

THE SHRINE *of* WISDOM

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THE ELEMENTS OF THEOLOGY

PROCLUS*

THAT INTELLECT IS NOT THE FIRST CAUSE

PROPOSITION XXI

Every order beginning from a monad, proceeds into a multitude co-ordinate to the monad, and the multitude of every order is referred to one monad

For the monad, having the relation of a principle, generates a multitude allied to itself. Hence, one series, and one whole order has a decrement into multitude from the monad. For there would no longer be an order, or a series, if the monad remained of itself unprolific. But multitude is again referred to the one common cause of all co-ordinate natures. For that, in every multitude, which is the same, has not its progression from one particular thing of which the multitude consists; since that subsists from one alone of the many, is not common to all, but eminently possesses the peculiarity of that one alone. Hence, since in every order there is a certain communion, connection, and sameness, through which some things are said to be co-ordinate, but others of a different

* For the previous sections see *Shrine of Wisdom*, Vol. XVII, No. 65, p. 130, No. 66, p. 141, and No. 67, p. 169.

order, it is evident that sameness is derived to every order from one principle.*

In each order, therefore, there is one monad prior to the multitude, which imparts one ratio and connection to the natures arranged in it, both to each other and to the whole.

For let one thing be the cause of another, among things that are under the same series; but that which ranks as the cause of the one series must necessarily be prior to all in that series, and all things must be generated by it as co-ordinate, not so that each will be a certain particular thing, but that each will belong to this order.

COROLLARY

From these things it is evident that both unity and multitude are inherent in the nature of body; that one nature has many natures co-suspended from it; and that many natures proceed from the one Nature of the universe. It follows, also, that the order of souls originates from one first Soul, and proceeds with diminution into the multitude of souls, and reduces the multitude

* The truth of this may be exemplified in light. Thus, for instance, we see many species of light; one kind emanating from the sun, another from fire and the stars, another from the moon, and another from the eyes of many animals. But this light, though various, is everywhere similar, and discovers in its operations a unity of nature. On account of its uniformity, therefore, it requires one principle and not different principles. But the sun is the mundane principle of all mundane light. And though there are many participants of light posterior to the solar orb, yet they scatter their uniform light, through one solar nature, property, and power. But if we again seek for the principle of light in the sun, we cannot say that the solar orb is this principle; for the various parts of it diffuse many illuminations. There will, therefore, be many principles. But we now require one first principle of light. And if we say that the soul of the sun generates light, we must observe that this is not effected by her psychical multiplicity, or she would diffuse different lights. Hence, we must assert that she generates visible by intellectual light. But again this production does not subsist through intellectual variety, but rather through the unity of Intellect which is its flower and summit. This unity is a symbol of that simple unity which is the principle of the universe. And to this principle the solar intellect is united by its unity. This divine unity of the sun, therefore, is the principle of the uniform light of the world, in the same manner as simple unity and goodness is the source of intelligible light to all intelligible natures.

into one. That in the intellectual essence, also, there is an intellectual monad; and that a multitude of intellects proceeds from one Intellect, and is converted to it. That a multitude of unities likewise originates from THE ONE Which is prior to all things; and that there is an extension of these unities to THE ONE. Hence, after the first One there are unities; after the first Intellect there are intellects; after the first Soul there are souls; and after total Nature there are natures.

PROPOSITION XXII

Every thing which subsists primarily and principally in each order is one, and is neither two, nor more than two, but is only begotten

For, if it be possible, let there be two things which thus subsist (since there will be the same impossibility if there are more than two); or let that which subsists primarily consist of both these. But if indeed it consists of both, it will again be one, and there will not be two things that are first. And if it be one of the two, each will not be first. Nor, if both are equally primary, will each have a principal subsistence. For if one of them is primary, but this is not the same with the other, what will it be in that order? For that subsists primarily, which is nothing else than that which it is said to be. But each of these being different is, and at the same time is not, that which it is said to be.

If, therefore, these differ from each other, but they do not primarily differ so far as they are that which they are said to be; for this primarily suffers that which is the same; both will not be first, but that of which both participate is said to subsist primarily.

COROLLARY

From these things it is evident that what is primarily Being is one alone, and that there are not two primary beings, or more than two; that the first Intellect is one alone, and that there are not two first intellects; and that the first Soul is one. This is also the case with every form, such as the primarily beautiful, and the primarily equal. And in a similar manner in all things. Thus also with respect to the form of animal, and the form of man, the first of each is one, for the demonstration is the same.

PROPOSITION XXIII

CONCERNING THE IMPARTICIPABLE*

Every imparticipable gives subsistence from itself to things which are participated, and all participated hypostases are extended to imparticipable hyparxes

For that which is imparticipable, having the relation of a monad, as subsisting from itself and not from another, and being exempt from participants, generates things which are able to be participated. For either it remains of itself barren and possesses nothing honourable, or it gives something from itself. And that which receives indeed from it participates, but that which is given subsists in a participated manner. But everything which is something belonging to a certain thing by which it is participated, is secondary to that which is similarly present to all things, and which fills all things from itself. For that which is in one thing is not in others. But that which is similarly present in all things, in order that it may illuminate all things, is not in one thing, but is prior to all things. For it is either in all things or in one of all, or it is prior to all. But that indeed which is in all things, being distributed into all, will again require another thing which may unite that which is distributed. And all things will no longer participate of the same thing, but this of one thing, and that of another, the one being divided. But if it is in one of all things, it will no longer be common to all, but to one thing. Hence, if it is common to things able to participate, and is common to all, it will be prior to all. But this is imparticipable.

PROPOSITION XXIV

Every thing which participates is inferior to that which is participated, and that which is participated is inferior to that which is imparticipable

For that which participates, being imperfect prior to participation, but becoming perfect through participation, is entirely secondary to that which is participated, so far as it is perfect by

* The imparticipable is that which is not consubstantial with a subordinate nature. Thus, imparticipable Intellect is the Intellect which is not consubstantial with soul, but is exempt from it. And imparticipable Soul is the Soul which is not consubstantial with body. And so with other things.

participating. For so far as it was imperfect, it is inferior to that which it participates, which makes it to be perfect. That, however, which is participated, since it belongs to a certain thing, and not to all things, is again allotted an hyperaxis subordinate to that which is something belonging to all things, and not to a certain thing. For the latter is more allied to the cause of all; but the former is less allied to it.

The imparticipable, therefore, is the leader of things which are participated; but the latter are the leaders of participants. For in short, the imparticipable is one prior to the many; but that which is participated in the many, is one and at the same time not one; and every thing which participates is not one and at the same time one.

PROPOSITION XXV
CONCERNING THE PERFECT

Every thing perfect proceeds to the generation of those things which it is able to produce, imitating the One Principle of all

For as That, on account of Its own Goodness, unically gives subsistence to all beings (for *The Good* and *The One* are the same, so that the boniform is the same with the unical); thus also those things which are posterior to The First, on account of their perfection, hasten to generate beings inferior to their own essence. For perfection is a certain portion of *Good*, and the perfect, so far as it is perfect, imitates *The Good*. But *The Good* gives subsistence to all things. So that the perfect, likewise, is productive according to nature of those things which it is able to produce. And that indeed which is more perfect, by how much the more perfect it is, by so much the more numerous are the progeny of which it is the cause. For that which is more perfect participates in a greater degree of *The Good*. It is, therefore, nearer to *The Good*. But this being the case, it is nearer to the cause of all. And thus it is the cause of a greater number of effects. That, however, which is more imperfect, by how much the more imperfect it is, by so much the less numerous are the effects of which it is the cause. For being more remote from that which produces every thing, it gives subsistence to fewer effects. For to that which gives subsistence to, or adorns, or perfects, or connects, or vivifies, or fabricates, all things, that nature is more allied which produces a

greater number of each of these; but that is more remote which produces a less number of each.

COROLLARY

From these things it is evident that the nature which is most remote from the Principle of all is unprolific, and is not the cause of any thing. For if it generated a certain thing, and had something posterior to itself, it is evident that it would no longer be most remote, but that which it produced would be more remote than itself from the Principle of all things, but it would be nearer to productive power, and besides this would imitate the cause which is productive of all things.

PROPOSITION XXVI

Every cause which is productive of other things, itself abiding in itself, produces the natures posterior to itself, and such as are successive

For if it imitates The One, but That immovably gives subsistence to things posterior to Itself, every thing which produces will possess in a similar manner the cause of productive energy. But *The One* gives subsistence to things immovably. For if through motion, the motion will be in It, and being moved, It will no longer be *The One*, in consequence of being changed from *The One*. But if motion subsists together with It, it will also be from *The One*, and either there will be a progression to infinity, or *The One* will produce immovably; and everything which produces will imitate the producing Cause of all things. For everywhere, from that which is primarily, that which is not primarily derives its subsistence; so that the nature which is productive of certain things originates from that which is productive of all things. Hence every producing cause produces subsequent natures from itself. And while productive natures abide in themselves undiminished, secondary natures are produced from them. For that which is in any respect diminished, cannot abide such as it is.

PROPOSITION XXVII

Every producing cause, on account of its perfection and abundance of power, is productive of secondary natures

For if it produced, not on account of the perfect, but through

a defect according to power, it would not be able to preserve its own order immovable. For that which imparts existence to another thing through defect and impotency, imparts subsistence to it through its own mutation and change in quality. But everything which produces remains such as it is, and in consequence of thus remaining, that which is posterior to it proceeds into existence. Hence, being full and perfect, it gives subsistence to secondary natures immovably and without diminution, it being that which it is, and neither being changed into them, nor diminished. For that which is produced is not a distribution into parts of the producing cause; since this is neither appropriate to the generating energy, nor to generating causes. Nor is it a transition. For it does not become the matter of that which proceeds; since it remains such as it is, and that which is produced is different from it. Hence that which generates is firmly established undiminished; through prolific power multiplies itself; and from itself imparts secondary hypostases.

PROPOSITION XXVIII

Every producing cause gives subsistence to things similar to itself, prior to such as are dissimilar

For since that which produces is necessarily more excellent than that which is produced, they can never be simply the same with each other and equal in power. But if they are not the same and equal, but different and unequal, they are either entirely separated from each other, or they are both united and separated. If, however, they are entirely separated, they will not accord with each other, and nowhere will that which proceeds from a cause sympathize with it. Hence, neither will one of these participate of the other, being entirely different from it. For that which is participated, gives communion to its participant, with reference to that of which it participates. Moreover, it is necessary that the thing caused should participate of its cause, as from thence possessing its essence.

But if that which is produced is partly separated from and partly united to its producing cause, if indeed it suffers each of these equally, it will equally participate and not participate. So that, after the same manner, it will both have essence and not have it from the producing cause. And if it is more separated

from than united to it, the thing generated will be more foreign than allied to that by which it is generated, will be more unadapted than adapted to it, and be more deprived of, than possess sympathy with it. If, therefore, the things which proceed from causes are allied to them according to their very being, have sympathy with them, are naturally suspended from them, and aspire after contact with them, desiring good, and obtaining the object of their desire through the cause of their existence—if this be the case, it is evident that things produced are in a greater degree united to their producing causes than separated from them. Things, however, which are more united, are more similar than dissimilar to the natures to which they are especially united. Every producing cause, therefore, gives subsistence to things similar to itself prior to such as are dissimilar.

PROPOSITION XXIX

Every progression is effected through a similitude of secondary to first natures

For if that which produces gives subsistence to similars prior to dissimilars, the similitude derived from the producing causes will give subsistence to the things produced. For similars are rendered similar through similitude, and not through dissimilitude. If, therefore, progression in its diminution preserves a certain sameness of that which is generated with that which generates, and exhibits that which is posterior to the generator, such, in a secondary degree, as the generator is primarily, it will have its subsistence through similitude.

PROPOSITION XXX

Every thing which is produced from a certain thing without a medium, abides in its producing cause, and proceeds from it

For if every progression is effected while primary natures remain permanent, and is accomplished through similitude, similars being constituted prior to dissimilars—if this be the case, that which is produced will in a certain respect abide in its producing cause. For that which entirely proceeds will have nothing which is the same with the abiding cause, but will be perfectly separated from it, and will not have anything common

with and united to it. Hence, it will abide in its cause, in the same manner as that also abides in itself. If, however, it abides, but does not proceed, it will in no respect differ from its cause, nor will it, while that abides, be generated something different from it. For if it is something different it is separated and apart from its cause. If, however, it is apart, but the cause abides, it will proceed from the cause, in order that while it abides it may be separated from it. So far, therefore, as that which is produced has something which is the same with the producing cause, it abides in it; but so far as it is different, it proceeds from it. Being, however, similar, it is in a certain respect at once both the same and different. Hence, it abides, and at the same time proceeds, and it is neither of these without the other.

PROPOSITION XXXI

Every thing which proceeds from a certain thing essentially, is converted to that from which it proceeds

For if it should proceed indeed, but should not return to the cause of this progression, it would not aspire after its cause. For every thing which desires is converted to the object of its desire. Moreover, every thing aspires after good, and to each thing the attainment of it is through the proximate cause. Every thing, therefore, aspires after its cause. For well-being is derived to every thing from that through which its existence is derived. But desire is first directed to that through which well-being is derived. And conversion is to that to which desire is first directed.

PROPOSITION XXXII

All conversion is effected through the similitude of the things converted to that to which they are converted

For every thing which is converted hastens to be conjoined with its cause, and aspires after communion and colligation with it. But similitude binds all things together, just as dissimilitude separates and disjoins all things. If, therefore, conversion is a certain communion and contact, but all communion and all contact are through similitude—if this be the case, all conversion will be effected through similitude.

(To be continued)

JOHN NORRIS

(1657-1711)

John Norris was born in Collingbourne Kingston, a small Wiltshire village near Marlborough, on January 2nd, 1657, and from an external point of view he lived a very uneventful life.

Educated for five years at Winchester School (1671-1676), he then entered Exeter College, Oxford, where he spent thirteen years (1676-1689). On June 15th, 1680, he received his B.A., and during the same year he became a Fellow of All Souls College, and also an M.A. Next, he took Holy Orders and for two years was Rector of Newton St. Loe, a beautiful little village on the Avon.

In 1689 he resigned his Fellowship and married, and in 1691 he became Rector of Bemerton near Salisbury, which living he retained until his death in the beginning of February 1711. He was the father of three children—two sons and a daughter. This is the simple story of his life.

One of his friends, writing to someone who had never met him, describes Norris as follows: "He is a little man of pale complexion, but he has a great deal of sweetness and good humour in his face, attended with an extraordinary modesty, and a more than common air of humility. There seems to be a reservedness in his temper, but when you are acquainted with him you will find it only the result of thoughtfulness. In a word, he is a man whose conversation is very agreeable as well as instructive."

Although he led the busy life of a parish Priest, he was happiest in his study, and his life was a very interior one.

He published twenty-six books. The discourse which follows was taken from the sixteenth of his works, which is entitled: *Practical Discourses upon Several Divine Subjects*.

Although he was an Oxford man, he carried on the traditions of the Cambridge Platonists, but it is improbable that he ever met or talked with any of them. He however did carry on a correspondence with Henry More (1614-1687) which extended over a period of fourteen months, from January 1684 to

March 1865, when More was seventy years of age and Norris only twenty-seven. There were nine letters in all, which have been published, five from Norris, who began the correspondence, and four from More.

It has been said of Norris that "he embraced the 'Theory of Ideas' with passionate ardour," and as their advocate he entered the lists against the doubts of John Locke, with a success which any one who reads both sides of the controversy with an open mind will easily recognize.

EXTRACTS FROM A DISCOURSE
BY JOHN NORRIS

THE NATURAL AND MORAL UNION OF THE SOUL
AND GOD AND OF THE PERFECTION THAT ACCRUES
TO IT FROM THENCE

"It is good for me to draw near to God."—PSALM 73, 28

The natural and inward Perfection of Human Nature bears so little proportion to the capacities and desires of the same nature, and men are withal so inwardly conscious and sensible of this disproportion between what they *are*, and what they naturally crave and aspire to, that they all with one general consent agree to go out of themselves and their own homes, to seek abroad for provision to strengthen their slender interest by some foreign ally, and to unite themselves to some *other* being, for the further perfection and supplement of their own.

Thus far all men agree to *go out of themselves* for their Good and Happiness; and perhaps it is the only thing wherein they do so, and you will scarce ever after this be able to meet with them all together again; for no sooner are they out of themselves, but they immediately *divide* and take several paths, and apply themselves to several objects, as their reason or their sense leads them, some directing their motion towards God, and some towards the creature.

Those that direct their motion towards the Creature travel so thick and dull, in such crowds and companies, that they

have scarce room to pass in without elbowing and justling one another; so that they are ready to quarrel about the way as well as the *end*; while in the meantime those that direct their motion towards God are so very *thin* and *few* that did they not travel by a good Light and were well assured of their way, the very singularity of their choice would be such an objection against it that they would be tempted to change roads and be where there is most company.

But the "*Path of the Just is as the Shining Light*"—a path which, like the milky way in the Heavens, discovers and distinguishes itself by its own brightness; and those that travel in this Bright Shining Road are Children of Light, of good sense and understanding, of great judgement and of great consideration, very wise, knowing and discerning persons, and they show their judgement by the wisdom of their choice, by the excellency of their aim in that they do not propose or endeavour a union of themselves with the creature, but with Him Who is their true and only Good, and Whose Union will perfect and better their nature. . . .

Of the Union of the Soul with God. This is either Natural or Moral. First there is a Natural Union between God and the Soul, as indeed there is between God and everything else. For if God has an Infinite Essence He must have also an Infinite Presence; He must be essentially everywhere, and if He be essentially present in all places, then He must also be essentially present with all creatures, consequently with the Soul of man, which must therefore be supposed to be so intimately and immediately united to Him as to have its very Being and Subsistence in Him. . . .

God, it seems, is the Foundation as well as the Efficient Cause of our existence; and the Soul has her Being in God as well as from Him. As God penetrates and pervades her, so she dwells and subsists in God, Who is the Place of Spirit, as space is of Bodies. Now this must needs imply the most inward and immediate Union that can possibly be between two natures; to be more nearly united, would be to be the same. If God be essentially present with the Soul and the Soul has her Being in God, then is it not a necessary consequence that there is an immediate Union between God and the Soul?

We live in Him: therefore He is not far from us but most

immediately united with us; for He cannot be nearer to us than for us to live, move and have our Being in Him.

It is observable that the Apostle does not say *by* Him, but *in* Him, to intimate the immediateness, the inwardness of His Essential Presence and Union with the Soul; and that this *in Him* must not be understood of the mere Power and Efficacious Influence of God, but of the very Essence and Substance of the Divine Nature, is plain from the consequence drawn from it which otherwise would be none at all. For it would be no proof of the nearness of God to us to say that we live in Him, meaning by *in Him* only His power and Efficacious Influence in preserving us in being.

Had this been the meaning, it would have been much better expressed by saying *by* Him, than *in* Him. Which expression, therefore, both considering its proper natural emphasis and the conclusion which it is brought in to prove, can be supposed to intend no less than the Essential and Substantial Presence of God, and that we live, move and have our Being in Him, not only as the Efficient Cause, but as the inward Basis and Foundation of our life, motion and being, sustaining and supporting us as space is supposed to do the bodies that exist in it: we are in God, as bodies are in space. God penetrates our being, and contains us, and we dwell in Him; He is our Place, That Which contains us, That Which supports us and pervades every part of us; according to another very remarkable expression of the same Apostle concerning God, that He is above all, and through all, and in us all. Than which nothing could have been said more expressive of God's Essential Presence to us, and of that intimate immediate Union we have with Him. So then God penetrates our essence and we dwell in Him even as space penetrates bodies, and bodies dwell in space. And what union can be imagined more close, more intimate, than this? Or how can we be more nearly united to God than for God to penetrate us, and for us to dwell and be contained in Him? The union which we have with bodies or which bodies have with each other is nothing to this strict Union which the Soul has with God, Who indeed is more intimately united with His Creatures than they are or can be with one another.

This is the Natural Union of the Soul with God; and thus all His Creatures are united to Him as well as the Soul of Man. . . .

All spirits that exist are essentially united to God, and this Essential Union between God and them is more intimate and immediate than any union they can possibly have with bodies or with one another; and being so close and intimate as it is, it cannot but be equal in relation to them all. For this Natural Union of Spirits with God being founded upon His Essential Omnipresence, whereby He thoroughly penetrates and entirely contains their whole substance, it is plain that it cannot admit of more or less, but must be supposed equal in respect to all spirits; yea, all creatures that have any being which they cannot have but in God, with Whom they are therefore equally united. This Natural Union with God, therefore, though a great benefit, honour and perfection, is yet no peculiar privilege of the Soul of man, since all other creatures partake of it with her; her own body being thus as much united to God as herself. But there is another Union with God whereof bodies are not at all capable, and which even Spirits partake of more or less.

The Moral Union between God and the Soul.

That natural tie fastens us to God so close that it cannot be strained closer. But though we cannot strain the same knot any harder, yet we may bind ourselves faster to God by another cord, by adding to our Natural a Moral Union. Now as the other is a union of our natures, so this is a union of our wills, and is none other than the Love of God. Whatever we love we unite ourselves to, and the more we love the more are we so united. Were it possible for a man to love nothing out of himself he would not be in union with anything. But since every man is too defective within to love nothing without, there is no man but what is bound and chained fast to something or other. He that loves the world is united to the world; and he that loves money is united to his money; and he that loves God is united to God; and he that loves God most is united to Him most.

For we all necessarily dwell in God as having our being in Him. This is that Natural Union which we have in God, and which all other Creatures have as well as we. That Dwelling in God which makes to be the proper consequence and effect of the love of God must be understood of a more especial and extraordinary Union, a Union of will and affection, the same with this our Moral Union of the Soul with God.

And thus far of this twofold Union that is between the Soul and God. I proceed now to consider the Perfection that accrues to the Soul from each.

The whole perfection of the Soul is either internal or external, from within or from without: either that perfection which she has in herself from the essentials of her nature and constitution, or that which she derives from her union with some other being. Now that perfection which she has in herself is so inconsiderable, if compared with her natural inclinations, that she is forced to go out of herself and to join herself to some other Being more perfect than herself. That Being to Which we are all naturally united is God; and He is also the Being to Which we are all morally united in some measure, and it is in our power to strengthen and confirm this Union by free and voluntary applications and to make it more and more close and entire till at last it be perfect and consummate.

WORTHY TEACHING OF THE DOCTRINE

The Blessed One spoke as follows :

“Any bhikshu, who in teaching the Doctrine to others thinks as follows: ‘O that they may hear from me the Doctrine, and be won over by what they hear, and manifest delight towards me!’ such a bhikshu is an unworthy teacher of the Doctrine.

“Any bhikshu, who in teaching the Doctrine to others thinks as follows: ‘The Doctrine has been well taught by the Blessed One, avails even in the present life, is immediate in its results, is inviting and conducive to salvation, and may be mastered by any intelligent man for himself. O that they may hear from me the Doctrine, and be enlightened by what they hear, and as a result of their enlightenment begin to act accordingly!’ and thus teaches the Doctrine to others because of that Doctrine’s intrinsic goodness and because of compassion, mercy, and kindness; such a bhikshu is a worthy teacher of the Doctrine.”

From the *Namyutta-Nikaya*.

BARDIC THEOLOGY

Three things which every man should avoid doing: to cause worldly loss to any man whatsoever; to cause bodily or mental pain to any man, or to any other living or animated thing; and to cause deterioration to any thing whatsoever, whether it be conduct, usage, learning, art, the science of wisdom, and morality, or any other thing, of whatsoever kind it may be; because the evil that he does will fall upon him either in this world and life, or in that which is to come in the next world.

Three men that will be odious to God: he who causes hatred and contentiousness among his neighbours; he who conceals the truth to the injury of another; and he who basely disputes against justice. Others say: he who works against justice.

The three indispensables of goodness: justice, beauty and truth.

The three indispensables of godliness: love, truth and prudence. Others say: consideration.

Three things that will augment godliness: sciences, alms and worship.

The three essentials of worship: truth, goodness and beauty.

The three mutual delights of worship: prayer, thanksgiving and praise.

The three requirements of God at the hands of man: belief, obedience and worship.

The three reasons for worship: to teach wisdom, to cultivate the energies of the mind, and to gladden hope.

Three things which God only can perform: what has never been in existence before, to know all that will happen, and to judge the conscience. Others say: Three things which are possible only to God: to perform what did not exist before, to know what will happen, and to judge the conscience.

There are three gifts from God, which ought to be in man before he can be happy: reason to understand and to know with rectitude, awen* to love and to study all rectitude, and courageous

* Genius.

patience to side firmly with all rectitude, and against all wrong, and to suffer, where occasion requires, for what ought to be, of whatever kind it may be.

The three losses that will bring gain in the end to man: to lose more than what life needs and requires, to lose bodily health on the part of a vainglorious man, and to lose what one considers as his chief in and over every thing, for it is in this that most of his sinfulness consists.

The three different sciences concerning God: to remove far off from all evil, to approach all goodness, and to acquiesce patiently in every thing whatsoever, and in every incident and event of life.

The three distinctions of truth: utility in every thing, beauty in every thing, and strength to obviate and to oppose every thing.

The three columns of godliness: truth, beauty and goodness.

From *Barddas*.

JEWEL

“God requires no man to do any thing He has not given him first light to know, and then power to do. But God requires every man to fear Him, and work righteousness: therefore He has given every man both a discovery of His will, and power to do it.

“No man ought to worship the true God ignorantly: but every man is commanded to worship God: therefore he is to do it knowingly.

“No man can know God, but God must discover it to him, and that cannot be without light: therefore every man has light.

“This light must be sufficient, or God’s gifts are imperfect, and answer not the end for which they were given. But God’s gifts are perfect, and can perform what they are designed for: therefore since the light is His gift, it must be sufficient.”

WILLIAM PENN.

ON REPENTANCE: FROM NIZAMI*

THE TYRANT FORGIVEN

A just Prince saw in his sleep, by reason of his good conduct, the image of a tyrant, and said to him: "What hath God done with thee, an oppressor? In thy night, after the day of oppression, what hath He done?"

The tyrant replied: "When life came to an end for me, I looked around upon all created beings:

"That I might discover from whom I should have hope of direction in the right way, or from whom the Almighty would have an eye of favour.

"No kindness from me was in the heart of anyone: no opinion of mercy being shown me was in any person.

"A trembling fell upon me, like a willow, my face being ashamed and my heart hopeless; I threw my useless baggage into a whirlpool: I made a pillow of forgiveness from God.

"I said, 'Oh! I, wretched being, am full of shame on approaching Thee: turn aside from this confusion, and pass over my offences.

"Although I have swerved from Thy command, reject me not, since I have turned back from all my sins."

"When He saw my shame from those who might bring assistance, He, Who is without companions, gave me aid.

"My speech prevailed upon the effusion of mercy. He threw off my burden and took me up.

"Every sigh which is uttered in penitence, will be a guard in the tumult of resurrection.

"All thy words, O thou weigher of wind, are but measuring loss and weighing sorrow.

"While thou art remaining in eager search of stones and pearl, thy measure of wealth is become empty and the cup of thy life full.

"Take a measure of thy past years and months, having measured them, take this month and this year."

* See *Shrine of Wisdom*, Vol. XI, No. 42, p. 160.

ONOMASTICON THEOLOGICUM

AN EXTRACT FROM
 AN ESSAY ON THE DIVINE NAMES
 ACCORDING TO THE PLATONIC PHILOSOPHY
 BY FLOYER SYDENHAM*

In those times when the philosophy of Plato was held in that high estimation which the excellence of it deserves, and was studied with that serious and profound attention which the importance and depth of it demand, a discovery was made that the tendency of all its parts uniformly points to the knowledge of the Divine Being: on which account we apprehend it was that, whenever in those days Plato was spoken of, it was usual to prefix to his name the epithet of Divine. This mark of distinction is certainly due to his philosophy. For it teaches that the whole created universe is a manifestation of the Divine Mind, a distinct declaration or, as it were, an open evolution of those Ideas which at the same time abide in that Mind, inwardly enwrapped and comprehended, as having there their native and eternal seat. So that, according to Plato's doctrine, the absolute Perfections of the Divine Being are exhibited to the view of all His rational creatures; and the glories of the Divine Ideas are displayed throughout the innumerable worlds of which the universe consists. From Plato's philosophy it follows that whatever is permanent in outward natures, whatever is immutably true in morals or in politics, oweth its permanency and truth to the Eternity and Immutability of the Divine Cause of all things—the Creator of outward Nature, the Father of all moral beings, and the Author of all good government. From Plato's philosophy we learn that whatever is demonstrable in any of the sciences, whatever is certain in any of the arts dependent upon those sciences, derives its clearness in theory and its certainty in practice from the self-evident principles of Mind, whose fountain is the Divine Essence. The philosophy of Plato teaches that all the connections

* See also *Shrine of Wisdom*, Vol.XV, No. 58, page 287, and No. 59, page 316.

by which the several parts of Nature compose one entire and ever-during whole, all the ties and relations—whether natural or voluntary—in human life, owe their strength and sacredness to those eternal Truths, the relations between the Divine Ideas.

There is good reason to believe that Plato has faithfully recorded his master's divine doctrine in those speeches of his *Dialogues* which he puts into his master's mouth. To vindicate the purity and simplicity of this doctrine, and to clear it from any mixture, we have endeavoured in the following essay to bring into one point of view the whole *Theology* of Plato; collecting from his various writings the Names by which he expresseth his sentiments of the Divine Nature, and his notions of the Unity or Oneness of It: for he applies all those Names to One only Being, Whom we, in our language, invoke by the Name alone of GOD.

Porphyry the philosopher wrote a treatise concerning the Divine Names, explanatory, we presume, of the truly Divine Nature. That work of Porphyry's unfortunately is lost. But there remains to this day a treatise, ascribed to Dionysius the Areopagite, written purposely to illustrate the Names or Characters by which the One Supreme Being is represented to us in the sacred books of Jews and Christians. And it is probable that Porphyry wrote his treatise, which had the same title, on purpose to illustrate, in like manner, the Names by which the One Supreme Being is characterized in the writings of Plato and Aristotle.

The Orphic Theologists, who introduced the Eastern learning into Greece and whose followers in Theology were the Pythagorean Philosophers, characterized the One Universal and Divine Mind by the figurative appellation of FOUNTAIN of Fountains. For they considered those Ideas, which are Universal in the most unlimited meaning of that word, as the Fountains of all which is *true*, or *good*, or *beautiful* in Nature, of all which is excellent in man, and of that full and complete *harmony* of things, through which the whole outward universe is preserved in a sound and flourishing state for ever:* and the Divine Mind they

* To this ancient doctrine it seems agreeable and consequential to suppose that these Ideas, the most Divine and truly Universal, contain virtually, and as it were seminally, all the innumerable Ideas, which are copies in the diverse kinds and species of corporeal things. An instance or two of such a comprehensive virtue in those absolute Universals may serve to explain our meaning, and at the same time

considered as the sole Fountain* of those Fountains; that is, of those Divine Ideas, which are truly and absolutely Universal.

to show the probability of a similar comprehensiveness in them all. The Universal Idea of Beauty contains within it, virtually, the general ideas of all the kinds of beauty: in these general ideas, are included the ideas of all the generic properties and powers, constituent of Beauty in each of its several kinds: and within the ideas of these generic properties and powers are included the specific ideas of the qualities peculiar to each beautiful form or species. In like manner through divisions and subdivisions, the Universal Idea of Virtue comprehends every particular virtue, excellence, or power, belonging to any kind and species of being whatsoever. Now, if what we have above supposed, and deem probable, be true, namely, that in these and in other Ideas, such as are absolutely and truly Universal, all general and special ideas are potentially or virtually contained, it follows that those absolute Universals may very properly be considered as the Formal Causes, virtually, seminally, primarily, and parentally, of all things in outward Nature; inasmuch as they comprehend and contain within them all those general and special ideas which are the actual and immediate Formal Causes of all external things.

* Between Ideal Things, the Objects of Mind, and corporeal things, the objects of outward sense, there may be found in many respects a very natural and just analogy; as indeed it is reasonable to expect; the latter being but images of the former. On this analogy between them, in respect of their rise and origin, depends the propriety of the metaphorical term *Fountain*; a term borrowed from things sensible, and applied to things purely mental, in the first of the Divine Names, which we have here attempted to comment upon, namely, FOUNTAIN of Fountains. To this we have given the first place because it seems to be first in dignity, as being supereminent or transcendental. For since the term Fountain is therein applied simply, to every one of the Names which are to follow, the Name FOUNTAIN of Fountains expressly comprehends all the rest, and declares Its own Transcendent Excellence. The same metaphorical term *fountain*, taken from the apparent origins or sources of all the water in our terraqueous globe, will, according to the analogy just now spoken of, illustrate our hypothesis in the note preceding this. For a fountain, sending forth a stream of water, which afterwards divides into several rivulets, produces all the waters flowing from it; and may be considered as the productive parent of them all, into how many distinct channels soever they may run. Plato, in his Dialogue called the *Banquet*, alludes to the like analogy between mental and corporeal things in respect of their seminal generation. Agreeable to which allusion is the use we have made of the metaphorical terms, seminally and virtually, in speaking of the gradual rise of ideas, as it were from one Primordial Seed, full of life and genial virtue.

For a further illustration of our hypothesis we shall call to our

This ancient description of the Supreme Being as the Fountain of Fountains—a description which the Platonic philosophers attribute to Zoroaster as the author of it—may perhaps be illustrated by exemplifying its truth in some of these Fountains of Good, the Primary and Universal Ideas of the Divine Mind. But previously to this kind of illustration, it seems proper and necessary to consider MIND, as comprehending in Itself the Primary Objects of Intellection, the Principles of all true Knowledge,* the Component Elements of all Ideal Forms, and of all aid another of the Divine Names or Figurative Terms applied to the Supreme Being by the ancient theologians, namely, LIGHT. For as the sun is the fountain of external light to this visible world, they held the Divine Mind to be analogous to it; and the Fountain of Intelligence or Intellectual Light, to the Intelligible or Ideal World. In this view, those Primary and Universal Ideas, the Fountains of all the different kinds of good which run throughout the whole external universe, may be considered as Beams, emitted forth and poured on all Nature, from the Absolute Goodness of the Divine Mind, that great Idea of Universal Good, Which is Himself. For although this Intellectual Sun, Who enlightens the whole Ideal World, be uniform in His Essence, like uncoloured Light, yet as He beams around on all things without exception or intermission, His Beams appear to take a diversity of tints from the diversely coloured objects on which they fall: so that as these Beams are reflected back to their Omnicentral Source, this Absolute Goodness, this Sole Fountain of all Good, appears omniform and assumes different characters or denominations, according to the diversity of its objects, or the different lights, in which the same objects are viewed and considered.

* That Sameness and Difference are Principles of Knowledge will appear from considering that nothing is properly or truly said to be known by us, unless we know the *sameness* of it with some things, namely, with the same in kind, and the precise *difference* of it from other things, namely, from the specifically or numerically different. We thus find that the Intellection of the Essences of Same and Different, that is, of Sameness Itself and of Difference Itself, is fundamental to all Knowledge.

And that Intellection of the Essence of Many, Multitude in the abstract, or Number Itself, is a Principle no less necessary to Knowledge of any kind, than the Intellection of Oneness, or of a One, will appear, if we consider that all difference implies the being of many, or at least of more than one; that the smallest difference, a difference merely numerical, implies the being of number; and that from the intellection of *this* only difference, we acquire the lowest degree of knowledge, the knowledge of a species, the least or smallest one and many; where sameness and difference appear first together, in our rising from sense to Science or true Knowledge. That these Principles of Knowledge,

One and Many, Same and Difference, are the Principles also of Mind Itself, appear from the following considerations.

The human mind, in the earliest state of infancy, seems to be, with regard to intellection or understanding, nothing more than a bare capacity: but as soon as she begins to energize (and all the virtue or power of mind consists in energizing) whatever form is presented to her view she perceives it to be one thing; and the many forms, occurring to her in succession, she views as so many distinct ones: she perceives that each of them is a thing different from every other; and that it is the same with itself, whenever it occurs unaltered: and thus arise in her some obscure notions of Oneness and Multitude, Sameness and Difference. In process of time, sooner or later, she compares these forms, one with another, and perceiving between some of them a similarity and an agreement, a kind of sameness, inferior in degree only to self-sameness, perceiving also between these and others a dissimilarity and disagreement, a difference greater than that which is merely numerical, she unites (or sees united) together within herself, the similar; and calling them by one and the same name, she conceives within herself a specific form, the idea of a species, in which the multitude of similar forms are comprehended, and from which all dissimilar forms are excluded. When further, the mind by her own innate Light, the Light of Sameness and Difference, Oneness and Multitude (which is at the same time the Eye of Mind and the Light by which that Eye sees Intelligible Things, that is, One and Many, Same and Difference, together)—when this internal Eye is opened, and the mind hath attained the power of looking into her self, and of contemplating her own ideas, she is able also to make her own being the object of her contemplation. If she is then willing so to do, and has leisure and opportunity to withdraw herself from all sensible objects, she will soon perceive, in such a retirement, that she hath the same relation to her internal or ideal forms as the infinite (indefinitely extensible) or external matter has to forms external and corporeal: for that she is the place where ideas or internal forms are seated; she will perceive also, that she is, in like manner, the subject-matter of these forms: for that she herself is formed by them, and is indeed that very form which she beholds, during the time of her beholding it. Thus will the human mind attain to know that every mind is by nature both intellectual and intelligible: that, as she is intellectual, she hath a capacity of apprehending and beholding any ideas or intelligible forms presented to her—though she can actually behold but one only at a time—and that as she is intelligible to herself, and the object of her own intellection, she herself is that very idea of mental form which she at any time beholds. Mind, therefore, considered as the place of those ideas which it contains, comprehends, and surrounds, should seem to be of larger extent and more ample than any, the largest or most universal ideas contained within it, and even than all its ideas taken together: yet, at the same time, mind, considered as the subject-matter of ideas, receiving form from them—or in other words, being

their mutual relations: by these Primary Objects we mean the Ideas of One and Many, Same and Different. Now these, in combination together and united in Mind (for in every mind there is a union of their essences, and this union seems to be the very essence of mind), constitute *uniformity amid variety*; and thus are they found to be also the Principles or the Constituent Elements of Beauty: whence it is that Beauty is perceivable only by mind; in mind alone all multitude receives a bound, and every number partakes of unity, beginning and ending with a unit; measured also throughout by ones, and itself becoming one whole; in mind alone, Sameness remains amidst all Difference—the sameness of a species, or of a genus, amidst every difference between individuals. Seeing, then, that the bounds and measures of all multitudes and numbers are within all minds, we may reasonably infer that the One Universal Mind, where these mental Principles, the Elements of Mind, originally and eternally are (and where they are the Fountain-Principles and Elements of every particular mind), is Bound and Measure Itself, the Principle of all Proportion, Order, and Harmony: and these are the constituents of all Good, as well as of all Beauty.

Having now, in a summary way, treated of these Principles of formed by them, or rather, being formed according to them—is of equal amplitude and extent with its ideas. The human mind, from these considerations, will perceive that her essence, considered apart from her ideas and merely as an intellectual being, is simply one; but that considered again together with her ideas—considered as her own object, as intelligible, as well as intellectual—she is the first or highest one and many, one great Idea comprehensive, or recipient, of all other Ideas how large soever. She will perceive that she is the same always with herself; the same also with the Ideal Form which she actually beholds; and that she is different from all those Ideal Forms which she actually beholds not. She will further perceive that every one of her ideas, from the most general down to the most special, is a likeness (in miniature) of herself, as being one and many, and also as being the same one in each of the subordinate many which it contains; and yet so diversified in each, that sameness and difference are, in every one of them, together. But all things sensible, and every individual being, divisible only into parts (not one of which is one and many, nor same and different), are objects of outer sense only, and are not visible to the Eye of Mind. Hence it appears that Oneness and Multitude, taken together, are the Principles of Intellection—that is, of Mind considered as Intelligent or Intellectual; and that Sameness and Difference, both together, are the Elements of every Idea, or Mental Form: that is, of Mind considered as Intelligible.

Intellection—or the Mind considered as Intellectual, or Intelligence—these Elements of Mind, considered as Intelligible, or as the One all-comprehensive Object to Itself, and having thus laid the foundation of what we have to say concerning those divinely Universal Ideas, the Fountains of that immense ocean of Beauty and Good, the Universe, but resolvable, all of them, into ONE only FOUNTAIN, let us proceed, with a becoming diffidence of our own private reason, but with no less a becoming confidence in the aid of that Paternal Mind to Whom, with humble prayer, we look up for aid in contemplating His Essence, the inconceivable Essence of an absolutely Universal ONE. Thus, then, proceed we to consider those Ideas, truly Divine, and truly Universal, by which the wisdom of antiquity characterized the One sole FOUNTAIN of all Good and Beauty. For the ancient sages rightly judged, in their supposing, that although the Divine Being be inconceivable in One Idea, yet in several Ideas taken together, each of Them compatible to a Nature the most excellent, as much of His Essence might be discovered as it concerns man to know. This, the very First Fountain of Things, this Cause of Causes, the Supreme Monad of the Pythagoreans, is, by the Eleatic Philosophers and by Plato, considered as He is ONE, not One of Many, like an individual of some species; nor One and Many, like the Idea of a species or of a genus, of things in outward Nature; nor like some One Number in Arithmetic, consisting of many ones or units, but (to make use of arithmetical terms metaphorically, as we conceive the Pythagoreans to have done of old) He is justly to be considered as simply One, the Fountain of all Number; as the Original and Primary One, from Whom is derived the Oneness of every Universal Idea, or of every One and Many; the Oneness also of every individual being, and of every whole, or thing composed of parts; the Oneness of every world, and of every system of worlds contained in the Universe; and the Oneness of universal Nature: in fine, as the Essential One, or ONE ITSELF; the Rays of Whose universal and ubiquitarian Oneness spread themselves throughout Infinity, and of Whose Essence—considered not as Universal, but as simply One—every particle of formed matter partakes.

FLOYER SYDENHAM ON DIVINE BEAUTY

None except the rational have, for aught that appears, any perception or sense of Beauty. And yet Nature exhibits Beauty in all those forms of her production, the fossil, the vegetable, and the animal, with which mere sensitive beings are daily conversant. But these beings, even the most perfect of them, have no other eyes than what are corporeal: in everything, therefore, which they look at, they see nothing but what is, like themselves, corporeal; nothing but the colour and the shape of it, the mere *μορφή*. For, as they are void of mind, and have no internal or incorporeal eye, they cannot perceive any thing which is incorporeal; and such a thing is Beauty. But with mind Beauty is congenial: whence it is easily and naturally by mind perceived and known. Inseparably connected with all mind is Beauty: and on this close connection depends the truth of these two positions; namely, that all beings endued with mind (and only such beings are rational) have a perception or sense of Beauty; and that, on the other hand, all beings void of the sense of Beauty, are void also of mind. With these general truths agree the following particular observations; namely, that the best philosophers in all ages have ever been the greatest lovers of beauty in the fine arts, and the most judicious critics on the performances therein; and that the best performers and masters in any of these arts, especially in the noblest of them, poetry and oratory, appear to have been well versed in the best philosophy, the study of mind and manners; that, on the other hand, those individuals of the human kind, whose mental faculties are duller than ordinary, are found to have a less sense of Beauty than other of their kind; that sensualists wholly immersed in pleasures purely corporeal have no feeling of any other, and are as insensible to the charms of Beauty, in even the lower species of it, that is in forms corporeal, as they are to the charms of it in any of the higher, that is in natural or social affection—in true love or friendship, in honesty and goodness, in generosity, gratitude, and patriotism, or in pure science, right reasoning, and speculative truth; and that those persons, whom necessity obliges to

employ the whole time of their lives in acquiring the means of continuing in life, such persons also as from choice employ it wholly in accumulating riches, have their thoughts so entirely engrossed by a constant attention to things purely corporeal that, be their mental faculties ever so bright and strong by nature, they generally lose, by degrees, all their natural relish of things incorporeal and purely mental.

We should not speak of the plenteous provision made by the All-beneficent Author of Nature, for the rational enjoyment of those His creatures Whom He has favoured with a sense of Beauty. But this is a theme by much too copious to be handled explicitly in our present undertaking. It may be sufficient to observe that every large part of Nature is an ample store-house, filled with provisions of this kind; that every individual being or production of Nature—even the minutest, enlarged to human sight by a microscope—is a spectacle of beauty; and that as much of the external world, or of sky, ocean and earth, as the human eye is able to take in together at one view, from the summit of a high hill in some fertile country near the sea in a sunshiny day, or in a star-light night, affords the most sublime and magnificent scene of corporeal beauty conceivable by man. Now all this beauty which results from the orderly disposition of various parts, and the harmonious composition of them together in a whole, is open to the view of all men: and the beauty of those parts of the universe which are inhabited by us, and of each particular object therein, is easy to be perceived by every person who has opportunities and other means of speculating the works of Nature. But beside what is daily thus obvious to an ordinary beholder's eye, the deep-searching fossilogist, the far-travelling botanist, the curious florist, and the inquisitive zoologist, are in every age going on to discover new objects of beauty in those parts of Nature which engage their attention and admiration most. The learned astronomer is employed in discovering more and more of regularity and harmony in the motions of those celestial bodies termed comets; and, consequently, more and more of order and beauty in the great mundane system. And to the experimental chemist, and the ingenious physiologer, is Nature gradually unfolding those hidden measures and proportions used by her in mixing her elementary or most minute parts, in composing also her mixtures, and in decomposing

her compositions, for the framing of bodies visible to the eye of outward sense. In fine, every advancement made in physical knowledge is a new discovery of some beauty unseen before: either a harmony between the parts of some being, till then unknown; or a harmony, till then undiscovered, between known beings; or the harmony between some larger and comprehensive parts of the corporeal universe. And of such discoveries we presume that never can there be an end; and that man never can attain to a complete knowledge of Nature and of her beauties; for that as the external universe is immense, and as matter,* the subject of external form, is infinite, the sub-divisions of form, and the relations between the various beings which fill the universe—though they fall short of being infinite (in number), and though, were all of them known, they might be numbered—must certainly remain for ever indefinite. Enough, however, of this knowledge is, and perhaps in all ages hath been, amongst men, to authorize the conclusion from analogy, namely, that outward Nature, throughout the Universe, is full of Beauty, and from this conclusion another will rationally follow regarding the relation between effect and cause, namely, that the Inward Nature of the Universe, the Fountain of all this beauty, is Beauty Original, Beauty Itself, Beauty Universal.

SEED THOUGHT

“Love harmonizes the three powers of our Soul, and binds them together. The will moves the understanding to see, when it wishes to love; when the understanding perceives that the will would fain love, if it is a rational will, it places before it as object the ineffable love of the eternal Father, Who has given us the Word, His own Son, and the obedience and humility of the Son, Who endureth torments, mockeries, and insults with meekness and with such great love. And thus the will, with ineffable love, follows what the eye of the understanding has beheld; and, with its strong hand, it stores in the memory the treasure that it draws from this love.”

ST. CATHERINE OF SIENA.

* i.e. matter in its abstract sense.