

# THE QUEST

## A Quarterly Review.

Edited by G. R. S. Mead.

---

VOLUME III.

NUMBERS 1—4.

October, 1911, to July, 1912.

---

JOHN M. WATKINS,  
21, Cecil Court, Charing Cross Road, W.C.,  
London.  
1912.

1. The first part of the document is a list of names and addresses of the members of the committee.



## CONTENTS.

	PAGE
Bergson : A French Impression. ERIC CLOUGH TAYLOR, B.A. - - -	328
Blake, The Method of. JOSEPH H. WICKSTEED, M.A. - - -	422
Blake, The so-called 'Madness' of William. JOSEPH H. WICKSTEED, M.A. - -	81
Boole, Mary Everest. Rev. G. W. ALLEN -	289
Buddhism in Japanese Thought and Life, Some Influences of. Prof. YOSHIO NODA, Ph.D. -	62
Buddhism, The Ideal Life in Progressive. The EDITOR, G. R. S. MEAD, B.A. - -	270
Buddhist Psychology, Some Features of. The EDITOR, G. R. S. MEAD, B.A. - -	665
Change (Verse). E. F. MOORE - -	46
China, The 'Kabbalism' of. HERBERT CHATLEY, B.Sc. - - -	733
Contemplatives. JOHN MASEFIELD - -	201
Christ, The Unbelievable. R. HOPKYNs KEBLE, M.A. - - -	258
Christianity, A Study in the Origins of: The Essence of the Faith. Rev. K. C. ANDER- SON, D.D. - - -	546
Cradle of the Christ, The: A Study in the Origins of Christianity. Rev. K. C. ANDERSON, D.D. - - -	47
Dante's 'Vita Nuova,' The Mystical Aspect of. EDMUND G. GARDNER, M.A. - -	458

	PAGE
Discussions :	
The 'Christ-Myth' Controversy and 'Ecce Deus.'	
Prof. W. B. SMITH, M.A. -	864
Whitman, The 'Coarseness' of. F. P. OSMASTON	766
Earth, The Song of (Verse). EVA M. MARTIN -	560
Emotions, The Logic of the. WILLIAM BROWN,	
M.A., D.Sc. - - - -	601
John-Jonah-Oannes? ROBERT EISLER, Ph.D. -	474
John the Baptist in the Light of a New	
Samaritan Document: The Second Noe.	
ROBERT EISLER, Ph.D. - - -	688
John the Forerunner, The Baptism of. ROBERT	
EISLER, Ph.D. - - - -	146
George, St., the Moon God. Prof. J. JAVAKH-	
ISHVILI, Ph.D. - - - -	528
Georgians, The Folk-Tales and Ancient Pagan	
Religion of the. Prof. J. JAVAKHISHVILI,	
Ph.D. - - - -	225
God and the Devil. Rev. F. W. ORDE WARD,	
B.A. - - - -	702
God, Personal and Abstract Ideas of. HAROLD	
WILLIAMS, M.A. - - - -	299
Haunted (Verse). E. J. THOMAS, M.A. -	764
Hegelianism, The Doctrine of 'Die to Live' in.	
L. A. COMPTON-RICKETT - - -	238
Historical, Is the New Testament Jesus? Rev.	
K. C. ANDERSON, D.D. - - -	334
Heaven, Hell and the Present Environment.	
The Late HENRY BERNARD, M.A., F.Z.S. -	648
Maeterlinck's Study of a Religious Crisis: 'The	
Sightless.' HENRY ROSE - - -	120
Mani, The Religion of. F. C. CONYBEARE,	
M.A., F.B.A. - - - -	1

# CONTENTS

v

	PAGE
Mandæan Mystery-Ritual, Fragments of a: 'The Book of Souls.' A. L. BEATRICE HARDCASTLE, M.R.A.S. - - -	714
Metaphysician, The (Verse). ERIC CLOUGH TAYLOR, B.A. - - -	761
Minds, Three and —? H. F. L. - -	742
'Mysteries of the House of God, The Book of the Hidden.' The EDITOR, G. R. S. MEAD, B.A. - - -	100
Mysticism, An Essay in Christian: The Sight of the Soul. H. STANLEY REDGROVE, B.Sc., F.C.S. - - -	496
Nature, Meaning of. A. R. HORWOOD .	516
Notes:	
Christ-myth, Further Literature on the so-called. R. EISLER - - -	195
Mysticism, Recent German Publications on. R. EISLER - - -	563
Psychic Tide, The Rising. The EDITOR, G. R. S. MEAD, B.A. - - -	401
Psychical Research, The Trend of. H. A. DALLAS - - -	22
Reviews and Notices:	
Agrippa, Henry Cornelius (French Translation) -	585
Apocalypse Unsealed, The. JAMES M. PRYSE -	194
Atmosphere, The Human. WALTER J. KILNER -	378
Astrologica, Bibliotheca. F. LEIGH GARDNER -	569
Babylonia and Assyria, Aspects of Religious Belief and Practice in. MORRIS JASTROW, Jr. -	777
Bergson, Henri. H. WILDON CARR -	792
Böhme, Studies in Jacob. A. J. PENNY -	790
Buddhism, Legends of Indian. WINIFRED STEPHENS - - -	593
Buddhism, The New Testament of Higher. TIMOTHY RICHARD - - -	183

	PAGE
Centaur, The. ALGERNON BLACKWOOD	395
Chinese Appeal to Christendom concerning Christian Missions, A. LIN SHAO-YANG	191
Christ in You	592
Church and the Age, The. WILLIAM RALPH INGE	579
Cosmologies, The Earliest. WILLIAM FAIRFIELD WARREN	587
Dragon, The Flight of the. LAURENCE BINYON	784
Fairy-Faith in Celtic Countries, The. W. Y. EVANS WENTZ	581
'Falling Upwards.' F. W. ORDE WARD	584
Flints and Flashes. E. H. VISIAK	568
Freemasonry. The Secret Tradition in. ARTHUR EDWARD WAITE	387
Gnosis, Documente der. WOLFGANG SCHULTZ	193
Gods, The Downfall of the. Sir HUGH CLIFFORD	399
Grail, In the Heart of the Holy. JAMES LEITH MACBETH BAIN	186
Heliogabalus, The Amazing Emperor. J. STUART HAY	780
Here and Hereafter. J. E. WATTS-DITCHFIELD	600
Hereafter, The Life. EDWARD HICKS	600
Hiuen-Tsang, The Life of. SAMUEL BEALE	392
Idolmakers, Among the. L. P. JACKS	580
Inter-racial Problems, Papers on	570
Islām, Aspects of. DUNCAN BLACK MACDONALD	575
Jewish Sources of the Sermon on the Mount, The. GERALD FRIEDLANDER	398
James, William. EMILE BOUTROUX	787
Jewish Proverbs, Ancient. A. COHEN	793
Laughter. HENRI BERGSON	393
Life's Basis and Life's Ideal. RUDOLF EUCKEN	771
Man in the Panther's Skin, The, of SHOT'HA RUST'HAVELI. MARJORY SCOTT WARDROP	788
Mediæval Mind, The. HENRY OSBORN TAYLOR	188
Millionaires, Inspired. GERALD STANLEY LEE	400
Mind, Body and. WILLIAM MCDUGALL	566

# CONTENTS

vii

	PAGE
Nineties, The Renaissance of the. W. G. BLAIKIE MURDOCH - - - -	396
Paul, The Religious Experience of Saint. PERCY GARDNER - - - -	795
Paracelsus, The Life of. ANNA M. STODDART -	572
Priests, Philosophers and Prophets. THOMAS WHITTAKER - - - -	799
Psychical Research. Sir WILLIAM F. BARRETT -	595
Psychical Research, New Evidence in. Sir OLIVER LODGE - - - -	400
Psychology, Religion and Modern. J. ARTHUR HILL - - - -	598
Qualities, The Desire for. STANLEY M. BLIGH -	594
Self, The Unexplored. GEORGE R. MONTGOMERY	182
Silence, Words out of the - - - -	800
Spiritual Science, Here and Hereafter. Sir EARNSHAW COOPER - - - -	386
Sphinx, Riddles of the. F. C. S. SCHILLER -	368
Šūfiism, The Oldest Persian Treatise on. The Kashf al-Mahjūb. REYNOLD A. NICHOLSON -	165
Swedenborg Congress, Transactions of the Inter- national - - - -	180
Tarjumán al-Ashwāq. REYNOLD A. NICHOLSON -	782
Telepathy, Personality and. F. C. CONSTABLE -	880
Theurgia or the Egyptian Mysteries (Iamblichos). ALEXANDER WILDER - - - -	578
Veil, Both Sides of the. ANNE MANNING ROBBINS	186
Verità e Realità. ALESSANDRO BONUCCI -	187
Vision of the Young Man Menelaus, The -	794
Well-rounded Life, An Interpretation of a. STANTON DAVIS KIRKHAM - - - -	185
Wilderness, The Altar in the. ETHELBERT JOHNSON	399
What is and What might be. EDMOND HOLMES -	174
Zohar, The French Translation of the. JEAN DE PAULY - - - -	381
Romanticism of the First Thinkers of Hellas, The. Prof. KARL JOËL, Ph.D. - - - -	634

	PAGE
Slowacki's 'Anhelli': The Mystic Pilgrimage in Siberia. MONICA M. GARDNER -	616
Totemism in the Old Testament. Rev. H. J. DUKINFIELD ASTLEY, M.A., Litt.D. -	443
Whitman, An Appreciation of Walt. CAROLINE A. ECCLES - - - -	349
Worshipper, The (Verse). INA M. STENNING -	360

# THE QUEST.

---

## THE RELIGION OF MANI.

F. C. CONYBEARE, M.A.

MANI was one of the greatest religious reformers that ever lived, and believed that he had a revelation which was destined to supersede both Christianity and Zoroastrianism, the two religions with which he was best acquainted. A Mahometan chronicler, Albiruni, who lived 973-1048 in Khiva, was well acquainted with the works of Mani and adduces a passage from his *Shābūrkān* or religious code, in which Mani spoke of his claims and rôle as follows :

“Wisdom and deeds have always from time to time been brought to mankind by the Messenger of God. So in one age they were brought by the Messenger called Buddha to India, in another by Zaradūsch (or Zarathustra) to Persia, in another by Jesus to the West. Thereafter this revelation has come down, this prophecy in this last age, through me, Mani, the Messenger of the God of Truth to Babylonia.”

This account tallies well enough with that of the Christians who accused Mani of setting himself up as the Paraclete or Comforter who according to the promises apocryphally ascribed to Jesus of Nazareth

in *John* 14<sup>17</sup>, was to be sent by the Father unto mankind, and was to be the Spirit of Truth and abide with Christians for ever. This Paraclete—continues the writer of the Gospel in question—the world could not receive, because it neither beheld him nor knew him. And in the sequel this comforting Spirit is identified with Christ himself: “Ye know him; for he abideth with you, and shall be in you. I will not leave you desolate: I come unto you.” And just below in 15<sup>26</sup> the Comforter is called the Holy Spirit. “The Father,” says Jesus, “will send him in my name, he shall teach you all things, and bring to your remembrance all that I said unto you.”

It is then more than probable that Mani regarded himself as a new prophet with a mission to interpret and fulfil and complete the work of Jesus. And his work was crowned with extraordinary success. His gospel spread almost in his lifetime eastwards over the great tracts we now call Siberia to the confines of China and India, westwards across Armenia and Syria to Africa, Italy and Gaul. In the latter regions it succeeded to the heritage of Mithraism, which in the third century everywhere competed with Christianity, with rites, sacraments and an ascetic discipline so closely resembling their Christian counterparts that the Fathers of the Church believed it to be a satanically inspired imitation of their Church.

Of the life of Mani we know all too little, but it is certain from monuments lately discovered in Central Asia and of which I shall speak presently, that he was born of a family of Fire-worshippers. The Arabic historians fix the date of his birth about A.D. 240, and say that he was well educated in Greek, in astronomy, painting, medicine and the Christian scriptures. His



father resided in Babylon, and was named Futtak, Grecised as Patricius; his mother's name was Mar Mariam. If we may trust these sources his father before him was addicted to the same asceticism which Mani afterwards preached, and was, if not founder, at least a member of a community of Baptists, called Mugtasila in the vernacular; this sect was met with in Mesopotamia, and their three chief rules of life were not to eat flesh, nor to drink wine, and to abstain not only from irregular intercourse with women, but even from marriage. Such asceticism, be it remarked, was no new thing. We find it widespread among the Christian Churches up to the year 250, and the earliest teachings on the subject of Baptism required it. Half Oriental, half Greek, sages, like Apollonius of Tyana, practised and inculcated it. It was, in short, in the air during the first three centuries of our era, and influenced the systems of Egyptian Therapeutæ, of Palestinian Essenes, of early Christians, of Neo-Pythagoreans, all alike. In most cases it was accompanied by views of Baptism and spiritual Rebirth and cleansing by immersion in sacred waters.

At the age of twelve Mani was warned by an angel of his destiny, and at the age of twenty-four was definitely called by another angel to his life's work. "Hail, Mani," said the voice, "from me and from the Lord, which has sent me to thee and chosen thee for his work. Now he commands thee to proclaim the glad tidings of the truth which comes from him, and to bestow thereon thy whole zeal."

What then was Mani's good tidings? It was an amalgam of old Magian belief with that peculiar form of Early Christianity known as Marcionism.

Marcion was a Christian of Sinope, to whom the

Catholic Church owes the earliest collection of the Epistles of Paul, whose disciple and follower he claimed to be, and really was, in a special way in which Catholic Christians were not. Christianity, I need hardly say, was, to begin with, Judaism *plus* the belief that Jesus was the Messiah or Man sent from God to restore upon earth the theocracy or Kingdom of God. As conceived of by Jesus this Kingdom was to be set up miraculously in the holy land, which was incidentally to be freed from the polluting presence of Roman governors and army. It was to appear soon and suddenly, but only the righteous Jews who had repented of their sins were to share in it, together with righteous Jews of other ages who were to rise from the dead for the occasion.

Now Paul took up all these ideas, but with the *proviso* that Gentile proselytes must also share in the Kingdom, and that for them the Jewish initiatory rite of circumcision and the observance of Jewish food taboos and of the sabbath were unnecessary, and not to be enforced. Peter seems to have been partly won over to Paul's more liberal views, but the other apostles of Jesus who had known him personally and aided him in delivering his message of the impending Messianic kingdom, continued to insist on the observance of the whole Jewish law. This conflict very nearly strangled the new religion in its cradle.

Paul's attitude towards the Law amounted almost to a repudiation of it, and Marcion bettered his example. The Eastern world, mainly through the influence of the old Persian dualistic religion, was full of people who held that in the universe of man and nature two principles are at work, one making for good, the other, if not for evil, at any rate for the retributive

justice which demands an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth, and enjoins us to love them that love us and hate those who hate us. This Just or retributive God was author of the visible world; he was also the God of the Jews and inspired their ancient scriptures and prophets. On the other hand, it was the Good God, a God of truth and love, that sent Jesus into the world for the redemption of a sinful humanity that till now had known only the Just God. The morality of Jesus was in all ways the opposite of that of the Old Testament, for he taught us to love our enemies, and to be patient and forgiving of injuries.

To emphasise this point Marcion deliberately took Jesus out of his Jewish *cadre*. He denied that he was the Messiah predicted by the prophets; for that Messiah was to be a soldier and man of war and was to come to the Jews only, and as yet he had not come. He even denied that Jesus had been born at all and apparently taught that he dropped out of heaven into Capernaum in the fifteenth year of Tiberius. Anyhow he was no son of David; and had a phantastic and not a real body of flesh and blood. Paul alone of the apostles had appreciated and understood Jesus, and the twelve apostles had wilfully falsified the records of Jesus' teaching by imparting to it a Jewish twist and predilection for the Law which had been really foreign thereto. All matter was evil according to Marcion, and therefore there is no physical resurrection for Christians; they will rise from the dead in a spiritual body, such as was that of Jesus all along. In the Marcionite churches the severest asceticism was practised, and Christians once initiated could not eat flesh or drink wine or marry.

Marcion preceded Mani by about 140 years, for he

was born about A.D. 100 and settled in Rome about 138. There it was in all probability that the so-called Apostles' Creed was drawn up to counteract his errors. In it many of Marcion's main theses are implicitly denied. Thus he denied that one God made heaven and earth; the creed asserts it. He denied that Jesus was born of woman at all; the creed declares that he was born of the virgin Mary. He denied that the sufferings on the cross and death of Jesus were real; the creed implicitly asserts they were. If he never truly died, then he never truly rose from the dead; the creed affirms both and the tenet of the resurrection of the body is also aimed against Marcion.

We know from epigraphic evidence that the Marcionites had synagogues of their own in Syria as late as A.D. 318. It probably caught on better in the East than the West, for the Eastern temperament is more prone to despise the body than the Western, and to yield itself up to the two extremes of excessive debauchery and self-indulgence or of an uncompromising and rigorous asceticism. In any case Marcionism was plainly the only kind of Christianity which Mani knew. It doubtless agreed with the maxims of Persian dualism in which he had been bred up, and he adopted it in its entirety, associating with it, often in ill-matched union, the legendary cosmogony and astrological myths of his old Magian religion. Except in the vaguest outline it is impossible to describe this latter element. It is enough to say that we have portrayed in it an elemental strife between the powers of good and evil as the Zarathustrian mythology represented them. On the one side Ahura Mazda, the principle of light, on the other Angra Mainyu or Ahriman, the principle of darkness. Between

these two and their forces rages a cloudy combat. The end of the first act is that some parts or members of the Light God are abandoned in the struggle and left imprisoned in matter, the kingdom of darkness. The problem is to disengage these particles of the Light God, as Mani conceived of souls, from nature, and restore them to the primal Kingdom of Light, whence they were stolen. The pure souls extracted from nature and lower earth pass upwards into the Moon, which is conceived as a heavenly ship whose brightness waxes and wanes as it is filled with them or restores them to the Sun. In this strife of good and bad, winds and clouds, tempests and lightnings play their part and are all personified in the spirit of the naïvest animism; and against the mist of battle are outlined mysterious figures, *e.g.* the Mother of life, the Living Spirit, the Omoforos who upholds the world on his shoulders and causes an earthquake if he trembles under the load, the Light Virgin, and so forth.

The chief, and almost the sole method by which man can aid the powers of heaven in the work of liberating the luminous element from the thralldom of matter is an ascetic life, and the Manichean Church consisted of two orders, roughly corresponding to priests and laity in the Western and to monks and laity in the Eastern Church. On the one hand you had a small number of elect or perfect ones, who might not eat flesh or drink wine or marry, whose life was one long fast, and on the other the *auditores* or hearers who lived in the world, but looked forward to being illumined by the Spirit before they quitted this life. The elect ones might not take life, and were as scrupulous in this matter as the Indian Jain who brushes a stone carefully before he sits down on it for fear he should destroy an

ant or a caterpillar. They might not even take the life of a plant by cutting it down or plucking its fruit, and as in accordance with their religious tenets they had to live on a vegetable diet, they made the laity cut their salads, shriving them afterwards for the sin they had committed in procuring the elect ones food. It remains to add that every breath or eructation of the elect one represented so much ethereal spirit rescued from gross matter and dispatched heavenwards.

Because of this admixture of Magian beliefs, the religion of Mani was esteemed to be foreign and dangerous by the Roman government, and a rescript of A.D. 287 is preserved of the Emperors Diocletian and Galerius Maximianus to Julian the Proconsul of Africa condemning it.

You have of your cautious wisdom (runs this edict) warned our serene highnesses that the Manicheans, like prodigies of novelty, have made their way or started from the Persian race which is hostile to us into our hemisphere, and are in it committing many crimes. For they set our quiet populations in an uproar and work the greatest harm in our cities; and we have cause to dread lest, as usually happens in such cases, they may as time goes on try to foist their execrable customs and Persian laws on our modest and tranquil people of Rome, corrupting their innocent nature and infecting our whole world with their malevolent poison. Therefore we order the authors and leaders of this movement, along with their abominable scriptures, to be subjected to the severest punishment, to wit, to be utterly burned by flames of fire. As to those, however, who take their part and even dispute in their behalf, we enjoin that they be beheaded, and we sanction the confiscation of their goods. If any persons of title, no matter what their rank and standing, have adhered to this sect unheard of, base and in all ways infamous, or to the teaching of the Persians, you shall appropriate their patrimonies to our treasury; and the offenders shall themselves be sent to the mines.

This somewhat ferocious edict seems to have been

taken as an example by the Christians, as soon as they got hold of the reins of government, of how to deal with religious dissidents. It was plainly inspired in the first place, however, by fear and dislike of the Persian religion *qua* Persian, and not primarily by religious intolerance. It proves that Mani's religion presented itself to the Roman official mind as a purely Persian cult and not as a sporadic form of Christianity. It is not evident, however, that Mani did not, for purposes of western propaganda, represent himself as a Christian, for I see no reason to doubt the genuineness of an epistle sent by him from the Persian frontier station about the year 276 to Marcellus. The latter was a magnate living within the Roman border, and the rumour of his kindness towards a number of Persian monotheists unjustly attacked on the frontier and captured by the Roman army reached the ears of Mani. Mani forthwith by the hand of his apostle Turbo sent him a letter beginning thus :

Manichæus, an apostle of Jesus Christ, and all the Saints and Virgins with me, to Marcellus, beloved son, grace, mercy, peace from God our Father and our Lord Jesus Christ ; and may the Right-hand of Light guard and keep thee from the present wicked age and from its failings and from the snares of the Evil One. Amen.

In the body of this epistle Mani warns Marcellus against the error of supposing that good and evil have a common author and single origin. This error arises from our failing to discriminate and separate darkness from light, good from what is bad and mean, the external man from the internal.

You (continues Mani) must not, as so many unreasonably and naïvely do, unify the two opposites, nor attribute both alike to God's goodness. For they identify with God the beginning and

the end and the father of all this of which the end is nigh unto a curse (*Hebr. 6s*). For they do not believe in the words of our Saviour and Lord Jesus Christ recorded in the Gospels, that a good tree cannot produce bad fruit, nor a bad tree good fruit (*Mt. 71s*). I marvel therefore at their daring to say that God is Maker and Creator of Satan and of his evil deeds. And would that their vain business had gone no further than this, and that they did not say that Christ the only-begotten who came down out of the Father's bosom was the son of a woman named Mary, and that he was born of flesh and blood, and of all the rest of the unclean stench of womenkind.

Whether the above letter be genuine or not, it is an admirable summary of Manichean opinion as we find it diffused all over Europe as late as the 13th century, and as it still lingers among certain of the Russian dissenters. It is given in a document called the 'Disputation of Archelaus with Mani,' which was written about 800 in Greek by one Hegemonius, and exists entire in an old Latin translation. In this there follows a quaint description of Mani as he presented himself before Archelaus, the bishop of the region in which Marcellus the philanthropic magistrate resided.

Mani arrived bringing with him elect youths and virgins to the number of twenty-two; and first of all he sought Turbo before Marcellus' door, but finding him not at home he went in to greet Marcellus. The moment the latter saw him he fell to admiring his costume; for he had on a kind of boots commonly called quadrisole; but his cloak was variegated, like the face of spring. In his hand, however, he carried a very stout stick of ebony wood. Under his left arm he carried a Babylonian book. He had also clothed his legs in breeches of different colours, the one being red, and the other a sort of green. His countenance, however, was that of an old Persian craftsman (or magician) or of a



leader in war. So Marcellus at once sent him to Archelaus.

On the latter, continues the text, his appearance made an unfavourable impression. There follows a long discussion between the Christian bishop Archelaus and Mani before Marcellus. The heretic is as a matter of course worsted in the argument, and flees back across the border into Persia, whence he came. It is probable that he had won over the Persian king Sapor, for a time at least, to his teachings, but Sapor's successor, Varanes I., put him to death some time between 272-276. About this time there was a considerable revival of the old Magian religion, and its high priests must have regarded with suspicion Mani's attempts to alloy it with Christianity. The reformer in short was suspected inside the Roman empire as a Magian and outside it as a Christian. In the *Acta Archelai*, from which I have quoted above, it is stated that the Persian king had him flayed. His skin, duly tanned and prepared, was blown up and hung over the city gates, and his carcass thrown to the birds.

In spite of the Draconian edict of Diocletian, the Manichean Church made its way in North Africa, and as early as A.D. 373 made a convert of the youthful Augustine, who was an *auditor* for nine years, but never rose to the rank of an elect one. He next joined the Neo-Platonic school, and finally at the age of thirty, under the joint influence of his mother Monica and Ambrose bishop of Milan, was baptised a Christian. Among the first fruits of his conversion to Catholicism were his anti-Manichean writings, which fill a large volume of nearly 900 pages, and are chiefly in the form of public disputations between himself and leading Manicheans. The discussion with Faustus fills thirty-three

books, and that with Felix two. In these and in the books against Fortunatus, Adimantus and Secundinus we have happily preserved to us long extracts from and real speeches of the heretics combated, from which we can estimate the dialectical skill, the piety and fervour, and also the superb Latinity of the leaders of the Manichean Church. I venture to translate the striking passage in which Faustus repels Augustine's taunt that the Manicheans did not accept the Gospel (*c. Faustum* v. 1). Faustus said:

You ask me, Do I receive the Gospel? That is tantamount to asking me if I keep its precepts. Might I not rather ask you whether you accept it, you who exhibit no signs of doing so. I have abandoned father and mother, wife, children and all else which the Gospel bids me, and you ask me whether I accept the Gospel? It seems that you are still in ignorance of what the word Gospel means. It is indeed nothing else but the preaching and command of Christ. I have rejected gold and silver, and have left off carrying coppers in my belt, contented with my daily bread and caring naught for the morrow, free from all anxiety as to how I shall fill my belly or clothe my body, and you ask me, whether I accept the Gospel? You behold in me those beatitudes of Christ which make up the Gospel and you ask me, whether I accept it? You behold me poor, you behold me meek, you behold me a peacemaker, of pure heart, a mourner, hungry, thirsty, bearing persecution and hatred for the sake of righteousness, and you doubt whether I accept the Gospel. We need not wonder then that John the Baptist, when he first saw Jesus and even after he had heard of his works, still asked if he were the Christ, and that Jesus rightly and fittingly, instead of deigning to answer him that he was, merely referred him to the works the rumour of which had already long before reached his ears: the blind see, the deaf hear, the dead are raised, and the rest. I too shall fittingly answer your question, whether I accept the Gospel, by saying: I have abandoned all that was mine, father, mother, wife, children, gold, silver, eating, drinking, delights, pleasures. Take that as a sufficient reply to your queries, and make up your mind that you will be blessed, if you are not scandalised at me.

I know no passage which better conveys the ideal at once of Manicheism and monkery. These words might have issued from the lips of St. Francis. A spirit breathes in them hostile to society and dangerous to civilisation. If you can get others to feed and clothe you, and look after the wife and children you have abandoned, well and good. In the East an ascetic who mortifies his flesh enough, can always win the reputation of a saint, and live upon others. This was the side of early Christianity which won for it among strenuous Roman officials like Pliny and Tacitus the reputation of being a deadly and depraved superstition. It was the ethic of those who thought that the end of all earthly institutions was at hand, and that the Kingdom of God was to be miraculously installed on earth the day after to-morrow. It was perhaps a respectable ideal in the case of the Manicheans and of the medieval Cathars who lived in perpetual risk of being caught and burned alive; but in the great Churches which basked in the sunshine of the favour of temporal princes, it resulted in the formation of a privileged class of make-believe ascetics. Among persecuted and persecutors alike, however, it encouraged the pernicious notion that the loftiest moral and religious ideals are not for the layman, but only for the priest or monk.

That the Manicheans had more reason to dread the brands of orthodox theologians than their syllogisms is apparent to anyone who reads through these treatises and disputations of Augustine. The record of a disputation which took place under the emperor Justinian between one of them and a Persian divine named Paul<sup>1</sup> enforces the same point. This Manichean was

<sup>1</sup> See Giovanni Mercati, *Studi e Testi*, v. (Roma, 1901).

named Photinus, and Dr. Mercati of the Vatican Library, in a learned summary and critique of this dialogue, justly remarks that "the arguments of Paul, the orthodox interlocutor, make a most painful impression on us, when we consider the unhappy condition of the man against whom they were directed, and bear in mind that the latter had sucked in with his mother's milk the evil tenets of which he was accused." For Photinus says: "I only hold the tenets which I inherited from my forefathers and mean to stick to." Dr. Mercati cites in the original Greek the passage of the disputation which leaves this painful impression on us of an unoffending and innocent religionist imprisoned and tortured by the Byzantine inquisition.

The CHRISTIAN says: Is God wholly sinless, or, if not, in what respect does he sin?

The MANICHEAN answers: God is wholly sinless.

CHR.: And is the soul equally so, or in what way does it sin?

The Manichean made no reply, and the Christian, after he had been silent a while, said: Even if you will not answer, because you suspect the conclusion, yet you admit that God is in every way sinless, and that the soul is not so. The soul therefore is not of the divine substance.

MAN.: Your conclusion is not drawn in agreement with the premises.

CHR.: Then refute it, if it be as you say.

MAN.: I am bound with chains and I cannot.

CHR.: Even if your body is bound, yet your soul is not thrown into prison. And according to your philosophy, as the body is essentially evil, the more it is humbled and oppressed, the more the soul is uplifted. So then you shall reason much better in chains than without them; for the body is properly humbled by them and the soul correspondingly exalted.

MAN.: If I could trust to the government to defend me, I would reason with you; but I cannot look to any quarter for help and protection, and therefore I must keep silence.

CHR.: You are a Doctor of the Manicheans?

MAN.: I am and I acknowledge it.

CHR.: And you say that the Manichean Doctors suffer in behalf of the truth, or how?

MAN.: In behalf of the truth: that is my deliberate opinion.

CHR.: Had the blessed Apostle Paul the protection of the government, when he was thrown into bonds, or did he for want of it neglect to go on with his peculiar teaching when he was in prison?

To this question also the Manichean made no answer, but remained silent.

An indescribable horror broods over such a passage as the above. It is like a tiger playing with its victim. It is the Christian and orthodox inquisition—in *petto*.

One more such passage I must cite to shew how identical was the temper of the Roman medieval inquisitor with that of the earlier Byzantine. I take it from a dialogue which exists, still unpublished, I believe, in the Laurentian Library at Florence (*Bibl. Ædil.*, cod. 37, fol. 75<sup>vo</sup> foll.). It is the work of some orthodox inquisitor and intended to be a confutation of the Manichean or rather Marcionite heretics who under the name of Patarenes were still numerous all over Europe as late as the year 1300.

The PATARENE, towards the close of a discussion of the *jus gladii* or right to use the sword, says: We are they of whom it is said: Blessed are they that suffer for the sake of righteousness, yea for Jesus' sake. It is not found in the New Testament that the good persecuted the wicked. But the wicked ever persecute the good, in the way your synagogue ever persecutes our church.

The CATHOLIC answers: Nay, on the contrary it is said in the Gospel that the Lord made a scourge of small cords and cast out of the temple the buyers and sellers, and on that occasion Jesus used the words: The zeal of thy house hath eaten me up. . . . In this way therefore do the good persecute the wicked, and Christians the heretics, not that they should perish, but be converted.

PATARENE: A man ought to be converted by preaching and not by force, for compulsory service and homage are not pleasing to God. So even your Augustine declared, saying: All else a man can do against his will, but believe he never can except of his free will.

CATHOLIC: 'Tis true that God is not pleased with compulsory acts of service, at the moment of compulsion; but acts which at first were compelled, will later on become spontaneous, and pleasing to him. And therefore we compel you, as Christ did Paul. It is true indeed that you cannot believe save of your free will, but you can be compelled to listen to us and you can be compelled to hold your tongues. And that is why we use our power and compel you, so that you shall indeed deign to listen to us. Under compulsion you listen to us, and later on with the grace of God, you shall spontaneously believe, because the true faith has been heard out by you. Or if you have not come to believe, you shall anyhow be compelled to keep silence by having your tongues cut out.

Such has ever been the *ultima ratio* of the appeals of Catholic and orthodox authority. Such it will be again someday, if we are supine enough to admit its claims. The most recent encyclicals of the Roman Pontiffs shew that they have learned nothing and forgotten nothing since the year 1300.

In the West, with the exception of passages of their writers transcribed by Augustine with a view to their refutation, hardly a page of Manichean literature survives; but a curious chance has lately thrown a little and will presently throw much more light on the manuscript hymns, liturgies, homilies, gospels and other books in use among the Manicheans of Central Asia from the fifth to the eleventh or twelfth century. In that land the great rivers flowing from the Himalayas and other massive Asiatic ranges have constantly changed their courses, leaving erewhile populous and flourishing cities stranded and deserted

amidst burning wastes of inhospitable sand. Explorers sent from Germany, Russia and England, especially Dr. Stein and Prof. Grünwedel, have found in Turfan on the borders of China thousands of literary monuments, longer or shorter, written and even printed on leather and paper. Beside Buddhist and Hindoo scriptures, hundreds of Manichean and Christian fragments have been thus exhumed, most of them written in the Vigur dialect of old Turkish. The Manichean books are written in the estrangelo Syriac alphabet, and shew exquisite calligraphy and decoration. In 1904 a whole volume of such fragments was published along with German renderings by Dr. F. W. K. Müller at Berlin. Here at last we get long fragments of Mani's work entitled *Shāpūrakān*, and of his Gospel and Epistles, polemics against the old fire-worship, also fragments of the so-called Gospel of Peter and of the Book of the Pastor of Hermas, which once had a place in the Christian canon of scripture, and also many scraps of the exuberant and fantastic mythology which, as M. Franz Cumont has remarked, took in Mani's religion the place of cosmogony. It illustrates the eclectic character of this religion that in the same prayer we find invoked the old Persian demi-god Srōsch, redeemer of souls, Mani the Lord, Jesus the giver of life, and the Virgin of Light. Mani and Jesus are invoked in the same breath and asked to forgive men's sins. In one hymn the full moon is adored, then Jesus, then Varēsap; then sundry angels, Raphael, Michael, Gabriel, Sarael and Jacob, leader of angels, are prayed to for joy and health alongside of the old Persian Time-god Zrvān. In another the worshipper prays to the God Mihir or Mithras, to Frēdōn, to the Sun, to the Mother of Life, to Zrvān and the angels

just mentioned to be protected against Ahriman the Evil One.

In the April number of *The Journal* of the Royal Asiatic Society, Dr. A. V. Le Coq contributes the text and translation of a long prayer and confession of sins used perhaps a thousand years ago by the Manichean *auditores* or laymen of Turkestan, from two MSS. One of these, a long roll, beautifully written in Syriac characters, was brought home by Dr. Stein; the other in Vigur or Uighur characters is in St. Petersburg. It begins with a recital of the primeval battle between Good and Evil as follows :

Khormuzta the God and the Five-God came descending (from the heavens), with the purity of all the gods, in order to engage in battle against the Demon; he battled against the ŠmnuDOM inclining to evil deeds, and against the five kinds of Demonry. God and the Demon, Light and Darkness at that time intermingled. God Khormuzta's youth, the Five-God, (and) our Souls engaging in combat with Sin and Demonry, became ensnared (?) and inter-entangled (?).

(Then forgiveness is asked for) the Born and Created who forgot and forfeited the eternal heaven of the Gods and became separated from the Light-Gods. Thereafter, my God, (continues the text) if, because the Šmnu intending evil deeds, has led our understandings and our thoughts astray . . . to demoniacal actions, and if, because thereby we have become unwise and void of understanding, we should have sinned and erred against the foundation and root of all bright spirits (namely) against pure bright Azrua the Lord. . . .

The sins to be repented of are then enumerated under fifteen heads. The fifth to the eighth heads are so characteristic that I venture to repeat them in brief *résumé*.

The fifth of these turns on the solicitude of the sect for the lower animals. We must not forget that the Manicheans, like so many religionists of India,



believed in the migration of human souls after death into animal bodies. This belief was held also by the European Cathars in the middle ages, and was partly of old Celtic origin and partly due to Oriental influences. In this chapter, therefore, the Manicheans beg to be forgiven for any transgressions committed against the five kinds of living beings, two-legged man, quadrupeds, birds, fishes and reptiles.

If somehow we have frightened or scared them, or have beaten or angered them, or have killed or tormented them. Now, my God, cleansing ourselves from sin! We pray, *Manastar hirza* (Our sin remit)!

In the fifth chapter they pray for forgiveness in case they have committed any of ten classes of sin, namely, falsehood, perjury, persecution of the innocent, backbiting, sorcery, devouring of an industrious man's homestead, and if they "shall have somehow done deeds displeasing to the God of the Sun and the Moon."

In the sixth they pray to be absolved of the sin of adherence to false religions, in case they have strayed along poison-laden roads that lead to Hell. The great offence named is that which we so often meet with in the early Christian Fathers, of "calling the Demon by the name of God and worshipping him with prostrations." This they are led into by failure to understand and comprehend the true God and the pure Faith, through disbelief in the Burkhans and in what the pure elect ones have preached. They have rashly trusted in those who say falsely: "I am a man of God, I am a preacher."

These false teachers must have been the Christian doctors, especially of the Nestorian Church, which we meet with all over Central Asia as far as China between the fifth and the eleventh century, constantly proclaim-

ing a form of Christian dogma which was the direct antithesis of the phantastic christology of the Manicheans. The fasts of such false teachers, our document goes on to say, must be avoided, as also erroneous forms of almsgivings :

If, invoking the Demon and the Preta by the name of God, we should have killed (sacrificed) living and moving beings and prostrated ourselves to the Demons.

This must refer to the animal sacrifices which still survive in the Nestorian, Armenian and Georgian churches, and which must have been much more common in those early centuries. Indeed we know that they endured in Celtic Christianity, and were still rife in Italy and France up to the tenth century. Any Greek *euchologion* before the year 1200 contains prayers for animal sacrifices to be offered for the dead or in crises of calamity. The Manicheans from the first rebuked the great Churches for their continuance and sanctioning of these usages of the older religions, and it is partly to Neo-Pythagorean influences, partly to the unflinching protests of Manichean teachers, that we owe their almost complete disappearance to-day.

The next head contains a sort of confession of a Manichean hearer or layman. It runs thus :

When we had come to know the true God and the pure Law, we knew the two Roots and the Law of the Three Times. The Bright Root we knew to be the Paradise of God, the Dark Root we knew to be the Empire of Hell. We knew what had been in existence before there was an Earth-God. We knew why God and the Demon had battled against each other, and how thereby Light and Darkness had intermingled. We knew who had created Heaven and Earth and by what means the *argon* (*archon*) Earth-God will again be reduced to nought, and how thereby Light and Darkness will again be parted; we knew what will happen after these events. Believing in and placing our reliance upon Azrua

the God, upon the Sun-and-Moon-God, upon the powerful God and the Burkhans, we became *Auditores*.

In the ninth they ask absolution for having walked, wittingly or not, in the love of the body, for having chosen or listened to bad comrades, for having obtained cattle and other possessions by ill means.

On the whole this document gives us the impression of a highly ethical dualism. It is true there is much primitive worship of winds and waters, of sun and moon; but we must not forget that the storm is a demon-spirit in the Gospel-story, and that for the Christian Fathers sun and moon and stars were still animated beings, Divine Animals, as Origen called them. In the background also there was a cosmology and a congeries of creation myths too cumbrous and fanciful to compete successfully with the Book of Genesis. Perhaps also in the ritual there were practices in themselves disgusting to us, but intelligible as the survival of nature-worship.

F. C. CONYBEARE.

# THE TREND OF PSYCHICAL RESEARCH.

H. A. DALLAS.

IN relation to great problems there is nothing at the same time so tempting and so detrimental to progress as the notion that one is in possession of an hypothesis all-inclusive and complete. A distinguished student of psychical research (Signor Ernest Bozzano) has said :

Truth may be represented by a prism with multiple faces, and error arises from observing only a few faces, and imagining that we see them all.

Anyone who seeks to combine into one system a large variety of facts must be equipped with considerable knowledge and have the judicial faculty in full exercise, otherwise he is almost sure to succumb to the temptation to fit facts to theories, instead of scrupulously checking and measuring every theory solely by its capacity to explain facts.

I desire to be on my guard against falling into this error. I am not so foolish as to think I have a theory which will account for the whole range of psychic phenomena ; my aim in this paper is simply to make a brief but careful review of some of the chief classes of phenomena in order to form a tentative estimate of the trend of the evidence, and to examine fairly towards what conclusions it seems to point. We have now a

large mass of observed facts before us, and it is not only permissible to make deductions from them; it is, indeed, a duty to do so. Sir William Herschell recognised this duty in relation to his own branch of science; he would not permit students to escape it on the pretext that their only concern was the observation and recording of facts. In 1785 he wrote :

We ought to avoid two opposite extremes. If we indulge a fanciful imagination and build worlds of our own we must not wonder at our going wide from the path of truth and nature. On the other hand, if we add observation to observation without attempting to draw not only certain conclusions, but also conjectural views from them, we offend against the very end for which only observations ought to be made.

This remark is equally applicable to the research we are considering. We are warranted, nay we are in duty bound to ask ourselves in relation to it: What are the implications involved in the acceptance of the already verified facts? It is well that we should take stock, as it were, from time to time, and clearly recognise what are the truths these facts establish.

Certainly they open the door to many suggestions, to many possibilities; but it is not with all these that I am about to deal. We cannot yet co-ordinate all the facts; and if ever the day comes when it is possible to do so, the final synthesis will doubtless be full of surprises.

What we may do, however, is, I think, this. Psychical research has, in the opinion of many, advanced far enough to permit us to affirm with confidence that, whatever the ultimate, all-embracing synthesis may be, it will be one that will involve the admission of certain conclusions which are already substantiated by an overwhelming amount of evidence.

Three conclusions which, I believe, we are warranted in expecting to find established, in any future synthesis, are :

1. The reality of an unseen universe of intelligent life.
2. Man's survival of bodily death.
3. That communication takes place between the (so-called) living and the (so-called) dead.

The evidence which is already forthcoming is of a character to place these conclusions on a scientific basis. It should challenge the attention of the most sceptical and the most materialistic. I do not say that it will necessarily convince these, for temperament and habits of thought are often the determining factors in conviction ; but the facts to which I refer are such as no man of an unprejudiced mind can afford to ignore. As far, then, as space permits I will proceed to consider how far the main classes of verified phenomena justify such convictions.

I may assume that many of my readers accept the fact of telepathy ; but before making any further remarks under this head, I should like to point out that many persons suppose that 'telepathy' may be treated as an *explanation* of a large number of mysterious occurrences. This is a fallacy. We must rid ourselves of the notion that we have in the word any real solution of problems, before we can hope to make any progress towards discovering what that solution may be. Telepathy is a word used to *denote* a fact, not to *explain* it. The word has been defined by Mr. Myers as "the communication of impressions of any kind from one mind to another, independently of the recognised channels of sense."

This definition offers no explanation as to how

the impressions are conveyed from one mind to another; that problem remains to be determined.

Assuming, however, that telepathy is a fact, how does it support the above-named propositions?

It supports them in this way: It removes some of the main obstacles to their acceptance; it offers a reasonable experimental basis for the conclusion that communication after bodily death is possible. If thought can be conveyed without physical channels, it becomes conceivable that it can be generated without a physical brain, and it shows that mental processes are not *necessarily* dependent upon a physical organism. It is also reasonable to conclude that if mind can commune with mind without using the bodily senses, here in this life, it may be able to do so after these bodily senses have ceased to exist.

Therefore, although the fact of telepathy does not, *per se*, supply positive evidence for either of these two propositions, it offers a strong argument in favour of the acceptance of both, if, on other evidence, that acceptance is justified.

In the year 1894, a 'Census' Committee appointed by the Society for Psychical Research made the following statements on the subject of telepathy, which, in the light of subsequent experiences, deserve special note.

There can be no doubt that the general acceptance of telepathy as a fact . . . of nature must importantly modify the current scientific view of the relation of mind to matter. But it may conceivably modify this view in either of two ways, respectively important in very different degrees.

It may lead to the ultimate discovery of some physical process . . . or it may lead ultimately to the conclusion that the causal relation between the psychical facts telepathically connected is independent of any such physical process.

It is obvious that the modification of received views in the acceptance of the second alternative would be far greater and more fundamental than that involved in the acceptance of the first.<sup>1</sup>

The Report proceeds to say that efforts to find an explanation will probably first be made in the attempt to discover a physical process, but adds :

Unless, indeed, other strange facts should be simultaneously established, clearly cognate to telepathy, and clearly not admitting of any physical explanation.<sup>2</sup>

No physical process has been discovered during the sixteen years which have elapsed since this was written, but many strange facts *have* been established. Whether the operation of physical laws will suffice to explain them is the point still at issue among students. These 'strange facts' include apparitions, automatic writings and physical and mental phenomena of various kinds.

Among recorded instances of apparitions there are apparitions of those still in the body. In the above-mentioned 'Census of Hallucinations,' fifteen well-authenticated cases of this kind will be found. A number of these cases were the result of deliberate attempts to appear to some person at a distance. Experiences of this nature are, obviously, closely related to telepathy, and at the same time they approximate to the far more numerous cases of apparitions of deceased persons. Whatever hypothesis is applied to interpret the one class, should be applied also to the other.

The object of this 'Census of Hallucinations' was to attempt to ascertain what proportion of persons have experiences of this sort, tactile, or visual, or sensory,

<sup>1</sup> *Proceedings* vol. x., p. 26.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 27.



and the 'Census' was signed by Professor Sidgwick, Mrs. Sidgwick, Mr. F. W. H. Myers, Mr. Frank Podmore, and Miss Alice Johnson.

Out of 17,000 answers 9·9 per cent. were affirmative. A very exhaustive analysis was made of these cases, and in order to appreciate its value the ten tables included in vol. x. should be carefully studied. The number of supernormal experiences of this kind which *coincided with a death* were 440 times the number that chance alone might lead us to expect, and the 'Census' shows that 95 cases were reported to have been shared by a second person or by more than two (p. 303).

Figures, however, convey little unless they are studied and compared with scrupulous attention. I will, therefore, state the result at which the 'Census' committee arrived by their analysis, and not attempt to summarise their long lists of figures. In summing up their conclusions the Committee say :

We have found that the distribution of recognised apparitions before, at, and after the death of the person seen affords some argument for the continuity of physical life and the possibility of communication from the dead (p. 392).

Between death and apparitions of the dying a connexion exists which is not due to chance (p. 394).

The bearing of this Report on the subject before us is obvious.

Two or three alternative theories have been suggested. One is that the apparent communication or vision may be due to some telepathic impulse from some other person, not the deceased.

I cannot go into this at any length, but will merely point out that there are instances in which this theory fits the facts very ill. Particularly is this the

case when the death has occurred among strangers, not connected with the percipient, or when the apparition is the fulfilment of a promise to appear made before the death.

The other hypothesis is that of delayed telepathy. In this case it is necessary to suppose that the idea was projected by the dying person, and remained latent in the mind of the percipient for some hours before it was recognised as an apparition.

Such latency under certain limits is not impossible. But when the lapse of time between the death and the appearance is considerable, many days, weeks, or years, this theory can hardly be claimed as a reasonable explanation.

Whether the apparition is due to the activity of a dying person or one already deceased, in either case the fact adds weight to the argument for survival. If it is due to a dying person, we are confronted with the remarkable fact that just when the physical powers are at their lowest ebb, some faculty (be it psychical or mental) is extraordinarily active and potent; so much so that it can project an image, or even, in some instances, carry information, to a person at a considerable distance. If, however, the apparition is projected by a person already deceased, we have, of course, experimental evidence for survival of consciousness.

Let us next consider whether automatisms, such as automatic writing and table-movements, afford evidence for survival.

The observation of table-movements and automatic writing has shown, I think conclusively, that both these frequently may exhibit nothing more than the contents of the mind of the automatist.

If a person finds himself writing words which were not consciously in his mind, he is disposed to conclude that they originated elsewhere, and to imagine that he is inspired by some extraneous intelligence. Careful observation of the phenomenon, however, shows that this impression is often a mistake. There is no exercise of subliminal faculty which requires more cautious discrimination than that of automatic writing. That stratum of the consciousness which for lack of a better term we call 'subliminal,' is the region most susceptible to impressions from other minds. It is there that we may expect to find telepathic messages registered; but it is also there that the manifold impressions made by past experiences are stored, and from this deep reservoir they emerge in varied forms when the normal consciousness is passive and leaves room for their manifestation. Much that passes for communication from some extraneous source is really due to the subliminal activities of the automatist; much, but not by any means all. There is often a blended product, partly self-originated, partly telepathically received. In the case of 'messages' obviously bearing evidence of their distinctly telepathic origin, the agent of these 'messages' is sometimes an embodied mind, but there are instances in which there is strong reason to believe that they issue from a disembodied mind; each case has to be judged on its own merits.

A remarkable incident of communications by raps in a table was related to me by Mr. Dawson Rogers, the late editor of *Light*. The incident is given in his own words in an issue of that journal (Nov. 19, 1910). I must here slightly curtail the narrative.

Mr. Dawson Rogers states that he was holding a

*séance* with Mr. and Mrs. Everitt and a few other friends, all being well known to each other. He says: "We were sitting under the full blaze of a gas chandelier when some loud raps came upon the table." At first nothing intelligible could be obtained, but after a while a few letters were spelled out; the table rapping at the letter required, when the alphabet was repeated.

When the letters M. A. N. S. were indicated Mr. Rogers supposed that the name referred to a Mr. Mansell, a friend who was sitting with them at the table. The 'table,' however, emphatically denied this. Presently, after the alphabet had again been repeated, it was understood that the S. was a mistake, and finally the name 'Thomas Manton' was spelled out. No one present knew any person of this name. Mr. Rogers continues:

I next asked the spirit to tell me how many years he had been in the other life. The answer came—S-I-X——.

'Oh,' I said, 'six years?'—An emphatic 'No.'

'Perhaps you mean six years and so many months? Tell us how many?'—Answer 'T-E——'

'Oh, six years and ten months?'—'No.'

'Go on.'—'T-E-E——'

'Oh, sixteen years?'—Again 'No.'

'Well, go on.'—'H-U-N-D-R-E-D.'

'Then you mean that you have been in the other life sixteen hundred years?'—'No.'

'Well, try again.'—'Sixteen hundred and seventy-seven.'

'Do you mean that you have been in the other life sixteen hundred and seventy-seven years?'—'No.'

'Do you mean that you entered the other life in the year 1677?'—'Yes.'

'Tell us where you were born.'

Answer, 'Laurencelydiard.'

Knowing nothing of such a place as this, I asked where

it was, and the reply was spelled out correctly and rapidly—  
'Somersetshire.'

'Where were you buried?'—'Stoke Newington.'

The spirit afterwards told us that he was a Nonconformist divine; was at one time chaplain to Charles II.; was afterwards ejected from the Church and imprisoned; that he could say no more then, but that if we wanted further information we could learn something of him at Wadham College, Oxford. He added, however, that he had been introduced to the *séance* by a Nonconformist friend whom he had met in the other life, Dr. Jabez Burns, who while in earth-life had attended some of Mrs. Everitt's *séances*.

On turning next day to a Clergy List in search of a parish of a name that might bear some resemblance to 'Laurencelydiard,' I found '*Lawrence Lydiard*' in *Somersetshire*. This gave me some hope that I might find all the rest of the narrative to be correct, and as the readiest method of testing the messages, I requested the Rev. W. W. Newbould, who was in the habit of frequenting the British Museum, to endeavour, if possible, to verify the facts for me, telling him, however, nothing more than that I wanted a brief sketch of the life of Thomas Manton, a Nonconformist divine.

On the following day Mr. Newbould sent Mr. Rogers a report of Thomas Manton which proved the accuracy of the communication in every particular.

This incident is a case of physical and mental phenomena combined. In relation to physical phenomena alone Sir Oliver Lodge has said<sup>1</sup> that, whilst he considers that there is sufficient evidence for believing that they occur, yet they do not appear to have any "immediate or necessary connection with the question of human survival." He does not, however, preclude the possibility that they may sometimes have indirect connection with this momentous question, and this they seem to have when they are intimately

<sup>1</sup> *Nature*, Oct. 20, 1910, p. 490.

associated with intelligent communications affording good evidence of identity.

There are indeed cases in which these phenomena cannot be accounted for without assuming the intervention of some discarnate mind, and we are, therefore, compelled to face the further question: Can we identify this intelligence?

Professor Lombroso, at the outset of his investigations, inclined to the view that these abnormal occurrences were due solely to the conscious or sub-conscious activity of the medium, but after twenty years of further study he expressed a different opinion. He then stated that he considered that there is valid evidence for the intervention of intelligences external to that of the medium. It is also well known that Sir William Crookes is of the same opinion. This does not, of course, *per se*, imply that these intelligences are human. There is, however, strong evidence that this is sometimes the case. As an illustration I will quote a case recorded by Dr. Joseph Venzano, a medical man in Genoa. Dr. Venzano was associated with Professor Enrico Morselli (a distinguished alienist and neuropathologist) in investigations with the famous medium Eusapia Palladino, and Professor Morselli has described him as "an excellent observer."<sup>1</sup>

His record of his experiences with this medium are related in detail and with careful note of all the conditions and keen analysis of the occurrences and their possible explanations; the account can be read in *The Annals of Psychical Science* (August, September, 1907). Dr. Venzano writes:

The control of Madame Palladino was confided to me, on the right, and to Madame Ramorino seated on the left. The room

<sup>1</sup> *Annals of Psychical Science*, vol. v., p. 344.

was arranged as usual, and lighted, when the phenomena occurred, by the candle in the ante-room. The narrative of this incident is taken from the special notes which I made myself on the same evening, after the *séance* (vol. vi., p. 164).

In spite of the dimness of the light I could distinctly see Madame Palladino and my fellow-sitters. Suddenly I perceived that behind me was a form, fairly tall, which was leaning its head on my left shoulder, and sobbing violently, so that those present could hear the sobs; it kissed me repeatedly. I clearly perceived the outlines of this face, which touched my own, and I felt the very fine and abundant hair in contact with my left cheek, so that I could be quite sure that it was a woman. The table then began to move, and by *typtology* gave the name of a close family connection who was known to no one present except myself. She had died some time before, and on account of incompatibility of temperament there had been serious disagreements with her. I was so far from expecting this *typtological* response that I at first thought that this was a case of coincidence of name; but whilst I was mentally forming this reflection I felt a mouth, with warm breath, touch my left ear and whisper, in a low voice in Genoese dialect, a succession of sentences, the murmur of which was audible to the sitters. These sentences were broken by bursts of weeping, and their drift was to repeatedly implore pardon for injuries done to me, with a fulness of detail connected with family affairs which could only be known to the person in question. The phenomena seemed so real that I felt compelled to reply to the excuses offered me with expressions of affection, and to ask pardon in my turn if my resentment of the wrongs referred to had been excessive. But I had scarcely uttered the first syllable when two hands, with exquisite delicacy, applied themselves to my lips and prevented my continuing. The form then said to me: 'Thank you,' embraced me, kissed me, and disappeared.

I should state at this point that this extraordinary phenomenon did not for a moment rob me of calmness of observation, which was more than ever necessary under these circumstances, and that I did not cease to watch the medium, who was quite awake and visible to all, and remained motionless through the whole course of the phenomena.

This incident, which is recorded by a thoroughly

capable witness, shows that these physical phenomena do sometimes strengthen the evidence in favour of survival; but, even when they afford no proof of identity, in so far as they show the action of intelligences other than those of the incarnate, they strengthen the argument that mind can exist apart from a physical brain, and thus they undermine materialistic objections to the possibility of survival.

If, as an illustration of trance-phenomena, I mention only one trance-medium, this is not because there are not many others who might be mentioned, but because this medium has been so long under critical observation that she has become famous in an unusual degree. Mrs. Piper has been studied for more than a quarter of a century by the S.P.R. and other investigators. Her trances are profound, and of their reality there is no doubt. The communications which are made during her trances, and which claim to come from deceased persons, frequently contain statements of information unknown to any one present. We are all familiar with the suggestion that in these cases she may have received the information telepathically from some one at a distance. As we do not know the limits of human capacity, it would perhaps be rash to say that this kind of ubiquitous mind-probing is *impossible*; but there is a feature in these experiences which renders such an explanation extremely strained and improbable. It is this. The ideas communicated through Mrs. Piper's trance-state are of a selective, purposeful character. Now it is just conceivable that Tom, Dick, or Harry might unconsciously communicate their thoughts to Mrs. Piper in a random fashion, even whilst they were miles away and, perhaps, quite unacquainted with her, and she might reproduce this



hodge-podge of ideas during her trance ; but this in no way explains how it happens that the pieces of information thus given should fit into the personality of a 'John' or a 'William,' deceased, and that, too, so appropriately that his friends are constrained to believe that it is indeed the man they knew who is conversing with them, making statements, moreover, which they are able to verify after the interview is over.

This kind of selective thought-transference (if it is thought-transference) has the character of intelligent, purposeful direction, and has not the character which we should expect involuntary, haphazard telepathy to bear.

There is another fact also which seems inexplicable on such an hypothesis. One of the communicators, 'George Pelham,' has recognised correctly and appropriately some thirty persons who visited Mrs. Piper when in trance. When we remember that this control never claimed to recognise the persons he did *not* know in his earthly life, we must acknowledge that, as Dr. Hodgson has said, we have here a strong indication pointing to the agency of the actual 'George Pelham.'<sup>1</sup>

Since the death of some of the leaders in this research there has been a fresh departure in the character of the evidence which has been forthcoming ; greater ingenuity has marked the communications.

Two aims seem to predominate in these messages. The intelligences behind them seem to direct their efforts, in the first place, so as to indicate the action of some mind or minds independent of those in the body, and, secondly, to give satisfactory evidence for the identification of the intelligence at work. Other

<sup>1</sup> Students of this subject should carefully read the Report on Mrs. Piper written by Dr. Hodgson, and published in *S.P.R. Proceedings*, vol. xiii, part xxxiii.

facts of great interest make themselves evident by the way, but these seem to be the primary objects in view. Those who are most competent to estimate the quality of the messages, and who have given several decades to the study of these kinds of phenomena, have expressed their conviction that, whatever be the source, these objects are obviously present in the communications and give them their trend.

In reply to an argument used by a contributor to *The Church Family Newspaper*, to the effect that these messages were lacking in intelligence, Sir Oliver Lodge wrote as follows (November 5, 1909):

What we are quite clear about is that ingenuity of a high order has been at work . . . and that to whatever agency the intelligence may ultimately have to be attributed, intelligence and scholarship and ingenuity are very clearly and unmistakably displayed. Of that we have no doubt whatever. The scholarship moreover in some cases singularly corresponds with that of F. W. H. Myers when living, and surpasses the unaided information of any of the receivers. Of that too I have myself no doubt.

I must now make a final demand on the reader's attention, for the episode with which I am about to deal is of an intricate character. Its importance, however, from the point of view of evidence for identity, can, perhaps, hardly be exaggerated; and this is why I have chosen to quote it rather than some more obvious incident.

In the year 1884, Mr. Myers had written a letter to his friend, Dr. Verrall, in which he said that a certain ode by Horace (*C. i.* 28), called the 'Archytas Ode,' had "entered as deeply as almost any Horatian passage into his own inner history."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Proc.*, vol. xxii., p. 406.

The ode is an obscure one, and open to more than one interpretation ; Myers seems to have interpreted it as expressing the dread of immortal life unless that life should prove more satisfying than the present, and the idea that survival in a monotonous eternity would offer no advantage. This seems to have been the thought which Myers had in mind when he intimated that the poem found a deep response in his heart.

His friend Mrs. Verrall realised that here was a suitable subject for a test-question. She knew the *direct* answer to the question, *i.e.* she knew the ode referred to in the letter to her husband, but she did not know why Myers cared specially for it. Accordingly when Mrs. Piper was in England in 1907, during one of her trances, Mrs. Verrall put the question to the 'Myers'-personality, "Which ode of Horace entered deeply into your inner life?"

This question was put on January 23, 1907. The reply received was that 'Myers' would have to recall and consider before he could "bring out an intelligent answer." (An intelligent answer from the point of view of a psychical researcher should of course be an *evidential* answer.)

During the month of February one reference was made by Mrs. Piper's 'control' to Horace, and it was connected with Myers' "own poems." This association of ideas was significant, as we shall see. In March 'Myers' repeated that he could not yet reply to the question. In April, when Mrs. Sidgwick reminded him of the matter, she received the following unexpected reply :

I recall the question and I had Ode to Nature on my mind ; but as I thought I loved another ode better I did not reply until I

could say it more clearly. Do you remember immortality? . . .  
I thought I could answer.<sup>1</sup>

Mrs. Sidgwick saw no sense in this, for there are no odes by Horace with these titles. Some months later, however, Mr. J. G. Piddington discovered that among Myers' "own poems" there are two, headed respectively 'Ode to Nature,' and 'Immortality'; both these are based upon memories of Horace, and the poem on 'Immortality' is reminiscent of the 'Archytas Ode' (*i.e.* of the ode referred to in the letter written to Dr. Verrall). It shows traces of the influence of this ode both in the language and in the thought expressed. Here is a stanza:

Yet in my hid soul must a voice reply  
Which knows not which may seem the viler gain,  
To sleep for ever or be born again,  
The blank repose or drear eternity.  
A solitary thing it were to die  
So late begotten and so early slain,  
With sweet life withered to a passing pain,  
Till nothing anywhere should still be I.  
Yet if for evermore I must convey  
These weary senses thro' an endless day  
And gaze on God with these exhausted eyes,  
I fear that, howsoe'er the seraphs play,  
My life shall not be theirs nor I as they,  
But homeless in the heart of Paradise.<sup>2</sup>

Mrs. Piper had never read these poems, and it was only months after this reference was made that Mr. Piddington observed that there are poems by Myers bearing these titles (namely 'Ode to Nature' and 'Immortality'). It was in the April of the following year, 1908, that the significance of these allusions forced itself upon his mind. At that time

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 398.    <sup>2</sup> *Fragments of Prose and Poetry*, p. 172.

Mrs. Piper was in the States and a Mr. Dorr was holding sittings with her, with the object of trying to find out whether the 'Myers'-personality showed any close familiarity with the literature, especially the classical literature, so well known to Frederic Myers. These attempts yielded most satisfactory results.

On one of these occasions (March 10, 1908), Mr. Dorr read aloud a passage from Myers' autobiography. When he came to the paragraph referring to his early love for classical authors, and particularly for Horace, the hand of the entranced Mrs. Piper wrote:

Ode to i motalty imortality  
Ode Horace to Mortality.

This reply conveyed no meaning to Mr. Dorr, who knew nothing of the question which had been put a year before. Then followed an emotional outburst, in which the communicator spoke of having at last found "my dreamed of joys."

At a later sitting in April of the same year, 'Myers' associated "Orion Neptune's son" with Horace, asking in this connection, "Do you remember an ode of Horace?" Now there is only one ode of Horace in which both Orion and Neptune are mentioned and that is the 'Archytas Ode.' Mr. Dorr replied:

I do not know my Horace well, and I recall none at the moment. Why do you ask?

'Myers' rejoined:

Because you ought to know that I am Myers by my giving all these proofs.<sup>1</sup>

But Mr. Dorr did *not* recognise the proofs, because he did not know what the communicator (if indeed it

<sup>1</sup> *Proceedings*, vol. xxiv., pp. 153, 154ff.; 158ff.

was Frederic Myers) did know, namely, that this Archytas Ode had been the subject of a test-question put to him a year before, a test-question of considerable importance from the point of view of evidence of identity.

To a careful reader there are obvious reasons why Mrs. Verrall's question should have been answered in this involved and obscure way rather than directly. A direct answer would have been explicable by thought-transference. Whereas, by referring to two poems written by Myers, both written under the influence of Horace, and one reminiscent of the particular ode in question, the intelligence at work showed that it possessed an independent understanding of the question, and a clear recollection of ideas which prompted the letter of 1884, but were not present in the mind of Mrs. Verrall. Moreover, no one can fail to be struck by the initiative shown in working out the answer in so subtle a manner. The fact that this same poem on 'Immortality' was alluded to a year later, when Horace was mentioned, seems to make the intention of the communicator quite unmistakable.<sup>1</sup>

This incident has an important sequel. After Mr. Piddington had reached the above interpretation of the communications respecting Horace and Immortality, he made the discovery that two earlier scripts, written automatically by Mrs. Verrall and purporting to be inspired by Frederic Myers, contained allusions to the Archytas Ode. These were both written in the year that Mr. Myers died, and one of them was the first intelligible bit of writing that Mrs. Verrall had ever obtained. It was dated March 5, 1901. She says :

<sup>1</sup> The 'Ode to Nature' seems also to be based on another ode mentioned in the same letter of 1884.

I was writing in the dark, and could not see what I wrote ; the words came to me as single things, and I was so much occupied in recording each as it came that I had not any general notion of what the meaning was . . . though the words are consecutive and seem to make phrases, and though some of the phrases seem intelligible, there is no general sense in the passage.<sup>1</sup>

A few weeks later, on April 27, another script contains allusions to this Ode, and these two scripts have another interesting feature. They both seem to be inspired by another reminiscence in addition to that of Horace's Ode. They are reminiscent of a poem by Myers called 'A Spring Morning at Sea.' This poem Mrs. Verrall had not at that time read, for it had not been published. It is a poem in marked contrast to the Horace Ode and to the poem on Immortality. 'On a Spring Morning at Sea' also deals with the thought of the Hereafter, but under the imagery of a glorious Dawn, a dawn bringing infinite satisfaction.

If the mind of Frederic Myers inspired these two scripts it is easy to see why the gloomy Archytas Ode and the joyful Spring Morning Ode should be in juxtaposition in the mind influencing the writing.

In the script of April 27, in which the Spring Morning is referred to, Mrs. Verrall was urged to "look well for a book under something blue."<sup>2</sup>

The script was very insistent on this point, which was repeated on several occasions. A description of a room where the book should be found was at last given, and the statement added : "It is a test." The description was not recognised by Mrs. Verrall until it was pointed out to her that the room was evidently that of Mrs. Sidgwick at Cambridge. In this room, under the *blue* drapery of a window-seat, Mrs. Sidgwick

<sup>1</sup> *Proc.*, vol. xx., p. 9.      <sup>2</sup> *Cp. Proc.* vol. xx., p. 198 ; vol. xxiv., p. 160.

kept, in a box, a sealed envelope which had been given to Professor Sidgwick some years before; the contents of this envelope she did not know, and she had even forgotten that the packet was there. It was not until three years later (1905) that Mrs. Verrall learned of its being found in the spot denoted by her writing. This envelope contained, among other things, a printed copy of the then unpublished poem, 'On a Spring Morning at Sea.'<sup>1</sup>

Again, it is clear to anyone who connects these facts together, that if the mind responsible for the ideas in Mrs. Verrall's script was the mind of Frederic Myers, it was appropriate that allusions to the poem 'On a Spring Morning at Sea' should be associated with an attempt to describe the place where this forgotten envelope, containing the poem, lay hid, and we can see why he should be urgent that it should be sought for.

Mr. Piddington is surely justified in suggesting that the object of the combination of allusions is

to contrast the gloomy foreboding of Horace's 'Archytas' Ode and Myer's 'Immortality' with the roseate hopes of 'On a Spring Morning at Sea' and thereby to imply that the happy and not the gloomy prevision was the true one.<sup>2</sup>

I will quote a few lines of the poem, 'On a Spring Morning at Sea,' so that the contrast in feeling between this poem and that on 'Immortality' may be noted.

And such a sight as this is, I suppose,  
Shall meet thee on the morrow of thy death;  
And pearl to sapphire, opal into rose  
Melt in that morn no heart imagineth;—  
Fair as when now thine eyes thou dar'st not close  
Lest the whole joy go from thee at a breath,

<sup>1</sup> *Proc.*, vol. xx., pp. 195-198; vol. xxiv., p. 168.      <sup>2</sup> *Proc.*, vol. xxiv., p. 168.



And the sea's silence and the heaven's repose  
Evanish as a dream evanisheth.<sup>1</sup>

This incident is typical of a class of experiences which have been of frequent occurrence since Mr. Myers' death. They fully bear out Mr. Piddington's statement that :

The presence in the communications . . . of associations of ideas once familiar to Frederic Myers is not accidental and that they are introduced—often with considerable delicacy and subtlety—for the purpose of suggesting the action of his personality.<sup>2</sup>

They are interesting also from another point of view. They emphasise repeatedly a thought which it is characteristic of Frederic Myers to wish to convey; the fact, namely, that the life beyond is a goal worthy of our aspirations and capable of satisfying and fulfilling our highest hopes; that there indeed awaits us a "morn no heart imagineth."

We find this strain running through the recent communications. Their ostensible object is to give proof of survival, but they do more than that, they breathe a spirit of assurance and of hope, they stimulate and cheer.

In each class of the phenomena which we have been considering, and in others besides, there are innumerable cases which might be cited in support of the propositions which I have laid before the reader. Yet the question is still asked by many: Is the evidence convincing?

I think that we are apt to forget that the answer to this question does not depend alone on the quality of the evidence. It depends largely on the capacity which we may have for appreciating the evidence. It is only those who approach it with an open mind and

<sup>1</sup> Myers, *Fragments of Prose and Poetry*, p. 54.

<sup>2</sup> *Proc.*, vol. xxiv., p. 19.

sympathetic insight, and who also have learned how to estimate the worth of evidence, who can at all do justice to the facts or learn their true significance. A serious hindrance to the formation of an impartial judgment on these matters has been well pointed out by Signor Bozzano at the close of a series of valuable articles, which appeared recently in the *Annales Psychiques* (1910).

We know, he says in effect, that whenever the mind has for many years uninterruptedly formed erroneous associations of ideas, it may become literally incapable of dealing with any association of ideas widely different from those it has always recognised. Mental ruts are very hard to get out of. A mind working habitually in a familiar rut may become quite impervious to facts belonging to another line of experience, and, however well-attested these facts may be, such an one will receive no impression from them, neither will he be able to perceive the conclusion to which they logically lead. This indicates that serious responsibility lies upon us, and great opportunities are opening before us. Although the phenomena are not new, we are confronted with a new experience in the methods of dealing with them; and they seem to occur in greater abundance in response to the attention paid to them. This opportunity is offered to students, but not without price. The price we have to pay for knowledge is always patience, perseverance, fair-mindedness. Those who do not care to pay the price, will not have knowledge thrust upon them.

In conclusion, if it seems strange that knowledge so important should be concealed in such intricacies and should demand so much industry for its discovery, I would commend for consideration four lines translated

by Mr. Myers and quoted in his *Classical Essays*. They are these :

Thus then will God to wise men riddling show  
Such hidden lore as not the wise may know.  
Fools in a moment deem his meaning plain,  
His lesson lightly learn, and learn in vain.

H. A. DALLAS.

#### SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE.

At the close of this lecture<sup>1</sup> a remark was made by one of the audience, raising an important objection to the view I have taken that the communications above referred to, which have come in the name of Mr. Myers and other pioneers in this research, are what they claim to be.

The speaker said that this view was in his opinion precluded by the character of these communications, which he described as "shifty" and lacking in straightforwardness. He complained that they showed an unwillingness to admit ignorance quite unworthy of the truthful, honourable men they claimed to proceed from. My reply, at the time, was that I failed to recognise this shiftiness in the communications which make this claim. I felt, however, that the adequacy of my memory might be called in question. I therefore wrote to Sir Oliver Lodge, asking him to be kind enough to tell me what he thought of the objection in this connection.

He kindly wrote as follows, and he gives me permission to quote his words.

"A certain amount of 'shiftiness' is noticeable,

<sup>1</sup> The above paper was read at a general meeting of the Quest Society on Jan. 16.—ED.

indeed very prominent, in answers obtained through planchette and other mechanical methods of evoking the rudimentary kind of automatism. And by such methods it is unusual to obtain an admission of ignorance: an answer of some kind is nearly always forthcoming. . . . But it would be a great mistake for anyone to suppose that the higher communications, such as we sometimes get to-day, have any real family resemblance to these rudimentary phenomena. . . . The communications from 'Myers' and 'Gurney' are remarkably straightforward and satisfactory—no sign of 'shiftiness' in them. Several times they have said, 'But you don't seem to realise that we are ignorant of some things'—or words to that effect. . . . Moreover they often admit verbal and other mistakes, but remind us that it is necessary to discriminate between errors or confusions which creep in through the automatist, and errors which are inherent in the mind of the communicator."

---

#### CHANGE.

WHAT if it be that change whose prospect chills  
Like a child's journey o'er the rolling hills,—  
What time the constant motion ends, and he  
Half roused from comfort of the cradling knee,  
Feeling his sleep not far away, yet thrills  
To look when bidden o'er the evening sea!  
And I—when elemental change fulfils  
Long thought and expectation, and sets free  
From fears, and ignorantly fancied ills,  
And brings fresh sense and silver calm that stills,  
And evening mystery and dreams for me—  
Shall feel in weariness my spirit leap,  
And glimpse of wonder win me half from sleep:  
So, when I breathe that seaside, may it be!

E. F. MOORE.

# THE CRADLE OF THE CHRIST: A STUDY IN THE ORIGINS OF CHRISTIANITY.

REV. K. C. ANDERSON, D.D.

IN the discussions going on at present over the question of the Historicity of Jesus there seems to the writer a distinct danger that the real point at issue will be missed. Attention is concentrated upon the question whether it is possible to prove either that Jesus existed or that he did not exist.

As to the first supposition—that Jesus did exist—many are dogmatic who are tolerant on all other matters. I would commend to the attention of such the ‘philosophical truism’ recently stated by Dr. Robert Eisler (see *THE QUEST* for April of this year, p. 595) in discussing this very question, that “the ‘reality’ or ‘historicity’ of a given *datum* can *never* be conclusively proved by any means whatever [italics Dr. Eisler’s]—not even by Professor P. W. Schmiedel’s nine proofs for the historicity of Jesus,” though the accomplished scholar adds that he has no intention on that account of “refraining for ever in agnostic resignation from all patient and sober historical research.”

In a private letter which he kindly allows me to make public, Dr. Eisler gives the following explanation of his ‘philosophical truism.’

Reality is essentially connected with the present tense; reality in the past is always, even if I myself have been the eye-witness, only a remembered stated or alleged reality. To distinguish

between facts and fancies in my own recollections, *e.g.*, of my earliest childhood, is an entirely different task from ascertaining the (empirical) reality of a presently occurring phenomenon. In every case, whether I have been myself present at an event, or whether I have to work on the testimonies of others, the connection establishing the historicity of a given *datum* is never based on direct evidence, but always on a psychic attitude of belief, or, in the reverse case, of critical disbelief. Consequently an arbitrary element of belief or disbelief is inseparable from all historical research.

Past events will always be subject to individual belief or disbelief. Accordingly a really living religion must always be based on direct, individual, presently felt experience, that is, on *gnōsis* (γνῶσις). A religion based on *historia* (ἱστορία)—however trustworthy the history may be—is doomed to be abandoned as soon as the individual succeeds in forming an independent world-view of his own.

To answer the question, therefore, how did any belief become a part of man's intellectual life, how did it come to speak to him in a tone of authority, we must turn to the inner life, for no one believes what is altogether outside of himself. This is the truth in Browning's famous lines :

Truth is within ourselves.  
There is an inner circle in us all  
Where truth abides in fullness. And to know  
Rather consists in opening out a way  
Whence the imprisoned splendour may escape,  
Than in effecting entry for a light  
Supposed to be without.

This 'philosophical truism' has a direct bearing on the matter in hand. The theory of the non-historicity of Jesus does not mean that Christianity rests upon subjectivism, and is without any phenomenal or historical basis at all. It would be absurd to attempt to account for the literature of the New

Testament by means of bodiless ideas. One does not forget George Eliot's words: "Ideas are poor ghosts, our sun-filled eyes cannot discern them." It is only when they are made flesh, "clothed upon with a living, human soul, with all its conflict, its faith and love," that they "breathe upon us with warm breath and touch us with sad, sincere eyes and speak to us in appealing tones." Those who think that there is no personal, historic Jesus to be discovered at the beginning of the Christian movement do not desire to substitute phantoms of thought for persons, intellectual issues for living men. Whatever thoughts are in the Gospels imply living minds, and living minds are persons. What is meant is that the historical basis, whatever it was, may not have been upon the actual lines described in the Gospels. These may have been but the veils or symbols securing truths that were not and could not be reduced to writing. The Incarnation, the Death, the Resurrection, the Ascension, were facts under whatever imagery expressed. Spiritual truth, no doubt, must manifest itself on the physical plane, but not necessarily in the identical manner set forth in the Gospels. Even on the supposition that the Gospels are records of the life of a historical Jesus, they are confessedly blurred and symbolic memories, and the 'reality,' the true happening, the 'historicity' proper, must have been far, far more than the phenomena or appearances, even to the eye of the most acute eye-witness. It was the appearance or phenomenon to him, and he cannot prove that he did witness this or that to another. The same phenomena never appear to another, which would be necessary for conclusive proof. As regards the matter in hand, the difficulty is to determine what the historical was. It eludes us

when we begin to search for it, as the whole history of the Search for the Historical Jesus 'from Reimarus to Wrede' abundantly proves. No two authorities agree as to what the historical Jesus was like, either in the New Testament or outside of it. What were the phenomenal facts of the Incarnation, the Death, the Resurrection, the Ascension? Who shall say? Who can say?

As to the latter supposition, that the historical Jesus did not exist, we are constantly warned that it is impossible to prove a universal negative—another 'philosophical truism,' which does not help us much in the matter in hand, though it is usually announced with the confidence that it is settling the question. The real issue concerns neither of these 'philosophical truisms.' It is a question which arises in the interpretation of the New Testament literature. In that literature there is a central figure, and the question is how are we to interpret that figure. We must not begin with a dogmatic assumption one way or the other, either that this figure was a historical person, or that he was not. We must let the literature itself speak. Which pre-supposition or theory will better fit the facts of that literature? Probability, which has been said to be the guide of life, must be our guide here as elsewhere. That theory or pre-supposition which will fit into the facts of the literature as a key fits the wards of the lock for which it was made, is presumably the true theory.

There would seem to be only three theories possible which we can apply to the case in hand: that of Orthodoxy, that of Liberal Christianity, and that of the school or party for which no name has yet been found sufficiently descriptive—those who think that the



Christian religion did not have its origin in a personal, historic Jesus, but in a belief in one who was conceived as a God, and who was called by many names, of which Jesus was one, and Christ another; and the question is simply which of these theories seems the most probable after the literary facts of the New Testament are set in their right relation to one another.

The answer of Orthodoxy to the question is an impossible one in face of the results of the criticism of the New Testament literature of the past fifty years. That answer was that the central figure of the New Testament in every feature of it, the Christ of the Epistles and the Jesus of the Gospels alike, was historical. The answer could satisfy only an uncritical age; it is impossible in an age like the present. If criticism has done anything it has proved that it is far from a harmonious or consistent character that the New Testament literature presents. It is a commonplace of criticism that different ideals of the Christ are found in the New Testament. Every one of the ideals cannot be historical. Professor Otto Pfleiderer has set forth what these are:

The simple prophet or man of God of the Acts, the man from Heaven of Paul, the apocalyptic King of Revelation, the Beginner and Ender of faith of Hebrews, the incarnate Logos of John.<sup>1</sup>

Pursued by this fact the Liberal Christian flees unto the synoptic Gospels and takes refuge in the "simple Man of Nazareth" whom he assumes the Synoptics present. But later criticism will not allow him to hide there, for it shows that the Jesus of the Synoptics is no more a harmonious or consistent character than the Christ of the Epistles. At one time he speaks as the apocalyptic King who is to come

<sup>1</sup> *Philosophy of Religion*, vol. iv., pp. 141, 142.

on the clouds of Heaven and within the lifetime of that generation; at another time he speaks as one who believes that the Kingdom of Heaven cometh not with observation, but gradually as the growth of the tree or flower. At one time he denounces his enemies as a generation of vipers, not worthy to escape the damnation of hell; yet on another occasion he enjoins love for enemies and insists on the non-resistance of evil. At one time he declares his mission is only to the lost sheep of the house of Israel; at another time he is as universal as Paul. We have no difficulty with the different images or ideals of the Christ. We say with Pfeiderer that "any stage and every side of the development of Christianity is reflected in a corresponding image of Christ." We never say that any one of these idealisations or representations is historical. If we should it would be enough to ask which one? They cannot all be historical. We would rather say with Pfeiderer again that

Every image of Christ is right in proportion as it is the right expression of the peculiar religious and moral ideal of an age. The more purely, the more aptly, the more intelligibly the ideal cherished by the Church at the time is expressed in the dogmatic view of the Christ, the more that image answers the purpose of communicating the Christian spirit in worship and education, the more correctly it is framed, be the form of expression what it may.

As the various Christ-images of the Epistles of the New Testament and of the later Church represent the various ideals of the respective times, so in the discrepant representations of Jesus in the synoptic Gospels, which no harmonising skill can reconcile, we have represented before our eyes the competing sects and warring ideals of the age when they lived and worked. It has become fashionable, even among the orthodox, to speak of 'the

Christ.' But there is as much reason for the title 'the Jesus.' Just as the 'Man from Heaven,' 'the High Priest,' 'the Logos,' 'the Bishop of Souls,' etc., were names of 'the Christ' or Divine Being worshipped by the early communities out of which the Christian Church arose, so was 'the Jesus' a parallel title. That is to say, Jesus is not a personal name but a descriptive title meaning Saviour, Healer, Guardian, Protector. Jesus was the God of the early communities conceived under these aspects. This is as abundantly manifest on the surface of the synoptic Gospels as the Logos is a descriptive title and not a personal name in the fourth Gospel, or 'the Christ' is a title in the pages of Paul. It is not necessary to go beyond the Synoptics for proof of the existence of a Jesus-cult; they are themselves the supreme evidence that such a cult existed. The various aspects in which 'the Jesus' is represented in these Gospels show the various stages of the formation of the idea of 'the Jesus,' just as 'the High Priest' of the Epistle to the Hebrews, 'the Man from Heaven' of Paul, and 'the Logos' of John show the various stages of 'the Christ' conception. They are as plainly marked as the various ages of the earth's crust are marked in the earth-strata. They cannot all be historical. We shall, of course, be tempted to take the one that most pleases our fancy—the Jesus that blessed little children, that uttered the parables and precepts, and was kind to the sinners. But is not this test an entirely subjective one? Why do we not take the Jesus who denounced the Pharisees and drove the money-changers out of the temple, and destroyed the Gadarene swine, and cursed the fig-tree? How do we know that this latter representation is any less historical than the former? To the men who entertained it and wrote it

down for us it was probably as worthy as any other. We do not like it because our moral and spiritual ideal has advanced. But that is no criterion of historical truth.

The Jesus that is taken as historical must be entirely human to fit the mind of our age. The affirmation that Jesus was historical carries within it the affirmation that he belonged to the range of history, *i.e.* was a human being. The affirmation that he was Divine, on the other hand, carries within it the denial that he was historical, for the Divine does not come into history in that form, or as Emerson expresses it: "God never speaks." What the Church has emphasised as the divine features have been eliminated one by one. We hear the cry raised when any attempt is made to prove the non-historicity of Jesus: "Jesus is not to be eliminated; Jesus cannot be spared"; but the Jesus as the Gospels present him has been slowly eliminated until all that is left is but a shadow or skeleton. The assumption underlying the process of elimination is that it is possible to separate the supernatural elements and to make Jesus stand forth as a true son of the twentieth century, living a simple life, and teaching, as the essentials of religion, love to God and man. This is the Jesus of Liberal Christianity, which began its course and has been characterised throughout, by the repudiation of the Christ of the Church. The popular statement is found in Professor Harnack's *What is Christianity?* published ten years ago. This work was put forward as a statement of the Christian faith not open to the objections of modern criticism. The author found the essence of Christianity in the teachings of Jesus. That and nothing else we are to understand by the Gospel. He drew a sharp dis-

inction between that teaching and the Christological speculations of the Church. The book, indeed, was but an abridgment of the author's very learned and exhaustive *History of Dogma*, in which it is shown that the Christological speculations of the third and fourth centuries were a departure from the simplicity of the Gospel. The two books were dominated by the same theory—that the essence of the Christian faith is not any dogma about Christ, but simply the good news about God and man taught by Jesus. The cry 'Back to Jesus' heard in recent years from Liberal Christians had its origin here. Let us be done with the doctrines of the Church; the Christianity which we want, and which the world needs, is the Christianity which Jesus himself preached in the Galilean villages, and which has come down to us in his Parables and Sermon on the Mount. Comparisons were drawn between the creeds of the pre-Reformation and Reformation churches and the teachings of Jesus, always to the disparagement of the former and in favour of the latter, and the promise was sometimes held out that the ultimate Christianity would be what was called the simple teaching of Jesus. The most important duty was thought to be the return to primitive Christianity, and the wiping out of all the creeds of the intervening centuries as so much useless speculation. It was not recognised that such a view of Christian history is essentially pessimistic, that what we are to see as the Christian centuries evolve, is the progressive obscuration of the truth, produced by the invasion into the realm of Christianity of Greek philosophy and the other products of secular culture. The theory of evolution which governs us in all other departments of thought is, on the contrary, essentially optimistic, and leads us

to expect the progressive rational development and ever richer unfolding of the truth at the heart of the Christian faith. The above has been in the main the characteristic of the presentation which Liberal Christianity has made of the Christian faith—the decrying of speculative theology and the emphasising of the Sermon on the Mount in pulpit and press for the last twenty-five years or more.

There are thus only two possible presuppositions with which we can start in our endeavour to interpret the New Testament literature: either that the central figure of the New Testament was, as Liberal Christianity assumes, a human being who was gradually deified in the minds of the early Christians, or that the nucleus of the central figure was not a human person at all, but a Divine Being, a God, who, of course, was not historical, but existed in the minds of His worshippers, and who was gradually humanised by them. On the one hand the Liberal Christian cannot deny that the central figure in large parts of the literature is conceived of as Divine by the New Testament writers. And he is obliged to maintain that the process of deification began very early, indeed before writing about him began, for the realistic, historical, human figure cannot be found in the literature. And the advocate of the non-historicity theory cannot deny that the God has been humanised, for human features do appear in the course of the literature. The question is, which process—that of deification or that of humanisation—is the more probable. It is no proof of the historicity of the central figure to point to the human traits of the synoptic Gospels, for it is not denied that there was this process of humanisation. The question is: Are

these the original nucleus to which the Divine features which are found everywhere in the literature were added in process of time? Or was the original nucleus a Divine Being to which these human features were added as the movement developed?

Were the Liberal Christian theory the true one we should expect that the human features would be more abundant in the early part of the literature. The process of deification must have taken considerable time and the development of the literature would be parallel with the development of the Divine features. If examination shows that the God occupies a large place in the earliest parts of the literature, that would be presumptive evidence against the Liberal Christian theory, and in favour of the theory of non-historicity. One motive that has animated the Higher Critic all along in his effort to prove a late date for the literature has been to provide time for the growth of the Christological dogma, and great comfort was given to the orthodox traditionalists by the announcement of Professor Harnack in the preface to his *Die Chronologie der altchristlichen Literatur bis Eusebius*, that he was reactionary (*rückgängig*). They jumped to the conclusion that he had made a general recantation of his former opinions, and that the whole body of modern criticism of the New Testament was reversed. All he meant was this: The Tübingen critics put seventy or eighty years between the events of the Gospel history, whatever they were, and the production of the literature, while Professor Harnack says forty or fifty are enough. I do not venture to decide between them; the point of interest to me is the fact that by both time is demanded sufficiently long to allow of the development of the supernatural features of the Gospel

story. It is the assumption of the Liberal Christian that the realistic, human, historical Jesus must have been a most extraordinary character to account for the fact that his followers did deify him. He speaks of him as the spiritual hero of the race, and its mightiest personality. The stories of the Virgin Birth, of the physical resurrection, of the miracles, generally, have been adduced as proofs of the transcendent spiritual greatness of Jesus, the assumption being that the former were the natural development of the latter. Well, is that the order in which the literature presents the matter? Before going to the literature to see, it may be well to remark that this argument has another side which can easily be turned against the Liberal Christian theory. The growth of the dogma of the Divinity of the central figure was, according to the Liberal Christian, a departure from the simple greatness of Jesus, and the question naturally suggests itself whether Jesus could have been so supremely great as is claimed to allow himself to be so thoroughly misunderstood in so short a time? Perhaps no one has put this argument so well as has Principal P. T. Forsyth, D.D., and so far as I know his argument remains unanswered.

The Pauline, the celestial Christ succeeded in smothering for nearly 2,000 years the simple Christ of the story. The supersession of the great, true and human Jesus by the apostolic distortion took place through the old apostles in about a decade. Paul took Jesus by force and made him king of the world. How can those who hold this view continue to speak in the lofty terms they use about the colossal spiritual force in Jesus, and how can they glorify him as the most potent spiritual personality in the history of the world? Where are the heroic dimensions, or the vast power of a personality which in a few years could be submerged as the real Christ was by the creation of an imaginative



ideologue like Paul? And submerged so effectually that for 2,000 years of the history of an amazing church the real Jesus has not been able to lift his head.<sup>1</sup>

To return from this digression, which, however, is very pertinent to the matter in hand, is it not against all probability that the very earliest literature we have—the literature nearest to this supremely great human Jesus—should have so little to say of him that it is a matter of debate whether the author of it knew Jesus at all? Suppose we had no synoptic Gospels, would anyone come to the conclusion that the Jesus Christ of the Pauline Epistles was a human being? The central figure here is very little humanised, if at all. He is a being who dwells in the soul of the Apostle and in the soul of the members of the communities to whom he writes. He is the unifying principle of several pairs of opposites. He is not a teacher as we would expect a human Jesus to be. All this bears with great force against those who assume the first-century authorship of the Pauline letters. Time is demanded for the growth and ripening of Jesus-worship. It is impossible, do what the critics will, for them to bring the dates down so late as to make such a growth and ripening plausible. And besides, the growth is all in the wrong direction for their purpose: it is not the deification of a man; it is the humanisation and historicisation of a god. It takes long, very long to develop a thoroughly matured cult, and in the very first literary product of the Christian movement the cult is full-grown. It is full-grown in one who the Liberal Christian claims was a contemporary of Jesus. Believe that who can. For myself it seems to me unbelievable that a purely human Jesus—

a Rabbi—could have grown into the Pauline Christ in the brief space of time supposed by those who make Paul a contemporary of Jesus. On all grounds of probability we would not have had enthusiasm for a heavenly Christ who did nothing but die and rise from the dead, but for a great teacher who taught the pure truth about God and man and duty, and we would have had many quotations from such teachings. The letters of such a writer would have been saturated with the miracles and parables and precepts which we have in the synoptic Gospels. If Paul was a contemporary of Jesus his mind must have had abundant memories both of his life and teaching, and yet he never quotes a saying, never recites a precept, never relates an incident, and the wonder of it all is the greater when it is seen that many of the sayings of Jesus in the synoptic Gospels would have admirably answered his purpose. The conclusion seems inevitable that the nucleus of his 'Jesus Christ' was not a human being at all, but a God, conceived after the manner of the numerous Mystery-cults of the day. The truth is that the Pauline Epistles are saturated with Gnosticism. As the author of the *Gospel of Rightness* says (page xvii.):

It is impossible to read the Trismegistic literature side by side with St. Paul without becoming convinced that in the Epistles of the latter we have echoes of the Græco-Egyptian form of the Gnosis illuminated by Christian developments. It is evident that both the apostle and he who is styled the 'Hermes' are treating of the same deep mysteries, that they were dedicated to the same spiritual gnosis.

It is just because of this that the 'Jesus Christ' of Paul is a Divine Being after the manner of these sects. If his Jesus Christ had been a human historical person,

his Epistles would, on the contrary, have been saturated with reminiscences of this person. They would have told of his life in Galilee, of his struggles and trials, of his deeds of mercy, they would have repeated the sayings of Jesus, and would have tried to reproduce his very thoughts and words. But there is no such attempt and instead of this the Epistles are full of a glorified Christ. The lofty title by which he is called, 'the Lord Jesus Christ,' does not describe a human being, a lowly teacher; it denotes a mystical being who dwells within the soul of the members of the community, and in whom these members can dwell. The great interest of the writer is not about a man who lived among men as one of them, but about a great scheme of the reconciliation of opposites, of which 'Jesus Christ' was the central reconciling principle. It is impossible to bring this being within the limits of humanity. The instinct of the Church in its contention for the Divinity of the central figure of the New Testament all along the ages, and in its contention at the present time is a profoundly true one, because the nucleus of the central figure of the New Testament is a God, under the aspect of the long eagerly yearned-for Saviour of men, the gracious Healer of the widespread disease of idolatry, the Conqueror of the demon-gods of heathenism, who brought to men the true Gnosis, the knowledge of the true and only God.

K. C. ANDERSON.

(Another paper by Dr. Anderson on this subject will follow in the next number.—ED.)

## SOME INFLUENCES OF BUDDHISM ON JAPANESE THOUGHT AND LIFE.

PROFESSOR YOSHIO NODA, PH.D.

THOUGH I am a Buddhist myself, my conception of Buddhism and my belief in it may be largely different from those of priests and scholars in Japan who know a great deal more about it than I do. So I may premise further that I am not writing particularly in favour of Buddhism, nor in opposition to Christianity, for which religion I entertain the most sincere respect. I shall try my best to treat the subject from an independent standpoint, though I think it hardly possible to do so with any scientific exactitude, for Japanese Buddhism has a long history of fourteen centuries behind it, and has been divided into many sects. To trace and analyse the complicated influence of different Buddhist sects upon Japanese thought at different periods of our history, is not an easy task to perform under any circumstances, much less in a short paper. I shall therefore be gratified if I can succeed in giving a general notion of the subject as a whole.

The Japanese has been a remarkably receptive and adaptable people. We have on many occasions in our history come into contact with foreign civilisations. We have always been ready to pick up from them anything good for our country, to digest and assimilate it, so as to fit it to our national life and character. If from the beginning of our history we have experienced

many radical changes in thought and life by the introduction of foreign civilisation, we have nevertheless understood how to incorporate these novel elements into our own civilisation and to stamp upon them our national character. So has it been with Buddhism in Japan ; it did not emerge with us exactly in the same form as in India or China or in Corea, whence it happened to come.

It is quite natural to believe that when Buddhism was first introduced by the Korean Ambassador in 552 A.D., it met with strong opposition from the side of Shintoism, which must be regarded as the primitive religion of Japan. The Emperor and the Prime Minister favoured the new religion, but other ministers objected to it, saying: "Our country has its own deities, and they perhaps will be angry with us, if we pay our devotions to a foreign god." This was most probably the public opinion also at that time. Consequently there arose a bitter hostility between two parties among the courtiers, Buddhists on the one side and Shintoists on the other. But thirty-five years later, the champion of the old religion being killed and his party being overpowered, the Buddhist party gained a complete victory and the new religion found its principal supporter and promoter in the person of a very wise and able imperial prince, known as Shotoku-taishi, who held the most important position in the government for twenty-nine years.

I think that one of the chief causes of the early success of Buddhism in Japan is the fact that it found its first believers in the Court, and consequently among those of highest intelligence and influence. Secondly it must be remembered that at that time we felt so great a reverence for Chinese culture that we were

disposed to regard anything respected in China as worthy of introduction.

On the other hand, it cannot be denied that those who favoured the new religion were attracted to it by the prospect of securing benefits in the present life and blessedness in a future existence, for the doctrine of Buddhism, being far more subtle and profound than that of Shintoism or of Confucianism in this latter respect, must have won proportionately greater respect.

Notwithstanding these reasons, however, Buddhism would not have obtained a firm footing in Japan, if it had not adapted itself to meet and harmonise with the existing beliefs and moral ideas of the nation.

This was very adroitly effected by Buddhist propagandists in the following way.

According to the old religion there exists a vast number of deities, who are all remote ancestors of the Emperor and of the people as well. The custom of ancestor-worship was so old and so deeply implanted in the hearts of the Japanese that it had become a second nature and an instinct. The Buddhist priests accordingly invented a way of reconciling the new and old religions. They declared the Shinto deities to be incarnations of various Buddhas and Bodhisattvas. This theory was soon accepted by the government as well as by the people. Many Shinto temples thus came into the hands of Buddhist priests, the old ancestor-worship being performed according to Buddhist rites and Buddhist images being introduced. In this manner Buddhism became an intimate friend of Shintoism.

But was this attempt to absorb Shintoism into Buddhism quite successful? Was Shintoism first eclipsed and finally extinguished by Buddhism? No,

Shintoism continued to exist. It had too strong a hold on the Japanese mind to be absorbed in a foreign religion. The two religions were not amalgamated; they were at most reconciled and brought into a condition of mutual toleration. Shinto temples continued to stand side by side with Buddhist temples. Every house had a Shinto god-shelf beside a Buddhist shrine, and the majority of people did not hesitate to declare themselves Shintoists and Buddhists at one and the same time.

This strange mode of co-existence, which is, if argued logically, an apparent contradiction in principle, continued to survive for many centuries, until the two religions were entirely separated by an Imperial decree in 1868, when the great political change took place in Japan. All Buddhist images were then removed from Shinto temples and Buddhist priests were no longer allowed to minister in them, and consequently Shintoism regained its old forms, though retaining in many ways the influence of Buddhism.

From the beginning the majority of the Japanese converted to Buddhism continued to profess the old creed as well, seeing no contradiction in such a course, while the Buddhist priests also learned how to interweave ancestor-worship into the daily prayers in their temples. As we have very strong family feelings, and are very solicitous to preserve unbroken the line of ancestral descent in our families—main and branch, both the priests in the temples and the lay Buddhists in their homes would pray for their ancestors, for the prosperity of future generations and the permanence of the ancestral house. The great respect of the Japanese for their ancestors and the ancestral house was not in the slightest degree changed by Buddhism. Indeed

ancestor-worship became so thoroughly interwoven with Buddhist rites that its Shinto origin escaped notice.

Again, loyalty to the Emperor and filial piety to parents have ever been two fundamental duties in the morals of the Japanese people. They are virtues deeply implanted by our remote ancestors, cultivated and fostered from generation to generation. They flow from ancestor-worship and the family-system of the people, on both of which is based the national character with its intense patriotism. Japan represents a large family of families, with the Emperor at its head. The Emperor is everything to the people, just as the head of a family to its members. These feelings were further strengthened by the philosophy of Confucianism, which had been introduced into Japan 268 years before Buddhism. The Buddhist priests accordingly drew from their sacred books the idea of the "four graces"—*i.e.*, the graces of Buddha, of the sovereign, of parents and of living beings, and emphasised particularly the second and third of these, so as to support the national principles of loyalty and filial piety.

They naturally preached the grace of Buddha first and foremost, but they never allowed this to clash with the fundamental ideas of national morality.

I will now touch on some important new ideas which were introduced by Buddhism, and which have more or less strongly influenced Japanese thought up to the present time.

Shintoism taught the survival of spirit after death in the form of 'ghost,' but it had no idea of the pre-existence of soul. Buddhism taught the doctrine of three states of existence, past, present and future.



The present state of existence is the re-incarnation of the past self just as the future state will be that of the present, the state of re-incarnation in each existence being determined for better or worse by the deeds of the preceding life. Life is an unbroken sequence of births and re-births in different states of existence, human and also non-human. Everything has to reincarnate in some form, there is nothing in the world that does not re-incarnate.

This for the Japanese was a quite novel way of explaining the present life. It created new respect for life, new hope as well as new fear for the future. There was no idea of future reward or punishment in Japan before the coming of Buddhism.

Again, according to Buddhism, everything in the world is transitory, temporary, fleeting and ever-changing. Nothing has constant, permanent existence, except the Absolute. We are born, become old, and die. Birth is nothing but the beginning of death; joy the origin of sorrow; life is full of miseries, cares, troubles, sorrows, griefs, afflictions, all caused by desire.

All this was another surprise to the Japanese mind, so simple and happy before.

The ultimate principle of Buddhism is Nirvāṇa. This is the Absolute in a metaphysical sense. Psychologically it is the consciousness that supervenes on the negation of self. It is thus the absorption of the individual into the Absolute. This is to be obtained by the absolute perfection of the religious life, which means the complete annihilation of all desires leading to sorrow and suffering. In the state of Nirvāṇa, there is no separated self, no life and death, consequently no desire, no sorrow, no fear. It is the consciousness of absolute peace, of absolute bliss, of absolute truth.

It is salvation from the misery of the world, deliverance from suffering, enlightenment and blessedness.

This was the most profound philosophical thought ever presented to the Japanese mind.

There are two ways of attaining to the state of Nirvāṇa : one by absolute devotion to Amitābha, 'The Boundless or Everlasting Life,' and the other, by special means of mental training.

These ways of devotion and of mental training and philosophical thinking were quite strange to the Japanese.

Buddhist training in self-culture implies a certain degree of asceticism, though it is opposed to the useless extremes of asceticism found among the Brāhmins. As the state of Nirvāṇa is only to be attained by the negation of every kind of desire, this training must naturally be very rigorous. It prescribes for the priests celibacy, abstinence from animal food, and the renunciation of all sensuous pleasures.

For the early Japanese there was no restriction in the use of animal food, and also no marked distinction between secular and religious life. The strict discipline and the lofty morals of the Buddhist priests accordingly aroused the deep veneration of the people.

Nirvāṇa means self-renunciation, the extinction of all worldly desires. To become a Buddhist priest, whose object was salvation from suffering and the attainment of Nirvāṇa in this life, the candidate must renounce family relations, give up all worldly interests, and abandon all property of every kind. He must not be tempted by vanity, fame, pride, pomp, or anything of this nature ; he must be satisfied with the extremely simple life of the priesthood ; he must not grumble at hardship, but must be ever quiet and resigned, and

submit absolutely to the regulations of the religious life. This was the way of life of Gautama himself, who resigned his hereditary rights as Crown Prince, renounced his wife and child, attained the Buddhahood after many years of mental struggle, ascetic discipline and meditation, and devoted the rest of his life to preaching his doctrine. There has ever been a tendency in Buddhist life to retire from the world and indulge in meditation.

But above all, universal mercy and sympathy with all suffering beings was a cardinal doctrine of Buddhism. It was thus a prime duty of a Buddhist to be kind to all animals as well as to human beings. It was this spirit also that prescribed abstinence from animal food to the priests.

I do not think there is any civilised country where mercy and sympathy are not recognised as virtues. But this gospel of tenderness of the Buddhists came in a new light to the Japanese as it was based on the doctrine of re-incarnation. Thus it led the wealthy to extensive deeds of philanthropy and generally had a powerful effect upon national life and customs.

These new ideas of Buddhism first gradually captivated the Japanese intelligence, and then were propagated among the people, and changed much of their life in many ways. Their influence, however, has differed considerably according to the different periods of our history and according to the state of social life, as well as to the relative predominance of different sects.

The doctrine of the possibility of reaching Nirvāṇa in the present life does not seem to have been understood by the common people. They hoped only for the possibility of attaining Buddhahood in the far future,

coming nearer and nearer to it, life after life, by re-incarnation, and one of the most popular sects preached the doctrine of Paradise and Hell, as reward and punishment in a future life.

The Zen or the Dhyāna sect, however, which was introduced from China into Japan at the end of the twelfth century, succeeded especially in converting the ruling military order, and spread a permanent influence among the upper classes. The doctrine of this sect aimed at the direct way of attaining the Buddhahood by self-effort, and by independent meditation, without, however, presupposing any dogma or erudition. It has been the most influential sect of this nature in Japan.

It cannot be denied that Buddhism influenced Confucianism in Japan also, as it had done to some extent in China before. The fact that until the beginning of the seventeenth century Chinese learning in Japan as well as Japanese had been chiefly in the hands of Buddhists for many centuries explains their reciprocal influence.

The influence of Buddhism on Japanese literature is also very remarkable. There have been many priests who have been writers and poets.

It may be of special interest here to note the influence exercised by Buddhism upon Bushido, or Japanese chivalry, of which something is now known in the West.

Bushido means literally 'Military-knight-way,' or the rules of conduct to be observed by the professional warriors, the Samurai, who formed the ruling class in feudal times, until 1868. Bushido was not a written code, but has been a supreme moral law for the military class for nearly seven centuries. Bushido was not of course an entirely new creation by the warriors. I

think it is to be regarded rather as a form of development of national morality under special conditions of society, and under the influence of current thought and belief. National morality is the direct outcome of national character, and so it must be remembered that Bushido has not only prescribed rules of conduct for the Samurai but also more or less for the people as well.

In ancient times, everybody in Japan was a soldier, who was willing to die for the sake of his country in times of war, but a hard-working citizen in times of peace. There were no professional warriors, no military class.

It must be admitted, I think, that the spirit which called forth Bushido in later periods was this same spirit of the people. Indeed 'Bushido' is often used as a synonym for 'Yamato-Damashi' or the 'Spirit of Japan.' The kernel of Bushido is to be found in the old national traditions and morals handed down from remote ancestors and fostered by Shintoism.

The influence of Confucianism on Bushido is also very remarkable, as its teaching was largely in harmony with our old traditions. But the influence of Buddhism, especially of the Zen sect, upon the mental training of the Samurai, is still more remarkable. It must be noted that the Zen sect was introduced into Japan just after the feudal system had been established and Bushido was beginning to be formulated, and it soon found a firm footing among the military class. I will endeavour then to enumerate those points in Bushido which Buddhism contributed to its development :

In the feudal period the loyalty of the Samurai to his lord was thought to be the first virtue, both lords and retainers uniting in their loyalty to the Emperor.

This was very necessary in fighting times, when many feudal lords with their retainers strove for supremacy. The Buddhist doctrine of karma confirmed belief in the continued connection of the lord and his retainers. Popular Buddhism taught that the relations between them lasted for three existences, while those between husband and wife for two, and between parents and children only for one.

According to Bushido, the Samurai should be ever ready to do or suffer, to die even, for his lord or for the sake of his country, which he identified with the Emperor. He was always to be prepared willingly to sacrifice his personal interests or domestic concerns, if Bushido required him to do so.

This spirit of willing self-sacrifice was greatly encouraged by Buddhism. It is easy to understand how the doctrine of self-negation gave the Samurai a new idea of life and death and made the sacrifice quite easy.

If a Samurai goes forth to fight or do other service for his lord, he should not be daunted at sight of danger, nor surprised by any accident, nor overpowered by any calamity, nor lose his head at any critical moment. He must always be composed and self-possessed, prompt and alert in all circumstances. He must be free from any kind of fear, anxiety, care and trouble, always calm and serene in mind.

He ought never to be overcome with personal grief or sorrow or great loss. He must be tenacious and decisive in his demeanour as if nothing had happened.

The Buddhist way of mental training in self-denial and self-control contributed greatly to the discipline of the Samurai in these respects. The Samurai, however, was not to spend his life in seclusion and retirement, nor in indulgence in deep meditation.

He was to train himself to attain calmness and peace of mind in every condition of life, composure and self-possession in any extraordinary occurrence.

The doctrine of karma teaches the Samurai also a calm acceptance of the justice of fate in the case of calamity, distress, or sorrow, in that he considers it to be the inevitable consequence of his own forgotten deeds in the past. This belief enables him to submit to the inevitable quietly and with calmness of mind.

The Japanese are well known to repress all expression of deep feeling or emotion. No mother will shed a single tear when her son has died bravely for the sake of his country. No Japanese will disturb the pleasure of another by the natural expression of his own grief. Not only is the Samurai taught to endure great calamity without a groan, but also to bear heat and cold and bodily pain with indifference.

The simplicity of life of the ruling military class is not easily explained unless we know something of the asceticism of Buddhist life, so free from self-indulgence and vainglory. Sensual pleasures, outward show, luxuriousness and extravagance, were all detested as enemies of Bushido as they were of Buddhism. The Samurai, though privileged and powerful, never aimed at the acquisition of wealth; he was trained to live in a poor house, with few comforts, superior to all desire for display. He disdained to indulge in sensual pleasures; so in times of peace, as well as in times of war, he was trained not to notice discomfort in any condition of life. The contempt of material wealth was the direct result of this simplicity of life. Though no one can continue to live without money, it was considered disgraceful for a Samurai to love money or to be engaged in money-making. The merchants were

of the lowest social class, below the farmer and the mechanic.

I will now try to indicate some influences of Buddhism on social life.

As the doctrine of Nirvāṇa promises absolute peace of mind and complete freedom from suffering, in addition to those who had a natural vocation for it, many pursued by misfortune after misfortune, or overtaken by disaster, or the victims of disappointed love, broken-hearted widows, or other unfortunates, tried to find rest and consolation in the priestly life or the sisterhood.

In the course of time, also, there arose among the Court nobles and eminent warriors a peculiar class who might be called lay priests (the Nyūdo). Though they were formally priests, wore priestly vestments and shaved off their hair, they still engaged in administration or in military affairs. Indeed many emperors even resigned their throne and devoted the rest of their lives to religion, but some of these still continued to perform a part of the duties of the State.

A somewhat similar custom obtains also among the people called 'Inkyo' (lit. 'retired head of a house'). At a certain age, the head of a family retires from his active life in the world to make way for his eldest son; he lives quietly either in another house specially built for him, or more or less separately in the same house as the eldest son. Most of these 'retired heads' spend the greater part of their time in religious devotion; they do not, however, completely give up their worldly interests and belongings to lead a purely religious life. The influence of Buddhism in all these customs is too evident to be denied.

Among national customs of a less pronouncedly



religious nature is the tea-ceremony. Though this was first introduced from China by a Japanese priest, it spread very widely among well-to-do people, and has existed from the twelfth century down to the present time. It is performed in a very small and simple room; the principal point is to celebrate it in perfect peace, with serenity of mind and tranquillity of feeling. No one can deny the evident influence of Buddhism in this custom.

The Buddhist pessimistic view of life, together with the conception of the world as transitory, and of all things as subject to perpetual change, checked the development of industry and commerce. This also largely explains the low estimation in which wealth and labour were held not only among the military class but also among the common people. They were satisfied with so little comfort that they did not strive to improve their material condition.

Finally, according to monkish conceptions, woman was regarded as an inferior being, immersed in sin and impurity. She was even not admitted into the sacred places. This false notion, together with the influence of the Confucian view, caused the neglect of woman's education and consequently her ignorance and her inferior condition in feudal times.

But in spite of the powerful influences of Buddhism upon the Japanese, the fundamental character of the nation has remained unchanged. We are receptive, adaptable and quick to imitate, as I have already remarked, but the national character persists notwithstanding the many radical changes in thought and social life.

Shintoism, as I have said, has never been absorbed by Buddhism; indeed it completely regained

its old status after thirteen centuries of co-existence with it. The spirit of loyalty to the Emperor, of filial piety to the parent, as well as of patriotism, which so strongly characterises the Japanese people, has been not only not diminished by Buddhism but on the contrary fostered by it. Indeed the doctrine of complete renunciation strengthened authority and tended to produce submission. The Japanese people has been ever united in loyalty and filial piety from generation to generation.

In spite of the peaceful teaching of Buddhism the spirit of bravery and daring of the people has remained unsoftened; indeed Buddhist fatalism has made personal courage and heroism much easier; it has contributed to the development of Bushido among the Samurai, whose chief business was to fight, if necessary. Though apparently contradictory to the Buddhist doctrine of universal pity and sympathy, which even prohibited animal food, many warriors dared to fight battles as lay-priests, and even many armed priests became formidable to the authorities in belligerent times. Buddhism has never been able to annihilate militarism; it has been contented to serve in its cause. The Japanese people could never become so peace-loving as to leave their country in danger or to sacrifice their personal honour when assailed.

The spirit of progress, again, has never been completely paralysed by the doctrine of renunciation, which induces the tendency to retire from worldly life, from competition into seclusion. The Japanese people as a whole have never indulged in deep meditation to the neglect of the interests of the national welfare.

The ambitious, energetic, vigorous, and strenuous

life of the nation is in direct contradiction to the doctrine of Nirvāṇa, when taken to mean the extinction of life. With this no Japanese would ever be satisfied. It must, however, be remembered that in Japan Nirvāṇa has ever been interpreted in the sense of the extinction of the smaller self and the revival of the greater self or greater energy; not in the sense of the negation of will but of the free exercise of will and intellect.

The discipline of the Zen sect or the practice of religious meditation has long been considered by the ruling class as the best way of training the will; its tendency has not been to encourage retirement from the world, but the more efficient performance of duty. The emphasis laid on will-power is most remarkable in the teaching of the Nichiren sect founded in Japan in the thirteenth century. This is one of the illustrations of the naturalisation or Japanisation of Buddhism.

The Buddhist pessimistic view of life has never made the Japanese people really pessimistic; the Japanese were originally as gay and open as their own blue sky, and as cheerful and romantic as their cherry-blossom. This optimistic side of the national character has never been crushed down by the heavy weight of pessimism and asceticism.

The asceticism of Buddhism again has never been carried out to an extreme in Japan. Though abstinence from animal food was prescribed for the priests, the ordinary Buddhists observed it only on special occasions. Indeed the Shinshū sect, which was founded at the same period as the Nichiren, considered priests as secular and permitted them to marry and eat certain kinds of animal food. It is this very sect that has the greatest number of adherents in Japan at the present

day. This is another illustration of the naturalisation of Buddhism in Japan.

The Restoration in 1868 was the greatest blow that Buddhism in Japan has ever had in its history. The new Government favoured the revival of Shintoism, seeing that it whole-heartedly supports imperialism and teaches ancestor-worship, which is the basis of patriotism and love of race and family. Shintoism and Buddhism thus separated from their long friendly union and stood once more as opponents. Their privileges, honours, and titles were all taken away from the Buddhist priests. The Progressives rushed to the study of European learning and arts, leaving the Conservatives behind. The influence of Buddhism became less and less as the people became more and more educated in the new learning. The complete separation of religion from education in the state-system of education made the recovery of Buddhist influence more hopeless. The Buddhist priests recognised the crisis, and sent some priests and scholars abroad to study Western civilisation. On the other hand, Christianity, which had been once driven away out of the country at the beginning of the seventeenth century, now made its way again to Japan, though under very unfavourable conditions. The formidable progress of the new religion aroused the Buddhists to renewed activity, while the study of Occidental philosophy supplied them with a fresh and better interpretation of their own religion and new confidence in its value. They sent missionaries abroad; they founded new sectarian schools of various kinds to improve their own education, as well as to contribute to that of the people; they organised new social works, such as temperance and reformatory societies, they started

magazines and began to publish many religious books and pamphlets.

These are the measures the Buddhists are taking to adapt themselves to the new conditions of social and national life, and I should say they have now greatly recovered from their reverse.

What then is the present state of Buddhism in Japan? It is not easy to answer this question; but in my own opinion it is briefly as follows:

There are two classes of Buddhist believers in Japan. The first comprises a vast number of people, mostly not well educated, belonging to the older generation, who will gradually die out in the course of time. The second comprises a smaller number of educated people belonging to the younger generation—some devoted priests, some earnest believers, some thoughtful philanthropists. There is a certain number of naval and military officers, civil officials, statesmen, etc., who are devoting themselves to training their will in Buddhist ways. There is also a certain number of scholars engaged in philosophical study, as well as in the historical and comparative investigation of Buddhism in a scientific way. In addition there is a great number of nominal Buddhists, especially among young people, whose religious belief is very superficial or who sometimes have no belief at all.

What will be the future of Buddhism in Japan? Will it recover its former state of prosperity? Here again I can only record my own opinion.

The doctrine of self-negation, of complete renunciation in its literal sense, is hardly in keeping with the present state of severe struggle for existence in national and social life, and with the progress of commercial and industrial life, which demands continuous, strong

and strenuous effort to enable Japan to hold her proper position among the world-powers. The ancient doctrine of karma does not satisfy the modern scientific mind except in its symbolic sense. The profound philosophy of Nirvāṇa is not easily to be understood by the popular mind.

Buddhism has nevertheless been the predominant religion of Japan for fourteen centuries, striving to adapt itself to national life and character, and helping the development of civilisation in many ways. Who then can deny the possibility of the appearance of some great reformer who shall rebuild Buddhism in an entirely new form?

Many Christian missionaries in Japan seem to be asking the question, "Can the dry bones live?" To this I would reply that the future of Buddhism in Japan is still an unsolved question.

YOSHIO NODA.

# THE SO-CALLED 'MADNESS' OF WILLIAM BLAKE.

JOSEPH H. WICKSTEED, M.A.

## I.

Few subjects have excited a wider divergence of opinion than the ecstatic life and work of William Blake. The capacity to enjoy him appears almost like a distinct sense, native to some and not to others, and equally impossible to demonstrate into or out of anyone. There are those for whom his art still seems a prolonged insult to every æsthetic sense, and—what is even stranger—who regard his life of heroic devotion to his ideals of art as tedious and commonplace, if not worse. But while for some his work is only madness, for his admirers—now at last a rapidly increasing number—the creations of this eccentric eighteenth century engraver are those of a seraphic genius standing apart from all ages and showing alike in verse, in picture and in life the unquenchable divinity within the human soul.

Undoubtedly this peculiar position of Blake's genius is largely due—as has always been claimed—to the fact that his inspirations were of the type which is sometimes called 'given.' He himself repeats again and again that his designs and writings were 'not his own,'<sup>1</sup> but copied from actual visions or from spiritual

<sup>1</sup> *E.g.*, Letter to Dr. Trusler, Aug. 16, 1799 (Russell, p. 57ff.); Letters to Butts, April 25 and July 6, 1803 (Russell, pp. 115f. and 121); Preface to Jerusalem (p. 8); J. T. Smith's Biographical Sketch (Symons, p. 386), etc.

dictation. In one passage indeed he speaks as though he feared to be reproached for spending time upon so personal a matter as his greater 'prophetic' works, but replies that, since the material comes to him without effort and even against his will,<sup>1</sup> he cannot be justly accused of squandering his energies on its composition.

Now it scarcely needs to be said to readers of *THE QUEST*, that *mere* 'givenness' cannot of itself command our admiration. The ideas and images that come surging up from the subliminal appear to cover an even wider range of value than the ideas consciously worked for and evolved. It is not too much to say that some of the eternal splendours of genius and some of the twaddle of the idiot and sleep-talker are equally 'given,' and in declaring that the productions of Blake's pen and pencil were 'not his own' we have done nothing towards deciding their merit.

The peculiar character therefore of this 'givenness' in Blake's case and the sense in which it does establish his claim to special attention must be investigated. It is probably a fact that all genius (and much good work that does not amount to genius) contains an element of 'givenness' together with an element of conscious labour and art. It is very difficult to believe that even the great Bacon himself was not largely indebted for his epoch-making ideas to certain flashes of insight, and his great follower Darwin was undoubtedly lighted on his path by initial inspirations, which became the basis of his prolonged inductive studies. And, on the other hand, as I shall hope to satisfy the reader in this and a succeeding paper, even so startlingly 'inspired' a genius as Blake was dependent for his highest success upon unsparing and unremitting,

<sup>1</sup> Letter to Butts, April 25, 1803 (Russell, p. 115f.).



sometimes life-long, labour, on fantasies that often came with astonishing profusion into his mind unasked. That he sometimes over-elaborated his first ideas and spoilt the pristine splendour of his visions, and on the other hand that he sometimes left things 'unfinished,' or imperfectly coherent to their incomparable advantage, will surprise no one who knows the accidents for good and ill besetting the progress of almost every artistic effort. But the venture of expending toilsome labour upon the native products of the mind must no more be condemned because of its occasional disasters than the wrecks along our coasts must be taken to negate the value of our foreign trade.

A remarkable saying in his note-book shows that Blake was quite conscious of the possibility of spoiling a good thing by too much labour. "Let a Man who has made a drawing go on & on, & he will produce a Picture or Painting, but if he chooses to leave it before he has spoild it he will do a Better Thing."<sup>1</sup> Probably this does not mean that he has already done a better thing in the drawing (although even this may be so), but that by taking a fresh sheet of paper and beginning anew he will do better than by continuing to work upon the old surface. At all events he elsewhere shows that he is well aware how much the best is only to be attained by labour and arrangement. "Invention," he says in his *Notes to Reynolds' Discourses*, "depends altogether upon Execution or Organisation"; and again, "Execution is the Chariot of Genius."<sup>2</sup>

The very common criticism, therefore, that Blake's work suffers from want of the more serious and respon-

<sup>1</sup> Blake's capitals are always characteristic and generally express emphasis.

<sup>2</sup> See Ellis' *Real Blake*, pp. 372 and 378.

sible artistic labour, necessary to the perfection of all supreme art, is extraordinarily untrue, if made generally. It has to be admitted that many of his own sayings and some of his own work have given a very plausible appearance to this charge, so much so indeed, that even some who profess to admire and expound his genius have sanctioned it.

Mr. Arthur Symons, who often shows fine insight into the peculiarities of Blake's art, has allowed himself to make the mistake of quoting a casual remark of M. Rodin's, as being "the fundamental truth about the art of Blake." Rodin was shown some of Blake's drawings and told that they were literally seen and not mere inventions. "Yes," replied the sculptor, "he saw them once; he should have seen them three or four times."<sup>1</sup> Mr. Symons ought to have known, if M. Rodin did not, how much evidence there is to show that Blake saw all his greatest visions many times.

Curiously enough one of Blake's most recent critics, Mr. G. K. Chesterton,<sup>2</sup> has made the very opposite charge against Blake in his writings that M. Rodin makes (and Mr. Symons sanctions) about his artistic creations. To Mr. Chesterton it is a sign of dementia that Blake *does* hear tags of verse three or four times. His point is at bottom, however, not very different from Mr. Symons's and may be put thus: the least valuable of Blake's 'given' ideas and images often controlled, instead of being controlled by, his rational or rather his artistic faculties. Whether we take it in Mr. Chesterton's or in Mr. Symons's form, the charge is an admirable example of the very thing it attempts to expose in Blake. Both these clever writers have seized on

<sup>1</sup> *William Blake*, by Arthur Symons (Constable, 1907), p. 217.

<sup>2</sup> *William Blake*, by G. K. Chesterton (Duckworth, 1910).

valuable ideas which they have spoilt, and worse than spoilt, through lack of a little investigation and critical labour.

Mr. Chesterton's indictment is so exceptional an instance of the miscarriage of an idea of real potential value, that it will advance our study of the phenomenon to follow it with some care; while incidentally affording a good example of the reckless injustice of much Blake criticism.

Three instances are selected by him of Blake's being, what he calls, 'hag-ridden' (p. 84) by lines he could not help repeating in inappropriate contexts. That the lines are in point of fact of a haunting character is clear enough, for they have exercised a curiously haunting effect upon Mr. Chesterton. He speaks airily of such lines getting written "in ten separate poems on quite different subjects" (*ib.*); but one discovers on investigation that each of them occurs *only once* in Blake's published works, and *once* more in his posthumously published manuscripts.<sup>1</sup> One of these is a couplet in an epigram written against Blake's patron Hayley and containing a line from an early poem. Mr. Chesterton says, without giving any authority, that Blake left this "lying about" (p. 29), a very grave statement made probably without a shadow of evidence. Blake's epigrams occur in his private notebook, published long after his death and probably never seen by outsiders before. But even so, in case the book *were* left about, and lest some busybody should pry inside, the full name in most of the epigrams is omitted, and in this particular case only an initial is written.

<sup>1</sup> Or in one case twice, that is to say in two MS. versions of the *same* poem.

It is part of Mr. Chesterton's charge that the lines in themselves have no appropriateness to the context. But this would not have been so, if Mr. Chesterton had happened to put them in their right context. He has unfortunately attached them to a wrong epigram, where they do not belong. In their own epigram they are cogent enough, though undoubtedly—even as Blake probably intended them to be understood—they are to say the least reckless and extravagant.<sup>1</sup>

Mr. Chesterton's next instance is given as follows (p. 88) :

In four or five different poems, without any apparent connection with those poems, occur these two extraordinary lines—

“ The caterpillar on the leaf  
Repeats to thee thy mother's grief.”

In the abstract this might perhaps mean something . . . some allusion to a universal law of sacrifice in nature. In the concrete—that is, in the context—it involves no allusion to anything in heaven or earth.

These lines occur in an unpublished poem, ‘The Auguries of Innocence,’ where Blake invokes our sympathy with the lower creation in a long series of independent couplets, so that the ‘context’ does not prevent Mr. Chesterton putting any meaning he likes into them. In a small engraved booklet they occur (with the word ‘reminds’ for ‘repeats’) in connection with an interesting illustration of a caterpillar and a chrysalis-like babe. This illustration is the only ‘context’ they can be said to have at all. I do not doubt that Blake's use of the ‘worm’ to symbolise

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Chesterton has doubtless followed W. M. Rossetti's version (Aldine Blake, pp. xciii.f.) written in 1874, and has not noticed Dr. Sampson's obviously correct arrangement (Sampson, 1905, pp. 214f.). Mr. Chesterton's theory of Blake's insanity, which has been credited with originality, is clearly suggested in this passage of Rossetti's, though the matter is there put with much greater caution and fairness. Messrs. Ellis & Yeats (vol. i., pp. 56-85) have discussed the lines at length.

the mortal body, and especially the embryonic body, is the basis of this strange but scarcely 'mad' conception.

But in his attempt to drive home this charge of insanity the writer becomes more and more reckless. There is a very fine couplet describing the 'stigmata' which occurs in three versions of the poem, usually called 'The Grey Monk.'<sup>1</sup> It is in this poem the well-known lines occur :

For a Tear is an Intellectual thing,  
And a Sigh is the Sword of an Angel King,  
And the bitter groan of a Martyr's Woe  
Is an Arrow from the Almighty's Bow.

Its theme is that the Christian's patient endurance of wrong is stronger to redeem the world than war, even waged against tyranny. The view may be disputable, but unlike many of its advocates Blake does not shrink from showing all that the process involves. He shows us the dying mother's cry for her starving children, as she hopelessly appeals against 'the tyrant'; the prophet's agony as he sees all the age-long suffering that his message of submission involves; the tales of torture and cruelty he has himself witnessed, and ever in his own body we see the bleeding wounds of Christ. The 'blood red' (not as Mr. Chesterton says the 'red blood') stains his side and his hands and feet betray the wounds of the nails.

All Mr. Chesterton has to say of this poem is (p. 88):

Here is another couplet that constantly recurs:<sup>2</sup>

"The blood red ran from the Grey Monk's side,  
His hands and feet were wounded wide."

<sup>1</sup> The published version in *Jerusalem* and one of the MS. versions are without title.

<sup>2</sup> (N.B., twice in MS. and once in type, in the same poem.) Mr. Chesterton adds a second 'his' before 'feet,' but for Blake's sake I have made the necessary corrections in these two lines.

This is worse still; for this cannot be merely abstract. The ordinary rational reader will naturally exclaim at last, with a not unnatural explosion, "Who the devil is the grey monk? and why should he be always bleeding in places where he has no business?"

If Mr. Chesterton had taken a fraction of the trouble to answer these questions which everyone considers it right to take over the interpretation of other poets, he would not have reached his hasty conclusion that "to say that this sort of thing is not insanity of some kind is simply to play the fool with the words."

But Mr. Chesterton has not quite finished. Conscientious perhaps that his evidence is not altogether as good as his case, he wishes to clinch the matter by shewing Blake guilty of some glaring irrelevance, some flagrant lapse in the sense of humour. Unfortunately he chooses the passage from the 'Auguries of Innocence' about the Ox. This is not very obscure, and had not Mr. Chesterton shewn so crass a failure to appreciate it, one would hesitate to labour an explanation for the 'ordinary, rational reader.' But in a word, let it be remembered that an Ox is not what breeders call an 'entire' animal. It is not therefore easily to be enraged, and for a man still in possession of his own virility to make sport of such a creature argued for Blake a deficiency in chivalry. That chivalry is the only manhood which constitutes a claim to the love of woman is surely a perfectly sane and worthy idea and expressed with admirable terseness in the couplet:

He who the Ox to wrath has mov'd  
Shall never be by Woman lov'd.

But Mr. Chesterton makes merry over the likelihood that a man's having 'slightly irritated an ox' should seriously injure his prospects with the fair sex,

and goes on to talk about a "blind spot on the brain."

"It is very true," as Blake sagely remarks to his contemporary critics, "I am mad or else you are so. Both of us cannot be in our right senses."<sup>1</sup>

What then are the real facts that have made so painful an impression on Mr. Chesterton? In the first place that Blake sometimes copied things out once or twice in MS. before publishing them. And secondly, that he sometimes used his private notebook as a safety valve, when he wanted to say bitter and indiscreet things that he was too wise to say in print. This was perhaps a sign of weakness, but if it is a sign of insanity, the company of the demented must, I fear, be taken to include the great majority of those who can write at all.

It would be comparatively easy to forgive so light-hearted and yet infallibly suggestive a writer as Mr. Chesterton himself for this 'almost blackguardly' (to borrow another of his choice expressions (p. 80) about Blake) treatment of his subject, if his work were not typical of so long and tedious a list of attempts to criticise Blake by men much less able than Mr. Chesterton himself. There seems to be something in the quality of Blake's genius which renders him peculiarly subject to slovenly treatment of this kind both from his enemies and his friends, amongst which latter I am sure Mr. Chesterton desires to rank himself. Blake's own greatest effects were perhaps never the result of raw flashes of genius, but it is part of their greatness that they always appear to be so; and many a rash critic has imagined himself inspired by Blake's example, in making merely impetuous assaults upon the mystery of his mind.

<sup>1</sup> *Public Address* (Gilchrist, ii., p. 170f.).

All that was wanting to give real value to Mr. Chesterton's theory was a little patient investigation. Beneath his and Mr. Symons's ideas alike lies a certain solid basis of fact, and their theories were worthy of better treatment than they have given them.

This underlying truth, well-known to all Blake students, is that Blake did not use Nature for his model and was never in any of his work attempting to address his public through the agency of natural images.<sup>1</sup> His raw material—if one may so describe it—came from his imagination, as he constantly avows, and not infrequently from that mysterious region of the mind which presents conceptions drawn originally no doubt from natural impressions, but strangely simplified or combined in some subliminal depths before reaching the conscious mind. These doubtless came with all the force of physical presentations but with an added significance, due to their quasi-mentalisation in the subterranean furnaces of the mind.

Now an artist who relies upon the gifts of this region for his plastic material is peculiarly tempted on the one hand to snatch his effects, and on the other to repeat them with tedious frequency. For we all know how fugitive some of our mental impressions are and how hard are others to get rid of. But far worse than either of these faults, is the tendency to attach a significance to our *own* mental images which they do not possess for others. And this is what Mr. Chesterton is really trying to prove against Blake.

Probably something of the sort could be proved, and it seems likely that Mr. Chesterton's general perusal of Blake's writings and designs has begotten a sub-

<sup>1</sup> Crabb Robinson's *Reminiscences* (Symons, p. 300), etc.



stantially true idea, without his noting its sources, so that when he comes to attempt to justify his position he is obliged to make up for the weakness of his evidence by the violence of his indictment. In a following paper I shall have occasion to give what appears a very strong instance of something in a design that is perhaps to be described as an 'insane' repetition—and we do not think it stands by any means alone—but meanwhile the danger of jumping at conclusions on this point may be instanced in passing by two examples of somewhat strange, but certainly justifiable, literary images repeated in Blake's actually published works.

Twice in Blake's poems, and in quite different contexts, we learn that something is like 'a fiend in a cloud.'<sup>1</sup> This is obscure in itself and still more so in its context. But in the notes to Swedenborg<sup>2</sup> we get a little light. Blake is saying very characteristically that it is impossible to love a cloud by conceiving it as holy, "but think of a holy man within the cloud, love springs up in your thought." The fiend therefore supplies the personal element necessary to emotion, whereas the cloud is doubtless the symbol of the spiritual. Dr. Sampson, who has bestowed on Blake the crowning honour of scrupulous care and scholarship, suggests that the image comes from Ossian, and this is highly probable. It is, however, of even greater interest to see where he took it to, and nearly forty years later we find the combination of a fiend and a cloud used with matchless effect in the great design of Satan tormenting Job. There is no attempt here to intermingle or confuse the fiend and the cloud. Each is definite and

<sup>1</sup> (a) 'Mad Song,' *Poetical Sketches* (Sampson, p. 15), and (b) 'Infant Sorrow,' *Songs of Experience*.

<sup>2</sup> Pencil notes made by Blake in the margin of his copy of Swedenborg's *Angelic Wisdom*—now in the British Museum—(p. 12).

distinct, and yet the design gives a haunting sense of their being spiritually one. The fiend is the vivid impersonation of the mental horror and madness, which is represented in another aspect by the deadly weight and gloom of the cloud. But the *thing* of which they are alike mere symbols is one and the same.

In an early poem we come across the daringly subjective, but not obscure image of the setting sun resting on the mountains while the evening star lights her torch of love.<sup>1</sup> This is repeated or rather developed in the *Milton*<sup>2</sup> (perhaps twenty-five years later) into the glorious image of the rising sun standing still upon the mountain to listen to the lark, "looking on this little Bird with eyes of soft humility & wonder, love & awe," until the other birds, joining the rapt chorus, "Awake the Sun from his sweet reverie upon the Mountain."

Now the strange subjectivity of such images repeated more than once in different connections, though never transgressing the bounds of legitimate poetic imagery, might perhaps prepare one to find traces of real morbidity elsewhere in Blake's work. And it is the more striking to discover how difficult it is to lay one's finger on a single instance of truly morbid repetitions throughout the lyrical poems.

In short the ground is extraordinarily weak for Mr. Chesterton's final summing up of the case, which is that Blake's mental obsessions were so acute as to be better regarded as the cause than the symptom of insanity (p. 93f.). Actual demons or demonic forces, he suggests, haunted a great and noble mind and were ever busy destroying its integrity. We need not here stop to discuss how far Blake's obsessions were or

<sup>1</sup> 'To the Evening Star,' *Poetical Sketches* (Sampson, p. 7).

<sup>2</sup> Blake's *Prophetic Book Milton. A Poem in 2 Books*, p. 31.

were not symptoms of disease and illusion, how far and in what sense they were as Mr. Chesterton holds really *there*. But we shall be able to make Blake speak for himself to show how he probably employed the agency of his artistic genius to protect himself from the possibility of their becoming an effective *cause* of mania.

In the silly and celebrated 'Visionary Heads,' which Blake drew for his silly friend Varley, we find the best instance of Blake's visionary, as separated from his artistic faculty.<sup>1</sup> Varley thus dilates upon certain of them to Allan Cunningham :

Observe the poetic fervour of that face—it is Pindar as he stood a conqueror in the Olympic games. And this lovely creature is Corinna who conquered in poetry in the same place. That lady is Lais, the courtesan, with the impudence which is part of her profession, she stept in between Blake and Corinna, and he was obliged to paint her to get her away.<sup>2</sup>

At another time we are told he paints Edward I., to induce him not to stand in front of William Wallace.<sup>3</sup>

Now these instances are chiefly interesting as showing that Blake put his visions on paper *to get rid of them*. The idea was developed some years ago in a little book written with no pretensions to profound scholarship or criticism, but showing occasional gleams of real insight into Blake's mind. A certain picture, says the writer (Mrs. Langridge) "fills the spectator with insane shudderings and alarm." What object could Blake have had, she enquires, for creating such awful images? The answer is, in brief, that expression was a refuge from obsession.

<sup>1</sup> The above does not apply to the celebrated 'Ghost of a Flea,' of which there are two completely different versions, and which Blake clearly worked up into its present splendid form. As for the rest, he did not see them again because they were not worth seeing.

<sup>2</sup> Allan Cunningham's *Life of Blake* (Symons, p. 421).      <sup>3</sup> *Ib.* (p. 420).

He sought relief from their dominion over his mental life by turning the vision that haunted him into a definite artistic image, thus by the act of projection getting rid of the disquieting, the torturing inward tyrant.<sup>1</sup>

The two points of view may be summarised thus. Both agree that Blake was in some sense obsessed by terrible morbid visions. Mr. Chesterton reaches the conclusion that his mind was partly unhinged or corrupted by these. Mrs. Langridge, recollecting no doubt Blake's own expressions, gets further into the matter and suggests that this corruption, although really imminent, was warded off by the act of artistic expression. According to this view Blake's demoniac guests, whether coming from without or within, may have been actually as dangerous as Mr. Chesterton suggests, but if so his saner mind was never vanquished and driven from the field by them. It may have suffered and probably did, but the strength of his art was sufficient to tame and *use* these morbid presentations. It is even possible that Blake's close identification of Art with the Saviour and Christianity<sup>2</sup> derived something of its significance from this redemptive character of design. At all events, as Blake worked with pencil or graver he had the god-given power to turn the panic of nightmare itself into grandeur. The very haunts of insanity assume the flowing lines which sustain the mind with the sense of universal sway, and show forth some dark but inviolable order present in Hell itself. The great tragedians have always done this for us in those fields of disaster, which come from without and have their origin in the concrete world. They enable us to see to the bottom of life's natural

<sup>1</sup> *William Blake, A Study of his Life and Art Work*, by Irene Langridge (George Bell, 1904), p. 188f.

<sup>2</sup> See marginal texts on 'Laocoon' engraving, etc.

horror and dismay, and so give a finitude to pain. But Blake's peculiar position is that he takes us through the abnormal and morbid in the *subjective* world. He is almost alone in having entered the fiery caverns of the maniac and *not* been mad.

## II.

I shall conclude this paper by a few instances tending to show that his power to do this is based on his possession in a superlative degree of the very faculty which is denied him. Even when dealing with the obscure and sub-liminal he has a master control of his material. Let us first take one more instance from his literary art. By a piece of supreme good fortune we have in the private MS. book already referred to, the various emendations and corrections made in the process of his composition of 'The Tiger.' It is not our present purpose to expound this poem, though its meaning is by no means as obscure as is generally supposed.<sup>1</sup> But we will take three or four of the emendations to show the absurdity of the idea that Blake was incapable of improving what came to him. In the second half of the first stanza Blake originally wrote:<sup>2</sup>

What immortal hand & eye  
Could frame thy fearful symmetry?

It is scarcely possible to exaggerate the added sublimity given by the change to 'hand or eye.' The crudely human image is at once superseded and the idea is thrown into the realm of transcendent suggestion.

<sup>1</sup> The general theme of this poem may be put in a word thus: The passionate element in human nature, no less than the lamb-like, is essential to lightening the darkness of earth, and ultimately to the melting of the very heavens, "When the stars threw down their spears and watered heaven with their tears," and so forth.

<sup>2</sup> See Sampson, pp. 113f.

We feel at once that the 'eye' or 'hand' with all their splendid definiteness are only cumbrous analogies for the organs of a Power whose mere glance can create like a hand, or whose hand, like an eye, can comprehend the scan of immensity. In the next line Blake obliterates 'could' and substitutes the stronger 'dare,' which in its turn was obliterated, when he conceived the fine idea of retaining 'could' in the first stanza and using 'dare' in the repetition at the end of the poem. In this way he used the physical mystery of creation to lead up to the more dread moral one. Perhaps, however, the most interesting change is connected with the lines:

And what shoulder and what art,

Could twist the sinews of thy heart?

There is an erased fragment beginning:

What the shoulder? What the knee?

Here by the change of *knee* to *art*, a splendid effect is again achieved by leading the purely physical image of the shoulder into an intellectual one; the first giving force and the second spirituality. But its peculiar interest is in connection with the celebrated design executed by Blake about the same time,<sup>1</sup> in which he portrays 'The Ancient of Days' reaching forth from the sun's disc and rolling round the compasses, whose lightning prongs shall delimit the finite universe. With characteristic naïveté—or humour, one can never be quite sure which—Blake declared that he saw the terrific vision at the top of the staircase.<sup>2</sup> One may suppose that here there was some dark place or space of blank wall upon which the vision of his inner eye found opportunity to project itself. But it is certainly

<sup>1</sup> *I.e.*, 1794, and not, as Mr. Chesterton imagines (p. 66), on his death-bed, 1827, when however, he coloured a print of it.

<sup>2</sup> J. T. Smith, *Memoirs*, footnote (Symons, p. 378); cp. Gilchrist, i. 125.

a true vision in the sense of being something not invented but coming unasked. Its terrible grandeur and daring, its originality and complete unnaturalness and withal its unaccountable power, all speak of an origin below the mind's rational surface; of something Blake did not in the first place consciously work for, or invent. But our particular point at present is the extraordinary and indeed awful character of two of its features. The figure's upreared knee is so drawn that, as the head and arm are bent far down into the depths, they tower above the rest of the figure, and give an awful sense of rock-like stability, which the floating sun, the blast sweeping away the hair and beard, the encroaching clouds, the black abyss below and around, are alike unable to disturb. Scarcely less portentous are the Deity's shoulder and shoulder-blade, which become visible as he thrusts down his arm far into the spaceless deep, out of which he is to create a universe. In the many versions we have of this design various alterations are made and in one there is even a right arm added; an attempt to complete and so to speak 'rationalise' the figure, which greatly weakens it.<sup>1</sup> But the unnatural left knee and arm remain,—indeed the design could not exist without them. Here then is a clear case of Blake's being haunted by a strange, and even incoherent image that came to him from beyond the regions of control, and whose proportions are unnatural and portentous. But the fact that the image of knee and shoulder so stupendously used in this design were considered for the poem, and rejected,

<sup>1</sup> So much so that the present writer is very sceptical as to the drawing (which is unsigned) being Blake's at all. The disc of the sun is larger than in Blake's print and the human figure is thus dwarfed. Though not without points of interest, the design is much weaker in other respects too. It can be seen in the British Museum in the Print Room, *Blake Portfolio*, and is the copy chosen by Mrs. Langridge for reproduction.

shows, I think, conclusively that he was not enslaved or morbidly dominated, even by his greatest conceptions.

But the more we consider Blake's designs, the more clear it becomes that he *used* his inspirations whether horrible or sublime, to express rational and artistic ideas. There is no better example of this kind of deliberate composition than the figure which first occurs on p. 21 of the *Marriage of Heaven and Hell*. A youth sits naked and with uplifted gaze, drawing up his right leg as though about to rise. The same figure, somewhat differently treated, occurs a few years after on p. 6 of the *America*. Fifteen years later it is combined with another figure from the *America* (p. 12) into the splendid design known as 'Death's Door' for Blair's poem 'The Grave.' The figure itself is now far more nobly conceived and placed above the vault where decrepit Age is seen staggering windswept into the door of Death. A sun, radiant behind the upper figure, emphasises the contrast between the immortal youth of our spiritual man and our tottering mortality below.

One is tempted to say that Blake had discovered the true meaning of the figure he had first seen so many years before. But in fact this art of using mental images as elements in the creation of designs, is not unlike the art of musical composition, where haunting melodies, arising involuntarily in the mind, may become the basis of complex and elaborate structures of art, and so wedded to their context as to become henceforth almost unimaginable apart.

It is for this reason that many of the themes in Blake's designs seem to have a meaning which is not primarily for the reasoning part of the mind, but for some primitive emotion which is waked within us at their call, as though at the sudden recovery of some



long forgotten clue. The genius who rescues these mysterious organic calls to the forgotten wilderness of man's mental world, and builds them into expressions of the discerning intellect is the master artist of imagination. Blake's picture of the soldiers casting lots for Christ's garments under the Cross is a simple, but supreme example of this. The spectator stands behind the three crosses so that he cannot clearly discern the forms of the crucified, but as he looks at the soldiers below he is filled with an awful sense of having been remotely and eternally familiar with these eager, smiling, fish-like faces, as they contend in the dim depths below the Cross for the rejected sheath of Deity. In the background is the still more dreary tragedy of Jerusalem, dark with eclipse, but austere and complacent, as she watches the destruction of the only light that could endow her spires and priesthoods with 'Humanity Divine.'

But one might wander on all day and for many days, watching Blake at his work and noting his extraordinary power of maturing and giving form to his inward visions. No instance is more wonderful than the many stages by which he arrived at that amazing creation 'Pity like a naked new-born babe,' which may be studied in the Portfolio to be seen in the Print Room of the British Museum. No one could study these sketches without being convinced that Blake saw his visions many times; nor I think could he compare them with Blake's other designs without acknowledging his independence of characteristic images, when these do not exactly suit his purposes.

In a following paper I hope to show how Blake deliberately dealt with his visionary material to give it symbolical and decorative value. JOSEPH WICKSTEED.

## **'THE BOOK OF THE HIDDEN MYSTERIES OF THE HOUSE OF GOD.'**

**G. R. S. MEAD, B.A.**

THE enormous influence on scholastic theology and mediæval mysticism of the writings which ascribe themselves to Dionysius the Areopagite, is too well known to need any elaboration. Indeed it has been said that if these important documents had by any chance been subsequently lost, they could have been verbally recovered not only from the endless quotations of mediæval scholars in general, but even from the citations of a single one of them—Thomas Aquinas himself, the supreme systematiser of Latin theology.

In those days these precious books and letters were unquestionably accepted as documents of the first century, written by Dionysius, the hearer of Paul at Athens; their orthodoxy, genuineness and authenticity were unchallenged. Subsequently, however, criticism got to work on the subject. We now know that these writings emerge for history in the East in the opening years of the sixth century only, when they were first translated out of Greek into Syriac. The earliest dated external mention of them is in the acts of the Council of Constantinople in 533. Curiously enough their genuineness was then called into question by the orthodox, but solely because they had been appealed to by the Monophysite party. The Monophysites held that the two Natures of Christ were so

united, that although the 'One Christ' was partly Human and partly Divine, His two Natures became by their union only one Nature (*μόνη φύσις*). The Monophysites of course did not so name themselves; they called themselves The Orthodox. It is difficult nowadays for a modern mind to enter with enthusiasm into the subtleties of this controversy which was waged with great bitterness for centuries. These first doubts, however, as to the genuineness of the Dionysian writings were speedily forgotten and gave place to general admiration; commentary succeeded commentary in Greek and Syriac testifying to the great esteem in which they were held in the East. In the Western Church they were practically unknown till 827, when the Byzantine emperor Michael the Stammerer sent a copy to Louis the Pious, in the childhood of the scholastic period. They were immediately translated into Latin by Hilduin and John Scot Eriugena, and at once found favour on all sides. Other translations followed; commentaries were written by the greatest doctors and mystics, such as Hugo of St. Victor, Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas and Dionysius the Carthusian. Buonaventura is saturated with their influence and so are also the great German mystics Eckhart and Tauler. In brief, on all hands they were accepted as authoritative, until the Renaissance period, when their genuineness was again called into question. Since then the battle has raged furiously with varied fortunes; and not only their authenticity but their orthodoxy as well has been assailed by Protestant scholars, who regard all mysticism with suspicion.

Irrespective of many other difficulties, apologists have never been able to give any satisfactory explanation of the fact that not a single word is heard of

these indubitably important treatises for at least five centuries from the time at which they claim for themselves to have been written. The best that can be said is that they were first circulated privately, or were 'withdrawn' documents, containing a secret tradition.

I have no intention of following the fortunes of this controversy; it is enough to note that as far as the question of authenticity goes, the claim is now practically abandoned on all hands, judging at least by the very carefully worded language of the most recent writer on the subject, in a work that bears the *imprimatur* of that Church whom the question more nearly concerns. "On the whole," says Mr. A. B. Sharpe, "it may be held that though the Dionysian authorship is not absolutely disproved, the balance of probability is strongly against it."<sup>1</sup> This is the language of ecclesiastical diplomacy; such an admission, we may be sure, would not be made in such a quarter, unless the case were hopeless. All Protestant and general encyclopædias and books of reference, however, without exception, now speak of the writings of the Pseudo-Dionysius.

But criticism has gone still further; elaborate research has marshalled a mass of evidence in demonstration of the strong influence on the Dionysian doctrines, not only of Alexandrian theology but also in part of Neoplatonism, and that, too, of the peculiar development of later Platonic doctrine in the fifth century, including a passage that Proclus and Dionysius have textually in common, to state the similarity in its lowest terms. Another element of great interest is

<sup>1</sup> *Mysticism: Its True Nature and Value, with a Translation of the 'Mystical Theology' of Dionysius*, etc. (London, 1910), p. 199.

that the quite peculiar nomenclature of the Dionysiana for the officers and sacraments of the church, etc., is extraordinarily reminiscent of the technical terms of the ancient philosophical mystery-cults.<sup>1</sup>

It is not, however, to be supposed that under present conditions Roman Catholic scholarship will be allowed to enter this wider field of research except for the purpose of apology. It is much, very much under the circumstances, for it to have to admit that "the authority of these writings lies not in their authenticity as the works of any particular writer." All that now can be said is that "they have been adopted by the Church as truly representative of certain phases of her doctrine, and as containing nothing contrary to it." For the Roman Church to-day their orthodoxy is guaranteed by "the accumulated authority of the long list of approved writers whose work has been based on them, or in accordance with them."<sup>2</sup>

These preliminary remarks may perhaps enable the reader to estimate the interest and importance of any addition to our information that may tend to throw light even indirectly on the genesis of these documents which were the chief source of mediæval mystical theology.

Who the writer of the famous treatises on Mystic Theology, on the Divine and Ecclesiastical Hierarchies and on Divine Names, and of the nine Letters, actually was, we shall perhaps never know. For scholars of the history of the evolution of dogma, however, he had a long line of predecessors; while for himself he

<sup>1</sup> The best study of this nature with which I am acquainted, is that of Hugo Koch, '*Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita in seinen Beziehungen zum Neuplatonismus und Mysterienwesen*' (*Forsch. z. christl. Litt.-u. Dogmengeschichte*, Mainz, 1900, Bd. i. Hft. 2, 8).

<sup>2</sup> Sharpe, *op. cit.* p. 202.

emphatically acknowledges his special debt to one of them in his own peculiar way. Thus he proclaims as his master and teacher, next after Paul, a certain Hierotheos, of whom he speaks in the very highest terms as an illuminate. This Hierotheos, he tells us, had written books of the greatest value; indeed he refers to these writings as inspired Logia second only to the scriptures. Of these works he explicitly mentions two by title—namely a collection of ecstatic hymns and a book on the elements of theology, and from the latter he quotes textually. These quoted passages are evidently the product of an independent mind of high attainment and marked individuality. They cannot possibly be dismissed as inventions of the Dionysian writer himself; he is only too eager to praise them and to draw a marked distinction between them and his own work. The writings of Hierotheos, he says, are ‘solid food’ intended for mature minds, that is for the perfect, whereas his own compositions are in a subordinate category; they are milk for babes, instruction for ‘newly-initiated souls.’ “Therefore,” he continues, “do I assign this teacher of perfect and mature intelligences unto those who are above the crowd, as second scriptures (lit. oracles) analogous to those divinely inspired.”

This clearly suggests that the writings of Hierotheos were never in general circulation but were kept withdrawn among the ‘perfect.’ It further suggests that in all probability these writings contained what the general Church would have condemned as heretical. If, as has been supposed, the Dionysiana are the product of a school and not of an individual,<sup>1</sup> that

<sup>1</sup>See J. Langen, ‘*Die Schule des Hierotheos*’ (*Rev. internat. de Théol.*, Berne, 1893, pp. 590-609; 1894, pp. 28-46).

school possessed a body of withdrawn writings ascribed to Hierotheos from which it drew its chief inspiration.

Who then is this mysterious Hierotheos, the supposed hearer of Paul and the first bishop of Athens, of whom history knows nothing prior to the appearance of the Dionysian documents? Speculation has been rife, but of the few bearers of the name known to us none is in any way suitable. Hierotheos is, like Dionysius, in highest probability a pseudonym.

Now of the two Books of Hierotheos referred to by Dionysius no further mention or trace is known in history. There is, however, both mention and trace of another work ascribed to Hierotheos. We know of a Book of Hierotheos which was said by some to have been forged by a certain Stephen Bar Sudaili. This Stephen was a Syrian mystic of Edessa who flourished at the beginning of the sixth century, when he was bitterly attacked by an orthodox Bishop of Mabūg for his heretical opinions, the most obnoxious of which was that of the non-eternity of hell, in brief that all, including the very demons themselves, would ultimately be saved. This doctrine of universal salvation was by no means new, we are glad to say, but was in the line of tradition of Origenistic optimism and prior even to Origen himself; and as a matter of fact Stephen while he lived at Jerusalem was in an Origenistic Monastery. Two centuries later on this same Stephen is said by Kyriakos, Patriarch of Antioch (793-817), to have been 'probably' the writer of a certain Book of Hierotheos, while John Bishop of Dara, who was well acquainted with the Dionysian writings, makes the same accusation about the same date, on the ground that the book teaches that there is to be an end to condemnation.

I had, however, no idea that any work claiming to be by Hierotheos was actually in existence, until chance brought into my hands a copy of a monograph of 111 pages, by A. L. Frothingham, Jr., and printed by Brill, of Leyden, in 1886; it is entitled *Stephen Bar Sudaili and the Book of Hierotheos*. Beyond a bibliographical reference in Herzog, I have not been able to discover that any notice has been taken of this instructive study.

The special interest of Mr. Frothingham's essay is that among the Syriac treasures of the British Museum he found the unique MS. of a work ascribed to Hierotheos together with an extensive commentary upon it by Theodosios, Jacobite (and presumably Monophysite) Patriarch of Antioch (877-896). This Book of Hierotheos seems to have been jealously withheld from circulation, for Theodosios tells us that he and his friend Lazaros, Bishop of Kyros, had experienced the greatest difficulty in procuring a copy. They had searched for it high and low, desiring to take it as their guide, from what they had heard of it. Here, then, we have a high dignitary of the Syrian Church—who though of incomplete orthodoxy, as judged by the general Church, was yet by no means a scandalous heretic—holding the Book of Hierotheos in the highest veneration. Not only so, but three centuries later, Gregory Bar Hebræus, the Monophysite Patriarch of the thirteenth century, who in his earlier writings had repeated from Kyriakos the accusation that the Book of Hierotheos was a forgery by Stephen Bar Sudaili, is loud in its praise, when later on, and again after great difficulty, he obtained a copy of the Book itself. Curiously enough this very same thirteenth century MS. in the British Museum is the actual copy of the commentary of Theodosios that Gregory used for the



purpose of making a compendium or rather a rehash of the Hierothean document, to which he now refers as "the Book of the illustrious, wise and learned Hierotheos"—a "great and wonderful" work. Gregory has evidently entirely abandoned the idea of its being a forgery by Stephen.

Nevertheless, Mr. Frothingham still maintains that it was. He bases his contention mainly on the similarity of some of the ideas in a book of Stephen's (which was bitterly attacked by his contemporary Mar Xenaias, Bishop of Mabûg, in a still extant letter) to some of the ideas in the Book of Hierotheos. It is, however, quite evident from the quotations of the Bishop, who had the book of Bar Sudaili before him, that Stephen's book was *not* the Book of Hierotheos which is known to us. Moreover, the Bishop characterises Stephen's style as contemptible, while Mr. Frothingham himself admits that the style of the Book of Hierotheos is admirable. Further, if the Book of Hierotheos was a forgery by Stephen we should expect to find him attempting to authenticate it by incorporating the Dionysian quotations, or at least to find his forgery in some way dependent on the writings of Dionysius; but this is by no means the case. The Book of Hierotheos is the work of an original and independent mind. This even Mr. Frothingham himself has to admit when he writes :

The intellectual position of the two minds is entirely different : Pseudo-Hierotheos is a simple monk whose thought is entirely distinct from any philosophical system, claiming direct vision, drawing his theories from his own consciousness [he professes to have more than once attained to the highest point of mystic union with the Good], and expressing them with great naïveté and freshness; it is the divine seer, and not the philosophic genius, who speaks. On reading his book we feel it to be the genuine out-

pouring of a strongly-excited religious imagination, and the work of an original mind, but of no eclectic or imitator.

This, we may note, is precisely the characteristic of the writings of Hierotheos on which Dionysius insists. The above estimate, however, has to be somewhat modified, for no seer can be really independent of his environment or of tradition. As we might expect, we find in the Book of Hierotheos reminiscences of ideas from the schools of Alexandria both Christian and Pagan, echoes of Gnosticism and of Babylonian and Persian conceptions of cosmology and soteriology: all, however, is "marshalled into a perfectly symmetrical and harmonious whole, in subordination to the ideal peculiar to Hierotheos himself."

Taking everything into consideration, then, we see no reason why this Book may not just as well be one of the Hierothean writings of the 'solid food' order, referred to by Dionysius, as a later forgery by Stephen Bar Sudaili. This of course leads us to expect in any case that its contents would be heretical; but they need not on that account be any less interesting, at any rate for those who prefer the flight of the mystic to the pedestrian gait of the systematisers who would reduce all illumination to the deal level of common terms and stereotyped notions.

Though Mr. Frothingham promised us twenty-five years ago a full translation of this interesting document, he has so far, unfortunately, not fulfilled his promise. We have, therefore, to be content with his version of a few only of the more salient passages, and for the rest with a summary which is by no means easy to follow. The work consists of five books, and the whole is entitled 'The Book of the Holy Hierotheos on the Hidden Mysteries of Divinity (lit. of the House

of God).’ The major part of it is a veritable epic of the soul setting forth the mystical stages of the ascent of the mind or spirit to the Supreme, in a series of vivid pictures of spiritual combat, of which we will now attempt to indicate the salient features; though, unfortunately, their vividness has already largely disappeared in Mr. Frothingham’s summary.

They who desire to ascend must first purify their garments—both soul and body. For the mind to ascend, the body must be as if dead, and the purified soul absorbed in the mind; the ascending mind being guided by that good-nature by means of which alone it can attain to union with the Divine. Such a spiritual struggle arouses the fiercest antagonism of the opposing essences that lie in wait for the soul on the first stages of the ascent, the purgatorial realms of unseen nature, corresponding with the external sublunary spaces, where are the demons of the ways of the midst, as they are elsewhere called. But by the grace of the Divine goodness all these are vanquished and the mind is raised to the firmament, while the angelic hosts above it cry aloud: “Lift up your heads, O ye gates, and the king of glory shall enter.” For they recognise that the victor in this fight is potentially or spiritually higher than themselves; the doctrine being that not even to the intelligence of angels are the wonderful mysteries of pure and holy minds, that is of spiritual men, revealed. The first stage of the ascent, then, is marked by that degree of purification of the lower nature which enables the aspirant while still alive in an earthly body to win his way through the purgatorial realms of Hades, and their opposing and at the same time chastening hosts.

The next stage is that of spiritual rebirth, which occurs when the mind is made worthy to ascend beyond the firmament, regarded as a 'wall of separation' between the purified and the unpurified, between Hades and Heaven ; the mind is become "as a new-born child that passes from darkness into light." This child has now to grow in stature. It enters the heavenly realms, the celestial states, of which there is a multitude. Through these, as it grows in stature and in purity, it continues to ascend. As it rises it becomes the purifier and sanctifier of the essences below it. The mode of its communion in these states is that of the mystical sacrament of the eucharist ; it eats and is eaten, to use the graphic symbolism of the most primitive and elemental act of all ; it is benefitted and benefits in turn. It has communicated to it the mysteries of the orders of the essences through which it passes and communicates to them the perfection of its intelligence. This may seem, at first sight, a strange doctrine. It explains, however, the first greeting of the celestial essences ; the idea is apparently that the purified ascending mind, precisely because it has been incarnated in the lower realms and has fought its way again above, is possessed of a treasure which is lacking to the celestial essences who have not descended. They recognise in it the sign manual of the supreme nature of the Good and assemble to adore it.

But Heaven is by no means the end. As in the doctrine of so many other great schools of the mystic way, the joys of Heaven are an even greater hindrance to the attainment of perfection than the mingled joys and sorrows of earth-life. The regenerate or spiritual child and youth is allowed to taste the celestial joys ; but as the mind grows in stature and reaches

spiritual manhood, it has to approve itself by a mighty trial of suffering willingly borne. When then the ascending mind has passed through the heaven-stages, it draws nigh to the Great Boundary which separates Heaven from the mysteries beyond, that limit apparently which divides the finite from the infinite, or at any rate from the supercelestial spaces. Here for a time it rests from its labours to gain strength for the great trial, in that state which is called Distinction.

Beyond this lies the mystery of the Cross. If it would go further the mind must endure the great passion and suffer crucifixion; for unless the mind undergoes all that Christ suffered, it cannot be perfected. The purification of the superficial human nature is the preliminary to the stages of perfection which transcend the purely human stage, and connote the perfection of the very depths of that nature. But how is the mind to be crucified when it has already reached the height of celestial bliss? When the deep motion to union with Christ arises in the regenerate nature as though it were the sign of true spiritual manhood, then a mighty revolution or transformation occurs in the depths of the lover's being. They who crucify the mind are those very same celestial essences or angels who previously adored it. These now, it would appear, desire to keep it with them, and because it would ascend still higher, hate it and oppress it. The crucifixion, however, is not of the mind only, it is of the whole human nature; for the mind is crucified in the midst and the soul and body crucified on the right and on the left. Thus only can the amazing subtlety of sin be vanquished and destroyed.

After the great passion, the mind is laid in the sepulchre to rest for three days; what state the

'sepulchre' symbolises we are not told. But on the third day it rises from the dead, and unites to itself its now perfectly purified soul and body which in the new life of the perfected human stage are now subjected entirely to it, and are no longer the causes of its subjection. The mind now becomes conscious of its being made like unto Christ—'our union.' But though the evil of soul and body has been purged, there are still elemental depths of the nature within that have not yet been vanquished, and which cannot possibly be vanquished till some degree of identification with Christ is reached. The very root of evil has now to be eradicated. The temptations of normal man are overcome, even the subtle temptations of the celestial joys have been transcended; but there are temptations that assail those greater than men, and roots of evil from which these superhuman deceptions arise. From this root of ignorance there grows up again and again an immense tree whose branches cast darkness over divine souls and hide them from the perfect light. They are cut down time and again, but like the heads of the hydra of fable they spring up ever anew in the depth of man's nature until they are destroyed by fire, the Baptism of the Spirit. This is the stage of the dark night of the soul indeed.

It is now that the mind sees by the grace of Divine illumination that it must descend again to the very lowest regions to tear up the tree by its roots. The sorrowful return is begun; the newly awakened or illuminated mind descends into the depths of Sheol to combat the subtlest and fiercest essences of evil and opposition in its own nature. It fights and fights on, but finally is slain, for of itself it cannot win the victory; the debt of death even of the mind itself must be paid,

for as yet it is not one with the Divine Mind, the Christ. The mind then is slain; it is the final mystic death. But as it was crucified above and raised above; so now it is slain below and raised in the depth by Christ Himself, the Divine Mind, and so peacefully and swiftly makes its second ascent through all the regions and states.

Then and not till then is it deemed worthy of the divine Baptism of the Spirit. For now it becomes not only like to, but enters on the first stages of identification with Christ. It now receives the adoration of the heavenly hosts, apparently the supercelestial choir, and has the power of the divine High Priest bestowed upon it. No longer is it mind, it has entered the sonship consciously, though as yet it is not the Son who doeth all according to his will.

One would have imagined that here the seer would have ceased and not dared to go further. By no means; he still continues with ultimate visions of the divine *drōmena*, now set forth as the mind conceives them as experiences of its own, while still short of identity with Christ, and then again as the triumphant deeds of Christ Himself. There are still further combats for the sonship itself; for beyond all personal salvation, there is universal salvation, and a mystery of utter simplicity in which all oppositions are finally to be resolved.

After consciously entering or being born into the Christ-state by the Baptism of the Spirit, the Mind, as High Priest, now communicates to the supercelestial host in the holy of holies the supreme eucharist, the spiritual type of every eucharistic feast. After this farewell banquet as it were, the Mind passes into that state where there is no longer vision, to enter on the stages of mystery of union with the Universal Essence

itself. Though there is now no longer any 'vision,' for the conflict is really with principalities and powers and essences, the writer is still constrained to use symbols and personifications. The Universal Essence is first figured as the Tree of Life.

The Mind first becomes a divine catechumen, as it were, and is instructed by the High Priest of the Universal Essence in three mysterious doctrines—namely, the distinction of minds, the coming of the mind into the body, and the final end of the nature of all things. But instruction must be followed by realisation, the hearing of the doctrine is to be followed by the doing of the will. Though the Mind is now in the supernal Paradise, it is not content but would be one even with the Tree of Life itself, a union which is said to be "the consummation of visions and the perfection of mysteries." But this desire, sublime as it is, necessitates still further combat. There now comes on the scene the Arch-Enemy himself, the adversary of the Christ, and transforms himself into the semblance of the Tree of Life, at the same time proclaiming: "I am the bread which came down from heaven; whoso eateth of me shall live for ever." The Mind thus deluded hastens to unite itself with the evil essence. But thereupon the Christ is fully revealed as the perfect Great Mind, burns down the false tree utterly and unites the Mind with the Tree of Life. Then apparently and not till then does the Mind become identical with the Christ.

But beyond the Tree of Life of the supernal Paradise is the Arch-Good. Even the unutterable rest and peace of union with the Tree of Life is not the end. Before the universal consummation can be reached the Mind must execute judgment on the adversaries of the



Good. That which was effected for it above, it must now effect for itself below.

It then receives a mystic sword and takes its downward way once more, but now with joy in full consciousness that none can any longer oppose it. The Divine Mind enters Sheol, apparently the purgatorial realms, or Hades, overthrows the essences of the demons of those regions, who gather together to oppose it, and the minds imprisoned therein are delivered, enlightened and forgiven; these regions moreover are illuminated and purified and made like to the celestial realms.

The Divine Mind has now cast out of itself the whole adversative nature. But below the purgatorial realms lie the depths of perdition. The Mind accordingly descends into Hell, and thereon the minds there who are the slaves of perdition, amazed at its beauty, desire to be united with it and be saved. Just as previously Purgatory was transformed into Heaven, so now Hell is changed into Purgatory; perdition is transformed into purgatorial chastisement of an essential nature. For when it is said previously that the Mind destroys the purgatorial demons, it means that it destroys these in itself, and not in their essence.

When the Mind has executed judgment in Gehenna, it descends still further to the lowest abyss, the place of the Prince of Darkness, to destroy the very root of demonic evil, the that which had had the power to appear to it above as the Tree of Life itself. Here is the limit of the sensible universe depth-wards. When it is said that the Mind destroys these roots, we are told it signifies that it has reached a stage of universal purification, when its sole will is to be united with the Arch-Good alone.

But between it and this supreme consummation lies a mystery called the Insensible Essence. It has now reached a state where there is no longer vision or symbol of any kind. There is the simple sense of the Insensible—utter negation. This essence possesses no name that is named on earth or under the earth; it possesses nothing of nature. It is immaterial, unconscious, lifeless and insensible. Although the Mind would vanquish it, it will not submit, for it is the final essence of contumaciousness. Before this mystery of 'non-being' can be solved, the final resurrection must take place; that is to say apparently, the Mind whose purified nature first included as far as the purgatorial realms only, must now extend itself to the whole sensible universe below as well as above.

It therefore once more begins its ascent from the very ground of what it has thought to be non-being. Thereon begins the final ascension and resurrection. As it mounts it sees all those that it had slain lying dead before it. Together with its supreme yearning to become the Father, there arises in it an overwhelming love to have mercy on the slain and raise them from the dead. It would now extend its goodness to all, including the evil and "make them all like unto itself."

Thereon a wondrous voice is heard: "Come from the four winds, O Breath, and breathe upon those slain that they may live!" The resurrection is consummated; the slain are raised and draw nigh the Divine Mind, who greets them with the words: "Ye are my brethren: for truly are ye bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh." They are thus united with Him that they may ascend with Him.

Then are all His limbs gathered together and He has united to Himself all minds in the universe. Thus

made whole He contemplates the Essence Above, the Light of the Divine. Nay more, He descends again below all essences, and there now sees that what He had before resurrection sensed as the Insensible, is the very same one Essence of the Divine He had seen above, and so he cries aloud: "If I ascend up into heaven Thou art there, and if I descend to hell there also art Thou. And if I raise the wings of my understanding like those of the eagle, and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea, even there shall Thy hand lead me, and Thy right hand shall hold me."

With this Universal Essence then at last is the Divine Mind united and embraces all in itself. It now no longer ascends or descends, for it is all-containing. Time has also now ceased for it. The Mind has even left the name of Christ, for it has transcended distinction, name and word. It can no longer be said: "Father, glorify Thy Son, that Thy Son also may glorify Thee," for all distinction of glorifier and glorified has passed away. Nay, more, Love the Spirit even, in any sense of distinction between lover and beloved, is transcended by perfect minds. "For whom should they glorify, as the Good is in them and they in it? granting it correct to use the expressions *in it* and *in them*, for one is the nature and one the person of them and of it; granting it correct to use the terms *of them* and *of it*. Neither will they any longer be named heirs, for distinction is blotted out from them, and when there is no distinction, who can inherit from another? Come now therefore, and let us glorify with unutterable glory the Mind which no longer glorifies but is glorified."

This consummation, however, is by no means a monotonous sameness of sheer unity. It is the prelude to the creation of a new and better universe. For

now is the Mind united to the creative power of Divinity.

“ It will thus begin, by a new and holy brooding, to create a new world, and will create a new man in its image, imageless, and according to its likeness likenessless. It will mete out heaven with its span, and will measure the dust of the earth with its measure; it will number the drops of the sea, and weigh the mountains in a scale. And who will speak of it, that cannot be spoken? or name it, that cannot be named? Let us, with the apostle, marvel at a mystery and say: Oh the depth and the riches, the wisdom and understanding, above the name of Divinity, of the Perfect Mind when perfected. For man cannot comprehend its judgments, and its ways are inscrutable. For who hath known its mind? or who hath been its counsellor? ”

The writer of the Book of Hierotheos draws a distinction between union with Christ and commingling with the Arch-Good. The latter consummation Mr. Frothingham translates as ‘absorption,’ though he admits that he has no support for this rendering from the lexicons. Christ is then the name of ‘our union’; but there is a state that transcends even this; to it no name can be given. It is, therefore, not very helpful to translate it by ‘absorption,’ for there is, as we have seen, a new creation; and mystically this renovation is an eternal process.

Thus though the writer tells us we should know that all natures will finally blend with the Father; he adds that nothing will really perish or be destroyed. Nothing will perish or be destroyed but all will return, be sanctified and united and blended. Then God will be all in all. Even Hell and its roots will pass away, and the damned and the slaves of perdition will return.

All orders and distinctions known to us will cease. Even what we call Spirit will be no longer, even what we call Christ will cease as such, even what we call God will be no more as we think it; the Divine Universal Essence alone will remain. But all this is at best an accommodation to the weakness of human thought and feebleness of human speech. It means simply that the universe as we know it, shall not only be transformed but recreated.

Such are the 'speculations' of the seer who wrote the Book of Hierotheos. Judged by the standard of Patristic theology they are of course heretical; they go far beyond any doctrine taught by the orthodox. It is, however, by no means improbable that documents of this nature were known to the writer of the Dionysian tractates, who explicitly admits that he adapted the teachings of Hierotheos to the capacity of newly-initiated souls. This means in plain words that in his own expositions he endeavoured to keep more within the limits of the ordinary and orthodox. In this he succeeded so well that, as we have seen, he has been accepted as orthodox by Latin theology. But the true charm of 'Dionysius' does not flow from his orthodoxy. That element to which he chiefly owed his charm was to be found more nakedly in the writings of Hierotheos. We might even go further than this and say that at present we can see no insurmountable objection to considering 'The Book of the Hidden Mysteries of the House of God' precisely such a document as allows us a far more extended view into the mind of the more intimate circle of 'Hierotheos' than does the unsatisfactory glimpse afforded by the few quotations from 'Hierotheos' in the Dionysian writings for the 'newly-initiated.'

G. R. S. MEAD.

# 'THE SIGHTLESS': MAETERLINCK'S STUDY OF A RELIGIOUS CRISIS.

HENRY ROSE.

WE live within the shadow of a veil that no man's hand can lift. Some are born near it, as it were, and pass their lives striving to peer through its web, catching now and again visions of inexplicable things: but some of us live so far from the veil that we not only deny its existence, but delight in mocking those who perceive what we cannot.

\* \* \* \*

IT has been affirmed in print, by one possibly unconscious of his own malformation, that Maurice Maeterlinck is a hopeless mental cripple. It has been also written that a certain work of his is a masterpiece pure and eternal, sufficient of itself to immortalise his name, "a name that must ever be blessed by those who hunger after what is great and beautiful." Both critics were eminent and sincere.

LAURENCE ALMA TADEMA.

## I.

*The Sightless* is one of the earliest, one of the shortest, and one of the best of the plays of M. Maeterlinck. It was published in 1890 under the title *Les Aveugles*. In the same year Maeterlinck published *La Princesse Maleine*, a prose drama in five acts. His only previous production at that time was a small book of verse entitled *Serres Chaudes*. This was in 1889. Maeterlinck was then 29, having been born in Ghent in 1862.

The English translation of *Les Aveugles* was

made by Miss Laurence Alma Tadema, who also translated *Pelléas et Mélisande*. These two plays were published in a single volume by the Walter Scott Publishing Company. A better translation of *Les Aveugles* one could not hope for. It reproduces in choice English the mystic charm of the original.

The play is in one act. It is a drama of the soul. Of action there is very little. A company of blind people anxious as to their whereabouts keep up the dialogue, never moving away from the place where we see them at the beginning of the piece. Yet so skilfully are the ideas worked out, so apt is every sentence and every word, so finely is the psychology of the various characters indicated that we follow the development of the play with growing interest, and feel when the curtain drops that we have indeed had before us a work having in it some of the distinctive elements of Greek tragedy—unity of time and place, unity of interest and idea, and, above all, nobility of theme and dignity of expression. Although, as I have said, the persons do not move from place to place, although in the external and material sense almost nothing happens, there is a progression of thought, an accumulation of effect, and a climax of interest which to those who are imaginative enough to feel in sympathy with the aim of the author are profoundly impressive.

I have said "when the curtain drops." But, of course, in the present case, this is a figurative phrase. *The Sightless* is not a play for the stage at all, at least not for the stage of to-day. Having regard to present conditions of theatrical production and public taste I cannot imagine the manager who would put this piece on the boards, the performers who would have sufficient confidence in their powers to appear in

it, or the audience that would sit it through with understanding and sympathy. As a play for the stage it is worse, or should I say better, than those more elaborate productions of Mr. Bernard Shaw and Mr. Granville Barker which, like 'Getting Married' and 'The Madras House,' are composed of conversation without action, and have on that account proved rather trying to the playgoer. In providing a play without action or with a minimum of action, a play dependent on psychology almost entirely, Maeterlinck anticipated the dramatists whom I have named by many years. It is evidence of his superiority as an artist that he saw that a play of this kind should not be spun out beyond the conventional limits of a single act. In days to come when the spirituality of playgoers is sufficiently high, and purely symbolic work is not as an unknown tongue, *The Sightless* may even be acted, and prove a stage success. But it must remain for a long time a play for the study, appealing to a few sympathetic spirits, though to them with a power that only a work of real genius can exert.

## II.

As I have indicated, we have before us a company of blind people anxious as to their whereabouts. They include men and women. All but one are old. Amongst them is a woman who is mad. She is nursing a child.

The scene is laid on an island, and in what is described as "a very ancient northern forest, eternal of aspect." The time is midnight, and the sky is "profoundly starred." From the conversation of the blind people we gather that they have come from an asylum. They have had a priest as their guide, but



they imagine that he has left them, and they are on that account the more distressed. They would be thankful were they back in the asylum again. Whither they were being led they cannot tell. They know that there is a river near. One of the men is deaf as well as blind. Continually in the ears of the rest of the company there is a sound as of the waters of a great sea. They are conscious that a lighthouse is not far away. They feel confident that if but the priest would return to guide them they would be safe. But, alas, unknown to them, the priest is lying dead in their very midst!

Such are the broad outlines of the situation in which these blind people are represented. It is a situation which is in the extreme distressing and pathetic—a situation which in well-chosen symbols reflects an experience which has been many times repeated in the history of humanity.

The sightless men and women in this play represent various types of human society. On the island, our little world, symbol of this mortal life, we find them in a time of religious crisis, a time of vast transition. The Church, the asylum in which they had long found kindly shelter and spiritual nurture, gives them shelter and nurture no more. Apparently their creed had become outworn. Even the priest, their guide, had ceased to have faith in it. But, unhappily, he has lacked both the spiritual insight and the intellectual power to reconstruct for them a new and living creed. Though they do not yet know it, his priesthood is at an end.

The night symbolises, as does their own sightless condition, the depth of their spiritual darkness. Yet in the fact that the sky is "profoundly starred" we

have the intimation of suns and systems without limit wherein there is fullness of light. The forest symbolises the entanglements of the soul arising more especially from the natural and external conditions of religious faith in which these sightless persons have existed hitherto. The sound as of the sea which they hear, often with fear and alarm, tells of the vast unknown: the illimitable ocean of truth. In the references to the lighthouse we have intimations of the existence of that inner light to which Man must look for guidance when all is dark without. "It may be that we are in the forest that surrounds the lighthouse," says the Sixth Blind Man. And this we must think to be indeed a strange place for a lighthouse until the meaning of the forest becomes apparent to us.

The river is the river of the waters of life, and may, at the same time, be viewed as representative of truth when brought within measurable compass or serviceable limits. That some members of the company should believe that the asylum is to be found beyond the river is, at any rate, evidence that their power of intuition is in some measure preserved to them. The First Blind Man is heard to exclaim: "Let us keep seated! Let us wait! We don't know the direction of the big river, and there are bogs all round the asylum." Of this we may be sure, if ever the company reach an asylum they will find that it is not the one which they quitted but an asylum different and better and more abiding.

Interesting is it to observe how well the distinctive character of each of the sightless people is sketched and the richness of detail in the symbolism of the play. Even the character of the dead priest is portrayed to

us in the talk of the blind people, so that we have a vivid idea of him in his later hours. The First Blind Man, not knowing that the priest is no longer alive, says: "He is growing too old. It appears that he has hardly been able to see for some time himself. He will not own it, from fear that another should come and take his place amongst us. . . . We ought to have another guide: he never listens to us now, and we are becoming too many for him. . . . I am sure that he has led us astray, and is trying to find the way again." Thus we see that the priest's growing doubt of the truth of the creed which he had continued to teach has had its correlative in distrust on the part of those whom he should have led.

But it is in the words of the Oldest Blind Woman that the real magnitude of the crisis as regards the relations of priest and people is indicated: "He was anxious too. They say that the great storms of these last days have swelled the stream, and that all the dykes are giving way. He said, too, that the sea frightened him: it appears to be agitated for no reason"—precisely the attitude of the leader who is conscious that he is not strong enough to face the conditions which, as the old is giving place to the new, are being set up. Later on, the Oldest Blind Woman also remarks: "You made him suffer too much: you have killed him. . . . You would go no further; you wanted to sit down on the stones by the roadside to eat; you grumbled all day. . . . I heard him sigh. . . . He lost courage."

That the priest was a man of the finest feeling, and strictly honest is obvious. Though he had become uncertain of the way, he was ever ready to give his people the best guidance in his power. But he needed

help not less than those whom he led, at least the help of sympathy. This had been withheld. The situation had become to him one of continuous agony.

In this connection we may observe that as the grip of the priest on the intellect of his people had loosened he had the more sought to appeal to the emotions. "Then he speaks only to the women now?" says the First Blind Man, interrogatively, when the Oldest Blind Man has remarked of the priest: "He has gone very far. I think he said so to the women." "He took my hands on leaving," says the Young Blind Woman, "and his hands trembled as if he was afraid. Then he kissed me. . . . He told me that he did not know what was going to happen. He told me that the old men's reign was coming to an end perhaps. . . . I did not understand him. He told me that he was going towards the great lighthouse."

It has been characteristic of the priest's solicitude to keep hold upon the affections of his people and to appeal at least to their emotions that, whilst he has been doing his best to lead both the men and the women, he has arranged the women in a group separate from the men. But a religion which does not rest on intellect as well as on feeling is doomed. From the exclamations of the men we see that they think that an injury has been done to them by this action of the priest.

On the individuality of each of the blind persons I have not space to dwell. The impatience and obtuseness of the First Blind Man, the reasonableness and hopefulness of the Oldest Blind Man, may be noted more especially, though, indeed, each of the company is a type of some member or other of the great human family. Most patient and hopeful of all are the women.

The details of the scene are filled in with a master-hand. The stones against which the blind people stumble are types of the hard concrete facts which are a cause of offence to those who have not yet learned to seek truth rightly. The fallen trees and decayed vegetation represent the beliefs which once flourished and gave food and shelter to men, but have now ceased to have either beauty or service. The thorns, and the dark or carrion birds are symbols of the pain and noisomeness of error, and types of evil and falsity. And the intense cold of which the blind people complain so bitterly suggests the sense of the deprivation of Divine Love—of the absence of the heat of the Heavenly Sun—of which they are now more than ever conscious.

### III.

It is in working up to the climax of his play—for it has a climax—that the author shows his greatest art. In times of crisis such as Maeterlinck here brings before us, when definite and helpful guidance from their spiritual teachers is no longer given, men are thrown back on their powers of intuition and their primary instincts. The need of religion is felt, but how that need may be satisfied they cannot well discern. They grope forward as best they can, and avail themselves with avidity of such help as comes to them from their own innate perceptions of what is right and best for themselves. And without some sense of reliance on these perceptions their condition becomes increasingly desperate. This the author plainly shows to us. He has a very similar faith in the appeal to and in reliance upon the instincts of

humanity which Emerson evinced when in one of his journals he wrote :

Be my life, then, a long gratitude ; I will trust my instincts. For always a reason halts (i.e., moves haltingly) after an instinct, and when I have deviated from instinct, comes somebody with a profound theory teaching that I ought to have followed it—some Goethe, Swedenborg, or Carlyle.

A similar doctrine was expressed by Ruskin when, in *The Ethics of the Dust*, referring to the revelation of the Divine Spirit to Man he wrote :

It seems to me, on the whole, that the feelings of the purest and most mightily passioned human souls are likely to be the truest. Not, indeed, if they do not desire to know the truth, or blind themselves to it that they may please themselves with passion, for then they are no longer pure. But if, continually seeking and accepting the truth as far as it is discernible, they trust their Maker for the integrity of the instincts which He has gifted them with, and rest in a sense of a higher truth which they cannot demonstrate, I think that they will be most in the right, so.

We need not stop to discuss whether Ruskin in this passage is considering humanity under somewhat different conditions from those which are presented to us in *The Sightless*. That question is not material ; the underlying doctrine of reliance upon the instincts is the same.

That the primary and God-given instincts of Man may be saving guides when the higher faculties of reason are blinded and other means of knowledge for the time being are not open to him is, indeed, an important part of Maeterlinck's creed, though, of course, it is ever to be assumed that good intention on the part of the seeker is a necessary condition of successful search.

It is in the feminine side of his nature that Man's instincts and perceptions are preserved in greatest

purity; the feminine principle impels him to the love of truth and good before ever the masculine principle is employed in analysing and confirming those things which are believed to constitute truth and good. In this play throughout, the women are represented as gifted with finer perceptions of the whereabouts of the wanderers and of the conditions which surround them than are the men. "I only smell the smell of the earth," reiterates the First Blind Man. But the Young Blind Woman repeats in varying terms and with increasing emphasis, "I smell a scent of flowers round about us."

In passing, it may be noted, as in some sense a justification of the conduct of the priest of which the men complained—I mean his conduct in appealing most of all to the women when the time of crisis arose—that he well may have felt not only that it was an easier task to reach their emotions than it would be to reach the intellect of the men, but that there was more to be hoped for from the perceptions with which the women were gifted.

In the study of the symbolism of this play the references to the flowers are important, as are also the references, not less frequent, to the dead leaves. The budding and fructification of a tree are familiar images of the spiritual birth or re-birth of Man. Observe that the dead leaves soon are made to whirl and fly in the tempest which breaks over the blind people. For the old beliefs are being driven away and are passing to utter decay. In the flowers of which the Young Blind Woman smells the scent we have the promise of a new and beauteous faith and of new fruits of life. "I have just smelt flowers on the wind," cries also the Oldest Blind Woman. And the Oldest

Blind Man declares, "I think that the women are right."

The flowers are strange, pale daffodils—flowers neither rich nor rare, yet flowers of Spring, harbingers of Summer glories. Of them Shakespeare wrote in *The Winter's Tale*,

Daffodils,

That come before the swallow dares, and take  
The winds of March with beauty.

That the daffodils described by Maeterlinck have but little beauty; that they are "strange" and "pale," is not a matter for wonder. How else but strange and pale must be the flowers of which in their then low spiritual state these sightless people can be conscious?

Happily, when at length the Sixth Blind Man, having reached the flowers, picks up a few and offers them to the Young Blind Woman a notable event is recorded. "The night-birds fly away."

#### IV.

Of all times in the life of humanity none seem so full of peril as those periods of transition when one faith having passed away a new one has not yet been attained. This is now borne in upon us vividly. "The wind rises in the forest and the sea roars suddenly and with violence." The cold becomes intense. The blind people are more than ever troubled.

A big dog now enters on the scene. I have said that in times of crisis such as the condition of these sightless people represents, men are thrown back on their powers of intuition and their primary instincts. These powers and instincts have been manifest subjectively in the finer perceptions which the women display. Objectively the author represents them by



the dog. He makes use of the dog with similar symbolical significance in his later work, *The Blue Bird*.

There are two respects in which the instincts of the dog are pre-eminent—in the sense of locality and in the apprehension of the presence of death. The dog of this play represents both of these forms of instinct, but notably the one last-named. The First Blind Man, who had all along been the most timorous and stupid of the company, is dragged by the dog towards the motionless priest, of whose death the blind people now first become conscious. The pitiable condition to which they have come is then more than ever realised, and, proportionately, their sense of need is greatest. The prayer of the soul goes forth, a prayer which when sincere and heartfelt is ever sure of answer. The Young Blind Woman remarks that she has been putting her hands to her eyes; she thought that she "was going to see." By-and-by the Oldest Blind Man declares that he can hear a noise, though it is one that he cannot well make out. The Young Blind Woman, now more positive, declares, "I hear someone walking in the distance."

The Mad Woman's child begins to wail suddenly in the dark. "It sees. It sees," exclaims the Young Blind Woman. "It must see something, as it is crying." And seizing the child in her arms the Young Blind Woman rushes forward in the direction of the sound, the other women following.

The sound of the footsteps symbolises the coming of the herald of a new faith.

Why should there be a woman described as mad in this strange company, and why should it be her child that thus displays a ready sense of the herald's presence? This woman may have been one of those

ecstatic and highly wrought devotees on whom a crisis tells most heavily; she may have loved much and suffered over-much in relation to the Church in which she no longer finds shelter. We do not know. But of the significance of her child we can have no doubt. The child whom the Young Blind Woman lifts above the group of the sightless and in whose vision she has such confidence, is the type of the innocence which is the necessary condition of spiritual perception. For, truly, "He hath hidden these things from the wise and learned and revealed them unto babes."

"The footsteps have stopped right among us," cries the Young Blind Woman. And with the pathetic prayer of the Oldest Blind Woman, "Have pity on us," the play ends.

## V.

"We have never seen each other. We question each other, and we answer each other; we live together, and we are always together. But we know not what we are."

So says the Oldest Blind Man in the time of doubt and difficulty which precedes the hearing of the mystic footsteps. These words, so exquisite in their tenderness and pathos, express that sense of isolation and consciousness of the need of communion which all men feel when the greater problems of life are borne in upon them and seem to baffle all attempts at solution. In *The Sightless* from beginning to end the dependence of men on one another is exemplified. But still more is exemplified the need for the establishment of a conscious and orderly relationship with the Supreme Source of life, of a sympathetic association

of Man with those Divine forces from which his being is derived and by which it is sustained.

By diverse means and in diverse forms, men in different ages and in different places have sought to establish this relationship. Hence religious systems have arisen. But no one system can for ever satisfy the needs of mind and heart. Religions are not exempt from the processes and conditions of decay, death, new birth and growth to which all forms of life are subject, however constant may be the laws which determine those processes, which regulate these conditions. And, inevitably, the time of transition is a time of tragic incidents. Maeterlinck spares no resource of his art in placing this fact figuratively before us.

But if the picture which Maeterlinck draws is sombre, it is not pessimistic. Man's need of some form of positive faith is emphasised with the utmost force in the work which we have been considering. And in the indication which the author gives of his conviction that provision for meeting that need will come as surely as the need is felt we have the best possible evidence of his optimism. This play is, indeed, true of insight, wisely philosophic. It is full of suggestive thoughts. And, as I said at the outset, the way in which those thoughts are expressed and the whole character of the work mark *The Sightless* as a piece of the finest art.

HENRY ROSE.

## CHRIST AMONG THE HERETICS.

REV. F. W. ORDE WARD, B.A.

ONE of the penalties attaching to human nature, even in its highest development, appears to be an inability to see every side of a question. We magnify one aspect, at the expense of the others. The advocate of authority, a very needful factor, usually disparages the force of reason. And the philosopher often under-rates the value and power of precedent and example in the highest places. Hedonist and ascetic quarrel bitterly like cat and dog, regardless of the truth that both represent vital ingredients in the evolution of character and history. Cavaignac said he did not love those who believed in God, because they generally made their piety an excuse for doing nothing on behalf of man. He meant that religious people are often unpractical, or satisfy themselves by keeping only some of the commandments and treating the half as the whole duty. As wrote John Stuart Mill long ago, egoism and altruism do not necessarily conflict with each other. "I believe the good of the species (or its separate units) can only be forwarded, by each taking for his exclusive aim the development of what is best *in himself*." Both elements, the self-regarding and the other-regarding, are absolutely indispensable for any true racial progress. The individual and the community grow together or grow not at all. In making the most of ourselves, we make the most for

others. The ego and the non-ego, the society and the unit, co-operate in the very act of competition or positive antagonism.

Of course, to look beyond the limits of our fellows involves peculiar sufferings of its own, and does not conduce to happiness. But for the broad-minded and would-be benefactors of the state, this will never weigh much. "Every increase of insight," and therefore of foresight, "carries with it the uncomfortable feeling of being separated more and more widely from almost all other human beings." Nevertheless *le jeu va* and on the whole *le jeu va bien*. Though with too many of us, as the witty Frenchman observed: "*Tout va bien, parce que tout va bien pour eux*"; and "*ayant leur lit bien fait ne veulent pas qu'on le remue*." Probably, in the interests of human progress, it is imperative as well as inevitable that particular points should be exaggerated at first, to show us in the end truth never was or will be or can be one-sided, and also that it may be exposed to the fiercest possible light of criticism and consequently obliged to reveal its innermost contents. And, as Maurice used to teach, the upshot invariably discloses a difference in method even more than in opinion. Perhaps the Stoics made too much depend upon the last. Our estimate of things, the judgments and emotions that we think and feel about them, count greatly. But the attitude we adopt in dealing with them, our postures and impostures, our way of confronting them, mean vastly more.

Opinion proposes, method disposes. Even the visual and tactual characters of an object appear, it is believed, to occupy different positions. And in like manner, a particular opinion does not necessarily

imply one and the same method of working it out. Men, entertaining a similar belief, in their practice may be and often are divided by a great gulf. So that it seems perfectly impossible always to infer the one from the other. *Quot homines, tot sententiæ*—yes, and no less *tot viæ*.

But while admitting the tendency to one-sidedness in human nature, and its frequent expression in history, we have tardily begun to discover that the heresiarchs and reformers were not quite so narrow and bigoted as their contemporaries and enemies and their interpreters maintained. It seems pretty certain now, according to the latest reports, that Calvin was not a Calvinist, and Erastus was not an Erastian, and—we might even add without irreverence or disagreement with facts, that Christ was not a Christian. The first and second, and our Lord Himself, have been cruelly misreported and perverted by miserable fanatics or for mere party purposes. The doctrine of Predestination, usually associated with Calvin, for instance, constituted but a small portion (we had nearly said an infinitesimal portion) of his teaching. And as for poor Erastus, he has suffered even more than Erasmus. In fact, Byzantinism has been now suggested as a title preferable to Erastianism. No doubt, Erastus himself was more or less (and rather more) a Zwinglian, and he permitted himself to be influenced far too much by the Old Testament. But he contended rather for more rigour and vigour in ecclesiastical discipline, than for a degrading connexion with the State or for its supremacy. Hobbes and Selden seem to have been the real Erastians, and not Erastus himself. Indeed, it appears not unlikely now, that impartial historical research will not only rehabilitate

the characters of many old heretics, but will actually transform them into orthodox believers and pillars of the faith. The judgments of giants like St. Augustine determined too much the decisions of the Church, in his own age and ever afterwards. Even he made mistakes, but then he was one *quem contradicere fas non est*.

If the Church so far has failed to perform her promises, it is not the fault of the truth she received. It is merely because she has used and abused secular means and appealed to the secular arm and the falsehood of Force. The Gospel or the Stake! The smell of incense has never injured the Church, but the smell of the faggot. Unorthodox views, doubtful doctrines, and not bad morals, constituted the chief offence in the eyes of ecclesiarchs and those who substituted party for the principles of Christianity. Only too soon enthusiasm and a literal interpretation of Bible teaching grew a crying scandal and unpardonable offence to pampered prelates or sectarian Churchmen, who put a formula before faith, and thought a great deal of an iota more or an iota less, and really cared for conformity alone and not the salvation of souls.

We all know now, that Montanists, and Novatianists, and Priscillianists, and Donatists and their extreme representatives in Circumcellions, were not the heretics that people believed them to be at the time of their activity and till quite recently. They were mainly men who understood the scriptures too faithfully and *au pied de la lettre*. They thought Christ meant exactly what He said. It never occurred to them that the simple ascetic missionary life prescribed at first was not intended to continue, and

was merely a temporary form and initial step of the great movement towards the evangelisation of the whole world. Heretics in the proper sense of the title they never were. They suffered from an excess of zeal, *nimia religio*, as the protomartyr Priscillian proved to his cost.

In tepid times, ardent beliefs are not acceptable. They reflect upon the chilliness of ordinary average Churchmen, and must be condemned immediately as suspicious and big with portentous possibilities. Puritans and pleasure-seekers (even when the last happen to be ecclesiastics) do not agree very well together. While the fanatic and formalist remain at daggers drawn, theologians and thinkers sometimes prove equally antagonistic. It was an eminent philosopher who wrote of certain famous Bampton Lectures: "Mansel's detestable and to me absolutely loathsome book." To make God's morality different in kind from ours, was a desperate and forlorn position and enough to madden the most dispassionate thinker. And to the plain man, with a commonplace mind, the philosopher was always a problem and an accursed thing. In the catalogue of Printed Books at the British Museum, we read under the entry "Mill (John Stuart)" "see 'Antichrist.'" Even half a century ago an impartial inquirer was dubbed immediately an infidel and atheist—as the early Christians themselves naturally were. At the beginning of the last century Radicals failed utterly to appreciate the attitude of Divines and the strength of Toryism, and predicted with the cocksureness of Macaulay the imminent downfall of the establishment and the House of Peers. The biggest lay minds, if saturated with purely secular thoughts and feelings, find the Gospels unintelligible.



The greatest pioneer of progress three generations ago committed himself to this preposterous statement: "Nearly all the good of the four Gospels is in Matthew alone, and we could almost spare the other three. Mark and Luke do no harm, but John has been the cause of almost all bad theology. The Christ of that Gospel is a sort of Edward Irving." St. Paul, according to the same false prophet, was "the first great corrupter of Christianity." When he wanted an example of stupidity, he wrote "as ignorant of life and the world and the opinions of instructed persons as a Church of England parson"! What would he think if he were alive now, of the Higher Critics, of Loisy and Harnack, and even Anglican bishops who might be named? Though indeed some of these extremists seem rapidly approaching in their process of easy and airy elimination the philosopher's dictum: "Nothing can be known on the subject of religion," and his further assertion: "Sin if other than the theological synonym of 'morally wrong' is a name for something which I do not admit to exist."

We all sadly need something of the "Cross Bench mind," which can envisage two or more sides of a difficult question. The single-view man, the one-string teacher—he it is who proves the most obstructive and impedes the advance of science. St. Augustine must not be contradicted! Not too much light, and let the blinds remain drawn down and the curtains outspread! That horrid sun (Lord Melbourne, who spoke of "that d——d morality" would have used a far stronger expression) will spoil everything! And so, when a bold and original speculator like Dr. Peake, on the strength of newly discovered papyri, suggests "title-deeds" as a better translation of "assurance,"

there will be sore searchings of heart and fluttering among theological dovecotes. Of course, with some a new theory needs not to be a new belief, but pure spirit of negation which has something Satanic about it; just as we find champions of progress opposing everything, Bentham remarked, not from a love of the Many but from a hatred of the Few.

The secret of successful discussion, and all European government now operates more or less by discussion, consists in a patient attempt to appreciate a contradictory view. Let us try to understand each other. To enumerate the links in a chain of argument, or to catalogue the antecedents of an adversary's action, will never explain all. We must enter into his heart and mind, and get at the levers of life and the springs of thought. No mental revolution can occur without an efficient and sufficient cause, and the trap will not fall without the adequate trigger or 'scandal.' Reasons, when unformulated and unconscious, nevertheless exist and energise—perhaps in the subliminal consciousness, which Dr. Sanday suggests as the theatre of Christ's Divine Power and Knowledge. If controversialists essayed to understand one another, they would certainly discover far more points of agreement than disagreement. But the Church as well as the State has acted on the bad principle of burning its martyrs first and canonising them afterwards.

To be a heretic, only means to be a day's march or two ahead of the world. The heterodoxy of yesterday refreshes us as the orthodoxy of to-day, and the orthodoxy of to-day will be the anachronism of tomorrow. J. S. Mill found it a fatal endowment, to start with an advantage of a quarter of a century over

his contemporaries. But the leaders of thought obey the driving force of the ideal and the unattainable. *Dort wo du nicht bist, dort ist dein Glück.* Or, to paraphrase it, that which we do not possess is the most desirable. And we behold Christ, the Ideal, always a little before us, and as we advance yet a little before us—and so on for ever and ever.

Christianity, the truth, is an anvil which has broken many hammers, and will break many more. And the so-called heretics have proved consistently the best defenders of the faith and borne all the brunt of every attack. They were, with rare exceptions, misunderstood and misappreciated members of the great vanguard. Their bodies, their lives, bridged the chasms on the way, and their graves grew into signposts and beacon-marks. Perpetually misrepresented, and not least by themselves and their own injudicious deeds and words, they nevertheless became part of the Order, the cosmic movement, the human trend Divine of evolving truth. Had they been less 'previous,' less concentrated—let us add boldly, less bigoted and narrow, less unaccommodating—they would not have produced the requisite shock. They were the saving discords of a dangerous harmony, sustained by coercion from without and not by a vital pressure and constraint and growth from within. And if the Church had been what she professed, *semper eadem*, there would be no Church to establish or disestablish, at the present day.

Only may heaven (and the heretics) continue to protect us from ourselves, and from religious freedom—to do nothing, and religious toleration—to be intolerant! We cannot have service apart from sacrifice, and a diffusive and effusive Church will be

powerless unless we add the infusive elements of martyrs and confessors and heterodoxasts. How shall we ever pour out, until we have first poured in? And the blood of the witnesses has always been, and always will be, the great and authentic fountainhead whence the stream of fresh onward vigour flows.

But the stumbling-block remains—St. Augustine must not be contradicted. But it remains only to be perpetually overcome, and this overcoming realises the continuity of the true Church. Romanists persecuted, as they did, simply and purely because they believed apostasy of any kind to be the very greatest of crimes, and the State could not govern or work at all unless the moral or religious sense of the community were entirely and absolutely on its side. Schism was rending Christ's robe, a breach in the general solidarity, so much so that a single dissenter affected and infected the whole nation and imperilled its corporate unity. But we must not imagine for a moment that, because the Church which first conquered the World, was speedily conquered by the World, therefore repression of different opinions, that frequently proved to be bigger and better and truer opinions, and consequently heresies, is the necessary outcome of Christianity. Persecution represents the negative and not the positive side of our faith; it means miserable State relations and a civil policy which for the Church signifies the deadliest impolicy. Affirmations of faith have nothing whatever in common with force, and this when invoked hardly conceals the borrowed argument or appeal—*ad leonem*. Tertullian's bitter and memorable words readily recur to the mind. "*Si Tiberis ascendit in mœnia, si Nilus non ascendit in arvo, si cœlum stetit, si terra movit, si fames, si lues, statim*

*Christianos ad leonem—hæreticos ad ignem, ad gladium, ad crucem.*"<sup>1</sup>

Let us grant that the grand old heretics were often, and perhaps usually, men of one idea. For that very reason, they possessed a singleness of purpose and a simplicity of heart enjoyed by few and possible to few. Had they seen more, to speak paradoxically, they would have seen a great deal less. It is the intensity, the unicellular concentration, if we may employ such an expression, of the enthusiast or fanatic which alone enables him to focus at last the whole world's attention on some weak point or imperfect statement of orthodoxy, some yawning blank or some disfiguring blot. He recovers the dropt stitch, lays bare the real thread of thought, adds or subtracts, as the case may be, and generally seals his testimony with his blood in great cheerfulness of heart. To the static elements he contributes the dynamic or doctrines like dynamite, full of explosive and expansive vitality. Establishments manufacture heretics, when they cease to be progressive. Dead fossilised formulæ are only chains to the fool and nets to the rogue, but cobwebs to the reformer. Behind the dogma lies the stake, but behind the stake lies the Kingdom of Heaven. Every bullet has its billet and every forward step a martyr's tomb and a new resurrection ground.

Orthodoxy too frequently repeats what the Church (and the World, alas) maintain, and Heterodoxy what Christ Himself taught and teaches now for all who have ears to hear and hearts to understand. Society

<sup>1</sup> If the Tibur floods the city or the Nile fails to flood the fields, if the heaven has stood still, if the earth has moved, if there is a famine or a pestilence, at once the cry arises: 'The Christians to the lion, the heretics to the fire, to the sword, to the cross.' Gibbon has a slightly different version.

has captured Religion and set its pretty seal upon our forms and ceremonies and principles, and reduces religion to a matter of mere good form and philanthropy or ethical attitudinising. Modernity (not Modernism) has solved triumphantly the old puzzle of how to make the best of both worlds—by secularising Christianity. We can hardly call it a compromise, or a blessed giving and taking, because the World has won all along the line, and any scoundrel (if only big and black enough) may do pretty much what he likes—provided he be a good Churchman.

But one drastic cure appears available now: Not to revive old penalties, or invoke the law—as the horse called in man to be his helper, and remain his master. For when has justice been impartial, or when have statutes catered for the poor and needy? Thorold Rogers truly said: “From 1563 to 1829, conspiracy concocted by Law, and carried out by all parties interested in its success, was entered into to cheat the English workman of his wages, tie him to the soil (*adstrictus glebæ*), deprive him of hope, and degrade him to irremediable poverty.” In what conceivable way then will the State assist the Church? Disestablishment seems the sole course open, the single way of escape possible, from such damaging friendship and disastrous remedies. Indeed, as a matter of fact, we are members of an Establishment that never was established, and is now disestablishing itself as quickly as it can. We must purify the Church and purge it of all political connexions and social successfulness and drawing-room perfumes and the patronage of Duchesses.

For heaven’s sake, let us have the real thing—the unadulterated article—not the thirty-nine definite and

indefinite articles or the forty stripes save one—but the Christianity that is Christ Himself. We do not expect that, when the partnership has been dissolved, the Church will become infallible. What Church is? Not even the youngest heresy and most omniscient sect. But we know, beyond the shadow of a shadow of a doubt, that the Church abides imperishable. Science for some time has been rallying round the Cross of Christ, with men like Faraday, Sir G. G. Stokes, Clerk Maxwell, Adams the astronomer, Lord Kelvin, Lord Lister, Lord Rayleigh, Sir David Gill—and dare we add Huxley himself? For in the light of his *Romanes Lecture*, it looks as if Huxley were drifting or rather reasoning that way, and had he lived a few years longer would have become as true a Christian as Romanes himself. Even Dr. Frazer of the *Golden Bough* and golden fame may yet discover the Cross to be the 'totem' of his tribe.

The passing away of religious disabilities, and the late amending of the Royal Declaration in the Coronation Oath, though capable (as the *Guardian* has shown) of vast improvement more in accordance with facts and good taste, all point to new and grander possibilities for the Church, if it is ever to be the Church that Christ contemplated and Man has mutilated. Not by going back to an imaginary undivided condition, but by going forward and boldly accepting our fresh responsibilities and putting duties before rights, by continuous readjustments and adaptations to modern needs and modern aspiration, will the Church become Catholic and democratic and the centre of eternal inspiration.

F. W. ORDE WARD.

## THE BAPTISM OF JOHN THE FORERUNNER.

ROBERT EISLER, PH.D.

THE whole of our knowledge concerning the life and ministry of John the Baptist is derived in the first place from a few rather insignificant lines in Josephus (*Antiqq.* xviii. 52),<sup>1</sup> and secondly from the traditions incorporated into the Gospels. The latter are all the more valuable because they contain fragments of John's preaching, which are obviously copied from some 'fugitive leaf' circulating among the disciples of the Baptist. Yet in dealing with our Christian sources we must not allow ourselves to be influenced by the specifically 'Christian' and therefore necessarily anachronistic view, that John was a 'forerunner' of Jesus or even (as the fourth Evangelist puts it) a witness of the Nazarene prophet's Messianic vocation. For though it is manifest that the son of Zechariah the priest came forward to prepare the way for a mightier one coming after him, who certainly was meant to be the expected Messiah of the Jews, it by no means

<sup>1</sup> "Joannes, surnamed the Baptist, was a good man, and commanded the Jews to practise virtue, both as to *justice towards one another and piety towards God*, and so to *assemble for a general [ritual] bathing*; for this baptism would be acceptable to God if they made use of it, not in order to obtain the remission of single infringements [of the law], but for the purification of the body, provided that the soul was thoroughly purified beforehand by righteousness."



follows that his own ministry had anything whatever to do with the entirely different one of Jesus and his apostles. It is not the traditional retrospect of the movement started by the Baptist, but only a prospect into the, at that time, still vague and undecided future of the Jewish nation, that will enable us to understand the individual life and aims of the last shining light of Old Testament prophecy.

The history of John's infancy in the third Gospel is generally admitted to be a pious legend artificially composed to suit a series of parallel motives in the Old Testament birth-stories of Isaak, Samson and Samuel. The name of the father may have been faithfully handed down to us owing to a custom of using the patronymic 'bar Zechariah' for the Baptist; less reliable—but in any case historically unimportant—is the tradition as to the mother's name Elisheba; for (as Holtzmann has suggested) it might be somewhat more than a coincidence that the two heroines of this 'gospel of infancy,' Miriam and Elisheba, bear the names of Aaron's sister and wife. The priestly descent of John seems trustworthy, although Brandt has lately questioned it on the ground that official observance considered the water of the Jordan, which the Baptist used for his rite, as unfit for purification.

This argument will not stand, however, because the choice of the Jordan-water is most probably determined by the influence of Ezekiel's prophecy (47<sup>1-8</sup>) of the spring that shall gush forth in the Messianic future from under the threshold of the sanctuary, and shall run down to the 'Arabah' (the 'desert' valley of the lower Jordan) in order to 'heal' its waters as well as those of the Dead Sea. As it is an acknowledged fact, that the main idea of John's baptism was evolved from

two predictions of Ezekiel (36<sup>25-28</sup><sup>1</sup>) and Zechariah (13<sup>1</sup>), there is no difficulty in assuming that the Baptist, who firmly believed in the completion of the times (*Matt.* 3<sub>2</sub>), identified the Messianic and purifying fountain of Zechariah with Ezekiel's spring flowing down into the valley of the Jordan<sup>2</sup> and turning its slow brackish stream into a river of living water.

In any case, whether John was a priest by birth-right or not, nobody can fail to perceive that he was deeply imbued with a knowledge of the scriptures and derived the inspiration for his whole life and ministry almost exclusively from the study of the Old Testament.

To begin with his peculiar dress : like the prophets of old and more especially like the expected renewer of the world, Elias, he wore garments of skin. Yet his intention was probably not that of posing by such cheap means as an inspired prophet of God, after the manner of the vain impostors whom we find ridiculed by Zechariah (13<sup>4</sup>). On the contrary, both the skin cloak of the old Israelitish prophets and that of John must be understood with regard to the ancient mythic tradition (*Gen.* 3<sub>21</sub>), that Jahvè clothed the first human pair *after their fall* in coats of skin (*'ôr*), according to

<sup>1</sup> "Then will I sprinkle clean water upon you and ye shall be clean : from all your filthiness and from all your idols will I cleanse you. A new heart also will I give you and a new spirit will I put within you. . . . Ye shall keep my judgments and do them. . . . Ye shall be my people and I will be your God."

<sup>2</sup> "In that day there shall be a fountain opened to the house of David and to the inhabitants of Jerusalem for (removing) sin and uncleanness."

<sup>3</sup> When the fourth Gospel gives the names of the places where John baptised, as '*Aenon Salim*' (= 'Strong Fountain of Salvation') and '*Beth Arabah*,' it surely means to hint at these two prophecies of the Messianic spring and the water flowing down to the Arabah. Similarly the so-called *Epistle of Barnabas* (111of.) explains the mystic stream of Ezekiel (47<sup>1-12</sup>) as a symbol of the baptismal waters. All this is almost certainly taken over from the original tradition of the Baptist's school.

<sup>4</sup> "The prophets shall be ashamed everyone of his vision . . . neither shall they wear a rough garment to deceive."

a Rabbinic legend,<sup>1</sup> in exchange for their lost garments of light ('ōr). Consequently the rough garb of hairy skins must have appeared to the meditative expositors of that naïve *haggadah* as the providentially ordained *clothing of penitent sinners*,<sup>2</sup> and therefore also of such leaders as would give their people the example of repentance.

Just as the Baptist found the reason for his peculiar dress in the biblical Paradise legends, his peculiar diet seems to be equally determined by the 'law concerning food,' first laid down for primeval man (*Gen.* 1.26.3). Only after the deluge had God allowed his creatures, in the so-called Noahic covenant, the use of animal food, apparently out of concession to the greed and voracity of a weaker generation. Accordingly a man who refused to profit by this later indulgence, would feel sure of acquiring special merit in the eyes of Jahvè. Moved by such considerations, then, most probably, the Baptist abstained from eating any animal whatever, and lived, according to a rigorous interpretation of the scriptures, on the seed-filled fruit of the carob or locust-tree (*ceratonia siliqua*), which the Jews

<sup>1</sup> *Bereshith Rabba*, § 20. Cp. *The Sohar* ii. 229 b. See also the newly-discovered *Odes of Solomon* (258): "I am covered with the robe of the spirit and He has taken off from me the garments of skin."

<sup>2</sup> The best proof of this view will be found in the tradition that Banus, the anchorite, with whom Josephus (*Vita*, ch. 2) says he lived a hermit's life in the desert for three years, wore *garments made of the bast of trees*. Now since we read in the Syriac *Cave of Treasures* (Bezold, p. 7), that such clothes were softer than the silk or linen garments of kings, we shall scarcely believe that a bast dress was worn for the purpose of physical mortification. The solution is offered by a passage in the *Book of the Bee*, by Solomon of Basra (Budge, p. 24), which proves that certain Rabbis shrank from the conclusion that God cruelly slaughtered some of the newly-created animals for the sake of their skins; the word 'ōr was therefore explained to mean the bast or inner bark of trees, "because it serves as a skin to the trees." Thus Banus, too, chose his clothing with regard to *Gen.* 321.

\* "Behold, I have given you every herb bearing seed which is upon the face of the earth, and every tree on which is the fruit of a tree yielding seed; to you shall it be for meat: and it was so."

considered, on account of a prophecy in Isaiah (1<sup>20</sup>), as the food of repentance *par excellence*. It was these same carob-pods to which also the prodigal son is forced to descend in his deepest degradation.<sup>2</sup>

As to his drink, it goes without saying that he usually quenched his thirst with water. If he also drank the honey of the wild bees (*Mk.* 1<sup>7</sup>, *Matt.* 3<sup>5</sup>), he probably followed *Deut.* 32<sup>2</sup> and *Ps.* 81<sup>17</sup>, where it is said that God makes Israel suck honey out of the clefts in the rocks. Thus the Johannine diet must not be considered as the ascetic caprice of a penitent, who simply chose locusts out of the many possible varieties of despised food, but as an outcome of the severest possible, if we may say so ultra-pharisaic, interpretation of the scriptures. A valuable confirmation of this theory will be found in the message of the angel to Zechariah (*Lk.* 1<sup>15</sup>), which prophesies—of course *ex eventu*—that John was to be a Nazirite. For most probably the old taboo (*Num.* 6<sup>6</sup>), that a Nazirite was not to come into contact with any 'dead being' (*nefeš meth*), was understood by a later age as referring also to slaughtered animals,—an extended interpretation that was practically equivalent to a prescription of a vegetarian life for the 'consecrated' devotees. In fact Graetz long ago conjectured that the notorious abstinence from meat and wine practised by the Essene order and later kindred sects—Ebionites, Monophysites,

<sup>1</sup> "If ye be willing and obedient, the good of the land shall ye eat; but if ye refuse and resist, carob-pods shall ye eat"—thus quoted in the Midrash *Wajikra Rabba*, 35, in support of the familiar Jewish proverb: "Israel needs carob-pods to make him repent."

<sup>2</sup> The oriental Christians have never forgotten that John observed a strict vegetarian diet. Therefore the Ebionite Gospel reads *enkrides* (= 'oil-cakes') instead of *akrides* (= 'locusts'). Others preferred *achrades*, wild growing wheat (*Acta SS. Jun.* iv. 692); the Æthiopian version has 'tops of vegetables'; the Monophysite 'revelation' on the locusts of John, 'roots of certain desert plants.' The real philological solution of the puzzle is due to T. K. Cheyne, *Enc. Bibl.* 2186.

etc.—was theoretically based on some such expansion of the Nazirite rule.

However this may have been, it is obvious that the Nazirite's vow of the Baptist had strongly contributed to the rise of the popular opinion, that John was a Messianic character of some description or other; for it is well known that the prophecy about the 'sprout' (*neṣer*) from the root of Jesse (*Is.* 11<sup>16</sup>), the longed-for 'saviour' (*neṣer*, Gk. *sōtēr*) of Israel, was mystically interpreted by some as referring to a born Nazarene (*noṣerī*, Gk. *nazōraios* = *Matt.* 2<sub>23</sub>). Others deduced from the same passage, that the Messiah was to be a carpenter (Ar. *bar nasar*; cp. Jesus as the *tektōn* in *Mk.* 6<sub>3</sub>), that is a second Noah, hewing the timber for a new ark of salvation.<sup>1</sup> Still others that he was to be a Nazirite, as Samson the redeemer of Israel from the yoke of the Philistines had been.<sup>2</sup> Such people will of course have been much impressed by the fact, that the prophet who announced the imminent approach of God's kingdom (*Matt.* 3<sub>3</sub>) and, in a covert way, also (*Matt.* 3<sub>10</sub>) the coming of the Messianic 'carpenter' whose axe was already laid unto the root

<sup>1</sup> The belief that a second Noah was to save the righteous of Israel through another deluge is well illustrated by a newly-discovered Samaritan Midrash and by the words: "As it was in the days of Noe, so shall it be also in the days of the Son of Man; they did eat, they drank, . . . until the day that Noe entered the Ark and the flood came and destroyed them all," in the 'Little Apocalypse' (*Matt.* 24<sub>37</sub>, *Lk.* 17<sub>26</sub>). As to Noah the carpenter, cp. with *Gen.* 6<sub>14</sub>, 22, Baidawi's commentary to Surah xi. 40 of the *Koran*, where a graphic description will be found of Noe preaching repentance to his wicked generation without any success, until God orders him to build the ark. Then the people mock at him for *suddenly turning carpenter from prophet*.

<sup>2</sup> In *Mk.* 12<sub>4</sub>, *Lk.* 4<sub>31</sub>, *Jn.* 6<sub>69</sub>, Jesus is in fact called 'the holy (or consecrated one) of God.' This, however, is the technical term for 'Nazirite' as applied, e.g., to Samson in the Greek version of *Judges* 18<sub>7</sub>, 16<sub>17</sub>. On the other hand, the Pharisees argue against the Messianity of Jesus (in *Matt.* 11<sub>19</sub>, *Lk.* 7<sub>34</sub>) from the fact that he is 'gluttonous and a wine-bibber,' which means the contrary of a 'consecrated one of God,' of a Nazirite. Besides, it can be deduced from *Gen.* 9<sub>3</sub> and 21, that *Noah did not touch meat or wine till after the deluge*.

of the trees, lived himself the ascetic life, by which the 'consecrated one of God' was to prepare for his divine mission. To them the Pharisees addressed their contemptuous argument (*Matt.* 11<sup>19</sup>) against the Baptist, that his abstention from wine and meat was not due to a vow of consecration, but to his being possessed by a devil—of course one that abhorred strong drink and animal food—in fact, just as if a modern sceptic were to say: "Let him alone, he is a hysteric, and not an ascetic." Thus we can easily understand, that when the Baptist came forward he was taken by the people on account of his garb of repentance for Malachi's Elias *redivivus* or more vaguely for the prophet foretold in *Deut.* 18<sup>15</sup> (*Matt.* 21<sup>26</sup>), and because of his Nazirite and penitent's diet for the expected 'holy one of God,' for the great Nazir-Neser, the Saviour of the Last Days (*Jn.* 1<sup>19A</sup>). That he himself anxiously avoided any confirmation of the concrete hopes attached to his person (*Jn.* 1<sup>20-22</sup>) is too human a feature and too parallel to the analogous attitude of Jesus, for us to attribute it to the well-known anti-baptistic tendency of the fourth Gospel. On the contrary, the statement of *Jn.* 1<sup>23</sup>, that the Baptist himself claimed to be "the voice of one crying in the wilderness" (*Is.* 40<sup>3</sup>), is wholly incredible.<sup>1</sup> Thus, summing up our evidence, we see that John did not come forward as a prophet or visionary—profes-

<sup>1</sup> A learned Palestinian Jew would doubtlessly have read in his *Hebrew Bible*: "A voice crieth: *In the wilderness* prepare ye the way of the Lord, make straight in the desert the highway for our God." On the contrary, the erroneous Greek version (based on a defective copy of the original), "The voice of him that crieth in the wilderness, Prepare ye, etc." (omitting the parallel "in the desert"), used already by the Synoptics, offered an opportunity to the author of the fourth Gospel, who had identified Jesus with the Word, to equate the forerunner with an equally mystic 'Voice' in the wilderness. Last, not least, *Malachi* 3<sup>1, 2</sup> likens the messenger, who is to prepare the way before God, to a *refiner's fire*, which is to purify the sons of Israel, a figure of speech applied by John not to his own person, but to the mightier one coming after him. The first to identify John himself with that Messianic messenger seems to have been Jesus (*Matt.* 11<sup>10</sup>, *Lk.* 7<sup>27</sup>).

sions that were in fact definitely discredited by the words of Zechariah (13<sub>3ff.</sub>). There is no trace whatever to be found in his remaining words, that he ever claimed to have received an immediate revelation from above or that he ever pretended to work miracles. As far as we can see he merely appears as a 'teacher' (*rabbi*) and expositor of the Law, of course in manifest opposition to the professional doctors, the so-called ' scribes.'

In order to estimate the historical importance of this inspired leader we shall certainly not start from the rather condescending judgment of Josephus, who calls him " a good man." What we must try to explain from our sources is on the contrary the fact that Jesus could have called him " the greatest [prophet] among those that are born of women " (*Matt.* 11<sub>11</sub>, *Lk.* 7<sub>28</sub>), most probably even without adding the subsequent rather inconsequent restriction " but he that is least in the kingdom of God<sup>1</sup> is greater than he." At first sight nothing in the ethical teachings of the Baptist seems to justify such a superlative estimate. He came, as Jesus says (*Matt.* 21<sub>32</sub>), " in the way of *righteousness*," or, as Josephus has it, " he taught the Jews to practise virtue both as to *justice* towards one another and piety to God." This means, that his ideal was the old Jewish *ṣedākah*, the legal principle of justice, a religious *suum cuique* involving faithfulness to our duties

<sup>1</sup> Manifestly those " in the kingdom of God " are contrasted here with the others " that are born of *women*." This is equivalent to the theory of the Christian neophyte's ' rebirth from above,' through which he is initiated into the ' kingdom of God.' This is certainly—as Dr. Martin Dibelius has acutely observed—not the language of Jesus, but that of the Church. The intention is to emphasise the superiority of Christendom, be it in its humblest disciple, even to the greatest prophets of Old Testament Judaism; the Church has the immediate knowledge (*gnōsis*) of that Christ, who is foretold only more or less clearly by the prophets. The words were added in order to refute those disciples of the Baptist (cp. *Clem. Recogn.* i. 60; Ephraem Syr. *Ev. Expos.*, ed Moesinger, p. 288) who placed John above Jesus on the latter's own testimony, which of course they must have known in its original unrestricted form.

both towards God and our fellow-men. Single examples of his moral teachings are given by *Lk.* 3<sup>11ff.</sup>, beyond doubt from good tradition. The publicans shall exact no more than that which is due to them; the soldiers shall be content with their wages and not abuse their function as police by doing violence to people or bringing false denunciations against them;<sup>1</sup> whoever has the least superabundance of clothing<sup>2</sup> or meat, shall give of it to his brother in need. These plain, nay trivial exhortations show that John was untouched by those latest Jewish ideals, such as man's forgiveness of his neighbour, the influence of which is so manifest in the teaching of Jesus himself; in fact by that new ethic of love propagated throughout the Christian world by the Sermon on the Mount, but taught as well by the Jewish sage of the second century B.C. who wrote *The Testaments of the XII. Patriarchs*<sup>3</sup>; neither did he dream of the redeeming 'antinomistic' ideas liberating man from the heavy yoke of the petrified Jewish ceremonial legalism, which underlie so many sayings of the Galilean teacher.

What then could have induced Jesus to place John above the greatest teachers and reformers of old Israel, above *e.g.* an Isaiah or Jeremiah? Can it be the institution—if institution there was—of the new peculiar purificatory rite, known to a later age (*Acts* 18<sup>25</sup>, 19<sup>3</sup>) as the 'baptism of John' or 'baptism of repentance,' or rather the new spiritual meaning he must have given to this ceremony in his preaching?

It is obvious that for an answer to these questions we shall have to turn to the few extant remains of the

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *Is.* 88<sup>15ff.</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Cp. with *Lk.* 7<sup>11</sup>, *Is.* 36, 7.

<sup>3</sup> Cp. R. H. Charles in the *Transactions of the IIIrd Intern. Congress for the History of Religions*, i. 810ff.



single but doubtlessly genuine sermon of the Baptist. What has been handed down to us of this utterance seems at first sight to be entirely devoid of unity.<sup>1</sup> I believe, however, that this appearance is mainly due to an early transposition of one sentence which can be restored quite easily to the right place, after the break of thought occasioned by this accident of tradition has once been noticed. The correct sequence of verses seems to be the following:<sup>2</sup>

7 O generation of vipers, who [of the prophets] has shown you escape<sup>3</sup> from the wrath to come.

9 Think not to say within yourselves [we are not descendants of vipers] *we have Abraham for our father* [with whom God has established an eternal covenant]; for I say unto you, that God is able of these stones (Aram. 'ab<sup>e</sup>najja')<sup>4</sup> to raise up [other] children (Aram. b<sup>e</sup>najja'; note the word-play) unto Abraham [if he choose

<sup>1</sup> This is e.g. T. K. Cheyne's judgment (*Enc. Bibl.* 2500).

<sup>2</sup> The parentheses in square brackets are meant to supply, by way of commentary, the connecting thoughts that may be read between the lines of this very laconic sermon itself, and thus to prove its coherence.

<sup>3</sup> The traditional text "warned you to flee from the wrath to come" is certainly in itself a plausible translation of the Greek. Still the *hypo* in the verb *can* mean to show *surreptitiously* an escape; it need not, however, necessarily convey any other sense than merely that of 'pointing out,' 'teaching' (= submitting to one's attention) a possibility of escape. A physical flight from the hand of the Almighty has never seemed practicable to the Jewish mind as is proved by the story of Jonah (13ff.). Thus John can only be understood to denounce as vain certain ritual outward ways of atoning for sins, such as e.g. mere ceremonial washings. The Jews are confident of having in the Law, revealed to them as the descendants of Abraham, sure means of expiating any failure. It may have been this faith in the official methods of atonement that the Baptist wished to shake by his terrible words. Still, we must not forget that the Greek version may not render quite accurately the original sense of the lost Aramean sermon. Perhaps John meant to say: "Who foretold to you that you would escape (= be safe) from the wrath to come?"—intending thereby to shake the self-righteous superstition of the Jews, that the ultimate judgment would be directed only against the Gentiles, and not against the sons of Abraham. I have therefore tried to cover both possibilities with my translation.

<sup>4</sup> It has been supposed that John here alludes to the twelve memorial stones of the twelve tribes set up by Joshua (420) on the bank of the Jordan. This can have very well been the opinion of that scribe to whom the reading 'Beth-abarah' in *Jn.* 128 is due. If John preached at the 'Place of Crossing'—meaning apparently where the Israelites had passed the boundary river of the Holy Land—he can well have hinted at the alleged monuments of this memorable event. It seems to me, however, that the phrase gains more vigour if any ordinary stones are meant.

to destroy you on account of your wickedness]. 2 Repent ye! for the kingdom of heaven is at hand! 10 The axe is already laid unto the root of the trees;<sup>1</sup> every tree which bringeth not forth good fruit is [to be] hewn down and cast into the fire.

8 Bring forth therefore fruits meet for repentance.<sup>2</sup> [Here Luke has appropriately inserted the above quoted moral examples.]

11 I indeed sprinkle you with water, but he that cometh after me—he, whose shoes I am not worthy to bear,<sup>3</sup> is mightier than I—he shall cleanse you with wind<sup>4</sup> and with fire; 12 whose winnowing fan is [ready] in his hand, and he will thoroughly purge his floor, and gather his wheat into the garner, but he will burn up the chaff with unquenchable fire.

The first problem for the expositor of this powerful sermon is the strange rudeness of the orator's address to his audience. The difficulty has been felt by 'Matthew,' who tried to justify it by the supposition that John was apostrophizing "the Pharisees and Sadducees." If the common source had contained this detail, Luke would not have omitted it. Besides *Lk.* 7<sup>29</sup> proves that the Pharisees precisely did *not* come to John's baptism on the shore of the Jordan; and finally nobody will think it in itself probable that *only* Pharisees and Sadducees composed the casually gathered audience of the Baptist. The true reason for this rebuke, which is certainly unintelligible in its present abruptness, was undoubtedly once to be found

<sup>1</sup> That is, the trees which are to be felled have been already marked with a slight cut of the axe at the roots.

<sup>2</sup> *Matt.* 82 has been torn out of its original context, to be prefixed as a kind of general 'motto' to the whole sermon. In its place 28 has been substituted; for, of course, this phrase can be understood only *after* the comparison of men with fruit-bearing trees has been brought forward in v. 10.

<sup>3</sup> *Lk.*: "the latchet of whose shoes I am not worthy to unloose."

<sup>4</sup> '*Pneumati*'; the word '*hagiōi*,' on which the traditional interpretation "with the holy Spirit" rests, is beyond doubt inserted by the Christian redactor of the original source, for according to *Acts* 192 ("we have not so much as heard whether there be any holy Ghost") the conception of a holy Spirit was entirely unknown to the school of the Baptist. Besides the beneficent '*charisma*' of the Spirit-baptism cannot have been paralleled in this way with the dreaded judgment by fire.

in the lost *exordium* of our sermon. Supposing that John drew the inspiration of his harangue, as well as the idea of his whole ministry, from the prophetic writings of the Old Testament, it will not be too difficult to find the one text in the scriptures that can have served as a text (*anagnōsis*) to his sermon about the expiating power of baptism. A prophetic passage in *Micah* 7 allows us to account for nearly every detail in it. The passage runs as follows :

14 Feed thy people with thy rod, the flock of thine inheritance, dwelling in the solitude in the midst of the gardenland. . . .  
 16 The heathen shall see that and be confounded . . . their ears will be deaf; 17 they shall lick the dust, like serpents, like those creeping on the earth; they shall move out of their holes and be afraid of Jahvè our God and shall fear because of thee.  
 18 Who is a God like unto thee, that pardoneth iniquity and passeth over the transgression of the remnant of his heritage, that retaineth not his anger for ever, because he delighted in mercy?  
 19 He will turn again (*jaschub*), he will have compassion upon us, he will subdue our iniquities. Yea, thou wilt wash away (*thash'liḥ*) all our sins into the depths of the sea. 20 Thou wilt fulfil the truth to Jacob, the mercy to Abraham, which thou hast sworn unto our fathers from the days of old (cp. *Gen.* 1769).

There can be no doubt that this passage forms one group with the two above (p. 148) quoted prophecies in Ezekiel and Zechariah, the influence of which on the Baptist's teaching is generally admitted. It is equally calculated to fill the chosen people with confidence in God's ultimate forgiveness of all their sins; at the end of days, say all these prophets, Jahvè will wash away from Israel the filth of its sinfulness and flush it into the sea. Moreover, a peculiar and certainly very primitive rite of expiation, which is practised by the Jewish Church up to the present time, is justified by the Rabbis through these lines in Micah, which are in

fact recited during the ceremony in question: On the Jewish New Year's Day old and young congregate on the shore of the nearest river, by preference on a bridge; whenever they catch sight of fish they shake their clothes over them in order that their sins may be carried away by the frightened creatures into the far-off sea.<sup>1</sup> This crude superstition, closely analogous to the rite of the scapegoat that carries the sins of Israel into the desert, or to the loosed bird of *Lev. 14* that bears the leper's disease into the open—cannot be a product of the later, refined and certainly more spiritual Judaism. Supposing, then, that it may have existed as early as in the days of John, and that the crowd which the Baptist happened to address, had gathered on the banks of the Jordan for no other purpose than this *thash'lih*, then nothing could be more plausible than that John took the very text of Micah's which was recited on such an occasion, as a welcome starting-point for his sermon on a really effective and spiritual way of atonement.

The first verse of our quotation—very similar as it is to the other watchword "feed my lambs," which is later on given to Peter in *Jn. 21*—may have sounded in the ears of the Baptist as a summons to take up the vacant ministry of a shepherd over Israel,<sup>2</sup> and that all the more because "dwelling in the solitude in the midst of the rich garden land"<sup>3</sup> could seem to allude to his own hermit's life in the desert. From the second

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Buxtorf, *Synagoge Jud.*, ch. xxiv. In most German, Polish or Russian towns this strange ceremony can still be witnessed on every Jewish New Year's Day. Helen Boehlau, a well-known German novelist, has seen it on the bridge over the Ilm at Weimar, and mentions it in her last work *Isebies*.

<sup>2</sup> Old Christian art generally pictures the Baptist with the attribute of a shepherd's rod. Cp. the words of the Baptist in the Mandæan treatise (*Genza* R. p. 191, Petermann): "I cast men into the Jordan as *sheep* before the *shepherd*."

<sup>3</sup> Heb. *Karmel*; if it is to be taken as a proper name, it will remind us of the famous Carmel, the traditional site of *Elijah's* activity.

line, where Micah compares the stubborn *Gentiles* to *serpents* and threatens them with the dreadful fate of eating excrement,<sup>1</sup> which is allotted to the snake-shaped souls of the damned in Sheōl, John evidently takes the impressive address "generation of vipers," which he draws like a whip-lash across the face of his audience. Only comparison with the prophecy of Micah, which proves that this invective to the Jews is equivalent to arraigning them as heathens damned to perdition, enables us to understand why it should call out the indignant retort: "We have *Abraham* for our father!"

Both the charge brought against the Jews in these initial words and their reply to it must of course be explained with reference to John's main idea: I mean the conviction underlying his whole mission, that a '*baptism of repentance*' was necessary for *Israel's salvation in the imminent Last Judgment*. To estimate again the religious signification of this peculiar theory, we must remember that according to a Rabbinic observance—the pre-Christian origin of which is no longer questioned nowadays<sup>2</sup>—a Gentile who wished to join the Jewish church in the quality of a 'newcomer' (*advena*, *proselytēs*), had to submit to a purifying, nay regenerating bath, in the presence of legal witnesses. While the convert stood in the water, his teacher delivered to him a short lecture containing a series of greater and minor commandments from the Law. At the end of this lecture the Gentile pupil dipped his head completely under the water, thereby symbolically drowning his old impure self.<sup>3</sup> After this

<sup>1</sup> Winckler has shown that *this* is the real sense of the Oriental euphemism 'to lick dust.'

<sup>2</sup> Cp. E. Schürer, *Gesch. d. jüd. Volkes i. Zeitalter Jesu Christi*, III<sup>3</sup> 130f.

<sup>3</sup> Cp. *Coloss.* 2:12, "buried . . . in baptism."

immersion he rose from under the water reborn as a true Israelite or son of Abraham—a mystic rebirth operated in the same way as in so many Pagan mystery-rites. Indeed it was taken so literally, that after it the 'neophyte,' or 'newly created,' 'new-born babe' could no longer inherit from his former relatives nor—a still more significant restriction—even commit the crime of incest with one of them.<sup>1</sup> Legally and spiritually this simulated voluntary death of the Gentile had severed all previous bonds of blood; he had sacrificed his old defiled and forfeited life to the wrath of the deity and received a new life through divine grace, evidently according to the promise in *Ezekiel* 36<sup>25-28</sup> (cp. 11<sup>19</sup>):

I will sprinkle clean water upon you . . . cleanse you from your filthiness and your idols . . . and give you a new heart and a new spirit.

Now it could not have been difficult for a man who knew the scriptures as John did, to see that this passage in *Ezekiel*, from which the Rabbis derived their theory of the regenerating rite of the *tebilah gerim* or 'proselytes' baptism,' could only be understood as referring to such Gentiles, if the passage were entirely removed from its context, which clearly refers to the Israelites only. *Ezekiel* meant certainly to predict the baptism of regeneration first to Israel itself, and that, too, not as a customary rite, to be instituted in the immediate future, but as a unique *miraculous event of the Last Days*.

From this obvious fact the Baptist drew a conclusion, the historical importance of which can hardly be exaggerated: Israel in all its wickedness and cor-

<sup>1</sup> *Mishna Jebamoth* XI<sub>2</sub>, *Jeb. babli*, 62a, *Jeb. jerush.* 4a, etc. Cp. W. Brandt, *Zeitschr. f. alt. test. Wiss.* Beih. xviii. 56-62.

ruption had forfeited its natural birthright in the covenant of its righteous ancestor Abraham with God—the promise of Jahvè's special favour and permanent protection; now that generations had filled to the brim the measure of idolatry and iniquity, *the Jews were no better than heathen*. If the present generation of Abraham's sons persisted in their evil ways, God would assuredly destroy them without pity; being almighty, he could do that and still "fulfill the truth to Jacob, the mercy to Abraham, which he had sworn in the days of old"; for could he not create—as he was doing continually through the 'baptism of the proselytes,' according to the scribes—a new Israel out of the Gentiles, nay out of inanimate stones, just as he had once hewn like stones (*'abanim*), a long succession of sons (*bānim*), from the formerly barren rock of Abraham (*Is.* 51<sub>1</sub>), the elected foundation stone of the whole world?<sup>1</sup>

Thus physical kinship with the patriarchs could no more be considered a guarantee against the wrath to come.<sup>2</sup> The only way leading to salvation was to *become* a member of the new spiritually created Israel by submitting to the 'baptism of the Gentiles,' however humiliating that might be to the racial pride of a Jew; thus this older rite became a true 'baptism of repentance.' For what deeper and sincerer consciousness of sin and moral depravity could be imagined than that

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *Jalkut Numeri*, § 766, fol. 243c. Venet. edit.: "Why is Abraham called a rock by the prophet? Because the Holy One (Blessed be He) said of him: I have found a rock thereon to ground and build the world"—a notable prototype of the saying in *Matt.* 61<sub>18</sub>.

<sup>2</sup> This fundamental thought of John has been taken over by both the world-religions that sprang from the root of Jewish thought. According to *Matt.* 12<sub>34</sub>, 23<sub>33</sub>, Jesus also used the invective 'generation of vipers,' that means 'heathens,' for those sons of Abraham who failed to do the works of Abraham (*Jn.* 8<sub>39</sub>). And likewise Mohammed (*Koran*, Sura II. 118f.) makes God say to Abraham: "My covenant does not extend to the wrong-doers among thy progeny." Cp. also the Rabbinic doctrine, *Mishna*, *Sanh.* x. 1-4.

which brought a proud and self-righteous Jew to the point of considering his old self, drowned through the voluntary burial of baptism, like that of a mere heathen idolater? Having in this way freed himself through repentance from the bondage of previous sinfulness, he had but to practise righteousness, "both as to justice towards one another and piety towards God," in order to remain what he had become through the "baptism of repentance"—namely a member of the truly Chosen People of God, that is to say of that righteous 'remnant' of Israel, to whom the prophets of old had really "foretold escape from the wrath to come."

It remains to be explained how the Baptist could have come to the belief, that he by his own preaching was to bring about the outburst itself of the longed-for Messianic Spring, which was to heal the brackish waters of the Arabah and remove sin and uncleanness from the house of David (above, p. 148). God had said through the mouth of His prophet: "*I will sprinkle you with clean water,*" etc. Who then could dare to usurp His function and thereby—as Jesus said of the Baptist and his followers—"storm the kingdom of heaven and take it by force like a robber"?<sup>1</sup>

It is one thing to have had the abstract conviction that the Messianic reign was at hand; this could easily be gained from calculations concerning the seventy weeks in *Daniel 9*, and the "fulness of the times" (*Gal. 4*). But quite another matter is John's apparently much more concrete belief that Zechariah's and Ezekiel's Spring *had already begun to flow down from the sanctuary to the Arabah*, a belief, without which the son of a priest would certainly not have dreamed of

<sup>1</sup> *Matt. 21*<sup>32</sup>—an expression which obviously means actively to accelerate the coming of the Messianic time, instead of patiently awaiting it.



using the unclean Jordan waters for his purificatory purpose. Yet even for this innermost problem of the Baptist's religious consciousness a probable solution may be found in the scriptures. I hope to prove elsewhere that all the prophetic passages about the abundant water flowing forth from Mount Zion are ultimately dependent on the following prophecy of Isaiah (28<sub>16</sub>), which had been mutilated at a very early date in the official copies through Pharisaic influence, but remained well known in its original extension till the 3rd century of our era :

Behold I lay down in Zion a living stone, a stone of probation, a precious threshold-stone for a foundation. Out of its hollow shall flow forth rivers of living water ; he that believeth on me shall not suffer from drought (*lō jibbash*, lit. = shall not dry up).

It is evident that in this allegory by 'living stone' is meant faith in Jahvè, the real foundation-stone of the temple. The living water flowing from it and watering the believer can only be the inspiration derived from faith (*Ps.* 36<sup>9</sup>), or more concretely the 'Word of God' speaking through his prophets. Even if some among the later parallels<sup>1</sup> to this Isaian text may have considerably materialised the prophetic image of the living water, it is highly probable that in the times of John there was a school among the Rabbis, which understood the Messianic water of life in its original spiritual sense<sup>2</sup>; indeed, the so-called *Dorshe Reshuth* or Palestinian expositors of the scriptures on the lines of allegory, who were contemporary with and even prior to their Alexandrian emulator Philo,<sup>3</sup> regularly

<sup>1</sup> *Ezek.* 47<sub>1-18</sub>; *Joel* 4<sub>18</sub>; *Zech.* 14<sub>8</sub>; *Odes of Solomon* 67ff.; *Rev.* 22<sub>1</sub>.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. *Is.* 45<sub>8</sub>: "Let the skies pour down righteousness," or *ib.* 55<sub>1ff.</sub>; *Amos* 5<sub>24</sub>: "Let righteousness run down as a mighty stream and justice like waters." See also the "waters of wisdom" in *Ecclus.* 15<sub>3</sub>, *Enoch* 39<sub>5</sub>, 48<sub>1</sub>, 49<sub>1</sub>; *Wisd. Solom.* 5<sub>22</sub>.

<sup>3</sup> Cp. Lauterbach's paper in *The Jewish Quarterly Review*, I. 291ff.

explained the water which was miraculously given to the Israelites in the desert, as a figure for the Law or Word of God. If John knew this symbolism and approved of it, why should he wait any longer for the literal gushing forth of a Messianic Spring for purification and for its marvellously atoning water, when the real source of life was at hand any moment in the revealed Word which quenches man's spiritual thirst? Could he not feel confident that the prophecies about the Messianic Spring foretold in reality nothing else but a new powerful proclamation of the Divine Law to Israel in the Last Days? And if he understood them so, what could be more natural than that this deep insight into their meaning gave him the inner conviction of being indeed the humble instrument chosen by God to work the final purification of Israel? Oscillating between a spiritual symbolism and the material reality, he can very well have thought it necessary at the same time to fulfill as far as possible the literal meaning of these scriptural passages above referred to; and so, when—as Josephus (above, p. 146) describes the Baptist's method—"the soul had been previously cleansed by righteousness," that is on the one hand by the moral exhortations of the Preacher (*Lk.* 3:11-14), and on the other hand by a confession of sins on the part of the penitents (*Matt.* 3:6), the old body was to be drowned in the waters of the Jordan, to which faith, the real redeeming spring descending from God's sanctuary to the desert, would have imparted life-giving qualities. If he could thus induce Israel to 'return' from its ways of wickedness, God could be expected to realise his promise too, "to turn again and wash away their sins into the depths of the (Dead) Sea," as Micah has it.

ROBERT EISLER.

## REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

### THE KASHF AL-MAḤJÚB.

The Oldest Persian Treatise on Šúfiism. By 'Alí b. 'Uthmán al-Jullábi al-Hujwírí. Translated by Reynold A. Nicholson, Litt.D. London (Luzac), 1911.

WE are very grateful to Dr. Nicholson for this excellent translation of the earliest and perhaps the most famous treatise on Šúfiism in the Persian language. Exclusive of a short preface and the very useful indexes at the end, Dr. Nicholson confines himself to the work of translation, which fills a stout volume of 420 pp., large 8vo, being No. xviii. of the 'E. J. W. Gibb Memorial' series. 'Alí al-Hujwírí writes so clearly as a rule that he may very well be left to speak for himself. Born at Gazna in Afghanistan, the pupil of famous Šúfi Shaykhs and himself a proficient in spiritual discipline, he ended his life at Lahore about 1075, where he wrote his celebrated book *The Revelation of the Mystery*. For this he was well equipped owing to his long travels, in which he had met practically all the most famous Sufis of his day and had acquainted himself with the tenets of the various schools, and also from his knowledge of what had previously been written or was still in the form of oral tradition. Al-Hujwírí's view of Sufism is sane; above all things, however, he is anxious to show that it is quite orthodox. He is a strict Sunni and contends that Sufism goes back directly to the Companions and to the Prophet himself, who were the greatest examples of its excellence. His point of view is neatly summed up in the aphorism: "The exoteric aspect of Truth without the esoteric is hypocrisy, and the esoteric without the exoteric is heresy" (p. 14).

The Sufis are the Servants or Lovers of God; the name was formerly given to the perfect saints and spiritual adepts. "He alone that is purified by love is pure, and he that is absorbed in the Beloved and has abandoned all else is a Sufi" (p. 34). Again, Sufism is "the renunciation of all selfish pleasures"—both formal and essential (p. 37); or it is "goodness of disposition" (p. 39), or "good nature" (p. 42). The Sufi never loses that which he finds (God), and never

finds that which he loses (his selfish self); he should not regard his own exterior and interior, but should consider all as belonging to God (pp. 40, 41). These are a few definitions culled from the sayings of the Shaykhs, but there are many others, some of an apparently contradictory nature, which however al-Hujwiri reconciles by shewing their inner meaning. One of the most interesting is that a Sufi is "he who is single in essence" (p. 66).

Together with the doctrines of love and purity there also was a doctrine of spiritual knowledge or gnosis, but this gnosis was useless unless carried into action. Thus it is related of Ibráhím b. Adham that he saw a stone on which was the legend "Turn me over and read!" He did so and found it written: "Thou dost not practise what thou knowest; why, then, dost thou seek what thou knowest not?" (p. 12). Of gnosis, however, there were two kinds for Sufis: "knowledge *from* God," the sacred law as set forth in the Book; and "knowledge *with* God," the science of the 'stations' and the 'path,' or degrees of the saints (p. 16). To make any beginning in this gnosis "you must know enough to know that you do not know" (p. 18). For whoever knows God turns his back on all else. The subtlety of distinction in the process of transmutation, or in this spiritual alchemy, is well shown by the declaration: "The gnostic turns his back on 'other' (than God) and is cut off from worldly things, because his knowledge is pure nescience (of worldly things), inasmuch as nescience forms part of his knowledge, and knowledge forms part of his nescience" (p. 79)—a paradox but one not difficult to grasp by the mystic. Thus the watchword is: "Guard thy heart from thoughts of 'other'"; that is to say, "Make thy heart obedient to God by self-mortification"—i.e. the death of 'other' in it—and "make thyself obedient to thy heart" (p. 85). This 'heart' is the 'wholeness' of the man, the ground of his being. Thus one of the famous mystics exclaims: "People in general give the name of 'heart' to that piece of flesh which belongs to madmen and ecstasies and children, who really are without heart. What, then, is this heart, of which I hear only the name?" On this al-Hujwiri comments: "That is to say, if I call intellect the heart, it is not the heart; and if I call spirit the heart, it is not the heart; and if I call knowledge the heart, it is not the heart. All the evidences of the Truth subsist in the heart, yet only the name of it is to be found" (p. 144). Into true gnosis, spiritual pride cannot enter, for as one of the great Sufis of Egypt says: "The gnostic is more lowly every day, because he is approaching nearer to his Lord every moment"

(p. 100). Al-Hujwiri explains the saying of the Koran, "I only created the genii and mankind that they might serve Me," by the gloss, "that they might know Me," and continues: "The greater part of mankind neglect this duty, except those whom God hath chosen and whose hearts He has vivified with Himself. Gnosis is the life of the heart through God, and the turning away of one's inmost thoughts from all that is not God." And so he tells us that theologians, lawyers and other classes of men give the name of gnosis to right cognition of God, but the Sufi Shaykhs "call right feeling towards God by that name" (p. 267). He finally sums up his own position by declaring that according to the view of orthodox Moslems, "soundness of reason and regard to evidences are a means to gnosis, but not the cause thereof; the sole cause is God's will and favour, for without His favour reason is blind" (p. 268).

In Sufi mysticism a great distinction is drawn between 'stations' and 'states.' Station denotes anyone's 'standing' in the Way of God—the fulfilment of obligations, such as repentance, renunciation, and so on. State, on the other hand, is something that descends from God into a man's heart, "without his being able to repel it when it comes, or to attract it when it goes, by his own effort." Thus "while the term 'station' denotes the way of the seeker, and his progress in the field of exertion, and his rank before God in proportion to his merit, the term 'state' denotes the favour and grace which God bestows upon the heart of His servant, and which are not connected with any mortification on the latter's part" (p. 181). The end of the stations and the beginning of the states is called 'satisfaction'; it is that of which "one side rests on acquisition and effort, and the other side on love and rapture" (p. 182). But the ideal aimed at by some was beyond all stations and states, as may be seen from the following quaint story of Shaykh Abū Muslim, who one day paid a visit to Shaykh Abū Sa'id; the former was in rags and emaciated with austerities, the latter was dressed in fine linen and lying on a luxurious couch. At this sight a feeling of scepticism came over the ascetic. "I said to myself: 'He is a dervish, and so am I, yet he is all in this luxury and I in this sore tribulation.' He immediately divined my thoughts and was aware of my vainglory. 'O Abū Muslim,' said he, 'in what *dīwān* have you read that a self-conceited man is a dervish? Since I see God in all things, God sets me on a throne, and since you see yourself in everything, God keeps you in affliction: my lot is contemplation, while yours

is mortification. These are two stations on the Way of God, but God is far aloof from them both, and a dervish is dead to all stations and free from all states'" (p. 846).

It is not by wearing a certain dress (the symbolical 'patched frock' with which the neophyte was clothed by the Pir or Director as a robe of honour) that one is a Sufi, or by outward signs of asceticism. "If, by wearing this garb, you wish to make known to God that you are one of the elect, God knows that already; and if you wish to show to the people that you belong to God, should your claim be true, you are guilty of ostentation; and should it be false, of hypocrisy" (p. 48). The true Sufi is unknown. There is a tradition of the Prophet which says: "My friends (saints) are under My cloak: save Me, none knoweth them except My friends" (p. 68). And so it is taught "if you wish no one to see you, do not see yourself" (p. 68). And yet "if all mankind should see the glory of a pious man's piety, he would suffer no harm"; it is only if he sees the excellence of his own piety that he is lost (p. 118). For "the eminent have eminence until they see it, and the saints have saintship until they see it" (p. 138).

On the practical side: "The food of the dervish is what he finds, and his clothing is what covers him, and his dwelling place is wherever he alights"—he does not choose his food and dress and habitation, but takes what he finds that God has provided. Mystically, however, "the food of the dervish is ecstasy, and his clothing is piety and his dwelling place is in the unseen"; but this is not the description of the sober Sufi, it is rather that of the intoxicated. For though on the one hand it is said that "ecstasy does not admit of explanation, because it is a secret between God and the true believers" (p. 138), nevertheless the sayings of the ecstatic are not to be taken as authoritative; a Sufi needs to be "firmly settled" before reliance can be placed on his utterances (p. 152). "Visions belong to novices, and the expression of such visions is delirium. Ecstasy belongs to adepts, and the expression of ecstasy, while the ecstasy continues, is impossible" (p. 167). But even sobriety is not the highest state, for we are told that the Saints of God attain there "where all degrees and stations disappear, and where outward expressions fall off from the underlying realities, so that neither 'spiritual delight' is left, nor 'taste,' nor 'sobriety,' nor 'effacement'" (p. 58).

This brings us to the consideration of the term '*fana*,' which Macdonald translates by 'passing away,' but which Nicholson

renders by 'annihilation,' a term which as a rule arouses the deepest prejudices in Western readers. This annihilation, however, concerns what is called the *nafs*, that 'animal soul' which the Koran describes as 'commanding to evil' (p. 9). On coming back from a campaign the Prophet is said to have declared: "We have returned from the lesser war to the greater war." This greater war he explained to be "the struggle against oneself." Thus, says al-Hujwiri, "the Apostle adjudged the mortification of the lower soul to be superior to the Holy War against unbelievers" (p. 200), for "the devil in reality is a man's lower soul and passion" (p. 208). It is this which has to be 'annihilated.' When this is finally accomplished, it is said that the victor's "presence with God has no end and his existence has no cause. And when he arrives at this degree, he becomes annihilated (*fdni*) in this world and the next, and is made divine in the disappearance of humanity" (p. 33). The doctrine, however, was that essences could not be annihilated but only attributes. Al-Hujwiri grapples with the difficulty thus: "A man's will is an attribute of himself, and he is veiled by his will from the will of God. Therefore a man's attributes veil him from God. Necessarily the Divine will is eternal and the human will phenomenal, and what is eternal cannot be annihilated. When the Divine will in regard to a man becomes subsistent, his will is annihilated and his personal initiative disappears. But," he adds, "God knows best" (p. 171). Hence he concludes: "The purpose of mortifying the lower soul is to destroy its attributes, not to annihilate its reality" (p. 207). The elect among the Sufis, he tells us, apply this term to the degree of perfection of the saints who "have become free from the pains of mortification and have escaped from the prison of 'stations' and the vicissitude of 'states,' of them who in the very essence of love have lost all desire of their own"; for "when a man becomes annihilated from his attributes he attains unto perfect subsistence, he is neither near nor far, neither stranger nor intimate, neither sober nor intoxicated, neither separated nor united." But, he continues expressly, "some wrongly imagine that annihilation signifies loss of essence and destruction of personality, and that subsistence indicates the subsistence of God in Man; both these notions are absurd" (p. 243). "Accordingly, our subsistence and annihilation are attributes of ourselves, and resemble each other in respect of their being our attributes. Annihilation is the annihilation of one attribute through the subsistence of another attribute" (p. 245). Perhaps the prejudice

might be removed by using the word transmutation, for in explaining another technical term (*iṣṭind*), al-Hujwiri says that the Sufis mean by it "that God makes a man faultless through the annihilation of all his selfish interests and sensual pleasures, and transforms in him the attributes of his lower soul, so that he becomes selfless" (p. 390).

This degree, however, he says belongs exclusively to the prophets. What then is the distinction between a saint and a prophet? The orthodox Sufi view is that the saints at all times and in all circumstances are subordinate to the prophets, "whose missions they confirm." The end of sainthood is only the beginning of prophecy. Every prophet is a saint, but many saints are not prophets. "The prophets are constantly exempt from the attributes of humanity, while the saints are so only temporarily; the fleeting state of the saint is the permanent station of the prophet; and that which to the saints is a station is to the prophets a veil" (p. 236).

The whole community of orthodox Moslems, we are told, and all the Sufi Shaykhs agree that "the prophets and such of the saints as are guarded from sin are superior to the angels" (p. 239). There is a legend that when the angels in the pride of their purity blamed mankind, God sent some of them to earth and changed their nature so that they felt a desire for food and drink and were inclined to lust, and were punished on that account; thereon they were forced to recognise the superiority of mankind (? the saints) to themselves.

The mystery of the something in man that makes him when purified superior to the angels is hinted at as follows: "God so willed that the pearl of His love should be set in the shell of popular contempt and be cast into the sea of affliction, in order that those who seek it may hazard their lives on account of its preciousness and dive to the bottom of this ocean of death, where they will either win their desire or bring their mortal state to an end" (p. 241). Therefore one of the Shaykhs declared: "One moment of this world is better than a thousand years of the next world, because this is the place of service" (p. 191). Moreover, if asceticism in this world is practised because of the fear of hell or desire of obtaining heaven, it simply proclaims the man's lack of fortitude or the quintessence of his desire (p. 86). "They seek for themselves an everlasting kingdom and say, 'We are working for God's sake'; but to tread the path of love is a different thing. Lovers, in fulfilling the Divine commandment, regard only the



accomplishment of the Beloved's will, and have no eyes for anything else" (p. 108). Or again: "Paradise hath no value in the eyes of lovers, and lovers are veiled (from God) by their love" (p. 107).

The root dogma of Mohammedanism is the utter transcendence of God; it therefore does not admit of Divine immanence, much less of Divine incarnation. Though then the end of Sufism is unitive, it is never that of union in an absolute sense. "It is impossible that God should be mingled with created beings or made one with His works or become incarnate in things: God is exalted far above that" (p. 254). Again: "It is impossible that the eternal should be commingled with the non-eternal or made one with it, or become immanent in it, or that the non-eternal should be the place of the eternal or that the eternal should carry it; for whatever is joined to anything must be like that to which it is joined, and only homogeneous things are capable of being united and separated" (p. 264). And yet all action is the act of God; this al-Hujwiri carries out to its logical consequence as follows: "If He so will, He makes one of His actions a guide that shows us the way to Himself, and if He will otherwise, He makes the same action an obstacle that prevents us from reaching Him. Thus Jesus was to some a guide that led them to gnosis, but to others he was an obstacle that hindered them from gnosis; the former party said, 'This is the servant of God,' and the latter said, 'This is the son of God'" (p. 273).

The straits to which the doctrine of utter resignation brought the Sufi may be seen from the following stories. "One day Shibli purified himself. When he came to the door of the mosque a voice whispered in his heart: 'Art thou so pure that thou enterest My house with this boldness?' He turned back, but the voice asked: 'Dost thou turn back from My door? Whither wilt thou go?' He uttered a loud cry. The voice said: 'Dost thou revile Me?' He stood silent. The voice said: 'Dost thou pretend to endure My affliction?' Shibli exclaimed: 'O God, I implore Thee to help me against Thyself'" (p. 294). The second story is of a dervish who could not swim and who fell into the Tigris, which al-Hujwiri relates in two places. "A man on the bank cried out to him: 'Shall I tell someone to bring you ashore?' The dervish said, 'No.' 'Then do you wish to be drowned?' 'No.' 'What, then, do you wish?' The dervish replied: 'That which God wishes. What have I to do with wishing?'" (pp. 180 and 380). The doctrine was that "human satisfaction is equanimity towards Fate,

whether it withholds or bestows, and spiritual steadfastness in regarding events, whether they be the manifestations of Divine Beauty or of Divine Majesty, so that it is all one to a man whether he is consumed in the fire of wrath or illumined by the light of mercy, because both wrath and mercy are evidences of God, and whatever proceeds from God is good in His eyes" (p. 177). Nay, further, "the more severely a man is afflicted the nearer does he approach unto God, for affliction is the vesture of the saints and the cradle of the pure and the nourishment of the prophets" (p. 388). This doctrine of inaction, however, if not that of resignation, meets with scant sympathy in the active West even among mystics. The Sufi is logical enough in some respects, and yet inconsistent, as may be seen from the following. "The man who speaks ill of anyone is criticising the decree of God, inasmuch as both the individual himself and his actions are created by God; and on whom can the blame for an action be thrown except on the agent? This does not apply, however, to the blame which God has commanded us to bestow on infidels" (p. 105).

There are many spiritual meanings of high excellence given to ordinary terms by the Sufis; thus the following definition of poverty should well explain the spiritual significance of the "Blessed are the Poor" saying. The Fakirs were originally the spiritual Poor. "Poverty is the separation of the heart from all but God." But "when the heart is cleared (of all except God), poverty is not better than wealth nor is wealth better than poverty. Wealth is abundance of worldly goods and poverty is lack of them: all goods belong to God: when the seeker bids farewell to property, the antithesis disappears and both terms are transcended" (p. 24). The highest poverty is the abandonment of all 'stations' and their merits (p. 25).

There are innumerable other points of interest and importance but our space is sufficient only to note certain hints of an inner organisation among the Sufis, a species of hierarchy of offices held successively by those who have attained to certain phases of illumination, and who are recognisable only by one another spiritually. They are referred to as officers of the Divine Court (? *Dīwān*), which is said to number the 300, the 40, the 7, the 4, the 3, and the one who is called the *Qutb* or *Ghawth* of the time (p. 214); the meaning of *Qutb* is the Pivot of the universe (? world). The 4 are called *Awtād* or Pillars (p. 146). It is well known among Sufis, we are told, with a brevity and obscurity that leaves much to be desired, that "every night the *Awtād* must go round

the whole universe [? earth], and if there should be any place on which their eyes have not fallen, next day some imperfection will appear in that place; and they must then inform the Qutb, in order that he may fix his attention on the weak spot, and that by his blessing the imperfection may be removed" (p. 228). This seems very contrary to the general doctrine that all is in the hand of God, and man can do nothing. There is a story of how Abū Bakr was taken to a meeting of this Court. It appeared to him to meet in a certain desert and he witnessed some marvellous doings there. When he subsequently asked his guide or spiritual director how they got to that desert, he was told: "O Abū Bakr, it is thy business to arrive, not to ask questions" (p. 229). Another story is told of a similar meeting, again in a desert, which shows that these wonder-meetings were not considered the highest of attainments. The narrator tells how he saw in his vision some of the saints approach the meeting on camels, while some were "borne on thrones" and some were "flying," and he continues: "Then I saw a youth with torn shoes and a broken staff. His feet could scarcely support him, and his head was bare and his body emaciated. As soon as he appeared Ḥuṣrī [the neophyte's spiritual director] sprang up and ran to meet him and led him to a lofty seat. This astonished me, and afterwards I questioned the Shaykh about the youth. He replied: 'He is one of God's saints who does not follow saintship, but saintship follows him; and he pays no attention to miracles' (p. 879). Al-Hujwīrī, it must be confessed, is somewhat confused on the subject of 'miracles.' In one place he says that according to the principles of Muḥammadan orthodoxy, "magic is real, just as miracles are real; but the manifestation of magic is the state of perfection in infidelity, whereas the manifestation of miracles in the state of perfection is knowledge of God, because the former is the result of God's anger, while the latter is the corollary of His being well pleased" (p. 152); while in another he declares: "The novice desires to gain miracles, but the adept desires to gain the Giver of miracles. In short the affirmation of miracles, or of anything that involves the sight of other than God, appears hypocrisy to the people of the Truth"—i.e., the true Sufis (p. 292).

The above is a summary of some of the main points of interest in this oldest Persian treatise on Sufism; and we hope that sufficient has been given to make evident the value of its contents for all students of comparative mysticism. There are many other Sufi treatises in Persian and Turkish and still more in Arabic,

hardly any of which have yet been translated—a wealth of material of many schools and traditions containing the experiences of thousands of mystics of high attainment; and yet only the other day we heard from the lips of an otherwise widely read and cultured theologian the naïve remark: “Why, I didn’t know there was any mysticism among the Mohammedans!”

#### WHAT IS AND WHAT MIGHT BE.

By Edmond Holmes. London (Constable), 1911.

“THE function of education is to foster growth.” With this principle Mr. Holmes starts and asks whether it be truism or heresy. He endeavours, out of the fulness of his knowledge, to prove its truth. That a principle so readily accepted by teachers in theory, has been honoured rather in the breach than in the observance in practice, is the melancholy fact that he exposes, and for which, to some extent, he accounts.

His criticism though scathing has no bitterness as against the great class of teachers. It is directed mainly against our elementary schools, for he knows them best; but he has as much to say, and with less hopefulness, of our higher education.

From 1862 to 1895 a rigid code was issued year by year “telling the teacher in precise detail what he was to do, how he was to handle each subject, what width of ground he was to cover, and what amount of knowledge was required for a ‘pass.’” ‘Payment by results’ was the rule. On his success in securing a high percentage of passes the teacher’s pay depended. The children were implements for wage-earning which had to be exactly fitted for their use. Any deflection from the prescribed course endangered his pay. He could not afford it. Any spontaneous variation in the children must be crushed at once. Suddenly in 1895 this policy was reversed. Teachers were required to assume for themselves and bestow on the children freedom and responsibility. As a prisoner “long accustomed to semi-darkness would be dazzled to the verge of blindness if he were taken suddenly into broad daylight,” so it was not possible that the teachers should at once use, and rejoice in, their liberty. Their fixed ideas, the whole system of their training, had to be recast. Great credit is due to them for the progress already made, even by many who had long been held fast in bondage.

But Mr. Holmes finds the faults in our education to spring

from roots deeper than Mr. Lowe's code, and to spread through strata of education which that code never touched. He finds the root of the evil in the doctrine of 'original sin,' for long advocated as a part of the Protestant religion. The great rebellion from the Church of Rome was a fight for freedom. But men were not ripe for so great a change. Puritanism soon developed a new dogmatism as uncompromising as that of Rome itself, and imposed restrictions as severe and as minutely intermeddling with daily life as those of Pharisaism. The doctrine of original sin is paralleled in education by the doctrine of original impotence and stupidity. On this basis all that comes into a child's mind spontaneously is to be suppressed. A clean slate, on which the teacher may write what is needed, is the ideal to be attained by that mind. To be receptive and retentive of what the teacher puts upon it, that is to be 'good.' The child "has to think what his teacher tells him to think, to feel what his teacher tells him to feel, to see what his teacher tells him to see, to say what his teacher tells him to say, to do what his teacher tells him to do." Since he has no interest in this passive procedure his industry must be stimulated by rewards, his idleness or naughtiness checked by punishments,—fortunately not everlasting, but always present to the child's mind. "There is nothing that a healthy child hates so much as to have the use of his natural faculties and the play of his natural energies unduly restricted." The child becomes restless, breaks some artificial rule, is naughty, punishment follows and teaching ends. "Go and see what Tommy is doing and tell him he mustn't," said the eldest sister in charge of the family. We all smiled at *Punch's* satire,—and forgot it. How often the man whose abounding energy has carried him to the front in after life was an unappreciated rebel at school! The fault was not his, but was innate in the principles of his education. Dam up the energy which should produce growth of mind and character and it will break out in many unauthorised ways.

But there is another influence poisoning the flood at its source,—the externalism of the West. The supreme importance of visible results, of what can be measured or tested, is an accepted axiom of our western life. To that was due the code of Mr. Lowe and 'payment by results.' To that is due the belief in examinations. Examination is, to a very large extent, a test not of the ability of his pupils, but of the industry of the teacher. It becomes a game in which he and the examiner endeavour to outwit one another, played with the children's minds as their pawns. "In his desire

to outwit the teacher the examiner will turn and double like a hare pursued by a greyhound, but the teacher will turn and double with equal agility. The teacher's attempt to outwit the examiner is deceitful and . . . he makes his pupils partners with him in his fraud. . . . In the atmosphere of the examination system, deceit and hypocrisy are ever changing into self-deception ; and all who become acclimatised to the influence of the system . . . fall victims sooner or later to the poison that infects it." In no subject is the influence of examination worse than in that called (or miscalled) religious knowledge. Knowledge, as Mr. Holmes insists, is a different thing from information. The latter may be only an accumulated record of facts, the former is an effect on the subconscious mind of an acquaintance with those facts. "It follows that the gulf between knowledge of God and information about God, is unimaginably wide and deep. . . . An examination in this subject may test information about God, it cannot test knowledge of God. What the diocesan inspector attempts to do, cannot possibly be done. . . . The greater part of the controversial talk about religious education in elementary schools is, to speak plainly, blatant cant."

How often in the discussion of Mr. Birrell's Education Bill the member of Parliament who was insisting that in the public elementary schools we *must* have a searching examination of the teacher's creed, that undenominational teaching was an abhorrence, and that the parent's choice must be *supreme*, was all the while sending his son to his own public school, where there was no religious test for the staff, no denominational teaching (or very little) for the boys, and where hardly two parents in a hundred asked any question whatever about the religious teaching that their boy would receive. It is true that not all elementary schools were drawn down to the level that Mr. Holmes describes. But many a teacher who would have tried various methods, even that perhaps of encouraging the spontaneous development of the children, was crushed into the established mould by the pressure of the Board's regulations and the examination system. The inevitable result on the children was apathy, weariness, insubordination, an entire lack of interest in anything intellectual, and of initiative or self-dependence a growing destitution.

How does Mr. Holmes tell us of "what might be"? He does not remind us of Pestalozzi and Fröbel and other teachers who have practised their art in remote countries, or expounded their theories at another time. He takes us into a village in a southern

county which he calls Utopia, to a teacher whom we are to recognise as Egeria. Here, within an hour of London, he finds his ideal—thought out probably during long years of work—actually an accomplished living reality. In this school not the eradication or suppression of self is the governing principle, but the realisation of self. Two things at once strike the visitor: the ceaseless activity of the children,—and the happy look on every face. “The Utopian child is alive, alert, active, full of latent energy, ready to act, to do things, to turn his mind to things, to turn his hand to things, to turn his desire to things, to turn his whole being to things.” Whence comes this difference in the children? In this school there prevails the doctrine of original goodness, not of original sin. In this school the teacher does, as far as possible, efface herself, and the child does all that it does spontaneously. It follows that the child’s attitude is one of jubilant activity, not of depressed and uninterested passivity. Look for a moment at Mr. Holmes’s list of ‘principal instincts,’—the communicative, the dramatic, the artistic, the musical, the inquisitive, the constructive instinct. The mere enumeration recalls the happiness of the (untaught) nursery. These instincts are, most of them, creative or expressive—expressive that is of what the child has in its mind, evidence of real knowledge, of “a correct attitude towards its environment,”—and they are stimulated by, if not founded on, activity and observation. Activity of body is a joy to a child, no less so is activity of mind. Exertion is a condition of growth—“the pressure on the child in Utopia to exert himself is so strong, the opportunities of exerting himself are so many, and the pleasure of exerting himself is found to be so great, that the temptation to be idle or rebellious can scarcely be said to exist. Rewards and punishments alike disappear, because they are not needed. Observation and imagination have taught the children sympathy and tact, from which spring unselfishness and a self-forgetfulness which adds a special charm to their manners.”

There is no hour in the time-table for religious instruction. Egeria does not make “the distinction between secular and religious teaching which is so profoundly irreligious.” “If we follow towards infinity the lines of love, of beauty, and of truth, we shall begin at last to dream of an ideal point,—the meeting point of all, and the vanishing point of each—for which no name will suffice less pregnant with meaning or less suggestive of reality than that of God.”

To understand the methods of Utopia the fourth chapter of

the book must be read in full. Quotations or condensation are inadequate. If doubters ask whether much that he describes is not due to Mr. Holmes's imagination, the answer is that others have seen and have believed.

Such in brief is Mr. Holmes's statement of the contrast between "what is and what might be," and his analysis of the causes of the difference. His criticism exposes with unsparing honesty the defects of what was formerly the established system. But for the teachers, "cabined, cribbed, confined" under it, he has the kindest and most appreciative sympathy. "Most of the failings of the elementary teachers are wounds and strains which adverse fate has inflicted on them. Most of their virtues are their own. . . . For my own part I honour the teachers as a body, if only because here and there one of them has dared, with splendid courage, to defy the despotism of custom, of tradition, of officialdom, of the thousand deadening influences that are brought to bear upon him, and to follow for himself the paths of inwardness and life."

If Mr. Lowe's code was deadly to the elementary schools, the examination and scholarship systems are, in Mr. Holmes's opinion, no less deadly to the schools of the well-to-do. There is a handful of such schools which have cast off the trammels of examination. In them experiments are possible, and are being made with marked success. Will change invade those sanctuaries of conservatism, the Public Schools and the Universities? will it be far-reaching? will it come soon? To open our eyes to the real inwardness of things is one of the chief tasks of education, and of its fulfilment this age of luxurious prosperity and anxious poverty is urgently in need. Forty years ago Matthew Arnold wrote of Hellenism and Hebraism: "The uppermost idea of Hellenism is to see things as they are, the uppermost idea with Hebraism is conduct and obedience." Very similar is the contrast which Mr. Holmes draws to-day between the Eastern and Western standards of value. The time has been long, the advance small.

"Religion is not a branch or department of human life but a way of looking at it as a whole," writes Mr. Holmes. His philosophy and his religion are therefore a part of his theory of education. Some may think his statement of the Protestant teaching too Calvinistic, others may think its connection with the teacher's methods in the past not quite established; but few will differ from Mr. Holmes's condemnation of those methods, or deny that the two show very similar attitudes of mind. All will read with keen



sympathy his description of Egeria's teaching, and even accept his principle that self-realisation is the chief encourager of growth in both mind and character.

Recent experiments in the teaching of drawing and music to young children, on self-developing lines, have proved how much their capacity in these arts has been underrated. Even more interesting has been the evidence, apparent in all their other lessons, that such teaching gives an increased power of grasp and attention, increased quickness of understanding, a new pleasure in learning, a new gentleness in manner. The methods resemble Egeria's. The results confirm her principle that self-expression is the great means of growth, i.e. of education. They suggest also that access to a child's mind is easier through the senses of sight and hearing than through the imperfect medium of but half-understood words.

Egeria reigned long enough over her school to bring her methods to the direct test of experience. All teachers agree that to teach literature and kindle, not kill, a love of it is among their hardest tasks. In this Egeria was conspicuously successful. No less difficult is the teaching of religion. But Egeria, with no hour for it in her time-table, recognised that "knowledge of God is the outcome not of definite dogmatic instruction in theology, but of spiritual growth." This, too, her method greatly fostered. Citizenship, self-devotion, patriotism were natural and incidental products of her teaching, not embalmed in lifeless maxims learnt by rote twice a week.

On no subject does the man ignorant of the teacher's art talk so positively as on discipline. Strange have been the devices used by teachers to prove that nothing could shake the perfect order of a class—a class dominated by fear of the cane—and they called that discipline! One day by illness and accident Egeria and all her teachers were detained half an hour after the time for opening school. "On entering it Egeria found all the children in their places and at work. They had looked at the time-table, had chosen some of the older scholars to take the lower classes, and had settled down happily, and in perfect order." That was true discipline. Discipline is an outgrowth of confidence between teacher and taught manifested in a vivacity which the will of the teacher, felt but not expressed, holds in check. In Utopia, as elsewhere, experience has taught that a mind full of healthy interest finds no time for gossip, no temptation in vicious literature, and resists the microbes of vice by its healthy and vigorous growth.

Such are a few of the thoughts suggested in, or expressed by Mr. Holmes's book. His readers will be grateful to him from their hearts for they will face the difficult problems of Education with more understanding, fresh hopefulness, and a determination to make some steps forward on the fascinating road which he has pointed out.

F. E. M.

#### TRANSACTIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SWEDENBORG CONGRESS.

Held in connection with the Celebration of the Swedenborg Society's Centenary, London, July 4 to 8, 1910. London (The Swedenborg Society), 1910.

THOSE who desire to learn about the present position of the Swedenborgian movement and to become easily acquainted with the extraordinary and versatile genius of the Swedish seer, his abundant and multifarious inventions and work, and the ideas for which he stood, as set forth by the most able of his present-day followers, cannot do better than procure this instructive and unusually interesting volume, so skilfully arranged to bring out the various phases of the life and work of the man whom the most representative assembly of Swedenborgians in the whole history of the movement came together to honour; it is a credit to the Swedenborgian Society. To review in detail such ample and variegated material is beyond the limits of our space; and we must therefore confine this notice to an expression of the general impression the volume has made on us, and a few notes. The major part of the papers are distinctly able, and some are quite excellent. Perhaps it is only natural that when a Congress of convinced and enthusiastic admirers meet with a specific object, which in this case we might sum up as 'In Praise of Swedenborg,' we should not expect criticism or even comparison. We cannot, however, but think that a more critical attitude would have strengthened rather than weakened a number of the papers. The writers for the most part keep strictly within the Swedenborgian world; they seem to have little idea that there have been other great seers. Swedenborg was a genius and an illuminate, but he had many predecessors and others have succeeded him. There is such a thing as the study of comparative mysticism, and it is one of the most instructive branches of human enquiry; due attention to this side of the subject would, in our opinion, have greatly increased the value of this collection of Swedenborgiana. Claims are made which fuller

knowledge cannot substantiate. For instance, one writer is filled with astonishment and regards it as Swedenborg's greatest claim to distinction as a profound student of the brain, as indeed he was, that he should have 'discovered' that "the motion of the brain is synchronous with the respiration" (p. 102). This, however, has been for many centuries a fundamental notion in all systems of Indian *yoga* and *prāṇayāma*. But indubitably Swedenborg has the credit of anticipating 'scientifically' by many years the consciousness of the importance of the ductless glands and such bodies as the pituitary and the pineal; though here again ancient psycho-physiology in both East and West, based on experience, anticipated Swedenborg. Excellent also is his idea of spiritual causation, though not new, as contrasted with what one of the writers rightly calls the "mechanical category of 'invariable antecedent'" (p. 140). Excellent too is Swedenborg's insistence on the importance of 'Use,' as when he writes: "There are three things in the Lord which are the Lord: the Divine of Love, the Divine of Wisdom, and the Divine of Use" (p. 192). Perhaps many will applaud Swedenborg's insistence on the absolute Transcendence of Deity, but for ourselves we cannot see that from the belief that "man has within him something of God's very essence," there "proceed," as Swedenborg says, "innumerable fallacies, each of which is horrible" (p. 201). Nor can we agree with such narrow dogmatism as that of the writer who asserts: "Thus it is that the Lord and His Word are one. Wherever in the Scriptures we may search for Him, there He is to be found. No other book in the wide world gives us knowledge of Him" (p. 242). Swedenborg pushed the use of allegorical interpretation to its furthest limit, and revelled in the most extraordinary correspondences; but though we are quite willing to admit a certain legitimacy in the allegorical interpretation of scripture, when it is purposely written to be so interpreted, we think that the abuse of the method as applied to all scripture of every kind leads to pure phantasy. Indeed, in our view, if Swedenborg had known as much of the rest of the scriptures of the world as he did of the Christian scripture, and as he knew of the science and Western philosophy of his time, we have very little doubt that he would not only have 'seen' many things very differently, but also that he would have sometimes, if not frequently, have given other values to what he saw, or at any rate other interpretations.

We freely admit the great genius and seership of Swedenborg and that much can be learned from him—provided always, how-

ever, that he is studied by those who also know something of other great phases of seership and something of the nature of the comparative psychology of religious experience; otherwise we fear that unprepared believers will be swamped in marvels and become the slave of yet one more 'inerrant revelation.' For the discriminating, however, these Transactions are full of deep interest. The papers are excellently arranged, but we regret the omission of an Index.

#### THE UNEXPLORED SELF.

By George R. Montgomery, Ph.D. New York (Putnam), 1910.

"THERE is a well-known rhyme of a pussy-cat who had been to London to see the queen, the net result of whose observations was a mouse under the regal throne. The story is no Mother Goose nonsense. It is a philosophy in a nut-shell." That is the author's pulpit way of telling us how what the eyes see is determined by the interests. Again, when he seeks to set forth immortality he affirms that "it is the view of life which determines the view of death." It would be difficult to put the whole problem better. Quoting Herbert Spencer he reminds us that science is systematised knowledge, but adds by way of a contrast that "religion is the systematising of values." Again, is not this well put?—"The most perhaps that can be said about divine retribution and divine rewards is that some time we shall be tremendously glad if we have tried to do right and some time we shall be tremendously sorry if we have done wrong. This allows a very effective doctrine of heaven and hell." "Sin is not an error of judgment, it is dominance of selfishness." "Confidence in the Ideal might be called Success." "Christ, with a remarkable common-sense, believed in separating Church and State, and history has shown him right." Lastly, we have an excellent synopsis of the different values ascribed to Man, in the popular estimate which holds that a few count and the rest are nobodies—*Nos numerus sumus et fruges consumere nati*, to quote Horace; in the cynical estimate which says that all men are alike rogues; in the pseudo-democratic estimate which holds that all men are not only politically but also constitutionally equal; and in the Christian estimate which teaches that all are alike of great value with an unlimited possibility of growth in value.

We have preferred to let the book speak for itself, because it is

a book of live Christianity stated with New York incisiveness. Dr. Montgomery is Assistant-minister at the Madison Square Presbyterian Church. If he and his people who know the things contained in this book do them, happy are they!

W. F. C.

#### THE NEW TESTAMENT OF HIGHER BUDDHISM.

By Timothy Richard, D.D., Litt.D., English Baptist Mission, China. Edinburgh (T. & T. Clark), 1910.

DR. RICHARD is a Missionary, but let us say at once *O si sic omnes!* Ungrudgingly and whole-heartedly he recognises the high spiritual worth of the best in Mahāyāna Buddhism and finds in it many points of intimate contact with the best in Christianity. The useful volume before us consists of a short general introduction and of translations from the Chinese of Ashvaghoṣha's famous *Shraddhotpāda Shāstra* and of a Chinese summary of the equally famous *Saddharmapundarika Sūtra*, lopped of its apocalyptic extravagances,—in brief, of the ground-scriptures, so to say, of the Great Vehicle. Of Ashvaghoṣha's master-piece *The Scripture of the Awakening of Faith* (sc. in the Mahāyāna) we have several Chinese versions from the original Sanskrit, but so far a copy of the original has not been discovered, though there surely must be copies hidden away in the libraries of Nepāl and Tibet. We already possess an English translation from the Chinese made by the Japanese scholar Teitaro Suzuki (Kegan Paul, 1900), somewhat influenced apparently by the metaphysical phrasing of Dr. Paul Carus, who wrote the introduction to this little volume, a work of high merit and very familiar, we believe, to some of our readers. The question now arises, how does Dr. Richard's translation<sup>1</sup> (in co-operation with Mr. Yang Wēn Hui, a distinguished diplomat and accomplished Confucian scholar who was converted to Buddhism by the *Awakening*) compare with T. Suzuki's version? Unfortunately we cannot control them by the Chinese, owing to our ignorance of that very difficult idiom or complex of idioms. We have, however, carefully compared the two versions, and can form some sort of a lay opinion from a general knowledge of Mahāyāna literature in Sanskrit form. The versions differ from one another so extremely that if we did not follow

<sup>1</sup> This was published apart for the first time by the Christian Literature Society, Shanghai, 1907, in which form we first made its acquaintance.

carefully from the beginning paragraph by paragraph, we should be at great pains to discover parallel passages. Now it may be that somewhat different texts lay before the two translators, but this will not satisfactorily account for the wide divergencies. Though there is no Sanskrit original in the possession of Western scholars by which to check the Chinese, T. Suzuki has throughout his version supplied the Sanskrit technical terms from other Mahāyāna sources of which we possess Sanskrit originals, the Chinese equivalents of the Sanskrit terms being well known to native scholars. Dr. Richard, however, is evidently not acquainted with Sanskrit, as may be seen by the extraordinary chaos he has made of the various systems of transliteration; for instance, he quite gaily romanises the italic letters in Max Müller's system in *S.B.E.* On these accounts and from a general knowledge of Mahāyāna literature and thought we are inclined to prefer Suzuki's rendering as nearer to the original. Not that we have by any means as yet got the ideal translation, for Suzuki has evidently his own bias; he is psychologically and philosophically quite modern in his phraseology. He however gives us a chance of forming an opinion by supplying the Sanskrit original technical terms as we have said; whereas Dr. Richard is quite too general in his phrasing; he is also very modern as well, but in a theological direction. Dr. Richard's great disagreement with Suzuki is about the rendering of the Chinese term (*Chên Jü*) for the Supreme Principle (in Sanskrit *Tathātā*). Suzuki renders this as 'Suchness.' Now *Tathā-tā*=Tathā-ness, Thus-ness; *ta-thā* is an adverb, from *√ta* as in *tat*=that. *Tathā* is also used of assent,=yea, and so is the equivalent of 'Amen,' and thus of the Reality. Dr. Richard will have it that Suzuki leans too much to transcendent absolutism and impersonality in his rendering of this term by 'Suchness,' and that a better equivalent is 'God' in the sense of the 'True Model' or Eternal Reality; in which, we may add, it is practically synonymous with *Tao*. Thus when we come to the title of the Supreme Buddha, which is in Chinese *Ju Lai* and in Sanskrit *Tathā-gata*, Dr. Richard translates it as the 'True Model Come,' and hence as the incarnate God. But *Tathā-gata* means simply one who has entered into, that is, has become one with the Supreme Reality, there being neither going nor coming from one point of view. He is 'gone,' that is has transcended the separated human state, though He is by no means severed from humanity as a whole; and in another sense He is 'come,'—that is, the Divinity is manifested. We would, however, leave the fight about words to

the scholastics; the truly experienced should easily reconcile the "antitheses of knowledge falsely so-called." As to Dr. Richard's translation of the Chinese summary of the *Lotus Gospel of the True Reality* (*Saddharma-puṇḍarīka-sūtra*) we have not had leisure to compare it with Kern's version from the original Sanskrit (in *S.B.E.*); but in any case we should have to prefer a translation made by a competent scholar from the original text; the Chinese Targum is of only secondary importance. But apart from questions of scholarship about which the general reader is as a rule sublimely incurious, we most heartily applaud the spirit in which Dr. Richard, with his forty years' distinguished work in the Far East, has approached his task. This is the noble way to study the scriptures, and no one with the true spirit of Christ in his heart will rise from a perusal of this veteran missionary's labours without a profound feeling of thankfulness that such high doctrines are shared in so profoundly by millions in the Far Dawn-Land.

#### RESOURCES.

An Interpretation of a Well-Rounded Life. By Stanton Davis Kirkham. New York (Putnam), 1910.

It is certainly remarkable that America should be the home of the shrewdest financiers and the most commonplace moralists. Mr. Kirkham is of course on the side of the angels, but it is to be feared the heavenly host will not benefit much by their champion. Being reasonably enough disgusted with the dollar-hunting propensities of the majority of his countrymen he has set out to show them a more excellent way of attaining happiness. Unfortunately he has produced a book beside which the financial article in a daily paper would be entertaining. He has a pronounced taste for analogy and teems with harmless aphorisms worthy of a nervous young man at his first dinner party: "solitude is restful"; "we are the creatures of habit"; "the true end of travel is to transport one to a new point of view"; "men are born musicians, as they are born poets"—such and no profounder are the truths which the author jerks out for 236 pages. The book has certainly one claim to distinction: there is not a sentiment in it which any reader of *THE QUEST* could fail to understand or would dream of controverting.

C. B. W.

## BOTH SIDES OF THE VEIL.

A Personal Experience. By Anne Manning Robbins. London (Fisher Unwin), 1910.

THIS book is the record of a series of communications from the other side of the 'Veil' through Mrs. Piper, concerning which Prof. William James remarked in an introductory note to the publishers: "It is a genuine record of moral and religious experience, profoundly earnest, and calculated to interest and impress readers who desire to know adequately what deeper significance our life may hold in store."

While there is much in the volume of value and interest, Miss Robbins would have done well to cut down some of the 'descriptive' communications, which are obviously lacking in the 'true ring.' Such, for example, as the following account of a typical 'day' in the 'Spirit World': "We walk about the lakes, we walk in the gardens, we meet friends, we commune with friends, we hear music, we hear sermons, and we pass our time glorifying God." Surely we may dare hope that for some of us at all events the monotony will be broken by a little useful work and that we shall be spared the 'sermons'? It is also unsatisfactory, speaking from the standpoint of a soiled human being, to learn that in the 'Spirit World' one bathes in the rivers without getting wet, since this is obviously to defeat the purpose for which bathing is universally undertaken! Seriously, the reverent enquirer into the realities of the life after death has no use for testimony of this kind, which, we venture to think, will cease as soon as the demand for it passes away—to the S.P.R.'s infinite gain in dignity. But there are better things in the book than these.

C. E. W.

## IN THE HEART OF THE HOLY GRAIL.

Being Hymns and Prayers of the Christ-Child to the Christ-Mother. Written by James Leith Macbeth Bain. London (Lund, Humphries), 1911.

THOSE who are admirers of Mr. Macbeth Bain's books and interested in his 'Healing' work will welcome these prayers and hymns, which are very well described by the sub-title as the author interprets the terms. They are the outpourings of a highly sensitive and kindly nature.



## VERITÀ E REALTÀ.

By Professor Alessandro Bonucci of the University of Rome.  
Modena (Formigini), 1910.

PROF. BONUCCI posits the truth or reality of anything as that which cannot further be rectified, which has the quality he calls *irrettificabilità*. This attribute is the highest criterion and nothing can go beyond it, though the reality of objects is modified by their relation to time and space. Several chapters are devoted to the consideration of these relations, and what is called their necessary connexions and consequences, in short, our notions of cause and effect. The connexions between thought and speech, thought and memory, between identity and diversity, between the Ego and the Absolute—all these are treated at considerable length. In the chapter on the Absolute the distinction between Religion and Philosophy is dogmatically laid down. Religion is human, Philosophy divine. The problem of evil, free-will and its limitations are discussed at length with the usual results. In the second half of his book, where Prof. Bonucci treats of man's moral life, and its action on others, his arguments assume a more interesting, that is to say, a more human character.

The duty of the state towards the individual as well as towards the whole community is passed under review, and also the consciousness which should by its means be awakened in all as to our duties to one another. This would, of course, result in *true* Socialism, very different from the policy which now assumes that name. It is questionable, however, whether such Utopianism will ever be universally embraced by mere theoretic study. Not such was the method which gave to the Christian religion its hold over the consciences of men. A living example of love to mankind can alone call forth the devotion of the heart and effect the transformation of the soul; not that Prof. Bonucci leaves out of count the way of religion—*la via religiosa*—but he identifies it with the scientific method—*la via scientifica*—a view which can appeal but to the few. To find the exact balance between what he calls the exteriority and the interiority of God, is a problem too hard for the many; and even the writer himself calls it a mystery—a mystery which each religious and thinking mind must interpret for himself, not wholly discarding the old traditions, but grafting on to them new thoughts, so that each man's religion becomes a living growth tending to a common purpose, and not merely a dead deposit, tending to decay.

E. K.

## THE MEDIÆVAL MIND.

A History of the Development of Thought and Emotion in the Middle Ages. By Henry Osborn Taylor. London (Macmillan), 1911, 2 vols.

MR. OSBORN TAYLOR is an American scholar who has already to his credit two volumes on *Ancient Ideals* dealing with intellectual and spiritual growth in the West from early times to the establishment of Christianity, and also a shorter study on *The Classical Heritage of the Middle Ages*. The present two volumes, making together some 1,200 pages, and the outcome of ten years' labour, will distinctly add to the author's reputation as a sympathetic and discriminating historian of culture. The work is an ambitious undertaking; as far as we are aware it is the first attempt on such a scale to gather up the threads of so many lines of special study and weave them into a general presentation of the evolution of the mediæval mind from the 9th to the 14th century. The sheer amount of reading involved in the preparation of such a work is tremendous; while the difficulties of steering any consistent course amid the contradictory views of innumerable authorities on special subjects, phases and periods one would think to be almost insuperable. Mr. Taylor, however, is by no means a summariser of other men's work and opinions. Following the excellent example of Langlois in France, he has largely let the Middle Ages speak for themselves. This he does by making descriptive digests of the chief works of the greatest minds of the various centuries, or by translating typically illustrative passages from the original Latin. Though the main object of the historian has been to follow the development of intellectual energy and the growth of emotion in the Middle Ages proper, his first 200 pages are devoted to ground work, in which he surveys the various phases of the Latinizing of the West, the adaptation of Greek culture to the Roman genius and the stereotyping of Christian doctrine by the Latin Fathers, the disruption of the Empire by the barbarian inroads, and the nature and genius of these younger peoples (especially the Celtic strains and the Teutonic qualities), of that complex of humanity which was to be gradually schooled by the Latin forms of ancient culture and of Christianity; the former of which represented for them the wisdom of an unquestioned higher civilisation and the latter the revelation of an inerrant faith. After dealing with this ground work, Mr. Taylor treats of the first stages of the

appropriation of the Patristic and Antique in the Carolingian period, which ushers in the Middle Ages, a period when there was no originality, but simple receptivity, the mind of the young nations being unable to think freely in the mass of tradition, and incapable of digesting the ancient culture and reproducing it in its own forms. But though intellect was young, emotion was deep, and Latin Christianity became now strongly emotionalised. There follows a survey of the state of monasticism and of the ideal and actual among the saints; thereon a review of the ideal and actual again among society, in which chapters on feudalism and knighthood, romantic chivalry and courtly love lead up to a consideration of Parzival as the brave man made slowly wise, and of the heart of Heloïse. Thereon follow books treating of symbolism, which played so great a rôle in these centuries of mystery and romance, of the more prosaic subjects of latinity and law, and finally the last and longest section of some 400 pages dealing with the ultimate interests of the 12th and 13th centuries.

On the intellectual and philosophic-theological side all development of the mediæval mind was subordinated to the dominant conviction of the entire truth of scripture, of the absolute validity of the revealed religion with all its dogmatic formulation. The universally prevailing view was that the end of all the sciences is to serve theology, the *divina scientia*. "It was stated and re-emphasised by wellnigh every mediæval thinker that theology was the queen of the sciences, and her service alone justified her handmaids. . . . Knowledge that does not aid man to know his God and save his soul, all intellectual pursuits that are not loyal to this end, minister to the obstinacy and vain-glory of man, stiff-necked, disobedient, unsubmissive to the will of God." There was of course some intellectual revolt against the tyranny of theology, but on the whole remarkably little. In tracing the emotional development, however, we find two far more strongly opposed forces. In spite of grave abuses within its own ranks, the Church ever upheld as the ideal the religious life, as led under the sanction and guidance of some recognised monastic rule. But among the people, "to the Church's disparagement of the flesh, love made answer openly, not slinking behind hedges or closed doors, nor even sheltering itself within wedlock's lawfulness." The virility of the nations could not be suppressed; it had to find outlet in more suitably higher modes than the extreme of asceticism. So we find that "love, without regard to priestly sanction, proclaimed itself a counter principle of worth. The love

of man for woman was to be an inspiration to high deeds and noble living as well as a source of ennobling power. It presented an ideal for knights and poets. If only knights and ladies might not have grown old, the supremacy of love and its emprise would have been impregnable. But age must come, and the ghastly mediæval fear of death was like to drive lover and mistress at the last within some convent refuge."

In spite, then, of this openly declared revolt of the heart and the far less openly expressed restiveness, it can hardly be called revolt, of the mind, salvation remained the "triumphant standard of discrimination by which the elements of mediæval life were to be esteemed or rejected." At the end of his labours Mr. Taylor says that he might perhaps be expected to make one final effort to draw the currents of mediæval life together and to note the disparity of taste and interest that make so motley the mediæval picture, but he considers it unnecessary, seeing that "this has been done so excellently, in colours of life, and presented in the person of a man in whom mediæval thought and feeling were whole, organic, living—an achievement by the Artist moving the antecedent scheme of things which made this man Dante what he was. We shall find in him the conflict, the silent departures, and the reconciliation at last of recalcitrant elements brought within salvation as the standard of universal discrimination. Dante accomplishes his reconciliation in personal yet full mediæval manner by transmuting the material to the spiritual, the mortal to the eternal, through the instrumentality of symbolism. He is not merely mediæval; he is the end of the mediæval development and the proper issue of the mediæval genius." In his last chapter accordingly Mr. Osborn Taylor treats of Dante as the mediæval synthesis, following on a lengthy review of the ultimate intellectual interests of the 12th and 13th centuries in which separate chapters are devoted to Bonaventura, Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, Roger Bacon, Duns Scotus and Occam.

In our present critical, objective and industrial age, when 'mediævalism' has become practically a byeword, except of course in the Latin Church, it is of great service to have so convenient a circumspectus of the ideals and actualities of a past phase of European culture that is to-day so little understood. There is no other work of precisely the same nature to which to refer those who have neither the time nor the equipment to follow special studies for themselves. Specialists naturally disagree among themselves on innumerable points, and will doubtless disagree with

Mr. Osborn Taylor on some of his more general judgments. The intelligent reader, however, knows that for a general impression we must be content with approximations, broad outlines, and averages. What the average man wants is a book that will give him a general idea of the subject suited to the lay mind, and this Mr. Osborn Taylor, we think, has supplied in a more satisfactory manner than has hitherto been attempted, at any rate in the English language.

A CHINESE APPEAL TO CHRISTENDOM CONCERNING CHRISTIAN MISSIONS.

By Lin Shao-Yang. London (Watts), 1911.

IF we thought that there was the slightest chance of such a wish being realised, we would say we hoped this Appeal might be read by all engaged in Chinese mission-work. We fear, however, that those to whom it is more particularly addressed will be the last to look at it. The unreasonable and intolerant belief in a divine commission to 'convert the heathen' of every faith and every class in every land at any price is still too deeply ingrained in the over-zealous and ignorant to yield to any argument. It is true that the need of men better equipped to meet the intelligent of other faiths on their own level is being felt, but there is little sign in missionary circles of even the faintest consciousness that their right to possess the religious earth is in any way questionable. The writer of the book under notice sets forth frankly his questioning of this right, and freely criticises the undesirable elements in missionary methods. He makes it plain that the educated Chinese brought, or rather forced, face to face with the crude statements of doctrine that form so large a part of missionary propaganda must naturally ask more or less the same questions which intelligent Christians have for long asked themselves in the West. The educated Chinese is, though we may not believe it, a common-sense person; he has a civilisation and ethical philosophy and choice of religions of his own that have stood the strain of many centuries. It is true that he is lacking in a knowledge of modern science and ill-equipped to enter into industrial competition and armed rivalry with Western nations, but that is all being rapidly changed—whether for the greater happiness of China and the world remains to be seen. As to religious propaganda, however, the writer's contention is that until the doubts which are apparently undermining the very foundations of Chris-

tianity are satisfactorily laid to rest among ourselves in the West, it is a mistake to propagandise a purely popular form of Christianity, as is almost invariably the case with the missionaries, and it is further bad policy, if not dishonest, to refrain from the slightest hint that such statements no longer represent the beliefs of the majority of thoughtful Christians, but on the contrary are being called into question on all sides by the historians and theologians themselves. The most active propagandists at present are the Protestant societies, who regard the Roman Catholic converts as converts to error little less undesirable than their former 'heathenism'; and the Chinaman naturally gets confused with the various forms of doctrine presented to him by the adherents of the various denominations. The writer does not confine himself to general statements; on the contrary he shows a remarkable familiarity with missionary literature and periodical publications and gives chapter and verse for all he has to say. Not only so but he shows an equally remarkable familiarity with the current literature of criticism and all the turns and twists of recent controversy. Moreover, he reveals a proficient acquaintance with psychology, especially with the psychology of religious experience and the intricacies of psychical research. Finally his English style is quite excellent and his method of argument quite Western. We have carefully read the book to discover signs of a veritable Chinese mind being at work, but have found nothing that a Western mind singularly sympathetic with Chinese standpoints could not have written. In brief we are fully persuaded that 'Lin Shao-Yang' is a pseudonym veiling the identity of a brilliant writer who has already presented us with the remarkable *Letters from John Chinaman*. This does not, however, mean to say that his Appeal is not a strong one; it is, and with much of it we are in sympathy, especially when he asks us to judge the Chinaman fairly and to sympathise with a great nation that is being goaded into finally adopting means of self-defence against foreign aggression of all kinds. What, he asks, should *we* do, if our internal affairs were being continually interfered with; what if we were overrun with propagandising societies of some Oriental faith whose emissaries were specially protected by Oriental powers, so that the people believed that at back of the propaganda was a political rather than a religious purpose? We certainly in the West should raise great outcry and make it very warm for the missionaries. If, then, occasionally there are riots in China and the missionaries suffer, we should not be so surprised, for there is

a breaking point to even the greatest tolerance of interference. China is beginning to awaken, and missionary activity is burning with unbounded zeal to increase its efforts manifold, but if the methods are not changed some great disaster will follow. The West has already learned that the Japanese are not an inferior race, as they once fondly believed. The Chinese are equally industrious and intelligent, if not more so, and they outnumber the Japanese by a hundred to one. The Chinese are notoriously peace-loving; it has been part of their polity to regard the profession of arms as a sign of barbarism rather than of culture. The West on this account, perhaps more than for any other reason, holds China in contempt; but what does it know of the phase of culture that has made China peace-loving in the past? Can it all be so inferior to our Western notions, that we should be anxious for nothing else than to convert China to our own ideas? May there not be something in the ancient culture of China that we can profit by or at least respect? We fear, however, that few in the West have any taste even to enquire. We are so supremely satisfied of our own superiority in all respects, that nothing short of some such lesson as Japan has taught the world will knock any common sense into us. It is all very stupid, but international relations between West and East are still in the barbarous stage. The missionaries ought to be the pioneers of the comity of nations, if not of the reconciliation of East and West, but they have much to learn before they can start on that humanist propaganda.

## DOCUMENTE DER GNOSIS.

Von Wolfgang Schultz. Jena (Eugen Diederichs), 1910.

DR. SCHULTZ, who is known as the author of some highly suggestive works on the early philosophies of Greece, and especially on Pythagorean and allied number-mysticism, in this volume offers us a programme essentially of the same nature as is to be found in English in *Fragments of a Faith Forgotten*. The main difference in content is that while the Christian Coptic Gnostic documents are excluded, examples of Pagan Gnosticism are given—namely, the Poimandres tractate of the Trismegistic tradition, and the Abraxas cosmogony and Mithra ritual from the Magic Papyri. In addition we have an interesting old Jewish Gnostic Midrash, 'The Book of the Creation of the Child,' which should be taken in close connection with the very similar account in the *Pistis Sophia*, to which however Dr. Schultz makes no reference. Those who are deterred from taking an interest in Gnosticism by the technical studies of

specialists who assume a familiarity with the subject on the part of their readers, will find in this volume a most useful collection of material, prefaced by a sympathetic and discriminating introduction of 91 pages. The translation of every document is moreover followed by a brief but instructive commentary that has in view the clarifying of the underlying principles of the system in question, rather than the elaboration of detail. The translations are distinctly good, and admirably arranged, and the book is very well printed.

#### THE APOCALYPSE UNSEALED.

By James M. Pryse. London (Watkins), 1910.

THE attempt to 'unseal' the Apocalypse has been the downfall of many a reputation. Mr. Pryse's endeavour is to interpret it as referring to the activities of certain centres of the psychic body of a tradition of Indian yoga, seven in number (which he compares with the seven churches), and to consider it as a symbolic record of 'initiation.' We are quite willing to admit that the symbolism of all true seership can be referred to the purification and perfection of the inner nature, and that there are distinct analogies with this in all genuine mystic experiences. What we doubt is that the seer of the Revelation would have been anything but surprised at Mr. Pryse's interpretation of his experience. It must, however, be admitted that Mr. Pryse is sometimes exceedingly ingenious in his analogies, and that he has probably got on the right track in his number-interpretations, led to it by the famous '666.' This is not to say that his elaborate 'key' actually does fit the lock, but the work done of late on Pythagorean number-values or psephology shows that some of the writers of the New Testament were not unacquainted with this artifice, and that therefore other mystical numbers besides '666' may very well lie hid in the Revelation. But if so they formed no part of the seership proper; they were artificial insertions, deliberately intended. We hold, with others, that the Apocalypse is an 'over-worked' document, a Christianised Jewish apocalypse, and therefore have no great confidence in Mr. Pryse's cavalier rejection of the critical work that has been done on this document, least of all can we persuade ourselves that the fourth gospel and the Revelation could come from the same hand and brain; the stand-points are fundamentally different. Mr. Pryse, however, has no difficulty in believing that they are both by the same illuminate, and that the Revelation as it stands was a holograph.



## NOTES.

### FURTHER LITERATURE ON THE SO-CALLED CHRIST-MYTH.

IN the April number of *THE QUEST* I attempted to describe the recent strenuous efforts of a few Neo-Docetists to deny the historicity of that Jesus who is believed to have been the Messiah expected by the Jews and the founder of that 'Messianic' religion which still flourishes in many parts of the world under the Greek name 'Christianity.' In the meantime the new sect has continued to be bitterly fought against by the modern 'Scribes' or 'Doctors of the Law,' and the strife has been observed with a certain mischievous rejoicing as at a great theological calamity, by those worldly-minded scholars who might be called the 'Sadducees' of our time, inasmuch as they have doubts as to a future life of the soul and a host of other dogmas, among them the belief that that Galilean Rabbi, of whose existence they are fairly convinced, was *really* the Son of God and the final Redeemer of Israel. Yet the new doctrine seems to have gained a certain number of adherents, not only among the Publicans—I beg pardon, I should have said the Publishers, since ever new gospels of this creed are being issued by the disinterested and self-sacrificing Diederichs of Jena—but also, still more strangely, even among the Soldiers. Indeed on Annunciation Day of this wonderful year 1911, the present writer received a book, or rather a printed manuscript, entitled *Der Astralmythus von Christus*, by Christian Paul Fuhrmann. The pseudonymous author proves to be—not, as might have been expected, a doctrinal reincarnation of the 'Christian' Apostle 'Paul' in the constellation of 'Auriga' or the 'Charioteer'—but an active officer of the German army. I hope the song-famed tranquillity of the *Lieb Vaterland* and its military authorities will never be disturbed by the knowledge that there is such an arch-heretic among the ranks of the "firm and faithful guard on the Rhine." As to the opponents of the 'Christ-myth' theory, they may well be "at ease," as the famous National hymn bids them be, for Lieutenant 'Fuhrmann's' arguments will scarcely make any

impression on a single one of the 250 scholars to whom the book has been despatched by its author. At least they have not convinced me, any more than Niemojewski's *God Jesus*, of which 'Fuhrmann' did not know when he wrote his book. I should be sorry to offend a gentleman who is personally unknown to me and has devoted much labour and considerable expense to what has seemed to him a noble and scientific undertaking; but I must confess that his book is so full of gross and elementary mistakes in all respects, that I should have taken it for a clumsy parody of Prof. Drews' methods, if the accompanying letter had not informed me of the author's real purpose. As to Niemojewski—who by the by seems to have escaped the 'martyrdom' which threatened him according to an advertisement of his publishers—he sends us a little pamphlet with the startling title, *Why did the Disciples hurry to Emmaus?* which is quite in keeping with the phantastic and arbitrary style of his greater astromythical work. A more scholarly treatment of the same problem—namely, the alleged astral elements of the gospel-narratives—can be expected from Dr. W. Erbt, a well-known champion of the Winckler-Jeremias 'Panbabylonism' theory, who publishes an enquiry concerning the Gospel of Mark in the *Mittheilungen der Vorderasiatischen Gesellschaft* for 1911 (xvi. 1). I have, however, not yet studied this paper, which leaves the historicity of Jesus unquestioned.

By far the most important contributions to the Christ-Myth controversy are due to the indefatigable efforts of Prof. Arthur Drews of Karlsruhe and Prof. W. B. Smith of New Orleans. The former brings out a second volume of his *Christ-Myth*;<sup>1</sup> the latter gives an answer to Weinelt in an appendix to Drews' new work, and publishes a voluminous continuation of his *Prechristian Jesus* in his new study *Ecce Deus*. Both these books are extremely trying reading for those accustomed to sober methodical research rather than to the passionate, rhetorical and rabulistic propaganda of preconceived ideas, which endeavours to hammer so-called arguments into the reader's head by frequent and emphatic repetitions of the same statements, and to preclude all discussion by stigmatising any and every kind of opposition as the outcome of religious prejudice or traditionalist narrow-mindedness. It is not the legitimate vehemence of certain answers to equally violent

<sup>1</sup> May I remind the author that his ever-recurring expression '*sine*' or '*die Mythe*' (feminine) nauseates a German reader. It is an utterly impossible false singular of the plural '*die Mythen*.' The correct form is '*der Mythos*' or '*der Mythos*,' and nothing else.

attacks which is distasteful, so much as the objectionable method of heaping coals of fire on the heads of the leading liberal theologians by continually praising their scholarship and sagacity in exaggerated tones. At least I cannot see what is the good of being told again and again that Harnack's learning or Wellhausen's critical acumen is famous all over the world, etc., etc. Besides, the *Ecce Deus* of Smith is translated into the worst kind of Brooklin German by such an incompetent hand that in many places only a thorough connoisseur of the American language can make out the author's real meaning. As to the 'new' material presented by Proff. Smith and Drews, it is beyond doubt—to state my opinion as politely as possible—"excellent in parts" like the curate's egg; but more detailed criticism is precluded for the present through lack of space. Moreover, since Prof. Smith informs us that he is not yet at an end with his 'proofs,' we shall be better advised to wait until he has shot his 'mightiest bolt' before replying to his archery. In the meantime I would make a few observations of special interest to myself and perhaps also of interest to the readers of THE QUEST.

First of all, I would suggest a new and more plausible theory concerning the two Jesus-passages in Josephus, about which both the Drews party and their adversaries have talked much nonsense. If the original text of Josephus really contained no mention of Jesus, the argument would be strongly in favour of Drews, for in this case whatever theory theologians might have put forward to account for that silence would certainly not work. But Smith and Drews have overlooked one important point. It is manifest that *Antiqq.* XVIII. 3, "At that time lived one Jesus," etc., is a Christian forgery from beginning to end. But the proof of this is to be found in these lines themselves, and not, as Smith would have us believe (*E. D.* 224ff.), in the fact that the other paragraphs of ch. XVIII. deal with nothing else than *catastrophes which befell the Jewish nation* while Pilate was Procurator of Judea. Of course the present "honorary mention" of Jesus in §3 does not suit this context; but who can fail to see that Josephus the Pharisee had the best reasons for describing, not the crucifixion of Jesus, but the last riotous event in his life, the so-called 'purification of the Temple,' as a national catastrophe, immediately after his account of the Jewish revolts against Pilate for having introduced the imperial statues into Jerusalem, and for having built an aqueduct with money taken from the Temple-treasure, and before he speaks of the expulsion of 4,000 Jews caused by the misdeeds

of a single nefarious Rabbi. I hope to prove elsewhere from the words of the Gospels, that Jesus entered the Temple of Jerusalem at the very hour when thousands of Passah-lambs were being slaughtered for the sacred Easter-meal. Horrified at the sight of the streams of blood running over the pavement of the sanctuary, he most probably broke out into an indignant diatribe against bloody sacrifice on the lines of the well-known prophetic utterances, among which he quoted the saying: "Ye have transformed my father's house into a cave of murderers." At the same time he seems to have attacked the numerous merchants in the sanctuary with the concluding words of Zechariah: "And in that day there shall be no more chafferers in the house of the Lord of Hosts." A riot arose, and the multitude, stirred by the power of Jesus' denunciation, drove those "that sold oxen, sheep or doves" out of the Temple, and overthrew the tables of the money-changers. If such a thing happened—and we have no sufficient reason to doubt that it did—it would mean that the *šegan* and the Jewish temple-police were overpowered. In that case Pilate would not have been the energetic Roman officer he was if he had not immediately repressed this revolt by means of the swords of his legionaries. We can imagine from the parallel instances how many Jews were slaughtered on this occasion, not to speak of the probability that in the tumult the sacred precincts of the sanctuary would also be violated by the Gentile intruders. Now if Josephus gave an indignant description of these events and of the subsequent trial of Jesus, if he used moreover similarly abusive language with respect to the so-called Messiah as he did when speaking of Simon Bar Giora and the other Zelots, we can be certain that no Christian copyist would have repeated what would have been for him so blasphemous a passage. And accordingly, since all our tradition has passed through Christian hands, it is natural enough to find that the most precious information about Jesus which we could possess, should have been replaced by the absurd concoction of the present §3. On the contrary, if Josephus had *not* mentioned Jesus at all in XVIII. 83, he could not—as Smith correctly observes on p. 281—have called James the "brother of Jesus surnamed the Christ" in XX. 91. To abandon in this latter passage with Smith and Drews the natural meaning of '*adelphos*' (brother) is a philological monstrosity. For Josephus must not be confounded with Prof. Smith's German translator; *he* at least wanted people to understand what he wrote. If Josephus had wished to express the meaning our Docetists would have him

convey, he would not have said: Ananus accused "*the brother of Jesus surnamed the Christ (who was called James),*" but Ananus accused "one of" or "*the most righteous of the [so-called] brethren of Jesus surnamed the Christ.*"

A second point of minor interest is that Smith, following Hengstenberg's commentary on the fourth Gospel, explains (p. 82) the 153 fishes of *John 21* as a symbol for the 153,600 *strangers* numbered by Solomon in the Land of Israel according to 2 *Chronicles 21*, adding, *on his own responsibility*, "from this passage the Jews calculated the number of Pagan nations as 153." This assertion is not only purely gratuitous, but also manifestly wrong, since it is well known that the Rabbis estimated the total number of nations in the world as 72. Besides neither Hengstenberg's commentary nor Smith's ironical §46 can really account for the final 600, which are reckoned in *Chronicles* but are utterly neglected in *John 21*. The true explanation of the mystic number is to be obtained by applying the so-called *gematria*-process,—not on the basis of such *imaginary* values of the Hebrew letters as have been arbitrarily assumed by Egli, Volkmar and Keim, but, as I hope to have proved in *THE QUEST*, vol. ii. (1911), p. 267, by equating in the words ΣΙΜΩΝ+ΙΧΘΥΣ the Greek letters Α-Ω to the numbers 1-24, a cypher the mystic use of which can now be proved from Artemidoros (*On.* ii. 70, pp. 164-166, Hercher).

Finally, I cannot refrain from saying that, however obliged I feel to Prof. Drews for his occasional quotations from my own modest research work, I cannot by any means approve of his methods in making me support his particular views, which as a rule are quite different from my own conclusions. Thus *e.g.* on p. 172 of vol. ii. he cites—in a very inaccurate and in some points scarcely intelligible manner—my remarks on the numerical mysticism in old Christian 'nicknames' such as Paulos, Linos, Simōn, Kepha', etc., from *THE QUEST* (1911, p. 264—not 18), and concludes: "All this looks very much as if these isopsepha were *not names of historical persons* but symbols covering certain ideas." He omits to mention that I have traced the same symbolism in the names of many old Orphic and Pythagorean teachers, whose historicity has never been called into question, and that on the contrary the fact of Paul being called originally with the entirely indifferent name Saul and of Simōn or Kepha' bearing elsewhere also the name Shimeon bar Jonah, excludes *a priori* the mythologising inference which Drews would like to draw from my observations.

On p. 267 he quotes my comparison of the Baptist's sermon

with *Micah* 7<sup>14</sup> (cp. above, p. 157) from an older German paper of mine, in support of his theory (p. 270), that the whole story of John's baptism of Jesus is a gratuitous fiction, artificially concocted out of certain Old Testament prophecies and devoid of any historical content, while I have simply tried to discover the scriptural sources of John's rhetorical masterpiece! I need hardly say that Drews is entirely wrong when he calls Josephus' account of John's ministry a Christian interpolation, since even a radical of W. B. Smith's type (*Ecce Deus*, pp. 88, 87, 270) admits the authenticity of this passage. Again in my book *Weltenmantel und Himmelszelt*, p. 738 (cp. QUEST, i. 138), which is quite well known to Drews and his friends, I have compared the saying of Cyrus in Herodotus, i. 141, "You need not dance now, if you would not dance when I was piping unto you," with *Matt.* 11<sup>17</sup> = *Lk.* 7<sup>32</sup>, *Acts of John* 95, arguing from the parallelism that this or a similar saying must once have been proverbial throughout the whole ancient Orient. Drews does not mention me, but asserts on p. 271 the wild absurdity that the Gospel-words "We have piped unto you and you have not danced," are "*manifestly borrowed from Herodotus*"! If this is the way in which Drews makes use of a contemporary author, readers can imagine how he usually handles our helpless ancient witnesses.

R. EISLER.

# THE QUEST.

---

## CONTEMPLATIVES.

JOHN MASEFIELD.

WHATEVER we may believe or disbelieve, and however happy or wretched we may be, in spite of our confidence, we all have moments of revelation, according to our fitness, and moments of interpretation, according to our power. We do not get through life without being brought to our knees from time to time by revelation of some kind. Whenever life is exalted or torn from its usual round, or simply hit, we have a revelation of what we may call Fate or Human Destiny, of its greatness, complexity, its power, often, seemingly, a blindly cruel power, its difference, at the least, from our normal conception of it; and we set ourselves, more or less awed, to find a meaning in it, to interpret it, to discover some way of complying with this strange thing's needs, if it has any, of learning its mind, if, as many doubt, it has a mind, and of serving it, if, as some still hold, it can be served. Some bold souls, putting their strength into their work, do none of these things, but accept it, with respect.

It may be that a great event in life does no

more than call up something fresh and unused in the nature; it may only cause an excitement and rallying of the brain's cells, so that they exaggerate what may be simply natural, as natural as a leaf's fall in autumn, or the dropping of a brook over a cliff. Moments of mental splendour, the accidents of tragedy, and the savagery of death, may, conceivably, be due to nothing more than changes in a few cells, and we ourselves may be only sports, strangely insane apes, with too high a sense of our own importance. We do not know anything; even this, unless we have Faith; but if we have Faith we measure life by the great event, and count as specially lived those days about the great event when we had suggestions of something bigger than ourselves, suggestions of reality, beauty and order, apprehensions of something stable, behind the flowing and ebbing of life, and apprehensions of something divine, some quality of mind or soul outside us, more real than us, which we approach at our great times and make our own at supreme times.

The Churches in most countries have taken care to give a special significance to these great times as they occur in the process of human life. They have enlisted to help them many of the best poets, and all the best artists, all those, that is, who have expressed most vividly their faith that outside this life there is a more real life, of which this life is only the shadow; and fortified thus, and still further by long generations of noble lives lived in the faith of that great life, they have had power to influence the minds of the many at all the great times of life if not always. So many noble men have strengthened the faith by showing to what heights men may march under its banner and to what beauty of mind and power of executing hand



men may attain only by believing, that to-day we are made richer at all holy moments by a body of thought not our own, but left to us from the holy moments of others, a wealth so great and common that we never think of it, but which makes up fully half of all that we believe. We, to-day, believe, if we do believe, because others believed ; and however much we may disbelieve at ordinary times, the great moment shows us pretty plainly that deep down we are in the Church of the European mind, and that we stand or fall, as souls, by that Church's revelation.

Modern life is largely external, and our great moments are soon clouded over by those multitudinous strokes from outside which cross-hatch our souls for us. Very soon, even when they come, these glimpses disappear, and then to most people the flowing and ebbing of life takes on its old importance as matter enough for the mind ; since poetry at its best is only make-believe, and faith a negation of reason, and art a synonym for immorality, and all these things impractical and filled with bunkum, dreams and sick man's fancies, as those who are given to such practices learn from their relations often enough.

Then on some special day, there may come a moment, helped by some accident, or trick of health, when our inmost selves take power, knitting up all doubt into certainty, resolving the fluent into order, so that we stand apart, united within ourselves, possessing ourselves, while the pageant goes by us and the stars move over us, contributing to our knowledge and delight in life. We know, then, that we possess our own souls ; and the knowledge and the delight make us long to prolong the moment, to have that possession always. Then the world comes in again, and we are

caught on the wheel of the world, and carried round on the circumference, poles no longer.

We all know the words "what shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world and lose his own soul?" Most of us have felt how difficult it is to gain possession of the soul in a modern city, where the whole world, with its fever and glitter, is offered instead; and we may have envied the dweller in some less distracted city, nearer some haunt of peace, mountains or the sea, who could look at once on tumult and on loneliness, and find his soul in the midst, and not find, as we do, so many substitutes for thought, the desire to heap up knowledge or to gain wealth, the desire to bathe in the many-coloured tide of life, always flowing up and down in the market-place, or the desire to destroy life, some other person's life, by arms and armies, or the desire to stifle life by varieties of pleasant ease. Such an one, we think, must have seen in clear images, burningly distinctly, the truths and the order of the life beyond; he must have felt that life beyond interpenetrating this life, more often and more fully than we can feel it; and however much we praise modern civilisation with its outward order and wealth of knowledge, its power over the outsides of things, and its honest pessimism about anything else, we sometimes wonder whether that earlier, simpler mind did not live a more real life than ours, did not see, beyond the husks of things, to what is precious to the real man, and, grasping that, did not find a beauty and an illumination, which we, for all our power, do not know.

We wonder thus, and then put the wonder away with the memory that earlier man had no police-force and no water-supply, that one could smell mediæval Paris for nine miles on a cloudy south-west morning,

and mediæval London, I suppose, for nine and a half or even ten. Then we go on to say that monkery and all the rest of it was foolishness, and religious ecstasy, hysteria, and that if you make yourself half mad by living away from your fellows, and the other half mad by starving your brain and exciting your nerves, you do become wholly mad, and naturally see things, highly exciting things, 'dreams out of the ivory gate, and visions before midnight.' So we shut it all from us, denying not the possibility, for we think most things possible, but the sanity of anyone unlike ourselves.

If life be worth having at all, and it is, or we should kill ourselves, it is worth while making sacrifices to make it better worth having. And if the sacrifice is voluntary, and the result an illumination of the mind of man, or of a part of the mind of man, it has its attractions. And if large bodies of men and women, quite as well fitted for life and the judging of human action as ourselves, though perhaps knowing less, decide that one form of sacrifice is very necessary, that sacrifice, however extreme, cannot be unwise. Human action has always a compensation or result in view, and that action which demands the whole life aims at something greater than life, an idea which makes life, however splendid, a little thing. People who give up their whole lives for an idea must see very clearly and believe very strongly that the idea is more real than life itself; and before we condemn that earlier, simpler man who grasped at a spiritual world beyond ours, and gave up his life for the chance of grasping it, we ought to ask ourselves whether we, with our complex and very crowded life and our habit of giving our lives for profit, get as much in return as he did.

In most countries and at most times there have

been people who have taken those poetical glimpses, those flashes at the great times of life, as gleams of reality, of the real life, as gleams from a state of the soul to which the soul can permanently attain and in which she can clap her wings, free from her cage a little, in which she can attain, as it is called, Union with the Divine Body, and live in that Divinity more fully and freely than in the unillumined earthly life.

In the East to-day and in Europe in the Middle Ages the multitudes of such believers could not be counted. In Europe here, for many centuries, over an incredible gamut of generations large numbers of people, very like ourselves, passed their thinking lives not in questioning nor in denying, but in the contemplation of a spiritual world and a spiritual nature greater than this world, and greater than an earthly nature, to which, by discipline and labour, through mercy vouchsafed, man's soul could attain. They had mapped out that spiritual world in a singularly precise way, as though they had explored its boundaries, they had peopled it with a glorious company of souls made perfect, and they had thought out Rules by which men might come to the inward vision and possession of it. Their conceptions and imaginations of this spiritual world made a magnificent imaginative inheritance, which soul after soul enjoyed, and made more splendid, century after century, till man's conception of splendour ceased to be spiritual. As far as any one thought at all, during some centuries of humanity, he or she thought of this spiritual kingdom.

Looking back on those religious souls we sometimes feel that their society was not like ours, composed of individuals, but of fellowships and brotherhoods banded together, bound, as it were, by oaths

of common service, and carrying within them watch-words and tradition, very beautiful and very manly. Their society was full of religious brotherhoods and sisterhoods shut away from the world, and of religious fellowships and societies, some mystical, some military, still in the world, but all founded to help man to the vision and the Kingdom of the Spirit, and all inspired by the same fervour of the desire of the companionship of Christ and the possession of the spiritual self.

Those men who thought this life a little thing and desired to give it up so that they might seek that other life, "to be with Christ, which is far better," to become what is called religious contemplatives, could always, if they chose, and could endure it, enter societies of men similarly minded. Many did so, and remained in the world; but many, and perhaps all the more devout, left the world and entered monasteries. And as monks are not well thought of in this age, having had much evil written of them, some of it no doubt deserved, for we all cut feeble figures on our weakest sides, and a religious man has to stand a stricter test than we fine souls with no bits in our mouths, it is necessary to set down what being a monk meant to the multitude of spiritual men who found their souls in it.

We may put away those light and improper stories about the religious which make such gay reading in Chaucer and Boccaccio, and we may put away the letters of Legh and Layton, those trusty souls who were paid to get up the evidence for a king greedy for the Abbey lands. Bodies of men must be judged by the mass, not by the exceptions, and the exceptions before judgment must be allowed to plead. To the mass of the religious, monkhood meant this:

A monk was one who belonged to a spiritual brotherhood, living in imitation of the brotherhood of the Apostles. He looked up always to an Abbot or spiritual Father, as the Apostles looked up to Christ, and he strove deliberately, by severity of outward life and mental effort, to perfect himself by liberating and gaining possession of his spiritual nature.

There are, and have always been, two ways by which the monk can tread to perfection and come to know his higher nature; both are difficult and painful, and the religious in many cases made use of both. There is the way of the Monastery with its moderately severe routine of worship, manual work, scanty food, and frequent religious observance, endured by many together, as directed by trained minds long in religion, and according to an Order imposed by authority over (perhaps) many religious houses; and there is the way of the Hermit or Anchorite, who lives a life much more hard in utter solitude, in a wild place, on an island in the sea, in a forest, on the top of a stone column, or in a cave on a hill, in some place, that is, where there is nothing to come between the seeking soul and God. In the early days of the Church, the latter, the way of ascetic isolation, was the more common. The text "Come out from among them and be ye *separate*, and touch not the unclean thing," expresses the point of view of this school of contemplatives; it is a point of view, perhaps more natural to the Jewish and the Egyptian mind than to ours, that the world is a bad place, to be put away and kept away. Often the early ascetics lived lives of an austerity which shocks and disgusts us, as degrading man and religion. When the Church had gained strength, and the strength it gained was nearly the whole strength of the Roman

Empire, the former way, of life lived in fellowship, became more common, and ascetic isolation became either an exception or an adjunct, and though many causes contributed to this, including perhaps the fact that the first founder of a monastery, Pachomius, was a man brought up in a military fellowship, it is more consonant with Western thought that the world, however bad it may be, can be re-ordered and regenerated by any band of men deeply in earnest. We have the knowledge that Christ lived on the earth among men, with his little fellowship, and only withdrew into the wilderness for lonely meditation once, and we have as a legacy from the Roman Empire a reverence for all progressive orders, and especially for the slow and careful training, half purgative, half formative, of those anxious to excel. The monastery, as it flourished here in Europe, was not so much a place of mortification as "a school for the service of God." Those men and women who, "after long probation in the school had learnt from the help and teaching of many to fight the Devil, and were able to go forth from the army of the brotherhood" to what St. Benedict calls "the single combat of the wilderness," were free to do so, and were esteemed as proven souls. Ascetic isolation to such souls was but the final stage of a long and careful training. To put the difference very briefly :

The earlier religious orders provided man with a way of escape from the world, the later ones fitted him with a means for conflict with it.

European monks generally followed the Rule, or Way of Life, laid down by St. Benedict in the early part of the sixth century ; and this Rule, the work of a gentle mind, is not an austere one, like the Rules of the Egyptians, Essenes, and Celtic Christians. It

made mortifications and austerities no longer matters of the monk's individual will, as they had been in Egypt, where the monks used to compete to see who could stand the most. It left all such questions in the hands of the Superior of each House. The monks were not to compete in austerities; they were to live their lives in common, and special austerities, whether of maceration or of work, were only to be inflicted, or undergone, at the Superior's pleasure or by his leave.

Outwardly, a monastery consisted of a church, in which the chancel was separated by an iron screen from the body of the nave, a dormitory and living house for the monks, a garden, cloisters or walking and working places, a guest house, a library and a chapter, or common meeting place. Its outward appearance was generally four-square; plenty of the biggest of them still exist, but we see them to-day without the distinctive human life for which they were built, we see only the husks of them, and what they were in their splendour we can only imagine.

Many people, men and women, pass through a phase of emotionalism which they look upon as a call to the religious life. People in that phase are in a very dangerous state, extremely potent for evil, both to themselves and those attached to them. No men knew this better than those trained through life to the intimate knowledge of human souls; and a man or woman anxious to take up the religious life was not admitted until he or she had tried the life in a novitiate lasting from one to three years. The novice was given several opportunities for withdrawing if he or she chose. Anyone who was not quite sure of his strength or of his calling and election was better out of the religious. No man or woman was allowed to take the



vows till he or she knew to the bone what the religious life demanded. There is a pleasant story of a young man who wanted to become a monk, and applied to the Superior of some religious house. The Superior asked him to come in, and took him to the garden, where there was a little fish pond with a boat upon it. "There's nothing much which you could be doing at present," said the Superior, "so will you get into the boat and row about till sunset." The young man got in, passed a delightful afternoon, and was told to come again the next day. The next day, the Superior welcomed him with much charm and again told him to get into the boat and row about till sunset, which the youth did, with less enjoyment than before. At sunset he was told to come again on the morrow. On the third day, he was again told to go into the boat; so he got in, and rowed about till he loathed the boat and the fishpond and the religious life. Towards 3 p.m. he drove the boat into some reeds, got out, and slunk away towards the back gate, where the Superior met him. "Good afternoon," said the Superior, "Good-bye. We get so many like you."

But when the more determined soul had passed his novitiate, the religious life appeared a sterner thing than pulling on a pond. A professing monk vowed always three things: to be obedient, to be poor, and to be chaste; in some cases, a fourth thing, to be stable, that is, to remain a monk, through life. On entering he gave up not only all his possessions, but even his own body. He became Christ's. His first duty was to be obedient instantly to his Superior, who stood before him as the representative of the Heavenly Father. Christ sought not His own will but the will of the Father which sent Him. The monk had to seek

always to crush his own will, and to do the will of his Father as represented by his Superior. He had to speak little, to watch himself narrowly, to regard the cloister as a workshop in which by tools found in Scripture he could make himself acceptable to God; he had to welcome crosses, which tended to crush his will's desires; he had to confess all the evil thoughts of his heart; to humble himself, to be gentle, to cast himself down and think himself guilty and a worm.

While this inward discipline went on he was kept engaged in the monastic routine, which was a hard one, with daily and nightly religious services, bringing the monks tired out of bed or weary out of the gardens to sing and say God's praise as perfectly as throat could do it. Several daily services and one at midnight, all to be done with the whole heart, made up the routine of praise; but besides this many readings from the scriptures and a very considerable deal of study were obligatory.

A monk was given little food, no flesh of any four-footed beast, and little enough of other flesh; he was not allowed under pain of very severe flogging to possess anything of his own, nor to receive any gift or present but by special license. He was not to speak after the last evening service, nor to grumble at anything required of him. He was not to go abroad without leave or order. He had to labour in the gardens, at the mill or in the bakehouse, or at whatever other work his Superior thought fit; he had to study the books given to him, he had to take what punishments were adjudged to him, and all this cheerfully and blithely. On fast days and during Lent he gave up something of the little sleep or talk or food allowed to him. He was compelled at all times to welcome

guests, and in St. Benedict's lovely words, "to let Christ Who is received in their persons, be also adored in them." He was to wear only the cheapest, coarsest clothes, and to sleep in them.

These restrictions are taken from the Rule of St. Benedict. There were other much stricter Rules, like the Carthusian; and there were religious bodies, like the Mendicant Orders and the Knights Templars, with other aspirations, but we may take the Benedictine Rule as an illustration of the monk's outward way of life. But the outward order was only a means to an end; the end before the monk was to possess the spiritual nature, and always, night and day, the true religious was seeking to subdue his earthly nature so that the spiritual nature might break through. If his Superior thought him fit for it, he set about this maceration by adding to the Rule's discipline, by wearing a hair-shirt, by greater strictness in fasting, by watching night after night, by flogging himself, by going half naked in the cold, by eating foul food and by handling all kinds of misery; and all the time imagining Christ beside him, till the personality of Christ became more real to him than the monk next to him in the choir.

The almost immediate reward of all this beating down of self was an inward sweetness and happiness, gracious and consoling to all who felt it, a sort of earnest of spiritual treasures still to be given, a blessed faith and gladness, very beautiful, but yet dangerous, because its sweetness was apt to beget "an exceeding vain desire to speak of spiritual things . . . and even at times to teach them, rather than to learn"; and because it bore "a strong resemblance to the monk's own desires and delights." It was necessary to

persevere upon the way, past this stage, and the monk found that just when he had begun to attain to some strength in God, beyond this stage, not long that is from his entering religion, the sweetness and gracious consoling happiness ceased ; the religious seemed to be in what was called a darkness or a dryness, "the which to them," as St. John of Yepes says, "is passing strange, as everything seems topsy turvy." This state of stipticity was an anxious and frightful state, in which the individual felt himself shut off and kept from the service of God, in spite of his longings. A great Saint explains that this state occurs when the properties and strength of the senses are withdrawn from mind and body and transferred to the soul ; and that the misery caused by it is by reason of the novelty of the change. The misery is acute and horrible, it is a feeling that God has deserted the sufferer, and a dread that He has done so in wrath at some sin committed.

The next step in spiritual progress is generally vouchsafed as a gift not won by labour. It comes as a refreshment to the soul still puzzled in the darkness, and it appears as a fire of the love of God, springing up warmly and brightly in the darkness, till the soul is "so sick for very love that she pants after God, like as did David." It comes not all at once, but gradually, sometimes after many years ; and leaves the soul more free upon her progress towards Divine Union. At this point, the soul and the sensitive man have become one, since the sensitive man has acquired the spiritual longings of the soul. The united being is ready to undergo the second or greater night of purging, "which is a fierce and terrible making naked, a stripping of powers, affections and senses, leaving the mind dark,

the will stranded and the memory void," and the desires of the soul in blackest misery, because of her foulness and the excessive splendour of the Divine Light now poured on her. In this dark night the soul is purged of its foulness as the fire of the Divine Love gradually takes hold upon it and illumines it, until to the very few perfected souls it is granted to be made one with the Divine Love, when the soul enters a state of ecstasy so intense that those who have attained it speak of it as union with God and partaking of the Divine Nature.

Not many attained to this state; but of those who did it may be said (*Psalms* 84) :

"Blessed are they that dwell in thy house: they will still be praising thee. . . .

"They go from strength to strength, every one of them in Zion appeareth before God . . . .

"(And) a day in thy courts is better than a thousand . . . no good thing will he withhold from them."

Of those who tried but failed, from whatever cause, it was said that however good they may have been before they entered upon the path, the perseverance upon the path, even if not rewarded fully, made them a great deal better. "The eye of the Lord is upon them that fear Him. . . . The Lord will make them drink of the river of His pleasures." Even in the darkest night of the soul there were gleams of consolation to encourage her to persevere; and all religious contemplatives and ecstasies knew very well that the inward sweetness of those moments was reward enough even for years of the dark night. "The administration of this service," says St. Paul, "not only supplieth the want of the Saints, but is abundant also." William Blake, the artist and Christian visionary,

was often sorely troubled by the failure of his intellectual vision; whenever the visions stopped he and his wife knelt down and prayed; and when after twenty years of the night they came back to him with a greater fury of beauty than he had ever known, his letter of thanksgiving is perhaps the most ecstatic thanksgiving we have.

It is perhaps necessary to say that the monk was not always so far removed from the world that his life was abnormal, useless, starved, remote from human experience and feverish. Many, but not all, of the great contemplatives have lived lives of intense earthly activity, wrestling with kings and nobles, founding schools, colleges and religious houses, administering estates, ruling brotherhoods, attacking heresies, rooting out error, and in all things trying to make the outer earthly nature active for good, as active as the figure of Christ who drove out the money-changers, and washed the feet of His disciples, and gave the multitude food. They strove to make themselves vessels of Christ, exponents of the spirit of Christ, and they sought Christ's cross cheerfully, wherever it might be found most heavy, in the world, the monastery or the wilderness.

The idea, that inner and outer correspond, and that an act on the earthly plane has its reflection in the spiritual kingdom, never very distant from the religious mind, inspired many minds not in religion and led to another kind of contemplative life, of which the very noble speculation, a noble madness as it is now called, became most noble at about the time when the religious houses were ceasing to attract the finer kinds of thinker. I do not know what led to this decline of the religious houses, if there was a decline,

as some doubt. Perhaps the world became more attractive as more of its wonders were revealed, or perhaps the machine of the monastery was worn out, was not big enough for the minds now pressing into the world on their march to union with the Divine Mind. But the Reformation came, and a sea of spiritual energy which would otherwise have passed through the religious houses, passed over them; and after that had happened, and until much more had happened, the Alchemist, not the monk, is perhaps the typical religious thinker.

Alchemy, in all its vast subtlety and splendour of symbolism, its very great wealth of knowledge and experiment, is very difficult to understand. It is only possible to indicate here some of the main points in alchemical thought.

The Alchemist held that there was a correspondence between the heavenly bodies and the parts of the human body, and a still further correspondence between the heavenly bodies and all earthly things, and that all earthly things had life, some sort of life. He believed that the human being is "a little world made cunningly" of the elements of which this world is made; and that all in the great world has its correspondent in the little. He also believed that nothing in either world was perfect in itself. Things could only be brought to perfection by the practice of the divine art of Alchemy, which mixes or chastens element with element, to produce the perfect thing out of the imperfect wherever it may be. The earth was an imperfect thing, a globe of the four elements, till God, mixing the four in His hand, wrought them to the quintessence of Man. Metal in the earth is an imperfect thing, till man with his sweat and fire transmutes

it into some swift ship, or other perfect image. The soul of man is an imperfect thing till Christ with His bloody passion transmutes it to His own likeness. Nothing good, godlike, or perfect, can be in this universe but by the practice of Alchemy. It is the universal art. It transmutes water into wine, wine into the Blood of Christ, the Blood of Christ into Spiritual Ecstasy. It fills the empty. It changes the elements into the forms of art, the chaotic to the simple, the simple to the complex, the ore to fineness, the dark to light, war to peace, beast to man, man to God. It is a continual pounding, melting and chastening of Nature, that the gold, or the godlike, may be set free from the baser things which prevent it from being gold.

He held that all spiritual and earthly things consisting of their four elements may be transmuted into a fifth, more perfect thing, which he called a quintessence, and that no things could die, but changed, changed continually from one substance to another, in their quest or endeavour to attain divinity or quintessence. He held, finally, that human wisdom might by effort become as powerful as Nature's self, and create the quintessential world, and that by effort human wisdom might practise here the art of God, who brought the four elements out of Chaos and wrought them to the quintessence of Creation.

Believing as he did that man has in him, in little, the whole universe, with its three planes of matter or metals, reason or man, and spirit or god, he invented a vast system of correspondence, or analogies, by which he linked each part of him to other parts of the macrocosm. Thus he came to speak of active vital energy as the Sun or Gold; and when he set out to



find what we now call the Philosopher's Stone his object was not so much earthly gold as spiritual power, which would make his inner being spiritual gold and enable him to make perfect earthly nature as he had perfected himself. As we know from Dante and Chaucer, there were many Alchemists, or 'Multipliers' as they were called, who sought only to make earthly gold or wealth, and in doing this, they made many interesting experiments and perhaps some knavish ones; but the true Alchemist sought by a knowledge of matter and a subtlety of reason to make the spiritual Gold, the Perfect Metal, the Incorruptible Substance, in himself and in the universe, and to practise in short (though not presumptuously) the Art of God.

Mr. Waite, by far the most learned modern scholar of occultism, has said of Alchemists, in a noble sentence, "they were soul seekers and they had found the soul; they were artificers and they had adorned the soul; they were alchemists and had transmuted it."

In their attempts to make Spiritual Gold, the Christ, the Sol, the Sun of Righteousness, the Noble Stone, the Tincture or Mystic Seed, Alchemists used three things besides the necessary Vessel or Athanor, and the Furnace. They needed Sulphur, by which they understood the bodily earthly nature of man, they needed Salt, or man's reasoning mind, and they needed Mercury, or man's pure spirit, the clear awakened soul, discovered and brought out from her wrappings by discipline and labour. Without this Mercury, this Splendour, nothing of their labour could come to perfection; it was the chief of the three principles. The three ingredients when attained were enclosed in the Vessel, by which you may understand Man's Body, the individual Alchemist, about to practise for the

Tincture, and then the work began. Since the Alchemist believed that the inner world corresponds to the outer world in all things, he held that an experiment, or endeavour towards perfection in spiritual things, should have its corresponding endeavour towards perfection in earthly things, believing that as, under the inner discipline, the Salt of man's mind, working with the Mercury of Super Nature, mixed with the Sulphur of Nature till Sol or Gold was attained, so under the discipline of the Vessel and the Furnace the metals changed to the finer thing desired. In the Athanor as in the Man the processes were processes towards perfection or Exaltation.

The Alchemists had very real chemical knowledge; but it is generally best to interpret their language spiritually. The names of the processes shew that the Alchemist, like the religious contemplative, knew all the steps of the Road to the Divine Nature. Each process corresponds with a step known by the religious.

The processes were Calcination, or purgation of the Stone, or the initial steps of the religious life. Dissolution, or the Black State, the misery of the first night of the soul. Separation of the subtle and gross, or the first kindlings of Divine Love. Conjunction, or the mixing of the elements. Putrefaction, or the dying of the earthly nature. Congelation or Whiteness, the sign of success. Cibation, an excess of the Congelation, and Sublimation, or Glittering Whiteness, Fermentation, the mixing of alchemical earth and water, and Exaltation, or accomplishment.

Some think that a few of the greatest Alchemists did really attain to Exaltation, in their souls and experiments alike, and found the Incorruptible Gold and transmuted metals with it, and became, them-

selves, immortal, so that they live still somewhere. Whether it be so or not, Alchemy gave a way of life to many noble men of fine intellect and the world's mind is finer because of it; but gradually, with the growth of mind and the multiplication of experiment and modes of action, as the world and man grew larger together, three or four Alchemists working independently discovered facts which made much of their belief untenable. Very unjustly, people made use of these facts to throw contempt on the whole Science. The spiritual side of Alchemy, which had certainly been growing dimmer as the experimental side became more interesting, was now forgotten or ignored; people began to speak of Alchemists as charlatans and bunglers, who hid their ignorance under a symbolism of Green Lions, Red Dragons and Baths of Mary. The Natural Philosopher, who corresponded with the Royal Society, seemed, on the whole, the two being compared, a much safer, more desirable figure. The Natural Philosopher's study had none of these symbols about it. "No lion shall be found there, nor any ravenous beast shall go up thereon," they exclaimed, quoting Isaiah, "but the redeemed shall walk there." The best Alchemists were too scientific to maintain an impossible position, and modern chemistry began when they surrendered. Alchemy was put upon the shelf, as a part of the lumber of the world's brain. It has only quite recently been re-studied as a Spiritual Way.

When Alchemy came to the ground, thought ceased to be religion. Thought began to undermine religion as it had undermined Alchemy: and although much of Christianity remains, it is not now a light illuminating the multitude.

Nowadays, the Universal Church is shattered and

the Universal Art condemned. There is no longer any great idea common to the mind of Europe; the uncommon mind can no longer make itself intelligible to the common mind; the two kinds of mind talk different languages, and the uncommon mind, trying to express himself, must invent his own creed, consecrate his own symbols and imagine his own ritual. He cannot sit in the sun of a common faith; he strikes a light from his own box of matches, and has the pleasure of being taken for a star.

I do not know who in this age can be called contemplatives, seeking union with the Divine Nature, though all seek it somehow, according to their enlightenment. It has been urged to me that artists are the people most like the religious of past times; but all who set themselves to attain mental or spiritual power take the three vows of the monk, and fight the rebellion of the alchemical Sulphur, and walk the dark night, often enough.

Since the first chemists made an end of the last Alchemists, and the first rebel brought the Church into question, artists have tried many ways to bring a way of peace to the soul of the world. We have seen them inventing feverish creeds out of the welter of their own emotionalism, and regarding their own intellects as the divine things, and taking it upon themselves to judge and to apportion praise and blame; we have seen them self-indulgent and experimental, turning from some ways and trying others, eating out their hearts, while "the Devil and their own fancy," as St. John of the Cross says, "play fantastic tricks upon their souls." All ways must be tried; a soul upon her road to the Divine Nature gets her strength from retrieving false steps, and art as a way of self-perfection

is as difficult as any other and as manly. Perfect art is an expression of a perfect humanity, and a man wrestling with the world, so that he may come to know and to utter wisdom and beauty, has to fit himself body and mind, by hardness and study, and unceasing exercise, to perfect his tabernacle as a dwelling-place for the vision. Whatever limits the man limits the art; the art is the man; the perfect art is the perfect man.

But looking at the art of this time one can see very little that can be called the work of a religious contemplative, or the fruit of deeply devout feeling in a manly mind. There is a great deal of power, a good many feverish creeds and curiosities, some careful and rather dreary looking out upon the world, with an eye on its weak spots; and in the finer souls there is a noble but sad resignation, as though all ways have been tried, and this world is all, with nothing beyond, and this world no such wonder, but a place of headache and vulgarity, of stupid and cruel doings, with the grave at the end, and widowhood and orphanage two decorations of it. There is in nearly all art of the time, a want of anything that will feed the soul.

It is better to deny with brave men and to question with active men, than to comply with hens and be at peace with the rabbits; but denying and questioning do not feed what is best in man, any more than a looking out upon the world, with a hard and critical eye, or with a receptive uncritical eye. Art has failed to supply the soul of this time with necessary food. It offers nothing to the soul, nothing glorious like the food offered by the Monk or great like the food offered by the Alchemist. If we could imagine a Heaven made up of Public Libraries and Post Impressionism we should probably reject it.

Since the Monk, the Chemist, the Natural Philosopher and the Artist have ceased or have failed to provide a way for the multitudes desiring spiritual peace, and since, looking round society, it is difficult to see any body of men offering a new way, the question arises, what does it matter? Why should we bother about the kind of spiritual help obtainable from the age's typical religious thinker? All this hunting for a guide or Master Pilot, some one to trust in and to follow, leaves one no more certain; for the philosopher of one year is the charlatan of the next. Like the cleric in Browning's play, we have all known five and thirty leaders of revolts and I don't know how many Last Words of Mr. Baxter. Inner peace, tranquil happiness, the possession of the spirit, and all the spiritual gifts, are not to be got by reading the new book and listening to the old fossil. If we want them, they are within ourselves, here and now, near the surface or not as the case may be, waiting to glorify our work here, whatever it may be, and we can get them, if we want them, as they have been got in the past, by the contemplative man. I know that the contemplative man got them, and what he did we can do. We can get them ourselves by trying for them and paying the price, and in no other way. And what is the price? The monk and the alchemist paid themselves, and got, as they declared, God, for the price paid. For the same price really paid down, without haggling, we can have the same reward. When we come to look at the price paid and to ask Can we pay this? Is it really worth it? we realise more the heroism and the nobility of those old dead thinkers, who paid the price, centuries ago:

“Casting down imaginations and every high thing that exalteth itself against the knowledge of God and

bringing into captivity every thought to the obedience of Christ."

That was the price paid; and it was paid very cheerfully by thousands of earthly men and women, who were the happier for paying it. And if we, whose lives are so much wider and finer than theirs, will pay that price, not leaving the world as they did, but making the world our monastery, and our work our laboratory, we, too, shall attain their Union and touch our fellows with Incorruptible Substance.

JOHN MASEFIELD.

---

## THE FOLK-TALES AND ANCIENT PAGAN RELIGION OF THE GEORGIANS.

PROF. J. JAVAKHISHVILI, of the University of  
St. Petersburg.

UNTIL Prof. N. Marr published his *Deities of Pagan Georgia*,<sup>1</sup> the information on the Pagan period of the country supplied by the 'Georgian Chronicle' was thought quite reliable. Armaz, Zaden, Gā, Gatzī, Ainina and Iṭrujan were considered the Georgian national deities of Prechristian times.<sup>2</sup> Prof. Marr, however, proved that on the contrary this information gives us no idea of the real Georgian national paganism, and is of no scientific value; it is simply the invention of some Christian writer at the time of the domination

<sup>1</sup> *Z.V.O.R.A.O.*, vol. xiv.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. 'Life of St. Nino,' in *Studia Biblica*, vol. v., pt. 1, pp. 19-21 (Oxford, 1900).

of the Arabs in Georgia. Even before Prof. Marr, Prof. Maxim Kovalevsky had studied and analysed a great many Georgian customs and religious legends, and had come to the conclusion that they were simply the survivals of Persian Mazdaism, *i.e.* of fire-worship. Prof. K. Inostrantzeff has also more recently shown that some present-day customs of the New Year Festival are also survivals of the same Mazdaism.<sup>1</sup> No other scholar has written on the subject, nor has anyone even made use of the labours of these three authors.

The works of Proff. Marr, Kovalevsky and Inostrantzeff, it is true, have proved the traditional view of the paganism and ancient religion of Georgia to be wholly unfounded. But although they have thus facilitated the investigation of the subject, the principal question concerning the ancient beliefs of the Georgian people still remains unsolved. What we previously considered reliable information has been declared untenable by scientific criticism; at the same time new materials and investigations have been wanting.

At one time I had lost all hope that any light could ever be thrown upon this interesting subject without the discovery of new sources of information. Soon after, however, I gained the conviction that in modern Georgian folk-tales and customs there are still preserved many evident traces of the ancient national paganism.

To simplify the question, it is necessary first of all to show how the Georgian popular mind represents the idea of the Creator. The popular tales and legends are the principal sources for the study of this question, and so we may begin with profit by summarising and analysing one of the most interesting Georgian folk-

<sup>1</sup> *Z.V.O.R.A.O.*, vol. xvi.



stories from a version<sup>1</sup> supplied by the school-master of the village of Baralethi in central Georgia. The tale is about 'Jesus Christ, the Prophet Elijah, and St. George':

Once upon a time, Jesus, Elijah and St. George were journeying together. After wandering for long they grew tired and sat down to partake of a meal. Not far from their resting-place a shepherd was tending his flock. They sent Elijah to the shepherd to ask him for a lamb.

"Good shepherd as you are, give us a lamb for a gift."—"You can take half my flock if you tell me your name," said the shepherd.—"I am Elijah the Prophet, who give you good harvest, send the fresh rain for your fields, and protect the labour and crops of the field workers," said Elijah.—"Oh, if I feared not my god, I would break your head with this staff," said the shepherd.—"But why are you so wrath with me?" asked Elijah.—"Because if some poor widow or some wretched man labour on even a tiny piece of ground, you ever spoil it and destroy the fruit of their toil with hail."

So Elijah returned empty-handed to his companions and told them all that had happened. Next Jesus went to the shepherd and asked him for a lamb.

"You can take half my flock if you tell me your name," said the shepherd again.—"I am your lord, the creator of the world," said Jesus.—"Oh, if I feared not my god, I would break your head with this staff," was again the reply.—"But, what wrong have I done?" asked Jesus.—"You take their lives from the young,

<sup>1</sup> *Sbornik Materialoff dlya Opisanya mestnostey y plemen Kavkaza*, vol. xix., pp. 152-154.

and let the old and wretched who are tired of life live longer," said the shepherd.

So, Jesus, too, went back to his companions empty-handed. Last of all St. George went to the shepherd.

When asked for his name, he answered: "I am St. George, to whom you ever pray when in misery. I protect you always against bad spirits and free you from the hands of your oppressors."—When the shepherd heard St. George's name he cried gaily: "Take the whole of my flock!" and knelt immediately before him.

After the meal Jesus shook the folds of his garments and said: "Let the best crops grow on this spot and every sheaf produce one hundred 'codis' of corn!" St. George immediately told the shepherd what Jesus had said and advised him to cultivate the place, and the shepherd did so. Some time after the same three wanderers by chance passed again by the same spot where now a fair cornfield was growing. When Jesus learned that the field belonged to the very shepherd who had once refused to give him a lamb, he ordered Elijah to send hail upon it. But St. George instantly warned the shepherd, who thereupon sold the field for two oxen to a widow; and so the hail ruined the widow's field. When Jesus heard of the shepherd's cunning he ordered Elijah to restore the widow's crop. But the shepherd knew all from St. George, and bought back the widow's field. And when Elijah restored the crop the shepherd reaped the harvest and obtained from every sheaf a hundred 'codis' of corn.

In this popular tale three deities are acting and competing with each other. One of them is called Jesus Christ, but since he calls himself 'creator of the world,' we are obliged to recognise in him the god-

creator of Georgian popular fancy. He is master of the life and death of man. The second is the prophet Elijah. He is the god of the weather, the atmosphere-god, the god of hail, of rain, and the rest. The third is St. George. He is the protector of man, more especially when misfortune overtakes him.

Under Christian influence, the god-creator must occupy the highest rank; after must come the prophet Elijah, and lastly St. George. But the folk-tale arranges them in quite a different order. The god-creator is so insignificant that he cannot obtain so much as a lamb from a shepherd. On the contrary, the shepherd even threatens him: "If I did not fear *my god*, I would break your head with this staff." It is evident that the shepherd would never have treated his chief deity in this manner; his words "if I did not fear my god" show quite clearly that he has no fear of the 'creator of the world,' simply because he is not *his* god. The god of the shepherd is quite another deity.

The god-creator is a vengeful deity. He tries to punish the shepherd, but at the same time he has not the slightest idea of what is going on in the world. He is ignorant even of the fact that St. George has twice told the shepherd his secret intention. In fact, the god-creator is represented in the tale as a powerless being. He cannot prevent St. George from protecting the shepherd, he cannot conceal his secrets, and is even ignorant of how men are taking steps to avoid his vengeance. We thus see that the deity of the tale does not in any way resemble the Christian almighty and omniscient God, creator of the universe.

Elijah also was not very kindly received by the shepherd, for, as the story shows clearly, he was subject to the god-creator and obeyed his orders.

The highest of the three is St. George. Before him the shepherd knelt, while he menaced with his staff the god-creator and the prophet. To him he offered not merely a single lamb but the whole flock. Neither Jesus nor Elijah can resist the will of St. George. He will deliver the shepherd from their vengeance; he will turn to the shepherd's advantage even their favours intended for others. Elijah and Jesus are absolutely powerless to punish the rebel, a single simple shepherd who offends and menaces them. In a word, St. George is far mightier, and in every way superior to creator and prophet. How can this strange phenomenon be explained?

Before seeking the deep cause of it let us examine its traces in the tale itself. When Jesus and Elijah told the shepherd who they were, he received them with the same strange menace: "If I feared not my god, I would break your head with this staff!" We see quite clearly from this remarkable phrase that the shepherd does not consider the prophet and the creator as his gods, but that he has and worships another god in whose power he believes infinitely more. This god of the shepherd is evidently not the enemy of the creator and prophet; had the shepherd really broken their heads, his god would not have approved the deed, but would have severely punished him. It is to be noted also that while the shepherd treats both Jesus and Elijah so harshly and refuses them even a single lamb, at the same time he throws himself on his knees before St. George and offers him his whole flock. This shows clearly that St. George is his god whom he particularly worships, and to whom he does not hesitate to give all he possesses.

Thus, according to our analysis, St. George is the

principal deity. He is superior to both creator and prophet. He is more powerful and more cunning than either of them. He is the good god, the best protector of man from every evil and misfortune. The second rank is held by the god-creator. He disposes of life and death for man ; he is revengeful, but less powerful than St. George ; he is neither omniscient nor almighty ; he is ignorant of what men are doing on earth and of how St. George reveals to men his secret plans. The third and lowest rank is held by the prophet ; he is the supreme master of the rain, of hail, lightning and the elements in general. He obeys at the same time the creator, and executes his commands.

Such must be the conclusion from our analysis. But the analysis of one single Qartlian<sup>1</sup> tale is not sufficient evidence that we have really discovered the chief deities of the old national religion of Georgia. The popular legends and tales of other provinces must be brought into court to confirm our conclusion concerning these three deities.

Now according to the Qartlian and Suanian<sup>2</sup> folk-tales, the god-creator is the same powerless being as we have already seen. In them this god is represented as a quite inexperienced man. When he falls into the river, he feels the cold and even sinks to the bottom ; and if the angels were not there to help him, he would be drowned. He wanders about and is ignorant of the dangers to which he is exposed. Following some tracks he comes to a blue stone and lifts it up ; whereupon Samuel the devil springs out of it and seizes him by the throat. He calls on the angels to help him but they are powerless to do so. At last he begs Samuel to

<sup>1</sup> Qartli is the central province of Georgia.

<sup>2</sup> Suaneti is the north-western province.

let him go: "Only let me go and you can ask me for whatever you wish." Samuel replies: "Let us henceforth be friends; that is the only wish I want of you." The god agrees and is released by Samuel. Then with the aid of the archangels Michael and Gabriel, he begins to create the world. They labour greatly but can do nothing. Thereon Michael says to the god: "Let me go to your brother Samuel and ask him how to proceed." The god consents and Michael goes to Samuel, who teaches him how to create the world.<sup>1</sup>

In another Qarṭlian tale we learn how the god wanted to break a round stone which was rolling before him. The angels advised him not to attempt it. "We shall regret it afterwards," they said. But the god paid no attention to their warnings and broke the stone with his feet. Suddenly Samuel the devil sprang out, seized the god by the throat and began to strangle him.<sup>2</sup>

Here, too, the god is represented as an inexperienced, ignorant and obstinate being. In all his misadventures the angels help him, and are more prudent and intelligent than the god himself. As to the devil, he is far more powerful than the god, and even in the creation of the world he aids him.

Finally in a Kakhian<sup>3</sup> tale the creator-god is represented as a most pitiless and wicked being. Once he learned that Michael and Gabriel were at the wedding-feast of a merchant's son and had not taken the soul of the young husband because he had received them with great hospitality. He was so angry that, crying and threatening, he seized them and tore out their livers, thinking that without this organ of good

<sup>1</sup> *Sbornik Materialoff*, etc., vol. x., pp. lxxv.-lxxx.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> Kakheti is the eastern province of Georgia.

feeling they would henceforth pitilessly and treacherously take the souls of men.<sup>1</sup>

The superiority and even omnipotence of St. George and the spiritual and physical inferiority of Elijah the prophet in comparison with him are well brought out in an Imerian<sup>2</sup> tale.

Two brothers chose respectively as their protectors St. George and Elijah, and each prayed his own guardian to be godfather to his children. One day their wives were quarrelling, and each began to praise her own and slander the other's protector. The elder brother's wife denounced her sister-in-law to her own husband's patron, Elijah. "My sister-in-law," she said, "has spoken falsely of you; she has said that Elijah could never be compared to St. George!" Thereupon Elijah tried to punish the younger brother; he set to work to ruin his field by drought or by hail. But he could never succeed, for St. George protected his charge so well that every evil prepared against him by Elijah always fell on the elder brother's head.<sup>3</sup>

This Imerian tale, as we see, witnesses to the incontestable superiority of St. George to Elijah in the folk-consciousness. In the Suanian legends also St. George's power is as pre-eminent as in the Qartlian stories. Against his protection even the creator-god himself is absolutely powerless. St. George (Ĵgrag) who sits on the right of the god, like the archangel Michael (Mqemtarinsel<sup>4</sup>), plans ever for the good of man and strives to help and protect him. Once god gave a cow to a man who had burnt incense before him

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. xxxv., pp. 106-111.

<sup>2</sup> Imereṭi is the west-central province of Georgia.

<sup>3</sup> A. Khakhanoff, *Sketches of the History of Georgian Literature* (in Russian), pp. 252-254.

<sup>4</sup> *Sbornik Materialoff*, etc., vol. x., p. 177.

and sacrificed a lamb to him. When St. George and Michael the archangel brought the gift, they advised the man to ask god for a wife as well, and the worthy followed their advice. But god grew angry and said: "You care for that man, George, or he would never have thought of asking such a thing"; nevertheless god consented. Thereupon St. George and the archangel Michael found a wife for the man, and all that was necessary for their home. Later, when St. George asked god how many children the man would have, god became still more angry and said: "George, you have spoken to the man; or how could he ask all this? If we give him children, the human race will multiply on the earth, and life will be hard." Nevertheless, god yielded to St. George and said: "Let us give him two children; but we will kill them when they have lived the half of their lives."—"Let us rather be generous and give them the whole of their lives. Why should we torture them?" replied St. George. Again god gave way; but some time afterwards he planned to spoil the man's field by hail. St. George descended immediately to the earth and bade the man harvest his crops without any delay, and he did so. After the storm, god saw that the fellow's crops were quite safe, and that other men's fields were utterly ruined; so he said to himself secretly: "I will set fire to the man's house." St. George, however, communicated once more god's intention to the man, and thus saved him. And god said: "It is George who protects the man, otherwise how could he avoid what I have prepared for him? As George is very desirous to make him happy, let it be so."<sup>1</sup>

In this Suanian tale also god (*gerbet*, *germet*) is

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. x., pp. 176-187.



the cruellest enemy of man. Were it not for St. George god would never be favourable to human beings. On the contrary, he is so heartless and cruel as to give children to parents until they have grown into manhood and then kill them. The spoiling of crops, setting houses on fire, destroying people, and other crimes of the same kind are his habits. Only against George he is powerless. George acts as he pleases, and god is obliged to obey him. He can take no revenge if George is against his will and intention. On the other hand, George's protection and good will for man are without limit. On every occasion when god is preparing some evil, he descends to earth and teaches man how to avoid it. In a word, George is the most powerful good spirit; he occupies the first rank, and is placed above god himself.

Now Qartli, Kakheti, Imereti and Suaneti are different provinces of one and the same country. Thus from the analysis of the popular legends of the whole of Georgia we can draw but one conclusion,—namely the absolute superiority of St. George over all other ancient Georgian *pagan* deities. Next to him comes the god-creator, who, far from being almighty and full of wisdom, is rather revengeful, heartless and cruel. Last comes Elijah the prophet, who is inferior to the god-creator and obeys his orders.

But St. George is worshipped not only in the folk-tales; in real life the Georgian people also adore him. In honour of no other saint, not even in that of God Himself nor of Jesus Christ, is there such a number of churches in Georgia as in his honour. In 1217 the traveller Thietmar wrote that the people worshipped St. George above all.<sup>1</sup> The Georgian geographer of the

<sup>1</sup> *Mag. Thietmarii Peregrinatio*, ed. Laurent, p. 51.

XVIIIth century, Wakhushti, mentions that "there are no hills nor small mountains without churches in honour of Saint George."<sup>1</sup> Moreover, in the present day also almost all the most important churches and holidays in the country are named after the Saint. According to the popular belief there are in Georgia as many churches in his honour and therefore as many St. Georges as there are days in the year. Thus, in the actual life of modern Georgia, St. George is practically considered as a chief deity, and this fact confirms perfectly our conclusion from the analysis of the folk-tales.

The 'Khevis-Beris' (lit. Chiefs of the Valley) of Khevsureti and Pshaueti call St. George explicitly God in their prayers. "God Saint George of Ikhinti"—thus they begin their prayer when blessing the cakes.<sup>2</sup> So also the Suans, who consider the Saint mightier than God Himself.<sup>3</sup>

It is evident that such a cult has nothing to do with Christianity; it is in direct contradiction to it rather. Beyond all doubt St. George represents some chief deity of the remotest pagan period of Georgian religious life. What deity then was it who was replaced by St. George after the introduction of Christianity?

Some thirty years ago the Academician Weselowsky examined this problem; though his immediate purpose was simply to discover whence the myth of St. George and the Dragon arose. Weselowsky was thus obliged at the same time to estimate the place St. George

<sup>1</sup> Wakhushti, *Description géographique de la Géorgie*, p. 52. (French Trans. from the Georgian. by F. Brosset, St. Petersburg, 1844.)

<sup>2</sup> David Goreli, *Iveria*, 1886, no. 242.

<sup>3</sup> Rev. Gulbiani, *Sbornik Materialoff*, vol. x., p. 89.

occupied in the Georgian pantheon after the introduction of Christianity. As far as we can conjecture from the author's extremely vague expressions, he was convinced that the legend in Georgia was of old pagan origin and that it originated in an ancient Persian myth at the period when Persian paganism spread over the whole of Georgia. We think, however, that this conclusion of the honourable Academician is entirely wrong. The Georgian St. George cult has absolutely nothing to do with Persian paganism.

*In the beliefs of the Georgian people St. George occupies the place of the ancient Georgian national chief pagan deity—the Moon.*

The elucidation of this problem, however, requires an article to itself, when we hope that 'St. George the Moon-God' will be found to be not without interest for English readers.

J. JAVAKHISHVILI.

(Translated from the Georgian by MICHAEL TSERETHELI.)

## THE DOCTRINE OF 'DIE TO LIVE' IN HEGELIANISM.

L. A. COMPTON-RICKETT.

Come, said the Muse,  
Sing me a song no poet has yet chanted,  
Sing me the Universal.—WALT WHITMAN.

It may be of interest to note among the multifarious schools of Academical metaphysics, firstly, a fundamental agreement in Christianity, Buddhism and Hegelianism and, secondly, some of its applications. The common element in these religious systems will be remarked before Hegel's Logic is dealt with.

Christianity has for one of its salient features the ethical teaching of altruism. This type of ethics previously found two of its great exponents in Socrates and Plato. "It is better," says the latter, "to suffer injustice than to inflict it." But the doctrine was expressed with fuller emphasis and more radical presentment by Christianity. The life and teaching ascribed to the Founder combine in the support of self-abnegation, mankind being told by him that "he who would save his life shall lose it, and whosoever shall lose his life (for his sake) the same shall find it"; while that aspiring candidate, the ruler of riches, is bidden to sell all if he would "follow." And as with fortune so also the family ties are to be less esteemed.

It is not a question of giving a tenth part to humanity, for entire existence has to be subjugated to

the general welfare ; it is not a rebate on the outgoing energies, the energies themselves are to be directed towards the end of service ; in fine, Christianity enunciated the doctrine as ' die to live.'

It does not, however, inform us why individualism and the survival of the hardiest are not the sounder doctrine, and to the Nietzschean mind it appears to be the faith of the unfit. Should not a nation in the interests of its integrity eradicate as a parasite its disabled and incompetent members ?

This question discovers one of the characteristics in the genius of Christianity, namely, the sporadic and unsystematised form of its message ; for while it is an appeal to the heart, on account of which Matthew Arnold calls it the language of poetry, Buddhism addresses itself more purely to the intellect and has a more philosophical structure.

In the latter is found a pantheistic cosmology in which the individual or eternal monad evolves through successive forms of existence until it realises that all forms are the expression of one life, and so identifies itself with 'that which is' or Reality. It is the illusion that an unrelated reality exists in each separate self—the great heresy—that is held to divorce the individual from his true being ; and therefore such personal gratification as does not consort with, or is not experienced for, the general good is esteemed vicious. As it will be found in Hegel an idea is indissolubly related to the Absolute, so here the personal life takes its reality from its relation with the whole of the Cosmos. Both when stripped of their relations, dwindle to the vanishing point and are therefore illusory.

This then is the answer to our question. The

reason a nation cannot afford to extirpate by force or negligence its 'incompetent' members, is that such members do not constitute either parasitic growth or offal, but are a vital part of its organic unity, which for its eternal well-being it is bound to recognise and deal with. "The Bright one in the highest is brother of the Dark one in the lowest";<sup>1</sup> suicide becomes homicide and homicide suicide.

The assertion that the doctrine of altruism in its fullest form is a vital part of both Christianity and Buddhism is not likely to meet with any repudiation; we may therefore turn our attention to the principles of Hegelianism, after remarking that if we desire the philosophy of ethics we must turn to Buddhism rather than Christianity.

In examining the Hegelian Dialectic it may be as well to begin with a comprehensive glance at the philosophy. To Hegel all things are a manifestation of Reality, which is rational and righteous, but which can only be discerned as such when it has ceased to be regarded in a time-series, or *sub specie temporis*, and is viewed as a whole, *sub specie aeternitatis*. The Dialectic is a process of considering this Reality in a time-series. The mind by its constitution must necessarily begin with a positive admission of some kind. "The only logical postulate which the Dialectic requires is the admission that experience really exists. The denial of this postulate involves reality of the denial and reality of the denier."<sup>2</sup> Or, as the late William James re-pointed out in his *Will to Believe*, every kind of denial implies a belief in, and an assertion

<sup>1</sup> Tennyson, *Demeter and Persephone*.

<sup>2</sup> Chas. E. Compton-Rickett, Notes on Dr. McTaggart's *Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic*—to whom my thanks are due for much clear help.

of, something else. We deny something because it does not conform with the idea of some other thing, and shocks our sense of propriety. Therefore it is impossible to begin with a negative, for whether implicitly as denial or explicitly as an assertion we are bound to hold a positive position in some respect. Total scepticism is thus untenable. The least assertion that can be made as a beginning is the affirmation of pure Being (abstract existence) and with such the Dialectic begins.

When we proceed from this fulcrum of undetermined Being and enquire into its nature, we discover that its essence consists of its operation in its complexity of relations. Only in relationship does a thing become defined or have a characteristic nature; for to know what a thing is we must know what it is not. Relationship gives, therefore, limitation and definition. Here we have passed from undetermined Being to determined Being. The determination of a thing by relation or setting Hegel calls 'reflection,' because its own nature is reflected from its surroundings.

If after searching into the nature of a thing and asking of what it is composed, we enquire for what end it is designed, we pass from the Essence to the third and last aspect technically known as the Notion.

In the lower categories or initial ideas of the logical process, relationship that gives its characteristic to a thing, also brings limitation and assumes the aspect of contingents. In following the categories through their higher forms the relations present themselves as complements rather than contingents, and limitation gradually ceases until the Eternal Reason or Notion is reached, when limitation in the sense of a foreign will or power ceases altogether, and all

differentiations are the self-limitations of pure Reason. The microcosm has now become the macrocosm, and the former, which hitherto was determined by external necessity, has through the growth of its life become identified with the latter. The external exigence is similar to the adult parent that constrains the child or individual into that very development which as an adult it would wish to have taken. Their wills, therefore, become identical, and thus it is that Hegel says "the truth" (inner nature) "of necessity is freedom."

Until the full-grown will,  
Circled through all experiences, pure law,  
Commeasure perfect freedom.<sup>1</sup>

Reality or the Notion is not substance but subject, not matter but spirit. Yet Hegel disclaims any 'Pantheistic taint'; by which he implies that in his system the individuality is not lost in the universality, but exists as a differentiation in it. "Hegel stoutly maintains that individuality is not suppressed in universality, but is conserved (*aufgehoben*) in a higher state of being or existence."<sup>2</sup>

Reality, then, is a differentiated unity, in which the differentiations participate in unity as well as the unity in differentiations, so that there are no subordinated parts, but difference and unity are on an equality,—as in self-consciousness, where the idea of self is a differentiation of the unity of consciousness, the idea of self existing as a particularity or focal point of the conscious unity. In other words Reality is unity in difference, difference in unity, as in a chord where the unity corresponds to the harmonised whole and the differences to the separate tones. Perhaps

<sup>1</sup> Tennyson, *Ænone*.

<sup>2</sup> Hibben, *Hegel's Logic*.



'Harmony' expresses the Hegelian reality better than any other word.

To return to the characteristic process of this evolution. The Dialectic of Hegel moves by a triad of three terms—namely thesis, antithesis and synthesis; and their logical constitution is such that the thesis on analysis is found to involve of necessity the antithesis, while that in turn passes, by the requirement of Logic, into the synthesis which unites the two former and removes their contradiction.

This principle, Hegel maintained, is the *modus operandi* of nature, where on all sides it may be seen as birth, death and resurrection, or generation, degeneration and regeneration. The great triad of the Dialectic, of which there are many sub-divisions, is Being, Essence and Notion or Absolute Idea.

The doctrine of Being answers the question as to what a thing is.

The doctrine of Essence answers the question of what a thing is composed.

The doctrine of Notion answers the question as to what end is a thing designed.

A complete knowledge of a thing, therefore, embraces the description of its being, the ground or explanation of its being, and the purpose or end of its being. . . . Thus the question *what* implies the question *whence*, and the question *whence* leads irresistibly to the question *whither*.<sup>1</sup>

We have now come face to face with the great law which Hegel, in his cogent and paradoxical language, names the identity of opposites (already suggested in self-consciousness). This is his own peculiar doctrine.

Let us first of all quote Dr. McTaggart from his *Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic*.

It is sometimes thought that the Hegelian Logic rests on a

<sup>1</sup> Hibben, *Hegel's Logic*.

defiance of the law of contradiction. That law says that whatever is A can never at the same time be not-A also. . . . So far is the Dialectic from denying the law of contradiction that it is especially based upon it. The contradictions are the causes of the dialectic process. But they can only be such if they are received as marks of error. . . . Why should we not find an unreconciled contradiction and acquiesce in it without going further, except for the law that two contradictory propositions about the same subject are a sign of error? Truth consists not of contradictions but of moments [parts] which if separated would be contradictions but in their synthesis are reconciled and consistent.

Dr. McTaggart elsewhere likens the oscillating forward movement to that of a ship 'tacking.' Professor Hibben presents it thus :

The formula that expresses the law of identity is  $A = A$ . It should be  $A = A'$ , that is, A differs from A' and yet in spite of the difference is one with it. The former equation  $A = A$  is merely an absolute identity which is stripped of all differences and as such is without significance and value.<sup>1</sup>

Let us take, for example, the concept of pure undetermined Being. When examined what does it mean? It means surely not-Nothing; the abstract idea of existence means not non-existence. They each serve by their contrast to sharpen each other into definite concepts. Pure, undetermined Being, therefore, depends for the whole of its significance on Non-Being. The latter is an indispensable factor to this first conception of Reality, *i.e.* Pure Being. By taking all its significance from its opposite it is explained by its relation; but as it is related to 'Nothing' the explanation is barren if the process is arrested at this point. The antithesis, Not-Being, therefore, shows us exactly what is required as the next step in the conception of Reality, namely Determined Being. Instead of the antithesis annihilating

<sup>1</sup> Hibben, *Hegel's Logic*.

the thesis it has discovered its weakness and forced it on a point further. In the higher categories (*i.e.*, conceptions that have advanced to a higher logical standpoint) the thesis and antithesis can be clearly seen to be two elements conserved and evenly balanced in the synthesis, as in self-consciousness that contains in Knowledge the Knower and the Known, the Self and phenomenal existence, which stand as complements; whereas in the triad of Pure Being, Not-Being and Determined Being, the second in passing on oscillates violently to the side of the first and is itself lost sight of. As Dr. Caird says:

Every definite thought, by the fact that it is definite, has a necessary relation to its negative, and cannot be separated from it without losing its own meaning. . . . Hence we are obliged to modify the assertion that every definite thought absolutely excludes its negative, and to admit that, in this point of view, it also includes or involves it. It does not mean that Being and not-Being are not also distinguished; but it does mean that the distinction is not absolute, and that if it is made absolute at that very moment it disappears. The whole truth cannot be expressed by the simple statement that Being and not-Being are identical, or by the simple statement that they are different, . . . [but consists of] their *identity in difference*.

It is "the never-changing one in the ever-changing many."<sup>1</sup> Dr. Caird points out that Aristotle was the first to see<sup>2</sup> that things were distinguished and Hegel that things were related.

In fine, opposites are the obverse aspects of one reality, and in this way they are both joined and opposed. The reality, however, is more than the mere totality of its obverse aspects, as a coin is more than the mere conjunction of its two sides; for the unity of the coin that contains the co-existing opposite sides


<sup>1</sup> D. T. Suzuki, *Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism*.

<sup>2</sup> See his 'Law of Contradiction.'

has its own specific value as a unity. In the synthesis the lion and the lamb lie down together, and it is to Hegel that must be rendered the honour for this menagerial feat in polemics.

To those whom symbols help instead of hinder, the figure below may serve to indicate the dialectic movement.

Absolute Idea or Ideal Unity.



Being.            Not-Being.

Here is a spiral which represents force or life. At the base its alternations are very marked and may be allowed to signify the opposition of the contingents that resemble the poles between which electricity is generated. As the movement proceeds the opposition becomes less marked and corresponds to the complementary nature of the differences in the higher categories, until it reaches the apex where opposition ceases in Universal Reason the true all-embracing self-consciousness of the Notion.

I am the eye with which the universe  
Beholds itself and knows itself divine,  
All harmony of instrument or verse,  
All prophecy, all medicine are mine,  
All light of Art and Nature :—to my song  
Victory and praise in their own right belong.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Shelley's *Hymn of Apollo*.

Self-consciousness symbolised by the sun is the eye with which the Universe beholds itself and knows itself divine.

It is not poetical philosophy; it is philosophy in its last synthesis showing itself to be poetry, thought taking fire by the rapidity and intensity of its own movement.<sup>1</sup>

Concerning the further nature of spiritual Reality there is divergence of opinion among the followers and students of Hegel. Those who consider that Reality is misrepresented by the term 'God,' belong to the so-called Hegelian Left (Idealistic Atheism) and include Mr. F. H. Bradley, and Dr. McTaggart; while those who retain the word, are classed with the Hegelian Right, among whom we may safely say was Dr. Caird.

Hegel summarises the Dialectic process in the term '*aufgehoben*,' which has three distinct ideas attached to it: "to destroy a thing in its original form, to restore it in another form, and to elevate it upon a higher plane."<sup>2</sup>

In looking at the external aspect of actuality, Hegel recognises phenomena of which one appears as the contingent of the other (thesis and antithesis).

The logically prior has for its special vocation as it were to be destroyed in its primary form in order to conserve the realisation of something else. As such it fulfils its own destiny, and though dying in its own individuality, it lives in another; and the other form for which it was evidently designed by its own nature is so near akin that it may be properly regarded as its own true self. In other words the condition is *aufgehoben* in the resulting phenomena to which it gives rise, and into whose actuality its own essence enters and is there conserved.<sup>3</sup>

Hence, says Dr. Caird:

<sup>1</sup> Caird's *Hegel* (Philosophical Classics).

<sup>2</sup> Hibben, *Hegel's Logic*, appendix.      <sup>3</sup> Hibben.

If we should seek to gather up the Hegelian philosophy in a sentence, as a Frenchman once asked Hegel to do, it would be this: that the words 'die to live' express not only the dialectic of morals, but the universal principle of philosophy. For if these words truly express the nature of spiritual life, then in spirit may be found a unity which will account for and overcome all the antagonisms of life and thought.<sup>1</sup>

We have come out once again at a point of view similar to that of Christianity and Buddhism—lower renunciation for higher unity. Having noted this comparison, we will now pass on to an application of the principle, and adumbrate certain triads that suggest themselves, after taking one of Hegel's examples as interpreted by Dr. McTaggart in his *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*. Here innocence is the thesis, sin the antithesis and virtue the synthesis.

Innocence is good, yet it implies the absence of goodness. . . . Whatever is innocent then is in harmony with the universe. But this involves for Hegel that it is good. Yet he also says that innocence implies the absence of goodness. And a man is not properly called good unless he is morally good . . . and Hegel will not call him good if he only possess that harmony which forms the goodness of being without will. When a man is virtuous he wills to follow certain principles. He is in harmony with the universe not merely as a part which cannot be out of harmony, but as an individual who proposes to himself an end, and who has proposed to himself an end which is good, and therefore since the universe is good, in harmony with the universe. . . . [While] innocence is blindly determined by goodness from outside, virtue . . . freely determines itself to goodness. The position of sin lies in the assertion—or practical adoption—of the maxim that my motives need no other justification than that they are my motives.

Sin, then, is self-determination or will-power that

<sup>1</sup> To the spirit death is an element, not an enemy. Cp. Caird's *Hegel*, pp. 210ff.

ignores the moral law of relation or unity, acting solely from selfish instincts that disregard the reality of inter-relationship. In innocence the individual satisfies his instincts unthinkingly and without effort. He acts because a thing 'comes naturally' to him. In sin the idea of choice is presented; he has complex instincts; reflection and speculation are actively engaged in forming a judgment, and volition is aroused to execute the judgment which is determined by selfish motives. Finally, in virtue there has come, from innumerable judgments and volitions, wisdom and power, and the individual ennobled by experience transmutes the first beauty of innocence into the full glory of its self-conscious at-one-ment with all things, living by the Kantian precept as if the single personal action was turned into a universal law of nature. In the thesis there is unconscious unity, in the antithesis self-conscious separation (the birth of individuality) and in the synthesis self-conscious co-operation or unity. The journey is from charm to the sublime.

Now let us consider a few speculative triads, others of which may occur to the reader.

One kindred to, and indeed included in, the above may be found in purity, turbidity, and holiness. In the life of a savage the natural instincts abound in a freshness and spontaneity without check or shame, and it is not until the self-consciousness of civilisation sets in, not until he tastes of the tree of knowledge, that the marks of prudery on the one hand and licentiousness on the other are to be recorded. There is a whole-heartedness disclosed by the customs of uncivilised races, which initial integrity stands here for our thesis.

Obvious also is the embarrassment that comes over racial life when, conscious of how the requisite impulse of propagation is rooted with destructive instincts, it is unable (even with the sanction of Church and State) to regard that impulse with the open consent accorded to what is rational in other modes. R. L. Stevenson sardonically remarks: "Marriage is a form of friendship recognised by the police." It needs only a little reflection on conversation, journalism, literature and art to see how deeply man's life is tinged with eroticism, and how great the interest that reveals itself on all sides, while at the same time the embarrassment is equally evident.

This is the antithetical stage in which we now are, and through which we must pass, according to Hegelian principles, to a synthetical stage where, instead of the unresolved purity of a child or savage race, will be the unembarrassed freedom *plus* the delicate perceptions wrought by civilisation: purity whose inmost heart is holiness—wholeness, a knowledge of entire relationship; while the humble daily offices of the body will have risen from their dark limbo and menial position into the dignity and approval of the social consciousness, beyond jest or whisper, and, having the 'freedom' of the mind conferred upon them, at last flush into poetry itself.

For another triad we may take the physical nature-world as our thesis with the spiritual and spiritual-physical for the antithesis and synthesis.<sup>1</sup> In the existing order of things the physical world is first to exercise its sovereign sway upon us; the sting of the senses and all that pertains to them in the glowing

<sup>1</sup> *Spiritual-physical*. This is an awkward combination. There is no recognised term to express it. Physico-spiritual might be used but the former seems the more accurate.



pageant of the world being at first the only reality—  
epitomised by Scott in

Sound, sound the trumpet, fill the fife,  
To the whole sensuous world proclaim  
One crowded hour of glorious life  
Is worth an age without a name.

Over this joy of battle, the sheer love of life and triumph, the exaltation of the individual, arise those philosophic inferences by which the rationalising mind refers the sense-data to extra-sensuous principles; and from the round of thought and feeling that pertains to daily life appear inchoate emotional needs and longings which constitute the initial aspect of the ideal or spiritual in opposition to the natural order of things: "Weep for the World's wrong."

Or the condition may take the form of the pure emotion of melancholy, the divine brooding, the "sweet sorrow" that comes upon the heart in seclusion; the "tears, idle tears, I know not what they mean, tears from the depth of some divine despair." It is indeed the strange *lacrimæ rerum*.

This state, when seen in others, is the proverbial *pons asinorum* to those kindly primitive souls who believe in 'rational self-indulgence' and a bustling cheerfulness. As it has been aptly said, they see (or feel) unity, because they have not seen (or felt) difference.

From the antithetical condition of separation there dawns a third phase that begins to reconcile the warring worlds of separate *régimes*, so that the material does not present itself as radically different in kind from the ideal, though how far that vast melancholy becomes an integral part of the ideal, one dare not surmise. In other words the physical is the rudi

mentary and inadequate apprehension of the spiritual. This is the beginning of the synthesis.<sup>1</sup> The antithesis was the stage of cloisteral seclusion, of world-renunciation, whose pure contemplation is taken by the synthesis and wedded to practical action, so that the illumination of the former directs the momentum of the latter.

The simple voice of Nature calls us first of all to live, and then she calls us to die; it is the voice of the spirit that bids us 'die to live.' The recognition of a spiritual world existing outside the material, informs life with depth and dignity; but the realisation that the physical is the spiritual, must so immeasurably increase the value of experience as to make each moment thus remembered terrible and sacred.

As the triad of purity, turbidity and holiness is allied to the triad of innocence, sin and virtue, so the triad of faith, scepticism and enlightenment is akin to the physical, spiritual and spiritual-physical.

In this triad of religion the thesis is the exoteric or literal acceptation of the world's scriptures. The antithesis is the sceptical denial of religious truths, and the synthesis is esoteric interpretation, intuition. The first is religion before philosophy and the last is religion after philosophy.

There is one advantage in the way the sacred writings are presented, namely, that their literal or veiled interpretation provides a gospel for simple humanity while their unveiled meaning is already extant for more subtle demands.

<sup>1</sup> As Tennyson writes in the *Holy Grail*:

"This earth he walks on is not earth,  
This light that strikes his eyeball is not light,  
This air that smites his forehead is not air,  
But vision—yea, his very hand and foot."

The world, in Pauline phrase, is transformed by the renewing of the mind.

But there comes a time when the literal teaching will not satisfy, when the mind throwing off the yoke of authority feels that religion has *imposed* upon it, and it therefore denounces tradition and thinks for itself. The simple unity has been ruptured, and like a new-born thing the mind has to make cosmos out of chaos for itself. This antithesis represents the analytic diastolic movement where expansion and self-reliance are gained; the sceptical period is one of great growth and branching in all directions; the sense of freedom is enjoyed together with the dignity of thought, which at last passes over into the wedded union of religion and philosophy; agnosticism shapes itself into gnosticism.<sup>1</sup> This synthesis has for its components the guiding light of the rational principle and the motive force of fervour, by which combination it is enabled, if not at first to experience 'immediately' the truths of traditional theology, at least to feel in some measure the cogency of its truths by intuition. The first stage is represented by the germ of a plant, the second by its rooting and the ramification of its branches, and the third by its complex entirety and crown of bloom. Again the thesis was that truth known by the worshippers in the ancient temples, the synthesis that known by the hierarchs.<sup>2</sup>

And so a man may come to find that the belief he cast aside in other days is true after all but in a new

<sup>1</sup> It is surely the intention of Æschylus to depict the sceptical stage in *Prometheus Bound*—the heroic champion of humanity chained to the fastness of material perception, and gnawed by 'the winged hound of Zeus,' i.e. the passion and suffering in what seemed an unjust and unintelligible world. Does the *Prometheus Unbound* represent reconciliation with Zeus (illumination), rather than submission, or is this reading into the subject?

<sup>2</sup> Hegel speaks of such stages as being affirmation, negation, and the negation of the negation or absolute negation, which last, as Professor Hibben points out, has the force of an affirmation and transcends the negative stage, not by ignoring it but by showing it to belong to a higher unity.

way—"In every Mythus a Logos." A grave fault among teachers is that they are impatient of the analytical period and would hurry the mind into a synthesis of some kind, saying in effect: "You will get over that stage, we all have to pass through it."

The bold and original thought of that illuminating writer Edward Carpenter, in his *Civilisation: its Cause and Cure*, opens a vista of social progression that discloses the Hegelian Dialectic working itself out in another aspect. His contention is that our state of civilisation is a disease through which every nation passes in the course of its evolution.

As long as a race continues in a 'natural' condition it preserves a capacity for health and happiness. The senses are keen and active, sight and hearing marvellously acute, the power of physical recuperation great, the appetites a trustworthy guide to health, and the mind not only unweighted and fresh but enjoying immunity from the sense of sin.

From this felicitous condition it departs until it reaches the evils that limit civilisation, where it is possible for one great division of a nation to live in wantonness and another in want—make-believe and misery. As Carpenter says:

Man has sounded the depth of hell . . . [for] he has to learn to die, quite simply and naturally; die to the most elementary desires, die to his loftiest ideal.<sup>1</sup>

Yet it has been properly pointed out that it is the very alienation and competitive antagonism that has produced the self-reliance and individuality of the present day.

The so-called orthodox view regards material

<sup>1</sup> The first part of the quotation is from *Civilisation*; the second is probably to be found in *The Art of Creation or Towards Democracy*.

civilisation as essentially opposed, by its straitened outlook and mechanical routine, to the life of the spirit, while the same view applies to the scientific method. This stage, however, is the Hegelian antithesis that, while it opposes the thesis, does so only to bring it to a fuller realisation of the truth contained implicitly in the thesis. Its attitude is really one of service, for it is by the passing physical infirmities and mental stress that the true inherent health of humanity is called out and finally confirmed. The worst a contingent can do is to indicate inherent weakness. The black chemic earth of man's misery draws down the roots of his being in order to give him that fundamental power to shoot up into the voluntary life of the spirit, the function of evil being to fertilise the good and to enable man thus to "make manure of the Devil."<sup>1</sup> The triad is generation, degeneration and regeneration.

We find our thesis in the 'noble savage,' and our antithesis in the epoch of scientific and industrial materialism (belief only in the forces of matter and the development of them for physical comfort), in external propinquity and internal separation, where man is united by mechanical contrivances and divorced by the alienation of his own spirit—an age of progress apart.

The synthesis will unite the excellences and transmute the evils of both. The chaotic nature of the instinctual spontaneity found in the thesis will be governed by the orderly thought in the antithesis, and here the stilted artificial character of action determined solely by logical judgments, will be vivified by the free and heartfelt power that is the transmutation of the

<sup>1</sup> Mary Everest Boole, *The Forging of Passion into Power*.

spontaneity found in the thesis. Or, if we allow ourselves to take a lordlier sweep, our thesis will be the first purity of the world, "the glory of the Prime," dawning so far away that its reality reaches us at last spent to the whisper of mythology; our antithesis the fall of man, the woe of life; and the synthesis the burden of prophecy, a Golden Age tried in its own fire. In the *primal* union of the Garden of Eden each loved the other because they were in natural harmony, instinctively attracted; while in the *perfect* union of the synthesis love will be a voluntary going-forth, or that deliberate act of the spirit that offers itself not out of innocent fullness, but out of a consciousness that overstrides all obliquity and alienation, and in its sacramental nature ratifies the rational principle of fundamental unity: natural attraction, natural repulsion, sacrificial love; lust, hate, love. 'The lover' represents the primal simplicity that is repeated in the morning of each life; the naïve selfishness—"live for thee, die for thee, only for thee."

In order to observe the process on this grand scale, let us glance at the Dialectical principle in germ-life and then compare it with international life.

The undifferentiated unity of the first cell divides itself and becomes many cells which coalesce into groups and finally draw together into an organised whole of differentiated tissues, etc.

So we hear of a unity of mankind before the division of tongues which marks the thesis; but we may ourselves see an international condition like the second cellular stage passing into the third. For here again are segregated groups, where social unrest and war represent the seething process, while yet the groups tend to aggregate and thus build themselves into a

higher entity, a unity of world-consciousness that uses racial traits as personal faculties.

The three parts of the Hegelian triad (placed as they have been in sequence for the purpose of examination) will be recognised as existing in most individuals to some extent simultaneously; that is to say, though persons will fall broadly into either thesis, antithesis or synthesis, yet by the unequal growth of character they will be in some respects in a synthetical category, while in others they still remain in the thesis. But whatever movement they make, according to Hegelian Logic, will be forward movement that proceeds towards the realisation of reconciling reality.

The master-words of Christianity and Buddhism are compassion, renunciation and unity, though in Christianity the last is more deeply veiled under the antagonistic aspect of good and evil. In Hegelianism the terms that correspond are relation, negation and union,<sup>1</sup> summarised in the word '*aufgehoben*'—life, death, resurrection.

The doctrine 'die to live' is a principle to be found in Buddhism, Christianity and Hegelianism. Incorporate as it is in two of the profoundest movements of the world and one of the greatest philosophies, it is worthy of the fullest examination in regard to the question whether or not it be the *modus operandi* of Nature, expressing itself at once in physical and psychical phenomena.

If its full significance should be found to obtain, the application of its law will be recognised as wider than any other.

L. A. COMPTON-RICKETT.

<sup>1</sup> Harmony. The Cosmos is a diapason.

# THE UNBELIEVABLE CHRIST.

R. HOPKYNs KEBLE, M.A.

## I.

RELIGIOUS belief is a vexed question, and many attempts have been made to settle it upon a philosophical basis. In some quarters it is customary to decry these attempts on the ground that the heart is as much concerned as the head, and that the heart cannot be reduced to philosophy; and even Fr. Robert Hugh Benson has recently reminded us that it is vain to seek the odour of beauty by smelling Botticelli's 'Primavera.' But the school of thought to which Fr. Benson belongs, parts company with this other with which it appears to have a good deal in common, inasmuch as it admits a sphere of the head which the other tends to neglect. "Reason is a beast," said Martin Luther, "and it is a quality of Faith that it strangles the monster." Yes, but he reasoned himself into strangling reason; and that is precisely the province of the head, to choose aright the field of exercise for the heart.

Thus it is possible to begin an enquiry into this vexed question with an axiom which seems to me to be indubitable, the axiom namely that a man believes whatever he does believe either on the authority of some other person or on his own experience. Of course the issue is a little complicated because we believe the major part of things on authority which has itself been tested by experience; but that fact



does not alter the main premise, since it does but relegate to the sphere of experience some more considerable measure of those incidents which we conceive ourselves to believe on authority alone. Thus I believe in the British Empire mainly because of my morning newspaper; but I have shaken hands with Anglo-Indians and Canadians. However, the main axiom does lie clear. Only two classes of individuals trust themselves on neither authority nor experience, and they are lunatics and children. The lunatic who believes himself to be the King of Siam has neither experienced the kingly state nor received any authoritative recognition of his claim, and it is because he yet continues to assert his kingship that we shut him up in a lunatic asylum. The child is happier; yet in a sense like. But we welcome the fancies of childhood, not because they are based on a mental state impossible of continuance, but because they are the product of a certain delicate, transitory, figurative spirit which we recognise to be of the Kingdom of God, and which leads to a lovable submission to the dictates of authority.

But this axiom has a corollary that is of the utmost importance. We must affirm that however much a man may believe on experience, the very fact that it is experience only on which he believes, rules him out of count as a teacher. Experience is a personal subjective matter which may be offered to a second person, but cannot be inflicted upon him. A dancing Dervish may insist that he has had experience of the Seventh Heaven, the Lord Mohammed, and the houris of Paradise, and he may present his experience to me, but there is no civilised country which would not substantiate my claim to lock him up if he howls outside

my door against my will. And why? Surely because we recognise that experience of that nature is not an arguable matter. If he has experienced, well and good, let him believe; but I have not, and I myself should be lunatic if I accepted his evidence without myself having experienced it or without further guarantee. In a word he may *offer*; but he may not *teach*.

Authority, on the contrary, has no need to offer save out of a generous spirit of love, and it must teach. If I am an Indian in Benares I may neither have seen the King, nor experienced prison life, nor walked the streets of Westminster, but I believe in all these things when the tax-collector presents himself at my door. I believe in them because the tax-collector can establish his identity with authority, and authority has just this about it, that it is entirely indifferent to my experience or lack of it. It may demand money of me for unreal and visionary or even unrighteous objects, and it can extract it because I cannot question, in a last resort, the unquestionable power behind. I allow a doctor to probe me, physic me, and generally inflict himself upon me, because I grant him the authority which he claims as a man of science whose scientific training has given him knowledge. Moreover, although I am myself a free agent, the community will force me to submit to the doctor's authority, if I have an infectious disease. It is not that I have experienced the results of his physic as yet any more than I have experienced Paradise; but it is that, because his claim is authoritative, I take at his hands in hope of a happy end what I refuse of the Dervish (although he offers me a like hope) just because all the latter has to offer it upon is his own unarguable experience. That is, Authority may *teach*; Experience can only *offer*.

## II.

These common considerations have a very real value when they are translated into the realm of religion. No religion ought to essay to teach unless it can point to reasonable authority; and no sane man ought to allow himself to be taught unless he is convinced of that authority. Hence 'By what authority?' is a question that all ought to ask of all religions that pretend to teach.

If the answer that they return is inadequate, what they teach must remain on that ground an open question. It may be that they claim that experience can prove what they teach, but in that case they are not really teaching, they are only offering; and they have no right to expect me to believe anything more than that which I do at last experience. Aphrodite was born of the foam of the sea, declares the Greek prophet; and I maintain that I neither believe nor disbelieve it save on the most general grounds. I do not believe it because I do not regard the authority which proclaims it as adequate, and because it is contrary to my religious experience of the working of God; but I should believe it, super-natural, super-reasonable fact though it be, if either an already accepted authority presented it to me, or if I met Aphrodite and she told me. In the latter case I should have no right to impose my special revelation on other folk; but in the former, if I were the accredited agent of authority, I should be within my rights in imposing my faith on the other children of that authority, or in punishing them by rejection.

Now when I read in *What is Christianity?* that the Christian Religion means "one thing and one thing only: Eternal life in the midst of time, by the strength

and under the eyes of God," I maintain that if this be all, the Christian Religion falls entirely outside the kingdom of fact and authority. Such a faith ought to be taught to none, and offered only by those who have experienced it. That must be all. 'Eternal life in the midst of time' must be an experience, and to have really experienced it without doubt, is, on Prof. Harnack's word, to be Christian. But 'Eternal life in the midst of time' is not a thing that I can take with my letters or pay with my taxes at the hand and at the beck of authority, indeed it is not concerned with authority at all. If the Christian Religion is this, it is a thing that ought to be taught in no school and inflicted upon no state; it will be real only to those who have experienced it, and their duty will be to offer themselves as evidence, but not to teach; and it will disappear when no more individuals are found to have experienced it.

### III.

But Prof. Harnack has scarcely done justice to what the Christian Religion has claimed to be any way for 1500 years at least. We are faced really with two facts—not one, as is often supposed: the fact of an historic personage known to the world as Jesus of Nazareth, and the fact that the interpretation of Him offered to us in the Nicene Creed has been the faith of the Western world from days so early that to reject it involves the branding of Paul of Tarsus with the stigma of an innovator. For the moment we are not concerned with the stupendous marvel of the thought that the huge edifice of Catholicity was reared from the brain of a Cilician Jew, although that is for example, the conclusion of the writer on 'The Words

of Institution at the Last Supper' in *The Hibbert Journal* (Oct., 1910), and of other illustrious theologians and critics. All that is by the way; our concern is with the fact that despite modern liberal theology the Nicene Christ has been the only Christ of the world for a clear fifteen hundred years, and that He is spoken of among us to-day.

The Nicene Christ is an interpretation of the Historic Christ, whether true or not is beside the point at present; and the Nicene Christ is a Christ of Miracle. Of course there can be no denial of that. The Nicene Creed teaches me that the Babe in the cradle must be adored as 'Very God of Very God,' which is, as Mr. Lowes Dickenson has said, reversing the order, that 'the lord of the stars and the tiger' may be called by 'a pet name.'

And precisely as a man who believes in the possibility of the Philosophers' Stone need find no difficulty with the story of King Midas, so, if I believe the Incarnation,—the Atonement, the Resurrection, the Ascension, the Session and the Advent need present no further difficulty touching miracle to me. But two conclusions outstand from this Nicene Christ of Miracle. It is certain that these matters are matters in the realm of the supernatural demanding, and based upon, the intervention of some other power than that of man; and secondly that they must have a value entirely independent of man's acceptance or rejection of them. If a Virgin conceived and brought forth a Child of no earthly parentage, then whatever we mean by God is involved; and whatever we mean by God, we mean something which transcends the mind of man and must remain incomprehensible until man becomes as God. Or again if God gave Mary a Son, it

is a fact so to speak in the realm of God which cannot depend upon man's belief or disbelief. Although all the world deny it, if He gave her a Son, He gave Him. And more, if the Advent be a fact, if Christ be coming to judge both the quick and the dead, that *must* be a fact entirely independent of the world's treatment of it. Incidentally, its very futurity makes the basing of a belief in it upon experience utterly impossible. It is worth noting the fallacy of the common argument that personal experience of a living Christ is sufficient authority for believing all His words, because one has to ask immediately how do you know what His words are? Prof. Harnack claims to have experienced the living Christ in some sense, but he rejects the words of the Advent as nonsense. Our point for the moment is that no man can experience the Advent or the Virgin Birth any more than he can have the experience of actually hearing the syllables of the Advent prophecy. And unless he hear them, he cannot experience them; he can only take them on some authority of manuscript or tradition. But if they are facts, they *are facts*.

Coming back then to what we may call the Catholic Christ we find that He is the result of an identification of the Historic Christ and the Nicene Christ, and He shares in the attributes of the Nicene. He must have a value independent of man's acceptance or rejection of His claims; He must, in part at least, be divorced from experience, for no man can claim to have experienced such events as the Advent; and He must demand the intervention of a supernatural or supernormal Power by way of explanation. There He stands in the distance; for however much it may be claimed that He stands in the present also, it is true that the littered stable-yard of Bethlehem and the

beams of Calvary are 1900 years behind us. There He stands, and allegiance is based for Him to-day upon experience and upon authority.

#### IV.

The allegiance which is based upon experience is dismissable in a dozen sentences. We have seen to begin with, that whatever experience may *offer*, it cannot *teach*. The Salvation Army captain claims to have experienced personal contact with the Baby born in Bethlehem twenty centuries ago; it may have been for him a heavenly vision. "You cannot smash my experience," said such a one on a chair in Chelsea last year. No, you cannot; but neither can he 'smash' the experience of the man who says he has not experienced Him. And even in this offer of experience, as we have seen, the captain must himself recognise his own limitations. It is impossible to experience the Catholic Christ. Even Brother Lawrence who was able to say within a week of his own death: "I hope from His mercy the favour to see Him within a few days," had to wait those few days. Brother Lawrence has doubtless experienced something by now; but neither he nor any other living soul could ever claim on this earth to have experienced more than half the Apostles' Creed. And even if he had, he could not *teach* it.

#### V.

We are thus left absolutely with the conclusion that if the religion of the Catholic Christ is to be taught to the world, it must be a religion of authority, and moreover its characteristics must be the characteristics of the Faith it is to teach. This Christ of miracle

cannot be believed unless the authority which claims to teach Him produces the same miraculous elements. We only believe in a spring of water among the mountains when it is water that we drink from the bed of the stream in the valley; and I am not going to accept a fountain head of almost incredible miracle, unless its outcome be in a miracle too. I cannot submit to the witness of an authority which is so human that it is certain to be human in error. I might as well believe in Aphrodite at the bidding of the Greeks, or in Mohammed at the call of my Dervish.

Whatever authority, therefore, sets up for the Catholic Faith must be supernatural in its life, for its life must be independent of the changing ages. If the Christ wishes to leave an authority to teach Him to me at the end of nineteen hundred years, He must leave an authority with a life certain to continue in any event. If His authority is a body of men, it must be a body of men capable of retaining and passing on truth because of a divine gift of permanence, or otherwise how am I to be sure that what they teach me is not the product of a mediæval age or of modern liberal Christianity? If it is not a body of men, it must be something at all events with this gift of indefectibility.

It must be an authority, furthermore, capable of explaining its own words, and constant in its expression: "If the trumpet give an uncertain sound who shall prepare himself for the battle?" It is of no use to me to read in the Bible that Christ said: "This is My Body"; what I want to know is what He meant when He said that. Nor is it any use my reading the canons of the first four Councils, for they are open to diverse interpretations even more readily than the Gospels. Nor is it any use offering me an authority which speaks, let



us say, about *S. Matt.*, 9<sup>18</sup>, with one voice in Moscow and another in Canterbury (and another at Cowley) and another at Rome, to say nothing of Westminster, Wittenberg and Geneva. Nor is an Authority any better which numbers S. Augustine, Luther, and Dwight L. Moody as links in its chain. In a word, this authority must have the gift of Divine consistency.

If many men claim many opinions within the bounds of the Body about this miraculous Christ Who cannot be as a whole experienced even in the facts of His Birth and certainly in the facts of His Future, then this authority must be able to decide between them, and to reject the false. It must be able to bind and loose, and to bind and loose with a surety no less than divine. If the stream be poisoned among the mountains no man can tell the nature of the fount. Either then our Stream must keep itself clean, or be kept clean by Another. In either case the keeping clean must be miraculous, and miraculously attested, or I cannot trust the water. I do not care how the cleansing is exercised ; by what mechanical means the binding is performed ; in what earthen vessel the treasure is contained ; but the treasure, the power of binding, and the cleansing must be there, and it must be divine. In a sentence this authority must be indefectible, infallible, and vital—vital because it must be possessed of Nature's own power of recuperation and rejection of extraneous matter, like a plant, for example a mustard plant. And without such a Witness, the Catholic Christ is unbelievable.

If He have such a Witness, however, there can be but one further corollary to add. Authority such as this, and for such as this, must receive absolute submission. There can be no question of picking or

choosing among the tenets of the Catholic Christ, for they one and all depend with Him on an authority which must be itself accepted or rejected. If I reject the Descent into Hades I reject the entire Apostles' Creed, because I can only believe the Descent into Hades by accepting that Authority which gives me the Apostles' Creed. Nor shall I have any trouble about individual articles of Faith. After all, God on any assumption is so far above me that He cannot be fully understood by me, and the Catholic Christ must possess elements not to be understood as well as not to be experienced. These tenets which trouble me will belong to this category. Them I must accept, not understanding, but because I do understand why I accept the authority which orders them. In short, I become a little child to enter the Kingdom of Heaven.

## VI.

We are back then at the lunatic and the child, for the individual who goes on believing in the Catholic Christ without adequate authority, and without the possibility of adequate experience, is as much a lunatic in the sphere of religion as our suggested King of Siam. The best that can be said is that he must not be allowed to inflict himself upon more reasonable mortals. But we are also back at the child, at the child who, without either experience or authority, obtains somehow and somewhere an attitude of mind, guilty indeed of futile fancies in some directions, but productive of a wise submission and loving obedience to an authority which must take the place of experience, always in some things, for a long time in others. And maybe this attitude is identical with that quality which Pasteur said he shared with the Breton peasant, since

he just came short of sharing it with the Breton peasant's wife.

But how may it be obtained? "*Si scires donum Dei. . .*" We can neither condemn those who have it not, nor quarrel with those that have. Prof. Adolf Harnack has it not, and not being a lunatic he does not believe in the Catholic Christ. Dr. Albert von Ruville has it, and not being a lunatic, he does believe in the Catholic Christ. He shares in that child's fancy, presumably, which found:

Christ walking on the water

Not of Gennesareth, but Thames.

All men either have that gift, or have it not. If they have it, through a mist of tears, they see. If they have it not, they can only throw themselves on the mercy of a Father Whose Son, if He be the Catholic Christ, they cannot yet believe because they cannot accept as yet His only adequate witness. Maybe, with them, it is the tears that blind. Ah! but it is said of Him that He can wipe away tears from off all faces.

R. HOPKYNs KEBLE.

## THE IDEAL LIFE IN PROGRESSIVE BUDDHISM.

G. R. S. MEAD, B.A.

IN the July number of *THE QUEST* I tried to give some idea of the nature of 'Spiritual Reality in Progressive Buddhism,'—that is to say, of the meaning of Nirvāṇa according to the most highly developed doctrine of the Mahāyāna or Great Vehicle, in other words, of the Northern Expansion of Buddhist tradition. In introducing the subject a rough sketch was attempted of the elementary factors that have to be borne in mind in any endeavour to trace the evolution of Buddhist dogma, and to this I would refer the reader as preliminary to the present paper as well.

Having had occasion lately to re-read Professor Louis de la Vallée Poussin's article on the term 'Bodhisattva,'<sup>1</sup> I have thought that it might be of service to return to the subject and to make a few notes on the ideal life as conceived of in the more catholic and progressive form of the Dharma or Buddhist Truth.

The spiritual Buddhist Church, in its highest connotation, is composed of the Bodhisattvas. It is they who constitute the Saṅgha, or Order, the Communion of Buddhist Saints. What, then, is a Bodhisattva?

<sup>1</sup> Art. 'Bodhisattva,' in Hastings' *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*, vol. ii. (1909), pp. 739-753. This in many ways admirable essay contains the amplest collection of material so far available.

Bodhi-sat-tva means literally 'Enlightenment-essence,' hence an enlightened being. Bodhi is the Buddhist technical term for Spiritual Enlightenment; hence Buddha in its simplest meaning signifies the Enlightened One, and the Gospel or Truth taught by the Buddha is known as the Bodhi-dharma. Bodhi does not mean intellectual knowledge; it is to be conceived of rather as an immediate and vital apprehension of truth operated by the moral energy of being true oneself. It may perhaps be described as sympathetic insight, or intuition, or spiritual understanding. Or again, it may be thought of as wisdom in its deepest meaning; not a perception of externals or an intellectual grasp of things as apart from ourselves in separation, but rather a vital comprehension of the nature and purpose of all existences as sympathetically embraced in our own being—in other words, self-realisation.

A Bodhisattva, however, is not possessed of Bodhi in its fulness; such transcendent perfection is reserved for the Buddha alone. To the latter, as possessor of perfect Bodhi, the superlatively honorific title Samyak Sam-buddha is given,—a term which may be literally rendered as the 'Supremely Perfectly-enlightened.' A Bodhisattva is thus a potential Buddha, a Buddha in the making, or a future Buddha. Thus 'Bodhisattva' has come to mean in its more general sense, not one whose essence is Enlightenment, but one whose essence is *of the nature of* Enlightenment; he is potentially enlightened but has not yet realised Bodhi in its perfection.<sup>1</sup> To use the more familiar Christian terms, he is not a Christ, the fully Anointed of the Divine Spirit, but one in whose 'heart' the Christ is being

<sup>1</sup> Cp. the saying in the Naassene Document of the Christianised Gnosis: "The beginning of Perfection is the Gnosis of Man, but Gnosis of God is perfected Perfection" (Hippol. Ref. v. 1; cp. *Thrice-Greatest Hermes* i. 147).

'born'—where 'heart' means the mystic 'heart,' as in Sufiism, the identical 'essence' to which reference has already been made. This *sat-tva*, 'heart' or 'essence,' thus suggests the depth<sup>1</sup> or deep of the man, his true 'wholeness' or 'monad'; a meaning confirmed by the synonym 'own-being' (*sva-bhāva*), which is, perhaps the equivalent of divine nature.

If Bodhi, then, connotes Enlightenment or the purest spiritual consciousness, we must be careful not to confound it with the 'subliminal' or 'sub-conscious,' which is by no means an explanation, but rather simply a label for what is at present little better than the common dumping ground of psychological ignorance. The 'sub-conscious' conveys to us little meaning save that of a submerged and bafflingly heterogeneous mass of sense-impressions interblended with a tangled complex or rather chaos of feelings of every sort and description, and that, too, more frequently of a low than of a high order. The spiritual consciousness of Bodhi suggests, on the contrary, the bringing into activity of the purified essence of our being so that it becomes a spiritual sensory, the vehicle of the unitary sense or immediate apprehension or sympathetic understanding. It is, so to speak, self-effacing insight clear of all personal prejudices. The differentiated organs of sense can only be used as means of immediate understanding when once every stain and tinge of personal desire and every taint of selfishness has been purged from this primal nature. On the one hand, the attainment of this transcendent consciousness seems to be dependent on the most strenuous purification of the moral nature, on the other it may be regarded as the immediate energising of Bodhi itself, which is

<sup>1</sup> Gk. *byth-os*; cp. *√ budh*, from which *bodhi* and *buddha*.

characterised by its aseity,<sup>1</sup> or self-origination, and hence its self-sufficiency.

The first awareness of this spiritual consciousness is called Bodhi-chitta. The conscious entrance into the Way of Bodhi, or what may be called the Path of Light and Life and Love, is said to take place when the aspiration or hope or thought (*chitta*) of becoming a Buddha for the sake of saving all sentient creatures arises in the 'heart.' The will thus begins to be purified of every selfish stain, and the transformation of the whole nature is gradually achieved by persistent effort. It is a process of spiritual alchemy that transmutes the base into the pure.

As still preserved in the Little Vehicle even, the legend runs that the Being, who as Shākyamuni reached to Buddhahood, had already in one of his long previous births made the Great Vow<sup>2</sup> of the Bodhisattva. In that far distant birth, it is said, the future Buddha Shākyamuni was the Arhat Sumedha. Sumedha had already discovered the way to the Nirvāṇa of the Arhat, which according to the doctrine of the Great Vehicle connotes salvation for self alone. But once he had seen in vision the glory of the then reigning Buddha, known to tradition as Dīpaṅkara, Sumedha renounced this false freedom, the 'Nirvāṇa of the eye' as it is sometimes called, and became a Bodhisattva in the hope of eventually attaining the supreme reality of the Samyak Sambodhi state, that is of the wholly and perfectly Enlightened One, whose salvation consists in the saving of others. Sumedha thus became a Buddha-seed or seed of Buddha<sup>3</sup>, or a sprout or shoot of Buddhahood.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> That which arises from itself (*a se*).

<sup>2</sup> This is known either as the Vow (*praṇidhāna* or *saṃvāra*) or Supplication (*prāthanā* or *abhinirhāra*). <sup>3</sup> Buddha-bija. <sup>4</sup> Buddhāṅkura.

The difference was this, and it was fundamental, according to the doctrine of the Great Vehicle: the Arhat strove to bring suffering for self to an end, while the Bodhisattva vowed himself to unceasing suffering in the service of others. Henceforth his task is to 'mature' or 'ripen' beings. Just as in some traditions in the West, and notably in the Trismegistic doctrine, the special duty of man is said to be to tend, develop and raise the animal creation, as it is the special office of the gods and good daimones to take care of men, so is the special service of the Bodhisattva to elevate, purify and save<sup>1</sup> not only mankind but also all sentient creatures of every kind in all states. Thus the Bodhi to which the Bodhisattva aspires, is not the elementary enlightenment which enables the believer to apprehend the doctrine of the causes of personal suffering and the means to bring them to an end, as laid down in the traditional teaching of Gautama Shākyamuni, but the transcendent ideal of Samyak Sambodhi, the 'perfectly perfect Gnosis.' This Wisdom goes far beyond the acquisition of the truth necessary for personal salvation, that is, according to Buddhist dogmatics, the conviction of the possibility of freeing oneself from egoism or even of transcending egoity in the sense of a separated or shut-off existence. Samyak Sambodhi is said not only to confer omniscience<sup>2</sup> in the sense of intuitive apprehension of all things and their causes, and so that immediate comprehension which is perfect understanding, but also to bestow creative faculty and executive ability, the power of a will that instantly accomplishes itself.

<sup>1</sup> Perhaps it would be more correct, according to Buddhist views, to say "be the means of purification and salvation being wrought in all creatures." For the strict doctrine seems to be that no one short of the Eternal or Perfect Buddha can save another really; all that can be done is to help others to save themselves.

<sup>2</sup> *Sarva-jñā-tva* (=omni-sci-ence).



It is thus to be thought of as the practical science of spiritual Wisdom, for it is the vital Gnosis that bestows omnipotence.<sup>1</sup>

The heights of this perfection are to be attained by ascending the degrees of the ladder of the 'transcendental virtues,' to the foot of which the path of institutional discipline leads. The first step of the ascent is marked by the taking of the Vow; that is to say, in the instituted rites there is a solemn ceremony of reception. It goes without saying, however, that before this Vow can be legitimately taken externally, there must have already been a 'calling' of the spirit within—a true 'vocation,' just as in Christian devotion, and also in some forms of Pagan personal religion before it in the West. In the inner discipline of some of the Hellenistic mystery-religions, for instance, the candidate had to be 'called' by the Patron God or Goddess before he could be duly initiated.<sup>2</sup> The nature of the Vow of the Bodhisattva may be seen from the well-known formulas—well known that is to say, to millions of Buddhists of the Great Vehicle, though presumably not known to one in a million in the West. According to Shāntideva (seventh century) in his *Bodhichary-āvatāra* (or *Introduction to the Practice of the Bodhi*), they are given as follows:

(1) The sin accumulated in my former existences, accumulated in all creatures, is infinite and omnipotent. By what power can it be conquered, if not by the thought of Bodhi, by the desire to become Buddha for the salvation of all men? This totally disinterested desire is infinitely sacred. It covers a multitude of

<sup>1</sup> *Jñā-tva*=*Gno-sis*; *sarva-kāra-jñā-tva* thus = the Gnosis that bestows omnipotence.

<sup>2</sup> The neophyte was 'called' in dream or vision, which had to be confirmed however by a similar vision on the part of the initiated priests who transmitted the rite. See Reitzenstein (R.), *Die hellenistischen Mysterienreligionen: ihre Grundgedanke und Wirkungen* (Leipzig, 1910).

sins. It ensures happiness during the round of existences. It is a pledge of the supreme happiness of the Buddhas for one's self and one's neighbour. All honour to the Buddhas whom everybody quite naturally loves, and who have as their sole aim the salvation of men !

(2) I worship the Buddhas and the Bodhisattvas in view of undertaking the Vow of Bodhi. Possessing nothing, by reason of my sins, how can I render unto them the worship which is due ? I beg them to accept this whole universe which I offer them in thought. But I am wrong, I do possess something ; I give myself unreservedly, by pure affection to the Buddhas and to their sons, the divine Bodhisattvas. I am their slave<sup>1</sup> and as such, have no more danger to fear. Of all dangers, the greatest is that which comes from my sins. I know how harmful these things are, I deplore them, I acknowledge them. I see and you see them as they are, pardon them !<sup>2</sup>

(3) But enough of myself. Let me belong entirely to the Buddhas and their creatures. I rejoice in the good actions which, among ordinary men, for a time prevent evil rebirths. I rejoice in the deliverance gained by the Arhats. I delight in the state of Buddha and Bodhisattva, possessed by the Protectors of the world. I entreat the Buddhas to preach the Law for the salvation of the world. I entreat them to delay their entrance into Nirvāṇa.<sup>3</sup> All the merit acquired by my worship of the Buddhas, my taking of refuge, my confession of sins, etc., I apply to the good of creatures and to the attainment of the Bodhi. I wish to be bread for those who are hungry, drink for those who are thirsty. I give myself, all that I am and shall be in my future existences, to creatures. In the same dispositions as those in which the former Buddhas were when they undertook the Vow of Bodhi, just as they carried out the obligations of future Buddhas, practising in

<sup>1</sup> Precisely the same term as is used in the Hellenistic mystery-religions and in the writings of Paul.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. 'The Confession of the Manichæan Hearers' quoted in the Notes of the July number, and in Mr. F. C. Conybeare's article, 'The Religion of Mani,' in the October issue. There was in highest probability a Buddhist tincture in the Religion of Mani.

<sup>3</sup> This is a somewhat strange supplication to find in such a connection, seeing that the perpetual preaching of the Law and the renunciation of Nirvāṇa are the essential characteristics of the Buddhas, at any rate according to the doctrines of the Great Vehicle, and Shāntideva was a Mahāyānist.

their order the perfect virtues, in these dispositions I conceive the thought of Bodhi for the salvation of the world, so also I shall practise in their order my obligations.<sup>1</sup>

But the Vow does not make the Bodhisattva. To arrive at the goal of 'perfect Perfection' which at the long last unites or harmonises the will of the man with the Divine Will, and so makes him a fully conscious co-operator with the Divine Purpose and the Divine Process, the new-born Bodhisattva must not only practise the virtues of ordinary morality incumbent on the laity or even the stricter discipline required of the monk, but he must become such a proficient in the perfect or transcendental virtues that they become spontaneous powers in him,—that is to say, spiritual qualities that express themselves naturally in every thought and word and deed; they operate through his purified essence as untrammelled, immediate, divine energies. At the beginning the manifestation of these spiritual virtues is of course intermittent; they appear as occasional excellencies at best. Their unimpeded operation is assured only when the man's whole being is so set in love of the Divine, so dynamic in compassion for all creatures, that he becomes at every moment an ever-ready servant and minister of the Truth, that is of the Eternal Will.

These 'transcendental' (*pāramitā*) virtues are so called, it is said, because they pertain to the Bodhisattva who has truly reached the 'further shore' (*parā*), that is to the Buddha. Such a one is called *Parā-gata*,<sup>2</sup> in that he has 'arrived at' (*gata*) the 'further shore' or 'other side' of Samsāra, the stream,

<sup>1</sup> See Poussin's art., *loc. cit.*, p. 749.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. the Buddha-title *Tathā-gata* = He who has reached the That-state, meaning the state of supreme Perfection.

or course, or circuit (*sāra*) of phenomenal existence or transmigration ; that is to say, he has reached Nirvāṇa or transcended the necessity of being reborn into any state whatever of separated existence. But he has reached this end with a motive very different from that of the Arhat. The matured Bodhisattva has transcended the necessity of being compelled against his will to re-enter the stream of birth-and-death, in this sense he has reached the other shore ; but in so far as he is Bodhisattva and not Arhat, it is his own good pleasure, his joyful will, to remain in that ocean of perpetual stress and change ; he is still to be *in* the world, though not *of* it. The reality to which the Bodhisattva attains thus differs fundamentally from the ideal of the Arhat, in that the former learns, as we saw in the paper on 'Spiritual Reality in Progressive Buddhism,' that Nirvāṇa is really not a state of absolute severance from the turmoil of the world, not a state of withdrawal into some carefully protected elysium of what in last analysis is but a selfish condition of serenity, rest and bliss, but on the contrary that true self-realisation is to be found only in the actualities of the life of Saṃsāra or concrete existence. These 'transcendental' powers<sup>1</sup> are thus to be regarded as 'immanent' virtues ; and 'transcendental' therefore becomes equivalent to 'nirvāṇic' in the dynamic sense of the term, that is to say operative at every moment and in every phase of the Ever-becoming.

These virtues in their perfection are thus conceived of as pure or impersonal or utter ; and the 'practice'

<sup>1</sup> These transcendencies are known specifically as *pra-jñā-pāramitū* or gnostic perfections, where *pra-jñā* (= perhaps in Greek *epi-gnōsis*) stands for that vital essential understanding which connotes doing or will, as well as thought and feeling. There can be no pure understanding until the will also is operative.

which leads up to their spontaneous manifestation consists of the strenuous elimination from the whole nature of personal desire for the benefit of self. Indeed, the original significance of the term '*nirvāṇa*' was simply the 'extinction' or 'blowing out' of the flame of this selfish longing. It did not mean 'extinction' in the sense of annihilation of being or even of existence, as is so often asserted in the West, for such an absurdity is unthinkable, but the transmutation of the whole nature or will from the inevitable 'death'-bringing grasping at possessions and powers for self to the divine self-sacrificing love which gives of all to all, and converts the separated individual into a free channel of eternal life.

The inadequate English equivalents of some of these transcendental virtues—such as charity, renunciation, energy, patience, wisdom, truth—convey but little of the real sense and power of such excellencies. They can, of course, mean but little to those who, either in the East or the West, have not deliberately and whole-heartedly practised them, in brief, who have not 'lived'<sup>1</sup> them. Moral and social experience to be effective must be vital and not theoretical, of the depth and not of the surface, concrete and not abstract. For these virtues to be actualised into powers, thought, word and deed must agree together, or their efficacy and efficiency will be non-existent, or at best unbalanced, diverted, weakened.

The basis of all these virtues is said to be sympathy. With that exactitude which is so beloved of the theorist, but so little in the mind of the practitioner, we are told that there are four 'means of sympathy,' or in more clumsy rendering 'elements of popularity' or 'of

<sup>1</sup> The German *erleben* and not simply *erfahren*.

conciliating creatures<sup>1</sup>: giving, kindly address, practising the rule of altruism, and doing oneself what we recommend to our neighbours; or, more generally, liberality, affability and obligingness, and sharing the joys and the sorrows of others.

Though all the orders and grades of the virtues are set forth with that pseudo-precision in which scholastic and monkish artificiality so greatly delights, they are practically all one of another, and cannot be, or at any rate have not been, so far, either in the East or the West, distinguished with real scientific exactitude. A vague notion, however, of some of them, may perhaps be gleaned from the following indications.

The virtue of giving or charity (*dāna*) or compassion (*karuṇā*) is said to arise when the disciple reflects:

My neighbour suffers his pain just as I suffer mine; why should I be anxious about myself and not about him?<sup>2</sup>

To be of real effect, however, this virtue must not be exercised to excess, otherwise the striver for Bodhi declines from the virtue of perfect balance. The virtue of impersonal morality (*śīla*) must be practised; and genuine impersonal morality includes self-preservation, though of course solely with the motive of benefiting others. The Bodhisattva must always so act as to be revered by his fellow-men; but again not for the sake of personal satisfaction or the gratification of spiritual pride, but in order that he may be thus a more potent means of helping others. He must further be possessed of unending patience (*kṣānti*), which includes endurance of all personal suffering and injuries, and thus develops insight into the Law. Anger, even righteous anger so-called, must never stir him, for the

<sup>1</sup> *San-graha-vastus*.

<sup>2</sup> *Bodhicharyāv.* vii. 90.

Bodhisattva should be as he is by definition a 'being of goodness.' Thus the practiser of patience will argue :

My enemy takes a stick to beat me, and I have assumed this body, liable to be wounded, and destined to be beaten. Far from being angry with my enemy, I ought to consider him almost as beneficial as the Buddhas, for he affords me the opportunity of practising patience, and forgiveness of wrongs, which blots out my sins. Am I to make this principle of salvation the cause of my condemnation? Let us rather pity our enemies who ruin themselves by their anger, and let us think of means of saving them in spite of themselves, as the Buddhas do. As to anger provoked by slander, loss of property, etc., it is particularly absurd ; so also is anger against the enemies of our religion, iconoclasts, etc.<sup>1</sup>

The ascent of the Bodhisattva is by no means a *via negativa* ; it is distinctly not quietism, at any rate in the vulgar and perhaps prejudiced sense of the term. It has throughout to be effected by positive effort for good, by energy (*vīrya*). There is to be no putting off, no saying 'there is time,' one of the besetting sins of the reincarnationist faith. Every nerve must be strained to shake oneself free from the bonds that bind to selfish desire. Thus the practiser of energy, the liver of the strenuous spiritual life, reflects :

I am in the power of the passions, like a fish in the hands of the fisherman, for I am in the net of rebirths threatened by death and by the guardians of the hells. Thou hast boarded this vessel which is the human state ; cross the river of suffering ; thou fool, this is no time for sleep ; when and at what cost wilt thou find this vessel again ?<sup>2</sup>

Though the doctrine of the Great Vehicle insists upon the virtue of meditation, this should, according to Shāntideva, from whose treatise we have been quoting, be entirely subordinated to the active virtues of charity, humility and patience. As to the subject of

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

such meditation again, far from counselling the vacant contemplation of the nothingness of the ego, Shāntideva insists on the moral and practical discipline of dwelling on the equality of self and neighbour and on the substitution of neighbour for self. Thus the disciple meditates on the 'enmity' of the selfish 'self,' or 'thought' as follows:

Renounce, O my thought, the foolish hope that I have still a special interest in you. I have given you to my neighbour, thinking nothing of your sufferings . . . . I remember your long enmity, and I crush you, O self, the slave of your own interests. If I really love myself, I must not love myself. If I wish to preserve myself, I must not preserve myself.<sup>1</sup>

The supreme virtue is wisdom (*pra-jñā*), the acquiring of the certitude of truth, of what really is (*tat-tva*). Only Buddhas, however, enjoy its fruit in fulness; Bodhisattvas cultivate its germ.

The unremitting practice of these transcendental virtues results in the spiritual energising of the whole man. It bears fruit in the Bodhisattva, however, as has been previously said, in no 'transcendental' fashion, if by this is meant something purely subjective and outside concrete reality. It bears fruit, it is taught, by gradually bringing to birth in the saint the so-called 'body'<sup>2</sup> of a Buddha. This essential entity, rather than body in the vulgar meaning of the term, though in its fundamental reality one with the Buddha as the Embodiment of Truth,<sup>3</sup> has two modes of existence: (1) as underlying the body of manifestation of a Buddha in the world of men, and (2) as revealed to saints in vision and to the gods in the (to us) subjective worlds.

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.* With such a passage before us, what becomes of the doctrine that there is no real 'I' in Buddhism? What is the 'I' that here speaks?

<sup>2</sup> *Kāya*.

<sup>3</sup> *Dharma-kāya*.



Though the body of an earth-incarnated Buddha is to all seeming the same as the bodies of all men, in its inner constitution it is said to be the most perfect means or vehicle of physical embodiment. By the unremitting practice of the transcendental virtues the substance or essence of the Bodhisattva is gradually purified of all selfish accretions, and therewith he becomes capable of transmitting the powers of the spiritual life with ever less impediment; till finally he wins to conscious Buddhahood and his transformed body becomes the outer shell of an inner 'body of transformation,'<sup>1</sup> as it is called.

This transmutation or transformation, however, is the outcome of a natural process wrought 'within' the natural physical body; it is not, as is so often erroneously supposed, that the physical body of the Buddha is this 'body of transformation' in the sense of a miraculously or magically produced body in appearance only. The physical body of an incarnate Buddha is not an illusory body,<sup>2</sup> not a 'docetic' figment or confection, but a purified natural body. The 'body of transformation' proper is the 'perfect body' of Alexandrian psychology, and the 'seed' of it lies latent in all men. The development of this potentiality is proportionate to the reality of the purification of the passions. This 'seed,' however, is not to be thought of as localised in some special centre of the body, but is rather, as it were, latent in every centre and organ and indeed atom of the body. Thus while the form of the body remains, the substance is transmuted or enlivened and enlightened.

<sup>1</sup> *Nir-māna-kāya*.

<sup>2</sup> *Mano-maya* or *māyāvi-rūpa*, mind-made or illusion-formed body (Ger, *Schein-körper*).

As far as outer observation is concerned no change has taken place, but within it is very different ; a new 'light' has arisen in the inner worlds. This glory or light is no longer to be considered as a natural growth in time and space, that is to say not to be confined within the prejudices of the normal objective consciousness ; it is rather to be viewed *sub specie æternitatis*,—that is, ideally in the vital sense of the term, or from the standpoint of eternity—æon-wise, if we might venture to coin a term.

Misunderstood rumours of such spiritual states have produced a monstrous crop of myth and legend of all kinds. Thus not only the Buddhas but also the Bodhisattvas are held to be in no way born from father and mother ; they are said to be produced by their own powers or begotten of their own substance,<sup>1</sup> or to be self-generated,<sup>2</sup> or brought forth by the spirit alone ; their mothers and their wives are virgins—all of which is very familiar to the student of comparative mythology and the mystery-religions. Though this is a grave scandal to the rationalist it is by no means incapable of a credible psychological interpretation, if the virgin-born is regarded as the spiritual man re-born from his own purified substance.

While then on earth the external form of the body of a Buddha remains the same, the substance within may be transformed infinitely. It is thus said that in the subtle states, while the essence retains the same glory the forms of manifestation of that glory may be infinitely varied. It is this glory in its infinite manifestation which is known to the saints in vision, and to the gods as the 'body of bliss'<sup>3</sup> of the Buddha.

The teaching activity of the Buddha is thus not

<sup>1</sup> *Sva-guṇa-nirvṛitta.*

<sup>2</sup> *Aupa-pādaka.*

<sup>3</sup> *Sam-bhoga-kāya.*

to be confined to the ordinary means of instruction. It is, on the contrary, essentially spiritual, an immediate vital quickening by the means of a divine 'presence' which can teach on earth and in all the many heavens and hells as well, that is to say in every state of existence. This quickening is of the substance, essence or 'heart' of the 'hearer' or 'hearers,' who thus become aware each in his own fashion; they hear and see in their own way, according to their several limitations. It thus connotes the power of attuning oneself to the mood or assuming the aspect of the auditor or auditors; it is the power of universal sympathy that can become all things for all men, and gods and demons as well, for their salvation. Of the exercise of this transcendent power there are many strange legends incomprehensible to the inexperienced and wholly incredible to those who deny such spiritual possibilities. It may, however, be possible to recognise far-off echoes of this power of the presence and way of the spirit even in the naïve popular recitals, as, for instance, when we find it related of the Buddha

When I used to enter into an assembly . . . before I seated myself there . . . I used to become in colour like unto their colour, and in voice like unto their voice . . . But they knew me not when I spoke, and would say, 'Who may this be who thus speaks? a man or a god?' Then, having instructed them, . . . I would vanish away.<sup>1</sup>

From the standpoint of the auditors there may have been a teacher teaching, or a group of disciples and one of them spoke in 'ecstasy' or 'with authority.'

<sup>1</sup> Rhys Davids, *S.B.E.* xi. 8. We find ourselves in a very similar atmosphere when reading in the 'Hymn of Jesus' in *The Acts of John*: "Who I am, that shalt thou know when I depart. What now I am seen to be, that I am not. [But what I am,] thou shalt see when thou comest"—that is, thou shalt know when thou comest to Me, or becomest as I am—a Christ or a Buddha.

The hearers recognised the power of the spirit, but did not know what or who the presence really was.

Instruction by means of set words is not spiritual enlightenment; it is information, it is not immediate truth. This was known to the 'saints' by experience, but the 'doctors' are at sixes and sevens about the matter. Thus the later 'supernaturalists' among the Buddhists pushed their speculations to an extreme in a theory of *apparent* descents<sup>1</sup> of the eternal Buddha. They distinguished reality by degrees of states or even by special grades, not sufficiently realising that truth must be free of all places and states, and therefore can manifest in every state and place. We can see the difficulties in which the earlier doctors of theology or buddhology found themselves when we read that the view of the 'supernaturalists' was that when Shākyamuni attained Nirvāṇa he no longer preached the Law; the preaching thereafter was carried on by Ānanda, the Buddha's favourite disciple. According to Prof. L. de la Vallée Poussin they taught:

That Shākyamuni, although he was a real man, flesh and bones, nevertheless remained, since the enlightenment, in a definite state of concentration or trance (*samādhi*, *dhyāna*); and can a being in *dhyāna*-state speak? We know from *Kathāvatthu* and from Bhavaya that schools were at a loss to settle the question. Doctors who deny the power of speaking to the 'concentrated' states assume that Buddha caused Ānanda or even the walls of the preaching-room to preach the Law . . . . Elsewhere Shākyamuni is credited with having uttered a few words: each disciple heard them with the developments his own development allowed.<sup>2</sup>

These difficulties seem to have arisen from the conception that Enlightenment is a static and not a dynamic condition. As we have already seen, the

<sup>1</sup> *Avatāras*.

<sup>2</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 748a.

spiritual perfection of a Buddha is not a state of passive *samādhi*, but is based on active universal sympathy; it is no shut-off condition. If a Buddha is spoken of as 'concentrated,' it accordingly can only be in the sense of being unceasingly centred in that sympathy and love. So far then from the 'power of speaking' being inhibited in that state,<sup>1</sup> the gift of speaking to every man 'in his own tongue' is acquired. Other doctors again, even among the Buddhists themselves, have made great merriment over the idea that the very walls of the preaching-hall could become means of teaching. Animism, as we know from the anthropology of the hour, is a primitive superstition, quite below the threshold of any respectable modern intelligence. But are there not extended or intenser states of consciousness in which the crude notions of the lower stages of culture re-present themselves in subtler forms and clearer light? It is a fact of highly cultured experience that what we call inanimate nature may at times become animate, expressive, vocal, through the inspiration of a spiritual presence. It is, therefore, not so very ridiculous to believe that there may be some truth in the idea that the very walls of the preaching-hall could be used as a means of conveying immediate spiritual instruction, that the outermost could be used as readily as the innermost by the Presence which we are told is ever there when two or three are gathered together in the 'Name'; for to the spirit there is neither high nor low, neither external nor internal. Though, then, it may be said that it is through the purified nature of the Bodhisattva that the Buddha power can operate most easily on earth;

<sup>1</sup> Even in the case of an ordinary spiritistic medium we have the common phenomenon of trance-speaking.

yet the spiritual reality of Buddhahood, being a universal presence, may be considered as independent of any particular vehicle and can use as means of communication not only all creatures but also all things.

Finally, it is to be insisted on that whatever heights of bliss and power may be attained by the purified being and illuminated 'heart' of the Bodhisattva, it is not for this that he strives, his will is not primarily set on such attainment. The spring of all his effort, the source of all his energy, is his boundless compassion for all creatures. Far, then, from seeking to escape the cramping conditions and ceaseless pain of earth-life, the Bodhisattva volunteers to enter even the most wretched conditions of existence for the sake of helping to free all passion- and misery-bound creatures. In Buddhism the lowest abyss of hell or most grievous state of torment is called Avīchi; and yet we hear of Bodhisattvas "rushing into the Avīchi like swans into a lotus pond."<sup>1</sup> This is said to be owing to the superhuman fervour of the love of the future Buddhas, who joyfully aspire to take upon themselves "the whole burden of the suffering of all creatures." This ideal of 'vicarious atonement' seems to be part of the Vow, for we read:

I am taking upon my body the heap of sorrows which their deeds have accumulated, in order to bear it in the regions of hell. Would that all creatures who dwell there might escape!<sup>2</sup>

Such extremes of aspiration induced by this transcendent doctrine of utter self-sacrifice, however, seem to fall short of the balanced wisdom of the fully enlightened Buddha; they may rather be ascribed to the inexperienced over-enthusiasm of the new-born

<sup>1</sup> *Śūlāṅkāśamuchchaya*, p. 360, 8.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 280.

Bodhisattva, who still commits what are called 'sins of love.' But these 'sins' are of love and not of selfishness, and therefore make for the fulfilling of the Law.

In any case, if such is really the nature of the Ideal Life in Progressive Buddhism, it seems to be essentially indistinguishable from the highest Ideal preached in the West.

G. R. S. MEAD.

---

## MARY EVEREST BOOLE.

AN APPRECIATION, AND A CRITIQUE OF HER BOOK, 'SOME  
MASTER KEYS OF THE SCIENCE OF NOTATION.'<sup>1</sup>

REV. G. W. ALLEN.

My friend Mrs. Boole always seems to me an instance of a finite mind in the throes of possession by an infinite percept. The throes may be accounted for as arising either from the limitation of the mind itself, or from the limitation and rigidity of surrounding minds. 'Throe' is always 'strain'; and strain is always resistance to some impression, or influence, being brought to bear on us, to which we are not at first disposed to yield. And the greater the suspicion of the greatness of the power taking us in hand, the greater is the strain and throe.

That some limitation exists in the mind of my

<sup>1</sup> London (Daniel), price 2s. net.

friend, she herself would, I think, be the first to admit. It shows itself in certain subtle contradictions between personal feeling and infinite perception (relatively infinite, that is), as in her hatred of 'priest-crafts' of all sorts. Why may not this 'priest-craft' be like the slime on the stems and leaves of water-weeds (her own figure), which look ugly to the eye, but—under the microscope—reveal forms of beauty?

Yet from some practical limitation shall no mind utterly free itself. We have the infinite perception, "All is very good," and the finite persuasion, "some things are very evil"; and what can the best of us do, other than struggle in the throes of this contradiction? We dare not play fast and loose with conscience, and we dare not be sure that the verdict of conscience now will stand unmodified when further light and knowledge has come. And yet—if we do anything—one of these two we must do. Hence it is that all such criticism as mine on Mrs. Boole for objecting to 'priest-crafts' is an instance of the very error in myself at which my criticism of her is aimed.

Under the circumstances, the one loop-hole of escape from self-contradiction is to compel the mind to append to all its judgments the formula: "At least, thus it now seems to me; and as it does so seem, I am going to act as if it were true; and am perfectly prepared to accept a conviction of error if any such *reductio ad absurdum* comes."

When man is born into the finite from the infinite, he must necessarily enter by a finite door, through which cannot pass his infinity in its fulness. If he brought with himself a consciousness of the fact that much, which ought to be in him, had been left behind on the other side, little harm would result.



Yet there is perhaps a sense in which greater harm would otherwise have resulted. For if we knew consciously the world and life we have come from, how unspeakably awful would the life here seem to us. We might almost say that it would be so awful, that none could possibly endure it without the aid of some anæsthetic. Thus the very limitation against which we chafe, may be a means of safeguarding us from madness and horror of the most dreadful kind.

And yet again, and from another point of view, this is probably a shallow idea. For it is perfectly possible that the limitation is *in us* and not *in things* about us. We may be at home all the while; only with an episodal limitation of faculty, or consciousness, which itself creates the surroundings we seem to see. Any subjective change changes objectivity; and the order of the mind determines the nature of the world cognised. Blake said, "The fool sees not the same tree as the wise man sees." Everywhere objectivity depends on subjectivity, and not the reverse; for all must start out from 'I'; and if there be no 'I,' there is nothing for anything from without to flow into. I know nothing of things outside me, save through 'myself.'

But mankind in the mass has not yet arrived at such a perception of the facts in the case as this; and there must always be 'throes' when interior perception opposes exterior seeing. Boehme says that manifestation arose through the interaction of two contrary Wills. We see the contradiction clearly; but make the fatal (and yet, perfectly natural) mistake of calling these contraries 'good' and 'evil,' whereas 'good' is rather the balanced action of the two, and 'evil' the unbalanced. Excess of stability leads to

ignorant conservatism; and excess of instability leads to flightiness and crankiness, and wild speculation.

But the real 'vice' of the matter is when we define all we like as 'good' and all we dislike as 'evil.' This is real idolatry, for the only 'other God' there is to worship is 'myself'; and the idolatry is never so disastrous as when it is unconscious, and I am persuaded that all the time I am worshipping the true God, the One. Thus we think wickedly that 'God is such a one as ourselves'; and—virtually *deifying* ourselves—make all progress in deeper truth impossible.

I believe therefore that that infinite percept with which my friend is in throes (throes which I should be glad to feel I shared with her), is this of the universal in opposition to the particular, this divine principle of the negation of all limitation confronted by the almost ineradicable tendency to "draw the line somewhere."

To express infinite ideas in finite terminology is always a difficulty. One is bound to use what Mrs. Boole calls 'notation.' The book under notice begins with an admirably lucid and far-reaching illustration of the significance of 'notation'; wherein she shows that many errors, thought to be in 'things,' are really due to inexact notation; as a tune in the key of E, with a signature of the key of C, or G or A. Mrs. Boole's own notation is largely drawn from mathematics; and there exists a strong and widespread, though really very short-sighted, prejudice against the idea that mathematics has anything to do with qualities; and should be rigidly restricted to quantities. I myself have been astonished to find how many people believe themselves incapable of taking interest in anything which has to do with numbers; and have been told, again and again, "It is no use putting such ideas

before me, for I never can understand mathematics." It is no part of my purpose here to enter on a justification of such notation; but rather to point out that, however much the notation employed by different perceivers of the infinite may vary, the ideas sought to be conveyed are all one. Nothing would be more interesting than a history of comparative notations. Boehme draws his often from what he had learned of the chemistry of his day; and thereby much perplexes his readers, either ignorant of chemistry altogether, or used to a very different kind from that of three hundred years ago. What follows is this: that if there be in the mind of the student no glimmer of how the case stands in the Fact beyond human consciousness—that is, of the spiritual Fact—a notation he is unused to will perplex and irritate him greatly; whereas if he has some basal perception of the difference between infinite and finite, he will be able to see what the user of the notation is driving at, however obscure and new to him the notation itself may be. The thing is to say to oneself: "Never mind what 'it' is, the question for me is, *what does it do?*" For the emphasis usually is not on the thing, but on its behaviour; and this I can follow.

I have no intention of forestalling the reader's delight in reading this book by giving quotations from it. I have an idea that quotations, taken out of their context, help rather the man who does not mean to go to the trouble of reading it, by allowing him to talk about it in that slipshod way whereby some gain a false reputation for wide reading. It is always better to read them *in situ*. What is more to the point is to give the prospective reader some idea of the sort of things he will find, and put him on those lines of

approach whereby the secret of the author will be more likely to be grasped.

‘Notation’ is clear; but notation of what? The answer is, notation drawn from the finite which tends to lead on to the infinite, and some apprehension of its ‘order,’ and characteristics. Undoubtedly what Mrs. Boole is driving at is the essential unity behind the diversity of our immediate cognition. This idea, accepted very generally in terms, and in the abstract, needs to grow to recognition as a practical working hypothesis to be universally applied to all our problems and difficulties.

But to apply it thus practically will mean the letting go of many (supposed) sure holds and lines of fancied safety drawn round what we take to be dangers. Therefore the very first thing required by the reader is to know, or feel, that man’s safety does not depend on the recognition of it; but stands for its assurance in the very nature of things. We are allowed a certain amount of rope, and may wander often into what our fear takes to be danger; but never into that which is danger to God. The word of the greatest Teacher of the Infinite often was: “Be not afraid”; “Why are ye fearful?” “Nothing shall by any means harm you.”

The way to the infinite Life must seem a way of danger to the finite. The finite wants its finitude glorifying with the divine abundance of all things, and—while remaining *itself* (finite)—to possess infinitely. But this is a confusing of categories; it is like asserting that a piece of string could have one end, and no other end. Sharp and hard upon our puerile fancies falls the word of the Master: “That which is born of the flesh is flesh, and that which is born of the spirit is

spirit." What is finite is finite from top to bottom, and what is infinite is infinite from top to bottom.

What then is the venture, the hardihood, the endurance, which all sons of the infinite must face? It is the utter, total and unrestricted laying down of the 'own self' idea; it is the death of the power of our finitude. We must feel, "Let come what will, I will be true to the likeliest God within me." The man in the Psalms says: "Thou hast laid me in the lowest pit, in dark places, in the deeps"; and "All Thy waves and storms are gone over me." (With this contrast the voice of the finite in us, "Soul, thou hast much goods laid up for many years; take thine ease, eat, drink, be merry.") "But, but," we cry, "if this is so, life is not worth living." *Is it worth living on the 'much goods for many years' basis?* Many years will come to an end; and possibly even "this night they require thy soul." No, it is just the perception that this life most truly is *not* worth living which encourages us to let 'this life' go—in the venturesome hope, which something very deep down whispers is an assurance, that thus we may win a life which is.

It is not in the power of any 'notation' to give this perception to minds which *feel* no drawing to it in themselves. I know and am persuaded that nothing that I can do, or suffer, can ever make me 'not be'; I am immune from every real and infinite evil. Feeling this, I feel there can be no limit to my venture; that there is in me a power to harden my heart against all fear and all saying 'thus far and no further'; all inclination to make the reservation, 'So that I do not lose my joy.' If men can risk their lives to find the Pole, it would be a poor thing if they could not do as much for an infinite gain.

Now take an illustration of this from Boehme, which will also show how different notations are only the same thing in other words.

Fifthly, we find in the compaction of the metals and stones, an Oil which is sweeter than any sugar can be, so far as it may be separated from the other properties. It is the first, heavenly, holy Essence, which has taken its original from the Free Lubet. It is pure and transparent. But if the Fire-source be severed from it (although it is impossible wholly to separate it, for the band of the great triumphant joy consists therein) then it is whiter than anything can be in nature, but by reason of the Fire it continues of a rosy-red; which the Light changes into yellow, according to the admixture of red and white, by reason of the earthly property, and the predominant influence of the sun. But if the Artist can unloose it, and free it from the Fire of the wrath, and other properties, then he has the Pearl of the whole world, understand, the Tincture. . . . O thou earthly man that thou hadst it yet! . . . O man! didst thou know what lay here, how wouldst thou seek after it!

To grasp the significance of the notation, note these points. The idea of 'white' is eternity or infinity, as in Shelley's fine line:

Stains the white radiance of eternity.

Red, and colours generally, signify a prism between the white light and the eye. This prism is the power of the limitation, from which arises the finite nature; and, generally, the 'own self-will.' In this consists our notion of 'joy'; and our attachment to this joy is the fetter which binds us to the finite; and on account of this, the separation of the colour from the Oil is well-nigh impossible. But if this 'gilded fetter' can be unloosed, then—words fail to describe the gain, the glory, the goodness. The Fire-source is this 'own self-will.' For a fine study of this, see George

<sup>1</sup> *Myst. Mag.* pt. i. ch. 10 pars. 22—24.

Macdonald's *Lilith*, chapter 'That Night,' on page 274. The way of the separation is the way we have been describing; the way which—to the finite mind—seems to be the way of death and awful suffering; the way of the Cross. And this is the venture to which all resolute, brave souls are called: "Take up thy Cross and follow Me." Only he who "loseth his life shall find it."

Mrs. Boole has not won the recognition she deserves because she has persistently preached this distasteful truth to the world. None should ever preach it who long for recognition. None the less has she been a means of showing to many individuals (including myself) this most mighty of truths. I will not deny that her favourite notation has a special, rather than a universal, appeal, and needs some effort to master; but any who cannot make such a comparatively easy effort as this, how shall they expect to face the hardihood and endurance which is called for by the practical operation which must be entered on when the principle is grasped? She has besides spoken in plain language, and called a spade a spade. 'Swindler's algebra' as applied to our commerce may be true, but is not winning. Few will venture to condemn her, for it is hard to feel justly bitter, and speak sweetly. Yet there can be no doubt that this language, which the American humourist would designate "frequent and painful and free," has not conduced to attract the men aimed at to Mrs. Boole's message; and yet it is no stronger than some our Lord used. "Serpents, generation of vipers," and "your father the Devil." There is just one great justification for such language; and it is not often seen. When one is hated, it is better that the hate should come to its logical florescence in

murder; because only when our enemy has sated his soul with the full execution of his wrath, can he begin to see that he may have been wrong after all. Till this takes place, he will be so pre-occupied with schemes for opposing his enemy that there is no place for the thought, on which side, after all, is the great Demiurgus—to use a figure from one of Mrs. Boole's powerful allegories in this book.

But generations to come will render to Mrs. Boole the honour due for the spirit of prophecy (not foretelling coming events, but coming great recognitions of principle) with which all her books are so full. And here and now there are many able to recognise this; and it is in the hope of introducing her to some of these who may not yet have been among her readers, that the present article is penned.

GEORGE W. ALLEN.



## PERSONAL AND ABSTRACT CONCEPTIONS OF GOD.

HAROLD WILLIAMS, M.A.

FROM the time when man first looked out upon earth and sky with a self-conscious mind he has made to himself gods in his image and after his own likeness. The god of tribal man was no more than a superior member of the tribe that suffered with his losses and rejoiced in his prosperity. Like the inferior members of the tribe he was subject to moods: he might at one time work its destruction by pestilence, war or other means, and must then be hastily ingratiated; or at another time he would bestow gifts in the shape of bountiful harvests and success in war. But with the development of man's self-reflective powers came a time when these crude notions of deity seemed to merit nothing but derision and scorn. As early as the sixth century before Christ Xenophanes reduced purely anthropomorphic ideas of the Divine Nature to absurdity. His words are almost too familiar to quote:

The lions if they could have pictured a god would have pictured him in fashion like a lion; the horses like a horse; the oxen like an ox.

The first impulse of primitive man, when he seeks to trace to their ultimate and hidden sources those powers which he sees working in the visible universe, is to attribute them to a being like himself, the highest

of created things which he knows, but of vastly superior strength and intelligence. How natural is this impulse of the imagination everybody knows for himself; our childish conceptions of God were entirely anthropomorphic. But for good or ill, we do not always continue to think as children; and what is true of the individual is true of the race. The God of the early Hebrews walked in the garden in the cool of the day, and ate of the food which Abraham set before him; he had hands and feet, nose and eyes, and was subject to feelings of anger and repentance. But in later Judaism a growing conception of the transcendence of God is clearly marked. The Targums sought to remove those anthropomorphisms which were regarded as a disfigurement to the historical scriptures of the nation. A definite vagueness of expression is adopted in relation to every physical or mental action ascribed to the Deity. In the Targum paraphrase of the incident already alluded to, we are told of Abraham's heavenly visitants that, "it seemed to him as though they ate"; and, throughout, crude and limited conceptions of Divine moods and passions are explained away.

This tendency becomes even more strongly developed where Jewish thought comes into contact with Greek philosophy. Aristobulus, a Judæo-Alexandrian writer of the second century before Christ, allegorises the descent of the Lord upon Sinai, and explains at length the anthropomorphisms of the Old Testament. And, later, Philo rejects all anthropomorphic expressions; though he regards them as a necessity for the unlearned. Jewish thought, where it yields to Greek, tends to regard God as a distant and impersonal abstraction rather than as the personal and divine Lawgiver of a theocratic state. The God of Hebraism

is concrete and personal; but it is only when the poet Plato emerges from the philosopher that his Deity ceases to remain a metaphysical abstraction and takes upon Him a personal nature.

These two conceptions of the Divine Nature, the personal and the impersonal, the institutional and the metaphysical, have held their place in human thought throughout history, though, from the time of Augustine, a personal and forensic Deity has been the accepted and popular conception.

Within recent times the opposing elements of these two conceptions, the concrete and personal and the metaphysical and abstract, have become more acutely contrasted. And the reason of this is that the conception of personality as now held is a development, almost an acquisition of the modern mind; it has no equivalent in ancient modes of thought.<sup>1</sup> With man's increasing consciousness of the nature of his own personality has come what may be called a re-statement of anthropomorphism upon a higher plane and level. This restatement of the direct argument from the personality of man to the personality of God has within recent times been enunciated in two entirely different ways. The clearest statement of one form of the argument is to be found in the famous Bampton Lectures of Dean Mansel, one of the most acute philosophic thinkers the Church of England has produced; the other receives a lucid and attractive expression in the writings of Mr. Illingworth, notably in *Personality, Human and Divine*. The former bases his argument upon an agnosticism which rejects as absurd any attempt to conceive the Divine Nature in any but a limited and human sense; the latter accepts

<sup>1</sup> See Martineau, *Seat of Authority in Religion*, p. 419.

the personal inference of the human mind as valid and trustworthy.

The argument of Dean Mansel may be summed up briefly. A metaphysical theology or philosophy of the Infinite (as represented by Hegel) he declares to be impossible; for it necessitates, to conceive the Deity as He is, that we conceive Him as First Cause, as Absolute, and as Infinite. But the three conceptions are logically incompatible. "A Cause cannot, as such, be absolute; the Absolute cannot, as such, be a cause."<sup>1</sup> The Dean further proceeds:

The conception of the Absolute implies a possible existence out of all relation. We attempt to escape from this apparent contradiction, by introducing the idea of succession in time. The Absolute exists first by itself, and afterwards becomes a cause. But here we are checked by the third conception, that of the Infinite. How can the Infinite become that which it was not from the first?<sup>2</sup>

That the human mind can have no complete and adequate conception of the Absolute and Unconditioned or of the Infinite, much less of the two conjoined with the conception of Causality super-added, must be conceded at once. But is it necessary to draw the Dean's conclusion that a metaphysical theology is valueless? Must our final lesson be an agnostic humility: "Such knowledge is too wonderful for me: it is too high, I cannot attain unto it"? Must we, as a last refuge, posit a Deity who is such an one as ourselves? Can the mind reach to no more adequate a conception of the Ultimate Reality than under the figure of "Man's giant shadow, hailed divine"?

It is an obvious truth to assert that which is the keynote of the Dean's lectures: "We cannot transcend

<sup>1</sup> *The Limits of Religious Thought*, p. 33.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, p. 33.

our own personality.”<sup>1</sup> This statement nobody will have the hardihood to deny. But, because I can form no clear representation in my mind of the number ten billion must I conceive of it as ten thousand or any smaller sum which suits my intelligence and capacity? To assert that God is absolute and infinite is to assert with the Dean that He “can have neither intelligence nor will.” He adds:

Personality, with all its limitations, though far from exhibiting the absolute nature of God as He is, is yet truer, grander, and more elevating, more religious than those barren, vague, meaningless abstractions in which men babble about nothing under the name of Infinite.<sup>2</sup>

Ruskin in finer and more poetic language expresses the same thought when he speaks of the childlike conception of God as the only possible one for us. If we think that

By standing on a grain of dust or two of human knowledge higher than our fellows, we may behold the Creator as He rises,—God takes us at our word. He rises into His own invisible and inconceivable majesty; He goes forth upon the ways which are not our ways, and retires into the thoughts which are not our thoughts; and we are left alone. And presently we say in our hearts, “There is no God.”

This, without being agnosticism, may be called an agnostic attitude of mind. It bases argument and theory upon the essential separateness of finite and infinite, absolute and conditioned, human and divine; the Word is no longer nigh us; and we are told to be content with a refuge of the hopeless, which may or may not, be something like the truth, but is, at all events, the only possible conception for us men.

The other direct line of argument from human

<sup>1</sup> *Ib.*, p. 60.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, p. 61.

personality to the Divine carries with it a more inspiring note. It begins from the assumption that "the Word is nigh thee." It bases itself upon the validity of the belief that human personality is a reflex of the Divine. A summary of the argument will help us. We begin from the fact that desire for the knowledge of and union with God lies at the basis of our being. All knowledge is a process or result of a process. Even sensitive perception is not involuntary; it requires attention; it involves all three functions of personality—thought, feeling and will. So also in the case of scientific knowledge there must be self-detachment, enthusiasm, patience, unflagging perseverance; the claim reaches to the entirety of the moral personality. An element of will or emotion is present in the beginnings of knowledge. In scientific thinking the action of this moral factor is intensified, and, finally, in acquiring the knowledge of a person it assumes an entirely predominant importance. Personal knowledge of a friend is essentially individual and concrete, it involves a progressive and lifelong effort of the will, which answers to an emotion and will with which we feel ourselves to be in conscious affinity. In man's consciousness of a moral law, of an imperative obligation laid upon his conduct, he gains the perception of a higher personality without himself. The moral law is not a physical necessity, nor can it originate within man, for he has no power to unmake it. It commands his will with an authority we can only attribute to conscious will. The inevitable inference is that it is the voice of a personal God, whose personality has an essential affinity with human personality.

Dean Mansel's lectures were never meant to be a complete philosophic argument leading to a final state-

ment of personality in the Divine Nature. They purport to be no more than a definition and enunciation of the limits of human thought. If Mansel ultimately accepts the belief in a personal God, he does so not because he thinks it is demanded by philosophic thought or by an exigency of human nature, but because he regards it as the only conception possible for men, and it is, furthermore, the presentation of God as revealed in Scripture. If, however, we refrain from deserting the limits of thought, as such, to take to an external refuge, the line of argument adopted by Mansel must leave us stranded in agnosticism. In using the last word we must remember that it can be employed in two senses, a positive and a negative. There is an agnosticism which, when it has reached the apparent boundaries of thought, rejects because it cannot know; and there is that wiser agnosticism which recognises that *omnia exeunt in mysterium*, and that, because we have arrived at a barrier, there is no necessary reason for believing that nothing lies beyond. But the argument of Dean Mansel, unless we introduce a *deus ex machina*, deserts and leaves us without support. When the same train of reasoning fell into the hands of Herbert Spencer, it led to a frank expression of agnosticism. It is impossible to read the famous Bampton Lectures without becoming most painfully conscious of the strength and acuteness which distinguish the destructive portion of the work and the weakness of that part in which the Dean strives to clothe his naked conclusions in the decent garment of religion.

The other argument from the finite to the Infinite which we have outlined, breaks down in a final assumption, which, however plausible, it is by no

means necessary to admit. Self-consciousness, the power of self-determination, and desires which irresistibly impel us into communion with other persons, in other words, reason, will and love, are marked out as the constituent elements of personality; and the chief weight of the argument for a personal Divine Being rests upon the conscious relationship of these faculties with the moral law. The reason by which we recognise, the will which is an apparent power to obey, and the love by which we desire the moral law cannot surely proceed from a Being less than or worse than ourselves? They must come from a Power, transcendent but like in constituent character to ourselves. Divine personality, on this showing, differs from human personality not in kind but merely in degree. Is this a necessary or the only religious conclusion? Shall we not be nearer the truth in believing that all finite things are in some way viewed under the form of eternity, than in believing that we can reach a valid inference to the Infinite from analysis and synthesis of the finite? Mr. Illingworth's final leap is only justified by a hope that the further bank may be within reach; whereas it is by no means certain that the bank is there at all. The moral law we may well conceive (and upon this the weight of the argument finally rests) may be imposed upon us from without by a Being for whom 'personality,' as a definition of His nature, has no essential application.

And, again, the ultimate nature of personality (for we can only name some of its elements) is a thing so doubtful, that it would seem entirely inadequate to support the great superstructure raised upon it. In discussing the nature of God Spinoza is led to say:

But how these things are distinguished—to wit, His essence,



His intellect, His will—I set down among the things which we wait to know. Nor do I forget the word *personality*, which theologians use to explain this difficulty; but, though I am not ignorant of the word, I am ignorant of its signification; nor can I form any clear conception of it, although I firmly believe that in the blessed vision of God which is promised to the faithful, God will reveal this to His own.

A clear conception of the nature of human personality would solve the question of knowledge and its possibility and all the problems of philosophy. We have not got it, and must therefore be content to believe that no analysis of that which we know as human personality will establish more than a degree of probability for the existence of a Supreme Being like in nature to ourselves.

To reach this conclusion is by no means the confession of an inability to believe that there exists a Supreme Being transcendent in nature, who imposes upon man a moral law which makes a conscious claim upon his allegiance. Spinoza, for whom God, as viewed in the character of an intelligent and moral Being, is everything, can say :

The knowledge of God doth not more correspond to the knowledge of man than the Dog in the Zodiac corresponds to the dog which barks in the streets ; perhaps much less.<sup>1</sup>

We are not reduced by an incapacity to conceive of God as “altogether such an one as” ourselves, to believe in nothing at all or in a reasonless and passionless power. The fine expression given to the latter conclusion in Mr. William Watson’s poem, *The Unknown God*, will, for a moment, almost persuade us; but it is by no means inevitable. The same idea has recently found an even more despairing and

<sup>1</sup> *Cog. Met.* II. viii. 1.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, II. xi. 3.

hopeless expression in the work of another living writer :

Then He : " My labours logicless  
You may explain ; not I :  
Sense-sealed I have wrought, without a guess  
That I evolved a Consciousness  
To ask for reasons why ! "

This is the resignation of all hope, the last note of despair, a confession that the universe has no ends in view. But the true door of escape from a merely anthropomorphic reading of the universe, or from the confession of incapacity to read it at all, would seem to be the conception of all things *sub specie æternitatis*, to see that God is all—a spiritual Monism. By this means religion and the spiritual aspirations of man stand to lose nothing and gain all. It has for too long been supposed that the religious instinct is necessarily bound up with a personal conception of the Deity ; and the human and Divine have been split by thought into a dualism, united by a vague ascription of 'personality.' Whatever be the value of the term personality in the study of human psychology, it can have no place in any definition of the Infinite. This was long ago stated by Spinoza, who perceived that personality, as a unity of self-consciousness, is predicable only of relationships, and can have no manner of application to an Infinite and Perfect Being, who is All and can be in relationship to nothing. The ascription of personality to the Deity, in the form in which we find it stated by Mansel, is not maintained even by himself as a true conception ; it is a mere refuge to which the human intellect is driven. It will be easy to admit that an adequate conception of the Infinite is impossible for limited and finite minds ; but, to accept as a

consequence of this admission, a conception which is recommended merely by its possibility, whether true or not, will, to many, appear the most difficult task of all. The theory as stated by Mr. Illingworth makes a definite claim to be adequate and true within limits; but the leap from the unity of human self-consciousness, of reason, will and love, to the Divine Personality, is unjustifiable, and is negated by the fact that what it really posits is not an Infinite but a finite personality at the back of the universe. Personality is essentially a term of finitude, it implies relationships, and can have no applicability to an Infinite and Absolute Being.

How shall we arrive at any speculative construction which shall satisfy thought? To pretend to offer a complete and all-comprehensive answer to such a question would be to over-shoot the mark; but the idealistic Monism of Spinoza appears to many in this day a systematic construction offering a more inclusive and satisfying conception of finite and Infinite than any other. The recent system of Mr. Bradley<sup>1</sup> represents the same type of speculative construction.

That part of Spinoza's system of thought which deals with the nature of God we shall find in the second part of the *Cogitata Metaphysica*. For Spinoza, God is the Infinite and Perfect Being—the Self-Existing Substance—who is present in all His works, to whom all His works are present. He discusses the attributes of God, Infinity, Ubiquity, Simplicity, Life, and explains these distinctions between His attributes as distinctions of our reason, not existing, in our sense of the words, in His nature. The chapter *De Intellectu Dei* forms the keystone of Spinoza's thought in regard to

<sup>1</sup> *Appearance and Reality*.

the nature of God. In this chapter he states his guiding principles, by which alone he believes that confusion can be avoided and men saved from falling into those vulgar conceptions which he stigmatises as "*enormes errores*." That which we mean by 'personality,' in our common use of the term, is a conscious cohesion of relationships, and it is against the transference of this designation to the Divine Nature that Spinoza's argument is directed. The chapter may be summarised as a threefold protest: (1) Against the notion that there is a matter external to God and co-eternal with Him, upon which He works. (2) Against the notion that there are certain things of their own nature contingent, or necessary, or impossible, which God knows as such, and is therefore ignorant whether they exist or not. (3) Against the notion that He knows contingencies from circumstances, as men know them who learn by long experience. That God has a knowledge of anything external to Himself is only a vulgar notion, which man reads into the Divine Nature from himself: "He is the object of His own knowledge; He is His own knowledge." As a corollary to this conclusion, and as an answer to the question whether the knowledge of God is manifold or simple, Spinoza adds that the knowledge of God, whereby He can in any intelligible sense be described as omniscient, is "a notion pure and simple" (*unica et simplicissima*) which has existed with God from all time, "for there is nothing beside His essence."

It will be easy to fasten upon such a statement as the last and declare that Spinozism is Pantheism. Where, it will be asked, is room for finitude or particularity if God is all? Objections of this character, when urged against the idealistic Monism of Spinoza, display

a radical misconception of his whole system. The pantheist we may suppose either: (1) to start from the world of nature, posit a principle to direct its operations, and call that soul or principle God; or, (2) to start from the conception of a Divine Being and regard the world as an emanation from Him. The first is certainly not the system of Spinoza; he, of all men, begins from a Divine Being. With equal vehemence Spinoza would have rejected any theory which regarded man and the universe as merely an emanation of the Deity; he affirms both to have been created, and created in such a sense as to exclude emanation. "*Deus est omnium rerum creator.*" If we ask what is meant by a created thing, we receive the answer that it is that which posits nothing beside God as a cause of its existence. But Spinoza is afraid of analogies, he shrinks from the use of common names, and he deprecates the use of terms of time and space in any discussion of God and His creativeness, which is not a definite act operating within fixed limits, but rather the movement of efficient and concurrent power arising from His own will.

The aim of Spinoza's system of thought is to conclude in One the finite and infinite, the universal and particular, to assert the presence of God in all His works, and to avoid a confusion or merging of the one into the other. But, above all, he must assert the knowledge of God, who is All, as the highest knowledge. To what extent he has succeeded may be a subject of question, and perhaps he has only indicated the right direction which the human mind must take when it attempts to pierce into spheres of thought from which it will always return again upon itself. But he has shown that the most abstract and imper-

sonal conception of the nature of God is compatible with the deepest and most pervading sense of religious aspiration. The ascription of personality to the Deity, in its ordinary form, is a derelict conception left stranded in the human mind from those ages when the tribal god was a being but a few degrees removed in powers and faculties from his fellow-tribesmen. As an expression of poetic language, in prayer, and in formal liturgies it will live; but are we compelled to conclude with Dean Mansel in words already quoted that

Personality . . . though far from exhibiting the nature of God as He is, is . . . more religious than those barren, vague, meaningless abstractions in which men babble about nothing under the name of Infinite?

To one who has in any measure apprehended the character of a thinking basis of life which begins from the unity of all in the Infinite these words are in themselves 'meaningless.' "Spinoza was right in holding that the true starting-point of thought is not in the consciousness of self as a *principium cognoscendi* separate from God who is a *principium essendi*."<sup>1</sup>

It may be that the dualism of the world still remains as an unsolved difficulty of thought in the face of such abstract assertion; but it provides a unified basis of thought freed from inherent and logical contradiction, and presenting us with a standpoint for our conception of God and the world into which we need introduce no saving clauses or limitations, and, further a conception which is capable of claiming our deepest moral and religious aspirations. The life of Spinoza is, in itself, a sufficient answer to the assertion that the religious consciousness cannot live in the atmosphere of an abstract conception of the Deity. Many

<sup>1</sup> Caird, *Critical Philosophy of Kant*, vol. i., p. 180.

will prefer to cast in their lot with Spinoza, and maintain that for them the harder feat is to keep awake a deep sense of aspiration, the keynote of religious feeling, when directed toward a conception confessedly limited and inadequate, than in its impulse toward that conception of God which regards Him as in and beyond all and the Unity of all.

HAROLD WILLIAMS.

---

## THE PHILOSOPHY OF DYNAMICS.

F. W. HENKEL, B.Sc., F.R.A.S.

It has long been a favourite idea with many students of Physical Science that whilst the fundamental principles of Philosophy, after centuries of discussion and investigation, are still matters of such uncertainty that no general agreement seems probable, the whole of Science, on the other hand, could be embraced in a few well ascertained and generally accepted terms. Two entities, Matter and Energy, whose properties were to be ascertained by observation, experiment, and strict logical deduction therefrom, were considered to exist *per se* in time and space, anterior to and independently of all human experience; both were alike in being capable neither of increase nor decrease (conservation of matter and conservation of energy), the one (matter) passive, the other (energy) continually active and varying, changing ever from one portion of matter to another, and by its changes producing all the phenomena of the physical world. Nay, there were not wanting those who boldly asserted that mind and

consciousness would be soon *explained* in terms of these units, as being only 'motion of matter.' We shall see in the sequel, however, how little justification there was for such assertions.

As it has been the avowed or implied aim of physicists to ultimately reduce all physical phenomena to strict dynamical reasoning, we may now proceed to the consideration of this process. Dynamics is defined by Thomson and Tait as the science which investigates the action of force upon matter, in producing motion or other change in the latter. Force is mathematically defined as the rate of change of acceleration ( $m \frac{dv}{dt}$ ), which is "all we know about it," as one writer says. The late Professor Tait, from this and from Newton's third law, "action and reaction are equal and contrary" (implying that the mutual actions of two bodies on one another are equal in *amount* and opposite in *direction*, so that the algebraical sum of *all force* is zero), argued that force has no real existence, "rate of change of momentum" being just as much an ideal concept as "rate of interest" which is not a sum of money or anything concrete! A similar argument would, of course, prove the non-existence of energy, since it is (measured by) the space rate of change of velocity, or of matter itself, considered as mass, the *ratio* of force to acceleration. We seem here clearly to have a confusion between magnitudes themselves and their *numerical measures*. The *number of units of area* in a parallelogram may be obtained by multiplying the number of units of length in one side by the number of units in an adjacent side, but the *area* itself is not a product of the length of either side.

We have now to deal with definitions of matter. Here we are brought face to face with a veritable



variety of views. Thomson and Tait say (§173): "We cannot, of course, give a definition of matter which will satisfy the metaphysician; but the naturalist may be content to know matter as that which can be perceived by the senses, or as that which can be acted upon by, or can exert, force." Force is similarly defined as that which moves or tends to move matter!—though it also (says Tait) has no objective existence. The definition of matter as that which can be perceived by the senses is at least sufficiently comprehensive, though at bottom, since all our knowledge (when we except intuition) is derived from sense-impressions, it makes matter identical with *everything*! Another definition of matter is given; it is that which possesses mass or inertia. Yet another makes it "the *permanent* cause of our sensations." So far as it is allowable to express a preference, the writer must confess his leaning to the views of Mach that the terms 'matter' and 'force' (and 'energy' also) are purely the names of intellectual concepts by means of which we represent the external world ('outside skin') in our minds, and the only consistent meanings we can give these must be such as can follow from, or at least not be inconsistent with, their mathematical measures. It is probably *impossible* to define these terms so as to give correct and logical ideas of the phenomenal world to a being supposed to be destitute of any experience. The two entities matter and energy (sometimes the older writers used the term 'force' in the same way that energy is now used), moreover, are never found apart from one another; matter without any energy would be apparently unrecognisable by any of our senses and could not appreciably differ from 'nothing,' whilst energy apart from matter is equally unknown. In fact it is the

supposed existence of energy (radiant) in the space between sun and earth that has been regarded as the strongest argument for a quasi-material (or according to some, *super-material*) substratum—the æther. The so-called properties of matter are never found existing *singly* in any body; though we can in thought separate them from one another, yet a number (perhaps all) of them is invariably found together in the same object.

All bodies possess mass (gravitative attraction), unless the æther be an exception; all show some signs of heat effect (possess definite temperatures), none are at the 'absolute' zero, whatever that may mean; all show some signs of electrification whenever carefully examined, though the *amount* thereof in any particular case varies indefinitely; all are either paramagnetic or diamagnetic, that is to say they are either *attracted* or *repelled* by the poles of a strong electromagnet. There is no perfectly transparent body (even air and the lighter gases absorb a small amount of the light passing through them), no completely opaque one; for even the metals in very thin sheets transmit a little light. No perfect conductor for heat or electricity is known (silver, the best conductor, stops a little), there is also no perfect non-conductor. No 'black' body exists, even lamp-black reflects a little light or it would be invisible. Most bodies are fair conductors of sound-waves; but all absorb some portion of this form of energy.

Mass has been considered the one absolutely unchangeable property of a body; but apart from the possibility, nay, the very high probability, that the doctrine of the conservation of mass is only an approximation, and that the phenomena of radio-activity indicate a slow gradual breaking down of 'matter,'

any observed change perceived would naturally be attributed to a gain or loss of *substance*, rather than to an increase or diminution in the mass of a body itself. On the 'electric theory of matter' brought into such prominence recently by Larmor, Thomson, Lodge and other leading physicists, however, mass is a distinctly varying quantity dependent upon the velocity of a body through the æther, so that for a speed comparable with that of light the inertia or mass has a considerably higher value than for a state of rest or slow relative motion. For these reasons three different estimates of inertia are now distinguished: one, the ratio of force to acceleration (Newton's definition); another, the ratio of momentum to velocity; and the third, the ratio of kinetic energy to half the square of velocity. Dr. Abraham even distinguishes between longitudinal and transverse inertia, making this dependent not only on the speed but on the *direction* of acceleration. Thus we see that during the last few years the whole of the fundamental ideas of physicists as to the nature and 'conservation' of mass have undergone radical changes. The doctrine of the conservation of mass, or indestructibility of matter, the name by which it is more generally known to the outer world, formulated (not as a scientific but as a philosophic doctrine) by Lucretius and probably long before his day, built up and experimentally verified by the researches of chemists since the days of Lavoisier, thus seems after all merely an approximation, though for us at present, a very close one. At best it expresses a negative—that we know of no processes tending to increase or decrease its amount, all chemical processes hitherto discovered producing merely changes of form.

The phenomena of radio-activity, however, are

regarded by many as indicating the slow but gradual decay of all 'matter'; whilst, as we have seen on the electromagnetic theory, mass varies with the speed and direction of motion of a body, and since it is probable that all bodies are in motion, it might be philosophically more correct to say that matter and mass are for ever, continuously but slowly, changing.

Matter has been supposed by the chemist and physicist to be divided into small ultimate indivisible particles called atoms, a distinction being sometimes drawn between a physical 'molecule' and a chemical 'atom,'—the former being the smallest part of a substance which can exist in combination, the latter the smallest portion of one element. Thus a molecule of water ( $H_2O$ ) consists of two atoms of hydrogen united with one of oxygen. However, since there is at least a possibility of many of our present 'elements' being found to be in reality compounds, and thus the atoms only molecules, it must be fairly evident that both atoms and molecules are merely *imagination*s of the human intellect, abstractions or limits perhaps necessary, or rather, convenient, for clear thinking, but not necessarily corresponding closely to anything existing outside our own minds. At the temperature of the Sun it is fairly certain that all matter must be permanently 'monatomic,' the distinction between molecules and atoms having then vanished and only elementary bodies existing,<sup>1</sup> whilst recent work in physics has led to the concept of 'electrons' or sub-atoms. Each atom of matter has been considered to consist of a positive nucleus, surrounded by a variable number of much smaller bodies, *the electrons*, each electron

<sup>1</sup> Prof. Fowler and others, however, consider that there is evidence of the existence of carbon monoxide and a few other simple 'compounds' upon the Sun.

carrying a minute electric charge, the unit of 'electricity.' This system of atom and electrons has been somewhat fancifully compared to a solar system, with an atomic 'sun,' and 'planetary' electrons moving round the central body. "The electron," says M. Lucien Poincaré, "has conquered physics, and many there are who adore the new idol rather blindly." Nevertheless, as he adds, it is right not to lose sight of the fact that an image may be a well-founded appearance, but may not be capable of being (exactly) superposed on the objective reality. So far, however, we have pushed back explanation one step; but whether we are any nearer to understanding is another matter. The relativity and limitation of our finite knowledge are only too apparent. We must, whether we will or no, measure all things by our own bodies. For these an atom is very small, an electron infinitesimal (the lowest term at present considered), the Earth enormously great, Rigel and Canopus much greater still and the Milky Way an infinity. Just as we conceive *physical* infinities and infinitesimals, corresponding quantities in their various orders exist in mathematics.

The concepts of time and space, modes of perception or what not, are only known to us relatively, following from our knowledge of motion or speed ( $V = \frac{ds}{dt}$ ), the displacement of bodies in space *during* time. "The idea of time," says Maxwell, "probably arises from the recognition of an order of sequence in our states of consciousness." 'Absolute' time is defined by Newton as flowing smoothly on at a constant rate, undisturbed by the speed or slowness of the motions of material things. 'Relative' time is duration estimated by the motion of bodies (the Earth, planets, etc.). 'Absolute' space is conceived as remaining always similar to itself

and immovable. But as there is nothing to distinguish one part of space from another except the different events which happen there or the different bodies which are met with, we can only deal with 'relative' space. This has been expressed by saying that both (relative) time and space are modes of perception, the latter more especially associated with the motion of bodies, while time is sometimes spoken of mathematically as the *independent* variable; as we have just said, *bodies* move in *space* and take *time* to do so. It has been a favourite speculation as to whether or no space may possess, or be considered to possess, more or fewer dimensions than the three usually assigned to it; but in our humble opinion the whole question seems another case of the confusion of ideas between objects and their *numerical* measures. To determine the position of one body (or point) with regard to any other or standard position, *three* numbers are, *in general*, necessary. A point to be seen by the eye or even conceived in the mind must possess some magnitude, being simply the *minimum visible*. A line must have breadth and thickness as well as length even in our mental picture; but in discussing its properties we find it convenient to disregard the two former by comparison with the latter predominant 'dimension.' Thus, to the argument that two-dimensional beings could have no more conception of our three-dimensional space than we can possess of a four-dimensional existence, we may reply that neither experience nor imagination gives us any help here, for no such beings have been met with or can be consistently imagined. Clifford's *infinitely* thin worm (see his *Common Sense of the Exact Sciences*) is, like the geometrical line, an *abstraction*, obtained by disregarding (*not* destroying)

its real breadth and thickness, and it with its properties is after all a 'limit.' By algebraic methods akin to those of the well-known co-ordinate geometry we may work out the properties of space and bodies of  $n$  dimensions, but the results will have no *parallel* in the world of perception, though some astronomers are of opinion that the 'curvature of space' *may* some day be detected by stellar observations. *How* this may be done is not so clear (on this point see also Stallo, *Concepts of Modern Physics*, p. 230). The idea of Clifford that geometry is a physical science seems to us an incomplete description of it. No doubt many, perhaps all, of its concepts are borrowed from the external world and are so far physical, but they are generally the idealised limits of perceptions, only approximately realised in 'real' objects. No perfectly spherical body is known to exist, yet the properties of the sphere are none the less well-known because of this fact. In some cases the theorems and constructions of geometry have suggested the formation of new shapes not previously met with in nature, even approximately, whilst much of the certainty and definiteness of the conclusions of mathematical science is intimately associated with the fact that the objects of its study are after all mental and not material. The same thing holds good with the science of pure motion (geometrically considered), called Kinematics, to distinguish it from Dynamics, which latter science assumes to consider motion with regard to its causes. No heavenly body moves strictly in any known geometrical curve; the planetary ellipses and the cometary parabolas are merely approximations more or less close to their true orbits. Newton's three laws of motion, which have been shown to be ultimately

dependent on the second law, are all of them unverifiable in practice. The first law, or 'law of inertia' (a body not acted upon by any external force will remain at rest or move uniformly in a straight line) follows directly from the second law, which is that the *change of motion* (if any) is proportional to 'impressed force'; for if there is no impressed *external* force there is no change of motion; force being thus defined as the *cause* of change of motion. Thus from one point of view we may even regard these famous laws as *truisms*, from another as unverifiable assumptions. The third law, "action and reaction are equal and contrary," or the mutual actions of any two bodies are equal in amount and oppositely directed along the same straight line, Newton himself attempted to deduce from observation by pointing out that the consequence of denying this would lead to effects on the motion of the Earth and planets not known to exist. Clerk Maxwell (*Matter and Motion*, p. 48), however, prefers to consider it as a deduction from the first law; for *if*, say, the *attraction* of any *part* of the Earth upon the *remainder* were greater or less than that of the remainder upon *it*, there would be a residual force acting upon the whole system which would cause it to move with ever-increasing speed through 'infinite space.' This is contrary to the first law, which asserts that a body does not change its state of rest or motion unless acted on by *external* force. But the whole system whether of one or of *three* laws, we may see clearly, is no less 'metaphysical' than that of the philosophers whom 'mechanicians' affect to despise. A century ago the mathematical work of Laplace, Lagrange and their contemporaries seemed to their admirers to leave nothing to be desired in the way of explanation—"the



whole universe summed up in a few algebraical formulae, whose solution would shortly be effected"; but how different has the sequel proved! H. Poincaré, one of our leading mathematicians and astronomers, to whom we owe so much, not merely for his researches into physical phenomena but for his clear and independent views on fundamentals also, his brother Lucien Poincaré, Mach, Pearson, and others, have shown how incoherent in reality the so-called 'principles' of dynamical science often are. Mach says:

The principles of mechanics, which are apparently most simple, are of a very complicated nature. They are based on unrealised, even on unrealisable experiments. In no way can they be considered as demonstrated truth. Every physical phenomenon has not only its mechanical side, but also its electrical, chemical, physiological and perhaps psychical aspect, and none of these can claim to be fundamental. Moreover, though the limitation of our faculties often compels us to take these 'things' into consideration separately, they all co-exist together, and must profoundly modify one another. There are as good, perhaps better, reasons for taking physiology as the fundamental science, as there are for placing dynamics in that position.

Attempts have been made in recent years to replace Newton's laws of motion by others giving the ascertained rules under which acceleration (rate of change of motion) takes place. These accelerations depend upon the relative position of the various bodies in question, unaffected by any previously existing motions. The *ratio* of the changes produced in the motions of any two given bodies by their mutual action is constant, whatever name we give to the nature of this influence, gravitational, electrical or what not, and from this ratio we get a definition of mass, the terms matter and force as the cause of motion of matter being no longer necessary are not used. The motion of any

given system will then be given by stating the orbits of its members and the times at which each arrives at any position (epoch) or by giving velocity in any position and acceleration at all possible positions.

All that science can do is to calculate and describe as accurately as possible such changes as occur or will occur in the future, leaving the 'why' unknown, "thus reducing all dynamics to kinematics." The quantitative law of gravitation, giving the exact manner in which its 'attraction' varies with distance is still in the same position as it stood in Newton's day, all attempts at explanation hitherto made having introduced new difficulties and objections, "making confusion worse confounded." That potential energy will some day be shown to be in reality kinetic is a proposition held by many physicists, but we seem further off than ever from that goal. Sir Oliver Lodge is inclined to regard potential energy as the peculiar property of the 'ether' (its state of stress), kinetic energy as that of ordinary matter. The doctrine of the conservation of energy asserts that the "total energy of the universe is a constant quantity, though a greater or less portion may take one or other of the various forms in which it is found." Apart from the fact that we can know nothing of the universe as a whole, not having explored even our own little earth more than a few hundred feet below its surface, every discovery of recent physics has warned us to be cautious of such sweeping generalisations. A stone thrown up in the air possesses energy by virtue of its motion, which energy (and motion) gradually diminishes until it stops, then it begins to fall again, attaining (roughly) the same speed in its downward course as it had on corresponding points of its upward course. If, now, at its highest point, it lodges on a rock, say, instead of

falling, it will remain peacefully at rest. We then say that though this is the case, *by virtue of its position* it has gained potential energy; *if* it fall again it will once more acquire its original kinetic energy (nearly). At every point what it gains in kinetic energy it loses in potential and *vice versa*; thus the *total energy* is made to remain constant.

However, though in such a case as this the matter may seem fairly simple, yet it is evident that "the faculty of considering energy which appears to be lost as having passed into the potential state, will always remove the principle of conservation of energy from experimental criticism" (Le Bon). As soon as conservation of energy is admitted, it is necessary to suppose that lost kinetic energy becomes potential, and the 'abyss' provides it with an inviolable retreat, no experiment being able to prove the contrary. If we had started with the contrary view, that energy can be *used* and *lost*, "we are compelled to acknowledge that this postulate would have as many facts in its favour as the contrary one."

From the observed phenomenon that in every terrestrial case of the transformation of energy, a balance in favour of heat results, and this heat tends to become universally diffused and unavailable, of uniform temperature, by the processes of conduction and radiation, Lord Kelvin framed his famous theory of the 'Dissipation of Energy,' and concluded that the ultimate 'death' of the universe would result. If, however, the universe be unlimited we may ask, would not this process take an infinite time? or why is it not dead already? But indeed, as stated before, as finite beings we can make no statements whatever with regard to infinity, save only "We do not know." On

other grounds, both philosophical and scientific, however, we may find many reasons for doubting the value of such conclusions, though for limited systems such a statement may be approximately true; the discovery within the last decade of the phenomena of radioactivity, the apparent slow disintegration of all 'matter,' and the detection of a supposed new form of intra-atomic energy, should teach caution in the formation of sweeping deductions. Attempts to determine the past and future duration of the sun's heat, the time during which our own earth will be habitable, and the origin of life upon our planet, seem alike premature.

On account of the limitation of our faculties and the necessity of taking one thing at a time, we commonly discriminate between different phenomena as mechanical, chemical, physiological, psychical, etc. In some cases we find a parallelism, in others an apparently complete divergence. It was no doubt from the *comparative* simplicity of many of the *phenomena* commonly designated as mechanical, and the readiness with which they lend themselves to accurate mathematical description that the hope was entertained that other phenomena too might ultimately be brought in under the same heading or resolved into mechanical *concepts*. But since we have seen that these latter are purely ideal, the results of abstraction, by no means necessarily corresponding to any ultimate 'realities,' it must be fairly evident that the attempt to resolve mental phenomena, states of consciousness, etc., into 'motion of matter' is an inversion of ideas. Matter, force and energy being only mental concepts, the attempt to explain 'mind' in terms of its own ideas must be even more meaningless than if we were to try to explain man in terms of the tools he uses or the clothes

he wears on his back. Some biologists, it is true, still continue to use physical and mechanical terms of description as though words were 'efficient causes'; one hears of 'forces' doing this or that (*pace* Tait, who denied the existence of force!), and many students of physics similarly conjure with the magic symbols. However, since the true aim of Science is *not* ultimate explanation, the more modest work of accurate description will amply employ the energies of its votaries for many ages to come, without being exhausted. That there are underlying realities few can doubt, but though the progress of knowledge "ever upwards and onwards" will doubtless lead to our present crutches being replaced by more efficient ones, these latter in their turn will presumably be no more final than those they supplant. 'Absolute' truth, like absolute time and absolute space, is perhaps not for man—at least, not in his present condition.

F. W. HENKEL.

## HENRI BERGSON: A FRENCH IMPRESSION.

ERIC CLOUGH TAYLOR.

It is difficult to find any parallel to the enthusiasm with which philosophy, chiefly reincarnated at the present moment in the person of Professor Bergson, is being acclaimed and followed in France by so many different classes, unless one goes back to the times when the Academy was thronged with eager crowds to hear words of wisdom that fell from the mouths of Greek sages. Those who in this country have been studying Bergson's works will not need to be told, and those to whom he is yet a stranger cannot be expected to learn in a short sketch, with what charm of style, and with what lucidity of thought, he is bringing home to us his striking views as to the place that intuition should take in our ultimate views of life; with what grace of manner, but at the same time with what tactful decision, he is putting 'mere' intellect in her proper place; or how with his vivid imagery and genius of metaphor, he is saturating thought with the importance of life as expressed in terms of feeling, and especially in the highest form of feeling that he calls the sense of pure duration as distinct from the 'bloodless categories' of mathematical time. Now the personality of an author, let us say, of a new theory of the fourth dimension, is of little interest; but that of the author of *Creative Evolution*, which is a work of self-expression,

if it is anything at all, is quite capable of throwing light on, and adding to the interest of his system of thought.

M. Gaston Rageot, in an article in *Le Temps*, gives some first-hand impressions of this extraordinary man, derived from attendance at his own lectures. "He used to come," he tells us, "to the class room with a huge handkerchief, a man of small and slender stature, his whole body, as it were, overwhelmed by his brain, yet of an alert and lively aspect. We were hardly in our places before he had already begun. He dictated, and those who wished, followed him; the others devoted themselves to their own affairs." (It sounds like one's recollection of the 'French hour' at school !)

"He did not see them, hardly heard them. He walked up and down the room with long strides. One hand behind his back, he kept raising the other, whilst lowering his head, a significant gesture, with something of the bizarre about it, giving one the impression that after all, what he was saying, though his own, was yet only an approximation to an unknown truth which was yet very far off. Sometimes he stopped, squatted on his haunches, his legs spread out, his blue eyes fixed on some unknown ineffable, full of wonder, with an expression of gentleness and candour face to face with mystery, awaiting the uncanny light of intuition." Of his method we are told that "in order to answer a question, he began by suppressing it. All the problems which up to then had been the torment of philosophers and the despair of pupils, he showed to be meaningless and non-existent. He purged our programme of every traditional difficulty. Was it a question of free-will? He laid it down with a shrug of his shoulders, that the opponents and the partisans of

liberty had no idea of the real crux of the dispute, having always confused the click of one billiard ball upon another with the unforeseeable rhythm of our inner life. Was the problem one of time? He distinguished between two kinds: the time of the philosophers, scientists, and the clock, an artificial thing, manufactured with space, extended like a thread, divisible into small parts; and true time, real duration, the feeling we have of changing and growing old; an infinite flux, a continuous process like a musical phrase. Such was the dialectic that amazed us."

In philosophy, the power of persuading is all, unless we are convinced that somewhere a corpus of true and absolute knowledge, not yet on speaking terms with human consciousness, lies cocooned in its own perfection, indifferent to the efforts of man. And the power of persuading is the art of oratory—an art which Bergson possesses. For "he had an astonishing diction, each articulation of which seemed to be underlined by his stiff and stubby little moustache. His voice was modulated and musical, with an inflection for every subtlety of analysis, and, now and then, as it rose and rose, seemed to exhaust itself in following the thought. Generally it was at the conclusion that he reached his highest note. He had the gift of imagery, of comparisons which are arguments; and with his restrained gestures he would punctuate the richest and most varied metaphors which have adorned the discourse of a philosopher since the time of Plato."

M. Rageot gives us a humorous account of how in 1895, every sort of written answer to examination questions, for every sort of degree, was but "badly chosen portions of Bergson." "As every year the great dressmakers draw the same profile for every



woman, so, about 1895, the author of *L'Essai sur les Données immédiates de la Conscience* had given to every candidate the same philosophic caste." Educated as a mathematician, he eventually deserted that field, coming to the conclusion that the categories of the intellect could never give him any real clue to life as lived, but only to life as manipulated, as we manipulate a problem of mechanics or dynamics or time, with the data always ready and always the same; whereas life is never the same. History cannot repeat itself, as the pointer of a clock can return upon the hours printed for all time on the dial. But to quote once more: "Intellect, according to him, is not philosophical. It creates geometers, land-surveyors, artisans; it constructs the phonograph or the automobile: that is to say its rôle is to fabricate implements, and to fabricate with those implements. . . . But intellect cannot understand life of which it is a product, much less conscience, which you cannot measure like a solid body. Intellect is the product of the cosmic evolution: it cannot explain it, any more than the shingle on the shore can explain the wave that brought it there." This is taken almost wholly from Bergson's introduction to his *Creative Evolution*.

There is something very fascinating in this vision, as it were, of the well-spring of life forming, as it bubbles up, the static spirals of the stalactites of intellect. To what theory of life will it ultimately lead? We wonder what is in the minds of all those who, we are told, crowd into the lobbies and cluster on the staircases of the *Collège de France* to hear this unique personality debate on every topic from the Kantian antinomies to his own theory of the Comic. Is this tread of thought one from the older pessimism

to a newer age of faith? Do they read the mental barometer with hope? Does the needle of Thought swing upwards from the age of the 'Pluie ou Vent' of pessimism to the 'Beau Temps' of optimism? Does this philosophy contain the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things unseen? This is what we eagerly await, in the expectancy of another book from the pen of this genius which shall treat of the bearing of his theories on the moral and ethical aspects of human life. Meanwhile, we have much to console us in the engrossing vistas of thought opened out for us by Henri Bergson, Membre de l'Institut, and Professeur au Collège de France.

Since the above was written, the writer has himself had an opportunity of seeing and listening to the subject of this short sketch; and by the courtesy of the Editor is allowed a few words of comment. Few of those who were fortunate enough to attend Professor Bergson's lectures at University College on 'The Nature of the Soul,' will see in the little spare figure, so erect and alert, with the head and deep-set eyes of the contemplative thinker, the nose, mouth and chin of the mathematician, whose nimble gestures gave so pointed a commentary to his lucid and precise speech, anything of M. Gaston Rageot's dreamer and visionary. Where was the huge handkerchief, where his blue eyes, where the squatting habit? They will be led to suspect that it is an exaggerated description, for the impression Professor Bergson gives is the impression of a precisian, whose lecturing style is deliberately formed, and who would not be likely to change that style to suit his audience. For the rest, the description of his method cannot fail to be admired; it has not changed, and any further comment would merely detract from

its convincing sincerity. We were told, a few weeks ago in a daily newspaper, that the chief point of interest about *L'Évolution Créatrice* was the tardiness with which its doctrines had percolated into the English mind; that it was entirely due to Mr. Balfour that he had come to be recognised; that in England we required our politicians to direct our attention to our philosophers; in France, her philosophers drew the attention of the public to her politicians. Like most paradoxes it contains an element of truth, but an element only, and one which may easily lead to an inadequate view of that philosophy. Mr. Balfour, as a philosopher, is a thorough idealist; and we were told by the chairman at the first lecture that Professor Bergson was to be considered an idealist. The association of his name with Mr. Balfour's may lead some to suppose that Bergson is as thorough an idealist as the English professor. But it is not so, and let those who rush to this conclusion walk warily. It has been said it is unfair to label him too quickly, for the author of *L'Évolution Créatrice* has not yet treated of ethics; but when he wrote of the harmony of the universe as expressed in Finalism, he said that that harmony would be found rather in the rear than in the vanguard. "*Elle tient à une identité d'impulsion et non pas à une aspiration commune. C'est en vain qu'on voudrait assigner à la vie un but, au sens humain du mot.*" That was his opinion when he wrote *L'Évolution Créatrice*; and that is in all probability still his opinion.

ERIC CLOUGH TAYLOR.

## IS THE NEW TESTAMENT JESUS HISTORICAL? A STUDY IN CHRISTIAN ORIGINS.

REV. K. C. ANDERSON, D.D.

THE following is the gist of the argument on the above theme in the last number of *THE QUEST* under the title of 'The Cradle of the Christ,' of which the following article is a continuation.

The position of orthodoxy, that the central figure of the Gospels and Epistles alike was a historical person, having been destroyed by the work of the Higher Criticism of the past fifty years, there are now only two possible presuppositions with which we can start in our endeavour to interpret these documents.

Either (1) the central figure of the New Testament was a human being strictly within the range and limits of history.

According to this conception, the *fons et origo* or 'founder' of the Christian movement was a human being who was gradually deified in the minds of the early Christians, the process of deification having begun before writing about him began, thus accounting for the passages in the New Testament in which he acts and speaks like a God.

Or (2) the nucleus of the central figure was not a human person within the range and limits of history, but a Divine Being, a God, who, of course, was not historical but existed in the minds of His worshippers,

and who was gradually humanised and historicised as the movement went on.

According to this conception the reality of the central figure is not denied but affirmed. It would ill become this age to deny the reality of the Immanent God. Neither is it denied that the belief in a historical founder of the Christian Religion was a powerful factor in the success of the movement in the early centuries and later. We have been taught long ago that the path to Truth is through illusion. The Higher Criticism itself has taught us to distinguish between the belief in the resurrection of Jesus and the historicity of the resurrection. The fact that the former was essential, so far as we can see, to the expansion of Christianity in the early centuries does not prove the latter. Similarly the fact that the belief in a historical Jesus was one of the elements which gave the Christian movement an advantage over the other movements of the time does not prove the reality of that belief.

As Mr. Thomas Whittaker points out in his scholarly essay on 'The Origins of Christianity,' prefixed to his translation of '*Van Manen on the Pauline Literature*,' two things were necessary to ensure the success of any religion at that time. First it must be 'pathetic,' something must "take the place of the slain and suffering divinities already introduced from the mystic East—of Dionysus and Adonis and Attis and Osiris; of the sorrowing Isis, and of Cybele the Mother of the Gods." Second, it must have a high tone of authority. Its central figure must speak and act like a God. He must be a wonder-worker and he must utter oracles, so that the revelation must be felt to be from on High, as the Jews felt theirs was, and as the proselytes from other faiths were made to feel, and not

merely "what had been for the wisest of the Greeks at best a result of fallible human reasoning."

The new religion was greatly helped by these two factors, if it did not owe its success to them; first by drawing to itself the pathetic story of one who had suffered and who was to triumph. This was to put the myth which had had marvellous power in the mystic cults of the East into concrete form. It was a story which would find ready credence not only from the Gentiles, to whom it was native so to speak, but from the Jews as well, for similar stories were current among them. And, second, the destruction of Jerusalem in the year 70 overthrew the old hierarchy, and put an end to its authority. The new religion stepped into its place by ascribing to the central figure a teaching which represented the best of the ethics of Judaism.

The new religion was a synthesis and a syncretism of many elements, it is true, but the chief of them were these two; and they contributed largely to its success, but this does not prove either that the central figure lived and died, or that he spoke the words put into his mouth, or performed the deeds attributed to him. History is full of illustrations of myth or legend contributing to the success of great moral and spiritual movements, and he who is not prepared to admit this has not reached the point of view from which the question of the origin of Christianity can be properly studied.

The following words of Professor Santayana are exceedingly appropriate to the matter in hand:

What overcame the world because it was what the world desired, was not a moral reform. . . . Not brotherly love, but what St. Paul said he would always preach, 'Christ and him crucified.' Therein was a new poetry, a new ideal, a new God.

Therein was a transcript of the real experience of humanity as men found it in their inmost souls, and as they were dimly aware of it in universal history. The moving power was a fable,—for who stopped to question whether its elements were historical if only its meaning were profound and its inspiration contagious? . . . It was a whole world of poetry descended upon them, like the angels at the Nativity, doubling as it were their habitation, so that they might move through supernatural realms in the spirit while they walked the earth in the flesh.<sup>1</sup>

The proof that the New Testament writers were moving 'through supernatural realms in the spirit' and not on the plane of history is abundant and satisfying. The Apostle Paul's world is not the world of history, but the super-sensible world of the mystic sects of his day. The 'Jesus Christ' of the Pauline Letters does not discharge the functions of a historical person, but of a deity or semi-deity resembling the Logos of Heraclitus, who was thought of as immanent in nature and in man and as also the '*concoro discordia rerum*'—the harmony in which all mutually antagonistic tendencies or forces, both in the moral and in the physical world, are reconciled.<sup>2</sup> Paul's 'Jesus Christ' dwelt within the Apostle's soul (*Gal.* 1<sub>16</sub>) and was the principle that kept the universe together (*Col.* 1<sub>17</sub>). Paul's Letters are confessedly the first product of the Christian movement, and had the central figure of that movement been a human historical person, this on all grounds of probability would have been the prominent feature of them. But no one contends that it is so. It is not necessary to the argument of this article and that in the last number of *THE QUEST* to say that there are no human features in the Pauline Epistles, all that is contended for is that the humanising process

<sup>1</sup> *Poetry and Religion*, p. 86.    <sup>2</sup> See Adam's *Vitality of Platonism*, p. 96.

has gone but a little way, if indeed it has begun at all, whereas it ought to have been the chief feature had the 'Jesus Christ' been a historical person, and the above divine features been an accretion that gradually grew around him.

The passages in the Pauline Letters which are cited to prove that the author must have known a human Jesus, are confessedly few and of doubtful interpretation. They are such as these: *Gal.* 1:4, "Our Lord Jesus Christ who gave himself for our sins." The conception here is that of a Saviour-God who died for the sins of men and rose again, which was universal in the Gnostic Mystery-sects of the time, and does not imply a historical Jesus. The same is true of *Gal.* 4, "God sent forth His son, made of a woman, made under the law." What we have here is not a life of Jesus as a human being, the words he spoke, the deeds he did, but a far developed Christology. "Made of a woman" does not prove a human being, for many deities or semi-deities were born of women. *Gal.* 6:17, "I bear in my body the marks of the Lord Jesus," is not the language of one who had known Jesus as a contemporary of his own circle; he has an exaltation such as men do not accord to a human being. *Gal.* 2:20 speaks of the Christ as dwelling in Paul, "Christ liveth in me." *Gal.* 3:1 surely does not mean that Jesus Christ had been "crucified among" the Galatians, but that the dogma of propitiation or sacrifice had been proclaimed to them, or set forth before them in dramatic form. *Gal.* 5:6 has no implication of a historical Jesus, but states one of the functions of the glorified Christ. *Gal.* 2:2 does not imply a human Jesus, but a Divine Christ. *1 Cor.* 2:2 is a proof that Paul did not go up and down the cities of the Mediterranean telling that



a great teacher had come in Palestine and quoting his teachings. It proves that Paul's gospel was the Cross, the centre of the Gnosis of the Mystery-sects of his time. In *1 Cor.* 6<sub>11</sub> the Jesus mentioned is not a human being, but the "Lord Jesus Christ." In *1 Cor.* 8<sub>6</sub>, again, it is not a human being, but "One Lord Jesus Christ by whom are all things, and we by him"—an indwelling God, a reconciling principle. As to *1 Cor.* 9<sub>1</sub>, how did Paul "see Jesus Christ our Lord"? Did he see him as a man, with his bodily eyes, or in vision as his spiritual Lord? Does Paul in *1 Cor.* 10<sub>16,17</sub>, refer to the physical blood of the man Jesus? *1 Cor.* 11<sub>23-29</sub> is the only clear and exact reference to an incident in the life of Jesus in all the Pauline Epistles, but this passage is under grave suspicion. If Paul wrote the Epistles before the Gospels of Matthew and Mark were written, how comes it that the account of these Evangelists is radically different from Paul's? They make no mention as Paul does of the injunction "This do in remembrance of Me," or of the statement "For as often as ye eat this bread and drink this cup, ye do show forth the Lord's death until he come." To the end of the first century—the time that Matthew's gospel was written—the Lord's Supper could not have been a rite in the Church. It is inconceivable that *1 Cor.* 11<sub>23-29</sub> is older than Matthew and Mark, for that would mean that they deliberately suppressed a direct injunction of the Master, "This do in remembrance of Me." Either the passage is an interpolation, or the whole Epistle dates from the second century. In either case it should be surrendered as a witness to a historical Jesus. Neither *1 Cor.* 12<sub>3</sub> nor 15<sub>3-8</sub> prove anything about a historical Jesus, for they declare about "Jesus" or "Christ"

what was said of the "Divine Man" who came down from heaven to suffer and die in all the Gnostic Mystery-sects of the time. The same is true of 2 Cor. 12:3 and 4:5. Whatever they do, they do not "express definite facts in the life of a historic person." What they do express is supersensible facts, beyond the pale of time, having reference to a plane other than terrestrial and physical, in the realm of the spirit, all the more true because not historically true; and we must remember that this was a very real realm to the writer of the Pauline Letters. Paul's Christ is immanent in the race, and is the race's hope of glory. He suffers in the painful process of the race's growth towards that glory. He is contrasted with the Adam of the old order of things, which is destined to pass away, and which in passing away was to usher in the new order. The Christ of Paul, the New Man, the Second Adam, no more implies the historicity of Jesus of Nazareth than does his Old Man, the first Adam, imply the historicity of the Adam of the Genesis story. The two terms, as the author of *The Gospel of Rightness* shows conclusively, denote "man in two elemental stages of being, each of which is governed by its own laws and subject to its own conditions. 'Adam' is the fleshly man, and 'Christ' is the spiritual man, and both are factors in a mighty evolutionary process." Probably the question of the historicity of Adam was not present to the mind of Paul, but what is perfectly clear is that it is not necessary to his argument. The 'Adam' of Paul was not any Adam who ever trod this earth, and the whole Eden-story was to him not history, but a "great spiritual allegory, dealing with the dim beginnings of man in states long previous to any of which we have any historical record." And the

argument is, if the 'Adam' of Paul was in this supersensible realm, above the plane of history, in the realm of spirit, so much more was his 'Christ.'

It is another assumption for which there is no proof that Paul's "Christ after the flesh" of *2 Cor. 5<sub>16a</sub>*, was a historical Jesus of Nazareth. The "Christ after the flesh" whom once he knew but would know no more, was the Jewish conception of the Messiah in which he had once gloried, but which he had renounced in becoming a Christian. Can we conceive that Paul, if he had known the historical Jesus of Nazareth as he is conceived by the Liberal Christian of to-day—the spiritual hero of the race, the mightiest personality of history—would have declared that he would know such a one no more? If Christianity centres in a historic Jesus of Nazareth, must it not be the duty and the privilege of every believer in him to continue to know him to the very end? The language of *2 Cor. 5<sub>16a</sub>* is unintelligible if Paul means a historic Jesus, but if he means the Christ according to the Jewish tradition there is sublime meaning in his words. In his earlier Epistles (*1 and 2 Thess.*) he shows how he had entertained a Jewish apocalyptic form of the Christ and the way in which the Christ would complete his work, but in his later ones (*1 and 2 Cor.* and *Phil., Eph. and Col.*) he shows how he had exchanged this materialised Christ for a more spiritual conception. "The Lord Jesus" of *2 Cor. 8*, "who was rich but became poor" cannot be the Jesus of the Evangelic story. When was he rich? The whole thought of the apostle moves in another and a very different region from that of history. Creation, according to the apostle, and according to the Gnosis of the Mystery-schools of the ancient world, was the impoverishment or sacrifice of

God, the limitation of the life of God in forms of matter. This is the great Mystery of the Cross, which with the apostle did not mean the wood on which a historic Jesus was crucified or the fact of a historic crucifixion, but a symbol of a universal sacrifice without which the universe could not be. The life of God was emptied, or poured out, in order that the world could exist. God is perpetually sacrificing Himself within His own universe. Creation is the primal and continual self-manifestation of Deity. God is the imprisoned essence of all that exists. He is immanent in all, and as a consequence must suffer in all. The manifested world is the perpetual Calvary of Deity. He crucified Himself when He willed to become a Creator. It was this profound and heart-moving conception that constituted the kernel of the Gnosis of the ancient Mystery-cults with which the writer of the Pauline Epistles is clearly familiar. This Gnosis was the centre of the teaching and ceremonies of the churches which he found existing or himself established, and it is this same Gnosis of the World-Passion of Deity that is the soul of his Epistles. It was this in which he was interested, and not the life of an historic Jesus. 'The Jesus' was the particular form, according to the thought of some of these Gnostic sects, in which this idea of the universal sacrifice was embodied; the function he discharged was that of a Divine Being, not that of a human teacher or exemplar. In *2 Cor.* 11, where the writer deprecates the preaching of "another Jesus," there is no reference to a Jesus other than the historic one, but to another conception of 'the Jesus' than that which embodied this sacrificial idea. When he declared that he was determined not to know anything among the Corinthians save Jesus Christ and

Him crucified (*1 Cor.* 2<sub>2</sub>), he is not declaring his intention not to know anyone but a Jesus of Nazareth, his life and teaching, but a Jesus who was the representative of the passion of God for man. There is no trace of any Jesus of *Nazareth* in all the Pauline writings, that is to say, no trace of a historic Jesus, and the argument is that if the Christian movement began with a historic Jesus who was "of Nazareth," this is just what we would have found everywhere. The Jesus of *2 Cor.* 13<sub>4,5,14</sub> is a Jesus who could be "in" the Corinthians, he was the Jesus of the Gnosis who was crucified in weakness, and yet lived by the power of God, and whose grace was that of a Divine Being, not of a human, historic person. Again, the "Lord Jesus Christ," of *Rom.* 1<sub>3,4</sub>, who was "made of the seed of David according to the flesh," was the Jewish Messiah, the "Christ according to the flesh" again. As to his being "declared to be the Son of God with power by the resurrection from the dead," it is sufficient to ask was the resurrection a historic fact? If the historicity of Jesus rests on the historicity of the resurrection, it rests on a very insecure foundation, according to the leading scholars of the day. Says Professor Harnack :

It is often said that Christianity rests on the belief in the resurrection of Christ. . . . When this means the assertion that the resurrection of Christ is the most certain fact in the history of the world, one does not know whether he should marvel more at its thoughtlessness or its unbelief. The following points are historically certain: (1) That none of Christ's opponents saw him after his death. (2) That his disciples were convinced that they had seen him soon after his death. (3) That the succession and number of these appearances can no longer be ascertained with certainty. (4) That the disciples and Paul were conscious of having seen Christ, not in the crucified earthly body, but in

heavenly glory. (5) That Paul does not compare the manifestation given to him with any of his later visions, but on the other hand, describes it in the words (*Gal.* 1.15, 16): "But when it was the good pleasure of God . . . to reveal his Son in me," and yet puts it on a level with the appearances which the earlier apostles had seen.

Here is the learned scholar's conclusion :

The mere fact that friends and adherents of Jesus were convinced that they had seen him, especially when they themselves explain that he appeared to them in heavenly glory, gives to those who are in earnest about fixing historical facts not the least cause for the assumption that Jesus did not continue in the grave.<sup>1</sup>

The above disposes of all the passages in the Pauline Letters that refer to the resurrection, and bears out the statement that they do not "express a definite fact in the life of a historic person." As to the ethical teaching of *Rom.* 12 and 13 and its resemblance to 'The Logia,' the 'Q' of the critics, it is enough to say that the ethical teaching of the Logia cannot be proved to be the teaching of a historic Jesus inasmuch as it can be paralleled in the teaching of the Old Testament and in the teaching of an earlier Jesus—the son of Sirach of the Apocrypha. If Christianity be founded on devotion to a historic person, it is certainly strange that the very first expounder of it—the author of the Pauline Letters—has nothing whatever to say of him.

If the historic Jesus cannot be found in Paul, he surely cannot be found in any other of the Epistles of the New Testament. The *Epistle to the Hebrews*, though not by the same hand, is yet written from the same point of view, that of a Judaicised and Christianised Gnosis. The Christ of this Epistle can by no possibility be identified with a Jesus such as Liberal

Christianity professes to find in the Gospels. The writer is not dealing with the realm of history at all, any more than Paul does. Every one of his references becomes luminous when read in the light of the central thought of the Gnosis, the great sacrifice of God for man; the ritual-system of the Jews the writer sees was a foreshadowing of this. The Gnosis was concealed in it and gives the clue to its meaning. The Jesus of the Epistle is no historic individual, but a Divine Being in whom and by whom the Gnosis is fulfilled. It would be only by a very violent interpretation that the features of 'the Jesus' could be brought within the limits of a human being. The instinct of the Church in all the ages has been right on this point—the Christ or the Jesus is Divine. It is no more possible to reduce 'the Jesus' to the limits of humanity than the Christ, and the point insisted on is that had Christianity its origin in a human historic Jesus, this would have been not only easy, but inevitable.

Who would ever imagine that the Jesus of the Book of Revelation was a human being in the mind of the author of it? It is confessedly a difficult book to interpret, but on the supposition that the Jesus of whom it speaks is the Jesus of Liberal Christianity, it would be sealed with seven seals. The plane on which the events of the book take place is not the plane of human history, but the universe as conceived by the writer, which is the apocalyptic universe of the Jewish Mystery-cults. What we have is what we always must have when the subject is Deity—a mythology; for the Absolute as Absolute, as Lessing taught the world long ago, never descends into history. That is the very kernel of the Gnosis, that the Absolute

limits himself in descending into history. The Gnosis, therefore, of the Book of Revelation, as of the Pauline Letters and of the Epistle to the Hebrews, is not the story of a human life, but the story of a God. There is a birth-story in this book (chap. 12) as in Matthew and Luke, but how different! The mother is a woman clothed with the Sun, with the Moon under her feet, upon her head a crown of twelve stars, showing at once the origin of the conception in the symbolism of the Mystery-sects that abounded all round the Mediterranean in the first century of our era, and before, out of which early Christianity arose. The language of the book is the symbol-language of the Gnosis, which reveals but more than "half conceals" the esoteric teaching of these secret societies. The key that interprets the symbolism of the book interprets also the other books of the New Testament, for the whole Christian movement developed out of Gnosticism. (Christianity is the child of Gnosticism,—a child, however, that rebelled against its parent when it became strong enough to do so, and subjected it to severe persecution.) There is evidently no knowledge on the part of the Revelation-writer of the Jesus of the Synoptics, for there is no mention of the incidents of the life of Jesus as therein related, no birth in Bethlehem or Nazareth, no crucifixion or resurrection, and there is no trace of the Sermon on the Mount. The argument here is the same, that had a historic Jesus been the founder of Christianity there would have been some traces of the fact in such a writing as this.

The conclusion we have reached as regards the other parts of the New Testament literature will prepare us for the study of the Gospels, because we



have reached the result, which seems incontrovertible, that the process which we observe at work as the literature is being produced is towards humanisation, and not towards deification. It is a God taking on gradually more and more human features; it is not a human being gradually becoming apotheosised. As the Gospels stand they do not give us the Jesus of Liberal Christianity—a strictly human being. At every point Liberal Christianity has been met and the Divinity of the central figure of the Gospels has been re-affirmed. It is only a very small body that has tried to be satisfied with a human Jesus. The great mass of the Church has remained true to the old tradition of the Divinity of Christ. This, indeed, does not settle the question, but it establishes a presumption that the instinct rests on a sure basis. No amount of manipulation or elimination will make the Gospels yield other than a Divine Being, and the real question that has to be faced is: Can this Divine Being just as he is presented in the Gospels be historical? The whole history of the Higher Criticism of the Gospels lasting over a hundred years now answers No. Never was a more painstaking search engaged in than the effort to discover what Liberal Christianity has called the realistic, historical, human figure of Jesus. Is not this search written in the masterly book of Schweitzer, with the result stated over and over again, that the Jesus of Liberal Christianity never had any existence? But if the Jesus of Liberal Christianity never existed what Jesus did exist? In the process of attempting to discover him, the supernatural elements which surround the central figure of the Gospels have been found to be an organic part of the New Testament presentation, and they cannot be removed without doing violence to all

historic probability. Assume that the nucleus of the central figure was originally a God in the minds of his worshippers, and all is intelligible; make him a man and you are landed in hopeless confusion and contradiction. The same arguments which set aside the fourth Gospel and the Pauline Letters as authorities for the life of Jesus, set aside the synoptic Gospels, and especially Mark. That is to say, the central figure of these Synoptics, and especially Mark, is a God. The purpose of the Gospels is not to give a biography of a man; their purpose is to establish a faith—the faith that Jesus is the Christ, or Messiah. They aim at awakening faith in the Jesus as one sent from God for the redemption of His people. The Gospel they set forth is the Gospel of the Jesus, the Son of God. He is the Son of God in a unique, supernatural way, and not after the manner of Liberal Christianity, and the human features which one finds in these writings are humanisations of one who was originally a God and always remains a God. It has frequently been pointed out that the Jesus of these Gospels never asks forgiveness, never owns to a fault, always stands above men, asking and demanding their faith and devotion to himself. No wonder. How else would or could a God speak? The compassion he has on the multitude as sheep having no shepherd is the compassion of a God. The nucleus of the whole figure in the Gospels and Epistles alike is the figure of the Gnosis of the ancient world, a Divine Being who for us men and our salvation came down from heaven to earth, suffered, died, was buried and rose again from the dead for men's justification and redemption.

K. C. ANDERSON.

## AN APPRECIATION OF WALT WHITMAN.

CAROLINE A. ECCLES.

THE feeling and the certainty that arrests and holds those who 'touch' *Leaves of Grass* is expressed in Walt Whitman's own declaration: "This is no book; who touches this touches a man"—a man, close, personal, living, breathing; repelling those for whom he is not, as strongly as he attracts those whom he is 'for' and who are 'for' him.

Do you say his style is rugged and unmusical? There are those who say that there is no music in the sound of the sea or of the wind through forest trees; there are those who have never listened in the silence of the night to the beating of their own or of a loved one's heart, the rhythmical ebb and flow of the breathing human breast, or having listened yet hear in these sounds no music—of these are they who hear no music in the songs of Walt Whitman. Musical they are not with the rhymed and polished sweetness of the lover's ode to his mistress's hair or eye-brow, or of a drawing-room ballad with its loves and doves and wings and springs; but musical, as surely as the sounds of life and nature have in them the very heart and essence of music—the sounds of rushing water and sighing winds and the eternal ebb and flow of pulsing hearts and breathing breasts. These songs of the life of a man, "a Cosmos who includes diversity and is nature"—

how could they find expression in stilted formal verse? It would be as incongruous should the sea sing melodies or the leaves of the forest trees rustle to rhyme and measure.

To have been drawn to Walt Whitman by the exquisite music of his song, is perhaps a somewhat peculiar experience, and thus may be worthy of testimony—so common is it to hear of those who find his rugged, unrhymed spontaneity, if not repellent, certainly difficult. Yet let anyone read—aloud by choice and without prejudice—‘Out of the Cradle endlessly Rocking’ or ‘When Lilacs last in the Door-yard Bloomed,’ and then say if the description ‘exquisite music’ is not justified. It may be objected that these examples are two of the most lyrical and tuneful and least characteristic of all. But this objection is of little weight, for they contain perhaps the fullest expression of the poet’s great themes, love and death and immortality, and are in that sense most characteristic of him.

The claim of Walt Whitman’s style to musical beauty, in view of his far greater claim to seership, might appear at a superficial glance not worth contending for; but it would be a very superficial glance indeed that brought one to such a decision, a view quite out of harmony with the seer’s own philosophy. In the man revealed to us in *Leaves of Grass*, does not the setting of the songs correspond to the outward appearance and the manner of the personality known as Walt Whitman himself, and as such is it not an integral and inseparable part of him? Can we separate the exquisite beauty of the language of Jesus, imperfectly and brokenly as it has reached us through the ages, from His personality and character? Does it

not matter, and that vitally and intensely, whether the parables and examples wherein He gave of Himself to us, are clothed in beautiful and perfect words?

The epithet, however, which we hear most commonly applied in disparagement of Walt Whitman is 'coarse.' It is the word he himself accepts. He *is* coarse, as Nature is, as the earth is, as animals are, as all men and women are. But whereas other men and women have tried to hide and dissemble or trample down and suppress their coarseness, he recognises and accepts it as part of himself and the cosmos, and by this acceptance, this childlike, unashamed frankness, without changing it, he transmutes it to spirituality.

There are two classes of innocence (here using the word with the full meaning the dictionary gives, as harmlessness, guiltlessness, perfect moral purity, integrity, simplicity): the innocence of the child, the innocence of ignorance or unconsciousness; and the innocence of the full-grown man, which is the innocence of full knowledge and consciousness. To unconsciousness and ignorance nothing is evil. To full knowledge and consciousness also, nothing is evil or "common or unclean." In the light of his seer's knowledge, of his comprehending consciousness, the coarseness of Walt Whitman is more than justified. How plainly and clearly he indicates this when writing:

"I will make the poems of materials, for I think they are to be the most spiritual poems,

And I will make the poems of my body and of mortality,

For I think I shall then supply myself with the poems of my soul and of immortality.

I will not make poems with reference to parts,

But I will make poems, songs, thoughts with  
reference to ensemble,

And I will not sing with reference to a day, but  
with reference to all days,

And I will not make a poem nor the least part of a  
poem but has reference to the soul.

Because having looked at the objects of the  
Universe I find there is not one nor any particle of  
one, but has reference to the soul."

"I am the poet of the Body and I am the poet of  
the Soul,

The pleasures of heaven are with me and the pains  
of hell are with me,

The first I graft and increase upon myself, the  
latter I translate into a new tongue."

How should it not be that this man who touches  
humanity at every point, should through humanity  
reach up to God? From this point of view what might  
seem at first to be his supreme egotism, as expressed  
notably in the beautiful lines 'To Him that was  
Crucified,' falls into proportion and place. There  
are those who seem to claim divinity for this poet  
of Democracy, those who, like Edward Carpenter,  
class him as one of the 'eternal peaks.' But they are  
always those who see the divinity in all men, no more  
and no less in the greatest, than in "your own  
Self distantly deriding you"; those who, like Walt  
Whitman himself, see with deep and searching vision  
into the very heart of things and dare to declare:  
"There is no God any more divine than Yourself";  
those who dare to see the divinity in the true Self  
which in everyone beckons and challenges the limited  
partial self.

But in these 'eternal peaks,' would it not seem that no longer the larger Self beckons and challenges? For the partial self has cast off its limitations and has attained to consciousness of the whole, has become merged in it, not lost but restored to fuller life by union with it. This is no more miraculous than any other development of nature is miraculous. It is the unfolding, the blossoming of humanity that we have seen through different stages, seed and leaf and bud, in smaller men.

Take a hyacinth; is it not reasonable to imagine the perfect flower in fuller relationship with the life-force or larger creative consciousness, in which both bulb and flower may well be thought to live—with that creative consciousness or thought or spirit which is of the mind of the Divine Creator, and of which thought or spirit both bulb and flower are manifestations? I find no analogy to express better than this, the position of men who, like Walt Whitman, have attained to fuller consciousness of Divinity than the average of their fellows. While neither accepting nor controverting the daring comparison with the Christs of the world which he makes for himself and which is made for him by Edward Carpenter, I believe Walt Whitman had attained a consciousness which gave him sympathy and tolerance and love of a well-nigh universal nature; for unless we are able to accept the fact of his possession of this higher faculty or consciousness, much of his work must appear nothing else than a jumble of meaningless exaggeration and overweening egotism.

There are of course in *Leaves of Grass* the paradox and the contradiction common to most great expression of this nature, the contradiction between the limited personality of the poet and the larger Self which is

also his greater person, between the simple, personal man who utters his thoughts and opinions and conclusions, and the free soul who enters by sympathy and loving comprehension into union with the spirit of the whole.

Twofold is the reflection of the mirror which Walt Whitman claims to "wipe and place in our hands": ourselves, as we are seen in him; himself, as he is seen in us, the sun reflected in myriads of dewdrops. What other meaning can we give to the first lines of 'Out from Behind this Mask,' which in the autograph edition of *Leaves of Grass* confronts his portrait?

"Out from this bending rough-cut mask,  
These lights and shades, this drama of the whole,  
This common curtain of the face contained in me  
for me, in you for you, in each for each,  
(Tragedies, sorrows, laughter, tears—O heaven!  
The passionate teeming plays this curtain hid!)  
This glaze of God's serenest, purest sky,  
This film of Satan's seething pit,  
This heart's geography's map, this limitless small  
continent, this soundless sea;  
Out from the convolutions of this globe,  
This subtler astronomic orb than sun or moon,  
than Jupiter, Venus, Mars,  
This condensation of the universe (nay here the  
only universe,  
Here the idea, all in this mystic handful wrapt)."

"Here the idea"; here in three words the clue to all the mystery, so difficult, so baffling. "Here the idea"; here the living, active, creative idea, the reflection of that reality which lies behind all ideas and all themes, the Divine Idea, the Thought, of which all



else is the manifestation. "Here the idea"; here the 'ensemble' mirrored and reflected.

It is not possible to write of Walt Whitman without straying into the region of mysticism; subtly mystical is the subject, spiritual, with the rare spirituality which lifts the material to itself, transmuting it.

"Will the whole come back then?

Can each see signs of the best by a look in the looking-glass? Is there nothing greater or more?

Does all sit there with you, with the mystic unseen soul?

Strange and hard that paradox true I give,  
Objects gross and the unseen soul are one."

How deeply suggestive, how pregnant with meaning this thought, how challenging and yet uplifting; how well it now not only tallies with the science of to-day, but supplements it and gives it life and spirit.

"The best of the earth cannot be told anyhow, all or any is best.

It is not what you anticipated, it is cheaper, easier, nearer.

Things are not dismiss'd from the places they held before,

Facts, religions, improvements, politics, trades are as real as before,

But the soul is also real, it too is positive and direct.

No reasoning, no proof has establish'd it;  
Undeniable growth has establish'd it."

Not only so, but he has an arresting doctrine to teach of the divinity of the material, even of the body. At best most of us had thought of this as the habitation of the soul, as something different and

apart from spirit; but with a flash of illuminating thought he lifts it to equality and unity with that spirit; it too is divine, immortal.

So full of the belief in immortality are the songs in *Leaves of Grass*, that it is difficult to choose from them those which give it strongest expression. At random we might turn the pages and find it almost anywhere. Take these lines from 'To Think of Time':

"I swear I think now that everything without exception has an eternal soul!

The trees have, rooted in the ground! the weeds of the sea have! the animals!

I swear I think there is nothing but immortality!  
That the exquisite scheme is for it!

And all preparation is for it, and identity is for it—and life and materials are altogether for it!"

Then, turning back, one's eyes fall by chance upon the heart-searching song, so exquisitely painful in its pathetic truth and tenderness, 'The City Dead House,' and there in one thought-compelling line, we learn of his certainty of the spirituality of the body:

"That little house alone more than them all—poor desperate house!

Fair, fearful wreck—tenement of a soul, itself a soul."

Or again, towards the end of his life, in the 'Sands at Seventy.'

"Nothing is ever really lost, or can be lost,  
No birth, identity, form—no object of the world,  
Nor life, nor force nor any visible thing;

Appearances must not foil, nor shifted sphere  
confuse thy brain.

Ample are time and space, ample the fields of Nature.

The body sluggish, aged, cold—the embers left from earlier fires,

The light in the eye grown dim, shall duly flame again ;

The sun now low in the west rises for mornings and noons continual ;

To frozen clods ever the spring's invisible law returns,

With grass and flowers and summer fruit and corn."

It may perhaps be questioned whether Walt Whitman is a great literary artist, for it is difficult to judge one who has broken away from the usual literary forms and traditions. But if truth to nature and clarity of expression be characteristic of high literary art, he undoubtedly gives ample evidence of these. Where will you find more vivid word pictures than his? They are to be compared only with such paintings as Millet's 'Angelus,' or the vivid, elemental, cosmic, musical pictures of Wagner, or the grand simplicity of the Bible.

But it is not to Walt Whitman as a literary subject that this slight study is directed—an appreciation which can hope to touch only the veriest fringe and surface of so great and comprehensive a subject—but to the man as a teacher and prophet, a bearer of light. One might dwell on his tenderness, on his quenchless optimism, on his wide tolerance.

"Not till the sun excludes you will I exclude you," he says in the lines addressed 'To a Common Prostitute.' "Not till the waters refuse to glisten for

you and the leaves to rustle for you, do my words refuse to glisten and rustle for you."

"My girl, I appoint with you an appointment and I charge you that you make preparation to be worthy to meet me,

And I charge you to be patient and perfect till I come.

Till then I salute you with a significant look that you do not forget me."

Surely it is not irreverence that makes one hear in this, faint echoes of the sayings of Another :

"God maketh His rain to fall alike upon the just and on the unjust"; and: "This day shalt thou be with me in Paradise"; and the all-comprehending, all-forgiving: "Go and sin no more."

Almost inadvertently has the description of Whitman as light-bearer been used. But it is doubtful if, after careful thought, one more appropriate could be applied to him. In this age of doubt and pessimism, one whose words ring with the joy of life, with faith and hope and unwavering confidence in the eternal purpose of good in all things, is worthy of the name 'light-bearer.'

"Do you see O my brothers and sisters? It is not chaos or death, it is all form, union, plan—it is eternal life—it is Happiness."

Not with the faith of a naïve visionary transcendentalist, not with the dim vision of one who will not face the evil and the darkness and sorrow of life, does he write; but with the faith of one who has gauged the depth and height of evil and darkness and sees the light on the other side, nay rather with the faith of one who sees the light beyond and above and all

through and around the darkness, does he deliver his message. For him :

“ Only the good is universal.  
 Out of the bulk the morbid and the shallow,  
 Out of the bad majority, the countless frauds of  
 men and states,  
 Electric, antiseptic, yet, cleaving, suffusing all,  
 Only the good is universal.”  
 “ All, all for immortality,  
 Love like the light silently wrapping all,  
 Nature’s amelioration blessing all,  
 The blossoms, fruits of ages, orchards divine and  
 certain,  
 Forms, objects, growths, humanities, to spiritual  
 images ripening.  
 Give me O God to sing that thought,  
 Give me, give him or her I love this quenchless  
 faith  
 In Thy ensemble, whatever else withheld withhold  
 not from us,  
 Belief in plan of Thee enclosed in Time and Space  
 Health, peace, salvation universal.  
 Is it a dream ?  
 Nay but the lack of it the dream,  
 And failing it life’s lore and wealth a dream,  
 And all the world a dream.”

CAROLINE A. ECCLES.

## THE WORSHIPPER.

HE has not once denied Thee since that hour  
When through the night Thou drew'st him to the sea ;  
He came, he came to Thee, he knew not why.  
Through dewy grass, deep-shadowed, moonlight-kissed,  
With lifted face and lifted heart he came,  
A Child that had been called and needs must go.  
And glory sang within him, and his soul  
Went out to worship Thine, and Thou could'st see  
The smile within his eyes that was the sign  
Of all his inner love.

He came to Thee  
From out the sleeping house, across dim lawns  
Where silent incense rose, invisible  
Yet filled with pregnant meaning, from the rows  
Of pallid lilies, and from deep deep hearts  
Of crimson roses, and carnations faint  
With their own perfume, hanging heavy heads,—  
He knew they praised Thee, and his spirit joined  
Their praise, and he was one with every flower.

He came to Thee beneath the whispering trees,  
And all the new-awakened soul in him  
Went out to greet the strange and subtle bond  
Between himself and them. He knelt to lay  
His cheek a moment at the mossy foot  
Of one tall pine, and silent and soul-stirred  
Was made aware of the aspiring breath  
That rose through root and trunk and spreading branch  
And trembling leaf-points ; and his spirit joined  
Their praise, and he was one with all the trees.

He came to Thee along the curving stream,  
That slid between its banks, star-brimmed and lit

With jewelled ripples, jade and pearl and rose,  
Where the white fingers of the moon caressed  
The dimpling eddies into flame,—as if  
On some dark sliding mirror one should cast  
The fire and foam of opals,—and he heard  
The voice, the voice that sped along the stream  
And rose and fell, and hushed itself to sleep  
In dusky pools, and slipped again to song  
Between the serried rushes lifting slim  
And spear-like heads towards the magic sky.  
He lingered by the water and he knew  
The voice that murmured through it, and the wind  
Among the reeds sang one long hymn of praise  
That ceases never ; and his spirit joined  
Their melody, and he was one with these.

He came to Thee across the empty shore  
And stood beside the waves, and heard the stir,  
The restless surging pulse that ebbcd and flowed  
And churned itself impotently and cast  
Moon-silver'd spray upon the sand, and hurled  
Again, again its passionate white arms  
Around the cliffs, and sank and rose anew  
In agonised endeavour to attain  
Some longed-for, needed end.—He recognised  
That just as wind and river, flower and tree  
Expressed themselves each in their separate way,  
So under all the wild commotion dwelt  
The soul of the great sea, a-strive to voice  
Its praise and prayer.—And he, the worshipper  
Knew, as he stood alone upon the shore,  
That under all the beauty of the earth  
A Purpose lies,—the Purpose to ascend  
Ever more near to Thee, oh pure and far  
Supreme Designer of the world !—He knew  
That he must ever follow up the way,  
That seeks to reach with every moment's breath  
A little nearer yet towards the height,  
Where veiled Beauty sits, and luminous

Irradiates with bliss ineffable  
The souls that penetrate the upward path.  
But they who would climb thitherward must know  
The inner beauty of the human soul.

And so he came to Thee through loss and grief,  
He came to Thee through long self-sacrifice,  
Through hours of pain and hours of loneliness,  
And through the aching heart that realised  
By slow degrees the sorrows of the world.  
Perception came to him of dreary lives  
All brave endeavour, and of hidden tears,  
Of humble lives of animals that bore  
In silent patience cruelty and wrong.—  
And often sick with pity and the sense  
Of his own impotence to aid, he came  
Anear to doubt Thy justice,—yet was stayed  
By one slight gleam of sunshine that lay hid  
Deep in his heart and drew him upward still.  
Not only beauty of the sun, the stars,  
The wind, the falling rain, were dear to him,  
But also dear the sad, slow, human tears,  
The loneliness, the frailty, and the sin ;  
And dear the beauty of the brave intent,  
And dear the beauty of the toilsome deed.  
He heard the striving praise that still arose  
Beneath all sorrow, and his spirit joined  
The pleading cry, and he was one with pain.

He came to Thee through sympathy with joy,  
And learned to smile responsive to the smiles  
In happy eyes ; and tenderness awoke  
Within his heart when in the street he heard  
The laughter of the children at their play.  
And in the courage of the heart that waits  
Its future with a jest whate'er it be,  
And fears nor pain, nor death, and smiles at fate  
And by its own light-heartedness brings light  
To all around it, there he found anew  
The beautiful expression of a soul.—



And love was his. Love came to him and made  
Of all his world a glory, and transformed  
His lonely nights and days to hours of bliss :  
And love lay warm within his life and filled  
Each moment with deep calm, and looked at him  
With true and tender eyes. Oh singing heart  
That rose within him then ! Oh melody  
That swept through all the chords of life, as soul  
To soul he heard the low aspiring breath  
Of all the world in love !—His spirit joined  
Their raptured song, and he was one with joy.

Thus he who once had dreamed of Thee afar  
In lovely meadows, or by some still pool  
Where mirrored sun and shadow interweaved  
In broken points of gold, has learned to see  
The beauty of the sunlight and the shade  
That comes and goes upon the human life ;  
Has learned that all is beauty. Like the voice  
Amid the running water, and the wind  
That stirs the leaves, and like the incense-breath  
Of flowers in the garden, like the sea  
He finds the true expression of his soul  
In silent prayer and praise that still ascend  
Through all perfected moments of deep pain,  
Through all perfected moments of deep joy,  
And draw him nearer yet, and still more near,  
O Beautiful ! All-Beautiful ! to Thee !

INA M. STENNING.

## DISCUSSION.

### THE 'CHRIST-MYTH' CONTROVERSY AND 'ECCE DEUS.'

THE article of Dr. Anderson on 'The Cradle of the Christ,' in the last number, has been read with eager attention. It is very gratifying to find such close agreement with one's own views and treatment in such a powerful presentation by another. On one single point I might be permitted to make an observation. Dr. Anderson quotes with exceptional praise the judgment of Forsyth, that "Paul took Jesus by force and made him King of the World," also his argument implied in the question, "Where are the heroic dimensions, or the vast power of a personality which in a few years could be submerged as the real Christ was by the creation of an idealogue like Paul?" Such as have read *Ecce Deus* will see at once that its author, at least, cannot for a moment accept such a representation of the facts as just; but aside from the distinctive thesis of that book, it seems clear that in the general mind no less than in the words of Dr. Forsyth the Pauline influence on early Christianity has been greatly exaggerated. A close study of Christian thought in the first two centuries fails to show any such dominance of Paul or distinctive Paulinism as seems commonly assumed. This consideration would appear to touch the nerve of the argument in question.

It remains true, however, as shown elsewhere, that the facts, so far as ascertained, of the Pauline propaganda are for ever irreconcilable with the Liberal dogma of the pure-human Jesus.

The article and notes of Dr. Eisler,<sup>1</sup> so opposed in spirit to Dr. Anderson's, have been read with similar interest, though with regret that Dr. Eisler should still await further development of the new critical position before casting his word into the scale. Surely the general thesis has been made intelligible, and the many 'so-called arguments' would seem to be seriously affecting thought and expression in various quarters. Perhaps it might be well to depart from the precedent set by Dr. Eisler and to notice some

<sup>1</sup> 'The Baptism of John the Forerunner,' vol. iii., pp. 146ff. and 'Further Literature on the so-called Christ-Myth,' *ibid.*, pp. 195ff.

of his *obiter dicta* even before his criticism takes its full and final shape.

1. His objections to *Ecce Deus* would seem to be in large measure æsthetic. The book is little to his taste. Not unnaturally. Even in the most optimistic mood I had never dared to hope that it would be pleasant reading to such as worship a Jewish Rabbi as the Lord of heaven and earth. More especially, he does not like 'endeavours to hammer so-called arguments into the reader's head.' Certainly a process equally disagreeable to reader and to writer. *Mais, que faire ?* Even such insistence and repetition do not always avail to forestall the grossest misapprehensions. Witness the main body of criticism upon *Der vorchristliche Jesus*. The author has been repeatedly and gravely informed of the mere existence of facts that he had himself explicitly stated and elaborately discussed in that volume.

In his very interesting and valuable article on John's Baptism, Dr. Eisler has given us some pertinent illustrations of the proper way to conduct 'sober methodical research,'—a paper that one used to hammering out so-called arguments on a strictly logical anvil will find by no means 'extremely trying reading' but rather an agreeable relief. The free use of such intensives as 'certainly,' 'obvious,' 'doubtlessly,' 'undoubtedly,' 'no doubt,' 'evidently,' etc., apparently to supplace major premises, should greatly facilitate the argumentative process, slow enough at best. One is reminded of the famous wish to be just as cocksure about some one thing as Macaulay was about everything. None the less, Dr. Eisler's work also is 'excellent in parts,' some of which seem quite in accord with certain views set forth in *Ecce Deus*.

2. The critic takes exception to the 'praise of the liberals,' as in 'exaggerated tones.' But the 'tones' were just and deserved in my judgment, nor was there any thought of 'heaping coals of fire.' Dr. Eisler has strangely overlooked the logical function of the 'praise' in question. Had merely certain critics failed in their attempt to interpret the Scriptures in accord with the pure-human 'theory' the fact would not have been remarkable and would have warranted no destructive inference. But when consummate critics, like Holsten, Harnack, Loisy, Schmiedel, Wellhausen, fail utterly, then indeed it means something, namely, that the difficulty is not in the critic but in the problem itself, which thus appears to involve an impossibility, like squaring the circle. Such is the good and sufficient reason for emphasising the ability of these critics, which as a weighty element in the argument must be kept steadily

before the reader's mind. Of course, Dr. Eisler felt no need of such emphasis, but there are others.

8. The translation is declared to be execrably bad. Parts of the book were written in German by myself, as the *Vorbemerkung* and others; possibly such may have given especial offence, though the condemnation sounds general. Meantime a scholar of world-wide fame (not to use 'exaggerated tones') writes of *Ecce Deus* in the *International Journal of Ethics* (October) that it is translated "doubtless by the same excellent hand," as *Der vorchristliche Jesus*, and a letter just received this morning from an accomplished German critic and literateur, who writes English almost as perfectly as Dr. Eisler, contains this sentence suggesting the alteration of 'Alter' into 'Zeitalter' (p. 17, § 25): "Here the translator, who otherwise, as far as I can see, has done his work *splendidly*, has erred against the spirit of our language," etc. The italics are the German author's. He suggests inserting 'einmal' to relieve the ambiguity in the question (p. 105): "*Wenn nicht ein Jude?*" and on p. 262, l. 15, he would change 'diesen' to 'ihnen.' Plainly then he has read this 'worst kind of Brooklin German' with great care and has not failed to criticise it in minute details; yet he thinks the translation has been done '*splendidly*.' Similar judgments have been pronounced by other highly competent authorities. Very likely Dr. Eisler's opinion will not stand alone. What then? When doctors disagree—? Perhaps something may depend on the atmosphere of feeling that envelopes the critical reader. In some moods it is not hard to find fault, even justly. Faultless German is perhaps as rare as faultless English.

4. Dr. Eisler declares the writer added "*on his own responsibility*, that the Jews calculated the number of Pagan nations at 153," which addition he stamps as 'purely gratuitous' and 'manifestly wrong,' since the "Rabbis estimated the total number of nations in the world as 72." Even in Dr. Eisler's own words italicised by himself, there seems to be some small grain of gratuity. The statement in question may be erroneous, but it was *not* made on my 'own responsibility.' At this moment I visualise clearly the (left-hand) page from which it was taken, in an accredited German authority, which, however, I have not at hand and cannot now recall. But that was twenty years ago, in course of a study of 'Numerical Symbolism in the Fourth Gospel' (mentioned in *Ecce Deus*, p. 126). Often it has been in my mind to look the matter up again, but it seemed so unimportant and was crowded out of thought. Lately I requested a friend, a learned Rabbi, to

investigate it carefully, but have not yet received his final report. In the revised manuscript of *Ecce Deus*, recently sent to London for publication, I have called attention to the foregoing facts. The nearest approach that I have found to a confirmation of the statement is in the work of Thoma, who, however, uses the modifier 'perhaps' (*vielleicht*). The matter, as Dr. Eisler perceives, is trivial; for, quite independently thereof, in my mind there can be no doubt of the symbolism—the parable in *Matt.* 13<sup>47</sup> is decisive: "The kingdom of heaven is like unto a net, that was cast into the sea, and gathered of every kind: which, when it was full, they drew to shore," etc. It seems plain that the 158 species of fish can hardly have been original with Jerome's 'most learned' Oppian, but must have been widely current ("*wird überhaupt gangbar gewesen sein*"—Hilgenfeld). Whence then the agreement with the 158 tribes of *2 Chron.* 21<sup>7</sup>? Was it a mere accident? *Credat Apella*. But if not, then the conceit *must* have been current among the Jews, whether or no the evidence therefor be still accessible. That the Rabbis reckoned 70 or 72 languages or nations (as I have myself elsewhere mentioned) is little to the purpose, since there were Rabbis and Rabbis. In view of the recognised double meaning of the Hebrew *eleph* (thousand, clan) and of the known habits of the rabbinical mind, it seems almost impossible that such an interpretation should not have been adventured.

Herewith, however, in still holding to the obvious symbolism of the miracle, I would by no means depreciate Dr. Eisler's interesting study in *THE QUEST* of January, 1911.

This last mentioned point, although accounted 'of minor interest,' appears to be by far the most important in Dr. Eisler's note. His notion that the passage in *Antiqq.* 18<sup>33</sup> is a Christian substitute for a Josephine original that "gave an indignant description of these events [riot aroused by Christ's cleansing of the Temple!] and of the subsequent trial of Jesus" is an imagination too magnificent 'for me to profane it'—but is it 'sober methodical research'?

WILLIAM BENJAMIN SMITH.

Tulane University, New Orleans.

## REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

### RIDDLES OF THE SPHINX.

A Study in the Philosophy of Humanism. By F. C. S. Schiller, M.A., D.Sc. London (Swan Sonnenschein), 1910.

THIS is a revised edition of Dr. Schiller's well-known essay, in which, some twenty years ago, he laid down the principles of Pragmatism or, as he prefers to call it, Humanism. Since then much water has flowed under the metaphysical bridges of speculative philosophy; nevertheless the author remains convinced that this "discovery in philosophic method . . . has rendered more or less out of date every earlier work on metaphysics, in much the same way as the rise of evolutionism rendered out of date every pre-Darwinian book on biology" (p. v.)—biology, note well, precisely the 'science' which according to Bergson fails most signally to explain life. Yet Dr. Schiller sees no reason to weaken his assurance that the ideas of which he has essayed an indication "do contain a real and complete answer to the Riddle of the Sphinx, an answer which is rational and capable of realisation" (p. 434). This is a bold claim indeed. What, then, is the Humanistic standpoint?

All human feeling and thinking must in the nature of things be 'anthropomorphic'—and we need not therefore boggle at the epithet. Of thought other than anthropomorphic we have no knowledge. The only possible distinction we can make is not between thought that is anthropomorphic and thought that is not, but between good and bad anthropomorphism. "Let us therefore call this unavoidable and salutary anthropomorphism Humanism" (p. 145). It therefore follows that "the ideal of true Humanism, and the ideal also of true science, would be realised when all our explanations made use of no principles which were not self-evident to human minds, self-explanatory to human feelings." Somewhat a putting of the ocean into a waterpot, we should imagine; however in Humanism, "we start . . . with the certainty of our own existence, on the basis and analogy of which the world must be interpreted" (p. 147). For, "after all, the world to be explained is the world as it appears to us; the life to be justified

is ours ; the sciences to be synthesised are human products called into being by our interests and needs. Man, moreover, is the highest of the beings he knows, though not the highest of those he conjectures and postulates. He has, therefore, no other and no better key to the mystery of being " (p. 164). The explanation, therefore, aimed at is solely an explanation *for us here and now*, for Dr. Schiller admits that there are in all probability beings far higher in the scale than ourselves ; from which it follows that *our* explanation may be as far from the reality when compared with the intuitions of such beings as an amœba's impression of *its* universe may be from the faulty adumbrations of human feeling and thought to which Humanism limits us. For "there might have existed, and still exist in the world, myriads of beings of a different order from ourselves, the denizens of stellar fires or interstellar space, whose constitution and mode of life concealed them from our sight. Or again, there may be phase upon phase of existence, forming worlds upon worlds impenetrable to our knowledge in our present phase, the existence of which may be indicated by the pre-human evolution of the world " (p. 299). If to this we add, as we may with equal legitimacy, the existence of a post-human evolution also actually in progress, though invisible to our present senses, we see hopes of escaping from what seems to us to be largely the vicious circle of insisting on 'explaining' the unknown (to us) solely in terms of the known (to us). Humanism will thus have no traffic with an 'absolute' of any kind whatever or even with 'infinity.' Infinity for it is a vain and useless and irrational concept corresponding to nothing given in experience. But granting the existence of beings far transcending ourselves, why should not their consciousness experience moments transcending finitude ? It does not follow that because we cannot understand infinity—that is, bring it within the limits of our finite thought—that it is not a real. We thus very cordially agree with Dr. Schiller when he writes that practically "a system of metaphysics, with whatever pretensions to pure thought and absolute rationality it may start, is always in the end one man's personal vision about the universe, and the 'metaphysical craving,' often so strong in the young, is nothing but the desire to tell the universe what one thinks of it " (p. vii.). But in the 'best society' of the spiritually educated might not such a 'craving' to tell the universe what we think of it be ascribed to 'bad form' ?

It must, however, be admitted that in clearing a way for his views in the crowded thoroughfare of clashing opinions and system-

mongering Dr. Schiller does not try to shirk the press of difficulties which beset him. He conscientiously endeavours to meet the obvious objections that can be brought against his views, and displays a marked ability in fence, a keen analysis and criticism. Though with such self-imposed limitations the outlook would not appear to be so very hopeful, our philosopher remains throughout an enthusiastic optimist, and cudgels away with right good will on the obtruding skulls of agnosticism, scepticism and pessimism. The Riddle of the Sphinx, Humanism stoutly maintains, can be and will be solved in the due course of human evolution, by means of the metaphysics of that evolution; we may have to wait till the whole of humanity is perfected, for the end is to be the consummation of an ideal social harmony; but it is bound to come, for the principle that has guided the philosopher's steps throughout is "faith in the world-process and in the metaphysics of evolution" (p. 413). What then is Dr. Schiller's 'personal vision about the universe'; what has he got to tell it and us as to 'what he thinks of it'?

To separate man from nature is a grave mistake. "Man is after all a part of nature, and it is an important fact about nature that it should culminate in man" (p. 150). But *does* nature culminate in man? It is a poor product if she does after such immense travail. We would rather say with the seer: "The whole creation travaileth in pain awaiting the manifestation of the Sons of God"; while at the same time we venture to believe that some of those Sons have already been born on earth. Nevertheless we agree that nature has to be interpreted by the apparent 'highest' in us rather than by the seeming 'lowest,' as materialistic mechanism insists. "The physical laws of nature are the earliest and lowest laws of the world-process, the most ingrained habits of things, the first attempts at the realisation of its End, and so are the very last to become intelligible. If we ever arrive at a teleological explanation of them, it will be only after we have *worked down* to them from the higher laws of the more complex phenomena. The basis, in other words, for a teleological interpretation of nature will not be found in sciences like physics and mechanics, but in sciences like psychology, sociology and ethics" (p. 204). There is, we believe, much truth in this, and the 'love' and 'hate' of the 'elements' may one day return from their long exile to vitalise the dead bones of physics. Dr. Schiller's teleological standpoint, which is quite Aristotelian, may be made clearer by another quotation: "To take the old puzzle which really involves



the whole question of philosophic method, though historically the egg comes before the chicken, it is yet an egg only in virtue of its potentiality to become a chicken; the egg exists in order to the development of the chicken out of it. Or, to put it into modern phraseology, the lower is prior to the higher historically, but the higher is prior to the lower metaphysically, because the lower can be considered only by reference to the higher, which gives it a meaning and of which it is the potentiality" (p. 196). The end of evolution is Humanistically conceived of as the perfection of personality. For "if by *person* we mean a *conscious and spiritual individual*, possessing moral and legal responsibility, who must be treated as an end and never merely as a means, then the higher phase of individuality, which we designate by the term personality, is an ideal to which we have very imperfectly attained" (p. 234). We are in process only of realising personality.

The most perfect personality is God; but to this supreme perfection (? an evolved perfection) man can never reach, for the end (for him) is to be of the nature of a harmony between personalities of which God is the supreme person, and not a transcendence of personalities; it is to be an eternal pluralism in which God holds the highest rank. For we are told that it is needless to invent such "gratuitous fictions" as an "impersonal intelligence" or an "unconscious purpose"—concepts that we should say need by no means necessarily be coupled together unless we are to limit "consciousness" to its normal human modes. It thus follows that "God is *finite*, or rather that to God, as to all realities, infinite is an unmeaning epithet" (p. 304). This seems to be little short of pure dogmatism. What *can* Dr. Schiller possibly know of the possibilities of the consciousness of "all realities," and *a fortiori* of the mode of the divine being? If the testimony of the highest mystical and spiritual experience of men is not entirely to be rejected by the Humanist as a 'gratuitous fiction,' then there is something other than the finite, something other than the personal, in any sense in which we know these limitations, a sense or intuition of infinite possibilities. For if, as Dr. Schiller himself writes, "atoms (?), crystals, animals, and men, the successive embodiments of the process towards individuality, are all of them real, and as such possess an infinity of attributes" (p. 234), we cannot see how that which already in lower stages of process possesses an 'infinity of attributes' should not be quite legitimately conceived of in its ultimate perfection as infinite rather than finite. Neither can we see the insuperable difficulty of conceiving that it

may quite well simultaneously embrace all finitude and transcend it. We thus refuse to be nailed down in Dr. Schiller's Humanistic coffin of eternal finitude; the solver of the Riddle of the Sphinx as to deity must be up to every wile of the Typhon of the human intellect, if he would escape the fate of Osiris and prevent the sorrows of Isis.

The next Riddle to be considered is the dualism of Spirit and Matter; this Dr. Schiller solves by assuming that they are 'aspects' of the same fact—an intellectual category again; we should prefer to say modes of the same reality. "The unity of philosophy is indicated by the discovery of a fundamental identity of Matter and Spirit, and by an ultimate reduction of the former to the latter" (p. 270). This we should think ought to lessen somewhat Dr. Schiller's detestation of monism; and if he thus spurns dualism so entirely, much more one would imagine should he throw pluralism to the winds! But it is not so, as we shall see in the sequel. The concept of Matter as something in itself, as a real, he thus holds, must be abandoned. Atoms or electrons, to use the label of the subtler concept that has come into existence since Dr. Schiller first wrote his essay, are 'force-centres.' "In order to be a satisfactory scientific explanation of things, these force-centres require some agency to prevent the individual atomic forces from coalescing into one." This postulate requires that the force-atoms should be endowed with "something like intelligence," so as to enable them to keep their position in space. "We should then say that they act *at* or from the points where they appear, and shall have substituted a known and knowable substratum, *viz.* intelligence, for unknowable 'Matter.' 'Our 'force-atoms' will have developed into '*monads*,' spiritual entities akin to ourselves. Thus the dualism of Matter and Spirit would have been transcended, and the lower, *viz.* Matter, would have been interpreted as a phenomenal appearance of the higher, *viz.* Spirit" (p. 269). This interpretation of Matter, which is by no means new, follows on the Humanistic interpretation of Force, which we are glad to see boldly joins hands with the so-thought utterly discredited primitive instinct of 'animism.' For "historically it is undeniable that Force is depersonalised Will, that the prototype of Force is Will, which even now is the Force *par excellence* and the only one which we know directly. The sense of Effort also, which is a distinctive element in the conception of Force, is inevitably suggestive of the action of a spiritual being. For how can there be effort without intelligence and will?" (p. 269.)

But Force implies resistance, and though the universe may be regarded as the manifestation of Divine Force, the stress in it must be accounted for as the reaction of the Ego upon this Force. The "cosmos of our experience" is thus to be thought of as "a stress or interaction between God and ourselves" (p. 274). We must, however, distinguish between the human Ego as it ultimately is and as it appears to us in this interaction. The Self as it appears is the phenomenal self, while the Self as an ultimate reality is the Transcendental Ego (p. 275). These twain, however, must not be too sharply distinguished; "they must be in some way *one*, and their unity must correspond to our conviction that we *change* and yet *are the same*." The Transcendental Ego may thus be conceived as "the 'I' *with all its powers and latent capacities of development*, as the ultimate plenitude of reality which we have not yet actually reached. The phenomenal self would then be that portion of the Transcendental Ego which is at any time actual or consciously experienced" (p. 276). Such is the Humanistic view of the nature of the Ego, for which there is much to be said.

As to the Riddle of the way in which the world arises, the solution offered is as follows: "If there are two beings, God and an Ego, capable of interacting, and if thereupon interaction takes place, there will be a reflexion of that interaction presented to or conceived by the Ego. And if . . . there is an element of non-adaptation and imperfection in this interaction, both factors will appear to the Ego in a distorted shape. The image of the reaction will not correspond to the reality. Such a distorted image our universe might be, and hence the divine half of the stress would be represented by the material world, and that of the Ego by our present phenomenal selves. But just as the development of ourselves reveals more and more our full nature, so it must be supposed that the development of the world will reveal more and more fully the nature of God, so that in the course of Evolution, our conception of the interaction between us and the Deity would become more and more adequate to the reality, until at the completion of the process, the last thin veil would be rent asunder, and the perfected spirits would behold the undimmed splendour of truth in the light of the countenance of God" (pp. 278, 279).

The ultimate reality for Dr. Schiller is thus to be thought of as pluralistic—yet not as a union or utter fulfilment of the Many in the One, but as a communion of the Many in an eternal

Harmony, which seems somewhat to mar the ultimate reality of personality, seeing that Harmony is not a person. This view he calls a pluralistic theism which can explain the world (p. 355). "The ultimate aim therefore of the world-process is a harmonious society of perfect individuals, a Kingdom of Heaven of perfected spirits, in which all friction will have disappeared from their interaction with God and with one another" (p. 414). As we shall see later on, the consummation is to be one of 'friendship' and not of 'love.' This pluralism is based upon the theory of the existence of certain *ultimate existences*, spirits, or transcendental egos, of course finite in number, among whom God is one, and not the One underlying the Many as in monism. This pluralistic view is not new, as all students of a certain phase of Indian philosophy are well aware; but it can apply at best to a particular world only, and forms no part of universalistic philosophy. It thus follows that God is finite—the old idea of the Īshvara or Logos of a system. He is limited by the co-existence of other individuals. And if the co-existence of these spirits is an ultimate fact it follows that "God need have no power to annihilate them; the most that can be done might be to bring them into harmony with the Divine Will. Now this might be just what the world-process was designed to effect, just *the reason why the world is in process*" (p. 349). This is the reduction of Deity to the status of a Demiurge at best, and we know, from the old myths, that when Man came into manifestation in the system of such a World-fabricator, he promptly refused to recognise the divinity of the Demiurge and betook himself to worship of his true Creator, the *Mysterium Exsuperantissimum*. This pluralism leaves us face to face with an eternally given multiplicity of a superior one and an inferior many, and leaves us with the Riddle of being and difference in being entirely unsolved, with the added difficulty of a God who is no ultimate. We cannot see what is the advantage of clinging so desperately to such a concept of personality; it is simply a making of God in our own very limited image. We prefer to bow in reverent silence before the Ultimate Riddle in an imageless shrine instead of setting an anthropomorphic idol on the throne of the universe. Dr. Schiller, however, will have it that "a personal and finite, but non-phenomenal, God, may legitimately be postulated to account for the existence and character of the world-process, and our belief in God's existence is ultimately bound up with the reality of the world-process" (p. 360). But we can believe in its reality just as fervently and 'explain' the world-process more reverently by

allowing the Deity to lay down the laws of His own being and becoming. The self-definition of the Divine Mind is not identical with the imposed limitations of the human intellect. Thus Dr. Schiller is too exclusive when he writes: "The education of the human race lies just in this, that in studying the nature and history of our world, we are progressively spelling out the elements of God's revelation to man" (p. 360); the education of humanity depends on much else besides this study.

But to pass to another Riddle of the Sphinx, which no system of philosophy or of religion has solved—the origin of evil. What is that "element of non-adaptation and imperfection" which faces Dr. Schiller in his effort to explain the interaction of God and man (p. 278)? His answer is more or less on all-fours with current theology; and like it, it leaves the Riddle unsolved. "The world is evil because it is imperfectly harmonised with the Divine will. And yet as God is not all things, He can be an 'eternal (*i.e.* unceasing) tendency making for righteousness,' and need not be, as on all other theories He must be, the Author of Evil" (p. 350). Here we are asked to choose between the Divine impotence and the Divine as maker of all things, or take refuge in the faith that the wisdom of the whole is very different from the casuistry of the part. Dr. Schiller also seems at times to be perilously near to ascribing evil to Matter, as when he writes: "The history of the world begins with beings to whom we can hardly attribute any consciousness or spiritual character. This obliteration of consciousness is effected by the aid of Matter, which has been recognised . . . as a mechanism for depressing consciousness" (p. 351). From this difficulty, however, the Humanistic philosophy would extricate itself, by declaring that "evil is, like all things, ultimately psychical, and what is evil about Matter is the condition of spirits that require the constraint of Matter" (p. 296). And so in giving its final answer to Materialism as a *hysteron proteron*, a putting of the cart before the horse, or inversion of the connection between matter and consciousness, Humanism declares: "Matter is not that which *produces* consciousness, but that which *limits* it and confines its intensity within certain limits: material organisation does not construct consciousness out of arrangements of atoms, but contracts its manifestation within the sphere which it permits" (p. 289). It follows then, we should imagine, that the endeavour to limit God is the outcome of the materialising intellect, rather than of spiritual intuition! We might thus even say "Physician, heal thyself," and all the more when we read that

the only adequate reply to Materialism is that "Matter exists only for spirits and the soul is the soul of a particular body, the internal reflex of a spiritual interaction of which the body is the external expression," followed by the rider that, "as in this dualism the body is the obvious and visible partner, whereas the soul is neither, there is an easy transition to a denial of the invisible soul and the crassest materialism." Spiritual liberty, we suggest, connotes the power of self-limitation at will, but it does not postulate the eternal finitude of Deity.

Though again Dr. Schiller declares himself strongly opposed to any theory of illusionism, and a firm believer in the reality of the world-process, he opens the door wide to something very much resembling the Taoist 'dream-life' and Great Awakening, and the Vedāntist 'world-illusion' and the One Reality. In contrasting dream-consciousness, as it appears in dream, with what it seems to our waking consciousness, he writes: "So with our present life: it seems real and rational, because we are yet asleep, because the eyes of the soul are not yet opened to pierce the veil of illusion. But if the rough touch of death awoke us from the lethargy of life, and withdrew the veil that shrouded from our sight the true nature of the cosmos, would not our earth-life appear a dream, the hallucination of an evil nightmare? [But] just as we are sometimes so struck by the monstrous incongruities of our dreams that, even as we dream, we are conscious that we dream, so philosophy arouses us to a consciousness that the phenomenal is not the real" (p. 280). But though from this point of view *our* 'objective world' be a 'hallucination,' being really 'subjective' in its mode of genesis, it need not on this account be without meaning and purpose. Our 'hallucinations' are all connected with the 'real' world and significant for our real life, and much more is this the case for the material world, the immediate manifestation of the Divine reaction or the "Divine half of the stress."

"The universe is *one*"; and why not then *a fortiori* the Deity? "Body and Soul, Matter and Spirit are but different aspects of the same fact: the material is but the outward and visible sign of the inward and spiritual state. . . . If the phenomenal world is a stress between the Deity and the Ego, the soul is but the reaction of the Ego upon the divine action which encases it as the body. . . . The single process of Evolution is [thus] a correlated development of *both* [Matter and Spirit], . . . the development of Spirit is naturally accompanied by a growth in the complexity of its material reflex" (pp. 282, 288).

One of Dr. Schiller's great merits is that he freely welcomes the psychological material acquired by psychical research; from the subordinate phenomena of the 'multiplex personality' of the phenomenal self, he is led to infer that it is not incredible that a plurality of phenomenal selves may be eventually subsumed in a single Transcendental Ego. "The question presents itself whether a single Ego corresponds to each *quasi*-individual, or whether several phenomenal organisms may not be the concurrent manifestations of the same Ego" (p. 405). If this is a possibility, or even if Dr. Schiller thinks it conceivable, then why should he not go further and conclude that an Ego with such consciousness would philosophise very differently as to 'personality' and 'depersonalisation,' as to separation and union, from the speculations of such 'split-off' portions as ourselves? For if it be admitted that the desire for union or of merging our personality in another and higher synthesis, manifested in the lives of the great mystics and claimed by them to be the characteristic of super-human love, may possibly foreshadow "the formation of coalesced existences of a higher order than our present partial and imperfect selves" (p. 407), why stop here, and deprive the Transcendental Ego of the bliss of a still more transcendent union? From this, however, Dr. Schiller is averse in his conviction that "in spite of strongest feeling, it has been shown that friendship is a more universal principle than love, that the concord of harmony is a better ideal than the ecstasy of love" (p. 411). The love, however, that gives all and asks nothing seems to be left entirely out of Dr. Schiller's speculation. "The Self," it is said, in an ancient verse, "lives by giving."

As to 'automatism' and the 'greater self' of the so-called 'sub-conscious,' Dr. Schiller thinks that it is not impossible that in the future we may regain fully conscious control of the body. It may be that "our direct control of our bodily organism, though obscured, is not an extinct power, that under favourable circumstances, we possess what appears to be a supernatural and is certainly a supernormal power over our bodies, and that this is the true source of the perennial accounts of miracles of healing and extraordinary faculties" (pp. 286, 287); that "just as Matter approximates to Spirit in the course of Evolution, so the body approximates to the soul" (p. 294).

As to the after-death state and survival, Dr. Schiller considers that it is to be considered most philosophically as a natural continuation of the present state (p. 365). While, as concerning

immortality, this to have any real meaning must be personal ; " it must involve in some sort the persistence of the 'I' which in this life thinks, and feels and wills " (p. 384). But how about that 'multiplex personality' idea? In any case the phenomenal 'I' is certainly a very imperfect thing. The course of development of the 'I,' then, requires the doctrine of pre-existence, and also a theory of metempsychosis or reincarnation of some sort. In dealing with the great crux of loss of memory, Dr. Schiller very admirably remarks that " oblivion is the only forgiveness of sins that nature sanctions " (p. 396) ; while as to the memories of the phenomenal self (the 'me' and 'mine') to be preserved for immortality, it is to be believed that " only to the extent to which we are to be identified with ultimate existences and transcendental egos would it follow that we are immortal." There is, however, no reason why in the process of development " a single Ego should not pass through the succession of organisms and developments of consciousness, from the amœba to man, and from man to perfection. And this would give, as it were, the *spiritual interpretation of the descent of man from the beasts* " (p. 388).

But this review has already spun itself out to an inordinate length, which, however, we hope will be found excusable owing to the great interest of the Humanistic attempt to solve the Riddles of the Sphinx.

#### THE HUMAN ATMOSPHERE.

Or the Aura made Visible by the Aid of Chemical Screens. By Walter J. Kilner, B.A., M.B. Cantab., M.R.C.P., etc., late Electrician at St. Thomas's Hospital, London. London (Rebman), 1911.

MOST of the readers of THE QUEST are familiar with the idea of the human 'aura,' which from the days of Reichenbach has been a subject of ever-increasing interest in the study of subjective psychical phenomena. Hitherto we have been dependent entirely on the testimony of 'sensitives' for the fact of its existence, and the subject has been consequently beyond the range of objective scientific research, and surrounded with all the prejudices that attach themselves to such enquiries. Dr. Kilner has the merit of being the first to discover a purely mechanical means of making the human atmosphere visible to a certain extent to perhaps some 90% of normal observers, and has thus opened up a new field for



methodical and systematic experiment on demonstrably objective lines. The process is a simple one. The retina is made sensitive to the ultra-violet rays by gazing at the light through a 'screen' containing a solution of a blue dye called dicyanin. The 'screen' consists of two small sheets of glass, with closed ends, containing the solution. The room is then darkened, and by using a screen with a weaker solution of the same dye a radiation is easily seen surrounding any bare portion of the human body. The action of the chemical is apparently cumulative, as in most cases the second screen can very soon be dispensed with, and the emanation seen with even clearer definition without it. It is to be noted, however, that where clothing covers the body the radiating or cloudy surround cannot be observed. The first thing to decide was whether the cloudy appearance was not simply an optical delusion. This primary and crucial objection, however, has been disposed of by a series of experiments that leave no doubt that we are dealing with an objective reality; a result which has been confirmed by a number of medical men who have experimented on their own account. The fact that an 'aura' exists may thus be said to have been demonstrated beyond question. Not only so, but this fact has already been used for the purpose of the diagnosis of disease and with remarkable results. For instance, no means have previously been known for detecting early pregnancy, but by inspection of this 'atmosphere' cases of a fortnight's pregnancy have been diagnosed with accuracy. Hysteria and epilepsy can be immediately diagnosed by strongly marked abnormalities of the shape of the patient's 'atmosphere,' and this diagnosis has been confirmed without any exception in a large number of cases. These are a few indications only of the diagnostic utility of the new discovery, which promises to inaugurate a new departure in medical science. It must not, however, be supposed by those who are familiar with the contradictory reports concerning the gorgeous colouring and precise definition of the aura by 'sensitives' that Dr. Kilner's invention introduces us to such a spectacle. At the beginning the experiment resembles rather the efforts of a tyro to see clearly with a microscope. The aura at first appears simply as a cloud of greys and neutral tints; for those accustomed to observing it, however, there is a bluish tinging. In high probability there are 'colours,' but these are all beyond the range of the normal physical spectrum, and belong to the ultra-violet range. It is probable, however, that just as dyes are used for the better definition of microscopical objects, so it will be possible to discover

means of defining this 'aura,' perhaps by means of vapours. The whole science is as yet in embryo, and calls for volunteers. It is easy for anyone almost to start; a few screens and a darkened room is all that is necessary. By the courtesy of Dr. Kilner and of a colleague who has worked with him from the start, and who is also an old friend, we have assured ourselves that this human atmosphere can be seen and that it is not an optical delusion. For the description of the aura and its types, and how it differs in men and women, and in health and disease, as far as it has at present been ascertained, together with the report of a large number of instructive experiments and of diagrams, we must refer the reader to Dr. Kilner's book, which, together with the necessary set of screens, can be purchased from Messrs. Rebman for 30s.

#### PERSONALITY AND TELEPATHY.

By F. C. Constable. London (Kegan Paul), 1911.

THE object of this work is to prove by the evidence of human experience that we exist as spiritual selves; the factor whereby the author claims to make his proof is telepathy, which he defines as "the timeless and spaceless communion between intuitive selves," 'intuitive' being the not very satisfactory term chosen by the author to designate what is more commonly called 'subliminal.' There is no attempt to prove the existence of an immortal soul in man; though Mr. Constable claims to present 'approximate proof' of the survival of personality after death. The First Part discusses Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* at some length with the object of showing that memory being outside Time and Space is not a physical function but belongs to the intuitive self; here Mr. Constable seems to be unconsciously following Prof. Bergson. In Part II. the claim is made that certain facts of human experience are only to be explained on the assumption of the truth of telepathy, and several instances both of spontaneous and experimental manifestations are given; these are taken chiefly from the *Proceedings* of the S.P.R., to which Mr. Constable belongs. Sleep, Hypnosis, Haunted Houses, and Multiple Personality are all dealt with in Part III. so far as they bear on the author's subject.

Mr. Constable's enthusiasm for his subject has not unfortunately inspired his style; the work is well reasoned, cautious in expression and incredibly tiring to read considering the fascination of the subject.

C. B. W.

## THE FRENCH TRANSLATION OF THE ZOHAR.

*Sepher ha-Zohar* (Le Livre de la Splendeur). Doctrine Ésotérique des Israélites. Traduit pour la première fois sur le Texte chaldaïque et accompagné des Notes. Par Jean de Pauly. Paris (Leroux), 1906-1911, 6 vols.

THIS is the first translation of the collection of tractates grouped under the general title *Sepher ha-Zohar* or *The Book of Splendour*, which from the thirteenth century onward have constituted, so to say, the 'Bible,' or better the Talmud, of the Kabbalists—an undertaking to which we have already drawn the attention of our readers in the January number of *THE QUEST* for 1910. We most heartily congratulate M. Émile Lafuma-Giraud, by whose care and at whose risks this great undertaking has been brought to a successful completion. The translator, Jean de Pauly, died at the early age of 40, after a sad life of suffering, with the hope "that the Shekinah would take his immense effort into account and bring him to the Ancient of Days." From love of his friend and because he was thoroughly convinced of the importance of the work M. Lafuma-Giraud, with the help of an unnamed scholar, has seen this huge mass of MS. through the press and finally presented us with six fat volumes, and therewith the indispensable means, for all who cannot read the Aramaic original, of becoming systematically acquainted with a series of documents that have exercised a most potent influence and a veritable fascination on many minds. At last the layman has the means of forming some opinion of his own on the whole matter, and is no longer entirely dependent on summaries and extracts only. The main thing, however, of which he has to assure himself is how far he can rely upon de Pauly's translation. Judging by the very favourable reception of de Pauly's German version of the *Šalchan-Arukh* (Bale, 1888), there can be little doubt of his competence as a translator; indeed he received specially hearty congratulations on the way in which he had done his work in this instance. We have also enquired of a Jewish scholar, a Reader in Talmudic, who has found that de Pauly is reliable in all the passages he has tested. On the other hand it cannot be denied that on comparison of the translations of various famous passages by different scholars, we find ourselves frequently face to face with wide divergences. Though this fact does not affect our reliance on the version of the general text it makes us hesitate to accept as entirely adequate

the translation of the more mystical and religio-philosophical portions; but that is usually the case with such matter. De Pauly's translation, however, always reads clearly in excellent French, and we have every reason to be grateful that at last we have a translation of the whole. It means much; it means for many a perspective of their own for the first time in which to view the Zohar. The volumes are excellently printed, and the notes are useful, though many of them are awkwardly placed at the end in the sixth volume. What we most object to is that there are no indications on the cover (paper) even of the number of the volume; this is a very serious oversight and greatly increases the labour of reference. There should have been a complete circumspectus of contents; the 'tables of matter' at the end of the separate volumes are not sufficient.

The general style of the main work is in the form of a Talmudic commentary on the 'Five Books' of Moses, sometimes called the Midrash of Shimeon ben Yohai, as it is put into the mouth of that famous and wonder-working Tana of the second century A.D.; it has indeed constituted, so to say, the mystical or 'esoteric' Talmud of the Jews—or such of them at any rate who accepted it, or still accept it, of whom to-day there are few, whereas in the later Middle Ages there were very large numbers.

As to the contents of the volumes, besides the Zohar properly so called, there is a number of subsidiary or supplementary portions printed as part of the text, the whole constituting the collection of Zoharic documents. These appendices are: 'The Book of the Mysteries,' dealing mostly with problems of Creation, such as the transition from the infinite to the finite, from pure intelligence to matter; 'The Great Assembly,' which enlarges upon the preceding portions, and 'The Little Assembly,' which summarises the foregoing. To these larger supplements are appended fragmentary tractates such as: 'The Mysteries of the Mysteries,' dealing with Kabalistic physiognomy and the relation of the soul to the body; 'The Palaces,' describing the seven heavenly halls, paradise and hell; 'The Faithful Shepherd,' dealing with the allegorical meaning of the Mosaic commandments; 'The Secrets of the Law,' treating of various Kabalistic subjects; 'The Hidden Midrash,' containing allegorical exercises on some scriptural passages; 'The Ancient,' dealing with the doctrine of metempsychosis; 'The Child,' with certain ritual observances. To these are added still further 'Extensions,' which treat of the doctrines of the Sephiroth and the Emanation of the Primordial Light, etc. These are all

embraced under the Zohar proper. But in still further addition we have 'The New Zohar,' 'The Zohar of the Song of Songs,' and certain ancient and new 'Supplements.'

The Zohar was first brought into publicity in Spain in the thirteenth century by the Kabbalist and distinguished scholar Rabbi Moses ben Shem-Tob de Leon. Though its authenticity as a genuine work of Shimeon ben Yohai was accepted by the Kabbalists and some of the most distinguished Talmudists, it was from an early date questioned, and extremists have asserted that the whole work was simply a deliberate forgery by Moses de Leon himself. Into the fortunes of this controversy we need not enter further than to say that it is impossible to believe that one brain could have produced such a transparently heterogeneous collection of matter of different styles and dates. R. Moses could have been at best a redactor of previously existing material. This, however, does not authenticate the ascribed provenance of the Zohar from the traditional teaching of Shimeon ben Yohai and his school. The question remains one of great difficulty and must be treated in connection with the whole history of the Kabbalah in its widest sense as a thread on which to string the traditions of the majority of the mystical, gnostic and theosophic schools and heresies among the Jews that go back to pre-Christian centuries. The best treatment of the subject on these general lines is to be found in Kohler and Louis Ginzberg's excellent article 'Cabala,' in *The Jewish Encyclopædia* (1902).

The Kabbalah, which means literally the 'received or traditional lore,' has always purported to be the tradition of a hidden or secret wisdom. In their dispersion the Jews came into contact with many high phases of inner religion and religio-philosophy and philosophy proper, with many mystery-cults, as well as with a wealth of popular superstitions. While on the one hand they knew well how to preserve their own peculiar genius in such matters, on the other many of them were extremely curious and acquisitive. While they 'spoiled the Egyptians,' the national spirit adapted the rich spoil to its own purposes and genius. As, however, every statement and doctrine had to be authenticated by reference to Scripture, this led to an extraordinary development of the allegorical method of interpretation, in which the Rabbis were enthusiastically followed by the Fathers and the mediæval exegetes. The conviction was that the truths of all wisdom and philosophy were already contained in the Scripture, and that it was given only unto the few to raise the veil and discover them

beneath the letter. The same idea was also the dominant thought of Swedenborg in his interpretation of Scripture. There were various methods of allegorical interpretation both among the Jews, the Christian Fathers, and the scholars of the Middle Ages; that of the Zohar is known as Pardes. As it brings out the mystical standpoint of the Zohar, it may be of interest to quote what Isaac Broydé has to say on this point in his article ('Zohar,' *J. E.*):

"The Zohar assumes four kinds of Biblical exegesis: 'Peshat (literal meaning), 'Remez' (allusion), 'Derash' (anagogical), and 'Sod' (mystic). The initial letters of these words . . . form together the word PaRDeS (Paradise), which became the designation for the fourfold meaning of which the mystical sense is the highest part. The mystic allegorism is based by the Zohar on the principle that all visible things, the phenomena of nature included, have besides their exoteric reality an esoteric reality also, destined to instruct man in that which is invisible. This principle is the necessary corollary of the fundamental doctrine of the Zohar. The universe being, according to that doctrine, a gradation of emanations, it follows that the human mind may recognise in each effect the supreme mark, and thus ascend to the cause of all causes. This ascension, however, can only be made gradually, after the mind has attained four stages of knowledge; namely: (1) the knowledge of the exterior aspect of things, or, as the Zohar calls it, 'the vision through the mirror that projects an indirect light'; (2) the knowledge of the essence of things, or 'the vision through the mirror that projects a direct light'; (3) the knowledge through intuitive representation; and (4) the knowledge through love, since the Law reveals its secret to those only who love it. After the knowledge through love comes the ecstatic state which is applied to the most holy visions."

The ingenuity displayed in torturing texts of scripture to yield the most unexpected meanings is marvellous; not only so but a whole system of the permutations and combinations of words and even their letters was invented, till finally the solid surface of the sacred texts becomes a fluid medium in which anything can be found. In this way all the objective difficulties that bestrew the path of modern criticism were dissolved and the way was cleared for bringing in and acclimatising many new ideas. These ideas are of great interest to the student of comparative religio-philosophy and mysticism, for whom the collection of Zoharic documents is as it were a drag net that contains a rich catch of all sorts of fish from

the past. Though the Kābalah is generally regarded as closely interwoven with magic and mystery of every kind, there is still much in it of value for the student of mysticism, and indeed, as one of its most recent scholars says, "it cannot be satisfactorily estimated as a whole unless its religio-ethical side is more strongly emphasised than has been the case heretofore." Not only so, but it must not be forgotten that the enthusiasm for the Zohar was shared in by many Christian scholars in the days of the Humanists, such as Pico de Mirandola, Reuchlin and Ægidius of Viterbo, in the belief that it contained proofs of the truth of Christian dogmas, such as of the fall and redemption, and notably of the Trinity, which was thought by them to be referred to in such a passage as the following: "The Ancient of Days has three heads. He reveals himself in three archetypes, all three forming but one. He is thus symbolised by the number Three. They are revealed in one another. [These are :] first, secret, hidden 'Wisdom'; above that the Holy Ancient One; and above Him the unknowable One. None knows what He contains; He is above all conception. He is therefore called for man 'Non-Existing.'" It must, however, be confessed that it is difficult to find the dogmatic Christian Trinity in such a passage; though it has indubitably close analogies with other mystical Triads of even pre-Christian times. We had thought that the expectation of the Humanist enthusiasts of the Zohar who propagated its doctrines in the hope of converting the Jews, had long been abandoned, and therefore we are somewhat surprised to find that this is still the very hope that has buoyed up M. Lafuma-Giraud himself in his labours, for in his preface to the Notes he writes: "Our recompense, and the only reward that we would desire, would be great indeed, if the reading of this book should bring light to a single Jewish soul, and show him that the Christian teaching is nothing else but the continuation of that of the Jewish tradition, and that the Zohar, the echo of this tradition in certain of its divisions, permits us to see, if obscurely, the dogma of the Trinity and that of the Man-God, who was the Messiah of the Prophets and incarnated on earth two thousand years ago." It is true that there are more mystical and therefore more universal elements in the Zohar than in the Talmud or in the orthodox Fathers, and that therefore the liberal-minded Jew and Christian who love such things can find in it some common ground of meeting; but that ground would be considered heretical by the orthodox co-religionists of both. Conversion on either side would mean passing over into the orthodox fold

of either Judaism or Christianity, and thus the abandoning of the very ground of agreement.

Apart, however, from what his intention may have been in publishing the work, we are grateful to M. Lafuma-Giraud for carrying out his undertaking in so self-sacrificing a way. He has, as he says, put the work through the press with very limited resources and at his own single risk. Such an enterprise deserves the support of all institutions for the study of comparative religion, the shelves of whose libraries should not be without so important a work. Only 750 copies have been printed, and each set of six volumes costs 150frs. They can be obtained from M. Émile Lafuma-Giraud, à Voiron (Isère), France.

#### SPIRITUAL SCIENCE HERE AND HEREAFTER.

By Sir Earnshaw Cooper, C.I.E. London (Fowler), 1911.

THE author of this work tells us that although he has been interested in the 'occult' for many years, his first experiences of clairvoyance did not occur until May, 1909. These impressed him so deeply that he decided to publish them, believing it to be his duty to pass on to others what had proved so valuable to himself. Whether his book will prove very convincing to his readers is open to question, but there can be no doubt about the sincerity and enthusiasm of the writer.

One could wish that the writer's opinions had been expressed a little less dogmatically, and with greater brevity; also the literary style leaves much to be desired; but there is interesting matter and much that is true to be found in these pages. The writer has read a good deal on the subject of 'Spiritualism' and makes considerable quotations; the most interesting chapter, however, is that in which he narrates his own experiences with Mr. P. E. Beard, who seems to be a remarkably good clairvoyant.

The title of the book is misleading, for it may induce the expectation that the subject is treated on scientific lines; which is not the case. It is the work of a practical, business man and from that point of view it has an interest of its own. Those who are curious to know how a man of affairs, accustomed to deal with mundane matters, can be affected by personal experiences of this nature may discover it by reading the book.

H. A. D.



## THE SECRET TRADITION IN FREEMASONRY.

And an Analysis of the Inter-Relation Between the Craft and the High Grades in respect of their Term of Research expressed by the Way of Symbolism. By Arthur Edward Waite. In two Volumes with 28 full-page Plates and many other Illustrations. London (Rebman), 1911. Crown 4to, pp. xxxvi. + 417 + 447. Price 2 guineas.

NEVER, in the history of Freemasonry, has "the popular and uninstructed world who are not Freemasons" taken so little interest in the Craft as in our days. Masonry is put down as a great philanthropy and dismissed as such from the mind of the man in the street. Masonic high junketings, though somewhat of a bye-word, are accepted in the manner of the dining propensities of civic guilds. Even the occasional brave show of weird millinery and of manly chests bedecked with medals and ribbons of many hues has lost its attraction for the fickle mind of the British public, who now-a-days positively refuse to take Masonry seriously. A hundred and fifty years ago, membership of the Craft conferred a kind of social distinction—the Lodges in those days, and more especially the higher grades, being composed largely of the nobility and gentry of these isles and of the Continent. But it is quite unnecessary to insist that such is no longer the case and that, on the contrary, membership on the part of a county magnate or other big-wig is considered in the nature of condescension, and calls forth from his 'Brethren' loud encomia as to the Great Man's affability and popularity. No, Freemasonry in this country has become essentially *bourgeois*, eminently respectable and intolerably dull.

That this is the truth, no candid member of the Craft will be able to deny—but (and there is always a 'but' in this complex world of ours) is it also the *whole* truth? If Freemasonry is a union of dining-clubs, or even if it is a hat that is being sent round the world to collect money for charitable purposes, how has it ever been able to carry on existence for at least two hundred years on so slender a pretence? Clearly, the visible body of this curious Institution could not possibly have continued to live as a growing organism, without a soul to give it life. For not only do we find that Freemasonry is not decaying like other archaic survivals, but, on the contrary, that its growth has never been so vigorous, its life never so strong as it is now. Hence we

must grant that appearances are—in this case, anyhow—deceptive. Do I, then, mean to infer that the Masonic claims as to a superior knowledge of some indefinite and unknown kind, should be taken seriously? Should we accept at their face value the pretences of 'Masters of the Royal Secret,' 'Sovereign Grand Commanders' of this, that and the other thing, 'Knights of the Apocalypse,' 'Chevaliers Elect,' 'Emperors of the East and West,' *et hoc genus omne*? No, naturally, all these claims are but *pour rire*. Only a little over a century ago they were of course taken seriously enough, quite as seriously, I suppose, as in our days are taken Swamis and Mahatmas and Higher Thinkers and Denominational Scientists and the rest of our Modern Magicians. But looking back, from the impersonal standpoint of history, upon the majority of the 'Higher' Grades in Freemasonry, as invented during the period just anteceding the French Revolution, they cannot but seem to us "the kind of thing that we should call foolish in the mummeries of our children. But since it is the work of grown men for communication to persons also of mature age, there is no reason to suppose that it was received otherwise than with tolerance, perhaps even with reverence" (ii. 369).

Then why the mummery? What is it all about? What do the Freemasons themselves say that Freemasonry is? The initiated will smile indulgently and inform us that Freemasonry is a system of morality. But morality is fortunately not a peculiar knowledge restricted to the few. It is found amongst all civilised members of humanity, be they Masons or non-Masons. The universal validity of ethics is recognised by all mankind. Freemasonry may re-affirm these truths in the lodges and inculcate a greater love of charity and a greater obedience to the moral law generally—but the truths themselves are commonplaces. "The counsels of morality and brotherhood borrow nothing from the realms of mystery, and secrecy has no part therein" (i. 81). That good is good, and bad bad, and that it is better to be good than to do evil—these are not exactly the kind of verities that require an elaborate apparatus of ritual and symbolism and hierophants for their revelation. We have learnt all that at our mothers' knees, and if counsels of morality are the only knowledge imparted, then surely fees are exacted for the possession of that which already is the common property of all. Of the thinking Freemasons there have, therefore, always been some who have tried to discover another and better interpretation of Freemasonry and of its

*raison d'être*. Some have thus thought to discover that the terrible secret Freemasonry has been called upon to perpetuate is—say it not in Dan, publish it not in the streets of Gath!—the amazing theory that the sun is the centre of our system. Others have substituted the Pole-star and quoted Egyptian papyri by the ream. Others—but that is rather *vieux jeu* nowadays—have seen the *lingam* and *yoni* everywhere and therefore also in Freemasonry. Still others regard the secret mission of Freemasonry to be the proclamation of the sublime truth that a triangle the sides of which are respectively 3, 4 and 5 must be a rectangular one! Gentle reader—as an early Victorian author would say—do not be impatient with me. I really do not presume on your credulity—these and similar ‘theories’ (*sit venia verbo!*) have actually been set forth in solemn seriousness, and many a portly volume has been filled with this kind of fatuity. Freemasonry has really been most unfortunate in its apologists. In fact, the only research hitherto undertaken, that deserves any serious consideration at all, is that of antiquarians like Findel, Hughes, Gould and all the other good men and true, *qui militant sub signis Quatuor Coronatorum*. Their investigations are altogether laudable and their results unassailable. Unfortunately for us, however, the end of the quest of all these historians is as much to our point, as a post-mortem report by the medical faculty on the body of Mr. Cobden would be to us in deciding the relative merits of Free Trade and Protection. What we want is a psychology, not an anatomy; an interpretation of the guise, not a scientific analysis of the garment.

Astonishing, then, as the conclusion is, it yet remains a fact either that Freemasonry—though established even in its present form for at least two hundred years—is still unconscious of its own true interpretation; or else that it is no more than it appears on the outside, that is to say an idle sham and a hollow vanity. The validity of the latter judgment I have already impugned in my opening remarks; but it is clear that it would altogether vanish if a true interpretation were offered. And this, I maintain, has actually happened. The grey, forbidding castle of Freemasonry, which has withstood the assaults of all false pretenders, which has contemptuously looked down upon the crowd picnicking without its ramparts, opens hospitably the massive old oaken doors of its gate to the one who produces the secret key which alone will open it.

Arthur Edward Waite should have been known to all Freemasons if not as the author of *Studies in Mysticism*, then

certainly as that of *The Hidden Church of the Holy Graal*. His message, however, remained largely unheeded by them, being altogether without the field of vision of the Craft; but since his publication of *The Secret Tradition in Freemasonry*, no excuse is any longer possible for ignorance of the fact that the long-lost word of Freemasonry has been recovered—which word is “the identity between the root-matter of Masonry and that of the other Mysteries” (i. 418); “the Secret Tradition, which is the immemorial knowledge concerning man's way of return whence he came by a method of the inward life” (ii. 379).

Considerations of space forbid any tracing on my part of the circumstances which led to this curious marriage of two so ill-matched as Building Guild and Inward Life seem. Enough, then, here to state that such spiritual nuptials did indeed take place, and that in the XVIIth century finally “the speculative side of building, having long been in close connection with the operative side, began to absorb it entirely” (i. 102), so that eventually “the body of the sodality fell altogether away and a soul of it only remained” (i. 106).

It must suffice, then, to repeat that the true inward meaning of Freemasonry—lost to the conscious mind of its present adherents—has been recovered. The true key has been produced, and the proof that it is what I claim for it exists in the very fact that naturally, obviously, easily, it turns in the lock and opens it—a contention which will be clear to all those who are qualified to judge. And to them, my fellow-craftsmen, or at least to those of them who know also, even if only by hearsay, something of the Mystic Quest, it will come as a revelation, how simply all symbols and allegories and legends of ours can be interpreted, what admirable sense all the seeming *bizarceries* and *grotesqueries* make, when looked upon as a guise of the spiritual and eternal truths of the mystic life. The necessity of moral purgation to the apprentice; the craftsman's attempt to grapple intellectually with the hidden mysteries of nature and science; the Master's death—they all become luminous and self-evident statements of fact. Yes, “the quest proposed in Masonry is one of recovery, and the implicit hereof is, that recovery is possible, or a certain method of ending the day of labour, by the ceremonial act of closing, would be only an insensate pretence, instead of—as it is—perhaps the most sublime indication of the inner meaning within external doctrine that has ever been expressed in language” (i. 342). For ‘Death’ in all the true Mysteries has always stood for “the

mystery of release by the suspension of the sensitive life " (ii. 299), symbolising that the path of knowledge is the path of unknowing. The casting out of the images of matter in the South, the expulsion of the images of the mind in the North, must be followed by the sacrifice of even the last image, that of the personal self, which can only be laid low by the heavy maul wielded by a Master. The result of all these operations is "an acquaintance, an experience, a familiarity, an inexpressible intimacy which cannot be grasped by understanding; a modal change in knowledge, which henceforth becomes of the substance and intrinsic, instead of the external and phenomenal elements" (ii. 287). This, then, is the primary import of the sublime history so well known to all Master Masons; but, like all true symbolism, it illustrates more than a single truth.

It is a curious fact that nobody hitherto seems to have realised "that nothing was lost in reality, but rather that an intended manifestation was delayed through the ages, that those who could have spoken merely elected to keep their counsel " (i. xv). "In this sense Masonry is a summary in symbolism of our mortal life and memorialises the widowhood of the rational faculty, which cannot comprehend the abstract notion of things by an act of union, but attains them only in signs of sacramental conception " (i. 55, 56). And since "the records of life only are communicable, and not life itself " (i. 35), "the Craft fulfils its office as a record of the loss of the union; it testifies in parables to the existence of the great things, and it keeps green the remembrance concerning them " (i. 60).

This leads us to see that Masonry is very much in the same position as is the Church to a great extent, when it imparts the greatest things of all in symbolism, not in experience (ii. 354). "The Sacrifice, for example, of the Mass is the greatest ritual of the whole wide world, but so profoundly is its true meaning laid to rest beneath the literal surface that amidst the concourse of worshippers there are, I am afraid, very few who can be said to discern, much less to realise inwardly, what is involved therein. Fortunately, the Sacrifice is so great and so holy, that it has the life of salvation on the external side, and therein at least the wayfaring man has no need to err " (i. 340).

"But this is no place to present in its fulness the Secret Tradition in Universal Mysticism," and we must regretfully agree with our author that "such task belongs to the term of his research and not to the present intermediate grade " (ii. 286). Yet, after the excellent results achieved by him even in such grades, it

is to be fervently hoped that such a task will not remain unfulfilled for long but that he will soon present us with a study of the "oversoul of religion, which subtends and extends over all formulæ of creed and dogma, all normal rules of life and sanctity of prescribed observance; of the power behind the Church, and the grace behind the Mass and the authority above the priesthood, intervening only to exalt, but to dispense or cancel never" (ii. 284). And even after testifying through all the Christian centuries to the catholic root-fact—a work gigantic enough to daunt any one man—there will yet remain the ultimate necessity of "marrying the East and the West in the unity of their own mysticism" (ii. 297). For, as the practice is Union, so is the doctrine Unity (ii. 298).

Z<sup>3</sup>.

#### THE LIFE OF HIUEN-TSIANG.

By the Shaman Hwui-Li. By Samuel Beal, B.A., D.C.L. New Edition with a Preface by L. Cranmer-Byng. London (Kegan Paul), 1911.

HIUEN-TSIANG was one of the famous Chinese Buddhist pilgrims who spent sixteen years (629-645 A.D.) of adventurous travel in the 'West,' mainly of course in India, in quest of the most authentic memorials of the Buddha's doctrine. The account of his experience he related in his famous *Record of Western Countries*. To supplement this his disciple Hwui-Li wrote a biography of his master and entitled it (in literal version) *History of the Master of the Law of the Three Piṭakas of the 'Great Loving-Kindness' Temple*. Beal's translation of this geographically and historically important document, forming one of the volumes of Trübner's Oriental Series, has long been out of print. The volume before us is not really a 'new edition' but a simple reprint. It bristles with names of people and places that require far more explanation and identification than it was possible for Beal (with the at that time very inadequate knowledge of the subject) to submit in his translation and edition of Hiuen-Tsiang's *Si-yu-ki* (or *Record of Western Countries*), to which he refers us on so many occasions in the present volume. The reprint is doubtless motivated by the great interest in early 'Central Asian' geography aroused by the recent rich finds of ancient documents in Western Turkestan and Eastern Tibet, which have opened to us an entirely new page of history.

## LAUGHTER.

An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic. By Henri Bergson.  
Authorised Translation by Cloudesley Brereton, L. ès L.,  
M.A., and Fred. Rothwell, B.A. London (Macmillan), 1911.

THIS translation—a very good one—completes the tale of Bergson's chief contributions to philosophic thought in English dress. Strictly speaking the sub-title more accurately describes the scope of this in many ways suggestive essay than the main heading; for even if we agree with Bergson that "the comic does not exist outside the pale of what is strictly *human*" (p. 8), we by no means are inclined to think that laughter in general can be limited to a reaction evoked by our appreciation of the comic, or even that the underlying element in this natural emotion can be restricted to mankind. It is true that the psychology of laughter has been the despair of the philosophers, as have so many other of the commonest phenomena of our emotional life; but we are somewhat surprised to find the protagonist of the *élan vital* and of intuitionism asking us to agree that "*absence of feeling*" is one of the most noteworthy symptoms that "usually" accompanies laughter (p. 4). In spite of the qualification 'usually' Bergson makes this 'absence of feeling' a fundamental element in his treatment and analysis of the idea of the comic, and laughter, he declares, is as it were a "*social gesture*" (p. 20) of a corrective nature, which brings back the absent-minded, and in general the victim of "*mechanical inelasticity*" (p. 10), to social sanity, and above all to spontaneity. In this we glimpse the principle on which Bergson bases his whole solution of the problem of the comic. He sets it forth very clearly in the following passage:

"Whatever be the doctrine to which our reason assents, our imagination has a very clear-cut philosophy of its own: in every human form it sees the effort of a soul which is shaping matter, a soul that is infinitely supple and perpetually in motion, subject to no law of gravitation, for it is not the earth that attracts it. This soul imparts a portion of its winged lightness to the body it animates: the immateriality which thus passes into matter is what is called gracefulness. Matter, however, is obstinate and resists. It draws to itself the ever-alert activity of this higher principle, would fain convert it to its own inertia and cause it to revert to mere automatism. It would fain immobilise the intelligently varied movements of the body in stupidly contracted

grooves, stereotype in permanent grimaces the fleeting expressions of the face, in short impress on the whole person such an attitude as to make it appear immersed and absorbed in the materiality of some mechanical occupation instead of ceaselessly renewing its vitality by keeping in touch with a living idea. Where matter thus succeeds in dulling the outward life of the soul, in petrifying its movements and thwarting its gracefulness, it achieves, at the expense of the body, an effect that is comic" (p. 29).

This seems to us a brilliant suggestion containing much truth; on it Bergson bases his whole treatment of the Comic in three instructive chapters, with a wealth of illustration, and a charm of style that avoids technicalities and makes his book a pleasure to read from the first to the last line. With such a master-idea, one that he has made his own and worked out in all his books with such brilliancy, it is all the more surprising that he has not found in laughter more than a social corrective of the 'unsprightly' and the 'rigid' or even a recalling of the soul to its proper nature. And since he permits us to hold that the 'imagination has a very clear-cut philosophy of its own,' we may venture to remind the philosopher of creative evolution, of the life impulse, of the urge of the spirit, of the joy of creation, that one of the old magic traditions of ancient Egypt would have it that Thoth created the world by bursting into seven peals of laughter, and that the Magical Papyri, following the same tradition, speak of the heaven or æon as the everlasting revelling-place (*kōmastērion*) of the gods. Does not Heraclitus speak of the Æon (? Bergson's *Durée*) as a child playing, and an old Orphic saying declare that the Ancient of Eternity is a boy? Does not the ever-young mystery-god Iacchos, the true creative soul of man, play with his play-things laughing? Have we not heard of the *lila* or creative sport of Vishṇu, and is not the most ancient philosophy of the Tao in the Far East a philosophy of laughter and soul-healing humour? What is wit but one of the most potent powers of the spirit? Indeed in French it is the same word, *esprit*. In the philosophy of æsthetics laughter should, we believe, be related as well to the beautiful and the sublime as to the ludicrous, for laughter, as is generally held, is an expression of pleasurable feeling. Though it may at times be ironical and depreciatory, we are not justified in limiting it to a feeling of superiority, or in agreeing with Hobbes that "laughter is a sudden glory arising from a sudden conception of some eminency in ourselves by *comparison with the infirmity of others* or *with our own formerly*" (our italics), for it is at



bottom, we hold, joyous, creative, spontaneous. It is not only a bodily expression, it is also of the mind and soul and spirit. "The valleys stand so thick with corn that they laugh and sing"; the music of the spheres is cosmic laughter, the Sons of God shout for joy, they laugh and sing, not because of any feeling of superiority, but because it is spontaneous, sudden, free with them. We have often said that it is a great pity that in the solemn list of 'powers' and 'virtues' in Indian mysticism, laughter has been omitted. Bergson has it, as his witty essay and whole philosophy proves, then why has he limited it to the comic and the ludicrous?

### THE CENTAUR.

By Algernon Blackwood. London (Macmillan), 1911. Price 6s.

AS to technique *The Centaur* is, we think, the best piece of sustained work that Mr. Blackwood has done; while as to subject, remote as are his themes in general from the grey world of the commonplace, he has this time almost surpassed himself. By means of a daring effort of the creative imagination he carries the reader with him on an awesome yet fascinating adventure to the furthest confines of primæval faëry. With deft suggestion he creates an atmosphere in which the dream of union with the soul of nature seems very near to realisation. He would reawaken the wellnigh superhuman phantasy of the ancient world, when men were children and still lay upon their mother's breast and got their nourishment direct from her, and so he would revive the dimmest and the most elusive shades of mythologic dreams, and yet not simply inking over the faint tracings of the academic copy-books, but rather restoring the life behind the dream to present feeling. For though Mr. Blackwood paints his word-pictures glowingly, the colours are subtle psychic tones rather than crude physical pigments. He carries us 'there' to see, rather than brings 'them' here, and yet 'they' are so much here that they are ever revealed by the commonest beauties of Nature. While then Mr. Blackwood limns the most fascinating pictures of the strength and beauty of those *Urmenschen*, the primal men of the simplest life, the favourite elder children of the Soul of Mother Earth, who preceded by æons the present race of mortals and all their nature-killing civilisations; he also deftly suggests a host of possibilities still realisable for the few, though for the mass hidden securely away in the deepest strata of their elemental nature.

Among the host of silly 'psychic' novels with which we are to-day inundated, it is pleasant to come across one of really a 'creative' order. Mr. Blackwood has the sane gift, among such writers, of lifting his subject out of the *bourgeois* and stuffy atmosphere of the vulgar interests of the clairvoyant and medium on to those heights of faëry phantasy where the spirit of Nature may be inbreathed—clean, chaste, simple.

#### THE RENAISSANCE OF THE NINETIES.

By W. G. Blaikie Murdoch. London (The De La More Press), 1911.

READERS of Mr. Blaikie Murdoch's *Memories of Swinburne* will not be disappointed with his latest work. Besides possessing the charm of style which has already made many friends for its author, the present volume fulfils a real want. As yet no writer has attempted a study of the nineties viewed as a whole; yet, though the actual lapse of time may be short enough, already a river seems to divide us from that charmed period. The reviewer has a poet friend who, when lamenting the apparent sterility of our time, may often be heard to exclaim: "Ah, but I made my mind in the nineties!" Many of us may have a vivid recollection of the tea-table chatter of '95, when *The Yellow Book* was the latest shock and Beardsley's name was frequently mentioned even by persons outside the small knowledgeable circle which has a care for the arts. We have learned, from our own experience, that echoes of those fiery discussions survive even yet, as the gods survived in remote corners of the Roman Empire, in centres known as 'provincial.'

We trust that readers of this comely little volume will not pass over the brief preface, but will mark it well, for the one defect of this able study—a defect due to its very ability—is fully explained therein. Like a true historian, Mr. Blaikie Murdoch writes from the point of view of his subject. In doing so he is apt at times to lose inevitably in balance and to venture statements which are controversial, if not positively short-sighted.

With considerable acuteness the author defines the art of the sixties as an art of muscles, and that of the nineties as an art of nerves. Each, undoubtedly, has its value. But when, mentioning "one of the diminutive water-colours of Charles Conder," he draws the conclusion, "Is it not just as perfect an artistic

victory as any one of the big canvases of Watts?" the present reviewer (who really belongs to the sixties) disagrees vehemently. Such a statement represents the fanatical element in the art of the nineties, but those outside the spell of the period may well contend that the one artist, though admittedly exquisite, through his neglect of form and by reason of his contentment with merely charming suggestion, tries for something far lesser than the sterner more searching man of the 'muscular' sixties. Life, after all, is not without elements of proportion. But the whole question is involved in fundamental principles, the final solution of which is but a possibility. Bearing in mind that other standards may question some of his valuations, Mr. Blaikie Murdoch's little work is wellnigh perfect.

In a complete study of the nineties we could wish that the name of Charles Ricketts had been given greater prominence. It is true that the author has the highest regard for the printed books of the Vale Press, designed and issued by Mr. Ricketts, but no mention is made of him as a draughtsman of far-reaching influence, and an important factor in the artistic evolution of the time. Not many years ago, young men used to mention the name Charles Ricketts with awe, as that of the man who had a share in forming Beardsley. Indeed the sudden fame of the younger artist undoubtedly interfered with the due recognition of the elder artist's illustrations to *The Sphinx*, exquisitely wrought in the pure line afterwards closely associated with the art of Beardsley. Such drawings, also, as the 'Oedipus' and 'The Autumn Muse' in *The Pageant*, to say nothing of earlier examples in *The Dial* and elsewhere, inspired Mr. Laurence Housman and many others of less fame, and their influence has not yet ceased.

Certain other details of the author's may be questioned, such as the praise given to Rothenstein's lithograph of Ernest Dowson, which by the poet's friends was considered to bear no resemblance to him whatsoever, with which view the present reviewer, on the strength of an afternoon's observation, entirely concurs. But in a study of this order personal preference must of necessity be strongly evident, and Mr. Blaikie Murdoch has given us a fascinating study of a fascinating period.

C. F.

## THE JEWISH SOURCES OF THE SERMON ON THE MOUNT.

By Gerald Friedlander, Minister of the Western Synagogue,  
London. London (Routledge), 1911.

FROM the time of Nork's *Quellen und Parallelen* a number of works have dealt with Jewish sources and parallels of the ethical teaching of the Gospels. Mr. Friedlander's book is a distinctly useful contribution to the critical study of the sayings grouped together under the heading 'The Sermon on the Mount.' It is most instructive as setting before us the point of view of a learned and cultured Jew who is careful to draw his illustrative parallels from sources anterior to or contemporary with the very beginnings of Christianity, so that it cannot be said he is using later Talmudic material. His contention is that what is old in the sayings is traditional Jewish ethic and what is new is open to grave objection. He is particularly anxious to remove the misconceptions which obtain on all hands among Christians concerning the Pharisees owing to the unqualified and wholesale denunciations of them found in the sayings, and he makes out a very good case for a reconsideration of this harsh judgment. In many places he calls into question Mr. Montefiore's view in his volumes on the Synoptic Gospels and in his Jowett Lectures, and contends that the latter has not been fair to his co-religionists; in brief what Mr. Montefiore praises as an advance in ethic, Mr. Friedlander calls into question as impracticable or leading to social abuses. As an orthodox Jew and strict monotheist he naturally resents Mr. Montefiore's claiming that Jesus went beyond the prophets, and contrasts strongly the 'Thus saith the Lord' of the latter with the 'But I say unto you' of the former. It may of course be objected that Mr. Friedlander has to make a selection of the finest flowers of Jewish ethic to carry out his purpose, and that these culled flowers are nowhere found together in his sources, but in contexts of a mixed nature. His main object, however, is to read the Sermon in the light of contemporary Jewish thought which was fed not only on the Old Testament and the Rabbinic glosses preserved in the Mishna, but also on the Jewish Hellenic literature, which included the Septuagint, Apocrypha, Philo and the Apocalyptic writings. This he does with much ability, throwing a bright light on some sayings which are left obscure in the vast majority of commentaries. Historically Mr. Friedlander is willing to accept the majority of sayings as

authentic utterances of Jesus, though he thinks that some of them show distinct signs of later ecclesiastical controversy, of manipulation or invention. His chief interest is to estimate their ethical value, to enquire whether or no they are really so superior to the best Jewish moral instruction as it existed in the first half of the first century. It is a book that deserves careful consideration by those who desire to be just and to hear all sides.

#### THE DOWNFALL OF THE GODS.

By Sir Hugh Clifford, K.C.M.G. London (Murray), 1911.

THE vast ruins of the Brahmanic temples of Angkor Wat in Cambodia have stirred the creative imagination of Sir Hugh Clifford to write this graphic story of a forgotten past. "My gropings and searchings," he says, "among the scattered wreckage of a once mighty civilisation, my sojourn among the deserted temples of a once great people's worship, had set me dreaming of the Past; forced my imagination to fearful probings of the Future; for these things told, in silent, grim mockery, of the changing, re-changing fate of gods and empires." The result is not a historical novel, for we know next to nothing historically of Angkor the capital of the once great Khmer Empire, how the Brahmans built it and its vast temples, the ruins even of which excite the greatest wonder. Sir Hugh is thus permitted to give free rein to his imagination; though we doubt very much that he has 'psychometrised' history correctly, he has written a gorgeous tale, suffused with the atmosphere of the mysterious East.

#### THE ALTAR IN THE WILDERNESS.

An Attempt to interpret Man's Seven Spiritual Ages. By Ethelbert Johnson. London (Rider), 1911.

A CLEAR, simple re-enunciation of truths by this time very familiar to all students of mystic thought. The writer has a wide and sane outlook, as is shown in the sentence: "When we really know the material world we learn truly to love it, and loving we try to serve and uplift."

C. E. W.

## NEW EVIDENCES IN PSYCHICAL RESEARCH.

By J. Arthur Hill. With an Introduction by Sir Oliver Lodge, D.Sc., F.R.S. London (William Rider & Son, Ltd.), 1911.

THE object of this little volume is to present in a handy form the records of some recent experiences "of apparently supernormal nature," which have occurred to the writer and to those personally known to him. The results gained through various mediums and clairvoyants, and the instances of spontaneous clairvoyance on the part of percipients not seeking or expecting it, are of a type familiar to all psychical research students, but they are told in a straightforward and unprejudiced way, and may thus appeal to many who have not the time or the interest to study a detailed official report. To this end the Psychical Research Society has kindly allowed some of its latest evidences to be incorporated. To meet the obvious question—"evidences of *what*?"—the author disclaims any specific theory of personal survival or "spirit return," and wisely says: "Some theorising of course is inevitable, and hypotheses can only be tested by adopting them provisionally and seeing how they work—how far they fit the facts. But it is necessary to keep a sharp eye on the hypotheses, lest they stiffen into doctrines; or rather, to keep a sharp eye on ourselves, lest we become so enamoured of a hypothesis that we try to make new facts fit it, instead of being guided by them to a perhaps truer explanation."

E. W.

## INSPIRED MILLIONAIRES.

A Study of the Man of Genius in Business. By Gerald Stanley Lee. London (Grant Richards), 1911.

WHAT is an inspired millionaire? Mr. Lee describes him as one to whom a million pounds is an art form, and, elsewhere, as one who has given up getting a living and is trying to live. His instrument is imagination, and his principles are: (a) not to make all the money he can, (b) to make money enough, (c) to act from mixed motives. His imagination gives him invention, mutualness and monopoly, and through these 'phases' he is going to regenerate England and America. Mr. Lee likes big things: an inspired millionaire is selfish for eighty million people, he suggests. Big sentences, too, he likes occasionally: there are 176 words without a full stop on page 26, and 215 on pages 102-3! But we prefer Inspired Millionaires to the Socialist State.

R. E. B.

# THE QUEST.



## THE RISING PSYCHIC TIDE.

THE EDITOR.

PERHAPS it would be more correct to speak of a wave and not of a tide when endeavouring to estimate the present steadily increasing interest in the psychic and the psychical. But whatever it may be in the scale of general history, in comparison with the state of affairs say even sixty years ago, it seems to me to be a tide. Concentrated attention no doubt exaggerates, but the thing is with us in steadily increasing volume. Even if one has a good acquaintance with the spread of the various movements connected directly or indirectly with the psychical in one form or other, it gives no idea of the number even of organised bodies, societies, associations, and groups, that have sprung up like mushrooms from the ground, in wellnigh every country. It is indubitably very large; while as to the members of such bodies they must be estimated in millions. But even if we possessed statistics they would give us no idea of the extent to which interest is spreading among the general public. I am using 'interest' to include every kind of attentive attitude.

It may be an open-minded spirit of enquiry, it may be simple curiosity, or it may be any grade of belief, from soberest credence to wildest credulity.

I am also using the terms psychic and psychical in a more widely extended sense than some may be inclined to allow them, though not in their common psychological meaning of mental. There is no accepted definition even among students of psychical research, and we may expand or narrow the meaning according to our proclivities and values. On the nether side the psychical is secular and materialistic enough in all conscience; it rises through all grades, and accompanies the inspiration of the artist and genius; it thus contacts the spiritual and brings us face to face with the enormously important study of the psychology of religious experience, in which it is of first importance to determine what are the psychical elements and what the spiritual. But as is well known, spiritual, like all such general terms, is an equally indeterminate label with the psychical; spirit has been used for anything from breath to divinity itself. For some people accordingly the spiritual world is all that is not physical, while for others, spiritual transcends the physical, the psychic and the mental. I think it preferable to use spiritual in an ethico-religious sense, or for an immediacy that transcends 'vision' of any kind, or for the in-working of immanent deity; spirit, I would believe, is independent of all 'planes' and 'states'; the 'powers' of the spirit are the choir of the virtues; it should transcend the duality of subject and object, as all the mystics have declared, and as our most intuitive philosophers to-day contend. Thus, for instance, Eucken writes:

Life in the individual must have roots deeper than the



immediate psychical life ; for psychical life cannot itself produce and make clear that which occurs in it, for this reason at least, that it involves the antithesis of individual and environment, of subject and object, beyond which spiritual creation results.

So also Bergson, whose conception of the chief end of genuine philosophy is that it should introduce us into the spiritual life, by means of the spirit, by which he says he means "that faculty of seeing (or intuition) which is immanent in the faculty of acting and which springs up somehow, by the twisting of the will on itself, when action is turned into knowledge." Spirit transcends subject and object, even as the true person transcends unity and multiplicity.

I am then (we must adopt the language of the understanding, since only the understanding has language) a unity that is multiple and a multiplicity that is one ; but unity and multiplicity are only views of my personality taken by an understanding that directs its categories at me ; I enter neither into one nor into the other nor into both at once, although both, united, may give a fair imitation of the mutual interpenetration and continuity that I find at the base of my own self. Such is my inner life, and such also is life in general.

I therefore prefer to call psychic much that is generally referred to in ordinary parlance as spiritual. If we agree with Sir William Barrett, who, in his recently published book on the subject, tells us that the study of human personality and the extent of human faculty form the main objects of psychical research, it is difficult to see where the limits of the psychical are to be set ; for human personality can contact the divine, and communion or union with divinity is the *summum bonum* of all the great religions. Nevertheless, Sir William agrees that the spiritual is of another order, and the psychical but a stepping-stone to it at best.

In a general sense we may say the psychic can be contrasted with the spiritual because of the former's phenomenal nature; though invisible it is still seen, though inner it is still outer, though internal it is still external; it is also 'phenomenal' in a vulgar sense, for there is no doubt that it is the element of the marvellous in it that has been the chief cause of the great attraction it has ever possessed for mankind in general throughout the ages. To-day also attention to the soul and its mysteries has been re-aroused by *mira* if we are no longer to speak of *miracula*. Now, as ever, it is not the inmost things of the soul, but its outer marvels, that have amazed the public and challenged the scrutiny of science. It seems almost as though the exaggerated denial of materialism, scepticism and rationalism had to be startled with as exaggerated assertion from the other side. In any case attention to the psychic has been re-aroused by the abnormal extranormal and supernormal phenomena, faculties and activities of human personality. It began with mesmerism a century or more ago, and every phase of the movement has been met, as is well known, by the most bitter hostility on the part of official science. In spite of denial and ridicule, however, the evidence as to mesmeric phenomena accumulated by degrees, and a vast field of research was opened up, until under the name of hypnotism<sup>1</sup> it has become part and parcel of accepted scientific investigation. The chief interest of

<sup>1</sup> Dating from the mechanical means discovered by Braid in 1843 to induce mesmeric states. This line of research and theory was taken up and developed by the Paris School founded by Charcot, to which later on was opposed the school of Nancy under Liébault and Bernheim, who would explain everything by suggestion. Both schools scout utterly the idea of what used to be called animal magnetism or psychic force, but of late this theory has been revived on strictly scientific lines by Boirac, who contends that not only must *both* hypnotism *and* suggestion be taken into account, but *also*, in cases where both have been rigorously excluded, a force of some kind

the medical faculty in mesmerism or hypnotism has been its use as a curative agency. Many think that the phenomena can all be explained by talking of suggestion; but suggestion is merely the name of a trigger that liberates forces of which we know nothing. To-day outside medical circles mental and spiritual healing, as it is called, and psycho-therapeutics of every kind and description, are practised on an enormous scale and that, too, without putting the patient into an hypnotic state. All this falls within the domain of the psychical. Mesmerism has at the same time made us acquainted with a large number of extraordinary phenomena which were previously considered incredible, and has largely aided to build up a new science of psychiatry. Some of the earlier experimenters, however, discovered that there was a great deal more in it than has been since brought out by medical specialists. They discovered among other things 'lucidity' as it used to be called, now better known as clairvoyance, and for some this re-opened the whole question of an 'other' world and the domain of the supernatural, as it used to be called in the old culture.

But what has done most to make this world-old subject once more an experimental question has been the rise and enormous spread of modern spiritualism or spiritism. Sometimes a precise date is given for its origin, and we are asked to trace the whole of this movement to what are called the 'Rochester knockings,' in the United States. But I remember many years ago reading records prior to that date of a seven years' 'controlling' of members of the Shaker communities

transmissible from operator to subject. See Émile Boirac, Recteur de l'Académie de Dijon, *La Psychologie inconnue : Introduction et Contribution à l'Étude des Sciences psychiques* (Paris, Alcan, 1908).

by what purported to be the spirits of North American Indians. These religious communities took the whole matter very seriously, and endeavoured by their prayers to free these earth-bound souls, as they believed them to be, and it is said they succeeded in doing so. In any case the idea of communication with the dead once more began to present itself to many who had been taught by science and the new culture to reject such a possibility as a vain superstition. The practice began first of all generally by crude methods such as rappings and table-turning, but mediums and sensitives were discovered or developed, who passed into trance and were controlled in various ways, and the whole complex of phenomena associated with modern spiritism speedily followed. An enormous mass of communications and 'teachings' of all kinds purporting to come from the dead or from other intelligences in the unseen world, has thus been poured forth. There has been of course much folly, unconscious mediumistic deception and self-deception, and with the advent of the paid medium and professional sensitive deliberate fraud and trickery of all kinds. But much of the phenomena has occurred in family circles or in small gatherings of intimate friends where the medium was one of themselves.

The phenomena of mesmerism and spiritism paved the way for a revival of interest in and a psychological interpretation of what are called the occult arts and sciences, and all those practices that had been shrouded in secrecy in the past, and therewith the idea of controlling instead of being controlled emerged. There followed a widespread endeavour to learn not only from the past what bore on the development of psychic powers, but also from the East what is still

practised. Much of this has been gradually adapted and modernised and changed beyond recognition, and the ferment is still working powerfully. Though the preponderating interest has always been in the phenomena and in the powers, at the same time a more serious interest has developed in the deeper problems of religious experience and in self-discipline and self-culture of a higher order.

It is impossible to give in a paragraph any idea of the enormous modern literature that now exists on all these subjects. Looking back some thirty years, when this literature was comparatively small in volume, it seems quite amazing that in so short a time so much could have been produced. Most of the literature confines itself to the present, some of it attempts to revive the past or to adapt it to the present, and some of the highest inspiration of antiquity has thus been popularised. Taking it all together it is by far the most extraordinary literature of the times. It is, of course, largely popular; the unlearned have not waited for the scientists, scholars and specialists, to lead the way; some have taken from the works of the specialists what they could adapt for their own purposes; others have been led to study at first hand for themselves. At the same time among the learned, from a different point of view, the study of comparative religion, mythology, folklore, magic and all the rest of it has developed in a most remarkable manner. The difference is that when the people are deeply interested, when they believe, they try to practise; it becomes intensely personal for them, it is not a matter of purely intellectual interest.

Of course in all this there are abundant ignorance and error and extravagance and self-deception of all

kinds. How should it be otherwise? For the psychical is really more puzzling and misleading than the physical and intellectual; the personal factor cannot be eliminated; it enters into it in every phase and therewith human nature in the raw. The human element with all its hopes and fears is there all the time; it cannot be suppressed. There are no mechanical contrivances of lifeless matter as in physical research: the instruments are living organisms.

But science has gradually been forced to turn its attention to the phenomena of spiritism as well as to those of hypnotism, and men of the greatest distinction in physical research and other departments of methodical work have tested many of these psychical happenings. First of all there were a few pioneers who risked their reputations and faced the greatest ridicule and contempt in asserting that certain of these phenomena occurred. Then co-operative systematic work of an experimental and observational character was organised. Certain classes of phenomena were authenticated and analysed and hypotheses put forward which are gradually influencing all but the most reactionary schools of psychology. And now after thirty years, even with regard to the crucial question for so many as to whether or not there is survival of bodily death, some of the most distinguished and experienced leaders in methodical psychical research, after the most rigid tests to eliminate fraud and self-deception, and after stretching the hypothesis of the ever-extending subliminal of the medium and sitters to the breaking point, are giving way in face of the evidence and cautiously admitting that in some cases it is possible to find oneself in touch with some part of a surviving personality. What wonder, then, that ordinary un-

trained and unlettered men and women should have jumped to this conclusion from the start? Indeed it must be confessed by those who have had experience of the better class of phenomena of this kind that it looks as if it were possible ; or, at any rate, that we are dealing with a baffling power of simulation that is quite beyond the range of the cleverest actor.

It is sometimes said by people when first they become acquainted, at first hand, with these subjects, why are not more people interested in them? Our contention, however, is that the interest is already very great, and that there is now less need of convincing people about the genuine occurrence of psychical phenomena, than of insisting on caution and sobriety in dealing with the subject. In the extended sense in which we use the word, we repeat, interest is no longer of the nature of a spasmodic wave ; it is a rising tide. We meet with it on all sides and in the most unexpected places ; psychism is the talk of the drawing-room and the scullery, of the palace and the cottage. There is no class of life, no grade of intelligence, that this rising tide has not moistened to some extent.

Philosophers and students of history tell us that there is no exact parallel between the present state of unrest and uncertainty and the rejection of traditional beliefs in any epoch in the past. But if we might, for the sake of a rough comparison, conjure up a picture from the past, then, turning one's eyes in certain directions in the London of to-day, we might almost fancy ourselves back in the Rome or Alexandria of nineteen hundred years ago. Many of the beliefs and practices that dogmatic rationalism, and for the matter of that the whole tendency of modern culture, has hoped to banish for good and all to the limbo of superstition, are back

again ; and with them a host of subtler beliefs, some of which seek weapons of defence in the latest discoveries and speculations of borderland science. In many directions we may see, if we look for them,—and we may even have the strident indications of them forced upon us by frequent sandwich men in the most fashionable thoroughfares—revivals of divination, seers and soothsayers and prophets, pythoneses, sibyls and prophetesses, tellers of dreams and of omens, mantics of every description and by every sort of contrivance ; astrologists and even alchemists ; professors of magical arts and ceremonies ; cosmologists and revelationists ; necromancy and communion with spirits ; enthusiasm, trance and ecstasis. And with all this, as of old, keeping pace with religious unrest and loss of faith in traditional beliefs, and blank denial of anything beyond the range of the physical, there is what looks very much like the bringing in of new gods and new saviours and new creeds, the blending of cults and syncretism of religions ; societies and associations, open and secret, for propagating or imparting new doctrines, new at any rate to their adherents though mostly old enough.

This is a very rough sketch, of course ; the outlines are over-emphasised and the colours are crudely used to bring out the comparison. But there was at the same time, also, as we know, in the past a genuine spiritual life stirring in the depths which manifested itself in many modes and lives, and finally out of a number of competitors for popular favour there emerged for the West a victorious form of religion, a new world-faith. I believe, and many believe, that there is also to-day a genuine spiritual life stirring in the depths under all the stress and struggle and ferment,



psychic and otherwise. But the present age can be compared only very imperfectly with any period in the past. The past has never had to deal with a real world-problem or with such widespread profound uncertainty. The Græco-Roman world was a circumscribed area. Our present world is the whole globe, and our present age is of necessity faced with problems that embrace the whole of humanity and its recorded history. What we need to-day, I believe, is not a new religion in any separative sense, but a better understanding of religion and all it stands for. We need to be suffused with a new spirit of genuine sympathy, a spirit that will enable us to recognise and value the essential truths in the great world-faiths as all of one origin; though indeed that is not a new idea—it was attempted also in the past among the Hellenistic mystery-religions. Mystery, however, and even high mysticism are now out of fashion and looked upon with the gravest suspicion. We need a new creative spirit that will replace all this with new forms of immediate self-realisation. What we want above all is that wisdom of the spirit that will enable us to bring about a genuine reconciliation between science and religion. They have been divorced too long, though perhaps it is for a beneficent purpose that the future alone will be able rightly to appreciate. Is it possible that this recrudescence of interest in the psychical may, if purified and rightly used, supply us with the means of approaching the ground on which science and religion can not only meet in friendship but join hands in whole-hearted co-operation? Art and philosophy must also come powerfully to the rescue, and aid in the reconciliation. But in this age of technical and industrial development we are suffering chiefly for want of a

vital science to complement the science of physical things; we have crying need of some spiritual mode of knowledge or assurance that can satisfy the whole man; it is unnatural to keep our religion in one compartment and our science in another. It is the mark of an artificial age, an age divorced from living nature, though one of ever-increasing mastery over the inorganic; but with our enslaving of physical forces comes the ever-increasing slavery of ourselves by the physical and material; our wants are steadily increasing.

The marvellous results that have attended modern methods of physical research are absolutely without parallel in the history of the world. In relation to the physical achievements of the past they can be represented diagrammatically by no curve of development. Compared with the painfully slow rate of progress up to a century or two ago, the present leap forward must be represented by a straight line not far out of the perpendicular. Physical research has in its own domain broken down the barriers of physical ignorance on all sides. But magnificent as are the triumphs of the intellect in dealing with the material, they are the result of a one-sided effort and cannot satisfy man as a whole. This material progress must be complemented with equal success in the inward way. It seems very much as though we have lost as much as we have gained and are at last beginning to be conscious of it. The present state of affairs reminds me somewhat of the old mystery-saying which two thousand years ago declared: "Ye have eaten dead things and made living ones; what will ye make if ye eat living things?"—though indeed the making of living things is hard to discover.

Before the rise of modern science, in the days

of the Renaissance, there were those who attempted to cover the whole field of the arts and sciences, encyclopædic men, students of books for the most part; but to-day it is utterly impossible to do so. It is an age of specialisation, and even the specialist is unable to keep up with the whole of the work done in his own subject. No intellect can cover the whole field of knowledge of this kind; there is need of the development of a new faculty, a new means of apprehending.

The natural organiser and orderer is life. By entering into life perchance we might learn somewhat of its secret operations. Does man possess the means whereby he can come into immediate touch with life so that he can learn to know its nature, not as the intellect thinks and knows matter, but in some way appropriate to vital knowledge? That there is such a possibility in man, has always been maintained by the illumine and by sharers in certain modes of immediate spiritual experience. But leaving on one side what the best of these have declared and the sublime subject of the possibility of communion not only with life but the source of life, the theme and end of the highest religion, as having no meaning for present-day science, we have all been recently struck by Professor Bergson's brilliant advocacy of a more immediate means of knowing life. What is this faculty? It must be of the nature of a divining sympathy—a purified and transmuted instinct. In a famous passage the French philosopher writes :

Instinct is sympathy. If this sympathy could extend its object and also reflect upon itself, it would give us the key to vital operations—just as intelligence, developed and disciplined, guides us into matter. For—we cannot too often repeat it—intelligence and instinct are turned in two opposite directions, the former

towards inert matter, the latter towards life. Intelligence, by means of science, which is its work, will deliver up to us more and more completely the secret of physical operations ; of life it brings us, and moreover only claims to bring us, a translation in terms of inertia. It goes all round life, taking from outside the greatest possible number of views of it, drawing it into itself instead of entering into it. But it is to the very inwardness of life that *intuition* leads us,—by intuition I mean instinct that has become disinterested, self-conscious, capable of reflecting upon its own object and of enlarging it indefinitely.

Now sympathy, instinct and intuition are of the greatest interest to students of that extended sensitivity which plays so large a part in the psychical. Intuition for Bergson, however, does not supersede intelligence for practical scientific purposes ; it complements it. “Intelligence,” he tells us, “remains the luminous nucleus around which instinct, ever enlarged and purified into intuition, forms only a vague nebulousity.” This does not seem to be a very happy illustration ; it might be reversed, for Life and Light have been associated with the Good by some of the greatest contemplatives and intuitionists. Bergson, however, refers what he calls ‘knowledge properly so-called’ to what he speaks of as ‘pure intelligence.’ At the same time he asserts the necessity of developing a new faculty to aid the intellect ; he does not, however, carry us as far as what I would call spiritual knowledge, or truly immediate gnosis. What Bergson’s view of intuition is, may be further seen from the following passage :

Intuition may enable us to grasp what it is that intelligence fails to give us, and indicate the means of supplementing it. On the one hand, it will utilise the mechanism of intelligence itself to show how intellectual moulds cease to be strictly applicable ; and on the other hand, by its own work, it will suggest to us the vague

feeling, if nothing more, of what must take the place of intellectual moulds. Thus, intuition may bring the intellect to recognise that life does not quite go into the category of the many nor yet into that of the one; that neither mechanical causality nor finality can give sufficient interpretation of the vital process. Then, by the sympathetic communication which it establishes between us and the rest of the living, by the expansion of our consciousness which it brings about, it introduces us into life's domain, which is reciprocal interpenetration, endlessly continued creation. But, though it thereby transcends intelligence, it is from intelligence that has come the push that has made it rise to the point it has reached.

This statement should especially be noted by those who speak of intuition as though it were disdainful of intelligence and could entirely dispense with it. Here we have a thinker who has a remarkable grasp of science and philosophy telling us that consciousness can install itself in life, and that unless it does so and returns to lend its aid to the intellect, our theory of knowledge remains "involved in inextricable difficulties, creating phantoms of ideas to which there cling phantoms of problems."

As far as I am aware the philosopher of creative evolution has nowhere explained how the "intellect can turn inwards on itself and awaken the potentialities of intuition which slumber within it." But many have told us that the way to intuition lies in that direction—the turning inward of the mind on itself, the stilling of the mind, the banishing of phantasy and the bringing to rest of the operations of the discursive reason. This is no negative quietism nor is it a blankness and a passing into other regions of subtler phantasy or even of the veridical invisible, but a very positive state of intense attention, followed by vital union. It is the cultivation of a divining

sympathy for vital processes, not of an extended consciousness of things.

I do not know whether I have caught Bergson's meaning correctly, or whether he would admit the idea of subjective materiality; but I believe myself that the inner living realities by their very nature remain hidden to what I would call the externalising intellect in every plane, phase or state of the formal side of things, no matter how many of these there may be in the 'other' world. Intelligence for form must be complemented with immediate apprehension of life. It is not a question of inner sight, but rather of insight.

But intelligence or intellect is not mind itself, it has been cut out of the latter by a process resembling that which has generated matter.

Intuition is mind itself, and, in a certain sense, life itself. . . . We recognise the unity of the spiritual life only when we place ourselves in intuition in order to go from intuition to the intellect, for from the intellect we shall never pass to intuition.

Bergson is also no lover of ends, in any pre-determined sense at least; but we agree with James when he says that in all ages the man whose determinations are swayed by reference to the most distant ends, has been held to possess the highest intelligence; and by 'most distant' is meant of course wide-reaching and deep-going; and this should mean already the dawning of the power of the immediate intuition of the purpose of life. The more remote is the end in this sense, the more moral becomes the determination. Thus for the highly developed intelligence the good of the individual is to be found in such activities as favour the common welfare. The individual is inextricably bound up with the whole; his good is its good, and its good is his

good. The most practically moral faith thus seems to me to require the belief that under the guidance of Divine Providence the soul of humanity is working towards an organisation and harmonisation of its individual units that will enable it to reach a self-consciousness of its own proper order, and that this higher consciousness can gradually be shared in by the individual in proportion as he subordinates his interests to those of the whole.

Within this high over-belief in the divine origin, guidance and end of man, there is reasonable room for the notion that the soul of humanity as a whole is potential in the individual, and that the actualising of this potentiality in the perfected person is the end towards which the ever-changing individuality in seemingly seeking its own ends is unconsciously striving under the impulse of the inworking of that common soul of humanity. Consciousness of this purpose and process would seem to depend fundamentally upon the development of the power of sympathy whereby the individual comes into ever greater awareness of the life in nature, in humanity, and in himself. Sympathy in this humane sense connotes harmlessness, well-wishing and good-will to all that live. But sympathy is also of another order, for in the individual man there is as it were a recapitulation of all the characteristics of the lower orders of sentient existence. His body is possessed of a sympathetic system, and it is largely with phenomena of an automatic, spontaneous and instinctual nature, that we have to deal in preliminary psychical investigation. But such extension of sense and action requires far greater discipline and control than does the normal field, if man is to maintain the equilibrium and poise of his whole nature, without

which the individual cannot become the conscious vehicle of that higher order of spiritual energy which works deliberately for the good of the whole of humanity. This spiritual energy may be said not only to sum up the experience of humanity but also to be provident of its future needs.

Man is driven by this spiritual impulsion to seek the means of satisfying needs of his nature that are totally unknown to the animal. He must perforce strive for all those things which constitute civilisation and culture, for scientific and artistic, for social, moral and religious ends, for the satisfaction of instincts, sentiments and ideals that do not concern his purely material and secular existence. Though he may not be able to explain the nature of these high aspirations that stir his deeper nature, he is perpetually driven to seek satisfaction for them by a purpose that leaves him with a feeling of loss short of utmost self-realisation. The nearest approach to legitimate satisfaction for the individual in this ceaseless struggle is perhaps to be found in a consciousness of harmonious development in his whole nature. When through moral training and self-discipline, thought, feeling and effort co-operate, we experience a sense of being in harmony with the purpose of the whole of our individual life, or with the purpose of things manifesting through us as a moral personality. This purified and balanced state seems to be the one condition under which the individual can without harm to others or himself wield extended powers of sense and activity. But this is an ideal state of things and we are far from it. Creative life does not seem to be much interested in avoiding risks. Extension of the field of sense and the rest, and invasions and uprushes of a psychical nature, do not



wait upon the development of moral character; they occur at all stages of human growth.

If then the psychical is not the spiritual, it is also as we have seen not the intellectual. Indeed ordinary psychical capacity is notoriously unaccompanied with intellectual ability. But meanings and values in the psychical are vastly more difficult to find even for the most highly trained intellect than they are in the study of the physical. The present invasion of the psychical thus affords the developed intelligence which has so successfully dealt with the physical from a material point of view, an admirable opportunity for further development and for a deep-going rectification of the inner senses as well as the outer, by purging them from the operations of the phantasy, and further freeing them from the power of fascination of subtler sense-impressions, thus arriving at a truer meaning and more correct evaluation of the phenomena of invisible nature. It is a very difficult undertaking indeed, for we have first of all to invade the border-realm of the mythic old man of the sea, ancient Proteus, who perpetually changes his form to prevent capture; it is only when he is held securely by the illuminated intelligence and purified instinct that he reveals his secret. The dissolving-view kaleidoscopic dæmon must first be exorcised before we can go further. But beyond that is the fascination of subtle sense-experience in supernormal states. We have had enough of dressing up the living things of unseen nature in the cast-off clothes of physical representations. This work is beginning and the way is being prepared for a further advance and therewith for a further revision of things of greater moment.

Meantime popular psychism is intensifying many

undesirable elements in human nature, and values are at a discount. Psychic sensitivity is frequently regarded as a sign of spiritual development; psychic experience is looked upon by many as something desirable in itself; indeed all the extravagances of the past are repeated as though the history of their disastrous results had never been written. Not to speak of the patent dangers of mediumship, of the risk of insanity, obsession and physical and moral degradation, there is much else that is very unhealthy. The idea of the adept and initiate in secret knowledge, the ideal of the divine man or woman, of the god-inspired, or at any rate of the human with superhuman powers, is in the air. No claims are too egregious to command acceptance by a following of some sort or other, and sometimes by an adhesion of thousands. Among people psychically suggestionable it is enough to assert and to continue to assert to obtain wide credence; skilful or even the clumsiest modes of self-advertisement are sufficient for the purpose. Adulation and idolatry are lavished by the impressionable on psychics as impressionable as themselves; lo here and lo there! is heard on all sides.

But in spite of all this extravagance the psychical on its disciplined side does indubitably point to an extension of effective human personality, and I believe that the rising tide of interest in it is the forerunner of a new age of enquiry. It is to the spiritual, however, and not to the psychical, that we must look for salvation; it has always been so taught by the greatest of mankind, the founders of the world-faiths. But faith may be transformed to knowledge of a spiritual order. Religion is not only faith; it is finally gnosis. Towards this high end psychical science may be made to yield

something of value ; but we must surely agree with Sir William Barrett when he writes :

Psychical research, though it may strengthen the foundations, cannot take the place of religion, using in its widest sense that much-abused word. For, after all, it deals with the *external*, though it be in an unseen world ; and its chief value lies in the fulfilment of its work, whereby it reveals to us the inadequacy of the external, either here or hereafter, to satisfy the life of the soul. The psychical order is not the spiritual order, but a stepping-stone in the ascent of the soul to its own self-apprehension, its conscious sharing in the eternal divine life.

G. R. S. MEAD.

## THE METHOD OF WILLIAM BLAKE.

JOSEPH H. WICKSTEED, M.A.

IN a former paper<sup>1</sup> I advanced the claim that Blake—though undoubtedly the subject of visions which have been called mental obsessions and which he sometimes professed to transcribe just as he saw or heard them—really displayed remarkable artistic control of this ‘visionary’ material, often adapting it with great freedom and judgment to form the basis of his wonderful artistic creations.

In the present paper I propose, before dealing with the great height which this artistic control reached in his latest work, to show his curious and still more unusual habit of controlling or adapting visions to fit his *symbolic* purposes. Finally, in such great creations as his ‘Sons of Gods Shouting for Joy,’ we shall find designs that seem to spring straight from the heart of genius like pure visionary flames, and yet are actually fraught in every detail with rich and carefully elaborated symbolic intention, and, moreover, are diligently *worked* into the almost perfect artistic and poetic unity they at last attain. It is of such designs that he himself says “not a line is drawn without intention, and that most discriminate and particular.”<sup>2</sup> The more we study Blake’s method the less do the facts support any theory of a literal

<sup>1</sup> ‘The so-called “Madness” of William Blake,’ in the October number, 1911.

<sup>2</sup> *Vision of the Last Judgment*, Gilchrist, ii. 193.

revelation. And for most of us, I imagine, there is something more satisfying in the knowledge that his undoubted 'inspiration' required the patient service of his ordinary human will before it bore its ripest fruits. His last great results were not achieved without humble and strenuous labour, built upon many years of ceaseless effort, constant failure and even occasional despair. Indeed, however Blake himself may at times declare that he was a mere amanuensis and deny his own share in the result, it is clear that he was not really unaware of it. It would be hard to find a finer image than his own to express the kind of collaboration between voluntary and inspired production which his works betray. The passage is in the beginning of his *Jerusalem* and describes how his prophetic genius compels his rational man to 'strike alternate' with him on the anvil.<sup>1</sup>

## I.

Anyone who has even a cursory knowledge of Blake's work will have noticed how frequently he reverses a design in a later version. I take for granted that this practice originated in the fact that a print is always the reverse of the design as graven on the plate, and that as an engraver Blake learnt the habit of easily thinking his designs in either mode. But as I shall hope to show, no mechanical convenience of printing or transference will account for many of the most interesting reversals, and still less of course will it account for cases where a reversal is expressly avoided or rejected.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Jerusalem*, 840, and cp. also *ib.* 8378 and 79.

<sup>2</sup> For instance, the figure of the youth in the design for 'Death's Door,' described above (*QUEST*, October, 1911, p. 98) may be seen experimentally reversed in a sketch in the Brit. Mus. Portfolio—but this reversal is rejected

One of the most suggestive of these reversals occurs in Blake's prophetic book *Milton*. The figure of a man is shown staggering back just as a meteor falls on his advanced foot. The figure is superscribed with the word 'William,' and we are told that it represents the (meteoric) effect of the poet Milton upon Blake's life. A few pages further on, the same weird vision is drawn reversed, and is superscribed 'Robert.' Now Blake, as we learn both from himself and a contemporary biographer,<sup>1</sup> used to identify his dead brother Robert in some strange way with the source of his own inspirations. He speaks of writing from Robert's dictation, and of taking his advice, but it is possible that he used Robert to symbolise his own spiritual man, for brotherhood and identity were very close ideas in Blake's mind.<sup>2</sup> In this case the two designs may represent the secondary inspiration which the earthly man (Blake himself) can get through the written letter of another poet, and the immediate inspiration received by the spiritual man symbolised by Robert. At all events we are expressly told that the first design represents an event in the "nether regions of the Imagination,"<sup>3</sup> and attention is three times called to the fact that the meteor-smitten foot is a left one.<sup>4</sup> It cannot possibly be an accident therefore that the corresponding foot in the 'Robert' design is a right one, and as the same

in the more completed sketch on the same page, and in the final design the figure appears in the same position as it had already been engraved in twice before.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Letter to Hayley, May 6, 1800 (Russell, p. 69), and J. T. Smith's *Biographical Sketch* (Symons, p. 366).

<sup>2</sup> Cp. Blake's reply when asked by Crabb Robinson "What resemblance do you suppose is there between your spirit and the spirit of Socrates?" "The same as between our countenances." He paused and added—"I was Socrates." And then, as if correcting himself, "A sort of brother" (Symons, p. 254).

<sup>3</sup> *Milton*, 194 and 5.

<sup>4</sup> *Milton*, 1449 and 50, also 1912.

passage expressly associates the left foot with the earthly, it is clear that it is as a disembodied spirit that Robert is made 'right' where William is 'left.' Indeed we seem to have in these designs and their context a very important clue to Blake's symbolical method, and unless they be proved to stand alone there seems no escape from the conclusion that Blake symbolically connected the right side with the spiritual and the left with the earthly or corporeal.

Let us then make the task of testing this clue an excuse for an excursion amongst some of Blake's characteristic designs, and whatever our results may be as regards elucidating the symbolism, we shall find that we have been led to travel through some very interesting regions of art. No better starting-point could be chosen for our purpose than the designs to that strange early work *The Marriage of Heaven and Hell*. We shall here find much that is curious, interesting and beautiful in itself, and incidentally much that is illuminating in the study of Blake's method.

*The Marriage of Heaven and Hell*, as its name suggests, is a daring and fanciful creation unlike any other book in the world, unless it be for points of kinship it possesses with some of the writings of Nietzsche. Its underlying theme is a glorification of spontaneity. Thought or introspection it regards as being at best a kind of framework for action, at worst a trap. What a man does of his *will* and *desire* is essentially human and creative; and as such it expresses the supreme, and indeed for Blake, at this time, the only, divine existence. At the same time he wishes to admit that this energy or utterance must have something to hold it, or to receive it, lest it be dissipated into infinity.<sup>1</sup> It

<sup>1</sup> Cp. esp. p. 16: "The Prolific would cease," etc.

is the function of Reason and of its offspring Law and Religion to be this receiver or '*bound*,' acting as it were like banks to the stream of life. The force of the stream is continually breaking down the old banks and enlarging the channel, but unless the old banks are succeeded by new ones it is no longer a stream.<sup>1</sup> Thus the apparent opposition between physical liberty or exuberance and rational law or restraint is seen by Blake as a phase of the universal and necessary co-ordination of the two ultimate forces which produce concrete life.

But Blake makes it his business in this work to recommend the stream as against the banks, energy as against its bound. He is content merely to recognise the necessity of the latter in one or two passages and then to pass on. Evidently he did not consider it necessary to advertise the merits of Heaven (or reason), and concentrated his efforts on the task of displaying Hell (or spontaneous impulse) as fit in every way to be her mate; a task which, as we shall see, he overdoes, to the wreck of his scheme.

If one may pause here for a moment to offer an explanation of Blake's delight in outraging all conventions, even his own, it seems to spring from an admirable determination he never relinquished, to make his system conform to his experience, and not to follow the more usual method of reading experience in the light of our own or someone else's theories. And if we often find him worse entangled in his own theories than if he had never attempted to think life out afresh, let us at all events recognise the value of all

<sup>1</sup> This metaphor is perhaps on the whole the best to express Blake's idea though it is not one he actually uses himself. A comparison of his Proverb 35 (p. 8) with its illustration, and the metaphor of p. 16 of the '*sea*,' seems to show that Blake had an idea of a fountain overflowing its original bounds to be finally and necessarily bounded at last by the sea.



such attempts. And by appreciating his aim we shall be in a better position to extract his incomparable gold from his dross. Blake saw a smug and pompous Society in the world condemning physical desire and especially the desires of sex as Hell. But in his own experience these last were happily associated with the tenderest and purest of wedded loves. He was naïve enough to believe that all sex-love was equally fair, and only corrupted by the substitution of legal for natural bonds. In a word he scorned to abandon at the command of either monastic, puritanic or conventional authority, his faith in the goodness of his instincts, which in art, in politics and in love, had ever led him right. If passion was Hell, then Hell should be for him the symbol of salvation. And with characteristic impetuosity he then carries the war into the enemies' camp and asks what sort of a world this faith in Law and Reason and restraint has produced.

Like too many other revolutionaries he attributes the woes of the world to the ideals and systems which are struggling, albeit unsuccessfully, to combat them. It surely is not fair to charge reason with the world's inhumanity because as a matter of fact it fails to make all men reasonably human. And if the ideal of 'charity' fails to undo all the ills perpetrated by indifference and neglect, it is not therefore responsible for all the coldness by which human lives are blighted. And yet it may be wholesome for us to be reminded that our current ideals have largely failed, and that the institutions of which we are most proud have often little enough to boast of, when their success is compared with what *ought* to be.

And Blake with a true prophetic passion shows us babes not loved as every healthy impulse would

dictate, but gathered in great hordes into orphanages and other 'charitable' institutions; boys instead of ranging the hills are herded in schools, made into chimney sweepers and every way robbed of their heritage of life and joy; village maidens are lured by gold into the city and left in the street, and the youths born to be their swains and protectors are then drafted off into a kind of slavery to be slaughtered in senseless foreign wars. And all this was done, as it appeared to his visionary eye, in the name of Church and State, Law and Religion, and of a Rationalistic Society whose hypocritical morality was in unholy alliance with a tyrannical commercialism.<sup>1</sup>

In one of the most characteristic passages of his *Jerusalem* he describes, in words that seem to anticipate Ruskin, how the "Arts of Life" were "chang'd into the Arts of Death in Albion." For the 'Sons of Urizen' (Reason) always supersede a simple instrument like the plough, the loom or the water-wheel,—

Because its workmanship was like the workmanship of the shepherd,

And in their stead intricate wheels invented, wheel without wheel  
To perplex youth in their outgoings & to bind to labours in Albion  
Of day & night, the myriads of eternity; that they may grind  
And polish brass & iron hour after hour, laborious task  
Kept ignorant of its use; that they might spend the days of wisdom  
In sorrowful drudgery, to obtain a scanty pittance of bread;  
In ignorance to view a small portion & think that All  
And call it Demonstration: blind to all the simple rules of life.

(*Jerusalem*, 85<sup>12-28</sup>.)

It was more than a tactical mistake on Blake's part, to surrender 'Reason' in any form to the enemy,

<sup>1</sup> The theme is too general to Blake's work to allow of complete and particular references here, but any reader consulting the *Songs of Experience*, the *Laocoon* texts, the *Auguries of Innocence*, and such passages as *Jerusalem*, pp. 302ff., will gain some idea of Blake's attitude towards social evils.

and it probably exercised a really baneful effect upon his own mind, but his other error of choosing mere physical energy and desire as the type of creative good was later modified by the substitution of 'imagination' and 'forgiveness' as the creative and unifying forces, without which he says love itself is eternal death.<sup>1</sup>

But we are wandering too far afield and must return to Blake's development of his theme in the *Marriage*. This is worked out with considerable underlying consistency—more in fact than at first appears—in a series of really amazing visionary episodes, reckless, extravagant, almost boisterously humorous, but full of mysterious charm and sometimes of almost classic beauty.

It is in the symbolism of the designs that we are now to look for an aid to interpretation that has hitherto escaped the vigilance of interpreters, and we shall discover that it is in the illustrations that Blake keeps most closely to his true theme of a mutual interdependence between the so-called 'bodily' and 'spiritual.' In the text he is, as has been said, always over-shooting the mark. He finds it impossible to recommend one without at the same time depreciating the other, so that he has no sooner shown Hell as worthy of Heaven than he shows Heaven as utterly unworthy of Hell. In fact Reason is already becoming evil for Blake, though in the illustrations we shall find it still represented, in contradistinction to (bodily) Energy, as spiritual.

The first four plates represent visions of Heaven and Hell, presented by male or female figures according to the metaphor employed. In every case it is possible to identify Heaven by the thrusting forwards of the

<sup>1</sup> *Jerusalem*, p. 6424, and cp. *Milton*, p. 82\*33.

right leg, Hell by a similar posing of the left one,<sup>1</sup> and generally by confirmatory indications.

It is in the third and fourth plates that we begin to find the interpretive value of this system. The first words in the text of p. 3 are: "As a new Heaven is begun, and it is now thirty-three years" [probably Blake's age at the time of writing] "since its advent; the Eternal Hell revives." The illustration at the head of the page shows the figure of a nude woman bathing in flames, spreading out her arms and about to rise. Her outstretched left leg identifies her as bodily energy, in other words as the 'Eternal Hell' *reviving*. Below is another nude, in outstretched agony, and in the very act of giving birth to a child. Again the symbolism of the limbs identifies her as Heaven, that is to say, the *ancient* Heaven giving birth to the 'new Heaven.' The sex is now changed (compare the frequent changes of sex in Blake's *Mental Traveller*), and we see a lyrical flight of a youth (shown symbolically as Hell) with a maiden (shown as Heaven), out from the foot of the page. With the impersonations thus identified the thought is not very far to seek, and proves worth the search. With the birth of every child (Blake himself for instance) a new Heaven, that is a new series of natural (and conventional) limitations, is born of the old ones. His limited individuality (or rational consciousness) now becomes the screen upon which the Universe's Eternal Energy, reviving afresh, projects itself; the bounds which contain and define it, the

<sup>1</sup> Though when the back is turned this latter symbolical attitude may be indicated principally by a thrusting back of the *right* leg. Blake's less exuberant use of nude limbs in his later works, as the *Milton*, *Job*, and *Dante* designs, leads to his using *feet* instead of *legs* as the expressive portion of the figure, with the result that we sometimes have to read the designs in a slightly different sense, according to their date, e.g. cp. the attitude of 'Hell' (*Marriage*, p. 2), with that of Satan in the *Job* plate 8. (For interpretation, see Blake's *Vision of the Book of Job*, Joseph Wicksteed, pp. 55f.)

banks to life's stream. Every life therefore is conceived as a new opportunity or framework (Heaven) for an original outburst and manifestation of the splendours of the universe's exuberant and perennial vitality (Hell). Whereupon we see the new-born soul wedded in virginal joy to life's eternal youth, and swept along by him into the swift race of existence.

We must now turn to the last of these four designs. Here the figures are all male. A waste of sea breaks forth in flames upon the right; a rising sun glows clear above the horizon on the left. From the flames a rushing figure throws a babe across the deep, to be caught in the arms of a figure advancing along the sunlight path across the sea. The flames would seem at first sight to identify the right-hand figure with Hell. But this seems improbable, as the symbolism shows him with his right leg advanced, and the sun-proceeding one with the left.<sup>1</sup> And fortunately Blake has left us in no doubt. By putting a manacle upon the leg of the son of flame, he clearly identifies him as the limiting power of law or reason (Heaven). This makes the interpretation simple. The design shows once more the old condemned and manacled Heaven sending forth its child, the New Heaven, across the waters (the child throws forward its right leg) to be caught and rescued by the Eternal Energy reviving from the deep with the rising sun.

This method of interpretation helps to explain several of the other designs in this weird book, where genii and giants are shown as merely spiritual beings, that is, unendowed with the divine and eternal vitality

<sup>1</sup> This fact seemed so contradictory as to cause me for some time to abandon the theory of there being any consistent use of a right and left symbolism in Blake's early designs. But further consideration eventually showed its interpretive value here as elsewhere.

of bodily and concrete existence; mere visions of the limiting earth-bound mind. "Thus men forgot that All deities reside in the human breast."<sup>1</sup> It also probably explains why the symbolical figure of Innocence in the frontispiece to the *Songs* is made left, and the corresponding figure of Experience right. Experience is the curbing, legal and in a sense earthly, factor of life, called Heaven by the priests and teachers of Christendom; but it is the body's spontaneity and innocence, with all its joys and instincts, that is according to Blake, at this stage of his thought, the really eternal and divine power of life, though spoken of as Hell.<sup>2</sup>

But before leaving *The Marriage* let us turn once more to this fourth illustration and compare it with a remarkable colour print executed probably some five years later. The reader who has followed the above account of Blake's attempt in *The Marriage* to make a harmony between the so-called Good and Evil or Spiritual and Bodily factors of life, will have divined the radical instability of his synthesis. The tendency already so obvious in the text to make what he calls Heaven the evil power, becomes more and more complete in Blake's work of the next few years, until at last Reason is made responsible for everything that is blind and cruel and self-sufficient; it becomes, in fact (as has been explained), the antithesis of Imagination instead of being contrasted with mere physical impulse as it was in *The Marriage*, and as such it is frankly the

<sup>1</sup> *The Marriage*, p. 11. Later, Blake regards the spiritual as the only real, but that is when Reason has come to typify materialism, and the spiritual is represented not by reason but by imagination. Even in *The Marriage*, where the body is certainly the primal reality (p. 4), he arrives at much the same point by declaring that it *is* the soul though but a portion of it (*ib.*).

<sup>2</sup> It is always dangerous to interpret earlier work by later, and in some ways Blake clearly intends Experience to represent a higher view.

type of the material and earthly. The colour print we are now to consider belongs to the period when this change may be regarded as confirmed. Again we see a flame-emerging and a sun-begotten spirit meeting over a waste of sea; again the former is identified as restraint or Reason by its manacled foot, and again the sun-spirit clasps a rescued babe. But now Blake spares no pains to represent the fiery spirit as wholly hideous and hateful, in which point it differs completely from the version in *The Marriage*. In one version of the print the eyes of the Evil Angel (as it is now called) are replaced by white and sightless orbs, which give it a particularly horrible aspect. And surely it is not a little interesting that the design is reversed, making the manacled figure now left or corporeal, and the other, which we may now perhaps call Imagination, right or spiritual. At all events, if the reversal is an accident, it is the kind of accident which must not happen too often.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This change of Blake's system is connected with his mythological characters, Urizen, Orc and Los, who symbolically may be said to cover the ideas of Reason, Energy and Imagination respectively, though the last especially is far too complex a character to be adequately described by a single word. It is the change from Heaven to Urizen as the symbol for Reason that marks the change in Blake's attitude. In *The Marriage*, Reason still has its legitimate, necessary and even, in a sense, spiritual function. But Urizen is always a fallen spirit only to be ultimately redeemed by unspeakable cosmic travail, the theme of the prophetic books. Yet even Urizen is still symbolised in *The America*, three years after *The Marriage*, as *right* (p. 8), though next year (1794) in the great frontispiece to *The Europe* he appears *left*. What is more interesting and important is the symbolism in the *Book of Urizen* of that year (1794). He is seen on the title-page with his right foot crossed over so as to appear under his left knee, while he has a pen in each hand with which he writes in opposite directions, and after this he is once represented 'right,' i.e. during his fall on page 11. Once before (p. 8) he is, as it were, equivocally 'right,' that is he would be 'right' if the symbolic value were not neutralised by the advanced foot being significantly covered by the beard. He then becomes left on pp. 17, 20 (hands especially), 21, 25 and 26. This last page is the end of the book, and the design is particularly interesting as it shows him in a similar attitude to that on the title-page, but the uncovered foot beneath his left knee is no longer right but left, as though the transmutation had been completed. These observations, however uninteresting to the general reader, may be of service to the student and are therefore given by way of suggestion.

## II.

But it would be a poor service to Blake to make out that everything in his work can be rationally accounted for, and that there was never anything inconsequent or unbalanced in his mind and art. We can only put ourselves into a position really to appreciate the great work of his last years by learning the nature of his difficulties and temptations, which will enable us to look with greater forbearance upon the faults which undoubtedly remain, and to appreciate the greatness of the genius which could turn even its defects themselves to purpose.

We will therefore leave the subject of Blake's reversals for a time, and his method of using his visions symbolically. For, however extraordinary designs of this type may be, it is always open to argument that if we understood his meaning better, we might be able to find some real fitness to the conceptions symbolised. This indeed so often proves to be unexpectedly the case that one is tempted to jump to the conclusion that it is always so. And it must be admitted that so far as the unnaturalness or monstrosity of his symbolical designs goes, they are thereby better and not worse fitted to their purpose as expressions of the inward and supernatural, than by being too like the natural world.

But there is a certain number of cases where 'mental' forms obtrude themselves into designs purporting to represent nature, and it is here, if anywhere, that we shall trace a real vein of mental morbidity in Blake.

In the instance we shall give, it will be necessary first to ask the reader's attention to a strange symbolical design on p. 37 of Blake's prophetic book



*Jerusalem.* A horrible and frankly unnaturalistic bird, facing the spectator, hovers with bat-like wings over a fair woman's draped corpse. Its greedy eyes and distended neck are scarcely more horrible than its pose and proportions, which are geometrical and unnatural. The idea is clearly one that haunts Blake himself, for the figure in a still more symbolical form has already appeared on p. 6 of *Jerusalem*, and in a very greatly elaborated form is the basis of his recently discovered symbolical design called the *Great Red Dragon*. In all these instances, however, it may be entirely in place, for it is in each case a mental image symbolically illustrating some purely mental conception. But the spectator receives an unpleasant shock at finding its counterpart in the beautiful painting of *The Canterbury Pilgrimage*. Although quite unobtrusively introduced and in itself infinitely less ghastly than before, this swooping bird, as part of an illustration to Chaucer's poem, jars in a way that its counterpart in the prophetic books or allegorical designs does not. In his subsequent engraving of the design, the bird becomes still more unnaturalistic, being rigidly and painfully conventional and ominous-looking. Though a very insignificant feature of the design it is a more serious blemish than any mere piece of bad drawing, which is what it might appear to be if we did not know the bird already as a symbol. The suggestion of some want of control is confirmed by our knowledge of Blake's state of mind when engaged in this work. He worked under a sense of bitter injury, full of jealousy and outraged vanity, and might be said to have been almost literally 'mad with rage.' His best idea had, as he believed, been dishonourably plagiarised by an old friend and brother artist, who, whether he had stolen the design or not

(and it is clear that he did not intentionally do so) had certainly stolen a march upon poor Blake by painting a far more commonplace, but superficially more attractive canvas, illustrating the *Pilgrimage*, and one most probably suggested by something he had heard of a sketch of Blake's. The two pictures were exhibited in the same year, and it is some little consolation to know that Charles Lamb—one of the very few who took the trouble to come and see Blake's—preferred it to his rival Stodhard's.<sup>1</sup> In a mollified mood we may suppose he undertook to engrave a small reduced frontispiece of a portion of the picture, for an edition of Chaucer's *Prologue* published by Newberry and expressly intended to encourage the sale of Blake's complete engraving. At all events, in this pleasant little plate the bird has recovered its right mind and shows no marks of that poisonous symmetry and evil obsession that mar the other versions.

### III.

But the final justification of an artist's method must be sought in his greatest work, and it is in the *Job* designs, which represent the crowning effort of Blake's art, that we find the purely illustrative, and the mental or symbolical method, combined to such noble purpose. The mere fact that these designs were known, admired, scrutinised and frequently reproduced during more than eighty years, almost without any suspicion of their profound symbolic content, is sufficient testimony to their being free from any obtrusive 'mental' irrelevancies. Practically the only suspicion of anything of the kind is in the frequent Stonehenge-like erections and shattered masonry in

<sup>1</sup> H. Crabb Robinson's *Reminiscences* (Symons, p. 284).

the background. The delicate tracery of the margins contains, it is true, a somewhat larger proportion of unintelligible symbolism, but it is scarcely ever obtrusive or out of place. Blake has shown his master-hand in the Illustrations themselves by using for his symbolism natural attitudes and situations, accepted religious conceptions and images, and the simplest and most beautiful decorative inventions. So that he has welded into a single noble harmony his own deep interpretation and commentary of the Job story with what is scarcely more than a plain and simple representation of the story itself. And pictures which present on the surface scarcely anything but a powerful and imaginative presentment of the great Old Testament drama, reveal to patient and sympathetic research depth within depth of profound commentary on human life; the sources of its pain, disaster and grief and of its ultimate and abiding joy; until Job becomes striving humanity itself, greatly failing, greatly achieving, and ever both in failure and achievement greatly loved and loving.

Let us spare one moment to ask where he got some of the 'visions' which make this work so great. For his first image of Satan he goes back thirty years to the *Book of Urizen*. For perhaps his very noblest image of the Creator in the great design of the Sons of God, he goes back still further to his *America*.

For another figure, the only one, so far as I can remember, which he reverses, he goes back to the *Europe* (thirty years). The reversal is certainly intended to fit the figure to its new symbolical meaning. The former design showed a spiritual being engaged in an act of spiritual rescue, whereas the theme of the Job design is the futility of attempts to save by material

'goods,' even used to rescue our own loved ones from earthly disaster; and accordingly the right leg of the central figure, as it originally was, now becomes a left one. In the last of the more purely symbolical designs of the series, where Job offers up the lambent symbol of his own Will as the atoning sacrifice to the Divine life, he goes back to a design of Noah's sacrifice. But though there is no reversal here the symbolical attitude of the feet is again altered by Blake to fit it with his particular intention, the portrayal of a symbolic unison between the earthly man and his Divine humanity. In every case the Job version is greater in conception, in spirit, and in execution.

But generally speaking it may be said that Blake shows himself in these Job designs more independent of formal visions, more free to express the ultimate idea, than ever before. It would be possible, for instance, to quote quite a number of designs which contain the same thought, as that of his 'Sons of God Shouting for Joy.'<sup>1</sup> But the design, as distinct from the idea, is unlike any of them. It is a new form created for its purpose and issuing from the mind in response to the demands of the soul. Even so we can trace an advance in the different versions, the whole conception being gloriously ennobled in the final engraving by the addition of arms and wings coming from beyond the margin and seeming to stretch the chain of angels to infinity. Blake's control is at last that of a perfect master. He no longer wrestles with his obsessions to force a meaning from them, or into

<sup>1</sup> On page 22 of *Jerusalem* we see a chain of angels linked by wings and feet forming a kind of bridge above the war and waste of corporeal existence. Again, on p. 75 of the same work, we find angels in intersecting circles spanning the page above a gruesome representation of carnal corruption. And this is in several respects very close to the symbolical theme of the Sons of God, though the latter is in every way a far greater and more beautiful conception.

them, but standing upon the wide brink of his teeming imagination he calls up from it the images he requires and they come obedient to his will.<sup>1</sup>

It is characteristic of Blake, as of so many great spirits, that, as his powers grew and matured, which they did up to his last day on earth, his humility also increased. In the *Job* we see him willing to relegate his message and 'system' to a kind of divine footnote, to be read or not by 'the angels' and 'posterity,' as fate decreed. And in the very last work of his hands,—the great but incomplete illustrations to Dante's *Comedy*—he seems to submit his own genius to that of a still greater one. It is true that a little knowledge of his mind and symbolic method enables us to read in many of the designs a protest against Dante's theology or ethics, more especially against the doctrine of eternal hell and the condemnation in any form of earthly love. Quaintly enough, they also show evidence of a reversion to a more ancient type of cosmogony than Dante's, for Blake always professed to hold the flat-earth theory, which was of course abandoned by the science of Dante's day. Yet in the main they are sincere attempts to accompany Dante in his great pilgrimage rather than to use Dante's episodes to express his own Blakean conceptions. And at least one great advan-

<sup>1</sup> For the complete treatment of the symbolism of these designs I may refer the reader to my study of *Blake's Vision of the Book of Job* (Dent & Sons). An interesting point connected with the above and following illustration has been raised by reviewers, which I take this opportunity of explaining. I have to thank Mr. McCartney Wilson, writing in the *Christian Commonwealth* (January 11, 1911), for calling my attention to the fact that all the animals in the book are 'left' with (he admits) the exception of Behemoth. And a reviewer in the *Saturday Review* (September 16, 1911), challenges an explanation of this exception. As a matter of fact, there is one other exception which has escaped Mr. Wilson's vigilance. It is the lion in the sixth day of creation. Now all the other animals except in these two illustrations are represented as in the natural and concrete world. But in these two illustrations the two aspects of Creation are seen explicitly in *vision* and the animals are therefore spiritual appearances, or true types, quite consistently represented as 'right-footed.'

tage is incident to their incompleteness. It is almost as though we could stand behind Blake's shoulder and watch him at work. A few bold rough strokes first plot out the paper and suggest the main lines of the composition. Later we see heavier masses and confused crowds of indistinguishable figures. Slowly some of these begin to take definite shape, and though frequently obliterated, as other parts of the design emerge and demand revision of their treatment, yet at last upon the mass of half-erased lines and figures a few strong lines in ink pick out some central figure. Then gradually one part of the design after another seems to mature and become explicit. Finally a wealth of strong primitive colour hides all discarded work and brings up the whole into a strangely bold and simple composition, that conveys in an extraordinary degree the sense of immediate inspiration. Like the *Tiger* or the *Ancient of Days* it is difficult not to believe that it came complete from his brain as an immediately 'given' inspiration. With the aid, however, of the many incomplete examples, we may perhaps attempt to picture the actual process. To me it seems that it must have been somewhat as though Blake sat at his canvas or sheet and gazed *into* it, as a man might gaze *out of* a mist-obscured window. Presently he seems to see through it, and the dim outlines of a scene appear; projected, we may suppose, by the inner light of genius upon the paper. Slowly, as his genius works, the mist seems to clear away and the window less and less to obscure the scene beyond. He traces its details upon the surface, until at last the full clear history has been transcribed on to the sheet and a stainless window opened into the regions of imagination.

We must now attempt in a few words to draw

some kind of a conclusion. Blake was, according to both his own account and to the evident nature of his art, peculiarly subject to inward obsessions both horrible and beautiful. These he was able to 'get rid of' (as was explained in my former paper) by drawing them. But they seldom attain their greatest beauty or power until he has drawn them many times, tried various experiments, sought new combinations, and sometimes adapted them to express new symbolical meanings. Now according to Blake's own theory, as symbolically expressed in several passages of his *Jerusalem*, he believed that the eternal prophetic genius within him co-operated with his rational and limited self to produce a kind of palace or city of Art, which should lay bare the gates of the Divine city of pure Imagination and Love. One of the reasons he gives for the necessity of this co-operation is that if he does not use his own reason to make a system, his genius will be enslaved by the system of some other man.<sup>1</sup>

But one is compelled to believe that there is in truth a deeper reason. Art is that which takes the gifts of Nature and puts them into relations where they may minister more abundantly to the joy and welfare of man. And reason should be the minister of Art in this widest sense. Blake's mind was like a luxuriant valley, yielding strange natural forms in abundance. In parts its coarse and savage growths made it seem like a gruesome wilderness, in others it yielded the fairest of meadows, full of sweet wild flowers and gracious scents. Out of this bounteous field he constructs by years of toil a wild but entrancing paradise,

<sup>1</sup> The somewhat perplexing fact that the works of the natural man are always being destroyed by his prophetic partner and therefore apparently rendered useless, is, I think, explained by a passage in a Letter to Hayley, "The ruins of Time build mansions in Eternity" (May 6, 1800, Russell, p. 69).

full of strange and formless mystery, but holding also the smoothest lawns, and gardens of quaintest symmetry. It is impossible to say to which is due the greater share of honour in this result, the spirit of the earth, yielding everything that grows, or the spirit of the master-gardener, ordering and educing the wild elements into an artistic whole. But surely it will not be strange if his admirers are inclined to attribute nearly all its worth to the rational genius of the master, planting, pruning, uprooting. Nor shall we wish it otherwise with himself, if, as he shows us round his wonderful domain, he ever sings a pæan of gratitude to the mysterious source, declaring with last breath to his ever-devoted wife, "My beloved, they are not mine—no—they are not mine."<sup>1</sup>

JOSEPH H. WICKSTEED.

<sup>1</sup> J. T. Smith, *Biog. Sketch* (Symons, p. 386).



## TOTEMISM IN THE OLD TESTAMENT.

REV. H. J. DUKINFELD ASTLEY, M.A., LITT.D.,

Fellow of the Royal Anthropological Institute.

THE title of our present study, which brings us to the third part<sup>1</sup> of our connected investigation of the help afforded to students of the Old Testament by Anthropology, seems, at first sight, perhaps, a *petitio principii*. It may be said, "You have first to prove that totemism, or rather traces of it, can be found in the Old Testament before you are justified in using so definite a statement for the heading of your study."

Well, it may be so; but meanwhile we will let it stand, and trust to the orderly development of our theme to provide its justification.

It has seemed necessary to say this because, as we observed in reviewing his great work, *Totemism and Exogamy*, in the April number of THE QUEST of last year, Dr. J. G. Frazer, though an avowed pupil of the late Robertson Smith, is now very doubtful whether the ancestors of the civilised nations, the Turanians, Aryans and Semites, ever passed through a stage of totemism in the process of their social organisation.<sup>2</sup> Robertson Smith was convinced, in the case of the Semites, that they did; Mr. Gomme and Prof. Keane have shown good reason to believe that the Aryans

<sup>1</sup> See 'Anthropology and the Old Testament,' and 'Animism in the Old Testament,' THE QUEST, vol. i., pp. 240ff. and 725ff. The bibliography at the end of this article relates to the whole investigation.

<sup>2</sup> Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy*, vol. iv., pp. 18ff. Cp. König, *Gesch. der alttest. Religion*, pp. 61ff.

had their totemic stage; and, in the case of the Turanians the same may be held at the least probable, if not proved.

Egyptian religion also shows unmistakable signs that its professors passed through a totemic stage of society, to whatever race they belonged.<sup>1</sup>

It is our hope in this study to carry forward the researches of Robertson Smith and to show that indubitable traces of totemism have been left, like glacial boulders on the Yorkshire moors, upon the pages of the Old Testament.

Totemism and animism belong to the same stage of culture, which we may call the Neolithic, and where animism has left so many traces, we may naturally suppose that totemism is also not without witness, although, from the nature of the case, its traces are not so salient as those of animism.

To show that the ancestors of Israel passed through a definite stage in the evolution of culture when their social system was arranged on a totemistic basis, as it is among the natives of Australia to-day, and among the Indians of North America, in a somewhat more restricted and probably later form (for although the *word* comes from N. America the *thing* seems to exist in its most primitive guise in Australia), as it was among the natives of many parts of Africa until recently, and as it probably existed among the peoples of Europe in the Neolithic Age, and indeed among all races coincidently with animism, everywhere, which is what all the evidence goes to prove—to show this, we should be able to point to three things: (1) names

<sup>1</sup> The animal, bird and insect cults of Egypt are a sufficient proof of this, e.g., the city of Bubastis was sacred to the cat, Heliopolis to the ibis, Kom Ombo to the crocodile, and so on. (Frazer, *op. cit.*, vol. i. 12, 17, 86; iv. 175, 176.)

derived from plants and animals; (2) a system of tabu; and (3) traces of group-marriage. With this we should also expect to find traces of a time when kinship was reckoned in the female line and not in the male; for *Mutterrecht* must be conceded everywhere to have preceded *Vaterrecht*—a consideration which incidentally goes to prove that the Arunta and other tribes in Central Australia who reckon, although totemists by male descent, are in a later stage of culture and more advanced than those who still reckon by female descent.

Taking our three points, with their corollary, we shall find clear traces of totemism in the Old Testament, and these are amply sufficient for our purpose, without entering into the more recondite questions so ably discussed by Zapletal and S. A. Cook.

(1) Bearing in mind what we have already said as to the conceptions formed by primitive man with regard to names, we have at once a reasonable explanation to account for the large number of names derived from plants and animals which we find surviving among the Hebrews, such as no other hypothesis can afford.

As Mr. Hill-Tout points out:

In the mind of the Indian, as in that of the savage in general, the form of the thing and the spirit of it were one and the same; the connection between the two was most intimate and binding. Hence when a man believed himself under the protection of the spirit of a thing, his first act was to secure this thing, in whole or in part, and wear it upon his person, or if this were not possible, hide it in some secure place, where he could resort to it in time of trouble or need.

Compare the *churinga nanja* of the Arunta, each denoting the totemic affinities of its possessor, and all securely deposited in the *ertnatulunga*, the sacred and secret hiding-places of the clan, known only to the

initiates, and into which no woman dared to pry. Mr. Hill-Tout continues :

He had still another and even surer way of keeping himself in touch with his guardian spirit, and that was by assuming and taking to himself the mystery-name of the object which was his totem. This the spirit revealed to him when it conferred its protection upon him.<sup>1</sup>

Here we note the essential distinction between the American and the Australian type of totemism, in that the former has become individual, whereas the latter remains tribal, or rather serves to mark the divisions within the tribe. Thus every Australian belongs, by the very fact of his birth, to some definite totem class or phratry, either, as in the case of the Dieri and others, to that of his mother, or, in the case of the Kamilaroi and Kurnai, to that of his father, or, as in the case of the Arunta, to that of the locality in which he happens to be born ; whereas, in the American sense, the totem is the guardian-spirit of the individual revealed at initiation. And inasmuch as tribal or family consciousness precedes the notion of individual personality (this is a well-ascertained fact), we see that the American type of totemism is at a later stage than the Australian. Probably the type of which we find traces in the Old Testament is rather of this later kind, although the earlier type has itself also left traces. Here then, in any case, is the origin and reason for the fact that the names most commonly used by primitive races are those of animals, plants, and other natural objects, and the fact that so many such names are found in the Old Testament is a proof of the survival of the custom after the meaning of it had been lost or forgotten.

<sup>1</sup> Hill-Tout, *British North America*, p. 176 ; Spencer and Gillen, *Native Tribes of Central Australia*, pp. 124-166.

I do not propose in this study to discuss any of the various theories proposed to account for the *origin* of totemism—I have done that elsewhere—but I would remark in passing that a combination of Dr. Frazer's latest theory with that proposed by Mr. Haddon seems to me most effectually to meet all the facts of the case, while, notwithstanding the cleverness with which its author has propounded it, both in *Social Origins* and in *The Secret of the Totem*, Mr. Lang's theory, first proposed by Herbert Spencer, that totem names were originally sobriquets or nicknames, appears to me more improbable than any other. The fact remains that savages distinguish their tribal groups or themselves by names derived from plants, animals, etc., and that such names survive in later stages of culture, the only reasonable hypothesis being that such a custom points back in every case to a time when society was organised on a totemistic basis. Thus among the Romans we find the *gentes* Fabii (Beans), Asinii (Asses) and Caninii (Dogs). So among the Hebrews we find the Calebites (Dogs); but the majority of such names in the Old Testament are, as we have said, personal, not tribal or clannish, pointing to the American rather than the Australian type of totemism. A full list of the Arab tribal totem-names will be found in Robertson Smith's *Kinship and Marriage*, and of the Hebrew personal totem-names in the *Encyclopædia Biblica*, so it is unnecessary for us to labour the point further here.<sup>1</sup> As regards place-names derived from animals, plants, etc., a full list will also be found in the *Encyclopædia Biblica*, as to which the writer remarks:

<sup>1</sup> Robertson Smith thought, from the fact that Nahash, Nahshon, serpent, is found among the names of the Davidic stock, that the serpent might have been the totem of the house of David, and with this he connected Nehushtan, the serpent of brass, destroyed by Hezekiah. But this is very doubtful.

Names of animals applied to towns are much more frequent in the southern territory of the Israelites than in the northern. Names of this class are often frequent as clan-names (on the other hand they are comparatively rare as personal names).

In saying this he forgets the list he has already given! And he adds:

This is one of the reasons which favour tracing at least many of them back to a totem stage of society.

Here it is evident there is some confusion of thought, and, though right is his conclusion, the writer shows that he is not quite at home in his subject. With the greater part of Mr. Lang's note on 'Ancient Hebrew Village Names,' in *Social Origins* (p. 300), I would agree, though, as stated above, I cannot agree with his derivation of the names from sobriquets.

Robertson Smith's careful statement in *Religion of the Semites* (pp. 354-356), portions of which we quote, will fittingly bring us to our second point, which is really a harking back to the most primitive ideas.

In looking further into this matter, we must distinguish between the sacred domestic animals of pastoral tribes (such as we find among the Zulus, the Masai and others in Africa) the milk-givers whose kinship with men rests on the principle of fosterage, and those other sacred animals of wild or half-domesticated kinds, such as the deer and the swine, which even in the later days of Semitic heathenism were surrounded by strict tabus, and looked upon as, in some sense, partakers of a divine nature. The latter was undoubtedly the older class of sacred beings. . . . Totemism pure and simple has its home among races like the Australians and the North American Indians, and seems always to lose ground after the introduction of a pastoral life.

Robertson Smith, it will be seen, does not distinguish between the Australian and American types of totemism, but that has no bearing on the truth of his argument, which brings us straight to our second point:

## (2) A system of tabu.

The question has often been asked as to the origin and meaning of the lists of animals, etc., in *Leviticus* 11 and *Deuteronomy* 14, which were to be accounted unclean, *i.e.* tabu, by the Israelites. The answer is that they were the survivals of the early totemistic stage of society, in which they were the eponyms of totem clans, and in consequence tabued as food, from which they acquired a character of *sacredness* expressed by the word 'unclean,' for the same reasons, for example, that a canonical book was said, in later days, 'to defile the hands.' Thus the swine was an *unclean* animal in exactly the same way that *Canticles* was said to 'defile the hands'! In the same manner the word *kadôsh* was used. The spoils of war were *k'dôshim*, 'sacred to Yahweh,' and at the same time 'accursed.' So were the temple-prostitutes. The ideas conveyed by the word 'devoted' carry both senses. So *sacer* was employed in Latin and *hagios* in Greek. And the primitive notion of 'tabu' derived from animism and totemism combines and includes both senses.

How potent the ancient animistic and totemistic conceptions must have remained among the people through all the pre-exilic history of Israel, is seen not only by a reference to the narratives of the reformatations accomplished by Hezekiah and Josiah, but by a reference to the passages in *Ezekiel* and *Isaiah* which testify to the prevalence of the same ideas, during and even after the exile, and though all *rites* connected with them had long been abandoned, yet these *ideas* leaven the whole tone of popular religion throughout the New Testament, as we showed under 'Animism in the Old Testament.'

In *Ezekiel* 8 we find a remarkable passage, dating

from about 590 B.C., in which the prophet describes how he is carried in the spirit to Jerusalem, and there beholds seventy men of the ancients of Israel engaged in secret rites in a chamber of the temple on the wall of which were portrayed "every form of reptile and beast, all manner of abominations and all the idols of the House of Israel," while "northward of the gate of the altar" stood "the image of jealousy," *i.e.* the image by which Yahweh was provoked to jealousy—probably the image of Astarte, called by Jeremiah "the Queen of Heaven," for whom he had seen the women of Jerusalem making cakes.

Of the reptiles and beasts and doll-images Prof. Toy remarks :

These probably represented forms of old Israelitish worship, but the connection suggests something mysterious, mystic cults, secret services to which only the initiated were admitted.<sup>1</sup>

They are in fact, *mysteries*, like the Eleusinian mysteries in Greece, or like the *sacraments* of the Christian Church, called in Greek *μυστήρια*,—only the initiated, *i.e.* the baptised, being admitted to the sacred feast of Bread and Wine, which themselves *are* the Body and Blood of Christ,—and all alike, purified and refined though they may be, find their living significance and their mystic power only in ideas derived from the animism and totemism of primitive men.

This will become even clearer when we consider the two passages from *Isaiah*, 65 and 66, which date from about 450 and 432 B.C. respectively. In *Isaiah* 65 the prophet describes Yahweh as saying :

I have spread out my hands all the day to an unruly and disobedient people who follow the way which is not good, after

<sup>1</sup> *Polychrome Bible, Ezekiel*, pp. 110, 111.



their own devices; the people who vex me to my face continually, who sacrifice in gardens, and burn incense upon bricks; who tarry in graves and lodge in secret places; who eat swine's flesh and in whose vessels is broth of unclean meats; who say: Keep by thyself, come not too near me, for else I shall sanctify thee. At such things there is a smoke in my nostrils, a fire that burns continually.

And in the next chapter we read of them "who shall be put to shame," *viz.* :

Those who consecrate and purify themselves for the gardens, the one consecrating the other on the tip of the ear, who eat swine's flesh, and the swarming creatures and mice, together shall they come to an end.

These passages are of the very utmost value and importance, and to us their meaning is perfectly clear. They tell us of mystic rites performed by members of initiated guilds, the representatives of the old totem clans, as they were in their origin; and the idea would be, at the outset, to render the totem animal prolific by partaking of it in a feast of communion; this afterwards developed into the mystic feast, with sacred rites, partaken of by all the members of the guild.<sup>1</sup>

At the graves necromancy was practised, and the 'secret places' are those sacred to the group, which no uninitiated person or woman must approach—the *ertnatulunga* of the Arunta, strictly tabued; but instead of the death penalty, the milder punishment is incurred of becoming oneself infected with the sacred influence, so as to be unfitted for the ordinary occupations of life. The 'swine' and the 'mice' and the 'broth of unclean meats' represent the old totem animals of the original group, and the idea is the old animistic one of communion by eating. Prof. Cheyne's remarks on these passages are excellent, and his

<sup>1</sup> Compare the *intichiuma* ceremonies of the Arunta described as intended to increase the number of the totemic animal or plant.

references to the *Religion of the Semites* render it unnecessary for me to enlarge further upon them.<sup>1</sup>

To come to our third point :

(3) Traces of group-marriage.

I have not mentioned exogamy because one of the results of Dr. Frazer's investigations has been to prove that totemism may exist without exogamy, and *vice versa*, that the origin of each is independent, and that totemism is in all probability the older of the two. But the classificatory system of marriage, says Dr. Frazer, is an invariable accompaniment of totemism, and he denies that this system is to be discovered among the primitive Semites and Aryans. This may be the case as far as all records or remains in tradition or fact are concerned; but one fact, or rather a double fact, stands out in the Old Testament which has a close connection with the system of classificatory or group-marriage, and is indeed discussed by Dr. Frazer under this heading, *viz.* the Law of the Levirate, *i.e.* the

<sup>1</sup> *Polychrome Bible, Isaiah*, pp. 198-200, and see Robertson Smith's *Kinship and Marriage*, p. 245 and pp. 308, 310, and *Religion of the Semites*, pp. 290ff. and 357ff.

In the former Robertson Smith says of these passages : " At the time when our evidence begins the greater worships of Arabia had passed through so many changes . . . that the chief signs of early totemism must be looked for rather in the lower superstitions of the people and in the private deities of small groups, just as among the Hebrews, *Ezek.* 8:10 gives us a glimpse of the private worship of unclean beasts and creeping things by the heads of Judean houses at a time when the public religion had long acknowledged no god but Jehovah." And, " It is such mysteries that are referred to in *Is.* 65:4, and 66:17 as Spencer long ago saw. . . . The only difference is that the persons who consecrate themselves by assimilating the very substance of the divine animal are no longer a totem-kin but a selected group of mystæ." In *Religion of the Semites* he says : " The sacrifices of vermin described in the book of Isaiah have their counterpart in the worship of all kinds of vermin described by Ezekiel. Here, therefore, we have a clear case of the re-emergence into the light of day of a cult of the most primitive totem-type, which had been banished for centuries from the public religion, but must have been kept alive in obscure circles of private or local superstition, and sprang up again on the ruins of the national faith, like some noxious weed in the courts of a deserted temple." Robertson Smith still regarded totemism as a sort of religion, and so could speak of 'cults of totem-type'; what are really meant are mystic rites or ceremonies performed in relation to the totemic animal or plant, etc.

obligation upon, or permission to, a deceased man's brothers to take his widow to wife, and with this Dr. Frazer associates what he calls the Sororate, *i.e.* the obligation upon, or permission to, a man to marry his wife's sisters either in her lifetime or after her death. Now the first of these customs survived as a law in Israel down to the time of our Lord, and is even advanced as a poser to Jesus by the Sadducees who desired to bring the idea of resurrection into ridicule. Of the second we have an instance in the story of Jacob, to mention no other example, though such a practice was afterwards forbidden by the Law.<sup>1</sup>

Finally the story of the Daughters of Zelophehad, together with the position held by Miriam in the earliest stories of the Exodus, and the story of Ruth and Boaz, with its most interesting archæological references to the ancient custom in Israel of "plucking off the shoe" in ratifying a covenant, sufficiently testify to the fact that there must in all probability have been a time when the ancestors of Israel reckoned descent in the female and not in the male line.

One further point may be noticed. The present writer, on a review of the whole subject of totemism, was led to the conclusion that it might well be briefly defined as "the heraldry of primitive man," and Mr. A. H. Keane arrived independently at the same opinion.<sup>2</sup>

That is to say that the emblems of the totems, whatever they might be, were often used as badges or

<sup>1</sup> See Frazer, *op. cit.* i. 426ff.; ii. 18, 26, 79, 189ff.; iv. 10, 12, 139ff.; MacLennan, *Studies in Ancient History*, 1st ser., pp. 109ff. *Matt.* 22<sup>nd</sup>., *Lev.* 18<sup>th</sup>.

<sup>2</sup> Astley, 'Cup- and Ring-Markings' in the *Journal of the R. Anthropological Institute*, vol. xli., 1911, pp. 96ff., and 'Portuguese Parallels to the Clydeside Discoveries,' in the *Journal of the British Archæological Association*, vol. lx., 1904. Keane, *The Import of the Totem*.

crests denoting the family or clan to which they belonged. Here indeed we have the origin of heraldry with all its ramifications and of heraldic crests and badges, and national flags.

Thus in *Totemism and Exogamy*, vol. iii., p. 40, Dr. Frazer tells us :

The Delawares used the figures of their totems as badges or crests to distinguish the tribal subdivision to which they belonged. On this subject Heckewelder says: "The Turtle warrior draws either with a coal or paint here and there on the trees along the war-path the whole animals carrying a gun with a muzzle projecting forward, and if he leaves a mark at the place where he has made a stroke on his enemy, it will be the picture of a tortoise. Those of the Turkey tribe paint only one foot of a turkey, and the Wolf tribe, sometimes a wolf at large, with one leg and foot raised up to serve as a hand, in which the animal also carries a gun with the muzzle forward. . . .

"The Indians, in their hours of leisure, paint their different marks or badges on the doors of their respective houses, that those who pass by may know to which tribe the inhabitants belong. These marks also serve them for signatures to treaties and other documents."

Now in the description of the arrangement of the tribes of Israel in *Numbers* 2, we read that each tribe took its station with its 'standard' waving over it; and that these probably represented some animal or plant, like our flags and crests, may be deduced from the fact that in the Blessings of Jacob and Moses (*Gen.* 40 and *Deut.* 33)—very old songs—what had been probably the totems of several of the tribes are mentioned: of Judah, the lion; of Dan in *Gen.* the serpent, in *Deut.* the lion's whelp; of Issachar, a strong ass; of Naphtali, a hind; and of Joseph, a vine,—and the others may be supposed to have been of the same kind. Surely far away in the distant past,

totemism had been a living power in Israel's social system.<sup>1</sup>

Thus we see, underlying all the progress of later times, relics in superstition and social arrangements, survivals of animistic and totemistic conceptions, which tell of the earliest ideas of primitive men, and of social *couches* long left behind, when the earliest pages of the Old Testament were written. These survived among the Israelites in folklore and superstition through all the advancing teaching of the prophets and the growing purification and progress of the cult of Yahweh, from the time when he was merely the national god, to the era when he was recognised as the one transcendent and immanent God of all the earth and of all nations, even as they do among ourselves in the twentieth century of the Christian faith, and they thus form an abiding witness to the great anthropological truth that everywhere and always, in similar stages of culture, and under a corresponding environment, *man is the same*.

All this is only a further proof of the correctness of the teaching of anthropology as to the evolution of man, and, incidentally, of the truth of the views propounded by the Higher Criticism as to the origin and development of the wonderful literature of Israel which goes by the name of the Old Testament.

H. J. DUKINFELD ASTLEY.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY.

TYLOR: "Primitive Culture," 1891. A new edition has since been published.

<sup>1</sup> With the 'heraldic' aspect of totemism we may too connect the 'Mark of Cain,' a tribal mark on the forehead or hand, by which he would be recognised as 'devoted to Yahweh,' and the subsequent prohibition of 'tattooing.' See *Lev.* 1928, 215, *Deut.* 141, and cp. *Ezek.* 946, *Rev.* 73, *Gal.* 617. *Encyclopædia Biblica*, coll. 971, 974, 'Cuttings of the Flesh.' The later *frontlets* and *phylacteries* were substitutes for these ancient barbarities.

- FRAZER: "The Golden Bough," 1909, etc., 3rd edition.  
 „ "Folklore in the Old Testament," in Volume of "Anthro-  
 pological Essays."  
 „ "Totemism and Exogamy," 1910.  
 HILL-TOUT: "British North America," 1907.  
 LENNARD: "The Tribes of the Lower Niger," 1906.  
 DENNETT: "At the Back of the Black Man's Mind," 1906.  
 SPENCER AND GILLEN: "Native Tribes of Central Australia," 1899.  
 „ „ "Northern Tribes of Central Australia,"  
 1904.  
 HOWITT: "Native Tribes of South East Australia," 1904.  
 MRS. LANGLOH PARKER: "The Euahlayi Tribe," 1905.  
 KINGSLEY, MISS MARY: "West African Studies," 1901.  
 ASTLEY: "Tree and Pillar Worship," "Trans. R.S.L.," 1903.  
 „ "Religious and Magical Ideas," etc., etc., "Journ.  
 B.A.A.," 1901.  
 „ "Date of the Samaritan Pentateuch," "The Thinker,"  
 1892.  
 „ "Prehistoric Archæology and the Old Testament," 1908.  
 Royal Anthropological Institute: "Man," etc., *passim*.  
 ROBERTSON SMITH: "Religion of the Semites," 1907.  
 „ "Kinship and Marriage," 1906.  
 LANG: "Social Origins," 1900.  
 „ "Secret of the Totem," 1905.  
 "Encyclopædia Biblica," Names, Elohim, and many articles.  
 JACOBS: "Studies in Biblical Archæology." This contains a  
 valuable article on "Totem-Clans in the Old Testament,"  
 which is worthy of careful study. Under its influence  
 Professor Robertson Smith was led to modify his views, as  
 originally expressed in the "Journal of Philology" (1880), in  
 "Kinship and Marriage" and "Religion of the Semites," *i.e.*  
 as they come before us in the pages of the O. T., they are  
 survivals, not then in actual existence.  
 Polychrome Bible: "Isaiah," Cheyne.  
 „ „ "Ezekiel," Toy.  
 DRIVER: "Genesis," "Deuteronomy," "Introd. to O. T."  
 HADDON: "Totemism," British Association, 1902.  
 STANLEY A. COOK: "Israel and Totemism," "Jewish Quarterly  
 Review," April, 1902.

ZAPLETAL: "Der Totemismus und die Religion Israels," 1901.

KÖNIG: "Gesch. der alttestamentlichen Religion," 1912.

In this new *History of the Religion of the Old Testament*, Dr. König makes a very thorough investigation not only of the progress of Old Testament religion, but also of its origins. On pp. 61ff. he has a short discussion of totemism, and on pp. 75ff. a similar discussion as to the 'cult' of sacred stones, wells and trees. The first is marred by the fact that, in spite of Dr. Frazer, Dr. König still connects totemism with religion. We know now that totemism is "an intimate relation supposed to exist between a group of kindred people and a species of natural or artificial objects, which are called the totems of the human group." (The American type, or individual totem, is here left out of view.) But it is true of both aspects that "a man no more worships his totem or regards it as a god than he worships his father or mother" (in their lifetime—he may worship them after they are dead, but that is not totemism). Totemism is the social side of animism; it is animism that leads on to, if it is not already, religion. To discuss the worship of animals or of ancestors under totemism as Dr. König does, is therefore beside the mark. Dr. König also shows himself unfamiliar with the true aspects of animism in what he says as to sacred trees, wells and stones, connecting these only with fetishism, which is a later phase altogether, and his attempt to answer those who, like the present writer, find very real traces of 'Animism in the Old Testament,' by a discussion on the 'Sacred Mountain of God—the Hill of Zion,' is irrelevant. Holding the somewhat confused ideas as to animism and totemism which he does we need not be surprised that Dr. König's heading for this part of his treatise should be 'Fragliche Vorstufen der israelitischen Religion.'

## THE MYSTICAL ASPECT OF DANTE'S 'VITA NUOVA.'

EDMUND G. GARDNER, M.A.

ANTONIO FOGAZZARO, the famous author of *Il Santo*, has said: *Dante è mistico in amore, in religione è teologo*. And a French writer, Dr. Albert Leclère, has attempted at some length to show that there is an inconsistency, however unconscious on the poet's part, between Dante's love and Dante's religion, and that, even in the Empyrean Heaven, he does not really succeed in reconciling his worship of Christ with his worship of a creature, but simply makes his Christianity serve the supreme interest of his passion.<sup>1</sup>

Such a conception of Dante's love and Dante's religion seems to me an entirely erroneous one. Theology is for the poet of the *Divina Commedia* identical with Scholasticism, and for him the distinction, which we are sometimes tempted to draw, between Scholasticism and Mysticism, hardly exists. They are but the two roads, of science and experience, by which the soul travels to the one goal. They merely present two aspects of the same truth, even as, in the Earthly Paradise, the double nature of the symbolical Gryphon is seen reflected in the eyes of Beatrice.<sup>2</sup> Indeed, it may be said that, while Scholasticism is the body of Dante's religion, Mysticism is its soul, and Love the animating spirit of both.

<sup>1</sup> *Le Mysticisme Catholique et l'Ame de Dante*, p. 103.

<sup>2</sup> *Purg.* xxxi. 118-126.



St. Thomas Aquinas, discussing the question *utrum Caritas augeatur in infinitum*, argues that, even in this life (*in statu viae*), no bounds can be set to the increase of Charity: "Charity, by reason of its very nature, hath no limit to its increase; for it is a certain participation in the infinite Charity, which is the Holy Spirit."<sup>1</sup> Read 'Love' for 'Charity,' as, of course, we may without altering the Angelical Doctor's meaning, and it was such a love for a woman that set Dante on the mystical way through time to eternity. It has been finely said, by George Tyrrell, that "all love is mystical in that it refuses the exact analysis of reason, which, without contradicting, it ineffably transcends."<sup>2</sup> In the relations between Dante and Beatrice, we have the key to the poet's mysticism.

Dante says of himself in the *Purgatorio* :

*Io mi son un che, quando  
Amor mi spira, noto, ed a quel modo  
Che ditta dentro, vo significando.*<sup>3</sup>

Taking love as signifying the innate force that impels every creature to follow out the trend of its true nature to the end divinely ordained, this Dantesque definition of poetical inspiration expresses in another form the doctrine of Rossetti's *House of Life*, that all great poetry is the transfigured life of its author. And it is in this poetical inspiration and in correspondence with it, that Dante, through the mouth of Bonagiunta of Lucca, finds the difference between the earlier poets and those who, like himself, were treading in the footsteps of Guido Guinizelli of Bologna.<sup>4</sup> The *Vita Nuova*

<sup>1</sup> *Summa Theologica*, II. ii., q. 24, a. 7.

<sup>2</sup> *The Faith of the Millions*, I. p. 283.

<sup>3</sup> "I am one who, when Love inspires me, take note, and, in that fashion that he dictates within, I go giving utterance" (*Purg.* xxiv. 52-54).

<sup>4</sup> *Purg.* xxiv. 55-63.

is essentially the transfigured life of Dante's youth and early manhood; Dante lived the life of love, of which his predecessors had only sung; and with him love, his love for Beatrice, becomes the guide to the fruition of the Divine.

Mysticism was, so to speak, in the air when Dante wrote the *Vita Nuova*. The great St. Gertrude, who was nine years older than the poet, was recording her visions in the *Legatus Divinae Pietatis*—the book of her revelations of which she had received the first in 1281, two years before Dante's dream of his heart aflame in Love's hand, the heart of which his lady eats, which is the subject of the opening sonnet of the *Vita Nuova*.<sup>1</sup> And in Umbria, Jacopone da Todi, converted from the world by the tragic death of his Vanna some three years after Dante's birth, was singing his wonderful *laude* of divinely inspired madness and self-annihilation. Another friar minor, about six years older than Dante, one whom the poet knew at least by sight and whom he had probably heard preaching in Santa Croce, Ubertino da Casale, was about to follow for a time upon the same road. Ubertino, like Dante, was led along the mystical way by a woman, Angela of Foligno, who wrought in him a renovation comparable with that wrought by Beatrice in Dante's 'New Life.' In the prologue to his famous book, the *Arbor Vitae Crucifixae* (composed about ten years after Dante had finished the *Vita Nuova*), he writes:

She restored, yea, a thousandfold, all the gifts of my soul that I had lost through my own sinfulness; so that from that time I have not been the same man that I was before. When I had experienced the splendours of her flaming virtue, she changed the whole face of my mind; and so drove out infirmities and langours from my soul and body, and renewed my mind that before was

<sup>1</sup> *Vita Nuova*, § 3.

rent with distraction, that no one who had known me previously could doubt that the spirit of Christ was begotten anew within me through her.<sup>1</sup>

Attempts have been frequently made to interpret the *Vita Nuova* as an allegory throughout. Such attempts, it is now agreed, are futile and unnecessary. There is, of course, much sheer allegory in the details and episodes—allegory which is probably not confined to the more obvious symbolism of the apparitions of Love in bodily form, in dreams or otherwise; but the book as a whole, whether we call it spiritual autobiography or psychological romance founded in fact, is not an allegory in the ordinary sense of the word. It is a mystical reconstruction of nine years in the inner life of the poet, in which earthly love becomes spiritual; but the soul, being thus exalted above her natural powers, falls to earth again, when her source of sustenance and inspiration is removed; only to rise once more, in repentance and humility, to a clearer vision and a larger hope, with the resolution to turn to the daily work of life until such time as she may become less unworthy to attain the ideal that she has discerned.

A mystical note is struck at the outset, in the first appearance of Beatrice to the poet's eyes when he was almost at the end of his ninth year:

From thenceforward I say that Love held lordship over my soul, which was so early wedded to him, and he began to exercise over me such great assurance and such great mastery, through the power that my imagination gave him, that it behoved me to do perfectly all that was his pleasure. He commanded me many times that I should seek to see this youngest of the Angels: wherefore I in my childhood often went seeking her; and I saw her of so noble and praiseworthy bearing, that certainly of her could be said that word of the poet Homer: *She seemed not*

<sup>1</sup> *Arbor Vitae Crucifixae Jesu, prologus primus libri primi.*

*daughter of mortal man, but of God.* And albeit her image, which continually abode with me, was an exultation of Love to rule over me, it was nevertheless of so noble a virtue, that no time did it suffer that Love should sway me without the faithful counsel of Reason, there where such counsel were useful to hear.<sup>1</sup>

This is very closely analogous with that first revelation of the Divine in early childhood which is related of so many mystical saints: a vision foreshadowing the soul's spiritual espousals and leaving her in like manner the handmaiden of celestial love. Thus St. Catherine of Siena saw, or thought in after life that she had seen, her first vision of her heavenly Bridegroom when she was six years old: "From that hour," says the man who knew her best, her director and biographer, Fra Raimondo,

Catherine began to show herself no more a child, but adult in holy virtues, gravity of bearing, and ripeness of wisdom; in such sort that, in her actions, nothing of childishness nor immaturity was displayed, but rather an age inspiring veneration. For already the fire of divine love had taken hold of her heart, through the virtue of which her understanding was illumined, her will inflamed, her memory strengthened, and her outward actions showed themselves in everything in harmony with the rules of the divine law.<sup>2</sup>

Similarly, a fifteenth century follower of St. Catherine, the Beata Osanna Andreasi of Mantua, tells us of a religious experience which came to her in her sixth year, and completely coloured all her subsequent thought and action. In the form which her memory gave to this experience, as she wrote it down many years afterwards, a great voice said in her heart: *Life and Death consist in loving God*; a vision followed, in which she was led by an Angel to behold the whole universe in all its grades, bound together by love and proclaiming the law of love, from the God of Love

<sup>1</sup> *Vita Nuova*, § 2.

<sup>2</sup> *S. Catharinae Senensis Legenda*, I. ii. 2.

Himself and the Mother of the Incarnate Word down to the beasts of land and sea, the plants and inanimate things. Then, in her own words, she "feared greatly because of the vision she had had, knowing herself not to be a true and perfect lover of God as she needed to be"; she prayed for guidance along the way of love; after which her 'New Life' begins, in which (she says in a letter):

All things that I saw and heard represented God to me in my mind, with such great knowledge and taste, feeling, and sweetness of God, that many times my spirit was absorbed in Christ . . . and it seemed to me that Christ ever discoursed in my heart, whether I walked, or stood, or conversed with others.<sup>1</sup>

A great English poet wrote:

Love knows no nonage, nor the mind :  
'Tis love, not years or limbs that can  
Make the martyr, or the man.<sup>2</sup>

The first realisation of the significance of beauty by the youthful Dante, the first more explicitly religious experience in the still younger Catherine and Osanna, lead in each to the revulsion and renovation of being which is the *Vita Nuova*—the 'New Life' in which, in Crashaw's great phrase, Love is "absolute sole lord of life and death." In part, the apparent difference is one of degree rather than of kind; and in part, to adopt a scholastic expression, it is in the nature of the recipient: troubadour or saint.

For, among the many things to which Dante is heir, he is heir to the troubadour tradition. Throughout the *Vita Nuova*, the perfect troubadour and the incipient mystic are reacting upon each other; troubadour conventions are receiving mystical

<sup>1</sup> Hieronymo Monteolivetano, *Libretto della Vita e Transitò della beata Osanna da Mantua*, I. i. v. ; *Ibid.*, Letter ii.

<sup>2</sup> Crashaw, *A Hymn to the Name and Honour of the admirable Saint Teresa*.

colouring; mystical feeling, and at the end what seems mystical experience, is finding expression in troubadour phraseology. And, throughout, the mystic is gradually absorbing the troubadour.

This is very clearly seen when we compare the first with the last sonnet of the book. In the opening sonnet, *A ciascun alma presa e gentil core*, 'To each enamoured soul and gentle heart,' with its invitation to the *trovatori* to a 'tenzone,' a contest or correspondence in rhyme, written ostensibly in 1283, in the poet's eighteenth year, Dante is simply following the fashion of his age, a fashion which had been transplanted from Provence into Italy. And the dream which is the subject of the sonnet, the dream in which he sees his Lady at Love's bidding eat of the heart of her worshipper which Love holds aflame in his hand, is simply investing with poetical beauty, and transforming with spiritual significance, a troubadour tradition: a tradition which appears in many forms, and by no means exclusively in troubadour or even in western literature, usually associated with a sordid and horrible tragedy of jealousy or revenge.<sup>1</sup> The last sonnet, *Oltre la spera che più larga gira*, 'Beyond the sphere that hath the widest circling,' written apparently in 1292, nine years later, tells of a spiritual ascent in which a new understanding (*intelligenza nuova*), implanted by love, draws the poet's thought beyond the last of the moving spheres, to look upon the glory of Beatrice in the Empyrean Heaven.<sup>2</sup> Clothed in the language of exalted human love, this is a poetical rendering of the theme of the mystics, according to the famous definition

<sup>1</sup> *Vita Nuova*, § 3 (Son. i.). Cf. note in A. D'Ancona's edition, pp. 32-36, and A. C. Lee, *The Decameron, its Sources and Analogues*, pp. 143-152.

<sup>2</sup> *Vita Nuova*, § 42 (Son. xxv.).

formerly attributed to St. Bonaventura, in which mysticism is "the stretching out of the soul into God by the desire of love."

Between these two sonnets is written, in prose and in poetry, the story of the purification and illumination of the poet's soul, by the love with which Beatrice inspired him, and which is, as it were, identified with her. Love speaks in his heart, and says: "He who would subtly consider, would call that Beatrice *Love*, because of the great similitude that she hath with me."<sup>1</sup> It is tempting here to attach a special significance to what in itself seems natural and obvious: the speaking of Beatrice as an Angel. Almost at the beginning of the book, Dante calls her *quest' angiola giovanissima*, 'this youngest of the Angels';<sup>2</sup> and, further on, we read: "Many said, after she had passed: This is not a woman, nay, rather, she is one of the most beautiful Angels of Heaven."<sup>3</sup> The doctrine, which from St. Bonaventura onwards became almost a commonplace with mystical theologians, the doctrine that the mystic's goal of divine fruition, whereby the desire and will are made one with "the Love that moves the Sun and the other stars," is attained by the threefold way of purgation, illumination, and union, is ultimately derived from the teaching of Dionysius as to the threefold function of an Angelic hierarchy, and the effect of the Divine light which it receives and communicates: purifying, illuminating, and rendering perfect; "according to which each one participates, so far as is lawful and attainable to him, in the most spotless purification, the most copious light, the pre-eminent perfection."<sup>4</sup> Thus, the office

<sup>1</sup> *V. N.* § 24.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* § 2.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* § 26.

<sup>4</sup> *De Celesti Hierarchia* (transl. Parker), x. 3.

of Beatrice in Dante's *Vita Nuova* is virtually that of the Angels in the Dionysian scheme. And it is noteworthy that, in the *Divina Commedia*, there is a certain resemblance between the passage where the poet first sees Beatrice again in the Earthly Paradise and that in which he looks upon the forms of the Angels in their eternal aspect in the Empyrean. "Their faces had they all of living flame, their wings of gold, and the rest so white that no snow attains that limit."<sup>1</sup> Here the Dionysian doctrine of the threefold function of the Angels is translated into the symbolism of colour; the surpassing whiteness represents their work of purification, their golden wings the knowledge that illumines, the living flame of their faces the love that renders perfect. And this is, in part, anticipated in the appearance of Beatrice: "Garlanded with olive over a white veil, a lady appeared to me, clad, under a green mantle, in colour of living flame."<sup>2</sup> The spotless white and the living flame are repeated in the Angels, but the green of the garland and of the mantle has changed into the gold of their wings—for green is the colour of hope, which has already attained its principal object in Paradise.

These stages of the mystical way are, it will be understood, only dimly foreshadowed in the *Vita Nuova*. The purgative stage is, to some extent, represented in the first part of the book—from the mystical conversion wrought by the first sight of Beatrice to the place where, in Dante's words, "it behoved me to take up new matter and more noble than the past," and he begins the *nuove rime* with the canzone *Donne ch'avete intelletto d'amore*, 'Ladies that have understanding of love.'<sup>3</sup> Through the troubadour convention of feigning

<sup>1</sup> *Par.* xxxi. 13-15.

<sup>2</sup> *Purg.* xxx. 31-33.

<sup>3</sup> *V. N.* §§ 2-17.



love for other women, the *gravi e dolorosi punti* ('the heavy and dolorous moments') through which the faithful follower of love has to pass, the refusal by Beatrice of her salutation, in which "abode my beatitude which many times surpassed and overflowed my capacity," and generally the "sighs and burning tears," which Leonardo Bruni found such a stumbling-block in Boccaccio's life of the poet, Dante's love is being purified from its earthly alloy. And the purgative process consists, above all, in detachment, in the elimination of the personal element in his worship. "I thought to be silent, because it seemed to me that I had manifested enough of myself, even though I should evermore refrain from addressing her."<sup>1</sup> So henceforth, after the rebuke from the unnamed *donna di molto leggiadro parlare* (the 'lady of most gracious speech,' in whom Adolfo Borgognoni tried to recognise the 'Matelda' of the Earthly Paradise), he will no more let his verse "signify his own condition."

Since there is so great beatitude in those words that praise my lady, why hath other speech been mine? And therefore I proposed to take for the matter of my speech evermore what should be praise of this most gentle one; and, thinking much upon this, it seemed to me that I had undertaken a matter too high for me so that I dared not begin.<sup>2</sup>

There is purgation still in the second part of the *Vita Nuova*, which runs from the canzone of the *nuove rime*, *Donne ch'avete intelletto d'amore*, to the sonnet written on the first anniversary of Beatrice's death, "on that day in which was completed the year when this lady was made one of the citizens of life eternal"—*Era venuta nella mente mia*: "There had come into my mind the gentle lady, who for her worth was placed

<sup>1</sup> *V.N.* § 17.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* § 18.

by the most high Lord into the heaven of humility where Mary is."<sup>1</sup> There is, I say, purgation still ; but, in the main, this second part of the book represents the illuminative stage. Into the purified soul has entered the image of perfect earthly beauty, itself the mirror of the Divine, uniting earth to heaven by its rays :

An Angel calls in its divine intelligence, and says : Lord, in the world is seen a marvel in very deed, which proceeds from a soul that shines even to here on high. . . .

My lady is desired in high heaven : now would I make you know of her virtue. I say : Let whoso would seem gentle lady go with her ; for, when she passes by the way, Love casts into base hearts a chill, whereby every thought of theirs is frozen and perishes. And whoso should bear to stay to behold her, would become a noble thing or die. When she finds one who is worthy to behold her, he experiences her virtue ; for this befalls him, that she gives him salutation and humbles him so, that he forgets every injury. Also, God hath given her for greater grace, that he cannot end ill who hath spoken to her.

Love saith of her : A mortal thing, how can it be so lovely and so pure ? Then he looks upon her, and swears within himself that God intends to make of her a wonder new. . . . She is the sum of good that nature can form ; by ensample of her is beauty tried. From her eyes, howe'er she moves them, go forth inflamed spirits of love, that strike the eyes of him who then doth look upon them, and pierce so that each finds the heart. You see Love depicted in her face, where none can gaze upon her fixedly.<sup>2</sup>

Thus, from lyric to lyric, proceeds the conception of the purifying and illuminating power of love's realisation of perfect beauty in her who "seemeth to be a thing come from heaven to earth, to show forth a miracle";<sup>3</sup> until at last : "The delight of her loveliness, withdrawing itself from our sight, became great spiritual beauty, that through heaven spreads a light

V.N. § 85 (Son. xviii).    <sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* § 19 (Canz. i.).    <sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* § 26 (Son. xv.).

of love that salutes the Angels, and makes their high and subtle intelligences wonder: it is so noble."<sup>1</sup>

There is a famous passage in the *Confessions*, where St. Augustine says: "I did not abide to enjoy my God; but I was rapt up unto Thee by Thy beauty, and soon dragged from Thee by mine own weight, and sank down with sighing into these lower things. This weight was carnal custom; but with me was still the memory of Thee."<sup>2</sup> As a modern writer on mysticism well puts it: "Each step towards the vision of the Real brings with it a reaction. The nascent transcendental powers are easily fatigued, and the pendulum of self takes a shorter swing."<sup>3</sup> It is thus now with Dante in the third part of the *Vita Nuova*, the part, so manifestly on a lower level than the rest of the book, which contains the episode of his incipient love (after the first anniversary of Beatrice's death) for the *pietosa donna*, the 'compassionate lady' of the window.<sup>4</sup> Here we have essentially a troubadour version of the psychological situation depicted by St. Augustine: the soul dragged down from the true beauty by the weight of carnal custom; it would, I take it, be excessive to call it a troubadour counterpart to the mystic's 'Dark Night of the Soul.' And as, in St. Augustine, the memory of that Divine beauty remained, so with Dante: "Greater desire was mine still to remember my most gentle lady than to see this one."<sup>5</sup> And the memory triumphs in the *forte imaginazione*, the 'strong imagination' of Beatrice as she had first appeared to his eyes; after which: "All my thoughts were turned again to their most gentle Beatrice. And

<sup>1</sup> V.N. § 34 (Canz. v.).      <sup>2</sup> *Conf.* vii. 17.

<sup>3</sup> Evelyn Underhill, *Mysticism*, p. 215.

V.N. §§ 36-39.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.* § 39.

I say that, from thenceforward, I began to think of her with all my shamefilled heart."<sup>1</sup>

An air of expectation seems to pervade the last part of the *Vita Nuova*, from the poet's return to the memory of Beatrice to the hint of the vision with which the book closes.<sup>2</sup> There is little of the troubadour element remaining, but much that anticipates the future spiritual ascent of the *Divina Commedia*. The pilgrims, "the folk who go on the service of the Most High," pass through the city—and, since "whoso is outside his native land is a pilgrim," the poet's own thought becomes *spirito peregrino*, in the sonnet already mentioned, *Oltre la spera che più larga gira*, which closes the poetry-cycle of the *Vita Nuova*.

I call it then *pilgrim spirit* (says Dante of his thought), inasmuch as spiritually it mounts on high and is as a pilgrim who is outside his native land. . . . I say how it sees her such, that is, in such state that I cannot understand it; that is to say, that my thought mounts into the state of this lady in such a degree that my intellect cannot comprehend it; for our intellect is, in respect to these blessed souls, as our weak eye to the Sun. . . . I say that, albeit I cannot see there whither the thought draws me, that is, to her wondrous state, at least I understand this: that such thought is all of my lady, because I hear her name often in my thought.<sup>3</sup>

Then follows the sonnet:

Beyond the sphere that hath the widest circling, passes the sigh that issues from my heart; a new understanding, that Love weeping implants in it, ever draws it upwards.

When it hath arrived there whereto it yearns, it sees a lady, who receives honour, and shines so that, through her splendour, the pilgrim spirit looks upon her.

It sees her such that, when it tells me again, I understand it not, so subtly doth it speak to the grieving heart that makes it speak.

<sup>1</sup> *V.N.* § 40.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* §§ 40-48.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* § 42.

I know that it speaketh of that gentle one, because it oft recordeth Beatrice, so that I understand it well, my ladies dear.<sup>1</sup>

As I implied above, this is the lover translating into his own language the definition of mysticism as "the stretching out of the soul into God by the desire of love." It is the mystical subject of the *Divina Commedia* in germ. But, obviously, it is not yet mysticism in its truest sense. It is an intellectual effort of the poet to think of his lady in her glory; not yet a personal experience of eternity. But now such a personal experience, on a totally different plane from anything that has preceded it in the *Vita Nuova*, comes:

After this sonnet there appeared to me a wondrous vision, in which I saw things that made me purpose to say no more of this blessed one, until such time as I could treat more worthily of her. And to come to this I labour all I can, even as she knoweth verily. So that, if it shall be the pleasure of Him, through Whom all things live, that my life persevere for some years, I hope to say of her what was never said of any woman. And then may it please Him, who is the Lord of Courtesy, that my soul may go hence to see the glory of her lady, to wit, of that blessed Beatrice, who looketh gloriously upon the face of Him who is blessed throughout all ages.<sup>2</sup>

This speaking of God as *sire della cortesia*, the 'Lord of Courtesy,' reminds us of an English mystic, Mother Julian of Norwich, who, throughout her *Revelations of Divine Love*, always lays stress upon God being 'our courteous Lord,' using courtesy towards and demanding courtesy from His creatures:

And of all the sight that I saw, this was most comfort to me, that our good Lord, that is so reverent and dreadful, is so homely and so courteous.<sup>3</sup>

Beware that we take not so recklessly this homely-head for to leave courtesie; for our Lord himself is sovereign homely-head,

<sup>1</sup> *V.N.* (Son. xxv.). <sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* § 43. <sup>3</sup> *Revelations of Divine Love*, chap. vii.

and so homely as he is, as courteous he is; for he is very courteous. And the blessed creatures that shall be in heaven with him without end, he will have them like to himself in all thing.<sup>1</sup>

Whatever this *mirabil visione* may have been, it was clearly a true religious experience, foreshadowing that greater vision which became the subject of the *Divina Commedia*. Love has so far purified and illumined the soul, but not yet uplifted her to the third stage of the mystical way, save in so far as an anticipation of it may be figured in this vision. It was after the experience allegorically represented in the *Divina Commedia*, and hinted at, without any allegorical veil, in the Letter to Can Grande,<sup>2</sup> that Dante passes again, in fuller measure, through the ways of purgation and illumination, to show in the *Paradiso* how the love of Beatrice became transfigured and identified with the love that is the union of the soul with the Divine and the fruition of the Absolute.

We heard Dante, at the beginning of the *Vita Nuova*, speak of his soul as espoused to Love: *L'anima mia la quale fu sì tosto a lui disposata*.<sup>3</sup> This image, of the spiritual espousals of the soul, does not play any noticeable part in Dante's mysticism; though it occurs again in the third canzone of the *Convivio*, the canzone beginning *Le dolci rime d'amor*, 'The sweet rhymes of love which I was wont to seek in my thoughts,' where he speaks of the soul whom true nobleness adorns, as being wedded again to God, *a Dio si rimarita*, in the fourth stage of life.<sup>4</sup> The goal of Dante's mysticism is the *momentum intelligentiae*, the 'one moment of understanding,' after which St. Augustine and St. Monica sighed, as they leaned in the window of the house at

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, chap. lxxvi. Cf. *Inf.* ii. 16, 17, where Dante again applies the epithet *cortese* to God's dealings with men.

<sup>2</sup> *Epist.* x. 28.

<sup>3</sup> *V.N.* § 2.

<sup>4</sup> *Canz.* iii. 137.

Ostia; the 'moment of understanding,' repeated in the *un punto solo* of the last canto of the *Paradiso*, in which the vision of the Divine should "ravish and absorb and wrap up its beholder amidst inward joys," so that it should be the anticipation of the entry into the Master's joy which is Eternal Life.<sup>1</sup> The goal of the poet's mysticism, I say, is this, rather than the spiritual espousals with Christ, of which such mystics as St. Catherine of Siena and St. Theresa speak. But the difference is more apparent than real. For these are, after all, merely two alternative ways of expressing, in the language of the intellect and the language of the heart respectively, an anticipatory experience of Eternity; of Eternity, as defined by Boëthius: *The complete and perfect possession of unlimited life at a single moment*; a coming by anticipation to that eternal now, of which Dante speaks, *dove s'appunta ogni ubi ed ogni quando*, "in which every *where* and every *when* is brought to a point."<sup>2</sup> It may be said that all the revelations of the great mystics are attempts, in very varying and more or less fragmentary form, to express this experience in finite speech and in figurative language. And the *Paradiso* of Dante is the supreme effort thus to give utterance in song to what "he who descends from on high lacks knowledge and power to relate":

*Perchè, appressando sè al suo disire,  
Nostro intelletto sì profonda tanto,  
Che retro la memoria non può ire.*<sup>3</sup>

EDMUND G. GARDNER.

<sup>1</sup> *Conf.* ix. 10, *Par.* xxxiii. 94.

<sup>2</sup> *Par.* xxix. 12. Cf. Wicksteed, *The Religion of Time and the Religion of Eternity*, p. 24.

<sup>3</sup> "Because, when it draws near to its desire, our intellect plungeth in so deeply, that memory cannot follow in its wake" (*Par.* i. 7-9).

## JOHN—JONAH—OANNES ?

ROBERT EISLER, PH.D.

It is more than a century since Charles François Dupuis, the famous Parisian lawyer and professor of rhetoric, first declared<sup>1</sup> that John the Baptist was a purely mythical personage and his name the equivalent of that of the Babylonian fish-clad divinity Iannēs or Ōannēs.<sup>2</sup> Quite recently the same theory has been repeated in Prof. Arthur Drews' much-discussed book on the so-called 'Christ-myth,'<sup>3</sup> a work of far less original, yet in other respects quite similar character to that of Dupuis.

If then I venture to support that part of Dupuis' assertion which refers to a possible connection between the two names—as I have already done before Drews took up the question—I feel confident that no reader of my previous contributions to *THE QUEST* will think that I am thereby encouraging this renewed attempt to deny the historicity of a Pre-Christian teacher, whose peculiar activity is attested beyond any reasonable doubt by the authority of Josephus.<sup>4</sup>

On the other hand, I am fairly convinced that the

<sup>1</sup> In his very learned, in parts highly ingenious but as a whole hopelessly fantastic book, *Origines de tous les Cultes* (Paris, 1795), vol. iii., pp. 619f. and 683.

<sup>2</sup> Both forms are attested in our sources. In two places the manuscripts would even allow us to read Iōannēs, in itself a possible rendering of the Babylonian \*Ea-Hani, which Lenormant believed to be the original of Berossus' enigmatical Greek spelling.

<sup>3</sup> Vol. ii., p. 271, of the German edition.

<sup>4</sup> Cp. *QUEST*, vol. iii., p. 200.



rapid propagation of John's ideas, and especially the spreading of his fame into the low-lands of South Babylonia, has indeed a good deal to do with the striking resemblance of his traditional name to that of the primeval Babylonian fish- and fisher-god, the teacher and lord of all wisdom.

Readers of THE QUEST will know from a paper<sup>1</sup> by Miss Beatrice Hardcastle, that the Mandæans (= Gnostics) or Ssubbās (= Baptists), who still exist in the marshes round Bussorah, have preserved such rich traditions about 'Jahjā Johannā' that Ignatius à Jesu, the first Christian missionary who worked among them, believed he had rediscovered in them the last remains of the 'Disciples of John' who are repeatedly mentioned in the Gospels.

Now it is very remarkable that in the still untranslated Mandæan *Sidrā-d' Jahjā* (or *Book of John*), the Baptist is described as the '*fisher of souls*.' This title, which, if the current views about the Christian origin of the fish-symbolism were correct, should be reserved to Jesus and his Apostles, and which has scarcely been transferred to John *à posteriori* by a late Christian afterthought,<sup>2</sup> is bestowed upon the Baptist also by other, occidental witnesses—*e.g.* the deservedly famous Ambrosian choral chant alluding to the baptism of Jesus by John :

He sunk the hook into the deep,  
Fished forth the Word of God.

Taking this striking fact into due consideration, we shall have to inquire whether there is not a certain probability that also among the 'Disciples of John,'

<sup>1</sup> 'Fragments from the Mandæan Traditions of John the Baptist,' vol. i., pp. 435ff.

<sup>2</sup> *E.g.*, through a confusion with John son of Zebedee. For how could such a transference have influenced the Babylonian Ssubbās ?

even as in the earliest Christian Church, the converted and baptised members of the community were called 'the fishes,' while those who operated the 'regeneration' of new believers through the rite instituted by the master—foremost among them the 'Baptist' himself—were known by the honorific title of 'fishers.'

If such were really the case, we should no longer be puzzled either as to John being called by Mandæans and Christians alike a 'fisher of souls,' or about his identification with the mythic fish-clad and fisher-god Ḥani-Ōannēs, especially if we compare Jesus' remark that the Baptist "neither ate nor drank" with Berossus' striking statement<sup>1</sup> that Ōannēs *was never seen to partake of any human food* during his daily sojourns among men, between his morning rising from the sea and his evening return to the deep. We should indeed not hesitate even to presuppose that the same syncretism of John and Oannes, which seems so natural with Neo-Babylonian Gnostics, existed also among the more immediate *Jewish* followers of the Baptist, seeing that an influence of the Babylonian belief in ever new incarnations of the primeval Oannes on the Messianic hopes of the later Jews is far from being incredible. In chh. 12f. of *IV. Esra* (temp. Domitian, 81-96 A.D.), the Redeemer of the world, the celestial 'Man,' is expected *to rise from the 'heart of the Ocean'* before his coming, as *Daniel* (7<sub>13</sub>) says, with the clouds of the sky; for:

As no man can search or discover that which is in the depths of the Ocean, even so no mortal can see the Son of God nor His hosts except in the hours of His day.

There is a striking difference between this vision and that of Daniel, where the four beasts rise—even as

<sup>1</sup> *Fragm. Hist. Græc.*, ed. Müller, ii. 496f.

Tihamat the Old Dragon—from the waters of the Ocean, while the 'Son of Man'—like Marduk, the Redeemer, the Son of Ea—descends from the heights of the sky.

Hermann Gunkel has well observed that the above-quoted reason for this alteration, as given in the text itself, is wholly unsatisfactory. As, however, no better explanation has been offered until now for this remarkable feature of late Jewish eschatology, I venture to suggest that Pseudo-Esra conceived his 'Son of Man' as the ultimate reincarnation of that primeval fish-clad Benefactor of mankind, of whose seven successive manifestations or risings from the Erythrean sea, in previous æons, he may have read, either in the works of Berossus, which enjoyed a wide popularity in the Hellenistic world, or in certain pseudepigraphic works that were attributed to Oannes himself in those days, and which most probably circulated wherever the wandering 'Chaldean' astrologers and magicians tendered their begging-bowls.

Now if really certain later Israelite thinkers, perhaps originally Jews of the Babylonian or Syrian Dispersion, identified their pre-existent Messiah, who was to deliver Israel under the astral sign of the Fish,<sup>1</sup> with the old Oannes, Iannes or Ioannes, and therefore expected the ultimate Redeemer of Israel to rise from the 'heart of the Ocean,' if on the other hand the most enthusiastic followers of the Baptist believed him and not Jesus to be the Redeemer, who lived hidden and unknown on earth to return with the clouds from the sky on the Day of Judgment, it is by no means impossible that the baptising 'fisher of souls' should have been considered by some of those

<sup>1</sup> See Scheftelowitz, *Arch. f. Religionswiss.*, xiv. 47ff.

who believed in him, as the reborn fish-clad Hani-  
Ōannēs.

However that may be, there is perhaps another identification of our hero with a mythic character, which should first be considered because of its far more transparent historical origin. We owe to W. Brandt<sup>1</sup> the very plausible conjecture—approved also by T. K. Cheyne<sup>2</sup>—that in the original (oral?) tradition *Matt.* 12<sup>39, 40</sup> (= *Lk.* 11<sup>30</sup>)-42 was connected with *Matt.* 11<sup>7-19</sup>, so that a testimony of Jesus to John was converted by the Christian author of Q, the source of matter common to *Matt.* and *Lk.*, into a testimony of Jesus to himself. According to this hypothesis Jesus would have said:<sup>3</sup>

*Matt.* 12<sup>39</sup>            An evil and adulterous generation    *Lk.* 11<sup>29</sup>  
looketh for a sign, but there shall be no  
sign given to it, save the sign of the prophet  
Jonah.

*Matt.* 12<sup>40</sup><sup>4</sup>           For as Jonah was a sign unto the    *Lk.* 11<sup>30</sup>  
Ninevites, so shall [he<sup>5</sup>] also be to this  
generation.

*Matt.* 12<sup>41</sup>           The men of Ninive shall rise in the    *Lk.* 11<sup>32</sup>  
Judgment with this generation and shall  
confound it, because they repented at the  
preaching of Jonah; and behold a greater  
Jonah is here.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Evangelische Geschichte*, 4592.

<sup>2</sup> *Enc. Bibl.*, 2502.

<sup>3</sup> The present writer himself is responsible for the transposition of some verses, which seems inevitable to him, in order to obtain a logical connection of ideas.

<sup>4</sup> Here *Lk.* alone has preserved the trustworthy text, while *Matt.* is manifestly altered.

<sup>5</sup> The word 'he,' which must be added in English to express the identity of subject in both parts of the sentence, has no equivalent either in the Greek or in a Semitic original. The subject can be the same in both phrases, either because the comparison of *Matt.* 16<sup>17</sup> 'bar-Jōna' with *Jn.* 14<sup>2</sup> 'hyios-Iōannou' (in both cases the father of Peter) shows that Jona and Joanan could be taken as the same name, or because Jesus could mean "so shall he—the re-born Jonah—be again a sign to you."

<sup>6</sup> The traditional reading "a greater *than* Jonah," is probably due to the author of Q.

- Matt.* 12<sup>42</sup>      The Queen of the South shall rise up      *Lk.* 11<sup>31</sup>  
in the Judgment with this generation, and  
confound it; for she came from the utter-  
most parts of the earth to hear the wisdom  
of Solomon;<sup>1</sup> and behold a greater Solomon  
is here.
- Matt.* 11<sup>7</sup>      But what went *ye* out into the wilder-      *Lk.* 7<sup>24</sup>  
ness to see? A reed<sup>2</sup> shaken with the wind?
- Matt.* 11<sup>8</sup>      What then went ye out for to see? A      *Lk.* 7<sup>25</sup>  
man clothed in soft raiment?<sup>3</sup>
- Matt.* 11<sup>9</sup>      What then went ye out for to see? A      *Lk.* 7<sup>26</sup>  
prophet? Yea, I say unto you, even more  
than a prophet!
- Matt.* 11<sup>11</sup>      Verily, I say unto you, among them      *Lk.* 7<sup>28</sup>  
that are born of women, there hath not  
risen a greater<sup>4</sup> than Jonah<sup>5</sup>—*the Baptist*!
- Matt.* 11<sup>13</sup>      For all the prophets and the Law<sup>6</sup> have      *Lk.* 16<sup>16</sup>  
prophesied until Jonah.
- Matt.* 11<sup>12</sup>      But from the days of Jonah—the      *Lk.* 16<sup>16</sup>  
Baptist—until now the Kingdom of Heaven  
is being stormed<sup>7</sup> and the violent appro-  
priate it by force.

<sup>1</sup> *Sc.* without waiting for him to work a sign in order to prove the divine origin of his wisdom.

<sup>2</sup> According to *Ezek.* 29<sup>6</sup> the reed is an appropriate symbol for weakness and unreliability. Jesus, of course, alludes to Jonah breaking down under the task which Jahvè had laid on his shoulders.

<sup>3</sup> The glossator who added "behold they that wear soft clothing are in king's houses," wished to lead the reader on the way to the right understanding of the verse. Of course, the words aim at "Solomon in all his glory" (*Matt.* 6<sup>29</sup>; cp. "gorgeously apparelled" in *Lk.* 7<sup>25</sup>), and the sense is: Did ye wish to "behold King Solomon with the crown" (*Cant.* 3<sup>11</sup>; cp. *I. Kings* 10<sup>24</sup>), and to "hear his wisdom"?

<sup>4</sup> *Lk.*'s addition "prophet" does not agree with the preceding verse. For the (interpolated) rest of this verse see *Querst.*, vol. iii., p. 153 n. 1.

<sup>5</sup> See above, p. 478 n. 6.

<sup>6</sup> Alluding to *Deut.* 18<sup>18</sup>, 15.

<sup>7</sup> Quite possibly the comparison of the Old Testament Jonah and the Baptist extends its influence even to this verse. The *over-zealous* Jonah quarrels with Jahvè, because He defers again and again in His forbearance the foretold Day of Judgment. Even so the greater Jonah, the Baptist, dares in his burning zeal to realise arbitrarily and at once God's plans of an ultimate purification of the repentant Israel immediately preceding the Last Judgment, forcing thereby Jahvè in a certain way to accelerate the coming of the Kingdom. Jesus, of course, attributes an over-zealousness to the Baptist and the violent ones. Yet, as does also the author of the Book of Jonah, he thinks that God does not disapprove altogether of such men, who

- Matt.* 1110      For this is he of whom it is written, *Lk.* 827  
                     'Behold I send my messenger before thy  
                     face, which shall prepare thy way for thee.'  
*Matt.* 1114      And if ye will receive it, he is Elias,  
                     who is for to come.  
*Matt.* 1115      He that has ears to hear, let him hear.  
*Matt.* 1116      But whereunto shall I liken this  
                     generation, etc.

The comparison of the Baptist with Elias is wanting in *Lk.* It is, however, beyond doubt genuine, for the combination of the second 'greater Jonah' and the reborn foretold Elias accords with Rabbinic passages such as the *Midrash Rabba to Leviticus* §15, where Jonah is connected—even as in certain Christian catacomb paintings<sup>1</sup>—with Elias. It affords, moreover, the only possible explanation for Jesus' conviction that, *according to the Scriptures*, he who was the prophesied Elias, was also doomed to suffer martyrdom. Now nowhere in the whole of the canonical and apocryphal writings does a single word occur about a suffering Elias; but as the Baptist was in the opinion of Jesus not only the reborn Elias but also a 'greater Jonah,' he was necessarily destined to be swallowed by the Great Fish, whose belly is hell (*Jonah* 2<sub>2</sub>), before he could—in the character of Elias—rise into the sky in a fiery chariot. It is very remarkable, that even for this belief Jewish parallels can be produced; for in later kabbalistic writings the first of the two subsequent Messiahs, the one who loses his life in the fight against the evil powers, the Messiah ben Joseph, is identified with the prophet Jonah.<sup>2</sup>

are "eaten up by the zeal for his house," and that indeed the Baptist's and his followers' fervent repentance had somehow brought nearer the Kingdom. Therefore, because he prepares the Lord's way, instead of merely foretelling it, he is the greatest among mortals.

<sup>1</sup> Wilpert, plate 160, fig. 2.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. Elijahn ha-kohen *Midraš Talpijōth*, Varsovy, 5635, fol. 233.

Now the theory of Cheyne and Brandt is that the above-quoted sermon of Jesus plays on the similarity or even equivalence of 'Jonah' with the Baptist's name 'Johanan.' The more I study the whole problem, however, the more I feel inclined to go boldly one step further and ask: Was the 'Forerunner' already called Johanan when Jesus delivered this important sermon, or does he not rather owe this name—indirectly of course—to this very comparison of him with the prophet Jonah, which became popular for a time through the authority of Jesus? In fact, if Jesus surnamed the Baptist 'Jonah' as he nicknamed Simon 'Kēpha' and the Zebedאים 'Benē R'geš,' later readers of his sayings, who were ignorant of his reasons, because they found the decisive words torn asunder and fundamentally modified (cp. above, p. 478, n. 6) in Q, may easily have taken Jonah for what it often is, *viz.* an abbreviation of Johanan, while at the same time they retained the good old tradition that this was the true, significant or 'spiritual' name of the Baptist, given him by Jesus, which means for a Christian author, by God himself.

What leads me to suppose such a development is a striking detail concerning the name or rather the names of our hero in Luke's 'Gospel of Infancy' (1<sup>59</sup>), where we are told that on the eighth day, when the family assembled to circumcise the child, "*they called him Zachariah after the name of his father.*" Moreover v. 61 expressly informs us that none of the Baptist's kindred was called John. Now since we know other cases of Jews being called by the name of their fathers—though the practice is unusual nowadays and seems to have always been rather uncommon—and as the whole *dissension* about the child's name is

certainly not derived from the Old Testament parallels which have been used to build up the pious legend of the Baptist's earliest life, I have long ago suspected that his real name was Zachariah b. Zachariah and that Iōannēs (for Joḥanan, and this again for Jonah) was only another surname,<sup>1</sup> even as was 'the Cleanser' (*ho Baptistēs*).

Just as the 'prophecy' of the angel in *Lk.* 1<sub>13</sub>, "he shall not drink wine or strong drink," is devised to explain the well-known and historical Nasirate of the Baptist, so also the angelic order, "thou shalt call him John,"<sup>2</sup> must be a late, and therefore possibly quite gratuitous, attempt to explain the hero's more popular name 'Iōannēs.'

If the secondary names Joḥanan or Iōannēs were really—as I believe—syncretised with the very similar titles Ḥani-Iannēs-Ōannēs or Iōannēs, then this must be a later development by some among John's followers, seeing that it transcends the strictly scriptural, and therefore genuinely Jewish, circle of ideas. This identification may have been favoured by the existence of a most extraordinary Jewish tradition which represents Jonah as at least a *would-be* 'fisher.' When the prophet of Gath-Hefer was in the belly of the whale (says the *Midraš Jalkut Jonah*, §1) he prayed the great fish to bear him quickly to the Leviathān, for he desired *to catch the monster with a fish-line*, in order, when safe on the shore again, to prepare with its flesh a meal for the pious—that is the legendary Messianic fish-banquet which will be dealt

<sup>1</sup> It is hardly necessary to enumerate all the analogous cases; such examples as 'Jesus who is called the Christ' (*Matt.* 116), Simon-Petros-Kēpha', John or Andrew ben R'geš, Justus bar Sabbas, Saulos-Paulos must recur to every reader.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. *Gen.* 17<sub>19</sub>, "thou shalt call his name Isaac."



with in a later paper. This over-bold undertaking—another attempt on the part of Jonah, to storm the Kingdom of Heaven and to bring about by force the Messianic state of things—had, to be sure, no success, but quite the contrary. From the typical representation, on early Christian sarcophagi, of fishermen spreading their nets by the shore, towards which the great fish vomits forth Jonah, we can guess that he who had dared to ensnare the primeval monster fell himself into the nets of the fishermen, a typical fate familiar to the comparative mythologist from the legends of the Fishergod Dionysos Halieus, the fishing goddess Diktyнна, the marine deity Proteus, etc. The strange idea of the swallowed man fishing from the whale's belly will somehow remind the reader of the Babylonian priestly fishermen clothed in fish-skins like their fish-clad god Oannes, and we may be sure that in those days many a Babylonian Jew must have taken the frequent images of such priests on the monuments surrounding him for representations of the famous prophet whom the Bible credits with the astonishing success of having humbled to sincere repentance the proud king of Assur and all the Ninivites—just as in our own days critics have often been struck by the tempting idea of a possible connection between the Jonah-motive and the Oannes-type.

However this may have been, the alternative as to whether the Baptist's original name was Johanan b. Zachariah or rather Zachariah b. Zachariah is ultimately of very slight importance. What really matters for the general history of those times is that he was certainly likened to Jonah and Elijah by Jesus, and most probably also to the Babylonian fisher-god Ōannēs-Ḥani by some of his disciples. But for the

special purposes of the present writer the main question still remains, whether John and his followers really conceived—as we were led to believe (cp. above, p. 475)—the regenerating rite of submersion in water as a ‘fishing of men’ in the same allegorical way as the early Christian Church; and if so, how *they* arrived at this symbolism.

In order to find a satisfactory solution of this problem we must start from the remarkable synoptic tradition (*Mk.* 1s, *Matt.* 3s)—not expressly confirmed, but also not contradicted by Josephus<sup>1</sup>—that John preached and baptised exclusively by the shore of that very Jordan which was considered unfit for cleansing by the Rabbis, owing to its being a mixture of running and stagnant water (*Parah*, viii. 10). Indeed, this single feature is sufficient to establish a sharp distinction at once between the ‘baptism of repentance’ and its immediate antecedent the Rabbinic ‘baptism of the Proselytes’ (cp. *QUEST*, vol. iii., pp. 159ff) on the one hand and on the other its subsequent development in the Christian baptism of initiation. *Acts* 8<sub>36ff.</sub> show that the latter could be performed in any wayside pool, in accordance with the general anti-pharisaic anti-formalistic tendency of early Christianity,<sup>2</sup> as determined by the attitude of Jesus and some of his most prominent followers.

Nothing, however, would justify us in attributing to a man like John, whose whole life was dominated by ultra-pharisaic speculations (cp. *QUEST*, vol. iii., pp. 150),

<sup>1</sup> See the quotation in *THE QUEST*, vol. iii., p. 146 n. 1. The place-names connected with John's baptism in the Fourth Gospel are purely symbolical (*QUEST*, vol. iii., p. 148 n. 8) and cannot therefore be used to supplement the synoptic account; the arguments against the baptism *in the Jordan*, which have quite lately been proffered by W. Brandt, are all but convincing.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. the abolition of all possible Judaising distinctions between ‘allowed’ or ‘forbidden’ waters for baptism in the so-called *Teachings of the Apostles*.

the same anti-nomistic, or rather anti-Jewish, motives that underlie the fundamental indifference of Christianity as to the physical qualities of the baptismal water. If *he* neglected purposely the *natural* deficiencies of the Jordan water, he must have had beyond doubt a mystic reason for so doing. As I have already stated,<sup>1</sup> the only justification of this nature is offered by Ezekiel's prophecy (47ff.) about the *healing water running down to the unclean Jordan* from the temple-hill of Zion in the longed-for time of Messianic deliverance, and by the manifest belief of the Baptist that those times were now at hand.

This hypothesis is proved to be correct by the existence of other features in John's teaching which manifestly depend on certain characteristic details of the same prophecy.

Thus, for instance, the very *comparison of the righteous* who "justify God [in His prophecies] by being baptised with the baptism of John," to *fruit-bearing trees*, which begins the second half of the Baptist's sermon (vv. 10, 8), is again manifestly derived from Ezekiel's description of the Messianic water of life. For there the prophet says (ch. 47) :

<sup>12</sup> Behold on the bank of the river many trees. . . . By the river upon the banks thereof, on this side and on that side, shall grow all *trees* for meat, whose leaf shall not fade, neither shall the fruit thereof be consumed ; *they shall bring forth new fruit month after month, because their waters issue from the sanctuary* : and the fruit thereof shall be for meat and the leaf thereof for medicine.

Nothing could be more natural than that John, who understood the life-giving water descending from the sanctuary as the Law emanating from God's eternal abode,<sup>2</sup> should also take the trees on the bank of this

<sup>1</sup> Cp. QUEST, vol. iii., pp. 147 and 162ff.      <sup>2</sup> QUEST, vol. iii., p. 164.

mystic river in a figurative sense: (1) according to the famous words (*Ps.* 1):

Blessed is the man . . . whose delight is in the Law of God . . . He shall be like a *tree planted by the rivers of water, that bringeth forth his fruit in his season; his leaf also shall not wither.*<sup>1</sup>

—words which occur in the same Psalm from which he also manifestly derives his impressive comparison of the wrong-doers with the chaff on God's floor;<sup>2</sup> and (2) according also to the picturesque and impressive words of the prophet Jeremiah (17:8):

Thus saith Jahvè: Cursed be the man that trusteth in man . . . he shall be like a barren juniper shrub *in the desert (arabah)* . . . he shall inhabit the parched places *in the wilderness, a salt land* and not inhabited. *Blessed the man, that trusteth in Jahvè* and whose hope is Jahvè, for he *shall be as a tree planted by the waters* . . . that spreadeth out her roots by the river, and shall not mind when heat cometh, *but her leaf shall be green*; and shall not be careful in the year of drought, *neither shall cease from yielding fruit,*

—words that invite combination with Ezekiel's vision by mention of the Arabah, the desert salt land around the Dead Sea, and comparison with the sermon of John by the symbolic contrast of the barren unfruitful shrub with the fruit-bearing tree.

Supposing then, with great probability, that *Ezekiel* 47 was the main point of departure for the development of the symbolism underlying John's

<sup>1</sup> The *Letter of Barnabas* (ch. 11, p. 160 of Hennecke's *Neutest. Apocryph.*) also connects *Ezek.* 47:12 with *Ps.* 13:6, and explains them as symbolising "that we descend into the water full of sin and filth, but rise from it loaded with fruits, since we carry the fear of God in our hearts," etc. That "the leaves of the tree shall not fade" (cp. Ezekiel's prophecy "it shall be for medicine") is interpreted by 'Barnabas' in the sense that "every one of your words, going forth from your mouth in faith and love, shall help many to conversion and hope."

<sup>2</sup> Cp. *Matt.* 3:12 "he will burn up the *chaff* with unquenchable fire" with *Ps.* 14: "the ungodly are not so, but like the *chaff*, which the wind driveth away."

regenerating baptism of repentance, we cannot help asking ourselves, whether the doctrine of the Baptist and his school should have neglected another prominent feature of this prophecy—I mean vv. 9 and 10:

Wheresoever the river shall come everything that moveth shall live; and *there shall be a very great multitude of fish, because these waters shall come thither* . . . and it shall come to pass [that] *the fishers shall stand by it* from En-Gedi unto En-Eglaim; they<sup>1</sup> shall be a [place] to spread forth nets [for all fish] according to their kinds.

Want of space prevents an exhaustive discussion of what Ezekiel himself may have meant by these words. It is of course quite possible to understand them with C. H. Toy (*Enc. Bibl.* 1466, §14) in their most literal sense. But, on the other hand, it is pretty certain that almost from the first there were readers of this chapter who would not by any means be satisfied with a literal interpretation of this high-spirited passage. Unfortunately, owing to the unfavourable attitude of the Rabbis towards the allegorical exegesis of the scriptures, the Pre-Christian speculations of the Palestinian *Dorshē Reshumōth*,<sup>2</sup> on *Ezekiel* 47<sup>9, 10</sup> have not been handed down to us. It is not impossible, however, to reconstruct them from what we have, namely from the commentaries of the Christian Fathers, by eliminating the specially Christian features of their symbolism, while retaining those elements which clearly correspond to genuinely Jewish ideas.

To begin with Theodoret's Commentary on Ezekiel.<sup>3</sup> The Church Father refers the prophecy about the mystic stream to the sacrament of baptism, by saying

<sup>1</sup> Sc. En-Gedi and En-Eglaim, or rather the spots where the water of these two potent and still extant springs flow into the Dead Sea.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. QUEST, vol. iii., p. 163 n. 3.    <sup>3</sup> Migne, *Patrol. Gr.* lxxx. c. 1244 B.

"all those that are washed in the redeeming waters will reach salvation." He means of course the Christian baptism, but the words could quite as well be used by a disciple of John, since the latter's baptism is intended to save the repentant and regenerate new Israel from the 'wrath to come.' Theodoret continues:

Ezekiel says also that the water will be *full of fish and frequented by many fishermen*: for many are they who through these waters will be *fished for redemption*, and numerous are they to whom the catching of this booty is entrusted. . . . And Ezekiel says also that the multitude of fish will not resemble the number contained in a river but in the largest ocean; for the new people<sup>1</sup> will not be equal in number to the old, but similar to the ocean of the nations, and it will fill the habitable world.

Equally Jerome<sup>2</sup> identifies the mystic stream running down from the threshold of Ezekiel's temple to the desert with the pure water of regeneration, which God promises to sprinkle over Israel in *Ezekiel* 36<sup>24f.</sup> <sup>3</sup> This water signifies, as he says several times, the grace of God to be obtained through baptism. By the fishermen, however, that stand on the river's banks the same fishers are meant, to whom the Lord Jesus said, "I will make you to become fishers of *men*," of whom we also find written in *Jeremiah* [16<sup>16</sup>]: "Behold I shall send many fishers that shall fish you."<sup>4</sup>

And numerous species, nay kinds of fishes, will live in the once dead sea.<sup>5</sup> All these different fishes . . . were drawn from the water at the bidding of the Lord by Peter, and their number

<sup>1</sup> Cp. the 'ready people prepared for the Lord' by John in *Lk.* 17. Theodoret means, of course, the New Israel of the Universal Christian Church.

<sup>2</sup> *Comm. in Ezek.* 47, Migne, *Patrol. Lat.* xxv. c. 467, 472ff.

<sup>3</sup> Cp. *QUEST*, vol. iii., p. 148.

<sup>4</sup> The reader will of course remember, that this very passage in *Jeremiah* has also been used by the present writer (*QUEST*, vol. ii., pp. 81ff.) to explain the use of the man-fishing metaphor in the sayings of Jesus.

<sup>5</sup> Cp. the 'ocean of nations,' that is 'of pagans,' in the above-quoted commentary of Theodoret.

was 153. Indeed those who have written about the nature and properties of animals, those who have studied the *Halieutica* (fish-ing-books) as they are called, both in Latin and Greek—among whom the most learned is the Cilician poet Oppianus—say that there are exactly 153 kinds of fish,<sup>1</sup> and all these kinds were caught by the Apostles.

Similarly in the Oriental Church, Ephraim Syrus<sup>2</sup> says—obviously alluding to *Ezekiel* 47<sub>10</sub> :

*Out of the stream, whence the fishers came up, He was baptised and came up, Who encloseth all things in His net.*

How popular this allegorical interpretation of *Ezekiel* 47<sub>10</sub> must have been with early Christianity at large, can be seen from the fact that in more than one sanctuary Christian artists have represented the mystic Jordan full of aquatic animals and fishes and peopled with the angelic fishermen of *Matt.* 13<sub>47-49</sub>.<sup>3</sup>

Now, with the one exception of Jerome's explanation for the phrase "according to their kinds" in *Ezek.* 47<sub>10</sub> with regard to *Jn.* 21<sub>11</sub>, the whole above-quoted allegorisms are purely Jewish. I have already pointed out<sup>4</sup> that a spiritual interpretation of the 'living water'—

<sup>1</sup> Unhappily this quotation cannot be verified. The copious literature of ancient fishing-books mentioned in Athenæus is entirely lost, except the poem of Oppian, which does not contain anything of this kind and is indeed not really quoted by Jerome as his authority. The Church Father merely wants to 'show off' with the one name of a 'halieutic' author that he knows. The precious scrap of information itself is probably derived through some—may be even Christian—bestiary from another fishing-book. I need hardly say that my explanation of the number 153 in *Jn.* 21 (*QUEST.* vol. ii., p. 267) is by no means inconsistent with this, as I believe, quite trustworthy tradition, viz. that some ancient, and then of course pythagorising fishing-book estimated the total number of existing fish-species at 153. If the author of *Jn.* 21 knew this theory, he meant to say SIMON-ICHThYS matches with all the different kind of 'fishes' caught in the world-embracing net of the Church.

<sup>2</sup> *Select Works of Ephraim*, Morris, p. 16.

<sup>3</sup> Cp. the frieze running round the edge of the mosaic in the apse of S. Giovanni in Laterano (reprod. Wickhoff, *Roman Art*, London, 1900, p. 169) executed by Jacopo Torriti at the bidding of Pope Nicolas IV., the original of the picture being a mosaic of the 4th century B.C.; a similar frieze is in S. Maria Maggiore, and there exist drawings of lost mosaics of the cupola of S. Costanza—also from the 4th century, where like motives are displayed (cp. Eugène Müntz, *Revue Archeol.* (Nouv. Série), vol. xxxvi., 1878, pp. 272ff.).

<sup>4</sup> Cp. *QUEST.* vol. iii., p. 163, n. 2.

the main subject of Ezekiel's vision—is frequently met with in later Jewish literature, and is indeed typical of the later strata of the Old Testament itself. As to the fishes representing the 'new' or regenerate righteous 'Israel of God,' everybody would have believed until quite lately that the comparison presupposes the well-known fish-symbolism of the early *Christian* Church. Fortunately, Dr. J. Scheftelowitz of Cologne, a younger Jewish scholar of uncommon erudition in comparative religions, has recently<sup>1</sup> succeeded in showing from hitherto neglected Rabbinic documents, that the fish living and breathing in the midst of the waters was quite a common symbol for the faithful Israelite, brought up and moving his whole life long in the waters of the sacred Law, as early at least as in the time of Rabban Gamaliel the Elder, who was the teacher of Paul and consequently a contemporary both of Jesus and of John.

Commenting upon the comparison in *Habakkuk* 1<sup>14</sup>, which I have analysed in a previous paper,<sup>2</sup> Rabbi Shemuel (beginning of the 3rd century A.D.) says for example :

Therefore are the sons of man compared here with the fishes : as the fishes of the sea die as soon as they come on the dry land, thus men perish as soon as they depart from the holy doctrine and the holy precepts.

Elsewhere we read :

The fishes grow up in the water, yet whenever a drop falls down from above they snap at it greedily, as if they could not swallow enough water from their water. Exactly so Israel grows up in the water of the sacred doctrine ; but whenever they hear a new interpretation of the Scriptures, they accept it eagerly, as if until then they had not heard any words of sacred teaching from their own fountain of water.

<sup>1</sup> *Arch. f. Rel. Wiss.*, 1911, xiv. 2ff., 321ff.

<sup>2</sup> QUEST, vol. ii., p. 82.



In the age of Hadrian this comparison must have been commonly understood, since it is applied as a matter of course by R. Akiba. At a time when the public exercise of the Jewish cult was severely prohibited, R. Akiba, being about to initiate his Jewish pupils into the study of the Law, was asked by one Pappos, whether he did not dread the Roman authorities. He answered with the following parable :

The fox saw the fishes swim to and fro in a river from fear of the fishermen's nets. He advised them to avoid the dangers of the water by coming up on the dry land, where the foxes would live in peace with them, as their ancestors had done in the days of Paradise. But the fish declined the proposition, saying that if they were threatened by persecutions even in the water how much more should they dread the dry land, which means certain death to them. And the same fate, said Akiba, would await the Jews, if they abandoned the life-giving water of the holy Torah.

And the famous commentary *Berešith Rabba* (ch. 97) reads :

As the Israelites are innumerable, even so are the fishes ; as the Israelites will never die out on the earth, the fishes will never die out in their element. *Only the son of a man named 'Fish' could lead Israel into the Land of Promise, namely Joshua ben-Nun (=Fish), a descendant of Joseph.*<sup>1</sup>

The great favour which the comparison of Israel with fishes must have enjoyed can be estimated by the fact that even the Targumim<sup>2</sup> have been influenced by

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *I. Chron.* 720-27. The descent from Joseph is mentioned here, because the Messiah, the re-born Joshua or—in the Greek version—Jesus will again be a 'ben-Joseph' ; in order to lead Israel into the Messianic Blessed Land, he will also have to be a 'ben-Nun,' a 'Son of Fish' or—quite as *bar-nasha*, 'son of man,' is in many places equivalent to the simple word 'man,' as *ben-bākār* is 'an ox,' *ben-zō'n* 'a sheep'—a 'Fish' himself. *This is beyond doubt the ultimate reason why Jesus the Nazarene is called the 'Fish' in the early Christian mystery-language.* Indeed the very Greek form *Iēsous* for Joshua is only chosen in order to imitate by the mystic *psēphos* 888 obtained through this spelling (cp. QURST, vol. ii., p. 267, n. 2), the equally peculiar Hebrew gematria of *Jehōshuah ben-Nun* = 555, and thus to make the name of the future Messiah really "a name which is above all names" (*Phil.* 29).

<sup>2</sup> The old Aramæan translations of the Scriptures, that were made for the purpose of public reading in the synagogues after the hieratic Hebrew language itself was no longer generally understood in Palestine.

its constant use. The blessing of Jacob on his grandsons Ephraim and Manasseh runs simply (*Gen.* 48<sub>16</sub>): "They shall be greatly multiplied in the midst of the earth." 'To multiply' is here *dāghah*, which is intimately connected with *dāgh*, *dāghah* ('fish') and *daghan* ('corn'). This coincidence is intentionally emphasised by the version of the *Targum Onkelos*, where the blessing is rendered: "May they be multiplied even as *the fishes of the sea*." On this version alone rests the Rabbinic theory<sup>1</sup> that the Israelites as descendants of Joseph are protected for ever against the 'evil eye,' because Jacob has called them 'fishes of the sea'; for as the fishes are covered by the water (= the Law) and therefore proof against the evil eye, even so are the Israelites protected against every such influence. In the kabbalistic *Zohar* there is a significant story of an astonishingly learned child who is being greatly admired by certain Rabbis. The mother therefore implores them to look on the boy with a *favourable* eye. He himself however says:

I do not mind the evil eye, for I am *the son of a mighty fish*, and fishes are proof against the evil eye. For Israel is compared in the blessing of Jacob to the fishes of the sea.

Even the Zodiacal Fishes are believed to signify that neither evil eye nor any star has power over Israel.

The pious students of the sacred Law are with special frequency compared to fishes:

As a fish delights in water, even so a master of scripture continually dives into the streams of balm, etc.<sup>2</sup>

The pupils of Rabbi Gamaliel the Elder were divided into four kinds of fish: into clean and unclean fish from the Jordan (=brackish water fishes) and fish from the Ocean, according to

<sup>1</sup> See the testimonia collected by J. Scheftelowitz, *l.c.*, p. 345f.

<sup>2</sup> *Midrash Tanhuma to Deut.* 532.

their low or high descent, and to the degree of their learning and quickness of understanding.<sup>1</sup>

All this new material which Dr. Scheftelowitz has placed at our disposal, enables us at last to *prove* an hypothesis which the present writer put forward as early as in 1908.<sup>2</sup> If the Baptist's comparison of the righteous with fruit-bearing trees is based on *Ezekiel* 47<sup>12</sup>, if he baptises in the 'unclean' Jordan water, because of his conviction derived from the same chapter, that the waters of the Arabah and the Dead Sea are *healed* in the Messianic time through a mystic influx from the sanctuary of God, *i.e.* through the living Word of God, through "righteousness flowing down like a stream" (*Amos* 5<sup>24</sup>) in order to restore the pure Law all over Israel and to heal even the worst and most hopeless corruption of those who are cursed with the curse of living in the salt land of the Arabah (*Jeremiah* 17<sup>3</sup>)—then he could not avoid interpreting also the numerous fish in Ezekiel's life-giving stream, as signifying, according to popular Rabbinic symbolism, the truly pious Israelites in their life-element, the sacred waters of the divine Torah.

If it was really the main idea of John's baptism<sup>3</sup> that not only the Gentiles but also the sons of Israel have to 'turn back' from the ways of wickedness and regain their forsaken birthright as sons of Abraham by being reborn through a regenerating baptism as true Israelites, because they "have abandoned God the fountain of living water" (*Jeremiah* 2<sup>13</sup>)—what could be more natural than that John should have called the unregenerate pagan-like Jews an 'offspring of vipers,'<sup>4</sup> reserving the honorific name of 'fishes' for those

<sup>1</sup> *Aboth de R. Nathan*, ch. 40.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. 'Die Taufe des Johannes,' *Südd. Monatshefte*, 1908, nr. 12.

<sup>3</sup> Cp. QUEST, vol. iii., pp. 160f.

<sup>4</sup> Cp. QUEST, vol. iii., p. 159.

repentant ones that have been 'reborn from the water'<sup>1</sup>? even as Tertullian<sup>2</sup> contrasts his adversary, the heretic woman, as a 'viper' with the little innocent 'fishes' swimming in the baptismal font of the Church?

As the serpent can slough his old skin, so should the 'generation of vipers' strip themselves of their old *ego* by drowning it in the Jordan; then—just as the Rabbis believed that fish can originate spontaneously (through what we would call a *generatio æquivoca*) in water,<sup>3</sup>—would they be reborn as *true Israelites*, as *fishes*, who could henceforth live in water, in "the place of life for the fish,"<sup>4</sup> that is to say in the true Law of God. As to the many fishermen standing on the banks of the Messianic river, John has certainly explained them, as Jerome did a few centuries afterwards, as identical with the Messianic fishers and hunters of *Jeremiah* 16<sup>16</sup> and with the powerful fishers in *Habakkuk* 1<sup>15</sup>—those same idolatrous ones, who vainly try, by means of a heathenish magical rite,<sup>5</sup> to discharge their sins on the innocent fish in the streams of their land: God will make *them* like the fish of the sea, by overflowing them with the mystic water from his sanctuary; after that he will send the fishers, who "take all of them with the hook, who catch them in their net and gather them in their drag," the fishers, who shall fish them from out of the 'ocean of the heathen,' from out of all the lands whither the Divine wrath has driven them. For they are not hid from God's face, neither is their iniquity concealed from His eyes.

<sup>1</sup> *Jn.* 35. In the formula "reborn from the water and the spirit," the second half is the characteristic *Christian modification* of the Baptist's theory. Cp. QUEST, vol. iii., p. 156 n. 4.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. QUEST, vol. i., p. 643.

<sup>3</sup> Treatise *Chulin* 63b., *Midraš Rabba* to Lament., p. 58. Cp. also the so-called *Jozzer* prayer for the New Moon Sabbath.

<sup>4</sup> *Aboda Zara*, 40a.

<sup>5</sup> Cp. QUEST, vol. iii., p. 158 n. 1.

And the final result of all these disquisitions? We know that Jesus underwent the baptism of John, and that he never thought of instituting another different baptism of his own.<sup>1</sup> We know further that no authentic saying of Jesus connects the figure of the fish or the fisherman with the baptismal rite instituted by John. On the other hand, no Rabbinic saying has ever been discovered in which the Pharisaic 'baptism of the Proselytes' is described as a 'fishing of man.' If therefore we find as early as in *Matt.* 17<sub>24</sub>—that is under the reign of Domitian—the newly baptised Christian spoken of as '*a fish that cometh up from the water*,<sup>2</sup> there is, as far as I can see, only one explanation for this fact and for the whole fish-symbolism in the Christian initiatory rite: namely, that *this allegorical way of speaking has been taken over, together with the baptism of repentance itself, from the school or rather sect of John* into the 'Christian' Church by such teachers as Apollōs from Alexandria, Andrew bar-Jonah, the brother of Simon Peter, and John bar-Zabdai, who are represented in our sources (*Acts* 18<sub>25</sub>, *Jn.* 1<sub>35</sub>), as having been *disciples of the Baptist* before they discovered the 'mightier one,' who was to come after John, in the humble person of Jesus the Nazarene.

ROBERT EISLER.

(A paper on 'The Second Noah and the Triple Baptism of the Last Days' is to follow.—ED.)

<sup>1</sup> See the proofs offered by Conybeare in the *Zeitschr. f. N. T. Wiss.*, 1902, for the theory that the original text of *Matt.* 28<sub>19</sub> was only "Go ye therefore and *teach* all nations in my name," and did *not* contain the manifestly later words "baptising them in the name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost."

<sup>2</sup> *QUEST*, vol. ii., pp. 91-94.

# THE SIGHT OF THE SOUL.

## AN ESSAY IN CHRISTIAN MYSTICISM.

H. STANLEY REDGROVE, B.Sc. (LOND.), F.C.S.

THE mystic seeks to discover God within the hidden ground of his soul, and to discern the spiritual significance of the things of nature and sensuous experience. He seeks for God and the spiritual, not merely as logical postulates or the necessary hypotheses of a rational theory of the cosmos, but as actual facts of experience. As Prof. Pringle-Pattison remarks :

Mysticism . . . appears in connection with the endeavour of the human mind to grasp the Divine essence or the ultimate reality of things, and to enjoy the blessedness of actual communication with the Highest. The first is the philosophical side of mysticism; the second is its religious side. . . . The thought that is most intensely present with the mystic is that of a supreme, all-pervading, and indwelling power, in whom all things are one. . . . On the practical side, mysticism maintains the possibility of direct intercourse with this Being of beings . . . God ceases to be an object, and becomes an experience.<sup>1</sup>

Now, this is possible, the mystics assert, because, not only is there a sight of the body, but also a sight of the soul. The soul, if its eyes be opened, can see; and to this sight is God, immanent in man and in nature, most gloriously visible. The outward eye

<sup>1</sup> *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 11th ed., art. 'Mysticism.' Though that portion of Prof. Pringle-Pattison's definition which we have quoted above is quite satisfactory, it is only fair to state that Prof. Pringle-Pattison's attitude is hostile to Mysticism. Much of his criticism, however, is directed against what has been termed 'the negative way,' which is really a perversion of Mysticism.

beholds only the things of the physical realm; the inward eye of the purified mystic perceives their spiritual meaning and the hand of the Divine Author of nature everywhere manifest.

The charge that Mysticism is opposed to reason, and that the majority of the mystics have been devotees of irrationality, guided only by their feelings, is an unjust one. It is, indeed, true that certain of the mediæval mystics of the Latin Church were not free from an unhealthy emotionalism; but it is manifestly unfair to blame Mysticism for the faults of a comparatively few mystics. As a matter of fact, it would be truer to say of Mysticism that it is the spirit of reason in religion—not, however, a cold, formal rationalism, a thing equally deplorable as an unhealthy emotionalism; but a spirit of rationality in which the heart joins forces with the head, and the feelings are given due place. The faith of the mystic is not founded upon the statements of other men, but on the facts of his own consciousness; his religion and his reason are indissolubly united. As Emerson well remarks: "When all is said and done, the rapt saint is found the only logician."<sup>1</sup> But there is, on the other hand, nothing so alien to the spirit of Mysticism as intellectual pride: the mystic bows his head to the divine revelation and receives with meekness divine instruction, for he knows that God is not divided against Himself and he realises that reason and revelation are one. His faith in the glorious revelation of the Christ is not based upon the assertions of other men that it is true and divine; and the rationality of his position must be admitted, for the mere force of an

<sup>1</sup> Ralph Waldo Emerson, *The Method of Nature*. (See the edition of Emerson's *The Conduct of Life, Nature, and other Essays*, edited by Ernest Rhys, 1908, p. 41.)

assertion is no criterion of its truth, nor does the truth of this revelation depend upon those historical evidences, which, valuable in another way, do not really touch the kernel of the matter. No! the mystic has faith in the revelation of the Christ, because he experiences its truth in his own soul; with him, faith has become reason and reason is turned into faith. "I will not make Religion for *God* : nor suffer any to make a Religion for *me*,"<sup>1</sup> wrote Benjamin Whichcote; and this is the humble, yet independent, attitude of every great mystic.

Of course, it can well be understood that such an attitude could not comfortably exist within the Latin Church. It is a matter of history that Rome has never regarded Mysticism with a favourable eye; the only Mysticism she has tolerated in her fold is an emasculated variety in which a blind following of so-called 'spiritual directors,' men in authority in the Church, is substituted for the belief that the light of God within the mind, manifesting itself in an enlightened reason and a free conscience, is the true guide in the life of the Christian mystic. We must look elsewhere for the free spirit of true Mysticism—amongst those early Greek Christian theologians, who so advantageously combined the philosophy of Plato with the religion of the Christ; or amongst the later mystics of Protestant times. Possibly, nowhere else (with the exception of the writings of Swedenborg) shall we find the excellency of true Reason, and its perfect harmony with Divine Revelation, so emphasised as in the works of that seventeenth century school of mystical divines (particu-

<sup>1</sup> Benjamin Whichcote, *Moral and Religious Aphorisms*. (See *The Cambridge Platonists, being Selections from the Writings of Benjamin Whichcote, John Smith and Nathanael Culverwel*, with Introduction by E. T. Campagnac, M.A., 1901, p. 67.)



larly Whichcote and Smith), called 'Latitudinarians' by their opponents, to whom their broad-minded spirit was displeasing, but now generally known as the 'Cambridge Platonists.' "Sir," wrote Whichcote to Tuckney, "I oppose not rational to spiritual, for spiritual is most rational";<sup>1</sup> and, again, in his discourse on *The Work of Reason*, he remarks:

Man is not at all settled or confirmed in his Religion, until his Religion is the self-same with the Reason of his Mind; that when he thinks he speaks Reason, he speaks Religion; or when he speaks religiously, he speaks reasonably; and his Religion and Reason is mingled together; they pass into one Principle; they are no more two, but one: just as the light in the Air makes one illuminated Sphere; so Reason and Religion in the Subject, are one Principle.<sup>2</sup>

Or as Smith puts it:

It's a fond imagination that Religion should extinguish Reason; whereas Religion makes it more illustrious and vigorous; and they that live most in the exercise of *Religion*, shall find their *Reason* most enlarged.<sup>3</sup>

Reason, the Cambridge Platonists rightly taught, is the very voice of God in the soul of man, and through it he may attain to a knowledge of Divine Truth. But this is not said of the perverted reason of the sinful man who is bound by the things of sense; but of the genuine reason of the virtuous soul, illumined by the light from the Source of all right Reason. "Reason *discovers* what is natural," writes Whichcote, "and Reason *receives* what is Supernatural."<sup>4</sup> Or as Culverwel (another of the same school) writes: "'Tis

<sup>1</sup> See *The Cambridge Platonists*, p. xxvii.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, p. 55.

<sup>3</sup> John Smith, *The Excellency and Nobleness of True Religion* (*ib.*, p. 186).

<sup>4</sup> Benjamin Whichcote, *Moral and Religious Aphorisms* (*ib.*, p. 67).

God that *plants Reason*, 'tis he, that *waters* it, 'tis he, that gives it an *increase*."<sup>1</sup>

John Smith, who greatly developed Whichcote's ideas, and is the clearest and most idealistic thinker of the whole school, definitely identified the purified and enlightened reason with the sight of the soul, and has many valuable passages on this point in his delightful *Discourse concerning the True Way or Method of Attaining to Divine Knowledge*, of which we quote the following, since the ideas expressed in them are so essentially true of all genuine Mysticism :

Were I indeed asked to define *Divinity* (he writes), I should rather call it *a Divine Life* than *a Divine Science* ; it being something to be understood by a *Spiritual sensation*, than by any *Verbal description*, as all things of Sense and Life are known by Sentient and Vital faculties. . . . Everything is best known by that which bears a just resemblance and analogie with it : and therefore the Scripture is wont to set forth a *Good life* as the *Prolepsis* and Fundamental principle of *Divine Science*. . . .

To seek our Divinity meerly in Books and Writings is *to seek the living among the dead* : we doe but in vain seek God many times in these, where his Truth too often is not so much *enshrin'd* as *entomb'd* : no ; *intra te quære Deum*, seek for God within thine own soul ; he is best discern'd *νοερᾷ ἐπαφῇ*, as *Plotinus* phraseth it, by an *Intellectual touch* of him : we must *see with our eyes*, and *hear with our ears*, and *our hands must handle the word of life*, that I may express it in *S. John's* words. "Ἐστὶ καὶ ψυχῆς αἰσθησίς τις, The Soul itself hath its sense, as well as the Body : and therefore *David*, when he would teach us how to know what the Divine Goodness is, calls not for *Speculation* but *Sensation*, *Tast and see how good the Lord is*. That is not the best and truest knowledge of God which is wrought out by the labour and sweat of the Brain, but that which is kindled within us by an heavenly warmth in our Hearts. . . .

But how sweet and delicious that Truth is which holy and

<sup>1</sup> Nathanael Culverwel, *An Elegant and Learned Discourse of the Light of Nature* (*ib.*, p. 298).

heaven-born Souls feed upon in their mysterious converses with the Deity, who can tell but they that tast it? When *Reason* once is raised by the mighty force of the Divine Spirit into a converse with God, it is turn'd into *Sense*: that which before was onely *Faith* well built upon sure Principles (for such our *Science* may be) now becomes *Vision*. We shall then converse with God  $\tau\hat{\omega}\ \nu\hat{\omega}$ , whereas before we convers'd with him onely  $\tau\hat{\eta}\ \delta\iota\alpha\nu\hat{o}\iota\alpha$ , with our *Discursive faculty*, as the *Platonists* were wont to distinguish.<sup>1</sup>

"Mysticism," wrote the late C. C. Massey, "is a peculiar vital apprehension of spiritual principles and energies, and of their functional operations in or through man and nature. It claims a certitude analogous to that of sensible experience, and usually designated 'intuitional.' Thought, in whatever province it is exercised, seeks to recover for consciousness the synthesis of its related elements; 'intuition' gives this synthesis immediately, and is a direct perception of truth in an organic and concrete unity."<sup>2</sup>

If we use the term 'reason' merely for the method of deductive logic, then it is true that intuition, that is, the sight of the soul, claims to transcend reason as a method of obtaining truth, but not (apart from the fact that deductive logic is necessarily limited by the premises at hand) in its results. In the truer use of the term 'reason,' however, as connoting, in Inge's words, "the logic of the whole personality," this is not true; for the real contrast is not between intuition and reason, but between intuition and outward sight, with the logic that is based thereon. Intuition is, indeed, not mere sensuous reason, neither is it irrational feeling, but a synthesis of the highest reason and the highest feeling, in which spiritual truth is experienced as a living fact.

<sup>1</sup> *Ib.*, pp. 80, 81 and 98.

<sup>2</sup> *Thoughts of a Modern Mystic: A Selection from the Writings of the late C. C. Massey*, edited by Sir W. F. Barrett, F.R.S. (1909), p. 136.

That 'intuition' is a real power of the soul, is not only the assertion of all genuine Mysticism, but is attested by all that is truly valuable in Art. For all genuine art is the manipulation of the symbols of nature and experience so that their spiritual meaning may be blazoned forth; and this can be accomplished only in virtue of a perception (whether conscious or sub-conscious) of this meaning by the artist who manipulates them. To this extent all genuine artists must also be mystics: they must taste of the vision—the vision of God in the soul, of the spiritual in the natural;—else they cannot give of the fruits of this vision to humanity at large. To him who would be true artist, there must come, as to Wordsworth:

. . . . a sense sublime  
Of something far more deeply interfused,  
Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,  
And the round ocean and the living air,  
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man;  
A motion and a spirit, that impels  
All thinking things, all objects of all thought,  
And rolls through all things.

He must experience that 'blessed mood'—

In which the affections gently lead us on,—  
Until, the breath of this corporeal frame  
And even the motion of our human blood  
Almost suspended, we are laid asleep  
In body, and become a living soul:  
While with an eye made quiet by the power  
Of harmony, and the deep power of joy,  
We see into the life of things.<sup>1</sup>

We have spoken of the inward consciousness of spiritual truth given by the intuitive power of the soul as vision, and thus is it rightly denominated as an

<sup>1</sup> William Wordsworth, *Lines composed a few miles above Tintern Abbey*, 1798 (see *The Shorter Poems of William Wordsworth*, edited by Ernest Rhys, 1907, pp. 36 and 35).

immediate perception of divine verity. But generally the term 'vision' has a somewhat different significance, and is used to denote such experiences as those of Suso, of whom we read that he beheld Mary and her Holy Child and knelt himself in adoration, and of the many other mystics who have claimed to have seen the forms of angelical beings. Such visions may be usefully distinguished from the inward perception of spiritual truth. The desire for the inward enlightenment of the soul, for the guidance of the Spirit in mind and heart, is one of which all must approve and to which all ought to aspire; but the longing for visions, during this earthly life, of the inhabitants of spiritual realms, or of our Divine Saviour as he appeared on earth,—which is a wish for 'form' rather than 'substance' with respect to spiritual verity,—to say nothing of the attempt to produce such visions by artificial means, generally, if not always, proves psychologically disastrous; and has been, as a matter of fact, universally condemned by the great Christian mystics of the past. But at the same time, we think, no fundamental distinction, no hard and fast line of demarcation should be drawn between the two types of vision as actually experienced. Spontaneous visions of spiritual beings may be as genuine and as much the result of the sight of the soul as the interior perception of Divine Truth, for such visions are not given to man by God save only when they have a mission of Truth to tell. Truth is still, in itself, one and the same, though it may be expressed in various forms, or in a manner that almost transcends form, save in the most spiritual sense of the term; a vision may still be *true*, and therefore *real*, even though expressed in a symbolic manner.

But this, of course, can by no means be asserted

of all such visions. Indeed, the great mystics have always recognised the fact that visions, apparently of spiritual beings, may be quite illusory, and have never assigned to them any such importance as one would gather from some of the statements of Mysticism's opponents. Such phenomena, then, whatever their value, are to be classed amongst the non-essentials so far as the claim to the title of 'mystic' is concerned. The cautious attitude of Fénelon in his *Maxims of the Saints* is largely characteristic of the great Christian mystics. He writes :

In the history of inward experience, we not unfrequently find accounts of individuals whose inward life may properly be characterised as *extraordinary*. They represent themselves as having extraordinary communications ;—dreams, visions, revelations. Without stopping to inquire whether these inward results arise from an excited and disordered state of the physical system or from God, the important remark to be made here is, that these things, to whatever extent they may exist, *do not constitute holiness*.

The principle, which is the life of common Christians in their common fixed state, is the principle which originates and sustains the life of those who are truly "*the pure in heart*," namely, the principle of *faith working by love*,—existing, however, in the case of those last mentioned, in a greatly increased degree. . . .

Again, the persons who have, or are supposed to have, the visions and other remarkable states to which we have referred, are sometimes disposed to make their own experience, imperfect as it obviously is, the guide of their life, considered as separate from and as above the written law. Great care should be taken against such an error as this. God's word is our true rule.

Nevertheless, (Fénelon continues) there is no interpreter of the Divine Word like that of a holy heart. . . . A holy soul, in the exercise of its legitimate powers of interpretation, may deduce important views from the Word of God which would not otherwise be known ; but it cannot add anything to it.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Archbishop Fénelon, *The Maxims of the Saints* (Allenson's 'Heart and Life' Booklets, No. 16), pp. 16 and 17.

In the main, we shall probably all agree with this. Great caution on this subject was most necessary, when fanatical persons declared views quite opposed to Divine Truth and Goodness, on the strength of revelations they affirmed to have been granted them; and the same remark holds good of the present time. The true vision of the mystic proves, not disproves, the Revelation of Jesus Christ; it expounds, not attempts to confound, the true teachings of Holy Writ.

A full treatment of the question of seership is hardly possible in the present state of fragmentary knowledge; some further brief remarks on the subject, however, may not be out of place. And, firstly, we would define a 'subjective' vision as one which is true only for its percipient; an 'objective' vision as one which is true for all men; the usual definitions of these terms by the use of such expressions as 'internal' and 'unreal,' on the one hand, and 'external' and 'real,' on the other hand, involving an obscurity of thought introduced by the tacit assumption of the truth of the materialistic hypothesis. The snakes of *delirium tremens* are in the first category (*i.e.* that of subjective visions), and we rightly say that the dipsomaniac is deluded, because the terrors he beholds, although perfectly real for him, are non-existent so far as the normal person is concerned: in a word, they exist only in the mind or imagination of the sufferer. On the other hand, when the psalmist declares that "The earth is the Lord's, and the fulness thereof,"<sup>1</sup> we rightly say, not that he is deluded, but that he is inspired; for his vision is true, not for himself alone, but for all who can see aright;—it exists not only in his

<sup>1</sup> *Psalm 24*, v. 1.

mind, but in the Mind of God. Between these two extremes lie visions of every degree of subjectivity and objectivity; visions, more or less truth-telling, more or less symbolic, in which both elements are blended together in varying proportions.

Now, a man's percepts of the things of the material world depend as much upon his physical sense-organs as upon the things sensed. This is evident from the fact that what is called the 'same' object appears different as perceived by the different sense-organs—thus, the look of a thing is utterly different from the taste of it, and this, again, utterly different from the feel of it. Or if we confine ourselves to one sense-organ, say the sight, we know that the appearance of objects depends very largely upon the condition of the eye, and its sensitiveness to the various rays of light. From this fact, in virtue of the laws of analogy, we might conclude that a similar principle of relativity holds good in the case of spiritual perception, spiritual verities appearing different according to the condition of the soul or state of mind of him who perceives. We are not, however, left to depend merely upon the principle of analogy for this conclusion; that it is a fact is in many ways abundantly evident. Thus, both the true scientist and the true artist perceive a fundamental unity or harmony underlying the apparent multiplicity of natural phenomena, and the unity of which they are conscious is essentially one and the same; but it appears, speaking generally, under quite different forms in the two cases. Or, to take a somewhat different example, we have evidence of the same principle of relativity in spiritual perception, in the fact that, whilst a good man sees moral truth as it really is, *i.e.* as it exists in the Mind of God, an evil



man beholds all spiritual things inverted—to him, falsities appear as truths, and evil things as good and greatly to be desired.

It will be generally admitted that the emotional type of mind is one exceedingly given to beholding things in a wrong perspective, of tincturing its percepts, as it were, with the colours of its own nature. The emotional type of mind, more than any other, projects itself into the things upon which it gazes, not infrequently distorting and exaggerating certain aspects of the same. Now, it is very largely mystics of a rather emotional type of mind that claim to have experienced visions of angelical beings and other visions of this type; the more purely intellectual mystics do not, as a rule, assert that they have been vouchsafed experiences of this nature. This is easy to understand if it be admitted, and we think it must be admitted, that, whilst there is an objective spiritual verity underlying many such visions, their form is largely subjective, and derived from the seer's own stock of ideas. This seems to be the most satisfactory theory regarding the nature of the majority of such of these visions as can be called genuine. They possessed a reality for the percipients beyond that which they can have for us; by which we mean, not that they may not have had their origin in objective spiritual verity, but that the relation between this objective reality and the vision as it actually appeared to the seer was one depending upon his mental nature; with the result that, in many cases, the form of such visions is largely symbolical and even fantastically so.

There are further considerations, however, which may cause us to place a not inconsiderable number of so-called visions of spiritual beings in what may be

termed a lower category. No genuinely idealistic system of philosophy can admit the possibility of physical causation—using the term ‘causation’ in its strictest meaning, and not simply as implying mere concomitance in time or place. But that there is *apparent* causation of this nature, that the things of the spiritual or mental world are not wholly unaffected by the things of the material world, is most evident. It is evident, for example, from the fact of sensation. But the material bodies which are said to give rise to sensations corresponding to them in the mind are not the *causes* of these sensations in the strictest sense of the word—the sensations, to speak in common language, are not made of the ‘matter’ of these bodies. We may, perhaps, be allowed to speak of man’s spirit as flowing into his body, and we may then say that this influx is modified according to the changes in state of the nerves and brain,—which changes in state are induced by such material bodies as are sensed,—and that these modifications in influx or variations in states of consciousness, which are really *caused* by the energy of the inflowing spirit, though modified according to the receptacle in which it is received, are what constitute sensations. At any rate, we shall be agreed that whilst incarnated our material bodies are not negligible factors in our lives.

We venture to suggest, therefore, that it will be in no wise a departure from a true Idealism, to maintain that an unhealthy and unnatural condition of the physical body is very liable to give rise to ‘visions’ of an entirely delusive nature. And that many recorded experiences of alleged appearances of spiritual beings were of this type, is a fact that was by no means unrecognised by the great mystics of the past. As to

asceticism<sup>1</sup> it must suffice here to remark: (i.) that it was largely practised in an extreme form by the mediæval mystics (*e.g.* Suso) of the Latin Church; (ii.) that since (like the opposite evil, *viz.* debauchery) it is contrary to Nature, which true Mysticism declares is the expression and manifestation of the Divine Mind, it must inevitably result in unhealthiness and an unnatural state of the physical man—two facts which warn us to be extremely cautious of setting too high a value upon the visions of many of the Roman Catholic mystics. And, of course, the same caution is necessary in dealing with the alleged visions of other mystics given to extremes of asceticism.

Moreover, we must here take into account the workings of the sub-conscious self. There cannot, we think, be much doubt that many of the so-called visions and auditions of modern clairvoyants and clairaudients (that is, of the minority who are not in the category of deliberate cheats and impostors) are merely the products of their sub-conscious selves; and the same, no doubt, holds good of some of the visions of the mystics of the past. Of course, it may be said that all visions are the products of the sub-conscious self, the sight of the soul being a 'faculty' of that self. Our present reference, however, is, not to those visions which are the perceptions of objective spiritual verity by means of a sub-conscious power, but to those pseudo-visions whose whole substance, as well as their form, is derived from the sub-conscious self. A modern case of this sort is recorded in a book published in 1909 under the title of *The Maniac*, a work purporting to be a study of acute mania from the standpoint of the sufferer—a woman—

<sup>1</sup> For some further remarks by the present writer on this subject, see a short article in *Morning Light* for August 6, 1910 (vol. xxxiii., pp. 880-882), entitled 'On Pleasure and Asceticism.'

journalist in this case. The voices which she heard, and which she treated as emanating from spirits other than herself, were, as she realised upon her recovery, due to fragments of her own sub-conscious self which acquired spurious personalities of their own—the result: dissociation of personality, that is, madness.

But after making all due allowances for the factors which produce delusion, there does remain a by no means unimportant residuum of cases which prove that to some souls have been vouchsafed visions of angelical beings<sup>1</sup> and of the spiritual world; and the materialistic contention that all such experiences have their origin in disease either of mind or body is as untenable as the credulous belief that none are of this nature.

The seership of Jacob Boehme, the inspired shoemaker of Goerlitz, calls for special mention. Boehme claimed, not to have beheld and conversed with spirits or angels, but to have seen into the interiors of Nature. He tells us that he never desired that any such mighty mysteries should be revealed to him; but “as it is the condition of poor lay-men in their simplicity,” he writes:

I sought only after the heart of Jesus Christ . . . and I besought the Lord earnestly for His holy spirit, and His grace, that He would be pleased to bless and guide me in Him; and take that away from me, which did turn me away from Him, and I resigned myself wholly to Him, that I might not live to my own will, but to His; and that He only might lead me and direct me: to the end, that I might be His child in His Son Jesus Christ.

In this my earnest Christian seeking and endeavour (he continues) the gate was opened unto me, that in one quarter of an hour I saw and knew more than if I had been many years together at an University; at which I did exceedingly admire, and I knew not how it happened to me; and thereupon I turned my heart to praise God for it.

<sup>1</sup> *I.e.*, “the spirits of just men made perfect.”

For I saw and knew the Being of all Beings, the Byss (the ground or original foundation), and Abyss (that which is without ground, or bottomless and fathomless); also the birth [or eternal generation] of the holy Trinity; the descent, and original of this world, and of all creatures, through the divine wisdom; I knew and saw in myself all the three worlds; namely, the divine, angelical, and paradisaical [world] and then the dark world; being the original of nature to the fire: and then thirdly, the external, and visible world, being a procreation, or extern birth; or as a substance expressed, or spoken forth, from both the internal and spiritual worlds. . . . I saw it (as in a great deep) in the internal, for I had a thorough view of the universe as in a CHAOS, wherein all things are couched and wrapt up, but it was impossible for me to explicate and unfold the same.

Yet it opened itself in me from time to time, as in a young plant: albeit the same was with me for the space of twelve years, and I was as it were pregnant (or breeding of it) with all, and found a powerful driving and instigation within me, before I could bring it forth into an external form of writing; which afterward fell upon me as a sudden shower, which hitteth whatsoever it lighteth upon; just so it happened to me, whatsoever I could apprehend, and bring into the external [principle of my mind] the same I wrote down.

However, afterward the sun did shine on me a good while, but not in a continual constant manner; for when the same did hide itself, I scarce knew, or well understood my own labour [or writings] so that, man must acknowledge that his knowledge is not his own, or from himself, but God's and from God; and that God knoweth [or manifests the ideas of His wisdom] in the soul of man after what manner and measure He pleaseth.<sup>1</sup>

That a subjective element entered largely into Boehme's visions seems evident from the form in which they are expressed in his works, which borders at times upon the fantastical; though it might be argued that they were not, perhaps, actually experienced in this form, but merely expressed therein afterwards,

<sup>1</sup> Jacob Boehme, *Epistles* (J. E.'s translation, Epistle II., §§6-11, 1886 reprint, pp. 29 and 80).

—certainly, the inspired shoemaker, as he himself tells us in the passage already quoted, experienced great difficulty in giving his experiences outward expression. Boehme was of an emotional temperament, much given to rhapsodising, and, in spite of the many most precious jewels of thought and feeling to be found in his works, there is also a not inconsiderable quantity of what may be termed clay. But after all has been said that can justly be said in criticism of Boehme, the fact remains that his works do contain these jewels, and that from an uneducated cobbler, Boehme became one of the greatest and most spiritual exponents of Christian Mysticism of his own or any other day. That he did experience an inward spiritual enlightenment and that his visions did involve a valuable element of objective spiritual verity, seem beyond reasonable doubt.

The case of Emanuel Swedenborg is, in many respects, even more remarkable and of even greater importance. We have said that most of the mystics who claimed to have experienced visions of spiritual beings were of a rather emotional type of mind—the seership of Sweden's great mystic-philosopher constitutes a striking exception to this generally valid generalisation. Like Boehme, Swedenborg<sup>1</sup> sought not for visions of spiritual beings, and like him also, he had from his earliest age a profound faith in the Christian religion as he then understood it. But unlike Boehme, he was of an intellectual type of mind, a practical scientist and a practical politician, with a European reputation for his learning. Ardently he sought for the soul analytically, hoping to discover it

<sup>1</sup> The humility of both Boehme and Swedenborg, their entire lack of intellectual pride, is a further point of resemblance well worth noticing.

by physiological investigations—until the vision came and he laid aside this work for a still higher calling. Other seers have claimed to have experienced more or less brief and fleeting visions of things spiritual; Swedenborg asserts that his spiritual sight was opened by God and that he enjoyed constant communication with the spiritual realm—with devils as well as angels—during the space of many years, whilst in full possession of those keen mental powers which warrant us to say of him, that no type of mind could be imagined better qualified to see things in a right perspective. Together with these ‘outward’ visions came also the inward spiritual enlightenment of his mind, whereby their meaning became plain to him. Thus, in his work on *Heaven and its Wonders and Hell* he writes :

It has been permitted me to associate with angels, and to talk with them as man with man; and also to see what is in the heavens, and what is in the hells, and this for thirteen years; and to describe them from things seen and heard.<sup>1</sup>

Elsewhere he says :

The Lord manifested himself before me his servant . . . and afterwards opened the sight of my spirit, and so let me into the spiritual world, permitting me to see the heavens and the hells, and also to converse with angels and spirits, and this now continually for many years, I attest in truth.<sup>2</sup>

And of the *doctrines* of the New Church that was to be established—the Church consisting in the mystic union of those who worship the Lord God in spirit and truth, who walk in the path of righteousness, seeking, not for self, but for the good of others,—he writes in the same place: “I have never received anything

<sup>1</sup> Emanuel Swedenborg, *Heaven and its Wonders and Hell*, §1 (Rev. J. R. Rendell's translation).

<sup>2</sup> Emanuel Swedenborg, *The True Christian Religion*, § 779.

relating to the *doctrines* of that church from any angel, but from the Lord alone, while I was reading the Word." Swedenborg most vividly realised that momentous truth, which he so often explicitly teaches, that all good and all truth is of God and from God alone. No man can speak that which is true, nor do that which is good, unless, in the very widest and grandest meaning of the word, he is inspired from the Divine Source of all good and truth.

But to return to the question of Swedenborg's seership. What is, perhaps, most remarkable is that he is the one seer for whose claims there is satisfactory external evidence. But valuable though such evidence undoubtedly is, from the standpoint of Mysticism, it is only of comparatively secondary importance. It is in the essential rationality of Swedenborg's system, in its appeal to mind and heart, that the final proof of the objective spiritual reality of his visions will be found. It is by the light of reason or divine inspiration (whichever one likes to call it), that truth is gained, neither by blind faith nor by the appeal to external authority. The true authority is the light of God within.

We may now conclude this necessarily brief discussion of a very great subject with a quotation from Swedenborg which has an important bearing on the question of 'the sight of the soul.' It has reference to the state of those beatified souls who are termed the 'celestial angels,' and who are wholly united to God, in virtue of a perception of their utter dependency upon Him for all the good that they are and all the truth that they know. *They* are in full conscious possession and use of that power which we have termed 'intuition' or the 'sight of the soul,' a power which



bears fruit in exact proportion to the degree of divine union (or moral purification) that the soul has attained.

Divine truths (writes Swedenborg) appear, as it were, inscribed on [the celestial] angels, or as if they were implanted and innate ; and therefore as soon as they hear genuine Divine truths, they immediately acknowledge and perceive them, and afterwards see them, as it were, inwardly in themselves. Because the angels of the third heaven [*i.e.* the celestial heaven] are such, they never reason about Divine truths, still less do they dispute about any truth, whether it is so or not so ; nor do they know what it is to believe or to have faith ; for they say, what is faith ? for I perceive and see that it is so. They illustrate this by comparisons, for example, that it would be as when anyone with a companion should see a house and the various things in it and around it, and should say to his companion that he must believe that these things are, and that they are such as he sees : or as if anyone should see a garden with its trees and fruits, and should say to his companion that he ought to have faith that there is a garden, and that there are trees and fruits, when yet he sees them plainly with his eyes. Hence it is that those angels never mention faith, nor have any idea of it ; neither do they reason about Divine truths still less dispute concerning any truth, whether it is so, or not so. But the angels of the first or lowest heaven have not Divine truths thus inscribed on their interiors, because with them only the first degree of life is opened ; therefore they reason concerning truths, and they who reason see scarcely anything beyond the immediate object about which they reason, or go beyond the subject, except to confirm it by certain things ; and when they have confirmed it, they say it is a matter of faith, and that it ought to be believed.<sup>1</sup>

It is this celestial state of wisdom—never, probably, achieved, save only partially, in this life—to which the mystic aspires ; and if he walk in the true way thereto, the way of self-sacrifice and love to God and fellow-men and women, who dares to proclaim his a foolish and a fruitless quest ?

H. STANLEY REDGROVE.

<sup>1</sup> Emanuel Swedenborg, *Heaven and its Wonders and Hell*, § 270 (Rev. J. R. Reudell's translation).

## THE MEANING OF NATURE.

A. R. HORWOOD

ALL nature is an allegory of life. Everywhere around us we see humanity, its strength and weakness, portrayed in the natural things we touch and see. The forest with its shade and dark depths tells of obscurity, abortive effort, the deeds of darkness. The open plain is eloquent of acts of brilliance, perspicacity, honesty, and fairness; and though its level is lowly it is free from the pride of the heights. The fountain tells of mirth and joyfulness, though Lucretius says :

*Medio de fonte leporum*

*Surgit amari aliquid, quod in ipsis floribus angat.*<sup>1</sup>

The valley shows the depths, the hills, the mountains, the heights of human thought, of human deeds of ideals lost and won :

See the mountain kiss high heaven,  
And the waves clasp one another.

The ocean labours to unfold its burthen of unfathomable forgiveness, forgetfulness. Into it all streams carry mud, as well as precious principles from the heights above :

Behold the sea,  
The opaline, the plentiful and strong,  
Yet beautiful as is the rose in June,  
Fresh as the trickling rainbow of July;  
Sea full of food, the nourisher of kinds,  
Purger of earth, and medicine of men ;

<sup>1</sup> " Full from the fount of joy's delicious springs,  
Some bitter o'er the flowers its bubbling venom flings."  
(trans. Byron.)

Creating a sweet climate by my breath,  
Washing out harms and griefs from memory,  
And in my mathematic ebb and flow,  
Giving a hint of that which changes not.

The face of the sky, with its manifold aspects, the clouds of rain or sunshine, depicts the mind of man, in calm, in storm, in wrath or retribution, in love or mirth. Ruskin describes it as

Sometimes gentle, sometimes capricious, sometimes awful, never the same for two moments together; almost human in its passions, almost spiritual in its tenderness, almost divine in its infinity.

The clear ether that envelopes Earth, as in a belt, gives life, through the ozone it contains, and in this same ether there is a mysterious magnetic force, electricity, or the like, that gives to the atom or ion its power of cohering, holding together. Take this inevitable something away and matter itself would vanish, resolving itself into but ultimate irresolvable ions, and would vanish as a mist in the early morn. So in the soul of man breathes an upholding power, the spirit, which unifies, sustains, and vivifies. Madame de Staël well describes the soul, the personality, in these terms:

The soul is a fire that darts its rays through all the senses; it is in this fire that existence consists; all the observations and all the efforts of philosophers ought to turn towards this **ME**, the centre and moving power of our sentiments and our ideas.

Here, in the ether, the forces of matter and of spirit are portrayed in force or essence, interchangeable, alike in origin, alike in ultimate essential elements.

Space itself is but a materialised localisation of the illimitable boundary of human possibilities. In its unfathomable territory all the unsearchable wisdom of the universe, all the potentialities of the individual

find their closest parallel. In its unity it unites the ego, in its diversity the non-ego, of man. Both are one as love :

Love is that orbit of the restless soul  
Whose circle grazes the confines of space,  
Bounding within the limits of its race  
Utmost extremes.

In the eccentricities of the atmosphere, the caprice of the air, all man's foibles and traits of character are faithfully copied. Or do we imitate Nature, now from instinct, as at first our prototype worshipped the elements, and so unconsciously imbibed by their study a measure of their nature or the characteristics of diversity? If so, man laid hold of the diversity of the Cosmos in his infancy, and in so doing the unity of the eternal system was obscured. Hence now, in his mature age, he cherishes the older primitive echoes of the truth, which unity in the sovereignty it demands of him, impatiently, importunately beseeches him to admit. The rain supplies a symbol of the gracious flow of tears of penitence or grief :

Be still, sad heart, and cease repining,  
Behind the clouds the sun is shining ;  
Thy fate is the common fate of all,  
Into each life some rain must fall,  
Some days must be dark and dreary !

As in the pure well of human sorrow all inequalities, all hardness, are smoothed away, leaving the heart soft and open to be influenced, so does the luscious rain prepare the ground in which the little seed may germinate in the warmth of the succeeding sunshine in the bright days to come. So, too, like summer sunshine is the smile of pleasure on the face of innocence. Where fails the picture? In her moods

and graces Nature is intensely human. If this be so, are our deeply ingrained anthropomorphic preconceptions so unwarranted? In the crash of the thunder, the swift passing of the illuminating lightning, the fury of the accompanying storm is the counterpart of human tragedy, when home, name, or fortune are wrecked or threatened by a single *coup de main*:

The thunder,  
Wing'd with red lightning and impetuous rage,  
Perhaps hath spent his shafts, and ceases now  
To bellow through the vast and boundless deep.

And in her waywardness or Fortune's vagaries we find life's comedy again portrayed. Nature is so full of incongruities, so bizarre at times, so humorous. As, too, she clothes the earth at times in the purest of ermine coats with snow, so is our earthliness transformed by some deep and powerful change, which sanctifies to comeliness. What can the sun symbolise, but the source of life, of light, of joy, of love, nay all that is, that matters:

The sun, centre and sire of light,  
The keystone of the world-built arch of heaven.

The stars shine forth as so many illuminating principles in the dark shadowy way of life, as they beautify and make clear the night:

One sun by day, by night ten thousand shine,  
And light us deep into the Deity.

How boundless in magnificence and might! Their magnitude, their wonderful system, and order; the existence of other worlds, other suns and moons than ours, serve only to show that ours is not a stray chance system in a large ordered system. Our microcosm, our unity or order is but eloquent of a wider universal system of order. So also the moon rising in obscurity,

sickly pale, but beautiful, tells us that the night of darkness is but the prelude, the forerunner of a brighter glorious morrow, illumined by the sun :

Day glimmer'd in the east, and the white moon  
Hung like a vapour in the cloudless sky.

And how fair is the aspect of dawn, day's messenger !  
Then in the early flutterings of wings, the songs of birds, the voice of the gods is heard with deep insistence at our gates, our hearts, in the eloquence of the human mind and heart whose deep chords are touched by the beauty of this loveliest phenomenon of Nature, Dawn :

Hail, gentle dawn ! mild blushing goddess, hail !  
Rejoicèd I see thy purple mantle spread  
O'er half the skies : gems pave thy radiant way,  
And orient pearls from every shrub depend.

Hither, in the first flush of orient light at dawn's birth, rushed the fire-god to earth, bringing hope again—man's soul, or fire its emblem. So in the earliest beauty of life's day man's highest feelings, highest mind, his mind touched by the spirit's magic impress, responds instinctively to the voice of dawn, the hour of earth's birth. It is to the dawn the poet's soul cleaves, as for light, and it is to the dawn he hurries with open arms when his task is done, when his life-work, his night of human striving is nigh closed :

We call those poets who are first to mark  
Through earth's dull mist the coming of the dawn :  
Who see in twilight's gloom the first pale spark,  
While others only note that day is gone.

This magic influence of the dawn draws all the earth-genius to its lap. Here all intellect worships at Minerva's shrine. The present is but a fulfilment of the past, the future the promise of the morrow.

The mineral realm is the quintessence of symmetry

as it signifies the crystallisation or assumption of form by vapour or instable matter.

*Ut natura dedit, sic omnis recta figura.*<sup>1</sup>

So it is a fitting simile for the realisation of a scheme or plans, the crystallisation of ideas or notions, the maturation of the visible from the invisible, the reduction of chaos to order. Moreover, do we not call certain stones gems? And what are gems but those very rare properties which embody brilliance, as the diamond, worth or excellence, as gold or pearls? In their extreme rarity do they not, too, repeat the characteristics of the human mind? What is true knowledge, but unattainable, and wisdom too, and are they not, like gems or crystals, only found in the bowels of the earth, only in certain veins or lodes?

Wisdom sits alone,

Topmost in heaven ; she is its light—its God ;

And in the heart of man she sits as high.

So is excellence as the sapphire, rubies, the opal, or topaz, superbly beautiful but rare. And what lends, moreover, added grace to the earliest hours of day but the gay flower-garden of Nature, earth's most beautiful symbol of all that is perfect, complete and unique—flowers. They help to illustrate in their choice variety of colour, form, and general loveliness all that is graceful, beautiful, and lovely in man, in woman, and not only in physical but intellectual beauty. What more fitting gift than flowers can we make to woman? To what can we liken the ruddy cheeks of youth or maiden more suitably than to the rose, queen of flowers? Why queen, except we see in the rose the highest, richest qualities, the attributes of woman? All the flowers are emblematic of some grace that mankind

<sup>1</sup> Every form as Nature made it is correct.

possesses, now developed in this, now in that individual. If the snowdrop signifies purity, the violet modesty, the daisy simplicity, we must allow to the rose all those likenesses to charms of person, symbolised in the delicate tints of the petals, the almost intoxicating aroma of the flower's breath, the depth of its whole beauty, the graceful outlines of its symmetry which are embodied in the human form divine. In a *Discourse of Flowers* Henry Ward Beecher writes :

Flowers have an expression of countenance as much as men or animals. Some seem to smile ; some have a sad expression ; some all pensive and diffident ; others again are plain, honest, and upright like the broad-faced sunflower and the hollyhock.

The trees speak to us of the fixedness of human aims, the stationary, prudent character of man's undertakings. The oak is redolent of strength, of the firmness, the age, the veneration, the worthiness of an ancient house, a venerable stock ; and we notice how it is the most unmoved the older it is, as its acorns spread afresh afar, whilst still an oak is the result of these in time :

The tall oak, towering to the skies,  
The fury of the wind defies,  
From age to age in virtue strong  
Inured to stand and suffer wrong.

In the rustling of the poplar leaves in the breeze we see the travail of human spirit and mind, the sigh of the human heart after the unattainable, the ideal, in perfect rhythm with the infinite. In the lofty towering of the pine, with its rugged dark needle-like foliage borne on branches lifted high as on the Olympic Mount, through which the wind whistles and moans, bearing sweet melody to the soul of poet, artist, or life's student (the philosopher), we read the flights which the mind



or soul makes toward the ideal, in the regions of esoteric thought or meditative reflection, or the realms of empiric philosophy.

'Tis night upon the lake. Our bed of boughs  
Is built where—high above—the pine-tree soughs,  
'Tis still—and yet what woody noises loom  
Against the background of the silent gloom !

And as the pine thrives, aloof, clustered on the barren heights of some craggy hillside, in lonely isolation, beautified by a background of the ethereal blue, so does the human spirit betake itself far from the madding crowd unto the hills, the heavenly heights, whither in solitude it may soar outward from earth, shaking far from it the force of {mundane gravity, its fetters. Here genius hastens on wings of the morning to live in the quiet fresh atmosphere of pure ether on the verge of the universe.

Then, again, all animal life is an exhibition of the characteristics of man, as it precedes him in progression, anticipating his cumulated characteristics individually. What is swifter than an eagle, more piercing in character than its fierce attack from a great height? Philomel is the embodiment of music in song, queen of song :

Where the nightingale doth sing  
Not a senseless tranced thing,  
But divine melodious truth.

What can be more instinct with motherhood than the partridge sitting close on her eggs or chicks beneath the mower's scythe? The poise of the swan's neck is the acme of grace. What human beast can vie with the lion for hunger and greed? Timidity and innocent harmlessness are personified in the deer, docility in the sheep, craft in the snake, and mischief in the monkey

or the magpie. The seasons themselves are symptoms of age, youth, prime, old age, decay, or health and vigour. Spring breathes of youth and infancy :

I come, I come ! Ye have called me long :  
I come o'er the mountain with light and song ;  
Ye may trace my step o'er the wakening earth  
By the winds which tell of the violet's birth,  
By the primrose-stars in the shadowy grass,  
By the green leaves, opening as I pass.

In its months are the beginnings of the bud, the courtship of birds, the promise of cattle. All is afire with energy and life. Love lingers long o'er these days. Life itself is filled with the rising of the sap, with an inflowing stimulus. Freshness characterises spring. The imagination is filled during this short interval with great longings, deep yearnings. It is but the vigour of life, eager to rush onward into prime, plentitude, manhood, womanhood. Now the metamorphoses of Nature begin their certain round :

There is no time like spring,  
When life's alive in everything.

Now begins the cycle of ephemeral entities. Now first the bi-lobed seed-leaf of the annual rears its head to quickly flourish ere the death-knell of winter clangs out again. Perpetual, perennial verdure puts on a fresh covering of immortal emerald green. Here and there the modest violet scents the hedgerows. The aconite has sown its seeds. The lesser celandine shoots forth its chiselled leaves, and its citron-tinted flowers adorn the shade, the meadow, or the bank wherever the clay holds its single-lobed seeds. These are the season's innocent months. Everything is unsophisticated, everything is pure. Only Nature has its way. What paints the colours of the flowers so

deep, so rich, so fresh a tint? No blue, no purple is so heavenly, so majestic as the violet then. No green is so rich, so full of life's promise, so bright as when the swelling buds of the larch are seen ; no crimson so full, so ruddy as in the cones of the larch. The bloom upon the breast of the robin or chaffinch is never so rich, so clear, so fresh as in these spring months. The black velvet of the rook's plumage is never so soft, so lustrous as in the months of spring :

Came the spring with all its splendour,  
All its birds and all its blossoms,  
All its flowers, and leaves, and grasses.

And then the summer, with its wealth of golden buttercups, the nesting of the birds, the flight of young, the journeyings to and fro of the ministers of song, the laying-up of store for the future, the ingathering of the hay, the ripening of the corn. Ah ! this is life in its fuller guise, when Nature endows all with the power to increase or to lay up for time of need :

All green and fair the summer lies,  
Just budded from the bud of spring,  
With tender blue of wistful skies,  
And winds which softly sing.

It is the season of greatest activity, as in man's prime, when the sun shines long and warm. Then the ocean depths are most transparent and clear, seas are purest blue like skies, and all is gay, all is joy, so seldom, but suddenly, as summer showers, come tears :

Life is so full ! Let us turn to autumn :  
Crown'd with the sickle and the wheaten sheaf,  
While autumn, nodding o'er the yellow plain,  
Comes jovial on.

In the return of the sap we see the arrest of the

vital activity of life. The sere tints of the leaves which adorn our England's woods and glades in autumn are but the ritual of Nature at the passing of maturity into quiescence. Summer, with all its loveliness, its charm, like life at its zenith, is fraught with all the dangers, the risks, the excess of being; and this over-being is seen in crops gone wrong or fruits broken ere they are ripe,—just as many a life of promise is wrecked in its prime by the seed of decay sown earlier by disease.

But autumn steadies, quietens, preserves, and with its still but rich beauty impresses a more permanent, more lasting beauty than summer. In the vital struggle between summer and autumn life is renovated, renewed, elevated, restored. Moreover it is in autumn that fruits ripen, even as after a summer of activity man's influence is felt in results for humanity or for him. Let it be for humanity! For our destiny, like the bee's, is altruism, but let it not be blind.

When the fruits are gathered, then comes winter with its coat of pure snow. So old age with venerable locks is an age when intellect is illumined by bright prophetic vision, as the atmosphere is brightest, clearest in winter after frost. So, too, chastened by life's storms and tempests, man in his old age or winter is sanctified, prepared after a year or season of activity, diverse and earthy at best, for a morrow to be ushered in by the next dawn, the dawn of another era, for him (our year) an æon of immortality.

So then as the seasons, so is life. A round of promise, work or fruit, and aftermath, and then just such another but a brighter, and a better round, as each year of ours is lived more usefully, more joyfully :

Autumn to winter, winter into spring,  
Spring into summer, summer into fall—  
So rolls the changing year, and so change we;  
Motion so swift, we know not that we move.

And just as the seasons simulate the phases of man's life-lesson, so then is all Nature, with its seasons, *an allegory of life*. If Nature, then, is a kaleidoscope of man's thoughts, his projects, his futilities and abilities, and man a recapitulation of Nature, then must Nature be the work of a divine author or kindred in Nature to man. It is to this end that all Nature works, its measure of the stature of perfection—God.

Nature is life materialised. Each soul is but as an element in the whole soul, not a perfect recapitulation of the Infinite. Nature is a recapitulation of life (human) with its limitations and life of the soul, whilst each soul is also part, a recapitulation of Nature and life also. The life-history or ontogeny of the individual is to phylogeny or race-history what life is to Nature. In a perfect Utopia life would recapitulate its source, and Nature would then be God. Now life and Nature include what is not God. Hence Nature is only an allegory of life, but what potentialities lie before her!

A. R. HORWOOD.

## ST. GEORGE THE MOON-GOD

PROF. J. JAVAKHISHVILI, of the University of  
St. Petersburg.

AT the end of my paper on 'The Folk-tales and Ancient Pagan Religion of the Georgians,' which appeared in the last number of *THE QUEST*, I ventured to state that:

In the beliefs of the Georgian people St. George occupies the place of the ancient Georgian national chief pagan deity—the Moon.

To convince the reader that this is the fact, it is sufficient to compare Strabo's description of the religious ritual of the Albani with the one still in use in Kakheti at the 'White George's' festival. Strabo writes:

The gods they [the Albani] worship are the Sun, Jupiter, and the Moon, but chiefly the Moon. She has a temple near Iberia. The priest is he who, next the king, receives the highest honours. He governs the sacred land, which is extensive and populous, and has authority over the sacred ministers, many of whom are divinely inspired and prophesy. If one of the latter becomes violently possessed, and wanders alone in the woods, he is seized by the priest, who, after binding him with sacred fetters, maintains him sumptuously for a year. He is then brought forth at the sacrifice in honour of the goddess, anointed with fragrant ointment and sacrificed together with other victims. The sacrifice is performed in the following manner. A man holding a sacred lance, with which it is the custom to sacrifice human victims, advances from the crowd and pierces the heart of the victim through the side; this he does with accuracy from experience in the office. When the victim has fallen, certain prognostications

are indicated by the manner of the fall, and these are publicly declared. The body is then carried away to a certain spot, where they all trample upon it, performing this rite as a mode of purification of themselves.<sup>1</sup>

Now the part of Albania near Iberia was a Georgian province with a Georgian population. Strabo says that the route leading from Albania to Iberia lay through the waterless and irregular land of Kambizene (Kambechiani).<sup>2</sup> The temple of the Moon situated near Iberia, according to the geographer, was thus certainly in Kakheṭi. This shrine was probably the chief Moon temple, for it is hardly possible that in all Albania, which occupied the extensive area between Iberia and the Caspian Sea, there was only one temple in honour of the supreme deity.

Let us now compare Strabo's description with the modern 'White George's' festival in Kakheṭi. In the village of Atskuri on August 14 (o.s.) a large crowd of pilgrims comes from Qartli, Kakheṭi, Qiziki and Tush-Pshaw-Khevsureṭi. They must all be at the appointed place in the evening. The crowd then makes the circuit round the church, three or seven times. They begin the procession from the western door, and move to the left, returning to the same door. The women walk at the head of the procession and the men follow them. They sing doxologies alternately: "Glory to God and Saint George. I am come to pray to Thee." At the first stroke of the church bell they all rush into the church. At that very moment one of White St. George's 'slaves' falls at the door of the western entrance, his head turned to the north, so that it is impossible to pass the threshold of the church without trampling on or stepping over his body. The

<sup>1</sup> *Geographica*, l. xi., cap. iii. 7.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, l. xi., cap. iii. 5.

priest first, and after him the rest, must trample upon his body, and the 'slave' must not protest, even if he suffers severe pain. After having gone round the church again, the crowd stands bare headed, in the precinct, and with great devotion looks at a dancing girl dressed in white who is also the 'slave' of St. George. The girl dances furiously; she moans as she dances, and finally she falls in convulsions.<sup>1</sup>

The priest is then surrounded in the enclosure of the church by the crowd of the faithful who have promised offerings to St. George. He burns the wool on the forehead of the animal and utters the prayer: "St. George, accept this offering from thy servant,"—adding the name of the giver. The deacon also stands there. He, too, is surrounded by the 'promisers' with chains on their necks in sign of their being 'slaves' of St. George. They have promised to be slaves for a certain time, and now they are come to the church to be discharged from their vows. The deacon cuts a piece of wool from the offerings, removes the chains from their necks, and thus they are discharged. Meanwhile girls dressed in white are walking in procession round the church; they all sing with their clear, sweet voices and at the same time they fix lighted candles on the walls of the sacred edifice, while one of them winds a cotton thread round the building. A fire also is kept burning in the enclosure during the whole night.

Nineteen centuries have passed away from the time when Strabo described the Moon-festival in Albania; since then the Georgian people have adopted first Mazdaism and then Christianity. These two religions have exercised a very deep influence upon the

<sup>1</sup> *Kavkaz*, 1878, nos. 229, 230, '*Grusinskie Narodnie prazdniki*'; also from private communications to the author by E. Zarapishvili, who saw and knew perfectly all these festivals and rites.



national spirit and thought of the people as well as upon all their customs; and yet, as we see from the White George rites, traces of a more ancient religion are almost fully preserved to the present day. Strabo tells us that the slaves of the Moon fell into ecstasy and prophesied; so also now the slaves of St. George, who have vowed themselves to his service, prophesy in the name of 'White George' and declare to the people the will of the deity. At evening, when the first stroke of the vesper bell is heard, one of these slaves falls at the door of the church and the people must trample upon him, and even if he suffers acutely, he must show no sign of protest. This slave, like all other slaves of St. George, wears a piece of wire round his neck. This wire now replaces the chain, for in Strabo's day the Moon-victims were bound with iron chains though they fed sumptuously for the whole year. According to E. Zarapishvili:

Even now there is an iron semicircle at the door of the church of White George. On both sides of this semicircle iron chains are suspended and they weigh more than a *poud* [36lbs. English]. The slaves put this yoke on their necks and let the chains hang down, and in this manner they either with slow steps or on their knees make the circuit of the church.

The falling of the slave at the church door signifies his symbolical death. He must not protest when people are trampling upon him, because he represents a sacrificed victim. And as in Strabo's time people trod on the victims to purify themselves, so now, too, they must trample upon the slave before entering the church. All this proves that the present-day custom is a symbolical representation of the ancient human sacrifice. The slaves who go round the church with the chains on their necks represent also the victims

to be sacrificed. As in Strabo's time, so now-a-days animal sacrifices also are offered to White George, but the chief priest of the Moon is now replaced by a Christian pope and his deacon. As in Strabo's time there was a virgin forest in the vicinity of the Moon-temple, so also, according to E. Zarapishvili, in the neighbourhood of White George's church there were still some years ago sacred trees to which people lighted candles and brought offerings of cakes. "The trees died and fell down within my recollection," he writes. Moreover the church of White George is built on the top of a high mountain.

That the White George holiday above described is but a survival of the ancient pagan religion is also proved by the fact, that the sacrifice of victims, the prophesying, etc., begin on August 14 (o.s.) in the evening, and last the whole night. On the White George holiday the chief observance is to pass the whole night without sleeping. As this festival is a lunar holiday, the Moon appearing in the evening and hiding herself at dawn, the rite takes place in the evening. As is well known, on August 15 the Christian Feast of the Assumption also takes place, but, nevertheless, in the village of Atskuri and in other parts of Georgia, the people celebrate White George's day. For just at that time the Moon is always full, if we calculate the months according to lunar revolutions. Now, we know perfectly that this mode of reckoning time was used in ancient Georgia, and we understand quite clearly why White George's holiday takes place just on the night of August 14-15: it is because this festival is the same as the ancient pagan Moon-holiday, and White George is but the chief deity of ancient Georgia—the Moon.

But to prove that in the religion of the Georgian

people St. George has replaced the Moon-god, and that the latter was considered in the pagan period as the chief and mightiest god, it is not sufficient to analyse one holiday-custom only in only one part of Georgia. We have, however, much material concerning other provinces of Georgia as well. Traces of Moon-worship remain in abundance; they are preserved in various rites and customs and vary in different provinces. As general customs we need mention only the vigil, the promises made to the deity and the devotion of the children to monasticism.

The Khevsurs and the Pshaws have perfectly preserved the institution and hierarchy of 'Khati'-worshippers.<sup>1</sup> At the summit of this hierarchy is the Khevis-beri ('chief of the valley'), next comes the Dekanozi, and lastly the Khutzesi and Shulta or Dastur. The Khevis-beri is invested with unlimited power, he is almost worshipped. He is at the same time the chief manager of all the estates belonging to the 'Khati,' and he is also the superintendent over the serfs and servants of the 'Khati.' The pilgrims ask the Dekanozi to let them know what St. George is disposed to do with them during the coming year. The Dekanozi refuses at first, but after the people's obstinate demand he begins to prophesy. To be invested with the title of Dekanozi he must have dreamed, while suffering from a sickness caused by the 'Khati,' that St. George has told him, if he desires to recover his health, he must promise to devote all his powers to the service of the 'Khati' of the Saint. There are also ordinary prophets among the men as well as among the women. Wakhushti, the geographer, says that the Pshaws

<sup>1</sup> *Khati* means in Georgian 'image,' 'icon.'

believe in a prophet who rises suddenly as if possessed and begins to talk of different things, as though he were St. George himself. And people listen to what he says and believe it as a supreme truth.

In this province of Georgia the 'Khati' possesses also its own property of forest (the 'Cross forest') and other estates.<sup>1</sup>

The resemblance of this custom to that which Strabo has described is striking. Just as in Strabo's day the Moon-god's priest prophesied, so to-day the 'Khati's' servants and Dekanozis of the modern Khevsurs and Pshaws also prophesy. The ordinary 'Khati's' slave and the Dekanozi himself prophesy in the name of St. George, just as in Strabo's time only the Moon's slaves and priests were authorised to carry out this sacred office. Like the Moon in Strabo's day, the St. George's 'Khati' of the Khevsurs and Pshaws has its own estates, and the Khevis-beri is the chief manager of this property. In a word, the 'Khati' worship of the modern Khevsurs and Pshaws is also a survival of the ancient Moon-worship.

Let us now take Qartli, the central province of Georgia. There is there a remarkable church of Goris Jwari. Wakhushti the geographer tells us that:

Opposite the town of Gori there is a church of Saint George on the top of a high mountain, a miraculous one. The head of Saint George is inside the 'cross.' The church is called Goris Jwari.<sup>2</sup>

A heavy iron chain is preserved in this edifice. When the pilgrim who has 'promised' to St. George

<sup>1</sup> R. Eristhavi, *O Tushino-Pshavo-Khevsurskom Okrughe* (*Zapiski kavkazskago otdelenia Russkago geographicheskago Obshchestva*, vol. iii., 1885, pp. 102, 103); N. Urbneli, *Iveria*, 1886, no. 267; Wakhushti, *Geography*, p. 140; Radde, *Khevsuria i khevsury* (*Zap. kavk. old. Russ. geogr. Ob.*, vol. x., p. 203).

<sup>2</sup> *Geography*, p. 81.

comes to the door of the church, he puts this chain on his neck and thus makes the circuit of the building. This also must be a surviving symbol of the ancient human sacrifice.

In the village of Arbo the holiday of St. George, which people call Gheristoba, falls on August 14-15. This festival is called the 'chief Gheristoba.' The 'stsori,' a week after, falls on August 21-22, and another 'stsori' after another week—on August 28-29. An enormous crowd of pilgrims from every part of Qartli comes to these festivals. Calves, sheep and cocks are sacrificed to St. George. The 'promisers' wear white clothes. Some of them bring their children to devote them to monasticism. The rite of the sacrifice is performed only by a chosen person, the so-called 'Nat.' After the sacrifices choral dances are performed, and just at that moment the St. George slaves begin prophesying.<sup>1</sup>

Here our attention must be directed principally to the first and second 'stsoris.' What is the meaning of the 'stsori' festival, and how is it explained? We think the festival of August 15 takes place at that date because the Moon is just then full. After one week, *i.e.* at the 'stsori,' the Moon is in her third quarter, and finally after another week, *i.e.* at the 'stsori's stsori,' she is in her fourth quarter. Thus the 'stsori' holidays are based on the Moon's quarters. Here, too, as everywhere in Georgia, the prophets declare to the people the will of St. George. It is also interesting to note that everywhere in Georgia the 'promised' children are called 'monks.' And we know that the chief priest of St. George's 'Khati' was called

<sup>1</sup> *Grusinskia Gadalschchitz* (in Russian), *Kavkaz*, 1853, no. 56; 1847, no. 3.

Khevis-beri ('beri' = monk). Thus everyone who vowed service to St. George was also called a 'monk.'

In Western Georgia, too, traces of Moon-worship are to be found in the St. George holiday customs and rituals. In the district of Rača, for instance, there is a monastery called the Monastery of the Chain, in the village of Sori. This church is dedicated to St. George of Mraval-dzali (*i.e.* Many Forces). Near to the village, in the forest, stands another church called the Church of Gadabsha. In this building are preserved an iron bow, an iron chain and an iron arrow.<sup>1</sup> Here is held a special festival called Natzikhuroba. This holiday takes place after Easter in the fourth week, on a Monday, and during the next three weeks every Monday they keep the same Natzikhuroba.

Here also, as we see, besides the chief festival, there are three others, on the three 'stsoris.' An immense crowd of pilgrims is gathered together on these Natzikhuroba holidays. The festival begins on Sunday evening at supper-time. People then rush to the hill of Natzikhuri. It is said that a fortress and a church once stood there and that the Natzikhuroba holiday was held for 'boys' good fortune.'

The pilgrims of Natzikhuri pray before St. George's icon ('Khati'), which is taken by the priest expressly for that purpose from the church and brought to the hill. People offer money to the icon. After thanksgivings they organise choral dances and sing and dance until daybreak. Early in the morning they go home.

Now we see that the Natzikhuroba takes place, like the White George's festival, during the night, for Moon-worship was possible only at night. The

<sup>1</sup> Rev. Mindeli, *Selenie Sori* (*Sborn. Mater. oblia opis. mestn. y plem. Kavkaza*, vol. xix., pp. 116-117, 121, 125-127).

festivals of the other three 'stsis' and the chief Natzikhuroba are due also to the worship of the quarters of the Moon. The above-mentioned Qartlian Gheristoba takes place only at two 'stsis' (i.e. two Moon-quarters), but the Natzikhuroba has preserved the festivals of all three 'stsis.' The chief Natzikhuroba is nothing but the worship of the new Moon, the three other 'stsi' holidays being in honour of the three quarters of the Moon. That the festival takes place always on Mondays is of course due to the fact that in the pagan period *Monday* was in Georgia the Moon-day; Monday was devoted to Moon-worship. Even now in Mingrelian 'Tutashkha' and in Suanian 'Dosh-dul' (Monday) signify the Moon-day. Under the influence of Christianity the ancient name of Monday was replaced by 'Orshabaṭi,' but only in the Georgian literary language. Thus the fact itself that the chief Natzikhuroba and three successive 'stsis' take place on Mondays and begin in the evening, proves that the holidays of 'Mraval-dzali's' St. George are also a mere survival of the ancient Moon-worship. The popular belief that Natzikhuroba is for 'boys' good fortune' shows also the traces of an ancient Moon-holiday. It is true the people no longer understand the significance of this phrase, but it proves evidently that in the remote past there was divination of the future at the Moon-holidays. We know already that the Moon-slaves and the priests prophesied and told the people what would happen in the future. We know also that the traces of this same custom are to be found on the modern White George's holiday. And there is therefore no doubt that the 'boys' fortune' of the Natzikhuroba is also a survival of the ancient Moon-worship. It is noteworthy, too, that perhaps the above-

mentioned chain, bow and arrow represent the implements for the sacrifices to the Moon-god. We have mentioned already Strabo's statement that at their sacrifices the Albani employed the chain and the lance, and to-day also, as we know, it is the chain again which plays a chief part in the surviving symbolical sacrifices at the White George's holiday.

Let us now instance another Saint George's holiday in the province of Mingrelia. Near the town of Akhal-Senaki, in the village of Sunja, there stands an old and famous church of St. George. On April 23 pilgrims gather here from the whole of Mingrelia. On the eve of the holiday they choose an old man well known in the country for his piety and holiness and leave him in the church for the whole night. He must pass the night in prayers and in dreams. Next morning, before the beginning of the holy office, they take the old man out of the church, and bring him to the top of a hill, where he begins to prophesy before an immense assembly, including the prince of Mingrelia himself.<sup>1</sup>

In this custom the fact that the old man must pass the whole night in the church is interesting. It shows that according to the popular belief it is St. George only who can communicate to the people what will happen in the future, and that this revelation is possible only during the night. This is also incontestably a survival of Moon-worship. The old man who prophesies in Mingrelia corresponds to the Khevisberi and Dekanozi of the Khevsurs and Pshaws.

That prophecies, mania, senseless talking and phenomena of this nature are attributed by the popular mind to the influence of the Moon, is to be seen from the

<sup>1</sup> A. Tzagareli, *Journal of the Ministry of Public Instruction* (in Russian), 1877, Dec., p. 217.



fact that the Mingrelians employ the term 'tutashi' to designate children's fever and delirium, for 'tutashi' signifies nothing else than 'the sickness caused by the Moon.'<sup>1</sup>

Lastly, we may mention the Saint George holiday of the Suans.<sup>2</sup> In the so-called Mekermi and Pharisean weeks the inhabitants of several villages go with their children to Saint George's church. Everybody holds in his hand lighted birch-tree branches, and when they reach the enclosure of the church they heap these branches all together and make a great fire. Then they begin to sing hymns and various religious songs. Afterwards they all go home and pass the whole of this Sunday night in singing and dancing.

This holiday is called in Suaneti 'Limpyari,' and corresponds doubtless to the Georgian 'Lamproba.'

We have endeavoured to show what place in the pantheon of the ancient Georgians the Moon in its different phases occupied, and we are therefore justified in supposing that the ancient priests of the Moon-god knew perfectly how to reckon the lunar periods. And, in fact, some fifty years ago every Khevis-beri and Dekanozi in Khevsureti could tell instantly how many days old the Moon was,<sup>3</sup> while the people in general some twenty years ago knew quite well how to calculate the lunar periods, and even to-day many of them know how to do so perfectly.

Our conclusion that St. George occupies the place of the Moon in the Georgian popular pantheon, is further strengthened by the fact that popular belief

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Gagua, *Selenie Nosiri* (Sborn. Mat., etc., vol. x., pp. 111-112).

<sup>2</sup> D. Margiani, *The Suans* (ibid., vol. x., p. 86).

<sup>3</sup> R. Eristhavi, *O Tushino-Pshavo-Khevsurskom okruge* (Zap. kavk. geogr. ob., vol. iii., p. 18).

still considers the Moon to be of the masculine sex. The following folk-song shows this clearly :

The bright Moon said: I am superior to the Sun! *He* it was who wrote the letters [to the Sun] and the North Wind sped them onward. When the Sun received the message, *she* became angry [and said]: I am [his] *sister* and *he* is [my] *brother*; why should we hate one another?

This general belief of the Georgians in the masculine sex of the Moon is by no means contradicted by Strabo's statement that the Albani brought offerings to the 'goddess,' for the geographer is writing in Greek, in which language the Moon (*ἡ Σελήνη*) is of the feminine gender. On the other hand, in Georgian the Sun is of the feminine sex, as we can further see from the fact that all the proper names into which 'Sun' enters as a component part are names of women. The following cradle-song is also very interesting in this connection: "Sleep, dearest dear, *yau-nanina*; the Sun bore the Moon, *yau-nanina*," etc. Evidently, if the Sun bears a child *she* is of the feminine sex. Finally, let me quote a Mingrelian song: "The Sun is my *mother*, the Moon—my *father*, and different stars—my brothers and sisters."<sup>1</sup>

Now, according to Strabo's statement, in Pontus and Phrygia, where traces of the earlier Georgian occupation are to be found, Moon-worship was universal. Strabo relates, for instance, that in the city of Cabeira, in Pontus, there was a temple of Pharnakos. The city and the village of Ameria belonged to this temple. The temple possessed, besides, many slaves and large estates, and the land belonging to the temple was worked only in the months consecrated to the

<sup>1</sup> This song has been communicated to the author by Rev. C. Tatarashvili.

Moon.<sup>1</sup> In Phrygia, Caria, in Pisidian Antiochia, etc., there were also many well-known temples of the Moon-god.<sup>2</sup> The Moon was considered as the chief deity and worshipped as the supreme 'Lord.' He is always represented as holding in his hands a sphere—the emblem of lordship over the world—, and in fact he was considered as the supreme 'Lord' of Heaven and Earth. He gives good crops to the labourer and protects men, especially the weak. It was sufficient for a victim of violence to denounce his enemy and leave a stick against him in the temple of the Moon, and forthwith the culprit would be struck by the deity's vengeance. Only by immediate offerings could the aggressor avoid the terrible vengeance of the Moon-god. The Moon communicated his will to the people through his slaves. The cock was the sacred bird of the deity, because he crows during the night. Such were the beliefs of the above-mentioned countries. When the Moon is sculptured in human form, the image has very often behind the shoulders two protuberances, like horns, which represent doubtless the waning luminary. The sculpture of an unknown deity found at Boghaz-Keuy, which has also two horns on its forehead, should also be a Moon-god statue. Horns in general were considered as a symbol of the Moon.

We arrive thus at the general conclusion that *since in every country inhabited by the Georgian race, in ancient or modern times, traces of Moon-worship are to be found, this worship of the Moon, as of a chief and supreme deity, must be considered as the general and the most primitive religion of all the race.*

As we stated in our former study, after St. George and God the creator comes Elias the prophet. Elias

<sup>1</sup> *Geogr.* xii.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

evidently occupies the place of an ancient atmosphere-god who was master of clouds, rain, hail, lightning, etc. In Qartli and Kakheti we observe many customs which show directly that they are also survivals of the worship of this ancient atmosphere-god. In summer, when extreme drought menaces the crops, the country girls assemble and organise the so-called 'Lazare.' They go through the villages singing :

O Lazare, Lazare! Lazare comes to the door and rolls his eyes, the sieve sifts, the rain hastens. O god, give us the water of heaven. We want no more the eye of the Sun. O god, give us mud, we want no more the dry earth.

But, on the other hand, when the rain lasts long and spoils the crops they change their song and sing :

O Lazare, Lazare! Lazare comes to the door, he rolls his eyes, the sieve sifts, fine weather hastens. O Lazare, Lazare! Drive the clouds away and clean the sky. We want no more the water of heaven. O god, give us the eye of the Sun. We want no more mud. O god, give us the dry earth!

Every householder gives the girls eggs and meal, but throws water at the 'Lazare' and at the girls also. The girls sell the eggs and meal and buy a lamb and a goat. The lamb they sacrifice to God and the goat to Elias. In the village of Akhalqalaqi, in Qartli, we observe the same custom, but here the villagers do not organise a 'Lazare.' They simply choose a woman and go with her to every door singing. The villagers throw water at the woman, etc. Evidently all this is a symbolical representation of the ancient human sacrifice to the atmosphere-god.<sup>1</sup> Among the Tushes there used to be a very interesting custom. Wakhushti tells us that :

They have a very large and high rock ; thither they come on the day of Elias the prophet and sacrifice to it sheep and cows, and worship it. And whatever they hear from this rock they believe.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cp. A. Veselovski's *Rosyskan'ia*, ii., pp. 313-314. <sup>2</sup> *Geography*, p. 172.

In the village of Sori (in the district of Rača) the Elias holidays take place in the first three weeks after Easter, every *Thursday*, on July 20, and in September also.<sup>1</sup>

The ancient Georgian pantheon naturally included other deities besides the Moon, the Sun (or God the creator as the people call him now) and the Master of clouds, but as I have not yet finished my researches into their names and signification, I will here simply mention one of them—the Mother of God. It is evident to me that God's Mother (Ghvṭis-Mshobeli) replaces a very old pagan deity, *viz.* the Earth-goddess herself. The famous Georgian holiday 'Vardobay (the Day of Roses) Ghvṭismshoblisay (of God's Mother),' or simply 'Vardoba,' is a survival of a very ancient pagan festival; but much more information on the subject is required than we possess at present in order to analyse it. It is noteworthy, however, that the Vardoba, like the Moon-holidays, was kept in all the countries where the Georgian race has ever had settlements.

Our investigation has been so far confined to Georgian ground. Let us now compare the results with the same facts in other countries.

Two characteristic features of the Georgian pagan religion are :

(1) The Moon is the chief deity, and not the Sun, as was the case generally among the great majority of nations.

(2) The Moon was of the masculine sex, and not of the feminine, as was the case in general among other nations.

Now the Moon was also considered to be the chief

<sup>1</sup> N. Mindeli, *Selenie Sori* (*Sborn. Mat.*, etc., vol. xix., p. 125).

deity among the Assyrians and Sabæans.<sup>1</sup> In Assyrian his name was Sin and he was regarded as lord of the world, as was also the case among the Sabæans. According to both peoples also the Moon was of the masculine sex.<sup>2</sup> On the other hand, the Egyptians, Hebrews, Greeks, Romans, Phœnicians<sup>3</sup> and Arabs regarded the Moon as a female deity.<sup>4</sup>

Thus, only the Assyrians, the Sabæans and the Georgians in Western Asia looked on the Moon as their chief male deity. Moreover, on comparison we can see clearly that between the ancient Sabæan and Georgian religions there was also another striking likeness. Let us take, for instance, the Georgian Lamproba (the Suanian Limpyari). We know already that it was a survival of the ancient Moon-worship, when people with lighted birch-tree branches sang to the Moon and thus worshipped him. We know that this festival takes place now in winter, some weeks before Lent. Similarly the Sabæans held a great festival in winter, when they also used to set fire to pine-tree branches. It is interesting that just at this same date, January 24, the Moon-birth holiday, as officially recognised, took place among the Sabæans.<sup>5</sup> Evidently, our Lamproba and the Moon's birthday among the Sabæans are one and the same thing. It is noteworthy also that a White George holiday takes place in winter as well, on December 24-25, *i.e.* on Christmas day; and that in this instance the Moon's birthday has been transferred to the birthday of Christ. The Sabæans had also four other Moon-festivals in the year: at the new-moon, after the first quarter, at the full-moon and at

<sup>1</sup> D. Chwolsohn, *Die Ssabier*, vol. i., pp. 319-403; vol. ii., p. 158.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. i., pp. 399-403.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. ii., p. 184.

<sup>4</sup> D. Nielsen, *Die altarabische Mondreligion*.

<sup>5</sup> D. Chwolsohn, *ibid.*, vol. ii., p. 35.

the last quarter.<sup>1</sup> Like the Georgians, the Sabæans kept some unknown festival in the month of May when they smelt the roses.<sup>2</sup> Finally the Sabæans, too, practised human sacrifices, and here the most interesting fact is that the word which signifies the 'victim' (*sebarich*) is not an Arabic term, but the habitual and common Georgian and Armenian word *zvarak*.<sup>3</sup>

What people originated Moon-worship and who were the imitators of the initiators? This is a problem very difficult to solve for the present. Some scientists, as for instance Fritz Hommel and Nielsen, are inclined to ascribe the origin of this Moon-religion to the Arabs, others to the Assyrians, others again to the Sumerians. In future, we think, science must take into consideration the Georgian Moon-religion as well.

J. JAVAKHISHVILI.

(Translated from the Georgian by MICHAEL TSERETHELI.)

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. ii., cap. i., § 5.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. ii., cap. v., § 2.

<sup>3</sup> N. Marr, *Zap. Vost. Otd. Russk. arch. obsch.*, vol. xvi., 1905.

## THE ESSENCE OF THE FAITH: A STUDY IN THE ORIGINS OF CHRISTIANITY.<sup>1</sup>

REV. K. C. ANDERSON, D.D.

AUGUSTINE, the greatest of the Fathers of the Church of the West, recognised the truth that Christianity had existed from the beginning. His words are worth quoting :

The very thing which now is called the Christian Religion existed among the ancients, nor was it absent in the beginning of the human race before Christ came in the flesh. Since when the true religion which always existed began to be called Christian.

There was a Christianity long before the beginning of our era, and all the characteristic ideas and terms such as we find in the pages of Paul and John—Logos, Saviour, Only-Begotten, Second Birth, Resurrection, Mystery, etc.—were in use in the pre-Christian Hermetic Literature of Egypt. Christianity was, strictly speaking, the grandchild of Paganism, the intermediate parent being the Gnosticism from which Paul derived his great ideas and terms. Christianity was the child of Gnosticism : it was from the Gnostic sects that it developed, and the proof of this is found in the Epistles of Paul. Christianity has thus its roots in the soil of antiquity. The Mystery which Paul says was through him made manifest was the same Mystery which was hidden in all the Mystery-traditions of antiquity. Under whatever forms it

<sup>1</sup> See the articles 'The Cradle of the Christ' and 'Is the New Testament Jesus Historical?' in the previous numbers, Oct., 1911 and Jan., 1912.



existed there was but one Gnosis fundamental to them all, which Paul called the Mystery of Christ—the Mystery hid from ages but made manifest now. In this one particular Paul's teaching differed from all the Mystery-teachings of the past: they had been secret, his was open. This made his message a gospel—good news to all; the highest spiritual truth was henceforth to be thrown open to all who were able to receive it.

“Christianity as we know it,” says Prof. B. W. Bacon, in his *Story of St. Paul*, “is Pauline Christianity,” and the cradle of Pauline Christianity is found in the writings of Thrice-greatest Hermes, not in the life and teachings of a historical person Jesus. It is significant that the early Church Fathers fully recognised their indebtedness to these ancient teachings and quoted them in support of the great doctrines of the faith. Gradually a contrary opinion prevailed, gradually there grew up an enmity between Gnosticism the Mother and Christianity the Child. Gradually the child grew independent of the mother, gradually it was seen that if this origin of the dogmas of the faith was acknowledged, the fundamental originality of Christianity could not be maintained. The Church meantime was growing in power and influence and consequently was growing in ambition and in arrogant claim, and was, therefore, less and less disposed to admit its indebtedness to Pagan thought and worship. And very soon came the fall of the Western Empire, when Goth and Hun and Vandal conquered the Romans enfeebled by effeminacy and luxury, and a wild sea of barbarian tribes surged and heaved where once the cultured fields of the old world had been. This new race was not ready for the Gnosis; it could not appre-

ciate the high spiritual teaching of the Gnostics, who, as their historian Mr. Mead says, in his *Fragments of a Faith Forgotten*, were "centuries before their time." It required a cruder faith and the mysteries of the spirit had to be withheld from it, not from choice, but from necessity. Especially was the central doctrine of the Gnosis and the central doctrine of Paul's Epistles—the doctrine of a mystical Christ who dwelt within the soul—too strong meat for those spiritual 'babes in Christ.'

Christianity, according to the Gnostic and Pauline conception of it, and according to the conception of it held by Augustine and the great Church Fathers, is not devotion to a person, because this person was not in existence from the beginning of the human race. It is only when you make Christianity of cosmic significance after the fashion of the Mystery-schools of the ancient world that it will fit in to such a definition as that given by St. Augustine. To make the central figure of the New Testament a mere human being is to eviscerate the Christian Gospel and make it of none effect. This has always been the instinct of the Christian heart and experience has confirmed it. It is just those features of the Gospels and Epistles which Liberal Christianity would eliminate, the birth and death and resurrection and ascension of their central figure, that are essential to Christianity as a religion of redemption, and all effort to keep it alive in the world as a code of moral teaching or as allegiance to an ideal man who lived nineteen centuries ago, is doomed to failure.

What is vital in Christianity as a religion is based on what the Higher Criticism of the New Testament has repudiated as historical facts, the Supernatural Birth, the Resurrection, the Ascension. In an article

in the *Hibbert Journal* for July, 1911, Prof. B. W. Bacon of Yale, an eminent master of Higher Criticism, says, "As Teacher and Leader of Humanity toward the ideal of a brotherhood of the race under the fatherhood of God, the figure of Jesus of Nazareth still dominates all the records of the past. The apotheosis doctrine of Peter and the incarnation of Paul are only primitive attempts to explain the significance of Jesus' personality and experience," but the real thing in which Liberal Christianity is interested is "the restoration of a strictly historical portrait of the Galilean Teacher and Worker for the kingdom of God." The assertion that Jesus was a historical 'Teacher and Worker for the kingdom of God' carries within it the additional assertion that he was human, *i.e.* was strictly within the range and limits of history. It has frequently been said that all of Christianity was concerned in the controversy between Athanasius and Arius,—that the essence of the faith was concealed in a diphthong. Similarly, here, all of Christianity is concerned in the controversy between a Liberal Christianity that bases itself on a human Jesus, who was historical, and a conception of Christianity that did not have its origin in a personal historical Jesus, but in a belief in a Jesus or Christ who was worshipped as a God. It is admitted that the Jesus of Liberal Christianity is not on the surface of the gospel-story, hence the efforts of the Higher Criticism to get at him. He is a Jesus who can be reached only by the scholar. The following words of Professor G. B. Foster, in his *Function of Religion in Man's Struggle for Existence*, are strictly true.

To determine whether a man by the name of Jesus lived for a few months in Palestine many centuries ago, one must travel the

scientific path. It is a long and difficult journey for which few have the time, and fewer still the ability. The indispensable equipment for this journey is not a pure heart, but a knowledge of Latin and Greek, of textual criticism, and of the nature and laws of evidence.

Principal P. T. Forsyth, D.D., the accomplished Head of Hackney College, is right in warning the Churches that in trusting to the Higher Critics, they are handing themselves over into the hands of a new Romanism. Professor Foster has said the same thing (*op. cit.*, p. 193) :

The gospel came from Jesus—from Jesus of whom the scholars only really know that he was not what he was said to be by the writers of the Bible; that he did not say or do what the gospels narrate that he said or did: from Jesus, of whom honestly we know very little, almost nothing, with indubitable certainty: from Jesus, who as a child of his people and of his time, thought and believed and said much which we to-day cannot truthfully think and say and believe: from Jesus who however has a hidden point somewhere in his heart where the true Christianity has its seat. But this point is problematically known only to the scholar, and the people are shut up to a new Catholicism in which the scholar is the Pope,—a Catholicism less religious to the heart and more uncertain to the intellect than the Papacy itself.

To see that the above words are no exaggeration, it is only necessary to ask who is to decide where we are to stop in peeling off the accretions which the Critic says have gathered around his realistic human figure. Shall we say that the miraculous features only are mythical or legendary? But the so-called Sermon on the Mount (which is not a sermon, but a collection of detached sayings) is saturated with myth and legend. The God and Mountain myth is found in almost every religion; and Professor A. Jeremias of Berlin, in a recently issued booklet, shows that miracle is deeply imbedded in the Logia, or Q of the Critics. (See *Hat*

*Jesus Christus belebt ?*) Professor Edwin Hatch said, in a famous passage in his Hibbert Lectures, that the difference between the Nicene Creed and the Sermon on the Mount is that the former was spoken to an assembly of Greek philosophers and the latter to a group of Syrian peasants. Is it possible to conceive of the cryptic utterances of the so-called Sermon being delivered to a group of Syrian peasants? How much could they have understood of it? What effect could it have had on them? Here surely we are in presence of the myth. We are not dealing with history. The Critic tells us that the birth-stories of Matthew and Luke are mythical; but it does not follow that the upbringing at Nazareth is historical simply because it is non-miraculous. The same critical tests that dissolve the former dissolve the latter. If you go with the Critic one mile you will have to go with him twain. He will show you the Nazareth-myth growing before your eyes just as he will show you the Bethlehem myth growing. He will proceed to prove that the stories of the trial, arrest and crucifixion of Jesus are quite understandable as scenes of a mystery-play, but are quite inexplicable as facts of history. The trial is represented as lasting through one night, when, as Renan points out, an Eastern city is wrapt in silence and darkness, quite natural as scenes in a mystery-play, but not as actual history. No one denies that the stories of the veil of the temple being rent in twain, of darkness being over all the land from the sixth to the ninth hour, of the graves being opened and many saints coming out and appearing to their friends, are mythical; but it is quite arbitrary to stop with these. Where do our feet stand on solid ground of history? Where is the realistic human figure? Who shall describe him? He cannot

be described because he cannot be found. And whenever an attempt is made to describe him it is seen that the description given is a reflection of the person who describes him and not at all a figure of the first century.

In the graphic language of Schweitzer:

As of old Jacob wrestled with the angel, so German theology wrestles with Jesus of Nazareth and will not let Him go until He bless it—that is, until He will consent to serve it and will suffer Himself to be drawn by the Germanic spirit into the midst of our time and our civilisation. But the day breaks, the wrestler must let Him go. He will not cross the ford with us. Jesus of Nazareth will not suffer Himself to be modernised.

What is vital in Christianity in all its past history has not been a modernised Jesus,—a Teacher and Leader in the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man. That is the modern ‘Liberal’ interpretation of Christianity which is repudiated by the whole orthodox Church of the present, and which would have been repudiated by all the great theologians of the Church of the past. If it were possible to ask any of the great Fathers of the Church the question “What is Christianity?” the answer would *not* be in harmony with the above description of Jesus by Professor Bacon—“the Teacher and Leader in the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man.” They would have said one and all: Christianity is the Religion of Redemption. What is most vital to it is contained in whatever is essential and permanent in the doctrines of the Incarnation and Atonement of Jesus Christ. According to Prof. Bacon these are but the “vehicles of thought and speech to which Peter and Paul were compelled to resort in their ignorance of modern psychology and philosophy in order to interpret to their undisciplined sense the teleological

significance of what they themselves had witnessed." Far otherwise is the view, of what is vital in Christianity, of Prof. Royce of Harvard in an article in *The Harvard Theological Review* for October, 1909. Prof. Royce regards the task as hopeless—the task of restoring a purely primitive Christianity (*op. cit.*, p. 437). He insists that the "reduction of what is vital in Christianity to the so-called pure Gospel of Christ as he preached it and as it is recorded in the body of the presumably authentic sayings and parables, is profoundly unsatisfactory" (*op. cit.*, p. 426). "As modern men," he continues, "we stand between opposed views. . . . On the one hand, the Christ of the historically authentic sayings, . . . on the other hand the Christ of legend, whom it is impossible for us modern men longer to conceive as the former ages of the Church conceived him. Can we choose between the two? Which stands for what is vital in Christianity?" (*op. cit.*, p. 427). Prof. Royce's answer to his own question is not doubtful. The essence of Christianity is not found in the teaching of a historical Jesus about the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man, but in doctrines that rest on what the Higher Criticism has proved to be legends or myths,—doctrines that are to be conceived not as something "accomplished once for all at a certain historical point of time," but something that "remains somehow an abiding work and that ought to be viewed as a timeless fact which never really happened but which is such as to determine anew in every age the relation of the faithful to God" (*op. cit.*, p. 435). This something is "capable of expression apart from the legends" and the truth may be seen to be "independent of historical events" (*op. cit.*, p. 438).

It is safe to say that Professor Royce has the whole

Christian Church on his side, past and present, except that small portion of it called 'Liberal.' St. Athanasius would not have understood a Christianity that had not its starting point in the Incarnation of the Son of God and did not culminate in His death, for his fundamental principle is contained in the words "God in Christ became man in order that man might become God." The same idea would have been given by St. Augustine, the greatest of the Fathers of the Church of the West. In the same line of teaching would have been St. Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus and indeed all the great theologians of the Middle Ages. And when we come across the line that separates the ancient from the modern world and enter the Churches of the Reformation, we should find essentially the same teaching, that what is vital in Christianity is not a teacher and leader in the fatherhood of God and brotherhood of man, but a Redeemer whose essential work was Incarnation and Atonement. Luther, Calvin, Knox, Cranmer, all the heroes of the Reformation, were at one with the Pre-Reformation Church in so regarding Christianity, however much they differed from it in matters not so vital. None of them would have understood a Christianity as the modern 'Liberal' theologian defines it,—the teaching of Jesus, a body of ethical and spiritual precepts. One and all would have said that Christianity centres in Incarnation and Atonement. In a book recently published, which we owe to German piety and scholarship, we have a luminous statement of the essential meaning of Christianity.

To think of the world's activity as God's activity, of mankind's development, filled with struggles and suffering, as the story of a divine struggle and passion, of the world-process as the process of a God who in each individual creature fights, suffers, conquers and



dies so that he may overcome the limitations of the finite in the religious consciousness of man, and anticipate his future triumph over all the suffering of the world, that is the real Christian doctrine of redemption.

What we have in the Gospels is the picture or parable of this profound truth. The birth and death and resurrection and ascension of the God are symbols of timeless facts and processes which are always taking place in the soul of each individual of the race. They express under the veil of historical symbol the timeless and eternal passion of the God within each man and within the soul of the race itself, by means of which the race itself and every individual in it is being redeemed out of subserviency to matter and refashioned into the image of God. This redemptive process is also the creative process, for creation is also, as the Gnosis taught, and as St. Paul teaches, the crucifixion of God. As Archdeacon Wilberforce puts it:

God being immanent in all, must suffer in all. God, therefore, is not an onlooker from without upon the sufferings of the world, but a sharer from within. And there is not a pang in this suffering universe that does not pierce the heart of God before it reaches man.<sup>1</sup>

This is the legitimate inference from the doctrine of the Divine Immanence. God is the soul of the world and the world is the life of God as He consciously lives it out. He is imprisoned within matter, and is the Divine Spirit within the human spirit, the true self of each individual soul, the Infinite Self within our finite selves. He is there that He may redeem or reconcile the world and humanity to Himself. The true birth of the Jesus, the Saviour, is not something that took place nineteen centuries ago. It takes place in the

*Speaking Good of His Name*, quoted in *The Gospel of Rightness*, p. 144.

soul. The soul is the manger where Christhood comes to birth. Here, too, the true resurrection takes place when the soul rises into conscious oneness with God. The true coming of the Jesus, the Christ, is the soul becoming aware of the eternal birth, and sin is the blindness of the soul to the eternal presence of the Incarnate God. The Light shines in the darkness, but the darkness does not comprehend it. These sublime truths are independent of the stories of the Gospels as they are independent of the symbolism—some of it crude—of the Mystery-sects of the ancient world, because they relate to eternal spiritual facts. God is incarnate in this world of human sorrow and sin, of finitude and imperfection, in order that He may triumph over it. The triumph is being gradually achieved; the process of creation and redemption is one process. God's triumph is our triumph, for God is in man, in the unity of a conscious life expressed in the lives of countless finite beings, and yet with the unity of a single universal life. God and man are one. Vicariousness is inwrought into the very texture of life. The world suffers in and with the individual until the individual wins his place in union with the Divine Will. Redemption is, thus, a cosmic process, God winning us through the triumph over evil to unity with His own perfect life.

To sum up. If the nucleus of the central figure of the New Testament had been a man, we should have had a gradual deification of this man. On the contrary, what we do have is a steady and persistent movement towards the historisation and humanisation of the God Jesus. This accounts for all the human features in the Gospels, but the process is by no means complete. In the Gospel of John the process has gone but

a little way. The Jesus is the Logos of God. In Mark, which the critics tell us is the earliest of the three synoptics, the Jesus is a wonder-working God, with very little if any human elements about him. In Matthew we have a little more, and in Luke a little more still, just what we should expect; but in none of them is he a man. What we have in the Gospels, therefore, as well as in Paul's Epistles, is a Jesus-cult, for Jesus is worshipped there too. The New Testament throughout presupposes such a cult.

It is quite true therefore that 'Jesus Christ' dominates the New Testament and that the whole of it may be said to be the product of his influence, but it is not of a 'Man Jesus,' but of a 'God Jesus.' If anything can be said to have failed, it is the attempt to reduce the central figure of the New Testament to the dimensions of a man; and nothing shows this so clearly as the work of the Higher Criticism itself upon the New Testament. But this failure is only relative; in another sense, the failure is a great victory: it has found the truth, which is that the New Testament throughout, Gospels and Epistles alike, is inspired and dominated by the Worship of Jesus, the Protector, the Healer, the Saviour-God.

K. C. ANDERSON.

## THE PROTISTA'S SELF-SACRIFICE.

FLORENCE NEVILL.

FOR a long time our planet was inhabited solely by such Protista or single-celled primitive creatures. From coenobia or social unions of these afterwards arose the lowest histones, multicellular plants and animals.—ERNST HAECKEL, *Monism*.

THE universe lay unformed in infinite space; throbbing with primitive atoms. Gradually the bodies separate themselves from that 'vibrating primeval cloud'; gradually the stars shone forth; the planets appeared. In this lifeless cosmos was seen a strange forecast of the future; a man who felt himself to be alone, looking down on countless stars and planets. This strange developed life thought it drew near the earth. The man saw that on its surface there was no organic life; he knew he had come too soon out of material force; that he was a later stage in the earth's story. The man wondered vaguely if it would not indeed be a blessing if the planet remained lifeless, and inorganic.

A great longing overwhelmed him to prevent the future suffering of mankind. In a terrible vision he beheld the torture of the future, the wretchedness, the terrible suffering. As the vision faded, he heard the murmur of tiny voices, saying: "We will not divide, we will remain obscure and unknown in painless inaction."

"I cannot make out what is happening," thundered another voice close to him. "Something has gone wrong with me, I am not fulfilling my laws."

It was the Cosmos speaking.

The man did not answer, though the remark appeared to be addressed to him. Silently he saw, as in a prophetic vision, the unbroken calm of inorganic life. Then it came to him that he too was a mistake. Must he pray to be even as the Protista, with no feeling, no power of thought. And instead of relief, his life rose in rebellion. No, he would think and feel as long as he had the power.

Then he thought the Cosmos, in its anger, swept him away and laid him down in the very midst of the Protista.

"There is a man," It shouted, "ask him if he would like never to be, to remain as insignificant as yourselves."

"Are you not glad," they murmured, "that man will never feel, that rest and peace will ever be on the earth?"

The man was by no means glad. At this moment he was feeling that sentient life was his dearest possession. "No," he said, "I like to feel."

"You like to feel," the Protista almost shouted, so excited were they, "and we are sacrificing ourselves to prevent all feeling."

"Yes," the man persisted, "I should like to feel something; I would indeed," he concluded desperately.

The Cosmos was shaking with laughter.

"My dear Protista," It said, "you will have to divide. Man must fulfil his destiny."

The Protista were very sulky; for when does self-sacrifice like to know it is not appreciated.

What is the sequel? This depends, you know, whether we obey or rebel.

Doubtless the rebels against law will believe that it is a great misfortune the Protista ever divided. But the dreamers know better.

FLORENCE NEVILL.

---

## THE SONG OF EARTH.

WHEN vagrant spirits, strayed from distant spheres,  
Approach our earth, wrapp'd in its filmy veil  
Of cloud and limpid air, what sounds must rise  
To greet their wondering and startled ears!  
Fresh from the cosmic harmonies of space,  
They first would meet a crystal fount of song  
Upwelling through the sun-illuminated air,  
And, when their eager gaze perceived its source—  
What an undreamed and exquisite surprise!  
A small, soft, feathered soul on outspread wings,  
Filling the sunlit sky with golden showers  
Of liquid music, saturate with bliss!  
How they would stretch enticing, gentle hands  
Towards that welcoming messenger of earth!  
How they would follow it with charmed eyes  
Grown bright through gazing on a million stars,  
As still it rose, still flooded all the air  
With ecstasies of heart-sweet happiness!  
Full of the wonder of this greeting song,  
They would draw nearer to the singer's home;  
Would see the trees lift their green crests to heav'n,  
Singing and sighing in wind-enchanted dreams,  
And straining at their mighty, earth-bound roots  
As though upon the wind's wings they would rise,  
To fly with him, still singing, to the sun.  
And, chiming in with this impassioned choir,

Other sweet strains would rise melodiously  
From golden throats of woodland-dwelling birds,  
Thrilling the airy visitors with new  
And rare delight. The happy water-song  
Of brooklets hurrying seawards through green fields—  
That laugh and chuckle in their secret hearts,  
And sport with sunbeams and with polished stones,  
And hide in pools, and shake and tumble o'er  
With headlong mirth when rocks stand in their way—  
Would fill them with a rapture so intense  
That they would laugh and weep for very joy,  
And send bright tears, clear as the silver stars  
From whence they came, to join the merry streams.  
And they would draw still nearer, till they heard  
The myriad sounds contributed by man  
To swell earth's varied melody. And here  
Would come a change, for, mixed with happy sounds,  
Would reach them sounds of devastating grief ;  
Wild sobs and lamentations, longing prayers ;  
Outbursts of anger, hate, and bitterness ;  
Sad children's voices, desolate and small ;  
Faint cries of animals, driven with whips,  
Starved, slaughtered, and ill-used ;—a complex chord  
Of woe to make the shuddering listeners quail.  
Yet they would note, 'mid these heart-rending sounds,  
Others that were so marvellously sweet,  
So pure, so near divine, that they would pause,  
But half-convinced, to hear them o'er again.  
Exquisite strains from sweet-toned instruments  
Which man has made to speak for him, through which  
He can express his deep and wordless thoughts  
Of infinite beauty ; or the dove-like song  
Of human mothers to their sleeping babes ;  
Or laughter from the merry heart of youth ;  
And, everywhere alike beneath the sun,  
That richest of all music—human speech  
When human voices are made sweet by love.  
All these would fill the astonished wanderers  
With a most radiant and undreamed-of joy ;

And they, returning to their native sphere,  
Would tell what they had heard, dwelling on each  
Remembered sound with wondering tenderness,  
And ending : " But the spirits on that globe—  
Spirits half-hid 'neath curious semblances—  
Send up a Song whose like was never heard,  
So sad, so cruel, so unbearable ;  
And yet shot through, as by pure beams of light,  
With tones of deepest meaning, full and true,  
And harmonising with the glorious Chant  
Of all the worlds : a Song whose sweetest note  
Is sounded by their voices when they love."

EVA M. MARTIN.



## NOTES.

### RECENT GERMAN PUBLICATIONS ON MYSTICISM.

NOT very long ago the student who, either from personal or scientific reasons, was interested in the history and literature of mysticism, had usually to hunt up in the public libraries or in the shops of book-antiquaries time-worn and worm-eaten volumes or parchments, many of them of great rarity and attainable only at considerable expense. Having at last secured some longed-for treasure of this kind he found himself confronted with a picturesque object, which was however by no means easy to handle. An unfamiliar letter-press, crammed full of abbreviations, a text, difficult and obscure in itself, and hardly intelligible in other respects owing to the linguistic difficulties of Mediæval Latin, French, Italian or German, deterred not only the general reader, however instructed he may have been, but also many a scholar from such study. And so, as nearly all the texts were accessible only with the greatest difficulty, not a few have nourished the strangest ideas as to what could reasonably be expected from this branch of literature. The most worthless trash—second-hand concoctions written by astrological, alchemistic and occultistic charlatans—were believed to contain the lost secret of secrets, the stone of the sages or the like. On the other hand the priceless creations of the greatest mystics of all times were hardly known from hearsay to the modern public. If this depressing state of things is by now being gradually overcome, at least for such readers as can freely use a modern German book printed in the clearest and most artistic Latin type on excellent paper and sold at a nominal price, we owe it nearly exclusively to the enterprise of one indefatigable idealist, namely the publisher Eugen Diederichs of Jena. Even a superficial perusal of his more recent catalogues will impress the reader with a sense of lively gratitude for the amount of work and—for the present materially unproductive—expense, which this enthusiast has devoted to the propagation of the same ideas that are aimed at also by *THE QUEST* in part of its programme. An attempt to describe in a few words the most important items in Diederichs' list, may, therefore, not be unwelcome.

There is first of all Karl Joël's work on *The Origins of Natural Philosophy from the Spirit of Mysticism* (M. 6), a work of the most penetrating intuition, which I deeply regret not to have known when I tried to set forth a very similar view on different lines in my *Weltenmantel und Himmelszelt*. The well-known Professor of Philosophy at the University of Basle compares the scanty but invaluable remains of early Ionian philosophy with parallel passages from Renaissance authors and modern German Romanticists. The outcome is striking and convincing in the highest degree. On the one hand it sweeps clean the history of the earliest Greek philosophy from the mildew of rationalism, which obscures it in the desperately unimaginative constructions of Eduard Zeller's great work, and on the other it destroys the narrow-minded prejudices of those who still believe mysticism to be a mild variety of paranoia, or at best, a harmless aberration of the human mind. Even one who has derived his information from the far superior *Greek Thinkers* of Theodor Gomperz—the thank-worthy translator of John Stuart Mill's works into German—or from Burnett's excellent *Early Greek Philosophy*, will become acquainted by Joël's book with an entirely new and—in my opinion—quite essential aspect of old Ionian speculation—namely, its religious or more precisely mystic side. A good specimen of Joël's brilliant style and bold flight of thought will, I hear, be shortly offered [to readers of THE QUEST. Those who may be induced by this fascinating analysis of Joël's to attempt a closer study of Presocratic philosophy in its extant remains, are offered an excellent translation of them by Dr. W. Nestle (*Vorsokratiker*). The ripest fruit of early Greek mysticism, however, as it is to be found in the remains of the old Ionian cosmologists, and in the traditions of Orphism and Pythagorism, the *fons et origo* of all the later Hellenistic mysticism, is made accessible to the lover of such studies in a new, refined and artistic German translation of Plato's Works by Rudolf Kassner—the author of a very valuable book on English poets and artists of the 19th century (*Mysticism, Artists and Life*, Diederichs, 1900)—K. Preisendanz, a philologist who will shortly provide us with a comprehensive edition of ancient magic texts, and O. Kiefer. Dr. Wilhelm Capelle has translated the Pseudo-Aristotelian, or rather Posidonian, treatise *On the World*, and Dr. O. Kiefer the *Enneades* of Plotinus, the standard production of Neoplatonism and the crown of Pagan religious speculation.

As to the equally admirable literature of Mediæval and

Renaissance mysticism Diederichs gives us a complete and handy edition of Meister Ekkehard's writings and sermons by Hermann Büttner; *The Booklet on the Perfect Life—a German Theology* of an anonymous Frankfortian (also by H. Büttner); *The Paradoxa* of Sebastian Franck (Heinrich Ziegler); John Amos Comenius' *The Labyrinth of the World and the Paradise of the Heart*, and the same author's lay-breviary, *The One Thing Necessary*; the deservedly world-famed *Cherubinic Wanderer* of Angelus Silesius—perhaps the greatest mystic poet of all times; a selection from Seuse's (Suso's) writings, and finally a series of unedited mystic texts of the 14th and 15th centuries from rare manuscripts, with an introduction by the well-known Munich Professor Friedrich von der Leyen.

Dr. Franz Strunz, Professor at the Technische Hochschule in Vienna, publishes a selection of Theophrastus Paracelsus' works (the book *Paragranum*, the volume *Paramirum* and *Opus Paramirum*), translated into clear German, and a most interesting biography of this great genius. A less powerful though interesting personality becomes accessible to the modern reader in Diederichs' selections from the work of Giovanni Pico della Mirandola. That particular shade of Christian mysticism which is commonly known as Quietism (mystic resignation) is represented in Diederichs' collection by the *Twelve Spiritual Dialogues* of Madame Guyon (with two portraits of her and her spiritual friend, Cardinal Fénelon).

To students requiring a first introduction into what might be called the 'world-literature' of mysticism we cannot too strongly recommend the *Ecstatic Confessions* collected by Martin Buber. The rich and attractive contents of this book give samples of Indian mysticism (from Bāba Lāl Rāmakrishna), from the mysticism of the Moslems—the Sūfis and their successors—from Neoplatonic and Gnostic texts, from the *Divine Love-Hymns* of the Greek Monk Symeon, the *New Theologos*, also a letter of St. Hildegard, the nun of Bingen and of St. Alpais; Franciscan texts (Ægidius of Assisi); confessions of Mechtild von Magdeburg, Mechtild von Hackeborn, Gertrud von Helfa, Heinrich Suso (13th century); Christina Ebner, Margaret Ebner, Adelheid Langmann (14th century); anonymous confessions from German nunneries (14th century); ecstatic confessions from Sweden and Norway; samples of ecstatic visions from the Netherlands (Gerlach Peters); confessions of Italian visionaries (Angela da Foligno, Catarina da Siena, Catarina da Genoa, Maria Maddalena de' Pazzi); of Spanish

ecstatics (Teresa & Jesù, Anna Garcias); 17th century testimonies from France, Germany and the Netherlands; and finally a few pages by the famous Catarine Emmerich (19th century). An appendix adds a passage from the *Mahābhārata* (in Deussen's translation), sayings of Laotse and his disciples, a chapter from Jewish mystics (Hassidim), and short passages from Makarios the Egyptian and the Pseudo-Areopagitic writings.

In spite of being most gorgeously printed, the price of this book does not exceed M. 6! Let us hope that it may be read and bought—as well as the other above-mentioned works—so as to enable the publisher to continue his valuable series until it may at last become a complete *Corpus Scriptorum Mysticorum*!

R. E.

---

## REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

### BODY AND MIND.

A History and a Defence of Animism. By William McDougall, M.A., M.B., Reader in Mental Philosophy in the University of Oxford. London (Methuen). Price 10s. 6d.

THE major part of Mr. McDougall's courageous work is a searching and drastic analysis and criticism of those mechanistic theories which presume to imagine a psychology without a soul, and his most telling attack is delivered against those desperate attempts of modern ingenuity which, while they reject the idea of a soul, struggle in vain to give an intelligible explanation of human nature that shall escape the irreligion of materialism. In brief, as opposed to the prevailing opinion in scientific circles, Mr. McDougall argues for the existence of soul, as a 'something' of a different nature from body, and claims that this view is verifiable on the data of empirical science. If the term 'dualism' is understood as relative only and is not carried over into metaphysics or ontology, then the animistic view may be said to be that of psycho-physical dualism.

The essential nature of 'animism,' in the sense in which our author uses the word, is that "all, or some, of those manifestations of life and mind which distinguish the living man from the

corpse and from inorganic bodies, are due to the operation within him of something which is of a nature different from that of the body " (p. viii.). This is the view of the overwhelming majority of mankind, ever since we have any record of belief; it is the view of common sense, of religion, of psychical experience and experiment, and of all the world's greatest thinkers, except in the West and in the modern or post-Renaissance period. And even in this period, and while theologians without exception perforce remain in the common belief, a number of thinkers justify its acceptance, including such penetrating minds as those of a Leibnitz, a Lotze, a William James, and a Bergson. It is true that of late years, to use James's graphic phrase, "souls have been out of fashion," but such fashion is surely ephemeral, and though we call Mr. McDougall's 'defence' a courageous work, we doubt not that in the near future when the facts of life come to their own once more in academical circles, it will be regarded as somewhat of a breaking of the butterfly of a passing phase of over-strained intellectual extravagance and abstraction, out of touch with concrete reality, on the wheel of the age-long facts of vital experience. For the time, however, Mr. McDougall's critique is a work of great utility, proving as it does, against the Epiphenomenalists, who would make mind a bye-product, and the Parallelists of all schools who would deny all interaction between mind and body, that the "facts of our conscious life, especially the fact of psychical individuality, the fact of the unity of consciousness correlated with the physical manifold of brain-processes, cannot be rendered intelligible . . . without the postulation of some ground of unity other than the brain or material organism" (p. 356). In fact, as Bergson said in his recent lectures at University College, the Ancients were nearer the truth than the Moderns who deny any link whatever, in postulating 'soul' as an intermediary between mind (in the Platonic sense) and body, or spirit and matter. Moreover the logic of value demands this hypothesis, for "Parallelism rules out all religious conceptions and hopes and aspirations, save those (if there be any) which are compatible with a strictly mechanistic Pantheism, a Pantheism which differs from rigid Materialism not at all in respect to practical consequences for the life of mankind; whereas Animism in this sphere also leaves open the whole field for further speculation and enquiry, and permits us to hope and even to believe that the world is better than it seems; that the bitter injustices men suffer are not irreparable; that their moral efforts are not wholly futile; that

the life of the human race may have a wider significance than we can demonstrate" (p. 357).

It seems indeed highly probable that the ancient doctrine in both the East and the West, of the existence of a 'psychic organism' obeying other than purely physical mechanical laws, will have to be accepted by modern psychologists before they can explain the abnormal phenomena which are bulking ever more largely in their studies. The purely vital problems of the nature of mind proper, of spirit, of consciousness, however, will, even with this enormous extension of psycho-physical possibilities, remain where they now are awaiting the development of the 'spiritual sense' to complement the intellect, which unaided will never solve them.

Seeing then that any theory of Animism must squarely face the question of a 'psychic body,' it is to be regretted that Mr. McDougall in his history of the idea of soul has not only passed over in silence the huge mass of doctrine on the subject in the East, especially in India, but has nothing to say about even the psycho-physiology of the Alexandrian schools in the West, for instance, in which on the side of body, the postulate of a 'spirituous body' or 'æthereal vehicle' with its extensions was a fundamental dogma, while at the same time on the side of life the 'separability' of the soul (*psychê*) and the transcendency of the mind (*noûs*) were maintained. Without some such theory the phenomena of abnormal psychology and psychical research remain a hopeless chaos, while as to the facts of normal consciousness, academical psychology has, on the soul-exclusion lines, no explanation, in that the various hypotheses in fashion mutually destroy one another, if they are not otherwise patently absurd to common sense when stripped of learned verbiage. Though it cannot be said that Mr. McDougall has contributed much of a positive nature towards a soul-theory that will work, he has cleared the ground for future construction, by showing that it must be a soul-theory of some sort and not a psychology without a soul that is to solve the psycho-physical problem.

#### FLINTS AND FLASHES.

By E. H. Visiak. London (Elkin Mathews).

MR. VISIAK'S volume of verse is somewhat of a puzzle. In it we find none of the material which has become a convention in much minor poetry—roses and lilies, dead loves, broken hearts, and the

like. Indeed we are agreeably conscious that the poet has generally something to say, and many of the lyrics, particularly the more sober ones, display considerable power. Why, then, is it that Mr. Visiak's verses have not the haunting appeal of the perfect achievements of our time, and do not take their place beside the verses of W. B. Yeats, A. E., Robert Bridges, and A. E. Housman? We think the answer lies in the fact that his lines have little beauty of sound. Being rarely truly vocal, they do not sing of themselves. We are inclined, also, to think that this defect is partly intentional, that the poet, in his effort to be 'strong,' is deliberately scornful of the graces of his art. Should this be so, it is a pity that he should make use of conventionally 'poetical' words, such as *scath*, *stilly*, to say nothing of 'twas, 'tis, 'neath, 'mong. The kind of verse which would be modern and alive, must, in order to impress us with its sincerity, be simple thinking aloud—noble thinking aloud certainly—but with no additions. Mr. Lilley's brief introduction seems rather unnecessary.

C. F.

#### BIBLIOTHECA ASTROLOGICA.

A Catalogue Raisonné of Works on the Occult Sciences. By F. Leigh Gardner. Vol. II., Astrological Books. With a Sketch of the History of Astrology, by Dr. William Wynn Westcott. London (privately printed).

THIS careful and comprehensive bibliography, running to more than 1,400 entries, will be welcomed by many students handicapped to-day by the mass of irrelevant material in which the scanty traditions of a genuine astrology are hid. In the Preface, the compiler takes occasion to repudiate warmly the introduction of Herschel and Neptune into the planetary scheme—just as a loyal European might resent the discovery of America, and argue that even if there is such a place, it ought not to make any difference to us. If the ancients indeed knew nothing of these two great planets, it is conceivable that the men and women of antiquity did not respond to their particular influences, just as certain constitutions fail to respond to particular drugs. Or it may be that some *did* respond, and the astrologers were ignorant of it. To borrow Bret Harte's homely verdict—"They didn't know everything down in Judee!"

E. W.

## PAPERS ON INTER-RACIAL PROBLEMS.

Communicated to the First Universal Races Congress, held at the University of London, July 26-29, 1911. Edited, for the Congress Executive, by G. Spiller, Hon. Organiser of the Congress. London (King).

IT is impossible in a notice to give any adequate idea of the contents of the fifty-four papers that are lying before us in this interesting and instructive publication, which was taken as the basis of discussion at the recent Universal Races Congress; the ground covered is as wide as humanity and the interests are as varied as the inter-relationships of its races, nations and peoples. As, moreover, the Congress was the first of the kind that has ever been held, its programme is necessarily of an embryonic, pioneer and tentative nature. Nevertheless there are abundant signs that the sense of a moral responsibility for the well-being of humanity as a whole, is emerging into clearer definition, and that the lofty ideal of harmonious co-operation between races and peoples is being slowly brought within the range of a practical survey. One of the most salient facts that leaps forth from a number of papers is that improved environment can hasten evolution to an almost incredible extent, and that the word 'impossible' has to be used with utmost caution in face of the results already achieved. What, for instance, can be of a more surprising nature than the simple fact that the children of Murray island, the language of whose immediate parents contained words for one and two only, and expressed three by one-two, and four by two-two, are judged by their present Scotch schoolmaster to be superior in arithmetical ability to those of an average British school! Another most instructive feature of these papers is that we have native scholars writing of the traditional culture of their own people. Take for instance the North American Indians, whose cult of the Divine Spirit of Nature was so pure that they regarded the felling of trees and the tunnelling of mountains by the whites as a violation of the sanctity of their holy things! Of their religion, when they were yet free, Dr. C. A. Eastman, one of themselves, writes that the Indian "was trained from infancy to hold the 'Great Mystery' sacred and unspeakable. That Spirit which pervades the universe in its every phase and form was not to be trifled with by him in express terms. The Indian cultivated his mind and soul so as to feel, hear and see God in Nature. He distinguished clearly



between intellect and spirit, and while conceding to man superior intelligence, as evidenced by the gift of articulate speech, he perceived in the unerring instinct of the dumb creation something mysterious and divine. He had absolute faith in the immortality of the spirit, believing that the 'Great Mystery' had breathed something of himself into every human frame. The highest type of prayer was offered fasting and alone in a solitary place, if possible upon a mountain-top, and was a true communion of spirits, far above all earthly and selfish desire." Is our boasted culture after all so very far above this high ideal? Is this 'savagery,' or have we in spite of all our 'civilisation' to go back to something of the kind if we would truly know God in Nature? To pass from the Indian to the Negro; Pastor Majola Agbebi, D.D., of Lagos, is an enthusiastic defender of the best of the secret societies among his people. "The rites and ceremonies of some secret societies in Africa tally in a large measure with some of those in Europe, and while many secret societies in Europe can show no greater use than occasional deeds of benevolence, *post-mortem* benefactions, encouraging temperance and thrift, some secret societies in Africa are cults for initiation into the mysteries of womanhood, for teaching the art of midwifery and motherhood, to inaugurate funeral obsequies, to inculcate the principle of immortality or life after death, some to fulfil the rôle of a national court of appeal, some to protect trade, others to preserve national pedigree or tribal dignity, some to assist men, others to assist women, and all for, as believed by the promoters, the general well-being of society. Freemasonry in its most exalted degrees can show no better or more innocent rites than those of some of the secret societies of Africa." As to the 'native schools' for initiating children into the knowledge of manhood and womanhood; instead of crying out in feigned horror or hypocritical prudery at one of the most ancient and universal customs of mankind, would it not be as well seriously to consider our own present criminal neglect of our duty to the young in this respect? These few examples will give us pause from imagining that we have nothing to learn from, but all to teach to, nations of lower culture; it is in fact far otherwise, for this industrial age is fast forgetting entirely how to contact nature. Equally so with missionary activity; as Prof. Caldecott, in his paper on the subject, admits, "the vocations of nations and races must be accepted." And so we find the idea fast gaining ground even among the zealots, that they must be content to establish "national forms of Christianity" in Japan,

China, India and Africa. Granted, however, that a race has a vocation, that it is purposed, it cannot be said that any paper in this volume has shed light on this most vital and fundamental problem of race. Blood is a very peculiar fluid, as Goethe says, and we are to-day as far from understanding the laws of its immixtures as were our ancestors. So long as men *feel* differently, intellectual training cannot harmonise them; they must first be brought into harmony by the power of spiritual sympathy before intelligence can devise suitable methods of co-operation. The warmth of good feeling displayed at the recent Congress was a signal proof that the primary conditions for the solution of the inter-racial problem have already been realised by numbers.

#### THE LIFE OF PARACELSUS.

Theophrastus von Hohenheim—1493-1541. By Anna M. Stoddart.  
With Illustrations. London (Murray). Price 10s. 6d. net.

IN this interesting and well-written volume Miss Stoddart, who unfortunately has not lived to enjoy the fruits of her long labours, endeavours to make accessible for English readers the main results of German scholarship which for the last twenty-five years has been busied in vindicating the reputation of one of the most misunderstood pioneers of medical science and most brilliant lights of the Renaissance. The careful researches of Drs. Sudhoff, Aberle and Julius Hartmann and of Profs. Franz and Carl Stunz have rescued the life-work of Theophrastus von Hohenheim from the hands of prejudice and ignorance, and restored it to its proper place in the history of the development of European thought and culture. Miss Stoddart was burning with enthusiasm for her subject and in many ways was well equipped for her task. But that task is one of very great difficulty and few if any are fitted to deal with it in a really competent manner; for apart from normal historical, archæological, linguistic, and scientific knowledge, it requires a familiarity with the history and nature of that chaos of 'occult arts' which are the despair of the ordinary scholar and historian and which require for their elucidation life-long study and peculiar gifts. To arrive at just judgments of value in all this tangled tradition from a hoary past is not yet possible for minds inspired solely with the modern spirit, and the really com-

petent historian of this phase of human life—the only phase up to the birth of philosophy in the 6th cent. B.C., the still common phase up to the beginning of the modern period—has not yet appeared.

Miss Stoddart is understanding when she can cover certain procedures of von Hohenheim with the fashionable garments of hypnotism and telepathy; she sets it down to the credit of her hero when she finds him inveighing against traditional astrology, but has no criticism to offer of a stellar theory of his own of far more doubtful value; she commends his alchemical researches as being founded on an experimental basis, but shakes her head over his amulet-nostrums. And who indeed is not puzzled, and what modern mind would not dismiss Paracelsus as he has been dismissed into the limbo of the superstitious, were it not that this man as truly started the reformation of medical practice as Luther the reformation of religious abuse.

His one cry was Back to Nature; for every disease Nature has a remedy. Cast aside all the books and read in the Book of God, the Book he has truly written with His own hand. To cure disease, you must know disease, and know Nature at first hand. A plague on your Aristotle, Galen and Avicenna, and all their disciples, men of books, pretensions and rule of thumb, *doctorculi*! Paracelsus naturally got back what he gave, and his life is a long history of suffering under misrepresentation, abuse, persecution, and exile—a real martyrdom. Living as he did at a period when the philosophy of nature was beginning to take on a new lease of life, and being himself one of the most distinguished pioneers of the new ways, he was, like others at similar periods, filled with an enthusiasm for Nature that was inspired with the spirit of mysticism. For him, Nature or the World, the Soul and God were all one of another.

The Great Physician was God acting by means of Nature from within, the doctor was but the servant to perfect external means so that Nature might be less hampered in her perpetual task to throw off disease. To know Nature one must study her in all her multifarious aspects; no man can know her from books or in the study, he must question her face to face, must travel much and go through long labours. And indeed the teacher practised what he preached, and his life is one of long travels and of sleepless nights. And however much we may, in our fancied superiority of modern methods, criticise his works, we must confess that he led the way in these methods, and that together with his ceaseless labours of

research and experiment, he possessed as well an insight into the workings of Nature that for want of a better epithet we must call intuitive.

Of this insight he writes : " For the light of nature is a light to make men see and it is neither dark nor dim: and it must come to pass that we shall use our eyes in that light to see those things which we require to see. They will not be otherwise than they are now; but we must be otherwise able to see them, and then the light of nature will give vision to the very peasant " (p. 202). As commentary Miss Stoddart prints a letter from Lady Huggins, who claims that " the fulfilment of this remarkable prediction " is to be found in the development of spectrum analysis. We venture to think that both Miss Stoddart and Lady Huggins have entirely misunderstood the mind of von Hohenheim; he was not thinking of any mechanical aids to vision, he was speaking out of his own experience of the sight of the soul which he already possessed. The external experimental side of the work of von Hohenheim science has perfected and far surpassed, but the inner intuitive side it has so far neglected, and it is now 'stuck' and will continue in its formal rigidity until it complements external research with that quest of inner vital forces which the mystics of all times have recognised and known as the source of outer phenomena. And perhaps ere long, when we know life better, we shall be able to appreciate many of the ancient superstitions by a new scale of values, and learn at last what is the meaning of all the unreason that refuses to be catalogued in the rigid categories of the life-emptying intellect and purely practical reason, and that there may be as valuable a logic of feeling and emotion as of the mind that thinks solely matter and immobilities. Then it may be that we shall be able to appreciate still better the genius of Philippus Theophrastus Aureolus Paracelsus Bombast von Hohenheim, Doctor of Arts and of Medicine, and the rest of it, and at the same time see more clearly where he broke down. In any case it is a remarkable fact that scholars in Germany have already vindicated his claim to a niche in the temple of fame of the greatest of the Humanists and Pioneers of the Renaissance, and that too on the basis of his positive experimental researches. Miss Stoddart has done well in bringing these claims before the English-reading public, and would have added to our indebtedness had she supplied us with a full bibliography. Of books in English she refers only to Dr. Franz Hartmann's study, while she makes no mention of Mr. Waite's publications.

## ASPECTS OF ISLAM.

By DUNCAN BLACK MACDONALD, M.A., D.D., Professor of Semitic Languages at Hartford Theological Seminary, U.S.A. New York (Macmillan).

IN the July number of *THE QUEST* of last year we drew the attention of our readers to the sympathetic and instructive series of lectures by Prof. Macdonald on *The Religious Attitude and Life in Islam*, which was published in 1909. As in that series, so in the present volume, great stress is laid on the mystical element in the religion of Islam as the truly vital nucleus of the faith. There are so few of our academicians competent to treat of religion from this standpoint that we lament our loss in the translation of Dr. Macdonald from Glasgow to Hartford, U.S.A. Nevertheless it cannot be said that these lectures are free from bias, for they are again delivered under the auspices of the Hartford-Lamson foundation, whose chief object is to assist in preparing students for the foreign missionary field. The consequence is that in spite of the sympathy of the lecturer for Muslim peoples and the better way in missionary endeavour which he is so conspicuous in inaugurating, the whole treatment of the subject is subordinated to an ulterior purpose. Still it is good to find him telling his audience that what is needed in a missionary to the Muslims is "a power of fine discrimination, combined with sympathy and an appreciation of points of agreement. The missionary to them must emphatically be a large, all-round man of personality and, if possible, of mystical tendency" (p. 2). Professor Macdonald thinks that as an outcome of the present unrest and the pressure of the West on the East there lies before the Muslim peoples a "terrible religious collapse" (p. 12), and yet he believes that we can safely leave the Muslim "face to face with the Bible." In the West we have been always face to face with the Bible and our unrest has never been more poignant than to-day. It is not the Bible or any other Book, but the realisation of the actuality of religious experience and the turning of our attention to the development of the spiritual sense that we all need, as Dr. Macdonald himself insists on elsewhere. Since writing his previous book the lecturer has passed a year among the believers of Islam, chiefly at Cairo, and has had many opportunities of getting below the surface of things and into intimate contact with the religious life of the people; the consequence is that we have in these eminently readable lectures, for

the most part a simple, direct and personal narrative which brings out strongly the very great difficulties that have to be surmounted if a Westerner is ever to come at the truth of the real East, and understand an attitude which fundamentally differs in most things from his own. A single instance will suffice; while the modern West believes in 'evolution,' and strives by every means to eliminate 'miracle' from the scheme of things, the Muslim theologian "regards the world and all the events in the world as a perpetual miracle—a miracle always and constantly going on. It is not only that, by a creative miracle, the world was brought into existence; it is not only that, by an overseeing Providence, the world is maintained in existence; but all through the existence of the world—from moment to moment—there is this miraculous creation going on" (p. 137). The true metaphysic of Islam does not need a pre-established harmony nor the self-developing monads of a Leibniz. "The Will of Allah continually produced those atoms, continually reproduces them, continually combines them into forms, and so the world keeps rising, shifting, changing" (p. 144). As to the Book, the Prophet, and the history of the religion and culture of Islam, Dr. Macdonald is a very candid critic, and will doubtless give much offence to all Muslim traditionalists, who, however, should remember that we do precisely the same thing with our own traditions in the West. But the real vitality of the faith is not in tradition, it must be sought elsewhere, and in this Islam is not behindhand. "With us what is called the Inner Light has appeared here and there, in one form and another, at one time and another; but it has never, for the general body of Christendom, been the dominant element in the basis of the faith. In Islam that position has been reached" (p. 149). It is thus that the most instructive chapters of this informing book are the two on 'The Mystical Life and the Darwish Fraternities.' In them those of our readers who are lovers of Sūfism will find much to interest them, especially the reform of the Darwish orders that is being attempted, and the suppression of public exhibitions of certain religious exercises of a frequently unregulated nature. Dr. Macdonald was privileged to assist at a private service where the *zikr*, or 'remembering' of Allah, as it is called, was being practised. His description is extremely sympathetic for a Westerner, and a genuine attempt to understand what so few in the West have any conception of. Indeed the whole experience impressed him very strongly, for he writes: "I wish to say as emphatically as possible that I did feel religious reality in it; did

feel that behind all this there was a real devotional spirit; and that certain, at least, of those young men were getting something out of it that perhaps they could not have got otherwise. There was this, at any rate, to be said for it, that there was in it none of the irregularated transports, outbreaks, shriekings, which so often appear in what we call times of revival" (p. 165). This is very strong testimony from one who is an instructor of missionaries. Equally strong is his evidence that a Christian convert from Islam who had been a Darwish, and had had experiences the reality of which he never doubted for a moment, though he was puzzled how to explain them, felt greatly the lack of this help in his new religious life.

The means and foundation of religion were laid down by the Mohammedan mystics from the earliest days; what one says on this subject is typical of the rest. Thus Al-Ghazzālī writes: "In the mind [?'heart'] of man itself there is the witness of God. If man will follow the path he will attain unto the truth. For the foundation of the mystical theology, then, man must study himself; and as he follows the path, he will find certain psychological states appearing, one after another; some of them will be more permanent than others; but none will be absolutely permanent; rather, they will flit across this mirror of his mind by which he knows God. These states he must study; he must strive to lead them steadily upwards, that he himself may become purer. If he succeeds, they will become continuously more intense and lasting until, it may be, if the stories are true that are told of the most eminent of the saints, he will be able to enter, even in this life, into the utmost, the absolute felicity of the direct vision of God" (p. 199). This indeed is the end of the common mystic way wherever we find traces of it.

We will conclude this notice with a note on the short and not altogether accurate account of what Dr. Macdonald has to tell us of the Qutb and Diwān. The Muslims believe that there is "a great invisible organisation of Saints, a kind of spiritual board of administration, which, under Allah, is managing the affairs of the world. That board has a head who is called the Qutb, the Axis. He is supposed to be always the greatest Saint of his time and he lives generally invisible." He is not invisible, but often one of the best known of his day; he is, however, known as Qutb only to those who know him spiritually. "Down from this invisible, absolute Qutb there stretches a widening hierarchy. He has four assistants who can, on occasion, take his place. If he dies, one of

them will be chosen by Allah as his successor. Under this, again, there is another class of Twelve, and so the great hierarchy goes downward, widening and widening, until it embraces all the Saints, the Friends of Allah, who are alive" (pp. 204, 205). Other accounts, however, and verbal information, limit the numbers of the Diwān, and add to the grades, for they speak of the 800, the 40, the 7, the 4 and the 3. The four are called the Awtād or Pillars and the Head of all is the Qutb or Ghawth, the Pivot of the World. When Dr. Macdonald further says that there are certain places in the Muslim World that the Qutb 'peculiarly haunts,' such as the roof of the ka'aba at Mecca, he is we venture to think mistaken, and is confusing the Qutb with al-Khadir, the undying Saint of Muslim legend, the Green One, who "is supposed to have drunk of the water of immortality and now to be wandering through the Earth, carrying out the commands of Allah."

#### THEURGIA.

Or the Egyptian Mysteries. By Iamblichos. Translated from the Greek by Alexander Wilder, M.D., F.A.S. New York (The Metaphysical Publishing Co.).

THE only other translation of the *De Mysteriis* into English is the century-old version of Thomas Taylor, which was reprinted in 1895. Thirty years ago our old friend Dr. Alexander Wilder, recently deceased, published his translation in *The Platonist*, under the editorship of Mr. Thomas M. Johnson, who has done so much to revive and continue the work of Taylor. The present volume purports to be a revised and corrected edition of this translation made by Dr. Wilder himself. Unfortunately, however, Dr. Wilder did not see the proofs and there are many mistakes which the equipment of the Metaphysical Publishing Company has not been scholarly enough to rectify. The main question our readers will expect us to answer is whether Wilder's version is superior to Taylor's. The answer is: It is better on the whole, but it still leaves much to be desired. Wilder has not been able to shake himself sufficiently free of the obsession of Taylor's ungraceful phraseology in the first place, and in the second no small number of passages remain as unintelligible in the one version as in the other. It must, however, be confessed that the translation of this famous treatise, traditionally ascribed to Jamblichus, is one of great difficulty, and that it is doubtful whether the original writer had



in many passages clear notions in his own head, and was not rather indulging in 'fine writing' of a pseudo-philosophical and exceedingly nebulous nature. He is transparently engaged in an apologetic task, and we are frequently impressed with the feeling that he has not really successfully extricated himself from the dilemmas which Porphyry has put to him. We have often ourselves thought of translating this deliverance, which purports to set forth the nature of the gnosis of the gods from the standpoint of the Theurgists; but every re-perusal of the text makes it evident that without an elaborate commentary and severe critical treatment a simple translation would remain not only unintelligible but misleading. One thing is certain, that the very high value which has been set upon it among the 'faithful' is not really deserved; it requires to be set in its proper environment, re-assessed and above all things rescued from further maltreatment at the hands of so-called 'occultists,' who can neither read the original nor control it by the contemporary literature of a similar nature and a knowledge of the nature of the mystery-religions, and religio-philosophies of the time.

Dr. Wilder's translation, his vague notes and conjectures, and his 'Taylorian' attitude of mind belong really to the past. The *De Mysteriis* still awaits a translator and a commentator. The ground-work will probably first be done in Germany and then made comprehensible in English.

#### THE CHURCH AND THE AGE.

By William Ralph Inge, D.D. Dean of St. Paul's. London (Longmans, Green). Price 2s. net.

THESE are the lectures which made such a stir in the press a few months ago and earned for Dr. Inge the penny-a-liner *soubriquet* of the 'gloomy Dean.' There is, however, nothing gloomy in the Dean's point of view. For him—Christianity is essentially optimistic, a joyous struggle for an independent spiritual life; it is the tendency to secularise the Spirit of the Ages by subordinating it to the passing Spirit of the Age that is the gloomy outlook. "Secularised Christianity has neither savour nor salt." A man who tilts so courageously against the prevalent *idola fori* as Dr. Inge has done in his outspoken addresses is possessed of a cheerful enough spirit of salutary criticism, as for instance when he says: "Democracy is perhaps the silliest of all fetishes that are seriously worshipped among us. The method of counting heads instead of breaking them is no doubt convenient as a rough and ready test of strength;

and government must rest mainly on force. It is also at least arguable that democracy is at present a good instrument for procuring social justice, and for educating citizens in civic duty. But that is really all that anyone has a right to say in its favour. To talk to the average Member of Parliament, one might suppose that the ballot box was a sort of Urim and Thummim for ascertaining the divine will: that the odd man enjoys a plenary inspiration, like a Bishop of Rome when he speaks *ex cathedra*."

The lecturer says he has received many interesting letters of praise and blame, some of the latter degenerating into hearty abuse, "as if it were a kind of impiety not to float with the tide"—to which he adds the ironical parenthesis—"a feat which any dead dog can accomplish." There are three blunders which the Church should avoid when it aspires to influence the world as an institution. First the blunder of trying "to reach men's souls through their stomachs, to make a bid for popular favour by offering material advantages." Thus "Socialism always assumes that the sty makes the pig, while Christianity declares that the pig makes the sty." The second temptation or blunder is "to trust to miracles, or, as we might perhaps put it, to shortcuts." In this connection we are told: "It matters little whether cheap forgiveness is offered as the result of the magical efficacy of the Sacraments, or as the result of being 'washed in the precious blood of the Lamb.' In either case it is false. Spiritual laws are inexorable. Whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he reap—that and nothing else. We are always sowing our future; we are always reaping our past. There is no short cut to the City of God, for men or nations." The third blunder is "to use questionable means, such as violence and fraud, in the service of the Kingdom of God." We must appeal to men by what is best in them. Taking them as a whole, these four addresses, "delivered to a very quiet little society of London ladies," are one of the most vigorous pronouncements of the kind we have read for a long time; we hope that the new Dean of St. Paul's will give us a few more quiet little chats of the same kind before long.

#### AMONG THE IDOLMAKERS.

By L. P. Jacks, Editor of *The Hibbert Journal*. London (Williams & Norgate).

ADMIRERS, and there must be many of them, of Professor Jacks' arresting *Alchemy of Thought* and his delightful *Mad Shepherds*

will turn with pleasant anticipation to his last volume, which in eight sketches mingles grave with gay and commonsense with uncommon insight. It is for the most part a feast of good things, from which we would specially select 'A Psychologist among the Saints,' which quite recently appeared in *The Hibbert*, 'The Reformer's Paradise,' and 'The Self-deceivers.' The Reformer's Paradise is a sort of Garden City where there assembles a choice collection of the strangest cranks and most extravagant geniuses. It is a liberal education to be introduced to the Futurists, the Cult of Failure, the Cult of Nothing, the Cult of the Sacred Rat and the Cult of our Noble Selves, and to hygienic faddists such as the Peloptusmatists, the Dirt-eaters, the New Gorillas and the One-meal-a-day folk. 'The Self-deceivers' is a hugely amusing skit on Determinist and Libertarian dogmatism, which it invites to chew on the proposition that he who freely chooses to be a Determinist is a more consistent Libertarian than one whom logic coerces into the profession of Free-will. The two short stories 'Mary' and 'Helen Ramsden' are both good in their way, but not quite in the same category as the rest of the collection.

#### THE FAIRY-FAITH IN CELTIC COUNTRIES.

By W. Y. Evans Wentz, M.A., Stanford University, California, U.S.A., Docteur-ès-Lettres, University of Rennes, Brittany, B.Sc., Jesus College, Oxon. London (Oxford University Press). Price 12s. 6d. net.

THE nucleus of this study was first presented as a *thèse* for the *doctorat* at Rennes, then developed into a pan-Celtic form and submitted for a research degree at Oxford, and now appears further revised and expanded. It is not only a literary study but is also based on oral testimony collected personally by Mr. Wentz in Celtic countries, mostly of course from the old folk, for the younger generations are children of the modern spirit, and fairies are fudge for them. To these collections of oral fairy-lore Mr. Wentz has secured introductions by distinguished Celtic scholars, namely: Dr. Douglas Hyde (Ireland); Dr. Alexander Carmichael (Scotland); Miss Sophia Morrison (Isle of Man); the Right Hon. Sir John Rhys (Wales); Dr. Henry Jenner (Cornwall); Prof. Anatole Le Braz (Brittany). They are, however, very canny, and averse from committing themselves, except to some extent the French scholar. It is very different with Mr. Wentz himself. In the first place he dedicates his volume to our old friends 'A. E.' and W. B.

Yeats, who are not unknowing of the fairies, and he has much to say of the views of some few learned Irish seers. Altogether the book is the most remarkable volume on fairy-lore that has yet seen the light. The study is divided into four parts. The first deals with the living Fairy-Faith among the Celts themselves; the second, with the recorded and ancient Fairy-Faith as we find it in Celtic literature and mythology; the third with the Fairy-Faith in its religious aspects; and in the fourth section "an attempt has been made to suggest how the theories of our newest science, psychical research, explain the belief in fairies."

The common notion of fairies as the imaginary diminutive creatures of children's story-books will give no idea of the numerous tribes or classes of beings of all sizes which are believed to people faërydom, or in more general terms the unseen world, and all of which Mr. Wentz has to include under the general name fairy, as a result of the analysis and summary of the evidence both literary and oral. Their folk-names are legion even in Celtic lands, while beyond these borders the faith is world-wide and the names innumerable. Mr. Wentz has no little to say on comparative fairy-lore, using the term in this wide sense, but the Celtic fairy-faith is his special study, and by the term he means "that specialised form of belief in a spiritual realm inhabited by spiritual beings," which has existed from prehistoric times till to-day in the countries of the Celt. Spiritual is hardly the correct term to use for the 'unseen'; but we may let it pass as a current coin of popular speech. The material, oral and literary, which forms the major part of the work, whatever be the age of the reader, provided he is not entirely fossilised, is fascinating reading, and we doubt not that many will sympathise at least to some extent with the lament of the old Highland crofter, as rendered from the Gaelic by Dr. Carmichael:

"That is as I heard it when a tiny little fellow upon the knee of my mother. My mother was full of stories and songs of music and chanting. My two ears never heard musical fingers more preferable for me to hear than the chanting of my mother. If there were quarrels among children, as there were, and as there will be, my beloved mother would set us to dance there and then. She herself or one of the other crofter women of the townland would sing us the mouth-music. We would dance there till we were seven times tired. A stream of sweat would be falling from us before we stopped—hairful little lassies and stumpy little fellows. These are scattered to-day! scattered to-day over the

wide world! The people of those days were full of music and dancing, stories and traditions. The clerics have extinguished these. May ill befall them! And what have the clerics put in their place? Beliefs and creeds and disputations about denominations and churches! May lateness be their lot! It is they who have put the cross round the heads and the entanglements round the feet of the people. The people of the Gaeldom of to-day are anear perishing for lack of the famous feats of their fathers. The black clerics have suppressed every noble custom among the people of the Gaeldom—precious customs that will never return, no never again return.”

This gives us some idea of the atmosphere; but it is not so much the clerics that have stamped out the belief in faërydom, it is school board science and industrialism. The fairy-faith means nothing but the grossest superstition, and can mean nothing else, to all who have lost touch with nature. The fairies must be left to the poets at best, to men and women of imagination, for even among the folk they have wellnigh entirely ceased to exist even in the most remote districts. Mr. Wentz believes they still exist however for the learned seer, and we have had similar assurance given us as he has had. But how to explain it all? for to-day science tries to explain even superstition. It has never seen a fairy, but it is quite ready to explain why people think they have seen fairies. There are four theories, all equally unsatisfactory. (1) The Naturalistic theory or Animistic theory supposes that the belief arose in the attempt to explain natural phenomena by anthropomorphic reflection, or the personification of natural forces. (2) The Pigmy theory imagines that the belief grew up in the folk-memory of an actual prehistoric pigmy race. But the ‘little people’ are a comparatively small factor in the faith. (3) The Druid theory accounts for it as the folk-memory of the Druids and their magical practices. (4) Lastly the Mythological theory supposes that the fairies are the diminished figures of the old pagan divinities of the early Celts. Mr. Wentz finds himself, as against all this insufficiency, compelled to adopt the Psychological theory and would bring the whole subject within the purview of psychical research. After an elaborate enquiry and a review of psychical phenomena and theories, he comes to the conclusion:

“Therefore, since the residuum or x-quantity of the Fairy-Faith, the folk-religion of the Celtic peoples, cannot be explained away by any known scientific laws, it must for the present stand,

and the Psychological theory of the Nature and Origin or the Belief in Fairies in Celtic Countries is to be considered as hypothetically established in the eyes of Science. Hence we must cease to look upon the term *fairy* as being always a synonym for something fanciful, non-real, absurd. We must also cease to think of the Fairy-Faith as being no more than a fabric of groundless beliefs. In short, the ordinary non-Celtic mind must readjust itself to a new set of phenomena which through ignorance on its part it has been content to disregard, and to treat with ridicule and contempt as so much outworn 'superstition.' "

How much justification Mr. Wentz has for this bold conclusion we must leave the reader to discover from a perusal of the book itself. It is a careful piece of work and cannot be neglected by any who are seriously interested in the subject. In any case Section II. will appeal to all lovers of Celtic myth and legend, dealing as it does with 'The People of the Goddess Dana or the Sidhe'—the Shée of whom Erin has never lost the memory; with 'The Brythonic Divinities and the Brythonic Fairy-Faith'; and with 'The Celtic Other-World and 'The Celtic Doctrine of Rebirth.'

#### ' FALLING UPWARDS.'

Christ the Key to the Riddles of the Cosmos. By the Rev. F. W. Orde Ward, B.A. Oxford. London (Simpkin, Marshall). Price 5s. net.

READERS of Mr. Orde Ward's papers in **THE QUEST** will find much to interest them in the twenty chapters of this vigorous, stimulating and frequently brilliantly written volume. The author of the *Keeper of the Keys* and *The World's Quest*, who is also a poet of no mean ability, is an adept in paradox, as the famous phrase of Leibniz which he has chosen for his title suggests. His main thesis is that we learn by failure, by sorrow, and perhaps most of all by sin. "Sin, which poisons our happiness and even more that of others, while we choose it and indulge in it, can yet be compelled by repentance to bring forth honey as from between the ribs of death"—and hence the fall is a fall upwards. Mr. Orde Ward claims everything for Christ as the Spiritual Principle, including all science. He claims also everything good and beautiful and true in the world prior to historical Christianity for spiritual Christianity. This will be distasteful to some of his readers because it displays an arrogance that is foreign to the true things

of the spirit. Mr. Orde Ward is keen enough to see intolerance in others, and frequently quite admirable in pointing out the good of seeming evil; he has, however, his own strong prejudices. We should pay more attention to his strictures on Buddhism, for instance, if he gave more indications of having made a careful study of the subject of his animadversions. To speak of the *Bhagavad Gītā* as a Buddhist scripture and invariably to write *kharmā* for *karmā* is not calculated to give us confidence in his pronouncements. To say that the Christ and the Buddha differ from each other *toto cælo* is an amazing statement from one who elsewhere labours to reconcile opposites and tries to penetrate to the spiritual life beneath the surface of things; it is the sort of thing one expects in a parish magazine but not in a book that contains so many good things as our author's. Mr. Orde Ward is a great quoter of striking texts, aphorisms and phrases; but he forgets that most of his readers have little Latin and no Greek and that the appositeness of his citation is entirely lost for the majority without a translation. As for the Greek, moreover, it is irritating to find the accents almost invariably wrong—the fault of the printers doubtless, still there are some very persistent errors. But, we repeat, the book contains an abundance of good things, and also some trenchant and true criticisms that badly need saying.

#### HENRY CORNELIUS AGRIPPA.

La Philosophie Occulte ou la Magie de Henri Corneille Agrippa, divisée en trois Livres et augmentée d'un quatrième, apocryphe attribué à l'Auteur. Paris (Chacornac). 2 vols.

THE collection which we usually entitle *Three Books of Occult Philosophy* was first translated into French in 1727, appearing anonymously at La Haye, though attributed to a certain A. Levasseur. Under the initials R. F., the same work was done into English and published at London in 1651. We had therefore the advantage in time by a very long period indeed. Our rendering has not been reprinted within my knowledge, though one never knows what may have happened beyond the common ken in the obscure activities of America. It would appear however that France has the advantage over us at the present moment. Our version of the mid-seventeenth century is very much better than that of La Haye, and it has a pleasant archaic flavour: but the French edition now under notice is by no means a mere reprint.

It has been under the care of M. F. Gaboriau, who has "revised, corrected and completed it," making use for this purpose of the best Latin edition, issued in 1588, under the personal supervision of the author. This is properly regarded as definitive in respect of the original language, and it remains now to say that M. Gaboriau has produced an excellent version which not only deserves to be called definitive in respect of the French vesture, but is not likely to be supplanted and still less to be improved. It is interesting and a little important that it should be made available thus, as it sets aside practically any literary or indeed commercial likelihood of its being done again into English. The work has been described recently in France as the first published encyclopedia of occultism, and the statement may be accepted in a restricted sense of the expression. I ask permission to suppose that the term occultism includes the physical side of alchemy; assuredly those who have writhed in this labyrinth have found it occult in a very high sense of the word; but there is no reference to alchemy in the work of Cornelius Agrippa. It is so utterly well known to all persons concerned with these distracted byways that there would be little excuse, if indeed there were an opportunity here, to give account of its content. It is a very curious ingarnering, just thoughtful enough to rank as more than a compilation, and it is quite naturally destitute of the most rudimentary critical sense or consciousness in the proportion of things; but as it is exceedingly readable, it has been widely favoured by amateurs, and it does give some elementary knowledge on its various subjects to those who are in search of information, and can take it in hotch-potch form. There was, however, one person in the seventeenth century who was not an amateur and who admired it hugely: that was the mystic Thomas Vaughan; perhaps he came across it early in his strange life of thought, and it would rank in his mind as some books of our childhood will always rank in ours. It reminds me of a personal example—but let that pass. I felicitate the editor for reproducing the study on Agrippa by Gabriel Naudé; it shows the apologist for 'great men accused falsely of magic' in his best mood, and with more of truth in his favour than was the case in some other instances. Agrippa deserved his reputation in the Black Art for adding the words *sive de Magia* to his title in chief. In this manner he accused himself, but it was quite falsely. M. Gaboriau has also helped the accusation by supplying particular titles to each of the three Books, which are not in the Latin edition. We have thus Natural Magic, Celestial Magic and Ceremonial Magic;



but nothing less savours of sorcery, and of what is termed practical occultism by modern professors, than the sheaf of excursions beginning with the "necessity, power and profit of religion" and ending with ceremonial observances in religious rites. The apocryphal fourth book, which is a gem in its way, claims to proceed from the theory to the real business of the work, but though it was not written by Agrippa, it caught his elusive spirit, and those who were hungering and thirsting after this kind of righteousness had to go much further for the practical part. They went accordingly—to Peter de Abano; to the *Arbatel*, if their intent was moderately decent; and in the last resource, but presumably with the worst design, to the *Key of Solomon*, the *Lemegeton* and the other mysteries of uncleanness when it has passed into that particular sink over which the word 'imbecility' is written. Trithemius was the master of Agrippa, excellent and perfect in the methodising of much rubbish, and the last issue of this legitimacy was Vaughan, as I have indicated, who carried his banner at last into God's light; but I fear that he bore also, and to the end, the scars of his occult birthright.

A. E. W.

#### THE EARLIEST COSMOLOGIES.

The Universe as pictured in Thought by the Ancient Hebrews, Babylonians, Egyptians, Greeks, Iranians, and Indo-Aryans. A Guidebook for Beginners in the Study of Ancient Literatures and Religions. By William Fairfield Warren, D.D., LL.D., Member of the Royal Asiatic Society, etc. New York (Eaton & Maines), 221pp., cloth, \$1.50.

THE 'fascinating science of Comparative Cosmology'—as Dr. Warren himself calls his favourite discipline—is greatly indebted to the venerable ex-president of Boston University for a new and most valuable contribution, which deserves the closest attention of every student interested in the 'world-view' of the ancients, be it from the point of view of the comparative mythologist or historian of religions or from the standpoint of the student of the rise and growth of physical geography and astronomy. The thesis of Dr. Warren, set forth in ten chapters dealing respectively with the Hebrew, Babylonian and Arabian, with the Egyptian, the Homeric, the Indo-Iranian and the Buddhistic universe, is, in the main, that the cosmology of the cultured nations of antiquity had reached a far higher level of consistency than scholars have

hitherto supposed. He rejects, *e.g.*, as the 'wooden literalism' of interpretation, the traditional statements of our handbooks, that the Hebrew Semite regarded the sky as a solid metallic vault (*Job* 37<sup>18</sup>), the earth as a disk (*Jug, Is.* 40<sup>22</sup>), that they believed in windows or gates of heaven (*Gen.* 7<sup>11</sup>, 28<sup>17</sup>; *2 Kings* 7<sup>2.19</sup>; *Ps.* 78<sup>23</sup>, etc.), in pillars supporting heaven, etc., because he thinks that with equal right we should be forced to conclude, for example, from *Is.* 12, 'Give ear, O earth,' that the earth was believed to possess at least one ear. The world-pictures, derived from Bible texts, which are presented by Principal Whitehouse in Hastings' *Dictionary of the Bible* and by the famous astronomer Schiaparelli in his *Astronomy in the Old Testament*, are severely criticised by the author. He compares the different reconstructions of the Babylonian cosmos by I. Myer, Hommel, Jensen, Maspero, Whitehouse, and Radau, and discards them all. The characteristic feature of his own scheme—illustrated in a frontispiece plate—is that it assumes a symmetrical, inverted counterpart to the well-known square, seven-staged pyramidal tower or 'zikurrat' which is the 'mountain of all the lands,' that is the earth itself, in the Babylonian cosmological system. While the one represents the abode of the living, the other, the inverted one, is meant to represent the seven stages of the underworld which were believed by the Semites to correspond exactly to the seven 'tubkati' of the overworld. I, for one, have previously (cp. *Weltenmantel u. Himmelszelt*, p. 628) located this seven-staged Hades in the interior of the (of course hollow) mountain of all the lands. Dr. Warren, however, sets out from the two premises: (1) that for the Babylonians the abode of the Gods was to be looked for on a lofty mountain of the north, while "the south and the underworld are identical" (Winckler); (2) that they believed "when one sails out upon the ocean one finally comes down into the underworld" (A. Jeremias). Now of course it is impossible going south *per mare* to arrive at the seven superposed hells of my Babylonian cosmogram. On the contrary in Warren's table dividing the upright pyramidal tower of the overworld from its dark inverted underground counterpart by means of the 'ocean of the four seas,' such a descent by sea to Hades appears as the most natural course. If I think it still possible to adhere to my old idea—in spite of the unqualified approval which Dr. Warren has won for his theory from Prof. Sayce, from Dr. C. H. W. Johns (Cambridge) the famous translator of the Codex Hamurabbi, from my own paternal friend and teacher Prof. Hommel, Munich, from E. W. Mander,

astronomer at the Greenwich observatory, and others—it is because I do not expect two beliefs about the *au-delà* of different historical and psychological origin to harmonise perfectly with each other. There is abundant folklore evidence to show that people who buried their dead, located the abode of the deceased in the interior of the earth; others on the sea-coast, who set the corpses adrift on the open ocean in boats, etc., believed in a far-off transoceanic blessed island, where their ancestors lived; still others who believed the souls departed with the last breath of the dying or with the smoke of the funeral pyre, thought the spirits lived somewhere in the air or even in the sky, in the sun, the moon or the stars or the milky way. The Babylonians believed in an *au-delà* beyond the one ocean they knew, the Persian Gulf south of Mesopotamia; they believed in an underground Hades, and, as we learn from Macrobius (*Sat.* i. 23), also in an ‘underworld’ in the sky, which is—by analogy with the terrestrial, transoceanic Hades—located in the southern hemisphere, in the watery or winter-region of the sky. But who can prove that the Babylonians ever intended to harmonise all these conceptions into one fairly ‘consistent’ scheme? Of course, if they did, Warren’s ingenious cosmogram is more likely to meet all the exigencies than any other that could be conceived, and this admission is the greatest compliment we could pay to the sagacity of its author. I should myself readily accept Dr. Warren’s reconstruction of the Babylonian cosmos, if I had only the choice between it and the other modern reconstructions he criticises. But the situation has changed, at least for me, since I have rediscovered the authentic illustrations of the old Irano-Babylonian world-image (cp. *Weltenmantel*, figg. 76-79), by Mar Aba of Nisibis, one of the last priests at the old Mesopotamian sanctuaries, afterwards converted to Christianity in the manuscripts of Cosmas Indicopleustes, which differ as widely from Dr. Warren’s frontispiece as this does from the plates in Jensen’s or Maspero’s book. Dr. Warren’s Babylonian universe is *spherical*, the schemes of Mar Aba picture a world-house, somewhat in the shape of an ‘innovation’-trunk, with a sky in the shape of a hemicylindrical vault and—beneath it—a flat ‘firmament,’ with four walls all round, swimming like an ark on the ‘lower waters’ and containing in its interior the great cosmic mountain, round which the sun, moon and stars are believed to revolve. Moreover I have collected a mass of literary evidence, from the earliest cuneiform inscriptions up to late Christian texts, that agree perfectly with Mar Aba, in so far as they describe an oblong vaulted

and not a spherical sky,<sup>1</sup> and mention walls that confine the world, pillars that support the firmament, and 'upper waters' enclosed between the vault of the sky and the firmament ceiling in a kind of attic. I would gladly treat Mar Aba, the 'great Patrikios,' as an ignorant perverter of the old genuine Babylonian world-lore, but can I help acknowledging that the Syrian Fathers are desperately earnest in combating the spherical world-system of Greek science, in speaking of cosmic walls, behind which the nocturnal sun hides itself, of columns supporting the sky, etc.? I admit that hitherto scholars of great authority have not dreamed of connecting the figures in Cosmas with old Irano-Babylonian cosmology; they have treated them as an absurdity derived from the same Biblical passages that underlie Schiaparelli's and Whitehouse's diagrams, due to the same process of 'wooden literalist' interpretation, which is criticised by Warren. But then how am I to account for the close relation between Mar Aba's figures and all extant Babylonian and Persian texts? If "Ptolemy's spheres are those of the ancient worshippers of Anu and Sin" (Warren, p. 40), how is the desperate fight of the Syrian Fathers against the Ptolemaic world-system to be explained? Then there is the side-evidence of the extant remains of Greek cosmology. Ch. VI. of *Earliest Cosmologies*, as well as an earlier work, *The Cradle of the Human Race*, by the same author, advocate the idea "that the earth of the Iliad and Odyssey is an unsupported sphere or spheroid in the centre of the starry sphere." Dr. Warren will be pleased, beyond doubt, to find in a forthcoming book on the interpretation of Homer in Greek antiquity, by my friend Dr. August Mayer, instructor at the University of Vienna, ample proofs that the same theory has been defended two thousand years ago by famous Stoic authors, so that he can appeal for a witness to his reconstruction of the Homeric universe to Krates of Mallos with the same right as I appeal to Mar Aba of Nisibis for my Babylonian scheme. If Krates was mistaken about Homer, why, Mar Aba could have known even less about what was believed in the *bārū*-schools of Nippur, Borsippa or Eridu! But, on the other hand, if Homer knew the earth to be an unsupported sphere, how could those Ionians who were not poets and bards but the first cosmologists *ex professo*, the Thales, Anaximanders, Anaximenes, etc., still

<sup>1</sup> This is the natural view for a people living in a more or less narrow valley as the ancient Egyptians and Babylonians. The sky appears as a manifest sphere only in boundless plains or on the open sea, everywhere else its apparent shape is influenced by the unequally distant horizon.

believe that the earth had the shape of a disk, that it floated on water or on compressed air, that the nocturnal sun did not descend beneath the horizon but hid itself behind the cosmic north-mountain, etc.? On p. 23 Dr. Warren discusses the question of 'antecedent probability' with regard to the belief in a discoid earth and says: "Nature knows nothing of disks, hardly anything of discoids. On the other hand, primeval man saw spheres and spheroids on every hand. *The sun and the moon are visible globes,*" etc. But if they were visible globes why did the Pythagoreans describe them as fiery disks or Anaxagoras as holes, through which fire was pouring? In reality the sun is not and was never a *visible* globe, as it is not relieved by any shade; the moon on the contrary was discernable as a ball lighted from a distance for him who for the first time observed its variable shading with a mind which had freed itself from the dominating ideas of the all-powerful lunar mythology of a waxing and waning, dying and ever again reborn moon. But this insight was certainly acquired as the result of hard intellectual struggle, and we owe it to the sacred memory of those Greeks, who liberated for ever the human mind from the bondage of crude cosmological myths, not to degrade their ingenious discoveries to the level of commonplace truisms which are accessible even to the uncultured 'primeval man.' I admit that there was once such a world-view as that pictured by Dr. Warren, with its two polar mountains pointing with their tops in the opposite directions, the whole body of this earth hanging unsupported with an erect north-south polar-axis in the void. It is described in every detail, *e.g.*, in the Sanskrit treatise, *Sūrya Siddhānta*, and—a remarkable analogy!—underlies also the mediæval conception of the world in Dante's *Divina Comedia*. We must not forget, however, that both the Indian and the mediæval cosmography offer a most incongruous combination of the *globular* earth with the idea of polar mountains. This proves—as far as I can see—that both the Indian and the 'Dantesque' system are attempts to reconcile the idea of a spherical world with its antipodal correspondences with the entirely different idea of a stellar system revolving round a high northern elevation of an elsewhere flat earth. Indeed the cosmology of the *Sūrya Siddhānta* is very liable to show, like all extant Indian astrological treatises, a marked influence of the Hellenistic spherical world-view, while the cosmos of Dante or rather of St. Thomas of Aquin is the last result of prolonged efforts to amalgamate certain Oriental ideas about the situation of hell or the mountain of

Paradise with the purely secular cosmological system of Ptolemy, who was of course totally unconcerned with any endeavour to meet these exigencies of the Christian Church. All these considerations make me stick to my previous opinion, that the notion of a spherical earth hanging unsupported in the midst of a spherical universe is purely Greek, and that the Oriental world has never completely abandoned the more primitive idea of the world being a temple or house or tent of the divinity. This difference of opinion does not prevent me from acknowledging the high qualities of scholarship which are so manifest throughout Dr. Warren's book and to assent gladly to many of his minor theses. May the author live to give us a second enlarged edition of his work, in which all the objections raised above will be answered and possibly even victoriously removed.

R. E.

#### CHRIST IN YOU.

Anonymous. May be had of J. M. Watkins, 21, Cecil Court, W.C.  
Price 2s. net.

THIS book will affect different minds differently; some will find much in it; others, little. It exhales a spiritual, rather than an intellectual, atmosphere. It purports to come from 'the other side,' and is in the form of 'lessons' given, not by automatic writing, but by direct impression on the mind of the recipient. It seems always a pity that such a claim should be made; for, first, it tends to withdraw attention from the matter to the manner of communication; and next, even when the claim is believed to be just, this way of reception can give no slightest *authority* to what is written: it must still be judged on its intrinsic merits, just as though it had come in the ordinary way.

The book, as a whole, pleases me greatly. I like its restraint, and its simplicity of expression, and yet with the simplicity goes a depth of penetration into certain great, spiritual implicits, which ought to be self-evident to all, but are not. Its restraint is shown in this, that in all the book there are but two narrations of happenings on the spiritual plane; both relevant to the matter in hand, and not introduced merely for the love of recounting 'wonders.' Its teaching on the subject of 'evil' is—to my thinking—sound and right. It affirms that there is no such thing, save in the dream of our false imagination. It gently reproves all fears which perfect love ever casts out. Whoso fears anything but to

be false to himself and his Maker, is yet in the false imagination. In a striking passage beginning on page 97, occurs the following :

"You can lift anything into the highest place, until it becomes transmuted and purified, changing into very gold the basest metal of Earth. It is the Philosopher's Stone. The transmutation into heavenly values by our Faith. . . . This is what has taken place with your Bible. You have given it this place, and your reward is that it will always reveal the highest things to you because of this very law."

This must be so, because there can be no darkness, no evil save to unbelief. Wherever we seem to detect error, it is created quite as much by our misapprehension, as by the writer's. Therefore it is said that the converse of every proposition is as true as the proposition, if only we can find the point of view from which it would show as truth. I have no space to enlarge on this ; but am persuaded that there is much here which will repay thought and reflection.

Again, we are told that even evil which seems real to the false imagination, is meant to be a help ; as the Lord said that we could make friends of the mammon of unrighteousness. Apart from some resistance, where were the occasion of using, developing, and so becoming conscious of, capability, resolution and faithfulness to right ?

Because it deals luminously with such subjects, the book pleases me. But I am aware that some—as earnest as myself in the pursuit of good in the form of truth—will not feel about it as I do. But there is no book (as the extract given above suggests) which may not be helpful to minds of some order, if only they *expect* help from it : for "According to your faith, so be it unto you."

G. W. A.

#### LEGENDS OF INDIAN BUDDHISM.

Translated from 'L'Introduction à l'Histoire du Bouddhisme indien' of Eugène Burnouf. With an Introduction by Winifred Stephens. London (Murray). Price 2s. net.

WE cannot say that the naïve Legends of Asoka which fill this volume of the Wisdom of the East series are a very happy selection. The 'wisdom' in them is hard to discover, while the childishness of monkish imagination is only too apparent on almost every page. We are so used to be served with a substantial fare in this useful series that the contrast is all the more pronounced.

## THE DESIRE FOR QUALITIES.

By Stanley M. Bligh. London (Frowde).

MR. BLIGH'S book is written for the general, we may say for the very general, reader, as a guide for the formation of personality and conduct by psychological methods and *data*. He bases his exposition upon the importance of 'values' in any scheme of life, and upon the varieties of ways in which these valuations are constructed—personal, pragmatic, æsthetic and social; the ultimate purpose being a philosophy of life by which a stable equilibrium may be retained between the desires of the individual and the needs of the State. The first part of the book deals more with the individual as swayed by his own valuations, the second, with the counteracting forces of general opinion. The author appears rather in the guise of a physician visiting the various psychical bedsides of patients; his manner is entirely correct, his diagnoses unimpeachable, and his opinion regarding treatment entirely non-committal. That is the chief fault to be found in the book. Treatises on social psychology (which Mr. Bligh considers in a very rudimentary stage, though it is now many years since Gustave Le Bon's admirable work on *Crowd Psychology* appeared, ever since when many accretions to the subject have been added) must either take the form of a technical and authoritative text-book (in which case the matter is treated scientifically and impersonally), or that of a vivid and personal point of view that stimulates, even if it turns out to be wrong.

Now, far from being stimulated by Mr. Bligh's point of view in his book, which is designedly not a 'treatise,' it is almost impossible to elicit anywhere a definite opinion of his own, except of the most obvious nature. For instance, in dealing with psychological correctives for mental weaknesses he says: "The remedy for licentiousness is discipline and the cultivation of purity." Again, on 'Melancholy': "Its remedies are plenty of activity, good conversation and bright social life, especially with those of the opposite sex." Again on 'Frittering away Time': "Its remedies are the cultivation of a greater sense of individuality, and of the sense of pleasure in taking responsibility." Well, well! It is hardly necessary to 'call in a doctor' to prescribe so obvious a treatment.

It is the same when general movements, such as Feminism, are sketched by the author. If the curious reader expects a



definite point of view as to how Feminism is to react upon the social organisation and what important *data* psychology will gather from its activity in our life, he will be given, not bread, nor even yeast, but the following stone: "Individual psychologists will naturally take different sides, but all ought to learn very much from what is going on," and so on. Of course they will, but what side does Mr. Bligh take, and how much does he learn from what is going on? We are not told.

In the chapter on 'Mental Discourse,' where importance is laid upon the practice of keeping the mind active by systematic trains of thought, we read that one advantageous result will be an original trend of character. "There is so much hackneyed repetition of the thoughts of others that the merest scintilla of originality will generally seem very attractive, even if it only amounts to the restatement of an old thought in a new form." We wish there were more 'restatements in a new form' in the book. It is too much interlarded with quotations from the 'thoughts of others.' Nietzsche, Benedetto Croce, G. Tarde, Tolstoy, McDougall, Mill, Brandes, Archdale Reid, Da Vinci, Mrs. Besant, Oscar Wilde are solicited,—and too frequently answer; and we are continually 'referred' to William James and other authors, just when the subject is becoming interesting. But we do not fail to note that Mr. Bligh takes an extremely earnest interest in his subject; and his book will certainly direct the novice's attention to the wide prospects which open to all lovers of Experimental and Social Psychology.

E. C. T.

#### PSYCHICAL RESEARCH.

By Sir W. F. Barrett, F.R.S., Professor of Experimental Physics  
in the Royal College of Science for Ireland, 1873-1910.  
London (Williams & Norgate). Price 1s. net.

It is symptomatic of the change of attitude with regard to such studies that the editors of 'The Home University Library of Modern Knowledge' should have included a volume on Psychical Research, and they are to be congratulated on their choice of Sir William Barrett, who has been so prominent in the work of the S.P.R. since its foundation thirty years ago, as the exponent of its objects, methods and record. It is also further symptomatic of this change of attitude when we learn that the essential portion of the late F. W. H. Myers' *magnum opus* on *Human Personality*

is now included in the examination for the Fellowship in Mental and Moral Philosophy in Trinity College, Dublin—"the highest prize in that famous university." It would, we think, be a step forward in the right direction if some knowledge of the subject were also required from all candidates for the medical and clerical professions. The subjects that are considered in this necessarily concise survey cover a very wide range; in the words of the author, "from *unconscious muscular action* to the mysterious operation of our subconscious self; from *telepathy* to apparitions at the moment of death: from *hypnotism* and the therapeutic effects of suggestion to crystal gazing and the emergence of hidden human faculties; from *clairvoyance*, or the alleged perception of objects without the use of the ordinary channels of sense, to *dowsing*, or the finding of underground water and metallic lodes with the so-called divining rod; from the reputed *hauntings* of certain places to the mischievous pranks of *poltergeists* (or boisterous but harmless ghosts whose asserted feats may have given rise both to fetishism and fairies); from the *inexplicable sounds* and movement of objects without assignable cause to the thaumaturgy of the spiritualistic *séance*; from the scribbling of *planchette* and *automatic writing* generally to the alleged operation of unseen and intelligent agents and the possibility of experimental evidence of human survival of death."

The very cautious wording of this catalogue, and the qualifications 'reputed,' 'alleged' and the rest, are, as far as the phenomena are concerned, largely removed by the exposition of Sir William Barrett; the phenomena for the most part occur, how they should be named and how they should be explained will doubtless be matters of doubt and controversy for many a long year to come.

What is established on the surest foundation is the fact of telepathy, or 'feeling at a distance,' a word first used by Mr. Myers to cover, as he himself states, "all cases of the communication of impressions of any kind from one mind to another independently of the recognised channels of sense. Telepathy may thus exist between two men in the same room as truly as between one man in England and another in Australia, or between one still living on earth and another long since dead." Of course many of his colleagues have not gone with Myers so far as the last clause carries us. But taking it at a minimum, most of those who have studied the subject will agree with Sir William Barrett when he writes: "The tremendous and far-reaching implications involved in the fact of telepathy render its discovery of the utmost impor-

tance to philosophical and religious thought, as well as to psychology. . . . Obviously telepathy renders a purely materialistic philosophy untenable, and furnishes the prospect of a far more perfect interchange of thought than by the clumsy mechanism of speech. It affords a rational basis for prayer and inspiration, and gives us a distant glimpse of the possibility of communion without language, not only between men of various races and tongues, but between every sentient creature, which if not attainable here may await us all in that future state when 'we shall know even as we are known.' "

Of the *modus operandi* of telepathy we, however, as yet know next to nothing, for, as Sir William says, "It is highly probable that the conscious waking self of those concerned takes no part in the actual telepathic transmission. The idea or object thought of in some way impresses the subliminal self of the agent, and this impression is transferred, doubtless instantaneously, across space, to the inner subconscious self of the percipient. Here, however, a favourable moment may have to be awaited before the outer or conscious self can be stimulated into activity. . . . It is quite possible, therefore, that if we knew how to effect this transfer, unfailingly and accurately, from the outer to the inner self and *vice versa*, telepathy would become a universal and common method of communicating thought."

If psychical research had established nothing else, the fact of telepathy alone is worth all the labour that has been bestowed upon it. But what is this subliminal self or transliminal or whatever we choose to call it, which psychical research seems forced to postulate to cover a vast range of its phenomena? It is doubtless a familiar enough hypothesis to most of our readers, but there can be no harm in repeating the graphic phraseology with which the general notion is set forth in this little volume. "Just as experimental physics has shown that each sunbeam embraces a potent invisible radiation, as well as the visible radiation we perceive, so experimental psychology affords evidence that each human personality embraces a potent hidden faculty or self, as well as the familiar conscious self. Mr. Myers, using the psychological conception of a threshold or *limen*, has termed the former the *subliminal self*. This expresses all the mental activities, thoughts, feelings, etc., which lie beneath the threshold of consciousness. This threshold must be regarded not so much as the entrance to a chamber but rather as the normal margin of the sea in the boundless ocean of life. Above this margin or ocean level

rise the separate islands of conscious life, but these visible portions rest on an invisible and larger submerged part. Again, far beneath the ocean surface, all the separate islands unite in the vast submerged ocean bed. In like manner human personality rears its separate peaks in our waking conscious life, but its foundations rest on the hidden subliminal life, and submerged deeper still lies the Universal ocean bed, uniting all life with the Fount of life. Sleep and waking are the tides of life, which periodically cover and expose the island peaks of consciousness. Death may be regarded as a subsidence of the island below the ocean level; the withdrawal of human life, from our present superficial view, which sees but a fragment of the whole sum of human personality."

The image halts, but it will serve to give some notion of the idea, which is thus dimly envisaged. The scientific study of the complex phenomena of psychical research is only just beginning, but it has not been unfruitful. Take, for instance, only the very cautious report on the now famous 'Census of Hallucinations' organised by the S.P.R. in 1884; it is startling enough for the sceptic to read the verdict: "Between deaths and apparitions of the dying person a connection exists which is not due to chance alone. This we hold as a proved fact. The discussion of its full implications cannot be attempted in this paper;—nor perhaps exhausted in this age."

As to the psychical in general, its dangers and fascinations, we have sufficiently set forth our ideas elsewhere in the present number, and it is necessary in conclusion only to recommend Sir William Barrett's little volume as an interesting and useful contribution to the literature.

#### RELIGION AND MODERN PSYCHOLOGY.

A Study of Present Tendencies, particularly the Religious Implications of the Scientific Belief in Survival; with a Discussion on Mysticism. By J. Arthur Hill. London (Rider). Price 3s. 6d. net.

MR. HILL has already given us a sensible volume on *New Evidences in Psychical Research*. He writes well and frankly and tries hard to be impartial, without fear or favour. The two chapters on popular sentiment regarding survival are of special interest as they bring out very clearly how nebulous and indifferent is popular feeling on the subject. Judging by the results of the question-

naire inaugurated by Dr. Schiller, a real desire for what used to be thought the orthodox heaven is very rare, not only so but a good many of the answerers asserted that they would prefer annihilation to it. The old eschatological ideas seem to be fast disappearing, and the view that is making most headway for the moment is that things are not so very different after death, at any rate in the lower stages. The last half of Mr. Hill's book is devoted to a consideration of mysticism; to it he applies the test of character, and for his own part finds that the 'twice-born,' as he calls them, are by no means so superior in this respect to the 'once-born,' as they frequently imagine themselves to be. It takes all kinds of people to make up humanity, and it by no means follows that mystics as such are the highest characters. "The mystic has his experience," writes Mr. Hill; "we have ours. He says, perhaps, that his brings knowledge which we cannot attain to. Well and good: let him act out the knowledge, for from him to whom much is given, much is required. He says that he has greater happiness than we—though perhaps he has greater depressions, which we hear less about; and, if so, we bid him be thankful but not vain-glorious. He lives his life, we ours. It takes all sorts to make a world. In the complete organism of humanity there are many functions, and presumably somehow right and necessary; to one man is allotted this, to another that. There are humorous and non-humorous, Barham and Wordsworth; tough-minded and tender-minded, pagan and saint, Haeckel and Marguerite-Marie, St. Thomas and St. John; as there are red and white corpuscles in our blood, both useful, both necessary, yet very different from each other. In the higher synthesis of the whole body they are seen to be equally right. So with different minds. Seen *sub specie æternitatis*—from the point of view of the whole—they may very well be equally right, equally useful." All of this is very true; we badly want some term, however, to represent a balanced and sane development towards the realisation and practical expression of this 'wholeness' which is potential in every man. We are no admirers of unbalanced mysticism; for sanity and health every rapture should be balanced by a proportionate return to the normal. Nevertheless monotonous normality does not represent progress, and spiritual re-birth is a fact of inestimable importance for humanity.

## THE RE-HABILITATION OF PURGATORY.

**The Life Hereafter: Thoughts on the Intermediate State.** By Edward Hicks, D.D., D.C.L., Fellow of King's College, London, Vicar of Fairfield, Liverpool. London (Robert Scott). Price 2s. net.

**Here and Hereafter.** By the Rev. J. E. Watts-Ditchfield, M.A. London (Robert Scott). Price 3s. 6d. net.

THE timidity of the orthodox on the subject of after-death conditions is being more and more forcibly challenged both by the scientific pronouncements and lay opinions of the day. Dr. Hicks approaches the problem boldly and sympathetically from the Anglican standpoint in a course of six addresses, here republished with supplementary notes. Granting at the outset that "Protestantism has pursued a tradition of *ignoring*, through excess of caution, any definite line of view concerning the life beyond the grave," he contends that the denial of an intermediate state is a modern heresy based on a certain interpretation of Scripture texts ("it was in all our hymns and little books fifty years ago") which takes all hope away, from the moment of death, and removes all possibility of subsequent growth or illumination or discipline. He then endeavours to show, from the words of the New Testament (1) that faculty and character may be developed after bodily death, (2) that therefore 'salvation' may still be open to "those who aforetime were disobedient," (3) that the resurrection of the body need not mean 'of the flesh' and (4) that the personal identity may survive and grow in a form not physical.

Mr. Watts-Ditchfield leans rather to 'excess of caution'; he nevertheless yields all the points submitted by Dr. Hicks, and indeed says, "it is reasonable to suppose that the saints of God in Hades may grow and develop in knowledge and character, *and may be changed from glory to glory*." He falls back, however, on the old argument as to the precise meaning of the word translated 'everlasting' in the texts relating to future punishment. Dr. Hicks—more wisely, to our thinking—goes straight for the difficulty as to the nature of 'time,' and cuts the knot by saying: "It may be that in *that* world duration is not measured by our sense of time, but that a thousand years may be as one day." Thus do our latest philosophies gradually filter through into the ancient Establishment, "through chinks which time hath made."

E. W.

# THE QUEST.



## THE LOGIC OF THE EMOTIONS.

WILLIAM BROWN, M.A., D.Sc.

THE problem which I wish to discuss under the above title is that of the general relation of Thought to Feeling. The psychology of the feelings or emotions has been sadly neglected in the past, and to this neglect may be attributed the predominantly intellectualistic character of the great philosophical constructions of history. In the writings of most of the classical philosophers the emotions are treated either as cases of confused thought, or as forms of consciousness essentially distinct from thought, a hindrance to it, and therefore fit only to be brought into entire subjection to it. A remarkable development of what may be called the 'psychological sense' in recent years has thrown these views into disfavour. Modern psychologists for the most part agree that the emotions are to be organised and controlled, not suppressed. Yet their account of the supposed way in which such control is exercised fails to produce complete conviction, because based upon the earlier view of an

entire disparity of thought and feeling which makes any interaction between them inconceivable. The pragmatists take a step further in their adoption of a utilitarian criterion of truth, thus making a place for feeling within thought itself; and M. Bergson, although he hardly mentions the term feeling, carries the movement still further in the same direction in his 'intuitional method,' which he postulates as a necessary complement to the ordinary abstract intellectual form of knowledge. This is strikingly illustrated by the fact that while Bergson identifies intuition with the insight of instinct, McDougall (to some extent following Schneider and Ribot) regards emotion as the inner or subjective side of instinct.

The full philosophical significance of this trend in modern thought is well deserving of special study, but owing to lack of space in this paper, I cannot do more than just refer to it. A preliminary *psychological* investigation is indispensable, and it is to this psychological investigation that my energies will be devoted in the following pages. Waiving for the time being all considerations of validity, I shall endeavour to describe and classify actual cases of the mingling of thought and feeling, and show how processes of reasoning may occur dominated by emotional tendencies and containing, as elements in the argument, emotionally-tinged concepts and judgments. The only writer, so far as I know, who has considered this question is the French psychologist, Th. Ribot, and it is to his excellent book, *La Logique des Sentiments*, that I am indebted for many of the arguments and examples that follow.

It is not easy to give a short and concise definition of emotion, although everyone knows what is meant by



the word. In such widely-differing emotional states as anger, suspense, fear, joy, antipathy, admiration, what are the common characteristics which induce us to classify them all under the same heading?

In the first place, each of these states involves a more or less extensive disturbance of the internal organs, especially in the form of changes in the vascular and muscular systems. The rate and depth of breathing, the rate and force of heart-beat, the tension of voluntary muscles, the secretory activity of glands, etc., may all undergo a change. It was the belief of James and of Lange that the organic sensations aroused by these changes are the essential part of emotion, indeed that any particular emotion may be fully described as a mere sum or synthesis of organic sensations mingled in certain proportions as regards intensity.

Secondly, each emotion tends to be directed towards some object. We are angry with somebody or at something, we feel antipathy towards somebody, we hope for something, etc. The object may at first be vague and undefined, as when we wake up in a bad temper, but our anger in this case quickly finds some object upon which it fixes and feeds itself.

Thirdly, every emotion is based upon some instinctive impulse; thus anger is based upon the instinct of pugnacity, fear upon that of flight, etc. Emotional reactions show all the generally-accepted characteristics of instinctive activities.

They are *innate*, that is they do not require to be learnt in the course of individual experience, even although they may not become manifest until some (longer or shorter) time after birth. They are *specific*, that is they appear in all normal members of the

human race. Finally, they are *relatively fixed*, showing little variation from individual to individual.

Emotional consciousness is almost invariably found permeated to a greater or less degree with intellectual elements—perceptions, ideas, etc.—but it is well to bear in mind that cases do occur in which such intellectual elements are entirely absent.

As examples we may mention the feeling of joy and exaltation produced by hashish and similar drugs, the state of depression or melancholy found during the incubation period of many mental diseases, etc. The evolution of the emotional consciousness is, however, in every case conditioned by a corresponding evolution of the intellectual powers. The more 'idealised' forms of emotion can only be experienced by individuals of developed intellect. The order of development follows that of the intellectual products, perception, generic image, word concept, abstract concept. Yet perhaps even here we ought to admit certain very rare exceptions in which moral, *i.e.* emotional, insight is in advance of intellectual development, not only in the individual but also in the race.

Emotions may be classified as primary or simple, and derivative or complex. The latter are more or less complex syntheses of members of the former class. This scheme of classification is that suggested by Ribot, and is accepted by McDougall and other psychologists. I cannot, however, entirely convince myself of its validity, and (to my mind) it should be adopted with caution.

Ribot determines his list of primary emotions by reference to the order of appearance of the different emotions in the course of development of the child's consciousness, regarding those only as primary which

appear as entirely new forms of consciousness. McDougall employs other criteria, but his list corresponds closely with that of Ribot. Thus anger, fear, curiosity, positive and negative self-feeling appear in both.

An intellectualised form of emotion which deserves an important position in the psychology of the subject is that which Shand calls a *sentiment*, and Ribot a *passion*. The conceptions of these two writers are by no means identical, although they refer to approximately the same experiences. In Shand's use of the word, 'sentiment' refers to all forms of love or hate of persons or things, and differs from emotion in being, rather, a complex system of emotional dispositions centred about the idea of some object. In the case of any particular sentiment, such as love for some particular person, different emotions are aroused under different circumstances, and in Shand's opinion all these emotions should find a place in the definition. Ribot, on the other hand, distinguishes this same type of experiences, under the name of 'passion,' from emotion by defining it as a prolonged and (in many cases) intensified emotion dominated by a fixed idea. In his view, the relation between emotion and passion is analogous to that between the acute and chronic forms of a disease. While "emotion is in the order of feeling the equivalent of perception in the intellectual order," "passion is in the affective order what an imperative idea (*idée fixe*) is in the intellectual order." These two accounts in some degree supplement one another, and the correct description is doubtless to be found somewhere between them. Perhaps it will prove necessary to employ both terms as applying to slightly different experiences, or to regard sentiment as a more

complex and more highly developed form of certain passions. We must at least recognise that Ribot classifies as passions mental states like timidity and jealousy which do not in the least conform to Shand's definition of sentiment. Space does not allow of any further discussion of the matter here.

The influence of the sensibility upon the intelligence is a well-worn theme of logicians and psychologists of an earlier age, but it has not hitherto been generally recognised how closely the feelings or emotions can mimic the plan of reasoning followed by pure intellect, and take on a form rivalling the syllogism in correctness and cogency. We find brief references to the 'logic of the feelings' in the writings of A. Comte and J. S. Mill, but Ribot, a psychologist of our own day, is the first to give a detailed analysis of its forms of procedure. Ribot contrasts the two logics, that of the intellect and that of the emotions, in the following passage :

*The logic of the intellect*, in its correct form, is determined by the nature and the objective order of the phenomena, whether it makes an assertion or whether it makes a conjecture, as in scientific discovery. It is constituted by intellectual states (perceptions, images, especially concepts) as free as possible from all emotional taint. *The logic of the emotions* is determined by the subjective nature of the reasoner who undertakes to establish, either for himself or for others, an opinion, a belief. Its origin is in a positive or negative desire which pursues a simulacrum of proof. It is constituted principally by 'values,' that is concepts or judgments varying according to the disposition of the feeling or the will. Among these values the end set up determines the choice of some and the rejection of others.<sup>1</sup>

Let this passage serve as a brief indication of the topic to be discussed in the rest of my paper.

<sup>1</sup> *La Logique des Sentiments* (Paris, 1905), pp. 61, 62.

It is well known that one school of psychological thought, the 'associationists,' would explain all forms of reasoning in terms of association, and association alone. Although this school is now becoming extinct, there is still a danger that in the matter of the feelings associationist views may be accepted as satisfactory and sufficient, and we must, therefore, prepare the way for our main discussion by briefly considering the relation of association to thought in both realms of experience. The laws of association in the intellectual field are generally said to be two in number, *viz.* that of contiguity and that of similarity, but the latter may be further analysed into assimilation and association by contiguity. Thus in meeting a person reminding one, by his appearance, of an old friend, there is aroused first a feeling of familiarity, or sameness with some past experience, and then by contiguity, elements of difference belonging to one's friend attach themselves, and the memory of the friend arises to full consciousness. Reasoning is conditioned by these processes of association, but is quite different from them in nature. The element of reasoning is the judgment, in which one thing is predicated of another. Association may be the cause of these two things appearing simultaneously or in immediate succession in consciousness, but judgment involves, over and above this, an act of identification which has induced some logicians to assimilate it to the process of volition. Others see in it a form of 'obligation,' which is perhaps a truer view. In any case, there is a completeness and finality about a judgment which conclusively marks it off from an association. Associations occur in trains or series, with no definite natural terminus. The judgment

takes an association, and by the act of judging sets it apart as an entity fixed and complete. The formal type of reasoning is, of course, the syllogism, consisting of two judgments, or the premisses, and a conclusion. Intellectual reasoning does not invariably or necessarily fall into syllogistic form, and a conclusion may not be drawn until a much larger number of premises have been considered, although in this case the chain of reasoning can be formally analysed into a series of syllogisms following one another. The essence of reasoning is summed up by Boole in the sentence: "Reasoning is the elimination of the middle term in a system which has three terms."

Turning to emotional states, we find much uncertainty as to the forms of association which they may exhibit. In many cases the association is one between the intellectual elements in the emotional process. There is the well-known law of transfer of feeling, where an intense feeling accompanying some intellectual state spreads to other intellectual states associated by contiguity or similarity with the former. The feeling of respect for the person of the King spreads to things connected with him in thought, such as the sceptre, the throne, etc. Love for a child spreads to his toys, his clothes, his cot. The converse of this is also very familiar. A particular mood or emotional state tends to call up associated ideas in harmony with itself, and these only. When one feels gloomy evidence of misfortune is observed whichever way one looks. The only form of association which seems to connect purely emotional states is that of association by contrast. A joyous experience calls up memories of sorrow. A marriage may remind one of a funeral. But this phenomenon is probably entirely different in

nature from the intellectual form of association of the same name. The latter is a derived form, this one is merely the reflection in consciousness of the tendency of the organic functions to follow a rhythm or alternation of states of exaltation and of depression, of increased and diminished nervous activity.

Emotional reasoning is conditioned and partly sustained by association, but, like intellectual reasoning, is in essence quite different from it. The two forms of reasoning are identical in that they seek middle terms which, expressed in judgments (the premises), lead to a conclusion; but whereas for intellectual reasoning this conclusion is at the beginning unknown, and is a discovery of objective fact, for emotional reasoning it is an end to be attained, an end determined by subjective emotional needs, and the middle terms or concepts which appear in the premisses are what may be called value-concepts or simply values, since they correspond to the needs and desires of the emotional consciousness. The two forms of reasoning have a common origin in the attempts at devising means to a practical end which engaged the attention of our early ancestors, and is even at the present day the only equivalent of reasoning to be found among savage tribes. In the course of experience, some of these means were found to be successful, some unsuccessful, and some indifferent. The first two classes of results gave birth, in the course of long ages, to the scientific conception of a relatively fixed objective order in the universe, and are the source of our modern intellectual logic. The third class is a survival which still sustains our emotional logic, for the simple reason that we cannot in every case become absolutely sure as to what is or is not indifferent

or irrelevant to the result obtained. To quote Ribot once more :

It is certain that the primitive reasonings which have succeeded by virtue of their rationality, that is to say by virtue of their adaptation to the nature of things, were not purely rational, but mingled with emotional and imaginative elements which were esteemed of equal value: all this formed one indiscriminated mass. We know how permeated primitive technique is with hieratic elements. Operations as profane in our eyes as the fabrication of an instrument or the building of a hut require, in the view of the uncivilised, a supernatural intervention, prayers, sacrifices, incantations, various rites, magic formulas. According to his manner of reasoning, these are indispensable intermediaries to the attainment of the end. It is the part played by the logic of the feelings, and the other (intellectual logic) still remains half hidden in this primitive mass. It is not until after a long education by experience that the irrelevance, the futility of these means clearly appears, and the emancipation of rational logic is complete.<sup>1</sup>

If we limit ourselves to this view we shall have to admit that the logic of the emotions is merely a special form of sophistical reasoning, to be placed in the same class with the various types of fallacy familiar to logicians from antiquity. Indeed, the examples to which I shall presently refer are all of this nature. Nevertheless, such a view would be far too extreme, since it would impute invalidity to our entire system of values.

Scientists are too ready to deny validity to so-called 'subjective' processes of consciousness—and all values are in a way subjective—and if in this there is some excuse for the physical scientists there is none for the psychologists, who are not limited to a merely external view of their facts, as the former are. A truer estimate of the significance of values is that shown by



Lotze when he says: "There where two hypotheses are equally possible, the one in harmony with our moral needs, the other in conflict with them, we should always choose the former." But I have renounced for the time being all consideration of the question of validity, and wish to limit my attention to psychological fact. Emphasis is at the present day frequently laid upon the distinction between 'existential' judgments or judgments of fact, and judgments of value. We must, however, bear in mind that values are themselves facts, they are forms of consciousness, and the judgments about them are still existential judgments. In this sense, psychology as a natural science can deal with them without having to plunge into metaphysics.

The conscious processes involved in emotional reasoning are partly intellectual, *i.e.* representative, and partly emotional, but it is the emotional aspect that predominates. For this reason, the elements in the logical demonstration are called values or value-concepts. Kreibig defines value thus: "By value in general, I mean the importance which the content of a sensation or of a thought has for the subject by virtue of the actual emotion or emotional disposition combined with this content either immediately or by association." The same writer holds that "the sphere of evaluation coincides with that of practice; the theory of values coincides with practical philosophy." As examples of values one may mention, in ethics the concepts of the chief good, happiness, justice, solidarity, etc., in politics those of monarchy, democracy, anarchy, etc., in æsthetics those of the beautiful, the ugly, the sublime, etc. What is a value for one person may be a non-value for another.

Ribot distinguishes two main types of emotional

reasoning according to the nature of the major premiss or general principle from which the argument sets out. In one the point of departure is a *desire*, and the reasoning process takes the form of the solution of a problem, *i.e.* it is inductive. The art and science of divination in all its forms is a good example of this type. It is based upon an intense desire to look into the future. In it we find affective elements, imaginative elements and rational elements. Among the first there is "the intense desire, uncriticised (*i.e.* free from any inhibition by rational judgments), which produces the belief that a supernatural power, God or Destiny, will reply by some special means to the question asked."

The means employed in asking the question are not fixed but vary according to the individual's preferences or according to tradition. The answer may be 'deduced' by an elementary process of emotional reasoning, *e.g.* by affective analogy, an analogy between emotional states, not between perceptions or ideas; thus the howling of a dog at night presages death. Or again by affective contrast; an unpleasant dream is of good, not bad, omen. When the reply is of doubtful meaning, the enquirer leans towards an optimistic or pessimistic interpretation, according to his temperament or momentary mood. The imaginative element present is that of symbolism. Perceptions are given symbolic meaning; "the manifestations of nature and of humanity have not only their face value but also a hidden significance, an occult meaning" needing special interpretation. The rational element requires no explanation and is illustrated by the elaborate calculations of astrology. We must not forget to note, in conclusion, the tendency a believer

has to attach more importance to one success in prediction than to many failures.

The second type may be called 'justificative' reasoning and has for its point of departure a *belief* or prejudice which the believer seeks to justify by special reasons, convincing to himself and his fellow-believers by virtue of their emotional coefficients, but unconvincing to others. Belief in a man, a government, a nation, produces emotional reasoning of this nature. Mr. Balfour has remarked on the great disparity in the premisses which different moralists take as their starting point and the strange unanimity of their conclusions. Can it be that all moral philosophy is merely a form of emotional reasoning? Is a purely rational demonstration either conceivable or desirable?

It is in the field of religious experience that justificative reasoning most abounds. In explaining cases of unanswered prayer and unmerited misfortune its scope is wide.

Other types of emotional reasoning less complete than those just described are the reasoning of the passions, the unconscious emotional reasoning that may be assumed to be at the base of all conversions, of whatever kinds, and finally a form which Ribot names mixed or composite on account of a slight predominance in it of intellectual logic, and which is well illustrated by the various forms of oratory and their effects upon an audience.

As an instance of the reasoning of the passions let us take the case of *timidity*, which Ribot regards as a passion because it is the emotion of fear become permanent and obsessive. It is social in form and only appears as between man and man. Hartenberg

has called it an 'affective hyperæsthesia.' It is this which constitutes the major premiss of the emotional train of reasoning which follows. Dugas has given a penetrating account of the timid person's state of consciousness.

Excess of sensibility develops in him a penetrating clairvoyance. . . . His perspicacity, however, is of a very special form. It is based on signs or indications, not on proofs; it is made up of impressions, not of judgments; it is sure of itself but does not discuss or justify within itself. It is the intuition or rather the rapid interpretation of spontaneous movements, words, the tone of the voice, facial expression and gestures. . . . It is opposed to the reflective judgment which we should pass on people according to their character and their acts as observed in cold-blood. Many minds trust more to their impression than to their judgment. But, in fact, the penetration of the timid person is not sure; passion guides it but also leads it astray. Its lucidity has all the resources but also all the imperfections of instinct.<sup>1</sup>

The intuitions and impressions referred to in this passage correspond to the judgments of value of our general scheme. The conclusion of the process of reasoning is a general view of life, egoism, pessimism, misanthropy, which sums up and systematises the mind's activity. It will be observed that this type of reasoning is only one stage removed from mere association of ideas governed by an affective basis. The difference is that in the former case the passion exerts a selective influence of an intellectual or cognitive kind.

The mode of arrangement of the judgments of value employed to reach a conclusion is most typically exemplified in the mixed form of reasoning found in oratory. Whereas the concatenation of arguments or judgments in intellectual logic is a linear one,

<sup>1</sup> *La Timidité : Etude psychologique et morale* (Paris, 1898), pp. 56f.

the terms in emotional logic exhibit the two forms of arrangement of *accumulation* and *gradation* under the unifying influence of the dominant tendency towards an end which represents the major premiss of the argument. In the first of these the terms are massed together anyhow, in the second they follow an order of continually increasing persuasiveness. It would be superfluous to give illustrations of these processes, as examples are familiar to everyone.

In the preceding pages I have endeavoured to show how feeling or emotion may not only confuse and hinder thought, but may also take the place of abstract thought and exhibit an emotional logic which leads to definite conclusions along lines of argument determined according to fixed rules. Judged by the standard of intellectualist logic, such conclusions can never be regarded as more than accidentally valid, in cases where they are valid at all. Nevertheless, emotional logic is as fundamental a characteristic of the mind's mode of working as is formal logic itself, and will persist so long as human nature remains what it is. Whatever the verdict of logicians may be upon its validity, the description and analysis of its nature as a process in time form a task of the utmost importance and interest for the psychologist,—a task which he has hitherto almost entirely neglected.

WILLIAM BROWN.

## THE MYSTIC PILGRIMAGE IN SIBERIA: SŁOWACKI'S 'ANHELLI.'

MONICA M. GARDNER.

IN the first half of the nineteenth century, a great romantic literature arose in Poland. National, idealistic, strongly tinged with a peculiar form of patriotic mysticism known by the name of Polish Mesyanism, it was inspired by the terrible sufferings that swept down upon the Polish nation after the Rising of 1830. Written for the most part by exiles, by wanderers on the face of the earth, whose lives were darkened with the miseries of their own lot and with their grief for their country, it breathes the deepest sadness. Yet not one of those poets who gave voice to their passionate sorrow in inspired song failed to look with hope, or rather with certainty, to the resurrection of the nation and to her future glory in the history of the world.

Among the greatest of Poland's poets stands Julius Słowacki. Inferior to Mickiewicz and Krasinski in depth of thought or moral beauty, he is a master of style and language. He began his poetical life as a follower and warm admirer of Byron. He ended it—death took the brilliant egotistic poet in the flower of his years—as a mystic.

"Place on his grave for all inscription: To the author of *Anhelli*; and that will be enough to secure his fame in future generations." So wrote Krasinski

after Słowacki's death. And *Anhelli*, that strange mystical and poetic journey through Siberia, stamped with the eternal despair of the prison-house of the Pole, is one of the most striking and most tragic productions of the great prophetic-national Polish literature.

"When I read it," said Krasinski—and it should be remembered that one of Krasinski's life-long tortures was his terror of Siberia and his conviction that he would be banished thither—"I yearned, God help me! for Siberia. For many nights, Siberia appeared to me in my dreams as a melancholy Eden." But the impression made by *Anhelli* on the English mind is widely different. It is that of a desolation as unending as those dreary snow-bound wastes that Słowacki unrolls before the reader's gaze; a despair which the pale light of the vague mysticism that gleams through the work seems only to enhance. The white deserts, their frozen sameness broken ever and again by the figures of the doomed Polish exiles; the fires of the Northern lights; the strange brilliance of the Siberian winter stars, are a fit setting for *Anhelli*, the youth who passes through the prisons and the mines, as the type of his people's sufferings, till his heart breaks for his anguish.

It is not our intention to describe Słowacki's *Anhelli*, but to let this exquisite prose-poem speak for itself in extracts which can, unfortunately, convey but a meagre impression of the beauty of the Polish original. But we would first note one or two of its characteristics. Inspired in part by Słowacki's wanderings in the Holy Land, it is written in a species of Biblical prose. It is in no wise intended as a closely exact presentment of Siberia. More than one of the

episodes introduced into it belong, not to Siberia, but to Poland. Various Poles whom *Anhelli* meets in Siberia never in reality went thither. But Słowacki appropriately chose to place the poem consecrated to the sorrows of his nation, and into which he poured his own sadness and weariness of life, in Siberia, that land watered by the tears of thousands of Poles, the scene of the long martyrdom of unnumbered sons of Poland.

Although, from time to time, *Anhelli* touches upon the great Mesyanistic theory of Poland's salvation and exaltation, yet its general tone is that of a profound melancholy that borders on despair, of something, indeed, not far removed from pessimism that is unusual in the Polish poetry of Słowacki's generation. For, tragic as that literature must needs be, written as it is out of the heart's blood of a cruelly wronged nation, it is illuminated by a radiant and invincible hope. We have called *Anhelli* a mystical poem; but its mysticism is of a peculiarly indeterminate and unsatisfying description. In fact, with a few exceptions here and there, the supernatural element in *Anhelli* strikes the reader as being more of a fairy than, strictly speaking, a spiritual nature. This feature weakens the work as a great national expression; but from the artistic standpoint it creates that weird and unearthly atmosphere that for long haunts our vision, as though we had wandered to some far distant and unutterably mournful dream-land.

The exiles came into the land of Siberia [so *Anhelli* opens]. And, clearing a wide place, they built them a wooden house that they might dwell together in harmony and brotherly love. For some time there was great order among them and great sadness, because they could not forget that they were exiles and would see their country no more, unless it pleased God.



[Then, after dissensions had broken out in their midst,] they saw a great flock of black birds flying from the north. And beyond the birds there appeared as it were a caravan, and a tribe of people and sledges drawn by dogs and a herd of reindeer with branching horns and men on skates carrying spears. And at their head went the king of the tribe, who was also their priest, clad in furs and in corals.

Then that king, as he drew nigh to the crowd of exiles, said to them in the language of their own country: "Welcome! Lo, I knew your fathers, unhappy like you; and I beheld how they lived in the fear of God and died, saying, Oh, my country! my country!"

This king, Shaman by name, stays with the exiles to comfort them. Half prophet, half wizard, the worker of miracles, he is a strong illustration of Slowacki's blending of the fairy-tale with deeper things.

Then Shaman, gazing into the hearts of that band of exiles, said within himself: "Verily, I have not found here what I sought. Their hearts are weak, and they will be vanquished by sadness. They would have been worthy men in the midst of happiness, but misery will change them into evil and dangerous men. Oh, God, what hast Thou done? Dost Thou not grant to every flower to bloom where it finds its own life and its own soil? Why, then, must these men perish? I will, therefore, take one from among them, and I will love him as a son, and when I die I will lay upon him my burden and a greater burden than others can bear, that in him there shall be redemption. And I will show him all the sorrows of this earth, and then I will leave him alone in a great darkness with the load of his thought and of his yearning in his soul."

When he had said this, he called to him a youth of the name of Anhelli and, laying his hands upon him, he poured into him heartfelt love and pity for men. And, turning to the crowd of exiles, he said: "I will depart with this youth to show him many sorrowful things, and you shall remain alone to learn how to bear hunger, misery and sadness. But keep hope. For hope shall go forth from you to the future generations and will give them life: but, if it dieth within you, then the future generations will be as dead men. Keep watch upon yourselves, for you are as men

standing upon a height, and they who are to come will behold you. But I say unto you, be at rest not about the morrow, but about the day which will be the morrow of your death. For the morrow of life is more bitter than the morrow of death."

This passage expresses the great life-giving principles of the Polish mystic-national literature. Though darkness encompassed them, the watchword of the proscribed Poles was hope. The Mesyanistic teaching that Poland had gone down to the dead to rise again to a glorious empire, won by her martyrdom, over all Slavonia, was the beacon-light whither her children were called to struggle by the steep and painful road. Hope was the preserver and bringer of life to a nation bereft of all else. "You are as those standing on the height," said Slowacki; and here again we have that aim for which Poland's greatest poets, and above all Mickiewicz and Krasinski, toiled and suffered and spent their lives. The rebirth of the nation was to depend upon the spiritual regeneration of each individual son of Poland.

The hour has now struck for Anhelli to set forth on his dolorous pilgrimage through the house of bondage of his people. Shaman summons him from slumber, bidding him "Sleep not, but come with me, for there are things of import in the deserts."

Then Anhelli, clothing himself with a white robe, followed the old man, and they walked in the light of the stars.

Before they had gone far, they saw an encampment of little children and boys who were being driven to Siberia, and who were resting by a fire. And in the midst of the little band sat a pope [Russian Greek priest] on a Tartar horse, and on his saddle were two baskets of bread. And he began to teach the children the new Russian faith and the new catechism. And he asked the children unworthy questions, and the boys answered to please him, because he had baskets of bread on his saddle and could give them food, and they were hungry.

Then Shaman, turning to Anhelli, said: "Tell me, has not this priest exceeded all measure, sowing the seed of evil? Behold, they have already forgotten to weep for their mothers, and they ingratiate themselves for bread, like little whelps, barking out evil things which are against faith. I will, therefore, use fire from heaven against this priest, and I will destroy him before the eyes of the children."

And as soon as Shaman had uttered the word of malediction, the priest on the horse was set on fire, and from his breast went forth flames that ran together in the sky above his head. And the terrified horse carried him away flaming over the steppe, and then, shuddering, flung from him a charred fragment sitting on the saddle to the end.

Then Shaman, drawing near to the children, said: "Fear not. The fire affrighted you like little sleeping doves, but you have slept in the house of fire and your bodies are withered already." And the children stretched forth their hands to the old man, crying: "Oh, take us with thee!" And Shaman said: "Whither shall I take you? I am going on the road of death." The children made answer: "Take us and lead us by the broad highroads to our mothers." And they all cried out with a great pride: "We are Poles. Lead us away to our own country and to our mothers," until Shaman began to weep while he smiled. And the Cossacks came and drove the children away from the strangers, but they dared not strike them, being mindful of that fire.

For all the poetic fancy that Słowacki flings over it, this episode of the children is, in its main features, no fiction. One of the blackest pages in the history of the Russian vengeance that desolated Poland after the Rising of 1830 is the tale of how, by the command of Nicholas I., the Cossacks tore thousands of Polish children away from Poland, and carried them off to Russia. Something of the horror that this outrage struck to a Polish heart may be gathered from Słowacki's treatment of the subject.

And Shaman passed with Anhelli through the desert ways of Siberia where were the prisons. And they saw faces of prisoners,

pallid and sorrowful, looking through the gratings to the sky. And near one of the prisons they met men, carrying biers, and Shaman stayed them, bidding them open the coffins. When, then, they had taken the lids off the coffins, Anhelli shuddered, beholding that the dead were still in their fetters, and he said: "Shaman, I fear lest these martyred men shall not rise from the dead. Awaken one of them, for thou hast the power of working miracles. Wake that old man with the hoary beard and white hair, for it seems to me that I knew him when he was alive." And Shaman, with a stern look, said: "Wherefore? I will raise him from the dead, and thou wilt slay him again. Verily, twice will I raise him up, and twice he will die at thy hands. But let it be as thou wilt, that thou mayest know that death shelters us from sorrows which were waiting for us on the road, but which found us dead."

Speaking thus, Shaman looked upon the old man in his coffin, and said: "Arise!" And the body in chains rose and sat up, gazing at the people like a man that sleeps.

But as Anhelli repeats to this man—Niemojewski, a well-known figure in the Polish history of Słowacki's time and one whom the poet knew personally—some of the tales that were told against him, "he who had risen from the dead died again, wailing."

Then Shaman said: "Anhelli, thou hast slain him by repeating men's slanders and calumnies of which he knew not before his death. But I will raise him up a second time, and beware thee lest thou bring him a second time to his death."

He awoke the dead man, and he rose in his coffin, with tears streaming from his open eyelids.

Mindful of the wizard's warning, Anhelli begs the dead man's forgiveness, and speaks words of praise both of him and of his equally famous brother. "Oh, unhappy ye," he ends. "Lo, one seeketh rest in a Siberian graveyard, and the other lies under the roses and cypresses on the Seine—separated and dead."

When he had heard these words, the man who had risen from the dead cried out: "Oh, my brother!" and he fell back in the

coffin and died. And Shaman said to Anhelli: "Why didst thou tell him of his brother's death? One moment, and he would have known it from God, and he would have met his dear brother in the heavenly land. Let them close the coffins and carry them to the cemetery. And ask me no more to raise from the dead those who are asleep and at rest."

And so Shaman with Anhelli made their journey through the sorrowful land and through the desert ways and beneath the murmuring forests of Siberia, meeting the suffering people and comforting them.

And one evening they passed near still standing water where grew many weeping willows and a few pines.

And as Shaman watched the little fish "leaping to the afterglow," he conjures Anhelli to bear in mind that melancholy "is a mortal disease."

"For there are two melancholies. One is from strength, the other from weakness. The first is as wings to men of high mind, the second a stone to drowning men. I tell thee this because thou art yielding to sadness and thou wilt lose hope."

While he still spoke, they came upon a throng of Siberians who were catching fish in the lake. And when the fishers had seen Shaman they ran to him, saying: "Oh, our king! Thou hast forsaken us for strangers, and we are sad because we see thee among us no more. Stay with us this night, and we will make thee a banquet."

"But after the supper, when the moon rose and threw her light over the smooth water," Shaman, to revive the faith of these children of the desert, works a miracle for them. He casts Anhelli into a trance, and

calling a little child from the crowd, he placed him on the breast of Anhelli, who had laid him down as though to sleep, and he said to the child: "Lay thy hands on the forehead of this youth, and call him three times by the name of Anhelli." And it befell that at the call of the child the soul went forth from Anhelli, and it was of a fair form and many hued colours and had white wings on its shoulders. And beholding itself freed the spirit went on the

water, and it fled across the column of the moon's light towards the south.

But when it was afar off and in the middle of the lake Shaman bade the child call upon the soul to return. And the bright spirit looked back at the cry of the child, and it returned slowly over the golden wave, dragging after it the ends of its wings which were drooping for sorrow. And when Shaman bade it descend into the body of the man it wailed like a shattered harp and trembled, but it obeyed. And Anhelli, awaking, sat up and asked what had been wrought with him. The fishermen answered: "Lord, we have seen thy soul. The Chinese kings are not clothed in such splendour as the soul that belongs to thy body. And we have seen nothing brighter on the earth save the sun, and nought glittering more brightly save the stars. The swans flying over our land in May have not such wings. Yea, and we even smelt scent like the scent of a thousand flowers."

"What, then," [asks Anhelli of Shaman,] "did my soul when she was free?" Shaman answered him: "She went over that golden road that is cast on the water from the moon, and she fled to yonder side like one that is in haste." And at these words Anhelli drooped his head, and, musing, he began to weep, and he said: "She was fain to return to my country."

Having comforted Anhelli, Shaman leads him on through the further stages of the pilgrimage, working fresh marvels, till he says:

"Lo, we will show miracles no more nor the power of God that is in us: but we will weep, for we have come to the people who do not see the sun. We may not teach them wisdom, for sorrow has taught them more. Nor will we give them hope, for they will not believe us. In the decree that condemned them was inscribed: For ever! Here are the mines of Siberia.

"Step carefully here, for the earth is paved with sleeping men. Dost thou hear? They breathe heavily, and many moan and talk in their sleep. One speaks of his mother, another of his sisters and brothers, and a third of his home and of her whom he loved in his heart, and of the meadows where the corn bowed to him as to its lord. And they are happy now in their sleep—but they will wake. In other mines criminals howl; but this is only

the grave of the sons of the nation, and is filled with silence. The chain that rattles here has a sorrowful sound, and in the vault there are many echoes, and one echo which says: I mourn for you."

While Shaman was speaking thus pitifully, there came wardens and soldiers with lanterns to awaken the sleepers to labour. Then all rose up from the ground and woke, and they went like sheep with bent heads, except one who rose not, for he had died in his sleep—

died of the poisonous lead that he had picked up from the floor of the mine and swallowed, hoping to end his misery.

Through scenes of death and anguish in the depths of the mines the pilgrims wend their way till they saw many men, pallid and tortured, whose names are known in our country. And they came to a subterranean lake, and trod the banks of its dark water which stirred not, and here and there was yellow from the light of the lanterns. And Shaman said: "Is this the Sea of Galilee?<sup>1</sup> And are these the fishers of woe?"

Then one of those who sat sadly by the banks of the black water said: "To-day they allow us to rest, because it is the Tsar's name-day. So we sit here over the dark water to dream and think and rest; for our hearts are more weary than our bodies. And not long since we lost our prophet,<sup>2</sup> whose favourite place was this rock and to whom these waters were dear. And seven years ago on a certain night the spirit of prophecy took possession of him, and he felt the great convulsion that there was in our country,<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The poet wrote *Anhelli* under the strong influence of his journey in Palestine, dedicating the poem to the Pole who had been his fellow-traveller there. The Sea of Galilee was one of the spots that he had visited, and certain of his descriptive passages, such as the lake where Anhelli's soul is shown to the fishermen, are said to be the poet's impressions of the scenery of the Holy Land.

<sup>2</sup> The poet said that this prophet was an imaginary figure, but that at the same time he had Thomas Zan in his mind. Zan was that high-minded leader of the Lithuanian youth, the intimate friend of Adam Mickiewicz, who, banished to Siberia, continued his philanthropic labours by working on the souls of the Russian children whom he taught there. When the poet wrote *Anhelli*, Zan was still in exile, but he returned in later years to end his days in his own country.

<sup>3</sup> The Rising of 1830, which took place seven years before *Anhelli* was written.

and he told us the whole night what he saw, laughing and weeping. And only at dawn did he wax sad, and he cried, 'Lo, they have risen from the dead, but they cannot roll away the stone from the sepulchres.' And having said this, he fell dead."

And Shaman, turning him to Anhelli, said: "Why art thou thus lost in thought above this black water which is of human tears?"

When he had spoken, there resounded a great echo from an explosion in the mine, and it was prolonged above their heads, beating like a subterranean bell. And Shaman said: "Behold the angel of the Lord for those who see the sun no more. Oh, God, oh, God, we pray Thee that our sufferings may be our redemption. And we will not entreat Thee to restore the sun to our eyes and the sky to our lungs, for we know that Thy judgment has fallen upon us—but the newborn generation is guiltless. Have mercy, oh, God! And forgive us that we carry our cross with sadness and that we rejoice not as martyrs, because Thou hast not said if our suffering will be reckoned to us as our expiation. But speak the word, and we shall rejoice. For what is life that we should mourn for it? Is it the good angel that leaves us in the hour of death? Happy are they who may sacrifice themselves for the nation!"

Then the wayfarers pass on where all is sorrow. Here, they see an old man knouted to death, there, a Russian prince toiling as a felon, with a devoted wife ministering to him. At last, as a second Virgil with his Dante, the guide carries Anhelli up from the pit of horror; and Anhelli opens his eyes once more on the Siberian stars and snow, asking himself if what he had beheld was but a dreadful dream.

The scope of the poem will now somewhat change. The national sufferings recede further into the background, and the grief of Anhelli himself fills the poem; a grief which, however, never ceases to be that of the Pole, eternally mourning for his nation. It is curious to notice that as the poet departs from those great tragedies with which the heart of the Pole was filled



to overflowing at the time that Słowacki wrote, and lingers instead on a more individual and restricted note, the artistic beauty of the work seems to increase rather than to be impaired. In the forlorn figure of the youth, desolate and alone in the Siberian night, and painted with an almost terrible power, there is probably much of Słowacki himself. The tale of his own sad and lonely soul is, without doubt, told here.

As he gazes at the angel Eloë, who sits watching the graves of those who have died in Siberia, Anhelli falls like a dead man. When recalled to life by Shaman, who bids him arise, for the time of his rest has not yet come, Anhelli confesses that the face of the angel recalls to him one whom he had loved in his own country.

"Therefore am I flooded with my tears when I think of her and of my youth. To-day that is all a dream. Yet the sapphire sky and the pale stars look down at me: are those stars in truth the same as those that saw me young and happy? Why does not a gust of wind arise to tear me from the earth and to carry me into the land of peace? Why do I live? There is not one hair on my head of those that there were of old, even the bones within me are renewed—and yet I still ever remember. And there is not one bird in the sky who cannot sleep if but one night of its life in a quiet nest. But God has forgotten me. I would fain die."

Thus he complains, wandering among the graves of those who died far from their country. In horror and disgust, he flings from him a human skull in which birds had made their home. At this the wraith of a dead patriot rises, reproaching him that he has "come hither to disturb the dead. Is it not enough for the dead to have the winds blow above them, and to be forgotten?"

Anhelli craves his pardon, and mournfully says

that he "will not tell thee what has befallen the name of thy family, for thou could'st not sleep although thou art dead, and thou would'st go weeping through the world." The spirit sinks into the snow, leaving only darkness where his flame went out, and a voice somewhere beneath the earth, in answer to Anhelli's request to know who lie there with him, pronounces a long list of names "already forgotten."

Shaman and Anhelli then leave the graveyard.

And when they came to the house of the exiles they heard a great tumult and laughter and clamour and the rattling of cups and foul songs: and Shaman stood at the windows and listened ere he entered that pit of misery. And, when he appeared amidst the band, they were silent, because they knew that man that was mighty in God, and they dared not defy him. And lifting his flashing eyes, Shaman spoke, on fire for grief: "What have ye done without me? I have seen your Golgotha. Woe unto you! The stormy winds scatter the seeds of the oak and strew them over the earth; but cursed shall be the wind that carries your speech and your counsel to your country. You shall die. The great day<sup>1</sup> is drawing nigh, and none of you shall live to behold the eve of that day. The Siberian day and the sun of destruction draw near. Why have you not hearkened to my counsels and lived peacefully in harmony and brotherly love, as befits those who have no country?"

In answer to his reproaches, the exiles set upon Shaman and slay him. As he lies dying, he calls Anhelli and gives him his last charge.

"Take my reindeer and go to the north. Thou wilt find a dwelling and peace in the snow. And thou shalt live on the milk of the reindeer. Be not sorrowful unto death for the destruction of thy country: but weep at the thought that thou shalt see her no more. All is a sorrowful dream."

He further tells Anhelli to take with him Ellenai, a woman once a sinner who had ministered to the

<sup>1</sup> The day of Poland's resurrection.

wizard's last moments, and to live with her as with a sister.

As he spoke thus, Anhelli heard a trampling on the snow, and said: "Some one approaches; or is it death that walks heavily?" But it was a reindeer that stood above his dying master, and whose wondering eyes filled with great tears; and Shaman turned away from him, weeping.

He dies: and Anhelli, leading Ellenai away, "both turned to the north, and behind them went Shaman's reindeer, knowing that they were following new masters. But Anhelli was silent, for his heart was full of tears and of grief. So they went, Anhelli with the woman and with Shaman's reindeer to the far northern desert; and finding an empty hut hewn out in the ice they dwelt in it." And the heart of the woman "from continual prayer was full of tears, sadness, and heavenly hopes."

Then the Siberian day came on, and the sun did not set but ran through the sky like a horse at his race with a fiery mane and a white brow. The terrible light never ceased, and the noise of the ice was like unto the voice of God speaking on the heights to the sorrowful and forsaken people.

And her long sadness and yearning led the exiled woman to her death, and she laid her down on a bed of leaves among her reindeer to die. And it was at the setting of the sun, because for some time past nights had begun in the land of Siberia, and the sun remained ever longer beneath the horizon. Turning her sapphire eyes filled with great tears on Anhelli, Ellenai said: "I loved thee, my brother, and I leave thee. I loved thee, but the grave ends all. Forget me not, for who will remember me after death save one reindeer which I milked?"

Then the dying woman began to recite litanies to the Mother of God and, even as she uttered the words *Rose of gold*, she died. And a fresh rose fell on the white bosom of the dead woman and lay there, and the strong fragrance of the rose filled the hut. But Anhelli, sitting at the side of the couch, wept. And lo, at midnight came a great rustling, and Anhelli thought that the reindeer

made this rustling, drawing out moss to eat from under the bed of death ; but a cloud as of the spirits of darkness poised over the hut with loud laughter, and dark faces appeared through the clefts of the ice roof and cried : " She is ours." But that wondrous rose put on the wings of a dove and flew on high, and looked upon them with the eyes of a pure angel. So those dark spirits and the cloud of them arose from the roof, crying sad curses into the dark sky ; and again there was silence as befits the place where a dead body rests.

And three hours after midnight Anhelli heard a knocking at the door which was of ice, and, putting aside the block of ice, he went out under the moon. And he saw the angel who had recalled to him his love for a woman and his first love on the earth. And Eloë said to him : " Give me thy dead sister ; I will take her and bury her pitifully. She is mine." And Eloë, kneeling over the sleeping figure, laid under her the ends of her swan wings, and, soaring to the moon, departed. Anhelli, therefore, returned to the empty hut, and mourned because she was there no more.

Then about the time when the earth begins to turn from the sun and sleeps in darkness, Jehovah called two of the eternal Cherubim before His throne and said : " Go ye to the plains of Siberia." And they went down into the misty land, hiding their brightness within them. And they came to the place where the shed of the exiles had been, but they found no trace of it, for the storms had brought it to the ground. And of those thousand men there remained but ten, pale and terrible to behold.

Starving in the snow, they had eaten human flesh, the bodies of their comrades. The leader of the remnant, with the blood of his countrymen on his lips, cries : " Has God remembered us ? Has He granted us to die in our land and on the earth where we were born ? "

" Return," [reply the angels,] " and pray to God, for we will show you the sign of His wrath which was once the sign of pardon." And, stretching out their hands, the angels pointed to a mighty rainbow which ran across half of the clouded skies. And a terrible fear took possession of the man-eaters at the sight of this

beautiful and flashing thing. And, marvelling, they pronounced the name of Christ, and fell dead.

That same day, before the setting of the sun, Anhelli sat on a block of ice in a desert place, and he saw two youths drawing nigh. Because of the light wind that came forth from them, he felt that they were from God, and he awaited what they would announce to him, expecting that it was death. And when they had greeted him like unto mortal men, he said: "I know you. You are angels. Do you come hither to console me? Or to quarrel with my sadness which I have learned in the solitude of silence?"

And the youths said to him: "Behold, we have come to announce to thee that the sun of to-day will rise again, but to-morrow's shall show itself no more over the earth. We have come to announce to thee the winter darkness and a greater horror than any men have ever known, solitude in darkness. We have come to announce to thee that thy brothers are dead, having eaten of human corpses and being maddened with human blood: and thou art the last. And we are the same who ages ago came to the hut of the wheelwright,<sup>1</sup> and sat at his table in the shade of the sweet smelling lime-trees. Your nation was then as a man who awaketh and saith to himself: 'Lo, a fair thing awaits me at midday, and in the evening I shall rejoice.' We announced hope unto you, and now we have come to announce the end and sorrow and God hath not bidden us reveal the future."

And Anhelli, answering, said to them: "Are ye not making mockery of me, speaking of Piast and the beginning now when I look for death and have seen only misery in my life? Have ye come to terrify me, crying: Darkness is coming! Why would you terrify one who suffers? Is not the terror of the grave enough? Depart! and tell God that if the sacrifice of my soul is accepted I will give it and will agree that she shall die. My heart is so sorrowful that the angelic lights of the future world are abhorrent to me, and I am indifferent as to Eternity, and I would fain sleep."

And the angels interrupted him, saying: "Thou dost ruin thyself. The desire of a man is his judgment upon him. And knowest thou not that perchance some life, yea, perchance the life and the fate of millions may depend on thy calm?" And Anhelli

<sup>1</sup> Piast, the founder of the first Polish dynasty.

humbled himself and said : " Angels, forgive me ! I will suffer as of old. My native language and human speech shall be silent within me as a harp with torn strings. To whom shall I speak ? Darkness shall be my companion and my country. But the horrors of the earth are nought, my anguish for my country is a greater horror. Why have I struggled and suffered torment for a thing that was madness ? Why did I not live at rest ? I cast myself into a river of woe, and its waves have carried me far, and now I shall return no more."

And again the angels interrupted him, saying : " Thou didst blaspheme against thine own soul, and now thou blasphemest against the will which was in thee when thou didst consecrate thyself to thy country. We therefore warn thee from the Will of God that within a few hours thou shalt die : so be of more tranquil heart."

Hearing this, Anhelli bowed his head and submitted to the Divine Will. And the angels departed. And when he remained alone, Anhelli cried out with a sorrowful voice : " This, then, is already the end ! What have I done on earth ? Was it a dream ?"

And while Anhelli pondered upon the hidden things of the future, the sky reddened and the glorious sun burst forth ; and, halting on the horizon, it arose no further, crimson as fire. Then the birds of the air and the white mews which God had bidden flee before the darkness, availed them of the short day and flew in great crowds, wailing. Then Anhelli looked on them and said : " Whither do you fly ? " And it seemed to him that in the plaint of the birds he heard a voice answering him : " We are flying to thy native land. Dost thou bid us greet anyone there ? Or, as we sit on some roof dear to thee, shall we sing in the night the song of sorrow, so that thy mother shall wake, or one of thy kin, and weep in the darkness for fear, thinking of the son whom the land of the grave hath swallowed, and the brother whom sorrow hath devoured ? "

Such was the voice of the birds, and Anhelli's heart broke within him, and he fell. And the sun sank under the earth, and there were only the birds flying ever higher, shining on the sapphire sky like wreaths of white roses, flying to the south.

Anhelli was dead.

In the darkness that then befell, there shone a great dawn

from the south and a fire of clouds. And the tired moon sank into the flame of the skies like a white dove falling at eventide on a hut red with the setting of the sun.

Eloe sat by the body of the dead Anhelli. And lo! on a sudden a knight on a horse, all in armour, came forth from the fiery dawn, and he fled with a terrible rattle of hoofs. The snow ran before him and before the breast of the horse like the foam of the waves before a boat. And in the hand of the knight was a banner, and on it burned three letters of fire.<sup>1</sup> And the knight reached in his flight Anhelli's dead body, and he cried out with a voice of thunder: "Here is one who was a soldier. Let him rise! Let him mount on my horse, and I will carry him swifter than the storm. Lo, the nations are rising from the dead! Lo, the streets of cities are paved with dead bodies! He who hath a soul let him arise, let him live, for it is the time for strong men to live."

Thus spoke the knight; and Eloe, rising from the dead body, said: "Knight, wake him not, for he sleeps. He was predestined to sacrifice, even the sacrifice of his heart. Knight, ride on, wake him not. This body belongs to me, and this heart was mine. Knight, thy horse stamps his hoofs. Ride on!"

And the fiery knight fled away with the sound of a mighty storm; and Eloe sat near Anhelli's dead body. And she was glad that his heart did not wake at the voice of the knight, and that he still slept.

So ends this strange and painful poem on that same deep note of melancholy that is the unrelieved setting of the whole work. The one faint gleam of joy, if such it can be called, is that Anhelli could wake no more even to the call of his country, but that he slept at last.

MONICA M. GARDNER.

<sup>1</sup> L U D, the Polish for Nation, People.

## THE ROMANTICISM OF THE FIRST THINKERS OF HELLAS.

PROF. KARL JOËL, PH.D., of the University of Basle.

I PROPOSE to treat of those earliest Ancients of the West who are clearly historical, of the first who thought and wrote, of the Fathers of Knowledge, who may be styled the Patriarchs of Europe. For we must see the Ancients young again; then will the young see us as old and we shall move forward. But what for us are the oldest Greek sages, the Presocratic thinkers? Grey torsos, from whose stark archaic mouths issue the strangest utterances, as, for instance, "All is Water" or "All is Air" or "Fire." But for us, all is stone, and we are only careful in examinations not to put 'water' for 'air,' or to ascribe to Anaximenes what Anaximander said. They told us at college these Ancients explained all from water because of the shells they found on the land,—they forgot to tell us that they found pearls in them. For did not head-master Thales find stones 'ensouled' and all things 'filled with the Divine'? It is true we were told these Ancients were good physicists,—and I remember a fine chapter on 'Lavoisier and Laplace, Robert Mayer and Darwin two millennia and a half ago'—but they forgot to tell us that they were also men with warm blood coursing through their hearts. Perhaps even they were the first physicists, precisely because they were so fully men that they found the aims of other men too narrow



and insipid, so that they had to compass earth and heaven, and could express the craving of their souls only in the mighty tongue of Nature.

I shall of course be told that this is to represent the Ancients too much as Romanticists, and it will not be believed. For we have learnt at school that the antique is classical, and that the classical is the reverse of the romantic; we are convinced that the Greeks came into the world hewn out of marble, and we are proud, by contrast, of our fever-bubbling hearts and of our newly re-awakened romanticism. But I shall try to show that our latest spiritual emotions are just the earliest over again, and that it is precisely by the help of our most recent friends the Romanticists, we can best understand these so seeming strange old masters of wisdom. I do not say these Ancients were Romanticists—such exaggeration I leave to my critics. In these originators are found the germs both of the classic and of the romantic; but the romantic is the more visible because the classic appears in its purity as maturity, as the ripeness of humanity, whereas the romantic is seen as the budding desire, the youthful ferment, and consequently as a mood of immaturity.

Or what other signs of the romantic will you further adduce? Shall we say the enthusiasm in the thinker's face? the thinker mounted on Pegasus, nay grown together with him into Centaur? the fusion therefore of the poet and the philosopher, as Romanticism so loudly proclaims? If so, I should know no period of philosophy in which that fusion was better realised than in the prematurity of Greek thought. If they did not write in verse, like Xenophanes the ancient bard, and Parmenides and Empedocles;

they wrote even more daring poetry in pictures, like Heraclitus.

But, it will be said, they were the epicists of Nature and the romantic is at root lyrical, has a subjective tone, luxuriates in the depths of the soul, in the cult of personality and genius. "A philosopher must speak of himself, just as a lyric poet," says Friedrich Schlegel. But the earliest thinkers of Hellas are not in vain precisely the contemporaries of the lyric poets; they speak surprisingly much about themselves, indulge in quite an unhellenic spiritual hero-worship, and delve into their souls. "I have gone in quest of myself." "Man's god is his own mind." "There is a reason of the soul which multiplies itself." "The limits of the soul thou couldst never reach by travelling, not even if thou tookest every road, so deep a ground (*logos*) does it possess." After these magical utterances of Heraclitus, such *dicta* of Romanticism as "We do not know the depths of our own minds," or "The greatest mystery is man himself," sound almost flat.

But, we are reminded: "Romanticism demands and sees mystery everywhere." Romanticists are above all, symbolists and mystics; they would "relate the appearance of the temporal to the truth of the Eternal, and resolve the one into the other through allegory and symbolism," for "all meaning is symbolic"; they would write only for the initiated, in mystery-style: "Nature is incomprehensible by itself." The highest, precisely because it is incommunicable, can be expressed only in allegory. "Every conception of God is empty prattle." Yet, is all this so very far from the mystery-wisdom of the Pythagoreans, the associates of the Orphic brotherhoods, and from all the sayings of a Xenophanes and

Alcmæon, a Heraclitus and Empedocles, about the 'unfathomable,' 'unspeakable' Godhead, which is the object of faith alone? "The fulness of the Divine is unattainable by the unbeliever." "Nature loves to hide herself," cries Heraclitus the Obscure, who loves to hide himself just like that Nature and that god whom he proclaims. "The Lord of the Delphic Oracle neither tells nor hides; he indicates." When Fr. Schlegel has to justify his own obscurity and claims for himself the 'mysticism of expression,' he complains that "Apollo who neither speaks nor is silent but only indicates, is no longer venerated"—the very words of Heraclitus re-echoing across the centuries like the sound of sunken bells. And Heraclitus knew that "the Sibyl, though with her raving mouth she utters words of gloom and unadorned and unperfumed, still carries with her voice across the centuries by reason of the god's impelling power." And the god impelled him, too, on whom most clearly is modelled Fr. Schlegel's best phrase: "The poetising philosopher, the philosophising poet, is a prophet." Heraclitus, too, writes in Pythian sentences, in aphorisms, fragments—just like the Romanticists.

It would be a mistake to believe that the blended prophet and poet style is only an external thing. It is the outcome of the inward unity of thinker, poet and prophet, which was natural to the early Hellenes, when the powers of mind and soul were still inseparably interblended; but which with the Romanticists, as it was no longer quite recoverable, became art and aspiration, tendency and purpose. And now you can guess why I find so much that is romantic in the Ancients, without calling them Romanticists. They have the same thought-content as the latter, but, as Schiller would say,

they have it 'naïve,' whereas the Romanticists have it 'sentimentally,' with effort, intentionally. The Ancients have it involuntarily. And so they are in conflict with poets and hierophants, precisely because they still feel themselves one with them, and would be separate, just as the Romanticists also struggle against them. But if poet, thinker and prophet, or more specifically lyricist, physicist and theosophist, are blended in their functions, the substances which they experience are also blended, and so the unity of vocation and of function results in a dogmatic unity: the oneness of Soul, of Nature and of God. This is the fundamental doctrine of mysticism, in which the early Hellenes and the Romanticists meet. And so they must explain the intelligible, the sensible and the divine, whose experienced unity they proclaim, the one by the other, and therefore have to speak in symbols—dark for all who have not had the same experience. To Fr. Schlegel "the infinity of the human mind, the divinity of all natural things, and the humanity of the gods" is "the eternal and the final theme." It is also the eternal topic of these earliest Greek philosophers. They teach the divineness of the soul, the soulfulness of the world, and the worldliness of the divine.

They arise out of the neighbouring East, out of mythology and mystery, and it is precisely into these that the Romanticists strive again to penetrate. "It is in the East we must seek for the highest Romanticism." "The heart, the source of poetry, is to be found in mythology and in the ancient mysteries." Phantasts! cry out the Moderns, and from the heights of their empirical science shudder with horror over such sayings of Novalis as "Physics is nothing but the science of imagination," and "Visible objects are

the expression of feeling." Should we not rather note that for them feelings verge towards the visible, and their doctrine of imagination is simply physics? "Spirit is Nature-philosophy," exclaims Fr. Schlegel; and for Novalis, "The poet is the prophet who represents Nature," and "Metaphysics and astronomy are a single science." It is admirably suitable, indeed it fits exactly as an apology for the speculative, cosmological poets, those Nature-poets with whom Greek philosophy begins. They 'outwardise' their inner life to the point of materialism, and 'inwardise' the world to the point of anthropomorphism. The world becomes to them a living being that breathes, has a right and left side, journeys about and alternates between hunger and satiety. The world becomes 'macranthropos,' and man 'microcosmos,' for the old Nature-philosophers and the Romanticists alike. The conception of a 'spiritualised, moral universe,' to which Novalis would return, had long ago been envisaged by ancient Anaximander in his world-notion as a penitential regulation, and by old Heraclitus in his view of a final judgment following natural laws, and by the early Pythagoreans in their dance of the heavenly bodies as a world temple-service. And just as those Physicists also spoke idealistically, so do the Romanticists speak materialistically. "Thought is galvanism as well." "Thought is muscular movement." One might imagine it is Karl Vogt or Haeckel speaking; but it is Novalis, the Romanticist.

The modern bureaucrats of thought-direction will never comprehend the complete veering round of the Naturalist into romanticism and of the Romanticist into naturalism. He naturalises the soul, in ensouling nature. This same Novalis desires for man "the

sweet passion for the stir of Nature, the eye for her ravishing mysteries. Would that he could only learn to feel! Then the stars would rise within him, and he would learn to feel the whole world." And indeed they really learned to feel the cosmos, and the stars began to dance for them divinely. So it was with the ancient Nature-contemplatives—for one must learn to feel Nature, before he learns to think Nature; she must first appear to man, bloom radiantly before his eyes in glowing colours, and yet do not those very colours come from man himself? In that century, when the Greek soul reached to its greatest stretch in the sense of power of her tyrants, in the love-pulse of her lyricists, in the mystic passion of her Orphics and Bacchantics, then also did Greek thought rise high with Dionysian surge to the cosmic consciousness, the all-embracingness, the dazzling vision of Nature. It was a thought grounded on feeling—that was its greatness; for from the expansion of feeling thought was heightened into breadth of speculation,—but that was also its limit, which was surpassed by the critical—that is analytical, feeling-suppressing—advance of science. But if science would renew its youth, it must re-experience the world, must again comprehend it in union with feeling, in order that it may be ever new for her. This is the right from time to time of Romanticism, which would refresh, rejuvenate. It presents a chalice which shall enliven us from time to time without intoxicating us by constant quaffing. The essence and impulse of the Romantic is not thinking and not feeling alone, but the happy, too often unhappy, blending of both. If then we would understand not only the Romanticists but also those earliest thinkers in whom the unity of thinking and feeling existed with so much more

originality, we must become psychologists and ask ourselves what feeling means and how it colours that thought into which it flows.

It must naturally do so in an artistic religious fashion ; for art and religion are as much the construct of feeling as science is the construct of thought. And so we find in the thought of feeling that ancient unity of thinker, poet and prophet, and also the unity of their subjects : World, Soul and God. And the early Hellenes keep it going like the Romanticists, only with more originality and power ; they secularise all, embody all, they ensoul all and ' divinise ' all. So they keep it going from Thales on, of whom only three utterances are certain : All is *water* ; all is *divine* ; and, in the magnet, stone shows itself *ensouled*. But how can Nature, God and Soul become one ? Only in the experience of feeling. But what do we mean when we say ' feeling ' ? how does the world appear to him who feels ?

When we think, we make clean cuts and fix limits or bind fast ; but when we feel, it is as though a stream flows through the soul, a limitless flux so that we have no consciousness of beginning or end. It is either a gentle stream or a wild, hurrying torrent. Tieck's Sternbald gazes into his excited mind "as into a fathomless abyss, where drives foaming wave on wave, and endless rage of elemental wrath." Foaming, streaming souls are the Romanticists, in restless movement ; they are eternal wanderers like their own heroes. Fr. Schlegel's advice to the young Friends of Truth is "a journey round the world instead of school." It was precisely the oldest ' Friends of Truth ' who followed this counsel. Solon travelled about the world ' philosophising '—indeed it is in this very connection

that the word appears for the first time in Herodotus. Legend exaggerates history but little in sending out Thales and Anaximander on distant journeys, and above all the ubiquitous Pythagoras. Were not many of the old founders of schools great travellers, and does not Empedocles himself tell the tale of his own wanderings? and Xenophanes, how he roved through many lands for seven and sixty years, and again Democritus, how he had made the farthest travels of his day?

As they journey through the world, the world changes before their eyes. It appears to them in kaleidoscopic pictures, until it turns into the mirror of their own travel-loving vital impulse. They live the world, *i.e.* they feel it, or rather, they experience it as an infinite flux. And so the Ionians proclaim the world as ceaseless change, until the last concludes: All flows. Thales cries bluntly: All is Water. More clearly does Anaximander exclaim: It must be the Infinite, for only the Infinite is inexhaustible in change. More distinctly cries Anaximenes: It must be Air, this ever-moving changing of the world. And still more finely Heraclitus, who declares: 'Tis Fire, the ever-flickering thing. There is a crescendo of effervescing feeling of the world and at the same time of the power of change, till it reaches its greatest strength and fervency, till it grows into passion. The Water of Thales expands to the Infinite of Anaximander, effervesces and steams in the Air of Anaximenes, until it reaches its highest temperature in the pure Fire of Heraclitus. Our chroniclers call that naturally enough a figurative construction. But what is the question that history puts to our chroniclers? and that, too, the history of speculation to the enemies of speculation? Ideas have their own causality; the idea of infinite



change was bound to heighten, and did as a fact heighten from Thales to Heraclitus—more cannot be said.

The Romanticists feel after it—this infinite world-stream. Novalis views “the history of Nature’s begetting from infinite fluidity . . . as though it were an immense drama.” But above all, that impulse which bursts open the Ionian horizon to the doctrine of infinite worlds, which drives Anaximander to erect the Limitless itself into a world-principle, this impulse of infinitude is just what thrills the Romanticists also through and through, and is indeed the most evident root-characteristic of their being. And they know that in this they are in touch with early antiquity, with originality, with poetic feeling. Fr. Schlegel praises the yearning for the Infinite in the Greek lyric poets, the contemporaries and fellow-countrymen of the Nature-philosophers. “Saturate your life-feeling with the idea of the Infinite, and you will understand the Ancients and Poetry.” “Nothing is more attainable for the spirit than the Infinite.” But they conceive the Infinite in the sense of Anaximander as the Inexhaustible, as the fullness of Nature’s becoming, as the divine ‘Chaos’ from which ‘countless worlds’ are born. “The Infinite as conceived of in that fullness is the godhead—eternal life—the one and only infinite whole,” “the infinite holy plenitude of the life of formative Nature,” the “eternal sprightliness of the infinitely full Chaos,” that “Chaos which ever strives to bring forth new and wondrous births, while hiding itself beneath the order of creation, within its very womb.” These and like phrases of the Romanticists must we ponder if we would look into the heart of old Anaximander, for whom infinite births of worlds uprise from the infinite womb of things.

“ Whose heart does not leap for joy when his soul is flooded with the inmost life of Nature in its plenitude, then, when that mighty emotion for which language has no other name than Love and Bliss, expands in him like some potent all-absorbing vapour, and he sinks trembling in sweet anguish into the dark, alluring womb of Nature—when naught in the Great Ocean remains but a focus of measureless creative power, an absorbing vortex! What is the flame that manifests everywhere? ”

Here we have in Novalis in the same breath all the world-forms of the early Ionians indicated as in a dream, and others as well of the later Ionians, the World-ocean of Thales, the dark Nature-womb of Anaximander, the all-powerful Vapour of Anaximenes, and the universal Flame of Heraclitus; and we see how they all rise as pictures from the dionysiacally expanded soul which feels itself one with Nature—and was not the pure essence of the world and the essence of the soul substantially one and the same for the Ionians?

If anyone contends that I have artificially transferred the ancient spirit of the Ionians into this passage from Novalis, let him only read the following lines from the same work, *The Disciples at Saïs* : “ Not falsely did the ancient sages seek for the origin of things in Water, for indeed they spoke of a higher water than that of seas and springs. Water is that which reveals solely the original fluidity, just as it is manifest in liquid metal, and therefore men should ever venerate it as divine. How few have as yet dived into the secrets of fluidity; while from many a one this presentiment of highest delight and life has never even dawned upon their intoxicated souls! The world-soul reveals itself

in thirst, that mighty yearning for deliquescence. The drunkard feels only too well this more than earthly rapture of the fluid, and, in the end, all pleasant sensations in us are but multiform dissolutions or meltings, affections of that original fluid in us.—How many stand on the brink of the intoxicating floods and yet are deaf to the cradle-song of these mother-waters, and blind to the entrancing play of their infinite waves!”

Heraclitus heard it and rejoiced to see it, he who saw the world as an endlessly flowing river which no man could twice enter, as the playing of a boy on the sea-shore, and again as a mingled draught which must be shaken together. For he also was a ‘toper’ and drunk with the Dionysian spirit like Novalis in modern days.

There is in the Ionians but one and only one ever-heightening notion of the eternally changing fulness of life, from the Water of Thales to the Fire of Heraclitus; and the Romanticists naturally bring it to new expression, for the most part in the highest, extremest form of the World- and Soul-Fire, unconscious Heracliteans as they are. “Adore the Fire,” such is the express demand that Fr. Schlegel makes of us, while he himself confesses “I venerate Fire,” and praises the ‘fiery Reason’ as against the ‘watery,’ just as Heraclitus sets the fiery, ‘dry’ soul above the ‘moist.’ “The eternal Fire lies hidden in the centre,” is the first line of Tieck’s sonnet to Schlegel, and Goethe speaks of fiery air from Schlegel’s laboratory. Some time ago there used to be phantasts who made the Fire-worshipper Heraclitus a follower of Zoroaster; since then we have only purists, who keep him far removed from every Persian influence. He was perhaps no more a ‘Parsee’ than the new ‘Zarathustra,’ but how

do our purists manage to think that Heraclitus should have heard nothing of the religion of the people under whose government he lived? "The Sun like a god! Is the life of the planets anything else than Sun-worship? Here also thou comest to meet us, primeval childlike religion of the Persians, and we find in thee the universal religion," says the pious Novalis in his quest of the 'Magi'; moreover he draws the inner parallel: "The Sun is to astronomy what God is to metaphysics; freedom and immortality are like light and warmth." "Our only business is to tend a holy and mysterious Flame."

But what will they, both Heraclitus and the Romanticists, say of that Fiery Flood that they let stream aflame with divine sovereignty through World and Soul? For them Flame is the symbol and the power of life which they feel in themselves, which makes World and Soul one; it is the eternal power of metamorphosis, which energising and consuming in eternal alternation of creation and destruction, rises and falls. And the unity of these two modes, the unity of the Up and Down in the perpetual reciprocity of the process of becoming, of which Heraclitus speaks, recurs in Novalis in his flame-symbol. "The act of transcending oneself is the summit, the primal point of all, the genesis of life. Therefore is flame just such a point; all life is a transcendent process of renewal, which has only from an outside point of view the appearance of a destructive process. The precipitate of life is a living thing, vitality. As heat to flame, so is spirit to life." The old Ionians, like the Romanticists, are vitalists, life-emphasisers; they have been miscalled materialists, emphasisers of matter, just as the Romanticists have been miscalled despisers of Nature. But Life at-ones

both Natures—Soul, God. The Romanticists also seek Truth in Nature. “There is only one real system—the great hidden, eternal Nature or Truth.” Nature is to them “the face of one Deity.” “We cannot see God, but everywhere we see the Divine; nearest and most truly in the heart of a man.” The old Ionians are also pantheists and find divinity most purely in the Soul. For them God is the World-Soul, the All-Being, the Universal of Nature. “All are driven to pasture by God’s scourge”; so teaches Heraclitus and he never ceases to exhort men to follow the Universal Divine Nature. Novalis echoes this almost in the same words: “Man will never lose his way, if he listens to the Universal within and around him”; and the individual soul must be brought into harmony with the World-Soul. He speaks of the ‘World-Reason’ like the old Ephesian. In God’s sight everything is beautiful, good and just, only for man is it not so, Heraclitus tells us; while Novalis says emphatically: For God there is no devil—but for us alas! he is a very effective brain-spectre.

KARL JOËL.

(The subject will be completed in the next number by a paper on ‘Archaic Romanticism: The Dawn of Nature-Philosophy.’—ED.

## HEAVEN, HELL, AND THE PRESENT ENVIRONMENT.

The late HENRY M. BERNARD, M.A., F.Z.S.

THESE three conceptions keep floating and revolving together in the current of my thoughts, like leaves on the surface of a brook. Distinct as they are, they cling and whirl along together as if belonging to one mysterious system. The first two, Heaven and Hell, are usually called 'supernatural' in contrast to the Present Environment, which is known as 'natural.' In the face of these distinctions, a natural history of the three would seem, at first sight, to be incongruous, but not, perhaps, if we regard them all as merely phenomena floating together in the stream of thought.

We need not enter here into the question whether these terms represent actual places or spiritual phases. We have to conceive of them simply as summations of experience; and it matters little to the individual whether such experience come to him entirely from within or as the direct result of his surroundings. What concerns us here is the involuntary and automatic association of the three conceptions: Heaven, Hell, and the Present Environment.

The orthodox association between the three dates from ancient times. Our souls, it is said, emanate from Heaven in an undeveloped condition. Our appointed course is, first of all, to be clothed in flesh and to appear on this earth as on a temporary stage.

Here we have a part to play which is intended to develop us spiritually. Those who play it to the satisfaction of some supreme court return to Heaven in triumph. Those who fail are not only disgraced, but punished in a Hell specially designed for them. Such a statement as this is obviously one befitting a primitive, childish fancy, and yet it is no exaggeration to say that it still holds the world. Individual men and women may cast it aside when they grow up sufficiently to perceive its puerility, but they have nothing else to suggest, and, until they have, it is futile to protest; nor can they protect their imaginative children from having their lives darkened by the terrors of Hell. This world, with all its immeasurable glories of sea, and land and sky, a mere temporary stage, to be burned up when the play is over, and then Hell in prospect! The teaching of anything so terrible should, years ago, have been made penal. So long as any of us are under the tyranny of such a doctrine it is the duty of those who have, or think they have, any light to throw upon the subject, openly to express their views.

I propose, therefore, to sketch a natural history of Heaven, Hell, and the Present Environment as phenomena. Not knowing what either Mind or Matter is, we cannot, of course, tell what they are, but we can trace an intimate relationship between them which leads to a healthier outlook.

The common ideas of Heaven and Hell are familiar to us all. Without going into details, we may describe them both as mirages which greet the eyes of the generations as they enter life and which, with varying intensities of brilliance, accompany the march. They are thought to play an important part in regulating the

morals of the pilgrims. There is a possibility of regarding them as exhalations and condensations, on the one hand, of racial joys and hopes, and, on the other, of racial miseries and terrors, accumulated in the human consciousness as vapours accumulate round the mountain peaks. This might account for the changes that occur in them. Hell, for instance, looms far more terribly in the minds of men at one time and place than at another.

But we must not allow ourselves here to be fascinated by these mysterious apparitions which haunt the mind of man and thus be led into speculation. It is obvious that we cannot deal, in any useful manner, with objects thus 'in the air.' It is necessary to find some clue linking these apparitions on to something that we know. We turn from them, therefore, with relief, to the Present Environment. Here we feel on solid ground, *i.e.* on some coherent framework of ideas, upon which we may build so long as we can satisfy our logical sense that what we build also really coheres. I say 'with relief,' for Heaven and Hell are purely spiritual phenomena; we weary of them because we have no foothold; every step gives way beneath us. The hopes and faiths which appear most solid, yet sink into the swamp of doubt and ignorance as soon as we venture to trust ourselves to them. So we are naturally relieved to find ourselves on the green sward which does not give way beneath us, to sit on hard rocks, to see the clouds sailing across the blue in the sunlit air, while a 'real' breeze wafts the sweet scents of the earth past us. The relief is very real and, for the moment, we can be deliciously happy and contented. This is a real happiness, and one to be diligently sought for and cultivated. It is the happi-



ness of the cows who, as Walt Whitman reminds us, never "lie awake all night brooding over their sins." But is it quite enough for man? Can he for long drift in pure enjoyment even of Nature's subtlest appeal to his senses? No, not for long. Strange visitings assail him,<sup>1</sup> aspirations after something greater and better and higher, and a restlessness seizes him, as if some faculty not being exercised were spurring him on, though he cannot understand what it is nor how to respond to it.

The fact is that man has a mind and, while the murmur of the breezes and the glow of the sun cause it to thrill with intense happiness, it is not a purely passive organ; it is to man what wings are to the eagle, his specialisation and his glory. And the environment, with all its wealth of beauty, is, to man, what a gilded cage is to an eagle; beyond its bars lies a wealth of mystery which he pines to explore. There, for instance, lie the Heaven and Hell which have gleamed dimly through the bars and have haunted the mind of man, and much besides these never seen or dreamt of.

We look around and we see only material things which cannot hear or answer, and we feel cut off from our real belongings. Our bodies are "roll'd around . . . with rocks and stones and trees" to which they belong, but our minds are astray as if lost in a desert. Our relief, consequently, is transitory, for our true kinship is thus felt to be with the unknown regions to which Heaven and Hell belong.

I would ask whether this sense of spiritual isolation which man feels, with ever greater pain and

<sup>1</sup> See the late Richard Jeffroy's fascinating little book *The Story of my Heart*.

perplexity, as his mind develops in the range of its perceptions and its sensitiveness, may not be an illusion, resembling those primitive illusions which took thousands of years to dispel; like that, for instance, destroyed by Galileo when he showed that the earth moved round the sun, after countless generations of men, both wise and foolish, had regarded the sun, moon and stars, as travelling from east to west across the sky?

It ought to be a truism that all organic life develops only in relation to some environment. In order to make this clear let us take any simple plant. It springs out of the soil, its roots being in close contact with particles of earth and organic matters, between the interstices of which water and air keep changing places. The water comes through after rain and then drains away to deeper levels, but always closely followed by more (moist) air which slowly dries, until another shower brings water again. But while the roots of the plant are obviously fixed firmly in the earth, the stem, with its leaves, flowers or fruit seems to stand up freely, pointing towards the skies with an apparent independence of which the plant might be inclined to boast, as human beings do. But the plant is not so foolish, for it is closely wrapped round by air which is nearly always in motion and at times violent, tossing its leaves and flowers about, sometimes threatening to break its stem and even to tear it up altogether by the roots. This air, also, is sometimes moist, sometimes dry, sometimes warm and at others cold, sometimes clean, at others dust-laden. The plant is thus never, for one moment, free and independent—never out of the close embrace of its environment; if it were, it would instantly die. ‘Life,’

for the plant, is nothing else than the sum of its organic contacts with the different parts of its environment; the plant is nothing more than a temporary arrangement of portions of the environment itself, in active, chemical and physical interactions with the rest. It might be defined as *a portion of the environment dynamically and temporarily individualised*.

This example of the plant is very instructive. Although the part standing up in the air looks free and independent, it is just as closely embraced by its environment as is the root part. Because we cannot see the transparent part of the environment, we are instinctively inclined to think that the earth round its roots is the only material part of the plant's contact and connection. But a little thought convinces us that this is an illusion, and that the transparent and apparently non-existent part may perhaps be more essential to the plant's life, in the matter of its vital processes, than the obviously material earth. We realise, then, easily enough, that the plant is *embedded* in its environment and thus continuous with it, though possessing some complex motion of its own.

Let us now apply this to ourselves. Our environment, also, is not limited to what we see. We can see a certain amount of it,—the earth under us, the surrounding rocks and trees and the sky above us, the walls and roofs that shelter us, the beds we sleep on, and, because we appear to move thus freely and independently of them all, we think that we are free. It is true that we are not rooted in the ground like the plant; we appear to move about freely, but our range of movement is limited. There is a certain group of things we live among, and are always returning to after

our wanderings and excursions, and to conclude that we are free and independent of any material environment is as mistaken, in our case, as it was in that of the plant's stem and leaves. We also have the air washing around us even more clingingly than water and penetrating into our lungs; one instant's complete separation from it would mean death. The food we eat is still grazed or grown from the ground, although it reaches us in complicated streams, usually at some specified spot, say our dining-room tables, and there we find them as we return along our wonted orbits. It is as if the plant could pull up its roots when it liked, and walk about on them as on legs, and then return to its place. Man's roots are not in solid earth undergoing transformations, but in a social matrix of endless changes and comings and goings; floods and ebbs of food and other necessities occur, and his physical welfare depends upon the regularity and adequacy of the necessary supplies flowing about him, and of his application to them. Man is thus no more truly independent of his environment than is the plant. He is embedded in his environment, wholly dependent on it, and a part of it. The physical life of man, in fact, is nothing but a small centre of disturbance *in* the environment due to some regular system of action and reaction—a system which is maintained for a period, until some equilibrium is attained; then this physical life comes to an end, as a fire becomes extinguished.

But in the life of man we find an element developed which cannot, for certain, be attributed to the plant. It is possible that, in some form or other, psychic elements are present in all organic life, and are what fundamentally distinguish living matter from

inorganic matter. Be that as it may, there is, in man, without doubt, what we may call an 'inner' life, some strange life which is, at one moment, in harmony with the physical life, and at another in discord ; the former condition is happiness, the latter misery. The two lives are interwoven, and yet can, to a large extent, be treated apart. Each has its cycle. The body grows, reproduces itself, or bears fruit, as does the mind. But, while the physical cycle appears to be mechanical and automatic, the mind cycle is what we call intelligent. It can, to some degree, watch the physical cycle, and it is perpetually agitated by thoughts and feelings and imaginations which cause all the alternations of joy, of hope, of terror. Very puzzling and mysterious is the interrelationship between the many-coloured soul-life and the body which it seems to inhabit or 'animate.'

All human ideas had their beginning in some perception of phenomena. The movements of the sun, the moon, the stars across the heavens must have been seen and pondered over ages before the idea of their circling round the earth took shape. There must also have been a time when man first began clearly to realise that he had a mysterious 'inner' life which could be talked about as such, and have a name given to it long before a doctrine of the 'soul' took shape. Even the sun and the moon and the stars must have paled in importance as compared with the discovery, coming so near him that he could not escape from it night or day, that his free and independent bodily frame was inhabited by a still freer and more independent soul. Sleep here came in for a ready explanation. It was a time when the soul wandered abroad. Dreams, too, were woven in and all the thousand and

one inexplicable phenomena of life came to be involved in a soul-life, which became more and more dramatic the more it was pondered over, the foundation-stone of the plot being that the soul was temporarily chained to but in reality distinct from the body.

What wonder, then, that a doctrine of 'soul' was started, and that, once started, it became entangled with every conceivable and inconceivable natural phenomenon, and thus accumulated, like a snowball, as it rolled through the centuries of human development? What wonder that it attained to colossal proportions, not seldom swaying the nations with strange frenzies, and probably only kept within bounds by the frequent invasions of physical force which extorminated whole peoples, temples and priests being ruthlessly given over to fire and sword?

The part played by doctrines of the soul in the human drama can be read in every page of history. The most concrete records are perhaps those preserved in stone in the Valley of the Nile, where, solely with reference to and in obedience to some doctrine of the soul, the rocks were cut from the cliffs and fashioned into temples, or piled up into pyramids which are still the amazement of the world. The ancient inhabitants of Egypt built and built, not habitations, nor storehouses, nor, indeed, anything for human use, but solely with reference to some purely imaginary soul-life. What still exists of that vast labour suggests the remains of a tremendous hive, the bees of which had been driven mad by some mystic terror. England, Italy, Russia afford other interesting examples. The slightest actual acquaintance with, say, Orthodox religion as a living force to-day in Russia, must convince anyone that the same frenzy

ran riot over Europe not many centuries ago. Every village church is frescoed round with the gaping jaws of Hell, into the flames of which gleeful devils are dragging, in chains, a helpless crowd, including not only violent men and 'gay' ladies, but also dignified kings, bearded priests and 'holy' monks. The Teutonic and Scandinavian races, with their explosive energies, suffered from a different form of frenzy. In the Crusades we have one result that has left a mark in human annals almost rivalling the pyramids in importance. And this frenzy is still running riot, although in milder forms, among us now.

To what colossal proportions this soul-doctrine attained may be judged from the fact that the solid mass of man's religious beliefs, from their smallest beginnings, is included. The early idolatries, with their monstrous rites, all the pagan mythologies, mediæval and modern creeds right up to the time in which we are living,—all, without exception, however incongruous and contradictory, are united together into one vast whole held together by this doctrine of a free and independent soul. Students of ancient religions have, in not a few cases, been able to trace, like a thread, the continuity and development of the ideas to their latest forms. It has been shown, for instance, that the stellar constellations which must have given rise, in the minds of unsophisticated savages, to an awe that we, in this sordid age of petty aims and cares, no longer feel, started many of the root-ideas;—that the mystery of the stars in the sky became mingled with the great mystery in man's own body, *viz.* his powers of reproduction, and that these two, mingled and interwoven, constitute the chief threads throughout the whole. These, although now disguised, are

traceable even in the religious rites of the Christian churches to-day. We have an instance in the fact that the beautiful Roman Catholic symbol of Mother and Child can be traced back on the Egyptian temples for thousands of years through Isis, with her infant son Horus (Isis being the wife of the Egyptians' King-god Osiris), to the constellation Virgo. Again, the date assigned to the birth of Christ, the 25th of December, is said to be clearly connected with the observation of early man that, on that day, the sun begins to be reborn and to visit the world once more, bringing, in its train, spring, summer and fruitful autumn. That was the day assigned to the births of other sun-gods, such as the great Osiris and the Apollo of the Greeks.

The fact that these threads of continuity go back so far tends to show, also, that the whole may have been started by a misapprehension of the psychic elements in man. Just as early man concluded that the sun, moon and stars circled round the earth, so he assumed that there was, in man, a soul, launched into the spiritual sphere as free and isolated as a baby born into this life appears to be in the physical sphere, and left to run similar chances of failure or success. What wonder, then, that a thousand dramas of the soul, inevitably and perpetually interwoven with other mysteries, old and new, produced the many-patterned fabric of human religions?

I am not for a moment implying that these doctrines of the soul, which have filled the intellectual atmosphere almost to suffocation, and have held the mind of man, were all wrong. Men were practically right in many important matters relating to the sun, the moon and stars,—they took bearings and even



predicted eclipses with marvellous accuracy,—at a time when their notions of the actual interrelationships between the earth and the heavenly bodies were quite wrong. And there is no doubt that many of the observations as to man's inner life have been practically correct, even though the fundamental ideas on the subject were of the crudest.

It is manifestly impossible to follow up the immense development of the soul-idea which has been growing through the centuries, until it ramifies into every corner and crevice of the whole edifice of human knowledge, and to select the false from the true. Although it started with an illusion, it has been absorbing and incorporating, not only masses of wild imaginings, but also many truths of the inner life which might not otherwise have been preserved. In such religious doctrines as pantheism and immanence, glimmerings even of our present theme have been struggling to find expression, but the illusion of the free soul could hardly fail to impart to all these incorporated truths some slight twist or colour, which will only be put right when we look at the whole subject from a new point of view. Further, this very assimilation of truth has, by its own natural growth, been doing a work of purification, constantly revealing the fact that one extravagance after another was quite out of perspective. The spirits and gods assigned to the sun and moon and terrestrial objects, Phœbus with his chariot, Diana with her bow, the Naiads and the Dryads, can be seen, in the pages of history, fading gradually away in long processions from the mind of man, only to be followed by fresh personifications of soul-ideas. To-day it is the turn of angels and devils to be passing away; for these are fast losing their hold, even though

Heaven and Hell, their respective abodes, still linger as more abstract conceptions. But, again, as angels and devils vanish, they are being replaced by new variations, all cast in the same mould of the soul-idea. Modern spiritualism, which bears witness to an irrepressible consciousness of a psychic life, never escapes from the fundamental conception of the separate individual souls of dead persons. And yet it is just this doctrine of the separate individual soul which, I would suggest, may be as great an illusion as the supposed separateness and independence of man's body.

We have seen that there is no organic life physically free from its physical environment. The former is embedded in the latter and a part of it. Man's physical life consists of nothing more than a complex system of chemical and physical interactions between portions of the material substances of the environment, caught up into some system of forces, and the rest of the cosmos. The phenomenon is started by a physical force of life and comes naturally to equilibrium in old age and death. So far as the body is concerned, there is no separateness, no independence; its individuality is temporary and purely dynamic.

If this is the case with the body, what of the 'soul' that accompanies it? The body being, to use the term applied by Huxley to the crayfish, a 'stationary vortex' of the physical environment, it follows naturally, unless otherwise proven, that, if psychic elements are interwoven with that body, they must be contributed by psychic elements of the environment. Hence, unless some other source of knowledge should open to us, the appearance of psychic factors in the evolution of man can only be

legitimately attributed to their previous existence in the environment in which he is embedded. Body and soul have to be regarded as much a part of a physical and psychical environment as an eddy on the surface of a stream is a part of the stream. There is no other source of knowledge which might show us the origin of the psychic elements in man. We have to look to the rock from which we have been hewn. Our bodies were hewn from the environment yet never separated from it. There is no separateness of body, then why of soul?

It may be urged that, while we can analyse the body, and find it built up of the materials of the environment, we are not aware of any psychè in the environment. But is this really the case? Surely this is true only for the few. Who can look at the sunset and not see something in it not merely suggestive of thought, but imperiously claiming allegiance to a greater Mind? And what was the origin of fetish-worship unless objects, the strangest and most incongruous, had the power of awakening the deepest psychic emotions in primitive minds? But, whether we are aware of the psychè in the environment or not, it is evident that we have to postulate it;—that, just as, in our bodies, the physical and the psychical are present in some, to us, inexplicable association, so the physical and psychical must also have been present in the environment out of which we were hewn, and that the extreme individuality of the soul is as much an illusion as is the individuality of the body.

Time and the calm meditations of many minds alone can reveal what will be the effect of such invasion, on the part of science (if, indeed, I may call

the above process of reasoning by that name), into the very foundations of the dogmatic edifices which have towered up in the mind of man, like vast cities linked on to Heaven on the one side, and to Hell on the other.

Sudden earthquake-crashes and dissolutions are not to be expected, since many profound truths have been built up into the walls; the work of the coming generations will be less destruction than modification, selection and reconstruction. The great fundamental truths of life have to be brought into prominence in all their natural grandeur, and rescued from the twists they have received in being made part of the 'grotesque fairy tales' which have been proclaimed as religious truth.

Questions of dogma and theology do not here concern us; but the life of man and its advance burn, like eternal lamps, before our eyes. Dreams, however long they may have held the human mind in thrall, when proved to be dreams, may float away into the darkness or serve merely as fuel to feed the fires of friendly intercourse. What we have specially to note is the effect of our new point of view upon the ideas of Heaven and Hell. These two conceptions now seem to shift together, and to coincide with the present environment, just as do the coloured reduplications of the image of an object when the focus of an optical instrument is correctly adjusted. And this is necessarily also the case with the great bulk of the vague spiritual personalities so long believed in. The deities in Heaven, the devils in Hell, and all their scattered emissaries, become concentrated and focussed in the psychical elements of the present environment, and these psychical elements are as intimately involved

with its physical elements as are our minds with our bodies. The whole divine hierarchy, as well as the rebellious hosts of evil, lose their existence as separate and individual points of spiritual force working freely and independently; they are all absorbed, and the phenomena in human life which have been attributed to them, must be referred to the natural interactions of the psychè in man and the psychè of the environmental matrix.

This shifting of the perspective not only profoundly affects the great spiritual drama of the popular religions but, equally profoundly, the materialism which has existed as a protest against the extravagancies of spiritual conception. For materialism appealed—and appealed with force—to the great natural order of things which seems to persist with supreme indifference to the spiritual drama, in spite of prayers which cut the soul with agony as with knives, and in spite of all the assumed dependence of the former upon the latter. We now find materialism itself invaded by spiritualism, and although we may still speak of the material universe and of the psychical universe, the distinction is merely in speech; the two, in fact, are as inseparable as are the body and the mind of man.

Further, man, the physical mechanism, is ceasing to be of as much interest to us as man the organ of the psychè, with whom we can exchange ideas and sentiments, from whom help and inspiration may be received and to whom they may be given. The same may be said of the cosmos. Its purely physical factors, which we are compelled, by the needs of our physical frames and the constitution of our minds, to explore, are no longer the prime sources of our human

life. Our inner life, without which life were not life at all, is sustained by the secret springs of spiritual influences, not scattered about in the forms of man-like gods, angels and, perchance, devils, but saturating the environment. They bathe us round; our spirits are never out of touch with them; they surround us, not only in our fellow-men, but in animals, insects, trees, rocks, earth and sea. This must be the truth and, as truth, able to stand against all the objections and difficulties caused by our sense of personality. It is our consciousness that is blind and untrained. No religion, however low,—even the merest fetish-worship, which suddenly feels and fears a spiritual influence in a stone that peeps out from a bank,—but is a distortion of the truth, and the history of religion is the history of the dawning of the spirituality of matter upon the human consciousness.

And here, although a door opens before us and shows a hundred paths, each more tempting than the other, we must end with a momentary reverie. How many philosophers, with names enrolled among the great architects in the building of the temple of knowledge, and how many more whose names have been erased from that list because of their ‘unorthodoxy,’ have said all this and said it much better than I have said it here, and yet have not been listened to? The most frenzied stage of the delirium of the waking mind, with its fierce struggles between angels and devils for the souls of men, appears, indeed, to have passed away, but has the fever abated sufficiently to allow man to apprehend and to welcome Reason as she seeks to enter the strongholds of dogmatic religion in the garb of science?

HENRY M. BERNARD.

## SOME FEATURES OF BUDDHIST PSYCHOLOGY.

THE EDITOR.

WE may look in vain for reference to any psychological system of the Orient in modern text-books of psychology. And yet this is precisely the field of experience that Eastern minds have tilled with the greatest assiduity and with no little success. Of all the systems built up by the acute self-analysis of the Oriental mind, the most thorough-going is that of the Buddhist contemplatives and thinkers. Its origins go back some two millennia and a half, and it is still a virile living tradition with a very extensive literature, of which we as yet know hardly anything. If it is to be classed as scholastic, it is a scholasticism that has sought to found itself and confirm itself in experience, at any rate in the past; and if we are to speak of what is to follow, as Buddhist mediævalism, it must be confessed that it is a mediævalism which, in some respects, is not yet out of date. If, to use the hackneyed phrase, the proper study of mankind is man, then the most elaborate study of man which the East has ever produced cannot be without interest to us in the West; unfortunately, however, Buddhist psychology is so overladen with technicalities as to deter all but the most stout-hearted, unless they are linguistic specialists, and even then the difficulty of finding correct equivalents in modern terms is

very great, indeed well-nigh insuperable, were it not that there is a still living tradition to help them.

The greatest authority on Buddhist psychology in the West is undoubtedly Mrs. Rhys Davids, whose pioneer version and commentary of the only book of that portion of the canon dealing specifically with the subject, that has yet been translated, stands out by itself as a monument of patient industry. But Mrs. Rhys Davids has now still further increased our debt of gratitude by collaborating with a Burmese scholar of high attainments, who is also well read in Western philosophy and psychology, in the production of a version of the most authoritative compendium of Buddhist psychological ethics and philosophy, which has been for upwards of eight centuries the text-book or manual of the priestly schools in Burma.<sup>1</sup> The work, it may be added, has been entirely a labour of love, and the ridiculously small price is sufficient only to cover the bare cost of production.

It is a pity that so valuable a volume should remain unknown to practically all but the select circle who follow Pāli studies; and I therefore propose, not to summarise what has already been made as compact as possible for mnemonic purposes, but to select a few points of special importance, chiefly from Mr. Aung's valuable introduction of 76 pages, in the hope that they may be of interest to readers of *THE QUEST*, and induce a few of them at least to grapple with this most instructive treatise themselves.

Mr. Aung tells us that he has no theories of his

<sup>1</sup> *Compendium of Philosophy*. Being a Translation now made for the First Time from the Original Pāli of the *Abhidhammatha-Sangaha*, with Introductory Essay and Notes, by Shwe Zan Aung, B.A. Revised and edited by Mrs. Rhys Davids, M.A., Special Lecturer in Philosophy at Manchester University. Published by the Pāli Text Society (London, Frowde), 1910, pp. xxiv., 298, price 5s. net.



own, and is acting solely as the mouthpiece of his country's teachers. He writes :

Albeit I am but an interpreter of Burmese views based on the Ceylon Commentary and the works of Buddhaghosa. You may take my essay as mediæval Buddhism presented through modern Burmese glasses.

The great advantage of this collaboration between an Eastern and Western scholar is that we have a more correct rendering of many technical terms than has hitherto been possible. Mr. Aung again and again insists that philology will not help us to the living meanings of terms which have long departed from their original significance, and points out many fundamental inaccuracies in current Occidental translations.

The title of the treatise, literally translated, means 'Compendium of the Subject-matter of the *Abhidhamma*,'—i.e. of the seven books of the third 'basket,' or collection, of Buddhist scripture. We have no exact equivalent for *abhi-dhamma*; it is almost 'meta-physics,' but is, perhaps, preferably to be rendered as 'philosophy,' as embracing philosophy of mind and philosophy of conduct. The scope of the treatise is well indicated in the Editor's Preface.

This philosophy begins, almost like modern empiricism, with an analysis of (1) what we find (*a*) within us, (*b*) around us, and of (2) what we aspire to find.

(1) Mind is analysed and catalogued. The visible world, and that which we associate therewith, is similarly treated. This includes things invisible, but conceived as analogously existing: worlds beyond our ken, beings infra-human, superhuman. . . .

(2) Then the Ideal [*Nibbāna*, Sk. *Nirvāṇa*], and thereunder chiefly the way thereto; for under this head the subject is no more things as they are, but work that has to be done, travail of thought and will to lift the whole being to a higher plane of existence, if so

be it lie in him to experience moments of ecstasy which may transform and purify all his earthly vision.

The way to the realisation of this ideal is marked out in stages of moral purification and stern mental discipline and the approach to it is accompanied by mystic experience. But the type of mysticism in what we may call Pāli Buddhism differs from the general root-form of Western religious mystical experience. Not only, as in all high forms of mysticism, does the Buddhist not seek union with *a* deity, but, owing to his fundamental dogma of the impermanence of the ego, he regards the consummation, not as the union of the human and divine in even the sublimest and most spiritual sense of personality, but solely as the transcendency of personality in every conceivable way. I do not think myself that genuinely experienced mystics, who have transcended the opposites, who are 'both—and' people, would quarrel over the matter fundamentally, for personality and impersonality are mutually complementary; but for 'either—or' people the distinction is radical. In any case the Buddhist, like the Indian philosopher in general, believes that the human mind and will are 'potentially god-like'—I use Mrs. Rhys Davids' own phrase—and that the powers of mind and will can by right training be actualised here and now, in "a supernormal evolution of faculties combined with, not to say resulting from, ethical purity."

As to the elusive question of the Buddhist conception of personal identity, we are told, as we have previously been taught, that it is to be thought of under the famous Heraclitean figure of the ever-flowing river—the same yet never the same. Mrs. Rhys Davids very aptly compares this further with the

modern conception of the great physical forces "in which identities are series of *informed* or *charged sequels*." We are not to speak of a transmigrating 'essence' or 'substance,' but of a life-stream or continuum; though why 'essence,' in an immaterial and spiritual sense, should not very conveniently complement or determine a stream of becoming is not easy to understand. It would be a further convenience if we could have some satisfactory term to distinguish the transcendental or spiritual 'self' (what is sometimes called the 'mystical I'), the fundamental being or life beyond subject and object, from the ever-changing 'me' which Buddhism insists quite rightly on regarding as the impermanent ego. By all means let us attempt to envisage reality in terms of life, but in doing so let us not forget that the analogies of an ever-flowing stream and of physical forces are only analogies, that a stream is thinkable only by means of its complementary notion, and that neither is without the other, and that in life the many and the one are inseparable; not only so, but the many in life are not external to one another as in the material universe.

For the Buddhist life is infinite, and 'my life' is essentially infinite though momentarily evanescent. To this statement no mystic need object. Man dies to live every moment, and yet he is immortal. It is the eternal riddle of man, happy and wretched, immortal mortal. To give this point, I will quote a line or two from a mediæval mystical gryphus :

Nor man nor woman, but both.

O'er all things in the world he rules, yet unto all he's subject.  
He measureth immensities, he who hath not power to add a  
single cubit to his stature.

Daily he lives, and dies, he waxes and he wanes.

One with himself, yet many, same yet other.

If there were not, however, some principle of spiritual identity of its own proper order and nature, the whole scheme of Buddhist ethical causality would manifestly collapse. And, therefore, though we have not the remotest desire to cling to the momentary 'me' or even the 'me' of any particular life-continuum, and have every sympathy with the most strenuous endeavours to remove, not the 'false notion of an I,' as we find the phrase so often in Buddhist books, in the sense that there is no reality at all underlying the principle of personality, but rather to get rid of the 'notion of the false I,' in the sense of a self separated from the universal life,—we cannot believe that the extreme no-ego dogma is nearer to reality than the ego notion in the sense of an evolving moral or spiritual personality; both are necessary for a complete understanding of reality we venture to think.

If there is no spiritual principle of identity, no genuine continuity, no true entity, it seems but empty words to speak of moral responsibility, and vainer still to write of Buddhist belief in "expansion of memory down the long past, the super-normal range of vision and hearing, telepathic, or rather telenoëtic power, the mastery of will over the body and beyond that." We have every belief in the spiritual reality that transcends ever-changing subject and ever-changing object, and have not the slightest wish to misconceive that reality as a static essence, but we cannot see how it is more philosophical to insist on the ever-changing nature of the relativity of subject and object, to the exclusion of any principle of spiritual self-identity which fundamentally embraces all relativity. The great interest in this theme, however, is that Buddhist tradition believes it is in posses-

sion of a discipline, known as 'purity of transcending doubt,' by which its theories can be verified. It is the cultivation of a faculty of the nature of insight or intuition or gnosis. Now, though this is precisely the claim made by disciplined mystics of other schools who theorise differently as to the nature of the self, we have much to learn from the Buddhist point of view, provided we remember that in the spiritual life theories of the intellect in apparently the sharpest antagonism may be found to be mutually complementary and necessary.

We now pass to Mr. Aung's highly instructive Introductory Essay, which is a succinct exposition of Buddhist philosophy from the psychological standpoint.

We all know that consciousness has never been satisfactorily defined. As Dr. Iverach says, in his admirable article on the subject in the last published volume of Hasting's *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*: "Like all ultimates, we must simply accept it as the condition of the explanation of all else, itself remaining unexplained." Mr. Aung, however, tentatively defines consciousness as the relation between subject and object, and adds that therefore the philosophy of Buddhism is essentially a philosophy of relations. The object is the relating thing and the subject is the related thing, neither can exist without the other. Here it will be noticed that the greater stress is laid on the object.

The object of consciousness is either object of sense or object of thought.

The object of sense, or 'five-door' consciousness, is classified according to the senses. Of these sight and hearing are classed together, because their objective sources do not come into physical contact with the

organism, whereas smell and taste are modifications of touch. Touch consists of any or all of the three essentials or primary qualities of body—namely, extension, heat and motion, corresponding to the senses of locality, temperature and pressure.

The object of thought is also five-fold: (1) mind, or 'mind-door' consciousness, (2) mental properties, (3) sensitive and subtle properties of body, (4) concept (idea, notion, 'name'), and (5) the ideal (*nibbāna*).

Mind is not to be regarded as that which is conscious of an object, but rather as thought in the sense of thinking of an object, and, therefore, as consciousness. It is, however, distinguished from its concomitants, the mental properties, factors or elements, distinguishable in the fact of consciousness or subjective experience, that is to say, factors which combine to constitute a state of consciousness, or distinguishable units in the continuance of consciousness. Of these mental properties no less than fifty-two are catalogued. Their nature may be seen from the following instances: the common sense-properties (*i.e.* properties common to every act of consciousness) range from contact to attention; the particular properties, from application to the desire to do; the immoral, from dulness to perplexity; the morally beautiful, from faith to rectitude of mind; thereafter right speech, right action and right livelihood; then pity and benevolence, and finally reason, or perhaps wisdom.

Under the object of thought are also shown the gross and subtle divisions of non-mental 'forms' or material qualities or properties of matter. Under the former (the gross) are comprised all sense-organs and sense-objects; and under the latter (the subtle), the material qualities of vital force, nutrition and sex,

the two media of communication—namely, movements of body and vocal organs to indicate purpose and meaning—together with space and certain other properties which are set forth very obscurely. As to space and time we are told :

Space (*ākāsa*) is a permanent concept by which the mind is enabled to distinguish objects in external perception. What space is to matter time is to mind. Time is the concept by which, first and foremost, mental states are distinguished in internal intuition.

The object of sense is always present—that is, it is intuited as something present. The ideal (*nibbāna*) and concepts are said to be out of time ; while the rest of the objects of mind are either present, or past, or future. It is here to be noted that the ideal is classed as an object of thought ; but if *nibbāna* is *the* reality *par excellence*, the ‘ideal’ here should stand for the *concept* of reality rather than for reality itself.

It is thus seen that a thorough analysis of the object as above set forth is intended to exhaust the whole universe.

We now pass to the subject, and therewith once more to the no-ego theory which forms the central doctrine of Buddhist philosophy. Mr. Aung states this as follows :

In Buddhism there is no actor apart from action, no percipient apart from perception. In other words, there is no conscious subject behind consciousness.

Mind is thus held to be simply the consciousness of an object ; and when subject is spoken of it must be understood to mean “not the self-same permanent conscious subject, but merely a transitory *state* of consciousness.”

It need hardly be remarked, for those familiar with Bergson’s philosophy, that ‘states’ of any kind are not of life itself, they are so to say snap-shots at it

from outside. A summation of states of consciousness, or a state of consciousness of any kind, we agree, is no true permanent self; the first half of Mr. Aung's statement may thus be accepted without admitting the second half. The main object, however, of the profound analysis known as *abhidhamma*, we are told, is:

to show generally that such state of consciousness is no simple modification of a mind-stuff, and, above all, that there is no soul or ego which is apart from the state of consciousness; but that each seemingly simple state is in reality a highly complex compound, constantly changing and giving rise to new combinations.

Life is like the current of a river, and though we term the source and mouth of this 'river of life' birth and death, they are still composed of the same water of life. What, then, is this life-stream or water of life? It is of the nature of being and thought, which are opposed yet similar. Existence in such a state as dreamless sleep, when mind is inoperative, is termed being; it is a state of obscure perception not amounting to consciousness. The dividing line between being and thought is termed the 'door of consciousness,' and is practically the threshold between the subliminal and supraliminal. And when we learn further that there are nineteen classes of subliminal consciousness according to Buddhist analysis, the thought occurs that it might be worth the while of those of our psychologists who are also familiar with psychical research, to give the matter some consideration; the subject, however, is too abstruse for the present short summary of salient features.

What, then, again we ask is this stream of being; and we are told that "a flow of the momentary



states of subliminal consciousness of a particular class" constitutes the stream of being bounded by birth and decease. "And as decease is but a prelude to another birth, the continued flow of the stream of being from life to life, from existence to existence," constitutes the 'continual going,' or 'ocean of existence' (*samsāra*) which is set over against the reality of *nibbāna*.

Now the momentary states of subliminal consciousness of what Mr. Aung himself calls an 'individual being,' are like one another in certain respects. And, he continues:

Because of the continuity of such similar states of temporary selves, men, under the blinding influence of ignorance, mistake similarity for identity, and are apt to think of all this 'river of life' as one enduring, abiding soul or ego, even as they think the river of yesterday identical with that of to-day. It is this constancy of relation, which according to definition is consciousness itself, which gives rise to the erroneous idea of personal identity. The phenomenon of self-consciousness is, like any other object, variable, but regarded as identical.

It is this stream of being that is the life-continuum; it is as it were "the background on which thought-pictures are drawn." If undisturbed, the stream flows smoothly on; but "when that current is opposed by any obstacle of thought from the world within, or perturbed by tributary streams of the senses from the world without," then thoughts arise. And thus, according to the Buddhist view:

Life is like an ever-changing river, having its source in birth, its goal in death, receiving from the tributary stream of sense constant accretions to its flood, and ever dispensing to the world around it the thought-stuff it has gathered by the way.

According to Buddhism, there are three worlds or 'planes' of existence, for which we must retain the

original terms as we have no exact equivalents: (1) *kāma-loka*, the world of desire, or state of material existence in which desire prevails; (2) *rūpa-loka*, the world or plane of existence in which a subtle residue of matter is said to be still met with; and (3) *arūpa-loka*, the world in which no trace of matter is to be found.

If it is asked how this is known, the reply probably will be that it results from the analysis of supernormal consciousness in meditation. In matters passing the possibility of verification in normal consciousness, Mr. Aung says that the nearest approach to proof is 'to show the likelihood' of anything. He tells us that the Buddhists who are not possessed of supernormal consciousness, accept in faith the traditional teaching on such matters. And continues:

For instance, our assertions about grades of superhuman beings will be laughed at in the West (*i.e.* by those who have relinquished their own traditional beliefs of like nature). Such beings cannot be proved to exist. Nevertheless, comparative anatomy has done a little service toward showing the *likelihood* of a regular gradation of beings, which does not necessarily stop at man. Again, we who have been accustomed to associate mind with brain, may scoff at the idea of the *arūpa* world. And yet modern hypnotism, in a small way, shows *likelihood* of the existence of a world with thought minus brain-activity.

*Kāma-loka* is not simply the visible physical universe, it is invisible as well as visible. It is further divided into the plane or state of (*a*) misery and that of (*b*) fortunate sense-experience. The former (*a*) is said to include: purgatory, the animal world and the state of unhappy shades and of demons; while the latter (*b*) embraces the realm of human beings and of the lower gods.

*Kāma-loka* is material and, though of grades of grossness and subtlety, is to be sharply distinguished from the *rūpa* world, into which, it is said, no human consciousness can rise that is not trained in the discipline of meditation, whereby a new form of existence is opened up in which there is, however, still a slight residuum of matter as a basis. The 'sublime' states, of *rūpa* consciousness, correspond with the realms of non-human beings of celestial lineage, of which there are said to be various grades. It may help somewhat to distinguish *rūpa-loka* from *kāma-loka* when we learn that sight and hearing alone are operative in the former; touch, taste and smell, gross or subtle, being characteristic of the latter, together, of course, with sight and hearing as well.

Beyond *rūpa-loka* again are still sublimer grades in states which are entirely immaterial (*a-rūpa*).

Now it is to be noted that even in the higher *kāma-loka* states, the life-term of beings may, according to Buddhist belief, last for millions of years. If this is so, and if such states in the still higher grades are indefinitely extendible in time, and if the human being can pass into such states of existence, then the possibility of survival, in its higher sense of the perdurance of the life-continuum as an evolving moral person, seems in Buddhism to be sufficiently provided for to suit all tastes; and consequently the no-ego theory means practically nothing more than that the limited egoity which we normally know, is indefinitely transcendable. It is true that eternity is of a different order from any time-series, and that ultimate reality transcends egoity in every sense in which we can understand the term; but about such ultimates it would be absurd to quarrel, until the three worlds are

transcended, and then it will probably be found not worth while.

But to return to the subject of consciousness. Supraliminal consciousness is treated of as normal, supernormal and transcendental, though not in the limited senses in which we use the terms. Normal consciousness is *generally* connected with the desire-world, though probably we in the West should speak of any consciousness of the invisible, other than dreaming, as extra-normal; supernormal consciousness pertains to the *rūpa*- and *arūpa*-planes of existence; while transcendental consciousness is held to be entirely 'beyond the three worlds'—it is immediacy itself.

Consciousness is said to be primarily composed of seven mental properties. These seven are called 'universals' because they are common to every class or state of consciousness and every separate act of mind and thought. These are: (1) contact, (2) feeling, (3) perception, (4) will or volition, (5) one-ness of object, (6) psychic life, and (7) attention.

(1) The simplest awareness of the presence of an object of sense, or awareness of an objective presentation, is called 'contact,' or more correctly 'tact.'

(2) Next, the subject or consciousness is aware of itself as being affected as an animated organism. This further awareness of subjective affection—either pleasant, painful or indifferent—is termed 'feeling born of contact.'

(3) The sensation or feeling is then referred to a sense-organ, and there thus emerges awareness of the physical basis of sensation, that is, it is extended so as to receive contact, or so as to occupy space. This recognition of the localisation of sensation proper is called 'perception born of contact.'

(4) Volition may be regarded under two aspects: psychologically it simply determines the activities of its concomitant properties; ethically it determines its own consequences subject to conditions.

(5) The mental property by which "the object of consciousness is *necessarily* regarded as an individual, occupying a definite position in space or time, or in both," is called 'individuality of object.' When this mental property of 'objective delineation' is cultivated and developed, it is termed 'concentration of thought.'

(6) The activities of will and the rest are due to the 'psychic life.' It is this which infuses mental life into one and all of the properties, and constitutes the whole into a 'psychosis or psychical state.'

(7) Finally, we have the '*alpha* and *omega*' of an act of consciousness in the selective or co-ordinating activity of 'attention.'

This is a subtle enough beginning, but it is nothing in comparison with the microscopic analysis displayed in the duration-theory of a single process of consciousness. The normal procedure of a single process of cognition is said to consist of a series or sequence of mental moments. A thought-moment is computed to last between a billionth and two billionth part of a finger-snap or eye-wink or shortest lightning flash. Moreover, each thought-moment is further subdivided into three instants, in which it becomes, exists and disappears. A thought-moment is thus the infinitesimal period occupied by any single state of consciousness, or by any separate act of mind or thought. For a complete process of consciousness it is supposed that seventeen thought-moments are required, from the moment an objective thought emerges above the threshold of subjective conscious-

ness to the moment when it sinks again into the subliminal. As mind is thought to produce matter, the Buddhists have come to reckon the duration of a material phenomenon, or to speak of matter, as lasting seventeen thought-moments. Some of the stages of process may be mentioned so as to give an idea of the sequence; it ought, however, to be remembered that the whole process in normal time appears to be instantaneous. Some of the phases are: turning-to, sensation, reception, examination, determining, apperception (*i.e.* full cognition), and registering.

The above will give the reader some slight notion of the subtlety of Buddhist psychological analysis, and when we add that this is but the merest beginning of the enquiry, it will be seen that the subject is well worth the serious attention of Western psychology.

The treatise proceeds, next, to consider the claims of what are called the 'specific' or accidental mental properties (as distinguished from the universals), which are also seven in number; while the final analysis results in no less than eighty-nine classes of consciousness that have to be studied. Some of them function as causes, some as results, and some are non-causal or 'static.'

Causal classes of consciousness are either good or moral, or bad or immoral, and are therefore determinate; while resultant and non-moral classes are neither moral nor immoral, and therefore neutral, unmoral or indeterminate.

Non-causal consciousness characterises only the Buddha and the Arahants; with them *karma* is said to be inoperative.

Before passing to a brief consideration of higher or supernormal or sublime states of consciousness,

known generally as 'great,' mention must be made of the 'way of the beginner' tending thereto, that is the process of thought-transition from normal (*kāma*) to supernormal (*rūpa*) consciousness. Purity of morals is an essential qualification in the beginner, who must belong to one of the four classes of beings known as the 'thrice conditioned,' that is to say those attended by three good conditions—namely, disinterestedness, love and reason. He must also repair to a teacher qualified for giving instruction in the art of meditation.

First of all an object of meditation suited to the character of the beginner is chosen. The object chosen for this transitional state of concentration may be the after-image of any one of the ten 'circles,' as they are called, or again of one of the foul things, or of the living body, or simply of the breath. The 'circles' are those of earth, water, fire or air, blue, yellow, red or white, of space or of light. The ten impurities or foul things are the images of a corpse in different stages of decomposition, down to the skeleton; this object is of course contrasted with the living body.

The preliminary concentration is practised on the image of the object, which is first depicted to the imagination as an exact copy of the original with all its original imperfection. Concentration is the power of individualising an object. By this preliminary concentration the image is gradually divested of its imperfections and conceptualised, becoming a sublimated copy, an abstract or after-image.

This preliminary phase of initial application is followed by an intermediate phase of sustained concentration, in which what are called the 'five

hindrances' have to be inhibited. These hindrances are: sloth-and-torpor, doubt, aversion, distraction-and-worry, and ignorance.

When these hindrances are removed, the consciousness pertains to that of the 'great' types of moral consciousness 'accompanied with joy and connected with knowledge.' It is now that normal thought approximates to the supernormal. There are four phases of such consciousness known as 'preparation,' 'access,' 'adaptation,' and 'adoption.' The last is so called because the meditator then becomes 'one of the race'—*sc.* of the Worthy or Arahants—corresponding with the idea of spiritual regeneration or re-birth in Western tradition. At the last moment of 'adoption,' normal consciousness is cut off by supernormal. In other words, "the subject, as adopted or regenerated, cuts off the heritage of *kāma*-consciousness, and evolves the lineage of the *rūpa*-class of exalted consciousness."

The transitional stage is thus succeeded by the first stage of supernormal consciousness known as the first *rūpa jhāna* or rapture.

It should, however, be remembered that *jhāna* of this nature is said not to be necessary for arahantship or saintship, and that there are saints known as 'dry-visioned.' The practice for the attainment of *jhāna with ecstasy* is generally attended with the greatest difficulties and is known as the 'distressful path.' Above all it is liable to the greatest abuse in the hands of the unscrupulous, for *jhāna*, in the sense of rapture, can be attained without moral qualifications.

Corresponding with the inhibition of the five hindrances of the transitional stage, there is now



a steady development of positive and pleasurable interest, growing keener and keener, up to thrilling emotion and rapture.

The indescribable pleasure derived from intense interest develops the element of individualisation [*i.e.* concentration on a single object] into ecstatic concentration, or state of being *en rapport* with the after-image, by which sensuous desire is inhibited.

It is mind penetrating into the inwardness or import of its object. This higher concentration, which as it were lulls to sleep the five hindrances for the time being, is called 'tranquillisation' or 'calm,' and also 'purity of mind,' as the mind is now free from the hindrances.

He who has experienced this state, realises himself as a completely changed person; he lives for the time a higher life, 'the life of a god of the heavens called *rūpa*.' If this is so, surely there is no loss of personality in a philosophical sense, but rather a metamorphosis into a higher person.

In the *rūpa* states of *jhāna*, of which there are said to be five, certain activities are gradually dispensed with or transcended—*e.g.* the direction of the mind towards the object, the grades of interest, etc.—and finally the happy feeling of ecstasy is replaced by a neutrality or balance of emotion.

Beyond this there is a further course of mental training to enable the contemplative to attain mastery of the intellect as well as of feeling, so that what are called the super-intellectual powers may be acquired. This brings us to the four *arūpa* states of *jhāna*, which are entirely immaterial in every way. Little is said about them beyond giving the traditional objects of meditation, which are said to lead towards these states. They are: (1) the con-

cept of the infinity of space as divested of all material objects; (2) the conception of this concept as infinite consciousness; (3) the conception of this deeper consciousness again as 'nothingness'; and (4) finally the conception of this 'absence' as utter calm and serenity of neither consciousness nor unconsciousness. This last, however, we may add, is not *nibbāna*, as is generally supposed.

It is hardly necessary to note that though mental training is generally spoken of, this discipline connotes the strictest moral purification, and the evolution of supernormal powers of will which involve the development of the principles of purpose, effort, knowledge and wisdom. The higher powers or virtues of the Path are of a spiritual nature; the lower powers are psychic and intellectual.

Thus we find mentioned in the list of the lower powers: power exercised by men in ordinary walks of life; power acquired by knowledge (science, art, hypnotism, etc.); power of extended action and locomotion; power of looking on agreeable objects as disagreeable and *vice versa*; power of resisting pain, death, etc.; power of creating phenomena outside one's body; of transforming one's body into different personalities; power of creating one's own double.

Some of these 'powers' are evidently similar to those exercised unconsciously by spiritistic mediums. Among other kinds of secular or worldly (*i.e.*, pertaining to the three worlds) supernormal thought-powers we find mentioned :

(1) Clairvoyance, or what Mr. Aung (or is it the Editor?) calls hyperæsthesia or telepathy of sight, where :

The adept in the willing process wills to see the desired thing

beyond the sensory range. It is said that light has to be created where darkness is, in order to enable the celestial eye to observe and discern things in the dark.

One knows so many clairvoyants who have not the remotest notion of creating light in darkness, that this seems to be valuing these extensions of sense at too high a figure.

(2) The power of the 'celestial ear' or what we more prosaically term clairauidience, or hearing sounds beyond the normal range, the various phases of which parallel the modes of clear-seeing.

(3) Discerning the thoughts of another, or thought-reading. The lower grades, however, it is said, cannot read the thoughts of the higher.

(4) The insight known as remembrance of previous circumstances, by which the past history of one's self or of another can be read. This is said to extend to past existences as well as to the present.

Under clairvoyance come the general phenomena of what we should call psychometry, and of the seeing of past events in the life of an individual, which latter is called 'supernormal insight concerning event according to deed.' There is also the seeing of the future, by which some particular event in the life of an individual may be foreseen. But the power of prophecy of general events is reserved for the Buddha alone, seeing that every possible condition would have to be taken into account.

All of the above 'powers' seem to accompany the lower *rūpa jhāna* or states of meditation; we should ourselves, however, say that most of it had to do with *kāma* consciousness.

But the way of the Path would seem to be other; at any rate the acquirement of powers of the above

order seem to form no part of the moral aspiration of the neophyte. Of the Path itself we have no space to speak, but may fitly conclude this paper by setting down some of the chief moments of approach to it.

He who would transcend the experience of this conditioned world must, first of all, concentrate on 'purity of views'—that is, he must attain to a correct view of the universe, which, according to the Buddhist, is a view free from the idea of "an identical *substance* of mind or matter."

Next, he must cultivate the 'purity of transcending doubt' by a study of the Buddhist doctrine of evolution.

Following this, he must cultivate the modes of insight. The first of these is the insight (lit. 'handling'<sup>1</sup>) by which he contemplates the three salient marks of things—or, in other words, the conditioned as impermanent, evil<sup>2</sup> and unsubstantial. The second is the insight into flux (or rising and waning), by which he observes "the growth and the decay of things, or being and non-being in the process of becoming," and so is said to attain the purity of insight by which the true Path is distinguished from that which is not the Path.

There follow other modes of insight known generally as 'purity of insight during the practice of discernment,' or more simply 'purity of intellectual culture,' or again 'Path-insight,' by which the meditator fits himself for the mental qualifications for the Path, and so acquires the insight of 'adaptation.' It is the insight of equanimity acquired in this discipline that leads to the arising of the Path, and it is thus called

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Plotinus' 'touch.

<sup>2</sup> Why evil? This is one of the chief flaws in the system.

the 'mouth or gate of emancipation'; for the Path itself is reached immediately after one moment of 'adoption,' or birth into the higher consciousness of the Path itself. Adoption, which follows on adaptation, "cuts off the heritage of the ordinary average person, and evolves the heritage of the Transcendental."

The text says:

Immediately after that consciousness [of noble kinship], the Path, namely [consciousness] discerning the fact of Ill, expelling the fact of its Cause, realising the fact of its Cessation, cultivating the fact of the Way [to Cessation of Ill], descends into the avenue of ecstatic thought.

And here we may leave the subject, as the nature of the Transcendental or of Spiritual Reality, to which the Manual, however, devotes little attention, has been recently discussed in these pages at some length, if not from the Pāli point of view, at any rate from the standpoint of progressive Mahāyānist speculation.<sup>1</sup>

G. R. S. MEAD.

<sup>1</sup> See the writer's two articles 'Spiritual Reality in Progressive Buddhism' and 'The Ideal Life in Progressive Buddhism,' *THE QUEST*, vol. ii., no. 4 July, 1911, and vol. iii., no. 2, January, 1912.

## THE SECOND NOE: JOHN THE BAPTIST IN THE LIGHT OF A NEW SAMARITAN DOCUMENT.

ROBERT EISLER, PH.D.

IN his last vision of the restored sanctuary on Mount Zion, Ezekiel beholds drops of water oozing out from under the threshold of the temple. Like a small runlet these drops trickle down from under the right side of the house on the right or auspicious side of the altar; then they drip through under the enclosing walls of the temple-precinct, and a thousand cubits farther they reach already over the ankles of one who passes through them. Again a thousand steps further down the seer crosses the stream a second time; but now the waters are up to the loins. Still another thousand cubits further the river has swollen to such a size that the waters—waters to swim in—could no more be passed over. With this the description of the wonderfully rapid growth of the stream stops abruptly; but if the reader's imagination follows these significant suggestions to the end, the image of a flood will inevitably rise before his spiritual eye.

We can safely suppose that the prophecy drifts quite intentionally into this current of ideas; for a very old Canaanite legend—parallels to which are to be found all over Palestine and Syria<sup>1</sup>—relates that in

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Gaster in *Folklore*, ii. p. 204, Feuchtwang in *Monatschr. f. Gesch. u. Wiss. des Judentums*, liv. pp. 535-552, 713-729; Wellhausen, *Reste arab. Heidentums*, p. 103; Clermont-Ganneau, *Archaeological Researches in Palestine*, London, 1896, pp. 237-239.

the great Noahic cataclysm the fountains of the cosmic deep broke forth from under the '*eben shethiya*,' or foundation-stone of the world, which afterwards became the foundation-stone of the Jerusalemic temple. Moreover Rabbinic traditions know of other instances when the waters, locked beneath this sacred seal of the universe, broke loose and had to be stayed by the mercy of God, so as to prevent a new universal destruction of mankind. At every Feast of Tabernacles a special libation of water was poured on the sacred rock, in order to ensure, by imitative magic, the necessary "moisture of the deep that coucheth below" for the land of Israel, according to the popular belief that the rock on top of Mount Zion could withhold or supply at will the waters of the primeval abyss. Thus it becomes obvious that Ezekiel expected the parching drought, which causes the sterility of a certain region in the midst of the elsewhere blessed land, to be definitely removed, by means of a new flood, breaking forth in the Messianic future from the rock-hewn threshold of God's house<sup>1</sup>—a belief which was in perfect harmony with the wide-spread Oriental idea that the end of the present *æon* will be marked by a cosmic inundation. It is well known that other prophets also<sup>2</sup> expected a beneficent result from this final outpouring of water, at least for Israel, while some<sup>3</sup> thought of it as of an ultimate divine chastisement after the manner of the first cataclysm.

As the son of a priest of the sanctuary of Jerusalem, the Baptist, whose teaching was so deeply influenced

<sup>1</sup> Cp. QUEST, vol. iii. pp. 147f.

<sup>2</sup> Joel 418; Zech. 148; Od. Sol. 67ff.; Rev. 22.

<sup>3</sup> Nah. 18; Is. 102ff., 2815, 18f., etc. Cp. H. Gressmann, *Urspr. der israel.-jüd. Eschatologie* (Göttingen, 1905), pp. 64ff., 160ff., 173.

by the study of Ezekiel's forty-seventh chapter,<sup>1</sup> must have been intimately acquainted with the traditions about the Noahic flood rising from the cave under the sacred rock on Mount Moriah. Consequently he cannot have failed to realise that Ezekiel meant to describe what could be appropriately called the initial stage of the *Messianic* flood, especially since this feature of the prophet's vision agrees perfectly with all the rest of John's ideas about his baptism, as we have tried to analyse them in two previous papers.

Indeed, among the many biblical passages that seem to have determined his own spiritual or mystic interpretation of Ezekiel's stream,<sup>2</sup> the most influential appears to have been *Isaiah* 10<sub>21f.</sub>:

The remnant shall *return*, the remnant of Jacob, to the mighty God. For though thy people Israel be as the sand of the sea, a remnant [only] of them shall return. *For consumption is decreed—a flood of justice.*<sup>3</sup> For the Lord of Hosts shall make an extermination, even determined, in the midst of all the land.<sup>4</sup>

A passionate seeker, searching—as John did—the scriptures, in order to learn the decisions of the Lord about the impending final judgment of Israel, and to discover the possible ways of escape from the 'wrath to come,' must have concluded from the above-quoted prophecy of Isaiah, that God had decreed a thorough separation of the righteous 'remnant' of Israel from the great multitude of wrong-doers, by means of a 'flood of justice,' which should bring about pitiless extermination for the great majority of stubborn

<sup>1</sup> Cp. QUEST, vol. iii. pp. 147f., 162ff., 485ff.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. QUEST, vol. iii. p. 163, n. 2.

<sup>3</sup> 'Shōtef s'dūkāh,' lit. 'flowing justice'; cp. in *Is.* 28<sub>15. 18</sub>, the expression 'shōt shōtef,' the 'flowing scourge,' a metaphoric name for the deluge, which recurs also in the Korān.

<sup>4</sup> The same sentence recurs in *Is.* 28<sub>22</sub>, and that too with reference to a future deluge.



trespassers, but a salutary return to Jahvè and an expiation of previous faults or defilements for the 'chosen' remnant. The unavoidable comparison of *Isaiah* 10<sub>21</sub>, and kindred prophecies about a final destructive deluge, with *Ezekiel* 47<sub>1ff.</sub> and the other foretellings of a beneficent Messianic outpouring of living, purifying waters over Israel,<sup>1</sup> must have confirmed John in his idea, that the same flood would mean at once a miraculous cleansing, nay a regeneration and final salvation, for those repentant ones who reverently submit to God's decree by a voluntary drowning of their old sinful self, and a sudden definitive annihilation for the impenitent ungodly ones who scorn the prophet's inspired preaching and his God-given 'baptism of repentance.' The former would be saved 'through the waters,' would pass unharmed through the Jordan, the boundary river of the 'promised land,' into the 'kingdom of heaven,' while the others, as enemies of God, would be overwhelmed without any pardon by the 'flowing scourge,' the stream of living water running down from Jahvè's sanctuary on Mount Zion, even as the Egyptian army was drowned in the same Red Sea which had offered a safe passage to the God-guided children of Israel.

The best proof that this was indeed the line of thought followed by the Baptist and his school is offered by the fact that the Christian Church, which almost incontinently took over John's 'baptism of repentance,' appears to be perfectly well acquainted, first with the typological relation between the Noahic flood and the baptismal immersion, and secondly with the spiritual equivalence of the baptismal water and the Red Sea, through which the Israelites had to pass

<sup>1</sup> Cp. above, p. 689, n. 2.

into the Land of Promise. As to the latter, the reader will remember 1 *Cor.* 10<sup>1</sup>. 2:

Brethren, I would not that ye should be ignorant, how that all our fathers . . . all passed through the sea and were all baptised . . . in the sea.

The former is stated in the still more fundamental passage 1 *Peter* 3<sup>20</sup>, where the author says:

The long-suffering of God waited in the days of Noah while the ark was a preparing, wherein *few* [that is eight souls] *were saved through the water,*<sup>1</sup> *the like figure whereunto*<sup>2</sup> *baptism doth also now save us*—not the putting away of the filth of the flesh, but the prayer to God for a good conscience.<sup>3</sup>

The meaning is that in the days of Noe the sinfulness of mankind had reached its culminating point. Even the few righteous souls who survived the deluge in the ark, were forced by God to pass through the waters into safety. But while for them the flood meant only a salutary purification—owing to the long-suffering of God, who after all did not allow the waters to increase too quickly for the sake of those few pious ones—the impenitent rest of humanity were utterly exterminated. In the same way the repentant who undergo John's baptism in the Jordan, are saved 'through the water' of it; a final flooding and symbolic drowning (*Coloss.* 2<sup>12</sup>) is not spared them, but after they have thus submitted to the decree of God, they are sure to escape the real drowning, which is to be the ultimate fate of those who refuse to 'justify God by being baptised.'

Thus the rite of John appears to be really what

<sup>1</sup> There is a Rabbinic legend (quoted by Spitta, *Christi Predigt an die Geister*, 1890, p. 51) that even Noe and his family were surprised, when at last the flood came, by its rapid growth, and had to save themselves *through the waves* and escape into the ark.

<sup>2</sup> Namely, 'unto the water of the flood.'

<sup>3</sup> Cp. *Lk.* 11<sup>1</sup>, on the special prayers—referring of course to the rite of baptism—which were taught by John to his disciples.

Albert Schweitzer<sup>1</sup> has first proclaimed it to be,—namely a purely *eschatological sacrament, a ceremony, which is expected to offer a guarantee against the 'wrath to come,' by anticipating mimically*—if this expression be tolerated—one of its main manifestations, namely *the final deluge foretold by the prophets*.

This essential correlation between the original 'baptism of repentance' and the 'flood of justice' of the dreaded Last Days—however much it may have been obscured, in the course of that fatal historic development which lead to evolving an established, self-centred, universal Christian Church, out of an informal, narrow Jewish circle of Messianic visionaries—offers moreover an unexpected clue to the eschatological significance, inherent not only in the Baptist's regenerative rite itself, but also in the fish-symbolism connected with it, as it has been studied in our last paper.

The connecting link between this fish-symbolism and the eschatological ideas about the final deluge is to be found in an apparently insignificant detail of the Mosaic flood-story. As the Rabbis have observed,<sup>2</sup> the waters destroyed in Noe's time "all flesh wherein there is the breath of life from under heaven," according to the words of *Gen. 7<sub>22</sub>* "all that was on the dry, died"; *no extermination, however, was decreed for the fishes that were in the sea*. Indeed, as a matter of course, they could not have come to harm through an inundation of the earth.

Whatever explanation may have been given for the alleged exception of the fishes from the universal destruction of all flesh at the time of the first deluge,

<sup>1</sup> *Von Reimarus zu Wrede* (Strassburg, 1906), pp. 373ff.

<sup>2</sup> *Sanh.* fol. 108a, *Seb.* fol. 113b, and *Kidd.* fol. 13ab.

we can prove from the quoted texts that it was considered as a distinctive feature of the first, watery cataclysm; consequently we may safely suppose that those allegorists, who took the '*fishes in the water*' as a metaphoric phrase denoting the *pious Israelites living in the righteousness of the Law*—foremost among them, as we have tried to show,<sup>1</sup> John the Baptist himself—must have understood *the sparing of the fishes in the primeval deluge as a prototype of the salvation granted to the righteous Jews in the final cataclysm*. Of course, according to John's peculiar eschatalogy, *only the true repentant Israel*, namely those that had been '*reborn from the water*' as '*fishes*,' could hope to escape the avenging flood.<sup>2</sup> *The 'fishes'* or baptised ones *will be*—as we read over and over again in the Christian authors—'*safe in the water*'; *they will be able to 'perambulate the paths of the ocean,' 'to leap over the waves,' and 'the breakers will not submerge them,'* even in those terrible days when the whole earth will again be covered by the last cataclysm.

Thus John appears to play, in the great Messianic drama of the Last Days, the rôle of the '*just man*' who is to save a *righteous remnant* of Israel, '*through the water*,' by means of sincere repentance, even as Noah, the '*just and perfect*' (*šadik tōmim*) man of old, preserved the few righteous souls in the ark through the deluge of his time—a feature of his ministry which is

<sup>1</sup> QUEST, vol. iii. pp. 490-495.

<sup>2</sup> The popular idea was, on the contrary, that the whole nation of Israel was to remain untouched by the final flood. This conviction is combated as early as in *Isaiah* 28s. Cp. H. Gressmann, *Palästina-Jahrbuch*, 1911, p. 424. It rests on the belief that the land of Israel had also been left untouched by the primeval flood; in *Ezek.* 223f., the highland of Judah is called '*a land that has not been cleansed nor rained upon in the day of indignation.*' The Talmud (*Sebahim* l.c.; cf. *Pirké de R. Eliezer* §28) quotes this passage in support of the above described theory.

all the more important, because a recently discovered Samaritan Midrash<sup>1</sup> proves that the Jews really attributed the functions of a *second Noah* to their expected Messiah.

This most interesting text begins with a remarkable etymology of the peculiar technical term '*Ta'eb*,' which is always applied to the future Redeemer in Samaritan writings, and must have been popular also in the Aramaic colloquial dialect of the ancient Palestinian Jews, although—as far as I know—it does not occur in any Rabbinic texts. Its literal sense is '*he that comes back*' or '*returns*,' that is to say *the 'returned,' reincarnated or reborn Joshua*.<sup>2</sup> But our treatise understands the '*returning one*' in that spiritual sense which is suggested by the frequent exhortation *shubhu!* (Aram. *tubhu!*) '*turn back!*' in the prophets of the Old Testament; it equates '*ta'eb*' with '*sha'eb*,' '*he who repents*,' or even '*he who turns back, makes repent*' others.<sup>3</sup> In this way the word *Ta'eb* is made to correspond to *Nōham*, a name given—obviously for the purposes of popular etymology—to Noe in *Gen.* 5<sup>2</sup>,<sup>4</sup> and which can be translated '*repenting*.'

<sup>1</sup> Ed. by Adalbert Merx, *Zeitschr. f. alt. Wiss. Beih.* xvii., 1909, p. 82.

<sup>2</sup> According to Merx's most important discovery it is expressly stated in the Samaritan Ms. Or. 3393 of the British Museum, that the *Ta'eb* will be called *Joshuah*.

<sup>3</sup> The translation *Ta'eb*=Converter is also offered by Abu'l Fath, Merx o.c. p. 42.

<sup>4</sup> Read with Wellhausen, *De Gent.* p. 38, n. 3, "and he called his name *Noham* (Masoret. text '*Noah*'), saying this same shall comfort us (*yenahamenu*)."  
The inconsistency of the traditional text has already preoccupied the Rabbis. Cp. *Beresh. rabba* § 25: "According to R. Johanan name and explanation do not tally; either he named him Noah [*sc.* and then we should expect another etymology], or he named him *Nahman*"; Maimonides (*Sepher-ha-Jashar*, sect. *Beresh.* p. 5b, edition of Leghorn, 1870) thinks that Noah was called by his father *Menaḥem* (Comforter) on account of the difficulty involved in *Gen.* 5<sup>2</sup>. This is most interesting, because *Menaḥem* is often mentioned as a *Messianic* name, an '*isopsephon*' to *Ṣemah* ('Branch'), which coincidence must have been known to Zechariah, when he alluded in his prophecy

The story itself is a spiritualising variation of the deluge-story working on a long series of mystic word-plays<sup>1</sup>; while Jahvè says to Noah in *Gen.* 6<sup>14</sup>, "make thee an ark" (*t'bah*), his order to the Ta'eb will be 'make thee a conversion' (or *repentance*, *shubah*, Aram. *tubah*). For the measures and details of the ark (*t'bah*) in *Gen.* 6<sup>15</sup>, the Midrash substitutes the spiritual features of the enjoined 'conversion' (*shubah*), for the cubits of the ark the number of days in the 'year of conversion.' As the ark is lined (*k-f-r*) with pitch (*k-f-r*) within and without, the 'repentance' shall be 'expiated' (*k-f-r*) inwardly and outwardly with 'atone-ment' (or 'propitiation,' *k-f-r*). As Noe was to put a 'light'-opening (*zōhar*, window, lit. brightness, light) into the ark and to finish it above in a cube, the Ta'eb will add 'light' or 'enlightenment' to the 'conversion' by doing righteous deeds, and thus finish it 'from above': "And the door of the conversion shalt thou set in the side thereof, that is righteous and honest deeds shalt thou work," etc. Where Elōhim says to Noah: "Behold I bring a *flood of water* upon the earth to destroy 'all flesh from under heaven; but with thee will I establish my covenant," etc., our Midrash makes him say to the Messiah-Ta'eb:

Behold, I bring a [flood of] conversion [and] of divine favour (*raṣōn*) about the earth, to save Israel and to gather it from anywhere under the sky. I shall perform my covenant, which I have erected with Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. And thou shalt enter *into the conversion*, thou and thy house and the whole house of Israel with thee and take with thee all kind of . . . *praying*<sup>2</sup>

612 ("the man whose name is the BRANCH . . . shall build the temple of the Lord") to *Nehemiah* ('Jahvè comforts'). As to the verb '*nōham*,' 'to feel rueful or repentant,' cp. the dictionary of Gesenius-Buhl, *s.v.*

<sup>1</sup> This method of 'explaining' a text allegorically by changing single letters in certain words is enumerated under the name '*temura*,' in the long series of 'legitimate' methods of Rabbinic exegesis.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. above p. 692, n. 3.

and *fasting*<sup>1</sup> and *purification*, which thou performest, and take all unto thee, and it shall be *for conversion* for thee and for them. And the Ta'eb did everything as God commanded him.

The ark (*t'bah*) saved Noah from the flood of perdition, and *the conversion* (*shubah, tubah*) will save the 'Penitent one' (Ta'eb) and all the sons of Israel from the flood of perversion (*panutha*).<sup>2</sup>

Then follows another very interesting pun on the Semitic word *t-b-h* for 'ark,' which can only be understood on the ground of belief that the Ta'eb—besides being a second Noe—was first of all *a new Joshuah*. In the first character he was to save Israel by taking it 'through' the waters into the 'ark,' or mystically into the conversion; while in the second he was to lead it through the Jordan into the realm of promise,<sup>3</sup> or mystically into the kingdom of heaven. This is expressed in our Midrash by substituting for the word 'ark' (*t<sub>2</sub>b<sub>a</sub>h*) in *Gen.* 7<sub>1</sub> ("Come thou and thy whole house into the *ark*") the phrase (*'ērēz*) *t<sub>2</sub>b<sub>a</sub>h*, 'the good land':

And Elōhim said to the Ta'eb: Come thou and thy whole house *into the good land*, for thee have I seen righteous before me in this generation. Out of the whole Israel, of *the clean ones* myriads shalt thou take with thee, the male and the female to keep seed alive upon the face of all the earth. And it came to pass in the year 6000 (cp. *Gen.* 7<sub>6</sub>) that the flood of the cursed æon (or 'of perdition,' *panutha*) came upon the earth, and the Ta'eb

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *Matt.* 11<sub>18</sub>, on the Baptist, who neither ate nor drank.

<sup>2</sup> The '*panutha*' is the present world of wickedness. With the phrase 'the flood of the *panutha*,' cp. the '*ocean of wickedness*' from which the divine Fisher draws forth the neophytes in the hymn concluding the *Paedagogus* by Clement of Alexandria. Jerome in *Ezek.* 47: "All kinds of men are drawn forth from the *sea of this (present) world*"; Ambrosius, (*Hexaem.* V6<sub>5</sub>): "O man . . . the *floods of this world* will not submerge thee," etc.

<sup>3</sup> Cp. also above, p. 689, n. 2, the belief in an immunity of the land of Israel against the flood. Besides, the reader will remember that Joshuah is the 'Son of Nun,' that is 'the Fish' (*QUEST.* vol. iii. p. 491 n. 1), while on the other hand in the Indian flood-story Manu is saved by a fish—most probably a reflection of the Babylonian fish- and water-god Ea who saves *Hasisatra* from the deluge sent by Bel.

and his sons and the sons of Israel went into the < conversion > and [thus] into the *good* land in view of the [rising] flood of perdition. And myriads and myriads came to the Converter (or Rueful one—*Sha'eb*), to the conversion and the good land, as Elōhim had promised to Moses.

The deciding influence that was exercised on the Messianic movements among the Jews at the beginning of our era, by the main ideas which we find expressed in this newly discovered Samaritan Midrash, can best be seen and appreciated in the well-known story<sup>1</sup> of Theudas' revolt. When Cuspius Fadus was procurator of Judea, a certain 'conjurer' (*goēs*), Theudas by name, persuaded a great number of people—about four hundred—to take all their earthly possessions with them and to follow him to the river Jordan; 'for he told them,' as Josephus says, 'that he was a prophet,' or—as the still more significant version in *Acts* has it, 'he gave himself out to be *somebody*'—meaning of course *the new Joshua*, or in the Septuagint Greek the expected '*Jesus*.'<sup>2</sup> In this quality he would perform the characteristic miracle of the 'Joshuah,' that is, divide at the word of command the river, and thus provide a dry passage through it for the sons of Israel. The unfortunate Theudas must have felt quite confident that if he thus tempted the long-suffering of God, he would really succeed in 'storming the kingdom of heaven,'<sup>3</sup> in bringing about the prophesied Messianic reign and in defeating the enemies of God's chosen people. Destiny, or rather the wisdom of the Roman policy, decided against his claims. For, when Fadus saw that Theudas had deluded many, he did not 'permit them

<sup>1</sup> Josephus, *Antiqq.* 20. 5. 1, § 97f.; cp. *Acts* 536.

<sup>2</sup> The covert way of speaking of Theudas' claim is easy to understand on the part of a Christian author, to whom it must have seemed an unutterable blasphemy.

<sup>3</sup> See *QUEST*, vol. iii. p. 479 n. 7.



to gain aught by their folly,' that is to organise a national revolt under the guidance of the 'new Joshuah,' but sent a squadron of cavalry against them, which dispersed the credulous crowd and slew many of them, before the intended Messianic experiment could be carried out.

It is obvious that the arrest and subsequent execution of John the Baptist by order of the Tetrarch was primarily due—as Josephus gives us to understand—not to his private offence against the royal family, but to a similar suspicion to that which was aroused later on by the strange undertaking of Theudas. Both John's baptism in the Jordan and the attempted crossing of the river under Theudas seem to be politically entirely harmless, as long as their Messianic aims—which are deliberately passed over in silence by Josephus, although they alone can explain the quick and energetic reaction of the authorities against both movements—are not duly taken into account. No harm could have been done if a man simply led a caravan of pilgrims through a ford of the Jordan; but it could have become dangerous, if by a miracle, which might—for all that Fadus knew about Jahvè Sebaoth—just as well succeed as not, the fanatic could induce four hundred Zealots to recognise him as the 'new Joshuah,' that is the predestined victorious leader of the last fight against the unbelieving foes of Israel. And, similarly, nothing could be more inoffensive for the secular power than the preaching of John about the cleansing of body and soul by water and righteousness, as it is rendered in Josephus. In this case, however, we can fortunately check the Flavian courtier's diplomatic account, by means of the fragments of John's sermon which are incorporated in the Gospels, and

which contain the decisive eschatological cry: '*The kingdom of heaven is at hand!*'—a proclamation of very bad augury for all the temporary holders of earthly power in that age.

More than this, the parallelism of the Baptist's preaching and ministry with the above-quoted Midrash about the second Noe leaves little if any doubt, that John was not only believed to be the predestined redeemer of the righteous remnant from the last flood, but that he himself considered his mission in the light of these same eschatological ideas about an impending new cataclysm and the necessity of a rapid conversion, which underlie also the well-known words of Jesus in *Matt. 24<sup>37ff.</sup> = Lk. 17<sup>26ff.</sup> (Q)* :

As the days of Noe were, so shall also the coming of the Son of Man be. For as in the days that were before the flood they were eating and drinking, marrying and giving in marriage, until the day that Noe entered into the ark, and knew not until the flood came and carried them away; so shall also the coming of the Son of Man be. Then shall two be in the field, the one shall be received<sup>1</sup> and the other left behind. Of two that are grinding at the [same] mill the one shall be received, and the other left behind.

In the light of this comparison, especially the threat of the axe that is already laid to the roots of the unfruitful, impenitent trees, appears to be *a direct menace of the Baptist* against his adversaries. It is true that the Church has explained the axe, in John's sermon, as referring to 'the mightier one,' so that either God Himself or the Messiah could be understood to wield the axe in the Last Judgment. If, however, we are right in assuming that the Baptist himself acts as the second Noe, it is probably his *own* axe which he

<sup>1</sup> *Sc.* 'by the Son of Man into the ark,' that is into the 'conversion' and salvation.

hints at; for in all the later traditions about the flood, the beginning of the last stage of the tragedy is marked by *Noe's beginning to fell the timber for the ark.*<sup>1</sup> Consequently this simile of John's could be understood as a covert hint, that the prophet was ready to give up preaching at any moment for a more active hastening of the 'Kingdom of God,' by taking up arms at the head of the 'regenerate' Israel against those that withstood the coming of the longed-for Messianic theocracy. Each impenitent 'barren' tree that would thus be cut off by the axe of the second Noe, would mean a beam more for the ark of salvation that was to save Israel from the final deluge. Small wonder then if the most prominent of the foes whom the Baptist had already singled out for the prophesied 'cutting off,' by a violent attack on his private life, thought it better—as Josephus has it—to get John out of the way in good time, before he could raise the people to open revolt, than to run the risk of things coming to the worst, and being forced to repent when it would be too late !

ROBERT EISLER.

(In the next number, in continuation of these important researches, will appear a paper on 'The Triple Baptism of the Last Days.'—ED.)

<sup>1</sup> Cp. the references, in the *Jew. Enc.* ix. 320, and *QUEST*, vol. iii. p. 151 n. 1, to an Arabian tradition that, before the cataclysm, people mocked at Noe for having become a carpenter—the Messianic carpenter of course!—after having been a prophet.

## GOD AND THE DEVIL.

REV. F. W. ORDE WARD, B.A.

WE find polarity everywhere, we cannot reach behind the positive and negative principles. This is the law of all being. We begin with contradictions, a fundamental opposition or rather a fighting antagonism at the core of creation; and we end with the same result. There runs the everlasting crack, the impasse, the universal discord which makes itself felt in the completest harmony. So we should antecedently expect both a God and a Devil, competitive and yet somehow, in some aboriginal mystery, co-operating (not necessarily towards an end but) towards the evolution of mind and matter, by a sort of double movement, along parallel but antipathetic paths. This would make a kind of curious equation between the Eternal Something and the Eternal Nothing, as indeed in mathematics the plus and minus balance each other, and 1 can be deduced from 0. So, if we only go back far enough, we find God to be the Elemental Negation as well as the Elemental Affirmation. In fact, Pure Being, as Hegel has shown, is so vague and colourless that it fades away into Nothingness. And it seems hardly true to say *ex nihilo nihil fit*, since metaphysically everything (instead of nothing) flows from nothing. But, when we consider how nebulous and thin and empty are the incunabula of things, though the sage and the man of science alike must assume a certain amount of quality of being with which to speculate or begin their inquiries,

we do not wonder Schopenhauer complained that philosophy starts with the minor key, or a melancholy and wistful wonder. God Himself is but a theory, yet He is the best working theory known. For His existence has never been proved, and never can be proved in the nature of things and the absence of adequate materials. Anselm's famous argument remains as good (or as bad) as most. "If God lacked anything whatever, He would contradict His own definition, and so He cannot want Being. And therefore He is *Ens necessarium*, *Ens realissimum*, *Ens perfectissimum*." It would be strange, wrote Hegel, if God were not rich enough to afford so mean a category as Being, the poorest and most abstract of all. Aristotle and Bacon after him root philosophy in wonder, though Bacon called this a kind of broken knowledge. This origin may be fairly questioned. The first metaphysician was the first soldier, in his militant attitude, when he met with resistance that had to be antagonised or counterbalanced or explained away—subject *contra* object; though man thought with his fingers and argued with his flint weapons by a crude and rough stone-throwing, before he reasoned with his brain. And, as time went on, even the Neolithic *homo* and the Mediterranean or Ægean *homo* found the sword of stone or bronze less effective than the sword of logic, when concept routed concept. Man, the promoted anthropoid ape, soon preferred to fight his way out with the spear-point of thought's irresistible phalanx. The first philosophy then was the first campaign directed against the unknown from and through the known, and against the great grim multitude of unanswered and unanswerable questions. It seems inevitable that, early in the warfare of the mind with its environment, so often hostile, the

adverse forces or spirits should be summed up and concentrated in one Supreme Evil—not God, as a poet has said, but—the Devil. Large generalisations have always something Divine (or Diabolical) about them. And if there had been no signs, no suspicions, no possibilities, of a Devil, the metaphysician would assuredly have created one. Science, which aims at being a “system of completely unified knowledge,” naturally resents and repudiates such a monstrosity and alien intrusive disturbing factor. But, as it lives from hand to mouth, by inductions and experiences that can never be absolutely comprehensive or final, the protest of Science (which by the very conditions of its own *raison d'être* must continue doubting with Prince George of Denmark, ‘*Est-il possible ?*’) may be safely disregarded here. Besides, old-fashioned folks would almost rather be robbed of their God than of their Devil. Indeed, they are far too often synonymous, and the Calvinist's God might well be the Devil of the Liberal Churchman. Moreover, a host of voluble and vindictive divines would lose their occupation, if we agreed with Science in this respect—“*entia non multiplicanda sunt praeter necessitatem*”—though we like quoting Science when it happens or appears to take our side. And then what a chopping-block, what a refuge or dumping-ground for anathemas, what a safety-valve for sinners, would be abandoned, if we renounced, not only the works, but the existence of the Devil, and took away his beautiful black character, by dismissing him with a polite sneer as a pure theological expression. We can so conveniently unload our offences upon him. His broad back, like that of Atlas, will support the world, and we may transfer to him the guilt of our iniquities. This seems better

anyhow, more reverent and perhaps more philosophical, than laying the onus on the Deity or Creator. As the old woman remarked, they have taken away the Bible now, but, thank God, they cannot take away the dear old Devil—*le bon Diable*, as the French call him. Ancient use and association have invested him with a sort of subdued halo, a poetic atmosphere, and given him almost a friendly face. Many pious and excellent persons would far more easily dispense with the most prized and venerable institutions than with the Devil. From the nursery to the schoolroom, he has been our faithful companion and pet horror and darling aversion. And the *diabolus* even more than the *deus ex machina* will always survive, when other and later superstitions go, as the most powerful weapon in the forlorn armoury of ignorance and bigotry. Even if the thing, the being, could conceivably be exorcised from the minds and imaginations of men, which seems quite impossible, the word would remain as a useful representative term which no other expression could supply. The human brain has been so soaked in literature dealing with the Devil, or invoking him or appealing to him as the final and most forcible illustration, that whatever happens, if the Devil be cast out of theology he will find a safe and permanent retreat in letters. History has given hostages to him. Science tells us that “if a given mass changes anywhere, the mutual gravitation of all things would *ipso facto* instantaneously alter.” Accordingly, for better or worse, the Devil has come to stay, and we must accept and enroll him definitely and decisively among the *primordia rerum*. He is not simply a religious doctrine, but a working force—whether he exists or not.

We begin with the union of detachment (or separa-

tion) rather than with the union of attachment. This fact really bulks so largely in life, that from its sheer prevalence we overlook and ignore it. A man of genius, and genius makes far more mistakes than common-sense, has asserted that we are born either Aristotelians or Platonists. Nothing could be farther from the truth. We are all born both Aristotelians and Platonists, both Idealists and Positivists, both Radicals and Tories, both Conformists and Non-conformists. It is from this division in the camp, this innate contrariety, through being at cross purposes with ourselves, by the opposition of the law of the flesh and the law of the spirit, that thought becomes bodied in action. We seem now, as a nation, governed by discussion; but we find our individual conduct still more determined by the discussion that goes on secretly in our own hearts and minds. The Pragmatist, were he honest, would often confess himself Hegelianising, and the Hegelian cannot possibly escape from occasional Pragmatising. Nor are these recoils into the opposite camp irregular or abnormal, if logic which plays no part in life condemns them, but consistently inconsistent and regularly irregular. The normal attitude of speculation immediately conjures up the Devil of the abnormal. Behind these surface or even radical differences and contradictions, there reigns a central "noëtic unity"—whether we understand it or not. *Un seul fait et une grande vérité* may have satisfied d'Alembert. But we want also the *grand peut-être* and the *splendidus error* and the *splendide mendax*. The divine spirit of affirmation would not endure a single day unless checked at every step and stage by the diabolical spirit of negation. The everlasting yea has no meaning and no message without the everlasting nay. The Schoolmen taught *quidquid est in effectu*



*debet esse prius aliquo modo in causa.* Locke maintained *nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu.* That means, we must all and always go back to the original *prius*, where possible. And when we have groped and fought and traced our way back to the beginnings, we find the eternal paradox, the eternal hendiadys. For the One reveals itself thus in the positive and negative elements. The everlasting and the temporary, the finite and the infinite, the fixed and the fluid, the static and the dynamic, the universal and the particular, the percept and the concept, feeling and intellection, continuity and discontinuity, logos and alogos, cosmos and acosmos, reason and unreason, and a thousand more instances, show the dualism everywhere, the dilemma or antithesis, as we decide to make it and take it. Every science, every system of metaphysic, if pushed to the extreme limits, will prove to contradict itself; each contains the apple (the devil) of discord within its very innermost inherencies. We may discover infinity in the *form* of conditions, but numerical determinations in the *fact* of these, and therefore finiteness. And the new mathematic has added a new interest (or terror) to life and thought, for it has disembowelled the Infinite and given us the Transfinite no less than the Absolute. It assures us gravely and cheerily that subtraction may take place in Infinity without loss. It tells us that in the centre of a straight line—a limited straight line—we meet with the problem of infinity.<sup>1</sup> Would Plato have called this science or a saving madness? But probably it is both. We used to admire and envy the fine frenzy of the inspired poet, but now the imagination of the

<sup>1</sup> E. F. Jourdain, *The Theory of the Infinite in Modern Thought* (Longmans).

modern mathematician has left him far behind—with the part equal to the whole or even greater than the whole. It may be that, some day, psychology now only in its infancy will ascertain that the ego represents the principle of antagonism (subject *contra* object) and in the very antithesis lies our final redemption. *Divide et impera*, divide and rule, but rule by resting in the division. It has remained for an Oxford Professor, Dr. Sanday, really great in his own sphere, to make the soul material, and abolish the useful and honourable distinction between the material and the immaterial. In his last book he informs us, “in our present experience the soul is confined within the body.” We are all well aware, we who still believe in a soul for the existence of which we have respectable and immemorial authority, that the soul uses the body and energises in the body and works through the body. But no metaphysician has ventured yet to assert “the soul is confined within the body.” *Ne theologus ultra theologiam!* If one indeed were obliged to localise the soul, it would be far truer to declare that body lies in soul and not soul in body. We encounter everywhere false oppositions as well as true oppositions, and all the errors of all the philosophies may be traced to a faulty dichotomy or antithesis. Why add to our psychical difficulties by multiplying our disharmonies? The pseudo-antithesis has been the bane of metaphysics. For instance, East and West offer no real antagonism. This may be seen in different degrees of civilisation or development, and not in such a crude and violent opposition. We see the genuine thing also in the masculine and feminine races. A statement like Dr. Sanday's makes one almost despair—and spoken too *ex cathedra!* “Hast any philosophy in thee, Shepherd?” But the rhyth-

mical movement of progress should prepare us for not merely the sequence of affirmation and negation but for their co-existence, and for the union of antagonism no less than of detachment. The superficial opposition always, in the case of true antithesis, implies a secret harmony or synthesis. Some things only seem able to co-operate or pull together, when they apparently pull against each other. The paradoxes of genius, so audacious and so instinctive, show that the very highest imagination sees the truth double, or in the mystical relation of antagonism. All the highest facts or principles can be expressed in no other way. And so the positing of a Devil, whether he exists or not, helps to explain the character and being of God. Accordingly even Progress must be sometimes backwards, and *regredi* is frequently more than ever *progredi*. What perhaps at bottom is the parallelism (but parallelism always with a difference) in Hebrew poetry, and what is the meaning in Arab histories of double accounts (but double always with a difference), if they do not ultimately point to some psychological law by which things are set over against each other and yet remain in vital union, in spite of vast divergencies—not to say contradictions?

Life, as we know it so far, seems a sort of Binomial Theorem, which expresses the value of any power of any sum of two terms to the end of time. But we postulate no less. For the cross upon which the cosmos hangs for ever, must have at least two parts. So we meet the manifold in unity and unity in the manifold, the all in each and each in all, the plural in the singular and the singular in the plural, the Aristotelian in the Platonist and the Platonist in the Aristotelian, God in man and man in God, soul in body

and body in soul, and the closest agreement in the fiercest disagreement. Our friends, let us hope, give us much pleasure and satisfaction, but our enemies even more so. Human nature has a terrible lot of cussedness or contrariety about it. "The effective desire, called religion, to be in right relation to the Power manifesting itself in the universe" realises itself best in opposition to the rival power named the Devil. Devotion to God, like philosophy, strikes a militant attitude, and sends forth aggressive prayers like so many 'letters of marque' into the hostile camp or coast. No wonder in the old heaven Satan appears as a visitor if not an inhabitant. And no wonder Milton, with the inspired intuition of the great poet, made the Devil his protagonist, not to say hero. Indeed, what would heaven have been without him, but a dreary world of appalling respectability, the perfection of decorum and dullness, and a monotonous stage for the interminable disquisitions of a school divine rather than a Deity? "The fact that certain sensations optical and tactile, certain perceptual experiences, cling permanently together or belong to each other, seems the sole evidence of substance." But our racial feelings and thoughts and beliefs and inheritances give equal assurance, when universal. And in that case, the Devil must be a very substantial sort of being. Even when we decline to believe in him, we are often terribly afraid of him. *Je ne le crois pas, mais je le crains.* Even old and fundamental distinctions or antitheses, like good and evil, may be reconciled or so revolutionised by our behaviour towards them, or our opinion of them, as the Stoics held, that they may change places or be completely transubstantiated as well as transformed. Everything

depends on the personal valuation. That which is universally considered evil, like suffering or extreme poverty, may be accepted in such a way and with such a spirit—rejoicing in tribulation—that it becomes a *summum bonum* or supreme good. *Tantum religio potuit suadere bonorum*—not *malorum*,<sup>1</sup> as Lucretius thought. Seers and saints, and all the great mystics, have proved this superabundantly. The spiritual enthusiasm, the ethical impulses, have from the beginning in all sacred literatures and lives, especially in the Hebrew, testified to the fact that the partition between joy and sorrow, good and evil, is so exceedingly narrow that at a certain stage or depth, by a radical endosmosis, they interpenetrate each other. The militant pleasure of resistance—subject *contra* object—the blessing in Scripture promised to overcoming, both tend to prove that at the right point for faith and a strong affection, that which ordinarily seems pain, may be completely transfigured in its innermost nature, and open the very portals of Paradise to the sufferers. This simply means, that mind or spirit rules matter and treats it as the potter treats the clay, and will-power possesses the dynamic and divine capacity for making the body do what it desires, and creating within the apparent environment another one more stable and beautiful. The so-called evil, the world, the flesh, the Devil, the absence of opportunity, affords the real opportunity for some eternal transaction with God and some permanent religious or moral gain. The conquering and progressive races, no less than the conquering and progressive individuals, have ever been those with the genius for hegemony—immense faith in some sublime ideal, which created its own medium and

<sup>1</sup> "To so much good (not evil) could Religion persuade."

atmosphere and occasions. The man, who waits for the opportunity, is the incapable, the fool of fortune, the slave of circumstance ; while the veritable prophet or pioneer, the born leader, the restorer of the ways, the builder of empires or souls, finds his opportunity everywhere, and licks the most intractable materials into shape, and obliges them to conform to his purpose. To hope for less and less resistance, in order to follow eventually the line of least resistance, resembles the conduct of the forlorn rustic.

*" Rusticus expectat dum defluat amnis, at ille  
Labitur et labetur in omne volubilis ævum."*<sup>1</sup>

Opportunities and materials are nothing to the hegemonic spirit, because it can make anything of everything. And, as a matter of history, all the chief reformers and teachers have been men who came into the world with everything against them ; and yet in the face of overwhelming odds and along the line of most resistance, they have carried all before them, and stamped their will in superb signatures on the cosmos. Unluckily, creative genius seems but slightly hereditary, and the makers of history did not transmit their dominancy to their children, as in the early times Irish bishops devolved their offices on their sons who were their successors. The innate constitutional dualism in the human mind, in any healthy child, invariably invites and welcomes conflict as the proper *milieu* for education. "*All things are double, one against another, and He hath made nothing imperfect. One establisheth the good of another.*" The master, in whatever field he may be constrained to work, recognises a limitation only when he has transcended it. He confronts each

<sup>1</sup> "The countryman waits for the river to flow away, but it flows and shall flow as it rolls along for ever and ever."

new negation, the opposing Devil, with a larger and loftier affirmation, and he incorporates the fragments of obstructive theories into the bases of his own. It will be seen on examination, that such cosmic men have usually been profoundly and gloriously ignorant of pettifogging particulars and beggarly details. Living in eternity, so to speak, they were too great to notice the straws and pebbles on the road. Grasping the grandest of principles, they have gone onward and upward, from one surpassed opposition to another, till they achieved their end, a cross or a grave, but still the high-water mark so far of the furthest progress. The world, or their world, was just what they chose to make it and leave it. They throve on persecution and struck the stars in their lowest adversity. And, if they gave their bodies to be burned, their hearts remained imperishable, like Shelley's *cor cordium*, and their dreams proved immortal and became the common facts and daily food of ensuing ages. We must not be in a hurry to draw conclusions. To conclude, is to shut up both the mind and the subject. And that necessarily means in the end to shut in error and shut out truth. The mind that always formulates, becomes at last the mind that fossilises. And we shall discover truth even more in differences and doubts than in agreements or petrified beliefs. "*Negare est affirmare, dubitare est certius facere, dividere est unire.*"<sup>1</sup>

F. W. ORDE WARD.

<sup>1</sup> "To deny is to affirm, to doubt is to make more sure, to divide is to unite."

# ‘THE BOOK OF SOULS.’

## FRAGMENTS OF A MANDÆAN MYSTERY- RITUAL.

A. L. BEATRICE HARDCASTLE, M.R.A.S.

THE attempt to translate any ancient mystery-ritual seems as it were to some extent unveiling, but let us hope with no irreverent hand, the sacred inner life of devotion of a long-forgotten and, in the present case of the Mandæans,<sup>1</sup> a most exclusive mystical sect.

The *Quolasta*, or *Book of Souls*, is a series of fragments from a beautiful and strange ceremonial, which leads, through the usual preparatory purifications, invocations and exorcisms (prayers of intense aspiration, and hymns in praise of spiritual Light), to a culminating moment of the ‘liberation’ or ‘raising’ of the soul, inducing the higher vision—an *epiphania*, with a foretaste, if not an actual realisation, of ecstatic union with the Divine. It seems to be a Nazarene-Gnostic rite with a background of Persian or even perhaps of Chaldæan eschatology, strangely shot through with the richest threads of ‘Orphic’<sup>2</sup> and Mithriac gold—worn and tattered, it may be, and ill-mounted though it is,

<sup>1</sup> For the dialect, see *THE QUEST*, April, 1910, p. 438.

<sup>2</sup> Although we have no documentary evidence of Orphic influence, there is much of the Orphic atmosphere of serenity and quiet dignity, of extreme purity and a spirit of mystic joy. There is also the same naming of secret names, the reverence of the ‘holy Ether,’ the power of rising above ‘the sorrowful, weary Wheel,’ the throning and crowning of a white-robed candidate who is fasting from flesh-food.



in the rough modern framework of a rubric which shews very inferior workmanship.

The full title is *Quolasta : Hymns and Prayers for Baptism and Raising*. *Quolasta* is a classical Syriac word meaning 'praise,' but curiously enough the word itself does not occur in the work, either as meaning praise or purity.<sup>1</sup> As the first line, however, runs "This is the Book of Souls," it is often thus spoken of, and indeed this is probably its more ancient title.

The *Quolasta* has never been translated or even described as a whole.<sup>2</sup> A few pieces were translated into rather unsympathetic German by Ochser, in the *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, vol. lxi., 1907. Lidzbarski relates the story of these unfortunate fragments, in the following number of the same publication.

During his mission in Persia in 1891, De Morgan found some Mandæan MSS., and as no one in France knew Mandæan, he had them photolithographed. I saw this in 1905, and found three times a word without the first letter, so I looked at the original. The plate had been too narrow, and when the lithographer had slipped on the stone, he had touched up his work without bothering about the original, and thus misspelt numberless words.

These fragments were then transliterated into Hebrew, and done into fluent if rather incoherent German by Ochser, who did not even know he had the *Quolasta* in his hands! He has run the rubric into the text and *vice versa*, thus entirely losing the ancient spirit of sustained devotion, so apparent when the text is read alone.

<sup>1</sup> Euting derives *quolasta* from an Arabic word meaning 'purity'; but McLean gives: *quolasa* meaning 'praise' (whence *quolasta*, 'praised be thou'), a liturgical word in old Syriac (McLean's *Grammar of Vernac. Syriac*, p. 222).

<sup>2</sup> In 1868 Prof. Krehl read it through, but was unable, as he stated, to make head or tail of it (Brandt's *Schriften*, p. vi.).

Brandt has noticed the work, but has also, like Ochser, given the rubric more attention than the text, and comes to no conclusion upon the ceremony as a whole.

The text of the prayers ranks next in age to the *Codex Nazaræus*; it shews no traces of Christian influence,<sup>1</sup> and the name of Jahia Johanna<sup>2</sup> (the Baptist) does not occur at all in the work, not even in the rubric.

The rubric is in an undoubtedly Post-Christian dialect, with an occasional intermixture of Arabic words, which shews that it may have been added even as late or later than the Muhammedan era.

The language of the text is so pure that it cannot be later than the 3rd century A.D. The authorship is quite unknown; but from what we know of the troubled times in Eastern Syria and Mesopotamia in the 2nd and 3rd centuries, the conditions were most unfavourable for the tremendous focussing of devotional life and of poetic and literary power implied in forming so beautiful and dignified a ritual. These great ceremonies belong to the finest fruits of an age of peace, of high civilisation and culture, whereas the Nazarenes were in those troubled centuries scattered, poor and persecuted, a fast dwindling remnant of a sect almost homeless and quite leaderless.

In the 5th century, on the other hand, we have the great Sāssānid Caliphs, with their extraordinary enthusiasm for collecting, copying and hoarding up ancient MSS. whenever they could lay hands on them. In the rubric we find constant reference to Bahram the Great, the 'Fruitful Vine' (Caliph 420-438 A.D.). We may thus venture to conclude that an ancient sub-

<sup>1</sup> Brandt (W.), *Mand. Schriften*, p. viii.

<sup>2</sup> Brandt, *Mand. Religion*, p. 137.

merged mystery-ritual was unearthed and copied in the 5th century. There is no dearth of modern copies in the various libraries of Europe. Euting's edition is from a MS. of the 18th century.

The most interesting indications of the Pre-Christian origin of this ritual, however, are traces of ancient Babylonian penitential psalms, and of an Accadian name for the Supreme borrowed from one of the 'Chaldæan' magical texts—'Ztak the Great Messenger'—which takes us back to Assurbani-pal, that is about 700 B.C. At this time what Sayce calls monkish Accadian, was much affected by Semitic priests as a sign of culture and of occult or mystical lore; much as Arabic was studied by certain mediæval monks, while it was regarded by the populace as a black art "and every square of text an awful charm."

Sympathetic treatment<sup>1</sup> these Mandæan books have never had; the chief Mandæan scholars describing them with orthodox prejudice as "of course merely apocryphal." There seems to be an idea, as Petrie remarks, that because passages in some ancient fragments bear "an unholy resemblance" to our accepted scriptures, that therefore they must be worthless imitations of them.

In any case, no amount of philology pure and simple will ever wrest from the fast-closed hands of time the key of the most sacred shrines or disclose the spiritual messages they hold, still less make once more living to us the actual inner experiences to which these messages were designed to lead.

The first part of *The Book of Souls* is a Baptism or

<sup>1</sup> In the absence of any general outline of this ritual, it may be that the following selections, very tentatively translated with a few suggestions as to the main thread of the ceremony, will induce some more learned hand to undertake the work.

Lustration ; that is, a preparation for the offering of a pure oblation—the mystic death of the lower self. The main events are as follows :

#### THE BAPTISM.

An Invocation and a Form of Creed.

The Unknown One calls upon the Light Æons.

A Cry for Light (six times repeated).

The Crowning (with Light).

Hymn of the Incense.

Prayers to the Watchers of the Hidden Place, or A Hymn of Adoration.

Entering the Stream with Enoch and the Guardians.

Naming of Secret Names.

Exorcism.

Blessing the Gate of the Beyond and the Shining Dwellings.

Solemn Rising from the Stream.

Signs given from the Great Mixing-Bowl and Ecstatic Cry.

Hymn of the Oil of Healing: "After the manner of Enoch shall be his Body."

Outpouring of the Gnosis of Life. Spirits of Brethren Invoked. Solemn Dance.

Chapter of the Seal (the great Seal taken upon the whole man).

Giving a White Raiment.

Three Trials of the Soul's Powers :

"Ascend the *Mount* before thee !"

"If the power is in thee, O Soul come !

Pass through the *Fire* !"

"If the power is in thee, O Soul come !

Cross the *Ocean* !" etc.

The Baptism is followed by the 'Masikta,' which means literally a Raising (of the Candidate), perhaps in the sense of Resurrection, or Rebirth in newness of life to a purified soul. The main events are as follows :

#### THE MASIKTA OR RAISING.

Prayer to Open the Gates of Light.

Prayer to Open that which is Hidden.

Hymn to the Secret or Hidden Doctrine.

Hymn to Seven Hidden Æons.

The Treasure-House. The Secret Word (which releases from Seven Sins) to pass the Gate.

Rule of reciting Hidden Words (seven times a day).

A Book of the Gnosis as of Enoch who saw not Death.

Prayer that the Gnosis of Life may come with the Instructions of Liberation.

Tzariel the Liberator takes the Soul out of the Body (as Enoch went out). Ecstasy. Dance.

Hymn of Joy.

The Place of Blessedness with Living and Dead.

A Stainless Robe, a Spotless Raiment.

Bound with a Stainless Girdle.

An Invisible Mansion for the Soul, a Shelter where the Sun never sets.

"Rest and Peace, O Virgin Soul, O Chosen One, made free from Chains (of Fate), Illuminated One, who makest light the dark House (*i.e.* the Body)."

The Soul is allowed to pass the House of Taxes and the Scales.

The Path: Four Men, Sons of Peace, who lead the Soul on the Path of the Great One, on the Way of Perfection.

Message of Truth (*i.e.* Knowledge of Future), sealed with a Ring and Nail-mark, is hung round the Neck of the Soul who flies past the Watchers to the Life.

This Raising ceremony is a mystery. It suggests a translation—a vision and a transfiguration with an ecstasy of union. If it is a burial service, what a conception of death, what an opening out of light, power, wisdom and joy through one narrow little portal!

Like all genuine mystic writings this rite has, I believe, no meaning if it is merely read; it has to be 'acted out,' as was said also of the Greek mysteries. Moreover a modern informer specifically told the French Consul, Siouffi, that to hear the Masikta really 'read' means for the hearer going through a great experience, for it can only be 'read' properly by

one who has been through the experience himself and knows the inner life to which the outer words refer.

The preparation for the 'reading' is arduous; it is not book-learning, but entirely moral and spiritual. The chief rules given are celibacy, fasting from flesh-food, and great simplicity of life. The preparer is to ask no one to wait on him; he is to find no fault with anyone or anything in his household. If the servant forget anything, he is to rise and fetch it for himself without saying a word.

After the Masikta come two sections which seem to be concluding parts of the Baptism and of the Masikta.

#### BAPTISM (IInd Part).

An Epiphania (or Vision).

"The Great Day of Joy, Day of Liberation. The Day of the Going Out of the Body."

Rejoicing over the Blessed Pupils, the Chosen of the Gnosis of Life, placed in the Stream.

#### MASIKTA (IInd Part).

A Transfiguration in Glory, a Translation in Clouds of Light.

"Go in Peace, O Chosen and Perfect!"

The Journey of the Soul (with Vision of Union).

The Day of the Going Out of the Soul. The Day of Rising up from Under the Wheel of Death, of Storm and Strife, in Robes of Glory, in Beauteous Raiment.

The Conquest over Darkness. "Receive this Soul into the Great Place of Light."

The general outline sketched above suggests to one who has studied the mystery-rites remaining to us, a ritual of lustration as preparation for initiation, followed by a trance and a vision of the prepared candidate or pupil.

The first words of the text are: "This is the Book of Souls and the Truth (*Kusta*) which heals."

*Kusta*, however, seems to have been a means for imparting an experience to the soul, which gave it fellowship in a peculiar way with those, and those only, who had been through the like experience. Thus in the *Codex Nazaræus* we read: "Brethren according to the flesh perish, but Brethren of *kusta* pass not away." This fellowship was recognised by a grip, a method of shaking hands—the *kusta*-grip. There is also a remarkable phrase when speaking of the angel Tzariel the Liberator: "In the world he is called Death, but those who know call him *Kusta*." This may refer to the death-like trance into which the candidate passed before his first liberation which gave initiation into Life.

After the invocation, the creed gives us an outline of huge epochs of time, during which there was a triple outpouring, from the First Life, the Second Life and the Third Life. Then comes a confession of monotheism: "There is One who is Infinite." The same was before the Earth was thickened and the Dark<sup>1</sup> Water was over it. From this Dark Water there arose and went forth (an) Evil (One)." Those who will not rise up and purify themselves from this Dark Water will have no Light-Crown set upon their heads.

The one who is invoked at the opening of the ceremony is called the Nikraia, the Unknown One, or the Stranger from the World of Light; it is he who presides over the rite.

In a fragmentary hymn in the Mandæan *Book of*

<sup>1</sup> Cf. the Sethian gnosis: "And the Darkness was an awesome Water," quoted in Mead's *Thrice-greatest Hermes*, i. 394. The word used for 'dark' is *siaiva*, a very ancient form of the Pehlevi *siah*. Its use here may place the date of these traditions as far back as the days of the *Avesta*.

*John*, the Gnosis of Life says: "I am the Unknown One" (cp. QUEST, April, 1910, p. 446). The same idea is found in *The Book of the Dead* (xlii. 25). "I myself am not known, but I am he who knoweth thee"; and often also in the impressive words of Osiris Nu: "I am he who cometh forth advancing, whose name is unknown," by which we are reminded of *John* i. 10, "And the world knew Him not," and of a Babylonian prayer to the god "whom I know not."<sup>1</sup>

In the following hymn the Light-Æons are called upon to manifest as Light:

#### A PRAYER FOR LIGHT.

In the Name of the Life!—Light, Light, Light, Light, Light, Light!<sup>2</sup> from the Great First Life—the First One, who gave Light, Wisdom, Learning<sup>3</sup> and Instruction.

Praise to the First Æon who comes from his Place to wreath us with a Crown,—the Crown-bearer who brings us the Crown, the Crown which consumes, the glowing Crown, the Crown which glows with the Four Shining Ones and with the Prayers of the Seven Supporters<sup>4</sup> of the silent Firmament. Praise to the Life!

The great event of the Coming of the Light (the Light-flash was a '*Haupt-moment*' in all the ancient mysteries) seems to have been followed by the burning of incense and by silence for a space; after which this hymn was sung:

<sup>1</sup> "Der Gott den ich nicht kenne," in H. Zimmern's *Babylonische Hymnen und Gebete* (Leipzig, 1895).

<sup>2</sup> In the minute description of baptism given by Justin Martyr (*Apol.* ii.), circa 150 A.D., he says: "Then we conduct them to a place where there is water and they are regenerated; for they receive a washing with water in the name of the Father of all. For Christ said: Except ye be regenerated ye shall not enter into the Kingdom of Heaven. This washing is also called *illumination*, because the minds of those who have learnt these things are enlightened." The true baptism was a dowsing in Light, a rite common to all the high mystery-schools.

<sup>3</sup> Cp. *Daniel* v. 11, also a parallel expression in the *Book of the Dead* (cxiv.), "the wisdom and knowledge and learning of Thoth."

<sup>4</sup> Cp. Mead, *A Mithriac Ritual*, p. 71: "May the Supporters come who serve the Seven Virgins of Light who preside over the Baptism of Life," quoting from the Coptic Gnostic works.



HYMN OF THE INCENSE.

Fragrant Incense (or Spirit),<sup>1</sup> fragrant Incense !

Hail to the Life of the Great One, the First One, the Unknown One,  
from the World of Light !

Glory is over him and over all his works, the Glory of the Ancient  
One and of the First Light.

Life of Life,

Truth which is of all Time !

Fragrant Incense, fragrant Incense !

Hail to Jakabar Ziva, mighty in Glory, who comes in Light and  
Honour,

The Candidate among the Chosen and the Just, the First One from  
the Worlds beyond, who cleaves the Heavens and unrolls them !

Fragrant Incense, fragrant Incense !

Hail to Ja-Ztak,<sup>2</sup> Gnosis of Life, who causes Silence,<sup>3</sup> and gives us  
the Teaching,

Who gives us the Prayer of the Incense with the Souls of the Men  
of Truth (*Kusta*), the Chosen and Blessed and Fragrant in the  
Place of Life, and in the Glittering Dwellings !

<sup>1</sup> The word for incense is *ruḥa*=spirit or breath.

<sup>2</sup> Ja-Ztak—the Semitic divine name Ja prefixed to an ancient Accadian name Ztak. On a bilingual tablet (Accadian and Assyrian, in alternate lines, both in cuneiform script) of 700 B.C., from the Royal Library in Nineveh, has been found this formula :

"The god Ztak, the great Messenger, the supreme Ensnarer,

Amongst the gods like the God of the Heights."

(Lenormant, *Chaldaean Magic*, p. 11.) The 'Ensnarer' is a curious epithet which we find again in a fragment of a hymn from Rawlinson's collection (*W.A.I.*, vol. iv.):

"Who can escape from thy Message ?

Thy Word is the Supreme Snare which is stretched towards Heaven and Earth."

(Sayce's *Religion of Anc. Babylon*, p. 497). Ztak is here the Bringer of the great Message of the Gnosis. We find the prefix Ja before several of the divine names in Mandæan writings, e.g. Jakabar, Josamin (see Brandt's *Mand. Religion*, p. 67).

<sup>3</sup> On the imposition of Silence, cp. *Chaldaean Oracles*, i. p. 35 (Mead's *Echoes of the Gnosis*) : "Silence, Nurturer of the Divine"; and again : "Man only 'knows' God by getting to this Silence, in which naught but the creative words of true power are heard"; also in Mead's *Mithraic Ritual*, the solemn invocation of Silence, "the supernal Mother of all things, and Spouse of the Divine." There is also a beautiful line in a Hymn to Ra of *The Book of the Dead* (xv.) :

"Thou sendest forth the Word, and the Earth is flooded with thy Silence,  
O thou Only One !"

(Budge's Trans.)

Fragrant Incense, fragrant Incense !

Hail to the Father of the Æons, high, hidden, ancient and guarded,  
The Man who is upraised and enthroned on the Deeps, who  
teaches the Worlds, and their inhabitants, how to work in a  
World of Darkness !

Fragrant Incense, fragrant Incense !

Hail to the Abodes of the Life, to the Baptism by the Æons.

Fragrant Incense, fragrant Incense !

Hail to the Abodes of the Four Men, the Sons of Peace !

Fragrant Incense, fragrant Incense !

Hail to the Dwelling of Abatur !

Fragrant Incense, fragrant Incense !

Hail to the Dwellings of Hibil, Schetel and Enoch, the Sons of the  
Generations of the Living Ones,<sup>1</sup> shining, rejoicing, and  
illustrious, who shall not be taken by the Sword, who by the  
devouring Fire shall not be consumed, and who by Defilement  
shall not be defiled, and on Earth and in the Dark Water shall  
not be begotten.

When they seek judgments they shall win ; they shall speak and  
be heard ; fullness is theirs and they shall not want.

Peace is theirs, they have no sorrow ;

Purity is theirs who have no stain. From a Holy Place they come  
and to a Holy Place they go.

Fragrant Incense, fragrant Incense !

Hail to the Living Ones, the Men of our Fathers, who are Men of  
Truth (*Kusta*),

Believers and Perfect Ones, who have gone out of their bodies,  
and those who remain in their bodies as witnesses ! Shut up  
from them the gates of sin, and open unto them the Gates of  
Light,

Open them with the Teaching of the Life which passeth not away !  
All our works are perishable, and all our thoughts are worthless.  
O Spirit of Life, set up for those who love Thee, the Name of

<sup>1</sup> Cp. "Thy Sahu becometh luminous among the Living," from a Vienna Papyrus; to which Budge appends this note: "The Sahu was the luminous, translucent and immaterial covering in which all the spiritual and intellectual faculties of a man arrayed themselves after death, i.e. 'spiritual body'" (*Book of the Dead*, vol. iii., p. 678).

Truth in the Everlasting Dwellings; and, purified from sins and guilt and follies and trespasses and stains,<sup>1</sup> take this Soul which goes down to the Stream to be baptised, that it may see the great Place of Light, and the Shining Dwellings!

Praise to the Great Life!

Glory to the Life Victorious!

The Hymn of the Incense, or the Hymn of the Breath, as it might be literally translated, may have been accompanied by a Breathing upon the candidate, as is still customary in the Church of Rome. In fact the main events of this lustration are those of the present-day Roman baptisms: the priest pronounces an exorcism after breathing upon the face of the infant; then follows a laying on of hands; then the lustration in running water; anointing with oil and also with chrism; a white garment is then placed on the infant, and a light is held near it or over it. The crowning is omitted, but that was once customary also.<sup>2</sup> As late as the sixteenth century the choristers of Old St. Paul's wore crowns formed of small gilt leaves. A relic of the Dance survived into the Middle Ages. At the Gloria it was customary for each monk to turn once round in a sort of solemn *pas seul* within his stall. For the ecstatic cry of '*ialuz! ialuz!*' we have the quaint '*lully lully lu*' in the Hymn of the Nuns of St. Mary's, Chester: "*Qui creavit cælum, lully, lully lu!*"

It is to this day the custom among the Mandæans to perform a Baptism of the Dead, a ceremonial lustration of the corpse, after which the second ceremony called the Masikta, the Raising or Resurrection, is read. But a living man may offer himself for a departed

<sup>1</sup> This is almost word for word from an old Babylonian penitential psalm, quoted by O. Weber, in *Der Alte Orient* (Leipzig, 1906), p. 82, "*die Pein, Vergehen, Sünde, Missethat, Frevel.*"

<sup>2</sup> In the early Christian Church, according to Miss J. Harrison, baptism was followed at once by holy communion, and the neophyte was then crowned.

soul and go through the whole ceremony, thus becoming what is called a Shalmana or one who is perfect.

This custom was known as early as S. Paul: "Else what shall they do which are baptised for the dead, if the dead rise not at all? Why are they then baptised for the dead?" (*I. Cor.* 15<sup>29</sup>). Baron F. v. Hügel calls this "that bath of initiation," and says that it was evidently a contemporary custom among Christian proselytes from Paganism.<sup>1</sup>

After the Hymn to the Incense comes the following Hymn of Praise or of Adoration, the solemn Formula of Baptism, and the Entering of the Stream.

The Formula consists of invoking certain secret words over the candidate and naming the "Names of those Hidden Ones," perhaps a reference to the invisible Æons. The hidden words were 'words of power' communicated only to the candidate for initiation, perhaps to enable him to pass the Watchers of the invisible worlds, as with so many other mystic and magical sects, or the 'sounds filled with deeds' mentioned by Petrie from Egyptian rituals. In *The Book of Souls* there are many *barbara nomina*,<sup>2</sup> perhaps names of creative beings, as the secret names of the Greeks, or the 'holy and original words' of the Finnish *Kalevala*<sup>3</sup> which broke through all obstacles.

#### HYMN OF ADORATION.

My eyes I lifted up and my head I raised  
To the Place of all the Gates of Glory, Light and Honour, adorned  
and beautiful and fair;

<sup>1</sup> *The Mystical Element of Religion*, ii. 233.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. *Chaldean Oracles*, ii., p. 74, where Mr. Mead quotes Psellus: "See that thou never change the native names, for there are names in every nation, given by the Gods, possessed of power in mystic rites, no language can express."

<sup>3</sup> Cp. Lenormant's *Chaldean Magic*, p. 248.

To the Life of the Great One, the Unknown One, the Second Life  
and the Third Life, and to the Crown-bearer,  
To the Vine of all Life, and the great Tree of all Healing.

Worship and Praise, Praise to the Place of Glory, and the Hidden  
Æons,

The Watchers and the Lords of the Great Ones from the Hidden  
Place (that they may) open up the Hidden Place,  
And ray out Truth and Faith in the First Life, the Son of the  
Great Life.

And may there dwell in the Shekinas those of the Souls which  
come from Thee (till) the last Day when they go out of their  
bodies,

And rejoice with Thee, and are encircled by Thee, and rise up and  
see the Ether Beyond<sup>1</sup> and the Mansions of Glory.

Worship and Praise, Praise to the Glorious Way ;

To the Great and Mighty Ones, the Kabiri.

Worship and Praise, Praise to Periawis, the great Stream of the  
First Life of all Healing.

Worship and Praise, Praise to Josamin the Pure, who brings the  
Chalice.

Praise to the Life of Life, and the Truth which was from the  
beginning.

Worship Jakabar-Ziva, the Candidate of the Life, and the Sayings  
of the Chosen and the Just, the First Ones.

Worship Abatur, High, Hidden, Ancient and Guarded, who uplifts  
and conceals and guards the Gates of the House of Life,

On His high Throne enthroned. The Scales are set up before Him  
to weigh the works and the rewards.

Worship and Praise to the Gnosis of Life and the Lords of  
Healing, the Man who calls to the Living and who ordained  
the Healing of those Souls ;

Those in Darkness were arrayed in Light, and lifted up (were  
those) who fell.

<sup>1</sup> The Ether Beyond, or the Outer Ether, is sacred to the Deity ; to attain to it is to be in the Presence of the Great Life. In somewhat the same way the Greeks spoke of the Ether of Zeus (Rohde's *Psyche*, ii. 255). Miss Jane Harrison calls the Æther a quasi-Orphic divinity ; and from a lost play of Euripides we have the line : " I swear by the Holy Æther, Home of God " (Gilbert Murray's *Euripides*, p. 287).

The Great Spirit of Life in the Place of the Spirits and Souls of  
our First Fathers,  
Seated in Glory and arrayed in Light and clothed in Life, the  
Great Spirit of Life above the First One.

Worship and Praise Schelmai and Nedbai, the two Æons, the  
Images of the Gnosis of Life,  
Who rule over the Great Stream of Life, in which we are baptised  
with the great Baptism of Light.<sup>1</sup> The Life conquers!

#### OF ENTERING THE STREAM.

On the Day of Entering the Stream (which is) the great and  
pure Glory of the Life, the First One, for it came from the Great  
One of the Life, there come with me forty-and-four thousand,  
and ten thousand Æons, the Sons of Light, and go down to the  
Stream baptising me, and rise up to the Shores and establish me,  
and I give praises to the Great One. The Life conquers!

This illumination of consciousness or expansion of  
the true man, commonly called initiation, is presum-  
ably not an affair of space and time, yet as it is effected  
by the man when in the prison-house of the body, and  
only then, it is in this measure an affair of the flesh.  
It is an experience of transcendence. The solemn and  
timeless nature of the change is most emphatically  
shewn in the following Hymn of the Rising from the  
Stream, after the spaceless worlds of the Beyond have  
been glimpsed by the candidate. It is impressively

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *Pistis Sophia* (p. 249, Mead): "For this cause I said unto you  
aforetime, 'They that are whole need no physician, but they that are sick,'  
that is to say, they that are of the Light have no need of the mysteries, for  
they are pure Light-powers, but the human race hath need of them, for men  
are purgations of matter. . . . Therefore preach, saying: Cease not to  
seek day and night, and stay not your hands, until ye have found the  
purifying mysteries which shall cleanse you, and will transform you into  
pure Light that ye may enter into the Height." It is curious that after an  
illumination or baptism in Light, an ascent is the next work of the soul as  
in the ceremony of *The Book of Souls*. The baptism is followed by the  
rising or ascent of the illuminated one to perfection. Before the eyes is  
constantly held the possibility of perfection, of rising in power and light,  
not in a distant heaven after an uncomfortable and unhealthy death, but  
now and here in this life, in a body made healthy by deliberate training and  
a mind purified by discipline.

explained that it is not to earthly light that the soul is dedicated, not a light dependent on time and space and visible to mortal eyes, nor is it any earthly fire that shall consume and purify the soul.

THE RISING FROM THE STREAM.

In the Name of the Life!

From the Stream I arise with the Souls my Comrades, with my  
Comrade-souls;

Supported by our Father Schetel.<sup>1</sup> Thus spake our Father  
Schetel as he went with us to the Stream:

Who shall be the Witness on High that I enter the Stream with  
you?

The Sun which rises above us is not the Witness we seek, for the  
Souls are not baptised for him.

That Sun which ye say is above, rises in the morning and sets in  
the evening,

That Sun is but perishing and shall pass away,

Passing away and perishing,

And Sun-worship is passing and shall perish!

From the Stream I arise with the Souls my Comrades, with my  
Comrade-souls,

Supported by our Father Schetel. Thus spake our Father Schetel  
as he went with us to the Stream:

Who shall be the Witness on High that I enter the Stream with  
you?

The Moon which rises above us is not the Witness we seek, for the  
Souls are not baptised to the Moon.

For morning and evening come and go and that Moon which thou  
sayest is over us,

Behold that Moon herself wanes and disappears.

Passing and perishing is the light of the Moon, perishing and  
passing away,

And worthless and passing away is the worship of the Moon!

<sup>1</sup> Schetel=Seth. The Seth, moreover, of the Christianized Gnosis has been equated with Zoroaster.

From the Stream I arise with the Souls my Comrades, with my  
 Comrade-souls,  
 Supported by our Father Schetel. Thus spake our Father Schetel  
 as he went with us to the Stream :  
 Who shall be the Witness on High that I enter the Stream with  
 you?  
 If the burning Fire is above us, it is not the Witness we desire,  
 for Souls are not baptised to the Fire.  
 And ye say : Every day we pass by the Fire.  
 And I say to you the Fire is dying and passing away,  
 Passing away and dying,  
 Fire and its worship is passing away and dying !

From the Stream I arise with the Souls my Comrades, with my  
 Comrade-souls,  
 Supported by our Father Schetel. Thus spake our Father Schetel  
 as he went with us to the Stream :  
 Who shall be the Witness on High that I enter the Stream with  
 you?  
 The Stream Itself shall be our Witness.  
 The Bread, the Truth and the Cup shall be our Witnesses.  
 The Sabbath and the Community of the Just shall be our  
 Witnesses.  
 Our Temple and its Worshippers shall be our Witnesses.  
 The Alms in our hands shall be our Witnesses.  
 Our Fathers who guide us shall be our Witnesses.  
 For these are they whom we seek ;  
 And in this manner was the Baptism of the Souls,  
 That they may rise to the House of Life and go up to the  
 Shining Dwellings.  
 When we ask of the Life Himself to be our Witness,  
 He will witness for us in Truth and in Power and in all His words.  
 The Life conquers !<sup>1</sup>

The text is thus continually lifting us above and  
 beyond the possibilities of the physical plane ; a sense

<sup>1</sup> I have sometimes divided the hymns into verses and lines to facilitate reading them, but in the original there is no punctuation of any kind and no division between the sentences ; nor are there, of course, any capital letters for the names of the divine beings.



of exaltation seems to be aimed at, a sense of expansion and of illumination. The modernized rubric, on the contrary, materialises and narrows the sense. The incense, for instance, is precious, not because it symbolises the Spirit of Life, but because it is sandalwood. The light is from a lamp over which there is much fuss in the filling. The glory is in the rich apparel, and so forth.

It may be suggested that the present writer's comments on the text of *The Book of Souls* are more modern even than those of the Post-Islāmic rubric. To this it may be replied that trouble, persecution, starvation and a hostile country have had disastrous effects upon the little sect of the Mandæans (or Christians of S. John as they are still called). The sacred MSS. have been copied and glossed by the only men available, unlettered, uncouth and devoid of the mystical sense, but faithful, automatic, and matter of fact; the true beauty of the ancient and profoundly symbolic ritual is hid from them, and its significance and power of developing the inner experiences of the soul utterly incomprehensible to them.

The beautiful Prayer for Light is, we venture to suggest, a recognition of the soul's illumination by the Light Invisible.

To this aspiration, to this great longing and seeking for inward light, for wisdom, comes in answer the Gnosis of Life Himself 'from among the stars,' bringing with Him 'the teaching which frees,'—which gives liberation from the body. It seems as if the originators of the ritual recognised within every soul a great potency of spiritual flight, a power of arising, which under conditions of ceremonial purity could be aroused, and so the soul upleaping as a mighty flame gains her

freedom for a space, and learns from the inner voice the hidden words or powers of the spiritual life.

The conditions of ceremonial purity and of beauty are all present in *The Book of Souls*, as they are in all the great mystery-rituals. Just as Nature's beauty is favourable to the health of the body, so may ceremonial beauty be favourable to the health of the soul, inducing those spiritual moods which are the index of fitness for receiving from the higher wisdom. The 'Back-to-the-Wild' school and Simple Lifers who go to their 'nature-altars,' however, may be in danger of becoming as physical as their surroundings. Only the perfect may live with Nature alone and then it must be 'upon the Mount.' If we have not the power to transmute Nature she drags us down; and the beasts of the field are neither artistic nor saintly.

But some sacred ceremonies may be made into the state-functions of the soul, in which robed with powers she is prepared to meet the King; and if this is so, may we not see in these Mandæan rites a moment of rest, of royal refreshment for the soul, which was truly noble and pure—a moment only perhaps, but a golden one worth many years of toil and struggle to possess?

A. L. B. HARDCASTLE.

## THE 'KABBALISM' OF CHINA.

HERBERT CHATLEY, B.Sc.

THERE can be little doubt that in early days the Chinese sages drew on the same sources of information (whether actually inter-connected or but sub-consciously so it is difficult to say) as served for the 'inspiration' of sacred literature in the nearer countries. The commixture of developed or degenerated forms of thought, which entered China from outside, with the direct tradition has produced a confusion which can hardly be unravelled. The main body of direct tradition is associated with Confucianism in educated thought and Taoism in popular belief. Both profess to teach Shen-Tac (the Japanese Shin-to), the spiritual way; but the governing classes developed a purely formal ethic accompanied by rigid ceremonial, while the more mystical and less educated populace devoted their attention to the personal relations of spirits and the practice of magic (Wu-shu). From the latter, largely under the inspiration of and with reaction upon the Mahāyāna Buddhism, developed modern Taoism.

The mystic literature of China is chiefly associated with the school of Lao-tzū, but most of its developments degrade rather than elevate the Quietism of the *Tao-té-Ching*. We are on more solid ground in the traditional literature produced by the Confucian school with the 'Classics' as its core. In it we find references to the fundamental laws of the cosmos, and

an unvarying belief that the same laws apply to the development of the individual.

This essay, therefore, will attempt to give some idea of the Chinese exposition of cosmic law, followed by a brief study of the practice of psychic development. The laws may be summarised under two headings: (1) The law of rhythm; (2) The law of numerical relation, including the law of octaves.

### 1. THE LAW OF RHYTHM.

European students are moderately familiar with the Chinese fundamental concept of Yin and Yang, but I doubt whether they often realise to what an extraordinary extent the idea permeates native thought. From the highest to the lowest every phenomenon is sorted out under one of these two polarities, or consists of a definite configuration of yin and yang elements oscillating from one extreme to the other. The cycle of the months, the seasons and the world-history are the mere process of harmonic variation from yin to yang and back to yin, thus forming one complete movement, with four critical phases. Chu Hsi calls these four phases by the names of the first four characters in the ancient text of the *I Ching*: (1) Yuan, 'beginning'; (2) Hêng, 'prosperity'; (3) Li, 'gain'; (4) Chên, 'purity'; and represents them by the four points of the compass or four inter-quadrant points of a circle. The 12 'horary' signs are also used for the subdivisions of a complete rhythm. The world-cycle is 129,600 years ( $=2^4 \times 9^2 \times 10^3$ ), and Chu Hsi, in section 49 of his complete works (translated under the title of *Chinese Cosmogony*, by the Rev. T. McClutchie, Shanghai, 1874), distinctly refers to fossil remains as relics of

previous world-cycles, thus anticipating the Cuvierian theory of 'cataclysms.'

A five-fold differentiation, similar to that referred to in the Upanishads, also appears in the system, the five elements (typified by the five planets), and an inherent duality in these produces a decimal arrangement. The rhythm is also supposed to extend through four planes: Tai chi, the Great Limit; Wu Hsing, the Elemental World; Nan nü, the Sex World; and Wan wu, the Manifold.

## 2. THE LAW OF NUMERICAL RELATION AND THE LAW OF OCTAVES.

The ideas which play so large a part in Pythagorean and Kabbalistic speculation as to the potency and significance of number, appear to a great extent in Chinese 'science,' particularly in the *Hsi T'zū Shang Ch'uan*, called by Legge the 'Superior Explanatory Narrative,' which is a commentary of the Confucian era on the *Yih Ching*, and forms part of the modern versions of that classic.

In the eighth chapter, line 1 refers to Heaven and Earth by the numbers 1 to 10 alternately, the odd referring to Heaven and the even to Earth. This illustrates the principle of rhythm and the almost universal concept of 'odd' as supernal. If we separate 1 and 2 as formative and regard 10 as the completion, the numbers from 3 to 9 remain as the degrees of an octave, 10 being the actual octave degree.

The Pa Kua or eight diagrams, on which the whole of the ancient text of the *Yih Ching* is based, may similarly be regarded as a formal symbolism of the law of octaves, with seven variations and a complete duplication as in sound-vibrations (musical notes).

Line 2 continues the subject of line 1, pointing out the five alternations (odd numbers) from 1 to 10 referred to Heaven, and the five (even numbers) referred to Earth. Taking the sums of the arithmetical progressions,  $1+3+5+7+9=25$  and  $2+4+6+8+10=30$ , it refers these respectively to Heaven and Earth, and concludes that the whole process of evolution is symbolised by the number  $30+25=55$ , and proceeds as Kuei-Shen, *i.e.* negative and positive spiritual influences.

Line 3 refers to Ta Yen, meaning the 'Great Flux,' and refers to its number as 50. The Yung or 'Use' (= objectivity) is 49. We here strike again on the law of octaves, 50 being the octave of octaves (an octave consists of 7 notes, and the octave note of the tonic  $(7 \times 7) + 1 = 50$ ), or seven complete 'spheres.' The odd one may be regarded as the immanent subjective monad. Line 3 proceeds to speak of the division of the 49 in the manner of the famous Pu-shih ('Tortoise and Stalks') method of divination, symbolical of the instantaneous configuration of the cosmos.

'Division' (potential) makes 'duality' (polarity). Setting aside one (the monad?) causes an image of the triad. Subdividing, four is obtained, in the image of the four seasons (= four critical states, *viz.*—inception, crisis, inversion, anticrisis), with the analogy of the four quarters of the moon and the maximum and minimum values of a harmonic function, leaving a surplus (the mathematician's 'epoch') which is analogous to the intercalary month. A Chinese year consists of 12 soli-lunar months of alternately 29 and 30 days (mean  $29\frac{1}{2}$ ), which is almost exactly the period between the conjunctions of Sol and Luna.

The text proceeds with a cryptic note to the effect that there is another intercalary after five years. As a matter of fact there is an intercalary month about every three years.  $[365\frac{1}{4} - 12 (29\frac{1}{2}) = 11\frac{1}{4}$ , which is rather more than  $\frac{1}{3}$ rd of  $29\frac{1}{2}$ .] Probably what is meant is that in the course of five years approximately two intercalary months are necessary.  $[(365\frac{1}{4} \times 5) - (12 \times 29\frac{1}{2} \times 5) = 56\frac{1}{4} = 2 \times 28\frac{1}{2}$ ;  $28\frac{1}{2}$  is only a little short of  $29\frac{1}{2}$ .]

The technical terms of subdivision are those employed in the Pu-shih divination, and it seems fairly clear that the divination-process was intended to be symbolic of (and influenced by) the instantaneous balance of the cosmos, like the Schema Coeli of the astrologers.

Line 4 proceeds to the calculus of the Liang I (Two Principles; Yin and Yang, Chien and K'un — 'Positive and Negative,' 'Tone and Octave'). It ascribes the number 216 to Chien, the Grand Tonic or Prime Mover. In the text of the *Yih Ching* the number 9 is ascribed to Yang. Chien is a trigram of 3 yangs;  $9 \times 3 \times 8 = 216$ . Probably the factor 8 refers to the octave. To K'un (triple yin), the octave or plasma (= Earth), the number 144 is given for the same 'reason.' The number of Yin is 6;  $3 \times 6 \times 8 = 144$ . The sum of the two is 360. The analogy of this number, which by including the great polarities synthesises all things, with the days of the year (or degrees of the circle) is indicated in the text.

Line 5 proceeds to ascribe the number 11250 to the manifold (Wan wu = 10,000 things, meaning an indefinitely large quantity). This number expresses various symbols: *e.g.* (a)  $8 \times 144 \times 10$ , — 8 for the octave, 144 for K'un (as above), 10 for completion of Earth (see

line 2); (b)  $4 \times 8 \times 360$ ,—4 for the quarters of the cycle, 8 for the octave, and 360 for the collective number of the polarities (as above).


Line 6 comments on the four processes and eighteen changes necessary to produce a hexagram, or symbol of the horary equilibrium of Heaven, Earth and Man.

Line 7, on the 'smaller perfection' of the eight trigrams.

Line 8, on the application of the principle to the categorisation of things and consequent prediction of earthly affairs.

Line 9 quotes Confucius as having said that a knowledge of the evolution of Tao (the way or course of change) enables one to understand the operation of spiritual influence. This is apparently equivalent to saying that the teleological impulse acts along mathematical lines, a statement which physical science entirely endorses.

The commentators (of the Confucian era) associate this system with the famous Ho tu ('River Chart') and Lo shu ('Inscription of the Lo River'). The former is referred to in the *Lün yü* (Confucian *Analects*), and in the versions set forth by the Sung School (Chu Hsi or Chu fu tzu was the principal sage of this school, which flourished in the 13th century A.D.). The Ho tu consists of a square figure as follows:





It will be observed that all the odd numbers are yang (positive), and the even ones yin (negative). Chu Hsi has elaborated a relation of this figure, which represents the creation, with the '5 elements' of Chinese philosophy.

The Lo shu is simply the old 'magic square' of nine as follows :

4 yin	9 yang	2 yin
8 yang	5 yang	7 yang
8 yin	1 yang	6 yin

The cross of yang is noticeable, the remaining four yin are at the corners.

9
8—5—7;
1

In the later books, chiefly devoted to Ti li (earth-principle = geomancy), or the 'science' of *local* influence, these numerical notions are combined with the Chinese astronomical notation, so as to provide a calculus whose prime object is to find the position and direction of the favourable (yang) influence at any given instant in a given place. The principal book of early date is the so-called *Green-Bag Classic*, whose name I should prefer to translate *The Classic of the Azure Vault*.<sup>1</sup>

### 3. PSYCHIC DEVELOPMENT.

The dominant feature of the classical literature is its reiteration of certain ethical principles, two in particular being fundamental: (1) Hsiao, filial piety; (2) Shu, general reciprocity.

Supplementary to this ethic, we find occasional reference to the mystic exaltations of the Ch'ün Tze ('Son of the Prince'), a technical term corresponding to the title of, let us say, 'Master.'

<sup>1</sup> Translators of Chinese have a weakness for the semi-comic in preference to a sympathetic version.

In the Confucian *Analects* he is said to know the future and be in harmony with Heaven. These are not mere metaphorical expressions, since they are amplified by elaborate parallelisms between the macrocosm and the perfected microcosm. There is a passage in the *Yih Ching* which is almost identical with the first sentence of the Trismegistic *Emerald Tablet*; and supplementary to this is the formula: "*Jen wei hsiao t'ien-ti*," i.e. "Man constitutes a heaven and earth in miniature." In the 38th paragraph of book vii. ('Chin Hsin') of the works of Mêng-tzu (Mencius), the doctrine of a periodical appearance of such Masters is enunciated, the period being given as 500 years. The Masters named are Yao, T'ang, Wen Wang, and K'ung fu tzu (Confucius).

The principal teachings as to the character of a Master are found in the classic termed *Chung Yung* (Legge's *Doctrine of the Mean*) which means 'Concentration' or 'Stability' and 'Application' or 'Harmony.' These two words constitute a formula of self-culture referring to: (1) Constancy in the 'way' of 'Heaven's decree,' and (2) Correct response to impressions. The final results of such training are outlined in ohh. xxii., xxiii., and xxiv. of this text, which read as follows:

xxii. He who has the utmost sincerity conceivable on earth, can fully expand his nature, and being so can do the same for others. Being able to do so for others, he can similarly influence all matters, and can assist the moulding influences of the cosmos. Being so able, he forms with Heaven and Earth a trinity.

xxiii. Next to the above is he who cultivates himself as far as possible, so attaining sincerity, which becoming visible, manifests and shines. It so affects others, who are transformed by it. Only the most perfect sincerity can produce this result.

xxiv. The path of utmost sincerity leads to prophetic power.

Omens of some kind always accompany impending development or degeneration. The Pu-shih divination will symbolise these as also physiological phenomena. He shall know the coming future whether good or evil. Hence perfect sincerity makes him like a spirit.

The classic proceeds to expatiate on the extraordinary qualities of Chên, 'sincerity' (the character means 'perfect words'), but is surprisingly free from the mythological subtleties which usually encloud references to the mystic faculty in other books. It seems perfectly clear that the author had a very definite conception of the psychic development which follows the rigid adherence to a life whose one idea is to be in conformity with the '*élan vital*.'

T'ang Shan, Chih-Li.

HERBERT CHATLEY.

## THREE MINDS AND ——— ?

H. F. L.

PSYCHIC communications are sometimes viewed with exaggerated reverence by those who obtain them. There is a tendency to invest with a romantic halo ideas which reach the mind in a supernormal manner, and the recipients of such ideas not infrequently imagine they possess a revelation for humanity at large, as well as for themselves. This is not to be wondered at, for the communication comes to them in a peculiarly intimate way, and yet, as it were, from outside; and thus it not unnaturally becomes endowed, in their eyes, with a kind of authority. It is far from the intention of the writer to decry the value and interest attaching to some psychic communications, for they arouse profound questions in the minds of thoughtful people who view them dispassionately. This paper is prefaced by the foregoing remarks only in order to make it quite clear that what follows is not written with intent to advance any theory, or put forward dogmatically any point of view. It is merely a record of some results obtained by three friends who have worked together for nearly three years. Much that is set down may seem confused, even contradictory, to some readers; still to the student of psychic phenomena all work of the kind must present a certain amount of interest, when it is the outcome of definite purpose, and serious and patient experiment.

The method adopted was simple. Automatic writing—in itself often interesting—has more or less a touch of negative mediumship about it, and so it was rejected. The three experimenters sat together, regularly and silently, in a semi-darkened room, the minds of all being made highly positive, and fixed upon the belief that *mental* mediumship and communication such as they desired, was a possibility. They further resolved that while critical faculty must be freely exercised upon results, it should be held in abeyance during the experiments, and united effort be

used to make the collective mind one-pointed, and raise it to its highest, ready to receive what might flow into it.

For a considerable period there were no results. At length the sitter, who—for reasons it is unnecessary to enter upon—had been selected as mouth-piece, heard words form more or less distinctly 'within the head.' These were taken down exactly as spoken. They came spasmodically, sometimes several words together in a sort of rush, then pauses between others. But despite this irregularity of utterance the words were found to fall into a sort of rhythmic prose when read consecutively. Also, although breaks occurred in the regular meetings,<sup>1</sup> the communication apparently followed a definite course, and even when the break had been one of several weeks' duration, seemed to take up the thread where it had left off. The mouth-piece never had the smallest clue beforehand to what was said at the meetings, and preferred never to speculate between whiles on what the next communication was likely to be. Sometimes mental questions asked by the other two sitters received an answer, or what might be understood as an attempt at such. The exact wording of the communications is given, but not the whole of them; that would make this paper much too long. Several things rather personal to the sitters have been cut out, and also others not altogether suitable for publication in a magazine intended for general reading.

The greater part of the paper consists of results when all three experimenters were together, from the first communication obtained in this way, until the last. At the end, however, are a few fragments received when two only were sitting. The last of all was suddenly heard by one of the group alone when thinking of nothing in particular. It is, however, fair to mention that two hours previously this person had read aloud extracts from the records to a friend. The fragment is included as it refers to things mentioned both before and after its reception, and it apparently falls in with the general drift of the communications.

(The three experimenters have been intimately known to me for many years, and I am fully assured of the straightforwardness of the record, whatever the value of the content may be, as apart from the form.—ED.)

<sup>1</sup> Extra leads are inserted between the various pieces to show this.—ED.

THE force drives everything before it if you will let it go. . . . It is life, vitality, flux, movement. Vitality is the thing you need. . . . The currents are changing the nations, the people, the very lands themselves, but only those who keep the balance can feel and know it; you must swing true to look out. Rising temperature is necessary to melt the old chilled forms; condensation comes afterwards. . . . The more vital you let yourselves be, the more you spread to the joy of life, the easier it will be for me to come. When the fires of life burn I am attracted, when the ashes are low I cannot reach you. Joy is the key-note of my existence. Joy is the key-note of my entrance. When you are swallowed in the great life you will not feel the small one. You are like children looking through peep-holes at the universe; reality flows by you unheeded, while you clutch and clatter with your curtains.

Out! out! out! Hear the triumphant shout. The laugh of the gods dismembers chaos. . . . Quiet mind and let it sleep. Sink into space, and there receive that that shall make you quiver. On you life dawns by slow degrees, as, looking upward from the mud wherein your roots are stretched, you see the sunshine. My raying, flashing, pulsing world, alive with light, where all is motion, joy and energy. Look out! look up!

I try to touch you, but your souls are slow, they drag and she is heavy. . . . Time will bring greater ease and also greater purpose. I seek to form a body who can hear me, but my words are not for all. . . . Unwinding coils, ye suffer, but I am glad. Force gives out for to-day; no more.

. . . Unwind the fiery coils and let me enter.  
Untie the past and look towards the future. Fire  
burns the knots, it utterly consumes them. When the  
great breath sweeps round without obstruction you  
will bring through. . . . Of air and water breath is  
the outcome.

The gods move on in ordered measure, their steps  
are slow; they halt and pause and then move forward;  
and the world shakes and things are disestablished,  
and chaos reigns before construction. Always and ever  
as the gods move forth confusion comes, but not for us  
confusion—only for you earth-dwellers; your heads are  
underneath the ripples, you do not see the breath.

Let changes come and fear not; he who fears  
change cannot step forth to universal gatherings.  
Humans fear change, as limpets to their rocks cling  
tightly. Life fears no change, for life is onward press-  
ing and remakes itself. In reborn atoms must your  
forms be built. Meet changes as they come, and swing-  
ing to them so shall ye build your atoms translucent to  
the light, transparent for the fire to course through.

Alive! alive! alive! Every atom sings, I swing  
to the whole, I touch the all, and I rebound. In  
heaven, in earth, in hell, my path is found.

It is the way *out* I show you, *OUT!* You waste  
time struggling to pick up the shells when the door  
stands open before you. Unbar it and go free.

When the gods move great light shines, it pierces  
the darkness and loses itself. Reverse ideas of good  
and evil and you will understand. It shines and it is  
lost, it shines and it is lost, and it is rhythm. The  
world moves on by rhythm; by rhythm it is swung.  
. . . The gods bend to it; there is give and take.

The world would spin more vastly did humans raise their eyes and understand, for there is choice. Although the gods move, the measure is set by Him who sent them forth to do His mighty will.

The seething movements of this churning world cover the steps of the gods. As they move through it they give the impulse and ye work it out. They do not work; they do His bidding, and then stand and look. And humans scratch and turmoil, and rush headlong here and there; yet is it progress—progress towards that mighty end, that consummation. When separation as ye know it seems great, then dawns fresh spurt towards consummation, gathering of effort, the harvest of the footprints of the gods. I see the world a struggling, quivering, moving mass, and, as the flash goes through it, it heaves the more. It is your chaos, it is our move towards consummation. Joy, the overwhelming joy of movement, of shining, flashing movement, and the great song of gods and earth goes up in triumph. For He who thrust it out, and called it forth, is ever present.

In that great world where changes are stability, I swing in vast untrammelled movements. (Movements and moments are the same, use either.) I touch you all—a breath from reality—no more.

Go free! go free! and watch the great earth-movement as it swings in space. The earth, too, treads a measure, and lightning on through space encircles round the feet of Him who called her forth, and the circling sets the measure of her rhythm. And the changes that beset you are born of the onrush past the mighty forces playing upon the ball that ye inhabit. And the mover of the ball—who heeds not much these



humans—steps with his counterpart towards consummation. For all move forward to that end; for all is not as ye see it, it is other. Your end is one thing; the ending of the earth another.

You speak of union, but you do not know what union is. Union is strength to hold, and strength to fly apart and shatter. Without shattering where were union?—Nowhere.

And love is strength to hold, and strength to rive apart. You speak of love and hate, yet are they puny things, within your little world all useful—a flickering image of the mighty force mirrored in turbid water. Great sweeps of life go round you, feel them . . . and you are—out.

A football spinning is your world. Its little hopes and joys and sorrows, what are they? Yet through them mount, and if ye would look up, not at them, ye would mount the higher, the nearer, the surer—nearer to Him who spewed the life-force forth and set it going.

Out into space, and see the mad rejoicing of the atoms. Constraint is put upon them when they form a world like yours—constraint, the dawn of evolution. See, ye are free and wild life courses through you, did you but know it. But hands and feet are bound by evolution.

Keep still!

All is quiet, and the region of great stillness is upon you. The silence calls, and speaks with her great voice, and power is with you.

In the great silence have I heard the voice say Come! and at the call I looked around, and saw the end and the beginning. And silence, which is the echo of the world-song, contains all speech, all movement, and all energy. And out of silence grows the active

soul, nourished by harmony, content to stretch its roots through space. Established there it stands and stretches out to heaven. The clatter of your little world disturbs it not; and with the silence of the soul ye first shall hear the great gods' silence. And when ye hear the silence, on your ears shall break the song, the song of all eternity. In that vast universe where now I stand, free and untrammelled, I seek to make you feel the sweep of pulsing cosmic breath, and mighty thronging movement. But, humans, if ye would reach and hear my silence, look up and out beyond the clatter of your little lives, and gain the silence. The loves and frets and jars of earth, so real to you, are nothing—such petty whorls within a whirl of life beginning small, yet stretching far, ringing through space unending.

Arise! and leave your earth-sphere. Swing with me into space where star calls star, and the great breath sweeps through the universe, and leave your measuring-tape of human mind. Set out with me a step beyond the confines. The mystery of creation's pangs lies far beyond you, and when ye have been welded close, and rent apart, and brushed about with living fire, ye then shall know it.

The pain is wonderful, upholding joy, loosening energy, stupendous life, the keynote of existence.

Pain reaches far, and joy upholds, and as they melt in one you find the union. It is the secret of your human world, and when ye learn that pain and joy and tears and laughter are but the phases of a mighty force which works in harmony, *then* shall ye stand triumphant. The man is out! Earth circles at his feet and he is free. The gods call to him and he comes; the

earth calls to him and he stoops. Come out with me  
O . . . and see the universe dance through space,  
and see the whirling of the atoms, and know that ye  
are free, and *out*, and OUT!

Pain is the fire and joy the water. Great breath  
equally partakes of both, moving with explosive energy.  
Beyond your world they are not two but one. Without  
them ye were caught whirling in endless revolutions.  
They form the way to wander out, and stand beyond  
the little world, and see the stars dance, and the great  
suns bow down before Him—Him who is all.

For when ye are revolving within your little coil of  
revolution, ye cannot sense the uses of your pains, ye  
cannot understand your joys. But mounting souls see  
further; to the end they look, and it is clear. And of  
your pain joy is born, the upward movement, and  
power to fling yourself upon the spaces, and there give  
form to that dark substance waiting a redeemer. . . .  
The whole is not as parts, and when ye touch the  
whole life is transfigured. For parts are weariness and  
toil, and slow. The whole is moveless motion, living  
force flowing without waves, without obstruction.  
The whole is simple and yet complex; the whole is far  
and yet is near; the whole is all and yet is nothing;  
and when parts melt in whole ye too shall bow before  
the gods as I have done and be partakers of their being.

Learn! The ways are many, their colours mingle.  
The gates swing open and the paths are shewn.

Eternity's great heart is beating, and in its beat  
the worlds swing to and fro; and He who called you  
forth swings on His mighty progress, and the hearts of  
men draw nearer to that Being of their being—and it  
is well.

But mighty paths stretch forth through space. I seek to make you see their manifold completeness. Myriads of mighty lives and suns flash on their way. Intensity of ever-churning stillness, that is the source from whence the Logos sprang. . . . Humanity lies nearest the great heart of Him who gave you being. It meets with that vast heart in ever widening circles. It is His special work, this movement—moment of extension.

Humanity moves with Him to His end, His consummation, and ever swifter as He moves, comes nearer the great play of outside forces. He closer joins Himself with those; thus comes the choices. He is the all; for most the great container. I find it difficult to voice in human speech what I would show you, for that that I would make you see stands far beyond human speech or comprehension. For all can comprehend Him who has sent you forth and made you beings, but that which is beyond is so outside, I find that human words do not avail well to enshrine my meaning. . . .

Fulfil your human side with fullest heart; seek not withdrawal, but open out to me, looking beyond.

The way is never ending, yet the finish lies immediate at your feet. . . . I fill you from the fullness. I lift you into the wide solitary spaces, causing new sense of world-spin and its coiling. It aids the coil that some souls stand beyond and spurn it; spurn it from vision—not by action. Lend yourself to the coil and circulate therein most willingly, thus easier shall dawn the stars of vision, rifts from the great beyond.

As rift succeeds to rift, the gates unlock, the doors fly open, and the soul stands looking with wide-eyed

vision on the great choices, and stays—or goes into the endless music, stepping its song in rhythm knowingly. . . . These counter-movements in the coiling life lighten the heart of Him who bears you with Him. His universe is quickened by each influx. He is in very deed incarnate in His universe, yet holds Himself within Himself, being beyond it; and in that subtle two-fold quality enshrined lies the mystery of duality.

It is a time for stir; humanity lies open to it and powers press through. . . . All levels feel the influx of this breath and bow before it. Things mighty and things foolish hear the call and uprise at it. It is a time of subtle penetration, and the great nature-hosts are active. The life of Him who bears you in His bosom now beats faster, and the uprush of His sons is quickened.

Enter the hushed spaces of the twilight that precedes the dawn, and listen.

The cry of gathering myriads takes form and substance, shaping itself upon the moving waters of existence. The mighty crash of universal uprush sounds triumphant. A movement—moment of extension—swings upon itself, transforming energy.

Things mighty come and go within the system, and echoes fall upon each soul within that system.

There is recoil as well as forward movement. Earth gathers to herself the harvest of the intake; her sons are borne aloft, or massed yet closer. The life incoming, moving through the one, shoots outward, through the many it is focussed, thus centres will be born and give expression—expression of the intake.

Controlling soul and mind look outward, then

loosening mind and soul turn inward; so from the double movement on yourself gain comprehension.

Life wins its way, shredding the rind of compact coils with thrusts of misery. Coils rent thus spring apart and life escapes, but ever turns upon itself, sweeping the shattered coils with whirling ecstasy into a new becoming. Leave pasts behind, yet melt them with the future. When past and future swing in balance true, account to life is rendered. I stand on past and future for my leap through space, it is the point that cuts the circle. Shiver the past to fragments and embrace the future. You humans cling to wreckage and your tears are shed for things that have no value. Laugh with the gods and thrust your open arms out heavenwards; fill them from the tide oncoming. Kick the hell of rigid things from 'neath your feet, and leap through space, and space shall hold you with the thrilling flux of life ascending; and hold you more complete in every part than did the rigid coil ye flung behind you.

Come out, I say! come out! and spin with me amid the rushing torrent of the universe, and know yourselves as breathers!

Fearless must be the stride of him who seeks to leap through space. Detach yourselves from clinging burrs; hampered the feet of those who look around. With wide sense of oblivion pass beyond, embracing all, yet holding none, and rending way through space reach the beyond. When looking back resolve the finite into its infinity, contract your effort to a point; your leap from thence through space shivers your circle of becoming. In this way works great breath with universe and persons.

Flash fire from central shaft of light, shiver the formal coils of your containing. Swing forth and view the universe. Lightly it throbs with massive force speeding through endless reaches of becoming. Holding her sons, by virtue of the coiling, your universe contains you. The outside press and inside swirl form an environment to keep you. Now reverse coiling shows that inward swirl and outer stress when mingled in true part give liberty. . . . The teaching that I seek to give to human mind is difficult. The words I have to do it in do not contain the essence of it. They sketch, with clumsy method, striving of living life to focus in a flash upon your mind—then leave it.

Raise up your minds with purpose, letting me brush them, and as I give the truth you grasp for a brief space my movement. . . . My effort has been made and reached you. It is no easy task to fit the language of the gods to human ears. Imperfect ever is the frame our sounds are heard in. Yet take courage and step on, listen and look, learning to snatch reflections—though our great moods pass on beyond you.

Ever the plunge is deeper as the thing proceeds. I gather you all within my grasp, and knit the threads proceeding from you into my handle of attachment. Given to me the task of welding human minds, able to sense living forces from my world, into the linking band between those kingdoms. Given a group of human minds so banded, much can we do, mighty the thrilling efflux set in motion. Intake and output melt in one, resolving finite things into infinity. Nourished by such the mighty heart of Him who bears you with Him. For, as the mighty being passes on His way, conforming to the universal law of life, He opens

outward, and seeks to thrust those children of Himself out into greater contacts; thus drawing through the travail of His vast work, through product of Himself, much sustenance.

Now, humans, learn that all your coils are His in miniature, and as your coiling turns upon itself and you can draw the centre of your being outward, ye closer cling to likeness with that thing which brought you forth and gave you utterance. Knowledge of all that He contains cannot stand comprehensible. Never the rising child can comprehend the parent,—but you approximate. Thus in this proximation lies your key—now turn it, for stimulus is yours. These outer contacts quicken mind if only humans use them—use them aright and not for stupid wonderment, but that your halting vision of beyond bring nourishment and power to fling your inner selves on outermost. These words I have made use of are but similes, for weak is human speech, poorer than human mind to frame my meaning. Yet do I know that sense of all goes near you. . . . Honest endeavour to attain a point is often clumsy but it shews clear—and in that thought I leave you.

Listen to the calling voices of the universe. Blend with the hurrying feet of mighty movement. Into the hushed spaces of your souls swings in the thrilling moment. From space I call and sweep the souls of you who hearken, into my splendid utterance. . . . Wrest yourselves free and dash these toils behind you. Cover the space between the toils and my unbounded measure with mighty strides, and let yourselves go free and draw great breath within you. For great breath fuses all the petty things into an



angle of becoming, and so great breath thrusts up your point through space, shattering the coil of your entombment. Bring outer force to bear on inner coil and see it wither; yet out of the spent ashes of this withering is born a mode, a mode to plunge you onward into the mood of Him who gave you utterance. Thus can ye speak His mood to listening ears, and seeing eyes shall know that ye have grasped something of finite uses for infinity. And though I call to you to thrust aside the clinging claims of petty things, despise them not. Holding them well enfolded in your grasp draw out their uses, for all may be avail to mounting souls. I beckon from the heights and point a hand to regions outward.

The voices of the gods are raised in action, and now upon your world is uproar, confusion and bewilderment. Amid the vibrant energy stand firm—though swinging loosely, and realise the great beyond from whence comes efflux. Thus only can ye comprehend the tide that bears you outward—that all shall be, and never is. So, as the struggle goes ye never lose it, and gain the great intake. Come up to me and open your dim eyes, and let me touch your ears—so hard of hearing. It lies so deep within you that ye sense it not, and often pass it by. Fearless and true must be the effort needed to swing the gates ajar for humans to step outward. Ever the call is sounding even when least expected. Even the smallest grain of dust is vibrant. If your ear be ever tense to catch the message you can spell out the words from all beside you . . . for lesser works as larger, and He gives the key. The mighty symphony is played round His unfolding, and the chorus of the shouting gods is ofttime heard most clearly in bewilderment.

Far shores, sunlit with dusk-encircled noonday, welcome the feet of those who stray beyond the confines of the visible. . . . Now leap, casting all backward fear behind you. Leap to the wondrous splendour of my world, snatching a glimpse of vision—vision of great outsides, and powers, and movements, and know no end to your beginning. Come! thrust ye out and swing behind the stars, and force the bolts and bars still hindering you! . . . .

Flash flame from outer depth to hidden space, loosen the human soul engulfed in pettiness, and bear it forth beyond the region of the stars into the limitless. Thus sweep ye free from all the little ties of days, letting the passage of your years break down the hedgerows.

Come further as I call, and tear away those closely clinging bonds of petty selves holding you from the infinite. . . . I would have you snap all ties of earth, then turn around and clasp them to you. Give all you have. Empty your soul upon the spaces, and when the spaces shall be fed from that you fling upon them, the spaces fling themselves upon your soul, bringing its consummation.

The voices of the deep break on your ears, their music plays around you—listen and look, for dayspring breaks. . . . Look! look! and see the wondrous beauty breaking on your world, the tide of life uprushing with all its myriad eddies of becoming. Be not confused, but purposeful. Rise up, pass on your way ever with glad rejoicing—for power is nigh you; and this great power, if ye co-operate, brings you to freedom of the universe.

## (TWO SITTERS.)

. . . . Hampered the feet of those who seek to leap, who hold too much to measurement. Now measurement, as I did say before, is of your human mind a quality. It hinders and it helps, it binds and lifts, and all who grow the mind must ever seek to balance it.

It lifts from out the mire of human detail and bewilderment. It guides the steps to higher ground and clearer view than is the lot of crawlers on the surface of your world. Their eyes are turned upon the mud wherein they grope, seeking that treasure that shall not be found until the eyes turn upward.

The feet of those who serve the mind are planted on the hill of knowledge ; their eyes are raised beyond the slime of necessary corruption. It has its use, your slime of earth, and is not wholly harmful. All those who pass along the common way draw strength and substance from out the swamp through which they pass—reaching to heights beyond.

But mind can hold as well as loose, can bind as well as lift. It clouds the far horizon. It shapes the nearer things with swift precision, yet flings a veil before the far-off reaches of infinity.

Infinity and mind cannot agree, for one is boundless essence of the universal inrush, and the other is but form producing power to snatch the shadows from the universal radiance, and melt them into images.

Fare forth from mind knowing its uses, even as mind fares forth from slime, and knows it useful.

Taking your leap through space cast all you have behind you and naked hurl yourselves upon the stars. There ! robed in universal covering ye then shall stand,

part of that great company who sense the Lord of all with glowing vision of His great command who made your world to spin, and gives to all the worlds and manifested universes power to pronounce the words of His command in regulated movement. Free yet harmonious swing the words in space and form a mighty syllable.

Your human mind has not the power to see—noble and useful as it is—for limitless **beyonds** cannot be cut in lengths, or laid in rows and stacked in heaps to sit upon.

The touch of fire ye had from Him, your heritage and kinship, your core of life, alone can sense the thrills of His becoming.

Your mind may shape the shadows it is true, but never can it seize them; and so once more before I pass, this do I say: Cast all the shapened shadows that surround you far from your feet. Uplift your hands and eyes, knowing ye stand awaiting the great robing, and plunge!—plunge without fearful looking backward; forget—yet hold—and thus you find the centre.

No winding way is evolution's mighty force, though human minds translate it so. It is a gladsome penetrating thrill. The heart of Him who gives you birth is quickened, His mighty movements of extension are to the stuff within His grasp as age-long æons of transfiguration. Time bounds your universe setting the limits, duration is illimitable and fragmentary.<sup>1</sup> With contradictions must I speak. I try to penetrate your human mind making it sense conditions of the infinite. Seen from outside the movement is not slow, but mighty thrusts in space encompassing deliverance.

<sup>1</sup> A mental question was asked here by the silent sitter.

Light calls to light, and glow on glow succeeds until the great light-centre fades in brilliance into the mystery of its background.

Create the spaces in your souls, and as infinity sweeps in the outlook widens. . . . The give and take between the soul and mind are necessary ; therein lies balance, and the power to swing with problems from afar comes out of it. Content of mind and discontent of soul breed mighty purpose. The offspring of this union reaches to the outermost, and there contacts those children of the far-off gods who swing in splendour. The fire they give plays on your earth, it both consumes and vivifies ; and you who feel this touch know that your smallest things mount glorified, while many of the larger sink behind, counting for little. For many things you count as naught in our eyes show unending, while many things you count for much have no significance.

(ONE SITTER.)

Great breath uncoiling bends you back swinging in spirals. From far—though near—they come, the outer presences, lending their note to fill the tide of chant onswelling.

The rush may not be stayed of the great One's extension. He swings His arms in space, and all His gathered offspring share in the universal tide of confluent energy. Great moods are born within His mighty content, and in those moods the human atoms swing, and speeding on their way are brushed about with varying energy. . . .

Transplendent light irradiates the shadowed

mystery by which humanity ingathers to its core the lessons of existence. For coiling life while turning on itself is agonised. Itself it gives to suffer of itself, thus winning inner force of self-sufficiency. Viewed from within the winding wheels, shaping new powers to thrust creation's stars through space, shew anguish unendurable.

Only as man soars high, resting his gaze beyond the writhing coils of his becoming, may he go free.

Yet ever as an outside presence passes by, some mortal sees the movement of its feet, or feels a stir of living breath within his ear—thus labour's pangs are lightened. For only humans coil and are unwound; the radiant gods move straight upon their path of power.

H. F. L.

## THE METAPHYSICIAN.

THE last word written, and my life work's done !  
There lies my book in battered manuscript  
Written, rewritten, and blocked out again,  
Erased, and scored with many a second thought,  
Not always best, it seems, now I look back  
From the new blue, all wet, to the old black  
I penned a score of years ago, when thought  
Ran lava-like within a brain of fire. . . .  
Black! . . . Why, it seemed the pen wrote liquid gold,  
Authentic ore, panned out with tireless toil,  
Washed of all dross, the splendid increment  
Delved from the scaurs and caverns of the mind—  
Unworked, I thought, all virgin to my steel—  
A claim my youth staked out with princely pride !  
*In the Beginning.* Thus I christened it—  
And sought to solve Enigma once for all ! . . .  
Strange, how oppressed with doubt my being seems  
Now, at the very end and crown of all.  
How have I answered ?—thus my question beats  
Reiterate in monstrous monotone ;  
How have I answered all the clanging chime  
Of those immortal questions mortals ask,  
That jangle in uneven intervals,  
Rocking forlorn the belfries of the brain  
With such insistent clamour—answered—how—  
The hates and lusts, the cruelties and sins  
That manacled in hopeless memories  
Make horrible the haunted house of Time?  
(Built by what master-mason I have shown,  
Or tried to show, by looking on the past. . . .)  
The Past ! Why does the word encumber me,  
Who all my life have worn and thumb'd it so ?  
*In the Beginning.* Is the name a knell ?

I have begun to think it, and regret,  
A vast regret, assails me, who have looked so long  
Behind—so long . . . nor known at all whereto  
My soul had come ; as some sea-voyager  
Who with reverted head, at the ship stern  
Has ever gazed upon the coiling wake  
Slipping away into the misty curve  
Of the sea's rim ; oblivious of the prow  
Cutting a fresh wave every pulsing minute,  
Till, at the last, strange cries fall on his ears  
Of alien tongues in commerce loud and swift,  
Bereft for him of meaning ; and the masts  
And sails of foreign shipping take his eyes  
In some outlandish harbour : he, who thought  
Never at all of whither steered his ship,  
Never looked forward with a helmsman's eyes,  
But troubled his pent mind with self-imposed  
And empty riddles—why the twisted foam  
In its receding writhings took such shapes  
Of interwreathed and wild meanderings,  
Why swerved and bubbled in just such a way,  
And where was the beginning of it all—  
When all the while he might have seen ahead  
The sunlight dance upon divided spray  
On either side the prow, and heard the song  
Of *Forward*, where the keen blade carved a path,  
And seen at last low lying in the East,  
Like some leviathan asleep, the land,  
And sensed new odours borne across the sea. . . .  
A tragic gesture, surely, *looking back* ?  
Sorrow looks back for ever ; and her tears  
For ever welling from despondent eyes  
Fall on her languid limbs, and turn her all  
To pillared salt. I saw a statue once  
Of sorrow, and 'twas thus the sculptor carved  
The drooping woman. Downwards from her waist  
Her limbs were lifeless, crusted and creviced thick  
With brine from her own tears ; and often since  
I seemed to hear a voice as I wrote on,



Speaking in accents sorrowful and slow:  
*Ah, look not back, thou Orpheus of the soul,  
And make thy life a lost Eurydice.*  
But Joy stands ever with her hand at brow  
Shading her eyes prophetic, for the view  
Of seas unchristened, and uncharted peaks  
Marbled and veined in sundawn's mystic rose—  
Expectant ever, with her ears attuned  
To noise of hidden rivers and the winds  
In valleys, still unvisited and veiled  
In dawn-mists.

Well . . . my life's work's here to attest  
What merit I deserve. I should feel glad  
And light of heart—the words should live and burn  
Here in my bosom, not black on the page.  
And yet all golden seemed the writing once  
And now . . . mere black . . . even the wet has dried.  
But the world's words still glisten from God's pen  
Unfinished ever, ever liquid gold!  
Indeed I should be glad . . . and yet I feel  
As if all sorrow in the world of men  
Were frozen in this single heart of me,  
Winter incarnate, from all hearts distilled.  
And, of all things, what must I turn me to,  
But just the vision of a laughing boy,  
His jersey brilliant in vermillion,  
I saw to-day—his curls a golden flower  
Of sun-kissed life, and with a smile that breathed  
The attar of a thousand thousand springs:  
A thousand thousand Junes you would have seen  
Flame in the aspect of his azure eyes;  
And as I passed he laughed, and with that laugh  
Still ringing in my ears, I wrote THE END.

ERIC CLOUGH TAYLOR.

## HAUNTED.

*Where all life dies, death lives, and nature breeds,  
Perverse, all monstrous, all prodigious things,  
Abominable, unutterable, and worse  
Than poets yet have feigned, or fear conceived,  
Gorgons and Hydras, and Chimæras dire.*

MILTON.

THE place was haunted, haunted by the forms  
Of old obscene desires in foul decay,  
Spiritual corruption, food for ghostly worms,  
Festering, and poisoning all from day to day.

For here had dwelt a dark self-centred mind,  
Too weak to work the baseness of its thought ;  
But gloating on what vileness it could find,  
Which bolder powers of wickedness had wrought.

As to a wide cloaca foulness flows,  
And there collecting, tenfold foulness yields,  
Its killing poison lives, and breeds, and grows,  
Spreading miasma through the fairest fields,

So was this mind a pool of soul-born mire,  
Of elementals, births of evil dreams,  
Discarnate lusts, the bodies of men's desire,  
Which else had withered in the light's pure beams.

Till like tormenting ghouls from lowest hell,  
They turned upon their host, and seized his soul,  
Feeding upon their feeder, and the spell  
That bound the vile pollution lost control.

But long they stayed, and sought whereon to prey,  
More hungry in decay persisting still,  
Incubi, succubæ, by night and day  
Draining all effort, stifling heart and will.

Hopes, aspirations, sank and flickered down,  
As does a candle in a noisome well ;  
Kindness was chilled, or quenched, the lightest frown  
Burst into passion, friendships powerless fell.

And did those parasites find life and grow,  
Or work their own destruction, and dispart ?  
What is the end ?—Why shouldst thou seek to know ?  
Set thy own house in order : search thy heart.

E. J. THOMAS, M.A.

## DISCUSSION.

### THE 'COARSENESS' OF WHITMAN.

THE 'Appreciation of Walt Whitman' in the January number was of real interest. I must, however, admit that the article, on two crucial points, did not bring me any nearer to the views of the writer. These points are, first, the charge of 'coarseness' imputed to certain passages in his poetry, and, secondly, the claim which Whitman advanced for himself as the interpreter of a spirit in direct descent from that of Jesus, and intelligible as such to our modern world.

As I understand her, the writer conceives that the 'coarseness' of Whitman is sufficiently exculpated by the statement that he is merely coarse as Nature is; that what others seek to dissemble or suppress, though equally inherent in their 'cosmos,' "he recognises and accepts as part of himself . . . and by this childlike, unashamed frankness, without changing it, transmutes it to spirituality." Such a statement invites criticism on several grounds. What is the conception we have here of 'Nature'? In what respect does the writer here conceive human nature to be identical with it? Surely this plea evades the very gravamen of the charge?

Nature as such is not 'coarse,' in so far as the term implies ethical significance. The copulation of animals is a fact of function. No positive connexion between human beings can be thus apprehended. The cosmos of man is not a merely natural cosmos. It is a nexus of relations; self-conscious reason, a spiritual world, an ethical sense, each and all are contributory. To borrow a phrase from our great novelist, "Women have us back to the conditions of primitive man or they shoot us higher than the topmost star . . . they are to us what we hold of best and worst." We may mark the entire scale of that ascent under the sanction of the wedded union itself, and in the ethical quality of the fact to which we refer, as inevitably as in the case of any other. It may partake of the nature of a sacrament, or

become the desecration of a sanctuary; it may be the fruition of health and chastity or the self-immolation of licence. But whether within or beyond it the distinctions are equally vital and profound. It is claimed that to "full knowledge and consciousness nothing is common and unclean." I fail to follow. The very existence of a moral sense disposes of such a thesis. Even to the most logical materialist the perversion of human passion must at least appear as a disease. The 'unweeded garden' in Nature and human life stand on entirely different planes. When Thoreau and Emerson experienced and expressed a repulsion from this aspect of Whitman's poetry, it was not merely based, I imagine, on the conviction that it was incompatible in its form with great and self-respecting human art; they conceived further that it could only be regarded as an adequate transcription of human experience in so far as the human element is brought down to its lowest denomination. It is, as Coleridge remarked in a different connexion, 'a meeting of flies in the air.'

The coarseness of Whitman then does not consist in this, that he was of more elemental mould than countless men and women whose bodily temples are less predisposed to the extremes of erotic passion; it does not even consist in his tendency to view emancipation from 'fleshly delight,' by any means whatever, as a 'suppression' or rather a perversion of man's nature. It consists in this, that being a man of like passions with Othello or Iago, he as a poet deliberately in his own person identifies himself with an imaginative transcript of such passion, the frankness of which is that of Iago in this sense, at least, that it treats it as any other natural phenomenon, that it abstracts man as thus possessed from all civil limitations, all that essentially makes him individual man, and enables us to express an ethical judgment on the facts depicted. In the form he presents his visions he is wholly wedded to sense, and indifferent to spiritual significance.

That humanity has its root in organic life is a truism. But the love-passion, where it is human, is a growth, and its branches and flower find their sweetest sustenance in spirit itself. Grow enamoured of the root, tear it up, expose it to the photographic plate, this is without any question the noblest device yet conceived by means of which that 'topmost star' may be banished from the human horizon altogether.

I venture to illustrate yet further. The 20th Sonnet of Meredith's *Modern Love* thus begins, and it goes to the heart of this domestic drama:

"I am not of those miserable males  
Who sniff at vice, and daring not to snap,  
Do therefore hope for heaven. I take the hap  
Of all my deeds."

It concludes thus :

"If for that time I must ask charity,  
Have I not any charity to give?"

That Whitman faced the hap of his deeds with courage is admitted; he had likewise no mean share of charity to give. It is more doubtful, or rather it is clear, that he felt under no obligation to ask for it. It is surely no impertinent question to ask if he faced with a frankness comparable with that of our English poet the essence of such distinctions the latter draws between 'satanic power' and 'spiritual splendour,' or the nature of the gulf that yawns between 'eating a pot of honey on a grave,' and 'the ancient wealth wherewith we clothe our human nakedness'? Nay, did he ever come to any final conclusion with that annihilating judgment of Shakspeare, when he brands 'the expense of spirit in a waste of shame' with the one word that reproaches its ethical significance?

One passage at least in the 'Song of Myself,' to mention no other poems, is surely incompatible with an affirmative. How can we expect otherwise from an intellect which to the profound truism, 'while mind is mastering clay gross clay invades it,' can only retort with the plea that the grossness is an illusion, which would ignore the importunity of hogs and ruffians, and deem Shakspeare's notion of his 'sinful earth' a superstition? He exclaims:

"No guard can shut me off, no law prevent me."

Or again:

"I am neither modest or immodest."

The words of Browning will suffice us here:

"So much the less Shakspeare he."

I will attempt no definition of modesty beyond adventuring the opinion that you must either have it or not; that the question of its genesis is irrelevant to its present significance; that it partakes of the nature of the sublime itself and is the crown of wisdom no less than the flower of purity.

The supreme question for the individual is surely not so much whether we are able freely to consort with publicans and sinners, as the nature of the terms under which we so consort, and the quality of our charity as an influence exerted over them. The

supreme test of the poet on this question is surely, not so much whether in his own person or another's he has probed into the quick of rankness, but whether he has at the same time, with a truth yet more indelible, presented a mirror of the loveliness, grace, and austerity of virtue, by means of which we may fortify our ethical judgment on the characters or experience depicted. In this respect Whitman is as incomparably below the creator of *Othello* or *King Lear* as *Zola* is beneath *Balzac*. He is unashamed certainly. But where the childlike comes in I fail to see, except in so far as a child often mistakes the show for the substance, the pageant of life for its significance. His erotic poetry receives, it is true, as the comedy of *Aristophanes* receives, the virtue of a fine and robust intellectual quality. But he is not content to remain the votary of *Dionysus*. He claims brotherhood and something more with *Jesus*. The 'Appreciation' supports this view and offers in proof his 'Lines to a Prostitute.' In this purport I believe those lines to be an assignation, but assume in this case they are written in the spirit of that later resolution :

"I henceforth tread the world chaste, temperate."

Can it be denied that my interpretation is more in harmony with his essential notion of the sex-relation, or indeed civic and social obligation? He was a man of heart and genius, with no little measure of the 'large love which folds the multitude,' and it is no doubt possible to confuse his standpoint with the catholicity of toleration and spiritual sympathy, which in the noblest conception of it is the Ideal of the Christian religion, no less than that of the Masters of other religions. But the distinction between the two is profound and unbridgable. The higher life of such religions is based on an ethical evaluation of the facts of experience in their gradations of spiritual ascent throughout ; it issues finally in an entire elimination of the natural man and his desires, under the direction of the principle that to die is to live. The fundamental principle of Whitman is on the contrary a life after Nature, in which the holiness of the body is as sacrosanct as the soul, and not merely as its temple. He does not so much admire man because he is buffeted by conscience and doubt, as he does the trees and the cattle because they possess neither. He is inconsistent, and he grows increasingly so as he becomes older. He would be Adam imperturbable in the Garden. Or he would eat without stint of the Tree of Knowledge, remaining incurious as to God. And finally he professes to walk with God Himself. What is most strange of all, we have no admission of the change in

humility or otherwise. And the principle that alone unity to his poetry is Naturalism. It is hardly to contrast his most characteristic apostrophes with those of Jesus. They mark the antithesis at the extreme. 'Inflation and pride' is the human attitude Jesus marks. His democratic 'yawp,' "By God, I will accept," cannot have their counterpart of on the same terms. He cannot flatly such pronouncements as, "My kingdom is not of this world," and, "Many are called but few chosen." It contrasts that wise word of Emerson, "God shields men from their own ideas." His notion of individual liberty, inseparable from Anarchist principles, is diametrically opposed to the conservatism of Jesus.

I am not contending for the truth or relative truth of this view. The extreme assertion of individualism and its consequences may be of the greatest importance to modern life. It adds weight to the proof that the poet who in the poem that follows that entitled 'To Him that was Crucified' he asserts, "I do not sound your name, but I understand," records the fact:

"Lusts and wickedness are acceptable to me,  
I walk with delinquents with passionate love,  
I feel I am of them—I belong to those convicts and

Such a man laboured under the profoundest need, not merely of the personal ascendancy of Jesus, but of Christian love itself.

And here my contribution closes. It is expressed in two points only touched upon by this 'Appreciation.' I accept Whitman as an 'Orson of the Muse' (Sonnet presumably refers to him). We are there as the Muse will hearken, when he blows of Earth and Man with graver ear than many of her train can waken." I concur, while remaining convinced that there is no security in securing scant approval either from Muses or Graces.

F. P.



## REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

### LIFE'S BASIS AND LIFE'S IDEAL.

The Fundamentals of a New Philosophy of Life. By Rudolf Eucken, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Jena. Translated, with an Introductory Note, by Alban G. Widgery. London (Black).

It is chiefly owing to the enthusiasm of Prof. Boyce Gibson that Eucken's philosophy has hitherto been made accessible to English readers, both by translations and articles;<sup>1</sup> we have now before us a careful version of the German philosopher's important *Grundlinien einer neuen Lebensanschauung*, under a new English title, by Mr. Widgery, a former scholar of St. Catherine's College, Cambridge, and a member of the University of Jena. It cannot be said that in this volume the style of Eucken does justice to the immense enthusiasm and vitality of the new idealistic and spiritual philosophy of Activism; in spite of his lofty subject and in spite of his intense conviction in the reality of the spiritual life, Eucken is somewhat a heavy writer, all the more so as the present volume is entirely lacking in examples and illustrations to relieve the continual strain of the attention on general propositions and judgments.

That we are in need of a really satisfactory philosophy of life is patent on all sides, for never has there been "so much uncertainty with regard to what should be the main direction of endeavour, and the meaning of all human existence and man's relation to the universe, as in the present" (p. 94). The present situation, with its juxtaposition of the old and new systems of life, is so full of confusion and perplexity that it has become intolerable; only a feeble disposition is capable of acquiescing in it. Eucken describes this situation as follows: "In the old we suspect or surmise a depth; but this depth does not know how to give itself

<sup>1</sup> See, for instance, 'The Philosophy of Rudolf Eucken,' in *THE QUEST*, vol. i., no. 2, Jan. 1910.

a form suitable to the present, or to influence us available in our own time. The new directs all the immediate present and fills us with its intuition. The present becomes superficial to us, and with increasing desire for more substance and soul in life rises up against it. The old lifted us to the proud height of a new height showed signs of becoming severed from the real and lapsed therefore into a state of painful insecurity. It builds up from the experience of sense, but it finds itself without fleeing beyond this experience and thus betrays itself. The old regarded the spiritual life of man as occupying the centre of all and thereby in danger of a hastened conclusion and of an anthropomorphism of reality. The new takes from man every position he is especially distinguished, and ignores all cosmic ultimate depths, but in so doing it overthrows what it intends; it undermines nothing less than the possibility of spiritual work, all science, all culture" (pp. 86, 87).

Modern life in spite of its apparent fulness is a "Since the desire and the conflict for more generate a considerable amount of excitement and passion, life seems content whereas in reality it is entirely lacking in content, and the tumult is felt to be empty. But man has no intention of all claim to a share in genuine spirituality; and so he seeks a better outward appearance to his endeavour and his spiritual life practises deceit upon himself as well as upon others. It is just at the point where man becomes proud of his spiritual life and makes such ostentatious display that he can least of all feel the inner emptiness and the foolishness of his way of life" (pp. 161, 162).

We want a new philosophy of life as a whole, as a consciousness of itself (p. 156). Life is fundamentally spiritual; it is only by relation to life as self-conscious that we can find its meaning and value. The spiritual life transcends the physical; for all psychical functions come under the antithesis of subject and object (p. 148). "Life in the individual must be deeper than the immediate psychical life: for psychical life must itself produce and make clear that which occurs in the reason at least, that it involves the antithesis of individual and environment, of subject and object, beyond which spiritual life results. The spiritual impulse that the immediate life manifests can be based only upon deeper realities and

prehensive relations" (p. 242). The spiritual life is reality. "From the beginning man, so far as he shares in the spiritual life, is not a being adjacent to reality, but within it. He would never be able to attain to a reality if he did not bear it within himself and needed only to develop it" (p. 223). It is in man alone that life develops personality. "The positive impulse of self-preservation is indispensable to complete vital-energy, but mere self-assertion on the part of an individual in opposition to others does not constitute a genuine self; a genuine self is constituted only by the coming to life of the infinite spiritual world in an independent concentration in the individual. . . . From the stage of law there must be a progress to the stage of love, which for the first time reveals an inner relation to reality and reacts upon the stage of law, giving it a soul" (pp. 186, 187). Thus "we men are by no means personalities from the beginning; but we bear within us simply the potentiality of becoming a personality; whether we shall realise our personality is decided by our own work; it depends primarily upon the extent to which we succeed in striving beyond the given existence to a state of self-determining activity" (p. 310). But what is this in man that strives and works, if it is not already the spiritual life in him? Eucken is for ever preaching the gospel of work and striving; the spiritual life does not happen in man, he must strive to bring it into activity. It is the old old problem of grace and works. Eucken is continually talking of problems and tasks, but this seems to contradict the doctrine of spiritual spontaneity. As, for instance, when in writing about the 'nature of freedom' he says: "The rousing of a new world to life within man is a problem and a task: it cannot be effected unless the spontaneity and self-determining activity that are distinctive of this world also manifest themselves within him. Further, it cannot be effected unless within man, who with the greater part of his being belongs primarily to nature, a deliverance from nature is accomplished and the centre of life is removed to its spiritual side; and this cannot happen without the co-operation of man. We need freedom, therefore, in two senses: as the presence of an independent inner life, and as man's capacity to change—and we cannot fail to recognise that these are closely related" (p. 174).

It is thus evident that we want both a new metaphysic and a new mysticism. For in the first place, as Bergson also contends, "the business of metaphysics . . . is not to add something in thought to a reality that lies before us, or to weave such a reality

## THE QUEST

into a texture of conceptions ; but to seek to grasp reality in itself, and to rouse it to life in its entire depth for ourselves " (p. 142).

As to the spiritual individual or personality, Eucken reckons it at the highest value. "The individual can never be reduced to the position of a mere member of society ; of a church, of a state ; notwithstanding all external subordination he must assert an inner superiority ; each spiritual individual is more than the whole external world. But as the individual does not derive his superiority from himself, nor from a natural particularity and peculiarity in distinction from others, but only from the presence of a spiritual world, so he is securely guarded from all vain self-assurance and the arrogance of the idea of the Superman, which grotesquely distorts the great fact of the revelation of a universal life at individual points " (p. 246).

What then is the nature of the new mysticism which many are trying in diverse ways to adumbrate ? Here is Eucken's contribution to the subject. "The desire for the presence of the infinite at the individual point may be characterised as an approximation to mysticism. Indeed, we need both a metaphysic and a mysticism ; but we want both in a new form, not in the old. It seems to us preposterous to declare that necessary demands of the spiritual life are finally disposed of, because the older solution has become inadequate. If man does not in some way succeed in appropriating the spiritual life, if it is not actively present as a whole within him and animating him, then his relation to the spiritual life remains for ever an external one ; and thus life cannot acquire a complete spontaneity in him, can never become a genuine life of his own. But the older mysticism was the offspring of a worn-out age, which primarily reflected upon quietness and peace, and was under the influence of a philosophy that sought the truth in striving towards the most comprehensive universal, and saw in all particularity a defect (*omnis determinatio negatio*). And so, to be completely merged in the formless infinite could be regarded as the culmination of life." This, in our opinion, is only partly true of the mysticism of the past, Western or Eastern ; it is the common view, but it is not generally true. Many of the mystics could combine and embrace and transcend the opposites as skilfully as Eucken himself. But to continue. "As the spiritual life is to us, on the contrary, an increasing activity and creation, a world of self-determining activity, so its being called to life at individual points is a rousing of life to its highest energy ; and also, a continual appropriation is necessary.

Further, the movement of the spiritual life does not appear to us as an advance from particular to universal, but as one from differentiation to the living whole; from the indefiniteness of the beginnings to complete organisation and distinctive form." But what do we know about 'beginnings,' least of all of spiritual beginnings? "The inwardness that we advocate is not a feeble echo and a yearning for dissolution,"—it never has been this to any genuine mystic, we should have thought; there is not much feebleness about the mystic death and rebirth—"but is of an active and masculine nature, and rests on ceaseless self-determining activity. One may or may not call this mysticism; in any case mysticism of such a kind cannot be charged with that which now appears to us to be defect or error in the older form" (p. 247).

But if the centre of life has to be removed into the invisible world of self-determining activity, seeing that it is in this invisible world that life first attains to self-consciousness and becomes a complete reality, it is evident that for the increased spiritualisation of human life we require a new presentation of this invisible world, that shall take into account the visible as now known to us. "For its own establishment the nature of the invisible must borrow means of expression from the visible, which now governs human presentation; must transform and refine them for its aims; prepare out of them an impressive presentation of the whole. Along with the energy of turning to the spiritual life a creative imagination is required, through which the invisible may become equal to holding its own against the visible" (p. 239).

What then is the fundamental characteristic of the spiritual life which Eucken invokes, and we think rightly invokes, to help us out of the ever increasing perplexities of modern culture? We have marked a number of passages, but the most salient of them seems to be the following:

"The taking up of the object into the life-process, the transcendence of the antithesis of subject and object, is characteristic of the spiritual life. But this remained an inner contradiction, a complete impossibility, so long as the spiritual life was regarded as an occurrence in a being who, with a closed nature, stands over against things, as though they were alien; and who can take up nothing into himself without accommodating it to his own particular nature. The contradiction is removed only when the spiritual becomes independent; for then both sides of the antithesis come to belong to each other and are related to each other in a single life; and a life transcending the division may develop,



a life that produces the antithesis from with different sides and seeks in them its own perfect process is now seen to be a movement that is not to subject, nor from subject to object; neither the movement of content from the object, nor the object controlled by the subject, but as an advance of a self in and through the antithesis. Life, by this movement to be a single, thin thread; it wins breadth; it gains inner universality. At the same time a depth is reached that a persistent and comprehensive activity emerges in the antithesis. In this manner life first becomes spiritual sense, a self-conscious and self-determining self-consciousness" (p. 146).

To intellectuals doubtless this passage will reverberate, but those who have had a touch of spiritual life will understand what Eucken is endeavouring to say. It is not however new; it is the ancient doctrine of the ancients. Neither is Eucken's insistence upon 'activism' so new as it may seem; Plotinus, for instance, is never weary of insisting upon it without perpetual activity thought and being would be impossible. But Eucken is so insistent upon 'activism' in the sense that he makes everything appear a task. He does not bring out the joy and spontaneity and creativeness of spiritual life. He refers to it, it is true, but he is fond of work, striving, tasks. "The basis of true life is continually won anew," he declares in his 'prolegomena to Activism'. "Only through ceaseless activity can we reach the height to which it has attained." Yet "absolute release from the given world is an absurdity; but it is attainable only through the living presence of a self-determining activity; the power of such a world can arouse the individual to self-determining activity."

Finally as to Eucken's view of religion,—he holds that Christianity is far superior to the other religions because it has evolved the life-process to a higher stage; it is more sufficient. The Christian type does not suffice for the life as a whole. "Most severe complications would be the position of Christianity were taken up as an ultimate and an absolute evaluation in the conditions which actually exist, and its principles without any further consideration applied to our life as a whole. The annulling of the even of spiritual capacity; the displacement of j

pity; the cessation of the conflict against evil [!]; the low estimate of man's own power, would all endanger most severely the rational character of life; an adoption of this type of life in its entirety would lead to the discontinuance of the work of culture; in particular, it is inconsistent with any kind of political organisation. Finite conditions are not to be judged by infinite standards; and we men are, after all, in the finite and remain so." From the earliest times since Christianity became dominant compromises have been sought between these two types of life. "But as such compromises do not fully and truly express spiritual necessity, they easily lead to falsity. To rise above this tendency to make such compromises, the acknowledgment of the right and of the limits of each type, the acknowledgment of the necessity of both within a comprehensive whole, is necessary. Such a whole and along with it a common ground, upon which the movements meet together, and can strive to understand one another, is given to us by the spiritual life, acknowledged in its independence" (p. 285.)

The above series of quotations will give the reader some idea of the direction in which Eucken's endeavour to present us with the fundamentals of a new view of life, leads. Spiritual life embracing and ordering the whole of human endeavour is indubitably the consummation devoutly to be wished, and every attempt to bring the conviction of this reality home to us deserves the heartiest thanks of all who are seeking to become truly self-conscious.

#### ASPECTS OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF AND PRACTICE IN BABYLONIA AND ASSYRIA.

By Morris Jastrow, Jr., Ph.D., Professor of Semitic Languages in the University of Pennsylvania. With 54 Illustrations and a Map. New York and London (Putnam). Price 9s. net.

WITHIN the last decade the study of the history of Babylonian and Assyrian culture has made rapid progress. Prof. Morris Jastrow, Jr., is not only intimately familiar with the work that has been done, but has himself taken no small part in the labour. The outcome is that in this in many ways instructive volume he presents us with a well-written, clear, and very objective summary of the present state of our knowledge of the facts, together with his own appreciation of them in respect to the general history of

**PAGE NOT  
AVAILABLE**



on to the Middle Ages and to our own days. He classes it with hepatoscopy or liver-divining, the most ancient and chief form of 'inspection' known to the Babylonians and their neighbours, of which he gives an excellent description. But though so much space is devoted to the different forms of divination, it is supposed that it all rested on pure rule-of-thumb objectivism. Indeed throughout the whole of the book there is no sign that Professor Jastrow has ever considered the possibility that, as in all primitive culture and in all ancient forms of developed religion as well, psychism played a not inconsiderable part. But because we have, fortunately for history, preserved for us comprehensive and extensive series of omen-lists, it is supposed that the 'inspectors' were nothing but careful scrutinisers of physical objects, with elaborate code-books or cylinders at their back containing a record of all the precedents. We fancy ourselves that there was also another side to the subject, and that the Euphratean priesthoods did not differ in this respect from other ancient priestly schools. It is quite impossible to believe that Babylonian 'wisdom' would have had so high a reputation among the Greeks if it had been nothing but the very poor thing that Professor Jastrow makes it out to be. Indeed, as far as the ancient culture is concerned, in reading the interpretation of the records of the monuments as given us by Professor Jastrow, one is well-nigh appalled at the gross materialism of the cult, at the terrifying nature of much of the belief in the unseen powers, and chiefly at the soul-numbing view of the state of the dead, which is almost more hopeless than the Sheol of the early Hebrews. It is hardly believable that under such a burden of devastating and desolating belief any high civilisation could have flourished, and yet we find that it did flourish, and that many things were comparatively admirable. We therefore venture to think that perhaps further research may tend to modify some of the hard and horrible outlines of the picture of this ancient culture which Professor Jastrow has tried to reconstruct from the rich *débris* of by-gone days. These ancient religions jealously preserved the past; the crudest myths and most barbarous legends were still retained in days when culture had long left them behind; the forms remained but the meaning was changed, and everything was interpreted in a higher sense. This must also have been the case in the development of Babylonian culture; but we do not find much to help us to a view of the subtler side of the cult in Professor Jastrow's exceedingly objective volume.

**PAGE NOT  
AVAILABLE**

that he attempted to introduce a new state-cult for the empire. His chief object appears to have been to establish the worship of El-Gabal, or Elah-Gabal, the Syrian Sun-god, whose chief shrine was at Emesa, of which his ancestors had been hereditary hierophants and of which he himself had become the 'Invincible High Priest.' The public cult was one of great splendour and of elaborate sacrifices, in which the boy emperor revelled as the representative of the god. We were in hope that Mr. Hay's researches would throw some light on the history and details of this phase of Syrian monotheism, which in some respects paralleled the ritual of the Yahveh-worship with its elaborate sacrifices; but there seems to be little that can be learned about it. We can hardly believe that there was no inner side to the cult, as Mr. Hay declares. At this time in the empire (apart from Christianity) several forms of Oriental religion were competing for popular favour, such as the worship of Mithra and of Isis, both of which had elaborate mysteries. The El-Gabal cult must have had a side to it, besides the splendour of the outer ritual, that powerfully excited the sensuous devotion of the boy priest, whose chief aim was to bring all other religions of the empire under the aegis of his god. He built a magnificent Eliogabalium, and had the sacred fire and the most sacred relics of the Roman state transferred to it. The astonishing thing is that this should not have aroused from the beginning the very fiercest opposition; but men were either cowed or supine or indifferent; in any case there is no mention of persecution of those of other faiths. It would seem that one of the dominant characteristics of this strange boy was a desire to give people a 'good time'; the cult of El-Gabal was to be a cult of joy. But if we ask what could a boy of this nature, or any boy even of a far more disciplined character, know of government, much more shall we ask what could he possibly know of religion? The fates of nations and empires are in the hands of Providence, and we take it that they get the rulers they deserve; and if so we shall have to admit that in the case of the amazing Heliogabalus the empire was visited with a manifestation of what the Muslim would call the Divine Wrath and not of the Divine Beauty. The marvel is that with the long list of so many incompetent and vicious rulers with which fate provided it, the Empire was not disintegrated long before its final downfall. There must, then, have been virtue in the masses in spite of the corruption of the classes, and history is at last beginning to seek for signs of this no longer exclusively within the ranks of the

Christians; there were many phases of person throughout the empire and we are beginning at the immense influence of some of them on life among these we can hardly reckon the cult of E

THE TARJUMÁN AL-ASHWÁQ.

A Collection of Mystical Odes by Muḥyi'ddīn ibn from three MSS. with a Literal Version of Abridged Translation of the Author's Com By Reynold A. Nicholson, M.A., Litt.D., L in the University of Cambridge. Ori Fund. New Series. Vol. xx. London Society). Price 7s. 6d.

THE poems of the *Tarjumán al-Ashwáq*, or *Inter* constitute one of the smaller collections of Arabi 'Arabí, who is generally considered to be the m Muslim mystics. It was finished in January, 12 preface the poet specifically declared that these l erotic quatrains but referred to mystical scienc As, however, this was doubted by some, he months after its appearance, to write an ela commentary, in which he utilised his profound Şúfí traditions and systematised mystical lore, a his own immediate spiritual experience, to thro would otherwise have remained an insolubly c It is well-known that the battle over the meani of Şúfí poets, both Arabian and Persian, ha furiously. Was their eroticism natural or a earthly and sensual or the veil of the heavenly a the case of Ibn al-'Arabí we have one of the Şúfí M own defence; we have, in one and the same persc and philosopher and scholar of things spiritu meaning and value of his own utterances in the poesy. It is a rare case, and one of the most mystical interpretations of the scriptures or apologetic allegorism we had had enough and f any writing can be wrested to a mystical meanin for instance, the most illuminating 'esoteric' 'Old Mother Hubbard,' 'Hi Diddle Diddle' and Sixpence,' which have deceived those who thought

very elect. But in Ibn al-'Arabī's autograph commentary on his own *Tarjūmān al-Ashwāq* we have an intensely instructive analysis of the 'stations' and 'states' figuratively and symbolically set forth in his inspired verses. The most interesting fact of all is that Ibn al-'Arabī admits himself "that in some passages of his poems the mystical import was not clear to himself, and that various explanations were suggested to him in moments of ecstasy." It is true that both the poems and the commentary will be 'caviar to the general'; they belong to the rarer atmosphere of genuine spiritual mysticism; but anyone who has read with care and intelligence, for instance, Dr. Nicholson's admirable version of al-Hujwiri's *Revelation of the Mystery* (*Kashf al-Mahjūb*), the oldest Persian treatise on Ṣūfism (11th century),<sup>1</sup> will be able to approach the study of Ibn al-'Arabī's commentary with some measure of understanding and spiritual profit. Though we should have appreciated further notes and comments by Dr. Nicholson himself, who is so admirably fitted to help us in this respect, we owe him a new debt of gratitude in making these odes and commentary accessible for the first time in modern dress. In conclusion a few points of the many that might be dwelt on, may be indicated. With reference to the technical term *fanā*, which most translators render misunderstandingly as 'annihilation,' but which Nicholson prefers to express by 'passing away,' Ibn al-'Arabī comments: "When the lofty thoughts ascend to their goal I remain in the state of passing away from passing away, for I have gained *the life imperishable which is not followed by any opposite*." Again, as to the illusions and fascinations of the intermediate world of vision, the mystical philosopher writes: "When those phantoms [of the Divine Ideas, in the intermediate world] are afraid that their absoluteness will be limited by their confinement in forms, they cause thee to perceive that they are a veil which hides something more subtle than what thou seest, and conceal themselves from thee and quit these forms and once more enjoy infinite freedom." Or again: "When the lover passes away from his own desire, every evil becomes good to him, because it is the will and desire of his Beloved [*i.e.* God]." The true mystic is free of the forms of all faiths: "My heart has become capable of every form: it is a pasture for gazelles [*i.e.* objects of his spiritual love] and a convent for Christian monks, and a temple for idols and the pilgrim's Ka'aba and the tables of the Torah [Jewish Law]

<sup>1</sup> For a review of this important work, see *THE QUEST*, Oct., 1911, pp. 165-174.



and the book of the Koran. I follow the religion  
 way Love's camels [actions, aspirations, facul  
 my religion and my faith." And again: "All st  
 of different religions and sects is about the  
 salvation, not about salvation itself. If any  
 was taking the wrong way, he would not persev  
 There are two interesting references to the 'ra  
 the 'river of Jesus' is glossed as the 'ample kno  
 in Jesus.' Finally there are eight references  
 Qutb, the Pivot or Axis of the Muslim hierarchy  
 one of these passages we might almost venture  
 Ibn al-'Arabi himself was the Qutb of the tir  
 reads: "O sons of az-Zawrá, this is a moon that  
 you and set in me." On this verse the poet hi  
 "Az-Zawrá is a name of Baghdád, which is the  
 Qutb in the visible world. The author refers to  
 the presence of the Qutb and under his ægis. 'A  
 an essential manifestation which appeared among  
 existence of the Qutb, and vanished in me, i.e.  
 being and mystery. He makes himself to be one of  
 In verse 32, moreover, immediately above, Ibn  
 "My heart is the Sámiri of the time." This nam  
 commented on. Enough has now been said  
 recommend itself to serious lovers of compa  
 without any further commendation on our part.

#### THE FLIGHT OF THE DRAGON.

An **E**ssay on the Theory and Practice of Art in  
 based on original Sources. By Laurence E  
 of the East Series. London (Murray). P

THOSE who read Mr. Binyon's article, 'Some Ph  
 Art in Eastern Asia,' in the July number of T  
 will need no commendation of this fascinatin  
 they will already know that they will have a delig  
 lead them round the inexhaustible art-gallery  
 It is a striking sign of the times that at this l  
 artists and scholars of art are beginning to st  
 æsthetics, and we doubt not that nothing but  
 come out of it. For just as in language and rel

well said that he who knows one language or one religion only, knows no religion or language, so also we may say of those who are stuck in one tradition of art and are blind to any other form of æsthetics, that they are ignorant of the root of the matter. Mr. Binyon has not only the catholic artistic sympathy that enables him to place himself *en rapport* with the Eastern love of beauty, but also a skilful pen and fair diction with which to express his appreciations. True art is not the mere imitation of nature, as the Aristotelian dogma has laid it down, to the lasting detriment of European art; the secret of inspired art is the spontaneous response to rhythmic vitality or spiritual rhythm and the power to give this expression; or, as Mr. Okakura renders the first of the six Chinese canons or tests of painting, it is the expression of "the life-movement of the spirit through the rhythm of things," or, as Mr. Binyon suggests, "the fusion of the rhythm of the spirit with the movement of living things." This is where true beauty comes in, and we may add that the 'astralism' of the 'Futurists,' though psychologically interesting, is for the most part as yet far from the realisation of beauty. The great achievement of the Chinese and Japanese artists is "to fuse the spiritual with the material"; they do not, as the Indian artists generally do, leave the spiritual to be indirectly inferred, nor are they, like the Persians, absorbed in expressing sensuous delight. Mr. Binyon is right when he finds the key that opens the secret of beauty in rhythm. Though we may not be able precisely to define the idea that the word 'rhythm' evokes, we know that "when the rhythm is found we feel that we are put in touch with life, not only our own life, but the life of the whole world. It is as if we moved to a music which set the stars in motion." This predominant desire to attain rhythmical vitality is characteristic of the art of the Far East; witness the charming story of the boy Sesstiu "tied up to a post in the temple, where he served, for some act of disobedience, and drawing with his toes in the dust mice so animated that they took life, and, gnawing at the cords which bound him, set him free." We could dwell on page after page of this delightful book, but have space for only two reflections. In the first place it is very remarkable that the pure Taoism of Lao Tzū, Lieh Tzū and Chwang Tzū, which on the one side degenerated into the absurdities of popular magic, was the main inspiration of Chinese art. The chief end of Taoism was to live *en rapport* with the life-beat of the universe, to express the natural movement of the soul of things. This expression of the soul of nature in external act, which was effected



by suppressing the activity of the individual (*wu wei* or inaction so-called), and so allowing spirit to energise immediately through the naturally passed over into art, and lay a artistic inspiration. It was of course only been duly trained and high technique acquire could find full expression. The second and which Mr. Binyon has chosen for his essay. the Dragon'? Mr. Binyon writes: "The with the wind which bloweth where it listeth mist that melt away in rain, and are drawn this sovereign energy of the soul, fluid changing, took form in the symbolic Dragon.' that the dragon in the Far East symbolises becoming, but it is rhythmical motion rather and simple. Why do the Taoists speak of power? Is the figure peculiar to China? Is the dragon in China is the serpent in dragon-power of the North is the serpent-power serpentine sinuosity, the coiling of the life-force is called *kunḍalinī shakti*, the serpentine power coil. But it is not confined to the East, where everywhere, and most conspicuously in the plural, breathing on the world-sphere or on the little body of man. As we come to 'Chaldæa,' and in the Orphic ophiomorph Phanēs, the Autozoon, the Aion, taken over as Chronos Zervan, Boundless Time and Space Caduceus of Hermes and elsewhere, and in the serpent-glyph of the pre-Christian and Christian. Just as Nāga, or Serpent, in India stood for or consciously alive in him, so among the Ophites the Serpent of wisdom; hence the saying: 'Serpents.' And so also in art; the dragon-power truly creative work, for the power is creative procreative below. But enough on the subject. Mr. Binyon is not responsible for this gloss, power and of its office in the creation of work, essay 'On the Theory and Practice of Art in a valuable piece of work, and deserves the attention of students of art.



WILLIAM JAMES.

By Émile Boutroux, Membre de l'Institut. Translated from the 2nd Edition by Archibald and Barbara Henderson. London (Longmans), pp. vi. + 114. Price 3s. 6d. net.

IT has been said that nothing is intelligibly explained to Europe until it has been explained by France. This excellent little treatise is another example of the extraordinary expository power of the French intellect. Beginning with a short sketch of William James' life, the author gives separate chapters dealing with Psychology, Religious Psychology, Pragmatism, Metaphysics and Pedagogy, as taught by the American philosopher. The scope of Rational Empiricism is far too wide to be dealt with in a review of this kind; but the abiding light of the whole is the fundamental and pivotal fact that Experience, whether physical, psychical or religious, is identical with Reality. This is the clue to all James' line of thought, and the attacks upon his philosophy, especially upon his Pragmatism, are based on an inadequate conception of what we mean by experience. Most objectors seem to confine experience to the lowest forms of sensationism, and it is one of the most admirable qualities of this book to present the reader with a more living and lively idea of what experience is. It is almost incredible with what apparent incapacity to understand James some of his critics set out, shortly after his death, to show that his philosophy offered no scope for high ideals, and to reduce pragmatism to mere philosophical opportunism; and it was an amusing example of what he himself called intellectual Old Fogeyism. We are now so saturated with dynamic philosophy that we are apt to forget that James suffered, as all pioneers must, in clearing away and destroying those iron bands of academic formalism and abstract conceptualism that had eaten into the Tree of Philosophy, and in claiming for subliminal experience an inherent and lasting value in metaphysics. Both Bergson and he, though working from different points of view, meet in their treatment of Consciousness; and the new analysis has received fresh waters from the recent translations of Pāli philosophy. Indeed the continual flux theory will no doubt form the base of any future text-books on psychology. But the real importance of this work is to make one realise that James had no use for any philosophy which was not applied. He applied his own most rigorously; and there is an illuminating review of his Pedagogy. Starting in the

first stage on mechanical lines, treating the body as an automaton, he desired to get ingrained certain motor habits in order to develop later the psychic functions. The motor habits were to be *determined* only in order to procure that *indetermination* in ideas, i.e. the psychic plane, which we have been taught is the great function of human consciousness. In just such a way does technique enable the artist to express; as technique is the fulcrum by which the artist can lift the world of ideas, so are these ordered motor habits merely the centre from which infinite displays of activity can be induced. Train the physiological mechanism, and you have an extremely subtle and flexible collection of channels for new concepts. This being the second, the third stage is to inculcate the knowledge of and sympathy with *other consciousnesses*. As all know, the idea of a reservoir of mind, a communal consciousness, was one James had dearly at heart, and he considered that hitherto our 'blind spot' prevented us from understanding how enormously pregnant with possibilities such a sympathy with other minds would be.

The English translation is excellent, and we are left with a fresher and stronger belief in a most human teacher, a loveable personality and a man of most excellent wisdom.

E. C. T.

#### THE MAN IN THE PANTHER'S SKIN.

▲ Romantic Epic by Shot'ha Rust'haveli. A close Rendering from the Georgian attempted by Marjory Scott Wardrop. Oriental Translation Fund. New Series. Vol. xxi. London (Royal Asiatic Society). Price 10s.

THIS is the first translation into English, and the second into any European language (the first being into German),<sup>1</sup> of the national Georgian epic, *Vep'khvis Tqaosanis* or *The Panther-clad Knight*, written by Shota Rustaveli in the reign of the famous King-Queen Tamara (1184-1212), the golden age of Georgia, when it reached the height of its military prowess, and its greatest development in the sciences and arts and of its native literature, which up to that time had been under the strong influence of the Persians, Arabs and Greeks. Rustaveli was the greatest Georgian poet of the 12th

<sup>1</sup> Arthur Leist, *Der Mann in der Tigerfelle*, Dresden and Leipzig, n.d. [1891]. The translation is in verse; the introduction is useless and there are no notes.

century, and indeed the greatest of all Georgian singers. His poem is the pride of Georgian literature. The depth of his thoughts, the fervour of his feelings, the correctness of his style and expressions, place him above all the writers of his country, and have won for him the title of the Georgian Dante.<sup>1</sup> This famous poem is the 'household word' of Georgia, and we owe a debt of gratitude to the late sad-lived translator<sup>2</sup> for this excellent literal version of a difficult literary masterpiece. The anonymous preface to this posthumous work is useful,<sup>3</sup> as is also the bibliography at the end; but the notes, other than philological and textual, leave the poem without a commentary, the very thing that it most cries out for. In our opinion, the poem is of far greater interest than appears at first sight; it may be regarded not only from the point of view of Georgian history and culture, but also as a valuable document for the comparative study of the history of the literature of 'chivalric love.' In it we have ample evidence of the striking similarity of the eastern horn of the crescent of chivalry to the western horn. It is a subject that deserves the closest attention of the historians of mediæval culture in the east as well as in the west. Though Georgia boasts of its Christianity, it is, as it always has been, permeated with non-Christian elements of many kinds, from the earliest centuries of our era to the present day, as may be seen from the two extraordinarily interesting articles of Prof. J. Javakhishvili recently published in our pages.<sup>4</sup> In this brief notice we have no space to venture suggestions that even a reviewer who is utterly ignorant of the Georgian language, might hazard on a very large number of points of historic and cultural interest. One point only may be touched upon. The names of the heroes are Persian; and in spite of an allusion to Easter eve and icon (that may be, like much else, classed among the many glosses and additions), and some Biblical names and echoes of Scripture phrases, that may very well come from Korānic sources, there is no reference to any characteristic Christian dogma or to

<sup>1</sup> Michel Tamarati, *L'Église géorgienne des Origines jusqu' à nos Jours* (Rome, 1910), pp. 73 and 75.

<sup>2</sup> The authoress of *Georgian Folktales* (1894), *The Hermit* (1895), and *Life of St. Nino* (1900).

<sup>3</sup> Note 1 on p. ix. contains an erroneous reference, '*Journal of Bib. Lit.* (Boston), 1894'; but we have not been able to correct it.

<sup>4</sup> See 'The Folk-tales and Ancient Pagan Religion of the Georgians' in the Jan. no., and 'St. George the Moon-god,' in the April no., both translated by M. Michel Tsereteli, who also read critically the whole of Miss Wardrop's MS.

Christ. The mosque, the Korān, are frequently mentioned as the sacred place and sacred scripture; the theology is distinctly Muhamedan, and that too of a distinctly mystical tinge. In brief, the Muslim influence is paramount. And this accounts for the statement in the preface that "at various times, down to the eighteenth century, the orthodox clergy destroyed manuscripts of the poem, and the *editio princeps* of 1712 could only appear because its royal editor [King Vakhtang VI.] appended to it a pious mystical commentary."

This strong Muslim influence is an element of prime importance in any attempt to estimate the origin and development of 'chivalric love' in the Georgia of the 12th century, the country of that extraordinarily interesting nation which was the battle-field for so many centuries between 'East' and 'West.' A review of this valuable document would require the space of an article, for which, however, we have unfortunately no space; we can only draw the attention of scholars of chivalry and its literature to a line of research that has not yet been pursued. *The Man in the Leopard's Skin*, the Dionysian, will have to be reckoned with in future, though neither the translator nor the preface-writer has touched on the point which we have ventured to emphasise.

#### STUDIES IN JACOB BÖHME.

By A. J. Penny. London (Watkins). Price 6s. net.

AT first we were somewhat inclined to think that Mr. C. J. Barker was ill-advised to break, with the present collection of studies, the sequence of his courageous attempt to republish the English versions of Böhme's *Opera Omnia*. It seemed as though every penny should be expended on Böhme himself; the text first, the commentaries afterwards. On reviewing, however, our acquaintance with Mrs. Penny's numerous studies in Böhme, which appeared at frequent intervals between 1886 and 1892, in short-lived mystical periodical *Light and Life*, and the old-established Spiritualist organ *Light*, we find that, on the whole, there is so little of Mrs. Penny's own speculations and such a wealth of well-chosen quotations from the works of the seer of Görlitz, woven together with the understanding won by thirty years of unremitting study of the obscure original texts and translations, that Mrs. Penny may be said to reflect Böhme as faithfully as any commentator with whom we are acquainted. It follows, there-

fore, that those who have wrestled with the reprints in the three fat volumes of translations which Mr. Barker has given us, will do well to procure Mrs. Penny's *Studies* and so furnish themselves with an instrument of further research on their own lines. The book is excellently printed and edited and absurdly low priced; indeed for such a volume of 475 pages, large octavo, the price is so ridiculously small that it may be said to be given away. In renewing our memories of 25 years ago, by a reperusal of Mrs. Penny's articles, we are struck with the lofty tone of much of what she has to say, and that too in an environment which must, in the nature of things, have regarded Böhme's pronouncements largely as *abracadabra*. It is also surprising that Mrs. Penny could have got so secure a grip on much of Böhme's thought and intuition with the somewhat limited range of her studies. Within her range, however, she is admirable, and refers with profit to a number of writers—*e.g.* Gichtel, Van Helmont, St. Martin, Jean Lead, Law, and Freher—who bear immediately on her chief teacher; she is also very well read in Swedenborg and uses him with advantage. Though discriminating, Mrs. Penny is in some cases not sufficiently so, as when she frequently lays under contribution Thomas Lake Harris, Oxley (*Angelic Revelations*), Éliphas Lévi, Fabre d'Olivet, and especially Rāma Prasād, from among the neo-theosophy of the time, whose *Nature's Finer Forces*, suggestive as it is, should be used with care. Nevertheless, Mrs. Penny saw clearly that Böhme was dealing with things from a genuinely spiritual standpoint, and that much she quoted from other sources was dealing with the more superficial and material side of things. Had this in many ways gifted woman, purified with long years of suffering, bravely borne, known something more of the great mystical traditions of the East at first hand, or had she known more of Hellenistic theology and the mystery-cults, or of early Christian mysticism, there are many pages of Böhme that she would have been able to grasp with less effort than that which led to her final understanding of them. But the great thing about Mrs. Penny is that she has sound moral intuitions in all the mass of frequently amoral speculations with which she had to deal, in steering a straight course through the troubled sea of psychic revelations that was aswirl then and is boiling now.

Böhme was indubitably a seer who sunk deep into the spiritual mysteries, but beauty and clarity of expression he did not possess. He is obscure, even beyond the obscurity of the classical paradoxist Heracleitus, and he uses scriptural terms which have been so

misused that it takes many years of strenuous unlearning before they can be understood in the way he employs them. That he will ever have any but a few really understanding readers goes without saying; though doubtless, as in the past, he will have many admirers who are hard put to it to say why they admire him, for they feel rather than understand. But one thing is certain, that Böhme is not to be set apart as unique; he is to be studied as a valuable source in the library of comparative mysticism. So studied, his very obscurity and his apparent extreme independence are a confirmation of the nature of the inner material that has to be treated by the scholar of this alchemy of the spirit. He is one of a 'race' with complex inner relationships, and those who have acquaintance with this 'race' will recognise his kinship, and be able to understand his inner language. Meantime, as far as the 'general' is concerned, his outer speech will appear confused at best, and unintelligible for the most part; and though he will have no message for them that their intelligence can seize, they may nevertheless feel somewhat of the power of the presence that at times enwrapped him.

#### HENRI BERGSON.

The Philosophy of Change. By H. Wildon Carr. The People's Books. London (Jack). Price 6d. net.

AN excellent sixpennyworth of Bergson that can be safely recommended as a popular introduction. It is clear and well written and almost always gives a faithful summary of Bergson's main positions. We, however, venture to think that Mr. Wildon Carr has not got Bergson's idea of intuition in right perspective. He says: "Intuition is the consciousness of life that we have in living" (p. 81); and again: "The intellect is formed out of the consciousness that is identical with life, and in living we do directly know life. This is the simple fact that . . . is neither mystical nor mysterious" (p. 32). If we have at all correctly sensed the living idea that Bergson is trying to convey when he talks of 'intuition,' we venture to think there is far more in it than Mr. Wildon Carr will allow, and in justification of this view would invite his attention specially to the following passage of *Creative Evolution*, where Bergson draws a decisive distinction between what he calls ultra-intellectual and sensuous intuition. On page 380 of the English translation (p. 388 of the French original), in criticism of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, in which there is for the sage of

Königsberg only one experience, and the intellect covers the whole ground, or in other words, for Kant, all our intuitions are sensuous, that is to say, infra-intellectual, Bergson says: "But suppose, on the contrary, that science is less and less objective, more and more symbolical, as it goes from the physical to the psychical, passing through the vital: then, as it is indeed necessary to perceive a thing somehow in order to symbolise it, there would be an intuition of the psychical, and more generally of the vital, which the intellect would transpose and translate, no doubt, but which would none the less transcend the intellect. There would be, in other words, a supra-intellectual intuition. If this intuition exist, a taking possession of the spirit by itself is possible, and no longer only a knowledge that is external and phenomenal. What is more, if we have an intuition of this kind (I mean an ultra-intellectual intuition), then sensuous intuition is likely to be in continuity with it through certain intermediaries, as the infra-red is continuous with the ultra-violet. Sensuous intuition itself, therefore, is promoted."

#### ANCIENT JEWISH PROVERBS.

Compiled and Classified by the Rev. A. Cohen, late Scholar of Emmanuel College, Cambridge. Wisdom of the East Series. London (Murray). Price 2s.

THIS is a useful little volume; indeed, on the whole, the best piece of work which has as yet been done in this direction. It is practically a list of *all* the folk-sayings of the Jewish people, of some two thousand years ago, which have been recorded. The genuine proverb, it should be remembered, is not the 'elaborately thought out sentence of an individual,' not a philosophical aphorism, but 'the commonly adopted expression of long and wide experience.' Mr. Cohen is to be thanked for giving us in so handy a form this collection of genuine *Volkssprüche*; it will be of great assistance to the student of Jewish culture. What, however, strikes one most in looking over the pages, is how very 'individualistic' the sayings are. There are few of them that would be intelligible to any but Semites. Indeed, if we omit the more commonplace, there is not one really striking expression that would be understood by an outsider. Within their own area, however, there are many most interesting colloquialisms, and though a number of the sayings have entirely baffled the commentators, there are on others instructive notes which deserve attention.

## THE VISION OF THE YOUNG MAN MENELAUS.

Studies of Pentecost and Easter. By the Author of '*Resurrectio Christi*.' London (Kegan Paul).

IT is well known that from the standpoint of historical criticism one of the most difficult tasks of New Testament study is the attempt to reconcile or harmonise the contradictory accounts of the resurrectional appearances or christophanies. Not to mention other serious difficulties, *Matthew* and *Luke* hand on traditions that are utterly at variance and both their accounts bear no resemblance to the detailed enumeration of Paul. In *Resurrectio Christi* the author attempted an elaborate explanation which invoked the assistance of a number of facts and possibilities drawn from recent studies in the elements of the just dawning science of religious psychology, supported by what are well described as the 'laboratory experiments' of psychical research. As this attempt, we are told, was the 'object of some misunderstanding,' the author goes over the ground once more, in the present volume, with greater elaboration in the hope of reaching greater clarity. The title is thus hardly well chosen, seeing that it is drawn from an illustrative story from the Apocryphal Acts, which are scrutinised for echoes of tradition in support of one of the author's contentions; it does not give a general idea of the contents.

The point of departure of the author's theory is the appearance to the five hundred brethren 'at once,' which is mentioned by Paul alone, though it would naturally be supposed that such a marvellous event, far transcending the rest of the christophanies, would have been given a foremost place in our other sources as well. The author first of all adopts the view of von Dobschütz, supported by Harnack and other scholars, that this overwhelming happening must be referred to the Pentecostal assembly. 'At once,' our author contends, however, does not mean 'together' as it seems to suggest; this is a mis-rendering of the original which means 'once for all,' in the sense that no more appearances occurred for the 'brethren' in general, and were not to be expected. But the theory before us goes far beyond this. The Pentecostal event, or 'trance,' it supposes, was the culmination of prior appearances to the five hundred that only then came into clear definition at the foundation of the Church. The five hundred had already been previously spiritually impressed individually in their homes, in Galilee apparently, in their deeper consciousness, 'subliminally'



or 'subconsciously,' to use the now very familiar but inadequate terms so much in fashion, and had thus without any definite registration in their 'supraliminal' consciousness, been impelled by the Spirit to assemble in Jerusalem. This possibility is supported by a survey of the general phenomena of suggestion, subliminal and telepathic activity, and a consideration of the nature of the 'under-mind.' A great distinction is drawn between appearances to individuals and to groups. On the former the action of the Spirit is supposed to have been purely spiritual; to the latter the appearances "may well have been seemingly bodily or material." Into the nature of the latter, an all-important question, the author does not further enquire; he does not include in his purview a consideration of what has been called in lesser things the phenomena of 'exteriorisation.' He probably thought rightly that he was going already as far as he could possibly venture. This theory of a two-fold form of impression, on individuals and on groups, he further makes use of to elucidate the Galilee and Jerusalem traditions which are at such open variance in *Matthew* and *Luke*. The disciples in this way were immediately brought back to Jerusalem, where they assembled on Easter day. The appearances promised in Galilee took place, but they were 'subliminal.' And so on and so forth.

#### THE RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE OF SAINT PAUL.

By Percy Gardner, Litt. D., F.B.A. London (Williams & Norgate).  
Price 5s. net.

THIS is mainly an enquiry into the purposes and teaching of the Apostle as deduced from the Epistles, the majority of which the author considers to be authentic, following the latest tendency in criticism, and indeed it is difficult to believe that in most of them we have not to deal with very human documents issuing from one and the same clearly marked individuality. Dr. Percy Gardner tells us that he has tried to set aside the books about Paul, and to read the Letters as though they had come before him for the first time. But this for a mind so full of the critical positions as that of the author of *Exploratio Evangelica* is a psychological impossibility. It must be a continual balancing of probabilities and an adaptation to sub-conscious environment and conviction. It is impossible to get a clean touch with a subject that has already entered profoundly into the life-work of so able a writer. The Pauline Epistles have perhaps given birth to more

dogmatism and sectarianism than any other documents in the New Testament, but it must be manifest to all disinterested students of these earliest writings of Christendom that, as Dr. Gardner writes, "with the Apostle all doctrine is in a fluid state" (p. 196), and that "there is no end to the confusions and difficulties into which we may fall if we insist on treating the Pauline Epistles as dogma rather than as literature" (p. 203). It is impossible in a short notice to remark on the many crucial points on which Dr. Gardner sets forth his opinion. Where we agree with him most thoroughly is when he says that, for a competent understanding of the conditions under which Paul worked, it is necessary to have in particular a knowledge of the religious surroundings and religious institutions of the Hellenistic age, and especially of the Mysteries (p. vi.). It is well known that some have contended that Paul was the practical 'founder' of Christianity or of the Christian Church. Dr. Gardner steers a more moderate course when writing: "To say that, with Paul, the Christian Church arose as a mystic sect, combined of Jewish and heathen elements, is to put the matter in a crude and exaggerated form. But the phrase may be regarded as a rough approximation to the truth" (p. 80). The Pauline central doctrine of the immanent spiritual Christ, and its origin in a mystic experience which set aside externals and transcended the 'Christ after the flesh view,' could not but bring early Christianity into line with the personal mystery-cults. Paul's great effort was to throw open what had been kept secret; his revelation had made him free and entirely independent of any tradition. His was a popular movement, however, and probably had no effect on the members of the high philosophical and contemplative mystery-communities. But there was also much else of this nature of a lower degree stirring among the people, and it was here that Paul found a prepared ground into which to sow his doctrines. Dr. Gardner's view is that Paul's work among the members of the mystic sects was his central achievement. "Whether or not Paul mentally recognised that the religious forces which were really potent in the world about him were those represented by the mystic sects of Hellenism, at all events he acted as if he had such insight. These forces he brought within the Christian pale, and set them to draw the chariot of the conquering Christ" (p. 230). Whatever may be the correct evaluation of the phenomenon, we now know as proved fact that Paul's Letters are full of mystery-terms and ideas, that he appeals in their own

language, so to say, to his hearers. It is not credible that Paul originated the practices that we find flourishing in the communities he addresses, the prophesying and speaking with tongues, and the use of what he calls *charismata* or gifts of the Spirit. All this existed and was widely spread before the rise of Christianity. It was of every sort and kind, high and low. How far exactly it had already affected Jewish circles in the Diaspora we cannot say with certainty, but it undoubtedly had done so to a great extent; and from the Wisdom and Apocalyptic literature and such documents as the *Odes of Solomon*, and from the information we possess about the Therapeuts and Essenes, we know that there was a deep striving after spiritual experience. 'Gnosticism' high and low abounded on all sides; it is now recognised that this wide subject is to be referred to the general history of religion rather than treated as a department of ecclesiastical history. What Dr. Gardner has to say on this subject is of interest as indicating the changed attitude. "It is very hard to trace the line which divides later Greek Mysticism from Christian Gnosticism. In fact no hard line can be drawn. The [Christian] Gnostic sects stand for an attempt to transfer to the fold of Christianity the syncretic ideas of what may be called Hellenistic theology, with its mystic sacraments, its speculations as to the nature of the divine and the human, its old-world rites and beliefs, its astrological science, and its symbolic art. But it was only the excess of these things which the Church rejected: she absorbed by degrees a great part of the mystic spirit. Had she refused to do so, she would have thrown away the fruits won by the efforts of many generations of earnest, though perverted, seekers after God. The ordinary notion of the Gnostics, that they were speculative thinkers led away by a perverse use of the intellect, is very partial. They represented rather the tendency to quit Greek philosophy as an insufficient way of studying the divine, and to seek such a way by means of asceticism, sacrament or ecstasy. The speculative part of their teaching was less important, and was largely developed on practical grounds, just as the orthodox faith which at the same time opposed them and absorbed much of their tendency" (p. 67).

The chief thing to remember is that the mystery-associations were saving cults. Gnosis was gnosis of salvation and finally gnosis of God. That Dr. Gardner should take away with one hand what he gives with the other, and speak of these men as 'earnest, though perverted, seekers after God,' seems to be a modern theo-

logical rather than a historical judgment. They did what they could in their age and environment, and unless the idea of a spiritual gnosis in some form or other is revived, we see no prospect of relief from the present state of ever-increasing religious doubt and indifference.

The great problem as to why Paul seems to know nothing or next to nothing of the Synoptic account of Jesus and his teaching remains as obscure as ever. Dr. Gardner tells us that Paul "was not anxious to know about the facts of the human life of his Master" (p. 247), an almost incredible position if the facts were those recorded in the Gospels. The modern way is to regard the miraculous setting of the Life as mythical; but that is only part of the puzzle, it is the absence of any clear reference to the teaching in Paul that constitutes the greatest difficulty. Dr. Gardner with regard to this problem orients himself as follows: "It is notable that this modern way of regarding the Gospels has brought us back much nearer to the Pauline point of view. Paul knew nothing of the Virgin Birth: modern criticism sets it decidedly on one side. To Paul the resurrection of Christ was not, as it was to the first disciples, a corporeal arising, but a spiritual manifestation, like the visions which he had himself experienced. Modern criticism decidedly prefers the Pauline view. Paul, no doubt, believed that his Master had wrought signs and wonders; but he laid as little emphasis on them as on those which he himself wrought. As to the journeyings and public ministry of his Master, Paul knew very little, probably less than a sceptical modern critic would regard as reasonably certain. There are in the Pauline Epistles traces of the influence of the teaching of Jesus, reflections of his spirit, which are very striking and remarkable. But, in regard to the Gospel of Jesus, we are far better informed than Paul could possibly be. No modern missionary could write letters to his converts so independent of the teaching to be found in the Synoptic Gospels as are the letters of Paul" (p. 252).

This passage is typical of Dr. Gardner's critical position throughout; it is an attempt to steer a middle course. But if the majority of the Pauline Letters are authentic, and we hold that they are, they are the earliest documents of Christendom, and this reticence or ignorance of Paul concerning the Life of Jesus must accordingly form the chief *cruz* of the historical criticism of the New Testament writings. For ourselves the enigma appears historically insoluble with the material before us; the attempted judgment in every case is subjective.

## PRIESTS, PHILOSOPHERS AND PROPHETS.

A Dissertation on Revealed Religion. By Thomas Whittaker.  
London (Black). Price 5s. net.

READERS of Mr. Whittaker's previous volumes, *The Neoplatonists* and *The Origins of Christianity*, though most of them may not be inclined to adopt the author's extreme positions, will know that they can count on a sober and scholarly exposition of his views. The title of this new volume is an excellent one, and the field surveyed is of perennial interest. After a preliminary dissertation, Mr. Whittaker deals successively with: The Rise of Monotheism; Greece and Philosophical Theism; The Opposition; The Persians and the Jews; The Jewish Law and the Prophets; The Christian Era; Christianity and Philosophy; The Theological Schisms; and The New Era. Whatever else Mr. Whittaker may be, he is consistent; in both Old and New Testament criticism he fights whole-heartedly on the extreme left wing. As to the Old Covenant documents, he is brother-in-arms with what he calls that 'revised criticism,' which flourishes mostly in France. Not only are the documents post-exilic, but so far from the Prophets preceding the post-exilic redacted and over-written Law, they come after that period of literary industry. As to the New Testament, not only is Mr. Whittaker with J. M. Robertson, W. B. Smith and A. Drews in supporting the extreme unhistoricity theory with regard to Jesus, but also with regard to Paul our author remains a convinced supporter of the views of the Van Manen School, which he so usefully set forth in his *Origins of Christianity*—by far the best exposition of the subject which is available in English. This view is that we do not possess a single genuine Letter of Paul, but only a Pauline tendency-literature dating from about the first quarter of the second century. For our own part we are satisfied that this theory is untenable, and that we have genuine writings of Paul, at least in the majority of the Letters. As to the non-historicity of Jesus, though it is very difficult indeed to get at the true historical figure, the hypothesis of entire non-historicity involves us in greater difficulties than the critical traditional view. As to the 'revised criticism' of the O.T. documents, however, we still have an open mind, though we cannot 'see' it at present. On the whole, Mr. Whittaker persuades

us once more that, valuable as rationalism is in many ways, it is insufficient for a true appreciation of 'revealed religion'; it is of great service in correcting extravagances and absurdities of a certain order, but it is not competent to survey the whole field, and this for the simple reason that it is without personal experience of just the very elements that constitute revealed religion. It is ever a criticism from outside, the view of a foreigner; it is not a self-analysis. But in spite of our inability to agree with Mr. Whittaker on his main positions, we have read him with interest and respect as a seeker for truth as he sees it.

#### WORDS OUT OF THE SILENCE.

Anonymous. J. M. Watkins. Price 2*d*.

A SHORT pamphlet, but full of depth. I dislike the form, for the writer speaks in the person of God, and the most universal of us can never be sure we are universal enough to do this safely. Yet the point of view taken is certainly very universal. One extract will show its spirit. "Let him that goeth to his assembly say to him that passes him by, the Lord be with thee, and bless thee in thy undertaking." Yet shortly after it is said: "I looked abroad on the Temples raised to Me, and saw therein My Name spelt backward. The letters indeed were there, but the heart to read was wanting." Too true in more instances than not, but not universally so, thank God; as anyone who will listen to Arch-deacon Wilberforce will feel. All who say "I only am left" are disquieting themselves in vain.

To such as love contemplation, this little booklet will afford ample and admirable material.

G. W. A.

# THE QUEST

## A Quarterly Review.

Edited by G. R. S. Mead.

---

Vol. III. ②

JULY, 1912.

No. 4.

---

THE LOGIC OF THE EMOTIONS - - - -	William Brown, M.A., D.Sc.	601
SLOWACKI'S MYSTIC PILGRIMAGE IN SIBERIA -	Monica M. Gardner	616
ROMANTICISM OF THE FIRST THINKERS OF HELLAS -	Prof. Karl Joël, Ph.D.	634
HEAVEN, HELL AND THE PRESENT ENVIRONMENT -	Henry Bernard, M.A., F.Z.S.	648
SOME FEATURES OF BUDDHIST PSYCHOLOGY -	The Editor	665
JOHN THE BAPTIST IN THE LIGHT OF A NEW SAMARITAN DOCUMENT -	Robert Eisler, Ph.D.	688
GOD AND THE DEVIL - - -	F. W. Orde Ward, B.A.	702
A MANDAEAN MYSTERY-RITUAL - - - -	A. L. B. Hardcastle, M.R.A.S.	714
THE 'KABBALISM' OF CHINA -	Herbert Chatley, B.Sc.	733
THREE MINDS AND ——— ? -	H. F. L.	742
THE METAPHYSICIAN (Verse) -	Eric Clough Taylor	761
HAUNTED (Verse) - - -	E. J. Thomas, M.A.	764
DISCUSSION: The 'Coarseness' of Whitman - - - -	F. P. Osmaston	766
REVIEWS AND NOTICES - - - -	- - - -	771

---

JOHN M. WATKINS,

21 Cecil Court, Charing Cross Road, London, W.C.

# THE QUEST.

THE QUEST welcomes contributions that exemplify the investigation and comparative study of religion, philosophy and science as complementary to one another in aiding the search for that reality which alone can give complete satisfaction. It desires to promote enquiry into the nature of religious and other supranormal experiences and the means of testing their value, to strengthen that love of wisdom which stimulates all efforts to formulate a practical philosophy of life, and to emphasise the need of a vital science to crown and complete the discoveries of physical research. It also invites contributions which treat of the purpose of art and the expression of the ideal in forms of beauty; and in literature interests itself in works of inspiration and of the creative imagination. THE QUEST will endeavour, as far as possible, to avoid technicalities, so as to meet the requirements of the more general public seriously interested in such matters. Space will be given to suitable correspondence, queries, notes and discussions.

A stamped and addressed envelope must accompany all MSS. of which the return is desired in case of non-acceptance. Every care will be taken of MSS., but copies should be kept, as the editor can in no case be responsible for accidental loss.

All editorial correspondence and books for review should be sent to:

THE EDITOR, 'THE QUEST,'

16, Selwood Place, Onslow Gardens, London, S.W.

Telegraphic Address: 'Questman, London.' Subscriptions and letters on business should be sent to the publisher.

---

AMONG the contributors are: Rev. G. W. Allen, Dr. K. C. Anderson, Dr. B. S. Arnulphy, H. A. Dallas, Dr. H. J. Dukinfield Astley, Sir William F. Barrett, Monsignor Robert Hugh Benson, Henry Bernard, Laurence Binyon, Dr. William Brown, Dr. J. Estlin Carpenter, Herbert Chatley, Dr. W. F. Cobb, Dr. F. C. Conybeare, E. E. Fournier d'Albe, C. A. F. Rhys Davids, Dr. Robert Eisler, E. D. Fawcett, Monica M. Gardner, Edmund G. Gardner, Prof. W. R. Boyce Gibson, Dr. K. S. Guthrie, Prof. J. Rendel Harris, A. L. B. Hardcastle, E. B. Havell, F. W. Henkel, Edmond Holmes, A. R. Horwood, Prof. J. Javakhishvili, Prof. Karl Joël, Maud Joynt, Prof. Franz Kampers, W. F. Kirby, Canon A. L. Lilley, Dr. W. Lutoslawski, M. A. Macauliffe, Fiona Macleod, John Masefield, Dr. T. W. Mitchell, Prof. Yoshio Noda, Alfred Noyes, Standish O'Grady, Prof. E. H. Parker, H. Stanley Redgrove, Ernest Rhys, Rev. R. Roberts, Otto Rothfeld, Prof. William Benjamin Smith, Prof. Ernst Sieper, E. Clough Taylor, E. J. Thomas, Father Tyrrell, Evelyn Underhill, M. Urquhart, Arthur Edward Waite, F. W. Orde Ward, Jessie L. Weston, Joseph H. Wicksteed, Harold Williams, and Michael Wood.



# The Quest Society.

*President* : G. R. S. MEAD, B.A.

*Vice-Presidents* : C. C. MACRAE, M.A., and A. E. WAITE.

*Hon. Treasurer* : H. ROUGHTON HOGG, M.A.    *Hon. Secretary* : E. T. STURDY.

- Objects* : i. To promote investigation and comparative study of religion, philosophy, and science, on the basis of experience.  
ii. To encourage the expression of the ideal in beautiful forms.

Of the objects thus briefly set forth, the first is intended solely as a general indication of the ground which may and should be covered and explored in any endeavour to understand the deeper meaning of human life and experience. As the name sufficiently indicates, The Quest Society is essentially a Society of Seekers ; it does not offer the results of a task fulfilled, but the plan of an undertaking in progress. That undertaking is to note the results of specialised work in all departments of religion, philosophy, and science, and to apply the same to the deeper and more vital needs of the human soul. The Society therefore welcomes as Members—whatever their views may be—all who desire to aid in the Quest, to add their own experience to the sum-total, and thus to enrich, intensify, and beautify human life.

*Meetings* for lectures, discussions, receptions, etc., are held once a fortnight, with breaks at Christmas and Easter ; there are no meetings in July, August and September. *Study-Groups* for such subjects as psychology, psychical investigation, comparative religion, philosophy, etc., are formed to suit individual requirements.

Members receive regularly, as included in their general subscription, a copy of *The Quest*, and have the privilege of introducing guests to all open meetings.

The *annual subscription* of Resident Members is £1 11s. 6d., and of Non-Residents £1 1s., according as they reside within or beyond a twenty miles' radius from Charing Cross.

Visitors must be furnished with *guest's tickets*, which are obtainable from the Honorary Secretary or from Members. Attendance as a guest is limited to *three* occasions.

On payment of half-a-guinea a *set of ten lecture tickets* may be obtained from the Honorary Secretary. They are available for ten open meetings of the Society, but within twelve months of the day of issue only (beginning at any date and terminable on the same date of the following year) and are non-transferable. In the event of their joining the Society during the currency of their subscriptions, subscribers to *The Quest* or for lecture tickets will be credited with the balance.

*Single tickets of admission* to a lecture or open meeting may be obtained, at a charge of 2s. 6d. each, from Mr. J. M. Watkins, 21, Cecil Court, Charing Cross Road, W.C., or from the Doorkeeper at the open meetings of the Society, but *not* from the Honorary Secretary.

Forms of application for membership and all particulars may be obtained from :

THE HONORARY SECRETARY, "THE QUEST SOCIETY,"

16, Selwood Place, Onslow Gardens, London, S.W.

# The Quest.

<b>VOL. II.</b>		<b>OCTOBER, 1910.</b>	<b>No. 1</b>
The Creed of my Heart ...	...	The Author of 'The Creed of Buddha'	
The Life of Jesus Christ in His Mystical Body ...	...	Mon. R. Hugh Benson, M.A.	
The Sacred Dance of Jesus ...	...	G. R. S. Mead, B.A.	
The Fishing of Men in Early Christian Literature ...	...	Robert Eisler, Ph.D.	
The Centenary of Slowacki ...	...	Wincenty Lutoslawski.	
Another Note on Mysticism ...	...	Evelyn Underhill.	
<b>VOL. II.</b>		<b>JANUARY, 1911.</b>	<b>No. 2</b>
The Intuitionism of Henri Bergson ...	...	Prof. W. R. Boyce Gibson, M.A.	
The Negative Evidence of Survival. I. ...	...	E. E. Fournier D'Albe, B.Sc.	
The Symbolism of the 'Miraculous Draught' ...	...	Robert Eisler, Ph.D.	
The Way of the Spirit in Ancient China ...	...	G. R. S. Mead, B.A.	
The Secret of the Sea ...	...	Edmond Holmes.	
<b>VOL. II.</b>		<b>APRIL, 1911.</b>	<b>No. 3</b>
The Messianic Emperor ...	...	Prof. F. Kampers, Ph.D.	
The Magic of the Finns ...	...	W. F. Kirby.	
Two Types of Christian Theology ...	...	Rev. A. L. Lilley, M.A.	
The 'True Man' in Ancient Chinese Mystical Philosophy ...	...	G. R. S. Mead, B.A.	
Bergson's 'Time and Free-Will' ...	...	E. Douglas Fawcett.	
The Negative Evidence for Survival, II. ...	...	E. E. Fournier d'Albe, B.Sc.	
Nirvana ...	...	Edmond Holmes.	
<b>VOL. II.</b>		<b>JULY, 1911.</b>	<b>No. 4</b>
Quaeritur: Can any Great Religion admit the Spiritual Equality with itself of the other Great Religions? ...	...	C. C. Macrae, M.A., Prof. S. Uchigasaki, Rev. W. F. Cobb, D.D. Sir K. G. Gupta, C.S.I., C. G. Montefiore, M.A., Rt. Hon. Sye Ameer Ali, P.C.	
Traces of Ophite-Gnostic Influences in the Poems of Shelley ...	...	Prof. E. Sieper, Ph.D.	
Some Phases of Religious Art in Eastern Asia ...	...	Laurence Binyon.	
Spiritual Reality in Progressive Buddhism ...	...	G. R. S. Mead, B.A.	
Dante and the Renaissance ...	...	Prof. F. Kampers, Ph.D.	
Call me not Back ...	...	Edmond Holmes.	
<b>VOL. III.</b>		<b>OCTOBER, 1911.</b>	<b>No. 1</b>
The Religion of Mani ...	...	F. C. Conybeare, M.A.	
The Cradle of the Christ: A Study in the Origins of Christianity ...	...	Rev. K. C. Anderson, D.D.	
Some Influences of Buddhism on Japanese Thought and Life ...	...	Prof. Yoshio Noda, Ph.D.	
The so-called 'Madness' of William Blake ...	...	Joseph H. Wicksteed, M.A.	
'The Book of the Hidden Mysteries of the House of God' ...	...	G. R. S. Mead, B.A.	
The Baptism of John the Forerunner ...	...	Robert Eisler, Ph.D.	
<b>VOL. III.</b>		<b>JANUARY, 1912.</b>	<b>No. 2</b>
Contemplatives ...	...	John Masefield.	
The Ideal Life in Progressive Buddhism ...	...	G. R. S. Mead, B.A.	
Mary Everest Boole ...	...	Rev. G. W. Allen.	
Henri Bergson: A French Impression ...	...	Eric Clough Taylor.	
Is the New Testament Jesus Historical? ...	...	Rev. K. C. Anderson, D.D.	
<b>VOL. III.</b>		<b>APRIL, 1912.</b>	<b>No. 3</b>
The Rising Psychic Tide ...	...	The Editor.	
The Method of William Blake ...	...	J. H. Wicksteed, M.A.	
The Mystical Aspect of Dante's 'Vita Nuova' ...	...	Edmund G. Gardner, M.A.	
John-Jonah-Oannes? ...	...	Robert Eisler, Ph.D.	
St. George the Moon-god ...	...	Prof. J. Javakhishvili.	
The Essence of the Faith ...	...	Rev. K. C. Anderson, D.D.	

The above back numbers may be obtained, post free, at 2/9 each, on application to

**JOHN M. WATKINS,**

**21, Cecil Court, Charing Cross Road, London, W.C.**

Price: Single Copies, 2/6 net; 2/9 post free.

Annual Subscription, 11/- post free.

# Annales des Sciences Psychiques.

PUBLICATION MENSUELLE ILLUSTRÉE

Consacrée aux Recherches Experimentales et Critiques sur les  
Phénomènes de TÉLÉPATHIE, LUCIDITÉ, PRÉMONITION,  
MÉDIUMNITÉ, etc.

---

ORGANE

DE LA

SOCIÉTÉ UNIVERSELLE D'ÉTUDES PSYCHIQUES.

---

*Directeur :* **Professeur CHARLES RICHET.**

*Rédacteur en chef :* **C. de YESME.**

*Comité de Rédaction :*

SIR WILLIAM CROOKES, CAMILLE FLAMMARION, DR. PAUL JOIRE,  
MARCEL MANGIN, DR. JOSEPH MAXWELL, PROFESSEUR HENRI MORSELLI,  
DR. JULIEN OCHOROWICZ, COLONEL ALBERT DE ROCHAS,  
DR. ALBERT VON SCHRENCK-NOTZING.

*Fondateur :* **DR. XAVIER DARIEX.**

---

**PARIS—Rue Guersant, 39 (Villa des Ternes, 14)—PARIS.**

*Prix du numéro : 1 fr.      Abonnement annuel : 12 fr.*

---

## *The* **ECHOES FROM THE GNOSIS (MEAD).**

- |            |                                |
|------------|--------------------------------|
| Vol. I.    | THE GNOSIS OF THE MIND.        |
| Vol. II.   | THE HYMNS OF HERMES.           |
| Vol. III.  | THE VISION OF ARIDÆUS.         |
| Vol. IV.   | THE HYMN OF JESUS.             |
| Vol. V.    | THE MYSTERIES OF MITHRA.       |
| Vol. VI.   | A MITHRIAC RITUAL.             |
| Vol. VII.  | THE Gnostic CRUCIFIXION.       |
| Vol. VIII. | THE CHALDÆAN ORACLES, I.       |
| Vol. IX.   | THE CHALDÆAN ORACLES, II.      |
| Vol. X.    | THE HYMN OF THE ROBE OF GLORY. |
| Vol. XI.   | THE WEDDING-SONG OF WISDOM.    |

The series includes some of the most delightful masterpieces of the Gnosis of antiquity, with introductions, notes and commentaries, suited to all readers who are lovers of spiritual mystery-lore, with its ever-fresh charm and vital and immediate significance.

---

**Neatly bound in green cloth ; 1/- net each volume ; post free 1/4.**

**JOHN M. WATKINS, 21, Cecil Court, Charing Cross Road, London, W.C.**

# BOOKS AT REDUCED PRICES.

- ARNOLD, SIR EDWIN. **THE SONG CELESTIAL** or BHAGAVAD GÎTÂ.  
Cloth, 8vo. 1906. (Pub. 5/-.) 2/6
- ARNOLD, SIR EDWIN. **PEARLS OF THE FAITH** or ISLAM'S ROSARY.  
Cloth, 8vo. 1910. (Pub. 6/-.) 3/-
- ARNOLD, SIR EDWIN. **LOTUS AND JEWEL.** Cloth, 8vo. 1891. (Pub. 6/-.) 3/-
- ARNOLD, SIR EDWIN. **INDIAN IDYLLS.** Cloth, 8vo. 1909. (Pub. 6/-.) 3/-
- ARNOLD, SIR EDWIN. **THE LIGHT OF ASIA.** Cloth, 8vo. 1890. (Pub. 6/-.) 2/6
- ALEXANDER, G. G. **LAO-TSZE, THE GREAT THINKER.** Cloth, 8vo.  
1895. (Pub. 5/-.) 2/6
- ELLIS, E. J. **THE REAL BLAKE.** A Portrait Biography. Cloth, 8vo.  
1907. (Pub. 12/-.) 4/-
- BLAKE, WILLIAM. **SELECTIONS FROM THE WRITINGS OF.** Edited by  
Laurence Housman. Cloth, 8vo. 1893. (Pub. 6/-.) 3/-
- CHURCHWARD, ALBERT. **THE SIGNS AND SYMBOLS OF PRIMORDIAL MAN :**  
the Evolution of Religious Doctrines from the Eschatology of the Ancient  
Egyptians. With 186 Illustrations, including 17 Coloured Plates. Roy.  
8vo, Cloth. 1910. (Pub. 25/- net). 10/- net postage British Islands 6d.,  
Foreign Post 1/6.
- ENGEL, CARL. **THE MUSIC OF THE MOST ANCIENT NATIONS,** particularly  
of the Assyrians, Egyptians and Hebrews. Cloth, 8vo. (Pub. 18/-.) 7/6
- FAIRBAIRN, A. M. **THE PHILOSOPHY OF CHRISTIAN RELIGION.** Cloth,  
8vo. 1910. (Pub. 12/-.) 7/-
- HARTMANN, EDWARD VON. **THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS.**  
Cloth, 8vo. (3 vols., pub. 31/6.) 12/-
- GARDNER, E. G. **THE STORY OF SIENA AND SAN GIMIGNAMO.** Illus  
trated by H. M. James. Cloth, 8vo. 1902. (Pub. 10/6.) 4/-
- GARDNER, E. G. **THE STORY OF FLORENCE.** Illustrated by Nell  
Erichsen. Cloth, 8vo. 1903. (Pub. 10/6.) 4/-
- SANKHYA APHORISMS OF KAPILA.** Translated by James R. Ballantyne  
Cloth, 8vo. 1885. (Pub. 16/-.) 7/6
- TIBETAN TALES.** Derived from Indian Sources. Translated by F. A. von  
Schiefner. Cloth, 8vo. 1906. (Pub. 16/-.) 6/-
- MASSEY, GERALD. **ANCIENT EGYPT, The Light of the World.** A Work  
of Reclamation and Restitution in 12 Books, with 15 Illustrations in the  
Text. 2 vols. Imp. 8vo, pp. 944, cloth. 1907. (Pub. £2 2s. net.) A  
*few copies only.* 18/-
- THOROLD (A). **CATHOLIC MYSTICISM.** Cloth. (Pub. 3/6.) 1/9

*Catalogues on application to*

**JOHN M. WATKINS,**

**21, Cecil Court, Charing Cross Road, London, W.C.**

# The Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly Review

## AND ORIENTAL AND COLONIAL RECORD.

(FOUNDED JANUARY, 1886.)

THIRD SERIES.

JANUARY, 1912.

Vol. XXXIII. No. 65.

### CONTENTS.

#### ASIA.

SIR ROPER LETHBRIDGE, K.C.I.E.: "The Dundee and Calcutta Jute Industries and the New Export Duty on Jute."

J. KENNEDY, I.C.S. (retired): "Economic Transition in India."

OLIVER BAINBRIDGE: "Some Impressions of India."

SIR T. HOLDICH: "The Gates of India."

SIR ROWLAND K. WILSON: "Compulsory Education for India in the Light of Western Experience."

#### ORIENTALIA.

PROFESSOR DR. E. MONTET: Report on Semitic Studies and Orientalism.

#### GENERAL.

L. A. WADDELL, LL.D., C.B.: "Evolution of the Buddhist Cult: its Gods, Images, and Art." With Illustrations.

#### PROCEEDINGS OF THE EAST INDIA ASSOCIATION.

CORRESPONDENCE, NOTES, AND NEWS. "Indian Currency Policy."

#### REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

The New Spirit in Egypt.—Urdu Reader for Military Students.—Hebrew Satire.—Rare Days in Japan.—Twelve Men of Bengal in the Nineteenth Century.—Sport on the Nilgiris and in Wynaad.—India and the Durbar.—Ancient Hebrew Proverbs.—The Ideals of Indian Art.—The Flight of the Dragon.—The Story of Korea.—A Grammar of the Persian Language.—Burmese Self-Taught.—Education and Statesmanship in India, 1797-1910, etc.

#### SUMMARY OF EVENTS IN ASIA, AFRICA, AND THE COLONIES.

5s. net. PUBLISHERS: ORIENTAL INSTITUTE, WOKING, ENGLAND.

## THE SEEKER.

A Quarterly Magazine of Christian Mysticism

PUBLISHED IN MAY, AUGUST, NOVEMBER AND FEBRUARY.

"THE SEEKER" is devoted to Mysticism of the School of Jacob Boehme and English Mystics such as Richard Rolle and Hilton, and others of the "Cloud of Unknowing" School, and the German School of Eckhart, Tauler, Suso and Ruysbroeck, &c. Aware that no School exhausts the whole Truth, it seeks to disentangle in these profound Writers, what is eternal from what belonged rather to their day; and to support everything in modern Thought which is of kin to the former and corrective of the latter; and thus to discover a philosophy of life and conduct which may be the basis of a Society dwelling together in Unity. Thus its aim is practical, rather than speculative: for no Truth—however much it may please the intellect—is of real value which has not power to set the individual in right relations with its fellow-men.

EDITED BY THE REV. G. W. ALLEN, *Vicar of Bretby, Burton-on-Trent.*

Subscription, 2/4 per annum, post free. Single copies, 6d.; by post 7d.

### CONTENTS—MAY, 1912.

INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF JACOB BOEHME	By THE EDITOR
VISION AND REALISATION	By H. MEUGENS
THE WEDDING GARMENT	By AGNES LEATHES
THE MYSTICAL MARRIAGE	By E. T. HARRISON
WHAT WE SEND UP	By FLORENCE NEVILL

SEEKER SUPPLEMENT 6d. net, post free 7d.

THE MYSTIC, THE CHURCH, AND THE WORLD

By THE REV. G. W. ALLEN.

Published by J. M. WATKINS, 21, Cecil Court, Charing Cross Road, W.C.

# Rassegna Contemporanea.

Diretta da G. A. CESARÒ e VINCENZO PICARDI

Pubblicazione mensile di Politica, Lettere, Scienze e Arti.

Ogni fascicolo, di più che 192 pagine, è riccamente illustrato e contiene  
gli articoli originali, un esteso notiziario, e numerose cronache, affidate a  
speciali divulgatori, che tengano il lettore al corrente della vita e del pensiero  
moderno in tutte le nazioni.

La Rassegna Contemporanea pubblica scritti di letteratura, di arte,  
storia, politica e scienza degli uomini più eminenti del mondo intellettuale e  
politico italiano, si è assicurata la collaborazione di scrittori di primissimo  
ordine e la pubblicazione di documenti inediti interessantissimi.

Il N. L. 2,50 (Est. L. 3) — Abbon. annuo L. 25 — Est. L. 35.

Italiani regnicoli o non, o residenti all' Estero L. 25.

Direzione e Amministrazione: ROMA, Via Nazionale, 40.

A Valuable Curative Agent to promote elimination of waste products, stimulate the  
natural recuperative powers and increase the activity of the vital functions.

The Medical Profession recognises the use of the inventor's apparatus for the production  
of radiant energy and colour wave forms.

The Effects of such Treatment are immediate and direct on the depleted nerve energy  
of the great centres, which are the cause of nine-tenths of our diseases.

Mr. HENRY J. MONSON treats all personally, by appointment in their own homes if desired,  
and in London.

Address—"HAZELWOOD," CHORLEY WOOD, HERTS.

Wrappers 8vo, pp. 227.

Price 2/- net.

## Addresses & Essays on Vegetarianism

By

ANNA (BONUS) KINGSFORD AND EDWARD MAITLAND.

"Now first collected and issued in book form."

JOHN M. WATKINS, 21, Cecil Court, Charing Cross Road, London, W.C.

# Some Works by G. R. S. Mead.

---

## **SOME MYSTICAL ADVENTURES.**

CONTENTS—As Above, so Below—Heresy—The Elasticity of a Permanent Body—The Immensities—Heirs of the Ages—The Master—Initiation—A Measure of What Wisdom Means to Me—Adumbrations—The Heroic Life—On the Track of Spirituality—Guesses at What to Expect—On the Art of Symbolism—The Self-Taught—On the Way of the Path—Mystic Reality—The Deathless Race—Mystic Cosmogony—Some Elementary Speculations—On the Nature of the Quest.

Pp. 303. Large 8vo, cloth, price 6s. net, post free 6s. 4d.

## **DID JESUS LIVE 100 B.C.?**

An Enquiry into the Talmud Jesus Stories, the Toldoth Jeschu, and some Curious Statements of Epiphanius. Being a Contribution to the Study of Christian Origins.

Pp. xvi. 440. Large 8vo, cloth, 9s. net.

## **APOLLONIUS OF TYANA:**

The Philosopher-Reformer of the First Century A.D. A Critical Study of the only existing Record of his Life, with some Account of the War of Opinion concerning him, and an Introduction on the Religious Associations and Brotherhoods of the Times and the possible Influence of Indian Thought on Greece.

Pp. 160. Large 8vo, cloth, 3s. 6d. net.

## **THE GOSPELS AND THE GOSPEL:**

A Study in the Most Recent Results of the Lower and the Higher Criticism.

Pp. 200. Large 8vo, cloth, 4s. 6d. net.

## **THE WORLD-MYSTERY:**

Four Comparative Studies in General Theosophy. The World-Soul—The Soul-Vestures—The Web of Destiny—True Self-Reliance.  
Second Edition, entirely Revised and largely Augmented, with Index.

Pp. 200. Large 8vo, cloth, 5s. net.

## **FRAGMENTS OF A FAITH FORGOTTEN:**

Some Short Sketches among the Gnostics of the first two centuries—a Contribution to the Study of Christian Origins based on the most recently recovered materials.

Pp. lv.+633. Large 8vo, cloth, 10s. 6d. net.

## **THRICE-GREATEST HERMES:**

Studies in Hellenistic Theosophy and Gnosis. Being a translation of the extant Sermons and Fragments of the Trismegistic literature, with prolegomena, commentaries and notes.

3 Vols., pp. xvi+481, xi+403, xii+371. Cloth, large 8vo, 30s. net.

---

**JOHN M. WATKINS,**

21, Cecil Court, Charing Cross Road, London, W.C.

# WISDOM OF THE EAST SERIES

In this age of Series the "Wisdom of the East Series" is exceptional, for it is no mere reprint of former works, but is a Library of original and valuable research. Many of the volumes are here translated for the first time into English.

*Full list post free on application.*

NEW VOLUME. JUST OUT.

## THE BUDDHA'S "WAY OF VIRTUE."

A Translation of the Dhammapada.

By W. D. C. Wagiswara and K. J. Saunders,

Members of the Royal Asiatic Society, Ceylon Branch.

2s. net.

**Taoist Teaching.** From the Mystical Philosophy of Lieh Tzū. Translated by LIONEL GILES. 2s. net.

**Ancient Jewish Proverbs.** Compiled and Classified by A. COHEN, late Scholar of Emanuel College, Cambridge. 2s. net.

**The Flight of the Dragon.** An Essay on the Theory and Practice of Art in China and Japan, based on original sources. By LAURENCE BINYON. 2s. net.

**Legends of Indian Buddhism.** Translated from "L'Introduction à l'Histoire du Bouddhisme Indien" of EUGÈNE BURNOUF, with an Introduction by WINIFRED STEPHENS. 2s. net.

**The Bustān of Sadi.** Translated from the Persian with an Introduction by A. HART EDWARDS. 2s. net.

**The Rubā'iyāt of Ḥāfiz.** Translated, with Introduction, by SYED ABDUL MAJID, LL.D. Rendered into English Verse by L. CRANMER-BYNG. 1s. net.

**The Alchemy of Happiness.** By AL GHAZZALI. Rendered into English by CLAUD FIELD, M.A. 2s. net.

**The Singing Caravan.** Some Echoes of Arabian Poetry. By HENRY BAERLEIN. 2s. net.

**The Wisdom of the Apocrypha.** With an Introduction by C.E. LAWRENCE, Author of "Pilgrimage," etc. 2s. net.

**The Burden of Isis.** Being the Laments of Isis and Nephthys. Translated from the Egyptian with an Introduction by JAMES TEACKLE DENNIS. 1s. net.

**The Master Singers of Japan.** Being Verse Translations from the Japanese Poets. By CLARA A. WALSH. 2s. net.

**The Path of Light.** Rendered for the first time into English from the Bodhi-charyāvatāra of Sānti-Deva. A Manual of Mahā-Yāna Buddhism. By L. D. BARNETT, M.A., Litt.D. 2s. net.

**The Splendour of God.** Being Extracts from the Sacred Writings of the Bahais. With Introduction by ERIC HAMMOND. 2s. net.

**A Lute of Jade.** Being Selections from the Classical Poets of China. Rendered with an Introduction by L. CRANMER-BYNG. 2s. net.

**The Confessions of Al Ghazzali.** Translated for the first time into English by CLAUD FIELD, M.A. 1s. net.

**The Heart of India.** Sketches in the History of Hindu Religion and Morals. By L. D. BARNETT, M.A., Litt.D., Professor of Sanskrit at University College, London. 2s. net.

**The Book of Filial Duty.** Translated from the Chinese of the Hsiao Ching. By IWAN CHEN, First Secretary to the Chinese Legation. 1s. net.

**Brahma Knowledge.** An Outline of the Philosophy of the Vedānta. As set forth by the Upanishads and by Sankara. By L. D. BARNETT, M.A., Litt.D., Professor of Sanskrit at University College, London. 2s. net.

**The Conduct of Life; or, The Universal Order of Confucius.** A translation of one of the four Confucian Books, hitherto known as the Doctrine of the Mean. By KU HUNG MING, M.A. (Edin.). 1s. net.

LONDON: JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W.



# MYSTICAL ART AND POETRY.

## POEMS DRAMATIC AND LYRICAL.

By CLIFFORD BAX.

Cover design in white and gold, title-page and tail pieces by DIANA READ. 4s. 8d. net, post free. The author expresses again and again the view of the universe which sees in human life a fragment of a much vaster life pulsing and glowing behind it.

## DREAM SONGS FOR THE BELOVED.

By ELEANOR FARJEON.

In crash and pale blue boards, 2s. 8d. net, post free. Grace, tenderness, and delightful melody are the three first qualities of these poems. The book is clear and radiant—like a glass of water held up to the morning sun.

## THE HERO IN MAN.

By A. E.

Grey paper covers. 2nd edition. 7d. net, post free. In "The Hero in Man" a living mystic puts forward a plea for the apparently downward soul. He sees in the man who spiritually fails the figure of Prometheus. 4s. 8d. post free per annum.

## ORPHEUS.

A QUARTERLY MAGAZINE OF MYSTICAL ART.

Seeks to form a strong imaginative movement in the world of art, uniting what is noblest in Western and Eastern Art.

PUBLISHED BY C. W. DANIEL, LTD.  
For the ORPHEUS PRESS, 3, Amen Corner, London, E.C.

*List of Orpheus Books post free.*

# THE HEREAFTER.

BOOKS ON THE FUTURE LIFE.

## HERE AND HEREAFTER.

By the Rev. J. E. WATTS-DITCHFIELD, M.A. 3s. 6d. net.

"The closing sermons, which deal with 'After Death,' are intensely solemn and moving. They deal with many questions connected with life after death, for which men are ever looking for an answer, and in these pages they will find light and leading. Mr. Watts-Ditchfield's style is fresh, open, frank, and unconventional. He quickly gets to the heart of things."—*Record*.

## THE LIFE HEREAFTER.

By the Rev. EDWARD HICKS, D.D. Cloth, 2s. net.

"Many will find in this volume much that will relieve their anxious minds, renew their hopes, and give them great comfort and strength. Dr. Hicks makes out a strong case, and presents it in such a sympathetic and winning fashion that his readers cannot fail to be helped and inspired by the admirable, temperate, and convincing presentation of his arguments."—*Light*.

## MUTUAL RECOGNITION IN THE LIFE BEYOND.

By the Rev. H. H. T. CLEIFE, M.A. Cloth, 2s. net.

"It is a pleasure to find a volume dealing with the life beyond the Veil, free from fantastic speculations and vain guesses."—*Record*.

*Write for New Catalogue, C104, sent free by post.*

LONDON: ROBERT SCOTT, Publisher, Paternoster Row, E.C.

# WORKS by the LATE WILLIAM JAMES

Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University.

## ESSAYS IN RADICAL EMPIRICISM.

8vo. 4s. 6d. net.

CONTENTS:—Does 'Consciousness' Exist?—A World of Pure Experience—The Thing and its Relations—How Two Minds Can Know One Thing—The Place of Affectional Facts in a World of Pure Experience—The Experience of Activity—The Essence of Humanism—La Notion de Conscience—Is Radical Empiricism Solipsistic?—Mr. Pitkin's Refutation of Radical Empiricism—Humanism and Truth Once More—Absolutism and Empiricism.

**THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE.** 8vo. 12s. net.

**A PLURALISTIC UNIVERSE.** 8vo. 5s. 6d. net.

**TALKS TO TEACHERS ON PSYCHOLOGY, and TO STUDENTS ON SOME OF LIFE'S IDEALS.** Crown 8vo. 4s. 6d.

**THE WILL TO BELIEVE, and other Essays.** Crown 8vo. 7s. 6d.

**MEMORIES AND STUDIES.** A Selection of Essays and Addresses. 8vo. 6s. 6d. net.

**SOME PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY.** 8vo. 4s. 6d. net.

**PRAGMATISM: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking.** 8vo. 4s. 6d. net.

**THE MEANING OF TRUTH: A Sequel to 'Pragmatism.'** 8vo. 4s. 6d. net.

**WILLIAM JAMES.**

By EMILE BOUTROUX, Membre de l'Institut.

Authorised Translation by ARCHIBALD AND BARBARA HENDERSON. 8vo. 3s. 6d. net.

**LONGMANS, GREEN & CO., 39, Paternoster Row, London, E.C.**

## THE METAPHYSIC OF EXPERIENCE.

By SHADWORTH H. HODGSON.

IN FOUR BOOKS.

Book I.—General Analysis of Experience.

Book II.—Positive Science.

Book III.—Analysis of Conscious Action.

Book IV.—The Real Universe.

In 4 vols. 8vo. buckram (the vols. not to be had separately). Price 36s.

*Also by the same.*

**TIME AND SPACE: A Metaphysical Essay.** 8vo. 16s. 1865.

**THE THEORY OF PRACTICE: an Ethical Enquiry.** 2 vols. 8vo. 24s. 1870.

**THE PHILOSOPHY OF REFLECTION.** 2 vols. 8vo. 21s. 1878.

**OUTCAST ESSAYS AND VERSE TRANSLATIONS.** Crown 8vo. 6s. 1881.

**ESSAYS:** The Genius of De Quincey, and De Quincey as Political Economist—The Supernatural in English Poetry, with Note on the True Symbol of Christian Union—English Verse.

**VERSE TRANSLATIONS:**—Nineteen short passages, mostly familiar, from Greek and Latin Classic Poets.

**LONGMANS, GREEN & CO., 39, Paternoster Row, London, E.C.;**  
New York, Bombay, and Calcutta.