

THE QUEST

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
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THE QUEST.

THE BUDDHIST PRINCIPLE OF CHANGE.¹

MRS. C. A. F. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A.

THERE is a view of the general fact of change which all philosophies would endorse and confirm. This is the popular view, inimitably expressed by the French proverb: *tout lasse, tout casse, tout passe*. It is also, with corollaries, the religious view. "The life of man passes by like a galloping horse, changing at every turn, at every hour" (Chwang-tzŭ);

"Change and decay in all around I see.

O thou who changest not, abide with me!"

Albeit it is worth mention, in passing, that in all world-religions the emphasis thrown on the great fact of change is curiously slight save for the notable exception of Buddhism. Exponents of this creed have not failed to bring out the insistence they have found on change as thus envisaged.

But philosophy, once it gets astride of this 'galloping horse' of change, may go further than either the popular or the religious view. It may say:

¹ Read before the Quest Society, June 7, 1917. References where not otherwise given are to P.T.S. (Pali Text Society) editions.

ultimately, fundamentally, there is only change. Repose, fixity, permanence are illusions. There are in reality, *i.e.* beneath our customary way of perceiving, no immobile things that get moved externally, or that persist in time, breaking up gradually. They are fictions of sense and intellect. "There are changes, but no things that change."¹

Buddhism, like Christendom, stands not only for a popular and for a religious culture of many branches, but also for a philosophy with a history. Where, in respect of such a philosophical gallop, does Buddhist philosophy get up and ride, and where does it dismount? Does the attitude of Theravāda doctrine (I mean, of the philosophic thought evolving for many centuries, first in N. India, then in Ceylon and Further India) correspond at all in its nature and its range to, say, that notable outcome in European philosophy which we associate at present chiefly with the name of Henri Bergson?

There are two main obstructions hindering the establishment of an adequate comparison. It may seem unreasonable to try to compare a philosophic departure which has at the back of it the results of some centuries of scientific developments, let alone of *literary* philosophizing, with a philosophic evolution which, however notable, has in these two essential bases been relatively starved.

Again, the documents of this evolution are as yet, to a mere European, most imperfectly accessible. In knowledge of them we have scarcely got beyond the corresponding position of Christian culture at the beginning of the Renaissance, which knew little of its Plato, and had its Aristotle largely from Arabian

¹ H. Bergson, *La Perception du Changement* (Oxford, 1911), p. 24.

sources, and which was scarcely aware of its own poverty in materials. So even now Indologists, pursuing the Theravāda philosophy no further than the Commentaries of the 5th century A.D., discuss the submergence, in India, of Buddhist metaphysic in the rising flood of Vedāntism and other mediæval lines of thought, oblivious of the quietly continuous development that appears in the works of Buddhadatta, Anuruddha, Sumangala-Mahāsāmī, Ariyavaṃsa, as well as of Dr. Ledi Mahāthera of present-day fame—to mention no others—who have handed on the torch of psychology and philosophy in Ceylon and Burma. Until, however, by the quietly persistent work of the Pali Text Society, editions, not to mention translations, of the typical writings of these luminaries are produced, it is a difficult matter for even a reader of Pali to acquire a historic perspective of Theravāda philosophy in its continuity. My excuse for speaking on it at this immature stage is that we have at least a little more than the foot wherefrom to speculate about Hercules.

And whereas the first of the two obstacles I have named is a historic fact that can in nowise be got over, so that Buddhist philosophy even up to the present day will seem archaic beside the scientifically and linguistically finished products of European thought, there is, in comparing them *as philosophies of change*, always this interesting feature to recollect: The philosophic tradition of Europe, rejecting the Herakleitean theory of change as more real than fixity, suffered the written expression of it to die, and its influence to be handed on chiefly in the scientific speculations of the Atomists. In its turn, and after many centuries, science has imposed a philosophy of change on Europe. But Buddhism literally built its philosophic foundations

on a theory of change. With the whole field of science in a relatively rudimentary state, it grasped by intuition a principle of change which, in many features, anticipates that which we have seen put forward to-day as the result of profound investigation and analysis.

What then is that principle of change? Let us examine its earliest expression in the oldest Pali books. Here anyway the evidence is entirely accessible. There are still obstacles to a complete understanding, as I shall presently indicate, but at all events the Pali Text Society has published all the oldest materials.

The fact of universal and continuous change is expressed by several more or less synonymous terms: *a-niccha*, impermanence; *añña . . . añña* (=the Latin *alter . . . alter*) 'now one, now another'; *aññathatā*, otherwiseness, alteration; *vipariṇāma*, fluctuation; *khaya*, dissolution; *vaya*, evanescence; *vāya*, mobility; *bhava*, becoming; *udayabbāya*, rise and evanescence, and others. But the first three are employed in the passages most crucial for our purpose.¹ In fact they exhaust the two shades of meaning in our own curious, if useful, Latin term 'change.' Take anything you like that is obviously changing in time or space, material or mental, *x* :—at any given moment *x* is, at another moment *x* is not. Thus *x* is impermanent, 'in the sense of not being,'² as the Commentators say. Or *x* is now *x* with a co-efficient of *y*, or if you like of *n*. Thus *x* is altered (*aññathatta*), and may proceed to alter so much that eventually we call *x* *y*. At a given moment a baby boy lies on my lap. At

¹ Dr. Ledi distinguishes, under *aniccha*, metastasis (*vipariṇāma*) and subsequent modification (*aññathūbhāva*). *Vipassanūḍipani* (Rangoon), translated by U. Nyana. *Vāya* is primarily 'wind.'

² *Abhavaṭṭhenāti aniccam.*

another given moment a young soldier leaves me for the war. My baby is gone, changed; my boy has evanesced.

In the older books of 'Suttas'—the Four Nikāyas—change is usually presented in this latter guise of the evanescent or impermanent, fleeting, transient. The other notion of 'otherwiseness' is used in more analytical Suttas of a psychological or philosophical content. The reason is fairly obvious. The Buddhist movement, as we know, was at the outset a movement of protest, dissent, reform in matters religious, social, ethical. It saw its chief enemy in the current and popular beliefs as to certain things being permanent, eternal, a ground for a feeling of rest and security in belief,—of ill-based rest, of false security. Namely, in the great mystery of life there were believed to be these three stable, real, perduring things: The I or soul of man; the world wherein that soul was born and could be reborn; the life in heaven once attained. The doctrines of the Dhamma or cosmic law denied permanence to all these things. It took for its ultimate view a vitalistic aspect of things. That is, it saw everything *sub specie vitæ*, as being governed by the law of life. What is that? To be subject to birth and to decay and death, with an apparent, more or less static interval between. Life might be renewed in recurring geneses, but it could not persist eternally in any conceivable phase, else it was not life.

Thus the physical world considered under each of its main constituents: earth, water, fire, air—resolved in all Buddhist philosophy to these four elements: the extended, the cohesive, the calorific, the mobile—and as composing either human bodies, or other substances, is said 'to manifest evanescence, to dissolve, to be

subject to impermanence, transience, to perish."¹ And this verdict is extended to the universe as a whole, which periodically undergoes revolution and evolution (*vivaṭṭa, samvatta*).²

Again as to life in heaven, Suttas on legends concerning the celestial spheres and their denizens relate of complacency felt by gods³ in the security of their tenure: "This our life is permanent (*nicca*), fixed (*dhuva*), eternal (*sassāta*), absolute (*kevala*); in-fluctuate in its nature; without rebirth, decay or death; and beyond it is no further salvation." Then the Buddha, intuitively knowing of this delusion, transports himself to that heaven, and on being greeted with a display of the same confidence, shakes, as it were, head and finger at them: "Alas! the good god! how ignorant he is! Alas! the good god! how ignorant he is! inasmuch as he will be calling permanent, fixed, eternal, absolute, bound to persist, that which is impermanent, mutable, temporary, relative, and bound to end . . . beyond which there is a different salvation."⁴

Lastly as to the soul or spiritual principle in man—I have elsewhere pointed out that the Buddhist argument against such a permanent entity was levelled not against the belief in a changing, growing soul, that could yet, unlike all other mental or physical phenomena, defy death, but against the belief in an *unchanging divine* soul that transmigrated, as the soul in other cults is held to do. The argument runs that nothing supremely divine, *i.e.* perfect happiness, power and immutability, can be claimed for a human being

¹ *Majjhima*, i. 185f. ² *Anguttara*, ii. 142; iv. 100f.

³ *I.e.* by beings who have lived as men on earth.

⁴ *Samyutta*, i. 142. Cf. my *Buddhism*, 1912, pp. 58f.

who, as essentially changing, must inevitably, sooner or later, suffer and suffer helplessly.¹

Next as to the use of the philosophical terms 'otherwiseness,' 'becoming otherwise,' 'alteration.' In one of the many analytical discourses on organ and field of sense we read: "Because of two things sense-impressions arise, namely because of a given organ and a suitable object. Now each of these two is always impermanent and changing and having a state of otherwiseness. Thus the dual process itself is vibrating and fleeting and evanescent and changing. Its conditions are so; how should the impression itself be permanent? And the feeling and the perception arising in consequence, these also are necessarily vibrating and fleeting, evanescent, changing."²

Once more, to take a concise philosophical statement: "All conditioned things³ have three characteristics. They arise, they evanesce and they have otherwiseness of duration."⁴ Thus the static interval, if it be more than a limiting point, is only apparently static. It too is changing. And the relatively swift and all-inclusive 'becoming-other-ness' in mental life is brought out in a curious simile. "Nothing in the world equals the rapidity of *chitta* (consciousness, mind).⁵ It is hard to find an illustration to show how swiftly mind comes and goes." "It were better if the unlearned man in the street considered this body of four material elements as the soul of him rather than mind. Wherefore? The body may last anyway for years, even a century or longer. But what is called

¹ Cp. e.g. *Majjhima*, i. 188; *Vinaya Texts*, S.B.E., i. 100.

² *Saṃyutta*, iv. 67f.

³ I.e. all things that have arisen through a cause (*sankhāta*).

⁴ *Anguttara*, i. 152.

⁵ *Anguttara*, i. 10.

mind or intelligence or consciousness, arising and ceasing in the night, is other than that which arises and ceases in the day. It is even as a monkey in the forest, travelling through the timber, clutches one bough, looses that and clutches another."¹

The curt wording in the archaic Sutta is felt by the Commentator, Buddhaghōsha, to be ambiguous, and he guards the reader from inferring that any day- or night-long duration of a conscious state was here intended—a heresy refuted elsewhere in the Canon.² For, he adds, in one instant many myriads of 'consciousnesses' arise and evanesce.³ This elaboration in explicitness of the apparently more leisurely rate of change as illustrated in the Sutta came about during the 1000 years or so that elapsed between the compiling of the text and Buddhaghosha's new edition of the Commentary.⁴ And later commentators screwed up the rate of mind-flux even higher.⁵

The earlier documents, as we have seen, bring us thus far, that of the two elements in the notion 'change,' namely, impermanence and alteration, nothing whatever in this conditioned universe is permanent. Everything, but especially mind, is perpetually altering, as composite phenomenon, nay even in its elements, and is either coming to be or passing away or undergoing intermediate change. The ancient canonical phrase *sabbe sankhārā aniccā*—"all things are evanescent"—has ever been and is for the Buddhist a motto parallel to the *kismet* of the Muslim. And the surviving work on his doctrines next in point of

¹ *Samyutta*, ii. 95. ² *Points of Controversy* (*Kathāvatthu*).

³ *Sūratthappakāsinī*, the Commentary on *Samyutta*.

⁴ Based on older versions.

⁵ Cp. *Compendium of Philosophy* (P.T.S., 1910), p. 26.

time after the Canon and nearest to it in sanctity—the *Questions of King Milinda*—is in this matter equally emphatic: “There are three things, sire, which you cannot find in the world. And what are the three? That which, whether conscious or unconscious, is not subject to decay and death—that you will not find. That quality of anything which is not impermanent—that you will not find. And in the ultimate sense there is no cognition of a personal entity.”¹ Let it not be supposed that this decided attitude is characteristic of Indian literature generally. There is no such emphasis to be found in any of it that is pronounced to be pre-Buddhistic. The only occurrence of the word ‘impermanent’ in any but late Upanishads is in one verse of the *Kaṭha Upanishad*,² itself not among the oldest; and even this is declared by Dr. Deussen to be a later interpolation, so much is it in conflict with the context.

Besides this emphasis on universal change, the Suttas give us the notion of change as an orderly or determined continuity. The series of phenomena that interested most deeply the early Buddhists, as they interested Sokrates a little later, were those of life, especially the vital phenomenon of mind. And it is to life and to mind that we find, in the Suttas, the first application of those two figures so closely associated with the dynamic speculations of Herakleitus—the stream and the flame.³ They became in later Buddhist thought no less closely bound up with its central principles. But this is not true of it at its inception.

¹ S.B.E. edition, ii. 102. On the last sentence cp. *Points of Controversy* (P.T.S.), p. 8.

² II. 10.

³ He ‘flourished’ 80 years later than, or almost coincidently with, the Buddha, according as we use Buddhist or European dates for the latter.

For all the wealth of simile and parable in the Suttas, and the Anthologies of the Fifth Nikāya, and in spite of the fact that no simile occurs oftener than 'river' and 'fire' (*nāḍī*, *aggi*), they are always used to illustrate other doctrines than that of impermanence.¹ Just once or twice however the pregnant word *sota* ('stream') is heard in the older books: "They who drift down the stream of becoming" (*i.e.* rebirth)²; "he understands the stream of consciousness"³; "my perception was as the flame in a fire of chips, changing as it rose and ceased."⁴ I think this is all. But in the little eleventh century manual by Anuruddha, *Compendium of Philosophy*, the *vade mecum* to this day of the Buddhist student, the *sota* stands out in its terse and dry paragraphs: "So . . . consciousness (*citta*) . . . after rebirth goes on, in the absence of any process of cognition,⁵ in unbroken flux like the stream of a river till the uprising of death-consciousness."⁶

I cannot as yet quote a mediæval application of the flame simile. But here is flame used as a striking instance in the latest words of Buddhist philosophy, written, after all these centuries, especially for the English reader: "Just as that flowing river or burning flame appears to those who contemplate it as a mode of motion, not as something static, and the motion itself consists in a continuous process of vanishing past acts and of manifested fresh acts, so all these determinations into various 'acts' are only series of distinct

¹ Cp. my 'Index to Similes in the Nikāyas,' *J.P.T.S.*, 1908-7, 1908. Dr. Oldenberg (*Buddha*, 6th ed., 1914, p. 299) maintains the opposite with regard to fire; and Mr. Dahlke sees in the Buddha's Fire Sermon a cryptic meaning of the *Inkraft* (inner force) of karma. (*Buddhismus als Weltanschauung*, 1912, pp. 54f.) But the context, taken with other fire-allusions, points only to an analogy with fever, inflammation, and the writers do not convince me.

² *Samyutta*, iv. 128.

³ *Dīgha*, iii. 105.

⁴ *Anguttara*, v. 9.

⁵ See below p. 17.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 158.

phenomena, mental and bodily, made manifest by way of arising and ceasing."¹

But putting similes aside, we have, I repeat, to see that, even in the older books, the notion of change was conceived, not as successions of fortuitous discrete happenings, but as orderly, connected processes. The Buddha is represented as confronted with two extreme views. One is that of the Permanent Self: *A* does the deed; *A* reaps the result, *i.e.* in subsequent happiness or unhappiness. The other is that of the Absolutely Different Self: *A* does the deed; he ceases to be. *B* reaps the result. Was either view right? No, the Buddha replies, there is a middle doctrine which is right; and he repeats the formula known as Arising by Way of a Cause.² Perhaps we feel baffled and have recourse to the Commentary. There we read: "Here he shows that there is neither a doer nor a feeler in any ultimate sense, but that any effect [*lit.* fruit] comes from its conditions, and that without the conditions comes no effect." And far better than this is the same Commentator's explanation in another cognate context: "If we understand the effect or fruit as something arising in a series, we get no absolute identity or diversity, so that we cannot say the result proceeds from the same, or from something quite different. So we look in the adult for the results of something we cultivated in the child."³

We may regret that the Buddha did not, according to his editors, expound his Middle Way more as, for example, a Bergson would now discuss it. But 24

¹ Ledi Sayadaw, 'Some Points in Buddhist Doctrine,' *J.P.T.S.*, 1913-14, p. 159. Cp. also *ib.* p. 146 the Herakleitean use of flowing water and permanent 'river' by one who has certes never read of Herakleitus, unless it were through a Burmese book.

² *Samyutta*, ii. 20. ³ *Visuddhi Magga*, ch. xvii.

centuries stretch between the two prophets. The Buddha was the first Indian thinker to state causation as a universal law valid for mental as for physical life. And his standpoint, that a person so-called was just a stage in, and a label for, a causal process among composite phenomena, was for his hearers striking and pregnant, far-reaching in its effect. It led subsequent thinkers to envisage the universe of changing phenomena and constituents of phenomena under the aspect of an orderly causation proceeding by way of *upakāra*, or 'assisting agency.'¹ That is to say, X in causing Y was conceived as assisting Y to become, and that by being passed on into, or wrought up into, Y. And thus anything is *what* it is, *as* it is, not fortuitously but as a 'fruit' or result of an antecedent thing. Yet a little later in time the *upakāra* notion of a fecundating cause is developed into that of *satti* (=śakti), a term old as the Vedas, connoting (like Carlyle's 'canning') ability, efficacy, force. Ariyavaṃsa, for instance, an eminent writer of Burma in the 15th century, speaks of the *pacchāyasatti*, the causal force.²

The Greeks began to think in terms of force a good deal later than the Buddha's day. Aristotle uses the word 'by force' (βίᾱ)³ but makes no fruitful use of it. Pali had also of course words to the same effect—*sahasā*, *pasayha*—but it did not occur to the early thinkers to apply either these or *satti* to philosophical theories. It was not till Stoic thinkers developed Aristotle's theory of causation, exploiting his adumbrated 'active' and 'passive'—τὸ ποιοῦν, τὸ πάσχον—that

¹ Commentary on the *Paṭṭhāna*.

² Not Lucretius's simple apposition *vis causaque*, but *causæ vis*. *De Rerum*, i.

³ *De Animā*, iii.

the antithesis of force and matter started on its career as the corner-stone in European cosmology: the pusher and the pushed. The relatively late appearance in Buddhist philosophy of a term equivalent to *vis* is an interesting problem. To answer it, we might derive a suggestion by first discovering why, in the 3rd century B.C., the Mediterranean thinkers developed the science of physics. The Stoic philosophers of Cyprus, the Ægean, Italy, Carthage were contemporaries of Archimedes. In connection with what other knowledge did the term *śakti* influence mediæval Buddhists?

Gotama Buddha may have been, relatively to his *milieu*, a master of knowledge (*sabbaññu*). But if there was, for him to take up and utilize for his teaching, no body of positive scientific knowledge, it follows that there would be no words of pregnant import for him to use. It is not historical honesty to read into the archaic diction of the old Suttas more than the knowledge of their times could fairly be said to express. On the other hand, the longer one studies them, the clearer seems to be the want, for an intellect far above the level of its age, of tools—tools in the shape of scientific materials and terminology. We seem to feel the mind of ‘the immeasurable Gotama’¹ labouring under this want in its pioneer questing. He could scarcely appeal to his hearers’ intelligence, in expounding a theory of a self-fecundating flux in terms of force or influence, lest they should see in those terms a reference to the personal intervention of a theodicy or divine fiat—a notion which was precisely what all his teaching strove to eliminate. Personal intervention is the sense in which *βίη*, ‘by force,’ appears in the *De Animā*. If,

¹ *Theragāthā*, 1089.

as M. Ed. Le Roy writes, "the function of philosophy is to criticize the works of knowledge,"¹ then must philosophy wait upon knowledge, that is upon the growth of science.

So much is clear from the Sutta: in the evolution of the act,² not one and the same person persisted as self-identical, sowing and reaping, nor were sower and reaper totally different. The latter was a causal outcome of the former. Or, as Buddhist philosophy preferred to say, the reaping was a causal outcome of the sowing. Later developments came to see in the process, by the aid of developed knowledge and new terms, phases in a continuous series of force-wrought changes, changes which meant that each imagined unit in the series was assisting agent to the next, by passing over into it, informing it, wrought up in it. But to the Buddha's hearers, the only explanation that would mean anything more or less intelligible would be a reference to the newly formulated doctrine of cause and effect. This theory was set out both in abstract terms, to this effect, that "a cause is that without which an effect cannot come to be," and also as applied to the ever-recurring life of a sentient creature in terms of sentience.³ The latter form is usually employed as, and by the Theravāda tradition to this day has been regarded as stating, no less than the abstract formula, albeit in less general terms, a doctrine of universal causation. As claiming to solve the problem of apparently persistent personal identity in a cosmos of unceasing change, it is of the greatest interest in our

¹ *A New Philosophy* (London, 1913), p. 144.

² *Kamma-vivaṭṭa*, a term ascribed in the same work to the Buddha, i. 85.

³ *Ency. Religion and Ethics*, Art. 'Paṭicca-samuppāda.'

inquiry. It is the expression of the Buddha's theory of becoming.

This is borne out by its employment in another Sutta to reconcile two metaphysical extremist views: "All is"; "Nothing is"—so similar to the Greek antithesis as represented by, say, Melissus and Gorgias.¹ The elements of matter and mind are for Buddhists ultimate realities. But they have never associated permanence with these. They are 'conditioned,' 'produced by causes'; they arise and cease; they are perpetually becoming.

Leaving these pioneer intuitions, let us notice a few points in the mediæval explications of them bearing upon our inquiry.

First with respect to the elements of matter. Matter or *rūpa*—a word almost as broad in import as 'phenomenon'—is defined as "that which changes its form under the physical conditions of heat, cold, etc.," following the older definition in the Suttas.² And the four essentials or elements in any material phenomenon, however relatively concrete their meaning may have been in the older books, have come in later philosophy to signify extended quality, cohesive quality, calorific quality, mobile quality. Every material phenomenon is compact of these four in differing proportions. Hence the whole material universe has this element of mobility, 'vibrating or oscillating; moving its co-existent qualities from place to place.'³ And since, in addition to this conception of essential movement, there is the yet more fundamental property in it of becoming and evanescence, since moreover there is no concept of inherent rest or rigidity to

¹ *Samyutta*, ii. 17. ² *Ibid.* iii. 86; *Compendium*, p. 271.

³ Ledi Sayadaw, *Paramattha-dīpanī* (Rangoon), p. 240.

counter-balance in space or time this mobility, but only static intervals in which change (otherwiseness) is still proceeding,¹ we may fairly say that in the Buddhist physical world movement is more 'original' than rest.

With respect to mind this has been already made out. In the original books the notion of a constant mental continuum, interrupted by fully conscious processes of perception, etc., is not, as far as I can discover, clearly made out. Such processes are said to arise from external stimuli and to constitute something which, in becoming, was not previously in existence. "Have I not taught thee by many methods that consciousness arises from a cause; that except from a cause there is no coming into being of consciousness? . . . Do ye see, bhikkhus, that it is something that has become (*bhūtam*); that the becoming is according to the stimulus; that if the stimulus cease, then that which has become ceases?"² The notion of some sort of mental life, however, ever proceeding as a concomitant condition or factor of life itself, soon emerges, in the later analytical books of the Canon, in the term *bhavanga*—'factor' or 'condition of becoming,' 'becoming' standing for existence or life. Coming to the *Milinda*³ we find it compared to the flow of life in dreamless sleep. And in the citation above from the *Compendium* it is compared to a river, and is *contrasted* with mental life when intellectual processes are going on.

Here we come to a very striking anticipation of modern theory. I have used the phrase 'interrupted' by conscious process as characteristic of the Bergsonian

¹ See above, p. 7.

² *Majjhima*, Sutta 38.

³ ii. 163.

hypothesis. In fact, it was a sentence in Dr. Wildon Carr's *Philosophy of Change* that lit up for me the significance of the Buddhist language: "Elements of experience . . . are . . . interruptions of movement. . . ." ¹ Interruption involves arrest; and our intelligence, building itself by the lessons of touch-based vision, is held (in the Bergsonian hypothesis) to create a world of fictitious static 'states' and 'things.'² If it were built up by the teaching of the ear, the world as we know it might wear a very different aspect.

But M. Bergson is more Buddhist than Dr. Carr, for he uses the actual Buddhist term of cutting on or into. "Things are constituted by the instantaneous cut which the understanding practises, at a given moment, on a flux of this kind."³ The *Compendium of Philosophy* states the traditional theory of perception thus: "When, say, a visible object . . . enters the avenue of sight and, the life-continuum (*bhavanga*) vibrating twice, the stream of that continuum is cut off, then consciousness . . . of an apprehended visible object arises and ceases." Thereafter, according to the relative intensity of the stimulus, follow the remaining moments in a full act of perception. "After that comes subsidence into the life-continuum."⁴

There exists quite a group of later commentaries on this manual, but I am not yet in a position to state that any one of them brings out the full significance of this interpretation of an act of perception for a principle of change as the fundamental reality.⁵ The

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 89.

² *Creative Evolution*, p. 261.

³ *Ibid.* p. 262, '*la coupe instantanée*.' Cp. also pp. 331. ⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 125f.

⁵ A transcript of the most modern of them has just arrived from Burma, and I hope that a transcript of the most classic among them is in preparation.

manual itself seems to be concerned simply with the (very concise) exposition of currently accepted doctrines in the interest of students, even to the extent of doggerel mnemonic verses as summaries to each section, and to be putting forward no fresh developments requiring discussion. Nowhere indeed have I yet met with any Buddhist disquisition conscious of the temerity we may feel in consenting to, let alone putting forward, a theory that our intelligence, trained for racial life by sight and by the need for action, subjectively arrests the 'flux of reality,' creating fictitious 'states,' like the arm of a London policeman in the mid-stream of traffic. For us this late-born temerity—this revenge of rejected Herakleitus—may be a back-wash of the wonderful passing of 16th century astronomy, revealing the daily lie told us by our senses of a static earth, of a sun as mobile adjunct. It may have required a Copernicus to breed a Bergson.

But Buddhist philosophy may be said to set out with the position that its proper function is the inversion of common (*i.e.* popular, conventional) sense; that the opinion of the man in the street (*puthujjāna*, many-folk) is never more than conventionally right; that the true, the real, is not the apparent.¹ Hence it saw perhaps no need to defend the gradual and *natural* evolution of its own original, never rejected doctrine of impermanence and 'otherwiseness.'

It is a natural step from sense-perception to memory. The Bergsonian theory of change has revealed to Europe that a philosophy of change, when conceived *sub specie vitæ*, can put forward a sounder explanation of memory than any theory of a persistent

¹ Cp. *Points of Controversy* (P.T.S., 1915), p. 68, n. 2; *Buddhist Review*, 'Expositions' by Ledi Sayadaw, 1915, pp. 253f.; *J.P.T.S.*, 1913-14, 'Some Points of Buddhist Doctrine,' p. 129.

modifiable self, however much such a theory might purge itself of popular spatial notions, such as the *boîte à souvenirs*, or a sort of bagatelle-score memory, with pegs moved along a line of life. The living continuum has its past wrought up into itself, recalling to the imagination George Eliot's pretty phrase: "As the sunshine of past mornings is wrought up in the bloom of the apricot." Our problem is not how we remember, but how we come to forget. Remembering becomes negative. It becomes the elimination of what we would forget.

Now while the Buddhist theory of cause as assisting agency, and as an informing influence (*satti*), coupled with a full and interesting theory of relations, into which I cannot enter here,¹ enabled the philosopher to explain memory after a fairly Bergsonian fashion, I will here only mention that Pali literature has no specialized term for memory, from its beginning till the present day. *Sati*, as I have pointed out elsewhere "is not wholly covered by 'memory,'" it is "rather the requisite condition for efficient remembrance or thought of any kind, namely, lucidity and alertness of consciousness. It is a quality rather than a specific *direction* of consciousness," expressing the opposite of distraction and of superficial thinking.² The more perfected your *sati*, the better can you penetrate present realities, review the facts that are past, foresee the events that are coming.³ Buddhist mental training might be called one long insistence on the need of *sati*.

If it be asked whether Buddhism conceived the flux of things, whether material or mental, as essen-

¹ S. Z. Aung in *Compendium*, p. 42; *J.P.T.S.*, 1915-16, Dr. Ledi, 'On the Philosophy of Relations.'

² *Buddhist Psychology* (1914), p. 90.

³ Cp. Bertrand Russell, *Our Knowledge of the External World*, p. 234.

tially indivisible and only 'cut' into states or units, or as successions of momentary units, discretes, or particulars,¹ I am not yet prepared to give a documentary reply of an adequately historical kind. I could give instances of mind referred to as minds or 'consciousnesses' ('*chittān*') of momentary duration, but very few. The rule is to speak of *chitta* in the singular, of *dhammā*, which may mean mental things or 'states,' in the plural. But to judge by the writings of Mr. Shwe Zan Aung,² present Buddhist philosophy insists strenuously on the essential unity of this mental life as a flux in time. "Each 'one-momentary' state of consciousness (*eka-kkhanika-cittuppādo*) is logically complex, but psychologically of a single indivisible whole." He uses the Bergsonian simile of the spectrum³ and applies the 'assisting agency' definition of cause in expounding this unity. I cannot trace a similar insistence in the case of physical change and movements in space. Nor have I yet elicited from him any traditional authority equally explicit on the subject. But he refers to the *Compendium* as expressing indivisibility in any given mental complex. This is not quite the same thing as indivisibility in duration of a series of so-called states.

To turn for a moment to the field of commentarial legend: it is not irrelevant to notice how, in certain stories, religious conversion is brought about through the power of the Buddha being exercised to accelerate the normal rate of change in the life-flux. Some youth

¹ *Ibid.* p. 150; and *The Monist* (1915), p. 405: "The real man too, I believe, . . . is really a series of momentary men, each different one from the other, and bound together . . . by continuity and certain intrinsic causal laws."

² *E.g.* 'The Philosophy of the Real,' *Jl. Burma Research Society*, April, 1917, p. 8.

³ *Introduction to Metaphysics*, p. 11.

of either sex, much obsessed by physical beauty, is made to see the vision of a lovely maiden swiftly maturing, ageing and falling crumpled up on the ground. And the much shaken beholder is recorded, in one case, as saying:

*"As bidden by some power age o'er her falls;
Her shape is now another, yet the same.
So this myself, who ne'er have left myself,
Seems other than the self I recollect."*¹

Such a vision modern applied science could no less give us, were someone to be photographed with sufficient frequency during a life-time in one pose, and were the films then cinematographed with that rapidity so much affected by the cinema-mechanic. As applied to the life-history of plants, the method is impressive. Will Christian teaching ever unwittingly plagiarize Buddhist legend by securing the life-reel of some persistently devoted human specimen?

But this fragmentary and inadequate statement of the scope and significance in the Buddhist principle of change must here end. Further materials, as has been said, may enable a more complete essay on the subject to be compiled. But it may be said by those who are acquainted only with Buddhism as a religious movement of the 6th century B.C., that we cannot expect to find in its doctrine any disinterested philosophical theory; for is not Buddhism, first and last, the study of an Ideal, of a Goal, of a Way Out, of a Danger and an Escape? Would not any doctrine of change as the great reality in life be studied, not disinterestedly, as a problem in the quest of truth, but chiefly in relation and subordination to the Great

¹ *Psalm of the Brethren*, cxviii.; cp. *Sisters*, p. 82.

Escape, namely from pain and sorrow and the causes thereof?

There is truth here as far as the statement will carry us, but it doesn't take us all the way. There is a parallel in Christianity. That started as a Gospel of Escape, and ended by becoming established as European culture, and annexing all the secular learning of those centuries during which it was sole director of all the Schools. In the same way there is a considerable difference in urgency between the missionary Suttas and the works written long after the establishment of the *Sāsana* or Order as paramount and its annexation, first of Indian culture, then of the philosophic intelligence in the countries it converted.

Nevertheless there is a unity in the evolution of Theravāda thought that cannot be claimed for that of Christian philosophy, with its Pagan annexations, so that we might well look to find the Theravāda ideal borne on the stream of universal flux, like the Most High riding upon the wings of the storm. We find the contrary. It will not see in Change a star—to take Emerson's metaphor—to which it might hitch its waggon. It was so occupied with the fatal certainty in this life, that happiness was bound to evanesce and change into unhappiness, that it forgot the other swing of the pendulum, that the blissful sense of returning happiness was *also change*. Life and experience were said to be painful, or liable to pain, *precisely because they were ever changing*. And life and experience, in Buddhist tradition, had been going on for each person a most awfully long time, yea, from everlasting. The completed perfected person had surmounted all change, save a few years of the last of his lives. *Anicca* is ever a term of baneful import. Even the blessed and

beneficent changes as the aspirant passed into stage after stage of the path of assurance, and broke fetter after fetter—even these are never labelled as modes of benign *anicca* and otherwiseness. And the final release from life after the saint's death, though never discussed, is alluded to in terms of non-change as the unborn, the unageing, the undying, the permanent, the uncaused. The saint was held to have had enough of

“ *Spinning down the ringing grooves of change,*”
and gladly said :

“ *Well ! of all that now have I made an end !* ”¹

And I find nothing to correspond to the eternal youth that pulses in Bergson's sentence : “ The more we steep ourselves in the sense of universal becoming, the closer we feel drawn to the principle in which we live and move and have our being, an eternity of which must not be an eternity of immutability, but an eternity of life and of movement. ”²

And yet——. More than one writer has called Buddhism the gospel of a senile decadent epoch in the history of India. Yet it is noteworthy that, in the whole of Pali literature, one goal is never invoked as desirable, and that is Rest. The Arahant is said to have laid low his burden, to have done his task, but concerning that task the words for tired, weary, and rest simply do not occur.³ Greek philosophy hovered around the notion of rest; Christian hymnology welcomes it; the modern Hindu poet tells us some-

¹ *Psalm of the Sisters*, p. 163.

² *La Perception du Changement*, p. 37. Or this : “ Humanity . . . is one immense army galloping beside and before and behind each of us in an overwhelming charge able to beat down . . . the most formidable obstacles, perhaps even death ” (*Cr. Evol.*, p. 286).

³ Save perhaps for two lines in the *Sisters' Anthology*, by a weary housewife and an old lady respectively, ver. 1, 16.

where: "The waves of turmoil are on the surface, and the sea of tranquillity is fathomless."¹ Buddhist philosophy and anthology both regard as supremely desirable energy, concentration, insight, serenity. And far away for most, near only to but a few at any time, there is held to be the one 'state' of utter peace, inconceivable in content and undescribable, since concepts and speech are the children of *life*.² It is a curious paradox. Or if my feeble torch throw its ray amiss, it may kindle a clearer light from elsewhere and

*"Ita res accendunt lumina rebus."*³

C. A. F. RHYS DAVIDS.

¹ Tagore.

² *Sutta Nipāta*, 1076, "Whereby one might speak of him, that for him is not."

³ *De Rerum*, 1115.

THE HOWL, THE GRIN, THE SMILE AND THE LAUGH.

Fleet-Surgeon C. MARSH BEADNELL, R.N.

THE EARLY CRY OF THE NEW-BORN.

THE biological facts of recapitulation teach us that the early development of the individual is a kind of synopsis of the past history of its species. Every animal in its upward growth from the single egg-cell to the many-celled adult is forced to make a hurried journey along the ancestral path taken by the dead-and-gone members of its race. The young frog and the young child possess the ancestral gill of the fish. This gill-stage is not harmful to the child and is of distinct use to the frog, and so, instead of being suppressed by natural selection, is retained by heredity. Lower animals complete this ancestral journey, that is attain full development, in a few months; but man, with his speech-centres which, like tender plants, demand assiduous care and prolonged cultivation, takes some fifteen or twenty years to do so.

If we turn to what Sir Ray Lankester has so aptly described as "that most mysterious and wonderful casket of ancestral secrets and unfathomable destiny"—the human infant—we find that for the first day or so it is apparently deaf to all but the loudest noises; then later it begins to recognise its mother's voice and will pick it out from other voices; but not until a yet

further lapse of time is it able to discriminate between the many and diverse sounds within the nursery. When about eight months old its delight in sheer noise is positively fiendish; objects are thrown about and dashed to the ground in a transport of joy at the ensuing clatter. But side by side with the evolution of the child's body is going on a corresponding evolution of its capacity to analyse sounds, and in this mental evolution again it faithfully repeats the various stages of sound-analysis passed through by ancestors; and if at any time we feel inclined to resent the din set up by these little limbs of Satan, we should remember, and be grateful to them for, the very interesting story they are unfolding for our special benefit.

In vocal powers, again, the child recounts a no less exciting tale, and the various evolutionary phases consecutively staged before our eyes are true representations of the past and in perfect accord with those phases of speech which, from other sources of evidence, we are led to believe existed in the long racial line. In the first place the very arrival of the infant into the extra-uterine world is announced by a loud primitive yell, and for weeks afterwards the little intruder keeps reminding those around him of his importance by an incessant monotonous howling. This definite and characteristic howling period is followed by a somewhat indefinite one of vowel-intonation wherein the child says 'ey' for yes but cannot say 'no.' At about the ninth month it indulges in 'instinctive words,' such as the 'kuk-kuk' of disgust, 'um-um' of satisfaction and the 'goo-goo' of joy. About the fifteenth month the child begins to associate words like 'da-da,' 'bow-wow,' with the percepts 'man,' 'dog'; but not for another half year does it associate these words with the

concepts 'father,' 'terrier.' In the eighteenth month voluntary language dawns and the child instinctively imitates the sounds heard, and for the first time succeeds in saying 'no.'

In the second year comes knowledge of good and evil; the child knows when it has done wrong. In the third year the instinct of play and make-believe are to the fore; the child commits one incongruity on top of the other, always however with the insatiable desire to know, know and yet know. It toddles hither and thither; everything goes to its mouth; it breaks things, opens them out, mixes them up, pours its broth into grandpapa's watch, puts the gold-fish in the doll's bed, and crams the doll into the fish-globe. In the fourth and fifth years the old ancestral instincts of destructiveness and cruelty are dominant, especially in the male child. He pulls the cat's tail or his small sister's hair, squashes spiders and removes the legs and wings from flies. When not engaged in such Hunnish acts he shows incipient powers of abstraction as regards 'time' and 'space.' The sixth year is to an alarming extent devoted to teasing others, and he fights with a calculated intent to do others bodily harm. In the seventh year he is swayed by the spirit of rivalry and the instinct to kill things for food and sport. In the ninth year he shows us with pride his 'collections'—eggs, coins, stamps, nibs, shells, buttons, and what not—and fills us with a conflicting mixture of alarm, disgust, admiration and envy at his insatiable and omnivorous appetite. In the tenth year the gestures of the sneer and of defiance are in evidence. The main characteristics of the twelfth year are boastfulness, conceit, and love of 'showing off'; and two years later he revels in the display of physical and mental strength

and enters with zest into games of skill and endurance. In the sixteenth year the sexual instinct appears, the voice alters, Adam's apple becomes prominent, and modesty and shyness are marked; he becomes awkward and nervous in the presence of the very girls whom, but a year ago, he chased and bullied and treated with scant respect. In the eighteenth and nineteenth years love and jealousy appear and he will fight his closest chum over the appropriation of a wink or a smile from a 'flapper.' In the twentieth year the parental instinct is potentially present, and in this and subsequent years the altruistic and humanistic sympathies mature. Such, briefly, are some of the milestones past which the mind of the average, normal, healthy English schoolboy must pass in its hurried journey along the old beaten ancestral route.

But we must go back to the infant. We saw that the first stage of phonation consisted in the emission of a monotonous howl. This howling habit is unaccompanied by the shedding of any tears, for it has not yet evolved into those other forms of phonation, such as 'crying' and 'sobbing,' that are accompanied by lachrymation. The very primitive nature of this howling of the new-born child is proved by the basal position and fundamental character of the nervous mechanism concerned in bringing it forth; for this is such that even those unfortunate brainless creatures known as anencephalous monsters can cry lustily. It is significant that a definite habit of howling is much more in evidence in the human than in the simian infant. Why is this? It must have been of great importance to recent ancestors of man, when wandering about in search of food, for their offspring to possess a reliable means of communicating with them.

In the darkness of night or amid the tangles of gloomy virgin forests, parent and infant were liable to separation, and a cry from the latter would at once bring the former to its aid. Perhaps this is why the child still cries so much in the dark.

“An infant crying in the night :
An infant crying for the light,
And with no language but a cry.”

In this way it is probable that, while fear and pain act as stimuli to the cry in the majority of offspring, these factors have sunk into the background in their relation to that of the human infant, which is now an ingrained habit that owes its survival value to the fact that it keeps those responsible for the child's welfare in constant attendance.

In the wild state crying has, of course, the obvious disadvantage of attracting friends and foes. For this reason natural selection as a rule only permits resort to the cry under rare and pressing circumstances. When from the man-like ape there emerged the ape-like man equipped with his new-found weapon ‘reason,’ one of the first things he did was to place his offspring beyond reach of prowling enemies. But this circumventing of natural selection and elimination of the very factor which hitherto had checked *habitual* crying carried its penalty, for subsequent generations of infants became more and more clamorous and subsequent generations of fathers had to put up with more and more disturbed nights.

The same principle is illustrated among lower animals whenever a corresponding change to that just indicated occurs in their environmental conditions. When rooting about the jungles, the wild boar does not

habitually grunt like the domestic pig. Pheasants and partridges are very silent when feeding with their young. Mr. Pycraft thus describes a covey of partridges foraging for food: "The male runs ahead and stands for a few moments surveying everything. If all is well, he goes on, uttering a low 'zut-zut,' while the female, crouching low, follows with the brood, seeking seeds and insects at every step." How different the state of affairs among their domesticated cousins in the farmyard. Artificially protected from her natural enemies, the hen never ceases clucking nor her chicks chirping; and it is change of environment alone that has brought about the marked contrast. The faint 'cheep' of the young partridge and the wanton chirp of the chick, the plaintive wail of the baby monkey and the lusty bawl of the human infant, are vital phenomena specially adapted in each instance to the preservation of the individual and species. Clamorous nestlings as a rule are those whose parents build homes in places inaccessible to prowling enemies; silent ones are those who are lodged on or near the ground, natural selection personified in weasels and stoats having enforced on them strict silence. As examples of the former might be mentioned the nestlings of the rook, sparrow, swallow and starling, and of the latter those of the wrens, warblers and game-birds. It would be possible to divide the birds up into two great categories; those who are helpless at birth and require prolonged parental care, and those who run about and fend for themselves almost as soon as they are out of the egg.

Silence is a great characteristic of the members of the reptile class, and so too is the ability to run about and look after themselves immediately

after birth. Birds, as we know, are direct descendants of the reptiles, and we shall not be far wrong if we conclude that, as a rule, birds with silent precocious young hatched in rude simple nests or mere scoops in the ground are the more primitive, and those with noisy young of the helpless type hatched in high and inaccessible nests are more specialised. So deeply rooted is the instinct of keeping silent when danger threatens that some young birds who are in the habit of calling while still in the egg, will at once become silent if the parents, whom, of course, they have never seen, utter an alarm. The young Norfolk plover may be handled and will hang limp, with eyes closed, quite silent and shamming death—an old reptilian dodge.

Not long ago when walking over a hillside overlooking what some old-time wag facetiously christened the German Ocean, I came on a young gull running about amid the stones and heather. Directly the little creature saw me it crouched flat to the ground, motionless, its mottled plumage making it appear so like a lichen-covered stone that for a time I was not quite sure that it had not, after all, run off. I was allowed to go up to it, and even stroking its head failed to elicit the slightest sound or the flicker of an eyelid. I then picked the bird up, shook it gently and placed it back on the ground. This seems to have convinced it that its stone-shamming trick was seen through and that it must resort to more heroic measures. The first thing it did was to bring up the whole contents of its stomach in one act; it then ran, balancing itself in its ludicrous bipedal gait by means of two absurd apologies for wings, and as it ran it screamed loudly to its parent, who had been silently watching from a distance and now came shrieking with threatening swoops over-head.

Evacuation of the contents of the alimentary canal is a well-known concomitant in man and lower animals of the emotion of fear. The advantage of a habit of this kind is somewhat complex and varies according to the particular species of animal. Here it is a sop to Cerberus, as when the terrified kittiwake disgorges its last meal to the pursuing skua, who adeptly catches it before it falls into the sea; there it is a weapon of defence against intruders, as in the brooding gannet and, as I know to my cost, in the Fulmar petrel. It may divert the attention of the pursuer to the ejected substance; or it may blind and stifle him, as in the case of the Bombardier beetle who discharges acrid vapours in the face of his pursuer; or it may act as a screen, as when the cuttlefish escapes behind a cloud of ink. In all cases the act lightens the body and thereby facilitates flight. In man the act is probably atavistic.

Now I said that the fledgling gull screamed in its fright; but I have often noticed that many nestling birds, such as young owls, robins and tits, hiss like a snake when in this state, a fact replete with evolutionary significance when viewed in the light of recapitulation and bearing in mind that birds are offshoots from the old reptilian stem. But mammals, too, branched off from the reptiles, and when frightened or displeased will hiss; even man, the lord of creation, will do so if he scalds his fingers, or witnesses a play he does not approve, or hears political opinions that do not happen to coincide with his own. Indeed it is impossible to avoid the somewhat startling conclusion that, in the cry of the mammal, the song of the bird and the speech of man, the threatening hiss of some old prehistoric reptile still finds occasional echo.

THE HOWL AS A PRECURSOR OF SPEECH AND SONG.

Singing, laughing and smiling are, after all, but means of communicating ideas. Like gesticulation, gesture and the striking of attitudes, they are auxiliary forms of speech and we must, therefore, make some attempt to trace them back to their beginnings. We will begin with the evolution of those musically inflected utterances called 'song.' There is plenty of evidence to show that both verse and song preceded prose, just as they, in their turn, were preceded by pantomime and gesture. Words were, in the far-away ages, chanted rather than spoken, and even to-day the discourse of savages and semi-civilised peoples is of a sing-song character and tends to terminate in a monotonous musical refrain. The dog's bark is more specialised than its howl, and it was from the howl of the aboriginal canine that the modern bark has descended. Precisely the same relationship holds in man between the language of prose or 'talking,' and the language of song or 'chanting' and 'singing.'

Of all emotions love is the most fundamental, and therefore it is not surprising that chanted rather than spoken words should be the favourite medium of its expression. When the unmated and love-smitten anthropoid ape wanders through the dense tropical forests, he emits deep-toned lugubrious wails to make known his whereabouts to the female. For this purpose he is equipped with a special system of resonating chambers in communication with his vocal apparatus. In the orang-utan the resonators extend as far as the arm-pits, an arrangement that enables this creature to give vent to an amorous yell that is a truly terrible performance for all but those whom it is

intended to fascinate. The lady anthropoid, on the other hand, is not so furnished, and so has to be content with listening and coyly following her future husband at a respectful distance until in the mood to submit to his embraces. That ancient and now almost extinct custom of serenading the loved one is possibly a lingering relic of the old ape-men's love-wail. Throughout the animal kingdom it is usually the male who emits, and the female who is attracted to, the sounds, though there are exceptions, notably among insects. Male mosquitoes, for instance, assemble around the source of musical tones, especially such as resemble the hum of their females. The mere fact that it is almost invariably the one sex that 'performs,' and the other sex that 'listens,' indicates that a solution of the origin of song must be sought on sexual lines. In man, in the apes and, in fact, in higher animals generally, the character of the voice up to a certain age is common to the two sexes. Then, at about the sixteenth year in man, the boy and girl enter the period called puberty, at which time the sex-glands, especially those of the male, secrete chemical substances called 'hormones' which, circulating in the blood, act in a marvellous way on the vocal organs. In the boy the larynx enlarges and the voice 'breaks' and becomes lower-pitched by an octave. At this time, too, "the young man's fancies lightly turn to thoughts of love." The girl's larynx also changes, but to a less extent, the proportional enlargement being 30 per cent. as compared with 50 per cent. for the boy.

THE ORIGIN OF THE SMILE AND LAUGH.

Unlike the song, which is present in other animals, the smile and laugh are met with only among the

highest mammals. The types with which we of to-day are familiar are usually exhibitions of joyful emotions, but this by no means indicates that a pleasurable element was present at their genesis or, indeed, that they had anything in common. Of the two the smile is certainly the more primitive but it was not, if I may be pardoned the mode of expression, the ancestor of the laugh. It is true that a smile often ushers in the laugh, but then, on the other hand, it often remains after the laugh has died away. The pleasurable emotions calling forth the smile are less in degree than those requisite to produce a laugh; and the former, as just indicated, is possibly present throughout the laugh, though swamped by the more obtrusive characters of the latter. Not only can the smile, as such, be traced lower down the animal scale, but it has in man a prior ontogenesis, appearing in the infant about the seventeenth week as compared with the nineteenth week when the first laugh is heard.

A dog will smile when pleased and also under certain conditions associated with 'fun' and 'play,' and even with the complex emotional state of 'humour' and the 'sense of the ridiculous.' But the dog has no true laugh; it can only bark for joy. Monkeys, on the other hand, can smile and laugh, especially if physically tickled. When 'courting,' monkeys indulge in those muscular contractions of the face which in man constitute the true smile. Indeed, there is little doubt but that the smile originated as an outward and visible sign or expression of the emotion of love; but this again, as I hope to show, was in the past of a complex type and contained many conflicting elements. Hence, after we have

examined the smile in the light of a secondary sexual character, we shall have to hark back to the problematical mode of courtship of our ape-like ancestors and see in what respects this differed from that of civilised mankind.

In the male mandrill may be seen two coloured and furrowed lumps, one on either side of the nose. In the courting season these undergo enormous development and their colour becomes correspondingly heightened. "In our ancestors facial characters similar to those of the mandrill were symptomatic of pleasure and connected with the period of courtship. Then they became conventionalised as pleasurable symptoms."¹ Human beings, especially children and savages, when greatly pleased, raise the skin on each side of the nose into puckered eminences morphologically identical with those on the mandrill's nose. These grooves and ridges are also clearly visible on the nose of a person about to sneeze. In smiling the angles of the mouth are drawn backwards and slightly upwards, and in the contrary emotions of grief and pain they are drawn backwards and downwards, hence the popular and not inaccurate description of the facial expressions of pleasure and displeasure respectively as the 'broad smile' and 'down in the mouth.'

A short time ago I amused myself by making rough measurements of the amount of this elevation and depression of the corners of the mouth, using for the purpose some of Bairnsfather's humorous war-pictures, and found that in an average broad smile the angles of the mouth were raised the eighteenth part of the length of the face, and a typical dejected counten-

¹ S. S. Buckman, 'Human Babies; What they Teach,' *Nature*, July 5, 1900.

ance, like that of the Tommy in the funk-hole whose comrade remarks to him, "Well, if you knows of a better 'ole, go to it," showed a depression equal to the sixteenth part of the face length.

The emotion of affection is, on the whole, pleasurable and is, as a rule, accompanied by a gentle smile; in children and monkeys this smile of affection is very prone to pass on into the laugh. Darwin thus describes the behaviour of two chimpanzees when they first met: "They sat opposite, touching each other with their much protruded lips; and the one put his hand on the shoulder of the other. They then mutually folded each other in their arms. Afterwards they stood up, each with one arm on the shoulder of the other, lifted up their heads, opened their mouths, and yelled with delight."

However, it is only among the very highest animals that courtship is carried out with gentleness and, indeed, without decided acts of violence and cruelty towards the weaker sex. The further we go down the zoological scale the more do we see the principle assert itself, that love inflicts and seeks to inflict pain, that love suffers and seeks to suffer pain. At the very dawn of life, and therefore of courtship too, the act of conjugation whereby the maintenance of the species is guaranteed necessitates the entire sacrifice of the male partner. This is the case in the history of the individual and in that of the race; for among the germ-cells of animals and plants as well as among certain unicellular organisms the act of conjugation consists in the complete absorption of a small active male by a large passive female; the male is truly devoured by and incorporated within the female.

Even among multicellular beings, we occasionally

see what seems to be a reversion to this unicellular trait; among certain insects and spiders the female, after impregnation, not uncommonly pounces on her spouse and eats him up, lock, stock and barrel. What better example of self-immolation upon the hymeneal altar could we take than that of the tragic nuptial flight of the bee so poetically portrayed by Maeterlinck? He depicts the young virgin queen soaring up into the blue sky eagerly chased by a swarm of ardent young males. One by one the latter drop out of the race exhausted, but ever higher and higher she flies in her maddening flight until finally she discovers she is alone with one splendid male—the very prince of the swarm. To him as prize she now surrenders herself amid the dizzy heights. . . . But alas! The rapturous moment of his life completed, the thin veil dividing love from pain, and life from death, is rent in twain, and the lover is hurled, mangled and dying, back to earth, while the now potential mother of future swarms calmly pursues her course.

When we reach the reptiles we are furnished with some remarkable examples of the deliberate infliction of pain during courtship. The terrapin, for instance, has been seen by Pycraft chasing the female round and round the tank; when he catches her he beats her unmercifully about the head with his feet until she is literally stunned into submission. Among birds, again, how often in the springtime one sees the cocks treat their hens with the greatest violence, knocking them down, rolling them in the dust, pecking and scratching them viciously. Chaffinches are notorious wife-beaters, their ungallant conduct being in marked contrast to the gentle and affectionate billing and cooing courtship of the turtle-doves and love-birds, the latter so-called

because of their mutual caresses and intense devotion to one another, which is such that if one dies the other almost invariably pines away.

Arriving, finally, at the class to which we ourselves belong, the mammals, we find no lack of similar examples of sexual ferocity. When the doe is unresponsive the stag will chase her for miles, and when the poor defenceless creature is ready to drop from exhaustion he proceeds to butt her fiercely with his antlers. Once, however, the required mood of docility is gained his behaviour is that of the model husband, and woe betide man or beast who dares disturb the domestic harmony of the devoted pair. In dogs and horses, in children, and sometimes even in grown-up individuals, biting is a mark of affection; every owner of a dog knows how that animal cannot resist gently biting the hand of his master.

There is no escape from the conclusion that in man, too, courtship was inseparably associated with what we should now call gross cruelty. Primitive man captured and carried away his struggling bride by violence, and any subsequent frigidity on her part was speedily cured by a club. Even comparatively recently in New South Wales it was the custom during betrothal for the lover to beat his sweetheart, and a similar custom is still extant among the Bedouins. And have we ourselves not a couplet to the effect that the more you beat a spaniel, a wife and a walnut tree the better they will be? Lower class Russian and Slav women regard wives who have not been beaten by their husbands with pity and contempt; and Mantegazza describes the S. American Indian ladies as actually complaining if their husbands did not occasionally subject them to violence and indignities,

and he alludes to a girl who proudly said of her lord and master: "He loves me greatly for he often beats me." I remember reading somewhere of a dialogue between two cockney lovers. The lady, apparently, was not altogether satisfied with her admirer's method of making love. "D'yer love me, Bill?" she asked. "Of course I does," was the reply. "Then why don't yer knock me abaht?" was her reproachful rejoinder. Every man owes his survival to the display, on the part of his ancestors, of violence and brutality during courtship, and every woman owes hers to the fact that her forbears watched with delight the combats of the males for their favours, and willingly and expectantly abandoned themselves to the ferocious dominance of their successful claimants. What is that roguish inclination on the part of every woman to make her lover jealous but the resuscitation of the primal desire to find herself a bone of contention between two frenzied rivals? In every man there remains a trace of the impulse to inflict pain upon the object of his love, and in every woman lurks the corresponding impulse to court the infliction of pain at the hands of her lover. In the highest types of humanity, however, such impulses lie dormant or, if they show a tendency to appear, are repressed, and it is only in disease or abnormal conditions that they are now seen. As Havelock Ellis puts it in his *Love and Pain*: "A certain pleasure in manifesting his power over a woman by inflicting pain upon her is an outcome and survival of the primitive process of courtship."

Apart from actual love the very nature of the feeling, regard and attitude generally of the stronger towards the weaker sex is a reliable criterion of the standard of civilisation and culture attained. If I

were asked to mention a racial characteristic of biological significance tending to show that the German nation is on a lower evolutionary plane than the nations her provocative conduct has forced into war, I should without hesitation point to the more primitive relationship that exists between the sexes in Germany as compared to that existing between the sexes in, shall we say, France or England. A German exhibits little consideration for his womenfolk; deference to ladies does not figure in his code of *Kultur*; indeed, he holds such as weakness and as derogatory to the manly bearing of a true Hun. No English or French officer would expect or allow a lady to step off the pavement to make way for him; in Germany no lady would dare remain on the pavement. If the German exhibits what we should call sad lack of chivalry in times of peace, we can no longer be astonished at his bearing towards the womenkind of his enemies who are so unfortunate as to get into his clutches. The trait is bred in the bone and runs in the blood—it requires a German to shoot a Miss Cavell.

I think enough has now been said to convince the reader that originally love was not the tender emotion which it is or should be to-day, and we must return to our study of the smile which was left temporarily labelled as an expression of amorous courtship, and endeavour to ascertain its nature prior to this stage. Keeping as our key-note the fact that the more primitive the courting the more was it a source of combativeness and cruelty, we should expect to find that the further back we traced the smile, the less did the amorous and the more did the ferocious element appear in the emotions incident to its production, and there is good cause to believe such was the case. We

of to-day have, indeed, barely emerged from the hybrid stage of the smile, when it was a mixture of two antithetical elements: the one a threat, advertising fangs with their power to inflict pain; the other a love-sign, promising protection from enemies and from the annoyances of other males, and hinting at the comforts of a home and the bliss of married life. An acquaintance of mine who is devoted to children cannot understand why they will not at first respond to his well-meaning advances; but the fact is his smile of ingratiating exposes such a broadside of dental armature that it frightens and repels rather than attracts the little mites. Their primitive minds fasten on to the atavistic element in his smile to the exclusion of all else, and they instinctively recoil from it—sometimes with screams.

In the sardonic smile the element of cruelty is *consciously* introduced and completely masks any element of affection. The very word 'sardonic' is derived from the Greek *sairo*, 'to show the teeth,' 'to grin like a dog'; a sardonic smile is thus a primeval grin of cruelty. Drawing back of the angles of the mouth with partial baring of the front teeth is not infrequently seen in lower animals when their emotional state is not quite one of anger and menace nor yet quite one of love and devotion, but a conflicting mixture of both. When my dog does something particularly ridiculous and discovers I am laughing at him—and all dogs dislike being laughed at—he adopts a humiliated posture and wears a characteristic 'smile' reminding one forcibly of that 'sickly smile' some people affect when they meet a 'friend' they cordially detest. His smile says plainer than words: "I know I've made an idiot of myself but please don't laugh at

me." Darwin, in his *Expressions of the Emotions*, describes the purchase of a bull by an official in the Indian Government. The animal would not allow his teeth to be examined. A native suggested a cow should be brought and when this was done the bull immediately stretched out his neck and opened his lips so as to expose the teeth. This practice of fetching a cow to make a bull show his teeth is common throughout India and is not unknown in England. Another interesting fact in this connection to which Darwin alludes is that when two apes are about to quarrel, or when they meet one another for the first time, they often open their mouths widely in a deliberate yawn. That this is not because they are 'bored,' but is to show each other their powerful teeth, is proved by the fact that apes who have lost their canine teeth never yawn in this way, obviously because they do not wish their comrades to know of their defenceless condition.

There yet remains for investigation the origin of those peculiar reiterated sounds in which man, and to a certain extent monkeys, indulge when pleased, and which together constitute the 'laugh.' It will be remembered that the howling period in the infant was succeeded by one of vowel-intonation. Shortly afterwards, about the fourth or fifth month, the laugh appears, though this is at first but little more than those cooings and chucklings that so delight a fond mother's ear. It would appear, then, that in the individual a definite stage of howling gradually merges into one where laughter is present, and this was probably likewise the case in the race; in other words the laugh was probably begotten of the howl. The mere suggestion that the doleful sounds of pain and

grief could possibly bear any relation to the merry peals of laughter that drive dull care away may at first sight seem absurd. Do not the very sounds of joy differ radically from those of suffering; how then could they possibly be related? Nevertheless, if laughter and grief be probed to their sources, an intimate and fundamental relationship between them will be discovered. In the first place, it is often impossible in young children to know from their contorted faces whether they are on the verge of weeping or laughing. Obviously, therefore, the nerve-muscle machinery brought into action to give expression to these contradictory emotions is much the same in the primitive organism. Again, in children and hysterical persons, laughing frequently turns into crying, and crying into laughing. In most people lachrymation accompanies both laughing and weeping, and it is the custom, when describing one's enjoyment of some exceptionally funny incident or joke, to say, "I laughed till I cried." Idiots often laugh where they should cry and *vice versa*, and Darwin alludes to the case of an idiot boy angrily complaining that another boy had given him a black eye and then bursting out laughing.

But a misplaced laugh of this kind must not be confused with a laugh which, while apparently ill-timed, is in reality but an exhibition of irrepressible good humour, as in the case of the Irishman who, while being flogged, laughed consumedly and then explained that they had got hold of the wrong man! A more puzzling instance of seemingly ill-placed mirth is that in connection with the three niggers sitting on the bank of a river as a gunboat went up. A cannon-ball from the vessel knocked off the head of the middle one, whereupon the other two went off into uncon-

trollable fits of laughter. The discerning reader shall settle whether their laughter was savage, atavistic, hysterical, or merely the physical expression of an exceptionally keen sense of humour.

Only modern civilised man can emit the typical hearty laugh of joy; the lunatic and child 'scream,' savages 'yell,' and monkeys and apes 'howl' with delight. In the mammals generally the laugh cannot be traced further back than to the simians, although the howl extends as far back as the marsupials. If we look carefully into the character of laughter as exhibited on different planes of society and duly note all the circumstances attendant on its production, we shall have to admit that the further down the anthropological scale we follow it, the less does the joyous, god-like element, and the more does the fierce, brute-like element, predominate.

Laughter arose when Edmund Burke was struck square in the face by a rotten egg while making a speech on the slave question. But laughter also arose when, calmly pulling out his handkerchief and wiping his face, he quietly remarked: "I always *did* say the arguments in favour of slavery were somewhat unsound." The first outburst of laughter was of the savage and primitive type and was *at* the orator, the second was *with* him and was altogether of a more refined and civilised nature. I say 'civilised' because the highest type of laughter, the most characteristically human, is invariably associated with 'humour.'

Now humour, of course, varies in kind, and the particular kind appreciated is dependent, again, on temperament. Good humour is a conspicuous feature of men of great courage and fortitude, and it is significant that the German nation as a whole is singularly

deficient in this quality. Not only does the average German fail to appreciate humour, he does not understand it and is pained and puzzled by its exhibition in other people. The sight of a little ragamuffin strutting up and down the street with a hollow turnip on his head in imitation of a helmet would make an Englishman laugh, but has been known to drive a Hun into a condition of speechless rage. Swagger, bluster, pomp and dignity enter so much into the composition of the German that he is incapable of seeing the funny side of things; there is, as Kipling says, "too much ego in his cosmos." The British Tommy with his ineradicable sense of the ridiculous is a hopeless enigma to the Teuton mind. The fact that some of our soldiers who were prisoners in Germany played football with a loaf of black bread has rankled more in the Teuton's bosom than the loss of Colonies. German ideas of strength and courage are totally different in character to British. Much of what our enemy terms bravery we should term brutality. Whereas the strength in which he puts his faith is exemplified in his well-known creed, "Might is Right," that in which we believe and on which we rely is based on the principle that in the long run "Right is mightier than Might." German courage is herd-courage; it is over organised and too exclusively modelled on the laws of cohesion and momentum of mass. Once let the units of a charging herd get separated and all collective courage goes and demoralisation ensues.

If there is one illusion more than another which this war has dispelled it is that the German soldier is so incomparably superior to our own. The exact opposite is the case. The British soldier is less of a machine-like automaton and is far better equipped

with that nimble intelligence essential to initiative. Being of a less conservative disposition he is quicker to adapt himself to any sudden and unexpected change of conditions. Possessed of the 'bull-doggedness' that is almost emblematical of his nation he has more staying power, greater capacity of 'sticking to' a thing and can 'put up a better show' in a losing fight. His sense of fun, his philosophical good humour and his sporting instinct to play the game place him shoulders high to his foes in ability to grin under hardships, smile at defeat, crack a joke when writhing in pain, and laugh in the face of death. "Look here, Miss," said a Tommy who had lost both legs from a shell, to a lady visitor, "Here's my pal in the next bed been shot in the spine and can't feel his legs, and here am I without any legs and I'm always feeling them. Queer, ain't it?" Yes, the British soldier sees the humour of life, ay, and of death too; and it is this trait in him that is the despair of his phlegmatic opponent. But let me illustrate with one or two incidents of the battlefield.

(1) An old shipmate of mine,¹ who was devoted to cricket, was killed in Ladysmith by a shell which shattered both his legs. When struck down his comment was: "No more cricket for me."

(2) On a certain occasion during the present war an officer of the Cheshire Regiment, who was also a cricketer, had to lie for several hours in a very exposed position. At last cramp compelled him to shift a leg but in doing so he got a bullet through his thigh. With a groan he rolled back into the trench exclaiming: "Out! By gum! And leg before wicket, too!"

(3) This in a civilian. During a Zeppelin raid

¹ Commander Egerton, of H.M.S. 'Powerful.'

several bombs fell into an Electric Power Station. There was a terrific crash and the whole place was plunged in darkness. In the centre of the wreckage the foreman engineer came across one of the men in a dying state bleeding furiously from many wounds. When he saw the foreman he gave a wan smile and pathetically remarked: "I copped the lot!"

(4) A little boy scout had his leg shattered by a shell during the Scarborough raid. Now the 'regulations' of the Boy Scouts lay down that they should keep cheery even under adverse circumstances. When the boy was told that his leg would have to be amputated and that a telegram was being sent to General Baden Powell to inform him, he begged that on the telegram might be added the words: "I'm still smiling."

THE ATAVISTIC ELEMENT IN THE SMILE AND LAUGH.

The laugh of all primitive beings, be they children, savages or lunatics, is invariably associated with an element of cruelty. The child's laugh is one of triumph; it is always *at*, never *with*, a person. Even in its production the laugh differs according to the anthropological standard of the agent, that of civilised persons being characterised by short expiratory and long inspiratory sounds, that of primitive individuals more approximating to cries of distress and possessing longer expiratory and shorter inspiratory sounds. There still lingers in the most innocent of laughs a relic of its barbarous origin, for it inevitably involves, on the part of the perpetrator, the consciousness of some triumph over a fellow creature. "They laugh that win." To tell successfully a good joke one must

first depict the butt of the joke with a certain lack of reverence; that is, one must instil into the subconscious mind of one's audience the idea of inferiority concerning the object of the joke. The onlooker will only laugh at the stout old gentleman chasing his hat if he knows his own hat is safe in its proper place. When at the festive board the general laugh is against some individual present, the latter may, through sheer force of circumstances combined, perhaps, with his own good nature and sense of humour, join in, yet he is none the less still conscious of a sense of superiority, of a feeling of triumph. This, no doubt, is different in kind to that of his friends; indeed, as a matter of fact, it is ethically on a higher level, for it is based on the knowledge that he has been a means of giving pleasure to others. A man who has made a hopeless ass of himself amid strangers does not join in the general laugh.

As already pointed out one can gauge the culture-level of the laugher by considering the nature of the circumstances calling forth his merriment. The sight of a decrepit old woman struggling with a heavy burden may possess humour for the street Arab but arouses nothing but pity in a refined being. The other day I read of an incident in the papers which is so good an illustration of the primitive type of humour that I will repeat it here. On a railway platform in Germany were standing some English prisoners, including a wounded officer. To the latter a German soldier offers a cup of coffee. The officer reaches out his hand to take the proffered cup whereupon the German spits into it amid the ribald laughter of the bystanders. Such humour could, of course, only appeal to singularly depraved and callous individuals, because it is *at a*

person entitled to pity and *with* one who is a brutal cad.

Yet another kind of primitive laugh is the hysterical, so often indulged in on painfully incongruous occasions. The news of a serious accident to some loved one will send certain people, whose tender and affectionate nature is beyond question, into uncontrollable laughter. Such laughter is a throwback to that of primal times when the laugh was cast in a painful, rather than in a happy, setting. A humorous scene that sends the civilised being into fits of laughter leaves the savage unmoved; and conversely sights and sounds that make the latter roar with laughter and dance for joy nauseate and disgust the educated man. But extremes meet. Just as the voice occasionally reverts, and in reverting discloses the story of its evolution, so too does the laugh. The speech of a man being goaded to a pitch of fury becomes first tremulous, then stuttering and is later reduced to a hoarse growl; then, finally, as the muscles of articulation get paralysed, it vanishes in 'speechless rage.' So it is with excessive laughter, as in the 'uncontrollable fit.' The laugh degenerates to a howl or shriek accompanied by paroxysms in which the head bobs to and fro, the tears pour down the face, the eyes close, the jaws quiver violently, the sides are pressed in with the hands—"Laughter holding both his sides"—the feet stamp on the ground. Finally in the last stages the whole body gets 'doubled up,' the mouth opens widely but no sound escapes, breathing is arrested, muscular convulsions set in, and the man, after rolling about from side to side, collapses in a semi-conscious state.¹

¹ Death from excessive laughter is not unknown. The death of Chrysippus the Stoic was occasioned by a fit of laughter. Seeing an ass

As the call of the wild dog is more howl than bark and that of the fledgling bird more hiss than twitter; as the speech of the savage is more chant than talk and the cry of the new-born child more howl than prattle; so the 'laugh' of the savage to-day is, and of the ancestors of all of us was, far more of a yell or shriek than a true laugh. This yell or shriek, in its turn, originated in the howl of the still more antecedent men-like apes, and this howl, again, was probably evolved from interjectional cries of physical pain which, last of all, originated in the most fundamental sound emitted by the organism, the *flatus vocis*, that accidental and meaningless noise caused by the simple escape of air from the lungs of the reptile, the air-bladder of the mud-fish or the fore-gut of still more primitive creatures. Yet it was this fiendish and blood-curdling yell of the strong over the weak, of the victor astride his writhing victim, that in the flux of time became transfigured into the innocent, tinkling laughter of maidens and the hearty, deep-chested laughter of honest men.

C. MARSH BEADNELL.

H.M.S. 'Shannon,'
Grand Fleet.

eating figs, the philosopher requested that some wine might be brought and given the animal to wash the figs down. So immoderately did he laugh at his own quaint conceit that it cost him his life.

THE RELIGIOUS OPPORTUNITY.

THE EDITOR.

THAT 'the Church' has so far failed to rise to the present profoundly soul-searching occasion, is now after more than three long years of agony and bloody sweat of world-war an unquestioned commonplace of history. The Church has given no lead, taken no action, found itself incapable of so much as attempting to bring the representatives of its great schisms and sects into conference for even the modification of the common suffering. Rome, with all her high claims and her pretension to the spiritual hegemony of Christendom in the person of God's Vicar on earth, has remained timorously silent. Or worse; when she has spoken, as in the recent Papal Note, she has shown no sign of comprehending the moral question at issue. Unquestionably then the Church has so far let slip the greatest opportunity she has had during her whole history for vindicating the efficacy of her spiritual ministry. Many regret, some raise an outcry, but few thinking people are really 'surprised'. Most of us, including many of the clergy, if we probe ourselves searchingly, find we had no expectation whatever that the Church would really do anything. It was a vast, practical, vital business that was upon us, a very real and immediate world-problem to be solved, and she had accustomed us all our lives to look for no real help from her in such falsely-called worldly affairs. There

was then no occasion for rhetoric or heated language of upbraiding or of accusation, as though we had previously lived in blind reliance on a government which was suddenly found to be incompetent and inarticulate. And so, when the greatest of all wars broke out in all its devastating fury and unspeakable horrors, no one even of the most faithful dreamed of calling on the Church to try to stop it; all knew instinctively that that at any rate would be a waste of breath.

The Church militant here on earth, having for so long doggedly refused to arm herself with modern weapons and adapt herself to the actual conditions of present-day spiritual warfare, could not go into the firing line, but had perforce to remain in the rear, where volunteers from her numerous colleges of professed physicians of the soul should try as best they might to tend those wounded and broken in spirit by the fray.

All of which, for the historian and philosopher at least, is natural enough; for when, as in the present case, the general established order of human affairs is being cast into the melting-pot, it is but reasonable to expect that the most conservative and reactionary elements of that order should be the last to yield to the purifying process.

The best spirits in the world to-day are therefore not saying the Church should have prevented all this; they are saying *we* ought to have tried to prevent it, and we have now to see to it that it shall be prevented, if humanly possible, from recurring again, at any rate in its present hideous form.

This does not however mean, I venture to think, as so many are saying, that the Church is to be counted

out for the future and has no part to play in the reconstruction and reformation that are already beginning. But it does very clearly seem to mean that the searching test and probing trial which is putting our whole civilisation to the severest question, have so far found the Church incapable of corporate speech in the only tongue that is understood in the high court of history—the language of right action.

Thither have we all been haled as prisoners at the bar; and we all stand condemned equally, individuals and organisations alike. It is no good trying to appeal against the sentence, no use endeavouring to excuse ourselves by putting the blame on others, least of all by seeking to make some particular body the common scape-goat. We have each and all to ask, first and constantly, what is wrong with ourselves. It is, then, for the Church to ask herself what is wrong with her, if any real good is to be done, and not for the rest of the community to raise railing accusations against her, and so only stiffen her to angry retort or false apology; least of all does it beseem the clergy to blame the lay folk.

As for the still deeper question, which so many are asking: Has Christianity failed?—it is vain for men of that religion to think they have entirely disposed of the matter with the simple retort: It has never been tried. If it has never been tried, then Hinduism and Buddhism and Mohammadanism can be similarly excused by their respective followers. And further, if Christianity is in all ways best and highest, as its adherents declare, then are they patently left with least excuse and manifestly stand in the greatest condemnation.

If finally panicky holders of small quantities of

scrip on the various banks of formal belief ask nervously: Is religion bankrupt?—it is enough to ask them in reply: What else but religion, in its deepest sense of faith in the best, could give so many courage to persevere for betterment, as they are heroically persevering, in the present hell on earth?

So much then for the concrete past and present for the moment; but what of the future? The past is over and cannot be changed, we say, the present is in the making, but the future is pregnant with ever greater possibilities of betterment; it is the realm of that hope which springs eternal in the human breast. But is this altogether really so? The divine spirit is eternal; the procession of time is servant and not lord of eternity. The past, the present and the future, we may not unreasonably hold, all equally modify one another in a spiritual act or the full movement of a world-event. And of that spirit is the spirit of man. Past and future are spiritually with us equally with the present. The past is with us and is being changed by the present and the future; the past plays on the future and the future on the past, and the present plays on both and both on it. It may here be objected that nothing can alter what has once happened; it has thus happened as a fact for ever. No power on earth or in heaven can ever put back the hands of the clock of time; no time-series is reversable. Doubtless no earthly power can alter the cosmic temporal instrument; but the spirit is self-conscious life and not the product of a mechanical procession of things. And indeed even on earth clock-time has of late been brought somewhat into disrepute, as based on a confusion of space with time; real time, it is averred, is not quantitative but qualitative. For the spirit then

an event in time is by no means simply a sequence of happenings determined solely by the mechanism of the physical medium in which they appear. True time is psychical not physical; it is of the soul not of the body. What may be a great happening for ordinary human consciousness may be a moment of an event of relatively little value for the spirit, and what is a happening that well-nigh escapes all human notice may be a moment of an event of the greatest importance for the whole. A fact is a fact irrespective of our consciousness of it; but it is of worth to us, not only in so far as we are conscious of it, but in so far as we can interpret it and rightly relate it to the rest of our universe. As to the burning metaphysical problem whether things ultimately are irrespective of any possible consciousness of them, it seems not unreasonable to suppose that what we call consciousness is a more immediate revelation of the nature of spirit than are things, and that for perfect spiritual consciousness the totality of things is present. Things then are not ultimates, happenings are not ultimates, events are not ultimates. They are all of time and not of eternity; and time in all its moods is an instrument of the spirit, and usable by it at will for its purposes.

Moreover, though one does not believe in miracles in the sense that the order of nature can be arbitrarily interfered with, in the disorderly sense of the word, there seems no good reason why that order should not contain in itself the principle of self-correction and self-rectification to an unlimited extent. Hence though from one point of view every event and every deed is ineffaceable as a material happening and there is no reversability of the time-process, from another their effects are indefinitely modifiable and their

values changing as the whole of which they are parts becomes more manifest to consciousness and subsequently to understanding. It follows thence that no isolated event, no single deed that is done, is absolutely unalterable, as it appears to be to the superficial interpretation of our limited consciousness and its resulting ignorance. It is not over and done with really as it physically appears to be; there is no break in the continuity of the process which carries the past along with it in the present and continually modifies it for the whole. And therefore nothing is beyond remedy; future deeds can transmute past deeds and continually reorder the system of doing. All this finally follows from the over-belief that the soul of the divine order is a progressively remedial life and its end the sanification of all things and the salvation of all creatures. This is, of course, an unblushing confession of faith in universalism. But what then? It is a doctrine of eternal hope and universal benevolence and a worthy tenet of spiritual religion. But enough of the philosophy of time for the moment.

Now those who have futurity more alive in them than the majority, are proportionately filled with optimistic energy; they turn more readily and respond more easily to the good, are filled with greater love of it and hence with desire to create a more worthy social embodiment for the incarnation of the all-beautiful reality which is the object of their worship. Hence are they quick to recognize the errors of the past, ready to admit their own shortcomings and eager to try to order anew the goings of their ways. The gigantic world-embracing explosion of this colossal war is effectively smashing up the carapace of our conventional and conservative self-satisfaction, and the air

and light of heaven can now begin to play on the quivering sensitive flesh of our humanity on a vast scale. It is the beginning of a tremendous change; a general emerging from the crustacean period of human behaviour. Defensive armour has been perfected to its limit; we have hitherto defended our selfish interests by every means human ingenuity could devise; we have made the most cunning apologies for our extremest separative instincts, and been forgetful of the promise of the higher life that can find fit expression only when the carapace of selfhood is shattered. It can be split from within by the natural moral growth of the individual, or shattered from without by the disruptive forces of an unstable social environment, which in their turn may be thought of as manifesting in wider scope the natural growth from within of the great body of humanity as a whole.

Now the most pressing question to-day, in the midst of the crisis of this greatest opportunity for general growth that has yet happened on earth, is: Shall we as a mass continue to follow the slow ways of instinctive evolution, or shall we begin at last consciously as a whole to exercise the high prerogative of human reason as a social unitary force, and so immensely accelerate the time-rate of our becoming? Such a possibility cannot be contemptuously dismissed as the vague, vain dream of an unphilosophical, unscientific and unreligious fancy; it is, on the contrary, I have courage to believe, a practical proposition. For I am of those who are convinced that man is, not only a psychical reality, but also essentially a spiritual being. He is not simply the product of blind chance, not the fortuitous coming-together of molecules, not the outcome of a purely pitiless, soulless, mechanical

process. Man is, for spiritual faith, potentially in time and space, but actually and eternally in his inmost being, 'son of God,' as the homely language of religion phrases it.

And so for those who share in this high over-belief, man may be reasonably held to be the inner link between the mortal and immortal, the finite and the infinite; and, thus sharing both natures, he has potentially in him the absolute power of the reconciliation and transcendence of the great extremes. His nature may then afford the means and medium of the consummation of the world-process. Though, in the realm of becoming in time and space, he must submit to assuming the form of the slave (to use the language of ancient story) and play the part of servant, yet it is but for the purpose of realizing eventually his essential lordship, his sovereignty and right rule of the worlds that constitute the field of his striving. Here, however, we should be well-advised not to confuse such spiritual lordship with our present crude notions of sovereignty. Viewed then externally as a creature of time and space, man is product of the process, in that he is clothed upon by the outcome of its operations; but for spiritual vision he is in his inmost being ordainer of that process, in that ultimately he is one with that 'son of God' by whom all things are made, as the mythology of scripture phrases it. Hence is it that the divine reason in the deepest depths of his best nature has power, by the exercise of a right will, of true good-will, to convert the potentiality of man's best nature into a glorious actuality here and now. That best nature, however, we shall be wise to believe, is not an isolated individuality; it is rather a social reality, a harmonious manifold unity, in brief a spiritual personality, in which each

shares with all and all with each; every spiritual personality becomes this blessed society, and the community takes up all its members into itself as organic units, all being each and each all. But this spiritual consummation would fail of its full reality were it to be reserved for some state of abstraction, in isolation from the concrete life of the realms of becoming, as it were an artificially made reserve, walled-off from the rest of the universe, miraculously guarded from the world of every-day affairs, like some mythical heaven or paradise. No, heaven must somehow eventually be brought down to earth and earth exalted to heaven, if there is to be an end of suffering and a true knowledge of God. First we must be fired with the beauty of this ideal, then have the spiritual faith that it could be realized if we really desired it, and thereafter become possessed of the humility, honesty and true nobility to recognize that the chief bar to its realization lies in ourselves. But the more we attend to this ideal, the more conscious we become that there is a potent nature in us that does not really want it; we find the 'me' in us longing for a thousand and one other things, and know that most people have no scruple in exploiting the rest of the community to get them for themselves if they have the opportunity.

Now this ideal which we have so crudely envisaged is a spiritual social ideal. It is utterly removed from all ideas of an arbitrary, autocratic sovereign state which reckes nothing of individuals but enslaves them for its own selfish purposes. It overpasses even the notion of a self-disciplined society whose chief concern is that the individual should be encouraged in every way to make himself fit to give of his best freely for the love of the community as though the society were his own greater

self. For if each so endeavoured, then inevitably all would benefit each as each would benefit all; the law would be that of benefiting and being benefited in turn. This is the ideal of a true democratic aristocracy. But even so a higher spiritual instinct warns us that so long as this were done as a calculated policy, there would indeed be political virtue of a high order in the realm of enlightened civics, but not yet true spiritual reality; for the spirit lives by giving without the smallest tinge of expectation of reward or return; calculation would dim its purity and dwarf its nature. Such transcendental virtue, however, is at present for the few only; saints alone can afford such spiritual luxury. For the majority the political virtues are those that stand in most immediate need of cultivation,—first in the narrower sense of the duties of the citizens of some particular *polis* or state, and then in the extended meaning of right behaviour within the general society of humanity as a whole.

And now briefly to consider some things of worth that stand firm when so much is falling in ruins around us. We are passing through a time of most searching trial, through what is admitted on all hands to be the most critical moment human destinies have yet experienced on this planet. Is the spirit of man dismayed and desperate; are we as a whole down-hearted? The men of our race who march to face the fiercest hell of physical battle, and who know right well beforehand what they have to face, confidently shout No! And this is indubitably an outward and visible sign of an inward and spiritual grace; for they do not shout No and act Yes. Their shout is the battle-cry of a victorious spirit and not the bluster of an empty boast; it is no vain pretence to screw their

courage to the sticking point. And is there less spiritual and moral courage in those who have to fight on other fields against even more ruthless and savage foes, against the remorseless ambition, inhuman tyranny and cunning selfishness that have waged unceasing war on human kind throughout its history?

There is, it is said, a law of wisdom which decrees that as the corruption of the best is the worst, so the purging of the worst is the best; and hence more rapid spiritual advance can be made in periods of great stress, in days of accentuated physical and moral evil, than in the slow and peaceful years of humdrum, normal, virtuous existence. Mankind has ever been haunted with fair and fond dreams of a golden age when all were happy and great saints and sages are supposed to have abounded. But this is surely the looking backward of tired children to the cradle and bottle days of babyhood, not the forward-looking of men with some great work to do and a high quest to achieve. Psychologically it is the retroversion of our hope for the future. The ineffectual and inefficient are ever found to blame the 'times' for their own shortcomings. They can do nothing to-day, they say (as they have been saying for so long in India), because it is now the iron age. Sage and saint and high spiritual achievement are impossible any longer; they were of the past in the good old days; we of to-day are degenerates from the great ones of old.

There is a pleasant Indian tale on this theme which shows that wisdom had still its genuine votaries in the midst of the general spiritual lethargy. One day a sage of exemplary life and great renown was bathing in the Ganges and chanting a hymn of praise. The verses of his song-offering all ended with

the strangely unexpected and revolutionary refrain: "Excellent, excellent is the Kali Yug!" Now the Kali Yug is the present age, the most degenerate and unspiritual of the four great periods, according to the theory of Hindu mythical chronology. In amazement the bystanders asked the bather the meaning of his strange refrain. Thereon he proceeded to expound to them the revolutionary doctrine that, for the truly courageous and virtuous, the Kali Yug was indeed the most excellent of all ages; for it was possible far more rapidly to reach Liberation in such an intense age of outer strife and inner tension than in the slow and peaceful and lethargic days of the lotus-eating long ago.

And indeed if it be true that there is more joy in heaven over one sinner who turns and repents than over ninety-and-nine just persons who need no repentance, then must there be proportionate rejoicing over every deft and happy turn of the paddle of right endeavour that shoots the canoe of man's general estate out of the whirl and swirl of the rapids of circumstance into safer waters.

And surely now if ever are we shooting the most seething, angry, rock-strewn rapids of our entire existence, wherein the canoe of our civilisation is bobbing and tossing and spinning about in wild career. It has over and over again missed many a jagged rock of shipwreck by scarce a hair's-breadth. There has been no pilot aboard, no authority, no agreement between the motley crew; every nation, every corporate interest, has been paddling frantically for itself, when not engaged in the lunatic diversion of breaking its paddle over a neighbour's pate. But now, at long last, slowly but surely, some reasonable sense of the common

danger is beginning to dawn on all but the thickest skulls in the boat, and the majority are clumsily trying to begin somehow to get together so as to paddle with some sort of a rational purpose. The wider instinct of corporate self-preservation is forcing many to sink at least their minor differences and begin to co-operate in the major task of saving the common craft which affords them their sole chance of general safety.

We rejoice at this earnest of good-will and anxiety for the common weal; but students long accustomed to the old chaotic state of affairs within the boat are not surprised to note that the most quarrelsome and most sulky of the crew are still the religious bodies. Most of them apparently even now would sooner see the boat upset and all the crew drowned than change their position or stir a finger to help, unless their rival claims to pilotage are first unquestionably recognized by the rest. But grim necessity and imminent danger pay scant attention to such pretensions.

Fortunately in times of great crisis the nature of what is really best in man responds the most readily and most rapidly and true leadership knows no distinctions of artificial caste. To-day this spirit of leading is showing itself in innumerable ways and in most unexpected quarters. Co-operation in an infinite variety of modes and on a vast scale has suddenly arisen; what in normal times, in the slow process of pedestrian evolution, would have taken fifty or a hundred years to accomplish, has been achieved in months. The great spirit of 'togetherness,'—the vital ground of comradeship and friendship, the recognition of equal worth in the several parts of a whole, all that is good in what we clumsily speak of as democracy—is declaring its healing presence in the unhealthy

organism of modern civilisation; the artificial hierarchies of the past are being surely relegated to the back seats in the arena of human valuation, when not sternly shown the door.

If all this, in roughest outline and embryonically enough, is so—and it seems most manifestly to be so to many—and if all our hopes for the future depend on fostering this fair principle of general growth and progress, is it conceivable that religion, the most ancient of human social institutions and in its essence, as apart from its outer forms, the profoundest passion of the human heart, can escape the general movement? God forbid! Nevertheless there is very great danger that the organizations which now severally claim to be the only legitimate representatives of religion, may continue their old policy of persisting in mutual isolation and indulging their prideful spirit of intransigence towards one another and to secular life in general. But even if this should unfortunately prove to be the case, there is no reason to despair; for the sceptre will then rightfully fall from their hands, and the spirit of true religion will be found to have taken up its abode outside their tents in the hearts and homes of the worshippers of that God of love who recognizes none of the selfish divisions men make for themselves by their ecclesiastical dogmas and theological hatreds. Nevertheless it is no pleasing prospect to contemplate the possible scrapping of much that may still be capable of beneficent use. We are not of those who would advocate a policy of radical revolution and anarchy in all established things religious, of change for the sake of change and novelty for the sake of novelty simply. Right conservatism is an indispensable factor in any stable form of orderly government. By all means then

let us hold to the good, cling fast to what is best in the past; only let us be quite sure it is really good, be confident it is truly worthy and worshipful. A thing is not true because it is old, it is not good because it is new; it is good and true because the power in it brings men together willingly and lovingly to worship it, to appreciate its excellence, to recognize its virtue as source of a larger, wider, deeper life that harmoniously takes up all as co-workers and co-partners in it.

The present time-space is pre-eminently an age of democracy; we are all invited, nay constrained, to bow down before this vocable as the most fitting word-idol of the Zeitgeist's present mood. Democracy, we are assured, is to solve all problems and get us out of all our difficulties. In many quarters indeed this new cult borders perilously close on crude fetishism, and in most directions runs into extravagance. Democracy is welcomed with open arms, and rightly welcomed, as the natural reaction against the evil side of aristocracy, as the corrective of its selfishness. But democracy has equally its own evil side; it has its selfish self, its tyranny, and a very grievous tyranny too. Both are of a mixed nature, while at the same time natural opposites to one another. They can never destroy one another, as fanatics on either side suppose, so that one should remain the absolute victor. The good and admirable in both are natural complements and mates whose marriage and harmonious blending give birth to timocracy, that beneficent rule of true worth, the realm of value, which alone can mirror forth the perfect rule of genuine theocracy and so establish the kingdom of God on earth.

Never before in the history of our civilisation have thinkers been so busied with the high problem of worth

or value. It is true that some popular writers intoxicated with the fumes of their own frothy smartness, allow themselves the evanescent pleasure of cheap sneers at the philosophy of values as though it were a trumpery article of pinch-beck intellectualism. But these are superficial critics, patently ignorant of the value of this quest and of the deep spade-work that has already been done in the tillage of this new field of human understanding. On the contrary, for serious students of the things that count, the outcome of this enquiry promises to supply the leaven that will eventually leaven the whole philosophical lump. This patient open-eyed search for a criterion of the things that really matter, they believe, will at the same time profoundly transform the whole of the future religious outlook as well. The present world-wide religious opportunity then imperiously calls on all reasonable men of religion, to whatever community they belong, to concentrate their attention on what in their respective traditions is of real value, of true worth or virtue, on what is in fine rightly worshipful, so that they may help to bring out their fairest treasures for the general benefit of mankind.

If one is then not utterly deceived in the signs, this search for value is destined to change profoundly the common point of view in regard to spiritual reality. The false, abstract spirituality of a crudely imagined other-world is already an absurdity for many, and is growing increasingly unsatisfactory for vast numbers. The ingrained, ancient habit of the world that has for so long dressed up its kings and rulers and dignitaries in gorgeous trappings is rapidly weakening and in many directions is already outgrown. Natural virtue and real power require no such artificial tricks of embellish-

ment. True beauty is best shown in the simple natural things. Barbarous trappings and their modern derivatives are on all sides being recognized as anachronistic and unreal. And surely here, if anywhere, religion should lead the way in reform; for it has already shown in many ways that the root of the idea of true worth has been more assiduously cultivated in some of its phases than in any other human institution. In the East, for instance, India especially has set the fashion that sanctity is an inner virtue which requires no external dressing-up; her holy men for long centuries have for the most part been mendicants. But here the reflection occurs: Have they not in reality made themselves as conspicuous externally as have kings and the rest by going to the other extreme? At any rate some of their spiritual leaders have been keenly alive to the prideful temptation of the garb and manner of outward humility and poverty. It is not, says one of them, the patched robe that makes the Sūfi, but love of God. As for the Western world, the story of the days of teaching of the founder of its faith insists throughout on service as the test of true greatness.

Now if we have here, as I am profoundly convinced we have, a potent means of insight into the nature of spiritual worth and values, then it seems but reasonable to revise the whole mythological setting of our ideas of heaven and of the nature of divine majesty. Of old the king was the strongest, most powerful and most gorgeously dressed of the tribe; the values of the time were frankly and exclusively physical and quantitative. Gradually the virtue of qualitative values was recognized—qualities of intelligence and of moral worth. But, strange to say, though religion, in its

higher phases, sought for moral and spiritual virtues, it persisted for the most part still in viewing God mythologically and clothing him with the attributes and trappings of an earthly king. He has his throne and crown and footstool, his court and ministers and armies and the rest. He is clothed in glory and majesty; if he is no longer decked in earthly garments, he is vested with the radiance of the sun and stars. Indeed those who outwardly dressed themselves in the garb of poverty and carried the beggar's bowl or their equivalents, were at the same time most frequently the chief poets and mythologizers of the gorgeous nature of the invisible world where they should themselves hereafter sit on thrones clothed in splendour. And to-day we have a host of psychical impressionists who would persuade us that the spiritual man is clothed with a glory of superphysical radiance. All this may doubtless be psychically possible; but is it spiritual reality? Who that is truly instinct with the innate spiritual virtues, would desire to be gorgeously apparelled physically or psychically? His values are of another order; he knows that for the most part there is greater worth and virtue in what all others pass by unheedingly than in the most gorgeous shows that fascinate the senses.

And if this is one of the outcomes of spiritual knowledge, he no longer seeks for God as the most gorgeous of appearances; his ideal is no longer to be satisfied by daubing the paint of such crude notions over the fair face of reality. His religious culture has passed completely out of the infantile and barbaric stage; it is no longer of the *Kultur* order or even of a more severely 'censored' type, either in this respect or in any other.

We are to-day in arms against the spirit of the satanic gospel of 'might is right,' naked and unashamed, against the forcible imposition of the yoke of a false mechanical *Kultur* upon the unwilling necks of humanity, against Kaiserdom and militarism and all the evils of a pseudo-aristocracy whose ambition is to dominate the world for its own selfish purposes, while loudly professing that it proffers rich benefits in its blood-stained paws. Thus is it with us in our secular striving; but under the storm-tossed secular surface, we feel convinced, the deep, quiet spirit of the eternal values of the really good is at work. Is then religion, which claims to be superior to all secular endeavour, to stand apart in this holy war? Is it too proud to fight? Worse still, is it in the West to persist in its ingrained dogmatic Cæsarism, its intolerance, overweening ambition, absolute claims and all the rest of it, which in its domain represent precisely the energizing of the same evil spirit against which we are fighting with secular weapons?

For what really essential difference is there between the one spirit and the other? The one excuses its depredations, horrors and frightfulness by invoking the flimsy pretext of military necessity, the interests of the state and devotion to the greater glory of the German God. The other has notoriously throughout history committed innumerable abominations, and ever, as it claimed, *ad maiorem gloriam Dei*? But of what God? Surely not the God whom Jesus worshipped in his life and deeds; but the God of narrow dogmas, of utterly perverted notions, and not simply of dense ignorance, of the truly Good God.

Many religious apologists will here loudly protest that we are all now utterly ashamed of these abomina-

tions of past history and of the blasphemous claim that they ministered to the greater glory of God. To-day, they will aver, all this is changed ; the Christian religion no longer tolerates such foul deeds in its name. But even if physical persecution in the name of religion has been swept away—and let us not forget that this beneficent improvement has been brought about by the secular spirit and not by the ecclesiastical—is the intolerant inner will of dogmatism and ecclesiastical ambition really changed ? We ordinary thinking folk at any rate feel that it is as yet by no means radically altered, however its outward expression may be ‘censored’ in the interests of diplomacy. We feel that this spirit will still take every opportunity it can to impose itself on the world and use every advantage circumstance puts in its way to aggrandize itself. As a matter of fact it has continued to do so, though forced by public opinion to change some of its methods and conform outwardly at least to an improved standard of milder general manners or even, as in the best types of missionary enterprise, when admirable service is done out of genuine compassion among the ignorant and suffering. This is plainly paltering with reality and no genuine conversion ; and the present great religious opportunity calls for a really radical change in the behaviour of the Churches. Our excellent *padres* at the front, the men who are face to face with things as they are and with the flower of our manhood as it is best realize the farce of the *ancien régime*. They are practical men of religion, yet they generously confess that they feel they could take off their hats to the average Tommy. There is a something in these Tommies, a deep down spirit in the men who cheerfully face the fiercest blasts of hell’s orchestra with a jest

upon the lips, that compels reverence. Yet are our heroic soldiers for the most part far from being religious, indeed no few are entirely destitute of religion, in the hackneyed, canting sense of the term. But the main thing is there, deep down, in deeds, though the doers of the deeds are utterly incapable both from temperament and training of expressing themselves in words. It is thus very patent that there must be deep-seated rottenness, something most radically wrong, in a Church that has found itself incapable of training and utilizing this so excellent material. It is not the *padres* who are blind to the situation; it is the stay-at-home, stolid, conservative, inexperienced, immoveable bureaucrats of the ecclesiastical machine who are the blind leaders of the blind. They are still for the most part hard at work filling up the old forms, issuing the stereotyped regulations, throttling every endeavour at initiative and every attempt at clearing a way for free movement with their official and officious red-tape. They forget that the future does not belong to their generation, that it is in the hands of the younger men, in the hands still more of the children who are growing to manhood and womanhood; and are blind to the fact that the rising generation is tired of their incompetence and has no respect for their proclamations. Do these bureaucrats of an outgrown *régime* of ecclesiastical autocracy of many forms really desire a revolution and for a time anarchy in religion? For that is what will come if they persist in their reactionary policy; or have they moral courage and spiritual foresight enough at last to lead a wise reform on constitutional lines and lay down the sure basis of a genuine religious commonwealth? What then are they going to do to win the men of the

future and the women of the future, for the women are beginning to play a very important *rôle* and will in future play an increasingly decisive part in public affairs? It is no longer a question of leaving the ninety-and-nine sheep and going into the desert to seek for one that is lost, but, as I heard a wise *padre* say recently, of leaving the one comfortable bell-wether in the so-called orthodox fold and seeking to understand the needs of the ninety-and-nine who prefer the free air of the open spaces.

But the religious problem is far greater than that of any particular religion; the religious problem is beyond all others a world-problem. Indeed, it may well be that in some respects the difficulty of trying to reconcile or minimize the differences of the schisms and sects and of agreeing on a common platform of essentials, the things that really count spiritually over against points of secondary importance, is greater than that of seeking to improve matters in inter-religious relations and foster the beginnings of a comity of religions on the most general lines. If hitherto international relations have been for the most part of a quasi-barbaric order, inter-religious relations of West and East have been of a still more primitive nature. The densest ignorance and most acute prejudice have generally been exalted into high religious virtues and loyalties on both sides. Is it not time that a truce be called to this spiritual barbarism; is there never to be a meeting together, not occasionally of a few individuals, as has been the case hitherto, who are regarded by their religious compatriots as traitors or at best unpatriotic pacifists, but of responsible representatives of the great religious complexes who would come together in the spirit of comity, if not of genuine

brotherly love, in the name of the common worship of what is best and highest, and so learn better to understand one another in friendly conference, not as enemies seeking to take every advantage of one another, but as friends and allies in the common cause of helping to improve the world and deepen the spiritual life of humanity?

What is there evil in such an inspiration ; what is there disloyal to God in such an effort ? What is there even impossible in such an attempt, if only we set our hearts on what is truly of worth and value, and let go the horrible falsities in which men fanatically delight to dress up the mortal idols they worship in place of the ever-living God of the things that really are,—the things that ought to be on earth and which will be as soon as we agree together that they are worth making our own, that is making them come true in our own lives, here and now ?

G. R. S. MEAD.

THE IMAGINAL WORLD-GROUND.

BERTRAM KEIGHTLEY, M.A.

THE first three chapters of Part III. of Mr. Fawcett's arresting volume¹ are devoted to brief re-statement and further definition of the position now reached. This is called for, because the task of Part III. is the attempt to rethink the framework of that vast creative episode with which is bound up the destiny of mankind; or in other words the re-casting of what has been termed Nature-philosophy in the light of the main hypothesis.

We have seen that there may be innumerable such creative episodes, each finite, each having a 'beginning' and a 'consummation.' We have learnt to regard 'Nature' not as something radically different from 'Spirit' which it confronts and as existing independently thereof; for there is no *radical* contrast between what we know directly in our conscious experience and the things which obtain in the order of Nature. These 'things,' this visible and tangible Nature, are not to be regarded merely as content, akin to the representations with which we play in fancy; for Nature *masks* collections of innumerable sentient, not to be classed merely as contents, but rather as centres of consciousness which are *aware* of contents.

We are reminded that prior to the genesis of the Cosmic Imagination a conservative activity *endures*,

¹ E. D. Fawcett, *The World as Imagination*. London (Macmillan); pp. xlii. + 623; 15s. net. See Mr. Keightley's appreciative summary 'The Cosmic Imagination,' in the last number.—ED.

not indeed timelessly, but without change of content. It is a harmonious unity of consciousness and content. Nature is born with the *appulse to change*; with the initiation of real time-succession. A germinal world-system detaches itself, or buds off, from the infinite imaginal matrix, and the descent of this nascent world into the storms of conflicting multiplicity, the unrest of change, is the genuine metaphysical 'fall,' the price of a new creative episode.

Nature is thus an aspect of a *creative* thought or content-whole within the Cosmic Imagination; a sub-whole which develops more or less independently of the content of the *conservative* background over against which it appears. It is necessary to say 'aspect,' since sharp separation of the content-side of Nature from the 'scious' and 'conscious' sentient lives allied with it will not be found to bring satisfaction.

After discussing what evolution really means, we come to Chapter II., which opens with the question whether there are Cosmic Nights and Days, the conclusion reached being that there is no evidence available to decide the matter finally, but that, in view of the inherent freedom and spontaneity of the Cosmic Imagination, there can be no 'law' which *enforces* such a rhythm.

The time-limitations of our world-system next engage the attention and are discussed in connection with 'energy' and the 'law' of its degradation. The true significance of this 'law' is shown to lie in these very time-limitations, and some telling points are made in regard to 'energy' symbolism in general.

The third chapter restates the hypothesis of the Cosmic Imagination as the *Ground of Evolution*, and points out that it is *the conscious activity of the Cosmic*

Imagination, ensouling content, which constitutes the 'energy' so-called of the universe. This conscious activity is discussed as the real 'principle of movement,' the position reached being thus stated: Considered apart from creative episodes (which may or may not alternate with non-creative durations) the Cosmic Imagination is, in point of *content*, a static reality, the accomplished eternal perfection, which is not however timeless, but endures. Its consciousness, the continuum of this content, is the side of its identity; is the active *grasp* for which the differences of the content are *together*, not a 'multiverse,' but aspects of a universe. Here we detect the fundamental standing of consciousness, or rather (as we ought, strictly speaking, to say) of *con-sciousing* or *co-awaring*; we are considering no mere 'relation,' but the ground of relations; no 'addition' to a given 'compresence' of somehow independent things, but the grasp-activity which that compresence presupposes. What is the manner of this compresence of the many to the universal consciousness? The many are, by supposition, *together* in the Cosmic Imagination; what then is the form in which they are awared? In a time-regard they are *simultaneous* aspects of a changeless whole that endures.

There are no *spatially* related differences within the harmonious content. For space, as we perceive it, implies co-existent positions; a related many which are more or less exclusive or opposed, and which, unable to meet without conflict, exist *alongside of* one another. Space is the content-variety in a novel form or manner of existence, in which the differences have broken away from the restful harmony of interpenetration and from one another.

Thus a germinal world-system—the initial situation from which the philosophers' 'Nature and History' are to be evolved—exists as a thought within the unity of the Cosmic Imagination. Nothing happens within this thought: there is the enduring of a complex idea, the harmoniously penetrating aspects of which suffer no change. But the initial situation or germinal world-system comprises a 'many,' it is not 'homogeneous' in the sense of being alike all through in respect of its contents. Nor is there any single all-embracing 'law'; for 'law' and 'laws' generalise conservative modes of psychical activity which may come and go, though the background remains. Thus the germinal world-system comprises no causal laws; but does it comprise real species or kinds?

We must distinguish in this connection between 'universals,' which are merely concepts or substitute facts, and 'universals of content.' The latter are imaginal realities more akin to perception than to abstract thinking. We shall distinguish them by a special name and call them *imaginals*. An imaginal is thus any ideal content which is shared or shareable by many instances. It is called so because it might be present to the imagining of a superhuman power just as a row of apples can be present to mine. The imaginal is not necessarily aloof from change; it is fixed or changeful as its 'instances' serve to declare. Imaginals, like the *universalia in rebus* of the middle ages, are not purely transcendent realities, but are embodied, at any rate in part, in these 'instances.' It might be urged, perhaps, that an imaginal, prior to its show in multiple instances, is '*ante res*,' and that it is then only a particular sub-idea within the complex idea of the world. But one must go warily here, for it

may be that an immanent plurality or 'many-ness' is part and parcel of its original being.

The World-Idea then may comprise such imaginals, *i.e.* kinds or species in this sense. It expresses statically moreover an immanent design, the *characters, measures and relations* of its imaginals being harmonious. So the initial situation limits, albeit in no inelastic manner, the possibilities open to cosmic process and will control very largely its future, come what striking improvisations there may.

We are thus led through a general discussion of 'design' and immanent purpose to the question whether each world-system has its God or Gods, with which this chapter concludes.

The next opens with the question: How does the initial situation, thus outlined, change—how does it pass into the time-process, into Nature? Bergson's theory of 'detension' is critically examined and then we pass on to what Mr. Fawcett terms 'our experimental and inevitably inadequate account of how *our* world-system may have begun.' In his own words:

The Cosmic Imagination *conserves* the static harmony of the World-Idea by activity with restful content. But though the world-idea thus *conserved* is harmonious, it comprises a manifold—the differences, *e.g.* of its imaginals and of *their* immanent manifold. It is not a blank, featureless identity. For the Cosmic Imagination indeed, it is a radiant glory of the perceptual type, beautiful beyond any vision imaginable by ourselves. Nevertheless shall we liken it, to compare the great with the small, to a wondrous poem which an exalted mortal could imagine and aware at a glance. The poem which contains, let us suppose, numerous characters, is at the outset just content *for*

the poet whose consciousness is its continuity; the field in which it hangs together as a whole. Conceive now these characters (which answer to the content-differences in the World-Idea) coming to exist *for themselves*, to be *sentient* in their own right, thus *detaching themselves* in a manner from the poet and the former unbroken texture of the poem; like the group of characters in *Hamlet* becoming suddenly conscious in detachment from their imaginer, Shakespeare, and his play. This conception may serve to introduce our account of creative change and the time-process.

For the World-Idea thus standing out against the background of the *conservative* Cosmic Imagination Mr. Fawcett adopts the term *Grand Imaginal* or simply *The Imaginal*, as being more expressive and nearer to reality than World-Idea. It is then the Grand Imaginal which is to fall into time-succession, and the fall takes place, it may be, thus:

The natural order is not due, as Bergson puts it, to a 'detension' or '*deficiency* of will.' It expresses a *quicken*ing of activity of the content-differences of the Imaginal, World-Idea or germinal system. The Imaginal is a stable harmony of *different*s—the differences of its many sub-imaginals. Conceive the conserving activity as just maintaining these *different*s without change. Conceive the activity as heightened. It is awaring conscious activity. All the different in the Imaginal are no longer mere contents, but conscious or 'scious' contents; are no longer differences contributory to, and absorbed by, a total idea. They are raised to the level of *agents*, *i.e.* active psychical centres whose very 'sciousing' or 'sciousness' *loosens* them from the Imaginal and from each other. The Many immanent in the Imaginal, but subordinated

before as mere contents, now pass from mere differences into the *clear-cut diversity* of multiple agents, each of which by the act of being sentient or 'scious' has become a *discrete* centre in the hitherto unbroken Imaginal. The *different* contents present to the different sentient agents become very largely *contraries*; contents opposed and mutually inimical. This reveals to us the true principle of movement, the imaginal principle. Given a situation of inner discords, transformation is the resource which serves to reduce the discords, as much as possible, to harmony. But the reduction, again, produces a new situation, which becomes in its turn the seat of inner discords, which tend to increase, whereupon is created a fresh transformation equally provisional. *The world-process is thus forced along the path of imaginal or creative evolution.*

The *different*s in the Imaginal exist originally in proportions expressed by the phrase the 'divinity of measure.' Qualities, in the respect in which they occupy the Imaginal, are quantities definitely greater, equal or less. Those qualities in definite quantity are harmonious elements of a whole. With the quickening of activity this harmony is lost. The *different*s, erst harmonious, are quickened or intensified as they become agents or sentients; and they overflow strongly into one another. Each inter-penetrating content insists on and expands itself, but since they are all equally in the Imaginal, *which is finite*, they tend to collide. The unrest of the incompatibles has begun. Self-conservation—the conservative side of the Imaginal as manifest in the sentient content or agent—is in this plight: that the contents are to conserve their characters at the same metaphysical points at which

incompatible or contrary contents are to conserve theirs. Self-conservation' is secured at the price of mutual *change*, of *an imaginal novelty* or 'solution' which provides provisional harmony. A universal changing sets in and, as no final harmony is attained, persists.

This universal changing of contents is the birth of time-succession; and therewith a consideration of the *intensity* acquired by contents leads to that of order, laws, disorder, chance-happenings and the earliest causal uniformities as the expression of the conservative side of reality. Then with Chapter V. we come to the birth of space, motion, etc.

The birth of time-succession is accompanied by that of space, in which the livened *intensity* of the differences of the Imaginal becomes *extensity* properly so-called. Space, concrete space, is an invention by means of which differentials, not harmonised by being altered, *i.e.* still maintaining contrary characters, are rendered, in Leibnizian language, 'compossible.' Space shows diversity—the different qualitative contents of the Imaginal—in a new *form*. It is an altered simultaneity; a form into which simultaneously existing and conflicting differentials are forced. The differentials in the Imaginal never overflow wholly into one another. In so far as they do overflow you have compenetration and creative change. But they have a standing also of their own. They modify one another, but they are also self-conserving, even amid change. This situation is expressed as their externality to one another—as the *coexistence* of differentials having different positions. Note, however, that this outsideness or externality of one to another is never complete. All the differentials belong to the content of the Imaginal and are related therein. They are related, indeed, as more or less

independent agents that, as sentient, have acquired a detached reality *of their own*. They are members of a system which shows at once continuity and 'looseness'; the 'looseness' already mentioned in discussing 'things.' They are agents, each of which has its centre of resistance to obliteration and, also, its sphere of influence.

This invention of space cannot possibly be attributed wholly to the minor agents themselves. It is of cosmic scope, includes them, legislates for them. Now this concrete heterogeneous space of agents having different positions, and real in the fullest sense in which any mode of content of the Imaginal can be real, provides us with the objective fact answering to the symbolic concept of certain mathematicians, familiar as 'absolute space.' Thus concrete cosmic space is essentially the coexistence of heterogeneous agents; and therewith arise, not 'dimensions,' which are conventions, but indefinitely numerous *directions* or possibilities of motion, which allow the distances between these agents to be altered. And this manner of coexistence is itself stable, the conservative side of a reality, which is different from itself at different points as qualities dictate.

After space motion. Primitive motion is a new form of change altering the relative distances between the natural agents or minor sentients in the Imaginal. It presupposes time-succession and space. There is change of place in the Imaginal since space or coexistence, while modifying the conflict of the minor sentients or agents, *brings no complete harmony*. These sentients remain *not wholly* external to one another; they are of one tissue, on their content side, with the Imaginal, and are still subject to the mutual

penetrations or invasions expressing the continuity of this Imaginal. The lives of the sentients are furthered and thwarted by the contents which are thrust upon them. And in the *act* of conserving themselves they move *toward* other furthering sentients and *away from* thwarting ones—thus are born those first ‘attractions’ and ‘repulsions’ which have so often been misdescribed as ‘original forces.’ Motion thus expresses outwardly in space the inward unrest of the primitive natural agents.

A very suggestive discussion of ‘motion,’ its ‘laws,’ ‘conservation,’ etc., now follows, into which, however interesting, we cannot follow Mr. Fawcett, and the chapter ends with a consideration of ‘surprises in Nature.’

Chapter VI. is somewhat of a digression, demanded by the frequent references to ‘sentients’ which have already been made. It is devoted to the consideration of the different sorts of sentient agents from the lowest upwards. It opens thus:

The lowest kind of sentients have figured already in our account of the sundering of the Imaginal and the birth of change. On their *content* side these sentients are instances of imaginals whose character they share, being, indeed, the many, immanent in these existents, which are now ‘loose’ in the world-process. Thus a speck of red is an instance or particular example of the colour-imaginal or colour-idea in the world-idea; which imaginal, however, must not be confused with the ‘universal’ or conceptual phantom of platonising writers. The content, which shares an imaginal, is never pure; it is shot with threads of other contents belonging to other imaginals in the world-idea, wherein anything is always pene-

trated by much else (though not by 'all else,' as was made clear in the analysis of causation). These minor agents, which lie so far below the level of 'protozoic' sentiency, must not be confounded with either 'monads' or 'selves.' They are not windowless entities, members of a pluralistic harmony which are self-dependent and exist in solid singleness. They possess contents which *are of one tissue with the rest of the contents of the Imaginal, and belong, indeed, primarily to this Imaginal.* It is the 'scious' side, lighting as it were a tiny area of these contents, that *detaches* the minor agent, in so far as it can be detached, from the other agents, and from the common Imaginal. Each 'scious' agent is aware of content; awaring is never bare, but always of this and that of those contents. But the concrete life which awares contents *a, b and c* is cut off from the concrete life which awares *d, e and f.* Each sentient seems to exclude every other. It is that which awares *a, b, c,* and *not* that which awares *d, e, f.* It is also a conservative awaring activity in respect of *a, b, c,* and, failing penetrations, might never alter into anything else through eternity,

These lowest kinds of primitive natural sentients may be called *nuclears*, as being the nuclei round which all subsequent evolution of Nature complicates. The nuclears are the ultimate qualitative 'radicals' of pre-chemical, 'inorganic' evolution; the *relatively stable cores* in the flux, just as the eighty-two 'elements' so-called are for 'inorganic' chemistry, and the carbon 'radicals' are for organic construction.

The nuclear-awareness does not include the contrast of 'self' and 'not-self,' but does include rudimentary affective feelings; for 'pleasures' and 'pains' in all their kinds are *vital* feelings, *i.e.* essential

features and marks of the furthering and thwarting of sentient life. Here, indeed, in these depths is the *normal* joy of life, and here is truly the *dance of life*, not a drab and depressing dance of the dead.

The identity of a nuclear may be understood thus. It changes, but always with a core of more or less stable content which is forced to lose certain qualities and to accept others. Identities always change in the time-process. Its *qualitative uniqueness*, however, which distinguishes it from other nuclears, is assured by the fact that no other sentient of its kind can undergo quite the same vicissitudes; their places in concrete space assigning to them different careers.

All the parts of Nature may be seats of sentients of these lowly sorts, so that there is no content which is not present to some 'scious' agent. But the contents of these, again, may be present to other sentients of wider grasp, and so on; and there may even exist *interlacing areas* of contents, present to different sentients of different grasps.

All contents of Nature thus being present to sentients, lowly or lofty, we get rid of the last vestige of the 'philosophies of the Unconscious.' An enlightening discussion of the 'sub-conscious' follows, leading on to 'atoms' as members of living species, and then upwards to sentients above the human level and finally to a brief section on 'God' which closes this chapter.

In Chapter VII. we return to a further discussion of the 'evolution of Nature,' beginning with the primitive repulsions or 'pellations' (as Mr. Soddy prefers to call them). The conclusion is that primitive natural agents, like ourselves on our higher level, tend to move in different directions, at once seeking, maintaining, avoiding, though not with the distinct memory

and anticipation which we humans associate with a 'self.' Their actions can be discussed *as if* they were mechanical, because they have the constancy of habits and lend themselves, accordingly, to calculations and predictions; their great numbers obscuring the variations which may occur in individuals. But this mechanistic category, though useful, is untrue. Its meaning is that the agent's behaviour is imposed on it by a power *outside itself*. This behaviour, while responding to incursions from beyond the agent, expresses also the agent's own *conservative act*.

This obstinate conservation, which is expressed in repulsions, is expressed also in the attractions; and here is to be found the true significance of gravity, cohesion, chemical attraction, and so forth. A series of brief and telling sections illustrates the way in which science is to be re-thought from Mr. Fawcett's standpoint. Organic evolution is also briefly dealt with. He suggests that marked 'stages,' such as the appearance of protoplasm, for instance, and other innovations in the evolution of life, through the plant and animal grades, must be regarded as new 'inventions' of the Cosmic Imagination for the solving of problems, just as the birth of time-succession and space were at the very outset of the world-process.

Chapter VIII. continues the same general topic, treating first of 'variation' in general, various connected problems and the current solutions proffered. All this, together with some well-chosen illustrations, serves to bring out clearly and helpfully the way in which the general hypothesis applies to these questions and leads to their unravelment, incidentally throwing further light on the nature of creative initiative and its workings. These pages bristle with points and

suggestions of deep and, I believe, of profound significance for the future building up of a sound philosophy of science. But no further reference can be made to them here, as we must conclude this all too long notice and summary with a few words on the concluding chapter, which takes the 'first steps towards a solution of the riddle of evil.' And one may add that any systematic constructive philosophy which can offer even an approximately satisfying solution of that riddle, has the strongest and best possible claim to thoughtful consideration and study at the hands of every sincere honest thinker.

There must be no shirking of the problem, no evasion such as one finds in the sham solutions proffered by theists and absolutists. To help us to do this, let us look at reality awhile with the eyes of the pessimist and note a very, very few of the evils which mar creation. Evils are real; for anything to which you can point in experience is real, though its reality may be only a passing feature of the time-process, and the solution of the problem of evil does not lie in the assertion that evil does not exist.

Taking only animal and human sentient, while we note that there is a happy side to animal life which no one can overlook, it remains a fact that the abominations connected with it are legion. Thus bacterial and protozoan creatures innumerable infest superior forms, raiding the vertebrates freely and sending scores of species to assail man. Their equipment, in regard of the superior forms, is an elaboration of pain-bringing mischief. This evolutionary riot ignores ethics and, as Carveth Read puts it: "The predatory species flourish as if in derision of moral maxims. . . . Animals, at first indistinguishable

from vegetables, devour them and enjoy a far richer life. Animals that eat other animals are nearly always superior, not only in strength and grace and agility but in intelligence." Not only are there 'failures' innumerable, but to failures are added enormities. There are the instincts of the butcher-bird which impales small mice, beetles, etc., on thorns for its larder; of parrots which tear kidneys out of the living sheep; of wasps which lay eggs in caterpillars and spiders, paralysing them with a rare precision to provide meat for the larvæ. The diabolism shown here is surpassed only by the crimes of the worst vivisectors. Is the invention of such an inferno to be fathered on the divine thought? Is there no other way of understanding the evolution of parasite, mamba, sphex, tiger, shark, stoat, and a thousand other pests, offensive even to half-developed moral man—man who is himself a slaughterer and torturer and yet is beginning to resent the inferno which he finds presented to him in Nature?

And what shall we say of the martyrdom of man himself—both physical and mental? Its horrors, its squalid features, its long-drawn-out agonies are familiar to every serious thinker. Wundt points out that the gamut of pleasure is less rich than that of pain. Grant Allen tells us that "massive pleasure can seldom or never attain the intensity of massive pain"; and looked at mentally man's case is little or no better. And consider the philosophical 'solutions' heretofore offered us. Hegel warns us against a superficial view of history—the 'slaughter-bench.' He tells us that that which is unfolding itself is the Idea or Spirit which moves to self-comprehension and freedom, 'using' the selfish passions of men and

incidentally martyring the elect. In reply let us ask (1) in what manner can the *general* view of Spirit, taken by Hegel, be defended to the dodging of the innumerable abominations which obtain in the *detail* of finite lives? There is no escape from this detail, which must be accounted for, must be explained satisfactorily to the critic. A whole, whose parts are evil, cannot itself be perfect as Dr. Schiller has urged. (2) The selfish passions 'used' cannot possibly be made to conspire to the glory of Spirit, and this theodicy does not even apply to most of the difficulties that may be urged. A similar Moloch-ideal is defended by Royce explicitly and implicitly by most other advocates of the Absolute. Royce says: "God who here in me aims at what I now temporarily miss, not only possesses in the eternal world the goal after which I strive, but comes to possess it even through and because of my sorrow . . . in the Absolute I am fulfilled." What jungles of evil lie outside this narrow type of solution!

Now 'evil' or 'ill' is a term of great width of application. It includes the pains usually called 'physical'; it has to include rudimentary painful psychical life even in depths such as are peopled by the nuclears and other sub-animal sentient agents. On the other hand it is a label which might be applied, *e.g.* to teaching, rumour, religion, the weather, drink, law, an ethical injunction, a custom, a species, a man, town, nations, or the entire world-process. Noticing this width of application we shall be prepared for a correspondingly wide 'solution.'

We can say at once that there can be no evil in the Cosmic Imagination *considered apart from creative episodes*. This ocean of the infinite, the 'activity of

rest,' the static conservative background of the time-process, is devoid of *conflict*; is, consequently, what, in Indian phraseology, we might call knowledge (imaginal) and bliss; the joy eternal, the *ἐνέργεια ἀκινήσιας* whose delight is as perfect as its perfect imaginal life.

Evil, in fine, belongs and can belong only to the time-process. It implies unrest, multiplicity, change, conflict, thwarting, with the attendant varieties of pain. How then came it to arise in connection with the time-process at all? How came this creative changing to include conflict?

Pleasure in its very many kinds is the mark of free or furthered psychical activity or life. Pain marks conflict, thwarting, discord between two or more agents, or between two or more aspects or contents in the psychical life of a single agent. It is the feeling which attends all unresolved conflicts *in any quarter*, whether in what we call 'inorganic Nature,' in our own lives or beyond. Whenever there are conflicts, pain will be felt by all the sentient agents whose lives are *thwarted*, directly or indirectly, thereby. Apart from thwarting of one kind or another there can be no evil with its, for sentient agents, implicated pain.

Evil is implicated with this pain and this thwarting. It is a label which conveys our resentment. There is evil in two very important contrasted fields: (1) that of the thwarting which takes place amid the multiplicity of a world-system, and (2) that of the discordant world-system itself regarded as a whole. The former is marked by the clash of sentient quasi-purposive and purposive activities, on the small scale, that cross and clash with one another. These details

melt into the yeast of cosmic change. But evil on a cosmic scale exists also, even now, seeing that 'our' entire world-system ever since the metaphysical 'fall' has been a prey to *internal conflict and thwarting*. But it makes, through unrest that denies a halt, towards some harmonious consummation in which evil, as we experience it, can have no place. For evil seems to haunt acosmism, *i.e.* the not yet surmounted riot of anarchy and chance which succeeded the creative appulse. It will vanish when the perfect, *i.e.* the 'completely made,' cosmos, which requires no further changing, has come.

Why did the World-Idea fall apart into that warring multiplicity which is the pre-supposition of evil and all its pain? It fell apart *because of the origin of finite sentient agents themselves*; sentients into which a great conscious appulse *divided itself*. The victimiser and the victims are the same reality in its transformative or creative life. This is a tremendous truth. The evils, to which sentients are heirs, are the price paid for their appearance on the field of creation with its indefinite possibilities of growth. But the truth lies even beyond this: the appulse has divided itself among the sentients; is *itself* in the adventures of the great, but also terrible, romance. And subordinate explanations of evil must all take account of this commanding fact.

Imagination creates, scattering at once roses and thorns. But it is not imagining in the form of the undivided World-Idea which is responsible for the appalling details of Nature 'red in tooth and claw.' Organic evolution is largely the field of an imagining that has *run amok*. We have to recur to the conception of local creative initiatives to understand. The initial conflict has divided the World-Idea against

itself, though its continuity is far from being wholly lost. Its members, reciprocally interacting, show in these interactions the imaginal initiative of their source. And this initiative is bent to subserve local uses in the struggle for existence. *Anything*, however grim, in the way of a 'variation' may appear, provided it can find physical support and furthers the life of the organism.

The dynamic of creation transforms a *given* situation, the plasticity of which is limited. The story of creation is not that of a magical production of perfection out of the void. *It is one of the slow overcoming of the 'fundamental evil' of the metaphysical 'fall'*; an evil which is to be altered, and altered as far on the way to perfection as conditions allow. But why did the 'fundamental evil' itself occur? The very 'evil,' implied by the genesis of a plurality of sentient, will become a 'good' in the divine event consummating the world-process. Thus the overcoming of the fundamental evil is also the creative evolution of a world-system.

Evil has here been considered primarily in its *cosmic* standing, as an aspect of a world-episode. In regard to the conscious individual the problem is reserved to be dealt with in a subsequent work which Mr. Fawcett promises. Here it can only be said that, in respect of being conscious, the individual is the peer of the Cosmic Imagination itself. And the value of life must be shown in his destiny, in what he is here and now and *in what he is to become*. For no view which fails to offer adequate prospects to the individual can answer the case of pessimism. The individual must continue through the story of creation if meliorism is to rest upon any solid foundation.

Here we reach the conclusion of Mr. Fawcett's book of which the foregoing pages have been an attempt to present an intelligible outline, as far as possible in his own words. I must be pardoned for repeating once more an observation already made several times. Chapter after chapter of this book raises, discusses and suggests vitally important and keenly interesting issues, problems and points. These have one and all been passed over in silence, tempting as they were and are; but the important thing seemed to be to give the reader an idea, however inadequate, of Mr. Fawcett's new departure in *constructive* philosophy, in sufficient detail to lead him, if possible, to read and study for himself. He will be most amply repaid, nor will he find that reading either dull or depressing. And here I leave the book, reserving for the future, if the Editor and readers of THE QUEST are not tired of the topic, the consideration of some special aspects and problems here omitted.

BERTRAM KEIGHTLEY.

PHILOSOPHY AND WAR.

EDWARD DOUGLAS FAWCETT.

THAT narrative of Man's vicissitudes which we call History (in the narrower meaning of the term) is being enriched with a striking episode—the Great War. We are familiar with the practical aspects of this episode which has brought into being a vast and most interesting literature, written in blood. And plain folk are apt to think that nothing but these practical aspects ought to hold our thought at this juncture. Such men resemble those 'patriots' who, at a crisis of French history, urged that "the Republic has no need of chemists"; chemistry then being considered too speculative, of too little service to action in remodelling the State. To-day such 'patriots' are loud in praise of the chemist, for does he not supply them with novel high explosives and noxious gas?

Philosophy, however, having no like wares to offer, is regarded by many as just now too 'unpractical.' It declines withal to be silenced even during the clash of arms; and it is right. After all, ideas—the ideas of individual thinking men—rule the political and social world, so that in fact, as Carlyle has put it, the future here is "nothing but the 'realised ideal' of the people." And behind overt popular ideals, the *imagining* of which comes to be embodied in reforms, stand the fundamental ideas which concern religion and philosophy. A betterment of thought about basic problems is the presupposition of lasting success in the field of

political and social practice. False solutions may entail disaster. How many hundreds of thousands of men have perished in this war owing to the forming of wrong philosophical notions about the individual and the State, about the 'struggle for existence' and the general character of the world-order in which this struggle takes place? From such mistakes spring hideous ideals and their eventual realisation in blood and tears. The vision of a supermoral absolutist State, deriving from bad metaphysics, may prove the undoing of legions who have no personal interest in speculative thought as such. Innumerable hewers of wood and drawers of water must perish because originally one or two philosophical thinkers and historians have dreamt amiss in their studies. And, unless the reconstructions of peace rest on sane dreaming, the ever recurring misfortunes of plain men, the calvary of 'practice,' will continue to render hideous the night of Time.

The philosophy of history regards war as just an interesting feature of the world-order of which it forms part. It is not concerned with such details as *communiqués* impart. And, of course, it is not a partisan. On the contrary, it resembles a naturalist who is watching a battle of ants. The naturalist is observing without taking sides, is gratifying a merely cognitive interest in the problem of how Natural Selection works in connection with two species. Now the particular sort of struggle called War and the particular example of it known as the Great War have to be treated by us in just this detached manner. Writers incline, however, to suppose that the struggles of men are at any rate much more important, cosmically speaking, than a battle of ants. But even in this respect we shall do

well to observe caution. A study of certain mystical writings and even of Hegelian literature might tempt one to maintain that men and their States are the supreme manifestations of the Absolute, tritons among finite minnows, on whose fortunes all the rest of creation waits reverently. This ridiculous belief, welcomed and approved by certain German idealists, need not be discussed seriously. Man is vain and takes bipeds and their adventures far too seriously. Echoes of riotous merriment among the gods reach us as State-paid professors elaborate their preposterous theme.

Idealistic philosophy desires to regard things in a whole way as they might appear to a Platonic 'spectator of all time and all existence'; their several meanings within this whole and, of course, the character of the whole itself being the quest. Unfortunately we actual spectators have a very limited concrete outlook. Living almost blind to our complex surrounds, awaring a 'specious present' of trivial span, marooned on an islet of a world-system, itself one only of perhaps innumerable systems unknown to sense, we have a very narrow direct experience which we supplement largely by hypotheses, *i.e.* constructs of private imagining, and we wait then for such further experience as may show that Cosmic Imagining is such as to *verify* our own. We have to make ideal experiments and see how they fare. But a very great many of our imaginal makeshifts remain truth-claims which cannot be verified during our present phase of existence. Thus when we speak of the 'universe,' which includes our own thinking, we are outrunning experience, but we do so because we must. All sane men, even agnostics, men of science, and bigoted religionists, etc., are metaphysicians; only animals and lunatics contrive

to escape thinking. There is a pressure which no one can resist, *viz.* the need of understanding our narrow direct experience more thoroughly. The poet's insight touching the 'flower in the crannied wall' is apposite. In considering the full meaning of the humblest object of thought, in attempting to assign to it its place in existence, we are driven by degrees toward the statement of our attitude in metaphysics—have to explain the object in question, be it a wayside flower, sand-grain or caterpillar, as an incident in a world-system having such and such characters and itself being what it is in virtue of the fundamental all-inclusive reality which it serves to express.

As with the flower or sand-grain, so with war in general or with this or that instance of war. A full understanding of war presupposes some attempt to solve the riddle of the universe, involves us in adventures which concern the Cosmic Imagination itself. For war is only one of very many instances of struggle or conflict, and to deal with the mystery of conflict we must get back to the topic of the Creative Appulse, source of this particular world-system in which human rivalries and other kinds of struggle are known.

We shall do well therefore to consider briefly (1) the quite speculative issue as to the origin of the conflicts which pervade our world-system. Whence and wherefore arose conflict, as marked a feature of Nature as it is of animal and human sentient life? Having suggested what appears to be the answer, we shall glance at other aspects of the enigma of war. We shall ask (2) whether war can be considered, from a human point of view, as on the whole an advantage, a curse, or it may be an ordeal of subtly mingled good and evil. We shall next inquire (3) whether war is

likely to recur indefinitely in the stories of the nations. We shall indicate the character of the pressure, overruling the clash of human purposes, which tends to its abolition.

This abolition, save for dealings with barbarous and noxious peoples and in the interests of international convenience, seems vital to real progress. Men having got rid of war and liberated by science from their present servitude to Nature and State-associations, will embark on a novel kind of civilisation of the highest promise. Great transforming possibilities confront us even now. Though full liberation may be very far off and though its slow coming may demand centuries of effort, interspersed with long-drawn-out reactions and disappointments, we may be able to state certain of the determining conditions. A moral advance, carrying our stock indefinitely ahead of the caveman and rendering the memory of our present civilisation almost a foul thing, is one of these. Just now we are only beginning to control Nature and the greater practical triumphs of science, on which the future of mankind so largely depends, lie ahead. Physicists, like Prof. Soddy, incline to this view. The outlook is, so far, encouraging. But relatively barbarous folk, such as modern Europeans, would be quite unfit to wield the greater Nature-forces which will be revealed, in due if distant season, to the morally developed communities of the future. Conceive certain champions of *Kultur* armed with the 'energy' that lies hidden in the intra-atomic depths of a pint of water! You resent the bare suggestion? Exactly. It is a consoling reflection that, in an imaginal world-order, the timing of discoveries of vital practical moment cannot be unconnected with purpose.

THE ORIGIN OF CONFLICT.

(1) In considering the origin of conflict—of the Heracleitan strife which marks the time-process—we are driven, in my judgment, to some such solution as has been discussed in that portion of my *World as Imagination* which deals with the Birth of Change.¹ I must not fill valuable space by restating this solution at length here, but will make brief mention of some aspects of it relevant to the present paper.

Consider our particular world-system with its perceived and sublime starry heavens and its unseen complementary, and perhaps still more impressive, regions. It is immersed in the storm and stress of the time-process; the sphere of change, of creative evolution, of the imaginal *making* of reality. Now go back in thought to that beginning which is repudiated by so many thinkers, but in which it seems, nevertheless, almost compulsory to believe.² Conceive (for you, a mere finite sentient on a humble level of being, cannot imagine it concretely) this same world-system as it existed in the Cosmic Imagination before the birth of Nature and the dawn of time-succession. This concept stands for the world as it was before the real or metaphysical Fall. There are no finite sentients, superhuman, human, animal and sub-animal, comprised in that germinal system.³ You are confronting just a

¹ *The World as Imagination*, pp. 460-478.

² Observe that the beginning of only one world-system is in question. The world systems unknown to us may be infinitely numerous. Cp. Chap. 2, Part iii., 'Nature (or the Natures) Began.'

³ I agree entirely with Taylor, Royce, Bradley, Schiller and many other idealists, in holding that the Nature of our work-a-day perceptions masks *innumerable societies of sentients*. But in the beginning the sentients as such did not exist. It is the arising of the lower grades of these that immediately precedes world-evolution.

particular total thought within the Cosmic Imagination. It is a thought-whole which is harmonious and which endures without change. Its quickening into innumerable internal changes is to launch the time-process, causation, motion, space, astronomic and geologic evolution, etc., in so far as one particular field of creative imaginal activity is concerned.

What to an external observer would seem dissociation has to occur. How? Well, this World-Idea (or Grand Imaginal as I have also called it) is just so much *content* for the Cosmic Imagining; content such as a richly imagined poem—could he be aware of its details all at once—would be for a poet. Suppose now that this poet, who had imagined a wonderful play, found that his characters were no longer mere *contents* for his contemplation, but contents which were becoming *sentient*, aware of themselves as existents in their own right! By dwelling on this suggestion you grasp the secret of the metaphysical Fall. The birth of time-process and conflict can be understood. After their quickening, the differences within the World-Idea are no longer differences contributory to, and absorbed by, a total idea. They are contents, not merely present to the Cosmic Consciousness, but also to themselves. They are raised to the level of *agents*, *i.e.* of active psychical centres; “they pass from mere differences into the *clear-cut diversity* of multiple agents, each of which in the act of being sentient or ‘scious’ has become a *discrete* centre” in the hitherto unbroken World-Idea. And over-flowing, so to speak, into one another they *conflict*; on which the transformations mediating Nature begin. The Imaginal Dynamic, at once conservative and creative, tends to reduce this conflict to harmony. “But the reduction, again,

produces a new situation which becomes in its turn the seat of fresh discords, which tend to increase, whereupon is created a fresh transformation equally provisional. The world-process is thus forced upon the path of imaginal or creative evolution." This dynamic is illustrated by the *invention* of space, or the story of the chemical natural agents, just as it is by the search for truth, by human volitions or even social progress, each stage in which realises 'imaginal solutions.' It is, perhaps, that long-sought 'principle of movement,' in which Hegel was so interested, but which he certainly did not conceive accurately in the form of his alleged 'universal power,' Dialectic.

I am citing these considerations with intent to suggest that all the conflicts of the time-process were heralded by this primeval quickening of the World-Idea. And with conflicts again began the *evils* of the time-process including, of course, æons later the martyrdom of animal and man. Nay, with the evolution of planetary systems and their denizens occur those specially grim abominations which puzzle the theologian and may be described as imagining that has 'run amok.' The 'fundamental evil,' as Schopenhauer would have termed it, is the appearance of an effective plurality within the World-Idea. Nevertheless this is also the summons which calls innumerable new minor sentient and eventually, perhaps, even a new God-sentient, exalted but still finite, into being. To exist and to continue to exist imply grim adventures. The compensatory aspect of the time-process, in so many ways infernal, is just the progress of these societies of sentient agents and of the system wherein they live and have their being towards a divine event; towards a harmony which will be 'perfect,' in the sense

that it will be reality thoroughly made and ideal, in the sense that it will be impossible to imagine it as bettered. If further unrestful cosmic imagining took place, the world-system would change yet again, for, in quarters where deep calls to deep, the imaginal thought of alteration is also the creative fact.

We have no space to dwell on cosmology, further than to add that an idealistic system which disallows a *relative sundering* of this world-system from its ground, and which fails to take adequate account of plural agents and of imagining that 'runs amok.' during the battles of creation, will never approach a solution of the riddle of evil. It may reach indeed painfully artificial conclusions. An illustration worth note is to be found in Prof. Royce's *World and the Individual*. According to Royce the eternal order is just the temporal order present entire and all at once to the Absolute, the all-inclusive Experience. And so close lies the finite person to his ground that "to seek anything but the Absolute itself is, indeed, even for the most perverse self, simply impossible" (Series II., p. 347); "nor is there any caprice, however perverse, that is not an aspect, however fragmentary, of God's perfect meaning" (*ibid.* p. 351). So that when Gille de Retz trapped, outraged and slew hundreds of children or a ju-ju man took joy in the slow torture of his victim, they were in truth realising fragments of divine meaning. *Credat Judæus!* One may say that in general the problem of evil is whittled down grotesquely by philosophers and mystics, most of whom desire, not to solve their riddle, but to save the face of the Absolute. A familiar device is to argue that *some* carefully selected 'evils' are beneficial, if not to the individual, at any rate to the species, and

then to infer covertly that *all* are so. But of course there can be no ignoring of the individual which meets the situation. And, further, there is a mass of evil, in varieties of acute pain, degrading diseases and privations, degenerations, miscreations in organic evolution and a thousand other quarters, which is surely no part of any world-order, tolerably called 'divine.' Failure to meet the difficulty marks a false, or at any rate an intolerably incomplete, system of philosophy.

We have urged that conflict, which pervades the world-system, began with the dawn of time-succession. A mere fragment of it is noticed in the familiar 'struggle for existence' among animals and men. We pass to consider the kind of struggle between men which is called war, being better prepared now to think cosmically in this interesting regard.

War (2) is then a prolonging of that strife which is native to the world-order; a strife which preceded the birth of the chemical natural agents, or 'elements' as mechanistic writers prefer to call them. Sentients and their 'societies' are always implicated in this strife even on the very lowest levels of Nature. Among humans the kind of strife called war occurs when an armed clan, tribe or larger stably organised society or state-association, tries to impose its will on another or resists like aggression. Is it beneficial, noxious or again partly a good and partly an evil?

The answer will have to consider, not war, but particular wars. On the assumption that creative evolution is *worth while* and that in the long run there are no martyrs, there is a clear case for the utility of many wars. But even in these cases a theodicy ought to accent not the conflicts, but the uses which *may* be made of them. *Conflicts once predictable, the purposive-*

*ness of the world-order can be shown in bending them, if possible, to its needs.*¹ But many wars do not subserve a wide purpose, are evil mainly or wholly and make simply for retrogression and decay. Their occurrence condemns any interpretation of reality, mystical or philosophical, which has eyes for nothing but *cosmic* purpose. The American Civil War or the War of the Greeks against Xerxes are examples of rational and admirable wars. The wars of the old Italian republics and most 'dynastic' struggles, the campaigns of Tamerlane and the like, simply worsen Earth's story already far too squalid and foul.

The wars of primitive man, despite the inevitable mire of abominations, were on the whole useful, always on the assumption that the process of evolution is worth while. Physique, discipline (once vital), social organisation and even industry profited. Elimination of inferior sires was secured, though hardly in a manner which, for a theist, would declare the glory of God! While, however, these wars subserved developments not contemplated by the combatants, they implied unfortunately the cult of anti-social qualities as well. He who kept on robbing, enslaving, torturing and killing enemies was sure to show his hardness within his own community.² And the waste of energy in maintaining the unproductive warrior and the practice of ranking him as superior to all other workers were grave disadvantages, which made inevitably for the retarding of social advance. Still these wars, we may say, resulted, all considered, in abiding gains from a sociological point of view.

¹ Organic evolution also illustrates the uses of conflict, but also and inevitably the merely evil side of life.

² Cp. Spencer, cited in *The World as Imagination*, p. 594.

Passing beyond the sphere of rude peoples, the student of universal history will be able to credit numerous wars with aspects alike of good and evil, but he will note also that the sheerly evil side of them often dominates. Uncritical believers in a Personal God who ordains *all* wars are silenced easily. There is a veritable diabolism to be reckoned with when conflict is fierce, and moral, physical and every kind of foul degradation may ensue. The Thirty Years War, for instance, produced a 'demoralisation without parallel.' The Yahveh-worshipping Israelites used to slay women and children in their wars; in this war all records have been broken and beside the new abominations the crimes of the 'chosen people' show pale.

With the march of the centuries many truths about 'glorious war' tend to become untrue. Wars still remain justifiable on occasions, alike for offence and defence; there are values well secured by the shedding of blood and tears. But war between highly organised communities is moving steadily towards almost unmitigated evil, towards an excess of mischief that will entail its abolition. The *Imaginal Dynamic*, as we shall see, will make an end of it.

The modern victorious nation, owing to the wastage of the great armies now put into the field, will reduce its biological fitness for generations; the best men are selected for the most trying tasks, and, as Marshal von der Goltz tells us, "death reaps its harvest always among the best men." This is to say that among the actual combatants those who survive are the relatively unfit instead of, as in primæval times, the fit. In this lies a terrible menace to the future of a stock. The ancient Greek States and the Roman Empire fought in a manner that gave the 'best men' a

fair chance, yet they were very largely brought to ruin by wastage of man-power, for which in the nature of things there is no compensating gain obtainable from peace-terms. The broad lands that accrued to Rome by conquest were secured at the cost of too many Romans. A world-tragedy, prolonging the 'fundamental evil' in the direction of failure, was being prepared.

To-day the victor, after sacrificing its physically fittest men, squandering vast blocks of capital, incurring a huge debt and obligations, and carrying hordes more of unproductive consumers on its back, has incurred risks of internal demoralisation. The sequel even of the successful war of 1870, in which the victor's losses were relatively light, was not such as to 'foster belief in the purifying effects' of the experience, observes Marshal von der Goltz. Medical and criminal phenomena tell their tale; grave hurt, as well moral as economic, is inevitable. The destruction of wealth alone is a serious mischief. Writers sometimes rejoice that 'too rich' communities can be drained of their surplusage of wealth. In sober verity there has never existed a 'too rich' community; never one whose total annual production divided equitably among its families would meet all reasonable wants. And this normal deficiency of wealth (*i.e.* of distributable goods and services) is rendered far more serious by a war. By this hang all sorts of trouble. No one who has to live on short commons, without leisure and means to expand freely, is much superior to a slave.

But the general decision of thinkers outside Germany is now against war, and the outstanding problem is only how to prevent it from recurring—at any rate on the colossal existing scale. Sooner or later

we shall be rid of it. We need not concern ourselves here with political details ; we will simply suggest how the Imaginal Dynamic presses toward war's abolition. This Dynamic is what millions have to *feel*, clearly or vaguely, and it is what will decide their action in the long run. The political arrangements requisite will be called into being as soon as they are fervently desired.

War, like so many social pests, tends to become worse in character, to become an experience whose evils, present and lasting, grow out of all tolerable proportion to its advantages—for, of course, there is still a considerable leaven of these. When its evils become shattering on the great scale to all concerned, male and female, civilian and soldier, and are felt as inevitably such, men are driven to contrive the 'imaginal solution' that seeks a new harmony and leaves effete ways of living behind. The 'imaginal solution' or solutions (for failures are possible) will be *imagined* at first only by a small group of thinkers, and later *realised* through a Congress, which will modify the self-sufficiency of hitherto 'sovereign States.' The particular State in its dealings with its fellow States has proved unsatisfactory, far below the moral level at which you and I, for instance, are living, and requires supervision from the outside.

Principal Jacks of Oxford has written warmly on the topic of the 'crimes' of States, and assuredly there are no stories of States which ought to inspire unbridled enthusiasm. This need not surprise us if we recall that originally the State-association had mainly plunder in view. And the Leviathan of the present day, in its external relations, still betrays its primæval character. The particular State or State-association is often exalted into being an end in itself, but they

who build fanes for this extraordinary god must be very hard-pressed to find a religion. The State always reminds the writer of that famous Mesozoic colossus, the Stegosaur, whose vast and clumsy body was controlled by a brain no bigger than a pigeon's egg. The pigeon's-egg-brain, in the case of the State, consists of politicians and permanent officials, who are not equal to the task of directing the main organism aright. Without pressing the comparison further just now, I will remind the reader that the Stegosaur, having lived its hour of awkward bumbling, became extinct.

Since August 1914, certain Stegosaur—I mean the Central Powers—have been doing Europe an unintended service (such is the irony of things!), which makes for the abolition of future wars. By intensifying 'ruthlessly' the evils of armed conflict under modern conditions, they have made the suffering, required by the Imaginal Dynamic, *insistent*. Every responsible man, his soul penetrated by horrors, is now endeavouring to invent, *i.e.* imagine, a mode of controlling the whole brood of Stegosaur which afflict us. For the Stegosaur are all but nonmoral, extremely greedy and seek ever to increase in bulk; and hitherto as they increased in bulk they have always bitten viciously at one another. This would be excellent sport for the Stegosaur, at least for those of them who do the effective biting, but the trouble is that we individuals who inhabit their organisms get bitten at the same time. At the present moment the Stegosaur are sacrificing their 'best men' in droves (as they always do, according to the writer of the *Nation in Arms*) in fighting, and at the same time are preserving religiously their unfit. The suggestion is that these monsters are liable to fits of insanity, and should be controlled

internationally. And what of the controlling power? Hope, dreaming brightly as ever, puts her faith in the supra-national authority and refuses to ask whether this supreme Stegosaur will realise beyond cavil her heart's desire!

WHEN WARS ARE NO MORE.

A great federation of socialistic States enjoying free trade and watched by a supra-national authority to ensure their good behaviour alike in external and internal relations seems to be the ideal of many advanced reformers. And the ideal may well be realised eventually and enjoy its career of success. But I must take leave to doubt whether any arrangement, which presupposes the existence of the Stegosaur, can be lasting. The reign of Authority and Might, even when asserted for genuinely moral purposes, is itself likely to be resented in the long run; and assuredly the lapse of centuries will bring astonishing developments. Ultimately, I suggest, there will be an end of the Stegosaur, and the Federation or Federations will become centres of reunion for voluntarist associations interested in common purposes when such arise. The Coercive State is a makeshift during the early stages of the evolution of reasonable mankind. The need for it will disappear when our more bestial instincts and impulses have passed away. The incubus of Authority, that is to say of authority not approved by the individual, will be removed from all spheres of thought and practical life. The ideal of a peaceful anarchism, of a *return* in a higher form to the originally 'free' life, ere Stegosaur were invented, will have been realised.

But the way to this goal is a very long one, and

of course dates for the stages of the journey are out of the question. We may be sure meanwhile that future mankind will not owe its liberation to the politician, the man with a loud voice whose 'greatness' consists too often in mismanaging a 'great' thing—the body of the Stegosaur. Nor is an economic revolution such as mere Socialism, in the sense of the collective ownership of the means of production and distribution, the hoped-for saviour. For Socialism must involve too much ordering and dragooning to be welcome permanently. And the all-important matter of the future is not improved distribution on the basis of existing powers of production, *but a revolution in the means of production themselves*. And in this regard the real economic saviours of mankind are not far to seek—they will be found among physicists, chemists and engineers, among *individuals* who are to increase our control over Nature.

Without donning the mantle of the prophet, I may draw attention to the need for vivid imagining in this quarter. Even a diamond age, in which diamonds are used for tools, is not unlikely.¹ As regards 'energy,' the whole future of production, all hopes of widespread artistic living, of leisure for high thinking and doing, of abolishing the insufferable boredom, filth and slavery of the modern worker's lot, depend on tapping new sources of 'available energy.' Given the discoveries of how to do it, human existence will be revolutionised. The 'energy' itself lies to hand in the very pages you are reading; the 'atomic systems' in these conserve, say, a million times more 'energy,' mass for mass, than is liberated when a high explosive rocks the earth.

¹ "This is no idle dream like the making of gold, and the age to succeed the steel age in the future may be a diamond age." Prof. F. Soddy, F.R.S., *Matter and Energy*, p. 132.

With such 'energy' at our command the real aeronef, instead of the aeroplane, would become practicable, the air a highway; transport, accordingly, would be utterly simple and production in most quarters accomplished easily without as now enslaving mankind. I am not seeking to forestall the greater coming discoveries of science. I am merely suggesting *one or two* developments which, realised in fact, would of themselves be of overwhelming significance; which, given an adequate *moral* spirit in the men of those days, would close with the death of the coercive State or Stegosaur. For small associations of men, rendered by science economically independent and no longer to be cooped within frontiers, would inevitably come to ignore all externally imposed and unapproved commands and consult simply their ideals of rich and full living. Note that even to-day the relatively free man of leisure may become more or less detached from Stegosaur and call himself cosmopolitan. It will be a much more striking liberation that is to occur later.

But this very remote achievement will not come to pass until after much that may tempt critics to despair of their kind. We are indicating only possibilities of a distant future, as visionary to some of us as a dream of a modern city, power-station, or aeroplane would have been to a cave-man. And, further, we are anticipating a social level which will embody a morality incomparably superior to that which determines conduct to-day. The persistence of aggressive egoism would wreck this Utopia and result in imprisoning man once more in the bodies of the Stegosaur.

DOUGLAS FAWCETT.

MAN AND WOMAN AFTER THE WAR.

G. H. POWELL.

ALL authorities seem to agree in promising us, as a result of our present trials and sufferings, some sort of social renaissance on a new and higher level of actuality. It would be strange if such a revolution did not strongly affect that particular social activity which is supposed to cherish in its domestic nidus the bulk of our national destiny moral and physical.

How then will the changes bred of the world-war when we are all to see each other in a truer light, to advance more eagerly than ever in the paths of liberal progress, affect the old-fashioned institution of marriage, the mutual rights and relations of man and woman?

True, any such effects of the present crisis will operate only as the accentuation or conclusion of a movement (on one side) begun long before, and may for practical purposes be considered part of it. The 'suffragist' agitation may be regarded as 'in suspense' for a while, and destined 'after the war' to proceed to its final evolution.

Social progress, thus accelerated, is to establish us all upon a footing of greater reality and sincerity than has been known before. The intellectual interest and significance of such a change—in which of course the *principal* element has been and still is the expansion of the knowledge, experience and industrial ability of woman—is immense.

The prime question here to be considered is how

far this process of independent self-realization, this courageous pursuit of actuality, will render the two 'parties' which divide humanity *more or less*, congenial and sympathetic to one another. This relation is, of course, no more regulated by mere mathematical laws than any other human feeling.

It is now well known that measured by the barometer of marriage—at least so far as concerns the 'leisured classes'—this sense of congeniality or mutual attraction has exhibited of late years a distinct and serious decline. The causes commonly assigned—a growing reluctance to sacrifice certain 'bachelor' comforts, a keener appreciation of the independent single life—scarcely affect the inference that their success signifies a diminution in the attractiveness of 'marriage,' as an institution, that is both of marriageable man and woman. And since, notoriously, the principal change of recent years has affected woman, not man, it would appear that something in her (modern and revolutionary) attitude has conduced to the result.

Looking at the subject of marriage as it must inevitably be regarded for some time to come, from the standpoint of the man and the wooer, it is curious, at least, that a good deal of our popular fiction of the highly 'actual' and realistic order has felt itself compelled to endorse the view (to which the most authoritative specialist on middle-class life would seem to be frankly committed) that marriage is a 'compromise' and most often an unworthy—not to say unsuccessful—compromise.

This is a part of the high-minded—or shall we call it 'ruthless'?—idealism of these writers. Novels must be written about marriage, seeing it is the main fact

and crisis of normal life. Yet the subject of peaceful and innocent domesticity is 'played out' and genius, feeling its way towards some freer species of union, can find no subject for romantic illumination in the old 'common round.'¹

Before seizing upon such a *dictum* as absurd or scandalous let us examine more closely what it means.

That the male individual, when committed to what Dean Farrar once called 'the slightly expanded egoism of a narrow domesticity,' will less fully realize his own potentialities, will surrender some of his personal ambitions—that may be regrettable, even shocking. But the phenomenon, the scandal, is of not unfrequent occurrence in other atmospheres, and the important question remains: What does he secure or produce in exchange for what is lost in the particular case—lost, but not necessarily wasted?

As Mr. Kipling crudely summarizes the matter:

"Down to Gehenna or up to the throne,
He travels the fastest who travels *alone*."

By which epithet is signified 'in untrammelled freedom from any *social* bond.' But life, whether so lived or in close conjunction with a fellow-being, remains subject to limits of space, time and intensity. If some potential *desiderata* are to be secured, certain others must be surrendered. In the chronicles of the grandest, most successful, human heroism the cheer

¹ It may be said of course that these literary and dramatic expressions of contemporary pessimism (if it should be so styled), like one famous *harum-scarum* satirist's suggestion of chronic flight and re-union as an antidote to the staleness of 'the long rubber of connubial life' (and other ebullitions of a topsy-turvydom surely more tiresome than the world-weariness it is supposed to relieve), all labour under one serious drawback. They seem to know little or nothing of the brighter or at least less agonizingly 'suburban' social strata and inter-sex relations depicted, for example, on the spacious and glowing canvas of George Meredith. It may perhaps be replied that these types have passed from among us, which would seem very doubtful. In any case the middle-class body of the nation has its peculiar importance.

for victory is mingled, Mr. Kipling himself would recognize, with the sigh for what has been 'missed.'

Doubtless there is considerable illusion about our regret, as well as our self-congratulation. Life after all is *usually* a compromise between complex interests and attractions, and most often, from any idealist standpoint, not a very satisfactory one. It is better that one important thing (if it be only a question of the best imaginable equipment of cavalry) should be really well done than that specialist genius should be given up to some ordinary task. Mr. Kipling's is, of course, a mere racy and impatient reflection on the general inconvenience of social *impedimenta*, a truth of which there can be no question, though of course it applies equally to the case of either sex.

Man cannot do two things any more than he can occupy two spaces—an office, say, and a boudoir—at once. Nor can woman. So might the question of making a fortune or writing a great scientific work, of learning the violin or touring round the world, of saving someone from drowning and keeping one's clothes dry, be considered and estimated.

But in the case of marriage the exchange is of two things totally different in kind. What man does, thinks and feels, in this peculiar or intimate association with another creature, is totally different from what he does, thinks and feels outside among his fellowmen.

The latter is his life-work as a man, upon which, in most cases, his existence depends; the former a pastime, it may almost be said, an enrichment or decoration of life, in the case of the very rich, to the professional classes a vocation which a man may or may not 'take up,' but which no public opinion stamps as a *necessary* adjunct to respectable existence.

Theoretically, of course, much the same may be said to be the case with woman; but in fact nothing more clearly marks the inequality of the sexes than the different degree in which they are involved in the eternal industry of *Nature*.

In relation to the difficulties above outlined as hampering the conjunction of humanity and civilisation, the popular conception of the matter is fairly portrayed in Robert Louis Stevenson's aphorism that, on the whole, "the best men are bachelors and the best women wives."

In regard to the first class—*those who turn out* 'the best men'—one may object that there is scarcely a fair comparison possible of the free and independent with the attached and domesticated, while the 'best women' (if it be so) are far more seriously involved in their particular sphere of excellence than man in the profession of fatherhood.

The great *complication*, in fact, the web of marriage and domesticity, is a structure of the female element. It is built over the dark gulfs, the mysterious depths where woman 'belongs'; while man, ephemeral man, plays upon the surface, amusing himself with the masculine trivialities of reason, logic, change and progress—things which do not much concern the unutterable depths where, intellectually sphinx-like, eternal unchangeable 'woman' broods over that great eternity—the race.

If it be true that (in the merely male sense) she 'does not grow'—an axiom drawn from the famous 'Pilgrim's Scrip,'¹ where so much of sexual philosophy is treasured—her evolution, it may be replied, is a vaster, less fidgety and self-conscious thing than that

¹ Meredith, *Richard Feverel's Ordeal*.

of man. She may come to the surface and play with him, amicably contemplate his occupations and diversions. She may even learn to do 'by herself' much of what he does—with a difference. "The eternal qualities of one sex remain eternally surprising to the other"—the explanation, of course, being that there are not two (equal, parallel or opposite) sexes, but one 'sex' only—woman—carved and specialized as Eve for Adam out of the general indifferent mass 'humanity.'

If such be more or less the general position and attitude of the sexes at present, what are we to expect of the future, now that woman has come forth in her thousands, to invade and occupy extensive positions formerly monopolized by man?

A vast army, more numerous than many of us believed to be discoverable, has come forward, fired by the patriotic enthusiasm of the moment, equipped with the normal feminine allowance of energy, skill, strength and beauty, to take the place of man. Of this surprising invasion of the industrial world the effect on the national fortunes, however great and even glorious, is not here to be considered. Of its most immediate effect on social life, in the plane we are here discussing, there can surely be only one opinion.

In the first place, unless the most obvious of evidence is to be distrusted, the change has produced an immense increase in the sum of national happiness. Social enjoyment and moral satisfaction are here mixed in a novel fashion. The consciousness of heroic and successful effort counteracts a pressure of grief and anxiety such as would often be expected to overwhelm the more tender sex. But as the effort, and the success—with its consequential revision of the qualities and status of womankind—has been *public*, and carried out

under the eyes of a mobilized male population, the further effect has been an additional and intensified degree of association such as could, under such favourable and exciting circumstances, have but one result, to wit a vast increase of marriages.

This phenomenon of the moment—for its immediate cause is largely the peculiar distribution and occupation of the populace during and for the purposes of the war—may be considered by itself as probably ephemeral, the direct result of a unique crisis in our history. The industrial changes, which are, as has been said, largely responsible for such a state of things, suggest altogether different matter for reflection, the secondary and future effects—at present artificially regulated—of the competition of male and female industry on a novel and unheard-of scale.

Thus behind the chatter and laughter of thousands of happy lovers thronging our streets, the imaginative listener may catch the murmur of industrial jealousy and discontent, even the vague menaces (first heard some years ago) of that unthinkable monstrosity, a 'war of the sexes.' If such feelings are distinguishable now, what new manifestation of them may not be expected from a force trained into a novel efficiency in scores of departments hitherto closed to their sex, strongly ensconced in many a 'position' hitherto monopolized by man, renewing its youth (and we do not speak of the 'flapper' element only) 'like an eagle' with an experience and self-confidence unknown before? Moreover this new force will speak (it is now understood) from a platform of political equality with man, or something very like it. The franchise so long and tantalizingly dangled before the eyes of the aspirants will doubtless be granted, and

will certainly affect the marriage-relation even if it produce none of the more startling results sometimes attributed to it.

Those who think the change a serious one will scarcely sympathize with the motives which seem to have converted some of its most eminent opponents. If 'woman,' in England, deserves 'the vote,' she *deserved* it just as truly four or even ten years ago, though she is now better qualified to assert the right. To say that her spirited and patriotic action during the great war has produced a sudden and complete refutation of the logical thesis to which the late Prime Minister, in common with so many educated Englishmen, was supposed to be definitely attached, is to talk shallow sophistry uncomplimentary to either side.

And alarm is perhaps premature. If the real desire for inter-sex political equality flourishes most among the unmarried and comparatively isolated women, perhaps it may not be increased but diminished *pro tanto* by a further close association (industrial, militarist, medical and educational) with man the competitor or oppressor.

The vast army of capable and well-liking girls (previously 'hid up' at home, as we heard a shopkeeper lately observe) now deployed into our factories, munition-works, etc., and destined, with the best will in the world, to see more of male life and work than was usually possible before—will their spell of industrial life, their journeys to and from their work, their new acquaintances, induce an increase of interest in abstract political rights or in old-world domesticity?

Will this expansion of 'free' industrial individualism (so long familiar to the Lancashire mill-hand) with its political independence do more for the

suffragist cause than the increased association with the other sex is doing for the home-ideal with its more or less inevitable subjection to man?

We may leave the question to answer itself, merely noting that the Registrar General assigns a record number of marriages to the year 1915.

The social speculation is, of course, closely connected with the industrial experiment. That the women of England would 'throw themselves into the breach'—in the fashion described—was inevitable enough. That the venture should clearly establish their equality, in certain respects, or even their superiority to normal 'man,' was quite another matter.

On the authority of experienced 'welfare-workers' one may infer that the great mass of evidence now being accumulated must certainly throw new and comprehensive lights upon the problem of woman's industrial capacity. Of female heroism and energy there need be no doubt; but whether in the matter of singleness of aim, uniformity of application and other points, the verdict would be ultimately in her favour is a question on which competent critics are far from speaking with one voice.

We may realize that the 'output' of a girl-worker has often proved to be three or more times that of a full-grown man, only to find our attention diverted from the industrious woman to the male shirker and his ethical position. The difference here is that between the 'innocent' and unconscious generosity of the volunteer, and the reflective (not to say restrictive) and calculating attitude of the professional. The immediate economic result is an unexpected windfall. But who is to receive and enjoy it, whether woman is to be allowed to reform (or undersell) man, or man to

'pool' the labour of both sexes, on accepted Unionist lines—these are problems yet to be dealt with.

To organized male 'labour' the latter course will doubtless appear inevitable. Man, ex-militant or other, will demand (1) the retirement of woman from certain occupations for which her fitness is questionable, and (2) an equalization of the sexes, in so far as the two are to work together, which will incidentally deprive both woman and her employer of any benefit attaching to her amateurish generosity.

It is the effect upon the worker herself (not upon the industrial market) with which we are chiefly here concerned.

On some of the vocations taken up, some of the 'rougher' kind ('omnibus-conducting' might surely be included under this head?) her hold is imperfect and unsatisfying. She can do the work, but not as man does it and (still more pointedly) not without a depreciative effect upon herself as woman. Unless the 'actuality' sought is that of a familiarity with the whole of industrial life as known to man, such 'equality,' however theoretically attractive, would mean, in the opinion of many of us, a change in woman neither necessary nor desirable.

The estimate of the success or failure of particular experiments may be wrong or right. But it is obviously desirable that any departure of the normal 'new woman' from whatever be regarded as the satisfactory domestic type should be carefully watched and measured.

This familiar anxiety has perhaps been too often 'smiled away.' Knowledge, experience, larger views of life—these, it is urged, must be essential parts of the modern feminine ideal. But do they complete, may

they not even overbalance it? We must take the facts of life as we find them.

The conflict impending is not so much between one sex and another, or not primarily so, as between the fluctuating 'actualities' of highly civilised existence and the eternal uniformity of 'Nature.' In no plane has this been more clearly illustrated than in that of religion, divided as it is (to the eye of modern Protestantism) into two fields—one of reasoned and largely agnostic eclecticism, the other of uncritical (indeed anti-critical) 'orthodox' acquiescence. It is a familiar characteristic of the first attitude that having once begun 'protesting' it can never stop. But seeing that the alternative involves the arrest of all thought, progress and liberty, there can—for those who prize these things—be no hesitation about their choice.

There is however another party to be considered, if not conciliated, and that is—*human nature*. The pursuit of scientific truth, the full perception of ourselves and our environment, the rejection of all the conventional veils or disguises, these are exalted aims. But at present it looks as if those who pursue them were, by the operation of some forgotten law, themselves doomed to early extinction. It would seem that some of the bosky conventional covers about to be 'cleared' by our light-hearted revolutionary positivism included some favourite retreats of the Great Mother herself!

At least, as it is clear that population increases most rapidly in the lowest and least 'desirable' strata of humanity, so also does it appear to be statistically demonstrable that the most old-fashioned and reactionary of the two great religious atmospheres is the most favourable to the no less old-fashioned instincts

and activities of Nature. The suggestion that the civilised European world will shortly be 'Roman Catholic' or cease to exist, may rouse various degrees of contempt or alarm.¹

We are here merely concerned with an extensive and unquestionable *tendency*. Outside the sphere of religious doctrine and discipline, the Church whose 'infallibility' offers so much repose from useless intellectual labour, secures perhaps for the human heart much that would elsewhere be wasted on the mind. At least, in her restful and comprehensive embrace, she takes to her bosom much of that old-world sentiment and conservative fancy—concerning men and women *inter alia*—which the actualist progressive Protestant reformer would sweep into the dustbin as mouldering remains of an 'Early Victorian' age.

Such reflections, at any rate, may give us pause ere we fling our energies whole-heartedly into the cause of a general advance of the sexes, *side by side*, through whatever fields of action the twentieth century may unfold to their view.

The final digestion of the mass of evidence accumulated during the war may teach us many things, while perhaps not demolishing the idea that woman's best sphere of action is and must always be—the home. In the scorn of over-homely 'Early Victorian' ideals, she may be pursuing a false—turning her back on the true—'actuality,' just as Puritan English liberalism may be shocked to find the most reactionary of political atmospheres more secure than itself of the greatest of all 'actualities'—*continued existence*. That is, after all, the first thing.

¹ Cp. an impressive article by Father Bernard Vaughan, 'England's Empty Cradles,' *Nineteenth Century*, 1915.

It is no hyperbole to say that the best blood of the Anglo-Saxon race has never yet been in such danger of extinction. That phenomenon is not altogether our fault; but we must cut the habiliments of our progressive ideal according to the cloth of our environment.

That the future status or existence of man or woman should be more intellectually interesting, more politically complete, is something certainly, much if the new political force evolved be capable of remedying its own mistakes and defects, as they are discovered.

But England has lately seen how flowery by-paths of social and philanthropic idealism may dangerously divert her steps from the dusty and prosaic highway of material self-preservation, and leave her secure perhaps of some advanced industrial reform, but doubtful if she will survive its attainment.

So on the smaller plane within, the pursuit of something only a little 'too good' for our actual needs may, like the new patch on the 'old garment,' make a worse rent in the fabric of a securely-rooted yet *over-cultivated* social system.

G. H. POWELL.

BENKEI: A NOH PLAY.

YONÉ NOGUCHI.

Characters.

SAEMON TOGASHI.

A SERVANT.

YOSHITSUNÉ, a lord of the Minamoto Clan.

BENKEI.

OTHER RETAINERS.

A COOLIE.

CHORUS.

THIS Chorus sometimes speaks in place of the characters, sometimes explains the meaning of their movements.

YOSHITSUNÉ is always represented on the stage by a boy to make a deeper dramatic appeal to our sympathy.

This is another strong proof that the Noh play wilfully transcends realism for an artistic unity of design.

TOGASHI :

YOSHITSUNÉ is forced to run away from the capital, since discord has arisen between himself and his elder brother YORITOMO. To avoid public recognition on their journey Lord YOSHITSUNÉ and his retainers, twelve in number, have adopted the garb of itinerant priests. It is said they have turned toward Mutsu Province in the farthest north. With the design of arresting them YORITOMO has erected new barriers in

all the countries on the way, and ordered the officials at them to examine every passing priest. I, SAEMON TOGASHI, of Kaga Province, am put in charge of this barrier at Adaka. I will now command my men to keep a look-out for every itinerant priest that passes through. Is there anybody on duty?

SERVANT :

Yes.

TOGASHI :

Show in any itinerant priest who may happen to pass by.

SERVANT :

'Tis well.

BENKEI AND OTHER RETAINERS :

Oh, the sleeves of travellers wet with dews by the road hidden under grasses of woe; the sleeves of travellers wet with dews,—wet with dews! Oh, how far yet is the goal of our journey!

BENKEI :

I, BENKEI, as leader of the party,—

OTHER RETAINERS :

—with YOSHIMORI, KIYOSHIGE, TAMEHARU, KANEFUSA, KAISON and others,—

BENKEI :

—follow after Lord YOSHITSUNÉ.

CHORUS :

It was on the tenth night of February, with the declining moon in the sky, that we departed from our beloved city. From the northern shore of Lake Biwa we entered into Koshiji; crossing over Arachi Mountain

we reached Kehino Bay. In prayer we knelt before the Kehi no Yashiro Shrine ; crossed the Kinome Toge mountain-pass and, seeing Itadori no Shuku on the right, hastened by Asamizu village. Through the Mikuni harbour we trudged into Kaga Province ; passing Shinowara we are now come to Adaka.

BENKEI :

We are come to Adaka. Let us rest here for a while.

YOSHITSUNÉ :

Benkei !

BENKEI :

Yes, my Lord.

YOSHITSUNÉ :

Did you hear what the passers-by said just now ?

BENKEI :

No, my lord.

YOSHITSUNÉ :

They talked of a barrier newly built for the purpose of examining passing itinerant priests.

BENKEI :

What insidious persistence of YORITOMO ! How sad is our master's life, pinched and threatened !

OTHER RETAINERS :

It is not difficult for us to break down the barrier by violence and let the master pass through with dignity.

BENKEI :

It goes without saying that it were a simple matter

for us to destroy this one barrier; but we must remember we should have still a long journey before us. If we make a wild to-do here, we must be prepared to see all the other roads from to-day wholly blocked. I insist it would be better to think out some more quiet way to pass through.

YOSHITSUNÉ :

BENKEI, I leave the matter in your hands. We will rely on your experience and wisdom.

BENKEI :

An idea has just occurred to me. We servants with faces and manners uncouth might possibly pass as itinerant priests; but you will find it hard to deceive the officers. It would be well—how sorry I am to say it—for you to take off your cloak and shoulder the box that coolie is carrying. Your sedge-hat should be drawn down. You follow after us with seemingly tired feet. Though it is assuredly irreverent toward you, my lord and master, we shall treat you according to the part you play. There is no other way, I think, to let you pass free from suspicion.

YOSHITSUNÉ :

I gladly adopt your idea, BENKEI. Now take off my cloak !

BENKEI :

Good. Ho, Coolie, bring your box here !

COOLIE :

Ay, Ay !

BENKEI :

Then approach the barrier and study the state of affairs and hurry back with a true report.

*(The Coolie goes and after a little while returns
breathless and pale.)*

COOLIE :

What warlike preparations with all arms ready to hand ! Heads of itinerant priests, five or six, may be seen lying under the trees.

BENKEI :

Now let us go !

CHORUS :

These feigned itinerant priests, most undaunted warriors in truth, but fearful of what fate may await them, now set forth toward the barrier where TOGASHI watches for a chance to give his zeal full play. They look back on their master playing the toilsome part of a coolie ; their eyes are filled with tears at his life's changed condition. How they wish that, by the protection of the gods of war, their master may succeed in passing safely ! Lo, YOSHITSUNÉ, with his face hidden under the sedge-hat, leaning on a pilgrim's staff, even affects to stagger with sore feet !

SERVANT OF TOGASHI :

Ho, master, many itinerant priests are passing !

TOGASHI :

Halt ! you travelling priests, halt ! This is the barrier you are forbidden to pass.

BENKEI:

We are a party of priests sent to the Hokurokudo division from the Todaiji temple of the Southern capital to solicit contributions for the rebuilding of the temple of the great Buddha-image. Pray, be one of the contributors!

TOGASHI:

That is indeed a praiseworthy aim of yours. Gladly would I accept your invitation. But you should know that this is the barrier where all travelling priests are to be stopped by command of authority.

BENKEI:

Why?

TOGASHI:

The rupture with his elder brother has forced YOSHITSUNÉ to run away from the capital and seek Hidehira of Mutsu Province for protection. It is said that YOSHITSUNÉ and his retainers, twelve in all, are travelling, if I may say so, as spurious itinerant priests. To arrest them a new barrier in each province has been built. I am in charge of this barrier, and by the power of authority I stop all priests or examine them whenever I see them. I am free to say that I feel somewhat suspicious of your party. I forbid you to pass through.

BENKEI:

We thank you for the information. But the august command from YORITOMO's office is, I suppose, against false itinerant priests. Is it the order that even true priests are to be deprived of the freedom of the road?

TOGASHI :

Foolish discussion is here not in order.

SERVANT OF TOGASHI :

Yesterday we slew three priests. Lo, their heads are under the tree !

BENKEI :

Do you mean then to kill us ?

TOGASHI :

No use of talking further !

BENKEI :

Unspeakable ! What an abomination ! To what inauspicious spot are we come ! Now, brother priests, make with me your last prayer ! Be ready to die calmly ! Oh, come, come all of you ! Let us perform the last holy service !

CHORUS :

What are itinerant priests ? They practise ascetic rule after YEN NO UBASOKU ; their own appearance is modelled—

OTHER RETAINERS :

—on the divine form of FUDO MYOWO with power to foil the snares of all the evil spirits.

BENKEI :

They wear on their heads the symbol of the twelve affinities ;—

OTHER RETAINERS :

—the holy crown of the five wisdoms ;—

BENKEI :

—the yellow-brown sacred cloak ;—

OTHER RETAINERS :

—black leggings.

BENKEI :

And they stand on an eight-petaled lotus-flower—

OTHER RETAINERS :

—with their sandals.

BENKEI ;

They recite the great holy law, breathing in and out.

OTHER RETAINERS :

They are even in their own present lives—

BENKEI :

—the Buddha himself.

CHORUS :

If one stay them, he should prepare for punishment from the Yuya Gonken temple, the divine centre of ascetic rule.

Thus they say and thumb their rosaries of prayer, repeating the words of spelling, threatening TOGASHI with dreadful words.

TOGASHI :

You spoke of a contribution for the great Buddha-image in the Southern capital. You should have then an official book of contributions. Pray read the writing of the holy appeal! I will listen to it here.

BENKEI :

Writing of appeal?

TOGASHI :

Yes.

BENKEI :

Good.

CHORUS :

BENKEI is taken aback, for his mention of begging for gifts was a random subterfuge. No such writing as TOGASHI demands has he to read. But he brings out respectfully some sort of roll from the box on his back, calling it the holy book in question. He begins to read loudly :

“ An autumnal moon of the Saviour sank into the cloud of Nirvāṇa ; there is no one who would disturb his dreams.

“ The Emperor Shomu, losing his dear wife, wildly lamented ; but his higher perception inspired him to build the great Buddha-image.

“ By the fire-brand of war, alas, this divine place has been brought to ruin. One who takes the matter deeply to heart and would carry on the rebuilding of the temple from public contributions in the various countries of the land, is SHUNJOBO CHOGEN, head of the Todaiji temple. Men and women, make your contributions, help toward the completion of the great work ! Ye shall then gain high happiness in the present life, and in the future world a divine seat upon the lotus-bloom ! ”

How Togashi's suspicious mind repents his treatment of these priests !

TOGASHI :

Pass through, all you worthy priests !

BENKEI :

We thank you deeply.

SERVANTS OF TOGASHI :

Ho, master, there goes one looking like Lord YOSHITSUNÉ!

TOGASHI :

What! Halt, halt, you coolie!

CHORUS :

The voice falls like a thunderbolt; all the retainers turn back aghast. BENKEI, a mighty soul of tactful composure, makes a sign with his eyes not to stir, but to leave the matter in his hands.

BENKEI :

Why don't you walk faster, you stupid fool?

TOGASHI :

I bade him halt.

BENKEI :

Why?

TOGASHI :

He looks like one in question. Therefore I command him not to take a step further.

BENKEI :

It is not strange for a man to look like somebody. Whom does he look like, pray?

TOGASHI :

He looks like Lord YOSHITSUNÉ! I use my authority to hold him until I ascertain the truth.

BENKEI :

You look like YOSHITSUNÉ. How detestable, how abominable ! We were thinking we should reach Noto Province by sundown ; your feeble feet serve only to make you suspect. I was thinking you detestable for some time ; I'll show you what I'll do with you. (*Snatching a staff from his master, and beating him down mercilessly with it.*) Alas ! My patience is now exhausted ! (*Telling YOSHITSUNÉ with his eyes to slip away amid the disorder.*) You, dirty coolie, get out, get out of this ! (*Turning to TOGASHI suddenly.*) Aha, I read your vile intention ! You want to plunder his box, you thief, you robber ! Here is a robber under the guise of an official ; you dirty ruffian ! Come, all of you, come, my brother priests ! Be ready to guard yourselves !

CHORUS :

Their hands on their swords, shouting the battle-cry, all the retainers advance close to TOGASHI, when BENKEI, standing between them, stops them with his staff. Oh, how fearful they look !

TOGASHI :

Pray, forgive my misunderstanding ! I beg you all to pass through.

BENKEI :

We are now at a safe distance. Pray, my lord and master, take the first place and let the others take their places accordingly. We will rest for a while. Oh, my lord, I have no words to express my chagrin, when I think of your life's fate in decline, by whose cruelty your head was smitten even with your servant's staff.

YOSHITSUNÉ:

I have but to thank the gods of war whose will was pleased to reveal itself through you, BENKEI. It was surely an act under divine protection—

CHORUS:

—that by your quick wit you beat me down, as if I were a real coolie.

YOSHITSUNÉ:

As a right-hand fighter to my elder brother YORITOMO I discharged my duty at the risk of my own life. Now stepping on the mountain-snows of Tetsukai no Mine or Hiyodorigoye, then floating on the sea-waves of Yashiro or Dan no Ura, there was no time when I could even mend the broken sleeves of my armour. In three years only I overthrew all his foes. But with no thanks for the service I am thus forced to flee to the far north for my life's safety. Oh! what an ill fate! I see that flatterers or sycophants get their opportunities, but honest servants get only suffering and pain; I cannot help wondering at the injustice of the world. I lost my way before in the clouds and mists of Mount Yoshino; and now, alas, I am going to be tortured by Koshiji's snow and frosts.

CHORUS:

Listening to the heart-breaking words of the master all the retainers are unable to lift their heads for sorrow and grief. . . . TOGASHI's sympathy befitting a warrior, after letting the party pass, now prompts him to send one of his servants after them with a cask of saké-wine.

SERVANT OF TOGASHI :

My master offers this cask as a fresh token of apology.

BENKEI :

We thank you for it most cordially.

CHORUS :

The party receive the cask of saké-wine but not without a soldierly watchfulness. Now the drinking feast begins between them. . . . BENKEI rises to dance a figure of the Yennenmai dancing and to sing and help the gaiety. BENKEI rises up and dances with a song.

BENKEI :

What we hear—

CHORUS :

—the voice of a waterfall !

BENKEI :

The waterfall rolls down—

CHORUS :

—forever rolls down—

BENKEI :

—even when the hottest sun shines.

BENKEI AND OTHER RETAINERS :

The waterfall rolls down, forever, rolls down—

CHORUS :

—even when the hottest sun shines. Let life ever run like the waterfall eternal. Hail eternal life ! Life ! Life everlasting as the waterfall !

THE END.

YONÉ NOGUCHI.

SHAKESPEARE THE WELLDOER.

GEORGE MORLEY.

SHAKESPEARE'S BROTHERHOOD.

The man who could write as Shakespeare wrote,

“ ‘Tis not enough to help the feeble up
But to support him after,”

could scarcely have been anything else than a well-doer of the first magnitude; for with the astonishing, almost divine, intuition which was an inseparable part of his being, he saw with a clear vision—bright as sunlight, fixed as stars—that there was only *one* way for the real welldoer to tread; a steep and thorny road perhaps, but certainly the one and only *right way* to the heaven of a good and permanent result.

How wide and wonderful, how kindly and expansive, was the knowledge of the heart of this marvellous man, who recognised so truly that help to be helpful must be *real*, must be certain, must be steadfast; unbound by poorly mean and thoughtless limitations. This is the real welldoer's way, and it was evidently Shakespeare's.

I often picture him in those early pre-London days of his, when wandering in his own—and my own—sky-directed Arden woodland, thinking of the social contrasts of human life, with a courage even more plain and spirited than that of Jean Jacques Rousseau, and much more right; seeing on the one side the beautiful and spacious parks and mansions of Charlecote and Fulbrooke—the possessions of Sir Thomas Lucy,

whom as 'Justice Shallow' he canonised in *The Merry Wives of Windsor*—the former stocked with their glorious herds of red and fallow deer, and on the other the poor and mean homesteads of the 'common people' as they are called, with hardly a perch of land to any of them, and a lean lurcher dog as the only 'deer,' where, in his own sympathetic and large-hearted words:

"Misery acquaints a man with strange bedfellows."

Yes, this was the Warwickshire young man—early taught the value of real welldoing when kneeling by the side of that good Mary Arden who mothered this wonderful son—who, if seeing a stranger fallen in his native Arden river, would not have stayed to enquire whether that stranger was a resident of his own parish of Stratford-on-Avon—as some ungracious parsons enquire whether any poor applicant for relief belongs to 'our Church' before giving the much-needed alms—but would have stretched out those welldoing arms of his to save and succour the stranger; and would not only have helped him out of danger, but would have 'supported him after,' and sent him on his way towards comfort and a quieter life.

SHAKESPEARE IN POSSIBLE NEED.

Such noble attributes of real welldoing can be read into thousands upon thousands of sublime passages in the plays of Shakespeare; and that he thoroughly realised the need of doing things well in the service of others—loving others well enough—seems almost to suggest, if not to prove, that in some period of his life, probably in those early, hard days of his in London, he had actually himself known the need for a friendly welldoer, a need which was afterwards happily

realised in the person of Lord Southampton, who was his real welldower, in actual deed as well as in name.

Listen to these true and just lines of his :

“A wretched soul bruised with adversity,
We bid be quiet when we hear it cry.
But were *we* burdened with like weight of pain,
We should ourselves as much, *or more* complain.”

Here is the wonderful insight of the man who had himself suffered; the perfect and complete knowledge of the world and its ways, which is a standing rebuke to ‘the world’ in so many of Shakespeare’s finest lines. Few indeed, as he too well knew, like to hear the cry of the bruised soul wretched with adversity, and all but the real welldower would bid the poor soul ‘be quiet.’ It is the rare creature, however, who hears the cry of the bruised soul and bids it ‘cry on’ and *not* ‘be quiet’ until its sad wounds are healed and comfort and justice administered.

SHAKESPEARE AND ADVERSITY.

And how well, too, this ‘Stratford’s wondrous son’ seems to have known, paradoxical though it may appear, the blessings of that adversity which is the welldower’s opportunity. When he says so finely :

“Sweet are the uses of Adversity,
Which, like the toad, ugly and venomous,
Wears yet a precious jewel in his head,”—

was he not telling a story out of his own life; of how ‘sweet’ adversity really was when it gave to him, and to others in like need of a good friend, the comforting succour and solace of a welldower’s hand—and heart?

Adversity, he knew, doubtless from personal experience of it, is your only true revealer, your only

real regenerator, your only finder of the genuine well-doer. Prosperity does not find the real, the true, the lasting friend. It is true that prosperity is the bond which unites riches to riches—so long as they last; but it is *not* the unbreakable bond, the three-fold cord which is not easily broken, which joins the heart of the real welldoer's soul to the troubled mind and wounded body of those on adversity's battlefield. Therefore, in Shakespeare's view, so beautifully expressed—the noble view and the right view—those who are walking on the thorny road of adversity, 'ugly and venomous,' are they who find the 'precious jewel' of a real friend, are they who reach the door of the welldoer's heart and find that it is open to receive them.

SHAKESPEARE THE HOPE-GIVER.

And to show how true a brother he was, how leal a welldoer, Shakespeare gives these words of hope and encouragement to those crushed down in the Valley of Adversity :

"Things at the worst will cease,
Or else climb upward
To what they were before."

There then is the larger hope, the brighter outlook, the smile upon the grave face, the cheering speech, issuing like a tonic from the kindly lips of the true welldoer to the ears and the hearts and the souls of the oppressed in human life; the words of that wonderful Warwickshire lad—that deathless spirit which passed from this earthly stage more than three long centuries ago; whose passing has been so recently commemorated by well-nigh all the nations in this wide and universal globe; and this, in spite of the

fearful fact that nearly the whole world is now writhing in the agonising convulsions of a great war, and particularly this little, yet wonderful England of ours, of which this inspired Warwickshire boy wrote so wisely, and—shall I not say so prophetically?—

“This England never did, nor never shall,
Lie at the proud foot of a conqueror,
But when it first did help to wound itself.
Now these, her Princes, are come home again.
Come the three corners of the world in arms,
And we shall shock them. Nought shall make us rue,
If England to itself do rest but true.”

We cannot all be Shakespeares, we cannot all evolve those wonderful ‘thoughts that breathe and words that burn,’ we cannot all write immortal plays that will live as long as the world lasts; but every one among us, no matter how poor, no matter how mean, can be a welldoer, as Shakespeare was when he was poor and mean in worldly conditions.

We cannot be certainly as the chief of welldoers, that Divine One of Nazareth, whose loving hand went with His lips and with His heart in the service of His brothers and sisters and the little children, asking no questions of class, creed or politics, but giving cheerfully and joyfully to all who were in any way distressed ‘in mind, body or estate,’—each according to their needs. But the very humblest amongst us may even be rich in the art of welldoing—by giving the bright smile, the hopeful word, the outstretched hand to any unhappily less fortunate than ourselves; and so fulfil the human and divine law of love to the brethren, which is so sweetly insisted upon as the greatest of all laws in the Bible and by Shakespeare.

GEORGE MORLEY.

THE UGLY SIDE OF THE CUBIST- FUTURIST-VORTICIST CRAZE.

WALTER WINANS.

ARTISTS, as everyone knows, are more highly strung than ordinary mortals; they more easily get into ecstasies and drop to the depths of despair. They are much more sensitive, and therefore much more easily affected by supernormal influences. One can see, from many of the world's master-pieces, that the sculptor or painter 'saw visions.'

As a sculptor, sculpture appeals to me more than painting. A painting is always the same; a piece of sculpture has an infinite number of points of view from which it can be seen, and these can be still further varied by the lighting. A sculptor has to foresee all this. He does not work to the end of being viewed from one fixed point; and so it may chance that some malicious sprite can play havoc with a sculptor's work. It is put up on a pedestal, for instance, higher than what the sculptor worked for; and then from some point of view it may look ridiculous. Travellers may remember how the guide, who has taken them to see some world's master-piece of sculpture, after letting them finish admiring it, has said "Just come and look at it from here!" and then laughed at the disgust on their faces.

Lately I have found an unexpected development of this unlovely point of view.

Like all sculptors I detest the cubist, futurist and

vorticist movements, which are simply the crude attempts of people who are unable to paint, model or draw a straight line, and who are utterly ignorant of anatomy. They do things which I, when an art-student, would have been turned out of the class for doing—things at which children even laugh.

In order to show what nonsense it all is, I began to model a statue on these lines; but as I worked I felt an evil influence coming over me.

We sculptors work in worship of the Beautiful, which is Nature, which is the Deity; and in doing so we work in the same reverent spirit in which worshippers pray and sing in church. These worshippers, however, repeat what is written down for them or listen to what the preacher says, who further says what he is bound to say. They do not worship of themselves, spontaneously, but just follow what they are told like parrots. A sculptor, on the other hand, worships by constantly seeking new beauties; and all Nature is beautiful, if one looks at it with an artist's eye.

What I found myself doing then was caricaturing Nature, which is blaspheming it, just as if a worshipper repeated travesties of prayers. I was therefore deliberately forsaking worship, and the consequence was I at once found my skill deserting me. I could see only hideousness, obscenity; and so I gave up the attempt to follow the 'new art' in horror and disgust.

A doctor has told me that lunatics draw exactly like the cubists, futurists and vorticists. These folk have got so obsessed that they cannot see beauty except in indecency and ugliness.

The ancient Greek master-pieces compelled worship, because they were executed in a spirit of worship. It

is said that Praxiteles' 'Jupiter' converted an atheist, *i.e.* one who did not believe in the gods, when he simply looked at it. These futurist sculptures on the contrary would turn a believer into an atheist if he began to worship them.

I go into a church and, as long as I listen to the music, enjoy the architecture, lighted though painted windows, smell the incense and silently commune with the Deity, I worship; but if anyone hands me a prayer-book and I begin to follow the words or if I listen to the preacher, all my religion vanishes, and I want to argue and point out how petty are their ideas of the Creator when put into words and dogmas.

In the same way to work at my art is a worship, because I *feel*, and do not have to put my feelings into words; words are capable of so many interpretations. This is the reason I do not believe that the Deity has ever dictated a single word or commandment, or given any dogmatic knowledge of His attributes.

Words only lead to endless controversy, and no words can do anything but detract from infinite Majesty. The Infinite can only be felt, and feebly expressed in art. If it is attempted to put the Infinite into words, dogmas and explanations, it only results in the ridiculous.

I do not know if other sculptors work as I do; but in my case I never make preliminary sketches either on paper or in clay. I think out the whole subject down to the minutest details, till I have it entirely in my mind's eye.

Then I work, often without models till the final stage, working from what I see in my mind, from memory, and cannot improve on my original mental picture. This mental vision is so vivid that I have

had brother sculptors say: "How well you have studied that; I can see it was modelled direct from Nature," in cases where I have not had Nature before me when modelling.

As I work, I seem to see what I want to represent as clearly as if it was actually there, in all its details; and when I have got it blocked out in the clay, the finishing is self-evident to me—simply a bit to be removed here, a bit there; no trying what is best; it is just like dotting one's *i*'s and crossing ones *t*'s.

In fact it is as if I were putting together a jig-saw puzzle. It is not that I have a choice; it is the shape decided by Fate from long ago. I am merely putting it together in the only shape the various pieces will fit into properly. Sometimes I do a wrong thing of course; but I see at once it is wrong, take it to pieces and begin again till the pieces all fit in properly. With this method of working it is evident that when I began the 'cubist-futurist' statue I was working against what I knew I ought to do if I was working honestly, doing what I knew I ought to do. As soon as I let things go wrong, then the feeling of being driven by evil influences came upon me.

The feeling of what I ought to do is so strong that whenever I have modelled a part which I feel is wrongly done, but which I leave, thinking "it does not really matter," I am not able to go on with anything else; I keep looking at it and finally have to put it right.

Anything which one has handled is easier to model afterwards than what one has only seen. If you are constantly handling a thing for years, you can model it almost blindfolded; you feel, rather than see, its shape.

Is it not possible that, as we are all parts of the Universal Spirit, if we put our minds into modelling, the Universal Spirit helps us in copying what He has already made?

The artist tries to imitate Nature, and so partially succeeds; the futurist, cubist or vorticist tries to improve on Nature, and so, like Lucifer, he falls. He rejects Nature as not being artistic, or as not conforming with his ideas of what should be; he thinks he knows what is beautiful better than Nature, and therefore he falls and fails.

Something of the same sort happens if one tries to make mythical animals, centaurs, satyrs, harpies, etc. The moment you try to blend two separate things in Nature you make ugliness, absurdity; the muscles will not join with any meaning. An angel's wings, springing from the shoulder-blades, have no anatomical meaning. They are merely ornaments. The pectoral muscles cannot work them. The only way to fit them on is instead of arms, and even then the whole thing is ugly, out of balance.

Nobody can improve on Nature in the slightest degree; the least attempt to do so spoils the whole composition. Even the conventional in the human figure, necessary from one point of view, detracts from its perfect beauty and symmetry, especially in painting. Let anyone copy the nude model as he or she really is, and compare it with a copy having the conventional omissions and he will see I am right.

The early Greeks went nearer to Nature than a modern artist dare go, and the result is that no modern has ever approached the ancients. There is a Swedish painter who defies Mrs. Grundy, and his works have a balance in form and colour no conventional nude

can approach. These conventionalisms destroy the balance of colour and form, which in Nature is perfect.

WALTER WINANS.

'YE ARE ALL DROPS OF THE SAME
OCEAN.'

God is the ocean. When the winds of Time
Beat on the surface of that ageless sea,
Nations arose. Crested and girt with foam,
Proud with the might of the resistless wave,
In restless clash they strove. And he who rose,
White-crowned, to dance an instant in the sun,
Higher than all the rest, broke, crashed, swung down
Forgotten in the dark translucent deep.

Night o'er the sea. The winds have furled their wings;
The turbid foam half-dreaming shrinks to rest,
Wave curled on wave, and crest on shattered crest,
Until the last faint irised bubble dies.

Calm as creation's dawn, the sea unruffled lies.

AELFRIDA TILLYARD.

¹ Behā' u'llah.

A FACE AT A WINDOW.

I.

I SEE a face at a window: a young face, comely, not particularly beautiful; the face of a woman absorbed in what she is doing.

She is plainly dressed in black, and her hands move swiftly among her knitting needles. The needles flash, catching the evening light.

For an instant she looks up, then bends again over her work; it is on that that her thoughts are fixed.

Or on something else? On the boy for whom she is knitting? Or on a boy who is dead, and for whose sake she is making something warm and cosy for some other boy, the son, or the husband, or the brother, or the sweetheart of some woman unknown to her? I do not know.

There is in her eyes—grave, thoughtful, absorbed—a look that makes me think of all the women who have lived through these years of war: the women whose hearts have been torn with grief for their dead; the women who have worked quietly and steadily at their posts; the women who have seen their husbands and children mangled before their eyes; the women who have suffered the worst that can happen to a woman, something infinitely more terrible than death.

II.

When we think of anyone we love we think first of the face of the beloved: how his eyes smile even

while his mouth is firm and set; or how noble his brow is, or how fresh and healthy his cheek.

And now we have to think of the face distorted by flying pieces of metal hurled with incredible force: of the features twisted out of all recognition; of the eyes blown away; of the nose driven into the flesh, the cheek torn open, the tongue lolling out. Yes, these things happen; they are facts.

They are facts because war is still a fact, and because men have used the divine gift of the intellect to fashion things deadly and cruel with which to kill one another.

III.

They said that when he came back from the war his children ran away from him because he was so ugly.

But it was only his face that was ugly, and even that the surgeons and artists remedied in the most miraculous way, taking bits of skin and bone and cartilage from other parts of his body and building up his poor broken features so that, feeling them with his fingers—for he was quite blind—he knew that he was no longer ugly, and that his children would love him again, as they used to do before he went for a soldier.

IV.

We ought not to think too much about the face. The spirit of the man whose features have been shattered is of infinitely greater importance. And that spirit is grand, heroic, undying.

O great spirit of heroes! When I think of thee, the broken faces that have haunted my dreams ever since I saw them at the hospital become beautiful, glorified, transfigured.

These are the thoughts that come to me while the woman with the sweet grave face looks up and then down again on her work, as the omnibus goes past her window.

GERTRUDE VAUGHAN.

THE PEDLAR.

Up and down the market
His wares he cries—
Jewels that sparkle clear
As Eastern skies,
Satins and silks that win
Eager surprise.

“ Old man, old crooked man,
What makes your joy,
Since so few buy of you
Trinket or toy?
How do you keep the bright
Eyes of a boy? ”

Up and down the market
Still he doth go :
Feeble his steps are,
Feeble and slow,
And his thin hair is
Powdered with snow.

“ I have a dream, child,
That makes me gay,
Though all my days fast
Flutter away,
Fall as light leaves in
November grey.

“ My dream has shown me,
As in a glass,
Earth's fleeting fancies
Dwindle and pass,
Swift as the loves of
Lad and of lass.

“ I am a king, child, .
Lord of my soul.
Kings can but seldom
Blind fortune control;
But I know the pathway
And vision the goal.”

R. B. INCE.

REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

THE METHOD IN THE MADNESS.

A Fresh Consideration of the Case between Germany and Ourselves. By Edwyn Bevan, Honorary Fellow of New College, Oxford, Author of 'The House of Seleucus,' etc. London (Edward Arnold); pp. 309; 5s. net.

WE congratulate Mr. Bevan on writing an exceptionally well-informed and a practically judicial volume on the burning question of the day. He has had special facilities for acquainting himself with the German war-literature and news-sheets, is a trained historian and, in our opinion, correctly reads the psychology of the chief criminal, the disturber of the peace of Europe. In brief, Mr. Bevan's summary and estimate of the case are on the whole the best we have so far come across. As to Germany's mind before the war, if she did not deliberately will war, nevertheless the Germans as a whole may be said to have desired war, in that "they desired certain things and regarded war as the necessary condition of their acquisition"; in other words, they willed beforehand "the whole complex of which war formed a part" (p. 15). There was no particular 'plan,' but rather "a body of ideas and sentiments which were held in different proportions and with a different degree of clearness by a multitude of persons" (p. 27). German ambitions before the war "consisted rather in a number of floating ideas than in a fixed programme" (p. 90). Germany whole-heartedly and instinctively was "out for power as such" (p. 51) wherever it could be secured, but this was as yet all vague; she would have roused less apprehension in the minds of the nations had she defined her objects. She was a universal menace. Europe was confronted with a nation that was suffering, not only from megalomania, but also from a severe attack of hysterical claustrophobia—the feeling of being shut in, of insufficient room for expansion, and therewith the false idea that she was being deliberately held down and held back, especially by England. Mr. Bevan sums up his first chapter of enquiry as to the cause of the present trouble in the words: "The origin of the present catastrophe is the temper of the German people in

A.D. 1914—the craving for vague splendid things, the unquestioning credulity with which they were ready to follow their rulers into a prodigious adventure" (p. 57). Further on Mr. Bevan is specially good in analyzing, tracing the origin of and criticizing the three main ideas of Teutonic ambition,—the Pan-German sea-power lust, the gospel of Mitteleuropa, *plus* the Berlin-to-Baghdad dream, which combines the glamour of the Holy Roman Empire with that of *The Arabian Nights* (p. 110). There follows a chapter 'Concerning Lies' and the psychology of the carefully organised German varieties of them. As to hate, it is only too true that the Germans hate us most bitterly, nay glory in their hatred and preach the gospel of hate as a sacred duty. But do we hate them? To this Mr. Bevan replies: "To describe the feeling which the ordinary Englishman now has for Germans as 'hatred' is surely a psychological infelicity. It would be more nearly described in German by *Ekel* than by *Hass*. A man shrinks from a being whose whole moral constitution is diverse from his own, in whom he finds a want of correspondence with himself in those elementary moral sensibilities and judgments which seem to constitute the deepest and most essential part of his own nature" (p. 213). Speaking generally and speaking of the nations as a whole, we cannot get away from the now amply demonstrated ground-fact that "there is a difference between the English and the German attitude to life." There is, for instance, a notable difference in the appraisement of values, as may be seen by the German attempt to justify 'frightfulness' *on principle*. In this connection Mr. Bevan writes: "I think it would be found that the reason why good men in Germany contemplate with complacency, or even applause, such actions as the sinking of the *Lusitania* or the Belgian deportations, is not only that they believe in the existence of certain justifying circumstances, but that they acquiesce more easily in the hypothesis of justifying circumstances because they have a comparatively less strong inner revulsion from atrocious actions performed by authorized agents of their Government. . . . Additional proof of this comparative insensibility is to be seen in the ignoring by religious German apologists of the expression of atrocious sentiments by other German writers and speakers" (p. 244). Finally, another great difference is to be found, not only between the Germans and ourselves, but also between Germany and all other nations, in the unparalleled self-glorification that is manifested by German speakers and writers almost without exception. To quote from

the remarkable volume of the Danish theologian Dr. Bang, *Hurrah and Hallelujah*, according to the Germans, "Germany is not only the strongest nation in the world, but it is also the nation which, without comparison, stands highest in every respect. The Germans are *the* people, the crown of creation. All moral virtues are, in the German, nothing but his natural inborn qualities. All that is noble, good and beautiful can, therefore, be described as German" (p. 10). Nevertheless Mr. Bevan thinks that the common charge that Germany wants to impose her *Kultur* upon other nations by force is difficult to substantiate. It is indeed even worse than this, though Mr. Bevan does not apparently see the irony of his following sentences. Germany apparently will be good enough to let nations do as they please within their own new borders, when she has finished with them, provided however that in no international question they ever dare to cross Germany's path. As to *Kultur*: "They will, of their own accord, come to the springs of German wisdom and German moral greatness to be healed!" (p. 269).

To call such fatuous folly of pride and arrogance megalomania would be a compliment. We are now at grips with this insane nation running amok in the world, and until so dangerous a lunatic is put once more under proper restraint there can be no peace for the planet. Perchance some may think that there is here an over-statement of the case. Mr. Bevan perhaps on the whole sounds more restrained when he is not read in selections; but that such is the case, unhappily and unfortunately the case, there is no doubt, for there is no substantive fact, physical or psychological, in Mr. Bevan's exceedingly instructive volume that is not thoroughly documented by the writings of these amazing Germans themselves. We are fighting against a nation that for the time is out of its senses; and as it is a highly intelligent nation along certain material lines, that makes it all the worse. There is 'method in the madness.'

ON THE THRESHOLD OF THE UNSEEN.

An Examination of the Phenomena of Spiritualism and of the Evidence for Survival after Death. By Sir William F. Barrett, F.R.S. London (Kegan Paul, etc.); pp. 386; 6s. 6d. net.

AFTER Sir William Crookes, the venerable *doyen* of our scientific psychical researchers, Sir William Barrett, Professor Emeritus of

Experimental Physics at Trinity College, Dublin, holds first rank in the veteran 'old guard,' now so sadly depleted in numbers, of this young but far-reaching, puzzling but extremely important, branch of human knowledge. As early as 1876 he read a paper on 'Abnormal Conditions of Mind' before the British Association, the first on the subject ever presented to that very British assembly, and in 1882, with others, founded the Society for Psychical Research. The present arresting volume is not entirely new; but it is largely so. In it Sir William has recast, expanded and brought up to date the successful work he published in 1908, entitled *On the Threshold of a New World of Thought*, a book that was actually printed in 1895 but held back, owing to the unfavourable verdict on the physical phenomena of the notorious Eusapia Palladino, pronounced by Hodgson, Sidgwick and Myers after their Cambridge experiments with her in 1895. Subsequently, in 1909, another Committee of the S.P.R. (Messrs. Feilding, Baggally and Hereward Carrington) testified to the genuineness of the phenomena they investigated under the most rigid test-conditions, and their enquiry marked a stage in the better understanding of the nature and conditions of mediumistic fraud, physical and psychical.

It is astonishing how much Sir William has managed to crowd into this small compass of 336 pages—small, seeing how vast is the material to be surveyed. He has carried out his difficult task of giving an account of these complex and obscure phenomena suited to the requirements of the general public with conspicuous ability. The book is throughout readable and holds the attention; it presents the pros and cons impartially, yet with regard to the main point at issue speaks in no hesitating tones and is generally constructive. The volume is moreover pleasantly written and embellished with many apposite quotations from high literature. We are therefore very pleased to recommend cordially Sir William's labours to all who require a sound introduction to psychical research and the study of those abnormal phenomena which are, by the misuse of a philosophical term of definite meaning, popularly referred to as 'spiritualism,' but which we should do well, to avoid confusion, to speak of as 'spiritism,' in conformity with Continental usage.

Sir William Barrett in his Preface (p. xix) wisely lays it down that the psychical order is not the spiritual order. The psychical still deals 'with the *external*, though it be an unseen world.' And in his last words (p. 326) he adds: "As a rule the higher and more spiritual the content of the messages, the less palpable and

material is their manifestation. The silent 'communion of saints' is very far removed from a spiritistic *séance*." He thus strongly protests (p. 84) against 'making a *religion* of Spiritualism.' With this we are in general agreement, if spiritual religion is meant, as may be seen by our recent attempt to distinguish 'The Spiritual and the Psychical in Religion' in the July number of THE QUEST. It is true that *every* human activity can be *made* religious, and that what are called spiritistic and cognate phenomena have in the past characterized the psychical element in religion; but this is not the spiritual element, and it can be dealt with on purely scientific lines.

What then is spiritism? Sir William approves (p. 9) its definition as "a belief based solely on facts open to the world, through an extensive system of mediumship, its cardinal truth, established by experiment, being that of a world of spirits, and the continuity of the existence of the individual spirit through the momentary eclipse of death." He adds courageously (p. 10) that a dispassionate review of his own experiments extended over forty years compels his belief in 'spiritualism' so defined. He however agrees with Myers that 'medium' is a 'barbarous and question-begging term,' and would prefer 'automatist' or 'psychic' (p. 125). Instrumental contrivances for revealing the action of the subconscious, such as planchette or the 'dowsing rod,' moreover, he would call 'autosscopes' (p. 122).

As to the dangers of such researches, of which there are very many, Sir William is on the whole of opinion that "the perils which beset the ancient world in the pursuit of psychical knowledge do not apply to *scientific* investigation to-day, which is based on the acknowledged omnipresence of order" (p. 82). He believes, further, with the whole of antiquity, that we shall all see more clearly as our knowledge grows that "the unseen around us is tenanted by many spiritual creatures whose influence is sometimes good and sometimes evil" (p. 88). Not only so, but these 'spiritual creatures' are not necessarily of human lineage. Again, most courageously, he affirms his belief hereanent when he writes: "For my own part, it seems not improbable that many of the *physical* manifestations witnessed in a spiritualistic *séance* are the product of human-like, but not really human, intelligences—good or bad *daimonia* they may be, *elementals* some have called them, which aggregate round the medium" (p. 118). This is an enormous admission for a man of science to make even when limited to physical mediumistic phenomena; and if we do not

worship exclusively at the hermetically inwardly-sealed, self-contained mental shrine of the psychiatrists, and provisionally deal with these psycho-physical phenomena as they appear, just as we deal with phenomena in the normal sense-world in the common language of appearance, there is no need to raise the cry of mythology and superstition, so long as the very superior psychiatrists and abnormal psychologists have patently no explanation to offer that does not put an even greater strain on our credulity than the spirit-hypothesis. As Sir William says admirably elsewhere (p. 121) in another connection: "Investigators who, taking an exalted view of their own sagacity, enter upon this enquiry with their minds made up as to the possible or impossible, are sure to fail. Such people should be shunned, as their habit of thought and mode of action are inappropriate, and therefore essentially vulgar, for the essence of vulgarity is inappropriateness." This is well observed and well remarked.

Though Sir William does not deal with the world-old problem of a 'subtle body,' which will have probably before long to come once more into its own as a working hypothesis in certain classes of mediumistic phenomena, he is inclined to think "it may be that the intelligence acting in a *séance* is a *thought projection of ourselves*—that each one of us has his *simulacrum* in the unseen" (p. 108). When however he adds (p. 109), in connection with the almost as ancient reincarnation, transmigration or transcorporation belief, that "the thoughts of each individual life generate a *thought-body* in the unseen, which becomes the next dwelling place of our soul on its return to earth," we are of opinion that Buddhist psychology has penetrated more deeply into the question. He is further persuaded (p. 110) that in *séances* for physical phenomena 'a quasi-vitality' may be given to these 'conceivable thought-bodies'; in any case "there appears to be some sympathetic response, *something analogous to resonance* in the unseen." This latter is a suggestive analogy but, let us not forget, still an analogy only.

Speaking further on of the abundant analogies which physical science affords of the necessity for a medium, or intermediary, between the unseen and the seen, such as the effects produced on visible material bodies by such invisible physical energies as electricity, magnetism, light, gravitation, etc., our author shows the spirit of the genuine scientist by adding (p. 119): "Thus we find certain definite physical media are necessary to enable operations to become perceptible which would otherwise remain

imperceptible. Through these media, energy from the unseen *physical* world without us enters the seen, and passing through the seen affects thereby the unseen *mental* world within us. The extreme ends of the operation are unknown to us, and it is only during the transition stage that the flux of energy appeals to our senses, and therefore it is only with this stage of appearances, that is to say with *phenomena*, that science can deal." Moreover he adds wisely later on (p. 272): "We do not perceive the actual material world, nor anything like it, and have not, therefore, the remotest idea of what the thing we call matter is in itself." From these considerations he argues as to the nature of the living human organism generally called a medium. Thus he concludes (p. 120): "The *nexus* between the seen and the unseen may be, as we have shown, physical, physiological, or psychical, but whichever it may be, it is a specialised substance, or organ, or organism; in many cases it is a body in a state of unstable equilibrium, and in that case, therefore, of a delicate nature, a body to be handled carefully, and its behaviour or idiosyncrasies needing to be studied and known beforehand."

As to communications through such a medium, psychic or automatist, they appear to fall generally into two groups with an indefinite line of demarcation between. "In one group the cause appears to be the operation of hidden powers that lie wrapped up in our present human personality, and which the peculiar organisation of the medium renders manifest; in the other group the cause appears to be the operation of the same powers, controlled by unseen personalities, who have once lived on earth or claim to have done so." But we should never leave out of sight the basic fact that "the unconscious mind of the medium is the instrument *from* which in the former case and *through* which in the latter the messages come" (p. 169).

Among such automatist messages purporting on the face of them to be evidential for survival, of which Sir William gives a number, we note his candour in reproducing three from 'Mrs. Holland's' script professing to come from Myers, and suggesting that all did not go well with him at the beginning, owing, we presume, in the first place to his over-elaborate arrangements to communicate with a very large number of people, who thus became psychically a crowd of many voices insistently summoning him and preventing his normal natural preliminary post-mortem sleep, and in the second to his own over-eagerness to communicate. The passages are as follows (pp. 201, 205):

"If I could only reach you—if I could only tell you—I long for power, and all that comes to me is an infinite yearning—an infinite pain. Does any of this reach you, reach anyone, or am I only writing as the wind wails—wordless and unheeding?"

"It may be that those who die suddenly suffer no prolonged obscuration of consciousness, but for my own experience the unconscious was exceedingly prolonged."

"Oh I am feeble with eagerness. How can I best be identified! It means so much apart from the mere personal love and longing. Edmund's [Mr. Ed. Gurney's] help is not here with me just now. I am trying alone among unspeakable difficulties."

This suggests that a mind of such intellectual development as Myers' found it as difficult to communicate thence hither as he found it difficult to get into personal touch hence thither when in a physical body; it seems that in most cases a medium is required on *both* sides.

Though believing in the possibility of genuine intercommunication of the discarnate and incarnate, Sir William is fully alive to the necessity of submitting the messages to the most severe criticism. Referring to a certain class of them (p. 242) he writes: "We cannot take these communications at their full value, as they are sometimes manifestly false, although presented to the sitter with a dramatic distinctness and corresponding character, which give them a life-like reality." And with regard to the so-frequent personation of great names in history, he appositely quotes Swedenborg (p. 258), whose evidence on this point and on others he holds in esteem. In his *Arcana Cælestia* the famous Swede writes:

"When spirits begin to speak with men they conjoin themselves with his thoughts and affections; hence it is manifest none other but similar spirits speak with man and operate upon him. . . . They put on all things of his memory, thus all things which the man has learned and imbibed from infancy, the spirits suppose these things to be their own: thus they act, as it were, a part of man with men. . . . Wherefore let those who speak with spirits beware lest they be deceived, when they say that they are those whom they know or pretend to be."

Two of the most useful chapters are accordingly devoted to 'Difficulties and Objections' and to 'Cautions and Suggestions.' The first-hand enquirer into the manifold and mixed phenomena of this vast intermediate psychical world should be furnished with a good scientific, philosophic and moral, if not religious, equipment

if he is to do sound work. Mediumship is by no means to be lightly indulged in and its practice should be carefully safeguarded. For "there is certainly some evidence indicating that continual sittings for physical phenomena cause an illegitimate and excessive drain on the vitality of a medium, creating a nervous exhaustion which is apt to lead, in extreme cases, to mental derangement, and to an habitual resort to stimulants with a no less deplorable end."

We should prefer to say that there was a no inconsiderable amount of, and not only some, evidence to this effect with regard to physical phenomena; and with regard to psychical phenomena proper, there is still more evidence of psychical excesses and 'drugging.' We are therefore fully in agreement with Sir William when he writes (p. 250): "The danger to the medium lies, in my opinion, not only in the loss of spiritual stamina, but in the possible deprivation of that birth-right we each are given to cherish, our individuality, our true self-hood; just as in another way this may be impaired by sensuality, opium or alcohol."

But in spite of all the dangers and difficulties of what some of the early Christian Gnostics called 'the ways of the midst,' we are firmly convinced with Sir William that "there is an *ultra*-liminal as well as a *sub*-liminal self" (p. 279). This is the treasure guarded by the 'dragon' of the uncensored love-nature, and until our psychiatrists take this into consideration, they will be dealing with half, and that too the lower half of, the truth; and though they may cure some of the lower ailments of the mind, they will fail to be true physicians of the soul.

There are very many other points that we should like to refer to in Sir William Barrett's *On the Threshold of the Unseen*, but lack of space forbids, and we must therefore send the reader to the book itself if he would be further instructed.

SHANTINIKETAN.

The Bolpur School of Rabindranath Tagore. By W. W. Pearson.
Illustrated by Mukul Chandra Dey. London (Macmillan);
pp. 111; 4s. 6d. net.

FIFTY-THREE pages of this small volume are given to a very sympathetic description of the educational experiment which has been made by Sir Rabindranath Tagore for some sixteen years at Bolpur, a remote village situated about one hundred miles from Calcutta. Then follow [forty-two pages of a children's religio-

faëry story called 'The Gift to the Guru,' by Satish Chandra Roy, who was teacher at the school for a brief year and whose early death was deeply regretted by all. Then we have four pages of a characteristic and charming address by the poet himself before Japanese students in Tokyo, entitled 'Paradise'; and in addition a few words of 'Introduction' and of 'Parting' by the same skilled pen. Shānti-nikētan, the Abode or Retreat of Peace, was many years ago consecrated by the prolonged meditation of the poet's distinguished and saintly father Devendranath, and here his youngest son decided to inaugurate his attempt to revive the spirit if not the form of the *brahmachārī ashram* of Vedic antiquity, and essay a new departure in the training and education of Indian boys. The *brahmachārī ashram* was the first stage of Vedic religious culture and education. In India, as the poet says in his chapter on 'My School' in his recent collection of lectures called *Personality*, they still cherish the memory of the tradition of the forest-colonies of great teachers. "These places were neither schools nor monasteries, in the modern sense of the word. They consisted of homes where with their families lived men whose object was to see the world in God and to realise their own life in him. Though they lived outside society, yet they were to society what the sun is to the planets, the centre from which it received its life and light. And here boys grew up in an intimate vision of eternal life before they were thought fit to enter the state of the householder" (p. 128). This ideal has never faded from the memory of India, and the Bolpur attempt is not the only one that is being made to revive some part at least of the ancient institution. On different lines a somewhat similar endeavour is being attempted by the Ārya Samāj in their Guru Kula schools near Hardwar and elsewhere. Shantiniketan is, however, free from all sectarian bias; though initiated in the spirit of all that is best in the tradition of the Brahmo Samāj, it is religiously as free as air. Nevertheless it is precisely the inculcation of the religious spirit that is the chief preoccupation of its founder; this however is to be effected by no set forms of instruction, but rather, if it may be so expressed, by the creation of an atmosphere. In the outspoken lecture referred to there is an arresting item of autobiography, revealing the inwardness of this ground-foundation of the undertaking. Rabindranath started without any educational training or experience, and things at first did not go well; much that was attempted had to be cast aside as inappropriate; there was an over-busy interest in success and

in the achievement of a set purpose. "I sat alone on the upper terrace of the Shanti-Niketan house," the poet tells us, "and gazed upon the tree tops of the *sal* avenue before me. I withdrew my heart from my own schemes and calculations, from my daily struggles, and held it up in silence before the peace and presence that permeated the sky; and gradually my heart was filled. I began to see the world around me through the eyes of my soul. . . . I found my message in the sunlight that touched my inner mind and felt a fulness in the sky that spoke to me in the words of our ancient Rishi —. . . 'Who could ever move and strive and live in this world if the sky were not filled with love?' Thus when I turned back from the struggle to achieve results, from the ambition of doing benefit to others, and came to my own innermost need; when I felt that living one's own life in truth is living the life of all the world, then the unquiet atmosphere of outward struggle cleared up and the power of spontaneous creation found its way through the centre of things" (pp. 133, 134). And so the spirit of the place was given free scope in trust and the great adventure was at last consciously entered upon. For the details and way of the experiment we must refer the reader to the sketch of Mr. Pearson, who was Sir Rabindranath's companion on his recent lecturing tour in America and is a teacher in the school, and especially to the poet's own deliverance on 'My School,' from which we have already quoted. It will be of great interest to many who are seeking to give children greater liberty and scope for initiation, as in the Montessori and other similar methods, and reminds one of the ancient Taoist root-faith in the 'original goodness of the heart of man' and in 'letting alone' so that natural growth should not be impeded. There is good in this way, much good, provided always the 'atmosphere' is right, and for that we want true spiritual teachers who live the life of the spirit. Failing this there will be very mixed results, we fear, for the 'original goodness of the heart of man' is a half-truth; there is the original 'cussedness' as well, as they have found out even at Bolpur. But it is good to try at last to 'educate,' instead of forcing every child through the soul-less mechanical curriculum that is falsely called education. Teaching is a noble profession; but how few understand the true spirit or function of the teacher! This applies to all teaching, but especially to that of religion; and here Rabindranath has a word of counsel that is drawn from the well of true wisdom. In 'My School' (*op. cit.*, p. 134) he writes: "From my experience I know that where the eagerness to teach

others is too strong, especially in the matter of spiritual life, the result becomes meagre and mixed with untruth. All the hypocrisy and self-delusion in our religious convictions and practices are the outcome of the goadings of over-zealous activities of membership. In our spiritual attainment gaining and giving are the same thing; as in a lamp, to light itself is the same as to impart light to others. When a man makes it his profession to preach God to others, then he will raise the dust more than give direction to truth. Teaching of religion can never be imparted in the form of lessons, it is there where there is religion in living." This is admirably remarked. But if it is the business of the teacher to keep himself in the background as much as possible, as a sort of 'God's providence,' according to the tenets of the most advanced school of 'go as you please' for infants, it is a safe method only when there is a true teacher, and these are *aves rarissimæ*, and therefore the ordinary school stands little chance of getting one. In brief, according to these notions, the first requisite is a school for teachers. Teaching, however, is a valuable discipline of self-training, so pupils and teachers may help one another along the common way. We therefore read understandingly when in a letter of the poet-educationalist, quoted by Mr. Pearson, we are told: "You must not imagine that I have fully realised my ideal—but the ideal is there working itself out through all the obstacles of the hard prose of modern life. In spiritual matters one should forget that he must teach others or achieve results that can be measured, and in my school here I think it proper to measure our success by the spiritual growth in the teachers. In these things gain to one's personal self is gain to all, like lighting a lamp which is lighting a whole room" (p. 52).

STUDIES IN PHARISAISM AND THE GOSPELS.

By I. Abrahams, M.A., Reader in Talmudic, University of Cambridge, formerly Senior Tutor, Jews' College, London.
Cambridge (University Press); pp. 178; 6s. 6d. net.

WHEN Mr. Claude G. Montefiore's two arresting and instructive volumes on the Gospels, which were a model of good sense and good feeling in the exegesis of Christian scripture by a Jewish scholar, appeared in 1909, it was understood that his learned colleague, Dr. Israel Abrahams, was to add a third volume of notes from Talmudic and Rabbinical sources. These notes were eagerly

awaited by a large number of students who confidently looked for a bounteous banquet at the hands of so competent a *chef*. Unfortunately Dr. Abrahams has found it impossible to carry out the full programme of this important undertaking; nevertheless we have to thank him heartily for putting at our disposal a score of studies on important points, all of which are essential to the understanding of the Jewish background of the Christian dispensation. From them we obtain an insight into the good of Pharisaism, and are enabled to strike a just balance over against the Gospel polemic against its abuses, which is the only side of Jewish piety contemporary with Jesus that the average Christian has ever heard of. As Dr. Abraham well remarks: "The danger always lies in this tendency to confuse a system with its abuses. This, as it seems to me, is an error made by many commentators on the Gospels, who seek to expand the often enough just criticism of Jesus against abuses, into an unjust condemnation of the whole Pharisaic system" (p. 87).

Moreover it should never be forgotten that Pharisaism is not a dead issue, not simply of archæological or historical interest; it is still a living force in Jewry. To quote from the Preface (p. vi.): "Pharisaism was not a mere historical phase; it has remained a vital force, it has gone on without a moment's break from the centuries before the Christian era to the twentieth century of that era. It has been put to the test of time and of life. It has survived throughout an experience, such as no other religious system has undergone." Most of the literature dealing with the thorny subjects treated of in these notes has hitherto been, on both sides, when not bitterly polemical, strongly apologetic. Neither side has been able to see the good of the other; prejudice has blinded judgment. As with Mr. Montefiore's sympathetic volume, however, so here we move in a fairer, freer and more enlightened atmosphere, reaching a high humanistic level. There is no direct controversy, but simply an honest attempt to state the facts *pro* and *con* on the various points without fear or favour, and all is imbued with the spirit of good temper and deep religious feeling. It is a book that all can read throughout with respect. Some of the more special points to be noted are the following. As to Repentance: "The formula of John (or Jesus) was: Repent *for* the Kingdom is at hand. The Pharisaic formula was: Repent *and* the Kingdom is at hand" (p. 84). The New Testament, the general historicity of which Dr. Abrahams does not impugn, is of value for Jewish historians. "Often . . . the

usages and ideas of the New Testament stand *between* Old Testament usages and later Rabbinic; in such cases they are valuable links in the chain. This is emphatically the case with the New Testament references to Synagogue customs" (p. 44). The popular notion that Pharisaism was a sort of dour Presbyterianism is a blunder. "Modern writers are too apt to confuse Pharisaism with Puritanism; more than half of the contrasts imagined between Hellenism and Hebraism arise from this same confusion. . . . The tendency to treat the modern Synagogue as a place formally restricted to purposes of worship was a reaction which is happily breaking down, especially in America, where so many of the so-called Jewish reforms are reversions to ancient traditions" (p. 82). In treating of the Parables, Rabbinic and Gospel, Dr. Abrahams aptly observes on the renderings of the latter: "These versions are, from the point of view of literary beauty, actually improvements on the Greek, just as the Hebrew of the twenty-third Psalm has gained an added grace in the incomparable English rendering with which we are familiar. No one has done so much for the gems of Rabbinic fancy. They have remained from first to last rough jewels; successive generations of artists have not provided increasingly becoming settings to enhance their splendour" (p. 97). In treating of 'Disease and Miracle' Dr. Abrahams dwells on the Rabbinic theory of the relation between sin and disease, but omits here to point out how entirely this fails to account for disease in animals. We venture to differ from our learned Talmudic scholar only with great hesitation, but surely he is in error when, in treating of demoniac possession and exorcism, he says: "But it is certain that these beliefs and practices were uncommon in Palestine at the time of Jesus" (p. 110). We cannot but think that his following remarks (p. 111) are not without a tinge of apologetics, a rare extravagance for so judicial a writer. Especially interesting is his essay on 'The Sabbath' when he says: "All things considered, it would seem that Jesus differed fundamentally from the Pharisees in that he asserted a general right to abrogate the Sabbath law for man's ordinary convenience, while the Rabbis limited the license to cases of danger to life (p. 134). . . . Whatever may be urged from other points of view against the Rabbinic treatment of the Sabbath, and much may be so urged, it is just on the subjects in dispute in the Gospels that their unwrung are entirely" (p. 185). Finally as to the main point at issue, the ground Pharisaic doctrine of man's direct access

to God and the mediatorial dogma of Christendom, Dr. Abrahams writes: "Jesus indeed was animated by a strong, one may even say a unique, sense of his own relation to an unbroken intercourse with God. But this sense of nearness is weakened for all other men when the intercourse with God is broken by the intrusion between them and God of the person of Jesus" (p. 142). And here we must leave this instructive and helpful volume, with the hope that some of our readers and many other readers will be able to profit by its perusal.

PERSONALITY.

Lectures delivered in America. By Sir Rabindranath Tagore.
With Illustrations. London (Macmillan); pp. 184; 5s. net.

THIS volume is for the most part the best English work that has come from the pen of Sir Rabindranath since the publication of *Gitanjali* and *Sādhanā*, and is on the whole his most virile production. It contains six lectures, respectively entitled: What is Art?—The World of Personality; The Second Birth; My School; Meditation; Woman. They are however unequal in merit; the first three are distinctly superior to the rest, and all to the last on Woman, which is weak from a Western standpoint though progressive enough from an Eastern point of view. The general title well represents the chief *motif* of the whole series of essays. What personality is thought to be by Sir Rabindranath may be best seen from the concluding paragraph of the lecture on Art. "What is it in man," our poet-philosopher asks, "that asserts its immortality in spite of the obvious fact of death?"—and continues: "It is not his physical body or his mental organization. It is that deeper unity, that ultimate mystery in him, which, from the centre of his world, radiates towards his circumference; which is in his body, yet transcends his body; which is in his mind, yet grows beyond his mind; which, through the things belonging to him, expresses something that is not in them; which, while occupying his present, overflows its banks of the past and the future. It is the personality of man, conscious of its inexhaustible abundance; it has the paradox in it that it is more than itself; it is more than as it is seen, as it is known, as it is used. And this consciousness of the infinite, in the personal man, ever strives to make its experiences immortal and to make the whole world its own" (p. 88). This is, we believe, true of the

spiritual personality of man, the that of which he is to grow gradually into self-consciousness, but of which he is not yet conscious; in other words, the reality he is making for himself. Sir Rabindranath, however, in general uses the term in a far looser sense, speaking of the personality even of animals. It is true that the problem of personality is of the utmost importance; and one is almost inclined to say it cannot be over-emphasized. Yet on the other hand we cannot but think that it is just now being somewhat over-done. It is indeed one side of the shield of truth; but there is another side, and both are necessary for a comprehension of the full reality. Sir Rabindranath is faithful to his love of the Upanishads, and therein assuredly are to be found unfading beauties of the loftiest inspiration; but in his enthusiasm for the 'Highest Person' he is somewhat forgetful that the *Mahā Purusha* of the earlier Upanishads is still mythologically involved with very primitive anthropomorphic notions. Nevertheless it is perhaps of advantage to insist strenuously on the theistic side just now, provided always, however, we remember that it is not all. In these first three lectures particularly there are some admirable thoughts and phrases. The first on Art insists on what Tyrrell called 'Divine Fecundity'—the exuberance, surplusage, of life. "This surplus seeks its outlet in the creation of Art, for man's civilisation is built upon his surplus." The world of emotion is taken into full account; for "our emotions are the gastric juices which transform this world of appearances into the more intimate world of sentiments" (p. 14). Generally speaking, "the one effort of man's personality is to transform everything with which he has any true concern into the human"; but it is only where there is "an element of the superfluous in our heart's relation to the world" that Art has its birth, and the proper function of Art is the building of "man's true world—the living world of truth and beauty" (pp. 29-81). Art belongs essentially to personality. "The reality of the world belongs to the personality of man and not to reasoning, which, useful and great though it be, is not the man himself" (p. 52). True, reason is not the whole man, the full spiritual personality, the attainment of the self-consciousness of which is the all-desirable 'second birth' on which our author waxes so eloquent in another lecture. But most of us are far from this conscious birth into spiritual personality, and reason is the midwife for a safe deliverance. It is the operation in us of that Reason which, as the poet confesses, "guides the endless rhythm of the creative idea, perpetually

manifesting itself in ever changing forms" (p. 54); for "all through its changes it has a chain of relationship which is eternal" (p. 59). There are many good things that we could quote, had we space, but we must be content with one suggestive and in one phrase especially profound paragraph treating of the two sides of soul-realization. "The moral side represents training of unselfishness, control of desire; the spiritual side represents sympathy and love. They should be taken together and never separated. The cultivation of the merely moral side of our nature leads us to the dark region of narrowness and hardness of heart, to the intolerant arrogance of goodness; and the cultivation of the merely spiritual side of nature leads us to a still darker region of revelry in intemperance of imagination" (pp. 68, 69). 'The intolerant arrogance of goodness' is a very fine observation; as to the last clause, however, we should prefer to call such a state of affairs psychical rather than spiritual, but we are no fighter about words.

Sir Rabindranath pays a high compliment to Walt Whitman by frequent quotations, appropriate enough when we remember the audiences to which these lectures were first addressed; but the most frequent quotations are, as usual with him, from the Upanishads. It is true that the poet's renderings bring out a depth of meaning and that his exegesis adds beauty thereto, but a number of the quotations could be translated differently and some would say more accurately.

THE COMING POLITY.

A Study in Reconstruction. By Victor Branford, M.A., Member of the Board of Sociological Studies, University of London, and Patrick Geddes, Professor of Botany, University of St. Andrews. London (Williams & Norgate); pp. 264 + xvii.; 5s. net.

THIS is the first volume of a series, entitled 'The Making of the Future,' of which Professor Geddes and Mr. Victor Branford are the joint-editors, and of half of the projected volumes of which they are to be the joint-authors. The main object of the series is "to gather together existing elements of reconstructive doctrine, and present them as a body of truth growing towards unity and already fruitful in outlook and application" (p. vii.). The main method and outlook is seemingly preponderatingly that of Professor Geddes, whose enthusiastic work and suggestive

speculations have for many years been before the public, ably seconded by Mr. Branford, who has for so long been sympathetic to the same ideals and undertakings. Both are remarkably well-informed in the extremely wide and variegated fields of sociological subject-matter and methods of treatment, and both are daring pioneers and generalizers. The professed attempt is to blend the best in the 'regionalism' of Le Play and the humanism of Comte, which are said to be complementary to one another, with the new science of civics. And concerning the last we are told: "This incipient civism has been the parent of constructive Betterment and to no small extent of Child Welfare also. It has inspired the repair and renewal of historic cities, the tidying up of confused industrial towns, the guidance and gardening of their suburban growths" (p. viii.). It is "the scientific doctrine of civism," we are assured, that "brings together into working unison the separate doctrines of regionalism and humanism" (p. 15). Most of us have at least some acquaintance with Comtist philosophy if not with Comte's sociology, but many outside the ranks of professed sociologists will have to confess their poverty of knowledge of the 'regionalism' of Le Play, the basis of his *science sociale*, concretely founded upon the rich material collected in his great work, *Les Œuvriers Européens* (2nd ed., 6 vols., 1877-79). The view that is obtained by standing on the edifice raised by Le Play, the father of scientific regionalism, who is 'dug out' of his comparative obscurity by our authors, "lays stress upon family life, contacts with nature, the significance of labour, the interests of locality." It is the last which is the dominant factor in 'regionalism'; our authors, keen as they are on a thousand and one other things, seem to be keenest on the necessity of regional surveys as preparatory to the reconstruction of society. Reconstruction, however, is but one of "the three R's" new style; the others being Re-education and Renewal. It is quite out of the question to attempt adequately to notice, much less to review, the volume before us in a page or so. It is encyclopædic in range and bristling with ideas and, if we may indulge in a neologism, following the frequent example of our authors, its whole atmosphere is 'polymathic.' The reader is carried along breathlessly with suggestions of solutions of the most varied and difficult problems, following one another with bewildering rapidity. Formulæ, maps, graphs and analogies are interspersed, and much that is embryonic has the appearance of being already born and even grown up. We do not say that our authors are dogmatic, or

doctrinaire, or are insufficiently alive to the complexity and difficulty of the host of problems of which they treat. Much that they write, especially in dealing with the errors of the past and present, is true; much they suggest for the future is helpful. Nevertheless, somehow or other, one has throughout the feeling that it is all too facile. In listening to or reading Professor Geddes, one is almost inclined to believe that he would be ready with a graphic scheme for the explanation or solution of well-nigh every difficulty or problem under the sun. And yet he is no vague visionary; indeed he is specially strong on history and geography, and insists throughout on these concrete bases as fundamental. Nevertheless we feel that he is too fond of pelting us with new sciences which he sees, prophetically so to say, in maturer forms than they have yet assumed and perhaps than they ever will assume.

Of the many points that might be dwelt upon, we select one only, the grand question of regionalism. Here Professor Geddes seems to be for ever preaching the gospel of getting back to the elements from which the complexities of modern society have been developed. But will the future lay so much stress on this regional decentralisation? We have had high-ways and rail-ways; the future will almost indubitably have air-ways, and much else that will still further modify the old paths of life and presumably proportionately 'cancel' the elemental features on which regionalism relies. If there is to be a return to the land and naturism, a decentralizing from capitals to provincial cities and from cities to towns, it will thus be in modes very different from the ancient ways. Professor Geddes is alive to this in that part of his futurism which deals with the transitional stages from what he calls 'wardom' to 'peacedom,' but in spite of the present strong reaction against cosmopolitanism caused by the Great War, we cannot but think the future will preponderatingly tend in that direction, and humanism will so widen out regionalism that the latter will not play the important part assigned to it by our authors. In this notice we have referred to Professor Geddes more frequently than to Mr. Branford, for we seem to recognize his special nomenclature and phrasing on almost every page; but it may be that by this time his pioneer ideals, ideas and methods are becoming hardened into a school.

THE SURVIVAL OF JESUS.

A Priest's Study in Divine Telepathy. By John Huntley Skrine, D.D., Author of 'Creed and Creeds' (Bampton Lectures), 'Pastor Ovium,' etc. London (Constable); pp. 306; 5s. net.

THIS is an intimate, out-spoken and sincerely religious document, which, though it will doubtless be judged by traditionalists to be revolutionary, keeps fundamentally well within the limits of orthodox christological dogma. In the first place it may be said that Dr. Skrine puts forward his plea for considering the psychical factor in the New Testament narratives with restraint and dignity, being at great pains not to shock the traditionalist and carefully avoiding those infelicitous vulgarisms that are so frequently met with in spiritistic literature dealing with the subject. If telepathy, and telepathy not only between the living, but also between the discarnate and the incarnate, is a fact, and personally Dr. Skrine has no doubt that it is a fact—then, he contends, the acceptance of that fact necessitates a reviewing of the nature of much in the Gospel happenings by the light of that fact. This he proceeds to do, with the intention of showing that the admission of this widely-extended form of telepathy—to use a now firmly established term which he rightly shows is not accurately descriptive—supplies a badly needed psychical *modus* of much that would otherwise be strictly miraculous, while at the same time in no way minimising the spiritual reality and value of what was wrought by Jesus. There is a wide gap between the spiritualistic and the spiritual. Much that Dr. Skrine has to say is devoted to showing in every instance the genuinely spiritual nature of the virtue of the doings of Jesus, and to taking the whole of the works up into the energizing of the Divine economy as the most absolute form of realization. The appeal is thus confined to already believing Christians and is within these limits a plea for the acceptance of the reality of telepathy. The historical difficulties of the Gospel narratives are not dealt with or even alluded to. We do not intend directly to criticise Dr. Skrine's theology and christology; suffice it to say that it is on the lines of the absolute claims of dogmatic Christianity. There are many felicitous phrases in the book; but now and again there is a too great tendency to edification and the 'Ah yes! Ah no!'

style. We hope we are not doing Dr. Skrine an injustice in saying that he seems to think that an admission of psychical possibilities, or we may even say of demonstrated facts, will help greatly to solve some of the most difficult dogmatic enigmas. But we are not quite so hopeful ourselves; the psychical may be 'explained'—save the mark!—on purely materialistic lines as well as on spiritual; indeed there are no few phases of psychism that may not unfairly be said to out-materialize materialism. It will be of interest to see what reception this in some respects courageous volume meets with at the hands of the orthodox press and country parsonages. When we remember the way Dr. Sanday was man-handled in these quarters for his attempt to whisper the word 'sub-conscious' in endeavouring to grapple with the paradoxes of christology, we are afraid that Dr. Skrine's 'telepathy' will meet with rough treatment from the stalwarts, though it is qualified as 'divine' and he goes out of the way most courteously and gently to smooth away difficulties and smooth down the bristling fur of his traditionalist clerical brethren. For our own part we hold that the spiritual problems of religion are insoluble without taking into account both the psychical and the intellectual. What we regret most in the present volume is that there is nowhere in its pages the slightest sign that Dr. Skrine has taken into consideration that there are other great spiritual religions on the earth besides Christianity, that religion is a fundamental human phenomenon, and must be so treated to yield its full meaning and value. For our author indeed it is not only the Christ but Jesus who is cosmic, who is universal, the one source of life in the whole universe! Nevertheless we think the book will do service where it is most needed, namely in moderately orthodox circles. Dr. Skrine has a just appreciation of the nature and power of a 'presence,' and frankly admits the difference in form of the first resurrectional appearances. But what of the 'empty tomb' and its doctrinal implications? There we have the main difficulty, and do not find that it is met in this in some ways able contribution to apologetics. It may be added that the book is more readable than most of its kind by the personal form of the narrative, which purports to be that of John Desmond, residentiary canon of Dunminster.

THE FOLK-ELEMENT IN HINDU CULTURE.

A Contribution to Socio-Religious Studies in Hindu Folk-Institutions. By Benoy Kumar Sarkar, M.A., Professor, National Council of Education, Bengal, etc. Assisted by Hemendra K. Rakshit, B.A. (Wisconsin). London (Longmans, Green); pp. 312; 15s. net.

THIS pioneer work is described as mainly "a study of the relations between Shaiva-cum-Shāktaism and Buddhism, both descriptive and historical, obtaining among the Bengali-speaking population of Eastern India" (p. viii.). The plan of study centres round an inquiry into a Bengali socio-religious festival of modern times connected with the worship of the gods of the Shaiva pantheon, and called in some districts Gambhīrā and in others Gājan; and the volume contains an immense amount of information. This practically first attempt to grapple with the exceedingly important subject of the folk-element in Hindu culture, so rich in material, but so difficult of treatment, both owing to the large number of vernaculars in which it is enshrined, and because so much of the lore is to be found solely in oral tradition, is to be highly commended as a start in the right direction. We yield to no one in our admiration of the painstaking and methodical work, especially in the fields of the history of Indian sociology, economics and polity, which Professor Benoy Kumar Sarkar has accomplished with so much distinction; but we are compelled to say that, exactly in proportion as the form of a scientific method of treatment has been adopted in this volume and we are led to expect certain things, so are we disappointed in not finding them. We thus have to be content with the material, but must wait for its sufficient analysis and scientific treatment, and especially for the light that comparative study may throw upon it. But beyond this we have to regret the frequently deplorable style of the English, which we have not noticed in Professor B. K. Sarkar's other work. We cannot but think that it is due to another hand, and that the text has not been sufficiently edited. Especially is this to be regretted as description follows description of folk-ceremonies and folk-doings that require a skilful pen, and of translations of prayers or folk-songs that lose all their grace and attractiveness by clumsy and infelicitous phrasing.

We hoped, moreover, for some light on the obscure history of Tantra but regret to say we have not found it. Nevertheless we repeat the attempt is a step in the right direction—even though it be of a stumbling nature.

THE BIRD OF LIFE.

By Gertrude Vaughan, Author of 'The Flight of Mariette,' etc.
London (Chapman & Hall); pp. 309; 5s. net.

AMID the flood of novels that ceaselessly pours from the presses Miss Gertrude Vaughan's is deserving of notice. It is well written and the portraiture is good. The subject is that of a woman who fights her way gradually out of the narrow ways of an early pietistic environment, first Nonconformist and then Anglican, into the strong stream of life's actualities. She marries a curate, leaves him and hides from him, adopts literature as a profession, and meets a man with whom she falls in love. Her husband turns up again. They are both older; he explains much. She hesitates. The War breaks out. Both men go to the front, and both are killed. She is left alone with their memories and begins at last to learn to find God in the ordinary experiences of daily life.

We cannot refrain from quoting from a number of unintentionally humorous epitaphs in the graveyard of a 'little Bethel' the one ending with the words, "The Lord had need of him," with the following remark: "Rachel, who knew her Bible pretty well, remembered that they belonged to the story of Christ riding into Jerusalem, and that it was the ass of which He had need."

THE GARDEN AND THE FIRE.

By Aelfrida Tillyard. Cambridge (Heffer); pp. 76.

THIS is a collection of verse-pieces on a variety of subjects, including poems about the War and borderland and mystical poems. Several of the pieces have appeared in *THE QUEST*, which is sufficient indication of what we think of their quality; others have appeared in *The Outlook*, *The Cambridge Magazine* and *One Hundred of the Best Poems on the European War*. Aelfrida Tillyard has the poetic temperament and a wide spiritual outlook that seeks inspiration in the scriptures of the East as well as in those of the West. Many of the poems were written at Cambridge and the volume is dedicated to 'Cambridge Poets, the Living and the Dead,' and the authoress's profits are to be given to the Serbian Relief Fund.

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THE QUEST.

THE PSYCHIC FACTOR IN EVOLUTION

SIR W. F. BARRETT, F.R.S.

LESS than a century ago there were few who ventured to differ from the crude anthropomorphic conception of a universe substantially unchanged during an infinite past. The doctrine of "arbitrary creation and mechanical contrivance which presented the world and its inhabitants as an aggregate and finished product" was once held by most people as a fundamental article of religious faith. To exhibit the universe as the result of a vast ascending evolutionary process, the unfolding of a great cosmic drama—rather than a heap of manufactured articles flung into space and time by the act of creation—seems to us so much higher a conception of the Deity that we are amazed that any thoughtful men could have opposed the former view. Such, however, is the tyranny of what Bacon calls 'the idol of the market-place' that it was once as heretical to believe in evolution as it is heretical now to disbelieve in it.

To whatever department of knowledge we turn, we find this law of progressive development, this evolutionary process, at work. Not only do we see it

in organic structure and biology, but in astronomy and physics, in medicine and surgery, in ethics and sociology, in psychology and philosophy; and even in politics, though obscured by party passion and prejudice, we find the evolution of higher ideals slowly emerging. Let us hope that one of the issues of this vast and devastating war may be to make the brotherhood of nations not a pious aspiration but a practical reality. This, however, can come to pass only when the world is freed from the curse of an arrogant and brutal military despotism, which we must take care does not invade our own shores and infect our own nation.

Nor can the domain of theology hope to remain exempt from this universal law of progress. Already we discern on every side a movement of the human spirit towards a new interpretation of the world, a new estimate of, and a new belief in, the highest values. Alas that now, when the destinies of mankind are being determined in a Titanic struggle, there is no united action, no bold and wise leadership on the part of the Christian Church. Now is the time of responsive human hearts who are weary of the shibboleths of sects, the pretensions of priestcraft, the forms and ceremonies of a bygone age. But it is folly to rail at the Church, the evil lies in the indifference or the bigotry of the church-goers. We need tolerance which springs from knowledge, and sympathy which comes from love.¹

To return from this digression. It is obvious that this doctrine of evolution is fatal to the *static* conception of the universe. The universe is dynamic, it is kinetic, ever in movement, a ceaseless *becoming*,

¹ See the suggestive article on 'The Religious Opportunity,' by the Editor, in the last number of THE QUEST.—W. F. B.

an infinite conception in process of growth, not of decay.

Now science has established and holds as eternally true that the world is a cosmos, not a chaos; that amidst the mutability of all things there is no capriciousness, no disorder. Hence the first and greatest problem which philosophy has to solve is whether the cosmos is merely a rhythmic interaction of atoms, an intricate machine, or whether "through the ages one increasing purpose runs." If the latter, then behind all evolutionary processes there must be a great Reality, a supreme Mind. The question therefore is whether nature is, or is not, more interpretable by supposing that mind—which involves thought, reason, will and motive—has had to do with its arrangements. As Sir John Herschel has said: "Will without motive, power without design, thought without reason, would be admirable in explaining a chaos, but would render little aid in accounting for anything else."

This, however, is not the view held by many leading biologists; to them the world is only a vast and soulless machine. Deriving their conceptions from the laws of physics and chemistry, they regard the whole cosmos as animated only by the play of known physical and chemical processes. But to-day physics no longer finds in gross matter, nor in the atom, 'strong in solid singleness,' an adequate explanation of phenomena; it has broken up the hitherto immutable atom, resolving it into electrons and these again into the less material and intangible ether of space. In fine, physics is pushing back the origin of material things from the seen to the unseen. Possibly the next generation may find biologists doing the same thing with regard to the origin of life. Meanwhile biologists

tell us, with Weismann and others, that evolution is based upon a purely mechanical process. The organism, Weismann says, is a 'living machine'; but a machine cannot construct itself, nor repair, nourish, reproduce and improve itself—and these are the attributes of life.

So also many eminent English biologists, impregnated by German habits of thought, have found nothing but mechanics in nature. According to them: "Evolution is the natural history of the cosmos—including organic beings—expressed in physical terms as a *mechanical process*." This is the definition (the italics are mine) given by a high authority, Professor Sully, endorsed by the distinguished naturalist Dr. Chalmers Mitchell, F.R.S., in his article on Evolution in the last edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*. No wonder the late Professor William James said a few years ago: "Souls have gone out of fashion."

Some great thinkers in the past, and an increasing number at the present day, have however dissented from this mechanistic view of nature, and have asserted that biological evolution is not a mere gladiators' show, where through natural selection the fittest survive, but that we are compelled to subordinate chance variations and mechanical conceptions to some vital and controlling principle—to what resembles a soul in nature.

That distinguished zoologist Professor Dendy, F.R.S., in his *Outlines of Evolutionary Biology*, p. 23, remarks:

"Whatever view we may take with regard to vitalism, there can be no doubt that the most distinctive property of living protoplasm is its power of controlling chemical and physical processes so as to make them yield results different from those which

would be obtained if we were dealing with not-living matter."

As illustration of this power Dr. Dendy cites the exquisitely beautiful protective skeletons which the lowest types of animals and plants are able to build up from solids dissolved in the water which surrounds them. Thus:

"Many simple unicellular organisms, such as the Radiolaria amongst animals and the Diatoms amongst plants, have the power of taking up dissolved silica from the water in which they live and using it in building skeletons. These skeletons, however, which are really composed of opal, do not consist either of shapeless masses or of geometrical crystals [as would be the case if silica were deposited without the intervention of living protoplasm], but assume beautiful symmetrical forms, which vary with each particular kind of organism, and which are wholly different from any forms occurring in the inorganic world. . . . It is evident, then, that we must attribute to living protoplasm a very remarkable power of selection or choice, for it is able, as it were, to pick out certain materials from its environment for its own purposes and to reject others."

The same power of choice is seen in the selection of food materials by the amœba, and is characteristic of all living cells, whether in the lowest or highest forms of life. In fact the physico-chemical explanation of life is impossible to reconcile with these known facts.

Finding a purely materialistic view of life to be inadequate, a minority of biologists have adopted the theory of vitalism, supported by the writings of Dr. Driesch, who gave a more scientific aspect to the theory

of vital force, or *entelechy* as he prefers to call it, reviving this old term. The vitalist holds that some obscure principle or force is at work in all living things, a force which controls and regulates the chemico-physical processes in organisms and guides organic development. But the vitalists do not sufficiently recognise the importance of the environment in the regulation of the organism. Moreover science rejects invoking an occult force, a *deus ex machina* which stops further experimental enquiry; hence it classes vital force along with other exploded terms such as hydraulic force, centrifugal and centripetal force, etc.

One of the most able physiologists of the present day, who is a philosopher as well as a physiologist, Dr. J. S. Haldane, F.R.S., in the Silliman Lectures he delivered at Yale University in 1916,¹ whilst dissenting from the theory of an occult vital force, points out in detail the failure of the attempt to state physiological facts in terms of the concepts of matter and motion. Physiology, as Dr. Haldane maintains, deals with *life*, and not with phenomena which the current conceptions of physics and chemistry can interpret. Every detail of organic structure and activity he holds to be the expression of the life of an organism regarded as a persistent and developing whole. Its essence is *organic regulation* and physiology deals with this organic regulation. Life is therefore not to be classed and confounded with matter and energy, which are conceived as entities existing independently of their environment. The parts of a living organism cannot exist separated from their organic environment, any more than they can exist separated from their activities.

¹ Now published in a volume entitled *Organism and Environment as illustrated in the Physiology of Breathing* (Oxford University Press).

Hence life is wholly distinct from what we at present interpret as inorganic phenomena, and its processes, Dr. Haldane concludes, cannot be expressed in terms of physico-chemical conceptions.

Many pronounced Darwinians admit the immense difficulty of reconciling the apparent purposefulness of the living organism, and of variations therein, with any mechanical theory of life. There are certain biological phenomena "that seem to defy," as Prof. Dendy remarks, "all attempts at mechanistic interpretation." Such for example as the power of restitution which an organism possesses. Thus a newt can regenerate its limbs over and over again, after they have been removed; even a lost organ can sometimes be replaced "out of material quite different from that from which the organ in question is normally developed, as in the case of the regeneration of the lens of the eye from the iris in the newt." Whatever mechanical processes are involved in such cases, "it is, I think, equally evident," says Prof. Dendy, "that the organism must possess some power of directing the course of events, so as generally to secure the appropriate result; and it is just this power of directing chemical and physical processes, and thus employing them in its own interests, that distinguishes a living organism from an inanimate object."¹

How life, this principle of organic regulation, came to our earth we can only surmise. The spontaneous generation of life has now few advocates. Lord Kelvin once hazarded the speculation that life had been brought to this earth in a meteorite. But, apart from

¹ Presidential Address to the Zoological Section of the British Association in 1914. Professor Loeb, the champion of the extreme mechanistic view of Nature in America, does not of course admit Dr. Dendy's interpretation of the renewal of the lens in the above case.

the improbability of life existing in the extremes of cold and heat to which a meteorite is subjected, this theory only carries us back to antecedent life in some other world. More probably, I think with the late Mr. A. R. Wallace, O.M., life reached us from the unseen universe. If we assume Bergson's *élan vital*, it is likely that in the more subtle and plastic matter of the unseen luminiferous ether, which pervades all space, this life-impulse found a habitat before it reached this earth. An infinite variety of modes of life may thus for ages have existed and been in process of evolution in the unseen. In course of time the grosser matter of this world became a fitting receptacle for life; and just as communication, in the opinion of many, is now found possible between the unseen world and the seen, so life may have been, and I believe was, transmitted from the invisible to the visible universe, and began to develop under new conditions, and probably into new forms, on the earth.

This, however, is pure hypothesis; what we do find is that some directive and formative force is at work in the ascending development of life here on earth. This is admirably set forth in Mr. T. W. Rolleston's suggestive book *Parallel Paths*. This directive force is not aimless; everywhere are signs of purposive action in evolution. Bergson's theory does not satisfactorily explain this purposive action, for he makes his life-impulse more or less purposeless and erratic.

Speaking with all diffidence, as one who is not a naturalist, I am convinced that, in addition to the accepted material agencies that are at work in evolution, an unprejudiced and critical study of the world of life reveals the operation not only of involuntary nervous reactions to the environment,—in other words psychic

forces *within* the organism—modifying its structure, but also of psychic forces impressed upon the organism from *without*, guiding the process of development, so that higher organs and faculties are gradually unfolded and attained. In a word, that there is really a *soul in nature* as well as in man.

It is certainly significant that distinguished psychologists like Dr. W. McDougall, F.R.S., in his masterly work *Body and Mind*, and other recent writers like Mr. Norman Pearson in his *Soul and its Story*, as well as former great thinkers elsewhere, like Lotze, are once more bringing the soul into fashion. It is useless to assert the impossibility of the interaction of mind and matter, for the fact is daily demonstrated, in our consciousness, in volition and voluntary muscular action—incomprehensible as is this psycho-physical interaction.

If we turn to that larger sub-conscious region of our life, where neither consciousness nor volition play any part, we find this interaction taking place constantly and perfectly, for respiration, digestion, circulation, reparation and secretion are carried on involuntarily and unconsciously, so long as all goes well. In fact when we direct our attention to these functions we do not assist them; on the contrary we tend to arrest and inhibit them.

Our conscious life expresses itself in voluntary muscular actions, our larger unconscious life in involuntary actions. Physiologists term these *reflex actions*, wherein a stimulus transmits its influence to certain nerve-cells and these in turn excite certain muscles or capillaries or glands into action without any effort or consciousness on our part. The effects of emotion are a familiar illustration. "Emotion," as

Dr. Hack Tuke says, "is mainly operative on the organic functions, on the skin, the mucous membrane and the tissues developed from it, in a word on the cell-life of the body, over which we have no voluntary control." We all know the close relation between fear and pallor, grief and the lachrymal glands, food and the salivary glands, maternal solicitude and the mammary glands. Here again any conscious volition may inhibit a reflex action. Darwin gives an amusing illustration of this; he laid a wager that not one of a dozen men would sneeze if they took a pinch of snuff. On trying the experiment it was found that not one of the men could sneeze though, and because, they tried their utmost to do so.

Reflex actions produce therapeutic effects as well as pathological disturbances; and suggestion starts these reflexes. When the conscious life is in abeyance during hypnosis or in trance, suggestion has freer play. Thus a painful burn and its blisters can be artificially produced or cured on a hypnotised subject by suggesting he is burnt or cured.¹ I have witnessed this, and also when the subject was told a red mark would appear on his arm, or a red cross on his chest, these effects were actually produced; the capillaries beneath the epidermis becoming engorged and blood oozing from the skin. Here too we find in suggestion the explanation of the *stigmata*; the intent and adoring gaze of the ecstatic on the crucifix producing on her own body the wounds of the crucified Saviour.

How suggestion operates we know not. It certainly liberates certain vital forces, which may

¹ In *The Lancet* for Nov. 8, 1917, Dr. A. Hadfield gives a striking illustration of this effect of hypnotic suggestion, under the strictest test conditions.

effect wonderful cures or changes in cellular tissue. But 'suggestion' is merely like the pistol which starts a race, it does not run the race.

Enough has now been said to show how suggestion, or the psychic factor, can produce profound changes in the *human* body. Here we meet with a noteworthy fact that must be kept in view. Some persons readily respond to suggestion, others do not. The former Prof. P. Janet calls *les individus suggestibles*. The stimulus of a suggestion may come from their environment, or from other minds, or arise in their own sub-consciousness, and in such persons suggestion may initiate striking physiological changes. Now a similar difference of behaviour is found in the animal kingdom and insect-world; some individuals or species appear to re-act more readily than others to their environment. In some the stimulus of light or colour starts a nervous reaction, a reflex which may result in modification of tissue or a remarkable change of appearance.

The chameleon affords a well-known instance. Pliny was the first to notice how the colour of this lizard changed and adapted itself to surrounding objects. The ordinary colour of the chameleon is a greenish grey, which may be changed to grass green, or to a brown, or dull black, or a mottled surface. These changes are involuntary, adaptive to the immediate surroundings of the lizard, and are apparently produced by the exposure of two or more layers of pigment-cells below the skin. When these cells are shifted nearer to or further from the surface the changes of colour are produced. If the chameleon is blinded no such changes take place. Hence the reflex which sets up the alteration of the position of the pigment-cells is brought

about by a nervous re-action, what we should term suggestion, derived from the colour of its environment.

A similar behaviour occurs in other lizards and in the chameleon shrimp, which is grey on sand and turns brown or green when placed on brown or green seaweed. Here also blinding of the creature prevents its change of colour. Many of the flat fish, certain cuttle-fish and some frogs, have a similar power; their colour changing within a limited range, according to the colour of the surroundings. Doubtless natural selection has preserved the varieties where the colour-changes were most protective and advantageous. Psycho-physical actions, something analogous to suggestion, have thus played an important part in the life-history and evolution of these creatures.

But in the insect-world we find the most wonderful examples of adaptive coloration and protective resemblance. When the form and colour of a creature resembles the leaf, stick, or ground—with light and shade,—on which it rests this similarity is termed protective resemblance. *Mimicry* is a special type of this, occurring between objects both belonging to the same kingdom, sometimes nearly related; but often mimic and model are in widely different classes. Thus edible species of butterflies are protected from insectivorous birds by resembling species which are inedible and which, as a rule, have conspicuous or warning colours. The stingless drone fly resembles the stinging honey bee; certain spiders resemble ants, not only in appearance but also in mode of progression, etc. This is called Batesian mimicry, from the name of the naturalist who gave this explanation.

There are, however, in certain localities groups of butterflies and other insects with identical tints and

patterns, more or less protected by being inedible. The explanation of this anomaly was first suggested by Fritz Müller, and is now generally accepted by naturalists; this is known as Müllerian mimicry.¹

Generally speaking, naturalists explain the problem of protective coloration and mimicry by the doctrine of natural selection. Some slight fortuitous variation in an individual of the species being found advantageous in the struggle for existence, it was inherited and so it gradually spread and was improved upon. But have we any proof that an occasional chance resemblance, say of an insect to a leaf or stick, is inherited, though the susceptibility to stimulus from its environment is doubtless transmitted?

Moreover, any slight variation in appearance, which differentiated, say, an edible insect from its fellows, and yet was very far from making it resemble an inedible one, would not deceive a bird in quest of food, but might indeed render the insect more liable to danger, if it were thus made more conspicuous than its fellows. Some widespread and more complete resemblance is necessary for protective coloration, and this according to the Darwinian theory can take place only by very slow degrees. Before it had been brought about it is possible the variants would all have been destroyed. "Mutations," as Prof. Dendy remarks, "occur in all directions, and the chances of a favourable one arising are remote. Something more is wanted and this something, it appears to me, is the direct response of

¹ This explanation depends on the fact that insectivorous birds do not know by *instinct* what insects are edible or not; by experience they have learnt to avoid the noxious ones possessing warning colours. It is therefore of benefit to other species even though noxious, to have a similar appearance, and thus avoid being mutilated or killed by birds experimenting upon them. A psychical association is thus set up in these birds between a particular pattern and a noxious insect. Prof. Poulton, who has widely extended our knowledge of this subject, defines this kind of mimicry as 'the unification of warning colours.'

the organism to environmental stimuli at all stages of its development.”¹ Natural selection, Prof. Dendy goes on to say, plays its part in mimicry and protective resemblance, but more important as a general factor in organic evolution is ‘functional selection,’ where natural selection is replaced by *intelligent* selection, for “all purposive reactions or adjustments are essentially intelligent.”²

Is it not then a more probable hypothesis to assume that a directive force, a psychic factor in the organism, something corresponding to emotion (and insects are singularly subject to emotion), has acted on the cellular tissue of the creature and instinctively caused a resemblance to its surroundings. Prof. Poulton, F.R.S., as is well known, has devoted many years to an exhaustive study of protective coloration, especially in the subtle relations between the larvæ of butterflies and their surroundings. His investigations confirm the late Professor Meldola’s observations that the colour of the leaf on which the caterpillar feeds is the main agent influencing the colour of certain caterpillars; this colour is sometimes due to the green chlorophyll in the leaf eaten, but in many cases it is not so, but caused directly by the colour of the light. In some way this makes itself felt by the production of pigments in the skin. This susceptibility to stimulus from the colour of its feeding-ground is hereditarily transmitted by the group; individual variations are unimportant. But if so the theory of fortuitous variation must be abandoned in favour of a reflex action, or psychic factor within the organism, in the sensitive species referred to.

The most wonderful of Professor Poulton’s experi-

¹ Dendy, British Association Address, 1914.

² This opinion is in agreement with the views of Prof. H. S. Jennings, the eminent American biologist.

ments are those in which he has shown that certain caterpillars can change their colour more than once in their life-time to suit the colour of their environment. This result is brought about, not like the colour-change in the chameleon by a rapid and transitory exposure of pigment layers already existent, but by a progressive change of colour taking days or weeks, and completely transforming the skin of the caterpillar to the colour of the objects around it. Prof. Poulton has proved that this change is due to the stimulus of light reflected from its surroundings. At first sight this looks like a photographic action; this has indeed been suggested, as will be seen presently.

Some of these experiments I have repeated, and anyone can try them with certain caterpillars which respond to their environment. Leave some of these green caterpillars in a tray of white paper, and they turn white; move them to a brown paper tray, and they will turn brown; place them on green leaves, and they will turn green again. Even black sticks placed among the green leaves will cause a change of colour. Thus Prof. Poulton put 25 larvæ in a glass vessel with green leaves together with half-a-dozen bits of black stick, and as a comparative experiment 25 similar larvæ were placed among green leaves only. In the course of three or four weeks the latter all remained bright green, but of the former only four remained green, the others turning black or some intermediate colour.¹

¹ This experiment certainly reminds one, though the case is not strictly parallel, of the old-world story of Jacob's cunning in getting Laban's cattle striped by showing striped rods to the mothers of the future offspring. The effects produced by prenatal suggestion in the case of human mothers have been disputed, but some well-authenticated cases are known. Now larvæ are equally embryos, which, after feeding voraciously, enter as it were, the womb in the form of the chrysalis or pupa, where their final development proceeds.

Singularly enough the effect of environment is also exhibited in the chrysalids of some butterflies. Thus the chrysalis of the small tortoise-shell butterfly (a *Vanessa*) is normally coloured a dark brown, but when this chrysalis was placed on white paper Prof. Poulton found it became pale; when placed on gold-leaf or gilt paper it often became golden all over, and looked exactly as if it were gilt. I have seen this change; and anything more wonderful can hardly be imagined. The metallic lustre of the gold is perfectly imitated; but when this brilliant metallic colour is analysed, there is of course no gold present, only thin films of liquid beneath the transparent outer layer of the skin, which produce the colour by interference of light. When dry the colour disappears but can be renewed by wetting.

The colour-changes in the chrysalis of certain butterflies had been noticed long ago by other observers. Thus Mr. T. W. Wood found that when the chrysalis of the small cabbage butterfly was put in a box lined with black paper it turned very dark, whilst in a box lined with white paper it turned nearly white. The same changes, he noticed, occurred when the chrysalis happened naturally to be fixed against a white, red or black surface; it turned nearly to the corresponding colour. Subsequently to Mr. Wood's observations Mrs. Barber, in 1874, described the extraordinary changes which she observed at the Cape in the chrysalis of an African butterfly.¹ This chrysalis has the property of acquiring the colour, more or less accurately, of any natural object it may be in contact with. One chrysalis which happened to fix itself at the junction of a red brick wall and some yellowish

¹ *Transactions of the Entomological Society*, 1874, p. 519.

wood, became on the one side red, on the other side yellow.

How have these almost incredible colour-changes come about? They are of course involuntary; and Mr. A. R. Wallace, in his well-known papers on the colours of animals and plants, at first thought they were a kind of natural photography. The particular coloured rays to which the pupa is exposed, acting on the semi-transparent surface of the fresh pupa, might effect a chemical change in the organic juices, so that the same tint is produced on the hardened skin of the chrysalis.

But the colour-changes as we have seen also occur in certain caterpillars. A simple photographic effect produced by coloured light might change the colour of dead tissues, but these colour-changes are essentially associated with life. Prof. Poulton's view is that the changes are caused by the light stimulus acting on the nervous system, a view afterwards, I believe, accepted by A. R. Wallace. But how does this stimulus act? May it not be through a process analogous to the effect of suggestion on a hypnotised person? A reflex action appears to be set up, which in some way modifies the colour of the pigment secreted by the caterpillar or chrysalis, enabling it to assume a protective coloration.

Enough has been said to show how important a part the nervous system, the psychic factor, plays in the appearance of these forms of life. The colour *adaptability* of caterpillars is inherited, but not the particular colour to which it last changed. On the other hand, nearly all the birds, reptiles and insects in the Sahara Desert, which exactly copy the colour of the sandy grey hue of the desert around them, inherit the colour from their ancestors, as here uniformity is an

advantage in concealing them from their foes; also the fishes and crustaceans which live in the Sargasso seaweed of the Atlantic are coloured like the seaweed.

This *procryptic* coloration, as it has been termed, is seen also in many birds and mammals inhabiting snowy regions. The polar bear is permanently white, but the Arctic fox changes from brownish grey on its upper surface in the summer to pure white all over in the winter. The ptarmigan, to which our grouse is nearly allied, has a brown plumage in summer, but this changes to a pure white plumage amid the winter snows of Norway. A visit to the Natural History Museum at S. Kensington enables anyone to see these beautiful examples of colour-adaptation.

Naturalists tell us these changes are due to slight favourable fortuitous variations, which have been inherited and after countless years at last have reached their present state. Is it not more probable that the colour-adaptation was brought about by the psychic factor in evolution, by that nervous stimulus which we call suggestion in human life and which sets up reflexes that in some way, we know not how, produce the change of colour.

It is amusing to note how shy or afraid some naturalists are of introducing into the animal economy any psychical subconscious influence, anything like a directive force in evolution. A century ago Goethe satirically wrote:

“ If some living thing you would know about,
You begin by driving the spirit out;
There lie the parts of it one by one,
But the binding spirit alas is gone! ”

We must now pass to the crucial problem whether

these adaptations produced by the psychic factor in evolution can be inherited. Here it will be necessary to take a brief survey of the theory of natural selection.

The great and enduring addition to our knowledge of biological evolution made by Darwin and Wallace is universally admitted. They showed how the variety of plants and animals was mainly dependent on two factors: the constant slight variation in individual plants and animals, and the natural selection of those variations which tended to favour the life of the species. No two blades of grass, no two individuals of any kind, are exactly alike; and any trifling variation which is useful in the struggle for existence had a 'selection value,' and gave a bias in favour of such individuals, as it rendered them more fitted to their surroundings. Wallace brought into this scheme a factor excluded by Darwin. He believed that behind the natural world lay a spiritual world, and that irruptions from the latter into the former had modified the process of natural selection, especially in the production of the higher mental and spiritual qualities of man, probably leading to our self-consciousness and possibly to the first origin of life on earth to which I have already referred.

Though Darwin and Wallace did not base the theory of natural selection on the transmission to offspring of artificially acquired variations, yet it was generally assumed that characteristics acquired by an individual became hereditary, until Weismann denied this altogether. His experiments certainly showed that the popular view was more or less untenable; and since then the main controversy in biological evolution has raged around the question of heredity. A century before Weismann, Lamarck had to some extent antici-

pated Darwin; he maintained that characters, habits and structure, acquired by an individual from its environment or otherwise, were transmitted to its offspring, that useless functions and organs disappear and the useful ones become hereditary. At the present day the majority of naturalists in England and Germany oppose the Lamarckian hypothesis; in France and America, where a school of Neo-Lamarckians has arisen, many naturalists support Lamarck's theory of evolution.

Congenital natural variations are undoubtedly sometimes transmitted; thus a person born with four fingers on one hand is likely to transmit to some of his offspring a similar defect. But a man who has had a finger cut off does not transmit this mutilation. Circumcision has been practised for generations amongst the Jews, but it is not hereditary. The knowledge a parent acquires is not transmitted to his child—would that it were!—but the habit of acquiring knowledge, the *educability*, is transmitted. In other words, ability to respond to any environment, the adaptability, is transmissible, although the acquired characters may not be.

But now comes the question of *instinct*. Instinctive habits, as Lloyd Morgan has shown—like a duckling swimming, a chick pecking, an alligator breaking from its egg snapping at the finger—are transmitted. But what about a bird building its nest? what about migration and countless other instincts? The anti-Lamarckians say that only the *tendency* is transmitted, and imitation of its parents accounts for the rest.

This however is doubtful, and the wonderful facts of insect-life, the honey bee, the ant, the spider, the

method of capturing prey, etc., all point to the fact that instinct is hereditary. The charming books and observations of the French naturalist Fabre all support the heredity of instinct and appeal to a soul in nature; but, and perhaps because of this, the German and English naturalists belittle this careful and indefatigable observer.

There can, however, be little doubt that decisive variations and habits produced by environment or function send their influence deep down into the system, probably penetrating the reproductive cells, the germ-plasm—which Weismann maintains cannot be affected except by intermingling with other germ-plasms in the act of fertilisation or reproduction and in nutrition.

I am not a naturalist, and therefore I have no right to offer any opinion on this vexed question of heredity. But the marvels of instinct, of the adaptive coloration of birds, beasts, fishes and insects, and other facts, all point to the inadequacy of the explanations now chiefly current among English and German biologists. The profound effect of the subconscious life needs to be taken into account. Whilst we may admit that no acquirements *consciously* attained can be transmitted, there is certainly proof of the transmission of the operations of the subconscious, the subliminal life. This has not hitherto been recognised, I believe, by naturalists.

The vital functions common to all life are of course transmitted; these may have originated in conscious effort and by repetition have become unconscious and automatic and inherited.¹ So too the

¹ As I have said elsewhere consciousness appears to depend on *effort*, which implies resistance to some force, and effort originates in *desire*. The first necessity of life is food, the desire for which created effort to secure

functions of instinct were probably acquired little by little by conscious effort, and have become automatic and hereditary. In like manner the effects of environment and colour-adaptation, springing from some emotional disturbance and operating through the subconscious life of the creature, have become inherited *as well as* the tendency and adaptability. The psychic factor appears to exert an unconscious directive force, in favour of life and of higher types of life, within the organism.

So far we have considered only advantageous changes as arising from some psychic factor *within* the organism. But what can we say of the higher organs of sense? Could the beating of sound-waves on the skin have evolved the exquisite and complicated organ of the ear in man merely through gradual fortuitous variations in lowly primeval forms of life? Could the impact of luminous waves in the course of ages have generated the lenticular eye we possess?

A. R. Wallace tells us that the thought of the eye gave Darwin even to the last 'a cold shiver';¹ and Darwin distinctly and frankly states: "If it could be demonstrated that any complex organ existed which could not possibly have been formed by numerous successive slight modifications, my theory would absolutely break down."² Wallace as well as Darwin however held that the origin of the eye is not unintelligible by the theory of natural selection, granting the sensitiveness to light of some forms of nerve-tissue.

It is well therefore to examine the development of

food. Thus I believe there is a dim diffused consciousness in the very lowest forms of life. Constant repetition of any effort renders the act automatic and unconscious, and so on with the other involuntary functions of life.

¹ *Darwinism*, p. 180.

² *Origin of Species* (6th ed.), p. 146.

the organ of vision in its perfect form, as it is a crucial question.

Sensitiveness to light we know is found in plant-life. On the border-line between vegetable life and the lowest forms of animal life, the protozoon, we find certain parts of the surface of the organism more sensitive to light than the rest. Small drops of red fluid are secreted which respond to light-stimulus. In the jelly fish very rudimentary eyes are arranged at the edge of its so-called umbrella. Then we come to the great group of molluscs, in the lowliest we find the sense of vision localised in a portion of its skin which becomes enfolded. In the eye of the limpet (*Patella*) the course of development has produced a concavity, over the interior part of which is spread a rudimentary retina. But the eye so developed is only sensitive to light and shade; no form can be distinguished. In another, the highest, order of molluscs, the Cephalopods, we find the nautilus, which has the extraordinary and absolutely unique pin-hole eye. The outer skin is closed, all but a minute opening; the cavity is filled with sea-water, and the retina now receives a perfect image of the external world. The eye of the nautilus is in fact a pin-hole camera.

If we bore a pin-hole at one end of a small, light-tight box and put a photographic plate at the other end, an exquisite and perfect photograph will be obtained. The exposure is long, as the light admitted is small. The advantage of a lenticular camera is that exposure can be much more rapid, as the light falling on the area of the lens is combined into a brilliant focus. Evolution, we may agree, by natural selection, has created a perfect organ of vision in the pin-hole eye. What then would be the next stage in development?

Obviously to select those varieties which had a more sensitive retina and therefore better vision; next to close the pin-hole opening by a transparent covering, or cornea, and keep the cavity distended by filling it with a transparent liquid, instead of sea-water with its occasional irritating particles. Such an eye would always have the image on the retina in perfect focus; there would be no need for any power of accommodation.

But no! as if in kindly consideration for the livelihood of a future race of oculists and opticians, the whole optical system changes and reverts, with improvements, to the arrested development of the primitive lenticular eye found in some of the gastropods, a lower order which includes the limpet, murex, etc.¹ In the *same order* as is the nautilus, we find the cuttle fish and octopus (Dibranchiata), where an eye very similar to our own is found—an eye-ball, with crystalline lens, iris and retina all complete. The eye is in fact a startling feature in the cuttle fish and octopus.

Naturalists it is true tell us that, although the eyes of cuttle fish and vertebrate animals appear wonderfully alike, this is only a superficial resemblance; the crystalline lens and retina are wholly different in the two cases. That may be so; but the problem is: how did this great divergence in the organ of vision, in the same natural order, come about? So far as I know, no naturalist has been able to suggest an answer to this question, or why the perfect pin-hole eye of the nautilus should have been found in no other creature. Did the soul in nature try two different methods of clear vision? If so, *intelligent* selection, more than natural selection, has been at work.

¹ The *Cambridge Natural History*; iii. 162ff., gives a full description with woodcuts of the organization and development of the molluscan eye.

When we pass on to fishes and birds and mammals, we find a wonderful lenticular eye essentially like our own. They are living photographic cameras, automatically adjusting the stop, or iris, to suit the amount of light for proper exposure, automatically focussing for near or distant objects, automatically cleansing the lenses, and automatically renewing the sensitive film (the retina) after exposure.

Imagine that a clever savage, who had never seen a lens or a photographic camera, were given a Kodak film and asked to construct a camera and take a photograph. He might eventually have arrived at a pin-hole camera, for when the light shines through any small aperture in a darkened room it creates an image of external things on the wall. But for him to create a lenticular camera would have been impossible.

The lens, to be useful to the species, must be not only highly refractive but transparent and of the right focus. In the eye of the fish, owing to the high refractive power of water, the lens must be more powerful, and the fish has a spherical lens exactly adapted for the purpose. A particular fish, the anableps, living in S. American rivers, has a bifocal eye; the upper part is less refractive, enabling it to see the insects in the air on which it feeds, and the lower part more refractive, enabling it simultaneously to see any enemies in the water. Bifocal spectacles, for near and distant vision, are a recent invention, even the camera obscura and photographic camera are comparatively recent inventions; yet all these optical appliances have existed in nature for ages past. Though Bergson has devoted much space in his *Creative Evolution* to the eye, and described how the vital impulse had many tries at it, one feels that some external directive psychic influence

must have been impressed on the subconscious life of the creature to enable this wonderful optical contrivance to come into existence.

We have no need to assume the mechanical God of Paley, nor any miraculous intervention of the Supreme Mind. In telepathy we find that one mind can impress another unconsciously to the percipient; and thus the subliminal activities can be set at work all unconsciously to ourselves. For, as Tennyson says :

“ Thought leapt out to wed with thought
Ere thought could wed itself with speech.”

If our incarnate minds can by suggestion direct and modify the cell-life of the body, it is not incredible that discarnate minds may effect similar or even profounder processes in the evolution of higher forms of life.

So I would venture to suggest that life in the unseen has come into touch with life in the seen ; that intelligences in the unseen universe have guided and controlled the operations of the subconscious life on earth, enabling it to unfold higher organs, faculties and aims than could have been reached by the operation of natural selection alone.

“ All are but parts of one stupendous whole,
Whose body nature is and God the soul.”

After all, the true significance of nature is not in the material world but in the Mind that underlies, unites, transforms and transcends “ all thinking things, all objects of all thought, And rolls through all things.”

W. F. BARRETT.

THE EARLIEST CONCEPTIONS OF RELIGION IN CHINA.¹

Prof. E. H. PARKER, M.A.

PREVIOUS to the arrival of foreign religions in China, it may be said that the Chinese people had never conceived the objective idea of Religion at all; that is to say, they had no conception of what we call 'revealed religion,'—to wit, a regular system of faith, conscience, sin, absolution, and so on (which, with or without a superstructure of dogma, might be taken on as a whole and again rejected as a whole on his own responsibility by any thinking individual), as a thing apart from compulsory state principles and social customs.

It may facilitate our apprehension of this hereditary frame of mind if we add, as an illustrative comparison, that they had not in very early times any objective idea of Law: state principles considered making war and punishing crime as mere different degrees in the assertion of general authority by the King or Emperor, acting on behalf of Heaven, either directly or through approved vassals and executive officers, with the tacit consent of his, their, and Heaven's people; whilst, as to mere social and customary law, this was the comparatively petty concern of the tribes, clans, and families of the people

¹ Purport of a Lecture orally delivered at the School of Oriental Studies, Oct. 1, 1917.

alone. Previous to the 20th century indeed, that is 20 years ago, the distinction between legislative, judicial, and executive functions was not realised, and names had to be invented; nor was there any civil or contract law, except in so far as it could find a place either within punishment and tort law, or within social and mercantile custom.

To this day 'teaching' or 'doctrine' is the only word available for our word 'religion'; thus Buddhist teaching, Catholic teaching, Protestant teaching, Mussulman teaching, and so on: a further Chinese term 'ancestor or apostle teaching' has been invented for these four, and translated into English as 'institutional religions.' Even the word 'teaching' as applied to Confucianism and Taoism (which are simply different forms or phases of the same set of elusive ancient principles) was only used after Buddhism was officially imported: hence the well-known expression 'Three Teachings,' Taoism, Confucianism, Buddhism, or, as we usually say, 'Three Religions.'

Thus, in seeking for a definition and description of the ancient Chinese religion, whether we mentally take that word in the sense of 'revealed religion,' 'the Law and the Prophets,' or in the sense of practical piety and fidelity to ceremonial obligation, we must first envisage the fact that the whole Chinese ethical system was from the first one and undivided; what we ourselves disintegrate into Religion, Law, Morality, Dogma, Faith, Belief, Worship, and other separate compartments, all being included by them in one undivided state machine, under the impulsion of a single guiding force; and our chief business now will be to ascertain what that force was, when it was first

defined and named, and whether the best Chinese thinkers and expositors have ever agreed upon a single, expressive name for it.

Recent political events in China furnish some small contributions towards clearing our minds upon this important preliminary point of definition. Some 10 or 12 years ago the recent Chinese Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Wu T'ing-fang—a Lincoln's Inn barrister—was ordered by the Peking Government to prepare and codify a new system of Law more in harmony with modern progress: the chief motive lying at the bottom of this desired reform was not so much academic zeal for justice and purity in public life as a passionate anxiety to get rid of what is called extra-territorial jurisdiction, which, in a greater degree even than the 'capitulations' in vogue in Mussulman countries, takes Europeans, Americans and (since 1895) Japanese entirely out of the venue of Chinese Courts. The indignity under which China felt she lay, as the most extensive though not an influential Power, was heightened by the fact that Japan had (since 1894) got rid of extra-territoriality herself, and would no longer allow Chinese in Japan to be dealt with by Chinese Consular Courts. This feeling of indignity did not exist when the first foreign treaties were made, for China had always recognised Home Rule in her vassal states, and had ignored her own colonists' judicial rights in all non-Chinese states; on the other hand, she contemptuously left barbarians in her own dominions outside the 'privileges' of her own law.

Accordingly Wu T'ing-fang, assisted by a specialist in native law, proceeded to draw up a voluminous code, modifying Chinese law in accordance with Western

ideas of right and justice. Although it was not so stated, there is reason to believe that Wu T'ing-fang's code was based on the new Japanese reformed law scheme under which the Japanese themselves had at last succeeded in getting rid of the hated extra-territorial jurisdiction in Japan. At first it seemed as though Wu T'ing-fang's code would be accepted; but several high provincial authorities (to whom as a high consultant body the central government had severally referred the code for a report) opposed it so bitterly that it had not been formally adopted when the Manchu dynasty fell in 1912. The ground for its rejection or postponement, apart from certain defects in literary style, was that, however modern progress might render reforms desirable, a fatal defect running throughout the whole scheme lay in the fact that the sanction or spiritual motive was not the outcome of ancient *li*, upon which from immemorial antiquity Chinese civilisation was founded, but was the outcome of foreign 'teaching'—that is to say 'ethics' or 'religions'—which in many respects ran contrary to Chinese ideas of propriety. Specially offensive, said certain viceroys, were the exaggerated rights and freedoms conferred, at the cost of the male head of the family, upon children and women; the absence of family responsibility for individual members, especially in political offences; the unbridled liberty of the Press; the first offender acts; the levelling of punishments without distinction of parent and child, husband and wife, master and slave or servant; and so on with many other innovations.

In other words, the learned viceroys, in expounding their theory and placing the ultimate dependence of all Chinese political and social ethics upon *li*—or

‘ceremony’ as we foreigners have hitherto translated it—seem to me to make it perfectly clear that we must seek in this word *li* a true translation of our word ‘religion’ in nearly all of its possible senses. But it is not in China alone that a difficulty of definition confronts us; *The Century Dictionary*, for instance, volunteers the observation that most words connected with religion have a tendency to wander away from their original root-meaning. If this be so, then most of all is it apparently the case with the Latin word *religio* itself, the root-meaning of which has been a subject of controversy ever since the time of Varro and Cicero 2,000 years ago. Monseigneur Casartelli, the erudite Bishop of Salford, calls my attention to Littré’s modern view, which is that it comes from the same source as, and in its old adjective form *religens* is precisely the opposite of, our word ‘negligent’: this would seem to accord with Varro’s view that it was an understanding with the gods for value received. Cæsar, who died one year before Cicero, and sixteen years before the aged Varro, in discussing in his Commentaries the British and Gallic Druids, thrice uses the word on one page: he says (1) “in undertaking *religions*, their first care is to interpret the will of the gods”; (2) “their chief function is to interpret *religions*”; and (3) (of certain tribal folk) “they were given up (or addicted) to *religions*.” Here it is plain that, after several centuries of literary development, and at least 50 years before the birth of Christ, the leading Romans took no conservative or exclusive view of their own word *religio*, but applied it indiscriminately to foreign superstitions, oracles and omens, as well as to their own individual and personal feeling of duty to the gods, propriety, and humane scruples

maintained in expectation of those gods' favour and protection.

I believe I am correct in saying that the English word 'religion' does not once occur in King James' version of the Old Testament; if the Greek word for 'culture' or 'religion' appears in the Septuagint Apocrypha once or twice, it does not, I am told, represent any Hebrew word. It is found in the New Testament not more than four or five times: here again both Greek and English words occur in the two or three widely different meanings (1) of a system of worship or ceremonies, (2) of teaching, and (3) of right feeling. The Slav and Teutonic groups of languages have, like ourselves, borrowed the Latin word, evidently feeling that their respective native words, 'faith, God-service,' and 'piety, God-fear,' were inadequate. The Russians, however, seem usually to speak of the Mahometan *law* rather than the Mahometan *religion*, or faith, and Mgr. Casartelli informs me that the unmistakably objective Persian word, like the Hebrew word, is often rendered *law*, the Arabs having adopted the Persian word. Professor Maurice Canney gives 'service,' 'ministry,' and 'doctrine' as the English meanings of the various Syriac words used.

The object of the above remarks is to bring ourselves round to a clearer appreciation of that extremely elusive subject the ancient Chinese religion, and its gradual development from vague and primitive to definite and academical ideas. Within the past generation there have been dug up in the earliest cultured parts of Old China, which latter term practically means the lower middle course of the Yellow River, a large number of mysterious inscriptions on bone and tortoise-shell. A number of these are

decipherable, and there is every reason to believe that the as yet undeciphered pictographs, characters, or hieroglyphs, each and every one, might be fitted to a modern character in common use, if only we could obtain graduated variants or later specimens, whether on bronze, brick or stone, shewing us how a few more of the written forms have changed in technique by degrees throughout the ages. An American missionary, Mr. F. H. Chalfant, had with infinite labour made a collection of 3,000 or more, in addition to the few hundred now available for examination in England; but unfortunately he died a few years ago before he was able to classify them for publication more fully than the Carnegie Museum had already done for him in 1906. His widow informs me that they are now in the temporary possession of Dr. Berthold Laufer, of the Field Museum, Chicago, and I believe I am correct in saying that, had not this unfortunate Armageddon or World-War broken out, that indefatigable gentleman intended to bring them to London for joint examination. However, so far as specialists have already got, it seems quite certain that these archaic inscriptions are the very oldest intelligible writings yet discovered in China, and relate chiefly, if not entirely, to oracles, omens, genealogies, astrology, prayers for happiness, hunting and war-like expeditions, and sacrifices. The Chinese gentleman whose name is chiefly associated with the discovery and interpretation of these inscriptions has already published several books on the subject, and he is at present in Japan, coöperating with the Japanese antiquarians, who have for long been the acutest critics in Chinese religion and philosophy, and whose published books had already given us every possible variety of Chinese script

anterior to these bone discoveries of 1899. It is fairly clear that these religious evidences on bone and shell belong to the dynasty which, after reigning 650 years, perished in 1122 B.C.; indeed they confirm Confucian history on the point of the successive Kings' names. There seem to be no authentic specimens of Chinese writing in existence of a date earlier than this dynasty, and (apart from these primitive bone inscriptions) few, if any other, connected and intelligible pieces of writing belonging to that dynasty itself. The more highly-cultured dynasty succeeding it in 1122 B.C. certainly introduced the quasi-religious civilisation that has existed with modifications down to our own times; but, as there are no definite dates in Chinese history anterior to 842 B.C., we are ignorant of how, as a vassal state, it had thus developed superiority, and we can say little more beyond that, having emerged from a vassal to an imperial status, it established a fresh sort of feudal or vassal system of states, nearly all the rulers of which were connected, either by blood or by political sympathy, with the new royal or imperial family. We also see clearly that these feudatories, as well as their imperial chief, had a hard task in keeping the raiding Tartar horsemen of the northern wooded ranges and the vast deserts beyond out of the loose clay plains of the Yellow River valley; but that they were more successful in the easier task of annexing and bringing up to their own standard of culture the kindred but unlettered tribes of the south and east; and that this was the position of affairs when true recorded history begins, *i.e.* only 2,700 years ago. The imperial house was the main centre of the *li* or state religion it had superimposed, three centuries earlier, in more definite and extended form, upon the old system

as imperfectly disclosed to us by tradition, by living practice and by the bone and shell inscriptions: all the feudal or vassal states naturally took their religious cue from this centre, subject no doubt to local or semi-barbarous modifications. With the arrival of definite dates—coincident with court revolution, abdication and struggles against Tartar intrigue—took place another great innovation, to wit, the elaboration of a much more highly developed system of writing, and an improvement in materials used for writing: trade and inter-state relations were more organised; the vassal states grew more self-assertive in the ratio that the imperial power dwindled; and, connected thought found expression in articulate writing, in place of the isolated, jerky, memoranda of mere name and day events such as the soothsayers apparently jotted down on bone or tortoise-shell for the benefit of rulers or great families in the remoter past.

In the seventh century before Christ, an able travelling merchant of noble antecedents settled down as prime minister to the prince of one of the wealthier, more cultured and better organised vassal states, and conceived the ambitious idea of making a sort of 'imperious Cæsar' of his princely master by way of forcing the neighbouring feudatories to pay more respect to the royal or imperial court. In this he was successful, and the maxims he inculcated upon his prince have come down to us in the shape of a lengthy treatise called *The Philosopher Kwan*. This remarkable work is little studied in China, probably in Manchu times owing to the fact that it lays too much stress upon the junction of military power with intensive agriculture in the state, and upon the duty of the princely personages to persist in this *cultura*—to

use Cicero's expression—and at the same time to stand or fall by the interests of their people; in fact, it seems silently but practically tabooed in the Great Concordance of Literature published by the Manchu dynasty, which makes a point of giving all possible reference to the acceptedly orthodox Confucian and Taoist writings, so that no wise seed can fall into oblivion or amongst tares. *The Philosopher Kwan* is much more appreciated in Japan than in China, and appears to me to have quite possibly had considerable influence in creating the civilisation of Japan as we first knew it fifty years ago, when for some centuries the 'imperious Cæsar' *Shōgūns* had compelled the *daimyōs*, or vassal kings, to do homage to the shepherded Mikados, or ceremonial Emperors, through the *Shōgūns* themselves as military rulers. Moreover this book of the Philosopher Kwan possesses in its military statecraft many of the leading features of the German *Kultur* in its best and unmilitary sense, *i.e.* as humanised by the *Sittlichkeit* of Lord Haldane's pleading. But the chief immediate point is this, so far as our present subject of religion is concerned: it develops and fills out what may be called the crude 'natural religion' skeleton in such a thorough-going way, and with such abundance of reiterated paraphrased definition, that it points to an interesting if not an inevitable conclusion. This conclusion is that both Confucius and his senior contemporary the so-called Taoist apostle Lao-tsz derived their reasoned philosophy, consciously or unconsciously, directly or indirectly, almost entirely from this earliest articulate source. As is well known, both K'ung-tsz or Confucius and Laocius or Lao-tsz themselves protested that they were mere transmitters, and not originators of the doctrines they summarised;

but no one has yet suggested definitely *what* they transmitted.

The word *tao* means 'the way,' that is, the natural course of things, day and night, life and death, sun and moon, growth and decay, people and chosen prince, husband and wife, and so on *ad infinitum*; hence it means 'the right way,' 'justice,' 'reason,' 'correct judgment,' 'right feeling,' 'maintenance of order,' and other things innumerable, according to each thinker's evolution of the main thought. It seems to be the very oldest Chinese word that in any way covers the whole ground of the Roman words *religio*, *cultus*, *cultura*, the Greek word *θρησκεία*, and the various Syriac, Hebrew, Persian, and Arabic words as given to me by Professor Herbert Strong and the other specialists above named; it also covers the all-important Chinese word *li*: in fact, the Philosopher Kwan himself says: "Law is born of *li*, *li* is born of order, and *tao* is in fact order and *li*." *The Book of Changes*, admittedly the oldest expression of Chinese cosmical and metaphysical ideas, speaks of *T'ien-tao* or the Way of Heaven, and *Shên-tao* or the Way of the Spirit (the Japanese *Shintō*), in illustration of the natural fitness of the Universe. The Philosopher Kwan during the 7th century before Christ thoroughly developed and threshed out this *tao* course of nature in a practical way, so as to create an applied science and specifically to elaborate a *Kultur* capable of regenerating the evil days upon which China was falling. He was successful in a way; but after his death the princely ruler who had given a free hand to, and from first to last for 40 years had completely trusted this Chinese Bismarck, was succeeded by intriguing incompetents, whilst other rival vassals who in turn tried to imitate the

same Lord High Protector plan, failed to achieve adequate results. It was under these disappointing circumstances that Laocius, a bookish archivist at the Imperial Court, having evidently carefully studied the Philosopher Kwan's theories, specialised in the direction of the more spiritual *tao*, whilst Confucius, a bookish pedagogue at the vassal but highly literary court just north of and immediately adjoining the Philosopher Kwan's principality, specialised in the direction of the more formal *li*. This all took place a century and a half after the death of the earlier philosopher from whom they had both borrowed, and the object of the two later philosophers was much the same as the object of the first—to save the general situation, put a stop to *Junkerism* and bloodshed, and restore law and order after the manner of what they both supposed to be the good old times of patriarchal and idyllic life. But a sketch of these three philosophers' work in literary days must be postponed for another paper; on this occasion a few final remarks may be added upon the ancient Chinese religion before literary men and philosophers, as above outlined, began to operate at all.

Mr. Herbert Spencer has left us vivid pictures of natural religion as found to exist or to have existed everywhere; forty years ago in China I myself received from him a form to fill up, more specifically about the expression of the emotions; and at this moment one of my retired colleagues, Mr. E. C. T. Werner, who has published a huge volume in co-operation with the late philosopher's scheme of general sociological enquiry, is hard at work in Peking revising the volume. The learned Jesuit Père Henri Doré has already reached his 12th volume of *Researches upon Chinese Supersti-*

tions, and has kindly sent me copies of all twelve. As the Speaker recently said (after stating in reply to a question that there was nothing in an alleged report) to a second honourable member who began with the words, "arising out of the last question"—"Out of nothing, nothing can arise." We might truthfully say the same about the 'religious' ideas of primitive men. They saw death, noticed the transmission of features, heard mysterious noises, experienced the discomforts of wind, rain, flood, blight, indigestion, nightmare and so on; and, having plenty of unoccupied time on their hands, did what Varro says the primitive Romans did—they saw a supernatural power in everything, and tried to make terms with wind, water, drought, barrenness, and general evil; for they imagined 'the soul,' *i.e.* 'dead life,' could be conciliated by offerings or sacrifice; and the Chinese at least tried to call back and propitiate the supposed spirits of the departed, so as to obviate revenges and wrath; omens and oracles being ancillary, as interpreters, to the same general objects. We can fill in all the further details by our own imagination, just as von Humboldt filled in or discovered Christian doctrine and innumerable other European and Asiatic evidences in certain of the Mexican hieroglyphics and pictures—themselves of doubtful origin. Father Doré proves to us that the crudest form of 'natural religion' exists to this day, tinged occasionally, of course, with such fragments of Taoism, Confucianism, and even Christianity as are easily 'understood of the people.' A Portuguese priest himself shewed me an image of the Holy Virgin in his Church at Singapore, which image was the object of an annual pagan 'wake,' once a year, in recognition of some past services to the local Chinese.

Ten years ago the mother of Confucius the 76th received from the Empress a statue of Buddha; and thirty years ago the Taoist Pope gave me an amulet which, at the earnest request of my servants, I kept hung upon my front door for the common protection. As to dealing with the spirits of the dead, we cannot wonder at primitive man, when, in our own time, we observe that distinguished journalists and scientists entertain certain convictions. As to omens, my own cook (a good Catholic) uttered a shriek the other day when peeping through the greenhouse at a funeral next door: a bee had suddenly flown in front of her, and she was nervously anxious to consult a soothsayer as to the meaning of such an awful omen.

However, instead of attempting to establish concrete things out of imaginary things, let us endeavour to clarify the subject by stating what the Chinese had *not*. They never seem to have had scruples about food; no idea of 'sin' except in the sense of infringing their own *tao* and *li*; still less any notion of repentance in the sense of penance; no notion of confession, absolution, or priestly authority. Certain scribes seem to have managed the omens and oracles, and later on there was a special state department for such; but there never was a priestly caste. The King or Emperor alone could approach Heaven; the vassal princes approached the 'gods of the land,' and individuals the gods or spirits of the village, clan, or family. Sacrificing animals by way of propitiation was universal, but the sacrifice of human beings was extremely rare, if it ever existed as a *recognised* ceremony at all; hence the pivot virtue of *hiao*, or filial piety, was the accepted basic motive of both *tao* and *li*, covering both family and state duty. The idea of a punitive Hell was

totally absent, as indeed that of Heaven as a reward for the good; the future life, if envisaged at all, was simply a repetition of this. There was no moral fear of death, the only dread being lest the ghosts of deceased persons should hover about and work evil. Nothing was farther from the Chinese conception than a Jealous God and praise of the same. The idea of meek piety only existed in the shape of fidelity to *tao* and *li*; and throughout the whole of tradition and history there has been no Pharisaism, no anxiety about one's soul, no notion of 'salvation,' not to speak of any priestly power to assist thereto. There were no churches, temples, or places of worship except the spirit-shrines of ancestors. When, before family dynasties were established, the Emperor abdicated and nominated his successor, that successor 'took over charge' in the spirit-temple of the abdicating monarch. It will be remembered that when the last Manchus abdicated in 1912 they first offered by way of compromise to inform the spirits of their ancestors of the concessions they were prepared to make.

At no period of Chinese history previous to the Christian era did any body of men set up a religious or moral doctrine in opposition to state policy. True, astrologers, professors of harmony or music, and soothsayers were always at hand at courts and with armies; but, even in pre-Confucian times, statesmen of reputation were inclined to ridicule them and pooh-pooh their prognostications; and in any case there was no attempt at dogma—apart from interpretations of recognised books—no setting up of privilege or cliquism or sectarianism, no attempt to break continuity with antiquity. Chinese religion, such as it was—that is, what men were *religens* or 'diligent'

about—was not an objective ideal viewed as a matter for acceptance or rejection at will, but a subjective feeling of what was naturally due to one's ancestors, one's self, one's successors, to the family, the tribe, the separate state, and the whole nation or empire: it was the *tao* or right way, for holding on to which *li*, or external formalities, grew up and were prescribed, *hiao* or duty being the articulate motive spring; but all these three expressions were conceived in historical times, and were only susceptible of even vague definition after the very first improvement in the art of writing—say at the earliest 1500 B.C.

E. H. PARKER.

VLADIMIR SOLOVYOF.

STEPHEN GRAHAM.

SOLOVYOF did a very valuable service to the Church of Russia by breaking up its superficial formalism, orientating its traditions and genius with regard to Christian culture, thereby making it the church of the cultured as well as of the peasant-pilgrim and the monks and priests. He gave to contemporary Russian philosophy its present religious and national basis, which distinguishes it from Western philosophy generally, and he made it possible for Russian thinkers to work for the elucidation of their own religious ideas rather than to dedicate themselves to Westernism pure and simple. Without Solovyof it is no exaggeration to say that Orthodoxy might have remained merely a peasants' church with beautiful traditions which were being forgotten, and a profound significance being forgotten also. The Russian Church still remains comparatively unknown, unstudied and unsystematised. It is associated with the illiterate peasant who hands the ideas and the customs on, embellished by his own religious experience and the marks of his soul's progress. It stands therefore a chance of being condemned, cleaned out and reformed on puritan lines. There are many who desire the material spoliation and reduction of the Church. The material wealth amounting to some millions in gold and jewels tempts, as do also the revenues of the Church, poor though the latter are—it does not possess the vital proportion of

land as did the Church in England at the time of the Reformation. But it is just to say that reformers are less interested in taking wealth than in forcing their ideas upon people living as they think in horrid darkness. They dislike the old Russian ideas and traditions and are taken up almost entirely with admiration of France, Germany, England or America. The recent Revolution is great gain for the Evangelical sects and the Secularists and for the many old-fashioned atheists and materialists which literate Russia possesses. The new *régime* may attempt to crush and beat out Orthodoxy. But the probability is that it will fail, thanks to the work of Vladimir Solovyof. Not that the peasant knows Solovyof. The peasant is not master of himself. The will of others is imposed on him from above, and now not from the Emperor who loved him and relied on him, but from a Western set who distrust him as a traditional enemy.¹ But the influence of Solovyof and what he did will be undoubtedly felt in the new Democracy, and the true values of the Church are less likely to be obscured because of what he has said and thought.

As a Russian writer says: "He passed like an ice-breaker through our religious formalism, because in him burned an enthusiasm for true religious themes, for the actual substance of religion, and not merely for opinions about religion."

The Russians accepted Christianity at the hands of the Greeks in the tenth century, and although that was before the division of the Church into East and West, Russia never was much influenced by the West. She remained in the spirit of Byzantium. The ideas

¹ N.B.—The new Russian state of set purpose omits the name of God from all the proclamations it makes on behalf of the Russian people.

of meditation, of suffering and of the beauty and majesty of death seem to have suited the Slav temperament. Passivity, not activity, is the distinguishing mark of the Church, and since the tenth century it has steadily conserved whatever has come to it from the Russian soul. It has not cast out much, has eliminated little. The Slav temperament as is well known loves complexity; it does not love simplicity. That is another way of saying it is not addicted to reducing and simplifying, and is addicted to multiplying and rendering more complex. The sense for complexity, and by that I mean real organic complexity, is a valuable Russian possession, possibly finding more satisfaction in expressing our nature and destiny than the more ordinary and obvious sense which most of us possess, namely that for simplicity. And the Russian Church is a naturally complex institution preserving a far-reaching and marvellous inheritance of this kind for a race that will continue to seek spiritual ends.

It is, however, not for us so much as for Russian scholars to survey the development of national and religious expression in Russia between the tenth and nineteenth centuries. It is in the nineteenth century that Europe becomes spiritually aware of Russia, in the twentieth that she becomes definitely interested. And for Europe two voices mean Russia—those of Dostoievsky and Tolstoy. Let us add a third. For inevitably there arises Solovyof, the greatest of the three. Dostoievsky and Tolstoy were artists, but their significance does not remain in the domain of art. It is their voice in religion that causes them to be so important. These two seem to contradict one another, but they are harmonised and united in the creative thought of the great master and leader Solovyof.

Dostoievsky comes first with his prophetic ardour, amounting at times to delirium. He is, as it were, a lay priest, a priest after the order of Melchizedek; he comes from the people and preaches the gospel of the living Christ, the resurrected Christ, who is walking the Russian roads, the Christ whom the Russian people knows at sight and shelters. He prophetically announces Russia as the God-bearing nation, the special vessel prepared for the growth and birth of the new Christ-child.

At the same time Dostoievsky remains distinctly loyal to the Orthodox Church; he is even at times what might be called *churchy*, *tserkovny* as the Russians say. He denies nought in the great accumulated spiritual inheritance of the Church. And the Byzantine inheritance of the worship of God through the spectacle of Death he transfers to the written page as a truly human conception and shows us his portrait of Christ as Mishkin the idiot.

Tolstoy on the other hand opposes all the circumstance of outward signs, the Church visible, culture and the world, in the name of the kingdom of heaven which is within. He will have nothing of the Orthodox Church as such, preferring

“Before all temples the upright heart and pure”—does not care for society as a collective whole, but cares for the individual human soul in which is all things.

How divergent these prophets of Russia in their tendency! It would seem to foreigners like ourselves as if in Russia there must be Tolstoyans and Dostoievskians, two camps definitely opposed to one another. And yet it is not so. Perhaps because one cannot very well stand without the other—Tolstoy appearing as an anarchist if taken by himself,

Dostoievsky as a reactionary. But there comes Solovyof, and unites them on one side in the culture of Russia, taking the genius for the inner life from Tolstoy and the genius for the outer from Dostoievsky, and combining them in the idea of humanity itself as one great Church, breaking through the formalism of the church or churches as they are externally organised, and finding the integral section or part of the mystical substance of the universal Church.

Solovyof gave shape to the struggle of Russia to become articulate, shape to its tendency, something to work for, for all mankind who understood to work for—the consciousness of the unity of mankind, not so much the unity of the bodies of men, though that also, but of the ardent glorifying spirit of humanity.

As the work of Solovyof is not known here and extremely little of his writing is available except in the original Russian, it will be better for the sake of brevity and clarity to tabulate in an elementary form the ideas to which specially he consecrated his life and his energies. They were:

1. The Universal Church, the idea of the unity of Christendom, and beyond that ultimately the conscious unity of mankind; not a world-republic, however, but a World-Church.

2. The evolution of the God-man; not the superman with his greater earth-sense and fierceness, but the God-man with his greater heaven-sense, mystical sense.

3. The Eternal Feminine, a characterisation of all humanity at one in the mystical body of the Church; Woman as the final expression of the material world in its inward passivity.

4. Love as the highest revelation, the gleam of

another world upon our ordinary existence; Love therefore as the proof of immortality, the guerdon and sense of it.

5. Sancta Sophia, the Heavenly Wisdom; the grand final unity of praise, the wall of the city of God.

Thus stated briefly it may perhaps be more easy to obtain the first rudimentary conceptions of what this great new prophet and teacher's vision was. It will then be more easy to fill in the details and to judge for ourselves whither he leads and in what relation to his great and new conception of the future our own conceptions lie. It is the time of re-thinking, of destroying and building afresh. All the old is being cast into the crucible to-day. Certain great figures already begin to stand out in the eyes of humanity, and one of these is Vladimir Solovyof.

Undoubtedly in connection with the realisation of the World-Church must appear the higher type of man, the God-man—not the superman who is merely the king of men on the animal plane, but Man the Christ-child.

In this conception the Russian Church in its spirit and expression has certainly helped Solovyof. It has been easier for him to arrive at the conception of the God-man than it would have been for a Protestant or Catholic. We should have been bound to consider the pride of the body at its best, and have deduced future humanity from that. But the Russian is otherwise circumstanced by virtue of his Church. Within the domain of his Christianity there is a marked antipathy toward the animal side of man's nature. Strongly as is that side developed in the ordinary Russian, it is nevertheless true that nowhere as in Russia have such heroic attempts been made to

overcome the natural and normal man in favour of the Divine, the superhuman, the unearthly and mystical. Witness the popular ascetic life, the life of the hermits and champions (*podvizhniki*) of the Skoptsi and Khlisti and other anti-natural sects which practise even mutilation in order to *overcome*. It is supremely the land where it is felt to be true that "blessed is he who overcometh." The Orthodox Church especially, with its back turned against ordinary life and its eyes looking beyond the grave, stands in a strangely advanced position, and is the greatest expression of collective faith that humanity has known. Solovyof sees it as a sort of outpost on the great road where all nations are pilgrims, where all nations are on the way to the place where they will be at one.

A certain amount of patience on the part of the student and also of humility is required. It is so easy to be led astray from the true scent, and to waste life and energy attacking and condemning superficial things, not ever reaching the profound and real things. So it is with the attitude of most Western minds towards Russian religious expression.

Solovyof, born and bred in Russian Orthodoxy, never falls into the position of Tolstoy who rejected the whole fabric because of certain external faults. But he rests on the positive side, on the empyreal substance and heavenly gold of the Church, as on the other hand he rests on all that is sound in Darwinism and the theory of Evolution. He is at once a mystic and a progressive, lives upon the planes of heaven and of earth at one and the same time. It is in this way that he arrives at the type of the God-man. He states in his great work, *The Justification of the Good*:

"The imperative 'Be ye perfect' does not refer to

separate acts of will, but puts before us all a life-long task. . . . [And to be perfect is to have become, not superman, but divine man]. . . . The historical process is a long and difficult transition from the bestial to the divine man."

"The process of manifesting God in matter has five stages called kingdoms: the mineral, the vegetable, the animal, the human, and then God's kingdom—that is the ascending process of universal perfection."

Our old materialism of all things classified as belonging to the mineral kingdom, the vegetable kingdom and the animal kingdom gives way to something more subtle in the addition of the human kingdom and the kingdom of heaven.

The ascending process is marked in this way:

"Stones and metals are distinguished by their extreme self-sufficiency and conservatism. Had it rested with them Nature would never have awakened from her dreamless slumber. But on the other hand without the stones and the metals there would have been no firm basis or ground for further growth.

"Then plants in unconscious unbroken dreams draw *towards* warmth, light and moisture. [The second stage.]

"Animals by means of *sensations* and free *movements* seek the fulness of sensual being:—repletion, sexual satisfaction, the joy of existence. [The third stage.]

"Natural humanity in addition to these things rationally strives to *improve* its life by means of sciences, arts and social institutions, actually improves it in various ways, and finally rises to the idea of absolute perfection. Spiritual humanity, or humanity born of God (*Bogo-chelovetchestvo*), not only understands this absolute perfection with the intellect but accepts it in

its heart and its conduct as *the true beginning of that which must be fulfilled in all things*. It seeks to realise it to the end and to embody it in the life of the universe."

As St. John says in Browning's poem of 'The Death in the Desert,' the first soul

"has the use of earth, and ends the man
Downward: but tending upward for advice
Grows into and again is grown into
By the next soul, which seated in the brain
Useth the first with its collective use,
And feeleth, thinketh, willeth,—is what knows:
Which, duly tending upward in its turn,
Grows into and again is grown into
By the last soul, that uses both the first,
Subsisting whether they assist or no,
And, constituting man's self, is what Is—
And leans upon the former, makes it play,
As that played off the first: and, tending up,
Holds, is upheld by, God, and ends the man
Upward."

Not that Browning meant the same thing by divine humanity and the God-man that Solovyof does. His sense was for the individual pilgrim and seeker, not for collective humanity, religious pan-humanism as some of Solovyof's followers style it.

Solovyof finds in Christ the great premonitory type in human evolution. "He is not," he says, "the last word in the actual human kingdom, but He is the first word of the kingdom of God."

In Solovyof's philosophy no attempt is made to find a higher form than this which is capable of an infinite development. In man a universal consciousness progresses. In actuality he seems a part of Nature, but in his spiritual conceptions he oversteps

the bounds of the merely human, and discloses himself as a centre of universal consciousness in religion, science, morality and art. Though man in his form is mortal and partial, having no absolute grasp of anything, he is yet capable of reflecting ultimate truth in his being.

There is a definitely graduated progress of vision from the minerals which sleep, through vegetables which dream, and animals which have joy in life, and human man who thinks and reasons, to God-man who divines. What is it the God-man divines? What is the substance of the higher vision? Solovyof's answer set out simply is this: He sees the unity of this divine in us all; he sees the unity of this divine in us with the divine without; he sees ahead of us in time or in eternity the increasing sense of that unity, its realisation in individuals and in the Church on earth, the ceasing of the multiplication of the species, the reconciliation of the duality of male and female in one type. And he sees this unity as the Church, Sophia, the Heavenly Jerusalem, where every man and woman who has ever lived or will live is inbuilt like a brick in the wall of the cathedral.

The condition of the divine humanity of this vision differs considerably from those of humanity as we generally see it in ideal. Solovyof lays great stress on the denial of the animal side of our nature. If every philosophy expounded by men may be said to be in the nature of an *apologia pro vita sua*, and there is no stigma attaching to that definition, Solovyof may well be said to lay considerable personal stress on his particular interpretation of the overcoming of the animal in us. He was himself in his life a virginal type. He is said to have had a deathless love for a

woman who however returned not the affection and married some one else. What modification there would have been in Solovyof's statement of his philosophy if he had married, it would be perhaps unfair to surmise. The great pattern of his vision would remain, and quite possibly the psychology which he wrote of love would be in material effect the same. But doubtless he would have written more fully and more gently, and possibly more convincingly concerning the gleam of attraction between men and women.

Thus he insists: "The carnal means of the reproduction of the species is for man evil, it is contrary to the dignity of man, destructive of human love and life. Our moral relation to this fact must be wholly negative. . . . It is man's final acceptance of the kingdom of death which is maintained and perpetuated by carnal reproduction, and it deserves absolute condemnation."

The obvious objection to this is the rather threadbare question which even the Bishop of London has been discussing lately: "What then is going to happen to the human race?" Solovyof's answer is in effect: "The human race will look after itself." He puts it in this way: "The idea that the preaching of sexual abstinence is likely to stop the propagation of the human race is absurd. . . . But should the moment come, then the historical process would be at an end and we should be beginning 'the life to come.'"

This comes somewhat startlingly in the midst of a halcyon philosophy which does not seem to trouble us in the practical domain of life. In this impatient era when literary thought becomes almost a game of forfeits, and when a man gives us an opportunity to condemn him he is forced to become silent, we might

dismiss Solovyof here at once as anti-natural and ridiculous. But it is always worth while forgoing to condemn and pursuing investigation further.

Although Solovyof denies the flesh in this formidable way, he does not deny love as between man and woman; on the contrary he finds in that love almost the most marvellous experience in our existence. But he claims and, in his remarkable essay on the 'Meaning of Love,' offers proof that the love of a man for a woman and of a woman for a man does not merely serve a racial end. This love, he observes, is most associated with the animals who reproduce least. The fish, spawning millions, do not exhibit any particular mutual affection. But among the birds already something of the nature of love has appeared. In the mammals there is still further progress. But with man, who multiplies least, love is most intense and significant. A strong attraction between the sexes does not therefore imply a great resultant reproduction.

Nor will Solovyof allow the popular theory that the intensity or speciality of the love of a certain man and a certain woman makes for the birth of genius. Great men are not necessarily born from parents who have loved greatly. "We find no relation between the strength of the passion of love and the significance of progeny coming after. On first consideration we meet a fact completely inexplicable in the light of this theory—that the strongest love is quite frequently unshared, and that not only does no great posterity, but no posterity at all, result. If as a result of such love men become monks or commit suicide, then for what purpose did the world-will interested in posterity take this trouble? And if the ardent Werther does

not kill himself, still his unhappy passion must remain an inexplicable enigma for the theory of graduated posterity. It is extraordinary that the individualised and exalted love of Werther for Charlotte showed (from the point of view of the theory) that it was just from Charlotte that he ought to obtain a posterity especially important and necessary for humanity, for the sake of which the world-will awakened in him this uncommon passion. But how was it that this all-knowing and almighty will did not think or was unable to act in the desired sense upon Charlotte also, seeing that without her participation the passion of Werther remained wholly aimless and superfluous. For the teleological acting substance, love's labour lost is a complete absurdity.

“Specially strong love is more often than not unrequited, and quite frequently unrequited love leads to suicide in one form or another; and each of the innumerable suicides caused by unrequited love manifestly refutes this theory, according to which a strong love is only for this purpose awakened, that the required posterity may be brought forth, whose importance is marked by the strength of the love; when as a matter of fact, in all these suicides the actual force of love excludes the possibility, not of an important resultant posterity, but of any posterity whatever.

“Occasions of unrequited love are too common for it to be possible to see in them only an exception to the rule. But even if we granted it so, it would help little, for even in those cases where great love is developed on both sides it does not lead to the result demanded by the theory. According to the theory Romeo and Juliet should give to the world some very great man, at least a Shakespeare, but in actual fact it

is, as we know, the other way round : not they created Shakespeare, as should have followed from the theory, but he created them, and that without any passion, by a mode of non-sexual creativeness. Romeo and Juliet, like the majority of passionate lovers, died, not giving birth to anyone, and the Shakespeare giving birth to them and to other great people was not born of a madly-infatuated pair but from an ordinary human marriage. (And Shakespeare himself, though he experienced a strong passion, as we know from the Sonnets among other things, left no remarkable posterity.) The birth of Christopher Columbus was perhaps more important for the world-will than the birth of Shakespeare, but we know nothing of any especial love of his parents for one another, though we know of his own strong passion for Donna Beatrice Enrico, and though she bore him their illegitimate son Diego, yet that son did nothing great, and wrote only the biography of his father which anyone might have done."

Solovyof carries his enquiry further, namely into the domain of religious myth, and finds remarkable confirmation of his contention in the Old Testament.

"The central fact of Biblical history, the birth of the Messiah, more than any other presupposes a providential plan in the choice and union of those who should lead to His birth, and indeed the chief interest of Biblical stories is concentrated upon the diversified and wonderful destinies which brought about the birth and union of the 'fathers of God.' But in all this complicated system of means, defining in order of historical phenomena the birth of the Messiah, there was no place for love in its real sense. Love, of course, is met with in the Bible, but only as an independent

fact and not as the instrument of the Christ-attaining process. The Holy Book does not say that Abraham and Sarah married in the course of ardent love; but in any case Providence waited till whatever love there were had altogether cooled in order that the hundred-year old parents should bring into the world a child of faith though not of love. Isaac did not marry Rebekah for love, but rather in accordance with a previously determined plan of his father. Jacob loved Rachel, but that love seems to have been unnecessary for the production of the Messiah. He must come from a son of Jacob—from Judah, who was not born of Rachel, but of unloved Leah. For the issue in a certain generation of the ancestors of the Messiah the union of Jacob with just this woman Leah was indispensable, but to that end the Almighty did not awaken in Jacob a strong passionate love toward the future mother of the God-bearer, Judah; the higher power allowed him to love Rachel, and did not over-rule the freedom of his affection, but in order to bring about the necessary marriage with Leah made use of means of quite another nature—the self-interested wile of a third person, Laban, devoted to his own family and his own economic ends. Judah himself, in order to give to life the next ancestor of the Messiah, was obliged, despite previous posterity, to unite himself in his old age with his own daughter-in-law Tamar. And because such a union was altogether out of the usual order of things, it had to be attained by means of an extremely strange incident very attractive to superficial readers of the Bible. But in this incident there can be no question of any love whatsoever. It was not love which brought together the harlot Rahab of Jericho and the stranger Hebrew; at first she gave herself to him in the course

of her profession, and afterwards the accidental connection was strengthened by her faith in the power of a new God and by the wish for His protection for her and hers. It was not love that united David's great grandfather Boaz to the young Moabite woman Ruth, and it was not from real deep love but only from casual sinful fancy that David begat Solomon.

"In sacred as in general history, sexual love does not appear as the instrument of historical ends. . . . And so, when subjective feeling tells us that love is an independent blessing having its own absolute value for our personal life, objective reality confirms that feeling and we find as a fact that strong individual love is never the serviceable instrument of racial ends. In general history as in sacred history, sexual love (in its true sense) plays no *rôle* whatever, and in no way helps the historical process; its positive significance must lie in individual life. What sort of sense then has it here?"

The answer which Solovyof gives is that Love is the nullification of egoism, the desire for heavenly unity. In this unity man finds his true individuality and immortality. "The division of the human being into male and female elements is a disintegration, and the beginning of death. To be in separateness means to be on the road towards death. It is only a whole man who could be immortal, and if physical union cannot establish the wholeness of the human being then the false union should be exchanged for a true union." The true union is that of the spiritual mystic and godly being in us with that same being in another.

It is curious that whilst Tolstoy and Solovyof may both be accused of being ascetic and anti-natural in their attitude to the functions of sex, yet Tolstoy is infinitely suspicious of the female principle and Solovyof

is infinitely trustful. He is not merely gallant, or even chivalrous, which is more sincere than to be gallant. He has a wonderful regard for all women, and each that he meets he treats as if she were some one celestial. If one can judge by suggestions in his poetry and by what is said of his life, Solovyof had that gentle and very beautiful but sincere regard for the presence of a woman, her judgment, her voice. He allows to her speech its full quality, as if it were indeed the language of another and most loved country, and it were at once necessary to give all the ear to catch each accent of it, and as if one specially delighted in the sound of it. She is always Mary; he is always Gabriel. He sees in her the shadow form and premonition of the Eternal Feminine, the Church that is to be, the Bride. He holds that in the pathos of love a man sees a woman not as she appears from external observation, but as she is in essence or idea. He sees the final human type, the consummation of our beauty and genius. "The moral duty in marriage," says Solovyof, "is so to act as to realise in the actual woman the ideal vision. On the other hand the highest form of love in woman has a corresponding character. The man whom she has chosen appears to her as her true saviour, destined to reveal to her and to realise for her the meaning of life. . . . The true human marriage is one which consciously aims at this perfect union."

This very passionate belief of the philosopher Solovyof has had considerable influence in the domain of Russian idealism and poetry. It has had a real vital influence which has only begun to make itself felt. It has also resulted in the formation of a sort of poetic cult.

The West holds that a marriage is not a true one.

unless it has been consummated physically. The East holds that physical consummation marks the imperfection of the married state. "Time goes on because marriage is imperfect," says Solovyof. "When marriage becomes perfect the temporal succession will cease."

A characteristic flower of this idealism is the volume of Alexander Blok, entitled *Of the Thrice-beautiful Lady*, in which every 'Thee' and 'Thou' refers to the dream-vision of the eternal feminine. When we remember that the aspiration towards the Madonna is even stronger among the Russian peasants than the aspiration toward God, who is taken for granted as standing behind and supporting all his saints, it is no more easy to grasp the great national background of Solovyof's philosophic contentions. So Alexander Blok writes:

"At the doors of the twilight of prayers
I will open my heart and await."

And the person whom he awaits is the Eternal Bride. He looks at the great mystical portrait of the Madonna with its flowers and tapers and lamps. The service is being sung by a strange crowd of fellow-men. He shuts his eyes or kneels and prays, and suddenly sees just a gleam of Her raiment or a glimmer of lilies.

When Solovyof wrote between jest and earnest that the most significant thing that ever happened to him in life was when all that is, all that was, that will be for ever, was incarnate in one woman's face of heavenly beauty, we get the true indication of the importance of the idea of the Eternal Feminine in his philosophy.

Prince Yevgeny Trubetskoi, who has written a great work on Solovyof, holds the idea of the

realisation of immortality through the perfect love of man and woman, and the cessation of reproduction, to be a romantic dream which can be left on one side as it does not affect the greater doctrine, namely that of *Bogochelovetchestvo* or divine humanity. But though undoubtedly Solovyof's point of view is biassed by his own personal passion and poignant feeling, I do not think that we in England need overlook it. We need only to step more cautiously, and to remember that for the moment the Russian is finding difficulty in articulating a portion of his belief. Although the statement is at times only conditionally true and the saving clauses and needful reservations seem to have been omitted, the philosopher is nevertheless all the while hinting and suggesting the eternal things which can never be expressed to complete satisfaction.

What can one say about the Bride of Christ, all-humanity-as-one, Sancta Sophia, except by suggestion, by impression, by reproducing the miraculous word of poetry, the dream-vision of the City? How can we give one burst or even far-off echo of the great music of God wherein all sounds are harmonised and all harmonies blend into the higher harmonies of the ultimate *Gloria*!

Solovyof believed in a unity of all nations—not a cosmopolitan unity or reduction to type as in the United States, but a union of each nation in its place. The true unity of languages is not an Esperanto or Volapük or everyone speaking French, “not a single language, but an all-embracing language, an interpenetration of all languages. Similarly a true unity of nations does not mean a single nationality, but an all-embracing nationality, the interaction and solidarity of all nations for the sake of each having an independent and full life of its own. . . . All nations

at their highest have seen the value of their nationhood to lie not in themselves but in something more universal. . . . The Body of Christ will be a perfect organism, and cannot consist of simple cells alone (*i.e.* persons), but must contain larger and more complex organs (nations)." It is no exaggeration to say that Solovyof looks forward to a united world, though whether materially or mystically realised, it would be hard to say; in his work the material realisation becomes attenuated and passes into the mystical, and the temporal into the eternal. Does he not look forward to a moment when the last hour of time will strike and the eternal have already begun, the beginning of *the life to come*? He treads a path that for a long while is on this earth and then goes up to heaven.

In Russia they sing for the dead what is called an Eternal Memory. The first part was beautifully translated by the late W. H. Birkbeck and is known here as the Russian 'Contakion for the Dead.' It was sung most fittingly at St. Paul's at the memorial service for Lord Kitchener, and Russian hearts in the audience thrilled to feel that the same hymn could be sung by East and West.

"Give rest, O Christ, to Thy servant, with Thy saints
Where sorrow and pain are no more,
Neither sighing, but Life everlasting.
Thou only art immortal, the Creator and Maker of man;
And we are mortal, formed of the earth,
And unto earth shall we return,
For so Thou didst ordain when Thou createdst me,
Saying, Dust thou art and unto dust shalt thou return.
All we go down to the dust, and, weeping o'er the
grave,

We sing : Alleluia ! Alleluia ! Alleluia ! ”

And then follows a great choric burst of singing :

“ Eternal Memory ! Eternal Memory ! Eternal Memory ! ”

This is a hymn which we could sing for all who have died in the great struggle. Europe lies low ; she will lie lower yet, more desolate.

“ Sceptre and Crown must tumble down

And in the dust be equal made

With the poor peasant’s scythe and spade,”

in order that something larger and more spacious may be built.

The Eternal Memory does not mean “ may the dead be remembered by us for ever.” Solovyof interprets the hymn as meaning : “ May God remember them for ever. May they dwell in the eternal mind of God.” May he who has died become part of the imperishable substance ! As we put the dust of our greatest heroes in the Abbey, which in England is our particular emblem of the Mystical Church, so may they each find a place in the Sophia, the wall of God’s kingdom.

Give rest, O Christ, to Thy servant with Thy saints.

“ May he become conformable to God’s eternal thought about him and to what he should be in the sphere of the absolute and the changeless.” That is the prayer and the vision of Vladimir Solovyof for the individual and for the nation ; for the living, for those to be, and for all those who have ever died ; for a united world and a Universal Church. May the poem of the Heavenly Sophia, the idea of ideas, be realised in humanity, and reflect itself in all the mirror-surfaces of the World-Soul !

STEPHEN GRAHAM.

A WORD ON PYSCHOANALYSIS.

THE EDITOR.

I PROPOSE to write two papers—one chiefly on the generalities of psychoanalysis and the other mainly on its incursion into the domain of mythological and religious symbolism. It is a research that probes into matters of great intimacy and delicacy, the rough handling of which generally arouses extreme distaste or provokes fierce resentment. It was first used as a help in the diagnosis and cure of nervous disease and developed its method in morbid surroundings of a special nature. The experience thus gained is now claimed to be of service in widely extended fields. The views and interpretations of psychoanalysts are accordingly being brought to the notice, not only of medical and psychological specialists, but also of an ever-widening public. It must be confessed from the outset that to the ordinarily healthy-minded layman there seems to be a marked extravagance in no little of the literature. And by extravagance I mean, especially in the case of the followers of the original School, the exaggeration, magnifying and magnification of certain facts and factors and the proportionate minimizing and undervaluation of others, and above all what seems to me to be not infrequently the flying in the face of justifiable reserve and thus seeking for trouble that could be legitimately avoided. It is extravagant, to say the least of it, I venture to think, to bring into the centre of the field of the general

psychology of the unconscious and to lay the supreme stress on the sex-element in human nature; it tends perpetually to wandering outside the reasonable limits of good feeling and good taste, and consequently to interpretations of and judgments on emotional behaviour that do not range or register justly with the system of human life as a whole. It should, however, be kept in mind throughout that psychoanalysis in itself is a method of research; it is not an agreed body of doctrine. It is then only fair to take the term as standing for a scientific movement in progress, continually readjusting itself by the light of new experience and the discipline of criticism.

These papers owe their genesis to my reading for review some months ago the English translation of a book by Dr. Carl G. Jung of Zürich, in which certain views based on the researches of psychoanalysis are applied to the treatment of some mythological themes and the symbolism of some of the mystery-religions of antiquity. On finishing its perusal, however, I found that a short review would be out of the question, if the subject was to be dealt with in any but the most superficial manner. I had of course previously read a certain number of books and some articles here and there on psychoanalysis. But the literature on the method and its applications is extensive; and so before dealing with Jung's volume I determined to refresh my memory on the one hand and extend my reading on the other. Perhaps the adept psychoanalyst will say that one should have practical training in a clinic before writing on the subject; my excuse is that Jung's book and those of others ask students of comparative religion and comparative mysticism to consider their interpretations in these wide fields of human

interest. Hence these two general papers on a new and far-reaching phase of psychological research. These articles, moreover, are intended for the general reader, and not for the specialist in any case. I have of course no competence to write on medical matters as such; I can attempt only to say how various points strike one who has a bowing acquaintance with psychology and knows a little about mythology and the mystery-religions. This introductory paper will now endeavour briefly to outline the main generalities of the subject.

In recent years psychology has been busied, and fruitfully busied, along a number of lines of approach, with the many elusive problems involved in the far-reaching concept for which one of the most usual word-symbols is 'the unconscious.' Psychoanalysis is one of the methods of approach whereby the unconscious is made to reveal some of its secrets.

Psychoanalysts seem agreed in general that the fundamental nature of psychology is essentially vital, dynamic, biological. For them psychology is not simply a refined physiology on the one hand or a vague metaphysic on the other; it is rooted in life. If academic scientific psychology may not unjustly be spoken of as psychology without a soul, the detested term being strictly taboo, psychoanalysts have no objection at least to the term *psyche*, dug up from the recesses of history, but used in a duly censored and dynamic sense. They thus welcome with open arms the *élan vital* notion so brilliantly formulated by Bergson in his theory of creative evolution, and for the most part favour the vitalistic standpoint adopted by Driesch in biology. Without exception they insist on the value of a better understanding of the non-

intellectual activities of human nature and especially of the motives of man's emotional behaviour.

A vast literature has been written by philosophers and psychologists about the unconscious, subconscious or subliminal, and endless controversies have arisen. Popularly the vague notion behind such terms has now become the most convenient dumping ground of our psychological ignorance. On the face of them these terms are negative or semi-negative; they denote the completely unknown or very indefinitely known. The initial difficulty with which we are confronted is that we are by no means certain how to define the familiar reality we call consciousness. In loose speaking and writing, conscious and self-conscious are frequently used as interchangeable expressions; in ordinary life no one bothers about such distinctions. The man in the street indeed troubles his head in no way about so fundamental and constant a fact as consciousness. For precise thinkers, on the contrary, consciousness is one of the most difficult concepts to define, much less to explain; and this must naturally be so, for it would seem to be the unanalysable ultimate in terms of which all the activities of the mind must be brought to knowledge. Research is, however, gradually discovering that in man there is an indefinite series of kinds of awaring or states of awareness before we reach the clearly conscious or self-conscious level. Moreover, many of these awaring activities are found to be by no means such purely mechanical reactions as a materialistic biology and psychology would have them to be. In their own order they may be said to be knowing and discriminating in appropriate ways. An attempt, it seems, should then be made to supersede such paradoxical and self-contradictory labels in this

respect as 'unconscious' and 'subconscious.' Here a good suggestion, in my opinion, might be taken from E. D. Fawcett in his most recent work, *The World as Imagination*. He there stresses the 'con' in 'conscious,' as denoting the active grasp for which the differences of the content of awaring are 'together,' and would presumably agree to use 'scious' for levels of awareness that for our clear consciousness fall within the domain of the so-called unconscious; so that we might speak of the 'scious,' not as opposed to the 'conscious,' but simply as distinct from it, both being grades of one and the same spiritual activity.

In psychoanalysis the term 'unconscious' is used generally for those contents of the human psyche which cannot be reached by deliberate and direct effort of recollection; they can be ultimately brought to the surface or into the field of focussed or attentive consciousness only by allowing free scope to the play of uncontrolled associationism. The contents of the psyche which are accessible to normal recollection, are sometimes said, not to be recovered from the unconscious proper, but to issue from the 'foreconscious,' as it is termed; they are regarded as residing in or waiting on the margin of consciousness. The difference is this, that when brought to consciousness the latter contents are found to be perfectly familiar; whereas those that emerge from the recesses of the unconscious in the process of psychoanalysis are not recognized; they give a distinct feeling of strangeness. The unconscious as a whole is sometimes called the 'hinterland' and has recently been spoken of as the 'mental background.'¹ The term 'superconscious' does not

¹ Maurice Nicoll, *Dream Psychology* (London, Oxford Univ. Press, 1917), pp. 12ff.

seem to occur in psychoanalytic literature. We might then, using the metaphor of light, find some sort of a symbolic correspondence between these activities of the psychic self and the vital structure of a germ-cell, and so speak of a bright self-conscious nucleole, surrounded by a dim semi-conscious nucleus, enclosed in a dark subconscious psychic plasma.

Now scientific research has shown that the human embryo passes rapidly through the typical stages of animal evolution, and thus resumes in its development the main moments of the long history of animal ascent. To use technical biological terms, ontogenesis resumes phylogenesis. This is, however, somewhat of a complementary way of looking at the matter, for phylogeny is generally held to be that branch of biology which attempts to deduce the ancestral history of an animal or plant from its ontogeny or individual developmental metamorphoses or organic changes. In studying the heredity of a human body then, regarded from the evolutionary standpoint, there is not only the history of the animal kingdom to be considered, but also that of the vegetable, and in last resort that of inanimate nature. The literature on psychoanalysis transfers this fertile idea to the domain of psychology, develops and illustrates it with innumerable examples. It shows that the human psyche repeats the stages of its long ancestry, that it is instinct with memory-modes, as it were, of its racial heredity; so that every one of us, no matter how well disciplined intellectually, conserves in the unconscious the modes of thinking and feeling of primitive and infantile humanity. The unconscious is thus spoken of as our historical past.¹

¹ A. A. White, *Mechanisms of Character Formation: An Introduction to Psychoanalysis* (New York, Macmillan, 1916), pp. 58, 87.

In dealing with this unconscious it is convenient to regard what may be called its animal and quasi-animal reactions as occurring roughly at three levels. First we have such functions as circulation, growth and digestion, the activities of the glands of internal secretion and of the sympathetic and automatic nervous systems — the physico-chemical level of mechanistic biology; secondly, the activities of the sensori-motor system, integrated by the peripheral nerves, the spinal cord and brain stem—the reflex level; and thirdly, a level that is distinctly psychic and which it is the special task of psychoanalysis to investigate. Here we have to deal largely, as we shall see, with the symbolisation of phantasy and dream thinking.¹

If the activities of this level of the unconscious are not logical in the sense of critical relational thinking, they are by no means bereft of meaning and value. They may even be said to have a logic of their own. If on this level the simplest analogies pass for identities, if it is mind free of all intellectual technique, bare of comparative and relational ways of thinking, it is nevertheless guided by feeling qualities, by a certain logic of the emotions, as it were. Its way of thinking is purely affective and infantile; nevertheless at the level of feeling it is quite understandable. This is all of course entirely from a retrospective evolutionary point of view.

The originator of the psychoanalytic movement is Prof. Sigmund Freud, of Vienna, whose first contribution to the subject dates from 1895. Freud is said to have been the first to have enunciated the hypothesis that every psychic fact and event has a history,

and to have demonstrated that in psychology the value of the past of the psyche is as great as that of the history of the body in the sciences of embryology and comparative anatomy.¹ Ontogeny is claimed not only to resume but to repeat phylogeny in the mental sphere. Freud has accordingly been acclaimed as 'a Darwin of the mind,' and is praised for "his shifting of the emphasis in psychology away from the intellectual to the instinctive, and his derivation of the higher and more complex mental activities from the lowlier forms more nearly akin to those characteristic of animals."²

There is certainly nothing new in this derivation view; it may be said indeed to permeate most modern systems of psychology. The description of evolutionary sequences alone, however, though chronicling stages of development, can scarcely be regarded as a thoroughly satisfactory account of real causation. In biological and psychological series especially, in which there must surely be some element of spontaneity and contingency, we can hardly speak of the antecedent term as the *cause* of the consequent. All that we can legitimately assert is that it is an 'assisting agency'; to use a Buddhist phrase, "*a* assists *b* to become." The whole notion of causation, indeed, has of late years been so deepened and refined, at any rate in philosophical circles, that there is a reluctance to use the term, as reminiscent of earlier insufficient conceptions; and so we meet with such phrases as 'real conditioning' in place of causation. In ultimate analysis presumably every fact or event may be considered as

¹ White, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

² Ernest Jones, *Papers on Psychoanalysis* (London, Baillière, Tindall & Cox, 1913), pp. xi., xii.

conditioned by all other facts or events of every order, and as reciprocally conditioning them. It must be confessed, it is true, that this does not bring us much further in empirical work. Nevertheless it seems vain to look for the sufficient causation of a psychical event solely in the direction of its past history, as Freud does. This genetic view by itself is unsatisfactory; it savours too much of mechanical determinism. Now determinism, as Croce says,¹ negates the end and affirms the cause. But in philosophy, considered as the science of the spirit, cause and end are equally causative.

Most writers on psychoanalysis, however, lay great stress on psychical determinism. It is claimed very emphatically that "there is no more room for 'chance' in the mental world than in the physical one"²; that "the theory of determinism has definitely taken its place in the field of psychology."³

In the face of these assertions it is somewhat difficult to see how 'moral autonomy,' to establish which is the highest therapeutic aim of the best psychoanalytic endeavour, can be brought about. Presumably all that is meant is a relative, modified or conditioned determinism, in the sense that there is an order where most people least expect to meet with one. Thus we find Jung, in a very striking paradoxical phrase, declaring with all the emphasis of italics: "So-called chance is the law and order of psychoanalysis"⁴; and elsewhere he writes: "The law of causation in the psychical sphere is not taken seriously

¹ *Logic* (Eng. Tr. by Douglas Ainslie, London, Macmillan, 1917), p. 266.

² Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

³ White, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

⁴ *Collected Papers on Analytical Psychology* (Eng. Tr., ed. by Constance E. Long, London, Baillière, Tindall & Cox, 1916), p. 257.

enough; that is to say, there are no accidents, no 'just as wells.'"¹

This notion is perhaps more carefully phrased in the introductory words of his most recent translator, where we read: "No expression or manifestation of the psyche, however trifling or inconsistent in appearance, is really lawless and unmotivated."² On the other hand, we find the latest writer on psychoanalysis breaking away and declaring: "Choice is a prerogative of the self, but is limited by the field, or patterns, of the force that reveals itself as interest, and beyond that is totally ineffective. The patterns of interest are formed by education and by *chance*."³

In connection with the idea of psychical evolution it is of interest to note that the familiar term 'adaptation to environment' is being replaced in psychoanalytic literature by a phrase of psychological import—namely 'function of reality,' a term first used by Pierre Janet (*fonction du réel*). The function of what is called the reality principle is to adapt the organism to the exigencies of reality.⁴ But surely this is taking reality at the level of naïve realism or pure sensationalism, and confining it to too narrow a ground. The term, however, seems generally to be used in this limited sense, as when Jung speaks of the function of or adaptation to reality as "something which occurs in all living nature as wholly independent from all thought."⁵ When, however, Dr. Hinkle says that "man's great task is the adaptation of himself to

¹ *The Psychology of the Unconscious* (Eng. Tr. by Beatrice M. Hinkle. London, Kegan Paul, 1916), p. 59.

² Hinkle, *ibid.*, p. xxxvi.

³ Nicoll, *op. cit.*, p. 102; the italics are those of the author, the son of Sir William Robertson Nicoll.

⁴ Jones, *op. cit.*, p. viii.

⁵ *Psychology of the Unconscious*, p. 459.

reality and the recognition of himself as an instrument for the expression of life according to his individual possibilities,"¹ we must surely seek for a higher meaning of the term 'reality'; there must be inner reality as well. Nevertheless we find Jung speaking of a certain refining of the inner world of images or symbols as due to the influence of 'the corrector of reality.'²

We should, on the contrary, be inclined to say that we can in no way correct reality, but only our erroneous notions concerning it; reality is rather what we shall come to know fundamentally by the harmonious co-operation of the physical, psychic and intellectual activities of our whole nature, integrated as a self-conscious spiritual personality. It is not simply a 'pushing out of interest on to life,'³ whatever that means, but a coming to know the life of the spirit. This concrete spiritual view by no means depreciates the value of sensible reality; it widens, heightens and deepens it.

We now pass to a very brief summary of the main notions or general principles of Freudian psychology.⁴ The psychological unit seems to be regarded as a certain charge or stress of psychical energy, sometimes referred to as 'amount of affect' or 'sum of excitation,'—a something that can be considered quantitatively, though we have no means of measuring it. It need hardly be remarked here that this is the antithesis of Bergson's qualitative view of the life-impulse. It is as it were a store of energy that continually tends to discharge itself. It can be increased or diminished. It is attached to, suffuses or charges the memory-

¹ *Ibid.*, p. xlii.

² *Ibid.*, p. 468.

³ Nicoll, *op. cit.*, p. 128.

⁴ Cp. Jones, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-29.

traces of ideas or images. Its most interesting characteristic is that it can become released from the idea to which it was first attached and transferred to another idea or even a number of ideas, all of which, however, are in a sense representative of the first. Accumulation of this energy results in tension; this tension is felt as discomfort or non-pleasure. The removal of tension through discharge is felt as pleasure, relief, gratification. The tendencies or strivings to seek pleasure through relief of tension and to avoid pain by preventing the accumulation of psychical energy constitute what Freud calls a 'wish' in the very widest sense of the word. When a competition or conflict of opposing tendencies takes place in a mental process, a certain blocking of the usual associative activities occurs, and therewith the shutting off or dissociation of the mental process. This repressed conflict is called a 'complex.' "A complex is a system of ideas, dynamically active, emotionally charged from an unconscious source."¹

In conscious mental events the 'normal' and 'abnormal' differ only quantitatively, not qualitatively. Indeed it is suggested that in this connection it would be better to talk simply of the 'usual' and the 'unusual.'² In both cases the so-called 'wish' or energy of the unconscious mental process is directed into the conscious paths of the psyche; the main distinction is that in the 'abnormal' case the discharge of energy takes place by a more circuitous or unusual route than in that of the 'normal.' In both cases consciousness exercises over the dynamic process what

¹ M. D. Eder, *War-Shock: The Psycho-neuroses in War Psychology and Treatment* (London, Heinemann, 1917), p. 66.

White, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

Freud considers its most characteristic function, namely a 'censoring' influence, as he calls it; that is, it allows it to express itself only in certain ways. This censoring influence or 'censor' consists of the "more rational wishes, which in ordinary hours are strong enough to hold the morbid wish in abeyance"¹; in this respect the 'censor' is said to stand for the individual's recognized character. It represents the fulcrum of his normal life, the standard of what is established in him as proper, prudent and social. Freud calls it the 'moral' censor, but he regards it as acquired solely through education and punishment. "For him all morality is acquired and is imposed from without upon the individual. There is no help to be sought from within, for the unconscious is like a Zoo in the midst of a great city full of caged beasts."² The idea of the unconscious as 'a wild beast couched, waiting its hour to spring,' gathered by many from the writings of pure Freudism, is what Dr. Constance Long calls 'that most dangerous thing' a half-truth; she thinks rightly that the far more hopeful view of the Zürich School will come as a relief to those who have been cast down at such a pessimistic and depressing notion.³

In obsessions and phobias, in grave hysterical and psychasthenic troubles generally, a bodily symptom, such as tremors or mutism, is regarded as the expression of a mental complex, resulting from an unresolved conflict between opposing affects, repressed into the unconscious; it is by this indirect physical channel that the energy finds an outlet and makes its

¹ E. B. Holt, *The Freudian Wish and its place in Ethics* (London, Fisher Unwin, 1915), p. 13.

² Nicoll, *op. cit.*, p. 179.

³ Pref., p. v., to *Trans. of Jung's Collected Papers*.

presence known. The energy accompanying the original idea, being dissociated, is incapable of becoming conscious, and must be transferred to another idea to be assimilable in consciousness. Freud maintains, not only that the unconscious mental life is indestructible, but that the intensity of its 'wishes' endures; he thus insists that the mental processes, and in particular the 'wishes,' of infancy and early childhood are of special importance, in that they are the permanent basis for all future development. But beyond all else is the extravagant stress he lays on the sex-element in psychology and his wide extension of its domain, not only to childhood, but even to the functions of nutrition in infancy. It is this which has given rise to the most severe criticisms of and to the most strenuous opposition to his views, for it colours and permeates his whole practice and exposition. The opposition, moreover, is not confined to outside criticism; it is found within the movement itself in varying degrees. This most characteristic doctrine of Freudism or of the Vienna School of psychoanalysis, which regards all mental life as sex-based, has been modified to some extent by the views of the Zürich School, headed by Jung, while quite recently attempts have been made to present the subject from a still wider standpoint and in a form that is free from this specially provocative extravagance.¹

It is always to be remembered that psychoanalysis was first used in the treatment of pathological and morbid states of mind and that too of an overt sexual nature. Freud was a specialist devoted to the care of this acute form of mental disease. He found in practice that what is called the anamnesis, that is

¹ See especially Nicoll's excellent little volume on *Dream Psychology*.

the evidence supplied by relatives or friends of the patient or what the patient told the physician of his own conscious self-knowledge as to the history of the malady was not sufficient. There was much the patient could not or would not tell. The problem was how to get at this, and so be in a more favourable position to trace the psychic causation or ætiology or genesis of the trouble. Freud believed that this was largely hidden in the unconscious. The first method used was hypnotism; the patient was questioned on the supposed spontaneous phantasies observed in the hypnotic state. Freud, however, felt that here suggestion could not be entirely eliminated; genuine spontaneity could not be obtained. Another method for obtaining the material for analysis, evolved by the Psychiatric Clinic at Zürich, was that of so-called free associationism, in which the patient, without being put into a state of hypnosis, allows images and ideas to flow through his mind in uncontrolled sequence. To this was added an ingenious method of obtaining word-reaction associations; this has been highly developed and lists of key-word stimuli have been drawn up.

Meantime Freud had hit upon and begun to develop the method of dream-analysis, starting from the dream as the preliminary material free-est from the resistance of the dreamer's waking censorship. The dream-material and dream-structure are treated as the spontaneous work of the unconscious. The manifest dream, however, namely that part of the dream that can be remembered, is by no means by itself self-revealing; its imagery is simply, so to say, the symbolic language whereby the desire in the unconscious phantastically expresses itself to the dreamer,

and that too in most cases not crudely but in a masked or disguised form.¹ The manifest content as related does not then give the meaning of the dream on the surface; this must be apprehended only from its latent content.² The interpretation of the dream depends on the analysis based on the results of subsequent 'free associationism' to the component parts of the dream obtained from the dreamer by cross-questioning thereupon. This procedure is now considered *the method par excellence* of psychoanalysis. The interpretation of dreams, says Jung, is its 'real instrument';³ it is, according to Freud, a 'royal road to a knowledge of the part the unconscious plays in mental life.'⁴ It thus comes about that one of the most neglected and we may even say despised elements of psychical life, at any rate in this scientific age, has come into great prominence; so much so that Jung can enthusiastically declare: "The stone that the builders rejected has become the head of the corner."⁵

An enormous amount of work has now been done in the psychoanalytic movement on the phenomena of dream-life and on the structure, symbolism and interpretation of dreams. We must, however, remember that dreams are largely an individual problem. "The study of dreams and symbolism and their bearing on one particular individual does not necessarily throw any light on the dreams of another individual. . . . There is no fixed symbolism."⁶ "The symbols to be interpreted are individual, not only to the person, but may even be to the dream itself."⁷ The question of

¹ 'There is a dream-censorship as well as a waking censorship.

² Eder, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

³ *Collected Papers*, p. 221.

⁴ *On Dreams* (Eng. Tr. from 2nd ed. by Eder, London, Heinemann, 1914), p. v.

⁵ *Coll. Papers*, *ibid.*

⁶ Nicoll, *op. cit.*, pp. 80, 82.

⁷ Eder, *Shell-Shock*, p. 116.

typical symbolism will concern us in our next paper. Freud's main theory is that the fundamental function of a dream is a 'wish-fulfilment.' But what shall we here say of nightmares and their sense of helpless terror? What 'fulfilment' is there here of any wish, desire or need? Ingenious attempts have been made to twist the meaning of words to suit this dogma; but they seem to me unsatisfactory.¹

But dream-psychology and the various psycho-analytic aids as used for the study of nervous and mental diseases by no means exhaust the subject. On this foundation a large literature has been erected claiming to throw light on mythology, the history of civilisation and racial psychology, on child psychology and pædagogics, on æsthetics and even philology, on mysticism and so-called 'occultism,' on wit, humour and the comic, on cartoons and slang, on unconscious gesturing and finally on the psychology of every-day life. Here, then, we have a theme of far-reaching importance; and it must be admitted there is much that is fascinating, suggestive and instructive to be found in the literature, particularly when the special King Charles' head of Freudism is given a rest.

We will now glance at the main points on which the Zürich School parts company with or exercises a modifying influence on the Vienna tradition. And here we must of course follow the most recent, considered and authoritative statement of Jung himself, dated January, 1916.²

The Zürich method is not purely analytical nor is its view solely causative; it does not take the psycho-

¹ See, for instance, "Ernest Jones, 'On Nightmare,' *The American Journal of Insanity* (Baltimore, Jan. 1910), vol. xlv., no. 3.

² *Collected Papers*, pp. viii.-x.

logical symbol exclusively as a sign or token of certain primitive psycho-sexual processes. It does not shut out this view, but regards it as a half-truth at best ; it repudiates its exclusive validity. The value of the symbol does not depend merely on historical causes so-called ; it has meaning for the present and for the future, and indeed this is its chief importance. For Jung, " the symbol is not merely a sign of something repressed or concealed, but is at the same time an attempt to comprehend and point out the way of the further psychological development of the individual." The Zürich method is thus also synthetic and prospective ; it recognises that the human mind has aims.

Freud's own theory is based on the principle of hedonism ; Adler, one of the earliest personal pupils of Freud, bases his theory on the principle of power. Doubtless both these types of mind are to be found in varying proportions in every individual ; but to interpret the whole man from either point of view exclusively or even from both combined is highly unsatisfactory. If our conception of man's aims is simply that of the fulfilment of desire, it is evident that analytical work carried on from this standpoint brings to mind only infantile and gross egoistic aims. Though the Zürich School is convinced that within the limits of a diseased mental attitude the psychology is of this order, it refuses to be content with such a reduction according to the biologism and naturalism of the pure Freudians, who, we may add, have all the appearance of preferring the standpoint of a philosophical materialism.

But, asks Jung, as surely all who believe in moral spiritual development must ask : " Can man obey the fundamental and primitive impulses of his nature

without grievously injuring himself and his fellow-beings? He cannot assert either his sexual desire or his desire for power unlimitedly, and the limits are moreover very restricted." In contradiction to the Vienna School, therefore, and in correction of its views, the Zürich School would seek in the analysis for indications of higher purpose in the unconscious, and not only of crude desires and passions and their sensuous gratification; it would regard the fundamental thoughts and impulses revealed by the analysis of symbolic representation as also indicative of a definite line of future development. This spiritual belief should be of the greatest importance in the interpretation of the symbolism. Indeed Jung himself goes even so far as to declare his conviction that "the further development of mankind can only be brought about by means of symbols which represent something far in advance of himself, and whose intellectual meanings cannot yet be grasped entirely. The individual unconscious produces such symbols, and they are of the greatest possible value in the moral development of the personality." This is a courageous declaration to meet with in such surroundings; it is an elevating, hopeful and helpful outlook, and we cordially welcome all efforts on the part of psychoanalysts to develop this view and illustrate it. The more attention they give to anagogic (or ascending) interpretation,¹ as it is called, the better it will surely be for their patients and for their readers.

This optimistic view is based on the high and ennobling creed that the creative energy in man "is ever striving to free itself from its limitations, to go onward and upward, to create; and in order to do this

¹ White, *op. cit.*, p. 108.

it must overcome resistances, tear loose from drag-backs, emancipate itself from the inertia of lower callings. The energy that succeeds is *sublimated*, refined, spiritualised."¹

Dr. Eder, in his just published book, defines sublimation as "the replacement of infantile and childish impulses by corresponding adult outgrowths subsuming more ultimate and ethical purposes"; but, he adds, "only when this development takes place as normal growth from within, and not by compulsion, by authority or external pressure." In successful sublimation there is no 'repression' in the technical sense in which the term is used in both Schools.²

This sublimation process in ethical development raises the question as to what is the precise meaning of the term 'censor.' So far I have not met with a detailed treatment of this very important subject. It is evidently a complex problem, for there is a censorship in dreams. In dream symbolism there are said to be two motives, and in each one the endopsychic censure is different. "Firstly, to conceal the dream-thoughts from the dreamer's conscious self, the censor prevents ideas out of harmony with the dreamer's conscious self, or more highly developed self, from entering consciousness." This is of course only in symbolic dreams; some dreams assuredly are very far from censored in any way. "Secondly, to prevent the apprehension of an idea which is beyond the dreamer's experience."³ Is the intention in the latter case however, we may ask, 'to prevent,' or is it not rather the best the so-called unconscious can do for the dreamer? Here, at any rate, an experienced and highly cultured analyst can give great help to the ordinary

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

² *War-Shock*, p. 91.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 117.

dreamer far beyond the immediate necessities of the moment.

As to the thorny question of suggestion, the *bête noire* of most psychoanalysts, Jung rejects with horror the reflection that the results of the analysis are determined by the suggestive influence of the views of the analyst. The psychoanalyst, he says, must never force anything on the patient which the latter does not see himself and find reasonable with his own understanding.¹ Nevertheless he has to admit that the personal character of the physician is of the very greatest importance in this most delicate therapeutic field. Here, if anywhere, suggestion in the widest sense at any rate must be done full justice to, but it must not be over-rated. "Patients," he admits, "read the doctor's character intuitively, and they should find in him a human being, with faults indeed, but also a man *who has striven at every point to fulfil his own human duties in the fullest sense*. I think," he adds, "this is the first healing factor. Many times I have had the opportunity of seeing that the analyst is successful with his treatment just in so far as he has succeeded in his own moral development."² Psychoanalysis is thus declared by Jung to be "a high moral task of immense educational value."³ It is, moreover, essentially an individual task; it depends on the material to be dealt with, on the doctor's skill and the patient's capacity. It is further laid down by a number of writers, that no one should attempt curative psychoanalysis who has not been previously psychoanalysed himself.

It must moreover be evident, without going into details, that the process of probing at all points where

¹ *Collected Papers*, p. 207.

² *Ibid.*, p. 244 ; italics J.'s.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 235.

hesitancy or resistance is found, if carried through, leads to most intimate confessions. It is held that these confessions are ultimately good for the soul, and that the full facing of the facts is of the very first importance in effecting a cure. The central aim of the psychoanalytic method, we are thus told, is to enable the sufferer "to discover and appreciate the significance of the mental process that manifests itself as a symptom."¹ The claim is that "it enables the patient to disentangle confused mental processes, and, by giving him control over the disharmonies of his mind, leads him to develop a greater measure of self-reliance and independence. The training received by the patient is thus an educative one in the highest sense of the word, for he not only achieves a richer development of will-power and self-mastery, but acquires an understanding of his own mind which is of incalculable value for future prophylaxis. He grows both in capacity to know and ability to do."² It is, however, admitted that with the stupid and uneducated, very little can be done, for the whole effort is to get the patient to co-operate intelligently and whole-heartedly in his own cure.

Such is a very brief account of the main features of this endeavour. Without some such preliminary description and preparation, I think, the general reader could not fairly have been expected to find his bearings in a discussion of Jung's views on the transformations and symbols of the psychical energy in man, the topic which will mainly concern us in our subsequent paper.

G. R. S. MEAD.

¹ Jones, *Papers on Psychoanalysis*, p. 187. ² *Ibid.*, p. 189.

THE RE-SPIRITUALISATION OF FRANCE.

HUNTLY CARTER.

WHEN the War began the government and the spiritualisation of the nation were the supreme problems of the century. Some of us doubtless had heard certain proposals to solve these problems. They were contained in three great social movements with great individualistic purposes: Regionalism, Sociological Civics and Neo-Socialism. Preceding and accompanying these movements were three restorations: the restoration of geography, of civics and of the guild-system. All three movements had a common end, an associative individualistic one: namely, the government of a people associated in a sovereignty under a new industrial and spiritual unity, and their redemption by means of the creative liberty so attained. But they approached it by different paths.

The modern movement towards regionalism (or, as the term implies, towards an inspiring nature re-synthesis and the recovery of natural laws of human 'government') came from France, where it may be associated directly and indirectly with a long line of initiators and interpreters, including Montesquieu, Taine, Comte, Reclus, Le Play, Tourville and Demolins. In its latest form it has become preoccupied with geographical origins, and thus associated with the Particularist theory of society and government.

According to this theory the social structure depends on occupational organisation, which in turn is the effect of geographical environment. So that each particularist society not only is the effect of its peculiar geographical surroundings, but its occupations are the result of being exposed to them. It was a process of the kind that gave birth to the form of society which existed in Pre-hellenic Greece, as anyone can see by referring to Mr. A. E. Zimmern's very able study of *The Greek Commonwealth*. Mr. Zimmern has been, I think, one of the first to apply the geographical origin to early Grecian society. Nature, as geographer carving out a particular form of society for itself, naturally offers a spiritualising agency in a return to itself and the occupations it provides. For out of these occupations bestowed upon man by his functions, and at the request of the creative impulse, each can build his own temple of refinement. In such ways then the new French regionalism asks to be permitted to convert society into an aristocracy of nature-evolved occupationists recruited by natural selection and strongly individual in character.

The civic movement was the outcome of the rediscovery of the Pre-hellenic and mediæval orders of social organisation. It was largely introduced by Professor Geddes, himself a re-incarnated Greco-mediævalist, a poet-naturalist of the first order, and inspired interpreter of the significant ideas of Comte, Spencer, Darwin, Reclus and Le Play. To the earlier conceptions of civics Professor Geddes added his own conception of nature and geographical origins, thus bringing the science into line with regionalism. Indeed Geddesian civics may be said to be a conception of English thought acting upon historical civics and

French regionalism. It postulates the supremacy of the city by making it a symbol of the projection of a people's soul at its best. So the city is conceived of as an individual, living and lasting entity, whose source can be traced to its citizens, just as their source can be traced to their natural environment and the occupations it produces. This supplements regionalism by adding the humanised city to the naturalised region; to the former it adds a system of government possessing human characteristics both spiritual and temporal, and to the world it offers a scheme of redemption by spiritualised cities. In short, civics would convert society into a civic aristocracy of socially-evolved citizens recruited by sociological selection.

The third movement, known as neo-socialism, has an international origin. But it is mainly identified in England with proposals, by Ruskin, Morris and other social reformers, for re-establishing the guilds. Socially, as distinct from economically, the neo-socialist aims to reconcile the two great parties, socialist and individualist, into which society has all along been divided. Economically, it seeks to make each individual the owner of his energy-wealth. Accordingly society is conceived of as a body of people constituted by a common industrial purpose, directed by an industrial form of government, and spiritualised by the creativeness of their imagination, as embodied in their institutions and other forms of expression. On the whole neo-socialism supplements regionalism and civics by adding an industrial lining to the naturalised region with its humanised city. But it is not actually associated with these other two movements as yet, and its partial view of social organisation in its concentration on the industrial shell is, for this reason, as

dangerous as the comparatively incomplete views of regionalism and civics.

What is needed is a synthesis of the three. The three forms of religion expressed by the movement are: regional christianity, with its subordination of public to private life; civic christianity, with its subordination of the individual to humanity; and industrial christianity, with its false and misleading substitution of the individual 'state' for the city or region. The three forms of belief arising from these religions are: the belief in the region, as an expression of the particularist form of society, and in the geographical survey, as the most effective method of realising it; the belief in the city, as the expression of citizenship, and in town-planning as the most effective method of realising it; and the belief in 'the state,' as the expression of citizenship, and in the industrial guild as the most effective method of realising it. These should unite to form one religion and one belief, yielding one inspiring conception of local 'government' resting on individual genius and initiative.

Though these three tendencies, individual, social and industrial, towards liberating change are pursuing separate but parallel paths, it is conceivable that they will quickly unite to develop one common ideal of government and spiritualisation, shaped no doubt, to some extent, by the doctrine of voluntaryism, *i.e.* that all that is produced by labour shall be produced by voluntary effort in free organisations, directly the meaning is clearly seen by everyone. For actually they mean that human beings are once more expressing a desire, through their active representatives, for a social harmony that shall conduct each individual as near to liberty as any human being may ever hope to get.

Philosophically they mean that the restless, ever-aspiring, never-satisfied spirit in man is turning the human mind towards the true source of its own activities once more. To what is it pointing? Surely to Liberty in reality. Surely present-day revivals and reconciliations indicate the renewal of the belief, consciously or unconsciously held, that the fundamental purpose of life is to evolve free beings, free that is in a divine sense, and in an ever-advancing process of human associative unity as an essential factor.

I suppose the first ordinary question of most people when told this would be: "What is Liberty in reality?" Then would come: "What is its true function?" Let me try to answer these questions, and in so doing explain how the attainment of Liberty is the great aim of the regionalist 'government' of France and its chief spiritualising factor.

To begin with, I should say that France is to-day undergoing a great spiritual change, which promises to restore that inspirational supremacy which made it the chief instrument of the transmission of refining influences in the past. There is plenty of evidence to show that the nation is resuming its quest of Liberty in reality. Before producing this evidence, however, I think I should make it quite clear what I mean by Liberty in reality. Otherwise the ground of reconstruction will remain obscure, and naturally the structure upon it will not be seen as a whole. I hold that the discussion of the fundamental principle of the philosophy which is developing in France, the philosophy of a new social form, is of universal importance just now, because out of this philosophy is likely to emerge a decentralised France that may serve as a working model for nations now moving rapidly

towards disintegration preparatory to individualised uniqueness. It should be understood that this philosophy rests on a renewed trust in nature, trust in natural thought and action, and above all trust in a pure language that really externalises vision and thought. Perhaps then the world is witnessing a philosophic renaissance, and the attempt to mould language in reality is the surest sign and beginning of it.

Take for instance the present concern with the mysteries and meanings of Liberty. Nothing would be easier than to show that the human mind has, generally speaking, given this term a changeable value, whereas in reality it defies change. To the rationalist or realist liberty has a concrete reality or nothing. To him this reality may change or be changed. Lord Acton, whose peculiar talent displayed itself in furnishing plenty of matter for controversy, thought the object of government to be liberty. So also think many who hope, by substituting a new government for the existing one, to establish laws ensuring the greatest freedom and welfare of the people. This sounds like a process of changing the literal into the literal; for, when we come to think of it, "the object of government is liberty" is a proposition involving of itself a contradiction. It is not true, and nothing could make it true, not even the support of the great classical authorities on political economy, from Moses to Mill, whose business it was to make shadows out of the sun. It may be objected that 'liberty' is largely used in a relative sense. So it is. Commonly it is spoken of in a concrete sense as freedom. The idea which most persons intend to convey by freedom is an exemption or redemption from bonds or slavery, according to circumstance.

Among the conditions which Robert Owen considered requisite for human happiness, and which were ultimately to be secured to all under the rational system of society, were those of "full liberty to express our thoughts upon all subjects" and "the utmost individual freedom of action, compatible with the permanent good of society." Dr. Havelock Ellis once expressed the opinion, in *The Independent Review*, that "we cannot have freedom in any triumphant degree unless we have restraint"; which is simply another way of expressing the fallacy that "the object of government is liberty." The rationalist or realist conception of liberty is not liberty. It is an extension of consciousness to the objective world by which we are made aware of certain objective restraints; true liberty, on the contrary, is the negation of all properties or qualities attributable to this world. As the mystic or mystic-philosopher conceives liberty it is a negation. That is, it is an activity experienced through the projection of the self, which over-passes those laws which issue from the finite brain. For this reason the mystic comes nearest to the attainment of liberty. He is in fact the only individual who is properly equipped to extract the definable quality from the term. This amounts to saying that only mystics can experience liberty, and therefore only mystics can never be enslaved. They cannot be enslaved simply because, like Swedenborg, who posited a spiritual world in terms of a material one, they have an experience which no one can affirm or deny, and therefore deprive them of it, any more than Blake could be deprived of his power to hold communion with angels. Liberty is then a changeless and definable reality of the mystic life, and is not conferred on

mankind by the group of wise men which Mr. H. G. Wells puts up somewhere to do the governing. Consequently if mankind desires liberation they must approach it through a mystic awakening.

I have defined liberty as an activity serving to rid us of the restraints of matter and force. A definition should also be given of reality, whose meaning differs from that of liberty perhaps in words only. What is reality? What is its function? I would maintain that reality is absolute permanence. This is I believe the most strict and proper use of the term. In this use it signifies that the subject of which it is predicated is something which the human mind cannot change because it is in itself unchangeable. I know we have the habit of speaking of absolute realities, that is realities that do not change, and of objective realities, that is realities that do change, and have different degrees of impermanence according as they are economic, vital or spiritual realities. But the latter, I hold, are really illusionary and properly ought to be called objective appearances. As long as they are miscalled realities, the mind is confused in trying to make a proper use of them. The point of my objection will be seen more clearly perhaps if I say that whereas the function of objective reality is to produce confusion, that of absolute reality is to remove it. Indeed the function of reality is, I hold, to mould language in reality, and thereby to give it a true and permanent form.

If we adopt this definition of reality and believe that its function is to reveal the permanent actions residing in words, it is easy to decide that the present generation has definitely entered upon the search for reality, and that it proposes to use reality to mould not only language but the societary forms issuing from

it. Such, in particular, is its proposal with regard to regionalism. For a long time past language has been coming up for re-valuation. To such an extent indeed has it undergone re-examination, by present-day significant writers and art-producers, that one is justified in saying that the age is engaged upon the production of a philosophy of meaning and forms. Thus language, in no matter what form expressed, has come definitely into the searchlight of inquiry. All who use it with a serious purpose, are making it a rule to ask themselves the precise meaning of the words on which any point they are concerned with, appears to turn and, if they had been used in so many senses that they have lost their true meanings, to ask what these true meanings are and restore them. In no other way is it possible to account for the widespread pre-occupation with definition shown by philosophers and psychologists and scientific writers who, like Mr. Allen Upward, are upholding 'the new word' as the foundation of a possible civilisation; or for the appearance of precision in the handling of words and distinction in expression which characterise new forms of poetry; or for the growing belief that we should write as we speak, because spontaneous speech has a far higher value as an interpreter of human experience than laboured rhetoric. Further, if we reflect a moment, we shall see that the desire for definition has a great deal to do with the feverish experiment with art-forms. Within recent years it would seem as though painters and sculptors have entered an infinite world of experience for the purpose of defining the real actions which their particular forms enclose. They have sought to express movement in form moulded by a moving reality. In France the desire to say things

unchangeably is to be met with in the works of the neo-mystics, neo-symbolists and neo-pantheists. Such writers have accustomed themselves to mould their vision in the language of reality and with that liberty which men attain when they have rid themselves of corrupt language. Advanced politicians likewise find unchangeableness so necessary to the truths of the new societary form which they seek, and to which I will give the name of 'sociocracy,' that they begin with and rest on the definition of terms. Regionalists, in particular, are busy in an attempt so to mould language. Evidently they are convinced that the word 'regionalism' should not only show clearly and certainly what regionalism is, but point out the way to the attainment of it. Of course regionalism in its proper sense has a permanent value, and till this sense is disclosed the value must remain hidden, and the word be dissociated from liberty. Doubtless this is the consideration which has led M. Charles Brun and M. Charles Maurras to study its meaning and to publish the results in two significant books. Both appear to agree that hitherto regionalism has been a word of indeterminate meaning, dimly intended to contain a protest against the evils which befall nations when they hand over the government to cities like Paris, London and Berlin, and the 'state' to a government who at once proceed to behave like an octopus by strangling all outlying regions.

Permanent liberty may then be said to be the basic principle of the new philosophy now moulding social form. Such is, I think, the plain and obvious key of the concrete movement towards regionalism. As I have indicated, regionalism itself is not new. Indeed it is as old as Adam, who was the first practical

regionalist, and as true as *Robinson Crusoe* and *The Swiss Family Robinson* could make it. Moreover it is as common to European nations, to the French, Italians, Spaniards and Germans, as their old forms of decentralisation. But it has a new meaning, new to persons who are accustomed to the artificial one, which the attempt to mould language in reality has brought to light and recent experiences in philosophy, science and religion have done much to verify. From philosophy has come the theory of creative evolution, with its reinstatement of intuition as a means of apprehending something in reality beyond the dead matter of physical science, and with its reassertion of individuality as the handmaid of continuity. This Bergsonism has presumably bred the regionalist doctrine that the only real societary form is an intensely individualistic one. Thus socialism is made to rest on individualism with a view to a possible reconciliation of the two for the first time in our history. From science has come an impulse towards resynthesis, which, as described by Professor Geddes in its relation to education, is "a substantial and definite renewal of the earliest syntheses of the ancient initiations—scientific, philosophic and religious in one." Moreover it is a religious synthesis, because "with this correlation of astronomic, organic and human evolution, we have practically recovered the standpoint of the 148th Psalm, *Benedicite omnia opera.*" Along with this restoration of the universal order has come the idea of a synthetic society, that is an organised unity having freedom in all its component parts, and an origin, growth, development, activity—a life and mind—of its own. Biology, in its turn, has added balance by placing the self-regarding factor of

the old political economists side by side with the species-regarding factor of present-day sociologists; hence a reconciliation of the male and female elements of society, by means of which woman will occupy a proper place. Then psychology has supplemented the old conception of development from within, held by a long line of thinkers from Bacon to Descartes, from Kant to Spencer, with the recent one of development from without held by Wolff, Goethe, Lamarck, Baer and Darwin. So organism is placed in environment or, regionally, man is linked with nature and natural expression. The immediate effect of these experiences on regionalism is that of widening its aim by substituting for a rather narrow conception of local government that of unchangeable liberty. The French regionalist wants himself to be released forever from fettering authority, and his country liberated from the tyranny of the centralised government of Paris, which serves only to subdue the nation to the autocratic will of a small body of jurists and legislators and to paralyse local life and genius.

In the foregoing I have shown the origin, nature and aim, as seen in certain tendencies, of the ideals of 'government' and spiritualisation now actuating France. As this is the main purpose of my paper I shall not discuss practical realisation except briefly and in the form of a summary. To sum up then, France is preoccupied with a conception of regionalism as permanent liberty. Implicit in this aim is the belief that man is a child of the soil who cannot live efficiently without land. To this must be added the astronomer's and gardener's view that occupational activities follow the course of the sun and of nature. So, "each man to his region," says

the regionalist, and this without delay. As for those who have no region, like the town-bred casual labourer, they must be readjusted or left to perish. Materials for the regional structure are not hard to find. Nature, faith in natural propensities, and faith in natural thought and action creatively expressed, are all part and parcel of regionalism moulded in reality. If reality conditions the physical, then the organic, then the social; logically the social must form the very essence of reality, and the reverse.

When we come to methods, however, difficulties appear. To begin with, there is disagreement between the theoretical and practical regionalist as to method. Then there is the difficulty of so overcoming the existing system of centralisation as to remove all its evils. Hence the question how to decentralise without centralising. Further there is the difficulty of dividing France into regions. Evidently, however, there is a simple and popular way out. Much is being done to educate public and parliamentary opinion in favour of regionalism. The public are being initiated into the truth of the false position of France, by societies, federations and conferences organised for the purpose and by an abundance of propaganda literature. Parliamentary education has for some time been pursued along the line of the introduction of measures, by M. Jean Hennessy among other prominent legislators, aiming at administrative reform and the application of the most practical legislative measures to regional organisation. In this way a positive alternative to centralised government has been presented to the Chamber of Deputies. But though it got so far as to appear in official print before the War, it was not till after the War began that it was seen to take effect.

The Government has now adopted M. Jean Hennessy's proposal to set up in each of the military regions into which France is divided, a central economic advisory council for the duration of the War. This is something of a triumph for regionalism, seeing that it lays the foundation for a definite start at a new economic regional order when the War ends.

Perhaps it is too early to speculate on the complete regional structure that will eventually emerge. Certain unseen shaping influences are bound to intervene to modify the original plan. But of this we may be sure, that the structure will have direct reference to the principles stated by P. Foncin in *Region et Pays*. On the administrative side there will be: (1) The division of France into homogeneous regions; (2) the creation of regional centres; (3) the strict conduct of affairs of the region by the region. On the economic: (1) The liberty of regional initiative and genius; (2) the conciliation of the economic interests of each region. And on the intellectual: (1) Education adapted to the needs of the region; (2) development of regional forms of literature, poetry, drama, art and craft with strict regard to the expression of individuality.

From this we may infer that a regional society will arise having the characteristics not of democracy but of what I have termed sociocracy—that is to say, a society composed of individuals capable of regulating the action of society in the interests of themselves. This means it will be constituted so as to leave individuals free to develop the resources of their own region and of their own soul in pursuit of their own material and spiritual profit. I see no other way towards the elimination of 'government,' no other way out from the domination of 'the state' and the

dilemma of property, money and labour, than the wise life (sometimes called the 'simple life') and the law of free organisation. Let the principle of free self-organised action in the individual compatible with the freedom and welfare of the community be applied regionally throughout the world, and the result will be a world-federation of free regions sharing in like spiritual aspiration and needs. Then we shall witness the mystical miracle of the world of matter moulded in reality—after the example of re-spiritualised France.

HUNTLEY CARTER.

IMMORTALITY.

Baron A. HEYKING, Ph.D., D.C.L.

EACH of us presumably has his own opinion about eternity, immortality, God; each may form his own belief in them according to his wish and will. The will is the father to the particular form of belief. In man's opinion and belief the personal, individual factor is predominant. Not so however in science, which deals with facts and laws that everyone must accept even against his own inclination and desire, simply because man is endowed with the power of reasoning and logical conclusion. Of course science is not infallible; it is subject to changes which are the result of more accurate knowledge gained through the progress of time. But undoubtedly the chief characteristic of science is its universality, by means of which all men belonging to a certain period of time must necessarily concur with its lessons and conclusions.

The widest possible tolerance can and must be extended to personal persuasion. It is an absurdity worthy of the darkest ages of religious persecution to apply force in shaping a particular form of individual religious conviction, which by its very nature is the outcome of personal experience only. On the contrary, when such phenomena of nature are under consideration as appear to all human beings in the same way, and stand—as in the case of mathematical axioms—beyond the approval or disapproval of the individual,

then, in face of such universal certainty, no difference of opinion or persuasion can be admitted.

If, therefore, we undertake to investigate the conceptions of eternity, immortality, God, from a scientific point of view, we are avowedly and intentionally not concerned with particular personal beliefs, but leave such to the discernment of each individual or particular denomination of religion. We appeal exclusively to knowledge which is common to all.

The conception of eternity arises from the fact that we do not know of a beginning or an end of the world. What we are able to perceive of this world is simply phases and changes in the constant progress of all that comes to our consciousness and is subject to our observation. We know that the extinction of one appearance of matter forms at the same time the conditions for the advent of another. Any combination of matter can be made to appear and disappear as a solid body or in a liquid or a gaseous state. But no particular form of existence, after finishing its natural life-course, is really extinct. Death does not mean annihilation, but rather marks the passing moment when the atoms, which had entered into a certain temporary combination, are set free for entering a new combination. The cells of which the higher forms of organic life consist have, before entering a certain organic combination, passed through a long chain of phases of existence, procreating themselves constantly, always adapting themselves anew to the changing conditions of existence, and passing on through endless phases of evolution. Nature teaches us that there is no beginning or end of the one substance which is always appearing in constantly changing forms, and that there is no extinction of the forces with which it

is immanent, and which make the universe as a whole and in its minutest molecule vibrate and live, continually progressing. The universe considered both as a whole and in its minutest parts is never at rest; it presents the aspect of an unceasingly moving entity. Even inorganic matter, which has an immovable and lifeless appearance, consists in reality of an agglomeration of infinitely small particles, which are vibrating with ceaseless energy. The limitations of time and space, which seem to exclude eternity, are in reality non-existent. Like so many other illusions, their conception is due to the shortcomings of our narrowly circumscribed powers of observation, a special patrimony of human nature.

Although we know that everything in the whole universe is in perpetual motion, we are able to observe only a comparatively small number of movements—those which are neither too quick nor too slow for our powers of perception. The stars in the firmament appear to be fixed to the naked eye although they travel at enormous velocities; on the other hand, the growth of vegetation is movement which cannot be observed. The one is too quick; the other is too slow. The idea of time is the duration which exists between two boundaries, a 'beginning' and an 'end,' as compared with the eternal. But as nature is constantly moving on, time is, as it were, swept away in the eternal procession. Suppose the universe were at a standstill and, as an exception, a phenomenon of movement came into existence to pass away again, it would then be possible to define time as the duration of that movement. But as everything that happens is only part of the everlasting general movement in nature, time cannot be traced. Black cannot be seen

on black, and a drop of water cannot be traced in the ocean.

The course of the mobile universe cannot be made to stop for a single moment to introduce the element of time, *viz.* a beginning and an end; just as a rolling ball cannot serve as an illustration of rest even for an infinitesimal period. In the constant movement of eternity there cannot be the moment of cessation of time. Therefore time does not really exist.

When our consciousness, which gives us the very notion of time, is eliminated, the sub-consciousness, which remains unaffected by outside influences, is found not to take count of time. In dreams which we can recollect the limitations of time do not exist. Many who have been restored to life from the brink of death—after already losing consciousness—assert that the experiences of all their past life were revealed to their sub-conscious mind in the flash of a moment. Those who are put under anæsthetics, if only for thirty seconds, are under the impression, when regaining consciousness, that they have been asleep for a long time. They are then able to relate dreams which they suppose have covered a period of several hours.

Our conception of time is indissolubly and palpably bound up with the limitations of our nature. There are, for instance, microbes whose course of existence is so short-lived that we cannot succeed in determining the lapse of their existence. Here time is no time, because it escapes our notice. On the other hand, the existence of certain stars extends over such a tale of years that any attempt to number them proves fruitless and the conception of eternity is, so to speak, brought forcibly to our consciousness. Time is, therefore, like

chance, accident, luck or misfortune, only a term invented to express the limitations of our own human nature; outside human affairs it has no existence. It is an appearance, not a reality.

The same can be said of space. The conception of space simply means a circumscribed enclosure. It stands in patent contradiction to the infiniteness of the universe, where instead of the three dimensions, breadth, height and depth, there is but the unfathomable expansion of the infinite.

We know that the gravitation of our planet towards the sun, combined with its centrifugal movement from it, determines the orbit by which a strictly defined space is marked out. Another example of the setting apart of a certain area of space is given by the attraction of our planet to all that is on it or which comes near it. The sphere of the influence of that attraction may be considered as comprising a certain strictly confined space. But these seeming limitations of space are only apparent and not real. The forces of gravitation and attraction which produce the conception of space cannot alter the fact of our knowledge of the immeasurable space of the universe, of which our solar system and the earth in it form but a minute part. A measurable part of an immeasurable space cannot bring that space into measurable limitations. Space, as the human senses comprehend it, is only the expression of the finiteness of human nature.

By regarding eternity as a reality the conception of immortality is implicitly admitted. The everlasting and infinite logically exclude destruction and death.

Eternity and immortality would be synonymous if the special claim of the preservation of individuality

after death did not put a personal significance on immortality. Although there is no doubt that death puts an end to the life of the physical body, the personality formed by earthly existence is surely meant to survive. Let us investigate this claim and the meaning of death in connection with it. Let us see whether the proposition of the individual forming an independent factor outside and in opposition to nature holds good.

Human beings possess the functions of freely moving about, of thinking and forming decisions of their own accord, of considering themselves morally responsible for their own actions, of subjugating the forces of nature to a certain extent to satisfy their own requirements, of changing the earth's surface at will, and persuading themselves that they are the masters and lords of creation. But are they really in any way independent of the laws which govern all nature, and can they be rightly considered as factors by themselves in opposition to the world surrounding them? They cannot even exist without allowing part of the earth and its atmosphere constantly to pass through their organism. They must eat, drink and breathe, and are utterly incapable while alive of leaving the globe, of which they are indissoluble and homogeneous parts. Moreover, although they consider themselves free and independent entities on earth, their fate is predestined by the laws of heredity and by all the accidents of climate, social conditions and other happenings and circumstances absolutely outside their own control.

In the great chain of the evolution of species man stands in intimate connection with the rest of the animal world, and in its turn the animal world is dependent upon the vegetable world which preceded

its appearance on earth. Again, the organic is a continuation of the inorganic world, the former having evolved and still evolving from the latter under certain conditions of temperature, moisture and so forth. In the light of the causal nexus of man, the earth and the universe, it is hardly possible to look upon man otherwise than as an organic and homogeneous part of the latter. But the pretension to claim for man a special position outside nature arises from the assumption of the presence in him of an immortal soul which makes him heterogeneous to nature. To animals the existence of such a soul is denied theologically for unknown reasons. Man is supposed to be the only creature who has the privilege of possessing an immortal soul. This assumption does not carry us any further. The soul is believed to be the personality which remains even after the body has ceased to exist. But if we eliminate the factor of the body, personality in the sense of the known ego is really impossible, as it is precisely the body with its characteristic physical features, its particular capacities and desires and its actions born of physical requirements which constitute the personality. This personality changes considerably in the course of the lifetime of an individual. A child has a different personality from that which develops sixty years later. It therefore appears that the individuality surviving death depends upon the accident of the time of death, a supposition which seems unacceptable.

Equally unacceptable is the supposition of the existence of a subtle body, which is supposed to survive the decay of the earthly body. We know it is the fate of the physical body to fall to dust. How then can that particular form survive?

The spirit in man, the existence of which can be proved by telepathic and allied psychical phenomena, doubtless subsists after death; but it is impossible to define in what form it may survive the physical body. Negatively it may be assumed that it cannot keep the same individuality as on earth, for the same reason that the flame of a torch ceases to exist when the torch has burned away. The phenomenon of life is very much like a flame, burning itself to extinction by using up the material which causes the combustion.

Humanity is like a great tree, constantly subdividing itself into new branches and shoots. Just as the branch of a tree cannot assert an original existence, so the human individual must not forget that he is merely a new shoot on the great tree of humanity and stands in intimate organic cohesion with it. And again, all humanity forms only a part of nature. Our highest realisation and deepest wisdom lie in our conception of the oneness which St. Paul teaches. Nothing is lost, and all that exists lives for ever, although undergoing changes in the stupendous phantasmagoria of the transmutation of the appearance of matter.

But immortality in this sense gives no satisfaction to those who want an assurance of the continuity of their personal ego. Such a presumption, however, is not corroborated by experience, and bears the stamp of the elementary tendency of self-preservation, a tendency which is the chief function whereby man overcomes the obstacles across his path of progress. It may, then, be supposed that the underlying motive in the belief in personal immortality is of a purely physical and not of a spiritual order.

On the other hand, the projection of earthly human

existence into eternity by the assumption that an individuality formed during earth-life is retained after death, is hardly in keeping with the higher aspirations of the spirit. When man's life on earth is over, all associations connected with it necessarily cease. In the sayings of Jesus there are many allusions pointing to this—for instance His answer to the scribe asking what relationship would exist in the next world between the woman and the several brothers whom she had married each in his turn: "Ye do err, not knowing the scriptures, nor the power of God. For in the resurrection they neither marry, nor are given in marriage, but are as the angels of God in heaven" (*Matth.*, xxii. 29 and 30).

As the atoms continually combine in forming new entities in the progressing evolution of nature, so do spirits presumably enter into new and higher formations, which are necessarily unlike earthly experiences as they are free from the fetters of bodily existence.

The human organism, which is claimed to be an independent factor in opposition to surrounding nature, consists in reality of an agglomeration of innumerable cells which, although belonging to the human organism, do their work and live their life outside the volition of the human individual. Thus the human organism characterises itself not as an indivisible entity, but as a commonwealth of cells. The central power of that commonwealth, the personal consciousness of the individual, governs the cells of which the human organism consists only in a very limited degree. The principal functions of our body, for instance the assimilation of food and the change of matter within the body, proceed by the action of its different organs outside our consciousness. The phagocytes, *i.e.* the

white corpuscles in the blood, perform necessary and difficult work to safeguard and benefit the human body, and behave with the utmost sagacity and intelligence, without being directed by the will of man. Individual cells of the human body serve the purposes of life in a more self-conscious, deliberate, practical and moral way than the human being as a whole. In their activity they do not indulge in vice and extravagances which undermine the life of the body and which are the prerogative of man. It may be concluded, therefore, that the cells are altogether superior to and much more subtle than man himself in the application of their energy to the purpose of life. In comparison with their activity in the human organism, man's part in the preservation of his own life is that of a mere stoker, who provides the machine with the necessary fuel, but is not otherwise responsible for its working. In their turn, the cells are agglomerations of molecules, and cannot claim to be units of themselves. Again, molecules are subdivisible into atoms, and so forth.

If, therefore, nature teaches us that the different organisms consist of a complexity of units, which have no less right to individual personality than man, it seems arbitrary and unreasonable to reserve the appellation of individual personality exclusively to the organism of man. If we look beyond this organism, the idea of personality may also apply to a more complex entity than man—for instance the family, the clan, the nation, the race, humanity, the earth as a whole, our planetary system, the universe as a whole, God. The only real individual unit is God, as the eternal spirit immanent in the universe as a whole, and in its minutest parts regulating and preserving it.

Such a definition does not necessarily imply

scientific pantheism, as the spirit of God can reveal itself to a greater or less extent in the different forms of creation. Science will admit that this spirit is more manifest in organisms which are more highly complex and developed than in rudimentary forms of life.

Immortality is then not necessarily bound up with the continuation of that personality which exists on earth. It may, however, be said to be vouchsafed in the spiritual nature of man. The point of view which clings to the personality developed on earth as surviving after death, and for ever, does not bear scientific investigation. Nearer to the truth is the more enlightened conviction that the immortal cannot be fettered by anything finite. It is really not in contradiction to the spirit and aspirations of the Christian and other higher religions to renounce the unsatisfactory assumption that the insignificant self formed in the measurable lapse of earthly existence is perpetuated in eternity.

All points therefore to the fact that death does not mean annihilation, but simply the transformation of the atoms of which the physical organism consists, and at the same time the setting free of the spirit for new forms of existence and for higher destinies. If man is not steeped in excessive love of the passing ego he does not fear death, but is on the contrary eager to cast off the shackles of a petty human existence to take on a higher and more satisfactory order of things, where human personality is gradually immersed and united in the immeasurable fulness of life—that is, in God.

A. HEYKING.

WINTER TWILIGHT.

J. C. LYNN.

THERE is in the early twilight of winter a charm of stillness and soberness which emanates from the pale-featured landscapes and imbues the solitary with a great content. In these northern parts the sun sinks but a short time after the day has passed its prime. The steely lights of a frosty sky are drawn over black-and-white river-sheets, where leafless trees image themselves in broken shape. Birds, chirping quietly, are going to roost in the shelter of the evergreens. Now is the time to feel the hardy cheerfulness of winter outside, inside to make our sacrifice to Vesta, the time for good books and conversation. One hears of various phantom lands, kinds of Elysium; of one which, like Jupiter, enjoys perpetual spring, of another where it is always afternoon, and yet of another where it is ever summer. And yet, though we laud spring and summer and deprecate winter, I doubt whether we should have half the enjoyment in a land where it was eternally fine and all was green. For many people pleasure spells change, and particularly as regards material things. Summer, with its warmth and long days, tempts us to open-air sports; but in the long nights of winter comes the chance of the quieter pleasures of the hearth and of books. And I think anyone born in northern lands and used to long winters and long nights, must often miss these

peaceful evenings when in summer climes. There is nothing perfectly satisfying in this life. In the summer we are apt to absorb all that is pleasant unconsciously and as a matter of course, yet to complain of heat and enervation; in winter, in the same way, we take the pleasures for granted, yet cry out against cold and cheerlessness. So that perhaps it is a wise providence which has ordained the seasons—a providence which understands the frailties of humanity, and knows its craving for change. After all, life is measured not so much by years as by experiences and impressions, which are produced by change. If then we measure years in terms of experience rather than by time, our existence is considerably lengthened by the inclination of our old planet to its ecliptic; for by the seasonal change we crowd into our allotted span a good deal more of that elusive intangibility called 'life.'

Given a bright hearth, an easy-chair, a quiet room through whose windows peers the fading daylight, and near which the birds are crooning their lullabies, and it will be odd indeed if we cannot find a sincere delight in some well-thumbed volume. Winter twilights remind us of bright fires, recall cosy rooms bright with Christmas decorations, comfortable arm-chairs and long evenings spent with books or in talk; quiet spells of dreaming, when the flickering coals provide a stage and players for the fancies of the idle mind, and leap with characters of olden times and ancient stories; chestnuts, the slow curling reek of fragrant pipe smoke and ineffable satisfaction. It is the time for familiar books, for books thoroughly good, with an ancient air of romance, with a thread of quiet joyfulness in accord with the time of year and day. I could get much out of *Lorna Doone* at such an hour. *Virginibus Puerisque*,

Virgil's *Eclogues*, Tennyson's *Idylls*, De Quincey's and Hazlitt's *Essays* are all books of that ethereal phantasy which seems to have then an added charm. For the charm of a book does not depend wholly on its author, but partly on the spirit of its reader. It is rather remarkable that of the many books we read—worthy books too—so few are remembered or identify themselves in any way with our being. It is said that we unconsciously assimilate the volume which we so soon apparently forget; that the sub-consciousness retains the gist of our reading. But we read so much and so quickly now-a-days that I believe it possible to finish a book without receiving a single definite impression from it. It is because we are so seldom in the mood to appreciate the underlying charm of a book that the total fruitage from years of reading is so scanty. Only the facts of a book which we grasp at the moment remain buried in our deeper self—when the brain, like a prepared matrix, receives the stamp of thought.

These wintry afternoons, I think, spread abroad a spirit conducive to the right reading of good literature. There is an atmosphere of peace and a sense of abundance of time, so that one reads without distraction and lays down the book to consider worthy passages. This is the only way to read usefully—to forget that there is an end to the book, to read with a sense of delight, with slowness and deliberation, to stop and dissect all that is not clear. How often a dim thought forming at the back of the mind is not allowed to mature simply because the reader will not lay down his book and wait! I wonder how many people are obsessed with the desire to get to the end of a book, to read on without pause? This is generally the case when I am reading a book for the first time; and I

often think the only good I then get from it is to discover whether the volume is worth reading at all. Once so read, I can then go back to it and peruse it in a leisurely way and with much more satisfaction; and it is only in the subsequent readings, I believe, that I get real pleasure, and unearth the hidden beauties of the author's conception. Like a traveller in familiar country, one knows the interesting places by the wayside and can afford to take one's ease thereat, and dally over their good points. A first reading gives more excitement or physical pleasure, but subsequent readings give true intellectual enjoyment. As the wintry afternoon declines and the light dims, it grows too dark to see the print; yet somehow it goes ill with the feeling in the air to light the candles immediately. There is a period of gloaming when one must perforce set down one's book and lean back in the chair. Thoughts then turn naturally to the contents of the last pages; they are revolved and scrutinised by a mind made admirably critical by time and scene. The gloaming was never meant for any man to work in! It should come as a natural break in the day's work, a spell of leisure for the observation of the beauties of the passing day, when Hesperus leads forth his spangled train from the orient, when the birds cease labour and sing evensong, when trees and flowers often seem breathless before the approach of night—a time, indeed, for thought and dreaming. These interludes, when we grasp at the beauty, the reality, the essence of existence, are the only moments of true life. Then, for a short time, the mind rises above itself, and gleams of that mystic wonderland which always seems to lie just beyond our horizon, bring visions of the everlasting joy. The mind, equable, free from desire, from

irritability, is then in that state which makes good criticism possible. Circumspection comes by way of leisure and calm. There is nothing more calculated to falsify literary judgment than discontent.

For some weeks now, even in grassy fields where the old herbage often acts as a warm carpet against the cold, the ground has been hard as a metalled road. The lakes and some of the larger rivers have been ice-bound. Many days have been dull, without a trace of sunlight, and the frost mist which fills up the valleys at night has clung around all day. But there have been days too of sparkling brightness, yet so cold that even in the mid-day sun the hoar frost has not melted. One morning the fog lifted, and at ten o'clock there was blue sky and sunlight. Every blade of grass, every twig, every roof, every leaf left on those trees which, like gnomes afraid of winter's chill, keep their foliage, was coated with a white mantle of frost-particles; as though some chastening goddess had passed by in the night and transformed all with magic to wondrous beauty. The wintry bowers of the birds in the evergreens gleamed with crystal purity. The thick woods, dark even in the winter season, sparkled with whiteness. The frozen streams were crusted with a spotless covering, and the dead seeds and grasses fringing their banks formed lines of Arcadian statuary more wonderful than the Elgin Marbles. Once more was there a fairy-land on earth. As the sun broke through and blue sky shone out above this immaculate countryside, it seemed as though a part of heaven had fallen in the night and fused with this planet of mortals to show them the Elysian glories and delight them with a glimpse of the unknown beyond. And, as ever in the realms of Pan, there was a strain of sorrow mingled with the joy; yet

it but perfected it, since, as De Musset said, for him who is a stranger to sadness there is no joy.

One thought of the birds.

From the far frozen north, where only the snowy owl pursues his quest in regions of eternal whiteness; from the barrenness and desolation of a great waste, over the virginal mountains, over wild seas that leaped and clutched in cruel frenzies, down many a cold glen and icy fiord, away through the pastures of starvation, had come the redwings. Borne along by the cheerful faith of reaching at last a land of plenty, a land of mildness beyond the rule of Boreas, that frozen-hearted lord of the north, they had winged their tired way to Britain. Many had fallen on the way, into the hungry sea, on the chilly mountains, in the barren plains; yet had the survivors still continued their journey, impelled by that enigma of the out-door world—instinct. And they had come—to more weeks of frost and snow and want. I saw the poor things working hard all day. Before it was light enough to read they were out in the fields hopping about in vain search for food; and they worked until after sunset. They grew weaker daily. Though wild at first, they at last became so tame with hunger that they barely moved out of one's way. They frequented the Mess and officers' quarters, to see if some stray crumbs perchance had fallen near the refuse-bins or if any scraps were still on bones abandoned by the dogs. Their crimson breasts and underwings gleamed in the snowy whiteness of the fields and their call, like the crack of a passing shot, sounded all day. A song-thrush too was there. He was easy to recognise, for he had lost his tail; and I saw him regularly in the morning, as I was going to breakfast, near the door of our quarters. I felt it on

my conscience to go into the Mess and have good meals whilst the birds outside were starving. To ease it, I threw out some crumbs daily, and they were gone in a moment.

Here is a case of Nature's apparent cruelty. We are wont to look upon the Force of Life as omnipotent and kind; yet how can we explain the starving of the birds? It is one of the many forms of the unanswerable question of the wilds.

Yesterday there was, quite unexpectedly, a slight thaw for a few hours, and as the sun set there was a singing of thrushes in the trees as in spring. How wonderful a spirit, to break into song at the very first signs of returning mildness, with body thin and weak! Truly the wild creatures know no sorrows; it is only man who sees sadness in their kingdom, and it springs from his own soul. I have but seldom seen gulls in this district, so far inland; but they have appeared lately, fighting with the rooks for pieces of food. Twice I heard and saw a lesser redpoll, another uncommon bird in this locality.

A very beautiful paragraph in the morning paper to-day described some of the early signs of spring, and suggested that we should not now have long to wait for its coming. But the dream which arose as the flowing lines, full of imagery, were read, faded away before the thought of what must still be in these northern parts before the breath of spring can once more reanimate the earth. There came a forecast of many snows and frosts, of many days of barrenness and leaflessness, of pale, wan banks and flowerless hedgesides, of the squelch of melting snow and the greyness of heavy skies. And then again beyond all these came a longing which framed a vision of the things of spring, when

Proserpine is abroad, and myriad forms come into being in her footsteps and sonant voices follow her in the woods. For the vision of the hoped-for always triumphs over our fears.

And how shall we define the creator of the frosts and snows, the journeys of the birds, the procession of the years, the movement of life? Nature is that force which decrees the pageant of the seasons; it is the force which moulds the species and diversifies life into countless forms; it is the force which regulates the mechanism of the cosmos, which binds the universe in its illimitableness into something law-abiding and orderly. It is the law-giver, the life-giver, the supreme ruler of all. It is the supreme beauty, the supreme truth, the supreme peace. Nature, to put it briefly, is the motive power of the cosmos. Nature is God.

Stars, glittering like diamonds on a field of blue velvet, shine at the close of these winter twilights as at no other time. There is a clear air in which natural objects stand out sharply—none of the mistiness which softens summer scenes. It is the pen-and-ink as compared with the water-colour, the angular as compared with the curved, the frozen as with the flowing. And Diana, from her silver chariot in the skies, looks down as though contemplating once again, in these days of philistinism, a visit to her Endymion. For in the twilight hope is strong and all things are possible. Faith is of Aurora and the morning; but hope, her youthful sister, is of the twilight.

It is at such times that one realises the source of all inspiration, all art. Our natural philosophy is still in a nebulous stage; and what is it but an investigation and classification of the laws of the wilds? That creative force which moulds the universe has discovered

and utilised, during the countless eras of its action, those laws of which we are now obtaining a rudimentary knowledge and utilising it for our purposes. What is architecture, what sculpture, what engineering, what agriculture, but a right use of those natural laws which the human brain has elucidated and appropriated for its own use? If, then, that creative force is the originator of these laws and has utilised them for its own ends since the beginning of time itself, how vastly superior must be its creations to those of man, who even yet stands but on the threshold of the known.

Our art and our industry are based on our incomplete knowledge of natural law. The more complete that knowledge the more perfect the work. And as we grasp not the whole, but only a very small part, our conclusions may be wrong; for in the exploration of that vast unknown which lies ahead we may be confronted with other laws that will scatter existing theories to the winds. What proof is there, for instance, that what we call elements are actually indivisible? None. Only that, with the laws that we already know and are able to utilise, they appear to be elemental. The measure of our knowledge of natural law is the measure of our power of creation and, inversely, the measure of our conscious ignorance. But because we cannot cure chronic bronchitis or understand the migration of birds, that is no reason why we should never be able to do so; and because our theories at present cannot be refuted, that is no certain proof of their everlasting stability. We thus conclude that as science and industry advance themselves by a closer acquaintance with the laws of Nature, so also is Nature the source and inspiration of art.

J. C. LYNN.

DEBOUT, LES MORTS!

A LEGEND OF THE PYRENEES.

JESSIE L. WESTON.

THE silence of the winter night brooded over the little mountain town. Cold, still, lonely it lay, separated from the world beyond by the towering walls of rock which swept backward in a wide curve. Tier upon tier the terraces rose, as if the hand of some pre-historic race had carved from the living rock a circus from which the giants of old might view at their ease the sports of the puny race that crouched beneath their feet.

On the inner side, where the amphitheatre lay open, the road sloped steeply downward between the lofty cliffs, which now and again narrowed till the passage was little more than a precarious pathway above the edge of the precipitous mountain gorge, then again swept back, leaving a road-space between them and the steep descent to the river-bed. But always the approach was stern and rugged, a road for daylight travellers, to be avoided after nightfall, when an unwary step might send the heedless crashing downward to the jagged rocks far below. Even on this Christmas Eve, when the moon shone brilliantly in the frosty sky above and the snow which clothed the mountain heights in a glittering mantle gleamed white on the earth below, it was scarcely a road for one who might choose his path.

Was there such an one abroad to-night, or was it but the shadows cast by the strange rock-formations that gave birth to the illusion? Almost it seemed as if from the snow-clad mass of rock something had become detached—something that moved slowly, silently upward, now lost in the deepening shadows as the rock walls drew closer inward, now vague, indistinct and yet unmistakeably living upon the lifeless plain where the walls receded from the gorge.

And now through the deep silence of the night came the slight yet clear sound of metal striking upon stone, the steady rhythmic beat of a horse's hoof, the tinkle of pebbles dislodged and rolling downward over the edge of the mountain path. Now and again came another and less familiar sound, the clash of metal upon metal. The rider was armed, armed in a fashion strange to the eyes of to-day—a knight, in full mediæval harness, helmet, coat of mail, shield and spear, with mantle floating from his shoulder. Mounted on a snow-white steed he rode slowly, wearily, as one bowed with the weight of years, up the rocky path to the amphitheatre where the mountains stood aside and gave space for the little town to shelter beneath their lofty terraces.

There, drawing rein, he stood, a strange, still figure, white, as though carved out of the surrounding whiteness, living, as though by some supreme effort of will he had detached himself from the dead world around. For some minutes he stood motionless; then, lifting his head, he sent forth into the silence of the night a cry, high, thin, wailing, that swept round the rocky semicircle like a wandering wind, a blast that sweeps through the hollow, echoing depths of some cavern, and dies as it reaches the open air.

“ Arise, ye Dead, and ride with me to free the Holy Places ! ”

Three times he cried ; and the third cry was faint and eerie, as the wind that stirs and passes before the dawn.

Then for a space he waited, as one who hearkens for an answer. But sound or movement there was none ; no wind stirred responsive in the crevasses of the towering hills, no shadowy form moved upon the snow-clad earth. Above, the moon shone in untroubled serenity ; the peace of Christmas held the world in its keeping.

Slowly the rider turned in his tracks ; wearily, as one on whom an unfinished task weighed all too heavily, he set his charger's head to the mouth of the gorge, to pass downward once more. Again there was the faint and fitful sound of horse-hoof upon stone, the fall of a stray pebble ; then silence, silence and snow.

* * * *

Above, in the church of the little mountain town, the midnight Mass was being offered. Lights gleamed brightly on the altar ; the priest in vesture of white and gold bowed low in adoration, while the choir chanted the *Adeste Fideles* and the people knelt in silent prayer. The church was filled with fragrant clouds of incense that floated round the massive pillars and low-curved arches, and settled here and there on the broken carving of the old tombs with their quaint effigies of armed, recumbent knights. The doors were closed against the bitter cold outside ; within all was warm, warm with the material flame of torches, with the spiritual glow of ardent worship, of faith and prayer.

Yet, in the very midst of the service, it seemed as if a cold wind had found entrance through some unheeded opening—a little whispering wind that scarcely stirred the flame of the candles, yet eddied round the arches and made the worshippers draw their loosened wraps more closely round their shoulders, made them lift their heads too, and gaze into each other's eyes with a meaning look. And as the little wind returned, once and yet again, old women nodded their heads with an understanding air, and whispered low the one to the other, "Listen! the Templar calls."

Little Marie, the Innkeeper's daughter, raised her eyes appealingly to her father's face; then, meeting his reassuring smile, slipped her hand into his, and drew closer as if for protection against some threatening danger. Later, when the folk after the final blessing flocked out of the church and, exchanging Christmas greetings, took their way homeward over the frozen snow that crackled beneath their feet, she breathed a low, half-terrified question: "Was it the Templar, father?"

"Surely, little one, thou knowest he calls every Christmas Eve."

"But whom does he call?"

"The Dead, little one. See, in old days, there were many of his Order here. All along this road to the frontier, and over the border in Spain, they had their churches where they now lie buried. Thou knowest their tombs along the Southern wall? He calls on them to rise and ride with him, to free the Holy Land from the Turk."

"And no one answers?"

"No one. He has called for many a year now; my father and grandfather heard him, and their fathers

and grandfathers before them. Ever, as Christmas comes, he calls ; and no one answers."

" *Mon père*, will they *never* answer ? "

" Ah, who can say, little one ? Not in my day nor, I think, in thine. Yet perchance the night may come when they will hear the call and . . . wake."

" *Mon père*, I would be there to hear."

" *Mon enfant*, when the Dead rise, who shall say how it will go with the Living ? Maybe it were better not to be there."

" But I should wish to be."

The child spoke with a grave insistence. She was a strange child, the Innkeeper's Marie, grave and thoughtful beyond her years. Not a clever child, the teacher of the Commune school declared, yet with a secret reservation behind the statement. It was true that Marie shewed but little interest in her lessons, was seemingly indifferent to her place in class and, gentle as she was, opposed a soft impenetrability to the ordinary routine of teaching and discipline. Insubordinate she was not, but where there was a possibility of escape she took it. Her faculties seemed to waken to full activity only when there was a question of Nature-teaching. It was always Marie who found the first blossoms of the rock-plants that pierced their way through the winter covering of snow. It was Marie who knew where the birds nested, where the wild things made their home. No one could foretell the weather so surely as she ; and no mood of Nature, however capricious, seemed to dismay her. If overtaken by a summer storm in her wanderings, she shewed no terror of the lightning that flashed in jagged spears of rose and blue and purple from the cloud-wrapped heights, no shrinking before the

crashing peals of thunder that echoed in seemingly endless resonance from the ravines around. She was a true daughter of the mountains; breathing their air from her birth, she seemed to have drawn into her being their unruffled calm and steadfastness, to have made herself one with them in their purity and peace.

So the years passed on. The child grew to girlhood; the girl stood on the threshold of womanhood. It was time she married, her parents said. With true French foresight they sought for a fitting husband, and found him in the eldest son of a farmer and small landowner in one of the valleys that lay lower down the mountain slopes. Jean was a steady youth; hard-working, thrifty, he loved the open-air life to which he had been reared, and there was no fear that the lure of the town would have a message for his ears, or that he would seek to take his bride from the heights to which her soul clung. He loved the girl too with a genuine affection, none the less real though it lacked the facile expression of the average Frenchman; and the girl had a kindly feeling for him. So the betrothal was arranged, and the marriage should have followed with but short delay.

Then, without warning, the shadow of the Great War fell upon the land, and town and country, hill and plain, lowland and mountain height had to yield their tribute to the forces of destruction which the boundless ambition of one man had loosed upon the world.

Jean, who had already passed his military service, was among the first to be called up. He fought through the awful struggle of those late summer months of 1914, when French and British reeled backward in a seemingly desperate attempt to stem the overwhelming

tide of the German invasion, yet in the end, with superhuman effort, rallying their exhausted forces, rolled back the menace from the very gates of Paris.

More fortunate than most, Jean survived the campaigns of the Aisne and Champagne without a scratch and shared in the heroic defence of Verdun, to fall finally, desperately wounded, in the advance on the Somme. Slowly he won his way back to life, his right arm gone and his life as a soldier ended, but with the Croix de Guerre on his breast and the knowledge of work well done in his heart.

He and Marie could be married now and, as he dimly felt, with a fairer prospect of happiness than two years before. He had proved his manhood. The cataclysm which was shaking the world to its foundations, though outwardly it had not ruffled Marie's habitual calm, had awakened in her a keener sympathy for her fellows. Always at the back of her mind was the dominating thought that, come what might, let the storm of men's evil passions, lust and cruelty, rage as it would, her beloved mountains would stand unmoved. Child of the everlasting hills, she stayed her soul within their eternal peace. But from this inner sanctuary she had learned to reach forth helping hands to those who, not sharing her deep love for Nature, were overwhelmed with the tide of suffering that beat at their very doors. For though the actual tumult of war was remote from this mountain stronghold, there was not a household that did not suffer in the person of husband, son or brother, who was taking his share in the agony of the fighting line. So when her lover came back to her, scarred and maimed, Marie met him with a simple directness of affection and sympathy that acted as a tonic to the war-weary man, and made him feel

that for him at least the tempest had passed, and that he had come to an assured haven.

Very quietly and very happily he walked beside her to the midnight Mass on the Eve of this their third Christmas of War. They were to be married in the New Year, and his heart was filled with thankfulness as he remembered the previous Christmas in the mud and slush of the trenches, enemy guns sending missiles of death overhead, and around him sights and sounds which he felt no distance of time and space could ever rob of their horror. Suddenly his mind swerved back from the thoughts of war to the recollections of his childhood; he looked at the girl beside him with a smile:

"Marie, dost remember the old tale of the Templar?"

The girl looked at him with a surprised glance in her dark eyes:

"Why surely, Jean, how could I forget? And this year above all!"

"But why? What has this year to do with the old tale?"

Marie spoke gravely, "Didst thou not read in the paper how the British are marching on the Holy Land? Some say they will reach Jerusalem by Easter."

Jean nodded. "'Tis true, I read it. But what has that to do with our Templar? Dost think he will call to-night?"

"He always calls, Jean, always; I have listened ever since I was a little child. But to-night . . . I think he may have his answer."

The young man looked at her startled: "So, thou dost think that? Well, if there be truth in the old

tale—and—*Mon Dieu!* when one has been in the trenches one has seen strange things—why then, if the Dead are ever going to rise, now is their time.”

Marie nodded. “It will be to-night, or never, I think.” And, as they passed under the porch into the lighted church, she whispered into her lover’s ear: “Listen, listen well, Jean!”

So as Jean knelt with the opening chant of the *Kyrie* he said to himself he would listen for the summons.

Little by little it was borne in upon him that others beside himself were listening too. Surely there had never been so attentive a congregation. As stage by stage the service moved to its great consummation it seemed as if the priest himself were conscious of the unusual stillness. There was no rustle of changing posture among the kneeling worshippers, no scrape of chair upon stone, not even a cough. The church seemed held in an awe-struck silence—through which the priest’s voice sounded faltering, oppressed. What were they waiting for?

Far off, in the distant gorges of the mountain, there rose a little sound. At first faint, remote, it grew gradually in strength and volume. Then with a deafening roar a rushing blast of wind smote upon the church, with a wailing cry swept round it, and died away into silence.

Startled, the worshippers raised their heads and gazed at one another. As Jean looked up his eyes met those of Marie. Question and answer flashed from one to the other—doubt, amazed incredulity on the one side, the assurance of a long expectation satisfied on the other. But even as they exchanged glances it came again, stronger, louder than before. The very

walls rocked. Surely another such blast would bring the building about their ears! There was a stir among the people, a movement. Dared they wait for a possible catastrophe? Dared they leave the shelter of the building to face the hurricane without?

Even as they hesitated the climax came. With a mighty shout the wind was upon them again. The doors burst open, and a sweeping blast extinguished alike the tapers on the altar and the oil lamps that lit the nave. For a space the church was filled with terrific swirls of air; it was as if all the winds of the world were prisoned within its walls or were striving to enter. Men and women crouched before the fury of the storm, holding to each other in a dumb terror, too awe-stricken to cry out. And through the storm came a strange rending sound, the crack and groan of stones in upheaval, the crash of block against block as the masses parted by some mighty force came together again. What was happening? There were voices in the wind too, shouts and cries.

And now the tumult in the church had died down. Outside the wind still roared; but the blasts were less violent. With each moment they seemed to recede. It was almost as if a mighty host were passing, had passed, taking their way through the ravine to the valley below. Then came stillness, and silence, the silence of a winter's night. The visitation, whatever it might have been, had passed them by.

There were stifled cries, sobs, the stirring of a panic-stricken crowd. The priest's voice rose above the rising clamour, calm and steady. "Wait for the light, my children, and we will see what has happened."

White-faced, with trembling hand, the sacristan relit the altar candles. One by one they gleamed out,

shining steadily through the gloom. There was no breath of wind now to stir their flame. Then he touched the wicks of the lamps. As they sprang into life, the folk gazed at each other, and then around. What had happened?

Apparently nothing. The fabric of the old church stood steady; walls, vaulted roof, arches, pillars, all seemed as they were. But as their glance fell downward they discerned ominous signs of the strange upheaval. Here and there the flags of the aisle had lifted; here and there the tombs ranged against the walls shewed unwonted cracks and crevices, as if some irresistible force had heaved up the covering slab or driven outward the solid blocks that formed the side.

The calm voice spoke again. "It was an earthquake . . . let us give thanks to God, my children, that He has so mercifully preserved us from its dangers." And the folk fell upon their knees.

The service was at an end. The worshippers streamed out into the night, a night as calm and peaceful as it had been before the strange rending blasts of that mighty wind.

Freed from the restraint of their surroundings, their tongues broke loose in a babel of excited comment, of question and answer. Jean passed his arm through Marie's and drew her a little apart. He looked at her, a question in his eyes and on his lips.

"Thou thinkest it was?"

"The Templar? Surely. Didst thou not see their graves were open? Did I not tell thee how it would be, *mon ami*? The Dead have risen, in very truth, and have ridden to free the Holy Places."

And in years to come, when the remembrance of

the earthquake of that Christmas Eve has become a distant memory, there will be those who, like Marie and Jean, will remain convinced that on that night the age-long quest of the Templar attained its term, that his fellow knights rose at his call, and rode forth to join the khaki-clad ranks who marched to the freeing of Jerusalem.

JESSIE L. WESTON.

SKIAMORPHISM IN SHADOWLAND

E. P. LARKEN

IN *THE QUEST* for January, 1914, an account was given of a race of shadows which existed solely for the purpose of enabling their owners to make perfect the experience which they required to fit them for the Shadowless Land. The shadows themselves came and went, and passed as shadows into nothingness, except in so far as the owners succeeded in influencing and, by influencing, in drawing into themselves portions of their shadows' personalities. The object of each owner was to come into as close touch as possible with his allotted shadow for the time being, in order so to influence it; because the more fully this was done the sooner did the owner become fitted for the Shadowless Land of his desire.

In *THE QUEST* for January, 1915, it was pointed out that a hostile element called the 'power of darkness' strove to break or weaken, as far as possible, the contact which the owners sought to establish with their allotted shadows, to the injury of the owners and the utter ruin of the shadows. This power of darkness was being continually reinforced by the passing into it of those parts of shadow-personalities which the owners had failed to influence and draw into themselves. In the following paper an important aspect of the relationship between owners and shadows is dealt with, wherein the power of darkness makes itself felt.

Throughout the long course of their association with their owners, a course which, by shadow-estimate, may be considered as infinite, the shadow-nature passed through numberless phases. Many of these phases, perhaps all of them, proved from time to time contradictory. We have seen that what was right at one time and under one set of circumstances, became utterly wrong at another and under different circumstances. But from the beginning of the relationship the shadows followed a plan from which they never deviated. It was in fact a plan from which it is unthinkable that they should deviate. They ascribed to their owners, in as far as the dimness of their vision allowed them to discern them as owners, certain qualities which for the time seemed to the shadows the most desirable that they themselves should possess. Thus in the history of Shadowland we find that violence, lust, craft, cruelty, jealousy, treachery and wrath, all predominating qualities in Shadowland at the time, were ascribed in a supreme degree by the shadows to their owners. As time went on and the association of shadows with owners brought about the modification in shadow-nature to which I referred, these qualities were rejected by the shadows with horror and came to be ascribed to the owner's opponents, the power of darkness. But even then the habit of the shadow-mind persisted and shadows ascribed to the owners other qualities then predominating, or considered as desirable to predominate, in Shadowland.

Now it may be imagined that in reversing the attributes of their owners, in replacing violence, lust, cruelty, fraud, by justice, mercy and love, the shadows were consciously admitting an error, an error

discovered on emerging from darkness into light. But this is not wholly the case. The object of the association of owners with shadows was, it must be repeated, to enable the owners, by every experience, so to perfect themselves as to become ripe for admission into the Shadowless Land. Now a moment's thought will show us that qualities which, however they may come in time to be regarded with loathing and contempt, were originally held in admiration and esteem, were, in those times and under those circumstances, qualities which acted as channels for the close association of owners with their shadows. In fact, given the conditions required, they were the best if not the only means available whereby a shadow could come into touch with its owner. Now owing to the fact that the shadows became conscious of their relationship with their owners through the means indicated, it was natural enough that they should ascribe those qualities to the nature of the owners themselves, saying that the owners themselves were jealous and irritable, lustful and selfish, violent and cruel, as the case might be. Needless to say that the owners were none of these things, but that they employed the qualities so called, as in the nature of things they were compelled to employ them, in establishing and making closer their relationship with the shadows.

Once more I must caution the reader to bear in mind that when the shadows are spoken of as being aware of their owners, or as being in conscious touch with their owners, it is not *quâ* owners that this is meant. Of the relationship as a fact the shadow was aware, very often in the fullest possible sense, but the real significance of the relationship was faint and dim. To a shadow its owner represented an order outside

itself, with which it felt itself in touch, which represented and made for something higher, more lasting and more powerful than anything of which it was aware in Shadowland. Hence it came about that when a shadow recognised certain qualities as predominating over and crushing out all others, it came to ascribe them to its owner and to say: My owner (or its dimly known equivalent) is a cruel owner and loves bloodshed, or is a jealous owner and demands all my flattery, or is a lustful owner and delights in things of the flesh.

This view was all very well at the time. The shadow in the nature of things could rise to no other conception of its relationship with its owner than those given. The mischief of it was this: so ingrained in the shadow-nature became this view of the nature of the owner that, when in process of time contrary views came to prevail, the conservative prejudices of the shadows fought against them tooth and nail. It was held to be something worse than foolishness to deny that the owner was cruel, lustful, or jealous. But the owners forced upon the shadows, in spite of themselves, the other views, in order of course that the full purpose of the relationship might be achieved. This curious and dangerous state of things therefore arose. The shadows involuntarily became themselves higher and purer and more 'ownerlike' than the conception which they had formed and held of their owners. While they developed under the influence emanating upon them from their owners, the knowledge which they had gained of the nature of their owners remained fixed.

But for a shadow to feel itself better than its owner was but one step to feeling wholly ownerless.

This step was soon taken. In the history of Shadowland whole long periods elapsed in which, so far as their consciousness was concerned, the bulk of the shadows were without owners. Happily the danger to the owners which arose from this state of things was obviated by the power they possessed, a power to which I have referred in another paper, of operating upon the subconscious part of the nature of their shadows.

Now when, as in course of time they succeeded in doing, the owners were able to impress upon their shadows a truer, or at least a purer and fuller, conception of themselves, the shadows persisted still in making the old mistake. They ascribed to their owners qualities which the owners had made the shadows conscious of in themselves and used as channels for communicating with them. It was the old mistake and led to the old confusion of ideas.

Cruelty, craft and lust yielded place, as the predominating influences in Shadowland, to benevolence, justice and self-mastery, and by means of these influences the owner strove to come into touch with his shadow. The inevitable result was that the shadow came to think of its owner as being himself benevolent, just and pure, just as in old days it had come to think of him as cruel, crafty and lustful. In fact the tendency to what may be called 'skiamorphism' seemed ineradicable in the shadow-nature.

But this attitude of mind in the shadow, though perhaps inevitable, was not the right one. All that a wise shadow could justly say on the point was something like this: "Justice, benevolence and purity are I know mightier forces than their opposites. They, and not the opposites, are the channels by which I

can communicate with my owner and my owner with me. But further than this I cannot go. I cannot predicate the possession of these qualities, which seem to me higher and stronger and more effectual for the full carrying out of our relationship than the others, to my owner himself."

Remember that the greatest of all injuries that a shadow could inflict upon its owner was an insincere belief in regard to the relationship in which it stood. Insincerity in this respect was the sin for which no pardon could be obtained.

E. P. LARKEN.

CROSSING THE BAR.

J. ARTHUR HILL.

MANY no doubt have wondered as to who or what exactly Tennyson meant by his 'Pilot' in 'Crossing the Bar.' The fact is that the poet had a very strong belief in a real spiritual world—a belief based on both objective and intuitional facts—and he felt sure that at death we are met and helped by friends; perhaps, those of us who are worthy, by the Friend whom he seems to suggest. And indeed who shall deny such a possibility? If the 'dead' live, that Person lives; and, being a 'helper of His comrades' in life, He may well meet His chosen ones in death. I do not know. But the idea does not seem incredible. I am, however, convinced that when we cross the bar we are met and helped by someone, whether it be Jesus or some friend of our earthly days. In the former case no proof is possible; in the latter case something very like proof is obtainable. In my own psychical investigations I have come across several instances of this proof.

For example, sitting with a certain sensitive (who is not a regular professional medium) I was told that an old gentleman named Leather was present—a man of over eighty, very gentlemanly, rather retiring, who died a few years ago. The medium hesitated to give the name, for he had never heard it before as a name, but only as meaning the material of which boots, etc., are made. But it was quite correct. I had known a Mr. Leather, and the details given were true and

characteristic. This was at a sitting in my own house at Bradford, Yorkshire. Four months later, the medium wrote to me from Bournemouth, saying that he had an impression of a man named 'Parberry,' an old man whom I had known, a man who retained his faculties almost to the end of his life, keenly interested in me; "Christian name perhaps Robert, not sure." This man—the sensitive felt—was waiting about for some old friend to pass over.

The fact was that Mr. Leather's full name was Robert Parberry Leather; it also happened that at the time when the medium wrote that letter, Mr. Leather's most intimate friend and lifelong chum and brother-in-law lay dying, near his old home and three hundred miles from Bournemouth. This old friend died eleven days later; and at a sitting a year afterwards the two of them came together, the medium naming and describing them with absolute exactness. I am quite sure that the person Mr. Drayton (the second old man) would most like to meet him when he crossed the bar, would be his old chum Mr. Leather, who by the way had retained his faculties almost to the last, as stated, for he was exceptionally youthful and alert up to his paralytic seizure, after which he died in a few hours, never regaining consciousness, in February, 1909.

Mr. Leather has since brought other friends of his, apparently to convince me of his identity and genuine agency. In one case it was a friend I had never heard of, and it took me a long time to track him down. But everything turned out correct. This case disproved telepathy from my own mind. I think that was Mr. Leather's purpose in bringing that particular man. He wanted to give me evidence which could not be accounted for by mind-reading. As to the medium's

own knowledge, I have every reason to believe that he had never heard of any one of these three men. They did not live in his neighbourhood, and they lived very retired lives, all being over eighty at death. Moreover fraud is excluded, not only by absence of motive (the medium coming really for a friendly chat and always refusing anything approaching a fee), but also by the fact that he often gets messages characteristic of certain spirits, which it would be impossible for anyone to concoct by inquiry—things concerning intimate family matters and the like.

Another series of incidents concerning altogether different people similarly indicated this fact of our being met. When here in December, 1914, the medium felt the influence of someone called Walker, but could get no more; in fact he seemed uncertain about the second syllable. Some time afterwards he wrote to me that he was feeling (while holding a letter of mine in his hand) the presence of a parson, a gentlemanly man, initials A. S. W. It happens that the initials of the minister whose sermons I listened to for seventeen years when I was a boy and young man, were A. S. W.; the surname was Walkley. He died in 1900, and no relatives are left about here. Then at a sitting on Feb. 17, 1916, the medium said that there was going to be a funeral soon, of some old lady over eighty, who had failed gradually; and an old man was waiting about for her, a grey-bearded man in a clerical hat. The fact was that Mrs. Walkley, our old minister's widow, had died two days before, and the funeral was the day after. She had lived many miles from here since her husband's death—mostly in a town two hundred miles away—and I do not believe that the medium had ever heard of her or indeed of

her husband either. Apparently Mr. Walkley had come to meet her, as Mr. Leather came to meet his old chum; and though she was already dead at the time of the sitting, she evidently had not yet got far away—in fact she was probably still in the recuperative sleep which seems to follow death—and consequently her husband was still in these regions, and could communicate or at least give identifying indications of his presence.

I have had several other pieces of evidence of this character, and some of them seem to eliminate any reasonable application of any theory of chance-coincidence, fraud or mind-reading. They seem explicable only on the supposition that a certain discarnate mind was operating, in a definite and purposeful way. And through a long series of sittings I think my best identity-evidence has been of this kind—namely messages or symbolical presentations from spirits who were waiting about for some relative or friend to go over. Apparently they can perceive the presence of a medium who happens to be with anyone they know—it has been said that mediums show a ‘light’ in our dim grey world of matter—and they can then usefully pass the time, while waiting, by sending a few signals, if no more. Fuller details of this and other similar cases are given in my book *Psychical Investigations*.

And it is not only a question of mediumistic messages. Dying people often see their welcoming friends, and say so. Attendants put it down to ‘hallucination’; and hallucination it may be in some cases, though it is a fact that the hallucinations of disease in other stages are usually of quite another order. But in most cases of this kind there is reason to believe that the seer has really achieved psychic

vision, the veil of flesh having worn thin, and is seeing in actuality into the spirit-world. Usually this cannot be proved, but occasionally it can—namely when the percipient sees the spirit of some one *whom he does not know to be dead*. There is a case of this sort in Dr. Minot J. Savage's *Psychic Facts and Theories*. A little girl and her most intimate friend both fell ill with diphtheria. One died, but her death was carefully kept from the other. This latter, shortly before her own passing, saw and named several relatives on the other side; then, suddenly stretching out her arms, said: "Why, papa! you did not tell me that Jennie was here! Oh, Jennie, I'm so glad you are here!"

These facts seem to me eminently helpful and consoling. We shall all be met and helped over and cared for. Our soldier boys who have made the great sacrifice at call of duty, have not had a lonely crossing or a welcomeless arrival. They have been met and helped over and cared for—some perhaps by grandparents or other relatives, others by friends killed previously (this I know to have been so in some cases), others perhaps by special messengers. All meet their pilot and find a friend; and if it is not Tennyson's Pilot Himself, it is at least a welcomer partaking of His spirit, doing His will, and thereby representing Him.

J. ARTHUR HILL.

'UNTO CÆSAR SHALT THOU GO.'

A REVIEW OF 'I APPEAL UNTO CÆSAR.'¹

THE individual conscience, in its beginnings, was necessarily the reflex of the social, without which it would not have been possible, and to which its origin and development were largely due. Not only has its comparative independence been of slow growth, but it is even now largely conditioned by its surroundings. The child, like our primitive ancestors, passes through a non-moral stage, to be succeeded by one in which conduct is regulated by the will of others, by the imposition of external law. The sense of freedom and responsibility grows with self-consciousness. Later on there emerge the universal moral ideals, such as Justice, Truth and Freedom, which are the same in principle in all times and places, but whose interpretation and application depend upon the changing conditions of civilisation. And this is the case, not only on a large, but on a small, scale. Kant's 'categorical imperative,' whatever its origin, has no more than an abstract reference, or, at most, enforces general principles of conduct, leaving the details to be filled in according to circumstances. Over a wide field, then, the conscience is plastic and takes the impress of its environment. Hence the vital importance of correct moral training for the young. Hence the particular formations of conscience among religious bodies and professions. Hence the influence, and often the tyranny, of social centres, which have imposed, with the force of moral obligation, mere matters of fashion or custom, such as duelling. In fact, custom enters so largely into moral conduct that some moral philosophers have sought to reduce it altogether to this, both as regards its sanctions and content. But the ideal element is not so easily ignored, which consists in the idea of perfection, or at least of betterment, and the sense of obligation to make this the aim. It is this element which, co-operating with the changing circumstances of human civilisation, makes moral advance possible. The morality of custom, when the circum-

¹ By Mrs. Henry Hobhouse. With an Introduction by Professor Gilbert Murray. London (Allen & Unwin); pp. xxii. + 86; 1s. net.

stances change which called it into being, degenerates into formalism, the hard crust of which can be pierced only by an intuition which applies the ideal to the new conditions. This is the task of a moral reformer, of a genius, not of an ordinary man. But, when the breach has been made with the static social convention, though the intuition is individual, its appeal must always be universal—i.e. to a broader and higher reason underlying the social synthesis. It cannot be an appeal only to sentiment, which, from its nature, is multiform and variable. It differs with each individual, and so-called 'common' sentiment can only be recognised as such when based on reason. Hence every intuition, and every sentiment, being individual, must be brought to the bar of reason before it can be received as current coin. The one reacts upon, and must correct, the other; but the instructed reason is the ultimate court of appeal. Otherwise there is no means of distinguishing the claims of intuition from the errors of madness or fanaticism.

It is the failure to recognise this cardinal truth that is the primary fallacy of all who make the claims of the individual conscience absolute as against the social. The only absolute elements in morality are the idea of perfection and the sense of obligation together with the great moral ideals. Their application to actual circumstances can never be absolute, and it depends therefore ultimately upon the general, not the individual will. And because no conscience can be simply individual, the formation of a false conscience is possible and not infrequent—i.e. a conscience formed by a narrow and prejudiced social *milieu*, which is really anti-social in the sense of being opposed to its larger environment. And, from the social standpoint, the problem of how to distinguish between the false and the true is easily solved. 'Conscientious Objectors' of all kinds point to the indisputable truth that moral advances have often been due to a critical and even rebellious attitude on the part of the reformer. The new ideas have been compelled to fight their way to recognition through the organised opposition, or at least the *vis inertiae*, of society. This is true; but it in no way proves that the particular claimants are right because they find themselves faced with such opposition. On the contrary, the presumption lies the other way, and the burden of proof rests with the 'reformers.' They have to show that reason is on their side; not such 'reasons' as satisfy themselves, but such as are universal and incontrovertible. The only universal test of reason, by which the truth of moral notions can

be judged, is the practical one: "By their fruits ye shall know them." And, judged by this test, the claims of the 'Conscientious Objectors' will not hold water.

In times of peace the eccentricities of a few enthusiasts can be overlooked, and the English sense of justice has been strained to avoid the appearance of intolerance. So long as the maintainers of such ideas are few and their theories are confined to words, toleration is politic. But how does the case stand now? The nation is at death-grips with a ruthless and unscrupulous foe, fashioned by its rulers into the enemy of the rest of humanity. The victory of that power means the death of freedom, of the false freedom with the true; yet those who claim it for themselves will not lift a finger to help avert the catastrophe. As far as their action goes, as far as it is possible for them, they leave the Hun free to ravage England and inflict on her those unspeakable atrocities and humiliations to which Belgium and all countries on which he has set his hoof, have been subjected. They, with their Pacifist friends, were willing that England should ignobly fold her hands, while treaties she had sworn to uphold were violated, while free countries, to whom she had promised her support, were enslaved, while her own future doom was assured. They, when England drew her sword, and while her noble youth volunteered in their thousands, left their countrymen to welter and rot in the blood and filth of the trenches or to languish amid the horrors and cruelties of German prisons, while they kept their skins whole at home and their bodies in comfort in the name of their God and their religion. When a wider and more urgent call was needed, because of the glaring inequalities of voluntarism, and conscription was brought in to rectify anomalies, to organise the willing and make the unwilling minority do their share, a final separation was effected between the sheep and the goats. Conscription was necessary for other reasons, but this alone would have been its sufficient justification. By this means a clear distinction was at last made between those who would serve their country in the only way possible and those who absolutely refused. And here the English principle of toleration met with such a severe test as it had never known before.

There was a line of policy by which this might have been reconciled with the unexampled pressure of circumstances. The Quakers were the only religious body whose non-combatism had always been recognised in England as part of their established moral creed. Their case, then, stood in a category quite apart

from that of the new-found claims of individuals outside their communion. In their case the withdrawal of toleration involved a breach with the past; in the other the question was not complicated by any such previous claim. Therefore English statesmen could have consistently refused to extend to others the toleration already accorded to the Quaker body, though this might have been granted also to one or two other minor and more modern sects which profess similar principles. This is the solution of the question which has found favour in America.

At the same time such a course would not have removed the causes of friction. Objectors and Pacifists would no doubt have pretended to find in such partial toleration a just ground for complaint and agitation. But, then, this would have been the case whatever the course adopted. They were determined not only to refuse assistance to their country in the greatest crisis of her history, but to hinder the work of others as far as possible by the force of preaching and example. At such a crisis there is no other country in Europe which would have given them freedom to do it. In Germany certainly, and in France probably, such disloyalty would have been met with the death-penalty. But, apart from this, there were good reasons for withdrawing the special favour extended to Quakers in the past, to which, as a matter of principle, they could lay no claim. Some of them, in the present war, have grandly broken with their tradition, and have joined the ranks of the army that is fighting for righteousness and peace. But their past record is not such as to place their country under a debt of gratitude: for, as a body, they have steadily refused to assist in the defence of that country, and are chiefly responsible, by the contagion of example, for that outburst of 'Conscientious Objection' which has been peculiar to England and has been the grit in her war-machine. The ground of their claims to special treatment, and of those of their modern imitators, is fundamentally the same as Tolstoi's, but is not nearly so consistent. The objection to the use of force as a remedy for civil rebellion or felony stands on precisely the same footing as the objection to war with foreign nations. The interpretation of the Sermon on the Mount as a practical rule of life implies far more than the latter. Some of the Quakers are wealthy people, who have made their money owing to the advantageous commercial conditions induced by England's past wars and the protection of property afforded by her law-courts and police. And even if they, and other Objectors, could claim to follow literally the divine command not to kill

others, they have shown no sign of wishing to obey that which enjoins them to "Sell all thou hast and give to the poor." Yet if "Resist not evil" is taken literally, why not this also? On the contrary, they have retained their money, with the power it brings, by the very means which they decry. They are thus more guilty of bloodshed than those who acknowledge its necessity for defence of the State. For while they denounce it as criminal, they hold to the treasure it has secured to them, which thus becomes to them blood-money; money stained with the blood of those who have died for their benefit, while they repudiate the means. The difference between themselves and the patriot may be shortly summed up in that, while the latter slays to promote the ultimate triumph of the Ideal, the wealthy Quakers or Objectors permit others to be slain that they may keep the gold.

The clearest and best-defined course, then, for the Government to have pursued would have been the maintenance from the first of the principle of equality of sacrifice for all; that, as all share the privileges, all must share the burdens of the State. The Quakers might have become passive resisters, the Objectors risen in 'righteous' indignation; but such an appeal to common-sense and justice could not have failed to carry the majority of the public with it, while the number of actual Objectors would have been confined to the uncompromising minority and thus reduced to manageable proportions.

But the Government of the day had unfortunately a great deal of the offensive grit in its own machine, with the result that it chose neither of these courses, but one which, from the nature of the case, was bound to cause the maximum of friction and which it was impossible to carry through consistently or equitably. "For who knoweth the heart of man save the spirit of man which is in him?" And, we may add, who, even of those who have thought and reflected, can know themselves well enough always to gauge their own motives with adequacy? Yet this was the impossible task which the Government set the tribunals: to find out, when Objectors came before them, whether their motives were pure or not! A certain few were probably sincere, so far at least as that the religious belief was uppermost in their consciousness; but below this no doubt were a crowd of confused and mixed motives exerting an unacknowledged influence, such as the natural shrinking from family separation, from the surrender of congenial or remunerative employment, and from all the horrors of war. But the majority (it can now be safely said as their subsequent

conduct has shown it) were those in whose minds the baser motives were uppermost, including the vulgar desire for notoriety and cheap martyrdom. It consisted chiefly of men who had not previously been particularly distinguished for conscientious scruples, and who now added the vice of hypocrisy to selfishness and want of patriotism. Their ranks did not lack even the criminal element. Had it not been for these, who formed the bulk of the Objectors, the movement would have fallen very flat. But, though in some cases the veil was partly lifted from these psychological traits in the course of examination, the tribunals could never be absolutely certain as to ultimate motives. It was the most cunning, not the most sincere, who made the best appearance. Such a method (save the mark!) was bound to result in the worst error, that of injustice; and it is injustice, so manufactured, which affords whatever seeming ground of complaint Mrs. Hobhouse's *Appeal unto Cæsar* contains. For the essence of injustice is inequality of treatment, which was involved in the method. But, when that has been said, all has been said that is possible in favour of such an 'appeal'; Paul appealed to Cæsar because the case lay between him and the Jews. He had not violated his Roman citizenship. With the Objectors, on the contrary, it is precisely because they have refused to perform the elementary duties of citizenship that they have no ground of claim to the corresponding rights. Genuineness of conviction may have been proved by endurance, but does not enter into the question. Once more, let it be said, that it is not for the State to attempt to determine motives. If these were taken into consideration, then it would become a serious question as to how far the persistent refusal to serve in any capacity is due to self-will, stubbornness, self-conceit, self-righteousness, love of self-advertisement. How, for example, can the normally constituted mind understand, much less sympathize with, one that refuses even agricultural work or the making of mail-bags, for fear men should thereby be released to serve in the war? (pp. 3, 46, etc.). The individual who imagines himself to be a railway signal, and acts on the assumption, has doubtless a genuine conviction, but is none the less put under restraint.

It may be admitted, however, that, as far as the genuine Objectors are concerned, the late Government created an appearance of injustice in that their method opened the door to all and sundry to pose as Objectors, and thus confounded them in a crowd which incurred the just odium and contempt of the public. Not

only so, but while the dishonest shirkers have been notoriously pampered and coddled, and treated better than our soldiers, whose khaki they were allowed to disgrace, the comparatively few really earnest fanatics were brought into collision with the authorities by their very intransigence. The former were rewarded for that sense of self-preservation which had saved their worthless skins from the chances of battle, and by which they afterwards managed to keep within the bounds of the very obliging law. But, though some appearance of injustice is involved in such inequalities of treatment, it cannot be too much emphasised that Objectors, of whatever kind, can, as such, have no solid ground of complaint.

In fact the legal claim put forward in this pamphlet is founded on the utterly false assumption that civil rights remain good when civil duties are not performed. As a matter of fact, the two are reciprocal and cannot be separated: the one has always implied the other and cannot exist without it. No man has the right to claim the advantages which accrue to him from the existence of a State army or police, if he denounces and refuses to support them. Yet it is this elementary social truth, the reciprocity of rights and duties, which the Objectors by their words and actions deny. No man can maintain this theory consistently, except he leaves the world altogether and becomes a hermit, like so many of the early Christians. Even Tolstoi, though theoretically consistent (which Objectors and Quakers are not), found it impossible to escape the practical inconsistency while living in this world, and made a belated and pathetic attempt to escape from it just before he died. Therefore no Objector, even the sincere, has any right to complain of the treatment he receives from the State in consequence of his own action against it. The early Christians, with whom they love to compare themselves, knew better than to do this. They knew they were disobeying the law in refusing to sacrifice, and were ready, for the most part, to take the consequences without flinching or murmuring. They were fighting the State and looked for no peace except behind the veil. The lack of this spirit of utter and uncomplaining sacrifice is one of the marks which distinguishes the modern Objectors from them. After all, their sufferings cannot be compared with those of our brave men on the stricken field and in German prisons. The State can only take cognisance of actions and, so far as these are detrimental to the general good, they cannot go unpunished. The most equitable and appropriate form of punishment for those who will not serve

their country in such a crisis, is the loss of civil rights. It is utterly monstrous that the representatives which such men return to Parliament should have a voice in the government of the nation. The present Government is not responsible for the initial blunders to which existing difficulties are due. But unfortunately they have inherited the evil results of those blunders and have to make the best of the hampering conditions so created. Perhaps the worst legacy left them by the late Government was the quasi-legal recognition which they contrived to give to the Objectors' claims; a recognition which, as this pamphlet shows, has now furnished some sort of handle to agitators on which to support their claims.

Under the circumstances, and having regard to the fact that the difficulties are largely of Government creation, the present Government would probably be acting wisely in releasing all Objectors from prison, conditionally on abstention from agitation in any form, while at the same time depriving them of all civil rights.

Perhaps one of the most nauseous features in a pamphlet which is a 'squeal,' or rather a chorus of 'squeals,' from start to finish, is the plea put forward by, or on behalf of, the Objectors that their attitude is due to "a fear of spiritual death" (pp. vi. and 73). It would almost seem as if, in their case, the old gibe was applicable, that religion is an affair of saving one's own dirty soul. Certainly this attitude of theirs is diametrically opposed to that of Moses and Paul, who wished to be anathema for their brethren's sake.

H. C. CORRANCE.

REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

LOGIC AS THE SCIENCE OF THE PURE CONCEPT.

Translated from the Italian of Benedetto Croce by Douglas Ainslie, B.A. (Oxon.), M.R.A.S. London (Macmillan); pp. 606; 14s. net.

MR. AINSLIE is to be heartily congratulated on this lucid version of the distinguished Italian thinker's third substantive contribution to the Philosophy of the Spirit. Already the English-reading public has to thank him for his translations of Croce's *Æsthetic*, or the philosophy of language and of expression in general, and of his *Philosophy of the Practical*, or the philosophical science of the will. As we might have expected, the *Logic* of Croce is by no means a treatise on the formal logic of the schools which, in the fond belief that it is analysing thought, presents, we are told, nothing but 'a series of mutilated linguistic forms' (p. 589). Croce will have nothing to do with such formalism or verbalism; it is in his view the confusion between thought and word. For him, on the contrary, the general assumption of Logic is the fundamental concept of philosophy as the science of spirit (p. 47); the object of Logic is precisely this form of spiritual activity, for the form of knowledge which is no longer representative but logical, is said to occur 'continually and at every instant in the life of the spirit' (p. 18). The end of Logic is thus science of the concept, the pure concept, as distinguished from mere generalisations, and also from empirical and abstract concepts. For Croce moreover ideality is true reality (p. 195); but ideality is in no sense to be confounded with abstractionism, on which he wages incessant war. For him the spiritual universal concept "enfolds in its bosom the infinite possibilities of the real" (p. 13); it is the 'concrete-universal' (p. 49), for in philosophy "none of the parts are without the whole, and the whole does not exist without the parts" (p. 275). Thus for him the only true form of concept is "logical nature itself in its universality and in its severity" (p. 28). This entirely surpasses the logic of the abstract concept; and hence the effort of Croce is to achieve the logic of the concrete concept, which he also calls the

pure concept or idea (p. 530). For him this true concept is the idea which is the absolute unity of the concept and its objectivity (p. 540); or, to put it differently, the idea is the unity of concept and representation, because it is 'the universal itself big with the individual' (p. 595). He therefore regards the individual as 'the situation of the universal spirit at a determinate instant' (p. 67); hence for him "man is complete man at every instant and in every man; the spirit is always whole in every individuation of itself" (p. 252). This grandiose notion is the key-note of Croce's philosophy of spirit. The spirit, we are told, is 'the whole spirit at every instant' (p. 561); and the true infinite is all before us in every real fact (p. 417). Hence the spirit being the whole spirit in every particular man and at every particular instant of life, is never 'composed of measurable elements' (p. 377); for already for Croce a mental fact is the 'transition' from quantity to quality, or the conversion of quantity into quality (p. 195). The concepts of reality or forms of the spirit (p. 462) are characterized not only by universality and concreteness, but also by expressivity (p. 44), for spirituality is not so truly if it does not express itself (p. 441). We must, however, remember that though philosophical concepts are all in every instant they are not completely expressed in every instant (p. 567). The common object of all the forms of the spirit is thus reality; "but this is not because reality is separated from them, but because they are reality; they therefore *have* not but *are* this object" (p. 258).

Pseudoconcepts are the product of the abstract intellect; whereas the true concept is the product of concrete intellect or reason. This latter is apparently what Croce elsewhere calls thought in the high sense in which he uses the term. To have before us the problem of the nature of thought, he tells us, we must meditate on the connections of affirmation-negation and unity-distinction. The object of our meditation is to draw near to the realisation of the synthesis that is the true concept, that "palpitating reality which makes itself and knows itself in the making" (p. 536); yet, "thought does not exist alone, nor does it exist above life: thought is outside and inside life; and if on one side it surpasses life, on the other it is a mode of life itself" (p. 498). Such thought of the universal is not subjective fictionism, but is rather that true subjectivity which is at the same time true objectivity (p. 294). The synthesis which is the unity of the necessary and the contingent, of concept and sensible intuition, of thought and representation, is the concrete universal (p. 585).

The concrete universal, the idea, the pure concept, "rebels against the mechanical divisions employed for empirical concepts. For it has its own division, its own proper and intimate rhythm, by means of which it divides and unifies, and unifies itself when dividing and divides itself when unifying. The concept thinks reality, which is not immobile, but in motion, not abstract being, but becoming; and therefore in it distinctions are generated one from another and oppositions reconciled" (p. 541). What then is philosophy for Croce? It cannot be defined otherwise, he says, than as the thinking of the pure concept of the universal that is truly universal, and not merely generality or abstraction (p. 256). If there is nothing abstract in such philosophy, far less is there anything of a static nature. Philosophy in its concreteness progresses, like art and the whole of life; it progresses "because reality is development, and development, including antecedents in consequents, is progress" (p. 488). Nay more, this infinity of philosophy, this persistent changing, "is not a doing and undoing, but a continuous surpassing of itself" (p. 818). Transcendence, however, finds little favour with Croce; he insists rather that philosophy is the concept of the immanent spirit "which is a self-distinguishing unity and certainty of itself" (p. 476). The universal spirit is immanent in all of us and is the continuity and rationality of the universe (p. 497). But the philosophy of the spirit can in no way stand apart from history; and for Croce the field of history extends far beyond that ordinarily assigned to it. For him history seems practically to be the whole world-process, the history of all nature in its widest significance, including the nature of man; it "embraces every manifestation of the real" (p. 529). This form of knowledge called history must be the pre-condition of philosophy (p. 813). Yet is history not something other than philosophy; for the spirit is itself history (p. 487). In Croce's *Logic* the concept is "the unity of subject and predicate, unity in distinction and distinction in unity, affirmation of the concept and judgment of the fact, at once philosophy and history" (p. 420). If, moreover, philosophy is the science of the spirit, it is also the science of immanent value (p. 529), for in Croce's judgment outside the universal there is no value (p. 157). Hence for him philosophy = thought = history = perception of reality (p. 496).

Such are a few of the great thoughts culled from this arresting volume; it is replete with acute observations and criticisms, and reveals the workings of a mind which can move freely and understandingly among the thoughts of the great thinkers of the past

and the present. Croce will have indubitably to be reckoned with by all idealistic philosophers and will surely delight lovers of the spirit immanent in all things, even though he exalts becoming and immanence to the great detriment of abidingness and transcendence.

PLOTINUS: THE ETHICAL TREATISES.

Being the Treatises of the First Ennead with Porphyry's Life of Plotinus, and the Preller-Ritter Extracts forming a Circumspectus of the Plotinian System. Translated from the ~~Greek~~ by Stephen Mackenna. London (Lee Warner, Publisher to the Medici Society); pp. 158; 16s. net.

"PLOTINUS is one of the great thinkers of the world, whose philosophy is still of the greatest value to humanity." So writes Dean Inge in his remarkable article on Neoplatonism in the last published volume of Hastings' valuable *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*. Dr. Inge devotes the major part of his space to an exposition of the philosophy of Plotinus, and in our opinion has set forth the matter more ably and understandingly than any previous attempt without exception. Here we have Plotinus in a new light, the true light, we venture to think, of his own exalted genius, which has hitherto been very inadequately reflected in his expositors. For sixteen years or more Dr. Inge has been saturating himself with his subject; he is no follower of the opinions of others, but has thought out the great thoughts of the greatest of all the Platonici for himself and corrected many a misconception of his predecessors in Plotinian studies. The full result of this long labour of love is now being delivered to the public in a set of Gifford Lectures, the publication of which is eagerly awaited by all those who have had a foretaste of what is to come. "The great lesson Christianity had to learn from the Platonists," writes Dean Inge, "was the meaning of 'God is Spirit'"—a courageous and generous confession—and though Plotinus fell short in that he made the Supreme exempt from suffering, and so failed to appreciate the great truth of Christendom that "it is part of the divine character to pity and redeem by a costing effort," nevertheless in other respects the fundamentals of his teaching do not seem to be incompatible with Christianity. We pass from this remarkable pronouncement to the immediate matter in hand. There is no English translation of the famous Enneads of Plotinus; all we have is an indifferent version of a few of the

tractates made by Thomas Taylor a century ago. The Latin, French and German translations are all without exception highly unsatisfactory in the opinion of competent writers. This regrettable state of affairs is not without some excuse. The translation of Plotinus is perhaps the most difficult task a Greek scholar can attempt. Porphyry, the immediate disciple of Plotinus, with great difficulty persuaded his beloved master in his old age to jot down the main substance of his more important lectures. After Plotinus' death Porphyry edited the material and arranged it after a fashion. He found himself confronted with a heap of almost illegible MSS., for Plotinus suffered from weak sight and would revise nothing. He evidently however had the substance clear in his own mind, for, whatever interruptions occurred, he could always resume where he left off as if there had been no break. What has come down to us has frequently the appearance of lecture-notes, terse and obscure; the living voice would doubtless have emphasized this and expanded that and carried the hearer along with the teacher by the power of his presence. The difficulty of his writing is not a modern difficulty; the immediate followers of the tradition groaned over these obscurities. The form of expression is frequently exceedingly condensed; the thinker as it were thinking his thoughts aloud but not sufficiently developing the form of expression. Sometimes one has imagined that this may have been also due to the fact that Plotinus was by birth an Egyptian and his native language was of a more Cyclopean nature than the exquisitely perfected tongue of Hellas. Yet, on the other hand, there are flowing passages of great sublimity. When then we opened the handsome volume that contains Mr. Mackenna's translation of the first Ennead, it was with a full and sympathetic knowledge of the great difficulty of the task attempted, and with no great hope that the first of the four volumes which are to complete the work, would allow us to say: Well done! With all the more pleasure then do we find ourselves now, after testing the version in many places by the original, in a position to say that we have here a most gallant attempt to represent worthily in the English tongue the thought of the most spiritual philosopher of the 'Golden Chain.' Mr. Mackenna is no slavish literalist, like the Latin and German versions which with mechanical mimicry reproduce all the obscurities of the original, nor yet a brilliant paraphraser, like Bouillet, the French translator, who imagined what he could not divine. Our translator has aimed at being faithful yet literary,

and has achieved a large measure of success. We do not say, certainly Mr. Mackenna would himself be the last to pretend, that all the obscurities have been cleared up; that would be an absurd statement for anyone to make who has puzzled for hours over many a dark passage. But a good example has been set, and a praiseworthy beginning has been made; the student can now read Plotinus in English with pleasure and with a reasonable assurance that for the most part he is being led by a guide who faithfully follows the thought-steps of Plotinus. The question of nomenclature is of course one of the main difficulties. Mr. Mackenna here would have been better advised, in our opinion, to have made a more sparing use of the term 'intellectual'; it gives a sense of coldness and abstraction to many a phrase which is pulsating with life in Plotinian thought. And indeed Mr. Mackenna is aware of this himself, when he advises the reader to substitute 'Spirit' for 'Intellectual Principle' (his rendering of the *Noûs*) if he would absorb the full mystical or religious suggestion of many a passage. Our own experience is that the rendering of *Noûs* by Spirit throws a brilliant light on the whole matter; and this is moreover justified by the occasional interchangeable use of the terms Spirit and Mind in the Trismegistic school that preceded the Plotinian. Dr. Inge has followed this course with the greatest success. The use of capitals again is a thorny question; and here we must admit that we do not see on what principle Mr. Mackenna has proceeded; he seems to be in this not seldom arbitrary and inconsistent. Finally, though we do not grudge the excellent print, paper and get up of this handsome and artistic quarto, for Plotinus if anyone is worthy of such homage, it must nevertheless be said that most of those who love and can understand these high matters are not well supplied with this world's medium of exchange. The price is simply prohibitive—16s. for one of four volumes!

A PRIEST OF THE IDEAL.

By Stephen Graham. London (Macmillan); pp. 405; 7s. 6d. net.

THIS is an unusual book, one which will puzzle, exasperate and even possibly disgust the ordinary reviewer, and just because it eludes his ordinary pigeon-holes and categories. Perhaps the author's own description of it is as good as any: a novel with emblems and at the same time an account of a pilgrimage to sacred and national

places, a new survey of the progress of our Christianity and of the English idea, a study of spiritual values and of the significance of the life of Christ in His birth-moment of a new era of human life.

The plot is indeed simple. Washington King, an American, comes to England to buy up second-hand anything in the way of religious or historical buildings or furniture we have no further use of, and to ship it off to America. He meets Richard Hampden, the real hero of the book, and makes with him a pilgrimage round some of the chief British shrines, Glastonbury, Iona, Holy Island and the like, with a view of purchasing any religious oddments he can get hold of, from a gargoyle to a cathedral. A multi-millionaire newspaper proprietor booms his mission in return for liberal advertisements, till he finds it unpopular. Washington King then gradually recedes into the background, and the rest of the volume deals with the spiritual coming of age of Richard Hampden, which a year later is followed by his death in France at the Front. Washington King represents Mammon, or rather the commercial spirit of the age, which believes that everything has its price, and, though Americans may demur at his portrait, is by no means unsympathetically depicted. Hampden is naturally his counterpart, the representative and interpreter of the new or rather the renovated gospel. As a matter of literary tactics we cannot help feeling it would have been wiser to make him rather the John the Baptist than the Messiah of the new Evangel. In any case, however, readers of *THE QUEST* will doubtless find this the most absorbing and interesting side of the book. It is not merely a pilgrimage to the holy places of the British Isles, to which Stephen Graham as a pilgrim of pilgrims makes an ideal conductor, but a spiritual quest of the new ideas abroad in England lately. The pilgrimage itself has a fine flavour of mediævalism, of that sense of the *religio loci*, which we have largely lost and in losing have lost so much. It has also a touch of that sense of the miraculous, since for Stephen Graham as for G. K. Chesterton the miracle is the normal. 'Live miraculously' is indeed the watchword of Hampden's life. As a mystic, Stephen Graham, though attracted to the National Church, is at bottom a believer in the possibility of direct access to the Divine, his ideal not being the priest but the lay prophet-priest, in a word the friar, not the anchorite or mere ministrant. Uniformity, system, blind observance, he specially detests. At times Hampden gives addresses often full of beautiful thoughts. One of these is on sanctuaries. Sanctuaries are everywhere,—for there are everywhere retreats from self.

Women are sanctuaries. Here Stephen Graham in his high opinion of women has affinities with Masfield (cp. 'Multitude and Solitude' and 'The Street of To-day'). In fact there is a distinct feeling after a return to the matriarchy. It is difficult to give an idea of the beauty and fertility of the thought of a book which is not the exposition of a system but a gospel. Perhaps a series of disconnected quotations may prove the best medium; not that the gospel preached is disconnected, but the links are living rather than logical. "All men are wounded and at odds to-day because of the sense of separation. Love alone can break down barriers." "Our whole aspiration comes from a sense of power." "God can only be found through the beautiful and after suffering." "Learn to look creatively on men." "The way to conquer lust for ever is by letting tenderness transform it." "Keep the impure and the drinkers and the murderous and dishonest at least *in the church*." "If my neighbour, if my near one is at fault, I must be also, if he ail, then I am also unwell." Surely here we have in a nutshell the whole doctrine of the East on collective responsibility and solidarity as needful to-day. Again we have the influence of Eastern or at least Russian thought in such sayings as "I and my brother are one," one of the cardinal beliefs of the book, and in the saying of Hampden, "Now I know that the chances are all the human race to one man that if I am born again I shall appear as one of the least of the kingdom." "It must be that if nature sees us, she sees our hidden beauty, sees us as we really are. Nature also loves us as we love her"—an apt illustration of Mr. Branford's phrase that "Man and Nature are lovers."

Many a mystic has his shrewd side, nor is the quality lacking in Stephen Graham. "The Harby of these days is ugly, red-brick, Victorian. The sense of its architecture is—we are nothing and man nothing." What a piercing vista of man's enslavement to the mechanistic and material! "When are we going," asks Hampden, "to build again to the glory of God?" In America "there seem to be no mysteries except those of the criminal and the police." "Thousands are working for European peace, for universal peace, for everlasting peace, but not for peace in the human heart, not for the rule of love in individual human lives." "The failure of the triumphant printed Bible without the pictorial and emblematic Church to help it out"—an illuminating example of the need of the symbol to complete the substance. Some of his sayings are provocative. "Our national passion becomes political and explores an illusion in the Commonwealth." One of the characters says to

Washington King: "You ought to go to the Jews, to their Press especially, and put your case to them in such a way that they will come to the conclusion that the sale will be a heavy blow to Christianity."

And here we must end, having, we think, made out a case for saying that it is a fascinating, disconcerting and provocative book.

C. B.

A DEFENCE OF IDEALISM.

Some Questions and Conclusions. By May Sinclair. London (Macmillan); pp. 396; 12s. net.

MISS MAY SINCLAIR is a brilliant novelist; indeed her latest book *The Tree of Heaven* shows her as being more brilliant than ever. Here she turns to philosophy, psychology and metaphysics, and, as one may say, splashes about in deep waters with a spirit of fun and frolic that we find most fascinating. There is a dash about her style which is as dazzling as it is delightful. Epigrams are everywhere. Thus does she shortly sum up Christianity: "There never was a religion that promised so much and gave so little." She writes of 'what may be called the Saints' Tragedy'; but the saints themselves never looked upon their lives as tragedies. The whole book fairly coruscates with cleverness, but we can imagine some of our quiet thinkers, after they have been whirled by her through the long corridors of Time, taking in their rush all the passing fashions of philosophy, asking breathlessly what it has all been about, and have the centuries brought us any real conclusions?

Miss May Sinclair is, we should say, the most modern of the modernists. She deals here firstly with 'The Pan-Psychism of Samuel Butler,' of *Erewhon*, that ingenious and meteoric thinker; then with 'Some Ultimate Questions of Psychology and of Metaphysics'; so on to 'Pragmatism and Humanism,' concluding with the 'New Realism' and 'The New Mysticism.' Finally, we have a chapter called 'Conclusions.' But both this word and the word Ultimate must be merely figurative, for in the movements of the mind nothing is ultimate and there can never be a real conclusion. We think this *Defence of Idealism* is here shortly set out: "It looks as if the only things that stand firm in this universe are Ideas: Truth, Goodness, Beauty: there is not a 'fact' that bears their imprint and their image for long together; yet *they*, eternal and immutable, remain." Well, we can all accept this as a truth and a truism. Many are willing to do so and leave all the

succeeding systems that are continually being built up around it to wipe out each other as they are always doing in the new movements of rushing Time.

When Miss May Sinclair comes to deal with what she calls 'The New Mysticism' we find she has to go back upon the Old Mysticism and the Old Church. She will have it that Magic and Mysticism are in root and essence the same thing, although Miss Evelyn Underhill, who is some authority, maintains their 'fundamental difference.' She notes that "The Hebrew's thirst for God was a consuming thirst." But she does not refer to the parallel point in the Gospel of St. John where Christ cried upon the Cross: "*Sitio*." This great last word is indeed the basis of that saying of one of the Greek Fathers, "*Sitit sitiri Deus*," in which many Mystics found their food.

Speaking of a real Religion, by which we take her to mean a true Mysticism, our author writes: "It was the secret thing conceived in the soul of Christ, that has its dwelling in the prophetic mind and in the dreams and in the heart of man. But it is still waiting to be born." Now this daring assertion makes us doubt whether Miss Sinclair has ever grasped what their Mysticism meant to the great Saints and Mystics of the Church with whose writings she shows some familiarity. Indeed, it is doubtful whether any author so entirely out of sympathy with their spiritual lives and relying upon a partial study of their works, the genius of which she admits, could even hope to understand their full meaning. They certainly thought that the 'secret things conceived in the soul of Christ' had been born again in them. Our author quotes several times one passage from the *Dark Night of the Soul*, but she never mentions St. John of the Cross in regard to his other and higher works, *The Spiritual Canticle of the Soul* and *The Living Flame of Love*. Nor is anything here said about Ruysbroeck, the writer in whom Catholic Mysticism puts forth its finest flower and fruit. But the book is so brightly quick and clever, that, even if, in some parts especially, rather smartly superficial, we have enjoyed reading it, though we fear not to the extent of the enjoyment it gave its author in the writing.

F. W.

THE MIRROR OF GESTURE.

Being the *Abhinaya Darpaṇa* of Nandikeśvara. Translated into English by Ananda Coomaraswamy and Gopala Kristnayya Duggirala. With Introduction and Illustrations. Cambridge, U.S.A. (Harvard University Press); pp. 52 and xv. plates; 6s. 6d. net.

THE *Abhinaya Darpaṇa*, or *Mirror of Gesture*, is one of the minor 'scriptures' of Indian traditional 'dramatic science.' It is a compendium based on earlier and larger works, the most important of which is the *Nāṭya Shāstra*, or *Scripture of Dramatic Dancing*, of Bharata, which unfortunately is not yet accessible to us in translation. No information is given us in the present volume as to the dates of these works, and we are unable to supply it owing to absence from books of reference. The setting of *The Mirror of Gesture* is that of the usual mythological Indian scripture, and the main content consists of lists of the conventional gestures used in dramatic expression, or in other words movements, positions and expressions of the limbs and other parts of the body and features. It deals therefore only with 'exposition by means of the gestures of body and limbs' and not with vocal and ornamental *abhinaya*, the other two divisions of the art. Here then we have a treatise of great interest, not only for actors and actresses, but also for students of the drama and psychologists, and a useful addition to the very few Indian works bearing on the subject that are so far accessible. First of all let us express our thanks to the translators and say that they have done a useful piece of work. But what then do we find? We find lists of gestures expressing a vast number of precise meanings, all of which have to be literally at the fingers' ends, not to speak of other less extreme extremities, of the actor or more usually actress or dancer. It spells the intricate and meticulous details of a tradition of elaborate art and—we hope we shall not be called Philistine if we add—artificiality. It may not really be so, but if it is not, the compendium itself gives us no help. If ever an attempt at 'explanation' is made, it is in the traditional mythological form—the gods did this or that on such or such an occasion, the chief authority being Parābrahmā, a somewhat unusual form. Otherwise there is not the slightest effort to show why such and such a gesture of this or that limb or such a change of features should mean what it is said to mean. It has all the appearance of a snow-ball rule-of-thumb

tradition of convention. It is true that Dr. Coomaraswamy in his 'Introduction' says that "the secret of art is self-forgetfulness," and hence would leave us to suppose that these gestures are all details of natural expression flowing from the life rhythms of the dancing or acting. But that is just the point that is to be decided. If so, why is there not a more or less common tradition at least as to essentials wherever drama and dancing are found? The art is now unfortunately dying out in India, but in its day it required the most strenuous and painstaking study and training to master the whole of the detail, and in the good old times without this *technique* the actor or actress did not satisfy the *connoisseur* or critic. Such was the *technique*, and without it there could be no conveyance of the true *rasa*, 'flavour' or 'taste,' of the passion and true meaning of the piece. We may be entirely wrong in our impressions and are very willing to be corrected; but in defence of this opinion we will cite a few words from the lately published volume of Sir Rabindranath Tagore entitled *Personality*. It must be remembered that the poet comes of a family of high artistic ability, members of which have done genuine service in reviving a knowledge of many well-nigh forgotten Indian arts, including music and the drama. In writing of his school at Bolpur, Sir Rabindranath says: "Those who have witnessed these boys playing their parts in dramatic performances have been struck with their wonderful power as actors. *It is because they are never directly trained in the histrionic art.* They instinctively enter into the spirit of the plays in which they take part, though these plays are no mere schoolboy's dramas" (p. 144). The question of Indian dramatic gesturing links up with the wide subject of *mudras*, sacred hand-positions or gestures, so familiar from Indian iconography. Are these also simply conventional or are they based on a tradition of psychical experience? All this has to be re-investigated and re-experimented with if it is to enter into the realm of 'science' properly so-called. That there is a natural language of gesture is very probable; but if so then equally probably it will be found to express the more primitive and elemental emotions and not elaborate sentiments or ideas as is frequently the case in the lists of the *Abhinaya Darpana*, where in one place the glance called 'looking up' (*ullokita*) is said to include in its meanings 'previous lives' or 'previous births' and in general 'tall things.' The drawings of the hands, which are well executed, and the photographic plates are interesting; but we cannot refrain from remarking that it is a pity the 'complete

pose' should be 'featured' by a stout, grey-haired, plain-featured old lady, for the text reads: "It is understood that the danseuse (*nartakī*) should be very lovely, young, with full round breasts," and no end of charming and artistic accomplishments besides. While we have read the Introduction of Dr. Coomaraswamy and the Preface of the Indian Editor with interest and in some respects with profit, we cannot but regret that they are both so entirely apologetic for tradition, and have let their enthusiasm for what is undoubtedly a very interesting phase of dramatic art swamp their critical faculty. We rightly expect some sort of comparative treatment in introducing such a subject to a Western public.

NATIONALISM.

By Sir Rabindranath Tagore. London (Macmillan); pp. 135; 4s. 6d. net.

SIR RABINDRANATH'S estimate of nationalism in the West, in Japan and in India, the three topics that engage his pen in this small volume, is entirely dominated by his pre-supposition as to the nature of a nation. For him a nation is the political and economic union of a people, "that aspect which a whole population assumes when organized for a mechanical purpose" (p. 9). A nation is an abstract being, an organization of politics and commerce, a machine; and as such he regards it with apprehension and strong distaste; for "success is the object and justification of a machine, while goodness only is the end and purpose of man" (p. 12). He is thus not against one nation in particular but against the general idea of all nations so envisaged (p. 110), and hence regards 'nationalism' as a great menace. As to our rule in India, as far as government by the 'Nation' goes, "there are reasons to believe that it is one of the best" (p. 15); but he strenuously denies that such government is British or anything else; "it is an applied science" (p. 17), a soulless thing. Western nationalism has so far evolved only a perfect organization of power; its basis is not social co-operation, it is devoid of spiritual idealism (p. 21). India on the contrary is no nation; of old she had to suffer from conquering kings and conquering races, from tyrannous humanity; but from humanity, not from a 'nation.' To point the contrast he paints with glowing colours a highly idealised picture of India of the past. "Take it in whatever spirit you like, here is India, of about fifty centuries at least, who tried to live

peacefully and think deeply, the India devoid of politics, the India of no nations, whose one ambition has been to know this world as of soul, to live here every moment of her life in the meek spirit of adoration, in the glad consciousness of an eternal and personal relationship with it. It was upon this remote portion of humanity, childlike in its manner, with the wisdom of the old, that the Nation of the West burst in" (p. 7). In proportionately lurid colours he paints the picture of what is rotten, and what we also admit to be rotten nationally and internationally, in Western civilisation, especially that systematic petrifying of the moral nature in order to lay a sure foundation for gigantic abstractions of efficiency (p. 88). And yet he acknowledges a true greatness also in Europe that must somehow have its motive in spiritual strength. Speaking for those like-minded with him, he says: "We cannot help loving this Europe with all our heart, and paying her the best homage of our admiration, the Europe who, in her literature and art, pours out an inexhaustible cascade of beauty and truth, fertilising all countries and all time; the Europe who, with a mind which is titanic in its untiring power, is sweeping the height and the depth of the universe, winning her homage of knowledge from the infinitely great and the infinitely small, applying all the resources of her great intellect and heart in healing the sick and alleviating those miseries of man which up till now we were contented to accept in a spirit of hopeless resignation" (p. 65). As to reform in India, Sir Rabindranath thinks that the real problem is not so much political as social; it is the race problem. What India most needs is 'constructive work coming from within herself' (p. 112). India has never had a real sense of nationalism (p. 106), he declares, in the special sense of course which our author gives the term. The real progress of India will not be achieved by the mimicry of political nationalism but will develop on a surer foundation native to herself. "We in India," he says, "must make up our minds that we cannot borrow other people's history, and that if we stifle our own we are committing suicide"; and therefore he believes that it will do India no good to compete with Western civilization in its own field (p. 107). He disagrees with the opinion of the present-day nationalists in India that the constructive work of society in that ancient land has been done long ago, and that Indians are now free to employ all their activities in the political direction (p. 122). On the contrary, social reform is of the very first importance and in particular an attempt should be made "to remove those social

customs and ideals which have generated a want of self-respect and a complete dependence on those above us,—a state of affairs which has been brought about entirely by the domination in India of the caste system, and the blind and lazy habit of relying upon the authority of traditions that are incongruous anachronisms in the present age" (p. 114). It must not, however, be supposed that Sir Rabindranath is in any way opposed to "the growing demand of the educated community of India for a substantial share in the administration of their country," as he puts it in an unpublished communication. By no means; he is in strong sympathy with their demand, as are many of us who love India and admire what is best in her and hope she will re-find this best and not suffer the misery of being misled by Extremists. But the whole burden of his exhortation is that politics and government should be humanized everywhere throughout the world; that the happiness of a people depends on social reform in the first instance, and that without this political and economic organization, no matter how materially efficient, is of the nature of a soulless machine, and not a living organic development to further the purposes of spiritual progress.

THE HARMONIAL PHILOSOPHY.

A Compendium and Digest of the Works of Andrew Jackson Davis, the Seer of Poughkeepsie. Edited with a Preface, Biographical Summary and Notes by a Doctor of the Hermetic Science. London (Rider); pp. 424; 10s. 6d. net.

THIS Compendium is a useful piece of summarising work, for few have the courage, even if they have the leisure, to wade through the thirty volumes which Andrew Jackson Davis, the Poughkeepsie seer, poured forth in the interests of Modern Spiritism. No student, however, of the history of this movement, which has now taken on so wide a development, can neglect the works of the pioneer writer who did so much to formulate and develop the main notions of the spirit-hypothesis. Born in 1826, Davis began to write before the 'Rochester knockings,' which are generally held to have inaugurated the modern phase of what in itself is as old as humanity. From 1847 to the end of the eighties he turned out volume after volume, and then for a score of years remained silent, passing away in 1910 at the ripe age of 84. Our 'Doctor of Hermetic Science' is fortunately an able summarist and a discriminating guide; he has done the same good service in many

another field of allied research, and to all of this labour he has set his name. Why, in this instance, he prefers pseudonymity is not apparent; no one familiar with his style and standpoint can be in doubt as to his identity. We do not propose to criticise or evaluate the 'Harmonial Philosophy' in detail. A few general remarks, however, may not be out of place. A. J. Davis was not a philosophical thinker; he was a seer, a psychic, an 'inspirational' writer, though apparently not an automatist. His view of the other world revolved mainly round his notion of the 'Summer Land,' a term which he invented, and which depicts the general after-death state in frankly material terms as an immediate sequence of life on earth in progressive but very similar conditions and surroundings; in brief he preaches what Harnack would have called 'a sensuous eudaimonistic eschatology.' He began with practically no education at all; later on he seems to have picked up imperfectly some very general notions of the science of his day. These and the evolutionary theory in particular strongly modified his views on religion. As to other modifying influences, and especially in his descriptions of the inhabitants of other planets, there is certainly one great name that must be mentioned, that of Emmanuel Swedenborg. Davis refers to him and had evidently read some of his works; agreement in some of the details is too precise to avoid the conclusion that there is here dependence. According to Davis the whole purpose of the world-process is the individualisation of the human spirit; the object of the whole process of creation is "to develop and perfect individualised, self-conscious, immortal spirits, manifested in the image of the Central Cause, and destined for the Summer Spheres." But throughout the term 'spiritual' is used to represent simply a finer state of material elements; the idea of spirit in the high sense of the mystic and idealistic philosopher is never grasped by our seer. This is doubtless the main reason why his books have had so great an attraction for people who can think comfortably only with the aid of sensuous images. This philosophic and mystic spiritual incapacity is well pointed out by our summarist and annotator, who, while trying his best to give the gist of Davis' main notions with scrupulous fidelity, is compelled by quotation to note the contradictions and modifications of doctrine, and to insist that mood dictated statement rather than any considerations of consistency. With these inconsistencies the commentator says he has dealt sparingly, though they abound. But enough of them has been given to win assent to his general judgment when he

writes (p. 106): "The reader will have understood long since that Davis not only began his intellectual and psychical life as a person imperfectly educated but he remained always a loose and inconsistent thinker, having an exceedingly ready flow of words, the strict sense of which he grasped in part only. His titles to consideration are entirely of the psychic order, and he is judged by these, not as a thinker or philosopher and—as there is no need to say—not as a qualified writer on any matter of science even the simplest." Within these limitations, however, his voluminous writings contain a mass of matter that is of value for careful psychological analysis; but most of these details will have to be sought for in the original publications, for a digest naturally serves the purpose only of a summary to help the reader the better to orient himself. This good service is not only faithfully but handsomely performed by our friend the 'Doctor.'

IDEAS AT WAR.

By Patrick Geddes, Professor of Botany, University of St. Andrews, Hon. Librarian Town Planning Institute, and Gilbert Slater, D.Sc., Professor of Economics, University of Madras, formerly Principal of Ruskin College, Oxford. London (Williams & Norgate); pp. 249; 5s. net.

IN 1915 a 'Summer Meeting' was held at King's College, London, to discuss war and after-war problems. It was inaugurated by Professor Geddes and Dr. Slater, who both gave courses of lectures. Those of the former were delivered *ex-tempore* and shorthand notes were taken of them. Dr. Slater undertook to incorporate these with his own material to form a volume, but before his task was completed was called away to Madras to take up a new appointment and left the unfinished MS. in the hands of Mr. Victor Branford to carry to completion. The general point of view of *Ideas at War* is the same as that of *The New Polity* in the series 'The Making of the Future,' of which it is the second volume, but, as we might expect, with Dr. Slater as joint-author, greater attention is paid to economics. The main contention is that the materialistic cry for Men, Munitions and Money should be complemented with the demand for Maps, Minds and Moods. We are accordingly invited to consider the thesis that "war and peace are not only matters of material sources and appliances, but have to be viewed as states of mind; in short, that Warden

and Peacedom arise from like Ideas. It is Ideas that are at war." (p. 7).

A feature of the 'Summer Meeting' was a War Exhibition; and with regard to this it is claimed that contemporary books for reference were regarded as minor exhibits only. "The essentials are maps and plans, graphics, photographs and sketches, caricatures even: and by their aid, and despite all incompleteness, a far more vivid account alike of this war, of earlier wars, and of the relation of each crop of dragon's teeth to preceding sowings, has been set forth than libraries and museums, with their far greater resources, have yet attempted to provide" (pp. 28, 29). It was really a plucky attempt to begin again; for the richer collection of a similar nature that had been shown at Ghent in 1913 and at Dublin in 1914, was sunk on its way to Madras by the *Emden* in its *Kulturkampf*. The chief graphic diagram in the volume is a symbolic '*Arbor Sæculorum*' representing the main great phases of the evolution of Western civilisation and their contrasted complementary results. The volume is essentially readable and suggestive, and like the first one of the series, which we have already noticed, crammed full of ideas and useful observations. We must, however, here observe, as we have already remarked, that one is too frequently breaking one's shins over neologisms and novel terms, such as wardom and peacedom, which are perhaps the least 'scandalous'; but what shall we say of ethopolity, eutechnic, geotechnic, neotechnic, ecological, eutopia, kakotopia?

THE ORIGIN AND MEANING OF CHRISTIANITY.

By Gilbert T. Sadler, M.A. (Oxon.), B.A., LL.B. (Lond.). London (Daniel); pp. 222; 5s. net.

MR. SADLER speaks of his book as the brief summary of results reached by continuous work during twenty years of ministry in Congregational churches. Part I. is devoted to a survey of the views of the extreme radical school which rejects without qualification all claim to historicity on behalf of the Gospel narratives. For them Jesus of Nazareth never existed. Christianity, they contend, grew up round the personification of an idea,—the ideal of a Saving God. We have already reviewed the best known works of these writers, such as those of Drews, W. B. Smith and the Dutch Radical School, and think that their main contention goes beyond the warrants of the most exacting criticism. In the

fury of the fray, however, that raged recently in Germany round Drews' popular exposition, it was overlooked that he did not come forward solely as a destructive critic. He had a constructive purpose as well; indeed he was filled with great enthusiasm for the power of the idea and the excellence of the ideal. He really believed that it would be better for Christianity as a spiritual religion, capable of true catholicity in the world, to be once for all relieved of all the historical difficulties attaching to the life of its Founder which have so greatly vexed the modern mind. It is from this point of view also that Mr. Sadler, in Part II., discusses the 'Meaning of Christianity in Modern Thought and Life.' In all he says he shows that he is most firmly convinced of the great value not only of the spiritual life in general but also of the Christian spirit, as apart from Christian dogma, as when he writes about social betterment: "Those who work towards the New Order must needs do so *in the Christian spirit*, or it will be merely another soulless and cruel system." It is therefore only to those who are profoundly convinced of the power of the spiritual life that Mr. Sadler addresses himself, as in the appeal at the end of his book, where he writes:

"The old message has a spiritual truth—that God has come (and ever comes) to save men. In the early Christians the spiritual life emerged, and was a well of water springing up to eternal life. But the rest of the old message is largely outgrown by minds of to-day. It now remains for all men who are interested in religion, and not only those professing to teach it, to *re-examine* the central figure in Christianity, Jesus Christ. Was he a man, with limited thoughts, a Jew of Nazareth, Capernaum and Jerusalem; or was he something better, *viz.* a personification of the Spiritual Life experienced by Christians, the Life which will outgrow all creeds, denominations, ritual, will move into fuller truth, love, beauty and joy, and will lead men through the school of earthly discipline to the Home of unending fellowship with God?"

THE SECRET OF CONSOLATION.

By L. Cope Cornford, Author of 'Echoes from the Fleet,' etc.
London (Williams & Norgate); pp. 168; 2s. 6d. net.

HERE we have on the one hand a series of vivid and very readable sketches of scenes in London during war-time, and on the other an attempt to deduce from reflections on the War a theory of the

possibility of overcoming pain and of attaining to a conviction of immortality. These results are said to depend on individual choice, and are reached by an effort of the will, of which Faith is the mainspring. Belief in immortality, both in the trials of ordinary life and during the horrors of war, has been found 'to work.' But other evidence than that offered by the Churches is required to-day. In fact, not evidence but knowledge is needed, and the road to that knowledge can be pointed out. Faith, the indispensable condition of power, creates what it believes. The dependence of man and his ability to use that dependence in order to ally himself with a spiritual power make him master of his fate. The question to what spiritual presence adherence is to be given is decided by the 'Inner Voice,' and the condition of discrimination between good and evil is a true moral attitude. These—not in themselves novel—views, presented in a frank, journalistic style, assume a welcome freshness, and false sentiment is eliminated. The writer is a bitter opponent of the late Liberal as well as of the Coalition Government, and hurls vituperative epithets at those now bearing the burden of authority in a manner hardly compatible, it would appear, with what he calls the 'sense of the fourth dimension,' of which he gives so beautiful a description on page 140, too long, unfortunately, to quote.

S. E. H.

ARCHDEACON WILBERFORCE.

His Ideals and Teaching. By C. E. Woods, author of 'The Gospel of Rightness.' London (Elliot Stock); pp. 175; 8s. net.

WE have to congratulate Miss Woods on this small volume. It is well done throughout and in particular the chapter of 'Personalities' is an excellent piece of portraiture. Not only the many friends and admirers of Basil Wilberforce will be glad to have their memories of his life-work refreshed by this sympathetic appreciation, but the book will do service in spreading a knowledge of the man and his ideals and teachings among a still wider circle than that of those who came under his immediate influence. Apart from his long ministry at Southampton and his strenuous championship of Temperance, Social Purity, Animal Defence, and other like reforms, for upwards of a score of years his occupancy of the pulpit of St. John's, Westminster, filled the church to overflowing. Keeping within the old forms, he poured into them a

new large spirit of hope and of confidence in the fundamentally divine nature of the human soul. Spiritual reality and the immanent presence of the Divine in the universe were the foundations on which he built. He was especially convinced of the power of prayer and the reality of survival, and had no hesitation not only in avowing his belief on these points but in putting it to the test. The consequence was that he filled his church not only with those who clung to tradition but with those who had either broken away from it or broken wholly with it. 'Why are our churches empty?' did not apply to St. John's, Westminster.

THE STORY OF BUDDHISM.

By K. J. Saunders, M.A., Author of 'Buddhist Ideals,' etc.
London (Oxford University Press); pp. 167; 3s. 6d. net.

THIS volume differs from Mr. Saunders' Buddhist 'Anthology'; it is fundamentally apologetic. That is, it sets forth the story of Buddhism in outline and touches summarily on its many phases and immixtures, but always to conclude the chapter with a 'How different from the Gospel of Our Lord,' 'How inferior to the comfort of Faith in a Loving Father,' etc. The book is also concerned with the present moral and social condition of monks and laity in Buddhist lands. Nevertheless Mr. Saunders is often a discriminating and at times a suggestive critic, as when he writes of the Buddha:

"He can only be understood if we place him in his true context, and see in him a revolt not against theism but against perverted forms of it, not against mysticism but against magic, not against devotion but against fanaticism. Such noble teaching as we find in many of his discourses sprang from no irreligious spirit; and it seems clear that he only confined himself to preaching ethics because the India of his day needed a moral tonic. He was inspired to administer this tonic, and it is one of the tragedies of history that India failed to blend his strenuous ethic with her passionate mysticism. Had she done that he would have remained, as he intended, a reformer, rather than the founder of a new religion; and his reforms would have been a worthy parallel to the ethical monotheism of Hosea and Amos." This is a suggestive view, all but the last clause, as is usual with our author; for history will continue to compare and contrast the Buddha, not with a Hosea or Amos, but with the Christ; the Buddha was not a minor prophet on any estimate.

PRIVATE DOWDING.

London (Watkins) ; pp. 108 ; 2s. 6d. net.

QUERY by whom? By 'Private Dowding' or by W. T. P., who writes the Introductory Note and the Remarks towards the end *proprio motu* and the rest of the matter automatically? It purports to be communications from a soldier killed in France in August, 1916, telling of what befell him and how it seemed to him after the death of his body. The part of the record concerning Private Dowding himself and how it fared with him is of interest ; it is when we get tangled up *via* the P. D. current with a 'Messenger' and 'teachings' that we grow restive. W. T. P. (p. 77) says : " Personally, I consider that this teaching, whatever its actual source may be, is well worth careful attention and study. It certainly does not emanate from my own mind, conscious or subconscious—that is, so far as one is in a position to judge. I realise that the mysteries of the subliminal and subconscious regions are still beyond our grasp." We do not wish to flatter W. T. P., but are persuaded from what we know of him and his interests that he could easily write the 'teachings' out of his own head. It is especially the 'teachings' in this order of communication that read so thin for the serious student of philosophy and religion. When the 'Messenger' communicates at the end *de suo* he indulges in a mass of prophecies some of which are plainly too much even for W. T. P.

JAPAN.

From the Age of the Gods to the Fall of Tsingtau. By F. Hadland Davis, Author of 'Myths and Legends of Japan,' etc. London (Jack) ; pp. 328 ; 2s. 6d. net.

To write a concise history of Japan is a task that requires much knowledge, sound judgment and no small measure of literary tact. Mr. Hadland Davis is a lover of Japan, and especially of its art and romance. His popular sketch of its history is in the main a creditable piece of work and a serviceable undertaking ; as a piece of literature it is well written. It is therefore a very convenient volume to serve as an introduction to more extensive studies ; and as it is exceedingly low priced and is diversified with numerous illustrations, it should have a wide circle of readers.

LOVE AND CRUELTY.

By W. H. Cock. London (Scott); pp. 148; 2s. net.

THIS little book is in effect a plea for kindness to animals. It is written in the form of a dramatic narrative from the creatures' own point of view, by one who evidently knows animal life well, and who certainly has the gift of making a story interesting. Certain more or less novel theories, unsupported by proofs, are advanced, such as that animals not only understand human speech but converse in a language of their own which can be understood by us, and that they both believe in and experience survival after death. On the other hand a good many practical hints are given about the manner in which unnecessary pain and discomfort are unthinkingly caused to animals. Statistics are given of the work of the Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals; which however, in the author's view, still leaves much to be done. The fact that the only person represented as able and willing to cope with the evil is described as a 'visionary' is a little disheartening to ordinary people.

S. E. H.

OUR LIVING DEAD.

Some Talks with Unknown Friends. By E. Katharine Bates.
With a Preface by Major-General Sir Alfred Turner,
K.C.B., R.A. London (Kegan Paul); pp. 160; 2s. 6d. net.

MISS BATES is already known as a competent writer on psychical subjects, and in this small volume (12^{mo}) eloquently pleads for the cause she has at heart—not only the reality of the survival of the soul but the fact of communication between the discarnate and incarnate. Miss Bates is convinced that, if only the living would give the 'dead' a better chance, not only by really believing in their continued existence, but by practical confidence in their nearness to us and their ready response to every kind and helpful thought, the world would witness a new change into a richer and rarer life that would gradually break down the ancient barriers on the borderland, or rather allow an extension of normal experience to soar over them.

THE SOUL OF ULSTER.

By Ernest W. Hamilton, Author of 'The First Seven Divisions,' etc. London (Hurst & Blackett); pp. 200.

THOUGH politics do not directly fall within our programme, we are glad to recommend to the attention of our readers this courageously plain-spoken essay of Lord Ernest Hamilton's. In our opinion it really does go to the root of the Irish question, and should not be neglected by anyone who desires to understand the fundamental psychological problems which underlie the whole sorry business. The implacable intransigence and impracticable nature of the extremist Celtic Irish element stand plainly revealed in the facts of history, and so long as ignorance of the facts continues, the main question at issue will remain utterly incomprehensible to the average Englishman.

THE SWINE GODS.

And Other Visions. By Regina Miriam Block, Author of 'The Vision of the King,' etc. With a Foreword by Israel Zangwill. London (Richmond); pp. 84; 8s. 6d. net.

IN his Foreword, which is intended to launch this young Jewish writer on the sea of a wider public, Mr. Zangwill speaks in the highest terms of these 'visions,' going so far as to say that he sees no reason "why a Dyson or Raemakers of the pen should not excite as much interest as these artists of the pencil." This raises high our expectations, even on tip-toes. We are sorry then to have to say they have not been fulfilled. There is a certain gorgeousness of imagery and diction, as may well be expected from a highly emotional and imaginative writer dealing with the hellishness of the horrors of the present war, but of 'vision' in the true sense we do not discover the accredited signs.

THE REAL OBJECT OF LIFE.

By Arthur Herbert Buss. London (Elliot Stock); pp. 206; 8s. net.

THERE is something pathetic in the whole-hearted devotion occasionally given by an earnest inquirer to some individual teacher. "Thou hast the words of eternal life," exclaims the

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S. E. H.

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The Story of a Soul. London (Methuen); pp. 317; 6s. net.

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S. E. H.

(Owing to the cost of paper being now some three or four times what it was at pre-war rates, we are at last reluctantly compelled to change the quality. This accounts for the thinner appearance of THE QUEST; the number of pages is the same as that of the previous issue.—ED.)

THE QUEST

A Quarterly Review.

Edited by G. R. S. Mead.

Vol. IX.

APRIL, 1918.

No. 3.

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THE QUEST.



RELIGION AND ILLUSION.

Baron FRIEDRICH VON HÜGEL, LL.D.

IF we know something and care much about man's religious faith, its possibility, reality and depth, and for man's finding or making for this his faith a place within the rest of his many-staged, many-sided life, we can hardly fail to feel the severe strain, the solemn seriousness, of our present situation. True, it is a situation prepared by developments, or driftings, or entanglements, none of which is newer than half-a-century at least. Yet it is a situation which may well provoke specially anxious thought at this particular moment in the history of the world. For here, in the midst of a titanic war, of vast upheavals and of acutest problems, religion seems, at first sight, either to have ceased altogether, or to persist as a feeble ghost rather than as an inspiring, formative energy. Religion appears to be the sleepy sleep-compelling partner of all the institutions and illusions now drifting, under our very eyes, like so much wreckage, before the storm. Look at the wild devastation, the Bolshevik carnival of anarchy and tyranny, now submerging Russia, the land believed by us all to be so full of religious aspiration

and of religious faith. Look at Germany. Can religion be accounted a great living power there, where the identification of Government with sheer material force still seems to sterilize all nobler, richer counter-movements? And look at Italy, France, England, America. Is all, is much, in these countries in a sound and spiritual state? And is religion really the central force within what here may, in its degree, be strong and faithful?

Is not religion, then, a spent power, a played-out thing? Ought we not to relegate it to the archaeological lumber-room—the museum so full already of the curious toys of the babyhood of man? Indeed, is not religion essentially illusion? Let us prepare our answer to this poignant question by a glance sufficiently far back and around us to furnish us with a starting point. We shall find that, as soon as we do so at all seriously, we are met by an apparent, or real, contradiction which runs, or seems to run, through the deepest of the things that, though still ever with us, are yet in process of further or new articulation, grouping or fixation.

I want first to describe this contradiction generally, on its affirmative and on its negative side. I shall next draw out roughly the difficulties attaching to the problem at its deepest. And I shall then, with a view to a closer grasp of the problem thus at its deepest, and to securing a fair hearing for the sceptical solution of it, carefully study the leading utterances of probably the best equipped, the ablest and the most thorough of the sceptics. This will suffice for this first paper. Thus fortified in knowledge, I hope to come back to my own general description and questions in a second paper, entitled ‘Religion and

Reality,' and there to attempt some final resolution of the whole most delicate, most difficult, most important matter.

I.

If we care to look back into human history, we can do so now with a greatly increased refinement of critical method and of sympathetic re-evocation. Workers possessed of these gifts and acquirements are daily increasing and improving our collections of the literary records, the rites and customs, the oral traditions and legends, the psychical concomitants, and the ethical and social conditions and effects of the various beliefs of mankind. And this wide-spreading, very detailed, ever re-tested study, so long as it remains simply busy with the patient collection and sympathetic articulation of the given facts, traces everywhere the following four characteristics of religion.

Everywhere this study of the past finds (in various degrees and ways, and in various combinations with other elements of human experience) religion,—the search for religion, or the sense of the want of religion, or evidences of the soul's stuntedness because of the lack of definite religion. Religion, if we take it in this extension of the term, appears to be as universal amongst men as are the ethical sense, the political instinct, æsthetic perception, or the philosophic impulsion,—all of them most certainly characteristic of man in general, yet all as certainly developed only very weakly in this or that individual or family, or even in this or that entire race or period.

Everywhere, again, this study discovers, although here once more in greatly different degrees and ways,

the influence, indeed the really central if often indirect importance, for good or for evil, or for both, of all religion, whether good or bad or mixed.

Everywhere, too, such study shows that, as ethics, politics, art, science, philosophy, so also religion manifests itself in what is, at first sight, a bewildering variety of simultaneous forms or successive stages. It shows moreover that for the most part (as indeed is also the case *mutatis mutandis* with those other activities of human life and apprehension) religion remains to this day represented in large part by rude, inchoate beginnings, or by obstinate arrests of growth, or by convictions which, though to some extent more developed and more pure, yet still manifest a considerable admixture of earlier stages of cultus and belief. And this same study shows that religion, in proportion as it gains a fuller consciousness of its own specific character, retains indeed relations with ethics and politics, science, philosophy and art, and even increases or refines such relations, yet in and through all such relations it increasingly differentiates itself from all those other modes and ranges of life and apprehension.

Finally this study discovers the most specific characteristic of all religion to consist in this: That, whereas Ethics and Politics proclaim *oughtnesses*, and seek to produce certain human acts and dispositions, and to organise human society in certain ways; whereas Science and Philosophy attempt respectively to discover the laws which govern natural phenomena and to lay bare or to divine the unity or harmony of life and the world as one whole; and whereas Art seeks to create for us beautiful forms, the incorporations of the ideals which it everywhere finds indicated, yet nowhere fully achieved, in the actual visible existence around us;—

Religion, on the contrary, affirms a supreme *Isness*, a Reality or Realities other and greater than man, as existent prior to, and independently of, the human subject's affirmation of It or of Them. Indeed this Reality is held to occasion such affirmation and to express itself, however inadequately, in this human response. Rules, indeed even the realisations, of moral rightness; social organizations, even the deepest and the widest; discoveries in and utilizations of natural forces, however stupendous; laws and ideals of the mind, however essential, however lofty: any and all of these things, in so far as they are taken apart from any super-human cause, centre or end, have never been considered, by the specifically religious sense, to be the concern of religion at all. Religion as such has ever to do, not with human thoughts, but with Realities other and higher than man; not with the production of what ought to be, but with fear, propitiation, love, adoration of what already is.

These four characteristics of all religion,—its practical *universality*, *importance*, *autonomy*, and *superhumanity*,—now appear before us in an astonishingly large collection of solid facts, derived from countless ages, races and stages of mankind.

Yet the opposite, the more or less sceptical, reading of this same mass of evidence is not uncommon, at least for the moment, even amongst serious and learned scholars. Indeed, with respect to the four general conclusions just described, there are certain apparently ruinous difficulties against the admission of their conclusiveness. And these difficulties appear to increase with the degree of significance attaching to them severally.

As to the *universality* of religion, especially if understood as at least the implicit affirmation of a Reality other and more than human, we are faced by the following apparent facts. Whole races, *e.g.* the Chinese and Mongols, seem to be more or less lacking in such religion. A very ancient, one of the most widely spread and a still powerfully influential, view and practice of life and death, which certainly considers itself religious, *viz.* Buddhism, seems systematically to look away from all things that are less than man's apprehending powers, yet it apparently does so without thought of, or belief in, any reality or influence other and higher than these powers, existing and operating in itself or elsewhere. A powerful and persistent philosophy, Pantheism, proclaims as its central doctrine the identity of the world, of man and of God; and this Pantheism, traceable in many a degree and variation throughout more or less all ages, races and countries, can boast of at least one exponent of the first rank, that great soul, Spinoza. And the denial of religion, *i.e.* of religion taken as involving the affirmation of a more than human Reality, can claim so eminent a mathematician as Laplace, so morally fervent and socially constructive a philosopher as Comte, scholars of such æsthetic penetration as Rohde, and so great a critical historian as Theodor Mommsen.

But if we restrict our attention to specifically religious believers, is the *importance*, the effect of this their belief, for or upon their lives and the world at large, so very marked? Is the difference, in depth, breadth and fruitful force of soul, between the devout Theist Newton and the cold Atheist Laplace readily recognizable? Is the difference in such effects so very great between Buddhist Tokio, Hindoo Benares,

Mohammedan Mecca, and Christian London or Rome? Or, in so far as cities are frankly materialist, are they very plainly inferior to cities where they are religious?

As to the *autonomy* of religion, is not this a myth? Is not every even superficial activity of man bound up with every other; and is not the whole man dependent, through and through, upon his racial and family heredity, his education and environment? And cannot religion in particular be shown always to depend upon the moral and intellectual gifts, the general training, indeed upon the political, economic, even upon the psycho-physical, conditions and upon the geographical position of its various votaries? And if this is so certainly very largely, why should it not be so altogether?

But especially do the objections against the *superhuman* claim,—the very claim which we hold to run through all specifically religious experience,—appear grave, indeed final. Since then even the universality, the importance and the autonomy of religion can readily be shown to be difficult of proof, or at least to raise particular difficulties, in proportion as we insist upon religion as present only where there is a superhuman claim; and since, according to our conception, this superhuman claim constitutes the very heart of religion, we can simplify, and yet deepen, our task by concentrating our attention, for the rest of these papers, directly upon this, the superhuman claim of all religion.

II.

The difficulties against the superhuman claim of religion can conveniently, even though only roughly,

be grouped according to the peculiarities in the objects thus presented to and apprehended by the human mind; the limitations, real or apparent, of these our apprehending minds; and the evils which result, with seeming necessity, from all such belief in the Superhuman. Thus the first group draws its material specially from the history of religion, from the examination of still living varieties of religion, and from the student's analysis of his own religious experiences. The second group depends upon analytic philosophy—the theory of knowledge in particular. And the third group once again requires history, and a wide knowledge and delicate penetration of the operations of religion, as these are still active around us and within our own soul.

The first group, then, is busy with the objects, be they only apparent or be they real, presented to the religious human mind and soul. These seem to inflict a treble, an increasingly final, denial and refutation upon any and all superhuman claim.

For we can compare these experiences, in the past or even in the present of religion, simply with each other; and we shall then find them to present us with endless variations, and even grave contradictions. Or we can compare the experiences in the past of religion with the moral law and with any sensitive spirituality, precisely in what we now feel sure are their most certain and most precious constituents; and we shall then discover those experiences mostly to fall visibly short of, and often flagrantly to violate, these constituents. And, finally, we can compare the religious experiences, in their fuller and more harmonious unfolding and in their completest ethical satisfactoriness, with certain apparently well-grounded conclusions

or postulates of natural science or of mental philosophy; and we shall then find ourselves at a loss how to escape from contradiction of those experiences or of these other truths.

Thus, if we take together the question of the variations and contradictions and the question of the violation of the moral and spiritual commands and truths, if we restrict ourselves to the Jewish and Christian Scriptures alone, and if we give these variations and violations the great advantages of taking them in the order of time and according to the tribe or people when and where they occur, we find such well-known facts as the following. We have polygamous and divorcing saints and leaders of God's people, such as Abraham and Jacob; and again such deceivers, as Jacob and Jaël; fiercely vindictive prayers by friends of God, such as are many of the Psalms and certain passages of the Revelation of St. John; and the extermination, by the Chosen People, of entire tribes of the original inhabitants of Canaan. We have also the conception that God Himself both tempts to evil and attracts to good replaced, only after some centuries, by the distinction that God Himself attracts to good alone, and simply permits Satan to tempt the soul to evil; and insistences upon this earthly life as the place of the soul's full consciousness, hence for the deliberate service of God, in contradistinction to Sheol, the grave and the Beyond, where the soul leads a shrunken existence,—insistences which last, practically unbroken by contrary enunciations, right up to the Captivity.

Indeed, even within the limits of the New Testament alone, we get, first, the vivid expectation of Christ's Proximate Second Coming and of the Consummation of the World; and then, gradually, the

adjournment, and finally the indefinite postponement, of these cosmical events. Again, certain passages or writings conceive mankind as destined to a happy reign, first or finally, here upon our earth, however rejuvenated; and other passages or writings place the after-life outside of, above, this earth.

And as to the apparent contradictions between the experiences and conceptions of religion and certain facts ascertained elsewhere, there are the three experiences or conceptions which appear to be simply essential to all Theism. We find here the experience of Miracle, which appears to clash with the determinism of natural law; and two conceptions,—the conception of Creation, which seems to contradict natural science, even in that minimum of evolutionary doctrine which can be taken as reasonably assured, and the conception of Personality in God, which seems to contradict psychology and philosophy in their, surely, well-grounded contention that personality always implies at least some kind of limitation if not actually a physical body.

The second group, which deals with the apprehending mind, contains two main difficulties, and this against precisely the most fundamental of all the evidences and conceptions of religion—Revelation. How can the mind, it is argued, apprehend with certainty anything outside of itself, outside of its own categories and modes? And, still more, how can the essentially finite and contingent human mind, even if capable of a real knowledge of things or of minds other than itself, have any real knowledge of, be at all really affected by, an Infinite and Absolute, even if such Infinite and Absolute can reasonably be conceived as Mind and Spirit? It will be noted that especially

these two difficulties are called out to their uttermost by any and every superhuman claim.

And the third group, which dwells upon the effects, *i.e.* the dire evils, accruing from the admission of religion as in any way or degree superhuman, can be taken as containing two main sets of facts. For has not precisely that belief in the superhuman reality of the Infinite, the Absolute, been the cause why religion has so largely ignored other, great and necessary, human activities,—has turned away from science and philosophy, from art and politics, even from society and the family, indeed even from elementary morality itself? And, again, has not precisely that belief, when it has turned its attention to these other sides of life, attempted to dominate, to mould or to break them by and into the specifically superhuman religious categories, or even by and into whole systems of philosophy or theology deduced logically from those categories?

Of such turning away from the non-religious activities of life we have instances in the Jewish prophets' antagonism to all statuary; in the Moham-medan Sultan Omar's destruction of the great classical library of Alexandria; and in the huge Christian exodus, in the fourth century, into the Egyptian desert. And as to the domination, was it not precisely some belief in the Superhuman, attached no doubt in these cases to terribly crude and corrupt imaginings of the human heart, that rendered it even possible for Syrian and Canaanitish parents to give their daughters to a life of 'sacred' prostitution in the temples of Aphrodite, and to pass their children through the fire as holocausts to the god Moloch? In already morally higher yet still painfully fierce forms,

was it not the belief that God Himself was ordering such acts which rendered it possible for the Jews to exterminate without mercy the Canaanite tribes? And, in again less indiscriminate applications and ways, was it not such transcendent claims and beliefs that rendered possible, and indeed terribly actual, the Spanish Inquisition in precisely what constituted its apparently irresistible appeal? Indeed, in all and every attempt at direct regulation or arrest of research, speculation and science by theology, whether the latter be Mussulman or Calvinist or Lutheran or Catholic, is it not in fact the superhuman claim, and the acceptance of the superhuman claim, of religion which render such action possible? Even further, does not the acceptance of any such claim lead *necessarily* to such results? And is not the only sure safeguard against such results, and against their disastrous effects, especially also upon religion itself, the resolute elimination of every such superhumanness?

And let us note that, not only the effects we have been thus describing fully explain men's sensitive fear, indeed often their angry hatred, of the very words 'metaphysic,' 'transcendence,' 'ontology,' but that these effects also constitute a serious difficulty against the reasonableness, indeed against the continued possibility, of all and every superhuman belief. For what is the worth of such superhuman affirmations, if we get into troubles and dead-locks of all sorts, as soon as ever we seriously begin to apply them to anything,—as soon as ever we deduce, anticipate or test any scientific method or scientific fact from them? Can affirmations be true, and indeed the deepest of truths, if they have carefully to be kept out of the reach of all tests of their truth? Is a position bearable which forces us

either to limit or vitiate our sciences—their results or at the least their methods and intrinsic autonomies—or to emasculate our religion ?

III.

It is obviously impossible for a couple of papers, indeed it is impracticable for any one man, to enter fully into all the sides and problems of this great matter. But before my second paper attempts some general construction that shall utilize and transcend the objections developed above, I want to take the problem, not according to any formulation of my own, but in the combination of remarkable psychological penetration, of rare knowledge throughout large reaches of the religious consciousness, and of sceptical assumptions and passion presented by Ludwig Feuerbach, in by far his greatest work, *Das Wesen des Christenthums*.¹

It is true that Feuerbach is considerably dominated by Hegelian positions which have long ceased to be accepted with such exclusiveness by the majority of philosophers or even by the general cultivated reader. It is true also that the very ruthlessness of his logic renders him sometimes unfair to his own general position, and makes him, so far, more easy of refutation than are minds swayed more inconsistently by various, never completely developed or entirely accepted, principles and trains of thought. Certainly much of value has been collected, analysed and speculatively or critic-

¹ The book first appeared in 1841 ; the text quoted by me is from the edition of 1849, as carefully reprinted by Quenzel, in Reclam's Universal Bibliothek, 1904. I give it in Marian Evans' (George Eliot's) English translation, 1854, as made from the text of the first edition, with such few changes of my own as are necessitated by the differences between the editions followed respectively by her and by myself.

ally thought out in matters of religion, since Feuerbach died in 1872, an utter materialist, with but little following in his later development. Nevertheless these earlier positions of Feuerbach, even where they have ceased to be axiomatic for professed philosophers, are still, in secondary forms and in semi-conscious ways, most certainly operative in various sceptical works. The vein of doctrinaire violence that undoubtedly runs through the book does not prevent the work remaining, to this hour, the most probing and thorough account of the certain, or even the simply arguable, contributions made by man to religion,—of the resonance of man's mind and heart in response to religion; and there has not, I think, been since Feuerbach any mind, of a calibre equal to his own, that has argued, with so unflagging a conviction, for the sheer illusion and mischievousness of all religion. And again, in dealing critically with a dead man's work, we escape all personal considerations and subjective complications, so readily awakened by even friendly controversy amongst living writers. And finally, by taking, not this dead man's last, much cruder book, but his fullest and most formidable work, we indicate, by our very self-restriction within the range of the writings of the author chosen by us, that our object is not a complete study of Feuerbach, nor, on the other hand, simply a refutation of Feuerbach at his weakest, but the careful analysis of the leading positions of Feuerbach at his best, to be used as so much vivid enforcement and as so much precise aid towards at least the formulation of the great question here before us. It will be sufficient for our purpose if we restrict our extracts to the two introductory chapters of the whole book.

From the first chapter on 'The Essential Nature of Man' let us take the following passages.

"Consciousness, in the strictest sense, is present only in a being to whom his species, his essential nature, is an object of thought. The brute is indeed conscious of himself as an individual—hence he has the feeling of himself as the common centre of successive sensations—but not of himself as a species."—"Science is the cognizance of species. In practical life we have to do with individuals; in science, with species. But only a being to whom his own species, his own nature, is an object of thought, can make the essential nature of other things or beings an object of thought. Hence the brute has only a simple, man a twofold life; in the brute the inner life is one with the outer, man has both an inner and an outer life. The inner life of man is the life which has relation to his species, to his general, as distinguished from his individual, nature. Man thinks—that is, he converses with himself."

Now "the essential nature of man, in contradistinction from the animal, is not only the *ground*, it is also the *object* of religion. But religion is consciousness of the infinite; thus it is, and can be nothing else than, the consciousness which man has of his own, not finite and limited, but infinite, nature. . . . The consciousness of the infinite is nothing else than the consciousness of the infinity of the consciousness" (pp. 53-55; Eng. Tr. pp. 1, 2).—"Man is nothing without an object. . . . But the object to which a subject essentially, necessarily relates, is nothing else than this subject's own, but objective, nature" (p. 57; Eng. Tr. p. 4).—"The *Absolute*, the God of man, is man's own nature. . . . Since to will, to feel, to

think are perfections, essences, realities, it is impossible that intellect, feeling, and will should feel or perceive themselves as limited finite powers, *i.e.* as worthless, as nothing. For finiteness and nothingness are identical" (pp. 58, 59; Eng. Tr. p. 516).

Now on this I would note the following. Feuerbach gives us here his own description, or rather his own very precise definition, of what actually occurs within man's consciousness—of what specifically constitutes the human consciousness. This particular interpretation has been reached, by some few men, tens of thousands of years after millions of men have experienced this specifically human consciousness. And even now, after this particular interpretation has come and is offered to all thus conscious mortals, and especially to those who particularly reflect upon this consciousness, this interpretation is recognized certainly only by a few, and probably even by a few only for a time, as a true and complete account of what is taking place within each one of us. These very certain facts do not prove that Feuerbach's account is false; but they do prove that it is not self-evidently true; and this point might easily be overlooked, seeing the manner in which the truth of this interpretation is assumed throughout the work as entirely above discussion.

No doubt Feuerbach here proves himself possessed of the penetration and the courage necessary for drawing the conclusion of certain assumptions which run, in various degrees and ways, through much of specifically modern philosophy. Yet it may well turn out that his main service in so doing is to make us feel, more strongly than we otherwise should ever have felt, that, if the older philosophy had its grave faults and limitations, this newer orientation is still largely

infected by the weaknesses and one-sidednesses of every reaction. Hence it will be well, neither simply to attempt a wholesale return to the old philosophy nor blindly to follow the new, but carefully to re-test the great questions as to man's primary knowledge in the light of the great facts of human life and experience—facts which every philosophy worthy of the name has, after all, not to ignore or violently to explain away, but to accept, to elucidate and to harmonize as best it can.

Here then Feuerbach, coming from his radical Hegelianism, and writing for a generation still steeped in Hegel, assumes straight away and even angrily emphasizes, without any attempt at proof throughout the book, that man essentially consists of mind alone; that this human mind can penetrate and can be penetrated by, can know at all, nothing but itself; that it never grows by, or attains to a real knowledge of, realities other than man himself. Man's mind is thus affected by but one reality—that of the species man, mankind, the human race, as distinct from what is simply selfishly particularist in an individual man. There is thus, from first to last, in human experience only one object—the subject itself, illusively mistaken, according to Feuerbach, for something different from this subject; and true philosophy consists in unmasking this inevitable, persistent illusion.

Yet actual life of all sorts and its various special successes, the different sciences with their diverse particular results, and the now truly immense accumulation of historical evidence are all before us to warn us that this is not, that this cannot be, the truth—full and entire. These tell us, as so many elementary facts, as *data* from which philosophy must start, and to which

it must ever be willing to grant appeal, that man is not simply mind, but also sense, imagination, feeling, will; that mind itself is not simply abstractive or discursive, but intuitive as well; that the human personality, if at all complete and perfect, holds and harmonizes all these forces in a generally difficult, always more or less rich, interpenetration; that these various constituents of the human personality are developed in and by their possessor—they are slowly built up by him into his true manhood—only by, and on occasion of, the contact with, and the action upon them of, other minds, other living beings, other things; and that, however more or other he be than they, or they be than he, he ever achieves some real knowledge of them, and thus, through his relations with them, he attains some real knowledge of himself. In this way, neither does the mind stand simply by itself in the human personality, nor does this mind merely abstract from itself and then hypostasize these its abstractions, nor does the entire personality stand alone in an empty or simply unknown and unknowable world. But the mind, a live force, finds itself in closest contact with other energizings and impulsions within the human subject. This entire human subject is always in the first instance necessarily related, not to an idea or representation, either of itself or of anything else, but to some, to various, concrete realities distinct from, though not entirely unlike, itself. It is the action of all that objective world upon this human subject, and the manifold reaction of this human subject to that world's action, which is primary; whereas the abstracting activity is secondary and instrumental, and necessarily never fully catches up or exhausts those primary informations. The more real

is the subject thus stimulated and thus reacting, and the more real is the object thus stimulating and thus acting, the more 'inside' does the subject and the object possess, and the more rich will be such stimulation and such response. This is certainly the case with man when stimulated by a plant, and not by a crystal; by an animal, and not by a plant; by a man, and not by an animal; by Isaiah, Shakespeare or Newton, and not by the man in the street. And thus we are coming again to see that precisely those realms of human experience and knowledge which, like history, politics, ethics, give us the widest and deepest subjective stimulation of the most varied and often the obscurest kind, and where consequently a clarified, harmonious and full conviction is specially difficult for us, are precisely the realms which carry the richest objective content within themselves, and which offer the fullest reward for our attempts to capture this content.

From all this we can readily see that, whether man's consciousness of the Infinite is or is not, as a matter of fact, simply man's consciousness of his own truly infinite consciousness, we cannot decide straight away that "it cannot be anything else." For we certainly, concomitantly with our awaking to a consciousness of ourselves, acquire varying (dim or clear, but very real) experiences of the existence, indeed to some extent of the inner life, of other beings as well. And at this stage of our enquiry it will suffice to point out that the specifically religious consciousness never has been, nor now is, and cannot (even when brought to book) discover itself to be simply the prolongation of the human individual's or of the human species' own efforts or achievements,

even if we take such prolongation as merely potential, or as still actually to be achieved. The religious consciousness is always of Something other than itself; and, in proportion to the spirituality, *i.e.* to the specific religiousness, of this consciousness, does an Infinite *not the soul's own* appear present and operative *here and now* in the world and in the soul—an Infinite different in kind from any simply human prolongation or ideal, since the soul rests upon It, and finds its support in the actual presence and operation of this Infinite, this Perfectness.

The following passage from Feuerbach's centrally important second chapter, on 'The Essence of Religion,' is specially instructive.

"Consciousness of God is self-consciousness; knowledge of God is self-knowledge. . . . But this is not to be understood as affirming that the religious man is directly aware of this identity; for, on the contrary, ignorance of it is fundamental to the peculiar nature of religion."—"Man first of all sees his nature as if *out of himself* before he finds it in himself. . . . Religion is the childlike condition of humanity; the child sees his nature—man—out of himself. In childhood a man is an object to himself, under the form of another man. Hence the historical progress of religion consists in this: that what by an earlier religion was regarded as objective, is now recognized as subjective; that is, what was formerly contemplated and worshipped as God, is now perceived to be something *human*. What was at first religion becomes at a later period idolatry. . . . Man has given objectivity to himself, but has not recognized the object as his own nature; a later religion takes this forward step: every advance in religion is therefore a deeper self-knowledge. But

every particular religion excepts itself—and necessarily so, otherwise it would no longer be religion—from the fate, the common nature, of all religions. . . . It is our task to show that the antithesis of divine and human is altogether illusory; that it is nothing else than the antithesis between human nature in general and the human individual" (pp. 68, 69; Eng. Tr. pp. 12, 13).

Here we have, I think, a profoundly true reading of history side by side with a colossal paradox,—a paradox which is indeed absolutely necessary in and for this philosophy, but which does not follow from this reading of history, a paradox which, from its very character, demands the strictest proof. Yet no such proof is forthcoming; whilst all the presumptions derivable from man's other, non-religious, experiences, and from the special nature and effects of this religious attestation itself, are very decidedly against it.

Thus it is indeed certain that later stages of religion do generally look upon the earlier stages as so many sheer idolatries; and that the strongly religious man, as such, is generally reluctant to concede an element of truth to those earlier stages. Such a man readily sees, in those earlier stages, a mere deification of the worshipper's worst passions, and as readily fails to perceive any traces of a similar projection in his own religious conviction and practice. Hence doubtlessly an important peculiarity in the phenomenology of religion is here laid bare. Yet it is plain that, unless the Irishman's argument be sound that, because a certain stove will save him half his fuel, therefore two such stoves will save it all, there is no necessary consequence from such admixture of illusion with truth to the negation of every and all truth,—to the

denial of the operative presence of some non-human reality within this long series of human apprehensions.

Again, it is true that religion has hitherto moved, upon the whole, from seeing God as it were visibly in the visible, outside world to experiencing Him in the operations of the human conscience and in the necessary laws and ideals of the human mind. Yet much in recent science and philosophy, and in the general movement of men's minds and requirements, points to future developments when men at large will again see in Nature (now encouraged to do so by science and philosophy themselves) not finally a mechanism, nor a blind impulsion and warfare of forces, but once again, yet now much more deeply than ever, a world which (in proportion to its degree and scale of reality) is purposive—a world indicative of, because preparatory for, mind, love and will. The strict and sharp delimitation of Nature and of Spirit, of mathematico-physical and of historico-philosophical methods and of their respective special fields, has been very necessary and has produced most fruitful results in both directions. Yet it is obvious that they must be somehow conceived as operating within one great inter-connected world, at however various levels of reality. Indeed this inter-connection is continually being shown by the manner in which any earnest, well-conducted enquiry of any kind promptly benefits all other enquiries of whatsoever other kind; and this, as much to the surprise of, say, the discoverer in biology as of the student of religion.

And in the study of the history of religion there is certainly no necessity for the mind which here knows most, and knows with the greatest critical discrimination and reproductive sympathy, about the endless variations and stages of religion, to recognize

in this apparent chaos just nothing but a pretentious effusion, a sheer projection, of the variations of the vain heart of man. Such utter scepticism cannot be a necessary conclusion; since, were it so, such daring, yet religiously tempered critics as William Robertson Smith, Paul de Lagarde, C. P. Tiele, Edwin Lehmann, could never have existed. For in the case of these scholars, and of many another now living critically trained mind, the intolerable insufficiency of all mere Immanence, the conviction that that very history testifies to the immanence of the Transcendent, has certainly not been weakened; it has somehow been quickened by or during such strenuous studies.

We undoubtedly find something closely analogous in the history of man's other experiences and cognitions. What a dreary waste is the history of philosophy, of politics, of ethics themselves, except to the man who is imbued with the strongest philosophical, political, ethical sense,—the man who knows where to look for truth and fruitfulness, and who is at the same time trained in historical—that is in patient, grateful, magnanimous—imagination! It may be retorted that in religion we are dealing not, as in philosophy, politics, ethics, only with principles and ideas, but primarily, according to our own insistence, with a great self-revealing Reality; and that hence we may expect in religion, from the first, a greater freedom from absurdities. But we can point, in arrest of judgment, to the notorious history of the natural sciences. Also these sciences are primarily busy with facts and existences which reveal their own selves to the observing mind. Indeed these sciences deal with objects which are, of necessity, more readily discernible and more easily describable than could ever be those of

religion. For in science the self-revelation is largely to our senses; the objects revealed do not claim to be more, and are indeed mostly less, than human; and the dispositions required for their accurate ascertainment are of necessity not as deep, delicate and costly as are those required in the case of religion. Yet especially the early history of the natural sciences is, at first sight, a continuous reeling from one gross absurdity to another hardly less gross.

The general conditions and circumstances and the specific effects of the religious attestation itself also strongly point the other way. For here we have to do, not with this or that particular attestation, nor even with this or that persistent concomitant of this whole range and succession of human experience, but with an entire kind of human life, one held by mankind at large to be the highest and the deepest life attainable by man. And yet this life is declared to consist in a sheer projection, by the individual human mind, of the general, but purely immanent, human requirements and ideals, although this individual mind is, whilst practising such a sheer projection, admittedly so entirely unaware of what it is doing that it actually considers itself, the projector, to be the creation of its own projection. But in real experience doubts may arise within the religious mind against this or that concomitant or element of its present faith,—it may even entirely lose faith in this or that particular religion, yet it does not *pari passu* lose faith in trans-subjective, transcendent, superhuman Reality as such. And let it be particularly noted that, according to Feuerbach, the whole force of religion proceeds precisely from what is sheer illusion in it; for it is just only that inversion, that attribution by the soul of the most

objective validity and transcendent worth to this its mere projection of a self utterly shut up within this self's own sheer human musings, which gives religion all its specific power. The same, precisely the same, content which, when seen in its 'true' place and character, leaves men cold or only superficially moved, becomes, when seen by them in its 'false' place and character, the most profoundly, often the most terribly, powerful force known to history. Yet not all the recitals of the childishnesses, the moral abuses, and the intellectual trials and complications, traceable in and alongside of the various religions of the world, can make any at all just student overlook religion's magnificent services to mankind,—the most heroic patience and courage, the noblest purity, the most self-oblivious love and service, and withal the keen sense of the givenness of man's very capacities, of the pathetic mystery of his life, and of the entrancing depth of the Reality that touches and pervades it. It is impossible to see why Plato, Aristotle, Leibniz and Kant, and why again Pheidias and Michael Angelo, Raphael and Rembrandt, Bach and Beethoven, Homer and Shakespeare are to be held in deepest gratitude, as revealers respectively of various kinds of reality and truth, if Amos and Isaiah, Paul, Augustine and Aquinas, Francis of Assisi and Joan of Arc are to be treated as pure illusionists in precisely what constitutes their specific greatness.

The following group of passages will now conclude our examination of Feuerbach.

"If you doubt the objective truth of the predicates (of God), you must also doubt the objective truth of the subject whose predicates they are. If the predicates are anthropomorphisms, the subject of them is an anthropomorphism too. If love, goodness, person-

ality, etc., are human attributes, so also is the subject which you presuppose; the existence of God, the belief that there is a God, are anthropomorphisms, presuppositions purely human " (p. 74; Engl. Tr. p. 17).—“Originally, man makes truth dependent upon existence; subsequently, existence dependent upon truth " (p. 77; Eng. Tr. p. 19).—“Not the attribute of the divinity, but the divineness or deity of the attribute, is the first true Divine Being.”—Hence “he alone is the true atheist to whom the predicates of the Divine Being—for example, love, wisdom, justice—are nothing; not he to whom merely the subject of these predicates is nothing. And in nowise is the negation of the subject necessarily also a negation of the predicates considered in themselves. These have an intrinsic, independent reality. They force their recognition upon man by their very nature; they prove, they attest themselves. It does not follow that goodness, justice, wisdom are chimeras, because the existence of God is a chimera; nor that they are truths, because this is a truth. The idea of God is dependent on the idea of justice, of goodness, of wisdom, . . . but the converse does not hold " (p. 79; Eng. Tr. p. 21).—“Religion knows nothing of anthropomorphisms; to it they are not anthropomorphisms. . . . They are pronounced to be images only by the understanding which reflects on religion, and which, while defending them, yet, before its own tribunal, denies them " (p. 84; Eng. Tr. pp. 24, 25).

I take these several positions in an order of my own.

It is certainly contrary to the facts that religion, as such, ‘knows nothing of anthropomorphisms,’ *i.e.* that religion, as such, is unaware of the inadequacy of

all human thought and language to the realities, even simply as these are experienced by the soul. "O the depth of the wisdom and the knowledge of God! How unsearchable are his judgments, his ways past tracing out!" This cry of St. Paul (*Rom. xi. 33*) expresses the very soul of religion. "One of the greatest favours bestowed transiently on the soul in this life is to enable it to see so distinctly, and to feel so profoundly, that . . . it cannot comprehend Him at all. . . . In heaven those who know Him most perfectly, perceive most clearly that He is infinitely incomprehensible." This experience and reflection of the peasant St. John of the Cross (*A Spiritual Canticle*, stanza viii. 10), only places in the very centre of attention that which persistently accompanies, as a delicate background and presupposition, all deep spiritual experience, and which indeed can be found to some degree even in the less spiritual religions. True, philosophical reflection and natural science bring perplexities to the religious mind, and there is some connection between a man's growth in such other insights and his analysis and theory of his religious experience. Yet the influence of philosophy and of science upon religious experience itself appears to be primarily the furnishing of obstacles and stimulants, of tests and purifications; and certainly the sense of *awe*, derived by the religious soul from its vivid apprehension of the greatness of the Reality, a Reality experienced as so much deeper and richer than the soul can ever express, is specifically different from any sense of *uncertainty* as to the existence and the superhuman nature of the Reality underlying and occasioning this apprehension. Healthy mysticism and genuine scepticism are thus intrinsically opposites.

The predicates which the believer finds inherent to the subject 'God,' indeed whatsoever he says or can say, believe or wish, as to God, are undoubtedly expressed within the limits of, and in accordance with, the human nature in which they are experienced or thought. "Everything that is apprehended by any apprehending being, is apprehended according to the manner of this being's apprehension," is continuously insisted upon by St. Thomas, the prince of the Scholastics, who here, as usual, follows Aristotle. (So, *e.g.*, in the *Summa Theologiae*, First Part, 75th Question, Article 5c.) Man can never jump out of his own skin. Yet this in no way decides how widely that skin may stretch, nor what, or how much of, Reality really affects man and is presumably apprehended by him with some genuine knowledge. Indeed man is found to possess somehow, in very certain fact, a more or less continuous, often most painful, sense of the inadequacy of any and all merely human mode and degree both of existence and of apprehension. And this sense is too fundamentally human, and is too much the demonstrably determining cause of his admittedly noblest achievements in science and philosophy, in art, in ethics, in life generally, for it to be anything but suicidal for man himself ever, in the long run and deliberately, to declare this sense to be sheer illusion, or (what is practically the same, and equally inadequate) to find in this sense nothing but the merely human race-instinct. There then remains no way out of scepticism, where scepticism is least tolerable and where it is most ruinous, than to carry right up into religion what we believe and practise in our practical life and in our science. Just as we simply admit the existence of countless realities, more

or less different from, though only lower than or equal to ourselves; and as we frankly grant the real influence of these realities upon ourselves and our real knowledge of them, since such influence and knowledge are prior to, and are the material of, our discursive reasoning about them: so also let us simply admit the existence of a perfect Reality, sufficiently like us to be able to penetrate and to move us through and through, the which, by so doing, is the original and persistent cause of this our noblest dissatisfaction with anything and all things merely human. Certainly no other explanation has ever been given which does not sooner or later mis-state or explain away the very data, and the immense dynamic forces of the data, to be explained. But this, the only adequate, explanation moves us on at once, from the quicksands of religion as illusion, to the rock of Religion as the witness and vehicle of Reality.

Of course, this dim or vivid general sense of the Perfect, of all-sustaining Spirit, operates in men and is describable by them only in human terms; but this very fact and the believer's ready admission of it make the persistent witness to the Reality all the more striking. Feuerbach's own later history shows most instructively that the question of existence *does* matter; that, sooner or later, it demands a categorical answer. It shows also how precarious, with denials as sweeping and as absolute as are those in his *Wesen des Christenthums*, is the persistence of the sense, here still so delicate and apparently so vigorous, of the possibility, indeed of the frequent reality, of devoted, self-oblivious love and devotion amongst men and for men, without any superhuman beliefs at all. Indeed even in this his chief work, and according to the author's

own actual procedure, which is often strangely ignored by himself, existence *does* matter. For here the subject of those predicates of love, wisdom, etc., is even passionately declared to exist; it is indeed not God, but it is mankind, conceived as an intensely real reality. But when Feuerbach comes to write his *Wesen der Religion*, 'mankind' has become an abstraction, and only two realities remain: utterly determinist, immoral Nature and hopelessly selfish, sensual, cruel individual men. Here also then existence matters; indeed here it matters supremely.

FRIEDRICH VON HÜGEL.

THE TAO OF ANCIENT CHINA.

Professor E. H. PARKER, M.A.

IN my last paper¹ an endeavour was made to shew what were the earliest conceptions of religion in China. If we can imagine mankind living on indefinitely without decay, we can at once see that there would be no reason to conceive any spiritual feeling of awe or mystery at all; man's entire efforts would be confined to regulating to his best advantage the material benefits of which he found himself in possession: he would not trouble about whys or wherefores, and, in short, would be in the mental condition of an animal, full of the *joie de vivre*, but having no consciousness of the hidden future. Clearly therefore it is not death, but the consciousness of death, and thus of life, that since his thinking power became articulate has made and still makes man *religens* or diligent; that is, concerned or at least curious about his future as distinguished from his present. Sir Oliver Lodge publicly announced a few months ago that he did not in the least know what life was: he is thus confessedly as ignorant of its origin and of his own origin as the primitive Chinese were 4,000 years ago; and moreover he shares their inarticulate doubts, distinctly confessed by Confucius 1,500 years later, as to whether the same mysterious origin ever has an end,—at least so far as human beings are interested;

¹ 'The Earliest Conceptions of Religion in China' (January No.). The present paper gives the purport of a Lecture orally delivered at the School of Oriental Studies, October 8th, 1917.

though we must never forget that the mystery is equally great where animals and even vegetation are concerned. The simple primitive Chinese observed that his father, after decaying or meeting with an injury, was dead and gone; but he recognised the familiar features and the paternal voice in other members of the family, and therefore assumed that 'life,' or the activity which had left his parent, was a spirit, or some invisible thing detachable from the helpless carcase before his eyes. If an idea occurred to and grew upon him, and upon successive generations, that he might communicate with this spirit, he did and believed no more than what some of our foremost journalists and scientists are doing in good faith even now. Moreover he continued in charity to provide the wandering spirit with comforts, feeling also in prudence that his own happiness might be endangered by neglect. We, in later times, have comforted our minds with 'revealed' explanations of these mysteries; but the practical Chinese, who had no revelation to assist him, observed that, whatever remoter life-springs, spiritual or otherwise, may have existed, his mother visibly produced him, and his father (not necessarily one exclusive father) was also indispensably concerned in the matter: he therefore not unnaturally honoured his parents as the immediate originators of himself; perceived that they had laboriously fed and 'raised' him; and further remarked that he himself, with the assistance of his wife, was repeating the same set of operations in the case of his own children. Thus the perfectly logical idea of unbroken continuity in each man's life established itself. The further development of deceased ancestors followed by living man and wife into family, village, community, and state groups

concerns material progress; but the one logical root idea has remained the basis of Chinese religion—that is, religency or ‘concern’—to this day, unaffected by the earliest ‘fathers’ of connected Chinese thought, by Confucian and other philosophers, by political revolutions, and by foreign religious importations, such as Buddhism, Manicheism, Nestorianism, Islam, Judaism, and the different churches or forms of modern Christianity. If the gratitude a Chinese expects from his offspring and shews to the unmistakable authors of his own being is worship, it must be remembered that the later religionist worships the ‘revealed’ author of his being also; and—apart from the question or fact that the Chinese has ocular evidence to justify himself withal—the word worship only means ‘treat as worthy’ or ‘revere’; that is to say: “Honour thy father and thy mother.” These considerations, which are now active in Japan, led to the quarrel between the Pope and the Emperor of China about 200 years ago; nor must it be forgotten that all words connected with religion have a tendency towards wide departure from their root-meanings.

The popular superstitions, twelve descriptive volumes of which I stated in my last paper had been sent to me by a learned Jesuit in China, are now most probably very much what they were thousands of years ago, and (like our own folk-lore and popular superstitions) must be carefully differentiated from the serious or thought-out conclusions committed to writing and consigned to respectable literature. I therefore dismiss them from further consideration; but it must not be forgotten that they powerfully affect the daily life of nine-tenths of the Chinese population (barely one per cent. of which is capable of abstruse reading) and are

deeply interwoven with native Taoism and imported Buddhism in their debased popular forms. The primitive Chinese, having perceived to the best of their natural powers the origin and continuity of the only life that deeply interested them—that is, human life—set themselves to account for its changes. They observed the unfailing regularity in the courses of Nature; the movements of the sun, moon, and planets, the succession of seasons, the contrasts between heat and cold, wind and rain, thunder and lightning, and so on. The idea that the life or spirit leaving deserted the body of a parent might have taken refuge in the beneficent or harmful things moving daily around the family, gradually developed into a notion that protecting hills, useful rivers, friendly forests, and in short all the mechanical attributes of life, had spirits too. Out of this vague medley of ideas developed the notion of conciliating the gods or spirits, of driving a bargain with them, keeping a sort of profit and loss account, and giving a just *quid pro quo*. If careful study be made of the early Romans' *religio*, it will be found that this was very much their view too, and that the *patria potestas* or unlimited paternal authority, the term *res religiosa* applied to tombs, the *sacra* or paternal worship ceremonies, and the strong desire for a legitimate heir to perform them, point very strongly to the primitive Roman and the primitive Chinese mind having moved on similar lines. A further point is the persistent consulting of the oracle by means of the tortoise-shell and the mayweed grass in connection with worship, military expeditions, cultivation and the weather, hunting, and so on, much after the fashion of the Egyptian, Greek, and Roman oracles. The recently discovered tortoise-shell and bone inscriptions of about one thousand different

characters, mostly primitive symbolic hieroglyphs or pictographs, and dating back to Moses' time, prove absolutely their competence to do at least one thing for us, and that is to confirm and even to correct the names or posthumous designations of the hitherto semi-mythical¹ monarchs who reigned and consulted the oracles from 1766 to 1122 B.C. Moreover they afford proof of family relationship with the previous hereditary dynasty which began in 2205 B.C.; and thus it has ever been the practice to search out the scions of fallen rulers so as not to cut off spiritual continuity. So then there is safe reason to assume that the ancient religion, based upon this continuity of life, and on the worship of the inextinguishable vital spark, has been carried on unshattered in principle through all vicissitudes to our own day, and remains unchanged from, say, 4,400 or 5,000² years ago, which limit is the remotest date back to which the serious Chinese historians pretend to trace even their semi-mythical annals. The Chinese uncertainty as to dates previous to B.C. 841 is no greater than that experienced by Professors Flinders Petrie, Burrows, and others, in puzzling out the calendars of Knossos and Egypt. One thing is clear: the ancient Chinese, however limited their lettered science, possessed a practical solar-lunar calendar sufficiently effective to enable them to record rulers' names and day dates. Whether they first did this with knotted cords or other simple agencies, and how far the memory of man ran into months and years besides days, was of secondary importance then; what we now know for a certainty is that down to 1120 B.C.

¹ The bones call them *Wang* or 'King,' and not *Ti*; the expression *Shang-ti* occurs once.

² The revolutionary year 1911 A.D. was officially declared to be the 4609th year of Hwang-Ti.

there was no consecutive dating or connected literature of any kind, and therefore no effective means of defining religion except by tradition, custom, and the conservative influence of the very limited administrative class, who managed the calendar (and thus cultivation, taxation and so on) and the oracles (and thus dynastic and perhaps family interests).

The new dynasty of 1122 B.C., upon whose definite recorded system 3,000 subsequent years of Chinese religion are based, simply clarified and improved the principles already committed to memory and inculcated by the guiding class; it also introduced the new principle of exogamy or marriage outside of the family clan. Up to this date all the so-called Emperors of China had simply been monarchs over a small territory, owing its political importance to the fact that it was the habitat of the only tribe in possession of even the roughest records; the rest of China consisted then, as it does now, of cognate tribes and clans, all speaking scanty monosyllabic tongues, eked out by musical or modulated tones instead of by inflexions and agglutinations. In those days the nearer of those cognate tribes, to the ever-increasing number of thousands, gradually fell as vassals under the controlling influence of the educated tribe, and thus China gradually extended itself by a cell-like development, until at fewest 10,000 petty principalities did homage duty at 'Court.' But the basic centripetal religious idea, as above outlined, never seems to have varied much, and any centrifugal tendency was in any case restrained by the existence of old records at the head-centre. Posthumous titles and mourning rites were placed upon a broader or more plebeian basis. Between 1122 and 841 both the population and the activity of these

communities underwent vast development, and each one (of the larger states at least) began to keep its own annals. The two outstanding features are: (1) incessant war (diversified by political intrigue and intermarriage) with the nomad Tartars threatening to overwhelm China; and (2) the growth of the Chinese vassals (whose ruling classes were mostly connected by descent with the imperial family) at the expense of the central king or emperor. A revolution at last took place, and for about fourteen years the exiled King or Emperor was represented at the head-centre by a republican Duumvirate. At this interesting juncture, a century before the captive Jews adopted the Chaldean form of writing, the clumsy old hieroglyphs were regrouped and co-ordinated by an intelligent historian or Secretary of State in such a way that for the first time logically connected sentences and even paragraphs became possible. The canons or 'classics' hitherto committed to memory, or roughly indicated by short jerky pictographs, were written and circulated in a fairly uniform manner. These canons were: (1) the traditions of history; (2) the traditions of natural evolution, life, religion; (3) the traditional ceremonies as introduced by the improving dynasty of 1122 B.C. (between 827 and 212 B.C. still reigning nominally); and (4) the ballads, often historical, sung by the common people in the dozen or so of leading vassal states; perhaps also (5) some notes upon music and posturing as used by the King in solemn offices, such as the Worship of the Heaven Spirit, Earth Spirit, and the other minor spirits, continuing animate or inanimate existences as above outlined. The eclipse of 776 B.C. has been found correctly stated in one of these ballads (29 Aug., 775, astronomical time).

It was in the seventh century before Christ, when the ambitions of the vassal states were becoming unbridled, that the old Chinese religion and cosmogony, which like its Roman counterpart had from the beginning formed an unnamed and inseparable part of both State and family policy, began to assume the subjective importance of an applied science, but still without any objective or separate name, and always quietly developing on the same graduated lines as law and literature, which, similarly forming part of the State system, and undistinguished by special objective names, were next applied with inter-state emulousness to the practical business of life and politics. A great original genius known to history as Kwan-tsz, or the Philosopher Kwan (Kwan being his family name, or surname, as we say in English), arose and asserted himself in the most prosperous part of China, that state which was then in full control of the Yellow River mouth, and known to us now as the Shan Tung province, or (until 1914) the 'German sphere' of influence. Originally a trader, but, like most educated men, of distinguished lineage, he offered his services as adviser to a vassal prince with whose dominions he had traded. The curious thing about Kwan-tsz is that he has been little noticed by either Chinese or foreigners in modern times, with an important exception, however, in favour of the Japanese, who not only know how to appreciate him, and moreover possess the best critical editions of him, but who, I shrewdly suspect, owe a great part of their political success during the 250 years from 1600 A.D. to the advent of European science, to the doctrines inculcated by him: they consider him a better administrator than Confucius, who, in the art of governing, owed much to Kwan-tsz. He was 2,000

years ago, and still is, usually classed by the Chinese bookmen as a Taoist and a Legist combined, but it would be almost as just and as accurate to describe him as an embryonic Confucianist too, for there is hardly a word or a sentiment contained in the Taoism of the Taoist classic of the philosopher Laocius (Lao-tsz) or in the Confucianism of the ancient canons—above described as amended, curtailed, classified, and Bowdlerised by the philosopher Confucius (K'ung-fu-tsz)—that is not to be found in Kwan-tsz. But, unfortunately for his reputation, he was a Militarist and a Machiavelli as well as a Religionist and Philosopher, and doubtless it is for that reason that the great Chinese Concordances published within the past 500 years, which give us every sentence uttered by Confucius and Laocius, are very sparing about quoting Kwan-tsz. They carefully excluded everything bearing upon popular rights, military efficiency, financial shrewdness, trade monopolies, and, in a word, sentiments of any kind affecting rulers' privileges or the assertion of political claims by the people, that is the cultivators who produce for the rulers to enjoy: probably this careful omission is on a par with the omission of all allusion to foreign religions and politics, which is also a striking characteristic. There is another powerful Manchu reason for the ignoring of Kwan-tsz. He conceived, developed, and carried out a scheme of ambitious *Kultur*, wonderfully like that perfected by the Prussians during the past century: this scheme he recommended to his master, the vassal prince, with a view to forcing the half-dozen or so rival great vassals to restore to the King or Emperor his dwindling power, tribute, and homage. The scheme marvellously well succeeded, and not only did Kwan-tsz's policy, as Confucius

textually admits, save China from becoming a Tartar milch-cow, but he had great difficulty in dissuading his successful master from seizing for himself the royal or imperial crown he had spent years of war in defending; he insisted on a *sic vos non vobis* finale. In the year 213 B.C., three centuries after Laocius and Confucius (themselves over a century junior to Kwan-tsz) had gone, an ambitious vassal of the Prussian military type did actually carry out to the bitter end this earlier Dictator or Protector scheme, which from 679 to 621 had passed in turn and by treaty agreement from vassal to vassal; and at last, after 400 years more of war, without any further Protectors or Dictators, China was completely conquered and amalgamated into one centralised Empire, very much as we ourselves saw it up to 1911 A.D. There is reason to suspect that this conqueror, who was more or less of a Taoist in political faith, and in any case was a hater of Confucianism, got his military *Kultur* from studying Kwan-tsz, and very likely his destruction throughout his new empire of all canonical and historical literature had as its main object the desire to hide away for ever the fact that he, or the ambitious premier who advised his policy, was no original, but a mere imitator of Kwan-tsz, whose Machiavellian secrets, which even Confucius reluctantly confessed were creations of genius, and not to be censured like the peccadilloes of smaller men, he did not wish to become public property in China any more, for between 874 and 374 B.C. this conquering state had observed great reserve and aloofness with respect to the rest of China.

When I say that both Laocius and Confucius borrowed almost all their distinctive politico-religious ideas from Kwan-tsz, or from the same sources as

Kwan-tsz did, I must add that those of my readers who doubt this can prove it to themselves by reading the works of these authors through, and I notice that Dr. J. J. M. de Groot in his *Religion of China* has partially realised this. At that date (550 B.C.) probably Kwan-tsz's maxims (700 B.C.) only existed in fragmentary form, connected sustained literature being still in embryo, and were dictated, re-copied, and carried by official traders and envoys between the vassal states and the royal domain in small parcels, having been composed as political occasion required. Confucius distinctly states that the literature of the preceding dynasties (B.C. 2205-1154) was not traceable in the dominions of their lineal descendants (vassal states in his time). It must be remembered that a 'book' even five centuries later than Kwan-tsz's time weighed anything up to a cart-load of bamboo slips strung together, and there are historical allusions to 'cranks' and specialists travelling about from state to state in order to expound the one particular book of which they had made a life-long speciality. It is unlikely that any princely library, except that of the King or Emperor, possessed more than a few dozen of books, apart from the five ancient canons, the particular calendar in local use, and their own state records; and it is equally unlikely that half-a-dozen men in any state—apart from the highest official class—personally possessed or were capable of critically studying any book at all. Moreover when I say that Laozius and Confucius consciously or unconsciously borrowed directly or indirectly from Kwan-tsz, it must be remembered that Kwan-tsz's own cosmogony, philosophy, and religion, taken as one whole, was borrowed from the ancient five canons, which he alludes to—one

might say—on every page, and only illustrates and develops by applying the ancient wisdom to the practical concerns of his day.

Laocius lays special stress upon Spartan simplicity, economy, democratic equality; expresses hatred of war, 'profiteering,' luxury, patronage, artificiality, 'functions' of all kinds, and striving for distinction. He is no anarchist and no pacifist, but he is in favour of leaving the unavoidable social evils of war, punishment, and government to specialists appointed in the public interest by the suffrages of the less qualified. Following directly the general lines of the ancient mystical canon known as the Book of Changes, and possibly also following Kwan-tsz, who himself followed the Book of Changes, Laocius gives us to the best of his ability a sketch of *tao* or the 'way,' that is the way of nature to which all things should conform. He lays no stress whatever upon benevolence, knowledge, study, filial piety, continence, mourning duties, the valuing of one's own life present or future, the worship of God or the gods, and so on; in fact he is distinctly hostile to both benevolence, charity, and justice, in the sense that all men are or ought to be content with natural simplicity, and that no one need be beholden to the presumptuous superiority of those who dispensed these purely artificial favours: he was against persistent study, and asked what after all were the ancient sages but men like ourselves and actuated by the same passions, that we should trouble ourselves to repeat their irresponsible chatter. He never once mentions the (winter and summer solstice) worship of Heaven and of Earth respectively, still less the worship of spirits and daemons. He particularly loathed courtly ceremonies, solemn functions, distinctions of rank, and

princely pretensions.¹ Confucius in his travels is said, on rather doubtful authority, to have visited Laocius, who according to all accounts gave him a rather rude reception, hinting that he was a mere sycophantic toady and futile dancing master.

The main point for us, however, in discussing China's religion, is that from Laocius' standpoint it did not exist at all in the sense we take it in modern times. He despised as selfish or ignored as childish all uneasiness about any possible future life; he has nothing whatever to say about sin, piety, fear of God, repentance, absolution, confession, priestly instruction, dogma, or spiritual guidance, praise due to God or the spirits, petitions for forgiveness, going to church or temple, food scruples, keeping one day holy, refraining from work on that day in order to contemplate, reflect, and pray, etc. On the other hand he advocates returning good for evil, is full of charity in the sense of mercy and natural kindness of heart, has plenty of 'faith,' in the sense that *tao*, 'the way,' or Nature (that is the right way, as men, animals, vegetation, the elements, the planets all instinctively feel it, know it, and follow it) will, if followed, of itself always in due course set right that which is temporarily agley. It is perhaps not fashionable in these fratricidal days to quote German to a British public, but Goethe has really put Laocius' religion in one line when he says:

*“ Ein guter Mensch in seinem dunkeln Drange
Ist sich des rechten Weges wohl bewusst ” ;*

¹ In *The Dublin Review* for 1903-4 I translated and annotated to the best of my ability every word of Laocius' book; and that word for word translation, with cross-references co-ordinating and justifying every line (but without the annotations, allusions to other translators, or expressions of opinion), was republished seven years later by Chapman & Hall in *Studies in Chinese Religion* (1910). To the above therefore are referred those who may wish to enter more thoroughly into the details of Laocius' doctrine.

which may be rendered in English: "Every decent man instinctively knows the right way throughout life if he only has the will to choose it." And this philosophy of Laocius is as clearly *understood*, and even felt, by the educated classes throughout China now—though not necessarily *followed*—as it was 2,500 years ago; for there are plenty of Lord Bacons in China, in intellect as in meanness, wearing both his faces according to opportunity. Laocius was a man of the people, employed as archivist at the court of the puppet King or Emperor, having access to most if not all the central and (probably annually despatched) local records in China; only too conscious of his royal master's helpless and contemptible position as an ornamental tool of the ambitious vassals; foreseeing his said master's fall; witnessing the misery of the people, the treachery and luxury of the great; and anticipating the coming Armageddon. His noble but pessimistic philosophy above cursorily described must not be confused with the Taoist 'religion' founded 500 years later upon one or two popular but perverted points in the philosophy; this was after our era in competition with Buddhism, and it has since been bolstered up from century to century with foolish yarns connecting Laocius with Buddha of India and Mani of Persia. This corrupt Taoist 'religion,' which has had its unbroken succession of 'Popes' for 1900 years, is not, however, entirely contemptible as a popular and moral factor, and, whilst beneath notice from a literary, philosophical, and historical point of view, in a practical way serves to keep the Chinese masses straight by inculcating honest maxims, assisting at solemn functions, and so on; even the Manchu Government recognized and protected it under imperial

statutes and rules. I myself had an interview with the 61st Pope 37 years ago: the 62nd was abolished by the Republic, but restored at the recommendation of the notorious military adventurer and imperialist blusterer Chang Hün, who had last year (1917) to fly for safety to the Dutch Legation.

Just as the 'Tao family' (*i.e.* school), founded or specialised by Laocius and developed by the jumble of scholars grouped together under the fictitious personal name of Licius (Lieh-tsz), the cynical Sancius (Chwang-tsz) and a number of inferior philosophers, made a speciality of that aspect or part of Kwan-tsz and the ancient canons which treat of the 'universal way' or the 'only way,' so did Confucius (K'ung-tsz or K'ung Fu-tsz) make a speciality of that aspect or part laying stress upon goodness (benevolence, humanity, charity), filial piety (duty to parents, to immediate princely rulers, to the supreme King or Emperor, and to Heaven or God), and sacrifice (to Heaven, Earth, and the spirits therein). We have seen that the bottom rock of Chinese *religens* feeling, or 'religion,' has always been the logical one of continuity in life; and just as the *paterfamilias* and his *haeres necessarius* formed a sacred connection (by means of the propitiatory offerings, sacrifice, or worship made at fixed seasons) with the ancestral spirit, generation by generation—exactly as we have seen the Romans did,—so did the King or Emperor, as representing the World, keep up a spiritual connection with the World's Spirit, that is with Heaven or God. In these days, when a distinguished author like Mr. Wells discovers for us a 'God the Invisible King' of his own special manufacture, and when Mr. Stead, Sir William Crookes, and Sir Oliver Lodge are all convinced that

they can speak with the spirits of the dead, we must not wonder extravagantly at the primitive Chinese if they made their own efforts to improvise an analogous solution for the insoluble.

Long before Chinese writing of any kind existed, that particular tribe of a people giving the intellectual cue to all other cognate tribes (and naturally having no separate national designation, as it, or they, thought themselves 'the world') designated their supreme earthly ruler as *Ti*; and the most ancient form of this word *Ti* has at last been discovered in the bone inscriptions, suggesting a root *idea* similar to *θέμις*, and *τίθημι*. The *Ti*'s spirit would naturally be called *Shang Ti*, or the '*Ti* above,' *i.e.* the *Divus Imperator* or 'late Emperor.' And accordingly in the ancient canons, notably in the popular ballad canon, we find both expressions promiscuously or in apposition used for God, along with *T'ien*, or the visible but impersonal Heaven; whilst the term *T'ien-tsz* or the 'Son of Heaven' gradually came into use (apparently not before 1500 B.C.) in the sense of the King or Emperor ruling over the *T'ien-hia* or '(the all) below Heaven,' *i.e.* the World or the Empire. Before dynasties became hereditary the nominated successor took over charge in the shrine of his predecessor's spirit, and not in that of his own father's spirit. We must not, however, labour this point of correct translation too much, for, as the House of Commons Speaker (who had already said "there is *nothing* in the matter questioned") recently replied to a persistent 'arising out of the same question' question: "Out of nothing nothing can arise." I am far from suggesting in the *Ti* case an etymological connection, for, as that distinguished etymologist Lord Strangford said in my hearing fifty

years ago, "Etymologists always differ, and they are mostly wrong": I am only suggesting a further community of root *ideas*, probably identical in growth with the Graeco-Roman ideas in the case of heirs and family continuity; it cannot possibly be of any importance to us what visions primitive isolated man, whether in China or elsewhere, may have conjured up, except in so far as there is collateral evidence to illustrate or prove it. My revered friend the late Dr. Legge, with not unnatural missionary enthusiasm, saw in this *Ti* or *Shang Ti* a One God idea, a God both dwelling *in* and Creator of Heaven, antecedent to or co-existing with the most ancient ancestor worship; and in the universistic *Tao*, 'existing before Heaven and Earth,' he saw the revealed Creator. Thirty-seven years ago one of his missionary colleagues (Mr. Happer) despatched to Max Müller a portentous protest against this view, asserting that neither Greek nor Roman, nor Protestant Christian Churches approved it. So far as I can see, neither the Canon, nor Kwan-tsz, nor Laocius, nor Confucius ever transmits to us words into which the notion of a Revelation, a Personal Creator, or an Omniscient God can be read. Confucius plainly said: "We do not know what life is, how can we know what death is?" He thus expressed himself in the exact terms of Sir Oliver Lodge; but none the less was he assiduous in his customary adherence to the ancient and hereditary spiritual duties as above outlined: like Charles II. 'he went to church' if only as a gentleman.

Confucius was a very different man from Laocius. He had a personal pedigree of 2,000 years and could trace his 'immediate' family back quite 1,000 years to the dynastic capital of the bone inscription period; his most immediate ancestors had migrated in the face

of political dangers from the bone inscription centre (discovered in 1898 A.D.) to the most learned vassal state in Old China, the first princely rulers of which were (B.C. 1122) intimate family connections of the King or Emperor. This small state, adjoining on Kwan-tsz's larger state, had been one of the victims of Kwan-tsz's military *Kultur* a century and a half before Confucius was born, very much in the sense that Hanover has been a victim of Prussia; and, curiously enough, these two states of the Shan Tung peninsula formed the German sphere of 1897-1914. But after Kwan-tsz's death chaos supervened: the alternate vassal state Dictatorships 'to restore the Emperor' failed to achieve Kwan-tsz's moderate success; China was a prey to licentious ambitions, and Confucius' main object—whilst preserving intact and unchanged the universal old religion of family spiritual continuity—was to restore central and local imperial rights, general vassal subordination, distinctions of rank, and class privileges. In other words (borrowing modern Europe as a simile) he wished to restore the full power of the Papacy, the political subordination to it of the Most Christian, Most Catholic, Most Faithful, Catholic and Apostolic, Defender of the Faith, and so on, and a proper respect of the masses everywhere for their 'betters.' He was regarded rather as a crank than as a success, and was always cold-shouldered, outside his own state, and even there the times were mostly out of joint for him. Once when travelling over neighbouring states as a disappointed searcher for a 'job,' he stopped his 'carriage' (*i.e.* springless ox-cart) to ask where the ford was. "Who's that driving?" "Mr. Confucius." "Is it Confucius of Lu country?" "The same." "Then he ought to know where the ford is," said the yokel, returning to

his plough (*i.e.* Mr. Confucius is reported to know everything).

In order to develop his own politico-religious views, Confucius, and his disciples too, laid extraordinary stress upon the principle of *hiao*, usually but inadequately translated 'filial piety': it was made to include not only absolute subordination to the paternal authority (*patria potestas*), but also strict duty to one's elder brother, kindness to younger brothers, fidelity to friends, and above all to the principle *quod principi placuit legis habet vigorem*, for Confucius felt and inculcated awe of Heaven's anointed. One of his pupils Cincius (Tsêng-tsz) composed, or took down piecemeal, a canon called the *Hiao* Classic, which is in use to this day. More than a century after the death of Confucius, this quasi-religious theory of natural *jên* (humanity, benevolence, virtue), combined with its outward expression *hiao*, was developed by the peripatetic philosopher Mencius (Mêng-tsz), whose pet theory was that, however corrupted by environment, human nature was originally good. A century later a more original and logical Confucian, but one much less read, whom we may call Syncius (Sün-tsz), reduced the absolute *hiao* privileges of prince and father to more reasonable proportions, maintaining that subjects and sons should assert their right to expostulate, and also that human nature was radically evil, and to give it a righteous growth required more careful training. These Confucianist sages, and scores of others less distinguished, formed what was subsequently called the '*Ju* family' (or *Ju* school) to differentiate it and them from the more abstractionist *Tao* school above outlined; this word *Ju*, which may be translated 'educated classes,' or 'distinguishers between right and wrong,' or 'people

capable of reading books,' existed in that sense long before Confucius was born, but owing to Laocius and Confucius having both borrowed consciously or unconsciously wholesale from Kwan-tsz, who himself had worked on the basis of the ancient unwritten canons, the old words *tao* or 'universism' and *ju* or 'culture' came to mean Taoists and Confucianists. But there was still no word for 'religion,' as a shifting cult separable at choice from general State and social policy; nor had even the word 'teaching' come into vogue as applied to the two rival schools, under one or the other of which, or their subdivisions, all educated men of the warring states ranged themselves between the date of Confucius' death (479 B.C.) and the formal abolition of the old spiritual monarchy, coupled with the declaration of a new, centralised, and universal Empire in 210 B.C. If, during these 250 years, it were necessary to indicate the divergent teaching of the two rival schools, the word *shuh*, meaning 'craft' or 'scheme,' was used, implying a kind of artful manipulation, and both Laocius and Confucius distinctly state that they were transmitters, not creators or originators of doctrine. For several centuries—a century before and after the date 210 B.C.—Taoism was viewed with more favour than the rival 'craft' of Confucianism in ruling circles, and meanwhile the amalgamating but short-lived Conqueror distinctly plumped for Taoism, detesting Confucianism so much that he destroyed all its literature. The great founder of the Han dynasty (206 B.C.) whose geniality enabled him to keep together the loose conquests of his violent predecessor, had a complete contempt for Confucianists, pacifists, and all their tribe; but his sons and grandsons were not long in discovering that the natural 'benevolence' cult and

the more artificial *hiao* or 'piety' cult were eminently suited to dynastic interests, and from that day (say B.C. 100) to the revolution of 1911 all Emperors have with insignificant intermissions adopted the motto of "We rule the world by *hiao*," just as since Constantine Europe has figuratively if not quite practically declared "We rule in Christ."

Thus we see that, quite up to the beginning of the Christian era, the Chinese had never conceived of religion in our European sense as an objective cult separate from the ordinary functions of life, such as rising, washing, dressing, eating, drinking, visiting, serving or commanding according to station, burying, keeping up spiritual continuity, offering harvest thanksgivings, studying deportment, worshipping or sacrificing to invisible family spirits by offering provisions and comfort, and thus at the same time protecting the living from spiritual vengeance. The idea of a personal creating God, apart from visible Nature; a God demanding exclusive praise and recognition; willing and able to grant favours and absolve from sin; holding direct spiritual converse with, comforting and listening to individuals; taking sides against enemies; sending down even a Spirit, not to say his Son, in the form of man born of woman to expiate man's sins and return to Heaven after revealing certain new spiritual conditions,—none of this ever entered the Chinese mind. True, Confucius once said: "He who offends Heaven has not the wherewithal to pray to"; but the native commentators here give the usual universistic meaning to 'Heaven' as the 'Natural Order' of all things, otherwise the 'Dispenser' above; on the other hand, when on his death-bed prayers for him were suggested by a disciple, he expressed a doubt

whether the Ritual for the Dead, running "We pray to you, O spirits above and below," applied to his case, adding that, in any eventuality, he had been doing this all his life. Laocius never once mentions prayer; he only once mentions *Ti*, and then vaguely and cosmologically as an emanation of *Tao*; he only once alludes to *hiao*, and then quite contemptuously as being an artificial or 'tendencious' exaggeration of the true ancient affection of parents coupled with the *hiao* of children. *T'ien* is named 50 or 60 times, chiefly in the senses Heaven and Earth, All below Heaven (*i.e.* China, the World), the *Tao* of Heaven (*i.e.* the natural or right way). *Li*, or ceremonious form, which Kwan-tsz identifies with *Tao*, and Confucius develops 'to a frazzle,' is only twice mentioned, and then with disapproval. Indeed, if we go back to Kwan-tsz, we find he also scarcely mentions *Ti* at all, and then chiefly in allusion to the mythical Chinese monarchs; but *Tao* occurs hundreds if not thousands of times in every possible sense used by Laocius and Confucius. *Shêng-jén*, usually translated 'the holy man,' and in much later times applied specifically to Confucius, is freely and almost colloquially employed by Kwan-tsz to mean anything between 'you' (respectful), 'a wise man,' 'a saint,' and 'the ancient rulers of China'; Laocius employs it also freely in the sense of 'the highest type of man.' Confucius uses it as an 'inspired man,' and modestly disclaims for himself any title to such a qualification.¹ Kwan-tsz accepts oracles and omens, but manifestly for political purposes, and he openly

¹ Those who desire to gain a knowledge of Confucius' detailed religious views will find the *Analests of Confucius*, by the Rev. W. E. Soothill (published in England by Oliphant & Co.) a cheap and adequate guide; moreover in addition to his own views he gives those of Dr. Legge (English), the Jesuit Zottoli (in Latin), Père Couvreur (in French), and Ku Hung-ming (a highly educated English-speaking Chinese).

scoffs at them. Laocius never mentions them at all, whilst Confucius ridicules a magnate who built a fine 'house' wherein to keep his oracular tortoise; evidently this and the mayweed were obsolescent as compared with bone inscription days.

We are now approaching the moment when an era of foreign conquest brought the Chinese into contact with various foreign religions, and when the first objective notion of a detachable teaching, apart from national government systems, came into vogue, culminating in the saying 'Three Teachings,' *i.e.* Taoism (corrupted), Confucianism (refined), and Buddhism (the Mahāyāna form of it).

It is worth while noticing that our own Scriptural history closes at about the time (say 500 B.C.) when Laocius and Confucius started what may be called the 'New Testament' of Chinese religion. Zoroaster, Solon, and Thales (say, 660 to 540 B.C.) roughly cover the era of Kwan-tsz and the interval between his death and the birth of Laocius, Pythagoras and Buddha; thus we see that a wave of new thought was occupying the minds of all the cultured nations at one epoch.

E. H. PARKER.

RELIGIOUS SECTS IN RUSSIA.

ANGELO S. RAPPOPORT, Ph.D.

In Him we live, and move, and have our being.—ST. PAUL.

Christianity, Judaism, and Islam, Monotheistic and Polytheistic worship, are mere fleeting waves in the vast Ocean of Divinity.

Of *all* mankind it can truly be said that it is an incarnation of God.

The omnipresence of that Spirit

In which all *live* and *are*.—SHELLEY.

The all-embracing, all-sustaining One,

Say, doth He not embrace, sustain, include

Thee?—Me?—Himself?—GORTHE.

RUSSIA is a sealed book, a veritable sphinx, in more than one sense. Few Western Europeans are able to understand the psychology and interpret rightly the gestures and acts of this vast nation, often strange and incomprehensible, at times puzzling and annoying. I hope I am not exaggerating if I say that the most characteristic trait of the vast majority of the Russian nation is of a religious nature. Religious sentiment, as distinguished from religiosity, is the fundamental mood in which Russia's millions live and move and have their being. Accordingly a brief survey of the numerous religious sects which have flourished for centuries and are still flourishing in that country, will perhaps shed some light upon Russia's past and help us to form an opinion as to her future.

I have shown elsewhere that a political ferment has for centuries existed among the more cultured classes of Russian society. Acquainted with Western thought, cosmopolitans in more than one way, these

more enlightened Russians became utterly indifferent to religion and transferred their interest to the domains of philosophy, literature and politics. Not so the vast peasant masses, the backbone of the nation. For centuries the Russian peasant, illiterate and naïve, ignorant of science and progress, has thought about life and its real meaning. The great questions and problems which, since time immemorial, have puzzled the thinkers of all ages—

“ Heads in hieroglyphical nightcaps,
Heads in turbans and swarthy bonnets,
Heads in wigs
And a thousand other
Poor and perspiring heads of us mortals ”—

these eternal questions and problems have found an echo in the heart and mind of the Russian peasant. He has endeavoured to reply to them, to solve the riddles in his own way. His answer has taken the shape of a sharp and implacable criticism not only of social life but of conventional religion ; for religion to him is the very pivot of man's existence.

One of the fundamental mistakes which superficial students of the psychology and history of religious thought usually make, is to imagine that it is the conservative and not the innovator or reformer in religious matters who is endowed with the deeper religious sentiment. The contrary is the case. The reformer, the innovator, is a seeker, a seeker for truth. He takes religion seriously and not lightly ; he treats it *con amore*. For him the way that leads to happiness, light and life is to be found in faith and religion ; he therefore examines this way with care and attention. In religion, true religion, the religion of the Spirit, he

sees the All-in-All, the solution of all problems of social, collective and individual life.

The seeker and innovator is yearning for a religious ideal, for a faith which is not in constant contradiction with the realities of life. His honest heart and mind revolt against all established religions which preach No and act Yes, or *vice versa*. His aim is to bring religious faith into touch with actual everyday life, to mould and shape the latter in accordance with his convictions, to establish harmony between his prayers and his actions. *Force majeure*, the exigencies of life, and other such excuses, he neither admits nor acknowledges. It is with him a to-be or not-to-be. Either the religious faith he professes is right, and then to act contrary to its tenets is a sin; or his religion is a sham, a living lie, and must be cast into the melting-pot. His criticism is not confined to attack on one particular dogma; it extends to the very essence of religion.

This explains the fact that for the most part religious sects are founded by deeply religious persons, and flourish and thrive in the midst of nations endowed with a deep religious sentiment. Hence the great number of religious sects in Russia. The search for moral truth, for spiritual inwardness, the craving for salvation, have always been paramount among the Slavs of history. In his quest of an ideal, of the Good and the True, of real happiness, the Russian peasant has discovered it in genuine religion, in spiritual inwardness. His soul thirsting for God, his direct nature, ignorant of sophisms and ecclesiastical lawyers' quibbles, have led him to denounce outward religious formalities as a sham. He has craved for a religion of the Spirit.

Some writers have endeavoured to convince

Western Europe that the vast peasant masses of Russia were strongly attached to the Orthodox Religion imported into the lands of the Slavs from Byzantium. As the Orthodox Faith was identical with the principle of Autocracy, it consequently followed that these masses were reactionary and deeply attached to Autocracy,—to the stained glass of the established Russian Church. When, however, the Revolution broke out, when Nicholas Cæsar was dethroned, and the vast millions made not the slightest attempt to save the dynasty, and therewith the religion of Byzantium went crumbling to the dust, other writers would have us believe that the Russian peasant was indifferent to anything but the soil, that he had no idea of or interest in spiritual values, and that all his thoughts were concentrated upon crude materialism. Both these views are wrong, and emanate from those who have not been able to grasp the real soul of Russia.

The Russian peasant masses—and they form the bulk of the nation—are deeply religious; spirit is of more importance to them than matter. And, just because they are religious, they have never been really attached to the old, cold formality of the Church of Byzantium with its outward pomp and ritual. The religion of Byzantium, grafted by force upon the soul of Russia, has never stirred the true depths of the peasant's being, never satisfied his craving for spiritual inwardness, for truth and salvation.

Ever since the introduction of the Orthodox Church among the Russians, the peasant has been tormented by doubts and questionings. He has turned to his priests and to his prelates, and his priests and prelates have answered: "Wait and see. Wait until you are dead; and in a next world you will find the

answer. Who are you to question and to criticise your betters?" He has bowed his head and gone away; but with loss of faith in his priest and determination to seek for himself. He has thought and thought, and in his own honest way tried to solve the riddles surging and swirling in his unsophisticated mind.

Seekers for truth and salvation have left their homes, wandered about in towns and villages, roamed through the dense forests and over the steppes and snowfields. They have become apostles, founders of numerous sects imbued with a deep religious spirit, followers of a religion of the Spirit, of a true Christianity; they have become harbingers of a new messianic message. They have denounced the sins of society and the flagrant contradiction existing between religious teaching and reality; and they have been listened to by millions of the simple, honest moujiks, craving for truth and salvation.

I have said that the religion of Byzantium never really satisfied the soul of the Slav. If Vladimir the Holy had not introduced it into the country in spite of and against the will of the people, the Russians might have gradually adopted Judaism. And by Judaism I do not mean the barren religion of ritual and ceremonies as taught by the modern, so-called orthodox Synagogue, but the spiritual teaching of the Prophets upon which is based the true religion of Christ, of Him who preached the Sermon on the Mount, but which Christendom, in spite of eighteen centuries of professed Christianity, never seems to have taken seriously or literally.

The influence of Judaism, and I hasten to repeat the Judaism of the Prophets, has exercised a much deeper and more far-reaching influence upon the mind of the Russian peasant masses than is usually imagined.

by superficial students. Apart from Judaising sects which arose in Russia, in Novgorod and in Pskov, in the 15th century, apart from the now existing sect of the Subotniky, or Observers of the Sabbath, nearly all religious sects in Russia, with their more than twenty millions of adherents, have drawn their inspiration from the teaching of the Prophets, in as much as this constitutes the basis of true Christianity. Moreover it is no exaggeration to say that, with the exception of those who can trace their origin and lineage to the Jews of Portugal and Spain, with the exception also of many Jews of Poland, the vast majority of Russian Jews are Slavs converted to Judaism in the early days of Russia's existence. Long before the arrival of the Viking brothers Rurik, Sineus and Trouvor, long before Byzantium made its triumphant entry into the lands of the Russian Slavs, Jews had settled in the country, and the teaching of the Prophets had strongly appealed to the religious sentiment of the inhabitants.

When Byzantine religion was finally forced upon Russia, the Slavs constantly turned away from it, openly or secretly, seeking and finding consolation in the doctrines of the Prophets and in the inner spiritual teaching of Christ, which is in harmony with the ideas and ideals of the Prophets. Hence this blending of the Old and New Testaments in the tenets of nearly all Russian religious sects.

It is not within the scope of this brief paper to give a detailed description of the origin, history and teaching of all the Russian religious sects; a bulky volume would hardly suffice for the purpose. I shall thus attempt to give only a general sketch, a rough and embryonic outline, of their fundamental ideas.

The Russian religious sects may be roughly

described as either mystical or as spiritually-rationalistic. At any rate a mystical element predominates in the former, while the latter more clearly show a rationalistic tendency. Both characteristics are in keeping with the temperament of the Russian Slav, which is a curious blend of mysticism and realism or rationalism. In this respect the Russian Slavs greatly resemble the Jews. Both are endowed with a deep religious sentiment and favour mystical as well as rationalistic doctrines.

In his famous work *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, William James speaks of two kinds of religion: the religion of the healthy-minded, and that of the sick souls. The religion of the latter is essentially a religion of deliverance. "Man must die to an unreal life before he can be born into real life."

All Russian religious sects may be said to belong to this second variety, for they are the outcome of a yearning for deliverance—the deliverance of the soul from the shackles of gross materialism, and the deliverance of man from social evils and oppression. Born and grown up in an atmosphere of suffering, they are imbued with the spirit which gave rise to the teaching of the Prophets, and fired with the beauty of the idéal expounded in the doctrines of true inner Christianity. They yearn for the day when the divine and spiritual in man will conquer the materialism in him, "when heaven will be brought down to earth and earth exalted to heaven," and there will be an end of suffering and a true knowledge of God.

Can such a state of affairs be ever realised? Yes, reply the Russian religious sects. It can be realised, if man really and honestly desires it, if he is possessed with a true sense of humility and nobility, if he

recognises once for all that the possibilities and means for such a realisation lie within him. Pessimistic these sects are, for they see evil paramount in the world; yet is their very pessimism but the rough and rock-strewn path leading to the Pisgah heights of optimism. Has not man salvation in himself? Are not divinity and spirituality dwelling in his own breast? He need but develop them and attain happiness. Evil exists everywhere, but this evil is only the result of worldliness. The soul and the spirit have the power to conquer this, just as man conquers nature. Man has the power to eradicate evil, social injustice and violence by developing spiritual inwardness. "Man," to quote the Editor of this Review, "has power, by the exercise of a right will, of true good-will, to convert the potentiality of his best nature into a glorious actuality."

If men would follow literally and honestly the commandments and precepts of true spiritual religion, happiness would reign among them, and the kingdom of God, of love and labour, would soon be established on earth. Fight and struggle, hatred and revenge, which embitter every moment of human life, would disappear. True religion, being based upon love, must abhor violence, for violence stands in direct opposition to love and goodwill. Unfortunately, however, indifference to spiritual religion develops in man an excess of selfish love. This he labels with all sorts of high-sounding names, but in reality it makes him crush his fellow-creatures to gratify his own desires, and thus he troubles his inner and outer peace of life.

All the Russian religious sects not only preach but also practise a religion of veracity rooted in spiritual inwardness, a return to the Gospel of truth and justice.

In these days of sham, when the words of brotherhood, equality, justice, idealism and democracy—whatever the latter expression may mean—are on everybody's lips but rarely in their hearts, these sects, right or wrong, according to our Western conceptions, cannot be accused of being false to their own selves. However they may vary in their doctrines, according as the mystical or rationalist elements in them predominate, their fundamental idea is identical. It is a quest for truth and justice, an endeavour to blend spirituality and actuality into one harmonious whole, a search for some talisman which will redeem sick and suffering souls and put an end to unhappiness, oppression and violence, to injustice and all social evils.

Society as it exists, say all these sectarians, does not live spiritually, but is a living lie. God has given unto man the earth, which contains all that he requires. In his depravity, however, and in his selfishness, man is bartering away the gifts of God ; he is selling his conscience, his faith and his personality. God commanded men to love each other, but they have refused to be brothers, and the strong have preferred to oppress and dominate the weak. But there should be neither oppressors nor oppressed.

Power and authority are but the result of man's depravity, for only the depraved require the rod of justice ; but when all the world will have developed the spirituality which is innate in man, government and authority will become superfluous. Let others, continue these sectarians, live as they wish to ; we only ask for freedom to live our own lives. Our weapon is not force but persuasion. Truth is on our side and we shall set an example of an equitable, moral and happy life and thus induce others to imitate

us. And when the majority of men come to think and live as we do, then the old order of things will disappear of itself, melting away like dew at the first ray of the sun.

The idea of brotherhood, which is taken seriously by all Russian sectarians, is one of the principal tenets of their doctrines. There is not one Russian religious sect that is not preaching and practising true fraternity. If men are all brothers, then it follows, according to these souls thirsting for truth and justice, that war is an immoral and cruel act. War cannot be crushed and eradicated by war.

The reader of these lines will no doubt exclaim : But this is Tolstoyism ! Perhaps it is ; but this would only tend to prove again what mistakes superficial students of and writers on Russia are so frequently making. It has been said more than once that the tendency to passive resistance and even to some extent the recent epidemic of non-combativeness in the Russian army are the result of the enormous influence Tolstoy has wielded upon the vast Russian peasant masses. This is an error. Tolstoy himself wrote : " There is no Tolstoyism ; all that I have said in my books is nothing else but what has been said eighteen centuries ago—and much better too—in the Gospels." I venture to add that it is not Tolstoy who has influenced the Russian peasant masses, but, on the contrary, the masses who influenced him. He has expressed in burning words the feelings and yearnings of his people, feelings latent in the peasants ; he has given articulate and corporate speech to their innermost convictions. His was the voice of the masses, and he only clothed in beautiful language the inarticulate longings of his compatriots.

Tolstoy drew his teaching from the people, and his doctrines bear the unmistakable traces of popular morality, philosophy and mysticism. Like all the adherents of the various religious sects in Russia, Tolstoy believed in human goodwill and in the original goodness of men. Man need but make an effort of the will and he can soon change his nature and his mode of life. The philosopher of Yasnaya Polyana, again like all the sectarians in Russia, preached neither a political nor a social revolution, but a re-birth, a renovation of man. By the power of a right will, by the spirit which is dwelling in him, man can change his lower nature. How can we obtain happiness? asked and still ask the Russian sectarians, and their questions were repeated by Tolstoy. How can we obtain happiness, peace of mind, remain pure, and above all establish harmony between our words and actions? By leading a life of love and labour, they answer, by working for our sustenance with our own hands, by developing the spirituality, the divine spark, which is dwelling in our hearts. Then will disappear all the unhappiness, social evils, strife, hatred and fratricide, which make us forget the true meaning of life. The solution of all problems, political and social, will thus have been found.

It was a Russian peasant named Bondarev, belonging to one of these religious sects, who exercised an immense influence over the great novelist and philosopher. This illiterate peasant, scarcely able to read, called the attention of the world-famous author to the true meaning of religion, to the inner teaching of Christ.

Tolstoy's truthful soul, like the simple souls of his compatriots, the adherents of the religious sects,

was filled with horror when he gazed attentively upon the flagrant contradiction existing between true spiritual religion and the actualities of everyday life.

I have spoken of these sects as mainly mystical or rationalistic. The most important among the former is that of the Christy or Chlisty, the Flagellants. Their fundamental doctrine consists in a belief that divinity, the divine spirit, is dwelling in the hearts of all men, that every one may one day find happiness and thus become his own Saviour or Christ. They call themselves the Men-gods. Their chief commandment is a firm belief in the Holy Spirit.

The human race, say the Chlisty, has from time immemorial been in search of a divinity. It thought to have discovered this divinity either in heaven or upon earth. Some have conceived God as a transcendent power, controlling the world outwardly, who "did on his finger whirl the mighty whole." Others have set this divinity in every atom of the atmosphere, in every plant and animal. God is present in every grain of sand in the desert, in every blade of grass in the field. He is present in the leaf that quivers in the breeze, and in the worm that creeps on the ground.

"Yet not the slightest leaf
That quivers to the passing breeze,
Is less instinct with Thee;
Yet not the meanest worm,
That lurks in graves and fattens on the dead,
Less shares in Thy eternal breath."

Thus God for them is no longer a transcendental power but immanent in the world, dwelling in plants which without consciousness lead a cosmic-magnetic life, dwelling in animals who in their sensuous dream-

life feel a more or less dumb existence. Humanity, say the Chlisty, has been in error. It has been seeking for God in the vast universe, in heaven or upon earth; but the heavens are empty and the earth is full of iniquity. God is in reality very near to us, the Divine Spirit dwells in man, who both feels and thinks. It is in man that God reaches self-consciousness, and through man, through the Christs of all ages, through the great God-men, He reveals this self-consciousness. Thus man, every man, is an incarnation of God. And as God is dwelling in every human being, every man carries in himself the ideal of perfection.

“For spiritual faith man is actually and eternally in his inmost being one with the Son of God.” Since Jesus Christ, they argue, who was a mortal man, has, by reason of his holiness and grace, become a God-man, every man may aspire to divinity. It depends upon the degree of his depth and faith. All men have in them the potentiality of holiness, all may be Chosen ones, Elect. Man need only make an effort of the will to shatter the carapace of materialism, of selfhood and imperfection, and he will discover in himself the Divine Spirit.

And when a man shall have recognised and developed the Divine Spirit in himself he will also recognise it in his neighbour, and he will consequently treat all men as his equals. Men, conscious of the fact that God is dwelling in the heart of every man, who has been created in His image, will be bound to respect each other, and will never dare to trample upon each other's liberty and freedom. The human personality, as a potential divinity, will be sacred; for to use violence against such a one is a sin and a crime.

Violence of any kind, say the Chlisty, is therefore

one of the greatest sins imaginable, and we must avoid it, or bear it passively when the non-Chlisty make use of it against us in any shape or form. The present social structure is based upon falsehood and iniquity; we must therefore endeavour to pull it down, not by bloodshed however, but by gentle persuasion.

Asceticism is one of the fundamental tenets of this sect. Man consists of body and soul; the latter, they hold, has been created by God, and is a divine spark, the former is the work of Satan.

The Chlisty, therefore, mortify the flesh by fasting, wearing chains on their bodies and flagellation. They seek the joy of suffering. This severely dualistic asceticism of the Chlisty has with some led to abuses and excesses, and run into extravagance perilously bordering on crude sensualism. Some Chlisty have maintained that the flesh cannot be mortified by abstinence but only by excessive indulgence. Such aberrations are of course by no means peculiar to the Chlisty alone. Clemens Alexandrinus, for instance, mentions some Gnostic sects for whom virtue consisted in the effort to conquer sensuality by sensual joy.

These excesses gave rise to a new sect, the Skoptzy, which was founded by a peasant of Orel, named Kondratyi Solivanov. It is impossible, he declared, to conquer the flesh; therefore, basing himself upon some texts in the New Testament (especially *Matthew* v. 29 and xix. 12), he advised his followers to emasculate themselves. Both the Chlisty and the Skoptzy thus strenuously preach the reign of the soul over the body, of the spirit over the flesh.

The Chlisty would thus discover Christ in every man and so style themselves Men-gods. The Bye-gouny (Those-who-run-away-from-the-world), however,

another mystical sect, consider themselves merely as the soldiers and sons of Jesus. Striving to place themselves above things terrestrial they live apart from the world, roaming about and shunning organised society. Mystic and ascetic practices support their fundamental doctrine, which is based upon the Biblical idea of Antichrist. Antichrist, they say, is reigning supreme over the modern social structure; emperors, kings and governments are his servants and worshippers. It is the duty of the true believer to escape from such a world, to live as an outcast and an outlaw.

Among other mystical sects may be mentioned the *Mozelshtshiky*, who carry their doctrine of deliverance from a world of iniquity to what seems to them the only logical conclusion, namely voluntary suicide. The world, they teach, is doomed to perdition; it is therefore best to escape this valley of falsehood and iniquity, of sin and sensuality, of crime and immorality, by courting death, which is a deliverance of the soul from the prison-house of the body.

There are also the *Skakouny*, or Jumpers, and the *Prygouny*, or Runners, who derive their names from their addiction to wild dances to induce religious ecstasy. The Children of Zion again are waiting and yearning for the end of the world; whilst the *Moltshalniky*, or Silent ones, and the *Nietshtshiky*, or Nay-sayers, deny the necessity of any ritual ceremonies and consider themselves as the only true spiritual Christians. This sect is also known as the Brotherhood of the Redeemer. The *Zhivye Poklonniky*, or Those-who-find-rest-whilst-yet-alive, look upon life as an evil and upon death as a blessing. They often court martyrdom.

It may be noted in passing that this idea of

preferring death to life, of courting death and endeavouring to escape from life, is to be frequently met with in Jewish post-biblical lore. The same notion has also found its philosophical exponents in Von Hartmann and Schopenhauer: "Life is suffering, but death is happiness; not-being is better than being." So taught these two philosophers, of whose very existence the Russian peasants are certainly unaware. But while for Von Hartmann and Schopenhauer the idea of not-being and of annihilation is but a mere watchword, a starting point for a philosophical system, the Russian peasants practise what they preach with a terrible, almost irresistible, logic.

In their search for deliverance, however, in their quest for salvation and truth, the Russian people have given birth, not only to such unbalanced mystical enthusiasms, but also to so-called rational sects. Whilst the former movements are distinctly anti-social, destructive and annihilating, the latter are more healthy and rational. Their followers are not anxious to escape life; on the contrary, they would seek it. This they would do by endeavouring to shape and mould their life in such a way as to bring it into complete harmony with religion, justice and truth. The critical sense of these sectarians has manifested itself, not only in their religious ideas and doctrines, but also in the realm of social morality. Their mysticism has given way to realism and to a more sane conception of life. They preach and practise, not only moral perfection, but universal brotherhood, economic justice, equality and righteousness, taking these doctrines literally. They are concerned with the problems of actual daily life, and look upon work as the basis of every social organisation. Their philosophy

and morality are inspired by the Old and the New Testaments, which they read and interpret literally. If these are sacred, they say, then the true believer ought to obey the words of the Book.

Now the Bible says: "Thou shalt eat thy bread in the sweat of thy brow." All men, therefore, should work for their sustenance. But the sun, the air, earth and water are the gifts of God and the property of all men. For any man, or group of men, then to appropriate the earth or the water is equivalent to robbery. To have to pay for a piece of land which a man is cultivating with his own hands is a sin. Individual property must then be abolished; collective property, culminating in communism, is what God intended for men.

Among these religious sects with rationalistic tendencies the most noteworthy are the Doukhobory, or Seekers of the Spirit. Their fundamental dogma is the rejection of all outward religious ceremonies and the adoration of God in spirit and truth.

The Molokany, or Milk-drinkers during Lent, whose doctrines are based upon the teachings of the Bible and whose fundamental religious tenets are equality of man and love, is another of such rationalistic sects. Both the Doukhobory and the Molokany consider war an abomination and carry their teaching into practice. The strength and sincerity of their opinions have been put to the test more than once. When a hostile government exiled the followers of this sect to inhospitable regions, amidst semi-savage tribes, they did not perish but won friends among enemies and turned waste lands into flourishing fields and meadows. They succeeded because they had introduced spirituality into daily life.

The Nemolyaky, or Non-praying ones, again deny the necessity of any external cult or ritual, for only a spiritual cult is agreeable to God. God should be addressed only in the spirit. They would praise God by the work of their hands. They affirm the necessity of the inward communion of man with God, the interior dialogue, the clinging of the soul to the source from which it draws its being, but they deprecate petitional prayer. God knows all our necessities, and to commune with Him in words is superfluous. Thus the Nemolyaky are at once followers of a natural religion and of the inner teaching of the Prophets and Christ.

The Shaloputy and Soutayevtsy are also rationalistic sects whose fundamental religious tenet is that of love and brotherhood. They preach and practise communism and maintain that true Christianity should consist in real love for our neighbours.

Such in roughest outline are the doctrines of the Russian religious sects, doctrines which in spite of all exaggerations have a firm basis of eternal hope and faith in universal benevolence, and their root in a spiritual religion. Had Autocracy and Bureaucracy not persecuted these sects, they would have numbered, not only twenty millions of followers, but five times as many. A foundation, however, has been laid; and mayhap in a free Russia the spirit that has fashioned it will prove to be the leaven which will leaven the whole lump. The present upheaval in Russia is radical enough in all conscience politically and socially, but perhaps not greater than it will be in the domain of religion and morality. Russia's future lies in idealism, and in spiritual religion. In this realization of ideals the Slavs, I believe, will be helped by the Jews dwelling in their midst. "It is not in vain," wrote Vladimir

Soloviev, Russia's great religious philosopher, "that Providence has placed so many Jews in our midst." If Russia's future is to be worked out in spiritual religion, the future of the Jews as a collectivity perchance will lie in Russia and their mission will be accomplished in that country. "For the idea of a nation is not what a few individuals, fleeting shadows, or even the nation as a whole, may think *at certain periods of time*, but what God or Nature has thought of her *in eternity*." Twenty million Russians are already practising religious tenets which are a blending of the teachings of the Prophets and of Christ. These millions, aided by the Jews, will gradually evolve a religion of spiritual inwardness, and the mission of the Jews will thus become a glorious reality. Ravaged Russia and the Jews will both find their salvation in the international, the old Jewish ideal, which is: "To do justice, love mercy, and walk humbly with thy God."

ANGELO S. RAPPOPORT.

ZOROASTRIAN PROPHECY AND THE MESSIANIC HOPE.

HERBERT BAYNES, F.R.S.L., M.R.A.S.

WHETHER from the standpoint of religion, philosophy or history Parsism is a most interesting system. In the sixth century B.C. the problem before Zoroaster was this: In a faith at bottom wholly monotheistic how is one to account for the existence of evil? The only possible solution seemed to him to be that inherent in the Supreme Being, Ahura Mazdāh himself, there must be two opposite forces or principles, which he called the Twins.

In the Gāthā '*Ahunavaiti*' (Yasna xxx. 3) we read :

"These two primæval spirits, the Twins, first made themselves heard: the Good and the Bad in thought, word and work. The wise rightly decided between them, not so the foolish.

"When these Two first came together to give rise to life and mortality and to determine how at last the world should be, the Bad spirit chose the evil, and the Holiest, who prepared the steadfast skies, chose the pure and the good and those who, believing in Mazdāh, satisfy Ahura with real deeds."

The Good spirit was called Ahura Mazdāh, the Bad Angra Mainyu, or, as we are wont to call them, Ormuzd and Ahriman. Of these Twins the Evil spirit was thought to be the weaker; and Zarathushtra or

Zoroaster did not hesitate to teach that in the fulness of time a Saviour would come, born of a virgin, with a halo of divine glory, to bring peace and to establish righteousness on earth.

This prophecy, at once so interesting and so important, cannot fail to appeal intensely to all Christians, and we shall surely do well to find out all we can about it.

But before citing the three or four very significant passages in the Avesta relating to Saoshyant, the coming Healer or Saviour, it might perhaps be well to give as succinct an account as possible of what is variously known as Mazdeism, Magism, Zoroastrianism and Parsism. Several distinguished European scholars, notably in France, have worked in this fascinating field of knowledge, but for a real summary of the subject we know nothing better than Prof. Deussen's luminous exposition, which is as follows :

In endless time (*Zrvana akarana*) and boundless space (*Twasha*), separated from each other by a vast distance, are two great realms : that of beginningless Light, ruled by Ahura Mazdāh, the 'Wise Lord,' or Spenta Mainyu the 'Holy Spirit'; and the Kingdom of beginningless Darkness, which is under the dominion of Angra Mainyu, the 'Striking Spirit.' Truth, Light and Life are the attributes of Ahura Mazdāh; Death, Darkness and Falsehood those of Angra Mainyu. Everything good in the world is a creation of Ahura Mazdāh, the corn-bearing earth, rivers and seas, metals and trees; whilst winter, drought and illness, beasts of prey, reptiles and vermin were brought into the creation of the Good God by Angra Mainyu. The whole history of the world consists in a conflict of these

two principles, which covers a period of 15,000 years, from the first creation to the end of the world, comparable to a drama in five acts of 3,000 years each, preceded by a prelude.

PRELUDE.

Angra Mainyu, the ruler of Darkness, sees in the distance Light, and mad with rage rushes at it in order to destroy it. Then, in his majesty, Ahura Mazdāh comes to confront him, demanding an armistice. They both recognise that it will be a struggle for life or death, and each becomes aware that he is not prepared for such a conflict. So they agree to be at peace for 9,000 years, the period of the first three acts of the world-drama. In his wisdom Ahura Mazdāh sees that, with this interval, he will certainly be in a position to overcome his enemy. Indeed Angra Mainyu himself recognises that he has made a bad bargain, but does this too late. His quality or property is afterthought; only *after* the event does he consider the consequences of his acts. He sees too late that Ahura Mazdāh has been able to thwart him, which puts him into such a towering passion that he becomes paralysed and remains helpless.

FIRST ACT (3,000 YEARS).

Ahura Mazdāh uses this time in surrounding himself with an army of divine spirits, consisting of 6 Amesha Spentas, 24 Yazatas and the Fravashis.

(a) The six Amesha Spentas, *i.e.* 'Immortal Saints,' are simply personifications of abstract ideas, and their position above the gods retained by the popular religion shows clearly that we have to do with

an artificial system, sprung from reflexion. Their names are: (1) Vohu Manah, 'Good Disposition'; (2) Asha Vahishta, 'Best Purity'; (3) Kshatra Vairya, 'Desirable Dominion'; (4) Haurvatāt, 'Wholeness,' 'Perfection'; (5) Ameretāt, 'Immortality'; (6) Spenta Ārmaiti, 'Holy Wisdom.'

(β) The 24 Yazatas or 'Adorable Ones.' By these we must probably understand the gods of the people partially suppressed by Zarathushtra's reformation; hence the uncertainty as to their exact number. The most important are: (1) Mithra, the god of the broad and beautiful pastures, whose throne is on Hara Berezaiti, originally, like Mitra of the Veda, the sunlight, welcome and friendly to man; (2) Sraosha ($\sqrt{\text{śru}}$, to hear) seems to be a genius of prayer and the hearing of prayer, whose body is the word (*manthra*); (3) Rashnu, a genius of righteousness; hence he is called the 'straightest' (*rahishta*) and is a terror to robbers and thieves. These three are found on the Chinvat bridge as judges of the dead. For the rest we need only mention Tishtriya, a star-god, and, as he acts as guardian of the eastern portion of the sky, most likely the Morning Star. At the same time he is said to be a rain-bringing divinity, and therefore a particular opponent of the demon of drought. Particularly interesting is Verethraghna, a god of victory, corresponding to the Indian Vṛtrahan, 'Slayer of Vṛitra,' a title of Indra, who, as Andra, is counted amongst the demons in the Avesta. But, owing to his being the destroyer of the demon Vṛitra, he has taken a place amongst the good spirits in Iran.

(γ) A third and last class of good spirits are the Fravashis, the individual prototypes and protecting genii of single men. Every man has his Fravashi from

time immemorial immortal in the heavens, which has come down to him at birth in order to guide his steps and to protect him from evil and which, after death, will return to heaven. But even whilst a man is alive his Fravashi stays in heaven so as to watch over him. In the *Minokheret* we read: "All the numberless stars which are visible are the Fravashis of mortals"; for a Fravashi of like nature may be said to belong to the whole of Ahura's creation, whether born or unborn. Closely related to this Iranian belief and perhaps influenced by it, is the Greek thought of the *daimōn* and the Roman of the *genius*, which dwells in man and shields him. It is more than likely also that the thought of guardian angels is derived from this source.

SECOND ACT (3,000 YEARS).

Having finished the creation of spirits, Ahura Mazdāh at the beginning of this act frames in 365 days an ideal world in heaven; in 45 days he forms the sky, in 60 days the sea, in 75 the earth, in 30 the trees, in 80 the cattle, and in 75 man. For 3,000 years this creation exists in heaven free from all plagues. Meanwhile Angra Mainyu has recovered from his stupefaction, and in these 3,000 years he brings about an opposition-world of evil spirits, which likewise fall into three groups, the Daevas, Drujas and Pairikās.

(a) The Daevas. Corresponding with the Amesha Spentas we find six chief Daevas created by Angra Mainyu: (1) Ako Manah, 'Evil Disposition'; (2) Andra or Indra, a demon of fire; (3) Saurva, demon of unrighteousness and hard-heartedness, of uncertain origin; (4) Nāonghaithya, demon of pride and impatience, corresponding to the Indian Nāsatyā; (5)

Tauru, as the opponent of Haurvatāt, and (6) Zairika, as the opponent of Amēretāt, are those who bring about an evil taste in food and produce poison. Besides these six chief demons there is a series of others, amongst whom perhaps Aeshma Daeva is the most important. He is a demon of anger and vengeance and is found in the Bible as Asmodeus.

(β) The Drujas, four female demons, namely: Būshganshta, sleep; Nashu, decay; Agha-doithra, the evil eye; and Jahi, vice.

(γ) The Pairikās (Peris), female demons who wander about the earth and seduce men by their beauty. Their male counterparts are the Yātus, who correspond with those of the R̥igveda.

THIRD ACT (3,000 YEARS).

The ideal creation by Ahura Mazdāh in heaven described in the former act is now let down into the space which it occupies at present, and which is hereafter to become the seat of war. Under the lordship of two mythical beings, prototypes of the human and of the animal world, it stays here for the remaining 3,000 years of the armistice undisturbed by the demons. The first man is called Gayo Maretan, 'Mortal Life'; his very name expressing the common lot of humanity. The first animal is Geush Urvan, 'Soul of the Ox,' its name seeming to indicate the essence of beasthood as such and generally. Since during this time Angra Mainyu must refrain from attacking the creatures of Ahura Mazdāh, he seeks at least to injure his creation by bringing about large tracts of barren soil in the fruitful earth, poisonous plants and noisome beasts.

FOURTH ACT (3,000 YEARS).

With the beginning of this act the 9,000 years, armistice has run out, and Angra Mainyu with his host of hellish demons rushes into the creation. Their first act of violence was the slaying of Gayo Maretan and Geush Urvan. The soul of the primal ox then mounts up with its complaint to Ahura Mazdāh and thenceforth is the guardian spirit of animals. From the body of the primal ox come 55 kinds of corn and 12 kinds of wholesome plants; from his seed spring a bull and a cow and from them 272 species of good beasts are produced. What became of the plants and animals created by Ahura Mazdāh in heaven and let down upon earth we are not told. We may perhaps suppose that they share the fate of the primal ox and are killed by the demons. Even Gayo Maretan is murdered by them, but his seed is preserved in the earth for 40 years; from it springs a stalk of Raivas (*rheum ribes*) which unfolds in two stems, from which are developed the first human beings, Mashya and Mashyana, man and wife. To them Ahura Mazdāh speaks: "Be human, be parents of the world; by me ye are created the best beings with perfect sense; do things lawful with complete understanding, say good things, think good thoughts, do good acts, honour not the daevas." But Mashya and Mashyana do not follow this injunction. Having clothed themselves in leaves and wandered about with no sustenance but milk and fruit, they begin to eat flesh, to sacrifice to demons and to beget. For 3,000 years they and their offspring remain under the influence of good and bad spirits. During this period the latter walk the earth in bodily form in order to lead mankind astray. The lot of men after death is unequal, according as they

have followed the good or the evil spirits. The mountain of the gods, Hara Berezaiti, rises in the north of Iran. From Demavend, its highest peak, the bridge Chinvat spans the abyss and leads to Garo-Nmāna ('Abode of Hymns of Praise'), the Paradise of Ahura Mazdāh. After death the soul remains three days near the corpse; then it mounts up to Hara Berezaiti and the Chinvat bridge, upon which sit the three Judges of the dead: Mithra, Sraosha and Rashnu. By them the deeds of the soul are weighed upon great scales; if the good deeds outweigh the bad, the soul in its Fravashi goes back to Garo-Nmāna and stays there until the end of the world. If evil works outweigh the good, it is thrust down from the Bridge into the Daosangha hell, where it remains in torment until the end of the world. If there be an exact balance of good and of evil works, the soul remains in a middle world without pleasure or pain, also until the world's end. Thus for 3,000 years rages with unequal result the struggle between good and evil.

FIFTH ACT (3,000 YEARS).

In order to help mankind in struggling against the world of demons, Ahura Mazdāh at the beginning of this last period sends his prophet Zarathushtra. As the most potent weapon against the evil spirits he gives men the Avesta. From this time on the daevas can no longer walk the earth in bodily form. A golden age begins, succeeded by a silvern under Ardashir Bābeghān, a steel one under Khosur Nushirvān and a brazen age in the Moslem period. The world grows worse the longer it has to wait for the coming of the prophet. But great progress and a real rise are to be expected. Zarathushtra is indeed dead, but his seed

is preserved in the waters of lake Kansu and guarded against the attacks of the demons by 99,999 Fravashis. In this lake bathes every thousand years a pure virgin and bears from the seed of Zarathushtra a new prophet. The first is called Ukhshyat-Ereta ('The Sublime Making Grow'), and as certification for him the sun will remain standing in the sky for 10 days and nights. He will add a supplement to the Avesta. But in his millennium the daevas will be powerful. A hideous wolf will molest mankind, with whose final destruction the wild beasts will vanish from the earth, and a demon named Malkosh will bring snow and rain upon the earth, so that it may become barren. At the end of another thousand years a second prophet is born in the same way, namely Ukhshyat-Nemo ('Veneration Making Grow'), for whose certification the sun is stationary for 20 days. In his millennium mankind will have to struggle with a great dragon and, when this is overcome, all snakes will disappear from the earth. At last, after another 1,000 years, from a pure virgin and of the seed of Zarathushtra, a prophet will be born, accredited by a prolonged stay of the sun in the heavens (30 days), who is destined to bring about the end of the world. His name is Saoshyant ('He who Will Save'). By command of Ahura Mazdāh, this prophet will effect the resurrection of all the dead. "In that time," we read, "the frame of the body will be demanded of the spirit of the earth, the blood of that of the water, the hair of the spirit of plants, vital force of that of fire, which from the first have been taken from them. All men will rise again in the form they had during life, parents at 40 years, children at 15. The good and evil deeds of all will be visible. Then Saoshyant will appoint a day for the

great assembly of the world, in which all men, from Gayo Maretan to the present time, must appear, and over which Saoshyant, supported by 15 male and 15 female assessors, will preside in judgment. A star, known to the *Bundahish* as Gurzshehr, will fall to the earth and cause it to tremble like a lamb. By the heat metals will begin to melt and thereby the wicked will suffer dreadful torments, whilst the good go through the molten metal as though it were warm milk. Then Saoshyant will separate the good from the bad, as one separates black from white sheep. The good go up to the heaven of Ahura Mazdāh and the bad are sent to hell for their purification. Their torment will last only three days and three nights, but it will be sharper than anything which men have borne for the 6,000 years of human existence. Each will bear a sign showing the nature of his guilt, so that for shame and remorse all would fain vanish into thin air. After three days their sin will be purged and all will enter Ahura Mazdāh's heaven. The end of the great world-drama is brought about by the overcoming of the evil spirits by the good. Vohu Manah strives with and destroys Ako Manah, Asha Vahista Indra, Kshathra Vairya Saurva, Sraosha Aeshma, etc. At last Angra Mainyu alone is left, and he is overcome by Ahura Mazdāh himself and thrust down into his own hell, where he and all his abominations are burned up and utterly destroyed.

We are now in a position to appreciate the references to Saoshyant in the Avesta itself, the sacred book of the ancient Magi and of the modern Parsis. Although we no longer possess the book in its entirety, enough has come down to enable us to ascertain the

main tenets of the system. Of the twenty-four original divisions we still have the Yasna, a collection of prayers and hymns in metrical form; the Vendidad containing rules and regulations as to penance and purification; the Vispered, consisting of invocations and appeals; and the Khurda or small Avesta, a collection of invocations intended for the laity, including the Yashts or prayers and songs from days of old.

Now as regards references to the Saviour who would appear at the end of the world, we have, first of all, in the 19th Fargard (5) of the Vendidad, the following remarkable passage:

“We worship the good, forceful and beneficent Fravashis of the just, who watch over the germ of Zarathushtra, the venerable, the just; in number 9, 90, 900, 9090 myriads.”

In the 129th section of the same Yasht we read:

“Who will have the name Saoshyant, the victorious, and Astvat-Ereta? He is Saoshyant because he will do good to all the corporeal world. He is Astvat-Ereta because he will render corporeal beings indestructible, body and soul; in order to repel the druj of the biped breed, so as to destroy the evil done by the just.”

A more elaborate description of the coming prophet is given in the Yasht xix. 88-95:

“We worship the redoubtable, royal and conquering Glory made by Mazdāh, which will accompany the victorious Saoshyant and his other friends; when he will make a new world, free from old age, death, decomposition and defilement, eternally living, always growing, with sovereign will; when the dead will rise, immortality will come to the living and the world will renew itself at pleasure; when creatures will be free

from death and happy in doing well; the druj will fall and be destroyed, despite her fine going and coming in order to cause the just, his race and his world, to perish. The bandit and his Ratu will be annihilated.

“We worship the redoubtable and unassailable Glory, overcoming more than anything else, when from Lake Kansu shall rise Astvat-Ereta, the friend of Ahura Mazdāh, son of Vīspa-Taurvairi, the all-taming one (Eredat-fedhri) conceived by a victorious germ. It is the Glory which was Thraētaona’s when he slew Ashi Dahāka, which was the Turanian Franhrasyan’s when the wicked Zainigao was slain, which was King Haosrava’s when he slew the Turanian Franhrasyan; which was King Vīštāspa’s when he converted the tribes to the Good. In the same way he will make the druj to disappear from the realm of the Good.

“He will contemplate with the eye of intelligence; he will regard the whole world of bodies with the eye of abundance, and his look will give immortality to all the corporeal world. And his friends will come, the friends of the victorious Saoshyant, good in thought, word and work, and in religion, and whose tongue has known no lie; before whom Aēshma with the deadly lance will bow, even he who has no glory. Asha will slay that wicked gloom-made germ of evil, the druj.”

Nor is this all. The firm faith in the coming at the end of time of a great Renewer, a Saviour of mankind, is found not only in the Avesta itself but also in the later patristic and legendary Pahlavi literature. As we have seen, his title is Saoshyant, a future participle of a verb meaning ‘to do good,’ ‘to save,’ from the same root as the Greek *Sōtēr* and Latin *Salvator*. Other leaders of thought and hope amongst the Mazdeans were known by this name, but it was

applied *par excellence* to Astvat-Ereta, the one who 'causes resurrection,' the last, the greatest and the best of all. Though not of divine origin or descent his coming was foretold by Zarathushtra and his birth, according to the Avestic passages already cited and to a detailed statement in the *Būdahish*, is to take place in a truly wonderful way from Eredat-fedhri, a virgin mother. And he is to be 'of the seed of Zarathushtra,' as Christ was 'of the seed of David.'

Moreover, although there is no mention of a 'star' in connection with Saoshyant, we have found frequent reference to the Hvarenō, the "divine light," as Darmesteter so well puts it, "which brings to him upon whom it descends all virtue, all power, all prosperity." First of all it belongs to Mazdāh Ahura, the All-Highest, then to his Amesha Spentas, his immortal messengers. It afterwards descended upon kings and warriors of old, until Yima, son of the great Vivanghao, was led into double dealing, and for his falsehood the celestial light, taking the wings of a dove, left him for ever. At length, in the fulness of time, it was restored to Zarathushtra, and at the end of time, as we have seen, it will belong to Saoshyant and his followers.

Thus those who followed the good Masdayasnian Law looked forward to a Saviour who would be clothed with light or accompanied by a divine glory, marking him out from all other teachers, Dasturs and Maubads.

So when we read in the Gospel according to St. Matthew (ii. 1): "When Jesus was born in Bethlehem of Judæa in the days of Herod the King, lo! there came wise men from the East to Jerusalem,"—we can easily believe that these strangers who were led by a heavenly light right up to the cradle of the Lord were

none other than Zoroastrian priests and worshippers of Mazdāh the great Ahura. Indeed the very word used to describe them (*Magoi*) comes from ancient Persia. The term *magu*, which is found both in the Achæmenidian and Assyrian cuneiform inscriptions, is sometimes used in an ethnographical and often in an official sense. In the latter meaning it applies to the priests of Mazdāh, in the former it is the name of one of the tribes into which the Medes were divided, and the one to which Zoroaster himself probably belonged. The Parsis still call their priests Maubads or Mōbeds, *i.e.* Magu-Paiti, chiefs of the Magi, and although, when we use the words 'magic' and 'magician' we never think of the worship of Ahura, certain it is that these terms take us back to Media and Bactria and the good Law of the worthy Mazdayasnians. The light which led these good and learned men can in no wise have been an ordinary star. In an article on this subject contributed to *The Dublin Review*, Dr. Casartelli well says that this was pointed out long ago by St. John Chrysostom. "Firstly, its direction was entirely contrary to that of any known heavenly body, being from north to south, from Jerusalem to Bethlehem. Secondly, it would appear to have been visible even in the daylight. Thirdly, its apparition was irregular, it being seen at one time and not at another, as during the stay in Jerusalem. Fourthly, it must have been at a comparatively low elevation, inasmuch as it was able to guide the Magi not only along the roads leading to Bethlehem, but even through the village and to the very cavern wherein the infant Christ was to be found, *over which* it stood. These conditions clearly indicate some luminous phenomenon in the form of a light or meteor

moving slowly and at a slight elevation above the earth."

It is indeed no wonder that in the early centuries of the Christian era very great importance was attached to the Feast of the Epiphany, to the coming of the first fruits of the Gentiles. It soon became a favourite subject of art. As Detzel well says:

"The history of the three Wise Men is one of the best beloved of the episodes out of our Lord's life which have been treated in legend, poetry and art. It is already a favourite subject of the oldest legends. In the Middle Ages we find the Epiphany plays and the writers of hymns celebrating the event; but to a quite exceptional degree the plastic arts, not only in the Middle Ages, but even in the earliest Christian centuries, have represented this biblical scene. By the close of the Middle Ages there was probably not a single church in which the arrival of the three Wise Men was not to be found either carved in wood or ivory, or painted in distemper on a gold background, or stained in glass, or embroidered in silk. Christian art was not merely concerned with the historical fact of the arrival of the Wise Men, but was desirous of connecting the event with a special teaching: the miraculous guidance of the Wise Men was to be brought before the eyes of the Christian people as a figure of the guidance of all Christians by God's grace to God's House, the Church in this world, and to God's House, Heaven, in the next world."

Here, then, we have a study appealing not only to the philologist and to the historian, but one worthy of the serious attention of the Christian theologian.

HERBERT BAYNES.

MESSAGES FROM 'BEHIND THE VEIL': THE PROBLEM OF THEIR REALITY AND VALUE.

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THIS subject is by no means a new one; but it presents a perennial interest for humanity. From time to time it reappears under new forms suggested by new views of life, or by circumstances which create a fresh interest in the question of 'survival.' We have to-day such a circumstance in the sorrowful experiences which are darkening the life of so many amongst us, and have left so many empty places in our homes. With fresh and sad meaning the lines of Tennyson recur to our minds:

"O life, as futile then, as frail!
O for thy voice to soothe and bless!
What hope of answer or redress?
Behind the veil, behind the veil."

But it is not enough for us, for many of us at any rate, to have rejected dismal solutions of the problem of life. We trust indeed that those we call the Dead "are breathers of an ampler day for ever nobler ends"; but the bereaved soul longs for more still. Again with the Poet it whispers to itself:

"Dare I say
No spirit ever brake the band
That stays him from the native land
Where first he walk'd when claspt in clay?"

A very natural thought, infinitely pathetic; we do not envy the man or woman who is incapable of it.

But, of course, some assumption must be made here to start with, if we are to proceed with our investigation without writing, as an introduction to our subject, a treatise on metaphysics. I shall not therefore attempt here a philosophical discussion on the immortality of the soul, but I must reverently assume that, "having fought our doubts and gathered strength," we have all of us found a stronger faith our own in the immortal destinies of our human spirits. We acknowledge then that Life in its essence is a divine reality; that God alone is Life; that Life is communicable but in itself uncreatable; that it is therefore essentially eternal like the Supreme Reality of which it is the eternal existence.

Forms of life in finite living beings may come and go, appear and disappear, on the ever-changing stage of Nature; but the life manifested in them cannot die. As the old Hebrew thinker whom we know under the name of Koheleth, the Preacher, puts it, "when the silver cord is loosed or the golden bowl is broken, the dust returns to the dust as it was, and the spirit returns unto God who gave it."

It returns, yes; but under what conditions? Does it return merely as undifferentiated vital energy into the infinite stream of life, or does it return with distinct, individual, personal endowments acquired here below during its temporary association with earthly elements?

To answer, at least in some measure, this highly interesting question we must, of course, have formed some definite idea of what is meant by 'personality,' and what constitutes it. Some of us will be familiar

with the definition of it given by Lotze : " A spirit is a ' person ' so soon as ever it knows itself as unitary subject in opposition to its own states and to its own ideas ; these states and ideas it recognises as uniting in itself, as the subject of them, while they are only dependent states in it." We see at once what this definition implies. It implies, not merely consciousness, but self-consciousness, a psychological fact essentially characteristic of the human mind. Can that self-consciousness of a human spirit, the supreme fact in a finite world, the highest achievement in its evolution, naturally return to the condition of undifferentiated, blind energy which we associate with all cosmic forms of motion operating in the universe ? That is the question. Pascal had that question before his mind when he wrote : " Man is but a reed, the weakest in Nature, but he is a thinking reed. Therefore, if the universe should crush him under its weight, man would still be nobler than the universe, for man would know he was dying, while the universe, with all its material superiority, would know nothing of it."

And Browning, in his picturesque way, deals with the same thought when he says :

" What's time ? Leave *Now* for dogs and apes,
Man has *Forever*."

This is no new faith in the world. Long before Christianity brought a firmer assurance of it, Socrates had professed that faith on the morning before he died ; Plato had professed it in his immortal Dialogues ; Cicero has declared in his most emphatic manner his own convictions, not only in respect to man's actual survival after death, but also in respect to the essential immortality of his spiritual nature. He even quotes a

saying to this effect from Pherecydes the Syrian, who, he tells us, lived in the early days of Rome. And he also refers incidentally in his *Tusculan Disputations* to a friend of his, named Appius, who was so convinced of the fact of survival that he actually endeavoured to put himself into communication with the spirits of the dead.

Granting then that such is man's destiny; and that his personality can abide, not diminished, but rather intensified by the shuffling off of his mortal coil which is called death, we next enquire: What does happen to man when he passes 'behind the veil'?

Here I can hardly proceed without having recourse to the testimony of a man of high character and vast learning in his day, who is the best known instance of a man seriously asserting that he has had actual experience of the things he relates concerning the other life. That man is Emanuel Swedenborg. In his famous book *Heaven and Hell*, he distinctly states to us his position. "I have," he says, "been shown by actual experience what it is to be carried of the spirit to another place, and how it is done; to speak with spirits and to be with them as one of themselves has been granted to me, even in the full wakefulness of the body, for many years past."

Of course, such a statement will probably appear incredible to some of us, and Swedenborg was fully conscious that this would be the first impression produced upon his readers. He has therefore anticipated their protest in the following terms: "I am well aware that many persons will insist that it is impossible for anyone to converse with spirits and angels during his life ~~in~~ the body. Many will say that such intercourse must be mere fancy; some will think

that I have invented such relations in order to gain credit; whilst others will make other objections. For all these, however, I care not, since I have seen, heard and felt."

Then he goes on to say: "It has been granted me to speak and converse with many persons with whom I had been acquainted during life in the body, and this not merely for a day or a week, but for months, and for nearly a year, as I had been used to do here on earth. They were extremely surprised that they themselves, during their life in the body, had lived, and that so many others still live, in such unbelief as to suppose that they will not live after death."

Thus Swedenborg makes his position very clear and definite. For him, the spiritual world is no distant realm radically separated from the world we see. "It is not far from each one of us," as S. Paul said to the Athenians, and it is only normally unseen because our physical eyes are not adapted to perceive it. But Swedenborg's important point is that in his case his heightened vision was not obtained by the help of trance or hypnotic sleep, or a condition of clairvoyance induced in him through the manipulations of someone else. His intercourse with the spiritual world took place in a state of complete wakefulness of the bodily senses, so that all the time he remained perfectly conscious of himself as a man in the visible world, and was able, it would seem, to note down on paper, while sitting at his desk, some of the things which he was observing in the world of spirits. And this went on constantly, he often repeats, for more than twenty-eight years of his life.

What shall we make of this? Was anything like it ever thought possible? Well, yes, we know of one

great thinker who believed it to be possible, namely Plotinus. Here are his own words:

"The consciousness of man may be centred within or beyond his physical form; and according to conditions a man may be, so to say, out of himself or within himself, or in a state in which he is neither wholly without nor wholly within, but enjoys both states at once."

After this my readers, I trust, will not expect me to show myself more critical or more wise than Plotinus. I shall therefore, without further apology, relate some of the experiences which Emanuel Swedenborg, under the wonderful conditions I have described, has been able to record in his numerous works.

What then happens to a human being when he passes 'behind the veil'? Closely following Swedenborg's text, we learn that the first state of man after death is similar to his state in the world. He feels just as if he were still in the world, unless he adverts to the things he meets with, and to the fact that, when he was raised up, at the separation from his body, he was told by the good spirits (who were attending on him) that he was now a spirit.

All, when they first come into the other life, are recognised by their friends, relatives and acquaintances. Soon various successive stages of preparation follow, until the moment when a separation of evil spirits from good spirits is effected; for in the first state after death both classes dwell together in the world of spirits. "Just what happens in this world," pointedly remarks Swedenborg. The third state of man after death is a state of instruction, that is for those who, in virtue of their spiritual disposition, are capable of being thus

instructed in spiritual things. In connection with this, we are distinctly told what we must all agree is a very important thing, namely, that a friendship or love contracted with one, regardless of his or her spiritual character, is positively detrimental after death. It creates a most painful situation, and for a time at least may be the cause of severe suffering to a good spirit thus tied by affection to one who is unworthy. Our own experience on earth certainly helps us to appreciate the grave possibilities thus revealed; we learn that, like this world, the world of spirits has its dramas.

But we are thankful to learn also that that world sees the crooked things made straight. Thus, those who in the world were idiots, are still foolish and idiotic on their arrival in the other world; but having been divested of their externals, and their interior mind being opened, which takes place with them all, they acquire an understanding in accordance with their former quality of life. For actual madness and folly only dwells in the external natural man, and not in the internal spiritual man.

Infants who die are infants still in the other life, but their state excels the state of all others, because evil from actual life has not yet taken root in them. In fact, says Swedenborg, their state in the other life is far better than that of the infants in the world. One very interesting point must also be quoted: Although the objects which appear in the heavens are for the most part like those which exist on earth, still they are not like them in essence. They are spiritual representations. Nevertheless they are realised by spirits in as real a manner as things appear here to us, and even more clearly and distinctly.

Thus we must try to imagine a world without our present objective notions of time and space and material things, where nevertheless perfect mental presentations are realised. It seems an impossible world to the natural man, remarks Swedenborg, but it only appears impossible or incredible because those conditions do not agree with our present experience.

Now from all this one conclusion arises very clearly, namely, that Swedenborg admits the existence and reality of all the conditions which would render possible, if not probable, an intercommunication between this world and the world of spirits, between ourselves here and the living 'behind the veil.' In fact Swedenborg distinctly states that such intercourse can take place and does sometimes take place. Only he strongly discourages any regular, habitual attempt to bring about such intercourse.

Many, he says, believe that by getting spirits to speak with them, they would obtain access to a clearer and higher knowledge of divine things; but they do not know that such intercourse might be fraught with grave danger to themselves. His own words are: "It is rarely permitted to speak with spirits at the present day, because it is perilous."

And Swedenborg goes on to explain the cause and nature of the danger. There is danger from the fact that, as soon as spirits begin to speak with a man, they come out of their spiritual state into the natural state of the man. Here the reader will perhaps require at once some explanation. Why should such a singular alteration of state be needed for a spirit to communicate with an inhabitant of the earth? But the case is not really difficult to understand. If I want a man to catch my meaning, I must not address him just in my

own language, but in the language he himself speaks. Let us take a still more obvious case: The difficulty I experience in making my dog understand what I want him to do is due to the fact that I cannot come down to his mental level, and thus put my thought to him in a way which his mind can grasp. He listens and evidently tries to read in my eyes the meaning of my words but, in most cases, he tries in vain. To use Swedenborg's phraseology, I cannot come out of my mental state into the mental state of the dog. The interesting thing therefore is that, according to Swedenborg, a spirit can come into the natural state of the man. Then, the spirit knows that he is with the man; he unites himself to his affections and communicates with him by means of the principles of his mind, whether those principles be true in themselves or whether they be false. He excites the man's affections and by so doing confirms the man in them, obviously with possible moral injury to him.

Secondly, spirits who thus come to man are not to be trusted. Swedenborg is very explicit on this point and we must hear his own words: "When spirits begin to speak with a man, he ought to beware that he believes nothing whatever from them, for they say almost anything. Things are fabricated by them . . . for they have a passion for inventing, and whenever any subject of conversation is presented, they think they know it and give their opinion upon it, quite as if they knew; and if a man then listens and believes, they press on and deceive in various ways. . . . Let men beware therefore how they believe them." Evidently, whatever we may think of Swedenborg's ideas, it is clear that on this subject he was by no means an uncritical enthusiast, and we may perhaps

wish that some recent books on the same subject had been written in a similar attitude of mind.

Then, thirdly, Swedenborg goes on to say: "Spirits can be introduced who represent another person, and in such a way that anyone who had been acquainted (on earth) with that person, cannot know but that he is the same who now speaks." Here Swedenborg gives us an interesting personal experience. "Yesterday and to-day, one known to me in life was thus personated, and the personation was so like him in all respects, so far as known to me, that nothing could be more like. Let those who speak with departed spirits beware therefore, lest they be deceived when they say that they are those whom they have known." And Swedenborg, after this, again repeats: "There is a belief that man might be more enlightened and become more wise if he had some immediate revelation by converse with spirits. But the reverse is the case."

From all this it certainly seems to follow that the fear of being deceived by the tricks of mediums, or rather of people pretending to be such, justified as it possibly is in some cases, is not the only fear we should have, since we are told that the spirits, when they really come, may prove even more deceitful than any medium. In fact, we may unfairly attribute to an honest medium falsities which in reality have only been heard through him. As far as we can see, Swedenborg has not dealt explicitly with the case of the medium, but all he says may be applied to him, since he speaks of the spirits in their peculiar mode of conjunction with the man's affections and thoughts and with his memory, whether that man be ourselves or someone else.

Nor can we find in Swedenborg's works any distinct

reference to what in modern Spiritualistic language is called 'controls.' It is not so very easy to say exactly what a 'control' is and does. Here, as elsewhere, the part which the middleman is playing in our affairs may be desirable, but is often uncertain and obscure. When Swedenborg tells us of the tendency of spirits to personate other spirits, for Elymas, for instance, to declare himself to be Paul, or for Nero to announce himself as Marcus Aurelius, we cannot help asking ourselves whether 'controls' may not be sometimes responsible for allowing unworthy tricks of that sort. And if they do, how are we to know? How are we to guard ourselves against the false insinuations, the dangerous deceits, the perilous advice and the doubtful ethics which may lurk under the cloak of such personations? Quite independently of what Swedenborg has told us, we must all feel that there is a grave difficulty in this, and a very possible danger. In fact, the uncertainty connected with these alleged communications through unknown intermediaries is in itself a most unsatisfactory feature of the whole question; and this thought may well do away with much of the consolation which we might otherwise experience from assured intercourse with our beloved ones now 'behind the veil.' When we find spirits expressing themselves, not only in vague and incoherent phrases, but also in words which, if those spirits are what they profess to be, jar upon our finer sense of what is becoming and right, we wonder, as I have already said, whether those 'controls' are really responsible for such degradation of an original message; whether such familiar spirits, as they were called in ancient times, are interpreters from the spiritual world or profane voices from this earth.

But it will be said: We grant that in the communications which we succeed in obtaining, there is often much which appears trivial, vulgar and often unconvincing; but our object has nevertheless been attained. We sought to prove the reality of a life beyond the grave. If then we have succeeded in obtaining communications, beyond all possibility of earthly trickery at any rate, as shown by the fact that what is communicated was unknown to all present, then our object has really been attained. The message may have been delivered in involved language, in terms unlike those which the spirit, when he lived on this earth, would surely have used; still there has been a true message, and therefore the reality of a life beyond this life has been demonstrated.

To this various objections will be made, possibly in the light of what we have already said, even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that an absolute assurance can be given concerning the conditions under which the communications have been obtained. Lack of space will not permit me to refer at present to the many problems of psychology which are involved in this thorny question. One thing at any rate we can safely say, namely that, given the limitations of our present knowledge of psychical phenomena, there is ample room for possible elements of error in our interpretation of those phenomena, quite apart from any dishonest activity in those who are engaged, professionally or otherwise, in the inquiry.

In speaking thus, I need hardly say that it is with unfeigned reluctance that I seem inclined to minimize the value of any effort to demonstrate the fact of man's survival after death. I firmly believe that to be a fact, but my belief, I confess, could not rest with full

assurance merely on the evidence so far presented by ancient or modern spiritism. In his interesting book *Psychical Investigations*, Mr. J. Arthur Hill has frankly recognized various possible elements of error. At times he is almost severe on mediums. He speaks of an 'active visualizing imagination' in some of them which I fear can hardly be denied; but this sincerity and desire for scientific accuracy, while it does Mr. Hill much honour, does not increase our assurance. It is so difficult to know how far 'visualizing imagination' may go in psychical matters. We can only hope that it cannot under any circumstances go as far in such matters as it appears to go sometimes in German official war-news.

Then there remains a most important point raised by Swedenborg in his writings, namely the character of the spirits who might find their way to some kind of communication with us. "Every man," he says, "as to his affections and thoughts is (unconsciously) in a society of spirits and his mind is, as it were, one of them." This would seem to explain why so little, if anything at all, is ever learnt that is worth knowing, or can be considered as a positive addition to the natural knowledge of mankind, from ordinary attempts to communicate with spirits. They are not, and according to Swedenborg they cannot be, on a higher mental and moral level than those with whom they could communicate, and most of the knowledge they may display, they must borrow from the affections and the memory of the man with whom they speak. Hence the difficulty of obtaining regularly and certainly what is called 'something evidential.'

Not very long ago a book was published by one whose honoured name is, no doubt, well known to all

readers of *THE QUEST*. Written by a man of the highest character and of very great scientific authority, *Raymond*, as the book is entitled, has therefore come before the world with very special credentials to recommend it to our attention. The very subject of the book fills us with deep sympathy and, as we read it, we can hardly resist the thought that this is indeed a case which makes the tender longing of affectionate parents for some sign from 'behind the veil' only too natural. And when to that longing to bridge the chasm made by death is added the generous resolve to make, if possible, others richer and more blessed, to assure them that death has not raised a wall of hopeless separation between them and those whom they "have loved long since and lost awhile," we hardly find in our hearts courage to approach such a book in a common critical spirit. We dare not intrude into what must be sacred to the writer and his friends, or utter words which, if true, could only offend the purest feelings and discourage our common hopes.

All I venture to say of that book, so courageously presented to a sceptical world, is that it rather confirms many of the remarks which I have already made, and many of the warnings which we have heard from Swedenborg himself. As it has been justly said, the book on 'Raymond' has mainly had the effect of causing more enquiries respecting the mystery of man's future. This, however, may not appear altogether unsatisfactory to the learned author, nor is it indeed unsatisfactory if only the enquiries can be carried out in the right direction and in a proper spirit. The author himself is too wise not to see the possible dangers to truth, to morality and to health to which, in certain temperaments, an indiscriminate practice of spiritism might

lead, and we must feel grateful for his advice to all bereaved persons who might be induced to make imprudent use of the means of communication he has described in *Raymond*. He warns them not to devote such time and attention as he himself, with a legitimate scientific purpose, has done to getting communications and recording them, unless they are really qualified for such a task. "I recommend," he says, "people in general to learn and realise that their loved ones are still active and useful and interested and happy—more alive than ever in one sense—and to make up their minds to live a useful life till they rejoin them."

This is indeed sound and reasonable advice, and in striking harmony with the teaching of Swedenborg where he says: "All those in the world who have loved a useful life and from that love have so lived, think sanely in their spirit. . . . Their affection of Use keeps their mind from wandering into vanities, insanity and deceit and the unreal delights of wrong desires." Of the truth of that we cannot doubt.

I have said that I would not apologize for quoting Swedenborg's words rather copiously in connection with the subject of this paper, and I should indeed feel well rewarded if I could believe that my readers are themselves satisfied that no apology is needed. None will be needed if we have to acknowledge that what Swedenborg has told us on the subject of spiritism is fair, reasonable and prudent. Now that it is certainly fair must, I think, be conceded, for he makes no charge of evil intention or dishonesty upon anyone. He does not say that all communications are the result of illusion or fraud. In other words, he fully admits the possibility of such communications when he says that "it is *rarely* permitted to speak with spirits at the present

day because it is perilous." No such permission could have any meaning unless communications were at least possible. We must, however, recognize what seems to follow logically from those words. It is clear that if we believe with him that such permissions, under Divine Providence, are rare, it must follow that considerable doubt may arise in our minds concerning the genuineness of the numerous alleged communications of which we hear so frequently, and from so many quarters.

Secondly, that what Swedenborg has told us is reasonable should also be recognized, for it rests upon the view now, I believe, pretty generally accepted, that death in removing human spirits from one sphere of activity to another does not produce any sudden change in their mental and moral dispositions. The law of progress operates certainly 'behind the veil,' a progress only measured by the breadth and depth and height of our spiritual destinies, but it is a gradual progress because progress in finite natures rests upon a universal law of evolution.

It is therefore reasonable to believe that the difficulties we so often experience here below in our relations with our fellow-men, the difficulties we encounter within ourselves in respect to unselfishness, sincerity, fidelity and the rest, are not suddenly removed when we have crossed the bar. We are not, at any rate most of us, suddenly transformed into angels of light. If we were, remarks Swedenborg, we should be still more unable to communicate with men on earth! Now this appears rather strange. What does he mean?

Here is his own explanation. He says: "No angel [he means regenerated spirit] of a higher heaven may

look down into a society of angels of a lower heaven and speak with anyone there; for if this happened, the angel would find himself deprived of his own degree of intelligence and wisdom." If this be so, it is obvious that no angel, that is 'no just man made perfect,' could communicate with us who are not even in a lower heaven but here on earth.

Lastly, what Swedenborg has told us is prudent, and this at once follows from what we have just said. It is prudent because his advice is but the echo of the apostle's advice: "Beloved, believe not every spirit [whether in this world or in the next], but prove the spirits whether they are of God." Again it is prudent advice, if it is a fact and a very probable fact that, at the most, we could only communicate with spirits little if at all removed from the mental and moral conditions which here on earth have to be so carefully taken into account in our daily intercourse with our fellow-mortals.

If then Swedenborg's doctrine about spiritism is fair, reasonable and prudent, we cannot safely decline to listen to him on a subject of such importance, affecting as it does the highest interests of mankind.

We gladly recognize the pure and superior motives which influence good people in their efforts to demonstrate, as it were, in a palpable manner the fact of man's survival. We share their conviction of its truth; but we are also convinced that more harm than good may follow from the methods by which they would bring mankind to share their conviction. They are trying to-day what has been tried in every age, as far back as we can clearly read the historical records, and we fail to discern any real progress in the results which so far have been obtained. Then as now we see

vagueness, obscurity, uncertainty; we see messages which raise often many doubts for one satisfactory and intelligible statement; that seems to be all that can be written to the credit of those methods. Are we not therefore justified in believing with Swedenborg, and with many other great thinkers, that the truth of man's survival must be made to rest upon more assured testimonies than those which spiritism, as we know it, has given or can give?

Even within the strict limits of its natural powers of vision, not to speak of what it may have seen in a higher light, mankind has got as far, and has felt that, as the American poet has said:

“ Life is real, life is earnest,
And the grave is not its goal;
Dust thou art, to dust returnest,
Was not spoken of the soul.”

In conclusion, then, I would repeat that we have not denied the possibility of some kind of intercourse with departed spirits; that we have recognized with Swedenborg that on rare occasions, apparently justified by reasons of a higher order, such intercourse has been, or may have been, permitted to take place. We have carefully abstained from imputing wrong or sinister motives to anyone in connection with whatever has been said or written on this dangerous subject, and, in discouraging any regular spiritualistic practices, we have not, of course, disputed the right of duly qualified persons to pursue scientific investigations in the course of their psychological studies. Our position is simply this: We do not believe that it is the Divine Will that man should ascertain his destiny or learn the nature of the spiritual principle within him by

such attempts to tear away the veil so obviously interposed between this stage of our existence and the next. We think we have ample evidence of the futility of such attempts, and of the grave dangers to mind and body and to social life connected with them. And as we also believe that no one has spoken more truly and more sanely than Emanuel Swedenborg on this subject, we are confirmed by him in the views which I have ventured, as simply as I could, to state in this article.

In thus appearing wilfully to neglect researches made in good faith, even when conducted with due care and diligence, we shall perhaps be taunted with being either unduly scrupulous or unreasonably indifferent to investigations so directly concerned with spiritual views which we ourselves profess; but our answer to this was given long ago by Socrates, a few moments before he drank of the fatal cup and died. To his assembled disciples Plato reports him to have said: "O my friends, if the Soul is really immortal, what care should be taken of her!"

Shall we decline to accept this view of the value of our soul and of the importance of a strict watch over its welfare? What is there among finite realities that is more precious than a human soul, if by that word we mean the very man himself? As it is written: "What shall a man give in exchange for his soul?" Socrates and Plato believed that the spiritual health of our souls must in this life be our first consideration, and Swedenborg means nothing else when he warns us so earnestly in respect to spiritualistic practices. We must not allow his quaint style, his 18th century science, and perhaps our objection to any definite theology, to hide from us the larger ideals and the

lofty spiritual aims which inspired his concern about our moral welfare.

Greek Philosophy laid great stress on knowledge and seemed to give excessive importance to intellect. It asked the question: "Can virtue be taught?" and it has often been blamed for having put the question in that form. But, as the late Professor Nettleship has justly said, the question has not always been properly understood. Reason was to Greek thinkers the very condition of man's having a moral being; hence their words for 'reason' and 'rational' cover to a great extent the ground which is covered by words like 'spirit' and 'spiritual' and 'ideal' in our philosophy. They would have said that man is a rational being where we should say that he is a spiritual being.

Now, it seems obvious that, if our souls cannot be made virtuous merely by right knowledge, they cannot, on the other hand, be brought to virtue unless certain right ideas are imparted to them.

We may take it that Swedenborg agreed with the old Greek philosophers in recognizing the fact that the impressive suggestion of certain ideas may lay a foundation in our minds for making us morally better. If so, shall we blame him for believing that the impressive and frequently repeated presentation of certain ideas may also make us worse?

L. B. DE BEAUMONT.

PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE SYMBOLISM OF MYTHS AND MYSTICISM.

THE EDITOR.

IN the last number of *THE QUEST* an endeavour was made to give a rough outline of the main features of the psychoanalytic movement. We found its exponents busily occupied with the symbolism of dreams and the interpretation of this symbolism in terms of the life-play of the psychical energy at work below the level or surface of our conscious world. Now interpretation, we are given to understand, is the 'handling' of symbolism by the intellect. But as such symbolism *ex hypothesi* is devised for the most part to serve the purpose of a life-language, and seeing that the intellect can never really seize on life, interpretations determined solely by the intellect would seem to be fated to fall short of complete adequacy. Interpretation, it would seem, should also satisfy æsthetic demands and respect feeling-judgments. The study of dreams, however, as we have seen, by no means exhausts the scope of psychoanalytic research. The fundamental characteristics of dream-thought and dream-structure, it is claimed and, I think, rightly claimed, are also to be found in all those constructs of human phantasy which appear in the perennially fascinating imaginative products enshrined in fairy-tales and fables, in magical stories and myths, in mystic parables, allegories and

visions. In brief, there is a psychical world of sensuous imagery, a plastic subjective ambient of the individual and of the race in which with marvellous adaptability the life-play of our emotions is immediately pictured and dramatized for us, and that too mostly without any conscious effort on our own part—a world of psychical appearances which in their turn react upon and change the emotional play, not only of the life of which we are conscious, but also of the deeper movements hidden in our unconscious selves. Our life thus psychically evolves itself and rises to progressive grades of complexity and refinement. In the temporal order of appearance, this vast sensuous, largely personal, image-world of phantasy and magic, of romance and poetry, is older in us, more ancient and archaic, or rather more original, than the conceptual world of our intellectual development, which is being perfected by an ever increasingly prosaic reaction to the abstracted or depersonalized world of sheer material fact. But its being older—or should we say younger?—does not necessarily mean either that it is outgrown or even that it ought to be outgrown as no longer of service to the race. In symbolic life-speech and in the folk-tongue of common experience at any rate the heart is said to be, not only older, but wiser than the head. To a consideration of this important point we shall return later.

Psychoanalysts of the Freudian School, however, regard the whole of this way of feeling-thinking as exclusively infantile and primitive, pertaining to the childhood of the race and the cruder forms of culture. Accordingly lapse into it at the present stage of adult racial development is looked on as a dangerous regression exceedingly detrimental to progress. Such

regression is regarded as the gravest symptom of that psychical inertia or indolence which drags back, holds down and imprisons the progressive life-impulse, and prevents its intellectual sublimation for the greater efficiency, ability and success of the individual in the world of every-day life. In order to guard against this danger in ourselves and the better to warn and set free others who have unwittingly fallen into it, it is of the greatest service to discover all we can about the nature and way of working of this infantile and archaic mode of thinking; and the most brilliant light that has yet been thrown on the problem, it is claimed, is due to the application of the psychoanalytic method to the study not only of dreams but also of myths and similar psychical products.

Of late years an immense amount of historical research and methodical analysis has been devoted to the comparative study of myths and folk-tales. Nevertheless it can hardly be said that we have yet arrived at a really satisfactory understanding either of the motives that have given rise to this instinctive activity of the human mind, or of the technique spontaneously used in this world-wide form of artistic expression. Myths are now usually regarded as attempts to explain certain phenomena, beliefs and customs.¹ Myth-making man seems to have been under the natural necessity of seeking to explain the appearances and happenings in his external world in terms of the patterns of the imaginal forms spontaneously created by the play of phantasy upon the feelings and emotions he experienced in his psyche from the impact of these outer objects and events. The emotional life-play of

¹ Cp. Prof. E. A. Gardner's just published article on 'Mythology' in *Hastings' Enc. of Relig. and Ethics*.

which he was dimly conscious within himself and which in dream and fancy told him its story in dramatic imagery, he felt must also be happening in manifold modes within the multitudinous appearances of the world which surrounded him, and also within that world as a whole. He thus projected his individual private feelings and imaginings on to the vast screen of the general public world, and in so doing is held by most moderns to have obscured its actual lineaments and hidden away its realities in a tissue of, not only nugatory, but positively mischievous fictions. From this childish state of affairs the human mind has been gradually and painfully weaned by the development of the intellect and use of right reason. The analytical positive objective science of our day holds that in the way of myth-making man can never arrive at telling the true story of the world and its happenings; all he can tell us in this way amounts at best to a naïve and childish account of his own personal subjective feelings and imaginings. Myth-making is thus regarded as a characteristic of the pre-scientific animistic age of human development, and we are assured that to-day sober thinkers have no longer any use for such vain speculations. Official science relegates to the nursery on the one hand, and to the experts in early culture and folk-lore on the other, all these phantastic stories which profess to explain natural phenomena, or would tell of the origin of the universe, or that of the gods, of animals and men. Thither also are dismissed all the absurdities of magical transformations, and also all accounts that would depict the marvellous and miraculous deeds of heroes, families or races, or of the founders of social institutions or religions and of the discoverers of great

inventions. Rationalistic science, moreover, has no interest in tales about existence after death and places of the dead, except in so far as it believes it can demonstrate their futility, seeing that for it there is no soul to survive; much more then does it laugh out of court belief in angels and demons and monsters, in all of which mythology delights to busy itself. Indeed if this strenuously prosaic variety of empirical science, which occupies itself solely with the physically obvious and actual, had its way, not only would the favourite reading of the nursery be suppressed, but the works of the poets and seers of the race, and especially of the men of religion, would be waste-papered, and they would in future be condemned to silence, unless they were content to treat of things apparent only, and that too in the way in which the mechanical science of matter and energy would permit them to appear.

But it is difficult to believe that all myths can be so readily dismissed and so easily explained away; they have played too vast a part in the history of human culture to be so unceremoniously bowed out. They must have their *raison d'être* deep down in some fundamental necessity of human nature, and pertain to an activity of the mind that will not so easily consent to be condemned to sterility and atrophy by the tribunal of a purely soulless science. In spite of the present strict taboo upon it, imagination will doubtless persist in perfecting itself in its own way. Indeed it may be that, by the natural reaction against the present horrid carnival of war's foul ugliness, which is but an outer symptom of the inner unloveliness of the soul of our civilisation, we are even now at the beginning of a happier age when the soul will once more come to its own in the hearts and minds of men, and imagina-

tion inaugurate a fairer order of æsthetic development complementary to the progressive achievements of the positive sciences.

For my own part at any rate, I am profoundly convinced that no attempt to explain the urge towards freedom and progress that ever wells up from our deepest nature, and the need and necessity that persistently press upon us from without, can really satisfy, which does not regard the spirit in man as a continuing reality, a life that does not cease with the death of the body. Or to put it still more definitely—I believe, not only in the immortality of the human spirit, but also in the survival of man's soul, not however as *a* single stable form, but as an informing principle that can clothe itself in innumerable forms. Based upon this fundamental conviction, I have for long been persuaded that the proper function of a genuine myth, and still more a mystical allegory, is of a revelatory nature. It is an endeavour to reveal the under-workings of the inner life of man by depicting it in typical symbolic images, the elements of which are selected from appropriate objects and happenings, not only in the physical, but also in the psychical world. In brief, we have here to do with stories of the life-play of the soul, both of the soul of nature and of the soul of man—stories of psychical life here and hereafter, of the life which does not cease with the death of the body. It is, I believe, the mode and mood of this life-play which fundamentally determine from within the dynamic schemes of at least some of these myths and allegories and their imaginative expression. Certain classes of myths, and especially of religious myths, do thus really tell us something of the nature of the deeper life that is hidden from us, both as now it

is within us and as it will be hereafter for us. But the telling is suggestive, inexact, indirect, and so for the practical intelligence highly inadequate, as compared with the precision of knowledge we now enjoy in respect to the prosaic world of physical phenomena and material forces. Not only so, but also many folk-tales and fables, some of which may be myths in the making and some again broken-down remains of forgotten myths, and magical recitals of all kinds, may also tell us storiettes of the soul, of things that can happen to us when our bodies sleep or die, and we are in a psychical world of a marvellously plastic nature of innumerable degrees suited to every individual need, where, for instance, the laws of space and time are less rigorous than, if not of another nature from, those in our physical world, and psychic flux and transformation are the order of the day.

From this point of view, the translation of the anthropomorphic and theriomorphic symbolism and animistic imagery of myths into terms of physical phenomena simply, and then resting there as though the task of exegesis had been fully accomplished, seems to be a very inadequate method of procedure. Sun myths, for instance, are a typical class of this order of symbolic narrative; but they tell us a story of deeper interest than the way of the going of the physical sun. The 'year god' or 'vegetation god' myths, again, tell us of the ever-recurring cycle of the seasons, of sowing and reaping and the wonder of recurrent fertility, of seed and growth and fruit; but they also convey a deeper meaning. The reduction of a myth to terms of physical phenomena simply is but the replacing of one set of symbols by another; it does not reveal the vital meaning of the tale. Still more unsatisfactory is it

when we are asked by rationalistic myth-enthusiasts to believe that the greatest stories in the world, those of the Christ-life and of the Buddha-life, are just simply sun-myths, or at best the personification of racial ideas or ideals—only this and nothing more. No, the genuine myth has first and foremost to do with the life of the soul: this is its text and law; all else is commentary.

But what is this amazing spontaneous and creative phantasy or imagination, this natural magician of our psychical world, this maker of dreams and visions and myths? A recent writer on the subject tells us that imagination “faces the future as memory the past; its product is essentially new, spontaneous, original, as that of memory is essentially old, reproduced, imitative.” Imagination is purposive; it would “construct or prepare for a *new* experience.”¹

This, however, tells us nothing of how free fancy works, and that is the real *crux*. For, curiously enough, deliberate imaginative constructs are less rich and fecund than the spontaneous products of phantasy; and it is with the latter ‘passive’ type of imagination, *i.e.* passive as viewed from our conscious centre, that we have mainly to deal in dreams and myths rather than with the ‘active’ or controlled variety. Even the sceptical Hume calls imagination a ‘magical faculty of the soul.’ Kant also recognizes its immense importance, for he would make it bridge over, or mediate the antithesis between sense and thought; and yet he can describe it in no more complimentary terms than as a ‘blind faculty working in the depths of the soul.’ Well then may his latest critic say that imagination is

¹ J. L. McIntyre, art. ‘Imagination,’ *E.R.E.*

the Cinderella of Kantian philosophy who does all the real work in obscurity.¹

Indeed we moderns seem not to have made much advance on the ancients in our endeavours to solve the riddles of this sphinx of the mind. The Later Platonists, for instance, made much of it. Porphyry greatly extended the scope of the power of the imagination, which Plotinus regarded as lying or functioning midway between sensation and reason; for the Syrian was persuaded that without imagination, not only sensation, but also spiritual perception, was impossible. A still later member of the School, Synesius, in his treatise *On Dreams*,² is of opinion that what he calls the 'phantastic spirit' is precisely the borderland between reason and unreason, between body and the bodiless. It is the common frontier of both, and by its means things divine are joined with lowest things. "For it lays under contribution what suits it from both extremes, as from neighbours, and images in one single nature things that are poles apart." Its activities extend to many divisions of existence from the world of irrational lives upwards. And here Synesius becomes very interesting for students of psychical phenomena, for he tells us that the 'daimones'—meaning thereby presumably what modern spiritism would class as certain orders of human and non-human disembodied spirits or intelligences—are said to be "supplied with their substance by their mode of life; for during the whole of their existence they are of the nature of images or take on the appearance of happenings." If, he goes on to say, man is conscious of many

¹ Prof. J. S. Mackenzie, *Elements of Constructive Philosophy* (1917), p. 172.

² *De Somniis*, 7 & 8, 137 A,B.

things by means of the activity of this psychical essence even when he is by himself, he is aware of many more when there is another present—*i.e.* presumably when another mind, either embodied or disembodied, is playing upon his imaginal nature.

This seems to me a point of very great importance in our present enquiry. Psychoanalysis seems to have worked for long on the supposition that the imaginal content of an individual mind is determined solely by the impressions made on it by stimuli from its material environment. In its latest phases, however, it has been driven to admit the presence in the deepest strata of the unconscious of a world of racial memories—an enormously far-reaching admission. But so far I have met with no signs of admitting the possibility that part of the personal content of the mind may also be derived from the direct psychical influence or play upon it of another mind or intelligence whether embodied or discarnate. This fertile idea evidently opens up a vast world of psychical possibilities. Not the least interesting of these is the traditional doctrine of Synesius that the intermediate order of disembodied intelligences, not only express their activities in images, but may even take on the appearance of happenings or events. This seems to me to suggest a mode or nature of psychical embodiment that deserves our most serious attention. It has ever been the conviction of the men of vision that in such states the indirect, cumbersome and complex methods of speech and writing whereby we express our thoughts here, are replaced there by a more immediate presentation of thought, by direct picturing or symbolic imagery or the showing of appropriate dramatic events. I think we have here a vitally important aspect of the enquiry, and I do not see how

a student of dreams and visions and mythic and mystic themes who entirely neglects or denies its existence, can ever really get to the bottom of the matter.

Now in the passage from the dreaming to the waking state the impression of 'coming back,' however naïve this expression of it may seem to the metaphysician of consciousness, is the commonest of experiences. In this process one can at times clearly observe a superposition of dream-pictures. The deeper dream, where all is vivid and immediately presented and in which one plays an active part in the drama, weakens; and then as it were the last memory-picture or scene of the vivid narrative is seen to blend with some other picture, which runs to meet it and tries to match it, as a whole or in some particular, out of the picture-store collected, as it is generally supposed, solely from the domain of waking consciousness. It is this lower imaginal region apparently that is the stratum of such dreams as may legitimately be held to be determined by purely physiological and biological conditions; though I am by no means so certain that even here their image-material is drawn exclusively from the dreamer's physically determined private psychical world. Reason and moral control are largely if not entirely inoperative in this class of lower dreaming activity, and the imagination of the human animal has here full play. In such dreams it is possible also to observe how the inner life-play of desire and aversion, expectation and apprehension, hope and fear, precedes and occasions the picture-changes and determines the course of the dramatic representation. To include all dreams, however, in this order, and much more to attempt to explain them solely in physiological and

biological terms, is surely inadequate. There is, I am convinced, beyond these a class of dreams, not to speak of an order of visions, of loftier lineage. These are not solely built up from below, and cannot be explained as simply a recombination of imaginal stuff that has been physically acquired. There is here at least, if not in the lower order, stuff that is new to the deeper dreamer, as well as novel combinations of known materials.

The general method of psychoanalysis, however, seems to confine itself to elaborating the manifest dream-content, *i.e.* the part of the dream remembered in waking consciousness, by associations drawn from the storehouse of this lower imaginal memory. But all that can legitimately be got by this way of working appears to me to be this: You remember a dream or part of a dream, and generally a dream of the inferior order. The psychoanalytic method then begins its enquiry by asking: What does this, that or the other element of the dream remind you of? And the usual answer is: Of this, that or the other thing drawn from the store-house of material waking memories. But even in dreams of the inferior order there may be elements of higher dreaming; it is therefore difficult to believe that the evocation of such lower imaginal associations, especially when it is reduced to as mechanical a level as possible, proves that such elements of higher or deeper dreaming are originally built up or derived from the pictures with which we subsequently endeavour to match them in so haphazard a manner. Much more difficult is it to be satisfied with the reduction to such beggarly elements of high visions, which evoke or accompany the most powerful and exquisite emotions in our inmost nature and at

times in our whole being. We cannot in such cases legitimately speak of deriving the higher from the lower. On the contrary, we should seek to interpret the elements of such higher dreams and sublime visions, by the fairest ideas we possess and the loftiest ideals we can imagine. In such states there is a sublimation and refinement of life which we can express or interpret only by the loftiest associations we can command.

It is true that psychoanalysis has a doctrine of sublimation, or de-sexualisation, from the instinctual to the rational order of life; nevertheless the method as generally used seems to me only too frequently to make the process of this sublimation more difficult than it need be by reawakening and bringing into focussed consciousness very undesirable psychic picturings of our animal nature. In connection with this theory of sublimation we might usefully remind ourselves of the Thomist doctrine of 'elevation.' Passive creation working through Nature may be said to produce the natural man; this natural product is taken up into a higher unity by the direct active creation of God—the human soul proper. It is the task of the human spirit to elevate man's animal nature. The rational soul through its causative mode of presence, not only elevates the bodily organism with which it is united to a higher degree of sensitive life, but it also elevates this higher sensitive life to the purely intellectual plane—a scholastic phrase presumably for indicating the stage of spiritual self-consciousness.

We may now turn to Jung's treatment of mythic and mystic symbolisms, as set forth in his voluminous study, known to the English reader under the very vague indication *Psychology of the Unconscious*, but to

the German by the very precise title *Transformations and Symbols of the Libido*.¹

In 'A Word on Psychoanalysis,' in the January number, we learned how high a standard Jung, in his *Collected Papers*, would set for the psychoanalyst and the lofty rôle for the future he would ascribe to the higher order of symbolism. To repeat his own statement: "The further development of mankind can only be brought about by means of symbols which represent something far in advance of himself, and whose intellectual meanings cannot be grasped entirely. The individual unconscious produces such symbols and they are of the greatest value in the moral development of the personality." That was written in 1916, when Jung had advanced far beyond the position he held in these studies of 1911 and 1912, at which date he was only just beginning slightly to shake himself free of Freud's dominating influence. Judged by the standard of the more sublimated and refined views Jung holds at the present day, I cannot but think it a mistake of policy

¹ 'Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido,' in Bleuler, and Freud's *Jahrbuch für psychoanalytische und psychopathologische Forschungen* (Deuticke, Leipzig u. Wien), III. (1911), 120-227; IV. (1912), 162-464. The Authorized English Translation is by Dr. Beatrice M. Hinkle, of the Neurological Department of Cornell University, and is entitled *Psychology of the Unconscious: A Study of the Transformations and Symbolisms of the Libido: A Contribution to the History of the Evolution of Thought*, by Dr. C. G. Jung of the University of Zürich. New York (Moffat, Yard), London (Kegan Paul); pp. lv. + 566; 21s. net. Neither the British Museum nor the London Library possesses a copy of the *Jahrbuch*, but fortunately through the kindness of Dr. Eder I have been able to consult it. It must be confessed that the original is a very awkward text to translate, not only because of the difficult phrasing and very numerous technical terms, but also owing to the innumerable quotations in or translations from modern, classical and oriental languages. There are, for instance, many passages in Greek and Latin of which Jung gives no translation. The English edition virtuously supplies versions of these, but unfortunately they contain many errors. Again, the German forms of many classical and oriental proper names are retained, to the mystification of English readers unskilled in these matters. We fully sympathize with the great difficulties that confronted Dr. Hinkle, but she would have been better advised to have submitted the proofs to the careful scrutiny of an expert. The very numerous notes are most aggravatingly placed at the end, and there is no index.

for him to have allowed this earlier work to be translated. I have read it twice carefully and find that for the most part its method of treatment is but little to be distinguished from the usual Freudian procedure.

The illustrative material of Jung's exposition is drawn, in the first place, from a paper by an American lady, Miss Frank Miller, published in French in a Swiss scientific periodical.¹ The writer seems to have been of a highly sensitive, imaginative and poetical temperament; she had moreover a scientific interest in her dreams and apparently dream-given poems, and has endeavoured to trace the moulding influence upon them from her prior experience and reading. Hereupon Jung steps in and says practically: This is all very well as far as it goes; but you have not gone far enough. We will now summon the psychoanalytic method to our aid. He then proceeds to reduce the material in the usual Freudian manner and to interpret the symbolisms as conditioned fundamentally, if not exclusively, by psychosexual impulses and affects. We must confess to feeling that Miss Miller's dream-romances and poems are in this way too hardly dealt with. The poetry and romance, the delicacies of thought, emotion and aspiration, are almost entirely suppressed by this anæsthetic method. The soul of them is driven out, and the body of them left on the operating-table. Miss Miller's phantasies are further made to serve as text and introduction to a number of typical topics of symbolism; they are illustrated or paralleled at length by the citation of a rich mythical,

¹ 'Quelques Faits d'Imagination créatrice sub-consciente,' in *Archives de Psychologie*, V. (1906), edited by Flournoy and published at Geneva. There is no copy of this publication in the British Museum, or the London Library, or the Libraries of King's or University Colleges, and I have therefore been unable to consult the original and establish a clean contact with Miss Miller's mind.

legendary and poetical material, all of which is submitted to a similar analysis. For example Miss Miller suggests that the scheme of her heroic dream poem 'Chiwantopel' may have been partly determined by her reading of Longfellow's 'Hiawatha.' Jung, who had never previously read 'Hiawatha,' then proceeds at great length to analyse the hero-material in it on Freudian lines.

It is impossible to follow our exponent through the ingeniously constructed labyrinths of detail he has woven round the various leading topics of which he treats, and the acute psychological analysis of such elements as legitimately fall within the field of Freud's purview; space permits us to deal only with some of his main conceptions.

The fundamental thesis is that the symbolism of mythic and allied imagery is indicative of the transformations of what Jung calls the *libido*. It will be noticed that this provocative and question-begging term, with which we are for ever being confronted and which gives the predominant tone to the whole enquiry, is dropped in the main English title in 1916. Is this, we wonder, due to deliberate censorship? For to the English ear it assuredly evokes no other meaning than that of lust—that is, not simply of purely animal passion, but of such animal propensities in man as his moral nature bids him severely chasten. Jung attempts a laboured philological apology for his use of the term; but its unconvincing nature has evidently been later on brought home to him, for already in a paper read before the Psycho-Medical Society, in London, on July 24, 1914, he says: "In my German publications I have used the word *libido*, which seems to be too easily misunderstood in English. *Hormé* is

the Greek word—force, attack, press, impetuosity, violence, urgency, zeal. . . . The concept *hormé* is an energetic expression for *psychological values*. A psychological value is something active and determining, hence it can be considered from an energetic standpoint." Here Jung practically gives the whole point away, for by no means can the general Greek term *hormé* be rendered by the special Latin term *libido*.

Both terms, however, are inadequate; but as to what they attempt to signify, Jung rightly regards this life-impulse not only as self-determining, but as purposive, as aiming at ends, in this differing radically from Bergson, who will not allow this function to his *élan vital* and so robs it of its most valuable characteristic. Jung, moreover, sees clearly that this creative vital energy can be regarded simultaneously as agent and product of its own transformations; that it can be symbolically spoken of as its own father and its own mother, or as its own son or daughter. It gives birth to itself and perpetually bears along in its self-contained and ever-recurrent flux the source of its becoming. Hence in the mythic symbolism created by the imaginative play of racial consciousness the son may be said to be husband of the mother, the daughter wife of the father, and so on in other degrees of relationship strictly taboo in the marriage arrangements of higher human culture. This traditional mode of popular mythic symbolism has been reasonably defended against the objections of rigidly literal moralism by the ancient philosophers of religion, as for instance by the Later Platonists. These Greek theologians declared that the gods were not men and women, but personifications of divine powers; their inter-

relations were not fleshly and sexual. Just as Jesus also asserted that in the resurrection there is no marriage or giving in marriage, but that in the spirit all is angelical. Sacred marriages, as classical antiquity called them, referred to unions and relationships of a vital, psychical, intellectual and spiritual order. What then are we to call this creative life that works such marvels through all the grades of becoming from lowest to highest? Surely not *libido*! Does it not shock our finer feelings to be told, as Jung tells us: "The gods are *libido*," or still more when we read: "The divine in us is the *libido*" (p. 227)? And even if we manage somehow to stomach this, though with a wry face, what shall we say of the barbarous declaration: "God is to be considered as the representative of a certain sum of *libido*" (p. 71), even though we subsequently read: "The *libido* is God and Devil" (p. 120)? There is something monstrously wrong with the use of the term in such connections and it should be ruthlessly jettisoned. We want something fairer and of better repute, some inclusive designation that may fitly characterize the whole from lowest to highest.

Elsewhere (p. 524) Jung tells us that the *libido* and the soul are of the same nature. This may help to raise us into a fairer atmosphere, and permit us to take a wider view, where we shall find no sums of *libido*, but qualitative transformations, apart from all ideas of numbering and measuring. The soul as living reality is neither a multitude nor a magnitude, but an intensive whole, and that too wholly present in all its parts, all in all, the parts being distinguished only as degrees of quality or suchness—as, in fine, values. In its own degree sexual impulse, in all its manifold forms and sublimations, is assuredly a most potent mode of

the life of the soul; but it is a mode or degree and not the chief characteristic of the soul's reality. It is a stage in the development of the soul's self-realisation, and the distinguishing marks of this stage can by no means rightly be used as descriptive of lower or higher grades of value.

It is true that ancient cosmogonic myths use terms for the primal impulse in the universal soul that at times have a somewhat sexual colouring; but *libido* is not one of them. The Veda calls the creative impulse *kāma*—desire or love, as in the verse: "Desire first arose in It that is the primal germ of mind." This it was which "sages seeking with their reason in their hearts" declared to unite the real and the unreal, truth and untruth. But this universal love is the world-desire, not sexual passion, just as it is with the Orphic divine love or longing, *erōs* or *pothos*. Aristotle says of this supreme creative activity that it moves the world as though it were in love. And indeed we can even to-day find no fairer term. But to realise in smallest part what this may mean, we must look forward and not backward; we must view it in terms of the highest values we can possibly conceive. To say even that God is love, in the highest sense in which we can possibly imagine the beauty, joy and transcendence of the supreme benignity and benevolence of the divine self-donation, doubtless falls infinitely short of the reality; but it is infinitely nearer the truth than to declare that our God is our *libido*.

Love, however, may not illegitimately be said to give value to life of every degree and at the same time to be the driving power that carries us onwards to grades of higher value. The precious thing, the hidden

treasure, the maiden to be freed and won, the all-sacred hallow, the kingdom of heaven—all signify the higher life mode for which we strive and which the hero of the myth or folk-tale seeks to win from out the stage in which he starts upon the quest. The heroic life is the ascending life-impulse itself seeking to find its complement, completion, fulfilment and perfection. To achieve this the hero must make sacrifice of all that holds him down or keeps him back. Jung treats of this leading mythic motive almost exclusively as the sacrifice of the infantile *libido* or infant personality. And indubitably the time for a most important life-transformation occurs at the stage marked by adolescence and the subsequent breaking free from home-ties and boldly going forth to face the wider life beyond the protective limits of the family. But this sacrifice must also indubitably be construed in terms of higher value still.

In this connection Jung, following Freud's bad example, is for ever dragging in another unlovely term —'incest.' And here again as with *libido* we find he has to apologize for its use, as when he writes: "I give the word 'incest' more significance than properly belongs to the term. Just as *libido* is the onward driving power, so incest is in the same manner the backward urge into childhood. For the child it cannot be spoken of as incest. Only for the adult who possesses a completely formed sexuality does the backward urge become incest" (p. 520).

We have been told how this term arose in the earliest days of Freud's pathological investigations owing to the extraordinary fascination the Œdipus myth exercised over his mind. We all know the terrible story which the great Greek tragedian has so

skilfully used to accentuate the horror of human fate by as extreme an instance as he could find, where the chief puppets of the drama were unwitting victims of the cruel cosmic play. Freud thought he had discovered a complete analogy to the climax of the *Œdipus* story in the hidden drama of many of the psychical tragedies revealed by his psychoanalytic method. But incest, the most reprehensible form of physical unchastity, is a moral evil which stains the soul only when knowingly committed. The defenders of the term reply: Just so; the victims are unconscious, unknowing. But even so, is the term or even the idea appropriate to the psychical happening? The term might be tolerated, perhaps, in high literature as a graphic metaphor of moral condemnation in respect of certain sins of the soul, just as we find in the Hebrew scriptures disloyalty to the worship of the One God characterized as 'fornication' or 'going a-whoring after strange gods.' But it is a striking incongruity, to say the least of it, to find oneself perpetually confronted with it in a scientific treatise on psychology. But Freud is a lover of lurid language; Jung evidently feels there is something inappropriate in such language, and yet he still persists in using the term 'incest' *ad nauseam*. The critic might then well exclaim: "Physician, heal thyself"—why this repeated regression to a bad habit started in the infancy of psychoanalysis?

It is true that we are for ever in our feebleness falling back into modes of life and thought we ought to have outgrown. The love of the life that has hitherto mothered us must be progressively sublimated and transformed, elevated and transmuted, into the love of a wider, deeper, freer, higher life. But the child's running back from the dangers of life to its

mother's arms is not rightly to be spoken of as 'incest.' For even when we have gone forth boldly into the life of the world, we are still children spiritually, children indeed yet unborn, enwombed in our earthly loves and interests. Jung has indeed somewhat to say about this high theme of the new birth, of spiritual rebirth or regeneration; but all is as yet very dim and obscured in the shadow of Freudian exegesis.

Students of the many varieties of the mystery-institutions of antiquity, from their most primitive forms onward, are well aware that at a certain stage of higher culture there emerges in them a new and lofty type of interest, which gives rise to the straitly contrasted forms of a lower and higher order—namely, the mysteries of generation and the mysteries of regeneration. The former from the beginning had to do chiefly with sex-lore, though even from the earliest times they were also made the occasion of imparting the tribal tradition of the things before birth and after death, the lore of the ancestors and of the gods. Within these most sacred and secret institutions of antiquity there gradually emerged the hope of liberation, of salvation, of whole-making and blessedness here and now, of the divinizing and immortalizing of human life, of an inner transformation whereby man is born into a new grade of being, a resurrection from the dead life of mortal earthly existence into the deathless life of self-conscious spiritual reality. Here we have the germ and developments of the sublime doctrine of the fulfilment of our imperfect human nature, whether this end or perfection be consummated here or hereafter. Now the processes of generation and those of regeneration are from one point of view natural opposites, but from another natural complements, for

the latter fulfil and perfect the former. It is not then surprising to find that the most intimate of physical relationships whereby the continuity of the race is preserved, can, in all its manifold bearings on life, be used analogically and symbolically as indicative of man's higher destiny. But, as the mystery of man's spiritual nature transcends the life-modes known to mortals and the scope of the practical dualistic intellect, in seeking an interpretation of its symbols we must tread warily and reverently, for here we are on holy ground. The greatest elevation of thought and sublimation of feeling are required to steady our steps so that we fall not from the height of the mount into the depths below. And here more than in any other adventure of the soul is it true that the higher we can climb the lower we may fall. It is only too easy to translate the mystic symbolic expressions of regeneration and renewal into their lower values, reduce them to the level of the processes of generation and substitute for the higher signs the crude anatomical emblems of sex. But this is a degradation of the spiritual life and a degenerate procedure. In this high quest the first most potent foe of his own household with which the spiritual athlete has to wrestle, is the sex-proteus of his animal nature, for it is the super-personal instinct of the preservation of the race. As fast as he lays it low in one form it rises again in another subtler appearance. And so the inner magical contest goes on in ever-changing mode; for even when this subtle form-creating power of the adversary grows weak, other and still fiercer passions take its place, the strongest of which is the instinct of self-preservation—the will to power. Finally the protean animal life-force in all its modes is tamed, and then and then

only does the victor recognize in his late adversary his own twin self, the beloved, both now having become god-like in union. This is the heroic battle of the soul for its spiritual complement. But in the myths the soul is not only shown as hero but also as heroine. If perchance we ask: Is the hero born from a virgin mother and then fights the good fight, or does he first fight the good fight and so made virgin in purity become fit for divine espousals?—the mystic myths reply: We tell of spiritual realities, not of temporal sequences and material happenings; ascend towards the contemplation of the living mystery as a whole, and you will find how both are true presentments of one and the same reality. Returning from this ascent we are no longer surprised to find that in the popular Jesus-story the virgin birth comes first in the life-sequence, while in the historically prior interpretation of Philo, the virgin birth is referred to the purified soul into whose spotless virgin purity God implants the creative power of the divine love and goodness, and so the soul gives birth to the virtues, and hence rebirth to itself into a new order of being, the race of the God-taught.

This solitary example of the spiritual interpretation of high mystery-lore may perhaps suffice to indicate what a student of comparative mysticism expects to find in any praiseworthy attempt to translate its symbolic language. The Freudian method of interpretation, however, pays no attention to these high matters, but confines itself to the pedestrian level of the lower mysteries; the soul of it is not as yet winged to soar aloft.

Again it is well known that in antiquity sex-worship was exceedingly wide-spread and still to-day persists in some forms of religion. The symbols of

this naturalistic cult are no longer tolerated by the spiritual instincts of our higher culture. Freudism busies itself with the reduction of religious symbolism of a higher culture to terms of this crude naturism. Jung now strongly objects to this; but at the time he wrote the study under notice, he was in the main following the same course of procedure. Later on he ridicules the Freudians for giving a phallic significance to every straight object they find in dream-symbolism; but even in this they cannot outdo Inman, one of the leading writers on sex-worship, who years before psychoanalysis was heard of laid it down that all straight lines were male and all curved ones female, and so the universe was indicative of sex throughout. Inman was intoxicated with his theme, and quite lost all sense of proportion. To-day saner views prevail, and we find the most recent reviewer of the subject¹ writing: "Widespread, however, as are the practices with which this article is concerned, and intimately as they are related to some of the deepest emotions, it is worth while to remind ourselves that they form a portion only of the history of religion. The caution is the more necessary since the subject exercises such a fascination upon some minds as to have given occasion to the taunt that no one who studies it remains sane." In any case it is inevitable that so long as the psychological analysis of dreams aims exclusively at revealing the under-play of sex-impulse in the unconscious, its interpretation of mythic and mystic symbolism must remain confined to the ground of the lesser mysteries of antiquity. That does not, however, mean to say that these mysteries of generation were of no service in their day; on the contrary in some respects they

¹ E. S. Hartland, art. 'Phallism,' in the last volume of *Hastings' E.R.E.*

were of high value. Who, for instance, will deny that the simple natural lore imparted in the ancient rites of adolescence, after due preparation and in the most solemn surroundings, was of social benefit? Can we to-day, in the appalling state of neglect of the simplest instruction to our children on such matters, boast ourselves wiser than our ancient forbears? It is mainly with the outcome of this criminal negligence, in many ways the most pressing of all our social questions, that psychoanalysts are perpetually being confronted in their therapeutic work. Their endeavour labours to give birth to a new science of sex by tracking it down to its hitherto hidden workings in the unconscious; it would thus reveal to modern minds a most important element of the lesser mysteries of human nature.

But what of the greater mysteries of the human spirit which are to-day equally, if not more, neglected? Will psychoanalytic investigations go far enough to compel the modern mind to recognize the crying need of a renaissance of this spiritual lore that overpasses all the sciences? We devoutly hope they will; and indeed there are already signs of a beginning being made towards this end.

It is true that hitherto nearly all the work done on the symbolism of myth and folk-tale has been on Freudian lines. This work is little known in England, for it is all in German and our libraries are without copies.¹ A strikingly new and most hopeful departure,

¹ With the exception of Franz Riklin's *Wish-fulfilment and Symbolism in Fairy-story* (1908), of which I have to thank Dr. Eder for the kind loan of a copy, I have been, therefore, unable to consult these works. Among them may be mentioned: Karl Abraham's study on Dream and Myth (1909), Otto Rank's on the Myth of the Birth of the Hero (1909) and on the Incest Motive in Poetry and Saga (1912), Wilhelm Stockel's on the Dreams of Poets (1912), and A. Maeder's on Symbolism in Legends, Fairy Tales, Customs and Dreams.

however, has been made by Herbert Silberer, in his *Problems of Mysticism and its Symbolism*.¹

This most instructive writer bases his enquiry on a lengthy mystical alchemical parable or allegory. He first of all interprets its symbolism analytically on Freudian lines; but, and in striking contrast, the rest of his exceedingly interesting study is devoted to a synthetic interpretation or hermeneutic, in which he allows the mystics to speak for themselves and give their own high spiritual exegesis of the symbols of their craft. It is a valuable piece of work and leaves one with a satisfied feeling that there has been set before us a rich feast of spiritual good things.

In conclusion, I would then repeat, that Jung's study which appeared in 1911 and 1912, suggestive and instructive as it is in a number of ways, does not give his maturer views. It marks a point in their development, when he was only just beginning to break away from the Vienna School. Most of his *Collected Papers on Analytical Psychology* are later in date and indicate stages of a continued evolution. It is in the Preface to the English translation of these later studies, which was published in 1916, that Jung gives his official statement of the then very wide divergence that had taken place between the views of the Vienna and the Zürich Schools, and it is there where he speaks so enthusiastically of the high rôle symbolism may play in the future moral progress of humanity. Only after this paper was written did I see a copy of the recently published second edition. In it Jung has now added two long new chapters, occupying no less than 120 pages. They are of intense interest and mark a still

¹ *Probleme der Mystik und ihrer Symbolik* (Wien, Heller), 1914, pp. 288. Again I have to thank Dr. Eder for kindly lending me his copy of this work.

further stage of progress. They show beyond question that Jung would now treat many things far differently from the way he has dealt with them in earlier works, and this would especially be the case with the interpretation of high mythic and mystic allegory. We accordingly look forward with keen expectation to the future developments of the right wing of psychoanalysis under his enlightened leadership.

G. R. S. MEAD.

GRAHAM, PLATO AND THE COSMOS.

GRAHAM felt decidedly depressed after his dreams. Life seemed so entangled and bound up in Nature's iron laws. Was man then nothing but the sport of the Cosmos? And yet in man there were glimpses of a higher life—"blank misgivings of a creature moving about in worlds not realized." What would the realization be? Surely not as the Cosmos would have it? Sometimes then he would feel an absurd pity for the stupidity and self-conceit of the Cosmos; then laugh at himself for feeling pity for an unthinking nonentity.

Naturally Graham did not make these thoughts known for fear of being considered a little mad. In fact, since his dreams, he knew he was already beginning to be considered somewhat abnormal. He had taken to getting up at night and wandering about. He had been seen on these occasions talking to himself and laughing in a very odd manner. Graham was in reality imagining over again his strange dreams of conversations with the Cosmos; but of course outsiders did not know this. He often thought of the men the Cosmos scorned as hinderers of mankind's true progress—men like Plato. The works of the great idealist were little known to him; so he determined to become better acquainted with them.

One evening, as Graham sat smoking in his study, with a volume of Plato open at *The Phædrus*, he seemed again to pass through the gate of sleep into the land of dreams.

A glorious southern sky formed a star-lit dome

over a dark grove of trees. Under the trees was a group of men in earnest conversation. One among them was evidently a teacher whose words were being listened to with reverence. There were grace and nobility in this man's bearing; his face had a calm beauty of expression, and a light as from a beautiful soul seemed to illumine his dark eyes. He looked king-like—a king though by right of the royalty of a spiritual kingdom.

"The Cosmos is looking very beautiful to-night," Graham thought. "I wonder if I shall meet the tiresome old nonentity again. Surely that wonderful looking man is a Greek. I expect this dream is going to be about Plato."

Graham looked curiously at the man he now felt sure was Plato. Plato, on his side, seemed very much surprised at Graham's appearance.

"Young man," he said in wonder, as he looked at Graham, "your dress shows you are a stranger. Have you come to learn in our Academy?"

"I have come from an age you have never heard of," Graham answered. "I belong to a time which is to you a part of the dim future."

"The future," Plato repeated slowly, "I should like to know of the future."

"Would you?" Graham answered doubtfully. "I must say I am somewhat tired of the present."

"Tell me about your present then," said Plato.

"I will tell you what men think they have learnt," Graham answered. "Most men now think that they have discovered that there is no God, and that they alone are judges of their actions. They are certain that man ends his individual life at death and is absorbed into the Cosmos. It is only the Cosmos which is

immortal. The individual perishes, returning to its original elements, to recombine into other forms of motion ; but its own individual life has for ever ceased. There are, however, some few who believe in a theory of re-incarnation ; others again say we can cross the threshold of the Unseen and hold converse with the life beyond."

Plato listened with great interest to what Graham was saying, and when he came to the belief in re-incarnation he seemed on the point of interrupting. When Graham finished, the philosopher remarked: "Re-incarnation is what I myself teach as a great truth ; by it the soul is gradually purified and released from earthly dross."

"It is a strange belief," Graham answered. "Yet there is perhaps something not unreasonable in it. It makes progress easier to understand."

"The earth-bound soul," Plato continued, "gradually acquires wings, by means of which it escapes finite limitations. You say many men believe they are absorbed into the Universe at their death. What then becomes of the soul?"

"They think the soul is but a function of the brain," Graham answered, "and perishes when man dies."

"Perishes with the brain," the Greek repeated slowly, as if considering a very strange statement. "Then all my philosophy of the Good, the True and absolute Beauty is only the outcome of my own thoughts and has no reality!"

"That is what many men believe," Graham said. "But it seems to me that a beautiful dream is better than an ugly reality."

"But you say there are men," Plato protested,

"who still believe in dreams, and think that there are mysteries of the Unseen not altogether beyond our knowledge?"

"There are some," said Graham. "There are also Christians who believe that we are not intended to see behind the veil of our earthly covering until death has opened the door, and who, unlike the men who believe reason is our only guide, cling to the teaching of a Jew called Christ."

"Was this teacher a good and great man?" asked Plato.

"Yes, he certainly was," Graham answered, though with some little apprehension of the storm he might raise in the self-conceit of the Cosmos. True enough, there was a loud explosion as of thunder and fierce mutterings and rumblings.

"Was the teacher you call Christ, honoured by his countrymen?" Plato asked.

"No," said Graham. "He was murdered."

"Murdered!" Plato exclaimed. "Christ then suffered for his teaching like my master, Socrates."

"Yes," said Graham, "the Jews hated Christ; they said he was profane, a law-breaker and blasphemer."

"But," rejoined Plato, "you say there are still Christians in your own time. The great teacher is not forgotten."

"Christ continues to be misunderstood," Graham answered. "Most men think he was a dreamer. We have awakened to reality."

"There is no reality without the soul," said Plato solemnly. "I cannot believe that men will become so presumptuous or so hopeless as to believe otherwise. I trust when next we meet, you will have returned to the path of wisdom."

Graham seemed to be alone, alone with the Universe. He waited for the Cosmos to speak.

"Plato believes in baseless dreams," It remarked scornfully.

"I wish his dreams were true!" said Graham.

"You wish Plato's dreams were true!" the Cosmos rejoined with surprise. "Are you so stupid as to prefer talking to Plato to hearing true wisdom?"

"Yes, I think there is true wisdom in dreams," said Graham. "And in any case I much prefer talking to Plato."

The Cosmos was too much insulted to answer.

FLORENCE NEVILL.

THE MESSAGE OF MESTROVICH.

SOME months ago many of us visited the Serbo-Croat Exhibition and saw, as it were, a picture of Serbia—its religion, its art, its crafts and its history. All must have carried away some impression of the sufferings of this small martyred country with so great a spirit; many must have been touched by what they saw. It was a strange contrast to enter this small space of Yugo-slavia from out the throng of busy London life; yet it contained something very precious for those open to receive it—no less than a fountain of living water alongside the dusty highway of life.

Of the many who still believe in the great prophets of old and take delight in reading their ever living utterances poured out in fiery streams, a few will not fail to recognise in Mestrovich a prophet of to-day and a great one.

True prophecy is not dead, nor are the messages of God untold; but in these days they come through the Artists, eloquent in every art. To them is given the vision; theirs is a holy vocation if they but recognise it.

The whole Exhibition through the medium of Art told the tale of a martyred people, ground down by the oppressor in every age—ever rising up again to fight, yet ever being beaten, though never defeated; for their spirit is still triumphant and victorious and their faith unquenched. Surely then the time will come when they shall enjoy the freedom for which they have so

gloriously fought: for to those who seek first the Kingdom of God all these things shall be added.

From a hillside in a far country, as came the prophets of old, Mestrovich comes to-day, bringing his message in magnificent simplicity, the spirit of Art and Religion. For Art without Religion cannot give its full message, nor Religion without Art. They are twins holding the hands of Truth on either side.

Powerful yet simple is Mestrovich's work. It is like the Bible, and gives the same answer as the Bible has ever given to what seems like defeat—the picture of the Passion, of the life and death of Christ. It is told anew by Mestrovich with a rare blend of force and simplicity, the story of the divine transcending the common life of man.

The great Crucifix, as the Tree of Life, whose roots are in the earth, whose branches touch the skies, tells us again the tale of sacrifice and redeeming love. Those wondrous angels at its base, live flames of Spirit, and the little seraph (so touchingly modelled) holding in its fingers the live coal from the altar—these are beings from the world of Reality which lies about our doors. The strange beautiful creature designed for a fountain—this seems an inhabitant of that strange land of transition somewhere between the worlds.

The tender beauty expressed in the Magdalen's offering, making the simple act momentous by the holiness of its love, and the caressing hands in the 'Descent from the Cross'—these are revelations of how the common acts of life may be transfigured by the love which is of God.

And then another aspect. Beyond the Tree of Life with its tragic suffering we see the Madonna and Child presented in different ways. How beautiful the

large one, which in the early days of the Exhibition faced the great Crucifix; so pure, with the new-born Christ. Here is shown the faith by which we look for a world born anew after its dark night of pain.

In all this beauty may we not see God revealed to us through the speaking hand of a prophet? May we not foresee the earth re-born and quickened, the new world sprung from the sacrifice, the Freedom for which our dead have died; and so the faith of Serbia and the whole world justified?

It were loss to miss the message of this great Artist. Of our inner selves we fashion our cups of spiritual receptivity. What we can drink of living water we shall receive, if we but hold them up.

F. THALIA HOW.

THE APOLOGUE OF THE BLIND MAN AND DEATH.

SCENE: A BATTLEFIELD CEMETERY.

BLIND MAN: The ground seems rocking under my feet;
It breaks in a thousand waves.

DEATH: Old man, you stand on the shores of a plain
That is scored with a thousand graves.

BLIND MAN: O what is it makes that the tranquil
earth

Like an ocean thus swells and heaves?

DEATH: The tide of battle swirled over the spot;
And these are the furrows it leaves.

And every furrow holds fast a man;

And the myriads rotting there,

If one could call them again to life,

Would replenish a hemisphere.

But their lights are quenched, and the
ground they drenched

With their spendthrift blood, may bear
A more plenteous crop of darnel and dock
To blow o'er their lonely lair.

BLIND MAN: O liar of liars! Infamous Death!

Their bodies lie fast in your hold;

But the hearts that have felt the passion-
ate beat

Of their hearts, can never grow cold.

By the inner light you cannot quench
I know, as sure as I breathe,

They have left us the best in themselves,
which we

In turn to our sons may bequeath.

Here is an epoch garnered up,

That on the vacant land

Another may spring; but the seed is the
same,

Though sown by a fairer hand.

What is buried here, is the grief and the
fear,

And the tangled tares of hate.

These are the things that men lay on your
bier—

But not their immortal state.

CLAUDESLEY BRERETON.

THE QUEST OF MY HEART.

My sordid soul soars not;

It is blinded by the veils of illusion.

And I hear the myriad voices which speak to me;

But I cannot answer to them.

I am entombed, and wrapped round with clay.

The swish of the wind in the leaves of the forest,

Swirling them along the pathway,—

The grey clouds hurrying across the sky,—

The arch of the rainbow and the gold of sunset,—

The mystic stillness of the sweet, fair dawn,—

The flame of orange lily and the scent of the deep red
rose,—

The awful vastness of the illimitable blue,—
The bleat of the lambs upon the hill-side,—
The laughter of little children,—
The whisper of young man and maiden together,—
The appeal in the eyes of the abandoned woman,—
The silence of a tiny, new-made grave,
And the baby hands and feet, so cold, so still,—
And somewhere in the distance a woman sobbing;—
All these cry out to me and speak.
But I am dumb, inarticulate.
I stretch my hands out in a passion of yearning,
seeking.
For all these cry unto me with a haunting memory of
something elusive;
Of something which was with me before the world was
—seeking its own.
And I long to come to it, but cannot reach it.
Is it that I am small,—too weak,—too impotent?
I long to find that greater self of me,
Which is as yet here unmanifest,
Which dwells beyond the starry spaces,
In other spheres, with God.

S. E. PEARSON.

ACQUITTED.

ST. PETER stood before the Judgment Throne.

Now Heaven had of late been overrun
With countless multitudes in khaki clad :
The stalwart warrior, the stripling lad,
Men of all ages and from every land,
Soldiers from East and West—a motley band.

And Peter stood . . . alone.

And God, from His High Place, in wrathful tone
Demanded explanation . . . and the keys.

“What means this rabble, Peter! Who are these?
What do they here? How durst thou let them in—
Men steeped in blasphemy, nor purged of sin?”

And Peter, trembling, answered: “Lord, my Lord,
I wrought not consciously against Thy word.
I scanned their souls; thereon I deemed them sons.
I did not hear the swearing for tumult of the guns.”

“Could'st thou not see, spite of the cannons' boom,
For such as these there is in Heaven no room?”

And Peter answered: “Lord, unworthily
Fill I my post; may *it* the forfeit be.
But for these legions, crave I pardon, Lord.
They journeyed here through fire and flood and sword;
So swift they came I could not judge aright.
I did not see their vice; their virtues shone so bright.”

Then spake the Loving Father of the throng:
“I did but test thee; thou hast done no wrong.
For Faith and Freedom have their lives been given;
Of such, O Peter, is the Realm of Heaven.”

LILIAN HOLMES.

REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

THE HOLY QUR-ÁN.

Containing the Arabic Text with English Translation and Commentary. By Maulvi Muhammad Ali, M.A., LL.B., President Ahmadiyah Anjuman-i-Isháet-i-Islám, Lahore, India. Woking ('The Islamic Review' Office); pp. cxv. + 1276; 21s. net.

THIS handsome volume witnesses in many respects to a highly praiseworthy and well carried out undertaking. We have before us a copy of the edition printed on Indian paper in flexible morocco binding. The printers, Messrs. Unwin Brothers, have done their work excellently. The Arabic text, in parallel columns with the translation, has been specially transcribed for the purpose by competent calligraphists and its photographic reproduction leaves nothing to be desired. The English and the proof-reading are both remarkably good. Without question this English translation is the best in all outer respects that has been made by an Eastern scholar, the one or two previous attempts falling far behind. Owing to our ignorance of Arabic we are unable to say how it compares technically with the versions of European scholars; but it reads as well as any other English version and is superior to them in its systematic arrangement. There is a Preface of over a hundred pages, ample foot-notes, commentaries and cross-references, and an index. The chapters are supplied with abstracts of the sections showing their connections with each other and also explaining the inter-connection of the chapters themselves, which are further broken up into verses, each verse being numbered. Indeed in general appearance and get-up *The Holy Qur-an* might have come straight from the Oxford presses of *The Holy Bible*. As to the general reliability of the version, we have sought for competent guidance and have been assured on the one hand by a distinguished English Arabist that it has on the whole been carefully and well made, and on the other by a learned Indian Mohammedan that, if it errs in any way, it does so in being

somewhat too literally faithful. It, however, does not read as though it were a slavishly literal version; its language is simple, straightforward and impressive—in short largely 'biblical.' On the whole then we may say that we have before us a version that is not only faithful but dignified; and that is high praise. It is certainly a work of which any scholar might legitimately be proud, and especially an Oriental scholar; it has further been completed in a remarkably short time for so difficult an undertaking. Eight years only have gone to its making, years therefore of such unremitting devotion and strenuous toil as legitimately to compel our admiration and praise. Maulvi Muhammad Ali, as we have been told by one who knows him intimately, is a man of rare intellectual gifts, who could easily have distinguished himself in any profession and made a very large income. He has preferred to devote himself to the service of religion and to live a life of poverty in that service. The translation is his alone; it has not been done by various hands and simply edited by him. As to the commentaries and the rest of the matter, though he has had the great advantage of being able to consult on all points many living Muslim scholars and theologians of the highest repute, as well as innumerable written and printed sources and authorities, the labour is still all his own, and the skilful presentation of the results of his researches show further that he has been an apt scholar in the school of Western methodology. Moreover, whenever in his version he departs from a generally accepted rendering, he tells us why he has done so frankly in the notes and sets before us the evidence for and against his new interpretation.

The work before us, however, is not to be regarded simply as the venture of an individual working unaided and unsupported, as has been generally the case with European translators of the Qur-án. On the contrary, it has at the back of it a powerful, young and vigorous movement, of which little is known in this country. This Ahmadiya or Qádiání movement now numbers more than half a million adherents, chiefly in the Punjab. It has, however, extended to other parts of India and is spreading beyond its borders, even to China in the far East and to America in the far West, not to speak of other lands, including our own. This movement was inaugurated by Hazrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad of Qadian, a village in the District of Gurdaspur (Punjab), a man of exemplary piety, high intellectual gifts and spiritual endowments, who at the age of forty received a revelation, which however he hesitated to accept until it had been repeated to him time after

time. This revelation proclaimed him as a 'Messenger of God, raised in the guise of all the former prophets.' It is not possible in the present notice to set forth, much less discuss, the barest outline of the claims and teachings of this remarkable man, who died in 1908, leaving behind him no less than seventy works on Islam and a numerous body of devoted disciples and followers. Nor is it easy, with our present very limited knowledge of the movement, to estimate the strength of the religious forces playing through it. It is essentially a propagandist movement of a prophetic nature, and the life of its founder, though hedged round with strenuous controversy, was one of high sanctity. And certainly the only book of his with which we are acquainted, for he did not write in English and little has been translated, is an excellent piece of work. *The Teachings of Islam* (translated from the Urdu by Maulvi Muhammad Ali in 1910) was acknowledged on all hands to be the most remarkable treatise presented to the Religious Conference at Lahore in 1896. It may be said that, irrespective of the claim of its adherents as to the status of their founder, the Ahmadiya movement in general stands for a strenuous defence of Islam, and even on what may be called modernist lines. It claims to base itself on good sense, good reason and good morals; it therefore does not shrink from argument but rather courts discussion, and at the same time, as far as we are acquainted with it, refrains from undignified abuse of opponents in spite of the very controversial subject-matter of its general challenge to the non-Islamic world. *The Holy Qur-an* is naturally the most considerable document of this challenge. It is frankly a propagandist and apologetic publication, which strives to meet and turn the edge of hostile criticism. Much space is devoted to establish over against European critics the claim that, not only the text, but also the arrangement, of this famous scripture are just as they came from the lips and the hands of the Prophet himself. One or two points may be touched on as showing the general nature of the apologetic tendency, rationalistic and otherwise, of the commentary. Slavery is claimed to have been allowed only during a state of war, and the practice of slavery, according to which men can be seized anywhere and sold, is condemned (n. 2294). Islam is the only religion which enjoins the duty of granting freedom to slaves (n. 2739). Angels are the external agents which bring the attraction of good into work, and devils are those that assist in the working of the attraction to evil (n. 214). The doctrine of abrogation, whereby some later

verses set aside some earlier, is rejected (nn. 152, 1398); this implies a breach with all previous Muslim theology. Life after death is a continuance of this life; the real hell is spiritual blindness, and from here this spiritual blindness is taken to the next life. Similarly "the paradise of the next life is only a continuation of the peace and rest which a man enjoys spiritually in this life" (p. x). "The blessings of paradise and the torments of hell are nothing but physical manifestations of the spiritual blessings which the good enjoy," and the converse. Accordingly, the *hūrī's* are translated the *pure ones*, and it is explained that the blessings of paradise are described in words which apply to women, because womanhood is a symbol of purity and beauty (n. 2356; cp. nn. 2109, 2110, 2521). *Jihād* is not 'holy war' but '(? spiritual) striving' (nn. 238, 1073, 1798). These and other points of a like nature are concerned with ancient and modern controversies. There are some others of less moment on which the commentator, in our opinion, might have with advantage refrained from indulging in highly hazardous speculations. Thus 'The Dwellers in the Cave' story is said not to be simply an echo of the Seven Sleepers of Ephesus legend, as most scholars are persuaded; it is a reference to some religious persecution the place and date of which is not stated. So far, so good; but matters are by no means improved by the speculation that the persons referred to may have been Joseph of Arimathæa and his companions, and the cave may have been Glastonbury (n. 1488). Nor are we impressed when, after maintaining the identification of Gog and Magog with the Scythians, it is further suggested that these had connections with the Angles or Saxons, and hence perchance their famous effigies in our own Guildhall (n. 1523). The exegesis of a verse to the effect that "the camels shall certainly be neglected so that they shall not be used for going swiftly (from place to place)"—the verse itself reading simply: "And when the camels are left"—is made the occasion of a claim to prophecy of the most astonishing character—no less than foretelling the railway systems of the world and especially the extension of railways into Arabia, this being the sign of the coming of the days when the superiority of Islam will be established over all the other religions of the world (n. 2671). Such speculations might well have been omitted from the notes; they attract more attention than they deserve and detract from the more serious contentions. Equally so we think it a mistake to have introduced into the notes a private belief of some (perhaps many) of the

Ahmadiyah, to which their founder a few years before his death lent his adhesion. That Jesus did not die upon the cross is a reiterated statement of the Qur-án; indeed in one passage apparently doubt is thrown even upon the fact of crucifixion. This may then be taken to be an article of faith with all orthodox Muslims. It follows that, even if the crucifixion be admitted, Jesus was taken down unconscious and revived and subsequently died like other men. This speculation is not unfamiliar, quite apart from the Quránic assertion. We find the rationalistic *motif* of revival by Essene brethren in early Life of Jesus literature, *e.g.* in the works of Bahrdt (1784-1792) and Venturini (1806). But what will make the general reader unversed in these matters rub his amazed eyes is the growing Ahmadiya conviction that thereafter Jesus travelled to the East; not only so but that his tomb is to be seen to-day in Kashmir, and still more precisely in Khán Yár Street, Srinagar. This reminds us of the Russian journalist Notovich's *Nouvelle Vie de Jésus* published about 1890. Notovich asserted that he had obtained his information from Tibetan documents preserved by the monks of the Himis monastery near Ladák. Subsequent enquiries, however, at Himis by a personal friend elicited the information that the monks had no such documents and had never heard of Notovich.

We are well aware that the bringing of this matter so prominently before our readers will tend to divert their attention from the general good work of the commentary and discount its value. Our learned Maulvi and President of the Ahmadiya Anjuman at Lahore, however, is evidently persuaded that it is a point of primary importance, and challenges the attention of his readers by setting forth an argument to persuade them, if possible, that he is not simply beating the air. We will therefore let him speak for himself by transcribing his commentary on verse 50 of chapter XXIII., which runs: "And We made the son of Mary and his mother a sign, and We gave them a shelter on a lofty ground having meadows and springs." This famous verse has given rise to much discussion, it being generally supposed that it refers to some pleasant spot in Syria. Muhammad Ali's confident note (1723), which doubtless echoes the authority of his revered teacher, whom he accepts as the Promised Messiah and Mahdi, is, to say the least of it, likely to give rise to still more discussion, for it runs: "*Rabwah* is lofty ground and *qarâr* means cultivated land and a place where water rests in a meadow. Neither Jerusalem nor Egypt, nor Palestine nor Damascus, which are the names

suggested, answers the description, which applies only and exactly to the valley of Cashmere. Part of the lost ten tribes of Israel is also traced to Cashmere, where a large number of towns and villages bear the names of the towns and villages of Palestine. The presence of a tomb known as the tomb of Nabí Sáhib (*i.e.* the Prophet), or Isá Sáhib (*i.e.* Jesus), or Yús Asaf Nabí (*i.e.* the Prophet Yús Asaf), in the Khán Yár street in the capital of Cashmere, lends additional support to this theory. The fact that the chapter deals with the final triumph of prophets and their followers and their deliverance from the hands of their enemies also gives us a clue to the mystery attending the circumstances of the disappearance of Jesus Christ; for, as has been shown in 645, Jesus did not die on the cross. The verse tells us that, being delivered from the hands of his enemies, he was given shelter at some other place, and the description of that place as indicated in this verse, along with the fact that Cashmere has a tomb which every available evidence shows to be the tomb of Jesus himself, leads us to the conclusion that Cashmere is the land referred to in this verse. As regards the tomb, the following evidence shows that the sacred body of no less a personage than Jesus Christ rests there. (a) Oral testimony, based on traditions of the people of Cashmere, tells us that the tomb belongs to one who bore the name of Yús Asaf, who was known as a *nabí* (*i.e.* a prophet), and who came to Cashmere from the west about 2,000 years ago. (b) The *Tárikh-i-A'zamí*, an historical [Persian] work written some two hundred years ago, says, referring to this tomb, on p. 82: 'The tomb is generally known as that of a prophet. He was a prince, who came to Cashmere from a foreign land. . . . His name was Yús Asaf.' (c) The *Ikmál-ud-Dín*, an Arabic work which is a thousand years old, also mentions Yús Asaf as having travelled in *some lands*. (d) Joseph Jacobs states, on the authority of a very old version of the story of Yús Asaf, that he (Joasaph) at last reached Cashmere, and there died ('Barlaam and Josaphet' [1896], p. cv). This evidence shows that the tomb in Khán Yár is the tomb of *Yús Asaf*. But who is this *Yús Asaf*? That he is called a *nabí* (prophet) both in oral tradition and in history settles the time in which he lived, for no prophet is recognized by Muslims to have appeared after the Holy Prophet. Again, there is a striking resemblance between the names Yús and Yasú', the latter being the Arabic form of Jesus. There is a striking resemblance in the teachings of Yús Asaf and Jesus; for instance, the parable of the seed-sower occurring in Matt. 13: 8, Mark 4: 8,

and Luke 8: 5 occurs also in 'Barlaam and Josaphet' (p. cxi). Another striking circumstance is that Yús Asaf gives the name *Bushrá* (the exact Arabic word for *Gospel*) to his teaching, as the following passage from the *Ikmál-ud-Dín* shows: 'Then he began to compare the tree to *Bushrá*, which he preached to the people.' All these circumstances lead to the conclusion that Jesus Christ went to Cashmere after the event of the crucifixion, and that he preached, lived and died there." Now the story of Barlaam and Josaphet was one of the most famous mediæval religious romances. Its heroes had been canonized as saints in both the Eastern and Western Churches. Critical research has shown beyond question that the story of the early life of the Indian prince Josaphet, who was converted by the Christian monk Barlaam, reproduces all the traditional incidents of the life of Prince Siddartha before he became the Buddha. It thus comes about that the Buddha has found a place in the calendar of Christian saints. The original of this religious romance is probably to be traced to the polemical propaganda of the Syrian Church in contact with India, and reminds one of the Acts of Thomas among the Indians style of legendary narrative. Of the Syriac original, however, we know nothing; it appears in Greek first among the writings of John of Damascus (*flor.* early part of the 8th century), who before he became monk held high office at the court of the Kaliph Abú Ju'far al-Mansúr. But even with the straw of possibility to grasp at that the story may also veil an element of Christian-Muslim polemics, the apologists of the Cashmere tomb of Yús Asaf will be hard put to it to justify their dragging of the Barlaam and Josaphet legend into their case. The legend was translated into many languages and the Arabic equivalent of Joasaph-Josaphet is Yúdasatf, which is held by recent research to be simply a corruption of Bodhisat.

THE GATE OF REMEMBRANCE.

The Story of the Psychological Experiment which resulted in the Discovery of the Edgar Chapel at Glastonbury. By Frederick Bligh Bond, F.R.I.B.A., Director of Excavations at Glastonbury Abbey, Author of 'The Architectural Handbook of Glastonbury Abbey.' Oxford (Blackwell); pp. 176; 6s. net.

THIS is a distinctly interesting case for students of the psychical. Mr. Bligh Bond has done well to have kept so careful a record and

is to be congratulated on the skilful way in which he has set forth the whole matter. The discovery of the Edgar Chapel is shown to have been led up to by a series of indications obtained by automatic script. The automatist was J. A., a friend who was assisting Mr. Bond in his preliminary studies of the ruins and their history prior to starting the work of excavation. Both men were thus soaked through with their subject and permeated with the atmosphere and memories of this famous ancient abbey as far as they could be recovered from literary sources. The script, however, by no means simply reproduces what they had ascertained from old chronicles and histories and prior descriptions. On the contrary it takes the form of statements which claim to be by dead and gone abbots, monks and builders writing as eye-witnesses of the many rebuildings and extensions, and that too in quaint old English speech and spelling or monkish colloquial and at times ungrammatical Latin. The most interesting memories thus recorded are those of the monk Johannes Bryant, a lovable character, negligent indeed in choir, for which he has to do much penance, but a fat and jolly friar with the true soul of an artist. Sculptor (*lapidator*), nature-lover and ardent fisherman, he passionately loves the abbey as a thing most beautiful, set in the fair framing of the peaceful countryside of mediæval England. He protests: "I was ever soe: of a merry heart, when like to melte in tears. So was I made. It was not my fault. Light of thought, save the thoughts I could not speak; and the light jests comme again to me. Glad soule! Had I but turned my soul to the things that were greate, I should not be now a child among the toys. But I was never meant to be a monk. They placed me here in choro, when I would have drawn the sword." And again, referring to some unrecorded lapse with which he had been charged, he protests: "I dydde it not, God wot, not I! Why cling I to that which is not? It is not I, and it is not I, butt parte of me which dwelleth in the past and is bound to that whych my carnal soul loved and called 'home' these many years. Yet I, Johannes, amm of many partes, and ye better parte doeth other things—Laus, laus Deo!—only that part which remembereth clingeth like memory to what it seeth yet." With regard to such declarations, of which there are many in the record ascribed not only to Johannes but also to a number of other communicators, Mr. Bligh Bond raises the question: "Is this a piece of actual experience transmitted by a real personality, or are we in contact with a longer field of memory, a cosmic record latent, yet living"

and able to find expression in human terms related to the subject before us, by the aid of something furnished by the culture of our own minds, and by the aid of a certain power of mental sympathy which allows such records to be sensed and articulated?" He leans, he says, on the whole towards the latter hypothesis; and yet he would admit, as we are inclined to admit, that the script itself gives the better diagnosis of the 'Johannes' complex, to use the terminology of a psychology that is mechanical at best, and seems strangely soulless when applied to the lively impression which the picture conjured up by the graphic description of the script makes on our minds. Part of the record gives a sort of review of the rôle played by Johannes in the whole psychical experiment, and we agree with Mr. Bligh Bond in thinking that, if not a true explanation of the related influences, it is at any rate full of interesting suggestions. It purports to emanate from the subjective supervisors of the experiment, who call themselves 'The Watchers,' a present-day influence so to speak, using a somewhat pompous style and a term or two of modern spiritism, and occasionally lapsing into the old-fashioned spelling of the major part of the script. It runs as follows:

"Simple he was, but as a dog loveth his master, so loved he his Howse with a greater love than any of them that planned and builded it. They were of the earth—planners and builders for their greater glory, nor ever, though honest men, for the glory of God. But Johannes, mystified and bewildered by its beauty, gave it his heart, as one gives his heart to a beloved mistress; and so, being earth-bound by that love, his spirit clings in dreams to the vanished visions which his spirit-eyes even still see.

"Even as of old he wandered by the mere and saw the sunset shining on her far-off towers, and now in dreams the earth-love part of him strives to picture the vanished glories, and led by the masonry of love, he knows that ye also love what he has loved, and so he strives to give you glimpses of his dreams.

"Simple child of Nature—loving her, he knew not why; but loving her yet more deeply because he knew not why he loved. He was not meant to be a priest of the chaire, and it harassed him sometimes over-much. Child of Nature! He loved freedom, and was happier in the orchard, and by the mere, than performing the rituals of the choir.

"Men loved him for his love, but oftentimes his Prior comprehended not, and mistaking the outward show in which he failed, for lack of that inner worship which they could not feel, they

made him do penances for which their backs were more fitted. Then ye should know who would understand him aright, and read his inner meaning.

"He would tell you what he saw, but how can he describe it? It was beautiful, and his soul rejoiced as he would have you also rejoice, but he could not tell you why. It was good. It was pleasing to the eye, and through the eye his soul was uplifted, in an age when souls were grovelling.

"It was lovely, and he knew it, but when ye ask, 'What was it like unto?' he cannot tell you. It was heavenly—so was the sunset—and the shadows on the mere—but he could not paint these nor reproduce them for you.

"Those others, the great and simple, are passed and gone to other fields, and they remember not save when the love of Johannes compels their mind to some memory before forgotten.

"Then through his soul do they dimly speak, and Johannes, who understands not, is the link that binds you to them."

Whatever else this may be, it is not 'nauseating drivel,' as the infuriated Old Guard of defeated materialism politely opines concerning all communications of this order; on the contrary, it poses a problem that materialism is utterly unable to solve. A point of interest for the future is that the script has given indications for excavating the Loretto chapel, a hitherto very obscurely known feature of the ruins. It will be instructive to learn whether they prove to be correct, for it not infrequently happens in psychical research that a striking success is followed by an equally striking failure.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF BENEDETTO CROCE.

The Problem of Art and History. By H. Wildon Carr, Hon. D.Litt., Durham. London (Macmillan); pp. 215; 7s. 6d. net.

IN reviewing Mr. Ainslie's translation of Croce's *Logic*, in the January number, we said that this distinguished Italian thinker would compel the attention of the idealistically minded by his skilful and refreshing treatment of the perennial problems of philosophy. His view of philosophy as a method and not a system of thought, as a living ever developing organon of knowledge and not as an effort simply to construct a perfect mental machine of rigid logical forms, is highly commendable and in keeping with what is

most promising in the new movement towards synthetic thinking which is beginning to declare itself in so many modes and forms in these revolutionary and disintegrating days. Dr. Wildon Carr, the respected President of the Aristotelian Society, which so usefully focusses the philosophical activities of British thinkers, has already, in his *Philosophy of Change*, done good service by a careful exposition of Bergson's views. We are now indebted to him for an admirable study of Croce's philosophy, and he is to be heartily congratulated on the accomplishment of a by no means easy task. His book is readable throughout and holds the attention. Nor is it a thing of shreds and patches; Dr. Carr has thought out for himself Croce's leading conceptions, and presented them with commendable clarity. He should thus make many his grateful debtors, for few have the equipment, time and industry needed to read Croce's voluminous works for themselves.

Philosophy for Croce is science, science of the mind, as Dr. Carr translates *spirito*, or science of the spirit if it be preferred. The subject matter of this science is the concrete life of mind, and by concreteness is meant "the full reality of mind as it manifests itself in its historical development." In this philosophy there are four main moments,—a double activity, each mode of which has two degrees—the doctrine of the double degree. These interdependent modes of activity are respectively the theoretical and the practical. The degrees of the theoretical are the æsthetic and the logical, grades of one and the same mode of activity; the degrees of the practical are the economic and the moral, equally grades of one mode of activity. The æsthetic is the condition of the logical, and the logical presupposes the æsthetic; the economic and the moral are similarly related. The practical is the activity of behaviour, or will, and this presupposes the theoretical or knowing activity. All this applies solely to the human order, for unmotivated or unconscious movements cannot be called actions.

All four degrees are thus moments of the life of one and the same reality—mind or spirit; the abstraction of any one from the rest is fatal to the true philosophic method. The end these strive towards respectively is the realisation of the Beautiful, the True, the Useful and the Good. All these are forms of one master concept or idea, the ultimate reality itself immanent in all things. The remarkable point here is the stress Croce lays upon the category of Use. The only previous thinker who has given to Use so great a distinction, as far as we are aware, is Emmanuel Swedenborg. But the Italian and the Swede arrive at this

judgment by very different paths. Croce is an idealist; but a concrete and not a subjective idealist. His idealism is no abstraction from reality. He insists throughout that the ideal is ever immanent in the real, and indeed without the latter is non-existent. The concrete universal is the chief text of his gospel. Intuitions are the matter of concepts; but here we must distinguish the pseudo-concepts or classifications of science from the pure concepts of philosophy. The pure concept is "a form of knowledge, or a kind of knowledge, which transcends any and every intuition which it concerns and which at the same time that it transcends all is wholly present with each" (p. 82). The pure concept is distinguished by its expressivity,—that is it is capable of distinct expression,—by its universality and by its concreteness. The one supreme necessity of logic is the concrete universality or immanent transcendence of the concept. To create pseudo-concepts we arbitrarily sunder this difference in unity, and form either empirical pseudo-concepts which are concrete without being universal, as dog, house, rose, or abstract pseudo-concepts, which are universal without being concrete, as triangle, free motion. Croce, though a warm admirer of the genius of Hegel, rejects the famous dialectic of the opposites as a sufficient logic of reality. Opposite terms are not something distinct and complete in themselves, but abstractions from reality. In reality ugliness is not the stark contradiction of beauty, it is an element in the concept beauty. The one without the other is non-existent. The distinct concept may be regarded as a synthesis or unity, an identity in difference, of so-called opposites. But Croce refuses utterly to follow the Hegelian dialectic which would make a distinct concept in its turn an opposite, a thesis or antithesis within a new synthesis. "Instead, then, of the final triad which Hegel reaches in the conclusion of the logic of the Absolute Mind,—the triad in which Art and Revealed Religion are opposites, thesis and antithesis with Philosophy as the synthesis,—Croce presents Absolute Mind as an ideal progression of four distinct concepts. Instead of the triad we have the relation of the double degree,—beauty and truth in the concrete forms of art and history, utility and goodness in the concrete forms of economic and moral conduct. The philosophical sciences have, then, each its distinct concept, and each concept is a synthesis of opposites. There is not a science of beauty and a science of ugliness. There is one science of æsthetic. Its concept beauty is a synthesis of opposites, the beautiful and the ugly. The same is true of truth

and error, worth and worthlessness, good and evil " (p. 152). How these leading notions of a synthetic philosophy are worked out by Croce, in the concrete facts of art and history, for instance, requires a patient perusal of the philosopher's voluminous detailed expositions; but his general method of treatment is well brought out by Dr. Carr's summary description. The concluding three chapters of this helpful study, which deal respectively with 'The Theory of Beauty,' 'Art and Religion' and 'The Concept of History,' will perhaps prove the most arresting for the general reader; whilst the student of philosophy will doubtless be induced by the whole presentation of the subject to seek further light in Mr. Ainslie's translations of the four works of Croce so far accessible in English. Where, in our opinion, Croce falls short is in his treatment of religion. He is not only generally unsympathetic, but at times distinctly hostile. For him religion as it exists is to be classed generally as *mitologismo* or at best as an inferior kind of philosophy; the religion of the future, he believes, will be identical with the best philosophical effort.

MY REMINISCENCES.

By Sir Rabindranath Tagore. With Illustrations. London (Macmillan); pp. 272; 7s. 6d. net.

THESE reminiscences are offered as memory-pictures illustrating the poet's childhood, and especially the precocious beginnings and the stages of development of his early literary career, up to the time when he first really found himself, so that out of direct experience, and not devised of the imagination solely, he could write:

"I know not how of a sudden my heart flung open its doors,
And let the crowd of worlds rush in, greeting each other."

Thereafter the artist could send forth his songs from the depth of a full heart and ever with greater power as he continued to become better acquainted with the world. This acquaintance did not spoil him, for the sense of the joy of realising the presence of the Infinite in the finite had left an indelible impression, so that indeed it formed the subject on which all his subsequent writings have dwelt. Previously to this, as he says, his poetry had lacked the backbone of worldly reality. Musing a quarter of a century later on this most deeply impressed of the memory-pictures of

what may be called the first book of his life, Sir Rabindranath writes :

“I had so long viewed the world with external vision only, and so had been unable to see its universal aspect of joy. When of a sudden, from some innermost depth of my being, a ray of light found its way out, it spread over and illuminated for me the whole universe, which then no longer appeared like heaps of things and happenings, but was disclosed to my sight as one whole. This experience seemed to tell me of the stream of melody issuing from the very heart of the universe and spreading over space and time, re-echoing thence as waters of joy which flow right back to the source.”

The volume is, however, far more than a graceful series of pen-pictures of reminiscences of personal happenings, interesting as these are in themselves, for they introduce us to the intimate atmosphere of a distinguished, patriarchal and highly cultured Indian household, whose leading members were engaged in artistic and literary, educational, social and religious reforms, in contact with representatives of the best thought and endeavour of a strenuous period in the cultural progress of Bengal. It is the musings on these reminiscences that give the volume its special value.

In reviewing his prolific youthful and immature literary output, Sir Rabindranath is his own most frank and penetrating critic. He is humorously apprehensive lest some indiscriminating admirer of his writings or some over-enthusiastic pedant of literary origins should disinter relics of his earliest outpourings, and congratulates himself that most of them have been lost or destroyed. Nevertheless much of what he now regards as immature work was purifying, enriching and beautifying his mother-tongue. We of the West must never forget that Rabindranath Tagore's finest medium of expression is Bengali. We here know him only from his work in English, a language he was slower to acquire than most of his relatives, and in which he never wrote for publication till 1912, when *Gitanjali* immediately captured the attention of lovers of fair things. This is a remarkable fact, and few who read the admirable English of this poet and intuitive philosopher of spiritual things, in his now extensive output in our tongue, would suspect it had not been a life-long means of expression with him.

Tagore is essentially a mystic with an innate feeling for the beauty of Nature and a yearning love for intimate communion

with the divine spirit immanent in all natural things. There is nothing in his writings to tickle the curiosity of the *amateur* of psychical eccentricities. It is, however, of interest to note that, as with Stevenson, for instance, the subjects of many of his stories and other writings were dream-given. But Tagore was not only a poet and writer in those days; he was also a singer, a musician. He has a firm conviction of the power of song itself, the pure movement of its rhythms, the soul of it. "The song," he writes, "being great in its own wealth, why should it wait upon the words? Rather does it begin where the words fail. Its power lies in the region of the inexpressible; it tells us what the words cannot." This he holds to be the chief characteristic of a genuine song in ideal Indian music. As in literary forms he was an innovator, so also was he well-nigh a revolutionary in musical matters. Yet, strange to say, he records that in this latter he escaped criticism. "On many an occasion," he writes, "has the Bengali reading public been grievously exercised over some opinion or literary form of mine, but it is curious to find that the daring with which I had played havoc with accepted musical notions did not rouse any resentment; on the contrary, those who came to hear departed pleased." We must remember here that much of Indian music consists of improvisation on a theme. Later he began to be acquainted with European music, and though he got somewhat into the spirit of it, he cannot claim, he modestly admits, to have gained admittance to its soul. Nevertheless it is instructive to have his view on what he considers the root distinction between these two spirits of music, which he is convinced abide in altogether different apartments, and do not gain entry to the heart by the self-same door. The following passage out of a number seems best to give the gist of his judgment:

"European music seems to be intertwined with its material life, so that the text of its songs may be as various as that life itself. If we attempt to put our tunes to the same variety of use they tend to lose their significance, and become ludicrous; for our melodies transcend the barriers of every-day life, and only thus can they carry us so deep into Pity, so high into Aloofness, their function being to reveal a picture of the inmost inexpressible depths of our being, mysterious and impenetrable, where the devotee may find his hermitage ready, or even the epicurean his bower, but where there is no room for the busy man of the world."

It is certainly of interest thus to learn how our music strikes one who has been brought up in the best Indian tradition. But

those of us in the West who regard music as the highest of the arts, the medium most capable of expressing thoughts and emotions too great for words, cannot admit the justice of so sweeping a generalisation. We have music of all kinds and suited to all purposes; and in our highest and best, and that too rendered with amazing excellence, we have the inspiration of unimaginable spiritual sublimity.

GONE WEST.

Three Narratives of After-Death Experiences. Communicated through the Mediumship of J. S. M. Ward, B.A., late Scholar and Prizeman of Trinity Hall, Cambridge. London (Rider); pp. 359; 5s. net.

MR. Ward tells us that, although he had for many years been 'keenly interested in the occult,'—an important fact to remember—he was unaware of his own mediumistic capacities prior to the death of a relative, H. J. L. He then suddenly and rapidly developed the ability to remember very clearly a long series of consistent and consecutive psychical experiences in the way of visions which he subsequently wrote out in full consciousness; in addition he found himself able to write down automatically in trance much else germane to and explanatory of the remembered experiences. This psychical development he ascribes to the good services and co-operation of H. J. L. In this way a large amount of material was collected purporting to describe certain aspects of the general state of affairs after death. These aspects included two views of the phase most closely allied to and interpenetrating earth life—called the 'astral plane': namely, as seen by a bad man and by an average man of the world. Of the aspects of what is called the 'spirit plane,' four descriptions were given: namely, of hell, or the realm of unbelief; and of the realms of half-belief, of belief lacking in works, and of belief shown forth in works. These narratives purport to be respectively by H. J. L. (a half-believer) and by three acquaintances who relate their first-hand experiences of lower and higher conditions outside the purview of H. J. L. The first intention was to publish the whole record; but the material proved so extensive that the description of the realms of belief without and of belief with works have had to be reserved for a future volume. *Gone West* has all the appearance of being a frank and sincere effort on the part of Mr.

Ward to chronicle his psychical experiences. His book is a favourable example of a class or type of after-death narratives which are now very numerous and so provide a very extensive material in which to trace the development of a complex of certain characteristic ideas. Mr. Ward's narrative is chiefly distinguished from the general run of such descriptions by including a graphic account of a lurid Dantesque hell, a subject about which books of this order as a rule are very shy. They are generally preoccupied with consolatory messages and edifying occurrences; the richer fare one might expect to find in such heightened imaginal states is, however, for the most part sadly lacking, and the emotions are starved on a thin diet of platitudinous banality and insipid sentimentalism. Mr. Ward's 'Officer,' who kindly obliges with a *scenario* of hell, is a purveyor of sterner stuff. Self-confessed blackguard and scoundrel as he was, he is nevertheless a strong character; his narrative is distinctly picturesque and his adventures at times thrilling, especially as he regresses to the mediæval and archaic modes of his imaginal surround. Throughout the whole record we notice signs of the contagion of ideas in psychical circles, and this argues the presence of a social rather than of an individual riddle to unpuzzle. Every narrative of this nature presents for solution more or less the same fundamental problems of which the systematic enunciation alone would require a volume. The first thing to be determined in every case is whether we have to do with a record of genuine spontaneous psychical experiences and not with the deliberate conscious exercise of the creative imagination. If this is satisfactorily established, as we think it is in Mr. Ward's case, we have then to ask ourselves: Is it all simply the play of the experient's 'unconscious'? Mr. Ward himself strenuously rejects this most narrowly parsimonious view, the stingiest of all hypotheses; he has been in the psychical trenches and this 'brass hat' theory of the Academic War Office does not seem to work satisfactorily when you go over the top into no man's land. It seems *then* at any rate not only ridiculous but stark lunacy to talk of the unconscious as explaining anything really about a state of affairs which manifestly conceals the activities of very distinctly intelligent wills whose attention is tensely turned in one's own direction. Nor will the grudging or even most generous admission of dissociated personality or even of telepathy between the living satisfy a man, who feels profoundly convinced that he has been up against very distinct personalities other than his own and of a

disembodied order; his experience cannot be so easily set aside by the theories of those who have had no such experience, as simply a cunning delusion played upon his reason by the emotional contents of his own mind. But the presence of a will is not the usual idea of a person; for most people a body is here the most important consideration. Psychical embodiment, however, is a far greater puzzle for us. What comes out in greatest clearness, for it is repeatedly and directly admitted and so stated in the narrative itself, is the highly imaginal and imaginative nature of life in the psychical world; and this seems to provide us with perhaps the most valuable working hypothesis in investigating the unstable kaleidoscopic phenomena of such states. But even so, when we have taken every other hypothesis in the field into consideration and allowed generously for it in its legitimate field of operation, we nevertheless in no few cases find ourselves face to face with a residual element that brings us back from all our theorizing to the naïve realism of concrete presentation; even as here in ordinary life we return to what is immediately before us after our scientific analysis and philosophic theorizing—our wives and children, for instance, are still our wives and children and not constellations of electronic systems. Experiences of the nature recorded by Mr. Ward would then seem in last resort from the natural standpoint of the experient to be determined—we will not say telepathically, for such a term is after all nothing but a question-begging spatial metaphor—but sympathetically, by the mutual psychical interplay of personalities in the sense of intelligent wills. We seem here to have to do with life-modes, the underlying movements and emotions of which are phenomenalized by an apparently spontaneous selection and adaptation of a vivid sensuous imagery so foreign to the prosaic experience of most of us as to appear well-nigh incredible. This view of course regards simply the mode of expression of the psychical facts; it is not concerned with an enquiry into their meaning and value.

‘I HEARD A VOICE.’

Or the Great Exploration. By a King's Counsel. London (Kegan Paul); pp. 272; 6s. net.

WE fear we cannot congratulate our K.C. on the appropriateness of the title, or even sub-title, he has chosen for this simple record of automatic planchette-writing through his little daughters, aged

fourteen and eleven respectively. He may be justified in saying the writing speaks to him ; but it is not the speaking of one voice but of many. It is somewhat surprising in these days of popular interest in all things psychical to find a record of this nature put forth by a K.C. as an astonishing novelty ; however, it actually does seem to have come in his case to an absolutely unprepared mind. The family of father and mother and two children, we are told, had previously not the slightest knowledge of spiritistic or psychical matters or literature. The planchette had been regarded simply as a game for the children, when suddenly it began to write coherent messages, and thus the family was gradually introduced to a far-reaching complex of psychical communications claiming to be from deceased relatives and their friends and others, who all in their several ways proceeded to carry out the now so familiar programme of spiritistic propaganda. They told of their past on earth, of the mode of their transition and of what thereafter they were suffering or doing, and all are made to play the rôle of messengers or transmitters of the 'new revelation.' The whole complex comes together in a common atmosphere of distinctively High Church piety, the normal environment of the family. What is communicated is accepted at its face value ; there is no explanation, no attempt at research or criticism. We have thus before us simply a collection of unanalyzed material, of a nature very familiar to all students of this class of psychical phenomena, but coming to the unaccustomed mind of our K.C., in spite of his legal training, as a new and marvellous revelation. It is transparently an honest record of what happened within the intimate privacy of an affectionate family circle, all the members of which regarded the whole matter as being of a specially sacred nature ; and consequently conscious fraud and deception on the part of the child-automatists and their parents may be ruled out. The main purport of the communications is pietistic and edificatory and the general intent is to comfort, raise up and rescue. Perhaps the most interesting feature is the way the planchette-writing is used to tell the story of psychical dramas brought to a crisis in the field of communication opened up between the family group and the communicating *dramatis personæ*, a number of whom seem to have found one another by this means. For instance, a husband and wife thus came together again and are reconciled. The woman had been of a fervently religious nature and an excellent wife ; the husband had treated her brutally and sneered at all she held most sacred. Death came to both of them,

and they go each in time to their respective places according to their inner natures. The wife first communicates and is thus once more switched on to her memory of earthly experience. Thereafter the script tells of the wailing and lamenting of a soul in hell-conditions. Subsequently the writing takes on the form of a duologue. To the despairing soul who, by contact with the atmosphere of the pious family group, begins to turn to prayer, there appears a radiant form who addresses him in the lofty conventional language supposedly appropriate to a messenger of God. The soul in anguish immediately accepts these exhortations as of the highest provenance and addresses the form with the greatest reverence. The point of interest here is that the wife on the one hand does not recognize her husband in the sinner before her and also plays the part apparently unconsciously of authoritative exhortation, and on the other the husband accepts the presentation at its face value, and is utterly ignorant that it is his wife who is speaking to him. Thereafter they discover one another and are reconciled. Another point of interest is that a certain Lorenzo, purporting to be a fifteenth century Italian, writes sentences in Latin and Greek, in Italian and French. We are not given the linguistic attainments of the whole family in detail; but the girls knew no Greek and of Latin one only knew the declensions. The father had forgotten whatever Greek he knew and could not decipher the part of the script that was in uncials. After two imperfect attempts at a text from *Luke*, a sentence from the *Acts* was given correctly, all but one letter. The point to be noted here is that before the first word is a reference mark, as though the text were reproduced *verbatim et literatim* from a modern critical text. The French betrays by one or two idiomatic errors that we have here to do with English and not Italian French. Even then, if the Lorenzo complex could be shown to be a memory of provable events, which is not the case, the mechanism of its expression is built up from that of other minds. It does not, however, follow that this is a deliberately conscious deception. By no means; there is no reason to suppose that the way of working such automatic associations, or even instinctively selective reproductions, is any better known to psychical entities than are the workings of the unconscious here to the man in the street. The more pompous passages of the communications are all of one general style, plentifully besprinkled with 'ye's' and 'thou's,' with lapses into bad grammar such as 'Be still, ye panting heart!' Occasionally the stream of fluent

pious commonplace rises to a moderate level of good writing. There are also six verses of a poem in quaint Elizabethan spelling that is not bad. Finally we note some references to the war and to the state of those who have suffered violent death for their country. Manifest anxiety is shown to insist that these have no purgatory to endure—a doctrine which *if unqualified* leads to some distressingly puzzling conclusions. Some of these at least, one would have thought, might have been pointed out for the benefit of the children by the father. He, however, is so carried away by the notion that, wherever he finds it in the script, he gives it the prominence of italics. Has a K.C. never heard of such horrors as the violation of Belgian nuns, for instance? And if so, what of the case of a violator subsequently blown to pieces?

THE CHURCH IN THE FURNACE.

Essays by Seventeen Temporary Church of England Chaplains on Active Service in France and Flanders. Edited by F. B. Macnutt, Senior Chaplain to the Forces, Canon of Southwark. London (Macmillan); pp. 454; 5s. net.

WE heartily congratulate these brave padres at the front for their moral courage in publishing this exceedingly valuable, frank and outspoken series of statements of facts, which unanswerably proclaim the lamentable failure of the Church of England in the matter of religious education. The writers are of course not concerned with the flocks of other denominations; but we fancy that the same account more or less would have to be given by all ministers of religion attached to the Forces. Now the Army is not a collection of a peculiar breed of individuals called 'Tommies,' as the comic papers would have us believe; it is just simply and literally the whole of the finest flower of the nation's manhood of every class and culture. There are exceptions of course; but it may be said generally that this mass of the manhood of the nation at its most vigorous prime, the vast majority of which is paraded as Church of England, knows next to nothing really about religion. Most of the men have hitherto never felt the want of religion in their lives; they have been either utterly indifferent to it or else have been positively antagonized by the unintelligent way in which it has been presented to them. In either case the crudity of the methods of instruction has made religion appear strangely unreal, the dull tradition of unmeaning conventions from an outgrown past devoid of living interest. And yet what do the padres find in

this apparently religiously indifferent mass of their fellow countrymen? They find everywhere a spirit of cheerful submission to strict discipline, countless deeds of self-sacrifice and unassumed good fellowship, marvellous courage in the constant presence of death in its most sudden and terrible forms, and patient endurance of excruciating tortures from smashed limbs and mangled bodies. The spirit and stuff of genuine religion is here deep down beyond all cavil, and indeed not hidden away, but proclaimed aloud for those spiritually awake in the most convincing of all languages—the potent speech of deeds. One would have imagined that, however great the prior indifference to the conventional forms and institutional rites of religion had been, now at any rate, under the present terrific strain and stress, we should have witnessed a powerful reaction, a very orgy of revivalism. But, strange to say, there is no sign of such superficial emotionalism. What is working is in the depths; it has not yet found expression in words, it is inarticulate even in thought; the symptom of its presence is in noble deeds. Intellectually there may be a certain amount of reasoned scepticism; but on the whole there is not any real antagonism to religion. It is found that the men are willing to listen if the padre knows how to talk straight from the heart about realities in language they can understand; but the mechanical repetition of the ancient formulæ leaves them cold. If there is general agreement on the crying necessity of a drastic reform in secular education, how much more clamant is the need of reformation in the subject-matter of and in our methods of imparting religious instruction! Hitherto any callow curate, patently devoid of all schooling in life's realities, has been allowed to occupy a pulpit and preach platitudes and drone forth ancient shibboleths; any bread-and-butter miss has been deemed competent to 'teach' at Sunday School. Everyone outside Church circles looks on with deserved contempt at so farcical a parody of what should be a wisely conducted initiation into divine mysteries. Yet our ecclesiastical bureaucrats have been hitherto content to slumber away in their stuffy offices, rousing themselves only drowsily to repeat the stereotyped forms of routine work with machine-like precision, while the state-religion of the land has been slowly dying of inanition; and hardly anyone has seemed to care. Out of this dead-alive world our padres at the front have been rudely awakened, and would now rouse the Church at home from the torpor of such senile somnolence. We cannot, however, but think that the call to their clerical brethren is not quite

determined enough ; there is a suggestion of timidity about it, a fear of giving offence, nay a dread of reprisals if the sleepers be suddenly disturbed. But let them not hesitate to keep on shaking with a will. All who are awake in the nation will applaud their action and cry shame upon the sluggards. For it is pride and prejudice, lethargy and stolidity, that thus persist in drowsy watch at the tomb of the dead body of the past. The living Christ of the new age is not there ; He is beginning to arise in the hearts of the men at the front in the great war of liberation that is now being waged on all planes of human activity.

Since this notice was written we are glad to see that the Archbishops of Canterbury and York have in a public document manifested their anxiety about the present state of affairs and their keen solicitude that strong measures should be taken to stop the rot. We would, moreover, make an exception and exclude from the general lethargy the Churchman's Union, whose members, clerical and lay, were wide awake before the war. Hitherto its efforts have been boycotted and cold-shouldered ; now, let us hope, they will receive recognition and the support they deserve.

PER AMICA SILENTIA LUNAE.

By William Butler Yeats. London (Macmillan) ; pp. 95 ; 4s. 6d. net.

IN these musings without method or self-communings in the twilight Mr. Yeats has set forth with skill of word-choice and phrase-craft somewhat of the conclusions to which he feels himself drawn after many years of brooding over the elusive problems of man's psychical nature. He would suggest to others some thoughts that specially haunt him when contemplating the mysteries of the soul in the friendly quiet of that reflected silvery light which half-dispels the darkness, yet does not rob the subject of all charm of glamour and romance. Beneath the veiling of the poet's words we may discern familiar forms of thought and speculation, familiar that is to the scholar of the history of things psychical and to the adventurer upon the mystic way. There is, for instance, the thought of that other self of man, the 'more' he is, yet is not clearly conscious of, the personal otherness he has to integrate before he can be wholly master of himself. Mr. Yeats calls it the anti-self, and tells us that this antithetical self comes openly only to those " who are no longer deceived, whose passion

is reality." If we are for ever seeking out this spiritual complement, it too is seeking us; but when it comes, it comes in strange disguises as in dreams; for "the Daemon comes not as like to like but seeking its own opposite, for man and Daemon feed the hunger in one another's hearts." In the theatre of the soul the action of the drama never stops; it is the ceaseless interplay of its own dual nature, now in tragedy, now in comedy. Conflict precedes reconciliation, and the quarrels of the lovers are but the renewal of their love. If, for instance, as Mr. Yeats has it, the Christ of the Christian mystic may be regarded as the antithetical self of the classical world, this opposition, we may add, veils and reveals a lovers' quarrel destined to heighten the joy of coming to know a deeper reality and more inclusive truth. In every case there is always a larger and deeper self veiled behind the conscious dialectic of our souls; beyond the narrow stretch of our small personal recollections we march with the vast realm of that great memory which is the heritage which passes on from generation to generation, and "whose images show intention and choice." This ancestral memory is a potent influence upon our lives in spite of our lack of knowledge of its nature or indeed of any awareness the majority may have of it. And so it comes about that Mr. Yeats is persuaded that "the dead living in their memories are . . . the source of all that we call instinct, and it is their love and their desire, all unknowing, that make us desire beyond our reason, or in defiance of our interest it may be; and it is the dream martins that, all unknowing, are master-masons to the living martins building about church windows their elaborate nests; and in their turn, the phantoms are stung to a keener delight from a concord between their luminous pure vehicle and our strong senses." This way of musing leads Mr. Yeats to speak of the magic of the imaginal, the psychical world of transformation, the proteus-nature of the individual and of the mundane soul. As to the nature of this metamorphic world whose ever-changing life is clothed in ever-changing forms, he finds, and we think rightly finds, much that is suggestive in Henry More, one of the Cambridge Platonists. Mr. Yeats does not, however, seem to be aware that of the group Cudworth has most to contribute in reviving the tradition of that instructive Alexandrian psychology and philosophy of the psychical which the Platonists of the first five centuries did so much to develop. For them the world-soul is the magical agent *par excellence*. "If" then, says our author, "all our mental images no less than apparitions (and I see no

reason to distinguish) are forms existing in the general vehicle of *Anima Mundi*, and mirrored in our particular vehicle, many crooked things are made straight." This leads him to reflect on the nature of that 'particular vehicle,' man's subtle embodiment, which is within the soul rather than the soul in it, and which only metaphorically can be regarded as a veiling of every grade of tissue from the coarsest spirituous (not spiritual, as Mr. Yeats phrases it, hanging on an old bad habit in translation) or crass animal to the most brilliantly luminous or radiant. It is the grade of texture of this vesture that distinguishes the medium from the mystic. On this Mr. Yeats has an interesting passage, the quotation of which will bring this short notice of his musings on the soul by moonlight to a conclusion. "When we are passive where the vehicle is coarse, we become mediumistic, and the spirits who mould themselves in that coarse vehicle can only rarely and with great difficulty speak their own thoughts and keep their own memory. They are subject to a kind of drunkenness and are stupified, old writers said, as if with honey, and readily mistake our memory for their own, and believe themselves whom and what we please. We bewilder and overmaster them, for once they are among the perceptions of successive objects, our reason, being but an instrument created and sharpened by these objects, is stronger than their intellect, and they can but repeat, with brief glimpses from another state, our knowledge and our words."

ELEMENTS OF CONSTRUCTIVE PHILOSOPHY.

By J. S. Mackenzie, Litt.D., LL.D., Emeritus Professor of Logic and Philosophy in University College, Cardiff. London (Allen and Unwin); pp. 487; 12s. 6d. net.

IN this carefully graded and systematically worked-out exposition, we have the maturest results of Professor Mackenzie's long teaching experience. It forms a companion volume to his prior works on metaphysics, ethics and social philosophy, all of which were in the form of outline, manual or introduction. We have in it a sober and cautious survey that eschews all dogmatism, whether on the positive or the negative side, yet is keenly sensitive to the alluring possibilities which a spiritual philosophy may reasonably be held to reserve for future organised co-operative effort. The ultimate problems of philosophy are notoriously unsolved. No one-sided effort can possibly resolve them. In genuine philosophical work

the way must be left open for the suggestions of poetry and art and the aspirations of religion and, adds Prof. Mackenzie, "perhaps also investigations of a more empirical character" (p. 479), which is presumably his cautious way of referring to psychological and psychical research. In the three main divisions of his treatise he works his way from doubt to belief, from nature to spirit, and from chaos to cosmos. On the idea of a cosmism he bestows much attention; for he believes that "to discover order and to create order" are "the highest functions of humanity" (p. 479). And he takes 'cosmism' to mean "the general doctrine that there is a system of reality, which contains both unity and difference" (p. 350); this is contrasted with 'monism' or, as he prefers to call it, 'singularism' (p. 369), *i.e.* seeking the universal origin in one or other element of a pair, such as spirit or matter. What is specially noticeable in this genial effort is the wideness of interest: the idealistic philosophy of India, for instance, is respectfully considered and the reincarnation theory thoughtfully reviewed; even the 'subtle-body' notion is allowed to have a chance of existence in the domain of philosophical hypotheses. "It may be true," writes our author, ". . . as some have supposed, that conscious life is . . . connected . . . with some subtle mode of existence, which can be detached from the physical organism without serious loss, and can still retain a large part of what is essential to the personality of the individual" (p. 393). Here, as in so many other points, Professor Mackenzie neither affirms nor denies the theory; he states it impartially. This is the safest method of procedure in a work that aims at being an impartial survey and an introduction to more detailed studies. Prof. Mackenzie rightly insists on the enormous importance of 'the co-operative element in the building up of knowledge' (p. 131); he is convinced that philosophy, like all the sciences, is built up by a co-operative process, and his main effort is to give an account which sets forth clearly the working of this process (p. 139). Nevertheless he is naturally at his best when he has the opportunity of following his own idealistic bent, as for instance in his interesting contention that there is ground for believing that "matter cannot be, in any ultimate sense, distinguished from form" (p. 213). This leading notion he elaborates into a striking hypothesis of which he makes frequent use. Its enunciation runs: "Everything is eventually Form; and . . . the particular—the Matter or 'that'—is simply a point at which certain universals or orders meet, or intersect one another" (p. 187). Hence what we

commonly call things may be regarded' as 'meeting points of universals' (p. 235), or better still 'as meeting points of universals in orders' (p. 348), orders such as time, space, causality. And as to the last, the thorny *cruz* of causation, we are glad to read: "When any particular result occurs, it can be connected with other occurrences before and after and simultaneous; but the real cause, in the most significant sense of the word, is not to be found in any of these, but in the method of their connection" (p. 226); hence Professor Mackenzie rightly lays the greatest stress on the organizing principle (p. 227) as the chief element in the causality of biological evolution. There is great danger in supposing that the more highly developed organisms can be expressed in terms of the lower; "the man who knows, so far from being an animal altogether, is not an animal at all, or even in part" (p. 244). As to ends, the reality in man and the reality in the universe is to be sought for in the concept of value. "The attitude of conscious valuation is so essential an aspect of human life, that it is not unfairly regarded as constituting the true nature or self of an individual—especially when his nature is being regarded from the point of view adopted in moral judgments upon character" (p. 300). Hence "it would seem that it is only by means of the idea of value that any ultimate explanation of the order of the universe can be conceived; and this seems to imply that the whole of reality must be regarded as good" (p. 383). From these quotations it will be seen how very cautious Professor Mackenzie is even in statements which clearly indicate an underlying profound conviction on his part. We must confess that we should have liked to have seen him 'let himself go' now and then; perhaps, however, the wise old saw of Hellas 'nothing too much' is the best rule to observe in a survey that may very well serve as a propædæutic for students of philosophy.

THE QUESTION:

'If a Man Die shall he Live Again?' A Brief History and Examination of Modern Spiritualism. By Edward Clodd. With a Postscript by Prof. H. E. Armstrong, F.R.S. London (Grant Richards); pp. 314; 10s. 6d. net.

APPARENTLY Mr. Clodd is fresh to the subject; manifestly he has had no first-hand experience. As far as one can make out, he was started off, not to enquire, but to denounce, by reading Sir Oliver Lodge's recent popular exposition *Raymond or Life after Death*.

Hence this hastily compiled 'Refutation' or rather 'Anathema of All Spiritistic Heresies.' *Raymond* made him very angry indeed, angry and alarmed. With furious outcry he bawls into the sleepy ears of the materialistic Old Guard the belated news: "Our science is in danger!" In these rapidly moving times, when even our mechanistic devices are making us free of the air, few will be found to respond to a call that to twentieth century minds sounds comically like: "Dragon of darkness swallowing the sun of Mid-Victorian enlightenment! All hands to the tea-trays!" But to Mr. Clodd it is no laughing matter; he is deadly, nay murderously, in earnest. Manifestly merciless, patently out to kill on sight, his onslaught may well be left to work its own natural instinctive reaction in the mind of any impartial reader, no matter how ill-instructed he may have previously been in the subject. For there is not the slightest attempt to disguise the animus that pervades it from cover to cover. Mr. Clodd is prosecutor, jury, judge and executioner in one. It is patently the 'hep, hep!' of the heresy-hunter and pogromist out to exterminate "a movement every aspect of which is pernicious—pernicious alike to the prime movers and to the public; one which, at all costs, in support of sanity of human outlook, we should seek to stamp out with every weapon at our command." So runs Prof. Armstrong's naïve declaration in an enthusiastic endorsement of Mr. Clodd's methods and policy. Now we hold no brief to defend modern spiritism at all costs; there is much connected with it that requires, to say the least of it, purgation and amendment. But in the interests of science, not to speak of anything higher, we must protest against employing the primitive methods of Judge Lynch to even the criminals, much more to the law-abiding citizens of the psychical world. It is precisely the intolerance of minds of the type which produces such books that has, more than anything else, brought modern spiritism into existence as a natural reaction. The test-tube science of the Mid-Victorian variety, exasperated by its furious conflict with the stupidities of traditional theology, when it failed to find the soul by its scalpel and microscope method of body exploration, arrogantly decreed its non-existence and consequently the impossibility of its survival. Religion, it sneered, was founded on a lie. The soul-notion was the most noxious of superstitions, and must for ever be banished from the curriculum of enlightenment. Rationalistic empirical science thus succeeded in expelling the soul from its Board Schools, Mechanics' Institutes and Royal Institutions. Driven out of the temples of Matter and

Mechanism she left the priests to their own devices and the consequent vain worship of abstractions in their empty shrines. They would need her some day and need her very badly. For the soul is life, and nature's goddess cannot be done violence to with impunity. The conflict between faith and knowledge has by no means been brought to an end by this high-handed proceeding; on the contrary, it has simply been violently suppressed into the unconscious, and as a consequence made the whole body politic patient of a deep-seated dis-ease. Modern spiritism is a symptom calling attention to the imperative necessity for both science and religion to co-operate in the easement of their common morbid state. This cure requires the exercise of the greatest wisdom and sympathetic consideration on both sides. Does Mr. Clodd's book here help us in any way? We have searched it in vain for any helpful suggestion. Modern spiritism, according to it, is entirely of the devil, as rationalism conceives the devil, and is damned from top to bottom beyond any hope of redemption. It is all deliberate fraud and charlatanry. No scientist who has investigated it and not damned it incontinently is worthy of credence. He is an incompetent observer and a victim of self-deception. In brief, the whole thing is 'nauseating drivel.' Mr. Clodd, who has done useful spade-work in tilling the anthropological field from an historical point of view, thinks that anthropology can throw all the light that is needed on this revival of superstition. For our own part we think on the contrary that a patient investigation of mediumistic and allied phenomena will throw the very light that is so much needed on most of our anthropological problems. In any case, his book brings nothing new for the historian of spiritism the world over and no suggestion of an improved method of examination. Psychical research has known all that he says and much more long ago, and it fancies its method of examination is far more in keeping with the best traditions of science than Mr. Clodd's slap-dash performance; running amok is a pre-scientific procedure, to say the least of it.

(As it is impossible to obtain cover-paper of the same tint as previously, we have been compelled to take the nearest colour procurable.—ED.)

5184F

THE QUEST

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THE QUEST



RELIGION AND REALITY.

Baron FRIEDRICH VON HÜGEL, LL.D.

IN 'Religion and Illusion'¹ we rapidly surveyed the main peculiarities to be found in religion at large throughout human history. These peculiarities were four: Universality, as wide for religion as for man's other deeper peculiarities; Importance, traceable also where man seems without the religious sense; Self-differentiation from the other modes and ranges of human life, in proportion as religion grows deep and delicate; and Superhumanity—the sense of Givenness, Reality, Otherness, Superhumanness, as characterizing the Ultimate Object and deepest Cause of religion. We next noted the chief objections to allowing any specific evidential value to this last peculiarity—the superhuman intimations; we noted the difficulties against the admission that these intimations really take us beyond individual men's idle fancies or egoistic selfishnesses, or, at best, beyond projections, by the human individual, of the deepest, yet purely human, needs and ideals of the human race. The human race itself and

¹ See the April no., pp. 358-382.

the less than human realities around it are taken, by such an objector, as the sole realities of which we men are truly cognizant. And lastly we took the chief articulations of such a purely human, illusionist, explanation of religion, as furnished by Ludwig Feuerbach at his immanentist best, and we attempted, in connection therewith, some preliminary discriminations of the whole question.

In 'Religion and Reality' I now propose to concentrate more fully upon the deepest of the four religious peculiarities—upon the Evidential, Revelational quality of religion, its intimations of Superhuman Reality, and to meet more systematically the chief objections to the trans-human validity of these intimations. But I want first to make plain how much this final exposition intends to cover, and in what way it intends to operate.

The following pages, then, will chiefly consider Revelation, but also, in some measure, Miracle, Creation and Personality,—since these four experiences or concepts are all closely connected with the points in need of elucidation against the Pure Immanentists. But this study excludes any equal consideration of Evil, Suffering, Sin. It excludes these great facts, because they do not directly obstruct, even if they do not directly aid, the question as to the evidential worth of the superhuman intimations. If the answer to the objections against the evidential value of these intimations, and against the reasonableness of the four experiences and concepts closely connected with these intimations, turns out successful, then, and only then, will it be worth while to study these great realities as objections to the Theism for which we have then found good grounds. Evil, Suffering, Sin, can then be taken

as difficulties which are possibly incapable of any complete solution, yet which, even so, would not of themselves abolish the evidential value we have discovered in the superhuman intimations of religion.

It might indeed be contended that Evil, Suffering, Sin—that the awful reality and significance of these things—themselves form a large part of the superhuman intimations of religion. But such a contention is based, I believe, on several confusions of thought. The intimations we here study are of a Superhuman Ultimate Reality; and this ultimate reality, in proportion as religion grows deeply and delicately religious, is apprehended as good, happy and holy. All this doubtless is always apprehended in conjunction, and in contrast with other, different qualities of the apprehending man himself; and these qualities, it may well be urged, are felt to be evil, painful, sinful. Yet the apprehension of the man's qualities by the man himself are, in any case, only the occasion and concomitant of the same man's apprehension of the Superhuman. It may even be questioned whether a man's apprehensions of the human which are in the most close contact and in the most constant contrast with the same man's apprehensions of the Superhuman, are indeed Evil, Suffering, Sin. I believe those closest and most constant concomitants of the superhuman intimations to be, in actual fact, the feelings of Weakness, Instability, Dependence. And these feelings and apprehensions are clearly involved, as concomitant contrasts, in the experiences and concepts of Revelation, Miracle, Creation and Personality, which we deliberately include in our study.

As to the form of the following exposition, it may well seem rather a clearing away of objections than a

direct establishment of positive facts. But this would only be an appearance. For the exposition assumes throughout the actual, indeed the admitted, existence of these intimations, whether illusory or not. The exposition has as little the need, as it would have the power, to construct these intimations; it simply finds them and describes and analyses them as best it can. The argument gets under way only upon the admission that religion, in fact, is always penetrated by these intimations; and the argument reaches port the moment these intimations are allowed really to be what they themselves claim to be. This study has thus to be taken in direct connection with actual life; the two, thus taken together, are free from any indirectness or ingenuity. The claim to trans-human validity continues upon the whole as present, operative, clear, in the religious intimations, as it continues present, operative, clear, in the intimations of the reality of an external world. And as our removal of objections to the reality of an external world necessarily establishes its reality for us—because *there* is the vivid impression, the sense of a trans-human reality all around us, which clamours to be taken as it gives itself, and which was only refused to be thus taken because of those objections; so now our removal of objections to the reality of the Superhuman Reality necessarily establishes its reality for us—since *there*, again, is the vivid impression, the sense of a still deeper, a different, trans-human Reality which penetrates and sustains ourselves and all things, and clamours to be taken as It gives Itself.

I.

We first take, then, the characteristics of the objects apprehended by the religious mind.

1. Here it seems clear that the apparently endless variations which exist simultaneously between one entire religion and another entire religion, and even between single mind and single mind, or which show successively in one and the same religion, and even in one and the same mind, indeed that the crude childishness of much that most individuals and most religions think and represent their religious experience and its Object to be, do not, of themselves, condemn the position that a great trans-subjective superhuman Reality is being thus, variously and ever inadequately, yet none the less actually, apprehended by such groups or persons. The Reality, extant and acting upon and within the world distinct from the human mind, and upon and within those human minds and spirits themselves, can indeed be taken as the determining occasion, object, and cause of man's long search for and continuous re-finding of God; of the gradual growth in depth and in delicacy of man's religious apprehensions; of man finding his full rest and abiding base in the religious experience and certainty alone; and of man simultaneously becoming ever more conscious both of the need of the best, and of the inadequacy of all, human categories and definitions to express this really experienced Reality.

There is nothing intrinsically unreasonable in this, unless we are to become simple sceptics also in ethics and politics, indeed in natural science itself, since, in these cases also, we readily find a closely

similar, bewildering variation, both simultaneous and successive,—we find similar childish beginnings, and similar slow and precarious growth. In natural science the earth and the sun are assuredly really extant, and rocks, plants and animals have been with man since first man appeared on the earth. Yet innumerable crude fancies, each variously contradicting the others, have been firmly believed for ages about these very certain realities; nor are these same realities, even now, free from mysteries greater certainly by far than is all we know with certainty about them. Indeed the reality of the external world in general can be called in question, as certainly as can the reality of the spiritual world and of God; the reality of both these worlds can be argued or willed away, as a mere subjective illusion or projection, by this or that person, or group of persons, for a while. But neither of these worlds can, with strict consistency, ever be thus dissolved by any man; and neither of these worlds will ever, consistently or not, be thus dissolved in permanence by any considerable body of men, for reasons to be given presently. And note that the very closeness and interiority of the chief evidences and experiences of religion render the clear perception and true explication of their content and significance, in certain important respects, indefinitely more difficult than is the analogous attempt with regard to the external world; and that such greater difficulty is characteristic of every advance in depth, richness and reality in the subject-matters of whatsoever we may study. Thus the science of the soul is indefinitely richer in content, but far more difficult, than is the science of shells.

2. But we have also to face the wide-spread

violation, in the earlier religions (even where these are already above nature-worship), of truthfulness, purity, justice, mercy, as these fundamental moral and spiritual qualities and duties are understood in the later religions; and the fact that much of such improvement as occurs (in what, if not the very heart of religion, is surely closely connected with it) appears to proceed, not from religion, but from the growth of civilisation, of the humane spirit, and this largely in keen conflict with the representatives of superhuman religion. These are doubtless grave objections. For if religion be, at bottom, the fullest self-revelation of the Infinite Perfect Spirit in and to man's finite spirit, and if indeed this self-revelation takes place most fully in religion, how can this self-revealing Spirit, just here, and precisely through the belief in the Superhuman, here most operative, instigate, or at all events allow, and thus often render at the least possible, terrible crimes of deception, lust, injustice, cruelty? How can It require the aid of man's non-religious activities against man's religious apprehensions?—Here if we care to remain equitable, we shall have to bear in mind the following.

Man's personality, the instrument of all his fuller and deeper apprehensions, is constituted by the presence and harmonisation of a whole mass of energies and intimations belonging to different levels and values; and not one of these can, in the long run and for mankind at large, be left aside or left unchecked by the others, without grave drawback to that personality. Religion is indeed the deepest of energizings and intimations within man's entirety, but it is not the only one; and though through religion alone God becomes definitely revealed to man as Self-conscious

Spirit, as an Object, as *the* Object, of direct, explicit adoration, yet those other energies and intimations are also willed by God and come from Him, and (in the long run and for mankind at large) are necessary to man's health and balance even in religion itself. So also the æsthetic sense alone conveys the full and direct intimations of the Beautiful; yet it nevertheless requires, for its healthy, balanced functioning, the adequate operation of numerous other energies and intimations, from the senses up to mental processes, in the man who apprehends the Beautiful.

Such an at all adequate and balanced development of any one group of energies and intimations, let alone of the entire personality, is necessarily, except in rare souls or in rare moments of ordinary souls, a difficult and a slow process. It has been so certainly with ethics and humaneness. It has been still more so with religion.

It is important too, throughout all these somewhat parallel growths, especially those of ethics and religion, always to compare the conviction, command, or practice of one time, race or country, not with those of much later times or of quite other races or communities, but with the, closely or distantly, preceding habits of one and the same race and community. Thus in ethics, polygamy should be compared, not with monogamy, but with polyandry; and polyandry again with promiscuous intercourse. And in religion the imprecatory Psalms and the divine order to exterminate the Canaanites should be compared, not with the Sermon on the Mount, but with purely private *vendetta*. We thus discover that, in many cases which now shock us, the belief that God had spoken was attached to genuine, however slight, moves or to confirmations of

moves in the right direction ; and in all such cases the belief was, so far, certainly well-founded.

Doubtless more or less self-delusion must at all times have occurred, and must be still occurring, both in individuals and even in the larger groups ; and doubtless, had religion never existed, certain special kinds of self-delusion would not have operated amongst men. Yet man cannot, without grave damage, do without religion ; for he cannot, in the long run, formally deny all Reality to a Subject in which man's highest inevitable ideals can find a persistent home and be harmoniously alive ; nor can he attain to the vivid apprehension and steady affirmation of such a Reality except by religion. Ethics, philosophy, science, all the other special strivings of man, have indeed the right and the duty persistently to contribute their share—a share indispensable (in the long run and in various, largely indirect, ways) in awakening, widening, sweetening man's imagination, mind, emotions, will ; and thus to aid him also in his preparation for, and in his interpretation of, the visitations of God's Spirit. But (again in the long run and in various, often strangely unexpected, yet terribly efficacious ways) these various activities, though not directly religious, will themselves suffer inevitably, if men *will* go further,—if they will deny all reality to the persistent object of all living religion. Our gratitude most rightly goes out to those men who, from whatsoever quarter, have helped to awaken, widen, sweeten man in general, and in ethical, philosophical, scientific directions in particular, even though those men may have had but little specific religion, indeed even if, often more sinned against than sinning, they have vehemently combated the only form of specific, hence superhuman, religion which they

knew. But a gratitude no less sincere is due to those men also who indeed failed to understand the worth, and who opposed the growth, of such other activities, yet who preserved the sense of the specific character of religion,—that it deals primarily, not with ideas, but with realities; that a certain superhumanness is of the very essence of all full religion.

3. The points where the affirmations seemingly essential to all superhuman religion appear to be hopelessly contradicted by philosophy or science have been taken by us as four: the experiences of Revelation and of Miracle, and the conceptions of Creation and of Personality. The first two will be considered presently in connection with the philosophical problems.

As to Creation, it is plain that no sheer beginnings, however much we may attempt to conceive them in terms and images of the latest natural science, are picturable, or clearly thinkable, by us at all. Yet assuredly all the finite life, even all the ordering of matter, such as is directly known to us in our visible universe, are known to us only with marks of having had a beginning. Natural science cannot indeed start otherwise than with already extant diffused matter, and cannot but tend to speak as though this matter, by its purely immanental forces, groups itself into such and such combinations, and proceeds to ever more complex and interior results. Yet that 'already extant,' that presupposition demanded for the purposes of science, and so as to secure to science a situation in which it begins to have a subject-matter at all—surely exhausts all that such science requires, and all that it can confidently teach us, concerning the eternity or non-eternity of matter. Again, the successive advents of vegetable, animal, human life upon our planet

introduce differences delicately, powerfully different in kind, especially when any one of these lives is compared with inorganic matter, yet also when any one such life is compared with any other of these several lives. And finally, the adaptations, in these several organisms, of their life to its environment (even if simply caused, at the observational level of natural science, by survival of the fittest amongst a mass of variations) always presupposes the original presence and the persistent repetition of variations deserving to be thus selected. We thus, still, get in natural science, if not a clear and complete proof of an Eternal Wisdom creating and ever sustaining all things, yet many a fact and problem which indicate how largely modal, where at all certain, is Evolution. Evolution in reality still gives us, at most and at best, not the ultimate *why* but the intermediate *how*; whilst the points of central religious importance here appear to be, not so much the non-eternity, as the createdness, of all finite realities.

Thus S. Thomas can teach us that the eternity of the material universe would not be incompatible with its creation, and that only creation is intrinsically essential to Theism; although the Jewish-Christian Revelation has now taught us that, as a matter of fact, the universe is not only a creature but a non-eternal one. And indeed it appears certain that what religion here centrally cares for is "the mysterious and permanent relation between the moving changes we know in part, and the Power (after the fashion of that operation, unknown) which is 'Itself unmoved all motion's source.'"¹

As to the Personal God, it has now become a

¹ Rev. P. N. Waggett, in *Darwinism and Modern Science* (1909), p. 490.

prevalent fashion angrily to proclaim, or complacently to assume, the utter absurdity of anything Personal about the Infinite; since personality, of every degree and kind, essentially implies, indeed largely consists of, limitations of various kinds, and is a gross anthropomorphism the moment we apply it to anything but man himself. Yet it is interesting to note the readiness with which these same thinkers will hypostatize parts, or special functions, of our human personality, and will indeed do so especially with concepts which we know to be specially characteristic of spatially extended bodies. Thus Thought or Love, or Law, or even Substance, nothing of all this is, for such thinkers, anthropomorphic or sub-human; but anything personal is rank anthropomorphism. Yet it is only self-conscious spirit that we know well, since it alone do we know from within. Self-conscious spirit is immensely rich in content; and self-conscious spirit is by far the widest and yet deepest reality known to us at all. True, natural science and even philosophy do not, of themselves, fully find the Personal God, since natural science, is not, as such, busy with the like ultimate questions, and since philosophy (as we shall show presently) appears, of itself, to bring us indeed to certain more than human orders or laws, but hardly fully to the Orderer. But there is nothing intrinsically unreasonable in thinking of the ultimate Cause, Ground and End of the world as certainly not less than, as somehow not all unlike, what we know our own self-conscious mind, feeling and will to be, provided we keep the sense that God is certainly not just one Object amongst other objects, or even simply one Subject amongst other subjects; and that, though variously present and operative in all subjects and objects, He is

not only more perfect than, but distinct and different from, them all. In so thinking we find in, or we attribute to, the supreme Reality what we ourselves possess that is richest in content, that is best known to us, and that is most perfect within our own little yet real experience—we have done what we could; and life and history abound with warnings how easy it is here to go apparently further and to fare in fact very much worse.

Indeed we can safely hold with Lotze, not only that Personality is compatible with Infinitude, but that the personality of all finite beings can be shown to be imperfect precisely because of their finitude, and hence that "Perfect Personality is compatible only with the conception of an Infinite Being; finite beings can only achieve an approximation to it."¹

II.

The general philosophical difficulties appear to be met by the following facts and observations.

1. Man's actual experiences, the *data* with which he starts, are never (as a certain current in modern philosophy might easily lead us to believe) simply impressions which are felt by man at the time of his receiving them as purely subjective, or which are conclusively shown to be merely subjective by philosophical analysis, or which in reason man ought to assume to be merely subjective unless a strict demonstration of their trans-subjectivity be forthcoming. The *data* of man's actual experience, on the contrary, are subject *and* object, each giving to and taking from the other; the two, and not the one only, are (somehow and to some co-relative extent) included within the single

¹ *Grundzüge der Religionsphilosophie* (ed. 1884), pp. 45, 46.

human consciousness. And since only an outlook so purely *solipsistic* as to be destructive of the assumptions necessary to any and all coherent reasoning can, in the long run, deny the reality of something, indeed also of some mind or minds, other than, and distinct from, our own minds; and since these our minds are doubtless surrounded by and related to such other various realities: the rational presumption is that the spontaneous and universal testimony of these our minds (after deduction of such points or forms as can be clearly shown to be simply subjective) is truly indicative of the several trans-subjective realities which these experiences so obstinately proclaim. Kant's interestingly unconscious self-contradiction here,—that we can know nothing whatever about trans-subjective reality, yet that we know for certain it is in no sense like what even our deepest and most closely criticized experiences indicate it to be—can doubtless not be maintained as reasonable by any mind once vividly aware of the inconsistency. We shall have, on the contrary, to say that, by the very nature of things, we cannot indeed get clean out of our mind, so as to compare things as they are outside it with the same things as we experience them within it; yet that we have every solid reason for, and no cogent reason against, holding that the objects most persistently apprehended by our deeper experience as trans-subjectively real, and whose acceptance by us as thus real brings light, order and fruitfulness, in the most unexpected ways and into the most remote places of our life and work, are indeed trans-subjectively real and are, in themselves, not all unlike to, not disconnected with, what we thus apprehend them to be.

We doubtless know nothing completely, nothing adequately, not even ourselves; we know nothing directly from within that thing except ourselves. Yet we do not know only ourselves, or other things only through reasoning them out from this our self-knowledge. But, in the endless contacts, friendly, hostile, of give, of take, between ourselves and the objects of all kinds which act upon us, and upon which we act in some degree or way, we do not obtain, of ourselves a real knowledge, and of the other things a merely subjective impression as to their mere appearance; but such contacts always simultaneously convey some real experience, some real knowledge, both of ourselves and of the objects thus experienced, and indeed of each precisely on occasion, and because, of the other.

But can I thus experience and know God? The question is, in the first instance, *not whether I can, but whether I do*. It is true that, outside the specifically religious life and apprehension, there is no vivid experience of God as a Distinct Reality, as the Supreme Subject, as Self-Conscious Spirit. Nor, even in the religious life, is God so apprehended except on occasion of and in contrast to other, different, lesser realities. Yet even outside such specifically religious experiences, in all the larger human apprehensions and endeavours, wheresoever they become entirely serious and fully conscious of their own essential presuppositions and necessary ideals, there is found to exist, ineradicably, the sense of a More-than-merely-subjective, whether individually or even generally human, without which those larger apprehensions and endeavours would lose all ultimate worth and justification.

This More-than-merely-subjective was admirably brought out, as regards ethics, by Fichte in 1800. "Let

us suppose you go and sow seed in a field : so much as this may be reckoned as your own act alone. But you no doubt sow, not simply to sow, but that your seed may germinate and may bear fruit. The latter, the future harvest—however much your sowing may be a necessary condition for it—is no more your action, but the aim of your action. We have here two things, and not one.” “Now in all your actions which show visibly in the world of sense, you always reckon in this way upon *two* things:—upon a first thing, which is solely produced by yourself, and upon a second thing, which exists and which acts entirely independently of yourself, and is simply *known* to you,—an eternal Order of Nature.” And thus too in ethics. “If a man here calls the law by which a special consequence necessarily follows from any particular determination of his will, an *Order*, and (in contradistinction from the Order of Nature), a Moral or Intelligible Order, whence a Moral or Intelligible Coherence, or System, or World, would arise ; such a man would not, by this procedure, be placing the Moral Order within the finite moral beings themselves, but outside of [distinct from] them ; he would thus assume something in addition to these beings.” “Now here is, according to me, the *place* of religious faith,—here, in this necessary thinking and demanding of an Intelligible Order, Law, Arrangement, or whatever else you may care to call it, by which all genuine morality, the interior purity of the heart, has necessary consequences.”¹ But the late Professor Windelband, in his *Praeludien* (1903 and since), and Professor Eucken, in his *Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion* (1904 and since), have very beautifully traced out precisely similar necessitations in the theory of

¹ *Sämmtliche Werke*, vol. v., pp. 388, 389, 392, 394.

knowledge and in logic, and again in æsthetics, where the worlds of the trans-subjectively True and the trans-subjectively Beautiful are as truly necessary presuppositions as is a world of the trans-subjectively Good a necessary presupposition in ethics. And the late Professor Siegwart and Professor Volkelt have most thoroughly laid bare the ever-present working of this trans-subjective intimation and faith in logic and the theory of knowledge.

Now even with these three more-than-simply-subjective worlds we have not, it is true, yet reached the Self-conscious Spirit experienced by religion. But we have thus established important points. Man's general, human experience (wheresoever it is sufficiently wide, deep and earnest, sufficiently trustful of whatever may turn out to be its necessary pre-requisites, and sufficiently pressed and analysed) reveals intimations and orders of more than merely human origin, truth and range. Man's general, human experience reveals this trans-subjective, superhuman world in at least three specific forms, on three different sides of his experience. And whether or not there be still another legitimate form and side of human experience, a fourth revelation of the trans-subjective, superhuman world which can bring further light and support to those three, it is certain that, having got as far as those three revelations, it is exceedingly difficult for men at large to retain a vivid faith in those three worlds, and yet deliberately to reject the revelation of Self-conscious Spirit offered to them by religion. True, the same Fichte, continuously so sure of the reality and more than human character of the Moral World, tells us, in 1798 and 1800, that "this faith is faith full and entire. That living and active Moral Order is

itself God; we do not require and we cannot apprehend any other. There is no ground in reason for going beyond such a Moral Cosmic Order, and, by means of a conclusion from the effect to the cause, to assume, in addition, a Particular Being as this cause."¹ But then we are left thus at the surely strange, highly abstract, more or less mythical, conception of 'an active Ordering.'² We are thus given an Order which is not a mere *Orderedness*, in which case God and world would be one, and there would be no God; but an Order which is an *active Ordering*, which is, in so far, distinct from the world it orders; and yet an Ordering which neither is, nor implies, an *Orderer*. But it is surely entirely doubtful (even apart from what the complete, hence also especially the religious, experience of mankind may convey and require) whether such a strange *intermezzo* of a conception is, in the long run, possible for the human mind. For we have here an active Ordering of a gigantic conflict and confusion, according to abiding, more than human, standards of Truth, Beauty and Goodness, standards not made by, yet recognisable by, the human spirit; and nevertheless this Ordering and these standards are not to be the effects of Self-conscious Spirit, and are not to be apprehended by such a Spirit.

Insistence upon this *intermezzo*, as the ultimate analysis of man's entire legitimate experience, becomes indeed something doctrinaire and contradicts the general method and temper which have led the mind to the point attained, if we *will* maintain it even after we have been brought face to face with the massive, varied, persistent witness of the religious sense and life. For only if we show how and why the

¹ *Sämmtliche Werke*, vol. v., p. 186.

² *Ibid.*, p. 382.

logical, the æsthetic and the ethical life can alone be trusted and not the religious life also, where it supplies what those three lives all severally seek, can we consistently accept the deep-lying testimony of the logical, æsthetic and ethical lives, and refuse or explain away the central witness of the religious life. Fichte indeed bids us "cease to listen to the demands of an empty system," and to beware lest, by our hypothesis of a Personal God, we make the first of all objective cognitions, the most certain of all certainties, to depend upon "ingenious pleadings (*Klügelei*)."¹ Yet the now immensely abundant testimony of religion lies before us as a warning that Fichte here confounded philosophical thinking and the general idea of religiousness with the specifically religious experiences themselves. Theological deductions and speculations have indeed at times articulated or analysed, in 'ingenious' ways, the deepest and most delicate experiences of living religion. Yet these experiences themselves always present their object as overflowingly existent; and, in proportion as spirituality becomes more conscious of its own requirements and more sensitively discriminating, this object is apprehended as perfect Self-conscious Spirit, as very Source of all existence and reality. We can indeed argue against religion as mistaken in so doing; but that religion actually does so, and this, not in the form of deductive reasoning, but in that of intuitive experience, cannot seriously be denied.

And this religious experience is, in fact, interwoven, from first to last, with the sense of Revelation and the sense of Miracle.

2. As to Revelation, it is remarkable that men's

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 180.

latter-day pre-occupation with the apparent imperfections in the *content* of the various religions has frequently blinded them to the excellence of the *form*, the vehicle of all religion. For the characteristic form of all religion is Revelation; and the various activities and achievements of human life, wheresoever these are sufficiently deep to awaken and to hold the entire man and to lead him to some certitude, all possess, in various degrees and ways, something *revelational* about them.¹

It is true, of course, that the *naïf* Realism or Objectivism of classical and mediæval times (so little conscious, upon the whole, of the always present, and often large, contribution furnished by the apprehending human subject to this subject's apprehensions of the object) led, by the excess of every reaction, to a sometimes equally one-sided Idealism or Subjectivism, in which the entire outer and inner world becomes the sheer projection, or at least the purely subjective elaboration, by mankind, into orders of beauty, truth and goodness, of what is intrinsically (or what at least is found by us analytically to be) a sheer *caput mortuum*—just so much dead matter or wild flux and chaotic impulses. Yet it is equally true that the newer sciences of biology, sociology and history are now fast bringing us to a third stage where truth and life will more and more evidently be found to consist in the fullest and most manifold interaction between subject and object—and this in increasing degrees, according to the increase in the importance of the subject-matter experienced or studied. And everywhere in these newer sciences there is a sense of how much there is to *get*, how rich and self-communicative is all reality,

¹ See Mr. Clement G. F. Webb's excellent exposition in *Problems in the Relations between God and Man* (1911), pp. 28ff.

to those who are sufficiently detached from their own petty subjectivisms. A keen yet reverent study of the *Given* appears here,—by a Darwin, be it of but the earth-worm, and by a Wilken, be it of but the scribblings on ancient potsherds. And then the greater *Givennesses* are found in those vast Intelligible Orders, which persistently show themselves anew, wheresoever human experience is sufficiently pressed, and which so entranced the great minds of a Kant and of a Fichte. In all these cases we have an absorption of the subject in the object, and a response—an assuredly gradual, ever only partial, yet a very real, self-revelation—of the object to the subject. And in the cases of the Intelligible Orders we have already something more or less religious. Indeed the sense of *Givenness*, of *Prevenience*, of a *Grace*, of something Transcendent having in part become Immanent to our human world as a fact within this factual world, and of this fact as alone rendering even possible that sense of *Givenness*—all these experiences are already present in the apprehension and affirmation of those Intelligible Orders as truly extant. And yet it is only the specifically religious experience which gives us Revelation at its fullest, not only as to Revelation's content but also as to Revelation's form. For religion alone brings the vivid revelation of Spirit other than man's—a Spirit so perfect and so richly real as Itself to be the ultimate, overflowingly self-conscious cause of man's very capacity for apprehending It. Nevertheless, such a Self-manifestation of Perfect Spirit, once found and accepted, gives a base, a setting and a crown to all those other self-manifestations of the lesser realities—a base, a setting and a crown which their graduated series, taken as a whole, so greatly requires and which indeed it

dimly and semiconsciously prepares yet cannot itself effectuate. And this same Self-manifestation of Spirit and the human spirit's response to It, render superfluous all attempts, always necessarily hopeless, to construct God *à priori*, or even to demonstrate Him from the facts of nature and of human life by any single, deductive argument of a strictly constraining force. Because Spirit, God, works in our midst and in our depths, we can and we do know Him; because God has been the first to condescend to us and to love us, can we arise and love Him in return. "Do you wake?" asks St. Bernard. "Well, He too is awake. If you arise in the night time, if you anticipate to your utmost your earliest awaking, you will already find Him waking—you will never anticipate His own awakeness. In such an intercourse you will always be rash if you attribute any priority, any predominant share to yourself; for He loves both more than you love, and before you love at all."¹ The prevenience of God becomes thus the crown and final guarantee of all the other, minor preveniences which variously bring us the materials and occasions for our other kinds of knowledge and conviction—from the crystal and the plant on to the animal and man.

3. The experience of Miracle, when discriminated in the higher religions and by maturely spiritual souls, appears to be composed, in its essence, of three, yet only of three, vivid, interdependent apprehensions. There is the vivid apprehension of something *unique* being experienced or produced, *hic et nunc*, in this particular experiencing soul. There is the vivid apprehension that this unique experience comes from the One Divine *Spirit* to this particular human spirit.

¹ *Sermons on the Canticle of Canticles*, lxix. 8.

And there is the vivid apprehension that this effect of Spirit upon spirit is not restricted to the human spirit alone, but that it always can affect, and in any particular instance is actually affecting, in more or less striking, most real ways, the very *body* and its psychical, indeed even its physical conditions and environment, and the visible exterior conditions and history of mankind. All our previous considerations have prepared us thus to conceive Reality as, in proportion to its depth, an ever nearer and nearer approach to the Concrete Universal, to the unique embodiment of a universally valuable type; to discover, in this tendency, throughout the successive stages of realities, to ever increasing typical uniqueness, the increasingly large operation of the actually extant Concrete Universal, God; and to recognize, as we retrace these stages, that neither does God's Spirit live all aloof from man's spirit, nor does man's spirit live all aloof from man's body or from this physical body's physical environment. On the contrary, throughout reality, the greater works in and with and through the lesser, affecting and transforming this lesser in various striking degrees and ways. To at least this degree in these ways does Miracle, and the belief in Miracle, thoroughly belong to the permanent experience of mankind, and to the adequate analysis of this experience. Grave difficulties arise only when these three central experiences are interpreted as meaning that the spiritual or psychical or physical effects of Miracle constitute direct breaches within (as it were) the phenomenal rind and level of natural reality—breaches which can be strictly demonstrated to be such by natural science itself. This opinion, if pressed, requires of natural science (whose subject-matter is essentially limited to that level and that constituent

of reality or appearance where strict continuity or repetitive law can be found or applied) to discover its object in what suspends or contradicts these characteristics, and hence is outside its special range and cognizance. Wherever such suspension or contradiction could be discovered, science would have nothing to work upon, and could only wait till it again came to something more or less continuous or repetitive.

III.

It is doubtless the practical difficulties which, more largely than all the other objections put together, explain the *doctrinaire* aloofness or the angry set-purpose to be found extant and operative, more or less in all times and places, against religion, as soon as religion appears in its full specific and articulate form—*i.e.* as a superhuman conviction and claim. For as men look back into the past, or even carry the effects of the past within their very blood, they perceive or feel that, if not religion in its roots, yet at least the various theologies and the various sects and churches have, in all sorts of times and places, ways and degrees, protected and perpetuated, or occasioned and increased, impoverishments, divisions, oppressions, obvious or obscure, yet very real, within men's inner lives, or as between man and man, or between one group of men and other groups. And in all such cases the sanction or stimulus to such grave inhibitions or complications appears to have sprung precisely from the supposed superhuman character of some revelation, command or institution. Such a work as Andrew White's *History of the Warfare of Science and Theology* (1903) shows, in full detail, how largely the science, philosophy, medicine, politics, life generally,

which we all practise or profit by, have been established at the price of conflict, more or less costly, with such superhuman claims. Hence we are bound to show how and why those blights or deadlocks were not produced by the superhuman claims as such, and indeed how and why a superhuman conviction, rightly understood and wisely practised, remains our sole ultimate guarantee against fanaticism on the one hand and scepticism on the other.

1. It is plain, for one thing, that this whole practical question is greatly complicated by the fact that, even more than the other circles of the higher human endeavours,—science, art, ethics,—religion always brings with it, that religion indeed requires as a home and a means for its richest and yet healthiest development, and for its relatively easy transmission, such things as association, organisation, institutions. Religious institutions indeed habitually insist upon two most precious principles and practices which the other, non-religious, circles do not and cannot thus vividly apprehend and directly inculcate; yet these same institutions also tend to enforce these principles and practices by means which are accountable for certainly the greater amount of the bitterness felt by so many serious, clean-lived men against those very principles and practices themselves.

Such institutions, then, most rightly maintain the superhuman claim as essential to religion; they emphasize religion as essentially Revelation, as man's deepest experience of the ultimate Reality through the action of that Reality Itself,—a Reality which both underlies and crowns all our other, lesser strivings and *givennesses*. And such institutions, again, most rightly emphasize the great difference in amount, purity and

worth of the spiritual truth and life to be found even within the sincerest and most entirely positive convictions and practices of the several religions of mankind.¹ Here we have two immense services rendered by the higher religious institutions to the abiding truths, to the ultimate basis of man's worth; services absolutely without serious parallel, as to their depth and range, in any other quarter.

Yet that superhuman, revelational religion has, in the rough and tumble of life, and by and for the average institutionalist, been too often conceived as though arising *in vacuo*, and hence as though able, even in the long run, to dispense with, or to starve, the other activities and necessities of man; or, again, as though not only religion but theology were a divine communication—as though God Himself communicated intrinsically adequate, mathematically precise formulations of religion. And thus we get a dangerous starving of all that is not directly religious in man or a dangerous arrest of theological improvement; and, through this, the weakening, in the long run, also of religion itself or an awakening, in most dangerous revolt, of the benumbed parts of man's complex nature. We get an insistence upon a direct and decisive jurisdiction, by a deductive theology and institutional administration, over the results of (indeed over the very methods and necessities specific to) man's other activities and apprehensions, in science and æsthetics, in historical research, politics and ethics, and in philosophy. And in proportion as this is actually effected, religion becomes bereft of the material, the friction, the witnesses so essential to the health and fruitfulness of

¹ See, as to this second point, the admirable discriminations of J. N. Farquhar in *The Crown of Hinduism* (1915), pp. 26-83.

man in general and of religion in particular. The material is lost; for man's full other experiences, which, pressed, yield so firm a foundation for specific religion, are here prevented from being thus full and from being thus pressed. The friction between Religion and Ethics, and between Theology and Science and Philosophy, so necessary to bring out the fullest powers of each and the deep underlying mutual need which each, in the living man, has of all the others, is eliminated; since all these several activities, except that of the official Theology, have, previous to all possibility of wholesome clashing, been carefully deprived of all their specific weapons of attack and of defence. And the witnesses for religion disappear; for what is a witness who has, by forcible suppressions or modifications of his testimony, been rendered 'safe' beforehand?

And again, as to all the religions of mankind other than their own, such great institutions tend, in their average representatives and disciples, to speak and act as though it were indifferentism ever to discover *some* religious truth and life as present in such other religions, in however various degrees and ways. The whole conception of varyingly intense and varyingly precious feelings after God; of stages of growth and of light; of more or less error and corruption mixed with more or less of truth and of health; of the test and measure of such truth and health lying indeed within the deepest practice and the fundamental convictions of the most richly and most specifically religious of the great religious bodies—with these as most fully explicating whilst exceeding the previous illuminations and gropings of man's soul: such a conception is clearly difficult to every fully organised religious institution.

2. The all-important facts here are, however, that no orthodoxy explicitly denies such a general position; and that no orthodoxy achieves its own deepest function except it explicitly admits and genially practises this its very genuine implication. And is it really so difficult, precisely for men so rightly concentrated upon the reality of God and of His operativeness throughout the world at large, and especially throughout the world of souls, to find thus His traces, though doubtless in very different degrees of clearness and of worth, even where their possessors are not awake to their source, or even where they turn angrily against the bearers of a fuller message? Unless the whole Christian Church is wrong in insisting upon the Old Testament as the Word of God, unless St. Paul was wrong in preaching God to the heathen Athenians as 'Him Whom they had ignorantly worshipped,' and unless our Lord Himself was wrong in coming, 'not to be ministered to, but to minister,' some such attitude cannot but be the right one, however difficult to our poor human passions it may persistently remain.

Assuredly, even amongst the rigorist Primitive Christians and amongst harsh Mediæval Churchmen, such mild and comprehensive convictions and characters have as certainly occurred as the fierce feelings and persecuting proceedings of others amongst their contemporaries. And it would clearly be utterly *à priori* and arbitrary to construe those convictions and characters as springing from, or as leading to, indifference. The Church Father Lactantius and the Popes St. Gregory the Great and Alexander II. were no less certain of, and no less zealous for, superhuman religion—for the supreme truth of Christianity and of Catholicism, than were the Church Father St. Augustine

or the Popes St. Pius V. and Paul IV. But the former combined, with this their all-pervading and all-crowning faith, a keen sense for the natural virtues, as the inviolable pre-requisites, concomitants and consequences of the supernatural life; for the elements of truth and goodness present in all men and in all religions; for the essentially free character of the act and habit of faith; and for the irreplaceable persuasiveness of love; whereas the latter were all but exclusively engrossed in the specifically religious virtues, in the completest religion, in this religion's scholastic and juridical formulation, and in the influence and utility of pressure, fear, commands, obedience. But both groups, in their several ways, are equally discriminative, equally zealous, equally superhuman.

3. The dispositions and acts of the mild and comprehensive group appear now to be as true and as wise as ever, and to require no more than certain further discriminations. We religious men will have to develop, *as part of our religion*, the ceaseless sense of its requiring the *nidus*, materials, stimulant, discipline, of the other God-given, non-religious activities, duties, ideals of man, from his physical and psychical necessities up to his æsthetic, political and philosophical aspirations. The autonomy, competition, and criticism of the other centres of life will have thus to become welcome to religion for the sake of religion itself. We religious men again will have to develop, *as part of our religion*, a sense, not simply of the error and evil, but also of the truth and the good, in any and every man's religion. We will have to realise, with Cardinal John de Lugo, S.J. (who died in 1660), that the members of the various Christian sects, of the Jewish and Mohammedan communions, and of the

ethnic philosophies, who achieve their salvation, did and do so in general simply by God's grace aiding their good faith instinctively to concentrate itself upon, and to practise, those elements in the cultus and teaching of their respective sect, communion or philosophy, which are true and good and originally revealed by God.¹ And, finally, we religious men, especially we Catholic Christians, will indeed never drop the noble truth and ideal of a universal unity of cultus and belief, of one single world-wide Church, but we will conceive this our deathless faith in religious unity as being solidly realizable only if we are able and glad to recognize the rudimentary, relative, paedagogic truth and worth in religions other than our own,—a worth which, as regards at least Judaism and Hellenism, the Roman Church has never ceased to practise and to proclaim.

To conclude.

We have found reason to hold that all actually lived religion is, in proportion to the depth and delicacy of its spirituality, always simultaneously conscious of two closely interconnected things: *the more than human reality of the Object of its experience*, which Object indeed Itself reveals Itself in, and makes real, this experience, *AND the abiding difference between even this its present experience and the great Reality thus experienced and revealed.* And, in this twin consciousness, living religion is like every other truly live apprehension. No true scientist, artist, philosopher, no moral striver, but finds himself, at his best and deepest moments, with the double sense that some abiding, trans-subjective, other-than-human or even more-than-human reality, or force, or law, is manifest-

¹ *De Fide*, Disputatio xix., nos. 7, 10; xx., nos. 107, 194.

ing itself in his experiences; and yet that these very experiences, and still more his reasoned abstracts of them, give but a very incomplete, ever imperfect, conception of those trans-subjective realities.

And now let us suppose that all such conviction of a real contact with Superhuman Reality were to be lost by humanity at large; and that neither general life, in its deepest necessities, nor the historical religions, in their special answers, would any longer be admitted as witnesses to anything but just so much sheer projection of merely human, although racial, fancies. Thus, the spiritual deeps, beckoning us on to their ever further, never exhaustible, exploration, and the spiritual atmosphere, in and through which mankind has ever, with varying degrees of consciousness as to this medium, perceived things finite, would go. And in lieu of mysterious reality, to be ever more closely pressed and more deeply penetrated, we should be environed by an importunate mystification which, surely, men would attempt to eliminate at any and every cost. Such men, bereft of all atmosphere, such 'men of the moon,' would, of necessity, end by being sure that they knew all there is to know, or, at least, that they or their fellow-men could thus know all there is to know: hence they would represent the very acme of intolerance. For, in truth, abstractions of his own mind and projections of his own wishes, if and where taken by man to be in very deed no more than himself, and to correspond to nothing outside of or higher than himself, will, in the long run, be incapable of satisfying man; and hence they will be unable to check his passions, good or evil. The fanaticism which in man, as long as he is man, will always lurk within the folds of his emotions, and

which in religious men springs, not from their superhuman belief as such, but from their ignorance or misunderstanding of certain pre-requisites and conditions essential to the healthy and fruitful working of superhuman religion (that gift and act and habit, so free and yet so firm, within poor yet rich, complex, many-levelled man)—will, in such a supposed attempt at a purely immanent life, no doubt at first (if it have no other man's supernatural belief to tilt against) roam about loose and restless. But fanaticism, in such a case, would soon attach itself to some sheer secularism—to what such a pure immanentist would at first admit to be merely such; it would next attempt solemnly to proclaim and to believe such a secularism to be somehow great or even unique, and to enforce it as such; and then, unless simple assent to the trans-subjective intimations returned, even this kind and degree of conviction and fanaticism would be succeeded by a scepticism, more sincere but more destructive than even this secularism itself.

Are cultivated West Europeans really coming, for good and all, to such a condition of alternating or of simultaneous irreligious fanaticism and utter scepticism? Surely, no. For if religious faith and hope and love are free gifts of God and free virtues of man, and if they are, in some respects, specially difficult for such Europeans, yet the present keenness of irritation, amongst so many of these men, against the very terms of Transcendence and the Superhuman, is demonstrably, in great part, a quite understandable reaction against still widely prevalent ways of conceiving and of applying (*i.e.* of enforcing) the Superhuman and Religion. The presence and pressure of the motives for General Religion, and the answering evidences and

aids of Specific, Characteristic Religion (as these latter culminate, for us Europeans, in the Jewish-Christian Revelation and Spiritual Society) remain, on and on, too strongly rooted in the very nature and necessities of the spiritual world which environs and penetrates us all, for them not, more or less continuously, to keep or to raise us above such irritation and reaction against the Supernatural as such. And once a man is thus free from a specially dangerous, because inverted and hence unnoticed, dependence upon the faults and excesses of others, he will be able to find, to love and to practise (by means of and within the great historical institutions) deep superhuman religion, and this without repelling other souls, where these are sincere and serious in their own degree and kind.

Some years ago alarm grew rife concerning the safety of Winchester Cathedral, and expert divers, in full diving dress, plunged down through the springs to the swamps and sands—the foundations so daringly accepted by the builders of the majestic edifice from the first. The divers found the great oaken beams, as laid by those first builders upon those shifting natural foundations, still, for the most part, serviceably sound. Yet some of these beams required replacing; and the guardian architects decided to replace them all by great concrete piers. We too, in this study, have been probing foundations—those of religion. But here we have found the foundations to consist of rock—two interdependent, interclamped rock-masses: the general, dim and dumb religiosity—the sense and need of the Abiding and Eternal; and the concrete, precise and personal religion—the clear answer to that confused asking, and, with it, the now keen articulation of that dim demand. And both that general dull sense and

this special definite presentment were found by us in actual life,—found by us there as givennesses of an evidential, revelational, an other-than-human, a more-than-human quality. Yet here also, in our own subject-matter, as there in the case of the Cathedral, some renovation or re-arrangement of the structure reared more or less directly upon the actual foundations appeared to be demanded. Nevertheless in this, the religious case, the desirable repairs turned out to consist essentially, not in preventing shifting, swampy foundations from spreading their sapping influence upwards, but, on the contrary, in eliminating, from the various stages of builders' work reared upon the sound and solid rock-foundations, whatsoever may impede those stages from full penetration by this soundness and solidity. And we found the dispositions necessary for the unhampered spreading throughout the whole of life of the soundness resident in the deepest roots—in superhuman religion, to be three: the soberly autonomous development of the several non-religious faculties and of the non-religious associations of man; the ready recognition, by any one religion, of elements of worth variously present in the other religions, and the careful avoidance of all attempts at forced conformity; and a careful respect for the methods intrinsic to history and philosophy, even where these analyse or theorise the documents and experiences of religion itself. Thus will all men of good faith be laid open to the appeal, so full of aid to the best that is in them, of Superhuman Religion in its profound life and reality.

FRIEDRICH VON HÜGEL.

THE EVOLUTION OF MIND AND MORALITY.

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THE subject matter to be dealt with is so vast in its scope and involves such wealth of detail that it is possible in this short paper to trace the development of mind only in very broad outlines.¹

Let me first make it clear what is meant by Mind. We may, I think, define mind as the permanent unity of which any state of consciousness is the temporary condition. Mind, that is to say, is the arena of interactions and stresses in the background, while consciousness is the small region that is illuminated at any moment—as the sun's rays illumine the surface of the ocean's depths. We say that body possesses extension, moves and is moved, while mind has no mass, but feels, sees, hears, anticipates, judges, infers. Body and mind together we name the 'self.' Now if we want to understand this self we must observe how it acts.

First of all let us bear in mind that every organism has certain vital needs which must be satisfied if it is to be kept alive. Let us also recall the fact that many living organisms possess a nervous system and a brain. What are these for? We may reply generally that their function is to effect a correlation of different parts of the body in their work of adaptation to its needs. Sense-organs, nerve-fibres, nerve-centres and

¹ Much of the material of this paper has been obtained from Prof. Hobhouse's published works.

muscles achieve this correlation for the most part without the aid of consciousness by what is called reflex action. Reflex action is the simplest form of interconnection. It is a flow of excitement in one direction. In brief, it is the function of the brain and nervous system to effect interconnection and to order behaviour. But this is also the function of mind. When consciousness, however, undertakes to achieve order and correlation, it performs it much more rapidly and efficiently than is done by a structure without the aid of consciousness, and we can measure the growth of consciousness by the extent and perfection of the combination it is capable of effecting.

At this point we must keep before us the fact that the mind is a part of a psychophysical whole, which has grown up under the influence of heredity, being modified from time to time by the pressure of vital needs. Our instincts and impulses are inherited from the racial stock, acquired in the fierce and age-long struggle with the environment. This hereditary endowment is the foundation of our temperament and character. In the life of the lower animals these inherited reflexes and instincts play the leading rôle. In man the sphere of conscious correlation is immensely widened, freeing him for unlimited initiative. Yet the hereditary structure is always there and exerts a mighty influence. It is the enfolding atmosphere of conscious life,—the womb out of which clear contents of consciousness and judgments emerge.

Since then the function of mind is correlation, we may take this as the criterion of development. The extent and degree of order and harmony in behaviour and thought achieved at any level will indicate the stage of the development of conscious control.

We must begin with the study of mind as it is manifested in animal life. Where we find mere random actions, such as throwing the limbs about or uttering cries, we are in the realm of the non-rational. The simplest example of correlated action is, as we have stated above, the type known as reflex, where a given stimulus calls forth a uniform response, and there is no variation. For instance, if the pseudopodium stretching out from the cell-body of a rhizopod be touched with some pointed instrument, it wrinkles up; if touched a little harder, it withdraws into the cell-mass. These reflex actions are unintelligent and quasi-mechanical, resulting from an inherited structure making in the main for the survival of the species. Reflex action is found throughout the whole scale of organic life, ranging from Protista to Man.

It is interesting to note that a slightly higher type of correlation (modifying the reflex) comes next in the scale of adaptive actions. We may call this the 'conative' type, and it is found in all unicellular organisms. When an infusorian knocks against any alkaline substance, it starts back a little. This is reflex response. But now it makes an exploratory motion, which ends in the animal moving forward at a different angle. It seems that the organism is aiming at a state of equilibrium. Here then is the germ of effort and purpose. It is not, however, pure purpose, because although action is vaguely directed to a change of conditions the organism does not foresee these conditions.

The next stage of correlation is sensori-motor action. At this level type-reactions are variously combined to suit the position or movements of an outer object, and to accomplish some effect in relation

to it: *e.g.* a baby a few months old grasps at something it sees and tries to convey it to its mouth; a cricketer adjusts his actions and position to bring off a spectacular catch. These sensori-motor actions consist of a combination of reflexes so nicely graded as to result in a movement definitely related to the position of the stimulating object; and the function of consciousness at this stage is "to grasp the special combination of stimuli, each of which has its own reaction modified by all the other reactions, so that there follows a response suitable to the situation as a whole." Here we have no longer uniform response to stimulus, but action controlled and moulded by a relation to a 'result.' This is rudimentary purposive action. Sensori-motor action extends far down the scale of animal life, perhaps even to the amœba. The actions of the higher animals, which are varied according to the twistings and turnings of the prey they are hunting, are excellent examples of sensori-motor response.

At this point a little must be said on instinct. "Where sensori-motors and reflexes are combined in series so as to lead to a definite result, though this result is not foreseen, we have instinct." All species of animals owe to their inherited characters a common bodily structure adapted to the environment in which they live. Similarly they exhibit a characteristic mode of behaviour making for their success and survival in the struggle with their environment. Instinct may be regarded as a product of evolution acquired by means of the struggle for survival, and the various instincts are connected with the procuring of food, with defence and protection, with care of offspring, with the relation of the sexes. These general classes may include special processes, such as lying in wait for

prey, constructing webs or snares, stalking, disguising, crouching when an enemy is near, flight and hiding, fighting, construction of homes with passages and chambers, examining with caution anything strange, such as a trap. In the instinct which exercises itself in the care of offspring we find many and various activities, such as placing the eggs in suitable places, nest building, shifting pupæ from one place to another as circumstances demand, hiding the eggs or covering them, feeding the young, cleaning them, and so on.

The question we may here raise is whether there is any intelligence within the sphere of instinct? The answer is in the affirmative. There seems to be the 'play of intelligence' modifying instinctive response in certain cases; but some instinctive actions are much more fixed and less plastic than are others. An example will illustrate this fixity. Prof. Lloyd Morgan had a tamed squirrel which would try to bury a nut in the floor of a room. "He would press the nut down on the carpet, and then go through all the motions of patting the earth over it, after which he went about his business as if that nut were safely buried." Similar little irrational habits can be discovered in our friends, if we observe them closely enough. Trains of actions of this kind approach to a fixed and unadaptable uniformity of response. They approximate to the compound reflex type of actions and are relatively mechanical.

Other modes of instinctive actions, however, are much more plastic, so that the animal apparently can adjust means to end. I have only space for one example. A solitary wasp had killed a spider; "presently she went to look at her nest, and seemed to be struck with a thought that had already occurred

to us—that it was decidedly too small to hold the spider. Back she went for another survey of her bulky victim, measured it with her eye, without touching it, drew her conclusions, and at once returned to the nest and began to make it larger. We have several times seen wasps enlarge their holes when a trial had demonstrated that the spider would not go in, but this seemed a remarkably intelligent use of the comparative faculty.”¹

On the whole we may say confidently that the basis of instinctive action is undoubtedly the response of hereditary structure to stimuli, which probably gives rise to a certain tension of feeling guiding the train of sensori-motor acts and persisting until an important result to the organism is attained. When, however, there are more original and individual adjustments to changing circumstances, suggesting the use of means to end, we seem to have the factor of intelligence assisting instinct. Intelligence in this realm is of course narrow in its scope. As intelligence grows however, its range widens, until it comes in time to control the ultimate end of action. In animal life the inherited structure plays the dominant rôle. Man, however, being reflective, is largely freed from pure instinct. In his instinctive tendencies he distinguishes what is essential from what is irrelevant, and can bring his instinctive disposition into relation with his life as a rational being and with the moral and spiritual claims of society. The instincts in the various species of animals have been evolved through the experiences of large numbers through ‘natural selection.’ Many types must have perished in the process, since natural selection aims only at the survival of those fitted for

¹ Mr. and Mrs. Peckham’s monograph, *Solitary Wasps*.

the existing conditions of environment. From this it follows both that the rate of organic change under natural selection will be very slow and that there will be no inherent tendency to any higher type.

I now pass to another stage of correlation, that of learning by experience, or 'assimilation' as it is called. Here the simplest form of inferential experience may be observed. This will be best understood by one or two examples. An infant touches the flame of a candle, burns his fingers, and next time shows signs of dread. Prof. Lloyd Morgan's chicks when only two hours old pecked at everything of suitable size—grain, small stones, bread-crumbs, currants, bits of paper, buttons, the toes or eyes of their companions. They soon learnt, however, what was good for eating and what was nasty. Having seized a bit of orange peel, one of them at once relinquished it, shaking its head. Seizing another bit, it held it for a moment in its bill, then dropped it, scratched its beak, and could not again be induced to touch orange peel. In the same way a spider after a few trials refused a fly dipped in turpentine. Here we have the modification of action by experience, a method of learning widely diffused in the animal kingdom. The feeling of satisfaction or dissatisfaction, arising from taste, contact or other stimulation, either confirms, modifies or inhibits reaction under like circumstances. It is not necessary here to call in explicit intelligence to explain this type of behaviour. What is more likely is that by means of a mass of experiences—sensation, motor-response and feelings—the organism is affected and modified in such a way that future reactions are determined by the nature of the feeling aroused by a stimulus. Stout calls this modification of consciousness 'acquirement

of meaning.' Elements of experience at this stage are not grasped in any articulate way, and what intelligence there is on this level is 'inexplicit.' Action on the levels of sensori-motor and assimilation is 'impulsive' in character and is relative to the feeling of the individual alone. Hence at this stage there can be no 'ethical' behaviour.

We now enter upon a higher level of correlation, *viz.* conscious correlation. Conscious correlation is only possible when 'ideas' emerge, because only by means of ideas can the different relations in which things stand to one another be grasped and appreciated. The appearance of ideas is a fundamental departure in the life of mind, for when once it is in possession of ideas conation can be directed definitely to something that is 'not yet.' Moreover at this level of conscious life 'desire' emerges, for desire is the idea of something not yet real, toned with feeling urging to action that will make it real. But action directed to the satisfaction of desire involves purpose in the form of desire, and purpose involves judgment. Hence the importance of ideas. How do they arise? Probably somehow like this. Imagine a dog to be hungry. Let three objects A B C be perceived by him, of which C is food. Now let it be supposed that the dog gets the food and devours it. At a later time if the dog is hungry, the dog perceives A alone. This will excite a conation corresponding to the earlier one, *viz.* towards B and C. The animal directs his efforts to a point where B and C should be. Conation is thus focussed towards something 'not yet.' We may imagine that A excites an anticipation (or memory) of B and C. The original percepts B and C (shall we say the plate and the food?) are now transformed into elements of anticipation, or

in other words into 'ideas.' In some such way as this it is probable that the 'conative' idea arises. Now the appearance of ideas depends: (1) upon the capacity to apprehend wholes with their parts and qualities; (2) upon the 'revival' or reproduction of such concrete experience in the form of idea, *i.e.* as a whole with distinguishable parts. Imagine consciousness at a certain stage of its development being able to discriminate the windows, doors, roof, walls, etc. of a building as constituents of one inter-related whole. This is the stage of concrete perception, where the terms and relations are not dissected out and made independent, but are perceived as a complex of terms-in-relation. If now there is also the power of 'reviving' such an experience, when such a mind apprehends at a later date, say, the front side of the building, it will be able mentally to add to what it sees, the parts it does not see, *e.g.* the back with the garden or the side-door; and although the garden is not seen, the footsteps can, if desired, be directed thither. The unseen parts and their relations are thus grasped in their relation to what is actually seen, and the individual's behaviour is at this stage influenced by the unseen, *i.e.* ideas. Now where there is reference to things as yet unseen, we have judgment, *i.e.* a belief in a certain sequence. (In the case of the dog's consciousness, *e.g.*, there will be the belief, on the sight of A, that B and C will follow; B and C at the time A is perceived being in the form of ideas.) This is equivalent to an 'assertion' about elements unperceived, and a new characteristic of the conscious life. It is what Professor Hobhouse calls the 'practical judgment.'

Another interesting departure in the life of mind may be noticed at this stage. When by means of

ideas anticipation arises, purposive action of a genuine sort becomes possible for the first time. For the individual is no longer tied to habitual action, but the choice of relevant means to the desired ends is now possible. At that level of conscious life where there is a perception of a world of objects in their manifold relations, and where the mind can make use of ideas, the individual is free to use means to end as occasion and circumstances require.

Since perception is knowledge of objects as wholes of distinguishable related elements, it becomes possible for the mind to make a rough analogical inference based on similarities of the various wholes perceived. It is inference from particulars to particulars, the universal being implied but not made explicit. Is intelligence of this character reached in any animal below man? Can the higher animals use one object as a means to achieving a desired end, thus acting purposively? Experiments have been made with dogs, cats, otters, elephants, monkeys and other animals, with the object of deciding whether animals could act in this way, learning so to do by observing the results either of their own actions or those of the experimenter. The animals had to effect a certain perceptual change as a step to procuring food, such as pulling open a drawer, drawing a bolt, unfastening hooks and, in the case of a monkey, moving articles of furniture. On the whole the experiments showed that animals can learn by attention to a simple sequence; and their method of learning seems to conform "to the rise of an idea, at first dimly grasped, then clearly seen, for a while waveringly held, but soon definitely established." Prof. Hobhouse, who conducted these experiments, calls the direction of action to effect an

external change a 'practical idea,' and the correlation of such an idea with a more remote end a 'practical judgment.' He says, however, that the 'ideas' of animals do not represent any analysis of what is perceived. Both their perception and their ideas are crude compared with human perceptions and ideas. They have no natural tendency to learn from perception, still less are they given to 'reflective' as distinct from 'simple' imitation. It seems, then, that although the higher animals are not aware of qualities and relations in abstraction, they are aware of them in a state of 'togetherness' as forming a whole. Apes apparently possess practical ideas in a less crude form than other animals and use them with greater originality. In summing up the results of his experiments, Prof. Hobhouse says: "The practical judgment may be attributed to apes with high probability, and with probability to the more intelligent animals."

It is interesting to notice that where there is evidence of intelligence in animals, we find mutual help, marked care of the young, intelligent sympathy (as when an old male monkey comes back to rescue a young one cut off by dogs), evidence of attachment to individuals, the beginnings of self-control (as seen in the behaviour of a dog forbidden to do something by his master). This we can understand, since with the knowledge of individuals emotional states towards one another become possible, which may be the explanation of the rudimentary social life certain animals live. Instincts at this level begin to be controlled; forbearance and self-restraint raise their head. In short we discern the first streaks of light heralding the dawn of morality.

I think it has become clear by this time that every

stage in the development of Mind brings increased freedom and originality. The more the correlation effected is a mind-correlation, the more the organism is freed from mere automatic response to stimulus from the environment and from the fetters of habit. We have now reached the human stage in our journey of description of the growth of Mind. Reasons have been given for the belief that 'practical' ideas, the use of means to end, memory and anticipation of the future, enter into the experience of the higher animals, so that it is no longer of the semi-conscious kind, which gradually remoulds impulse by inhibiting one tendency and strengthening another. It is probable that animals have a definite experience of concrete objects with their qualities and of the order of events. All this, however, falls far short of human experience. The further development of Mind has been possible because of the potency of language yielding concepts. Language is a combination of general terms; it is a "sort of sieve catching the expressible, and letting go those elements of experience which it cannot render." Language implies: (1) that the general context or meaning has been analysed out of perception; (2) that the idea or meaning so acquired can be combined with similar ideas without any compulsion of perception. By analysing the data of perception thought discriminates the elements that are common and names them. This gives the human mind a privileged position, since it can now combine the elements so analysed into new ideal wholes. When an element common to a number of separate experiences can be thought of without being perceived, and combined in thought with other elements, the Mind has become relatively freed from a perceptual

setting, and can henceforth move in a world of general ideas, being liberated from imprisonment in the concrete. The limitation of animal language—sounds and cries—is that it is concerned with immediate feeling and the suitable action at the moment. It is not disengaged from concrete experience. Human language, on the other hand, makes use of universals; and thus the ideas are detached from the perceptions in which they were first given, and can be used at will in any new ideal combination. The concepts of language arise through the power of analysis and synthesis. When the Mind can distinguish by analysis qualities or attributes and relations of a concrete whole, it is forming concepts applicable equally to other objects, so that these general ideas can be combined in any way desired by the thinking subject. Thus relevant thinking and intercourse between mind and mind becomes possible through language.

In the previous stage of mental evolution, the Mind was only able to divide up a perceptual complex into components, getting, as it were, a number of separate percepts. But now the percept is broken up into fresh elements. The object always remains concrete, but general attributes common to many objects are dissected out by means of the concept. Thought at this level has achieved the mastery of the attributive relation, and is thus free to construct completely new ideal wholes. Nevertheless the general attribute is not something analysed out of reality and left suspended in the void. It is always understood as qualifying objects; so that when general contents or ideas are combined in the judgment we have "a synthetic process at work articulating what has been disarticulated by analysis." The Mind by this means

learns that reality reveals itself as substances qualified by attributes, and that the latter are analysible into more elementary attributes and are connected by the manifold strands of a web of affinities. It is the characteristic affinities of the things in the world which are the foundation of the whole world of ideas with its science and philosophy. By means of the category of 'resemblance' thought endeavours to reach precise resemblances and definite differences; and the universal judgment is reached when underlying affinities are discovered connecting things most remote in space and time. At the level of the universal judgment we can go beyond our limited individual experience. Great masses of experience can now be grasped and classified. In the animal world it is the broad average result of racial experience that determines the constitution of the individual with his reflexes and instincts, and natural selection has been the clumsy and costly method shaping the psycho-physical organism to cope more or less successfully with its environment. But as soon as the level of free ideas and language is reached, racial experience can be recorded and communicated, and we now reach the level of social heredity. This means that the result of experience will be applied in a much more rapid and effective manner; and since a new generation will be born into an atmosphere of social tradition, which will enable individuals to face reality with the accumulated experience of the race at their disposal, ready-made instincts rigidly fixed become less and less necessary, for intelligence can now do what blind 'Providence' up to this stage had to accomplish. With the emergence of free ideas art and imagination also become possible; science can make a beginning, and Mind is now for the first time free to

direct conduct towards comprehensive ends through the use of ideas. By means of the idea of continuity and the 'collective' concept the individual apprehends the unity of his own experiences in space and time, and in this way becomes conscious of 'self,' and at the same time of other persons and social groups. Thus conduct can now be framed to meet the requirements of the self as a whole, as opposed to mere impulsive demands, and with this there arises the conception of duties to others and of social welfare. Hence Morality is brought to birth.

What have we learnt up to the present of the development of Mind? The first stage of mental development expressed itself in mere impulsive behaviour; the second stage was characterised by desire and the balancing of desires. Now, however, we are at a genuinely ethical level. Desire has been transmuted into will and mere sympathy into rational consideration for the personality of others. Conduct can now be directed to the satisfaction of personality as a whole; and the social impulses of an earlier stage are transformed into the conception of an ordered social life which dictates duties based on general rules and imposes obligations on the members of society as responsible constituents. As a result of grasping the 'universal' there arises the conception of rights that should be enjoyed by all men in virtue of possessing a common humanity with a common destiny. The 'universal' has all along been operating, but up to now it has been directing behaviour unconsciously. Now, however, it has become explicit, and intelligence is able to widen its influence to those permanent conditions which maintain life and to the great 'values' that alone can make life worth possessing.

The work of Mind in its beneficent *rôle* of achieving order and harmony is, however, not yet complete. Until the principles which have been operating on or in the Mind throughout its development have been grasped and understood, human knowledge is no full-orbed vision but a mere series of disconnected glimpses. Similarly, because of the imperfect knowledge of the 'self' and others our purposes are broken arcs,—our wills are torn asunder by rival claims, and we are at war both with ourselves and with one another. In order to achieve a still higher level of development and harmony the Mind must grasp and correlate, not merely the forces of external nature, but the powers at work in life and mind as well. For although man has made much progress, he has not yet become master of his fate. He has reclaimed a little plot out of the wilderness of the unknown forces of Nature; but there remain mighty powers not yet understood or controlled, among which the incalculable forces of his own nature are by no means the least terrible. Thus we have a world of strife in which philosophies rival one another, creed opposes creed, nation strives against nation in bitter jealousy and suspicious fear, and class is ranged against class in mutual distrust and hatred. At this stage of conceptual thinking then, the world of human ends is not an ordered whole owning the sway of a single all-embracing principle; and as a result the best energies of men are frittered away in strife. Common-sense morality is really a blend of hostility and co-operation. Hence the need is felt for a comprehensive purpose that shall rationalise human effort, and unite human wills in harmonious co-operation. Progress toward the goal is most apparent on the side of knowledge. In the rough life of common-sense experi-

ence conceptions grow up uncritically and contradictions abound. Moreover confusion of thought is aggravated by magical conceptions, and true morality is frequently hindered by religions which have their roots in the poisonous soil of fear. Science, however, aims at exactness, and converts rough generalisations into comparatively exact universals, seeking to build up a system of interconnected facts, and thus exhibit the essential connection of things. This involves that the rough and ready conceptions of Nature, Personality and Society as framed by common sense should be pulled to pieces and thought out afresh. It demands also that the 'Gods' shall give an account of themselves and 'dogma' justify itself at the bar of reason. By this method of exact analysis common-sense experience is completely modified and transformed. The application of exact scrutiny to experience extends even to the work of the Mind itself. An analysis of the principles underlying the activity of Mind in its work of correlation is made, and an enquiry conducted as to the laws that govern its system-making. By this means philosophy aims at computing the actual work of Mind itself, at making explicit its principles of correlation, and showing the relation of thought to reality. Philosophy in short has for its goal the exhibiting of all the rich experiences of life as aspects of one interconnected whole.

The ideal unity of thought which philosophy sets before it, is however more what Kant would call 'a regulative idea,' than a goal that can be reached. Nevertheless it is possible to conceive a stage of knowledge in which the human race should have arrived at the understanding of its own development; should have absorbed the significance of its history,

and have formed true conclusions on the conditions and possibilities of further advance. At this level of development life would enter upon the epoch of self-conscious direction. For such an advance there must be a further twofold development. It must be both intellectual and ethical. On the intellectual side the sciences must be more complete. The 'lower' sciences must become more perfected before man can have the requisite knowledge effectively to control nature, and the 'higher' sciences of biology, psychology and sociology must advance towards their adult stage, before the complexity of the individual and society can be intelligently and clearly understood. But there must also be a higher development of man's ethical nature. Knowledge by itself is not enough, for spiritual truth is not grasped by the intellect alone. The Mind is emotion and will as well as intellect. "The ethical ideal is to bring the conduct of life under the unity of a single comprehensive purpose by the synthesis of all the possibilities of human development." Before this ideal can begin to be realised man's moral nature must be more enlightened, purified and deepened and his æsthetic faculty more highly cultivated. When the consciousness of man reaches that level of development where it has for its goal the fruition and perfection of all its faculties, a remoulding of the whole of life with this end in view will become possible, and life can then move forward to the harmonious development of its complete nature. A knowledge, then, of the conditions of human development, and an ethic making the perfection of that development the supreme goal of effort, would mean that life had become self-conscious and its growth self-determined.

S. E. HOOPER.

LIFE'S SEEMING CONFINES.

THE EDITOR.

It is a remarkable fact that, though death is the inescapable material end of all creatures, life pursues its business undismayed as though it utterly refused to accept the verdict of our senses. Not only is bodily death inevitable, but the whole material universe would seem to put every possible obstacle in the way of life. If the evidence of our normal physical senses is to be taken as the sole condition of our knowledge, then indeed the vastitude of matter hems in life most straitly in every direction. In all its incalculable domain death seems grudgingly to afford to life only the narrowest of margins in which to manifest those marvellous activities which alone give value and meaning to the otherwise sheer mechanism of a soulless world. If then it were not for the innate confidence that life has in herself, and which in spite of intellectual scepticism we all instinctively share with her in living,—if we were dependent solely on our out-turned normal powers of sense and their report—how depressing would the outlook be!

At every moment of our lives we are confronted by the certain fact that if the blood-temperature of a human body rises above or falls below the niggardly scale of some poor ten degrees, death claims that body

for corruption and disintegration.¹ Within that paltry scale we can somehow manage to live; that is, our body can hold together as an organic whole; but this by no means warrants the enjoyment of our existence. The margin of healthy and sane living is within far narrower limits still,—a miserable degree or two at best. Yet even so, even when confronted by this grim fact of the perpetual threat of death to our somatic life, there is no reason for dismay. Instinctively we feel ourselves to be more than the life we use, and already in this life we have a potent witness to the presence of a wisdom which effects a work far transcending the highest capability of the sense-bound knowledge of our intellect to achieve; life is already here busied with a task which is quite beyond our understanding. We cannot, it is true, see this inner process at its admirable work: nevertheless from the external facts of biological research reason compels us to infer that, all unseen and all unknown to us in any clearly conscious mode, our unitary organic life, whose beneficent activity we enjoy so carelessly and thoughtlessly, is day and night, without a moment's pause, devising and contriving with infinite concern and patience to maintain that healthy constant of temperature within which the multitudinous cell-life may work

¹ This temperature is said to be the same as that of the tepid ocean in which animal protoplasm first appeared. René Quinton, in a remarkable work (*L'Eau de Mer, Milieu Organique*, Paris, Masson, 1904), has made out a good case for believing that: "(1) animal life in the cell stage showed itself first in the sea; (2) throughout the zoological series, animal life has always tended to keep the cells composing each organism in a marine environment, so that . . . every animal organism is a veritable marine aquarium, in which the constituent cells continue to live in their original aquatic condition." The composition of the blood is of a saline nature. Mammals and birds, in spite of the lessening temperature outside, "did not cool down as the earth did, but maintained their cells at the original temperature which allows the maximum of activity. They acquired the power of creating heat and so fought against their cooling environment." See the interesting article, by Dr. Bernard S. Arnulphy, on 'The Oceanic Origin of Life,' in *THE QUEST* for April, 1910, pp. 492 and 497.

together as one whole, and so survive the fluctuations of external heat and cold. This for the human bodily organism, the highest known to us in the material world. But even if we consider the utmost limits of external temperature within which a living organism of any kind can exist, it is insignificant enough; the maximum or minimum is soon reached, and the inexorable inanimate seems to cry halt to life's activities. From within and from without then our bodies are perpetually threatened with disruption, and our life-tenure here is thus to all seeming precarious in the extreme.

Over and above these most sure and constant dangers to our individual bodily existence, the theory of physical science would threaten us, not only with a general disaster that must inevitably some day overtake all living organisms upon this planet, but also with the possibility of the sudden disintegration of the planet itself. The degradation theory, which bases itself upon the so-called law of the continuous cooling down of the whole system, would convince us that the solar energy, which is the source of all our light and heat and all the power the plants store up,¹ must inevitably some day give out. Ages, however, before that takes place our planet will, on this assumption, have become as dead as the moon. So we are assured by the supporters of this theory. And yet even this so tenaciously held dogma is beginning to lose its authority when confronted by the results of recent

¹ As Sir William Barrett eloquently writes, in his recent article on 'The Deeper Issues of Psychical Research' (*The Contemporary Review* for February): "Each pencil of the sun's rays carries with it a trinity of benediction to this earth. The visible rays illuminate the world and reveal the glory of nature, the longer invisible waves warm the earth and give us all our wind and water power, the shorter invisible waves, beyond the blue, cover the earth with vegetation, and thus feed man and beast."

research in the revolutionary phenomena of radioactivity; so that it seems probable that a law of recuperation may be found to hold good even in physics. Meantime there is the possibility, if not the probability, of sudden and general destruction from the collision of our system or of our planet with one or other of the innumerable wandering bodies in stellar space, rushing hither and thither in headlong career. Therein collisions of a vast scale are known to occur; and indeed they are not infrequent. Whatever general order then there may be in sidereal space—and as yet we are unable even to guess at a scheme capable of co-ordinating the motions of the countless solar systems and the rest of the host of astral atoms—it is clearly not of a nature to eliminate the chance of collision. This being so, wholesale catastrophe might any day overtake our speck of a planet as suddenly as it is seen to overwhelm celestial bodies of vastly greater magnitude. On the face of it, the facts seem well observed and the induction from the facts appears to be logically inevitable. The sudden appearance, for observers on this planet, of brilliant *novæ*, or new stars, for instance, is thought with probability to be the result of collision. Presumably, however, such sudden catastrophe, as it appears for us observing it, could not overtake our earth without long warning to ourselves. We should be aware of the impending danger long before the final disaster actually occurred; the direction and velocity of the approaching body would be calculable. But what a paralyzing nightmare would the time of waiting be!

Now if the faith of our reason compels us to assume the uniformity of nature, and if we are thus driven to hold that the law of the conservation of

energy, which is the fundamental presupposition on which all our mechanics and chemistry are based, holds universally, then the whole physical order must somehow be a closed system, and not of infinite extent. The problem then is to account for the comparative infrequency of collisions rather than to explain their occurrence. Moreover it has recently been established, on what seem to be convincing grounds, that there is a definite maximum velocity, or an absolute of motion, in physical space. We may if we like continue to imagine, or theoretically to conceive of, indefinitely extended rates of acceleration beyond this maximum, but as an actual sensible fact we have, according to the witness of these researches, to deal with a definitely limited scale of physical motion. Nature has thus set bounds to her extensity in this direction; and the limit set is said to be no more and no less than the velocity of light. At this great boundary, so to speak, physical energy is compelled to turn back upon itself. Apart from the elaborate mathematical demonstrations of this phenomenon, which are beyond the competence of the lay mind to follow, one of the most striking popular arguments in its favour is well within the grasp of even the untrained imagination. If a straight line be traced out on the surface of the earth and indefinitely produced, it will eventually meet itself again at the point from which it was started. Now if a physical body could move more rapidly than the velocity of light, and moved along such a path, all our conceptions of clock-time as an essential element of motion would be upset; for we should have to conceive this body as arriving at one and the same spot before it had started from it—which, as ancient Euclid taught us to say at school, is absurd. Or again we are con-

fronted with the paradox that a physical object on this planet moving with the velocity of light would stand still. We can doubtless conceive of an order of psychical time which permits us subjectively or inwardly to remove the seeming fixations of objective clock-time. Indeed what else is remembering for the individual but a blending of past and present, as it were a psychical short-circuiting of the historical time current? But the general objective temporal order of material reality cannot be retarded, accelerated or reversed for others by any effort on the part of an individual mind.

From the above considerations we seem to be confronted by the arresting fact that there is a definite limit to the velocity of matter in motion. It is, however, by no means easy to imagine what the nature of this material limit is, seeing that it must somehow apparently be a limit to change in the becoming of sensible things. By the empirical physicist the phrase 'matter in motion' may doubtless be taken as a sufficient description of a simple self-evident sensible fact; but for the philosopher it is by no means a judgment that requires no further analysis. For what is this matter which is the ground-reality of the physicist? Matter, he is told by the most recent metaphysics of physics, is inertia—a negative conception. The inert is thus apparently said to be in motion. Does the predicate 'in motion' then mean that the inert moves, an apparent contradiction, or is it in a somewhat called motion which is again apparently a reification of a concept? But the sense-realist or uncritical aestheticist may perhaps here retort that he must leave the metaphysicians and logicians to settle their own conundrums; as for himself he is an

empiricist, a practical man, a pragmatist, who is modestly seeking to discover what works in the sphere of the useful. We may momentarily be abashed by this display of economic virtue, and yet pluck up courage to ask in the interest of the more than simply useful, whether he considers this motion, which does so many wonderful things, the ultimate physical reality, or does he seek to limit it spatially. If he prefers the latter alternative and we try to imagine a spatial boundary of the universe of sense, we find ourselves contemplating the notion of an ultimate, continuous, homogeneous, luminiferous ether, or prime matter, which on the lines we have been thinking ought to be the equivalent of absolute inertia, and we find ourselves at an entire loss to account for motion in any way. But as soon as we break up the unity-in-difference matter-motion or inertia-energy, as soon as we abstract one from another, we are involved in suicidal contradictions. For it always happens that when logic hounds on one of any pair of opposites to an extreme, reason, which bides in the centre, incontinently convicts the intellect of contradiction, and it has shamefacedly to recall its dogs to heel. In our energy-inertia hunt we thus seem to be shut into a vicious circle, in which we for ever continue to retrace our own tracks. But is this circle really vicious? Is it not simply the natural way of going? For after all what we are seeking to elucidate is the idea that somehow the material universe must be a closed system, a determined order that continuously enters into itself, and that this is corroborated by the newly discovered fact of an absolute velocity of motion. Now a fundamental determination of the sensible universe is that it is spatial. The analytical mind that finds its satisfaction

in creating distinction and complexity, must somehow distinguish space from matter. The synthetical mind, whose satisfaction consists in obeying the law of its unity or self-preservation, following the instinctive movement of an idealistic psychology, affirms that space is necessitated by the unitary nature of our own consciousness; it is a necessary form of mind. We may thus, keeping within the reality of the life of the mind, be permitted to talk of the extension of matter in space. What we are then in search of actually is a limiting notion to the notion of extension. Matter is not sufficiently described as inertia; for inertia is really masked energy. Inertia and energy appear as opposites, but in reality they are subsumed in the unitary concrete concept energy. Inertia is an integral element of energy; indeed we may even say the greater the inertia the greater the energy. Matter is dynamic. In last resort the notion of matter as inertia is to be sought for with the help of psychology; it is the way the intellect interprets the feeling of resistance. But if we are conscious of resistance, we are equally conscious of overcoming resistance. Extensity is thus also a construct of the mind based on feeling. The intellectual truth we come upon by analysing the idea of extensity is that throughout the whole of the material order there is an invariable law of the mutual externality of parts. No matter how deeply we probe into physical phenomena, no matter how minutely we divide up sensible objects, down to or up to electrons, and even when we are compelled to conceive the latter as dynamic units, the law of mutual externality holds. There is in this material order an indefinite series of wholes and parts, of containers and contained, of systems and components, but ever and

everywhere the law of mutual externality obtains. There is here of course a specious inner and outer, as in the instance of a box and its contents; but if the box is external to its contents, the contents are equally external to the box, so also with the units which in aggregation compose the box and compose the several contents. Here, no matter how minutely we analyse and subdivide, we never arrive at genuine internality, at a true inwardness. But this mode of activity of the mind is conditioned by the intellectual abstraction of matter from concrete reality; life is entirely neglected. In actual fact, in concrete living, every act of cognition and discrimination is suffused with life, is indeed of life itself. Thought is living thought. We may imagine, for greater convenience in accomplishing certain partial empirical ends, that we are dealing with matter apart from life, but we can never really succeed in doing so. We can never commit such suicide really in spite of all our intellectual efforts. Every human activity is an activity of life, is life living itself. We can never eliminate the concrete reality of ourselves in any single act; and therefore any endeavour to give an account of things which starts from the imagining of a falsified reality from which man, that is rational life, is conceived as being eliminated, is fated sooner or later to be found riddled with absurdities.

Nevertheless in our quest for intellectual truth we seem bound radically to distinguish life from matter, even when we have succeeded in conceiving of the latter as mechanical energy. Life is found to belong to the order of inwardness, which is fundamentally distinct from and therefore a genuine limiting notion to the order of externality which is the main character-

istic of matter even when analysed into energy. Inwardness and outwardness in their deepest meaning are mutual determinations, and both are aspects of one and the same reality which the mind comes to know by its innate complementary powers of introversion and extraversion. These opposites are the expression of complementary activities of one and the same reality. They constitute the life of the mind and the matter of the mind; and mind as a synthesis, or unity in distinction, when not intellectually sundered into the specious dualism of subject and object, may perhaps, in spite of the modern dislike of the term by scientific thinkers, still best be called spirit. Now to obtain an adequate notion of inwardness, as the complement or completion of outwardness, we must set our faces determinedly against the powerful current of the habit of thinking in terms of matter, and stoutly refuse to transfer images or ideas of externality into the inward order; for if we do this we falsify reality by extending externality into a mode of being where it has no legitimate status. In seeking to understand life we have no justification whatever for atomizing it; we have no longer to do with the notion of com-position, with aggregations or quantitative heapings together, or with externally applied forces. We have to do with a mode of reality that throughout its whole being and in its very first instance must be conceived as trans-spatial, as immaterial. The contemplation of life even in its lowliest manifestations awakens notions of immediacy, compenetration, coadunition, quality, suchness, intensity; it instructs, rather than constructs, instructs or directs mechanical energy in the work of building material constructs. It is the principle of organicity inworking in the

fabricative processes of that mechanism of nature which rules in the inanimate.

Here we are face to face with a mode of reality that is radically different from, and in the order of value superior to, the theoretical abstraction matter in motion. We can never think life out of itself and treat it as an abstraction ; it refuses to be anything else than concrete. It is the intellectual activity of the mind that creates abstractions from the concrete whole, to serve as instruments of thought for the greater efficiency of action. But that very intellectual action of itself is, paradoxically, nothing else but a mode of the life of the mind as spiritual reality. A function, even the intellectual function of the mind, cannot transcend that of which it is a function, and defy reason by miraculously separating the whole from the part. The life of the mind is nothing short of the whole activities of the mind. You cannot get more out of an abstraction than from the whole from which it is abstracted. If, for instance, it pleases abstract intellectualism in one of its moods to posit matter as the ultimate reality, it is utterly incapable of accounting for mind and much more for life. Indeed any monistic theory that would posit a single element of reality as the one and only, the original and ultimate, ground of all things is bound to fail, for it starts with an abstraction. This would be as true of spirit as of matter, if the spiritual is to be regarded as antithetical to the material. But it would not be true if we are permitted to use the term spirit as a synonym of that reality which at-ones or integrates the material, vital and mental modes of its own being. Indeed the present-day representatives of philosophical materialism have entirely abandoned their former

ground, and now contend simply for unity of law in the universe; that is to say, apparently they hold that even if a spiritual order exist its laws will be found to fulfil and not to set aside the known laws. As to ultimate terms that are all-sufficient, it goes without saying that language has so far failed to satisfy the needs of mind as a whole. The chilly vocable 'the Absolute,' for instance, can never free itself from the fundamental vice of abstraction, in spite of all our efforts to give it a positive value. Here religion is better off with the ancient sacred name of God. Taking then all that our language offers into consideration, perhaps the best philosophical term to use for the ultimate principle is just simply Reality. No effort of the intellect can abstract this from the actual concrete whole; for the more we strive after reality the greater is the actualizing of itself. The more we strive the more real it becomes, even in the very pain of the struggle, which is the condition of bringing the best in us to finer temper still, so that it may ever more subtly and more deeply penetrate into the truth of reality and enjoy the rapture of its beauty and the all-sufficing excellence of its worth. The way of going of our deeper life may thus be conceived of as the progressive realisation of the truth of reality; it is not only an ever widening experience, but an ever deepening understanding of the meaning and value of that experience.

But perhaps it will here be said by many: All this is up in the air; it is the vapping of metaphysical speculation. The plain man and common sense and above all science, which the plain man is asked to regard as nothing else but glorified common sense, we shall be informed, have no use for metaphysics; the men of common sense all deal with facts and not with

speculations. But setting aside the well-known fact that every science speculates upon its facts, is it true that the plain man, if he have common sense, has no use for metaphysics? After all metaphysics is simply the instinctive effort of the mind to penetrate to the simplicity and clarity of first principles in the confused flow of sensible appearance,—an unavoidable activity of even the crudest attempts at philosophy. Does the plain man really think he can dispense with all philosophy? Even in thinking he thinks he can, he is philosophizing in spite of himself; in imagining so vain a thing as that he is not doing what he is doing, he philosophizes though erroneously. Every rational being is compelled to have a philosophy, a view of life and action of some sort, whether he is aware of it or not; and it is better to know what one is doing than to remain in ignorance. The plain man and above all the scientist cannot then escape philosophizing. So too every man, though he may not know it, is in embryo an historian and an artist and even a poet in the widest sense of these terms. The life of a rational creature is maintained on the one hand by the striving to express the life of the mind and on the other by the effort to understand that expression; sooner or later we are all forced to try to understand what we are doing. Expression and understanding then are unavoidable activities in a rational life.

Now expression is inseparable from form, and form, which the plain man may imagine he can take at its face value, without even its simplest analysis into the arrangement of or relation between the parts of anything, is a factor of reality that masks a depth of meaning. In the West, for instance, some have recently thought that ultimately there is no real

difference to be found between form and matter.¹ In the East, in Buddhist philosophy, one of the most frequent terms for characterizing a living organism is *nāma-rūpa*. It is a term naming a pair of co-efficients, a concrete unity in difference. It designates the individual sentient being as a unity or assemblage on the one hand of mental and on the other of material elements or properties or better still qualities. It is generally translated 'name and form,' where the former is of course the psychological name, *i.e.* mind, and not the grammatical name. This 'name,' in primitive or pre-scientific psychology and in magical tradition, was regarded as the life-principle itself, the characteristic or specific mode of life of a creature. In Sanskrit *nāma* has the meaning of manner, mode, character, nature, species, and last but not least of form. The literal translation then of this duality in unity by 'name and form' by no means sufficiently renders the idea. Indeed comparative philology is ever warning us that words in different languages seldom convey identical ideas, their histories are different. To-day we should perhaps best speak of this twin reality as mind and body, and body is of course here assumed to mean living body without further analysis. But if living body is the equivalent of *rūpa*, *rūpa* also means generally any outward appearance or phenomenon, form, figure, shape. And here the interesting point to notice is that, just as in a recent phase of Western thought it has been found that form and matter are indistinguishable in any ultimate sense, so we are told by an eminent Burmese Buddhist scholar who at the

¹ Cp. Prof. J. S. Mackenzie's just published *Elements of Constructive Philosophy*, p. 213; also p. 137, where he writes: "Everything is eventually form; and . . . the particular—the matter or 'that'—is simply a point at which certain universals or orders meet, or intersect one another."

same time is well read in Western philosophy and psychology, that *rūpa* is rather what the West would call 'matter' than what it would call 'form.'¹ But why am I plaguing the reader with the difficulties of rendering the technical terms of the most systematic and consistent psychological system of the East into modern terms? Simply to show the depth of meaning masked by so familiar a term as form. The history of a general term in philosophy reveals the whole movement of progressive change in philosophical development. Already we see that we cannot be sure whether form is mental or non-mental. On the one hand it is said to be non-mental, for it is given as the equivalent of *rūpa* or an assemblage of material qualities, and on the other it is immaterial or mental, in that *nāma* can also be rendered by 'form,' for here it is the psychological 'name,' which again is the life-secret, the knowing of which was supposed to give power over the life of a man, according to ancient magical belief the world over. Indeed *nāma-rūpa* has also been rendered by life and form; so that we find life and form, mind and body, form and matter here playing general post.

Again, while in Indian thought the formless as the immaterial has ever been held to be of higher value than the formal, the best Greek thinkers, in their love of beauty, looked on formlessness with aversion, and considered that which was incapable of taking form as the privation of existence, empty abstraction or sheer matter.² This at any rate was Plato's view,

¹ Shwe Zan Aung and C. A. F. Rhys Davids' *Compendium of Philosophy* (Pali Text Society, 1910), pp. 271f.

² In his arresting article on Neo-Platonism, in the last volume of Hastings' *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*, Dean Inge writes: "Matter is really a mere abstraction; it is the bare receptacle of forms, the subject of energy, viewed by abstraction as subsisting apart from energy which alone gives it meaning and existence. Plotinus's 'matter' is not material;

and it is difficult to see how in this way matter has not been practically eliminated, form alone remaining as the basis of existence. But extremes are said to touch; and therefore when the mind drives its logic to the limit, it finds the greatest extremes in closest contact. Thereupon the movement of the mind seems to re-enter itself for its own greater intensification.

From such considerations we are not surprised to find there are those who hold that for all practical purposes form is ultimately indistinguishable from matter. But what is form? Shall we say it is a modification in the continuity of becoming, *à la* Bergson? Physical form at any rate seems to be the arrestation of motion; it is the power that brings about fixations in the sensible flux. Here we seem somehow to be shaking hands once more with our old friend inertia. But inertia, we have seen, is only a label for a grade of energy more potent than the energy which it arrests, otherwise it could not hold back or modify the homogeneous flux.

It is true that in our modern schools 'form' has lost its once high status, but in the middle ages 'form' was, and is still in surviving scholasticism, one of the most important concepts of philosophy. Form, for it, is that which makes a living body what it is, that which accounts for its own kind of life and its own kind of growth. The human soul, for instance, is defined as the form of a rational life. Aristotle called this form or psychical principle by the term *entelechy*, which

it is not to be confounded with the ponderable stuff to which science gives the same name, and which it is now engaged in sub-dividing till it seems on the point of being sublimated into the subject of electrical energy—a strange approximation to Plotinus's view. Matter is that intangible, impalpable all but nothing which remains when we subtract from an object of thought all that makes it a possible object of thought. This is quite clearly the Neo-Platonic doctrine about matter."

conveyed the meaning of the characteristic distinction of soul. In its lowest grades, as in plant life, it was hardly to be distinguished from energy or actuality, which he opposed to potentiality or matter. Energy was taken to represent a stage on the path to entelechy, which stood for progressive realisation. Entelechy or form is the principle that makes for the completion or fulfilment of development. With form thus conceived we pass from the material to the psychical or mental order. Aristotle is thought to have thus set aside Plato's theory of ideas or original forms, but it is difficult to believe that these two great minds were so fundamentally at variance. At any rate in Neoplatonic days we find many attempts at what were called symphonies of Plato and Aristotle. Already with Plotinus, the greatest of all the followers of Plato, we can discern, blended with a vital grasp of the theory of the ideas or ideal forms, a utilization of Aristotelian notions and Stoic terminology, when he speaks of the enforming or immanent principle of plants, for instance, as the 'spermatic logos' or germinal reason, in other words, the potency of purposive direction in their becoming, the ordering or organizing principle. There was an immanent reason in all things. This principle was the very reverse of anything we can conceive of as static; sensible forms were determined by dynamic schemes of activity of a purposive nature.

Everyone even slightly acquainted with the general tendency of modern scientific thought knows that there is an intense aversion from all theories of the universe that are in any way obnoxious to the suspicion of animistic or anthropomorphic conceptions. It has indeed been made axiomatic for this way of thinking that the least tendency to such modes of

what is deemed pre-scientific thought, is indicative of unpardonable error. But of late it has been shown by some acute thinkers that in dealing with reality we can never get rid entirely of these essential characteristics of thought. It is largely prejudice that has fixed the shackles of false notions on these natural activities of the mind as though they were criminal propensities. We must perforce think in terms of our own being; the reality and meaning and value of things are to be found in no other way than in the realisation of that being. We have not yet come to speak of neo-animism and neo-anthropomorphism, but the way is being paved towards a thorough revision of the notions underlying these much abused terms and to rehabilitating them with or without the aid of a prefix. In this regard one cannot avoid referring to McDougall's recent brilliant psychological defence of animism,¹ while only a few months ago Professor J. B. Baillie inaugurated an equally brilliant philosophical defence of anthropomorphism.² "If," writes the latter, "memory, perception, and imagination are but ways by which we apprehend the real so as to conserve the stability and unity of our individual minds, conceptual activity, judgment, and inference perform a similar function in precisely the same interest." It is this view of human experience in general and of knowledge in particular that Prof. Baillie thinks is best described as anthropomorphism. He strongly objects to restricting the use of the term to the narrow sense which would refer it to "certain ways of ascribing literally to non-human kinds of reality qualities which are exclusively human." And

¹ W. McDougall, F.R.S., M.Sc., M.B., *Body and Mind* (1911).

² 'Anthropomorphism and Truth,' a Paper read before the Aristotelian Society, Feb. 18.

here he adds in a note a penetrating criticism of this prevalent fashion of the use of the term. Anthropomorphism thus defined, he writes, "is often described as a peculiar tendency of the primitive mind: but it is by no means confined to primitive intelligence. The difference between the uncultivated and the cultivated mind does not consist in the former being anthropomorphic in the narrow sense, while the latter eschews anthropomorphism. Both may be anthropomorphic in the same sense; the difference between the two consisting in the sort of human qualities ascribed to non-human objects. Thus, the primitive mind will ascribe human emotions—anger, pleasure, etc.—to external beings, whether natural or non-natural; the 'matured' mind will ascribe human ideas—conceptions, volitions—to non-human beings. Scientists and philosophers alike show this tendency. Why the primitive attitude should be rejected with contempt, and the attitude of the more developed mind treated with profound respect, is not evident, except to those who prefer to ascribe to non-human realities human thoughts rather than human emotions, and who imagine that a later generation must necessarily be wiser than the earlier."

We have seen that the more our human intelligence probes into the inner constitution of the material world the more potent and dynamic it is discovered to be. But what does this mean? Is it not that this discovery of the inner nature of the material order is the progressive recognition by the life of the mind of what is not fundamentally foreign to it, but rather of an essential mode of its own nature eloquent in the universal language of fact? And if this be so, it stands to reason that that which recognizes can in no

wise be inferior, less potent, less dynamic, than that which is recognized. On the contrary, it should be of greater dignity and worth. Indeed it has even been said that the whole material order in last resort is not of such value as a single human life; for it knows not its own nature, whereas man is a creature of knowledge.

What comes out of all these considerations seems to me to be that the desolating view of the vast domain of death with which we started is not the only view we are permitted to take. It is rather a view which falsely focusses reality, for it assumes throughout that life can be judged in the same terms as those we apply to matter. It is a purely quantitative judgment, presupposing that we can calculate life as we calculate matter. Life may dispose of material energy that can be calculated, but in itself it is of a higher order of value. Therefore when we read, for instance, such a great utterance of the self-revelation of the spirit as declares: "I came that they may have life and have it more abundantly," we should understand this not as a greater quantity of life, but as more intense life, deeper realisation of ourselves, closer union with the reality in which and of which we are. Death is not the victor of man's spirit; death's triumph, if really it be triumph, is over his temporary material embodiment. The outer form must change and pass away, otherwise our energies would for ever be restricted to the activities liberated through a meagre mass of matter, or as the ancient metaphor has it, we should be perpetually imprisoned in a narrow tomb. Death then does not triumph over life; it is the name we give to the term of life's activities in a particular material form. But such form, as we have seen, is not the principle of life; life is rather the principle of such form. It was then

surely a deeper consciousness of life, an insight of reality, that led the makers of the Mandæan liturgies to end their great pronouncements with the triumphant declaration: "The life conquers!"

Life is invisible; nay more, it is accessible to none of the outer physical senses. It is not heard, nor smelt, nor tasted, nor touched. Some say that life can be known only by living it; that is indeed true. But surely, and apart from the physical inner sense of somatic activities which we may add to the five outer means of sense, there is an immediate awareness of life in all feeling? Indeed what else is it but life that gives us feeling, both feeling tone and feeling attitude, as distinguished from physical sensation pure and simple, which we are asked to regard as solely the mechanical interplay of sense-objects and sense-organs? We feel our own life and we feel by sympathy the life in others. How all this comes about it is very difficult to say in spite of the unwearying effort of the intellect to solve the problem. For my own part I venture to think that physical research and the analysis of the intellect will never really solve this problem, though they will doubtless do most valuable work in defining it with ever increasing clearness, thus honourably co-operating in the preparatory work of solution. But the real solution, I believe, can be achieved only when we attain to self-consciousness of that spiritual order which is capable of really integrating the distinctive activities of our life and giving us a direct knowledge of their nature and inter-relations. The derivation theory of higher from lower will not serve us here. Émile Boutroux sees this clearly when he says, in his just published Herbert Spencer Lecture for last year, delivered at Oxford: "Neither thought, nor action, nor

feeling can be held self-sufficient or absolutely pre-eminent in the human soul. As the development of thought and action implies the intervention of feeling, so feeling itself develops, grows higher, nobler, more definite, rich and spiritual, under the influence of action and thought. In an ideal life, thought, action and feeling would be at the same time first principles all three, yet each of them yielding to the penetration of the others. So that their relation would be one of reciprocity and harmony, not of lineal derivation one from the other."¹ Indeed the unilinear theory of development is faced with grave difficulties in other regards. The error which has vitiated most of the philosophies of nature from Aristotle onwards is well pointed out by Bergson. Life is viewed by it as graded into the successive orders, vegetable, animal and human—vegetative, instinctive and rational life. These are regarded as the successive degrees of the development of one and the same tendency, whereas, says the writer of *Creative Evolution* (p. 142), "they are three divergent directions of an activity, that has split up as it grew." This is an illuminating suggestion. Life develops in different orders of activity directly from itself rather than from one another in successive stages; these interplay but do not proceed from one another. As to matter in relation to life, according to Bergson's theory, matter is the inversion or interruption of life. Here we are left with the feeling of confronting an unsolved dualism, unless we are to suppose that somehow or other life in resisting itself and interrupting itself appears as matter; but Bergson would doubtless not assent to this. Here we

¹ *The Relation between Thought and Action from the German and from the Classical Point of View*, Oxford, The Clarendon Press.

seem to require some name for reality more fundamental even than life. If we agree to call this spirit, then spirit might be said to create the expression of the life of the mind which we call matter or form, and in so doing to understand the reason of its own creative life, which is the life or mind of its creation.

But apart from this striving of the intellect to overpass itself and win to a deeper apprehension of reality by reflecting on the normal experiences of our mental existence, there are unusual modes or moods of experience which may justify us in taking a wider view of life's activities than that with which we started. Indeed, before having recourse to anything of an unusual nature, we might remind ourselves that already in everyday speech, which is the expression of common experience, we talk of feeling an audience, in other words the mood of the life of a crowd. Again we speak of the life of the bee, not of a particular bee, but of bees in general. There is social and community as well as individual life. Moreover we talk of the life of the forest, the life of the field. Is all this pure metaphor? Is there no reality sensed, no life lived in such experience? Let the intellectual abstractionist deny; concrete feeling affirms the contrary. There is then collective life in which the individual shares, and the mutual externality of individual organisms does not exclude the individual life from sharing in some measure in the collective life. But what shall we say when living organisms are no longer there before us to awaken this feeling of a greater life? What, for instance, of the over-feeling that comes to some when contemplating sea or sky or mountain heights, the feeling of a presence, significant, awe-inspiring or ravishing? A presence means life. There are indubitable records of

extensions of consciousness that bring the experient into such intimate contact with even inanimate nature, that he feels he is sharing in a greater life than he has ever known before. Life then can express itself, declare itself, there where normal perception asserts there is no life. In such experiences there is no inference ; it is not the result of intellectual activity. It is given in immediate feeling and is at times so vast and overwhelming that, in the state, it seems utterly vain to think of explaining it by any theory of the projection of our own feelings into the inanimate ; on the contrary the feeling is that of being plunged into a deeper stratum of reality. What is more real for us in feeling is surely a surer ground on which to erect a satisfactory interpretation of reality than any less vital persuasion of the senses. We may hesitate to jump to the conclusion that any such deeper experience we may have enjoyed is of a cosmic nature ; that would be begging too many questions. But it is hard to convince one who has even in a small measure sensed this greater life, that the testimony of the artist and poet and mystic is unworthy of inclusion in any genuinely unprejudiced survey of the reality of things.

Such then are a few of the reflections which it seems to me not inappropriate to make on the apparent confines of life.

G. R. S. MEAD.

RELIGION VERSUS MORALITY.

F. W. ORDE WARD, B.A.

MAN begins as a religious creature, but he is not a moral creature—rather the reverse. “*Operari sequitur esse.*” The former appears immediately as a grace, the latter as an achievement. Religion preceded morality, because the first question was not whether there existed a right and a wrong, a good and an evil, and these then were not divided as now by an impassable gulf. But ‘before the beginning of years’ the primitive beast-man or hermaphrodite or mollusc with the possibilities of man—whether Darwin’s pithecanthropic postulate or life sleeping in the stone—grew conscious of some Other One, person or presence or spirit, with which he or it must make terms for practical purposes at once or—die. Here we have the incunabula of religion, in the sense of the distinction between the ego and the non-ego, or the greater ego which comprehended and to a certain extent explained the ego to itself.

Morality has always lagged behind religion; it varied with varying conditions. The morality of one age was the immorality of the next, as the sanguinary prescriptions and proscriptions of Yahweh were the polar opposites of Christ’s teaching. Men seemed never of one and the same mind, some preferring freedom and some despotism, when they would be saved the trouble of thinking for themselves or managing their own affairs. The strong hand, the iron rule, appeal

to certain natures and certain nations; they only respect government that kicks and beats them into shape. Look at the Germans, for instance, an empire of slaves at the mercy of the drill-sergeant and a crazy Kaiser, the victim of a monstrous megalomania.

Morality does not play any part here, but religion does. We can get rid of the one by Act of Parliament or an imperial rescript, but not of the other, because the latter is bound up with the nature of man as part of his ultimate psychology. Voltaire described England as a nation with fifty religions and one sauce; but he was a shallow thinker. It would be far more in accordance with the facts to say: We have fifty moralities and only one religion, which provides sauce for all. For servile natures and nations the problem does not arise whether a particular course is right or wrong, good or evil, but whether the subjects must obey and obsequious Germans or others must conform, or what is the length and weight of the tyrant's arm. Can he or his law be resisted with impunity or not? What will be the probable consequences or the approximate results to a herd of slaves or cowards? Child-peoples are rarely moral. They do not understand morality and they do not want it; but they are always very religious.

The autobiography, the *Memoirs*, of Benvenuto Cellini exactly and intimately expresses this view of things—the *régime* of and the preference for fraud and force, which was consistent with any amount of immorality, tempered by religious observances, wax candles, penance, fast and pious practices. A man might come red-handed to confession, mumble a form of words and receive absolution and go away to sin again. What had religion to do with morality? There

was no harm in murder or in the seduction of a friend's wife, if only the sinner were not found out and made the appropriate offering to God or his priest.

Religion did not arise, as Lucretius and the philosophers have thought, from fear or a feeling of helpless dependency, but in a sense of imperfection that required additions and supplements and a process towards completion. It has nothing whatever to do with right or wrong, good or evil, but was at its earliest and in its simplest expression an instinctive automatic logical impulse towards self-fulfilment or self-realisation. It is at first absolutely non-moral, and the great province of ethics lies entirely outside its scope or (shall we say?) periscope. One might be as wicked as he liked and break every law, whether human or divine, and obey in letter and spirit alike Luther's brutal dictum '*Pecca fortiter*,' and yet remain severely religious, if he now and then burnt a pinch of incense to his God and bowed the knee at times in the Temple of Rimmon. God was only a glorified man, an idealised ancestor, who would inevitably know all and therefore pardon all, being of the same mixed and contradictory character himself.

It must have been something of a shock when men discovered, however tardily, that religion must have an ethical side and was not complete without this, and began to moralise religion. They saw at the outset no contradiction in the antagonism between good and evil, and nobody (so experience and observation taught) could be always either alone. Society was the measure of morality, and in the early ethical stages that of course was very low indeed. Croce assures us that Piccolomini and Aretino actually wrote books to prescribe the behaviour of procuresses and courtesans. This was a special literature of the *cinque-cento* period.

It took centuries and centuries before men could and would believe in the union of the moral and the religious elements, that no one could be holy and could offer a holy offering unless he conformed at least to the dictates of the Decalogue. The sixth commandment and the seventh were more honoured in the breach than in the observance. To kill a man was not so bad as to kill a horse or as some trivial heresy, and adultery belonged to the venial indiscretions of youth; while, on the other hand, an omitted formula was almost an unpardonable sin.

Religion, in its ultimates and the last analysis, is a sense of one's own exceeding grandeur and even divinity, that "we are greater than we know," God as well as man, the perpetual testimony to 'the Incarnation.' It was never 'unselfing' or 'de-egotising,' but rather over-selfing or super-egotising in the Supreme Personality, by the consciousness of the Christ within us. We only realise and fulfil ourselves, whenever we have crucified and surrendered ourselves in daily services of sacrifice for God and others. When we have lost ourselves we find ourselves again in God. Union and communion with God by faith and love is man's highest self-consummation and this is religion—the identification of the human with the Divine. Religion then emerges and operates as a craving for the Infinite, the Impossible, the Unattainable, the Inconceivable, the Ideal and the Real, which are one—the Real first; and yet at one and the same time a craving for the homely, the familiar, the friendly, the common, the universal, like the light and the air—that we are or ought to be the All, ourselves alone, and yet in and for everybody and everything.

It is the hunger and thirst for independence, in

the very dependence of the spirit on its thousand forms, without which it could not function at all, a perpetual need of self-renewal and self-effacement, which are the two moments of self-manifestation. Religion appears to be the most intimate and intense and enduring relation, the light of life, the principle of vitality and its shadow, death. For unless we continue daily dying we cannot possibly be living. Death is the breath of life, the promise of fuller and larger life. If this tremendous process, this life-death or death-life process, did not go on every moment, there could be no existence whatever. St. Paul knew and declared this infinite scientific and spiritual truth: "I die daily." But then, as his writings prove, he was a Stoic as well as a Christian, and in some respects more of a Stoic than a Christian. In the present war every soldier, as he gives up his life for his country and his king, in the very act of passing from the one world to the other, realises (as so many have) the truth and beauty and necessity of dying and yet more dying.

"Mors aperit portam vitæ divosque revelat."

In all religions that ever existed or do exist, anyone can prove for himself by personal examination of the records that they teem with inconsistencies and contradictions. But when we have grown up with these and fed upon them and drunk them in with our mother's milk, when we have lived with them day and night and been educated upon them, it is impossible to see their immanent antagonisms. They may in their structural parts appear opposites, but nevertheless they only complete each other. So much depends on the time and place and mood which are always changing. There can be no growth without change as the character widens and deepens. The falsehood of yesterday is

the truth of to-day; the vice of yesterday is the virtue of to-morrow. Look at the history of Enthusiasm alone. Absolute morality seems to be the dream of theologians or prophets and priests. Conduct makes this clear enough, to say nothing of the pitiful hair-splitting and logomachies of our casuists. There is nothing but Spirit, as Benedetto Croce says, and sometimes the materials with which it works are good or bad or indifferent. Nevertheless it energises in all by accommodation and perpetual adjustment or readjustment, and so the eternal relativity goes on. Contradictions will never be overcome by the petty logic of the schools, and they constitute the *pabulum* of the heart's logic. If facts and processes work together, it is idle to declare they ought not—they do (*solvitur ambulando*)—and therefore we must make the best use possible of this. In the ultimate logic the explanation or the revelation will be found, if anyone asks for explanation. But it is only super-fools or professors with a prejudice or a theory who want this.

Science and metaphysics both help to build up the glorious super-structure, and temples of thought upon antagonisms and the unit of consciousness—subject *contra* object. This is the universal 'hendiadys,' the one by two, the unity in difference, the one against the other and therefore with the other, the two parts of the great cosmical cross, with its positive and negative elements, its affirmations and negations, its thesis and antithesis, which for ever fight against each other and yet pull and push together. Antinomies are the foundation-stones of churches and states; and it is as true to say unless a church or state is divided against itself, it cannot stand, as to repeat Christ's contrary declaration. God governs the world by dialectic, by discussion among

men, by opposing views and forces, along the lines of most resistance, and progress for ever comes up against the wind like a thunderstorm. Both statements about division in the camp, our Lord's and that of Science, are equally true, and both in accordance with the facts—often first tragedies and then human comedies. Just as Walpole asserted, Life is to those who feel, a tragedy, to those who think, a comedy. Because nothing stands still for a moment and everything flows. Suddenly, after years of gestation, a new synthesis appears, in which contraries, opposites, antitheses, antagonisms, are merged and reconciled. And then, by the law of resolution, this breaks up into hostile camps. And so the warfare proceeds, from one condition of unstable equilibrium to another. "*Natura (homo) non nisi per oppositionem progreditur.*"

We see then that religion and morality would neither be vital nor useful, could not be religion and morality, unless they were continually quarrelling. From the start they did not agree, and to the end they will never fully agree. What is right, in either case, and what is wrong? What is good and what is evil? What holiness and what unholiness? What our duty to God in the most compendious form and what our duty to man? These relations are never the same and never true yoke-fellows. That is the fault or the consequence of the particular periods, of the cosmic process which is not ethical, of the flux, of the rapacious relativity, in which we are always being submerged and refashioned. At one time morality kills religion, at another religion kills morality. Sometimes it is all religion and sometimes all morality. One cannot be righteous overmuch or religious overmuch with impunity. If we are logical in one or the other to the

bitter end, we find ourselves landed in the most flagrant absurdities. Nature, man, God, were never logical in this way, but by check and counter-check.

Progress is a curve, a rhythmic movement, and not a straight line. Rectilinear schemes may suit the schools, but nothing else—not human nature, not a working living changing cosmos. We are not at the mercy of an iron categorical imperative. “We ought and so we must” is perpetually countered by “We will if we can.” Religion entered the world with the first man’s first heart-beat, the first man’s first breath. His earliest conscious feeling or ejaculation was wonder, a very big, mouth-filling Oh!—which keeps growing bigger and bigger every day and really knows little more than it did at the beginning. The palæolithic man’s brain was certainly no smaller than our own at the present day, and would never have endured for long some of our contemporary neolithic theology. We can, by his surviving legacies of art, prove or infer that he was a man of prayer. His work breathes the very spirit of prayer, of adoration, of Christ-consciousness. And though his surgical knife was but a flint, he evidently understood trepanning. He worshipped his Other, which he threw off from himself, transformed and glorified and idealised man, at once human and divine. He felt alike the unity and the helpful antagonism of God and man, himself the shadow of the real Substance.

Morality came in, like law, as a parenthesis, with crude speculations on conduct. What the tribe or family said was right, became right, till a stronger tribe or family dispossessed it with a new formula. It could not but change as races multiplied and spread over the earth or conditions altered and fresh problems presented themselves. But religion was unchanging in

its central secret of mystery, its attitude towards the unknown and the unknowable. It asked for no explanations, for on that side lay science, but only for room and liberty to adore. Miracle, the unsolved aspect of life and nature, was the breath of its being. To know all would be to know nothing, as it could leave no time or place or material for imagination and the creative faculty. Religion stood out as the one necessary and permanent element in human affairs. Ethical customs and systems followed each other by the thousand and vindicated or condemned behaviour. They were all more or less purely negative, while religion is the Universal Positive, the Great Affirmation, the Eternal Yea as against the Eternal Nay. The one deals with our conduct and is practical—deals with what we do. The other deals with our life—with what we are.

We have no lack of interpreters, critics, casuists, commentators, but, building as they do on authority and tradition and arrested growth, they never last. Compare our own morals with the recent period which permitted and defended duelling and its preposterous code of so-called honour, and see the difference. Feudal forms, class-made laws, ethics of convenience and compromise, varnished vice, manners established in the seat of morals, dignified depravity, held the field everywhere. Ours is decent at any rate, while theirs betrayed the principles of the poultry-yard, barbarism and brutality however gilded and refined. The successful duellist or seducer was the idol of society, and secretly (if not openly) admired by the Church. If a man was a 'gentleman,' that sufficed. He might go everywhere and do anything, he might be at once a law-maker and law-breaker, while beauty continued to smile on him, court and camp welcomed him as a

guest. He blew the trumpet in Sion, and piety patronized him as the flower of chivalry. Under the ægis of the Establishment he grew and flourished and did very much as he liked—a chartered and cherished libertine. He was the inevitable abortion of a diseased age, when church and state alike were rotten through and through. But it was always so, and always will be; '*Corruptio optimi pessima.*'

But where was religion then? And where shall we find it at the present day? We must not ask the Rev. R. J. Campbell, who like Balaam has gone from altar to altar in search of new enchantments, and like Balaam at last has been at last constrained to bless that which he once cursed. 'Spiritual pilgrimages' of this kind, even when personally conducted by a brilliant man, are rather expensive luxuries and may drop much of real value by the way. And where will he end his pilgrimage? He may well have many more before him. Agnosticism has charms, though somewhat bleak and barren, as Mr. Campbell knows, and Romanism is not without attractions. Theism, pantheism, modernism, have been sucked dry, and nothing seems left now except to affirm everything or deny everything. One might almost have thought that Mr. Campbell was endeavouring to follow the great Italian philosopher's definition of the Spirit as 'infinite possibility passing into infinite actuality.'

The religious principle, in its true inwardness, never varies. We find it in all the churches, but chiefly among the heretics of the churches, the 'hope of the world,' and generally hidden away in holes and corners and obscure places. It never occupies the fat sinecures of stipendiary stupidity or established ignorance. It exfoliates from time to time passing vanities

of dead dogmas or petrified and putrifying formulæ, outgrown creeds and confessions. But it soon recovers itself, and starts once more with renewed strength like a giant to run its course, fighting with and for and against the existing ethical framework, with which it is associated or even incorporated and identified.

They still agree to differ and differ to agree, ethics (sometimes the ethics of a worm, sometimes the ethics of a fool and always the ethics of imperfection) and religion, the two inseparable and incommensurable factors that make man and that man makes. But everything is mixed and everything relative, and no pure good and no pure evil exists or will ever exist. The Spirit of God energises in a most imperfect medium. He is necessarily limited by his materials. But we are growing a little more particular about our spiritual diet. It was asserted by some mediæval saint that he had reached such a pitch of indifference to food that all of it tasted like dry straw. He had probably attained a still higher pitch of mendacity. And now

“The hungry sheep look up and” *will be* “fed.”

F. W. ORDE WARD.

SOME RED INDIAN RITES.

M. CARTA STURGE.

ONE scarcely expects, when taking up a dry looking Report, such as those published in Washington by the 'Bureau of American Ethnology,' to find oneself suddenly rapt away into a world of poetry, or immersed in a mystic region where one seems to stand in the awesome presence and silence of unseen and eternal forces. Yet such sometimes may be the case, and there are some who speak of such documents with bated breath. Still more thrilling is it to talk face to face with some of those who have lived among Red Indians for years and been able to produce these reports, as for instance with the late Mr. Frank Hamilton Cushing, one of the most famous of them, or with Miss Alice Fletcher, whose knowledge of the Indians, especially of those living in the great valleys of the Mississippi or the vast plains beyond, is such that she was employed by the Government in Washington to apportion allotments to individual Indians when the plan of Reservations had been found to fail.

By mixture with white people the manners and customs of the Red Indians have become so greatly modified, and so much has even been forgotten by them within the last generation, that the greatest pains have been needed to arrive at their original ideas, and to be sure that there is no element in them which has been derived from Christianity. Miss Fletcher, among others, has had the good fortune to study these at first hand

from priests and chiefs well versed in the manners, and especially in the rites, of their tribes. She has in some instances had every word phonographed as it came from the mouth of one of these ancient narrators, and so obtained the most careful and exact records. Of such obscure notions as the Indians have about God and about the Cosmos in general she was careful to get full explanations, from one or two priests in particular, so that she has been able to arrive at minute shades of meaning both as to their religious ideas and the words by which they express them.

Miss Fletcher's intimacy with Indians ranges over many tribes, from the Pawnees and kindred stock as far south as Oklahoma to the Omahas in the great plains of Nebraska; so that when she is describing their religion, what she is giving is by no means merely local or exceptional, but is found with only slight variations spread all over these vast regions, although expressed in many different languages. A Pawnee gave her almost exactly the same idea of God as did an expert of the Omaha, the former speaking of him as Tira'wa, whilst the latter used the name Waconda.

"Waconda," says Miss Fletcher, "stands for the mysterious life-power permeating all natural forms and forces and all phases of man's conscious life,"—which looks like simple pantheism. But the Indians also attach a certain idea of personality to Waconda; he was not simply the life-breath of the universe, but a Being capable of feelings of pity and sympathy and able also to send powerful help to mankind when called upon to do so. The Indian regards himself as in a closer relation with animals and plants than has been customary with the Western mind. He is "one of many manifestations of life, all of which are endowed

with kindred powers, physical and psychical, and animated by a life-force emanating from the mysterious Waconda." Indeed he regards men and animals as so closely interrelated that, not only is he able to nourish his physical life by using as food animals and the fruits of the earth, but in some way "similar to the assimilation of food, man's faculties and powers can be reinforced from the animals." This explains why animals play so large a part in their rites, and why they believe they can obtain the swiftness, the courage, or the skill, in hunting and so on, of certain animals and birds, by wearing their skins or feathers.

Subject to Waconda or Tira'wa are lesser powers with whom, as they can be seen and felt, it is easier for man to come in contact. Such are the Winds, the Sun, the North Star, the Golden Eagle and the Spirits of the Earth and Sky. These are the 'deputies or attributes of Tira'wa.' He himself is too awful to be addressed directly, and therefore the Indians appeal to his dwelling-place or to some of his attributes. We have an instance of this in one of their most beautiful hymns, an invocation with which they begin one of their most striking ceremonies, the Hako. Fully to understand the intention of the hymn, a stanza or two must be quoted in the original. The absence of the peculiar music to which it should be sung is a great loss. The music in combination with the words is expected to bring out a psychical influence of a particular kind, as was the case with the various 'modes' employed by the Greeks according to the kind of impression they wished to produce. The religious music of the Red Indians is intended to arouse certain subtle resonances which are believed to be in sympathy with and therefore able to call out still more subtle vibrations of

unseen energies, in a manner the idea of which is familiar to students of Eastern and Semitic lore.

The opening invocation for the Hako ceremony begins thus:

“ Ho-o-o !
I 'hare, 'hare, 'ahe !
I 'hare, 'hare, 'ahe !
Heru ! Awahokshu, he !
I 'hare, 'hare, 'ahe !

“ Ho-o-o !
I 'hare, 'hare, 'ahe !
I 'hare, 'hare, 'ahe !
Heru ! Hotoru, he !
I 'hare, 'hare, 'ahe ! ”

The exclamation ‘Ho-o-o,’ in which the o’s are prolonged for a considerable interval, is sung with a peculiar pulsation of the voice. It is a preliminary to call the attention of the worshippers to an attribute of the very essence of life, namely rhythmic vibration. The effect of this pulsating note, says an eye-witness of this ceremony, is of a peculiarly solemn nature, and at once introduces a new atmosphere, making one realize that a holy presence is about to be invoked. No translation can at all adequately give the meaning of the words which follow, each of which has so rich a connotation that we can only render them by whole sentences, and even these are unsatisfactory. ‘I 'hare,’ which is repeated in varying forms, with at last a change of the ‘r’ into an ‘h’ for the sake of euphony, is a word intimating that the mind has now to concentrate itself upon something demanding one’s whole attention, something of profound significance which

needs to be reflected and meditated upon, whilst one is forgetful of all besides. The slow repetition of the word as it is sung more and more fastens the attention, until the mind of everyone is in the deeply solemn mood necessary for calling upon the great Power or one of his emissaries.

And now a feeling of profoundest reverence has overspread the assembly, which is emphasized by the word 'Heru.' This, like the other words, has a deep connotation and expresses reverence felt on coming into the presence of one able to give us utmost help.

'Awa' or 'Tira'wa' is too great to be directly addressed, and therefore 'Hokshu,' signifying the dwelling of the sacred powers, is appealed to. 'He!' is the last syllable of the second line repeated; and the final line of the stanza reiterates once more the word which calls for reverent and concentrated heedfulness. In the second stanza the power appealed to is that of the Winds under the name of 'Hotoru.' In the remaining eleven stanzas 'Awa' is appealed to by means of his various attributes, as the 'giver of breath,' the 'father of strength,' 'wall of defence,' 'giver of food,' and so on; and the final appeal is especially striking, as 'Awa' is appealed to as the 'way' or 'channel,' metaphorically the 'way to himself,' and in the rite it alludes also to the channel into the sacred enclosure where the ceremony is to take place and actual contact with the higher powers is to be found.

Every stanza begins with the pulsating breath and with the repetition of the last line, ending again with the same. Repetition forms a very large part of these rhythmic Indian hymns, and in some there is much more reiteration even than we find here. Repetition is believed to steady the life-rhythm of

those present, and to bring it into conformity with the great rhythms of nature.

This hymn has been thus translated into English :

“ We heed as unto thee we call ;
Oh, send to us thy potent aid !
Help us, Oh, holy place above !
We heed as unto thee we call.

“ We heed as unto thee we call ;
Oh, send to us thy potent aid !
Help us, Hotoru, giver of breath !
We heed as unto thee we call.

“ We heed as unto thee we call ;
Oh, send to us thy potent aid !
Help us, Shakuru, father of strength !
We heed as unto thee we call.”

And so it continues, the third line being always different, “ Help us, centre within,” “ promise of fire,” and so on.

This gives but a faint hint, as those who have heard it tell us, of the force of the original, where each word has so full a content, and is arranged and set to notes in a way to call out the harmonics, as it were, in the universe and in ourselves.

On the birth of a child it has to be formally introduced, not only to the lesser powers which mediate between it and Waconda, or Tira'wa, but also to all Nature of which it forms a part. In the Omaha and cognate tribes there is a beautiful little ceremony for this purpose, which takes place about the eighth day after the birth. It is described as follows. On the appointed day the priest arrived and, standing at

the door of the tent within which the infant lay, raised his right hand and intoned in a loud and impressive voice the following chant :

“ Ho ! Ye Sun, Moon, Stars, all ye that move in the heavens !

I bid you hear me.

Into your midst has come a new life.

Consent ye, I implore !

Make its path smooth, that it may reach the brow of the first hill.

“ Ho ! Ye Winds, Clouds, Rain, Mist, all ye that move in the air !

I bid you hear me.

Into your midst has come a new life.

Consent ye, I implore !

Make its path smooth that it may reach the brow of the second hill.

“ Ho ! Ye Hills, Valleys, Rivers, Lakes, Trees, Grasses, all ye of the earth !

I bid you hear me,” etc.

“ Ho ! Ye Birds, great and small, that fly in the air !”

“ Ho ! Ye Animals, great and small, that dwell in the forest !”

“ Ho ! Ye Insects that creep among the grasses and burrow in the ground !

I bid you hear me,” etc.

“ Ho ! All ye of the heavens, all ye of the air, all ye of the earth !

I bid you all to hear me.
Into your midst has come a new life.
Consent ye, consent ye all, I implore!
Make its path smooth—then shall it travel beyond the
four hills.”¹

Such was the introduction of the child to Nature ; but it was not yet a member of the tribe. For this another ceremony was necessary, which took place as soon as it could run alone. This rite was called the ‘Turning of the Child’ and several children took part in it at once. It was a much more elaborate affair, but unfortunately some of the details have been lost. Those that have survived are due to the curiosity of a little boy, afterwards an important chief, who hid himself in the sacred tent on one occasion. Having the very retentive memory of the Indian, he was able afterwards to sing the six songs of the ceremonial and his account was reinforced by fragments that have come down in kindred tribes.

A tent was very specially prepared and consecrated. In the centre was a fire, a stone being set beside it on the eastern side and a ball of grass on the other. Each child was brought to the door by its mother, but had to enter the tent alone carrying its new moccasins. It was met by the priest, who in this rite was the priest of Thunder, a lesser power presiding over war. He led the child towards the fire ; having impressively uttered the words, “I am a powerful being ; I breathe from my lips over you,” he lifted it and placed it on the stone in a standing position. He then sang a ritual invocation to the Four Winds :

¹ The four hills are the four ages of man : infancy, youth, manhood, and old age.

“Ye Four, come hither and stand! Near shall ye stand;
In four groups shall ye stand;
Here shall ye stand, in this place stand.”

Thereon there is a sound as of thunder. The priest then lifts the child and makes him stand with his face towards the East; he is lifted again and turned to the South, then to the West and to the North, and once more is brought back to the East. In this way the child is introduced to the Winds as very important deputies of Waconda. Another ritual song is then sung directly addressed to the Winds, after which they should help him throughout his life.

The child's new moccasins are next put on, and he is told to take four steps, which are symbolical of his entrance on a long life. The moccasins also have significance. When the child is born it is given a pair of them, in one of which a small hole has been cut. This is intended to prevent an early death; it indicates that the moccasins are worn out and therefore the child cannot undertake a journey! Now, in its fresh start on the journey of life, it must have new ones. Finally a new name is given it and its baby one abolished, and each child is told what tabu it has to observe.

For the boy yet more was to come, a rite of dedication of the future warrior. A lock of his hair was cut off by the priest, dedicated to Thunder, the war-power, and carefully put away in a sacred repository. The Indian believes, as do most aborigines, that the hair is in vital connection with the individual's life. The presentation of the hair to Thunder therefore implied the dedication of the boy from whose head it was severed, and thus he was given into the safe

keeping of the god. The ceremony ended with an invocation to Fire or Lightning :

“ Come hither, haste to help me,
Ye flames, ye flames, Oh come !
O red-hot fire, hasten !
O haste, ye flames, to come !
Come speedily to help me,
Ye flames, ye flames, Oh come ! ”

During the chanting of this song the ball of grass is thrown into the air and as it descends bursts into flame.

After the ‘ Turning ’ the child was believed to show a marked increase in strength and in the power of self-control.

These are instances of rites which had to do with the individual ; but there were many that had to do with the whole tribe. Among the most interesting of them is one elaborately described by Miss Fletcher in a book published by the Ethnological Bureau called *The Hako ; a Pawnee Ceremony*. She herself had witnessed it several times as practised by the Omahas ; but they had lost some of its details, and it took her fifteen years to arrive at a knowledge of it in its entirety. She had the good fortune to know a Pawnee who, while remaining in perfect sympathy with the ideas and customs of his tribe, had been reared in a school under American influence. Thus, speaking English as perfectly as his native tongue, he was able to give the minutest shades of meaning as to both the thought and the words of his people. Through him she became acquainted with a venerable Ku’rahus, that is one who is accustomed to perform the ritual ceremonies. The

old priest regarded these as so sacred that it was difficult at first to prevail upon him to recite the hundred songs of the Hako or to explain the rite for fear of profanation. His confidence, however, was finally won. Thereupon, feeling sure it would be treated with reverence, he gave the whole from beginning to end, with explanations of everything as he went. The songs were registered by a graphophone. Few aboriginal ceremonies have been so carefully recorded and preserved as this Pawnee rite, coming direct, as it did, from one who had long practised it, and rendered by one able to interpret the language and thoughts to a nicety. It is a ceremony widely spread among the Indians and is extremely ancient.

Originally its purpose was to ensure offspring to the members of a tribe ; consequently the cosmic forces such as day and night, sun and moon, the heavens and earth and so on, which they regarded as male and female, play a large part in it in a dramaturgic manner. But in course of time its object became extended to that of sealing in friendship two different gentes or tribes, who would henceforth live forever in peace together.

As the rite in its origin was a family affair, this idea was retained when it became a link between two tribes. The chief of the tribe which took the lead was called the 'Father,' whilst the one who took the leading part in the tribe to be approached was the 'Son.'

The Father called together his relatives and the most important men of the tribe. These, with most of the clan, assembled together in a consecrated tent. The ceremony was led by a Ku'rahus who had previously been through a form of purification,—a sweat-bath followed by immersion in the smoke of

burning scented grass. The Ku'rahus then prepared everything needed for the rite, singing the ritual songs as he proceeded. He first invoked Tira'wa or Waconda, or rather the lesser powers that did his bidding, by singing the hymn already partly quoted above; and when this rhythmic chant had been slowly and impressively sung everyone was in fitting mood for the entrance of the powers.

Now have the sacred pipes or feathered stems to be made. These sacred pipes were held in the deepest reverence. They might never be placed on the ground or on anything but the consecrated cat's skin dedicated to their use. The making of them was a very solemn act because at every step in it a power was thought to be received. None of the symbolic objects used were regarded as mere symbols or representations. The divine powers were for the assistants actually there in the objects, and anyone misusing them or touching them irreverently would bring disaster, not only upon himself, but probably upon the tribe as well. There must be two of these feathered stems, one to represent the male element and the other the female, and of these the latter had the pre-eminence and took the lead of the male. The stem was made of ash and was rather over a yard long. Every minutest article used, not only had a special meaning, but was believed to convey the divine power. A special tree had to be used, a special skin, a special animal's fat; everything was the living symbol, if we may so call it, of some particular power, and nothing else could be used. For instance, the wild cat symbolized wisdom and tact. It does not rush upon its prey, but never fails to gain the object of its pursuit. Its influence, therefore, was necessary in order to give "ability to accomplish a

purpose with tact and without exciting opposition." Apart from this ceremony, the wild cat was one of the insignia of a chief, that he might possess these fitting qualities. The preparation of the feathered stems was a long affair. Each had to be painted,—the female blue to bring in the masculine element of the heavens, the male green to introduce the feminine earth-power. Each had a groove running down its length painted red, the colour of life, and down this groove descended the spirits of the lesser powers to vivify the whole proceeding. To the blue stem were fastened ten feathers from the Golden Eagle, Kawas, arranged fan-like. As Kawas soared so near to the abode of the powers, he was essentially the medium between them and man. Near one end was fastened the head of a woodpecker, symbolically connected with the storm-gods; it thus could protect from disaster; from lightning or tempest. The stick was also run through the body and head of a duck, since the duck knew the ways of both land and water and was an unerring guide.

These feathered stems were held in unutterable awe; at the same time the deepest affection was felt for them, so much so that Miss Fletcher says they are never spoken of without a brightening of the eyes and a feeling of great happiness. A man carrying one, though he should meet his most deadly enemy, will remain unmolested.

Equally sacred was the ear of corn which played so leading a part in the Hako. It symbolized the 'Mother,' the 'supernatural power that dwells in the earth' and brings forth its fruit. She is called H'Atira, or 'Mother breathing forth life,' and is spoken of as 'Mother Corn.' As she receives her power for

bringing forth life from above, she is painted blue at the top, the colour of the sky, the dwelling place of Tira'wa. Four lines of blue extend downwards beyond the mass of colour and are the four channels down which the vivifying influences descend. The powers are regarded as quadruple, in analogy with the four points of the compass. Therefore all songs addressed to them are in stanzas of four lines, or perhaps of six to include as well above and below. Songs to do with human beings simply are in stanzas of three lines only. The number three does not seem to have so much significance for the Indians as it has with us.

When everything has now been made ready, and messengers have been sent forth to notify the Son—whose home may be distant a hundred miles or more—and an assenting response brought back, at early dawn on the succeeding day the sacred objects are brought outside the lodge and all are solemnly consecrated together. For this they are held up to the sky towards the East, that they may be once more vivified and acknowledged by the divine powers who are believed to be actually present in them.

And now the party is ready for the march. They have so to place themselves as roughly to make the form of an eagle, with the feathered stems representing wings. These being waved gently in the wind figure the flight of an eagle. The whole thing is a representative drama. Finally the chief, carrying the Mother Corn, steps forth from behind and advances to the front. This indicates that she has always supported them in the past and will continue to do so in the present and future. Meanwhile a song is sung in the powerfully vibrating mode of which no indication can be given in the translation.

“ Mother with the life-giving power now comes.
Stepping out of far distant days she comes,
Days wherein to our fathers gave she food.
As to them, so now unto us, she gives.
Thus she will to our children faithful be.
Mother with the life-giving power now comes.

“ Mother with the life-giving power now comes.
Now she forward moves, leading as we walk
Toward the future, where blessings she will give,
Gifts for which we have prayed granting to us.
Mother with the life-giving power now comes.”

Before going forward there is an almost passionate appeal to the gods for help :

“ Look down, West gods, look upon us ! We gaze afar
on your dwelling.
Look down while here we are standing, look upon us,
ye mighty !
Ye thunder gods, now behold us !
Ye lightning gods, now behold us !
Ye that bring life, ye that bring death, now behold
us ! ”

“ Look down, South gods, look upon us. . . .
“ Ye daylight gods, ye sunshine gods, ye increase gods
. . . now behold us ! ”

And so it goes on, calling on yet other gods to give their blessing.

And now the journey begins. The chief leads, carrying Mother Corn ; the Ku'rahus and his assistant, one on each side of the chief, hold aloft the feathered stems ; and all are arrayed in ritual robes of buffalo skin. The medicine men follow with their insignia, and the choir with their drum ; and then come all the

important members of the tribe. Bringing up the rear are ponies laden with the presents for the Son, and with the necessary supplies for the journey. On leaving their own familiar haunts a certain anxiety sets in as to possible difficulties and dangers on the way; and they appeal in solemn chant to Mother Corn, who reassures them in answering chant, promising full protection and guidance. Those who have witnessed the Hako say that this procession is a most impressive sight. If it is descried by a party of Indians on the war-path, these turn aside that they may not meet it, since before the feathered stems the warrior must lay down his arms and put aside his anger.

Everything met by the Hako party is seen with other eyes than usual, trees, mountains, plains, flocks and herds in a glow "that never was on sea or land," and they are addressed in appropriate song. If a river crosses their path, it must be forded, not in the ordinary careless way, but with extreme solemnity to the usual accompaniment of ceremonial song in which Kawas, the eagle, is invoked. For not one moment throughout the journey are the travellers allowed to forget that they are in the presence of supernatural powers. Many of the hymns in which these are addressed as the party progresses are exceedingly beautiful, but too long for quotation.

On the night before arriving at the village of the Son, the spirit of Mother Corn goes forward and reveals to him in a dream that the Father is approaching and warns him to be ready. With her go the spirits of the Hako party, who by deep meditation and concentration have consolidated as it were into one spirit, the solidarity of human nature being with them a realized actuality; and in this oneness of spirit they impress

themselves upon the sleeping mind of the Son, who prepares himself for the solemn ceremony to come.

And now, on the arrival of the party, many fresh preparatory rites are gone through before the actual ceremony itself begins. It is a very long proceeding and lasts many days, and can be witnessed only by the chosen few. It is dramaturgic, a sort of acted-out process of birth far too long to describe here.

It is said that, if any two tribes have performed this solemn rite together, they can never go to war with each other again, but will live henceforth and forever in assured peace.

This is one only of innumerable ceremonies practised in old days and until quite recent times by the Red Indians. It is impossible here to convey any adequate idea of the exceedingly powerful effect made on those present by the strangely vibrating rhythms of the songs and the pulsating influence of certain syllables as they are intoned by the singers. Some suggestion of it may be given if I mention that Miss Fletcher and a friend of hers, both of whom I have heard describe it, on one occasion found the rite so absorbing and enthralling and its influence so powerful that they sat for twenty-four hours on straight-backed chairs without rising from their seats, without food, without sleep and at the time without feeling fatigue.

M. CARTA STURGE.

PREMONITIONS: SOME SUGGESTIONS TOWARDS EXPLANATION.

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THERE are various ways in which it is claimed that the future is or may become known to man. On the one hand we have scientific prediction (of which more anon). On the other we have such phenomena as that of prophecy—the utterance of a prediction either by word of mouth or by the aid of writing, in a conscious, partly conscious, or unconscious state; of premonition, in the narrow sense of that word, as connoting a ‘feeling’ revealing the nature of future events; and of prevision or foreseeing. It is convenient to group these phenomena together, because they have an element in common, which serves to mark them off from scientific prediction—namely, that the conscious reason of man is not involved in their production,—and they may be conveniently referred to in general as ‘premonitions.’

The reality of such phenomena—and it is with this question that any discussion of them must begin—is a matter to be resolved purely by empirical evidence. No amount of argument can affect the question one way or another; it can at best only predispose our minds to accept either a positive or negative answer, as the case may be. But I do not propose here to relate any new cases of premonition. Collections of instances, such as the Rev. Claud Field’s *Shadows Cast Before*, are available, and must

be held to establish at least a *prima facie* case for investigation, even though the evidential value of some of these stories is not high.

Can we not, however, dismiss all such instances as mere chance coincidences? To do this is either to confess our ignorance of the causes at work or to go further and deny any connection between premonition and fulfilment, any natural law binding them together in experience. But I do not think the calculus of probability will allow us—or at least those of us who wish to follow scientific method—to make this denial. A premonition now and again fulfilled in a merely general sense needs no specific explanation. But the constant recurrence of the phenomenon and the fulfilment of a whole series of predicted details demand our serious attention; here probability urges us to formulate a natural law and thus bring the phenomenon within the pale of utility. The law, however, can be no simple one. *Premonitions that remain unfulfilled, or are partially fulfilled only, must be brought within the statement of this law, if it is to possess true generality.* Too frequently there is a tendency to regard unfulfilled premonitions as arising from quite different causes from those of fulfilled premonitions. But the principle of the non-multiplication of causes (justifiable on pragmatic grounds) ought to warn us against this attitude of mind, especially as there is, in fact, no sharp line of demarcation between the two classes, one merging gradually into the other through various stages of accuracy and inaccuracy.

To my own thought the hypothesis of the 'sub-conscious self' is by no means an easy one. Though writers on psychological questions use the term very glibly, it may be questioned whether they have any

clear idea of what they mean by 'subconsciousness,' because it appears that any such notion must involve in itself the elements of self-contradiction, as of that which is at once conscious and unconscious, and yet neither one nor the other. From the pragmatic standpoint however, we may, I think, use the hypothesis so long as we find it more useful than any alternative; and, once we have adopted it, we should, I think, not fail to make use of it to the full, even if in the end we have, with another school of psychologists, to substitute 'discarnate intelligence' for 'subconscious mind.' It seems then to me that the hypothesis of the subconscious self serves as well in the case of premonitions as in the cases of other psychological phenomena where its utility is admitted.

From the past man is enabled to judge as to the future, sometimes with extraordinary accuracy—as in the case of astronomical predictions,—sometimes with little hope of success—as when I attempt to predict the behaviour of a certain capricious friend of mine. Now all such judgments are based upon a belief in the uniformity of nature—that is, the persistence of general relations or natural laws—and upon the accurate observation of events with the aim of formulating such laws of relation. In other words, they are the product of acute sensibility *plus* the power of induction and deduction, that is reason. But reason—and, perhaps, reason in a higher degree—must be attributed to the subconscious self; moreover, if I may be allowed to speak in seemingly materialistic terms, I would say that there are many sensations possible to man, which do not penetrate his consciousness, but which may reach his subconsciousness. If this be granted, it is not difficult to draw the inference

that the subconscious mind may be capable of judging as to future events in a far more accurate and astonishing manner than the conscious mind. And once we have made this inference, it falls into line with what we know (or, rather, have been obliged to assume) of the subconscious mind, to say that the products of such subconscious judgments may, on occasion, be conveyed to consciousness, either in the form of a vague feeling or as a dream, a definite vision, or in some other dramatic manner.

There was a case described in an early number of *The Occult Review*, where a lady avoided a nasty, and perhaps fatal, accident from a falling picture by acting on a premonition.¹ As she herself suggests, the occurrence is not difficult to understand, if we postulate a subconscious mind wide-awake to insignificant sensations that escape ordinary consciousness, and thus aware of signs of looseness about the nail supporting the picture in question. Many other premonitions, of which it is needless to particularize instances, obviously come under this head. Indeed, I would suggest that all can be explained on similar lines, and also that the operation of other intelligences, if required to be postulated, is of an analogous nature. All we have to assume is an extension of known powers of the mind. It seems to me, in other words, that every premonition is of the nature of a *judgment*, and is not an actual 'seeing' of the future, except in the very true sense that reasoned knowledge is sight. Take, for instance, the very interesting premonitory dream of

¹ Cp. the premonition experienced by a well-known German professor related by Jung Stilling in his *Theory of Pneumatology* (Jackson's translation, 1834), pp. 98ff., quoted by Mr. Field on pp. 8 and 9 of his book already referred to.

Cavaliere Giovanni de Figueroa, given in Bozzano's *Les Phénomènes Prémonitoires* and quoted by Maurice Maeterlinck in *The Unknown Guest*.

"In August, 1910, Cavaliere Giovanni de Figueroa, one of the most famous fencing-masters at Palermo, dreamt that he was in the country, going along a road white with dust, which brought him to a broad ploughed field. In the middle of the field stood a rustic building with a ground-floor used for store-rooms and cow-sheds, and on the right a rough hut made of branches and a cart with some harness lying in it.

"A peasant wearing dark trousers, with a black felt hat on his head, came forward to meet him, beckoned him to follow him, and took him round behind the house. Through a low, narrow door they entered a little stable with a short, winding stone staircase, leading to a loft over the entrance to the house. A mule, fastened to a hanging manger, was blocking the bottom step; and the chevalier had to push it aside before climbing the staircase. On reaching the loft, he noticed that from the ceiling were suspended strings of melons, tomatoes, onions and Indian corn. In this room were two women and a little girl; and through a door leading to another room he caught sight of an extremely high bed, unlike any that he had ever seen before. Here the dream broke off. It seemed to him so strange that he spoke of it to several of his friends, whom he mentions by name, and who are ready to confirm his statement.

"On October 12th in the same year, in order to support a fellow-townsmen in a duel, he accompanied the seconds by motor-car from Naples to Marino, a place which he had never visited nor ever heard of. As soon as they were some way in the country he was

curiously impressed by the white, dusty road. The car pulled up at the side of a field, which he at once recognised. They alighted, and he remarked to one of the seconds:

“ ‘This is not the first time that I have been here. There should be a house at the end of this path, and on the right a hut, and a cart with some harness in it.’

“ As a matter of fact, everything was as he described it. An instant later, at the exact moment foreseen by the dream, the peasant in the dark trousers and the black felt hat came up and asked him to follow him. But instead of walking behind him, the chevalier went in front, for he already knew the way. He found the stable, and, exactly at the place which it had occupied two months before, near its hanging manger the mule blocking the way to the staircase. The fencing-master went up the steps, and once more saw the loft with the ceiling hung with melons, onions and tomatoes, and, in a corner on the right, the two silent women and the child, identical with the figures in his dream, while in the next room he recognised the bed whose extraordinary height had so much impressed him.”

Surely there was no actual seeing of the future here, because of the change in order in which Cavaliere Giovanni de Figueroa and the peasant walked towards the latter's house. But it may well have been a judgment as to the future, based presumably upon some extraordinary telepathic *rapport* between the Cavaliere and the peasant in question, a judgment which erred in one detail at least, because it did not allow for the effect of its operation, and consequent knowledge, on the conscious mind. And lest such a judgment seem an impossible feat, one must remember that the concatenation of details is not so extraordinary in view

of the conservative habits and tastes of the peasant class.¹ Moreover, one must allow for little tricks of the memory tending to exaggerate points of resemblance and blur over points of divergence.

Now the theory that all premonitions are the results of mental judgments (of the subconscious mind—shall I say?—as a rule) at once brings unfulfilled and partially fulfilled premonitions into line with those whose entire fulfilment so surprises us. They are all seen to be products of the same activity; for there is no reason to attribute infallibility to subconscious reasoning any more than to conscious reasoning, nor can one believe in the possibility of a judgment at once finite and inerrant.

The whole question of freewill *versus* fatalism is, of course, here involved. The theory I suggest is on the side of freedom, for the fulfilment of a premonition no more involves fatalism than the fulfilment of a prediction of the conscious mind, and the latter predictions, let it be remembered, relate to human action as well as to the phenomena of the inanimate world. Necessary truth can be posited of no such judgment, but only a certain degree of probability. I would add, moreover, that the probability of any judgment being absolutely correct is infinitely small,—that is to say, absolute exactitude is absolutely improbable. An astronomer may predict some celestial phenomenon and find that it occurs at, as he says, the exact time and position in space that he predicted. But obviously the degree of the exactitude of the coincidence is limited by the exactitude of his measurements. Even were he able correctly to measure time, say to the millionth part of

¹ For example, the man probably always wore the same pair of trousers on working days.

a second, the probability of his prediction being absolutely accurate would still be infinitely small, because there are infinite possible subdivisions of a millionth part of a second. Obviously the limit of accuracy of scientific prediction is fixed by the limit of accuracy of its formulæ or laws, and that again by the limit of accuracy of measurement, in which perfection is impossible. In the early days of science nature seemed to operate according to beautifully simple laws; but as measurement increased in accuracy, so these laws had to be discarded in favour of more complex ones.¹ A few simple laws still appear to hold good; but there is no reason to suppose that they will not share the fate of the rest and be found to be approximations only. And there is no limit conceivable to this increase in complexity. An exact statement, then, of the conditions under which any phenomenon occurs, or of the relations between any two phenomena, would involve an infinite number of terms, and for this reason would be useless for the purpose of determination. For this purpose only a finite number of terms could be taken into account, and consequently the result would always fall short of complete accuracy. But the probability of any given premonition being fulfilled is certainly much less than the probability of the fulfilment of an astronomical or other scientific prediction, and thus affords less evidence for determinism.

In his 'Notes of the Month' for December, 1914, Mr. Shirley, the Editor of *The Occult Review*, asks a pertinent question concerning the matter under discussion. He writes: "Given a certain person of a certain character and certain qualities, physical, mental,

¹ Boyle's Law of gaseous volumes and pressures is a good case in point, for a further discussion of which see Part 3 of my *Magic of Experience* (1915).

etc., under certain specific conditions,—will that person always act in the same way under those same conditions?" The reply is that absolute sameness is identity. You cannot have two things or two sets of conditions absolutely the same, because *two* implies difference. If the things or sets of conditions are absolutely the same, they are identical, that is one and the same—one thing, one set of conditions. But a man's environment is infinite; it involves the whole universe. And because that universe is constantly changing you cannot have that environment the same at two different moments of time. For, apart from other changes, time itself has changed; and how dare we assume, simply because we have not yet observed its action, that time is not itself a factor in the occurrence of every event—that the laws of nature themselves are not subject to evolution—time, that is, in no abstract sense, but as the whole summation of the past?

I suggest, in a word, that the solution of the problem of free-will *versus* determinism will be found in the concept of a universe infinitely complex in its determinations—a universe in which every event is unique. Such a universe is free.

Mr. Shirley in the 'Notes' referred to has done good service in clearing the ground by pointing out the futility of certain of the stock arguments for freedom. But determinists have made errors of equal magnitude. We are frequently told that man is not free, because his actions are always the results of the strongest motives. But the analogy between motives and forces, and the consequent comparison of an action to the resultant of these forces, is an artificial and invalid one. In the first place, we have no means of measuring the strength of motives; all that we mean by the

'strongest' motive is that motive which is actually put into action. Evidently, therefore, to ascribe the action to the strength of the motive is a flagrant begging of the question—an arguing in a vicious circle.¹ In any case this separation of a man from his will and its motives, with the denial of freedom to the one if action be dictated by the other, is a quite unjustifiable splitting up of an individual. Surely, to be guided just by one's own motives and by nothing else is to possess freedom limited only by the physical possibility of acting on this guidance.²

And finally, to obviate another frequent mistake, we must always remember that caprice and freedom are by no means identical. A fixed purpose may lead to uniformity in action, but such may be followed, not of necessity, but of free choice. Indeed, from one point of view, the highest type of freedom finds its outcome in a complete uniformity—yet a uniformity involving an infinite diversity. Such, I suggest, may be conceived to be the constitution of the universe in which we live.

H. STANLEY REDGROVE.

¹ In his very interesting work, *God in the Universe* (1914), pp. 24 and 25, Mr. J. W. Frings, who endeavours to controvert this position, which I had discussed with him before the publication of his book, entirely misses the point of the argument, and bases what he has to say on a merely terminological objection, namely, that it is inaccurate to speak of a motive issuing into action. He gives no method by which the strength of motives can be ascertained, and thus, of course, fails to overthrow the position I maintain.

² Cp. Prof. G. F. Stout's fine treatment of this subject in the final chapter of his *Groundwork of Psychology* (1905). See also Prof. Emile Boutroux' *The Contingency of the Laws of Nature* (Authorised Translation by Fred Rothwell, 1916), pp. 140 and 141: "Undoubtedly it is always the strongest motive that prevails, but only just so far as we subsequently give this title to the very motive chosen by the will."

THE MAKING OF A SHADOW.¹

E. P. LARKEN.

It will be seen that a shadow formed the field of battle for two contending forces—the owner and the power of darkness. The owner was striving to perfect himself in order that he might pass into the Shadowless Land; the object of the power of darkness was to hinder, to the utmost of its powers, the perfecting process of the owner. The means by which each of the contending forces sought to carry out its purpose lay to a great extent in the shadow which for the time being was attached to the owner. Just as on a field of battle each of the opposing forces tries to seize, before the other can prevent him, the points which appear the most advantageous for his purpose, so it was here. We must therefore, in order to get a full grasp of the nature of this contest, examine as fully as may be the formation of the field of battle—in other words, the nature of the shadow.

The clearest way in which to look at this nature is to consider it as a congeries of characteristics—that is to say, a congeries of the leading or predominant points in the character of an innumerable line of shadow-ancestors which the shadow inherited on entering into its existence in Shadowland. This congeries of characteristics formed the foundation of the shadow-

¹ For Mr. Larken's previous essays in shadow-lore see *THE QUEST* for Jan. 1914, Jan. 1915 and Jan. 1918.—ED.

personality which had ultimately to emerge, but the foundation only; the full personality was due, not only to these inherited characteristics, but to the action upon them of other forces which we shall come to later. For the moment, however, we must consider the shadow as a bundle or congeries of characteristics.

Now of these characteristics some, as might be expected, asserted themselves with more strength than others in the new personality to which they contributed. This was by no means always due to the original force of these self-assertive characteristics; other causes contributed, amongst which was the fresh environment in which those characteristics found themselves on the evolution of a new personality in Shadowland. Moreover as a general rule it was found that the more remote in time an inherited characteristic might be, the less its power of asserting itself in the newly formed shadow-personality. This was the general rule, but it was subject to all manner of exceptions. In this consideration we leave out of account certain automatic, instinctive, unconscious characteristics, more or less common to all shadows, the ancestry of which was extremely remote, and we give our attention to those inherited characteristics which had an immediate and direct bearing upon the personality of the shadow they tended to build up.

Now among these characteristics it was not uncommon to find one, or even more than one, which owing to its new environment, or to other causes, found itself so forceful that it became the predominant characteristic. And more; not infrequently such a characteristic actually usurped, for a shorter or longer time, the place of the very personality to which it normally was only a contributory power, so that the

true personality of the shadow was lost and the contributory characteristic usurped its place and assumed a personality of its own.

Now these predominating characteristics which contributed to the making of the shadow-personality, and at times actually usurped the place of the personality to which they were the contributing elements, were the points on the field of battle on which one or other of the antagonists seized most eagerly. But it must be borne in mind that a larger part, perhaps by far the larger part, of the shadow-personality lay in realms unapproachable by the consciousness of the shadow. The shadow itself was aware of only a part, and probably, as I said, of only a very small part, of its own personality—directly. Indirectly it was otherwise. The result of the contest which went on in that part of its personality of which it was unaware, reacted upon the smaller part of which it was aware, and made itself manifest to the self-consciousness of the shadow although the process was hidden. Thus was built up on the foundation of inherited characteristics that shadow-personality upon which the owner, on the one hand, and the power of darkness, on the other, acted with a view to obtaining total or partial possession. The owner, as we know, in as far as he was able to obtain the mastery on the field of battle, was able to fulfil his object of making himself perfect for the Shadowless Land. The power of darkness sought a re-inforcement for its ceaseless war upon the owner, and at the same time tried to hamper the owner in his efforts at perfection.

It may be asked what part, if any, did the shadow play in the strife beyond being the battle-ground, or prey, of the two contending powers? To this question

it may be replied that the shadow was able to take a very active part in the strife. The shadow was endowed, as we have seen, with the power of will. This power was not so great, perhaps, as the shadow imagined it to be; but still there it was, and it was able on occasion to prove the decisive factor in the strife. In a word, the shadow could choose which of the contending parties it wished to win at any given crisis, and by throwing its weight on that side do much to decide the issue.

Now of these characteristics which went to the building up of the shadow's personality some were distinctly favourable for the purposes of the owner and some were as distinctly unfavourable. But the favourable characteristics might be turned to the owner's injury, as the unfavourable ones might be turned to his benefit. For example: the sense which a shadow often had of being in close touch with its owner was due to some foundation characteristic of its personality, which the owner had seized upon and enlarged perhaps, but which none the less had come into being with the shadow. Now this sense, preserved in the way in which the owner wished it to be preserved, was of the utmost value from the owner's point of view, and yet this sense told of a characteristic which if taken possession of by the power of darkness might, and very often did, lead to disaster. I have pointed out elsewhere that nothing did more to injure the owner, and therefore to strengthen the hands of the power of darkness, than a sense of self-satisfaction on the part of the shadow. In countless cases in Shadowland the sense of being in close touch with the owner was turned by the agency of the power of darkness into a sense of self-satisfaction. And so it

was, or so it might be, with every one of the foundation characteristics whatever their nature.

In this way there was built up on the foundation of the congeries of characteristics that shadow-personality which, on the ceasing of the shadow to exist in Shadowland, passed in part into the owner in whom, in so far as relationship had been established, it became merged, in part into the power of darkness, to pass gradually from active hostility to the owner, in various phases, to the nothingness from whence it sprang. For the rest the shadow contributed, as other shadows before it, to the forming by its own characteristics of fresh personalities.

The power, limited as it was, which the shadow possessed in virtue of the will with which it was endowed, of proving the decisive factor on occasion between the two adversaries could of course be exercised only in that part of the field of battle which came in contact with its own consciousness. We have seen that by far the larger part probably of the field of battle was inaccessible to this consciousness. But the two parts of the shadow-personality, that of which it was conscious and that of which it was unconscious, in as far as the two acted and reacted upon each other were really and essentially one. There was nothing resembling a clear line of demarcation between them. That part of its personality of which the shadow was conscious faded by slow degrees, not as an Indian day passes suddenly into an Indian night, but through degrees of gradually increasing twilight and darkness, till the last darkness, the darkness which hides, was reached.

Now let us see in what way the owners sought to profit by their success in this wider field of battle

where, as we have seen, active conscious co-operation and active conscious opposition on the part of the shadows were alike of small account. In an earlier paper on this subject I have pointed out that there was an infinite number of ways in which the owners could impress their wills on or correspond with their shadows. Generally speaking, it may be said that the owner corresponded with his shadow by appeals made to that shadow's sense of beauty or goodness or pity or harmony or rhythm. Now a shadow entered into Shadowland endowed with a sense of such things utterly rudimentary at best. Such as it was, the shadow owed it to one or other of the foundation characteristics which went to the building up of its personality. Left to itself this rudimentary sense would never be more than rudimentary. It would never so develop as to contribute to the fresh personality which it was the object of the owner to call into being. But the action of the owner was directed to those characteristics of the shadow which were inaccessible to its consciousness, with a view to so cultivating and preparing them as to secure their consolidation in the personality of the shadow. This work of the owner was shown, to a very limited extent indeed, but unmistakably, in its result. The shadow became aware from time to time of new and growing faculties, energies, aspirations, desires, which had hitherto been absent from its consciousness. Often enough it was puzzled by these things, pushed them aside and did not make anything of them; but the point is that it became aware of them. Something unexpected, unknown hitherto to the shadow's consciousness, sprang to meet the will of the owner. It was an emergence from the unknown to the known;

and so the shadow became aware, in some dim way, of the relationship which the owner sought to establish. But no two shadows were alike in all points; perhaps it may be true to say that no two shadows were exactly alike in any one point of their foundation characteristics. The consequence of this unlikeness of characteristics was the unlikeness in the methods adopted by the owners for strengthening the relationship between themselves and their shadows. So opposite indeed to one another were the methods, in many cases, that they were the cause of much mutual hostility among the shadows who, knowing little or nothing about the ultimate purpose of the owners, assumed not unreasonably that, if one method or set of methods of which they were conscious was right, a contrary method or set of methods of which they were unconscious in themselves, when applied to the other shadows, must be wrong.

It must be remembered that the shadows existed for the owners, not the owners for the shadows, and that each owner sought by his association with a given shadow to draw from it such experiences as to perfect himself for entering into the Shadowless Land. It was for this reason that the shadow had to be *made*, that is that a full shadow-personality had to be built up upon the foundation of characteristics to which I have referred. In this way only could the close association with their shadows required by the owners be secured. The experience required for the perfecting of the owner was an *entire* experience. He had to draw from his shadow all that the shadow had to give. Naturally therefore the methods employed by the owners in their association with their shadows were different and often opposite. Naturally too the shadows,

seeing the methods but not grasping the underlying purpose of the owners, became immersed in mutual hostility.

The full shadow-personality required by the owners was, we see, evolved from or built upon the congeries of characteristics with which the shadows were endowed on entering into Shadowland, by the pressure brought to bear upon them by two contending forces. The personality thus evolved, or built up, or formed, was a real personality which, as we have seen, persisted in three ways. (1) It would persist as part of the owner, inheriting the nature of the owner into which it was merged, in regard to that part of it in which full touch had been secured. (2) It would pass into the realm of the power of darkness and, through various stages of decay, sink into the nothingness from whence it came, in as far as the owner had failed to reach it. (3) It might leave in Shadowland the impress of its own characteristics to be inherited by succeeding shadows. It should be remembered however that if, on the one hand, ultimate nothingness was the destiny of a shadow, on the other hand its destiny lay in the Shadowless Land whither the owner was wending with sure if slow footsteps.

E. P. LARKEN.

WITCH-FINDERS OF SHAKESPEARE'S GREENWOOD.

THE LAST WITCH-HUNT IN RURAL ENGLAND.

LAPSES of centuries have made but small changes in the life, career, character, or feelings of the rustic dwellers in Shakespeare's woodland. Their moods, tokens, signs, dialect, and beliefs are as the laws of the old Medes and Persians. They never change; they are always the same. What Shakespeare thought of witchcraft has been expressed in the First Part of *King Henry VI.* (Act I., Scene 5), where Talbot says to Joan La Pucelle :

“Blood will I draw on thee; thou art a witch;
And straightway give thy soul to him thou servest.”

And what he thought more than three centuries ago had a literal realisation in the Poet's own greenwood even in the latter half of the nineteenth century. And what the unchanging dwellers in leafy Warwickshire have thought of witchcraft, they still think; for to-day, in the eighteenth year of the twentieth century, and at the crisis of a world's war, is to be found, in all its cardinal points, the same life that was lived by the peasantry of Shakespeare's woodland between three and four hundred years ago.

THE ROMANCE OF THE VALE OF THE RED HORSE.

As there were and still are living in this classic greenwood men who, by the quivering of a forked hazel-

twig, can discover the position and volume of water hidden beneath the ground, so there were yesterday and are to-day people there who profess to be able to discover the witch-points in a woman as thoroughly as did Potts, the notorious Lancashire witch-finder. Like the witches themselves, if there be any, the witch-finder of to-day lives more in the villages along the romantic Vale of the Red Horse than in the thick woodland of the northern part of the county. Tysoe and Long Compton, as a matter of fact, are the scenes of the very last witch-findings in leafy Warwickshire, and indeed in the whole of rural England.

As I have often pointed out, this is probably due to the fact that the celebrated Rollright Stones, with their weird glamour and strange traditions, stand in the immediate neighbourhood and cast their influence over the minds of the scattered dwellers.

THE WITCH OF LONG COMPTON.

Long Compton, over which the King Stone of the Rollrights peers like an envoy spying out the land, is famous for its surprising quantities of corn-cockles and an incomparable inn, which would have delighted the heart of Shenstone. It was in this isolated, hidden, out-of-the-world village that occurred the stirring and moving survival of witch-hunting and witch-stabbing in 1875—the last recorded case in England of modern witch-killing.

At that time there were believed to be in this pleasant Warwickshire hamlet no fewer than sixteen witches. Such at least was the astounding testimony offered by the modern witch-finder, one James Heywood, a native of the village; and he was not alone in his belief, for there were several other male inhabitants

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of Long Compton who held a similar faith. There was this difference, however, between them : Heywood was the active witch-finder ; the others were passive.

The victim of the Long Compton witch-finder was not a young and lovely girl, such as is supposed by the cloudy peasants of Shakespeare's greenwood to inhabit the wych-hazel, but a poor ancient dame, native and resident of the village, named Anne Tennant. She was not well-favoured and possibly not over careful in her choice of expressions. It is perhaps not to be wondered at that, in a community so richly endowed with the heritage of superstition as were and are the villagers of Long Compton, this time-honoured and quaint old dame should have drawn upon herself the unwelcome and, as it subsequently proved, dangerous attentions of her friends and neighbours.

Any ill thing that happened to any of the villagers was invariably attributed to the evil influence of poor Anne Tennant. If a cottage-holder's live stock died, his garden crops failed, or any member of his family sickened, the remark on such natural events would be always the same :

"Hey, old Mother Tennant's at the bottom of thisen. 'Tis that evil eye of hern, for sure."

In time the luckless old creature became the pet aversion of nearly every villager, excepting perhaps her own immediate relatives ; though doubtless some of these also had imbibed the popular superstition that she really had the fatal gift of the evil eye.

THE WITCH-FINDER.

But to none in that fair though tragic scene of superstition was Anne Tennant more obnoxious than to James Heywood, the self-constituted witch-finder ;

though, according to his own showing, the ill-fated old dame was only one of sixteen witches who he averred were then actually living in Long Compton.

Like many another dweller in Shakespeare's country at the present time, Heywood pretended to be possessed of all the true instincts of the witch-finder. He professed to be able to see witches in everything—on land, in the air and in the water; in trees, on haystacks and in the persons of the women, both old and young, among whom he dwelt. He averred that but for the evil eyes of these sixteen witches many former inhabitants of Long Compton who were now lying quietly inearthed in the parish graveyard, would still be living. It was ostensibly in revenge for the supposed untimely decease of these departed that he made a successful design upon the life of unfortunate Anne Tennant.

It was the beautiful corn-harvest of September, 1875, the season of the year when the approaching romantic fall of the leaf adds to the power of that superstition which is always existent in the mind of every country-dweller. Heywood was returning homeward from his day's work of pitching. He was carrying the cruel fork in his hand, and doubtless brooding over the ill-luck which seemed to be continually descending upon him and others in Long Compton from the evil machinations of the sixteen witches living there.

In this mood he chanced to meet with Anne Tennant—helpless, friendless, alone. All the forces of his superstitious nature seemed to rush together to madden him; thereon, to strengthen his courage, muttering some sort of mysterious incantation, which he had probably learned as a counter-spell against those possessed of witchcraft, he 'drew blood' from

her with his two-pronged fork. The shock and the wound together speedily exhausted the life of the unfortunate old dame, who was doubtless innocent of every offence which the vivid imagination of the witch-finder laid to her charge.

A WITCH YEAR.

That year of 1875 was what might be called a 'witch year' in Shakespeare's country owing to the fanatical influence of the lunatic Heywood, who, when imprisoned in Warwick Gaol, awaiting his trial for murder, gave his janitors 'the creeps' by screaming at them that the prison water they brought him to drink was full of witches. Women as well as men became bitten with the craze for witch-finding, and all the villages along the poetic Vale of the Red Horse were thrown into a state of superstitious frenzy, with mutual accusations of harbouring folk possessed of the evil eye.

A case is recorded which instinctively reminds one of that of Eustacia Vye, in Thomas Hardy's novel, *The Return of the Native*; but with this difference: The victim of superstitious dread in the Warwickshire village was well stricken in years, whereas the Lady of Egdon Heath was both young and beautiful.

The witch-testing to which I refer, occurred in the village of Tysoe. In manners, superstitions, dialect and the rest, Tysoe has probably been less touched by so-called civilising influences than any other village in leafy Warwickshire. In a thatched cottage there, lived an old lady who had somehow attracted the undesirable attentions of her neighbours; just as in a similar manner Anne Tennant had drawn upon herself the fatal notice of the villagers of Long Compton. Her

reputation as a presumptive witch soon extended beyond the circle of her own village; so one day in 1875 it was decided to put the venerable dame to the test.

Whether as suggesting or as imitating the Heywood case of Long Compton, the witch-finding of Tysoe was a curious business, yet quite what one might expect to find in this classic greenwood, among a people who have imbibed so deeply of the faith and works of Shakespeare. To make themselves sure as to the evil influence or otherwise of this luckless old creature, three women came over from Brailes. Brailes is an adjoining village with a beautiful, cathedral-like church. Catching the supposed witch unawares, they scored her hand with a corking-pin, much in the same way as Eustacia Vye's arm was served in Hardy's novel. This was done, as the women afterwards asserted, to nullify the effects of the evil eye, which they said the suspected woman had cast upon them and others of her own village.

It is not recorded whether the supposed witch cried out or held her peace during the testing. If the latter it would be a sure sign that she was a witch. In any case this victim of superstition died in Tysoe that same year, and it is highly probable that her death was hastened by the treatment to which she had been subjected by the witch-finders of Brailes.

CURIOUS AND PICTURESQUE CUSTOMS.

In connection with these survivals of the ancient belief in witchcraft in out-of-the-world villages and hamlets of Shakespeare's greenwood, it is curious and interesting to notice that the method of attacking suspected persons was that employed by the Saxons—

the famous method of stabbing or 'drawing of blood.' It is this to which Shakespeare alludes in *King Henry VI.*, and which, in the Poet's time, was the popular method of testing supposed witches.

There seems to be no mention made of the floating of women accused of witchcraft in the deep and stilly pools of woody Warwickshire; though there are many instances of the ducking of scolds. The stool now preserved in the crypt of St. Mary's Church at Warwick was doubtless often used to cool the tempers of village termagants. The severe and Puritanical feelings of the peasants, however, drew a distinction between a mere scold and a woman suspected of having the fatal gift of the evil eye.

The murder of Anne Tennant is the last recorded case of witch-killing in England. But even to-day belief in witchcraft, intensified perhaps owing to the dreadful influences of the War upon the superstitious mind, is still strong in isolated quarters of the hedged-in Shakespeare's greenwood. And so Anne Tennant's case may possibly not really be the last; for the mysteries of the unseen weave a spell over the minds of the ignorant which even the law of the land often finds it difficult to counteract.

GEORGE MORLEY.¹

¹ We regret to announce that since his last contribution to *THE QUEST*, in the October number, 1917, this ripe Shakesperian scholar and lover of Shakespeare's Greenwood has passed away.—ED.

THE SONG OF THE DIVINE FLAME.

To thee I sing, O Flame most beautiful !
When smoke-free thou risest up into the sky what is
fairer than thee ?
Thou art the cause of all beauty ;
Thou lendest my soul thy comeliness.
Most sacred Flame, I bow to thee !
What purer is there than thy guileless smile ?
Refined art thou and full of grace like a chaste maid ;
Oh with thy holy touch make thou me pure !
I worship thee, most mighty Flame !
Thou art the mighty power of the Most Powerful.
Thou art valiant, great art thou, thou art the Lord.
Fill my whole being with the spirit of thy strength !
O Flame ethereal, I praise thee !
Tender as smile of new born babe art thou ;
Make my heart gentle with thy tenderness !
O Flame most terrible, with awe I gaze at thee !
When in mad haste thou openest thy fiery mouth to
swallow up all in thy way, what is more terrible
than thee ?
I bring all of my sins to thee, O mighty Flame !
Take them into thy bosom, hide them behind thy
glorious face, that I may look terrific in pure
beauty as thou art !
O Flame divine !
The great sun is thy brother, the soft moon is thy
sister.
I bow unto thee all in one !

Thou all dost give us life and joy ;
Thou art the source of all that's known.
O radiant Flame, in thee no darkness dwells !
I know not whence thou comest or whither goest thou ;
 but thou dost lead my soul upon the open path lit
 with thy light.
Nay, into thy arms thou takest me. I give myself to
 thee.
Embrace me, O thou Flame divine, that I may lose
Myself in thee, the one in all, unspeakable, and one
 and only one.

(Translated from the Bengali original of
 SIR RABINDRANATH TAGORE.)

TAPANMOHAN CHATTERJI.

THE DESOLATE.

THE army of the desolate swept by,
Their piteous raiment streamed upon the wind ;
The haggard sky was not more wan than they,
As in the pallid dawn I saw them pass.
A surging sea they were, whose hungry waves,
Crested with human faces, surely knew
Only high-tide of human misery.
And as they passed a vapour as of tears
Robed them in mist, and flung a garb of grey
About them, making phantom-like and dim
Their silent passing through a world of shade.
A motley throng were they, and more than strange
The poignant contrasts that had leapt to birth
Beneath the hand of pain which levels all.
For beauty walked with ugliness grotesque,
And silks and rags were jostled side by side ;
The virtuous and the sinful knew no bar,
And health and sickness travelled hand in hand.
Now here and there the shrouding veil of grey
Parted to show a gleaming shower of gold
Crowning the head of some poor Magdalene,
Who, loving much, perchance had greatly sinned,
While others greatly sinned who had not loved.
The maimed were there, the halting and the blind,
Those who had had their birthright filched from them
Ere they set foot upon the path of life
With stunted mind and feeble brain and limb,
The toil-worn, vice-worn of the underworld,
The derelict, the failures—all the sad.
Onward they passed, the children of the night,
Seeking the tardy day that tarried long,

Importuning, all dumb and impotent,
The sword of dawn that would not stab the east
And let light to the world and so to them.
Until at last upon the waves of grey,
Upon the haggard faces crowning them,
A pale light glinted spectral-like and strange ;
Then grew and throbbed into a radiance
Dazzling to eyes so long grown used to gloom.
For now it seemed as if two mighty arms,
Transcendent, luminous and wrought of gold,
Sought to enfold the world from east to west
In tenderness, in glory and in light,
Drawing all things that suffered to God's heart.
And the great ocean that had surged and flowed
In dreary waves of human grief and pain,
Was changing, flushing from grey lovelessness
To vital splendour, at the call of dawn ;
While the vast grey-hued pall that shadowed it,
The pall of tears, the symbol of the sad,
Vanished and fled away, as in its stead
The tenderness of golden, sun-kissed light
Illumined brows scarred by the crown of thorns
A moment since. Then children stooped to pluck
Blossoms like stars that sprang beneath their feet ;
And men and women, who had long been dumb
Beneath the stony misery that crushed
Their hearts, their senses, stilling all to grey,
Laughed and were glad as grey was merged in blue,
As red and gold o'erspread th' exultant east,
And gates of crimson splendour opened wide
To fling their welcome to the desolate.
Crowned with the promise of unfolding dawn
The army of the desolate passed in.

DORIS S. GOODWIN.

CREATIVE EVOLUTION.

LIFE is a dream, but the Dream of that dream is our
inner Reality,
Which projects itself upon time and space and creates
as it passes,
Whether unveiling the old that was hid or a new
thing evolving,
And ere it return to itself handing on to the rest its
discoveries.

Each as he goes his way, a new world creating,
revealing,
Be he a king or a beggar, a lord of the earth or an
outcast,
Mints it in thought and idea or mirrors it forth in a
vision,
Or builds it like ancient Thebes to the strains of his
thrilling emotions,
Harmonious architect, unique composer, whose music
Even when faulty and frail is still a version and variant
Of the world's immortal song of ever-proceeding
Creation,
Song that the morning stars together in unison
chanted,
Song now sad and low, now lapping the spheres with
its pæan,
Co-eval with light in its war with immemorial Chaos,
Co-substantial with Love, and co-eternal with Goodness.

CLAUDESLEY BRERETON.

REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

THE TREASURE OF THE MAGI.

A Study of Modern Zoroastrianism. By James Hope Moulton, Greenwood Professor of Hellenistic Greek and Indo-European Philology in Manchester University, D.Lit., D.D., D.C.L. Oxford University Press; pp. 278; 8s. 6d. net.

JAMES HOPE MOULTON was barbarously done to death last year by German brutality. He was returning from India, where he had passed sixteen months, chiefly in friendly intercourse and lecturing among the Parsi community, when his ship was torpedoed in the Mediterranean. Twelve of the twenty-five souls in Dr. Moulton's boat died from exposure, and among them this most distinguished scholar and man of godly life. Dr. Rendel Harris, who was in the same boat, mercifully survived the terrible four days' experience. This then is the last book written by one of the greatest Iranists—so few in number—whom either the West or the East has produced. Fortunately, in another field in which he was even more distinguished, he completed before he sailed the MS. of another work—the second volume of his Grammar of New Testament Greek. This has yet to appear. In the Oct. no. for 1914, under the title 'The Gospel of Zarathushtra,' we made clear to our readers the great debt we owe to Prof. Moulton for his studies in Early Zoroastrianism, and especially for his translation of the *Gāthās*, those few most ancient and authentic hymns going back to the days of the Prophet himself, and genuinely human documents telling of the man, his struggles and his high message. Here we move in an atmosphere of simplicity and high spirituality which straitly differentiates these hymns from all the rest of the Avestan and later documents. At last, after many years of patient search and research, we get to Zarathushtra himself, and find in him one of the most simple and direct of the great Prophets of the world, preaching a gospel that contains nothing to which Christian doctrine can object and strangely similar in its main elements to much that many regard as characteristically Christian. In the present volume Dr. Moulton, after summarizing the ancient

and mediæval history of the 'development' of the religion which more and more obscured the original simple teaching, as set forth in his Hibbert Lectures (*Early Zoroastrianism*), takes up his main theme—the condition of the traditions and of the practice of the faith as it exists to-day among its 100,000 adherents of the Parsi Community in India. In proportion as our author is warmly enthusiastic over the message and teaching of the Zarathushtra of the *Gāthās*, is he by contrast cool and critical about the present state of affairs, in which customs, rites and ceremonies, prayers and liturgies in a tongue the worshippers no longer understand, take the place of the living spirit of religion. The Parsis as a whole are an industrious, wealthy, loyal, charitable, public-spirited community: but if, as Professor Moulton contends, the first aim of religion is the making of saints, their otherwise praiseworthy activities relegate their religious interests to a subordinate position. It is for the Parsi Community to reply to these well-intentioned criticisms of one whom they welcomed with open-armed cordiality as a sincere lover of what is best in their tradition. They seem to be a deliberate and slow-moving Community in respect of religious change and strongly averse from opening their ranks to proselytes from without. On the other hand, very few Parsis change their faith for Christianity—only some score or so apparently in two generations. Dr. Moulton, however, was by no means disheartened by the history of past missionary failure in this respect; he was, on the contrary, an enthusiastic missionary himself. He went to India by special invitation of the National Council of the Y.M.C.A., and wrote his book specially for the Series 'The Religious Quest of India.' If the chief writer of this Series, Dr. Farquhar, holds that Christianity is the predestined 'Crown of Hinduism,' equally so does Dr. Moulton here hold and plead that Christianity is the foreordained 'Crown of Zoroastrianism.' Did not the Magi come to adore the Babe of Bethlehem? Their intuition was right. They came and found the Saoshyant, the promised Saviour of their faith. Why do the Parsis look for one who is yet to come, when he has come already? Their answer will doubtless be: If the Deliverer has come, why is deliverance yet so far to seek? Europe, Christendom, is agonizing beneath the violence of the Lie. Never has the Lie been more powerful than it is to-day; never has there been greater need of the Saviour that is to come. But as the business of both faiths is to fight the Lie to the death, they have a common ground and might well join forces on that ground.

IMMORTALITY.

An Essay in Discovery co-ordinating Scientific, Psychical and Biblical Research. By Burnett H. Streeter, A. Clutton-Brock, C. W. Emmett, J. A. Hadfield and the Author of 'Pro Christo et Ecclesia.' London (Macmillan); pp. 380; 10s. 6d. net.

TO-DAY in the West millions are seeking their spiritual sustenance outside the pales of the various Churches of Christendom. It is true that much of the food offered for their consumption is by no means spiritual in the highest sense of the word; it is very largely psychical. Most of these seekers, however, find in it a spiritual flavour more to their liking than the monotonous, orthodox, traditional diet of which they have so long grown weary. Hitherto the combine of Church of England caterers—to limit ourselves to the confession of the writers of these essays—has followed the old bad habit of contemptuous indifference to the needs and tastes of its customers. If complaints have been made, the dissatisfied have been curtly told they would have to take the old-fashioned goods just as they were or leave them. But in life and in spiritual matters especially there is no standing still; you must either go on or go back. The march of events waits for no man or body of men. Established religion in all its forms has always set its face against this law in the self-satisfied delusion that *it* at any rate was advanced beyond the instability of the law of change and the necessity of continual readaptation to life. At any rate history knows of no religion once securely established that has ever taken the lead into new ways of endeavour or fresh paths of discovery; it has always looked with grave suspicion and timorous anxiety on all such attempts of the new, young and adventurous soul of man to free itself from the lethargic spell of habit and of custom with which fond memory would bind it to the past. It should be remembered that the many modern movements we have in mind, are not set in the direction of scepticism or of denial of spiritual things; on the contrary, they owe their existence to a hunger which neither the rationalistic science nor the traditional religion of the establishments has been able to satisfy, a crying need for having the things of the spirit brought nearer to the common understanding and lives of men. It is no little thing for one who has been brought up in the formularies of a conventional religious tradition, which looks back for its inspiration to a distant past and stands straitly and starkly shut off from all present reality, to learn that the average man can come to know somewhat

of the nature of the soul, and find relief from the deadening feeling of having to face the blank wall of an insensible essence within. Now in many very various ways and degrees these new movements, which for the historian are novel in form only and not in nature, offer the average man some hope of coming to know something of a larger if not deeper self in ways suited to his immediate needs and the measure of his power of understanding. Broadly speaking, they bring into the foreground of interest facts which point towards the indefinitely extensible possibilities of man's psychical nature. Vistas of vast fields for the exercise of the ever fascinating æsthetic activities of the emotional nature are opened up,—all the more attractive because this nature has been so largely of late put on a starvation diet by the impersonal asceticism of the purely objective and positive sciences; fleeting visions moreover are again being caught of the serenity of the mystical heights in which the saint and religious philosopher delight to dwell. It is not unreasonable to interpret these manifold gropings and endeavours as signs pointing to the beginnings of that genuine spiritual renaissance of which there is so piteous a need on all sides in the present seeming going-under of our civilisation. All is of course at present inchoate and embryonic; nevertheless it is surely indicative of a potent stirring and striving in man's soul, the presage, promise and earnest of a new age whose characteristic will be at long last, we may well believe, the inauguration of a practical science of that soul. One would have thought that ecclesiasticism, taught by her experience of defeat in the domain of physical science, over which she once claimed the empery, would have seen the wisdom of changing her suicidal policy when faced with a similar decision in a matter of far graver moment. Surely in the psychical field at any rate the clergy might very well co-operate in perfecting methods for wise tillage and fruitful work, instead of damning the impudence of the lay folk for profanely setting foot in a domain they would reserve as sacred to themselves. It is a pitiable spectacle in these modern days to watch the forces of obscurantism vainly endeavouring to wire off from this domain with an apologetic fence their private preserve enshrining the venerable ruins of archaic, classical and mediæval thought overgrown with an artistic tangle of romanticism. Nor is such a picture to be angrily dismissed as an ill-natured and trivial caricature; it should be regarded rather as a cartoon of most serious import whose symbolism brings into focus the underworkings of the traditional ecclesiastical mind, its hereditary instincts.

There have been of course individual exceptions, the isolated pioneers of a better way within the ranks of the establishment; but hitherto no corporate action has been taken in this direction. The essays in the present volume are therefore of special interest as marking a change from the sporadic awakening of isolated individuals beginning to take notice to the co-operative awareness of a group. Here we have a corporate stirring, though not of course an official activity. This group of writers have taken counsel together and are agreed on a general plan and certain fundamental principles. Their attempt at reorientation is distinctly useful and hopeful. There is, for instance, a frank acknowledgment of many shortcomings in the past and also an agreeable absence of indiscriminate condemnation and intransigent intolerance; the prideful spirit of superiority and patronage, moreover, shows signs of being considerably chastened. The everlasting hell dogma, which ascribes the devilish infliction of unending torment devoid of all moral purpose to the deity, is frankly abandoned. The sheer miracles of the physical virgin birth and of the physical resurrection, which starkly negate the humanity of Jesus, are seen to be not only intellectually impossible on any showing but in no wise necessary to man's spiritual salvation. As to the secondary and intermediate problem of survival states, as apart from the high hope and over-belief in genuine spiritual immortality, which, as in other great religions, is the ground-basis of the Christian faith,—it is recognized that the Bible has little to say on the nature of the soul and its immediate future after death that can stand in the way of man's reverent enquiry into the question. The survey of the two modern movements which are selected for special treatment—namely, spiritism and theosophy—are entrusted to Miss Lily Dougall, the authoress of *Pro Christo et Ecclesia*. With regard to the former, Miss Dougall seeks to account for so much on the hypothesis of telepathy that she has great difficulty in saving anything of an evidential nature to authenticate the survival in which she believes. In dealing with modern theosophy, she pays most attention to the ancient doctrines of karma and reincarnation, which that movement has specially laboured to popularize in the West. But to anyone well read in Indian philosophy and religion her treatment of these doctrines will seem superficial. The karma doctrine is exceedingly difficult to dispose of, if for no other reason, because on one side it is on all fours with modern mechanistic ideas which have so thoroughly permeated every branch of scientific research in the

West. The Indian philosophers sought for Liberation out of this determinism, and they have much worthy of consideration in many various ways to say on the subject. As for reincarnation, though we may well reject the *naïveté* of much of the speculation bound up with it, there is probably some great principle, as yet undiscovered, underlying it; otherwise it is difficult to account for the doctrine having been made one of the foundations of morals in a country so religiously-gifted as India.

MATERIALS FOR THE STUDY OF THE BĀBĪ RELIGION.

Compiled by Edward G. Browne, M.A., M.B., F.B.A., F.R.C.P.,
Professor of Arabic, Cambridge. Cambridge (The University Press); pp. 380; 12s. 6d. net.

PROFESSOR E. G. BROWNE has long been known as our foremost authority on the religion of the Báb (or 'Gate'), the Persian prophet and reformer who suffered cruel martyrdom in 1850 at the hands of his orthodox Moslim opponents. Our author began to write on the subject from personal intercourse with the followers of this claimant to Madhihood nearly thirty years ago and has published numerous valuable studies on original Bábism and its developments. To-day Mírzá 'Alí Muḥammad, the original Báb, has few followers; his memory has been entirely overshadowed by others and especially by the dominating personality of Mírzá Ḥusayn 'Alí, called Bahá'ullah ('the Glory of God'), who claimed to be the true Manifestation for whom the Báb simply prepared the way. He died in 1892 and was succeeded by his son Abbás Efendi, known as 'Abdu'l Bahá ('the Servant of Bahá'). Up to that date Baháí propaganda had been entirely confined to the East. In 1893 it was started in America by an energetic missionary, and in a decade succeeded in arousing some considerable attention, especially at Chicago. Later propaganda was carried on in Europe, chiefly in London and Paris, and was increased by the travels of Abbás Efendi himself in Europe and America in 1911—1914. A popular presentation of Baháism on the most general lines thus became familiar to many who take interest in such movements; it presented itself as a reconciling and universalistic religion, an advocate of peace and brotherliness and of social and educational reforms. But it was very difficult to obtain any certain information as to its domestic history or inner tenets or the precise claims made for its founder. Professor Browne now presents us with materials which throw much light on all these

points ; he has managed by his well-known sympathetic interest in all things Persian to keep in friendly touch with all parties, and the information he has collected is of great interest and should be closely studied by those who desire to know many things about which the outsider could previously procure no information from the enthusiastic propagandists of the movement in the West. It would require a long and very carefully considered article to present to the reader a just appreciation of the multifarious material collected by Professor Browne. As to the remorseless prosecutions and tortures to which the Bábís were for so long subjected, the graphic descriptions here translated must move all readers to pity and commiseration ; unfortunately in later years the faithful are themselves found by no means innocent of bitter dealings with one another. We find ourselves, alas, moving in an atmosphere of claims and counter-claims, of mutual accusations and recriminations. If Bahá'ullah is claimed to be the Supreme Manifestation of God Himself, and his son Abdu'l Bahá to be the 'return' of the Manifestation in Jesus Christ—*i.e.* not a reincarnation, for the Baháís do not believe in this but in a recurrence of types of Manifestation—there has been and is strong opposition to both claimants. Mírzá Yahyá, known as Šabih-i-Azal ('the Morning of Eternity'), the half-brother of Bahá'ullah, repudiated the latter's over-weening claims and became leader of the sect of the Azalís ; he died in 1912. Muhammad 'Ali, the half-brother of Abbás Efendi, repudiates the authority and exalted pretensions of Abdu'l Bahá and is leader of the present most active opposition within Baháism. Both these divisions have occurred within the bosom of the 'holy family' itself, and in proportion as the claims made are so extreme and productive of fanaticism, and the atmosphere so tense with revelations and inspired tablets, it is easy to understand that strife has been and is bitter, and that the propagandists in the West have been only too anxious to keep these deplorable controversies from the ears of their hearers. The numbers given of the followers of the movement in all its forms are plainly guess-work and greatly exaggerated, nevertheless they are considerable ; the literature, only a very small fraction of which is translated into any European language, is voluminous, for all the leaders have made great use of the power of the 'pen' or have had their utterances recorded. What the future of the movement will be is impossible to conjecture ; but in the West its propaganda will certainly not be made easier by the publication of *Materials for the Study of the Bábí Religion*.

THE PRINCIPLES OF THE MORAL EMPIRE.

By Kojiro Sugimori, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Waseda, Tokyo. University of London Press; 5s. net.

MANY have been the volumes which have appeared during the past three and a half years on the reconstruction of the society of the future. Taken as a whole, these books are very disappointing: they are either the works of men of insufficient training in philosophy and history, or they consist of general abstractions which reduce the meaning of human society to the level of the abstractions of the natural sciences. Other books have appeared which find the solution of the problems of society in some supernatural revelation. There are a few outstanding volumes, such as Bosanquet's *National and International Ideals* and Maciver's *Community* which deal with the problems from the standpoint of the individual life as well as from the over-individual ideas and ideals which grow up in the individual mind, and which give the mind the true orientation of the future. It is in this respect that the real value of Croce's works lies. And this remarkable volume belongs to the same small group of books of very great importance.

The author is a Japanese, but he is something much more than a Japanese. He is one of the prophet-thinkers who see beyond the level of nationality, and whose deepest life consists in universal ideas and ideals which are at the same time the most intimate experiences of the personal life. Is not the experience of man, at the best, something which is intensely personal and over-personal at the same time? It is abundantly proved by the thinkers I have mentioned that life is so, or can be so, and it is only when it is so that life can grow on all its sides without injury to any of them. That is the main purpose of this book. The true development of human life is shown to be something intensely personal and over-personal at the same time. We live in an atmosphere which seems to contain more of the ideal elements of humanity than we are apt to suspect in the ordinary, dead-level moments of our experience; and, on the other hand, these ideal moments must become something more than ideal concepts—they must become actual experiences of the whole personality. Professor Sugimori shows all this in his new volume, and does this with remarkable insight. The problem of life and society is a mental and moral problem, because man leaves behind an essential portion of his personality when he forgets this fact. We have to

realise and create the 'great reality' within ourselves before the possibilities of our nature can come to a fruition, and before we can be of any real, lasting service to the cause of mankind in its forward march. "We ourselves, meaning each and every one of contemporary mortals, must first of all be inspired and enlightened ere we are worthy or capable of the task of inspiring and enlightening others."

The volume treats in a brilliant manner the course of this development through conscience and utility, the inner and the outer world, through pride and love, through personal worth and the social order, and, finally, through the necessity of a new religion. The volume is not of course very easy reading. But who is foolish enough to expect the greatest things of life for nothing? We are called here to effort—effort of the whole mind and will; we are called to organise and to specialise for the sake of the world and for our own sake. The author shows that moral and theological reform is most urgent. It is impossible to read this volume without coming to the conclusion that it is a book of fundamental importance, with a significance which is very far-reaching for the future evolution of human society in its difficult passage through nationalism to the over-national ideals which are true to all and good for all.

W. T. J.

THE BOOK OF THE KINDRED SAYINGS.

Or Grouped Suttas (Saṃyatta Nikāya). Part I. Kindred Sayings with Verses (Sagāthā-Vagga). Translated by Mrs. Rhys Davids, M.A., assisted by Sūriyagoda Sumangala Thera. Pali Text Society, Translation Series, No. 7. Oxford University Press; pp. 321; 10s. net.

YET another excellent piece of pioneer work from Mrs. Rhys Davids' pen—careful, scholarly, refined. The Rev. Sūriyagoda Sumangala, Vice-Principal of the Parama Dhamma Cetiya Oriental School at Mount Lavinia, Ceylon, was to have shared the labour of translation with her, but multifarious duties and ill-health have prevented this full co-operation and allowed only of his reading the MS. and suggesting a few useful elucidations of obscure passages. This collection of very brief Suttas, with the verses which sum them up, form about a third of the material of the collection of Kindred Sayings. Mrs. Rhys Davids has rendered

the Pali verse into good English verse-form; this additional difficulty she was already well equipped to surmount by her graceful poetical renderings of the Psalms of the Brethren and the Psalms of the Sisters. As to the contents of these short Suttas, there is in them little detailed systematic exposition of doctrine; the main burden of the teaching is presupposed throughout. It is its effect on the life, the power of spiritual realization the doctrine confers, which is the main interest. The narrative is by no means confined to incidents of normal experience; on the contrary most of the Suttas deal with legends of gods, fairies and devils, and the triumph of the power of the doctrine over them. It should, however, be remembered that entities of these states of being are always supposed in Buddhist doctrine to have been men at some time or other—in some or other previous birth. They may have achieved exalted rank through merit, attained to the magical powers exercised by the gods, or sunk down to the demonic levels through demerit; but in all cases, even in the case of the highest gods, they are unknowing of the truth of the Buddha. Not to speak of the great teacher himself, the disciples who have realized the truth of the doctrine can pass into these states and by the power of the realization of that truth spontaneously surpass the powers of the gods and the rest. The Western reader will thus meet with many strange things in these narratives, but, as Mrs. Rhys Davids says in her Preface, "ever as he wanders on, there will move before him, luminous and serene, the central figure of the great-hearted Gotama, bringing him to the wood's end braced and enlightened by the beneficent tension of listening to many wise sayings. In these he will hear the lesser gods instructed and the higher gods brought low, the devil swept aside and the demons fearlessly confronted; the king given simple, practical, secular advice, not too high or unworldly for his limited intelligence, and the priests' rites and dogmas tested by a new and higher Norm; the disciples' talents evoked and appreciated, and the earnest lay enquirer made welcome." This very brief notice must suffice to call attention to Mrs. Rhys Davids' most recent labour of love, whereby another fragment of the voluminous canon of the Pali Buddhist scriptures is made accessible to readers of English. We should have liked to say a great deal more, but the most rigid economy of space has to be exercised. It is very remarkable that the Pali Text Society should have succeeded in bringing out a new volume in this time of stress. It argues a very high devotion to its humanistic task.

THE MYSTICAL LIFE.

By Dom S. Louismet, O.S.B. London (Burns & Oates); pp. 128;
8s. 6d. net.

"THE Saints are the great Artists. Their masterpiece, their great work of art, is their own beautiful, pure life, the active share they take in the secret of their own heart, in the Sanctity and Joy of God." So writes the monastic author of this book in his Preface, and in these few words he puts forward the high ideal of traditional Mysticism in the Catholic Church. The claim here made for the Mystic who achieves success in reaching the summit of saintship is truly tremendous. For it is that the spirit of man can come to take an 'active share . . . in the Sanctity and Joy of God,' that is, of the Eternal Spirit whom we call God. This is placed before us as the end of true Mysticism, and the mystical life is here defined as 'a life of intimate, sustained, conscious union with God.' In other words, it is a life in which the human soul is conscious to itself of living in intimate union with the Almighty and Everlasting Spirit Who created and upholds the life of all things that live.

Dom Louismet traces the growth of this life in the Mystic from its first beginnings in the soul down to the time when this union of the Spirit is accomplished. He deals with the law of progress in the mystical life, with its usual three stages, the Fatherhood of God, the Beatific Vision, the *Verbum Crucis*, and other well-known matters. When he comes to the Holy Ghost we are taken up to a higher level of thought and live in a more rarefied atmosphere. He declares that the Holy Ghost is the first Gift to the soul and is also the surest Director of the Mystic. "The whole art of the spiritual life consists in attending to the Holy Ghost within us: in our becoming docile to His lights, and responsive to His motions." This undoubtedly was the real rule of life by which the great mystic Saints lived and died. It probably accounts for the fact that, though they submitted to human direction in the Church from superiors and confessors, they were free in their own souls, and restless under outward ceremonies and observances. Dom Louismet certainly explains later the part which the Church takes in the mystical life, but nothing said by him in that chapter can take away from the strength of his admissions that the Holy Spirit is the true and only guide of the soul of man in the mystical life.

But the most striking chapter in this very clear and cogent

treatise is that entitled 'Man, himself the Real Master of the Work.' Coming out of a cloister under Benedictine rule these words look like a direct defiance of all monastic teaching and tradition. He puts it in this way: "The three Divine Persons are in collaboration with the Christian in his efforts to become a saint, but they leave to him, if not the principal, at least the decisive action, the casting vote, so to say." Now we take this bold statement as being quite true. It could be supported upon the broad basis of the freedom of the human will, and the power of the human personality. But we doubt whether such a great truth as this has ever been, or ever will be, preached from any pulpit in any Church or Chapel. It will be seen that this well-written little book is of real value both for the clearness of its doctrine and for the quite unusual candour with which this is defined and disclosed.

F. W.

THE GNOSIS OF THE LIGHT.

A Translation of the Untitled Apocalypse contained in the Codex Brucianus with Introduction and Notes. By the Rev. F. Lamplugh, B.A. (Cantab.). London (Watkins); pp. 89; 3s. 6d. net.

IN *Fragments of a Faith Forgotten* a considerable portion of this gem of Coptic Gnostic literature, as it is called, i.e. of Greek originals rendered into Coptic, was translated from C. Schmidt's German version. Introductory and appreciative matter was added and the enthusiastic opinion of the greatest authority on the subject recorded and endorsed. Mr. Lamplugh now supplies the English reader with a translation of the whole from Amélineau's French version. It would have been better, we think, to have taken Schmidt's version as a basis pending a direct translation from the Coptic; for it was made subsequently to the French scholar's, and Schmidt worked on the text itself and not on a faulty copy as did the latter. It may be here stated that the whole of the Apocalypse was translated when the Extracts were published in *Fragments*—indeed the whole of the famous Bodleian Codex containing two distinct treatises in two different MSS., of which the leaves were in inextricable confusion till Schmidt distinguished them. But meantime a new Coptic Gnostic MS., containing three valuable treatises, had come to hand in 1896, and Schmidt had promised a translation of them and a commentary that would also

throw light on the Codex Brucianus' contents. That was upwards of a score of years ago and alas! the promise is still unfulfilled. Moreover, there were hopes of something better than a translation of a translation. Fired with enthusiasm for this fascinating Apocalypse, a friend had devoted years of labour to acquiring a knowledge of Coptic, and just before the War had succeeded in completing a methodical, painstaking, accurate and dignified version from the original. Then came the War and arrangements for publication (text, transliteration, version, etc.) broke down. This was to have been followed by a translation of the *Pistis Sophia* from the Coptic. Strenuous war-work in France intervened and Coptic became a thing of the past. The scientific treatment of the subject is naturally a very difficult matter even for the best equipped specialist; but there is another side. In the midst of obscurities there appear passages of such great beauty as to make immediate appeal to lovers of the mystical element in religion. It is because of this that Mr. Lamplough has issued his version and supplied it with a brief, but most sympathetic, introduction and notes on a few points. Many who are unfamiliar with Amélineau's and Schmidt's labours have been delighted with the extracts in *Fragments*, and these will now be able to turn to Mr. Lamplough's booklet to become acquainted with the rest of this very remarkable Apocalypse from the most vigorous period of early Christian Gnostic activity.

SOME REVELATIONS AS TO 'RAYMOND.'

An Authoritative Statement. By a Plain Citizen. London (Kegan Paul); pp. 245; 3s. 6d. net.

WE seem to be rapidly accumulating a *Raymond* literature. 'Plain Citizen' tells us that he is the author of some recognized scientific text books and that he has also studied psychical phenomena for fifty years; he is therefore anything but a 'plain citizen' and we are not impressed by the reiteration of his shibboleth throughout the book of the verdict of the plain man; indeed in our own experience we have frequently found the opinion of what is called the 'hard-headed business man' on these matters quite worthless. 'Plain Citizen' is evidently posing for a part and is somewhat of a puzzle. His 'authoritative statement' is simply the text of *Raymond*, which he summarizes in some 75 pages, and submits to a close scrutiny, bringing out remorselessly its flaws and contradictions as though he were an utter sceptic,

and yet repeatedly adding to some damaging inference, as it were: "Mind, I do not say it is so; but as far as the evidence presented by *Raymond* goes it may very well be so." We are thus left with the impression that the verdict will be not simply 'not proven,' but very decidedly unfavourable in all respects. Nevertheless, when we come to the final summing up and the final verdict, we are confronted with what appears to be a strangely illogical *volte face*. We are presented with no less than fifteen conclusions, eight probable and seven certain, all of which Sir Oliver Lodge is admitted to have established, and which seem to us to be not only all but even more than he could have legitimately expected his readers to accept. Since this notice was written some months ago it appears that the book has been withdrawn as infringing the copyright of *Raymond*.

HUMAN IMMORTALITY.

Two Supposed Objections to the Doctrine. By William James, Ingersoll Lecturer for 1897-1898. London (Dent); pp. 80; 1s. net.

THIS reprint of William James' famous Ingersoll Lecture shows how everything bearing on the subject of survival is in eager demand by the public and expected to command a ready sale by the publishers. With great ability James urges the superiority of the transmission-theory of consciousness against the materialistic production-theory. He agrees, with Bergson and Schiller, that matter so far from being that which produces consciousness is that which limits it; consequently, we are compelled to invert our ordinary ideas on the subject of memory and try to account for forgetfulness rather than for memory. This is his first point. His second refers to the incredible and intolerable number of beings which we must believe to be immortal, if immortality be true; and by immortal he means continuing beyond bodily death. In his picturesque and vivid style he continues: "God himself, you think, can have no use for them. An immortality of every separate specimen must be to him and to the universe as indigestible a load to carry as it is to you. . . . But is not such an attitude due to the veriest lack and dearth of your imagination? . . . I feel no call for them, you say; therefore there is no call for them. But all the while, beyond this externality which is your way of realizing them, they realize themselves with the acutest internality,

with the most violent thrills of life. 'Tis you who are dead, stone-dead and blind and senseless, in your way of looking on. You open your eyes upon a scene of which you miss the whole significance. Each of these grotesque or even repulsive aliens is animated by an inner joy of living as hot or hotter than that which you feel beating in your private breast. . . . Not a being of the countless throng is there whose continued life is not called for, and called for intensely, by the consciousness that animates the being's form. That *you* neither realize nor understand nor call for it, is an absolutely irrelevant circumstance. That you have a saturation point of interest tells us nothing of the interests that absolutely are." And so on; an *argumentum ad hominem*, if you will, but an exceedingly telling arraignment of the conceit that would measure the universe by its own insignificant span of interest.

THE BOOK OF THE CRAFT OF DYING.

And Other Early English Tracts concerning Death taken from Manuscripts and Printed Books in the British Museum and Bodleian Libraries. Now done into Modern Spelling and edited by Frances M. M. Comper. With a Preface by the Rev. George Congreve, S.S.J.E. London (Longmans); pp. 173; 6s. net.

FIRST of all there must be generous praise for the careful preparation and artistic presentation of these quaint early English tractates, which besides the famous *Craft of Dying* (including two Abridgments) comprise chapters from Henry Suso's *Orologium Sapientiæ*, from *The Tower of All Towers*, of unknown provenance, and from Richard Rolle's *Form of Living*, also the anonymous *Lamentation of the Dying Creature*, which reminds one strongly of the mystery-play *Everyman*. Mediæval Christianity made of Death the most gruesome of all terrors and strove its utmost to scare people out of their wits in dread of it. There is still a fond illusion in many quarters that a Christian death-bed must necessarily be the most peaceful and hopeful of all modes of passing away. It may be that it ought to be so, if the more hopeful elements of the faith are dwelt upon. But these tractates for the most part rejoice in stressing the terrors of the passing and reducing the chances of escape to a minimum. We cannot imagine that a man going 'over the top'—doing 'his bit'—would be helped and strengthened in his great need by having at the

back of his mind the gruesome pictures of a yawning hell and devils lying in wait for his soul as soon as it is out of his body, that these morbid musings so powerfully suggest to a sensitive and ignorant mind. It is true that the means of protection and escape are set forth; but they are within the competence of the saint rather than of the average man, and it is the man in the street who wants help most. Father Congreve writes: "We stoutly refuse belief to the adventures of mediums in the spiritual world"; and to this the average man replies: "We know nothing about mediums; but we stoutly refuse belief to the adventures of the mediæval imagination of this order in its picturing of the after-death states." Picturing for picturing, we should say, modern imagination is as legitimate as mediæval; where it is superior is that the spirit of it is more in keeping with faith in Divine beneficence.

MAN IS A SPIRIT.

A Collection of Spontaneous Cases of Dream, Vision, and Ecstasy.

By J. Arthur Hill. London (Cassell); pp. 199; 5s. net.

MR. J. ARTHUR HILL is a sober and level-headed psychical researcher who has been gradually converted from a severely sceptical attitude to one of acceptance of the conclusion that the multifarious phenomena which fall within the scope of such researches all point to the fact of man being essentially a spirit. The present volume is not so strictly 'evidential,' that is the cases are not so methodically recorded and tested, as his former work *Psychical Investigations*, but it contains a number of distinctly interesting communications to Mr. Hill by correspondents published for the first time. The book is very readable and the author's treatment of the material and comments are useful and discriminating. His researches, he tells us, have led him to accept largely the scheme suggested by F. W. H. Myers, in his famous work *Human Personality and its Survival of Bodily Death*; but his attitude is free from all dogmatism and he is well aware that the scientific study of these puzzling phenomena has only just begun.

THE MAKING OF A MYSTIC.

By Aelfrida Tillyard. Cambridge (Heffer); pp. 109; 2s. 6d. net.

THE course of this 'making' is set forth in a series of letters between a slangy Cambridge girl-undergraduate and an older

woman who has read diligently of the mystic way in Western and Eastern tradition and had some schooling and experience therein. The object is to trace the first reactions of an entirely unprepared modern mind to mystical ideas and the subsequent dawning of inner appreciation of the nature of the longed-for goal, and the desire is to give help. Things, it must be confessed, seem on the whole to move somewhat too rapidly and the development of the pupil to be a little too facile. But then the sketch does not profess to be a genuine history; it is rather used as a device for answering a number of questions which the writer has had addressed to her after certain courses of lectures at Cambridge. The contrast between the minds and styles of the two correspondents is maintained with literary ability.

HUMAN GEOGRAPHY IN WESTERN EUROPE.

A Study in Appreciation. By H. J. Fleure, Professor in the University College of Wales, Aberystwyth. London (Williams & Norgate); pp. 263; 5s. net.

THIS is the third volume of the Series, 'The Making of the Future,' edited by Prof. Patrick Geddes and Mr. Victor Branford. We have already reviewed the *Coming Polity* and *Ideas at War*, and familiarised our readers with the main programme of the series. An article by Mr. Huntley Carter on 'The Respiritualisation of France,' in the January number of this year, also dealt with some of the leading ideas of renewal, re-education, reconstruction, civics, town-planning, regionalism, etc., which are the concern of the complex of ideas which are stirring in so many directions and seeking expression in practical suggestions for the future. Prof. Fleure's study shows how geography conditions anthropology and ethnography, and so largely determines the make-up and characteristics of the present populations of Western Europe. He thus supplies a suggestive sketch of the probable nature and distribution and intermixture of human strata on which and of which reconstruction is to be attempted. In such 'human geography' much is at present tentative, for it is a novel subject; but it points to a fruitful field for future tillage and will one day doubtless be included in the ordinary curriculum of a humanistic education.

1. SACRIFICE AND OTHER PLAYS. 2. MASHI AND OTHER STORIES. 3. LOVERS' GIFT AND CROSSING.

By Sir Rabindranath Tagore: London (Macmillan); pp. 256 ; 228 ; 117 ; 5s. net each.

WE have already reviewed and praised, frequently at length, the many previous volumes of Sir Rabindranath's rich output in English. If then we find ourselves compelled on this occasion to take together the last three additions, which have appeared within only a few short months, it must not be thought it is from any diminution of pleasure in reading him or of appreciation of his rare distinction as writer of beautiful things, of delicate spiritual feeling and of quaint conceits. It is on the one hand because grim necessity now constrains the strictest economy of space for reviews, and on the other that even if space were plentiful we should be but repeating what we have so often said already. We have before us four characteristic plays, of which 'Malini' is the best known, and fourteen short stories which take us into the heart of Indian life as depicted by one whose sympathetic insight and poetical imagination bring out subtler shades of conduct and motive than any European could be expected to detect. And last but not least we have two fine compositions in rhythmic prose, each consisting of a series of numbered paragraphs or short pieces, somewhat loosely strung together. The one is devoted to the immemorial yet ever fresh theme of human love, the other to the mystical musings of a traveller crossing to the other shore of love divine; both in their different ways are of the delicate quality which Sir Rabindranath has now taught us to expect from him with sure confidence of not being disappointed. The shortness of this notice may be thus further excused on the principle that good wine needs no bush; Tagore's vintage is already world-famous and it is enough to say: Here is some more of the familiar quality.

(Owing to the continued tremendous advance in the price of printing and paper we have been compelled to reduce our space by 16pp.—ED.)