequently might oblige to any thing, is an absolute contradiction, and a non-entity; it supposing nothing to be in its own nature just or unjust; which if there were not, there could be no obligation nor authority at all. Wherefore the Atheists, who would flatter civil sovereigns with this infinite right, as if their will ought to be the very rule of justice and conscience, and upon that pretence prejudice them against religion, do as ill deserve of them, as of religion hereby; they indeed absolutely divesting them of all right and authority, and leaving them nothing, but mere brutish force and belluine liberty. And could civil sovereigns utterly demolish and destroy conscience and religion in the

minds of men (which yet is an absolute impossibility), they thinking thereby to make elbow-room for themselves, they would certainly bury themselves also in the ruins of them. Nevertheless, thus much is true; that they, in whom the sovereign legislative power of every polity is lodged (whether single persons, or assemblies); they, who make civil laws, and can reverse them at pleasure, though they may unquestionably sin against God, in making unjust laws, yet can they not sin politically or civilly, as violators or transgressors of those laws cancelled and reversed by them, they being superior to them. Nor is this all; but these sovereign legislative powers may be said to be absolute also in another sense, as being ἀντιστοιχοί, unjudicable,—or uncensurable by any human court; because, if they were so obnoxious, then would that court or power, which had a right to judge and censure them, be superior to them; which is contrary to the hypothesis. And then, if this power were again judicable by some other, there must either be an infinite progress, or endless circulation (a thing not only absurd, but also utterly inconsistent with government and property; because, there being no ultimate judgment unappealable from, there could never be any final determination of controversies); or else at last, all must be devolved to the multitude of singulars, which would be a dissolution of the body politic, and a state of anarchy. And thus have we fully confuted the second atheistic pretence also, for the “inconsistency of religion with civil sovereignty.”

Their third and last follows; “That private judgment of good and evil is contradictory to civil

sovereignty, and a body politic, this being one artificial man, that must be all governed by one reason and will." But conscience is private judgment of good and evil, lawful and unlawful, &c. To which we reply, that it is not religion, but, on the contrary, the principles of these atheistic politicians, that unavoidably introduce private judgment of good and evil, such as is absolutely inconsistent with civil sovereignty; there being, according to them, nothing in nature of a public or common good, nothing of duty or obligation, but all private appetite and utility, of which also every man is judge for himself. For if this were so, then, whenever any man judged it most for his private utility to disobey laws, rebel against sovereigns, nay, to poison or stab them, he would be unquestionably bound by nature, and the reason of his own good, as the highest law, to do the same. Neither can these atheistic politicians be ever able to bring men out of this state of private good, judgment and will, which is natural to them, by any artificial tricks and devices, or mere enchantments of words, as artificial justice, and an artificial man; and a common person and will, and a public conscience, and the like. Nay, it is observable, that themselves are necessitated, by the tenor of these their principles, casuistically to allow such private judgment and will, as is altogether inconsistent with civil sovereignty; as, that any man may lawfully resist in defence of his own life; and that they, who have once rebelled, may afterwards justly defend themselves by force. Nor indeed can this private judgment of men, accord-

ing to their appetite and utility, be possibly otherwise taken away, than by natural justice, which is a thing not of a private but of a public and common nature; and by conscience, that obligeth to obey all the lawful commands of civil sovereigns, though contrary to men's appetites and private interest. Wherefore conscience also is, in itself, not of a private and partial, but of a public and common nature; it respecting Divine laws, impartial justice and equity, and the good of the whole, when clashing with our own selfish good, and private utility. This is the only thing that can naturally consociate mankind together, lay a foundation for bodies politic, and take away that private will and judgment, according to men's appetite and utility, which is inconsistent with the same; agreeably to that of Plato's,* *Tò κοινὸν συνδέει, τὸ ἴδιον διασπᾷ*, that, which is of a common and public nature, unites; but that, which is of a private, segregates and dissociates.—It is true indeed, that particular persons must make a judgment in conscience for themselves (a public conscience being nonsense and ridiculous), and that they may also err therein: yet is not the rule neither, by which conscience judgeth, private; nor itself unaccountable, unless in such mistaken fanatics, as professedly follow private impulses; but either the natural and eternal laws of God, or else his revealed will, things more public than the civil laws of any country, and of which others also may judge. Nevertheless, we deny not, but that evil persons may, and do sometimes make a pretence of con-

* De Legib. lib. ix. p. 660.

science and religion, in order to sedition and rebellion, as the best things may be abused ; but this is not the fault of religion, but only of the men ; conscience obliging, though first to obey God, yet, in subordination to him, the laws of civil sovereigns also. To conclude, conscience and religion oblige subjects actively to obey all the lawful commands of civil sovereigns, or legislative powers, though contrary to their own private appetite, interest, and utility ; but when these same sovereign legislative powers command unlawful things, conscience, though it here obliges to obey God, rather than man, yet does it, notwithstanding, oblige not to resist. Rom. xiii. " Whosoever resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God, and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation." And Matt. xxvi. " All they, that take the sword, shall perish with the sword." Here is " the patience and the faith of the saints." And thus does religion " give unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's," as well as " unto God the things that are God's."

And now, having fully confuted all the atheistic grounds, we confidently conclude, that the first original of all things was neither stupid and senseless matter fortuitously moved, nor a blind and nescient, but orderly and methodical plastic nature ; nor a living matter, having perception or understanding natural, without animal sense or consciousness ; nor yet did every thing exist of itself necessarily from eternity, without a cause. But there is one only necessary existent, the Cause of all other things ; and this an absolutely perfect Being, infinitely good, wise, and powerful ;

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who hath made all, that was fit to be made, and according to the best wisdom, and exerciseth an exact providence over all: whose name ought to be hallowed, and separated from all other things; To whom be all honour, and glory, and worship, for ever and ever. Amen.

DISCOURSE

CONCERNING THE

TRUE NOTION

OF THE

LORD'S SUPPER.



THE
TRUE NOTION
OF THE
LORD'S SUPPER.

THE INTRODUCTION.

ALL great errors have ever been intermingled with some truth. And indeed, if Falsehood should appear alone unto the world, in her own true shape and native deformity, she would be so black and horrid that no man would look upon her; and therefore she hath always had an art to wrap up herself in a garment of light, by which means she passed freely disguised and undiscerned. This was elegantly signified in the fable thus: Truth at first presented herself to the world, and went about to seek entertainment; but when she found none, being of a generous nature, that loves not to obtrude herself upon unworthy spirits, she resolved to leave earth, and take her flight for heaven: but as she was going up, she chanced, Elijah-like, to let her mantle fall; and Falsehood, waiting by for such an opportunity, snatched it up presently, and ever since goes about disguised in Truth's attire.

Pure falsehood is pure nonentity, and could not subsist alone by itself; wherefore it always twines up together about some truth, *παραφύαδος εικός*, as Athenagoras the Christian philosopher speaks,

like an ivy, that grows upon some wall, twining herself into it with wanton and flattering embraces, till at length destroyed and pulled down that which held it up. There is always some truth

which gives being to every error: "Est quædam veritatis anima, quæ corpus omnium errorum agitat et informat." There

is ever some soul of truth, which doth secretly spirit and enliven the dead and unwieldy lump of all errors,—without which it could not move or stir. Though sometimes it would require a very curious artist, in the midst of all error's deformities, to descry the defaced lineaments of that truth which first it did resemble: as Plutarch spake sometime of those Egyptian fables of Isis and Osiris, that they had ἀμυδράς τινὰς ἐμφάσεις τῆς ἀληθείας, certain weak appearances and glimmerings of truth—but so as that they needed δεινοῦ ἰχνηλάτου, some notable diviner—to discover them.

And this I think is the case of that grand error of the Papists, concerning the Lord's supper being a sacrifice; which perhaps at first did rise by degeneration from a primitive truth, whereof the very obliquity of this error yet may bear some dark and obscure intimation. Which will best

appear, when we have first discovered the true notion of the Lord's supper; whence we shall be able at once to convince the error of this popish tenet, and withal to give a just account of the first rise of it. "Rectum index sui et obliqui."

In. Orat. de
Resurrect.
Mort.

Lik. de Iside
et Osiride.

See chap. v.

CHAP. I.

That it was a custom among the Jews and Heathens, to feast upon things sacrificed; and that the custom of the Christians, in partaking of the body and blood of Christ once sacrificed upon the cross, in the Lord's supper, is analogical hereunto.

THE right notion of that Christian feast, called the Lord's supper, in which we eat and drink the body and blood of Christ, that was once offered up to God for us, is to be derived (if I mistake not) from analogy to that ancient rite among the Jews, of feasting upon things sacrificed, and eating of those things, which they had offered up to God.

For the better conceiving whereof, we must first consider a little, how many kinds of Jewish sacrifices there were, and the nature of them. Which, although they are very well divided, according to the received opinion, into four, **עֹלָה**, **חֹטֵאת**, **אִשָּׁמָה**, **שְׁלָמִים**, the burnt-offering, the sin-offering, the trespass-offering, and the peace-offering—yet perhaps I may make a more notional division of them, for our use, into these three species.

First, Such, as were wholly offered up to God, and burnt upon the altar: which were the holocausts, or burnt-offerings.

Secondly, Such, wherein, besides something offered up to God upon the altar, the priests had also a part to eat of. And these are also subdivided into the sin-offerings and the trespass-offerings.

Concerning the difference between these two, see Petit in his Varie Lectiones.

Thirdly, Such, as in which, besides something offered up to God, and a portion be-

stowed on the priests, the owners themselves had a share likewise. And these were called שלמים, or peace-offerings,—which contained in them, as the Jewish doctors speak, חלק לשם חלק רבון חלק, לכהן, a portion for God,—and the priests and the owners also; and thence they use to give the etymon of the Hebrew word *shelamim*. ביטת חובת שרת ביניהם because these sacrifices brought peace to the altar, the priests, and the owners, in that every one of these had a share in them.

Now, for the first of these, although (perhaps to signify some special mystery concerning Christ) they were themselves wholly offered up to God, and burnt upon the altar; yet they had ever peace-offerings regularly annexed to them, when they were not קרבנית צבור, offerings for the whole congregation,—but for any particular person; that so the owners might at the same time, when they offered up to God, feast also upon the sacrifices.

And for the second, although the owners themselves did not eat of them, the reason was, because they were not perfectly reconciled to God, being for the present in a state of guilt, which they made atonement for in these sacrifices; yet they did it by the priests, who were their mediators unto God, and, as their proxies, did eat of the sacrifices for them.

But in the peace-offerings, because such as brought them had no uncleanness upon them, (Lev. vii. 20.) and so were perfectly reconciled to God, and in covenant with him, therefore they were in their own persons to eat of those sacrifices, which they had offered unto God as a federal rite between God and them; which we shall explain at large hereafter.

So then the eating of the sacrifices was a due and proper appendix unto all sacrifices, one way or other, and either by the priests, or themselves, when the person that offered was capable thereof. Wherefore we shall find in the Scripture, that eating of the sacrifices is brought in continually as a rite belonging to sacrifice in general. Which we will now shew in divers instances.

Exod. xxxiv. 15. God commands the Jews, that when they came into the land of Canaan, they should destroy the altars and images, and all the monuments of idolatry among those Heathens thus; "lest thou make a covenant with the inhabitants of the land, and they go a whoring after their gods, and one call thee, and thou **EAT** of his sacrifice:" which indeed afterward came to pass, Num. xxv. 2. "They called the people to the sacrifice of their gods, and the people did **EAT**, and bow down to their gods;" or, as it is cited in Psal. cvi. 28. "They joined themselves unto Baal-peor, and **ATE** the sacrifice of the dead."

When Jethro, Moses's father-in-law, came to him, (Exod. xviii. 12.) "he took a burnt-offering and sacrifices for God; and Aaron came, and all the elders of Israel, **TO EAT BREAD** before the Lord:" by sacrifices there are meant peace-offerings, as Aben-Ezra and the Targum well expound it, which, we said before, were regularly joined with burnt-offerings.

So Exod. xxxii. When the Israelites worshipped the golden calf, the text saith, that "Aaron built an altar before it, and made a proclamation, saying, To-morrow is a **FEAST** unto the Lord:" (see how the altar and the feast were a-kin to one another :) "And they rose up early in the morning,

and offered burnt-offerings, and brought peace-offerings, and the people **EAT DOWN TO EAT AND DRINK.**" Which passage St. Paul makes use of, being about to dehort the Corinthians from eating things sacrificed to idols, 1 Cor. x. "Neither be ye idolaters, as some of them were, as it is written, **The people EAT DOWN TO EAT AND DRINK:**" for this was no common eating, but the eating of those sacrifices which had been offered up to the golden calf.

The 1st of Samuel i. 3. it is said of Elkanah, that "he went up out of his city yearly to worship and to sacrifice to the Lord of hosts in Shiloh: and when the time was come, that he offered, he gave to Peninnah his wife, and to all her sons and daughters, **PORTIONS**; and unto Hannah he gave a **double PORTION**;" that is, portions to eat of those sacrifices that had been offered up to God, as R. David Kimchi notes. And in the ninth chapter of the same book, when Saul was seeking Samuel, going towards the city he met some maidens, that told him Samuel was come to the city, for there was a sacrifice for the people that day in the high place: "As soon (say they) as you come into the city, you shall find him before he go up to the high place **TO EAT**; for the people will not **EAT** until he come, because he doth bless the sacrifice." Where, though the word *bamah* properly signifies a high place, or place of sacrifice; whence the Greek word *Bῆμος* is thought to be derived; yet it is here rendered by the Targum, as often elsewhere, **בֵּית אֲסֻחָתָא**, *domus accubitus*, a house of feasting;—because feasting and sacrificing were such general concomitants of one another.

So again, in the 16th chapter, Samuel went to Bethlehem to anoint David: "I am come (saith he) to sacrifice to the Lord: sanctify yourselves, and come with me to the sacrifice." But when he understood, that Jesse's youngest son ^{ver. xi.} was absent, he saith to Jesse, "Send and fetch him, for we will not sit down [until he come."

So I understand that of the Sichemites, according to the judgment of the Jewish doctors, Judg. ix. 27. "They went into the house of their god, and did EAT and DRINK, and cursed Abimelech;" that is, they went into the house of their god to sacrifice, and did eat and drink of the sacrifice: which perhaps was the reason of the name, by which they called their god, whom they thus worshipped, BERITH, which signifies a covenant, because they worshipped him by this federal rite of eating of his sacrifices; of which more hereafter.

Thus likewise the Hebrew scholiasts expound that in the 16th chapter of the same book, verse 23, concerning the Philistines, when they had put out Samson's eyes; "They met together to offer a great sacrifice unto Dagon their god, and to REJOICE;" that is, in feasting upon the sacrifices.

Hence it is, that the idolatry of the Jews, in worshipping other gods, is so often described synecdochically under the notion of feasting: Isa. lvii. 7. "Upon a lofty and high mountain hast thou SET THY BED, and thither wentest thou up to offer sacrifice." * For in those ancient times they were not wont to sit at feasts, but lie ^{* Or Saba, see Salmasius in Plinianis Exercitat. p. 497. et 500.} down on beds or couches. (Ezek. xxiii.) "You sent for men from far, Sabeans

from the wilderness (i. e. idolatrous priests from Arabia), and lo they came, for whom thou didst wash thyself, and satest upon a stately bed, with a table prepared before thee." (Amos ii. 8.)

"They laid themselves down upon clothes laid to pledge by every altar;" i. e. laid themselves down to eat of the sacrifice, that was offered on the altar. And, in Ezek. xviii. 11, eating upon the mountains seems to be put for sacrificing upon the mountains, because it was a constant appendix to it. "He that hath not done any of these things, but hath even eaten upon the mountains," כִּמְזִירָא בְּלֹא לִשְׁחִירָא, i. e. hath worshipped idols upon the mountains;—so the Targum renders it. Lastly, St. Paul makes eating of the sacrifice a general appendix of the altar, (Heb. xii. 10.) "We have an altar whereof they have no right to eat that serve the tabernacle."

I will observe this one thing more, because it is not commonly understood, that all the while the Jews were in the wilderness, they were to eat no meat at all at their private tables but that whereof they had first sacrificed to God at the tabernacle. For this is clearly the meaning of that place, Lev. xvii. 4, 5. "Whatsoever man there be of the house of Israel, that killeth a lamb, or a goat, or an ox, within the camp, or without the camp, and bringeth it not to the door of the tabernacle, to offer an offering to the Lord, blood shall be imputed to him. And so Nachmonides there glosses, according to the mind of the ancient Rabbins, וְזֶה מִתּוֹלַדַּת צֶדֶק שֶׁכָּל מֶה שֶׁהָאֱלֹהִים שָׁלַח, i. e. Behold, God commanded at first, that all, which the Israelites did eat, should be peace-offerings.—Which command was afterward dispensed with, when they

came into the land, and their dwellings were become remote from the tabernacle, so that they could not come up every day to sacrifice. Deut. xii. 12. "If the place, which the Lord thy God hath chosen be too far from thee; then thou shalt kill of the herd and of the flock, and thou shalt eat within thy gates whatsoever thy soul lusteth after." Only now there were, instead thereof, three constant and set times appointed in the year, in which every male was to come up and see God at his tabernacle, and eat and drink before him; and the sacrifice, that was then offered, was wont to be called by them, עֶלְת דָּמִיָּה, a sacrifice of seeing.

Thus I have sufficiently declared the Jewish rite of joining feasting with sacrificing; and it will not be now amiss, if we add, as a *mantissa* to that discourse, something of the custom of the Heathens also in the like kind, the rather because we may make some use of it afterward. And it was so general amongst them in their idolatrous sacrifices, that Isaac Abarbanel, a learned Jew, observed it in Pirush Hattorah : בּוֹמִים קְדָמִיִּים בְּלִמְיָם : שְׂחֹתָ עֲשֶׂה עֲבֹדַת אֱלֹהִים מִדֹּד עֲשֶׂה עֲלֵיהֶם מִכְרָה. In those ancient times, whosoever sacrificed to idols, made a feast upon the sacrifice.—And the original of it amongst them was so ancient, that it is ascribed by their own authors to Prometheus, as Salmasius, in his Solino-Plinian Exercitations, notes,

"Hunc sacrificii morem a Prometheo
 originem duxisse volunt, quo partem hostiæ in
 ignem conjicere soliti sunt, partem ad suum vic-
 tum abuti. Which Prometheus, although, ac-
 cording to Eusebius's Chronicon, and our or-
 dinary chronologers, his time would fall near

about the 3028th year of the Julian period, which was long after Noah; yet it is certain, that he lived much sooner, near about Noah's time, in that he is made to be the son of Japhet, which was Noah's son, from whom the Europeans descended, (Gen. x. 5.) called therefore by

Note that, the islands of the nations—is commonly used in Scripture as a proper name to express Europe by. Lib. i. de Idol. the poet *Jāpeti genus*. For there is no great heed to be given to the chronology of human writers concerning this age of the world, which Censorinus from Varro calls *Μυθικόν*, the fabulous time or age.—

Although I rather subscribe to the judgment of the learned Vossius, that this Prometheus was no other than Noah himself, the father of Japhet, and not his son, because the other things do so well agree to him; and we may easily allow the Heathens such a mistake as that is, in a matter of so remote antiquity: and then, if this be true, the whole world received this rite of feasting upon sacrifice, at first, together with that of sacrifice, at the same time. Instances of this custom are so frequent and obvious in Heathen authors, that Homer alone were able to furnish us sufficiently.

In the α of the Iliads, he brings in a description of a hecatomb-sacrifice, which Agamemnon prepared for Apollo by his priest Chryses, and a feast that followed immediately after it. In β the same Agamemnon offers up an ox to Jupiter, and inviteth divers of the Grecian captains to partake of it. In γ of the Odyssees, Nestor makes a magnificent sacrifice to Neptune of eighty-two bullocks, with a feast upon it, on the shore. In θ Alcinous offers up a bullock unto Jupiter, and then immediately follows,

Δαΐων' ἱερὰ δαΐων
 Τετρίμνοι

Plato, in his second *De Legibus*, acknowledges these feasts under the name of *Ἑσπρὰ μετὰ θεῶν*, feasts after Divine worship—offered up to the gods. Among the Latins, that of Lycus in Plautus's *Pœnulus* belongs to this purpose ;

Convivas volo
 Reperire vobis commodos, qui una sient,
 Interibi attulerint exta.

And that of Gelasimus in *Stichus* ;

Jamne exta cocta sunt ? quot agnis fecerat ?

After this manner he, in Virgil's *Eclogues*, invites his friend,

Cum faciam vitula pro frugibus, ipse venito.

And thus Evander entertains *Æneas*, in the eighth *Æneid*,

Tum lecti juvenes certatim, aræque sacerdos,
 Viscera tosta ferunt taurorum.——

Plutarch somewhere observes, it as a strange and uncouth rite, in the worship of the goddess Hecate, that they which offered sacrifice unto her, did not partake of it. And the same author reports of Catiline and his conspirators, *ὅτι καταθύσαντες ἄνθρωπον ἐγεύσαντο τῶν σαρκῶν*, that sacrificing a man, they did all eat somewhat of the flesh—using this religious rite as a bond to confirm them together in their treachery. But Strabo tells us of a strange kind of worship used by the Persians in their sacrifices, where no part of the flesh was offered up to the gods, but all

eaten up by those that brought it, and their guests : they supposing, in the mean while, that whilst they did eat of the flesh, their god, which they worshipped, had the soul of the sacrifice that was killed in honour to him. The author's own words are these in his fifteenth book : *Μερίσαντος δὲ τοῦ Μάγου τὰ κρέα τοῦ ὑφηγουμένου τὴν ἱερουργίαν, ἀπῆλθον διελόμενοι, τοῖς θεοῖς οὐδὲν ἀπονείμαντες μέρος. Τῆς γὰρ ΨΥΧΗΣ φασὶ τοῦ ἱερείου δεῖσθαι τὸν θεόν, ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενός. Ὅμως δὲ τοῦ ἐπίπλου τι μικρὸν τιθείασιν, ὥς λέγουσί τινες, ἐπὶ τὸ πῦρ*—*Sua quisque accepta abeant, nulla parte diis relata ; dicunt enim Deum nihil velle præter hostiæ animam : quidam tamen (ut fertur) omenti partem igni imponunt.*

From this custom of the Heathens of feasting upon sacrifices arose that famous controversy among the Christians in the primitive times, sometimes disputed in the New Testament, whether it were lawful *ΕΣΘΙΕΙΝ ΕΙΔΩΛΟΨΥΤΑ*, to eat things sacrificed to idols.

These Gentile feasts upon the sacrifices were usually kept in the temple, where the sacrifice was offered ; as may be gathered from that passage of Herodotus in *Clio*, where, speaking of *Cleobus* and *Bithene*, and what happened to them after that prayer, which their mother put up to the gods for them, *ὥς ἔθυσαν* (saith he) *καὶ εὐωχῆθησαν, κατακοιμηθέντες ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἱερῷ*, &c. As soon as they had sacrificed and feasted, lying down to sleep in the same temple, they died there, and never rose more—But it is very apparent from that of *St. Paul*, *1 Cor. viii. 10*. “If any man see thee, which hast knowledge, sit at meat,” *ἐν εἰδωλείῳ*, that is, not, as *Erasmus* translates it, “in epulo simulachrorum,” but as *Beza*, and from him our

interpreters, in the idol's temple; for so both the Syriac metaphrast expounds it, **בֵּית אִסְמָה**,

and the Arabic **في بيت اصنام** in the house of idols.

If any thing were left, when these feasts were ended, they were wont to carry portions of them home to their friends: so that learned scholiast upon Aristophanes in *Plutus* tells us, *οἱ γὰρ ἐκ θυσίας ἰόντες, ἔφερον ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς θυσίας τοῖς οἰκείοις κατὰ νόμον τινά*. Whence Petit, in that excellent collection of Attic laws, inserted this for one, *viz.* "that they that go home from a sacrifice should carry part of it to their friends." And that Greek comedian himself alludeth there to it in these words:

Τῶτο δὲ τὸ κρεάδιον
τῶν ἱεροδίων τις εἰσιπυλάτω λαβόν.

Theocritus in his *Bucoliastes* doth express it fully;

καὶ τὸ δὲ θύσας
ταῖς τόμοις, μέροντι καλὸν κείας αὐτίκα πύρρον.

And Plautus in *Miles*;

Sacrificant?
Dant inde partem majorem mihi quam tibi.

These portions, which they carried home, were called commonly by the Greeks *μερίδες*, and in the Umbrian language, as Festus tells us, *strobula*. Theophrastus in his *Characters* uses the word *τόμοι* in this sense, *καὶ θύοντας καὶ ἀναλίσκοντας ἢ κων τόμον ἀπαιτήσων*, *i. e.* *ad sacrificantes et epula concelebrantes accedit, ut inde portionem auferat*.

And because they thought they did receive

some blessings from the gods with it, therefore it was sometimes called *ὑγίεια*, as we find in Hesychius upon that word *ὑγίεια*: ἄλφιστα οἶνον, καὶ ἐλαίῳ πεφυραμένα, καὶ πᾶν τὸ ἐκ θεοῦ φερόμενον, εἴτε μύρον, εἴτε θάλλος, ἢ ὑγίεια.

But otherwise, if there were any thing yet remaining, it belonged to the priests, as we learn from that scholiast, which we have already commended, upon Vespæ, νόμος ἦν, τὰ ὑπολειπόμενα τῆς θυσίας τοὺς ἱερεῖας λαμβάνειν i. e. It was an ancient law among the Athenians, that the priests should have the remainder.—Which is not only to be understood of the skin and such-like parts, but of the flesh of the sacrifice itself; as we learn from St. Austin in his exposition upon Rom. ii. who tells us also, that these relics were sometimes sold for them in the market; whence that speech of St. Paul, 1 Cor. x. 25. "Whatsoever is sold in the shambles eat, asking no question for conscience' sake."

I will shut up all with this one observation more, That as we said of the Jews, that in the wilderness they did eat no meat, but of that which they had first sacrificed; in like manner the Heathens were wont to sacrifice before all their feasts: whence it is, that Athenæus observes, feasts among the ancient Heathens were ever accounted sacred and religious things. And thus we must understand that speech of St. Paul in the twenty-seventh verse of the forenamed chapter, "If any one, that believes not, invite you, and you be disposed to go; whatsoever is set before you eat, asking no question for conscience' sake." Nay, it was accounted a profane thing amongst them, to eat any meat at their private tables,

whereof they had not first sacrificed to their gods; as appeareth by the Greek proverb, *ἀθῦρα ἐσθίου*, used by Anacreon and others as a brand of a notorious wicked man, viz. One that would eat meat whereof he had not sacrificed.

Now having thus shewn, that both amongst the Jews under the law, and the Gentiles in their Pagan worship (for Paganism is nothing but Judaism degenerate), it was ever a solemn rite to join feasting with sacrifice, and to EAT of those things which had been offered up; the very concinnity and harmony of the thing itself leads me to conceive, that that Christian feast under the gospel, called THE LORD'S SUPPER, is the very same thing, and bears the same notion, in respect of the true Christian sacrifice of Christ upon the cross, that those did to the Jewish and Heathenish sacrifices; and so is "EPULUM SACRIFICIALE," a sacrificial feast—I mean, a feast upon sacrifice; or, "EPULUM EX OBLATIS," a feast upon things offered up to God.—Only this difference arising in the parallel, that because those legal sacrifices were but types and shadows of the true Christian sacrifice, they were often repeated and renewed, as well as the feasts, which were made upon them: but now the true Christian sacrifice being come, and offered up once for all, never to be repeated, we have therefore no more typical sacrifices left amongst us, but only the feasts upon the true sacrifice still symbolically continued, and often repeated, in reference to that ONE GREAT SACRIFICE, which is always as present in God's sight, and efficacious, as if it were but now offered up for us.

CHAP. II.

An objection taken from the Passover answered. Proved that the Passover was a true sacrifice, and the paschal feast a feast upon a sacrifice, from Scripture, and Jewish authors.

But methinks I hear it objected to me, that
Object. the true notion of the Lord's supper is to be derived rather from the Passover among the Jews; it being the common opinion of divines, that the Jews had but two sacraments, viz. circumcision and the Passover, that answer to those two amongst us, baptism and the Lord's supper: but the Jewish Passover had no relation to a sacrifice, being nothing else but a mere FEAST; and therefore from analogy to the Jewish we cannot make the Lord's supper to be "EPULUM SACRIFICIALE," a feast upon sacrifice.

To which I answer, first, That I know not
Answer. what warrant there is for that divinity so confidently imposed upon us by some, that the Jews had but two sacraments, circumcision and the Passover; and that it should thence follow by inevitable consequence, that the Lord's supper must ἀντιστοιχεῖν, answer only to the Jewish Passover. Sure I am, the Jews had many more.

1 Cor. x. For not to instance in that of St. Paul, "Our fathers were all BAPTIZED unto Moses in the cloud, and in the sea," like our Christian baptism; "and did all EAT the same spiritual meat (viz. the manna), and did all DRINK the same spiritual drink" (viz. the water of the rock

that followed them), like the bread and wine in the Christian Lord's supper: nor to examine all the other sacramental ceremonies, which they had, that were almost as many sacraments as ceremonies. These feasts upon the sacrifices, which we have all this while insisted on, were nothing else but true and proper * sa-
 craments joined with sacrifices.

* See Clod-
 penburg in
 Schola Sacrif.
 and of the
 right Notion
 of the Sacra-
 ment
 see Vossius
 in Thes.
 Theolog.

But, secondly, I will grant, that the Jewish Passover hath a special resemblance to the Christian LORD'S SUPPER, although upon other grounds; for I say, undoubtedly the Passover was a true and proper sacrifice, and therefore the paschal feast a feast upon a sacrifice: so that this shall still advance and improve our former notion.

For the better conceiving whereof, we must understand, that besides those four general kinds of sacrifices among the Jews beforementioned, the burnt-offering, the sin-offering, the trespass-offering, and the peace-offering; there were some other peculiar kinds of sacrifices, as the masters tell us, viz. these three, *בכורים ומעשר ופסח*, the firstlings of cattle, and the tenth, and the Passover. And the reason why these, in the distribution of sacrifices, are thus distinguished by them from all the other general kinds of sacrifices, is thus given by the famous Maimonides upon the Misna of the Talmud, in Massecheth Zebachim, the 6th chapter, *לפי שאיתן הארבע פעמים רבות יתחייב היחיד בכל אחד מהם לפי שנה הענינים והצרכי* *וזיכרם בהם בומנים ואלו אינם בו* forenamed were such kind of sacrifices, as that a private person was often bound to each of them in several cases, and the whole congregation in seve-

ral seasons; but these three were not of that nature, being peculiarly restrained to one case or season. —Now these three kinds of peculiar sacrifices were in their nature all nearest of kin to the peace-offerings, and are therefore called by the Jewish doctors חֲסִידִים לְשֵׁלָמִים, like to peace-offerings,—because they were not only killed in the same place, being all קֹדְשִׁים קְלִיִּים, light holy things,—and had the אִימָרוֹם, or inward parts—thereof, to be burnt likewise upon the altar; but also, in that part of them was to be eaten by the owners. Inasmuch that the Talmudists put many cases in which a lamb, that was set apart for a Passover, and could not be offered in that notion, was to be turned into a peace-offering, as that which was near of kin to it.

But yet these masters tell us, there were three precise differences between the *pascha* and the ordinary peace-offering, בְּסִיבֵיהֶם וְנִסְבֵּים וְתוֹפֶת וְחֵן. First, in that there was no laying on of hands upon the passover in the killing of it; for this was nowhere commanded, as in all the peace-offerings. Secondly, that there was no *mincāh* or meat-offering, nor *libamen* or drink-offering, to be joined with it (for so they use to include both in the word *Nesachim*). Thirdly, that there was no waving of the breast and shoulder for the priests' portion; the reason whereof was, because the priests were bound always to have Passover-offerings of their own, as it is expressed Ezra vi. and so needed not any wave-offering.

But that the passovers were, in other respects, of the same nature with the peace-offerings, and therefore true and proper sacrifices, because it is a thing generally not so well understood, and

therefore opposed by divers, I shall labour the more fully to convince it. I say, that the passovers were always brought to the tabernacle or the temple, and there presented and offered up to God by the priest, as all sacrifices were; that the blood of them was there sprinkled upon the altar, of which the Hebrew doctors well observe, * עקר חס, *The very essence of a sa-* *Maimon. in Korban Pesach. c. ii. crifice is in sprinkling of the blood;— and also that the Imurim (as they call them), that is, the fat and kidneys, were burnt upon the altar: all this I shall endeavour to demonstrate.

Only first I must premise this, that when I say the passover was brought to the tabernacle, and offered by the priests, I do not mean, that the priests were always bound to kill the passovers: for I grant, that the people were wont to kill their own passovers; and so I find it expressly in the Misna of the Talmud, Massech. Zebach, cap. v. sect. 6. שחט ישראל וקבל הכהן, *All Israel killed the passover, and the priests received the blood.*—Which Talmudical expression alludes to that place, *Exod. xii. vi.* “The whole assembly of the congregation of Israel shall kill it in the evening;” where this seems to be commanded by God. And the practice consonant hereunto, I find intimated at least in Scripture, in Hezekiah’s passover, *2 Chron. xxx. 17.* “There were many in the congregation, that were not sanctified; therefore the Levites had the charge of killing the passover for every one that was not clean, to sanctify it unto the Lord.” Where R. Solomon writeth thus: אל תתמה למה לא שחטו בעלים עצמם. Wonder not, why the owners themselves did

not kill them, for it followeth, that many in the congregation had not sanctified themselves; therefore the Levites were appointed in their place to sanctify the work unto the Lord.—And R. D. Kimchi to the same purpose: “Though many of them did eat the passover in uncleanness, it being a case of necessity, in that they had no time to purify themselves; yet for them to come into the court, and kill the passovers, this was not needful, when it might be done as well by the Levites.” And therefore the same is to be thought likewise of the priests and Levites killing the passover, (Ezra vi.) because the people returning newly from captivity were not yet purified, as it is there also partly intimated.

But this doth not at all hinder our proceeding, or evince the Passover not to be a sacrifice: for it is a great mistake in most of our learned writers, to think, that the killing of every sacrifice was proper to the priest; whereas indeed there was no such matter; but as we have already granted, that the people commonly killed their own passovers, so we will affirm, that they did the same concerning any of the other sacrifices. Lev. i. 4, 5. it is said concerning the burnt-offering, “If any man bring a burnt-offering to the Lord, he shall lay his hand upon the head of the burnt-offering, AND HE SHALL KILL the bullock before the Lord, and the priests, Aaron’s sons, shall take the blood.” So concerning the peace-offerings, chap. iii. 2. “He shall lay his hand on the head of his offering, and KILL it at the door of the tabernacle of the congregation:” and concerning the sin-offering, chap. iv. 24. “HE shall lay his hand on the head of the goat, and KILL it at the place

where they kill the burnt-offering before the Lord." We see then what incompetent judges our own authors are in Jewish customs and antiquities. The Jewish doctors and antiquaries (which are so much contemned by some of our magisterial dictators in all learning) would have taught us here another lesson. For thus Maimonides, in *Biath Hammik.* speaks to this point, שחטת קדשים כשרה, בחים אפילו קדשי קדשים בן קדשי דור ובן קדשי ציבור שגאוהם את בן הבקר, that is, the killing of the holy things may lawfully be done by strangers, yea, of the most holy things, whether they be the holy things of a private person, or of the whole congregation: as it is said, Lev. i. "And he shall kill the bullock; and the priests, Aaron's sons, shall take the blood."—The same is avouched again afterward, by the same author, in *Maaseh Korban*, chap. v.

But if any one would therefore fain know, what were properly the priests' actions about the sacrifice, which might not be done lawfully by any stranger, the same Jewish authors have a trite rule amongst them concerning it: מקבלה ואילך, מצות כהונה, the receiving of the blood, and all the other parts, that were to be offered up, and all that followeth after that, belongeth to the priests' office.—And Isaac Abarbanel will teach us more particularly, in his comment on Leviticus, that there were five things to be done by the owners of the sacrifice that brought it, and five things by the priest that offered it. The first five were, laying on of hands, killing, slaying, cutting up, and washing of the inwards; the other five were, the receiving of the blood in a vessel, the sprinkling of it upon the altar, the

* Of this vide
Magistorum
Placita.

putting* of fire upon the altar, the ordering of the wood upon the fire, and the ordering of the pieces upon the wood. Hence it is, that upon the forequoted place of the Misna (which I brought to shew, that the people did kill the passovers), Rabbi Obadiah of Bartanora thus glosseth, שחט ישראל את דמו שהשחטו, בישורו בורות בכל הקרבת, i. e. The people of Israel might all kill the passovers themselves, if they pleased, because the KILLING OF ANY SACRIFICE might be done lawfully by strangers; but the priests received the blood.

Now, I come to prove what I have undertaken. And, first, that the passover was always brought to the tabernacle or the temple, and there offered unto God as the other sacrifices were, is clear enough from Deut. xvi. 5. "Thou shalt not sacrifice the passover within any of the gates which the Lord thy God giveth thee; but at the place which the Lord thy God chooseth to place his name in, there thou shalt sacrifice." And that this is to be understood not of Jerusalem in general, but of the tabernacle or temple, appears, both because the same expressions are used of the other sacrifices, Deut. xii. ver. 5, 6. 11. 14. where it is clearly meant, that they were to be brought to the temple; and because it is certain, that every thing that was killed amongst the Jews, was either to be killed at the door of the tabernacle of the congregation, or else might be killed indifferently in any part of the whole land.

Let us now see, how the Jewish doctors comment upon this place, men better skilled in these rites than our own authors are, R. Moses BEN MAIMON, in Halachah Pesach, cap. i. פתח שחטת

וּמִזְבֵּחַ הָעֹלֹת, &c. They kill not the passover but in the court, as the rest of the holy things; yea, in the time when high places were permitted, they sacrificed not the passover in a private high place; for it is said, Deut. xvi. "Thou mayest not sacrifice the passover in any of thy gates." We have learnt, that this is a prohibition to kill the passover in any private high place, although it be in a time when high places are permitted.— From which excellent gloss of theirs, it appeareth, that there was more preciseness in bringing of the passover to the place where God's name was put, and offering it at the tabernacle or the temple, than of any of the other sacrifices. And this was the reason, as was before intimated out of KIMCHI, why in Hezekiah's passover the Levites had the charge of killing, because the passovers were to be killed in the court of the temple, whither the people being unclean could not enter; for otherwise, if it had been done without the court, they might as well have killed their own passovers as have eaten them. And this may be further confirmed, in that the passover is called a *korban*: (Numb. ix. vii.) "When certain men were defiled by a dead body, that they could not keep the Passover, they came to Moses, and said, Wherefore are we kept back, that we may not OFFER an OFFERING to the Lord in his appointed season?" And again, ver. xiii. "If any one be clean, and forbear to keep the Passover, even that soul shall be cut off, because he brought not an OFFERING (or a KORBAN) to the Lord in his appointed season." Nothing was called an OFFERING, or a KORBAN, but that which was brought and offered up to

God at the tabernacle or temple where, his name was put.

That the blood of the passovers was to be sprinkled by the priest, and fat only to be burnt upon the altar, although this must needs follow from the former, yet I prove it more particularly thus: (Exod. xxiii. 18.) "Thou shalt not offer the blood of my sacrifice with leavened bread; neither shall the fat of my feast remain until the morning." For by the general consent of the Jewish scholiasts, and all those Christian interpreters that I have seen, this place is to be understood only of the passover; and therefore ONKELOS, that famous Chaldee paraphrast, for דם זבחי the blood of my sacrifice—made no question but to read it דם פסח the blood of my Passover.—But it appears undoubtedly from a parallel place in the 34th chapter of the same book, ver. 23, 25, 26, where those 17, 18, and 19th verses of the 23d chapter are again repeated: "Thrice in the year shall all your men-children appear before the Lord.—Thou shalt not offer the blood of my sacrifice with leaven, neither shall the sacrifice of the feast of the Passover be left unto the morning. The first of the first-fruits of thy land thou shalt bring into the house of the Lord thy God. Thou shalt not seethe a kid in its mother's milk." Here what was wanting in the former is supplied; "Neither shall the sacrifice of the feast of the PASSOVER be left unto the morning." And I have set down the whole context with it, because it will be needful, for the better clearing of it, to consider its coherence with other verses, which is the very same in both chapters; and Isaac Abar-

Abarbanel hath set it down excellently in this manner.

First therefore, saith he, when God had spoken of the Jews appearing thrice before him every year, viz. at the feast of the Passover or of unleavened bread, the feast of weeks or Pentecost, the feast of tabernacles or in-gathering, *בין שניד שלשת חצונים החם נון בכל אחד מהם משפט מיוחד*, i. e. When he had spoken of these three feasts, he subjoins immediately, some rule concerning every one of them in particular:—First, for the Passover, in those words, “Thou shalt not offer the blood of my sacrifice with leaven, neither shall the sacrifice of the feast of the Passover be left until the morning:” Secondly, for the feast of Pentecost, in those, “The first of the first-fruits of the land thou shalt bring into the house of the Lord thy God:” Thirdly, for the feast of tabernacles or in-gathering; “Thou shalt not seethe a kid in his mother’s milk;” which words, for want of this light of the context, were never yet sufficiently explained by any of our interpreters. And the thread of this coherence alone led Abarbanel very near the true meaning of them, ere he was aware: *דיותר נראה בזה שהיה ממעשה עברי עבודת אלילים בוכן קבוצתם לעשות כן רל לבשל הגורים בחלב בוכן אספת דתבואת לחשבם שבה יתרו לאזהרם*, i. e. It seems most probable, that this command was occasioned from a custom among the idolatrous Heathens, that at the time of their gathering in of fruits, they were wont to boil a kid in the dam’s milk, thinking, that by this means, they were made acceptable to their gods, and did procure a blessing by it.—To confirm which gloss, he tells us of a cus-

tom somewhat like to this, used in his time in some parts of Spain.

But because Abarbanel doth not tell his tale so handsomely as he should, I will help him out a little from an ancient Karraite, whose comment I have seen upon the Pentateuch, MS. (for the monuments of these Karraite Jews were never yet printed, and are very rarely seen in these European parts). And it is thus: "It was a custom of the ancient Heathens, when they had gathered in all their fruits, to take a kid, and boil it in the dam's milk; and then *דרד בשפה* in a magical way, to go about and besprinkle with it all their trees and fields, and gardens and orchards; thinking, by this means, they should make them fructify, and bring forth fruit again more abundantly the following year." Wherefore, God forbid his people, the Jews, at the time of their in-gathering, to use any such superstitious or idolatrous rite. And I produce this the rather, because Abarbanel, towards the end of his comment on this place, mentions a gloss of some KARRAITISH author upon it, although it be altogether unlike to this, which we have here related. *חכמי הקראים כתבו במעם לא תבשל גי של תעקב חפזו עם העקרים* Scribunt sapientes Karæorum, Ne coquas hædum in lacte matris suæ, hoc est, Ne commisceatur germen cum radicibus.

But to return. As from the coherence of the whole context thus cleared, it is manifest, that this verse in both places is to be understood only of the Passover; so it may be further confirmed from the Talmudists, who ever expound it in this sense, as appears by the Misna in Zebachin, chapter

the sixth : השחט את הפסח על הדמץ עובר בלא תעשה
 He that killeth the passover with leaven, sinneth
 against a negative command—(which is more
 amongst the Jews than to sin against a positive),
 viz. that in these places already quoted, “Thou
 shalt not offer the blood of my sacrifice with lea-
 ven;” from whence they collected, as Maimonides
 tells us, that they were to put away leaven the
 fourteenth day, a day before the killing of the
 passover. Nay, this place cannot possibly be
 understood in any other sense, as of sacrifices in
 general, because leaven was sometimes commanded
 with sacrifices, as Lev. vii. 13.

But that the blood of the passovers was sprink-
 led, may be demonstrated further, not only from
 that of Hezekiah’s passover, 2 Chron. xxx. 16.
 “The priests sprinkled the blood, which they re-
 ceived from the hand of the Levites; for there
 were many in the congregation that were not sanc-
 tified; therefore the Levites had the charge of
 killing the passovers;” but also from Josiah’s,
 chap. xxxv. ver. 11. which can no ways be evaded;
 “They (that is), the Levites, killed the passover,
 and the priests sprinkled the blood from their
 hands, and the Levites flayed them.” Now the
 sprinkling of the blood is the essence of a sacri-
 fice, as before we noted from the Jewish doctors.
 And therefore the Passover must needs be a sa-
 crifice : ὅτι ἐπει δειῖται.

For a confirmation of all this, I will describe
 punctually the whole manner of the PASCHAL SA-
 CRIFICE from the Misna of the Jewish Talmud, a
 monument of such antiquity, as cannot be dis-
 trusted in these rites. Nothing (say they) was
 killed before the morning sacrifice; and after the

evening sacrifice, nothing but the passover. The evening sacrifice was usually killed between the eighth and ninth hour (that is, half an hour after two in the afternoon), and offered between the ninth and tenth (that is, half an hour after three). But in the evening of the Passover, the daily sacrifice was killed an hour sooner; and after that began the killing of the passover, which was to be done between the two evenings; whereof the first began at noon, from the sun's declination towards the west, the second at sun-set. Yet the *pascha* might be killed before the daily sacrifice, if there were but one to stir the blood, and keep it from coagulating, till the blood of the daily sacrifice were sprinkled; for that was always to be sprinkled first. The passovers were always killed by three several companies. When the court was once full, they shut the doors, and the priests stood all in their ranks, with round vessels in their hands, to receive the blood; those that were of gold, in a rank by themselves, and those that were of silver; all without bottoms, lest they should be set somewhere on the ground, and the blood congeal in them. And they killed the passovers, as the peace-offerings, in any part of the court, because they were *קדשים קלים*, the less holy things;—as *קדש קדשים*, the holy of holies,—were always to be killed at the north side of the altar. The priests then took the blood, and gave it from one to another, till it came to him that stood next the altar; and he sprinkled it all at once towards the bottom of the altar, which was a square of thirty-two cubits, save that the south-east horn had no bottom. After the blood was sprinkled, the lamb was flayed, and cut up, the *imurim*, or

inwards, taken out and laid upon the altar ; then the owner took up the lamb, with the skin of it, and carried it to his own home. The first company having ended, then the second came in, and afterward the third ; and for every company they began a new HALLEL, and sang all the while the passovers were killing ; and when they had finished the *hallel*, they sang it over a second time ; and when they had gone over it a second time, they began it a third time ; although it was never known, that the third time they sang out the *hallel* quite, or came any further than אֲדַבְרִי אֲדַבְרִי before the priests had done.

But because, besides these Talmudistic Jews, there is another sect of KARRAITES, mentioned before (that reject all Talmudical traditions, which are not grounded upon Scripture), though little known amongst us, yet famous in the orient ; I will produce one testimony of theirs also from an ancient manuscript, that so it may appear we have the full consent of all Jewish antiquity for this opinion. The author's name to me is uncertain, because the papers have lost both their beginning and end. But they contain in them divers large and complete discourses upon several arguments in the Karraite way, as about the Jewish year, the sabbath, the Passover, &c. Concerning the Passover, he divides his discourse into several chapters, whereof the title of one is this, במקום הקרבת הפסח ואכילתו, concerning the place where the passover was to be offered and eaten ;—where he thus begins : דע שהקרבת הפסח היא במקום המובחר בכתוב לא תוכל לזבוח את הפסח באחד שעריך ומקום שדשנתו בעזרה ושפירת דמו אל יסוד המזבח ואימדיו היו

אֲדַבְרִי אֲדַבְרִי
I love the Lord,
&c. is the beginning of
Psalm cxvi.
being part of
the *hallel* or
hymn sung at
that time,
which began
at Ps. cxiii.
and reached
to the end of
Ps. cxviii.

וְקָמְדוּ בַמִּזְבֵּחַ, i. e. Know, that the offering of the passover was always in the place which God had chosen (to put his name there), as it is written,—
 “Thou shalt not sacrifice the passover within any of thy gates; and the place of the killing of the passover was in the court called HESRA, and the blood of it was poured out towards the bottom of the altar, and the *imurim* or inward parts of it were burnt upon the altar, &c.

Hence it was, that when Cestius once demanded what the number of the Jews was that resorted to Jerusalem, at the time of their solemn feasts, the priests made answer, and told him exactly how many lambs and kids were sacrificed at the Passover, εικοσίπεντε μυριάδες, πρόσδε πεντακισχίλια ἑξακόσια, twenty-five myriads five thousand and six hundred;—which they could not have done, had not they sacrificed them at the temple.

But what need have we of any more dispute? When the Passover was first kept in Egypt, were not the paschal lambs there killed in a sacrificial and expiatory way, when the blood thereof was to be sprinkled upon the houses, for God to look upon, and so pass over them? It is true, they were killed in every private house; but the reason of that was, because there were then priests in every

* Vide claris.
 Seldenum de
 Succes. in
 Pontificat.
 Hebræor. l. i.
 c. i. et de
 Succes. ad
 Leges Heb.
 l. i. c. v.

family, viz. the * first-born, which were afterward redeemed, when the children of Israel gave up the whole tribe of Levi to God for his service. Such priests as these were those whom Moses sent to sacrifice, Exod. xxiv. 5. called there *young men*; “Moses sent young men of the children of Israel, which offered burnt-offerings, and sacrificed peace-offerings to the Lord;” where

Onkelos the Chaldee paraphrast reads it וְהָיָה בְּיוֹם הַבְּרִיָּה, he sent the first-born :—to which agreeth the Arabic translation of R. Saadiah, and the Persian of Tawasius, as Mr. Selden notes, whom I cannot without honour mention, as the glory of our nation for oriental learning.

And was not the killing of the passover a special type of the death of Christ, the true sacrifice of the world? Give me leave to note one thing to this purpose, upon the credit of Justin Martyr, in his dialogue with Trypho, that in the ancient Hebrew copies of the Bible, there was in the book of Ezra a speech of his, which he made before the passover, expounding the mystery thereof concerning Christ; which, because it favoured the Christians, was timely expunged by the Jews. The speech was this: *Καὶ εἶπεν Ἐσδράς τῷ λαῷ, τοῦτο τὸ πάσχα ὁ Σωτὴρ ἡμῶν καὶ ἡ καταφυγὴ ἡμῶν. Καὶ εἰάν διανοηθῆτε, καὶ ἀναβῆν ὑμῶν ἐπὶ τὴν καρδίαν, ὅτι μέλλομεν αὐτὸν ταπεινοῦν ἐν σημεῖῳ, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ἐλπίσωμεν ἐπ' αὐτὸν, οὐ μὴ ἐρημωθῇ ὁ τόπος οὗτος εἰς τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον, λέγει ὁ θεὸς τῶν δυνάμεων. Ἐὰν δὲ μὴ πιστεύσητε αὐτῷ, μηδὲ εἰσακούσητε τοῦ κηρύγματος αὐτοῦ, ἔσεσθε ἐπὶ χάρμα τοῖς ἔθνεσι.* i. e. *Et dixit Esdras populo, Hoc pascha Salvator noster et perfugium nostrum. Et si in animum induxeritis, et in cor vestrum ascenderit, quod humiliaturi eum simus in signo, et postea speraturi in eum, non desolabitur locus iste in omne tempus, dicit Deus exercituum. Sin in eum, non credideritis, neque audieritis annunciationem ejus, deridiculum eritis gentibus.*—Remarkable it is, if it be true; and the author deserves the better credit in it, because he was a Samaritan, and therefore might be the better skilled in Jewish writings. But however, I am

sure the apostle tells us, not only that the Passover was a type of Christ, in respect of his death, but also that the proper notion of the paschal feast was to be a feast upon sacrifice, in those words, 1 Cor. v. 7, 8. "Christ our passover is sacrificed for us; therefore let us keep the feast (that is, the paschal feast upon this sacrificed Christ) with the unleavened bread of sincerity and truth." Where, alluding to that common Jewish custom of feasting upon sacrifices, of which we have before spoken, he implies, that the paschal supper was a feast of the same nature, a sacrificial feast.

CHAP. III.

An answer to some objections against the Passover's being a sacrifice : and the controversy about the day upon which the Jews kept the Passover about the time of our Saviour's death discussed. Proved against Scaliger, and others of that opinion, that no translation of feasts from one Feria to another were then in use.

BUT yet we will not dissemble, what there is of any moment, either in antiquity or reason, against our own opinion, ere we let this discourse pass, but subject all to an impartial view.

And first, the authority of Philo, who, in his third book *De Vita Mosis*, speaks thus concerning the Passover : Ἐν ἧ οὐχ οἱ μὲν ἰδιῶται προσάγουσι τῷ βωμῷ τὰ ἱερεῖα, θύουσι δ' οἱ ἱερεῖς· ἀλλὰ νόμου προτάξει σύμπαν τὸ ἔθνος ἱεράται, τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἐκάστου τὰς ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν θυσίας ἀνάγοντες τότε καὶ χειρουργοῦντες. Ὁ μὲν οὖν ἄλλος ἅπας λεῶς ἐγεγῆθει καὶ παιδρὸς ἦν, ἐκάστου νομίζοντος ἱερῶσύνῃ τετιμῆσθαι i. e. In qua non ut alias plebei homines victimas adducunt ad altare mactandas a sacerdotibus, sed jubente lege tota gens sacrificat, dum pro se quisque mactat hostiam quis manibus. Tunc universus populus exulta-

bat, unoquoque existimante se sacerdotii dignitate honoratum.—And again, in his book De Decalogo: Ἐν ᾗ θύουσι πανδημί αὐτῶν ἕκαστος, τοὺς ἱερεῖς αὐτῶν οὐκ ἀναμένοντες, ἱερωσύνην τοῦ νόμου χαρισάμενον τῷ ἔθναι παντὶ, μίαν ἡμέραν ἐξαίρετον ἀνὰ πᾶν ἔτος, εἰς αὐτοσυργίαν θυσίων. Quando populariter singuli sacrificant, non exspectatis sacerdotibus, ipsi permissu legis fungentes sacerdotio, quotannis per unum diem destinatum huic negotio.

But to this we answer, that Philo doth not here deny the Passover to be a sacrifice, but confirm it rather, in that he calls it often, here and elsewhere, θυσία, and saith, that they did ἀνάγειν, bring it to the altar,—and that the people did ἱεῖσθαι, sacrifice;—and doth only distinguish this paschal sacrifice from all the other sacrifices in this, that here, according to his opinion, every one of the people was ἱερωσύνη τετιμημένος, honoured with the priestly office,—and that the law did ἱερωσύνην παντὶ τῷ ἔθναι χαρίζεσθαι, make every one a priest for that time, to offer up their own passover.—

But moreover, it is well known, that Philo,* though he were a Jew by nation, yet was very ignorant of Jewish customs, having been born and bred up at Alexandria: and we have a specimen of his mistakes here, in that he seems to

make this difference between the Passover and the other sacrifices, that they were only killed by the priest, but the people themselves killed their own passovers, νόμον προστάζει, and νόμον χαρισάμενον, according to the law;—where he means doubtless that, in Exod. xii. 16. “the whole assembly of the congregation of Israel shall kill it.” For this is that *solenne delirium* of our late authors also,

* Scalig. E. lench. Tribur. cap. xxv. circa finem. Item in Emend. Temp. de Cyclo Judæorum Karaim. et Hug. Grotius in Matt. xxvi.

which we have chastised before. But, if he mean moreover, that the people did not only kill their passovers, but do all other priestly offices concerning them, when he says they were *ἱερωσύνη τε-τιμημένοι* this, as it hath no ground from Scripture (and, I think, will hardly find a patron now to defend it), so it doth not prejudice our opinion of the Passover's being a sacrifice, but still much confirm it.

Secondly, it may seem to some a kind of impossibility to conceive, how so many sacrifices, as there must be at every Passover, could all be offered upon one altar, since there were no more by the law permitted.

To which, nevertheless, I need not answer any thing but this; that there was nothing but the fat and some of the inwards burnt upon the altar; and that the bigness of the altar was greater than perhaps is ordinarily conceived: for under the second temple, the area thereof, upon the top, was a square of twenty-eight cubits, as the Talmudists constantly relate; to which Josephus also agreeth very near, if the difference of those cubits, which he useth, be allowed. Only they may please to learn from the instance of Josiah's Passover,

²Chron. xxxv.

which was said to be so great, that "there was no Passover like to that kept in Israel, from the days of Samuel the prophet, unto that time," that this was possible to be done; for it either is or must be confessed, that then they were all offered upon the altar.

But, lastly, we must confess ingenuously, that there is one great difficulty yet behind, concerning our Saviour's last Passover, which, according to the general consent of our best divines, critics,

and chronologers, was kept a day before the Jews kept their Passover: whether therefore his paschal lamb, which he with his apostles did then eat, were first sacrificed at the temple; and how could that be?

Where, not to engage ourselves any more than needs we must, in that nice and perplexed but famous controversy, concerning the time of the Jewish Passover about our Saviour's death; it will not be amiss, first to take notice, that the Latin church ever maintained the contrary opinion against the Greeks, viz. that the Jews kept the Passover on the same night which our Saviour did: and though it be true, that of later times most of our best learned authors have quitted that opinion of the Latins, and closed altogether with the Greeks, as Paulus Burgensis, Munster, Scaliger, and Casaubon; yet, notwithstanding, our countryman, Mr. Broughton (understanding, perhaps, better than they did, that the Jewish Passover was a true and proper sacrifice, and first, according to God's command, was to be offered up to God, before feasted on), espied a difficulty here concerning our Saviour's Passover (which they took no notice of), that could not easily be solved; and therefore, he thought good *scindere nodum*, as Alexander did, to cut the knot which he could not loose,—and absolutely to deny, that the Jewish Passover, and our Saviour's, were then celebrated on two several nights. And he is of late seconded by Johannes Cloppenburg, a Belgic divine (in an epistle written upon this argument to Ludovicus De Dieu), insisting upon the very same ground, because the paschal lamb, which Christ with his disciples did eat,

could not have been sacrificed at the temple, unless it had been at the same time when the Jewish Passover was solemnly celebrated. His words to this purpose, expressing fully Mr. Broughton's sense, are these "Non potuit mactari agnus paschalis extra templum Hierosolymitanum: In templo mactari non potuit citra generalem populi consensum: Quare neque dies mactationis potuit anticipari." It follows, "Vel ergo dicendum Christum comedisse agnum non mactatum in templo, atque hoc facto (quod absit) legem violasse; (juxta legem enim agnus privatim comedendus e templo deferendus domi erat in ædes privatas, post igne absumtam in templo adipem, et sanguinem delatum ad altare); vel Judæos eodem tempore cum Christo pascha celebrasse."

But I must confess, although I am as much addicted to that hypothesis of the Passover's being a sacrifice, and as tender of it as Mr. Broughton could be, or any body else; yet I cannot but yield myself captive to truth, on which side soever it presents itself, and though it be εἰς καθαίρειν τῶν ἰδίων (as Aristotle saith a philosopher should do), to the destruction of our own phenomena.

And indeed those two places especially, brought out of St. John's gospel, to prove that the Jews kept their Passover the day after our Saviour did his, seem to me to be unanswerable, nor any way cured by those σοφὰ φάρμακα, which are applied to them.

The first is chap. xix. ver. 14. where, the next day after Christ had kept his Passover with his disciples, when Pilate delivered him up to the Jews to be crucified, it is said, that it was then παρασκευὴ τοῦ Πάσχα, the preparation of the Pass-

over;—where they tell us, that by the preparation of the Passover is meant the preparation of the sabbath, on which the second day of the Passover fell. But, *En jecur criticum!* as Scaliger sometimes cries out; and what a far-fetched conceit is this!

The second is that in chap. xviii. ver. 28. When Jesus was led into Pilate's judgment-hall, early in the morning, it is said, that the Jews themselves went not into the judgment-hall, lest they should be defiled, but that they might eat the passover. Here we are told, that by eating the passover is meant the eating of the *chagigah*, that was killed the day before with the passover, whereof something, perhaps, remained till the day following. And this gloss is little better than the former; for, although they appeal to that place in Deut. xvi. 2. to prove, that the *chagigah* was sometimes called by the name of *passover*, which indeed, if our English translation were authentic, would make something for them; "Thou shalt therefore sacrifice the passover unto the Lord thy God of the flock and the herd," as if there had been a passover of oxen, as well as of sheep; yet in the Hebrew the words run thus, חֲבֹחַת פֶּסַח לַיהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ צֶאֱזוּ וּבָקֶר, which, according to a several punctuation, and a several supplying of something that must be understood, may be expounded several ways; any of which is far better than that which our English translators have unhappily pitched upon.

Onkelos, in his paraphrase (which seldom merits that name, being indeed commonly nothing but a rigid version, reads it thus, וְתִבְנוּ פֶסַח קֹדֶם, יְהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ מִן בְּנֵי עַמּוֹ תִּבְחַס קֹדֶם מִן תִּחַר, i. e. And

thou shalt sacrifice the passover before the Lord thy God of the sons of the flock, and the peace-offerings (thereof) of oxen;—which interpretation is followed by R. Solomon and Aben-Ezra, צאן לחיוב הפסח ובקר לשלמים i. e. sheep for the Passover, and oxen for the peace-offerings, or the *chagigah*.—And it may be confirmed from that of Josiah's Passover, 2 Chron. xxxv. 7. "Josiah gave to the people, of the flock, lambs and kids, all for the Passover-offerings, to the number of thirty thousand, and three thousand bullocks:" where the bullocks, or the herd, are divided from the Passover-offerings, because they served for the peace-offerings, or the *chagigah*, as appeareth from ver. 13. "They roasted the passovers with fire, according to the ordinance; but the OTHER HOLY OFFERINGS (that is, the peace-offerings, or *chagigah*) sod they in pots, and cauldrons, and pans." Nachmanides hath another interpretation of it to this purpose, יצוה בפסח חמא חשה שהובד כבוד, וצאן ובקר אלים ועוים ובני בקר לחיוב חגיגה i. e. He commandeth here the passover, which was a lamb, as he had said before—(making the pause there); and צאן ובקר the flock and the herd; or the sheep and the kids, and the young bullocks, for the *chagigah*;—giving other instances, in which the conjunctive particle *vau*, which he doth here supply, is in like manner to be understood.

And this exposition is rather approved than the former, not only by Abarbanel, but also by the Karraite, which I have before commended; who, quoting one R. Aaron for the author of it, doth express it thus: ויהיה מאמר חבת מושך עצמו ואחר עמו חבת פסח ליהיה אלוהי חבת צאן ובקר כמו ולא למדתי חבת חבת חמת, i. e. The word חבת (Thou

shalt sacrifice) is to be repeated ἀπὸ κιονοῦ before THE FLOCK AND THE HERD, thus,—And thou shalt sacrifice the passover to the Lord thy God, and thou shalt sacrifice sheep and oxen, or the flock and the herd; as in like manner, Prov. xxx. 3. the particle (ὃν *not*) is to be repeated ἀπὸ κιονοῦ from the former part of the verse.—So that it cannot hence be proved, that the peace-offerings, offered with the passover, were ever called by the name of Passover.

There is another place in the same evangelist, that hath not been observed by any one, to this purpose, which, if it were rightly understood, would be as clear a testimony as any of the rest. And it is in the 19th chapter, ver. 31. ἦν γὰρ μεγάλη ἡ ἡμέρα ἐκείνη τοῦ Σαββάτου, for that sabbath-day was a great day.—Μεγάλη ἡμέρα, in the Greek of the Hellenists, is used for the first, or the last day of every solemn feast, in which there was a holy convocation to the Lord. This appeareth from Isa. i. 13. “Your new-moons and sabbaths, the calling of assemblies (which was the first and last day of the feast), I cannot away with:” which the Septuagint render thus, Τὰς Νουμηνίας ὑμῶν καὶ τὰ Σάββατα, καὶ τὰς μεγάλας ἡμέρας, Your new-moons and sabbaths, and your GREAT DAYS.—For the last day of the feast we have it used by our evangelist, chap. vii. ver. 37. “In the last day, the GREAT DAY of the feast, ἡμέρα τῇ μεγάλῃ τῆς ἐορτῆς; and doubtless by the same evangelist for the first day of the feast, in this place: and therefore the Jews did not eat their passover till the night before, which was the same night our Saviour was crucified.

Which may be strengthened further by this ar-

gument; that if the Jews had celebrated their Passover the same night which our Saviour did his, it is certain, they would never have gone about immediately with swords and staves to have apprehended him, and then have brought him to the high-priest's hall, and afterward have arraigned him at Pilate's judgment-seat, and lastly have crucified him; all the same day. For the first day of unleavened bread was, by the law, a holy convocation to the Lord, on which it was not lawful to do any work; and we know the Jews were rigid enough in observing these legal ceremonies.

If then it must be granted, that our Saviour, with his disciples, kept the Passover the night before the vulgar Jews did celebrate it, our next work is to shew, how it might be probable, that our Saviour's passover was first sacrificed at the temple.

And here, perhaps, I might run for shelter to that story in Suidas, upon the word Ἰησοῦς, that Christ was enrolled into the number of the two-and-twenty legal priests, that served at the altar, from the pretended confession of an ancient Jew in Justinian's time; and then he might possibly sacrifice his own passover at the temple, though the Jews had not solemnized theirs till the day after; but that I hold this to be a mere fable, and that not only ridiculous, but impious.

Or I might take up the opinion of the Greeks, that Christ did not keep a true legal Passover, but a feast of unleavened bread in imitation of it; or, *In Annot. ad Matt. c. xxvi. as the learned Hugh* Grotius (who hath lately asserted this opinion) expresseth it, not Πάσχα θύσιμον, but μνημονευτικόν, such as the

Jews at this day keep, because the temple being down, their sacrifices are all ceased. But this opinion hath been exploded by most of our late authors; and indeed I can no way satisfy myself in it, and therefore will not acquiesce in this answer.

But before we are able to give a true account of this query, we must search a little deeper into the true ground of this difference between our Saviour's Passover and the Jews'.

The common opinion is, that the Jews in our Saviour's time were wont to translate their festivals from one *Feria* to another upon several occasions; as, whenever two festivals were immediately to follow one another, to join them into one; and therefore, when any fell upon the sixth *Feria*, to put it over to the next *Feria* or the sabbath, to avoid the concurrence of two sabbaths together; in the same manner as the Jews use to do in their calendar at this day, where they have several rules to this purpose, expressed by abbreviatures, thus, *Adu*, *Badu*, *Gahaz*, *Zabad*, *Agu*; whereof each letter is a numeral for some *Feria*. The rule for the Passover is *בדר*, *Badu*; that is, that it should not be kept on the second, fourth, or sixth *Feria*. (There is an extract of a Rabbinical decree to this purpose, under the name of R. Eliezer, in Munster upon Matt. chap. xxvi.) And therefore, at this time, when our Saviour was crucified, the Passover falling upon the sixth *Feria*, or Friday, was, say they, by the Jews translated, according to this rule, to the next *Feria*, and kept on Saturday, or the sabbath; but our Saviour, not regarding these traditions, observed that day precisely which was commanded in the law, *ἐν ἡ ἑτέρα*

θύεσθαι τὸ πάσχα, (Luke xxii. 7.) that is, as they expound it, "upon which the Passover ought to have been killed;" which was Friday, the day before.

But, under favour, I conceive, that all these decrees, together with that *rationcinium*, or calendar, to which they do belong, were not then in use in our Saviour's time (although it be so confidently averred by the incomparable Joseph Scaliger), but long since invented by the Jews. Which I shall make appear;

First, In that the ancient Jews, about and since our Saviour's time, often solemnized as well the Passovers, as the other feasts, upon the *Ferias* next before and after the sabbaths, and those other *Ferias*, which have been made rejectitious since by that calendar. In the Talmudical title Succoth, chapter the last, we read of יום טוב הסמוך לשבת בן לפניו בן לאחריו that is, a feast going immediately before, or following immediately after, the sabbath.—And in Betzah, chap. i. יום טוב של לילית, and יום טוב של לילית ערב שבת שבת, a feast, that falls to be on the evening of the sabbath, or the day after the sabbath.—In Chagigah, the second chapter, עצרת של לילית בערב שבת, which is to the same purpose with the former. More particularly concerning the Passover Pesachim, chap. vii. sect. 10. "Ossa, nervi, et omne residuum agni paschalis, cremantur sexto decimo: si is dies sabbatum, decimo septimo." From this, and divers like places of the Talmud, Aben Ezra on Lev. xxiii. 4. observes, במסכתא נה בתלמוד ראית שיהא, פסח בבדי. There be divers instances in the Misna and the Gemara of the Passovers being kept in BADU,—that is, on those days, which were made

rejection in the late calendar, the second, fourth, and sixth *Feria*. Therefore, these translations were not in use when the doctors of the Misna and Gemara lived.

Secondly, In that the Jews ever, while the temple stood, observed their new moons and feasts, according to the *φάσις* or appearance—of the moon, and therefore had no calendar for their rule to sanctify their feasts by, but they were then sanctified by the heavens, as the Misna speaks. This is so clearly delivered by R. Moses Ben Maimon, in that excellent Halachah, entitled, *KIDDUSH HACHODESH*, that I wonder so many learned men, that are well skilled in those authors, should miss of it. For having spoken of the rules of observing the *φάσις*, he then adds, that these were never made use of since the Sanhedrin ceased in the land of Israel, after the destruction of the temple; since which time they have used a calendar, calculated according to the middle motion of the moon. דבר זה הלכה למשה מסיני הוא שבזמן שיש סנהדרין קבעין עלפי הראייה ובזמן שאין שם סנהדרין קבעין עלפי החשבון והוא שאנו משתנים בו היום ואין נוקקין לראיה אלא פעמים שהיה יום שקבעין בחשבון זה הואיום הראייה או קדם לו ביום או אחריו ביום: Et hæc erat traditio Mosis in monte Sinai, quod omni tempore, quo duraret Sanhedrin, constituerent Neomenias juxta *φάσιν* hoc vero tempore, quo jam cessavit Sanhedrin, constituerent secundum calculum hunc astronomicum, quo nos hodie utimur: nec ullo modo jam ad *φάσιν* nos astringimus, cum sæpe contingat, ut dies, legitimus secundum nostrum calculum vel concurrat cum lunari *φάσει*, vel antevortat eam unica die, vel etiam subsequatur.—And again, a little after, most punctually; מאימתי התחילו כל ישראל לחשוב בחשבון חזק מסוף חכמי תלמוד בעת שהדבה ארץ ישראל ולא נשאר בית דין

קבעו אבל בימי חכמי משנה וכו' בימי חכמי תלמוד עד ימי אב"י
 חזבא על קבועת ארץ ישראל היו סמכין. Quando primum
 cœperunt omnes Israelitæ computare, secundum
 hunc calculum? A fine doctorum Talmudicorum,
 quando jam desolata erat terra Israel, neque erat
 consistorium aut synedrium, quod determinaret:
 nam per omnes dies doctorum Misnæ et doctorum
 Gemaræ, usque ad Abæum et Rabbæum, acqui-
 escebant omnes Judæi in sanctione terræ Israelis.
 —And those rules forementioned of not keeping
 the several feasts upon such and such *Ferías*
 were made together with this calendar, as the
 same author there also avoucheth: אין קבעין בהשבת: זה
 בימי אור לפי שהחשבון זה הוא לקבוע הידודה שמש בחלובת
 i. e. אמועתה לא במקום אמת לפיכך עשו יום קביעה ויום דחיה
 In this account they never constituted the new-
 moon of Tisri upon Adu, because this account
 was made according to the conjunction of the sun
 and moon in the middle-motion; therefore, now
 they constituted some legitimate and other rejéc-
 titious days, which they could not do before,
 when the new-moon (and therefore all the other
 feasts) was determined according to the *phases*.

But the Talmud was not completely finished
 till about the five hundredth year of the Christian
 era; therefore this Jewish calendar, and these
 rules concerning the translation of feasts, were
 not in being till about that time, and so could be
 no reason of this difference between the time, in
 which our Saviour solemnized the Passover, and
 the other Jews.

For further confirmation hereof, we may ob-
 serve, that the Karraites, which have rejected the
 fond traditions of the Pharisees, retain still the
 ancient custom of reckoning their new-moons *and*

τῆς φάσεως, as * Scaliger himself hath well observed: though in this he were mistaken, that he thought they had assumed it of late, merely out of hatred to the other Jews, whereas they have kept it in a constant succession from antiquity, and hold it still as necessary by Divine right. אסנן הוא מההעתקה (saith my author) שכל ישראל מודים בה שמונן המלכות היי מקדשים וחדשים בראיית החד: ועוד מהקש כח הדוכד ערע הענן ממלת חדש יורע שהוא חרש הדבר ודוא חרש ירחבל חדש. This is confessed by all Israel, that from the time of the kingdom they were ever wont to consecrate the new-moons by the φάσις and the very etymon of the word *chodesh* implies so much, for it signifies the renewing of something; so that it is denominated from the change of the moon, or phasis, as the epocha and beginning of it.—And this is one of the great controversies to this day between those two sects of the Jews, the קראים or Karræi,—and רבנים, or Rabbanæi;—which is grown at length to such a height, that the Karaites, deciphering the conditions of those witnesses, whose testimonies might be accounted valid for the φάσις, make this for one, that they should no way belong to the sect of Rabbinists: which perhaps to observe in the author's own words would not be unpleasant τοῖς φιλαρχαίοις καὶ φιλολόγοις. חתבאי השני שלא ידעו הליק ברעתו בקדש החדש מדעת חבמינו וחבה מות הצד ראוי לקבל עדות וישמעעלים מפני שהם חילבים אחרי רעת חבמינו בעניי הראייה וברייב הזמנים אני שרים עמחם ואין ראוי לקבל לט עדות הרבנים מפני שהם דלוקים ממני בזה ואעפ שאחינו ובשרנו הם אמנם בזה מוד ונעבנו את רוח קדשו, i. e. A second condition is, that they be not such, as hold an opinion concerning the sanctification of the new-moon different from the opinion of our wise men concerning the pha-

* Euseb.
Temp. p.
149, 150.

sis, and in most of their appointed times they agree with us. But we may not receive the testimony of any one that is of the sect of the Rabbins, because they are divided from us in this; and although they be our brethren and our flesh, yet herein they have rebelled and grieved his Holy Spirit.

Having thus disproved the common and received opinion, and removed the false ground of this difference of time between our Saviour's Passover and the Jews, we come, in the next place, to lay down the true, which must be derived from that way of reckoning the months, and of determining the *רֵאשִׁית הַחֹדֶשׁ*, the head or beginning of the month, —which was in use in our Saviour's time, which (as we have shewed already in general) was by the *φάσις* so it will be expedient to describe the whole manner of it more particularly from authentic authors.*

* Talmud Babyl. in Rosh Hashanah, et Maimon. in Kiddish Hachod.

In the great or outer court of the temple, there was a house called Beth-Jazek, where the senate sat all the thirtieth day of every month, to receive the witnesses of the moon's appearance, and to examine them. And here they always had a feast provided for the entertainment of those that came, to encourage men to come the more willingly. In ancient times they did admit of strangers, and receive their testimony, if it were approved upon examination. But when the heretics (that is, the Christians) afterward grew up, by whom (they say) they were sometimes deluded, they began to grow shy, and to admit of none but such as were approved of to be of the Jews' religion. If there came approved witnesses upon the thirtieth

day of the $\phi\acute{\alpha}\varsigma\iota\varsigma$ seen, then the chief man of the senate stood up and pronounced MEKUDDASH, it is sanctified;—and the people standing by caught the word from him, and cried out MEKUDDASH, MEKUDDASH. Whereupon there was notice presently given to all the country; which was done at first by torches from mountain to mountain, till at length the Christians (they say) abused them in that kind also with false fires; wherefore they were fain to send messengers from place to place over the whole land, to give intelligence of the new-moon. But if, when the consistory had sat all the thirtieth day, there came no approved witnesses of the $\phi\acute{\alpha}\varsigma\iota\varsigma$, then they made an intercalation of one day in the former month, and decreed the following one-and-thirtieth day to be the calends. And yet, notwithstanding, if after the fourth or fifth day there should come some witnesses from afar, that testified they had seen the $\phi\acute{\alpha}\varsigma\iota\varsigma$ in its due time, nay, though they came towards the end of the month ($\text{מִסְלֵיבָא בְּסֶף הַחֹדֶשׁ}$) the senate, when they had used all means by affrighting them from that testimony, that so, if it were possible, they might decline a new consecration (after they had already made an *embolism* in the former month) if the witnesses remained constant, were then bound to alter the beginning of the month, and reckon it a day sooner, to wit, from the thirtieth day.

Here we see the true ground of the difference of a day, that might arise continually about the calends of the month, and so consequently about any of the other feasts, which did all depend on them; viz. between the true time of the moon's $\phi\acute{\alpha}\varsigma\iota\varsigma$, upon the thirtieth day, and that of the se-

nate's decree, a day after. For since it appears out of their own monuments, how unwilling they were, having once made a consecration of the *neomenia*, to alter it again; it may be probably conceived, that, in those degenerated times, the senate might many times refuse to accept the testimony of undoubted witnesses: and then, it seems, they had such a canon as this, בית דין שקדשו את החדש בין שנים בין משעים דנה זה מקדש ודיבין חבל לתקן המעשים על דתם אעפי שזה יורעשמש. that whatsoever time the senate should conclude of for the calends of the month, though it were certain they were in the wrong, yet all were bound to order their feasts according to it:—Which I cannot think was approved of by our Saviour, and the most pious Jews. And, therefore, I conceive it most probable, that this was the very case between our Saviour's Passover and the Jews', in that he followed the true *φάσις*, confirmed by sufficient and assured witnesses; but the other Jews superstitiously observed the pertinacious decree of the senate of Sanhedrin, which was for the day after.

And now, at last, we are come again to the acme of the question that was first propounded, How our Saviour's passover, notwithstanding all this, might be sacrificed the day before those of the other Jews were.

To which I answer, that upon this ground, not only our Saviour and his apostles, but also divers others of the most religious Jews, kept the Passover upon the fifteenth day from the true *φάσις* of the moon, and not from the senate's decree, which I may confirm from the testimony of Epiphanius, that reports there was, at this time, *θόρυβος*, a tumult and contention,

In Panario
Hær. ii.

amongst the Jews about the Passover; and so we may easily persuade those other evangelists, that intimate Christ's Passover to have been solemnized, when many others kept it, to agree with St. John, who assures us, that it was also by divers Jews kept the day after. Now, it was a custom among the Jews, in such doubtful cases as these, which oftentimes fell out, to permit the feasts to be solemnized, or passovers killed, on two several days together. Maimonides affirmeth, that, in the remoter parts of the land of Israel, they always solemnized the feast of the new-moons two days together; nay, in Jerusalem itself, where the senate sat, they kept the new-moon of Tisri, which was the beginning of the year, twice, lest they should be mistaken in it. In the Talmud we have an instance of the Passover's being kept two days together, because the new-moon was doubtful, in Gemarah Rosh Hashanah, cap. i. Hence the Karrites, who still keep the ancient custom of observing the moon's *phases*, retain it as a rule to this day, לעשות שני ימים, *observare duos dies propter dubium*.—Nay, the Rabbinical Jews themselves, since they have changed the phasis for the synod or conjunction of the moon in the middle motion, in imitation hereof, still observe to keep the Passover two days together, *iisdem ceremoniis*, as the learned author of the Jewish Synagogue reports; and Scaliger himself, not only of that, but also of the other feasts, "Judæi post institutionem hodierni computi eandem solennitatem celebrant biduo, propterea quod mensem incipiant a medio motu lunæ: itaque מספּק מתברר המארים *propter dubium conjunctionis luminarium*, Pascha celebrant 15.

et 16. Nisan, Pentecosten 6. et 7. Sivan, Scenopagia 15. et 16. Tisri; idque vocant עֵשׂר עָשָׂר מִלֵּיל פֶּסַח. Festum secundum exiliorum.

Now then we see, that nothing hinders, but that the Passover might be a sacrifice. And thus we have hitherto cleared the way.

CHAP. IV.

Demonstrated, that the Lord's supper in the Christian church, in reference to the true sacrifice of Christ, is a parallel to the feasts upon sacrifices both in the Jewish religion and heathenish superstition.

BUT lest we should seem all this while to set up fancies of our own, and then sport with them, we come now to demonstrate and evince, that the Lord's supper, in the proper notion of it, is *EXULUM EX OBLATIS*, or a FEAST UPON SACRIFICE; in the same manner with the feasts upon the Jewish sacrifices under the law, and the feasts upon *ΕΙΔΩΛΟΘΥΤΑ*, (things offered to idols) among the heathens: and that from a place of Scripture, where all these three shall be compared together, and made exact parallels to one another.

1 CORINTH. chap. x.

14. Wherefore, my dearly beloved, flee from idolatry.

15. I speak as to wise men, judge ye what I say.

16. The cup of blessing, which we bless, is it not the communion of the blood of Christ? The bread, which we break, is it not the communion of the body of Christ?

18. Behold Israel after the flesh; are not they which eat of the sacrifices partakers of the altar?

20. Now I say, that the things, which the Gentiles sacrifice, they sacrifice to devils, and not to God; and I would not, that ye should have fellowship with devils.

21. Ye cannot drink the cup of the Lord and the cup of devils; ye cannot be partakers of the Lord's table, and the table of devils.

Where the apostle's scope being to convince the Corinthians of the unlawfulness of eating things sacrificed to idols, he doth it in this manner: shewing, that though an idol were truly nothing, and things sacrificed to idols were physically nothing, as different from other meats, (as, it seems, they argued, and St. Paul confesses, ver. 19.) yet morally and circumstantially, to eat of things sacrificed to idols in the idol's temple, was to consent with the sacrifices, and to be guilty of them.

Which he doth illustrate, first, from a parallel rite in Christian religion; where the eating and drinking of the body and blood of Christ, offered up to God upon the cross for us in the Lord's supper, is a real communication in his death and sacrifice: ver. 16. "The cup of blessing, which we bless, is it not the communion of the blood of Christ? The bread, which we break, is it not the communion of the body of Christ?"

Secondly, From another parallel of the same rite among the Jews; where always they, that ate of the sacrifices, were accounted partakers of the altar, that is, of the sacrifice offered up upon the altar, ver. 18. "Behold Israel after the flesh; are not they which eat of the sacrifices partakers of the altar?" "In veteri lege quicumque admitte-

bantur ad edendum de hostiis oblati, censebantur ipsius sacrificii, tanquam pro ipsis oblatis, fieri participes, et per illud sanctificari;" as a late commentator fully expresses it.

Therefore, as to eat the body and blood of Christ in the Lord's supper, is to be made partaker of his sacrifice offered up to God for us; as to eat of the Jewish sacrifices under the law, was to partake in the legal sacrifices themselves: so to eat of things offered up in sacrifice to idols, was to be made partakers of the idol-sacrifices, and therefore was unlawful.

For the things which the Gentiles sacrifice, they sacrifice to devils; but Christ's body and blood were offered up in sacrifice unto God, and therefore they could not partake of both together, the sacrifice of the true God, and the sacrifice of devils. "Ye cannot drink the cup of the Lord, and the cup of devils; ye cannot be partakers of the Lord's table, and the table of devils." St. Paul's argument here must needs suppose a perfect analogy between these three, and that they are all parallels to one another; or else it hath no strength. Wherefore I conclude from hence, that the LORD'S SUPPER is the same among Christians, in respect of the Christian sacrifice, that among the Jews the feasts upon the legal sacrifices were, and among the Gentiles the feasts upon the idol sacrifices; and therefore EPULUM SACRIFICIALE, or EPULUM EX OBLATIS. ΟΝΕΡ'ΕΔΕΙ ΔΕΙΞΑΙ.

CHAP. V.

The result of the former discourse; that the Lord's supper is not a sacrifice, but a feast upon a sacrifice.

THUS having declared and demonstrated the true notion of the Lord's supper, we see then how that theological controversy, which hath cost so many disputes, whether the Lord's supper be a sacrifice, is already decided: for it is not *SACRIFICIUM*, but *EPULUM 'EK TH'S ΘΥΣΙΑΣ*, not a sacrifice, but a feast upon sacrifice;—or else, in other words, not *OBLATIO SACRIFICII*, but, as Tertullian excellently speaks, *PARTICIPATIO SACRIFICII*, not the offering of something up to God upon an altar, but the eating of something which comes from God's altar,—and is set upon our tables. Neither was it ever known amongst the Jews or heathens, that those tables, upon which they did eat their sacrifices, should be called by the name of altars. St. Paul, speaking of the feasts upon the idol-sacrifices, calls the places, upon which they were eaten, “the table of devils,” because the devils' meat was eaten on them; not the altars of devils: and yet doubtless he spake according to the true propriety of speech, and in those technical words, that were then in use amongst them. And, therefore, keeping the same analogy, he must needs call the communion-table by the name of the Lord's table, *i. e.* the table, upon which God's meat is eaten; not his altar, upon which it is offered. It is true, an altar is nothing but a table; but it is a table upon which God himself eats,

consuming the sacrifices by his holy fire: but when the same meat is given from God unto us to eat of, the relation being changed, the place on which we eat is nothing but a table.

And because it is not enough in any discourse, as Aristotle well observeth in his Ethics, to confute an error, unless we can also shew τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ ψευδούς, the cause of that error;—having thus discovered the true notion of the Lord's supper, we may easily discern from hence also, how that mistake grew up, and that by the degeneration of this truth. There is a sacrifice in the Lord's supper symbolically, but not there as offered up to God, but feasted on by us; and so not a sacrifice, but a sacrificial feast; which began too soon to be misunderstood.

CHAP. VI.

The further improvement of that general notion, how the Lord's supper is a federal rite between God and us, at large: concluded with a memorable story out of Maimonides and Nachmanides.

I SHOULD now come to make some further improvement of this general notion of the Lord's supper, by shewing what these feasts upon the sacrifice did signify under the law; and then applying the same in a more perfect manner to the Lord's supper under the gospel, being warranted thereunto by that analogy, which is between them. But because there may be divers glosses and interpretations of these feasts upon the sacrifices, which are obvious to every common understanding, we will decline them all, and pitch only upon one, which is not so vulgarly under-

stood; and it is this, that the eating of God's sacrifice was a FEDERAL RITE between God and those that offered them; according to the custom of the ancients, and especially in those oriental parts, to confirm and ratify their covenants by eating and drinking together.

Thus when Isaac made a covenant with Abimelech the king of Gerar, the text saith, ^{Gen. xxvi.} "He made him and those that were with him a feast, and they did eat and drink, and rose up betimes in the morning, and sware to one another."

When Laban made a covenant with Jacob, Gen. xxxi. 44. "Now, therefore, come (saith Laban) let us make a covenant, I and thou, and let it be for a witness between me and thee:" then it follows in the text, "They took stones, and made a heap, and did eat there upon the heap; and Laban called it JEGAR-SAHADUTHA," in his Chaldee tongue, but Jacob (in the Hebrew language) GALEED, *i. e.* a heap of witness;—implying, that those stones, upon which they had eaten and drank together, should be a witness against either of them that should first violate that covenant. R. Moses Bar Nachman, in his comment, thus glosseth upon this place, *אכלו שם מעט לחם, שחצו דרך באים בברית לאכול שנים מלחם אחד לחברת ולאחבה ואחרי כן בשבתה וברית וכן עשה להם כרה גדולה, i. e.* They did eat there a little upon the heap for a memorial; because it was the manner of those that enter into covenant, to eat both together of the same bread, as a symbol of love and friendship.—And Isaac Abrabanel much to the purpose, *זאת מנהג בנידם שהאובלים להם על שלחן אחד יושבו ראשים נאמנים, i. e.* It was an ancient cus-

tom amongst them, that they, which did eat bread together upon the same table, should be accounted ever afterwards as entire brethren.—And in this sense he conceiveth that place, Lamentations v. 6. may be expounded; “We have given the hand to the Egyptians and to the Assyrians by fulness of bread,” i. e. We have made a covenant with them.

Joshua ix. 14. When the Gibeonites came to the Israelites, and desired them to make a league with them, it is said, “The men of Israel took of their victuals, and asked not counsel of the mouth of the Lord;” that is, they made a covenant with them, as Kimchi learnedly expounds it, לקח מצודים ואכלו ממנו בברית בור שבטוי בהם. *Acceperunt de viatico ipsorum, et comederunt cum illis per modum fœderis.*—For so it follows afterward in the text, “And Joshua made peace with them.”

Hence also was that emphatical expression, Psalm xli. 9. spoken literally by David of Achitophel, “Mine own familiar friend, that did eat of my bread, hath lift up the heel against me;” but seeming prophetically to glance at Judas, that dipping with Christ in the same dish betrayed him. The singular emphasis of which speech, we, that are unacquainted with this custom of the oriental nations, cannot easily perceive; neither can we any where better learn it, than from that passage of Celsus in Origen, who carping at that history of Judas’s betraying Christ in the gospel, as an incredible thing, made, in the meanwhile, an excellent comment upon this prophecy, when he little thought of it. Ὅτι ἀνθρώπῳ μὲν ὁ κοινωνήσας τραπέζης οὐκ ἂν αὐτῷ ἐπιβουλεύσειεν, πολλῷ πλέον ὁ θεῷ συνευώχηθεις οὐκ ἂν αὐτῷ ἐπὶ βουλος ἐγίνετο, i. e. Si ho-

mini nemo insidiaretur ejusdem mensæ particeps, multo minus Deo;—And Origen's reply to him, which shews, that though this were an unusual thing, yet it sometimes came to pass, is very pregnant also for our purpose: Τίς γάρ οὐκ οἶδεν ὅτι πολλοὶ κοινωνήσαντες ἀλῶν καὶ τραπέζης ἐπεβούλευσαν τοῖς συνεστίαις; καὶ πλήρης ἐστὶν ἡ Ἑλλήνων καὶ Βαρβάρων ἱστορία τοιούτων παραδειγμάτων. Καὶ οὐκ οἶδον γε ὁ Πάριος Ἰαμβοιοῖς τὸν Λυκάμβαντα μετὰ ἄλλας καὶ τράπεζαν συνθήκας ἀθετήσαντα, φησὶ πρὸς αὐτόν, Ὁρκὸν δὲ ἐνοσφίσθης μέγαν, ἄλλας τε καὶ τράπεζαν. i. e. Quis ignorat multos ad communionem salis et mensæ adhibitos insidiatos tamen suis contubernalibus? Plena est historia tam Græcorum quam Barbarorum exemplis ejusmodi. Et Parius ille Iamborum scriptor, exprobrans Lycambæ violatum fœdus quod sal et mensa conciliaverat, sic eum alloquitur, sacramentum irritasti magnum, salem atque mensam.—All which makes manifest, what a heinous offence it was accounted anciently to be guilty of the breach of a covenant, which had been confirmed by eating and drinking together.

In the seventh verse of Obadiah, that prophet speaks to Edom in this manner: "All the men of thy confederacy have brought thee to the border; the men, that were at peace with thee, have deceived thee; they, that eat thy bread, have laid a wound under thee."

In the New Testament, that place, John iv. 9. is well observed by Heinsius, in his Aristarchus, to carry this notion, "How is it that thou, being a Jew, askest drink of me, being a woman of Samaria?" "Suavissime dictum (saith that forenamed critic) ex eorum more, qui, cum peregrini essent,

aut alieno fuissent animo, animis conciliandis cibum mutuo ac potum alter alterius gustabant."

Wherefore, I think from all these instances I may conclude, that this is the true etymon of that Hebrew word ברית, which signifies a covenant,—or any federal communion betwixt parties, from ברך, comedere,—because it was the constant custom of the Hebrews and oriental nations to establish covenants by eating and drinking together; as hath been shewed.

And as the Jews, so likewise did the heathens in the same manner, use to ratify their covenants between parties, by eating together. Lucian in Toxaris reports it of the Scythians, that when any one was injured, and could not revenge himself, the manner was, that he should kill an ox, and cut it into small pieces; which being boiled, he was to sit down by them with his hands behind him (which was a gesture of earnest supplication amongst them), and then whosoever was minded to help him, came, and did eat a piece of his flesh, and so with this ceremony promised to assist him. And this was accounted a covenant of mutual defence between them; whence that Greek proverb; *Ἐπὶ βύρῳ ἐκαθήζοντο*, In tergore bovis desedit,—of which Erasmus in his Adages.

Herodotus reporteth of the Persians, that they made their leagues and covenants at feasts; and of the Nasamones, a people of Lybia, that they composed peace by stretching out a cup full of wine to each other, and pledging one another in it. Alexander ab Alexandro relates this of the Thracians and Egyptians, that "e cornibus boum (quæ veteribus poculorum loco erant) vina sibi in-

vicem propinantes, id firmissimum contracti fœderis vinculum esse putabant." Curtius reporteth of the Macedonians, "quod patrio ritu fœdus, quod sanctissimum vellent haberi, sic inibant, ut panem gladio divisum uterque libaret."

And therefore Alexander; when he fell in love with Roxana, commanded bread forthwith to be brought before him; which when he had divided with his sword, and they had both tasted together of, he took her presently to himself as his wife. And there remaineth a custom to this day, something like this, at weddings, in many countries, that when the bridegroom and bride are come from church, they have a piece of cake brought them; which when the bridegroom hath tasted, he gives it to the bride to taste of likewise, in token of a covenant between them. The Germans still use to conclude of bargains, and ratify friendship between parties, by drinking together, as appeareth by that phrase which they have, *den Friben trîschen*, Pacem bibere.

In like manner, I say, the eating of sacrifices, which were God's meat, was a federal rite between God and those that did partake of them, and signified there was a covenant of friendship between him and them.

For the better conceiving whereof, we must observe, that sacrifices, beside the nature of expiation, had the notion of feasts, which God himself did, as it were, feed upon. Which I explain thus: When God had brought the children of Israel out of Egypt, resolving to manifest himself in a peculiar manner present among them, he thought good to dwell amongst them in a visible and external manner; and therefore, while they

were in the wilderness, and sojourned in tents, he would have a tent or tabernacle built, to sojourn with them also. This mystery of the tabernacle was fully understood by the learned Nachmanides, who in few words, but pregnant, thus expresseth it, עקר החוץ במשכן הוא מקום מנחת השכינה; and again, סוד המשכן הוא שיהיה הבית אשר מבין על דוד; סני שוכן עליו; that is, the mystery of the tabernacle was this, that it was to be a place for the Shechinah, or habitation of Divinity to be fixed in:—and this, no doubt, as a special type of God's future dwelling in Christ's human nature, which was the TRUE SCHECHINAH. But, when the Jews were come into their land, and had there built them houses, God intended to have a fixed dwelling-house also; and therefore his moveable tabernacle was to be turned into a standing temple. Whence, by imitation, came all those temples among the heathens, which they apprehended as so many places of peculiar residence, or habitation, for their deities, next the heavens, to dwell in; as appears by that of Silius, amongst many others,

—————Tarpeie Pater, qui templa secundam
Incolis a coelo sedem.—————

Now the tabernacle or temple being thus as a house for God to dwell in visibly, to make up the notion of dwelling or habitation complete, there must be all things suitable to a house belonging to it. Hence, in the holy place, there must be a table and a candlestick, because this was the ordinary furniture of a room; as the forecommended Nachmanides observes, סוד השלח והמנחה שהם כל ים במדבר, i. e. He addeth a table and a can-

dlestick, because these suit the notion of a dwelling-house.—The table must have its dishes, and spoons, and bowls, and covers, belonging to it, though they were never used, and always be furnished with bread upon it. The candlestick must have its lamps continually burning.

Hence also there must be a continual fire kept in this house of God's upon the altar, as the *focus* of it: to which notion, I conceive, the prophet Isaiah doth allude, chap. xxxi. ver. 9. **אִשׁר אֵוֶר לֵוּ** **בְּצִדְדֵי הַיְּהוּדָה**, which I would thus translate, *qui habet ignem suum in Sion, et focum suum in Jerusalem.*

And besides all this, to carry the notion still further, there must be some constant meat and provision brought into this house, which was done in the sacrifices, that were partly consumed by fire upon God's own altar, and partly eaten by the priests, which were God's family, and therefore to be maintained by him. That, which was consumed upon God's altar, was accounted God's *MESS*, as appeareth from the first chapter of Malachi, where the altar is called

Ver. 12.

GOD'S TABLE, and the sacrifice upon it, **GOD'S MEAT**; "Ye say, the table of God is polluted, and the fruit thereof, his meat, is contemptible." And often in the law the sacrifice is called God's **לֶחֶם**, that is, his bread or food.—Whence, in that learned Hebrew book Cozri, the king Haber objects to the Jew Cozar against his religion, that it seemed to place corporeity in God, in making him to feed upon the flesh of beasts in these sacrifices. To which the Jewish doctor answers cabalistically in this manner; that as, in men, corporeal meat is a

means to unite and continue the soul (which is a spirit) to a body; so, in the land of Israel, the blood of beasts offered up in sacrifice had an attractive power to draw down Divinity, and unite it to the Jews. And methinks this may be a little further convinced from that passage in the 50th Psalm, "If I were hungry, I would not tell thee; for the world is mine, and the fulness thereof. Will I eat the flesh of bulls, or drink the blood of goats?" For though it be here denied, that God did really feed upon the sacrifices, yet it is implied there was some such allusive signification in them.

Wherefore it is further observable, that beside the flesh of the beast offered up in sacrifice, there was a *mincah*, or meat-offering, made of flour and oil, and a *libamen*, or drink-offering, that was always joined with the daily sacrifice, as the bread and drink, which were to go along with God's meat.

It was also strictly commanded, that there should be salt in every sacrifice and oblation, because all meat is unsavoury without salt; as R. Moses Bar Nachman hath here also well observed, מפני שאני רודן כביר להחיות לחם השם מפל מבלי מלח i. e. Because it was not honourable, that God's meat should be unsavoury, without salt.

Lastly, all these things were to be consumed on the altar only by the holy fire, that came down from heaven, because they were God's portion, and therefore to be eaten or consumed by himself in an extraordinary manner. And this the devil sometime imitated, in some sacrifices offered up to him. For so I understand that passage of Pindar in his Olympiacs, Ode vii. speaking of the

Rhodians, that when they had prepared, and were come to offer sacrifice to Jupiter, they had by chance forgotten to bring fire with them: but Jupiter, being conscious of their good intentions, rained down upon them A GOLDEN SHOWER (as I understand it), A SHOWER of fire; a pure imitation of the sacred story. Take it in that elegant poet's own words:—

Καὶ τοὶ γὰρ αἰθούσας ἔχοντες
 Σπέρμα' ἀνέβαν φλογὸς οὐ,
 Τεύχεα δ' αἰτ' ποιεῖν ἱεροῖσι
 Ἄλως ἐν ἀερεσίναις νάηοισι μὲν ἔαν-
 θαν ἀγαγόντες νεφέλαι,
 Πολλὰν ὕα χρυσήν.

That is, according to Benedictus's metaphrase, "Etenim Rhodii ascenderunt, quamvis non habentes ardentis semen ignis. Verum dum instrunt sacrificiis igni carentibus aram in arce, illis quidem flavam adducens nebulam, multum pluit [Jupiter] aurum."

And Solinus reports it of the Vulcapian hill in Sicily, that they which offered sacrifice upon it never put fire to it, but expected it should be kindled from heaven. His words, according to Salmasius's edition, are these; "Nec longe inde Collis Vulcanius, in quo qui divinæ rei operantur, ligna vitea super aras struunt; nec ignis adponitur in hanc congeriem. Cum prosicias intulerunt, si adest Deus, si sacrum probatur, sarmenta, licet viridia, sponte concipiunt, et nullo inflagrante halitu, ab ipso numine fit accendium. Ibi epulantes adludit flamma, quæ, flexuosis excessibus vagabunda, quem contigerit non adurit; nec aliud est quam imago nuncia perfecti rite Voti." The place is very remarkable; and where he says thus, "epulantes adludit flamma," he alludeth to that

custom of feasting on the sacrifices, which was before explained.

I will add to all this the words of a late learned author, that sometime stumbled unawares upon this very notion which we are now about, and yet expressed it happily in this manner ; “ Deus ad suam cum populo Judæorum familiaritatem significandam, sibi ab illo carnes, sanguinem atque fruges in ALTARI atque MENSA offerri voluit, ut ostenderet se quasi COMMUNEM in illo populo habere MENSAM, esse illius CONVIVAM perpetuum, atque ita familiariter cum illis habitare.”

And as it was thus among the Hebrews, so it seems, that sacrifices had the notion of feasts likewise among the ancient Persians, that worshipped the fire, of whom Maximus Tyrius thus relateth, “Οτι ἐπιφοροῦντες πυρὶ τροφὴν ἐπιλέγουσι, Πῦρ, δέσποτα, ἔσθιε, i. e. bringing in the sacrifices to the fire, which was their god, they were wont to say, “Ignis, Domine, comede.”

The sacrifices then being God's feasts, they that did partake of them must needs be his CONVIVÆ, and in a manner EAT and DRINK with him. And that this did bear the notion of a federal rite in the Scripture account, I prove from that place, Lev. ii. 13. “Thou shalt not suffer the SALT OF THE COVENANT of thy God to be lacking; with all thine offerings thou shalt offer salt.” Where the salt, that was to be cast upon all the sacrifices, is called THE SALT OF THE COVENANT, to signify, that as men did use to make covenants by eating and drinking together, where salt is a necessary appendix; so God by these sacrifices, and the feasts upon them, did ratify and confirm his covenant with those that did partake of them,

inasmuch as they did in a manner EAT and DRINK with him.

For salt was ever accounted amongst the ancients a most necessary concomitant of feasts, and condiment of all meats. *כל מלח שראו פתחו בזה* *כל פתחו*, saith the Jewish proverb in Beracoth, "Omne convivium, in quo non est salitum, non est convivium." And therefore because covenants and reconciliations were made by eating and drinking, where salt was always used, salt itself was accounted among the ancients *AMICITIÆ SYMBOLUM*. *Ἀλς καὶ τράπεζα*, *sal et mensa*—was used proverbially among the Greeks to express friendship by; *Ἀλς καὶ τράπεζαν παραβαίνειν*, in the words of Origen before quoted out of Archilocus, "*sal et mensam transgredi*,"—was to violate the most sacred league of friendship. *Æschines*, in his oration *De Perperam Habita Legatione*, hath a passage very pertinent to this purpose; *Τοὺς γὰρ τῆς πόλεως ἄλς καὶ δημοσίαν τράπεζαν περὶ πλείστον δεῖ ποιῆσθαι*, *Etenim civitatis sales et communem mensam ait se plurimi facere debere*.—Thus I understand that symbol of *Pythagoras*, *τὸν ἄλς παρατίθεσθαι*, (by *Erasmus's* leave) for friendship and hospitality. There is a pregnant instance of this very phrase in the Scripture, (*Ezra iv. 14.*) where our translators read it thus, "Because we have maintenance from the king's palace:" but the words in the Chaldee run after this manner, *כִּי מִלַּח דְּמֶלֶךְ חִיבְלָא מִלְּחָא* *i. e. quod sale palatii salivimus*—"Because we have eaten of the king's salt [that is, because we have engaged ourselves in a covenant of friendship to him, by eating of meat], therefore it is not meet for us to see the king's dishonour." That proverb men-

tioned, in Tully makes to this purpose, "*Multos modios salis simul edendos esse, ut amicitiae munus completum sit:*" which was, because that federal symbol had been so often abused. Nay, hence, there remaineth a superstitious custom amongst us and other nations to this day, to count the overturning of the salt upon the table ominous, as betiding some evil to him towards whom it falls: "*Quia amoris et amicitiae symbolum.*" And by this time I think I have given a sufficient comment upon מֶלַח הַבְּרִית, the salt of the covenant in the text.

Only I must not forget, that as in God's sacrifices there was ever salt to be used, so the like was generally observed in the Heathen sacrifices; as that one place out of Pliny, amongst many, shall sufficiently testify: "*Maxima salis auctoritas e sacris veterum intellegitur, apud quos nulla sacra sine mola salsa conficiebatur.*" And the reason of it also is thus given by that famous scholiast upon *Iliad* *α. διότι οἱ ἄλς φιλίας σύμβολον*, because salt is a symbol of friendship;—which is the same with that reason given by God, why he would always have salt in his sacrifices, because it was מֶלַח הַבְּרִית, that is "*sal symbolum foederis,*" as before was shewn. And this phrase, being thus explained, will clearly expound that other phrase, about which critics have laboured so much in vain, where the same words are used, but inverted, and a covenant is called a covenant of salt, as salt is here called the salt of the covenant, (*Numb. xviii. 19, and 2 Chron. xiii. 5.*) viz. because covenants were established by eating and drinking together, where salt was a necessary appendix.

Now therefore, that we may return: As the legal sacrifices, with the feasts upon those sacrifices, were **FEDERAL RITES** between God and men; in like manner, I say, the Lord's supper under the gospel, which we have already proved to be **EPULUM SACRIFICIALE**, a feast upon sacrifice, must needs be **EPULUM FÆDERALE**, a feast of amity and friendship—between God and men; where, by eating and drinking at God's own table, and of his meat, we are taken into a sacred covenant, and inviolable league of friendship with him.

Which I will confirm from that forecommended place, whence I have already proved, that the Lord's supper is a feast upon sacrifice. For there the apostle thus deborts the Corinthians from eating of the feasts upon idol-sacrifices, which are a parallel to the feast upon the Christian sacrifice in the Lord's supper, because this was to have fellowship and federal communion with devils: the things that the Gentiles sacrifice, they sacrifice to devils, and not to God, "and I would not, brethren, that ye should have **FELLOWSHIP** (or **COMMUNION**, *κοινωνίαν*) with devils." Where the comment of St. Chrysostom is excellent to our purpose: *Εἰ γὰρ ἐπ' ἀνθρώπων τὸ κοινωνεῖν ἀλῶν καὶ τραπέζης φιλίας ἀφορμὴ καὶ σύμβολον γίνεται, ἐγχωρεῖ καὶ ἐπὶ Δαιμόνων τοῦτο συμβῆναι* that is, If among men to communicate of bread and salt be a token and symbol of friendship, it must carry the same notion between men and devils in the idol-feasts.—If therefore to eat the sacrifice of devils be to have federal communion with those devils to whom it was offered; then to eat the sacrifice of Christ, once offered up to God in the Lord's supper, is to have federal communion with God.

There is an excellent story in Maimonides's Moreh Nevochim, concerning an ancient custom of the Zabii of feasting together with their gods in this federal way, which will much illustrate this notion: for, going about to give the reason, why the eating of blood was forbidden in the law, he fetches it from the idolatrous use of it then in Moses's time among the Zabii; according to his principles, who thought the reason of all the ceremonial precepts was to be fetched from some such accidental grounds, because those laws were not *primæ* but *secundæ intentionis* in God. "Multarum legum rationes et causæ (saith he) mihi innotuerunt ex cognitione fidei, rituum, et cultus Zabiorum."

By these Zabii he means the ancient Chaldeans; the word in the original Arabic, according to the copy of Joseph Scaliger, being thus written, فبيلين "A Vento Apeliote sic dicti

In Epist. 62.
ad Isaacum
Casanbensem.

(as he * observes), quasi dicas Orientales." And that book, which Maimonides so often quoteth concerning that nation; their rites and religion, is still extant among the Mahumetan Arabians, as the same Scaliger avoucheth. The story then is this, according to the Hebrew translation of Rabbi Abben Tibbon, lib. 3. cap. 46. דע כי היום הוא טמא מאד בעיני הצאבה הנם כל זה היו אז בלים אותו מפני שהיו חושבים שהוא מזון השדים והשאכל אותו מי שאכלו כבוד השתתף עם השדים ויבואו וירשעו העתידות כמו שידמו החזקן ממעשי השדים i. e. Licet sanguis impurus et immundus admodum fuerit in oculis Zabiorum, tamen ab illis comestus fuerit, eo quod existimarunt cibum hunc esse dæmonum, et quod is, qui eum comedit, hoc ratione COMMUNICATIONEM aliquam cum dæmoni-

bus haberet, ita ut familiariter cum illo conversentur, et futura ei aperiant.—But because others of them did abhor the eating of blood, as a thing repugnant unto nature, they performed this service in a little different manner. **היו שם אנשים שדחה קצת בעיניהם אכילת הדם כי הוא דבר שומאם הו מנע האדם והיו שדחשם בהנזה ומקבלים דמו בכלי או בחפידה ואוכלים בשר השחושט והוא סביב דמה היו מדמן במעשה זה שהשדחם יאכלו הדם אשר הוא מונחם והם יאכלו הבשר ובוה תדחה האהבה והאנחה והרעית בהם בעבוד שאכלו כלם על שלחן אחד ובמשב אחד ויבאו להם שדחם והם לפי מחשבתם בואלם יוגדו להם העתודות ויעלו להם i. e. Mactantes bestiam aliquam, sanguinem in circulo sedentes comedebant; imaginantes sibi in hoc opere, ipsis CARNEM COMEDENTIBUS, Dæmones ILLUM SANGUINEM COMEDERE, et hunc esse IPSORUM CIBUM, hocque medio AMICITIAM, FRATERNITATEM et FAMILIARITATEM inter ipsos contrahi, quia omnes in una mensa edunt, uno consessu accumbunt.**

As for the former part of this story, I find it also in Rabbi Moses Bar Nachman upon Deut. xii. 23. where he goes about to give the reason why blood was forbidden in the law, as Maimonides did, although, in the first place, he saith, it was because blood served in the sacrifices for expiation, otherwise than Maimonides (for there was a great controversy between these two doctors about the nature of sacrifices): but yet, in the second place also, he brings in this, also, because it was used superstitiously by the Heathens in the worship of their idol-gods. **היתה העבודה היא באכילה מן הדם בי היו מבעים הדם לשדים והם אוכלים עליו וממנו כאילו הם קרואים לשדים לאכול על שלחן השדום והם ומת i. e. הברים עמהם—הנה היו מתבאים בו ומגידים עתידות.** They performed their superstitious worship, by eating of blood in this manner; they gathered to-

gether blood for the devils their idol-gods, and then they came themselves, and did eat of that blood with them, as being the devil's GUESTS, and INVITED to EAT at the TABLE of devils; and so were JOINED in federal society with them. And by this kind of communion with devils, they were able to prophesy, and foretel things to come.

TWO SERMONS.

SERMON I.

PREACHED BEFORE THE HONOURABLE HOUSE OF COMMONS,
AT WESTMINSTER, MARCH 31, 1647.

Εὐσεβία, ἃ τίθενται ὁ γὰρ Εὐσεβίων ἀκρως Χριστιανική.

TO THE HONOURABLE

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

THE scope of this sermon, which not long since exercised your patience, worthy senators, was not to contend for this or that opinion, but only to persuade men to the life of Christ, as the pith and kernel of all religion; without which, I may boldly say, all the several forms of religion, though we please ourselves never so much in them, are but so many several dreams. And those many opinions about religion, that are every where so eagerly contended for on all sides, where this doth not lie at the bottom, are but so many shadows fighting with one another: so that I may well say of the true Christian, that is indeed possessed of the life of Christianity, in opposition to all those that are but lightly tinctured with the opinions of it, in the language of the poet :

Οἷος πίπνυται, τοὶ δ' ὥς σκῆαι δίσκουοι.

Wherefore I could not think any thing else, either more necessary for Christians in general, or more seasonable at this time, than to stir them up to the real establishment of the righteousness of God in their hearts, and that participation of the Divine nature, which the apostle speaketh of. That so they might not content themselves with mere fancies and conceits of Christ, without the Spirit of Christ really dwelling in them, and Christ himself inwardly formed in their hearts; nor satisfy themselves with the mere holding of right and orthodox opinions, as they conceive, whilst they are utterly devoid within of that Divine life, which Christ came to kindle in men's souls; and therefore are so apt to spend all their zeal upon a violent obtruding of their own opinions and apprehensions upon others, which cannot give entertainment to them: which, besides its repugnancy to the doctrine and example of Christ himself, is like to be the bellows, that will blow a fire of discord and contention in Christian commonwealths; whilst in the mean time, these hungry and starved opinions devour all the life and substance of religion, as the lean kine in Pharaoh's dream did eat up the fat. Nor, lastly, please themselves only in the violent opposing of other men's superstitions, according to the genius of the present times, without substituting in the room of them an inward principle of spirit and life in their own souls. For I fear many of us, that pull down idols in churches, may set them up in our hearts; and whilst we quarrel with painted glass, make no scruple at all of entertaining many foul lusts in our souls, and committing continual idolatry with them.

This, in general, was the design of this following discourse, which you were pleased, noble senators, not only to express your good acceptance of, but also to give a real signification of your great undeserved favour to the author of it. Who therefore cannot but, as the least expression of his thankfulness, humbly devote it to you; presenting it here again to your eye in the same form in which it was delivered to your ear. Desirous of nothing more, than that it might be some way useful to you, to kindle in you the life and heat of that which is endeavoured here to be described upon paper; that you may express it, both in your private conversations, and likewise in all your public employments for the commonwealth. That you may, by your kindly influence, effectually encourage all goodness; and by virtue of your power and authority (to use the phrase of Solomon) "scatter away all evil with your eye," as the sun by his beams scattereth the mists and vapours. That from you "judgment may run down like waters, and righteousness like a mighty stream," to refresh this whole land, that thirsteth after them: which, whilst you distribute them plentifully to others, will bestow both strength and honour to yourselves. For justice and righteousness are the establishment of every throne, of all civil power and authority; and if these should once forsake it, though there be lions to support it, it could not stand long. These, together with a good peace, well settled in a commonwealth, are all the outward felicity we can expect, till that happy time come, which the prophet foretelleth, and is therefore more than a Platonical idea;

when "the wolf shall dwell with the lamb, and the leopard shall lie down with the kid, and the calf, and the young lion, and the fatling together; and a little child lead them:" when "the sucking child shall play on the hole of the asp, and the weaned child shall put his hand on the cockatrice den:" when "they shall not hurt nor destroy in all God's holy mountain; for the earth shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord, as the waters cover the sea."

I have but one word more; if you please to give me leave; that after your care for the advancement of religion, and the public good of the commonwealth, you would think it worthy of you to promote ingenious learning, and cast a favourable influence upon it. I mean, not that only which furnisheth the pulpit, which you seem to be very regardful of; but that, which is more remote from such popular use, in the several kinds of it, which yet are all of them both very subservient to religion, and useful to the commonwealth. There is indeed a *ψευδοπαιδεία*, as the philosopher tells us, a bastardly kind of literature, and a *ψευδώνυμος γνῶσις*, as the apostle instructeth us, a knowledge falsely so called; which deserve not to be pleaded for. But the noble and generous improvement of our understanding faculty, in the true contemplation of the wisdom, goodness, and other attributes of God, in this great fabric of the universe, cannot easily be disparaged, without a blemish cast upon the Maker of it. Doubtless, we may as well enjoy that which God hath communicated of himself to the creatures, by this larger faculty of our understandings, as by those narrow and low fa-

culties of our senses; and yet nobody counts it to be unlawful to hear a lesson played upon the lute, or to smell at a rose. And these raised improvements of our natural understandings may be as well subservient and subordinate to a Divine light in our minds, as the natural use of these outward creatures here below to the life of God in our hearts. Nay, all true knowledge doth of itself naturally tend to God, who is the fountain of it; and would ever be raising of our souls up upon its wings thither, did not we κατέχειν ἐν ἀδικίᾳ, detain it, and hold it down, in unrighteousness, as the apostle speaketh. All philosophy to a wise man, to a truly sanctified mind, as he in Plutarch speaketh, is but ὅλη τῆς Θεολογίας, matter for Divinity to work upon. Religion is the queen of all those inward endowments of the soul; and all pure natural knowledge, all virgin and undeflowered arts and sciences, are her handmaids, that rise up, and call her blessed. I need not tell you how much the skill of tongues and languages, besides the excellent use of all philology in general, conduceth to the right understanding of the letter of sacred writings, on which the spiritual notions must be built; for none can possibly be ignorant of that, which have but once heard of a translation of the Bible. The apostle exhorteth private Christians to "whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report, if there be any virtue, if there be any praise, to think on those things:" and therefore it may well become you, noble gentlemen, in your public sphere to encourage so noble a thing as knowledge is, which will reflect so much lustre and honour back again

upon yourselves. That God would direct you in all your counsels, and still bless you, and prosper you in all your sincere endeavours for the public good, is the hearty prayer of,

Your most humble Servant,

RALPH CUDWORTH.

SERMON I.

And hereby we do know, that we know him, if we keep his commandments.—He that saith, I know him, and keepeth not his commandments, is a liar, and the truth is not in him.—1 JOHN ii. 3, 4.

WE have much inquiry concerning knowledge in these latter times. The sons of Adam are now as busy as ever himself was about the tree of knowledge of good and evil, shaking the boughs of it, and scrambling for the fruit; whilst, I fear, many are too unmindful of the tree of life. And though there be now no cherubims with their flaming swords to fright men off from it; yet the way, that leads to it, seems to be so solitary and untrodden as if there were but few that had any mind to taste of the fruit of it. There be many, that speak of new glimpses and discoveries of truth, of dawnings of gospel light; and no question but God hath reserved much of this for the very evening and sun-set of the world; for in the latter days knowledge shall be increased: but yet I wish we could in the mean time see that day to dawn, which the apostle speaks of, and that “day-star to arise in men’s hearts.” I wish, whilst we talk of light, and dispute about truth, we could walk more as “children of the light.” Whereas, if St. John’s rule be good here in the text, that no man truly knows Christ, but he that keepeth his commandments; it is much to be suspected, that many of us, who pretend to light, have a thick

and gloomy darkness within, overspreading our souls.

There be now many large volumes and discourses written concerning Christ, thousands of controversies discussed, infinite problems determined concerning his Divinity, humanity, union of both together, and what not; so that our bookish Christians, that have all their religion in writings and papers, think they are now completely furnished with all kinds of knowledge concerning Christ; and when they see all their leaves lying about them, they think they have a goodly stock of knowledge and truth, and cannot possibly miss of the way to heaven; as if religion were nothing but a little book-craft, a mere paper-skill.

But if St. John's rule here be good, we must not judge of our knowing of Christ by our skill in books and papers, but by our keeping of his commandments. And that, I fear, will discover many of us (notwithstanding all this light which we boast of round about us) to have nothing but Egyptian darkness within our hearts.

The vulgar sort think, that they know Christ enough out of their creeds, and catechisms, and confessions of faith; and if they have but a little acquainted themselves with these, and like parrots conned the words of them, they doubt not, but, that they are sufficiently instructed in all the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven. Many of the more learned, if they can but wrangle and dispute about Christ, imagine themselves to be grown great proficients in the school of Christ.

The greatest part of the world, whether learned or unlearned, think, that there is no need of purging and purifying of their hearts for the right

knowledge of Christ and his gospel: but though their lives be never so wicked, their hearts never so foul within, yet they may know Christ sufficiently out of their treatises and discourses, out of their mere systems and bodies of divinity; which I deny not to be useful in a subordinate way; although our Saviour prescribeth his disciples another method to come to the right knowledge of Divine truths, by doing of God's will. "He that will do my Father's will (saith he), shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God." He is a true Christian indeed, not he that is only book-taught, but he, that is God-taught; he, that hath an unction from the Holy One (as our Apostle calleth it) that teacheth him all things; he, that hath the Spirit of Christ within him, that searcheth out the deep things of God: "for as no man knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of a man, which is in him; even so the things of God knoweth no man, but the Spirit of God."

Ink and paper can never make us Christians, can never beget a new nature, a living principle in us; can never form Christ, or any true notions of spiritual things, in our hearts. The gospel, that new law, which Christ delivered to the world, it is not merely a dead letter without us, but a quickening spirit within us. Cold theorems and maxims, dry and jejune disputes, lean syllogistical reasonings, could never yet of themselves beget the least glimpse of true heavenly light, the least sap of saving knowledge in any heart. All this is but the groping of the poor dark spirit of man after truth, to find it out with his own endeavours, and feel it with his own cold and benumbed hands. Words and syllables, which are but dead things,

cannot possibly convey the living notions of heavenly truths to us. The secret mysteries of a Divine life, of a new nature, of Christ formed in our hearts, they cannot be written or spoken, language and expressions cannot reach them; neither can they be ever truly understood, except the soul itself be kindled from within, and awakened into the life of them. A painter, that would draw a rose, though he may flourish some likeness of it in figure and colour, yet he can never paint the scent and fragrancy; or if he would draw a flame, he cannot put a constant heat into his colours; he cannot make his pencil drop a sound, as the echo in the epigram mocks at him;

———*Si vis similem pingere, pinges sonum.*

All the skill of cunning artizans and mechanics cannot put a principle of life into a statue of their own making. Neither are we able to enclose in words and letters the life, soul, and essence, of any spiritual truths, and, as it were, to incorporate it in them.

Some philosophers have determined that ἀρετή is not διδακτόν, virtue cannot be taught by any certain rules or precepts. Men and books may propound some direction to us, that may set us in such a way of life and practice, as in which we shall at last find it within ourselves, and be experimentally acquainted with it; but they cannot teach it us like a mechanic art or trade. No, surely, “there is a spirit in man; and the inspiration of the Almighty giveth understanding.” But we shall not meet with this spirit any where but in the way of obedience: the knowledge of Christ, and the keeping of his commandments, must always

go together, and be mutual causes of one another.

“ Hereby we know, that we know him, if we keep his commandments.”

“ He that saith, I know him, and keepeth not his commandments, is a liar, and the truth is not in him.”

I come now unto these words themselves, which are so pregnant, that I shall not need to force out any thing at all from them: I shall therefore only take notice of some few observations which drop from them of their own accord, and then conclude with some application of them to ourselves.

I. First, then, If this be the right way and method of discovering our knowledge of Christ, by our keeping his commandments; then we may safely draw conclusions concerning our state and condition from the conformity of our lives to the will of Christ.

Would we know, whether we know Christ aright, let us consider whether the life of Christ be in us. “ Qui non habet vitam Christi, Christum non habet :” He that hath not the life of Christ in him, he hath nothing but the name, nothing but a fancy of Christ, he hath not the substance of him. He that builds his house upon this foundation, not an airy notion of Christ swimming in his brain, but Christ really dwelling and living in his heart, as our Saviour himself witnesseth, he “ buildeth his house upon a rock ;” and when the floods come, and the winds blow, and the rain descends, and beats upon it, it shall stand impreguably. But he that builds all his comfort upon an ungrounded persuasion, that God from all eternity hath loved him, and absolutely decreed him to life and hap-

pitiness, and seeketh not for God really dwelling in his soul ; he builds his house upon a quicksand, and it shall suddenly sink and be swallowed up : " his hope shall be cut off, and his trust shall be a spider's web ; he shall lean upon his house, but it shall not stand ; he shall hold it fast, but it shall not endure."

We are no where commanded to pry into these secrets, but the wholesome counsel and advice given us is this, " to make our calling and election sure." We have no warrant in Scripture to peep into these hidden rolls and volumes of eternity, and to make it our first thing that we do, when we come to Christ, to spell out our names in the stars, and to persuade ourselves, that we are certainly elected to everlasting happiness, before we see the image of God, in righteousness and true holiness, shaped in our hearts. God's everlasting decree is too dazzling and bright an object for us at first to set our eye upon. It is far easier and safer for us to look upon the rays of his goodness and holiness, as they are reflected in our hearts, and there to read the mild and gentle characters of God's love to us, in our love to him, and our hearty compliance with his heavenly will ; as it is safer for us, if we would see the sun, to look upon it here below in a pail of water, than to cast up our daring eyes upon the body of the sun itself, which is too radiant and scorching for us. The best assurance that any one can have of his interest in God, is doubtless the conformity of his soul to him. Those Divine purposes, whatsoever they be, are altogether unsearchable and unknowable by us : they lie wrapped up in everlasting darkness, and covered in a deep abyss : Who is able to fathom the bottom of them ?

Let us not therefore make this our first attempt towards God and religion, to persuade ourselves strongly of these everlasting decrees: for if at our first flight we aim so high, we shall happily but scorch our wings, and be struck back with lightning, as those giants of old were, that would needs attempt to assault heaven. And it is indeed a most gigantic essay to thrust ourselves so boldly into the lap of heaven; it is a prank of Nimrod, of a mighty hunter, thus rudely to deal with God, and to force heaven and happiness before his face, whether he will or no. The way to obtain a good assurance indeed of our title to heaven, is not to clamber up to it by a ladder of our own ungrounded persuasions, but to dig as low as hell by humility and self-denial in our own hearts: and though this may seem to be the farthest way about, yet it is indeed the nearest and safest way to it. We must ἀναβαίνειν κάτω, and καταβαίνειν ἄνω, as the Greek epigram speaks, ascend downward, and descend upward, if we would indeed come to heaven, or get any true persuasion of our title to it.

The most gallant and triumphant confidence of a Christian riseth safely and surely on this low foundation, that lies deeper underground, and there stands firmly and steadfastly. When our heart is once turned into a conformity with the word of God, when we feel our will perfectly to concur with his will, we shall then presently perceive a spirit of adoption within ourselves, teaching us to cry, Abba, Father. We shall not then care for peeping into those hidden records of eternity, to see whether our names be written there in golden characters; no, we shall find a copy of

God's thoughts concerning us written in our own breasts. There we may read the characters of his favour to us; there we may feel an inward sense of his love to us, flowing out of our hearty and unfeigned love to him. And we shall be more undoubtedly persuaded of it, than if any of those winged watchmen above, that are privy to heaven's secrets, should come and tell us, that they saw our names enrolled in those volumes of eternity. Whereas, on the contrary, though we strive to persuade ourselves never so confidently, that God from all eternity hath loved us, and elected us to life and happiness; if we do yet, in the mean time, entertain any iniquity within our hearts, and willingly close with any lust; do what we can, we shall find many a cold qualm every now and then seizing upon us at approaching dangers; and when death itself shall grimly look us in the face, we shall feel our hearts even to die within us, and our spirits quite faint away, though we strive to raise them and recover them never so much with the strong waters and *aqua-vitæ* of our ungrounded presumptions. The least inward lust willingly continued will be like a worm, fretting the gourd of our jolly confidence and presumptuous persuasion of God's love, and always gnawing at the root of it; and though we strive to keep it alive, and continually besprinkle it with some dews of our own, yet it will be always dying and withering in our bosoms. But a good conscience within will be always better to a Christian, than "health to his navel, or marrow to his bones;" it will be an everlasting cordial to his heart; it will be softer to him than a bed of down, and he may sleep securely upon it in the

midst of raging and tempestuous seas, when the winds bluster, and the waves beat round about him. A good conscience is the best looking-glass of heaven, in which the soul may see God's thoughts and purposes concerning it, as so many shining stars reflected to it. " Hereby we know Christ, hereby we know, that Christ loves us, if we keep his commandments."

II. Secondly, If hereby only we know, that we know Christ, by our keeping his commandments, then the knowledge of Christ doth not consist merely in a few barren notions, in a form of certain dry and sapless opinions.

Christ came not into the world to fill our heads with mere speculations, to kindle a fire of wrangling and contentious dispute amongst us, and to warm our spirits against one another with nothing but angry and peevish debates; whilst in the mean time our hearts remain all ice within towards God, and have not the least spark of true heavenly fire to melt and thaw them. Christ came not to possess our brains only with some cold opinions, that send down nothing but a freezing and benumbing influence upon our hearts. Christ was *vita magister*, not *scholæ*: and he is the best Christian, whose heart beats with the purest pulse towards heaven; not he, whose head spinneth out the finest cobwebs.

He that endeavours really to mortify his lusts, and to comply with that truth in his life, which his conscience is convinced of, is nearer a Christian, though he never heard of Christ, than he, that believes all the vulgar articles of the Christian faith, and plainly denieth Christ in his life.

Surely the way to heaven, that Christ hath taught us, is plain and easy, if we have but honest hearts : we need not many criticisms, many school distinctions, to come to a right understanding of it. Surely Christ came not to ensnare us and entangle us with captious niceties, or to puzzle our heads with deep speculations, and lead us through hard and craggy notions into the kingdom of heaven. I persuade myself, that no man shall ever be kept out of heaven for not comprehending mysteries, that were beyond the reach of his shallow understanding, if he had but an honest and good heart, that was ready to comply with Christ's commandments. " Say not in thy heart, Who shall ascend into heaven ? " that is, with high speculations, to bring down Christ from thence ; or " Who shall descend into the abyss beneath ? " that is, with deep searching thoughts to fetch up Christ from thence : but lo, " the word is nigh thee, even in thy mouth, and in thy heart."

But I wish it were not the distemper of our times, to scare and fright men only with opinions, and make men only solicitous about the entertaining of this and that speculation, which will not render them any thing the better in their lives, or the liker unto God ; whilst in the mean time there is no such care taken about keeping of Christ's commandments, and being renewed in our minds according to the image of God in righteousness and true holiness. We say, " Lo, here is Christ," and, " Lo, there is Christ," in these and these opinions ; whereas, in truth, Christ is neither here, nor there, nor any where, but where the Spirit of Christ, where the life of Christ is.

Do we not now-a-days open and lock up heaven with the private key of this and that opinion of our own, according to our several fancies, as we please? And if any one observe Christ's commandments never so sincerely, and serve God with faith and a pure conscience, that yet haply skills not of some contended-for opinions, some darling notions, he hath not the right *shibboleth*, he hath not the true watch-word, he must not pass the guards into heaven. Do we not make this and that opinion, this and that outward form, to be the wedding-garment, and boldly sentence those to outer darkness, that are not invested therewith? Whereas, every true Christian finds the least dram of hearty affection towards God to be more cordial and sovereign to his soul, than all the speculative notions and opinions in the world; and though he study also to inform his understanding aright, and free his mind from all error and misapprehensions, yet it is nothing but the life of Christ deeply rooted in his heart, which is the chemical elixir, that he feeds upon. Had he "all faith, that he could remove mountains" (as St. Paul speaks), had he "all knowledge, all tongues and languages;" yet he prizeth one dram of love beyond them all. He accounteth him, that feedeth upon mere notions in religion, to be but an airy and cameleon-like Christian. He findeth himself now otherwise rooted and centred in God, than when he did before merely contemplate and gaze upon him; he tasteth and relisheth God within himself; he hath *quendam saporem Dei*, a certain savour of him;—whereas before he did but rove and guess at random at him. He feeleth himself safely anchored in God, and will

not be dissuaded from it, though perhaps he skill not many of those subtilties, which others make the *alpha* and *omega* of their religion. Neither is he scared with those childish affrightments, with which some would force their private conceits upon him; he is above the superstitious dreading of mere speculative opinions, as well as the superstitious reverence of outward ceremonies; he cares not so much for subtilty, as for soundness and health of mind. And, indeed, as it was well spoken by a noble philosopher, *ἀνευ ἀρετῆς Θεὸς ὄνομα μόνον*, that without purity and virtue, God is nothing but an empty name;—so it is as true here, that without obedience to Christ's commandments, without the life of Christ dwelling in us, whatsoever opinion we entertain of him, Christ is but only named by us, he is not known.

I speak not here against a free and ingenuous inquiry into all truth, according to our several abilities and opportunities; I plead not for the captivating and enthralling of our judgments to the dictates of men; I do not disparage the natural improvement of our understanding faculties by true knowledge, which is so noble and gallant a perfection of the mind: but the thing, which I aim against, is, the dispiriting of the life and vigour of our religion by dry speculations, and making it nothing but a mere dead skeleton of opinions, a few dry bones, without any flesh and sinews, tied up together, and the misplacing of all our zeal upon an eager prosecution of these, which should be spent to better purpose upon other objects.

Knowledge indeed is a thing far more excellent than riches, outward pleasures, worldly dignities,

or any thing else in the world besides holiness, and the conformity of our wills to the will of God; but yet our happiness consisteth not in it, but in a certain Divine temper and constitution of soul, which is far above it.

But it is a piece of that corruption, that runneth through human nature, that we naturally prize truth more than goodness, knowledge more than holiness. We think it a gallant thing to be fluttering up to heaven with our wings of knowledge and speculation; whereas, the highest mystery of a Divine life here, and of perfect happiness hereafter, consisteth in nothing but mere obedience to the Divine will. Happiness is nothing but that inward sweet delight, that will arise from the harmonious agreement between our wills and God's will.

There is nothing contrary to God in the whole world, nothing that fights against him, but self-will. This is the strong castle that we all keep garrisoned against heaven in every one of our hearts, which God continually layeth siege unto; and it must be conquered and demolished, before we can conquer heaven. It was by reason of this self-will, that Adam fell in paradise; that those glorious angels, those morning-stars, kept not their first station, but dropped down from heaven like falling stars, and sunk into this condition of bitterness, anxiety, and wretchedness, in which now they are. They all entangled themselves with the length of their own wings, they would needs will more and otherwise than God would will in them; and, going about to make their wills wider, and to enlarge them into greater amplitude, the more they struggled, they found themselves

the faster pinioned, and crowded up into narrowness and servility ; insomuch, that now they are not able to use any wings at all, but, inheriting the serpent's curse, can only creep with their bellies upon the earth. Now, our only way to recover God and happiness again is, not to soar up with our understandings, but to destroy this self-will of ours ; and then we shall find our wings to grow again, our plumes fairly spread, and ourselves raised aloft into the free air of perfect liberty, which is perfect happiness.

There is nothing in the whole world able to do us good or hurt, but God and our own will : neither riches nor poverty, nor disgrace nor honour, nor life nor death, nor angels nor devils ; but willing or not willing, as we ought. Should hell itself cast all its fiery darts against us, if our will be right, if it be informed by the Divine will, they can do us no hurt ; we have then (if I may so speak), an enchanted shield, that is impenetrable, and will bear off all. God will not hurt us, and hell cannot hurt us, if we will nothing but what God wills. Nay, then we are acted by God himself, and the whole Divinity floweth in upon us ; and when we have cashiered this self-will of ours, which did but shackle and confine our souls, our wills shall then become truly free, being widened and enlarged to the extent of God's own will. Hereby we know, that we know Christ indeed, not by our speculative opinions concerning him, but by our keeping of his commandments.

III. Thirdly, If hereby we are to judge, whether we truly know Christ, by our keeping of his commandments ; so that he that saith he knoweth him, and keepeth not his commandments, is a

liar: then this was not the plot and design of the gospel, to give the world an indulgence to sin, upon what pretence soever.

Though we are too prone to make such misconstructions of it; as if God had intended nothing else in it, but to dandle our corrupt nature, and contrive a smooth and easy way for us to come to happiness, without the toilsome labour of subduing our lusts and sinful affections: or, as if the gospel were nothing else but a declaration to the world, of God's engaging his affections from all eternity on some particular persons in such a manner, as that he would resolve to love them, and dearly embrace them, though he never made them partakers of his image in righteousness and true holiness; and though they should remain under the power of all their lusts, yet they should still continue his beloved ones, and he would, notwithstanding, at last, bring them undoubtedly into heaven. Which is nothing else but to make the God that we worship, the God of the New Testament, *προσωπολήπτης*, an accepter of persons,—and one, that should encourage that in the world which is diametrically opposite to God's own life and being.

And, indeed, nothing is more ordinary than for us to shape out such monstrous and deformed notions of God unto ourselves, by looking upon him through the coloured medium of our own corrupt hearts, and having the eye of our soul tintured by the suffusions of our own lusts. And therefore because we mortals can fondly love and hate, and sometimes hug the very vices of those to whom our affections are engaged, and kiss their very deformities; we are so ready to shape out a Deity

like unto ourselves, and to fashion out such a God as will, in Christ at least, hug the very wickedness of the world, and in those that be once his own, by I know not what fond affection, appropriated to himself, connive at their very sins, so that they shall not make the least breach betwixt himself and them. Some there are, that question, whether of the two be the worse idolatry, and of the deeper stain, for a man to make a god out of a piece of wood, and fall down unto it and worship it, and say, Deliver me, for thou art my God, as it is expressed in the prophet Isaiah; or to set up such an idol-god of our own imagination as this is, fashioned out according to the similitude of our own fondness and wickedness: and when we should paint out God with the liveliest colours that we can possibly borrow from any created being, with the purest perfections that we can abstract from them; to draw him out thus with the black coal of our own corrupt hearts, and to make the very blots and blurs of our own souls to be the letters which we spell out his name by. Thus do we, that are children of the night, make black and ugly representations of God unto ourselves, as the Ethiopians were wont to do, copying him out according to our own likeness, and setting up that unto ourselves for a god, which we love most dearly in ourselves, that is, our lusts. But there is no such god as this any where in the world, but only in some men's false imaginations, who know not, all this while, that they look upon themselves instead of God, and make an idol of themselves, which they worship and adore for him; being so full of themselves, that whatsoever they see round about them, even God himself, they colour with

their own tincture; like him, that Aristotle speaks of, that wheresoever he went, and whatsoever he looked upon, he saw still his own face, as in a glass, represented to him. And therefore it is no wonder, if men seem naturally more devoutly affected toward such an imaginary god, as we have now described, than to the true real God, clothed with his own real attributes; since it is nothing but an image of themselves, which, Narcissus-like, they fall in love with: no wonder if they kiss and dandle such a baby-god as this, which, like little children, they have dressed up out of the clouts of their own fond fancies, according to their own likeness, of purpose that they might play and sport with it.

But God will ever dwell in spotless light, howsoever we paint him and disfigure him here below; he will still be circled about with his own rays of unstained and immaculate glory. And though the gospel be not God as he is in his own brightness, but God veiled and masked to us, God in a state of humiliation, and condescent, as the sun in a rainbow; yet it is nothing else but a clear and unspotted mirror of Divine holiness, goodness, purity; in which attributes lie the very life and essence of God himself. The gospel is nothing else but God descending into the world in our form, and conversing with us in our likeness; that he might allure and draw us up to God, and make us partakers of his Divine form. Θεὸς γέγονεν ἄνθρωπος (as Athanasius speaks) ἵνα ἡμᾶς ἐν ἑαυτῷ θεοποιήσῃ, God was therefore incarnated and made man, that he might deify us;—that is (as St. Peter expreseth it), make us partakers of the Divine nature. Now, I say, the very

proper character and essential tincture of God himself is nothing else but goodness. Nay, I may be bold to add, that God is therefore God, because he is the highest and most perfect good; and good is not therefore good, because God out of an arbitrary will of his would have it so. Whatsoever God doth in the world, he doth it as suitable to the highest goodness; the idea and fairest copy of which is his own essence.

Virtue and holiness in creatures, as Plato well discourseth in his Euthyphro, are not therefore good, because God loveth them, and will have them be accounted such; but rather God therefore loveth them, because they are in themselves simply good. Some of our own authors go a little further yet, and tell us, that God doth not fondly love himself, because he is himself, but therefore he loveth himself, because he is the highest and most absolute goodness; so that if there could be any thing in the world better than God, God would love that better than himself; but because he is essentially the most perfect good, therefore he cannot but love his own goodness infinitely above all other things. And it is another mistake, which sometimes we have of God, by shaping him out according to the model of ourselves, when we make him nothing but a blind, dark, impetuous self-will running through the world; such as we ourselves are furiously acted with, that have not the ballast of absolute goodness to poise and settle us.

That I may therefore come nearer to the thing in hand; God, who is absolute goodness, cannot love any of his creatures, and take pleasure in them, without bestowing a communication of his

goodness and likeness upon them. God cannot make a gospel to promise men life and happiness hereafter, without being regenerated, and made partakers of his holiness. As soon may heaven and hell be reconciled together, and lovingly shake hands with one another, as God can be fondly indulgent to any sin, in whomsoever it be. As soon may light and darkness be espoused together, and midnight be married to noon-day, as God can be joined in a league of friendship to any wicked soul.

The great design of God in the gospel is to clear up this mist of sin and corruption, which we are here surrounded with, and to bring up his creatures out of the shadow of death to the region of light above the land of truth and holiness. The great mystery of the gospel is to establish a god-like frame and disposition of spirit, which consists in righteousness and true holiness, in the hearts of men. And Christ, who is the great and mighty Saviour, came on purpose into the world, not only to save us from fire and brimstone, but also to save us from our sins. Christ hath therefore made an expiation of our sins by his death upon the cross, that we, being thus delivered out of the hands of these our greatest enemies, might serve God without fear, in holiness and righteousness before him all the days of our life. This "grace of God, that bringeth salvation," hath therefore "appeared unto all men, in the gospel, that it might teach us to deny ungodliness and worldly lusts, and that we should live soberly, righteously and godlily in this present world; looking for that blessed hope, and glorious appearing of the great God and our Saviour Jesus Christ, who gave him-

self for us, that he might redeem us from all iniquity, and purify to himself a peculiar people, zealous of good works." These things I write unto you (saith our apostle a little before my text) that you sin not ;" therein expressing the end of the whole gospel, which is, not only to cover sin by spreading the purple robe of Christ's death and sufferings over it, whilst it still remaineth in us with all its filth and noisomeness unremoved ; but also to convey a powerful and mighty spirit of holiness, to cleanse us and free us from it. And this is a greater grace of God to us, than the former, which still go both together in the gospel ; besides the free remission and pardon of sin in the blood of Christ, the delivering of us from the power of sin, by the Spirit of Christ dwelling in our hearts.

Christ came not into the world only to cast a mantle over us, and hide all our filthy sores from God's avenging eye, with his merits and righteousness ; but he came likewise to be a surgeon and physician of souls, to free us from the filth and corruption of them ; which is more grievous and burdensome, more noisome to a true Christian, than the guilt of sin itself.

Should a poor wretched and diseased creature, that is full of sores and ulcers, be covered all over with purple, or clothed with scarlet, he would take but little contentment in it, whilst his sores and wounds remain upon him ; and he had much rather be arrayed in rags, so he might obtain but soundness and health within. The gospel is a true Bethesda, a pool of grace, where such poor, lame and infirm creatures as we are, upon the moving of God's Spirit in it, may descend down,

not only to wash our skin and outside, but also to be cured of our diseases within. And whatever the world thinks, there is a powerful Spirit, that moves upon these waters, the waters of the gospel, spreading its gentle, healing, quickening wings over our souls. The gospel is not like Abana and Pharpar, those common rivers of Damascus, that could only cleanse the outside ; but is a true Jordan, in which such leprous Naamans as we all are, "may wash and be clean." "Blessed indeed are they, whose iniquities are forgiven, and whose sins are covered : Blessed is the man to whom the Lord will not impute sin ;" but yet rather blessed are they, whose sins are like a morning cloud, and quite taken away from them. Blessed, thrice "blessed are they, that hunger and thirst after righteousness, for they shall be satisfied : blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God."

Our Saviour Christ came (as John the Baptist tells us) "with a fan in his hand, that he might thoroughly purge his floor, and gather his wheat into his garner : but the chaff he will burn up with unquenchable fire." He came (as the prophet Malachi speaks) "like a refiner's fire, and like fuller's soap ; to sit as a refiner and purifier of silver, and to purify all the sons of Levi, and purge them as gold and silver, that they may offer unto the Lord an offering in righteousness."

Christ came not only to write Holiness to the Lord upon Aaron's forehead, and to put his urim and thummim upon his breast-plate ; but, "This is the covenant, saith the Lord, that I will make with them in those days ; I will put my law in their inward parts, and write it in their hearts ;

and then I will be their God, and they shall be my people." They shall be all kings and priests unto me. "God sent his own Son (saith St. Paul) in the likeness of sinful flesh, and by a sacrifice for sin condemned sin in the flesh; that the righteousness of the law might be fulfilled in us, who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit."

The first Adam, as the Scripture tells us, brought in a real defilement, which, like a noisome leprosy, hath overspread all mankind; and therefore the second Adam must not only fill the world with a conceit of holiness, and mere imaginary righteousness: but he must really convey such an immortal seed of grace into the hearts of believers as may prevail still more and more in them, till it have at last quite wrought out that poison of the serpent.

Christ, that was nothing but Divinity dwelling in a tabernacle of flesh, and God himself immediately acting a human nature, came into the world to kindle here that Divine life amongst men, which is certainly dearer unto God, than any thing else whatsoever in the world; and to propagate this celestial fire from one heart still unto another, until the end of the world. Neither is he, nor was he, ever absent from this spark of his Divinity kindled amongst men, wheresoever it be, though he seem bodily to be withdrawn from us. He is the standing, constant, inexhausted fountain of this Divine light and heat, that still toucheth every soul that is enlivened by it, with an outstretched ray, and freely lends his beams, and disperseth his influence to all, from the beginning of the world to the end of it. "We all receive of his fulness grace for grace;" as all the stars in heaven are said to

light their candles at the sun's flame. For though his body be withdrawn from us, yet, by the lively and virtual contact of his Spirit, he is always kindling, cheering, quickening, warming, and enlivening hearts. Nay, this Divine life, begun and kindled in any heart, wheresoever it be, is something of God in flesh, and, in a sober and qualified sense, Divinity incarnate; and all particular Christians, that are really possessed of it, so many mystical Christs.

And, God forbid, that God's own life and nature, here in the world, should be forlorn, forsaken, and abandoned, of God himself. Certainly, wherever it is, though never so little, like a sweet, young, tender babe, once born in any heart, when it crieth unto God the father of it, with pitiful and bemoaning looks imploring his compassion, it cannot choose but move his fatherly bowels, and make them yearn, and turn towards it, and, by strong sympathy, draw his compassionate arm to help and relieve it. Never was any tender infant so dear to those bowels that begat it, as an infant new-born Christ, formed in the heart of any true believer, to God the father of it. Shall the children of this world, the sons of darkness, be moved with such tender affection and compassion towards the fruit of their bodies, their own natural offspring? and shall God, who is the father of lights, the fountain of all goodness, be moved with no compassion towards his true spiritual offspring, and have no regard to those sweet babes of light, engendered by his own beams in men's hearts, that, in their lovely countenances, bear the resemblance of his own face, and call him their father? Shall he see them lie fainting, and gasping, and dying

here in the world, for want of nothing to preserve and keep them, but an influence from him, who first gave them life and breath? No, hear the language of God's heart, hear the sounding of his bowels towards them: "Is it Ephraim, my dear son? is it that pleasant child? Since I spake of him, I do earnestly remember him; my bowels, my bowels are troubled for him; I will surely have mercy upon him, saith the Lord." If those expressions of goodness and tender affection here, among the creatures, be but drops of that full ocean that is in God; how can we then imagine, that this father of our spirits should have so little regard to his own dear offspring, I do not say our souls, but that, which is the very life and soul of our souls, the life of God in us (which is nothing else but God's own self communicated to us, his own Son born in our hearts), as that he should suffer it to be cruelly murdered in its infancy by our sins, and, like young Hercules, in its very cradle to be strangled by those filthy vipers? that he should see him crucified by wicked lusts, nailed fast to the cross by invincible corruptions, pierced and gored on every side with the poisonous spears of the devil's temptations, and at last to give up the ghost; and yet his tender heart not at all relent, nor be all this while impassioned with so sad a spectacle? Surely, we cannot think he hath such an adamant breast, such a flinty nature, as this is.

What then? must we say, that though indeed he be willing, yet he is not able to rescue his crucified and tormented Son now bleeding upon the cross; to take him down from thence, and save him; then must sin be more powerful than God;

that weak, crazy and sickly thing, more strong than the Rock of ages; and the devil, the prince of darkness, more mighty than the God of light. No, surely; there is a weakness and impotency in all evil, but a masculine strength and vigour in all goodness; and therefore, doubtless, the highest good the *πρωτον αγαθον*, as the philosopher calls it, is the strongest thing in the world. "Nil potentius summo Bono." God's power, displayed in the world, is nothing but his goodness strongly reaching all things from height to depth, from the highest heaven to the lowest hell; and irresistibly imparting itself to every thing, according to those several degrees, in which it is capable of it.

Have the fiends of darkness then, those poor forlorn spirits, that are fettered and chained up in the chains of their own wickedness, any strength to withstand the force of infinite goodness, which is infinite power? or do they not rather sculk in holes of darkness, and fly, like bats and owls, before the approaching beams of this Sun of Righteousness? Is God powerful to kill and to destroy, to damn and to torment? and is he not powerful to save? Nay, it is the sweetest flower in all the garland of his attributes, it is the richest diadem in his crown of glory, that he is *mighty to save*:—and this is far more magnificent for him, than to be styled *mighty to destroy*. For that, except it be in a way of justice, speaks no power at all, but mere impotency; for the root of all power is goodness.

Or must we say, lastly, that God indeed is able to rescue us out of the power of sin and Satan, when we sigh and groan towards him; but yet sometimes, to exercise his absolute authority, his

uncontrollable dominion, he delights rather in plunging wretched souls down into infernal night and everlasting darkness? What shall we then make the God of the whole world? Nothing but a cruel and dreadful *Erinnys*, with curled fiery snakes about his head, and firebrands in his hands, thus governing the world? Surely this will make us either secretly to think, that there is no God at all in the world, if he must needs be such; or else to wish heartily there were none. But, doubtless, God will at last confute all these our misapprehensions of him; he will unmask our hypocritical pretences, and clearly cast the shame of all our sinful deficiencies upon ourselves, and vindicate his own glory from receiving the least stain or blemish by them. In the mean time, let us know, that the gospel now requireth far more of us than ever the law did; for it requireth a new creature, a Divine nature, Christ, formed in us: but yet withal it bestoweth a quickening spirit, an enlivening power, to enable us to express that which is required of us. Whosoever therefore truly knows Christ, the same also keepeth Christ's commandments. But "he that saith, I know him, and keepeth not his commandments, is a liar, and the truth is not in him."

I have now done with the first part of my discourse, concerning those observations, which arise naturally from the words, and offer themselves to us. I shall, in the next place, proceed to make some general application of them all together.

Now, therefore, I beseech you, let us consider, whether or no we know Christ indeed: not by our acquaintance with systems and models of divinity, not by our skill in books and papers, but by our

keeping of Christ's commandments. All the books and writings, which we converse with, they can but represent spiritual objects to our understandings; which yet we can never see in their own true figure; colour and proportion, until we have a Divine light within, to irradiate and shine upon them. Though there be never such excellent truths concerning Christ and his gospel set down in words and letters, yet they will be but unknown characters to us, until we have a willing Spirit within us, that can decipher them; until the same Spirit, by secret whispers in our hearts, do comment upon them, which did at first indite them. There be many, that understand the Greek and Hebrew of the Scripture, the original languages in which the text was written, that never understood the language of the Spirit.

There is a *caro* and a *spiritus*, a flesh and a spirit, a body and a soul in all the writings of the Scriptures. It is but the flesh and body of Divine truths, that is printed upon paper; which many moths of books and libraries do only feed upon; many walking skeletons of knowledge, that bury and entomb truths in the living sepulchres of their souls, do only converse with; such as never did any thing else, but pick at the mere bark and rind of truths, and crack the shells of them. But there is a soul and spirit of Divine truths that could never yet be congealed into ink, that could never be blotted upon paper; which, by a secret traduction and conveyance, passeth from one soul unto another, being able to dwell or lodge no where, but in a spiritual being, in a living thing, because itself is nothing but life and spirit. Neither can it, where indeed it is, express

itself sufficiently in words and sounds, but it will best declare and speak itself in actions; as the old manner of writing among the Egyptians was, not by words, but things. The life of Divine truths is better expressed in actions, than in words, because actions are more living things than words; words are nothing but dead resemblances and pictures of those truths, which live and breath in actions; and "the kingdom of God (as the apostle speaketh) consisteth not in word," but in life and power. *Τὰ πρόβατα οὐ χόρτον φέρουντα τοῖς ποιμέσιν ἐποδεικνύει πόσον ἔφαγεν* (saith the moral philosopher) *ἀλλὰ τὴν νομὴν ἔσω πέφαντα ἔριον ἔξω φέρει καὶ γάλα*. Sheep do not come and bring their fodder to their shepherd, and shew him how much they eat; but inwardly concocting and digesting it, they make it appear by the fleece which they wear upon their backs, and by the milk which they give.—And let not us Christians affect only to talk and dispute of Christ, and so measure our knowledge of him by our words; but let us shew *ἀπὸ τῶν θεωρημάτων πεφθέντων τὰ ἔργα*, our knowledge concocted into our lives and actions; and then let us really manifest that we are Christ's sheep indeed, that we are his disciples, by that fleece of holiness which we wear, and by the fruits that we daily yield in our lives and conversations: for "herein (saith Christ) is my Father glorified, that ye bear much fruit; so shall ye be my disciples."

Let us not, I beseech you, judge of our knowing Christ by our ungrounded persuasions, that Christ from all eternity hath loved us, and given himself particularly for us, without the conformity of our lives to Christ's commandments, with-

out the real partaking of the image of Christ in our hearts. The great mystery of the gospel doth not lie only in Christ without us (though we must know also what he hath done for us); but the very pith and kernel of it consists in Christ inwardly formed in our hearts.

Nothing is truly ours but what lives in our spirits. Salvation itself cannot save us as long as it is only without us, no more than health can cure us, and make us sound, when it is not within us, but somewhere at a distance from us; no more than arts and sciences, whilst they lie only in books and papers without us, can make us learned. The gospel, though it be a sovereign and medicinal thing itself, yet the mere knowing and believing of the history of it will do us no good; we can receive no virtue from it, till it be inwardly digested and concocted into our souls; till it be made ours, and become a living thing in our hearts. The gospel, if it be only without us, cannot save us, no more than that physician's bill could cure the ignorant patient of his disease, who, when it was commended to him, took the paper only, and put it up in his pocket, but never drank the potion that was described in it.

All that Christ did for us in the flesh, when he was here upon earth, from his lying in a manger, when he was born in Bethlehem, to his bleeding upon the cross on Golgotha, it will not save us from our sins, unless Christ by his Spirit dwell in us. It will not avail us to believe, that he was born of a virgin, unless the power of the Most High overshadow our hearts, and beget him there likewise. It will not profit us to believe, that he died upon the cross for us, unless we be baptized

into his death by the mortification of all our lusts; unless the old man of sin be crucified in our hearts. Christ indeed hath made an expiation for our sins upon his cross, and the blood of Christ is the only sovereign balsam to free us from the guilt of them : but yet, besides the sprinkling of the blood of Christ upon us, we must be made partakers also of his spirit. Christ came into the world, as well to redeem us from the power and bondage of our sins, as to free us from the guilt of them. " You know (saith St. John) that he was manifested to take away our sins : whosoever therefore abideth in him, sinneth not ; whosoever sinneth, hath not seen nor known him." Lo the end of Christ's coming into the world ! Lo a design worthy of God manifested in the flesh.

Christ did not take all those pains to lay aside his robes of glory, and come down hither into the world, to enter into a virgin's womb, to be born in our human shape, and to be laid a poor crying infant in a manger, and having no form or comeliness at all upon him, to take upon him the form of a servant, to undergo a reproachful and ignominious life, and at last to be abandoned to a shameful death, a death upon the cross ; I say, he did not do all this merely to bring in a notion into the world, without producing any real substantial effect at all ; without the changing, mending, and reforming of the world ; so that men should still be as wicked as they were before, and as much under the power of the prince of darkness, only they should not be thought so ; they should still remain as full of all the filthy sores of sin and corruption as before, only they should be accounted whole. Shall God come down from heaven, and pitch a

tabernacle amongst men? Shall he undertake such a huge design, and make so great a noise of doing something, which, when it is all summed up, shall not at last amount to a reality? Surely Christ did not undergo all this to so little purpose; he would not take all this pains for us, that he might be able at last to put into our hands nothing but a blank. He "was with child," he "was in pain and travail;" and hath "he brought forth nothing but wind? hath he been delivered of the east wind?" Is that great design, that was so long carried in the womb of eternity, now proved abortive, or else nothing but a mere windy birth? No surely: the end of the gospel is life and perfection; it is a Divine nature; it is a godlike frame and disposition of spirit; it is to make us partakers of the image of God in righteousness and true holiness, without which salvation itself were but a notion.

Christ came into the world to make an expiation and atonement for our sins; but the end of this was, that we might eschew sin; that we might forsake all ungodliness and worldly lusts. The gospel declares pardon of sin to those that are heavy laden with it and willing to be disburdened, to this end, that it might quicken and enliven us to new obedience. Whereas otherwise the guilt of sin might have detained us in horror and despair, and so have kept us still more strongly under the power of it, in sad and dismal apprehensions of God's wrath provoked against us, and inevitably falling on us: but Christ hath now appeared like a day-star, with most cheerful beams; nay, he is the Sun of Righteousness himself, which hath risen upon the world with his

healing wings, with his exhilarating light, that he might chase away all those black despairing thoughts from us. But Christ did not rise that we should play, and sport, and wantonize with his light; but that we should do "the work of the day" in it; that we should walk *εὐσχημόνως* (as the apostle speaketh) not in our night-clothes of sinful deformity, but clad all over with the comely garments of light. The gospel is not big with the child of a fancy, of a mere conceit of righteousness without us, hanging at distance over us, whilst our hearts within are nothing but cages of unclean birds, and like houses continually haunted with devils, nay, the very rendezvous of those fiends of darkness.

Holiness is the best thing that God himself can bestow upon us, either in this world, or the world to come. True evangelical holiness, that is, Christ formed in the hearts of believers, is the very cream and quintessence of the gospel. And were our hearts sound within, were there not many thick and dark fumes, that did arise from thence, and cloud our understandings, we could not easily conceive the substance of heaven itself to be any thing else but holiness, freed from those encumbrances, that did ever clog it and accloy it here; neither should we wish for any other heaven besides this. But many of us are like those children, whose stomachs are so vitiated by some disease, that they think ashes, coal, mud wall, or any such trash, to be more pleasant than the most wholesome food: such sickly and distempered appetites have we about these spiritual things, that hanker after I know not what vain shows of happiness, whilst in the mean time we neglect that, which is the only

true food of our souls, that is able to nourish them up to everlasting life.

Grace is holiness militant, holiness encumbered with many enemies and difficulties, which it still fights against, and manfully quits itself of; and glory is nothing else but holiness triumphant, holiness with a palm of victory in her hand, and a crown upon her head: "*Deus ipse cum omni sua bonitate, quatenus extra me est, non facit me beatum, sed quatenus in me est:*" God himself cannot make me happy, if he be only without me, and unless he give in a participation of himself, and his own likeness into my soul.—Happiness is nothing but the releasing and unfettering of our souls from all these narrow, scant, and particular good things; and the espousing of them to the highest and most universal good, which is not this or that particular good, but goodness itself: and this is the same thing, that we call holiness. Which, because we ourselves are so little acquainted with (being for the most part ever courting a mere shadow of it), therefore we have such low, abject, and beggarly conceits thereof; whereas it is in itself the most noble, heroical and generous thing in the world. For I mean by holiness nothing else but God stamped and printed upon the soul. And we may please ourselves with what conceits we will; but so long as we are void of this, we do but dream of heaven, and I know not what fond paradise; we do but blow up and down an airy bubble of our own fancies, which riseth out of the froth of our vain hearts; we do but court a painted heaven, and woo happiness in a picture, whilst in the meantime a true and real hell will suck in our souls

into it, and soon make us sensible of a solid woe and substantial misery.

Divine wisdom hath so ordered the frame of the whole universe, as that every thing should have a certain proper place, that should be a receptacle for it. Hell is the sink of all sin and wickedness. The strong magic of nature pulls and draws every thing continually to that place, which is suitable to it, and to which it doth belong; so all these heavy bodies press downwards towards the centre of our earth, being drawn in by it: in like manner hell, wheresoever it is, will by strong sympathy pull in all sin, and magnetically draw it to itself: as true holiness is always breathing upwards, and fluttering towards heaven, striving to embosom itself with God; and it will at last undoubtedly be conjoined with him; no dismal shades of darkness can possibly stop it in its course, or bear it back.

Ὡς αἰὶν τὸ ἔσχατον ὅπου ὁδεῖ εἰς τὸ ἔσχατον.

Nay, we do but deceive ourselves with name: hell is nothing but the orb of sin and wickedness, or else that hemisphere of darkness, in which all evil moves; and heaven is the opposite hemisphere of light, or else, if you please, the bright orb of truth, holiness and goodness: and we do actually in this life instate ourselves in the possession of one or other of them. Take sin and disobedience out of hell, and it will presently clear up into light, tranquillity, serenity, and shine out into a heaven. Every true saint carrieth his heaven about with him in his own heart; and hell, that is without, can have no power over him. He might safely wade through hell itself, and,

like the three children, pass through the midst of that fiery furnace, and yet not at all be scorched with the flames of it : he might walk through the valley of the shadow of death, and yet fear no evil.

Sin is the only thing in the world that is contrary to God. God is light, and that is darkness : God is beauty, and that is ugliness and deformity. All sin is direct rebellion against God ; and with what notions soever we sugar it, and sweeten it, yet God can never smile upon it, he will never make a truce with it. God declares open war against sin, and bids defiance to it ; for it is a professed enemy to God's own life and being. God, which is infinite goodness, cannot but hate sin, which is purely evil. And though sin be in itself but a poor, impotent and crazy thing, nothing but straitness, poverty, and nonentity, so that of itself it is the most wretched and miserable thing in the world, and needeth no farther punishment besides itself ; yet Divine vengeance beats it off still farther and farther from God, and, wheresoever it is, will be sure to scourge it and lash it continually. God and sin can never agree together.

That I may therefore yet come nearer to ourselves : This is the message, that I have now to declare unto you, that " God is light, and in him is no darkness at all. If we say, that we have fellowship with him, and walk in darkness, we lie, and do not the truth." Christ and the gospel are light, and there is no darkness at all in them : if you say, that you know Christ and his gospel, and yet keep not Christ's commandments, but dearly hug your private darling corruptions, you are liars, and the truth is not in you ; you have

no acquaintance with the God of light, nor the gospel of light. If any of you say, that you know Christ, and have an interest in him, and yet (as I fear too many do) still nourish ambition, pride, vain-glory, within your breasts, harbour malice, revengefulness, and cruel hatred to your neighbours in your hearts, eagerly scramble after this worldly pelf, and make the strength of your parts and endeavours serve that blind mammon, the god of this world; if you wallow and tumble in the filthy puddle of fleshly pleasures, or if you aim only at yourselves in your lives, and make yourself the compass by which you sail, and the star by which you steer your course, looking at nothing higher or more noble than yourselves; deceive not yourselves, you have neither seen Christ, nor known him: you are deeply incorporated (if I may so speak) with the spirit of this world, and have no true sympathy with God and Christ, no fellowship at all with them.

And, I beseech you, let us consider; Be there not many of us, that pretend much to Christ, that are plainly in our lives as proud, ambitious, vain-glorious as any others? Be there not many of us, that are as much under the power of unruly passions, as cruel, revengeful, malicious, censorious as others? that have our minds as deeply engaged in the world, and as much envasalled to riches, gain, profit, those great admired deities of the sons of men, and their souls as much overwhelmed and sunk with the cares of this life? Do not many of us as much give ourselves to the pleasures of the flesh, and though not without regrets of conscience, yet ever now and then secretly soak ourselves in them? Be there not

many of us, that have as deep a share likewise in injustice and oppression, in vexing the fatherless and the widows? I wish it may not prove some of our cases at that last day, to use such pleas as these unto Christ in our behalf; Lord, I have prophesied in thy name; I have preached many a zealous sermon for thee; I have kept many a long fast; I have been very active for thy cause in church, in state; nay, I never made any question, but that my name was written in thy book of life: when yet, alas! we shall receive no other return from Christ but this: "I know you not; depart from me, ye workers of iniquity." I am sure there be too many of us, that have long pretended to Christ, which make little or no progress in true Christianity, that is, holiness of life; that ever hang hovering in a twilight of grace, and never seriously put ourselves forward into clear day light, but esteem that glimmering *crepusculum* which we are in, and like that faint twilight better than broad open day: whereas "the path of the just (as the wise man speaks) is as the shining light, that shineth more and more unto the perfect day." I am sure there be many of us, that are perpetual dwarfs in our spiritual stature, like those silly women (that St. Paul speaks of) laden with sins, and led away with divers lusts, that are "ever learning, and never able to come to the knowledge of the truth;" that are not now one jot taller in Christianity, than we were many years ago, but have still a sickly, crazy, and unsound a temper of soul as we had long before.

Indeed, we seem to do something; we are always moving and lifting at the stone of corruption, that lies upon our hearts, but yet we never stir it

notwithstanding, or at least never roll it off from us. We are sometimes a little troubled with the guilt of our sins, and then we think we must thrust our lusts out of our hearts; but afterwards we sprinkle ourselves over with I know not what holy water, and so are contented to let them still abide quietly within us. We do every day truly confess the same sins, and pray against them; and yet still commit them as much as ever, and lie as deeply under the power of them. We have the same water to pump out in every prayer, and still we let the same leak in again upon us. We make a great deal of noise, and raise a great deal of dust with our feet; but we do not move from off the ground, on which we stood, we do not go forward at all: or if we do sometimes make a little progress, we quickly lose again the ground which we had gained; like those upper planets in the heaven, which (as the astronomers tell us) sometimes move forwards, sometimes quite backwards, and sometimes perfectly stand still; have there stations and retrogradations, as well as their direct motions. As if religion were nothing else but a dancing up and down upon the same piece of ground, and making several motions and friskings on it; and not a sober journeying and travelling onwards toward some certain place. We do and undo; we do "*Penelopes telam texere*;" we weave sometimes a web of holiness, but then we let our lusts come, and undo and unravel all again. Like Sisyphus in the fable, we roll up a mighty stone with much ado, sweating and tugging up the hill; and then we let it go, and tumble down again unto the bottom; and this is our constant work. Like those Danaides,

which the poets speak of, we are always filling water into a sieve, by our prayers, duties, and performances, which still runs out as fast as we pour it in.

What is it, that thus cheats us, and gulls us of our religion? that makes us thus constantly to tread the same ring and circle of duties, where we make no progress at all forwards, and the farther we go, are still never the nearer to our journey's end? What is it, that thus starves our religion, and makes it look like those kine in Pharaoh's dream, ill-favoured and lean-fleshed, that it hath no colour in its face, no blood in its veins, no life nor heat at all in its members? What is it, that doth thus be-dwarf us in our Christianity? What low, sordid, unworthy principles do we act by, that thus hinder our growth, and make us stand at a stay, and keep us always at the very porch and entrance where we first began? Is it a sleepy, sluggish conceit, that it is enough for us if we be but once in a state of grace, if we have but once stepped over the threshold; we need not take so great pains to travel any farther? or is it another damping, choaking, stifling opinion, that Christ hath done all for us already without us, and nothing need more to be done within us? no matter how wicked we be in ourselves, for we have holiness without us; no matter how sickly and diseased our souls be within, for they have health without them. Why may we not as well be satisfied and contented to have happiness without us too to all eternity, and so ourselves for ever continue miserable? "Little children, let no man deceive you; he that doth righteousness is righteous, even as he is righteous:

but he that committeth sin is of the devil." I shall therefore exhort you in the wholesome words of St. Peter ; "Give all diligence to add to your faith, virtue; and to virtue, knowledge; to knowledge, temperance; and to temperance, patience; to patience, godliness; and to godliness, brotherly-kindness; and to brotherly-kindness, charity: For if these things be in you and abound, they make you, that ye shall neither be barren nor unfruitful in the knowledge of our Lord Jesus Christ." The apostle still goes on, and I cannot leave him yet: "But he that lacketh these things is blind, and cannot see far off, and hath forgotten, that he was once purged from his old sins. Wherefore the rather, brethren, give diligence to make your calling and election sure; for if ye do these things, ye shall never fall." Let us not only talk and dispute of Christ, but let us indeed put on the Lord Jesus Christ. Having those great and precious promises, which he hath given us, let us strive to be made partakers of the Divine nature, escaping the corruption that is in the world through lust; and being begotten again to a lively hope of enjoying Christ hereafter, let us purify ourselves, as he is pure.

Let us really declare that we know Christ, that we are his disciples, by our keeping of his commandments; and, amongst the rest, that commandment especially, which our Saviour Christ himself commendeth to his disciples in a peculiar manner; "This is my commandment, that ye love one another, as I have loved you:" and again, "These things I command you, that you love one another. Let us follow peace with all men, and holiness, without which no man shall see God:

Let us put on, as the elect of God, holy and beloved, bowels of mercies, kindness, humbleness of mind, meekness, long-suffering, forbearing one another, and forgiving one another, if any man have a quarrel against any, even as Christ forgave us: and above all these things let us put on charity, which is the bond of perfectness. Let us in meekness instruct those that oppose themselves, if God peradventure will give them repentance to the acknowledging of the truth; that they may recover themselves out of the snares of the devil, that are taken captive by him at his will. Beloved, let us love one another; for love is of God, and whosoever loveth is born of God, and knoweth God."

O Divine love! the sweet harmony of souls! the music of angels! the joy of God's own heart! the very darling of his bosom! the source of true happiness! the pure quintessence of heaven! that which reconciles the jarring principles of the world, and makes them all chime together! that which melts men's hearts into one another! See how St. Paul describes it, and it cannot choose but enamour your affections towards it: "Love envieth not, it is not puffed up, it doth not behave itself unseemly, seeketh not her own, is not easily provoked, thinketh no evil, rejoiceth not in iniquity; beareth all things, believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things." I may add, in a word, it is the best-natured thing, the best-complexioned thing in the world. Let us express this sweet harmonious affection in these jarring times: that so, if it be possible, we may tune the world into better music. Especially in matters of religion, let us strive with all meekness to instruct

and convince one another. Let us endeavour to promote the gospel of peace, the dove-like gospel, with a dove-like spirit. This was the way, by which the gospel at first was propagated in the world: Christ did not cry, nor lift up his voice in the streets; a bruised reed he did not break, and the smoking flax he did not quench; and yet he brought "forth judgment unto victory." He whispered the gospel to us from mount Sion, in a still voice; and yet the sound thereof went out quickly throughout all the earth. The gospel at first came down upon the world gently and softly like the dew upon Gideon's fleece; and yet it quickly soaked quite through it: and, doubtless, this is still the most effectual way to promote it farther. Sweetness and ingenuity will more command men's minds than passion, sourness and severity; as the soft pillow sooner breaks the flint, than the hardest marble. Let us ἀληθεύειν ἐν ἀγάπῃ, follow truth in love—and of the two, indeed, be contented rather to miss of the conveying of a speculative truth, than to part with love. When we would convince men of any error by the strength of truth, let us withal pour the sweet balm of love upon their heads. Truth and love are two the most powerful things in the world; and when they both go together, they cannot easily be withstood. The golden beams of truth and the silken cords of love, twisted together, will draw men on with a sweet violence, whether they will or no.

Let us take heed we do not sometimes call that zeal for God and his gospel, which is nothing else but our own tempestuous and stormy passion. True zeal is a sweet, heavenly and gentle flame, which maketh us active for God, but always

within the sphere of love. It never calls for fire from heaven to consume those that differ a little from us in their apprehensions. It is like that kind of lightning (which the philosophers speak of) that melts the sword within, but singeth not the scabbard: it strives to save the soul, but hurteth not the body. True zeal is a loving thing, and makes us always active to edification, and not to destruction. If we keep the fire of zeal within the chimney, in its own proper place, it never doth any hurt; it only warmeth, quickeneth and enliveneth us: but if once we let it break out, and catch hold of the thatch of our flesh, and kindle our corrupt nature, and set the house of our body on fire, it is no longer zeal, it is no heavenly fire, it is a most destructive and devouring thing. True zeal is an *ignis lambens*, a soft and gentle flame, that will not scorch one's hand; it is no predatory or voracious thing: but carnal and fleshly zeal is like the spirit of gunpowder set on fire, that tears and blows up all that stands before it. True zeal is like the vital heat in us, that we live upon, which we never feel to be angry or troublesome; but though it gently feed upon the radical oil within us, that sweet balsam of our natural moisture, yet it lives lovingly with it, and maintains that, by which it is fed: but that other furious and distempered zeal is nothing else but a fever in the soul. To conclude, we may learn what kind of zeal it is that we should make use of in promoting the gospel, by an emblem of God's own, given us in the Scripture, those fiery tongues, that, upon the day of Pentecost, sat upon the apostles, which were were harmless flames, for we cannot read that they did any

hurt, or that they did so much as singe a hair of their heads.

I will therefore shut up this with that of the apostle; "Let us keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace." Let this soft and silken knot of love tie our hearts together; though our heads and apprehensions cannot meet, as indeed they never will, but always stand at some distance off from one another. Our zeal, if it be heavenly, if it be true vestal fire kindled from above, will not delight to tarry here below, burning up straw and stubble and such combustible things, and sending up nothing but gross and earthy fumes to heaven; but it will rise up, and return back pure as it came down, and will be ever striving to carry up men's hearts to God along with it. It will be only occupied about the promoting of those things, which are unquestionably good; and when it moves in the irascible way, it will quarrel with nothing but sin. Here let our zeal busy and exercise itself, every one of us beginning first at our own hearts. Let us be more zealous than ever we have yet been in fighting against our lusts, in pulling down these strong holds of sin and Satan in our hearts. Here let us exercise all our courage and resolution, our manhood and magnanimity.

Let us trust in the almighty arm of our God, and doubt not but he will as well deliver us from the power of sin in our hearts, as preserve us from the wrath to come. Let us go out against these uncircumcised Philistines, I mean our lusts, not with shield or spear, not in any confidence of our own strength, but in the name of the Lord of hosts; and we shall prevail, we shall overcome our lusts: "for greater is he that is in us, than he

that is in them.—The eternal God is our refuge, and underneath are everlasting arms; he shall thrust out these enemies from before us; and he shall say, Destroy them." We shall enter the true Canaan, the good land of promise, "that floweth with milk and honey," the land of truth and holiness. "Wherefore take unto you the whole armour of God, that you may be able to withstand. Let your loins be girt about with truth; have on the breast-plate of righteousness; and let your feet be shod with the preparation of the gospel of peace. Above all take the shield of faith, whereby ye shall be able to quench all the fiery darts of the wicked; and take the helmet of salvation, and the sword of the Spirit, which is the word of God." And lastly, be sure of this, that ye "be strong only in the Lord, and in the power of his might."

There be some, that dishearten us in this spiritual warfare, and would make us let our weapons fall out of our hands, by working in us a despair of victory. There be some evil spies, that weaken the hands and hearts of the children of Israel, and bring an ill report upon that land, that we are to conquer, telling of nothing but strange giants, the sons of Anak, there, that we shall never be able to overcome. "The Amalekites (say they) dwell in the south, the Hittites, Jebusites, Amorites in the mountains, and the Canaanites by the sea-coast;" huge armies of tall invincible lusts; "we shall never be able to go against this people;" we shall never be able to prevail against our corruptions. Harken not unto them, I beseech you, but hear what Caleb and Joshua say; "Let us go up at once and possess it, for we are able to

overcome them ;" not by our own strength, but by the power of the Lord of hosts. There are indeed sons of Anak there, there are mighty giant-like lusts, that we are to grapple with ; nay, there are principalities and powers too, that we are to oppose : but the great Michael, the Captain of the Lord's host, is with us ; he commands in chief for us, and we need not be dismayed. " Understand therefore this day, that the Lord thy God is he, which goeth before thee as a consuming fire ; he shall destroy these enemies, and bring them down before thy face." If thou wilt be faithful to him, and put thy trust in him, as the fire consumeth the stubble, and as the flame burneth up the chaff, so will he destroy thy lusts in thee : their root shall be rottenness, and their blossom shall go up as the dust.

But let us take heed, that we be not discouraged, and before we begin to fight, despair of victory : but to believe and hope well in the power of our God and his strength, will be half a conquest. Let us not think holiness in the hearts of men here in the world is a forlorn, forsaken, and outcast thing from God, that he hath no regard of holiness ; wherever it is, though never so small, if it be but hearty and sincere, it can no more be cut off and discontinued from God, than a sun-beam here upon earth can be broken off from its intercourse with the sun, and be left aloft amidst the mire and dirt of this world. The sun may as well discard its own rays, and banish them from itself into some region of darkness far remote from it, where they shall have no dependence at all upon it, as God can forsake and abandon holiness in the world, and leave it a poor orphan thing,

that shall have no influence at all from him to preserve and keep it. Holiness is something of God, wherever it is; it is an efflux from him, that always hangs upon him, and lives in him: as the sun-beams, although they gild this lower world, and spread their golden wings over us, yet they are not so much here, where they shine, as in the sun, from whence they flow. God cannot draw a curtain betwixt himself and holiness, which is nothing but the splendour and shining of himself; he cannot hide his face from it, he cannot desert it in the world. He that is once born of God, shall overcome the world, and the prince of this world too, by the power of God in him. Holiness is no solitary neglected thing; it hath stronger confederacies, greater alliances, than sin and wickedness. It is in league with God and the universe; the whole creation smiles upon it: there is something of God in it, and therefore it must needs be a victorious and triumphant thing.

Wickedness is a weak, cowardly and guilty thing, a fearful and trembling shadow. It is the child of ignorance and darkness; it is afraid of light, and cannot possibly withstand the power of it, nor endure the sight of its glittering armour. It is allied to none but wretched, forlorn and apostate spirits, that do what they can to support their own weak and tottering kingdom of darkness, but are only strong in weakness and impotency. The whole polity and commonwealth of devils is not so powerful as one child of light, one babe in Christ; they are not able to quench the least smoking flax, to extinguish one spark of grace. Darkness is not able to make resistance against light, but ever, as it comes, flies be-

fore it. But if wickedness invite the society of devils to it (as we learn by the sad experience of these present times, in many examples of those, that were possessed with malice, revengefulness and lust), so that those cursed fiends do most readily apply themselves to it, and offer their service to feed it and encourage it, because it is their own life and nature, their own kingdom of darkness, which they strive to enlarge and to spread the dominions of; shall we then think, that holiness, which is so nearly allied unto God, hath no good genius at all in the world to attend upon it, to help it and encourage it? Shall not the kingdom of light be as true to its own interest, and as vigilant for the enlarging of itself, as the kingdom of darkness? Holiness is never alone in the world, but God is always with it, and his loving Spirit doth ever associate and join itself to it. He, that sent it into the world, is with it as Christ speaketh of himself; "The Father hath not left me alone, because I do always those things that please him." Holiness is the life of God, which he cannot but feed and maintain wheresoever it is: and as devils are always active to encourage evil, so we cannot imagine, but that the heavenly host of blessed angels above are busily employed in the promoting of that, which they love best; that which is dearest to God, whom they serve, the life and nature of God. "There is joy in heaven at the conversion of one sinner;" heaven takes notice of it; there is a choir of angels, that sweetly sings the epithalamium of a soul divorced from sin and Satan, and espoused unto Christ. What therefore the wise man speaks concerning wisdom, I shall apply to holiness: "Take fast hold

of holiness, let her not go; keep her, for she is thy life: keep thy heart with all diligence, for out of it are the issues of life," and of death, too. Let nothing be esteemed of greater consequence and concernment to thee than what thou doest and actest, how thou livest. Nothing without us can make us either happy or miserable; nothing can either defile us, or hurt us, but what goeth out from us; what springeth and bubbleth up out of our own hearts. We have dreadful apprehensions of the flames of hell without us; we tremble, and are afraid, when we hear of fire and brimstone; whilst in the mean time we securely nourish within our own hearts a true and living hell,

—et cæco carpirur igni:

The dark fire of our lusts consumeth our bowels within, and miserably scorcheth our souls, and we are not troubled at it. We do not perceive how hell steals upon us whilst we live here. And as for heaven, we only gaze abroad, expecting that it should come in to us from without, but never look for the beginnings of it to arise within, in our own hearts.

But lest there should yet haply remain any prejudice against that, which I have all this while heartily commended to you, true holiness, and the keeping of Christ's commandments, as if it were a legal and a servile thing, that would subject us to a state of bondage, I must here needs add a word or two, either for the prevention or removal of it. I do not therefore mean by holiness, the mere performance of outward duties of religion, coldly acted over as a task; nor our habitual prayings, hearings, fastings, multiplied one

upon another (though these be all good, as subservient to a higher end); but I mean an inward soul and principle of Divine life, that spiriteth all these that enliveneth and quickeneth the dead carcass of all outward performances whatsoever. I do not here urge the "dead law of outward works," which indeed, if it be alone, subjects us to a "state of bondage;" but the inward law of the gospel, the "law of the Spirit of life," than which nothing can be more free and ingenuous: for it doth not act us by principles without us, but is an inward self-moving principle living in our hearts.

The first, though it work us into some outward conformity to God's commandments, and so hath a good effect upon the world; yet we are all this while but like dead instruments of music, that sound sweetly and harmoniously, when they are only struck and played upon from without by the musician's hand, who hath the theory and law of music living within himself.

But the second, the living law of the gospel, the "law of the Spirit of life" within us, is as if the soul of music should incorporate itself with the instrument, and live in the strings, and make them of their own accord, without any touch or impulse from without, dance up and down, and warble out their harmonies.

They, that are acted only by an outward law, are but like *neurospasts*, or those little puppets, that skip nimbly up and down, and seem to be full of quick and sprightly motion; whereas they are all the while moved artificially by certain wires and strings from without, and not by any principle of motion from themselves within: or

else like clocks and watches, that go pretty regularly for a while, but are moved by weights and plummets, or some other artificial springs, that must be ever now and then wound up, or else they cease.

But they, that are acted by the new law of the gospel, by the "law of the Spirit," they have an inward principle of life in them, that from the centre of itself puts forth itself freely and constantly into all obedience to the will of Christ. This new law of the gospel is a kind of musical soul, informing the dead organs of our hearts, that makes them of their own accord delight to act harmoniously according to the rule of God's word.

The law, that I speak of, is a law of love, which is the most powerful law in the world; and yet it freeth us in a manner from all law without us, because it maketh us become a law unto ourselves. The more it prevaieth in us, the more it eateth up and devoureth all other laws without us; just as Aaron's living rod did swallow up those rods of the magicians, that were made only to counterfeit a little life.

Quis legem det amantibus?

Major lex amor est sibi.

Love is at once a freedom from all law, a state of purest liberty; and yet a law too of the most constraining and indispensable necessity.

The worst law in the world is the "law of sin, which is in our members;" which keeps us in a condition of most absolute slavery, when we are wholly under the tyrannical commands of our lusts: this is a cruel Pharaoh indeed, that sets

his hard task-masters over us, and maketh us wretchedly drudge in mire and clay.

The law of the letter without us sets us in a condition of little more liberty, by restraining us from many outward acts of sin; but yet it doth not disenthral us from the power of sin in our hearts.

But the "law of the spirit of life," the gospel law of love, it puts us into a condition of most pure and perfect liberty; and whosoever really entertains this law, he hath "thrust out Hagar" quite, he hath "cast out the bond-woman and her children;" from henceforth Sarah, the free-woman, shall live for ever with him, and she shall be to him a mother of many children; her seed shall be "as the sand of the sea-shore for number," and "as the stars of heaven." Here is evangelical liberty, here is gospel freedom, when "the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath made us free from the law of sin and death;" when we have a liberty from sin, and not a liberty to sin: for our dear Lord and Master hath told us, that "whosoever committeth sin, is the servant of it."

He that lies under the power and vassalage of his base lusts, and yet talks of gospel freedom, he is but like a poor condemned prisoner, that in his sleep dreams of being set at liberty, and of walking up and down wheresoever he pleaseth, whilst his legs are all the while locked fast in fetters and irons. To please ourselves with a notion of gospel liberty, whilst we have not a gospel principle of holiness within us, to free us from the power of sin, is nothing else but to gild over our bonds and fetters, and to fancy ourselves to be in a golden cage. There is a straitness, slavery, and

narrowness in sin: sin crowds and crumples up our souls, which, if they were freely spread abroad, would be as wide and as large as the whole universe.

No man is truly free, but he that hath his will enlarged to the extent of God's own will, by loving whatsoever God loves, and nothing else. Such an one doth not fondly hug this and that particular created good thing, and envassal himself unto it; but he loveth every thing that is lovely, beginning at God, and descending down to all his creatures, according to the several degrees of perfection in them. He enjoys a boundless liberty, and a boundless sweetness, according to his boundless love. He enclaspeth the whole world within his outstretched arms; his soul is as wide as the whole universe, as big as "yesterday, to-day, and for ever." Whosoever is once acquainted with this disposition of spirit, he never desires any thing else, and he loves the life of God in himself dearer than his own life. To conclude this, therefore; if we love Christ, and keep his commandments, his commandments will not be grievous to us; his yoke will be easy, and his burden light: it will not put us into a state of bondage, but of perfect liberty. For it is most true of evangelical obedience, what the wise man speaketh of wisdom, "her ways are ways of pleasantness, and all her paths are peace: she is a tree of life to those that lay hold upon her, and happy are all they that retain her."

I will now shut up all with one or two considerations, to persuade you farther to the keeping of Christ's commandments.

First, from the desire, which we all have of knowledge. If we would indeed know Divine truths, the only way to come to this is by keeping of Christ's commandments. The grossness of our apprehensions in spiritual things, and our many mistakes, that we have about them, proceed from nothing but those dull and foggy steams, which rise up from our foul hearts, and becloud our understandings. If we did but heartily comply with Christ's commandments, and purge our hearts from all gross and sensual affections, we should not then look about for truth wholly without ourselves, and enslave ourselves to the dictates of this and that teacher, and hang upon the lips of men; but we should find the great eternal God inwardly teaching our souls, and continually instructing us more and more in the mysteries of his will; and "out of our bellies should flow rivers of living waters." Nothing puts a stop and hindrance to the passage of truth in the world, but the carnality of our hearts, the corruption of our lives.

It is not wrangling disputes, and syllogistical reasonings, that are the mighty pillars, that underprop truth in the world: if we would but under-set it with the holiness of our hearts and lives, it should never fail. Truth is a prevailing and conquering thing, and would quickly overcome the world, did not the earthiness of our dispositions, and the darkness of our false hearts hinder it. Our Saviour Christ bids the blind man wash off the clay, that was upon his eyes in the pool of Siloam, and then he should see clearly; intimating this to us, that it is the earthiness of men's af-

factions, that darkens the eye of their understandings in spiritual things. Truth is always ready and near at hand, if our eyes were not closed up with mud, that we could but open them to look upon it. Truth always waits upon our souls, and offers itself freely to us, as the sun offers its beams to every eye, that will but open, and let them shine in upon it. If we could but purge our hearts from that filth and defilement, which hangeth about them, there would be no doubt at all of truth's prevailing in the world. For truth is great, and stronger than all things: all the earth calleth upon truth, and the heaven blesseth it; all works shade and tremble at it. The truth endureth, and is always strong; it liveth and conquereth for evermore. She is the strength, kingdom, power, and majesty of all ages. Blessed be the God of truth.

Secondly, if we desire a true reformation, as some would be thought to do; let us begin here in reforming our hearts and lives, in keeping Christ's commandments. All outward forms and models of reformation, though they be never so good in their kind, yet they are of little worth to us without this inward reformation of the heart. Tin, or lead, or any other baser metal, if it be cast into never so good a mould, and made up into never so elegant a figure, yet it is but tin or lead still; it is the same metal, that it was before. If adulterate silver, that hath much alloy or dross in it, have never so current a stamp put upon it, yet it will not pass notwithstanding, when the touchstone trieth it. We must be reformed within, with a spirit of fire, and a spirit of burning, to

350 SERMON I. BEFORE THE HOUSE OF COMMONS.

purge us from the dross and corruption of our hearts, and refine us as gold and silver; and then we shall be reformed truly, and not before. When this once comes to pass, then shall Christ be set upon his throne indeed, then "the glory of the Lord shall overflow the land;" then we shall be a people acceptable unto him, and as mount Sion, which he dearly loved.

SERMON II.

But thanks be to God, which giveth us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ.—1 Cor. xv. 5—7.

Χριστιανισμός ἐστὶ τῆς Θεῆς χάριτος μνησμός.

S. GREGORY NYSSÆN.

CHRIST's resurrection, which the Apostle treateth of in the former part of this chapter, is one of the main and principal articles of our Christian faith: for though Christ by his death upon the cross made a propitiatory sacrifice for the world, yet it was his resurrection only, which did manifest his death to be effectual and available for that end, and did evidence its acceptation with God. For if the grave had detained Christ, and held him prisoner, this would have been an argument, that the debt, for which he was committed to that dark dungeon, was not yet paid, nor satisfaction made; for "if Christ be not raised (saith the Verse 17. apostle) your faith is in vain, ye are yet in your sins." But now death and the grave having delivered up Christ out of their custody, his resurrection is an undoubted argument, that they had no more to lay to his charge, as he was a surety and undertaker for mankind; but the debt which was owing to the law and Divine justice,

was in the court of heaven fully acquitted and discharged. For Christ was delivered for our sins, and rose again for our justification.

Rom. iv.

And though Christ's other miracles ought to have conciliated belief to his doctrine from the Jews ; yet his resurrection from the dead (foretold by himself, and really accomplished) added to all the rest, was a most undoubted and unquestionable confirmation of his prophetic ministry. For if it were supposed (as the Jews of old, and the Talmudists of later times, maliciously calumniated our Saviour Christ), that a mere wizard or magician should have appeared, and not only have done many miracles by Beelzebub and the powers of darkness, but also have foretold, that after he had been put to death, he should rise again, and have given this as a farther sign to confirm his prophecy, as our Saviour did, Matt. xii. 39. it could never be conceived, that Divine Providence should suffer such an impostor miraculously to rise again, in so remarkable a manner, and so often to appear before the eyes of so many spectators, and at last visibly to ascend up to heaven. Because this would have been *tentatio invincibilis* to mankind ; it being not imaginable, what greater assurance heaven itself could give, to confirm and seal a prophet, and persuade the world, that what he did was by the finger of God, and not by magical imposture, than this is. And therefore it is observable, that though a good while after our Saviour's time, when the Jews had now forfeited that peculiar Providence, that watched over them, a certain counterfeit Messiah, one David El-Roy, was permitted to do several strange and miraculous things by magic and witch-

craft, if the Jewish relations be true; yet, when he gave this for a sign to the Persian king, to prove himself the Messias, that after he was beheaded by him, he should rise again, he plainly discovered his imposture, to the great disappointment of the deluded Jews, who (as Maimonides writes) in vain expected his resurrection a good while after.

In Iggereth
Teman.

Moreover, if Christ had not risen again after death, the world would not have had sufficient ground to trust and believe in him as a Saviour. St. Austin reckoned it as great a miracle as any that Christ ever did upon earth, that the world should be brought off to believe in a crucified Saviour. For to worship *ἄλλῃ*, as the Jews by way of disgrace call our Saviour, or *τὸν ἀνασκολοπιζόμενον* in Lucian's language, one that was hanged, for a God, and to believe in him, could not but seem a monstrous and prodigious thing, both to Jews and Gentiles; and certainly it would never have been brought to pass, had there not been unquestionable assurance given of Christ's resurrection from the dead. For who would be so sottish as to believe in a dead Saviour, and to expect help and assistance from him that had not been able to help himself, and therefore had given no proof that he was able to help others? nay, from him, that, to all human appearance had now no being at all? Upon which account the Psalmist upbraids the sottish heathen, that "they ate the sacrifices of the dead." Psal. cvi. Wherefore it is observable, in the gospel, that when Christ was now dead, and buried in his sepulchre, the hope and expectation of his disciples, who had formerly believed in him, lay, as it were, entombed in the

same sepulchre with him. And then the two disciples, that went to Emmaus, could only say,

“ We trusted, that this had been he,”

Luke xxiv.

which should have redeemed Israel.’

But afterwards, when they were able upon good grounds to affirm, that Κύριος ἀληθῶς ἀνέστη, the Lord was risen indeed,—then their faith revived anew, and mounted up higher than ever, and grew triumphant in them.

Again, there was another excellent design in Christ’s resurrection from the dead, which the apostle pursues largely also in this chapter; viz. To give the world assurance of a life after death, and a blessed immortality to be enjoyed by all true believers and followers of Christ. Christ, by his resurrection, hath “abolished death, and brought life and immortality to light,” as the apostle speaks, (2 Tim. i. 10.) or, as the church sings in that Divine anthem, “After he had overcome the sharpness of death, he opened the kingdom of heaven to all believers.” The reasons of philosophy, that prove the soul’s immortality, though firm and demonstrative in themselves, yet they are so thin and subtile to vulgar apprehensions, that they glide away through them, and leave no such palpable impressions on them, as can be able sufficiently to bear up against that heavy weight of gross infidelity, that continually sinks down the minds of men to a distrust of such high things, as be above the reach of sense. Neither are these considerations any longer of force, than men can actually attend to the strength and coherence of the demonstration; and when that actual attention (which is operose and difficult) is taken off, then the truth itself, like a spectre or apparition,

suddenly vanishes away, and men question with themselves afterwards whether there were any such thing, or no. Such thin and evanid things are philosophical speculations about the high mysteries of faith and religion. But Christ's raising of the self-same body which was laid in the sepulchre, and afterwards appearing in it often to his disciples, gave such evident assurance of the soul's immortality and life after death, as must needs strike more strongly upon vulgar minds; and make more palpable impressions on them, and be always of more present and ready use, than any philosophical reasons and demonstrations.

And the Scripture is herein very harmonious, and agreeable to itself, both in the Old and New Testament; for, as in the one, it makes the original of death's entrance into the world to be the sin and disobedience of the first Adam, who was *ἄνθρωπος ἐκ γῆς, χαϊκός*, of the earth, earthy;—so in the other it attributes the recovery of life and immortality to the meritorious obedience of the second Adam, that was *ὁ Κύριος ἢ οὐρανῶν, ἐπουράνιος*, the Lord from heaven, heavenly—who by his death vanquished and destroyed death. For as Samson, who was a type of our Saviour, when he was besieged by the Philistines in the city Gaza (Judges xvi.) rose up at midnight, and pulled up the gates of the city, and the posts, and laying them upon his shoulders, carried them up to the top of the hill; in like manner, Christ our Lord, when he was environed and encompassed by death, after he had been awhile detained under the custody thereof, he ascended victoriously out of the power of the grave, and carried the gates of hell and death

upon his shoulders along with him triumphantly ~~into~~ heaven: he slighted and dismantled that mighty garrison, whose walls were stronger than brass, and gates harder than adamant, that it should be no longer a prison, with doors and bars to shut up those that believe in him, but an open and free passage, and a broad highway to life and immortality. He is "the resurrection and the life," (John xi. 25.) and "he that believeth in him, though he were dead, yet shall he live." For, he that liveth, and was dead, and is alive for evermore, even he hath the keys of hell and of death. Rev. i. 18.

But that which I chiefly aim at at this time, concerning Jesus's resurrection and ascension into heaven, is this; That by and after it he was made Lord and Christ, King and Saviour, and Sovereign of his church. Not but that Christ's humanity was always hypostatically united to the Divinity; but because the economical kingdom of Christ, as mediator, according to the Scripture calculation, seems not to commence till after the state of humiliation was, and so begins its epocha from Christ's resurrection, or his exaltation to sit at God's right hand in heaven. (Acts ii. 36.) "Let all the house of Israel know assuredly, that God hath made that same Jesus, whom ye have crucified, both Lord and Christ." (Acts v. 31.) "Jesus whom ye slew and hanged on a tree, him hath God exalted on his right hand to be a prince and a Saviour," &c. (Philip. ii. 9.) "Who humbled himself and became obedient to the death of the cross; wherefore God hath highly exalted him, and given him a name above every name, that at the name of Jesus every knee shall bow, &c. and

that every tongue shall confess, that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father." And that article of our creed, concerning Christ's sitting at God's right hand in heaven, signifies thus much unto us; that Christ, after his resurrection and ascension into heaven, hath all power given him both in heaven and in earth, all things being made subject to him, "excepting him only that hath put all things under him." 1 Cor. xv. 27.

He being, for the comfort of his church and members here upon earth, according to his humanity, made God's vicegerent, and seated in his Father's throne; and having a mediatorious kingdom bestowed upon him, that shall continue,

"till he hath put down all authority and power, and hath subdued all enemies under his feet;" and then hath delivered up this economical kingdom to God the Father, "that God may be all in all." Verse 24. Verse 28.

And this is an unspeakable consolation, that Christian religion affords to us, and a most gracious condescension of the all-wise God; that forasmuch as we, who dwell in these houses of clay, are so far removed from the pure and abstracted Deity, and so infinitely disproportioned unto it, that there should be such a contrivance as this set on foot, that we should have one of our own flesh and blood, that was in all things tempted like unto us, and had experience of all our difficulties and calamities; who demonstrated his infinite love to us in laying down his life for us, and therefore we cannot doubt, but hath a most tender sympathy and fellow-feeling with us in all our infirmities; I say, that we should have such a one exalted to God's right hand, and invested

with all authority and power both in heaven and earth, that he might administer all things for the good of his church and members, and supply them in all their wants and necessities. Which consideration must needs be far more comfortable, cheering, and reviving, to every true Christian, than it was to the sons of Jacob, when they went down to Egypt to buy corn and provision for their necessities, to think,* that Joseph their brother was made lord of all the land.

And yet, notwithstanding, this is wholly eluded and evacuated by those high-flown spiritualists of these latter times, that slight and reject the letter of the New Testament, as a mean and carnal thing; and will acknowledge no other death and resurrection of Christ, no other ascension and sitting at God's right hand; nay, no other day of judgment, nor resurrection of the body, but what is mystical and allegorical; whereby they do not only impudently slur the gospel, according to the history and the letter, in making it no better than a romantical legend, or a mere *Æsopic* fable, that contains a good *ἐντύχθον*, or moral under it; but also plainly defeat the counsel of God against themselves and mankind, by antiquating Christianity, and bringing in instead thereof old Paganism again, disguised under a few canting phrases of Scripture language. For though Moses had a veil over his face, though there were many obscure umbrages and allegories in the law (the children of Israel being then not able to bear the brightness of that evangelical truth that shined under them); yet now, under the gospel, "we do all with open face behold, as in a glass, the glory of the Lord" nakedly re-

* Cor. iii.

presented to us, being "changed into the same image from glory to glory."

But to let these pass, and still to improve our former meditation farther; let us in the next place consider, that Christ, who received all this power after his resurrection and ascension, did not receive it in vain and to no purpose, either taking no notice of our human transactions here below, as having removed his pavilion too far into those regions of light and glory from us; or else remaining, notwithstanding, an idle spectator, and no way concerning or interesting himself in the issues of our human affairs. Which will be so much the more improbable, if we consider what the Scripture and experience tell us, that the devil and apostate spirits are perpetually active and busy in promoting the concernments of the kingdom of darkness. And therefore doubtless he, whom God hath made the shepherd and bishop of our souls, can never be so regardless of his office, nor so careless of his flock and tender lambs committed to his charge, as to suffer those cruel wolves to prey upon them at pleasure; and to have no pity at all for them, nor to extend his watchful providence over them, whom once he vouchsafed to redeem with his own precious blood. No certainly; he, that waded through so many difficulties and agonies for us in the days of his flesh; he, that "bore our griefs and carried our sorrows;" he, that was "wounded for our transgressions, and bruised for our iniquities;" that sweat drops of blood in the garden, and was nailed to the cross for us in Golgotha; he cannot so easily forget those whom he hath so dearly bought, nor suffer all that power which God hath

invested him with for the good of his church, to lie by him idle and unemployed.

But to the end that there might not be the least ground of suspicion or distrust left in the minds of men concerning this particular, Christ, after his ascension into heaven, thought good to give us a sensible demonstration both of his kingly power, and of his watchful care and providence over his church, that he would not leave them orphans, and destitute of all assistance, by sending down his Holy Spirit on the day of Pentecost, in a visible and miraculous manner, upon his disciples. (Acts ii. 32.) "This Jesus hath God raised up, of which we are all witnesses: therefore, being by the right hand of God exalted, and having received of the Father the promise of the Holy Ghost, he hath shed forth this, which you now see and hear." And verily, if there had been no news heard of our Lord and Saviour Christ, after he ascended above the clouds out of his disciples' sight, no real and visible demonstration of his existence, power, and providence over his church; the distrustful hearts of men would have been too prone to suspect, that the pretence of an invisible kingdom at God's right hand above had been no better than a mere dream, an airy and fantastic notion; and they would have been too ready to have called in question the truth of all his other miracles, his resurrection and ascension, witnessed only by his own disciples, and to have surmised those several apparitions of his, that we read of after his death, had been nothing else but spectres, or phantasms, like the vulgarly-believed apparitions of the ghosts of men in airy bodies. But the sensible and miraculous pouring out of the

Holy Ghost upon his disciples, after his ascension into heaven, was a palpable confirmation of all Christ's other miracles, of the validity of his meritorious death and passion, of the truth of his resurrection and ascension; and gives most comfortable assurance to all believers to the world's end, that though his bodily presence be withdrawn from them, yet he hath not left his church utterly forlorn, and destitute of all assistance; but that his Spirit, the holy Comforter, continueth to be present amongst them, as his vicegerent, and to assist them for all the holy purposes of the gospel, to the world's end. Now the principal effects of Christ's Holy Spirit, which are to be hoped for and expected by every true believer and private Christian, are comprised by the apostle under three heads here in the text, as consisting in a threefold victory over a threefold enemy. "The sting of death is sin, and the strength of sin is the law: but thanks be to God, which giveth us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ."

1. A victory over sin, as that which is the cause of death.

2. A victory over the law, as that which aggravates the guilt, and exasperates the power of sin.

3. Lastly, A victory over death, the fruit and consequent of sin.

First, therefore, There is a victory over sin to be obtained in and through Christ.

Some there are, that will acknowledge no other victory over sin but an external one; that whereby it was conquered for us by Christ upon the cross, sixteen hundred years since, where he "spoiled principalities and powers, and made a show of them openly, triumphing over them in it." (Col. ii. 15.)

and where he "redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us." (Gal. iii. 13.) And doubtless this was one great end of Christ's coming into the world to make a propitiatory sacrifice for the sins of mankind: not only that he might thereby put a period to those continually repeated and ineffectual sacrifices of brute beasts, and the offering of the blood of bulls and goats, that could not take away sin, nor propitiate his Divine Majesty; but also that he might at once give a sensible demonstration, both of God's high displeasure against sin, and of his placableness and reconcilableness to sinners returning to obedience; and, therefore, to that end, that the despair of pardon might not hinder any from repentance and amendment of life, promulgate free pardon and remission of sins, through his blood, to all that should repent and believe the gospel.

But it is a very unsound and unwholesome interpretation of this salutary undertaking of Christ's in the gospel, as if the ultimate end and design of it were to procure remission of sin, and exemption from punishment only, to some particular persons still continuing under the power of sin, and to save them at last in their sins, that is, with a mere outward and carnal salvation; it being a thing utterly impossible, that those undefiled rewards of the heavenly kingdom should be received and enjoyed by men in their unregenerate and unrenewed nature.

For what is this else, but to make Christ the grand patron of the kingdom of darkness, and to suppose God to be such a being as may be bribed and corrupted, by sacrifice and intercession, to

a partial connivance and fond indulgence of men in their sins to all eternity? or else to insinuate, that there is no other evil at all in sin, but only in respect of that outward punishment consequent upon it? Which is to destroy the nature and reality of sin, and to make it nothing but a mere name or fancy; as if good and evil, just and unjust (as some philosophers dreamed), were not *Φύσις*, but *Νόμος* and *Δόξα* only, had no reality in nature, but depended only upon arbitrary laws, enforced by outward punishments, or mere opinions: and so were only *Πομπή*, (as Democritus expresseth it) mere factitious things, or else *Φαντασμά*, fictitious and imaginary: either of which opinions, if they were true, then indeed remission of sin, and exemption from punishment, would quite take away all the evil of sin.

But if sin be not a mere name or fancy, but that which hath a real and intrinsical evil in it, greater than that of outward punishment; then certainly it cannot be so transcendent a happiness, as some men carnally conceit, to have an impunity in sinning to all eternity, that the accomplishment thereof should be thought the only fit undertaking for the Son of God to engage in, and that which would deservedly entitle him the Saviour of mankind. For that of Socrates in Plato must then needs be true, *Τὸν ἀδικοῦντα μὴ δίδοναι δίκην, πάντων μέγιστον τε καὶ πρῶτον κακῶν εἶναι*, that (in those which are not incorrigible and incurable) it is the greatest evil that can possibly befall them, to continue in wickedness unpunished; and the greatest kindness that they can receive, by the lesser evil of punishment and castigation, to be cured of the greater evil of sin:—For (as the same philosopher

speaks) ἡ ἰατρικὴ τῆς πονηρίας δίκη, chastisement and correction is the natural remedy and cure of wickedness ;—which our Saviour confirms, Rev. iii. 19. when he said, “ As many as I love, I rebuke and chasten :” and sure the remedy is not worse than the disease.

Wherefore it was so far from being the ultimate end of Christ's undertaking to die for sin, that men might securely live in it, that on the contrary, the death of Christ was particularly intended as an engine to batter down the kingdom of sin and Satan, and to bring men effectually unto God and righteousness, as the Scripture plainly witnesseth, (1 Pet. ii. 24.) “ His own self bare our sins in his body on the tree, that we, being dead to sin, might live to righteousness.” The death of Christ conducing to this great end, not only as it was exemplary, and hieroglyphically instructed us, that we ought to take up the cross likewise, 1 Pet. vi. 1. and follow our crucified Lord and Saviour, suffering in the flesh, and ceasing from sin ; but also as it doth most lively demonstrate to us God's high displeasure against sin, and the malignant nature of it, that could not otherwise be expiated than by the blood of that innocent and immaculate Lamb, the only-begotten Son of God ; and, lastly, as the hope of pardon and free remission of sin, in the blood of Christ, for the truly penitent, might invite and animate men to cheerful and vigorous endeavours against sin.

Others there are, that tell us, there is indeed something farther aimed at in the gospel besides the bare remission of sins, but that it is nothing else but the imputation of an external righteous-

ness, or another's inherent holiness, which is so completely made ours thereby to all intents and purposes, as if we ourselves had been really and perfectly righteous; and this upon no other condition or qualification at all required in us, but only of mere faith scrupulously prescinded from all holiness and sanctification, or the laying hold or apprehending only (as they use to phrase it) of this external and imputed righteousness; that is, the merely believing and imagining it to be ours: which kind of faith therefore is but the imagination of an imagination, or of that, which really is not, and, as Pindar calls man *Σκιάς ὄναρ*, the very dream of a shadow.

For though this be pretended by some to be spoken only of justification as contradistinct from sanctification, the latter of which they conceive must by no means have any conditional influence upon the former; yet it will unavoidably extend to the taking away of the necessity of inherent righteousness and holiness, and all obligation to it: upon which very account it is so highly acceptable, because under a specious show of modesty and humility it doth exceedingly gratify men's hypocrisy and carnality: for he that is thus completely justified by the imputation of a mere external righteousness, must needs have *ipso facto* a right and title thereby to heaven and happiness without holiness; for (Rom. viii. 30.) "Whom he justifieth them he also glorifieth." Neither can any thing be required inherently in them, where all inherency is perfectly supplied by imputation. And though it be pretended, that sanctification will spontaneously follow after by way of gratitude; yet this is like to prove but a very slippery

hold, where it is believed, that gratitude itself, as well as all other graces, is already in them by imputation. Neither can it be reasonably thought, that true holiness should spring by way of gratitude or ingenuity from such a principle of carnality, as makes men so well contented with a mere imaginary righteousness.

But this opinion, as it makes God, in justifying, to pronounce a false sentence, and to conceive of things otherwise than they are, and to do that, which himself hath declared to be abominable, to justify the wicked (in a forensic sense) and as it is irreconcilable to those many

Prov. xvii. 15. scriptures, that assure us God will render to every man according to his works ;

so it also takes away the necessity of Christ's meritorious and propitiatory sacrifice for the remission of sins : for where a complete righteousness is imputed, there is no sin at all to be pardoned. And, lastly, it vainly supposes righteousness and holiness to be mere fantastical and imaginary things ; for otherwise it were no more possible, that a wicked man should be made righteous by another's righteousness imputed, than that a sick man should be made whole by another's imputed health. "If a brother or sister be naked and destitute of daily food, and one of you say unto them, Depart in peace, be you warmed, and be you filled ; notwithstanding you give them not those things, which are needful for the body ; what doth it profit ? (James ii. 15, 16.) Even so, what doth it profit, my brethren, if a man say he hath faith (or imputed righteousness) and have not works ? (that is, real and inherent righteousness, or inward regeneration) can such a

faith (that is, imagination or imputation) save him?" Certainly no more than mere words can clothe a naked man's back, or feed a hungry man's belly, or warm and thaw him, whose blood is frozen and congealed in his veins. Nay, it is no more possible for a man to be made holy, than to be made happy, by mere imputation, which latter few men would be contented withal; and, were it not for their hypocrisy, they would be as little contented with the former; and it would as little please them to be *opinione tantum justi*, as *opinione tantum beati*, to use Tully's expression against the Epicureans. Nay, since it is most certain, that the greatest part of our happiness consisteth in righteousness and holiness, it will unavoidably follow, that if we have no other than an imputative righteousness, we can have no other than an imputative happiness, and a mere imaginary heaven, which will little please us, when we feel ourselves to be in a true and real hell.

But it is not our intention here to quarrel about words and phrases, as if Christ's meritorious satisfaction might not be said to be imputed to those that repent and believe the gospel for remission of sins; much less to deny what the holy Scripture plainly asserts, true and living faith, that worketh by love, which is the very essence of the new creature, or regenerate nature, λογίζεσθαι εἰς δικαιοσύνην, to be imputed, or accounted for righteousness—under the gospel dispensation, where God will not proceed according to legal rigour and severity with his fallen creatures, but according to that equity and Ἐπιείκεια, which the philosopher tells us is the truest justice. But our only design is, to caution against that Antino-

mian error, which is too often insinuated under the notion of imputed righteousness, as if there were no necessity of inherent righteousness, and a real victory over sin, in order to salvation, but that an imputed or imaginary one might serve the turn. Which error springing up very early amongst the Gnostic Christians, St. John gives a very seasonable antidote against it. (1 John iii. 7.) "Little children, let no man deceive you; he that doth righteousness, is righteous, even as he is righteous:" and in chap. ii. ver. 4. "He that saith, I know him, and keepeth not his commandments, is a liar, and the truth is not in him." To which purpose is that also in his first chapter, (ver. 5.) "This is the message which we have heard of him, and declare to you, that God is light, and in him is no darkness at all. If we say that we have fellowship with him, and walk in darkness, we lie, and do not the truth: but if we walk in the light, as he is in the light, we have fellowship one with another, and the blood of Jesus Christ his Son cleanseth us from all sin." Wherefore the same apostle, in that Epistle, tells us of overcoming the wicked one, (chap. ii. 14.) and of overcoming the world, by our faith in Christ. (chap. v. 4.) And in the Apocalypse he propoundeth, from Christ himself, divers remarkable promises to him that overcometh: That he shall eat of the tree of life, that is in the midst of the paradise of God, (chap. ii. ver. 7.) That he shall not be hurt of the second death, (ver. 11.) That he shall have the hidden manna, and a white stone with a new name written in it, which no man knoweth, saving he that receiveth it, (ver. 17.) That he will give him the morning-star, (ver. 28.) That he shall be

clothed in white raiment, and his name shall not be blotted out of the book of life, (chap. iii. ver. 5.) That he shall be a pillar in the temple of God, (ver. 12.) And that he shall sit with Christ in his throne, as he overcame and sat down with his Father in his throne. (ver. 21.) The condition of all which promises being overcoming, we may well conclude from thence, that there is a real, and not an imaginary victory only, to be obtained over the power of sin, as well as the guilt of it.

Nay, it is true, and very observable, that those places, which are usually quoted as the foundation of an imputed righteousness in some other sense than what we before mentioned, are indeed no otherwise to be understood than of a real inward righteousness, that is wrought or infused by the Spirit of Christ. As that principal one, Philip. iii. 8. "Yea doubtless, and I count all things lost for the excellency of the knowledge of Christ Jesus my Lord;—that I may win him, and be found in him, not having mine own righteousness, which is of the law, but that which is of the faith of Christ, the righteousness which is of God by faith." Where Christ, whom the apostle desires to win, and to be found in, and the righteousness, which is through the faith of Christ, and the righteousness, which is of God through faith, are no external imputed righteousness, but the real inward righteousness of the new creature, wrought by the Spirit of Christ through faith, which is opposed here to our own righteousness, and the righteousness, which is of the law; that is, the righteousness of outward works done by our own natural power, according to the letter of the law, in our unregenerate state: for so the following

words explain the meaning, "that I may know him; and the power of his resurrection, and the fellowship of his sufferings, being made comfortable unto his death; if by any means I might attain to the resurrection of the dead." And this same inward and real righteousness is often elsewhere called Christ, and the new man, that is said to be in us, and which we are exhorted to put on; not by conceit or imagination only, but by real conformity to his nature; and participation of his spirit.

And whereas the magnifiers of free grace, in an Antinomian sense, and the decriers of inherent righteousness, commonly conceive, that the free grace of God consists in nothing but either in the pardon of sin and exemption from punishment, or the imputation of an external holiness, and accounting men just freely, without any condition but only the mere believing of this, that they are so accounted; and that faith is no otherwise considered in the gospel, than in order to the believing of this imputation; and that our own works, when they are comparatively undervalued to grace and faith, are to be taken for all inherent righteousness and holiness, even the new creature itself: that all these are errors, as it might be abundantly proved from sundry other places of Scripture, so it may sufficiently appear from that one, Eph. ii. 4, &c. "God, who is rich in mercy, for his great love, wherewith he loved us, even when we were dead in sins, hath quickened us together with Christ, (by grace ye are saved), and hath raised us up together—That in the ages to come he might shew the exceeding riches of his grace, and his kindness towards us in Christ Jesus. For by grace are ye saved through

faith, and that not of yourselves; it is the gift of God : not of works, lest any man should boast. For we are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus unto good works." For when we are here said to be saved by grace, it is plain, that the apostle means by saved, inwardly quickened and sanctified : *salvatus* (saith Grotius well here) is *purgari a vitiis*: which inward sanctification is here attributed to God's free grace, and denied to ourselves and to works ; the meaning whereof is, that it is not effected by our own works (whether of outward morality or legal ceremonies) done by our natural power in the unregenerate state, but by the quickening and enlivening spirit of Christ inwardly creating us anew. And, lastly, faith is plainly made the instrument of this inward sanctification, that is not wrought by our own works, but the grace and spirit of Christ. Whence we may well conclude, that the true object of the Christian faith is not only the blood of Christ shed upon the cross for the remission of sin, but also the renewing spirit of Christ for the inward conquering and mortifying of it, and the quickening or raising of us to an heavenly life.

And I dare be bold to say, that the inward sense of every true and sincere-hearted Christian in this point speaks the same language with the Scripture. For a true Christian, that hath any thing of the life of God in him, cannot but earnestly desire an inward healing of his sinful maladies and distempers, and not an outward hiding and palliation of them only. He most needs passionately long more and more after a new life and nature, and the Divine image to be more fully formed in him ; insomuch, that if he

might be secured from the pains of hell without it he could not be fully quieted and satisfied therewith. It is not the effects and consequents of sin only, the external punishment due unto it, that he desires to be freed from, but the intrinsical evil of sin itself, the plague of his own heart. As he often meditates with comfort upon that outward cross, to which his Saviour's hands and feet were nailed for his sins; so he impatiently desires also to feel the virtue of that inward cross of Christ, by which the world may be crucified to him, and he unto the world; and the power of Christ's resurrection in him still to raise him farther unto newness of life. Neither will he be more easily persuaded to believe, that his sinful lusts, the malignity and violence whereof he feels within himself, can be conquered without him, than that an army here in England can be conquered in France or Spain. He is so deeply sensible of the real evil, that is in sin itself, that he cannot be contented to have it only histrionically triumphed over. And to fancy himself covered all over with a thin veil of mere external imputation, will afford little satisfactory comfort unto him, that hungers and thirsts after righteousness, and is weary and heavy laden with the burden of sins, and doth not desire to have his inward maladies hid and covered only, but healed and cured. Neither can he be willing to be put off till the hour of death for a divorce betwixt his soul and sin; nor easily persuaded, that though sin should rule and reign in him all his life-long, yet the last parting groan, that shall divide his soul and body asunder, might have so great an efficacy, as in a moment also to separate all sin from his soul.

But that we may not seem here either to beat the air in generals and uncertainties, or by an indiscreet zeal to countenance those conceited and high-flown enthusiasts of latter times, that, forgetting that example of modesty given us by the blessed apostle, "Not as though I had Phil. iii. 12. already attained, or were already perfect

——But this one thing I do; forgetting those things which are behind, and reaching forth unto those things which are before, I press towards the mark," boldly arrogate to themselves such an absolute perfection, as would make them not to stand in need of any Saviour, nor to be cleansed by the blood of the Lamb, which therefore they allegorize into a mystical sense; we must declare, that we speak not here of inherent righteousness, and a victory over sin in a legal or pharisaical sense, but in such an evangelical sense, as yet notwithstanding is true and real.

The first degree whereof is a principle of new life, infused into the soul by the spirit of Christ through faith (which the apostle calls *semen Dei*, the seed of God), inclining it 1 John iii. 9. to love God and righteousness, as a thing correspondent to its nature, and enabling it to act freely and ingenuously in the ways of God, out of a living law written upon the heart, and to eschew sin as contrary to a vital principle. For the true gospel-righteousness, which Christ came to set up in the world, doth not consist merely in outward works, whether ceremonial or moral, done by our own natural power in our unregenerate state, but in an inward life and spirit wrought by God. Which those very philosophers seemed in a manner to acknowledge, that denied *ἀρετήν* to be *διδασκόντι*, that

virtue could be taught by outward rules and precepts like an art or trade; and Aristotle himself also, when he inclines to think, that men are *οὐκ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀγαθοί*, and that their being good depends upon some extraordinary Divine influence and assistance. Which I the rather take notice of, because some late pretenders to philosophy have profanely derided this doctrine after this manner, as if it made good thoughts and virtuous dispositions to be POUNCED and BLOWN into men by God. But there is a second degree of victory over sin, which every true Christian ought not only to look upon as possible, but also to endeavour after, and restlessly to pursue; which is "such a measure of strength in the inward man," and such a degree of mortification or crucifixion of our sinful lusts; as that a man will not knowingly and deliberately do any thing, that his conscience plainly tells him is a sin, though there be never so great temptations to it.

Whether or no this be that evangelical perfection, which was the mark that St. Paul pressed towards, and which he seems mystically to call the "resurrection from the dead," or any thing farther, I leave it to others to make a judgment of. But doubtless, they, that have attained to such a principle of new life, and such a measure of inward strength, as is already mentioned, that is to the perfection of unfeigned sincerity, may, notwithstanding the irregularities of the first motions, violent assaults, and importunities of temptations, sudden incursions, and obreptions, sins of mere ignorance and inadvertency, (which are all washed away in the blood of Christ) in a true evangelical sense be said to have attained to a victory over sin.

Wherefore I demand, in the next place, Why it should be thought impossible, by the grace of the gospel, and the faith of Christ, to attain to such a victory as this is over sin? For sin owes its original to nothing else but ignorance and darkness, *Πᾶς ὁ ζωντὸς ἄγνοει*, Every wicked man is ignorant.—And therefore in that sense that other maxim of the Stoics may have some truth also, that *ἄκοντες ἀμαρτάνομεν*, Men sin against their will;—because if they knew that those things were indeed so hurtful to them, they would never do them. Now, we all know, how easily light conquers darkness, and upon its first approach makes it fly before it, and, like a guilty shade, seek to hide itself from it, by running round about the earth. And certainly the light of God arising in the soul can with as much ease scatter away the night of sinful ignorance before it. For truth hath a cognation with the soul; and falsehood, lies, and impostures are no more able to make resistance against the power of truth breaking forth, than darkness is able to dispute with light. Wherefore the entrance in of light upon the soul is half a conquest over our sinful lusts.

Again, though sin have had a long and customary possession in the soul, yet it has no just title, much less a right of inheritance in it. For sin is but a stranger and foreigner in the soul, an usurper and intruder into the Lord's inheritance. Sin it is no nature, as St. Austin and others of the fathers often inculcate, but an adventitious and extraneous thing; and the true and ancient nature of the soul of man suffers violence under it, and is oppressed by it. It is nothing else but the preternatural state of rational beings, and there-

fore we have no reason to think it must needs be perpetual and unalterable. Is it a strange thing that a jarring instrument by the hand of a skilful musician should ever be set in tune again? Doubtless if an instrument of music were a living thing, it would be sensible of harmony as its proper state, and abhor discord and dissonancy as a thing preternatural to it. The soul of man was harmonical as God at first made it, till sin, disordering the strings and faculties, put it out of tune, and warred the music of it: but doubtless that great Harmonies, that tunes the whole world, and makes all things keep their times and measures, is able to set this lesser instrument in tune again. Sin is but a disease and dyscrasy in the soul; righteousness is the health and natural complexion of it; and there is a propension in the nature of every thing to return to its proper state, and to cast off whatever is heterogeneous to it. And some physicians tell us, that medicaments are but subservient to nature, by removing obstructions and impediments; but nature itself, and the inward Archæus released and set at liberty, works the cure. Bodies, when they are bent out of their place, and violently forced out of the natural position of their parts, have a spring of their own, and an inward strong propension to return to their own natural posture, which produceth that motion of restitution, that philosophers endeavour to give a reason of. As for example, air may be forced into much a lesser room, than it would naturally expand itself into: but whilst it is under this violence, it hath a spring or strong *conatus* to return to its proper state, (of which several ingenious observations have been lately published by a learned hand.) Now sin being a vio-

lent and preternatural state, and a sinner's returning to God and righteousness being *motus restitutionis et liberationis*, whereby the soul is restored to its true freedom and ancient nature; why should there not be such an elater or spring in the soul, (quicken'd and enlivened by Divine grace) such a natural *conatus* of returning to its proper state again? Doubtless there is, and the Scripture seems sometimes to acknowledge it, and call it by the name of Spirit, when it speaketh of our free-acting in God's ways from an inward principle. For the spirit is not always to be taken for a breath or impulse from without; but also for an inward propension of the soul, awakened and revived in it, to return to its proper state, as it is intellectual, and then to act freely in it according to its ancient nature. For if the spirit were a mere external force acting upon the soul, without the concurrence of an innate principle, then to be acted by the spirit would be a state of violence to the soul, which it could not delight always to continue under; whereas the state of the spirit is a state of freedom, and not of violence, as the apostle witnesseth, when he calls it the freedom of the spirit: it is the soul's acting from an inward spring and principle of its own intellectual nature, not by a mere outward impulse, like a boat, that is tugged on by oars, or driven by a strong blast of wind. Wherefore the soul's returning from sin to righteousness, which is its primitive nature, must needs have great advantages, it going on *secundo flumine*, according to the genuine current of its true intellectual nature, and having besides the assistance of a gentle gale of the Divine Spirit from without to help it forwards.

Why should it be thought so great an impossi-

bility for men willingly to do that, which is agreeable to the law of goodness, since this is the genuine nature of the soul, when once it is freed from mistakes and incumbrances, from that which is heterogeneous and adventitious to it, that clogs it and oppresses it; and every life and nature acts freely according to its own propensions? Why should it seem strange, that the superior faculties of the soul should become predominant, since they are φύσις δεσποτικάι, of a lordly nature, and made to rule, and the inferior faculties of a servile temper, and made to be subject; why should it seem impossible for equity, light, and reason to be enthroned in the soul of man again, and there to command and govern those exorbitant affections, that do so lawlessly rebel against them? For if some grave commanders and generals have been able by the majesty of their very looks to hush and silence a disorderly and mutinous rout of soldiers; certainly reason re-enthroned in her majestic seat, and re-invested with her ancient power and authority, which is natural and not usurped, would much more easily be able to check and controul the tumultuous rabble of lusts and passions in us.

Doubtless God hath no other design upon us in religion, and the gospel of his Son, than what is for our good, and to restore us to the rectitude and perfection of our own beings: wherefore he seeks to redeem and call off our affections from the perishing vanities of this world, which being so infinitely below us, to debase and pollute our spirits: wherefore he would not have us to addict ourselves wholly to the gratifications of our lower faculties, which are but the brute in us, but he would have the best in us to be uppermost, the man to rule the brute, and the τὸ Θεῖον that

that is of God in us, to rule our manly and rational faculties. He would not have us, Narcissus-like, to be always courting our own shadow in the stream; for, according to the ancient Democritical philosophy, this whole visible world is nothing else but mere extended bulk, and hath nothing real in it but atoms or particles of a different magnitude, diversely placed and agitated in a continual whirlpool. But all the colour, beauty and varnish, all that which charms and bewitches us in these objects without us, is nothing but the vital sensations and relishes of our own souls. This gives all the paint and lustre to those beauties, which we court and fall in love withal without us, which are otherwise as devoid of reality and fantastical as the colours of the rainbow. So that this outward world is not unfitly compared to an enchanted palace, which seems indeed mighty pleasing and ravishing to our deluded sense, whereas all is but imaginary and a mere prestigious show; those things, which we are enamoured with, thinking them to be without us, being nothing but the vital energies of our own spirits. In a word, God would have man to be a living temple for himself to dwell in, and his faculties instruments to be used and employed by him; which need not be thought impossible, if that be true, which philosophy tells us, that there is *cognatio quædam*, a certain near kindred and alliance between the soul and God.

Lastly, we must observe, though this inward victory over sin be no otherwise to be effected than by the spirit of Christ through faith, and by a Divine operation in us, so that in a certain sense we may be said to be passive thereunto; yet not-

withstanding we must not dream any such thing, as if our active co-operation and concurrence were not also necessarily required thereunto. For as there is a spirit of God in nature, which produceth vegetables and minerals, which human art and industry could never be able to effect; namely, that *spiritus intus alens*, which the poet speaks of, which yet notwithstanding doth not work absolutely, unconditionally, and omnipotently, but requireth certain preparations, conditions, and dispositions in the matter, which it works upon; (for unless the husbandman plough the ground and sow the seed, the spirit of God in nature will not give any increase :) in like manner the Scripture tells us, that the Divine Spirit of grace doth not work absolutely, unconditionally, and irresistibly in the souls of men, but requireth certain preparations, conditions, and co-operations in us; forasmuch as it may both be quenched, and stirred up or excited in us. And, indeed, unless we plough up the fallow-ground of our hearts, and sow to ourselves in righteousness, (as the prophet speaks) by our earnest endeavours; we cannot expect, that the Divine Spirit of grace will shower down that heavenly increase upon us. Wherefore, if we would attain to a victory over sin by the spirit of Christ, we must endeavour to fight a good fight, and run a good race and to "enter in at the strait gate," that so overcoming we may receive the crown of life. And thus much shall suffice to have spoken at this time concerning the first particular, The victory over sin.

I shall now proceed to speak something briefly, to the two other victories that remain, which are attainable also by Christ over the law and death.

And the law may be considered two manner of ways: first, as an outward covenant of works, that pronounceth death and condemnation to all, that do not yield absolute and entire obedience to whatever is therein commanded; and which imposed also with the same severity a multitude of outward ceremonial observations, which had no intrinsical goodness at all in them, but kept men in a state of bondage and servility. Now the law, in this sense, as it is an outward letter and covenant of works, is already conquered externally for us by Christ's death upon the cross; (Gal. iii. 13.) "Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law; being made a curse for us; for it is written, Cursed is every one that hangeth on a tree; that the blessing of Abraham might come on the gentiles through Jesus Christ, that we might receive the promise of the Spirit through faith." And he hath thereby freed us also from our obligation to those commandments that were not good, having "broken down the middle wall of partition, that was betwixt Jew and gentile," Ezek. xi. 25. abolishing in his flesh the enmity, even the law of commandments, (Eph. ii. 14, 15.) and blotting out the hand-writing of ordinances, that was against us, which was contrary to us, and taking it out of the way, nailing it to his cross." Col. ii. 14.

Secondly, The law is sometimes also considered in Scripture as an inward state of mind, wrought by the law and truth of God, whether written outwardly in the letter of the Scripture, or inwardly in the conscience, prevailing only so far as to beget a conviction of men's duty, and of the wrath of God against sin, but not enabling them with inward strength and power to do what is command-

ed, willingly, out of a love of it. It is such a state when men are only passive to God's law, and unwillingly subject unto it (as an enemy) for fear of wrath and vengeance. And this must needs be a state of miserable bondage and servility, distraction and perplexity of mind; when men are at once strongly convinced of the wrath of God against sin, and yet under the power of their lusts bailing and dragging of them to the commission of it. It is that state (as I conceive) which St. Paul describes, (Rom. vii.) after this manner: "The law is spiritual, but I am carnal, sold under sin: for that which I do, I allow not; for what I would that do I not, but what I hate, that do I." And again, "I see another law in my members warring against my mind, and bringing me into captivity under the law of sin. O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from this body of death?" Now from the law in this sense, that is, from the bondage and servility of the legal state, we are not delivered, nor made conquerors, by what Christ did outwardly upon the cross, as some imagine; as if he had there purchased for us an indulgence to sin without controul; but by the inward working of his Holy Spirit, freeing us from the power and bondage of sin, and unbewitching us from the love of it.

Wherefore there is a double freedom from this legal state to be taken notice of; a true and a false freedom; which I cannot better explain, than by using the apostle's own similitude in the beginning of the seventh chapter: "Know ye not, brethren, that the law hath dominion over a man as long as he liveth? (or rather, as long as it, that is the law, liveth?) For the woman, which hath a husband,

is bound by the law to her husband so long as he liveth, but if her husband be dead, she is loosed from the law of the husband. So then, if while her husband liveth she be married to another man, she shall be called an adulteress: but if her husband be dead, she is free from that law; so that she is no adulteress, though she be married to another man." Where the law is compared to a husband; and one, that is under the law, or in a legal state, to a woman, that hath a husband. And as there are two ways, by which a woman may be freed from her husband; the one, if she break loose from him whilst he yet liveth, contrary to the laws of wedlock, and marry to another man; which is an undue and unlawful freedom, for then she is justly styled an adulteress: another, if she stay till her husband be dead, and then, being free from the law of her husband, does lawfully marry to another man: in like manner there are two ways, by which men may be freed from the law, as it is an inward state of bondage and servility. The first is, when men do illegally and unlawfully break loose from the law, which is their husband, whilst he is yet alive, and ought to have dominion over them, and marry themselves to another husband; which husband's name is carnal liberty, or licentiousness, too often miscalled in these latter times by the name of Christian liberty: and such as these may well be styled, in the Scripture-language, adulterers and adulteresses. But there is another freedom from the law, which is a due and just freedom; when we do not make ourselves free before the time, violently breaking loose from it; but when we stay till the law, which is our husband, is dead, and the compulsory power of it

taken away by the mortification of our lusts and affections, and so marry another husband, which is Christ, or the Spirit of righteousness, (Rom. viii. 2.) "The law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath made me free from the law of sin and death."

Wherefore there are three general states of men, in order to God and religion, that may be here taken notice of. The first is of those, that are alive to sin, and dead to the law. This the apostle speaks of, (Rom. vii. 9.) "I was alive without the law once." These are those, whose consciences are not yet considerably awakened to any sense of their duty, nor to the discrimination of good and evil, but sin freely, without any check or control, without any disquieting remorse of conscience.

The second is, when men are at once alive both to the law and sin, to the conviction of the one, and the power and love of the other; both these struggling together within the bowels of the soul, checking and controlling one another. This is a broken, confounded and shattered state; and these, in the apostle's language, are said to be slain by the law. "I was alive without the law once; but when the commandment came, sin revived, and I died. And the commandment, which was ordained to life, I found to be unto death. For sin, taking occasion by the commandment, deceived me, and by it slew me." Here is no peace, rest nor comfort to be had in this state, men's souls being distracted and divided by an intestine and civil war between the law of the mind and the law of the members conflicting with one another.

Wherefore the third state is, when men are

dead both to the law and sin, and "alive unto God and righteousness; the law of the Spirit of life freeing them from the law of sin and death." In the first of these three states, which is the most wretched and deplorable of all, we are sin's freemen, that is, free to commit sin without check or control. In the second, we are bondmen to God and righteousness, and serve God out of a principle of fear, and according to an outward rule only; children of Hagar the bondmaid, and of the letter. In the third, we are God's freemen and sons, and serve him in the newness of the spirit, out of a love to God and righteousness; children of the New Testament, and of Sarah the free-woman.

Wherefore here are two mistakes or errors to be taken notice of, that defeat and disappoint the design of Christ in giving us the victory over the law. The first is of those, that we have already mentioned, that seek to themselves a freedom from the bondage of the law otherwise than by Christ and the Spirit of righteousness; namely, in a way of carnal liberty and licentiousness; whereby, instead of being bondmen to God and righteousness, they become perfect freemen to sin and wickedness, which is the most deplorable thralldom in the world. Wherefore these men, instead of going forward from the second state unto higher perfection, wheel back again unto the first; just as if the children of Israel, after they had been brought out of Egypt, and travelled a while in the desert of Arabia, where the law was given, instead of entering into Canaan, should have wheeled back into Egypt, and then, enjoying the garlic and onions, and flesh-pots thereof, should persuade themselves this was, indeed, the true "land of promise,

that floweth with milk and honey." And there is very great danger, lest when men have been tired out by wandering a long time in the dry and barren wilderness of the law, where they cannot enjoy the pleasure of sin as formerly, and yet have not arrived to the relish and love of righteousness, by reason of their impatience, they should at last make more haste than good speed, being seduced by some false shows of freedom, that are very tempting to such weary travellers, and promise much comfort and refreshment to them, inviting them to sit down under their shadow; such as are a self-chosen holiness, ceremonial righteousness, opinionative zeal, the tree of knowledge mistaken for the tree of life, high-flown enthusiasm and seraphicism, epicurizing philosophy, antinomian liberty, under the pretence of free grace and a gospel spirit.

The second mistake, that is here to be heeded, is, of those, that would by all means persuade themselves, that there is no higher state of Christian perfection to be aimed at, or hoped for, in this life, than this legal state; That the good they would do, they do not: the evil they would not do, that they do; that the law of sin in their members still leads them captive from the law of their minds: having no other ground at all for this, but a novel interpretation of one paragraph in the Epistle to the Romans, contrary to other express places of Scripture, and the sense of all ancient interpreters; and yet with so much zeal, as if it were a principal part of the gospel-faith to believe this (which is indeed arrant infidelity), as if it were no less than presumption or impiety to expect a living law written upon our hearts. But

this is nothing else, but, instead of seeking liberty out of the bondage of the law, to fall in love with our bonds and fetters, and plainly to deny the victory over the law by Christ, and to affirm, that the gospel is but the ministration of a dead and killing letter, and not of the Spirit that quickeneth and maketh alive.

I come now, in the third and last place, to the victory over death, expressed by the resurrection of the body to life and immortality; which, as it was meritoriously procured for us by Christ's dying upon the cross (his resurrection afterward being an assured pledge of the same to us), so it will be really effected at last by the same Spirit of Christ that gives us victory over sin here. Rom. viii. 11. "If the Spirit of him, that raised up Jesus dwell in you, he that raised up Christ from the dead, shall also quicken your mortal bodies by his Spirit, that dwelleth in you:" as if he should have said, If the Spirit of Christ dwell in you, regenerating and renewing your souls, the very same Spirit hereafter shall also immortalize your very bodies. Avicen, the Mahometan philosopher, in his *Almahad*, hath a conceit, that the meaning of the resurrection of the body is nothing else but this, to persuade vulgar people, that though they seem to perish, when they die, and their bodies rot in the grave; yet, notwithstanding, they shall have a real subsistence after death, by which they shall be made capable, either of future happiness or misery. But because the apprehensions of the vulgar are so gross, that the permanency and immortality of the soul is too subtile a notion for them, who commonly count their bodies for themselves, and cannot conceive, how they should

have any being after death, unless their very bodies should be raised up again; therefore, by way of condescension to vulgar understandings, the future permanency and subsistence of the soul, in prophetic writings, is expressed under this scheme of the resurrection of the body, which yet is meant *κατὰ δόξαν* only, and not *κατ' ἀλήθειαν*. Which conceit, how well soever it may befit a Mahometan philosopher, I am sure it no way agrees with the principles of Christianity; the Scripture here and elsewhere assuring us, that the resurrection of the body is to be understood plainly, and without a figure; and that the saints, departed this life in the faith and fear of Christ, shall not be mere souls without bodies to all eternity, as Avicenna, Maimonides, and other philosophers dreamed, but consist of soul and body united together. Which bodies, though, as the doctrine of the church instructeth us, they shall be both specifically and numerically the same with what they were here; yet, notwithstanding, the Scripture tells us, they shall be so changed and altered, in respect of their qualities and conditions, that in that sense they shall not be the same. Ver. 36, 37. "Thou fool, that, which thou sowest, is not quickened, except it die: thou sowest not that body, that shall be, but bare grain, it may chance of wheat, or of some other grain; but God giveth it a body, as it pleaseth him, and to every seed his own body." The apostle here imitating the manner of the Jews, who (as appeareth from the * Talmud) were wont familiarly to illustrate the business of the "resurrection of the body" by the similitude of seed sown into the ground, and springing up

* See Gemara, in Chetiboth, cap. 13. & in Israel, num. 50.

again. Accordingly he goes on, "It is sown in corruption, it is raised in incorruption; sown in dishonour, it is raised in glory; sown in weakness, it is raised in power; sown a natural body, raised a spiritual body." Which epithet was used also in this case, both by the philosophers and the Jews; for Hierocles upon the Golden Verses calls them *ὄχηματα πνευματικά*, *vehicula spiritualia*, spiritual bodies;—and R. Menachem, from the ancient cabalists, *רוחניות התלבשות*, the spiritual clothing.—Lastly, the apostle concludes, thus; "Now this I say, brethren, that flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God, neither doth corruption inherit incorruption." For which cause he tells us elsewhere, that they, which do not die, must of necessity be changed. And, indeed, if men should be restored after death to such gross, foul, and cadaverous bodies, as these are here upon earth, which is the very region of death and mortality, without any change at all; what would this be else, but, as Plotinus the philosopher against the Gnostics writes, *ἐγείρεσθαι εἰς ἄλλον ὕπνον*, to be raised up to a second sleep,—or to be entombed again in living sepulchres? "For the corruptible body presseth down the soul, and the earthly tabernacle weigheth down the mind, that museth upon many things." Wisdom ix. 15. Wherefore we must needs explode that old Jewish conceit, commonly entertained amongst the rabbinical writers to this day, that the future resurrection is to be understood of such gross and corruptible bodies, as these are here upon earth, to eat, drink, marry, and be given in marriage, and (which must needs follow) afterward to die again. Nachmanides, in his *Shaar Haggemul*, is the only Jewish author

that ventures to depart from the common road here, and to abandon this popular error of the Jews, endeavouring to prove, that the bodies of the just, after the resurrection, shall not eat and drink, but be glorified bodies: but*

* In Nachath Aveth,

cap. 4. נחש

נחש, This

is the very name

with the opi-

nion of the

Christians, that

hold, that after

the resurrec-

tion men shall

not eat, drink,

marry, or be

given in mar-

riage, or die

again, but some-

time eternally

in these bodies,

as it is a letter only ;

our bodies, in that

this corruptible shall put on incorrup-

tion, and this mortal immortality, and

that these vile bodies shall be made like

to Christ's glorious body. In both which

the complete salvation of man consisteth, the per-

fection and happiness both of soul and body.

For, though our salvation consists chiefly in the

former, in the victory over sin, and in the remova-

tion of the mind, yet without the latter, which

is the victory over death, and the immortalizing

argument than this ; That this was the doctrine and opinion of the Christians.

Let us therefore now consider, how abundantly God hath provided for us

by Jesus Christ, both in respect of our souls, and of our bodies; our souls, in

freeing us by the Spirit of Christ (if we be not wanting to ourselves) from the

slavery of sin, and bondage of the law, as it is a letter only ; our bodies, in that

this corruptible shall put on incorrup-

tion, and this mortal immortality, and that these vile bodies shall be made like

to Christ's glorious body. In both which the complete salvation of man consisteth, the per-

fection and happiness both of soul and body. For, though our salvation consists chiefly in the

former, in the victory over sin, and in the remova-

tion of the mind, yet without the latter, which is the victory over death, and the immortalizing

of our bodies, it would be a very lame and im-

perfect thing. For righteousness alone, if it should *male habitare*, dwell always in such incon-

venient houses, as these earthly tabernacles are, however the high-flown Stoic may brag, it could

not render our condition otherwise, than trouble-

some, solicitous, and calamitous. Wherefore the holy men in Scripture, not without cause, longed

for this future change. Rom. viii. 23. " We

groan within ourselves, waiting for the adoption, to wit, the redemption of our bodies." 2 Cor. v. 2. "In this we groan earnestly, desiring to be clothed upon with our house, which is from heaven." But there is no obtaining of this future victory over death and mortality, except we first get a victory over sin here. For this is that crown of life, that Christ, the first-begotten from the dead, will set upon the heads of none, but those, that have here fought a good fight, and overcome. For as death proceeds only from sin and disobedience, so the way to conquer death, and to arrive at life and immortality, is by seeking after an inward conquest over sin. For "righteousness is immortal," Wisd. i. 15. and will immortalize the entertainers of it; and, as the Chaldee oracle speaks,

ἐνταῦθα κερταί τοῦ
 "Ergo in" εὐσεβείας μετρίῳ, καὶ οὕτω σάδου.

Having hitherto shewed, what are the great things we hope for by Christ, and are to endeavour after, namely, to procure an inward and real victory over sin by the Spirit of Christ, that so we may hereafter attain a victory over death and mortality; we cannot but take notice briefly of some errors of those, that, either pretending the impossibility of this inward victory over sin, or else hypocritically declining the combat, make up a certain religion to themselves out of other things, which are either impertinent, and nothing to the purpose, or else evil and noxious.

For, first, some (as was intimated before) make to themselves a mere fantastical and imaginary religion, conceiting that there is nothing at all for them to do, but confidently to believe, that all is

already done for them ; that they are dearly beloved of God, without any conditions or qualifications to make them lovely. But such a faith as this is nothing but mere fancy and carnal imagination, proceeding from that natural self-love, whereby men fondly dote upon themselves, and are apt to think that God loves them as fondly and as partially as they love themselves, tying his affection to their particular outward persons, their very flesh and blood ; hereby making God a being like unto themselves, that is, wholly acted by arbitrary self-will, fondness, and partiality ; and perverting the whole nature and design of religion, which is not mere phantastry and an historical show, but a real victory over the real evil of sin, without which God can neither take pleasure in any man's person, nor can there be a possibility of being happy, a real turning of the soul from darkness unto light, from the power of Satan unto God.

Again, some there are, that, instead of walking in the narrow way, that Christ commendeth to us, of subduing and mortifying our sinful lusts, make to themselves certain other narrow ways of affected singularity in things, that belong not to life and godliness, outward strictnesses and severities of their own choosing and devising ; and then persuade themselves, that this is the strait gate and narrow way of Christ, that leadeth unto life. Whereas these are, indeed, nothing else but some particular paths and narrow slices cut out of the broad way. For though they have an outward and seeming narrowness, yet they are so broad within, that camels with their burdens may easily pass through them. These, instead of

taking up Christ's cross upon them, make to themselves certain crosses of their own, and then laying them upon their shoulders and carrying them, please themselves with a conceit, that they bear the cross of Christ; whereas in truth and reality they are many times too much strangers to that cross of his, by which the world should be crucified to them, and they unto the world.

Some place all their religion in endless scrupulosities about indifferent things, neglecting in the mean time the *τὰ βαρύτερα τοῦ νόμου*, the more weighty things—both of law and gospel, and (as our Saviour farther expresseth it) *διωλίζοντες τὸν κώνωπα, τὴν δὲ κάμηλον καταπίνοντες*, straining at a gnat, and swallowing a camel;—that is, being not so scrupulous as they ought to be about the substantials of religion and a good life. For as we ought not to place the chief of our religion in the mere observation of outward rites and ceremonies, whilst in the mean time we hypocritically neglect the morals and substantials; which may deservedly be branded with the name of superstition: so we ought to know, that it is equal superstition to have such an abhorrence of indifferent things, as to make it the main of our religion to abstain from them; both of these arguing equal ignorance of the nature of God, as if he were some morose, humorous, and captious being; and of that righteousness, which the kingdom of God consisteth in, as if these outward and indifferent things could either hallow or defile our souls, or as if salvation and damnation did depend upon the mere using or not using of them. The apostle himself instructeth us, that the kingdom of God consisteth no more in ἀκρο-

βελτίᾳ than in περιτομή, no more in uncircumcision than in circumcision;—that is, no more in not using outward ceremonies and indifferent things than in using of them. Wherefore the negative superstition is equal to the positive, and both of them alike call off men's attention from the main things of religion, by engaging them over-much in small and little things. But the sober Christian, that neither places all his religion in external observances, nor yet is superstitiously anti-ceremonial, as he will think himself obliged to have a due regard to the commands of lawful authority in adiaphorous things, and to prefer the peace and unity of the Christian church, and the observation of the royal law of charity, before the satisfaction of any private humour or interest; so he will be aware of that ἀμετρία τῆς ἀνβολῆς, which many run into, of banishing away all the solemnity of external worship, the observation of the Lord's day, and of the Christian sacraments, under the notion of ceremonies, quite out of the world. To conclude; unless there be a due and timely regard had to the commands of lawful authority in indifferent things, and to order, peace, and unity in the church, it may easily be foreseen, that the reformed part of Christendom will at length be brought to confusion, by crumbling into infinite sects and division, and then to utter ruin.

Again, many mistake the vices of their natural complexion for supernatural and Divine graces. Some think dull and stupid melancholy to be Christian mortification: others, that turbulent and fiery zeal is the vigour of the Spirit. Whereas zeal is one of those things, that Aristotle calls τὸ μέτρον, of a middle nature,—neither good nor bad

in itself, but which, as it is circumstantiated, may indifferently become either virtue or vice. For there is a *πικρὸς ζῆλος*, as the apostle calls it, a bitter zeal,—which is contrary to all Christian love and charity, and is nothing else but the vices of acerbity, envy, malice, cruelty, tinctured and gilded over with a religious show. And there may be also a turbulent and factious zeal, when men, under a pretence of acting for the glory of God, violate just and lawful authority, in order to the advancement of their own private self-interest. Indeed, there was amongst the Jews a certain right, called *jus zelotarium*, or the right of zealots—whereby private persons, acted by a zeal for God, might do immediate execution upon some malefactors, without expecting the sentence of any court of judicature. And some conceive, that our Saviour, by this right of zealots, did whip the buyers and sellers out of the temple, and overturn the tables of the money-changers; because he was never questioned by the Jews for it. But this was then a legal and regular thing, permitted by the public laws of that nation in some certain cases, yet so as that those zealots were afterward accountable to the Sanhedrin for what they did. However, a little before the destruction of the temple, as Josephus tells us, there were a crew of desperate miscreants, that, abusing this right, and calling themselves by the name of Kennain, *i. e.* zealots, made a pretence from hence to commit most villanous actions. And I wish some had not too much entertained this opinion, that private persons might reform public abuses, whether belonging to the ecclesiastical or the civil polity, without and against the consent of the supreme

magistrate, in a turbulent manner, *jure zelatorum*; by the right of zealots;—nay, and that actions, that are otherwise altogether unwarrantable in themselves, may notwithstanding be justified by zeal for God and good ends. But God needs no man's zeal to promote an imaginary interest of his in the world, by doing unjust things for him. "Will you speak wickedly for God; or talk deceitfully for him? will you accept his person?" was the generous expostulation of Job with his friends; and he tells them in the following words, that this was nothing else, but to mock God as one man mocketh another.

The Divine zeal is no corybantic fury, but a calm and regular heat, guided and managed by light and prudence, and carried out principally neither for nor against indifferent rites and unnecessary opinions, but those things that are immutably good and fundamental to Christianity; always acknowledging a due subordination to that authority, civil and ecclesiastical, that is over us.

Lastly, some there are, whose pretence to religion and the Spirit is founded in nothing else but a faculty of rhetoricating and extemporizing with zeal and fervency, which they take to be nothing less than Divine inspiration, and that which the Scripture calls "praying in the Holy Ghost," an undoubted character of a person truly regenerated. Which being a great delusion, whereby many are hindered from seeking after the real effects of the Divine Spirit, by idolizing, instead thereof, that which is merely natural (if not artificial); I think it not impertinent here to speak a little of it. And certainly that, which is frequently attained to in the very height by persons grossly hypocritical

and debauched, can never be concluded to be Divine inspiration, or to proceed from any higher principle than mere natural enthusiasm. For there is not only a poetical enthusiasm, of which Plato discourseth in his *Ion*, but, though oratory be a more sober thing, a rhetorical enthusiasm also, that makes men very eloquent, affectionate, and bewitching in their language, beyond what the power of any bare art and precepts could enable them unto; insomuch that both these, poets and orators, have oftentimes conceited themselves to be indeed divinely inspired: as those known verses testify:

Est Deus in nobis, agitante catascimus illo;

And,

Sedibus æthereis Spiritus ille venit.

And, concerning orators, the like might be proved, if the time would here permit, by sundry testimonies: but I shall here instance only in *Aristides*, a famous orator, who not only speaks positively of himself, as inspired in his orations, but affirms the same also concerning rhetoric in general, when it is extraordinary, that it comes by immediate inspiration as oracles and prophecies do, and not from art or nature. Wherefore it is not at all to be wondered at, if, when men are employed in religious and devotional exercises, the same natural enthusiasm, especially having the advantage of religious melancholy, which makes men still more enthusiastical, should so wing and inspire the fancies of these religious orators, as to make them wonderfully fluent, eloquent, and rapturous, so that they beget strange passions in their

auditors, and conclude themselves to be divinely inspired. Whereas, notwithstanding, they may have no more of Divine inspiration in all this than those poets and orators beforementioned had; that is to say, be no otherwise inspired, than by a rhetorical or hypochondriacal enthusiasm, that is merely natural. But it is far from my intention here to disparage the sincere and ardent affections of devout souls, naturally and freely breathing out their earnest desires unto God in private; although perhaps this be not without some kind of enthusiasm also. For enthusiasm, as well as zeal, and other natural things, may be well used, and, being rightly circumstantiated and subservient to a better principle, become irreprehensible. Some have observed, that no great work of the brain, that begot much admiration in the world, was ever achieved without some kind of enthusiasm; and the same may be affirmed of the most transcendently virtuous and heroical actions. But then the goodness of these actions is never to be estimated merely by the degree of enthusiastic heat and ardour that is in them, but by such other laws and circumstances, as moralize human actions. Wherefore, my meaning, as I said before, is only this, to caution against that vulgar and popular error of mistaking the natural and enthusiastical fervour of men's spirits, and the ebullieny of their fancy, when it is tinged with religion, and idolizing of it instead of the supernatural grace of God's Holy Spirit; and of looking for the effect of God's Spirit principally in words and talk, or thinking, that God is chiefly glorified with a loud noise, and long speeches. For the true demonstration of God's Holy Spirit is no where

to be looked for but in life and action, or such earnest and affectionate breathings after a further participation of the Divine image, as are accompanied with real and unfeigned endeavours after the same; which is the true praying in the Holy Ghost, though there be no extemporaneous effusion of words. And, therefore, when some Corinthians were puffed up, by reason of a faculty which they had of rhetoricating religiously, St. Paul, like an apostle, tells them, that he would come amongst them and “know, not ^{1 Cor. iv. 19.} the speech of them that were puffed up, but the power. For the kingdom of God (saith he) consisteth not in word, but in power and life.” Wherefore, laying aside these and such-like childish mistakes, and things that are little to the purpose, let us seriously apply ourselves to the main work of our religion; that is, to mortify and vanquish our sinful lusts by the assistance of God’s Holy Spirit through faith in Christ; that so being dead to sin here, we may live with God eternally hereafter.

C

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CHAP. IV.

The idea of God declared; in way of answer to the first atheistic argument; and the grand objection against the naturality of this idea (as essentially including unity or oneness in it) from the pagan Polytheism, removed: Proved, that the intelligent Pagans generally acknowledged one supreme Deity. A fuller explication of whose Polytheism and idolatry intended; in order to the better giving an account of Christianity.

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In what sense Orpheus, and other mystical theologers amongst
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sexes, male and female together 89

Orpheus's recantation of his Polytheism a fable; he at the

same time acknowledging both one unmade God, and many generated gods and goddesses 91

That besides the opinion of monarchy, a trinity of Divine hypostases subordinate was also another part of the Orphic cabala. Orpheus's trinity, Phanes, Uranus, and Chronus 92

The grand arcanum of the Orphic theology, that God is all things; but in a different sense from the Stoics 95

God's being all, made a foundation of pagan Polytheism and idolatry 100

xviii. That the Egyptians themselves, the most polytheistical of all nations, had an acknowledgment amongst them of one supreme Deity. The Egyptians the first Polytheists. That the Greeks and Europeans divided their gods from them, and as Herodotus affirmeth, their very names too. A conjecture, that *Ἀθηνᾶ* of the Greeks was *Nῆθ* or *Nῆθας*, the tutelar god of the city Sais: a colony whereof the Athenians are said to have been. And that Neptune, the Roman sea-god, was derived from the Egyptian Nephthus, signifying the maritime parts. Of the Egyptians worshipping brute animals 102

Notwithstanding this multifarious Polytheism and idolatry of the Egyptians, that they had an acknowledgment of one supreme God, probably first from that great fame which they had for their wisdom. Egypt a school of literature before Greece 107

The Egyptians, though attributing more antiquity to the world than they ought, yet of all nations the most constant assertors of the Cosmogonia, or novelty and beginning of the world; nor did they think the world to have been made by chance, as the Epicureans; Simplicius calling the Mosaic history of the creation an Egyptian fable 109

That besides the pure and mixed mathematics, the Egyptians had another higher philosophy, appears from hence; because they were the first assertors of the immortality and transmigration of souls, which Pythagoras from them derived into Greece. Certain therefore, that the Egyptians held incorporeal substance 112

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This arcane theology of the Egyptians concealed from the vulgar two manner of ways, by allegories and hieroglyphics. This doubtless a kind of metaphysics concerning God, as one perfect being, the Original of all things 118

An objection from Chæremon (cited by Porphyrius, in an epistle to Anebo, an Egyptian priest), fully answered by Jamblichus, in the person of Abammo, in the Egyptian Mysteries 120

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That Casaubon, from the detection of forgery in two or three at the most of these Trismegistic books, does not reasonably infer them to have been all Christian cheats: those also not excepted, that have been cited by ancient fathers, but since lost 127

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Other books also written by Egyptian priests, in several ages successively, called *Hermaical* (as Jamblichus informeth us), because entitled (*pro more*) to *Hermes*, as the president of learning 131

That some of those old *Hermaic* books remained in the custody of the Egyptian priests, till the times of *Clemens Alexandrianus* 133

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The *Asclepian Dialogue*, or *Perfect Oration* (said to have been translated into Latin by *Apuleius*), vindicated from being a Christian forgery 142

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Petavius's farther suspicion of forgery, because, as Lactantius and St. Austin have affirmed, the Christian Logos is herein called a second God, and the first begotten Son of God. The answer, that Lactantius and St. Austin were clearly mistaken, this being there affirmed only of the visible and sensible world 146

That besides the Asclepias Dialogue, others of the present Trismegistic books contain Egyptian doctrine. Nor can they be all proved to be spurious and counterfeit. This the rather insisted on, for the vindication of the ancient fathers . . . 150

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The same thing proved from their vulgar religion and theology; Hammon being a proper name for the supreme God amongst them; and therefore styled the Egyptian Jupiter 163

Though this word Hammon were probably at first the same with Ham or Cham the son of Noah, yet will not this hinder but that it might be used afterwards by the Egyptians for the supreme God 164

The Egyptian God Hammon neither confined by them to the sun, nor to the corporeal world, but, according to the notation of the word in the Egyptian language, a hidden and invisible Deity. This farther confirmed from the testimony of Jamblicus 165

This Egyptian Hammon more than once taken notice of in Scripture 167

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or veil, east over the statue as well of the Saitic as Athenian Minerva, hieroglyphically signified the invisibility and incomprehensibility of the Deity which is veiled in its works. From what Proclus addeth to this inscription beyond Plutarch, "And the sun was the fruit which I produced;" evident, that this was a demiurgical Deity, the creator of the sun and of the world 170

How that passage of Hecataeus in Plutarch is to be understood, "That the Egyptians supposed the first God and the universe to be the same," viz. because the supreme Deity diffuseth itself through all things. *Tò πᾶν* a name of God also amongst the Greek philosophers 175

That Pan, to the Arcadians and other vulgar Greeks, was not the corporeal world, as senseless and inanimate, but as proceeding from an intellectual principle diffusing itself through all; from Macrobius and Phornutus. Socrates's prayer to Pan, as the supreme God, in Plato's *Phædrus* 176

Our Saviour Christ, called the great Pan by demons . 178

How the old Egyptian theology, that God is all things, is every where insisted upon in the Trismegistic writings . 180

That the supreme God was sometimes worshipped by the Egyptians under other proper personal names, as Isis, Osiris, and Serapis, &c. 187

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Probable, that the Egyptians distinguished hypostases in the Deity also. Kircherus's Egyptian hieroglyphic of the Trinity. An intimation in Jamblichus of an Egyptian trinity. Eicton, Emeph, or Hemphtha (which is the same with Cneph), and Ptha 195

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Nevertheless, Homer distinguished, from all those generated gods, one unmade God, the Father or Creator of the world 206

Homer thus understood by the Pagans themselves, as Plutarch, Proclus, and Aristotle 207

Though Hesiod's gods, properly so called, were all of them generated, yet did he suppose also one unmade God, the Maker of them, and of the world 209

Pindar likewise a Divine Theogonist; an assertor of one unmade Deity (and no more) the cause of all things; yet nevertheless, of many generated gods, besides his one God to be worshipped far above all the other gods 211

The suspicions, which Aristotle sometime had of Hesiod, and Plato of Homer, seems to have proceeded from their not understanding that Mossic cabala, followed by them both, of the world's being made out of a watery chaos 213

That famous passage of Sophocles, concerning one God the Maker of heaven, earth, and seas (cited by so many ancient fathers), defended as genuine ib.

Clear places in the extant tragedies of Euripides to the same purpose; with other remarkable ones cited out of his own inextant tragedies: besides the testimonies of other Greek poets 214

The consent of Latin poets also, in the monarchy of the whole 217

xx. After the poets of the Pagans, their philosophers considered. That Epicurus was the only reputed philosopher, who,

pretending to acknowledge gods, yet professedly opposed monarchy, and verbally asserted a multitude of eternal unmade deities, but such as had nothing to do either with the making or governing of the world. He therefore clearly to be reckoned amongst the Atheists. All the Pagan philosophers, who were Theists (a few Ditheists excepted), universally asserted a mundane monarchy 222

Pythagoras a Polytheist as much as the other Pagans; nevertheless a plain acknowledger of one supreme God, the Maker of the universe 225

Pythagoras's dyad no evil god, or demon self-existent, as Plutarch supposed 228

But this dyad of his, whether matter or no, derived from a monad. One simple unity the cause of all things 229

That Pythagoras, acknowledging a trinity of Divine hypostases, did therefore sometimes describe God as a monad, sometimes as a mind, and sometimes as the soul of the world 231

The Pythagoric monad and first God the same with the Orphic Love, senior to Japhet and Saturn, and the oldest of all the gods, a substantial thing. But that Love, which Plato would have to be the youngest of the gods (the daughter of Penia, or Indigency, and a parturient thing), nothing but a creaturely affection in souls, personated and deified. Parmenides's Love, the first created god, or lower soul of the world, before whose production Necessity is said to have reigned; that is, the necessity of material motions undirected for ends, and good 233

That Pythagoras called the supreme Deity not only a monad, but a tetrad or tetractys also. The reasons for this given from the mysteries in the number four, trifling. More probability of a late conjecture, that the Pythagoric tetractys was not the Hebrew tetragrammaton, not altogether unknown to the Hetrurians and Latins 235

Xenophanes a plain assertor both of many gods, and of one God, called by him, One and All. Simplicius's clear testimony for this theosophy of Xenophanes, out of Theophrastus. Xenophanes misrepresented by Aristotle, as an assertor of a spherical corporeal god 238

Heracitus, though a cloudy and confounded philosopher, and one who could not conceive of any thing incorporeal, yet both a hearty moralist, and a zealous assertor of one supreme Deity 241

The Ionic philosophers before Anaxagoras, being all of them

Corporealists, and some of them Atheists; that Anaxagoras was the first who asserted an incorporeal mind to be a principle, and though not the cause of matter, yet of motion, and of the regularity of things. The world, according to him, not eternal but made, and out of pre-existent similar atoms; and that not by chance, but by mind or God. This mind of his purely incorporeal, as appeareth from his own words, cited by Simplicius 244

Probable, that Anaxagoras admitted none of the inferior Pagan gods. He condemned by the vulgar for an Atheist, because he ungodded the stars, denying their animation, and affirming the sun to be but a mass of fire, and the moon an earth. This disliked also by Plato, as that which in those times would dispose men to Atheism 247

Anaxagoras farther censured, both by Plato and Aristotle, because, though asserting mind to be a principle, he made much more use of material than of mental and final causes; which was looked upon by them as an atheistic tang in him. Nevertheless Anaxagoras a better Theist than those Christian philosophers of latter times, who quite banish all mental causality from the world 249

Parmenides's acknowledgment of one God the cause of gods. Which supreme Deity, by Parmenides, styled One-all-immovable. That this is not to be taken physically, but metaphysically and theologically; proved at large. The first principle of all, to these ancients, one, a simple unity or monad. This said to be all, because virtually containing all, and distributed into all; or because all things are distinctly displayed from it. Lastly, the same said to be immovable, and indivisible, and without magnitude, to distinguish it from the corporeal universe . . . 252

Ἐν τῷ πᾶν, One-all, taken in different senses; by Parmenides and Xenophanes, &c. divinely, for the supreme Deity (one most simple Being, the Original of all things); but by others in Aristotle atheistically, as if all things were but one and the same matter diversely modified. But the One-all of these latter, not immovable but moveable; it being nothing else but body: whereas the One-all-immovable is an incorporeal Deity. This does Aristotle, in his Metaphysics, close with, as good divinity. That there is one incorporeal immovable principle of all things Simplicius's observation, that though divers philosophers maintained a plurality or infinity of moveable principles, yet none ever asserted more than one immovable 256

Parmenides in Plato distinguishes three Divine hypostases, the

first whereof called by him, $\epsilon\nu\ \tau\acute{o}\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu$, one-all; the second, $\epsilon\nu\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\alpha$, one all things; and the third, $\epsilon\nu\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\alpha$, one and all things 256

But that Parmenides by his One-all-immoveable really understood the supreme Deity, yet farther unquestionably evident from the verses cited out of him by Simplicius; wherein there is also attributed thereunto a standing eternity, or duration, different from that of time 262

The only difference betwixt Parmenides and Melissus, that the former called his One-all-immoveable, finite; the latter, Infinite; this in words rather than reality: the disagreeing agreement of these two philosophers fully declared by Simplicius. Melissus's language more agreeable with our present theology. Though Anaximander's infinite were nothing but senseless matter, yet Melissus's Infinite was the true Deity 263

That Zeno Eleates, by his One-all-immoveable, meant not the corporeal world neither, no more than Melissus, Parmenides, and Xenophanes; but the Deity, evident from Aristotle. Zeno's demonstration of one God, from the idea of a most powerful and perfect being, in the same Aristotle 266

Empedocles's first principle of all things, $\tau\acute{o}\ \epsilon\nu$, or a unity likewise, besides which he supposed contention and friendship to be the principles of all created beings; not only plants, brutes, and men, but gods also 267

Empedocles's original of all the evil both of human souls and demons, from this $\pi\epsilon\iota\sigma\iota\varsigma$, discord and contention, together with the ill use of their liberty 271

XXII. The doctrine of divers other Pythagoreans also the same; as Philolaus, Archytas, Ocellus, Aristæus, &c. Timæus Locrus's God the Creator of gods. Onatus's many gods, and his one God, the Coryphæus of the gods. Euclides Megarensis's one the very Good. Antisthenes's many popular gods, but one natural God. Diogenes Sinopensis's God that filleth all things *ib.*

XXIII. That Socrates asserted one God, undeniable from Xenophon 283

But that he disclaimed all the other inferior gods of the Pagans, and died, as a martyr, for one only God, in this sense, a vulgar error 289

What the impiety imputed to him by his adversaries, appeareth from Plato's Euthyphro, viz. that he freely and openly condemned those fables of the gods, wherein wicked and unjust actions were imputed to them 289

That Plato really asserted one only God and no more, a vulgar error likewise; and that thirteenth epistle to Dionysius, wherein he declared himself to be serious only when he began his epistles with God, and not with gods (though extant in Eusebius's time), spurious and supposititious. He worshipping the sun and other stars also (supposed to be animated) as inferior gods 290

Nevertheless, undeniably evident, that Plato was no Polyarchist, but a Monarchist, no assertor of many independent gods, or principles, but of one Original of all things; one first God, one greatest God, one Maker of the world and of the gods 293

In what sense the supreme God, to Plato, the cause and producer of himself (out of Plotinus); and this notion not only entertained by Seneca and Plotinus, but also by Lactantius, that Plato really asserted a Trinity of universal Divine hypostases, that have the nature of principles. The first hypostasis in Plato's Trinity properly *αὐτόθεος*, the original Deity—the Cause and King of all things; which also said by him to be *ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας*, or *ὑπερούσιος*, above essence 296

Xenophon, though with other Pagans he acknowledged a plurality of gods, yet a plain assertor also of one supreme and universal Numen 303

XXIV. Aristotle a frequent acknowledger of many gods. And whether he believed any demons or no, which he sometimes mentions (though sparingly), and insinuates them to be a kind of aerial animals, more immortal than men; yet did he unquestionably look upon the stars, or their intelligences, as gods. *ib.*

Notwithstanding which, Aristotle doth not only often speak of God singularly, and of the Divinity emphatically, but also professedly opposes that imaginary opinion of many independent principles, or unmade deities. He confuting the same from the phenomena or the compages of the world, which is not *εὐνοοειδής*, but all uniform, and agreeably conspiring into one harmony 308

Aristotle's supreme Deity, the first immoveable Mover. The difference here betwixt Plato and Aristotle; Plato's original of motion; a self-moving soul Aristotle's an immoveable mind. But this difference not so great as at first sight it seems; because Aristotle's immoveable mind doth not move the heavens efficiently, but only finally, or as being loved. Besides which, he must needs suppose another immediate mover, which could be nothing but a soul of them 311

Aristotle's immoveable mind not only the cause of motion, but

also of well and fit; all the order, pulchritude, and harmony, that are in the world, called therefore by Aristotle the separate good thereof. This together with nature (its subordinate instrument) the efficient cause of the whole mundane system: which, however co-eternal with it, yet is, in order of nature, junior to it 314

Aristotle and other ancients, when they affirm mind to have been the cause of all things, understood it thus, that all things were made by an absolute wisdom, and after the best manner. The Divine will, according to them, not a mere arbitrary, humorsome, and fortuitous thing, but decency and fitness itself 317

From this passage of Aristotle's, that the Divinity is either God, or the work of God, evident, that he supposed all the gods to have been derived from one and therefore his intelligences of the spheres 318

That, according to Aristotle, this speculation of the Deity constitutes a particular science by itself, distinct from physiology and geometry: the former whereof (physiology) is conversant about what was inseparable and moveable, the second (geometry, about things immoveable, but not really separable; but the third and last (which is theology) about that which is both immoveable and separable, an incorporeal Deity 319

Four chief points of Aristotle's theology or metaphysics, concerning God; first, that though all things are not eternal and unmade, yet something must needs be such, as likewise incorruptible, or otherwise all might come to nothing. Secondly, that God is an incorporeal substance, separate from sensibles, indivisible, and devoid of parts and magnitude. Thirdly, that the Divine intellect is the same with its intelligibles, or containeth them all within itself; because the Divine mind, being senior to all things, and architectonical of the world, could not then look abroad for its objects without itself. The contrary to which supposed by Atheists. Lastly, that God being an immoveable substance, his act and energy are his essence; from whence Aristotle would infer the eternity of the world . . . 320

Aristotle's creed and religion contained in these two articles, first, that there is a Divinity which comprehends the whole nature, or universe. And, secondly, that besides this, there are other particular inferior gods; but that all other things, in the religion of the Pagans, were fabulously superadded hereunto for political ends 322

Speusippus, Xenocrates, and Theophrastus, monarchists 324
 xxv. The Stoics no better metaphysicians than Heraclitus,
 in whose footsteps they trode, admitting of no incorporeal
 substance. The qualities of the mind also, to these Stoics,
 bodies 326

But the Stoics not therefore Atheists; they supposing an eter-
 nal unmade mind (though lodged in matter) the maker of the
 whole mundane system 328

The stoical argumentations for a God not inconsiderable, and
 what they were 329

The stoical god, not a mere plastic and methodical, but an in-
 tellectual fire. The world, according to them, not a plant, but
 animal; and Jupiter the soul thereof. From the supposed one-
 liness of which Jupiter, they would sometimes infer the singu-
 larity of the world: (Plutarch on the contrary affirming, that
 though there were fifty, or a hundred worlds, yet would there
 be, for all that, but one Zeus or Jupiter 334

Nevertheless the Stoics as polytheistical as any sect. But so,
 as that they supposed all their gods, save one, to be not only
 native, but also mortal; made out of that one, and resolved
 into that one again: these gods being all melted into Jupiter,
 in the conflagration 336

Wherefore during the intervals of successive worlds, the
 Stoics acknowledged but one solitary Deity, and no more; Ju-
 piter being then left all alone, and the other gods swallowed up
 into him. Who therefore not only the creator of all the other
 gods, but also the decreator of them 339

The Stoics, notwithstanding this, religious worshippers of
 their many gods; and thereby sometime derogated from the
 honour of the Supreme, by sharing his sovereignty amongst
 them 341

Nevertheless, the supreme God praised and extolled by them
 far above all the other gods; and acknowledged to be the sole
 Maker of the world 342

Their professing subjection to his laws as their greatest li-
 berty 343

And to submit their wills to his will in every thing, so as to
 know no other will but the will of Jupiter 349

Their pretending to look to God, and to do nothing without
 a reference to him; as also to trust in him and rely upon him 350

Their praising him as the Author of all good 352

Their addressing their devotions to him alone, without the

conjunction of any other god; and particularly imploring his assistance against temptations 353

Cleanthes's excellent and devout hymn to the supreme God 354

xxvi. Cicero, though affecting to write in the way of the new academy, yet no sceptic as to Theism. Nor was he an assertor of many independent deities. Cicero's gods (the makers of the world) the same with Plato's eternal gods, or trinity of Divine hypostases subordinate. This language the Pagans in St. Cyril would justify, from that of the Scripture, "Let us make man" . . . 356

Varro's threefold theology, the fabulous, the natural, and the civil or popular; agreeably to Scævola the Pontifex's three sorts of gods, poetical, philosophical, and political. The former condemned by him as false; the second, though true, said to be above the capacity of the vulgar: and therefore a necessity of a third or middle betwixt both; because many things true in religion not fit for the vulgar to know. Varro's supreme Numen the great soul or mind of the whole world: his inferior gods, parts of the world animated. Image-worship condemned by him as disagreeable to the natural theology 364

Seneca, a pagan Polytheist, but plain assertor of one supreme Numen excellently described by him. That in his book of Superstition (now lost) he did as freely censure the civil theology of the Romans, as Varro had done the fabulous or theatrical . . . 368

Quintilian, Pliny, Apuleius, their clear acknowledgments of one sovereign universal Deity. Symmachus (a great stickler for Paganism), his assertion, that it was one and the same thing which was worshipped in all religions, though in different ways 369

The writer De Mundo, though not Aristotle, yet a Pagan. His cause that containeth all things, and God from whom all things are. Which passage being left out in Apuleius's Latin version, gives occasion of suspicion, that he was infected with Plutarch's Ditheism, or at least held matter to be unmade . . . 372

Plutarch a priest of Apollo, however antickly engaged in those two false opinions of an evil principle, and matter unmade, yet a maintainer of one sole principle of all good . . . 374

Dio Chrysostomus, a Sophist, his clear testimony, βασιλευς οὗτος ὁ κόσμος, that the whole world was under a kingly government or monarchy 375

Galen's true hymn to the praise of Him, that made us, in his book De usu Partium 376

Maximus Tyrius's short account of his own religion; one supreme God the monarch of the whole world, and three subordinate ranks of inferior gods, the sons and friends of God, and his ministers in the government of the world 377

A most full and excellent description of the supreme God in Aristides's first oration, or hymn to Jupiter, wherein he affirmeth all the several kinds of gods to be but a defluxion and derivation from Jupiter 379

All the latter philosophers after Christianity (though maintainers of the world's eternity, yet) agreed in one supreme Deity, the cause of this world, and of the other gods. Excellent speculations in them concerning the Deity, especially Plotinus; who, though deriving matter and all from one Divine principle, yet was a contender for many gods: he supposing the grandeur and majesty of the supreme God to be declared by the multitude of gods under him. Themistius; that the same supreme God was worshipped by Pagans, Christians, and all nations, though in different forms: and that God was delighted with this variety of religions 381

The full testimony of St. Cyril, that the Greek philosophers universally acknowledged one God, the Maker of the universe, from whom were produced into being certain other gods, both intelligible and sensible 383

XXVII. This not only the opinion of philosophers and learned men, but also the general belief of the vulgar amongst the Pagans. A judgment of the vulgar and generality to be made from the poets. Dio Chrysostomus's affirmation, that all the poets acknowledged one first and greatest God, the Father of all the rational kind, and the King thereof ib.

The testimony of Aristotle, That all men acknowledged kingship or monarchy amongst the gods: of Maximus Tyrius, that notwithstanding so great a discrepancy of opinion in other things yet throughout all the Gentile world, as well the unlearned as learned, did universally agree in this, that there was one God the King and Father of all, and many gods the sons of that one God; of Dio Chrysostomus also to the same purpose; he intimating likewise, that of the two, the acknowledgment of the one supreme God, was more general than that of the many inferior gods 385

That the sense of the vulgar Pagans herein is farther evident from hence, because all nations had their several proper names for the one supreme God; as the Romans Jupiter, the Greeks

Zeus, the Africans and Arabians Hammon, the Scythians Papæus, the Babylonians Bel, &c. 387

True, that Origen, though allowing Christians to use the appellative names for God in the languages of the several nations, yet accounted it unlawful for to call him by those proper names; because not only given to idols, but also contaminated with wicked rites and fables: according to which, they should be indeed rather the names of a demon than of a God. Notwithstanding which, he does not deny those Pagans ever to have meant the supreme God by them, but often acknowledge the same. But Lactantius indeed denies the Capitoline Jupiter to be the supreme God, and that for two reasons. First, because he was not worshipped without the partnership of Minerva and Juno, his daughter and wife. Granted here, that there was a mixture of the fabulous or poetical theology with the natural to make up the civil. But that wise men understood these to be but three several names or notions of one supreme God. This confirmed from Macrobius 388

Vossius's conjecture, that in this Capitoline Trinity there was a farther mystery aimed at, of three Divine hypostases. This Roman trinity derived from the Samothracian Cabiri. Which word being Hebraical, gives cause to suspect this tradition of a trinity among the Pagans to have sprung from the Hebrews 390

Lactantius's second reason, because Jupiter being Juvanus Pater, was a name below the dignity of the supreme God. The answer, that the true etymon thereof was Jovis Pater, the Hebrew Tetragrammaton 391

That the Capitoline Jupiter was the supreme God, evident from those titles of Optimus Maximus; and of Omnipotens by the pontifices in their public sacrifices. Seneca's testimony, that the ancient Etrurians by Jupiter meant the mind and spirit, maker and governor, of the whole world. The Roman soldiers' acclamation in Marcus Aurelius's German expedition (to Jove the god of gods, who alone is powerful) according to Tertullian a testimony to the Christian's God 392

That as the learned Pagans in their writings, so likewise the vulgar in their common speech, when most serious, often used the word God, singularly and emphatically, for the Supreme, proved from Tertullian, Minutius Felix, and Lactantius: together with the testimony of Proclus, that the one supreme God was more universally believed throughout the world than the many gods 395

That Kyrie Eleeson was anciently a Pagan litany to the supreme God, proved from Arianus. The supreme God often called by the Pagans also *Kύριος*, or the Lord . . . 397

That even the most sottishly superstitious, idolatrous, and polytheistical, amongst the Pagans, did, notwithstanding, generally acknowledge one supreme Deity; fully attested and elegantly declared by Aurelius Prudentius in his Apotheosis 399

However, some of the ancient Pagans were said to have acknowledged none but visible and corporeal gods, yet as they conceived these to be endued with life and understanding, so did they suppose one Supreme amongst them, as either the whole heaven or ether animated, or the subtile fiery substance, that pervadeth all things, the God of the Heraclitics and Stoics; or the sun the Cleanthean god . . . 400

Though Macrobius refer so many of the Pagan gods to the sun, and doubtless himself looked upon it as a great god, yet does he deny it to be *omnipotentissimus Deus*, the most omnipotent God of all; he asserting a Trinity of Divine hypostases superior to it, in the Platonic way . . . 401

That the Persians themselves, the most notorious sun-worshippers, did, notwithstanding, acknowledge a Deity superior to it, and the maker thereof; proved from Eubulus. As also that the Persians' country-Jupiter was not the sun; confirmed from Herodotus, Xenophon, Plutarch, and Curtius. Cyrus's Lord God of heaven, who commanded him to build a house at Jerusalem; the same with the God of the Jews . . . 405

That as (besides the Scythians) the Ethiopians in Strabo, and other barbarian nations, anciently acknowledged one sovereign Deity; so is this the belief of the generality of the Pagan world to this very day . . . 406

xxviii. Besides Themistius and Symmachus, asserting one and the same thing to be worshipped in all religions, though after different ways, and that God Almighty was not displeased with this variety of his worship; Plutarch's memorable testimony, that as the same sun, moon, and stars, are common to all, so were the same gods. And that not only the Egyptians, but also all other Pagan nations worshipped one reason and providence ordering all; together with its inferior subservient powers and ministers, though with different rites and symbols . . . 407

Titus Livius also of the same persuasion, that the same immortal gods were worshipped every where (namely, one supreme

and his inferior ministers); however the diversity of rites made them seem different 409

Two Egyptian philosophers, Heraiscus and Asclepiades, professedly insisting upon the same thing, not only as to the Egyptians, but also the other Pagan nations: the latter of them (Asclepiades) having written a book entitled, *The Symphony, or Harmony of all Theologies or Religions*, to wit, in these two fundamentals, that there is one supreme God, and besides him, other inferior gods, his subservient ministers, to be worshipped. From whence Symmachus and other Pagans concluded, that the differences of religion were not to be scrupulously stood upon, but every man ought to worship God according to the law and religion of his own country. The Pagans' sense thus declared by Stobæus, that the multitude of gods is the work of the Demiurgus, made by him together with the world 411

XXIX. That the pagan Theists must needs acknowledge one supreme Deity, further evident from hence; because they generally believed the whole world to be one animal, actuated and governed by one soul. To deny the world's animation, and to be an Atheist, all one, in the sense of the ancient Pagans. Against Gassendus, that Epicurus denied the world's animation, upon no other account, but only because he denied a providential deity. This whole animated world, or the soul thereof, to the Stoics, and others, the *πῦρος θεός*, the first and highest God 414

Other Pagan theologers, who though asserting likewise the world's animation, and a mundane soul, yet would not allow this to be the supreme Deity, they conceiving the first and highest God to be no soul, but an abstract and immoveable mind superior to it. And to these, the animated world and mundane soul but *δεύτερος θεός*, a second god 415

But the generality of those, who went higher than the soul of the world, acknowledged also a principle superior to mind or intellect, called *τὸ ἄν* and *ἀγαθόν*, the one, and the good; and so asserted a Trinity of Divine hypostases subordinate, Monad, Mind, and Soul. So that the animated world or soul thereof was to some of these but *τρίτος θεός*, the third god . . . 416

The Pagans, whether holding soul, or mind, or monad, to be the highest, acknowledged only one in those several kinds, as the head of all; and so always reduced the multiplicity of things to an unity, or under a monarchy 417

Observed, that to the Pagan theologers universally, the world

was no dead thing, or mere machine and automaton, but had life or soul diffused through it all; those being taxed by Aristotle as Atheists, who made the world to consist of nothing but monads or atoms, dead and inanimate. Nor was it quite cut off from the supreme Deity, how much soever elevated above the same: the forementioned Trinity, of Monad, Mind, and Soul, being supposed to be most intimately united together, and indeed all but one entire Divinity; displayed in the world; and supporting the same 418

xxx. The sense of the Hebrews in this controversy. That according to Philo, the pagan Polytheism consisted not in worshipping many independent gods, and partial creators of the world, but, besides the one Supreme, other created beings superior to men 420

That the same also was the sense of Flavius Josephus, according to whom, this the doctrine of Abraham; that the supreme God was alone to be religiously worshipped, and no created thing with him. Aristæus's assertion in Josephus, that the Jews and Greeks worshipped one and the same supreme God, called by the Greeks Zene, as giving life to all . . . 422

The latter rabbinical writers generally of this persuasion, that the Pagans acknowledging one supreme and universal Numen, worshipped all their other gods, as his ministers, or as mediators and intercessors betwixt him and them. And this condemned by them for *עבוד זר* strange worship or idolatry. —The first commandment thus interpreted by Maimonides, and Baal Ikkarim; Thou shalt not set up, besides me, any inferior gods as mediators, nor religiously worship my ministers or attendants. The miscarriage of Solomon and other kings of Israel and Judah this, that believing the existence of the one supreme God, they thought it was for his honour, that his ministers also should be worshipped. Abravanel's ten species of idolatry, all of them but so many several modes of creature-worship; and no mention amongst them made of many independent gods 424

Certain places of Scripture also interpreted by rabbinical writers to this purpose; that the Pagan nations generally acknowledged one sovereign Numen 429

The Jews, though agreeing with the Greeks and other Pagans in this, that the stars were all animated, nevertheless denied them any religious worship 431

xxxvi. This same thing plainly confirmed from the New

Testament; that the Gentiles or Pagans, however Polytheists and idolaters, were not unacquainted with the true God. First from the Epistle to the Romans, where that, which is knowable of God, is said to have been manifest amongst the Pagans; and they to have known God, though they did not "glorify him as God, but hold the truth in unrighteousness;" by reason of their Polytheism and idolatry (or image-worship), the latter of which accounted by the Jews the greatest enormity of the Pagans, as is proved from Philo: and this the reason, why their Polytheism called also idolatry. Plainly declared by St. Paul, that the Pagan superstition consisted not in worshipping many independent gods and creators, but in joining creature-worship some way or other with the worship of the Creator. *Παρά τὴν κρίσιν*, how to be understood; and in what sense the Pagans, though acknowledging the Creator, might be said to have worshipped the creature, beyond him 432

Again, from St. Paul's oration to the Athenians, where their "unknown God" is said to be that same God, whom St. Paul preached, who made the world and all things in it. And these Athenian Pagans are affirmed *εὐσεβεῖν*, religiously and devoutly to worship this true God 437

Lastly, that Aratus's Zeus was the true God, whose offspring our souls are, proved not only from the context of that poet himself, undeniably, and from the scholiast upon him, but also St. Paul's positive affirmation. Nor was Aratus singular in this; that ancient prayer of the Athenians, commended by M. Antoninus for its simplicity, (*Υἱον, ὕσον, ὃ φίλε Ζεῦ*, Rain, rain, O gracious Jupiter, &c.) no otherwise to be understood. And how that other passage of St. Paul, that in the wisdom of God, "the world by wisdom knew not God," does not at all clash herewith 442

XXXII. In order to a fuller explication of the Pagan theology, and making it the better appear, that the Polytheism thereof was not contradictory to the acknowledgment of one supreme omnipotent Numen; three things to be considered. First, that much of their Polytheism was but seeming and fantastical only, and really nothing but the polyonymy of one God. Secondly, that their real and natural Polytheism consisted only in religiously worshipping, besides this one supreme universal Numen, many other particular and inferior created beings; as animated stars, demons, and heroes. Thirdly, that they worshipped both the supreme and inferior gods, in statues, images, and symbols;

these were also sometimes abusively called gods. To one or other of which three heads, all the pagan Polytheism referrible 443

For the better persuading, that much of the pagan Polytheism, was really nothing but the polyonymy of one supreme God, or the worshipping him under several personal names; to be remembered again, what was before suggested; that the Pagan nations generally, besides their vulgar, had another more arcane theology, which was the theology of wise men and of truth. That is, besides both their fabulous and poetical, their political and civil theology, they had another natural and philosophic one. This distinction of the vulgar and civil theology, from the natural and real, owned by the Greeks generally, and amongst the Latins, by Scævola the Pontifex, Varro, Cicero, Seneca, and others ib.

That the civil theology of the Pagans differed from the natural and real, by a certain mixture of fabulosity in it. Of the Romans suffering the statue of Jupiter's nurse to be kept in the very capitol, as a religious monument. Jupiter's nativity, or his having a father and a mother, atheistically fabulous; poets themselves acknowledging so much of the natural and true theology, that Jupiter being the father of gods and men, the maker of the whole world, was himself eternal and unmade 445

That the civil as well as poetical theology had some appearance of many independent deities also; they making several supreme, in their several territories and functions; one chief for one thing, and another for another. But according to the natural and philosophic theology, the theology of wise men and of truth, all these but poetical, commentitious, fictitious, and fantastic gods; such as had no distinct substantial essences of their own; and therefore really to be accounted nothing else but several names or notions of one supreme God . . . 446

Certain, that the Egyptians had several proper and personal names for one supreme universal Numen, that comprehends the whole world, according to several notions of it, or its several powers: as Ammon, Phtha, Osiris, Neith, Eneph; to which may be added Serapis and Isis too. Besides Jamblichus, Damascius's testimony also to this purpose; concerning the Egyptian theology. This the pattern of the other, especially European theologies, the Greek and Roman 447

That the Greeks and Romans also often made more gods of one, or affected a polyonymy of the same gods, evident from

those many proper and personal names bestowed, first upon the sun (of which Macrobius), who therefore had this epithet of *πολυώνυμος*, given to him; and then upon the moon, styled also polyonymous, as well as her brother the sun; and lastly upon the earth, famous likewise for her many names, as Vesta, Cybele, Ceres, Proserpina, Ops, &c. Wherefore not at all to be doubted, but that the supreme God, or sovereign Numen of the whole world, was much more polyonymous. This title given to him also, as well as to Apollo in Hesychius. He thus invoked by Cleanthes. Zeno, the writer De Mundo, Seneca, Macrobius, clearly confirm the same. Maximus Madaurensis in St. Augustine his full acknowledgment thereof 450

The first instances of the polyonymy of the supreme God, amongst the Pagans in such names as these; *Βρονταῖος*, *Υἱέτιος*, *Πολιεύς*, *Μελίχιος*, *Φίλιος*, *Ξένιος*, *Σωτήρ*, &c. And amongst the Latins, Victor, Invictus, Opitulus, Stator, Tigillus, Centupeda, Almus, Ruminus, &c. Again, *Ἀνάγκη*, *Εἰμαρμένη*, *Πεπρωμένη*, *Μοῖρα*, *Ἀδράστεια*, all several names of the one supreme God, as likewise were Clotho, Lachesis, and Atropos, in the writer De Mundo. And amongst the Latins, not only Fate, but also Nature and Fortune too, as Cicero and Seneca affirm 453

But besides these, there were other proper names of the supreme God, which had a greater show and appearance of so many several gods, they having their peculiar temples, and several appropriated rites of worship. And, first, such as signify the Deity, according to its more universal nature. As for example, Pan; which not the corporeal world inanimate, or endued with a senseless nature only, but a rational or intellectual principle displaying itself in matter, framing the world harmoniously, and being, in a manner, all things. This also the universal pastor and shepherd of all mankind 455

Again, Janus; first invoked by the Romans in their sacrifices, and never omitted. The most ancient God, and first beginning of all things. Described by Ovid, Martial, and others, as an universal Numen. Concluded by St. Austin to be the same with Jupiter, the soul or mind of the whole world. The word Janus probably derived from *Ζανός* the Ætolian Jupiter 457

Genius also, one of the twenty select Roman gods, according to Festus, an universal Numen; that God, who is the begetter of all things. And, according to Varro in St. Austin, the same with Jupiter 459

That Chronos, or Saturn, no particular deity, but an universal

Namen also, which comprehends the whole nature of the world, affirmed by Dionysius Halicarnassensis. The word Saturn He-trurian (and originally from the Hebrew *סוד*) signifies *hidden*; called by the Latins, *Deus Latius*, the hidden God; whence Italy *Latium*, and the Italians Latins; as worshippers of this hidden God, or the occult principle of all things. This, according to Varro, he that produceth out of himself the hidden seeds and forms of all things, and swalloweth them up into himself again; which, the devouring of his male children. This *sinus quidam nature*, &c. a certain inward and deep recess of nature containing all things within itself; as God was sometimes defined by the Pagans. This to St. Austin the same with Jupiter; as likewise was Cœlus, or Uranus, in the old inscription, another name of God too. The poetic theology of Jupiter's being the son of Saturn, and Saturn the son of Cœlus; an intimation (according to Plato) of a Trinity of Divine hypostases universal 460

Though Minerva or Athena were sometimes confined to a narrower sense, yet was it often taken for a name of God also, according to his universal notion; it being to Athenagoras the Divine wisdom displaying itself through all things. This excellently described by Aristides, as the first-begotten offspring of the original Deity or the second Divine hypostasis, by which all things were made; agreeably with the Christian theology 463

Aphrodite Urania, or the heavenly Venus, another name of God also, according to his universal notion; it being the same with that Love, which Orpheus, and other philosophers in Aristotle, made the first original of all things. Plato's distinction of an elder and a younger Venus: the former, the daughter of Uranus, without a mother, or the heavenly Venus: said to be senior to Japhet and Saturn. The latter, afterwards begotten from Jupiter and the nymph Dione, the vulgar Venus. Urania, or the heavenly Venus, called by the oriental nations, Mylitta; that is, the mother of all things. Temples in Pausanias dedicated to this heavenly Venus. This described by Æschylus, Euripides, and Ovid, as the supreme Deity, and the Creator of all the gods. God Almighty also thus described, as a heavenly Venus, or Love, by Sev. Boethius. To this Urania, or the heavenly Venus, another Venus in Pausanias near a-kin; called *Ἀνορροπία* or Verticordia; as converse of men's minds upwards, from unchaste love, or unclean lust 466

Though Vulcan, according to the common notion of him, a

special god, yet had he sometimes a more universal consideration. Zeno in Laertius, that the supreme God is called Vulcan as acting in the artificial fire of nature. Thus the soul of the world styled by the Egyptians Phtha; which, as Jamblichus tells us, was the same with the Greeks' Hephæstus, or Vulcan. 468

Besides all which names of the supreme God, Seneca informs us, that he was sometimes called also *Liber Pater*, because the Parent of all things; sometimes Hercules, because his force is unconquerable; and sometimes Mercury, as being reason, number, order, and knowledge. 469

But besides this polyonymy of God, according to his universal notion, there were other *dii speciales*, or special gods also, amongst the Pagans; which likewise were really but several names of one and the same supreme Deity, *varie utentis sua potestate* (as Seneca writeth), diversely using his power, in particular cases, and in the several parts of the world. Thus Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto (mistaken by some Christians for a trinity of independent gods), though three civil gods, yet were they really but one and the same natural and philosophic God; as acting in those three parts of the world; the heaven, the sea, the earth, and hell. Pluto in Plato's *Cratylus*, a name for that part of Divine Providence which is exercised in the government of separate souls after death. 470

This styled by Virgil the Stygian Jupiter. But by others, Pluto together with Ceres, the manifestation of the Deity, in this whole terrestrial globe. The celestial and terrestrial Jupiter but one God. Zeus and Hades one and the same to Orpheus. Euripides doubtful whether God should be invoked by the name of Zeus, or Hades. Hermesianax the Colophonian poet, makes Pluto the first of those many names of God synonymous with Zeus. 471

Neptune also, another special god, a name of the supreme Deity, as acting in the seas only. This affirmed by Xenocrates in Stobæus, Zeno in Laertius, Balbus and Cotta in Cicero, and also by Maximus Tyrius. 473

The statue of Jupiter with three eyes, in Pausanias; signifying, that according to the natural theology, it was one and the same God, ruling in those three several parts of the world, the heaven, the sea, and the earth; that was called by three names, Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto. Wherefore, since Proserpina and Ceres are the same with Pluto, and Salacia with Neptune; concluded, that all these, though several poetical and political

gods, yet were but one and the same natural and philosophic God 474

Juno also, another special god, a name of the supreme Deity, as acting in the air. Thus Xenocrates and Zeno. The Pagans in St. Austin, that God, in the ether. From whence St. Austin disputeth against the Pagans. Maximus Tyrius, of these and many other gods of the Pagans, that they were but *θεία ὀνόματα*, Divine names 475

Yet many other special gods amongst the Pagans, which also were really nothing but Divine names, or names of God, as variously exercising his power, or bestowing several gifts; as in corn and fruit, Ceres; in wine, Bacchus; in medicine, Æsculapius; in traffic, Mercury; in war, Mars; in governing the winds, Æolus; &c. 478

That not only philosophers did thus interpret the many poetical and political gods, into one and the same natural God; but the poets themselves also sometimes openly broached this more arcane, free, and true theology; as Hermesianax amongst the Greeks, and Valerius Soranus amongst the Latins *ib.*

That St. Austin, making a large enumeration of the other special gods amongst the Pagans, affirmeth of them universally, that, according to the sense of the Pagan doctors, they were but one natural god, and all really the same with Jupiter 479

Apuleius, in his book *De Deo Socratis*, either not rightly understood by that learned and industrious philologer, G. I. Vossius, or else not sufficiently attended to. His design there plainly to reduce the Pagans' civil theology into a conformity with the natural and philosophic; which he does as a Platonist, by making the *dii consentes* of the Romans, and other invisible gods, to be all of them nothing but the Divine ideas; and so the offspring of one highest God. An occasion for this fancy, given by Plato, where he calls his ideas animals 482

Nor was Apuleius singular herein; Julian in his book against the Christians going the very same way; and no otherwise understood by St. Cyril, than as to make the invisible gods worshipped by the Pagans to be the Divine ideas. A fancy of the same Julian, who opposed the incarnation of the eternal Word, that Æsculapius was first of all the idea of the medicinal art, generated by the supreme God, in the intelligible world; which afterwards, by the vivific influence of the sun, was incarnated, and appeared in human form about Epidaurus. And that this Pagan doctrine; older than Christianity, proved out of Philo,

writing of a sun, and moon intelligible, as well as sensible, religiously worshipped by the Pagans; that is, the ideas of the archetypal world. And thus were these ideas of the Divine intellect, *νοητοὶ θεοὶ*, intelligible gods,—to Plotinus also . . . 482

Wherefore Julian, Apuleius, and those others, who thus made all the Pagan invisible gods to be nothing else but the Divine ideas, the patterns of things in the archetypal world, supposed them not to be so many independent deities, nor really distinct substances, separate from one another, but only so many partial considerations of one God. Julian before affirming them, *ἐξ αὐτοῦ γεγενῆσθαι αὐτοὺς, συνπαρῆσθαι τε καὶ ἐνυπάρχειν αὐτῷ*, as to have been generated out of him; so also to coexist with him, and inexist in him . . . 492

That the Pagans appointed some particular god or goddess by name, to preside over every thing (there being *μὴδὲν ἄθεον*, nothing at all without a god to them),—appeareth from that catalogue of their ignoble or petty gods, collected by St. Austin out of Varro. Now it is incredible, that they should think all these to be so many single substantial spirits of each sex, really existing apart in the world: they must therefore needs take them to be so many partial considerations of the Deity, either in the way of the more high-flown Platonists, as his ideas exemplarily and virtually containing all things; or else in that more common and easy way of the generality; as so many several denominations of him, according to the several manifestations of his power and providence; or, as the Pagans in Eusebius declare themselves, those several virtues and powers of the supreme God, themselves personated and deified. Which yet, because they were not executed without the subservient ministry of created spirits, angels, or demons, appointed to preside over such things; therefore might these also, collectively taken, be included under them . . . 493

But for the fuller clearing of this point, that the pagan Polytheism was in great part nothing but the polyonymy of one God, two things here to be taken notice of. First, that the Pagan theology universally supposed God to be diffused through all, to permeate and pervade all, and intimately to act all. Thus Horus Apollo of the Egyptians. Thus, among the Greeks, Diogenes the Cynic, Aristotle the Italic, and Stoical philosophers. Thus the Indian Brachmans before Strabo. Thus also the Latin poets; and Seneca, Quintilian, Apuleius, and Servius, besides others 496

That Anaxagoras and Plato also, though neither of them con-

founded God with the world, but affirmed him to be unmingled with any thing, yet concluded him in like manner to permeate and pervade all things. Plato's etymology of *δέικναι*, as taken for a name of God, to this purpose in his *Cratylus*. Where a fragment of *Heracitus*, and his description of God agreeably hereunto; a most subtile and swift substance, that permeates and passes through every thing, by which all things are made. But Plato, disclaiming this corporeity of the Deity, will neither have it fire nor heat; but a perfect mind, that passes through all things unmixedly 500

Wherefore no wonder, if the Pagans, supposing God to be diffused through all things, called him, in the several parts of the world, and things of nature, by several names, as in the earth *Ceres*, in the sea *Neptune*, &c. This account of the pagan Polytheism given by *Paulus Orosius*, that whilst they believed God to be in many things, they indiscreetly made many gods of him 501

Farther to be observed, that many of the Pagan theologers seemed to go yet a strain higher, they supposing God not only to pervade all things, but also to be himself all things. That the ancient Egyptian theology ran so high, evident from the Saitic inscription. A strong tang hereof in *Æschylus*; as also in *Lucan*. Neither was this proper to those who held God to be the soul of the world, but the language also of those other more refined philosophers, *Xenophanes*, *Parmenides*, &c. they affirming God to be one and all, with which agreeth the author of the *Asclepian Dialogue*, that God is *unus omnia*, one all things;—and that before things were made, he did then *κρύπτειν*, hide them,—or occultly contain them all within himself. In like manner *Orpheus*, 502

This not only a farther ground of the polyonymy of one God, according to the various manifestations of himself in the world, but also of another strange phenomenon in the Pagan theology, their personating the inanimate parts of the world, and natures of things, and bestowing the names of gods and goddesses upon them. Thus *Moschopulus* before cited, and *Arnobius*. This *Plutarch* thinks to have been done at first metonymically only, the effects of the gods being called gods; as the books of *Plato*, *Plato*. And thus far not disliked by him. But himself complaineth, that afterwards it was carried on farther by superstitious religionists, and not without great impiety. Nevertheless, that inanimate substances, and the natures

of things, were formerly deified by the ancient Pagans, otherwise than metonymically, proved from Cicero, Philo, and Plato. For they supposing God to pervade all things, and to be all things, did therefore look upon every thing as sacred or Divine; and theologize the parts of the world and natures of things; titularly making them gods and goddesses. But especially such things, as wherein human utility was most concerned, and which had most of wonder in them 504

This properly the physiological theology of the Pagans, their personating and deifying the natures of things and inanimate substances. That the ancient poetic fables of the gods were many of them, in their first and true meaning, thus physiologically allegorical, and not mere herology, affirmed against Eusebius. Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus, famous for thus allegorizing the fables of the gods. Chrysippus's allegorizing an obscene picture of Jupiter and Juno in Samos. Plato, though no friend to these poetic fables, yet confesses some of them to have contained allegories in them: the same doth also Dionysius Halicarnassus; and Cicero likewise, who affirmeth this personating and deifying the natures of things, to have filled the world with superstition 511

Against Eusebius again, that the whole theology of the Pagans consisted not in thus deifying the natures of things, and inanimate bodies; because he that acknowledgeth no animant God, acknowledgeth no God at all, but is a downright Atheist 514

Neither ought this physiological theology of the Pagans, that consisted in personating and deifying the natures of things and inanimate bodies, to be confounded with that natural and philosophical theology of Varro, Scævola, and others, which admitted of no other but animant gods, and such as really existed in nature: for which cause it was called natural, in opposition to the fictitious and fantastic poetic gods 515

St. Austin's just censure and condemnation of the Pagans, for their thus theologizing of physiology, or fictitiously personating and deifying the natures of things 516

But though the Pagans did thus verbally personate and deify the things of nature, yet did not the intelligent amongst them therefore count these true and proper gods. Cotta in Cicero, "though we call corn Ceres, and wine Bacchus, yet was there never any one so mad, as to take that for a god which himself feeds upon and devours." The Pagans really accounted that only for a god, by the invoking whereof they might expect be-

nefit to themselves; and therefore nothing inanimate. This proved from Plato, Aristotle, Lucretius, Cicero, and Plutarch. Wherefore these natures of things deified, but fictitious and fantastic gods. Nor can any other sense be made of them than this, that they were really but so many several names of one supreme God, as severally manifested in his works: according to that Egyptian theology, that God may be called by the name of every thing, or every thing by the name of God. With which agreeth Seneca, that there may be as many names of God, as there are gifts and effects of his; and the writer *De Mundo*, that God may be denominated from every nature, he being the cause of all things 517

Wherefore these deified natures of things were not directly worshipped by the intelligent Pagans, but only relatively to the supreme God, or in way of complication with him only; and so not so much themselves as God worshipped in them. The Pagans' pretence, that they did not look upon the world with such eyes as oxen and horses do, but with religious eyes, so as to see God in every thing. They therefore worshipped the invisible Deity in the visible manifestations of himself; God and the world together. This sometimes called Pan and Jupiter. Thus was the whole world said to be the greatest God, and the circle of the heavens worshipped by the Persians; not as inanimate matter, but as the visible manifestation of the Deity, displayed from it, and pervaded by it. When the Roman captains sacrificed to the waves, their worship intended to that God who stilleth the waves and quieteth the billows . . . 521

These Pagans also apprehended a necessity of permitting men to worship the invisible God in his visible works. This account given by them in Eusebius. Plato himself approved of worshipping the invisible God in the sun, moon, and stars, as his visible images. And though Maximus Tyrinus would have men endeavour to rise above the starry heavens, and all visible things, yet does he allow the weaker to worship God in his progeny. And Socrates persuades Euthydemus to be contented herewith. Besides which, some Pagans worshipping the elements, directed their intention to the spirits of those elements, as Julian in Ammianus (these being supposed also to be animated), or else to those demons whom they conceived to inhabit them, or preside over them 524

XXXIII. Farther to be observed, that amongst those natures of things, some were merely accidental, as hope, love, desire,

memory, truth, virtue, piety, faith, justice, concord, clemency, victory, echo, night. According to which, the vulgar Athenians supposed St. Paul to have deified Anastasis, or made a goddess of the resurrection, as well as a god of Jesus. Vices also sometimes thus deified by them, as Contumely and Impudence (to whom were temples dedicated at Athens), though to the end that these things might be deprecated. These accidents sometimes deified under counterfeit proper names, as Pleasure under the name of Volupia, and Lubentina Venus; Time, under the name of Chronos or Saturn; Prudence, or Wisdom, under the names of Athena or Minerva; against which, Origen in his answer to Celsus. Cicero himself allowed of dedicating temples to mind, virtue, piety, faith, &c. 527

But such accidents and affections of things deified could not possibly be accounted true and proper gods, they having not *ὑπόστασιν καὶ οὐσίαν*, any real subsistence, or substantial essence of their own.—And thus does Origen again dispute against Minerva's godship, as tropologized into Prudence. As he doth also elsewhere, upon the same ground, against that of Memory, the mother of the Muses, and that of the Graces; he conceiving, these and such-like, therefore, to be nothing but figments of the Greeks, they being things personated, and feigned with human members. Thus the Pagans condemned by Prudentius also, for feigning things incorporeal, with counterfeit members. These gods plainly exploded by Cotta, or Cicero in disguise; as having only *vis rerum*, but not *deorum*, the force of things, but not of gods in them; or being but *natura rerum*, and not *figura deorum* 531

Wherefore the true meaning of these deified natures of things could be no other than this, that God was to be acknowledged and worshipped in all things; or, as the Pagans themselves declare it, that the force of every thing was both governed by God, and itself Divine. Pliny of this breaking and crumbling of the Deity into parts, every one worshipping that in God, and for a god, which himself most stood in need of. This dividing of the simple Deity, and worshipping it brokenly by parcels and piece-meal, as manifested in all the several things of nature, and parts of the world, justly censured, and elegantly perstringed, by Prudentius against Symmachus. Where Prudentius grants, that Symmachus, who declared, that it was one thing which all worshipped; when he sacrificed to Victory, did sacrifice to God Almighty, under that partial notion, as the giver of vic-

tory. This, in the Egyptian allegory, Osiris mangled and cut in pieces by Typhon. Victory and Virtue, as well as Neptune; Mars, and Bellona, but several names or notions of Jupiter, in the prólogue of Plautus's *Amphitryo* 534

Vossius's opinion, that these deified accidents, and natures of things, as well as the other Pagan invisible gods, were commonly looked upon by the vulgar, as so many single substantial minds, or spirits created by the supreme God, and appointed to preside over those several things respectively. Where it is acknowledged, that neither the political nor the poetical gods of the Pagans were taken, so much as by the vulgar, for so many independent deities 536

Probable, that by these gods the wiser Pagans sometimes understood demons in general, or collectively; that is, whosoever they were, that were appointed to preside over those several things, or dispense them. As *Æolus* in *Arrianus* seems to be taken for the demons appointed by God Almighty to preside over the winds 539

Lactantius's reason, why the *consentes* and select gods, vulgarly worshipped by the Romans, could not be single demons or angels 542

And from Aristotle's observation, against Zeno, that, according to law, or civil theology, one god was chief for one thing, and another for another, concluded, that these political gods were not properly the subservient ministers of the Supreme; and therefore could be nothing but several names and notions of one natural God, according to his various powers and effects ib.

And thus does Vossius himself afterwards confess, that, according to the natural theology, all the Pagan gods were but several denominations of one God. Where, notwithstanding, this learned and industrious philologer seems to take the natural and philosophic theology for the physiological, he making the god thereof the nature of things. Whereas the natural theology was the true, and real, and philosophical, opposed both to the fictions of the poets, and the institutes of law-makers and politicians. As Varro affirmeth, that in cities those things were worshipped and believed, according to false opinions, which had no nature, nor real subsistence, neither in the world, nor without it. The God of the Pagans not the nature of things, which could be the Numen of none but of Atheists; but an understanding Being, the great Mind, or Soul of the whole world,

pervading all things. Thus unquestionably true, that the many poetical and political gods were but several names or notions of one natural, real, and true God. Besides which, there were other inferior ministers of this supreme God, acknowledged to be the instruments of his providence, and religiously worshipped also. A brief but full account of the Pagans' natural theology, set down by Prudentius 544

And when the more high-flown Pagans referred these poetical and political gods to the Divine ideas, or patterns of things in the archetypal world; which, besides the Platonists, the Egyptians in Celsus are said to have done, making the brute animals worshipped by them, but symbols of the eternal ideas; they hereby made these gods to be but so many partial considerations of one God neither, as being all things, or containing in himself the causes of all things; as Julian himself declareth in his sixth oration 547

An anacephalæosis, that much of the pagan Polytheism was but the polyonymy of one God; he being worshipped under several names. First, according to several general notions of of him; as of Janus, Genius, Saturn, Minerva, Urania, or the heavenly Venus, or Love, and others before declared. So also of Summanus, according to St. Austin, and Themis, afterwards to be mentioned 549

And, secondly, according to other more particular notions of them (in their special gods), as acting in some parts of the world only, or exercising some particular powers 551

And, lastly, as pervading all things, and being all things, or the cause of all things, he was thereupon called by the name of every thing, or every thing by his name. The Pagans in St. Austin; that their ancestors were not so sottish, as not to understand, that those things of nature were but Divine gifts, and not themselves gods. And the Pagans in Eusebius; that the invisible God, the cause of all things, ought to be worshipped in his visible effects, wherein he hath displayed himself . . . 552

Though the two former kinds of these gods only called by Athanasius poetical and fictitious, he opposing them to those of the third sort, that were natural and real things; yet may these also be well called poetical, fictitious, and fantastical gods too; because though themselves were real things, existing in nature, yet was their personation and deification, mere fiction, fancy, and poetry. And accordingly were they before called by Origen *Ἑλλήνων ἀναπλάσματα*, mere fragments of the Greeks 553

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XXXIV. Of those Pagans, who supposed the supreme God to be the whole animated world. Hitherto shewed, that even the most refined of the Pagans agreed in these two things. First, in breaking and crumbling the one simple Deity, and multiplying it into many gods; or parcelling it out into several particular notions, according to its several powers and virtues (*Πολυώνυμον* being, to these Pagans, the same thing with *Πολύδυναμον*). And then, in theologizing the whole world, personating and deifying the natures of things, accidents, and inanimate bodies. They supposing God to pervade all things, and himself to be in a manner all things: therefore every thing to the religious, sacred, and Divine; and God to be worshipped in all 1

We shall now add, that both those forementioned principles, of God's pervading all things, and his being all things, were carried on farther by those Pagan theologers, who had no higher notion of the supreme Deity, than as the soul of the world. For, first, whereas the more refined Pagans supposed God to pervade all things unmixedly; these mingled and confounded him with the whole world; some of them supposing him also to be a subtile body 3

Again, whereas the other more sublimated Pagans affirmed God so to be all, as nevertheless to be something also above all; these concluded him to be nothing higher than the animated world 5

And though they supposed, that as well in this mundane animal as in other animals, there was something principal and hegemonical (whether the sun, or ether, or fire), which therefore was emphatically called God; yet did they conceive the whole matter thereof to be animated, and so to be all God. Not barely as matter, but by reason of the soul thereof . . . ib.

Now if the whole world animated be the supreme God, then must all the parts and members of the world be the parts and members of one God; but not themselves therefore properly so

many gods. This affirmed by Origen, as the true sense of these Pagans, against that unwary assertion of Celsus, that if the whole were God, then must the several parts thereof needs be gods 8

Wherefore, though these Pagans deified the parts of the world and natures of things, as well as the powers of the mundane soul; yet did not the intelligent amongst them worship them severally, as so many true and proper gods, but only as the parts and members of one great animal or god; or rather worship the great mundane Soul (the Life of the whole world) in them all. This proved from St. Austin 10

The same plainly declared also by the Pagans in Athanasius, that not the divided parts of the world were by them accounted so many several gods, but the whole, made up of them all, one God; which yet might be worshipped in its several parts 12

The Pagans being thus divided, as to their opinions concerning the natural and true theology, some of them worshipped the world as the body of God, but others only as his image or temple. Thus Plutarch, though disliking the deifying of inanimate things, did notwithstanding approve of worshipping God in the whole world, as his most sacred temple. And the Persian Magi, allowing of no artificial temples made with men's hands, worshipped God *sub dio*, and upon the tops of mountains, as conceiving the whole world to be his natural temple. For the same reason did they condemn also artificial statues and images, concluding fire, earth, and water, and the like parts of the world, to be the natural images of the Deity. Thus Dino in Clemens Alexandrinus. This difference amongst the Pagan theologers noted by Macrobius. Thus were all the Pagans world-worshippers, in different senses; but not as a dead and inanimate thing, but either as the body of God, or else as his temple or image 13

Furthermore, the Pagans universally acknowledging the world to be an animal, those of them, who supposed it not to be the first and highest God, conceived it to be either a second or else a third god; and so worshipped it, not only as a temple or image, but also as the son of the first God. Celsus pretended the Christians to have called their Jesus the Son of God, in imitation of these Pagans who styled the world so 17

Thus have we made it fully to appear, that, according to the saying of Antisthenes, the many popular gods of the Pagans

were but one and the same natural God; or, according to that of Euclides, their many gods were but many names. So that neither their poetical nor yet their political theology, was looked upon by them as true and natural 19

Nevertheless, the wiser Pagans generally concluded, that there ought to be another theology, besides the natural, fitly calculated for the vulgar, and having a mixture of falsehood and fabulosity in it. Varro and Scaevola agreed, that the vulgar being incapable of the true and natural theology, it was expedient for them to be deceived in their religion. Strabo also, that the vulgar cannot, by philosophic reason and truth, be carried on to piety; but this must be done by superstition, and by the help of fables, and prodigious relations. The same partly acknowledged by Synesius for true. Plato also, that it is hard to find out God, but impossible to declare him to the vulgar; and therefore a necessity of a civil theology, distinct from the natural and philosophical 20

xxxv. We come now to the next thing proposed, that, besides this seeming and fantastic Polytheism of the Pagans, which was nothing but the polyonymy of one God, they had another real Polytheism, even in their natural and philosophic theology itself. But this not of self-existent gods, but generated or created ones only. Thus, according to Plutarch, one highest unmade God is the Maker and Father of all the other gods, generated or derived from him. And Proclus concludes all the gods to derive their godship from the first God, who therefore is the fountain of the Godhead 22

These inferior Pagan gods styled by Ammianus Marcellinus substantial powers, in way of opposition to those other poetical and political gods, that were not substantial or real, but only several names or notions of one supreme God. Those substantial powers (as divination and prophecy was by them imparted to men) said to be all subject to that one sovereign deity, called Themis, placed by Pagan theologers in the throne of Jupiter. This Themis also another name or notion of the supreme God, besides those beforementioned. Poetry and phantasty intermingled by the Pagans with their natural or philosophic theology 25

Thus the Pagans held both one God and many gods, in different senses. Onatus and Plotinus, that the majesty of the supreme God consisteth in having multitudes of gods dependent

on him, and ruled by him, and that the honour done to them redounds to him. The gods of the original Pagans not mere dead statues and images, but living understanding beings, represented by them. That Christians asserted no solitary Deity, as Pagans pretended, but agreed with this of Seneca, that God hath generated or created innumerable understanding beings superior to men, ministers of his kingdom; the only difference being this, that they gave them no religious worship: out of Lactantius 28

xxxvi. That besides the inferior gods, generally received by all the Pagans (namely, animated stars, demons, and heroes), the more refined of them, who accounted not the animated world the supreme Deity, acknowledged a trinity of Divine hypostases superior to them all. Which doctrine affirmed by Plotinus to have been very ancient, and no invention of Plato's 32

Parmenides an assertor of a trinity long before Plato. This imputed to the Pythagoreans, by Moderatus in Simplicius, and Jamblichus in Proclus. Before Pythagoras, Orpheus had his trinity, Phanes, Uranus, and Chronus; the same with Plato's three kings or principles. Probable, that Pythagoras and Orpheus derived the same from the theology of the Egyptian Hermes. Some footsteps of such a trinity, in the Mithraic mysteries, amongst the Persians, and the Zoroastrian cabala. The same expressly declared in the Magic or Chaldaic oracles. A trinity of Gods worshipped anciently by the Samothracians, and called by a Hebrew name *cabiri*, the mighty gods. From thence the Roman Capitoline trinity derived; the second whereof, Minerva, or the Divine wisdom. The Ternary, a number used by the Pagans, in their religious rites, as mysterious 33

It being no way probable, that such a trinity of Divine hypostases should have sprung from human wit, we may reasonably assent to what Proclus affirmeth, that it was at first *θεορραδωτος θεολογια*, a theology of Divine tradition or revelation;—as having been first imparted to the Hebrews, and from them communicated to other nations. Nevertheless, as this Divine cabala was but little understood by these Pagans, so was it by many of them depraved and adulterated 35

This called universally by them a trinity of gods; or a first, second, and third god: by some a trinity of causes, and of principles, and of opificers. The tradition of the three gods, in Proclus, ancient and famous. Numenius's three gods, called

by him the father, the son, and the nephew (or grandson). Nous, or intellect, to Plotinus, a second god: as also the world an image of all the three gods. Plotinus and Porphyrius, their ecstatic union with the first of these three gods . . . 36

That Philo, a religious Jew, and zealous opposer of the pagan Polytheism, called, notwithstanding, the Divine Word, also a second god. This not agreeable to the principles of Christianity. Nevertheless St. Austin partly excuses this language in the Pagans . . . 39

And they perhaps the more excusable, because they sometimes called also those three hypostases, taken all together, the first god . . . 41

Nor was this trinity of Divine hypostases ill-linguaged only by the Pagans, but also the cabala thereof much depraved and adulterated by some Platonists and Pythagoreans. As first, such as made the world to be the third god. Such a trinity, a confounding of God and creature together . . . 42

And that this an adulterated notion of the Trinity, evident from hence; because no reason, why these philosophers should stop here, since the sun, moon, and stars, and their other generated gods, differ not in kind, but only in degree, from the world . . . 44

Neither will this excuse them, that they understood this chiefly of the soul of the world; since if there were such a mundane soul, as together with the world made up one animal, this itself must needs be a creature also . . . ib.

This probably the reason, why Philo, though acknowledging the Divine Word as a second god, and second cause, yet nowhere speaketh of a third god; lest he should thereby seem to deify the whole created world. Though he call God also, in some sense, the soul of the world too (whether meaning thereby his first or his second god). So that Philo seems to have acknowledged only a duality, and not a trinity, of Divine hypostases . . . 45

Another depravation of this *θεοπαράδοτος θεολογία*, theology of Divine tradition—or cabala of the Trinity, that some of these Platonists and Pythagoreans, concluding all those several ideas of the Divine intellect, or archetypal world, to be so many distinct substances, animals, and gods; have thereby made their second hypostasis, not one, but a heap of innumerable gods and hypostases, and consequently destroyed their trinity . . . 46

Though Philo again here Platonized so far, as to suppose an incorporeal heaven and earth, and an intelligible sun, moon, and stars, to have been made before the corporeal and sensible; yet does he no where declare them to be so many distinct substances and animals, much less gods; but on the contrary censures that for Pagan idolatry. This pretence of worshipping the Divine ideas, in all sensible things, that which gave sanctuary and protection to the foulest and sottishest of all the Pagan idolatries; the Egyptians worshipping brute animals thus, and the Greeks the parts of the world inanimate, and natures of things 48

A third depravation or adulteration of the Divine cabala of the Trinity, by Proclus and other latter Platonists, asserting an innumerable company of henades, particular unities, superior to the first Nous, or Intellect, their second hypostasis; as also innumerable noes, substantial minds or intellects, superior to the first Psyche, their third hypostasis 50

These noes seem to be asserted by Plotinus also: as likewise the henades and agathotetes were by Simplicius 51

A swarm of innumerable Pagan gods from hence; besides their intelligible gods, or ideas, particular henades and noes, unities and intellects 53

Now since these particular henades and noes of theirs must needs be creatures, the trinity of Proclus and such others nothing but a scale or ladder of nature, wherein God and the creature are confounded together, the juncture or commissure betwixt them being no where discernible; as if they differed only in degrees; a gross mistake and adulteration of the ancient cabala of the Trinity 1b.

This that Platonic, or rather pseudo-Platonic trinity, by us opposed to the Christian, viz. such a trinity, as confounds the differences betwixt God and the creature; bringing the Deity by degrees down lower and lower; and at length scattering it into all the animated parts of the world; a foundation for infinite Polytheism, cosmolatry or world-idolatry, and creature-worship. Hence the Platonists and Pythagoreans the fittest men to be champions for Paganism against Christianity . . . 55

Concerning the Christian Trinity, three things to be observed. First, that it is not a Trinity of mere names and words, nor logical notions, or inadequate conceptions of God; this doctrine having been condemned by the Christian church, in Sabellius

and others; but a Trinity of hypostases, subsistences, or persons 56

The second thing observable in the Christian Trinity, that though the second hypostasis thereof were begotten from the first, and the third proceedeth both from the first and second; yet neither of them creatures. First, because not made *ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων*, or from an antecedent nonexistence brought forth into being, but both of them coeternal with the Father. Secondly, because all necessarily existent, and unannihilable. Thirdly, because all of them universal, or infinite, and creatures of all other particular beings 58

The third observable as to the Christian Trinity, that the three hypostases thereof are all truly and really one God; not only by reason of agreement of will, but also of a mutual *περιχώρησις* and *ἐνβάπτις*, permeation of each other, and inexistence.— Though no instance of the like unity to be found elsewhere in nature; yet since two distinct substances, corporeal and incorporeal, make one man and person in ourselves, much more may three Divine hypostases be one God 59

Though much of mystery in the Christian Trinity, yet nothing of plain contradiction to reason therein; that is, no nonsense, and impossibility. The ill design of those, who represent the Christian Trinity as absolutely contradictory to reason, that they may thereby debauch men's understandings, and make them swallow down other things, which unquestionably are such *ib.*

The Christian Trinity much more agreeable to reason than the pseudo-Platonic, in the three particulars beforementioned. First, its making their third hypostasis the animated world, or mundane soul. Which, not only too great a leap betwixt the second and third, but also a gross debasement of the Deity, and confounding it with the creature; a foundation for world-idolatry, and worshipping inanimate things, as parts and members of God 60

God to Origen, but *quasi anima mundi*, as it were the soul of the world, and not truly and properly such. All the perfection of this notion to be attributed to God, but not the imperfection thereof 61

Certain, that, according to the more refined Platonists, their third Divine hypostasis, not a mundane, but supra-mundane soul, and the *δημιουργός*, or opificer—of the whole world. So to Amelius, Porphyrius, and Plotinus. A double soul of the world

to Plato likewise. The third hypostasis, to these, no creature, but a creator 64

So in their second particular (whereby the forementioned pseudo-Platonic trinity, no trinity), its making all the ideas and archetypal paradigms of things, so many hypostases, animals, and gods. This a monstrous extravagancy. Not to be doubted, but that Plato well understood these ideas to be nothing but *noëmata*, or conceptions of the Divine mind, existing no where apart by themselves; however called *oûata*, essences or substances,—because not such accidental and evanid things as our human thoughts are, they being the standing and eternal objects of all science: as also *ζῶα*, or animals;—to signify, that they were not mere dead forms, as pictures upon paper, or carved statues. And thus did not only Amelius understand St. John concerning the Logos, whatsoever was made was life in him, but also divers of the ancient fathers, Greek and Latin. This deifying of ideas but a piece of Pagan poetry 65

Lastly, whereas Proclus and others intermingle many particular gods with those three universal hypostases, and *henades*, and *agathotetes*, unities and goodnesses, substantial above the first intellect; and *noës*, particular minds or intellects, above the first soul; this hypothesis of theirs altogether irrational and absurd; there being nothing essentially goodness, wisdom, and sanctity, but the three Divine hypostases, all other beings having only a participation thereof. Thus Origen expressly; who therefore acknowledgeth no higher rank of created beings than such as the Platonists call souls, that are self-moveable, vitally unitable to bodies, and peccable. With whom agreeth St. Jerome, and others of the fathers, that God is the only impeccable being; but all understanding creatures free-willed, and lapsable 68

An opinion of Simplicius, that even in that rank of beings called souls (though not essentially immutable, but self-moveable) some are of so high a pitch, as that they can never degenerate, nor sink or fall into vicious habits. Insomuch that he makes a question, whether *proæresis* belong to them or no 71

But whatever is to be thought of this, Origen too far in the other extreme, in denying any other ranks of souls above human; and supposing all the difference, that is now betwixt the highest angels and men, to have proceeded only from their merits, and different uses of their free will; his reason being this,

because God would be otherwise a *prosopoleptes*, or acceptor of persons. This also extended by him to the soul of our Saviour Christ; as not partially chosen to that dignity, but for its faithful adherence to the Divine Word in a pre-existent state; which he would prove from Scripture. But if a rank of souls below human, and specifically differing from them, as Origen himself confesses those of brutes to be; no reason, why there might not also be other ranks or species superior to them 72

But least of all can we assent to Origen, when from this principle, that all souls are essentially endued with free will, and therefore in their nature peccable, he infers those endless circuits of souls, upwards and downwards, and consequently denies them any fixed state of holiness and happiness by Divine grace; an assertion contrary to the tenor and promises of the gospel. Thus perhaps that to be understood, that "Christ brought life and immortality to light through the gospel;" not as if he were the first who taught the soul's immortality, a thing believed before by the pharisaic Jews, and generality of Pagans; but because these held their endless transmigrations and circuits, therefore was he the first who brought everlasting life and happiness to light 75

That Origen, a man well skilled in the Platonic learning, and so much addicted to the dogmata thereof, would never have gone so far into that other extreme, had there been any solidity of reason for either those henades, or noes, of the latter Platonists. This opinion all one, as if the Christian should suppose besides the first person, or Father, a multitude of particular paternities, superior to the second person; and also besides the one Son, or Word, a multitude of particular sons or words, superior to the third, the Holy Ghost. This plainly to make a breach upon the Deity, and to introduce a company of such creaturely gods, as imply a contradiction in their very notion 77

Lastly, this not the catholic doctrine of the Platonic school neither, but a private opinion only of some late doctors. No footsteps of these henades and agathotetes to be found any where in Plato; nor yet in Plotinus. This language little older than Proclus. Nor does Plato speak of any abstract or separate mind, save only one; his second things about the second, being ideas; as his thirds about the third created beings. Plotinus also doubtful and staggering about these noes, he seeming sometimes to make them but the heads or summities of souls.

Wherefore this pseudo-Platonic trinity to be exploded, as confounding the differences betwixt God and the creature. Whereas the Christian Trinity homogeneal, all Deity or Creator; all other things being supposed to be the creatures of those three hypostases, and produced by their joint concurrence and influence; they being all really but one God 77

Nevertheless, these forementioned depravations and adulterations of that Divine cabala of the Trinity, not to be charged upon Plato himself, nor all the other ancient Platonists and Pythagoreans; some of which approached so near to the Christian Trinity as to make three hypostases all truly Divine, and creators, other things being the creatures of them 81

First, therefore, Plato himself, in his *Timeus*, carefully distinguisheth betwixt God and the creature, and determineth the bounds of each, after this manner. That the first is that, which always is, and never was made; the second, that which is made and had a beginning, but truly is not. His meaning here perverted by junior Platonists, whom Boetius also followed. Where Plato also takes it for granted, that whatsoever hath a temporary and successive duration, had a beginning; and whatsoever had no beginning, hath no successive but permanent duration: and so concludes, that whatsoever is eternal, is God; but whatsoever exists in time, and hath a beginning, creature ib.

Now to Plato, more eternal gods than one. Which not ideas or noemata, but true substantial things; his first, second, and third, in his epistle to Dionysius, or trinity of Divine hypostases, the makers or creators of the whole world. Cicero's gods, by whose providence the world and all its parts were framed 85

The second hypostasis in Plato's trinity, to wit, mind or intellect, unquestionably eternal, and without beginning. The same affirmed by Plotinus also of the third hypostasis, or *Psyche*, called the word of the second, as the second the word of first. Porphyrius's testimony to this purpose in St. Cyril; where also mind, or the second Divine hypostasis (though said to have been begotten from the first, yet), called *ἀνδράρως*, and *αὐτογένητος*, its own parent, and its own offspring,—and said to have sprung out *αὐτογόνως*, self-begottenly 88

This mysterious riddle expounded out of Plotinus. The plain meaning thereof no more than this, that though this second hypostasis proceeded from the first, yet was it not produced by it after a creaturely manner, nor arbitrarily by will and choice,

but in way of natural and necessary emanation. Thus have some Christians ventured to call the Logos, *αὐτόθεον*, and *ex seipso Deum*, God from himself 88

Dionysius Petavius, having declared the doctrine of Arius, that the Father was the only eternal God, and the Son, or Word, a creature, made in time, and out of nothing; concludes it undeniably manifest from hence, that Arius was a germane, true, and genuine Platonist. Whereas it is most certain from hence, that Arius was no Platonist at all; and that Petavius himself did not well understand the Platonic doctrine. Had Plato denied the eternity of his second hypostasis, called Nous, he must have denied the eternity of wisdom and understanding itself; this being to him that wisdom by which God himself is wise, and whereby he made the world. With which agreeth also Athanasius; "Our Lord is wisdom, and not second to any other wisdom; and, the Father of the Word is not himself Word; and, that was not word and wisdom, which produced word and wisdom." This in opposition to Arius, who maintained another word and wisdom, senior to that word and wisdom in Christ. These Platonists, so far from denying the eternity of the Word, that they rather attributed too much to it, in making itself begotten. Wherefore Plato, asserting the eternity of his second hypostasis, Nous or Logos, and not of the world, did thereby, according to Athanasius's own doctrine, make it to be no creature 90

Nor is there any force at all in that testimony of Macrobius, cited by Petavius, to the contrary, wherein the first hypostasis is said to have created Mind from itself, and the second to have created Soul; because these ancient Pagans did not confine the word *creare* to such a narrow sense, as Christians commonly do; but used it generally for all manner of production. Petavius's mistake, chiefly from that spurious trinity of the latter Platonists, whose third god is by themselves called *ποίημα*, a creature. But this not the doctrine of the ancients 92

Nevertheless some more reason to doubt, whether Plato's third hypostasis were eternal, because in his *Timæus*, he generates the mundane soul, this controversy decided, by supposing a double Psyche, *ἐγκόσμιον*, and *ὑπερκόσμιον*, a mundane, and supra-mundane soul; the first of these called by Plotinus a heavenly Venus, and a separate soul. Wherefore, though the lower Venus, or mundane soul, according to Plato made in time together with the world; yet the higher Divine soul, or heavenly

Venus, the son of Chronus without a mother, his third hypostasis, eternal, and without beginning 93

This farther evident from hence, because Plato, in his epistle to Dionysius, affirmeth as well of the second and third, as of the first, that in all those things that are cognate to our human soul (or creaturely) there is *οὐδέν τοιοῦτον*, nothing like thereunto 95

Secondly, the three hypostases of Plato's trinity not only all eternal, but also necessarily existent, and absolutely unannihilable. Nor could the first any more exist without the second and third, than the sun without its primary light and secondary splendour. These also, according to Plotinus, the three principles of the universe; so that there could be neither more, nor fewer. They who called the second autopator, signified thereby the necessity of its existence ib.

Thirdly, these three Platonic hypostases, as eternal and necessary, so likewise universal, or comprehensive of the whole world, that is, infinite and omnipotent. Therefore called principles, and causes, and opificers. Though nous, or mind, vulgarly looked upon as the highest principle of all things, yet Plato set before it one most simple good. When Nous, said by Plato to be *γενούσῃς*, of the same kind with the first cause of all things, this all one as if he had affirmed it to be *ὁμοούσιος*, coessential or consubstantial with it 96

Plato's third hypostasis, Pysche, or the superior mundane soul, called by him Zeus, from *ζῆν*, as also the cause and fountain of life, and the prince and king of all things. And when said to be *ἔκγονος*, the offspring of the highest mind,—thereby made consubstantial with it also. So that Plato's whole trinity homoousian 98

Though by the demiurgus or opificer Plato commonly meant the second hypostasis, mind or intellect, yet Atticus, Amelius, Plotinus, and others, called the third, or the higher Psyche also, by that name. Wherefore, according to the genuine Platonic and Parmenidian trinity, all the three hypostases joint creatures of the whole world. Thus Ficinus often, and Proclus. Porphyrius's affirmation, that the Deity, according to Plato, extends to three hypostases 99

Certain therefore, that Arius did not Platonize, but rather Athanasius and the Nicene fathers; who, notwithstanding, made not Plato but the Scriptures their foundation. The genuine trinity of Plato and Parmenides, a middle betwixt that of Sabellius

and that of Arius; it being neither a trinity of words and names as the former; nor an heteroousious trinity, a confused jumble of God and the creature together; but homoousious and homogeneous: all eternal, necessarily existent, infinite or omnipotent, and creator 99

But that it may yet more fully appear, how far the most refined Platonic and Parmenidian trinity does either agree or disagree with the Scripture and Christian doctrine, two things farther to be observed concerning it. First, that the Platonists universally asserted an essential dependence of their second and third hypostases upon the first, as also a gradual subordination in them. Thus Plotinus; Chronos, or the second hypostasis, is in a middle state betwixt his father who is greater, and his son who is inferior. And that in this eternal generation or emanation no progress upward, but all downward, and a gradual descent 100

More of the dependence and gradual subordination of the second and third hypostases of the Platonic trinity to the first. Each following hypostasis called *ἵχνος* and *ρόνος* and *εἰδών*, and *εἰδωλον*, and *μίμημα*, of that before it. Philo's offensive expression, that the Logos, or Word, is the shadow of God. This gradation commonly illustrated by the *ἐκλαμψις*, or *ἀπαύγασμα*, the effulgency or out-shining splendour of the sun 102

The same farther manifested from the several distinctive characters given to each hypostasis in the true Platonic or Parmenidian trinity. The first, *ἐν πρὸ πάντων*, one before all things;—the second, *ἐν πάντα*, one all things,—as to their distinct ideas; the third, *ἐν καὶ πάντα*, one really producing all things. The first, Unity and Goodness essential; the second, Understanding and Wisdom; the third, self-active Love and Power. The first, or Father *ἀνενέργητος*, above action;—the second or Son, the Demiurgus, the Maker or contriving Architect of the world, but an immoveable nature; the third a moveable Deity, and the immediate Governor of the whole world. Amelius's distinction of them into *τὸν ὄντα*, *τὸν ἔχοντα*, *τὸν ὁρῶντα* 106

The greatest difficulty in the distinctive characters of these three Platonic hypostases; that understanding, reason, and wisdom, should be made peculiar to the second, as if the first were therefore devoid of mind, reason, and wisdom. This an arcanum of the Platonic and Pythagoric theology; that whereas Anaxagoras, Aristotle, and the vulgar, make mind and understanding the oldest of all things, and the highest principle in the universe; this supposes mind, knowledge, and wisdom, to be not

the first, but second. Partly because there is a multiplicity in knowledge, but there must be unity before multiplicity. And partly because there must be Νοηρόν before Νοῦς, an object or intelligible before intellect.—As also, because intellection or knowledge is not the highest good, or happiness; and therefore to be some substantial thing, in order of nature superior to mind. Hence concluded, that the supreme Deity is better than Logos, reason, word, or intellect. That not Logos, from whence Logos is derived. Thus Philo; The God before Reason, or Word, better than all the rational nature. But this difficulty common to Platonism with Christianity; which likewise makes Word, or reason and wisdom, not the first, but second hypostasis. Thus does Athanasius deny, that there is any word, reason, or wisdom, before the Son of God. What then? Is the first hypostasis therefore *ἄνους* and *ἄλογος*, devoid of reason and mind?—Plotinus's attempt to answer this; that the first hath *φῶς ἀπλόον*, a simple light,—different from that multiform light of knowledge. Again, that the first is *νόησις αὐτή*, intelligence itself,—and therefore superior to intellect, or that which hath intellection. (For *ἡ νόησις οὐ νοεῖ*, intelligence itself doth not understand.) Besides which, another attempt also to solve this difficulty . 108

The ground of this Platonic dependence and subordination in the Divine hypostases; because there is but one fountain of the Godhead; so that the second must needs differ from the first, as the *ἀπαύγασμα* from the *φῶς*, the splendour from the sun . 114

Though the second hypostasis said to have been begotten from the first; yet this not to be taken for such a generation as that of men, where three men (father, son, and grandson), all adult, have no essential dependence upon one another, nor gradual subordination. This but an imperfect generation . ib.

Furthermore, the Platonists would recommend this their gradation in the Deity, or subordination of hypostases; from hence, because by this means, not so great a leap or jump in the creation, as otherwise there must be; nor the whole Deity screwed up to such a disproportionate height, as would render it incapable of having any intercourse with the lower world. Were the whole Deity, either one simple monad, or else an immoveable mind, it could have no such liberty of will as is commonly attributed to it, nor be affectible with any thing here below; nor indeed any fitter object for men's devotion than an adamant rock. Whereas all the phenomena of the Deity solvable by this Platonic gradation 115

As also, according to this hypothesis, some reasonable satisfaction to be given, why just so many Divine hypostases, and neither fewer nor more 116

The second thing to be observed, concerning the genuine Platonic or Parmenidian trinity; that though the hypostases thereof be called three natures, and three principles, and three opificers, and three gods; yet they all really make up but one Divinity. For the world, being created by all three, and yet having but one creation, they must needs be all one Creator. Porphyrius in St. Cyril explicitly, that according to Plato, the essence of the Deity extendeth to three hypostases . . . 117

Platonists farther add, that were it not for this essential dependence and subordination, the three Divine hypostases must needs be three co-ordinate gods; and no more one God than three men are one man, or three suns one sun. Whereas the sun, its splendour, and derivative light, may all well be accounted one and the same thing 120

These Platonists therefore suppose so close a union, and so near a conjunction, betwixt their three hypostases, as no where else to be found in nature. Plotinus, that there is nothing between them, and that they are only not the very same. They acknowledge also their perichoresis or mutual inexistence. The three hypostases one Divinity to the Platonists, in the same manner as the centre, radius distance immoveable, and moveable circumference of a sphere, all one sphere. The first infinite Goodness, the second infinite Wisdom, the third infinite active Love, and power substantial 121

From this full account of the true and genuine Platonic trinity, its both agreement and disagreement with the Christian, plainly appeareth. First, its agreement in the three fundamental things beforementioned; and consequently its discrepance from Arianism 124

Secondly, its disagreement notwithstanding, from the now-cited doctrine, in that it supposes the three hypostases not to have one and the same singular essence, nor yet an absolute co-equality, but a gradual subordination, and essential dependence. Upon which account, said by some to symbolize with Arianism, however different from it in the main point 125

Besides which, the best of the Platonists sometimes guilty of extravagant expressions. Plotinus's *ὁμοειδὲς δὲ καὶ ἡμετέρα*, that our human soul is of the same species with the mundane soul, or third hypostasis;—that being but the elder sister. Which

indeed is to make it coessential or consubstantial with us men, as St. Austin understood it. This a foundation for creature-worship or idolatry. Why the Arians by Constantine called Porphyrianists. But this doctrine, as repugnant to Plato, so elsewhere contradicted by Plotinus himself 126

That notwithstanding a Platonic Christian would apologize for Plato and the genuine Pythagoreans after this manner. First, that having no Scriptures, councils, nor creeds, to direct them in the darkness of this mystery, and to guide their language, they the more excusable, if not always uniform, and sometimes extravagant. More to be wondered at, that they should approach so near the Christian truth 130

And for their gradual subordination of hypostases, and dependence of the second and third upon the first; that these Platonists herein the more excusable, because the majority of Christian doctors, for the first three centuries, seem to have asserted the same 131

The Platonic Christians' farther apology; that the Platonists' intention in subordinating their three hypostases, only to exclude a plurality of co-ordinate independent gods. That none of Plato's three hypostases, creatures, but that the essence of the Godhead belongeth to them all: they being all eternal, necessarily existent, infinite or omnipotent, and creators. Therefore in the sense of the Nicene council, consubstantial and coequal. The essence of the Godhead, wherein all the three hypostases agree, as well to the fathers as Platonists, general and universal 132

Besides which the genuine Platonists would acknowledge also all their three hypostases to be homoousian, coessential, or consubstantial, yet in a farther sense, as making up one entire Divinity: as the root, stock, and branches, coessential to a vine. The trinity not so undivided as if three were not three in it. The inequality and subordination in the Platonic trinity within the Deity itself only, and in the relation of the hypostases to one another; they being *ad extra*, all one and the same God, jointly concurring in the same actions, and in that respect devoid of inequality 136

Furthermore, the Platonic Christian would urge, that according to the principles of Christianity itself, there must needs be some dependence and subordination in these hypostases, in their relation to one another; a priority and posteriority of order and dignity: that which is originally of itself, having some kind of

priority and superiority over that which is wholly derived from it. The second and third hypostases not so omnipotent as the first, because not able to beget or produce that. Hence first styled by Macrobius, the most omnipotent of all. Sundry passages in Scripture favouring this hypothesis, as also orthodox fathers. Athanasius's resemblances to the original light and the secondary splendour; to the fountain and the stream, the root and the branch, the water and the vapour. The equally asserted by the orthodox, in way of opposition to the Arian inequality of God and creature; that they equally God, or uncreated. Notwithstanding which, some inequality amongst them allowed by Petavius and others, as this God and that person 137

However, no necessity of any more inequality and subordination in the Platonic, than in the Christian trinity; they being but infinite goodness, and infinite wisdom, and infinite active love, and power substantial. Another hypothesis of some Platonists hinted by St. Austin out of Porphyry, which makes the third hypostasis a middle betwixt the first and second; and implies not so much a gradation, as a circulation in the trinity . 142

As for the Platonists supposing their three hypostases (though one entire Divinity) to have their distinct singular essences, without which they conceive they could be nothing but three names; the Platonic Christian would make this apology, that the orthodox fathers themselves were generally of this persuasion, that the essence of the Godhead, wherein all the three persons agree, not one singular, but only one common or universal essence. Their distinction to this purpose, betwixt *ὁμοία* and *ἰσόρροια*; that the former was common or generical, the latter singular or individual. Theodoret, Basil, and many others. Petavius's acknowledgment, that the Greeks universally agreed therein 143

The opinion of Gregory Nyssen, Cyril, Damascen, and others, that the persons of the Trinity no otherways one, than as three individuals under the same species, or as three men agree in the same common humanity. These the chief assertors of an absolute, independent, and un subordinate coequality. This the only fault that St. Cyril finds in the Platonists, that they did not after such a consubstantiality. Whereas this trinity, Tritheism; the three persons thereof being no more one God than three men are one man; however this certain, that these fathers did not suppose the three hypostases of the Trinity to have all the same singular essence. Another extreme, that sprung up after-

wards in the room of the former Tritheism, and owned by no other authority than of a Lateran council 146

And that this sameness of singular essence was not asserted by the Nicene fathers, and first opposers of Arius : first, clearly acknowledged by Petavius 150

But this farther evident from hence ; because the same orthodox fathers, who opposed Arianism, did also condemn Sabellianism ; which asserted, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, to be but one hypostasis, that is, to have but one and the same singular essence ; and consequently acknowledged no other trinity than of names or words 152

It appeareth also from hence, because the word *homoousious* had never any other sense, than to signify the agreement of things numerically differing, in some common and general nature or essence. St. Basil, that the same thing is not *homoousious*, *coessential*, or *consubstantial* with itself ; but always one thing with another. Τὸ *ὁμοούσιον* the same with *συγγένεια* in Plotinus. So also in Athanasius, he affirming the branches to be *homoousious* and congenerous with the root. Besides which, *ὁμογενής*, *ὁμοειδής*, and *ὁμοφύης*, used by Athanasius and others as synonymous with *ὁμοούσιος*. None of which words signify an identity of singular essence, but general or universal only. The council of Chalcedon, that our Saviour Christ, as to his humanity, was *homoousious* or *consubstantial* with us men. Thus does Athanasius deny the Son or Word, as such, to be *homoousious* or *consubstantial* with creatures : as also he affirmeth men to be *consubstantial* and *coessential* with his Father 152

Moreover, the sense of the Nicene fathers, in their *consubstantiality*, may more fully appear from the doctrine of Arius opposed by them ; which made the Son a creature, and therefore (as Athanasius writeth) *ἑτεροούσιον* or *ἀλλοτριούσιος*, of a different essence or substance from the Father. Proved clearly from Athanasius, that by the *consubstantiality* of the Word was meant no more, than its being not a creature or uncreated . . . 153

Farther proof, out of Athanasius, that by *consubstantiality* is not meant a sameness of singular, but only of general essence. As also out of St. Austin 159

Lastly, that the *homoousian* fathers did not assert against Arius, a sameness of singular essence, evident from their disclaiming those two other words, *ταυτοούσιον*, and *μονοούσιον* (as having a Sabellian sense in them), the former by Epiphanius, the latter by Athanasius. So that they, who asserted the Son to

be homoousious, consubstantial with the Father, denied him to be monoousious, or tautoousious, that is, to have the same singular essence 164

From all these considerations, concluded by the Platonic Christian, that as the genuine trinity of Plato agreed with that of the orthodox Christians, in being not heteroousian, but homoousian, coessential or consubstantial; not made up of God and creature, but all homogeneous of uncreated, or creator: so did the Trinity of the first orthodox Anti-Arians herein agree with the Platonic trinity, that it was not monoousian, or tautoousian, one and the same singular essence, under three names or notions only; but really three hypostases or persons . . . 166

Nevertheless, here remaineth a question to be answered; whether Athanasius, the Nicene fathers, and all the first Anti-Arians, did therefore assert the same thing with Greg. Nyssen, Cyril, and others, that the three persons in the Trinity were but three co-ordinate individuals, under the same species, having only a specific unity or identity (besides consent of will); or that they all agree in the uncreated Nature only. This grossly asserted in the Dialogues of the Trinity, vulgarly imputed to Athanasius, and to that purpose also, that three men are not three men, but only then when they dissent from one another in will and opinion. But these Dialogues pseudepigraphous. Nevertheless to be granted, that Athanasius himself, in that book of the Common Essence of the Persons, seems to lay something too much stress upon this common nature, essence; or substance, of the three persons, as to the making of them all but one God. However, it is certain, he does not there rely upon that alone; and elsewhere acknowledgeth it to be insufficient. The true reason why Athanasius laid so great a stress upon the Homoousiotes, not because this alone would make them one God, but because they could not possibly be one God without it: For if the Father be uncreated, and the Son a creature, then can they not both be one God. Several passages of Athanasius cited to this purpose. Those expressions in him of one Godhead, and the sameness of the Godhead, and one essence or substance in the Trinity, not so to be understood, as if the three persons were but several names, notions, or modes of one thing . . . 167

Wherefore though Athanasius lay his foundation in this *αἰδωὶ ἐνός*, common specific unity of the persons (which is their consubstantiality), in order to their being one God; yet does he superadd other considerations also thereunto. As first of all

this, that they are not three principles, but only one; the essence of the Father being the root and fountain of the Son and Spirit; and the three hypostases, gathered together under one head. Where Athanasius implies, that, were they perfectly co-ordinate and independent, they would not be one but three gods 174

In the next place, he farther addeth, that these three hypostases are not three separated disjoined things, but indivisibly united; as the splendour is indivisible from the sun, and wisdom from him that is wise. That neither of these persons could be without the other; nor any thing come between them: they so immediately conjoined together, as that there is a kind of *συνέχεια*, or continuity betwixt them 176

Thirdly, Athanasius goes yet higher; affirming these three hypostases not only to be indivisibly conjoined, but also to have a mutual inexistence in each other. This afterwards called an Emperichoresis. That of our Saviour, "I am of the Father, and the Father in me," therefore quarrelled at by the Arians, because they conceived of things incorporeal after a corporeal manner. That the Godhead of the Son is the Godhead of the Father; and the Father exercises a providence over all, in the Son 178

Lastly, Athanasius also, in sundry places, supposes the three Divine hypostases to make up one entire Divinity; as the fountain and the stream make up one entire river; the root, stock, and branches, one entire tree. Accordingly the word *homousios* used by Athanasius, in a farther sense, not only to signify things agreeing in one common and general essence, but also such as essentially concur to the making up of one entire thing. That the three hypostases do outwardly, or *ad extra*, produce all, *πάν ἐνέργειαν*, one and the self-same action;—the Father by the Word, in the Holy Spirit, doing all things. That all this doctrine of Athanasius would have been readily assented to by Plato and his genuine followers. The Platonic Christian therefore concludeth, that there is no such real difference betwixt the genuine Platonic trinity, and that of the first orthodox Anti-Arian fathers, as some conceive. From which notwithstanding that tritheistic trinity, of St. Greg. Nyssen, Cyril, and others, of three co-ordinate individuals under the same species (as three men), seems to have been a deviation . . . 181

Hitherto the Platonic Christians' apology, for the genuine Platonic Trinity; or endeavour to reconcile it with the doctrine of the ancient church: where nothing is asserted by ourselves, but

all submitted to the judgment of the learned in these matters. And whatsoever in Plato's trinity shall be found discrepant from the sense of the first orthodox Anti-Arian fathers, utterly disclaimed by us. Athanasius a great instrument of Divine Providence, for preserving the Christian church from lapsing into a kind of pagan and idolatrous Christianity. . . . 183

The reason of this apology, for the genuine Platonic trinity; because it is against the interest of Christianity that this should be made more discrepant from the Christians than indeed it is. Moreover certain, that this genuine Platonic trinity was Anti-Arian; or rather the Arian Anti-Platonic. Wherefore Socrates wondered, that Georgius and Timotheus presbyters should adhere to the Arian faction; when one of them was accounted much a Platonist, the other an Origenist. . . . 184

Furthermore, Platonic Pagans, after Christianity, highly approved of the beginning of St. John's Gospel concerning the Logos, as exactly agreeing with their Platonic doctrine. Thus Amelius in Eusebius, and others. A Platonist in St. Austin, that it deserved to be writ in golden letters, and set up in some eminent places in every Christian church. But that, which is most of all considerable, to justify this apology, the generality of Christian fathers, before and after the Nicene council, looked upon this Platonic trinity, if not as really the same thing with the Christian, yet as approaching so near thereunto, that it differed chiefly in circumstances, or manner of expression. Thus Justin Martyr, Clemens Alexandrinus, Origen, St. Cyprian, or the author of the book *De Spiritu Sancto*, Eusebius *Cæsariensis*, and, which is most of all to the purpose, Athanasius himself, he giving a signal testimony thereunto. To which may be added St. Austin and Theodoret. St. Cyril, though blaming the Platonic subordination (himself supposing the Trinity to be three co-ordinate individuals under the same specific nature of the Godhead), yet acknowledges, that Plato was not altogether ignorant of the truth, &c. But that Plato's subordination of his second hypostasis to the first, was not (as the Arian) of a creature to the Creator; already made unquestionably evident. . . . 185

Wherefore a wonderful providence of Almighty God here to be taken notice of; that this doctrine, of a trinity of Divine hypostases, should be entertained in the Pagan world before Christianity, as it were to prepare a way for the reception of it amongst the learned. Which the junior Platonists were so sensible of, that besides their other adulterations of the Platonic

trinity before mentioned (for the countenancing of their Polytheism and idolatry), they at length innovated and altered the whole cabala, now no longer acknowledging a trinity, but at least a quaternity of Divine hypostases; namely, before and besides the Trinity, another hypostasis superior thereunto, and standing alone by itself. This first started by Jamblichus, carried on by Proclus, taken notice of by St. Cyril: besides which, Proclus also added other fantastic trinities of his own . . . 193

Another advantage of this Platonic trinity, extending to the present time; perhaps not unintended also by Divine Providence to abate the confidence of those conceited wits, who so boldly decried the Trinity for nonsense, absolute contradiction to reason, and impossibility, when they shall find, that the best and freest wits amongst the Pagans, though having no Scripture revelation to impose upon them, were yet fond of this hypothesis . . . 197

And now it sufficiently appears, that the ancient Platonists and Pythagoreans were not to be taxed for Polytheists and idolaters, in giving religious worship to their three Divine hypostases. One grand design of Christianity, to free the world from idolatry and creature-worship: and this the reason why the ancient fathers so zealously opposed Arianism, because it thwarted that design, it paganizing and idolatrizing that which was intended for the unpaganizing of the world. One remarkable passage of Athanasius to this purpose . . . 198

Where first observable, that Athanasius expressly affirmeth the Pagans to have worshipped only one uncreated and many created gods. Thus Greg. Naz. that there was but one Divinity amongst the Pagans also. And Irenæus, that they attributed the first place of the Deity to one supreme God, the Maker of this universe. And, secondly, that to Athanasius, and all those other fathers who charged the Arians with idolatry, this was supposed not to consist in worshipping many independent and self-existent gods, but in giving religious worship to creatures: as the Arians gave a religious worship to the Son or Word, supposed by themselves to be but a creature . . . 201

But if Arians guilty of Polytheism or idolatry, for bestowing religious worship upon the Son or Word, as a creature (though the chief of creatures, and that by which all others were made), much more they guilty hereof, who religiously worshipped other inferior beings. Athanasius; that no creature the object of religious worship, and that the orthodox worshipped the Divinity in the humanity of our Saviour Christ. Nestorius branded

with the name of a man-worshipper. Some suppose that necessary to idolatry, which is impossible, to worship more than one, as omnipotent, or with mental *latria* 203

And now have we sufficiently answered the objection against the naturalness of the idea of a God, as including oneliness in it, from the pagan Polytheism. What farther here intended concerning the same (as a foundation for our defence of Christianity) deferred, to make room for a confutation of all the atheistic arguments.

CHAP. V.

A particular confutation of all the atheistic grounds.

THE first atheistic argument; that there is no idea of God. That in answer to this, the idea of God hath been already declared; viz. a perfect understanding being, unmade, or self-existent from eternity, and the cause of all other things, in which nothing inconceivable nor contradictory. That these confounded Atheists themselves, who deny that there is any idea of God at all, must notwithstanding, of necessity, suppose the contrary; because otherwise, denying his existence, they should deny the existence of nothing. And that they agree also with Theists in the same idea; the one denying the existence of that which the other asserteth, that an understanding nature is the original of all things. This idea of God, as containing oneliness and singularity in it, not only largely defended and made good against that objection from the pagan Polytheism; but also proved, that the generality of mankind have a natural prolepsis or anticipation in their minds concerning the real and actual existence of such a being. Atheists but monsters, and anomalies of mankind. This a sufficient confutation of the first atheistic argument 209

Nevertheless, that Atheists may not pretend any of their strength to be concealed, all their particular exceptions against the idea of God here declared, being five. Their first exception, that we can have no idea nor thought of any thing not subject to sense; much less any evidence of the existence thereof. The answer, First, that whereas the Atheists suppose sense to be the only knowledge, or at least original knowledge; sense, as such, is not knowledge, or understanding; because if it were, then every one that sees light and colours, or feels heat and cold, would understand light and colours, heat and cold.

Plainly proved also from that atomic philosophy (which the Epicurean Atheists so much pretend to), that there is a higher faculty of the soul, which judges of sense, detects the phantasm thereof, resolves sensible things into intelligible principles, &c. No passion able to make a judgment, either of itself, or of other things. The confounded Democritus himself sometimes acknowledged sense to be but seeming and phantasy, and not to reach to the absolute truth and reality of things. He therefore exploded qualities out of the rank of entities, because unintelligible; concluding them to be but our own phantasms. Undeniably evident, that we have ideas, notions, and thoughts, of many things, that never were in sense, and whereof we have no genuine phantasms. Atheists attend not to their own cogitations. That opinion, that there is nothing in the understanding which was not before in sense, false and atheistical. Men having a notion of a perfect understanding being, the cause of all things, as the object of their devotion; the Atheists, notwithstanding, would here persuade them, that they have none, and that the thing is a nonentity, merely because they have no sensible idea or phantasm thereof. And so may they as well prove, not only reason and understanding, appetite and volition, to be nonentities, but also fancy and sense itself; neither of these falling under sense, but only the objects of them. Were God indeed corporeal, as some mistaken Theists suppose, yet his essence chiefly consisting in mind and understanding, this of him could not possibly be subject to sense. But that there is also substance incorporeal, which therefore in its own nature is insensible, and that the Deity is such will be elsewhere demonstrated 211

Though the evidence of singular bodies existing, depend upon the information of sense, yet the certainty of this very evidence, not from sense alone, but a complication of reason and understanding with it. Sense fantastical, not reaching to the absolute truth of things; and obnoxious to delusion. Our own imaginations taken for sensations and realities in sleep, and by melancholized persons when awake. Atomic Atheists themselves assert the existence of such things as they have no sense of; atoms, membranes, or exuvius images of bodies, nay, incorporeal space. If the existence of nothing to be acknowledged which falls not under sense, then not the existence of soul and mind. God the great mind that rules the whole universe; whence our imperfect minds derived. The existence of that God, whom no eye can see, demonstrated by reason from his effects 216

The second atheistic pretence against the idea of God and his existence, from Theists' own acknowledging him to be incomprehensible; from whence they infer him to be a nonentity. Here perhaps it may be granted, in a right sense, that whatsoever is altogether inconceivable, is either in itself, or at least to us, nothing. How that of Protagoras, that every man is the measure of all things to himself, in his sense false. Whatsoever any man's shallow understanding cannot clearly comprehend, not therefore to be presently expunged out of the catalogue of beings. Nevertheless, according to Aristotle, the soul and mind in a manner all things. This a crystalline globe, or notional world, that hath some image in it of whatsoever is contained in the real globe of being 218

But this absolutely false; that whatsoever cannot be fully comprehended by us, is therefore utterly inconceivable and consequently nothing. For we cannot fully comprehend ourselves, nor have such an adequate conception of any substance, as perfectly to master and conquer the same. That of the Sceptics so far true, that there is some something incomprehensible in the essence of every thing, even of body itself. Truth bigger than our minds. Proper to God Almighty (who alone is wise) perfectly to comprehend the essences of all things. But it follows not from hence, that therefore we have no idea nor conception at all of any thing. We may have a notion or idea of a perfect being, though we cannot fully comprehend the same by our imperfect minds; as we may see and touch a mountain, though we cannot enclasp it all round within our arms. This therefore a false theorem of the Atheists, that whatsoever cannot be fully comprehended by men's imperfect understandings, is an absolute nonentity 219

Though God more incomprehensible than other things, because of his transcendent perfection, yet hath he also more of conceptibility: as the sun, dazzling our sight, yet hath more of visibility also than any other object. The dark incomprehensibility of the Deity, like the azure obscurity of the transparent ether, not any thing absolutely in itself, but only relative to us 221

This incomprehensibility of the Deity, so far from being an argument against its existence, that certain, on the contrary, were there nothing incomprehensible to our imperfect minds, there could be no God. Every thing apprehended by some internal congruity. The scantness and imperfection of our narrow understandings must needs make them asymmetrall or incommensurate to what absolutely perfect 222

Nature itself intimates, that there is something vastly bigger than our mind and thoughts, by those passions implanted in us, of devout veneration, adoration, and admiration, with ecstasy and pleasing horror. That of the Deity, which cannot enter into the narrow vessels of our minds, must be otherwise apprehended, by their being plunged into it, or swallowed up, and lost in it. We have a notion or conception of a perfect being, though we cannot fully comprehend the same; because ourselves being imperfect, must needs be incommensurate thereunto. Thus no reason at all, in the second atheistic pretence, against the idea of God and his existence; from his confessed incomprehensibility 223

The third follows, That infinity, supposed to be essential to the Deity, is a thing perfectly inconceivable, and therefore an impossibility and nonentity. Some passages of a modern writer to this purpose. The meaning of them, that there is nothing of philosophic truth in the idea or attributes of God, nor any other sense in the words, than only to signify the veneration and astonishment of men's own minds. That the word infinite signifies nothing in the thing itself so called, but only the inability of our understandings, and admiration. And since God, by Theists, is denied to be finite, but cannot be infinite, therefore an inconceivable nothing. Thus another learned well-willer to Atheism. That we have no idea of infinite, and therefore not of God. Which, in the language of Atheists, all one as to say, that he is a nonentity 224

Answer. This argument, that there can be nothing infinite, and therefore no God, proper to the modern and neoteric Atheists only; but repugnant to the sense of the ancients. Anaximander's *ἄπειρον*, infinite matter,—though Melissus's *ἄπειρον*, the true Deity.—Formerly both Theists and Atheists agreed in this; that there must be something or other infinite, either an infinite mind, or infinite matter. The ancient Atheists also asserted a numerical infinity of worlds. Thus do Atheists confute or contradict Atheists 225

That the modern Atheists do no less contradict plain reason also, and their very selves, than they do their predecessors, when they would disprove a God from hence, because there can be nothing infinite. For, first, certain, that there was something or other infinite in duration, or eternal without beginning; because, if there had been once nothing, there could never have been any thing. But hardly any Atheists can be so sottish, as

in good earnest to think there was once nothing at all, but afterwards senseless matter happened to be. Notorious impudence in them, who assert the eternity of matter, to make this an argument against the existence of a God; because infinite duration without beginning an impossibility 227

A concession to the Atheists of these two things; that we neither have a phantasm of any infinite, because there was never any in sense; and that infinity is not fully comprehensible by finite understandings neither. But since, mathematically certain, that there was something infinite in duration, demonstrated from hence, against Atheists, that there is something really existing, which we have neither any phantasm of, nor yet can fully comprehend in our minds 228

Farther granted, that as for infinity of number, magnitude, and time, without beginning; as we have no phantasm nor full comprehension of them, so have we neither any intelligible idea, notion, or conception: from whence it may be concluded, that they are nonentities. Number infinite in Aristotle, only in a negative sense, because we can never come to an end thereof by addition. For which very reason also there cannot possibly be any number positively infinite, since one or more may always be added. No magnitude so great neither, but that a greater may be supposed. By infinite space, to be understood nothing but a possibility of more and more body, farther and farther infinitely, by Divine power; or that the world could never be made so great, as that God was not able to make it still greater. This potential infinity, or indefiniteness of body, seems to be mistaken for an actual infinity of space. Lastly, no infinity of time past, because then there must needs be time past which never was present. An argument of a modern writer. Reason therefore concludes, neither world nor time to have been infinite in past duration 229

Here will the Atheist think he has got a great advantage for disproving the existence of a God; they, who thus take away the eternity of the world, taking away also the eternity of a God. As if God could not be eternal otherwise than by a successive flux of infinite time. But we say, that this affordeth a demonstration of a God; because, since both the world and time had a beginning, there must of necessity be something whose duration is not successive; but permanent, which was the creator of them both. Wherefore the Atheists can here only make grimaces, and quibble upon *nunc-stans*; as if this standing eternity of the Deity was nothing but a pitiful moment of time

standing still; and as if all duration must needs be the same with ours, &c. 231

Concluded, that infinite and eternal are not words which signify nothing in the thing itself, but only the idle progress of our minds; or our own ignorance, stupid astonishment, and veneration: not mere attributes of honour and compliment, but attributes belonging to the Deity (and that alone), of the most philosophic truth. And though we have no adequate comprehension thereof, yet must we have some notion of that which we can demonstrate to belong to something 232

But the thing, which the Atheists principally quarrel with, is infinite power, or omnipotence; which they pretend also to be utterly inconceivable, and impossible, and a name of nothing. Where indeed our modern Atheists have the joint suffrage of the ancients also, who concerned themselves in nothing more, than disproving omnipotence, or infinite power. 234

This omnipotence either wilfully or ignorantly misrepresented by Atheists, as if it were a power of doing things contradictory. An irony of a modern Atheist, that God could turn a tree into a syllogism. The absurd doctrine of Cartesius, that God could have made twice two not to have been four, or the three angles of a triangle not to have been equal to two right. This to make one attribute of the Deity devour and destroy another; infinite will and power, infinite understanding and wisdom. To suppose God to understand and be wise only by will, really to give him no understanding at all. God not so omnipotent as that he can destroy the intelligible natures of things; which were to baffle and befool his own wisdom. Infinite power that which can do all that is possible; that is, conceivable, or implies no contradiction. The very essence of possibility, conceptibility. And thus all the ancient Theists. Absurd for Atheists to say, that a power of doing nothing but what is conceivable is inconceivable ib.

But because Atheists look upon infinity as such a morrow, we shall take off the vizard from it: by declaring, that it is really nothing else but perfection. Infinite understanding and knowledge, perfect understanding without any defect, and the knowledge of all things knowable. Infinite power, perfect power, or a power of doing all things possible. Infinite duration, perfection of essence. Because infinity, perfection; therefore nothing, which includeth any thing of imperfection in the essence of it, can be truly and properly infinite; as number, magnitude;

and time: all which can but counterfeit infinity. Nothing one way infinite which is not so every way, or a perfect being 237

Now, that we have an idea of perfection, plain from that of imperfection. Perfection first in order of nature, as the rule and measure. This not the want of imperfection, but imperfection the want of perfection. A scale or ladder of perfections in nature, perceived by means of that idea which we have of a being absolutely perfect, the measure of them. Without which we could not take notice of imperfection in the most perfect of all those things which we ever had sense of. Boethius; that whatsoever is imperfect in any kind, implies something in that kind perfect from whence it was derived. And that the nature of things took not beginning from any thing incomplete and imperfect; but descended downward, from what was absolutely perfect, by steps and degrees, lower and lower . . . 238

Wherefore, since infinite the same with perfect, we having a notion of the latter must needs have of the former. And though the word infinite be negative, yet is the sense positive. Finite the negation of infinite, as which, in order of nature, is before it; and not infinite of finite. However, in things incapable of true infinity; infinity, being here a mere imaginary thing and nonentity, can be only conceived by the negation of finite, as nothing is by the negation of something. An infinite being nothing but a perfect being, such as never was not, and could produce all things possible, or conceivable . . . 239

The fourth atheistic pretence against the idea of God; that it is an arbitrary complement of contradictory notions. Where first we deny not, but that as some religionists extend the Divine power to things contradictory, so may others compound contradictions together in the nature of the Deity. But it does not follow from thence that theology itself is therefore contradictory, no more than that philosophy is so because some philosophers also hold contradictory things; or that nothing is absolutely true, neither in divinity nor philosophy, but all seeming and fantastical; according to the Protagorean doctrine . . . 240

But though it be true, that whatsoever really implies a contradiction is a nonentity; yet is this rule obnoxious to much abuse, when whatsoever men's shallow understandings cannot reach to, is therefore presently cried down by them, as an impossibility, or nothing. As when the Atheists and Materialists explode incorporeal substance upon this pretence; or make it

only an attribute of honour, expressing the veneration of men's minds, but signifying nothing in nature, nor having any philosophic truth. But the Atheists' true meaning in this objection, and what kind of contradictions they are which they impute to all theology, may appear from a passage of a modern writer, namely, such as these: when God is said to perceive sensible things, and yet to have no organs of sense; as also to understand, and yet to have no brains. The undisguised meaning of the writer, that religion is not philosophy, but law, and all mere arbitrary constitution; nor God a subject of philosophy, as all real things are; he being no true inhabitant of the world or heaven, but only of men's brains and fancies; and his attributes signifying neither true nor false, nor any thing in nature, but only men's reverence and devotion towards what they fear. And so may any thing be said of God, no matter what, so it be agreeable to civil law. But when men mistake attributes of honour for attributes of philosophic truth; that is, when they will suppose such a thing as a God really to exist; then is all absurd nonsense and contradiction. God's understanding without brains no contradiction 242

Certain, that no simple idea, as of a triangle, or a square, can be contradictory to itself; much less can the idea of a perfect being, the most simple of all. This indeed pregnant of many attributes, which, if contradictory, would render the whole a nonentity; but all the genuine attributes of the Deity as demonstrable of a perfect being as the properties of a triangle or a square; and therefore can neither be contradictory to it, nor one another 246

Nay, the genuine attributes of the Deity not only not contradictory, but also all necessarily connected together . . . ib.

In truth all the attributes of the Deity, but so many partial and inadequate conceptions of one and the same perfect being, taken into our minds as it were by piece-meal 247

The idea of God neither fictitious nor factitious. Nothing arbitrary in it; but a most natural and simple idea, to which not the least can be added, nor any thing detracted from it. Nevertheless may there be different apprehensions concerning God; every one that hath a notion of a perfect being, not understanding all that belongeth to it; no more than of a triangle, or of a sphere ib.

Concluded therefore, that the attributes of God no confounded nonsense of religiously-astonished minds, muddling up

together all imaginable attributes of honour, courtship, and compliment; but the attributes of necessary philosophic truth; and such as do not only speak the devotion of men's hearts, but also declare the real nature of the thing. Here the wit of a modern atheistic writer ill placed. (Though no doubt but some, either out of superstition or ignorance, may attribute such things to the Deity as are incongruous to its nature.) Thus the fourth atheistic pretence against the idea of God confuted 248

In the next place, the Atheists think themselves concerned to give an account of this unquestionable phenomenon; the general persuasion of the existence of a God in the minds of men, and their propensity to religion; whence this should come if there were no real object for it in nature. And this they would do by imputing it, partly to the confounded nonsense of astonished minds, and partly to the imposture of politicians. Or else to these three things; to men's fear; and to their ignorance of causes; and to the fiction of law-makers and civil sovereigns 250

In the first of these atheistic origins of religion; That mankind, by reason of their natural imbecility, are in continual solicitude and fear concerning future events, and their good and evil fortune. And this passion of fear raises up in them, for an object to itself, a most affrightful phantasm; of an invisible understanding being, omnipotent, &c. They afterwards standing in awe of this their own imagination, and tremblingly worshipping the creature of their own fear and fancy . . . ib.

The second atheistic origin of Theism and religion; That men having a natural curiosity to inquire into the causes of things, wheresoever they can discover no visible and natural causes, are prone to feign causes invisible and supernatural. As Anaxagoras said, never to have betaken himself to a God, but only when he was at a loss for necessary material causes. Wherefore no wonder, if the generality of mankind, being ignorant of the causes of all or most things, have betaken themselves to a God, as to a refuge and sanctuary for their ignorance 251

These two accounts of the phenomenon of religion; from men's fear and solicitude, and from their ignorance of causes and curiosity, joined together by a modern writer. As if the Deity were but a mormo or hughbear, raised up by men's fear, in the darkness of their ignorance of causes. The opinion of other ghosts and spirits also deduced from the same original. Men's taking things casual for prognostics, and being so addicted

to omens, portents, prophecies, &c. from a fantastic and timorous supposition, that the things of this world are not disposed of by nature, but by some understanding person . . . 252

But lest these two accounts of the phenomenon of religion should prove insufficient, the Atheists superadd a third, imputing it also to the fiction and imposture of civil sovereigns; who, perceiving an advantage to be made from hence, for the better keeping men in subjection, have thereupon dexterously laid hold of men's fear and ignorance; and cherished those seeds of religion in them, from the infirmities of their nature: confirming their belief of ghosts and spirits, miracles, prodigies, and oracles, by tales, publicly allowed and recommended. And that religion might be every way obnoxious to their designs, have persuaded the people, that themselves were but the interpreters of the gods, from whom they received their laws. Religion an engine of state; to keep men busily employed; entertain their minds; render them tame and gentle, apt for subjection and society . . . 253

All this not the invention of modern Atheists. But an old atheistic cabal; that the gods made by fear. Lucretius; that the causes of religion, terror of mind and darkness; and that the empire of the gods owes all its being to men's ignorance of causes; as also, that the opinions of ghosts proceeded from men's not knowing how to distinguish their dreams and other frightful fancies from sensations . . . 254

An old atheistic surmise also; that religion a political invention. Thus Cicero; the Atheists in Plato, that the gods are not by nature, but by art and laws only. Critias, one of the thirty tyrants of Athens, his poem to this purpose . . . 256

That the folly and falseness of these three atheistic pretences, for the origin of religion, will be fully manifested. First, as to that of fear and fancy. Such an excess of fear, as makes any one constantly believe the existence of that for which no manner of ground, neither in sense nor reason, highly tending also to his own disquiet; nothing less than distraction. Wherefore the generality of mankind here affirmed by Atheists, to be frightened out of their wits, and distempered in their brains; only a few of themselves, who have escaped this panic terror, remaining sober, or in their right senses. The sobriety of Atheists nothing but dull stupidity and dead incredulity; they believing only what they can see or feel . . . 258

True, that there is a religious fear consequent upon the be-

lief of a God; as also, that the sense of a Deity is often awakened in men's minds by their fears and dangers. But religion no creature of fear. None less solicitous about their good and evil fortune than the pious and virtuous; who place not their chief happiness in things alien, but only in the right use of their own will. Whereas the good of Atheists wholly in things obnoxious to fortune. The timorous complexion of Atheists, from building all their politics and justice upon the foundation of fear 260

The Atheists' grand error here; that the Deity, according to the general sense of mankind, nothing but a *terriculum*, a formidable, hurtful, and undesirable thing. Whereas men every where agree in that Divine attribute of goodness and benignity ib.

Φθονερὸν τὸ δαιμόνιον, in the worst sense, taken by none but a few ill-natured men, painting out the Deity according to their own likeness. This condemned by Aristotle in the poets (he calling them therefore liars), by Plutarch in Herodotus, as spoken universally; Plutarch himself restraining the sense thereof to his evil principle. Plato's ascribing the world to the Divine goodness, who therefore made all things most like himself. The true meaning of this proverb; That the Deity affecteth to humble and abase the pride of men. Lucretius's hidden force, that hath, as it were, a spite to all overswelling greatnesses, could be no other than the Deity. Those amongst Christians, who make the worst representation of God, yet fancy him kind and gracious to themselves 260

True, that religion often expressed by the fear of God. Fear *prima mensura Deitatis*, the first impression that religion makes upon men in this lapsed state.—But this not a fear of God, as mischievous and hurtful, nor yet as a mere arbitrary being, but as just, and an impartial punisher of wickedness. Lucretius's acknowledging men's fear of God to be conjoined with a conscience of duty. A natural discrimination of good and evil, with a sense of an impartial justice presiding over the world, and both rewarding and punishing. The fear of God, as either a hurtful, or arbitrary and tyrannical being (which must needs be joined with something of hatred), not religion, but superstition: Fear, faith, and love; three steps and degrees of religion, to the son of Sirach. Faith better defined in Scripture than by any scholastics. God such a being, as if he were not, nothing more to be wished for 262

The reason why Atheists thus mistake the notion of God, as

a thing only to be feared, and consequently hated; from their own ill-nature and vice. The latter disposing them so much to think, that there is no difference of good and evil by nature, but only by law; which law, contrary to nature as restraint to liberty. Hence their denying all natural charity, and acknowledging no benevolence or good-will but what arises from imbecility, indigency, and fear. Their friendship at best no other than *mercatura utilitatum*. Wherefore, if there were an omnipotent Deity, this (according to the atheistic hypothesis) could not have so much as that spurious love or benevolence to any thing, because standing in need of nothing, and devoid of fear. Thus Cotta in Cicero. All this asserted also by a late pretender to politics; he adding thereunto, that God hath no other right of commanding than his irresistible power; nor men any obligation to obey him but only from their imbecility and fear, or because they cannot resist him. Thus do Atheists transform the Deity into a monstrous shape; an omnipotent being that hath neither benevolence nor justice in him. This indeed a mormo or bugbear 265

But as this a false representation of Theism, so the atheistic scene of things most uncomfortable, hopeless, and dismal, upon several accounts. True, that no spiteful designs in senseless atoms; in which regard, Plutarch preferred even this atheistic hypothesis before that of an omnipotent mischievous being. However, no faith; nor hope neither, in senseless atoms. Epicurus's confession, that it was better to believe the fable of the gods, than that material necessity of all things, asserted by the other atheistic physiologers before himself. But he not at all mending the matter by his supposed free will. The panic fear of the Epicureans, of the frame of heaven's cracking, and this complement of atoms being dissolved into a chaos. Atheists running from fear plunge themselves into fear. Atheism, rather than Theism, from the imposture of fear, distrust, and disbelief of good. But vice afterwards prevailing in them makes them desire there should be no God 268

Thus the Atheists, who derive the origin of religion from fear, first put an affrightful vizard upon the Deity, and then conclude it to be but a mormo or bugbear, the creature of fear and fancy. More likely of the two, that the opinion of a God sprung from hope of good than fear of evil; but neither of these true, it owing its being to the imposture of no passion, but supported by the strongest and clearest reason. Nevertheless, a

natural prolepsis, or anticipation of a God also, is men's minds, preventing reason. This called by Plato and Aristotle, a *metempsychosis*. 270

The second atheistic pretence to solve the phenomenon of religion, from the ignorance of causes, and men's innate curiosity (upon which account the Deity said by them to be nothing but an asylum of ignorance, or the sanctuary of fools), next to be confuted 271

That the Atheists, both modern and ancient, here commonly complicate these two together, fear, and ignorance of causes; making Theism the spawn of both; as the fear of children in the dark raises bugbears and spectres. Epicurus's reason why he took such great pains in the study of physiology; that, by finding out the natural causes of things, he might free men from the terror of a God, that would otherwise assault their minds.

The Atheists thus dabbling in physiology, and finding out material causes for some of those phenomena, which the unskilful vulgar solve only from a Deity; therefore confident, that religion had no other original than this ignorance of causes; as also, that nature, or matter, does all things alone without a God. But we shall make it manifest, that philosophy and the true knowledge of causes lead to a Deity; and that Atheism, from ignorance of causes, and want of philosophy

For, first, no Atheist, who derives all from senseless matter, can possibly assign any cause of himself, his own soul, or mind; it being impossible, that life and sense should be naturally produced from what dead and senseless; or from magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions. An atheistic objection; nothing to the purpose; that laughing and crying things are made out of not laughing and crying principles; because these result from the mechanism of the body. The Hylozoists never able either to produce animal sense and consciousness. The Atheists, supposing their own life and understanding, and all the wisdom that is in the world, to have sprung merely from senseless matter, and fortuitous motions; grossly ignorant of causes. The philosophy of ourselves, and true knowledge of the causes of our own soul and mind, brings to God.

Again, Atheists ignorant of the cause of motion, by which they suppose all things done; this phenomenon being no ways solvable, according to their principles. First, undeniably cer-

tain, that motion not essential to all body or matter as such, because then there could have been no mundane system, no sun, moon, earth, &c. all things being continually torn in pieces, and nothing cohering. Certain also, that dead and senseless matter, such as that of Anaximander, Democritus, and Epicurus, cannot move itself spontaneously, by will or appetite. The Hylozoists farther considered elsewhere. Democritus could assign no other cause of motion than this, that one body moved another from eternity infinitely; without any first cause or mover. Thus also a modern writer. To assert an infinite progress in the causes of motion, according to Aristotle, to assign no cause thereof at all. Epicurus, though an exploder of qualities, forced here, to fly to an occult quality of gravity. Which, as absurd in infinite space; and without any centre of rest; so indeed nothing but to make his own ignorance, and he knows not why, to be a cause. The motion of body, from the activity of something incorporeal. Though motion taken for translation be a mode of matter; yet as it is taken for the *vis movens*, a mode or energy, of something that is incorporeal and self-active. The motion of the whole corporeal universe originally from the Deity. Thus the ignorance of the cause of motion another ground of Atheism. . . . 276

Thirdly, the Atheists also ignorant of the cause of that grand phenomenon, the *κόσμος καλῶς*, the regular and artificial frame of the mundane system,—and of the bodies of animals; together with the harmony of all. They who boast they can give causes of all things without a God, able to give no cause of this, but only, that it happened by chance so to be. This, either to make the absence of a cause (chance being but the absence of an intending cause); or their own very ignorance of the cause, and they know not why, to be a cause; or to make one contrary the cause of another (confusion of order and harmony, chance of art and skill): or, lastly, to deny it to have any cause at all, since they deny an intending cause. . . . 279

But here the Atheists make several pretences for this their ignorance. First, that the world is not so well made, but that it might have been much better; and many flaws to be found therein; whereas a God, or perfect being, would have bungled in nothing, but have made all things after the best manner. But this a twelfth atheistic argumentation, and the confutation thereof to be expected afterward. Reason, why some modern Theists give Atheists so much advantage here, as to acknowledge things be ill made; whilst the ancient pagan Theists stood

their ground, and generously maintained, that mind being the maker of all things, and not blind fortune or chance, nor arbitrary will, and irrational human omnipotent; the *τὸ βέλτιστον*, that which is absolutely the best, in order to the good of the whole (so far as the necessity of things would admit), the measure and rule of nature and Providence 280

Again, the atomic and Epicurean Atheists pretend, that though many things serve for uses, yet it does not therefore follow, that they were made intentionally for those uses; because things that happen by chance may have uses consequent. Thus Lucretius, and the old atheistic philosophers before Aristotle, of the parts of the bodies of animals, and all other things. The answer, that when things consist of many parts, all artificially proportioned together, with much curiosity, as for example, the eye; no man who considers the anatomy thereof, and its whole structure, can reasonably conclude, that it happened so to be made; and the use of seeing followed: but that it was made intentionally for the use of seeing. But to maintain, that not only eyes happened to be so made, and the use of seeing followed, but also ears, and a mouth, and feet, and hands, and all the other parts organical and similar (without any of which the whole would be inept or useless), all their several uses, unintended, following; gross insensibility, and stupidity. Galen of the Use of Parts 282

Democritus's dotages; countenanced also by Cartesius's book of Meteors (first written with design to solve all those phenomena without a God), but unsuccessfully. Nevertheless we acknowledge, that God and nature do all things in the most frugal and compendious way; and that the mechanic powers are taken in, so far as they will serviceably comply with the intellectual platform. But nature not mechanical and fortuitous only, but also vital and artificial; the Archeus of the whole world 285

Again, Atheists farther pretend, that though it may well seem strange, that matter fortuitously moved, should, at the very first, fall into such a regularity and harmony as is now in the world; yet not at all strange, that atoms, moving from all eternity, and making all manner of combinations and contextures, and trying all experiments, should, after innumerable other inept and incongruous forms, at length fall into such a system as this. They say therefore, that the earth, at first, brought forth divers monstrous and irregular shapes of animals; some wanting feet, some

hands, some without a mouth, &c. to which the ancients added centaurs, scyllas, and chimeras; mixedly bovine and hominiform animals. Though Epicurus, ashamed to own these, would seem to exclude them, but without reason. But because we have now no such irregular shapes produced out of the earth, they say, that the reason is, because none could continue and propagate their kind by generation, but only such as happened to be fitly made. Thus Epicurus, and the Atheists before Aristototele. They also add hereunto their infinite worlds; amongst which they pretend, not one out of a thousand, or of ten thousand, hath so much regularity in it as this of ours. Lastly, they presage likewise, that this world of ours shall not always continue such, but after awhile fall into confusion and disorder again; and then we may have centaurs, scyllas and chimeras, as before 286

Nevertheless, because this universal and constant regularity of things, for so many ages together, is so puzzling; they would persuade us that the senseless atoms, playing and toying up and down from eternity, without any care or thought, were at length taught by the necessity of things, and driven to a kind of trade, or habit of artificialness and methodicalness . . . 290

To all which atheistic pretences replied, first, That this is an idle dream, or impudent forgery, that there was once an inept mundane system; and in this world of ours, all manner of irregular shapes of animals; not only because no tradition of any such thing; but also because no reason possibly to be given, why such should not be produced out of the earth still, though they could not continue long. That also another atheistic dream, that in this world of ours, all will quickly fall into confusion and nonsense again. And as their infinite worlds an impossibility, so their assertion of the irregularity of the supposed other worlds well enough answered, by a contrary assertion; that were every planet a habitable earth, and every fixed star a sun, having all more or fewer such habitable planets moving round about them, and none of them desert or uninhabited, there would not be found so much as one ridiculous or inept system amongst them all; the Divine act being infinite . . . 291

Again, that the fortuitous motions of senseless atoms should in length of time, grow artificial, and contract a habit, or trade of acting regularly, as if directed by perfect art and wisdom; this atheistic fanaticism 292

No more possible, that dead and senseless matter, fortuitous-

ly moved, should at length be taught and necessitated by itself to produce this artificial system of the world; than that a dozen or more persons, unskilled in music, and striking the strings as it happened, should at length be taught and necessitated to fall into exquisite harmony; or that the letters in the writings of Plato and Aristotle, though having so much philosophic sense, should have been all scribbled at random. More philosophy in the great volume of the world, than in all Aristotle's and Plato's works; and more of harmony than in any artificial composition of vocal music. That the Divine art and wisdom hath printed such a signature of itself upon the matter of the whole world, as fortune and chance could never counterfeit 292

But, in the next place, the Atheists will for all this undertake to demonstrate, that things could not possibly be made by any intending cause, for ends and uses; as eyes for seeing, ears for hearing; from hence, because things were all in order of time, as well as nature, before their uses. This argument seriously propounded by Lucretius in this manner; if eyes were made for the use of seeing, then of necessity must seeing have been before eyes: but there was no seeing before eyes; therefore could not eyes be made for the sake of seeing 294

Evident, that the logic of these Atheists differs from that of all other mortals; according to which the end for which any thing is designedly made, is only in intention first, but in execution last. True, that men are commonly excited from experience of things, and sense of their wants, to excogitate means and remedies; but it doth not therefore follow, that the Maker of the world could not have a preventive knowledge of what, ~~soever~~ would be useful for animals, and so make them bodies intentionally for those uses. That argument ought to be thus framed; whatsoever is made intentionally for any end, as the eye for that of seeing, that end must needs be in the knowledge and intention of the maker, before the actual existence of that which is made for it: but there could be no knowledge of seeing before there were eyes; therefore eyes could not be made intentionally for the sake of seeing 296

This the true scope of the premised atheistic argument, however disguised by them in the first propounding. The ground thereof, because they take it for granted, that all knowledge is derived from sense, or from the things known pre-existing without the knower. And here does Lucretius triumph. The controversy therefore at last resolved into this; whether all know-

ledge be in its own nature junior to things : for if so, it must be granted, that the world could not be made by any antecedent knowledge. But this afterwards fully confuted ; and proved, that knowledge is not, in its own nature, ectypal, but archetypal ; and that knowledge was older than the world, and the Maker thereof 297

But Atheists will except against the proving of a God, from the regular and artificial frame of things ; That it is unreasonable to think, there should be no cause in nature for the common phenomena thereof ; but a God thus introduced to solve them. Which also, to suppose the world bungled and botched up. That nature is the cause of natural things, which nature does not intend, nor act for ends. Wherefore the opinion of final causality for things in nature but an *idolum specus*. Therefore rightly banished by Democritus out of physiology 298

The answer : Two extremes here to be avoided ; one of the atomic Atheists, who derive all things from the fortuitous motion of senseless matter ; another of bigoted religionists, who will have God to do all things himself immediately without any nature. The middle betwixt both, that there is not only a mechanical and fortuitous but also an artificial nature, subservient to the Deity, as the manuary opificer and drudging executioner thereof. True, that some philosophers have absurdly attributed their own properties, or animal idiopathies, to inanimate bodies. Nevertheless, this no idol of the cave, or den, to suppose the system of the world to have been framed by an understanding being, according to whose direction, nature, though not itself intending, acteth. Balbus's description of this artificial nature in Cicero. That there could be no mind in us, were there none in the universe. That of Aristotle true, that there is more of art in some things of nature than in any thing made by men. Now the causes of artificial things, as a house or clock, cannot be declared without intention for ends. This excellently pursued by Aristotle. No more can the things of nature be rightly understood, or the causes of them fully assigned, merely from matter and motion, without intention or mind. They, who banish final or mental causality from philosophy, look upon the things of nature with no other eyes than oxen and horses. Some pitiful attempts of the ancient Atheist to solve the phenomena of animals without mental causality. Democritus and Epicurus so cautious, as never to pretend to give an account of

the formation of the fœtus. Aristotle's judgment here to be preferred before that of Democritus 300

But nothing more strange than that these Atheists should be justified in this their ignorance by professed Theists and Christians; who atomizing likewise in their physiology, contend, that this whole mundane system resulted only from the necessary and unguided motion of matter, either turned round in a vortex, or jumbled in a chaos, without the direction of any mind. These mechanic Theists more immodest than the atomic Atheists themselves; they supposing these their atoms, though fortuitously moved, yet never to have produced any inept system, or incongruous forms; but from the very first, all along, to have ranged themselves so orderly, as that they could not have done it better had they been directed by a perfect mind. They quite take away the argument for a God, from the phenomena, and that artificial frame of things, leaving only some metaphysical arguments; which, though never so good, yet by reason of their subtilty cannot do so much execution. The Atheists gratified to see the cause of Theism thus betrayed by its professed friends; and the grand argument for the same totally slurred by them 306

As this great insensibility of mind, to look upon the things of nature with no other eyes than brute animals do; so are there sundry phenomena, partly above the mechanic powers, and partly contrary to the same, which therefore can never be solved, without mental and final causality. As in animals, the motion of the diaphragma in respiration, the systole and diastole of the heart (being a muscular constriction and relaxation); to which might be added others in the macrocosm; as the intersection of the planes of the equator and ecliptic; or the earth's diurnal motion upon an axis not parallel with that of its annual. Cartesius's confession, that, according to mechanic principles, these should continually come nearer and nearer together; which since they have not done, final or mental causality here to be acknowledged, and because it was best it should be so. But the greatest phenomenon of this kind, the formation and organization of animals; which these mechanists never able to give any account of. Of that posthumous piece of Cartesius, *De la Formation du Fœtus* 308

Pretended, that to assign final causes, is to presume ourselves to be as wise as God Almighty, or to be privy to his counsels.

But the question, not whether we can always reach to the ends of God Almighty, or know what is absolutely best in every case, and accordingly conclude things therefore to be so; but whether any thing in the world be made for ends otherwise than would have resulted from the fortuitous motion of matter. No presumption, nor intrusion into the secrets of God Almighty, to say, that eyes were made by him intentionally for the sake of seeing. Anaxagoras's absurd aphorism, that man was therefore the most solert of all animals, because he chanced to have hands. Far more reasonable to think (as Aristotle concludeth), that because man was the wisest of all animals, therefore he had hands given him. More proper to give pipes to one that hath musical skill, than upon him, that hath pipes, to bestow musical skill 310.

In the last place, mechanic Theists pretend, and that with some more plausibility, that it is below the dignity of God Almighty to perform all those mean and trivial offices of nature, himself immediately. This answered again; that though the Divine wisdom itself contrived the system of the whole for ends, yet is there an artificial nature under him, as his inferior minister and executioner. Proclus's description hereof. This nature, to Proclus, a god or goddess; but only as the bodies of the animated stars were called gods, because the statues of the gods 311.

That we cannot otherwise conclude, concerning these mechanic Theists, who derive all things in the mundane system, from the necessary motions of senseless matter, without the direction of any mind, or God; but that they are imperfect Theists, or have a certain tang of the atheistic enthusiasm (the spirit of infidelity) hanging about them 314.

But these mechanic Theists counterbalanced by another sort of Atheists, not fortuitous, nor mechanical; namely, the Hylozoists, who acknowledge the works of nature to be the works of understanding, and deride Democritus's rough and hooky atoms, devoid of life; they attributing life to all matter as such, and concluding the vulgar notion of a God to be but an inadequate conception of matter, its energetic nature being taken alone by itself as a complete substance. These Hylozoists never able to satisfy that phenomenon, of the one agreeing and conspiring harmony throughout the whole universe; every atom of matter, according to them, being a distinct percipient; and these unable to confer notions one with another ib.

Nor can the other Cosmo-plastic Atheists (to whom the whole

world but one huge plant or vegetable, endowed with a systematic artificial nature, orderly disposing the whole, without sense or understanding) do any thing towards the solving of this or any other phenomena; it being impossible that there should be any such regular nature otherwise than as derived from and depending on a perfect mind. 315

Besides these three phenomena, of cogitation, motion, and the artificial frame of things, with the conspiring harmony of the whole (no way solvable by Atheists), here farther added, that those who asserted the novelty of the world, could not possibly give an account neither of the first beginning of men, and other animals, not now generated out of putrefaction. Aristotle sometimes doubtful and staggering concerning the world's eternity. Men and all other animals not produced at first by chance, either as worms out of putrefaction, or out of eggs, or wombs, growing out of the earth; because no reason to be given why chance should not as well produce the same out of the earth still. Epicurus's vain pretence, that the earth, as a child-bearing woman, was now grown effete and barren. Moreover, men and animals, whether first generated out of putrefaction, or excluded out of wombs or egg-shells, supposed by these Atheists themselves to have been produced in a tender infant-like state, so that they could neither supply themselves with nourishment, nor defend themselves from harms. A dream of Epicurus, that the earth sent forth streams of milk after those her new-born infants and nurslings, confuted by Critolaus in Philo. Another precarious supposition, or figment, of Epicurus; that then no immoderate heats, nor colds, nor any blustering winds. Amaximander's way of solving this difficulty; that men were first generated and nourished in the bellies of fishes, till able to shift for themselves; and then disgorged upon dry land. Atheists swallow any thing rather than a God ib.

Wherefore here being *dignus vindice nodus*, a Θεὸν ἀπὸ μηχανῆς, reasonably introduced, in the Mosiac cabala, to solve the same. It appearing, from all circumstances put together, that this whole phenomenon surpasses, not only the mechanic but also the plastic powers; there being much of discretion therein. However, not denied but that the ministry of spirits (created before man, and other terrestrial animals) might be here made use of. As in Plato, after the creation of immortal souls by the supreme God, the framing of mortal bodies is committed to junior gods 319

Furthermore, Atheists no more able to solve that ordinary phenomenon, of the conservation of species, by the difference of sexes, and a due proportion of number kept up between males and females. Here a providence, also, superior as well to the plastic as mechanic nature 320

Lastly, other phenomena, as real, though not physical; which Atheists cannot possibly solve, and therefore do commonly deny; as of natural justice or honesty, and obligation; the foundation of politics, and the mathematics of religion. And of liberty of will, not only that of fortuitous self-determination, when an equal eligibility of objects; but also that which makes men deserve commendation and blame. These not commonly distinguished as they ought. Epicurus's endeavour to solve liberty of will, from atoms declining uncertainly from the perpendicular, mere madness and frenzy . . . 321

And now have we already preventively confuted the third atheistic pretence, to solve the phenomenon of Theism, from the fiction and imposture of politicians; we having proved, that philosophy and the true knowledge of causes infer the existence of a God. Nevertheless, this is to be here farther answered ib.

That statesmen and politicians could not have made such use of religion, as sometimes they have done, had it been a mere cheat and figment of their own. Civil sovereigns in all the distant places of the world could not have so universally conspired, in this one piece of statecraft or cozenage; nor yet have been able to possess the minds of men every where with such a constant awe and dread of an invisible nothing. The world would long since have discovered this cheat, and suspected a plot upon their liberty, in the fiction of a God; at least governors themselves would have understood it; many of which, notwithstanding, as much awed with the fear of this invisible nothing, as any others. Other cheats and juggles, when once detected, no longer practised. But religion now as much in credit as ever, though so long since decried by Atheists for a political cheat. That Christianity, a religion founded in no human policy, prevailed over the craft and power of all civil sovereigns, and conquered the persecuting world, by suffering deaths and martyrdoms. This presignified by the prophetic spirit . . . 322

Had the idea of God been an arbitrary figment, not conceivable, how men should have universally agreed in the same, and the attributes belonging thereunto (this argument used by

Sextus): nor that civil sovereigns themselves should so universally have jumped in it 325

Furthermore; not conceivable, how this thought, or idea of a God, should have been formed by any, had it been the idea of nothing. The superficialness of Atheists, in pretending, that politicians, by telling men of such a thing, put the idea into their minds. No notions or ideas put into men's minds by words but only the phantasms of the sounds. Though all learning be not remembrance, yet is all human teaching but maieutical or obstetricious; not the filling of the soul as a vessel, by pouring into it from without; but the kindling of it from within. Words signify nothing to him that cannot raise up within himself the notions or ideas correspondent to them. However, the difficulty still remains; how statesmen themselves, or the first inventor of this cheat, could have framed any notion at all of a nonentity 326

Here the Atheists pretend, that there is a feigning power in the soul, whereby it can make ideas and conceptions of nonentities; as of a golden mountain, or a centaur: and that by this an idea of God might be framed, though there be no such thing. Answer: that all the feigning power of the soul consisteth only in compounding ideas of things, that really exist apart, but not in that conjunction. The mind cannot make any new conceptive cogitation which was not before; as the painter or limner cannot feign foreign colours. Moreover, the whole of these fictitious ideas, though it have no actual yet hath it a possible entity. The Deity itself, though it could create a world out of nothing, yet can it not create more cogitation or conception than is or was always entertained in its own mind from eternity; nor frame a positive idea of that which hath no possible entity 328

The idea of God no compilement or aggregation of things, that exist severally apart in the world; because then it would be a mere arbitrary thing, and what every one pleased; the contrary whereunto hath been before manifested 329

Again: some attributes of the Deity no where else to be found in the whole world; and therefore must be absolute non-entities, were there no God. Here the painter must feign colours, and create new cogitation out of nothing 330

Lastly, upon supposition that there is no God, it is impossible, not only that there should be any for the future, but also that there should ever have been any; whereas all fictitious

ideas must have a possible entity, since otherwise they would be inconceivable, and no ideas. 330

Wherefore some Atheists will farther pretend, that besides this power of compounding things together, the soul hath another ampliating or amplifying power; by both which together, though there be no God existing, nor yet possible, the idea of him might be fictitiously made; those attributes, which are no where else to be found, arising by way of amplification or augmentation of something found in men ib.

Answer: first, that according to the principles of these Atheists, that all our conceptions are nothing but passions from objects without, there cannot possibly be any such amplifying power in the soul, whereby it could make more than is. Thus Protagoras in Plato; no man can conceive any thing but what he suffers. Here also, as Sextus intimateth, the Atheists guilty of that fallacy called a circle or diallelus. For having first undiscernedly made the idea of imperfection from perfection, they then go about again to make the idea of perfection out of imperfection. That men have a notion of perfection, by which, as a rule, they judge things to be imperfect, evident from that direction given by all theologers, to conceive of God, in way of remotion or abstraction of all imperfection. Lastly, finite things added together can never make up infinite; as more and more time backward can never reach to eternity without beginning. God differs from imperfect things, not in degree, but kind. As for infinite space, said to consist of parts finite; we certain of no more than this, that the finite world might have been made bigger and bigger infinitely; for which very cause it could never be actually infinite. Gassendus's objection, that the idea of an infinite God might as well be feigned as that of infinite worlds. But infinite worlds are but words or notions ill put together, or combined; infinity being a real thing in nature, but misapplied, it being proper only to the Deity 332

The conclusion; that since the soul can neither make the idea of infinite, by amplification of finite; nor feign or create any new cogitation, which was not before; nor make a positive idea of a nonentity; certain, that the idea of God no fictitious thing. 334

Farther made evident, that religion not the figment of civil sovereigns. Obligation in conscience the foundation of all civil right and authority. Covenants, without this, nothing but words and breath. Obligations, not from laws neither, but be-

fore them; or otherwise they could not oblige. Lastly, this derived not from utility neither. Were obligation to civil obedience made by men's private utility, then could it be dissolved by the same. Wherefore if religion a fiction or imposture, civil sovereignty must needs be so too 334

Had religion been a fiction of politicians, they would then have made it every way pliable, and flexible; since otherwise it would not serve their turn, nor consist with their infinite right . . . 336

But religion in its own nature a stiff inflexible thing, as also justice, it being not factitious, or made by will. There may therefore be a contradiction betwixt the laws of God and of men; and in this case does religion conclude, that God ought to be obeyed rather than men. For this cause, atheistic politicians of latter times declare against religion as inconsistent with civil sovereignty; it destroying infinite right, introducing private judgment, or conscience, and a fear greater than that of the Leviathan; to wit, of him who can inflict eternal punishment. Senseless matter the Atheists' natural god; the leviathan or civil sovereign his artificial one. Religion thus disowned and disclaimed by politicians, as inconsistent with civil power, could not be the creature of political art. Thus all the three atheistic pretences to solve the phenomenon of religion, from fear, ignorance of causes, and fiction of politicians, fully confuted . . . 337

But because, besides those ordinary phenomena beforementioned, there are certain other extraordinary ones that cannot be solved by Atheists, which therefore they will impute, partly to men's fear and ignorance, and partly to the fiction and imposture of civil governors (*viz.* apparitions, miracles, and prophecies); the reality of these here also to be briefly vindicated 340

First, as for apparitions; though much of fabulosity in these relations, yet unquestionably something of truth. Atheists imputing these things to men's mistaking their dreams and fancies for sensations, contradict their own fundamental principle, that sense is the only criterion of truth; as also derogate more from human testimony than they ought ib.

That some Atheists sensible hereof have acknowledged the reality of apparitions, concluding them nevertheless to be the mere creatures of imagination; as if a strong fancy could produce real substances or objects of sense. The fanaticism of Atheists, who will rather believe the greatest impossibilities, than endanger the being of a God. Invisible ghosts permanent easily introduce one supreme ghost of the whole world. . . . 341

Democritus yet farther convinced; that there were invisible beings superior to men, independent upon imagination, and permanent (called by him idols), but having nothing immortal in them; and therefore that God could be no more proved from the existence of them than of men. Granted by him, that there were, not only terrestrial, but also æreal and ethereal animals; and that all those vast regions of the universe above were not desert and uninhabited. Here something of the fathers, asserting angels to have bodies; but more afterwards . . . 341

To this phenomenon of apparitions may be added those two others, of witches and demoniacs; both of these proving, that spirits are not fancies, nor inhabitants of men's brains only, but of the world: as also, that there are some impure spirits, a confirmation of the truth of Christianity. The confident ex- ploders of witchcraft suspicious for Atheism. As for demoniacs or energumeni, certain from Josephus, that the Jews did not take these demons or devils for bodily diseases, but real sub- stances, possessing the bodies of men. Nor probable, that they supposed, as the Gnostics afterward, all diseases to be the infestation of evil spirits; nor yet (as some think) all demoniacs to be madmen. But when there were any unusual and extra- ordinary symptoms in any bodily distemper, but especially that of madness, they supposing this to be supernatural, imputed it to the infestation of some devil. Thus also the Greeks 344

That demoniacs and energumeni are a real phenomenon; and that there are such also in these times of ours, asserted by Fer- nelius and Sennertus. Such maniacal persons, as not only dis- cover secrets, but also speak languages which they had never learned, unquestionably demoniacs or energumeni. That there have been such in the times since our Saviour, proved out of Psellus; as also from Fernelius. This for the vindication of Christianity against those who suspect the Scripture-demoniacs for figments . . . 348

The second extraordinary phenomenon proposed; that of miracles, and effects supernatural. That there have been such things amongst the Pagans, and since the times of Christianity too, evident from their records. But more instances of these in Scripture . . . 352

Two sorts of miracles. First, such as, though they cannot be done by ordinary causes, yet may be effected by the natural power of invisible spirits, angels; or demons. As illiterate de- moniacs speaking Greek. Such amongst the Pagans that mi-

racle of the whetstone cut in two with a razor. Secondly, such as transcend the natural power of all second causes and created beings 353

That late Politico-Theological Treatise, denying both these sorts of miracles, inconsiderable, and not deserving here a confutation 354

Supposed in Deut. that miracles of the former sort might be done by false prophets, in confirmation of idolatry. Wherefore miracles alone not sufficient to confirm every doctrine 355

Accordingly in the New Testament do we read of *pseudes*, lying miracles;—that is, miracles done in confirmation of a lie, and by the power of Satan, &c. God permitting it, in way of probation of some, and punishment of others. Miracles done for the promoting of creature-worship or idolatry, instead of justifying the same, themselves condemned by it 356

Had the miracles of our Saviour been all of the former kind only, yet ought the Jews, according to Moses's law, to have acknowledged him for a true prophet, he coming in the name of the Lord, and not exhorting to idolatry. Supposed in Deut. that God would not permit false prophets to do miracles, save only in the case of idolatry; or when the doctrine is discoverable to be false by the light of nature; because that would be an invincible temptation. Our Saviour, that eximious prophet, foretold, by whom God would again reveal his will to the world; and no more out of flaming fire. Nevertheless some miracles of our Saviour Christ's such also as could be done only by the power of God Almighty 357

All miracles evince spirits; to disbelieve which is to disbelieve sense, or unreasonably to derogate from human testimony. Had the Gentiles entertained the faith of Christ, without miracles, this itself would have been a great miracle 359

The last extraordinary phenomenon, divination or prophecy. This also evinces spirits (called gods by the Pagans): and thus that of theirs true; if divination, then gods 360

Two sorts of predictions likewise as of miracles. First, such as might proceed from the natural presaging power of created spirits. Such predictions acknowledged by Democritus, upon account of his idols. Not so much contingency in human actions, by reason of men's liberty of will, as some suppose *ib.*

Another sort of predictions of future events imputable only to the supernatural prescience of God Almighty. Epicurus's pretence, that divination took away liberty of will; either as

supposing or making a necessity. Some Theists also denying the prescience of God Almighty, upon the same account. Certain, that no created being can foreknow future events otherwise than in their causes. Wherefore predictions of such events as had no necessary antecedent causes, evince a God . . . 362

That there is foreknowledge of future events, unforeknowable to men, formerly the general persuasion of mankind. Oracles and predictions amongst the Pagans, which evince spirits, as that of Attius Navius. Most of the Pagan oracles, from the natural presaging power of demons. Nevertheless some instances of predictions of a higher kind amongst them; as that of Vectius Valens, and the sibyls. Thus Balaam divinely assisted to predict our Saviour . . . 364

Scriptures triumphing over Pagan oracles. Predictions concerning our Saviour Christ, and the conversion of the Gentiles. Amongst which that remarkable one of the seventy weeks 368

Other predictions concerning the fates of kingdoms, and of the church. Daniel's fourth ten-horned beast, the Roman empire. This prophecy of Daniel's carried on farther in the Apocalypse. Both of them prophetic calendars of times, to the end of the world . . . 369

That this phenomenon of Scripture-prophecies cannot possibly be imputed by Atheists, as some others, to fear, or ignorance of causes, or to the fiction of politicians. They not only evince a Deity, but also the truth of Christianity. To this purpose, of more use to us, who now live, than the miracles themselves recorded in Scripture . . . 370

These five extraordinary phenomena all of them evince spirits to be no fancies, but substantial inhabitants of the world; from whence a God may be inferred. Some of them immediately prove a Deity . . . ib.

Here have we not only fully confuted all the atheistic pretences from the idea of God, but also, by the way, already proposed several substantial arguments for a Deity. The existence whereof will now be farther proved from its very idea . . . 371

True, that some of the ancient Theists themselves declare God not to be demonstrable. Thus Alexander Aprodias. Clemens Alexand. But their meaning therein no more than this, that God cannot be demonstrated *a priori* from any antecedent necessary cause. Not follow from hence, that therefore no certainty or knowledge of the existence of a God; but only conjectural probability, faith, and opinion. We may have a cer-

tain knowledge of things, the *διότι* whereof cannot be demonstrated *a priori*; as, that there was something or other eternal, without beginning. Whensoever a thing is necessarily inferred from what is altogether undeniable, this may be called a demonstration. Many geometrical demonstrations such; or of the *δὲ* only 371

A special position of Cartesius; that there can be no certainty of any thing, no, not of geometrical theorems, nor common notions; before we be certain of the existence of a God, essentially good, who therefore cannot deceive. From whence it would follow, that neither Atheists, nor such Theists as assert an arbitrary Deity, can ever be certain of any thing; as that two and two are four 374

However, some appearance of piety in this assertion; yet is it a foundation of eternal scepticism, both as to all other things, and the existence of a God. That Cartesius here went round in a circle, proving the existence of a God from our faculties, and then the truth of our faculties from the existence of a God; and consequently proved nothing. If it be possible that our faculties might be false, then must we confess it possible, that there may be no God; and consequently remain for ever sceptical about it 376

Wherefore a necessity of exploding and confuting this new sceptical hypothesis, of the possibility of our faculties being so made as to deceive us in all our clearest perceptions. Omnipotence itself cannot make any thing to be indifferently true or false. Truth not factitious. As to the universal theorems of abstract science, the measure of truth no foreign or extraneous thing, but only our own clear and distinct perception. Here whatsoever is clearly perceived, is; the very essence of truth, perceptibility. Granted by all, that there can be no false knowledge or understanding. The perception of the understanding never false, but only obscure. Not nature that erreth in us, but we ourselves, in assenting to things not clearly perceived. Conclusion; that Omnipotence cannot create any understanding faculties, so as to have as clear and distinct conceptions of all falsehoods and nonentities as of truths; because whatsoever is clearly and distinctly perceived, hath therefore an entity; and Omnipotence itself (to speak with reverence) cannot make nothing to be something, or something nothing. This no more than that it cannot do things contradictory. Conception the measure of power 378

True, that sense as such is but fantastical and relative; and were there no other perception, all truth would be private, relative, and seeming, none absolute. This probably the reason why some have suspected the same of knowledge also. But mind and understanding reach beyond fancy and appearance, to the absoluteness of things. It hath the criterion of truth within itself 379

Objected; that this an arrogance, for creatures to pretend to an absolute certainty of any thing. Answer: that God alone is ignorant of nothing, and infallible in all things; but no derogation from the Deity, to suppose, that he should make created minds such as to have a certainty of something; as the whole to be greater than the part, and the like: since otherwise they would be but a mere mockery. Congruous to think, that God hath made men so as that they may possibly attain to some certainty of his own existence. Origen, that knowledge is the only thing that hath certainty in it 381

Having now some firm ground or footing to stand upon, a certainty of common notions, without which nothing could be proved by reason; we shall endeavour, by means hereof, to demonstrate the existence of a God from his idea . . . 383

Cartesius's undertaking to do this with mathematical evidence; as this idea includeth in it necessary existence. This argument hitherto not so successful, it being by many concluded to be a sophism. That we shall impartially set down all that we can, both for it and against it; leaving others to make a judgment ib.

First, against the Cartesian demonstration of a God. That because we can frame an idea of a necessarily-existent being, it does not at all follow that it is; since we can frame ideas of things that never were, nor will be. Nothing to be gathered from hence, but only that it is not impossible. Again, from this idea, including necessary existence, nothing else inferrible, but that what hath no necessary existence is not perfect; and, that if there be a perfect being, its existence always was and will be necessary; but not absolutely, that it doth exist. A fallacy, when from the necessity of existence affirmed only hypothetically, the conclusion is made absolutely. Though a perfect being must exist necessarily, yet not therefore follow, that it must and doth exist. The latter a thing indemonstrable 384

For the Cartesian demonstration of a God. As from the notion of a thing impossible, we conclude, that it never was nor

will be; and of that which hath a contingent adhesion to existence, that it might be, or might not be; so from that which hath necessary existence in its nature, that it actually is. The force of the argumentation not merely hypothetical; if there be a perfect being, then is its existence necessary; because this supposes that a necessary existent being is contingent to be or not to be: which a contradiction. The absurdity of this will better appear, if, instead of necessary existence, we put in actual. No Theists can otherwise prove that a God, though supposed to exist, might not happen by chance to be. Nevertheless God, or a perfect being, not here demonstrated *a priori*, when from its own idea. The reader left to make a judgment 399

A progymnasma, or prelusory attempt towards the proving of a God from his idea, as including necessary existence. First, from our having an idea of a perfect being, implying no manner of contradiction in it, it follows that such a thing is possible. And from that necessary existence included in this idea, added to the possibility thereof, it farther follows that it actually is. A necessary existent being, if possible, is; because, upon the supposition of its nonexistence, it would be impossible for it ever to have been. Not so in contingent things. A perfect being is either impossible to have been, or else it is. Were God possible, and yet not, he would not be a necessary but contingent being. However, no stress laid upon this . . . 399

Another plainer argument for the existence of a God, from his idea. Whatsoever we can frame an idea of in our minds, implying no contradiction, this either actually is, or else, if it be not, is possible to be. But if God be not, he is not possible to be. Therefore he is. The major before proved, that we cannot have an idea of any thing which hath neither actual nor possible existence 391

A farther ratiocination from the idea of God, as including necessary existence, by certain steps. First, certain, that something or other did exist of itself from eternity, without beginning. Again; whatsoever did exist of itself from eternity, did so exist naturally and necessarily, and therefore there is a necessary existent being. Thirdly, nothing could exist of itself from eternity naturally and necessarily, but what contained necessary self-existence in its nature. Lastly, a perfect being, and nothing else, containeth necessary existence in its nature. Therefore it is. An appendix to this argument; that no tem-

porary successive being could be from eternity without beginning. This proved before 392

Again, the controversy betwixt Atheists and Theists first clearly stated from the idea of God, and then satisfactorily decided. Premised, that as every thing was not made, so neither was every thing unmade. Atheists agree in both. The state of the controversy betwixt Theists and Atheists; whether that, which being itself unmade, was the cause of all other things made, were the most perfect or the most imperfect being. A certain kind of atheistic Theism, or Theogonism, which acknowledging a God, or soul of the world, presiding over the whole, supposed him, notwithstanding, to have emerged out of Night and Chaos; that is, to have been generated out of senseless matter 394

The controversy thus stated easily decided. Certain, that lesser perfection may be derived from greater, or from that which is absolutely perfect; but impossible, that greater perfection, and higher degrees of entity, should rise out of lesser and lower. Things did not ascend, but descend. That life and sense may naturally rise from the mere modification of dead and senseless matter, as also reason and understanding from sense; the philosophy of the kingdom of darkness. The Hylorists so sensible of this, that there must be some substantial unmade life and understanding; that atheizing, they thought it necessary to attribute life and understanding to all matter as such. This argument a demonstration of the impossibility of Atheism 396

The controversy again more particularly stated, from the idea of God, as including mind and understanding in it; viz. whether all mind were made or generated out of senseless matter, or whether there were an eternal unmade mind, the maker of all. This the doctrine of Theists, that mind the oldest of all things; of Atheists, that it is a post-nate thing, younger than the world, and an umbratile image of real beings 398

The controversy thus stated again decided. Though it does not follow, that if once there had been no corporeal world or matter, there could never have been any; yet it is certain, that if once there had been no life nor mind, there could have never been any life or mind. Our imperfect minds, not of themselves from eternity, and therefore derived from a perfect unmade mind 399

That Atheists think their chief strength to lie here, in their

disproving a God, from the nature of understanding and knowledge. According to them, things made knowledge, and not knowledge things. All mind and understanding the creature of sensibles, and a fantastic image of them; and therefore no mind their creator. Thus does a modern writer conclude, that knowledge and understanding are not to be attributed to God, because they imply dependence upon things without; which is all one as if he should have said, that senseless matter is the more perfect of all things, and the highest numen 400

A compendious confutation of the premised atheistic principles. Knowledge not the activity of sensibles upon the knower and his passion. Sensible things themselves not known by the passion, or fancy of sense. Knowledge not from the force of the thing known, but of the knower. Besides phantasms of singular bodies, intelligible ideas universal. A late atheistic paradox, that universals nothing but names. Axiomatical truths in abstract sciences no passion from bodies by sense, nor yet gathered by induction from many singulars; we at once perceiving it impossible that they should be otherwise. An ingenious observation of Aristotle's, that could it be perceived by sense, the three angles of a triangle to be equal to two right; yet would not this be science, or knowledge, properly so called: which is of universals first, and from thence descends to singulars 402

Again, we have conceptions of things incorporeal, as also of such corporeals as never did exist, and whose accuracy sense could not reach to; as a perfect straight line and plain superficies, an exact triangle, circle, or sphere. That we have a power of framing ideas of things that never were nor will be, but only possible 405

Inferred from hence, that human science itself not the mere image and creature of singular sensibles, but proleptical to them, and in order of nature before them. But since there must be *νοητόν* before *νοῦς*, intelligibles before intellection;—the only true account of knowledge and its original is from a perfect omnipotent being, comprehending itself, and the extent of its own power, or the possibilities of all things, their relations and immutable truths. And of this one perfect mind all imperfect minds partake 406

Knowledge, therefore, in the nature of it, supposeth the existence of a perfect omnipotent being, as its *νοητόν*, or intelligible,—This comprehending itself, the first original knowledge,

a mind before the world, and all sensibles not ectypal, but archetypal, and the framer of all. Wherefore not Atheism, but Theism, demonstrable from knowledge and understanding 407

This farther confirmed from hence; because there are eternal verities, such as were never made, nor had any beginning. That the diagonal of a square incommensurable to the sides, an eternal truth to Aristotle. Justin Martyr's *αιώνια δίκαια*, or eternal morals,—geometrical truths, not made by any man's thinking, but before all men; as also before the world and matter itself 408

Now if there be eternal verities, the simple reasons and intelligible essences of things must needs be eternal likewise. These called by Plato things that always are, but were never made, ingenerable and incorruptible. However Aristotle quarrels with Plato's ideas, yet does he also agree with him in this, that the forms or species of things were eternal, and never made; and that there is no generation of them; and that there are other things besides sensibles the immutable objects of science. Certain, that there could be no immutable science, were there no other objects of the mind but sensibles. The objects of geometrical science no material triangles, squares, &c.: these, by Aristotle, said to be no where. The intelligible natures of things to Philo the most necessary essences 410

Now if there be eternal truths and intelligibles, whose existence also is necessary; since these can be no where but in a mind, there must be an eternal necessarily-existing mind, comprehending all these ideas and truths at once, or being them. Which no other than the mind of a perfect omnipotent being, comprehending itself, and all possibilities of things, the extent of its own power 414

Wherefore there can be but one only original mind; which all other minds partake of. Hence ideas, or notions exactly alike in several men; and truths indivisibly the same: because their minds all stamped with the same original seal. Themistius; that one man could not teach another, were there not the same notion both in the learner and teacher. Nor could men confer together as they do, were there not one mind that all partaked of. That anti-monarchical opinion, of many understanding beings eternal and independent, confuted. And now have we not only asserted the idea of a God, and confuted all the atheistic pretences against it; but also from this idea demonstrated his existence 415

SECT. II.

A COMPUTATION of the second atheistic argument, against omnipotence and Divine creation; that nothing can, by any power whatsoever, be made out of nothing. In answer to which, three things to be insisted on. First, that *de nihilo nihil*, nothing out of nothing,—is in some sense an axiom of unquestionable truth, but then makes nothing against Theism, or Divine creation. Secondly, that nothing out of nothing, in the sense of the atheistic objectors, viz. that nothing, which once was not, could by any power whatsoever be brought into being, is absolutely false; and that, if it were true, it would make no more against Theism than it does against Atheism. Lastly, that from this very axiom, nothing from nothing, in the true sense thereof, the absolute impossibility of Atheism is demonstrable . 417

De nihilo nihil, nothing from nothing, in some sense is a common notion of unquestionable truth. For, first, certain that nothing, which once was not, could ever of itself come into being; or, that nothing can take beginning of existence from itself; or, that nothing can be made or produced without an efficient cause. From whence demonstrated, that there was never nothing, or, that every thing was not made, but something did exist of itself from eternity unmade or underived from any thing else 418

Again, certain also that nothing could be efficiently produced by what hath not at least equal perfection, and a sufficient active or productive power. That of an effect, which transcends the perfection of its supposed cause, must come from nothing, or be made without a cause. Nor can any thing be produced by another, though having equal perfection, unless it have also a sufficient active or productive power. Hence certain, that were there once no motion at all in the world, and no other substance besides body which had no self-moving power, there could never possibly be any motion or mutation to all eternity, for want of a sufficient cause or productive power. No imperfect being hath a productive power of any new substance which was not before, but only of new accidents and modifications; that is, no creature can create. Which two forementioned senses respect the efficient cause ib.

Thirdly, nothing can be materially produced out of nothing

pre-existing or inexisting. And, therefore, in all natural generations (where the supernatural power of the Deity interposes not) no new real entity or substance produced which was not before, but only new modifications of what substantially pre-existed 420

Nothing out of nothing, so much insisted on by the old physiologers before Aristotle, in this sense, commonly misunderstood by modern writers, as if they designed thereby to take away all Divine creation out of nothing pre-existing. Granted, this to have been the sense of the Stoics and of Plutarch; he affirming the world to have been no otherwise made by God, than a house is by a carpenter, or a garment by a tailor. Plutarch and the Stoics therefore imperfect Theists, but nevertheless zealous religionists. But the ancient Italic philosophers here acted only as physiologers, and not as theologers, or metaphysicians; they not directing themselves against a Divine creation out of nothing pre-existing; but only contending, that neither in natural generations any new real entity was created; nor in corruptions annihilated; but only the modifications of what before existed, changed: or, that no new real entity could be made out of matter 421

That this was the true meaning of those ancient physiologers, evident from the use which they made of this principle, nothing out of nothing; which twofold. First, upon this foundation they endeavoured to establish a peculiar kind of physiology, and some atomology or other, either similar or dissimilar; homœomery, or anomœomery. Anaxagoras from hence concluded, because nothing could be made out of nothing pre-existing and inexisting, that therefore there were in every body similar atoms, of all kinds, out of which, by concretions and secretions, all natural generations made; so that bone was made out of bony atoms pre-existing and inexisting; flesh out of fleshy, and the like. This the Anaxagorean homœomery, or similar atomology, built upon this principle, nothing out of nothing 424

But the ancient Italic, both before and after Anaxagoras (whom Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus, here followed), with greater sagacity concluded, from the same principle, nothing out of nothing, that those qualities and forms of bodies, naturally generated and corrupted, were therefore no real entities, distinct from the substance of matter, but only different modifications thereof, causing different fancies in us; and this an anomœomery, or dissimilar atomology, the atoms thereof

being devoid of qualities. Those simple elements or letters (in nature's alphabet), out of which, variously combined, these philosophers spelled out or compounded all the syllables and words (or complexions) of corporeal things, nothing but figure, site, motion, rest, and magnitude of parts. Were qualities and forms real entities distinct from these, and not pre-existing (as Anaxagoras dreamed), they must then have come from nothing, in natural generations; which impossible 426

Another improvement of this principle, nothing out of nothing, made by the Italic philosophers; that the souls of animals, especially human, since they could not possibly result from the mere modifications of matter, figure, site, motion, &c. were not produced in generations, nor annihilated in deaths and corruptions; but being substantial things, did pre and post-exist. This set down as the controversy betwixt Atheists and Theists, in Lucretius. Whether souls were generated, or insinuated into bodies. Generations and corruptions of animals, to these Pythagoreans, but anagrammatical transpositions. That those philosophers, who asserted the pre-existence and ingenerability of souls, did not therefore suppose them to have been self-existent and uncreated, but derived them all from the Deity. Thus Proclus, though maintaining the eternity of souls with the world. The ingenerability of souls in Plato's *Timæus* no more than this, that they were not generated out of matter; and for this cause also were they called principles, in the same sense as matter was so accounted. Souls, therefore, to Plato, created by God, though not in the generation of animals, but before 427

St. Austin himself sometime staggering and sceptical in the point of pre-existence. That we have a philosophic certainty of no more than this, that souls were created by God out of nothing pre-existing, some time or other; either in generations, or before them. That unless brutes be mere machines, the reason the same also concerning brutish souls; that the senot generated out of matter, but created some time or other by the Deity; as well as the matter of their bodies was 430

That all these three forementioned particulars, wherein it is true, that nothing can possibly come from nothing, are reducible to this one general proposition, that nothing can be caused by nothing; which will no way clash with the Divine omnipotence or creative power, as shall be shewed afterwards; but confirm the same. But those same words, nothing out of

nothing, may carry another sense; when that ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, out of nothing,—is not taken causally, but only to signify the *terminus a quo*, the term from which, or an antecedent nonexistence: and the meaning thereof will be, that nothing which before was not, could afterwards, by any power whatsoever, be brought into being. And this the sense of the Democritic and Epicurean objectors; viz. that no real entity can be made, or brought out of nonexistence into being; and therefore the creative power of Theists an impossibility 432

Our second undertakings in way of answer hereunto; to shew, that nothing out of nothing, in this sense is false; as also, that, were it true yet it would make no more against Theism than it doth against Atheism; and therefore ought not to be used by Atheists as an argument against a God. If this universally true, that nothing at all, which once was not, could ever be brought into being, then could there be no making nor causing at all no motion nor action, mutation or generation. But ourselves have a power of producing new cogitation in our minds, and new motion in our bodies. Wherefore Atheists forced to restrain this proposition to substantials only. And here some deceived with the equivocation, in this ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, out of nothing; which may be taken either causally, or else to signify the term from which that is, from an antecedent nonexistence; they confounding both these together; whereof the first only true, the latter false. Again, others staggered with the plausibility of this proposition; partly because no artificial thing (as a house or garment) can be made by men, but out of pre-existing matter; and partly because ancient physiologists maintained the same also concerning natural generations, that no new real entity or substance could be therein produced; and lastly, because it is certain that no imperfect created being can create any new substance; they being therefore apt to measure all power whatsoever by these scantlings. But as easy for a perfect being to create a world, matter and all, out of nothing (in this sense, that is, out of an antecedent nonexistence), as for us to create a thought, or to move a finger, or for the sun to send out rays. For an imperfect substance, which once was not, to be brought into being by God, this not impossible, in any of the forementioned senses; he having not only infinitely greater perfection, but also sufficient productive or emanative power. True, that infinite power cannot do things in their own nature impossible; but nothing thus impossible but what contradictory: and

though a contradiction for any thing, at the same time, to be and not be; yet none at all, for an imperfect being (which is in its nature contingent to existence), after it had not been, to be. Wherefore, since the making of a substance to be, which was not before, is no way contradictory, nor consequently in its own nature impossible; it must needs be an object of perfect power 433

Furthermore, if no real entity or substance could possibly be brought out of nonexistence into being; then must the reason hereof be, because no substance can derive its whole being from another substance. But from hence it would follow, that whatsoever is substantial, did not only exist from eternity, but also of itself, independently upon any thing else. Whereas first, the pre-eternity of temporary beings not agreeable to reason; and then, to suppose imperfect substances to have existed of themselves and necessarily, is to suppose something to come from nothing, in the impossible sense; they having no necessary self-existence in their nature. As they, who affirm all substance to be body, and no body to be able to move itself, though supposing motion to have been from eternity; yet make this motion to come from nothing, or be caused by nothing. What in its nature contingently possible to be, or not be, could not exist of itself; but must derive its being from something else, which necessarily existeth. Plato's distinction therefore betwixt two kinds of substances must needs be admitted, that, which always is, and was never made; and that which is made, or had a beginning 437

Lastly, if this true, that no substance makeable or producible, it would not only follow from thence (as the Epicurean Atheist supposes) that matter, but also that all souls (at least human), did exist of themselves, from eternity, independently upon any thing else; it being impossible, that mind or soul should be a modification of senseless matter, or result from figures, sites, motions, and magnitudes. Human souls substantial, and therefore according to this doctrine, must have been never made; whereas Atheists stiffly deny both their pre and post-existence. Those pagan Theists, who held the eternity of human minds, supposed them, notwithstanding, to have depended upon the Deity, as their cause. Before proved, that there can be but one understanding being, self-existent. If human souls depend upon the Deity as their cause, then doubtless matter also 438

A common but great mistake that no pagan Theist ever ac-

knowledge any creative power out of nothing; or else, that God was the cause of any substance. Plato's definition of effective power in general, and his affirmation, that the Divine efficiency is that whereby things are made after they had not been. Certain, that he did not understand this of the production of souls out of matter, he supposing them to be before matter, and therefore made by God out of nothing pre-existing. All philosophers, who held the immortality and incorporeity of the soul, asserted it to have been caused by God, either in time or from eternity. Plutarch's singularity here. Unquestionable, that the Platonists supposed one substance to receive its whole being from another; in that they derive their second hypostasis or substance, though eternal, from the first; and their third from both; and all inferior ranks of beings from all three. Plotinus, Porphyrius, Jamblichus, Hierocles, Proclus, and others, derived matter from the Deity. Thus the Chaldee oracles; and the old Egyptian or Hermaic theology also, according to Jamblichus. Those Platonists, who supposed the world and souls eternal, conceived them to have received their being as much from the Deity as if made in time 441

Having now disproved this proposition, "nothing out of nothing," in the atheistic sense, viz. That no substance was caused or derived its being from another, but whatsoever is substantial, did exist of itself from eternity, independently; we are, in the next place, to make it appear also, that were it true, it would no more oppose Theism than it doth Atheism. Falsehoods (though not truths) may disagree. Plutarch, the Stoics, and others, who made God the creator of no substance, though not genuine yet zealous Theists. But the ancient Atheists, both in Plato and Aristotle, generated and corrupted all things; that is, produced all things out of nothing, or nonexistence, and reduced them into nothing again; the bare substance of matter only excepted. The same done by the Democritic and Epicurean Atheists themselves, the makers of this objection: though according to the principles of their own atomic physiology, it is impossible, that life and understanding, soul and mind, should be mere modifications of matter. As Theists give a creative power of all, out of nothing, to the Deity; so do Atheists to passive and dead matter. Wherefore this can be no argument against Theism; it equally opposing Atheism. 445

An anacephalæsis; wherein observable, that Cicero makes *de nihilo fieri*, and *sine causa*, to be made out of nothing, and

to be made without a cause, one and the self-same thing; as also, that he doth not confide this to the material cause only. Our third and last undertaking; to prove that Atheists produce real entities out of nothing, in the first impossible sense; that is, without a cause 452

A brief synopsis of Atheism; that matter being the only substance, is therefore the only unmade thing; and that whatsoever else is in the world, besides the bare substance thereof, was made out of matter, or produced from that alone . . . 455

The first argument: when Atheists affirm matter to be the only substance, and all things to be made out of that, they suppose all to be made without an efficient cause; which is to bring them from nothing, in an impossible sense. Though something may be made without a material cause pre-existing; yet cannot any thing possibly be made without an efficient cause. Wherefore if there be any thing made, which was not before, there must of necessity be, besides matter, some other substance as the active efficient cause thereof. The atheistic hypothesis supposes things to be made without any active or effective principle. Whereas the Epicurean Atheists attribute the efficiency of all to local motion; and yet deny matter or body (their only substance) a self-moving power. They hereby make all the motion that is in the world to have been without a cause, or to come from nothing; all action without an agent; all efficiency without an efficient 456

Again, should we grant these Atheists motion without a cause, yet could not dead and senseless matter, together with motion, ever beget life, sense, and understanding; because this would be something out of nothing, in way of causality, local motion only changing the modifications of matter, as figure, place, site, and disposition of parts. Hence also those spurious Theists confuted, who conclude God to have done no more in the making of the world, than a carpenter doth in the building of a house (upon this pretence, that nothing can be made out of nothing); and yet suppose him to make souls out of dead and senseless matter, which is to bring them from nothing in way of causality 457

Declared before, That the ancient Italics and Pythagorics proved in this manner, that souls could not possibly be generated out of matter; because nothing can come from nothing, in way of causality. The subterfuge of the atheistic Ionics out of Aristotle; that matter being the only substance, and life,

sense and understanding, nothing but the passions, affections, and dispositions thereof; the production of them out of matter, no production of any new real entity 458

Answer: Atheists taking it for granted, that there is no other substance besides body or matter, therefore falsely conclude life sense, and understanding to be accidents or modes of matter; they being indeed the modes or attributes of substance incorporeal and self-active. A mode that which cannot be conceived without the thing whereof it is a mode; but life and cogitation may be conceived without corporeal extension; and indeed cannot be conceived with it 460

The chief occasion of this error from qualities and forms; as because the quality of heat, and form of fire, may be generated out of matter; therefore life, cogitation, and understanding also. But the atomic Atheists themselves explode qualities, as things really distinct from the figure, site, and motion of parts, for this very reason, because nothing can be made out of nothing causally. The vulgar opinion of such real qualities in bodies, only from men's mistaking their own fancies, apparitions, passions, affections, and seemings, for things really existing without them. That in these qualities, which is distinct from the figure, site, and motion of parts, not the accidents and modifications of matter, but of our own souls. The atomic Atheists infinitely absurd when exploding qualities, because nothing can come out of nothing, themselves bring life, sense and understanding, out of nothing, in way of causality. That opinion, that cogitation is nothing but local motion, and men themselves but mere machines, prodigious sottishness or intolerable impudence 462

Very observable here, that Epicurus himself, having a mind to assert contingent liberty, confesseth, that he could not do this, unless there were some such thing in the principles; because nothing can be made out of nothing, or caused by nothing: and therefore does he ridiculously feign a third motion of atoms, to solve that phenomena of free will. Wherefore he must needs be guilty of an impossible production, of something out of nothing, when he brings soul and mind out of dead senseless atoms. Were there no substantial and eternal life and understanding in the universe, there could none have been ever produced; because it must have come from nothing, or been made without a cause. That dark philosophy which educes not only real qualities and substantial forms, but also souls themselves, at least sensitive, out of the power of the matter, educes them out

of nothing, or makes them without a cause; and so prepares a direct way to Atheism 464

They who suppose matter otherwise than by motion, and by a kind of miraculous efficiency, to produce souls, and minds, attribute that creative power to this senseless and inactive matter, which themselves deny to a perfect being as an absolute impossibility. Thus have we demonstrated the impossibility and nonsense of all Atheism from this very principle, That nothing can be made from nothing, or without sufficient cause . . . 467

Wherefore, if no middle betwixt these two, but all things must either spring from a God, or matter; then is this also a demonstration of the truth of Theism, by deduction to impossible; either there is a God, or else all things are derived from dead and senseless matter: but this latter is impossible; therefore a God. Nevertheless, that the existence of a God may be farther directly proved also from the same principle, rightly understood, nothing out of nothing causally, or nothing caused by nothing, neither efficiently nor materially 468

By these steps; first, that there was never nothing, but something or other did exist of itself from eternity, unmade, and independently upon any thing else, mathematically certain; from this principle, "nothing from nothing." Had there been once nothing, there could never have been any thing. Again, Whatsoever did exist of itself from eternity, must have so existed necessarily, and not by any free will and choice. Certain, therefore, that there is something actually in being, whose existence is and always was necessary. Now that which exists necessarily of itself, must have necessity of existence in its nature; which nothing but a perfect being hath. Therefore there is a perfect being; and nothing else besides this did exist of itself from eternity, but all other things whatsoever (whether souls or matter) were made by it. To suppose any thing to exist of itself necessarily, that hath no necessary existence in its nature, is to suppose that necessary existence to have come from nothing 469

Three reasons why some Theists have been so staggering and sceptical about the necessary self-existence of matter. First, from an idiotical conceit, that because artificial things cannot be made by men but out of pre-existent matter, therefore nothing by God, or a perfect being, can be otherwise made. Secondly, because some of them have supposed *ἀλην ἀσώματον*, an incorporeal hyle, or first matter unmade; an opinion older than Aristotle. Whereas this really nothing but a metaphysical

notion of the potentiality or possibility of things, respectively to the Deity. Lastly, because some of them have conceived body and space to be really the same thing; and space to be positively infinite, eternal, and necessarily existent. But if space be not the extension of the Deity itself, as some suppose; but of body, only considered abstractedly from this or that, and therefore immoveably; then no sufficient ground for the positive infinity or the indefiniteness thereof, as Cartesius imagined: we being certain of no more than this, that be the world and its space, or extension, never so great, yet it might be still greater and greater infinitely; for which very cause it could never be positively infinite. This possibility of more body and space, farther and farther indefinitely, or without end, as also its eternity, mistaken, for actual space and distance, positively infinite and eternal. Nor is there perhaps any such great absurdity in the finiteness of actual space and distance (according to this hypothesis), as some conceive 470

Moreover, the existence of a God may be farther proved from this common notion, "nothing from nothing causally;" not only because were there no God, that idea which we have of a perfect being must have come from nothing, and be the conception of nothing; but also all the other intelligible ideas of our minds must have come from nothing likewise, they being not derived from sense. All minds, and their intelligible ideas by way of participation, from one perfect omnipotent being comprehending itself 473

However, certain from this principle, "nothing from nothing," or "nothing caused by nothing;" that souls and minds could never have emerged out of dead and senseless matter, or from figures, sites, and motions; and therefore must either have all existed of themselves, necessarily from eternity; or else be created by the Deity out of nothing pre-existing. Concluded, that the existence of a God is altogether as certain, as that our human souls did not all exist from eternity, of themselves necessarily. Thus is the second atheistic argumentation against omnipotence or Divine creation, from that false principle, "nothing out of nothing," in the atheistic sense (which is, that nothing could be brought out of nonexistence into being, or no substance derive its whole being from another substance, but all was self-existent from eternity), abundantly confuted; it having been demonstrated, that unless there be a God, or a perfect omnipotent being, and creator, something must have come from

nothing in the impossible sense; that is, have been caused by nothing, or made without a cause. 474

SECT. III.

THE six following atheistic argumentations, driving at these two things (the disproving, first of an incorporeal and then of a corporeal Deity), next taken all together. In way of answer to which, three things. First, to confute the atheistic argumentations against an incorporeal Deity, being the third and fourth. Secondly, to shew, that from the very principles of the atheistic Corporealism, in their fifth and sixth arguments, incorporeal substance is demonstrable. And, lastly, that therefore the two following atheistic arguments (built upon the contrary supposition) are also insignificant 475

Before we come to the Atheistic arguments against an incorporeal Deity, premised; that though all Corporealists be not Atheists, yet Atheists universally mere Corporealists. Thus Plato in his Sophist, writing of those who maintained that nature generated all things without the direction of any mind, affirmeth, that they held body and substance to be one and the self-same thing. From whence it follows, that incorporeal substance is incorporeal body, or contradictory nonsense; and that whatsoever is not body is nothing. He likewise addeth, that they who asserted the soul to be a body, but had not the confidence to make prudence and other virtues bodies (or bodily), quite overthrew the cause of Atheism. Aristotle also representeth the atheistic hypothesis thus, that there is but one nature, matter; and this corporeal (or endued with magnitude) the only substance; and all other things, the passions and affections thereof ib.

In disproving incorporeal substance, some difference amongst the Atheists themselves. First, those who held a vacuum (as Epicurus and Democritus, &c.) though taking it for granted, that what is unextended or devoid of magnitude is nothing; yet acknowledged a double extended nature; the first impenetrable and tangible, body; the second penetrable and intangible, space or vacuum; to them the only incorporeal. Their argument thus; since nothing incorporeal besides space (which can neither do nor suffer any thing), therefore no incorporeal Deity. The answer: if space be a real nature, and yet not bodily; then must it needs be either an affection of incorporeal sub-

stance, or else an accident without a substance. Gassendus's officiousness here to help the Atheists, that space is neither accident nor substance, but a middle nature, or essence betwixt both. But, whatsoever is, must either subsist by itself, or else be an attribute, affection, or mode of something, that subsisteth by itself. Space, either the extension of body, or of incorporeal substance, or of nothing; but nothing cannot be extended; wherefore space, supposed not to be the extension of body, must be the extension of an incorporeal substance infinite, or the Deity; as some Theists assert 478

Epicurus's pretended gods, such as could neither touch nor be touched, and had not *corpus*, but *quasi corpus* only; and therefore incorporeals distinct from space. But granted that he colluded or juggled in this 480

Other Atheists, who denied a vacuum, and allowed not space to be a nature, but a mere imaginary thing, the phantasm of a body, or else extension considered abstractedly, argued thus: whatsoever is extended, is body, or bodily; but whatsoever is, is extended; therefore whatsoever is, is body ib.

This argument against incorporeal substance answered two manner of ways; some assertors of incorporeal substance denying the minor, whatsoever is, is extended; others the major of it, whatsoever is extended is body. First, the generality of ancient Incorporealists really maintained, that there was something unextended, indistant, devoid of quantity, and of magnitude, without parts, and indivisible. Plato, that the soul is before longitude, latitude, and profundity. He also denies, that whatsoever is in no place, is nothing. Aristotle's first immoveable mover also devoid of magnitude. So likewise is mind, or that which understands, to him. He also denies place and local motion to the soul otherwise than by accident with the body 481

Philo's double substance, distant and indistant. God also to him, both every where (because his powers extend to all things) and yet no where, as in a place; place being created by him, together with bodies. Plotinus much concerned in this doctrine. Two books of his upon this subject, that one and the same numerical thing (*viz.* the Deity) may be all, or the whole every where. God to him, before all things that are in a place: therefore wholly present to whatsoever present. This would he prove also from natural instincts. He affirmeth likewise, that the human soul is numerically the same, both in the hand and in the foot. Simplicius's argument for unextended

substance; that whatsoever is self-moving, must be indivisible and indistant. His affirmation, that souls, locally immoveable, move the body by cogitation 486

None more full and express in this than Porphyrius. His assertion, that were there such an incorporeal space (as Democritus and Epicurus supposed), mind, or God, could not be coextended with it; but only body. The whole Deity indivisibly and indistantly present to every part of divisible and distant things 490

Thus Origen in his against Celsus. St. Austin, that the human soul hath no dimensions, of length, breadth, and thickness, and is in itself *illocabilis*. Boethius reckons this amongst the common notions, known only to wise men, that incorporeals are in no place 492

This therefore no novel or recent opinion, that the Deity is not part of it here, and part of it there, nor measurable by yards and poles; but the whole undivided, present to every part of the world. But because many objections against this, we shall farther shew, how these ancient Incorporealists endeavoured to quit themselves of them. The first objection, that to suppose the Deity, and other incorporeal substances, unextended, is to make them absolute parvitudes, and so contemptible things. Plotinus's answer; that what is incorporeal, not so indivisible as a little thing; either a physical minimum, or mathematical point: for thus God could not *congruere* with the whole world, nor the soul with the whole body. Again, God not so indivisible, as the least, he being the greatest of all, not in magnitude, but power. He so indivisible, as also infinite. This an error proceeding from sense and imagination; that what unextended, therefore little. Incorporeal substance, the whole of which is present to every part of body, therefore greater than body. Porphyrius to the same purpose, that God is neither to be looked upon as the least, nor as the greatest, in way of magnitude 494

The second objection; that what neither great nor little, and possesses no place, a nonentity. This, according to Plato, Plotinus, and Porphyrius, a mistake proceeding from men's adhering to sense and imagination. They grant, that an unextended being is *ἀφάνταστον*, unimaginable.—Porphyrius, that mind and fancy are not the same, as some maintain. That, which can neither do, or suffer, not nothing, though it swell not out into distance. Two kinds of substances to Plotinus; bulky tumours, and unbulky active powers. Which latter, said by Sim-

plicius to have nevertheless a certain depth or profundity in them. Something *ἀφάνταστον*, unimaginable,—even in body itself. We cannot possibly imagine the sun of such a bigness, as reason evinces it to be urged also by Plotinus, that an unstretched-out duration, or timeless eternity, as difficult to be conceived as an unextended substance: and yet must this needs be attributed to the Deity 498

That God and human souls no otherwise incorporeal than as *σῶμα λεπτομερές*, a thin or subtile body, false. Because the difference of grossness and subtlety in bodies, according to true philosophy, only from motion. That the most subtile body may possibly be made as gross as lead or iron; and the grossest as subtile as ether. No specific difference of matter 504

The third argument against unextended substance; that to be all in the whole, and all in every part, a contradiction and impossibility. This granted by Plotinus to be true of bodies, or that which is extended; that it cannot be *ἁμῶς πᾶν* but impossible, that what hath no parts, should be a part here, and a part there. Wherefore the word *ἅλον* (in that, whole in the whole, and whole in every part) to be taken only in a negative sense, for *μὴ μεμερισμένον*, undivided.—The whole undivided Deity every where; and not a part of it here only, and a part there 505

The last objection is against the illocality and immobility of finite created spirits, and human souls only. That this not only absurd, but also contrary to that generally-received tradition amongst Theists, of souls moving locally after death, into another place, called Hades. Two answers of Plotinus to this. First, that by Hades may be meant only the invisible, or the soul's acting without the body. Secondly, that if by Hades be meant a worse place, the soul may be said to be there where its idol is. But when this same philosopher supposeth the soul (in good men) to be separable also from this idol, he departeth from the genuine cabala of his own school. That souls always united to some body or other. This asserted here by Porphyrius; that the soul is never quite naked of all body; and therefore may be said to be there, wheresoever its body is 507

Some excerpts out of Philoponus; wherein the doctrine of the ancients, concerning the soul's spirituous or airy body (after death), is largely declared 511

Intimated here by Philoponus, that, according to some of

these ancients, the soul hath such a spirituous body here in this life, as its interior indument, which then adheres to it, when its outer garment is stripped off by death. An opinion of some, that the soul may, in this spirituous body, leave its grosser body for some time, without death. True, that our soul doth not immediately act upon bones and flesh; but certain thin and subtile spirits, the instruments of sense and motion. Of which Porphyrius thus: "The blood is the food of the spirit, and the spirit the vehicle of the soul" 516

The same Philoponus farther addeth, that, according to the ancients, besides both the terrestrial and this spirituous or airy body, there is yet a third kind of body, peculiar to such as are souls, as are more thoroughly purged after death; called by them a luciform, and heavenly and ethereal, and star-like body. Of this Proclus also upon the *Timæus* (who affirmeth it to be unorganized), as likewise Hierocles. This called the thin vehicle of the soul, in the Chaldee oracles, according to Paelus and Pletho. By Hierocles, a spiritual body, in a sense agreeable to that of the Scripture: by Synesius, the Divine body. This distinction of two interior vehicles, or tunics of the soul, besides the terrestrial body (called by Plato the ostreaceous), no invention of latter Platonists since Christianity; it being plainly insisted upon by Virgil, though commonly not understood 517

That many of these Platonists and Pythagoreans supposed the soul, in its first creation, when made pure by God, to be clothed with this luciform and heavenly body; which also did always inseparably adhere to it, in its after-descents into the aerial and terrestrial; though fouled and obscured. Thus Pletho. And the same intimated by Galen; when he calls this the first vehicle of the soul. Hence was it, that besides the moral and intellectual purgation of the soul, they recommended also a mystical or teletic way of purifying the ethereal vehicle, by diet and catharms. This much insisted on by Hierocles. What Pliny's dying by wisdom, or the philosophic death 522

But this not the opinion of all, that the same numerical ethereal body always adhereth to the soul; but only, that it every where either finds or makes a body suitable to itself. Thus Porphyrius. Plato also seems to have been of that persuasion 526

This affirmed by Hierocles to have been the genuine cabala of the ancient Pythagoreans, which Plato afterward followed. Hierocles's definition of a man, a rational soul together with a

cognate immortal body; he declaring this enlivened terrestrial body to be but the idol or image of the true man, or an accession to him. This therefore the answer of the ancient Incorporealists to that objection against the illocality and immobility of created incorporeals; that these being all naturally united to some body or other, may be thus said to be in a place, and locally moved. And, that it does not follow, that because created incorporeals are unextended, they might therefore inform the whole corporeal universe 527

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THAT it would be no impertinent digression here to compare the forementioned Pythagoric cabala with the doctrine of Christianity; and to consider their agreement or disagreement. First, therefore, a clear agreement of these most religious philosophers with Christianity in this, that the highest happiness and perfection of human nature consisteth not in a separate state of souls un-united to any body, as some high-flown persons have conceited. Thus Plotinus, who sometimes runs as much into the other extreme, in supposing human souls to animate not only the bodies of brutes but also of plants. Thus also Maimonides amongst the Jews; and therefore suspected for denying the resurrection. His Iggereth Teman written purposely to purge himself of this suspicion. The allegorizers of the resurrection, and of the life to come 1

Again, Christianity correspondeth with the philosophic cabala concerning human souls in this, that their happiness consisteth not in conjunction with such gross terrestrial bodies as these we now have; Scripture, as well as philosophy, complaining of them as a heavy load and burden to the soul; which therefore not to be taken up again at the resurrection. Such a resurrection as this called by Plotinus a resurrection to another sleep. The difference betwixt the resurrection-body and this present body in Scripture. The resurrection-body of the just (as that of the philosophic cabala) immortal and eternal, glorious and lucid; star-like and spiritual; heavenly and angelical. Not this gross fleshly body, gilded and varnished over in the outside

only, but changed throughout. This the resurrection of life, in Scripture emphatically called the resurrection. Our souls strangers and pilgrims in these terrestrial bodies: their proper home and country the heavenly body. That the grossest body that this, according to philosophy, may merely by motion be brought into the purity and tenuity of the finest ether 3

But whether human souls after death, always united to some body, or else quite naked from all body till the resurrection; not so explicitly determined in Christianity. Souls after death live unto God. According to Origen, this a privilege proper to the Deity, to live and act alone, without vital union with any body. If natural to the soul to enliven a body, then not probable that it should be kept so long in an unnatural state of separation 11

Again; probable from Scripture that wicked souls after death have punishment of sense or pain, besides remorse of conscience: which not easily conceivable how they should have without bodies. Thus Tertullian. He adding, that men have the same shape or effigies after this life which they had here. Though indeed he drive the business too far, so as to make the soul itself to be a body, figurate and colourate . . . 14

But Irenæus plainly supposed the soul after death (being incorporeal) to be adapted to a body, such as has the same character and figure with its body here in this life 17

Origen also of this persuasion, that souls after death have certain subtile bodies, retaining the same characterizing form which their terrestrial bodies had. His opinion, that apparitions of the dead are from the souls themselves, surviving in that which is called a luciform body. As, also, that St. Thomas did not doubt but that the body of a soul departed might appear every way like the former: only he disbelieved our Saviour's appearing in the same solid body which he had before death 18

Our Saviour telling his disciples, that a spirit had no flesh and bones, that is, no solid body as himself then had, seems to imply them to have thinner bodies, which they may visibly appear in. Thus, in Apollonius, is touch made the sign to distinguish a ghost appearing from a living man. Our Saviour's body after his resurrection, according to Origen, in a middle state betwixt this gross or solid body of ours, and that of a ghost . . . 21

A place of Scripture, which, as interpreted by the fathers, would naturally imply the soul of our Saviour after death not to have been quite naked of all body, but to have had a corporeal

spirit. Moses and Elias visibly appearing to our Saviour, had therefore true bodies 23

That the regenerate here in this life have a certain earnest of their future inheritance (which is their spiritual or heavenly body), gathered from Scripture by Irenæus and Novatian. Which prelibations of the spiritual body cannot so well consist with a perfect separation from all body after death till the day of judgment 24

This opinion of Irenæus, Origen, and others, supposed by them not at all to clash with the Christian article of the resurrection. Nothing in this point determined by us 26

The last thing in the Pythagoric cabala, that demons or angels, and indeed all created understanding beings, consist, as well as men, of soul and body, incorporeal and corporeal, united all together. Thus Hierocles, universally of all the rational nature; and that no incorporeal substance, besides the supreme Deity, is complete, without the conjunction of a body. God the only incorporeal in this sense; and not a mundane but a supra-mundane soul 26

Origen's full agreement with this old Pythagoric cabala, that rational creatures are neither body, nor yet without body; but incorporeal substances having a corporeal indument 29

Origen misrepresented by Huetius, as asserting angels not to have bodies, but to be bodies; whereas he plainly acknowledged the human soul to be incorporeal, and angels also to have souls. He proveth incorporeal creatures from the Scriptures; which, though themselves not bodies, yet always use bodies. Whereas the Deity is neither body, nor yet clothed with a body, as the proper soul thereof 31

Some of the fathers so far from supposing angels altogether incorporeal, that they ran into the other extreme, and concluded them altogether corporeal; that is, to be all body, and nothing else. The middle betwixt both these, the Origenic and Pythagoric hypothesis, that they consist of incorporeal and corporeal substance, soul and body joined together. The generality of the ancient fathers for neither of those extremes. That they did not suppose angels to be perfectly unbodied spirits, evident from their affirming devils, as the Greek philosophers did demons, to be delighted with the nidours of sacrifices; as having their vaporous bodies, or airy vehicles, refreshed thereby. Thus Porphyrius, and before him Celsus. Amongst the Christians (besides Origen), Justin, Athenagoras, Tatianus, &c. St. Basil,

concerning the bodies of demons or devils being nourished with vapours; not by organs, but throughout their whole substance 34

Several of the fathers plainly asserting both devils and angels to consist of soul and body, incorporeal and corporeal substance joined together. St. Austin, Claudianus, Mamertus, Fulgentius, Joannes Thessalonicensis; and Psellus, who philosophizeth much concerning this 37

That some of the ancients, when they called angels incorporeal, understood nothing else thereby but only that they had not gross but subtile bodies 43

The fathers, though herein happening to agree with the philosophic cabala, yet seemed to have been led thereunto by Scripture. As from that of our Saviour, they who shall obtain the resurrection of the dead, shall be *ισάγγελοι*, equal to the angels;—that is, according to St. Austin, shall have angelical bodies. From that of St. Jude, that angels sinning lost their own proper dwelling-house; that is, their heavenly body (called *οικητήριον* by St. Paul), which made them fit inhabitants of the heavenly regions; and thereupon cast down into the lower Tartarus; interpreted by St. Austin to be this caliginous air or atmosphere of the earth. Again, from that fire said to have been prepared for the devils: which being not to be taken metaphorically, therefore (as Psellus concludeth) implies them to be bodied; because an incorporeal substance alone, and not vitally united to any body, cannot be tormented with fire . . . 45

Now if all created incorporeals, superior to men, be souls vitally united to bodies, and never quite separate from all body; then probable, that human souls, after death, not quite naked from all body, as if they could live and act completely without it; a privilege superior to that of angels, and proper to the Deity. Nor is it at all conceivable how imperfect beings could have sense and imagination without bodies. *Origen contra Celsum*, "Our soul, in its own nature incorporeal, always standeth in need of a body suitable to the place wherein it is. And, accordingly, sometimes putteth off what it had before; and sometimes again putteth on something new." Where the following words being vitiated, Origen's genuine sense restored. Evident, that Origen distinguisheth the *τὸ σκῆνος* in St. Paul (translated *tabernacle*) from the earthly house; he understanding by the former a thin spirituous body, which is a middle betwixt the earthly and the heavenly, and which the soul remain-

eth still clothed with after death. This opinion of Origen's, that the soul after death not quite separate from all body, never reckoned up in the catalogue of his errors. Origen not taxed by Methodius for asserting souls to have bodies, but for not asserting them to be bodies; there being no truly incorporeal substance, according to Methodius, but the Deity. This one of the extremes mentioned. And the Origenic hypothesis to be preferred before that of Methodius 49

Already observed, that Origen not singular in this opinion concerning human souls; Irenæus, Philoponus, Joannes Thesalonicensis, Psellus, and others, asserting the same. St. Austin in his *De Gen. ad Lit.* granted, that souls after death cannot be carried to any corporal places, nor locally moved without a body. Himself seems to think the punishment of souls, before the resurrection, to be fantastical. But gives liberty of thinking otherwise. In his book *De Civ. D.* he conceives that Origenic opinion not improbable, that some souls after death, and before the resurrection, may suffer from a certain fire for the consuming and burning up of their gross: which could not be without bodies 55

Hitherto shewed how the ancient assertors of unextended incorporeals answered all the objections made against them; but especially that of the illocality and immobility of created incorporeals; namely, that by those bodies which they are, always vitally united to, they are localized and made capable of motion; according to that of Origen, the soul stands in need of a body for local motions. Next to be considered their reasons for this assertion of unextended and indistant substance, so repugnant to imagination 59

That whatsoever arguments do evince other substance besides body, the same against the Atheists demonstrate, that there is something unextended; themselves taking it for granted, that whatsoever is extended, is body. Nevertheless, other arguments propounded by these ancients, to prove directly unextended substance. Plotinus's first, to prove the human soul and mind such. Either every part of an unextended soul, is soul; and of mind, mind; or not. If the latter, that no part of a soul, or mind, is by itself soul, or mind; then cannot the whole, made up of all those parts, be such. But if every supposed part of a soul be soul, and of a mind, mind; then would all but one be superfluous: or every one be the whole: which cannot be in extended things 60

Again, Plotinus endeavours to prove, from the energies of the soul, that it is unextended; because it is one and the same indivisible thing, that perceiveth the whole sensible object. This farther pursued; if the soul be extended, then must it either be one physical point, or more. Impossible, that it should be but one physical point. If therefore more, then must every one of those points either perceive a point of the object, and no more, or else the whole. If the former, then can nothing perceive the whole, nor compare one part of it with another: if the latter, then would every man have innumerable perceptions of the whole object at once. A fourth supposition, that the whole extended soul perceives both the whole object, and all the parts thereof (no part of the soul having any perception by itself); not to be made; because the whole of an extended substance nothing but all the parts: and so if no part have any perception the whole can have none. Moreover, to say the whole soul perceiveth all, and no part of it any thing, is indeed to acknowledge it unextended, and to have no distant parts 63

Again, this philosopher would prove the same thing from the sympathy or homopathy which is in animals; it being one and the same thing that perceives pain in the head and in the foot, and comprehends the whole bulk of the body 67

Lastly, he disputes farther from the rational energies. A magnitude could not understand what hath no magnitude and what is indivisible: whereas we have a notion, not only of latitude as indivisible to thickness, and of longitude as to breadth, but also of a mathematical point, every way indivisible. We have notions of things also that have neither magnitude nor site, &c. Again, all the abstract essences of things indivisible. We conceive extended things themselves unextendedly; the thought of a mile, or a thousand miles distance, taking up no more room in the soul, than the thought of an inch, or of a mathematical point. Moreover, were that, which perceiveth in us, a magnitude, it could not be equal to every sensible, and alike perceive things greater and lesser than itself 68

Besides which, they might argue thus; that we as we can conceive extension without cogitation, and again cogitation without extension (from whence their distinction and separability is inferrible): so can we not conceive cogitation with extension; nor the length, breadth, and thickness of a thought; nor the half, or a third, or the twentieth part thereof; nor that it is figurative, round, or angular. Thoughts therefore must be nonentities, if

whatsoever is unextended be nothing; as also metaphysical truths, they having neither dimensions nor figure. So volitions and passions, knowledge and wisdom itself, justice and temperance. If the things belonging to soul and mind be unextended, then must themselves be so. Again, if mind and soul have distant parts, then could none of them be one, but many substances. If life divided, then a half of it would not be life. Lastly, no reason could be given, why they might not be as well really as intellectually divisible. Nor could a Theist deny, but that Divine power might cleave a thought, together with the soul wherein it is, into many pieces 71

The sense of the ancient Incorporealists therefore this; that in nature two kinds of substances. The first of them passive bulk, or distant and extended substance; which is all one thing without another; and therefore as many substances as parts, into which it can be divided essentially antitypous; one magnitude joined to another always standing without it, and making the whole so much bigger. Body all outside, having nothing within, no internal energy, nor any action besides local motion; which it is also passive to 73

Were there no other substance besides this, there could be motion, action, life, cogitation, intellection, volition; but all would be a dead lump; nor could any one thing penetrate another. Wherefore another substance, whose character *ψυχή δραστήρια*, the active nature,—life, self-activity, cogitation: which no mode or accident of extension, it having more of entity in it. Nor are these two, extension and life, inadequate conceptions of one and the same substance. A thinker a monad; or one single substance. Not conceivable, how the several parts of an extended substance should jointly concur to produce one and the same thing 74

The energies of these two substances very different. The one nothing but local motion, or translation from place to place; a mere outside thing; the other cogitation, an internal energy; or in the inside of that which thinks. Which inside of the thinking nature hath no length, breadth, or profundity, no out-swell-ing tumour; because then it would be outside again. Were a cogitative being extended, yet must it have, besides this extended outside, an unextended inside. But one and the same substance cannot be extended and unextended. Wherefore in this opinion of extended incorporeals, a complication of two substances, and

a confusion of them together into one. True nevertheless, that all finite incorporeal substance is always naturally united with some extended body, as its outside 76

All summed up together 78

Hitherto the sense of the ancient assertors of unextended incorporeals represented to the best advantage. Nothing asserted by us; but that these, and other arguments, do demonstrate, against the Atheists, some other substance besides body: but whether or no they prove this to be indistant and unextended, left to others to make a judgment. The Atheists, who deny this, must acknowledge every thought to be not only mentally but also physically divisible and separable, together with the soul; as also deny internal energy; and consequently make cogitation nothing but local motion; and, lastly, hold that no substance can coexist with another substance, more inwardly than by juxta-position 80

This the first answer to the forementioned atheistic argument against incorporeal substance, made by the ancients by denying the minor, that though whatsoever is extended be body yet every thing is not extended. But the argument otherwise answered by some learned assertors of incorporeal substance, by denying the major; that though every thing be extended, or what unextended nothing; yet whatever is extended is not body; they asserting another extension incorporeal, which is both penetrable and not made up of parts physically separable from one another; to which belongeth life, self-activity, and cogitation. Probable, that some would compound both the forementioned hypotheses together; by supposing the Deity to be altogether unextended, and indivisibly all every where; but souls, or created incorporeals, to have an unextended inside, diffused, as it were, into an extended outside. Ourselves here only to oppose Atheists; and dogmatize no farther than to assert, what all Incorporealists agree in, that besides body there is another substance, which consisteth not of parts really separable from one another; which is penetrable of body, and self-active, and hath an internal energy, distinct from local motion. All which is demonstratively certain. This the full answer to the first atheistic argument against incorporeal substance; that either there is something unextended, or at least extended otherwise than body, so as to be penetrable thereof, and indiscernibly one with itself, and self-active 81

The second atheistic assault against incorporeal substance; by pretending the original of this mistake to have sprung from the scholastic essences, distinct from the things themselves; and the abuse of abstract names and notions, they being made to be substances existing by themselves. For, though the opinion of ghosts and spirits (whereof God is the chief) sprung first from fear; yet that these should be incorporeal could never have entered into the minds of men, had they not been enchanted with these abstract names and separate essences 83

The first general reply to this, that it is all but romantic fiction. That the opinion of the Deity sprung not from fear, and that all invisible ghosts are not fancies, already sufficiently proved; as also the existence of a God demonstrated by reason. That apparitions are real phenomena; and reasonable to think, that there may as well be invisible aerial and ethereal, as there are visible terrestrial animals. Sottishness to conclude, that there is no understanding nature superior to man 84

The second particular reply, that the opinion of spirits incorporeal sprung not from the scholastic essences, whether considered concretely as universals only, or abstractly. No man supposing these to be things really and substantially existing without the mind; either a universal man and universal horse; or else humanity and equinity: and that these walk up and down in airy bodies; they being only *noemata*, or the intelligible essences of things, as objects of the mind. These essences of things said to be eternal, as their verities. The meaning of these eternal essences, not that they are so many eternal substances incorporeal; but that knowledge is eternal, and that there is an eternal unmade mind that comprehends them; which all other minds partake of 85

Again, that another atheistic dream, that the abstract names and notions of the mere accidents of bodies were made substances incorporeal; souls, minds, and ghosts. Conscious life no accident of bodies, as Atheists suppose; but the essential attribute of another substance, which incorporeal; as magnitude or extension is the essential attribute of body 86

The following atheistic arguments to be dispatched with more brevity. That the four next, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth, proceed only upon this supposition, that there is no other substance in the world besides body or matter; and therefore signify nothing to the assertors of an incorporeal Deity. Stoics and the like, only concerned to answer them. Nevertheless, from

the impossibility of these atheistic Corporealisms, contained in the fifth and sixth, a necessity of incorporeal substance will be evinced 87

Here two atheistic Corporealisms founded upon these suppositions, that all is body or matter; and, that matter, as such, is devoid of life and understanding. The first in the way of qualities and forms generable and corruptible, called the hylopathian. This the most ancient atheistic form, as we learn from Aristotle; viz. that bulky extension the only substantial and unmade thing, and all other things but the passions, qualities, and accidents thereof; makeable out of it, and destroyable into it. The consequence from whence, that there is no substantial unmade life and understanding; and that no mind could be a God or Creator; it being all accidental, factitious, and creature 88

This hylopathian Atheism called also by us Anaximandrian: Though we are not ignorant that Simplicius conceives Anaximander to have held an homœomery, or similar atomology, of eternal unmade qualities, as Anaxagoras afterwards; only, that he acknowledged no unmade life or mind, but generated it all from the fortuitous commixture of those qualified atoms. (Which no improbable opinion, though not certain.) Because, however Anaximander supposed life and understanding to be at least secondary qualities, and accidents of body, generable and corruptible. And not fit to multiply forms of Atheism ib.

The second atheistic Corporealism, in the way of unqualified atoms, producing all things, even life and understanding, from figures, sites, motions, and magnitudes of parts. From whence it will also follow, that mind is no primordial thing, but secondary, compounded, and derivative; creature, and no creator. This called Democritic; not because Democritus was the first in- or of the dissimilar atomology; but because he was the first atheizer of it, or the first who made dissimilar atoms the principles of all things whatsoever, even of life and understanding 89

Not to be denied, but that from these two things granted, that all is body, and that the first principles of body are devoid of life and understanding, it would follow unavoidably, that there is no God. Therefore the Stoics who were corporeal Theists, denied the latter; they supposing an understanding fire, eternal and unmade, the maker of the whole mundane system. Truly observed by Origen, that this corporeal god of the Stoics was but by accident incorruptible and happy; and only because wanting a destroyer. This no genuine Theism 90

But an absolute impossibility in both these atheistic Corporealisms; not only because they suppose no active principle; but also, because they bring life and understanding, that is, something out of nothing; or make them without a cause. Where the atomic Atheists of the two most to be condemned, because so grossly contradicting themselves. From that true principle, that matter, as such, is devoid of life and understanding, an absolute necessity of another substance incorporeal, which is essentially vital and intellectual. That all life cannot possibly be factitious and accidental, generable and corruptible; but there must be substantial life: and also some eternal. 91

The truth of this understood and acknowledged by the Hylozoists; that there must of necessity be both substantial and unmade life and understanding; who therefore attribute the same to all matter, as such, but without animality; which, according to them, is all factitious and accidental. Wherefore this hylozoic Atheism also brings conscious life and animality out of nothing; or makes them without a cause. The argument of the Epicurean Atheists, against Stratonism or Hylozoism, unanswerable; that upon this supposition there must be in every man and animal a heap of innumerable percipients, as many as there are atoms of matter; and so no one thinker. The pretence of the Hylozoists, that all the particles of matter in every animal do confederate, ridiculous and impossible. . . . 93

Thus the fifth and sixth atheistic argumentations fully confuted; and from that true supposition in them, that matter, as such, is devoid of life and understanding, incorporeal substance plainly demonstrated: which was our second undertaking. 94

The third and last, that there being undeniably substance incorporeal, the two following atheistic argumentations (built upon the supposition of the contrary) altogether insignificant. The seventh not properly directed against Theism, but against a religious kind of Atheism or Theogonism; which supposed a God or soul of the world generated out of senseless matter, and the offspring of Night and Chaos. A sober and true sense of the world's animation; that there is a living, sentient, and understanding nature, presiding over the whole world. But the sense of pagan Theists, that the whole corporeal world animated is a God, exploded by us. This argument therefore being not against Theism, but Theogonism; the confutation thereof might be here well omitted, without any detriment to our cause. But because the denying of a living understanding nature presid-

ing over the world is atheistical; the ground of this assertion briefly declared, that life and understanding are accidents of bodies, resulting only from such a composure of atoms as produce flesh, blood, and brains, in bodies organized; and, that there is no reason to be found any where but only in human form: which also confuted. A brutish passage of a modern writer, "that it is inconceivable by men how God can understand without brains" 95

The next (which is the eighth atheistic argumentation), that there can be no living being immortal, nor perfectly happy; built upon that false supposition also, that all life and understanding result from a contexture of dead and senseless atoms, and therefore are dissolvable and annihilable. But that there is life essential, and substantial, which naturally immortal: as also a necessity of an eternal life, and mind unmade, and unannihilable; which perfectly happy 98

SECT. IV.

THE Epicurean Atheists farther endeavour to disprove a God, from the phenomena of motion and cogitation; in the three following argumentations, the ninth, tenth, and eleventh. From motion, thus; that from this principle, "nothing can move itself, but whatsoever is moved, is moved by another," it will follow, that there can be no first cause and unmoved mover, but one thing moved another from eternity infinitely; because nothing could move another which was not itself first moved by something else 99

Answer: the meaning of this axiom; not that nothing can act from itself, as the Atheist supposes; he taking it for granted that every thing is body, and that all action is local motion; but, that no body resting could ever locally move itself. A false supposition of the Atheists and some Cartesians; that were there but once motion in the matter, this would of itself continue to all eternity. True, that of Aristotle; that to make an infinite progress in the causes of motion, and no first mover, is all one as to say, that there is no cause at all thereof; or, that all the motion in the world is a passion without an agent, or comes from nothing. Clearly impossible, that there should be any motion at all, were there nothing self-moving or self-active 100

Wherefore from this principle, that no body can move itself, it follows undeniably, that there is some other substance in

the world besides body that hath an active power of moving body 102

Another corollary from the same principle; that there is another species of action, distinct from local motion, and which is not heterokinesy, but autokinesy. That the action, by which local motion is first caused, could not be itself local motion. All local motion caused originally by cogitation. Thus the ninth atheistic argument from motion confuted: and from hence, that no body can move itself demonstrated, that there is something incorporeal the first cause of local motion, by cogitation ib.

But the Atheists farther pretend to prove, that cogitation itself is heterokinesy, the passion of the thinker, and the action of some other external agent upon him; because nothing taketh beginning from itself; and no cogitation can rise of itself, without a cause. That therefore thinking beings themselves are machines, and no cogitation local motion. And, no understanding being a first cause, nor perfectly happy; because dependent upon something else 103

Answer. True, that no substance beginning from itself; as also, that no action causeth itself. But false, that no action taketh beginning from the immediate agent; or, that nothing can act otherwise than as acted upon by something else. Atheists here affirm only what they should prove, and so beg the question. If nothing self-active, then all the motion and action in the universe must come from nothing, or be made without a cause 104

True, also, that our human cogitations are frequently occasioned from external objects, and that the concatenations of thoughts and phantasms often depend upon mechanic causes. But false, that all cogitations are obtruded upon us from without; and that no transition in our thoughts which was not before in sense. The human soul a principle of actions, and therefore also of cogitations. This a bubbling fountain of thoughts. But that there is such a perfect mind as at once comprehends all truth, and was before sensibles 105

This a prodigious paradox, and falsity of Atheists; that cogitation, local motion; and thinking beings, machines. Here a correction of what we wrote before, vol. iii. p. 462. and a change of our opinion, upon farther consideration; that not only a modern writer, but also the ancient atheistic Atomists, did conclude cogitation to be really nothing else but local motion. Nevertheless, these men troubled with the fancy of cogitation; which

because they cannot make local motion, they would persuade us to be no reality, or nothing. Atheists aware, that if there be any action besides local motion, there must then be some other substance acknowledged besides body. They, who make cogitation local motion, and men machines, no more to be disputed with than senseless machines 106

To affirm, that no understanding being can be happy, nor a God, because dependent upon something without it, all one as to affirm, that senseless matter is the most perfect of all things; and that knowledge, as such, speaking imperfection, is but a whiffing and fantastic thing. But of this more afterwards. Thus the tenth atheistic argument confuted 108

Another atheistic argument, from the nature of knowledge and understanding. That the world could not be made by an understanding being, because there was no knowledge before things, which are the objects of it; and the only things are sensibles, which knowledge a passion from. Therefore all mind, as such a creature, and none a creator 109

This already fully answered, vol. iii. p. 308, and so forwards. Where proved, that singular bodies are not the only things and objects of the mind, but that it containeth its intelligibles within itself. And that knowledge is archetypal to the world, and the maker of all. So the existence of a God demonstrable from the nature of knowledge and understanding ib.

That the Atheists can no more solve the phenomenon of cogitation than that of local motion, evident from their many hallucinations concerning it; whereof a catalogue subjoined. First, that all life and understanding, a mere accidental thing, generable and corruptible, and no life nor mind substantial or essential. This before confuted 110

Again, that life and mind no simple and primitive natures, but compounded syllables of things; and therefore none immortal nor incorruptible. Answer: that life and understanding are active powers, and could never result from mere passive bulk; nor can any composition of dead and senseless matter, possibly forget life and understanding. Though no necessity, that there should be any external unmade red or green, because these might be made out of things not red nor green; nor that there should be eternal motion, because motion might be produced from a self-active principle; nor that there should be any eternal unmade matter, because were there none, it might notwithstanding be created by a perfect incorporeal being: yet an absolute neces-

sity of eternal unmade life and mind; because had there been once none, there could never have been any . . . 111

Another atheistic hallucination, that there is nothing of self-activity in cogitation; nor any thing could act otherwise than as it is made to act by something else. This to bring all action from nothing, or to suppose it without a cause . . . 113

Another madness of theirs already mentioned, that cogitation, local motion, and thinking beings, machines. This equal sottishness or impudence, as to affirm number to be figure, &c. . . . 114

Another paradox of the Epicurean and Democritic Atheists, that mental cogitation, as well as sensation, the mere passions of the thinker, and the actions of bodies existing without him; some of them supposing thoughts to be caused by certain finer images than sensations; others that they are the remainders of the motions of sense, formerly made. Answer: that sensation itself is not a mere corporeal passion, but the perception of a passion, in a way of fancy; much less mental cogitations such; and least of all volitions . . . ib.

But consentaneously hereunto these Atheists determine all knowledge and understanding to be really the same thing with sense. From whence follow two absurdities; first, that there can be no such thing as error, because all passion is true passion, and all sense, true sense; that is, true seeming and appearance. This absurdity owned by Protagoras. Epicurus endeavoured to avoid this, but in vain, and contradictiously to his own principles . . . 117

A second absurdity consequent thereupon; that there is no absolute truth nor falsehood, but all knowledge private and relative, and nothing but opinion. This freely owned likewise by Protagoras. Sometimes also by Democritus. Who therefore but a blunderer neither, in the atomic philosophy; which plainly supposes a higher faculty of reason and understanding, that judges of sense; and discovers the phantastical thereof; it reaching to absolute truth . . . 119

Another atheistic error; that singular bodies are the only objects of mental conception, as well as of sensation. This imputed by Aristotle, to Democritus and Protagoras. But sufficiently before confuted . . . 121

The better to maintain this paradox, added by a modern atheistic writer, as his own invention; that universals are nothing else but names, by which many singular bodies are called;

axioms or propositions, the addition and subtraction of names; and syllogistic reasoning the reckoning the consequences of them: and that therefore besides the passions of sense we know nothing at all of any thing but only the names by which it is called. Whence it would follow that geometrical truths not the same in Greek and in Latin, &c. 122

That the Atheists, according to these premised principles, endeavour to depreciate knowledge and understanding, as that which speaks no higher perfection than is in senseless matter. Thus the Atheists in Plato make it but a ludicrous, umbratile, and evanid thing; the mere image of bodies the only realities. Their design in this to take away the scale or ladder of entities 123

All the grounds of this again briefly confuted, and particularly, that opinion so much favouring Atheism, that there is nothing in the understanding which was not before in sense, out of Boethius. Just and unjust greater realities in nature than hard and soft, &c. Unquestionably a scale or ladder of entities, and therefore certain, that the order of things must be in way of descent, from higher perfection to lower, and not of ascent, from lower to higher. The steps of this ladder not infinite; the foot thereof inanimate matter; the head, a perfect omnipotent being, comprehending in itself all possibilities of things. Mind by nature lord over all; and sovereign king of heaven and earth 127

The reason, why we so much insist upon this; because Atheists pretend, not only to solve the phenomenon of cogitation without a God; but also from thence to demonstrate the impossibility of his existence. Though modern writers not so much aware hereof, yet is the controversy betwixt Theists and Atheists thus stated by Plato; whether soul and mind juniors to senseless matter, and the offspring thereof; or else substantial things, and in order of nature before it. Accordingly Plato confuteth Atheism no otherwise than by proving soul not to be junior to inanimate matter, and generated out of the same. Evident, that Plato by soul here understood, not only the mundane soul, but also that whole rank of beings called soul; and that no life was generated out of matter 132

Those professed Christians who generate rational souls out of senseless matter, plain betrayers of the cause of Theism 136

Nor is the case much different as to others; who, though they professedly generate only sensitive souls, yet making the ratio-

nal but mere blanks, which have nothing in them but what was scribbled upon them by sense; and so knowledge, in its own nature, junior to sense and sensibles; highly gratify the Atheists hereby 137

If any life and cogitation may be generated out of dead and senseless matter, then can no good reason be given why all should not be. Life not partly accidental, partly substantial; but either all conscious life, accidental, generable, and corruptible; or else none at all ib.

The doctrine of real qualities generable and corruptible, favourable to Atheism also. And though the atheistic Atomists explode all the other qualities, because nothing can come from nothing; yet contradicting themselves again, do they make life and understanding real qualities, generated out of matter, or caused by nothing 138

There being a scale or ladder of entities in nature, to produce a higher rank of beings out of a lower; as life and cogitation out of matter and magnitude, is to invert the order of this scale from downwards to upwards; and so to lay a foundation for Atheism. Wherefore great reason to maintain this post against the Atheists; that no souls can be generated out of matter 139

The grand objection against the substantiality of sensitive souls, from that consequence of their permanent subsistence after death. Cartesius so sensible thereof, that he would rather make brutes to be senseless machines, than allow them substantial souls; which he granted they must have if thinking beings. What clearly demonstrable by reason not to be abandoned, because attended with some difficulties, or seemingly offensive consequences 141

The Pythagoric hypothesis; that souls all created by God, not in the generation of animals, but in the cosmogonia. These therefore first clothed with thin and subtile bodies aerial or ethereal ochemata, wherein they subsist, both before their ingress into terrestrial bodies, and after their egress out of them. Thus Boethius and Proclus. Ammonius's irrational demons mortal; brutish souls in aerial bodies. Since the first creation no new substantial thing made or destroyed, and therefore no life. This looked upon by Macrobius as a great truth . . . 142

That the Pythagoreans would endeavour to gain some countenance for this hypothesis from the Scripture . . . 149

But if these aerial vehicles of brutish souls be exploded for a whimsey, and none but terrestrial bodies allowed to them; though

after death they will not vanish into nothing, yet must they needs remain in a state of insensibility and inactivity till reunitd to other terrestrial bodies. Wherefore these in one sense mortal; though in another immortal. Silk-worms dying, and reviving in the form of butterflies, made an emblem of the resurrection by Christian theologers 150

But no absolute necessity, that the souls of brutes, though substantial should have a permanent subsistence after death, either in a state of activity or inactivity; because whatsoever created by God may possibly by him be annihilated. The substantiality only of the rational soul demonstrable by reason; or that it will not of itself vanish into nothing; but not that it is absolutely impossible for it to be annihilated; the assurance of this depending upon a faith in the Divine goodness. Porphyrius's assertion, that brutish souls are resolved into the life of the universe. The whole answer to this objection against the substantiality of brutish souls; that they may, notwithstanding, possibly be annihilated in the deaths of animals as well as they were created in their generations; but if they do subsist (without aerial vehicles), they must remain in a state of inactivity and insensibility 152

That this the doctrine of the ancient pagan theologers, that no life or soul generated out of dead and senseless matter; but all produced by the Deity, as well as matter; proved out of Virgil; though sundry other testimonies also might be added thereunto 154

The hylozoic Atheists themselves so sensible thereof, that there must be some substantial and unmade life (from whence the lives and minds of all animals are derived), that they attribute the same to matter; and conclude, that though the modified lives of animals and men be accidental, generated, and corrupted, yet the fundamental life of them is substantial, and incorruptible. These also asserted a knowledge before sense, and underived from sensibles 155

This hylozoic Atheism again confuted. Absurd to suppose knowledge and understanding without consciousness; as also, that the substantial and fundamental life of men and other animals should never perish, and yet their souls and personalities, vanish into nothing. That no organization can produce consciousness. These Atheists not able possibly to give an account, whence the intelligible objects and ideas of this their knowledge of matter should spring. This hylozoic Atheism nothing but the crumbling of the Deity into matter 156

Concluded, that the phenomenon of mind and understanding can no way possibly be solved by Atheists without a God; but affordeth a solid demonstration of his existence . . . 157

SECT. V.

THERE now remaining only the atheistic objections against Providence, their queries and arguments from interests; their first objection, from the frame of the world, as faulty: or, because things are ill made, that therefore not made by a God. This directed against the sense of the ancient theologers; that God, being a perfect mind, therefore made the world after the best manner. Some modern theologers deviating from this, as if the perfection of the Deity consisted not at all in goodness, but in power and arbitrary will only. The controversy betwixt these and Atheists; but whether matter fortuitously moved, or a fortuitous will omnipotent, be the original of all things. No ground of faith in a mere arbitrary deity. To have a will undetermined to good, no liberty nor sovereignty, but impotency. God to Celsus the head or president of the righteous nature. This not only the sense of Origen, but of the ancient Christians in general. Plotinus; the will of God essentially that which ought to be. God an impartial balance weighing out heaven and earth. The Deity not servilely bound to do the best; but this the perfection of its nature. No Atheists able to prove the world to be ill made . . . 159

Not to be concluded, that whatsoever we cannot find out the reason or use of, is therefore ineptly made. For example; the *intestinum cæcum*, though seemingly an odd appendix, and which the generality of anatomists give little account of; yet that, with the valve at its entrance, both together, an artificial contrivance of nature, to hinder the regurgitation of the *scæces* 164

The first atheistic instance of the faultiness of things; in the disposition of the equator and ecliptic intersecting each other in such an angle, whereby the terrestrial globe rendered not so habitable as it might have been. This objection founded upon a false supposition, that the torrid zone uninhabitable. But this the best disposition; which being contrary to mechanic causes, therefore its continuance, together with the constant parallelism of the earth's axis, a manifest eviction of Providence; and that the *τὸ βέλτιστον*, the best, is a cause in nature . 164

In the next place; the Atheists would prove against some

Theists that all things not made for the sake of man. This at first but the doctrine of strait-laced Stoics only; recommended afterwards by men's self-love. Whereas Plato's doctrine, that the whole not made for any part, but the parts for the whole. Nevertheless, things in the lower world made principally (though not only) for man. Atheists no judges of the well or ill making of worlds, they having no standing measure of good. That nature a stepmother to man, but a froward speech of some discontented persons, seeking to revenge themselves by railing upon nature, that is, Providence 165

Evils in general from the necessity of imperfect beings, and impossibility of things 167

Men afflicted more from their own fancies than reality of things. Pain (which a real evil of sense) often linked with pleasure, according to the Socratic fable. This not the evil of the whole man, but of the outside only. Serviceable to free men from the greater evils of the mind. Death, according to the atheistic hypothesis, an absolute extinction of all life; but, according to genuine Theism, only a withdrawing into the tiring-house, and putting off the terrestrial clothing. The dead live to God. Christian faith gives assurance of a heavenly body hereafter. The Christian resurrection not the hope of worms. This the confutation of the twelfth atheistic argument 167

The thirteenth; but second objection against Providence as to human affairs, because all things fall alike to all; and sometimes vicious and irreligious persons most prosperous . . . 170

Granted, that this consideration hath too much staggered weak minds in all ages. Some concluding from thence that there is no God, but that blind chance steereth all. Others, that though there be a God, yet he knows nothing done here below. Others, that though he do know, yet he neglecteth human affairs ib.

Unreasonable to require that God should miraculously interpose at every turn; or to think, that every wicked person should presently be thunderstruck. That which steers the whole world no fond and passionate but an impartial nature. Yet, that there want not instances of an extraordinary Providence. Good reasons for the slowness of Divine vengeance. The notoriously wicked commonly met with at the long run . 171

The sometimes impunity of wicked persons so far from staggering good men as to Providence, that it confirms them in

their belief of future immortality and judgment after death. The evolution of human affairs a kind of dramatic poem, and God Almighty the skilful dramatist, who always connecteth that of ours which went before, with what of his follows after, into coherent sense. A geometrical distribution of rewards and punishments 178

That there ought to be a doubtful and cloudy state of things for the exercise of faith and the more difficult part of virtue. Had there been no monsters to subdue, there could have been no Hercules. Here we are to live by faith, and not by sight 174

But that to make a full defence of Providence would require a large volume. The reader therefore referred to others for a supplement. Only some few considerations to be here propounded, not so much for the confutation of Atheists, as satisfaction of Theists, sometimes apt to call in question the Divine goodness, though the very foundation of our Christian faith 176

First, that in judging of the works of God we ought not to consider the parts of the world alone by themselves, but in order to the whole. Were nothing made but the best, there could have been no harmony for want of variety. Plotinus, that a limner does not make all eye, nor place bright colours every where; nor a dramatist introduce only kings and heroes upon the stage ib.

Secondly, that we ought not to confine God's creation to the narrowness of vulgar opinion, which extends the universe but little beyond the clouds, and walls it in with a sphere of fixed stars. The world incapable of infinity of magnitude as well as of time. Nevertheless, as the sun is much bigger than we can imagine it, so much more may the world be. The new celestial phenomena widen the corporeal universe, and make those fancied flaming walls thereof to fly away before us. Not reasonable to think that all this immense vastness should be desert and uninhabited 179

Thirdly, that we cannot make a right judgment of the ways of Providence without looking both forwards upon what is future, and backwards upon what is past, as well as upon the present. That the Platonists and Pythagoreans solved many phenomena from the *τὰ προεβιωμένα*, things done in a pre-existent state.—Our common Christianity supposeth but a kind of imputative pre-existence to solve the pravity of mankind and the evils of this state. The different fates and conditions of men

here in this life to be resolved into a just though occult Providence 180

The third objection against Providence, or fourteenth atheistic argument; that it is impossible for any one being to animadvert and order all things; and, if it were possible, that it would be distractionous, and inconsistent with happiness. Moreover, that an irresistibly-powerful and happy being would not concern itself in the welfare of others; benevolence arising only from imbecility 182

The reply; that because ourselves have but a finite animadversion, and narrow sphere of activity; to measure the Deity accordingly, is but an idol of the cave or den. Certain, that were there nothing but what we could fully comprehend, there could be no God. Had the sun life, equally coextended with its rays, it would perceive every thing touched by them. Creatures but the rays of the Deity. Men able to manage affairs, in many distant places, without distraction. And innumerable notions lie together in our minds, without crowding one another, or any disturbance to us ib.

But for the easing the minds of weak mortals, already suggested, that there is no necessity God should himself immediately do all things: he having ministers under him, executioners of his providence; as, an artificial plastic nature (for this reason, partly before insisted on); instincts also in animals a part of that Divine fate which is the servant of Providence. Above which, other knowing and understanding ministers of the Deity appointed to preside over human affairs. But all overlooked by the watchful eye of God Almighty, who may himself extraordinarily interpose 183

Wherefore no need to confine Providence to a few greater things only, to free the Deity from distraction. Small things (upon which greater often depend) not neglected by it. Nevertheless, the chief employment of Divine Providence, in the economy of souls, by Plato reduced to this compendium; the translating of them into better or worser states, according to their demeanors. Thus may the slow wits of mortals more easily conceive Providence not to be laborious and distractionous to the Deity 185

But that all benevolence arises from imbecility, and that what is perfectly happy would be troubled with no business, but enjoy its own ease; idols of the Atheists' den. These other

the narrow contractedness of their minds by vice and immorality 186

The atheistic queries next to be answered. The first query: If there were a God, who was perfectly happy in himself, why would he go about to make a world? *Answer.* The reason of God's making the world was from his overflowing and communicative goodness, that there might be other beings happy besides himself. This consistent with God's making the world for his own glory. The reason why Plotinus would explode that. True, that God did not make the world merely to ostentate his skill and power; but to display his goodness, which is chiefly his glory. The Atheists farther demand, What hurt would it have been for us never to have been made? *Answer.* No other than this, that we could never have enjoyed good, nor been capable of happiness. If no hurt not to have been made, then none to be annihilated; the distance being as great from nothing to something, as from something to nothing . . . 187

The second atheistic query: If God's goodness were the cause of his making the world, why then was it not made sooner? This question capable of a double sense: First, Why was not the world from eternity? The reply: This not from any defect in the Divine goodness, but because there is an impossibility of the thing itself; the necessity and incapacity of such an imperfect being hindering it. Ourselves prone to think, that could the world have been from eternity, it should have been so. Thus Philoponus, in his confutation of Proclus's arguments for the world's eternity. And now no place left for those atheistic cavils against the novelty of the creation; as if God must therefore have slept from eternity; or had contracted a satiety of his former solitude. Another sense of the question: Why, though the world could not be from eternity, yet was it not made sooner? *Answer.* The world could not possibly have so been made in time, as that it should not have been once but a day old; and also once no more than five or six thousand years old 188

The third atheistic query: How could God move the matter of the whole world, especially if incorporeal? *Answer.* That all things being derived from the Deity, and essentially depending on him, they must needs be commandable by him, and obsequious to him. And since no body can move itself, that which first moved the matter must be incorporeal, and not

move it by machines and engines, but by cogitation or will only. That conceit, that an incorporeal Deity could not move matter, because it would run through it, absurd; this moving not mechanically, but vitally. That cogitative beings have a natural power of moving matter, evident from our own souls moving our bodies, not by machines or engines, but merely by thought. More easy for the Deity to move the whole world by will and cogitation, than for us our bodies 190

The last head of the atheistic argumentation, from interest. First, that it is the interest of particular persons there should be no being infinitely powerful, who hath no law but his own will. The first reply; wishing is no proving. Nor will any man's thinking make things otherwise than they are . . . 191

But, secondly, this wish of Atheists founded upon a mistaken notion of God Almighty, that he is nothing but arbitrary will omnipotent. God's will not mere will, but law and equity; ought itself willing. Nor does justice in God clash with goodness; but is a branch or particular modification thereof. The interest of none there should be no God, unless perhaps of such as are irreclaimably wicked, and wilfully abandon their own true good 192

To be without God, to be without hope. No faith nor hope in senseless matter. According to the atheistic hypothesis, no possibility of happiness nor security of good 193

God such a being, as, if he were not, nothing more to be wished for. To believe a God, to believe the existence of all good and perfection; and that things are all made and governed as they should be. Peccability from the necessity of imperfect free-willed beings. Infinite hopes from a being infinitely good and powerful. Democritus and Epicurus, however cried up so much of late, but infatuated Sophists, or witty fools, and debauchers of mankind ib.

The last atheistic argumentation, That Theism or religion is inconsistent with the interest of civil sovereigns. Their first pretence for this, that the civil sovereign reigns only in fear; and therefore must be no power nor fear greater than that of the leviathan 194

In answer to this, the atheistic ethics and politics to be unravelled. Their foundation laid in the villanizing of human nature. That there is no natural justice, equity, nor charity. No public nor common nature in men, but all private and self-

ish. That every man by nature hath a right to every thing, even to other men's bodies and lives. That an appetite to kill and torment, by nature gives a right. That nature hath brought men into the world without any fetters or shackles of duty and obligation, the hinderances of liberty. Lastly, that nature absolutely dissociates and segregates men from one another, by reason of the inconsistency of appetites and private good. Every man by nature in a state of war against every man 196

But, in the next place, they add, that though this state of nature, which is belluine liberty, and lawless freedom to every thing, be in itself the best; yet by accident, and by reason of men's imbecility, does it prove the worst. Wherefore, when men had been weary of hewing and slashing, they then be-thought themselves at length of helping nature by art; by submitting to a lesser evil for the avoiding of a greater; abating their infinite right, and yielding to terms of equality with others, and subjection to a common power 197

Where these Atheists first slander human nature; and then debase justice and civil authority, making it the ignoble and bastardly brat of fear; or a lesser evil submitted to out of necessity for the avoiding of a greater. According to which atheistic hypothesis no man is willingly just. This no new invention of the writer De Cive, but the old atheistic generation of justice, and of a body politic, civil society, and sovereignty (before Plato's time); it being fully described in his second book of a Commonwealth. Where the philosopher concludes justice, according to these, to be but a middle thing betwixt the best and the worst; loved, not as good in itself, but only by reason of men's imbecility: or, that justice is indeed another man's good, and the evil of him that is just. The same hypothesis also, concerning justice, as a factitious thing, that sprung only from fear and imbecility, and was chosen but as a lesser evil, insisted on by Epicurus 198

The vain attempts of our modern atheistic politicians, to make justice by art when there is none by nature. First, by renouncing and transferring men's right by will and words. For if nothing naturally unlawful, then can no man, by will and words, make any thing unlawful to himself. What made by will may be destroyed by will. The ridiculous conceit of these atheistic politicians, that injustice is nothing but *dati repetitio*, and such an absurdity in life, as is in disputation when a man

denies a proposition he had before granted ; no real evil in the man, but only a relative incongruity in him as a citizen. Again, these justice-makers and authority-makers pretend to derive their factitious justice from pacts and covenants. But pacts and covenants, without natural justice (as themselves confess), nothing but words and breath ; and therefore can have no force to oblige. Wherefore they make another pretence also from certain counterfeit laws of nature of their own devising, that are nothing but mere juggling equivocation ; they being but the laws of fear, or their own timorous and cowardly complexion. They ridiculously dance round in a circle, when they derive the obligation of civil laws from covenants ; of covenants from laws of nature ; and of laws of nature again from civil laws. Their vain attempt by art to consociate what nature hath dissociated, like tying knots in the wind or water. Their artificial obligation, or ligaments, by which the members of their leviathan are held together, more slender than cobwebs . . . 200

These artificial justice-makers and obligation-makers sensible of the weakness of these attempts artificially to consociate what nature hath dissociated ; therefore fly at last from art to force and power ; making their sovereign to reign only in fear. This the true meaning of that opinion, that all obligation is derived from law ; that is, the command of him who hath power to compel. If obligation to obey civil laws only from fear of punishment, then is no man obliged to hazard his life for the safety of his prince ; and whoever can promise themselves impunity, may justly disobey. If civil sovereigns reign only in fear, then is their authority nothing but force ; and power would justify rebellion. Lastly, if civil right or authority nothing but force and violence, then could it not last long ; what natural prevailing against what is violent . . . 204

Wherefore since civil authority and bodies politic can neither be merely artificial, nor yet violent things, there must be some natural vinculum to hold them together, such as will both oblige subjects to obey the commands of sovereigns, and sovereigns, in commanding, to seek the good of their subjects ; something of a common, public, and conglutinating nature ; which no other than natural justice. The authority of God himself founded in justice ; of which civil authority a participation. Sovereignty no creature of the people and of men's wills ; but hath a stamp of Divinity upon it. Had not God made a city, men,

neither by art or political enchantment, nor by mere force, could have made any. The whole world one city of God and rational beings. The civil sovereign no leviathan; that is, no beast, but a god. He reigns not in mere brutish force and fear, but in natural justice and conscience, and the authority of God himself. Nevertheless, need of force and fear too, to compel some to their duty; nor is the sovereign's sword here alone sufficient, but he must reign also in the fear of God Almighty 206

The second atheistic pretence, to make religion inconsistent with civil sovereignty; because it limits and confines that which in its own nature is and ought to be infinite. The reply: that the Atheists' infinite right and authority of civil sovereigns is nothing but belluine liberty; but true right and authority are essentially founded in natural justice; there being no authority to command, where there is not an obligation to obey; and commands not creating obligation, but presupposing it, without which they would signify nothing. The first original obligation not from will but nature. The error of those Theists who derive all obligation to moral things from the will and positive command of God, as threatening punishments and promising rewards. From whence it would follow, that no man is good and just but by accident only, and for the sake of something else. Justice a different species of good from that of private utility. Infinite justice as absurd as an infinite rule or measure. If no infinite justice, then no infinite right and authority. God's own authority bounded by justice; his will ruled by justice, and not justice by his will. Atheists, under a pretence of giving civil sovereigns infinite right, really divest them of all right and authority, leaving them nothing but brutish force. Proved here that the *summæ potestates* must of necessity be ἀνυπεύθυνον 208

The last atheistic pretence for the inconsistency of religion with civil power, because conscience is private judgment of good and evil. Answer. That not religion, but Atheism, introduceth such private judgment as is absolutely inconsistent with civil sovereignty, it acknowledging nothing in nature that tends to public and common good, but making private appetite the only rule or measure of good, and utility of justice. The desperate consequence from hence, that private utility may justify rebellion and parricide. The Atheists' professed assertion, that they who have once rebelled may justly defend themselves after-

ward by force. Though private persons must make a judgment in conscience for themselves (the Atheists' public conscience being nonsense and contradiction), yet is the rule of conscience not private, but public, except only to mistaken fanatics; who therefore sometimes make a pretence of conscience and religion, in order to sedition and rebellion. Religion and conscience oblige subjects, in all lawful things, actively to obey the sovereign powers: in unlawful, not to resist . . . 210

The conclusion of the whole book: that all the atheistic grounds being fully confuted, and the impossibility of Atheism demonstrated; it is certain, that the original and head of all things is no blind and unconscious nature, but a perfect understanding being, self-existent; who hath made all that was fit to be made, and after the best manner, and exerciseth a just providence over all. To whom be all honour and glory, &c. 213

THE END.

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