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ON THE MYTHOLOGY OF THE GREEKS *

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PART I

As the mythology of the Greeks is intimately connected with their philosophy and theology, it is not at all wonderful, since the moderns are ignorant of the latter, that they have not genuinely developed the former. For the most piercing sagacity, the most brilliant wit, and the most exquisite subtlety of thought without the assistance of philosophy are here of no avail. It is, indeed, easy for ingenious men to explain an ancient fable in a way which to the superficial observer shall appear to be the precise meaning which its inventor designed to convey, though it be in reality very far from the truth. This may be easily accounted for, by considering that all fables are images of truths; but those of the Greeks, of truths with which but few are acquainted. Hence, like pictures of unknown persons, they become the subjects of endless conjecture and absurd opinion, from the similitude which everyone fancies he discovers in them to objects which are generally known, and with which he is familiar. He who understands the explanations given by the Platonic philosophers of these fables, will immediately subscribe to the truth of this observation, as he will find that these interpretations are a *scientific* development of their external or apparent meaning.

In order to demonstrate this, I shall present the reader with an elucidation of some of the principal fables of the Greeks, by these philosophers, and particularly of those of Homer: preparatory to which it will be necessary, in the first place, to consider whence the ancients were induced to devise fables; in the second place, to show what the difference is between the fables of philosophers and those of poets; and in the third place, to enumerate the different species of fables, and give examples of each.

* Certain passages of this article which have not a direct bearing on the subject of Mythology have been omitted.—Eds. S.O.W.

As to the first particular then, the ancients employed fables looking to two things, nature and our Soul. They employed them by looking to nature and the fabrication of things, as follows:— From things that are visible we believe in things invisible; and from bodies, in incorporeal natures. For, seeing the orderly arrangement of bodies in the universe we understand that a certain incorporeal power presides over them. As we therefore see that our body is moved but is no longer so after death, we conceive that it was a certain incorporeal power which moved it. Hence, perceiving that we believe in things incorporeal and invisible on account of things visible and corporeal, fables came to be adopted in order that we might progress from a knowledge of things visible to a knowledge of invisible natures; as for instance, that on hearing of the adulteries, bonds, and lacerations of the Gods, the castrations of Heaven, and the like, we may not rest satisfied with the apparent meaning of such particulars, but may proceed to the unapparent, and investigate its true signification. After this manner, therefore, looking to the nature of things, were fables employed.*

* The philosopher Sallust, likewise, in the following admirable manner, unfolds the reason why fables were employed by the ancients, in his golden treatise *On the Gods and the World* (cap. 3):—

“The first utility arising from fables is this—that they excite us to inquiry, and do not suffer our reasoning power to remain in indolent rest. That fables therefore are divine may be shown from those by whom they are employed. For they are used by divinely inspired poets, by the best philosophers, by those who instituted the Mysteries, and by the Gods Themselves in oracles. But why fables are divine it is the province of philosophy to investigate. Since, then, all beings rejoice in similitude, but turn away abhorrent from dissimilitude, it is requisite that assertions about the Gods should be similar to Them, in order that they may be adapted to the dignity of Their essence, and may render the Gods propitious to those by whom the assertions are made; which can alone be effected through fables. Hence fables imitate the Gods and the Goodness of the Gods according to the effable and ineffable, the visible and invisible, the perspicuous and the concealed. For as the Gods impart to all men in common the benefits produced by sensibles, but to the wise alone the benefits of Intelligibles, thus also fables proclaim to all men that there are Gods; but Who They are, and in what Their Nature consists, they unfold to those who are capable of obtaining this knowledge. They likewise imitate the energies of the Gods. For the world also may be called a fable; bodies indeed, and sensible things being visibly contained in it, but Souls and Intellects subsisting in it latently. And besides this, to teach all men the truth

But from looking to the human Soul they originated as follows: While we are children we live according to the phantasy; but the phantastic part is conversant with figures, and types, and things of this kind. That the phantastic part in us therefore may be preserved, we employ fables, in consequence of this part rejoicing in fables. It may also be said that *a fable is nothing else than a false discourse, adumbrating the truth:** for a fable is the image of truth. But the Soul is the image of the Natures prior to herself; and hence she rejoices in fables, as an image in an image. As we are therefore from our childhood nourished in fables, it is necessary that they should be introduced. And thus much for the first problem, concerning the origin of fables.

In the second place, let us consider what the difference is between the fables of philosophers and poets. Each, therefore, has something in which it abounds more than, and something in which it is deficient from the other. Thus, for instance, the poetic fable abounds in this—that we must not rest satisfied with the apparent meaning, but pass on to the occult truth; but it is defective in this, *that it deceives those of a juvenile age.*† Plato, concerning the Gods produces contempt in the stupid, through their inability of understanding it, and indolence in the worthy; but to conceal the truth in fables, prevents the contempt of the former and compels the latter to philosophize. Why, however, do fables speak of thefts, adulteries, paternal bonds, and other absurd atrocious deeds? May it not be said that such narrations are attended with this admirable effect—that the Soul, through the apparent absurdity, is immediately led to conceive that these assertions are veils, and that the truth contained in them is arcane?—T.T.

* Conformably to this definition of a fable by Olympiodorus, Timaeus the Locrian says: “For as we sometimes restore bodies to health by things of a noxious nature when this is not to be effected by such as are most salubrious; thus also we restrain Souls (from evil conduct) by *assertions which are not literally true*, when they are incapable of being led by such as are true.” So entirely ignorant, however, are many of the present day, even among those that are called learned, of this definition of a fable that the fables of Homer are continually defamed by these men as monstrously incongruous, from not perceiving that they have a hidden meaning, and that like the curtains which formerly guarded the *adyta* of temples from the profane eye, they are the veils of truths the most luminous and divine.—T.T.

† Hence it follows that those who are deceived by these fables, i.e. who consider them solely according to their individual meaning, are juvenile in understanding.—T.T.

therefore, neglects fables of this kind, and banishes Homer from his Republic; because youth, on hearing such fables, will not be able to distinguish what is allegorical from what is not.

Philosophical fables, on the contrary, do not injure those who go no farther than the apparent meaning. Thus, for instance, they assert that there are punishments and rivers under the earth: and if we adhere to the literal meanings of these we shall not be injured. But they are deficient in this, that as their apparent signification does not injure, we often content ourselves with this, and do not explore the latent truth. We may also say that philosophic fables look to the energies of the Soul. For if we were entirely Intellect alone, and had no connexion with the phantasy, we should not require fables, in consequence of always associating with Intellectual Natures. If, again, we were entirely irrational, and lived according to the phantasy, and had no other energy than this, it would be requisite that the whole of our life should be fabulous. Since, however, we possess Intellect, opinion, and phantasy, demonstrations are given with a view to Intellect: and hence Plato says, that if anyone is willing to energize according to Intellect, he will have demonstrations bound with adamant chains; if according to opinion, he will have the testimony of renowned persons; and if according to the phantasy, he will have fables by which it is excited; so that from all these he will derive advantage.

Plato, therefore, rejects the more tragical mode of mythologizing adopted by the ancient poets who thought proper to establish an arcane theology respecting the Gods, and on this account devised wanderings, castrations, battles, and lacerations of the Gods, and many other symbols of the truth about Divine Natures, which this theology conceals; this mode he rejects, and asserts that it is in every respect most foreign from erudition. But he considers those mythological discourses about the Gods to be more persuasive and more adapted to truth, which assert that a Divine Nature is the cause of all good, but of no evil; and that it is void of all mutation, comprehending in itself the fountain of truth, but never becoming the cause of any deception to others. For such types of theology Socrates delivers in the Republic.

Hence all the fables of Plato, guarding the truth in concealment, have not even their externally apparent apparatus discordant with

our undisciplined and unperverted anticipations of Divinity. But they bring with them an image of the mundane composition, in which both the apparent beauty is worthy of Divinity, and a beauty more divine than this is established in the unapparent lives and powers of its causes.

In the third place, with respect to the different species of fables, they are five in number, and are beautifully unfolded by the philosopher Sallust in his treatise *On the Gods and the World* (cap. 4), as follows: "Of fables, some are theological, others physical, others psychical (pertaining to Soul), others material, and others are mingled from these.

"*Theological* fables never employ body, but survey the essences themselves of the Gods; and of this kind are Saturn's absorption of His children. For since Saturn is an Intellectual God,* but every Intellect is converted to Itself, the fable obscurely indicates the essence of the God. But we may survey fables *physically*, when they speak of the energies of the Gods about the world. Thus, for instance, some, conceiving time to be Saturn, and calling the parts of time the children of the whole of time, say that the children are absorbed by the father. The *psychical* mode of fables consists in surveying the energies of the Soul herself; because the intellections of our Souls, though they proceed into other things, yet abide in their parents. And the *material* mode is that which is especially used through inerudition by the Egyptians,† who call bodies by the names of Gods, and conceive them to be Gods. According to this mode, earth is denominated Isis, but moisture Osiris, and heat Typhon; or water is called Saturn, but fruits Adonis, and wine Bacchus. And to assert, indeed, that these are dedicated to the Gods in the same manner as plants and stones and animals, is the province of wise men; but it pertains to madmen only to call them Gods; unless after the same manner

* Thus also He is defined by Plato in the *Cratylus* to be *coros nous*, a pure Intellect. Saturn, according to the fable, not only devoured His children, but afterwards refunded them, because Intellect not only seeks and procreates, but produces into light and profits.—T.T.

† Among the Egyptians who were contemporary with Sallust, religion and philosophy had become generally degraded, although in its original purity Egyptian Wisdom was the source from which the greatest of the Greek philosophers derived their teachings.—Eds. S.O.W.

as when from custom we call the orb of the sun, and the rays emanating from that orb, the sun itself.

“The *mixed* species of fables may be seen in many other examples, and in that in which it is said that Strife at a banquet of the Gods threw a golden apple, and that a contention about it arising among the Goddesses, they were sent by Jupiter to take the judgment of Paris, who being charmed with the beauty of Venus, gave her the apple in preference to the rest. For here the banquet manifests the supermundane powers of the Gods, and on this account they subsist in conjunction with each other: but the golden apple is the world, which, as it consists of contraries is very properly said to be thrown by Strife. As different Gods, however, impart different gifts to the world, they appear to contend for the apple. And a Soul living according to sense (for this is Paris), and not perceiving the other powers in the universe, says that the apple subsists alone through the beauty of Venus.

“But of fables, the theological pertain to philosophers; the physical and psychical to poets; and the mixed to the Mysteries; since the intention of all mysteries is to conjoin us to the world and the Gods.” And thus much for the different species of fables according to the excellent Sallust.

Previous to a development of some of the fables of Homer, it will be requisite to observe that this most divine poet, by combining fiction with historical facts, has delivered to us some very occult, mystic, and valuable information, in those two admirable poems, the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. Hence, by those who directed their attention to this recondite information, he was said, according to the tragical mode of speaking which was usual with the most ancient writers, to have been blind, because as Proclus observes, he separated himself from sensible beauty and extended the Intellect of his Soul to invisible and true harmony. He was said, therefore, to be blind because *that* Intellectual Beauty to which he raised himself, cannot be perceived by corporeal eyes. Thus, too, Orpheus is tragically said to have been lacerated in an all-various manner, because men of that age *partially* participated of his mystic doctrine. The *principal part* of it, however, was received by the Lesbians; and on this account his head, when separated from his body, is said to have been carried to Lesbos. Hence the Platonic Hermeas,

conformably to this opinion of the hidden meaning of the *Iliad*, beautifully explains, as follows, the Trojan war in his *Scholia* on the *Phaedrus* of Plato:—

“By Ilion we must understand the generated and material place, which is so denominated from mud and matter (hyle) and in which there are war and sedition. But the Trojans are material forms, and all the lives which subsist about bodies. Hence also the Trojans are called *genuine*; for all the lives which subsist about bodies and irrational Souls are favourable and attentive to their proper matter. On the contrary, the Greeks are rational Souls, coming from Greece, i.e. from the Intelligible into matter. Hence the Greeks are called *foreigners*, and vanquish the Trojans, as being of a superior order. But they fight with each other about the image of Helen, as the poet says (about the image of Aeneas).

“Around the phantom, Greeks and Trojans fight.” (*Il.* v. 451). *Helen* signifying Intelligible Beauty, being a certain *vessel* (*ελενοη*), attracting to itself Intellect. An efflux therefore of this Intelligible Beauty is imparted to matter through Venus; and about this efflux of Beauty the Greeks fight with the Trojans (i.e. rational with irrational lives).* And those, indeed, that oppose and vanquish matter return to the Intelligible World, which is their true country; but those who do not, as is the case with the multitude, are bound to matter. As therefore the prophet in the tenth book of the *Republic*, previously to the descent of Souls, announces to them how they may return (to their pristine felicity) according to periods of a thousand and ten thousand years; thus also Calchas predicts to the Greeks their return in ten years, the number ten being a symbol of a perfect period. And as in the lives of Souls some are elevated through philosophy, others through the amatory art, and others through the royal and warlike disciplines; so with respect to the Greeks, some act with rectitude through prudence, but others through war or love, and their return is different (according to their different pursuits).”

* Conformably to this, Proclus in *Plat. Polit.* p. 398 says, “that all the beauty subsisting about generation (or the regions of sense) from the fabrication of things is signified by Helen; about which there is a perpetual battle of Souls, till the more intellectual having vanquished the more irrational forms of life, return to the place from whence they originally came.” For the beauty which is in the realms of generation is an efflux of Intelligible Beauty.—T.T.

It may also be said that by the Greeks and Trojans Homer adumbrates the twofold orders of mundane natures, arising from a division of the universe into the incorporeal and the corporeal, and from again dividing the incorporeal into the more intellectual and the more material natures, but the corporeal into the heavens and the sublunary region, the heavens into contrary periods, and the sublunary region into opposite powers: and that he also adumbrates through these the powers of an opposite characteristic which subsists in the mundane Gods, in daemons, in Souls, and in bodies. "Hence," says Proclus (in *Tim.* p. 300), "Homer when energizing enthusiastically represents Jupiter speaking, and converting to Himself the twofold co-ordinations of Gods; becoming Himself, as it were, the centre of all the Divine genera in the world, and making all things obedient to His intellection. But at one time He conjoins the multitude of Gods to Himself without a medium, and at another through Themis as the medium:—

‘But Jove to Themis gives command to call
The Gods to council’ (*Iliad* xx. v. 5.)

For this Goddess pervading everywhere collects the Divine *number*, and converts it to the Demiurgic *Monad*. For the Gods are both separate from mundane affairs, and eternally provide for all things, being at the same time exempt from them through the highest transcendency, and extending Their Providence everywhere. For Their unmingled nature is not without providential energy, nor is Their Providence mingled with matter. Through transcendency of power They are not filled with the subjects of Their government; and through beneficent will, They make all things similar to Themselves; in permanently abiding, proceeding, and although in being exempt from, being similarly present to all things. Since, therefore, the Gods that govern the world, and the daemons,* the attendants of These, receive after this manner unmingled purity and providential administration from Their Father; at one time He converts Them to Himself without a medium, and illuminates Them with a separate, unmingled and pure form of life. Whence, also, I think He orders Them to be exempt from all things, to remain

* Angels.

in Olympus,* and neither convert Themselves to Greeks nor Barbarians; which is just the same as to say that They must transcend the twofold orders of mundane natures and abide immutably in undefiled intellection. But at another time He converts Them to a providential attention to secondary natures through Themis, calls upon Them to direct the mundane battle, and excites different Gods to different works."

As to the recondite meaning of the *Odyssey*, the opinion of Numenius the Pythagorean appears to me to be highly probable, that Homer in the person of Ulysses represents to us a man who passes in a regular manner over the dark and stormy sea of generation; and thus at length arrives at that region where tempests and seas are unknown, and finds a nation,

"Who ne'er knew salt, or heard the billows roar."

(*Odys.* xi. 122 and xxii. 270.)

"For, indeed," says Porphyry,† "it will not be lawful for anyone to depart from this sensible life in a regular way, and in the shortest time, who blinds and irritates his natal daemon;‡ because he who dares to do this will be pursued by the anger§ of the marine

* i.e. in the highest and purest intellectual splendour.

† *On the Cave of the Nymphs*, p. 271.

‡ The natal daemon is that aspect of Providential power which "keeps souls in their own manners, which are not yet able to ascend."—Proclus. (i.e. maintains the natural energies and tendencies which pertain to the irrational part of man.—Eds. *S.O.W.*)

"Ulysses, after voluntary submission to his natal daemon by indulging the irrational appetites and desires of his Soul, flies from his base servitude, and adds irritations to his flight."—Thomas Taylor, *Restoration of the Platonic Theology*.

(He is, however, purified by thus contending with his lower nature, and striving to render himself fit for participation in the illumination of those Gods who preside over human energies and existences—"the marine and material Gods."—Eds. *S.O.W.*)

"He, therefore, who in the present life perceives himself like Ulysses, attended by uncommon misfortunes, while he is in the road of virtue, and eagerly searching for wisdom, may safely conclude that either here, or in a prior state, he has voluntarily submitted to the power of his natal daemon, and that he is now abrogating the concessions which he made."—Thomas Taylor, *Restoration of the Platonic Theology*.

§ "The 'anger' of the Gods is not an indication of any passion in Them, but demonstrates our inaptitude to participate of Their illuminations."—Proclus.

and material Gods, Whom it is first requisite to appease by sacrifices, labours, and patient endurance; at one time by contending with perturbations, at another time by employing stratagems of various kinds by which he transmutes himself into different forms; so that at length being stripped of the torn garments* by which his true person was concealed, he may recover the ruined empire of his Soul. Nor will he even then be freed from molestation till he has entirely passed over the raging sea, and taken a long farewell of its storms; till, though connected with a mortal nature, he becomes, through deep attention to intelligible concerns, so ignorant of marine and material operations as to mistake an oar for a corn-van." Porphyry adds, "Nor is it proper to believe that interpretations of this kind are forced, and are nothing more than the conjectures of ingenious men; but when we consider the great wisdom of antiquity, and how much Homer excelled in intelligence, and in every kind of virtue, we ought not to doubt that he has secretly represented the images of Divine things under the concealments of fable."

* i.e. becoming purified through the exercise of the cathartic virtues. Porphyry elegantly alludes to this denudation through the exercise of these virtues in the following passage in his excellent treatise, *De Abstentia*. Lib. I, p. 27:—"We must therefore divest ourselves of our many garments, both this visible and fleshy garment, and those with which we are inwardly clothed, and which are proximate to the cutaneous vestments. But we must enter the stadium naked, and without the encumbrance of dress, strenuously contending for the Olympia of the Soul."—T.T.

SEED THOUGHTS

Thou art never at any time nearer to God than when under tribulation; which He permits for the purification and beautifying of thy Soul.
—*Molinos*.

When, then, we shall be in very truth masters of ourselves, our footsteps will not be hampered, but boldly and freely we shall walk with the Lord, looking at all things along with Him.

And in company with Him shall we go forth to all things that are and are done, and thence shall we return unto Him the self-same, in all things being at peace and at rest in God.

—*Gerlac Petersen*.

PHILOSOPHICAL EXTRACTS FROM
DANTE'S "DE MONARCHIA"

THE book from which the following extracts are taken is one of Dante's less well-known works. It is a treatise on government, and more especially upon the rulership of a monarch, as the title implies. Much that it contains is of interest chiefly to the historian, but scattered throughout the work are to be found some of Dante's most profound philosophical conceptions concerning man and his ideal relations to God and to his fellows.

The manner in which first principles are used for the demonstration of many of the propositions is evidence that he was not only a poet, but also that he had been trained in the best philosophical schools of his day. He thus participated in that stream of pure philosophy originating in Plato, which has been the inspiration, directly or indirectly, of the greatest thinkers of the western world, and of which one of the chief characteristics is the manner in which it is based on primary principles which are themselves rooted in the Principle of all principles, and thus forms a complete, orderly, harmonious, and perfect whole.

Dante had a deep veneration for the traditions of the past, and he arrived at similar conclusions to those of the wisest of all ages, namely, that man, coming from a Divine Source, in order to realize the end for which he was created, must willingly conform in his activities to the Providential Laws by which all things are governed; human institutions should be constituted according to the plan exemplified in the universe; mundane rulership, to be ideal, must be in conformity with the perfect rulership of the Creator; and justice can only be administered amongst mankind through a realization and actualization of that Divine Justice by which all things are perpetually and harmoniously ordered.

Dante likewise realized the value of purity of outlook, and suggested that those who approached the study of philosophy should be "as little children," having no accumulation of metaphysical subtleties or false systems of teaching to unlearn. Through this childlike simplicity they would be in a far better position to unfold the faculties of their Souls, than would those whose minds are stored with a vast collection of unrelated knowledge about arcane matters.

The use of reason and the ability to relate all things to their real causes are the only means by which the problems of the human race can be solved with any degree of certitude.

The extracts which follow have been especially chosen with the object of emphasizing Dante's philosophical outlook upon life.

THE TRANSMISSION OF TRADITION

"It very greatly concerns all men on whom a higher nature has impressed the love of truth, that, as they have been enriched by the labour of those before them, so they also should labour for those that come after them, to the end that posterity may receive from them an addition to its wealth."

FIRST PRINCIPLES

"Since every truth which is not itself a first principle, becomes manifest from the truth of some first principle, it is therefore necessary in every inquiry to have a knowledge of the first principle involved, to which by analysis we may go back for the certainty of all the propositions which are afterwards accepted."

CAUSES

"A cause has the nature of a cause in proportion as it is more universal; for the lower cause is such only on account of the higher one. . . . And, in proportion as a cause is really a cause, it loves what it effects; for such love follows the cause by itself."

BEING AND OPERATION

"Let it be understood that God and Nature make nothing to be idle. Whatever comes into being, exists for some operation or working. For no created being is an ultimate end in the Creator's purpose, so far as He is a Creator, but rather the proper operation of that being. Therefore it follows that the operation does not exist for the sake of the being, but the being for the sake of the operation."

THE NATURE OF UNDERSTANDING

"The ultimate quality of men is not existence, taken simply; for the elements share therein. Nor is it existence under certain conditions, for we find this in minerals too. Nor is it existence

with life; for plants too have life. Nor is it percipient existence; for brutes share in this power. It is to be percipient with the possibility of understanding, for this quality falls to the lot of none but man, either above or below him. For though there are other beings which with him have understanding, yet this understanding is not, as man's, in need of development. For such beings are only certain intellectual natures, and not anything besides, and their being is nothing other than to understand; which is without interruption, otherwise they would not be eternal. It is plain, therefore, that the distinguishing quality of humanity is the faculty or the power of understanding."

THE SPECULATIVE AND THE PRACTICAL INTELLECT

"The speculative understanding becomes practical by extension; and then its end is to do and to make. This I say in reference to things which may be *done*, which are regulated by political wisdom, and in reference to things which may be *made*, which are regulated by art; all which things wait as handmaidens on the speculative intellect, as on that best good, for which the Primal Goodness created the human race."

"The practical intellect receives its major premiss from the speculative intellect, under which it places its own particular premiss, and then draws its particular conclusion with a view to action."

THE WORK OF HUMANITY

"The proper work of the human race, taken as a whole, is to set in action the whole capacity of that understanding which is capable of unfoldment: first in the way of speculation, and then by its extension, in the way of action. And seeing that what is true of a part may also be true of the whole, and that it is by tranquillity that the individual man becomes perfect in wisdom and prudence; so the human race, by living in the calm of universal peace, applies itself most freely and easily to its proper work; a work which, according to the saying: 'Thou hast made him a little lower than the angels,' is almost divine."

THE DIVINE LIKENESS

"All is well and at its best which exists according to the will of the First Agent, Who is God. This is self-evident, except to

those who deny that the Divine Goodness is absolutely perfect. Now it is the intention of God that all created things should represent the likeness of God, so far as their proper nature will admit. Therefore was it said: 'Let us make man in our image, after our likeness.' And though it could not be said that the lower part of creation was made in the image of God, yet all things may be said to be after His likeness, for what is the whole universe but the footprint of the Divine Goodness? The human race, therefore, is well, nay at its best state, when, so far as can be, it is made like unto God. But the human race is then most made like unto God when most it is one; for the true principle of oneness is in Him alone. Therefore it is written: 'Hear, O Israel; the Lord Thy God is one God.'"

JUSTICE

"The world is ordered best when Justice is most paramount therein; whence Virgil, wishing to celebrate that age, which in his own time seemed to be arising, sang: 'Now doth the Virgin return, and the kingdom of Saturn.' For Justice was named 'the Virgin,' and also Astraea. The kingdom of Saturn was the good time, which they also called the Golden Age . . . it must be recognized that Justice, considered in itself, and in its proper nature, is a certain rightness or rule of conduct, which rejects on either side all that deviates from it. It is like whiteness considered as an abstraction, not admitting of degrees."

JUSTICE, APPETITE, AND CHARITY

"As Appetite in some degree, however small, clouds the habit of Justice, so does Charity, or rightly directed affection, sharpen and enlighten it. In whomsoever, therefore, rightly-directed affection may chiefly dwell, in him may Justice have best place. That rightly-directed affections work as we have said, we may see thus: Appetite, scorning what in itself belongs to man, seeks for other things outside him; but Charity sets aside all else, and seeks God and man, and consequently the good of man. And since of all the good things that men can have, the greatest is to live in peace, and as it is Justice which most chiefly belongs to peace, therefore Charity will chiefly make Justice strong, and the more so in proportion to its own strength."

THE SHRINE OF WISDOM

FREEDOM OF WILL AND JUDGMENT

“The human race is ordered best when it is most free. For this will be manifest if we see what is the principle of freedom. It must be understood that the first principle of our freedom is freedom of will, which many have in the mouth, but few indeed understand. For they come so far as to say that the freedom of the will means a free judgment concerning will. And this is true. But what is meant by the words is far from them.

“Judgment is between Apprehension and Appetite. First, a man apprehends a thing; then he judges it to be good or bad; then he pursues or avoids it accordingly. If therefore the Judgment guides the Appetite wholly, and in no way is forestalled by the Appetite, then is the Judgment free. But if the Appetite in any way forestalls the Judgment and guides it, then the Judgment cannot be free: it is not its own: it is captive to another power. Therefore the brute beasts cannot have freedom of Judgment; for in them the Appetite always forestalls the Judgment. Therefore, too, it is that intellectual wills are unchangeable, and souls which are separate from the body, which have gone hence in peace, do not lose the freedom of their wills, because their wishes cannot change; nay, it is in full strength and completeness that their wills are free.

“It is therefore again manifest that this liberty, or this principle of all liberty, is the greatest gift bestowed by God on mankind; by it alone we gain happiness as men. But if this is so who will say that human kind is not in its best state, when it can most use this principle?”

PURITY OF OUTLOOK

“Each thing is the more easily and perfectly qualified for any habit, or actual work, the less there is in it of what is contrary to such a disposition. Therefore, they who have never even heard of philosophy, arrive at a habit of truth in philosophy more easily and completely than those who have listened to it at odd times, and are filled with false opinions.”

CONCORD AND UNITY

“It is plain that whatever is good, is good for this reason, that it consists in unity. And because concord is a good thing

in so far as it is concord, it is manifest that it consists in a certain unity, as its proper root, the nature of which will appear if we find the real nature of concord. Concord then is the uniform motion of many wills; and hence it appears that a unity of wills, by which is meant their uniform motion, is the root of concord, nay, concord itself.

“All concord depends on the unity which is in wills; the human race, when it is at its best is a kind of concord; for as one man at his best is a kind of concord, and as the like is true of the family, the city, and the kingdom; so it is of the whole human race. Therefore the human race at its best depends on the unity which is in will.”

THE MASTER ARTIST

“It must be recognized, that as there are three degrees in every art, the mind of the artist, his instrument, and the material on which he works, so we may look upon nature in three degrees. For nature exists, first, in the mind of the First Agent, Who is God; then in heaven; as in an instrument, by means of which the likeness of the Eternal Goodness unfolds itself in shapeless matter. If an artist is perfect in his art, and his instrument is perfect, any fault in the form of his art must be laid to the material alone; and so, since God holds the summit of perfection, and since His instrument, which is heaven, admits of no failure of its due perfection, it follows that whatever fault is to be found in the lower world is a fault on the part of the subject matter, and is contrary to the intention of God Who makes nature, and of heaven; and if in this lower world there is aught that is good, it must be ascribed first to the artist, Who is God, and then to heaven, the instrument of God’s art, which men call nature; for the material, being merely a possibility, can do nothing of itself.

Hence it is apparent that, since all Right is good, it therefore subsists first in the mind of God, and since all that is in the mind of God is Divine, according to the saying, ‘What was made in Him was life’, and as God chiefly wishes for what is Himself, it follows that Right is the wish of God, so far as it is in Him, and since in God the will and the wish are the same, it further follows that this Right is the will of God. Again it follows that Right in the world is nothing else than the likeness

of the will of God, and therefore whatever does not agree with the Divine will cannot be Right, and whatever does agree with the Divine will is Right itself. Therefore to ask if a thing be by Right is only to ask in other words if it is what God wills.

“The will of God is an invisible thing, but ‘the invisible things of God are seen, being understood by the things which are made,’ for when the seal is unseen, the wax, which has its impression gives manifest evidence of it, though it be unseen; nor is it strange that the will of God must be sought by symbols; for the human will, except to the person himself who wills, is only discerned by symbols.”

THE TWO ASPECTS OF MAN

“It must be recognized that man alone, of all created things, holds a position midway between things corruptible and things incorruptible; and therefore philosophers liken him to a dividing line between two hemispheres. For man consists of two essential principles, namely, the Soul and the body. If he be considered in relation to his body only, he is corruptible; but if he be considered in relation to his Soul only, he is incorruptible and therefore the Philosopher (Aristotle) spoke well concerning the incorruptible Soul when he said in the second book *Of the Soul*: ‘It is this alone which may be separated, as being eternal, from the corruptible.’

“If, therefore, man holds this position midway between the corruptible and the incorruptible, since every middle nature partakes of both extremes, man must share something of each nature. And since every nature is ordained to gain some final end, it follows that for man there is a double end. For as he alone of all beings participates both in the corruptible and the incorruptible, so he alone of all beings is ordained to gain two ends, whereby one is his end in so far as he is corruptible, and the other in so far as he is incorruptible.

“Two ends, therefore, have been laid down by the Ineffable Providence of God for man to aim at: the blessedness of this life, which consists in the exercise of his natural powers, and which is prefigured in the earthly Paradise; and next, the blessedness of the life eternal, which consists in the fruition of the sight of God’s countenance, and to which man by his own natural powers cannot rise, if he be not aided by the Divine Light.”

EXTRACTS FROM THE TREATISE
TEN DOUBTS CONCERNING PROVIDENCE

BY PROCLUS

Translated by THOMAS TAYLOR

PART III*

4. Let us consider in the fourth place, from another principle, after what manner we say the participations of the Gods are effected: which also those who engage in the speculation of ideas are accustomed to investigate. For if the Gods always energize, and yet the natures which are here do not always participate of Them, must it not follow that the Gods would energize in vain? Or if we do not admit that They possess an eternal energy, a still greater absurdity will follow—if it is proper to call that which is impossible absurd—for whatever exists with the Gods always exists with Them, and prior to all time. Hence Their energy does not take place in a part only of infinite time, for time and that which is infinite are external to the Gods. That these things, therefore, may also be appropriately discussed, it must be observed, in the first place, that every participation, whether it is of eternal or corruptible natures, is always allotted a middle order between participants and the things participated. And as a communication with the extremes is requisite to all media, it is necessary that the media should be united both with the participants and the things participated; for if the media pertained to one of these only, they would not conjoin both the extremes to each other, but being media, they subsist in the before-mentioned manner in their participants. For they proceed, indeed, from the things participated, but are established in the recipients of their energies; just as we say that knowledge primarily subsists in gnostic natures, and not in the things known. Hence, participation having this order, and Providence being primarily participated by all things—by animate, inanimate, rational, irrational, eternal, and corruptible natures, according to their several powers (for with respect to all the instruments of it, these are more proximately produced, but those more remotely) this being the case, it is necessary not only that participations

* For Parts I and II see *Shrine of Wisdom*, Nos. 49 and 50.

should indicate Providence as the cause from which they proceed, but also that there should be an antecedent aptitude in the participant. This aptitude, therefore, will subsist rationally in rational, but intellectually in intellectual natures, phantastically or sensibly in those beings which live according to phantasy or sense, and essentially, and through existence alone, in those which possess being without life. But all these being instruments, and Providence using all of them, it is necessary that each of them should correspond to the power which employs each according to its proper work; neither in its energy obscuring the peculiar hyperaxis of Providence, nor its own nature, but exhibiting one thing which is effected by both. Thus the sun transmits light to the moon, and from the moon imparts it to us; yet the light which we receive is not such as that of the sun, white and dry, nor like that of the moon, gross and caliginous, but is mingled from the power of that which is participated and of the participant, and its colour is changed according to its energy; and in many other particulars this also may be seen. Hence, Providence being placed above all beings according to divine union itself, and energizing conformably to one energy adapted to *the One*, everything which accedes to It participates of It, and in a way conformable to its natural adaptation; one thing indeed essentially, another vitally, another gnostically, and another participating of It according to all these, and being naturally perfect. One thing, likewise, always receives the beneficent illuminations of Providence on account of its own power, and possesses a never-failing participation of It through the infinite energy of the giver, and through its own permanent and firm habitude with reference to It; but another is a participant only sometimes, in consequence of not being allotted a stability of nature. Hence, on account of its debility being not always a participant, it possesses, indeed, well-being from Providence, but it is owing to the recipient that it does not always participate; Providence being always able to give, and giving to those natures that possess the power of always receiving from It that which It imparts. Hence the participation which is effected sometimes only is not from Providence, but from the imbecility of the participant; just as the sun, illuminating perpetually that which is not always able to see its light, and which only sometimes sees, does not by its light occasion this temporary perception, but the

recipient rejecting its light, deprives itself of perpetual vision, and when turned away no longer participates of the solar rays.

If, therefore, although Providence always energizes, a thing only participates of It at a certain time, the thing itself diminishes its own participation, yet does not exclude the eternal energy of Providence, for the energy of Deity remains always the same. Just as if, while a face remains in the same position, a mirror should at one time receive a clear image of it, and at another one obscure and debile, or indeed, no image at all. If someone, therefore, should say that oracles sometimes participate of the Gods, Who are the sources of divination, and sometimes fail, becoming inefficacious and as it were without spirit for a certain time, the causes of the irregularity are to be referred to a failure of the power of participation of the spirits that use and energize through the prophetic inspiration of the Gods. For true oracles are those to which angels, daemons, and heroes give completion, and which are illuminated by the Gods, and by the allotments which have a perpetual subsistence in the universe. For neither must we dare to accuse the sun as the cause of the moon being eclipsed, but we must assign as the cause of this, the conical shadow of the earth into which the moon falls. Nor, in reality, must the participation of the energies of Providence by some things at certain times only be attributed to Providence, but the cause of this must be referred to the participants, and not to that from which the participation is derived both to these and to those beings which always participate. Providence, however, according to the transcendently united and infinite energy of Itself, is present to all things; and of those beings which participate of It differently at different times, in consequence of their possessing an incomprehensible variety, there are certain intermediaries conjoining *the one* of Providence and the multitude of these, the impassivity of the former and the instability of the latter. Hence, as it appears to me, of these intermediaries, angels are more proximate to Providence, but heroes to beings of an unstable nature; and the daemons form the connecting link between the two, uniting the beings which participate of Deity differently at different times to the perpetually abiding hyparxis of Providence, and multiplied natures to *the One*. And sometimes, indeed, the illuminations of Providence immediately extend to the beings posterior to angels, daemons, and heroes, but some-

times through these as media. For there is a great difference between illuminating some of the better genera, and the transmission of illuminations through the better genera. For the natures to whom these illuminations are transmitted partake in a very slight degree of the beings which are proximately arranged above them, through the inferiority of their aptitude; but the better genera, on account of the excellence of their nature, tend upwards to the participation of superior beings, and the illuminations which they receive from these have the relation, as it were, of matter with reference to supernal gifts. Thus, if someone should be able to participate of geometry alone, but another not only of this, but also of a sublimer theory, though not without the assistance of geometry, through which he is led upwards and becomes accustomed to an incorporeal nature; the former of these characters delighting in geometrical speculations, but not having the eye of his Soul sufficiently able to perceive the object of intellectual vision, it is again evident that the perfection of the former is derived from geometry, and that his ascent is as far as to this; but that the transition to the latter is through geometry, and that by means of this he ascends to things which are prior to it. If, therefore, the like takes place in the genera that are more excellent than our nature, it is one thing to be illuminated by the genera which are posterior to the Gods, and another to be illuminated by the Gods Themselves: and the former, indeed, refers the cause of the illumination to the attendants of the Gods, but the latter to the presiding Gods Themselves; except that although illuminations are transmitted by the better genera, certain splendours are imparted after another manner in a greater degree by Providence, from Whom the guardian care of the former is derived, in consequence of their imitating Its beneficent energy according to the order which they are assigned. And such are my answers to this question, through which we may be able to lead those that are well adapted to the perfect speculation of Providence.

5. After this, if you please, let us direct our attention to a fifth subject of inquiry, which disturbs the imagination of many: I mean, why, if Providence exists, evil has a place among beings? For through this many are persuaded either to deny the existence of Providence, in consequence of perceiving that evil extends to all generated things; or if they admit that Providence adorns all

things, they are induced to exclude evil, and to assert that all things are alone good, though certain persons think fit to call that good which is most remote from primary natures evil, for there is not any evil which is not a less good.

If, therefore, we also accord with these, there is no occasion to investigate any further what we proposed to consider. For there will not be anything evil which, as we have said, will molest Providence. But if there is something which in some way or other we assert to be evil, it is necessary to explain whence this is derived. For it is not proper to say that it is from Providence, from Whom everything that is good proceeds; but if it is derived from another cause which ranks among the causes which originate from Providence, then again it will be requisite to refer it to this cause. For the beings which proceed from the causes that owe their existence to Providence, proceed likewise from Providence. If, however, they are produced without Providence co-operating in their existence, we shall make two principles—one of good, and the other of evil—and we shall not preserve Providence unmolested, since It will have something contrary to It. Admitting, therefore, that there is such a thing as evil, let us consider what kind of a thing it is, without molesting the kingdom of Providence.

In the first place, because evil is twofold, *this* existing in bodies, and being preternatural, but *that* in Souls, and deviating from reason; and because that which is preternatural does not subsist in all bodies, nor in Souls that rank as wholes, let us direct our attention to the bodies in which, by the will of Providence, the preternatural exists. It is obvious, therefore, that what is preternatural is in corruptible bodies alone: for that which is not susceptible of the preternatural is perpetual, since the preternatural is the path to non-being. If evil therefore exists, it exists as that which is corruptible; but this is in order that there may not only be that which is eternal; and this again in order that the universe may be perfect. Hence, it is most manifest that the evil which is attributed to corruption subsists on account of that Providence which energizes about the world,* and that

* That Providence which energizes about the world governs all natural processes which consist of the alternation of generation and corruption, and through Its laws the Divine Ideas are manifested in time and space, making the universe complete and perfect to the very outermost.—Eds. J.O.W.

Providence may be entirely what it is, by causing the world to be perfect. For to this evil the end is good; since on account of good, corruption was introduced among beings, as contributing something requisite to the whole of things. For all corruption is on account of the generation of another thing, and everything which is preternatural exists in order that something may be produced which is according to, but not contrary to, nature. Hence, that is not in every respect evil, which is for the sake of good, nor is it unmingled with good, but to a certain thing it is accounted evil, namely to that which is corrupted; and to another thing good, namely to that which subsists on account of the corruption of it. Hence, likewise, it is good to the universe, as the cause of the corruption of one thing, and the generation of another: for it is necessary that there should be both generation and corruption, and the universe requires both these, in order that it may be truly complete as we have frequently said. And if, indeed, that which corrupts energizes according to nature, but that which suffers, suffers preternaturally, perhaps this also suffers according to nature. For being a contrary, it is natural to it to suffer from a contrary, and thus it now becomes manifest to us, that on account of the most excellent Providence by which the universe is governed, that which is preternatural takes place among beings, and that it is not absolutely preternatural, but is in a greater degree conformable to than contrary to nature; since it is natural for that which is corruptible to be corrupted, and for that which is capable of corrupting to corrupt. And if they are contraries, it is requisite that the one should be corruptible, but the other corruptive. If, also, it is necessary that generation should always exist, it is necessary there should be contraries: for generation is from contraries. Hence, if generation is according to Providence, and that which is prior to generation is likewise according to Providence; and if that which is preternatural subsists differently from that which has alternate generations—if this be the case, the preternatural is an instrument of the cause of generations, and gives completion to that which is natural. But let us here terminate that which does not require much discussion.

Let us, therefore, pass on to the consideration of that which is preter-rational, and evil in Souls, in order that we may understand how this likewise subsists according to Providence. Here,

therefore, the association of certain contraries, I mean of the immortal and mortal Soul, affords a place for that which is preternatural. For when that which is mortal in us predominates over that which is divine, then the generation of evil is effected in the Soul; as, for instance, when either anger or desire predominate, in consequence of either of them suffering that which is conformable to its nature; the one in wrath, but the other in concupiscence. In this case reason, which possessed in us the appellation of divine, becomes preter-rational; for both the rational and the irrational part of Soul wish at the same time to energize conformably to the desire of that which is natural; the one desiring to live with passion, but the other without passion; and the one rationally, but the other irrationally. In the mixture, however, of both these, and in their depraved habitude with reference to each other, that which is denominated a *parypostasis*,* or a *deviation from subsistence*, takes place, and since this has not a principal essence, it is evident that the preter-rational is both evil, and not evil; for it is evil to the rational, but not to the irrational part. For where there is not reason nothing of this kind is evil, as in irrational animals; and this, not because to suffer through passion is according to nature, and to be vanquished by reason preternatural; since the latter is in a greater degree conformable to nature, because reason is naturally adapted to vanquish.

When of opposites, one is better but the other worse, though the latter, in energizing as it is adapted to energize, suffers that which pertains to itself, yet when subservient to the former, which is better, it is transferred to that which is above its own nature; thus reason, energizing in us as reason, impedes the energy of that in us which is divine and better than reason, though in so doing it operates conformably to its nature; nevertheless, from the predominance of what is divine, reason (being corroborated), exists as reason in a greater degree. For every being has both a good connascent with itself, and a greater good derived from that which is more excellent than itself: therefore intellect is able to energize divinely, Soul intellectually, and body self-motively. That which is irrational, therefore, and anger, and desire, are moved as such, according to nature; and the more vehemently they are moved, the more natural are their energies. But when considered with reference to that part in us which is

* From Parhypostasis.

divine, and as impeding its energy, and also as capable of participating from it another greater good, of which they are deprived as long as they wish to be moved with their own motions which are preter-rational, they occasion an ingress of evil to partial souls.

If, however, these things are truly asserted, it is necessary that those who think they do not exist through Providence should either blame a divine Soul for its descent into generation, or the mortal soul* which is in generation. For admitting that both these subsist through Providence, it is entirely necessary to refer the generation of that which is preter-rational to good, in consequence of Providence distributing everything into the world according to its desert. But, indeed, it is evident that it is good for the human Soul to descend to the ultimate part of the world in order that the universe may be perfect, and that it may not only be full of rational and immortal beings, and, again, of such as are rational and mortal, but likewise of the media between these, namely rational and at the same time mortal beings. If these natures were wanting, the world would be truly imperfect. It is likewise manifest to everyone that in consequence of a divine Soul acceding to generation, it is requisite that prior to this a mortal soul should be present with bodies; and that the divine Soul should not dwell in these fleshly, bony, and in short, terrene organs. For how is it possible that the body, destitute of vitality, and mingled from many things, should of itself participate of an incorporeal and immortal Soul? How, also in reality is it possible, if it were merged in material masses, that it should not blind its own reason, itself suffering everything which pertains to the mortal soul; perceiving, indeed, the passions of the body, and wishing, by energizing according to anger, to repel whatever is noxious to the mortal animal. For suffering all these, it would be corrupted in as great a degree as the body, *and its descent would be in vain, through not being assisted, but corrupted by its recipients.* For neither would it be possible to know the things which externally corrupt, without sense which knows particulars; nor to desire liquid and solid aliment, without that part of the Soul which is the source of all-various appetitions; nor to pursue what is mortal, without the remembrance of that which is able to hurt or assist it. It is better, therefore, for that which is connected with another thing different from itself, by which also it is perhaps

* The irrational nature.

molested, to be thus connected sometimes only, and not always, and in a far greater degree it is better for the Soul merely to direct its attention to the irrational nature, than to become itself irrational. If, therefore, it is necessary that the immortal Soul should descend hither, that the mortal soul also should subsist on account of it—and the existence of both these is conformable to the will of Providence—if this be the case, the preternatural also must be referred to the same bound of Providence, as existing because of that which is according to nature. Thus, too, in Souls, that which is preter-rational exists on account of that which is according to reason; that which energizes preter-rationally in us subsisting on account of our rational energy. But respecting this problem enough has been said at present.

A SHORT DIALOGUE BETWEEN A LEARNED DIVINE AND A BEGGAR*

A certain *Divine*, who (if we may believe the ancient copies) was John Taulerus himself, meeting with a Beggar, had this Discourse containing a most excellent example of a perfect man; whence we may be taught how in all things we ought to be of the same mind, resigned to the Will and Appointment of God.

There was in times past, a certain famous Divine, who by the space of eight years had continually importuned the Lord by prayer, conceiving he wanted the right knowledge of the Truth, notwithstanding all his learning; and spent whole nights therein begging of God to let him know Him, and know himself, and to show him any man that might teach him the way of Truth: and when upon a time he was inflamed with a most vehement desire thereof, a voice from Heaven thus spake unto him: *Go forth to the Church doors and there thou shalt find a man that can teach thee the Way of Truth*: and going forth, he found there a certain Beggar with patcht and torn apparel, and filthy-dirty feet, all whose apparel was scarce worth three half-pence; unto whom by way of salutation he thus spake.

* From *The Gospel Treasury Opened* by John Everard, 1659.

DIVINE. God give thee a good morning.

BEGGAR. Sir, I do not remember that ever I had an evil one.

DIVINE. God make thee fortunate and prosperous; why dost thou speak in this manner?

BEGGAR. Neither was I ever unfortunate or unprosperous.

DIVINE. Be happy! what mean these words of thine?

BEGGAR. Nor was I ever unhappy.

DIVINE. God save thee! Now at last speak more plainly.

BEGGAR. Truly sir, I will do it willingly: thou sir, didst wish me a prosperous and good morning; and I answered, I never had an unprosperous or evil one; for when I am pinched with hunger, I praise God; if I suffer cold, if it hail, if it snow, if it rain, if the weather be fair or foul, I praise God; if I be wretched and despised, I likewise praise God; and therefore there never happened any sad or evil morning to me. Thou didst likewise wish that I might be fortunate, and I answered that I had never been unfortunate; because whatever God gave me, or I suffered, or whatever happened to me, whether it were agreeable to me or otherwise, were it sweet or bitter, I gladly received it at His Hands as the best: and therefore I was never unfortunate.

Thou saidst, moreover, that God would be pleased to make me happy: whereunto I likewise answered, that I never had been unhappy: for I am fully resolved through his Grace, to adhere and onely to cleave to the Will of God as the best (as abandoning mine own will) into which I have so wholly poured out mine own will, that whatever He wills, that I will also; and for this cause (as I said) I was never unhappy, seeing that I will cleave to His Will onely, and have wholly resigned mine own proper will.

DIVINE. This is very strange: but what, I pray thee, wouldst thou say if the Lord of Majesty would drown thee in the bottomless pit, couldst thou then be content with His Will?

BEGGAR. Drown me in the bottomless pit? Why certainly, if He should I have two arms, by which I would still embrace Him and clasp fast about Him: one is true humility, and that I lay under Him: and by it I am united to His Most Sacred Humanity: the other, and that is the right arm, is Love, which is united to His Divinity: and by this Love given to me from Himself, I hold him so fast that He would be forced to go

down to Hell with me: and it were much more to be wished by me to be in Hell with God, than to be in Heaven without Him.

By this, that Divine learned that the most compendious way to God is a true resignation with profound Humility; hereupon the Divine spake again to the Beggar, and asked him,

DIVINE. Good Lord, Whence camest thou?

BEGGAR. From God.

DIVINE. Where foundest thou God?

BEGGAR. Even there, where I left all the creatures.

DIVINE. But where didst thou leave Him?

BEGGAR. In humble and clean hearts, and in men of Good-will, which is His Temple and Dwelling-place.

DIVINE. I pray thee friend, who art thou?

BEGGAR. Who am I! Truly, I am a king, and Jesus Himself hath crowned me with Peace, Power, and Rest.

DIVINE. Art thou a king? But where is thy kingdom?

BEGGAR. Sir, the Kingdom of Heaven is within me, in my Soul, and I can now, and do, by His Power in me, so govern and command all my inward and outward senses, that all the affections and powers of the old man in my Soul are conquered, and are in subjection to the new man in me; which Kingdom no man can doubt but is better than all the kingdoms, sceptres, crowns, and glories of this world.

DIVINE. Lord! What brought thee to this perfection?

BEGGAR. My silence, sublime meditation, and above all, my union with the ever-blessed God of Peace and Rest; which is my Kingdom, and to say the Truth, I could rest in nothing which was less than God; and now having found my God, I have forsaken the unquiet world, and in Him I have found Everlasting Peace and Rest.

JEWEL

All things always work together for good from the divine point of view; and whoever can make this divine point of view in any sense his own, just in so far sees that they do, despite the inevitable losses and sorrows of the temporal order.—*Josiah Royce.*