

# THE QUEST

A Quarterly Review.

Edited by G. R. S. Mead.

Vol. XIII.

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# THE QUEST.

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## YOGA PSYCHOLOGY.

Prof. SURENDRANATH DAS GUPTA, M.A., Ph.D.,  
Chittagong College.

THE word 'Yoga' occurs in the earliest sacred literature of the Hindus in the Rigveda (about 3000 B.C.) with the meaning of effecting a connection. Later on, in about 700 or 800 B.C., the same word is used in the sense of yoking a horse. In still later literature (about 500 or 600 B.C.) it is found with the meaning of controlling the senses, and the senses themselves are compared with uncontrolled spirited horses. The word probably represents a very old original of the Aryan stock, which can be traced also in the German *joch*, O. E. *geoc*, Latin *jugum*, Greek *zeugon*.

The technical sense of the term in the system of philosophy which I am to discuss, is not only that of restraining the senses but of restraining the mental states as well, so as to bring the mind into absolute quiescence. Yoga in this sense is used only as a substantive and never as a verb. It probably, therefore, came into use as a technical expression to denote the quiescence of the mind, when people came to

be familiar with the existence of such mystical states. Analogically and etymologically, however, it is related to the older sense of 'yoking.'

In the *Maitrāyaṇa Upaniṣad*, dating about 500 B.C. or so, we find a curious passage, a part of which I quote from Max Müller's version as follows :

"All that we call desire, imagination, doubt, belief, ~~unbelief~~, certainty, uncertainty, shame, thought, ~~fear~~,—all these make up the mind. Carried along by the waves of qualities thickening into imaginations, unstable, fickle, crippled, full of desires, vacillating, he enters into belief, believing 'I am he,' 'this is he,' he binds himself by his self, as a bird with a net. Therefore a man being possessed of will, imagination and belief is a slave; but he who is the opposite is free. For this reason let a man stand free from will, imagination and belief; this is the sign of liberty, this is the path that leads to Brahman, this is the opening of the door, and through it he will go to the other shore of darkness. All desires are there fulfilled. And for this the sages quote a verse: 'When the five instruments of knowledge stand still together with the mind and when the intellect does not move, that is called the highest state.' "

The testimony of early Hindu and Buddhist writings goes to show that probably about five or six hundred years B.C. the sages who were engaged in asceticism and the acquirement of the highest virtue of self-control, had discovered that by intense concentration the mind could be reduced to an absolutely quiescent or unmoved state, and that at this stage the highest metaphysical truths flashed forth intuitively in a way quite different from what was ordinarily the case from inferential processes of thought. This state



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## Reviews and Notices

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AUTUMN SESSION, 1921.

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was thus regarded by them as leading to the highest that man could aspire to achieve. When this experience had been testified to by many sages, its place in the system of human knowledge and its value began to be discussed. The quotation given above represents one of the earliest specimens of such speculations. Later on, about 150 B.C. or so, Patañjali collected some of these floating arguments and speculations and gave them the form of a system of thought, which closely resembled the Sāṅkhya system of philosophy which was said to have been promulgated by Kapila. The resemblance of the Yoga way of thought with that of the Sāṅkhya is so great that they are regarded as representing two schools of the same system. The Yoga-system has undergone much elaboration and improvement at the hands of Vyāsa (200-300 A.D.), Vācaspati (900 A.D.) and Vijñāna Bhikṣu (1500 A.D.). It has associated with it its own metaphysics, cosmology, physics, ethics, theology and mystical practice. I propose to discuss in this paper mainly some aspects of its psychology. But as its psychology is very intimately connected with its metaphysics, I am afraid it may be impossible to avoid brief reference to some of its metaphysical doctrines also.

The Yoga-system admits the existence of separate individual souls, of individual minds, of an objective world of matter and of God. It holds that both matter and mind are developed by the combination of an infinite number of ultimate reals (*guṇa*'s). These reals are of three different classes: forming the energy-stuff (*rajas*), the mass-stuff (*tamas*) and the intelligence-stuff (*sattva*). As space does not allow of entering into any detailed account of them, it may briefly be noted

that the combination of these three different types of reals in different proportions and different modes is said to produce both mind and senses on the one hand and the objective world of matter on the other. Minds are said to differ from matter only in that they contain a very large proportion of the reals of the type of intelligence-stuff and energy-stuff, whereas the world of matter is formed by a large preponderance of the reals of mass-stuff and energy-stuff. The souls are distinguished from the minds and the matter as being principles of pure consciousness; they are said to be absolutely passive and inactive and devoid of any other characteristics. There is an inherent 'blind' purposiveness in the reals such that they tend to relate themselves to the principles of pure intelligence or consciousness and allow themselves to be interpreted as experience. This is rendered possible by the hypothesis that one of the classes of reals, the intelligence-stuff, is largely akin to the souls or principles of pure intelligence. The reals classed as the intelligence-stuff cannot, however, of themselves give us conscious experience, for being always associated with the energy-stuff they are constantly changing. Conscious experience cannot be produced without reference to a fixed or steady purposiveness which should run through all the reals and unite them into a system referring to a person. What we perceive when we analyse mind is but a fleeting series of mental states. These are passing in quick succession. They will not stop for a moment, but are rapidly consuming themselves like a burning flame; percepts, images, concepts, are all continually appearing and passing away. When, however, we notice carefully our conscious experience, we find



that, though these are present in all our mental states, they imply a unity, a distinct purposiveness, without which they themselves become as blind as any physical phenomenon of inanimate nature can be. To take an example: I know that I have experienced a world of events during the last thirty years. These are all in me or in my memory; but if I am asked of how many of these I am now conscious, I can hardly mention any except what are directly uppermost. If, however, I should try to think how many of Browning's love-poems I can remember, I find that I can recall a number of them. Only then can I say that I am directly conscious of these. There can be no doubt they were existing in the mind; but we say that they were existing in a sub-conscious state (*saṃskāra*). During deep sleep I cannot say that my waking experiences are destroyed; I can say only that I was then unconscious of them. This shows that our mind-states can exist in a condition in which they cannot be called awarenesses. Consciousness does not belong to them as their innate and intrinsic property; but they come to consciousness somehow under certain circumstances. The condition under which our mental states are rendered conscious is due to their association with our self (*puruṣa*).

It must, however, be noted that this real self is never objective to us in our psychological experience. When in accordance with ordinary perceptual experience I say I see my book on my table, there is indeed in me a notion of self which connects itself with this experience. But this self forms a part of the act of cognition, and it associates itself differently with different experiences, and as such it is but a part of our thought. Each and every definite mental state

shows itself to be associated with some notion of ego or 'I.' This notion is an indispensable stage through which the mental states must pass in order to get themselves fully expressed. But this notion of an 'I' is not a direct experience of pure self. It is simply a necessary stage in the process of the completing of the cognitive act, and as such its nature is not different from the nature of the cognitive experience. When I see my book on the table and think 'this is my book,' there are at least three elements involved in the judgment: there is the sense-object; there is the definite apprehension of the book as such; and there is also the association of the book with the notion of 'I' to which it appears to belong. This interpretation of the experience as my experience in connection with the notion of an ego, varies with each different experience; for the nature of this association of the sense-objects with this ego has a different character in accordance with the change of the sense-objects. My experience of a part of my body as being mine is obviously more intimately mine than my experience of a book as my book. When I speak of my pen and my book, I am disposed to think that the notion of 'mine' is more or less of a homogeneous nature, and the only difference here is the difference of the object of cognition. But when I compare the notions of my honour, my son, and my stick, I see that the association of the three objects of cognition with the sense of 'mine' is very different on these three occasions. It may be objected that there is an ambiguity in the use of the word 'mine' on these three occasions. I agree, and this is precisely what I was trying to show. The main point is that our notion of 'mine' is no simple homogeneous and fixed element,

but varies largely with the variety of experiences with which we have to deal. The notion 'mine' thus does not point to the experience of a permanent self in consciousness, but to the existence of a separate category of an egohood which represents a confused mass of feelings, having its root far into the depths of the sub-conscious elements of our nature.

The self (*puruṣa*) in Yoga is thus not directly demonstrated in experience and cannot be found by an analysis of introspection. The existence of the self (*puruṣa*) is a matter of implication and not an object of direct apprehension in consciousness. The existence of the self is held to be implied on teleological grounds, and on grounds of moral responsibility and moral endeavour. If there be not a separate self for each of us behind all our experience, what would give the unity to our experiences? This unity is not given by any notion of 'mine,' for we have already seen that the notion 'mine' is a variable element, and hence is as much of a changeable nature as are the mental states. On the other hand, we cannot say that our experiences have no unity and system in them. This unity thus presupposes a permanent subject with reference to which or in unison with which our experiences become systematized into a whole. There is an order and a purpose running through all our experiences, though the full meaning and value of them are not indeed clear to us. This much, however, we can understand, that probably our experiences are connected in such a way that something like a blind destiny runs through them, and that this blind destiny refers to some entity which is beyond them and with which they are somehow mysteriously associated. There is a difference between our sub-conscious and



conscious mental states, and this is inexplicable except on the supposition that our conscious experiences are made conscious by some entity other than themselves. There is in us a sense of moral responsibility and a sense of striving after the good, and this also would be inexplicable except on the supposition of a self. The only psychological ground on which the self can be inferred is the necessity of accounting for the peculiar trait of consciousness, *viz.* of its illuminating, which cannot be said to belong to the mental states themselves.

The existence of the mental states in potential forms in the sub-conscious is the root-idea of Yoga-psychology. The sub-conscious mental states resemble the conscious mental states so far as the substance, stuff or constituents of which they are made up, is concerned, but still there is an essential difference between the two: *viz.* that the one are unconscious, while the other are conscious. Why, if their substance be the same, should the mental states at one time be conscious and at other times be unconscious? This seems to imply the association with some other element different from the mental states. So in Yoga the self has to be admitted, and its association with the mental states has also to be somehow admitted. This is, however, the obscurest part of Yoga-psychology.

But we here tend to digress from the field of Yoga-psychology to Yoga-metaphysics. Leaving aside the question of the transcendent influence of a pure intelligence by which the mental states are somehow electrified into consciousness, let us come to the consideration of these states.

Mind (*buddhi*) according to the Yoga-system is a product of certain super-sensuous and super-subtle

reals which are in essence characterized as feeling-substances. It is indeed difficult to understand what the Yoga-thinkers understood by calling them feeling-substances. But since feelings are not treated separately from cognitive acts, it appears that the whole of the mind-stuff was regarded more or less in the light of a melted mass of feeling-stuff. We are generally accustomed in these days to think that feelings are mental experiences, whereas substances are things which have a non-mental or physical existence. There is therefore for us some confusion when we are told that the mind in Yoga is regarded as a product of the combination of three types of reals which are in essence but feeling-substances. But we should remember that according to the Yoga-theory, with the exception of a transcendental element of pure consciousness or pure intelligence, all forms of cognition, volition and feelings are regarded as super-subtle, substantive entities or reals. Feelings are regarded as the ultimate forms into which both the cognitive and volitional modes return and out of which they differentiate themselves under certain conditions. If we should think of the mind-substance as apart from cognitive or volitional states, we should call it according to Yoga an indeterminate stuff of feeling-complexes. The cognitive form of the mental states no doubt constituted the only stage in which the feelings or the volitions could find themselves interpreted and expressed, for it was with this form alone that the light of the transcendent self in a person could become associated. The substances of these cognitive states, however, are but the stuff of feeling-complexes, and so each cognitive state has a feeling-tone inseparably connected with it, as pleasurable,

painful or dull. A cognitive state in fact in Yoga means nothing but that state of the combination of the feeling-essences in which these could copy the objects of cognition and get the light of the self reflected on it. The energy which characterizes volition is already presupposed in the feeling-reals, and hence the volitional element is also present in every state of mind. We shall see below that a well-regulated volitional control was the chief thing in which the Yoga-system was interested.

It is thus I hope clear that the special nature of the hypothesis of the mind-stuff is such that there is no room for considering feeling, willing and knowing as three distinctly separate mental functions. These according to Yoga are as the three aspects of the particular states of the same substances.

But it may be asked: If the mind-stuff is made up of so many diverse reals, how is any unity of action possible? We have already observed that there is postulated an inherent teleology in the mind-stuff such as to serve the purposes of the self. Blindly guided by this teleology the reals conglomerate in such a manner as to render the experiences of the self possible. It is said that as fire, wick and oil, though altogether different, combine together to form the flame, so the different types of reals combine together for the formation of the stuff of the experiences of the self. The three different kinds of reals which form the mind-stuff can by no means remain uncombined, or separated from one another. Moreover, these combinations are continually changing form like the flame of a lamp. During our waking state our senses are continually coming into contact with all sorts of objects, and as an effect of this contact these objects are automatically



being copied or photographed in the mind, and at every moment a phase is formed in the mind which duly represents them. Moreover, as any perception passes away from the field of operation of the senses and another new perception comes in, the phase of the mind which represented the old perception passes away and a new one comes in its place. But the old phase is not wholly destroyed; it is only shifted into the region of the sub-conscious and may be revived partially or completely later on. Disappearance from the field of direct consciousness should on no account be regarded as destruction, any more than external things should be regarded as having ceased to exist when there is no perceiver to perceive them. And just as the physical objects, though to all appearance they may sometimes seem to have remained the same, may yet undergo considerable changes in the shape of atomic displacements unperceived by us, so is it the case with the mental states which pass into the sub-conscious. All physical objects are wasting away every moment, some rapidly and others slowly. The changes of those which waste away slowly can be remarked only after a long time; nevertheless it has to be admitted that they have been wasting all the while. This wasting does not mean that they have been completely destroyed, but only that there has been disintegration in one form and re-formation into another. There is nothing which comes into being from nothing, and there is nothing which is absolutely destroyed. So the mental states also as they exist in the sub-conscious are continually wasting; nevertheless the waste in some mental states takes place so slowly that they may be said to exist more or less the same even after long intervals of time. There are other

mental states, however, which waste away so quickly that even after a short interval they cannot be revived except in distorted forms. According to Yoga some of these mental states reduced to mere impressions or modes of mind continue to exist even through the lapse of many births. They cannot be directly recalled into consciousness, but they still exist and mould or influence the nature of our thought. These semi-effaced mental states often determine the mode and nature of our choice. In most cases, when we think that we are acting freely, we are in reality being determined by these hidden experiences of the past operating unseen. These semi-effaced mental states which reveal themselves as unaccountable tendencies of the mind, are technically called *vāsanā*. It is said that the mind is netted with innumerable knots of these *vāsanā*'s. They represent the result of a host of experiences, the detailed features of which are often lost, but which have produced such deep impressions that they can largely determine the course of our choice and the nature of our enjoyments. The perceptual and other forms of our conscious mental states, including all the volitional and feeling aspects, when they are continually active and repeated, constitute potencies in the sub-conscious state of the mind. These potencies are in a large measure the determinants of the modes and the habits of our thoughts and volitions. These unseen potencies are, according to Yoga, of a twofold character : 1, those which are the results of the experiences of past lives and operate as innate tendencies or instincts of this life ; and 2, those which are the results of repeated experiences of this life.

Ordinary mental processes are said to be of five kinds : *pramāṇa*, *viparyaya*, *vikalpa*, *nidrā* and *smṛiti*.

*Pramāṇa* includes valid states, the states of perception, inference and belief in valid testimony. *Viparyaya* means illusory knowledge, which is produced by the operation of the defects of the senses, the rousing of wrong memories, causing non-observation of the distinction between the right and the wrong thing. *Vikalpa* means the processes of abstraction and contraction employed by us in following an argument or sometimes in using language. Thus when I say 'consciousness of the self' I make an unreal abstraction, for the self according to Yoga is identical with consciousness; but for the convenience of language I separate them as though they were different from each other and then unite them. This state of the mind is of a distinctly different type, and without it thought and language are not possible. Sleep (*nidrā*) is also regarded as a separate type of mental process, when the volitional control of a man is absent and as a result thereof, by the loose play of the suppressed mental states of the sub-conscious, dreams are produced. In the state of deep sleep there is not a cessation of mental states; the state represented therein is one of negation of all positive appearances, but though a negation it is considered as a mental process (*vr̥itti*). Memory (*smṛiti*) is also regarded as a separate mental process. Memory is produced by the recalling of the old *samskāra*'s or impressions in the sub-conscious by similarity, contrast, contiguity of time or place, etc. It is said that memory may also be produced by the random working of the *samskāra*'s, in which case it is said to be determined by time.

But if in the perceptual state of our consciousness we are determined by the influx of sensations, and in our thought-processes, choice and volition by the accu-

culated experiences of the past acting as tendencies we seem in no way to be our own masters and to have, no power for moral endeavour at our disposal at all. Such a view, however, Yoga cannot admit; for the whole theory of its psychology aims at explaining the fact that we can by the exercise of our will and concentration attain final emancipation from the bonds of all worldly experience. It therefore holds that there is a power (*śakti*) inherent in the mind by virtue of which it can endeavour (*ceṣṭā*) in any particular direction. It can react against the forces of the past tendencies, repress them and concentrate upon states which may appear desirable to it. Undoubtedly the force of the tendencies of the accumulated experiences of the past in the sub-conscious cannot easily be overcome. Whenever there is any slackening of the will, these will try to have their own way and distract us into paths hostile to our best wishes. If we are with full consciousness exerting our will, there will be a constant fight between the sort of conscious states which we are trying to have, and the sub-conscious tendencies pulling us the other way. But if, as said above, none of our experienced states can be destroyed, it would seem that we can never hope to succeed in having our own way entirely.

Here, however, comes in the theme of the law of contrary mental states (*pratipakṣabhāvanā*). Ordinarily no mental states are destroyed; even when they seem to be destroyed, they work in a cumulative manner as tendencies of particular kinds. But the law of contrary mental states holds that any sub-conscious mental state or tendency can be ultimately destroyed by generating opposite mental states. Thus if I am jealous of a man, I shall naturally be led to

think of his evil deeds; but I can fight against this tendency and try to think of some of his good traits. In the first stages it will hardly appear pleasant to shake off my ill-will against the man; but I may try it again and again and each attempt will make the task easier for me. For each good thought that I may be having at different times is being stored and accumulated in the sub-conscious. Here another law comes into operation; *viz.* the law that the repetition of any mental state will strengthen the corresponding impression of it in the sub-conscious. Thus in accordance with this law the power of the sub-conscious impression of good thoughts will gradually gain in strength. The evil thoughts come now only at random moments, and hence, however strong originally, they may be destroyed eventually by continually thinking of the opposite good thoughts. When any particular evil thought ceases for a time to present itself before us, we are not to suppose that the evil tendency has been removed. In reality it is still existing and, if it is to be completely uprooted, the root of the impression of the opposite thought in the deepest parts of the sub-conscious has to be strengthened. There are different levels of the sub-conscious, and even when an impression has been destroyed in the shallower ones, it may still have roots in the deeper and may in time grow up again. So there is no permanent safety from any impression of an evil thought unless the roots of the opposite good thought may be made to run as deep as the roots of the impressions of evil thought. As a good impression in the sub-conscious grows stronger and stronger, its roots go deeper and deeper into the utmost levels of the sub-conscious, and as it spreads there, it destroys the roots of the opposite evil thought which have been



already enfeebled by its growth. The significance of the Yoga-theory of psychology with regard to ethical conduct is that it is possible to control not only our external conduct but also our inner thought. Though the workings of the sub-conscious are apparently unknown to us, we may by directing the workings of the conscious determine the growth of the sub-conscious in a way helpful to our purposes. We may cease to be disturbed by any evil thought or propensity, not by simply negating it, but by the acquirement of positive good thoughts and ideals. Thus we may so develop the habit of thinking of universal love and compassion and the tendency to overlook others' defects and of feeling happiness at the happiness of others, that it will become impossible for us to have a single evil thought against any fellow being.

It should be noted, however, that the Yoga-ideal is not satisfied by a man's becoming solely moral. A Yogin seeks deliverance from every bondage, even from the bondage of his mind. The attainment of perfect morality and self-control by acquiring the virtues of universal non-injury, truthfulness, celibacy, purity, contentment, fortitude, etc. (technically called *yama* and *niyama*), is of course indispensable for him. But this is not all. This cannot give him full liberation. He would be a pure and free 'spirit' untrammelled even by his 'mind.' Thus when his mind has been sufficiently purified and is no longer disturbed by ordinary moral strivings, he endeavours to engage himself in a higher work, *viz.* that of staying the movement of the mind-states.

We have already said that the mind is always changing as the flame of a lamp. So long as this change of mind, this continual succession of mental

states, continues, a man is as it were for ever being tossed upon the crests of the waves of thought. He is not master of himself. The Yogin, therefore, in order to suppress the ever-changing nature of the mind, tries to restrain his mind from the many different objects of thought and to hold one object only continually in his attention. The former process is called *dhāraṇā* and the latter *dhyāna*. In the first stages it is difficult to fix the mind on one object, and the object has to be continually replaced before the mind. By this process of continually presenting the same object to the mind a habit is generated and a potency of fixation is acquired in the sub-conscious, and gradually the changeful character of the mind ceases and the mind becomes one with the object. At this stage there are no fluctuations of mental states; the mind becomes one with the object of thought, absolutely still and motionless. This state is called *samādhi*. When the mind becomes thus fixed on one object, it is said that immediate cognitions of the real nature of the object dawn before the mind. This is called *prajñā*-knowledge. In its character as immediate and direct it resembles perception, but it does not fluctuate and so the nature of the reality of the object appears in one undisturbed flash. The mind is at this state one with this reality. It is this knowledge alone which the Yogin considers to be supremely real. As the Yogin advances in his path of meditation the impressions of this tendency to meditation grow stronger, so that to get into meditation becomes an easy thing for him; and as at each stage of meditation he meets with new flashes of true wisdom, the potencies and impressions of his old phenomenal knowledge are gradually destroyed, and there comes

a time when he is able to perceive the true nature of the self as distinguished from the mind. As this stage is persisted in, the ignorance through which the mind was being falsely identified with the self is ultimately destroyed, and as a result of this the connection of the mind with the self ceases and the soul (*puruṣa*) remains in itself in its own absolute pure intelligence.

In this part of the Yoga-theory there seem to be three things which may appear to us as assumptions, but which the Yogins affirm to be undeniable facts of experience. These are : firstly, that the changeful processes of the mind can at a certain state be brought to a standstill ; secondly, that such a state can give us a new grade or dimension of knowledge ; and thirdly, that, as a culmination and highest advancement of this knowledge, the pure individual self as pure intelligence can be known. This kind of knowledge will not of course be knowledge in the familiar sense ; for all *samādhi*-knowledge is said to be non-conceptual knowledge and so of a different order. This difference in kind refers not only to the fact that *prajñā*-knowledge gives us a knowledge of reality, whereas perception gave us phenomenal knowledge only, but also to a difference in their essential nature or character. The *prajñā*-impressions tend to loosen the mind from the self. They represent a different dimension of knowledge completely foreign to phenomenal knowledge. We can never recall the knowledge gained by *prajñā* in our normal consciousness, for it is opposed to the latter, and the former can never be translated in terms of the latter ; the memory we recall is a phenomenal state of consciousness. This new dimension of knowledge is thus said to super-

sede scientific knowledge and not to supplement it. We should also remember that this *prajñā*-knowledge has nothing to do with telepathy, dual or multiple personality or the like, which are all but varieties of phenomenal knowledge.

If we do not believe the testimony of the Yogin, there is probably no way for us either to prove or disprove its reality.

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# THE STANDPOINT AND METHODS OF PSYCHOLOGY IN RELATION TO RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE.

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## I.

It is a truism to-day that for the proper understanding of all problems, public and private, which arise in the social intercourse of men, whether at peace with one another or at war, above all things we require some degree of what is called psychological insight, some knowledge of psychology. The Germans are asserted to have lost the War because they failed to understand what is called the psychology of the English people; we in our turn fail to win the Irish because we find their psychology so full of tears and trifles as to be incomprehensible. A certain Prime Minister is alleged to have bewitched statesmen intrinsically more able than himself by virtue of his uncanny power of psychological divination. The whole armour of advertising is compounded of the soft steel of psychology, and the reason why "East is East and West is West, and never the twain shall meet" is that their respective psychologies are incompatible. So it is insinuated that psychology, and psychology alone, can interpret and unravel the mysteries and meaning of religion. But before we accept psychology as such an 'open sesame' it is necessary to understand what the term



precisely means, what are its scope, its standpoint, its methods and its limitations.

Psychology, we are often told, is the science of mind. In what sense *science*, and in what meaning *mind*? Or it is the 'science of mental processes as such.' What differentiates *mental* process from other process, and what means the proviso *as such*? Or it is the science of the '*behaviour*' of men, an intensive and applied branch of biology. From the behaviouristic standpoint psychology is primarily a record of objective observations, together with the logical inferences therefrom; from the opposite point of view psychology is primarily subjective in scope and introspective in method. When psychology is concerned with groups of men and social actions and processes, it is preferably to be called sociology; and its methods are those of comparative science in general.

The selection of *consciousness* as the real field of psychology we owe to Descartes. Unfortunately, however, he set up such a complete antithesis between soul and body, matter and mind, that the problem of their relationship has yet to be surmounted; while the inexplicability of external perception, on the lines of Cartesian dualism, was insisted upon by Berkeley, Hume and their successors. If, then, we cannot accept the position that psychology is the science of life (which is to over-emphasize the biological side), neither can we say it is the science of mind or of mental processes as such, for this implies too great a gulf between it and the science of matter (hylology, Prof. Ward would call it). For us, "mind is organic to matter and matter organic to mind." As we cannot deduce the nature of mind solely by inferences from behaviour of body, neither can we deduce all its

properties and processes *a priori* from the simple concept of consciousness. The mind-theory and the life-theory must be combined in one which recognizes the inseparability of subject and object in experience. We shall define psychology, therefore (in Dr. Ward's terms), as the science of individual experience; and we shall insist throughout that this experience is constituted by two factors: the knowing percipient subject and the known, perceived object, a duality of ego and non-ego in one individual experience.<sup>1</sup>

## II.

The bearing of this general view of psychology upon religious problems must be discussed later on. But it will be well to point out here that from the psychological standpoint any experience is a relation between subject and object, some step in the progressive differentiation of a *totum objectivum*; and that *for psychology* there is no difference between the objectivity of the Object in religious experience and the objectivity of the object in sensuous or in æsthetic experience. We have to keep the epistemological question entirely separate at this stage. The terms subjective and objective are so ambiguous that we cannot be too careful on this point. Some people are inclined to depreciate religious experience because, they say, it is subjective; as a matter of fact all experience, and not only religious experience, is subjective in the sense that it is owned by the experient. For epistemology, or theory of knowledge,

<sup>1</sup> The writer desires to acknowledge his indebtedness to Prof. Ward's books: the application to religious experience is of course his own responsibility. *The Realm of Ends* and *Psychological Principles* are indispensable to the student.

objective means the universal, common properties of experience, and subjective means the private and particular characterizations thereof; but for psychology subjective refers primarily to the experiencing subject, while all that he experiences is objective.

But when we come to a closer analysis of experience, we are beset by a tendency to confuse the experience itself with the exposition thereof, to identify the experience of analysis with the analysis of experience. This is the *psychologist's fallacy*, and it is one which is continually committed in the analysis of religious experience. We tend to interpret the past solely by the present, the immature experiences of youth in the mature light of middle-age. In particular the ideas we gain about feelings are identified with feeling itself, so that the latter is regarded as on a level with percepts and sensations; whereas, properly speaking, feeling is subjective in a double sense. It is subjective for epistemology and subjective for psychology; it inheres solely in the subject, and is not and cannot be itself an object of knowledge. Ideas about feelings are one thing, feelings themselves are another. Feeling is thus unique amongst psychological data in being wholly and purely subjective, subjectively subjective<sup>1</sup> we might say. The importance of this for our present purpose is at once manifest. We cannot ground religious experience simply in feeling; feeling can never attain to objectivity in the epistemological sense; and so, although Schleiermacher analysed religion into a feeling of dependence, it does not follow that the validity of religion is therefore dependent on feeling.

A further consequence of the psychologist's fallacy is an intellectual bias which may lead us to neglect

<sup>1</sup> The phrase was first used by Hamilton.

the function of bodily movements in experience. But genetic and comparative methods have made clear to us that, not in intellect but in will, not in cognition but in activity or conation, is the real key to the character and development of the experient. Experience, says Dr. Ward, is the process of becoming expert by experiment. From our earliest moment we are continually adjusting ourselves, our whole selves, body-and-mind, to respond to stimuli that interest in such a way as to retain what is of interest and value at the centre of consciousness. A deduction from this will be made later. •

### III.

It will be noted that we have used the term 'experience' much more freely than the term 'consciousness.' Advisedly so; for consciousness is too often identified exclusively with self-consciousness; moreover consciousness often means an intense degree of awareness; and, again, some psychologists who eliminate the terms 'soul' and 'substance' from psychology, proceed then to hypostasize or personify consciousness itself, in order to make it perform the *rôle* of subject. It is better, therefore, to speak of experience rather than of consciousness, and to say quite frankly that the individual subject or the individual experient has certain presentations, certain feelings, acts in a certain way; we cannot eliminate the percipient experiencing subject simply by eliminating the term 'soul' because we dislike it.

In thus preferring the term 'experience' to the term 'consciousness,' we reach questions of method. It might be urged that by studying the experience of

simpler (I do not say lower) animals than ourselves we shall the better understand the complexities of our own.

Experience seems to be evolutionary, and it might therefore seem to be wise to treat it wholly on the historical or genetic basis. Hence, too, some writers would have us search for the key to Christian religious experience in the early fetishes and magics of primitive people. As a matter of fact, however, although our own experience is complex, it has one supreme merit: it is immediately accessible to us; we know it first, we know it best; the experiences of simpler races and simpler animals we can know only later, inferentially and in less degree. Difficult as the task may be, the analytic method must precede the genetic; we must begin with what is at any rate partially known. Biology, physiology, sociology and comparative psychology can never really displace analytic psychology, and must, in fact, themselves employ the materials and analogies of individual experience. "Psychology may," it is true, "be individualistic without being confined exclusively to the introspective method"<sup>1</sup>; it may employ any or all the facts presented by observation in other sciences, but on one condition only: that those facts have psychological meaning or significance, *i.e.* are constituents of the experience of some one individual. Whatever is presented in the experience of an individual is germane to psychology; what is not presented therein is irrelevant. "Psychology, then, never transcends the individual."<sup>2</sup> Certain French sociologists object to the phrase 'religious experience,' and insist that the terms faith and belief alone should be employed. The objection cannot be sustained, and

<sup>1</sup> Ward, *Psychological Principles*.    <sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*



is itself due to an unacknowledged prejudice against religion. The expression 'religious experience' is just as legitimate as that of æsthetic experience or scientific experience, and is intended to signify, not a simple state of faith or belief, but a real experience, the Object of which can be characterized in terms of increasing precision, and towards which Object the experient has certain feelings and behaves in certain ways. And even the sociologists make a postulate of the principle that "no human institution could endure if it were solely based on error and falsehood. Hence all religions are in a sense true religions," although they are not all equally true. Moreover "there is no religion which is not a cosmology at the same time as it is a speculation on the Divine. . . . The notion of the Divine is no mirage of social facts: it is an implicit theory of the universe. The human mind naturally conceives itself with the All, though it always starts with its immediate social environment, and only gradually realizes that it is not the dominant fact in the universe."<sup>1</sup>

Group-theories of religion, therefore, while they serve to emphasize the social side of religious practice, and even of religious thought, must be rejected by us, not only because (in Prof. Webb's words) "they do not do justice to what we usually mean by individual or personal religion, and must inevitably end in a view of it as something illusory," but also because group-theories cannot dispense with the essential standpoint and method of psychology as the science of *individual* experience. Far from weakening either the content or the validity of religious experience, psychology illuminates the content and strengthens the validity. Precisely because experience is constituted psycholo-

<sup>1</sup> Webb, *Group Theories of Religion*.

gically in a 'subject-object relation,' religion can never assent to an individualism which excludes all that is other than itself; and, similarly, because experience is a *subject-object* relation, religion will also present a front to pantheism. Find yourself by losing yourself, say the idealist and the Christian idealist; yes, but having so found yourself, stand firm, don't go losing yourself again. There is no second chance in these circumstances. The "religious soul knows that only in proportion as what it finds in itself is not its own but God's, has it anything worth calling its own, but the religious soul must find this *in itself*"; this is psychologically imperative and inevitable.

Recognition of experience is independent of theories of its social genesis. That psychology is in fact independent of sociology brings out one other principle of great importance in the psychology of religion itself. Inasmuch as the analysis of experience is not the experience of analysis, is not the experience itself, we are able to separate two distinct problems: that of origin and that of validity. Chemistry is the child of alchemy, but it is not an illegitimate child—rather we should say it is alchemy which was illegitimate chemistry. Similarly, astrology preceded astronomy, but it is the former and not the latter which is invalidated. Chemistry and astronomy are none the worse for their ancestral origin in astrology and alchemy, and these latter indeed are made respectable in their offspring. So also, whatever may be the origins of religion, public and private, the *validity* of religion and the valid value of religious experience in the individual are unimpaired. Shakespeare's plays are not made more valuable nor are they explained by reason of their derivation from Plutarch, Holinshed and the rest;

but those persons are made more respectable, more interesting, by reason of their utility to Shakespeare. So it is with Christianity; it is not made more valuable, valid or respectable by Sir J. G. Frazer's researches into the dying gods of other religions; but the dying gods have become more respectable through their association with Christianity, have indeed come to life again because only in Christianity is there the real power of a real resurrection. Truth is not the less truth because it is seen painfully to issue from trial and error; but error is seen to be the less error, to be affirmation of the second degree (as Bergson puts it) by reason of its being the matrix of truth. "We do not make truth, rather it makes us; we do not make love, but rather love makes us"; we do not make experience of God, but rather God through experience and in our experience makes us. Religious experience, then, is not weakened by its origins, and may indeed in some ways give a new value to those origins. The origins have instrumental value; the experience itself is of intrinsic value.

#### IV.

We shall return to the epistemological discussion again, meanwhile it is desirable to proceed to a general analysis of individual experience, in order to make the bearing of psychology upon religion still clearer. We have said that experience is the process of becoming expert by experiment. Speculation (intellectual, that is) has been described by Mr. Bradley as experimenting with ideas; and if experience in general is the process of becoming expert by experiment, religious experience is likewise experimental in character, with expertness

as its consequence. Or, in simpler terms, it involves a quest and ends in conquest.

Now when we come to this question of analysis, the determination of what is invariably present in any psychosis or phase of experience, we are often told that feeling is alone primordial, is, as we have already said, doubly subjective. But the word feeling has at least five different meanings. It may denote (i.) touch, active and passive—*e.g.* a feeling of roughness; (ii.) organic sensation, *e.g.* thirst; (iii.) emotion, *e.g.* a feeling of anger or pride; (iv.) some purely subjective state, *e.g.* a feeling of certainty or conviction; and (v.) purely *affective* feeling of pleasure or of pain.

Feeling *accompanies* organic sensation, but is not wholly identified therewith; and organic sensations of pain, physiologically, are not identical with the subjective displeasure which is pain psychological. "The simplest form of psychical life involves not only a subject feeling, but a subject having qualitatively distinguishable presentations which are the causes of its feeling." Feeling, then, is not primordial; the subject feeling feels because there is change in the continuum of presentations which produces a feeling of pleasure, a feeling of pain. Hence in religious experience there is not first feeling, then an idea of dependence, and last an idea of God, but a presentation of 'God,' a consequent feeling and consequent action. A presentation for psychology is *any* mind-content, any constituent of experience cognized or attended to by the subject; such presentations are legitimately to be called *objects*, but to avoid confusion should not be too frequently so called. Any object related to the experient, to the subject, is a presentation; and the relation of objects to subjects is a relation or process of presentation.

And process of presentation implies attention in the subject. "Be still, and know that I am God." Attention in the subject also implies intension in the object. "Speak, Lord, for Thy servant heareth." But the adjustment of attention to the object means change in the subject, which change is generally effected by movement: the nun in adoration is breathless—*i.e.*, she has ceased to move. The change of movement is itself due, *as far as we can tell*, to a change of attention: we say as far as we can tell, because "we cannot imagine the beginning of life, but only life begun"<sup>1</sup>; we cannot imagine the beginning of movement but only movement begun, nor the beginning of religion but only religion begun.

There are, therefore, in any psychosis, in any case of the subject-object relation which we call experience, three logically distinguishable constituents. These constituents are commonly described as: knowing, feeling and willing; or cognition, affection and conation or volition. But we have ever to keep in sight the fundamental unity of experience; and, further, we have to avoid the notion that these three constituents are three co-ordinate faculties. Feeling alone is subjectively subjective, and conation or activity is the subject's power of distributing attention according as it is pleased or displeased, affected or disaffected; hence feeling and attention are not presented in the subject-object relation. Our analysis therefore resolves itself into saying that in any one concrete experience or psychosis there are three distinct components: attention, feeling and objects or presentations; and that since attention may be determined *ab extra* or *ab intra*, we have either a receptive attitude (commonly

<sup>1</sup> Ward, *op. cit.*

called cognition) when attention is determined *ab extra*, or a motor and active attitude, when attention is determined *ab intra*. In the one case feeling follows the act of attention, in the other it precedes it.

Presentations admit of variation and continuous and progressive differentiation, which gives to presentation a certain individuality and associability; attention cannot be so progressively differentiated. Growth of experience therefore means growth in the progressive differentiation of presentations in the continuum; and growth in religious experience is none other than growth in a similar progressive differentiation of the continuum of moral, æsthetic and intellectual ideas which are implicative of God, a world in which God is immanent and yet transcendent. Our religious experience, because it is experience, is always experimental; but it is progressively experimental in the sense that its Object, which was, and is, and evermore shall be, is for the religious soul more and more fully known and apprehended by attention and by affection—*i.e.* love.

We may, therefore, now attempt a further definition of experience, one which we owe in part to Kant's category of reciprocity and in part to Ward and McDougall. Experience is always social and always of a solidarity. It is, we may say, reciprocal interaction or *mutuum commercium*; implying two agents and not merely two phenomena. The nature of the two agents is not, strictly speaking, a matter for psychology; metaphysics must attempt to describe the agent finite, him whom we have called the subject, and theology the nature of the Object-Agent, Him whom we call God. But it is a great gain for the philosophy of religion, for religion itself to realize that all experi-



ence is a reciprocity between two agents, all experience is intercourse in a society, all experience is a divine trafficking. The first object presented to the infant mind is its own body, and it grows by exploration, experiment, intercourse therewith. The object presented to the religious mind is also its own body, the body which is described by Royce as the Beloved Community, but which is described by Christian thought as the Church, the Body of Christ; in and with that body the soul has intercourse by exploration, experiment and expert experience. *Anima naturaliter Christiana* expresses a profound psychological truth; the soul is naturally Christian because all its experience is a reciprocity of intercourse between itself as agent and an Other who is also Agent, and whose agency is the Church.

## V.

We must now revert to that problem which lies on the border-line between psychology and epistemology, between theory of mind and theory of knowledge. We have to shew in what sense psychology, while it can never transcend the individual subject, yet has an objectivity which enables it to become scientific. Presentations in mind are not simply subjective modifications of a state of consciousness. Were experience solely subjective, the term subjective would be meaningless, and the term objective could never arise. There is individuality and unity in the subjective factor, the ego; there is also unity and individuality in the objective factor or non-ego. Ego-and-non-ego constitute the universe, and though each individual has something unique in him, yet he is somewhat similar to non-ego; moreover the non-egos

are so similar after a certain point that they become indistinguishable. There is a common objective continuum for us all, looked at differently by each of us, but objectively whole and undivided. To help us here we employ a series of terms: subjective, objective and inter-subjective and trans-subjective.

For psychology no experience is solely subjective; for epistemology only those features of experience which are universal, the same for every subject, can be described as objective. To overcome the apparent antithesis between private and public, personal and impersonal factors, between sense-knowledge and thought-knowledge, Dr. Ward speaks of inter-subjective and trans-subjective. Take Reid's example: Ten men look at the moon: do they all see the same object? Reid answers yes; Hamilton says the percepts differ, but by process of *reasoning* we infer that beyond the percepts is a common moon. To this moon we apply the term trans-subjective; but Hamilton did not quite bring out the fact that we pass from the immediacy of our subjective knowledge of the moon to the knowledge of the trans-subjective moon by social intercourse, *i.e.* by inter-subjective experience. We have, therefore, three levels of experience: (i.) the immediate, private, subjective; (ii.) the social, inter-subjective experience; (iii.) the trans-subjective. As the bodily adjustment of the subject to his environment advances, so also does his spiritual adjustment, and the arbitrary gulf between subjective and objective disappears as a problem, though the distinction remains as a guide.

But this *mind* that we continually speak of may signify: (a) only a series of mental phenomena; or (b) only the subject of the series; or (c) the subject plus or with its series.

Empirical psychology must on the whole use 'mind' in the third sense, although William James in his doctrine, that the thoughts are the thinkers, tries to combine the first two into an extraordinary and for us unacceptable position. We cannot eliminate the ego from psychology, though the ultimate nature thereof is not a question for psychology only.

But we can also say I know myself; *je me connais*; let a man examine himself. There is a distinction here which is of importance in the psychology of religion. The self-known is 'Me'; the self-knowing is 'I.' The Me is empirical, object of experience; never a presentation; the 'I' is the subject and only the subject of experience. Metaphysically the ego, or pure self, is prior. Psychologically the concept of the pure, real self is in order of time where the series ends rather than where it begins. To lose oneself in order to find oneself means then to lose, or rather to subjugate, the empirical self and thereby to liberate the pure ego which metaphysically is presupposed all the while. *Psychologically*, then, the self grows; epistemologically and metaphysically,

It "has no parts, and cannot grow—  
 Unfurlèd not from an embryo.  
 Yet must keep pace and tarry, patient, kind,  
 For its unwilling scholar, the dull Mind.  
 Born of full stature, lineal to control,  
 And yet a pigmy's yoke must undergo."

The marks of self presented, *i.e.* of Me, are that Me has: (a) a unique interest; (b) a special inwardness; (c) an individuality, that (d) persists; is (e) active; and (f) knows itself or is self-conscious. This Me which has these marks, *grows*, and its growth indicates

corresponding features in religious experience and in method of religious education. The growing Me, then, as a presentation is, firstly, a somatic, sensitive, appetitive Me—mainly presentation of body and bodily appetites, with that unique interest, inwardness, individuality and persistent activity which we have already named as characteristics of every stage of the growth of Me. Hence the anthropomorphism of early religious experience as well as the higher anthropomorphism of Christian doctrine of the Incarnation are the counterpart of the appetitive somatic Me.

Secondly, the growing Me through the fact of memory is a creature that looks before and after and pines for what is not. It begins to introduce order, scale, into appetites; it is the imagining and desiring Me. This imagining and desiring Me may never fully develop; there are individuals of so phlegmatic and dull a kind that they rarely look before and after, rarely pine for what is not, finished and finite clods untroubled by a spark. Religious education here must be directed towards fostering and quickening both memory and imagination; and for this purpose with such people the use of external aids, music, sacred pictures and the like is essential, so that they may find infinite riches in a little room. There are others, however, in whom this imagining and desiring Me may be so developed and concentrated in one tense moment of attention that attention passes into absorption, rapture, ecstasy, wherein somatic consciousness is suspended; they are laid asleep in body, as Wordsworth says, and become living souls.

Thirdly, at a level above simple sensation, and above simple desire, memory and imagination there is the life of intellect, the self presented as a system

of ideas, tastes, conviction, character. This is the thinking and willing Me. It is formed largely through the agency of language spoken and written; it is never really localized either in the heart or in the brain. Spatial relations have disappeared. Whereas in the second level there may be emotional and imaginal ruptures, so that dissociated systems, multiple personalities arise; here there is a welded unity, a certain harmony: emotions and passions are clarified in ideas; thought is largely imageless. For this inmost willing and thinking self, external aids to devotion, even the recognized rites of the Church, are no longer of the *esse* of his religious being, though they may still be of the *bene esse*.

It is important in religious psychology to note that probably the majority of individuals rarely reach this third level, at any rate permanently; most are visualisers, audiles, motor-minded. We stay at the second level of memory and imagination, or even at the first. But with growth, discipline of the emotions and discipline of intellect we can reach and abide at the third level, the intellectual self, where love of God is Spinoza's *amor intellectualis*.

Next we come to what for psychology is ultimate, the pure self or ego, no longer the presented Me but the knowing subject of experience, last in order of knowledge, first in order of existence. This pure Ego that knows is related to the self that is known, to the intellectual self, in a two-fold fashion—related to it through social intercourse, so that a man can truly say "I have many selves"; and, related to it secondly in a unity which overcomes or transcends the duality of subject and object which is experience. Here the Ego is autonomous, acts, creates; it is no presen-

tation but owner of all presentations, very self of very self. This highest self-consciousness may become, perhaps implicitly is, God-consciousness, so that we may say, not I but God worketh in me. Experience without an experient is unintelligible, we cannot wholly and logically identify I and Me, but we can say this pure Ego is immanent in all experience; and further, precisely because it is necessary to all experience, while not all experience is necessary to it, we may fairly call this I transcendent as well as immanent. Psychology will therefore help us to connect the two-fold doctrine of Divine transcendence and Divine immanence. As my pure Ego is immanent throughout my individual experience, and as by that very fact it transcends it, so the Spirit of God is immanent in all experience too, and by that very fact God transcends it. The further relation between the finite individual whose pure Ego is both immanent in and transcendent of his experience, and the Infinite Being whom we call God, is not for psychology to solve, or even to attempt. But we get a clue in that interpretation of experience as reciprocity which we have already discussed. Perfect personality, says Lotze, is in God alone; and we, broken beams of Him, have yet a measure, a real measure of real independence, functioning in the Divine experience, since that experience too is a reciprocity of Subject-and-Object in inseparable relation. It is no disgrace, no weakening of our own individuality, to say that *ultimately*—ultimately—there is one pure Ego, one pure Self, one perfect Personality in God; while at the same time we, objects of His experience, are yet subjects of our own. “Daughter I am in my Mother’s house, but mistress in my own.” By saying that the subject is both

immanent and transcendent in experience, we both do justice to and avoid the dangers attaching to excessive ecstacy or to terms such as Divine union, Divine espousals or deification. Ultimately, the Subject of all experience is God, but He who is thus the logical *prius* of experience is, in a sense, last in order of knowledge. As Object of *our* experience, we grow into knowledge of Him, and, in a sense, He grows in our knowledge<sup>1</sup>; yet *the more we know Him* and are known by and of Him, the more we realize that, though the immanent Object of our experience, He is yet the transcendent Subject to whom we owe adoration, worship, duty and love.

It will perhaps be observed that we have attempted to demarcate the nature of psychology and its relation to religious experience, without any reference to that abundant material provided by William James in his *Varieties of Religious Experience*. The reason is twofold: (i.) James's *Varieties* partake too much of the ultra-normal; and (ii.) are interpreted in an ultra-Protestant manner. Better is it for us to keep closely, as closely as possible, to the normal in human experience, and to avoid an ultra-denominational standpoint. The way to reunion lies along the path marked out in our common psychology. If we can shew in psychology a certain common form of experience, can shew that self-knowledge implies escape from sheer subjectivity to objectivity of a higher order, can shew that through inter-subjective intercourse we reach to the beyond, the *ultima ratio* of all our existences; then we have reached to the common Father of mankind, to Him in whom there is no variableness nor shadow of turning,

<sup>1</sup> This may perhaps be criticized as savouring of Patripassianism.

to Him in whom, while we approach Him only through a great darkness, there is yet no darkness at all.

## VI.

There is, however, one aspect of religious experience concerning which psychology has a special word to say—*viz.* the fact of belief. Experience may be said to begin in belief and to close in faith. This implies a distinction between faith and belief which is not always realized. The Christian faith in 1914 did not require us to make any asseveration regarding the Angels of Mons, but many Christians believed therein. The term belief, indeed, has both a wide and a narrow significance: it may include certainty or it may exclude it. And this corresponds to the difference in the psychological and the epistemological meaning of belief. Belief psychologically includes subjective certainty (and this is Mill's use); but belief epistemologically excludes subjective certainty. For epistemology, belief and knowledge differ in *kind*; for psychology they differ only in degree. Certainty for psychology is only the upper limit of belief.<sup>1</sup> Epistemology is concerned with the logical grounds of knowledge; psychology not so. In fact, while epistemology is concerned with Truth and the logical grounds of Truth, psychology is not really interested in Truth *per se* at all, but only with subjective certainty or conviction. "Truth belongs," says Prof. Ward, "to the universe of propositions; certainty implies a complete, a *certain* state of mind." Now with regard to the certainty of sense, this is immediate, fundamental, and dependent on sensory materials that are given; but the certainty of thought,

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Ward, *op. cit.* ch. xiv.



which is concerned with objects of a higher order, is a certainty which is psychologically *secondary*. The doctrine of the historic Christ, manifested in time and space, is in Christian theology the necessary counterpart of the psychological primacy of the certainty of sense. Were there no primary sense-certainty, secondary certainty of thought could never be absolute; because the Incarnation is psychologically of the primary order, the rest of Christian theology acquires, or can acquire, secondary certainty also. We rely, of course, as is obvious, upon memory-judgments; but into this we cannot now go, except to say that were there no forgetting there could be no remembering. Certainty then is a subjective attitude to which we are constrained, in which consent is inevitable, even though our consent be not obtained. The effects of belief are well known: belief yields *satisfaction* (the wish is father to the thought), and belief facilitates action. Indeed, preparedness to act is the sole genuine criterion of belief; faith without works is dead. On the other hand *objective*, not subjective, constraint is essential to certainty, to genuine belief. We cannot, despite William James, we cannot really will to believe. We may wish to believe, but if wishes were horses beggars would ride, and if wishing were belief there would be no punishment for sin. A man cannot deliberately deceive himself, he "cannot base action on what he *knows* to be fiction." On the other hand, imagination may impose upon us and impart a specious certainty, so that we are, as it were, hypnotized into belief. We may be blinded by passion and desire, or hypnotized or fascinated by imagination, so that belief is constrained by the complex abeyance of all option: Duncan is bewitched by Macbeth, and builds on him an

absolute trust. Imagination is therefore a frequent indirect cause of belief, and inclinations similarly bias belief through their ideational mechanism. "Personal bias, *quot homines, tot sententiæ*, is subjective selection uncontrolled"; it is living according to nature, and not according to reason. Man's proper belief, therefore, while it implies objective constraint, must also be grounded in a proving of all things of which doubt is a first instrument. "If men only knew how to doubt," said Renouvier, "there would be no fools, intellectually speaking." But we cannot *begin* with doubting; we cannot doubt that we doubt; we *must* begin with some *supposal*, some act of belief, act of incipient faith, for otherwise doubt may defeat its own ends. We must neither confuse credulity with belief nor either with faith. When Anselm said: "*Credo ut intelligam*, I believe that I may understand," he was not uttering a paradox but a profound psychological truth. Our psychological, our spiritual life begins with supposal, belief, and ends with faith, so long as we see through a glass darkly.

We have contrasted the terms faith and belief. They are allied, but are not identical. When we stress the objective constraint, the objective cognitive side, belief is the appropriate term; when we stress the subjective side, we stress the conative or active aspect, and use the term faith. In belief we are constrained towards, and to assent to what is there; in faith we strive to achieve what is not yet there. Hence we believe in God—we are constrained so to do—and we have faith in Him, *i.e.* we find Him by an act of will, though we see only through a glass darkly. In belief facts convince *us*, in faith we convince *facts*; hence by faith we can remove mountains. We cannot cease to

believe therein, but by faith we can remove them. Mountains, moral as well as physical, constrain us to belief; in faith we constrain mountains, moral as well as physical, to remove.

This is not to assert that faith *creates*. Faith removes mountains, it does not create them. Similarly faith moves God ("thy faith hath made thee whole"), it does not create Him. What faith does is to constrain our belief in God. The intellect, confronted by Nature, given to us as our objective and natural environment, and aided by our own *conatus* or effort or subjective selection towards self-conservation and betterment, finds in Nature the theoretical possibility of things and beings divine. Faith *on moral grounds* constrains us to believe in God, to go beyond the theoretical possibility, and to assert that God is because He ought to be. Religious faith, therefore, does not arise from theoretical belief, but it does give rise to doctrinal belief; *i.e.* creeds do not make faith, they formulate it. Hence creeds may grow; *credenda* lead to *agenda* and knowledge registers the *acta*.

A. A. COCK.

(Read at an Open Meeting of the Quest Society, May 5, 1921.)

## ON A SPECULATION IN FOURTH DIMENSIONALISM.<sup>1</sup>

THE EDITOR.

P. D. OUSPENSKY is a professor of mathematics, or was before the Russian *débâcle*; he is also a traveller and a convinced believer in the extensibility of consciousness and in mystical apprehension, and is a stalwart champion of hyper-dimensionality. He is the author of a number of works—among them *The Search of the Wondrous*, 2 vols. (p. 111), that world which for him is the truly real (p. 176), and *The Fourth Dimension*, 2 eds. (p. 125)—besides the volume which last year became accessible in translation (from the 2nd Russian edition, 1916) for the English reader, and he is now engaged on a work entitled *The Wisdom of the Gods*. The book<sup>2</sup> to which we now turn, is, we must confess, over ambitious, too flamboyantly titled, and introduced with a superfluity of puff by the American editor. Nevertheless Ouspensky is a serious thinker, well read in mathematics, psychology and philosophy. He has some acquaintance with mystical and also with neo-heosophical and spiritistic literature, but thinks that the latter expositions completely disfigure the inner

<sup>1</sup> See in the last number a paper entitled 'Some Remarks on Fourth Dimensionalism and the Time Enigma' which may be taken as introductory to what follows.—ED.

<sup>2</sup> *Tertium Organon (The Third Organ of Thought). A Key to the riddles of the World.* Translated from the Russian of P. D. Ouspensky, by Nicholas Bessaraboff and Claude Bragdon. Rochester, N.Y. (Manas Press). It is so called because the author is said to challenge comparison with the *Organon* of Aristotle and Bacon.

content of the symbolical forms of which they treat taking them too literally. Thus he writes:

"All systems dealing with the relation of the human soul to time—all ideas of post-mortem existence, the theory of re-incarnation, that of the transmigrations of souls, that of karma—all these are symbols, trying to transmit relations which cannot be expressed *directly* because of the poverty and weakness of our language. They should not be understood literally any more than it is possible to understand the symbols and allegories of art literally" (p. 113).

Our immediate concern, however, is with his basic conception of fourth-dimensionalism and the time problem and not with its further possible implications.

He recognizes from the start that the world problem for both science and philosophy is wrapped up in the enigma of consciousness, and unreservedly takes his stand with Kant in considering our modes of space and time as psychological. Everything known by the senses is known in these modes. Time and space are the necessary conditions of our sensuous receptivity—*i.e.* receptivity by means of the five organs of sense. They are thus essentially subjective forms of our individual consciousness, properties of our knowledge of the world and not of the world itself, categories of our sense and understanding. What we thus know is only our *mode* of perceiving things or the form of our knowledge of the world. "Our consciousness is limited by its phenomenal receptivity, *i.e.* it is surrounded by itself. The world of phenomena, *i.e.* the form of its [of consciousness'] own perception, surrounds it as a rim or as a wall; and the ordinary consciousness sees nothing but this wall" (p. 197). "Everything we perceive, generally speaking, is of our own creation."

the product of a cognizing being" (p. 7). What the world in itself really is we cannot know by even the most acute sensuous perception. Our empirical knowledge is not, however, a confused knowledge of a real world. On the contrary it is a very acute perception, but "of an *entirely unreal* world appearing round about us at the moment of our contact with the world of true causes, to which we cannot find the way because we are lost in an unreal 'material' world" (*ibid.*).

Ouspensky, after reviewing Kant's famous proposition, says that the philosopher of Königsberg was the first to put the question and to show to the world the problem, demanding the solution, but not pointing the way to it. Kant's brilliant initiative, he complains, has not been followed up; for all our positive science is based upon hypotheses contradictory to his epoch-making thesis. According to this we create time ourselves. It is a function of our receptive apparatus or convenience in perceiving the outside world. Reality," says Ouspensky, "is continuous and constant, but in order to make possible the perception of it, we must dis sever it into separate moments; imagine it as an infinite series of separate moments out of which there exists for us only one. In other words, we perceive reality as through a narrow slit, and what we are seeing through this slit we call the present; what we did see and now do not see—the past, and what we do not quite see but are expecting—the future" (p. 30).

From the Kantian point of view space and time are conditions of all our experience, not however externally imposed, but supplied by the mind from its own inward resources; they are absolutely necessary conditions of human intelligence. Space Kant calls the form of outer sense and time of inner sense. To

all of this among other considerations it has been objected that, if space is a pure form given *à priori* from within and unaffected by all specific differences of content, "it would follow that a man born with one sense only, say that of taste, would have the same space-conception as the rest of us" (Sturt's art., 'Space and Time,' *E.B.*) and this is supposed entirely to dispose of Kant's contention. But surely no sentient being of any kind, much less a man, could exist without both the sense of touch and the inner somatic sense, and these would suffice for the space-sense.

Of all the contradictory notions of space and time which have been and are still so hotly debated, that of Kant, though by no means entirely satisfactory, may still be held to contain some elements which are highly suggestive. It has relative validity in so far as our limited space-and-time-sense may be held to deform rather than conform reality. But what is the reality which it modifies? It is that reality which is already conditioned by the cosmic creative activity from its own inward resources with the appropriate fundamental spatial and temporal modes which determine the world-order in which we are conscious of existing. These cosmic modes are for us accordingly universal determinations and therefore in themselves beyond the present reach of our sense or grasp of our understanding; but they are not necessarily universal determinations for or from the standpoint of the creative ordaining spirit within whose originating, conservating and eliminating activity we live and move and have our being. This view of what may be called idealistic realism is in keeping with the philosophical principle of relativity. It does not embark on the vain venture of absolute definition or defining the

absolute, but contents itself with cruising about within the activity of that reality which we call the universe of becoming. Nevertheless we need not say that in the nature of things we never can really know this reality, for the creative activity which reifies this reality and its basic spatial and temporal conditions out of its own resources, manifestly presents them for our contemplation. That is to say, its activity is present for the contemplation of minds which are, for this philosophic faith, essentially of a higher order of reality than the reality they contemplate, being fundamentally not process but function of the creative activity itself.

But from these high metaphysical speculations let us return to Ouspensky and Hinton, in whom he finds 'the first flashes of a right understanding of the Kantian problem, and the first suggestions in regard to a possible way towards its solution' (p. 13).

Much space is accordingly devoted to a restatement and reconsideration of Hinton's flat-land speculations. These Ouspensky agrees must be regarded as highly artificial exercises in analogy, as we have always thought them to be. Hinton deals largely with mental artifacts. Doubtless the method of analogy is indispensable in all exercise of the scientific imagination, but though fascinating, it has to be exercised with great caution. Very briefly and very crudely it may be said that the Hintonian analytical and analogical mental gymnastics consist in imagining how plane sections of solid figures or the passage of three-dimensional objects through a plane surface might possibly appear to entities endowed with only two-dimensional consciousness—*alias* flat-landers. From the notions thus imagined of the relations between



two-dimensional and three-dimensional consciousness, it is inferred by analogy what might probably be the relations between supposed four-dimensional bodies and objects and movements in our three-space. All three-dimensional objects may thus be regarded as three-dimensional 'sections' of four-dimensional bodies, and many apparently unrelated objects 'here' may be imagined as belonging to a series of sections of one and the same body 'there.' But what seems to me to vitiate the procedure is that, to be consistent, the flat-lander must be held, not only to be restricted to movement *on* a surface, but must have his existence entirely *within* that surface. Now a mathematical surface has no sensible concrete existence. The Hintonian imagined experience of a flat-lander is not that of an entity whose consciousness is confined to a rigidly conceived mathematical and therefore purely conceptual two-dimensional limit; it is always set forth as a sensible state of existence in the same order as our own. It is thus *ipso facto* always really three-dimensional, a lamination so to speak, or very thin layer, at best of three-dimensional space,—a minimal representation of concrete space therefore.

Ouspensky does not bring this criticism to bear on Hinton's flat-landism; nevertheless he is aware of the artificial nature of the procedure, while at the same time thinking that the analogies and comparisons thus established help us somewhat to clarify the problems of time and space and their mutual co-relations. His main contention is that it is all a question of consciousness, that three-dimensionality depends upon the fact that so far man has attained to three clear units of psychic life only: sensation, perception, conception. There is, however, a higher form of

consciousness latent in him, or only at times confusedly appearing, and thus requiring development—a certain combination of feeling and thought of high tension which he would call ‘intuition.’ This ‘intuition’ lies at the back of the fourth dimensional idea (p. 74). The general notion is that, if the psychic apparatus were changed, the world around would be changed. Ouspensky thus suggests that Kant’s contention that space, with its properties, is a form of our sensuous receptivity, could be proved experimentally, “if we could be convinced that for the being possessing sensation only, the world is one-dimensional; for the being possessing sensations and perceptions the world is two-dimensional; and for the being possessing, in addition to concepts and ideas, the higher form of knowledge [‘intuition’] the world is four-dimensional” (p. 75). The question of the possibility of the expansion of consciousness in a so-called ‘four-dimensional direction,’ thus conceived, is, he holds and we agree, experimentally verifiable in certain psychical states; where we disagree is on the appropriateness of using the term fourth-dimension for this expansion. But the point of interest in the Hintonian imagining is, not whether we can conceive of an *expansion* of consciousness, in the sense of an addition to our normal psychic characteristics, whatever we may call it, but whether we can represent to ourselves a *diminution* of the units of our psychic apparatus. Experiments in this direction, Ouspensky admits, are impossible; but observation, he holds, may furnish us with what we seek. We must observe beings in the world standing in the necessary relation to ourselves, that is whose psyche is of a lower grade than our own (p. 76). These are the animals, who have no concepts. Their

consciousness is confined to a world of particulars solely. This raises all the very difficult problems of animal psychology, with which Ouspensky shews he is well acquainted; his speculations, however, are interesting. They must be read in detail as in the careful exposition of the author, who graphically illustrates and repeatedly summarizes his points as he proceeds in fair methodical order. Hence the briefest of summaries must suffice.

The animal, just as we ourselves, sees two dimensions only—surfaces. But we know the world is not a surface; we do not accept things as they appear, as does the animal. It senses, but does not see, the third dimension; and it senses it as something transient, *just as we sense time*. These surfaces therefore possess for it numerous and various motions. For instance, “all those illusory motions which *seem* to us real, but which we *know* to be illusory, are entirely real to the animal,—the turning about of the houses as we ride past, the growth of a tree out of some corner, the passing of the moon between clouds, etc., etc. . . .

“Innumerable objects quite immobile for us—properly *all objects*—must seem to the animal to be *in motion*. The *third dimension of solids will appear to it in these motions; i.e. the third dimension of solids will appear to it as a motion*” (p. 95).

The horse, for instance, does not distinguish two roads from one another conceptually as we do; for it the two roads have nothing in common. But it remembers in proper sequence all the emotional tones which are linked with the first road and with the second and so distinguishes them.

That which is mechanical motion for us, *e.g.* a revolving wheel or a passing carriage, will seem to an

animal arbitrary, *alive*. All such movement is probably animated for the animal, even an immobile object, as for instance a bush that frightens a horse; for though the bush does not really move, it seems to the horse to do so, because it is itself running. So also when a dog barks furiously at a carriage that catches its attention, probably to the eyes of the dog "the carriage is turning, twisting, grimacing all over. It is alive in every part—the wheels, the top, the mud-guards, seats, passengers—all these are moving, turning" (p. 100).

From the development of such and other considerations, and by reasoning analogously thereon, the conclusion is reached that the fourth dimension of space for us three-dimensionals must lie in time—*i.e.* that time is the fourth dimension of space for us. The contention is that our time is really a confused perception of hyper-space, and therefore that time is progressively convertible into space. But what of four-dimensional motion?

If the supposed two-dimensional being is bound to regard the properties of the three-dimensionality of solids as motions, and further to regard the proper motion of such solids, going on in what is for it a higher space, as the phenomena of life, we may proceed a step further by analogy, and hazard that what are the phenomena of life for us are those of mechanical motion in higher, four-dimensional space. In other words "that motion which *remains* a motion in the higher space, appears to the lower being as a phenomenon of life, and that which *disappears* in the higher space, transforming itself into *the property* of an immobile solid, appears to the lower being as mechanical motion" (p. 108).

Whether this process could be continued in-

definitely and still higher 'dimensions' successively postulated, Ouspensky does not elaborate; he hazards only the suggestion that, "if we pre-suppose a space not of four, but of five dimensions, then in it the 'phenomena of life' would probably appear as the properties of *immobile solids*—genus, species, families, peoples, races and so forth—and motions would seem, perhaps, only the *phenomena of thought*" (p. 109). As far as he goes, however, there is a progressive process of, so to say, a mechanicalization of life and a stabilization of motion, as consciousness advances in spatial comprehension. It seems thus very much as if we had embarked on a voyage towards the static absolute, and we are only saved by the introduction of the phenomena of thought, the thinking of which we may still hold to be a creative activity, subsuming both life and motion. It all reduces itself to the fundamental problem of consciousness as the logical *prius* of existence, and to this Ouspensky is agreed.

"No matter how hard we may try to define *consciousness* in terms of *motion*, we nevertheless know that they are *two different things*, different as regards our receptivity of them, belonging to different worlds, incommensurable, but which can exist simultaneously. Moreover, consciousness can exist without *motion*, but motion cannot exist without *consciousness*, because out of consciousness comes the necessary condition of motion—*time*. No consciousness—no time: no time—no motion" (p. 191).

Ouspensky's conclusion is that reality is ultimately to be sought in consciousness and not in motion. Motion seemingly imposes itself upon our present limited consciousness, but the greater consciousness immanent in the less can free us from the restraints of

an imposition which it has itself devised. He does not say this in so many words, but leaves it to be inferred. Meanwhile he treats of motion as an 'illusion of consciousness' and accordingly approves of extreme Indian *māyā* speculations. But we prefer ourselves the more balanced view of the moderates who would regard *māyā* as divine creative imagining, rather than 'illusion'; and such imagining for us is constitutive of reality.

As to matter, he holds that, on the one hand, it is a logical concept, a form of thinking. No one has ever seen matter, nor will they ever—it is possible only to think matter. On the other hand, it is an illusion accepted for reality, or rather the incorrectly perceived form of that which exists in reality. "Matter is a section of *something*: a non-existent, imaginary section. But that of which matter is a section exists. This is the real, *four-dimensional* world" (p. 193). The 'substance' of which any natural object is made exists, but the true nature of its existence we do not know, we know only the form of our receptivity of it. But if we ceased to exist, would it also cease to exist or still continue? Certainly this 'substance' will continue to exist, not only for consciousness working in conditions of receptivity analogous to ours, in the same forms as ours, but also in itself in some other way,—*i.e.* presumably for modes of consciousness higher than our own. How precisely, we do not know, but assuredly not in space and time as we know them, for we ourselves by our limitations impose these relative forms upon it. So far, so good. But Ouspensky is not content with this, and seems to us subsequently to go beyond his brief.

He has thought himself deeply into things, but

only apparently at last to make shipwreck on the bare rocks of an 'immobile universe.' He leads up gallantly to a conclusion, and then falls back, short of the beatific vision, into a spatialization of time *in excelsis*, abstracting time from space, and leaving us with a spurious space which camouflages the false notion of a 'created once for all' state. He leads up to his conclusion suggestively as follows:

"Motion goes on inside of us, and creates the illusion of motion round about us. The lighted circle [of consciousness] runs quickly from one *I* to another—from one object, from one idea, from one perception or image to another: within the focus of consciousness rapidly changing *I*'s succeed one another, a little of the light of consciousness going over from one *I* to another. This is the true motion which alone exists in the world. Should this motion stop, should all *I*'s simultaneously enter the focus of consciousness, should the light so expand as to illumine all at once that which is usually lighted bit by bit and gradually, and could a man grasp simultaneously by his reason all that ever entered or will enter his consciousness and all that which is never clearly illumined by consciousness and lies in the sub-conscious (producing its action on the psyche nevertheless)—then," he concludes, "would a man behold himself in the midst of an *immobile universe*, in which there would exist simultaneously everything that lies usually in the remote depths of memory, in the past; all that lies at a remote distance from him; all that lies in the future" (p. 211).

But this conclusion appears to us to be illegitimate. For supposing a man did arrive at such an order of consciousness as this preamble leads up to, he would surely not 'behold himself in the midst of an *immobile*

*universe.*' On the contrary, we should say, he would embrace the 'universe' in his consciousness and not see it from a centre. He would thus be what he beheld and the 'universe' would no more be immobile than his consciousness would be immobile. On the contrary he would be more active and the universe more actual, more dynamic, than any grade of motion we can conceive. The enhanced consciousness of extensity in space would keep pace with that of intensity of time; and this living of concrete duration would be a reality that would render simultaneity as well as succession as meaningless apart from itself as one- and two-dimensional space are meaningless apart from that concrete three-space which is the characteristic of lived existence. An immobile universe seems non-sense for normal consciousness, and we dare to think much more so for mystical experience. However, we refrain from dogmatizing on such high matters, and these few crude remarks on fourth-dimensionalism and the time-enigma are ventured solely as the tentative opinions of a layman blundering round the outskirts of a very difficult and highly debateable subject.

G. R. S. MEAD.



## NIETZSCHE'S RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE.

EDWARD LEWIS.

YOU must have loved religion and art as you loved mother and nurse,—otherwise you cannot be wise. But you must be able to see beyond them, to outgrow them.

THE complete phenomenon covered by the common usage of the word 'religion' has several aspects. There is that peculiar quality of feeling, for example, which is sometimes called the religious consciousness or the religious instinct; an instinct which has been held to be universal in mankind, and to which, as the sense of the Invisible and the Infinite, Max Müller ascribed the origin of religions; a consciousness whose more pronounced forms have been modernly described as 'in tune with the Infinite' or, more grandiloquently still, as 'cosmic consciousness.' There is also religion as practice—a phrase wide enough to embrace the severities of the saint, the devotional exercises of the temple-treader, the reformer's faithfulness to his vision, the solitary meditations of the philosopher, and the good works of the philanthropist; it is a type of conduct which may be characterised in a general way as manifesting an element of excess—love in excess of duty, service beyond requirement, "as unto the Lord, and not unto men"; enthusiasm, as the etymology of the word reminds us, is religion in action. There is also religion as theory—that is to say, theology. And finally the word is frequently used

as an abbreviation for Christian religion; men say 'religion' and they mean 'Christianity.'

Popular speech is therefore equivocal, and doubtless popular thought is often confused on this matter. Nietzsche was not confused in his mind, but his well-known habit of writing down his reflections in the form of detached aphorisms and paragraphs is likely to confuse the inattentive reader, for he may find on one and the same page the term 'religion' used with two quite distinct references yet without any indication of the change of thought; the fact being that the paragraphs which are printed in sequence were written at different times when different aspects of a complex subject were occupying Nietzsche's mind.

Our immediate concern is with Nietzsche's views on religion as consciousness and with his own religious experience.

That he was aware of this aspect of the phenomenon of religion is evidenced by a few sporadic utterances here and there in his writings. For example: "in every religion, the religious man is an exception"; "it seems to me that though the religious instinct is in vigorous growth" (that is to say, in Europe in the latter part of the nineteenth century), "it rejects the theistic satisfaction with profound distrust"; "there is not enough Religion in the world even to destroy the religions." But he does not appear to have reflected upon it, or examined it closely, except in one case.

Here, revolting against Renan's dictum that religion is a product of the normal man,<sup>1</sup> Nietzsche

<sup>1</sup> "*La religion est un produit de l'homme normal; l'homme est le plus dans le vrai quand il est le plus religieux et le plus assuré d'une destinée infinie.*"

attempted to show how vital to the maintenance of religion was a kind of experience which bordered on the pathological. This he called indifferently the 'religious mood' or the 'religious neurosis.' He found it exemplified in individuals,—in Luther's indelicate passion for God, in St. Augustine's oriental exaltations, in Madame de Guyon's longing for a *unio mystica et physica*, and in the fact that religious conversion so frequently synchronises with the emotional instability of puberty. He found it exemplified also in mass-movements,—in the hysterical ebullitions of the Salvation Army, in revivals, and in that peculiar phenomenon to be sometimes observed among both savage and civilised peoples, when a whole community is caught up in a sudden madness of excessive sensuality, which with equal suddenness is transformed into paroxysms of penitence and religious enthusiasm. He hazarded the guess that disguised epilepsy might afford an explanation; but, as one whose taste has been offended, it seemed best to him to avoid any attempt to seek an explanation, rather to look in the opposite direction and go away.

On this point Nietzsche was not in such absolute opposition to Renan as he appears to have imagined. An instinct may be perfectly normal and yet have abnormal manifestations, even characteristic abnormal manifestations. What is abnormal about the manifestation may not be the instinct itself but the conditions, at a certain point or in a certain person, under which it operates. Most people are normally unaware of their nervous system; and the existence of violent and dangerous neuroses is no argument against the soundness and the value of the nervous system. The study of pathological cases has proved

most fruitful in knowledge concerning the normal processes of nature and the normal structure of human personality. In Nietzsche's view there is something pathological about the saint; yet he admits that, instead of turning away from the saint in disgust, the mightiest of men have always bowed reverently before him. Why? Because they divined in him a superior force, a strength of will, which although it was directed to ends which seemed to them absurd,—to self-subjugation, voluntary privation, anti-naturalness,—they recognised as akin to their own strength and love of power and its exercise. In honouring the saint they were honouring something in themselves. Exactly! The 'Will to Power' evidently has its neuroses also, but it is not therefore a disease. The religious life has its neuroses, but the religious instinct on that account need not be rooted in epilepsy and hysteria.

It is hardly fair, however, to take Nietzsche up on a riposte of this character as if it were meant to be a decisive and inclusive utterance upon the whole question. The truth is that he did not reflect at all upon the religious instinct; and it is at least possible that a reason for this omission may be that he was no more conscious of the religious instinct in himself than the ordinary healthy man is conscious of his nervous system.

What was Nietzsche's case?

At Pforta, a famous German public school, the custom obtained that those pupils who were about to leave, should express in writing their gratitude to those who had thus far been their guides and guardians in life. On such an occasion Nietzsche wrote: "To Him, to Whom I owe everything, do I offer the first-

fruits of my gratitude ; what else can I offer Him but the fervent adoration of my heart, which feels more than ever the warmth of His love—the love to which I owe this hour, the happiest of my existence. May God always have me in His keeping.”

He was at this time twenty years of age, and had been confirmed three years earlier.

Such sentiments well became one whose father was a clergyman and whose mother the daughter of a clergyman ; and who, at a very tender age, by the gravity of his demeanour and by his devotion to religious exercises, had earned among his school-fellows the nickname of ‘the little parson.’ At fifteen, he wrote in his diary a list of the subjects which he aspired to study, and the list culminates with : “Religion, the solid foundation of all knowledge.”

Scarcely had he been confirmed, however, when doubts began to assail his mind. His critical spirit awaked. It dawned upon him that his religious faith was largely constructed of deeply-rooted prejudices due to the impressions of childhood and to the influence of parents and teachers. The revealed certainties of religion, which hitherto had comforted and inspired him, now dropped their masks and appeared to him as perplexing problems, hypotheses which might be open to serious question and collapse before the assault of facts. It is on record that during his residence at Pforta his thinking upon religious matters, his first essays in criticism, gave his professors much anxiety and even alarm.

How then shall we interpret the apparently confident and enthusiastic address of gratitude with which he brought his school-career to a close ? Was it a mere ebullition of pious sentiment, amply accounted

for by the natural emotion of the hour? Was it the final leap of flame from the dying embers of a childhood's faith? Did it represent the last passionate resistance of religious prejudice offered to the restless and violent motions of the critical and speculative impulse,—the final tug at the old moorings before the hawser snaps and the vessel ventures out into unknown seas? Or was it a momentary compromise with incipient doubts and denials made at the bidding of a heart of gentleness in order that the parting-word at least should not be an offence to those who had been generous in friendship and service?

Perhaps the truest comment upon it would be that it bears witness to a profoundly religious disposition, a disposition which readily expressed itself in childhood and youth through the ritual and creed devised and imposed by authority, but which did not cease to be religious, but rather gave evidence of a more intimate saturation, when those forms and formulæ no longer satisfied and reverence was supplanted by revolt.

For if, apart from conceptions of God which are many and methods of worship which are also many, to be religious is to be devoted; to be single-eyed, sincere and passionate in devotion; to be vividly aware of an inward calling, and to render thereto an unfeigned and most faithful obedience; to apprehend, beyond all experience and all reason, a high destiny for oneself and for the race in and through oneself; to consort with the object of the heart's desire in solitude and silence, and to do courageous battle for it, not counting the cost, if so be that the world may come into life; to have profound joy in moments of lucid vision, and to agonise under the pressure of the

"passion that left the ground to lose itself in the sky";—if, in short, the essence of religion is to be found in the spirit of one's life, consecrated, elevated by aspiration towards the invisible and the intangible, and not in the particular kind of beliefs one happens to hold, Nietzsche was first and last a religious man, and not less so when he cried "God is dead, now do we desire superman to live" than when he penned the youthful effusion quoted above.

There is an interesting passage in *Ecce Homo*, in which Nietzsche describes his own experience of inspiration.

"The idea of revelation, in the sense that something which profoundly convulses and upsets one, becomes suddenly visible and audible with indescribable certainty and accuracy, describes the simple fact. One hears—one does not seek; one takes—one does not ask who gives; a thought suddenly flashes up like lightning, it comes with necessity, without faltering—I have never had any choice in the matter. There is an ecstasy so great that the immense strain of it is sometimes relaxed by a flood of tears, during which one's steps involuntarily rush and anon involuntarily lag. There is the feeling that one is utterly out of hand, with the very distinct consciousness of an endless number of fine thrills and titillations descending to one's very toes; there is a depth of happiness in which the most painful and gloomy parts do not act as antitheses to the rest, but are produced and required as necessary shades of colour in such an overflow of light. There is an instinct for rhythmic relations which embraces a whole world of forms (length, the need of a wide-embracing rhythm, is almost the measure of the force of an inspiration, a sort of

counterpart to its pressure and tension). Everything happens quite involuntarily, as if in a tempestuous outburst of freedom, of absoluteness, of power and divinity. The involuntary nature of the figures and similes is the most remarkable thing; one loses all perception of what is imagery and metaphor; everything seems to present itself as the readiest, the truest, and simplest means of expression. It actually seems as if all things came to one, and offered themselves as similes."

The passage deserves reflection. We may without hesitation accept it as a genuine and scrupulous account of an actual experience. Its primary reference is to the inspiration of poets; and it was out of some such mood, more or less durable, that *Thus Spake Zarathustra* came. But the experience was not an isolated one, and sometimes its issues were other than poetic—in the narrower acceptation of that term. For instance, a similar experience by the lake of Silvaplana gave Nietzsche the idea of Eternal Recurrence which he boldly announced as his transvaluation and substitute for existing metaphysics and religion.

It is pertinent to remark that some of the phrases in Nietzsche's description of this clarified and heightened consciousness as he experienced it—*e.g.* the feeling of being out of hand, the mixture of joy and pain, the instinct for rhythmic relations, the overflow of light, the sense of freedom and power, the translucency of the visible universe—might without difficulty be paralleled in the autobiographical writings of Christian saints, or of the prophets of non-Christian religions, or in the confessions of such visionaries as Walt Whitman or Edward Carpenter, who equally with Nietzsche would repudiate any religious label. If it



were necessary, innumerable examples in support of this statement might be culled from the pages of William James, Bucke, Starbuck, Evelyn Underhill and others; and endless quotations from a perennial literature with Plotinus at one end and Masefield's *Everlasting Mercy* at the other.

At bottom the experience is one and the same in all who have in any wise been the subjects of it. It arrives suddenly and involuntarily, but as it issues and begins to take shape in thought and action it is not independent of the individual mind and character through which it is mediated. In different persons it acquires different tones, colours, emphases, forms. Here certain rays of the beam, there other rays, are blocked on account of some personal idiosyncrasy and do not come through. Every individual is opaque at some point or other. St. Augustine does not share the pagan joy of Nietzsche; and, in his turn, Nietzsche does not share the burning and comprehensive race-consciousness of Walt Whitman—with whom, otherwise, he has so much in common.

In any individual the experience is rare; it is abnormal, but it certainly need not be unhealthy, neurotic, or delusive. On the contrary, it may represent the high-water mark of the wholeness of personality, and its visions may be the few actual glimpses of reality that are vouchsafed to us. Nietzsche must not be allowed to put it down in Paul to epilepsy; nor must some equally violent partisan on the other side be allowed to put it down in Nietzsche to the "foreshadowing of the madness that was to overtake him." Nor must it be held to be of highly spiritual significance in one man and in another to be mere hallucination induced by ascetic practices.

Nor must it be 'divine possession' in one and 'megalomania' in another. Nor, finally, must it be discredited because on the one hand it may produce such a doctrine as that of Eternal Recurrence, which many deem to be entirely foolish, or on the other hand may give rise to a reaction in which the convert falls back into deeper pits of darkness than those from which he was temporarily lifted.

Various explanations have been offered of the experience. Nietzsche himself would have nothing to do with any supernatural hypothesis. To explain it as daimonic possession, as the descent of some extra-personal almighty power, was in his judgment possible only to those who were still held captive by religious superstition. He preferred to say simply that it was the violent breaking forth of pent-up energy after a long suppression of productive power, during which there had been an accumulation of emotional capital. He fought shy of giving it a fine name, of even calling it 'inspiration'—a word so strongly redolent of supernaturalism. He spoke of 'sudden suggestions,—so-called inspirations.' And while he advised the artist that it was to his interest to believe in these flashes from the midnight of subconsciousness, these inward and urgent pressures, he warned him against becoming enslaved or hypnotised by them to the extent of making them a substitute for hard work and the tedious effort of rejection and selection. This excellent advice he was himself prepared to follow, and after the *éclaircissement* at Surlei he determined to pursue a long and severe course of scientific study in order to see whether any rational and factual basis could be discovered for the idea of Eternal Recurrence. The plan, however, fell through, chiefly because the

state of his health and particularly the condition of his eyes prevented him from any prolonged study which would have involved close reading.

Nietzsche's naturalistic explanation of the inspirational experience is doubtless true so far as it goes. The only question is whether it goes far enough, and whether, when pressed, it does not so nearly approximate to the supernaturalistic explanation which he derided, that the difference between them is only a matter of words. For it seems to lead inevitably on to the conclusion that the area of personality is much wider than that of consciousness; that, in the region of the subconscious, the individual is in touch with an activity, constant in operation, of immense vitality, and universal in character; that this activity is the common source of the vision of the seer, the creative impulse of the artist, of all those various manifestations of power which give spiritual distinction to great individuals, and at the same time of that gently glowing emotion of community and fellowship which provides the lowlier sense of life to the masses of people, the 'men of the herd,' who are scarcely distinguishable save in a formal way from each other; that it is the same power which now isolates us, and now binds us into one; that the creative principle is also the unifying principle.

The modern tendency is, on the whole, in the direction of accepting this conclusion. We interpret in terms of the subconscious that which used to be interpreted in terms of the supernatural; we have, so to speak, naturalised the supernatural in the subconscious; we have chased 'God' out of the upper window, but He returns into the human economy through the cellar.

The totality of human experience seems to be inexplicable apart from the hypothesis of a universal element in man. Call it 'God,' call it 'Will to Power'; say that it is personal and capable of entering into relations with man, say that it is impersonal and is becoming personal in man; these are words, points of view, experiments in interpretation. The fact remains that our awareness in whatever degree of this universal element,—whether in the form of illumination, creative power, heroic joy, the sense of the fulness of life, the enthusiasm which bears us up through dull and painful days and against bitter odds, the necessity to faithfulness, the urge to self-expression, or those milder but not less profound emotions of kinship with all men and with all things,—is the 'religious consciousness' in the light of which we are revealed as somehow belonging to each other and together serving the inscrutable purposes of Life.

Both by his words and by his career Nietzsche gave evidence of being the subject of this consciousness to a conspicuous degree; but he did not deduce therefrom the conclusion here set out; indeed some of his positions are barely reconcilable with it. This may be due to some opacity or other in him, but on that account we should not permit ourselves the error of thinking that he did not lie near—and nearer than many—to the unpolluted wells of truth and reality.

EDWARD LEWIS.

## THE TENSION WHICH CREATES RELIGION.

J. C. HARDWICK, M.A.

THE religious problem advances by the continual raising of fresh issues. The old questions are less often solved than shelved as having become irrelevant; so that thinkers should be estimated rather by the problems they raise than by the problems they solve.

Hume opened a fresh chapter in the history of the religious problem when, in his *Natural History of Religion*, he raised the question whether it is primarily any necessity of the understanding which produces belief in a divine being, and whether the ordinary believer does not find his motives in things which to the thinker are actually stones of stumbling, *e.g.* the mischief and disorder in nature.

The idea was unwelcome to contemporary feeling about religion, which was generally regarded as a more or less picturesque form of philosophy; whence it followed that the motives of belief were primarily intellectual or rational. This attitude is reflected in eighteenth century deism, which was nothing else than philosophic theism based on the 'argument from design.'

It was quite natural that the significance of Hume's question should escape the attention of those whose view of religion required them to regard it as primarily a philosophic theory. And it was not until

later that the true nature of the problem raised by Hume became evident. That problem was whether religion is, after all, the product of an intellectual need.

Faced with the phenomena of existence, the intellectual need is for a 'first cause' or for some 'unification of experience,' and the ideas of a 'Creator' and of an 'Absolute' are the products and satisfactions of this need. They are created by it, and they satisfy the thirst which they were designed to quench.

And if the deists were right, if it is this intellectual need for a 'first cause' which has produced religion, then the question must be put whether religion is not now altogether redundant—as satisfying a need which can be more efficiently satisfied by other means, *i.e.* by philosophy.

And those who candidly adopt what we may call the 'intellectualist' attitude about the origin and significance of religion, do admit, as we have seen, that religion is only a more or less picturesque form of philosophy, which serves as an admirable substitute for serious philosophy with the intellectually unregenerate. The truths of religion are 'symbolic' expressions of metaphysical truths. Religion is absolute truth presented in imaginative and therefore palatable form.

It should not escape notice that, if this theory of religion be sound, if the religious need and the intellectual need are identical, religion may look forward to a more or less abbreviated euthanasia. For our theory compels us either to put religion aside as unnecessary or to give it simply a temporary lease of life as a substitute for philosophy until the world becomes intelligent. This position, however, will evidently be a precarious one for religion. It lives, but it lives so to speak on a reprieve, which may any

day be revoked; when it will, like its predecessor magic, evaporate.

The only means of avoiding this conclusion, that religion has no future, is to return on our steps and to put the question whether the specifically religious and the specifically intellectual needs are the same; and if, as it may turn out, the *needs* are different, whether their *satisfaction* may not also be different. In which case philosophy and religion will be heterogeneous, and not homogeneous; as different from one another as æsthetics and the higher mathematics.

Those who are inclined to feel that there is something to be said for this point of view, will find much to interest them in Feuerbach's *Essence of Christianity*. According to this author the desire to understand existence has no connection whatever, or only an indirect connection, with religion. According to Feuerbach to know and understand existence may lead not to religion, but away from religion. The motive of religion, the need for which religion is a satisfaction, is the desire to find sanctions for our hopes and realisations for our ideals.

Feuerbach's view is that the religious need arises from an apparent or real conflict between things as they are and things as we would have them to be. It is the unfortunate misfit, so to speak, between the real and the ideal which constitutes the religious motive and generates religion. Religion is precipitated by the reaction upon human nature of an environment more or less hostile to human ideals.

Religion in brief arises in intimate connection with the idea of *value*. Man attaches intrinsic values to certain things and qualities; and as these seem to be threatened on all hands by an environment which is

indifferent or hostile to them, they must at all costs be protected, and even enhanced, by other means. And if the actual world of every-day experience will not admit of this being done, another world, not of experience, but of the creative imagination, must be substituted for it. Another world must come into existence whence "there streams upon me with the splendour of virgin gold what here shines only with the dimness of unrefined ore."

Religion consists, according to this view, in the objectification of ideals which are in reality purely subjective. Religion regards as actual what is as a matter of fact ideal only; it is the anticipated payment with lavish interest of a debt which man feels to be owing to him. The debt, however, is one which can never be paid save to the imagination; for the universe recognizes no such obligation. Respect for human values does not characterize the universe; and it is only because man sees his own image reflected everywhere, that he has the presumption to suppose this.

This philosophy of religion, it is only too evident, is the product of, or to be associated closely with, a pessimistic view of life. The influence of Schopenhauer upon Feuerbach, here as elsewhere, is evident.<sup>1</sup> Both thinkers were favourably disposed towards primitive, as contrasted with modern, Christianity; both alike regarded it as fundamentally pessimistic in outlook, a view which was shared by Nietzsche, though in his case a very different corollary was added.

Modern criticism of Feuerbach should take the line not of castigating his 'subjectivism,' but of inquiring

<sup>1</sup> It is not only his pessimism that is derived from Schopenhauer. In his *Foundations of a Future Philosophy* (1843) Feuerbach takes up the anti-intellectualist attitude that the real is inexpressible and impenetrable by thought—a dogma which inspired *The World as Will and Idea* (1818).



whether, as a matter of experience, it is psychologically possible for human feeling to create its own satisfactions in the way postulated by him ; for though the powers of creative imagination are considerable, yet the cognitive faculties must always be exercising a restraining influence.

However, Feuerbach's philosophic pessimism and the possible weakness of the psychological axioms with which he starts, should not blind us to the importance of his contribution to the religious problem. This contribution was that religion is concerned primarily with ideas of *value*. And the religious interpretation of existence stands or falls with the validity or invalidity of human values.<sup>1</sup>

Of course problems of value and problems of existence cannot be dissociated finally. And the link between them is the link between religion and philosophy. But to admit that a connection, even a vital connection, exists between these two is not the same as to say that the two are identical. Religion is not, as the intellectualists have imagined, a more or less spurious, or a more or less primitive, form of philosophy. The two are distinct and characterized by distinctive interpretations of existence. Religion interprets experience in terms of worth, philosophy in terms of existence.

The specifically religious problem arises whenever worth and existence, the ideal and the real, seem to contradict one another. Feuerbach envisaged the real poignancy of the situation ; all the more so because he took the pessimistic view. The contradiction which

<sup>1</sup> Feuerbach's own realisation of this is only too evident. His rejection of religion is a corollary of his belief that human values had nothing but a subjective significance—*i.e.* they were, to use a later phrase, 'all too human.'

experience reveals, appealed to him as final. There was no way out, save the way of subjective imagination; one must flee from the horrors of objective reality to the peace and joy of subjective dreams.

Yet it is possible that a more hopeful attitude may be possible for us who are no longer confined to a static view of existence. Quite different possibilities present themselves when we once abandon this view and regard reality as 'becoming' rather than as 'existing.' Such an attitude has inspired the writings of some modern Realists, such as Mr. Bertrand Russell and Professor Alexander.

The former, in *A Free Man's Religion*, takes the view that, though the real and the ideal are as yet so far from coinciding that the universe is positively hostile to our highest values, yet these values can and should be enhanced, *i.e.* the universe must be defied.

Professor Alexander adopts an attitude which is more definitely optimistic, for he looks to a *nisus* in things which tends ever to create fresh values. This is essentially a philosophy of *becoming*. And it is perhaps from some such outlook as his that the truths of philosophy and the values of religion may be seen to coincide.

The particularly suggestive contribution made by Professor Alexander is that the religious need itself constitutes evidence that the process of 'becoming' has room for and can sanction our highest ideals. Religious experience, a feeling of dissatisfaction with the actual and a groping after the ideal, is, so to speak, evidence that ours is a world of 'becoming,' especially when we take into consideration the empirical proofs of 'development' in the biological world and elsewhere.

Thus Hume with his characteristic insight below

the surface was right. It is the darker sides of life which are a motive for religious belief, in the sense that these set up a tension between fact and value, real and ideal. And it seems evident that it is this tension which creates religion. As the current striving to leap the gap between the two carbons creates the brilliant light of the arc-lamp, so the struggle and tension between the real and the ideal creates spiritual life.

J. C. HARDWICK.

## A PLEA FOR A NEW CONCEPTION OF THEOLOGY.

Rev. H. L. HUBBARD, M.A.

THE conservative position is on its trial to-day. This is true of politics, of morality, of theology. It is right that it should be so, since the world moves forward. The static attitude cannot long survive in a dynamic environment. The judgment of the critic is inevitably followed by the work of the active iconoclast, which must in turn give place to the patient toil of the architect and builder. In the sphere of theology the critic has been at work for some time past. The weak spots in the old edifice have been ruthlessly exposed and the hand of the destroyer is even now at work. Soon will come the time in which to set about building anew the walls of Jerusalem, and the Church will be called upon to proclaim a theology which is alive and able to meet the needs of a new generation of thinkers and workers. It is the purpose of this article to attempt a definition of Theology with a view to discovering what its function will be in the religious life of the new age.

At risk of being accused of putting the cart before the horse, I would set down the definition of Theology which I believe to be most consistent with both conservative and modern modes of thought. "Theology is the intellectual interpretation of religious experience." Such a definition is, of course, open to criticism. I do

not pretend that it covers all the ground. I am only concerned to show that for the ordinary man such a definition has a real bearing on his life and conduct. It brings Theology to life; it transplants it from the study to the market-place.

In the first place it may be asked: What is the purpose of Theology? I would answer that Theology is not concerned to define the indefinable. Such a proceeding is not only futile, but tends to bring Theology into disrepute and to make of its students a laughing-stock. This has been done *ad nauseam* in the past. In the attempt to define the Atonement men have lost sight of the practical issues of Redemption. In the attempt to define the mode of the Incarnation men have forgotten the implications of the fact.

The purpose of Theology is two-fold. It serves to set before men, in the form of Creeds, Articles or Confessions of Faith, a standard whereby they may judge the validity of their own religious experiences. The Creed represents a *consensus gentium* with which the individual can compare and contrast his own personal experiences. In teaching children to recite the Apostles' Creed we should be saying in effect: "Here are the results of the considered wisdom of the past: do not think you can believe it all at once, but use it to measure your growing experience." There is no intellectual dishonesty in this. It is inconceivable that a child of school-age should be expected, without any real religious experience, to express a living faith in the doctrines which find a place in the Creed. In nine cases out of ten it would be hypocrisy. Extend the school-age to cover a man's life, and the folly of regarding the Creed as anything but a standard of judgment is apparent. For it is impossible to believe

without some kind of experience, and an equal measure of experience, whether qualitative or quantitative, is not granted to all alike.

It is true, in the second place, to say of Theology that it provides one of many starting-points for the ultimate apprehension of Divine Truth. It cannot define Truth, but it can guide men towards it. Some men discover God through the emotions, others through the will. To some it is given to approach Him by the intellect and, for such men, Theology is their guide.

If, then, the purpose of Theology is not to define the indefinable, but rather to set up a standard for the estimation of individual experience and to guide men to the apprehension of Divine Truth, certain corollaries follow.

1. *Theology is always to be regarded as secondary to experience.*

Since Theology is the interpretation of experience, it presupposes the existence of that experience. For instance, there can be no satisfactory interpretation of the Eucharist until the soul has experienced, or failed to experience, the Presence of God in the Mass. The interpretation must always be subsequent to the experience. To transpose this order is to make the interpretation unintelligible, and to run the risk of suggesting experiences. Consequently Theology must always be regarded as dependent upon the soul's experience of God, which is Religion.

2. *Religion is based on personal experience.*

No one can really hold anything as true which has not made its appeal to the whole personality. It is impossible to accept the experience of another. Experience is valid, but only for the man who undergoes it. A man's religion is not always that

which he professes with his lips. Rather is it compounded of the various and varying experiences which he has undergone, consciously or subconsciously, during the whole course of his life.

3. *The function of the Church is to prepare men to receive the experience of God.*

A danger of course lies in the fact that such preparation may suggest, and so invalidate to a large extent, the subsequent experience. But the danger is more apparent than real. It only assumes dangerous proportions when the work of preparation is understood to consist in the teaching of a system of Theology. For such teaching certainly does imply a similarity in the subsequent experience of each individual; whereas God reveals Himself in different ways and by varying media to different individuals, or types of individuals.

If this be true, it follows that Theology, as defined in this article, can never be a static conception. It must remain fluid and be capable of endless readjustments to meet the needs of every temperament and every age. This is not to say that there can be no *corpus* of positive truth which is the same for all time. However varying the religious experiences of men, there are some fundamental propositions upon which both the practical and philosophical positions depend. The fact of God is a foundation truth; though the nature, character and work of God may be a cause for endless speculation. The fact of consciousness, whereby a man conceives of his own entity, is another such fundamental; as is also the relationship which exists between God and the self-conscious ego.

The conclusion of the whole matter would appear to be this: If Theology be rightly defined as 'the intellectual interpretation of religious experience,' it

must be allowed the very widest latitude within which to do its work. It must be cramped and restrained by no rigid tests of orthodoxy, such as Creeds, Articles or Confessions of Faith. The function of formularies is that of summarizing a collective experience rather than that of dictating an absolute standard to which all alike must conform. Religion is one thing, Theology another. Just as no man can dictate the conditions of his personal experience of God, so no man dare enforce his interpretation of that religious experience on another man.

H. L. HUBBARD.



## IN QUEST OF THE SOUL.<sup>1</sup>

Prof. J. S. MACKENZIE, LL.D., Litt.D.

THE main title of Dr. Hollander's two volumes, *In Search of the Soul*, is somewhat misleading; but the long sub-title sufficiently explains the nature of their contents. Those who are already acquainted with the author's previous work will not be surprised to learn that it is mainly occupied with an attempt to justify the doctrine of the localisation of psychical functions in the brain. In order to do this thoroughly, however, the author has thought it necessary to give an elaborate account of the history of philosophical speculations and scientific investigations as bearing upon the main subject, and also to indicate the way in which his theory affects the study of morals and 'psychical research.'

A work covering so large a field could hardly be adequately judged by any one reviewer—certainly not by the present writer. The most original and important parts of the book can be properly dealt with only by experts in physiology. A considerable part of the first volume is devoted to an account of the work of F. J. Gall and a general defence of his main contentions.

<sup>1</sup> *In Search of the Soul, and The Mechanism of Thought, Emotion and Conduct; a Treatise in two Volumes, containing a brief but comprehensive History of the Philosophical Speculations and Scientific Researches from ancient Times to the present Day, as well as an original Attempt to account for the Mind and Character of Man, and establish the Principles of a Science of Ethology.* By BERNARD HOLLANDER, M.D. London (Kegan Paul, etc.); pp. vi. + 516 + 361.

It is urged that the disrepute into which his phrenological doctrines fell, was due partly to the conservative prejudices of the medical profession, and partly to the charlatanism of some of his followers—notably Spurzheim and Combe. About this I am quite unable to judge. Nor am I competent to pronounce an opinion that would have any real value on the original investigations of Dr. Hollander himself on the localisation of different powers. I can only state that it is very evident that he has devoted a great deal of attention to the subject, that he has worked at it for a long time with much care and enthusiasm, and that his conclusions are such as to carry conviction on many points to a layman. If they are reliable, it is clear that they are of very great practical importance, especially in their bearing upon the treatment of insanity and mental deficiencies. It is perhaps too soon to expect any immediate applications to education, or any direct guidance to the young in the choice of a career.

What is of chief interest, however, to readers of *THE QUEST*, is the way in which Dr. Hollander applies his results to the search for the soul. It might at first be supposed that the results would be purely negative. The splitting up of the mind into separate functions and the localising of these in particular parts of the brain might be expected to lead to a doctrine of pure materialism; and it is partly at least on this account that such inquiries have been regarded with suspicion and repugnance by many of those who are most deeply interested in the spiritual life of mankind. Few people would be concerned to find that powers of movement are localised in particular parts of the body, or that there are physical centres for special modes of

sensation or special emotional dispositions. These, it might be said, are simply animal functions which are taken over and controlled by the human consciousness. Even intellectual powers may be handed over to the material system without any sense of spiritual loss. In India, for instance, the mind is sharply distinguished from the soul and is not usually regarded as sharing in the soul's immortality. It is much more serious when the higher faculties of moral and æsthetic valuation and creative imagination are referred to physical sources. When Dr. Hollander professes to 'account for the mind and character of man' on the basis of physiological research, it is apt to seem that anything that could be called a soul or spirit must have completely disappeared, and that we are left with nothing but physiological dispositions. This, however, is not the result to which the author points; and probably the way in which he escapes from such a result may be of special interest to readers of *THE QUEST*.

As I understand him, he escapes from it primarily by a doctrine of Vitalism. "Science," he says (ii. 318), "does not deal with life, but with *biological facts*. The two essentially distinctive properties of living matter are the *power of growth* and the *power of reproduction*. All living things grow by *intussusception* and *multiply by division*, whereas these properties are not found in any non-living thing. . . . What is the force that gives this bit of protoplasm the capability of becoming a living, thinking, and loving being? We do not know. Anything that is physical can be made from other material things by man. Nothing approaching to the cell of a living creature has ever yet been made." So far, of course, this is only a confession of

ignorance, and cannot be said to throw any definite light upon the subject. There are many similar confessions throughout Dr. Hollander's work; and his general conclusion about the soul is thus stated: "So little is known of the mental constitution of man, and its relation with his physical being, that it would be audacity on my part to affirm or deny, or even to argue, on the existence of the soul and a life hereafter. Not until investigations are made on the lines described in this work, not until ethology is recognised as well as psychology, not until brain research is extended from motor and sensory to mental manifestations, and the elementary powers can be defined and their physical bases are discovered, will it be safe to speculate on the soul and the spiritual nature of man. Only one suggestion I would venture in conclusion: Every particle of man is alive and adjusted in its function to the whole being, the self, and by his thought and emotion he can control not only his brain activity, but every function of the body, accelerating or inhibiting it. From this it appears to me that instead of saying 'man has a soul,' it would be more correct to say that 'man himself is a soul.' He is not a conscious machine but a spiritual being." This statement is evidently somewhat vague and tentative; but it at least shows that Dr. Hollander does not conceive that his doctrine of localisation of functions necessarily leads to materialism.

It is no doubt his consciousness of the grave issues that are thus raised that has led Dr. Hollander to include in his book a sketch of the history of philosophy, as well as of physiology. Necessarily such a sketch must be very incomplete. The attempt, for instance, to sum up the views of Socrates and Plato in a few

sentences would be a rather hopeless task even for one who was thoroughly familiar with all the investigations that have been carried on for the discovery of their true interpretation. The attempt to compress the Vedānta philosophy is, if possible, even more inadequate and misleading. It is doubtful whether such a sketch as that which is here given will be of much use to anyone. I believe a short history of psychology would have been more to the purpose. It is rather remarkable that Dr. Hollander makes very few references to psychological writers.

The real value of the book lies in the account which it contains of Dr. Hollander's own researches into mental diseases and abnormal modes of experience. The parts that would probably be of most interest to the majority of the readers of *THE QUEST* are those contained in chaps. xxxvi-xxxviii, in which the 'unexplored powers of the mind' are dealt with. Among the subjects here referred to are subconsciousness, universal suggestibility, auto-suggestion, hypnotism, dreams, dissociated personality, psycho-analysis, multiple personality, magnetic influences, nervous force, human aura, clairvoyance, telepathy, human beings endowed with capacities still unexplored and unappreciated. In connection with all these subjects Dr. Hollander supplies many striking illustrations. He appears to have tested them with great care, and certainly he is remarkably cautious in his explanations. Usually he has to admit that very little is really known about them. As an instance, it may be worth while to quote what he says about hypnotism (ii. 272): "Considering that we possess little or no knowledge of what mind itself is, it can cause no wonder that all the explanations offered hitherto for the phenomena

of hypnotism are still unsatisfactory. Considering, also, the varieties of theories of natural sleep, we cannot be surprised at our ignorance of hypnotic sleep. . . . My own experience strengthens my belief that *the phenomena of hypnosis are due to some inherent capacity which varies with different subjects*. A hypnotic effect is not something forced upon the subject by the will of the operator, but something evoked by the mind of the subject exercising its own powers at the suggestion of the operator. And this suggestion is addressed to the person's consciousness—mind speaks to mind. The operator only suggests the result to be accomplished; he does not suggest the method whereby it is to be achieved."

It is greatly to be regretted that Dr. Hollander's valuable researches on these subjects are imbedded in a work so bulky and expensive as to be almost inaccessible to many of those who would be most deeply interested in them. May we hope that it may yet be found possible to bring out a smaller book containing nothing but the most remarkable of his own investigations and the general conclusions to which he is led with regard to them? In the meantime, however, we have every reason to be grateful to him for his truly Herculean labours. He has certainly thrown a flood of light into some of the darkest corners of human experience; and those who wish to explore them further could probably find no safer guide.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

## THE FOUR MOON BRETHREN.

GUSTAV MEYRINK.

Who I am is easy to tell. From my twenty-fifth to my sixtieth year I was *valet de chambre* to his lordship Count du Chazal. Before that I had been employed as under-gardener, tending the flowers in the monastery of Apanua, where I had also lived the monotonous dull days of my early youth. I was taught reading and writing by the kindness of the Abbot. I was a foundling and had been adopted after my confirmation by the old head gardener of the Abbey; since then I have had the right to call myself Meyrink.

As far as I can think back in memory, I have always had the feeling as though I wore an iron ring round my head, encircling my brain and hindering the development of what is commonly called phantasy. I should say that one of my inner senses is wanting, but in compensation my eyes and ears are as keen as those of a savage.

If I close my eyes, I can see even to-day with almost oppressive lucidity the black sharp outlines of the cypresses silhouetted against the crumbling walls of the old Abbey. I see the worn bricks in the pavement of the cloisters, one by one, so that I could count them. Yet all this remains cold and mute for me; it does not tell me anything, though things are said to speak to others, as I have often read.

I state with full candour and quite openly what is amiss with me, for I would lay claim to absolute

trustworthiness. I am moved by the hope that what I write down here may meet the eyes of those who know more than I do, and who may enlighten and instruct me, if they can and dare do so, concerning the whole sequence of unsolvable riddles that have followed the course of my life.

If, contrary to all reasonable expectation, this *mémoire* should come to the knowledge of the two friends of my late second master—Magister Peter Wirtzigh (deceased and buried at Wernstein on the Inn in the year of the Great War, 1914)—that is to say, to the knowledge of the two honourable gentlemen and doctors Chrysophron Zagreus and Sacrobosco Haselmayer, called also ‘the red Tanjur’—these reverend gentlemen may be just enough to remember that it cannot be simply garrulity or curiosity which induces me to publish a matter which the two gentlemen have kept secret for a whole generation. An old man of seventy years like myself should have outgrown all such childish folly. May they rather credit me with pressing motives of a spiritual nature, among them certainly not least the anxious fear of my heart to become after the death of my body an ‘*engine*’ (these two gentlemen will certainly understand what I mean by this).

But now to my story.

The first words addressed to me by Count du Chazal, when he engaged me were: “Has ever a woman in any way come into thy life?” As I could say ‘No’ with a good conscience he seemed visibly satisfied.

These words I feel now burning me as fire; I don’t know why. The same question, every syllable of it repeated, was asked me thirty-five years later by my second employer, Magister Peter Wirtzigh, when



I entered his service: "Has ever a woman in any way come into thy life?" Even then I could also confidently answer in the negative; I could do so even to this day. But for an anxious moment in giving the answer I fancied myself a lifeless engine, not a human being.

Whenever I worry now over the matter, a dire suspicion creeps into my brain. I cannot say in so many words what I am thinking on these occasions, but are there not plants too that never develop properly, that shrivel up and remain of a waxen yellow colour, simply because the poisonous shumach-tree grows near and secretly sucks at their roots?

The first months I felt very uncomfortable in the solitary castle occupied only by Count du Chazal, his old housekeeper, Petronella, and myself, and literally choked-up with weird old-fashioned instruments, clocks and telescopes; especially as his lordship himself had so many odd habits.

For instance, although I was allowed to help him when dressing, he never permitted me to do so when he took off his clothes. If I offered to help him he always pretended he wished still to read for some time longer. But in reality—at least this is what I am driven to conclude—he roamed about in the dark; for often in the morning his boots were thickly covered with mud and mire, even when he had not set a foot out of doors the day before.

His appearance too did not make me feel at home. Small and slender, his body did not well suit his head. In spite of being well-built the Count made the impression upon me for a long time of being hunch-backed, though I could not exactly account to myself for the reason of this impression. His profile was

sharply cut and, owing to his thin protruding chin and pointed gray beard curving forward, formed an oddly sickle-like outline. He must have possessed also remarkable vitality, for he did not seem to grow older in any perceptible measure through all the long years I served him; at most the peculiar sickle moon-like shape of his features seemed to grow sharper and thinner in the course of time.

In the village curious gossiping went round about him. The peasants said he did not get wet in the rain, and so on, and that whenever he passed their cottages in the long sleeping hours of the night, all the clocks would stop.

I never troubled about such idle talk. I also believe it is not a very wonderful thing, if similarly at times all the metal objects in the castle—knives, scissors, and the like—became magnetic for some days, so as to attract steel pens, nails and similar objects. At least so his lordship readily explained these matters to me, when once I ventured to ask him about them. The place, said he, was built on volcanic soil; besides such incidents were connected with the full moon. Altogether the Count had an extraordinarily high opinion of the moon; so I conclude from the following occurrences.

I must preface by saying that every summer, exactly on the 21st of July, but always only for twenty-four hours, we received the visit of an uncommonly strange guest—the same Dr. Haselmayer of whom I shall have to say much more later on.

When his lordship spoke of him, he always called him ‘the red Tanjur.’ Why, I have never been able to understand, for the honourable doctor was not only not red-haired at all, but had not a single hair on his

head, and no eye-brows or eye-lashes either. Even at that time he made the impression upon me of being an old man—maybe because of the odd, extremely old-fashioned costume he used to wear all the year round: a lustreless moss-green cloth tall hat, narrowing almost to a point towards the top, a Dutch velvet waistcoat, buckle-shoes and black silk knee-breeches on his disquietingly short thin shanks. Perhaps this was why he looked so, so . . . 'defunct,' for otherwise his high, soft childish voice and wonderfully finely drawn girlish lips contradicted the idea of old age. On the other hand there probably never were such extinct eyes as his seemed to be in the whole world.

While not wishing to fail in due respect, I must add that he was hydrocephalous. Moreover his head seemed frightfully soft—as soft as a peeled boiled egg—and that not only as to his quite round pale face but also as to his skull. At least, whenever he put his hat on, there instantly rose up all round it under the brim a kind of anæmic swelling, and when he took it off a considerable time always elapsed before his head happily regained its former shape.

From the first minute of Dr. Haselmayer's arrival until his departure, he and his lordship the Count used to talk of the moon without break or interruption even for eating or drinking or sleeping, and that with a puzzling earnestness which I failed to understand.

Their hobby went so far that, whenever the time of the full-moon fell on the 21st of July, they invariably went out at nightfall to the small, marshy lake of the castle, and would stare for hours at the reflection of the silvery disk in the dark water.

Once, while passing by them, as I occasionally did, I even noticed that both gentlemen threw pale

fragments—probably crumbs of white bread—into the little lake. As Dr. Haselmayer observed I had seen them do it, he said quickly: “We are only feeding the moon—pardon, I meant the swan.” But there was no swan either near or far in the neighbourhood; nor were there any fish.

What I was forced to overhear that night seemed to be mysteriously connected with the incident. Therefore I took great pains to impress every word on my memory and wrote it all down immediately afterwards.

On another occasion I was lying awake in my bedroom when I heard in the adjoining library, which was never entered at other times, his lordship’s voice making the following elaborate speech:

“After what we have just observed in the water, my dear and highly esteemed Doctor, I should be very much mistaken indeed if all should not be perfectly in order for our cause. Evidently the old Rosicrucian sentence ‘*post centum viginti annos patebo*’ (that is ‘in a hundred and twenty years I shall be revealed’) is to be explained entirely according to our expectations. Indeed this is what I should call a joyful secular recurrence of the great *solstitium*. We can confidently state that already in the last quarter of the past 19th century mechanics have been quickly and surely gaining an ever increasing ascendancy over mankind. But if things continue at this pace, as we have every right to expect, in the 20th century men will scarcely have time left to catch a glimpse of daylight because of all the trouble of cleaning, polishing, keeping in repair and eventually renewing the many and manifold and always multiplying machines.

“Even to-day we might rightly say that machinery

has become a worthy twin of the late golden calf. For a man who tortures his child to death, gets no more than a fortnight's prison, while he who damages an old street roller, may be locked up for three years."

"True; but the production of such mechanical devices is assuredly a good deal more expensive," grimly objected the Rev. Dr. Haselmayer.

"Generally it is, most certainly," politely admitted Monseigneur du Chazal. "But that is surely not the sole reason. In my opinion the essential matter seems to be that man too—taking things as they are—is nothing but a half-finished thing, destined itself one day to become a clock-work. You can see that from the visible fact that already certain by no means unessential instincts of his—*e.g.* the choosing of a right mate in order to improve the race—have degenerated into automatism. Small wonder then if he sees in machinery his true descendant and heir, and a changeling in his bodily offspring. Imagine how readily and gladly people would rush into matrimony, if only women would give birth to motor-cycles or machine-guns instead of children. Indeed in the Golden Age, when men were less developed, they believed only what they could 'think'; then came gradually the period when they believed only what they could devour. But now they are climbing to the summit of perfection: that means, they admit the reality only of what they can—sell!

"In doing this they expect as a matter of course—for it is written in the fourth commandment 'thou shalt honour thy father and mother'—that the machines they procreate and anoint with the finest oils while they themselves remain content with margarine, will repay them a thousandfold for the

ains of production and shower the blessings of every kind of happiness upon them. They only forget completely that machines too may prove ungrateful children.

"In their crass credulity they let themselves be lulled to sleep by the illusion that machines are but lifeless things, unable to react against their creators, things that can be thrown away when one has got sick of them. Lord, what idiots! Have you ever observed a big gun, most reverend Sir? Would you ever think even that an inanimate thing? I tell you, not even a General is so lovingly cared for. A General may catch a cold, and nobody will worry about it. But big guns are wrapped up in stout coverings that they may not get rheumatic—or rusty, which is the same thing—and they are provided with hats, that it may not rain down their muzzles.

"Of course you could object that a cannon will not roar if it is not stuffed with powder and before the signal to fire is given. But does an operatic tenor begin to roar before his cue is given? And does he go off if he has not been filled before sufficiently with musical notes? I tell you, in the whole world's expanse there is not a single really dead thing."

"But our own sweet home the moon," suavely piped Dr. Haselmayer—"isn't she an extinct astral body; isn't she dead?"

"She is not dead," Monseigneur informed him. 'She is but the face of death. She is but—how shall I call it?—the collecting-lens which, like a magic lantern, concentrates the life-giving rays of that damned insolent sun for an inverted work, projecting by her witchcraft all kinds of magic imagery out of the brains of the living into the seeming reality,

thereby causing the venomous fluid of death and decay to breathe and germinate in manifold shape and effect. How extraordinarily curious—don't you think so too?—that nevertheless men actually prefer the moon to all other stars? Even their poets, who are superstitiously credited with seers' powers, sing their songs to her with ecstatic sighs and upturned eyes. And not one of them feels his lips grow pale for horror at the thought that for millions and millions of years, month after month, this bloodless cosmic corpse turns round our earth. The very dogs have more sense—especially the black ones! They at least put their tails between their legs and howl when they see the moon!"

"Did you not write me quite recently, Monseigneur and Master, that machines were the direct creatures of the moon?" asked Dr. Haselmayer. "How then am I to understand that?"

"You have misunderstood me," interrupted the Count. "The moon has only *impregnated* the brains of men *with ideas* through her venomous breath, and machines are the visible births engendered in this way.

"The sun has implanted into mortal souls the wish to grow richer in delights and finally the curse on man, to produce in the sweat of his brow transitory works and to break them up again. But the moon, the secret source of earthly shapes, has overcast all for them with a deluding glamour, so that they have run astray into a wrong imagination and projected into outward reality—into the tangible world—what they ought to have contemplated inwardly.

"As a consequence machines have become visible titan-bodies, born out of the brains of degenerate heroes.

"And even as 'to conceive' and 'to create' something is nothing else but *to cause one's soul to assume*

*the shape* of what one 'seeth' or 'createth' and to unite one's self with it, even so are men henceforth driven helplessly on the way to transforming themselves magically into machines, until at last they will stand here naked as a never slowing-down, ceaselessly pounding, heaving and groaning piece of clock-work—as that which they always wanted to invent—a joyless *perpetuum mobile*.

"We, however, we Brethren of the Moon, shall then be the heirs of 'Eternal Being'—of the one unchangeable consciousness that saith, not 'I live,' but 'I am,' that knoweth 'Even when the all breaketh—I remain.'

"How else could it be—if shapes were not simply dreams—that we can at will change at any time one body for another, that we should be able to appear among men in a human form, among spectres as a shade and among thoughts as an idea,—all this through the power of the secret of how to divest ourselves of our shape as if it were a toy picked up in a dream? Even as a man who is half asleep, may suddenly become conscious of his dreaming, thereby putting the illusive conception of time into a new present. And thus he gives another more desirable direction to the off-flow of his dream, as if jumping with both feet at once into a new body, seeing that the body is in reality nothing but a contraction of the all-pervading ether laden with the illusion of tangible solidity."

"*Magnifice dictum,*" enthusiastically exclaimed Dr. Haselmayer with his sweet girlish voice. "But why really should not we let the mortals participate in this bliss of transfiguration? Would that be so very bad?"

"Bad!" his lordship broke in at the top of his



voice. "Incalculable, terrible! Imagine: man endowed with the power to tap out '*Kultur*' through the whole cosmos!

"What do you think, most reverend Sir, the moon would be like in a fortnight? Velodromes in every crater-circle and round them fields irrigated with sewage-water! Provided they had not first of all dragged in dramatic 'art,' and thereby once for all soured the ground against any possibility of future vegetation!

"Or do you perhaps long to see the planets connected by telephone during exchange business hours? Or do you fancy the double stars in the Milky Way being obliged to produce legal marriage-certificates?

"No, no, my dear Sir, for a while the universe will still have to put up with the old jog-trot way.

"But let us turn to a more agreeable subject, my dear Doctor. By the by, it's high time for you to wane, I should have said to depart. Well, till we meet again at Magister Wirtzigh's in August, 1914! That's the date of the beginning of the great finish, and we shall certainly not fail to celebrate this catastrophe for mankind in a worthy manner, shall we?"

Already before the last words of Monseigneur were uttered, I had hurried into my livery so as to help the Rev. Dr. Haselmayer with his packing and escort him to his carriage. A moment later I stood in the hall.

But what a sight awaited me there!—his lordship coming out of the library *alone*, in his arms the Dutch waistcoat, buckle-shoes, silk breeches and tall hat of the Rev. Dr. Haselmayer. The latter had vanished without leaving the slightest trace! Monseigneur entered his bedroom without deigning so much as to look at me, and quietly shut the door behind him.

As a well-trained servant I considered it my duty to be surprised at nothing my master chose to do. Yet I could not help shaking my head, and it took me a considerable time before I could drop off to sleep again.

\* \* \* \*

I must now skip many, many years. They passed monotonously and are recorded in my memory like so many dusty and turned leaves, yellow and fragmentary, from an old book with motley and exaggerated events in it, which I seem to have sometime read but scarcely understood in a dull feverish state of mind with half-exhausted memory.

One thing only I know quite clearly. In the spring of 1914 his lordship suddenly said to me: "I shall have to start soon on a journey—to . . . Mauritius"—looking at me with lurking suspicion—"and I wish you to enter the service of my friend, a certain Magister Wirtzigh, at Weinstein on the Inn. Have you understood, Gustav? Besides I shall not stand any objections."

I bowed without a word.

One fine morning without any previous preparations Monseigneur left the castle. At least I had to infer this from the fact that I saw him no more, and that in his stead a strange gentleman lay in the four-poster in which the Count used to sleep.

This gentleman was, as I learned later on in Weinstein, the Rev. Magister Peter Wirtzigh.

On arriving at the Rev. Magister's place, from which you could look straight down on to the foaming stream of the Inn, I immediately busied myself with unpacking the boxes and trunks we had brought with us, and stowing away the contents into chests and drawers. Among them was an extraordinarily ancient

lamp in the shape of a transparent Japanese idol squatting cross-legged. The head consisted of a milky glass ball, and inside the lamp was a snake worked by clockwork and holding up the wick in its jaws. I was just about to open a high Gothic press to put it away when to my great horror I saw hanging in the press the dangling corpse of the Rev. Dr. Haselmayer.

In my terror I almost let the lamp fall to the ground; but fortunately in the nick of time I realized that it was only the clothes and tall hat of the Rev. Doctor which had tricked me into fancying I was seeing his dead body.

Nevertheless the incident made a deep impression and left me with a foreboding of the approach of some threatening fatality which I could not get rid of, though the following months had nothing exciting about them.

The Rev. Magister Wirtzigh was, it is true, invariably kind and friendly to me. Yet he resembled Dr. Haselmayer in so many respects that I could not help remembering the incident of the press. His face was round like that of the Rev. Doctor's, only very dark, nearly like a negro's, for he had suffered for many years the incurable result of a wearisome bilious disease, black jaundice. If you stood a few paces from him and if the room was not very well lighted, you could often hardly distinguish his features, and the short, scarcely a finger wide, silvery white beard that grew under his chin up to his ears, showed up then against his dark face like a dully-shimmering uncanny iridescence.

The oppressive anxiety which held me spell-bound, vanished only when in August the news of the outbreak of a terrible world-war fell on all like a thunderbolt.

I remembered immediately what years ago I had

heard my master Count du Chazal say about an impending catastrophe for mankind ; and perhaps this was the reason why I could not get myself to join whole-heartedly in the cursing of the hostile powers by the villagers. Indeed it seemed to me that behind all these events there stood as their real cause the dark influence of certain hateful powers of nature playing with mankind as it were with a marionette.

Magister Wirtzigh remained absolutely unmoved, just like a man who had long foreseen what was to come.

Not till the 4th of September did a slight restlessness come over him. He opened a door, which had till then been closed to me, and led me into a blue vaulted chamber with only one round window in the ceiling. Exactly underneath, so that the light fell directly upon it, stood a round table of black quartz with a bowl-like cavity in the middle. Round it stood carved and gilded chairs.

"This basin here," said the Rev. Magister, "you are to fill this evening before the moon rises with clear cold water from the well. I am expecting visitors from . . . Mauritius. When you hear me call, take the Japanese snake-lamp—I hope the wick will not do more than glimmer," he added half to himself—"and stand over there with it in that niche like holding a torch."

Night had long fallen ; the clock struck 11, then 12, and I was still waiting and waiting to be called.

Nobody could have entered the house. I knew for certain I should have noticed it ; for the door was shut and it always creaked loudly when being opened. But there had been no sound up to now.

Dead silence lay all round me, so that little by

little the buzzing of the blood in my ears had become a thundering surf.

At last I heard the voice of the Rev. Magister calling my name—faintly as if from far off. It was as if the voice came out of my own heart.

The glimmering lamp in hand, nearly dazed by an inexplicable drowsiness which I had never before experienced, I groped my way through the dark rooms into the vaulted chamber and placed myself in the niche.

In the lamp the clockwork was faintly ticking, and I saw through the reddish belly of the idol the wick glowing between the snake's jaws as it slowly moved round and seemed to rise almost imperceptibly in spirals.

The full moon must have been standing vertically above the aperture in the vaulted roof, for in the water filling the basin of the stone table there swam her reflection as a motionless disk of yellowish green-shining silver.

For long I thought the gilded chairs were empty. But by and by I began to distinguish in three of them the figures of men sitting; and when they hesitatingly moved their faces I recognized in the north the Rev. Magister Wirtzigh, in the east an unknown person called Dr. Chrysophon Zagreus, as I gathered from their subsequent conversation, and in the south, with a wreath of poppies on his bald pate, Dr. Sacrobosco Haselmeyer.

Only the chair in the west was empty.

By and by my hearing also must have been awakened, for words were coming to me, partly in Latin, which I did not understand, partly, however, in the German language.

I saw the stranger bend forward and kiss the Rev. Dr. Haselmeyer's forehead, and I heard him say: 'Beloved Bride!' A long sentence followed, but too low for it to reach my consciousness.

Then, suddenly, the Rev. Magister Wirtzigh was in the middle of the following apocalyptic utterance:

"And before the throne was a sea of glass like unto crystal, and in the midst of the throne and round the throne four beasts, full of eyes before and behind. . . . And there came forth another horse, which was yellow, and he who sat upon the horse was called Death, and Hell followed at his heels. Unto whom power was given to take away peace from the earth, so that they should strangle each other; and unto him was given a great sword."

"Given a great sword," echoed the Rev. Dr. Zagreus, when his eye chanced to fall upon me. Thereupon he paused and asked the others in a whisper whether I could be trusted.

"He has long since become a lifeless piece of clock-work in my hands," the Rev. Magister assured him. "Our ritual prescribes that one who has died to this earth, should hold the torch, when we meet in council. He is like a corpse, carries his soul in his hand and believes it is a smouldering lamp."

Fierce scorn sounded in his words, and a sudden terror paralyzed my blood when I realized that in truth I could not move a limb and had become as rigid as a corpse.

Again the Rev. Dr. Zagreus began to speak: "Nay, the 'Song of Songs' of Hate is a roar through the world. I have seen with my own eyes him who sits upon the yellow horse and behind him in its thousands the army of machines, our friends and allies. Long

have they had power of their own, but ever men remain still blind and think themselves masters and lords over them.

“Driverless locomotives, loaded with chunks of rock, rage on in mad fury, precipitate themselves upon them and bury hundreds and thousands beneath the weight of their iron bodies.

“The nitrogen of the air coagulates into terrible explosives. Nature herself hurries in breathless haste to offer her most valuable treasures to exterminate, neck and crop, the white monster who has furrowed her face with scars for millions of years.

“Steel creepers, with sharp horrid thorns, grow out of the ground, catch legs and tear bodies. In silent glee semaphores wag to one another and again hundreds of thousands of the hateful brood are destroyed. Hidden behind trees and hills giant howitzers lie in ambush, necks outstretched to the sky, with chunks of ore between their teeth, till treacherous wind-mills tap out to them insidious signals to spit forth death and destruction.

“Electric vipers hiss beneath the ground. Lo! a tiny greenish spark, and an earthquake uproars and instantly changes the landscape into a fiery general grave.

“With the shining eyes of beasts of prey search-lights peer through the darkness. More, more, still more! Where are they? See, there they come stumbling along in their grey shrouds—endless rows of them—with bleeding feet and dead eyes, staggering from exhaustion, half asleep, lungs panting, knees giving way under them. But quickly drums begin to roll with their rhythmic fanatical fakir's tattoo and whip the furies of a *Berserker* rage into intoxicated

brains. Then howling, irresistible, amok-running madness explodes, until the lead-storm has nothing to hurt but corpses.

"From West and from East, from America and from Asia, they stream on to the war-dance, the brown monsters, their round mouths filled with murder-lust.

"Steel sharks lurk round the coasts, stifling in their bellies those who have given them life.

"But even the home-stayers, the seemingly lukewarm ones who have been so long neither hot nor cold—those who have previously procreated only tools of peace—are awakened and contribute their share to the great massacre. Restlessly they spew their glowing breath up to the skies day and night, and out of their bodies flow swords and cartridges, bayonets and projectiles. Not a single one of them wants to lie down and sleep.

"Ever new giant vultures hurry to get fledged, to circle above the last hiding-places of men; and thousands of restless iron spiders run to and fro, to weave shimmering silver-white wings for them."

For a moment the flow of words ceased and I saw that Count du Chazal was suddenly present. He stood behind the chair in the west, leaning with his arms crossed over its back; his face was pale and haggard.

Then Dr. Zagreus with an impressive gesture continued:

"And is it not a ghostly resurrection? What had long ago decayed into rock-oil and lain quiet in mountain-caves, the blood and fat of antediluvian dragons, begins to stir and would become alive again. Boiled and distilled in pot-bellied cauldrons it flows as petrol into the heart-valves of new phantastic air-monsters and makes them pulsate. Petrol and



dragon's blood!—who can any longer see a difference between them? It is like a demon-prelude to the Last Day."

"Do not speak of the Last Day," hastily interposed the Count.—I felt an undefined fear vibrate in his voice.—"It sounds like an omen."

The gentlemen rose in astonishment: "An omen?"

"We intended to meet to-day as for a . . . feast," began his lordship, after for some time endeavouring to find the right word. "But my feet have been delayed to the present hour in . . . Mauritius."—I understood vaguely that the word must have a hidden meaning and that the Count could not mean a land.—"I have long been in doubt whether what I perceived in the reflection breathed up from the earth to the moon is true. I fear, yes I fear—and my flesh grows cold with horror when I think of it—that in a short time something untoward may happen and snatch from us the longed-for victory. What is the good of my guessing? There may be a secret reason in the present war, that the World-spirit wants to keep the people asunder, so that they may stand separate as the limbs of a future body? What does it help me if I do not know the last intention? The influences you cannot see are always the most powerful. For I tell you: Something invisible is growing and growing, and I cannot find its root.

"I have interpreted the celestial signs which do not deceive. Yes, even the demons of the deep are preparing to fight; and soon the skin of the earth will twitch like that of a horse tormented with flies. Already the princes of darkness, whose names are inscribed in the Book of Hate, have hurled again a stone—a comet—from the abyss of cosmic space, and this time against

the earth, as they have often cast such a throw before against the sun, though it has missed its aim and flown back, as the boomerang returns to the hand of the Australian hunter when it has failed to hit the victim.

“But to what purpose, I ask myself, is this great display of power, when the final doom of mankind through the army of machines seems sealed and decided?”

“And then the scales fall from my eyes; but I am still blind and can only grope my way.

“Do you not too feel how the imponderable, which death cannot catch, surges to a stream compared with which the oceans are as a pail of swill?”

“What is the enigmatic power that sweeps away overnight everything small and makes a beggar’s heart as wide as an apostle’s? I have seen a poor school-mistress adopt an orphan without any ado—and then fear seized me.

“Where is the power of machinery if mothers rejoice instead of tearing their hair when their sons fall? And may it not be a prophetic hieroglyph which nobody can decipher at present, when in the shops may be seen a picture of a crucifix in the Vosges from which the wood has been shot away while the Son of Man . . . remains standing?”

“We hear the wings of the Angel of Death humming over the lands. But are you sure it is not the wings of another and not those of Death we hear? Of one of those who can say ‘I’ to every stone, to every flower and to every animal within and without space and time?”

“Nothing can be lost, they say. Whose hand then gathers all that enthusiasm which is liberated every-

where like a new power of nature? And what birth is to come forth from it, and who will be the heir?

"Shall there again come forward one whose steps no one may hinder—as it has always happened from time to time in the millennial course? The thought does not leave me."

"Let him come! But if he comes again this time too in clothes of flesh and blood," said the Rev. Magister Wirtzigh scornfully, "they will quickly nail him down—with jests. No one has yet triumphed over grinning laughter!"

"But he may come *without shape*," murmured Dr. Chrysophron Zagreus to himself, "even as a short time ago spooks came overnight upon the animals, so that horses suddenly could calculate and dogs could read and write. What if he should break forth out of men themselves like unto a flame?"

"Then must we cheat *light through light* in man," cried Monseigneur du Chazal. "We must dwell henceforth in their brains as a new false glow of an illusory, sober intelligence until they mistake the moon for the sun. *We must teach them to distrust everything that is light.*"

\* \* \* \* \*

What more his lordship said I cannot remember. I found that suddenly I could move again, and the glass-like, crystallized state that had held me hitherto spell-bound slowly began to leave me. A voice within me seemed to whisper that I ought to be afraid; but I could not manage to feel anything.

Nevertheless, as if to protect myself, I stretched out my arm with the lamp in front of me.

It may be that a draught of air caught the light or that the snake had reached the hollow in the head of

the idol so that the glimmering wick could now flare out as a flame. I know not. I only remember that suddenly a dazzling light burst upon my senses. Again I heard my name being called, and then something heavy fell to the ground with a dull thud.

It must have been my own body; for when I opened my eyes for a moment before losing consciousness, I saw myself lying on the ground with the full-moon shining overhead. But the room seemed empty and table and gentlemen had disappeared.

\* \* \* \*

For many weeks I lay in a deep stupor. When at length I had slowly recovered consciousness I learned—from whom, I have forgotten—that the Rev. Magister Wirtzigh had meanwhile died and appointed me heir to all his property.

But as I have probably to lie in bed for a considerable time still, I have full leisure to think over what has happened and to write down everything.

Only at times during the night a strange feeling overcomes me, as if there was an empty abyss in my breast, infinite to east, south, west and north, and high in the centre the moon floating, waxing to a brilliant disk, then waning, then becoming black, and then again recurring as a thin sickle. And every time her phases are the faces of the four gentlemen, as they sat last round the round stone table.

When morning dawns, the old housekeeper Petronella will often come to my bedside and say: "Well, how are you, Reverend Sir, . . . Reverend Magister Wirtzigh?" For she wants to persuade me that there never was a Count du Chazal, since that family became extinct in 1430, as the pastor knows for certain. I am said to have been a somnambule who

had fallen from the roof in an attack of lunacy and had for years imagined himself to be his own valet. Of course neither Dr. Zagreus nor Dr. Sacrobosco Haselmeyer will she admit to exist.

"The red Tanjur," she always concludes threateningly, "well, that does exist. It lies over there by the stove and is a Chinese magic charm, as far as I can learn. But one sees what comes of a Christian body's reading such stuff."

I remain silent and never contradict her, for I know what I know. But when the old lady has left the room, I get up surreptitiously to make sure. I open the Gothic press and convince myself of the reality of everything.

Yes, of course, there stands the snake-lamp and below it there they hang—the green tall hat, the waistcoat and the silk breeches of the Rev. Dr. Haselmayer.

Starnberg, 1917.

GUSTAV MEYRINK.

(Authorized Translation by R. E. and G. R. S. M.)

## ‘ICI REPOSE UN SOLDAT INCONNU.’

HEREUNDER lies,  
Broken and still'd,  
Dirt in his mouth and eyes,  
The beginning and end  
Of thrice ten million years.  
Sunlight that spill'd  
Out of the sky in the dawn of the world,  
A thousand empires and ten thousand kings,  
The unchanging song  
Eternal childhood sings,  
The inarticulate wrong  
Of beast and slave,  
The sunset fires that flared  
While man  
Still slept in the womb of the sea,  
Each cradle and each grave,  
Love that hungered and dared,  
All triumph and defeat,  
The measureless span  
Of the stars' immensity,  
The bitter and the sweet,  
The laughing tears  
Of the streams that rippled and curled  
By flaming grasses,—have come  
To break themselves, and spend  
Their pain and splendour  
In this surrender  
To the dirt in his mouth and his eyes. He is the sum.

STEPHEN SOUTHWOLD.

FRANCE, January, 1918.

## ETERNITY IS NOW.

He who has no vision of Eternity will never get a true hold of Time.—CARLYLE.

ETERNITY is Now.  
Each day, each hour,  
Prove thou thy power  
To live in the Eternal Good.  
Time's phantom waters flow ;  
Our bodies battle with the flood,  
Yet, high above,  
A heaven of Love  
We see ; and feel a heavenly link.  
We see, and know we need not sink.  
Live thou, majestic, with such majesty  
As comes to thee at night, when all is still,  
And moon, and star, and brook, and whispering tree  
With holy ecstasy thy being fill ;  
Or when, by day, a soft cloud floating by,  
A tint of flower, or a bird's sharp cry  
Floods thee with joy well-nigh akin to pain,  
Startles thy soul and gives it wings again ;  
Then lo ! all things on earth  
Of beauty or of worth,  
The glorious sun above,  
The friends whom most we love,  
And all the Best we know  
Of man's soul here below,  
All high achievement, all endeavour high,  
Grow one with God in His eternal sky.

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Whence are these visions? Whence, but from thy soul?  
Weave thou their glories to a garment bright;  
Dare to be part of that stupendous Whole  
Which is Eternal Life, and Love, and Light.

LUCY E. BROADWOOD.

### AFTER BRAIN FEVER.

DEATH hath gone back to shadow-land,  
And Love is but a melting mist;  
I dream not, but again exist,  
And self resumes her old command.

The fires within my brain die out,  
That cave wherein my being lay,  
Oblivious of its walls of clay  
Or of the busy world without.

The only light that fills its cell  
Steals through the loopholes of my eyes,  
And outward sound unheeded plies  
The broken cord of hearing's bell.

Nought answereth, for everything  
In that dim morgue lies stiff and stark,  
And habit steers me like a bark  
By dint of her dead reckoning.

I live again as other men  
The empty life of polished brutes,  
That withers feeling at its roots,  
With self-advance its only ken.



And this is life ! Oh God, the pains  
That made my brain a burning marl,  
That did each nerve-string knot and gnarl,  
Seem worthier than such shallow gains—

To heap up riches doomed to rust,  
To write in shifting sand my name,  
To trust to epitaph for fame,  
Or urn to hearse my worthless dust.

My soul revolts in scorn, and wakes  
The slumbering passions in my brain  
That fan the smouldering fires again,  
While pain anew her furnace makes.

She shall therein refine my soul  
As in a fiery crucible,  
Till clearer than a silver bell  
My Self shall on her anvil toll,

Wrought by her wondrous alchemy  
To the true likeness of a man.  
Then die, ye fires, if so ye can ;  
My life is lived and I can die !

CLAUDESLEY BRERETON.

## REVIEWS AND NOTICES

### THE MESSAGE OF PLATO.

A Re-interpretation of the 'Republic.' By Edward J. Urwick, M.A., Head of the Ratan Tata Department of Social Science and Administration, University of London; Author of 'The Philosophy of Social Progress.' London (Methuen); pp. 262; 18s. net.

THE author has divided his speculative but interesting work into five Parts. In Part i. he discusses the ancestry of Plato's faith, maintaining the hazardous view that in no small measure it was *directly* derived from India. In Part ii. he analyses Books i. to iv. of the 'Republic,' interpreting them as an exposition of the preparation of the soul and an account of the righteousness—his rendering of the '*dikaïosunē*,' usually translated 'justice'—of the lower path. Part iii. discusses what Mr. Urwick holds to be the central, dominant theme of the 'Republic,' *viz.* spiritual realisation, or the path of religion, which is contained in Books v., vi. and vii.; Part iv. is devoted to the dangers of the lower path, which are dealt with in Books viii. and ix. of the text. Finally Part v. is occupied with the discussion of the doctrine in the light of modern thought; and a somewhat scanty index and glossary of two pages complete the volume.

In the Preface the author explicitly states his firm belief that Plato's 'Republic' is really his supreme attempt to show us how the human soul can fit itself for the realisation of the divine Good which is the goal of every soul's life. Further he admits that he does "assume a fairly direct contact between India and Greece," and that this "influence was profoundly felt by Plato." He explains also that as the book is intended for the general reader, he has "omitted a long enquiry into the channels by which Indian thought penetrated Greece in the fifth and sixth centuries B.C.," and also a "detailed comparison between the Indian and Greek metaphysical speculations." It must therefore be admitted, as he says himself, that "he makes some very big assumptions

without attempting to justify them." Moreover, the internal evidence, upon which he relies solely here in support of his primary thesis, is only very inadequately dealt with, since "lack of space has prevented him from collating the 'Republic' with such important dialogues as the 'Parmenides,' the 'Sophistes,' the 'Philebus' and the 'Timæus.'"

It is obvious that a book of this character invites consideration from two points of view. Primarily one would naturally deal at length with the author's thesis as to intimate contact between India and Greece and the profound influence of Indian thought upon Plato from the standpoint of historical evidence and scholarly research as well as in the light of all the available internal evidence. But the explanation and apology advanced in the Preface clearly render this not possible with any fairness. We are therefore thrown back upon the contrasted standpoint—perhaps a higher one with a broader outlook—which may be formulated in the question as to how far, granting his primary assumptions, the author has put forward a really illuminating and constructive interpretation of Plato's teaching. And judged thus it must be conceded that Mr. Urwick has achieved a measure of success.

But one can hardly call the book a 'commentary' on the 'Republic,' though the 'Republic' supplies the frame-work and much of the text of the work. For the author uses the 'Republic' rather too much, perhaps, as a vehicle or text for the exposition of his own understanding of Indian philosophico-religious thought, especially of the Vedānta. And he has avowedly derived much of that understanding from very modern and much Westernised exponents, such as Vivekananda, Swarupananda, Ramanathan, Harendranath Maitra and Bhagavan Das.

Now it must be stated that the interpretation of Indian *ancient* thought, and especially of its terminology, put forward by these exponents, would most likely be peremptorily rejected, or at least called in question, by students who adhere more closely to the ancient tradition. For instance, the interpretation of the three *guṇas* which Mr. Urwick adopts, which indeed is fundamental in his exposition, would not, I fear, be accepted by real *paṇḍits* of the orthodox type; and the same thing would apply to several other points. And this of course must weaken the value of the author's exposition regarded as 'internal evidence' for his primary thesis. For, however well these modern interpretations may be adapted to the ancient framework and terminology, it is

difficult to believe that they were current and accepted in the sixth and fifth centuries B.C.

From the discussions in Part v., however, there appears a further purpose the author has had in view, which may in a measure excuse these defects. It is plain that Mr. Urwick intends his work to have a practical bearing and to be a plea for the explicit adoption and recognition *by us in the West* of a wisdom-religion—at the least of Plato's 'path of spiritual realisation,' or path of religion *par excellence*, as "the real element in our real lives, as the one great interest among our many interests, as the true goal behind all our endeavours, as the background which gives meaning to all our activities." And their ultimate purpose dominates and colours the whole of the discussions of the doctrine in the light of modern thought which form this concluding part of the work.

It cannot be denied that the author faces squarely and frankly the great difficulties of the position, as appears from the following extracts from his able summary of what are likely to be regarded as the most questionable elements in the argument:

"The distinction between the path of pursuit (or life as we know it) and the path of religion (or life as we do not know it, and do not particularly wish to know it).

"The distinction between the goodness we understand and value, and a goodness called real, few of whose features we can even recognize as good.

"The distinction between the religion and faith which are everything to many of us, and a religion which seems so little religious as to have no place for belief in a personal God and our devotion to Him.

"The distinction between the positive scientific knowledge which is the great hope of progressive civilisation, and a 'science' which, while pretending to supersede human knowledge, offers no credentials, no proof of its validity, and has no obvious practical utility whatsoever.

"The distinction between the objects of our knowledge (which are real enough to be the very obvious causes of our weal or woe), and the objects of assumed wisdom (which are not real enough to us to merit any name except *Eidē*, or Forms or Ideas).

"The distinction between the faculties of knowing (whose worth is proved every moment of our lives), and the faculty of super-knowing (whose very existence is a sheer assumption).

"The distinction between the philosophy which, not finally

perhaps, but with ever-increasing success, systematizes our whole knowledge and thought, and a 'real' philosophy, which is admittedly useless as a guide in life, and does nothing to co-ordinate the elements of our knowledge."

Finally these 'distinctions' really imply the claim that a vast gulf exists between the things distinguished, and obviously assumes that the entire group of objects, faculties and states which we know as valuable, are immeasurably inferior in value to those called 'real.'

This indictment of Plato's teaching as interpreted by Mr. Urwick is certainly far-reaching and drastic enough. The author meets it as ably and convincingly as perhaps may be, though he shows a no less full, deep realization of the value, the justification of the Western standpoint. And—in their heart of hearts certainly—I think that many, after due consideration, will echo with sympathy, even with agreement, the author's words: "The active and achieving West is right all through—except in the one thing needful."

B. K.

HENRY EDWARD MANNING.

HIS LIFE AND LABOURS. By Shane Leslie, M.A., London (Burns & Oates); pp. 516; 25s. net.

"HE stands well and nobly in the distinguished group of Englishmen who have worn the Cardinal's hat." In these few firm words Mr. Leslie finally closes his estimate of the man whose character and career he has so boldly sketched in this brilliant book. The author does not attempt to re-write Purcell's *Life*; his work is rather an acute commentary on the doings of Manning as already disclosed than a dwelling upon the fresh documents which he produces. Written in the most modern style, lighted up with epigrams, passing rapidly along, with many bright quick touches, this work is entirely unlike the usual official prosy and pompous ecclesiastical biography, and so it is eminently readable and interesting. It is as broad as it is bold, and it will be found full of suggestive flash-lights of thought for every reader.

Born July 15, 1808, and dying January 14, 1892, Manning had a long and a crowded life of 84 years. He was of good family and English descent. His mother was a beautiful woman from whom he got his refinement of form and feature. His father, a prosperous merchant of London and a member of Parliament, failed shortly

after his birth, and the family fell from affluence to comparative poverty. At Harrow he became Captain of the School, played cricket and got the nickname of 'the Parson.' He went to Oxford in 1827. As Mr. Leslie says: "Manning leaped into life with political ambitions struggling against monetary repressions. He had little faith. At Balliol he prayed not. Unknowingly he had walked amongst the prophets. He preferred to hear himself argue than Newman preach," and he read Adam Smith. He took a first-class, and owing to the ruin of the family, accepted for a short time a clerkship in the Colonial Office, where, as he said later, he learned business habits.

Turning to the growth of the mind and soul of the man, which is our main point here, we come upon one of the most important of the original documents that Mr. Leslie has discovered. It is entitled 'Character of H. E. M. (February 9, 1832),' a keen diagnosis of his mental and spiritual lineaments by his spiritual mother, Miss Bevan. Evangelical, pious and gifted, she set out to save his soul by reading Scripture with him, and thought she succeeded. Mr. Leslie describes this paper as being "so unique and penetrating as to save reams of biographic research and conjecture. *Ecce Manning!*" We can take only a few points from this most subtle intuitional—indeed prophetic—summary by a woman of the character of Manning at 24.

"I know of no power in which he is deficient. . . . Pride is the natural accompaniment of talent. This is the ruling passion of H. E. M. . . . He covets *every* gift from the highest to the lowest, the admiration of every creature from the highest to the lowest. So towering an aim, so grasping an ambition, can never be gratified. His imagination comes to his aid to conceal from him painful realities. . . . His sensitive disposition calls for the consolations of friendship. . . . He does not believe wisdom is confined to any sect or party. . . . He seeks her everywhere and therefore cannot miss her. . . . I do declare him capable of braving public opinion. . . . He is a complicated creature and calculated to disappoint expectation in some respects and at some seasons. Yet he may take a flight beyond the warmest hopes of those who wish him well. . . . He will himself need the exercise of no ordinary vigilance to steer his course right, of no common degree of faith to enjoy a moderate share of repose."

At the end of 1831 Manning suddenly decided to take orders in the Church of England, became deacon in that year and was ordained priest in June, 1838. Then came a curacy at Lavington,

Sussex, where, in November, he married Caroline, daughter of his Rector, John Sargent, whom he soon after succeeded. His wife died in 1837, of consumption, after four years of happy married life. There were no children. There have been many legends about this short period. Mr. Leslie shows them all to be false and baseless. Manning did not forget his wife, he kept her memory green and holy. Since the publication of this book Baron F. von Hügel has written a remarkable letter (*Times Lit. Sup.*, March 24, 1921), which more than confirms all that is said here. It deals with 'a battered little pocket book full of a woman's fine handwriting.' These were prayers that his wife had written down, of which Manning said to the writer, in 1892, when he was dying: "Not a day has passed since her death, on which I have not prayed and meditated from this book."

Amongst his original sources our author deals with Manning's letters to Gladstone, which were thought lost but which he has discovered and used. This correspondence, he writes, "reveals that each realised the Roman position in the flash of Newman's act." These twin ecclesiastical minds braced each other up as best they could in their common fear. Manning was made Archdeacon of Chichester. In 1841 we find him writing to Gladstone: "The English Church is Catholic in dogma and in polity." 'Safe as Manning' became the watchword of the hour. He restored Good Friday and Ascension Day in his diocese, and started a Seminary. Oxford men called him 'morbidly moderate,' but he was hearing confessions and keeping a spiritual diary in 1846 in which he wrote: "Tho' not therefore Roman I cease to be Anglican." "The meshes seem closing round me. I feel less able to say Rome is wrong." This was during his illness, and in August of that year he noted down: "Now I see that St. Peter has a Primacy among the Apostles. That the Church of Rome inherits what St. Peter had among the Apostles. That the Church of Rome is heir to Infallibility." Here we have the first hint of what was going to happen. Twenty-four years later, in July, 1870, Manning was admittedly the power and the personality that carried the new dogma through the Vatican Council in triumph to the end.

These spiritual diaries of the man, in bad health, disclose his thoughts and hopes. Many will think him weak and morbid, but they are the genuine notes of the state of his soul while under bodily sickness. He writes in March, 1847: "I feel to dread my own active choice. Is it God's leading? Is it a temptation? Is it my own mind deluding itself? How I sink at heart for want of

some one of whom I can ask a judgment of these things. God knows I feel very lonely." And a little later: "Either such a life as St. Charles, or St. Aloysius, is an illusion, or mine is!" In June the doctors ordered him abroad. In this mood of mind he left England for Malines, travelling thence through Catholic Europe and ending in Rome; so ill was he that, when they met, Newman did not recognise him. There on December 8, 1847, he set eyes for the first time on Pope Pius IX., who was to be his future friend and eventual patron. Writing home he said: "It is impossible not to love Pius IX. His is the most truly English countenance I have seen in Italy." He went everywhere, knew everyone and was shown everything. He returned to England with a quiet determination to lead Anglicanism to its conclusions.

Then came the shock of the Gorham judgment, which now-a-days seems a very small matter. But it led Manning to hint secession from the Church and Gladstone from politics. In November, 1850, the clergy required Manning to convene them in order that the Archdeaconry might protest against the Roman Hierarchy. He resigned, and on December 5 wrote to Miss Maurice, one of his closest women friends, after his last Sunday at Lavington: "It was a time of strange spiritual sorrow, a heaviness of soul such as I dare hardly speak of. Love, tenderness, long and fond memories of home and flock, were around me and upon me. But, through all, a calm clear conviction stood unmoved." Manning came to London and put on plain clothes. Referring to his last sermon at St. Barnabas's he wrote: "I remember what I preached about, the Love of God. There was nothing else left." Yet it would be easy to show from many of the great Saints that this is the All, the 'one thing needful.' But then they had lived in an atmosphere high above contending churches! On April 6, 1851, Passion Sunday, Manning was received into the Roman Church. "Now my career is ended," he said to his friend Hope. In truth and in fact he had but then begun, at the age of 48, a new and a greater career. Within ten weeks after this he was ordained priest by Wiseman; then he went to Rome, 'for the purpose of commencing his ecclesiastical studies,' though to the end he was never technically a thorough theologian or philosopher, as he would have admitted.

Such, so far, was the drama of Manning's life. He had done well as Rector and Archdeacon in the English Church. With his gifts and powers, Canterbury lay open before him. No one can say that he had failed of achieving his ambition as an Anglican.



He had taken the 'flight' Miss Bevan had foreseen. He had shown himself a 'complicated creature,' as she said. "Know that he struggles with a temperament of a most susceptible, excitable, I may say morbid, kind," she also wrote. Many then thought that this temperament had carried him to Rome against his reason. Manning's progress in the Church was rapid. The Pope made him Provost of the Westminster Chapter. The Canons protested and required him to withdraw. Manning was unmoved, and finally it was the Chapter that left the room. Then came the Errington squabble, which is now very stale and ancient history. In February, 1865, Wiseman died. The Chapter sent three names to Rome as to his successor, not including Manning's. Pius IX. set them all aside, appointing Manning, who on May 8, 1865, was made Archbishop of Westminster. The news was a great shock to the old Catholics and to the whole Church in England. But Manning certainly justified the Pope's choice, and did more for English Catholicism than any other man could have achieved.

Mr. Leslie gives us the notes of a Retreat entered upon by Manning with the Passionists on Highgate Hill, in preparation for his consecration as Archbishop. He had already printed it all in the *Dublin Review*, under the taking title of 'The Real Cardinal Manning.' It is an earnest and eager searching of the soul, and to those who are used to such very human documents, it will seem full of the emotion and elation which these Retreats always produce in the minds of religiously thinking men. He took up his task most seriously and worked hard in the diocese. Old men can still remember his powers of preaching. He would speak from a platform attired in gorgeous cope, mitre, cross and ring, standing up holding his crozier. So seen, tall and thin, austere and ascetic, he looked like some mediæval bishop saint out of a stained glass window. He would speak for an hour, in clear-cut Oxford tones, with perfect enunciation, without gesture or pause, on the highest spiritual level of thought.

But Manning's greatest time was at the Vatican Council. His management of the affair showed him as a true leader of men, and also as one who could have climbed to power through politics and the House of Commons, which it was undoubtedly his early ambition to do. The intriguing and lobbying that went on in Rome are not edifying to those who still talk of the guidance of the Holy Spirit of God in the Church. On July 18, 1870, the Definition was passed by vote, and Infallibility decreed. This was done in a great storm of thunder and lightning, which some said showed

Heaven's displeasure. Manning, always ready, replied: "They forgot Sinai and the Ten Commandments." Next day the Franco-Prussian war broke out. France was beaten and the Temporal power ended. But the Papacy remained.

Although the Vatican Council showed Manning at the zenith of his power and prestige, he was to do much more at home. After trying to raise the Pope's Temporal power into a sort of dogma and failing, he took a line of compromise on Roman affairs. His influence upon Education and Temperance was good in every way, though he could not convert his own priests to teetotalism. His intervention in the great London Dock Strike of 1889 was dramatic and effective. It won him an enormous popularity and was a genuine effort in the direction of a true democracy.

Manning died on January 14, 1892, and had a great funeral from the people and the poor who followed in thousands. Pope Leo, with whom he had been on terms of intimate friendship and whose Encyclical on Labour he had certainly inspired, said: "A great light of the Church has gone out." He was an intellectual giant of his day, ecclesiastically, and a man born to power in any line of life he chose. Of his strength and sincerity there can now be no doubt.

F. W.

#### PHILOSOPHUMENA OR THE REFUTATION OF ALL HERESIES.

Formerly attributed to Origen, but now to Hippolytus, Bishop and Martyr, who flourished about 220 A.D. Translated from the Text of Cruice, by F. Legge, F.S.A. London (S.P.C.K.); 2 vols., pp. 180 + 189; 30s. net.

As shown by his *Forerunners and Rivals of Christianity*, Mr. Legge has a good acquaintance with matters gnostical and the early movements which were their congeners. His version of Hippolytus' famous *Refutation*, which gives us in many cases more accurate information on the Christianized gnosis than the works of the other Patristic heresiologists owing to his abundant quotation of documents, is careful, if not as graceful, especially in the many rhetorical passages, as we could have wished. His invariable rendering of the Greek *δὲ* by 'but' is a general witness in point and he is occasionally not averse from split infinitives. Why in his sub-title Mr. Legge should think it worth while to stress the early false attribution of the work to Origen on the appearance of the first printed text (Miller, 1851), after the discovery of the only

known MS. by Mynoïdes Mynas at Mt. Athos, is not clear ; for no one has any longer the slightest doubt that Hippolytus is the author. Mr. Legge's version is an improvement on Macmahon's in the Ante-Nicene Christian Library (1868), but the difference is not so great as the advance in price, even in these days of prohibitive cost of production. Macmahon's translation may still be had for 7s. 6d.; the S.P.C.K., which has hitherto been turning out so many translations of Early Christian and other literature at remarkably moderate prices, asks for these two small volumes no less than 30s. We have no space for a detailed notice of this classical document for the history of Christianized Gnosticism, and must be content with one or two remarks on Mr. Legge's labours. We cannot agree that Hippolytus' work depended so largely on dictation. It is crammed with quotations; whether always accurate or not is another question, for we know that the Patristic apologists and refutators of heresy were generally not scrupulous in this respect and in some cases provedly grossly misleading. Hippolytus, however, is proud of possessing copies of certain Gnostic documents, otherwise unknown to us, and holds his quotations *in terrorem*, as he thinks, over the heads of his victims. Mr. Legge is obsessed with his notion of lecture-notes, and indeed it is very probable that Hippolytus did first deliver the substance of his work in lecture-form ; but it must have been, as far at any rate as the quotations are concerned, written out beforehand. When, further, dealing with the famous 'Naassene' document, Mr. Legge (i. 145, n. 3) thinks it probable that Hippolytus "may have taken down his account of 'Naassene' doctrines from the lips of some convert, which would account for the wildness of the quotations and to [*sic*] the incoherence with which he jumps about from one subject to another," we can only think that he is unacquainted with Reitzenstein's elaborate study of the document in his *Pæmandres* and our own more detailed analysis in the Prolegomena to *Thrice-greatest Hermes*. It is a purely literary problem and dictation from verbal memory is entirely out of the question. Our translator again in referring to the Coptic Gnostic works, the so-called *Pistis Sophia*, and the two documents of the Bruce Codex, writes (i. 3. a. 1): "There are said to be some other fragments of Coptic MSS. of Gnostic origin in Berlin which have not yet been published." So far from these being 'fragments,' they are three very valuable Gnostic documents: *The Gospel according to Mary*, *The Apocryphon of John* and *The Wisdom of Jesus Christ*. So important are these MSS. that Harnack has ventured the opinion

that the third may possibly be the lost famous *Wisdom* of no less a doctor of the Gnosis than Valentinus himself. The second is also of great importance, for it is early, and lay before Irenæus, so that we can now check the quotations of that redoubtable heresiologist and prove that, as Harnack says, "the sense of the by no means absurd speculations of the Gnosis has been ruined by the Church Father" by his mangled quotations. All of which may be learned from Carl Schmidt's important communication to the Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences (July 16, 1896), with an appendix by Harnack. The fulfilment of Schmidt's promise to translate these precious MSS. has been too long delayed, and is still eagerly awaited by all students of the Greek Gnostic works in Coptic. We are, however, glad to note that Mr. Legge will have nothing to do with Salmon and Stähelin's hypothesis that the nine major Gnostic documents quoted from by Hippolytus and forming the most valuable part of his contribution to the history of the Gnosis in Christian circles, were forgeries palmed off on a credulous Church Father. De Faye in France gave this conjecture its *quietus*, and it would never have been supported by Stähelin in Germany but for the deservedly high reputation of Salmon in Gnostic studies. The proofs of Mr. Legge's two volumes have not been read with sufficient care, the Greek is faulty in a number of places. In spite of these criticisms we are glad to welcome a new translation of what is generally known as *The Philosophumena*, for without some knowledge of Gnostic and allied movements the Origins and Early Development of Christianity are shorn of part of their background. Mr. Legge's work on *The Forerunners and Rivals of Christianity* is a valuable contribution to this difficult study and is deserving of a second edition.

#### THE REACTIONS BETWEEN DOGMA AND PHILOSOPHY.

Illustrated from the works of S. Thomas Aquinas. The Hibbert Lectures (Second Series). Delivered in London and Oxford, October-December, 1916. By Philip H. Wicksteed, M.A., Litt.D. London (Williams & Norgate); pp. 669; 24s. net.

OUR great Dante scholar and interpreter here gives us the ripe result of long years of study of the works of the greatest of the Summists. Outside the Roman communion too few are acquainted with the greatest monument of synthesis within its limits which the world has seen, and Dr. Wicksteed deserves the thanks of students for his sympathetic yet critical summary and evaluation

of Thomas Aquinas' 'masterpiece. The lectures are helpfully supplemented in the Notes and Appendix with the Latin text of the most pertinent passages quoted, and this is a great convenience. An adequate review would mean a substantive article, and we must content ourselves with praising the insight and discrimination with which the whole matter is treated. Dr. Wicksteed modestly excuses himself for any inadequacy in dealing with the mystical element in religion, yet he has a due appreciation of it. For ourselves the most interesting and instructive fact in the biography of the formulator of this most rigidly intellectual and logical system of dogma, when once the premises are granted, is how it came about that the great work was never completed. It is set forth as follows by our lecturer.

"In view of the attempt of S. Thomas to remain throughout on the intellectual plane, even in his exposition of the supreme vision, it is impossible not to record the well-known testimony (on the authority of his friend and secretary) reported at the process of his canonisation. Some two years before his death, we learn, when his great work the *Summa Theologiæ* was still incomplete, though well advanced in its third and concluding section, as Thomas was celebrating mass in Naples, he had some experience the nature of which is not further specified, which made him put his pen and inkhorn on the shelf and never write another word of his treatise. When he was reminded of the incomplete state of his great work and was urged to go on with it, he only replied: 'I have seen that which makes all that I have written and taught look small to me'" (p. 391).

One would have thought that with this supreme fact before them the Roman authorities would have refrained from accepting so slavishly the *dogmata* of the *Summa*. The incident is so important and of such great interest that we append a version of the Latin passages quoted in Dr. Wicksteed's Notes.

(1) From William of Tocco's *Life* of S. Thomas.

Raynald, his secretary, had with difficulty roused him out of the deep state of rapture or trance which had come upon him :

"[Thereon] he said with a sigh : Son Raynald, I have a secret to tell to you, but you must not breathe a word of it to anyone during my life. My writing has come to an end ; for what has been revealed to me is of such a nature that the things I have written and taught, [now] seem mean to me, and hence I have hope in my God that there will quickly be an end of my life as of my teaching."

(2) Testimony of Bartholomew of Capua, Pronotary of the Kingdom of Sicily, given Sept. 18, 1819 (*Act. Sanct. Mart. i. 672b, D, E, 711a, C.D.*):

"After the Mass he did not write, nor did he dictate anything; indeed he laid aside his writing materials. . . . After he had been plied with many questions most persistently by Raynald himself. . . he replied: All the things I have written seem to me as straw compared with those which I have seen and which have been revealed to me."

It is evident from these two variants that S. Thomas regarded his own labours, which have fascinated so many minds by the brilliancy of their intellectual perspicacity, as of small account—'mean' (*modica*), 'as straw' (*paleæ*)—in comparison with the immediate touch of Reality with which he was favoured. Had he enjoyed this direct contact in earlier years, we should doubtless have had no *Summa*, or at any rate one that would have differed greatly from the present Bible of Scholasticism.

#### A NEW ENCYCLOPÆDIA OF FREEMASONRY

And of Cognate Instituted Mysteries: Their Rites, Literature and History. By Arthur Edward Waite, P.M., P.Z., etc., etc. Author of 'The Secret Tradition in Masonry,' etc., etc. With sixteen full-page! Plates and other Illustrations. London (Rider); 2 vols., pp. xxxi. + 458 + 488; 42s. net.

To write an Encyclopædia of Freemasonry that is not to be simply a compilation from prior similar works of reference, is no easy matter. It requires long years of apprenticeship in many lines of recondite research outside the beaten tracks. If any one is competent from a long life of strenuous labour devoted to the study, not only of Freemasonry within its proper strictly defined borders, but also of all those cognate interests which may be brought into direct or indirect relationship with it, as far at any rate as the mediæval period onwards is concerned, it is surely Mr. A. E. Waite, who has to his credit scores of instructive and discriminating volumes which display, not only a just appreciation of history and a keen sense of verifying quotations, but also a sound judgment on subjects where as a rule sceptical prejudice on the one hand and uncritical credulity on the other play the dominant rôle. Though Mr. Waite gives some general informa-

tion on the most famous mystery-institutions of antiquity, he does so with reserve, as indicating rather than as tilling a remote field of cognate research, which he leaves to classical and antiquarian scholars, remarking, however, that the desired combination of a specialist in Freemasonry and a scholar in the mystery-lore of antiquity has so far not been produced. Mr. Waite's indications in this small part of his great undertaking are derived from works that are mostly out of date and of inferior value. But even if the more recent and accurate contributions to the subject had been drawn upon, we doubt whether any really satisfactory light would have been thrown, even at long distance, upon the formation of the three Craft degrees, even of the third, which is the only one for which our author claims the reflection of a high mystery-like content, and there but a presage, an unfulfilled promise, of higher things to come. The best of the higher degrees, all of them apparently of later invention than the Craft are strongly Christianized; of some of them Mr. Waite speaks with enthusiastic approval as capable of being used as a step in the ladder that leads to the height of spiritual mysticism. Our author is at heart a Christian mystic and his insight here is penetrating. Whenever he gets a chance, therefore, he brings out the spiritual value of his subject-matter; but it must be confessed that much with which he has perforce to deal as a historian gives him little opportunity. The motley array of Masonic and pseudo-Masonic orders and rites, in which high-sounding titles occur in inverse proportion to anything of real worth, has to be marshalled and reviewed, and in doing this no one is more sensible of the hollowness of most of this verbally imposing pageant than Mr. Waite himself. He is severely critical also of a number of writers whom the ignorant have regarded as high authorities, and exposes their errors, fallacies and pretensions. Here his own independent researches are of the greatest value. In no case, however, is our author a dogmatist. He states the case impartially and repeatedly for the historic emergence of the speculative craft, and sets forth clearly the contradictory theories of those who would derive it from operative Masonry pure and simple, and of those who claim for it a more lofty lineage. He thinks, and we agree with him, that the speculative elements must have their source in interests other than those of purely craft-associations and building-guilds. But the history of a secret institution or of a semi-secret association of the widest ramifications is hard to get at and its origins must perforce remain in obscurity. Neverthe-

less we have no hesitation in saying that, in taking Mr. Waite as his *cicerone*, the reader who would be informed as to the literature, history and rites of Freemasonry and of its more immediate cognates, will not be misled, and that is saying much. This applies not only to the general reader, but also to members of the Craft, most of whom are woefully ignorant of the nature and scope of their undertaking.

#### D. D. HOME: HIS LIFE AND MISSION.

By Mme. Dunglas Home. Edited, with an Introduction, by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle. London (Kegan Paul, etc.); pp. v. + 280; 9s. net.

THIS is a reprint, in slightly abridged form, of the *Life of D. D. Home*, written by his widow, with the help of a large mass of unpublished correspondence, some thirty-five years ago. It is of service, in these days when psychical phenomena are attracting wider attention than has ever previously been the case, to revive the memory of Daniel Dunglas Home, who was one of the greatest, if not indeed the most convincing, of mediums whom the Spiritualistic movement has produced. Home never received a ha'penny for a single one of the innumerable sittings he gave, and though most bitterly and ferociously attacked and schemed against, was never detected in any fraudulent attempt whatever. He welcomed investigation and willingly lent himself to the most irksome tests. There was never a prepared room, cabinet or anything of the kind; and the astonishing physical phenomena produced through his mediumship took place always in light of some sort. No one was more anxious to expose trickery and rid the movement of the parasitic charlatanry which found in it so convenient a host, than Home himself, as his last work, *Lights and Shadows of Spiritualism*, amply proves. Browning's 'Sludge the Medium' is as slanderous and revolting a caricature of Home as could well have been penned. Home moved in the best circles of Society in half-a-dozen countries, and maintained his position there with dignity and charm. His high moral character, deep piety and tender-hearted solicitude for the sorrows and misfortunes of others, and his brave struggle against the exhausting drain of ever-recurrent and protracted ill-health and continual financial worries, are set forth by his biographer mainly from contemporary private letters and documents which speak for themselves. Over against the simplicity, sincerity, and scrupu-



losity of the man himself, who carefully kept from publication a mass of private testimony to his psychical capabilities and *bona fides*, owing to his over-sensitive repugnance to mentioning the name of anyone who did not come forward of his own free-will to bear witness, is set the unpleasing picture of the invincible prejudice, facile misrepresentation and dogmatic denials of the representatives of an official science which, excellent in its own special province, showed itself, with the exception of one or two courageous and far-seeing minds, untrue to the great trust reposed in it by the general public. The phenomena happened, and it was the duty of those who claimed to speak for science seriously and patiently to investigate them. The phenomena still happen and those who have the enterprise, temperament and training to observe psychical and psycho-physical events in a genuinely scientific spirit, are fortunately more numerous to-day than in the cock-sure Victorian Age. But "it's a long long way to Tipperary" yet; for the great campaign is as it were only just beginning in earnest, and the twentieth century will doubtless witness many a hard-fought field before the battle is won, not in the interest of any 'ism,' but for a genuine science of life and mind.

#### FROM THE HUNTINGTON PALIMPSEST.

- (1) The Gospel of St. Luke. (2) The Gospel of St. John. (3) The Acts of the Disciples. Deciphered and Translated from the oldest known Latin Text by E. S. Buchanan, M.A., B.Sc. London (Roworth); pp., 51, 52, 40; 2s. 6d. net each.

IN 1907 a Latin MS. of the Received Text of the New Testament on fine vellum was purchased from the Cathedral Library of Tarragona by Mr. Huntington and placed in the Museum of the Hispanic Society of America in New York. Mr. Buchanan, who had for many years been working on Old Latin New Testament texts, was appointed curator of the MSS. of the Society in 1917. He had been persuaded by his studies that there had been in the West of Europe in the first centuries a text differing very widely from the Received Text, and had three years before predicted its character as being quite in keeping with what he now claims to have discovered in the underwriting of the Tarragona MS. "It was nearly a year," writes Mr. Buchanan, "before I found out its hidden words, for they had been washed out by an acid bath, and the Gospel text which we for many centuries have known

was then written over the washed-out words. By perseverance, and long previous experience with Palimpsests, I was able to read the hidden writing by the indentations which were made by the steel pen on the surface of the vellum, and which remained when the ink was removed." We accordingly turn to the translations in expectation of obtaining some sort of confirmation of so confident and remarkable a claim; but what do we find? A sort of monotonous refrain runs through the whole; wearisomely reiterated it produces the impression of the flattening effects of a steam-roller. The reader may get some notion of this from the opening verses of the three translations under notice, and so imagine the deadly effect produced by having to wade through many sequences of verses uniformed in the same drab overalls. Here are the openings of Luke, John and Acts.

(1) "There was a certain man born for the glory of the Father of spirits and for the glory of the Holy Spirit and for the glory of the Son of God."

(2) "In the beginning was the Word in the glory of the Father of spirits and in the glory of the Holy Spirit and in the glory of the Son of God."

(3) "After the Lord Jesus had preached to the spirits of men by the Holy Spirit the glory of the Father of spirits and the glory of the Holy Spirit and the glory of the Son of God, He ascended into the place of the glory of the spirits of the children of God."

Surely if we have here the translation of a genuine decipherment, all goes to show that it emanated from a later attempt to swathe the living body of tradition in such stereotyped phrases as utterly to mummify it. But indeed it is difficult to believe that we have to do with a normal case of consistently objective decipherment. No scholar has checked Mr. Buchanan's work; it seems impossible on the face of it that a lengthy text of 482 leaves could be recovered from the dim indents of a stylus, if that is what a 'steel pen' means, for surely the latter is of modern invention. Is it possible that we may be face to face with a happening in the borderland domain of abnormal psychical phenomena? Can it be for the most part a subjective construct gradually built up by long brooding in an atmosphere of intense desire to recover what had been hoped for for so many years? But even supposing the palimpsest in question were clearly readable by ordinary methods, surely the results would have shown that the realisation of such a hope could not possibly lie in this direction? It is more than astonishing that a scholar who has worked on ancient texts,

should have ventured to put such arid, jejune and colourless matter before the public accompanied with so startling a claim. By no stretch of the imagination can any primitive features be found in it. That there is something very strange about the whole matter is shewn by the fact that the reconstructed Latin text, after being set up by a leading New York publisher, was suppressed.

#### SEVENTY YEARS AMONG SAVAGES.

By Henry S. Salt. London (Allen & Unwin); pp. 251; 12s. 6d. net.

THIS is not a book of travel and adventure in Pacific seas or other remote places. It is the reminiscences of a life lived in England by the veteran chief founder and leader of the Humanitarian League, which recently came to an end after thirty years of a necessitous, but strenuous and polemical existence in the face of strong opposition and at times bitter hostility, when not of general indifference, to much of its programme. Educated at Eton and Cambridge, Mr. Salt returned to his old school to work on its staff as an assistant master for ten years. Converted to socialism and vegetarianism among other things, he gradually lost faith in the Public School system, threw up his post and renounced all the advantages of culture, scholarship and social position which Eton offered. Free from the restraining influence of his early conservative and conventional environment, he followed the bent of his highly sensitive but combative nature, and broke out in revolt against certain customs and practices in our social life which were generally tolerated, excused or defended, but which all without qualification seemed to him anachronistic relics of a barbarism we should have by now outgrown. Mr. Salt was a keen controversialist, but he might with advantage have toned down some of the more provocative forms of expression he used in his eloquent but somewhat indiscriminate protests. All attempts at reform working on popular lines are wont to make use of exaggeration and over-colouring to stir an indifferent public. But a non-flesh eater, for example, can hardly be expected to gain the sympathetic ear of his fellows for his views, by bluntly dubbing all non-vegetarians 'cannibals.' He hits too hard, and, missing the mark, loses his balance. Our autobiographer's programme was comprehensive: it was chiefly the condemnation of every form of cruelty, overt or disguised. Thus, apart from his intellectual interests in the direction of free-thinking and socialism, he denounced without

qualification blood-sport, flesh-eating and slaughter-houses, vivisection, the wearing of feathers and furs, which he called 'murderous millinery,' flogging and capital punishment, and championed pacifism in all its grades, apparently not realizing that the professional pacifist is frequently a most quarrelsome person. It is, unfortunately, only too true that our so lately boasted civilization has fallen on evil days and proved itself a sorry mixture at best. The War and its immediate aftermath have revealed in lurid light how grievously we may deceive ourselves in thinking we have outgrown our primitive animal instincts and barbarous impulses; and doubtless this terrible experience has confirmed Mr. Salt in following his habitual bent when he chose 'Seventy Years among Savages' as the title of his reminiscences. We have witnessed an orgy of savagery, judged by any standard; but on the contrary how brightly has shone forth a great company of tenderly humane and nobly valiant souls in the midst of the dire world-tribulation, and that too from among the rank and file of those among whom Mr. Salt has been living. This righteous leaven in the masses will surely yet save the common city of a genuine humanity and thence truly civilize the world. Savage and citizen are one of another, and in the great majority are ever alternating with one another in one and the same individual.

Mr. Salt writes well, and has a fine taste for literature; he describes interestingly a number of distinguished people he has met, and relieves his pages with a number of good anecdotes and humorous stories.

#### MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

By Guido de Ruggiero. Translated by A. Howard Hannay, B.A., and R. G. Collingwood, M.A., F.S.A. London (Allen & Unwin); pp. 402; 16s. net.

OF recent years English students of philosophy whose Italian is poor or non-existent, have been learning much through translations of a powerful idealistic movement of thought which has been taking place, and is the dominant mode of philosophizing, in Italy. The name of Croce has become a household word; works of Alliotto, Varisco and Gentile are familiar to us. We are now by the present excellently translated volume introduced to a brilliant pupil of Gentile's who has written a penetrating review of modern philosophy from the idealistic standpoint and in the idealistic interest. It is a remarkable volume, abounding in acute

observation and enlivened by vigour and freshness of expression. The first three parts review German, French and Anglo-American philosophy, emphasizing the development of Kantian criticism and Hegelian dialectic in their conflict with the forces of positivism and materialism. But it is the fourth, which deals with the history of this special development of thought in Italy, during the last half of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, which is the most instructive, for it is the only account available. The original appeared in 1912, and therefore does not include the most recent contributions of the school to which Ruggiero belongs and which maintains a philosophical position which is avowedly in continuation of Croce and in close agreement with Gentile. The new view is bound up with an endeavour to give concreteness to the Hegelian metaphysic and to develop the thought of immanentism.

The fruitful principle of the new philosophy is found in 'Kant's immortal discovery, the *a priori* synthesis' (p. 374). To consider analysis as a self-creative process is to pass from analysis to synthesis, from psychology to metaphysics. "Pure thought is an idea which produces itself from itself, and which we can only know by producing it in ourselves by a process of *a priori* construction or synthesis" (p. 150).

Hegel, we are told, has thus returned to favour, and occupies the position of honour with the young idealistic philosophy. "In France, in England, in Italy neo-Hegelianism," it is maintained, "stands for the highest expression of national culture. . . . The living element of Hegel's problem consists in its search for immanence, the negation of all dualism, the concrete vision of reality. . . . This new philosophy does not shut reality in a leaden shroud by presenting a solution which denies the necessity of the problem, but on the contrary it contends that in every form of human activity solutions give birth to new problems and that this movement from the one to the other is not a purposeless game but a spiritual development" (pp. 374, 375).

The endeavour has thus been to get at and appreciate 'what is living and what is dead' in the philosophy of Hegel, as the English title of one of Croce's most interesting works phrases it. Hence, as Ruggiero tells us, "the Hegel who is known to-day is not the Hegel of the old Hegelians, who has spoken the last word in philosophy, but simply the Hegel who gave new significance to the Kantian *a priori* synthesis and opened out a new intellectual horizon, although nevertheless his imperfect apprehension of his

own discovery caused him to shut out this horizon from his own view."

But glorify 'pure thought' as we will, it is still human thought we have to deal with, strive as it may to rectify itself. It is no doubt gratifying to the out-and-out immanentist to learn that "the conception of the absolute actuality of thought in which this new metaphysic culminates is at bottom the expression, purged of all transcendence, of the intimacy and concreteness of life" (p. 379). But whether the 'purging reality of all transcendence' can be attempted without at the same time abstracting it from God, is a doubt which the new philosophy does not set at rest.

#### VISIONS AND BELIEFS IN THE WEST OF IRELAND.

Collected and arranged by Lady Gregory. With two Essays and Notes by W. B. Yeats. London (Putnam's); 2 vols.; 22s. 6d. net.

THE recent photographs issuing from so unfairy-like a county as Yorkshire have roused considerable discussion on the question as to whether the 'little people' can be transported from the realm of pure imagination to that of the camera. The only scientific essay on the general subject that has recently appeared is Mr. W. Y. Wentz's *Fairy Faith in Celtic Countries*, in which fairy phenomena are partially classified under headings of those psychic facts now increasingly prevalent. To the present collection of narratives, collated word for word by Lady Gregory from her peasant friends, Mr. Yeats adds many illuminating notes on the same lines. But no names or addresses are given; and the reader must not expect any overwhelmingly convincing evidence, though he may get a general impression of the sense of nearness to the unseen in certain districts of West Ireland. In vol. i., p. 122, we find a strangely curious resemblance between the story of the priest marrying two departed lover-souls and one of the Japanese 'Noh' plays, edited by Fenellosa, which represents a Buddhist priest performing the equivalent office for two ghosts by "a deserted grave on a hill where morning winds are blowing through the pine." Certain magical powers are clearly suggested by the tales about Biddy Early, whose healing powers were not entirely approved of by the priesthood. It would appear that the peasants credit priests themselves with powers of this kind, but on condition of their "saying prayers they ought not to say," and thus probably

attracting the evil influences to themselves or their property. Generally speaking the *Sidhe* are regarded as fallen angels, not absolutely doomed, but spending their time till the world-end in hurling and dancing. "They have the hope of Heaven and they are afraid of God. They'll not do you much harm if you leave them alone: it's best not to speak to them: they can 'take' a cow or a calf or such things, but not a sheep or a lamb, because of our Lord."

Mr. Yeats, in addition to his terminal essay in vol. ii., gives a long and interesting note on Sinistrari's work on Incubi and Succubæ; and Lady Gregory is to be congratulated on a collection of folk-lore up-to-date in the naïve dialect of the peasant. English readers may not be converted to any very strong belief in the 'little people'; but (as we know) the Irish differ from 'Saxons' in otherworldly, as well as in worldly, affairs.

A. H. E. L.

#### GESAMMELTE ZUSÄTZE ZUR RELIGIONS-SOZIOLOGIE.

By Max Weber, Tübingen (J. C. B. Mohr); 3 vols., pp. 575, 442, 378; M. 150.

*Toute religion ne vaut qu'en fonction de sociologie.*

FERD. BRUNETIÈRE,

*Sur les Chemins de la Croyance*, Paris, 1908, p. 197.

THOSE of us who are sick of the modern Sunday-religion which is safely put aside on week-days, sick of word-religions that do not work where the political and economic side of life comes in, will learn with fascination from these fine volumes of the late lamented economist and sociologist of Heidelberg and Munich, what a social and economic power religions were and are where and when they are *living* religions.

The historical demonstration that '*mind moves matter*,' as it is to be found in this admirable work of a distinguished scholar, may seem a truism. But it is not in this our perverted age, which believes it yet acts as if 'ideologies' were a purely illusory 'reflection' of economic 'realities.' Max Weber's book ought to be read by all who have come near to the belief that their sufferings under the unbearable pressure of modern economic conditions on the spiritual development of mankind are inevitable and beyond hope of remedy. It is glad tidings, indeed, to see it established once more throughout history and in spite of the inveterate prejudice of materialism: "*mens agitat molem*!"

Want of space prevents a detailed review of these three large volumes; they ought to be translated. In the meantime, those who can read Weber's easy, clear and fluid German will do well to obtain the original; for even should an English rendering appear it will cost six times the price.

The first volume contains the famous essay on 'Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism' with a most instructive chapter on the economic spirit of the Puritan sects. Then follows the great disquisition on 'The Economic Ethics of the Great World-religions,' treating first of the sociological character of Confucianism and Taoism (note pp. 512-536, the admirable comparative analysis of Confucianism and Puritanism); then of 'Hinduism and Buddhism' (ii. 1-378); and thirdly (vol. iii.) of 'Ancient Judaism.' Nobody who has not thoroughly studied the last volume will in future appear to be qualified to say anything about the intricate question of Jewish ethics, which plays such a fundamental part in the modern discussions of the Jewish question. Nowhere will the problems raised by Prof. Weber's book have a more sympathetic welcome than in the ethically and sociologically interested circles of modern English Nonconformity. *Tua res agitur Albion!*

R. E.

#### SPIRITUALISM AND THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY.

An Explanation of Spiritualist Phenomena and Beliefs in Terms of Modern Knowledge. By Millais Culpin. With an introduction by Professor Leonard Hill. London (Arnold); pp. 159; 6s. net.

THE sub-title indicates the scope of the book. Had the work been adequately carried out, it would have been of great value; but unfortunately this is not the case. The author has an excellent idea and begins excellently by giving a clear and concise account of the theories of the psychoanalytical school and then proceeding to apply them to the study of mediumistic phenomena; but here his excellence ends, for he has not gone to the trouble to obtain any real first-hand knowledge of the subject with which he would deal.

He tells us of two occasions on which he saw the phenomena which he sets out to study; but in neither case did he make any attempt to impose test-conditions, and one can only say that his



methods compare very unfavourably with the precautions of investigators whose evidence he treats so lightly.

One other case in his own experience he mentions, that of a shell-shocked soldier (pp. 146-7), who described the incidents in a murder-mystery that was occupying public attention. Dr. Culpin says: "The description of the murder, if true, could only have been derived from something like second sight," but he does not tell us whether it was true or not.

For the rest, the author is entirely dependant upon books for his information, a singularly unsatisfactory state, for the crux of his theory is the mind of the medium, and he cannot psychoanalyse the printed page. Moreover in dealing with these books he does not give us an adequate summary of their contents, but picks out a point here and there which fits in with his theory, and ignores the rest.

That the subconscious mind of the medium will repay psychological investigation is obvious, and that Dr. Culpin is well equipped to carry out such a task is equally undeniable; it is only to be regretted that he did not wait to make himself a better master of his subject before rushing into print.

V. M. F.

#### AN OUTLINE OF THE RELIGIOUS LITERATURE OF INDIA.

By J. N. Farquhar, M.A., D.Litt. London (Oxford University Press); pp. 451; 18s. net.

THERE have been books written on the general literature of India, but though Dr. Farquhar confines himself to the religious literature solely, no previous attempt has brought so much together within two covers. It is a courageous and ambitious survey, dating large numbers of works with precision, and even parts of collections, where approximately possible, and bringing all within certain periods. The method pursued is not to follow out the literature of one stream of religion or of one sect from beginning to end, but to present cross-sections of successive periods, so that the student may be able to acquaint himself with the contemporary environment of thought when dealing with any particular book and so place it in its proper perspective. It is an encyclopædia of compressed and well-arranged information, linked up with introductory matter and interspersed with judicious remarks. The whole is equipped with a full index and a large bibliography which gives the literature on the literature. Dr. Farquhar has been

assisted by a number of distinguished Indian scholars, and many others, especially those in the Missionary field, have given help and valuable indications to follow up. But the initiative and the hard labour of search for and co-ordinating the vast material have been his, and he may rest well content with the carrying out of so great an undertaking. Prof. Berriedale Keith of Edinburgh who read through the whole in MS. and sent the author many critical notes, expressed his high appreciation of the work when reviewing it for the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society.

"It deals," he writes, "with its vast theme with so wide a knowledge and so much objectivity of exposition and judgment that it must immediately rank as indispensable alike to the specialist and the general student of Indian religion."

Prof. Keith speaks for the specialist, but we venture to echo his expert opinion from the point of view of the humble general student.

#### THE INNER MEANING OF THE FOUR GOSPELS.

By Gilbert T. Sadler, M.A., LL.B. London (Daniel); pp. 106;  
3s. 6d. net.

THIS is the first book of a series of four by the same author in which he expounds his theory of a world-religion. Three quotations from the Foreword of this introductory volume explain his position. "The present writer for years resisted the idea that there was no man Jesus. But by persistent examination of the stories concerning Jesus it was borne in upon him that the old explanation of them was very unsatisfactory." "It is needful to get behind the Four Gospels to the Gnostic idea of the Christ-Logos not as a man, but as divine life descending and ascending. . . ." "The World-Religion needs to gather from the West (ancient Greek and modern Anglo-Saxon ideals) as well as from the East (Buddhist and Hebrew ideals)." An author who is prepared utterly to reject every scrap of evidence for the historicity of Jesus is not likely to carry much weight to-day. However unwilling one may be to base one's appeal solely upon history, yet such appeal has a certain unshakeable value in the establishing of facts; and few events of world-history rest upon a surer foundation than the fact that Jesus was an actual historical personage. At the very outset the author of this book sacrifices the serious attention which he desires for his interpretation of the Gospel-narratives. The 'idea

of the Christ-Logos as divine life descending and ascending' is the key by which the author seeks to unlock those mysteries which lie hidden in the four gospels. The general impression which his method gives is that he seeks rather to read his theories into the stories than to draw them out of the narrative. It is true that mankind is slowly progressing towards the elucidation of a world-religion, but it is unlikely that Mr. Sadler will do much to advance the cause which he has at heart. Where scholarship is required, he displays only ingenuity, and leaves a vague impression of unreality in the reader's mind.

H. L. H.

#### BEHIND THE NEW TESTAMENT.

By Gilbert T. Sadler, M.A., LL.B., Author of 'The Origin and Meaning of Christianity,' etc. London (Daniel); pp. 112: 3s. 6d. net.

MR. SADLER'S standpoint is that of the 'Non-historicity School' as set forth by Dr. Anderson in our own pages. It is one of the positions on the critical chess-board, that of the Extreme Left, and serves to bring into clear definition the importance of the data gleaned by the industry of comparative religion. It brings out clearly what is historically the most important element in the background. Nevertheless, and in spite of an intimate acquaintance with the work of the chief representatives of the Non-historicity School, we are unable to accept this violent cutting of the Gordian knot. What we fail to find in Mr. Sadler's exposition is any reference to the very drastic criticisms which have been made on the statements and contentions of such protagonists of the Radical School as van Manen, van Eysinger, Drews, W. B. Smith and J. M. Robertson. On the other hand the saviour-cults, mystery-institutions, gnostic schools and apocalyptic writers had an enormous influence on nascent Christianity. Jesus, we hold, was a historical character, but much that is written about him is non-original to him. Christianity is not wholly the historicizing of the idea of a Saviour-God, it is partly that and partly the divinizing of a man. This is what makes the problem so exceedingly difficult of solution. It is not simply a question of 'either-or,' but of 'both and . . .', the true solution, whatever it may be. The *tertium quid* is still to seek.

## THE FAITH OF A QUAKER.

By John W. Graham, M.A., Principal of Dalton Hall. Cambridge  
(The University Press): pp. xvi. + 244; 21s. net.

FEW men are better qualified for the task of writing a book dealing with the history and teaching of the Society of Friends than the Principal of Dalton Hall—a Quaker ‘hall of residence’ in connection with the University of Manchester. It is not easy to write of the mystic experience of God; still more difficult is it to tell the story of a mystical society. A combination of gifts is needed: the historian’s sense of accuracy, the mystic’s knowledge of the inner life, the philosopher’s gift of critical analysis. That Mr. Graham has accomplished his task with success no reader of this book will deny.

The first five chapters are devoted to a consideration of the theological foundations upon which the Society of Friends rests. Everything starts from the personal experience of an immanent God; the complementary truth of the Divine transcendence is little dwelt on. Quaker theology starts from, and is an exposition of, the doctrine of the ‘inner light.’ Mr. Graham is a little obscure (a Quaker reader might penetrate this obscurity) in some parts of this theological section, but his analysis of the teachings of the early mystics is admirable.

Four chapters are devoted to the lives and writings of some of the founders of the Society of Friends: George Fox, Isaac Pennington, William Penn and Robert Barclay (author of the famous *Apology*, the most comprehensive account of the nature and teaching of Quakerism). The third part of the book is concerned with the external edifice of Quakerism, its unworldliness, its worship, its attitude towards art, education and a professional ministry, its organisation and discipline. This section is descriptive rather than theological or apologetic, and a study of it will avail to explain those phenomena of the sect which are most apparent to the outsider.

Mr. Graham has kept the best to the end. In the final portion he deals with the Quaker’s outlook upon the world. He emphasizes those notes which have marked the life of the Society of Friends from the beginning: the wonderful devotion to social service, the hatred of violence and war, and the desire for complete religious freedom. The longest chapter is devoted to a considera-

tion of the Friends' attitude towards war. Two sentences from this instructive chapter admirably summarize the Quaker argument against war: "It is because we cannot defile the living Christ within that we cannot join in war. Our personality would be desecrated by its murderous servitude, because that personality has its birth and its home in the Indwelling God."

Because the world has not understood this attitude, and because the Quaker theology has seemed to be so remote from the world of men and affairs, there has long been the need for such a book as this. It deserves to be widely read and doubtless will provoke discussion and even controversy.

H. L. H.

#### REINCARNATION, IMMORTALITY AND UNIVERSALISM.

By G. Christopher, F.C.S. London (Kegan Paul); pp. 102; 2s. 6d. net.

THESE notes are the result of an endeavour to answer the question, What is Christianity? Incidentally, they are an attempt to prove that reincarnation is a Christian doctrine. The method of proof is hopelessly inadequate and out-of-date. The author assumes that Christianity is founded upon the Bible, and on this false assumption, by means of proof-texts, he seeks to show that reincarnation is part of the Christian revelation. We are inclined to think that the author has not been quite unbiassed in his use of the Bible. He has begun with the conclusion that he desired to establish (i.e. the truth of reincarnation) and has worked back to find texts in support of his preconceived conclusion. In such a way it is possible to defend any theory by means of Bible-texts. Christianity is the religion, not of a book, but of a society (the Church). We may not agree with the Society (that is a perfectly legitimate position), but we have no right to foist upon it a doctrine which has been repudiated by that Society from its earliest days. It is possible to deduce reincarnation from a catena of Bible-passages. It is equally possible to deduce teetotalism in the same way; but it does not follow that the former any more than the latter is a Christian doctrine. The author displays great skill and ingenuity, and it is a pity that a false premiss and antiquated methods of proof invalidate his whole argument.

H. L. H.

## THE WISDOM OF AKHNATON.

By A. E. Grantham. London (Lane); pp. 179; 6s. net.

IN the middle of the 14th century B.C. the young Pharaoh Akhnaton (Amenhotep IV.) tried to impose a new cult upon ancient Egypt. It was a high form of spiritual monotheism, and a doctrine of peace and goodwill inspired by faith in the divine love and beneficence. The chief symbol of the cult was the disk of the sun with rays shining forth, from which depended hands as though dispensing blessings on all creatures far and wide. The Aton-cult flashed out suddenly like a *nova* in the religious sky and on the death of the Pharaoh at the early age of 30 speedily disappeared, while the memory of Akhnaton passed down to history as of one who had done ill service to his country; so entirely was he absorbed in his single-handed endeavour to establish the worship of Aton that the kingdom fell into great distress and peril. Mr. Grantham's *Wisdom of Akhnaton* is not a formal study of Atonism, but a dramatization in free verse of an episode in which at the end Akhnaton is represented as successfully persuading his people to choose peace instead of war, of which the horrors are graphically depicted. The conflicting passions of the different classes of the populace are well brought out and the climax is reached in a fine 'Hymn to the Splendour of Aton,' in free rendering based on excerpts from a version of the original. Lofty utterances are put into the mouth of the Pharaoh, and Mr. Grantham has brought out the best in the spirit of the Aton-cult with great sympathy and in a fair guise.

## THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DAY-DREAMS.

By Dr. J. Varendonck, formerly Lecturer in the Paidological Faculty of Brussels. With an Introduction by Prof. S. Freud. London (Allen & Unwin); pp. 367; 18s. net.

THIS is an elaborate study on psychoanalytic lines of what Dr. Varendonck terms fore-conscious states by a careful and methodical observer and recorder of his own ante- and post-omnial imaginal activity. These are states of 'affective thinking' as distinguished from the controlled logical activity of the fully conscious mind. Dr. Varendonck has faithfully recorded without reserve a number of instances of chains of this type of uncontrolled musing from his own personal experience and mercilessly analyzed them. By dint of practice and persistency he has

been able to recover these chains with remarkable fulness and so supplied himself with accurately recorded and therefore valuable scientific material for his treatise. His study is a remarkable example of how much can be made out of what seems at first sight, as far as content is concerned, to be of very little value. The end in view, however, is to show the nature of the dynamic of spontaneous, drifting, imaginal, affectively determined thought-processes as detected in the border-state between sleeping and waking, and Dr. Varendonck's work is a valuable pioneer contribution to the study of this so familiar but so little investigated type of psychic activity. It links up in some ways with Freud's suggestive researches into the psychology of every-day life. We think, however, that it is too early to venture on the generalisations which are becoming only too frequent with the enthusiasts of the psychoanalytic method. It does not strike us that Dr. Varendonck's is a typically normal case; on the contrary, throughout his investigations he is clearly dominated by Freudian presuppositions and dogmas and on tip-toe with psychoanalytic expectations. We need a score of differently environed cases before we can begin to make inferences of general validity. Nevertheless every individual case has its value, and Dr. Varendonck's study is a praiseworthy pioneer effort for which we are grateful. We also congratulate the author on the excellent English in which he has written his treatise.

#### THE STUDY OF PATAÑJALI.

By Surendranath Das Gupta, M.A., Ph.D., Professor, Chittagong College. Griffith Triennial Prize, 1915. Calcutta (University of Calcutta); pp. 207.

THIS is a very able analytical study of the classical *Yoga-Sūtra* of Patañjali by an excellent Sanskrit scholar, who has not only made a profound study of Indian philosophical and psychological literature but is very well grounded in Western thought. It is a study (published in 1920) preliminary to a larger work which Prof. Das Gupta hopes to have shortly brought out by the University of Calcutta, to be entitled *Yoga-Philosophy in relation to other Indian Systems of Thought*. We have found that our author's labours throw light on so many points that we could have wished his exposition had been cast in a less technical form, so that those ignorant of Sanskrit could derive benefit from it, for Yoga is a subject that is of great interest to many in the West and Patañjali is, so to say, the Euclid of this philosophy and discipline.

## THE RHYTHM OF LIFE.

Based on the Philosophy of Lao-Tze. Translated from the Dutch of Henri Borel. London (Murray); pp. 89; 3s. 6d. net.

WE are glad to welcome this delightful phantasy, which appeared originally in a Dutch periodical, and which the Wisdom of the East Series now gives us in a revised English form. The title of the prior English version was *Wu-Wei*, generally rendered Doing Nothing or Inactivity, which is so misleading for those who are ignorant of the true spirit of the Tao as set forth by a Lao-tzū, a Chuang-Tzū or a Lieh-Tzū. The mystic Tao or Way rightly understood is the most profound philosophy of life to which ancient China has given birth; its universality oversteps the limits of time and place, and it is not too much to say that its profundity has not yet begun to be appreciated outside of China and Japan. The education of the student of comparative mysticism remains woefully incomplete without a knowledge of it, for there are few ancient products that make so immediate, direct and powerful an appeal to lovers of the higher naturalism, if we may so term it. M. Borel has well caught its spirit and writes charmingly of the Tao itself and of Art and Love in connection therewith. The Tao-doctrine is one of the great things of the world, and a remarkable instance of a greatness born before its time; they who conceived of it were spiritual giants compared with the little folk who come after them.

## (1) A HISTORY OF HINDI LITERATURE.

By F. E. Keay, M.A. London (Oxford University Press); pp. 116; 2s. 6d. net.

## (2) PSALMS OF MARĀTHĀ SAINTS.

One Hundred and Eight Hymns translated from the Marāthī.  
By Nicol Macnicol, M.A., D.Litt. London (Oxford University Press); pp. 94; 2s. net.

## (3) HYMNS OF THE TAMIL ŚAIVITE SAINTS.

By F. Kingsbury, B.A., and G. E. Phillips, B.A., M.A. London (Oxford University Press); pp. 132; 2s. 6d. net.

THESE three volumes are the most recent in 'The Heritage of India Series,' so ably edited by Dr. J. N. Farquhar and Bishop Azariah. In all three the reader is introduced to the riches of Indian vernacular religious literature mainly of the Bhākta type.



It is in the cults of Vishṇu and Shiva that Bhakti, or loving devotion, has been most highly developed. These cults are the most popular in Hinduism, and without a knowledge of them and especially of their rich hymnology it is impossible to enter into the religious spirit of vast masses of the folk. The volumes are all done with scholarly care and sympathy, and are a remarkable testimony to the new liberal and enlightened spirit which is at work in Missionary circles. The first is the most packed with formal information and has less of translation than the others; it is a convenient and instructive survey. The two other volumes are mainly translations into verse and are well done; in both cases the help of those whose mother-tongue is the language of the originals, has been utilized to perfect the translation. From the Marāṭhī we have renderings of selections from the psalms or religious poems of such great saints and singers as Jñāneśvar, Nāmdev and Tukārām, mainly of the last; and from the Tamil, versions of the songs and hymns of Sambandar, Apparswāmi, Sandaramūrti and Mānikka Vāsahar. There are many beautiful things and high thoughts in these poems, which are characterized throughout by the absolute surrender of the soul to God in loving service. Praise must also be given to the Wesleyan Mission Press (Mysore City) for the way in which the books are turned out; though the books are 'made in India,' there are few presses in our own country that could have so successfully overcome the difficulties of diacritical marks and the rest of the apparatus necessary for such careful work. Compared with the crushing prices at present ruling, the books are also a marvel of cheapness. The Oxford University Press are the agents only.

#### SWIFT WINGS.

Songs in Sussex. Steyning (The Vine Press); pp. xiii. + 59.

FEMININE rimes too many and uncouth words like 'vair' and 'virent' too frequently make these wings of song heavy to the ear and understanding; but there is poetry not a little in the book. Richard Jefferies is nobly commemorated in the sonnet bearing his name, and, to our thinking, it is true that "he broke his heart Against the eternal rock of ecstasy"; while it is pleasant to find William Collins remembered, though surely his unrimed 'Ode to Evening' were itself best praised in unrimed song. In a book of Sussex Songs, and so full of literary names, it is strange to find two unutilized—Rudyard Kipling and Francis Thompson. A. A. C.

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# THE QUEST



## MILTON AND THE ZOHAR.

DENIS SAURAT, Professor of English Literature  
in the University of Bordeaux.

I PURPOSE to prove that Milton knew the *Zohar* and other kabbalistic documents; that he used them freely as a source of inspiration; that practically all his philosophical ideas are kabbalistic ideas, in such a way that the only tenable hypothesis is that he derived the most important part of his philosophy from the Kabbalah.

I shall use the French translation of the *Zohar* by de Pauly (Paris, Leroux, 1906-1911) and S. Karppe's *Étude sur les Origines et la Nature du Zohar* (Paris, Alcan, 1901). Both books contain unacceptable ideas as to the formation of the *Zohar*; but that is of no importance here, as we shall consider the *Zohar* as it was known in the 16th century. I also beg to be allowed to refer the reader to my study of Milton's philosophy (*La Pensée de Milton*, Paris, Alcan, 1920)<sup>1</sup> for any more detailed proof than can be here given that Milton held such and such an idea.

<sup>1</sup> Referred to as *P. de M.*



The *Zohar* was printed in Mantua and Cremona in 1559-60, another edition coming out at Lublin in 1623. The most celebrated commentators of the *Zohar*, Cordovero and Loria, belong to the middle of the 16th century. Pico de la Mirandola, Reuchlin and Agrippa had, during the 15th and 16th centuries, prepared the scholars of Europe to receive kabbalistic ideas and had made known many of the principles of the Kabbalah. In 1635 Joseph Voysin published in Paris a Latin translation of some passages of the *Zohar*. Father Kircher published his study of the Kabbalah in Rome from 1652 to 1654. In England Robert Fludd (1574-1637) gave to the public the most interesting among the kabbalistic conceptions, and there are many striking resemblances between Fludd's and Milton's ideas. Last of all Henry More, who belonged to the same Cambridge college as Milton, published in 1654, in London, his work on the Kabbalah.

Such facts must here suffice to show that Milton could not be ignorant of the existence of the Kabbalah. Unanimous tradition and even the statement of the poet himself leave us no doubt that he was able to read the Aramean text of the *Zohar*; and we know Milton sufficiently well to be sure that, if once he became interested in the Kabbalah, he would go straight to the main text with his usual contempt for commentators, since the text was accessible. In such circumstances the proof that Milton knew the *Zohar* and derived ideas from it must come from a comparison of the two systems of thought and a precise investigation of texts.

I do not mean to maintain that Milton was a kabbalist in the sense that he accepted the *Zohar* as a revealed book in any other way than any other great book. His mind was much too clear and exacting for

that. Besides, the *Zohar* is full of contradictions, owing to the way it was put together or transmitted. Milton evidently took only what suited him from that chaos of ideas. But Milton used the *Zohar*, found there abundant confirmation of his general ideas and drew thence many of the ideas which seem at first sight most particularly his own.

Many of his general conceptions belong to a traditional stock, common to the *Zohar* and to other Jewish or Christian lines of development. But some of Milton's most original notions are found only in the *Zohar*; and the most striking fact of all is that in the *Zohar* can be found all Milton's ideas, whether apparently peculiar to himself or not. With one reservation only,<sup>1</sup> it can be stated that Milton's philosophy is in the *Zohar*, and Milton had only to disentangle it from extraneous matter.

Inversely, although Milton took from the *Zohar* only a very small part of its contents, there is really but one great idea of the *Zohar* which is not in Milton: the idea of reincarnation. Even in this case, however, there is a parallel conception in the poet. The basis of the theories of reincarnation is that the future life must take place on earth and debts contracted either by us or towards us must be paid in kind. This idea of justice as rendered in this world and not in another world is what drove Milton to adopt the notion of the Millenarians and Fifth Monarchy men: it is on this earth that Christ will come and reign and settle all accounts (*P. de M.*, p. 209).

<sup>1</sup> The idea of the non-existence of the soul, of the origin of which I have made a study in the *Revue Germanique* (Oct., 1921); and even in this case all the ideas on which Milton bases this notion are in the *Zohar*: pantheism, matter as a divine substance, transformation of matter into spirit, unity between matter and spirit, vindication of sex-passion, etc. Milton only drew the conclusion, and was probably helped to it by an out-and-out kabbalist, Robert Fludd.

Let us first see what Milton owes to the mythology of the *Zohar*. It is comparatively little. So reasonable a mind could not be much influenced by the extravagant development and complication of myths in which the kabbalists indulge.<sup>1</sup> Yet a few traits are very interesting.

In *Paradise Lost* (ix. 815-833) Eve, after eating the apple, and before giving it to Adam (she had thought it better perhaps to keep superior science to herself), soliloquises thus :

“ But what if God have seen  
And death ensue ? then I shall be no more,  
And Adam, wedded to another Eve,  
Shall live with her enjoying, I extinct ;  
A death to think. Confirmed then I resolve  
Adam shall share with me in bliss or woe :  
So dear I love him, that with him all deaths  
I could endure, without him live no life.”

Splendid psychology, in splendid language. The *Zohar* says :

“ The woman touched the tree. Then she saw the Angel of Death coming towards her, and thought: Perhaps I shall die, and the Holy One (Blessed be He) will make another woman and give her to Adam. That must not happen. Let us live together or let us die together. And then she gave the fruit to her husband that he should eat it also.”<sup>2</sup>

There is perfect correspondence in the sequence of ideas :

<sup>1</sup> Milton follows the normal Christian tradition as to myth, see *P. de M.*, pt. iii., ch. i.

<sup>2</sup> *Zohar* i. 209b. (de P., vol. ii., p. 637). Eleazer of Worms has a similar passage derived from *Midrash, Genesis rabba* xix. But Eleazer of Worms or the *Zohar* is all one for my thesis, Eleazer being one of the most celebrated kabbalists.

But what if God have seen, Perhaps I shall die, and the Holy  
 And death ensue? then I shall One (Blessed be He). . .  
 be no more,

And Adam wedded to another Eve will make another woman  
 Shall live with her enjoying, I and give her to Adam  
 extinct;

A death to think. Confirmed then That must not happen.  
 I resolve  
 Adam shall share with me . . .

With him all deaths Let us live together or let us die  
 I could endure, without him live together.  
 no life.

A second trait seems more important still. The allegory of the iind book of *Paradise Lost*, in which Satan commits incest with his daughter Sin, issued from himself, and thus produces Death, has revolted many minds since Voltaire; the more so because the repulsive idea of incest seems quite gratuitous, a mere indulgence in the horrible on Milton's part, since *James* i. 15 gives no hint of it: "When Lust has conceived, it bringeth forth Sin, and Sin, when it is full grown, bringeth forth Death."

If, then, we have been sorry to take from Milton's wreath that flower of Eve's jealousy, it is a sort of compensation to acquit him of this less graceful invention.

Karppe (p. 427) tells us that in the kabbalistic myths: "It is a law, which applies also to the Sephiroth—that the female first issues from the male, and then is fecundated by him."

Hence Sin came from Satan, and then incest was committed by them. In the *Zohar*, the particular form of incest, 'father-daughter,' becomes a law. God himself has sexual intercourse with the Matrona, or

Shekhina, his daughter.<sup>1</sup> And there is a *Matrona* of the lower world (*Lilith* perhaps) who has become Milton's Sin, daughter and wife to Satan, as she boasts herself :

"At thy right hand voluptuous,  
Thy daughter and thy darling, without end."

A third trait, less important perhaps, is also interesting. Whence comes chaos in Milton? Since in his philosophy everything comes from God by his 'retraction,'<sup>2</sup> which produced first that divine matter from which the universe is evolved naturally, it is difficult to explain the anterior existence of chaos, and we may be tempted to see here a purely poetical survival from a different cosmogony.

But the *Zohar* explains this chaos and, incidentally, suggests a meaning for one of Milton's finest and most discussed lines<sup>3</sup> (*P.L.* ii. 911), where chaos is "The womb of Nature and perhaps her grave." Why 'perhaps her grave'?

The *Zohar* relates on several occasions<sup>4</sup> that God, before creating this world, had created several others and, not being pleased with them, had destroyed them; the remnants of such worlds being pointed to by the words: "and *the Earth* was *tohu* and *bohu*." It seems evident that, in Milton's mind, unless the Earth fulfil the aims for which God created it, it will be destroyed also and become part of this chaos of lost worlds. Hence a tragic significance to 'perhaps her grave.'

<sup>1</sup> *Zohar* i. 173, 353; ii. 432, etc. The *Zohar* insists somewhat too much on this point for our modern European taste.

<sup>2</sup> *P. de M.*, pp. 138 and 146, on 'matter,' and below.

<sup>3</sup> See Professor Greenlaw, *Studies in Philology*, July, 1920, p. 335.

<sup>4</sup> See specially i. 24b. (vol. i., p. 152) and i. 266b. (vol. ii., p. 681).

Such are the artistic traits in common between Milton and the *Zohar*: few indeed, but very curious.

Let us now see the practically complete correspondence between the philosophical ideas.

The most striking feature here is the identity of views on the ontological relationship between God and the world.

In Milton's system, since God is all things, the creation of separate beings must be their separation from God. I have tried at length to show that this idea of free-will within a pantheistic system was the central point of Milton's thought both in *Paradise Lost* and the *De Doctrina Christiana* (*P. de M.*, p. 133, 'le retrait'). This creative liberation can only be accomplished by a 'retraction' of God upon himself: the divinity 'retires,' as Milton says, its will from certain parts of itself, giving them over, so to speak, to whatever latent impulses remain in them. God himself, at one of the decisive points of *Paradise Lost* (vii. 170) before the creation of this world, when Satan seems to have wrought havoc in the divine scheme, gives out the theory:

"I uncircumscribed myself retire  
And put not forth my goodness, which is free  
To act or not."

The *Zohar* says:<sup>1</sup>

"When we think that the Holy One (Blessed be He) is infinite and that he fills everything, it is easily understood that any creation would have been impossible without the *zimzum* ['retraction']. How could it be possible to put more water into a cup which is already filled to the brim? The Holy One (Blessed be He) has therefore contracted the Holy Light which is

<sup>1</sup> *Tikunē Zohar*, xix., quoted by de Pauly, vol. vi. (2nd part), p. 346.

his essence; not that he diminished himself—God preserve us from such an idea!—being all things, he can neither increase nor decrease. Only, since the Light of God is of such purity and strength that it eclipses all things, even the higher angels, even the Hayoth, even the Seraphim and the Cherubim,<sup>1</sup> the Holy One (Blessed be He), to make possible the existence of celestial and material worlds, withdrew his almighty Light from a part of himself."

If we go back to the complete passage in Milton, in its very construction we shall find an exact reproduction of these few lines of the *Zohar* :

Boundless the deep, because I am	When we think that the Holy One
who fill	. . . is infinite and that he fills
Infinitude, nor vacuous the space. <sup>2</sup>	everything,
Though I uncircumscribed my-	it is easily understood that any
self retire	creation would have been im-
And put not forth my goodness,	possible without the <i>zimzum</i>
which is free	[' retraction ']. . . The Holy
To act or not,	One (Blessed be He) has there-
	fore contracted the Holy Light
	which is his essence ;

Necessity and chance	not that he diminished himself—
Approach me not, and what	God preserve us from such an
I will is fate.	idea!—being all things, he can
	neither increase nor decrease.

In the two texts we find in the same order :

1. *The assertion that God is infinite*, repeated twice—"I am who fill infinitude" rendering "the Holy One is infinite," and "nor vacuous the space" rendering "he fills everything";

<sup>1</sup> Note Milton's insistence on this theme—"God is light"—and this particular trait (*P.L.* iii. 888) :

" — dazzle Heaven, that brightest Seraphim  
Approach not, but with both wings veil their eyes."

<sup>2</sup> Many editions erroneously put a comma here instead of the necessary full stop.

2. *The idea of 'retraction,'* the English 'retire' rendering *zimzum* ('*retrait*' in the French of de Pauly), and "put not forth my goodness" rendering "contracted the Holy Light," since 'goodness' and 'Light' are two names of the Shekhina, the essence that plays the principal part in the *Zohar*;

3. *The assertion* that, in spite of this 'retraction,' God remains all powerful, his greatness undiminished.

It appears, therefore, that the passage from *Paradise Lost* is simply an adaptation of, or properly a sort of free translation from, the passage in the *Tikunē Zohar*. Milton has omitted only the comparison to the cup of water, which was a hindrance to the logical impetuosity of his period.

It must be considered also that this is not a side issue, but that these six lines are the most important passage in *Paradise Lost* from the philosophical point of view, also the most characteristic (*P. de M.*, pp. 134ff.). Here Milton expresses his most striking and, as it seems, his most original idea, from which is derived his conception of matter; since matter is that 'space not vacuous' even after the contraction of God, what remains of God's powers in space when God has withdrawn his will. It can therefore be asserted that Milton has derived from the *Zohar* his philosophical system. Pantheism, materialism, doctrines of free-will and of fate as God's will—by a truly remarkable *tour de force* Milton has logically tied these four somewhat antagonistic conceptions into one solid knot; he has done it in six lines, but only because the *Tikunē Zohar* had done it in ten.

Should even some source, at present unknown, have transmitted second-hand to Milton this idea of 'retraction,' the close correspondence of the two



passages seems to me to prove that anyhow in this particular case Milton has gone back to the original text and that whatever other inspiration may be found could have only indicated it to him.

This central point once fixed, everything else derives from it. A volume would be necessary to study precisely the relationship between Milton's ideas and the ideas of the *Zohar*, and even such a study would be incomplete, because other elements than either Milton or the *Zohar* would have to be taken into account; these are only two strands of a rope that is made up of many more besides. I shall here point out only the chief resemblances, and therefore, practically, only open the discussion. I do not assert in what follows that this or that particular passage of the *Zohar* has inspired this or that passage in Milton, but only that the same ideas exist in the two systems.<sup>1</sup>

To Milton God is the infinite, immutable, unknowable, non-manifested; that is, the 'En-Sof,' the Endless of the *Zohar*, which is also 'Ayin,' Nothingness, so inconceivable is it:

"Fountain of Light, Thyself invisible" (*P.L.* iii. 374). "But God, as he cannot be seen, so neither can he be heard" (*Treatise of Christian Doctrine*, Bohn, p. 109). "The phrase 'he did not think' is not applicable to God" (*ib.*, p. 145).

"Within the Supreme Thought," says the *Zohar*,<sup>2</sup> "no one can conceive anything whatsoever. It is impossible to know the Infinite, which does not come under the senses; every question and every meditation

<sup>1</sup> To allow of some sort of method in this rapid survey, I shall follow here the systematized scheme of Milton's thought I have drawn up in *La Pensée de Milton*.

i. 21a (vol. i., p. 129); see also Karppe, pp. 842, 852, etc.

is vain to reach the essence of the Supreme Thought, centre of all, secret of secrets, without beginning or end, infinite."

In both systems, God is the Absolute of the metaphysicians, equally incapable of manifesting itself and of being conceived. Consequently, in both systems there is a Demiurge, as it were an inferior God, who is at once the Creator and the Creation, since there is some sort of pantheism in the two schemes. In Milton this Demiurge is the Son who is the Finite, the Expressed, "the first of the whole creation, by whom afterwards all other things were made" (*T.C.D.*, p. 80), "not co-eval with the Father" (p. 83), "not from everlasting, but from the beginning" (p. 109), "the secondary and instrumental cause" (p. 91). In the *Zohar*, the part of the Demiurge is played by the 'World of Emanation,' the first three Sephiroth taken as one whole,—Crown, Wisdom and Intelligence,—because the *Zohar* carries the idea further and puts several steps between God and the world.<sup>1</sup> Milton follows suit on the few occasions when he feels inclined to admit of the Holy Ghost; he makes of that being a third step between the Son and the world, quite clearly inferior to the Son (*P. de M.*, p. 145).

The three higher Sephiroth seem to have inspired Milton in his invocation to Urania, at the beginning of Book vii.:

"Before the hills appeared, or fountain flowed,  
Thou with Eternal Wisdom didst converse,  
Wisdom thy sister, and with her didst play  
In presence of the Almighty Father, pleased  
With thy celestial song."

<sup>1</sup> See Karppe, pp. 377, 378, etc. The quotations are too numerous to be given here; among others, see de Pauly, vol. i., p. 98 and vol. vi., p. 119.

We know 'Eternal Wisdom'; it is the Logos, the Creative Son. But who is Urania, who has a place with Wisdom in presence of the Father? Is she a purely poetical personification? It would seem very bold here on Milton's part. Besides, Milton insists on her reality: "Thou art heavenly, she (the Muse) an empty dream." The *Zohar* explains her. The Father is the Crown, the first Sephira, too near as yet to the En-Soph to be creative; Wisdom in Milton is, by name, the Wisdom of the Kabbalah: Urania then is the third Sephira, Intelligence, the sister of the second, as Milton well knows, and Milton addresses this Intelligence, which he disguises as Urania, so that he may be inspired by her—the proper power of inspiration.<sup>1</sup> And from these divine 'recreations' the creation came. Milton ascribes to these acts within the bosom of divinity the sexual character which is so well marked in the *Zohar*; and that is the meaning of that terrible passage in *Tetrachordon* (pp. 329-30), in which Milton invokes God's own example to justify man in his need of woman:

"God himself conceals not his own recreations before the world was built; I was, said the Eternal Wisdom, daily his delight, playing always before him"; and Solomon "sings of a thousand raptures between these two lovely ones, far on the hither side of carnal enjoyment" (cp. *P. de M.*, pp. 74, 75, 170, etc.).

No doubt Milton is quoting sacred texts; but he adds another text: "before the world was built," and this is a relationship of cause to effect in the *Zohar*—the world is the outcome, the child, of sex-life within the divinity. Milton also makes use of another

<sup>1</sup> See Karppe, p. 375.

kabbalistic law: life here below is the image of the life within God; that is why man has need of woman.<sup>1</sup>

But let us pass on to less delicate subjects. Free-will is a natural consequence of the 'retraction' of God both in the *Zohar* and in Milton.<sup>2</sup> A connected idea in both cases is that of the usefulness of evil. Milton's texts are rightly celebrated.

"Good and evil we know in the field of this world grow up together almost inseparably.—What wisdom can there be to choose, what continence to forbear, without the knowledge of evil?—I cannot praise a fugitive and cloistered virtue unexercised and unbreathed" (*Areopagitica*).

Thus also the *Zohar*: "Had not the Holy One (Blessed be He) created the spirit of good and the spirit of evil, man could have had neither merit nor demerit; that is the reason why God created him a mixture of the two spirits" (vol. i., p. 142).

In both systems God has foreseen the use his creatures would make of their free-will and has provided for all the consequences by his 'preliminary decree,' so that, as the *Zohar* has it: "The Spirit of Evil works his Master's will." Thus Milton's Satan is himself an instrument of God, and it is 'fondly' that he thinks he can do anything to 'damage' his Master.<sup>3</sup>

The ontology is thus in complete concordance: God absolute and unmanifested, Demiurge, 'retraction' of God and free-will, necessity and usefulness of evil, preliminary decrees of God—all are both in the *Zohar* and in Milton.

<sup>1</sup> *Zohar*, vol. i., pp. 173, 353, 391, and vol. ii., p. 432, etc., and *passim*, for the sex-life God-Matrona.

<sup>2</sup> Karppe, pp. 466, 478, etc.

<sup>3</sup> *Zohar*, vol. iv., p. 105; *P. de M.*, p. 136: "My damage fondly deemed," says God, of Satan's activities (*P.L.* viii. 52).

The same harmony exists in the cosmology, but for the difference insisted upon earlier. In the two systems the universe is made of one substance, and that unique substance is God himself. The theories of the *Zohar* on 'emanation' are well known, and all through the *Zohar* flows a current of pantheism<sup>1</sup>: "All souls form one Unity with the essential soul."

And although the *Zohar* does not give up, as Milton does, the idea of a soul distinct from the body, yet it adopts this other idea, which bridges the difference, that there is no essential distinction between the body and the soul. This last is a Miltonic thesis also.

M. Karppe (p. 375) sums up the doctrine of the *Zohar* as follows:

"As the aim of the kabbalists is not to bring the En-Sof into direct contact with the Finite, it becomes necessary that the Crown [the first Sephira] be able to replace the En-Sof, and contain along with the spiritual principle the potentiality of the material—matter being for the *Zohar* a degradation of the spiritual substance—the Crown is the whole of this substance, with its full potentialities."

This is all Miltonic thought; witness the passages: "Spirit being the more excellent substance, virtually and essentially contains within itself the inferior one, as the spiritual and rational faculty contains the corporal, that is, the sentient and vegetative faculty" (*T.C.D.*, p. 181).

"The original matter of which we speak is not to be looked upon as an evil or trivial thing, but as intrinsically good, and the chief productive stock of

<sup>1</sup> Karppe, pp. 375, 407, etc. "One first matter all," says Milton, etc.; see *P. de M.*, pp. 146 to 153, *Zohar*, vol. v., p. 866.

every subsequent good; it was a substance, and derivable from no other source than the fountain of every substance [God]" (*ib.* p. 179).

This divine origin of the substance of which all beings are made, has the same consequence in psychology and ethics for Milton and for the *Zohar*. The physical instincts of the body are good and legitimate and, especially, that of sex is good and legitimate; both the poet and the kabbalists find it in God himself, as we have seen. We need not, therefore, develop the point beyond marking the extreme limit, common to both.

The *Zohar* proclaims several times that it is a sin to abstain from lawful sexual intercourse (vol. i., p. 290, vol. ii., pp. 340, 642, etc.); Milton is just as positive with his

"who bids abstain,

But our destroyer, foe to God and man?"

And Milton has shown us the example of physical love in a passage which causes Raphael himself to blush, among the angels also:

"Whatever pure thou in the body enjoy'st  
(And pure thou wert created) we enjoy" (*P.L.* viii. 618).

But there is an evil sensuality, which in both systems is associated with the Fall. "Sexual desires," says the *Zohar*, "are good or evil according to the spirit that prompts them" (vol. i., p. 142). The whole argument of Milton on the subject in the treatises on divorce is based upon that very principle.<sup>1</sup> Therefore the history of the Fall is the same; the *Zohar* reads like a commentary on the ixth book of *Paradise Lost*:

"The woman saw that the fruit was good to eat; she took and ate thereof. These words refer to the

<sup>1</sup> See *P. de M.*, pp. 68 and 181.

first union of Adam and Eve. At first Eve consented to the union solely because of her reflections on the usefulness of conjugal cohabitation<sup>1</sup> and also because of the pure affection that bound her to Adam. But as soon as the serpent came into it—Scripture says ‘and gave thereof to her husband’—their intercourse was no longer inspired by a pure affection, but she roused in him carnal desires” (vol. i., pp. 287-288).

All these elements are in the Miltonic tale of the Fall: the purity of sexual relationship before the Fall, the fruit considered as an aphrodisiac, sexual corruption following immediately upon the Fall, the first manifestation of it.<sup>2</sup>

And the *Zohar*, like Milton, can rise to a generalisation from these facts: it has the great theory of the opposition between passion and reason, and derives it also from reflection upon sexual passion.

“Man,” says Rabbi Yehuda,<sup>3</sup> “has three guides: reason, inspired by the holy soul, passion inspired by evil propensities, and the instinct of self-preservation common to all men. Note that the Evil Spirit can act only upon the last two guides. The guide called passion does not even wait for the Tempter—it runs to meet him; and it is this second guide which perverts the third, by nature inoffensive.” This third guide Milton calls ‘desire’ or ‘will,’ which is ‘inoffensive by nature.’ The poet describes the effects of sensuality on Adam and Eve:

“For understanding [the 1st guide] ruled not, and the will [the 3rd]

<sup>1</sup> Let us note here another trait common to Milton and the *Zohar*—an occasional colossal lack of sense of humour.

<sup>2</sup> *P. de M.* (p. 164) gives the Miltonic texts.

<sup>3</sup> On the daughters of Lot (vol. ii., p. 691).

Heard not her lore, both in subjection now  
To sensual appetite [the 2nd]" (*P.L.* ix. 1135).

And again :

"Reason in man obscured, or not obeyed [the 1st],  
Immediately inordinate desires [the 3rd]  
And upstart passions [the 2nd] catch the government  
From reason " (*Ib.* xii. 85).

Consequently Milton's attitude to woman is much the same as that of the *Zohar*. For both, man without woman is an incomplete being. The *Zohar* frequently asserts the fact:<sup>1</sup>

"The male form alone and the female form alone are each only one half of a body."

(The basis of these ideas is in the theories on primitive hermaphrodism, traces of which can thus be found in Milton's thought also.)

Thus Adam explains to the Archangel that God

"from my side subducting, took perhaps  
More than enough " (*P.L.* viii. 537).

Man without woman is an incomplete being ; hence his weakness before her. Then woman, being the instrument of passion, is not so directly as man in relationship with God.

"He for God only, she for God in him," says Milton, and the *Zohar* : "Women do not possess the Light of the Law, which is reserved to men, but they have the candle of the Sabbath, which brings them rewards " (vol. iv., p. 119).

But quite a special dignity is given woman in many passages. For the *Zohar* woman remains on Earth the expression of the Matrona : "small in her exile, but powerful " (vol. vi., p. 117) ; "the house is

<sup>1</sup> Karppe, pp. 426-427.



hers, and man is to consult her for all matters relating to the household"; "the union of man and woman must be voluntary on both sides." Woman must never be considered as the passive instrument of pleasure; her consent must be obtained "by words of friendship and tenderness" (vol. i., p. 286).

This attitude of superiority mixed with respect and tenderness is quite precisely Milton's attitude to woman (cp. *P. de M.*, pt. ii., ch. iii.).

If we pass on to Milton's more particularly religious ideas, the conception of the 'Greater Man,' of Christ, who is the whole body of the elect, of the intelligent, the problem becomes wider. It is a larger tradition than that of the *Zohar* which comes down to Milton; I have pointed out two main links in the chain in Plato and Origen (*ib.*, p. 185). But the tradition is in the Kabbalah also. The Heavenly Man, Adam Kadmon, who is One, the prototype and also the whole of mankind, may have helped Milton towards his idea of the Greater Man, Christ. In any case there is harmony.

This parallelism could be carried on *ad infinitum*. I shall only add here the simple statement that, among others, the following Miltonic conceptions are also found in the *Zohar*:

Original Sin takes place in each of us, and not once  
for all in Adam.

In God's intention our bodies were to become spirits  
without having to undergo death.

There is in the Fall much that is good.

There exist mysteries which it is fatal to unveil.

God reveals himself to men according to their powers,  
and not such as he is.

Holy Scripture has many meanings.

External events, although real in themselves, are yet in a way only symbols of spiritual events, etc.

There is practically not one philosophical trait in Milton which is not to be found in the *Zohar*.

Does this mean that Milton derived all his ideas from the Kabbalah? That cannot be reasonably asserted. It seems to me :

1. That he obviously derived from the *Zohar* such peculiar conceptions as are found nowhere else, e.g. the idea of 'retraction,' his most fundamental idea ;
2. That some ideas coming to him from other sources were strengthened by the *Zohar* into a maturity and importance they would not otherwise have reached ;
3. That again he found in the *Zohar* confirmation of other ideas which belonged to a much wider tradition.

But it is perhaps practically impossible—and it is of no real utility—to try to work out this division in the detail of the ideas. What conclusions then are we to draw from the main facts ?

The first is that Milton has used the *Zohar* ; I see no other hypothesis covering the range of correspondences I have hardly done more than point out here.

The second is that Milton's originality as a thinker is much diminished ; indeed, practically, it is reduced to the working of his intellect or feelings upon outside material which he appropriates and only arranges. Yet he remains a great thinker, because he is still the representative of the modern mind in presence of the tremendous chaos of impossible ideas, puzzling myths and grotesque conceptions of the *Zohar*. Milton has

chosen warily; he has drawn from this confusion practically all the original or deep ideas that were acceptable to the cultured European. He has never been swept away by the element of intellectual and sentimental perversity which plays so great a part in the *Zohar*. In the presence of this (for it) new world rising on the European horizon an undeniable greatness of character and of intellect was needed to maintain such an attitude; few of those who dealt intimately with the Kabbalah were able to do so.

In the light of these new *data* and of Milton's now appearing, not as the creator, but the stage-manager only, of his philosophical ideas, the problem of the poet's thought is transformed and becomes:

Why and how did Milton come to adopt such ideas? Why did he give up the orthodox tradition of his time and adopt this kabbalistic tradition?

The answer is to be found in the historical and psychological study of his life, of the evolution of his feelings and character, a study of which I have tried to lay the foundations in my *Pensée de Milton*.

Milton's original value may thus be diminished, but his historical significance becomes much greater. He is no longer an isolated thinker lost in 17th century England, without predecessors or disciples. He becomes, at a given moment, the brilliant representative of an antique and complex tradition which continues and widens after him; for the problem becomes larger. 'Milton among the kabbalists,'—this is, as it were, a gap blown into the very fortress of English literature, and much may here come in: *e.g.* the inexplicable relationship of Blake to Milton becomes clearer for this common light<sup>1</sup>; Blake himself in many points is

<sup>1</sup> See on this my *Blake et Milton* (Paris, Alcan).

less of a puzzle; and this current broadens into the 19th century from Shelley to Whitman. But here it is no longer simply Milton and only the *Zohar* that are in question; other influences are at work, and on others besides Milton. It becomes necessary to trace a whole stream of semi-occult ideas, flowing through the whole of modern literature and taking in much of Goethe, Wagner and Nietzsche, much of Lamartine and Hugo.

From another point of view, if we remember what affection Milton felt for Sir Henry Vane the younger, what strange ideas Sir Henry indulged in, incomprehensible indeed to all in his time, what intimate relationship existed at one time between Vane and Cromwell, perhaps a new light may be thrown upon some still half-obscure points of the history of revolutionary England, from which so much in the political modern world is derived.

DENIS SAURAT.

## NEW-FOUND FRAGMENTS OF A BABYLONIAN MYSTERY PLAY AND THE PASSION STORY.

THE EDITOR.

IN the July issue of the Royal Asiatic Society's *Journal* Professor Sayce briefly called attention to a very remarkable cuneiform document which has recently been deciphered by Professor Zimmern, the well-known Assyriologist. The venerable scholar of Oxford, whose judgment must be received with all respect, is of opinion that this tablet is "of unusual importance for theologians," and "is likely to excite a considerable amount of interest, if not of perturbation, in theological circles." So far this is the only notice of the new find which has appeared in this country.<sup>1</sup> The indications seemed of such importance that at once I set to work to study Prof. Zimmern's very technical exposition, to see whether anything of interest and service could be made accessible to the layman. I now lay the result of my labours before the readers of *THE QUEST*. It has been a work of no little difficulty to get the matter into any presentable shape, for much perforce must be left in obscurity, not only owing to the damaged state of the tablet, but also because the knowledge of even the best specialists in Assyrian and Babylonian studies is still very defective on very many

<sup>1</sup> Prof. Sayce also refers to his notice in a couple of paragraphs at the end of his article on 'The Latest Results of Old Testament Archæology' in the Oct. no. of *The Expository Times*, pp. 37ff.

points. I also bring into service another tablet to which Prof. Sayce does not refer.

The two tablets dealt with in this paper belong to the collection of cuneiform documents discovered by the German excavators, in 1903/4, at Kalah Shergat, the site of the ancient Assur. They belonged to the Library of Assur, formed in the ninth century B.C., or even earlier. They are however copies of still earlier Babylonian works. The first contains, according to Prof. Sayce, "the stage-directions for a sort of miracle-play which was performed in the temple of Bel-Merodach at Babylon every New Year's day." The existence of such a play had been previously conjectured, but no corroboration had hitherto been afforded by the inscriptions. The tablet now places the proof in our hands. The second contains a hymn sung by Mystæ celebrating the saving mysteries of Marduk.

Marduk, the Biblical Merodach, was the patron deity of the city of Babylon. When Babylon was made the political centre of the united states of the Euphrates Valley under the great king and legislator Hammurabi (c. 2250 B.C.), Marduk became head of the Babylonian pantheon. He was worshipped as the creator, as the arbiter of destiny and also, we now know, as the Saviour-God, the life-renewer and regenerator. His chief feast coincided with the general Babylonian New Year's festival (Zagmuk) which was held at the time of the spring equinox. This festival, which lasted for at least eleven days (beginning on the first of Nisan, which may be approximately equated with the middle day of March), symbolized the yearly new birth of nature, a reproduction as it were of the creation of the world.

The famous temple of Marduk at Babylon was

called E-sagil ('Lofty' or 'High House'); its great tower, the most conspicuous object in Babylon, was called E-temenanki ('House of the Foundation of Heaven and Earth'). This is said to have been of *ziggurat*-form, that is presumably a sort of truncated pyramid of seven stages; round it and mounting its sides was a processional ascent.

Gradually the proper name Marduk, the meaning of which is not known, not only replaced the ancient proper god-name Bēl, but was also replaced by the general term Bēl, *i.e. the Lord par excellence*. Marduk's spouse was called Šarpanītu ('Silver-gleaming'); she was generally referred to as Bēlit, *i.e. the Lady par excellence*. Bēlit-Babili thus means the Lady of Babylon. In brief, Bēl gradually absorbed the powers of the other gods and became their lord.

When Assyria conquered Babylonia (c. 2000 B.C.), Ashshur, the city-god of the then capital of the victors, was for the suzerain state the chief god politically. But Bēl always retained the religious supremacy; and indeed the Kings of Assyria were never acknowledged by the Babylonians as legitimate rulers unless they yearly 'held the hands' of Bēl, a sacred rite whereby it was believed that the life and power of the king was renewed.

And now to our tablet,<sup>1</sup> beginning with a slavishly

<sup>1</sup> Heinrich Zimmern, 'Zum babylonischen Neujahrsfest: Zweiter Beitrag,' in *Berichte über die Verhandlungen der Sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig*, Bd. 70, 1918, Hft. 5. Z.'s first contribution to this study is to be found in the same *Transactions of the Saxon Society of Sciences* (Bd. 58, 1906, Hft. 3); it has, however, nothing germane to our present purpose. Both *Transactions* can be obtained apart, from Teubner's, Leipzig, price M. 1.80 each. For the texts see *Keilschrifttexte aus Assur religiösen Inhalts*, ed. Ebeling. Tab. I.=VAT 9555 (*i.e. Vorderasiatische Abteilung. Tontafel*), ed. Eb. Nr. 148; for ll. 27-64 there is a duplicate (unpublished), VAT 9538. Tab. II.=Eb. Nr. 10 and Nr. 11, of which the second is a duplicate. With regard to Tab. I., the rows of points signify illegible or missing characters; square brackets indicate conjectural completions, round brackets (ll. 27-64) additions from the duplicate.

literal translation of the German (no easy task in what is frequently such broken matter), for here accuracy of rendering is the first essential.

## I.

## THE MARDUK PASSION PLAY TABLET.

1 [. . . . .] That is Bēl, how he] is held [prisoner in the Mount]. — 2 [. . . . .] . . . . .] — 3 [. . . . .] bringeth him forth : — 4 [. . . . .] there runn]eth round a messenger from his lords, (crying): "Who bringeth him forth?" — 5 [It is . . . . .] who go]eth [thither], bringeth him forth. — 6 [. . . . .] who] disappeareth: That is how he goeth there to the Mount. — 7 [The . . . . , to the . . . .] cometh: That is the house on the slope of the Mount, wherein they try him. — 8 [Nabū, who] cometh [from Bors]ippa: That is how he cometh for the well-being of his father, who is held prisoner. — 9 The [. . . .], who run round in the streets: (That is) how they seek for Bēl: "Where is he held prisoner?" — 10 [The . . . .], whose hands are stretched forth: (That is) how she weepeth to Sin, to Shamash, thus: "Make Bēl living (again)!" — 11 [The gate] of [. . . .], to which she goeth: That is the Gate of Burial, she goeth thither, seek[eth for] him. — 12 The twin-[. . . .], who stand at the g[a]te of E-sagil: That is his guards, they are set over him, wat[ch him]. — 13 [. . . .] . . [. . . .] which,] are made: (That is), after the gods have bolted him in, he hath disappeared out of li[fe], — 14 [into the pri]son, away from su[n] and light, have they made him descend. — 15 [The . . . .], which come up below him, with which he is clad: That is the wounds, with which he is wounded, with his blood [. . . .]. — 16 A god[dess], who stayeth by his side; for his well-being hath she de[scended]. — 17 [The son of Ashshur (?),] who goeth not with him, saying: "I am no malefactor," and again: "I shall not be put to [death]; — 18 [the . . . .] of Ashshur have made clear my cause (?) before him, have de[cided] (?) my cause (?)." — 19 [. . . . , who] goeth not with him, the same son of Ashshur, that is the guard, he is set over him, [he watcheth] the stronghold because of him. — 20 [The . . . . , which] is tied to the door-bar of Bēlit-Babili: That is the head of the malefactor.



whom they [led] forth with him — 21 (and then) put to death; his head they tie to the [neck (?)] of Bēlit-Babili. — 22 [. . . . .], who returneth again to Borsippa; the door-[bar (?)] on to which he is . . [. . .] : — 23 (That is,) aft[er] Bēl hath gone into the Mount, how the city falleth into tumult because of him, and they set to fight therein. — 24 The pigsheads on the way of Nabū, when he cometh from Borsippa to pay homage, — 25 Nabū, as he cometh, draweth near, catcheth sight of (them): [That is] that malefactor with Bēl, — 26 just as though it were that one with Bēl, he catch[eth sight of it]. — 27 The exorcists, who go before him, chant an exorcism: That is his people; they wail before him. — 28 The mage, who proceedeth before Bēlit-Babili: That is the herald; before her he lamenteth — 29 thus: "They take him away to the Mount"; but she crieth aloud (?): "O my brother! O my brother!" [. . .]. — 30 His clothing, which they bring to Bēlit-Uruk: That is his garments which they ta[ke] away. — 31 Whether silver or gold or his jewels, which they carry away out of E-sagil to the temples: That is his temple [. . . .]. — 32 The garment of wheat-ears (?), with which he is clad: In . . . . . [. . . . .]. — 33 Milk, which they . . . . . for Ishtar of Nineveh: (That is) because it is she who hath nursed him, shown him favour. — 34. 'Once when on high,' which they chant of Bēl, sing to him in the month Nisan: (That is) for that he is held prisoner, [. . . . .] — 35 their prayers he prayeth, their lamentation he lament[eth]. — 36 . . [. . .] is it; he speaketh thus: "Benefactions for Ashshur are they which I (?) did"; again: "What is [my (?)] si[n]?" — 37 [The . . .], who looketh to the heaven: To Sin, Shamash, he weepeth thus: "Make [m]e living (again)!" — 38 [The . . . , who] looketh to the earth: (That befalleth for) that his . . . is set thereon, that he may co[me] forth (again) from within the Mount. — 39 [. . . . .], who with] Bēl setteth not out for the prison-house: The . . . . . of a prisoner he weareth, together with him he sitt[eth]. — 40 [Bēlit (?)-] Babili, who goeth not into the prison-house: [That is] the governess of the [hou]se; — 41 [. . . . . saith:] ". . .] of the house thou knowest"; again: "Watch the house, with thy hands dr[aw out . . . .!]" — 42 [. . . Bēlit-] Babili, who (weareth) black wool on her back, (wear[eth]) coloured wool in front . . . : — 43 (That

is) [for that she] with her [ha]nd [wipeth away (?)] the heart's blood which hath poured forth. — 44 [The (f.) . . . .], before whom they sl[ay] a pig on the 8th of Nisan . . . . : — 45 That governess of the house they question thus: "Who is the malefactor?" again: ". . . . .?" — 46 [. . . who . . .] take away, [put to death (?)] the malefactor [. . . . .]. — 47 [. . . .], who come, . . . . ., for they [were put to] death . . . . — 48 [. . . . .] . . . speedest the waters," they sin[g]. — 49 [. . . .], which they trou[ble], make to flow (?): That is the troubled waters [. . . . .]. — 50 [. . . .] . . . . ., which they exhibit . . . . [. . . . .]. — 51 [. . .], which in the month of Nisan is richly abundant, the flour [. . .]: . . . when he was held [. . .]. — 52 The water for the hands, which they bring on, declaring that it [removeth (?)] the pestilence; — 53 the garment of wheat-ears (?), which he weareth, in regard to which they say thus: "The same (?) waters (mean) weeping (?)" : — 54 Such say they within [the] 'Once when on high': When heaven and earth were not (yet) formed, then ar[ose] Anshar — 55 when city and temple were made, then he himself arose; the waters, which [poured in (?)] upon Anshar, [he subdued (?)]. — 56 That one whose sin in . . . . . that one . . . . . the water (?) was he clothed, . . . . [. . . . .]. — 57 The foot-race, which all in[stitute] for Bēl and his cult-places: — 58 (That is,) when Ashshur sent out Nin-urta because of Zū's being held prisoner, <sup>god</sup>. [. . .] — 59 spake before Ashshur thus: "Zū is held." Ashshur [spake] to <sup>god</sup> [. . . .] — 60 thus: "Go hence, proclaim (it) unto all the gods." He proclaimed (it) unto them, but they [rejoiced (?)] thereat. — 61 All the speeches, which [were made (?)] by the Kalū-priests about the spoilers, who despoil him, who have him slain: That is the gods, his fathers, they [. . .]. — 62 Nusku of E-sa-bad who passeth across: He is a messenger; Gula sendeth (him) because of him. — 63 Clo[thes and sh]oes, which they bring into the temple of Bēlit-Babili: This corresponds with (?): He has (them) brought to her, — 64 for that they let him not go, he cannot go forth. — 65 The car, which approacheth with speed to the prison-house: (That signifieth) its owner is not in it; without its owner it dasheth therein. — 66 The muffled-up goddess also, who lamenteth (?) out of the city: That is his mourning-woman; out of the city she lamenteth (?). — 67 What is called the

window-door: That is the gods, after he had been shut in, he had entered into the house, the door had been bolted on him, — 69 how they then bored holes through the door, set to fighting therein.—

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70 Whosoever destroyeth this tablet or casteth it into the water, — 71 also if such an one getteth to see it who knoweth naught of it, who should not be allowed to know anything about it, — 72 him may Ashshur, Sin, Shamash, Adad and Ishtar, Bēl, Nabū, Nergal, Ishtar of Nineveh, — 73 Ishtar of Arbela, Ishtar of Bēt-Kidmuri, — 74 the gods of heaven and earth and the gods of the land of Ashshur all together — 75 curse with a fatal curse beyond redemption, so that he may find no pardon as long as he liveth; — 76 may they remove his name, his seed, out of the land, put his flesh in a lion's jaws.

From the very elaborate curse at the end it is clear that the contents of the tablet were considered a priestly secret, to be withheld from the eyes of the profane. They are cast in the form of a sort of a commentary on the 'things done,' adding certain mythical indications or interpretations. The picture in the minds of the priestly writers seems to have been made up of detached scenes or incidents in a mystery-, miracle- or passion-play. This was presumably not staged as a whole, but played among the spectators, partly in the festival street and partly in the great temple of Babylon, and also conjecturally at other cult-centres of Bēl. As the great festival lasted at least 11 days, the chief scenes or incidents may have been distributed over several days. If we are to judge by our tablet alone, there seems to have been little orderly sequence of scenes; it repeats a number of the most prominent features without paying any attention to their natural order. Zimmern does not help us greatly here; indeed his summary and notes for the most part

throw little light on the matter. He seems to take it for granted, for instance, that his readers will be as learned as himself in the difficult subject of the Assyrian and Babylonian god-complexes, myths and epics; but that is precisely where the layman requires most help.

The Mount reminds us of the world-mountain, in which or beneath which, as the Babylonians believed, lay the realm of the dead. To reach it the deceased had to cross the river of death in a ferry-boat; on their arrival at the further shore of this river they were put on trial. I would venture to suggest that the place of trial and the prison-house, or tomb, to which there is such frequent reference, were both scenically represented at the foot of the Mount of Bēl, the great Tower of E-sagil.

In many places the mutilated state of the tablet makes it impossible to give any intelligible summary, and even when the wording of the text is clear, the meaning is often obscure. It is perhaps foolhardy to hazard any attempt at making comments; but a few remarks may be ventured in the endeavour to glean some of the main features of the mythical representations of the passion and triumph of Bēl at his great Easter feast.

(1ff.) We are first given a summary of the general action of the sacred drama: The god is imprisoned in the house of the Mount; the sad tidings are proclaimed; a herald calls for one to set him free; finally, we gather later on, a rescuer or rescuers appear.

(6f.) A scene depicts how the god disappeared from the light of day; how he arrived at the court-house at the foot of the Mount and was tried.

(8) Nabū comes on the scene. He comes to do

homage to Bēl, but finds him vanished. At Babylon Nabū, the 'Announcer,' is counted as Son of Bēl. He comes from Barsip (Borsippa), of which he was the patron deity. As he returns thither, we may conjecture that he thence goes to report the sad news to the father of the gods.

(9) The Marduk-worshippers make tumult in the streets (perhaps the tumult included a mock-fight, cp. the pigsheads' incident below (l. 24), seeking their Lord.

(10) The Lady of Babylon, his wife, laments with outstretched hands, praying that her Lord be brought again to life.

(11f.) She goes apparently to one of the (many) gates of E-sagil, called the 'Gate of Burial,' perhaps one opening into the Tower, seeking him. Two guards watch at what may be called this portal of the tomb.

(13ff.) Next comes a scene depicting Marduk lying in the dark tomb, the prison-house of death. He has been stripped of his garments of divine royalty and is now clad in a robe of green wheat-ears, which have sprouted from the blood of his wounds. Over him watches a goddess who has accompanied him to tend him.

(17ff.) Then follows mention of the two malefactors. One of them has successfully pleaded his cause and been set free; the other has been put to death and accompanies the god to the underworld. The former establishes his innocence before certain judges; where, it is not stated, but presumably in the court-house where Marduk and the other malefactor are condemned. Whether 'son of Ashshur' means son of the god, or simply an Assyrian, one of the folk, is not clear. It indicates an over-writing of the Babylonian original in the Assyrian interest. This second malefactor

character of the play apparently is also set as a guard over the prison-tomb, in addition to the twin-guards already mentioned (l. 12).

(20ff.) Concerning the malefactor who paid the just penalty of his evil deeds,—this presumably refers to a human sacrifice in more primitive days, when a criminal, personifying the god, used to be slain. In later days a pig was substituted for the human victim, and its head was fixed to the door-bar either of the main gate of the temple of Bēlit, or—may it be?—to one of the gates of E-sagil which bore that name.

(23ff.) Can part of this tumultuous scene have consisted of a mock battle in which pigs were slain, as substitutes for the enemies of Marduk?<sup>1</sup> The heads of the slain pigs were apparently set up on posts along the festival street along which the Nabū actor had to pass. If this conjecture is admissible, it may clear up part of the obscurity of the original, and lead us to infer that the priestly writers wished it to be understood that the special head on the gate of Bēlit had a very different significance from the others, and was not to be confused with the lines of heads in the street.

(27f.) The scene shifts, and is apparently displaced. We are now assisting at a procession of priests preceding the body of the slain god; it is headed by a band of exorcists to keep off hostile influences.

(28f.) Another scene brings on the stage a high official, a magus, acting as herald, and proclaiming the sad news before the mourning figure of the Lady of Bēl, who laments her husband and brother.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. as a parallel similar Osiric festival doings, where the god's opposer and those hostile to him were buffooned; e.g. red-skinned men were rolled in the mud and an ass driven over a precipice, "because," says Plutarch, respecting one of the myths (*De Is. et Os.*, xxxi.), "Typhon was born with his skin red and ass-like."

(30f.) We next come to the sending back of the divine robes; they are brought to the temple of Bēlit-Uruk, that is the Ishtar of Erech, a synonym presumably for the great Mother-goddess. At the same time all the insignia of Bēl are removed from E-sagil and deposited in other temples.

(32f.) This signifies that now the god is lying, stripped of his celestial garments and insignia, clad in the natural robe of new-grown wheat. He is apparently thought of as being nursed back to life by the great Mother-goddess, now called Ishtar of Nineveh, the later capital city of Assyria. The people make offerings of milk, symbolizing the nurturing of the divine mother-life.

(34ff.) On the 8th of Nisan the creation-epic, of which the opening words are 'Once when on high,' was sung in honour of Bēl, acclaiming him as creator. In pitiful contrast there follow hymns of lamentation in which he is represented as presenting his defence, protesting his innocence to heaven, and praying for his restoration to life.

(37f.) The picture presented is apparently that of Bēl praying to heaven to the gods of light, and the Supreme looking down in answer to his prayer, and preparing his rescue.

(39f.) The following lines refer again to the two malefactors. One is represented presumably as an ordinary person (? dressed as an Assyrian), the other is dressed as a prisoner, sitting with Bēl in the prison-house.

(40ff.) Another scene depicts a conversation between the Wardress of the House, apparently the Queen of the Dead, and Bēlit-Babili. The latter is told, presumably before Bēl is carried within, to draw

forth the weapon of death, perhaps a spear, and wipe away the blood. The actress-goddess it would seem had her black mourning robe splashed with blood in front to symbolize this incident.

(44ff.) More pig-killing in connection with the slain malefactor is referred to. Apparently on the 8th of Nisan a pig was slain before the statue of the Queen of the Dead; pigs were common victims for the chthonian deities.

(48ff.) What follows is too badly defaced to be intelligible. There is reference to, it may be, an incident in the creation-myth concerning Bēl and the waters, in connection with which apparently offerings of flour were made, presumably to assure the ultimate blessing of an abundant harvest.

(52ff.) There follows the ceremonial washing of the hands, apparently a symbolic rite of purification intended to avert pestilence from the crops. It is all connected with the garment of wheat-ears. It may be that the weeping of Bēl is here taken to mean the rain, and is in some sort of far-fetched fashion connected with the primal turbulent waters and Bēl's subdual of them and his clothing himself with their more beneficent aspects. This latter was set forth in the creation-epic, a passage from which is quoted. Who or what Anshar may be, is difficult to say. The name may be a homonym of Ashshur, whether god, city or country, or may be a synonym of Apsū, the primal water father-god. In any case it was Bēl who set things right when the powers of the primal water mother-god revolted. There may also be reference to the later sinning of mankind and the judgment of the flood and Bēl's saving of a righteous remnant. Cp. here the interesting passage from the new-found 6th



creation tablet referred to by Prof. Sayce and quoted later on (p. 189 below).

(57ff.) As to the famous foot-race, seemingly the priestly scribes will have it that this was intended to celebrate the speed of the divine messenger Ninurta, despatched by the father-god to proclaim to the assembly of the gods that Bēl is a prisoner. There is here a change of names, marking a conflation with the Zū-myth, about which little is known. The gods, or more probably the lower or hostile gods, rejoice at the news. In connection with this certain priests recite speeches about the despoilers and slayers of Bēl.

(63) We next have mention of the entrance and exit of another messenger. This time he is said to represent Nusku, originally the great plenipotentiary of Enlil, whose chief seat of worship was at Nippur, where his great temple E-kur ('Mountain House') has recently been excavated by an American mission. Nusku was a beneficent deity, and is appropriately sent by Gula, wife of Ninib, who was regarded as the great physician *par excellence*, the guardian patroness of the healing art.

(64f.) Another reference is made to the bringing of the clothes of the dead god to his Lady. We are evidently here in this part of the tablet dealing with alternative interpretations.

(66f.) Another scene depicts how Bēl's empty festal car, which was made in the shape of a boat, dashes up, apparently in readiness to bring him forth from the Mount in triumph. But as yet he has not been set free; they still wail and lament his absence from the light of day.

(68f.) The last piece of stage-setting which is explained, is a curious door with holes bored through it.

The gods, now apparently those who are Bēl's friends, in contrast with those who plotted his death and rejoiced over his imprisonment, force their way into the tomb, deliver battle to the forces of the underworld, and bear the god away in triumph, restored to the sun's light.

So far we have had to do with a public dramatic representation, with scenes out of a mystery-play in the most general sense of the term, most probably staged in street and temple. Of mysteries, in the narrower sense of the term, *i.e.* of mystic ceremonies or acts in which the mystēs shared in the passion and triumph of the saviour-god, though they have on general grounds been supposed to exist in Babylonian religion, we have so far had no indications in the inscriptions. Zimmern now gives us a version of a tablet which to all seeming affords the needed proof. It has all the signs of being a cult-song for mystæ, sung in procession up to and within Marduk's great temple E-sagil, proclaiming how with the help of the god they have shared in his passion, as shown forth at his high festival, and been saved by his grace. This find is of the first importance, for hitherto we have been in doubt whether saving cults existed as part of the national instituted rites, prior to their exportation into the Græco-Roman world in the days of propaganda.

## II.

### THE HYMN OF THE MARDUK-MYSTÆ TABLET.<sup>1</sup>

The redeemed refers to the saving-acts of Marduk on his behalf: "He hath laid hold of me."—"He hath made me living (again)."—"When the adversary bore me away to the river Ḫubur,"<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The text is badly defaced; the phrases and passages set with quotation-marks are all that can be clearly deciphered.

<sup>2</sup> The river of death across which the souls were ferried to the land of the dead.



be made out is a reference to Marduk's bestowal of life on the creatures. The redeemed now enters E-sagil with prayers, prostrations and sighings. Thereafter he declares proudly how he has passed through the twelve<sup>1</sup> gates, presumably of the temple, and thus been brought back from death to the life of regeneration.

"[I who] had descended into the grave,            I have returned to  
the gate of the liv[ing].

"[At the gate] of the fulness of life            was I filled with the  
fulness of life ;

"[At the g]ate of the great guardian spirit            my guardian spirit  
again drew near [to me] ;

"[At the] gate of good-health            I beheld good-health ;

"At the gate of life            life was allotted unto me ;

"At the gate of sun-rise            was I counted among the living ;

"At the gate of bright omens            were my omens bright ;

"At the gate of sins' removal            was my ban removed ;

"At the gate of mouth-questioning            my mouth did question ;

"At the gate of sighing's removal            was my sighing removed ;

"At the gate of purification with water            was I besprinkled  
with the water of purification ;

"At the gate of good-health            was I seen at Marduk's side ;

"At the gate of filling with fulness            was I laid at Šarpanītu's  
feet ;

"In prayer and weeping            I sighed before them ;

"Sweet incense            did I offer before them."

The remaining lines apparently give a description of the thank-offerings which the redeemed makes to the protecting gods of E-sagil.

From this very interesting and important text we learn that there was a personal saving mystery-cult of regeneration alongside of or within the general instituted rites of the Marduk-faith. The yearly passion of the god,—his sufferings, trial, death, burial and restoration to life,—formed the chief features of the great spring festival, when mythic incidents of the sacred story were dramatically represented for the edifi-

<sup>1</sup> Or possibly the ten, for the last two seem to be repetitions.

cation of the populace. The priests alone apparently knew the proper order and significance of the confused scenes, and desired to keep even such purely formal knowledge secret. The details of the inner mystic rites of personal salvation were undoubtedly protected with even more rigid priestly *tabūs*, as was the case with all the other known great mystery-institutions of antiquity. Nevertheless there was no disguise of the fact that such rites existed. As in the public part of the Eleusinia, so at Babylon the mystæ in procession chanted an initiation-hymn which all could hear. In it they proclaimed the inner purpose and even referred to some of the main incidents of the mystic rites. It is thus firmly established from the inscriptions that at Babylon, at least some 800 or 900 years B.C., there existed both public mythic and private mystic rites of a saviour-god; the former being dramatically illustrated for the benefit of the folk in the form of a passion-play, the latter being set forth as a mystery-drama reserved for the eyes of the initiated alone.

Future discovery may throw further much-needed light on these exceedingly important facts for the general history of religion and clear up many of the present obscurities with which we are confronted. Meantime, on the one hand, it is clear that the general form of the Easter Bēl-rites is in close correspondence with that of the very ancient Tammūz nature-cult and, on the other, it is highly probable that later on, successively in the Persian and Hellenistic periods, modifications in the tradition of both the public and private cults were effected, especially in the great syncretic three centuries which preceded the Christian era. This must have been in particular

the case with the mystery-cult elements, which at least towards the end of this three-century period enjoyed so wide a distribution, formed so many alliances and underwent so many transformations, as may be seen especially from a study of the Chaldæan and Syrian (Assyrian) types of the pre-Christian gnosis. This brings us to a statement of the problem in the comparative history of religion which the contents of our tablets, especially of the first, force upon the attention of those engaged on what is called Life of Jesus research.

Professor Zimmern has already dealt with the Sakæan mock-king incident in this connection in his work, entitled *Zum Streit um die 'Christus-mythe,'* which he wrote presumably as his contribution to the controversy which raged round the non-historicity Christ-myth theory, first brought into public prominence by the radical works of such exponents as A. Drews and W. B. Smith, some fifteen years or so ago. To this work our author now refers us for his exposition of this 'parallel.' Unfortunately there is no copy of his study either in the London Library or in the British Museum. Professor Zimmern is of opinion that the characteristic feature in our tablet of a malefactor who is led away and put to death, may be brought into close connection with the chief feature of the Sakæa, may even be its prototype. The point in question is highly debatable and has given rise to much speculation. It may be outlined as follows :

Berossos was a Babylonian priest; he wrote a history, which he dedicated to the Seleucid Antiochus Soter, who reigned 280-261 B.C. He tells us (*ap. Athenæus*, xiv. 44, p. 639 c) that at Babylon, beginning on the 16th day of Loos, there was a five-day festival

called the Sakæa. During these five days the slaves assumed the rôle of their masters; one of them was clad in the royal mantle and called Zoganes.

Dio Chrysostom (*Orat.* iv. 67; i. 79 ed. Dindorf) further informs us that at the same Sakæa festival the Persians have the following custom: They select one of the prisoners condemned to death, set him on the king's throne, clothed in the royal robes, and let him give whatever orders he pleases, carouse to his heart's content and be free of the king's concubines. No one can stop him doing anything he desires. But at the end of the five days they strip him, scourge him and hang him.

Here we have an oriental Saturnalia-like festival in which the slaves enjoy full liberty and license and change places with their masters. Its chief feature was the crowning of a mock-king, most probably as a substitute for the real king, who, as we have seen above (p. 168), had at this period symbolically to die and to renew his life by grasping the hands of Bêl. Zoganes is probably the Greek corruption of the Babylonian Sukallu, *i.e.* Vizier or Viceroy, while Sak-æa is that of Zag-muk. There is, however, a difficulty of date, for Zagmuk was a spring festival, whereas the Macedonian month Loos is generally thought to have been about July. This is, however, a conjectural opinion and a number of distinguished scholars do not accept the assignment.<sup>1</sup>

The Sakæa festival has been brought into close

<sup>1</sup> See especially Robertson Smith's note, printed by Sir James Frazer, *G.B.*,<sup>8</sup> pt. v., *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild* (1912), i. 258. Among scholars who accept the Sakæa-Zagmuk equation may be mentioned Bruno Meissner, Winckler, Bockelmann and Sayce. Here it should be noted that, in the third and last edition of his *Golden Bough* encyclopædia, Sir James Frazer has withdrawn from the text his study of the Sakæan mock-king and the mocking of Jesus parallel and placed it in the appendix as being in the light of present inadequate knowledge over-speculative. See *G.B.*,<sup>8</sup> pt. vi., *The Scapegoat* (1918), pp. 412-428.

connection with the Jewish feast of Purim, kept on the 14/15th of Adar (corresponding with March). This carnival-like feast of masquerading, jollity and license, at which in olden days excesses were frequent, is of post-exilic origin and was taken over in Babylon perhaps in Persian times. Later the very secular *Book of Esther* was written to authenticate it, somewhere about 300 B.C. The names of the majority of the leading characters are from Persian and Babylonian originals: Ahasuerus (Xerxes), Mordekai (Marduk), Esther (Ishtar).

The chief incident is the hanging of the wicked Vizier Haman, who had plotted the destruction of the pious Hebrews, on the very gallows on which he had intended to hang the righteous Mordekai, their head. Part of the disgrace of Haman is that he was forced to lead Mordekai in triumph on horseback through the streets, clothed in the royal robes. In ancient and mediæval days one of the chief features of the festival was the cursing and hanging of Haman in effigy amid wild scenes of excitement. *The Jewish Encyclopædia* (art. 'Purim') informs us that these proceedings often aroused the wrath of the Christians, "who interpreted them as a disguised attempt to ridicule Jesus and the cross." Indeed prohibitions were issued against them in the reigns of Honorius and Theodosius II., in the first half of the 5th century A.D. The accusation was also renewed in mediæval times in the days of the Talmūd-burnings.

In this connection I would draw attention to a very curious passage in the Targum Sheni to *Esther* vii. 9. The Targum, after relating that Haman appealed with tears to Mordekai for mercy, but in vain, proceeds to tell us that Haman thereupon began



a great weeping and lamentation for himself in the garden of the palace. Thereupon is added: "He answered and spake thus: Hear me, ye trees and all ye plants, which I have planted since the days of the creation. The son of Hammedatha is about to ascend to the lecture-room of Ben Pandera." Tree after tree excuses itself from being the hanging-post of Haman; finally the cedar proposes that Haman be hanged on the gallows he had himself set up for Mordekai.<sup>1</sup>

Now Ben Pandera is one of the by-names for Jesus in the Talmūd. Elsewhere, in one of the Esther-haggādoth, we are told that Haman, when he went to beg mercy from Mordekai, who in Rabbinical days was of course regarded as the most famous Rabbi of his day, found him surrounded by his Torah-pupils,—presumably in his lecture-room therefore. In grim contrast Haman is carried off to a far different place of teaching—the gibbet of Ben Pandera.

So much for this legend-play of shadows haunting the threshold of dim historic consciousness, or as it were a folk-dream censored by learned Talmūdic camouflage.

But apart from any attempt to associate one of the malefactor-characters of our new-found tablet with the Sakæan mock-king figure, it is evident that the *motif* of the two malefactors, one of whom is put to death and the other set free, must strike the attention of every reader who is acquainted with the comparative method in religious historical research. This alone would make the new-found myth of the passion and triumph of Bēl-Marduk of outstanding importance as containing an arresting association-element for the

<sup>1</sup> See my *Did Jesus Live 100 B.C.?—An Enquiry into the Talmud Jesus Stories and the Toldoth Jeschu* (1903), pp. 207ff.

comparative study of the New Testament Passion-story. There are, however, other probable parallels and correspondences to which Prof. Zimmern feels it incumbent upon him to call attention, leaving it to the reader to judge of their strength or weakness respectively and collectively. These may be summarized as follows:

THE BABYLONIAN  
PASSION PLAY.

Bēl is taken prisoner.

Bēl is tried in the House on the Mount (the Hall of Justice).

Bēl is smitten (wounded).

Bēl is led away to the Mount.

Together with Bēl a malefactor is led away and put to death. Another, who is also charged as a malefactor, is let go, thus not taken away with Bēl.

After Bēl has gone to the Mount, the city breaks out into tumult and fighting takes place in it.

Bēl's clothes are carried away.

A woman wipes away the heart's blood of Bēl flowing from a drawn-out weapon (? spear).

THE CHRISTIAN  
PASSION STORY.

Jesus is taken prisoner.

Jesus is tried in the House of the High Priest and the Hall of Pilate.

Jesus is scourged.

Jesus is led away to crucifixion on Golgotha.

Together with Jesus two malefactors are led away and put to death. Another (Barabbas) is released to the people, and thus not taken away with Jesus.

At the death of Jesus the curtain in the temple is rent (Synopt.), the earth quakes, the rocks are rent asunder, the graves are opened and the dead come forth into the holy city (Mt.).

Jesus' clothes are divided among the soldiers (Synopt., Jn., cp. Ps. xxii. 19).

The lance-thrust in Jesus' side and outflow of water and blood (Jn.). Mary Magdalene and two other women busy themselves with the (washing and) embalming of the body (Mk., Lk.).

Bēl goes down into the Mount away from sun and light, disappears from life and is held fast in the Mount as in a prison.

Guards watch Bēl imprisoned in the stronghold of the Mount.

A goddess sits with Bēl; she comes to tend him.

They seek for Bēl where he is held fast. In particular a weeping woman seeks for him at the 'Gate of Burial.' When he is being carried away the same lamented: "O my brother! O my brother!"

Bēl is again brought back to life (as the sun of spring), he comes again out of the Mount.

His chief feast, the Babylonian New Year's festival in March at the time of the spring equinox, is celebrated also as his triumph over the powers of darkness (cp. the creation-hymn 'Once when on high' as the New Year's festival hymn).

Jesus, in the grave, in the rock tomb (Synopt.), goes down into the realm of the dead (I. Pet. iii. 19, Mt. xii. 40, Act. ii. 24, Rom. x. 17, 'descent into hell' dogma).

Guards are set over the tomb of Jesus (Mt.).

Mary Magdalene and the other Mary sit before the tomb (Mt., Mk.).

Women, in particular Mary Magdalene, come to the tomb to seek Jesus where he is behind the door of the tomb. Mary stands weeping before the empty tomb because they have taken her lord away (Jn.).

Jesus' restoration to life, his rising from the grave (on a Sunday morning).

His festival, approximately at the spring equinox, is also celebrated as his triumph over the powers of darkness (cp. *e.g.* Col. ii. 15).

With regard to the 'descent into hell' parallel, which, as far as our tablet goes, is a very weak point in Prof. Zimmern's correspondences, Prof. Sayce (*l.c.* above p. 166) gives the following interesting information, when calling attention to a tablet which has been translated by Dr. Pinches (*Proc. Soc. Bib. Archæol.*,

1908), but which could not previously be referred to any known setting. He writes:

It gives us, in fact, the wording of the miracle-play. We are told how, after the fetters of Bēl Merodach had been made fast, he "descended into hell" (*iriddi kisakkis*), and "the spirits who are in prison" (*ilāni tsabtutu*) "rejoiced to see him." The words of St. Peter (I. Pet. iii. 19), which have been quoted from some apocryphal writing, are a literal translation of the cuneiform text, and the preaching to the spirits is explained by the address of Merodach to Nergal and Enne-sarra which follows his entrance into Hades.

While Bēl was in the prison-house of the tomb the beginning of the creation-epic was recited by his followers in Babylon.

The sixth tablet of the epic, relating to the creation of man, has now been recovered from one of the Assur tablets, and in this there is probably a reference to the descent of Bēl into the underworld. Mankind, it is said, grew rebellious after their creation; the sanctuaries of the gods were destroyed and their worship neglected. Then comes a line which Prof. Barton translates: "making a pit as a tomb in full splendour he (*i.e.* Bēl Merodach) went down into it," though the translation seems to me somewhat difficult to defend. The two next lines, however, are clear: "who (*i.e.* Merodach) with his weapon, the deluge (*abubu*), took captive the wicked, and saved from destruction the gods his fathers." It is noteworthy that the passage in the Epistle of St. Peter which mentions the descent into hell, couples with it a reference to the deluge.

It is now amply evident from what has been set forth in this paper, that Prof. Sayce is not wrong in thinking that the new find "is likely to excite a considerable amount of interest, if not of perturbation, in theological circles." But this exposition of the matter has already exhausted our space and must suffice for the present.

As having, however, no little bearing on the general problem at issue, I will in conclusion translate

a very curious cognate mystery-echo transmitted by the Church Father Epiphanius (*Hær.* li. 22). It comes in that part of the text which used to be suppressed. I came across it in my studies of 'Some Curious Statements of Epiphanius' in connection with research into the Talmud Jesus Stories and the Mediæval Toldoth Jeschu; I have, moreover, never met with any other reference to this striking passage:

How many other things in the past and present support and bear witness to . . . the birth of Christ! Indeed the leaders of the idol-cults, filled with wiles to deceive the idol-worshippers who believe in them, in many places keep highest festival on this same night of Epiphany, so that they whose hopes are in error, may not seek the truth. For instance, at Alexandria, in the Koreion, as it is called—an immense temple—that is to say, the Precinct of the Virgin, after they have kept vigil all night, with songs and music, chanting to their idol, when the vigil is over, at cock-crow, they descend with lights into an underground crypt and carry up a wooden image lying naked on a litter, with the seal of a cross made in gold on its forehead, and on either hand two similar seals, and on both knees two others, all five seals being similarly made in gold. And they carry round the image itself, circumambulating seven times the innermost temple, to the accompaniment of pipes, tabors and hymns, and with merry-making they carry it down again underground. And if they are asked the meaning of this mystery, they answer and say: "To-day at this hour the Maiden (Korē), that is, the Virgin, gave birth to the Æon."

G. R. S. MEAD.

## BRITISH-AMERICAN RESEARCH AND THE GRAIL LEGENDS.<sup>1</sup>

H. C. FOXCROFT.

THE foundations of 'Grail' scholarship were no doubt laid on the Continent, where San Marte, Gaston Paris, Simrock, etc., have had innumerable successors. Nor is this surprising; the Grail-literature, as such, is primarily a Continental phenomenon. If English scholars, however, came late into the field, if they profited by the spade-work of their Continental predecessors and contemporaries, they have repaid the debt with interest. In these isles, whence, as is now generally admitted, came the initial impulse, may best be studied the original material of these stories; and it may perhaps prove that an English student has laid her hand on the key to the mystery.

<sup>1</sup> 1. *The Legend of the Holy Grail*, Alfred Nutt. Folklore Society Publications, 1888.

2. *Studies in the Arthurian Legend*, John Rhys, M.A. Clarendon Press, 1891.

3. *The Legend of the Holy Grail*, George Maclean Harper. Publications of the Modern Language Association of America, viii., 77ff., Baltimore, 1893.

4. *The Holy Grail: A Discrimination of the Native and Foreign Elements in the Legend*, George Y. Wardle. Y. Cymmrodor, xvi. 126, xvii. 1, London, 1903-4.

5. *The Arthurian Material in the Chronicles*, Robert Huntingdon Fletcher. Studies . . . in . . . Literature . . . , published under the direction of . . . Harvard University, Boston, 1906.

6. *The Legend of Sir Gawain*, Jessie L. Weston. Grimm Library, No. 7, David Nutt, London, 1897.

7. *The Legend of Sir Lancelot du Lac*, Jessie L. Weston. Grimm Library, No. 12, David Nutt, London, 1901.

8. *The Legend of Sir Perceval*, Jessie L. Weston. Grimm Library, No. 17, David Nutt, London, 1906.

9. *The Hidden Church of the Holy Grail*, A. E. Waite, London, 1909.

10. *The Quest of the Holy Grail*, Jessie L. Weston. The Quest Series, London, 1913.

11. *From Ritual to Romance*, Jessie L. Weston. Cambridge University Press, 1920.

It would be absurd in a simple review to make any attempt at covering the whole of the ground involved. Nor, if it could be done, would the result prove of any general interest. So numerous and so various, so voluminous and so diffuse, so complicated, and in a sense so monotonous, are the Grail-romances, so innumerable are the points of textual criticism involved and so obscure are the affiliations of the various MSS., that its detailed study, to all but the devoted enthusiast, becomes a weariness of the flesh and a still greater weariness to the spirit. But the broader issues can never lose their attraction. What elements (we ask) are of Celtic and what of Romance origin? Can any episodes be traced to extraneous Eastern sources? At what period was the Grail christianized? What share had popular and monastic influences respectively in the evolution of the sanctified legend? And—to end where perhaps we should have started—what is the Grail?

We will begin with the Celtic element. Most authorities now-a-days agree, we may presume, in very general terms, with respect to their estimate of the historical Arthur. That there did exist, in the vith century, a supreme leader of the Britons, obscure perhaps as to birth, who by sheer force of will and strategic genius welded for a brief space the wild tribes of the Cymry into a more or less coherent whole; that he stayed and even repelled the tide of Saxon invasion; that his fame and perhaps his influence extended from the Grampians to the Land's End; that by the Celts themselves he was extolled under the title of Emperor; that victories, of which the names have descended to us, culminated in a final victory at 'Badon'; that he perished in a fratricidal strife with men of his own race, if not of his own kin;—these statements we seem

warranted in deducing from the universal testimony of tradition.

But having said this we have said all that can be said with even the most distant approach to certainty of the historic Arthur. In the earlier legends he is little more than a name and a centre, and the few adventures assigned to him suggest confusion with some mythological hero of similar appellation. The localization of his campaigns is matter of fierce controversy; and while the name and infidelity of his wife 'Gwenhywyvar' are among the earliest features of the tradition, the details of her 'capture' suggest a mythical origin. And what was the sequel of the last fatal fight? Was his body never recovered? Did his people, in accordance with that strange law of human nature so recently exemplified in the case of Lord Kitchener, refuse credence to the story of a death of which no ocular demonstration could be afforded? Did they translate their lost (and last) leader to the 'fairy island of the West'—the Hesperides, the Apple-paradise of the Celt, the mystic Avalonia which even Christianity had not been able to eliminate or to transform? Or was his body really laid by some few flying followers in the marsh-protected sanctuary of the race—the Apple-island<sup>1</sup> of the Somerset levels, so easily confused with its mythical namesake? The supposed 'discovery' of his bones at Glastonbury in 1191 may suit either hypothesis. For as the centuries rolled on, as no fresh deliverer arose among the defeated Welsh, as to the fierce Saxon succeeded the no less fierce and more competent Norman oppressor, the shadow of the Dead Leader assumed gigantic proportions. Wild prophecies

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Nutt, we know, prefers to connect the Somerset Avalon with *Avallach*, King of the Dead—a name which appears in the earlier legends of Glastonbury and, as *Evelach*, in the later legends of the Grail.



of his return, 'more sacred' to the men of Brittany, of Devon, of Cornwall and of Wales 'than Church, monks or miracles,'<sup>1</sup> were deliberately fostered by the Welsh bards and chieftains and became the rallying cry of desperate Welsh resistances in the xith and xiith centuries. So dangerous did they seem to the astute Normans as to necessitate the exhumation, real or pretended, of the dead warrior's<sup>2</sup> coffin.

But vague as was the outline of the great national champion, it was the nucleus about which there gradually clustered all those derelict fragments of obsolete Celtic mythology and living Celtic folklore, which, thanks to the unbroken influence of an organized literary class, had survived the solvent, repressive action of Christianity and the shocks of many conquests. Round the throne of Arthur were gradually grouped as warriors or tributary princes all the dethroned gods, debased demi-gods and prehistoric great ones of the Celtic pantheon, all the *disjecta membra* of Celtic cosmogony and those few meagre items of historical fact which had succeeded in impressing the Celtic imagination. For history is too pedestrian for the impatient Celt; he prefers the 'high horse' of legend, a legend entirely directed to the glorification or exculpation of his own people. The Celt in fact, as a witty Irishman once remarked, is possessed by an exuberant imagination, and the 'brutal Saxon' in consequence dubs him a liar.

Of Celtic megalomania, Celtic grandiloquence and

<sup>1</sup> See the remarkable references in Fletcher, p. 101. These carry the legends back to 1118, more than a quarter of a century before Geoffrey of Monmouth.

<sup>2</sup> William of Malmesbury's *Antiquities* seem to show that before 1148 the monks claimed that Arthur's body was buried in the famous graveyard. On the other hand the supposed Latin inscription, "Here lies King Arthur with Guinevere his second wife in the Isle of Avalon," sounds very apocryphal.

Celtic hostility to fact Geoffrey of Monmouth is the grand example. Joining to the fervour of the Celt the considerable classical attainments he had acquired in a Norman monastery, he aspired to be the Livy of his race. Sedately composed after the most approved models of classical antiquity and clothed in a latinity of remarkable elegance for its day, the *Historia Regum Britannicæ* took the reading world by storm and introduced to the enraptured Europe of 1145 a series of brilliant legendary episodes under the sober guise of truth.

Whether as author or translator—and we believe he had at least one lost original before him, a Celtic life of Arthur—this ecclesiastic of Welsh birth and Norman upbringing certainly launched upon the world with magnificent effect the traditions of his race. Moreover, the enthusiasm which his work excited, is but a supreme instance of what occurred wherever there was contact between the pure Celt and his more or less Latinized neighbours. We need not pursue the rather barren controversy as to the respective importance of Welsh and Breton influence and the exact methods by which the popular legends of the Celt reached the Franco-Norman *Trouvères*. Miss Weston's Bledericus Latinarius may have played all the part she assigns to him; but all the avenues suggested by all the experts must have contributed to one result. The monastic writer and the Normanized noble, the fireside story-teller, the court-poet, the wandering minstrel, each served as a means whereby the Celtic fairy-tale penetrated the racial defences of the Norman warrior. How indeed could it be otherwise? For on one side of the linguistic barrier was a race eager to learn, keen-witted and adventurous

rather than actually imaginative; on the other a race imbued above all others with the passion for rhetorical self-expression, eager and proud to teach. In arms, in polity, the Celt had proved the weaker; by Saxon, by Frank, by Norman, he had been thrust back into the fastnesses of the mountains, the waste lands of Brittany, of Wales, of Cornwall. But as a teller of tales the Celt was still supreme; like Kipling's True Thomas (himself of course a Celt!) he could 'harp the heart out of the breast' of his political superiors, transcending them in this art as the Hellenic Greek transcended the Roman. And it was not merely the peculiar artistic attractions of the Celtic legend—its unearthly 'glamour,' its vivid sense of colour, its untiring movement, its delicate appreciation of natural beauty—which told in its favour; it brought to the more sophisticated Norman, whose breach with the traditions of his fathers was complete, a refreshing draught of the wild and primitive fiction which he had never really outgrown, and his taste for which had been whetted afresh by the marvels of the Crusades. Less weird, less powerful, less dramatic than the sagas of the North, less shrewd, humorous and observant than the homely folk-tale of the Saxon, the child-like, and sometimes childish, wonder-world of the Celt was admirably adapted to minds which, under a veneer of semi-Latin civilization, were still essentially child-like. Tales of warlike prowess and artless love, tales of magic and of adventure—the Norman drank them all in with avid delight, only to retell them after his own fashion, barbarously transliterating or mistranslating the uncouth Celtic appellations, tingeing them with the manners, social and religious, of his own day, adorning them with all the increasing material

splendour of xiith-century Europe, firing them with the Southern passion and hedging them with the courtly etiquette which the Troubadours of the South had brought into fashion. And thus—Romance was born.

Among the many scattered folk-tales (originally perhaps of mythological extraction) which had been drawn into the all-embracing vortex of the Arthurian tradition, was one which told how a King's son, whose father had fallen in combat and who had been bred in woodland seclusion by an anxious mother, went forth into the world to seek his fortune. In its origin the story was probably one of primitive revenge; and this character is retained in what seems to be a late version of a very early form—the so-called 'Thornton Syr Percyvelle.'<sup>1</sup> But this simple tale of the 'great fool' or rustic princeling was soon expanded by the addition of many extraneous adventures, and above all by one episode of supreme importance for our purpose. This episode is the episode of the Grail.

Modern scholars seem agreed that this episode confronts us for the first time in the famous 'Conte del Graal' of the court-singer Chrestien de Troyes, a poem obviously founded on older Celtic material. It is there assigned to Perceval in the first instance, and to Gawaine only in the second. But Chrestien's continuator, Wauchier de Denain (for Chrestien himself 'left his tale half told'), and the writer of a strange and obscure 'Elucidation' or preface prefixed to the amplified poem, both of whom are believed by Miss Weston to have had access to a Welsh source more

<sup>1</sup> It is also one ingredient in the extraordinary 'Peredur' variant contained in the so-called 'Mabinogion,' an ill-digested congeries of quite irrelevant episodes, which is believed to have been affected by Romance versions. It occurs, moreover, in the 'Manessier' continuation of Chrestien de Troyes.

primitive than those of Chrestien,<sup>1</sup> lay the chief stress on Gawaine.

Now in this Gawaine or Gwalchmai (who plays a great part in the earliest Arthurian traditions) Miss Weston thinks she has detected a dethroned solar divinity, and he certainly displays one solar characteristic—his strength culminates at midday. Whoever of the two be the protagonist, the destined Knight after many adventures, some apparently of the nature of a test, reaches a mysterious Castle by the sea, belonging to a 'maimed' Fisher King or Rich Fisher, and sees a strange procession. In the 'Gawaine' passages this procession and its preliminaries include (beside minor accessories) a Broken Sword,<sup>2</sup> a Dead Knight on a bier, a Bleeding Lance, lamenting attendants and a 'Grael,' which dispenses automatically bread and wine to all. The significant talismans for Chrestien are Bleeding Lance, Graal and Sword; and his 'Grael' contains a Host by which the life of the Maimed King is miraculously sustained. In both tales the Knight refrains from adequate enquiry into these marvels; finds next morning that either the castle or its inhabitants have vanished; and is eventually reproached for a reticence but for which (in the Gawaine version) the waste places would have become fertile, (in the Perceval version) the King would have been healed and the land would have had peace.

Now what in the first place *is* a 'grael'? Etymologists have no doubt. It is derived, through the Low Latin *gradalis*, *gradale*, from the Latin—and Greek—*kratēr*, a mixing bowl,—a term equally applicable to

<sup>1</sup> The identification of 'Bleheris,' 'Blehi-Bleheris,' 'Breri,' 'Bledericus Fabulator,' with Bledericus Latinarius (*circa* 1100) seems very plausible.

<sup>2</sup> Which may have become confused with the sword of Wayland Smith.

the bowl used for festal and that used for ritual purposes. But (and this is a point on which, we think, sufficient stress has not been laid) the word 'graal' in Chrestien's time seems to have been, as far as France is concerned, obsolescent.<sup>1</sup> The Chronicle of Helinandus (*circa* 1200) finds it necessary to offer the (absurd) explanation that '*gradalis vel gradale*' means a dish,<sup>2</sup> broad and somewhat deep, in which choice morsels are served at feasts '*gradatim*,' and the Romances frequently give the equally ludicrous derivation that it is called *graal* because *agreeable* to all. Nor is the fact that it had become archaic surprising. A *bowl* is among the most primitive of utensils; the invading Franks evidently brought with them their own word '*bol*' (the modern French equivalent), and the disuse of the terms may have been hastened by the fact that the '*tailleur*' ('*Teller*'), or carving-platter, was rapidly ousting the bowl and spit as a means of service.

Why then did Chrestien employ so far-fetched a term? Surely because this word, or something like it, *was in the Welsh or Breton originals*.

Here Mr. Wardle makes an interesting conjecture. He supposes that the original talisman may have been a magic griddle or baking girdle (Welsh *greidell* or

<sup>1</sup> That it was not quite obsolete is shown by a passage in one version, where boars' heads are brought in on 'graals.' The term *gradaletto* occurs in Italian inventories of the xvth century.

<sup>2</sup> In reference to the definition of Helinandus given above we must remember that the *dish* of the Middle Ages was not our specialized carving-platter with a well—a modification no doubt of the '*tailleur*,' but rather a shallow bowl. Even Johnson, whose first definition of *dish* is the more modern one, gives secondarily 'a deep hollow vessel for liquid food,'—which is almost the same as his definition of 'bowl' as 'a vessel to hold liquids, rather wide than deep,' and the little bowls from which tea is drunk were originally described, indiscriminately, as 'basins' and 'dishes.' The identification of the Graal with the drinking vessel of the Last Supper (τράχηλον) is quite modern; for Mallory and even Scott it is still the central dish (*i.e.* bowl) from which the meats were eaten (in the Gospel, τρύβλιον).

*gradel*). The griddle, always an essential part of Welsh domestic economy, would have become doubly important among the impoverished Welsh borderers, to whom an inexhaustible supply of barley-cakes might have seemed the very symbol of plenty. A term, incomprehensible to the Norman translator, might well, he thinks, have been transliterated into the archaic 'grail.' But such a solution, not without a certain plausibility if we treat the story as an ordinary Celtic folk-tale, becomes less appropriate if we accept Miss Weston's interpretation of the whole Grail-problem. In her eyes the *procession* in its original setting is as important as its component parts. The whole scene with all its appurtenances—Lance, Grail, Blood, Sword, Dead Knight, Weeping Maidens, Maimed King, Wasted Land—all point, she thinks, to the initiatory rites of some primitive nature-worship, connected with the reproductive forces of animal and vegetable life. We are confronted with mysteries such as those of Adonis or Attis, or of Osiris or the Great Mother,—rites so amply investigated by Sir James Frazer in the volumes of *The Golden Bough* and by his successors, rites which in Hellenistic days became the veil and the vehicle of a more spiritual teaching.

Miss Weston herself was once in doubt whether she should refer the legend to a native Celtic origin; but to us it seems obvious that the original adherents of the cult which gave a starting-point for the legend—whether these came from the ranks of Eastern mercenaries in Roman service or from Romans who had imbibed their lore,<sup>1</sup>—must have spoken the Latin tongue and called the ritual bowl *gradale*. More-

<sup>1</sup> Mithraic rites were certainly practised in England and these are known to have been frequently associated with the rites of Attis.

over we allow much more than does Miss Weston for an apprehension originally imperfect, and the disintegrating effect of time. We cannot think that the real meaning of the rites was fully grasped by the Celts with whom the legend originated, whether these were accidental spectators or partially instructed disciples. Miss Weston and her 'adept' authorities themselves compare the Grail-procession, its preliminaries and its sequel, to an initiation '*manquée*' or seen from the outside. Far less can we suppose that the Grail, in the xith and xiith centuries, still symbolized, however obscurely, a lingering occult belief. It is true that a sense of awe, of mystery, surrounds the Grail; but such was the characteristic feature of the rites to which she refers it. The extraordinarily confused 'Elucidation' or preface to the '*Conte del Graal*'—a preface clearly attributable to another and presumably earlier hand than Chrestien's—tells us of hospitable maidens (gold cups in hand), who came from the hills, a thousand years before King Arthur, to feed passers-by, relates how 'King Amangons' and his followers robbed and outraged them, whereby the land became waste and men could no longer find the court of the Rich King Fisherman who had filled the land with plenty. Maidens descended from these, and their attendant Knights, are encountered in the forest by Arthur's Knight-errant, whose discovery of the Grail is to restore the Waste Places. This strange rigmarole may be not improbably reminiscent of a primitive 'Life'-cult, of its violent suppression and of secret rites, long lingering among the hills; but if so, the tradition, by repeated transmission, has faded into a fairy-tale. Nor are we greatly impressed by Miss Weston's anxiety to prove that Perceval, Son of the



'Widow Lady,' was first associated with the story, because 'Sons of the Widow' is a synonym for adepts; or by her attempt to derive the 'Fisher King' from the abstruse mystic simile of the 'Net of Souls.'<sup>1</sup> Her hypothesis, that the rites on which the tale was founded, represented some one of the semi-christianized nature-cults of the Near East, seems to us equally unconvincing. It is true—and Miss Weston makes perhaps less use of this argument than might be expected—that the Grail in Chrestien's narrative, contains a Host;<sup>2</sup> while in those German versions which, unable to translate the word '*graal*,' regard it in virtue of its radiance as a precious stone, a Dove<sup>3</sup> yearly places on the talisman a consecrated Host. But these details seem to us simply perfunctory attempts to account in some orthodox fashion for miraculous powers.

Soon, however, the symbol of the Bleeding Lance suggested a more august identification. The reputed Spear of Longinus, the 'Spearman' who had pierced the Lord's side, had been displayed to pilgrims in the Church of Golgotha during the vith century, but seems to have disappeared in the troublous times that followed. Its dramatic and more than suspicious 'rediscovery' had been among the most exciting

<sup>1</sup> Miss Weston reminds us that the prolific fish is for 'Life'-cults an emblem of fertility; while de Borron connects the 'Fisher's' appellation with an early Christian ceremony apparently of Jewish origin still commemorated by the connection of fish with fasting. But it seems to us possible that the 'Fishing' is merely a connecting incident of the original story; where the Lord of the Castle, found engaged in the 'menial' occupation of fishing, must be distinguished as the Rich or Royal Fisherman.

<sup>2</sup> The 'bread' of 'Diu Crône,' where the Graal is a box, may be also a Host.

<sup>3</sup> Here again Miss Weston notes that the prolific dove was closely associated with 'Life'-cults. Mr. Waite reminds us that the Tabernacle of the Host was often in the form of a dove—a more probable interpretation.

incidents of the First Crusade and was still, one hundred years later, the talk of Christendom.

It had always ranked among the supreme treasures of the Church, since the early passion for relics, which had culminated in the journey of the Empress Helena to Palestine, had known no objects more sacred than the Instruments of the Passion. A lingering sense of reverence suggested in some quarters that all traces of the Blood shed on earth might have miraculously followed the Risen Body of the Lord.<sup>1</sup> This belief and the co-presence of the symbols of Body and Blood in the Eucharist seem to have precluded the 'Invention' of the Holy Blood<sup>2</sup> till the time of the Crusades. It is actually during the Second Crusade, when Jerusalem found itself over-run by hordes of ignorant soldier-pilgrims eager for religious talismans, that we first hear of such a relic. In 1148, the Patriarch of Jerusalem had solemnly presented in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre to Thierry of Alsace, Count of Flanders, at the instance of his brother-in-law Baldwin III., King of Jerusalem, a small phial of the so-called Precious Blood, then said to have been taken from a larger quantity obtained by Joseph of Arimathea while washing the Holy Body, and given by him to the Apostle James who had taken it to Antioch. Thierry in 1150 presented his treasure to the City of Bruges, where it is still displayed.<sup>3</sup> It is within a quarter of a century of this significant date that the christianized Grail is first associated with the Blood of the Redeemer.

<sup>1</sup> Wardle, *Cym.* xvi. iii., quoting Theodosius the pilgrim (vith century).

<sup>2</sup> A reference, unfortunately lost, showed that the Church had discountenanced a rumour that another so-called lance of Longinus, preserved in Italy, had bled.

<sup>3</sup> The patrons of Chrestien, Wauchier and de Borron were all allied to Thierry.

Miss Weston, however, suggests another and earlier impulse. She holds that the first suggestion was given by the rather grotesque Saint-Sang legends which emanated from the Norman Monastery at Fécamp. This ancient Abbey claims to have received from its founder, as early as 990, the head of the spear of Longinus and a portion of the Precious Blood preserved by Nicodemus in his glove and miraculously transported to Fécamp in a fig-tree. Miss Weston has detected, in a *non-Grail* portion of Wauchier's narrative, an allusion to the minstrel-guild attached to Fécamp. But Mr. Waite has drily remarked that the Fécamp MSS. have never been critically examined; and it would not surprise us were the supposed early documents a late fabrication, perhaps stimulated by the fame of the great relic of Bruges. That, on the other hand, certain details of the Fécamp-legends reacted on the Grail-romances seems practically certain.

But if the wonders of the Grail-procession were to be identified with Christian relics, how trace their previous wanderings? This is attempted in de Borron's 'Joseph,' the earliest extant romance on the subject.

In this work the Grail is identified with the dish or bowl used at the last supper. Stolen, it is used by Pilate at the symbolical washing of the hands; is given by him to Joseph. By Joseph it is used to receive the Blood which issues at the Washing of the Lord's Body; and when, after the Burial, the Jews arrest Joseph, Christ appears to him in the dungeon and restores it. For his love, he is told, he shall have the symbol of the death of Christ and give it to whom he will. But, adds the poem, inconsequently enough, he is to yield the vessel to three persons only who are to take it in the Name of the Trinity. No Sacrament shall ever be

celebrated, but Joseph shall be remembered. But Joseph must be taught concerning the Sacrament: the bread and wine are Christ's flesh and blood; the tomb is the altar, the grave-cloth the corporal; the vessel wherein the Blood was put, shall be called chalice; the cup-platter signifies the tombstone. All who see Joseph's vessel shall be of Christ's company. I dare not, nor could not, adds de Borron, tell this, but that I have (some read, not having) the great book wherein are the histories written by the great clerks, therein are the great secrets written which are called Graal.<sup>1</sup> Joseph is thereupon miraculously released, and eventually leads his kin (among whom are conspicuous Alain and Hebron or Brons) into the wilderness; whence (leaving, we gather, Joseph behind them) they finally start westward for the Vaux d'Avaron (Vale of Avalon?).

Now is all this, we ask, the invention of de Borron? By no means; the ultimate source of his romance is even well known. It is none other than a pseudo-gospel, the so-called *Acts of Pilate* or, to use a more recent title, *The Gospel of Nicodemus*.

This apocryphal account of Christ's last days on earth, though by some attributed to the iind century, is in its present form no older, certainly, than the vth. It seems to have been compiled by a converted Jew, on the basis of the canonical gospels, with the objects: (1) of multiplying evidences to the Divinity, Resurrection and Ascension of Jesus; (2) of confining the guilt of His death entirely to the unconverted Jews. Its effect is to focus attention, not on the Apostles, who are never mentioned, but on Nicodemus in the first,

<sup>1</sup> All this is given in the words of Mr. Nutt's summary.

Joseph in the second place. After the crucifixion Joseph is immured in a house without a window, where the Lord appears to him. Joseph, affrighted, believes him to be a spirit; but is reassured by His voice saying: "I am Jesus, whose body thou didst beg from Pilate, and thou didst wrap me in clean linen and didst put a napkin on my face, and didst lay me in a new tomb, and didst roll a great stone to the door of the sepulchre." Miraculously released by Christ, Joseph is found at Arimathea and examined by the chief priests. They remain obdurate, but the people are converted.

This original narrative, orthodox in doctrine, though apocryphal in language and incident, was subsequently interpolated in honour of the Virgin, the Apostle John, Longinus, Mary Magdalene and the woman with the issue of blood—here called Berenice, a name subsequently corrupted into Veronica.

Now it is clear that between any form of the *Acts of Pilate* and de Borron's 'Joseph' lies a long period of evolution. Many of the subsidiary episodes in de Borron are, as we shall see, quite inexplicable save as references of which the real meaning had been lost. What were, we ask, the probable stages of this transformation?

Mr. Wardle is responsible for the very suggestive conjecture that the *Acts* may have been in the first place remodelled to the exclusive honour of Joseph by one who was dissatisfied with the share of veneration accorded by the official Church to the preserver of the Sacred Body. He will have shortened and expanded the *Acts of Pilate* into a Gospel of Joseph of Arimathea.

The original *Acts of Pilate* is, as we have seen, an amplification of hints contained in the canonical

gospels. Christ appears to Joseph 'the doors being shut'; an obvious reminiscence of two canonical appearances. He remains at first unrecognized; which incident recalls another canonical appearance, wherein he had revealed himself 'at the breaking of bread.' This, we are inclined to believe, suggested to the devotee of Joseph a further glorification of his hero by a further expansion of his author's prison scene. Christ shall not merely appear to Joseph and refer to his good offices; he shall administer to Joseph the first post-resurrection Eucharist.

This suggestion, so far as we know, has not been previously made; but it explains, as nothing else could do, some strange passages in de Borron. The startling promise made to Joseph would be much more relevant if connected with a Sacrament than with a relic. The equation of the circumstances of the Burial and of the Sacrament in de Borron is very confused. The original comparisons were, we suspect, Body and Blood = bread and wine; Tomb = cup; Gravestone = cup-platter; Linen Cloths = corporal. The substitution of *altar* for cup and the irrelevant observation "the cup shall be called chalice" suggest awkward subsequent emendations necessitated by the interpolation of bowl of the Holy Blood in place of an actual Sacrament.

Further expansions, which we may lay to the credit of the first reviser, are: (1) the substitution of the whole Veronica-legend for a single passing allusion to the woman with the issue of blood; and (2) a similar expansion of incidental references to the wanderings of the Israelites, to Joseph's 'preparing a table' for certain Jewish messengers and to the feeding of the multitudes into a Continuation, wherein Joseph leads his followers into the wilderness, feeds them miraculously, and

divides as miraculously by virtue, we must presume, of the Sacrament the true from the false disciples.

At what period may we suppose this first revision to have taken place? Liturgical experts detect in the narrative of de Borron confused reminiscences of the ritual Fish-Meal of Jews and early Christians and of other primitive Eastern customs. On the other hand there seem to be borrowings from a crude Western viii<sup>th</sup> century forgery, *The Avenging of the Saviour*. Perhaps what we have called the first revision was after all gradual.

At any rate there seems strong reason to suspect that our remodelled pseudo-gospel passed into Provence, where legends of Joseph and the Maries, very possibly connected with it, are even now rife. A gospel which ignored the orthodox apostolic succession of the West, which related the wanderings of a humble Christian flock and the rejection of impure elements, must have been attractive to some among those obscure Provençal sects which we group under the name of Albigenses. To a revision under such influences we can most probably assign the strange confused episodes in de Borron, wherein 'Moses' and 'Peter'<sup>1</sup> are represented, one as hostile, the other as subordinate to Joseph. For vague as are the identities of these two in the pages of de Borron, it is clear that they originally stood for Moses the Lawgiver and Peter the Apostle, representatives respectively of the Old and New Law (St. Augustine). And little as is known of the actual tenets of the Albigenses, we are at least aware that they resented the pretensions of the Petrine See and were accused of disparaging the Books of Moses.

But our hypothetical gospel, thus doubly re-

<sup>1</sup> 'Symeon' occurs in some of the later Grail-romances.

modelled, must have certainly had a third reviser, possibly a fourth, before it reached de Borron. To some Breton or Welsh admirer of the gospel, still hankering after the lost independence of the Celtic church, and resentful of the all-embracing claims of Rome, we must ascribe the incongruous interpolation which introduces Alain, the representative of Brittany, into Joseph's little band, and the transformation of Hebron into Brons. For Brons is none other than Bran the Celtic demi-god, transmogrified long ere this, on the strength of his epithet 'Blessed,' into a Welsh saint and missionary.

We should thus have a narrative which would need only one change to convert it into a History of the Grail. Christ in the prison must not administer a Sacrament. He must present a Sacred Bowl containing His own Blood.<sup>1</sup> This bowl is so to speak borrowed by the new editor from the paraphernalia of the Last Supper and the story of Pilate's ablution; the legend of the Bruges Saint-Sang supplies the rest. That this change was made by an immediate predecessor, and not by de Borron himself, seems likely. The whole process is purely conjectural; but on what other hypothesis explain de Borron's incongruities?

De Borron followed up his 'Joseph' by a singularly weird 'Merlin'; that again by a 'Grail Quest,' of which Perceval is the hero and which led up to a 'Morte D'Arthur.' The Grail-incidents of his 'Perceval'<sup>2</sup> are comparatively early and simple; but the picturesque woodland-scenes, characteristic of the

<sup>1</sup> Traces of this seem to be seen in de Borron; Joseph is to give his vessel to whom he would—this is the Sacramental Cup; he is to give it to three only—this is the Saint-Sang relic.

<sup>2</sup> Usually known as 'Le Didot Perceval' from the owner of one of the MSS.



original 'Perceval,' are eliminated ; Perceval becomes the son of Alain and grandson of Brons. This identification obliges the romancer to span, by two lives, the interval between the era of Christ and the days of King Arthur. This awkward hiatus can only be filled up by ascribing to Brons and Alain a more than Methuselan longevity or by the intercalation of an entire dynasty of Grail-keepers.

By one romance, the 'Grand St. Graal,' in its present form a very late contribution to the series, the interval is rather disguised than filled by the introduction of a mythical son of Joseph—Josephes;<sup>1</sup> he leads the disciples of Joseph to the apparently apocryphal city of Sarras between Babylon and Salamandra, whence as we are told, the Saracens have their name, and which contains the Spiritual Palace foretold by Daniel. Here occur interminable episodes of 'conversion,' some forcible, some otherwise. The whole romance is a farrago of wonders culled indiscriminately from Apocryphal Acts, Celtic mythology,<sup>2</sup> Welsh hagiography, and Crusading Travellers' Tales. Finally the wanderers, with the sacred vessel, find themselves in Britain, where further complicated adventures prepare us for the Quest of the Grail by the Knights of Arthur's Court.

Meanwhile external causes had brought up a further development of the Grail-Quest. Lancelot is never connected with the Grail by any of the earlier writers. He is indeed a late arrival on the stage of Arthurian Romance. He does not appear among the older Celtic heroes ; and though it is probable that his

<sup>1</sup> He was probably a result of varying versions, according to which the original Joseph did, or did not, leave Palestine.

<sup>2</sup> Dorothy Kempe, Introduction to *Lonelich*, *E.E.T.S.*, 1905.

origin, which has been much debated,<sup>1</sup> is really Celtic, his development took place entirely under the influence of the spirit of Provençal Romance. Who first connected him with the Queen and why, is not known; but it is in one of Chrestien's non-Grail romances that we first find him recognized as her paramour. The story of their loves was, however, so consonant with xiith century manners that it speedily eclipsed in popularity all other Arthurian episodes. It developed, in fact, parallel with the development of the now christianized and sanctified Grail; and, as into the vortex of the Grail-Quest were gradually drawn all the heroes of the Round Table and even Arthur himself, it became impossible that the *preux chevalier* of all should not be included. But this forced a very inconvenient issue. The primitive fairy-tale of the Celt is not so much immoral as pre-moral; the question of right and wrong hardly arises; all that is required of men is that they be valiant, of women that they be fair. The love-element is easily minimized, bowdlerized or regularized, as in the fairy-tales we tell to children. But in the guilty passion of Lancelot lies the essence of his developed story; and the problem is thus posed: If Lancelot, still obsessed by his adulterous love, go in quest of the Grail,—what then? An answer tending to edification is given in the long-drawn romance known as 'Perlesvaux,' 'Perceval le Gallois,' or 'The High History of the Holy Grail.' Here Lancelot is drawn into the Quest, and is rejected of the Grail, which, unlike Gawaine, he may not even behold; its achievement is reserved for the now purified and asceticized Perceval. But moral and ascetic as the tale has thus become, it still remains, though with a deepened sense

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Mr. Nutt's and Miss Weston's theories.

of tragedy, popular and adventurous and, from the ecclesiastical point of view, somewhat unconventional; for Josephes is still the first Bishop of Christendom and still, after the ancient fashion of the East and of the Celt, consecrates the Eucharist behind closed doors. But divergent as are the tendencies in this romance, still stranger is the intermingling of the ascetic, moralizing and mystical element with the Lancelot-episodes in the final romance of the cycle. The 'Queste del Saint Graal' was long erroneously attributed to Walter Map. We may surely rather ascribe it to some *trouvère* turned monk; for the conflicting strands of interest are each carried to the highest possible point. On the one hand is the desire to exalt still further the beloved hero. If Lancelot cannot attain the Grail, he must see it, though only in a vision, and its achievement must be reserved for one sprung of his loins. So in the 'Queste' we have the child begotten by Lancelot under enchantment, not indeed (as he believes) of the Queen, but of the maid-guardian of the Grail. On the other hand, despite so repulsive a beginning, this tale of the chaste boy-knight Galahad is highly charged with an extreme sacramental mysticism. Like the 'Grand St. Graal,' it adopts and develops the then crystallizing doctrine of transubstantiation; many of its incidents are avowedly allegorical, and a stringent asceticism governs every page. It is in fact a kind of ecclesiastical Pilgrims' Progress '*à la mode des moyens âges.*'

With this romance we conclude the French tradition of the Grail. Ecclesiastical disapproval<sup>1</sup> has been adduced to explain the rather abrupt drying-up of a source hitherto so prolific. But after a vogue of

<sup>1</sup> This certainly did exist; see Wardle, *Cym.* xvi. 20, and Miss Weston's *Ritual to Romance*, p. 177.

fifty years the possibilities of the theme were at least temporarily exhausted, and new topics occupied the romancers of the later xiii<sup>th</sup> century. The existing romances moreover continued to be reproduced till, as condensed in Mallory's 'Morte D'Arthur,' they passed into the main stream of English literature. From them too were clearly derived the Joseph-traditions of Glastonbury.<sup>1</sup>

The Teutonic variants of the legend have been so exhaustively studied by the German scholars that less scope was left for English-speaking critics. The romance 'Diu Crône' ('The Crown of Adventure') is evidently founded on very early Celtic versions. Gawaine is still the hero; the Grail, though not a bowl (the Germans, as we have said, never understood the word), is a box containing miraculous bread (a Host?). The 'Parzival' of Wolfram von Eschenbach, the Bavarian singer, is on the other hand professedly moulded on the work of a Provençal, Kiot or Guiot. This has not been certainly discovered; but seems to have been itself based, partly on a Celtic tale of Perceval akin to that of Chrestien, partly on other Celtic and Anjou traditions known to Chrestien's continuator Gerbert, partly on legends and tales of the Crusaders (the Eastern colouring is said to be singularly correct<sup>2</sup>), and partly, if we may believe Wolfram himself, on an Arabic work, presumably of an

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Lomax, who has translated the Hearne MS. (c. 1200) of W. of Malmesbury's *Antiquities* of Glastonbury (c. 1143), shews that all the references to Joseph except one are interpolations in later hands from the Grail-romances. The sole exception is a brief sentence which says that when the first missionaries reached Britain Joseph, 'ut dicitur,' was among them. This may point to a vague rumour concerning our supposed 'Gospel of Joseph'; unless indeed it be itself, as its rather strange form suggests, a still earlier interpolation into Malmesbury's original text.

<sup>2</sup> Miss Weston, who quotes Herr P. Hagen.

Alchemical nature, composed by the Jewish astrologer 'Flegetanis,'<sup>1</sup> found by Kiot at Toledo. The Grail here, as we have already explained, is a precious stone, possibly identified with the Philosopher's Stone<sup>2</sup> or with some other Eastern talisman<sup>3</sup> and still hallowed, not by the Holy Blood, but by the presence of the Host. In fine, except for the early youth of Perceval, charmingly described by Wolfram, the German and French 'Percevals' have hardly anything in common.

So ends our brief, imperfect survey of this complex problem. In the main, as has already been seen, we accept provisionally the general result of Miss Weston's painstaking investigations. But, as we have hinted before, besides many subsidiary points of difference, we dissent not only from her, but also from Mr. Waite (who approaches the subject from the reverse direction) on one crucial issue. We may readily agree, on the one hand, that the 'Life'-cults of the near East had reacted on the sacramentalism of orthodox—still more of unorthodox—Christianity, and that this approximation would tend to facilitate the transformation of a story founded on such rites into a Christian legend. But we cannot believe that the Grail-episode, at the time the transformation took place, was still the vehicle of occult 'naturalistic' teaching. On the contrary, we regard it as a folk- or fairy-tale, a tale handed down by tradition, of which the significance has been lost. The history of Joseph of Arimathea on the other hand is as obviously unorthodox as apocryphal; but its heterodoxy

<sup>1</sup> We find this name in the 'Grand St. Graal' applied to a pagan Queen.

<sup>2</sup> In Gerbert, Philosophine is the name of Perceval's mother who had come over with Joseph.

<sup>3</sup> Miss Weston quotes Herr P. Hagen, who connects it with meteoric talismans.

is in the matter of ecclesiastical authority and was no doubt unobserved by its final editor, de Borron; we see in it no trace of the occult mysticism, the 'super-sacramental' tradition, which Mr. Waite would fain establish. Into the legend of the Holy Grail the fantastic piety of the early Middle Ages wove its ideals and its aspirations—ideals and aspirations which, even when most obsolete or most imperfect, retain a perennial fascination, but the warp on which this brilliant woof produced its most gorgeous and most impressive symbolism, was the fairy-tale which was only a fairy-tale, and the legend which is nothing but a legend.

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## MYSTICISM AND THE ORGANIC SENSE.

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### I.

MYSTICISM has always been regarded as aiming at the discovery of God as identified, at least in some degree and at certain moments, with the self of the seeker. This implies, of course, the previous effecting of a change in the personality or self. But it also implies, as a prominent practising Mystic has recently assured us, a change in the process of self-knowledge. Accepting this view of Mysticism as the correct one, I propose in the present article to inquire in what precise way the principal Mystical practice shows itself psychologically adapted to bring about the twofold change. There is really little doubt as to what that principal practice is. The one essential exercise to which every other is subordinate would appear to be, on the united testimony of Christian and Mahomedan witnesses at least, the affective practice of the Divine Presence.

The statement can hardly be questioned, but as our whole argument depends on its truth, it may be well to adduce a few representative declarations. Take first the German mediæval Mystics Eckehart and Tauler. "Direct thy mind always to gaze upon God with a steadfast look that never wavers; as for other spiritual exercises practise them so far as they may be helpful thereto." "I do not doubt that God might give me as much grace, or even more, in outer work than in the most sublime contemplation, provided I preserve the Divine Presence."

Next let us turn to two Spanish writers, Castanoza and Alvarez de Paz. "The chief austerity of life consists in the continuous application of ourselves to interior recollection, introversion and contemplation. . . . The Presence of God is the shortest way to Divine Union." "I venture to say that this means [recollection] makes up by itself alone for the other means of reaching perfection and contemplation, and that it includes them all."

The Sufis tell us the same. "It is necessary for thee to habituate thyself to this intimate relationship in such wise that at no time and in no circumstances thou mayest be without the sense of it, whether in coming or going, in eating or sleeping, in speaking or listening" (Jami). "This [burning of books] is proper to the intoxication of commencement and in the fervour of youth. Those who have become fixed are not veiled from God by the whole universe; how, then, by a sheet of paper?" (Al-Hujwiri).

Or here are two quotations from contemporary mystics. "To attain [in the mystic work] I conceive that it is essential and imprescriptible that at any and every hour we should abide—at least by conformity of the will—in communion with the Divine. We should never permit any lesser interest to interfere with that communion, because there is nothing to be gained in the whole world which is of any value in comparison with the Gift of God, wherein He offers Himself and is received" (A. E. Waite). "It is not a matter of half hours or set times, it is a matter of the whole life down to its humblest details; a state of mental prayer is established and divine contemplation becomes the very substance of one's life. Indeed, separate acts of mental prayer are either the signs, or fruits, of a state of



contemplation already established in the soul ; or they are ordered, and naturally tend, towards the establishment of such a state ; otherwise I do not see why they should be performed at all " (Dom Savinien Louismet).

There is also an indirect proof. The unremitting character of the practice is shown by the way in which by the laws of self-suggestion and habit it tends to become habitual, to pass, as our last witness says, into a state ; the Presence, as Mr. Waite puts it, " comes to be without the practice," and " prayer," in the words of Saint-Martin, " prays itself within us."

It is unnecessary to add extracts to show that the recollection is a matter not of the head, but of the heart. The fact is generally acknowledged, and the last word on this aspect of the subject has been said by the French writer Puyol: " Mysticism is not a science or a philosophy, but a way of approaching God by means of the affections."

It is clear, accordingly, that our purpose reduces itself to the endeavour to discover how it is that the practice of loving recollection changes the self and the mode of self-knowledge. Obviously that practice contains two elements : love and unremitting recollection. What are their respective *rôles* and comparative value? The traditional account of the matter attributes nearly everything to love. Is this view justified, or should we not in the light of modern psychology expect very far-reaching effects to follow on continuous recollection? I venture to suggest that we should, and attempt to show this first negatively, by indicating that most of the effects ascribed to love are mediated by recollection, and then more positively, by tracing out the process by which recollection modifies the personality.

## II.

From the time of Dionysius the Areopagite onward it has been a commonplace with Mystics that love is 'ecstatic.' The saying is clear in so far as its general meaning is that love changes the self, but is at the same time ambiguous, admitting as it does the alternative interpretations, either that a man is *taken* out of himself by his continual interest in another, or that he is, as we say, *carried* out of himself by a sudden access of overpowering emotion.

Dionysius himself, in the immediate context of his definition, mentions both interpretations in a breath. "The Divine Love brings ecstasy, not allowing them that are touched thereby to *belong to themselves* but only to the objects of their affections. . . . The great Paul, constrained by the Divine Love, and having received a share of its ecstatic power, says with inspired utterance, 'I live, yet not I but Christ liveth in me': true lover that he was and (as he says himself) *being beside himself* unto God and not possessing his own life but possessing and living the life of Him whom he loved."

Clearly the first meaning implies that self, being, as psychology tells us, largely developed and defined by its interests, is changed when its interests revolve round a new centre. Quite plainly, however, in the case of God much of the alleged effect depends on the beliefs, that the centre of interest is always present, and that the Divine Will is constantly operative in all the happenings of every day. In other words, the effect of love on the Mystic is largely due to its being associated with recollection. The impression that continuous attention is the really dominant factor is confirmed, when we take into account the constantly

repeated statement that love changes the self because it assimilates the lover to the Beloved, and the other mystic commonplace, clearly referring to the same class of observed facts, according to which the mind takes on the form of whatever object it contemplates. The associated maxims, as we should now say, tell us in effect that the thought of the Beloved, like any other thought held constantly before the mind, sets in motion the forces of self-suggestion with their usual results. The greater the constancy with which the thought is held, the greater the influence which those forces may be expected to exercise, so that once again the maximum modification of self would follow from the most unremitting recollection.

Next, still keeping to the first or milder connotation of the word ecstasy, let us see how love might gradually bring about a change not only in the self but in the manner of self-knowledge. Love is an emotion or capable of constantly announcing itself emotionally; and I cannot help thinking in spite of Professor Laird that, whether or not Hamilton's description of emotions as 'subjectively subjective' be technically valid, all emotions are known to us with such peculiar immediacy and in such independence of any studied or reflex introspection that they seem part of our very self. Feeling and the self which feels stand manifested together by a kind of intrinsic phosphorescence. Thus the development and cherishing of a state of love would involve a continuous natural luminosity of the love-suffused self. If, further, the resultant change in natural self-feeling was accompanied by the discouragement and avoidance of reflex self-study, we can understand how by this combination of positive and negative operations the modification of self might

become increasingly fundamental. But it is obvious, as before, that everything would depend on the constancy with which love was cherished, or in other words on the extent to which love was accompanied by recollection.

Now let us glance for a moment at the second meaning of the word ecstasy. Here we are dealing with love as it shows itself in occasional moments of white-hot intensity. But how is such intensity developed? Surely it is produced gradually and indirectly. It is produced gradually, because it is only when love has been spread out continuously over all the minutes that make the long years, that all the love of a life can be swept together into the eternity of some great moment. It is produced indirectly, because love, like pleasure, has its paradox and cannot be captured by any vehemence of frontal attack. Divine love becomes ours either by our thinking of God's love for us, or by our putting ourselves into God's hands with the express object of receiving His love. But this gradual seeking and this seeking by a twofold indirection are simply variations on the one theme, the perpetual cherishing of the perpetual Presence.

Love at its greatest intensity implies not merely a change of self but a modification of self-consciousness. Naturally when our being is stirred to its very foundations, more of the self is involved and manifested by the self-luminosity of feeling than when affection is simply a glow on the surface. Not only in such cases is self known in a different way but an infinitely wider area of the self evinces its presence. So that when St. John of the Cross says that the soul reaches its inmost depth or centre when it attains the utmost love of which it is capable, he may be taken as meaning that, when love

is at its highest, immediate self-knowledge is at its widest.

Here for the first time we seem to see the love-element hopelessly outdistancing its rival. But there are two reservations.

In the first place it may well be doubted if extraordinary ecstasies, in the usual meaning of that word, are of the real essence of mysticism. At most they represent a passing stage. At the highest degree of all, that of permanent or transforming union, the Divine consciousness is in some transcendent manner permanently participated in by the human subject or self, and this continuous participation, while differing *toto cælo* from the recollection practised or enjoyed previously, remains after all a divinely-ordered recollection.

The second reservation is this. Even if it be true that an ecstatic period is a necessary feature in most Mystics' lives, because the competing tendencies and interests of the personality need occasionally profound emotions to fuse them into a harmonious whole, still the important thing after all is not so much the establishment of a harmony as the discovery of God therein. Great as it is to come completely in possession of your self and to know this, it is yet greater to find that possession of self is really possession of God,—self and God being known together in a single act. But may it not be the case that God is only manifestly identified with the self at some great moment because the self has claimed the identification already by an interminable series of attempts to permeate act and word and thought with the consciousness of the Divine concurrence? May not the Presence of God in the soul be the eternal aspect of what seem from the standpoint

of time moments of recollection? Are the mental life and the mind finally independent? Or is the life simply the mind as it shows itself moment by moment, and the mind when seen as by the Mystic in its totality simply the gathering up of the life? Can God possess the mind unless previously He has possessed the life? It is, however, a theological commonplace that God is only prevented from possessing our lives by our will to be without Him; and surely something might be said for putting the same statement positively and declaring that God can only possess the life, and so the mind, when the will for the Divine Presence is as constant as the will for the Divine Absence which it supersedes.

Attainment would be thus the eternal aspect of recollection in time. But it is also the Divine aspect, since it seems to involve the discovery that our acts of recollection were the effect within us of the self-communicating Grace of God. The Mystic does not so much acquire the Presence as keep himself under its influence. "Are you always thinking of God?" a character is asked in one of Michael Wood's stories. He replies: "No, it is God who is always thinking of me." Recollection seems to be our act, but it is equally God's. For the most part we fail to realize this at the time. No observation enables us to seize on the Divine action before the point at which it has already become our own. But, no doubt, if we could see any particular act of recollection completely and truly, we should find it beginning as God's act, then entering as it were an intermediate region where it was partly God's and partly man's, and then lastly announcing itself as man's very own. Can we not imagine that, when in the extreme emotion of some ecstasy mind is manifested to itself no longer as the

superficial, fragmentary mind of one or another moment, but as a concrete whole, then in this resultant totality or self the real general nature of the constituent parts is more or less perfectly represented or reflected, so that the Mystic finds that twilight aspect of recollection where the light of God has not yet passed into our human darkness, characterizing however vaguely his consciousness of self? Some Mystics expressed this by saying that in their experience they penetrated to their mind's ground. But what they meant seems to have been that in their highly emotional states their mind's ground penetrated them.

### III.

So far our line of argument has been negative. We have been trying to establish the importance of recollection as an explanation of Mystical phenomena by showing that the explanation from love really subsumes and involves the explanation from recollection. Let us now reverse our procedure and, approaching the problem from the opposite side, endeavour to ascertain whether the practice of the Presence of God is not intrinsically adapted to work the necessary changes in the human subject by its own right. What I have really to suggest is the possibility of self-consciousness becoming modified by that practice in much the same way as, according to most psychologists, self-consciousness comes into being and is, to a great extent, subsequently maintained; the Mystic makes his new self by a strict imitation of the method by which nature made his old one. My meaning will become clear if I begin with a few citations.

“ My body is not merely an object presented to me by the organs of the special senses; it is also something which I feel as a whole in common or organic sensation,

and in the changing thrills of my various emotional moods. This unique feeling of my body as a whole accompanies every movement of my conscious life, and there seems no doubt that it forms the foundation of the sense of personal identity."<sup>1</sup>

"As Jodl says, 'Respiration, alimentation and sex, as well as mobility, refer not merely to complexes of sensations, but are the most primitive, the oldest, the specifically original needs not only of mankind but also of the organic world in general.' These feelings are the origin of the sense of self, and its distinction from soulless things. Nor does their importance cease when the earliest stages of development have been passed. To feel fresh or tired, to feel well or ill, these surely are primarily feelings of the body, but they, and the moods which they induce, are as it were the tonicity of the self, its vital balance. Together they form that general feeling of bodily tone which, because of its diffused generality, is at once fundamental to selfhood and difficult to analyse precisely."<sup>2</sup>

"The importance of these bodily feelings to the sense of continuous personality is not in dispute."<sup>3</sup>

"We may even agree with Professor James that the body is the storm-centre, the origin of co-ordinates, the constant place of stress in the experience-train. Everything centres round it, and is felt from its point of view. The body is a constant centre of action, it is the constant focus of perception, and organic sensations are the only ones constantly present to us. It is the cause of the subjectivity of our presentations, and thus goes far to differentiate personalities."<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> A. E. Taylor, *Elements of Metaphysics*, p. 203.

<sup>2</sup> Laird, *Problems of the Self*, p. 83.

<sup>3</sup> Laird, p. 84.

<sup>4</sup> Laird, pp. 79, 80.



Thus according to Taylor and Laird, and also, as we see incidentally, to Jodl and James, the consciousness of self or personal identity comes into being largely because the body is an ever-present object of attention or, at any rate, of vague feeling. Consider, however, any typical instance of Mystical contemplation or recollection in love. Perhaps the most graphic way in which we can represent the attitude to ourselves is by thinking of some Roman Catholic worshipper before the tabernacle,—a very apposite example, since the French Society, L'Adoration Réparatrice, formed to encourage this particular devotion, has shown itself a very successful school for Mystics. "I look at Him," said the peasant of Ars, "and He looks at me." Contemplation could not be better described than in that short sentence. Another constant worshipper by the same method is found always speaking of the Divine *glance*. Another instance to our purpose would be the poet who looks through nature to 'the Great Face behind.' Or the attitude can of course be quite independent of the actual presence of the material symbol. Alvarez de Paz is merely speaking generally of the practice of Christ's Presence when he says: "It will not be sufficient to think of Jesus Christ as a your side . . .; it is also necessary to imagine that His eyes are fixed on you."

Is it not clear that the Mystic who "directs his mind to gaze upon God with a steadfast look that never wavers" (Eckehart), "without letting of any thing" (Hilton)—the Mystic who aims at what St Francis Borgia calls 'perpetual contemplation'—is quite literally, setting up a second centre of constant interest side by side with the body, and that his method of acquiring and maintaining spiritual person

ality by recollection is strictly analogous to Nature's way of doing the same for our ordinary personal identity through the *cœnæsthesis*; for if the Mystic practises the Presence of God, men in general cannot help but practise, as we said, the presence of the body. The parallel is additionally perfect, because the mystical attention to God, like our constant attention to the body, becomes eventually automatic, and if it is not for the moment central persists in the margin.

At this point a question suggests itself which is of some importance for the psychology of Mystic states. May not the two processes of attention be more or less rivals, in so far as the continual attention to God might very probably entail a corresponding withdrawal of attention from organic sensation? Our powers of central attention are certainly limited. Is there or is there not a similar restriction on our capacity for attention in the margin? May not the old saying, originating I believe with St. Augustine but repeated both by Eckehart and St. John of the Cross, "The soul is more present with the object of its love than with the body which it animates," mean in effect that constant attention to an object other than the body cannot be maintained without a change in the *cœnæsthesis*?

The modification of the *cœnæsthesis* thus adumbrated would be a negative one. But there is also a more positive possibility. The mode of recollection, which we have hitherto regarded as typical, postulates the Divine Presence as an object set over against the human subject and forming its environment. But in the recollection practised by Mystics who have made some progress on their path, the Presence is generally postulated or experienced as within the Mystic's own self. The Divine action is thought of as involved in

the very act of loving recollection, particularly when that recollection becomes habitual, 'passive,' or 'infused.' Even the spiritually-proficient worshipper before the tabernacle abides continually in the Divine Presence solely with the purpose, so one of them has told us, "of continually receiving the Divine Life." Is it not possible that in certain cases of infused recollection, the cœnæsthesia is actually involved? Have we not a clear indication of this when recollection is described as 'sensible'? Such a suspicion, moreover, is confirmed when we find a careful student of Mysticism asserting that the infused Presence announces itself precisely in the same way as do vague organic sensations. "Many persons to whom the mystic state is familiar, have told me that the following comparison depicts with great exactness both the interior possession of God and the physiognomy of the impression by which it makes itself felt. We may say: it is exactly in the same way in which we feel *the presence of our bodies* when we remain motionless and close our eyes. If we then know that the body is there, it is not because we see it or have been told so. It is the result of a special sensation, of an interior impression which makes us feel that the soul permeates and vivifies the body. It is an extremely simple sensation and one that we should try in vain to analyse. And so it is with the Mystic union; we feel God in us, and in a very simple way."<sup>1</sup> In a footnote the author adds: "This impression is admitted to be the result of a multitude of sensations which separately would be imperceptible and which are united in one complex whole. This result is called 'cœnæsthesia' (self-feeling)."

<sup>1</sup> Poulain, *Graces of Interior Prayer*, p. 92.

Thus the mystical process from our present standpoint could be described in outline as consisting: first in setting up a sense of God side by side with the sense of self; secondly in practising the Presence of God under the assumption of His immanence within the self and concurrence in its various activities. Such a process in practice would mean alternation between attitudes in which the *cœnæsthesis* was involved and other attitudes in which it was not. Clearly too the concurrence of the *cœnæsthesis* might announce itself in all possible degrees from zero to maximum, and sometimes the influence of the same factor might be positive, sometimes negative. That we are here in sight of a valuable means of explanation is proved by the various forms which the practice of the Divine Presence takes in the accounts of Mystical writers. There is a practice of the Presence by what seems to be the mind or will only, the action of the *cœnæsthesis* as I should say, being excluded or repelled ('arid quiet'). There is, on the other hand, a practice of the Presence of the kind we have just had described for us by Poulain ('sensible quiet,' accompanied by 'gusts'). Madame Guyon, Grou and others maintain that the normal course is for recollection gradually to become less and less sensible, and Augustine Baker tells us that aspirations and acts of love become increasingly spiritual and imperceptible. That amounts, on our theory, to saying that the *cœnæsthesis* is becoming changed. More and more the Mystic finds it true, as we said, that love is obtained indirectly. Do the laws of habit and self-suggestion, which are the main factors employed in the indirect search, set in operation influences which penetrate into the mind by way of the *cœnæsthesis*? The quotation from Poulain might be taken to

countenance such a view. But there are other phases of the Mystic's attention to his constant object. There is a practice in which, as it would seem, the *cœnæsthesis* interferes negatively, either because the existence of hunger- or fatigue-toxins in the body is reflected in the general 'tonicity' of the self, or because the Mystic has pursued his task imprudently and brought about, in his over-zealous attempt to hasten the formation of his new self, a temporary dissociation of personality. The former alternative is in evidence when contemplation is difficult, distasteful or painful, and the latter may be the explanation of that 'spiritual night' in which the self becomes a battle-ground of competing tendencies, and is in any case certainly the explanation of 'obsessions.' Lastly there is a practice of the Presence, or rather a manifestation of the Presence without the practice, when a final unification of the whole personality has been effected, so that the 'divine touch is no longer grievous' and the completed self, body and mind, is divinely actuated and knows it. Thus, throughout the whole of the Mystic way, the influence of the *cœnæsthesis* seems operative.

Lastly, we may profitably glance for a moment longer at the final Mystical attainment, that of permanent or transforming union. The condition is significant from our point of view in two several ways. In the first place, a most striking feature of this degree is what has been called the conversion of the body or the sublimation of natural impulses. "Thy joy will now be complete according to the harmony of thy soul, and that even of thy body" (St. John of the Cross). "In the enlightened and uplifted man the life of the senses adheres to the spirit. And so his sensual powers are joined to God by heart-felt love and his

nature is fulfilled with all good" (Ruysbroeck). The cœnæsthesiis, as I would put it, has been modified. At the final unification of the self the spiritual cœnæsthesiis centred upon God has become superimposed upon the natural, and throughout the process there has been a certain amount of osmosis between the new self and the old.

In the second place, by what precise psychological process is God recognized as more or less taking the place formerly occupied by the human subject or self? Might not the real medium of such consciousness be the spiritualized cœnæsthesiis? It is significant that Professor Laird, who disputes as we said Hamilton's theory which makes all feeling 'subjectively subjective,' sees no reason to dispute Husserl's modification of the same view, according to which the description holds good of physical feelings only. "Organic sensations," says the Professor, "are more distinctively subjective than any other sensations." That surely implies that a modification of the cœnæsthesiis would provide a theoretically perfect means for the revelation of God within the self.

#### IV.

The final argument for our suggestion is that it possesses the highest conceivable sanction, being in fact little more than an amplification of the view of that greatest of Mystics, St. John of the Cross. The following passage, to be found in the Spanish critical edition of *The Living Flame of Love* (*Obras*, vol. iii.), while at a first reading somewhat obscure, is really a summary of our contention :

St. John is describing the condition of transforming union.

"The light of grace, which God had before given to

the soul, by which He had illumined *the eye of the abyss of the spirit*, opening it to the divine light and making it pleasing to Himself, calls to another deep of grace, namely the divine transformation of the soul in God, wherein *the eye of sense* is enlightened and rendered so pleasing to God that we may say that the light of God and of the soul is all one, the natural light of the soul being united to the supernatural light of God, and the supernatural light being now the only one shining; just as when the light which God created united itself with the light of the Sun, and the light of the Sun shone alone without the divine light being lost."

Transforming union in which the Divine action is continuously recognized as the originating principle of life and its activities is, St. John says, really brought about by the coalescence of two factors.

The first factor is the antecedent illumination of the eye of the abyss of the spirit, the development of the consciousness or sense of God by contemplation. Contemplation consists in loving attention and the reception, for the most part imperceptible, of the Divine enlightenment.

The second factor, since in the transforming union God is at last perceived as permanently united with the human self, is clearly our human self-knowledge, which St. John, following the Aristotelian conception which had passed over into the Scholastic philosophy, attributes to the 'common sense,' an expression which he uses elsewhere as an alternative to the one found in the present passage,—the eye of sense. Since for St. John as for St. Thomas Aquinas the complete personality is a complex of soul and body, St. John would hardly have objected to the view which makes the self-sense largely a product of the cœnæsthesis.

Short then of the attainment of the transforming union the life of the the Mystic hovers between his attention to God, with the resulting God-consciousness, and that attention to the body which cannot be altogether avoided, and which is the nucleus of his natural sense of self.

Then comes the transformation. The body is converted and the self-sense transfigured, and now at last St. John can define, as in an earlier passage than the one quoted, the soul's sense as its power for perceiving and enjoying God. Why? Because, as he tells us above, the eye of the Spirit and the eye of self, God-consciousness and self-consciousness, have become one. He illustrates this coalescence by quoting the mediæval gloss upon the Mosaic account of creation, which described how, when the heavenly bodies sprang into being on the fourth day, light which had been produced on the first, floated in the form of a luminous cloud across the heavens and united itself to the sun. The application is obvious. First the sense of God is independently developed by the centring of attention upon Him to the exclusion of all else. And then this God-consciousness in the abyss of the spirit coalesces with the natural sense of self, which involves henceforth a realized participation in the consciousness of God. Such participation, however, must imply that the God-consciousness latent for the most part in the undiscovered regions of the mind is not so much man's consciousness of God as God's own self-consciousness. St. John holds that, as we have suggested, attainment reveals contemplation or recollection from the Divine standpoint, and not the human.

V. C. MACMUNN.



## FUTURISM IN ART.

### WHAT IT IS, AND WHAT IT IS NOT.

WILLIAM SAUNDERS.

THERE is nothing more extraordinary than the psychological influence exercised upon civilized communities by such apparently innocuous entities as arbitrary divisions of time. For example, as the 10th century drew towards a close, the nations of Western Europe lay inert and panic-stricken and the Church reaped a harvest of gold and lands unexampled in the whole of its preceding history; for the belief was then universal that with the year 1000 the end of the world was certain to come. Even when that year came and went and nothing happened, so deeply had the idea become ingrained, that the people refused to believe their forecast had been wrong; and the 11th century was well advanced before the impression that only a short respite had been given to the sinful masses to make their peace with an angry God, ceased to exercise the minds of the terrified communities. What occurred on a large scale when the 10th century was drawing to its end, has happened on a smaller scale as each succeeding century has neared its close. A species of epidemic senile decay, mental and moral, breaks out and developes, generally during the last decade of the century. The *fin de siècle* movement in France and the *décadence* in our own country during the nineties of last century are cases in point.

With the dawn of every new century, on the other hand, there occur converse movements of a more hopeful and optimistic character. There is a spring-like awakening and rejuvenating of the languishing life forces. The age that is past is left behind in every sense and all thoughts, words and deeds are respectively conceived and accomplished for the present and future alone. Never has this been so pronouncedly, even perchance appallingly, realized as in the opening years of the present 20th century. The new awakening of this epoch has been chiefly characterized by an inordinate tendency towards emancipation,—the emancipation of the worker, of woman, of the young, even of the child from parental control. When we consider the far-reaching activities of this revolutionary tendency in the growth of sentiment and opinion, we are forced to the conclusion that the so-called Futuristic movement was inevitable from the beginning.

The Futuristic movement was born in Italy, at Milan, in 1908; its founder and leading protagonist was the Italian poet and *littérateur*, F. T. Marinetti. In essence it has embodied the latest manifestation of the everlasting conflict between the fresh, though frequently irreverent, outlook of youth and the safe, mild conservatism of middle-age; and as such it is not unwholesome. Progress has largely consisted in a breaking-loose from stereotyped conventions and in a fervid idealism, partly iconoclastic and partly formative, and nine times out of ten we owe it entirely to the young. But when youth comes into the field with all its ingenuousness and wealth of ideas, a certain restraining influence is necessary, otherwise extravagance and anarchy of the grossest type must emerge. And in fact, as the natural result of a too

sudden and too drastic universal emancipation of the young and the immature, this possibly is what has occurred in the opening decades of this 20th century of ours. Futurism declares itself as a breaking away from all restraint and a systematic scheme of mentally running amok.

There are benevolent people who still believe in doing unto others as they would have others do unto them. I should be the last to dispute the beauty or excellence of such a religion; but its efficiency breaks down entirely if interpreted by the declared policy of the Futurists.

With Article I. of their official manifesto—"We shall sing the love of danger, the habit of energy and boldness"—no fault can be found. Even in Article II.—"The essential elements of our poetry shall be courage, daring and rebellion"—there is an element of independent self-assertion which tends to excite a certain sneaking spirit of admiration. And so on it goes, rising in power and intensity, until we reach Articles IX. and X., which respectively declare that:

"We wish to glorify war—the only health-giver of the world—militarism, patriotism, the destructive arm of the anarchist, the beautiful ideas that kill, the contempt for woman."

"We wish to destroy the museums, the libraries, to fight against moralism, feminism and all opportunistic and utilitarian meannesses."

What treatment then, we ask, is to be meted out to such people? Are we to do to these others as we wish to be done by? They ask for war, and war they must be prepared to receive, the sort of war that decent society wages everywhere against the criminal and all his associates. Otherwise we may at once

surrender all of civilization and culture the centuries have laboriously built up, and let loose the whole forces of red anarchy and bloody revolution to do their worst with the world and its peoples.

"Ah!" but I hear someone say, "you grossly exaggerate the power and influence of a purely artistic movement or cult!" To this I reply: True, Futurism as a purely artistic cult might have been harmless enough; but it can no longer be regarded solely as a branch of so-called Art. From its very inception, indeed, its significance has been as much political as artistic. The movement was publicly inaugurated in the Teatro Lirico, Milan, thirteen years ago, with frenzied shouts of "Down with Austria!" Thus, altogether apart from the merits of its artistic functions and ideals, it took on a political colour from its very earliest declaration of policy and propagation. Its influence, literary, artistic, musical and political, is already world-wide; it is to be traced under many names and forms, of which Bolshevism is perhaps not the most extreme.

To revert to the purely artistic ramifications of Futurism: a few examples may perhaps serve to indicate the dangers it holds, dangers not the less insidious because of their superficial absurdities.

The first manifestations of Futurism were literary; but before giving examples of Futurist literary creations (*sic*), it may be as well to mention that there are certain regulations laid down for the proper production of masterpieces of this cult, though in principle they imply the absolute denial and negation of all rules whatsoever. These regulations require the abolition of syntax and the indiscriminate use of nouns without reference to their relevancy, the constant employment

of the infinitive, the abolition of the adjective and adverb, the use of nouns in apposition, the extension of punctuation by the adoption of mathematical and musical signs, the abolition of figures of speech and the invention of analogical chains. The first personal pronoun must never be introduced in literature; all psychology must be eschewed and replaced by a lyrical treatment of materialism. Noise, weight and smell are essentials. The ugly is to be glorified and hatred for all intelligence engendered. What madness!

Here is a *lyrical (!) treatment of materialism* by F. T. Marinetti himself:

#### “YELLOW YELLOW

pungency urine sweat cassia obscenity jasmine  
belly of banker feet-ploughmen, sand-cushion  
go-to-bed-thirst—thirst noise+weight of the  
sun+orange coloured smell of heaven+20000  
obtuse angles+18 demicircles of shade+miner-  
alisations of negroes' feet in the crystal sand.”

In France one of the literary phases of Futurism is called ‘Dada-ism’; and there could be no surer testimony to the inherent madness of the human race than the fact that Paris has already begun to take it seriously. The classical poem (*sic*) of the Dada-ists is entitled ‘Suicide.’ It is the first of a collection named ‘Cannibale,’ and reads as follows:

“A b c d e f  
g h i j k l  
m n o p q r  
s t u v w  
x y z.”

Could imbecility go further? Another effusion of

this school called 'Curtains,' by H André Breton, is rendered in translation by Mr. F. S. Flint thus :

“ Mousetraps of the soul after the extinction of  
the white radiator  
meridian of the sacraments  
Connecting-rod of the ship  
Raft  
Pretty stranded grass-wrack of every colour  
Shivers on coming home in the evening  
Two heads like a pair of scales.”

If the Futurist *littérateurs* have thrown all psychology to the winds, the painters of the cult, with the go-as-you-please illogicality that is so distinctive a characteristic of the movement, despise the purely material side of their art and attempt rather to paint 'the soul of the spectator,' whatever that may mean. Witness the following deliverance :

“ Let us explain again by examples. In painting a person on a balcony, seen from inside the room, we do not limit the scene to what the square frame of the window renders visible, but we try to render the sum total of visual sensations which the person on the balcony has experienced: the sun-bathed throng in the street, the double row of houses which stretch to right and left, the beflowered balconies, etc. This implies the simultaneousness of the ambient, and, therefore, the dislocation and dismemberment of objects, the scattering and fusion of details, freed from accepted logic, and independent from one another.”

Whoever has seen a Cubist picture or such examples of the Italian Futurist school as were exhibited

in this country ten years ago, scarcely needs to be told that:

“ We go our way, destroying each day in ourselves and in our pictures the realistic forms and the obvious details which have served us to construct a bridge of understanding between ourselves and the public.”

We have only to consider the modern tendency towards the crudest of tints and most inartistic of combinations in present-day decorative schemes and women's dress, to note the evil effects of this Futuristic (mis-named) art.

A last brief reference only is necessary to point to the dangers of Futurism in music and the dance. In a manifesto, entitled ‘The Art of Noises,’ Signor Luigi Russolo classifies the possible resources of a Futurist orchestra. There are six different categories of noises; these include the sound of falling water, whistling, groans, strident street noises, percussions on metal, wood, skin and stone and the cries of men and animals in pain, rage, laughter, scorn and sorrow. As an approach to the Futurist ideal we have the music of Strauss, Schöneberg, Ornstein and Stravinsky; we find, however, the realization not far distant in a pianoforte composition by an American, where we are directed to place a board  $14\frac{3}{4}$  inches long on the keys of the piano and thump it with our fingers, fists and even, when a fortissimo is required, with our feet. To Signor Russolo's orchestra of horrors, moreover, we are invited by Signor Marinetti to dance an inharmonious, ungraceful, asymmetrical, dynamic, word-free ‘Shrapnel Hop,’ ‘Aviation Glide’ or ‘Machine-Gun Scamper,’ shouting, screaming, yelling

the while and torturing our limbs, bodies and faces into every possible hideous shape. For we are young, they say, "the oldest among us are thirty," and "the poet must give himself with frenzy, with splendour and with lavishness, in order to increase the enthusiastic fervour of the primordial elements."

Let us here turn to a recent novel by the American writer Mr. Upton Sinclair, where we have the following clever word-picture of Jazz music and dance,—another, though again by no means the most virulent, of the Futurist poisons:

"The strangest music that ever assailed human ears! If Peter had heard it before seeing Nell, he would not have understood it, but now its weird rhythms fitted exactly to the moods which were tormenting him. The music would groan, it would rattle and squeak; it would make noises like swiftly torn canvas, or like a steam-siren in a hurry. It would climb up to the heavens and come banging down to hell. And everything with queer, tormenting motions, gliding and writhing, wriggling, jerking, jumping. Peter would never have known what to make of such music, if he had not had it here made visible before his eyes, in the behaviour of the half-naked goddesses and the black-coated gods on this dancing floor. These celestial ones came sliding across the floor like skaters, they came writhing like serpents, they came strutting like turkeys, jumping like rabbits, stalking solemnly like giraffes. They came clamped in one another's arms like bears trying to hug each other to death; they came contorting themselves as if they were boa-constrictors trying to swallow



each other. And Peter, watching them and listening to their music, made a curious discovery about himself. Deeply buried in Peter's soul were the ghosts of all sorts of animals: Peter had once been a boa-constrictor, Peter had once been a bear, Peter had once been a rabbit and a giraffe, a turkey and a fox; and now under the spell of this weird music these dead creatures came to life in his soul. So Peter discovered the meaning of 'jazz' in all its weirdly named and incredible varieties."

Shades of Dante, Shakespeare, Raphael and Beethoven! "A mad world, my masters, a mad world!"

WILLIAM SAUNDERS.

## A NEW FRANCISCANISM.

RICHARD WHITWELL.

THE times call for a re-valuation of all things, for the old standards and values have proved hollow and worthless. The proud edifice built to their measurements is collapsing. Our western civilisation is tottering to its downfall, unless there be a turn in an entirely new direction, making possible a vital renewal and reconstruction. Night is spreading over the nations in social and religious chaos. New problems require new and more searching remedies. The War that was to usher in something better, to all appearance has left things worse than before. Spite of the demonstration it gave of the futility of war the nations are busy in all necessary preparations to make another war possible. The War performed one service. By its red glare it threw into awful visibility the deep fissures in the structure of our modern life. And we recognize it as foundationally insecure. The insecurity is heightened in that the War has placed a sword in the hands of Labour. "Right, to be vindicated, must needs be reinforced by might," was a word sanctioned by the nation's spokesmen—"force without limit and without stint," as the greatest of them said. It was here that the Pacifist asserting the supremacy of Principle over Power rendered highest service.

The War hastened the process of disintegration which previously was evident in the many eddies of unrest disturbing the tranquillity of the nation. What

were eddies and streamlets, are now rivers moving with mighty sound. Though the old fabric stands as before, is even buttressed with greater energy, and old methods and expedients reasserted, in due time waters underflowing may cause a collapse as complete as unexpected.

There is no one of intelligent goodwill that would wish to see the old conditions perpetuated, but the more speedily a new and better society is inaugurated the better. Meanwhile all would deplore an issuing into social anarchy and moral chaos. The spirit of the New Order will largely depend upon the transition period, whether it is bridged by revolution or by self-sacrifice. The feeling of the masses moves towards what is called 'direct action,' which wisely motivated may work in a social, or blindly in an anti-social way. Personal anger is due to a failure in moral resource. In a nation or class it becomes a blind emotion—as smoke rising before fire enkindles—of revolution or of war. So war begins, so revolution has its origin, in the failure of moral resource. War can never cease till we expunge from our mind the thought that by war we may end war. Neither can we establish an ideal by a revolution of force, but its own nature will be reflected in the new society. The ages are marked by the swing of the pendulum from one extreme to the other.

Rightly regarded, Principle is Power. It is ineffectual because it is not applied. Self-sacrifice is the application of Principle when it works contrary to one's own personal interests. The true Pacifist whose conscience rises against war, in practice cannot but feel the inward monition to separate himself from the conditions that engender war. Here indeed is the

spiritual issue, and it is *the* way out of the social difficulty. But to do this, some would urge, is impossible, for these very conditions cover every phase of human activity. It is indeed difficult when we consider all the ramifications of modern society; for besides being broad-based economically on a competitive mode of living, its influence reaches far into the inner sphere of our common thought. Many are troubled beyond measure, but hesitate in taking definite action by reason of social or family obligations. Nor should they be blamed for such a hesitancy. Nor would it be well to make so stern a separation without facing the issue and counting the cost. Great is the self-sacrifice required. The first enthusiasm over, it means the holding fast to a new standard against every kind of onset, both economical and spiritual. It may mean apparent failure in the eyes of the world. Yet it is through this opening of the spiritual ground that the power of God works. When a thing is impossible, it is time for it to be accomplished. Man's necessity is God's opportunity.

A great issue makes necessary a certain action. The action taken, it is found to have severed the tap-root of a larger growth than was imagined, and at first it is as if a portion of the very life has been cut away. The principle of that action proves, however, to be a germinal centre of a new *living* outlook upon life, richer and freer than what had been. There is a story of St. Cuthbert. On one of his missionary journeys a snowstorm drove his boat on the coast of Fife. "The snow closes the road along the shore," mourned his comrades; "the storm bars our way over sea." But Cuthbert joyfully answered: "There is still the way of heaven that lies open."

The way of self-sacrifice is the heavenly way, though it implies the giving up of much considered good; it opens a door of greater good when all other avenues are shut. When human methods are exhausted, the action of God takes place. Discernible in our affairs, it nurtures faith in Life itself, that faith concerning which Jesus taught, far-seeingly: "He that hath to him shall be given, but from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath."

It is the pursuit of an original motive unto an original understanding of life. It is here we find kinship with St. Francis of Assisi. Though he lived seven hundred years ago, he was faced with problems not wholly dissimilar from our own. It is said of him that he restored religion and averted social revolution. A child of the wealthy, he was yet touched to the quick by the sight of the social inequalities of his day, and the wrongs and hardships meted to the poor. He felt that the social system of his day, resting then, as now, upon a frankly material basis, was in deadly enmity to the whole tenor of the Gospel-message. On the one hand there was spiritual corruption, on the other social degradation. The returns went to the rich instead of, as he thought, by right to the poor. When his loving message thrilled the countryside, it became more compassionately gentle as he touched upon the sufferings of the Minors, the poor who had no social rights. He espoused their cause, taking on himself their very name. It was a strong inward pressure that made him, a young man, burst the fetters of the society he knew, and step out naked. It was a venture of faith arising out of a synthesis of the religious and social problems, a great belief that they are not two but one. Joy

burst from his heart with the new freedom gained. Possessions having dropt from him, he turned to the One Source for all his good. So resting, so trusting, he found himself marvellously upheld. This action, leading where he knew not, was germinal to all that followed. After a prolonged period of testing and difficulty, at first with hesitancy he began to express his thoughts. With an increasing audience his power of utterance grew. His obvious sincerity, his renunciation, his simplicity, the directness of his word so earnestly passionate, had almost magical effect. It was as a spring of pure water in a dry and thirsty land. Then one by one he was joined by others. The two or three became the nucleus of the Franciscan Order, dedicated to Poverty. It was not, while he had control, a mendicant order, but a labouring body, which always did good work for a sufficiency, beyond which they were not allowed to receive. Every brother that had no handicraft had to learn one. Only on missionary journeys were they permitted to beg, and then it was enjoined to maintain humility. They asked alms for no more than the immediate need, and it was for service rendered as emissaries of the Highest. In asking they were to give the 'Love of God,' bestowing a blessing. That Franciscan expression is still sometimes used, but with a changed emphasis. "You ask an alms for the Love of God," cried Francis. "Is it not like offering one hundred silver coins in exchange for one?" He dreamed of a fraternal social order that would embrace all people, and in which all, awake to the divine meaning, might receive their good as from God, all personal anxiety being freed through the balance of mutual service. As he emphasized the necessity of living the life rather than preaching, the

little communities formed were at first models of industry and good-will.

The true ground of separation from the social order of to-day is that same recognition which Francis had, that the social and religious problems are not two but one. It is the Franciscan challenge. It enforces the radical belief that Life and Religion are not separate but complementary. Without the one, in truth, not the other. Many from time to time have turned away from existing conditions to experiment in a new mode of living. And little communities have been formed, generally with very partial success. Usually the ruling motive has been either purely social or religious. The Franciscan motive is larger and richer, is prompted by loving service. Here the dissociation from the system is but to draw closer to the truly human, to renew the note of human praise, restore man's creative activity, find Life in Religion, Religion in Life. Because its communal activity finds its scope within a larger vision, it holds a greater measure of success. The ideal is a Fellowship, a Comradeship of Service, in which there is mutual confidence and co-operation in the fundamentals. In it man would enjoy a creative freedom, the bias of personal anxiety being removed.

The little pioneer communities referred to, which we recognize as having rendered yeoman service in more ways than one, in most cases, where failure has been obvious, have come to grief either through the clashing of temperaments or through the temptation of prosperity—not of adversity, as some might assume.

The communal life fails in its purpose, we conclude, when it is regarded as an end in itself. It is through a spiritual centralization that the temperamental diffi-

culties are overcome. Wealth coming in should not be hoarded, but utilized in improvement or in service, in extension of communal activity and propaganda, for a community while self-supporting should not be self-sufficing.

These difficulties are met at the outset by the New Franciscanism. There is no room for the protrusion of personalities, for he who serves most, is greatest in the Kingdom of God.

From the new synthesis of Life and Religion there arises the great Comradeship of Service, in which there is a loving interchange of material good. It would find expression in little Fellowship-groups, working together practical-wise, as far as possible, on the land. The acquirement of land free from all restrictions is absolutely essential for full freedom from the old conditions. The land is primary to all else. Through co-operative land-work are made possible a free development of the arts and crafts and a loving interchange of all the commodities of life. We can imagine the rich and close fellowship and intercourse between each group, also a central group established on the land which would be the heart of the movement, where all would gather periodically for inspiration and intimacy and special direction and communion. The spiritual life would be enhanced, the faculty of wonder developed, the heart of man fired with love, and there would be a speeding of the great propaganda: "Peace on earth to men of goodwill." From the holy synthesis of Life and Religion there should eventuate this organic comradeship with heart of love, working with single motive the whole will of God. It was out of religious enthusiasm that the mediæval cathedrals had their origin. We marvel at the wealth of detail, the



loving devotion spent on every part, each having its due place in the unity of the whole. Out of the New Franciscanism, working with the materials of life itself, there will arise a more beautiful edifice, in which every human activity will have its due part, each affording its measure of worship to the larger harmony.

RICHARD WHITWELL.

## COBWEBS.

### THE FANTASY OF A SEPTEMBER MORNING.

I AWOKE with the ringing of bells in my ears—millions of bells, pealing with a delicious, irresponsible gaiety that took me straight into fairyland. At the same time my practical, work-a-day self began to respond to its prosaic summons.

“Anything I can do for you?”—I asked drowsily, sitting up in bed. Laughter of the same foamy quality greeted the question. I saw that the sky was flushed with dawn; beneath it the moor, rosy and misty, seemed to shake itself, like a child on waking.

I said to myself: “The wind blowing through the heather!”

But there was no wind; only a great stillness, as of Nature expectant, hushed at the advent of the rising sun. Again there came that merry, joyous peal of bells. I saw the common as one vast camp of shining gossamer, cunningly stretched from tuft to tuft among the heather; poised above, aerial bell-ringers seemed to swing the blossoms to and fro.

“So that’s how it’s done,” slipped unawares from my lips; and a voice in my ear whispered joyously: “Of course, how blind you’ve been!”

“I was sleeping,” said I, indignantly.

“You were indeed,” returned my visitor. “We thought you would never wake; it isn’t often we have to ring all our bells. We tried lots of other things

first," continued the spokesman gleefully. "First we shook the dew out of our wings on to your eyelids; then we persuaded a bat to stay up a little longer and flap his wings in your face. We sent spiders . . . oh, enormous spiders!"

But at that I sprang hastily out of bed and, kneeling on the window-seat, peered down on to the heather for my strange awakener.

The wild solitary moor had become a kaleidoscope of colour; brilliant, winged creatures flitted to and fro beneath gossamer awnings with a motion set to the rhythm of bells and laughter. I became as a child again, playing with foam on the sea-shore, sailing fearless on the crest of waves, borne as a leaf on the wind—a creature of froth, mirth and moonshine.

"What a lot you've missed!" said the voice again. This time it came from below the window, and I saw my friend, like a human dragon-fly, seated on a tuft of heather.

"I suppose so," said I, rather wistfully. "But was it my fault?"

At that there came a fresh peal of laughter that rippled like a young waterfall away into the distance and echoed back from the hills.

"Why, of course!" said my caller of the Dawn. "It's your fault for sleeping so soundly. We ring and laugh and call every morning . . . but you never hear."

"Yet," returned I thoughtfully, "I saw your tents."

"Oh, yes, *outside*," was the mocking answer. "But what's the use of that? You didn't ever look inside. So it doesn't count, you know."

An aphorism darted through my mind: "As within, so without." But before I could utter it, my friend beneath the window had seized and flung it back to me.

"How can you walk backwards until you have learned to *see* backwards?" was the retort. "Now can you tell me what we are making inside our tents?"

"Dreams?" I asked, as some filmy picture floated through my consciousness.

"Dreams!" echoed my informant. And every one of all those myriad voices caught up the word, flung it to the hills that tossed it back till it dropped, with all its swinging, haunting melody, into the drowsy humming of the heather.

"Try again!" cried the mocking, elusive voice. "You're very near!—But get underneath the dreams, and then you'll see."

A chorus of voices, clear and low, from moor, hill and forest called my name. Not indeed that known to my waking self, but another, strangely familiar, out of the long-ago, drawing me with alluring sweetness back to the life that I recognized as once my own . . . . Looking down I saw I too had wings.

"Oh, hurry, hurry," they cried, "for the sun is coming, and with the first glimpse of him behind the hill we flee, we flee."

I spread my wings. Then the room behind me with its treasures and solid comfort became the dream, the shadow, the phantom of reality; while whither I went, what my soul yearned for, became life indeed. It seemed afterwards the most natural thing in the world to sit swinging on the slender branches of a baby pine amidst all that surging throb of sound and motion in the beauty of the young dawn. But memory, elusive as ever, cheated me yet.

"I know," I pleaded, "but have forgotten. I feel you," I cried; "but words slip away. They will not help me."

Smiling eyes, blue as heaven itself, looked down into mine.

"We are the dew of the world," they said, "the laughter that hides behind tears, the mists about the soul of pain, sunlight through storms. We are mirth and fun and the joy of life. We creep in behind your dreams and sing to you. We kiss your eyelids and shake dew over them before we fly away. We leave the thoughts that burst like bubbles in the air, radiant with colour, that spread as ripples on the surface of still water. We send the laughter that helps to bear the weight of grief—the other side of tragedy."

A sigh like a sobbing wind passed over the moor, and once more a single voice took up the theme.

"You won't listen!" it said. "The children hear, but as you grow up, your ears are stuffed with chaff and a film grows in front of your eyes. You are all so 'ternally busy with your silly outside things that you no longer see us at all, nor hear us, no matter how we call and ring."

"But surely," I objected, "those gleams at odd moments, the laughter that shines on the hidden pain . . . forgotten dreams . . ."

But the figures beneath the tents of gossamer were fading as the light grew. Like a far-away echo came the chorus of silvery voices:

"We are the forgotten dreams—forgotten dreams . . ."

I opened my eyes, drowsily conscious of moisture on the lids. Elusive memory, hiding behind the waking brain, defied me; and then emerged.

"Dew!" I cried exultantly, and springing out of bed caught the last faint flicker of wings, the last iridescent sparkles of powdered gold, as the forgotten dream fled, vanishing into the daylight.

Outside on the common a thousand cobwebs glittered as the sunbeams played on woof and warp. Dewdrops, like stars, shone from grass and heather. Birds called; insects hummed. Strangely and wonderfully the mystery of the dawn passed into familiar sound and movement. The golden morning lay around me, as a cloud of glory about a song.

The sweet early morning scent of sun on pine and heather blew through my window; a light breeze ruffled the awnings of the deserted tents. Later they too would disappear, to be woven anew with the new day. . . .

But I had caught my dream on the wing, for though it fled, the dew and the gold dust glittered still on my eyelids, and the dream lay in my heart.

L. HILAL.

## THE SONG OF BEING.

### AT THE WHEEL OF GOD.

ON generation generation rolls :  
God at the wheel of human souls  
Pours and kneads and bakes the clay,  
Breathing his soul in a timeless lay.

“Transparent are ye, and hard,  
Beautiful, lightning-starred,  
Strong as the mountains are,  
Bright as an only star.  
Vessels, that rise  
From the fire of my eyes,  
Remain ye pure  
While the stars endure,  
Holy and sure,—  
While time and space and stars endure.”

But alas for the vessels God shaped on His mighty  
wheel !

They were broken, smitten, dishonoured, scattered  
piecemeal.

They returned to God like an impure corpse,  
Like a piece of drift the surge of the grey tide warps.

But God in His grace divine  
Salved His vessels all pure and all fine.  
They were placed in parchment-fold  
And washed with virgin-gold.  
To withstand their foes He made  
Them strong and unafraid.

And they were strewn  
With wonder-stone  
A glory to behold.

But alas! the gold was stolen away ;  
They made them gods of gold and clay ;  
They made them chains to fetter their bones ;  
They taunted each other with gleam of stones.  
The naked were robbed, skinned, disgraced ;  
The parchment-wounds were dust-defaced.  
And worse than ever in time before  
The vessels were eaten by rot and sore.

God strengthened them now with roofs of steel ;  
But they smote each other with rod and wheel.  
They danced hell-dances upon each other ;  
Each impure pot defiled his brother.  
There was never a question throughout the void :  
The vessels were shattered, scattered, destroy'd.

Now was a night of glooms and fears ;  
And God, enthroned beyond His spheres,  
Said in His lonely grief apart :

“ My clay is rotten unto the heart !  
It will not take  
The impress of the form I make.  
I shall not strive with it again ;  
It will not keep for all my pain.  
It is no use to violate  
A clay instinct with evil hate.  
I shall not use this clay nor mend  
Until so be my kingdom end.”

Yea, was there wrath in the eyes of God.  
He poured the clay and His vast feet trod



The clay upon His stellar floor  
To be black waste for all time more.  
Veiling His mercy then He said  
In a great cry, while lightnings shed  
Stupendous flames around His head,

    In a great cry  
    Which split the sky,  
In a great cry which woke the dead :

    “ No more, no more,  
    I shall sing no more  
    The Song of Being  
    With evil clay ;  
    Till huge seas, fleeing  
    At my decreeing,  
    Shall mix the howling night with day ;  
    Till underneath my hands  
    Be neither stars nor lands ;  
Till space is a blindness of waters and rocks are sands.”

MOYSHEH OYVED.

## IT.

THERE was a man not like the other men ;  
He walked from now until he came to then.  
He did not like the others, dull and fat ;  
And bored with this he only wanted that.  
He found his world uninteresting and bare ;  
Here was so stupid that he longed for there.  
He walked and walked and walked and would not stay  
Until he found himself in yesterday ;  
He hated that, he fled from all his sorrow,  
He passed to-day again and found to-morrow,  
He found out what and where and why and how ;  
And satisfied he turned again to Now.

VIA PLANCHETTE.

Aug. 1921.

(The above poem was obtained automatically in the same fashion as was so humorously narrated by our contributor L. M. Corry in 'Some Problems of the Subconscious' (Oct. no. 1920). If any reader can 'spot' the source from which it is derived, will he kindly communicate with the Editor? The Planchettists and their friends have been unable to identify it.—ED.)

## CORRESPONDENCE.

PERMIT me to correct some slight inaccuracies in the remarks contained in your review<sup>1</sup> of my book *Tertium Organum*.

First of all, I am not the person to whom the book is ascribed by my translators. I am not a professor of mathematics, and never was. The fact is that one of the translators, Mr. Bessarabof, became interested in my book while he was abroad and, when he tried to discover who and where I was, a friend of his mentioned a professor of mathematics of the same name at the St. Petersburg Institute of Engineering. Mr. Bessarabof put two and two together, as he imagined, and ascribed my book to the professor. As it was impossible to communicate with St. Petersburg, Mr. Bessarabof together with Mr. Claude Bragdon translated and published my book and only later, about a year ago, through my London friends got into communication with me at Constantinople, where I had come from South Russia.

Something very similar occurred in the title of my book. To the title *Tertium Organum* the translators added an explanatory sub-title—'The Third Organ of Thought'—which gives quite a wrong interpretation of the idea. The Russian word translated by the word 'organ' means 'weapon' or 'instrument,' and not in any case an organ. The phrase is taken from the text of the book. On page 270 there are the following lines :

"I have called this system of higher logic *Tertium Organum* because for us it is the third instrument of thought after those of Aristotle and Bacon. The first was *Organon* ; the second *Novum Organum*. But the third existed earlier than the first.

"Man, master of this key, may open the door of the world of causes without fear."

These lines in my opinion affirm with sufficient clearness that I do not claim to have invented a new instrument of thought and still less to have discovered 'a third organ of thought.' By my title I simply intended to say that a much deeper and larger understanding of the possibilities of logic had existed far earlier than the narrow frames given us by Aristotle and Bacon, in which almost all subsequent thought has been confined, leaving that which could not be there included as illogical.

London, October 25, 1921.

P. OUSPENSKY.

<sup>1</sup> See 'A Speculation in Fourth Dimensionalism,' in the last no.—Ed.

## REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

### ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.

By Baron Friedrich von Hügel, LL.D., D.D. London (Dent);  
pp. 308; 15s. net.

THESE essays are all written with that deep apprehension of spiritual realities, generous appreciation of the sincerity of much he disapproves in views he criticizes, and transparent desire not to misrepresent those views, while yet remaining rock-sure of the superiority, nay of the absolute nature, of the Roman Catholic position in all fundamental respects, which we expect to find in the always instructive and arresting writings of this learned and saintly writer, who has won for himself the hearts of so many who are outside his own communion, and yet not for that communion. These essays and addresses, which have been delivered mainly to important gatherings representative of a deep interest in the Christian religion though drawn from the membership of Churches other than the author's own, cover a very wide field. Though written or delivered at very varying dates, the central ideas and main contentions are so consistent and one with another, that they can easily be brought together within one cover and co-ordinated. They fall into three groups: (i.) 'Religion in General and Theism'; (ii.) 'The Teaching of Jesus and Christianity in General'; (iii.) 'The Church and Catholicism Generally.' If we may say so, this book is more clearly phrased than has been the case with the two great works by which the Baron is chiefly known. At any rate we have found little difficulty here in following his thought and appreciating it. This does not mean to say that we can assent to all his positions and conclusions; if we did, we should be convinced, not only of the main traditional doctrines of General Christianity, but of Roman Catholicism itself, and this is not the case. Many things which Baron von Hügel generously admits with regard to the nature of the earliest documents are such that we can by no means draw the same inferences from them as he does. We read him always with respect; with much profit where spiritual insight is the topic, especially appreciating his unwear-

ing attempt to rescue spirituality from all abstractionism, but with reservation frequently in his interpretations of history. If only we could have many such sincere and cultured minds blended with warm affections striving to get to the heart of the matter in face of the concrete facts, not only in the various Christian communities, but also in those of the other great religions the world over, and could bring them together into some sort of a co-operative union, it would indeed be very well. We doubt not but that they would, when brought together, find that some of the things which previously they had severally thought most necessary to insist upon as essential, were after all, in the light of union, secondary and not primary.

Two of these richly thoughtful papers have already appeared in THE QUEST.

#### THEISM IN MEDIAEVAL INDIA.

Lectures delivered in Essex Hall, London, Oct.-Dec., 1919. The Hibbert Lectures, Second Series. By J. Estlin Carpenter, D.Litt. London (Williams & Norgate); pp. 552; 24s. net.

WE extend a very warm welcome to Dr. Estlin Carpenter's Hibbert Lectures. They make a thick volume; but there is not a dull or uninteresting page from the first to the last. Our Hibbert Lecturer, who holds one of the only three chairs for comparative religion in this so far forth benighted land, knows how to present his subject to less instructed minds than his own, knows what the vast majority of his readers want to know, and does not expect they should be acquainted with a glossary of technical Sanskrit and Pāli terms before they are deemed competent to follow the expositions of his wide and informing researches. He is no pedant, but an educator. Above all we are pleased with Dr. Estlin Carpenter's sympathy and impartiality in treating the many aspects of his subject, and with the comprehensive survey he has given us, which includes all the main modes of presentation of the Divine nature which the rich religious consciousness of India directly and indirectly has initiated and developed. Thus our author deals in the main divisions of his course of eight lengthy Lectures with: The Origins and Developments of Theistic (i.e. Mahāyāna) Buddhism (2 Lects.); Popular Theism: Brahmā; Religious Philosophy in the Great Epic (The Mahābhārata); The Trimūrti (Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Shiva); Philosophy and Religion in Śaivism; Religion and Philosophy in Vaiṣṇavism; and

**Hinduism and Islām (2 Lects.).** There follows an instructive and impartial Note on Christianity in India, in which any probable influence of the former on mediæval Indian religious consciousness is reduced to proper proportions. The whole work is well supplied with references to the chief works on all the many various subjects dealt with, showing how wide has been the reading of this highly cultured mind in the humanistic comparative study of religion. A Unitarian by personal conviction, Dr. Estlin Carpenter has here a subject dear to his heart, and, because of his more comprehensive view, is on the one hand saved from the restrictions of sectarian apologetic, and on the other remains securely on the religious ground, keenly interested in spiritual values and not simply coldly analysing and contrasting the forms of theories, to the neglect of the life they have vehicled and still vehicle. We warmly recommend to our readers this eminently successful attempt to present to the English reader a general view of the phases of Theism in Mediæval India. It will give them an insight into the heart of the matter, and help them the better to realize India's more mature contribution to the religious heritage of our common humanity; for we hold that what is truly spiritual in religion is a common heritage free to all who will avail themselves of it, as open as is science, and not to be confined to any race or sect or land or time.

‘PHÉNICIENS.’

*Essai de Contribution à l'Histoire antique de la Méditerranée*  
par C. Autran de l'École des Hautes Études, Pensionnaire  
de l'Institut Français d'Archéologie du Caire. Paris  
(Geuthner); fol. pp. 146; 80frs.

THE ‘Phenicians,’ in quotes, of M. Autran are not the Semitic Phenicians of history, but an ‘Asianic’ people or groups of peoples to whom, he contends, the prehellenic Mediterranean owed its civilization. By ‘Asianic’ our author means tribes and nations on the coast of Asia Minor, such as the Trojans, Carians, Lycians, Lydians, Cilicians, Pisidians, Mysians, etc., who were in close connection with the prehellenic population of the isles, and therewith of Crete. He pushes further inland, moreover, tracing his ‘Phenicians’ to Little Armenia, Sarmatia and Cappadocia, the last being the chief centre of the Hittites in the historic period, and speaks of three great invasions

of these highly civilized folk out of the Asia Minor hinterland into the Mediterranean basin,—three waves: (1) The Lelegian Phœnician; (2) The Hittite; (3) The Iranian. He first criticizes the academic theory, going back to Movers' famous monograph *Die Phönizier*, which makes the historic Phœnicians Semites by relying on an inadequate linguistic analysis of a few names and words, and contends that Greek and Hebrew in common have many loan-words from the ancient speech of his 'Phœnicians' proper, of whom the Phœnicians of history were but a single colony. The enquiry is largely philological, linguistic, onomastic, and is conducted by one who is widely equipped in a knowledge of ancient and modern tongues. Myths, legends and the most ancient chronicalism and beginnings of history are laid under contribution; and the author is well aware of the many pitfalls that beset his course and treats all his subject-matter by the light of a scientific method and prudent criticism. He puts forth his essay as a pioneer suggestion only, a sketch of outlines for future research. The following summary may give the reader some idea of M. Autran's general thesis.

The legend of a Semitic Kadmos and Phœnix, he claims to have shown, does not for very long maintain itself under examination, even though in the nature of things this examination cannot be quite methodical. The essayist maintains that the comparison of Greek and Semitic names is not especially convincing in this respect; that the so-called kinship of the lexicons reduces itself in fine to a small number of words of an isolated character both in Hebrew and Greek; that the nature even of the influence exercised and undergone as well as the historical probabilities are clearly unfavourable to the traditional interpretation; that the examination of the Hellenic pantheon does not discover a single Semitic god; that the analysis of the technical vocabulary excludes this Semitic influence also; that archeology and comparative philology are no less unacquainted with it. When, however, we review the problem from a different aspect, the communication between Hellas and the Asianic world, we find on the contrary an intimate correlation between the proper names of places and persons, and between historical and religious traditions, pantheons and heroic legends. As to Kadmos and Phœnix especially, the main agents of Phœnician influence in Greece, the connection of their families with Asia Minor and the Ægean appears still more striking in spite of their Tyrian and Sidonian origin. The author draws attention in Greek literature to the relatively frequent use of the non-Semitic words

'Phoenix' and 'Phenician' to signify, not Semites, but certain elements pertaining to peoples to whom he has given the name 'Asiatic,' who were dominant in Asia Minor and the Mediterranean from about 3000 to 1200 B.C. He believes he has shown that tribes of that family were established at a very early date in Canaanite territory, where they have left in local names, in the construction of 'strong places' and in pottery, numerous and striking traces of their presence. The testimony of chronology, of archæology—Trojan, Canaanite, Mycenaean—and also up to a certain point of Greek heroic traditions strengthens the *ensemble* of these convergent indications. Moreover the relative lateness of Phenician inscriptions in a Semitic dialect affords a new support to these presumptions. It is true that the greater portion of all these coincidences does not constitute a thorough proof. But for the latter, it is very much to be feared, we shall have long to wait owing to the poverty of our sources. Nevertheless the whole evidence seems to offer the historian a sufficiently coherent brief to hold the ground until fresh evidence can effect a more complete proof. In any case, M. Autran hopes that the various indications he has collected in his critical study, are sufficiently definite for '*la Grande Phénicie*' of the Carians and their Ægean cousins—Achæans, Gergithites, Solymites—to have henceforth a part in the history of civilization at least equal to that of Semitic Phenicia which succeeded to it and masked it, but which never even remotely showed itself able to replace it.

The whole essay is deserving of the close attention of scholars; it is also of interest to the general reader, especially for the finely written sketch of the chief features of this remarkable prehellenic civilization at the end. As Prof. Flinders Petrie remarked to the reviewer recently, what we most want now in our comparative studies in the history of religion is a better knowledge of Asia Minor from 2000 to 1000 B.C., and M. Autran's essay is a valuable contribution of background in this direction, though unfortunately he deals little with the religious question. We know of two unpublished works, of long years of research but different points of view, tending in the direction of a language and a civilization lying back on the one side of Hellenic and on the other of Iranian and Indian culture-origins, which have points of contact with this study of what M. Autran calls 'Phéniciens,' in quotes, the *x* of a number of exceedingly important unsolved literary and archeological equations.



## THE LIFE BEYOND THE VEIL.

Spirit Messages received and written down by the Rev. G. Vale Owen, Vicar of Orford, Lancashire. Book IV.: The Battalions of Heaven. London (Thornton Butterworth); pp. 252; 7s. 6d. net.

THIS is the concluding volume of the extensive Vale Owen scripts, recently published in the columns of *The Weekly Despatch*, the three preceding volumes of which we have already brought to our readers' notice. Many of the ideas set forth in these pages strongly remind us of those in Swedenborg's writings, and a series of interesting papers bringing out numerous parallels therein has recently appeared in the Spiritualistic weekly *Light*, which has taken on a new lease of vigour lately. For all students of psychical phenomena, and especially those engaged upon the analysis and evaluation of the contents of scripts, Mr. Vale Owen's pages supply a rich material. Like the rest of the better class of Spiritualistic communications, however, they raise a host of ghostly problems from A to Z of the psychical alphabet and from alpha to omega of the theological. After allowing for the inescapable fact that 'messages' of this order must always be mediated through the subconscious of the sensitive, these rumours of the hither hereafter may not unreasonably be held in some measure to set forth imaginally such restricted phases of the proximate conditions of the presumably infinitely extensible state of other-world life as fall within the immediate purview of the communicators. To this view at any rate we are ourselves inclined after many years of study and research. These invisibles appear severally to share in the same order of mingled intellectual and emotional life as ourselves; with this marked difference, however, that the psychic intensification of the life in the hither hereafter seems generally strongly to stress the emotional element at the expense of the rational. This may very probably be the general case in the earlier stages, where it is difficult to stand upright in the ever more vivid and more potent stream of the intensified life of the emotions; for all reports of the happier stages depict a life of sensuous, if not sensual, enravishment for the better sort, with a corresponding depression or coarsening of sense-capacity, though with intensified conditions of pain, in the case of the unfortunates who still seek to indulge their animal lusts and passions. It is the continuation of a material and embodied

existence. In all the range of Spiritualistic literature there is found no such entity as a bodiless spirit; and we are inclined to think that, as far as this range of experience is concerned, it is most probably so. But though we are no defenders of ultimate dualism, philosophical or religious, as the terms 'bodiless' and 'immaterial' might seem to suggest, it by no means seems necessary to believe that the spirit in man is to be for ever clothed upon by a human form either resembling his present shape, even though this be sublimated and glorified, or emitting a radiance of a star-like or even solar order. The volume before us is deeply exercised about such spectacular psychical vestures. We are not so foolish as to deny that such things may be, but what we do question is their having anything fundamentally to do with genuine, not to speak of ultimate, spiritual realities or values. The notion that the more potent, wise and good a spirit is, the more brilliantly and spectacularly he shines in external vestments, is, in our humble opinion, no true canon of the law of genuine spiritual reality. This superficial standard of worth is inherited from the most naïve of notions of our primitive forebears.

It is the question of values we are here considering, and not possibilities of psychical phenomena. From this deeper ethical standpoint, we venture to think that the spirit of holiness has no need to deck itself out in gauds, either physical or psychical. Moral realism, the truly divine, we would believe, is to be apprehended in a totally different order of appearance. It is not to be envisaged in its truth by notions bred in us by the shows of that superficial line of heredity which has given rise successively to the tawdry trappings of a savage chief, to the advertising insignia of his dressed-up successor in the kingship of civilized nations, to the pagan and biblical representations of gods and angels, or even to the nimbs and aureoles of saintly personages. All this order of representation is based on the same naïve conceit of outer signs of inner powers and virtues. It seems time at long last for us, profiting by the admonitions and examples of the most highly spiritual of the great teachers of this infant humanity, to make use of a more delicate and penetrating canon of reality. "When I was a child I thought as a child; but now I have put away childish things." So declared Paul; but he was still great on glories. Most of us are still infants to-day in this matter and apparently are content to remain so for long after death. But there are those who long to see in spirit and in truth, and such rumours do not seem to them to tell of the truly Beatific Vision.

## MITHRAISM AND CHRISTIANITY.

A Study in Comparative Religion. By L. Patterson, M.A., Trinity College, Cambridge, Vice-Principal of Chichester Theological College. Cambridge (The University Press); pp. 102; 6s. net.

THIS is a painstaking study, at the end of which Mr. Patterson concludes that the similarities are comparatively very slight and the differences very great, and that the former can be more readily explained on the psychological theory, that similar religious traits and rites arise in similar circumstances, than on the rival theory of borrowing or of the naïve Patristic notion of plagiarism by anticipation at the hands of demons. On the whole we agree, but with the reservation that in the days of a Justin and a Tertullian there were sources of information open to them which we no longer possess; these gave them such deep cause for disquietude or even bitter amazement that we cannot dismiss the fact lightly simply because of their fantastic theory to account for it. Supposing that to-day we possessed no more information about Christianity than we can gather of Mithraism from its comparatively few monuments, inscriptions and literary references,—what could we make out of the religion of the Christ, if all that remained were the ruins of a few churches with some scattered inscriptions? No gospels, no service-books, no account of the sacred *logos* of the God, no narrative of his exploits,—and we had to guess at the story from a *bas-relief* or two? What sort of a just comparison could we make between such a decayed corpse of Christianity and any great living faith? We are glad to note that Mr. Patterson admits the genuineness of the Mithra-liturgy, agreeing with Dieterich over against Cumont; this should have given him a deeper insight into the true heart of the matter than he seems to have reached. He will have it moreover, from an Avestan parallel, that the mystic banquet consisted, not only of wine, the Western equivalent of *haoma*, and of thin, unleavened breads or cakes, scarcely larger than a crown-piece, which (as we know from the monuments) were marked with a cross, but also of fragments of meat placed on these wafers. The Mithra-monuments, however, in no sense confirm this last feature of the parallel; and even if they did, we should have to remember the representations of the loaves-and-fishes-meal, so reminiscent of the Jewish Messianic banquet *motif*, in Early Christian iconography, and also that the occasion of the institution of the Eucharist was, according to the Synoptists, the Pascal lamb commemorative

ceremonial meal. Nevertheless we do not suggest that the theory of plagiarism holds here or is to be preferred to the psychological; we note only that the facts are not fully exposed by Mr. Patterson, who takes the gospel-narratives as they stand without analysis. On the whole our author has laboured to make himself acquainted with the history and development of Mazdaism, but with our present knowledge Darmesteter's date and theories are manifestly not to be endorsed. Thus the five *gāthās*, the earliest pieces of the Avesta, are far more likely to be placed about 1000 B.C. as Moulton has shown, than assigned to 500 B.C., as Darmesteter supposed and Mr. Patterson uncritically accepts. The exported Mithra-mysteries, as we know them, were highly syncretistic, and retained, among other non-Persian elements, far-off echoes of the ancient Cretan bull-cult, as the writer has tried to indicate in the proem of his recently-published study of *The Doctrine of the Subtle Body in Western Tradition*. Moreover, it can be shown that chivalry very probably goes back to ancient Persian origins, and that the Mithra-cult played a prominent part therein. The last word has by no means been said on the subject.

#### A HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.

By Prof. Karl Joël. Tübingen (J. C. B. Mohr); vol. i., pp. xiv. + 990; M.120 = about 10s.

OUR eminent collaborator, who contributed to our pages his since famous paper on 'The Romanticism of the Early Thinkers of Hellas,'<sup>1</sup> has at last begun to publish his long-expected *magnum opus*,—a new, modern history of Greek Philosophy. The previous standard works on the subject are on our shelves, and we are certainly glad to have and to use them as works of reference. While perhaps to-day nobody cares to read through E. Zeller's six volumes, Gomperz' and Burnet's well-known books are beyond doubt very attractive literature. Yet they too will probably not be very congenial to most readers of *THE QUEST* because of their—at times quite insufferable—rationalistic attitude towards those early systems of Ionian thought and imagination, which are of a distinctly mystical character, however many roots of the later rational and scientific speculation they may contain. The present reviewer, who has devoted years of the most painstaking research-work to the study of the early mystical and orientalizing stage of Greek thought,

<sup>1</sup> See July no., 1912; and also 'Archaic Romanticism: The Dawn of Nature Philosophy,' Oct. no., 1912.

and who has earned little thanks for it at the hands of the disciples of the Zeller school, welcomes with the greatest satisfaction the publication of a book, which at last shows a more sympathetic attitude towards the transition period 'From Religion to Philosophy.' (It is a pity, by the by, that Prof. Joël seems to have overlooked F. M. Cornford's excellent book on the subject which appeared under this title in 1912.) While amply quoting from the reviewer's book *Weltenmantel und Himmelszelt* (1910) and most kindly accepting a number of its results, the author has to my great regret neglected to discuss some of its most fundamental theses. I will not reproach him for not endorsing my own and W. Schultz' theories on the peculiar 'isopsephic,' that is grammato-arithmetical, basis of the Pythagorean number-lore (see my paper on the Epitaph of Abercius in *THE QUEST*, Jan. 1914), for Schultz has never published the promised proofs of his hypothesis and Joël could not know that I have since collected them for the use of my friend Dr. Dornseiff, who is just about to publish a book on ancient 'letter-mysticism.' But my explanation of the strange 'initial' problem of Ionian speculation, that is of the 'archê' notion—whether the 'beginning' of the world was 'water,' 'air' or 'fire'—with reference to the astromystic notion of a 'great world-year' with an 'airy' spring, a 'fiery' summer and a 'watery' winter, which could of course begin with any one of its three seasons, would seem to have deserved at least some discussion. This may seem a somewhat arrogant assumption on the part of the reviewer, who is, although long past the youthful age when he sowed his wild oats in the fields of comparative religion, still by far the celebrated author's junior. Yet this notion of the 'great world-cycle,' the main idea of Iranian Zrvanism, is certainly the starting point of Ionian speculation and the historic connecting link between the history of Occidental, that is Greek, and Oriental that is Indian, cosmology. I treasure a letter of the late Prof. Paul Deussen's, who wrote that, if he had but known in time my comparative materials about the Iranian Zrvanism, the Indian *Kāla*-doctrine and the 'Chronos'- or 'Æon'-mysticism of the Ionian Greeks, he would have been able to unite the now disconnected first (Oriental) and second (European) part of his life's work into a real 'world-history' (*Universalgeschichte*) of philosophy. With all that, it is a pleasant duty for the present reviewer to say that Joël's enormous work is a most fascinating and suggestive book and that in spite of its bulk it makes one long impatiently for the next volume. Indeed I have read these thousand pages from cover

to cover, and they have made me neglect for a whole long week the most pressing 'pot-boiling' work of the day. If by chance you happen to open it anywhere, while standing on your library-ladder, do not forget to climb down at once. Else you may awake with a start to profane every-day reality some hours later, a good deal wiser than before, but in a very cramped position! There is no such danger with any other 'History of Ancient Philosophy' I know of. The volume reaches from Pherecydes and Thales to Socrates and the Socratic schools of thought. May the author live to write, and the reviewer to read and enjoy, the following chapters from Plato to Plotinus and Porphyry.

R. E.

Feldafing, 1921.

#### STUDIES IN ISLAMIC MYSTICISM.

By Reynold Alleyne Nicholson, Litt.D., LL.D., Lecturer in Persian in the University of Cambridge, formerly Fellow of Trinity College. Cambridge (The University Press); pp. xii. + 282; 24s. net.

#### STUDIES IN ISLAMIC POETRY.

By the same Author and from the same Publishers; pp. xii. + 300; 24s. net.

WE should like to write a substantive article-review on these two fascinating volumes; but time and space forbid. The brevity of this notice must be regarded as in inverse ratio to the value of the volumes. Dr. Reynold A. Nicholson, one of our most distinguished contributors, needs no introduction to readers of *THE QUEST*. All that comes from his pen deserves the closest study of every lover of Islamic mysticism, for he can find no saner guide and no one in the West who has made a deeper study of the vast original material in Arabic and Persian. Sūfism has a peculiar fascination of its own, as well as most instructive and interesting connections with other of the great traditions of mystical experience. What we find in Dr. Nicholson's work is never a vain repetition or pedestrian summary of those who have preceded him in the West, but always something new, always most valuable pioneer-work adding to our knowledge. Our author has, indeed, an intimate acquaintance with all the prior work of Occidental Orientalists who have devoted themselves to Moslim studies; but his chief authorities are the sages and poets of Islam themselves and their co-religionist commentators. It follows that we have in Nicholson's work the

fruits of the ripest scholarship and first-hand research. But this is not all. There are those who take mystical works as their subject-matter and treat them as solely philological and historical phenomena, with a detachment that presents their readers with nothing but the dry bones abstracted from the living body of the thing itself. Our author is not one of those soulless desiccating dissectors and anatomists. He treats his vast spiritual theme with insight and delicate sympathy, while remaining on the ground of a sane and reasonable criticism which penetrates to the heart of the matter and points true to the centre. There is much in Sūfism which should appeal to students of Western mysticism who are not sentimentalists and love simplicity, directness and virility in sacred things and a theology that ever under all circumstances looks to God alone. It is astonishing that so little attention is paid by compilers of what purport to be historical mystical works in the West, to this rich treasure of inmost religious experience which the Moslim seers and philosophers of the spirit have piled up through the centuries. Personally we have learned much from our valued collaborator, and of his prior output would specially mention his fine translation, introduction and commentary on the most ancient and celebrated Persian treatise on Sūfism, the *Kashf al-Mahjūb* of al-Hujwiri (in The Gibb Memorial Series, 1911), and his delightful small volume *The Mystics of Islam* (The Quest Series, 1914), which we can safely recommend to our readers as the most convenient and instructive introduction to Sūfism of our acquaintance. Dr. Nicholson's latest *Studies in Islamic Mysticism* are devoted to Abū Sa'īd ibn Abi 'l-Khayr and his treatise on 'The Perfect Man' and to the Odes of Ibnu 'l-Fāriḍ. The volume is crammed full of delightful and deep things; the prose and verse of the versions are dignified, and the general treatment excellent. This volume of the two under notice will doubtless be the more attractive to readers of THE QUEST, but they should not miss the second. In it Dr. Nicholson gives us for the first time the graceful rendering of an Early Persian Anthology, written by an Arab of the first part of the eleventh century. 'The Meditations of Ma'arri' are very vivid and vigorous and express modern thought in exceedingly elaborate verse-forms. The difficulties of rendering the original are very great, but Dr. Nicholson seems to have overcome them with signal success, judging by their favourable acceptance at the hands of competent critics. Our poet and scholar and deep knower of Sūfism has presented us in his last two books with a rich and rare banquet indeed. We tender him our most grateful thanks.

## STUDIES IN CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.

The Boyle Lectures, 1920. By W. R. Matthews, M.A., B.D. London (Macmillan); pp. xiv.+231; 12s. net.

THIS book contains the six lectures which comprise the first series of the Boyle Lectures delivered in 1920. In his Preface to the present volume Prof. Matthews, Dean of King's College, University of London, states his intention of dealing with the subjects of Revelation and Incarnation in the two succeeding courses. It is important to state this fact, since it explains both the introductory character of the present volume and also excuses the author for a somewhat cursory treatment of these two vitally important Christian doctrines.

In the first lecture Prof. Matthews sets out very clearly his conception of the true relationship between philosophy and theology. He shows a power of critical analysis in dealing with the position of Croce which is at once stimulating and fearless. He refuses to identify himself with Croce's view of the origin and nature of religion and that myth is primitive philosophy. Myth deals with representations instead of concepts and therefore, so the author of this book would have us believe, it is at best only an imperfect philosophy. The whole relationship between philosophy and religion is called into question in the teaching of Croce. Croce would identify them; whereas Prof. Matthews would, at any rate for the present, keep them separate. Our lecturer, however, goes so far as to admit that "Croce is right in holding that there is no inherent and necessary distinction between them." Such difference as does exist is due to their imperfect development and to historical causes. Ultimately they will unite, but Prof. Matthews refuses to predict which, if either, will absorb the other.

This first lecture is by far the most important since it prepares the ground for those which follow. In the second Prof. Matthews attempts to outline the main features of the Christian *Weltanschauung*. He finds that there are four characteristic notes of the Christian civilization: (1) it is progressive; (2) it is always struggling towards a more complete and more securely founded unity; (3) it produces the ideals of political freedom and equality; (4) it possesses a peculiar type of humanistic culture.

In dealing with Divine Personality in a later lecture, Prof. Matthews starts from the assertion that, although a belief in a personal deity is not of the *esse* of religion as such, yet it is an



essential of Christianity. This he bases on the assumption that Christianity stands or falls by its profession that intercourse is possible between God and man. Prof. Matthews states, though we wish he could have asserted it less dogmatically and with more argument to support it, that "intercourse can subsist only between persons, and has no meaning apart from them." Because intercourse of another kind is unknown, does it follow of necessity that it is impossible? In his treatment of the nature of personality our author is admirably lucid and presents a well-argued position.

There is much else in this volume which calls for notice did not space forbid. The author's treatment of ethical theism and his use of the moral argument in its support, his lecture dealing with the idea of Creation, and its closely connected problem of the relationship between the One and the Many involved in the conception of theism, all deserve the close attention of theologians and philosophers. The days are gone by when the two camps (theology and philosophy) either politely ignored or paid undue deference to each other. The time has now come for a *rapprochement*, wherein each may bring its special contribution to the common stock of knowledge and experience.

H. L. H.

#### ESSAYS IN CRITICAL REALISM.

A Co-operative Study of the Problem of Knowledge. By Durant Drake, Arthur O. Lovejoy, James Bissett Pratt, Arthur K. Rogers, George Santayana, Roy Wood Sellars and C. A. Strong. London (Macmillan); pp. viii. + 244; 10s. net.

THE reader of this useful volume will be left in no doubt as to the value of co-operation among philosophical workers in the elucidation of such important problems as admit of being formulated and discussed in relative isolation. In the opinion of the authors concerned in the production of these seven essays this is eminently the case in regard to the problem of knowledge, and the result achieved goes far to substantiate their view. One cannot rise from a perusal of their various contributions without feeling that the focussing of several minds on such a problem, its repeated mutual discussion both oral and by correspondence, has led to their common doctrine emerging with considerable clarity, largely freed from the onesidedness and limitations which almost inevitably attend an exposition from a single mind and pen.

The writers are all 'realists,' though not in the sense of much recent American realism and neo-realism. They call their doctrine critical realism—though in no Kantian sense—but their agreement is confined entirely to the single problem of knowledge, epistemologically dealt with, for they hold differing views as to ontology. According to Mr. Durant Drake, who writes the opening essay on the Approach to Critical Realism, all those 'who believe that existence is far wider than experience—that objects exist in and for themselves, apart from our experiencing them—are properly to be called realists.'

Aside from the general validity of this description, I would point out that Mr. Drake has omitted to make clear one most vital and important point. He first says that existence is far wider than experience, and then goes on to speak of objects existing apart from *our* (italics mine) experience. But the two statements involve very different implications. The first seems to imply that existence is far wider than *all* experience; but pray what *can* be meant by existence outside of and apart from *all possible* experience? It seems to me an empty verbalism. And the second statement may be granted without accepting this; for it is obvious that objects do exist apart from *our* experiencing them, or their being experienced by any human being. But surely if they can rightly be called 'objects' at all they must needs be 'objects' in and for *some* experience.

The foregoing illustrates, it seems to me, the extreme difficulty of the problem under discussion and how essential it is in all such discussions most carefully to explain and justify the significance and meaning assigned to the terms and phrases employed; and I am afraid that Mr. Drake at any rate has not been sufficiently careful in these respects.

It is not at all easy to state briefly and clearly the view he seems to hold as to the problem of knowledge. Rejecting both the position of naïve realism, that our data of perception are actual portions, or selected aspects, of the objects perceived, and so the view that these data are mental states, he seems to hold that the objects we perceive do really exist independently and in their own right, but that our sense-data—all data of perception, i. e., indeed—are *quid* data simply "character-complexes which we take to exist, but which have no existence, except as some of the bits of the complex are actual traits of the physical object received, and some are traits of the perceiving state." These 'essences,' as they are called by Prof. Santayana, according to the

view here advanced, in so far as they are data in our sense-perceptions, may or may not 'exist.' As data they are simply imagined or dreamed to exist: if they happen to be the 'essence' of an actually existing object, then they too 'exist'; but if not, then they are simple imaginations, or dreams, to which we ascribe 'existence'—an attribution which may be entirely mistaken, as for instance in the case of objects perceived in a dream. In fact Mr. Drake goes on to assert that we may "call perception a sort of imagination—vivid, controlled, involuntary imagination, which is to some extent veridical." And he continues later: "What appear, our data (sense-data, memory-data, thought-data, etc.), are merely character-complexes, logical entities, not another set of existents to find a locus for in the world of experience."

In some ways this analysis may prove useful and helpful; but I find myself quite unable to make out what Mr. Drake understands and means by the 'objects' which he says 'exist' in the 'outer world'; and even Mr. Strong's essay on the Nature of the Datum, which concludes the volume, does not seem to me to make this clear.

From some of the expressions used one is led to suppose that the writers—or some of them—regard these really existing 'objects' as things—or complexes—existing beyond and outside of *all* experience, human or other. At other times this interpretation seems mistaken. It may be that the writers regard this aspect of the problem as being purely ontological and so lying beyond the scope of their volume. But I confess to finding that the obscurity in which this aspect of the problem is left, militates considerably against a full understanding and appreciation of the fundamental analysis of the 'knowledge-situation' itself, and on their interpretation of what happens actually, in immediate sense-perception especially.

The concluding essay just mentioned and the one by Prof. Rogers of Yale on the Problem of Error seem to me the most valuable contributions to the discussion next after Mr. Drake's introductory essay. I cannot pretend to have clearly understood or grasped the critical-realist position as set forth in this book. Much remains obscure and with a good deal that is said I am not in agreement; but at least I must recognize that a real contribution has been made towards the elucidation of a very difficult and obscure problem, which has hitherto been either totally ignored or given only a half-hearted and none too sincere consideration by almost all writers upon both philosophy and psychology.

It is true that philosophy and psychology have distinct and differing fields and obligations. But there are some problems, such as this of sense-perception, and indeed the whole of the 'knowledge-problem' and situation, which to my mind cannot be dealt with as exclusively or purely belonging to one domain or the other. Long convinced, however, that a thorough and exhaustive examination and discussion of these problems is one of the most pressing needs for sound progress in philosophy, I commend this volume to the careful attention of students of philosophy as a sincere and courageous attempt to grapple with at least one of these pressing and difficult problems.

B. K.

#### MAN'S UNCONSCIOUS SPIRIT.

The Psychoanalysis of Spiritism. By Wilfrid Lay, Ph.D., Author of 'Man's Unconscious Conflict,' etc. London (Kegan Paul, etc.); pp. 337; 10s. 6d. net.

BOOKS on psychoanalysis come from the presses apace and the movement is vigorous. Its claims are being widely extended, but it would be well for some of its exponents to remember that no little in it is still on trial and to refrain from dogmatizing. Dr. Lay's main contention is that until, not only mediums, but also psychical researchers have been first thoroughly psychoanalyzed, it is vain to hope that the investigation of any of the phenomena of spiritism can rest on a genuinely scientific basis. Not only so, but he agrees with the still more pretentious view of Ferenczi that every scientific worker in any field should be first psychoanalyzed, so that he may become acquainted with his unconscious wish-content, his unconscious affects or emotions, and so be better able to eliminate unconscious prejudice from his theories and judgments. In fact psychoanalysis is to be the cathartic science of the future, preliminary to all others, and it necessarily follows that "we (the psychoanalysts) are the people." This is bordering on the charlatanism of a universal panacea. True it is admitted by its practitioners that a methodical analysis on Freudian lines cannot be completed in less than two years; but even that would be quite insufficient to meet Dr. Lay's requirements, for: "Until that time shall come when it will be possible for each one of us to evoke from the past the memory of *every* sensation we ever had, and examine it for its bearing upon the so-called supernormal media of intelligence, it will be impossible certainly to say that

the 'messages' received by us in a medium's trance are anything else than messages from some lower stratum of the medium's unconscious memory." As it would take presumably as long to evoke the memories of *every* sensation, as it had taken to experience the sensations originally, and even if such an undertaking were within the remotest bounds of possibility, no one could ever say positively that *all* sensations had been really recalled, the preliminary conditions laid down by Dr. Lay seem to exclude for ever the possibility of positive certitude. And we have not only to evoke all of the memories but also to examine them. We clearly would require a new time-dimension. It is laid down further that the evidence of the senses is worthless for science. Let us grant that the testimony of the senses has to be severely checked before it can be accepted; but without senses no science is possible. When still further a call is made for "the complete exclusion of the human element from all experimentation with the end in view of showing personality existing apart from body," we ask: How can any experimentation of any kind in any field of research be carried on without the human element,—especially we might add in psychoanalysis? Science, we have been assured times out of number, is glorified common sense, but we can see no common sense in the impossible conditions which our author would seek to impose on its progress. Every scientific investigator of psychical phenomena knows that the sub-liminal, trans-liminal, sub-conscious, pre-conscious, fore-conscious, co-conscious, un-conscious, and all the rest of it, of both mediums and sitters constitute an essential part of his subject-matter, but he has yet to be assured that the psychoanalyst, who is so full of the now very elaborate theories of his craft, does not suggest much to his subject in the elaborate processes of an art which is so favourable to suggestion. We are assured by Dr. Lay, with characteristic self-complacency, that all psychical researchers are suffering badly from the death-fear complex and infantilism, and this also without any qualification, as though all psychical researchers were convinced spiritists. But even the benighted believer, if he were impolite, might invent equally or more opprobrious terms for the root psychoanalytic complex of so dogmatic a writer. Our author further assures us that if he had the job of analyzing a medium for a couple of years, the phenomena would in highest probability cease. We think it is very likely that such would be the result of his suggestion in many cases. But what then? What we miss throughout are any signs of Dr. Lay's having any first-hand experience of

the mediumistic phenomena for the control of which he would so drastically legislate. Finally we wonder if psychoanalysts as a body will approve of Dr. Lay's *dictum*: "Everything points to the detrimental nature of any repression of emotion whatsoever. If we cannot express ourselves because of the squeamishness of our social environment, so much the worse for it." The new cathartic is apparently to start with an orgy of unbridled libidinisism! Assuredly so much the worse for it!

#### PSYCHE'S LAMP.

A Revelation of Psychological Principles as Foundation of all Thought. By Robert Briffault, Author of 'The Making of Humanity.' London (Allen & Unwin); pp. 240; 12s. 6d. net.

FOR Mr. Briffault, if any definition of psychological science is to be insisted on, it would, he thinks, be best described as the science of the factors of behaviour. In other words, for him the study and elucidation of the process, of the way in which we ourselves come to act, to produce changes in matter, should constitute the whole subject-matter of the science of psychology. The mind is a link in the process of doing. The way of treatment is throughout radically genetic. Consciousness is fundamentally feeling; and in the background there is a sympathy with psychoanalytic presumptions, though nothing specifically is said on this head. The book is vigorously written and displays at times acute analysis and criticism; on the other hand it not seldom hits too hard and over-reaches itself. As we are little persuaded that Behaviourism, in any of its aspects, can deal successfully with the fundamental problems of psychology, and as we do not think that belief in spiritual personality (to which few have attained) is a degrading superstition, but hold that it is a natural and necessary step to higher things which we cannot evaluate until we reach that stage in clear consciousness, we are unable to follow Mr. Briffault either in his out-and-out condemnation of the idea of individuality or in his unqualified insistence on the impersonal alone being our only salvation. For us 'personal' and 'impersonal' are abstractions from a uniting reality, both together incapable of exhausting that reality and either in separation misrepresenting it. If our author had not so over-weening a contempt for mysticism in every form, he might have avoided some of the pitfalls of the 'either-or' fallacy and have

with advantage modified some of his concluding remarks, when he writes :

"It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that the concept of individuality has plunged the world into despair. The apprehension of the truth that individual differentiation is but a superficial and misleading appearance, while the essential fact of existence is, on the contrary, the continuity and impersonal unity of all the forces that represent the substance of being, is the solution of all the problems of sentiment. It invests the values, high, low, base, noble, good and evil, with meaning. It abolishes the conflict of the individual with an autocratic or patriarchal universe. It robs the conflict of egoism of its polluting obsession. It abolishes the problem of evil ; for the evil against which all existence struggles is its own past, which, being dynamic, it must surpass. It abolishes death, for what does not exist cannot cease to exist, and what is universal cannot die. The infirmities, disabilities and imbecilities that flesh is heir to are the limitations which constitute the pretext for the illusion of individuality ; what we prize in individuality is that which transcends these limitations. What is personal in the individual is base, what is of value is impersonal. [This is the chief dogma on which all the rest is founded.] The perception of human impersonality [a contradiction in terms] is the sign by which man may yet win. It is the giver of that trust and strength, that power and confidence, that fortitude and peace, which thought and religion founded on the illusion of individuality have shewn they cannot give."

When Mr. Briffault says that this concept of individuality has been 'the root of all thought and all religions' his history is severely at fault. Many thinkers have thought otherwise, and in the domain of religion he might have remembered the classical instance of Buddhism. Have all the blessings he depicts followed this type of thought, and the other type been so wanting in any beneficent results ?

#### ALCHEMY.

Its Science and Romance. By the Right Rev. J. E. Mercer, D.D., sometime Bishop of Tasmania. With Four Illustrations. London (S.P.C.K.) ; pp. 245 ; 9s. net.

SOME years ago we reviewed with pleasure Bishop Mercer's small volume on Nature Mysticism. There is, perhaps, a certain link or association of ideas between this and alchemy in one of its phases,

and it may be that this has induced Dr. Mercer to attempt the survey of one of the most difficult subjects even in the domain of the so-called occult arts which confront the historian. It speaks well for the new liberalism of the S.P.C.K. that they have undertaken the publication of this study. From our own experience of the obscurities of alchemy and the intractability of most of its matter we have little expectation of welcoming a really satisfactory treatment of the subject for some time to come. Dr. Mercer's sketch is useful for the beginner; and he pleads hard for a more generous estimate of the pre-scientific work of the alchemists on the material side as a necessary introduction preparing the way for modern chemistry, and even in some very general points anticipating the tendencies of some of the most recent theories of this science. We are inclined to think on the whole that Dr. Mercer has been too much influenced by Berthelot. Much as we are indebted to this great scientist for his two important works, *Les Origines de l'Alchimie* and *Les Alchimistes grecs au Moyen Âge*, and to him and Ruelle for their three stout volumes, *Collection des anciens Alchimistes grecs*, providing texts and translations of Byzantine MSS., we are by no means altogether satisfied with his account of the historic origins of alchemy, as we have endeavoured to indicate in the Proem to our recent small volume on *The Doctrine of the Subtle Body in Western Tradition*, where we have pointed, to a heredity wider than the generally assumed exclusive Egyptian provenance. On the material side, the chrysopœic quest, Dr. Mercer is far more satisfactory than when he comes to touch on what he vaguely calls the mystic aspect. Here he is somewhat at sea; and this is shown especially in his going out of his way on several occasions out and out to damn the Rosicrucians. Though we by no means hold any brief ourselves for these 'philosophers,' nevertheless we think they knew more than Dr. Mercer has suspected about the psychical implicits of the art, which they so monstrously camouflaged in keeping with all the rest of the obscuratists or illusive alchemy. The essay before us does not purport to be more than a popular sketch, but even with this limitation we miss any sufficient indications of the vast nature of the task which confronts the historian of alchemy. Some very general remarks on bibliography should have been included. We are also not impressed with Dr. Mercer's accuracy when he tells us, for instance, that Basil Valentine was an 'adept' of the 13th century (p. 90), of the 15th (p. 119) and of the 14th (p. 171)! Nevertheless the Bishop writes well and, within his restricted view, interestingly.



DR. BEALE.

Or More about the Unseen. By E. M. S., Author of 'One Thing I Know.' With Preface by Stanley de Brath. London (Watkins); pp. 152; 8s. 6d. net.

IN *One Thing I Know* we had a very interesting case of abnormal healing, under the direction of apparently a discarnate intelligence, set forth in a straightforward and transparently honest fashion by the lady who was cured, and whose *bona fides* and common sense are beyond question for those who know her. Dr. Beale is the record of another remarkable case,—that of E. M. S.'s sister, who, if not fully cured, has been saved from death in a very extraordinary way by a similar agency. The record is well worth study by all engaged in psychical research, and is largely evidential for those who hold that the 'disembodied spirit' theory is the more likely hypothesis to cover the undeniable facts of this order of psychical phenomena. The most interesting point in the book, in our opinion, is the controlling of a sensitive by a friend, who is also a sensitive, and their mutually corroborative testimony to the fact. Their physical bodies were at long distance from one another. This beats telepathy hollow, and we hope the two ladies will continue their exceedingly instructive experiments. Our old friend Mr. Watkins is to be congratulated on his selection of valuable material for psychical science for publication, and also on his consideration for lean-lined purses in issuing the volume at so moderate a price.

#### THE PALI TEXT SOCIETY'S PALI-ENGLISH DICTIONARY.

Edited by T. W. Rhys Davids, F.B.A., D.Sc., Ph.D., LL.D., D.Litt., and William Stede, Ph.D. Pt. I. (A). (Published by the Pali Text Society, Chipstead, Surrey); pp. 92, large 4to; 18s. 6d. net.

HITHERTO students of Pali have had to be content with Childers' Dictionary (1875) whose courageous compiler had at his command but a very minute proportion of the Pali texts. Since then much water has flowed under the bridges of Pali research, owing chiefly to the labours of the Pali Text Society and its venerable leading figure, Professor Rhys Davids. The new Dictionary is based on the patient lexicographical labours of a number of scholars, chief of whom are the Professor himself and for psychological terms, which bulk so largely in Buddhistic studies, his accomplished wife Mrs. Rhys Davids. This is a real Dictionary and not a preliminary glossary like Childers' work. When completed, it will contain from

150, to 160,000 references and will cost £5 5s. A comparison with Chambers' (at that date) most praiseworthy pioneer efforts shows that we have now in progress of publication an admirable, thorough-going and widely embracing, if not exhaustive, dictionary of the Pali language, on the most advanced lines of scholarly research and philological achievement. Pali students will now have a solid foundation on which to build for the future, and the Pali Text Society will have erected an enduring monument comparable with the great St. Petersburg Sanskrit dictionary of Böhltingk and Roth (their Sanskrit-German Wörterbuch). We most heartily congratulate the editors of the new Pali-English Dictionary on seeing the first fruits of their long labours and arduous undertaking.

#### LIFE ETERNAL.

Past—Present—Future. By Barthélemy Prosper Infantin.  
Translated by Fred Rothwell. London (The Open Court);  
pp. 188; 6s. net.

BARTHÉLEMY PROSPER ENFANTIN (1796-1864), erratic genius, enthusiast and fanatic, was a follower of Saint-Simon, but broke off from him and started a new religion with himself as its central figure. As Mr. Rothwell's short introduction tersely puts it: "He wore on his breast a badge with the title of '*père*,' was spoken of by his disciples as 'the living law,' declared himself to be the Chosen of God, and sent out emissaries in quest of a woman destined to be the 'female Messiah,' and the mother of a new Saviour. He regarded himself not only as the bearer of a heavenly message but as actually the Word of God incarnate." His converts in France alone numbered no less than 40,000; but in 1832 the halls of the new sect were closed by the Government, and he himself was arrested, tried, found guilty and sentenced to a year's imprisonment. This effectively punctured the bubble. The work that Mr. Rothwell has capably translated in abridged form, was published three years before Infantin's death, when he had had time to sober down his *Schwärmerei*. His megalomania deservedly ruined him; but it is not to be thought that all he taught was nonsense. He had some leaven of fine ideas and ideals, or of course the present summary would not have been brought before the English-reading public. As an example we may quote the following utterance:

"When will the Christian Church recognize and acknowledge

that God is not only within it, but that He lives in the faithful and infidel alike?

"Can one imagine what fortunate changes this simple belief would effect, not only in the heart of Christianity and the relations of its many sects to one another, but also in its dealings with Mohammedans, Indians, Chinese and Negroes? Frankly, we do not even treat them as beings made in the image of God, though He dwells in them as He does in us.

"Without this faith there can be no true humanity; naught but men and brutes, shepherds and flocks. Frequently, even, the brutes are not what they are supposed to be; and human beings, whose privilege it is to enter the presence of God, are often more brutes than the very flocks of cattle in which they pretend that God has not yet deigned to dwell. What blasphemy! God is in them as He is in all beings!"

A pantheist! Yes, if you will; but he does not say, God dwells *equally* in all.

#### NEW FOUNDATIONS.

Some Aspects of the Work of the Caldecott Community. By Enid Coggin. Illustrated. The Caldecott Community, East Sutton, Kent; pp. 28; 1s. net.

ALL who are interested in new ideals in education should get to know of the interesting experiment of this praiseworthy community. It is an endeavour to give the advantages of a boarding-school in the country to the children of the labouring classes. Not only so, but the whole curriculum of the school is planned on genuinely all-round educative and self-disciplinary lines. It attempts a sensible adaptation of the better principles of the Montessori method and the 'Young Republic' experiments; the aim is, however, to bring about loving co-operation between teachers and children rather than to let either of these complementary factors dominate. We have had the pleasure of visiting the community and were struck with the good results in all departments, but above all with the self-sacrificing lives of those who devote all their time unpaid to incarnating fully the spirit of their high ideal. The struggle to keep going, however, is a very hard one. The very small fees which the parents can pay are of course entirely inadequate, and a very large deficit has to be met annually by subscriptions and donations. Those who are interested in humane and humanistic ideals of education which are not purely theoretical, but whose efficiency is

being practically demonstrated, should procure this interesting sketch of the work of the Caldecott endeavour and give it publicity, and if they can, give something themselves, and if they are unable, try to procure for the community from others that financial support without which this praiseworthy enterprise can no longer continue in being. The need is pressing. All information can be procured from the Secretary.

#### THE PRODIGAL RETURNS.

By the Authoress of 'The Golden Fountain' and 'The Romance of the Soul.' London (Watkins); pp. 220; 8s. 6d. net.

THE Authoress of 'The Golden Fountain,' which was an interesting account of a genuine mystical experience of Christian tincture, here again gives us some chapters of autobiography, which will be read with interest by all students of Christian mysticism. There is little doubt but that we here are allowed to share mediately in a series of genuine psychical experiences rising into a mystical order. This applies, however, only to the first half of the little volume. The second half becomes didactic and edifying, with a corresponding dulling and deadening of the atmosphere. These pages add nothing of value, and, in our own case at least, we found that they greatly impaired the vividness of the impression caused by the earlier pages. An exception, however, must be made of the concluding inspirational passage, which is fine. The book is well got up and is low-priced in these days of exorbitant printing charges.

#### TWO NEW PERIODICALS OF INTEREST.

PSYCHE: A Quarterly Review of Psychology in relation to Education, Psycho-analysis, Industry, Religion, Social and Personal Relationships, Æsthetics, Psychical Research, etc. (Incorporating 'The Psychical Research Quarterly'). London (Kegan Paul); pp. 96; 5s. net.

THE EASTERN BUDDHIST: A Bi-monthly Magazine devoted to the study of Mahāyāna Buddhism. Kyoto, Japan (The Eastern Buddhist Society); pp. 94; single copy, 1 yen, yearly 6 yen.

WE have much pleasure in calling the attention of our readers to these recently-started periodicals. They are both sound and scholarly publications, and deal with subjects of special interest to many of our public. Familiar names will meet them in the contents-list of *Psyche*, and *The Eastern Buddhist* is edited by Daisetz

Teitaro Suzuki, a name that guarantees its competence. We have no space, unfortunately, for reviewing periodical literature, but are glad to make known the existence of these new-born.

#### PERILS OF WEALTH AND POVERTY.

By the late Canon Barnett, M.A., D.C.L. Edited by the Rev. V. A. Boyle, M.A. London (Allen & Unwin, Ltd.); pp. 98; 2s. 6d. net.

AS a writer on social subjects the late Canon Barnett is one whose words command respect and attention. He was no mere dreamer, but a man of action. He was by no means a dry-as-dust economist, but one who brought to all his work a mind and spirit charged with a passionate love for the 'under dog.' It is because of his noble record that we are inclined to regret the publication of this little book. It is true that here we catch a glimpse of the man himself, his wonderful faith in the possibilities of human nature, his love of children and his belief in the ultimate triumph of good over evil. We find the same delightful style which makes all Canon Barnett's books so irresistible in their appeal. But the present volume is badly out-of-date. It was written in the days before the War came to change the conditions under which the mass of people in our great cities exist. Consequently it has called for an Editor to explain it, instead of being able to speak for itself. Its statistics are those of six or seven years ago. There may be some interest in seeing how some of the measures of reform which Canon Barnett urged before the War have come to pass (*e.g.* his remarks on a national scheme of education and a higher scale of teachers' salaries on pp. 82, 88), but this is scarcely sufficient of itself to justify the publication of this book. Doubtless those who knew the author will like to have this book on their shelves, but the younger school of social reformers will regard it as past history, useful as history, but of little value in estimating the significance of the social problems of to-day. There is a preface, explaining the genesis of the book, by Mrs. Barnett.

H. L. H.

#### MOTIONISM.

By E. J. McCarthy Morris, F.R.C.S. Edin. London (The Caxton Press); pp. 180; 5s. net.

"UP to the present day the only basis of all our knowledge has been a half-basis, or knowledge as a presence only. The discovery of Motionkey now makes a radical change in the basal principle

alluded to by disclosing the whole of that principle in the form of knowledge both present and absent." These words in part explain the purpose of this book. The author is seeking to discover the world's true religion, and after rejecting every other philosophy and religious system begins his search *de novo*. He himself tells us that he found his solution almost by accident, and he calls it by the unpleasing name of *Motionkey* or the sense-found trinity. He recognizes the basal need for a trinitarian mode of thought, and, like Mr. H. G. Wells, spurns the Christian trinity for one of his own making, namely: mind, matter and motion. From three points of view we would venture to criticize this book. Its tone is arrogant with that peculiarly objectionable form of arrogance—pride of intellect. The author is too much given to patronizing other philosophies to gain much sympathy for his own. Secondly, he is not accurate in some of his statements. For instance, it is not true to say that the Christian trinity is the 'invention' of Philo. The Alexandrian thinker may have influenced the theological interpretation of the doctrine, but he did not invent it. Lastly, the author is too fond of strange, obscure expressions which he makes no attempt to explain (*e.g.* 'beginning untouch,' 'living immortal bi-cyclic national unity,' 'motional rectitude'). Strange to say, in spite of all this, the philosophy expounded is not uninteresting. But *Motionkey*—*Monkey*! Who can escape the association?

H. L. H.

#### LIFE.

by E. J. Detmold. London (Dent); pp. vii. + 50; 5s. net.

HIS little book is described on the wrapper as 'the philosophy of modern quietist.' If the word 'quietist' be used in its historical sense, there is little affinity between the work of Mr. Detmold and that of such writers as Malaval, Molinos and Mme. Guyon. Quietism in the commonly accepted interpretation of the term postulates, as an essential condition of spiritual perfection, the suppression of as many personal actions as possible, except in the case of a manifest activity on the part of God. The purpose of this conduct is so to still the human energies that they may become the instruments of Divine authority. There is little or no attempt at active co-operation with the Divine Will. Mr. Detmold is rather a philosopher than a quietist, at any rate so far as the present volume gives the key to his life-principles. He thinks rather than sits; his mind is active and ruminative rather than passive and desiccated. He has a message to give and his teaching is of the kind

that modern men seem to need. He sums up his mysticism in these words, "I seek unity—diversity is in the nature of things." Therefore he sets himself to a process of self-overcoming, where he may rise above all infatuation with things into a clear realization of essential unity. This self-overcoming is for Mr. Detmold an active effort: "Towards the utmost would I impel myself and men." It is hard to reconcile such an activity with the philosophy of quietism. The *format* of the book provides an exuberant and spacious setting for the mediocre thoughts of the author. J. N.

#### THE GAIN OF PERSONALITY.

A Popular Psychological Statement of the Practical Values of Personality. By W. Charles Loosmore, M.A. London (John Murray); pp. x+233; 6s. net.

THERE is abundant need for those who possess the necessary qualifications to interpret in the language of ordinary men and women the findings of scholars and students of the new psychology. Mr. Loosmore is one who is well qualified for this kind of *liaison* work, and his book *The Gain of Personality* consists of a plain statement of the everyday values of personality in business and social life for the average man and woman. His volume escapes the banality of much of the contemporary 'success-literature' which emanates from America, since it is based upon a sound knowledge of psychology. He divides his subject under the headings: Nature; Elements; General Development. In the first part Mr. Loosmore writes of personality as it is, its bases and its nature. He deals very fully with the old controversy as to whether it is the more important, faith or works, theory or practice, thought or action. Without any question the man of action makes more appeal than his brother whose life's work consists of a more interior activity; but there is traditional support for the view that thought must precede action, whether in the life of a man or of mankind, and therefore the thinker or the theorist is at least as necessary as the worker. Wherein lies the charm of personality? Mr. Loosmore enumerates ten elements in its constitution and describes the manner in which these elements may be trained and developed. Finally he writes of the threefold nature of man and traces the lines of his simultaneous development in the physical, mental and spiritual spheres. At the conclusion of each chapter the author gives a number of aphorisms upon which he begs his reader to meditate. Some of these are strikingly original, but the majority of them are, we fear, platitudinous and trite. H. L. H.



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## A Quarterly Review.

Edited by G. R. S. Mead.

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# THE QUEST

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## THE RELIGIOUS PROBLEM.

The Late Prof. ÉMILE BOUTROUX,  
Membre de l'Académie.

THERE would appear to be one condition from which no religion in our modern societies can escape: it must enquire into the principles on which these societies are based, and ascertain that there is both actual compatibility of fact and logical agreement between itself and these principles. Formerly it was possible to persuade ourselves that, if religion and lay culture were to be induced to live together on good terms, it was necessary only to place them in water-tight compartments, so to speak, and invite them conscientiously to practise the maxim: "Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's and to God the things that are God's." It would be erroneous to imagine that a law which decreed the separation of Church and State would perpetuate this system; rather would it put an end to it. For the maxim regards the existence of the two terms as necessarily given, whereas this particular law forms part of a system which tends

to remain alien from religion and to endow the State with the means of doing without religion.

As a matter of fact, science and rational morality which, like religion, claim to mould and shape mankind, seem to have become excessively ambitious. Encouraged by its conquests in realms which were once regarded as outside its sphere of influence, such as the life, soul and evolution of societies, science no longer accepts that criticism. It resolutely denies the possibility of mystery, which is but something unknown, analogous to that which, but a few years ago, was declared to be unknowable. Science, moreover, is now engaged in explaining religious phenomena themselves in the same way as it explains physical phenomena.

Along parallel lines, lay morality purposes to supply man with all the knowledge and principles necessary for the regulation of his conduct. It does not seriously admit that, apart from the social life with which it deals, there may be for man another existence which does not apply to itself. To act humanly, it declares, is to act freely and autonomously; but autonomy implies the rule, not of any authority whatsoever, but of reason alone.

Such being the claims of science and lay morality, what room do they leave for religion? Are we to say that religion, if it would avoid conflict, has only to bury itself deep within the individual consciousness and lose interest in all that is not theoretical knowledge or external action?

Even so interpreted, religion would not escape the concern of science and rational morality; for science aims at explaining both the objective and the subjective, whereas morality claims to govern thought as

well as action. But in reality what religious soul would be content with a plain subjectivity, imprisoned in its own exalted condition, and removed *à priori* from every intellectual or practical domain? Religion by its very nature is expansion; and even though it does not derive its power or dominion from this world, still it is here that it aims at exercising it. As the will of God is done in heaven, so the aim of religion is to bring it to pass on earth. In any thinking consciousness then it cannot help coming into contact with science and rational morality. With these latter it can have lasting co-existence only if connected with them by intelligible relations.

What, however, do we mean by intelligible relations?

Clearly the most readily perceptible intelligibility would be the logical reduction of multiplicity to unity, of diversity to identity. Science deals with intelligibility as thus understood; for it tends to consider the laws that seem most heterogeneous as particular applications of a more general law. Apart, however, from this intelligibility, which may be called abstract and analytical, there is a concrete and synthetic intelligibility, through which things really diverse and mutually irreducible are yet recognized by the mind as belonging to one another, as forming one whole, one harmonious *ensemble*. This is the kind of intelligibility that philosophers have endeavoured to define. Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant and Hegel, each in his own way, recognized that there exist between beings relations which are irreducible to purely logical identity or contradiction, and yet capable of being fathomed by the intellect. They gave the name of reason to the faculty possessed by man of conceiving



and appreciating such relations. Whereas abstract logic seeks beneath beings for concepts, and beneath the diversity of concepts for relations of identity or exclusion, reason strictly so called, that of words and concepts, goes back to the beings they represent and finds links of conformity and solidarity between such forms of existence as, when judged by our inadequate representations, seemed foreign to one another or even mutually irreconcilable.

To attempt to find between religion on the one hand and science and rational morals on the other some logical relation of identity would be a contradictory task. Religion, if reduced to science and morals, would vanish altogether. It is possible, however, that religion and rational culture, though different in reality, may yet be capable of harmonization, just as the several notes of a chord harmonize whilst remaining distinct and irreducible.

\* \* \* \* \*

What exactly are the terms the relations of which we have to define? These cannot be on the one hand religion, as a given system of dogmas and rites, and on the other science, as an *ensemble* of theorems along with morals, as a collection of ready-made formulæ. Neither divergence nor agreement between religion and lay culture, considered as given and externally observable facts, can be really significant.

In this case what religion should we be considering? What right should we have to consider any particular religion to the exclusion of the rest? And on the other hand what would remain of religions, if we were to take away the common element in them all for the purpose of making it the sole object of our investigation?

Again what scientific result, what positive precept of morals, could we set up as certainly ultimate and henceforth immutable?

Besides, what would the coincidence of some particular dogma with some particular affirmation of science or lay reason prove? This coincidence, which is contingent and perhaps ephemeral, would really exist only in words and not in things, since the objection might always be raised that all teaching of science or rational morals is essentially an affirmation of the autonomy of nature and reason, whereas religion is precisely the denial of this autonomy.

It is not then between the positive religions and the various expressions of lay culture that the secular struggle is carried on, it is rather between the lay spirit and the religious spirit. Consequently, the dispute appears only the more serious; for, though we may conceive that the expressions of religion and of lay culture may be transformed indefinitely and may happen to coincide externally, they cannot, both of them, be radically different in spirit without ceasing to exist.

This is a matter of almost daily occurrence. Scientists and theologians are like two individuals who quarrel about everything and are really poles asunder, though apparently following the same track, because there is incompatibility of temperament between them. How should they understand each other? As a matter of fact, they do not. Words have not the same meaning for both of them; facts are not seen in the same light; the evidence differs. Between such opponents there is no common ground, no genuine discussion, possible.

It is very difficult for men to satisfy themselves that they really have nothing in common. "Fool," exclaimed Victor Hugo, "to imagine that you are not myself!" Do the lay spirit and the religious spirit really exclude each other?

There is one form of the lay spirit and one of the religious spirit which it appears as though we must abandon all attempt to reconcile: dogmatic rationalism on the one hand and materialistic theology on the other. The characteristic of dogmatic rationalism is that it sets up as absolute and primary laws, the scientific determinism of phenomena and the actually given forms of human reason. Materialistic theology consists in forcing divinity to reveal itself by violating the laws of nature, by contradictions imposed on science when seeking after a natural explanation of phenomena. The former says: There exists nothing but facts which necessarily determine one another; the latter says: Apart from facts there is a supernatural power which at its pleasure breaks the connection between them. For the one there is nothing but nature; for the other there is in addition to nature God who is at enmity with nature.

These two conceptions are contradictory. But is this the true philosophic and the true lay spirit?

Science for a time had all the appearance of dogmatism. It regarded as perfectly clear and adequate to being the following formula: Everything may be reduced to facts connected together by necessary laws. The march of philosophical and scientific reflection, however, has destroyed this illusion. According to the opinion prevalent now-a-days, the doctrine of mechanical necessity as a primary and absolute principle expresses nothing else than subjective metaphysics

arbitrarily worked into scientific explanation strictly so-called. Facts external to one another, such as atoms would be, laws mutually connecting these facts,—all these form a scheme built up by analogy with separate objects which are but slightly bound to one another. There is nothing similar in nature, which is continuous and shifting. Decidedly modern science has only one principle: the sovereignty of experience or the immediate fact—that is, the necessity of subordinating its conceptions to a given and objectively observable reality. No doubt it tries to discover laws; but it does not know beforehand what will be the form of these laws,—whether they can be exactly reduced to one another, and how far nature repeats herself and adapts herself to our methods of explanation.

In like manner morals has often shown itself as the simple expression of absolute laws that are inherent in human nature. Thus understood, it may appear contradictory to religion; for the latter cannot admit that human nature, as given, represents anything primary and absolute.

But the spirit of relativism, which has permeated science, has not spared morals. What we call by this name is but the exposition of the present state of human consciousness, exclusive of the origin and destiny of this consciousness. No longer do we regard the lay mind as professing to consider that the present contingent state of human reason is the eternal standard of all truth: it tends only to reveal and emphasize in present-day society that common substratum of notions which now obtrudes upon all minds; it thus clings to these notions, whatever their origins and whatever the transformations they may be susceptible of undergoing in times to come.

Nor is the religious spirit on the other hand now linked, as it might have been, with any materialistic theory of the supernatural. The fact that we have become more and more certain of the importance of the personal, interior and mystical element in religious phenomena, enables us to distinguish between the physically supernatural—which boldly infringes the laws of nature and is in reality no other than a *contra-nature*—and a wholly spiritual supernatural, inherent in the very springs of nature and really deserving of the metaphorical title of supernatural. Though it is generally admitted that the dogmas and rites of religion are indispensable elements thereof, it would still be only slightly in conformity with the modern religious consciousness to regard them as the very bases of religion. For such a consciousness they are means, whose end is the ever closer union of the soul with the principle of all life, love and thought.

Thus understood, in the meaning given to them more and more by criticism and reflection, the religious spirit and the lay spirit are not the negation of each other. The rationalistic spirit clings to present reality as it appears in this world of ours; it tries to discover the most general and permanent modes of this reality. The religious spirit aspires to discover the hidden source of things welling up, and by uniting with it, if possible, to share in the excellence and the creative force which characterize it. Now, being does not exclude the obligation to be; the transitory state does not shut out the productive power.

It is thus conceivable that the religious spirit and the lay spirit, when reduced to their true essence, may logically co-exist. Still this absence of logical inconsistency is not sufficient; we must find between

these two terms—if we would regard them as qualified to exist conjointly in human consciousness—a real, positive connection, something that approaches a bond of organic solidarity and mutual conformity.

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If there is one universally recognized principle proclaimed by ancients and moderns alike, by a Socrates, a Pascal or an Auguste Comte, implied in all our judgments, it is the command: Be a man! What is the exact meaning of this formula?

The ancients made a distinction between those things without which we cannot live, and those without which we do not wish to live. Aristotle was not afraid of saying that man, if he wishes to live in accordance with the better part of his being, should seek to make himself immortal and to live a divine life. Pascal ends his careful enquiry into human nature with the words: "Man infinitely transcends man." And even in our own times it has become almost an axiom to affirm that man is a being made to transcend self.

What are the conditions of a completely human life? Are science and rational morals sufficient to enable man to become all that he can be and wishes to be?

Science from its own distinctive point of view is self-sufficing. It has strictly confined its ambition to the knowledge of what is, as it is, without enquiring why it is so or whether it is so necessarily or contingently. According to this view, it takes nothing for granted prior to itself. It creates for itself by experiment and analysis all the principles it needs.

But if man fully employs his reason and reflects on the conditions and the range of science, he finds

that this latter really satisfies neither itself nor himself.

Science daily invents more powerful methods in an endeavour to confine being within its own formulæ. This being then is there, exterior to it. It has its nature, life and destiny, which either are or are not fully knowable by the methods at its own disposal. Purely experimental knowledge is logically posterior to its object and without any influence over it.

Science has for its counterpart, from the practical point of view, morals, which is a kind of science of the laws of judgment and conduct, universally present in human consciousness. Can we affirm that morals suffices both itself and us ?

It is self-sufficing after the fashion of science in that, confining its ambition to a determination of the present form of consciousness, it has no need, for the purpose of systematizing the facts that concern it, of any other principles than those it obtains from these facts themselves. But if reason reflects on these *data*, it perceives them as derivative and dependent, and conceives of something beyond them.

Amongst these *data*, for instance, we find the notion of duty. True, by a process of subtle psychological and sociological analyses, we sometimes think we have abolished this notion and thus destroyed its practical effective value. But the man who really wishes to live a human life, will take no notice of this criticism, which, if accepted unreservedly, asserts that mankind is in process of retrogression ; and indeed, though it attacks those inadequate definitions of the idea of duty which our imagination or our logical understanding are capable of forming, leaves duty itself intact in all its living reality. Duty is an object

of faith, and its roots, as Kant declared, are beyond the reach of human science.

Morals sets before us an ideal. Whence comes this conception of a form of existence superior to that given to us? Is it arbitrary; or is it the mental image, adapted to our nature and condition, of an ultimate perfection, which has its own reason of being, its own absolute value and existence? And is this ideal only an abstract idea; or does it contain a force which, when communicated to our being, renders us capable of helping forward its realization?

Finally, morals directs that the will should become one with law. This identification of obedience with independence really finds its consummation in love alone. But then is man capable of loving? To love is to give oneself: it is to live not only for others but in others; it is to be another and to be oneself at the same time; it is to be oneself in so far as one is another;—strange propositions from the standpoint of a purely logical understanding,—a sign of the necessity in which we find ourselves to transcend the reasonings of morals in order to realize the moral ideal.

\* \* \* \* \*

Science and morals, when investigated, if not from their own points of view, at all events from that of human reason, are not self-sufficing; they demand, if they are to be at all possible, principles relative to the origin and the end of things.

Now if we consider the given religions, especially the Christian, we cannot help remarking that they answer, each in its own way, the problems raised by science and morals.

The Gospel regards religion as consisting essentially of three elements:



1. Belief in a perfect and omnipotent God.
2. Love of this God, realizing itself in the love of men for one another.
3. The possible coming of the divine kingdom on earth.

These three ideas, living, real and efficacious, constitute religion according to the Gospel.

Now it is clear that these ideas, when accepted, felt and lived by mankind, tend to fill up the void which the reflection of reason on science and morals shows us.

They point to perfection as the source and end of being. They are specially suitable as a foundation for duty, love and the ideal. They explain the work that is secretly going on within the soul of individuals in the formation of an increasingly truer idea of being and the constant striving after something better. They form the interior life, conferring on it the power to express itself in the visible world. Hence what we call reason and morals, is but the sum total of those principles which, springing from this secret life, appear as relatively universal amongst mankind.

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And so the lay spirit and the religious spirit, when regarded by themselves in all their living reality, and not according to such concepts and stereotyped definitions as we in our intellectual sloth are but too ready to substitute for them, are not only not incompatible with but naturally demand and attract each other; the religious spirit bringing with it all the might of enthusiasm and creation, the lay spirit placing us in possession of the world as at present existing, and thereby enabling us to make use of nature for the subduing of nature: "*Natura a Natura vincitur.*"

But we shall be asked: Is it indeed religion that we are here considering? What place does theology hold in it; and can there be any religion apart from theology? What becomes of rites and ceremonies which form so essential an element in traditional religions? Speaking generally, what is the form of religions stripped of their matter?

It may be answered that theology, rites, the matter of religion, are but seldom mentioned in such a book as the Gospel, which manifestly has a religious value.

There is no real form, however, which does not involve matter; and assuredly the germs of life found in such a book as the Gospel, when they have been developed and set forth, taught, translated into our own language and interpreted according to the present *data* of our science, morals and philosophy, naturally give birth to systems of theology, to rites and institutions. These developments are necessary; for man, as Aristotle said, cannot think without images. Bare form is a pure abstraction. Some matter is necessarily included in what we call form. And whencesoever the developments of this matter come, they are conformable to reason, if they are in harmony with the essence of religious form and with what science and life teach us of the nature of things.

But it may be asked if religion, as thus conceived, retains the supernatural character of which it could not be deprived without doing away with it altogether.

This word 'supernatural' also is liable to ambiguity. Does it mean that God is above nature, just as some human power, that of an absolute king for instance, is above the power of his subjects?

In that case God is withdrawn from our own nature, only to be confined in a nature which is perhaps

vaster, though similar to our own,—as a man who oppresses his fellow-beings, is distinct from them, though he forms part, like themselves, of the sum total of mankind.

The word 'supernatural' is a metaphor; it assumes a truly religious meaning only if it indicates some power which cannot be reduced to that of the so-called natural forces. Now this power is, in effect, altogether unique and superior if it is a principle of intelligent, harmonious and beneficent creation, of the ideal transfiguration of existence, the blending and exalting of soul and conscience in love, joy and unity of effort.

"No man hath seen God at any time," we read in the Gospel according to Saint John. "If we love one another, God is in us and his love is fulfilled in us."

(Authorised Translation by FRED ROTHWELL, B.A.)

(Since this Paper was received Boutroux has been liberated from the narrow confines of the flesh into the freedom of a wider life. He is most worthily *emeritus*. *Sit illi terra levis!*—ED.)

## THE BUDDHIST DOCTRINE OF REBIRTH.

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THIS is in outline what I have to say: Buddhism gave the world a more definite doctrine, cult or theory of rebirth than any other religion or philosophy before or since. From our present point of view, sharpened by a few centuries of scientific inquiry, it is indefinite, unfinished, a patchwork, and by the rather one-sided emphasis of aftermen somewhat obscured and strained.

In the original doctrine, so far as we can really get back to it, we find:

- (1) The fact of rebirth accepted as universal law;
- (2) The whence and whither of rebirth fairly well defined;
- (3) The acceptance of rebirth of the whole self, both mind and body, not of discarnate mind or soul;
- (4) No very positive information as to the 'how' of rebirth.

The naïve simplicity of the doctrine as to the 'how' is obscured: (a) by an unfortunate ambiguity of language at a place and a time; (b) by a certain mystic theory involving that ambiguity, and attacked by early Buddhism only; (c) by the well meant efforts of the Fathers of the Buddhist Church to expand the logic of certain tenets; (d) by our own imperfect knowledge confusing later with early doctrine; and (e) by the materialistic taint in our own psychology.

(1) In the early literature of India it is not till we come to the Suttas of the four Pali Nikāyas that we find the vague earlier belief in life after and life before this life on earth gathered up in anything approaching a definite orderly doctrine. In the Vedic hymns any indefinitely long survival of life is a matter to be prayed for, the gift of gods or of 'fathers.' In the Brāhmaṇas and early Upanishads there are various modes of pre-existence and survival asserted. The former assertions are much on a footing with similar ones by Empedokles. In the Upanishads there is no consensus of belief. Leaving aside on this occasion the teaching of the Jains, it is only in the Buddhist Suttas that we find aspirations and speculative assertions reduced to the acceptance of a certain scheme of pre-existence and post-existence as a law of nature. You were and you will be, whether you pray and sacrifice, or whether you do not. Your life is taken up into the causal law of the universe. And this was a new standpoint.

How was it expressed in words ?

Special terms for this continuity of life here or there are far more to seek in the Buddhist books than in our own discussions on them. Rebirth, reincarnation, transmigration, survival, metempsychosis, — all are Western labels. Terms that we do find are the following :

(1) Recollection by some saintly person of how and where he or she lived in many 'lives' prior to this is called recollection of former 'residings' (*pubbe-nivesānussati*).

(2) Different spheres of existence are called 'the three becomings' (*bhavā*).

(3) The Buddha is asked as to the destiny of certain individuals who have recently passed away.

(4) Worldly desire leads to 'again-becoming' . . . he "at the death of the body is on his way to a body."

(5) The Buddha calls the whole business, past, present and future, as a long, long 'faring on,' a 'running on' of you and of me.

(6) The most usual term, perhaps, is just 'happening' or 'arising' (*uppajjati*), after 'falling' or 'deceasing' (*cuti, cavati*). There is no spatial emphasis, in these terms, of going up or down as in the Christian legend of the Ascension. The term descent (*avakkanti*) is applied to consciousness finding a new home in some sort of body. But if children were born, like Athēnē, from the parent's head, it is quite possible that the current term might have been 'ascent.' We are concerned in this paper with pre-scientific language.

Many more allusions to individual pre-existence and individual survival might be quoted; enough to show it as a very important assumption or datum in Buddhist doctrines:—namely, that a man in deceasing lives on; that he has so deceased and lived on times without number; that the beginning of his life is not revealed; that the end of it, that is, the deceasings and rebirths—not of being itself—*is* revealed. Nowhere is this datum evaded. No query is raised when the Buddha claims pre-existence under another name: "I was then that Brahmin chaplain . . . I was then the young Jotipāla . . . I was then that wheelwright." It had become an old and popular tradition. It was taken up into the doctrine of karma, *i.e.* of the power of the will and its outcome in action to shape the doer's destiny. "Lord!" babbles the crazy Ophelia, "we know what we are, we know not what we shall be." "We only know," said Buddhism, "what we are when we know what we have been and what we may be."

(2) The possible whence and whither also were in this doctrine brought into clearer relief than before "Five goings (or bournes, *gati*'s) are there," the Founder teaches: *nirāyā*,—that is, hell or purgatory the animal kingdom; the realm of the *peta*'s (or *manes*) the earth-life of men; the deva-worlds. "Each of these I know, and the way to each. And there is Nibbāna that I know and the way to it" (*Majjhima* i.73).

This is the simplest, possibly the oldest, Buddhist category. The fifth *gati* was in its contents not so simple. It was, so to speak, a dumping-ground for not only survivals in eschatological beliefs but also for the imagination of the Indian mind playing about with its four logical alternatives: A is B; A is not B; A is both B and not B; A is neither B nor not B. Thus rebirth as a deva may be of body only; it may be of mind (the incorporeal) only; it may be of both body and mind; it might be of neither. And so a place is found for beings living a mindless life, and for beings living an incorporeal life—both of them unimaginable. And they are, as we might expect, as lifeless as logical abstractions would be. The mindless devas are only imaginable when they begin to think, whereupon they promptly die (*Dialogues of the Buddha* i., 41)! And the bodiless devas are practically only fetches of abstract thinking, without life or light or love. Where we are shown any inmates of the four unseen *gati*'s, we find creatures of both body and mind analogous to ourselves.

(3) That this was the relatively simple unsophisticated belief in the earlier days of the Buddhist age—in so far as Suttas and the tradition handed down in commentarial stories faithfully reproduce this—may be seen in the alleged cases of intercommunication between

the three last-named of the five worlds. In the case of the Peta's—a form of rebirth that may well be Buddhism's annexation of the then decadent survival among the common folk of the once powerful Fathers-cult of the Vedas—we find communication was possible between such beings and humans who were psychically developed—clairvoyants and clairaudients, as was Great Moggallāna, one of the two chief apostles of Gotama. He, the stories tell, could and did see and interview these Peta's, ill-born because of misdeeds in their past earth-life. They are reported as dwelling round the walls of the earth-villages in (invisible) dwellings sometimes highly decorated. Sometimes they are recorded as comely, but all in different ways are suffering some more or less appalling penalty in person or health because of their ill-deeds; and their term of suffering could be shortened by the transferred merit of their human kinsmen's benevolent acts. Thus they are to each other as substantial in body, as earth-people are to each other, and have average intelligence. Their world was the centre of their universe, and if they looked longingly for help from earth, it was analogous to our looking for help, uplift and consolation from a world 'above,' which is not as substantial a conception to us as is our own world.

But—and here is where the Buddhist mind is interesting—their world was not 'above' nor 'below.' It was right here, interpenetrating our own space. This is a more significant concept for us than it used to be. It was easy for Christian belief to rest in an 'up into heaven' (Lk. xxiv. 51) and a 'descended into hell' when space had not been charted by astronomy as far as thought can reach, and there were no Antipodes. But we do not now believe in a survival on the moon or



stars or, with the Veda-hymns, at the back of the sun. We have to learn to conceive not so much, not so wholly, an otherwhereness as an otherwiseness. One day this will constitute the great, the most practical problem in Relativity for us. It may be that, in a space that is one for all worlds, the otherwhereness may be inward, and, for the rest and more than that, it may be just 'otherwise.'

Between 'devas' and men intercommunication is not infrequently met with in the Suttas. The deva-worlds are in a way remoter than the peta-worlds—it is a much later book that gives an attempt at a measured distance of one of them<sup>1</sup>—but the idea that you have to ascend into either the more earth-like kâma-devas' world or the less earth-like rūpa-devas' (or Brahmas') world, is not made apparent. To visit either from another world was possible only to the saintly who were psychically developed, or to a deva. The transit is effected by an effort of will analogous to that put forth in a vigorous voluntary gesture: "Just as a strong man stretches out his flexed arm, or flexes his outstretched arm, so X vanished thence and appeared in Y," the world in question. All the preposterous, if decorative, symbolism of wings is in this literature undreamt of. "Seated cross-legged he can travel through air as a bird on the wing"—is the nearest approach to it.

And once in those bright realms (*svarga* or *sagga*) the earthly visitor does not find himself among 'discarnate spirits'—a very impossible conception, at least for us—he is with men and women apparently as complete in body and mind as himself. They see him, walk to meet him, take his arm, and talk—all of course

<sup>1</sup> Brahma-world, *Questions of King Milinda*, i. 126.

impossible without bodily organs. So when devas come to earth they use arms and legs and voice (*e.g. Dialogues*, ii. 37). They were longer-lived, more mobile, happier than earth-folk, and had the power of reading thought. Such were they in their deva-conditions, but *in kind* they were human men and women. Of the earth they had been, of the earth many of them would be again. As it were clothes, they have changed bodies and therewith the psycho-physical reactions, but they are not bodiless.

You will note that I speak of 'devas,' and not, as the word is usually translated, 'gods.' It is true that the denotation of 'god' is wide and diverse, but the word should not be strained. When is a god not a god?

A god is a god when he has, if not perhaps creative power, at least informing influence, controlling force, some sort of cult and votaries, some power to bestow or withhold, aid or harm, reward or punish. When he has nothing of all this, at least outside his own sphere of life, then he is no god. In the Vedic pantheon we do get deities having these attributes. But in the later age when Gotama formed his *sāsana* or church, it is only Brahmins who are still worshipping survivors in that pantheon; it is only the common folk who have their little local cults of this or that *devatā*. The devas who now and then pay or receive visits, on earth, at home, are nothing more than so many ladies and gentlemen, pleasant, courteous, respectful to great earth-teachers or earnest disciples. They have, it is true, their governors, but these too are not immortal, but have been, and will probably again be, denizens of earth.

No, Buddhist devas are not gods. And one way to understand Buddhist doctrine is to cease calling them

so. It is curious that while Christendom has always maintained its constant, if very vaguely conceived, doctrine of survival, it has never coined a good word for the survivors. But it has been hampered by its want of light as to the body in which 'we' survive, and by its myths of a waiting sleep and of opening tombs. Pure spirit is as yet an impossible conception. When progress in the theory of survival becomes more generally intelligent, either a word for 'survivors' will be found, or we must hold by 'souls.' For that word is capable of covering both mind and body, as in the wireless call S.O.S.

(4) What did the early Buddhists hold happened at rebirth? In what did rebirth consist?

This seems to many inquirers to be a dreadful *crux*. And indeed must it not always be so when, on the one hand, we are dealing with, if not a primitive, yet with a pre-scientific attitude of thought, and when, on the other, we do not ourselves know the relation between 'ourselves' and our bodies?

Yet may it not be that, to a certain extent, we have created more of a puzzle than there should be? And by 'we' I include writers on Buddhism, old and new. In fact it is they largely who are to blame. It seems curious, but it is a fact, that, whenever those writers get explicit on *how* Buddhism conceived rebirth, he—or she—I too have sinned—always goes, not to the old Suttas, but to the later books. But the Founder taught for years and years. And there was no Paraclete descending after him to teach his followers. What's wrong with the old Suttas?

What happened, according to them, when a man or woman came to die? They did not say there would be at once rebirth on earth, for they said this was

improbable. They classed, speaking generally, the other four bournes under two heads: the unhappy 'downfall' to either Niraya, Petas, or animals, and the happy coming-to-be in deva-world.

There was yet a third eventuality—that of the final Nibbāna or Parinibbāna of the perfectly 'Worthy,' the Saint or Arahant. He by his perfect saintliness eluded all five *gati*'s or goings, for he ceased to 'go-on,' i.e. to be once more reborn and die. Somewhere, somehow, he passed into a rest from going-on. That he had ceased to exist it was not right to hold (*Majjhima* i., 140). But for the race to whom Gotama's mission came, as there was no new revelation of the Alpha of all things, so there was none either of the Omega of all things. It does not of course follow that there was no Alpha or Omega because none was revealed through him. But just there and just then man was to try to go alone through a rather dark valley. And few were fit for Arahantship.

For everyone else it was rebirth on the one hand as nerayika, peta, or animal, on the other as a kāma-deva, or as a brahma-deva, according as, by an unexplained automatic sequence, his or her voluntary acts had been predetermining destiny. In passing it is perhaps worth commenting on the absence, in all the wealth of simile, parable and symbol, in Buddhist literature, of those scales of doom so familiar in mediæval Christian thought. Yet weighing, both literally and figuratively, figures in Indian civilization.

Well, the man when his term here is up—to use the refrain 'at the separation of the body' after death'—finds himself 'arisen' in a new world with a new body.

<sup>1</sup> *Kūyassa bhedo*. *Bhedo* is etymologically 'breakage,' but it is chiefly used figuratively, as 'schism,' and in grammar, etc.

‘Himself?’ I hear the readers of books about Buddhism say. That is so. For all practical purposes, as we say,—‘conventionally understood,’ as later Buddhist documents say,—when some Ānanda dies, it is Ānanda who ‘goes on.’ It may not be an identical Ānanda’s self, but that is because Ānanda’s self is ever changing. It is not quite a different Ānanda, for it is the beginning of, say, chapter 500,001 in the life-history of this individual now called Ānanda. But it’s much more the ‘same old’ Ānanda than ever you or I could be. And he will very likely keep his name. Thus we read of the rich patron of Gotama’s Order, Anāthapiṇḍika, revisiting the Jeta Grove at Sāvattihī—his gift to the Order—from the next deva-world and being seen and heard psychically by Gotama and Ānanda, and recognized as Anāthapiṇḍika.<sup>1</sup> And, to name only one other such episode, we read of Gotama telling his disciples how the local General Ajita, who had recently died, had appeared to him to denounce a certain would-be rival fakir as a liar. “He has been telling people I am reborn in purgatory. But I have become a deva in the world of the thirty-three [the ‘nearest’ deva-world].”<sup>2</sup> The Buddha does not say ‘the man who was Ajita.’ He speaks of him as ‘Ajita the Licchavi general.’ The essential individuality therefore is considered as unbroken.

No doubt in the case of rebirth as an animal, name and human mentality are the one wholly, the other largely, lost. But outside folk-lore and the garrulous commentaries, no actual cases of a rebirth recognized as such by a teacher’s supernatural insight are met with. The Buddha is made to affirm in a few Suttas (e.g. *Majjhima* iii. 167), that some classes of wrongdoers

<sup>1</sup> *Kindred Sayings*, i. 79f.    <sup>2</sup> *Dialogues of the Buddha*, iii. 17.

will meet with such a fate, but the Suttas, so far as I know, contain no other special affirmations on the subject.

But in this kind of rebirth and in that of earth-humanity, while the entrance of the self or person finds no adequate treatment, the acquisition of the new body is a relatively simple matter, for parents of some sort were ever making new bodies, but it is quite maintainable that no parents, animal or human, ever made new minds or new selves.

If we next ask whence came, in Buddhist belief, the new body, when a man passed on to appear as inmate of purgatory, as *peta*, or as *deva*, there is not a word in the teaching about it. In each case it is evident that there was a new body, and that is all there is to say about it. Nor were the founders asked concerning this—so far as the records show. The age was in such matters not critical. Ready to their hand, had they thought it either true or a teaching expedient to adopt, was the notion of the finer body set free from the tissues of the earth-body during the deep sleep of the latter. For it is not a 'discarnate spirit' that then comes forth from the earth-body, but the man's self invested in a finer vehicle, leaving only the breathing life to guard its 'nest.' By this bright light-body, he 'looks down' at his sleeping members, and "goes again to his home, golden person, lonely bird," has a pleasant time of sport and laughter and love, or sees fearsome things, learns things good and evil and hastens back, when the earth-body is waking, to dissolve into it again like rain or vapour. And thus the dream at waking is a memory not of strange unaccountable earth-fancies, but of the adventures during sleep. The Upanishad dealing with this belief is

reckoned usually among those that are pre-Buddhistic (*Bṛihadāraṇyaka*).

Psychology is occupying itself much with dream-consciousness. Is it possible that Indian psychologists may one day look into their ancient lore and find it, as well as the present, '*gros de l'avenir*,' as Leibniz said? But early Buddhism took up from the outset a position of manifold protest against current theories. And it may well be that one of these (to which we are coming) barred the way against its accepting light from the teaching we find in those earlier Upanishads. The theory of the subtler body as our self's new home at death would have sufficed to explain—hypothetically, as we should say—all bodily rebirth not of parents. But it is left untouched. We have even, in one of the Suttas, a description of the symptoms of death in a deva<sup>1</sup> (and of his friends' valediction as his return to earth draws nigh), but nothing about the arrival of a worthy man among devas.

But what about the rebirth of a new mind? Is it a brand-new mind that is reborn? Is the doctrine here also unfinished? We are now dealing in a way with four-fifths of the earth-person; for of his corporeal and incorporeal constituents the corporeal occupies but one *khandha* or aggregate, the incorporeal aggregates are four in number, and all are what we call mental. What has the Buddha to say about a new mind at rebirth?

Nothing. Mind is a perpetually changing movement of arising and ceasing (*Samyutta*, ii. 95): this is said generally, not concerning a new life-spell. As he might have said: "It is no fit question." If he had lived now, he might well say, it is as if, when a man

takes down a worn-out electric battery and sets up a new one, he were to ask, why have you sold me no new electricity? The electric force would be potentially ready all the time, though unable to work without the battery and the bell-push. All we need, at dying, is a new battery. *We* are the force; our translation into this is mind.

But you will say, that is how a modern Buddha might express it, who had learnt to think in terms of forces. How did The Buddha express it?

This is a very fit question. He was introducing more analytic care into his teaching than had been done previously, but he could not draw parallels from a stock of knowledge that was as yet non-existent. So he spoke of mind (*viññāṇa*) getting a new station, or standing, or platform in a new body. This did not mean that mind, for him, was itself a stationary thing, as if it was a head fitted on to a bust. He saw not mind, but minding; not consciousness, but a 'consciencing,' analogous to an act of handling. We handle pen, type-writer, diary. When these are done for, we renew them, but we do not buy new handling of them. Thus at death there was a *bheda*, a separation of the body, from that 'mind' by which word we express the self, but the dying was of the body only. We need not be misled by the little parable of the 'burden-bearer' (*Samyutta* [iii.], xxii. 22, 1). There the 'bearer' is any person; the 'burden' is the mental and bodily complex of his living organism. The 'taking up,' the 'laying down,' of it are the one the exercise, the other the extinction, of craving. The simile is not so told as to convey what one would expect,—namely, the laying down at death, the taking up at rebirth. But critics have written as if it did convey this: mind as well as



body laid down at death, and a 'person' or ego left burdenless, or with a new burden. This is to garble the text.

Death is of the body only. The cessation in the dying instrument of the incorporeal processes or forces making up mind and their renewal by a new instrument could not—nay, cannot be explained until the hour comes for man to learn—as he has not yet learned—what is the relation of mind to body. He was not ready to learn it then. He is still waiting and seeking for light, and Gotama either did not know, or did not go beyond the mandate of that inspiration that comes to great helpers of men.

What then is it that puzzles some inquirers in the Buddhist doctrine of rebirth? Buddhism, it is said, is illogical in order to serve an ethical purpose. It taught rebirth—that is, life past and future, as well as present—to enforce the doctrine that good deeds done in past lives have brought happiness in this life, and that good deeds done in this life will bring happiness in a future life; that bad deeds have had, will have, the opposite effect. But at the same time it taught a doctrine of *an-atta* or no-self or soul, coming over from a past life into this life, or going from this life to another life in a new body. Now if I myself have not so passed on, will not so pass on, how have have 'I' incurred, how shall 'I' incur, happiness or suffering because of what 'I' have done? This is the puzzle. It was put to Gotama himself, and answered in a peculiar and to us very baffling way.<sup>1</sup>

Let me recall the four ways in which this difficulty arose then, and now arises. First from an unfortunate

<sup>1</sup> See my *Buddhism* (Home University Library), pp. 188f.

ambiguity of language. The Buddhist word for life, in the sense of a span of individual life, was self-state (*atta-bhāva*). And the reflexive pronouns—myself, thyself, ourselves, etc.,—were one and all expressed by the one word *atta* in its various inflexions without any possessive pronoun attached to it. But *atta* did not only mean our fairly unambiguous word [my-] self, [your-] self. *Atta*, in Sanskrit *ātman*, meant also spirit (derived, like spirit, from breath); nay, it meant Divine Spirit and was equivalent to Brahman. And these two were identified not with any one god of the ancient Indian pantheon, but with that deeper quest of the Indian mind after the source, essence and world-will of the all. The Greek *pneuma* is the only word that approaches *ātman* in meaning; both are etymologically the same. Hence arose an ambiguity in language into which we can hardly enter. If, every time we use the word ‘self,’ we *might* mean ‘Holy Spirit,’ it is plain that the way to a wrong doctrine lay perilously near. *Pneuma ho theos*: “God is spirit,” said St. John. But Jesus, when he said “my soul is exceeding sorrowful even unto death,” did not have to say my *pneuma*. He said, ‘my *psychē*,’ or its Aramaic equivalent. And when he was tempted—“if thou be the Son of God, cast *thyself* down”—he had not to say, in telling his experience, ‘cast holy-spirit down’ but ‘*bale seauton katô*.’ But in Pali, ‘spirit,’ ‘soul,’ ‘thyself,’ would all three be *atta*. Thus it was but a little way for the Indian in Gotama’s world to see in self or soul something mysteriously divine, though it is a much longer way for us.

That little way had been travelled when Gotama lived. To the eye of mystic insight man’s self *was* the divine self, dwelling in every man’s heart, a small

delicate replica of himself, body and mind, quitting the earth-body in sleep and at death. And as God, it was eternal, unchanging, not subject to suffering or sorrow. For such was the essence of divinity.

Against this belief the Buddha at the outset of his career (*Vinaya*, i. 13) uttered an emphatic protest, a protest repeated, in part, throughout the Suttas. The argument he used is *only intelligible* when we see, in his repudiation of *atta*, a self that is not human only but also divine. It is not a denial of self or soul, but only of a theory of it (*atta-vāda*). In direct opposition to the teaching of those who said: *Tat tvam asi*: "That thou art; that Ātman is thyself; thou thyself art God," he said: "That is not thine, that art thou not, that is not thy God."

He would not have taken just this stand had he lived here and taught to-day. He would have agreed with us that self or soul, whatever else we mean by it, is nothing divinely perfect, powerful, immutable, not susceptible of growth, but is a frail, fallible, mutable being, often suffering, capable of growth as of falling backward.

This did not exhaust Gotama's quarrel with *atta*-theory. His other quarrel may be said to have been with the word itself. He was no materialist in the agnostic gospel he preached. But he saw that for people *words, names*, too much meant *things* (*Dialogues of the Buddha*, i. 263; *Kindred Sayings*, i. 16, 18). Especially things they saw, touched. Even if they could not see or touch, to name a thing gave it substance in their notion of it. He waved aside metaphysical discussion with those who asked questions on metaphysic. And he had no scientific vocabulary to help out his meaning by physical analogies. But

ever is he denying that 'body,' or 'mind' or divine ātman is the real being of me that 'goes on, runs on' from birth to birth, like a force manifesting itself in material substance, or in modes of mind. It is as if he wished to say: If 'I know,' there is not a knower, not a knowledge: I am knowing, I am knowledge. If 'I love,' I do not have love, I am the loving, I am love. Give names, but do not lose sight of this, that a name may not correspond to a truth. But he did not say this. Let us not put words into his mouth. What he said was man goes on (from life to life). And: man is neither body nor mind (*Samyutta* iii. 33, 166), neither the name nor the thing. He did not say what is the very man. He probably did not know. He knew that 'the man' went on. 'He fares on, he runs on' (*samsarati, sandhāvati*), he said, from an unknown beginning (*ibid.* ii. 178, etc.). And so long as there is 'ignorance' and 'craving,' mind finds ever a new 'station' (*ibid.* ii. 38, etc.). This 'mind' is not at each birth a new 'thing.' It is a causal process (*ibid.* ii. 20, 23; *Majjhima* i. 259f.).

(3) When, centuries later, the mind of Pundits, or as we should say Scholastics, had been concentrating on the records called Vinaya and Dhamma, and when its somewhat crude analyses and dialectic termed Abhidhamma had been compiled, and when all three collections had been written down, the religious outlook was changing. The older Ātmanism was blending into what came to be called Bhaktism. The blending may be seen in the *Bhagavadgītā*. *Atta* as 'divine spirit' is no longer a danger-point in Buddhism, neither in the *Milinda*, nor in the *Visuddhi Magga*. It is only the self as an entity apart from its functioning that has still to be contended with. So much does this negating

it as such take up the attention of early and later Abhidhamma, that any positive, constructive thought on the subject is far too much neglected. And hence we of to-day are left often puzzling.

The Buddhist 'Fathers' were no more able than was their great master to say what man really is. But when, whether in the *Kathāvatthu* or in the *Milinda*, a 'going on from one world to another' is apparently denied, it is rather a denial as to what passes on than that there is a passing on. It is no transition of an identical, unchanging entity corresponding to the identical, unchanging label 'person,' 'being,' 'soul.' That there is a transition conceived is evident from the simile in the *Visuddhi Magga*. "As a man might cross a ditch by swinging himself as he hangs to a rope from a tree on this bank, so does mind (*viññāna*) at death proceed onward in causal relation to objects and so on," wrote Buddhaghosa (*Visuddhi Magga*, p. 554). But though his language is copious (and often terribly involved) his range of ideas is very small; those of the *Milinda* are smaller, those of the *Kathāvatthu* (I. 1) smallest of all. And why? Because their knowledge of natural laws and natural forces was so restricted and crude. They had some skill in dialectic, but not much else. There is a great gulf between them and us. They fought hard to beat down this notion of their 'man in the street': that when he *says* 'person,' 'being,' 'soul,' 'I,' 'you,' the word corresponds to a certain inner invisible objectified unity underneath the visible appearance. So hard did they fight that they lost sight of what was much more important: that there is an unobjectifiable spiritual continuity or real being of man, expressing itself in what we call mind (or feeling, thought, will)

through a series of bodies. They have played a little into the hands of materialists.

(4) For just as bell-push, fiery coil and battery are not electric force, so is our tangible, visible, audible frame-work not we, nor the 'mind' operating it either. But give me a body and I can express myself through it as what I am 'pleased to call my mind.' Hence it follows that all we need ask of any creed that teaches rebirth or survival is: How about the new body? We can leave the question of 'new' mind. Find man a new body, and he will work it as mind. *How* we cannot say till the relation of mind to body in general is understood.

When shall we see scientific attention—in psychology, biology, physics—waking up to concentrate on this wonderful and pressing problem,—the new body that man, passing on, will work by mind? The so-called 'new psychologies' have not come to it yet, though they are so much prolegomenon to the great move on that is coming.<sup>1</sup> The psychology of yesterday tried to build up the mind of the individual from the racial mind of the past. It had to deal in masses, for it had not the Buddhist secret of rebirth. The psychology of to-day is investigating the past of the individual—the last little bit of that past; it will have none of the Buddhist doctrine of rebirth. The next step will be to inquire into the psychology of our future—into what *we* rise up as, when *we* discard this body, the whence of that new body and the nature of it. It is no idle quest, but of tremendous practical importance. Few of us will urgently need to wireless to the Antipodes, much less to Mars. But we all die,

<sup>1</sup> I hailed with pleasure the conclusion of Dr. Bernard Hollander's *In Search of the Soul* (London, 1921): "Instead of saying 'man has a soul,' it would be more correct to say 'man himself is a soul.'"

and very soon. Are we always going to be so childish as to be content, not only with creeds, but with sciences that leave us in ignorance, and so in the fear of death? This is no hopelessly impossible quest. Quietly research is going on, experiences are mounting up recorded more carefully now than ever. It is only the switching on of competent scientific investigation to an adequate extent and intensity that is lacking. This would in no long time bring us from our present darkness of fear and doubt and ignorance and anguish into a clearer air.

Still is the voice of us Rachels heard weeping for our sons—why? “Because they are not,” said the ancient book. *Are they not?* Perhaps in a way nearer to us than ever they were, more otherwise than elsewhere?

Still do our poems smell of the tomb; still do we read epitaphs on Here lies—not always ‘the body of,’ but Here lies John Brown. And we stay our torn hearts with bed-ridden notions about ‘So He giveth His beloved sleep’ and the like. Does John Brown lie here? Does he sleep? Is it not time, if we have burning within us the love of truth and the will to bring something worth calling consolation to the afflicted, that the scientifically trained among us should wake up and begin to put an end —*as they can*—to our ignorance.

C. A. F. RHYS DAVIDS.

(Read at an Open Meeting of the Quest Society, November 10, 1921)

## THE DECAY OF TRADITIONAL THEOLOGY.<sup>1</sup>

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It is common knowledge that in England during the years before the War the emptying of the churches and the drifting away of the masses from all organized religion had already caused dismay among the clergy and their supporters. Some had dolefully admitted that it was not dogmatic religion purely that was losing its grip, but Christianity in each and all of its multitudinous forms. The present Bishop of Durham, for example, declared several years before the War that "Christianity no longer holds the supreme position which for centuries it has held in the thought of civilized men." (Henson, *The Liberty of Prophecy*.) Similarly a Scottish theologian reported "a widespread alienation from the Christian faith." (Dr. P. McA. Muir, in *Modern Substitutes for Christianity*.) Citations to the same effect might be made in great numbers, but it seems hardly worth while to accumulate evidence in confirmation of facts which are now so well known.

During the War a great opportunity came to the Churches to institute a methodical enquiry into the

<sup>1</sup> Read before the Philosophical Society of the State University of Peking, January, 1921. Owing to lack of space some parts of this paper have had to be omitted.—ED.



religious beliefs of the masses of the people. Perhaps in this connection I may be allowed first to quote a British soldier's views on the much-debated question whether the experiences of the War, coupled with the ministrations of the chaplains, tended to make men religious.

"I do not think there is any sign of religious revival," he says, "even when religion is interpreted as being distinct from the Churches. So far as organized religion is concerned it has lost its hold upon us. The Army church-parade has done that. And besides we don't *feel* like it. . . . We have not been driven to God. We are no longer sure that there is one." (T. H. Proctor, in *The International Journal of Ethics*, Oct. 1920, p. 46.)

This is the utterance of a layman. It may be interesting to compare with it the conclusions arrived at by Army chaplains, who utilized to the full their excellent opportunities for ascertaining what the state of religion among the young manhood of England really was. The Rev. Professor Cairns, having carefully sifted the evidence coming from many quarters, came to the conclusion that about 80 per cent. of the men in the British armies (exclusive, of course, of all coloured troops) were 'out of touch with organized Christianity.'

One who was himself an Army chaplain, commenting on this announcement, reminds us that after the introduction of conscription the armies were necessarily recruited from all ranks and classes, and he adds with praiseworthy candour that "they certainly did not represent the worst part of our manhood." He goes on to say that these men "are now back in civilian life once more, and we can reckon that the figures still

hold good and that the things that are vital for us are of little account with the vast majority."

Similar evidence has been collected in a book entitled *The Army and Religion*, published in 1919 by a number of chaplains and lay-helpers. One observer records the fact that "the religion of 90 per cent. of the men at the Front was not distinctly Christian, but a religion of patriotism and valour, tinged with chivalry, and at the best merely coloured with sentiment and emotion borrowed from Christianity."

A staff-chaplain wrote as follows: "The attitude of the Army to-day towards religion is fairly indicative of the normal attitude of the British people as a whole towards religion. There is much in the whole situation that is profoundly disquieting."

Another book, consisting of letters written by an Army chaplain (*Letters of Oswin Creighton*), tells the same story. He was forced to "face the fact that dogmatic Christianity hardly existed in the Army." He makes an interesting reference to a friend who was 'the finest officer in the R.A.,' but came to church only out of good nature. In frank conversation with the chaplain, the officer expressed the opinion that "perhaps it would be better if all churches were shut up." He had formerly thought they were "good for ignorant people," but now "he had given that idea up."

A welcome feature of these and similar revelations is that the writers (who, be it remembered, are biassed in favour of Christianity) have found themselves obliged to admit that the defection of at least 80 per cent. of the young male population of England from the Churches has not been attended by any moral degeneration,—except, indeed, in so far as the beastliness of war itself has tended to blunt the delicacy of

men's moral perceptions. It used to be assumed by devout Christians that abnormal wickedness was a necessary accompaniment of loss of faith. "We found them," says a chaplain I have already quoted, "good pals, clean, straight fellows, whose lives sometimes made one ashamed of one's own, or wild, passionate men, lax in morals but full of kindness. We lived alongside them during the topsy-turvy years; they were men we admired—brave, cheerful, open-hearted, good company, and full of the joy of life, but they did not seem to feel the need of the faith for which we are giving our lives in order to take it to the ends of the earth, and what is more, they seemed to get on very well without it." There is something very touching in the words that follow. Apparently this writer intended to devote himself to missionary work among savages; and he adds: "So it looks as if, in going to New Guinea, I am going to take a Gospel to the black man that the white man doesn't want, and am trying to win the savage to a faith which the civilized man ignores." (From an article in *The East and the West*.)

Many religious optimists foretold a great revival of religion after the War in spite of the many warnings from the trenches that the men were showing no disposition to become religious. But there has been no revival, and the immense efforts made to start one while the War was still in progress is generally recognized to have been a dismal failure.

If then the experience of the Great War has done nothing to revive the drooping forces of institutional religion in England or Europe, it has at least had the result of convincing a large number of thoughtful members of the clergy that the heretics and free-

thinkers were right, after all, in one of their main contentions: that religious belief is not indispensable to a lofty morality, and that good men are found quite as often among unbelievers as among the faithful. Not unnaturally this is a fact which Christian people were slow to realize; great numbers of them are not prepared to admit it yet.

In 1914, six clergymen confessed themselves perplexed by the fact that "many of those who absent themselves from church and chapel lead lives moulded on Christian lines," and asked themselves "why is it that there is so much Christianity outside the Church?" ('Lay Views of Six Clergy'; see *Times Literary Supplement* of May 28, 1914.) Surely a fairly adequate answer might be framed thus. In the first place many such people dislike the ecclesiastical side of Christianity and derive no moral or spiritual stimulus from going to church; hence they have very naturally ceased to go. In the second place a great deal of the so-called 'Christianity outside the Church' is not distinctively Christianity at all. It is called Christianity partly because Christians have been allowed to assume that outside Christianity there can be no true virtue, and partly because in countries that have been long dominated by the Christian Churches the term 'Christianity' is a convenient though quite inaccurate label for virtues which, as a matter of fact, existed before Christianity came into the world, and exist to-day in countries where Christianity has little or no influence. "Christian principles," says the Bishop of Durham (in a letter to *The Morning Post* of December 11, 1913), "have sometimes been applied most effectively by men who are not themselves Christian." Quite so, but why call them '*Christian*

principles,' unless we are prepared to prove that they have never been practised in pre-Christian days or in non-Christian countries? A fairer admission is that of the late Bishop Creighton, who acknowledged the existence of '*principles of right and wrong*' which might be, and were, held and practised by civilized men to-day quite irrespective of "their position or beliefs as members of any religious organization."

The efforts of some of the clergy to explain the existence of the moral virtues among the people of 'heathen' countries, such as China, sometimes throw an instructive light on the mysterious workings of the ecclesiastical mind. For example, an English clergyman, in a book published seven or eight years ago, offers the more or less illuminating suggestion that the strivings of the non-Christian conscience and the moral efforts of non-Christian races should not be regarded as connected with "the specific work of the Holy Spirit" (as is the case with good Christians), but with "the general work of the Logos." (*The Spirit of God*, by W. H. Griffith Thomas.) This ingenious theory seems to have escaped the attention of previous writers on the perplexing subject of the 'heathen' virtues, and I gladly take this opportunity of commending it to the notice of my Chinese audience.

One of the most significant admissions with regard to the effect of religious institutions and the religious profession on morals which I have come across, is contained in a remark made by a high ecclesiastic whom I have already quoted. "Almost always," says Bishop Henson of Durham, "the ecclesiastical system fails to secure the sanction of the conscience; *the moral progress of men out-paces the formal teaching of their churches*, and by a dismaying and persistent

paradox, the moral standard of the priesthood falls below that of the community of believers." Might not the bishop have added—"and of an ever-increasing host of unbelievers"? Anyhow he has made a very courageous statement which must have puzzled and pained a great many earnest Christians.

The cause of traditional Christianity and organized religion in England is in an even more perilous state than the statistics of Army chaplains would lead us to suppose. They admit that about 80 per cent. or more of the young men of England practically stand outside all the Churches. What of the remaining 20 per cent. It would be rash—and in fact untrue—to assert that even this comparatively small remnant consists entirely of sincere and intelligent believers. We must remember, to begin with, that although the Churches have lost their power to compel men to conform, at least outwardly, to the established religion, and though persecutions for heresy and unbelief are now obsolete or have at least been robbed of their terrors, there are still strong reasons, of a severely practical type, why Englishmen should think twice before they decide to sever their formal connexion with the Christian religion. These reasons are mainly connected with the fictions and conventions of social life, and therefore they are particularly effective in the case of the middle and professional classes. Most educated Englishmen, I suppose, have come across doctors, lawyers and other professional men who are known to them to be agnostics or free-thinkers, yet who find it highly desirable, if not necessary, to conceal their views from all outside the circle of their most intimate friends. The position of such men is gradually becoming less painful than it was even a few years

ago, for the general decay of the church-going habit has released them from the irksome necessity of acting a lie and attending religious services which for them have no meaning. The Report of the Archbishops' Second Committee on the Worship of the Church, issued in 1918, refers to the decline of church-going in the following significant words: "Church attendance has had until lately the support of popular tradition and custom, . . . and convention to a large extent made up what was lacking in devotion." This is perfectly true, and it undoubtedly led to a great deal of hypocrisy and insincerity which must surely have been disadvantageous to both morals and religion. For the decay of church-going as a social convention we owe a good deal to such things as motor-cars and the institution of 'week-ending.' But the fact that a mechanical invention should have helped to empty the churches shows in a highly instructive way how thin must have been the religious veneer that could be so easily rubbed off.

Besides professional men and other members of the great middle class, there is a host of others who maintain their connection with official Christianity through indifference. They may be 'believers,' but their belief too often rests on no surer foundation than that God is to them (as a writer on religious psychology has recently said) "not sufficiently real to be doubted." (J. B. Pratt, *The Religious Consciousness*.) Their adherence is not so much due to the fact that they are religious as to the fact that they care nothing about religion. They are traditionalists because they are too lazy to think for themselves. They accept official Christianity with the rest of their social environment and ancestral traditions. They are

conventional in religion just as they are conventional in every detail of social intercourse.

More laudable are the motives of those social workers and philanthropists who, while more or less sceptical about Christian dogmas, find it an economy of effort to use long-established and influential Christian agencies for the carrying out of their schemes for human betterment. The Churches claim and receive a great deal of credit for humanitarian and philanthropic work which is not really due to their own initiative.

Then again there is a considerable number of people, mostly to be found in literary and artistic circles, who, while they have no real belief in the creeds, retain a certain sentimental interest in Christian traditions and institutions, and derive emotional or æsthetic pleasure from participation in or contemplation of religious rites when celebrated in beautiful buildings to the accompaniment of good sacred music. They, too, help to impart a certain rather precarious stability to the fabric of institutional religion.

‘Religious’ folk of this particular variety are not confined to Europe or to Christendom. They are to be found even in India, the mother-land of religion. Rabindranath Tagore, in his *Reminiscences*, tells us of a class of “religious epicureans,” who, without being believers, find “comfort and solace in gathering together, and steeping themselves in pleasing sights, sounds and scents galore, under the garb of religious ceremonial.” Such people, he adds, luxuriate in “the paraphernalia of worship.”

A larger and perhaps slightly more influential body of nominal Christians is composed of members



of the so-called upper classes, a great and growing number of whom take no serious interest in religion for its own sake, but rally to the support of the Church because they regard it as a force which makes for conservatism and the maintenance of the existing order. They know that in the past the Church has been a valiant champion on the side of privilege and established institutions, and they expect it to fight equally valiantly on the same side in the struggles that are to come.

Another class which supplies the Church with many of its most useful recruits, consists of the members of the various Government Services—especially those who are much in the public eye. I think it will be observed that officers of the higher ranks in the army, navy, civil, colonial and diplomatic services show a much larger proportion of Christians—real or nominal—than are now to be found in other sections of the community. In the professional fighting services especially, ‘infidelity’—even mild forms of unorthodoxy—are still comparatively rare among officers; probably because the training and discipline that turn men into good officers readily become instruments for turning them into good conventional Christians as well. Even the sergeant-major has an almost proverbial grudge against ‘fancy religions’; and colonels and major-generals are apt to be sarcastic and severe—and somewhat emphatic in their language—when they come across young men who have the temerity to swerve from the religious orthodoxy of their day. Uniforms, ribbons and decorations often, I fancy, exercise a subtle influence in determining men’s attitude towards the Churches. It is not surprising, perhaps, that uniforms should tend to

encourage uniformity: that is what they are intended to do. Government officials are expected to walk in step, and the more be-ribboned they are the more rigidly must they curb any untoward originality or independence of spirit, and the more scrupulously must they pay attention to all the accepted conventions. One of our latest poets writes thus of a particular class of officials, but his words might be given a more general application:

“Their uniforms are prison walls,  
 Their peaked hats iron bars,  
 And there dwell hearts turned stony cold,  
 Cold as the wintry stars.”

(S. Winsten, in *Chains*.)

There is perhaps some truth even in the last two lines of this stanza, but I should be inclined to deprecate any reference to the stars in such a connexion. Stars suggest the music of the spheres, to which the Government official is too often deaf. That is inevitable, I suppose, because his heart has to beat in time with a terrestrial music of a much more commonplace type. On the whole, I fear it must be admitted that red tape, whatever may be said its favour, is not a commodity that facilitates the emancipation of the spirit.

When I say that the State official is expected to show deference to religion, I must not be understood to mean that he is in any way encouraged to make religion a dominant force in his life. That, indeed, might have most embarrassing results both for the official himself and for the State. But the model Government official—like the average ecclesiastic—is never so indiscreet as to apply his Christian principles

fully and consistently in real life. Those principles are mostly reserved for Sundays, during church-hours and even then they are meant to be objects of prayerful contemplation rather than practical guides to action. The official who wishes to stand high in the estimation of his departmental superiors, will not fail to show outward respect to ecclesiastical institutions and personages, but while keeping himself untainted by the least suspicion of heresy he will be exceedingly careful to avoid the inconveniences and possible martyrdom that may result from taking religion too seriously.

It follows from what I have said that, though the great Departments of State approve of a decorous conformity to religious usages on the part of their officials, they themselves are by no means imbued with the religious spirit. Their deference to religious institutions merely indicates that Church and State are still regarded, to a considerable extent, as natural allies.

“Religion, like Government,” as Dr. Ellwood says, “is one of the oldest means of control in human societies. The religious sanction for conduct, being a supernatural sanction, all human experience shows, has been one of the most effective means of controlling the conduct of normal individuals.” (*Sociology in its Psychological Aspects*, pp. 356-7.) A remark made to me not long ago by a British official may serve as a commentary on this. “Of course,” he said, “real belief in Christian dogmas is hardly possible for educated men now-a-days, and I don’t believe in them any more than you do; but I support the Church because I believe it is the only thing that may save us all from Bolshevism.” An admission of this kind is

in itself a striking indication of what I have been trying to show—that the Church derives a great deal of its remaining strength and influence from people who support it for reasons which have little or nothing to do with Religion properly so-called.

I may note one significant fact with regard to the various classes of nominal Christians whose peculiarities I have attempted to review—a fact which seems to show with sufficient clearness that religion with them is little but a social convention. I mean that in such circles religious topics are usually tabooed as a subject of conversation even among fairly intimate friends. There is a sort of unwritten law that it is 'bad form' to mention the subject at all, except in a conventional way, and altogether unpardonable to discuss it with any approach to seriousness. The assumption seems to be that religion is too sacred a subject for discussion, or that it involves the danger of hurting people's deepest feelings. But I fancy that the real trouble with many people is that they know their own religious notions to be so confused and immature that they are quite incapable of discussing the subject intelligently, and dare not make the attempt. Religion is tabooed in the first place because it bores; in the second place because, if admitted as a subject of conversation, it is apt to expose the pretensions of those who know little and care less about the subject, yet are unwilling that their ignorance and lack of interest should stand revealed.

The conclusion of the matter is that the existence of these taboos has the rather depressing result of discouraging the discussion of a subject which, to all men who are not materialists of the crudest type, should surely be by far the most absorbingly interesting

and most vitally important subject in the world. The taboos show that conventional Christians, to put the matter briefly, are Christians without being religious; whereas intelligent unbelievers are often intensely religious without being Christians.

Among the forces that tend to make the fortress of organized religion in England appear to be stronger than it really is, we should not fail to notice the Press. We find that the majority of the great newspapers and prosperous magazines rarely publish anything hostile to or adversely critical of official Christianity; and their reviews of books written on religious subjects by agnostics or non-Christian writers (however able and scholarly such books may be) are too frequently inadequate and misleading. In spite of this, the cause of 'infidelity' grows and the cause of traditional religion becomes ever weaker.

I may be asked *why* there is all this unbelief, half-belief and sham belief. Old-fashioned Christians, who still adhere with pathetic loyalty to the traditional theology, the infallible Bible, and the Pauline 'scheme of salvation,' are of course disposed to put it down to the depravity of man, the enticements of the Evil One and wilful blindness to the Light. Perhaps there are several causes more potent than these, but one of the most conspicuous is simply that the old theology and the old bibliolatry have become impossible to the modern mind. Orthodox Christianity has been 'riddled by the shot and shell of criticism,' as Bishop Gore said of some time-honoured doctrines of Protestantism. To-day young men are giving up orthodox Christianity for the very adequate reason that they no longer believe it. That modern unbelief is not due either to wickedness or ignorance is clearly demonstrated by

one very remarkable fact, the importance of which can hardly be over-emphasized. I refer to the fact that the most highly educated and most intelligent members of the clergy are themselves finding it necessary to surrender (or 'reinterpret,' which to the non-ecclesiastical mind comes to the same thing) nearly all the old beliefs that were once considered essential to Christianity and necessary to salvation.

The Roman Catholic Church doubtless maintains its traditional position and its priests remain loyal and docile believers; not, indeed, because Modernism is unknown to that Church—on the contrary, it arose within it—but because it has come under the ban of the Papacy, and all open manifestations of the Modernist spirit are treated as heresy. If Rome has no openly-avowed Modernists in her ranks to-day, that is simply because an open avowal means ex-communication, and the convicted Modernist ceases *ipso facto* to be a Catholic. Whether the Modernists and other unorthodox theologians of to-day will finally make their views prevail, it is too early to say. If they succeed, they will establish a new orthodoxy which will differ so enormously from the old that we may reasonably doubt whether it should continue to call itself Christian in any traditional sense.

In the Church of England the present position is extremely interesting, and I wish I had time to go into details. On the one side we have conservative divines like Bishop Gore, whose own views, when he was a young man, were regarded by the orthodoxy of that day as so dangerous that it is said he was almost refused ordination. He has not modified those views, but others have now advanced further than he is willing to go, hence he is ranked to-day among the

conservatives. With him are ranged men like the bishops of Ely and Zanzibar. On the other side we have the Modernists—such men as J. M. Thompson of Magdalen and Canon Glazebrook—who, conscious of the support of sympathisers and allies all over Western Europe—are submitting the Christian creeds and dogmas to a process of ‘reinterpretation’ so drastic as practically to change the whole meaning and content of the traditional faith.

With regard to philosophy the case is even more ominous for the supporters of the old orthodoxy or any kind of dogmatic Christianity. At the present moment I can think of only two English philosophers of high reputation who can by any stretch of the imagination be rightly styled orthodox Christians, and both these men would probably have been burned alive for their *unorthodoxy* three or four centuries ago. One of them, I may say, is a theologian rather than a philosopher, though I think he has not taken orders in the Church. Oxford and Cambridge—especially the former—were once the strongholds of doctrinal and institutional Christianity in England; it is not many years since no youth could be admitted as an undergraduate until he had subscribed to a confession of faith. All religious tests have now been swept away for both undergraduates and fellows, and the guidance and instruction of English youth at those seats of learning is very largely and increasingly in the hands of tutors and lecturers who make no attempt to disguise their disbelief in the traditional creeds.

Perhaps many are anxious to remind me that all I have said goes to show that it is only dogmatic, credal religion that is dying, not Religion itself. This is a view with which I entirely agree, and I hope the

distinction is implicit, if not explicit, in all I have said. It was precisely because I wished to differentiate 'theology' from 'religion' that I entitled my paper 'The Decay of Traditional *Theology*,' not 'The Decay of *Religion*.' I am inclined to think that Religion, so far from being a shrinking force, is a growing one, though of course everything depends on what we mean by Religion. One of the foremost authorities on religious psychology has told us in a recently-published book that religion differs from theology in that it is an attitude rather than a doctrine. (J. B. Pratt, *The Religious Consciousness*.) This seems to me to be true as far as it goes, though it is inadequate as a definition, which of course it was not intended to be. I agree also with Miss Jane Harrison, when she suggests that gods and theology are a temporary phase, "always perforce fabricated, and only to be broken. They are husks, shells, that the swelling kernel of religion must always break through." (*Alpha and Omega*, p. 196.) Confessing that she herself is a "deeply religious atheist," she declares that "the God of theology is simply an intellectual attempt to define the indefinable; it is not a thing lived, experienced; it almost must be a spiritual stumbling-block to-day." (*Ibid.*, pp. 205, 207.)

As far as Europe goes, I am not convinced that deep religious feeling is a rarer thing now than it was in the Ages of Faith. The relaxation of the bonds of authority has certainly tended to empty the churches, but how many of us, now-a-days, suppose that a church is a more fitting refuge for a soul that is athirst for spiritual truth than, say, a mountain or a forest, or—for that matter—a crowded market-place? I do not remember where I read the story of the artist who,



one fine Sunday morning, was seen by a pious busy-body sitting in the sunshine painting a rural scene. The man of piety, who was presumably on his way to church, asked the artist why he was not in "God's house"? "I was not aware that I was ever out of it," was the artist's quiet reply, as he went on painting.

As theology, creeds and dogmas decay, Religion, I believe, comes into its own. If Theology insists upon its right to call itself Religion, as of course it does, perhaps we might meet the case by borrowing a phrase from Auguste Sabatier, and say that, while the religions of authority are dying, the Religion of the Spirit is coming to the birth. This religion will not be dependent on popes, councils, priesthoods or sacred books. If it comes to maturity in Europe, it will, I suppose, call itself Christianity, if only for the sake of preserving at least an appearance of historical continuity. Should it develop in the East, or find its most congenial home there, it will possibly call itself Buddhism; and not inappropriately so, if, as may be the case, in Buddhism, properly understood, the Religion of the Spirit has already found one of the best existing channels through which it can find its way into the heart of man. I say 'one of the best' advisedly, because the spiritual religion of the future may ultimately find its most adequate mode of expression, not in any of the surviving embodiments of past religious experience, but in a new transfiguring vision of nature, and in an art which, with deeper and purer sources of inspiration than it has hitherto known, will prove itself able to achieve a finer interpretation of the spirit's life than has ever been possible in the past.

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## SOME GENERAL INITIAL LITERARY PROBLEMS IN 'LIFE OF JESUS' STUDY.

THE EDITOR.

COMMENTING on Croce's paradox "every true history is contemporary history," a *Times* reviewer recently remarked: "It is contemporary because the subject, however remote in time, lives in the historian's mind with the same urgency as the present, and nothing but this present interest can move him to attack it. The interest is part of his own life, as compulsive as a love affair or the threat of a danger."<sup>1</sup>

If Croce's aphorism, as it stands unqualified, is at best a nebulous generality, his commentator's expansion of it, when applied to the vast majority of the countless subjects of history, seems downright nonsense. Doubtless the historian must be urged by some sort of interest before he can tackle even the most insignificant of such problems. But to ask us seriously to believe that any but the most absorbing of the innumerable theories of history, which are of such indefinitely varying degrees of interest, can be of such importance for even the most vividly imaginative history-student as to live in his mind, not only with the same urgency as the present, but with the overwhelming compulsion of the primary and primal instinctive passion of falling in love or blindly striving to escape from pressing danger,—this is surely a farcical proceeding. The remark can in

<sup>1</sup> *Times Lit. Supp.*, Sept. 8, 1921, art. 'What is History?'

reason apply at best only to cases where 'true history' has to deal with the most highly critical events which are, not only of theoretical world-importance for the history of the development of the human spirit, but of the most pressingly living interest to-day for all serious thinkers.

There is moreover the doubt whether the whole question has not been begged from the start by the use of the phrase 'true history.' For true history is surely an ideal which we seek, but which we have so far failed to realize. The science of history has as yet, I venture to think, not been able to formulate the full theoretic conditions which would constitute absolutely certain historic truth, much less to produce a concrete example of them.

For instance, what test-case could be selected of greater importance for the history of our Western culture, and therefore for that of the spiritual development of humanity as a whole, than what is known as the 'Life of Jesus'? And yet it is precisely here that the greatest and most painful problems arise as to the positive objective truth of what purport to be the historic records of that 'Life.' What would constitute such historic truth should be the primary essential enquiry of all 'Life of Jesus' research; all else sinks into comparative insignificance historically.

It is in vain here to think that we can abstract the earliest documents which we possess, because in many ways they baffle the would-be positive historian, and regard their contents as outside the scope of scientific historical treatment, contenting ourselves solely with the indubitable fact that Christianity emerges into history, and concretely develops, in the form of a belief that these gospel-narratives are in all respects faithful

accounts of the once actual objective happenings. Because the historian finds himself faced with a host of difficulties in these documents, he cannot supinely abandon the problem, and timidly fall back on a pseudo-scientific theory that here 'true history' can concern itself solely with the fact of the emergence of this belief, and that to probe its antecedents lies outside the task of the scientific historian.

As is well known, there are those who, though by no means opponents of spiritual religion, deny *in toto* that the canonical gospel-narratives contain any genuinely objective historic elements, and who therefore maintain that to continue to insist on regarding them as secularly historical is the greatest obstacle to the spiritual development of Christianity. They argue that the various accounts presented to us in the New Testament show all the signs of being stages in a literary development, which exemplifies successive phases of growth in the imaginative bodying-forth of a highly spiritual saving-God-ideal, and does not flow from the deeds and words of any one particular historic human individual; that in this process the presentation of the ideal was gradually humanized by many minds, and at last became so graphically and successfully portrayed that it came to be believed in as the actual earthly history of a great personality; that, in brief and in cold fact, we have here practically to do with the historicizing of a spiritual myth. For such thinkers, it is the stupendous power of a creative idea that conquered, and not the influence of an over-mastering personality. This is in the main a learned theory set forth for the most part by men well versed in New Testament literary and historic criticism, of which they form the extreme left wing, the Dutch

Radical School being perhaps their most eminent representative.

On the other hand, there are very many reverent minds to-day who, though instinctively or temperamentally far removed from subservience to traditionalism, are little or not at all versed in history and criticism, or who, while knowing somewhat of the subject, are sick of its being obtruded into their religious life. These are content for the most part to regard the gospel-narratives as embodying spiritual truths of the utmost value, no matter what their historic origin may be,—true for all time for all worshippers of the Christ conceived of as the incarnation of the universal Logos of God, the Divine Spirit, or even of very Deity, and capable of verification in the experience of those who sincerely live the life of the Spirit. These naturally prefer the fourth gospel to the synoptics and rejoice in allegory and symbolism. Though for the most part without knowing it, and certainly always without consciously assenting to it, the standpoint of most of them is perhaps not so very far removed from the main spiritual attitude of the non-historicity folk. But they instinctively keep repressed the historic-problem-complex, which the latter endeavour so pressingly and distressingly to bring into the focus of the clearest possible consciousness. They not only shrink from contemplating this painful spectacle but, when it is by chance forced on their notice, they pour scorn on those who have so staged the drama and emphatically repudiate all sympathy with their attempt.

For my own part, though I have deep sympathy with every sincere attempt to throw light on the obscure origins of the greatest story in the world,

I cannot convince myself that Christianity could have arisen from what, if it were a possible hypothesis, must be regarded as for the most part the activities of a conspiracy of imaginative camouflage — whether instinctive or deliberate—to use no harder expression. Nor do I think that it makes for the deepening of spiritual truth to assent to what amounts to the blurring, or indeed blotting out, of what historical outlines survive, dim though they may be, by enveloping them still more in a nebulous mystical veil.

On the other hand, with the vast majority of the best scholars and sincerest thinkers of the day, I am convinced that the old, conservative, traditional attitude to the gospel-narratives, which has ever regarded them as being, not only concretely historical, but also inspired in all their facts, is utterly untenable without the deliberate sacrifice of that good gift of reason which is so indispensable an element in all human growth in genuine and deep spiritual life.

And here 'reason' by no means denotes abstract intellectualism, much less Rationalism (with a capital). This so-called Rationalism *pur sang*, so to say, with its intolerant negative dogmatism and pseudo-scientific tabū of all psychical and spiritual facts, which so complacently posed its skin-and-bone theories before the camera of public opinion chiefly in the latter half of the last century, I am convinced is as entirely out of the stream of progress and meliorism in this new age as Victorian furniture and architecture are out of the fashion of the times. We refuse to recognize in the picture of this theoretic and doctrinaire mummified skeleton the winning features of true science, much less of a truly reasonable religion which is clothed in

the warm flesh and blood and fair garments of all psychical, mystical and spiritual possibilities.

“Truth though the Heavens crush me!” exclaims Carlyle in one of his most famous, if grandiloquent, outbursts. Rhetorical it may be, but it sums up most graphically a spiritual attitude which is the very essence of the religious faith of an ever-growing number. They must perforce follow the gleam of truth, however evanescent, wherever they may catch a glimpse of it, no matter into what danger of loss of peace in their habitual emotional life or into what peril of damaging or even of sacrificing a conventional ‘rationalistic’ limb it may lead them. They must ‘follow the gleam’; they ‘can no other.’ The gleam is not the truth itself, as they know full well; but it lights the way leading to it. To know the naked truth of the spiritual economy energizing in the Christian beginnings, we should have to be acquainted with, not only the physical facts in exact detail, but also the enormously more extended and deeper world of psychical events of which physical happenings, even when known, show us but a section or surface. ‘True history’ would have to know all this; and such knowledge is plainly beyond our present human possibilities. We are, therefore, compelled to be content with the moral discipline of trying to fit ourselves impartially to sift out and evaluate the dim memories recoverable from the imperfect records, in the hope thus of catching a genuine glimpse of the gleam of that supernal truth which so long ago showed objectively on the screen of earthly events.

Let us then try, however crudely and clumsily, to clear a little the way of approach towards the contemplation of this great theme of history. And here I follow what seem to me, after forty years of study and

thought, to be the findings or tentative conclusions of the soundest scholarship and sanest judgment, avoiding the extremes of eccentricity and extravagance on the one hand, and of credulity and scepticism on the other.

For the first century we have not a scrap of genuine literary, contemporary external evidence as to Christianity from Pagan or Jewish sources. For this period we are dependent entirely on a certain number of documents in the New Testament collection.

The earliest documents of this canonical collection of books of the New Covenant are not the gospels, but the Pauline letters,—at any rate 'the great epistles,' dating about 51-64 A.D. Those 'open letters' in Greek are in the main, I venture to think, genuine first-hand documents. There are of course endless problems connected with all the Apostolikon and cognate writings in the New Testament; but they do not enter into the scope of the present essay.

Of 'Life of Jesus' events Paul tells us next to nothing. Of the historic Jesus we can gather from Paul only that he instituted a sacramental rite, was crucified in the flesh and rose again in a spiritual body. Paul had a vision of a risen Christ, who on reflection became for him also the pre-existent Christ, conceived of as 'the Lord, the Spirit'; and this great experience was the burden of his testimony and the central point of his teaching. He evidently regarded all else concerning the 'Christ after the flesh' as of quite secondary importance. It was the spiritual fact of the abiding presence of the Christ in glory, and the equally present fact that he could be known of the heart here and now, which constituted the essence of the faith. The Pauline communities lived in an atmosphere in



which the out-pouring of the Spirit was considered a usual enjoyment of faith; the faithful were in general endowed with charismatic gifts, as they are called, the extravagant exhibition of some of which Paul laboured to restrain. All lived in vivid expectation of the near coming again of the Christ in glory, when the existing world-state would be brought to an end. There is no indication in the Pauline letters that the Apostle, insistent as he ever is on deep-going moral regeneration, directly refers to the characteristic ethical teaching of Jesus, much less uses any collection of the gospel-sayings, so as authoritatively to reinforce his own teachings. Strive to explain all this as we may, the historical documentary fact remains that the greatest propagandist of nascent Christianity, not only did not think it imperative to bring the acts and words of the historic Jesus into the forefront of his teaching, but on the contrary seems to have been strangely incurious about them.

We now turn to the four canonical documents which we call the gospels (our English rendering of the Greek '*evangelia*'), a term derived from the Anglo-Saxon 'God-spell' or God-story, and thus a theological gloss on the original meaning. At first *evangelion* meant the message of good news or glad tidings, the content of a proclamation or teaching; it came to be applied to a book far later. These canonical or standard gospels (there are many apocryphal ones) are practically our sole accepted sources of information for 'Life of Jesus' study; for, as we have seen, the letters of Paul, though earlier in date, here help us hardly at all.

As the most casual reader can at once detect, there is a very striking difference not only of content,

but of method of treatment of material, shown in the work of the fourth evangelist, when compared with the other three documents.

The common attempt at a comparatively objective treatment of their material made by the writers of the first three gospels, which presents us with a similar point of view, or better, which enables the readers to take a common view, and which is indicated by the term 'synoptic,' is not without severest effort and strain to be found in the work of the fourth evangelist. Even the comparatively small amount of matter for which he is dependent on the synoptics, this gospel-writer treats with the greatest freedom. For the most part he brings forward a mass of entirely new material, and that too conceived in a manner which makes the whole read as well-nigh another story. Everywhere he is preoccupied with sublimating the whole presentation, seeking ever to stress indications and interpretations of signs, symbols and types of spiritual events and eternal realities in the manifestation on earth of the pre-existing Logos of God, who throughout appears in the person of Jesus as in fullest consciousness carrying out a pre-ordained plan, and speaking always with the absolute authority of the self-conscious Divine incarnate, the proclaimer of a new law and arbiter of the world-destiny. Though the fourth gospel is ideally by far the most beautiful, it is at the same time the least reminiscent of actual objective happenings, as all who have any sense of concrete history are agreed.

It should be remembered that the present conventional order of the gospels in the Received Text has no significance or ancient authority; in many of the earlier MSS. the four are to be found placed in any manner of sequence.

Methodical scientific gospel-study begins with the attempt to purge the Received Text and to get back as far as possible to the earliest wording of the documents. For it should be remembered that the most common scribal vice has ever been to make scripture-texts conform to the reading most familiar to the copier. Here also later redaction-work—additions, omissions and glosses—has to be taken into account.

Much work of admirable patience has been done on this laborious task, which is of the utmost importance,<sup>1</sup> but so far, and from the very nature of the case, no generally agreed ground of positive certainty on any but a comparatively few points has been reached, and possibly never will be generally reached; so that we must perforce always go forward to the next methodical stage of literary criticism with the feeling that our textual lines of communication are by no means properly secured.

The next stage is still a purely objective, literary, analytical and comparative treatment of the documents. Here we may say with confidence that certain, if few, definite general results have been reached after a century and a half of the most laborious research, during which every hypothesis and permutation and combination of hypotheses have been put forward and severely tested to meet the facts of the objective

<sup>1</sup> For the general indications of its enormous value I would venture to refer the reader to the chapters on 'The "Word of God" and the "Lower Criticism"' and 'The Nature of the Tradition of the Gospel Autographs' in my book *The Gospels and the Gospel* (1902), pp. 36-77. Here it is sufficient to indicate one point only,—namely, that it is highly probable that many of the sayings were originally set forth in a far more vivacious and homely form. Here are a couple of examples from the ancient Codex D. Mt. 6s,—T.R.: "Your Father knoweth what things ye have need of before ye ask him," but D. more graphically, "before even ye open your mouth"; Lk. 137,—T.R.: "Cut it down; why cumbereth it the ground?"—but D. with far greater graphic power: "Bring the axe!" (*op. cit.*, p. 75).

literary phenomena as they have successively been more and more clearly brought to light. The few general literary analytic facts so far elicited to the satisfaction of an ever-increasing majority of scholars, however, are of the utmost value. Briefly and roughly they are as follows:<sup>1</sup>

Canonical Mark substantially lay before Mt. and Lk. With the exception of about 50 verses our Mk. could theoretically be substantially recovered from the use Mt. and Lk. have severally and diversely made of it. But it is to be strongly doubted whether, if we did not possess the text of Mk., any attempt at theoretical reconstruction would give us this text exactly; for Mt. and Lk. frequently vary the wording according to their several tastes and intentions and authorities. The hypothesis that Mt. and Lk. had before them an older form of Mk. than the one we possess, is now regarded by most scholars as on the whole unnecessary. The use of Mk. by Mt. and Lk. thus stands as the first sure result of progressive literary gospel-criticism. The Mk.-document substantially lay before Mt. and Lk.; it is one of their sources. But whereas the order of its narrative substantially determines the sequence of narration in Mt., Lk. follows a different ordering of events.

The second general point on which there is a practical consensus of judgment is that, in addition

<sup>1</sup> I here use the traditional ascription of titles without prejudice, reserving consideration of them till later; and I employ the term 'substantially' so as to keep free of the endless difficulties of special points which would only confuse the reader. For what I may term the 'mechanism' of the subject I am dependent chiefly on the two following works, which are absolutely indispensable and so great a credit to English scholarship: 1) *Synopticon: An Exposition of the Common Matter of the Synoptic Gospels*, by W. G. Rushbrooke, M.L., Fellow of St. John's Coll., Camb. (London, 1880); 2) *Horæ Synopticæ: Contributions to the Study of the Synoptic Problem*, by the Rev. Sir John C. Hawkins, Bart. M.A., D.D., Honorary Canon of St. Albans (Oxford, 2nd ed., 1909).

to the Mk.-material, Mt. and Lk. drew variously on a second substantially common, though differently transmitted and used, source. This has been generally distinguished since Wellhausen (1905) by the symbol Q (Ger. *Quelle*, Source). The symbol Q, however, must be taken in the widest possible sense and regarded as begging no questions of detail. This second source, parts of which the first and third evangelists draw on in common, seems ultimately not to have contained anything that could be called narrative proper; it consisted rather of collections of sayings, discourses and parables, which, as far as its use by Mt. and Lk. go, are absent from Mk., though Mk. also, as far as I can see, may also have been dependent on it to some extent. It is of course only when Mt. and Lk. substantially agree in their quotations from this source, that we can speak of any quite certain recovery of part of the contents of Q. To attempt to recover Q itself is perhaps futile. For, though there is every reason to infer that, in keeping with their procedure in utilizing Mk., Mt. also in some passages derives from Q where Lk. has no parallel, and so also Lk. *vice versa*, this can hardly be proved to general satisfaction. Indeed even when Mt. and Lk. are in substantial agreement, they word a large number of the sayings so variously that it seems highly probable that different versions of Q lay before them. This is, however, a difficult problem. For as Mt. and Lk. word variously numerous passages taken in common from Mk., we are entitled to conclude that they presumably used the same freedom with the wording of some common passages taken from Q. We need not then necessarily multiply our hypotheses as far as this common matter is concerned by assuming that two definitely doctrinally different copies of Q lay

before them. It might, on the contrary, be supposed that Lk., owing to what is called the 'Ebionitic' (Ar. Ebiōn=Poor) tinge of some of the Q-sayings he quotes in common with Mt. (*e.g.* 'Blessed are ye poor' as against 'the poor in spirit' of Mt.), is here probably the more faithful to the original, though this trait is generally set down to the personal proclivities of Lk. In any case Q is undoubtedly a second ultimate common literary source of Mt. and Lk.

All fertile 'Life of Jesus' research now-a-days proceeds on these two primary literary facts in synoptic criticism. It follows that what was once called the 'triple tradition' is not a threefold independent witness, but only one literary witness, and equally that the once so-called 'double-tradition' is but a single witness; we have, in this respect, therefore, only two independent witnesses to interrogate, and only one of these for narrative.

In addition, Mt. and Lk. use some few other sources severally and independently. But this further problem is a delicate and difficult matter to elucidate. It is thus in the highest degree improbable either that Mt. lay before Lk. or that Lk. was known to Mt. In both cases we have to do with writers later than Mk., compiling and composing from prior literary sources in addition to their selections from Mk. So also with Jn.; in spite of his great independence of attitude and comparatively scant use of their material, it is nevertheless amply demonstrable that Mt., Mk. and Lk. lay before him. It follows then that of our canonical gospel-documents Mk. is the earliest and Jn. the latest.

The next question which arises is: Can we assign probable dates to any of these four writings? We can, I think, do so within certain limits; *i.e.* assign them to

probable decades, and in one case even with comparative precision.

The redactor of Lk. is almost unquestionably the same as the composer and compiler of Acts. This writer is in high probability acquainted with *The Antiquities* of Josephus, which was written in 95 A.D. It follows that the Lk.-gospel-document may be conservatively assigned to about 100-110 A.D.; and it follows as a corollary that Jn., which is later than Lk., may be placed as conservatively, say, about 110-120 A.D.

As for the probable date of Mt., its evangelist indubitably, not only knows of the destruction of Jerusalem, 70 A.D., but he refers to the martyrdom of Zachariah the son of Barachiah in the temple, and that too in such a way as to show that it was for him by no means a recent event. This act of violence took place in 68 A.D. We have no convincing grounds for deciding whether Mt. was written before Lk. or Lk. before Mt.; but if their similarity of treatment argues for a more or less contemporary date, Mt.'s theology is nearer to that of Mk. than Lk.'s. On the whole, bearing in mind the Zachariah reference, it would seem that the date of Mt. should be assigned to 90-100 A.D. rather than to 80-90 A.D.

The most important, but more difficult, date to conjecture is that of Mk., the earliest of the four. It is not so easy a matter to distinguish literary sources in Mk. as in the others; on the whole we seem not to be dealing here with so highly a developed complex of literary tradition, and this is what makes Mk. historically so valuable. But as to the special question of date: there is one lengthy section (Mk. 13=Mt. 24=Lk. 21) which in highest probability contains a literary source; this is generally known as the Little Apoca-

lypse. If we compare the glossing respectively of Mt. and Lk. of the key-date-passage in this section, we find that what is heavily veiled in Mk., has on the one hand been emphasized by Mt. scripturally, probably so as to make it more definite and impressive for Jewish readers as a fulfilment of familiar prophecy, and on the other entirely altered by Lk. so as to make it refer unequivocally to the siege of Jerusalem (70 A.D.). It is exceedingly likely that part of the matter of this section was drawn from one of the many Jewish apocalyptic writings which circulated so freely among the earliest Christians, one which was further so appropriate in this particular prophecy that it could easily be combined with more general Christian sayings of a like purport. The violation of the sanctity of the temple by the Roman conqueror, however effected, after the siege could thus be shown to have been definitely foretold. Mk. is very probably the more faithful to the wording of the original; he leaves it more or less as he found it. And indeed it would have been dangerous for this writer to have been more precise, seeing that with great probability his gospel was first put into circulation at Rome itself, the capital of the empire, and the authorities there would scarcely relish being referred to in connection with what the Little Apocalypse calls 'the abomination of desolation.' The Roman origin of Mk. is highly probable, among other things from the fact that Mk.'s Jewish Greek has a large number of Latinisms, and it is difficult to imagine where in Christian Greek-speaking circles, at the comparatively early date of the composition of the Mk.-document, such a phenomenon could occur except in the Jewish colony at Rome. Moreover, it agrees with the tradition that the second gospel was written at Rome after the



death of Peter there, an event which is traditionally assigned to 64 A.D. Many scholars, however, have doubted whether Peter was ever at Rome; but it may be on the whole with undue scepticism. Nevertheless it is a thorny question; and still *sub judice lis est*. If these critical and traditional *data* are accepted as reasonably valid in their respective provinces, then even traditionally, that is to say at the most conservative estimate, the earliest possible minimum date for Mk. is to be assigned to 65 A.D., while critically it can be taken back no further than 71 A.D. We may leave it at that, with preference for the latter date as the *terminus a quo*.

It should here be noted that the genuine gospel of Mk. breaks off suddenly at 16<sup>s</sup>; in other words all our copies go back to a single MS. This of course could hardly have been the autograph or author's MS.; copies of the complete text of Mk. in every probability lay before Mt. and Lk. The use they (and also Jn.) made of the missing leaf or leaves in their accounts of the post-resurrectional events is of course a matter of difficult speculation; but attempts have been made to recover thereby the lost ending. The present conclusion of, or appendix to, Mk., which is found in a shorter and longer form, is agreed by all scholars to be due to later hands. This argues that the Mk.-document was at one time not highly prized, as being too crude for the rapidly developing christology of the Church, and thus unsuited for catechetical purposes. Presumably Mt. and Lk. speedily superseded it in popularity and for a space it fell into neglect. It is a striking example of the hazards of literary tradition, that what is historically our most valuable document, has been preserved to us by the intermediary of a single imperfect copy.

It may here be noted as to this Mk.-conclusion (which the R.V. clearly prints apart from the rest, appending the reason for this distinction in a marginal note), that Conybeare (*Expos.* '93 b, pp. 241-254) has discovered an Armenian superscription which ascribes the longer form to the presbyter Ariston. This may perhaps be the Aristion of Papias (c. 130-150 A.D.). If so it fits conveniently enough into the general time-frame we are considering.

Let us next turn to the problem of the traditional titles, which for so many centuries were held in all cases to give the names of the writers themselves. It might be said that 'according to' need not invariably carry this implication; but this objection has been plainly absent from the mind of tradition.

In two cases (Mk. and Lk.) the names are, even traditionally, those of sub-apostolic men.

Mark is said by Papias, our earliest direct informant, writing c. 130-150 A.D.,<sup>1</sup> to have at one time been an 'interpreter' of Peter. 'Interpreter' can here mean only 'translator.' Mark, according to Papias, had at some time companied with Peter, acting as his interpreter from Aramaic into Greek. Afterwards (according to another tradition, more specifically, after the death of Peter) he set down as accurately as he could all he remembered of the Apostle's *ex tempore* teachings in so far as they were reminiscent of the acts and words of Jesus. Peter did not set forth these in order, but referred to this or that as occasion required. It is probably the latter association of thought which leads Papias to say that Mk. also did not arrange his reminiscences of what Peter said in any order, which,

<sup>1</sup> I here take the average period between the speculative extremes 115-165 A.D.

in spite of his provokingly vague indications of time, is not true of our Mk. On the whole, however, there does not seem to me to be any insurmountable objection to accepting the main indications of Papias that in Mk. we have the substance of Petrine narrative-tradition, and that Mark is the name of the third gospel-writer.

Now Papias, who was Bishop of Phrygian Hierapolis and a somewhat naïve personage according to himself, but a man of ability according to the Church Father and historian Eusebius, wrote a work in five books,<sup>1</sup> which we know directly, unfortunately, only from a few quotations by Irenæus (last quarter of 2nd century) and Eusebius (writing c. 325-330).

The title of this much debated work was 'Exposition' of what Papias calls 'Kyriacal Oracles (*Logia*²),' which may be Latinized as 'Dominical Oracles.' The proper meaning of this title has for long been a matter of strenuous controversy owing to the very important historical results which flow from its precise significance. It is only quite recently that the *cruz* has been solved in a thoroughly objective manner by the patient labours of Proff. J. Rendel Harris and Vacher Burch.<sup>3</sup>

These fine scholars have now proved beyond cavil that perhaps the very earliest Christian document—it may even possibly have been publicly prior to the first collection or collections of Sayings (*Logoi*) of Jesus, the foundation of the Q-material—was a collection of prophetic 'proof-texts' from the canonical Old

<sup>1</sup> A favourite number in those days in imitation of the 'Five Fiftths' of the Jewish Torah or Law.

<sup>2</sup> *Logia* should, strictly, be distinguished from *Logoi*, which was the term used for the Sayings, as we now know from the Oxyrhynchus Sayings; but the confusion is old-seated.

<sup>3</sup> *Testimonies*, Pt. I. (1916), Pt. II. (1920), Cambridge, The University Press.

Testament and some few apocalyptic works subsequently judged as apocryphal, to show that Jesus of Galilee was indeed the fulfilment of all prophecy. This collection was called *Testimonies against the Jews* or simply *Testimonies*. These listed texts were the chief instrument of controversy in the early days. The battle waxed furious and was fought out in an atmosphere of mutual recrimination and frequent accusations on both sides of adapting or falsifying the texts. Patent traces of the use of these *Testimonia* are to be found, not only in all the Gospels, but also in the Letters of Paul, our earliest documents. The establishment of this primary literary fact throws a brilliant light on a host of what have hitherto been insoluble obscurities. Among other things the numerous quotations from the Old Testament in the books of the New often agree clearly with the common Greek LXX Targum or Version, but there are very numerous and puzzling variants. A very few of these may be due to direct translation from the Hebrew; but the majority is due to some other existing Greek Version-Source. This is now found to have been the *Testimony-book*.

We have now no longer to break our heads over the meaning of the title *Kyriacal Logia*. It means the collection of proof-texts relating to Jesus as the Messiah and the fulfilment of all prophecy. These texts were divided into five books, as was Papias' commentary on them, the contents of each book being further grouped under various sub-headings. This linking of passages from many authors will account among other things for a number of erroneous ascriptions and confusions of reference, *e.g.* Jeremiah for Isaiah, by simple miscopying; and it also shows that no few apologists used exclusively this convenient *Vade*

*Mecum* of texts, and so displayed seemingly a profound acquaintance with the scriptures (the Jewish books being the only recognized scripture proper by the Christians during the first century) which they did not really possess. Few went directly to the books themselves.

Though the literary use is not always entirely consistent, it would be as well to reserve the term *Logia* for these O.T. prophetic deliverances, and keep the term *Logoi* for the Sayings, Discourses and Parables assigned to Jesus, as is shown so clearly in the Oxyrhynchus fragments.

There is nothing to show that what constituted the subject-matter of Papias' 'setting forth' or 'exegesis' contained any narrative. Now in the body of his work our informant tells us that it was Matthew who 'collected and wrote down' these *Logia* 'in Hebrew,'—meaning by this, as very generally elsewhere in Patristic literature, in Aramaic; and that everyone 'interpreted' them to the best of his ability,—that is, in highest probability, 'translated' them; for Papias here uses the verb of the identical substantive he applies to Mark, the 'interpreter' of Peter, in the preceding statement. It follows seemingly that Papias had to make his own version.

Now our canonical Mt. cannot possibly be the Papian *Logia*, the first collection of which he ascribes to the Apostle Matthew (Matthai). In the first place, as is agreed on all hands, canonical Mt. is not a translation from the Aramaic; and in the second, beyond all cavil, it is an expansion of Mk., the additional matter being fitted into the frame-work of Mark's order. It is impossible to believe, even on the old conservative hypothesis that the Papian Matthæan

Logia were the Jesus' Logoi, which is now no longer tenable, that an original disciple, apostle and eye-witness like Levi-Matthai, whose language was Aramæan, could so submissively and subserviently have taken a junior Greek-writing second-hand narrator such as Mk. was, in comparison with himself, as an exemplar to copy.

The traditional evangelical title 'According to Matthew,' then still remains unelucidated. But in any case canonical Mt. must be assigned to the pen of a post-apostolic writer, whether he was named Matthew or no.

Concerning the Lk.-document, there is of course no question as to its being of sub-apostolic origin. Now if the first-hand diary (the 'we'-clauses) embodied in Acts is from the same hand as the rest of the document, and stylists are becoming convinced that this is highly probable, it points to the conclusion that the third gospel was written by one who as a very young man (this is the only hypothesis that can hold) was a personal companion of Paul. But though there are, and for the above reason very naturally, indications of Pauline theology to be found in Lk., this gospel cannot legitimately be spoken of as setting forth the Pauline tradition about Jesus; for, as we have seen, Paul himself handed on practically nothing that can be called a tradition of the acts and sayings of the historic Jesus. Whether or no the writer of the third gospel was Luke the physician (according to the assertion of the very inaccurate Irenæus at the end of the 2nd century), is a matter of secondary importance; but whoever he was, he wrote perhaps the best Greek of all the evangelists.

Finally we come to the traditional ascription of the

fourth gospel to the Apostle John, whom Jesus is reported to have called with his brother Jacob Boanerges because of their strikingly impetuous characters. This might well suit the writer of the Apocalypse ; but the ascription of two such fundamentally different documents, in contents, style and temper, as the Revelation and the Gospel to one and the same writer, as tradition insists, presents the historian and literary critic with an intolerable state of affairs. It is beyond the bounds of even the most complacent credence, indeed it takes us into the dark regions of blind credulity and of slavish subservience to later apologetic authority, no better informed than we are ourselves to-day, to believe that the writer of such barbarous Greek and the enunciator of such frequently crude and fierce notions as we find in the Apocalypse, could possibly be the same loveable individual as the writer of the fine Greek and expositor of the sublime conceptions we find in the fourth gospel. This 'spiritual gospel' (as it has been called since the days of Clement of Alexandria at the end of the 2nd century) is the product of a skilled writer composing in the full vigour of life, and cannot be ascribed to declining years, much less to one who even traditionally must have been a very very aged man, at the least a century old.

On the other hand, the latest critical judgment converges towards the probability that the fourth gospel is of Ephesian origin; it may even be possibly ascribed to a certain John the Elder, of whom Papias speaks. The fourth gospel is plainly the work of a post-apostolic writer, as, if nothing else, the fact that Lk. lay before him must convince us. That a physical eye-witness, one who was really and indeed bodily present throughout the greatest events of the ministry, could make use

of any material gleaned by so late a compiler as the writer of Lk., who makes no claim to originality, telling us quite frankly that already before his own attempt many had taken in hand to draw up a narrative of what he believes the original eye-witnesses had handed down, is out of all possible question for the historian. The fourth gospel is manifestly the work of a post-apostolic writer.

It results that all four gospels are products of sub-apostolic activity, and three of them of the latest period of that age of rapidly growing doctrinal development. All the documents bear ample witness that their writers, most naturally and humanly, under the compulsion of unquestioning faith, set forth their material from the standpoint of their several dogmatic christological and theological convictions, and in keeping with the mind of those circles of the day to whom they made appeal. As so many theologians of our own day, so then in narrower compass, they read back the developed theology of their time into their settings-forth of the history of the beginnings. This tendency is at a minimum in Mk. and at a maximum in Jn. But even in Mk., which retains most historic 'stumbling-blocks' for those who had been taught from childhood or in the first days of their conversion to worship Jesus as God, and to whom forcible reminders of his humanity would be very distasteful, the process of deification may be seen already in vigorous development.

If the earliest stages of that development are now most clearly to be detected in Mk., can we discover traces of this striking phenomenon in any other clearly early sources in Mt. and Lk.? Q may with most probability be assigned to approximately the same date



as Mk.; but it may well depend ultimately on very early tradition. Here then we may have a probability of a line of regress to a genuinely very early written source for sayings, discourses and parables, but not for narrative. But the doubt will always remain whether in the Greek version of them, theology has not already tintured history.

We next pass to a glance at the remaining independent sources of Mt. and Lk. respectively. First then as to the genealogies. Clement of Alexandria, at the end of the 2nd century, asserts that these were the first portions of the gospels which were written. This may be probable; for it is obvious that the necessity of proving the Davidic descent of Jesus to the Jews was forced on the Christian Messiahists from the very first. But what do we find? The genealogies incorporated in Mt. and Lk. differ profoundly and in some respects are entirely contradictory. It has been suggested, so as to blunt the horns of the dilemma, that the form in Mt. may be called the Palestinian tradition and that in Lk. the Hellenistic. But this in no way removes the difficulties for the traditionalist. For the most arresting fact is that both genealogies trace the descent of Jesus through Joseph, and not through Mary as the Virgin-Birth-dogma requires. In the Received Text Lk. begins with: "Jesus . . . being (as was supposed) the son of Joseph"; Mt. ends in the same Text with: "Joseph the husband of Mary, of whom was born Jesus who is called Christ." The 'as was supposed' in Lk. betrays itself; while the most ancient Syriac version (in both the Curetonian and Lewis MSS.) preserves at Mt. 1<sub>16</sub> the original: "Joseph . . . begat Jesus the Christ." As to the Virgin-Birth-narrative,—Mt. preserves seemingly an earlier

form; in Lk. it is far more highly developed. The whole scheme of the genealogies contradicts it; Mk. knows nothing of it; while Jn., who especially might have been expected to include it, not only knows nothing of it, but refers to Jesus as "the son of Joseph."

Next to the pressing question of authenticating Jesus' Davidic descent for those who believed that he was the Messiah Ben David, the necessity was forced upon the early Christian Messianist Church of producing proof-texts from the prophetic (and also from some of the apocalyptic) scriptures to shew that all that was claimed to have taken place in their prophet's life, had been already foretold in detail. The oft-recurring phrase "in order that it might be fulfilled as it is written," which is especially characteristic of Mt., and among other indications argues for a probable first circulation of Mt. in circles where there was strong Jewish opposition as well as approval, strikingly reveals this method of prophetic fixation of history, and is in keeping with the fundamental requirement of all Rabbinical dogmatic exegesis, which was compelled to quote scripture in authentication of every single doctrinal proposition or inference therefrom.

Concerning the Story of the Magi in Mt.,—a Syriac writing ascribed to Eusebius of Cæsarea (first published by William Wright in *Jr. of Sacred Lit.*, 1863) makes the statement that this narrative was first committed to writing in the interior of Persia; that "in 119 A.D., during the episcopate of Xystus of Rome, [it was] made search for, discovered and written in the language of those who were interested in it (that is to say, in Greek)."<sup>1</sup> If this statement can be accepted, it

<sup>1</sup> Art. 'Gospels,' *En. Bib.*

indicates at least a later redaction of Mt. in this respect. It might even render feasible an argument that 120 A.D. is the *terminus a quo* for the whole document; but this does not seem to me very probable, in spite of the vigour with which a generation ago far later dates for all the gospels were argued than is now the case.

There are also some very striking parallels in the Egyptian folk-tales with the passage in Mt. narrating the birth of the child and the revelation of his name and future greatness to the father in a dream (120,21), and with those in Lk. telling of his rapid growth in wisdom and stature (240) and of his questioning the doctors in the temple (246,47). But the most striking parallel of all is with the story of Dives and Lazarus (Lk. 16<sup>19-31</sup>).<sup>1</sup> These arresting correspondences have been strangely neglected by scholars.

Touching other sources in Lk., it has been suggested with some probability that the Magnificat, Benedictus and Nunc Dimittis may have been taken from an early Jewish Christian hymn-book; and indeed they present us with a very similar problem to that of the Jewish Christian 'Odes of Solomon.'

Quite recently<sup>2</sup> various lines of independent research have been brought together which tend to show that Lk. in some considerable blocks of narrative peculiar to himself used another written narrative-gospel besides Mk. It is an ingenious hypothesis and deserves patient attention. It would account for variations of phrasing independent of Lk.'s own glosses, where Mt.

<sup>1</sup> See my *The Gospels and the Gospel*, pp. 175-180, dealing with F. Ll. Griffith's *Stories of the High Priest of Memphis: The Sethon of Herodotus and the Demotic Tales of Khamuas* (Oxford, 1900).

<sup>2</sup> See Canon Streeter's 'Fresh Light on the Synoptic Problem' in the October number of *The Hibbert Journal*.

and Lk. use Marcan and Q-material in common. But even if Lk. can be proved in these passages to have used another written gospel, it must have been one of the 'many' now lost attempts at gospel-writing to which he refers in his preface. The peculiar further hypothesis of Canon Streeter, that it was none of these but a gospel Lk. had written himself at a very early age, and which he had subsequently expanded and revised by inserting Marcan and other material into its frame-work, may be set down as the hazard of apology in straits. On the other hand, it is quite possible that Lk. did prefer the order of narrative of this presumed gospel to that of Mk.; this would account very naturally and satisfactorily for his departure from the latter's order. It would supply perhaps a precedent for the Ebionitic tinging, and also authority for the tendency of Lk. to heighten the miraculous element and for the wide departure of his wording in many cases when we can compare it with that of Mk. or of Mt.'s Q.

But even if this new hypothesis holds, the stage of doctrinal development which this presumed new source shows, is plainly post-Markan. Mk. and Q still remain our indubitably earliest records. But what an infinity of trouble these worthy compilers and editors of the gospels might have saved posterity by squarely and honestly telling their readers whence they got their material. Such objectivity, however, was foreign to the time when edification, and not history as we understand it to-day, was the main interest.

Finally, in Jn. the R.V. encloses the beautiful pericope of the Woman taken in Adultery in brackets, adding the note: "Most of the ancient authorities omit Jn. 7:53-8:11." The last chapter of Jn. also is undoubtedly a later addition; the proem also may probably be taken

or adapted from a source. If moreover the saying put into the mouth of Jesus (543): "I am come in the name of my Father and ye receive me not; if another will come in his own name, him ye will receive" can be taken as a prophecy after the event, it may very well refer to the great patriot and hero Bar Kokba, the 'Son of the Star,' who, claiming to be the Messiah, headed a revolt of the Jews in 132 A.D., which ended in the complete extinction of the Jewish state in 135 A.D. This hypothesis, if maintained, would date the redaction of the fourth gospel with great probability as somewhere about this time. In general, however, though something may yet be accomplished, the sifting out of sources in Jn., other than passages from the synoptics and the acquaintance of the writer with a characteristic phrase ('Lamb of God') in the Apocalypse, is a difficult matter. The fourth gospel is manifestly largely the work of an independent creative genius.

And here from lack of space we must break off this brief consideration of some of the most general preliminary problems in 'Life of Jesus' study. We have laid before the reader the minimum of initial difficulties which every sincere student has perforce to face before he can begin methodically to sift out the genuinely early material, in which alone undisturbed traces of the historic Jesus are haply to be found. These it is not possible to recover without the most patient, unprejudiced and skilled labour. To do so requires a workman who must be utterly honest with himself and with his fellows. No labour in this field can lead to enduring results which is not undertaken with the utmost sincerity, and with the one object of getting at the historic truth fearless of all consequences. Some may imagine that this is a purely intellectual

task; but in entertaining such an opinion they show they have never attempted the study even in the feeblest fashion. For all who have seriously undertaken it, 'Life of Jesus' research means submitting themselves to the most strenuous moral discipline, in which the seeker's spirit is tested and purged to the utmost. If a man is not here, not only true to himself, but utterly loyal to truth, his labour must inevitably be brought to naught.

With the above exposition may be read the writer's recent contributions on 'Round the Cradle of Christendom' and 'The Gentile Surround of Early Christendom' (July and Oct., 1920) and also 'New-found Fragments of a Babylonian Mystery Play and the Passion Story' in the last number. I have written the present paper, not only in this connection, but also because I think it opportune to remind or inform readers of *THE QUEST* who are seriously interested in 'Life of Jesus' study, of some of the most unavoidable problems which needs must confront them before they can go further forward. For it seems to me that just now, not only the clergy in general, but also most even of our scholars who feel the necessity of bringing Christianity and modern thought together, in oversensitive reaction from the agonizing shock of our late terrible War-experience, display a greater anxiety to protest their unwavering faith in the exclusive cult of the Lord-God Jesus, as the only knowable Deity, and of 'Our Blessed Lord' (the capital O is eloquent) as the sole panacea of all human ill and ignorance, than to go forward boldly to lead the laity towards a more faithfully inclusive worship of God himself, and that too not only in spirit but also in truth.

G. R. S. MEAD.

# HASIDICA: STORIES AND SAYINGS OF THE BA'AL SHEM AND OTHERS.

MARTIN BUBER, Ph.D.

## TRANSLATORS' INTRODUCTORY NOTE.

HASIDISM or Chasidism (lit. Pietism) was a mystical religious movement among East-European Jews of the 18th century, chiefly in Poland and the Ukraine. There is an extensive scientific and popular literature on the subject in German, Hebrew and Yiddish, but in English information is somewhat meagre. Schechter and Zangwill are helpful. Hastings' *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, which has a whole article on the Báb and Bábism, gives not a word on the Ba'al Shem himself, and a few very unsatisfactory lines only, by Loewe, on the subject generally (v. 606). The American *Jewish Encyclopedia* however, contains two articles, on the Ba'al Shem (1700-1760) and on Rabbi Baer of Meseritz. Martin Buber, the author of three most valuable books of Hassidica—*Legends of the Ba'al Shem*, *Stories of Rabbi Nahman* and *The Great Maggid* (soon to appear in an English version)<sup>1</sup>—has collected and edited a number of 'Logia' from other Zaddikim (Righteous), as the leaders of the movement are called by their 'faithful.' The term 'Logia' may be used, because the literary development of these sayings and of their historical framing, from the original flying leaves and the collections made by the immediate followers of the master up to the classic beauty of Martin Buber's German rendering, provides a very suggestive analogy to the evolution of the original Aramaic Jesus-Logia from the primitive vulgar Greek form, which we find occasionally on papyrus-scrap, *via* Matthew, Mark and Luke, finally to John; even as the whole movement offers in

<sup>1</sup> All published by Ruetten and Loehning, Frankfort a. M., at about 3s. 6d. the volume.

ome respects the best sociological and religious analogy to and most striking illustration known to us of the original Jewish Messianist Church. Far better than any theoretic and historic disquisition about this important, but at present sadly degenerated, mystic movement, the original documents themselves—short stories of exquisite perfume—will make the reader acquainted with this quaint religion of joyful loving-kindness and its ideas in metempsychosis, reincarnation, personal magic, mantic powers and the rest. The founder of Hasidism was Rabbi Israel ben Eliezer, known as Ba'al Shem-Tob (The Good<sup>1</sup> Master of the Name), shortened to Besht (B° Sh T).

### THE POWER OF COMMUNITY.

THIS is told us :

Once on the eve after the Day of Atonement the moon stayed covered with clouds ; and the Ba'al Shem could not go out to say the blessing over the moon. This weighed heavily upon him ; for now as on many other occasions he felt that imponderable destinies were entrusted to the work of his lips. In vain he sent forth his depth of power to the light of the planet to help it to throw off its heavy coverings. But as often as he sent to find out, he was ever told that the clouds had grown still more dense. At last hope vanished from him.

Meantime the Hasids, who knew not of the master's sorrow, had gathered in the out-building and begun to dance ; for in this way were they wont upon this evening to celebrate in festal joy the Atonement or the year as observed through the high-priestly service of the Zaddik.

When the whole jubilation reached its climax, they entered dancing into the room of the Ba'al Shem.

<sup>1</sup> There were believed to be two secret Names of God—a good (Name of Mercy) and a terrible (Name of Revenge), corresponding to the notion of 'white' and a 'black' magic.



Soon in their rapture of enthusiasm they seized the hands of the master, who was sitting in dark gloom of spirit, and drew him into their choir. At this moment a call sounded from without. Suddenly the night had cleared; in radiant splendour, never seen before, the moon was sailing over a spotless sky.

#### BLESSING AND IMPEDIMENT.

ONCE on a time the Ba'al Shem asked Rabbi Meir Margolioth: "Meir, beloved, dost remember the Sabbath when thou began'st to learn the 'Five Books'? The great room of thy father's house was full of guests; they had stood thee on the table and thou didst recite thy discourse."

The Rabbi answered: "Well do I remember. On a sudden my mother entered and pulled me down from the table in the middle of my sermon. Father grew angry. But mother pointed to a man in a peasant's short fur coat standing at the door and looking at me. Then all understood. She was dreading the evil eye. While she was still pointing towards the door, the man disappeared."

"It was I," said the Ba'al Shem. "At such hour a single glance may pour a great light into a soul. But the fear of man builds walls against the light."

#### THE INITIATION OF TEARS.

ONCE on his great pilgrimage Rabbi Sussiah came to the town where the father of the boy Ya'akob Yizchak—later Zaddik of Lublin, surnamed the 'Seer of Poland'—was living. In the house of prayer he placed himself as was his wont behind the stove, his head wrapped tightly in his praying shawl. Suddenly he peered out

of it, half turning round, and looked into the eyes of the child Ya'akob, without letting his own rest on any other thing. Then he turned his head again to the stove and continued his prayer. The boy was overwhelmed by an inscrutable power of sobbing; a depth of tears welled up in his heart and he wept for a whole hour. Ere his tears dried up, Rabbi Sussiah turned to him and said: "Thy soul is awakened. Go now to my brother Elimelech and be taught by him that thy spirit too may rise from its slumber."

#### UNADVISED.

THE pupils of the Ba'al Shem had heard of a wise and God-learned man. Some were moved by a desire to visit him and hear his doctrine. The master gave them leave. But they went on to ask: "And how shall we find out whether he is a true Zaddik?"

"Ask him," said the Ba'al Shem, "to tell you, how you are to prevent alien and profane thoughts disturbing your prayers and studies. If he advises you, then will you know he is one of the vain ones. For this indeed is man's service in this world unto the hour of death,—to wrestle unadvised and unaided with the Profane and ban it again and again from the unity of the Divine Name."

#### THE RECEPTION.

THE Maggid<sup>1</sup> Rabbi Baer was a scholar of rare sagacity, an expert of all the labyrinthic windings of the Gemara<sup>2</sup> and learned even in the depths of the Kabbalah. When he had again and again heard of

<sup>1</sup> A popular preacher, especially on Agadic or legendary subjects.—Trr.

<sup>2</sup> Exegetic discussion of the Mishna, which is itself the legalistic exposition of the Law-scriptures.—Trr.

the Ba'al Shem, he decided to journey to him, to try the wisdom of the much-belauded one. On arriving at the master's house and meeting him, he waited after the salutation, without even looking at him properly, for the words of his doctrine so as to examine and weigh them. But the Ba'al Shem only told him that once he was driving for days through a desert country and had not bread enough to feed his coachman, and that he had met a peasant who sold him bread. Then he dismissed his guest. The next evening the Maggid returned to the Ba'al Shem thinking that now at last he would hear some word of his teaching. But Rabbi Israel only told him that once while travelling he had had no hay for his horses then a peasant had come and fed the beasts.

The Maggid could not understand what was the good of telling him such stories. He was now quite sure it was useless to expect wisdom from such a man. So he returned to his inn and ordered his man to prepare for the return-journey. They would start as soon as the moon had scattered the clouds.

About midnight the sky cleared. Then a messenger came from the Ba'al Shem to say that Rabbi Baer was to present himself to him at that hour. He went over at once. The Ba'al Shem received him in his bed-room.

"Dost know the Kabbalah?" he asked. The Maggid said he did. "Take the book here, *The Tree of Life*, open it and read." "Consider now." He did so. "Now expound it." He expounded the passage which treats of the essence of the Angels. "Thou hast no knowledge," said the Ba'al Shem. "Rise!" He rose. The Ba'al Shem stood up before him and recited the passage.

Then before the eyes of Rabbi Baer the chamber vanished in fire, and he heard the Angels' wings rustling through the fire until he lost all consciousness.

When he awoke the room was as he had entered it. The Ba'al Shem stood opposite him. He said: "The exposition thou didst utter is right. But thou hast no knowledge; for thy knowledge hath no soul."

Rabbi Baer went to the inn, sent his servant home and stayed in Miedzyborz.

In the book, *The Community of the Pious*, it is written that afterwards he received the doctrine which was destined for his soul, from the Ba'al Shem in the same way as the people of Israel received the Law at Mount Sinai.

#### SAMAËL.

THE Ba'al Shem saw the approach of a terrible fatality for Israel, but he knew not its secret. His prayer found no access. So he conjured the Abyss. Wrathfully Samaël broke forth. Out of the flames he roared: "Thrice have I come up: once for the temptation at the Tree; once for the temptation on the Mount; once to seduce you to dissension in your beleaguered city. It is not yet time for the fourth up-coming. Why dost thou dare touch me?"

The Ba'al Shem bade the disciples, who stood round him, bare their foreheads. Upon each forehead Samaël saw the sign of the Image in which God creates man.

An earth-hour's length Samaël stared into the half-circle of light. Then his eyes failed him. "It is turned away," he said and vanished.

## THE HEAVY PENANCE.

ON a man who had unwillingly broken the Sabbath, because his conveyance had broken down and he could not, though he ran with all his might, reach the town before the beginning of the sacred rest-time, young Rabbi Michaël (later called 'He of Zlozow') laid the sentence of a heavy and long mortification as a penance. The man strove with all his strength to fulfil the ordinance. But soon he found his body could not endure it, but began to grow sick and thus weaken also the power of his soul. At that time he learnt the Ba'al Shem was travelling through those parts and was just then staying in a neighbouring town. So he went there, took courage and insisted that the master should prescribe for him an atonement for the sin he had committed.

"Carry a pound of candles to the prayer-house," said the Ba'al Shem, "and have them lighted for the Sabbath. This is thy atonement."

The other thought that his request had not been properly listened to, and repeated it most pressingly. When the master insisted on his so incredibly mild sentence, the man told him how heavy a penance had been laid upon him.

"Do as I have told thee," said the Ba'al Shem. "But unto Rabbi Michaël bear my message. He is to come to me to the town of Chovstoff where I shall spend next Sabbath."

With a lightened heart the suppliant went away.

Now when the Rabbi was driving to Chovstoff, a wheel broke in half and he was forced to continue his journey on foot. In spite of all his haste darkness was falling when he reached the town. When he

crossed the threshold of the Ba'al Shem, he saw the master standing with hand on cup to pronounce the blessing over the wine for the beginning of the day of rest. The master stayed his act, and thus addressed the confounded visitor :

"Good Sabbath, sinless one! Hast not tasted the sorrow of the sinner, didst never bear his broken heart in thyself? So was thy hand light to dispense penance! Taste the atoning grief! Good Sabbath, sinner!"

#### THAT WHICH GOETH INTO THE MOUTH.

RABBI Ya'akob Yizchak of Przysucha, who was known simply as 'The Jew,' once ordered his pupil Rabbi Bunam to go a journey. He did not say, however, whither he was to go. Rabbi Bunam did not ask, but took the road with some other Hasids who left the town and followed wherever the way might lead them. Towards noon they came to a village, and put up at a Jewish innkeeper's who, delighted with such pious guests, invited them to stay. Rabbi Bunam sat down in the inn-parlour. But the others, as was their wont, went in and out inquiring what slaughterer (*shokhet*=ritual butcher) had killed and prepared the beast off which they were to eat; if there was no doubt about its purity and freedom from every blemish; whether it had been salted with all care, and similar questions. Then a man in rags who sat behind the stove, still holding his pilgrim's staff, began to speak. He said to them: "Oh you Hasids! You ask and inquire; you want to know who was the slaughterer and how the meat was cleansed. But what you bring forth out of the mouth,—your word,—you do not test; about its purity you do not trouble!"

When Rabbi Bunam heard these words, he understood for what purpose his master had sent him on the road. He arose at once and returned home.

But the pilgrim was Elijah the Prophet himself.

### TRUE WISDOM.

‘He of Zans’ once stood at his window and looked out into the street. Seeing a passer-by, he tapped on the pane and beckoned him to enter. As soon as the man was in the room Rabbi Chayim put him the question: “Tell me: if thou shouldst find a purse of gold gouldens, wouldst thou return it to the owner?” “Rabbi,” cried the man, “certainly would I find the owner without delay.” “Thou art a fool,” said ‘He of Zans.’

Again he turned to the window, called in another man who was just passing, and put him the same question. “I am not fool enough,” replied the other with decision, “to give up a purse of gold, fallen to my lot.” “Thou art a rascal,” said the Rabbi of Zans.

He called in a third passer-by. This one answered to his question: “Rabbi, how can I know now upon which step I shall then stand? Whether I shall be able to conquer the Evil Impulse? Perhaps he will overpower me and I shall keep the property that is not mine; maybe, however, God (Blessed be He!) will help me against him and I shall return the find to the lawful owner.” “How fair are thy words!” exclaimed the Rabbi of Zans. “Thou art the truly wise man!”

SAYINGS OF RABBI NAHMAN BEN SIMHA OF BRATZLAV.<sup>1</sup>

## ALL THINGS TURN.

THE world is like unto a rolling die. Everything turns. Man is turned into angel, angel into man, head into foot and foot into head. Thus all things turn, revolve and change, this into that and that into this, uppermost to downmost, and downmost to uppermost. For in the Root all is one, and in the change and revolution of things is their redemption.

## THE WORLD-VISION.

As the hand, when held before the eye, hides the largest mountain, even so this little earth-life hides from the sight of man the monster lights and secrets of which the world is full. He who can remove a hand, sees the great splendour of the inner world.

## GOD AND MAN.

ALL man's miseries come out of his own self; for though God's Light forever flows over him, yet by his all too fleshly life he casts a shadow over himself, so that the Light Divine cannot reach him.

## FAITH.

FAITH is a very mighty power. Through faith and implicitness without sophistry a man is privileged to rise to the state of mercy, which is higher even than the state of holy wisdom. To such an one is given overflowing grace in God in an all-blissful silence, till he can bear no more the might of silence and cries out from the depth of his soul's fulness.

<sup>1</sup> The great grandson of the Ba'al Shem, 1770-1810.—Trr.



## PRAYER.

LET everyone cry unto God and raise his heart to Him as if he were hanging on a single hair and a hurricane were raging right up to the very heart of the sky, till he know no longer what to do, and have scarcely time left him for crying out. Of a truth there is no counsel for him and no refuge, but only to become alone and raise his eyes and heart to God and cry unto Him. Let him do this at all times; for man is in great peril in this world.

## TWO LANGUAGES.

THERE are men who can utter the words of prayer in truth so that the words flash like a precious stone sparkling with its own light. And there are men whose words are like a window only, which has no light of its own, but simply opens a passage through to light and shines by the splendour of that one.

## WITHIN AND WITHOUT.

MAN is fearful of things that cannot harm him, and he knows it; and he lusts for things that cannot avail him, and he knows it. But of a truth there is one thing in man himself of which he is afraid; and there is one thing in man himself for which he lusts.

## THE TWOFOLD SPIRIT OF MAN.

THERE is a twofold spirit, as it were a forward and a backward one. There is a spirit which man acquires in the course of the times. There is a spirit that overwhelms him in great fulness, in great haste, more quickly than an eye-wink; for it is above time, and there is no need of time for this spirit.

## THOUGHT AND SPEECH.

ALL man's thoughts are words and motions of speech, even if he does not know it.<sup>1</sup>

## TRUTH AND DIALECTIC.

VICTORY cannot abide truth; and if a true thing is displayed before your eyes you reject it for victory's sake. He who desires truth for its own sake, should repel the spirit of victory. Then only may he begin to contemplate truth.

## THE WORLD'S PURPOSE.

THE world has been created only for the sake of choice and of choosing.

Man, lord of the world, should say: The whole world has been created only for my own sake. Therefore should every man take care, and look to it, to redeem the world everywhen and everywhere and fill up its deficiency.

## JOY.

THROUGH joy the mind becomes settled, but through sadness it goes into exile.

## PERFECTION.

To perfect his own unity a man must become as perfect after creation as he was before creation, so as to be completely good, completely holy, even as before creation.

One must renew one's self each day in order to perfect one's self.

<sup>1</sup> This is a very characteristic expression of the specifically 'motor' mentality of the Jew (M. Buber, *Essence of Judaism*) even in a visionary and mystic in whom one would expect to find the visual order of thought.—Tr.

THE EVIL IMPULSE.<sup>1</sup>

THE Evil Impulse is like unto one that runneth about among men ; and his hand is closed and no one knoweth what is therein. And he goeth to every man and asketh : What do I hold in my hand ? And to every man it seemeth as if there were in that one's hand what he coveteth most in his heart. And all run after that one. And then he openeth his hand, and lo ! naught is therein.

A man can serve God with his evil impulse, if he direct his burning passion and his hot concupiscence towards God. Without evil impulse there is no perfect service.

In the righteous the evil impulse is changed into a holy angel, a being of power and of fate.

## ASCENT.

To the ascent of man there is no limit, and to every one the most sublime ascent is open. Here thy choice alone leadeth thee along.

## JUDGING ONE'S SELF.

IF a man does not judge himself, all things judge him and all things become messengers of God.

## WILL AND ITS HINDRANCE.

THERE is no hindrance which cannot be overcome ; for the hindrance exists only for the sake of the will. In truth there are no hindrances save in the spirit.

<sup>1</sup> Heb. *jezer ra'* = Satan psychologically explained.—Trt.

## BETWEEN-MEN.

THERE are men who suffer terrible misery and cannot tell what is in their hearts, and they live on full of distress. If they meet a man with a laughing face, he may enliven them with his joy. And this is no small matter,—to enliven a man.

## IN SECRET.

THERE are men who have no power in the manifest world; but in the secret world they rule their generation.

## THE KINGDOM OF GOD.

THOSE who walk not in solitude, will be distracted when Messiah comes and calls them. But we shall be as men awaked from sleep with clear and quiet mind.

## THE PILGRIMAGE OF SOULS.

GOD never does the same thing twice. When a soul returns another spirit is mated to it.

WHEN a soul descends into this world, its deeds begin to rise from the secret worlds.

THERE are naked souls who cannot enter into a body; and for them there is great and mighty compassion, greater than for those who have lived. For these were in the body and have begotten sons; but those others cannot rise to the heights without descending downwards to clothe themselves in body. And there are still migrations in the world that have not yet revealed themselves.

THE righteous must needs be exiles and fugitives because there are exiled souls who can rise only through them. If a righteous strives against this necessity and does not wish to wander, he becomes an exile and a fugitive in his own house.

THERE are stones as well as souls cast upon the streets. But when once the 'new houses' are built, then the holy stones will be built into them.

#### HASIDUTH AND THE ANIMAL WORLD.

RABBI WOLF could never bring himself to shout at a horse. Rabbi Mosheh Leib used to give water to neglected calves in the markets. Of Rabbi Sussiah they say that he could not see a cage and the despair of the birds and their hopeless longing for flight through the air of God's world, without opening it; and that he took the blows he used to get for this from the owners with smiling joy as a most precious reward. He even expanded his love beyond the realm of those beings who are alone called the 'living ones' (*hayyoth*, animals) by the short-sighted multitude.

There is no thing in the world in which is no life. And from this life it has the form in which it stands before thy eyes; and lo! this life is the Life of God.

#### THE LOVE OF GOD.

WHEN a father complained to the Ba'al Shem: "My son has fallen away from God. What shall I do?" He answered: "Love him more!"

RABBI Rafaël, the Zaddik, said:

If a man sees that his companion hates him, he should love him more. For the community of the living is the Chariot of God's Glory; and where there

is a rift in the Chariot, one must fill it, and where there is too little love, so that the joining is loosened, one must increase love on *this* side to make up for the want.

ONCE before starting on a drive Rabbi Rafaël invited a disciple to sit with him in the conveyance. He answered : " I am afraid I shall make it too narrow for you." Rabbi Rafaël answered, raising his voice : " Let us then love each other more ; then will the car be wide enough for us."

(Authorized Translation by R. E. and G. R. S. M.)

#### NOTE ON MARDUK-MYSTÆ HYMN SOURCE.

(In the light of the following interesting communication the opinion expressed in the last number (p. 179), that a proof-text had seemingly at last been found for the existence of a mystery-saving-cult proper within general Babylonian instituted religion (" Zimmern now gives us a version of a tablet which to all seeming affords the needed proof"), must be abandoned. Z. has sung his own palinode and there is nothing further to be said. This, however, in no way affects the importance of the Marduk passion-play tablet.—G. R. S. M.)

## THE SOURCE OF THE SO-CALLED 'HYMN OF THE MARDUK-MYSTÆ.'

ROBERT EISLER, Ph.D.

### INTRODUCTORY.

THE Editor of THE QUEST has deserved the lasting gratitude of all English-knowing students of comparative religion by his most painstaking and accurate version and exposition of the highly important Babylonian passion-play tablet, which Prof. H. Zimmer had edited and translated into German in 1918, and which has been briefly commented upon by the Rev Prof. Sayce in the *J.R.A.S.*, July, 1921. On page 179 of his paper in the last issue Mr. Mead, however, brought into service another tablet which was also published by Zimmern in the same transaction, but to which Prof. Sayce has not referred.

I wonder whether the venerable Assyriologist of Oxford purposely refrained from connecting this tablet with the passion-play text because he already knew by some private means of communication of what my learned friend Mr. Mead obviously was unaware, owing to the still deplorably sporadic and casual Anglo-German exchange of scientific books and to the still imperfect international bibliographic service, when he strove to make sense of that short and severely mutilated fragment,—namely that it has since 1918 been proved to belong to a totally different kind of religious literature.

In his review (in *the Berlin Philological Weekly*, 1919, c. 1042) of Prof. Zimmern's contribution to the study of the Babylonian New Year's Festival, Dr. Ebeling of the Berlin Museum informed the public of a recent fortunate discovery made by himself, and which he has since edited (in an autograph of the cuneiform signs only) as Nr. 175 of the *Keilschrifttexte aus Assur religiösen Inhalts*, 1919. A new preliminary analysis and translation of the restored and supplemented text was further given by Prof. Zimmern, in the summer of 1921; unfortunately however for Mr. Mead's paper, in a publication where no one could be expected to look for it,—namely an appendix to Prof. Reitzenstein's new book on the *Iranian Salvation Mystery* (Bonn a. Rh., 1921, pp. 253ff.) As a matter of fact the present starved condition of all the scientific reviews has the natural effect that, as soon as an author has by some supernatural piece of cunning or good luck got hold of a publisher generous enough not to limit too strictly the number of pages of a prospective book, he finds to his sincere delight a number of friends and colleagues only too eager to deposit into his hospitable nest a number of valuable cuckoo's eggs, which under ordinary circumstances would have been separately laid in proper receptacles and duly crowed over *in conspectu totius orbis* by their lawful progenitors. Thus it happens that, *e.g.*, my own lucubrations on number- and letter-mysticism will be found smuggled into Eberhard Hommel's and Franz Dornseiff's books on this and kindred subjects, or that Prof. Reitzenstein's latest work contains a number of brand-new and otherwise unpublished finds by Profs. Andreas, Le Coq and Gressmann, and finally Zimmern's above-quoted appendix, which I have the pleasure of



introducing here to the readers of Mr. Mead's valuable Review.

I would gladly have placed it at the disposal of my distinguished friend for his own article, had only I known in time that he was about to devote his labour to this new fragment of a deservedly famous masterpiece of Babylonian religious literature; for this, indeed, is the surprising solution of the puzzle on which Mr. Mead expected future discovery to throw further much needed light (*l.c.*, p. 182).

The new Assur-finds are now known to be nothing else but important hitherto missing fragments of the great 'LUD-LUL BEL NIMEKI'-psalm ('I will Praise the Lord of Wisdom'), found in five separate more or less mutilated copies and one large commentary<sup>1</sup> in Assurbanipal's Ninive (Kuyunjik) Library by Rawlinson (iv. 60\*), and in another Babylonian duplicate in Sippar (Abu Habba) by Father Scheil.<sup>2</sup>

A new English rendering of the whole context as we now know it may be welcome, not only to the readers of THE QUEST, but also to British theologians at large.<sup>3</sup>

The first tablet begins with a title-like theme:

I will praise the Lord of Wisdom<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Rawlinson, v. 47\*; Zimmern, *Bab. Hymnen und Gebete, Auswahl*, i. 30

<sup>2</sup> Former publications of this plainly classic composition may be found in the *Proc. Soc. Bibl. Arch.*, 478, Pl. I. and II. (Evetts); in Zimmern's 3rd ed. of Schrader's *Keilschr. u. Alt. Test.*, pp. 585f.; an attempt at an English translation by Sayce in his Hibbert Lectures (p. 535); and a transcription in Hebrew letters in Halévy's *Docc. Religieux*, pp. 193-197. More recent German translations may be had in Gressmann's *Altorient. Texte und Bilder* (Tübingen, 1904, p. 92), by Ungnad; in Edv. Lehmann's *Textbuch z. Religiösgesch.* (1912, pp. 113ff.), by Landsberger; and finally in Morris Jastrow's *Religion Babyloniens und Assyriens* (1912), ii. 121ff.

<sup>3</sup> J.=Jastrow; U.=Ungnad; Z.=Zimmern; in square brackets [ ] my own suggestions for the filling up of lacunæ or explanatory insertions.

<sup>4</sup> Cp. Ps. 11820.

## THE LAMENTATIONS.

## TABLET I.

*The King.*

. . . . .

. . . . . [for] protection.

The staff of thy divinity (?) I touched.

My eyes were closed as though by a door's bolt against me.

[My ears were stopped ?] as those of a deaf man.

Although a King I have become a slave.

As a madman am I harried by my kinsmen.

In the shade (?) of the (family) assembly they hold me a prisoner.

At the talk of my (*sc.* hoped-for) pardon . . . [my] affliction  
[grows only the harder].

[My] day is groaning ; [my] night, weeping ;

[My] month is howling ; [my] year, mourning.

[had] reached the [end of<sup>1</sup>] life ; to life's term [had] I advanced ;

Wherever I turn, evil upon evil.

[My] affliction hath increased ; well-being is not to be contemplated.

The God I implored ; but he did not grant me [the regard of]  
his face.

To the Goddess<sup>2</sup> I prayed ; but she did not raise [her] head.<sup>3</sup>

The priestly seer prophesied not [my] future.

By an offering the oracle-priest set not forth (or did not advocate)  
my right [to the God].

The geomancer<sup>4</sup> I consulted but he let me have no [answer].

The healing<sup>5</sup>-priest by magic means hath not unloosed my ban.

<sup>1</sup> U. '[long] life ; beyond life's term.'

<sup>2</sup> Lit. 'To the Ishtar.'

<sup>3</sup> J. '[her]'; U. '[my] head.' I believe that the God is thought of as Moon-god, who turns away or shows his face, even as in the Jewish priestly benediction (Num. 625): "The Lord make his face shine upon thee and be gracious unto thee"; while the Goddess is figured as an underground divinity who has to raise her head when listening to a man's complaint.

<sup>4</sup> *Zaḡiqu*-priest; *zaḡiqu*='sand,' 'dust.'

<sup>5</sup> *Ašipu*.

The prospect of future change<sup>1</sup> is not to be seen in the world ;  
 [Yet] if I look backward, a turn [for the worse] is for ever dog-  
     ging my path ;  
 As if one had not stablished the sacrifice for the God ;  
 As if one had not taken thought for the food for the Goddess ;  
 Not bowed my face, not offered my reverence ;  
 As if supplication and prayers [pouring] from my mouth had ever  
     been broken off ;<sup>2</sup>  
 As if I had not kept the day of the God, had neglected the  
     celebration of the New Moon ;  
 As if I had thrown them aside, despised their images.<sup>3</sup>

*The Chorus.*<sup>4</sup>

Not taught the fear of the God and [his] worship to his people ;  
 Not thought of his God, [not] eaten of his sacred (tabooed) food :  
 Relinquished his Goddess, not brought her drink.<sup>5</sup>  
 As if he, who afore had honoured his master, had now forgotten  
     him.

*The King.*

Unto one who hath uttered the great name of power of his God<sup>1</sup>  
     was I like.  
 Though I was ever intent upon supplication and prayer ;  
 Prayer was my rule, sacrifice my principle,  
 The day of adoring the God my delight.  
 The day of obeisance to the Goddess was deemed my profit and my  
     riches.  
 The King's act of loyalty before the God,—that was my pleasure  
     and the chanting of it [an act of] his mercy for me.

<sup>1</sup> Lit. 'other events will not be seen in the world' ; Z. 'how different deeds (appear) in the world !' ; U. 'what perversion of things everywhere !'

<sup>2</sup> U. 'held back.'

<sup>3</sup> Or 'their oracles.'

<sup>4</sup> These lines are manifestly recited by a chorus ; for the suffering King is spoken of in the 3rd person.

<sup>5</sup> U. 'a document [of dedication ?]'

<sup>6</sup> Even as with the Jews, Babylonian laymen were not allowed apparently to utter the proper name of a god. The free use of divine names in the texts shows only that this taboo did not extend to the priests, who thus held their class-monopoly of conjuring with the proper names of the mighty ones.

I taught my land to reverence the name of the God ; to glorify  
the name of the Goddess I taught my people.

The glorification of the King I made equal to that of a God ;

And the fear of the ' Palace ' I had the people taught.

If only truly I knew that this were pleasing to the God !<sup>1</sup>

What seems good to one, to the God may be an abomination ;

What in one's heart may be thought contemptible, may be good  
with God.

For who understandeth the counsel of the Gods in Heaven ?

The plan of God is full of darkness.—Who can understand it ?

How can the dwellings [of men] understand the way of God ?

### *The Chorus (?)*.

He who still lived in the evening, in the morning was he dead.

Suddenly he goeth into darkness ; quickly is he broken down.

In the turn of a moment he still singeth and playeth ;

In another wink of time he crieth like unto a lamentation-priest.

Like unto the opening and closing [of the sky by day and night]  
their fate is changed.

When they are hungry, they are like to a corpse ;

When they are filled, they liken themselves to their God.

If they fare well, they talk of mounting to the sky ;<sup>2</sup>

When they are thrown down, they talk of sinking to the underworld.<sup>3</sup>

. . . . .

. . . . .

### *The King.*

An evil spirit hath settled his dwelling within me ; first yellowish,  
[then] the sickness grew white.

I have been dashed to the ground and cast upon my back.

My lofty stature hath been bowed down like unto a reed ;

Like an *ulitum*<sup>4</sup>-plant have I been thrown down, cast headlong like  
*puppanu*.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Possibly, the King thinks, this may have been his sin, although he did it for the God's sake.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. Genes. 114.

<sup>3</sup> These lines—from 'He, who still lived,' onwards—may again be the chant of a chorus.

<sup>4</sup> Unidentified botanic names.

*The Chorus.*

His food became putrid like unto the stinking plant.

*The King.*

Without the possibility of feeding, I was tortured by hunger.<sup>1</sup>  
 Endlessly my sickness hath been drawn out; the power of my  
     blood [hath been exhausted ?].  
 My limbs are tightly drawn together and . . . . .  
 I am chained to the cribbed, narrow and painful couch; my  
     house hath become my prison.  
 As fetters to my body my hands are laid upon it;  
 As my own bonds are my feet stretched out.  
 Devastation . . . . .  
 With a scourge of many lashes hath he whipped me.  
 With a stout pole hath he empaled me; mighty hath been the  
     stab.  
 The whole day the persecutor persecuteth me;  
 In the midst of the night he doth not let me breathe.  
 Rent asunder, my joints are dissolved;  
 My limbs are destroyed. Accurst [am I].  
 On my bed I spend the night bellowing like a bull;  
 Like unto a sheep am I soaked with my own ordure.<sup>2</sup>  
 The list of the symptoms of my fever hath the medicine-priest  
     destroyed in despair;  
 And my prognostic hath the prophet-priest thrown away [in  
     perplexity].  
 The healer hath not diagnosed the nature of my illness;  
 And the seer hath not seen the term of my sickness.  
 The God hath not helped me, not taken my hand;  
 The Goddess hath not pitied me, hath not walked by my side.  
 The great abode<sup>3</sup> is opened for me;  
 My burial is already accomplished.<sup>4</sup>  
 Before I have died, lamentation for me is already over;

<sup>1</sup> Hereafter begins the Sippar-fragment.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. Ps. 67; 384-11.

<sup>3</sup> Written *Ki-Makhi*; 'the great abode,' i.e. the under-world.

<sup>4</sup> Cp. Ps. 882-5.

The people of my land have already cried 'Woe' over me.  
 When my foe heard it, his face brightened;  
 When the glad news was brought to him, his heart became joyous.  
 If only I knew now the day when my pain will come to an end,  
 And when in the midst of the protecting spirits I shall be honoured  
 as a God!

## TABLET II.

*The King.*

HEAVY is his hand; I cannot bear it. . . .

Here follow the new fragments of Dr. Ebeling which are still untranslated. According to Zimmern they show clearly that the suffering King has three successive visions in dream foreshadowing his impending salvation,—a feature which reminds us of the Greek practice of seeking healing-dreams in famous sanctuaries by means of what has been called 'incubation.'

In the second of these visions he sees LAL-UR-ALMA, a legendary primeval king of Nippur (perhaps the ALÔROS of Berossos' list of antediluvian kings<sup>1</sup>) and probably one of the lamenting King's own ancestors or predecessors. The sufferer himself is called 'Tabi-utul-Bêl<sup>2</sup> living in Nippur' in the concluding part of the poem.

This royal dream-figure sends a messenger to the sick man to cleanse him by pouring healing 'water' over him and by chanting over him 'the conjuring of life.'

The continuation of the text is translated by Jastrow (*l.c.*, pp. 131f.) and—with some more recovered

<sup>1</sup> Thus Poebel, *Historical Texts*, Philadelphia, 1914 (Univ. Museum, Bab. Sect. iv. i).

<sup>2</sup> The name occurs in an etymological list of archaic Babylonian Kings' names (Rawl., v. pl. 44, coll. 2, 17); Jastrow, p. 72.

lines—by Landsberger in Lehmann (*l.c.*). The penitent King, 'Tabi-utul-Bēl of Nippur,' 'the strong ruler crowned with the diadem,' exclaims for the last time, 'with a heavy sigh': "Oh! how long is this to endure!"—when suddenly he regains his old strength, feels how the "sign of slavery is wiped from his brow" and how "his fetters are being broken." Marduk<sup>1</sup> has laid hold of him, revived him. At the very moment when the fiend has dragged the King to the shore of the river Hūbur, whence men are ferried over for judgment,<sup>2</sup> the God has lent him a helping hand; when the fiend slew the King, the God has raised him; the fist of the demon-fiend is broken, his weapon smashed.

### THE TE DEUM..

In the jaws of the lion, who would have devoured him,  
Hath Marduk laid his bit.

Marduk hath taken from the oppressor his hiding-place and  
surrounded his lurking-place.

Marduk,—my sin he hath removed . . . . .

My ears that were stopped and locked like those of one deaf,

Their deafness hath he removed, their hearing hath he opened.

The fiend who had trodden me under foot, the strong one, he hath  
torn from my body.

He hath made my breast joyous; let it sound like a flute.

<sup>1</sup> This name is certainly given the God only in the Babylonian recension of the classic poem.—In the original text of the sufferings of a king of Nippur the sufferer must have been saved by the 'old Bēl' of Nippur. The use of the word 'God' (*ilu*) without a proper name, but always coupled with a 'Goddess,' is no sign of Babylonian 'monotheism' (as A. Jeremias would have us believe in his *Monotheistische Strömungen in Babylonien*), but simply the result of Nippur's monolatry of the God and the Goddess (Bēl and Bēlīt) of the city. For a ruler of Babylon 'the God' or, 'God' is Marduk; for a chief of Harraṇ it would be Sin; for one of Sippar, Samaš; for one of Borsippa, Nebo.

<sup>2</sup> The boundary-river of the *Au-delà* is here meant, and not the real Habor-Chaboras river, nor the 'Grand Canal' (*Maru Kabaru*) of Chaldæa. the stream where Ezekiel (i.1) relates he had a vision of God 'by the river of Kiebar (XOBAP) among the captives.'

*The Chorus.*

The fetters [that were] closed like a lock, hath he unloosed.  
 One starved by hunger he hath made like unto a strong sprout.

*The King.*

He offered me food; he brought me drink.  
 The neck bowed down, low and feeble, he hath raised like to  
 a cedar.  
 Perfect in strength hath he made my frame.  
 My nails are cut like those of one freed from an unclean demon;  
 He hath poured out their (*sic*) wealth, made fair [? for me]  
 their (*sic*) possession.  
 My knees that were caught like a bird's in a trap (?— lit. cleft),  
 he hath freed.  
 The whole frame of my body he hath restored.  
 His wrath he hath ended; he hath softened his anger.  
 The dark face shone brightly.

After a mutilation of some ten lines comes the pilgrimage of the restored to the sanctuary of E-SAG-ILA with prayer, prostration and sighings. Then follows the passing through the twelve doors of the great temple (cf. Ps. 118<sup>18-20</sup>),—the identical lines printed on page 181 of the January number. We have now two variants: one reads always 'in the gate' for 'at the gate,' and instead of "I returned to the gate of [the living]" Zimmern would now read 'to Bab(=Gate) ilani' (=Babylon). The same name for the 3rd and 11th gate—KA-SILIMA—is probably simply graphic. For SILIMA means both *salamu* ('good health') and *salamu* ('reconciliation'); so that one of the gates would be that of 'good health,' the other that of 'reconciliation' (with the Gods). After the description of the thank-offering, and a short lacuna of some lines, there follows the description of the thanksgiving meal,



—that is the text printed on p. 180 of the same issue (cp. Ps. 23<sub>26π</sub>). This, however, is now to be read with the following corrections :

[At] the [joyous] repast the people of Babylon praised the Name of Marduk.

[He] whose burial-chamber [they] had already built [now presideth again] at the [thanksgiving-] meal.

The people of Babylon saw how he had made him live again.

All their mouths praised the highness of [Marduk].

Who was it, who ordained, that he should see the light again ?

Into whose mind did it come [at last], that he should walk his street again ?<sup>1</sup>

The next four lines on p. 180 are correct ; but the final allusion to the creation-myth is simply a hymn-phrase, like the English " while grass grows and water flows."

Wherever the earth is set forth and the heavens are spread,  
[wherever] the sun shines, fire flashes forth,

All those whom Aruru hath created,<sup>2</sup>

Who are filled with the breath of life,<sup>3</sup> who stride forth [on their legs],

All the people (or lands) praise Marduk.<sup>4</sup>

The severely mutilated doxology (?) which follows, seems to close the hymn, which is, as we now see clearly, though scarcely a mystery-text in the proper sense, nevertheless a close parallel to Job and (even in its choric passages) also to Pss. 116, 118 and above all to Ps. 22 (v. 4f. corresponds to the appearance of the King's divine ancestors!) and to Ps. 6.

ROBERT EISLER.

<sup>1</sup> Not: ' in procession ' ; cp. Ps. 116<sub>9</sub>.

<sup>2</sup> Lit. ' whose clay pieces she has nipped off ' from the primeval clay.

<sup>3</sup> Cp. Ps. 150<sub>6</sub>.

<sup>4</sup> Cp. Ps. 117<sub>1</sub>; 148<sub>12f.</sub>; 149; 150.

## THE GLASSY SEA.

The Very Rev. H. ERSKINE HILL, Provost of  
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It is characteristic of St. John, the Seer of the Apocalypse, with his spiritual insight and wonderful intuitive power, to see and represent in the form of pictures and living images the great truths which St. Paul with his grand intellect seeks to grasp by the aid of metaphor and to express in terms of the reason. The same subjects occupy to a surprising extent the attention of both writers and, as they see from very different levels, the contrast in their methods of treatment is deeply interesting.

Thus, while St. Paul speaks of the Church under the metaphor of a chaste bride to be presented to Christ, the Angel Guide shews to St. John the actual vision of 'The Bride, the Lamb's Wife,' to whom it is granted to be arrayed in fine linen.

St. Paul writes of the one Church as 'built upon the foundation of the Apostles and Prophets'; St. John *sees* the Holy City and its wall "had twelve foundations, and in them the names of the twelve Apostles of the Lamb." "The whole creation," says St. Paul, "groaneth and travaileth in pain together . . . waiting for the manifestation of the Sons of God"; St. John sees the four Living Creatures fall down in thankful worship before the Lamb as the solution of the great problem of pain and suffering, represented by the Sealed Book, passes into His

mighty hands. "We shall all stand," cries the Apostle of the Gentiles, "before the judgment seat of Christ"; "I saw a great white Throne," says St. John, "and Him that sat upon it."

But one of the most interesting examples of this constant correspondence in thought, and contrast in expression, can be seen in their references to the material world as the reflection of the world invisible. Let any one compare St. Paul's statement, in Romans i. 20, that "the invisible things of Him since the creation of the world are clearly seen, being perceived by the things that are made," with St. John's description of his vision of Nature in Revelation: "[I saw] before the Throne as it were a glassy sea," and he cannot fail to recognize that the thought in the mind of the Seer is just that of the Apostle,—that the changing world below reflects the spiritual world above; or, if our minds were trained to think in four dimensions, it might be better to say that the outer, denser, material world reflects the inner and more permanent and more spiritual world which interpenetrates it. This idea of reflection in the phrase the 'glassy sea' has been strangely missed by most commentators, though Plato's doctrine of ideas should have made it sufficiently familiar. Newman indeed associates it with this passage in his striking lines in the *Lyra Apostolica* :

"A sea before

The Throne is spread; its pure still glass  
Pictures all earth-scenes as they pass."

But his conception is exactly the opposite of the Apocalypticist. It is not earthly things which cast their reflection on the Glassy Sea before the Throne, but the eternal things from the spiritual world—in

other words the thoughts of God—which find their transient reflection in the mirror of Nature. It seems so difficult even for theologians to realize that it is the spiritual and not the material world which is real; that “the things which are seen are temporal but the things which are not seen are eternal”; and that the forms which rise and break in the shining ocean of matter, and again and again repeat themselves with every returning spring-time, are only reflections in three dimensions of the beautiful thoughts of God.

It is not possible to study Apocalyptic literature to any kind of profit, if we insist on standing on our heads and seeing everything upside down. It only becomes intelligible to the mystic,—that is to the man who seeks to take the standpoint of one whose consciousness is centred in the spiritual and eternal world. To a true mystic the transiency of every created thing, be it castle or mountain or star, is as clearly visible as it is plain to our reason when we force ourselves to think of it.

But the image of the Glassy Sea carries us a good deal further than the simple thought of reflection. That which is reflected, bears an ordered and proportional relation to that from which it is derived, and is seen—as all reflections from above are seen—in an inverted order.

To the vision of the seer the spiritual world meets the material and re-doubles itself in the reflection; as

“The swan on still St. Mary’s Lake  
Floats double, swan and shadow.”

Thus to one who can see only the reflection, “the invisible things since the creation of the world are clearly seen, being perceived by the things which are

made," and the soul-vision of the eternal beauty which lies behind "the meanest flower that blows," may well give "thoughts that do often lie too deep for tears."

Let us then think of these two worlds—the spiritual and the material—whose margins may be said to meet at the point where creation begins. Just as the topmost branch of a tree which grows beside the still waters of a lake, corresponds to the reflection which seems deepest in the surface-mirror below, so we should expect to find the reflection of the highest glory of Heaven in the lowest stoop of Divine Love manifested here on earth.

Thus we might ask where shall we find on earth the most complete reflection of God. St. John in his simple and sublime way gives us three definitions. "God," he says, "is Life" or Spirit; "God is Light," "God is Love." These words are meaningless apart from the idea of giving, spending, pouring forth. God exists by self-sacrifice as light exists by shining. In the man Christ Jesus we see "the effulgence of the Father's Glory and the very image of His Substance," and in His mightiest act of self-sacrifice on Calvary, in the Crucified Figure with the outstretched arms, we find the fullest reflection of God. The utter earth-weakness of the Cross is just the inverted image of the strength of the Lord God Omnipotent.

If we think of the Virgin Birth of the Eternal Son of God in Bethlehem, we may reverently allow ourselves to imagine how that wonderful coming forth into manifestation in the physical world would appear to the multitude of the heavenly host who sang on that holy night the Angel-song of glory and goodwill; or we can perhaps let fancy picture how the Magi might

see it with consciousness entranced as to the world and lifted up into the Eternal to see from the spiritual side the mystery of the Incarnation. To them that marvellous progress earthwards would seem the laying aside more and more of heavenly splendour, till the Divine Glory, which filled the heaven-world, would be narrowed down to a single star-like point, where in the rude inn-stable the margins of the two worlds met. So it might seem to those who perhaps saw it as it were from above. Then, when the consciousness of the entranced seers awoke again to their physical surroundings, there would be the earnest desire to find on the material plane the point corresponding to what they had seen on the spiritual side. "Where is He that is born King of the Jews? For we have seen His star in the East."

Now, just as the glory of the Divine narrowed itself down in that mighty descent to a single star-like point where the Christ was born, so we should expect that from that point on the earthly side the reflected glory, which is self-sacrifice, would broaden out and expand more and more as the Child grew to boyhood and manhood, more and more through His Baptism, His Ministry, His Passion, reaching its fullest manifestation, as we have seen, at the Cross of Calvary.

St. Paul, in words which have been deplorably mistranslated into phrases oscillating violently between heresy and abject nonsense (according as we accept the Authorised or the Revised Versions), describes for us the whole wonderful process,—the narrowing down of the Divine glory till it reaches earth, and then its corresponding expansion like the broadening out of the reflection of an inverted pyramid. "Let this mind be in you," he writes—and no apology need be made

for rectifying the translation of our two versions—“which was also in Christ Jesus, who being in the form of God thought not that the being equal with God involved *grasping* (ἀρπαγμός), but [on the contrary, realizing that it is the very nature of God to give] emptied himself by taking the form of a slave”; and the contrast between grasping (ἀρπαγμός) and emptying (κένωσις) is identical with the contrast in the Apocalypse between the Wild Beast (τὸ θηρίον) and the Lamb (τὸ Ἀρνίον).

The blundering of our translators is the more inexcusable in the light of Origen's comment:

“We must venture to affirm that the goodness of Christ appears greater and more Divine and truly after the image of the Father when ‘he humbled himself’ . . . than if he had supposed that the being on an equality with God meant ἀρπαγμός.

“Being found in fashion as a man he humbled himself, becoming obedient even unto death, yea, the death of the Cross.”

So St. Paul describes the descent going deeper and ever deeper till it touches Golgotha; and then, when the glory of God which is self-sacrifice, has broadened out into the all-embracing love of Christ crucified, he sees that that lowest stoop on earth corresponds to what is highest in heaven.

“Wherefore,” he says,—and how splendidly ‘wherefore’ meets the case!—“Wherefore also God highly exalted him, and gave unto him the name which is above every name, that in the name of Jesus every knee should bow of things in heaven and things on earth and things under the earth, and that every tongue should confess that Jesus Christ is Lord to the glory of God the Father.”

So the mightiest exaltation far above all principalities and powers corresponds to the lowest point reached on earth—to the degradation and darkness and curse of Calvary.

And exactly the same thought which St. Paul so wonderfully expands, is seen by St. John in one flash of tremendous imagery, and expressed in one short sentence :

“ [I saw] in the midst of the Throne . . .  
a Lamb as it had been slain.”

Self-sacrifice is centred at the very heart of infinite power and universal rule.

H. ERSKINE HILL.



## TREE-FELLING.

WITH me the felling of a big tree is a sight that produces mingled feelings. I can put the sentimental on one side, and be as utilitarian as you please, when I think of the comfortable blaze of winter-fires or of weather-boarding or mine-props; and yet there is a dash of the authentic in my spontaneous thrill of unrest when I see the great mass sway impotently forward, with its wide arms outspread, and majestically swoop to the earth.

In the mood of that moment I should reckon tree-felling—with bull-baiting—a savage and ungenerous sport. It was Gladstone's recreation, I remember, and the sycophant Press used to give details of his statesmanlike prowess with the axe; but was there not a critic who said that Gladstone's intellect was so subtle that it could persuade his conscience of anything? Here surely was an instance. The humbled Kaiser cuts up wood for a pastime; I suppose he also cuts down trees. In my sentimental moment I am not surprised that he who hacked so desperately at the huge trunk of Europe, must still hack at something in his will-to-destruction, even though it be only a Dutch poplar. And I should say to the man, be he Kaiser or squireen, who would go tree-felling in his own woods: "Let the woodmen do it!"—in the same spirit where-with I would recommend him not to dabble his hands in the blood of his own lambs and calves, but let the butcher do it, and so make the destroying of life

a trade, if it must be, and not a game; for killing is a solemn business, and should be done at the urge of duty, not of delight.

For as the fated tree groans, sways, stoops and falls, I feel myself either a very ancient and sincere Pagan or a very modern philosopher in my sense of the departing of a life. Either the hamadryad, who made her home in its woody fibres, and rustled its leaves with laughter at the greeting of the wind, is now being evicted by *force majeure*, to wander not materialized, or a centre of panpsychic force, completely actualized in its own grade of subconscious feeling and external beauty, is being for ever extinguished: in either case here is a serious assault upon the integrity of the universe.

This is fantastic nonsense, cries common-sense. But is it so? Consider where I can go for any sure basis of sense, as opposed to non-sense, except to the 'immediate certainty' of my own consciousness, wherein is subject, object and subject-object to boot, —so say the metaphysicians. And this pang at the tree's fall I certainly feel as the pain of sudden death. If then my pang at a hero's fall is of the same order, only vastly more bitter, as my sympathetic unrest at the violence done to the tree, how shall I not deduce that there is something alive in the tree, akin to my own life, even as I am assured that there is something in me akin to the hero?

Poetry has often enough compared the falling soldier to a falling tree,—"even as some monarch of the forest." It is the most primitive of tropes, a *cliché* that must in these late days be elaborately tricked out to be respectable. I but plead that the trope rings real in the reverse order: "Even as some king of men,

so the tree itself heroic,"—as some Cæsar wrapping his cloak around him at the base of Pompey's statue, some Pompey mangled on the Libyan sand, some Hector soon to be dragged at the heels of Achilles' horses. I persist that I feel an emotion as when face to face with a human tragedy; it is as if I suddenly and all unprepared came into sight of an assassination, as one might any day in Petrograd, or found myself eavesdropping at the deathbed of the great or the beautiful. What I feel is similar; because what I see is similar. The swaying of the trunk, as its hold on mother-earth grows feeble; the plaintive creaking of the fibres, the stately swooping fall; perhaps too the vicious kick-back of the severed trunk on its assassin, forcing him to join it on its track to Hades—are alas! of one piece with the fate of strength, glory, greatness, loveliness, impotent against the assault of circumstance, force, cunning, passion or commonplace utility. "So mighty Cæsar fell!" Should we not draw down the blinds, rather than gaze with the vulgar?

The tree felled, there follows the slashing off of the branches and the carrying away of the bare trunk and principal boughs. Or shall we call it the despoiling of the body of the slain, and its funeral? But what of all this? Will you be one to slash off the green tokens of life, and hack away the branches from the mighty trunk, wherein lurked so long, so arch a hamadryad? Surely it is an indecent job. Or again,—will you volunteer to hale brutally the scarred remnants of violated grandeur on to the wain that waits to carry them to the saw-mill, there to be out into boards or sizeable billets for the fire? Or will the consciousness of sharp contrasts hold you back,

keep you silent, then and now, yesterday and to-day,  
—vigour and impotence, life and death?

Lopped and naked—how complete an image of death!—the trunk is carried through cool lanes beneath overhanging branches. There is stateliness in its journey, as well as shame and pathos. It takes four horses to draw this giant: their brass harness glints and the bells tinkle at their ears; the woodmen assist as bearers on either side; the long lumbering wain is like the gun-carriage that carries the body of a hero.

In me as I look on the last scene a sense of its dignity supervenes on that of its pathos, an intuition akin to triumph. This is not the triumph of man over nature, of one form of life over another; it is the sense of triumph in completed sacrifice, in the spirit meekly offered for the good of the whole. It is the triumph of the martyr.

Where the tree fell there is no gloom. The gap it left is where the sunlight streams into the wood. The rabbits scamper through the sawdust, and a thrush seated on the shaved stump sings a song regardless of all but good in Nature, Man and God.

W. J. FERRAR.

## CORRESPONDENCE.

### THE LEGENDS OF THE HOLY GRAIL.

I HAVE read Miss Foxcroft's summary of the present position of Grail-research<sup>1</sup> with much interest. There are certain points however, on which the writer seems to have missed the latest evidence at our disposal, and I venture to think she may welcome such additional information.

It is perfectly true that, so far as the date of the existing MS is concerned, the *Conte de Graal* of Chrétien de Troyes is the earliest extant Grail-poem; but that it is based upon Celtic material and is the first welding together of the two originally independent (*Grail-Perceval*) themes, cannot be admitted. Chrétien's poem, as Dr. Brugger (whose work Miss Foxcroft does not appear to know) has shewn, comes at the end, not at the beginning of an evolutionary process, the details of which are not yet ascertainable. Chrétien was, by his own admission, retelling an already popular story; and of that story there was more than one accepted version. Thus, Perceval might be an only child, or he might have a sister, a character of great importance in the latest stages of the story. His father might be anonymous and himself, so far as we are told, without relatives; or he may have a name—Perceval, Alain or Bliocadrans—and be one of twelve brethren famed for their warlike prowess. The Knight of the Swan may be Perceval's son or his descendant, or be otherwise connected with the Grail House (as in *Sone de Nansai*); or there may be no hint of connection between the stories. The writer apparently knows the first volume of my *Perceval Studies*. If she will refer to the section on Wauchier, she will see what a diversity of tradition was at the disposal of Chrétien's first continuator. Chrétien's source was undoubtedly a complete and elaborate

<sup>1</sup> See the article 'British-American Research and the Grail Legends,' in the last number, pp. 191ff.—Ed.

French poem, part of which was drawn from what must have been a very well written and constructed romance dealing with the adventures of Gawain. This composite poem was also the ultimate source of the *Parzival*. To say, as Miss Foxcroft does, on p. 214, that, apart from the description of the hero's youth, "the German and French *Percevals* have hardly anything in common," is most misleading. The two run parallel up to the conclusion of Chrétien's version, *i.e.* to the middle of Gawain's adventure at the Chastel Merveilleus; and, as I have pointed out in the Studies referred to above, the writer of Wolfram's source quite obviously knew the end of the story, as did also the copyists of Chrétien's poem, who drew upon it at their varying will and pleasure.

That the German writers did not know what the word *Grail* signified, is an assumption I have never been able to accept. The author of *Diû Crône* knows precisely what Chrétien knew. The Grail in each poem is the same—a reliquary, of fine gold and precious stones, containing a Host (in the German version, a *Brödchen*), with which in the one instance the Fisher King's father, in the other the King himself, is nourished, partaking of no more material food. In the *Parzival* one form of the Source of Life has simply been replaced by another. The fact that the 'Stone' is also the agent of the rejuvenation of the Phoenix, leaves no doubt as to its true character. If the author of Wolfram's source had not thoroughly understood what the Grail really signified, he could not have made so intelligent a substitution; it was not *his* understanding, but that of the latter-day critics which was at fault. As I have shewn in Vol. II. of the *Perceval* Studies (which apparently Miss Foxcroft does not know), the Grail, regarded as a Vessel of Initiation, appears in three forms—as a Cup, as a Dish, and as the 'holy' Grail, the ultimate Source of Life, which is wrought of no material substance, and the shape of which cannot be dogmatically postulated. Of these three forms the term *Grail* can be applied correctly only to the second; but that was of course the form familiar to *all* the worshippers, and naturally became applied to the manifestation vouchsafed to the more restricted group of true initiates—to the confusion of critics unacquainted with the real nature of the material with which they were dealing. The *Parzival* is so incontestably the most

coherent and best constructed text of the Grail cycle that I have never been able to accept the paradoxical conclusion that the author, and he alone, started in sublime ignorance of the nature of his theme! If any one knew what he was writing about, it was the author of the *Parzival*.

To turn to the writer's remarks on Robert de Borron,—I am not aware that the Counts of Montbéliard (later, of Montfaucon) were connected with the House of Flanders; they were of Lorraine. Borron himself probably came from Fontainebleau. Since publishing *From Ritual to Romance*, I have come across a statement in Mr. Legge's interesting work, *Forerunners and Rivals of Christianity*, to the effect that the *Gospel of Nicodemus* was one of the sacred books of the Naassenes, whose cult I believe to be the original of the Grail-ritual. This is a very significant point.

The 'startling promise' made to Joseph, referred to on p. 207, finds corroboration in actual fact. I have recently received a paper on 'Joseph of Arimathea,' by Dr. H. Jenner (*Pax*, No. 48), in which the writer, discussing this point, states that in the Byzantine Liturgy the Priest, at the moment of placing the Bread and Wine upon the Altar says: "*The noble Joseph taking down Thy spotless Body from the Tree, and wrapping It in a clean linen cloth, placed It with funeral rites in a new tomb*" (*op. cit.*, p. 131). Whoever wrote the romance, must have been familiar with the Eastern rite. So far as the *Perlesvaus* is concerned, both Dr. Nitze and myself are now convinced that the romance was constructed at the end of the 12th, or at the very beginning of the 13th century, in order to exploit the fame of Glastonbury as the burial place of Arthur and Guenevere; the supposed discovery of their tombs taking place in 1191. It is noteworthy that, though the author was certainly familiar with Glastonbury (Avalon), the topography of Lancelot's visit is, as Dr. Nitze has shewn, quite correct: he does not locate the Grail there; wherever the Fisher King's land may be, it is not Glastonbury.

I fail to understand the reference to Josephe, the first Bishop of Christendom, 'celebrating behind closed doors.' Josephe the Bishop never appears in *Perlesvaus*; though Josephes, '*le bon clerc*,' who is constantly quoted as authority for the romance (but does not seem to be regarded as a living personality) is once, and

once only, identified as 'the first Bishop.' This I take to be the insertion of a copyist, misled by the similarity of name; for the *Grand Saint Graal*, on its side, clearly distinguishes between the two in the statement that Josephe is not "*chil Josephes qui l'écriture trait si souvent d temoin*,"—a remark which can refer only to the *Perlesvaus*. Probably there should be a distinction made between Josephe and Josephes; the latter name having been suggested by Josephus and adopted in order to lend colour to the fiction that the original of the *Perlesvaus* was in Latin. As for a Celebration behind closed doors,—I can imagine only that Miss Foxcroft has misunderstood her text. The doors of the Grail Chapel are certainly closed against Gawain, on account of his failure to ask concerning the Grail; but all the inhabitants of the castle are present. When Arthur 'assists' at Mass in the Grail Castle, he sees all the changes (five) of the Grail; so the consecration must have been in full sight of the worshippers.

It is, naturally, extremely difficult to convince anyone not familiar with such subjects of the extraordinary persistence of 'Occult' tradition; but in view of a recently published work, *The Witchcult in Western Europe* (M. A. Murray), in which the practices we know as 'witchcraft' are shewn to be part of an organized religion with a fixed cult and official ministry, which religion the author identifies with the ancient Fertility-worship of Europe and the British Isles, it seems at least permissible to maintain that, if the *lower* form of this worship was a living faith in the closing years of the 17th century, the *higher* form may well have been still extant in the 12th. At the same time I am quite willing to admit that there may have been another stream of tradition—that which Miss Foxcroft designates as fairy-tale. There is a close connection between witches and fairies! This would be most likely to affect the earlier *Gawain* versions of the story,—i.e. that version which was current before the Arthurian tradition assumed a literary form. The record of Gawain's Grail-adventures in *Diu Crône*, especially those associated with his first visit to the Castle, a visit which for some unexplained reason critics of the texts have hitherto ignored, is of the very wildest and most fantastic description.

We should thus have a double tradition: on one side genuine and based upon the knowledge derived from actual participation



in the rites; on the other fantastic, the outcome of hints and rumours appealing to popular fancy, but with no actual experience to serve as basis for the representation. In the final stage of literary development the two lines crossed, and became interwoven to the resulting perplexity of the modern critic; but the fairy-tale was always more than a fairy-tale and the legend preserved the record of a profound truth.

JESSIE L. WESTON.

Paris, Jan. 1922.

#### THE VIRGIN-BIRTH AT THE ÆON-FESTIVAL.

AT the end of my paper in the last issue, 'New-found Fragments of a Babylonian Mystery-play and the Passion-story,' I quoted a strikingly interesting passage from Epiphanius about a mystery-rite, celebrated in the Alexandrian Koreion, which affords a striking parallel with the Christ-story, adding that I had not met with any other reference to this arresting passage. My esteemed encyclopædic and polymath contributor, Dr. Robert Eisler, has hastened most kindly to enlighten my ignorance, by forwarding me an offprint of one of his own very numerous learned contributions to scientific periodicals—in this case the *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, 1911, pp. 628-635—entitled '*Das Fest des "Geburtstages der Zeit" in Nordarabien.*' In it he combats the theory of Hermann Usener (*Weihnachtsfest*, i. 27), that the Alexandrian mystery-play was plagiarized by the Egyptians from the Christians, as is clearly on all hands not the case, and gives a most instructive summary of the information which can be gathered together from numerous and frequently very out-of-the-way sources to throw light on this wide-spread cult of the Æon, on which as a general topic in comparative religion Dr. Eisler has made so many valuable contributions. As I have always thought, Eisler here shows that the golden crosses, signed on brow and hands and knees of the image of the God, must have been the famous Egyptian 'cross' or 'tie' of life, with which innumerable monuments are bespattered. If my paper should appear subsequently in book-form, I shall most certainly and very gratefully make full use of my colleague's illuminating study on the subject.

G. R. S. M.

## REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

### PISTIS SOPHIA.

**A Gnostic Miscellany : Being for the most part Extracts from the Books of the Saviour, to which are added Excerpts from a Cognate Literature. Englished (with an Introduction and Annotated Bibliography) by G. R. S. Mead. New and completely revised edition. London (Watkins); pp. lxxix. + 325 ; 21s. net.**

WE have set out the full title-page because this is an unusually important product of scholarship. It gives us an edition of a notable work, such as the dignity of literature requires that the English language should possess in translation.

It is preceded by an Introduction and an Annotated Bibliography, both of them just what are needed to make the volume a thing complete in itself. The Bibliography of writings and references covers both French and German, as well as British, which is, indeed, only a scanty retinue. Being thoroughly critical it adds another proof of the Editor's erudition in this field. The Translation, it should be noted, is not Mr. Mead's first try: he published one in 1896. But this revision has the benefit of 25 years of further study of the work itself, *plus* the results of the labours of specialists abroad, especially in Germany. It is therefore considered by Mr. Mead himself as practically new.

Before passing from reference to the translating, we should like to express the opinion that Mr. Mead has been successful according to that crucial test of a translation of a work with any *style*: he has been able to imbue the whole with a style which has a distinctiveness of its own. The more one reads it, the more one is sure that any one with a sensitiveness for words and rhythms will feel that there is a tone which pervades the whole. Whether or not this reproduces or reflects the original Coptic only a few scholars can judge of course; all that the present writer is able to say is that it seems to him to be English with an exotic perfume or flavour which indicates a distant land and a distant time, and has an individuality, translation though it be.

As this notice is written for the general reader by one who may correlatively be termed a general writer, it makes no pretension to be critical, but aims at giving a conspectus of a remarkable product of the religious imagination, as set forth in this edition.

A fact of no small interest is that it has survived in a single MS., which we are proud to know is a possession of our British Museum, purchased in 1785 for the trifling sum of ten guineas. This MS. is in the Coptic language, of Upper Egypt, and is regarded on almost all hands as itself a translation from some Greek original. It has been written by two scribes, sharing the copying about equally. The contents do not really constitute a single work, but are rather, as the editor says, 'Extracts from a Literature' of at least two principal strata; but it has acquired the single title here assigned to it, and as such it is referred to by scholars. The MS. has been assigned to dates between the 4th and 9th centuries, with greatest weight for the 5th. The composition of the work itself Mr. Mead assigns, after full consideration, to the 3rd century.

A careful enquiry as to its provenance leads Mr. Mead to place it along with two other works which give us a new perspective as to Christianized Gnosticism, coming not as presented by opponents but by those who believed in it themselves. In other words, from the period when, as Wernle puts it, "Gnosticism and Catholicism were two brothers rather than deadly enemies." And in it we can easily discern some of the features which were compelling the Catholic Church to draw away from even Christian Gnosticism, and finally to regard it as heretical and hostile. At the same time some common features are broadly marked; of which Mr. Mead notes especially (i) the centrality of Jesus as the ascended Christ, and (ii.) an admirable ethic, in harmony with that of the Catholic tradition.

Although we take it as a product of the Religious Imagination, we find it employing a quasi-historical setting, just as Plato expounded his philosophy by means of a Socrates discoursing with young men of Athens. Here we have the ascended Lord Jesus revisiting and remaining on the earth to instruct his disciples, both for their own sakes and as bearers of his message to the world. The scene is the Mount of Olives, and the time the twelfth year after his resurrection. He stays with them continuously; at the last, after a mystic ascent, he appears once more, having received a supernal vesture which had been prepared

for him from the beginning but which he had for a time left behind. The group whom he descends to instruct consists of the Apostles, the Blessed Virgin, Mary Magdalen, Salome, Martha. Nothing is said in this connection of Paul, or of any Christian leaders later than the Apostolic circle. In great humility they put forward many enquiries, to which answers are granted. Very frequently they venture to offer their own tentative solutions of problems; and the teaching is given by the confirming or the correcting and extending of these endeavours of their own, with kindly commendations bestowed upon them whenever they exhibited thoughtfulness and insight. As a single example of these we may cite from chap. 61 (p. 100):

"Jesus said: . . . Now therefore, Mary, my mother according to matter, in whom I have sojourned, I bid that thou also speak the thought of the discourse.

"And Mary answered and said: My Lord, concerning the word which thy power hath prophesied through David: 'Grace and truth met together, righteousness and peace kissed each other. Truth sprouted forth out of the earth, and righteousness looked down from heaven,'—thus hath thy power prophesied this word aforetime about thee. . . .

"This is the word and its solution. 'Grace' is the spirit which hath come down out of the height through the First Mystery; for it hath had mercy on the race of men and sent its spirit that he should forgive the sins of the whole world, and they should receive the mysteries and inherit the Light-kingdom. 'Truth' on the other hand is the power which hath sojourned with me. When it had come forth out of Barbēlō, it became material body for thee, and hath made proclamation concerning the region of Truth. 'Righteousness' is thy spirit, who hath brought the mysteries out of the height to give them to the race of men. 'Peace' on the other hand is the power which hath sojourned in thy material body according to the world, which hath baptized the race of men, until it should make it stranger unto sin and make it at peace with thy spirit, so that they may be at peace with the emanations of the Light; that is, 'Grace and Truth kissed each other.' As it saith: 'Truth sprouted forth out of the earth,'—'truth' is thy material body which sprouted forth out of me according to the world of men, and hath made proclamation concerning the region of Truth. And again as it saith: 'Righteousness [looked down] from heaven,'—'righteousness' is the power which looked out of the height, which will give the

mysteries of the Light to the race of men, so that they will become righteous and good, and inherit the Light-kingdom.

"It came to pass then, when Jesus had heard these words which his mother Mary spake, that he said: Well said, finely, Mary."

But besides these disconnected problems and questionings there is a remarkable episode, occupying more than a third of the whole book as we have it. Religious experience is traced in a single soul under the name of *Pistis Sophia*. This part is so striking that it has given the title to the whole. The form of the Lord Jesus answering questions of the disciples is still retained.

The Soul is presented as being in a lower sphere, or æon, than it belongs to; and it is conscious of this calamitous situation and earnestly desires to rise to its proper sphere. But it is obliged to pass through much opposition and persecution: it must even descend far below the æons and experience the woes of the chaos and darkness of the underworld. In describing these experiences there is a remarkable testimony to the use of the Psalter in early Christian times: over and over again the experience is described by reciting not merely verses but whole Psalms. (And it may be noted in passing that the translation of this Coptic version of the Psalms, employed as they are in the spiritual significance here treated of, brings out a new force and beauty in the Psalms themselves.) And there is also a frequent use of the Odes of Solomon in the same way. For example, after a series of tribulations, the joy of deliverance is expressed in Psalm 90: and when final deliverance comes the Soul breaks forth in some verses of Psalm 29, including: "O Lord, thou hast led up my soul out of hell; thou hast saved me from them which have gone down into the pit." It is of prime importance for us to note that this Gnostic composition rings true in a fundamental note of both Old Testament and New Testament religion. Delivered as the Soul is by Higher Power from the onset of external foes, the foes are held back from overcoming her because she wished for salvation and because *she had faith in the Light*.

The reader of this notice will not expect any attempt to set forth the elaborate system of the universe which this particular Gnostic production adopts. Any endeavour to imagine it would require concentrated study of the work itself, just as it is required for endeavours to 'picture' the intricacies of the systems of Dante or Swedenborg. We must content ourselves with an abbreviation of the scheme set out by Mr. Mead in the Introduction.

The Uppermost Realm is the Ineffable.

The Light-world has three levels :

- I. The Highest—with three 'Spaces.'
- II. The Middle—the Treasury and two other Regions.
- III. The Lower—in which there is incorporation of matter :  
     Thirteen Æons.  
     The World, including Mankind.  
     The Underworld : Chaos and Darkness.

The Gnosis belongs to those who have attained the mystery of the Ineffable.

"The Soul which receiveth the mystery of the Ineffable, will soar into the height, being a great light-stream, and the receivers will not be able to seize it and will not know how the way is fashioned upon which it will go. For it becometh a great light-stream and soareth into the height, and no power is able to hold it down at all, nor will they be able to come nigh it at all. But it will pass through all the regions of the rulers and all the regions of the emanations of Light . . . until it goeth to the region of the inheritance of the mystery which it hath received, —that is, to the mystery of the One and Only, the Ineffable."

But from the height of the mystery of the Ineffable the perfected Soul will be able to understand the lower levels. Here there is no lack of claim for concreteness of knowledge: there is an enumeration as detailed as one finds in Hinduism when it descends to bring in the concrete. For example, he who 'shall receive the mystery of the Ineffable' will be able to understand the origins of light and darkness, of bodily movement, of metals, of animals; and in human life, not only of impiety and goodness, but of poverty and wealth, of freedom and slavery, and even of tears and laughter. In Book III. there is also much concrete matter; for guidance for the moral and religious life there is a long list of *renuntianda*, from love of the world and atheism down to slander, pillage, gluttony and murmuring, together with some positive injunctions of almsgiving, gentleness, peaceableness and general loving-kindness. A perusal of these quite justifies the Editor's estimate of the ethical quality of the teaching in this circle of Gnosticism, and shows that its high speculations were not inhibitive of care for the goodness of ordinary character and life.

Book III. deals with many interesting problems of religion: very prominently with repentance and forgiveness; how often repentance can be accepted; whether any troubles remain for the

perfected; whether the sufferings imposed by 'Fate' are avoidable. The mixture of doctrines which were separated by Catholicism is illustrated by a discussion of the effect of Baptism, lying not far from one upon the doctrine of Reincarnation; and a glance is given at a possible danger of the latter in leading to procrastination of repentance. Towards the end of Book IV. we find a problem ever present in the thought of Christian communities: "Mary answered and said unto the Saviour: My Lord, before thou didst come to the region of the rulers and before thou didst come down into the world, hath no soul entered the Light? The Saviour answered and said unto Mary: Amēn, Amēn, I say unto you: Before I did come into the world, no soul hath entered into the Light . . . . Mary continued and said: But, my Lord, I have heard that the prophets have entered into the Light . . . . The Saviour continued and said unto Mary: Amēn, Amēn, I say unto you: No prophet hath entered into the Light; but the rulers of the æons have discoursed with them out of the æons and given them the mystery of the æons. . . . And when I go into the Height . . . I will carry their souls with me into the Light. . . . The rest of the patriarchs and of the righteous from the time of Adam unto now, who are in the æons and all the orders of the rulers, I have through the Virgin of Light made to turn into bodies which will all be righteous,—those which will find the mysteries of the Light, enter in and inherit the Light-kingdom. Mary answered and said: Blessed are we before all men because of these splendours which thou hast revealed unto us."

Enough has, we trust, been now said to attract the reader's attention to this product of Christian Gnosticism. It is obvious that it does not make its appeal either to the historian in search of the actual teaching of Jesus or the Apostles, or to the philosopher who stands upon observation and reasoning as sole sources of value. It is a projection of the Religious Imagination, in part developing Christian beliefs of the first century, in part adding thereto speculations from Oriental religions of the succeeding periods. We feel that in it we are in company of both the Eastern and the Western types of mind. At times the Imagination plays freely with abstractions and impersonalities; at times there is a vivid personal and humanistic interest. If we think of it in comparison with our English allegory of the Progress of the Soul from the City of Destruction on pilgrimage to the City of Zion, or with the drama of the Repentance and Conversion

of Faust, we see how for us Westerns the humanist interest has become predominant over cosmical speculations—with Dante as moving in a transitional period, and Blake as recurring to the Oriental mode. In relation to Catholic tradition we have indicated some fundamental affinities; but we can see important differences: (i) in the absence of reference to any churchly organization (we have only the Lord, the disciples and their mission, and the individual souls); (ii) in the scheme going far beyond the outlines of Pauline cosmology, and even beyond that of the Johannine Apocalypse; and (iii) in the inclination over to the Oriental side in the preference for the impersonal over the humanistic interest in the efforts of the pious Imagination. It is true that we have not any central reference to that taking up of a full human personality upon which Catholic tradition stands. The Lord Christ descends, but it is in the manner of Docetism. The only human traits are the historical personages of the B. V. Mary and the Apostolic circle as those chosen to be commissioned for the promulgation of the Way of Salvation, and the occasional citations of sayings of Jesus recorded in the historical Gospels. And yet in centre and essence it presents a Religion in which the Lord Jesus is the Saviour of men in this world, the Mediator and Representative of the Most High who dwells in the Ineffable Glory of the Transcendent.

A. C.

#### JACOB BOEHME.

An Extract from the Catalogue of Printed Books in the British Museum. London (Clowes); pp. 18 fol.; 2s. net, sold at the Museum.

THIS will be of interest and service to many of our readers; all the more so as it is occasioned by the liberality of our old friend and colleague C. J. Barker, who for so many years has devoted himself to reprinting English versions of the chief works of the great seer and automatist-writer known as Jakob Böhme. Our national Museum now possesses 184 works of Boehmeniana. The note accompanying the reprint reads:

“A gift by Mr. Charles John Barker of fifty-seven works by or concerning Jacob Boehme, so greatly augmented the British Museum Boehme collection that the new notices could not be conveniently inserted in the interleaved copies of the Catalogue of Printed Books, already congested with the additions made during



thirty-six years. Mr. Barker, therefore, kindly offered to defray the cost of reprinting the entire 'heading.' In its enlarged form this has some importance for students of Boehme, and additional copies have therefore been struck off for presentation and purchase."

### THE SURVIVAL OF THE SOUL.

And its Evolution after Death. Notes of Experiments by Pierre-Émile Cornillier. With two full-page Portraits. London (Kegan Paul); pp. 472; 10s. 6d. net.

THIS is a translation from the French, presumably (judging by certain phrases) by Mme. Cornillier, who is the American wife of the Parisian artist who makes accessible to students this record of an interesting series of experiments with one of his models, a young woman of extreme sensitivity and transparent honesty. Reine received no payment for the 107 *séances* extending over some 17 months, Nov. 1912—Mar. 1914. So many books of this nature have been reviewed in *THE QUEST*, and they continue to pour in so rapidly, that it is quite impossible to deal with each at length. Our attitude is that of a student striving to be impartial, though at the same time fully convinced of the great importance of the scientific recording of those abnormal phenomena, of their fearless analysis and of their just evaluation. M. Cornillier is no tyro in these studies, and his one desire is to be as exact as possible and press his enquiries home.

As a consequence we have a collection of material of value for the investigator and an instructive record of the stages of development of a fine sensitive in an orderly fashion, directed by an intelligence other than that which the experimenter is conscious of being his own. There is nothing flabby or sentimental about the whole matter; and much of it reads very naturally for those skilled in this puzzling field of research. We can conscientiously recommend the book to our fellow-students for their patient analysis and consideration; it will be worth their while. It is of a different quality throughout from that of the Vale Owen scripts, which have been boomed so widely in this country, both more in keeping with a greater awareness of more general possibilities and for the most part a more intelligent appreciation of them than is found in the general run of spiritualistic 'communications.' And yet . . . we are still far from ordering the tangle or resolving the contradictions. Still every little helps.

## MACKENNA'S PLOTINUS-VERSION, VOL. II.

Psychic and Physical Treatises; comprising the Second and Third Enneads. Translated from the Greek by Stephen Mackenna. London (Medici Society); pp. 246; 21s. net.

IN the January number for 1918 we reviewed the first volume of Mr. Mackenna's courageous and largely successful undertaking. It is a considerable translation of the difficult Greek of what were largely the lecture-notes of the great corypheus of the Later Platonic movement. The second volume carries out the promise of the first, and what we have already said as to its quality, we can only repeat: "Our translator has aimed at being faithful yet literary, and has achieved a large measure of success." It is to be regretted, however, that the translator has entirely dispensed with notes. Assuredly he ought to have given at least some indications of the readings he has adopted in difficult and obscure passages; for a new critical text is badly needed. It is moreover no lack of appreciation of Mr. Mackenna's labours which compels us to say that *the* version of the Enneads is still to be made. We have before us a painstaking and valuable attempt to make clear the thought of Plato *redivivus*; but it does not reproduce the style of the original. There is throughout the Enneads a very distinct 'something' that is peculiar to Plotinus himself; whenever you open the Greek text, you know at once that you are reading Plotinus and not Porphyry or Iamblichus or Proclus. That 'something,' which is wellnigh everything, has not been caught in the meshes of Mr. Mackenna's translation-net. His version is polished; and the Greek of Plotinus, whatever else it may be, is not that, though already Porphyry did something to smooth it. But perhaps we demand too much in our love and admiration of the work of this outstanding genius of truly philosophic thought based so frequently on spiritual experience. Plotinus is and will remain the pre-eminent classic of mystical philosophy.

After the publication of Mr. Mackenna's first volume, there appeared in the United States a rendering of the Complete Works of Plotinus, in four volumes, by Dr. Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie. Of this we gave a favourable review in our October issue of 1919. We reiterate our warm appreciation of the careful critical work done by Dr. Guthrie on the chronology of the Enneads and the four periods of thought-activity of the greatest of the Platonists. His analysis is indispensable for the understanding of Plotinus,

and for the solution of many a riddle and contradiction which otherwise would be insolvable. But what we wrote as to his "freely rendered version" we must now regretfully retract. Just as our notice was in print, we had occasion to translate a passage of Plotinus, and in so doing took from our shelves to consult a copy of that now very rare work in three volumes by M.-N. Bouillet (Paris, 1857), *Les Ennéades de Plotin*. At the same time we turned up Guthrie's version. What was our amazement and sorrow to find that this professed translation from the original was a close rendering of Bouillet's French. Bouillet, as all students of Plotinus know, is a brilliant writer; but his version so-called is Bouillet on Plotinus and not the genuine article. His rendering is more frequently a paraphrase than anything else.

Those who cannot read French may find it useful to consult Guthrie's rendering to see what Bouillet made out of a passage; but that is all. They will have in these four volumes, so highly belauded, we understand, in the U.S.A., no independent work as far as translation is concerned. We are glad to see from a note at the end of Mr. Mackenna's second volume, that he has so far made no use of Guthrie's version, but promises that it will be "carefully consulted in the revision" of the MS. of his remaining two volumes. Mr. Mackenna, if he has not already done so, would be better advised to go straight to Bouillet's paraphrastic pages.

Finally, we must again express our regret that the volumes of this version are so highly priced. It is true they are an art-work; but those who are most capable of understanding Plotinus are scholars and students whose wages are less than those of mechanics. The art-form of a book is for bibliophiles; the contents alone are of value to the thinker. The small volumes of the American work also are priced at the precise equivalent of the large handsome English production printed most excellently on pure rag paper. *Quid plura dicam?*

#### FOUR PLAYS FOR DANCERS.

By W. B. Yeats. London (Macmillan); pp. 138; 10s. 6d. net.

IT is said that probably greater demands are made upon a poet than upon any other of those artists of the Beautiful who minister as the creators and interpreters to the æsthetic senses of their fellow-men. Books to-day are sown broadcast over the land, and a large though half-educated public has access to the production of

a maker of books. But while words are open to an initial faculty of comprehension, which may or may not appreciate the emotional or other content, and an uninstructed criticism may determine the rejection or recognition of genius for the passing generation, as an æsthetic achievement the employment of words is as complex a matter as the painting of a picture or the composition of a symphony. Many years ago in *The Edinburgh Review* it was pointed out that in the Celtic Revivalists, as represented by Mr. Yeats and others, we find an avowed endeavour to give utterance to the distinctively national genius of their race and country. Actuality exists in their art, but their poetic realism is an equivocal realism. A fine-spun film, the spiritual texture of their imagination, overlays it; an emotional atmosphere, charged with indefinite desires, bereft of human and personal passions—" *La Nature n'a fait que les désirs, c'est la société qui fait des passions* "—broods over each scene portrayed, and *les choses vues*, no less than *les choses vécues*, pass by vaguely outlined, imperfectly discriminated. Turning the leaves of an anthology covering some two hundred years, one finds this criticism is applicable to practically the entire collection of verse therein. In all Celtic districts and in all Celtic natures or temperaments the clandestine faith of ancient nature-worship lingers among the Catholic traditions of later centuries. The legends, old and new, heroic and mythical, lend their appeal in Mr. Yeats' works. "Christianity and the old Nature-faiths have lain down side by side in the cottages, and I would proclaim that peace as loudly as I can within the Kingdoms of Poetry, where there is no peace that is not joyous and no battle that does not give life instead of death." Mr. Yeats sees the concrete visions of the Without as A. E. does of the Within.

The *Four Plays for Dancers* suggest, as do his earlier dramas, the exotic and morbid beauty of Maeterlinck's earlier dramas. Actors, actions, passions, are all as vague in their suggestive symbolism as a grey glass splashed with vaporous colour by a blind hand. It lures us into regions of mist, unfolds vistas of dreams opening into blanknesses; and when the imagination demands foothold, it is landed in quicksands of shifting ideas. In that haunted air of twilight there is a strangeness and stillness, while: "Slowly the darkness falls, the broken lands blend with the savage; | The brute-tamer stands by the brutes, a head's breadth only above them. | A head's breadth? Ay, but therein is hell's depth | And the height up to heaven, | And the thrones of the gods

and their halls, their chariots, purples and splendours." These words from one of Padraic Colum's poems seem to us to express Mr. Yeats' work as no other words could. Nevertheless for all its confused phantasmagoria of thought, its *feu-follet* semblance, it has æsthetic unity of impression, and illustrates in its undeniable beauties the working of Celtic fancy in a dream-tragedy of objectless passion and illusive vision. Hitherto, as a dramatic poet Mr. Yeats stands foremost; it may be due to the disintegrating influence of political turmoil, though from such evil the Dark Rosaleen has suffered all through the ages, but we think his old fires are growing dim.

Staged after the suggestions given in the clever black-and-white drawings of Mr. Dulac and Mr. Yeats' hints of procedure with Maeterlinckian stage-lighting and patches of strong colour and shadowy effects, we can vision a dream-feast of beauty and strangeness that will lift one into the land of a far horizon.

B. H. D.

The music, both by Mr. Dulac and Mr. Rummel, is quite a clever imitation of *Oriental* music of the Arab 'bazaar' kind. There seems *nothing of the primitive Irish music about it*, though one would have supposed that the wild primitive 'Caoine' (Ang. = 'Keen'), of which there are so many examples in our Irish collections, would have been far more appropriate in the case of those plays which purport to have Ireland as their scene of action. Even if one credits Mr. Yeats with the recollection that the Irish are allied with the Mediterranean Iberians as are the Arabs, the *primitive Irish* musical idiom is *very distinct* from the *Arab idiom*, as we know both.

The queer music, cacophonous and foreign to European rules of course, is probably ghoulishly effective and attractive for its purpose, and if well executed probably goes much farther to 'make' the plays than anything else.

L. E. B.

#### THE BOOK OF THE HOLY GRAAL.

By Arthur Edward Waite. London (Watkins); pp. 176; 6s. 6d. net.

HAPPY is the poet, and fortunate his readers, in whom the scholar and the lover are one. Mr. Waite's devotion to the mystic's quest is known to us through many volumes of distinguished

prose, but from time to time it overflows the historical and experimental channels; he stands aside from the Great Work in which he has "lived laborious days," and pauses to utter his delight in song.

The present volume tells in blank verse, broken by some dozen lyrics, the story of two dreamers who, unknown to each other, know themselves in sleep as Bearers respectively of the Pyx and the Cup, giving the sacred food to needy multitudes, yet with their own hearts unsatisfied still. At last, in dream, they meet, facing one another across an altar. Mutual recognition follows, and the knowledge that sooner or later they will meet in waking life. Shortly the woman finds on earth one whom she can call 'Master'; and he, going about the world, is found by the man also. Through their confessions to him of their dream experiences he brings them together and blesses their union here. Taking the sacrament of marriage in the flesh, and having learnt from him its meaning, they find the consummation that they sought, and rise therefrom to the spiritual marriage with the 'One Spouse of both.'

It is a beautiful and quite credible tale, congenial to the spirit of the writer, and told with all the wealth of symbolism and imaginative power which he has at command. From first to last the poem moves on high levels, and its language kindles a glowing vista of nature's pageantry and of the magical and pregnant realms of sleep.

As in the allegorical paintings of G. F. Watts—of which Mr. Waite's work frequently reminds us—we feel that to describe things seen in ecstasy, whether in sleep or waking consciousness, is a task impossible to the brush or pen. Does not a new and comfortable prophet tell us that the inexpressibility of things thus seen is the very seal of truth, the sign of reality? Yet in this ornate and sonorous verse the impossible comes very near achievement. For our poet has the primary qualifications of an envoy of Heaven,—reverence, ardour, and a deep sense of the sacramental in common life.

Among the lyrics may be noted especially the beautiful and touching little *intermezzo* on p. 121—'In the morning of life,' and another, equally happy in its form, on p. 20—'Till I can bless with fingers touched by Thee'; also the noble 'Valediction,' p. 164, which strikes a personal note at the close.

E. W.

## ORPHEUS—THE FISHER.

Comparative Studies in Orphic and Early Christian Cult-Symbolism. By Robert Eisler, Ph.D., Late Fellow of the Austrian Historical Institute at the University of Vienna, etc. With Seventy-six Plates. London (Watkins); pp. xvii. + 302; 21s. net.

THIS handsome volume is a revised reprint of numerous studies which appeared in our own pages from the first number (Oct. 1909) to the outbreak of the War. It is reprinted from our own type and in the exact size and style of *THE QUEST*. The book should have been published in 1914, but hell broke loose in Europe and everything perforce had to be held up. At last, after seven years and after many a chapter of difficulties which the author, publisher, editor and printers alone can realise, we have the work before us, embellished with 76 plates, many of which are rare and are here reproduced for the first time in an English publication. The proofs are well read except the last few pages and some of the legends on the plates, which have been neglected owing to an unfortunate misunderstanding.

We do not intend to review this rich collection of valuable material and interpretation, although we regard it as one of the most useful contributions to the comparative study of the symbolism of which it treats that has yet appeared. It covers so much ground and opens up so many vistas that a substantive review would mean several articles. It goes without saying that, in a task of such magnitude, bristling with innumerable points of keen controversy, the author himself during the course of his series of studies, and also thereafter during six years of compulsory silence, has found reason for modifying his opinion on several points; but on the whole he maintains his general contentions, which are of the greatest interest to all students of Christian origins from a comparative point of view. It may seem hard on Dr. Eisler that his friend and editor should not write a substantive review on his labours, but the task is too formidable; not because of lack of appreciation or to some extent of knowledge, but because it is difficult adequately to summarise what has grown as it developed far beyond the framework of the original plan. What we propose to do, to bring out our colleague's quality, is to contribute to the July number a special study on one point, and endeavour to show,

on the criticized data laid before us by Eisler, how enormously important for all students of Christian origins is the information remaining to us on the mission and prophetic activity of John the Baptizer. Comparatively little though this information, unfortunately, may be, it can be made, in such skilful hands as those of our colleague, to yield results of the greatest value. This attempt then will be our tribute to the protracted labours, sagacity and insight of the distinguished author of *Orpheus—the Fisher*.

#### AN ENCYCLOPÆDIA OF RELIGIONS.

By Maurice Canney. London (Routledge); pp. ix + 397; 25s. net.

THE twelfth and concluding volume of Hastings' invaluable *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics* has just been published. The E.R.E. is now the most indispensable 'source' for every student of the comparative science of religion, a monument of erudition and information; every scholar should have it 'on his shelves.' But alas! the wages of skilled scholars, in these days of the transvaluation of values *à rebours*, are generally less than those of the majority of unskilled labourers; and so they cannot purchase even their most indispensable tools. But there is much in this vast store-house of material which is of importance also for the general reader—what indeed every serious and intelligent man and woman 'ought to know,' but of which they are at present utterly ignorant. It was a good intention then which prompted Messrs. Routledge to endeavour to make some portion of the ground covered on vaguer lines than those of the E.R.E. accessible to those of slender information and slenderer means. If it could be done, Prof. Maurice A. Canney, who holds the chair of Semitic Languages and Literatures in the University of Manchester, and who has been a valued contributor to our own pages, was well-chosen as one largely equipped for so difficult a task. But we fear that it is beyond the competence of any single hand to condense into so small a compass such a vast subject-matter or sketch its outlines even when reviewed from the most general standpoint; no single writer can really perform so corporate a task with much hope of satisfying even himself. Prof. Canney has done what he could and is to be thanked, for doubtless the volume will be of service to many who would educate themselves; but the scholar must always go first to the E.R.E. and then *via* its bibliographies to the authorities cited.



## RABINDRANATH TAGORE.

**His Life and Work.** By E. J. Thompson, B.A., M.C., Principal, Wesleyan College, Bankura. The Heritage of India Series. London (Oxford University Press); pp. 112; 2s. 6d. net.

THIS is a very excellent piece of work. It is the first really competent and critical estimate of Rabindranath Babu's genius that has appeared in English. At last we have got things in proper proportion. What is of real value is heartily and generously appreciated and what falls short is honestly and fairly pointed out. Mr. Thompson is not only a personal friend of his subject but also a fine knower of literature; and above all he is competent to make us acquainted with the amazing output and extraordinary variety of the poet's work in his mother-tongue. Though Rabindranath's command of English is, for a non-Englishman, excellent, and in some ways astounding, it is by no means flawless; and it should be remembered that he never wrote a line of English for publication till his fiftieth year. Again in 'translating' from his own works, he generally gives us a few lines of summary of what runs to pages in the original, and that too not infrequently of a virility and picturesqueness that his summary almost entirely fails to convey. Mr. Thompson gives some admirable translations of his own in illustration, and we look forward with pleasure to the forthcoming publication of his selections from the poet's Bengali works. But above all we appreciate in his biographical review the sincerity and justice which, refraining from setting down aught in malice, extenuates nothing. It is, we repeat, an excellent piece of work, and rescues Rabindranath Tagore from the hands of blind adoration and ignorant flattery.

## THE PROCESS OF MAN'S BECOMING.

**Based on Communications by Thought Transference from Selves in Inner States of Being.** By Quæstor Vitæ. With a Preface by David Gow, Editor of 'Light.' London (Duckworth); pp. 254; 8s. net.

THIS book is mysterious as to its origins and thus deprives us of part of the documentation which would enable us the better to control its statements. The claims set forth in the Preface are lofty; nevertheless we find on turning back after perusing it to the end, that we have pencilled queries on many a page. As it purports to supply us with the 'plan of an intelligible universe,'

it touches on most of the great fundamental problems which from time immemorial have vexed the mind of man; but we have personally little hope that these will be satisfactorily solved for many a year to come. However, there is always something to interest us in these 'communications' of the better sort, and this record belongs to that category. We have not space even to summarize our many queries; but our general impression is that, whatever the means of communication were, and whatever the number in the group, the phraseology, nomenclature and point of view are strongly reminiscent of the thought and works of one of our own contributors. If he was not the principal mediator of communication, his hand has been the chief one in redaction. If the style is not the man, in spite of the literary dogma that asserts the contrary, it at any rate betrays his presence, and that too in this case down to frequently recurring tricks of phraseology, and these not altogether impeccable. One thing we are glad to notice, —namely, that for once our friend has given Kant a rest, at any rate overtly. But as this member of the group of Thought-transferencers is an enthusiastic thinker, this volume on *The Process of Becoming* is a lively piece of work, and useful as material to analyse, especially with the end in view of discovering how far the so-called 'subconscious' can be separated from the postulated objective independent contents.

### DIALOGUES OF THE BUDDHA, PART III.

Translated from the Pāli of the Dīgha Nikāya by T. W. and C. A. F. Rhys Davids. London (Oxford University Press); pp. 274; 12s. 6d. net.

THIS third part of the translation of the Dīgha Nikāya, or Long Collection or Compendium, which is the name of the first section of the Suttapiṭaka, one of the three great divisions of the Pāli Buddhist scriptures, contains Dialogues (Suttantas) 24 to 34, and so completes one of the great undertakings which our veteran Pāli scholar, Professor T. W. Rhys Davids, began a score of years ago. In the conclusion of his task he has been most ably helped by his accomplished wife. We have before us a volume which in every page gives us the mature results of ripe scholarship. The translation shows many signs of a knowledge of the ancient tongue which goes beyond the scope of the available dictionaries and

that, too, set forth in a clear and polished English which avoids the infelicity of neologisms for technical terms and as it were makes the original speak for itself in the vulgar tongue. This is a high accomplishment and well preserves for the reader the impression of being in contact with that early tradition which still retained a clear memory of the original simplicity with which the Buddha set forth the most profound and spiritual truths.

When we recall to mind the long years of unremitting labour that both Prof. and Mrs. Rhys Davids have devoted to what is still the pioneer task of making the treasures of Pāli Buddhism known to English readers, and the enormous amount of work they have turned out in so praise-worthy a manner, the debt which all lovers of Buddhism and students of comparative religion owe to them seems great indeed.

#### QUAKER ASPECTS OF TRUTH.

By E. Vipont Brown, M.D. Lond. London (The Swarthmore Press); pp. 156.

THE commonly accepted notions as to the particular spiritual genius of the Society of Friends are far from representing the truth. From the days of George Fox onwards the Quaker has always supplied a revolutionary element in the body corporate of the Christian Church. He has brought not peace but a sword. He has turned the world upside down. He has handled the strongest weapon in the armoury of God or man,—the weapon of love. As Dr. Vipont Brown writes: "The true Christian position is not merely that of non-resistance. It is not a negative position at all. It is the resistance of evil with good—hatred with love. It is much more than 'Peace at any price.' It is 'Love at any price,' even at the price of the Cross." It is that spirit which makes of the gentle Quaker the religious revolutionary.

Once that fact is grasped, a book such as this is seen to be a coherent exposition of the doctrine of love. It breathes the spirit of the first days of the Christian Church's life; indeed one of the most interesting chapters describes Quakerism as 'primitive Christianity revived.' It is not always or universally desirable to revive any religious or philosophic movement which belonged to a past age, but Dr. Vipont Brown is concerned with removing our worn excrescences which mar the beauty of the Gospel-spirit. He would not—could not, in view of his first chapter, where he writes

of the evolution of Quakerism—institute a retrograde movement in religious development, but he passionately desires that once again Christianity should become the religion 'of the Truth, the whole Truth, and nothing but the Truth.' That is the purpose of this book, a purpose which is admirably summarized on the title-page: "Christianity without Judaism; Religion without Ecclesiasticism; Worship without Ritual; Faith without Creeds."

H. L. H.

### THE KARMA-MIMĀṂSĀ.

By A. Berriedale Keith, D.C.L., D.Litt., Prof. of Sanskrit and Comparative Philology, University of Edinburgh. The Heritage of India Series. London (Oxford University Press); pp. 112; 2s. 6d. net.

HAVING already contributed a concise objective volume on *The Sāṃkhya System* to this instructive Series, Prof. Berriedale Keith here presents us with an equally scholarly study of the *Pūrva-Mimāṃsā*. Of the six classical schools of Vedic philosophy this 'prior investigation' or 'enquiry,' so called to distinguish it from the *Ultara* or 'later enquiry,' is based on the *Karma-kāṇḍa* or 'work-section' of the Veda, while the *Ultara-Mimāṃsā* is founded on the *Jñāna-kāṇḍa* ('gnosis-section') or Upanishads. The main object of the 'enquiry' is to discover the rules of human duty. It deals with the sacred texts and the principles of their interpretation so as to elucidate them into a consistent system or body of rules governing ritual, sacrifices, offerings and the use of hymns, and setting forth the merits and rewards of their performance. The subject-matter does not give much scope for an exposition that can be of very immediate interest to any in the West but those who are students of the history and implications of rites. It is, however, incumbent upon all who would acquaint themselves with the leading notions of the great schools of Indian religio-philosophy, to know something of *The Karma-Mimāṃsā*. For them Prof. Berriedale Keith's small volume will be a safe and painstaking guide. It bears all the signs of ripe scholarship and careful research; we cannot, however, but think that, as in the case of the *Sāṃkhya*, so here the Professor might have remembered more frequently that the Series is intended for the general reader rather than for the already, to some extent, informed student.

## THE REASON OF THE BEGINNING.

And Other Imaginings. By Nesta Sawyer. London (Watkins)  
pp. viii+136, 3s. 6d. net.

MOST of the forty-seven imaginings of Miss Nesta Sawyer scarcely seem to have been worth printing in book-form. Had they appeared in a magazine, they might have been favourably noticed as showing promise of future development in production. Regarded as a serious literary effort, they are hardly satisfactory. The modest opening of the Foreword, entitled 'A Thought,' "How little we light the world," is prophetic of the illuminative quality of what follows, for in none of the Imaginings can there be said to be really high flight of fancy or depth of thought. In her attempts to be original the authoress becomes at times almost grotesque. The first lines of 'The Reason of the Beginning,' from which the booklet takes its title,—

"The god lay in his easy chair . . . . The west wind . . . . stood behind his Master's chair and fanned him . . . . 'How badly you are fanning me,' said his Lord,"—do not give a dignified picture of the Creator about to give life to a new world. They rather suggest an altercation between a choleric Indian Judge and his Punkah-wallah. Again, in 'The Slum':

"A young angel sat on a chimney-pot, his shining wings tucked tightly about him"—is distinctly humorous, and greatly weakens what little interest there is in the sketch.

'The Woman with the Crooked Smile' reaches a higher level. The story is inspired by an incident of the war. It is simply told and has a touch of true pathos. But why should the woman on finding flowers growing on the grave of her dead, resentfully exclaim: "So nature has already forgotten!" Surely her grief could not make her imagine that the processes of nature are affected by human joys or sorrows. And at the conclusion of the story why compare the moon shining down on the lonely plain to "the Holy Cup, turned earthwards"? The metaphor is very strained and adds nothing to the effectiveness of the scene.

By far the best thing in the book is 'The Taj Mahal.' Here we have some good descriptive writing, not unworthy of the theme. It conveys an idea of the matchless beauty of this wonderful building.

C. C. B.

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Vol. XIII.

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# THE QUEST

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# THE QUEST



## THE WILL AND THE WAY.<sup>1</sup>

Mrs. RHYS DAVIDS, M.A., D.Litt.

THE title of our discussion is a thin disguise for the subject of questing. We go out for many a quest in this Society, sporadically or systematically, and it may be the wiser plan, on an occasion like this, to concentrate not on this quest or that, but on main object and general method, lest we lose the wood in the trees. I learn that my predecessor took this line, so that I run a little risk of boring you by lack of freshness of subject. Yet there is infinite variety in the ways of individual mind, and I may say nothing that either he has said, or you would put forward. So that what I say may serve to stimulate the different central attitude of each of us.

Thus Mr. Holmes' title was 'The Spirit of the Quest.' Mindful that 'spirit' is an ambiguous term, I may say that my message is just the converse: 'Will and Way' in the quest of the spirit.

### THE QUEST OF THE SPIRIT.

The 'of' here is also ambiguous. Spirit's quest, is it, or our questing of spirit? Let us take it both ways

<sup>1</sup> A Presidential Address delivered to the Quest Society, May 18, 1922.

—what does spirit seek? what do we think about spirit?

Our prospectus speaks of our Society's central object a little differently: 'to seek for spiritual values.' What may this mean? To be of value is to matter much as compared with other things. To be of supreme value is to be the 'one thing needful' in life. And 'spiritual' is 'relating to spirit.' And spirit? This let us call here that real 'I,' that real 'you,' who is not body as such, not mind as such, but that invisible being who functions and expresses himself as body through the instrument we call mind, that being of whom we are intensely conscious in the words 'I,' 'myself,' but of whom we know neither the beginning nor the ending, and of whose attributes we are absolutely sure of one only: that spirit is alive, alive in that 'he' is ever changing, evolving, and as we *hope*, growing. Thus 'spiritual values' now appears as 'things that matter, are good for, make for the growth of, spirit, or of you and me, as in ourselves we really are.'

Growth towards what? Towards a state of maturity we can only conceive yet as 'perfection,' or 'the divine nature,' or which we can now figure as growth in wisdom, beauty, holiness, or as becoming utterly 'well.'<sup>1</sup>

You may take me up here with: In life is not growth, maturity, always followed by decay? Have you, a student of Buddhism of all subjects in the world, not thought of this deadlock in stating that spirit grows?

Yes, I have. The Buddhists were sagacious. They did not outrun their words. They never used the word 'life' when they said "whatever comes to birth, comes

<sup>1</sup> We need here the noun of our adverb and half-obsolete adjective 'well.' 'Wealth' is alas specialized, and so, degraded.

also to decay and death." Just as they had no word coinciding with our 'love,' so they had no word so charged with a vague, immense meaning as our word 'life,' largely through Christian teaching, has come to have.

When we say 'life' we habitually think of life as it expresses itself in body through mind. That life, as category, may not be exhausted by this dual channel we do not always tell ourselves. Yet it is a tenable hypothesis that 'life' is more truly an essential attribute of spirit who informs, animates body and mind than it is of these two (and in lower organisms, is an attribute of something analogous to spirit in ourselves). Hence, by this hypothesis, we do not land ourselves in an *impasse*, when we figure our real self as 'being that grows,' and refuse to identify life with growing and decaying bodies and mind and with nothing else.

### OUR QUESTING AND THE WORLD.

Let us now leave quest of spirit and speak of will and way in terms of our questing, and then of our questing as way and as will. At the end we will come back to spirit.

Our quests—we assign them some importance. What is it that makes a quest important? Two notions suggest themselves: one is that the quest be one which in a way affects everybody, comes into life generally. It must not be confined to a corner of life wholly, must not belong only to things abnormal, supernormal. It must be connected, connectible with the very stuff and movement of life. The other is, that a quest to be important must be for something that is wanted, a need, the being without which is hindering, hurting mankind like a retarded spring, a cold summer,

absence of sunlight. If our quest have both these qualities we know it is important.

Many quests have not this dual importance. Our several quests are so many ways, selected by our will, which are to a very varying extent coincident with our life itself. The more our quest covers our life, the more critical becomes this dual aspect of its importance. Let us consider that one about which I have a little experience, the branch of comparative religion, just now concentrating on Jesus-research. It is akin to much of my own 'way.' We are engaged in seeking for originals beneath a heap of disguising superstructure.

Many would question how our results, if we get any, affect everybody? And in what way mankind is hindered by a lack of just that knowledge which we seek to make clear in the results of our search?

Anyone who can glance backward at known history and is not too short-sighted to see that the world will not always stand to its creeds as it does now, will be able to follow us here. We who seek would say to him: From time to time there has come to a portion of the world a message, a teaching—not absolutely new, but not grasped by the multitude—through the person of one whom we will call Helper of men. And a great part of the world has come to be extraordinarily affected by this teaching, in the form in which it spread. And records of it, set down too long after to be trustworthy as they stand, are with us. In them, chiefly, we dig for our originals.

But many hold that *one* collection of these records, be it Tipitaka, Bible or Kuran, contains in its message, taught at a certain time and place, a revelation true and sufficient for the world's spiritual health for all time. All who hold such an opinion are greatly affected by it

in their present and forward view of life. Equally so are those who do not. Those who do hold it, will not look for any new revelation, or if they do, it is to look for light on the lines of the one all-adequate revelation. They walk along the way beholding a height; they will not expect at a turn in the way to see a new peak swim into their ken. They will teach contentment with the old. They will not strive to win new light. They will not look for a new star in the east. They will con their records with their impressive sayings, their inconsistencies, their evident editorial patchwork. And they will to some extent live in a past, not to say a dead, world while they are in a new.

Those who do not hold with one past final revelation, will either do the opposite of these things, or they will lose all faith in such teachings, past and to come, and will say: All men are liars; religion is a weary farce.

Now our Jesus-research, our Gotama-research, has, or should have, these ultimate results in view. Either that research confirms the view as to the truth of one gospel, delivered just there and then, for all and for all time, or it undermines it. And when mankind in general recognizes that a creed undermined is about to crash, it will look for some guide to take its place; it will ask itself how to get that guidance which the old creed failed to give. It will seek new light.

So that such a quest does in a way affect mankind generally, does in a way point, if indirectly, to what mankind is even now wanting, nay, points directly to the felt want of certainty about the past gospel, whichever it be.

That even popular literature is using such research to feed this want we can see. Take Wells's *Outline of*



*History*, a work for the million. We there find the personality of Jesus dealt with in a frankly undenominational, historical manner such as would, in such a publication, have scarcely been possible in the last century.<sup>1</sup>

And if our quest, whatever it is, be for us a living way along which we walk with will, we shall be habitually alive to the importance of the world's becoming more and more aware of its importance. For until the world admits that our quest in a way affects it, and feels to some extent the want of what we seek, our quest is important rather in theory than in practice. We do need to be working to some extent in sympathy with the race, that is, with ourselves, and not to be walking in isolation, if we are to be really effective.

It is recorded that one of earth's wisest sons was only persuaded to begin his mission of teaching his little world that the good life was, there and then, of more importance to man than his polytheistic creed, with its priests and sacrifices and ritual, by being shown that there were some who would understand, some whose eyes were dust-free, some who were as lotus-buds emerging from the water to blossom.

And the way to hasten mankind's awakening interest is to leaven, to infect those, be they neighbour, friend or stranger, with whom we can come into contact now. If when we are abroad we keep the husk of our quest, like the man in the parable, carefully 'laid up in a napkin,' if we go about with the torch of our quest carefully extinguished, we shall persuade no one of its vital importance. We should risk boring a few

<sup>1</sup> The growing work of the Pali Text Society, the greater part of its income derived from the sale of its issues, is another instance of a growing want.

to win over one. Let us try oftener—not without opportunity and tact—to draw attention to at least two matters: that it is of vital importance to the intelligent to come to a decision, within the next fifty years, about the so-called psychic nature of us, whether it is limited or not to receive impressions from the five senses and from one undifferentiated general sense, whether, if not so limited, it can be very greatly developed and exploited, what it can contribute to things that are objectively valid; next, about the fitness of any teaching of the old-world creeds to be a sufficient guide, one or all of them, for the expanding ideals and broadened needs of the new world, and if there be not fitness, then as to the need of everyone to think out what it is whereon more light is wanted, more than the old creeds give. If, as we speak of any one of such things, a coal from the altar has touched our lips, we shall give all but the callous, and as yet quite unfit, a chance to kindle their spirit by ours.

Let us any way not make either of two mistakes about the world: let us not suppose it remains in every way the same old world, and let us not forget of what the collective will at times is capable.

It is in some ways a new world. The child is trained in the habit of learning the new as he never used to be. And adolescent and adult carry on the habit. For opportunities and means to learn the new are in more general access than ever they were. It is no longer so toilsome to break out of grooves. So we cannot glibly say, what the world will *not* attend to or take up. Again, there are crises when the will of a group or of a people will do the impossible. War, shipwreck, persecution, oppression may reveal here a will as strong and unflinching as that of a hero,

a saint, a martyr. Let the world want a thing badly, and the world will get it. Let it only will peace strongly enough, let it only know 'the things that belong unto its peace,' and there will be no more war.

Meanwhile it is up to us to be willing the world with ourselves into the better way. What of our own way?

### THE WAY.

Is our will trotting along in a grooved way, comfortably, void of a wish to worry others to come along? Whether or no we have a quest that is just a hobby and a relaxation, or our very life-work, how does it rank in respect of our central quest, the purpose of our life, that purpose which, in the prospectus of our society, we are committed to try to understand, in other words, do we, in the way which is our life, see at all where we are going? For if we do not see this, a dreadful thing may happen. We may lose the way itself. By this, I do not mean that we necessarily stop our going, our work. I mean, we suddenly realize we are going on without any clear idea of the way as a whole. We have been seeing only a part. We have been walking along a way with no outlook, no prospect. We have been in a cutting, and not on the hillside.

There is a famous modern hymn which says:

"I do not ask to see

The distant scene. One step enough for me."

For ultimate realities this is true enough. We are a long way from being fit to understand the greater mysteries. But we need not be so in the dark as to the distant scene on the offing, unless we choose to

be so. Where childlike humility is right, childish incuriosity is wrong. 'One step enough' may not be pure humility. It may be mixed with much alloy: intellectual sloth, imaginative dulness, a lack of initiative, acquiescence in dogmas, theological or scientific, of an age that is passing away. Over this 'one step enough,' we have been saying: "I have no time to attend to distant scenes, no opportunity, no aptitude, I have no special ability to take up the general way of our human destiny. Others may have it. I am making bricks. Others may build with these. Let me just concentrate."

Then, it may be, comes the crash of some crisis—such as that of the Great War or more private tragedy—and even the near way is blotted out. We lose our way, for we have had no distant objective, and our step by step method had no further orientation, no beckoning significance to direct it.

"O but," perhaps we say, "our little steps are only significant when considered as a minute section in the work of humanity, our work becomes great in virtue of the cause. We lay a stepping-stone where others will pass over."

This is a sirens' song which is only the more dangerous because it has so much truth in it. It is fine to be doing even spade-work in a great cause. It is true that humanity to-day progresses through the work of its earlier children. It is not fine that each worker sees no more of the way than a private soldier in a battle, or a hodman carrying up bricks. It is not proven true that each is merely a sectional worker. Be the lot just now never so humble, there is no one who is not a separate spirit walking along an individual way to an uttermost, as yet inconceivable goal.

Well, if we have found our way again, and found a truer way—as we shall have done unless we are unteachable—then a notable thing will have happened. If we have looked up from our one step at a time, and understood something of the significance of the outlook, something of the real purpose of our going, we have found that the old quest or quests have got fitted in to our way as they never were before. Their value is transformed. Their true significance comes out, if not all at once, at least gradually. There seemed at times a wall barring our view. Now we see how our work can minister to something that is our way, yet is much bigger and longer than our present work.

Such an experience as the foregoing is doubtless not that of everyone. But it is true, and it may happen to some. It is a little thing to be walking along a way; it is a great thing to be walking along a way that cannot be lost. I use 'way' for the life of the real us, of spirit, as choice and self-surrender have shaped it. And that life has included, does and will include many quests. There is no student of Buddhism who has not a tenderness for the figure of way or path. Used for the individual life, the way is the very centre of Gotama's teaching, the noble path of the divine living.<sup>1</sup> It is a fine simile. Way never repeats itself, as life does not. Walking along it suggests progress, and also growing fitness. Way suggests view; way suggests goal.

#### WILL.

Let us now see what can be done for way, when will is driving us along it. What is will properly so called? Not wish only, or merely desire, but synergy of body and mind. Will is spirit, real self, directing body

<sup>1</sup> Commentators prefer to define 'divine' (*brahma*.) as 'best.'

and mind to an end conceived as such and no other. Way is self, spirit, I as I live. Will is self, spirit, I in action. And we are all going along a way, but we are not all or always going along the way with will.

We are so going when doubt is absent. It may be new to be free from doubt. It is never new to be in doubt. Only the very stupid have never known doubt. Doubt is halting for fresh decisions. Will has faltered. It may fail to respond even when the fresh decision is made. Why is this?

Will gets tied up to so many old things. Which old things? Here are some with will sticking to them: The will to stand still, to be content to stand still; the will to believe something because other people believe it; the will to believe as true what is contained in certain venerated books; the will to hold sacred what (we hear) has always been held sacred; the will to believe something because we like it; the will to look always backwards, not forwards; the will to be content with what we know; the will to stop at a certain point because we do not clearly see further; the will to see no further; the will to wait because it is dangerous to go further; the will to hope we may not have to go further; the will that wishes there may be nothing round the next corner to see; the will to be saved the trouble of going round it, and so on. It is in such ways that our will has been stifling fresh judgments, not suffering us to recast and decide "This is the way. Walk ye in it." Will has been hushing us rather in the words of Jeremiah's scathing irony: Ask for the old paths, where is the good way; walk therein and ye shall find rest for your souls. Yet there were watchmen who said, Harken to the sound of the trumpet. And (our wills) said, we will not hearken. Peace, peace. . . .

It may be that, as with the way, so with the will, some other instrument must tear away, brace up and transform will. A vision may do this. Love may. Or we may develop imagination.

I could tell of what a vision did for a general at a crisis. His name I must withhold. It was the eve of a decisive battle, and he had a few hours in which to rest. His was a good cause, but a black hour of misery came over him. Doubt gnawed him whether relief that had been promised for his inferior forces on the morrow would come, would come in time. The worry obsessed him and all his will seemed drained out of him. He foresaw certain death to thousands, certain misery to tens of thousands, and for the first time he felt more like a murderer than a successful soldier. Would he win? Could he afford to survive where so many were to fall? Then as he lay, not in sleep, he seemed to be in a lane of fighting men, advancing, with an old-world halberd in his hand, along an avenue to certain death. He felt no fear; he had no choice; he had to go on. Suddenly the avenue broadened out to a way of safety, and he was no longer in desperate straits. He was in a great light on his way to victory. He was winning; he had won. . . . His summons came as grey dawn was creeping up, and from that hour all fear fell away and he felt sure he would win. His will was steeled to win and he won.

This might be matched, if Englishmen were less reticent, oftener perhaps than we think. And instances of love firing will 'to find out the way' might be given did time permit. Blessed are they who have known such wonder-working love, which will not brook the impossible, but opens up avenues to light when all other motives falter.

*“Sei's noch so fern die Liebe wird's erreichen!”*

as Beethoven's *Fidelio* sings. Hard is it and toilsome, to find the true but when love drives will, the quest of truth is the loveliest way, the true way to the true.

Way-and-will-illuminating love comes not to everyone. But in everyone will may be quickened and drawn along by the constructive power of mind we call imagination. We have heard much of this lately and M. Coué has been turning it on to cure this sick body and that. More even do we need his methods for the body politic. That is still very sick, and no wonder, but it may be in the throes of new birth. The country, all Europe, needs to dwell less on its state and sick symptoms, and more on the fact and certainty of renascence after fearful years. It needs to believe in its convalescence, ‘day by day in every way.’ Let it so talk and so write and it will come to will the betterment it pictures. What it wills strongly it will get. In this way there is no one who cannot brace up and quicken the will, whether he imagine his own betterment, or that of his world.

#### WILL AND WAY IN THE QUEST OF THE SPIRIT.

And now, finally, to see that we leave ourselves in no confusion as to will and way and quest of spirit, so far as we have touched on these matters. We have suggested that ‘spirit’ is the real ‘we,’ whom we know as yet through mind and body; that the ‘spirit’s quest’ is growth towards perfection or utter well-ness; that ‘way’ is spirit, ‘we,’ as we live; that ‘will’ is spirit, ‘we,’ in action. How can we best use will in our way so as to forward this quest?

First, let us look upon the way, that is, upon life



itself, as quest. This is the supremely right view of life, and it will be happier for us if we face it as such. "We are all seekers still"—wrote Arnold—though often we know it not. What is it we seek? We seek to know, for we do not know enough. We seek to be strong, for we are weak. We seek to be better, for we are not nearly as good as we might be. We seek the true, for we walk amid error and illusion.

By all these things we grow, spirit grows. And spirit, as he or she grows, waxes not older but younger. When we admit this, we have freed ourselves from the usual way of speaking of life in terms of body and mind. But we have only done so by a *tour de force*, by an inversion of that usual way. By speaking of spirit growing younger, we are speaking as we do now of a recuperated body and mind: 'He looks twenty years younger.' We mean just 'well-er.' It is a protest against the tired, old-age view we are so apt to take of life. We talk of growing older and older here below, and many say, hereafter we shall never be tired and old any more for ever and ever. For my part I do not believe we have deserved to enter on perpetual youth and absence of weariness so soon as all that. But how limp, how awkward, how stultified is man's imagination, from lack of exercise about matters outside his five little senses!

Let us think a little less that we are growing old. Let us consider what children we all really are! We teach children, and think it all no longer applies to us. And yet it must be borne in daily on many of us how little grown-up the elders are. Chiefly because we are in so many ways incorrigibly childish. So few are really wise. In so few can we find capable counsellors. And this is because, whereas this present body of them is ageing, and their mind, too much in subservience to the body,

is shrivelling and wrinkling with it, 'they,' that is, their spirit has not been growing as it might. It is stunted, its outlook has been shut off. It is not walking in the right way; it is not driven along that way by will.

But once we admit, once we really believe, that, whether body be waxing or waning, and whether mind, in so far as it works by sense and images of sense, is conforming to body, the spirit, that is we, can be *uninterruptedly growing*, that is, improving as it fares along its way, then we quite lose the tired, old-age view of life. Our present quests become just a passage in the long, long way of the spirit's life. And the will we put into our seeking is the acceptance of the gift, of the opportunity of such a splendid adventure as is this long, long way towards perfection, as well as the effort to grow towards it.

This will-to-grow will vary to some extent in form according to the nature of what we are seeking. If we seek to disentangle the true from the not-genuine, the original from the superadded, the will becomes effort for utter sincerity, the pure will to the true. So that we stand by our results, whether they are what we wanted or expected them to be, or whether they are not. This is not nearly so easy as it sounds. And we do well to take to heart the noble exordium at the end of Mr. Mead's discussion in the last number of *THE QUEST* (pp. 368f.). If our quest be some other form of rendering service, more obvious if not more genuine than beating out truth, will that makes growth is the will of brother and sister to help brother and sister. With no other will can we safely try to help. If our quest be to enlarge our knowledge of our psychical nature as yet so imperfectly sounded, if we are testing channels that are yet more abnormal than they need be, the will that makes

growth is a veritable synergy of our best effort, bodily and mental. Not only uttermost sincerity, the pure will to the true, but the will to empty ourselves of pre-conceptions and of mere curiosity, the will to receive, to become pure instrument, so that not only we but the world eventually may be helped.

Not all recipients of new light by these channels have proved themselves able to summon up such pure self-emptying will to be transmitters only. The new light has been tainted at its inception, and has done as much harm as good. We have no right to set down all recipients of revelations as liars. But it is a hideous wrong to embroider the messages.

Psychic science is also a quest—like that of creed-research—which is creeping into the dual importance of being admitted as something entering into the general life and of catering for a felt want. I need only refer you to its novel appearance, as a science among sciences, in the popular publication *Outline of Science*. It is as yet a baby science, and one day the writer's utterance on it in that series will be ranked as those of a child crying in the night. But the inclusion of his article is very significant.

Whether it be along these uncharted coasts that we seek for the true, or in the mines of old records, whether we are out not for Jesus-research, but for Jesus-service to our fellows, or whether our way be the making of new things of beauty, the will that makes for growth of spirit needs that rich blend of imagination which, so blended, is faith: faith that new light and plenty of it will come when the hour is at hand; faith that it may, for aught we know, be waiting to come in one form or another, to each of us if we turn our faces to the source of new light, if we can persuade ourselves

that, in a would-be recipient, it is better to have the heart of a little child than to be over-careful that we are learned and critical.

It was a great creator of new things of beauty who wrote his J. J.—*Juвет Jesu*—in the corner of each new manuscript. We might do worse than utter the *sursum corda* of a *Juвет aeterna lux, aeternus amor* when will takes up the daily way. Indeed it may be will's only way of safety. . . .

No, I did not echo Bach's *Juвет Jesu*. According to John's gospel, Jesus said: "I am the way, the truth, the life," and then: "No man cometh unto the father but by me." According to Matthew and Luke he said: "Ask, and ye shall receive . . . your father knoweth your need before ye ask . . . say, Our father . . . give . . . forgive . . ." In these welcomes to direct access (followed by the early Church) we find no trace of an intermediary making access and asking indirect. Is not the day gone by for the way that goes round about, for the will that says, I am the way for you?

For we are in the Way of all the worlds, and a Will is weaving it as it were a great web. If we place our will within that Will, we shall be shown the way marked out for us in that web.

C. A. F. RHYS DAVIDS.

## A STUDY IN CHRISTIAN PANTHEISM.

ARTHUR EDWARD WAITE.

IN the First Epistle to the Corinthians (xv. 28) there occur the following familiar but strangely pregnant words: "That God may be all in all." They are intimations of a state which is beyond the state of which it has been said previously: "Then cometh the end," that is to say, when Christ delivers up the Kingdom to God, "even the Father." On the surface at least, and whether or not within the measures of St. Paul's conscious intention, they suggest an indrawn state of the cosmos and all that abides therein, though it is not understood in this manner—as there should be no need to say—by the official or orthodox commentators, by Cornelius a Lapide among moderns, by Gregory the Great or St. Basil in the earlier Christian centuries. In any case, as we dwell upon them, it seems to me that for us and for our dedications they can have but one meaning,—that in no sense of allegory and in no figure of speech there is a state to come in which God shall be all in all. And this is pan-theism. It connotes also by implication what Martines de Pasqually terms the doctrine of resipiscence, otherwise of that universal redemption to which Saint-Martin also alludes; for when God is all in all there can be nothing cast out. We may remember the hope of Tennyson:

**"That not one life shall be destroy'd  
Or cast as rubbish in the void  
When God has made the pile complete."**

But I am not concerned with eschatology, nor are the words of St. Paul—whatever their final significance—other than a text for my thesis. And this is that the all-in-all state of God-ness encounters us again in the deep searchings and realizations of the Christian, and indeed among other mystics, as something belonging to their experience at the end of the long path of their inward travelling. It is this primarily that I mean in speaking of Christian pantheism; but it should be understood that such pantheism is in respect of the individual soul, and is not a philosophical hypothesis concerning the universe. Were it otherwise, it would have been no part of my concern to have discussed it in the present paper; and it would have been impossible, moreover, as historically and doctrinally there is no Christian pantheism of the cosmic kind. In the sense of devotion and pre-occupation it can be said, and is said truly, that God is all in all by the hypothesis of those who have learned after any manner that he is the one end, as he is also the one beginning. It is the postulate of the life of sanctity, but belongs as such to the realm of propositions, and I am concerned with records of experience. We shall see in due course that the experience not only verifies the postulate, but gives life of life thereto.

On the threshold of what is understood as attainment the soul of the mystic does find that God is all in all—otherwise *non pars est sed totum*, according to the memorable maxim of Raymund Lully. The manner of plenary finding is a great mystery of life in Divine Being; but it must be understood that I speak

of it as the sense of this ineffable state awakens in the hiddenness of the mind, when the mind listens and the soul speaks within; for in the present instance one is not concerned only with a question of research. There are the records in the first place, and there is the manner of understanding these. The records tell us that there is an experience of unity possible to the soul of man. The testimonies concerning it are everywhere; and, when every allowance has been made for the distinctions of national mentality, for modes of metaphysical thought and the diverse helps or hindrances of official religious belief, the testimony is always the same. Herein lies the witness of its validity. But this, so far, is on the historical side, a question of texts and of authority behind the texts. There is another kind of validity,—when life answers to life, when the witness of the past awakens corresponding witness in the heart of the living present, in your heart and in mine. We are linked up then into the golden chain which, so far as Christianity is concerned, begins with pseudo-Dionysius, and we know not where it shall end. But the intimations of it are everywhere also under the rule of the other great religions, in all human spiritual history, outside the chaos of the savage state. Above all, the intimations of it are everywhere in our own spiritual history, when the obtruding personal identity has merged for the time being in any one or other of the high and holy pre-occupations which absorb the mind. The pre-occupation of love is the great living illustration; because it is the only one of them all which is made in the likeness of the mystic state itself. But this is love in its separation from the sense-body of desire. The explanation is that the created love is instilled by

the uncreated. But with this aspect of the subject I have dealt on a former occasion.

As regards the state itself—on the path and even to the threshold there is that which Saint-Martin terms so eloquently the thirst for unity, but when the soul has ‘crossed the bar,’ it does more than see its Captain face to face; for that which follows is the mode of unity attained. The true end, the high end which emerges after all the emotions and all the raptures, is not of seeing but of being. St. John of the Cross says that the soul is itself the union. But there are many degrees, and they are described under the veils of many images and similitudes. The doctrine of the Blessed Vision has given us the immortal *Paradiso*; and we know in *The Divine Comedy* how the Vision was understood by one of the great poets of the whole world of literature. On the surface it may seem as the poles asunder from the unity of Eckehart and Ruysbroeck, St. John of the Cross and St. Teresa. But I am not sure that as formulated by St. Thomas Aquinas it is so far away; for it may be advanced that the soul in the state of Vision is really in the state which is called otherwise Absorption, Deification and the Spiritual Marriage, and that we are being beguiled by the fantasy of a comparison drawn from a faculty of material sense. It must be understood in any case that the so-called seeings of the deep states, as unfolded by many mystics, must at their least signify an awareness of spiritual perception; and this is one reason why people like Poulain and most of his precursors, with all their zeal and sincerity, only confuse the real issues further as their pages grow in number. I set aside, of course, the cases which can be explained psychically, like those of Maria d’Agreda, the Venerable



Mary of the Incarnation, and I must perhaps even add St. Catherine of Siena. But Blessed Angela of Foligno, speaking of this state of seeing, and psychic indeed as she was, adds in a very pertinent paradox: "I see all things, and see nothing," denying also the presence "of anything which has form."

We are on other ground with Ruysbroeck, affirming that those who are illuminated by Divine Grace do find within them, "above reason and in their proper essence," the Kingdom of God and God in his Kingdom; with Cardinal Bona: "the end of perfect life is intimate union with God"; with Tauler, speaking of those who are "established solidly and as if naturalized in God"; and with St. Teresa, testifying that "the spirit of the soul is made one with God." But centuries before these witnesses there is 'Dionysius' on an ineffable mode of being in which the soul is "lost in God." This is the state which is beyond the state which according to St. Thomas Aquinas is "one with one." I have quoted it elsewhere, and have said also that it corresponds to the Blessed Vision. As one standing on a threshold, I have also characterized the state of being plunged in God as that of one in one. But this is a veridic approximation which the soul brings back on its return into the personal life. In the experience it is not one abiding within the One: it is the state of perfect unity. By possibility the Zoharic theosophist knew something, or had dreamed concerning it, when he said that "God and his name are one." It is the uttermost mode of sanctification: in the realization it is all holiness and all saintship. I do not know by the operation of what law the soul comes back therefrom: it may be for the work of manifestation, for the complete fulfilment thereof, and for the

business of the faithful witness in the world. In itself it is realization of the Divine Immanence emerging into a plenary state of possession. There is no watchman to compare with this Watchman, keeping the City of God. St. Paul had entered into its great mystery of being, for he was able to say: "I live, but not I; for Christ liveth within me." These also are words spoken in the aftermath of the experience. The state is otherwise like that of a King upon his throne when no minister is present with him in the throne-room, though they may be elsewhere and about the King's business. But in the last resource, and as there is little need to say, even this imagery fails; for in the mystical state the King is also the throne, and the house is he. So is it put into words as we best can, and lamely: they may be sufficient for those who can hear. The meaning is that, if God is all in all, the soul is not in separation; and hence—as the state lasts—there is no I, except in the sense that He who is all is I. There is neither fatherhood nor sonship; and how much more is the state of God and his worshipper in suspension for the time being! It is the state in which those who come back repent of their antecedent testimonies, like the Angelic Doctor, who after his Mass-time ecstacy is said to have repented the *Sum of Theology*, and so was put into the silence, leaving it still unfinished. If we could imagine the official Church with its Sovereign Pontiff being integrated suddenly in this very life of very Godhead, would it not perchance repent of all its dogmas and all the high definitions? I know not which at least should remain over, unless the Church affirmed somewhere that God is known of the heart. It might overcome the last enemy, saying that the Church is Christ, and that

which would follow should be as the morning of Easter, the Lord Christ coming into manifestation out of the rock-hewn sepulchre in which we have laid him for nigh on two thousand years. Or it should be as a light shining in the East and extending even to the West when Shiloh comes.

In the records which are continuous throughout Christian mystical literature, the deep experience passes into expression only in terms of pantheism. It is put into language of this kind for the reason that there is no other. I have shewn elsewhere that the unity-state implies the sense of identity so long as the state endures; and more recently Dr. Nicholson, speaking of Islamic mysticism, agrees that "the unitive state" cannot be described "otherwise than pantheistically." The Christian terminology is express and as such significant after its own manner. In illustration of this I will collect some typical examples, remembering the extraneous witness of Philo, that human reason is replaced mystically by the Divine Spirit.

(1) According to Ruysbroeck, outside the measures of the normal mind, in a superessential beatitude, we are one with the Spirit of God, above our created essence, in an abyss unfathomable, and this is the essence of God. We are dissolved in him, meeting God by God, apart from all mediation, in rejoicing rest. The soul is said otherwise to be dissolved in him whom the soul loves, as it is absorbed with him in unity. In Christ terminology, it becomes a living Christ. (2) Tauler speaks of the human mind being clothed with the form and image of God, of the soul receiving God in an altogether divine manner, of God radiating within it, and so is it transformed in him,

effectuating a supreme union between the human and divine will, as if the one were annihilated in the other. So far *The Institutions*, but the changes are rung, so to speak, like silver bells in the Sermons. We hear of moments when the soul is lost to itself and sinks into the great deeps of God, when it plunges with the whole being and all the faculties of reception and absorption into that which is one, simple, divine, illimitable, and from which the soul is no longer distinguishable. (3) In Eckehart the soul is not only the Kingdom of God, but in that Kingdom she and the Divine Being are one bliss. (4) St. John of the Cross affirms that the soul is transformed completely in God, that it becomes like unto God, is God rather than itself, by a process of participation. (5) For St. Teresa the marriage of the soul with God is like a stream which has been discharged into the sea, and is so merged therein that the waters of the one can be distinguished no longer from those of the other. The synonym of this is obviously that "the dewdrop slips into the shining sea." (6) But we may compare *The Cloud of Unknowing*, which offers a variant analogy when it speaks of "the high wisdom of the Godhead descending into man's soul" and "knitting it" to God himself. The substantial unity is otherwise affirmed when the Deity is defined as "the blissful being" both of himself and the soul, which is said to be joined in the spirit with him, apart from separation. We hear also of union with God "above all substance and knowledge." Among lesser memorials that of (7) the Venerable Maria de Escobar bears three testimonies: (a) of being submerged and lost in the Divine Essence, (b) of being united suddenly therewith in a deep ecstasy and (c) of being plunged, as it were, into a vast

ocean, which is God. (8) The Venerable Augustine Baker describes the soul as drawn gradually to God till the sense of its own being passes away and it is so lost to itself, that life and being for it are in God only. (9) The transfiguration of the soul into God is an expression of the Venerable Anne Madeleine de Remusat and it is said to be divinized by the experience.

I have given but a few examples from among the cloud of Christian witnesses. To have produced others would have sounded like mere repetition, but their records call to be studied from this point of view, taking care to set aside—but I mean of course provisionally—their own qualifications on the subject, under the regulating and chastening hand of the regnant orthodoxy. In this connection let it be assumed that for the time being, meaning in the present enumeration, I am concerned with a question of fact, not with the verity and validity of mystical experience. About this I am otherwise certain, with the certitude of the whole mind and in the spirit of humility of the whole heart; but at the moment I am dealing only with a question of evidence, the concurrence and identity of certain depositions, not with what lies behind them and not with the status of the witnesses, whether they are in a mesh of delusion or are examples of God's grace abounding in God's elect. They are all witnesses of experience at the value thereof, and I have tried in the first place to let them speak clearly for themselves on the fact of experience. We now see what it is and that the soul comes back therefrom saying that the soul is God, not as to source and origin, not as a point of doctrine, not on philosophical considerations, but on the faith of a state attained.

To speak of this state, even when free from the complications of other possible issues, was a perilous thing under the ægis of a dogmatic orthodoxy holding everlasting session, armed to the teeth. It is obvious that, whether they wished it or not, the mystics had to qualify; but those, if any, who affirm that they qualified and accommodated their convictions merely to keep at peace with the teaching Church, are unacquainted with the psychology of the centuries and of the personalities which are being passed in review. Let it not be supposed for a moment that the succession of mystics represented any sect or school within the official establishment, and much less one that was in secret opposition thereto, cherishing its own designs and its own private views over matters belonging to faith. There was no school, save only an unincorporated school of saints. There were heresies enough and heresies so-called through all the times and places, but speaking generally—or at least for those that counted—they were not mystic, as I understand the term, and it seems very certain, for example, that they did not preach pantheism. There is, as suggested already, no doctrinal pantheism among the Christian mystics, but there is the pantheism of experience. It is this, I conceive, which has made the succession of mystical witnesses an element of doubt and danger in the eyes of the Latin Church. I do not mean to suggest that they would have dispensed with them gladly, had this been possible; they were much too important and vital, and there is no trace of the wish anywhere. But of anxiety there seem traces, and it is intelligible in view of the issues, for the whole body of doctrine might prove less or more at stake, and there were witnesses, as *e.g.* the case of

Eckehart, when what I have called the pantheism of experience seemed merging into pantheistic doctrine. But generally speaking, the records of experience stood at their own value, apart from dogmatic suggestions. The universe, was not identified with God, and the unity of God and the soul was a diagnosis of experience, a matter of attainment, and stood forth in contrast to the formal professions of faith and the whole stream of teaching by which the texts embodying the records are always characterized. I hold sincerely that this contrast was no result of submission, performed *volens volens*, but a natural consequence of spiritual life led within the Church, whose body general of doctrine was so ingrained that it was like second nature to the mystics, as to the lowly and unlettered monk.

The *synteresis* of Tauler and the soul-apex of Eckehart are not conscious pantheistic propositions, any more than this can be said of the Zoharic *tsure*, that supernal part which does not leave the Supernals, any more than it is involved by the doctrine of Divine Immanence or of the Kingdom of Heaven within. If I am right, it follows that the mystics qualified or explained their own first-hand experiences in harmony with that faith which Mother-Church had delivered to them. I do not need here to quote many examples. In his long treatise on contemplation Ruysbroeck insists continually on the distinction between the soul and God, as between Creator and creature. He goes indeed further than the logic of his case can tolerate, for he affirms in one place that whatsoever has "a mode of being or a form" and whatsoever has no form are distinct "and can never become one." But this appears to challenge the fundamental message of

his own inward experience. Eckethart claims for the eye of the soul and God that they are one eye, "one mode of knowing and one feeling"; but though he wavers thus and frequently on the brink of unreserved pantheism, even as regard God and Nature, he decides that the unified soul is and remains a creature. Again *The Cloud of Unknowing*, which is like the waters of unity offered in a great chalice, makes it clear from the beginning that every soul had its beginning in the substantial creation, "the which was sometime nothing." For St. John of the Cross, even in the great deeps of the union, the soul preserves the distinction from God of its own natural substance, as it did prior to attainment, and this notwithstanding that the soul is transformed in God. But an unhappy illustration follows,—that the soul is comparable to a window, the substance of which remains distinct from that of the solar rays which shine through and enlighten it. It would serve little to cite further St. Teresa, who submitted everything to her directors; but Tauler, having affirmed absorption into something that is "one, simple, divine and illimitable," adds immediately: "I speak not of the reality but of the appearance, of the impression that is felt." He dwells also on the brevity of the experience, as if it were a further safeguard set about the difficult subject.

It is not therefore only the orthodox commentators and theologians, whose business it was to produce mystical experience in the form of a body of doctrine, to arrange and harmonize its degrees and phenomena, it is not these only who brought and limited the great range of its subject within orthodox lines. The work was done for them beforehand by those who created in this manner the title-deeds,



as it were, of their real concern. It is true that a voice of protest was raised occasionally. When Pope John XXII. condemned certain propositions of Eckehart, he put antecedently the seal of anathema on several others formulated by later mystics, and though they contrived to pass unchallenged from the seat of authority they led some people to think. Notwithstanding his own dedications, the pantheism of mystical experience set Chancellor Gerson in flaming hostility against Ruysbroeck. Meanwhile the commentators and scholiasts, makers of manuals and directories, are notable after their own manner, from Corderius on pseudo-Dionysius to Scaramelli, Schram and Devine. For better, for worse they have had to accept and echo the terminology under which the deep states have entered into expression, and to use language therefore which can have one meaning only in the stern logic of things. They do not shrink from speaking with the mystics of the soul's participation in the Divine Nature, of immersion in God, of transformation and deification. And so it comes about that the witness goes on through the ages, that the roll of the Christian mystics is not only a roll of sanctity but of beatified and canonized saints. They do not walk by faith only but sometimes by sight, even through the halls of the Vatican. But it happens that their eyes can dare to turn only in one direction, lest perchance they discover to their confusion that under other names than those of Christ and in the light of other dogmas than those of the Trinity has the soul of man in many times and places attained the knowledge of unity and satisfied the thirst thereof, has returned from that centre to testify, and in its own manner of language has said the same thing. So far

therefore concerning the pantheism of experience in Christian annals of the past. But there remains something to be said briefly from another standpoint.

It is questionable whether the teachings of the mystics on the basis of their experience can be counted as evidence for doctrinal or philosophical pantheism, because it belongs to the end and has nothing as such to say about the beginning or that which is intermediate between the first and the last. We may feel certain intellectually that the end is like the beginning and that thither where we pass in fine is that from which we come forth; but the question belongs to another ground of thought. In any case, between the one and the other there intervenes a state of normal separation, wherein we become acquainted by experience with the world of external phenomena, in which we act our external part, with the self as it is so manifested, with the evil side of our selfhood, with the passions of our heart in hatred, with the will to malice; and I do not know at what stage, if indeed at any, it can be said that they are rooted out utterly, even in the mystical life. It is very certain that Ruysbroeck, St. John of the Cross, St. Teresa and other of the paramount witnesses did not make this claim. If the serpent is not awake, it is credible that it is asleep within us, and the tiger is no doubt in his lair when he is not seeking prey in our jungles. The Kaiserism of the Great War has no part in the union, and there is a Kaiser also within us. He may be in exile and yet for all that not idle. He has found refuge, let us say, in some approximate or remote Holland within us, and he remains either an actual or possible danger. But this is for our best and worthiest, for those, as the saying is, who have entered the path, for some per-

chance who may stand, as it were, on the threshold of union. I do not know: it is a great day of the world and holy things may be doing in the hiddenness, as well as all the natural good which is at work amidst all the evil in the outer ways. We have heard about many being called and few chosen, but it seems to me that we are amidst great titles of election, so that many people look ready, or as if they had only to lift the latch of a certain door in the heart and they might be not so much in the Presence as the Presence might be declared in them, which is the day of understanding in Israel and of *Regnum Dei intus*. It is not so far thereafter to the valid attainment, when God is all in all without as well as within, when the soul goes forth in peace and errs no more in questing, nor is any longer in that state of dereliction in which the servant usurps the place of the Holy One.

A general testimony through the Christian centuries concurs with Tauler that the most deep experiences are brief, and seeing that at least as regards distinguished cases of election there are many worlds to conquer in lives of dedication and mission, there is no evidence before us, and there can be none in the nature of things, that as chosen souls pass on their way, performing the sacred pilgrimage of the soul, they do more, hereafter as here, than enter the unity-state for measured periods until the great day comes when God calls back the worlds or alternatively, having fulfilled its tasks and earned its titles, the soul is called to the everlasting rest of the centre, by the operation of some unknown law in God. There is otherwise and of course a sense in which those who have known the union are for ever in its aftermath, in its transfiguration of life and personality, which in an alternative

symbolism is the Christ-state of Ruysbroeck. St. Paul is the witness hereof, and it is this, I suppose, which begets the saving missions of the soul through the worlds and the ages.

This for our wisest, as Matthew Arnold says, but I speak of that wisdom which is integrated in the providence of God. For us others, let us ask to be counted among those who have received in the mind and accepted also in the heart the sacred witness to the heights, not alone to the state of the union but that which in the veridic hypothesis of attainment is described as beyond the union, which is designated in our imperfect figures of speech by such terms as absorption and the equivalents of complete identity. O sacred quest of the soul in the realization of its own world and transformation by the ineffable Presence within the world of the soul! The heart beats on the threshold and the uplifted part of mind begins to perceive in the stillness. Between the all-in-all of God, 'before the beginning of years' and the end of all, conceived beyond the years of time, can we find room anywhere in our thoughts, except for God abiding, with and within all? I have said that the end is like the beginning, and that which lies between shall be for us apart from neither. If it is not all God now, such at least it ought to become and perhaps will. For us and for ours henceforward, let us so work and so perchance attain that it shall be only and all for God.

A. E. WAITE.

(Read at an Open Meeting of The Quest Society, Nov. 24, 1921.)

## JOHN THE BAPTIZER AND CHRISTIAN ORIGINS.

THE EDITOR.

A DISTINCT ray of light has been cast on the obscure background of Christian origins by Dr. Robert Eisler in a series of detailed studies on the movement and doctrines of John the Baptizer. The studies, with other cognate essays, appeared originally in the pages of *THE QUEST* (1909-14), and are now available in book-form in an arresting volume, called *Orpheus—the Fisher: Comparative Studies in Orphic and Christian Cult Symbolism*.<sup>1</sup>

It may perhaps be of service if I work over these detailed and fully documented studies in summary fashion, and so attempt a more general exposition of the main points of my esteemed friend and colleague's labours; for they are in my judgment of very great value not only to all who are engaged in 'Life of Jesus' research, but also to all who are interested in Christian beginnings. For the full details and references the reader must go to *Orpheus* direct. In Dr. Eisler we have a ripe scholar in whom the heredity of Rabbinical lore is so to say innate. He has almost an uncanny *flair* for biblical texts; it is not too much to say that his knowledge of the religious literature of his people is profound, his acquaintance with oriental sources

<sup>1</sup> London, Watkins, price 21s. net. Chh. xv.-xxvi. (pp. 129-207) are devoted to this special subject.

very extensive and his linguistic accomplishments are enviable. Few are thus better able to enter with sympathy and understanding into the idiosyncrasies and depths of the Jewish mind in the various periods of its development, and thus for the time to live in the prophetic, apocalyptic and rabbinical thought-world of the days of the Baptist and share in its old-time beliefs and hopes and fears. Our exponent is thus an excellent historian of the theme he sets forth. If his wide-flung net has not caught all the fish of the literary and archæological ocean, he has fished most carefully the stream of John the Baptist tradition, landed a rich catch and shown others how most fruitfully to set about bringing to the surface things about John which have long been hidden in the depths of a buried past.

In all reason, apart from Christian testimony, John the Baptizer is a historic character, witnessed to by the Jewish historian Josephus, the courtly Flavian chronicler who flourished in the last quarter of the 1st century A.D. The famous passage in his *Antiquities* (XVIII. v. 2, ed. Niese, iv. 161, 162) referring to John is undoubtedly genuine, and has been assailed only by the very extreme doctrinaire non-historical school, who find it a very inconvenient thorn in their flesh. A Christian forger would have dotted the i's and crossed the t's with the pen of his tradition, or at any rate betrayed himself in some way by the prejudice of his thought; but this we do not find. The passage runs as follows as nearly as I can render it:

Some of the Jews thought that Herod's army had been destroyed, and indeed by the very just vengeance of God, in return for [his putting to death of] John the Baptizer. For in fact Herod put the latter to death [though he was] a good man, nay even one who bade the Jews cultivate virtue and, by the practice

of righteousness in their dealings with one another and of piety to God, gather together for baptism. For thus in sooth [John thought] the dipping (in water) would seem acceptable to him (God), not if they used it as a begging-off in respect to certain sins, but for purity of body, in as much as indeed the soul had already been purified by righteousness.

Now since the others<sup>1</sup> were gathering themselves together (or becoming organized),—for indeed they were delighted beyond measure at the hearing of his (John's) 'sayings' (*logoi*),—Herod, fearing that his extraordinary power of persuading men might lead to a revolt, for they seemed likely in all things to act according to his advice, judged it better, before anything of a revolutionary nature should eventuate from him, to arrest him first and make away with him, rather than when the change came, he should regret being faced with it.

Accordingly on Herod's suspicion he was sent in bonds to Machærus,<sup>2</sup> the above-mentioned fortress, and put to death there. The Jews, however, believed that destruction befell the army to avenge him, God willing to afflict Herod.

This statement of Flavius Josephus is sufficiently categorical. It states clearly that John the Baptizer was a very remarkable prophetic reformer of the day and that his following was very considerable. John's 'sayings,' Josephus tells us, had an astonishingly persuasive power over the Jewish populace. Herod fears John's influence and is convinced that he could do anything he pleases with the people. But what interests us most in this unfortunately too short statement is the reference to the nature of John's practice and teaching. His proclamation to the Jews, like that of all the prophets before him, was a strenuous call to righteousness,—they were to practise righteous dealings with one another (love of neighbour) and piety to God (love of God). There was also an external rite

<sup>1</sup> The rest of the Jews other than Herod's party presumably.

<sup>2</sup> A mountain fortress in Peræa on the boundary between Palestine and Arabia.

of baptism; but it had to be preceded by a cleansing of the soul through the fulfilling of this duty to neighbour and to God. Josephus particularly points out that the public washing or dipping was by no means intended as a magical rite which so many believed in those days capable of washing away sins. The baptism was not a daily practice, as among the Essenes and other sects, but a public corporate act; and therefore Josephus is clearly in error in regarding it as simply for the purifying of the body. On the contrary it distinctly conveys the impression of being designed as an outer testimony to some belief—an act of faith.

And now let us pass to our New Testament information. Without laying stress on the details of the story of John's infancy as given in the third gospel, so evidently reminiscent as they are of the Old Testament birth-stories of the old-time national heroes Isaac, Samson and Samuel, not to mention that the two heroines of the gospel birth-narratives bear the names of Miriam and Elisheba, the sister and wife of Aaron, the first priest, we may very well believe, as it is stated, that John was of priestly descent; and therefore in every probability he was highly trained and well versed in the scriptures.

Vowed from his birth to God by his parents, his strange dress and peculiar ascetic mode of life are quite in keeping with prophetic traditions, and thus of the schools of the prophets and of the Nazirs. As the prophets of old, notably Elijah, he wore a skin robe. But in keeping with the spiritual significance of his whole teaching, which will be more fully brought out in the sequel, such an outer sign in high probability had an inner meaning for this great proclaimer of



repentance, of the turning back of Israel in contrition unto God.

Now there were certain Palestinian pre-Christian allegorists or exponents of the scriptures on mystical lines called Dorshē Reshumōth. According to a Rabbinic legend, going back along this line of interpretation, the ancient myth of Gen. 3<sup>21</sup> was conceived more spiritually. After the fall, the first falling away from God, Yahveh-Elohīm clothed Adam and Eve in coats of skin (*'ōr*), not because of their nakedness, but in exchange for their lost paradisaical garments of light (*'ōr*).

John lived at a time when such mystical interpretations, with a host of prophetic and apocalyptic notions, were in the air. It might very well then be that he himself in wearing a skin-robe intended something more than a simple copying of the fashion of the ancient prophets. In keeping with his ruling idea he may have thought it a most appropriate outer sign of repentance, a return to the first garments of fallen man, the proper robe of penitent sinners, and therefore especially of a leader who would show the people a whole-hearted example of turning again to God, thus retracing in a contrary direction the way of the fall.

So too with regard to food, there must be a return to the primitive law laid down for primal fallen man (Gen. 1<sup>29</sup>): "Behold, I have given you every herb bearing seed, which is upon the face of the earth, and every tree, in which is the fruit of a tree yielding seed; to you it shall be for meat." It was only after the Deluge that men were permitted to eat animal food, according to the Noahic covenant as it is called. Imbued with ideas of penitence and repentance, John would desire to return to the strictest food-regulations

of the earliest days of the fall, in keeping with his symbolic manner of clothing. Not only so, but seemingly with a refinement of self-discipline as a means of contrition, John chose from out the many 'fruits from a tree yielding seed' that of the carob or locust-tree, which was considered by the Jewish allegorists the most appropriate food of repentance. For we have preserved from this line of tradition an ancient proverb: "Israel needs carob-pods to make him repent," said to be based on a prophecy in Isaiah (1<sup>20</sup>), which the Midrash (*Wajikra Rabba*, 35) quotes as: "If ye be willing and obedient, the good of the land shall ye eat; but if ye refuse and resist, carob-pods shall ye eat"—where the last clause differs considerably from the R.V., which reads: "ye shall be devoured by the sword." Perhaps the 'husks' eaten by the Prodigal in the gospel-parable may in the original Aramaic have been carob-pods (Lk. 15<sup>16</sup>). Much controversy has raged round the 'locusts' eaten by John, and early versions are various.

As for drink,—in addition to water for general purposes, John is said to have in particular sipped the honey of the wild bees. Why is this brought into so great prominence? Again perhaps this custom was determined for John by the same circle of ideas. He probably bethought him of Deut. 32<sup>13</sup>: "He made him to suck honey out of the rock," and also of Ps. 81<sup>16</sup>: "And with honey out of the rock shall I satisfy thee." From such considerations it may well be believed that John adopted an asceticism of repentance with regard to clothing and food as completely in accordance with the scriptures as possible, and this in addition to the customary discipline of a vowed Nazir, 'consecrated' or 'made holy' as such from birth. The technical

term for a Nazir is a Nazirite unto God, or holy unto God, as of Samson (LXX. Judges, 13, 16),—in brief God's 'holy one.'

According to Josephus the great fear of Herod was that the reformatory movement of John would develop into a dangerous political Messianic revolt. The populace was on the tip-toe of expectation; many rumours were afloat as to the nature of the long-expected God's anointed. Some thought he was to be a Nazir who would free Israel from their present foes, even as in days of old the Nazir Samson had freed them from the yoke of the Philistines. Moreover the well-known prophecy (Is. 11) about the 'sprout' from the root or stem of Jesse gave rise to much speculation, helped out by that word-play which exercised so powerful a fascination over the imaginative minds of the Jews of that day, and long before and after over other minds in many other lands. Now 'sprout' in Hebrew is *nešer* or *nezer*; and this *nešer* was to be the longed-for 'saviour' (again *nešer*)—sounding so well together with *nazir*. Indeed, as was thought, he must needs be a Nazarai-an (Heb. *nošeri*, Gk. *nazōrai-os*). Or again, as others expected, he was to be a carpenter (Aram. *bar nasar*), this being in association according to a Samaritan Midrash, as we shall see in the sequel, with the expectation that the coming Redeemer was to be a second Noah, spiritually hewing and preparing the timber for a new ark of salvation.

All this was in the air and widespread; it is then quite believable, whether John himself made any such claims or no, that there were many rumours current of a Messianic purport concerning the strange appearance and powerful appeal of the renowned Baptizer. His Nazarite vow, his garb and diet of repentance, his

confident proclamation of the very near approach of the catastrophic end of this æon or age or world,—all would conspire to make some, if not many, think that he himself was the great Nazir-Neser, the expected ‘holy one’ of God. By others he was thought to be Elijah returned as the prophet Malachi (the Book of the Angel or Messenger of Yahveh) had foretold (4<sub>5</sub>): “Behold, I will send you Elijah the prophet before the great and terrible Day of the Lord come,” or even, may be, some thought that that prophet of promise like unto Moses (Deut. 18<sub>15</sub>) had been raised up in John. John himself apparently made no claim to be any of these; he was a proclaimer of the near approach of the great and terrible Day and a powerful exhorter to repentance. It is doubtful even whether he gave himself out to be simply “the voice of one crying in the wilderness” (Mk. 1<sub>3</sub>); for such a knower of the scriptures would have been aware that the original of Isaiah 40<sub>3</sub> read: “The voice of one crying: In the wilderness, etc.” But apparently John was not only an inspired prophet, he was also a wonder-worker, if certain echoes concerning him in the Synoptics ring true. For there we read that because of his healing wonders Jesus was thought by some to be John returned from the dead, and that the same accusation in this connection of being possessed by a demon brought against Jesus had also been brought against John.

However all this may be, John was utterly convinced not only that the time of the End was close at hand, but also that the prophecies were beginning to be fulfilled. But what of his characteristic baptizing in the Jordan of all places? This is taken as a simple historic fact which requires no explanation by the vast majority; but it presents a serious problem for those who are aware that in those days the brackish waters

of the sluggish Jordan were deemed by theologians and ritualists as unfit for purificatory purposes. What then could have induced John to reject this priestly and purist tabū? The only feasible motive is to be found in supposing that John was convinced that a remarkable prophetic vision of Ezekiel (47<sup>1-8</sup>), where the prophet is addressed as Son of Man, was being fulfilled. In the longed-for time of the Messianic deliverance a mighty stream of holy water from the temple-hill of Zion was to flow down and heal the waters of the unclean Jordan-land, the Arabah or Desert.

Eisler has acutely conjectured that this idea of a fount of living and healing water for Israel goes back ultimately to Isaiah 28<sup>16</sup>, not however as it stands at present in the R.V. wording, but in its extended form which was well known up to the 3rd century A.D. This reads as follows according to his rendering: "Behold, I lay down in Zion a living stone, a stone of probation, a precious threshold-stone for a foundation. Out of its hollow shall flow forth rivers of living water; he that believeth on me shall not suffer from drought."

This was of course taken by the allegorists of the time, the Dorshē Reshumōth, in a spiritual sense, even as they explained the water miraculously supplied to the Israelites in the Desert as a figure for the Torah or Law. The living water signified the Word of Yahveh, the outpouring of the spirit of God. Thus the Messianic Spring of living water could well be believed to typify an intensification or consummation of the Divine Law heralding the manifestation of the Sovereignty of God in the Last Days. But spiritual reality and material happenings were never widely divorced in the mind of a pious Jew, and thus there was a literal meaning as well to be given to prophecy.

If all this is well conceived, it is not difficult to understand what Josephus tells us of John's method, though the proper sense of John's motive seems to have escaped the historian. Deeply stirred by the strenuous exhortations of the teacher and the extraordinary power of a proclaimer so utterly convinced of the near coming of the terrible Day, little wonder that the people, just as in evangelical revivals of our own day, were filled with an agony of penitence which would find relief only in a public confession of their sins. Thereafter they were plunged in the Jordan, signifying no external washing, but a very drowning as it were of the old body of sin in that now sacred stream to which faith ascribed life-redeeming properties, a regeneration wrought by the saving spring of God's outpouring flowing down from the sanctuary into the desert. If they repented, if they once unfeignedly turned again to God, then would the prophetic promise in Micah 7<sup>19</sup> be fulfilled: "He will turn again, he will have compassion upon us, he will subdue our iniquities. Yea, thou wilt wash away all our sins into the depths of the sea."

But in practising this baptismal rite John was running counter to far more than the priestly purist *tabū* which regarded the Jordan water as unfit for purification. He was baptizing Israelites and in so doing putting the Chosen ones on a level with those gentiles who had to submit to a bath of purification before they could be admitted to the privileges of the sons of Abraham. A proselyte or a 'new-comer' (*advena*) who would join the church or *ecclesia* of Israel, had to submit to a baptismal rite, the pre-Christian origin of which is no longer disputed. It was a bath not only of purification but also of regeneration in the presence of legal witnesses. The

candidate stood in the water and listened to a short discourse consisting of commandments from the Law. Thereon the gentile convert dipped completely under the water, signifying the drowning of his previous impious and idolatrous self. Thereafter he arose reborn a true Israelite. And this new birth was taken in a very literal sense, for after the rite the neophyte or 'new-born babe' could no longer inherit from his former gentile relatives; not only so, but according to Rabbinic casuistry he could not even commit incest with one of them. This regenerative gentile baptism (*tebilah gerim*) was made by the theologians to depend from the promise in Ezekiel (36<sup>25-26</sup>): "I will sprinkle clean water upon you, and ye shall be clean: from all your filthiness and from all your idols, will I cleanse you. A new heart I will give you, and a new spirit will I put within you."

But this prophecy clearly applied to Israel only. It could never have been intended as the sanction of a customary rite for converted gentiles. It is thus very credible that a fervent eschatologist, filled with Messianic expectations, such as John, would conceive the promise as foreshadowing a unique miraculous event of the Last Days. Moreover John's insistence on baptism for the Jews, at a time when their religious leaders thought it necessary to impose baptism on gentile converts as a purificatory regenerative rite making them fit to be associated religiously with the naturally born sons of Abraham, seems clearly to have been dictated by the deeper spiritual conviction that it was Israel itself who required regeneration. For him, from the standpoint of spiritual values, the Jews were no more a privileged people; they had forfeited their birthright; Israel itself was now no better than the

heathen. Physical kinship with Abraham could no longer be considered a guarantee against the Wrath to come. To escape the trials and terrors of that Day the only way for them was to repent, and so become members of the new spiritual Israel by submitting to a rite similar to that which they arrogantly imposed on the gentiles. What greater humiliation could there be to the racial pride of the Jew? But things were so desperate, that it required even this act of humiliation as an earnest of truly sincere repentance and contrition. Unrepentant they were no better than heathen idolaters.

Let us now turn to the first part of the short but powerful address of the Baptizer handed on by Mt. (37-10) and Lk. (37-9), a most interesting example of those stirring utterances or 'sayings' of his referred to by Josephus.

Ye out-births of vipers, who hath given you a glimpse of fleeing from the Wrath to come? Make fruit, therefore, worthy of (or sufficient for) your repentance. And think not (Lk. begin not) to say within (or among) yourselves: We have Abraham [for] father. For I say unto you that God is able of these stones (Aram. *'ab'nayya*) to raise (or wake) up children (Aram. *b'nayya*) for Abraham. But even now the axe is laid unto the root of the trees: every tree, therefore, which beareth not good fruit, is hewn down and cast into the fire.

This powerful discourse begins with the same terrible phrase 'generation' or 'out-births of vipers' which Jesus also uses on several occasions. It presumably goes back to Micah 7<sub>17</sub>, where we read, referring to the heathen: "They shall lick the dust like serpents, like those creeping on the earth." And if 'licking the dust' can be taken in the sense of the allegorists of the time, who interpret it as eating excrement, a fate allotted to the snake-shaped souls of the damned in Sheōl, it becomes all the more strikingly



graphic. In vain do they think they will escape because they are of kinship with Abraham, or that God cannot repeat the wonder he once wrought of raising up children out of the barren rock of their forefather. God is able to make a new Israel out of the very stones, just as he had of old hewn, like stones, (Heb. *'abanīm*) a line of sons (Heb. *bānīm*) from the once barren rock of Abraham, as Isaiah says (51:2): 'Look unto the rock whence ye were hewn . . . look unto Abraham your father.'

This for the 'stones'; but what of the 'trees'? There are other passages in the O.T. (*e.g.* Ps. 11, Jer. 17:8) which liken the man who delights in the Law and has faith in Yahveh to fruit-bearing trees; but the most arresting verse in this connection is to be found in the continuation of the same vision in Ezekiel (47:1-8) which so graphically depicted the Messianic Source. This reads (v. 12):

"By the river upon the banks thereof, on this side and on that side, shall grow all trees for meat, whose leaf shall not fade; they shall bring forth new fruit month after month, because their waters issue from the sanctuary: and the fruit thereof shall be for meat and the leaf thereof for medicine."

The mystical application of this prophetic utterance to the righteous of Israel as the fruit-bearing trees of the longed-for days of the Messiah would surely strike the imagination of so intuitive a mind as John's; it is indeed all of a piece with his general conception and expectation and fits in most deftly.

But this does not exhaust the imagery of Ezekiel's striking vision of the outpouring of God's spirit in the days of the End, which made so deep an impression

upon John. The prophet uses another graphic figure, which also greatly influenced early Christianity and was made much of later on in the symbolic interpretations of some of the Church Fathers. If only we had the mystical exegesis of this figure as conceived in the mind of the pre-Christian Palestinian Dorshē Rashumōth, who anticipated the Alexandrian Jewish allegorists of Philo's day, we should probably find that they had already given spiritual significance to the following arresting verses (9 and 10) of the vision. These read in Eisler's rendering:

"Wheresoever the river shall come, everything that moveth shall live; and there shall be a very great multitude of fish, because the waters shall come thither. . . . And it shall come to pass [that] the fishers stand by it from En-Gedi unto En-Eglaim; they shall be [a place] to spread forth nets [for all fish] according to their kinds."

En-Gedi and En-Eglaim were two oases with fresh-water springs—the Gedi or Kid Spring and the Eglaim or (?) Calf Spring—on the shores of the Dead Sea or Salt Lake. The former was the chief centre of the Essenes. With such a striking figure before him it would be easy for John, the proclaimer of repentance and the turning again to God of a righteous remnant, to believe that in the Days of the End there were to be prophets who should be 'fishers of men.'

Now it is remarkable that we have a number of references to this fishing of souls bound up with echoes of legends of John the Baptizer, which are blended into a highly syncretic stream of Gnostic traditions which still exists to-day and goes back eventually to very early times. The Mandæans, that is believers in the Mandā or Gnosis (who also call themselves Nazorāyā and are

sometimes referred to as Sūbbā or Baptists), have now as apparently they have had from of old, their chief seat in the marsh-lands of the mouth of the Euphrates. They have preserved the remains of an extensive literature, collected, developed and over-written through the centuries. The analysis and criticism of this literature have as yet by no means been completed in spite of the praiseworthy labours of such scholars as Brandt and Lidzbarski, to mention the two chief workers in this very difficult field of research. It would be out of place here to go further into this complicated matter. We must content ourselves simply with giving, from the German of Lidzbarski's most competent recent translation of the 'John-Book' (otherwise known as 'The Discourses of the [Light-] Kings'), a selection of one or two striking utterances and a short summary from a collection of pieces concerning 'The Fisher of Souls.'<sup>1</sup> It may encourage some to read the book themselves and other more competent scholars than myself to follow up a most interesting clue.

"In the Name of the Great Life may the August Light be Glorified!

"A Fisher am I, a Fisher, who is elect among the fishers. A Fisher am I, who is elect among the fishers, the Head of all catchers of fish. I know the lake-waters . . . I come to the net-layings, to the lake-waters and all fishing spots, and closely search the marshes in the dark. My boat will not be separated [from the others], and I shall not be hindered in the night.

\* \* \* \*

"In front of me standeth Hibil (? Abel); at my side Šitil (Seth) sweet named is seen; close to me, close before me sitteth Anōš (Enoch) and proclaimeth. They say: 'O Father, Good Fisher, hallo! Fisher sweet named!'"

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<sup>1</sup> Mark Lidzbarski, *Das Johannesbuch der Mandäer*, Giessen, 1915, pp. 198ff.

The Fisher of Souls hears the uproar of the fishers below, the fishers who eat fish, and their stench rises up to his light-ship. It is plain from what follows that the evil fishers are the Seven, the hostile rulers of the world and their agents. They are the principalities and powers of the air, against whom the great battle of the End is to be waged. Then the Fisher above, the Head of the living stock, the race of the living, has his horn or trump (some wind instrument) handed to him, and sends forth a cry into the marshes to warn the fishers of the deep and scare away the foul-smelling birds which pursue the fish. On hearing this cry the evil fishers call out to one another: "Get thee to thy inmost fishing place! For there is the cry of the Fisher, the Fisher who eats no fish. His voice is not as the voice of a fisher, nor his horn like ours. His voice is not like our voice, his speech not like this world."

The Divine Fisher casts his net and emmeshes the evil ones. They cry for mercy, protesting they do not catch the fish who "name thy Name." He slays them with his gaff, destroys with fire their nets and takes their mystery from them.

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The narrative is disjointed and evidently consists of pieces copied out from different prior collections. Thus in another connection we are told that the Divine Fisher of Souls bids the good fishers on earth: "Bring your boat up hither, so that it founder not on the dike."

"When the Head of the catchers of fish thus spake, the evil fishers answered him and said: 'Blessed be thou, O Fisher, and blessed be thy boat and thy vessel. How fair is thy casting net, how fair the yarn thereof! Fair is thy cordage and thy noosing, thou who art not like the fishers of the world. On thy meshes are no shell fish and thy gaff gaffeth no fish. Whence art thou come hither? Tell us; we would be thy hired servants. We will bake and brew and serve to thee. Eat, and of the crumbs that fall from thy hand we will eat and be filled therefrom.'

"But I answered unto them: 'O ye fishers, who lap up your [own] filth, I am no fisher who catcheth fish, and I was not made for an eater of filth. A Fisher of souls am I, who beareth witness to the Life. A poor Fisher am I, who calleth the souls, gathereth them together and teacheth them.'"

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"He calleth them and biddeth them come and flock together unto him. He saith unto them : 'If ye come . . . , ye shall be saved from the foul-smelling birds. I will save my friends, bring them on high and make them stand in my ship. I will clothe them with robes of glory and deck them with precious Light. I will put on them a crown of æther and set upon their head all else of majesty. Then do they sit on thrones and shine in precious Light. Them I bear away and set them on high. But ye Seven shall remain here behind. The portion of filth and filthiness shall be your portion. On the day when the Light ariseth shall the Darkness return to its place. I and my disciples will arise and behold the Light-region.'"

This saga of the Fisher of Souls is a beautiful conception within the setting of these eschatological notions, and seems to be an integral element of this syncretic stream of the Mandā which goes back far towards Gnostic beginnings. Now the Mandæan traditions are hostile not only to Christianity but also to Judaism. Many of their notions, however, can be closely paralleled with some of the doctrines of the religion of Mānī, with some of the main elements underlying the scheme of the Coptic Gnostic Pistis Sophia and the two treatises of the Bruce Codex; points of contact may also be found in what we know of the doctrines of the Elchasaites, and in some parts of the Clementine romances which preserve early Ebionite traditions and legends of Simon Magus, with whom John is brought into connection.

And here it may be noted that if it is surprising to find the influence of John the Baptizer spreading as far east as Babylonia, it is not out of keeping with the fact that the baptism of John was also practised in the west far outside Palestine among the Dispersion and indeed among some of the early Christian communities, as we learn from the Acts and Epistles.

No little of mythic notions from old Babylonian and Iranian traditions is to be found immixed in this Mandæan stream; there is thus a pre-Christian background as well. Indeed the Fisher-figure cannot fail at once to remind students of comparative religion of the ancient Babylonian fish-clad fisher-god Ḥani-Ōannēs—the archaic Ea, father of Marduk the saviour-god of Babylon who rose yearly from the dead. This primeval God of Wisdom was the culture-god who had taught early mankind all the arts of civilization. Berossus, the Chaldean priest who wrote for the Greeks a history of his people, tells us of no less than six manifestations of Ōannēs in successive periods; and this notion of revelation and saving in successive periods is fundamental with the Mandæans. Ōannēs rose from the sea—the waters presumably of the Persian Gulf, in the old story; but Marduk, his son, descended from heaven.

It is by no means improbable that the picturing of appropriate ancient myths which floated freely in the thought-atmosphere of Babylon may have determined some of the imagery of Ezekiel's visions by the 'river of Babylon,' and indeed may otherwise have psychically influenced no little of Jewish apocalyptic literature, as for instance when the Ezra Apocalypse (at the end of the 1st century A.D.) tells us that the Redeemer of the world, the Celestial Man, is expected to rise from the 'heart of the ocean.' If then, as Ezra IV. permits us to conclude, certain apocalyptists and allegorists, who were probably Jews of the Babylonian or Syrian Dispersion, could conceive of their pre-existent Messiah as in some way associated with the figure of the ancient Ḥani (Ōannēs, Iannēs, Iōannes) and expected the Redeemer of Israel to arise from the depths of the

great waters, it is not improbable that in those days when the interplay of mystical associations was so prevalent and eagerly sought out, that some of the most enthusiastic followers of John may have believed that this baptizing 'fisher of souls' was the expected manifestation.

Similarity in the sounds of names fascinated men's minds and Hani-Ōannēs-John is not the only name-play we meet with in the Baptist's story. Attempts have been made by scholars to show that 'the sign of the prophet Jonah' was perhaps originally connected with John, and that a testimony of Jesus to John has been converted already in Q, the non-Markan source of matter common to Mt. and Lk., into a testimony of Jesus concerning himself. (On this point see Eisler, *op. cit.*, pp. 156-162, where all is set out in detail.) It is further of interest to note that Jonah in Hebrew means Dove and that among the Mandæans there was a class of the perfect called Doves. Compare also the Greek *Physiologus* (xli.): "The Dove . . . which is John the Baptist." The names Jonah and John could easily be brought into close connection, and indeed Jonah is sometimes found as a shortened form of Johanan.

The Jonah-legend provided a very suitable setting wherein to depict the life of a prophet who caused his hearers to repent, and it may be that Jesus referred to John as 'a greater Jonah' (Mt. 12<sub>41</sub>). The most striking image in the mythic story is the Great Fish. Now the belly of the Great Fish for the Jewish allegorists, and indeed it is plainly stated in the legend itself, was Sheōl, the Underworld, the Pit. But another mythic Great Fish, or perhaps the same in another aspect, was the cosmic monster Leviāthān. And symbolists, allegorists

and mystics got busy with this mythic figure. Thus we find that Leviāthān was the name given by the Ophites of Celsus, who are plainly of Syrian Babylonian origin, to the Seven,—that is to the cosmic animal psychē, the hierarchy of rulers and devourers of the animal souls of men as well as of animals proper, each of the Seven being symbolized by an animal figure, probably an animal-faced (lion, etc.) dragon or fish. It will be remembered that in the Mandæan tradition the Fisher of Souls takes the Seven in his net and destroys them, even as in the old Babylonian myth the Saviour-god Manduk catches Tiamāt, their mother, the primeval dragon of the deep, in his net and destroys her. And strangely enough there is an old Rabbinical legend of Jonah preserved in the *Midrash Yalqut Yona* (§1), which relates that, when the prophet was in the belly of the Great Fish, he prayed that it should carry him quickly to the Leviāthān, so that he might catch it with his fishing tackle. For Jonah desired, when once again safely ashore, to make of its flesh a feast for the righteous,—a distinct reference to the Messianic fish-banquet which is to take place in the days of the End.

The Jewish folk of the Babylonian dispersion, who were surrounded with images of the fish-clad Hani-Ōannēs and of his priests, would easily think of them as representing a man swallowed by a fish, and as easily be reminded of the story of their great prophet Jonah, who was fabled to have made the proud King of Ashshur and all the Ninevites repent; and the mystics subsequently would easily associate all this with Messianic notions.

It has recently been shewn by that acute scholar J. Scheftelowitz from hitherto neglected Rabbinical documents that 'fish' was quite a common symbol for



the righteous man of Israel, who lived all his life in the waters of the Torah or Sacred Law. The evidence goes back as early as the times of Rabban Gamaliel the Elder, the teacher of Paul, who was therefore a contemporary of John and Jesus. Thus we read in the *Midrash Tanhuma* to Deut. 5<sub>32</sub>: "As a fish delights in water, even so a master of the scriptures dives into the streams of balm"—the sweet smelling waters of the Law; compare the stench of the evil fishers in the Mandæan 'John-Book.' Decisive in this connection is the following passage from the *Aboth de R. Nathan* (ch. 40):

"The pupils of Rabbi Gamaliel the Elder were divided into four kinds of fish: into clean and unclean [brackish water] fish from the Jordan and fish from the Ocean, according to their high and low descent and to the degree of their learning and quickness of their understanding."

Though they were not 'fishers of men,' they were fish of Yahveh swimming in the holy stream, the life-giving waters of the Law. It was thus very natural for John, remembering the striking passage in Ezekiel (47<sub>12</sub>) about the fish who repented, to contrast with them the unrepentant as a 'generation of vipers,' (cp. the fish-scorpion contrast in Mt. 7<sub>10</sub>). Nor could John have been ignorant of the prophecy in Jeremiah (16<sub>16</sub>) concerning the gathering together of dispersed Israel: "Behold, I will send for many fishers, saith the Lord, and they shall fish them," and have given it a spiritual significance. But of an even more arresting nature is the following from *Berešith Rabba* (ch. 97):

"As the Israelites are innumerable, even so are the fishes; as the Israelites will never die out on the earth, the fishes will never die out in their element. Only the

Son of Man named 'Fish' could lead Israel into the Land of Promise,—namely Joshua Ben Nun (= Fish)."

The Greek transliteration of Joshua in the LXX. version is invariably Jesus. Now in Samaritan tradition, and it will be remembered that the Samaritans rejected all the Jewish scriptures save the Five Fifts of the Law, their future Redeemer was to be called Joshua. This Deliverer they called the Ta'eb, the Returner, and they believed he would be a reborn or returned Joshua. The Ta'eb is the Samaritan Messiah. In this connection a recently translated Samaritan Midrash (B.M. Samaritan MS. Or. 3393<sup>1</sup>) is especially instructive. It understands the title Ta'eb as signifying 'he who repents' or even 'he who makes to repent,' not so much the Returner as the Turn-back of others. It is brought into close connection also with Noḥam, meaning Repenting, and is thus by word-play associated with Noah. Our Samaritan Midrash accordingly brings Noah on to the scene of expected redemption, and becomes a spiritualized version of the Deluge-story, abounding in mystical word-plays. One or two specimens of them may now be given, as the ideas behind them are reminiscent of the John circle of ideas.

Whereas in the old story Yahveh orders Noah: "Make thee an ark (*t'bah*)," the Midrash makes God say unto the Ta'eb: "Make thee a conversion"—or repentance (Aram. *shuba*, *tubah*). And so it continues in many details glossing the original parts of the ark by means of word-play, introducing notions of propitiation, expiation and atonement. A single passage from the original will make this clear, and in reading it we

<sup>1</sup> Ed. by Adalbert Merx, *Zeitschr. f. alt. Wiss.*, 1909, xvii. 80.

should remember that Samaria was a hot-bed of mystic and gnostic movements of all sorts.

Behold I bring a [flood of] conversion [and] of divine favour upon the earth, to save Israel and gather it from everywhere under the sky. I shall perform my covenant, which I have set up with Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. And thou shalt enter into the conversion, thou and thy house and the whole house of Israel with thee; and take with thee all kind of . . . praying and fasting and purification, which thou performest, and take all unto thee, and it shall be for conversion for thee and for them. And the Ta'eb did everything as God had commanded him.

The ark (*t'bah*) saved Noah from the flood of perdition, and the conversion (*shubah*, *tubah*) will save the Penitent One (*Ta'eb*) and all the sons of Israel from the [flood of] perversion.

The 'flood of perversion' is that of 'the cursed æon.' Among the many Messianic expectations of those days, therefore, was the belief that in the Last Days it would again be as in the days of Noah, as indeed we are expressly informed by Q (Mt. 24<sup>37ff.</sup> = Lk. 17<sup>26ff.</sup>).

There are other points of interest in the fragmentary 'sayings' of John and other references preserved in the synoptic accounts, but of these we shall select only one as being of special interest. John's expectation of the nature of the catastrophe of the times of the End was somewhat complex. Three phases of elemental destruction haunted his imagination. Similar disasters had already happened in the past at the culmination of certain successive critical periods in the history of mankind. There had been a destruction by water, another by a mighty wind and tempest which overwhelmed the great Tower (to which many a Rabbinic legend testifies), and a destruction by fire in the days of Lot. John's baptism or water-purification may well have been intended as an outer sign of the inner

attempt to avert from the righteous the dire results of the great forthcoming world 'trial' by the water of God's wrath that would overwhelm the wicked. But there were two other baptisms or purifications which he expected a greater than himself to effect in similar fashion and for a similar purpose. There was to be a purification or baptism by fire; and, in Christian interpretation, the third and last and greatest was to be effected by means of the holy spirit. This would not be out of keeping with the belief of John, for it was ever the spirit of God, as water, fire or wind, that would purify and save the righteous. But the graphic figure of the winnowing fan in John's declaration shows clearly that the notion was connected in his mind with the necessary wind without which winnowing was impossible—the mighty wind or spirit of God. For the good this would result in a blessed harvesting, but for the evil it would be a scattering as chaff.

Though all these notions may well have come to John within the ambit of the Jewish scriptures, many prophetic pronouncements in which graphically depict all these forms of Divine visitation, it is nevertheless not without significance that the rites of purification by water, fire and wind (ventilation) were an integral element of some, if not all, of the Hellenistic mystery-institutions, and that the periodic catastrophic scheme is clearly to be paralleled in the Babylonian astral religion and especially its blending with Iranian conceptions which centre round the æon-cult (Zervanism), and all those notions of the Great Year and world-periods, which later Stoicism took over and made familiar to Imperial times. This Great Year had three 'seasons'—summer, winter, spring—each of which was assigned to one of the three most ancient elements:

fire, water and wind. As the Great Year turned on itself the constellations returned at the end of the revolution to the same positions they had occupied in a former Great Year. There were thus critical moments in the æonic movement, and at these cosmic catastrophes occurred.

It is hardly to be supposed that John had any such 'scientific' notions in his mind: but it is undeniable that many had such conceptions in his day, and indeed among the learned and mystics we find blends of such 'science' with prophetic intuitions. But for the Jewish eschatologist it was a once for all event he expected, whereas for such men as the Stoic thinkers it was a perpetual recurrence.

And what is the outcome of this enquiry? It seems to me that a very important background of Christian origins is here indicated. It points to a widespread Jewish eschatological and therefore necessarily Messianic movement prior to Christianity, of which earliest Christianity was at first a culmination, whatever modifications and completions were subsequently introduced. It is therefore to be regretted that our information concerning John the Baptizer and his doctrines is so meagre. It is quite believable that many of John's adherents attached themselves to Jesus after the martyrdom of their teacher. Indeed the suddenness with which Mk., our earliest narrative, introduces Jesus 'calling' the first four of his disciples and their instant leaving all and following him to become 'fishers of men,' is inexplicable without there having been some prior knowledge on the part of Simon and Andrew, James and John. They may well have already been familiar with John's teaching. But if many of John's adherents followed Jesus, others, if

we can believe there are any real echoes of history in the Mandæan traditions, rejected him. For indeed these traditions are very hostile, depicting Jesus as a false Messiah and boasting their own faithful to be the true believers, as against, not only the Christians but also the Jews. The history of the expansion of Christianity in the West, outside Palestine, shows that there was not only sympathy with the followers of John but also, in some places, the continued use of his baptism.

It may then be that some of the great figures, types and symbols used by Jesus in his exhortations and teaching were not original to him, but that he shared them, together with other mystic, apocalyptic and prophetic notions, with the circles who had been instructed by John. Jesus is made to distinguish John as the greatest prophet who had come before him, nay as more than a prophet; and yet the least in the Kingdom of Heaven is said to be greater than a John. This can only mean in the Kingdom in its fulness; for surely most of the Christians fell far short of the high virtue of the Baptist. What is furthermore evident is that the whole of John's mentality was flooded with what we can only call mystic notions and conceits, graphic figures, highly spiritualized, the mentality of a prophet and seer. If John is the forerunner of Jesus, many of the Baptizer's eschatological and associated beliefs are probably the forerunners of earliest Christian doctrine. And with all this in mind, it is difficult not to believe that Jesus knew more of John personally and used more of his ideas and symbolisms than the gospels would lead us to suppose.

G. R. S. MEAD.

## THE POETRY OF RACHEL ANNAND TAYLOR.<sup>1</sup>

REV. W. H. HAMILTON, M.A.

THAT the body of Mrs. Taylor's work is not bulky argues nothing against its worth and importance. English poetry would be a vastly poorer thing without *A Shropshire Lad*, yet Professor Housman, preoccupied largely with Juvenal and Manilius, has given us but one or two stray verses beyond it, and to an ingenuous (or ingenious) plea made years ago by this pen for "a poem for an undergraduates' magazine" he replied: "I am a barren fig-tree, and neither have anything suitable ready written nor can sit down and produce something when I desire to do so. I regret this quite as much as you can." Neither for atmosphere nor song-quality could we liken the three little books by Mrs. Taylor to *A Shropshire Lad*. They are not likely to move Dr. Arthur Somervell, Mr. Graham Peel, Mr. George Butterworth, Mr. Seymour Halley and many more to set them to music; on the other hand they might very well inspire an Edmund Dulac or an Arthur Rackham to delicate graphic interpretations. They have nothing of the gorse and hawthorn and landscape, the coloured counties and farms and spires, that glorify the lyrics of Severnside; their flowers are mystical,—the Rosa Mundi, symbolic daisies and lilies; they breathe of the cloister and the scourge, of spiritual cities like Sarras,

<sup>1</sup> *Poems* (John Lane, 1904); *Rose and Vine* and *The Hours of Fiammetta* (Elkin Mathews, 1909, 1910).

windows of flagrant marvel and antique ossuaries. The stern stoicism of Housman has little indeed in common with these throes of aspiration and art, even if both works are enwrap by an all too sad loveliness and abound in metrical subtlety. The one is classic, the other drenched in mediævalism. But if one little book of unique beauty and perfect making be a joy for ever, why may not three others, unique in their way, be worthy of recall even although their vogue may have been briefer and narrower?

It is already a far cry to 1910. Much has happened since then. No one writing and publishing then is likely to write in the same manner now, and any breaking of silence in lyrical work after such an interval would mark the beginning of a new phase. The inclusion of some four of these poems by Rachel Annand (Taylor) in the recent *Alma Mater Anthology*, issued by the students of Aberdeen University, brought to memory the delight with which her volumes were read on their first appearance and often since, and suggested that some critical appraisement of them would now be appropriate and is indeed rather more than due; for whatever the limitations of this writer's art, however removed from the main forward currents of song her highly artificial decorativeness, it is the work of a first-class intellect, a fastidious taste, a skilled artist, a subtle philosopher, an imagination of power and grace; and fate would deal hardly indeed with her work, were it to be allowed to pass early from remembrance or by public neglect to cease from charming younger devotees.

The poetess was one of the pioneer Scottish University women-students and her fame as critic and creator remains in her Northern college to this day.



She resided in Dundee for some years, and about this time her verses found favour in such diverse (but equally exclusive) periodicals as *The British Weekly* and *The English Review* among others. It was in 1904 that Mr. John Lane issued her first volume. Perhaps it did not exactly set the Tay afire, but—however far short of its merit its reception may have been—it achieved a fame and a success far greater than so splendid a gift could count on securing either then or now. That noble æsthete and bibliophile, Mr. Thomas B. Mosher of Portland, Maine, U.S.A., was among the many impressed, and many sweet songs from this book and its successor, *Rose and Vine*, adorned his dainty catalogues till at least 1915. But the *Poems*—some of them fashioned in girlhood—had a simple pensive goodness that could win the common ear, and the later elaborate technique and subtle soul-analysis could not perhaps quite compensate for the loss of this charm. Few of the sixty-three pieces—classified as Romance, Devotional, Chant d'Amour, and Reverie—were even faintly suggestive of immaturity. The portrait of the poet by Mr. Stewart Carmichael, a Dundee painter of great talent, recalls Rossetti's women, and the ritual influence of Rossetti on her work was unmistakable; the rich artificiality, the quaint imagery, the delicate preciousness, all whispered it or sang it exultantly, but it had an ease and freedom unknown to that master. Archaic terms found in it a natural home; tournaments, masques and pomps, legends and myths, o'ercastled portals, litanies, 'Tristram's musique,' 'plangent lyres,' 'oriflammes and spears,' 'damozels' and 'donzellon,' 'girdles of gold and of gramaraye,' 'Death, the sombre Nympholept' and 'monks distraught with subtile dreams' make a dazzling pageantry and withal a gentle

pathos through her pages. There is a sheer joy of singing too amid all the high sorrowfulness, and the rhythms are as inventive and haunting as the style is sweetly impassioned and opulent.

“The daughter of Herodias,  
Like waves before the moon,  
Like ringing rimes a dreamer has  
Lured to a lay of lover folk,  
Swayed softly to the tune.”

Or, for measure, this “of a Knight whose Lady died before he knew his love for her” :

“How was I to know  
When you lived, long ago,  
The sorcery in you,—that you could be,  
Once dead, a white magician wasting me  
From flaming crucibles of weary spells?”

Or the lilting heartache of :

“Where have you been sweetheart, sweetheart, since  
clang of twilight bell?”

—“A weary, weary pilgrimage, to the Water of Weary  
Well.”

“Now, what so crazed your silken feet, your sumptuous  
eyes, my bride?”

—“The craving of a dreamer’s heart, outraged and  
crucified.”

And, in spite of the inauspicious opening phrase, what could excel the architecture and portrayal in this address?

“When that the Queen with all her maids came singing  
Across the daisies, through a dusk of May,  
Their spoils of fairy gold and silver bringing,  
You rang no chime in that sweet roundelay:—

But held yourself a little way apart,  
 Your hands above your heart,—  
 A fair frail image robed in royal scarlet,  
 Dreaming of splendours insolent and warlit,  
 Dreaming of crowns to wear,—  
 Although your drooping head could hardly bear  
 Its crown-imperial of yellow hair."

The verses 'An Early Christian' have been much quoted, likewise the sonnet 'The Vanity of Vows'; although Mrs. Taylor's verse may be deemed too slightly related to Space and Time to sound quite aptly from a pulpit or seem at home in a history of the Church or a magazine-article, whatever is to be said of anthologies. The lofty pagan adoration of 'An Art-Lover to Christ' and the twin sonnets 'To the Bound Captive in the Louvre' are as typical and prophetic of Mrs. Taylor's art as any. The latter err a little on the side of violence in imagery perhaps, and the youthful maker is still in echo-bondage to Keats.

"And shall it soon be waking and red morn,  
 And plague and fire in delicate Florence town?  
 O Hylas-beauty, poignant, perilous,  
 O luring, yearning curves of throat and chin,  
 Whereby is written Love's desire, Love's dread!  
 Whose captive art thou? What sarcophagus  
 Holds thee its victim and thy darker Twin,  
 Immortals thrall'd for ever to the Dead?"

She is at her best in contemplation among her Renunciations.

"Let Silence with her long pale hands ravish the violin:  
 Let Reverie with silken snare entoil the dancing  
 foot!

Rumours of antique beauty, love o' stars, and shriven  
sin,

Die softly out from my tired soul. That I may  
rest, be mute!

That I may rest, be mute!

"But let some faint and rhythmic voice intone me  
monkish tales

Of tears occult, and pangs of unendurable  
divorce,—

Alhambras rainbow-bright made sullen cloisters,—  
scourges—veils,—

The great white glimmering tomb of love, the vigil  
of remorse,

Foretell the long remorse."

Even to-day the little green book has a May-time  
grace about it, a call and rapture of Youth, briefly  
bestowed and not to be recaptured.

For *Rose and Vine*, published five years later, is  
somehow excessive. It might have been more effective  
if two separate volumes had been made of its content;  
but the devouring of a hundred-and-nine pieces of  
greatly strengthened and also greatly elaborated  
technique, of extreme richness, marvel upon marvel  
of decorative and symbolical ornamentation subtly  
'glimmering with reds and blues on backgrounds of  
gold,' is apt to confuse our enjoyment; an overdose of it  
may pall on one. The reverential girlish devotion has  
passed into a proud worship of Beauty—beauty of  
image above all. The book, I venture to think, is the  
most splendid ritual of fantasy in our literature. Yet  
one can weary even of that and understand the  
uninitiate reviewer of the *Westminster Gazette*, who,  
while lauding Ella Wheeler Wilcox, declared with an

obvious yawn that Mrs. Taylor had "said as much about peacocks, apes and ivory in her earlier verse as poet ever needs to say." Her preoccupation with the strife of flesh and spirit has, no doubt, led her further into mysticism rather than into "a more healthy and joyful appreciation of the real poetry of life." But the real trouble is rather that the amazing wealth of genuine poetry is obscured by over-illumination—stained glass, moonstones, ivory and incense. In a more sombre collection a perfect jewel like 'Ecstasy' would gleam with its due effect:

"O ye that look on Ecstasy,  
The Dancer lone and white,  
Cover your charmed eyes, for she  
Is Death's own acolyte.  
She dances on the moonstone floors  
Against the jewelled peacock doors:  
The roses flame in her gold hair,  
The tired, sad lids are overfair.  
All ye that look on Ecstasy,  
The Dancer lone and white,  
Cover your dreaming eyes, lest she—  
(*Oh! softly, strangely!—*) float you through  
These doors all bronze and green and blue  
Into the Bourg of Night."

No mere revel of words is here. It is, of course, an imaginative presentation of a certain mystical Neo-Platonic doctrine, and in it every sensuous detail obeys a subtle logic of its own and is interpretive as well as pictorial. It is a kind of 'metaphysical' poetry, and the writer is perhaps most directly affiliated in English literature through the Pre-Raphaelites to Donne—an affiliation of extraordinary interest, resulting in a very special, slightly bizarre, beauty which, as in the case of

Donne, you must either love or hate. But poetry unmistakable even to conventional tastes is here in plenty also: 'Eriskay,' 'The Unknown Sword-Maker,' 'The Masque of Proteus' and the sonnets and much else of strange and lovely invention rejoice us as might perfect porcelain. Well may the poet carol:

"Oh! Stranger dreams because of me  
Shall trouble eve and morn;  
And love and roses redder be  
Because I have been born."

There is a brave new gallantry in 'The Roman Road' and 'The Young Martyrs.'

"They wore their wounds like roses  
Who died at morning tide.  
From Youth's enchanted closes,  
From loves that did adore them,  
With perfumes broken o'er them,  
As bridegroom goes to bride,  
They rode the Flaming Ride.  
They wore their wounds like roses  
Who in their morning died."

A high music and stately refrains burden the book with beauty. Soul-analysis almost too subtle has been developed profoundly. Still the images delight and blind one,—witness:

"The opal towns of Italy  
Like sirens fallen on sleep."

All poets believe that words are living things and have souls, and that, just as a human soul is moulded by experience, so the soul of a word, its poetical content, is modified by the use which a great poet has made of it. The Muses are the daughters of Memory. You cannot now speak of the simplest things—the redness

of dawn, the waving of boughs, the grey falling snow and the white fallen,—without evoking a hundred echoes and associations; for now these things are charged with an ancient spirit of magic, since “to use some image of a thing for the thing itself will often convey a truer impression than the literal name, if that has become a little worn or faded.” Perhaps no English poet has carried this method of imagery so far as Rachel Annand Taylor. She thinks in images. Colours especially have an intellectual value for her, and all her images are the imaginative equivalent of the colourless idea. In this they differ from symbolistic imagery which need have no intelligible relation to the thing symbolized; but not a whit less than the symbolists does this poet penetrate her poetic quality with singular and delicate idiosyncrasy. In a single stanza she can thus perfectly evoke ‘The Ludovisi Venus’:

“Lift her softly like roses,  
For lo! she is tender and tired,  
The wonderful World’s desired.  
Lift her like sad white roses.”

It is perhaps more important to observe how a distaste and horror of dogmatic, disciplinary religion has grown and cries in rebellious, defiant, angry, but ample beauty. For the great historic religions she has an infinitude of sympathy and respect; they are of the very stuff of poetry. For emasculate and sentimental pietism, it may be known that she has nothing but repulsion and disdain. Especially for imaginative Youth does she fear the snaring circles of this tepid Inferno; for what Youth needs is something very different, something fiery and stringent and haughty

in the way of discipline, and an ideal of gracious, humane and liberal character which has no *deliberate* concern with the ugliness of prohibitions and restraints or with any febrile, languishing affectation or hysterical simulation of faith. It is indignantly reflected in 'The Mother Desires the Joy of Her Children.'

"Because I had no dancing, they shall dance  
With all the rapturous, delicate circumstance  
Of dancing . . .

"Since I learned wisdom in an iron school,  
Strange horror shall not mar my beautiful  
Idealists, whose feet I shall prevent  
From all the secret snares,—  
From all the obscure lairs  
Of libbard kind. For not by broken hearts  
Must they be truth's diviners, but by arts  
Of sympathy, and pity's sacrament.—  
Vain! Vain! In those dim lairs  
What desperate agonies must yet be theirs!"

It is an unequivocal—one has sometimes feared a slightly petulant and unintelligent—challenge to cherished methods of attempting regeneration. But, indeed, the only hope of spiritual happiness lies in preserving the perfect sincerity of one's soul, and the airiest carelessness is less deadly to it than the poison of falseness induced by artificially-impelled and morbid emotionalism. Religion is an elemental communication to elemental need, and in all great art and literature is latent a plea that the leading of the soul to this is not only to be entered upon, but even to be thought on, in a delicacy that the gentlest can hardly command at



will, and a virility that must be utterly clean of all pose and self-consciousness.

Yet this sternly-pitiful mind has great social enthusiasms too, constantly considering certain problems with a passionate indignation, as 'The Appeal to the Artist'—inscribed to Professor Patrick Geddes—reveals :

“Ah! lead them in some simple sweet translation  
Out of this Night.  
For Life begins with beauty, adoration,  
Wonder, delight.”

This desire for delight recurs everywhere :

“Oh! lose the winter from thine heart, the darkness  
from thine eyes,  
And from the low hearth-chair of dreams, my love-o'-  
May, arise ;  
And let the maidens robe thee like a white white-lilac  
tree,  
Oh! hear the call of Spring, fair Soul,—and wilt thou  
come with me ?

“ *Even so, and even so !  
Whither thou goest, I will go.  
I would follow thee.*”

Mrs. Taylor's third book, all written in one September and published in 1910, is *The Hours of Fiammetta*, a sequence of sixty-one sonnets (with prologue, epilogue and prose foreword) which might be styled the epic of imaginative womanhood. Here the deep psychological insight and the artist's evident familiarity with all recondite things of beauty combine to make expression intricate and the meaning hard

for any but unusually cultivated minds ; and yet that expression is clearer and more precise than ever. It seems to be backed by a dreamy and yet austere disdain of

“ the uncoloured wisdom of great souls  
With whom great passions have no more to do.”

Fiammetta sets herself in contrast to the Madonna tradition of womanhood ; she is the priestess of the unknown gods, redeeming the soul of man from “ the spiritual sloth, more to be dreaded than pain.” She is aware that she appears “ equally inimical and heretical to the opposing camps of *Hausfrau* and suffragist.” Instinctively vexed with unanswerable questions, she knows perplexity and embitterment and her “ verses present the moods, misconceptions, extravagancies, revulsions, reveries—all the obscure crises whereby she reaches a state of illumination and reconciliation regarding the enigma of love as it is, making her transition from the purely romantic and ascetic ideal fostered by the exquisitely selective conspiracies of the art of the great love-poets, through a great darkness of disillusion, to a new vision infinitely stronger and sweeter, because unafraid of the whole truth.”

Her obsession with the ironies of the strife between body and soul is very intense, and the appropriate enough metaphor of marriage is so powerfully and consistently used as to cause the reader sufficient torture and to make intelligible the revolt and loathing that at times seem to possess the unwilling imaginary singer and psychopath.

But out of these great throes rise courage and inspiration :

“Since passion makes immortal Time’s tired slaves  
I am of those that delicately sunder  
Corruptions of contentment from the breast  
As with rare steel. Like music I unveil  
Lost things, till, weary of earthen cups and rest,  
You seek Montsalvat and the burning Grail.”

It is the study of harrowing spiritual passion, elusive exceedingly, and but a cry of beauteous anguish in the dark of a summer night when all is done. There is nothing so sad, so painful, but art may be wrought of it. That is all she knows, or needs to know.

“Take back this armour. Give us broideries.  
Against the Five sad Wounds inveterate  
In our dim sense, can that defend, or these?  
In veils mysterious and delicate  
Clothe us again, in beautiful broideries.

“Take back this justice. Give us thuribles.  
While ye do loudly in the battle-dust,  
We feed the gods with spice and canticles.  
To our strange hearts, as theirs, just and unjust,  
Are idle words. Give graven thuribles.

“Give mercies, cruelties, and exultations,  
Give the long trances of the breaking heart;  
And we shall bring you great imaginations  
To urge you through the agony of Art.  
Give cloud and flame, give trances, exultations.”

The few who can fully understand such pain, may but listen to it in silence for seven days and seven nights. For most of us, it can hardly be that it will

speak to us with other than a vague voice : for the thought has approached the Ineffable.

“The spirit is a spotless doe that haunts  
The vast pure woods of God. Thro’ her domain  
She feels the calm, sweet days unsullied wane,  
And white dream-dryads are her ministrants.  
And, through the fluttered leaves the love-light slants,  
—Till suddenly shrieks her softly slumbering pain.  
The hounds o’ the flesh are on the trail again  
And on, on, on, the sobbing quarry pants.

“Who is the Hunter that unleashed the pack ?  
Was it a god’s strange heart the sport designed?  
*She* only knows *He* cannot call them back :  
That only to the flaming hour she flies  
When the last shameful agony shall blind  
The accusation of her hunted eyes.”

Not a page of it could have been written in the open-air ; hardly a page of *A Shropshire Lad* could have been written anywhere else. But Fiammetta’s “meditations unfortunately betray the fact that Etruscan mirrors are as dear to her as the daisies, and that she cannot find it more virtuous to contemplate a few cows in a pasture than a group of Leonardo’s people in their rock-bound cloisters. For the long miracle of the human soul and its expression is for her not less sacredly part of the universal process than the wheeling of suns and planets ; a Greek vase is to her as intimately concerned with Nature as the growing corn—with that Nature who formed the swan and the peacock for decorative delight, and who puts ivory and

ebony cunningly together on the blackthorn every patterned Spring."

In all her poems—simpler and more involved, sweeter and more anguished—we feel how deeply the writer has drunk of every fountain of Romance. Mediævalism breathes over all, but the profound mysticism of the early Christian centuries has also had a potent influence on her thought, and the pressure of the present and the ambiguous to be agonizes the last of the volumes. She has had evident delight in all who have given their life to Art, and naturally her verse is frequently reminiscent, but never derivative. She has lured from the 'sorcerous strings' new music, new colour, new song, new life and death, and a beauty that, accepting much from models, is yet resplendent in its own unborrowed majesty.

W. H. HAMILTON.

## CONCERNING WILLIAM BLAKE—AND OTHER MATTERS.

R. WENDELL QUEEN.

SIR EDWIN ARNOLD has given in English verse a story of the Buddha. The wandering teacher, with other wayfarers, was taking shelter from the Indian sun under a temple porch; there he was questioned as to life's chief good. He looked about him,—at the dyer's shed near by, at the prison and at the glittering roof of the king's palace,—and said :

“ Shadows are good when the high sun is flaming,  
From wheresoe'er they fall ;  
Some take their rest beneath the holy temple,  
Some by the prison wall.  
The king's gilt palace roof shuts out the sunshine,  
So doth the dyer's shed.  
Which is the chiefest shade of all these shadows ? ”

In reply to a remark that all were alike, he pointed out that some trees in the forest cast a fragrant and some a poisonous shade,—

“ Therefore, though all be false, seek if ye must  
Right shelter from life's heat.  
Lo ! those do well who toil for wife and child  
Threading the burning street.”

Then the Buddha went on to indicate some of the virtues beneath which, as shadows, we may shelter,—

justice, loyalty, gentleness, generosity; raising his eyes to the cloudless Indian sky, he continued:

“ But see where soars an eagle : mark those wings  
Which cleave the blue, cool skies !  
What shadow needeth yon proud Lord of Air  
To shield his fearless eyes ? ”

For good or ill, owing to the anxious efforts of religions and the religious, mankind has seldom lacked protective shadows. Instead of a few trees of right conduct we find dense forests which shut out both light and heat and abound with dark and poisonous growths. There the trees of right conduct, which flourish only in the open, wither and die. The process is described by Blake :

“ He sits down with holy fears  
And waters the ground with tears ;  
Then Humility takes its root  
Underneath his foot.

“ Soon spreads the dismal shade  
Of Mystery over his head,  
And the caterpillar and fly  
Feed on the Mystery ;

“ And it grows the fruit of Deceit,  
Ruddy and sweet to eat,  
And the raven his nest has made  
In its thickest shade.”

So the growth spreads until upon the resulting forest come its self-bred destroyers and the earth is swept clean again. For some the present time is as a bare and burning plain, for some as a swamp at midnight, for but few is it like to English beech-woods in May. Most of us find things uncomfortable enough

to cause us to watch wistfully the movements of any strange winged creature that may come within sight.

Said Blake, in his *Proverbs of Hell*: "When thou seest an eagle, thou seest a portion of genius; lift up thy head." We may apply the saying to himself. He was a scorner of shadows, a spurner of the ground. Not only is his work original and distinctive, often majestic, in the ordinary sense, but there is about it a unique and nameless 'otherness.' That nameless quality is perhaps best indicated by Yoné Noguchi. Referring to his examination of Blake's coloured drawings in the British Museum, he speaks of "the strength which his mind drew from the contemplation of an art greater than life." After the lapse of a hundred years, from a man of widely different race, born on the opposite side of the earth, comes this comment which seems so appropriately to epitomize Blake,—“An art greater than life!”

Let us seek to gather from the man, for what they may be worth, some ideas of this world, of that other world of his which he called 'Imagination,' and of the relationship between them.

How did Blake express himself about 'life,' this present order of going which to the Japanese poet he seemed to have transcended? This life was of very little account for Blake, he came as near to ignoring it as is humanly possible; but there is one aspect of it which is nearly always before his mind. He says:

"Without contraries is no progression. Attraction and Repulsion, Reason and Energy, Love and Hate, are necessary to human existence." Again: "One portion of being is the Prolific, the other the Devouring, . . . the Prolific would cease to be Prolific unless the Devourer as a sea received the excess of his delights.



. . . These two classes of men are always upon Earth, and they should be enemies : whoever seeks to reconcile them seeks to destroy existence."

When first we read these words and think of existence with its 'myriad millions' of creatures, each striving to live by devouring some other fellow-creature and by that effort at once adding to its strength and producing sustenance for its own destroyer ; when we think of our own bodies, built up by force at the expense of other organisms, to be sooner or later, but inevitably, torn to pieces and consumed ; when we think of the swamping result, if even a single species of organic life was for one short year released from attack ;—then the foregoing pronouncement of Blake's seems but a plain statement of an obvious fact. But when we look into our own minds and find that by no possibility can we think of anything without finding over against it an opposite, when we go on to reflect on love and hate, good and evil, and on the God of our fathers, then we shrink back. We remember the confession of the Manichæan hearer :

"If I should have said, the Good and the Bad, all has been created by God ; if I should have said, God and the Demon are brothers ; if in my sinfulness I should have pronounced such tremendous, blasphemous words, through my having unwittingly become false to God ; if I should have sinned this unforgivable sin ; my God ! now I repent ! I pray, cleansing myself from sin : my sin remit."

We are inclined to echo the cry of the Quaker poet :

" Pardon, Lord, the lips that dare  
Shape in words a Mortal's prayer !

. . . . .

Never yet in darkest mood  
Doubted I that Thou wast good,  
Nor mistook my will for fate,  
Pain of Sin for heavenly hate:  
Never dreamed the gates of pearl  
Rise from out the burning marl,  
Or that Good can only live  
Of the Bad conservative,  
And through counterpoise of hell  
Heaven alone be possible."

Whittier goes on, in the person of Andrew Rykman, to say in effect that God is all-holy, all-good, all-wise, governing all without chance, without wrong, "to the rhythm of love," and in the time-honoured way which our Blake so hated, puts all the blame upon his "miserable sinner" self: "I alone the music mar." Whittier was probably right, in a sense, but it was tenderness and goodness in himself making a discord in contact with a system working on quite other principles. Did he fail to remember, as he penned the lines above, the saying of the one to whom he looked as Master and God: "It is necessary that offences come, but woe to the man by whom the offence cometh"? What conception of an all-powerful God is here but that conception from which Whittier shrank? Thus do we seek the shadows. We may rest beneath the shadow cast by a belief in a personal God or that cast by a belief in goodness, but we can hardly have both at once. It may be that we ought rather to arise and thread the burning street of understanding beyond the protection of either shadow.

At times, as we watch the back and forth of good and evil in the world and in ourselves, the only thing of

importance seems to be to understand,—*to understand*.  
This was a frequent mood with Blake :

“The fool shall not enter into heaven be he ever so  
holy,  
Holiness is not the price of entrance into heaven.”

And again :

“I care not whether a man is Good or Evil ; all  
that I care is whether he is a Wise man or a Fool.  
Go ! put off Holiness and put on Intellect.”

He becomes indignant as he contemplates the  
way of the religionists :

“It is easier to forgive an Enemy than to forgive  
a Friend.

The man who permits you to injure him deserves  
your vengeance ;

He also will receive it. Go Spectre ! obey my  
most secret desire,

Which thou knowest without my speaking. Go  
to these fiends of righteousness,

Tell them to obey their Humanities and not  
pretend Holiness,

When they are Murderers, as far as my Hammer  
and Anvil permit.

Go tell them that the worship of God is honouring  
his gifts

In other men, and loving the greatest man best,  
each according

To his Genius, which is the Holy Ghost in man :  
there is no other

God than that God who is the intellectual fountain  
of Humanity.

. . . . . Go tell them this, and overthrow  
their cup,  
Their bread, their altar-table, their incense, and  
their oath,  
Their marriage and their baptism, their burial and  
consecration."

We can, if we wish, for a time shut out from the mind one half of the natural world and look upon existence as a progression from the lily to Saint Francis of Assisi. We may even thereby, also for a time, after the manner of Christian Science, cause the butcher-bird and Torquemada to devote their attention to others, although the psychological phenomena of ambivalence may well give us pause. Whatever the fruits of this method may be, 'understanding' is not one of them. Human existence and progress may or may not be of value and desirable, but let us not put value upon them and then ignore the dual condition of their continuance. The results, from our racial standpoint, of determined blindness of this kind are apparent in past and present. The preaching of peace and non-resistance as of universal application, the making, as Blake said, of one law for the lion and ox, has brought a more cruel sword upon the earth than that which Thor flung upon it, in order, as the legend significantly has it, "that men might learn the meaning of peace." The Papal tale of murders for the sake of the one church of God bids fair to be rivalled in the future by Socialism, if we may judge by the results of its efforts to establish a unitary 'earthly paradise' in Russia. We may be quite sure, however, that neither Christianity nor Socialism will look at life as it is.

During their recent incursion into politics one of our bishops remarked: "If the economic law was in conflict with the Kingdom of God, then the economic law must be changed." Give this bishop the power to apply what he believes to be the law of the Kingdom of God, and it does not need a modern Macaulay's school-boy to foretell the result. The economic law can no more be changed than can organic life, of which it is a process. It is quite indifferent to individuals; it does not care who pays. But paid it must be,—not only on its original claim but also the cost of collecting from some one else on the average at least 50 per cent. Result—through the intervention of the bishop: Tom goes free while the economic law deals faithfully with Dick, taking his coat and his cloak also, as it is dealing even now with the bishop's own clergy. The bishop has satisfied his desire for righteousness at the expense of Dick, in other words he has retired into the shadow of the Temple wall, while Dick willy-nilly threads the burning street. As for Tom, there is "the tavern door agape." The bishop here shows no better understanding of life than did the poor negro 'Israelite' who hurled his deluded followers against the machine-guns. He follows in the footsteps of most of his predecessors ever since Moses, according to Blake,

"Saw upon Mount Sinai forms of dark delusion."

I recently attended for the first time a Quaker meeting. It was in their old meeting-house close by the graves of Penn and Pennington and near where the Society is building their new co-operative village. Both the scene and the day were of that strange, benignant, maternal loveliness which seems peculiar to England.

In the course of the speeches by which the grateful silence was at intervals broken, there was much of peace and love, of unity and co-operation, and very much reading of spiritual values into the beauty without. Nevertheless the mind kept perversely setting over against it all the words of Emerson :

“The dearest friends are separated by impassable gulfs. The co-operation is involuntary, and is put upon us by the genius of life, which reserves this as a part of his prerogative. 'Tis fine for us to talk ; we sit and muse and are serene and complete, but the moment we meet with anybody, each becomes a fraction. Dear heart ! take it sadly home to thee—there is no co-operation.”

One man, whose voice shook with enthusiasm, told how years ago he had planted near the meeting-house two trees and named them ‘Righteousness’ and ‘Peace’ ; how for years they had languished and then begun slowly to grow ; and how on that glorious morning he had found them straight and tall and so grown that they touched each other—Righteousness and Peace had met together, Righteousness and Peace had kissed each other. After the meeting, while the memory was trying on its own account to arrange Emerson’s words in sequence and the eyes were idly looking about for ‘Righteousness’ and ‘Peace,’ I felt a grip upon my shoulder, and turning saw Blake. There he was, his great head thrown back, his wonderful eyes flashing, as he pointed angrily to an oak clasped by a gigantic ivy. Under the magic of that hand the two trees were gigantic animals rearing and straining in a death grapple, while he seemed to repeat :

“What is the price of Experience ? Do men buy it for  
a song,

Or Wisdom for a dance in the street? No! it is  
bought with the price

Of all that a man hath—his house, his wife, his  
children.

Wisdom is sold in the desolate market where none  
come to buy

And in the withered field where the farmer ploughs  
for bread in vain."

He turned and said "Come away"; and I went along  
the road with him, a little, a very little way,—in  
'Imagination.'

Needs must we, when we make our pathetic little  
efforts to understand, turn sometimes from this life to  
see what 'otherness' there may be. Something in us,  
in the exercise of its own nature, seems so to demand.  
Blake tells us that there are what he calls 'states,'  
whose being and permanence he exalts as compared  
with the entities who inhabit them. These 'states'  
he no doubt attempts to describe in detail in the  
Prophetic books, and perhaps they may be equated  
with what are now called 'levels' or 'planes.' There  
is one 'state' of which the vision is his 'Supreme  
Delight,' which he calls 'Imagination,' the 'world of  
the Imagination,' the 'Poetic Genius,' 'Humanity' and,  
in an arresting phrase, "that eternal world that *ever  
groweth*." There, he tells us, everything shines by its  
own interior light, all is Vision, Inspiration. "Inspira-  
tion and Vision was, and is, and I hope will always  
remain, my Eternal Dwelling Place." That 'state' is  
spiritual, it is intellectual. "What," he asks, "are the  
gifts of the spirit but intellectual gifts?" It is eternal.  
it is infinite. But if we speak of it as formless over  
against this 'state' of forms, he is up in arms. He  
declares:

“A spirit and a vision are not, as the modern philosophy supposes, a cloudy vapour or a nothing; they are organized and minutely articulated beyond all that the perishing and mortal nature can produce. He who does not imagine in stronger and better lineaments and in stronger and better light than his perishing and mortal eye can see, does not imagine at all.”

Nature is to him the formless and the vague :

“Nature has no outline ;

But Imagination has. Nature has no Time ; but  
Imagination has.

Nature has no supernatural and dissolves. Imagination  
is Eternity.”

It is to be feared that the ordinary person has small portion in this world of Imagination. Blake will not have it that we reach this divine apprehension through an improvement of natural faculties. We can no more climb into it upon the back of beauty than upon the back of ugliness, upon goodness than upon badness. “Knowledge of ideal beauty is not to be acquired. It is born with us. Man is born like a garden ready planted and sown. The world is too poor to produce one seed.” Neither nature nor the reason, which he calls the “ratio of the five senses,” implying apparently that it is a kind of automatic sorter or calculator of sense-impressions, nor the memory, will serve for this Poetic Genius. Not only do nature and reason not help, but they hinder. “Nature and Fancy are two things and can never be joined ; neither ought any to attempt it, for it is idolatry and destroys the soul.” Wordsworth had in this according to Blake fallen into both idolatry and atheism. The reading of the Prologue to *The Excursion* made him physically ill. What the



effect upon him would have been of such verses as the following from a recently published book, may be guessed :

“ Do you hear the country laughing in the springtime  
of the year ?

Then be certain 'tis none other than the Laugh of  
God you hear.”

For Blake nature “ smelt of mortality.” “ Natural  
objects always did and do weaken, deaden and obliterate,  
imagination in me.” His office was to free man from  
nature :

“ To cast off the rotten rags of Memory by Inspiration,  
To take off his filthy garments and clothe him in  
Imagination,  
To cast aside from Poetry all that is not Inspiration.”

For the phenomenal world was “ the void outside of  
existence,” the abyss of the senses. The creation of  
the phenomenal world had been a process of shrinking  
caused by a principle working against the current of  
real creation. The process had gone on until that  
which had shrunk, nature, no more was cognate with  
the spiritual. In its action upon the spiritual, the  
divine in man, his real humanity, it was as an  
imprisoning web, which contracted upon its victim,  
a “ dark net of infection.”

“ Six days they shrank up from existence,  
And the seventh day they rested  
And blessed the seventh day in sick hope  
And forgot their eternal life.

"No more could they rise at will  
 In the Infinite Void, but bound down  
 To Earth by their narrowing perceptions  
 They lived a period of years,  
 Then left a noisome body  
 To the jaws of devouring darkness.

"And their children wept and built  
 Tombs in the desolate places  
 And formed laws of Prudence, and called them  
 The eternal Laws of God."

If we ask Blake how all this came to be "in the beginning," he is no more and no less illuminating than other would-be solvers of the problem. There had been it seems a calamity:

"Lo, a shadow of horror is risen  
 In Eternity! Unknown, unprolific,  
 Self-closed, all repelling."

There seems also before this to have been some sort of treasonous giving and taking:

"Because thou gavest Urizen the wine of the Almighty  
 For steeds of Light that they might run in thy  
 golden chariot of Pride."

The wine had been given by beauteous Luvah, who  
 ". . . . kept with strong Urthona the living gates of  
 Heaven."

Urizen fell, and falling grasped and bore down with him bright Luvah and dark Urthona. Los, the eternal prophet, apparently the divine humanity, had in his efforts to localize the trouble become entangled and divided through Pity, "for Pity divides the Soul." All

of which and much more does not help us with "the beginning."

It will no doubt be easy to find in Blake conceptions of the natural and spiritual and their relationship differing from those which we have chosen. We may, with the symbolist, find justification for the seeking of spiritual values in nature. For instance, we find the lines :

"In futurity  
I prophetic see  
That the Earth from sleep  
(Grave the sentence deep)  
Shall arise and seek  
For her maker meek  
And the desert wild  
Become a garden mild."

The earth is adjured to hear the voice of the Bard,  
"who present, past and future sees."

"O Earth, O Earth, return !  
Arise from out the dewy grass ;  
Night is worn  
And the morn  
Rises from the slumbrous mass."

But in general his attitude is that "Error or Creation will be burned up, and then and not till then Truth or Eternity will appear. It is burned up the moment men cease to behold it."

Presuming that we find in Blake something of true perception, there seem to be certain implications in his pronouncements, which were perhaps obvious to him, perhaps unrecognized by him. Like his Los, "he

would not reason and compare, his business was to create."

The 'states' are separated and have each their own differentiation and economy. As a result each state apprehends itself as definite, ordered and organic, and apprehends another 'state,' in so far as it apprehends that other at all, as inorganic and inferior, if not unreal. They act upon each other because of their own life or motion, partly in absorptive attack, as an organism seeks food, partly in abrasive attack, as a stream contacts its obstructive banks. Each seeks to catch and bind or to break down and clear out of its path the others. It is perhaps all right and proper; at any rate in no other way could each exist. That they have each distinctive existence implies that there is a line drawn between them, which, because of the very existence of each, cannot be overpassed by any of the creatures of either order. Each 'state' bears its own fruits, produces its own entities, and there is no necessary or derivative correspondence between the two modes of differentiation. As one of the consequences there are no God-like beings, ourselves for instance, who live in both and who pass at intervals from one to the other. The truth of this division is apparent even in the narrower circle of the less separated modes within this phenomenal 'state.' Electricity no doubt has some sort of polity of its own, is a 'state,' a special and definitive synthesis of some kind, but when it comes to act upon another order of going,—when the light is switched on,—no electric entity is transplanted to gambol about for our benefit. Electricity, *as electricity*, is caught in a machine or net, and its energy, perhaps its struggle for freedom, produces phenomena. When we see a young tree growing on the dead trunk

of one of its kind, we know that here a particular woody fibre is not being transplanted. The old tree goes back into the general life of its 'state,' to what is for it, as a tree, dissolution, and, as such, it is taken up, and quite indifferently, by the new. If we graft a twig of cultivated apple upon a roadside stock, we find the superficiality of individuals and entities emphasized. It would seem that the sap which passes up the two types of tree is very much the same, but at the forking of the last twiglet there seems to be lodged a different kind of machine, which set going produces a different apple. What right have we to suppose that the fruits upon our human tree are otherwise differentiated? Why should we think that the formation of our consciousness, our sense of identity and our memory, these three which set us apart from our fellows, our personality, should be due to the distinctive activity of some divine being who has miraculously transplanted himself and his identity out of that which formed him. If there is in us that which has its home beyond nature, it would seem to be neither consciousness nor sense of identity nor memory, which are but as wheels in that little machine which nature has framed to "catch the joys of Eternity" for the purposes of her own life. That something in us may be Imagination or Poetic Genius; it is hardly an Imagining Entity. As to the phenomenon called Blake, the simple, yet incomprehensible, truth may have been that in him the 'state' which we would call the spiritual, and which he called the imaginative, apprehended itself; that in his imagination he *was* that state, and in no sense Wm. Blake. That rare mechanism of nature which was his mind, thrilled under the power of the current which it contacted, and produced those marvellous visualizations

on which his art was based. What wonder that William Blake sometimes thought these visualizations divine realities. Yet there seems also to have been a truer apprehension of the course of life: that it "lives upon death," that neither entities nor forms pass from the natural to the spiritual nor from the spiritual to the natural, though each mode of life supports the other.

"To bathe in the waters of life, to wash off the Not  
Human

I come in self-annihilation and the grandeur of  
Inspiration."

On the other hand his divine man, his Milton, descending, said: "I go to Eternal death."

We conceive of desire and thought, which for Blake were states of a lesser degree of 'otherness,' as attributes of ourselves; yet surely, when we stop to look at the operation of desire and thought, we realize that here are things which relatively to ourselves are universal. Our desires, our thoughts, are but bubbles upon those streams. How much more so is the case with that in us which is mightier than either—"the nameless of the hundred names?" Even in ordinary life accomplishment in anything is in proportion to our absorption, that is to the obscuration of our personality. When we recall those rare moments of partial otherness which come to the most humble of us, we know what a secondary part consciousness then plays. It seems to be much more so with the operation of that which we call genius. The measure of genius is the measure of the power to die. Inspiration and death (there seems to be no other word) go hand in hand.

There are some cherished and sheltering ideas with which we here find ourselves at variance, for they spring

from exaltation of the personality. The central idea of Christianity is that by the continued life, once in the natural and now in the spiritual, of an individual, a bridge or way has been made for us to pass *as individuals* from the one to the other. This idea seems to be a sort of last defence into which Christianity, following the example of Mahāyāna Buddhism, is retiring. Such a miracle, were it possible, would injure and not benefit. What could it add to the spiritual? The welfare of the natural depends upon transformation and re-arrangement, upon the formation and dissolution of individuals and not on their persistence. In what way would the natural, of which we and our fellows are a part, be benefited by the cornering and holding together of its finer elements? If it were thought to carry these elements into the spiritual, nature would have something to say to such a systematic robbery. We are inclined to conceive of the dying to live as the giving up of a city-flat for a country-mansion. It is to be feared that the process is not quite like that. The same idea which is at the back of Christianity now comes to us from Islam. Sheikh Muhammed Iqbāl talks of a "unique individual" who will "absorb God," and tells us that we are to "obtain immortality" by maintaining "a state of tension, *i.e.* personality." As soon might the proverbial frog puff himself out into an ox. The method would be effective for drawing tighter the web of nature, for shutting out so far as is possible the spiritual and forming in the natural what would be analogous to a hardened tumour in the body. There is a hard saying of Blake's: "Drive your horse and cart over the bones of the dead." It expresses his attitude towards all exploitation :

"He who bends to himself a joy  
Does the winged life destroy."

To his imaginative insight religion, whatever its type, appeared as a terrible wheel going from West to East against the current of creation, a principle which, giving an unhealthy permanence to the differentiations of nature, obstructed both the natural and the spiritual, thereby producing what is really deplorable in existence. Even if, as seems quite possible, the obstruction has reached the compass and enduringness of something which we might conceive of as a transcendent God, exploitation it would still be, and would end like all exploitation, however subtle and sustained. As Swinburne has written in words which seem to echo Blake:

"Lo winged with worlds' wonders,  
With miracles shod,  
With the fires of his thunders  
For raiment and rod,  
God thunders in heaven, and his angels are white  
with the terror of God.

"For his twilight is come on him,  
His anguish is here;  
And his spirits gaze dumb on him,  
Grown grey from his fear;  
And his hour taketh hold on him stricken, the last of  
his infinite year."

The spiritual must be sought for its own sake and not as an adornment for our personalities. He who seeks it otherwise than for its own sake has lost it already.



It may be said that without the protection of these religious ideas both race and individual would plunge headlong. We need not trouble about the race. It would be supported, as in the main it has been supported in the past, in part by its natural emotions and passions, but chiefly by its invincible inconsequence, that inconsequence which probably represents a better appreciation of the truth than does the anxiety of religion. For some individuals life would no doubt at times appear hard, a ghastly isolation, an intolerable boredom. Let these not always scorn the fare of their fellows. And for all, as for Blake, there is at hand an inexhaustible world of wisdom, strength and joy, from which we are shut out by nothing but—ourselves.

R. W. QUEEN.

(Read at a Members' Meeting of the Quest Society, June, 1921.)

## PSYCHOANALYSIS IN ITS RELATION TO ART.<sup>1</sup>

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ALL psychoanalysts, however else their opinions differ, postulate two concepts. These are the unconscious and what is generally known as libido. The term unconscious is used simply to indicate that there are psychological processes at work in man outside the focus of his awareness, whether such processes are a reflex neural arc or the most complex intuition. And this implies that the unconscious is dynamic; that behind it there is a definite driving force, which has been called libido; that there are in man various currents of energy, various tides of desire, which animate him and express themselves in all his activities. Let me here attempt a metaphorical figure. Imagine the surface of the sea on a black night, and imagine a searchlight playing on it from above. The bright area of focussed light is complete consciousness, —the attention consciously directed on any matter at any given moment. Around it is a dimly-lit area of unfocussed light; this corresponds at any given moment with all such vaguely realized thoughts and feelings as hover always round the object of conscious attention. In psychoanalytic language this has been called the preconscious. Outside all the light there is blackness,

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April 18, 1921.

the unknown, the unconscious. Like the sea, the unconscious is perpetually dynamic and fluctuating, and the driving force behind it is called libido.

If we admit these two concepts, we can go on to consider the theories built upon them. These are three in number.

Freud was the originator of psychoanalysis; his representation of our two concepts is that the unconscious consists only of memories and primitive instinct, reducible eventually to the sexual, procreative instinct. Freud is a pure materialist and a Darwinian evolutionist, and his theory is the logical outcome of such an intellectual attitude. Expressions of the unconscious he considers to be "fragments of the abandoned psychic life of the child." Libido, he says, is even with the child purely sexual instinct or desire; and that portion of libido which animates unconscious expression, is such desire as has been repressed during a man's growth by such forces as the convention of the historical moment. Libido is energy; we cannot conceive of energy as zero: consequently all expression of repressed libido in unconscious, spontaneous activities is the resultant of a clash between the desire seeking expression and the convention of the given historical moment holding it back. In philosophical language the unconscious of Freud is a pleasure-pain-principle perpetually in conflict with the reality-principle of the world of actuality.

The second theory is that of Adler; it practically differs from Freud's only in postulating the egotistic, self-assertive instinct, the will to power, as the basis of life rather than the sexual. Where Freud analyzes an unconscious act as the expression of repressed infantile sexuality, Adler regards it as an expression of

repressed desire for self-gratification. The one regards sexuality as the fundamental factor; the other considers egotism to be the motive power in life. In Adler's theory sexual instinct is motivated by egotism.

With neither of these two theories can we quarrel as far as they go. Both are right; they are simply the two sides of what I will call instinctual libido—that is, the will to be, to grow, to divide and multiply. The one deals with love, the other with power, in their most primitive aspects.

Let us now consider the third and, from my point of view at any rate, the most important and comprehensive theory of the unconscious that has yet been formulated,—the theory of Jung. Jung defines the unconscious as “the unknown of a given moment”; he regards libido as desire in the very widest meaning of any urge to any activity,—as love in the sense in which Diotima uses *erōs* in Plato's ‘Banquet.’ This libido is equivalent to the *lubet* of Jacob Boehme. A modern slang term is ‘keenness.’ A religious term is ‘zeal.’ In this conception is coiled up the idea of power, as in the *speirama* of the Greeks, the *kundalinī* of the Hindus. Libido in fact is the driving force in life. “It's love that makes the world go round.” Furthermore Jung, as a consequence of this conception, takes a teleological or purposive view of the unconscious, and considers it as manifesting definite trends of libido or functions.

There is a world of difference between regarding the unconscious as a “fragment of the child's abandoned psychic life” and as “the unknown of a given moment.” The first attitude implies the postulation of determinism all through life. Force of circumstance has caused the repressions which make up the unconscious in this

theory; the unconscious consists entirely of material repressed from consciousness. Freud is no philosopher at all. But the second theory permits us to take the teleological view; and, if we take this purposive view, we can throw overboard the Freudian notion that unconscious activities are invariably the distorted expression of repressed desires.

According to Jung's theory there are two functions in the unconscious: that of instinct and that of intuition. Instinct Jung has defined as "a teleological impulse towards a highly complicated action." The example he gives is the yucca-moth, which once a year lays its eggs in the yucca-flower in a most complicated fashion. Or, to take a simpler example, we can consider the bee. The instinct of the bee, its function, is to make honey, and all its complex activities are directed to that end. For the matter of that, the instinct of man is to be—man. Intuition, on the other hand, Jung calls "an unconscious teleological apprehension of a highly complicated situation." Intuition thus becomes the counterpart of instinct; and both are unconscious, spontaneous processes.

If we admit this conception of the unconscious, our psychoanalytic theories must be extended very much from their Freudian origin. Unconscious expression is not simply desire that has been abandoned in our course through life; it becomes prospective also, and has a definite value for the immediate moment. Jung's criticism of Freud is this: Cologne cathedral may most certainly be analyzed in terms of mineralogy; but when this has been done, the fact of the cathedral has by no means been explained. To take another illustration, which has been given by Dr. Nicoll: It may be perfectly right to say that in such

and such a picture there are so many grains of chromium and so many other grains of lead ; but the knowledge of this fact does not tell us what the picture means, what significance the picture has for the life either of the artist or of the community. If, however, we accept Jung's teleological view of the unconscious, we can take a much wider outlook altogether. The Freudian and Adlerian theories are therapeutic measures of reductive analysis whose only sphere of usefulness lies in the treatment of pathological unconscious expressions such as neuroses or psychoses. In neurosis repressed desire of one sort or another plays the major part, and consequently the Freudian or Adlerian aspect of the unconscious is here the most prominent. But we can see now that instinct is only one element in the unconscious ; there exists in it intuition also. If then we neglect the intuitional aspect, it is as if we were to pretend we possessed only one eye ; for in what I will call normal unconscious expression, intuition bulks as largely as, if not more largely than, instinct. The unconscious activities of any individual who is tolerably at ease amongst his instincts, will be largely intuitional.

What is really implied in Jung's theory, is that there are two ways of thought : the conscious and the unconscious. In consciousness we express ourselves more or less by words. In the unconscious, in dream state and reverie, in meditation and inspiration, our mind functions in a manner that, as I am speaking in consciousness, I am compelled to call symbolic. The picture which can be analyzed into grains of chromium and lead, can also be considered hermeneutically as something with a definite symbolic meaning. I use symbol here in the same sense as Jung, when he calls it a reference to what is at present unknown by analogy

with the known. A man dreams he is catching a train, for instance. It is as if he were catching a train; the important thing here is the idea behind the analogy of catching a train. The Union Jack is a symbol for all England and the ideas behind England. But to return to our picture. It is an unconscious expression on the part of the painter, in as much as its production is dependent upon a spontaneous inspiration,—whether rising directly out of his being or awakened by some objective association in the world around him.

If I may digress for a moment, it is very interesting to speculate on the nature of inspiration. The analysts have noted a phenomenon which they have called cryptomnesia, by which they mean that a completely obliterated memory may suddenly appear as an inspiration from the unknown. But in spite of this there is no doubt that inspiration eventually comes from a purely subjective source. A man writes a sonnet. Well, perhaps the actual sonnet-form or the phraseology or the epithets may be determined by objective associations; but the fundamental impulse to poetic expression is entirely from within himself.

We can now see wherein psychoanalysis is related to art. All works of art are expressions of the unconscious,—that is to say, are intuitional. I do not say anything of instinct here, because instinct, as I understand it, is really a psycho-physical phenomenon, whereas art is an entirely psychological activity. The expression of instinct, that is to say, must be physical; that of intuition is psychological, and only dependent on physical machinery as a means to an end. I do not think this statement is quite so arbitrary as it sounds. Kenneth Richmond, the analyst, has definitely divided the unconscious into subconscious and superconscious,

and personally I follow him in this division. The driving force behind either is always libido.

Now how does this apply to art? I have called art a psychological activity. In other language that means an activity of the spirit. But we see that art is by no means uniform. There is supreme art, good art, mediocre art and extremely bad art. If we put aside the judgment of the convention of the historical moment as being beside the point, we can, I think, decide upon a definite, stable canon of art by which all artistic work may be judged and marked. The canon I am going to suggest is not my own; it is one that I once heard in conversation, but I feel that it hits the mark very closely. The qualities essential to a work of art are these: dynamic, which is driving power; passion, which is blood, the 'astral' quality of instinct (do not let us be ashamed of that; if we deny our 'astrality,' we deceive ourselves and the truth is not in us); individuality, which is uniqueness; humanness or universality; architectonic or constructive; and the qualities also of divinity and ineffableness. In proportion as these qualities are present, in that proportion is any work of art adjudged as great or small. And the collective popular judgment is in this matter sound. We find that some artists fulfill all these requirements, some are deficient in certain qualities, others preponderate in other qualities. But the aim of art, it seems to me, is to express these qualities in such harmonious proportions as can only be called perfection. If I may give a literary example, I would suggest the great Indian epic the *Mahābhārata*. That poem at its best, is an expression of the superconscious. When interpolations are discounted, it is the epic standard of perfection. I will confine myself to literary examples, since



literature is the only art on which I feel qualified to speak.

Now what has psychoanalysis to do with this? In the above-suggested canon I have mentioned the two qualities of dynamism and of individuality or uniqueness. Psychoanalysis is a process whereby the analyzed individual studies his unconscious; he becomes aware of his instinct and intuition and of all the various channels along which his libido has been expressing itself. He becomes aware of everything that in consciousness lay so close under his nose, as it were, that he was overlooking it. He sees himself, not quite as others see him (others are equally blind to their own unconscious), but as his own mind, as his own intuition, sees him. He becomes aware of his *attitude* towards life; and with this awareness comes the power to re-orientate himself and to change that attitude, if he so wishes. The artist works by his unconscious. In so far as his superconscious is permitted expression, in so far does his work approach our canon of perfection. In so far as his subconscious and superconscious are intermingled, and in so far as his attitude towards life—his ideas about life—is coloured by false notions imbibed during growth, in so far will he fall short of our canon of perfection. Before analysis the unconscious appears generally to be undifferentiated, so far as our conscious estimate of it is concerned, and the analysis is an attempt to secure first a differentiation, then a synthesis. Thus a patient in the early stages of analysis dreamed of the Cyclops. The mythic Cyclops possesses the third eye, which is an intuition-symbol, though he also stands for a great deal that is primitive savagery and infantility. The point I wish to make here is that psychoanalysis is a definite help to an

individual in that it is an aid towards ultimate perfection.

Broadly speaking, there are two types of neurosis, or psychological disablement, or psychological falling off from perfection. There is the neurosis that inhibits a man's expression; and there is the neurosis that drives a man into expression, and is the root-cause of his becoming a valuable personality. Gray is an example of the first type, Nietzsche an example of the second; or if anyone feels disposed to quarrel with the latter statement, let us take instead Carlyle as an example of the second.

The Freudians make a great song about the psychoanalysis of artists. They say it is all wrong and likely to destroy the artist's artistic expression. And from their point of view they are perhaps right. But it is an undoubted jar, besides being incorrect, to be told that one's art is a distorted expression from one's subconscious, from the residue of one's infantile sexuality. Man is so constituted that he will always have a certain amount of guilt-feeling about his sexuality, and this guilt-feeling will prove an inhibition to his unconscious expression, if he believes that expression to be the resultant of his undifferentiated infantility.

But if we accept the theories of Jung about the unconscious, we need not be deterred by these Freudian notions. The unconscious regarded teleologically has a value for the moment and a value also for the future. And the hermeneutical analysis of Jung is a means whereby libido, power, the dynamic of our canon, may be freed from the subconscious depths of infantile sex and self-gratification, and may be transferred to the superconscious. In the ancient phrase, it is an attempt

to make the mind 'one-pointed,' to polarize libido. "If the eye be single, the whole body shall be full of light." It is further a means whereby a man's own individuality, in the real sense of that term, uniqueness, may be enhanced. So far from destroying the man's art, psychoanalysis in this sense should make its expression more perfect. Where expression is inhibited, the inhibition is removed; where expression is let drive, the driving irritant is removed, and consequently the expression may become more harmonious in its qualities. A forced expression is not really good.

When personal problems are resolved, the artist is left free to deal with collective pan-human problems. I am not advocating art for art's sake so much as art for life's sake. In so far as any work of art is universal in its application, in so far is it of value; witness the *Mahābhārata*. In so far as it deals with the personal problems and conflicts of the artist, in so far is it of value only to him and a small circle. The artist with a personal problem suffers from a loss of universality and works in a circle. Let us consider Rider Haggard and his everlasting Allan Quartermain or Conan Doyle with Sherlock Holmes and Watson. All such characters typify various aspects of the writer's psyche, symbolize such and such a libido-current. And such art falls off from perfection in that it is not universal in its application. And the reason is that libido, when entangled in a personal problem that has not been brought into consciousness, simply plays a fugue upon that problem and gets no 'farrarder.' But libido released from a personal problem is free to expand to the universal, pan-human problems,—that is, in the ancient language, to myths which have their being in the collective psyche of Everyman.

J. A. M. ALCOCK.

## TRIANGLE.

THEY'VE sold your pictures, Peter : I was there.  
Were you, I wonder ? No, I think that God  
(Who's kind, they say) would let you have a rest  
After you died, because you were so tired—  
So deadly tired of any kind of living—  
Before Eternity begins for you.  
I hope so, anyhow, old man ; and so  
I think I'll write down just what's happened to-day—  
To-day and all these queer days since you went.  
Then, if you should come back some time, perhaps  
You'll light on it, and see I understood  
At last ; and even—who knows ?—forgive us both.  
If not . . .

Well, anyhow, I've got to do it !

They'd hung your pictures in the Board Room.

Bowles

Was doing the honours, working like a horse.  
'Fat, jovial, common—with a heart of gold,'  
You once described him ; and I knew him by it.  
There he was, backing up your Treasurer :  
"I'll have that snow scene. What ? Only ten quid ?  
Make it fifteen, Tremaine. Oh, *that's* all right !—  
Must help the widow the best way we can.  
(Throw in those sheep : five guineas more for me.)  
Here, Richardson, you've got to fork out, too !  
Which shall it be ?—this cheerful ruin, or

That Monna what-d'you-call-her with the smile?  
 Levick!—a chunk of yellow fog for you?  
 Good!—only twelve pound ten, and that poor girl  
 Is sure of her next quarter's rent. Oh, Dan,  
 Haven't you been away? Poor Thrace is dead.  
 Yes, Peter Thrace; yes, shockin' sudden thing;  
 At work here just three weeks ago he was.  
 You knew he painted? Here's some of his stuff;  
 We want to sell the lot. Take a look round. . . ."

That was at lunch-time, Peter. Now I've heard—  
 Annette has rung me up to say they've sold  
 For close upon two hundred pounds.

I know,

I know, old man. (O God, your very eyes  
 Leap at me from this paper, smiling, sad,  
 Quietly uncomplaining as in life.)  
 The irony of it!—to have them sell  
 Now, and for such a reason. . . . Peter, I *know*;  
 Don't! I can't stand it, man. . . .

Your work was good—

Was *good*, I tell you!—bettering, too, each year;  
 Only you hadn't time for it; you couldn't  
 Afford to leave your office-stool, and so  
 It broke your heart—half broke it, anyhow:  
 Annette and I between us did the rest.

Annette your wife, and I your friend. How clear!  
 Why did I never see it till you died?  
 What is this death that ends a man, and then  
 Floods him with light for those that stay behind?  
 If either of us had seen it! . . . But we didn't;  
 We thought *we* did the suffering, plumed ourselves  
 Upon our loyalty—*our loyalty*!

I was your friend before I loved your wife ;  
 And for that friendship I renounced that love.  
 She was your wife before she loved your friend ;  
 And to that wifehood sacrificed her heart.  
 We did no wrong ; our love was innocent,  
 As the world reckons innocence ; it was  
 Love unfulfilled, love schooled to quietness,  
 Love asking nothing except just to be.  
 Yet in that being, that bare existence, how  
 Love shut you out, out, out ! . . .

Oh, horrible !

Because we loved, we made the world your prison—  
 The body, the soul, your solitary cell ;  
 Alone you lived and in a desert died  
 Because we loved.

So little, so very little,

We seemed to take !—and yet how much it was,  
 Peter, compared with what we left for you.  
 Love made an aureole about our days,  
 And in that golden light Annette's least look  
 Or word or touch was ecstasy to me,  
 And all my trivial service was to her  
 A knightly sword unsheathed.

Most sweet—most sweet !

While you ?—as if I had it from your lips,  
 I know now that you saw it all—yes, all.

You gave no sign ; you made no difference ;  
 You seemed to know that we had robbed you, Peter,  
 Of nothing except love. And what is love ?  
 Can Justice measure it upon her scales ?  
 Can Law assess its worth, its damages ?  
 Divine, intangible essence !—love, once yours  
 From wife, from friend, was yours no longer. True ;  
 Yet how do anything but suffer it ?

How say to me 'Hands off!' who had not touched  
Anything but a woman's secret soul?  
How bid Annette, "I must insist you love me,"  
As though love were a dog and could be chained?  
Of course not!—no! "Things without remedy  
(You must have thought) should be without regard."  
And so you bore the thing you could not mend;  
So you were just as decent to us both  
As though you didn't know. And yet you did;  
I see it now so well: of course you did.  
It's just that knowing that explains the rest;  
Explains the look of quiet hopelessness  
That fastened on your eyes beneath their smile;  
Explains why (though you must have known that you  
Were dying) you didn't worry about Annette,  
About the future, money, anything.  
You knew she'd be all right—I'd take your place  
In death, as I had taken it in life!

Heavens, you were lonely, Peter! *That* was why  
You never made the smallest effort to live;  
Glad to let go—to finish with us and go.  
Between us we had robbed you, stripped you bare:  
Poverty and the office—those came first,  
Stealing your days that should have been for art;  
The passion of service, the communion  
That can be wife, friend, lover to a man!—  
These, half denied, left you half desolate;  
And after that your friend absorbed your wife,  
Your wife your friend; and there was nothing left  
But loneliness, but aching loneliness.  
What should you do, what should you do but die  
As soon as death (which must have seemed a friend,  
Compared with us) held out a finger to you?

You died ; we killed you, Peter. We—our love—  
Murdered in you the very will to live.  
And now the price is that love dies—*love* dies !  
How strange to write. Annette . . . I loved her so. . . .  
And now just nothing, nothing left at all  
For me as once for you (the justice of it !)  
But a bare duty.

Oh, I'm bound, of course,  
By every wordless bond that was our love—  
Annette's and mine ; (bound, too, because *you* knew  
And trusted to it) ; and in a year we'll marry.  
Only—that's all. No shining aureole now ;  
Nothing to hide the thing we did to you,  
The pitiless thing.

I thought she'd feel that, Peter ;  
I thought she'd be, like me, mad with remorse—  
*Seeing* you suddenly—hating me for grief.  
I took it for granted, and I should have loved  
Her hate more than her love ! Anguish, despair,  
If only they had swept us equally—  
That would have been 'a marriage of true minds.'  
Penanced and purged, absolved by time, by you,  
We should have come together, lovers, at last !  
Instead I found—wretched, amazed, I found  
That nothing of all this had touched her spirit ;  
Nothing had lessoned, scourged her with the truth.  
She weeps—but not as though her heart must break ;  
She mourns—but not as one that has no hope.  
There is some hard, insensitive streak in her ;  
She sees you still by life's pale glimmer, not  
By death's majestic beam of pity and pain.  
I sicken at it. And it is the end—  
The end of love !



Oh, no, don't be afraid !—  
It's only you I'm telling. She won't know.  
Nobody in the world will ever know  
But you and I—but you, old Peter, and I. . . .  
There is a sort of comfort—yes, I'm glad  
To have to pay, and in the very coin  
Of silent suffering that we forced from you.  
Annette shan't suffer ; I'll see to that.

(No, no ;

I *want* to do it ; it will be done for love,  
If anything ever was !—for love of you.)  
Only, old man, if some day you come back,  
Remember, won't you, that I'm paying still ?  
Forgive me, Peter, if you can, because  
I can't forgive myself—because I'm going  
To be as lonely now as ever you were. . . .

V. H. FRIEDLAENDER.

## LIFE.

LIFE is Eternal Becoming that down the cascade of  
the ages  
Streams with tumultuous force, to which the glittering  
rapids  
Of the broad-flowing Milky Way seem an insignificant  
runnel  
That gleams for a moment beneath the ageless sun of  
eternity.  
Life is a torrent outpoured from an inexhaustible  
chalice,  
A cornucopia held in the hand of an unseen Divinity,  
A supreme thank-offering made to Himself, a mystic  
libation,  
Whose myriad drops when united prefigure the Oneness  
of Spirit.  
It carries the galleon of Time on its flood like a lordly  
Amazon.  
It worms its way through the tiniest crevice of Space,  
returning  
To the chalice from which it has issued, as water  
returns to the fountains,  
Pulsing through every vein of an universe otherwise  
lifeless,  
Till it recurs at long last to the mighty Heart of All  
Things.  
Yet every moment 't is real, as real as the Mind that  
controls it,

That sits enthroned in the midst of all, unmoved and unaltered.

For consider the Ocean, the symbol alike of Time and Eternity,

Whose restless bosom heaves with the rhythmical throb of the billow,

While the fathomless depths below the turmoil and toil of its fluxes

Abide unchanged in their watery fortress for ever and ever.

Yet real is the transient course, as real as the changeless abysses.

CLAUDESLEY BRERETON.

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## FILLE DE JOIE.

I WAS in the beginning of Man ;

I shall see the end.

I am the eternal sacrifice,

Love's other self, the Demon of the soul.

I am Lust's scapegoat beaten and pursued

Into uttermost wildernesses.

Babylon rose and fell, and many kings

Are scattered dust ; but I

Have drained the cup of immortality.

I am the ghost that haunts desire, a jest

Upon men's lips, derided, sold and bought,

Spat at and fawned upon.

I am the waif of the world,

A bitter laughter on lascivious tongues,  
The solitary of appetite,  
The Wandering Jew—  
I am most utterly alone.

I am the worm in the rose,  
The destroyer of seed,  
The blight on fruitfulness.  
I am the traitorous breach  
In Love's walled sanctities.

Because of me

Beauty on wounded feet  
Passes invisible.

I am the shame of Woman, the measure of Man,  
The probe of every creed.  
I am the orphan of God.

STEPHEN SOUTHWOLD.

## CORRESPONDENCE.

### 'THE PROCESS OF MAN'S BECOMING.'

PERMIT me to point out that your otherwise favourable notice of the above book in your April issue, carries a misconception with regard to its authorship. Allow me to state that, though not himself the mediator used in the communications in question, the present writer is the sole person who has been authorised by the school who received them, to publish a summary thereof and he had no assistant in the redaction of the book.

With regard to the question raised as to what were the means of communication used. It clearly states in the book that this consisted in thought-carrying life-currents, projected by operators in inner states of being. The thoughts thus conveyed were received by an embodied mediator who had been specially prepared for the work; in whom responsiveness in correlative degree had already been developed by the action upon him of these operators. From his inner degree of consciousness they were mediated to and through his personal degree of consciousness (so there was no automatism) becoming clothed with words in the process, which words were dictated and recorded.

This process in the microcosmic instrument, embodied on the earth, corresponded to the macrocosmic process of transmission from the central cosmic states to the circumference or external earth.

Had this inner level of responsiveness not been developed in advance in the receiving instrument by the action of the inner operators, the reception and clothing of such thought in words would not have been possible. That is the fulcrum of the whole question. It involves the presence in man of degrees of consciousness relating us with correlated inner states and planes of being in our cosmos,—degrees that are higher in mode than that of the personal degree functioning through the senses which relate us to the external universe.

It is interesting to note in this respect that Viscount Haldane in his recent work on *The Reign of Relativity* states: "Even in the mind that is finite there may be degrees that take us beyond what is finite, incapable of becoming present in direct sense experience." That insight is all to his honour. But we go further and claim that such inner degrees may be made to mediate their content to and through the personal degree.

The possibility of discovering how far the so-called subconsciousness of the instrument may have contributed to these communications, as suggested by the reviewer, is a consideration which naturally arises from current psychological teachings. But while admittedly it is impossible for personal self-consciousness to verify the existence of the postulated operators in central states of being, yet the suggested alternative source of the subconsciousness is but an equally vague field to personal knowledge.

It would certainly be attributing greater powers of origination to that nebulous domain than has so far been allowed to it and exalting it to a level which experience in research does not yet warrant. Not even Flournoy, who dealt with *Des Indes à la Planète Mars*, would have claimed that the subconsciousness of an average man, neither a scientist nor a metaphysician nor a psychologist, as was the 'mediator' used, could construct a 'plan of an intelligible universe.' Flournoy's complaint in that instance was that there was nothing original in that book; nothing that could not be attributed to the re-groupings by the imagination or subconsciousness of facts of previously acquired knowledge. But that criticism would not apply to the communications at present under consideration.

No human imagination or subconsciousness could have originated descriptions of the transcendent states of being such as these communications convey. No human being has dared to deal with the process of self-differentiation by the Infinite of its own life into finite units, or to present us with Angelic parents and with Angelic heredity before human heredity arises. No one has ever told us that Angels are dual beings and that we ourselves will become such, made in the image of our maker, the Supreme Father-Mother of all. No one has yet imagined that we come to project radiations of life-rays to inconceivable distances, inter-

penetrating all within their circumference and constituting the basis of communion. No one has conceived of a state in which each unit shares reciprocally in the knowledge of all units in the unity in which they form fractions. Who has yet ventured to point out that, in as much as we are inseverable fractions of the Infinite, none can be lost and that all, in spite of our present failings and shortcomings, will ultimately rise into Celestial states? All this is new and no subconsciousness could originate such conceptions.

QUESTOR VITÆ.

THE testimony of Quæstor Vitæ disposes of our conjecture. This conjecture was concerned with the intermediary stage, the formal expression of the communications, whether transmissive or editorial. It was in this connection that the theory of the subconscious factor was brought in; there was no contention that it covered the whole ground. Some measure of interplay and immixture of this factor must surely be allowed for even in the most favourable cases where we may be persuaded that the primary impulse comes from another mind or is transmitted through several minds other than that of the proximate mediator. The latter probability especially must be taken into consideration; and indeed it is not infrequently asserted in mediumistic communications which purport to come from a high source, that this is what generally occurs, and that it is very difficult to avoid leakage and distortion on the way. It would almost seem that the other side has its subconscious problems to deal with equally with ourselves. All such processes and their interlinking are naturally very obscure for us. We have to take their ultimate products as we find them and do with them the best we can. It is the contents solely by which we can judge. Our correspondent claims that the contents of the communications in question are very exceptional and calls to witness their daring nature and novelty in support of this contention. But whatever value the ideas instanced may have, they can hardly be said to be unprecedented in the latter two respects. Human beings have frequently dared to deal with the processes of the self-differentiation of the Infinite. Doubtless much of this in the past has been claimed to be a matter of revelation; but thinkers have equally had the hardi-

hood to make similar attempts without claiming any revelational authority for their speculations. And this not only in the past, but it continues in both forms at the present day. Again an angelic or spiritual heredity for man is by no means a rare doctrine either in antiquity or to-day, when it is still held as the characteristic counter or complementary theory to the evolutionary. Indeed, all really optimistic views of human nature contain some such notion. The dual sex of higher beings is a widespread belief. Not to speak of other traditions, it is one of the commonest concepts in India, and in the West the Hermetic tradition sets forth the doctrine in lofty terms, declaring that man in his true inner nature is made in the image of the Divine Parent—the spiritual fatherhood and motherhood in one. Further the interpenetration and reciprocal sharing of spiritual minds in one another's qualities, powers and knowledge is precisely the main characteristic of the Plotinian noëtic state. And finally the high hope of an ultimate salvation for all, the doctrine of universalism, is far from unknown in Western tradition; indeed no less a mind than Origen's was a powerful advocate of this ultimate conquest of love. When an idea or doctrine already exists in the mind of humanity it can be said to be new only for an individual mind. There may be novelty of presentation of already existing notions, but the advent of a fundamentally new idea is a rare and great event.—ED.



## REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

### A CRITICAL HISTORY OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY.

By W. T. Stace. London (Macmillan); pp. 336; 7s. 6d. net.

THIS is a vigorously written and highly critical exposition of the history of Greek thought from its beginnings in Ionia to the days of later Platonism. For Mr. Stace philosophy is solely the effort to comprehend, to understand, to grasp the reality of things intellectually; it cannot admit anything higher than reason. This test he applies throughout to every phase of Greek thought and finds its highest exponent in Aristotle. He holds that the idealism of Plato was clogged with unessentials and overgrown with excrescences from which Aristotle freed it; on Pythagoras a far harder sentence is passed. His point of view may be most conveniently seen in the following passage in which he contrasts the two greatest minds of Hellas:

"Thought, the universal, the Idea, form—call it what you will—this is the ultimate reality, the foundation of the world, the absolute prius of all things. So thought both Plato and Aristotle. But whereas Plato began to draw mental pictures of the universal, to imagine that it existed apart in a world of its own, and so might be experienced by the vision of the wandering soul, Aristotle saw that this was to treat thought as if it were a thing, to turn it into a mere particular again. He saw that the universal, though it is the real, has no existence in a world of its own, but only in *this* world, only as a formative principle of particular things. This is the key-note of his philosophy. Aristotle registers, therefore, an enormous advance upon Plato. His system is the perfected and completed Greek idealism. It is the highest point reached by the philosophy of Greece. The flower of all previous thought, the essence and pure distillation of the Greek philosophic spirit, the gathering up of all the good in his predecessors and the rejection of all that is faulty and worthless—such is the philosophy of Aristotle."

That Plato's outlook is here shorn of all its beauty and vitality is very apparent; for his lovers Plato stands for much

more. Mr. Stace does not sufficiently consider how the pendulum of thought must always be swinging between these two typical modes of philosophic endeavour, and that it continued so to swing in Greece. For him progress ends with Aristotle. "It was not possible for the Greek spirit to go further. Further development could be only decay." That the pendulum swung back centuries later towards Plato's position is regarded by our author as a disaster, and Neo-Platonism comes in for severe criticism as though it had turned its back entirely on reason. But this is far from being the case; most if not all of this line of thinkers, who for some three hundred years summed up the best in the philosophic heredity of Greece, showed themselves possessed of very high dialectical ability, and a Proclus, for instance, formulates his propositions with almost mathematical precision. Neo-Platonism neglected no side of human nature in its discipline and paid ample homage to the intellect. In its schools Aristotle's works were closely studied alongside of those of its own great master, and many attempts were made to reconcile, harmonize or make 'symphonies' (as they were called) of what might appear to be contradictory but were really complementary methods of thought. This being so, surely our philosophers are not to be blamed for leaving a way open for the recognition of a whole-making activity of the human spirit which would eventually bring about its union with ultimate reality? For it is clear that, admirable as reason is, it does not do this for us; man is a rational animal, but he is also something more; and it is this 'more' precisely, the inworking power of self-transcendence, which is ever seeking to realise itself in great minds; here the power of expression in terms of the discursive intellect necessarily falls short.

"The essential character of Neo-Platonism," writes Mr. Stace, "comes out in its theory of mystical exaltation of the subject to God. It is the extremity of subjectivism, the forcing of the individual subject to the centre of the universe, to the position of the Absolute Being." This central doctrine of spiritual mystical endeavour is the conviction that the ultimate reality in man is kin with the supreme reality of the universe; and it is difficult to understand why entering into the heart of this supreme reality should be regarded as the extremity of subjectivism. For the Neo-Platonists the Good was no abstraction from reality but a fulness of being, full to overflowing; they indeed averred that it was more than Being. Mr. Stace thinks it

a self-evident absurdity if he makes them say: "If ordinary consciousness will not suffice, we will pass beyond ordinary consciousness." But why not? For most assuredly ordinary consciousness does not suffice. From this, however, he concludes that Neo-Platonism is "founded upon despair, the despair of reason." But what despair is there in affirming that there is a reality in man more admirable than reason? We should prefer to say that mystical philosophy is founded upon hope, on confidence in the power of the human spirit to go forward when reason has reasonably to confess itself at the end of its resources. If human reason alone were capable of solving the ultimate problem of philosophy, it is strange that to-day the intellectual battle is still being waged as furiously as ever it has been in the past.

#### THE SOCIAL DOCTRINE OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCHES AND SECTS.

Soziallehren der Christlichen Kirchen. Gesammelte Schriften.

By Ernst Troeltsch, D.D., Ph.D., L.D. Anstatic Reprint.  
Tübingen (J. C. B. Mohr-Paul Siebeck); 2 vols., pp. x. + 994;  
M.120, about 10s.

IN addition to Max Weber's essays on the sociology of religion (Oct. no., 1921) I should like to draw the reader's attention to this volume by Troeltsch, first published 1912, which was out of print till quite recently, and has not got in England the attention it deserves and is sure to find, now that the War and after-War experiences have done so much to quicken our understanding for the social side of religious problems.<sup>1</sup>

Written before the catastrophe and now republished unchanged by this mildly, but still unmistakably, conservative author, the book does not give in essential parts what we should to-day expect from a work on this fascinating subject. Especially the first chapter, on the gospel of Jesus—the message of which is explained as purely spiritual and transcendent, devoid of any political and social connotation and unconnected with any class-antagonisms of the period,—assuredly does not do full justice to

<sup>1</sup> Baron F. von Hügel in his last published volume of *Essays and Addresses on the Philosophy of Religion*, reviewed in our last issue, has dealt at great length with Troeltsch's views, especially with his *Soziallehren*.—Ed.

the question, least of all to the Jewish Messiah's own decidedly revolutionary attitude (see my paper 'Jesus and the Jewish Blood-Sacrifices,' Jan., 1921), which is nowhere analytically separated from the very different ideas of Paul, the Roman citizen, and his followers. However much both the work of the strongly anti-socialist historian Robert von Pöhlmann of Munich (*History of the Social Problem and of Socialism in the Ancient World*, 1912), and still more the naïve tendency-book of the Socialist Karl Kautzsky, on *Christian Origins*, leave to be desired on the side of sound criticism, there can be no doubt that they are both nearer the truth than Troeltsch in this first chapter of his book. The excellent paper of Miss L. Dougall on 'The Salvation of the Nations' in the *Hibbert Journal* (Oct., 1921, pp. 114f.) has at last directed the attention of the general reader to the always, or at least frequently, quite obvious national and political side of the sublime Sermon on the Mount of the Nazarene King-claimant; for what else is a Messiah, and what else was Jesus, in spite of all recent hair-splitting about the traditions concerning the 'Messianic secret'? The social purpose of Jesus' teaching is patent for everyone who is not misled by the usual mistranslation of the Sayings about the "realm which is not of this world" (Jn. 1836) and still "amidst you" (Lk. 1721).<sup>1</sup> The reign of the Messiah over this our real world (which is the 'kingdom of God,' because his will is done in it after the demonic antagonists are at last overcome) was certainly not meant to perpetuate the existing social iniquities and to redress them only somewhere '*in animis vestris*' or in a transcendent spirit-world, but was intended to abolish them quite simply and truly *hic et nunc*. The conservative attitude of the early Church, *e.g.* in the matter of slavery—Troeltsch's great argument (pp. 19ff.) for his purely spiritual interpretation of the message of Jesus to the poor and down-trodden—is manifestly nothing else but a temporising compromise with 'this world,' intended originally for the short space between

<sup>1</sup> Only the Greek '*entos hymōn*,' and never the Aramaic original, could be understood by the Church Fathers as '*in animis vestris*'—'in your hearts' or 'in your moral conscience.' The Semites ignore the very notion of 'transcendancy,' of a transcendent, so to say fourth-dimension, *au-delà*, and of a 'spiritual interior.' Their heavenly realm, their 'next world,' is most massively existent in the interior of the sky; hence it comes down first tentatively in drops or seeds—such as *e.g.* appearances of the Messiah, of angels, etc.—and then fully in glory, not in a far-off dimly perceived, but in a next, tangibly imminent future. Even so the *Gehinnom*, *She'ol*, *Hades*, are underground realities, not transcendent states of consciousness of the soul or what not.

the present and the second advent of the glorified Christ in power. Only when the original hopes of the speedy coming of the Redeemer had definitely proved vain, was the Church forced to make its peace with 'this world,' to develop a long series of subsequent systems of sociological doctrines on the basis of existing conditions, to confine the ideal universal communism of love to the cœnobitic life of the 'perfect,' and to push into the background of sectarian chapels and praying-circles those 'heretics' who stuck tenaciously to the old ideal. Since a revolutionary overthrowing of the Roman Empire and its society—the 'tearing down to earth of the heavenly kingdom by force, as it were by robbers' (Mt. 11<sup>12</sup>, Lk. 16<sup>16</sup>)—was quite out of the question, the educational, spiritual alleviation of the evils of 'this world' became the secular task of the Christian Church. How the leading teachers wrestled throughout the ages with this infinitely difficult problem is most lucidly explained in Troeltsch's admirable book, which is a very mine of learning, and offers an enormous wealth of historic material in an excellently clear and well-disposed order. It is a pity, not to say a shame, that neither Max Weber's essays nor Troeltsch's book are mentioned anywhere—*e.g.* in the articles 'Sociology,' 'Socialism,' 'Slavery,' 'Ethics (Christian)'—in the *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*. The readers of THE QUEST will be specially interested in the elaborate chapter on the sociological aspects of mysticism and spiritualism, which are set forth with great acumen and deep insight into the psychology of the different movements.

R. E.

#### HELLENISM AND CHRISTIANITY.

By Edwyn Bevan, Hon. Fellow of New College, Oxford. London (Allen & Unwin); pp. 275; 12s. 6d. net.

THIS is a collection of essays, two of which have been published in THE QUEST, others in various other reviews. The volume includes subjects that bear only indirectly on the title. The author is well known as a learned, fair-minded and accurate scholar. His style has a lucidity which errs, if at all, in the direction of discursiveness. We must confine ourselves to the briefest summary of the main theme. Mr. Bevan wishes to trace the history of 'rationalistic' civilisation, and to show that Christianity in its essential features may be regarded as its legitimate outcome. Rationalism, "the critical intellect, the

bent to submit tradition and belief to logical examination, the desire to get the values of things in their real proportions," starts with the Greeks. The evolution of this rationalism, as of everything else, cannot be traced as a continuous modification and improvement. In the ancient Hellenic civilization the promise of its development seems to have been suddenly arrested in every department of thought and activity. But the principle of rationalism is reincarnated in Western civilisation and remains a permanent influence and method. The data, however, on which it works become enlarged. Extended, say, to India or China, the rational method is likely to bring vast enrichment to our spiritual heritage. Just so Christianity, in introducing an altogether new experience, enlarges the data for thought to deal with. Christianity cannot profess to bring certainty, which in the sense of truth proved, sealed and final is nowhere to be found. "There is no concealment on the part of Christianity of its whole scheme standing or falling by a hypothesis." Everything depends upon the individual's estimate of the value and worth of things, and of this every man must judge for himself. The enlargement of natural science depends at every step on some hypothesis about the universe. "If the hypothesis that the inner reality of the universe is revealed in good men and especially in Christ cannot be logically proved or disproved, neither can any other hypothesis—*e.g.* that the universe has no moral quality, that it is indifferent to good and evil, that it is essentially unknowable." A leap of some kind (*i.e.* an act of faith) we are compelled to make in the pursuit of any kind of knowledge, and this because of the necessity of action. We can never be simply spectators of life. "If the Christian Church is going to further its cause in the days to come, it will be by exhibiting a certain type of life, realized in practice . . . It can only convince the world of the supreme value of its ideal of love by steadily confronting the world with the actual thing."

To our readers probably the most interesting part of the volume will be contained in the essays that deal with the state of the Greco-Roman world out of which Christianity took its rise. We have a concise and graphic account of the origin, the varieties, the inadequacies of the various forms of Gnosticism. In the decay of the old civilization and the concomitant welter of traditions, cults and mystery-worships that thronged the vacant chambers of men's minds, confusion and darkness seemed to reign, just as they do with us to-day. The picture presented

is that of a lonely child that has lost its way in a strange, large city and is thoroughly frightened. Man cannot rest in such a condition. The various forms of Gnosis were different attempts to find the way out of darkness into light—back to God. Sincerity, originality and fuller life seem to have been the attraction to those who adopted the Christian way. A certain uniqueness in the relation of Jesus to God seems to our author to be the essential characteristic of what in the field of human history Christianity has actually been. We heartily commend the book.

C. R. S. S.

#### THE EARLIEST SOURCES FOR THE LIFE OF JESUS.

By F. Crawford Burkitt, D.D., F.B.A., Norrisian Professor of Divinity in the University of Cambridge. Now and Revised Edition. London (Constable); pp. 121; 3s. 6d. net.

WE are very glad to see this new edition of Prof. Burkitt's most useful little volume. It has long been out of print and that has been a loss to many. We are often asked to recommend a book on this subject, and since its appearance Burkitt's succinct and penetrating exposition has always been our first choice; failing its procurability, we have referred enquirers to the same careful scholar's Art. 'The Gospels' in Hastings' *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*. Other informative books there are, but we are especially drawn to this study because of its impressive insistence on the value of Mark as our earliest narrative source, in other words on its prime importance for the history of the brief Galilean ministry of Jesus and the tightly-packed passion-week at Jerusalem. In Mark, if anywhere, are to be found the least accommodated accounts of what happened during these most critical months for Christianity and for the world. Sometimes Mk. has handed on incidents of so disturbing a nature that Mt. and Lk., who copy from him in large portions of their gospels, have both independently judged it wiser to modify or omit these 'scandals.' This is what makes Mk. of so great value for the historian; throughout he is the more primitive, the more closely in touch. Prof. Burkitt is of opinion that the Mark-document has been too much neglected, and that the more it is studied the more it rewards the unprejudiced historian. That is very true, but we fear we cannot go as far as he does in his pet theory that John

Mark was as a youth an eye-witness of the great events of passion-week, being no other than the youth in the single linen garment who fled away, leaving his garment behind, with the rest of the disciples and adherents when Jesus was arrested. Not only so, but we are asked to believe that this same John Mark was present at the great scene of Gethsemane, the garden of the 'Oil Press'; while the others slept, he kept awake and so heard the words of Jesus. Thus Prof. Burkitt would make Mark an eye-witness of that last week and so for its events a first-hand narrator. This seems to us in the highest degree improbable, and in spite of our great respect for the writer we can only think that here our good Homer has nodded. It is impossible to believe that if Mark had been an eye-witness, he could have so carefully concealed the fact; even had he desired to do so—and what reason can be assigned for such a desire?—he must have betrayed himself in some more definite fashion than the single little incident of the fleeing youth. To assume his presence at Gethsemane seems a desperate expedient; had he been there, would he not have rejoiced to say so, and have considered himself privileged beyond measure to have heard so intimate a confession of the one he regarded with such love and adoration?

#### ARABIC THOUGHT AND ITS PLACE IN HISTORY.

By De Lacy O'Leary, D.D., Lecturer in Aramaic and Syriac, Bristol University. London (Kegan Paul); pp. vii. + 820; 10s. 6d. net.

WE have still a keen recollection of pleasure in reading and of benefit derived from the study, some forty years ago, of Draper's *Intellectual Development of Europe*. Since then we do not remember coming across anything precisely of a similar nature, or at any rate which brings out so entertainingly and compactly the enormous influence of the schools and thinkers of Islam on the Middle Ages of Scholastic Europe. We welcome warmly, therefore, Dr. O'Leary's instructive volume; it is crammed with information,—indeed so tightly packed that it is difficult somewhat to see the wood because of the innumerable trees. Doubtless space-limits were prescribed by the publishers, so that the learned author has been compelled in many cases to give us names of thinkers and titles of works, rather than a summary of their lives and of the contents of their MSS. The consequence is that in these cases the unlearned reader finds himself contemplating the



skeleton rather than the living tissue of thought. Nevertheless there is much in the volume that is more vitally displayed; and this is of the greatest value to the historian of the culture and intellectual development of the Western middle period. What Europe owes to 'Arabic Thought' has never been sufficiently acknowledged; indeed what 'school-boy' knows a word of the matter? And yet 'Arabic Thought' is an unfortunate label: most of the scholars, philosophers and mystics coming under this heading, were not of Arab lineage; it were better to have said 'Muslim.' And again the 'Thought' also is not an original product, but derived very largely from Greek culture, especially of the Aristotelianized Later Platonic type. Dr. O'Leary makes good use of the best European authorities, such as Browne, Nicholson, and Macdonald among ourselves, and also shows considerable familiarity with Muslim sources. We would cordially recommend his book to students of this very important phase of religious, philosophical and early scientific culture; not that we think the subject is by any means exhausted, but because the volume is a valuable contribution to its elucidation, whetting the appetite for further information. It is to be regretted only that the author's style is not very clear or inviting, and above all that he has given us no index. This short notice, it should be understood, is no indication whatever of the importance of these 320 pages of informing summary, survey and exposition; and that too even though the author vigorously repudiates all sympathy with the psychical element which frequently plays so important a part in the minds of the thinkers whose views he reviews, but of which he seems in his treatment of the subject to be regrettably ignorant. The pseudo-scientific Rationalistic tabūs of the second half of the 19th century are fast becoming ridiculous in the light of the 'new psychology.'

#### THE GREAT SOCIETY.

A Psychological Analysis. By Graham Wallas. London (Macmillan); pp. 888; 12s. net.

PROFESSOR GRAHAM WALLAS has for over thirty years—he was an original member of the Fabian Society (1888)—been thinking about sociology. Of late he has determined to get hold of a better psychology of the individual than he found the leading sociologists had been using. This he has found to his hand in the parallel work of Prof. McDougall, who had been working for

a better sociology to support his psychology. And so we have a recourse to Activism, Behaviourism, as more true to life than the psychology and sociology which had been absorbed in studies of an Intellectualist or an Emotionalist character. In his *Human Nature and Politics* (1908), Mr. Wallas gave us a brightly written first instalment of his method. In the present volume (published in 1914 and reissued in 1920) he analyses the social ordering of a great modern State; with, however, some protests against the excessive anti-intellectualism which he sees reason to oppose.

There is not much in the volume which is of special interest to readers of *THE QUEST*. In fact, it is a study on the level of the concrete life with which Plato deals in the first four books and the last two of the *Republic*, apart from the consideration of a higher ideal world and its possible influence upon the dense and complicated world of our ordinary life. But I think our readers will find some profit in reading Mr. Wallas's study of Society on a large scale with such questions as these in mind: Is the Activist psychology more or less helpful than the older forms to those who are regarding life as a quest for perfection of Soul? Is the consolidation of the many tribes and nations into a single Great Society a move onwards towards a Perfect Society? Is there advantage for the Mystic in this enlargement and unification by reason of its vastness, magnificence and even sublimity in comparison with the divided manifold of mankind as hitherto most conspicuous in its history? Or is this enlargement and unification of Society adverse to the Mystics' appeal to the inner life of the Individual as the centre of interest and reality?

A. C.

#### THE RATIONAL GOOD.

By L. T. Hobhouse, D.Lit., LL.D. London (Allen and Unwin); pp. 162; 8s. 6d. net.

WE have here another volume from the philosophical side of sociology. Dr. Hobhouse is a colleague of Mr. Graham Wallas, holding the University Professorship of Sociology at the same School of Economics. Readers of his fine volumes on *Morals in Evolution* will be glad to have this statement of his own view; which has, we may suppose, been greatly assisted by his own studies of moral ideas in their historical development.

The book is not of direct interest to students of Mysticism, for it is a strenuous effort to *rationalize* ethical ideas,—to set them forth as containing their own explanation and justification. For readers of THE QUEST the interest will lie in asking how far so competent and so well informed a mind succeeds in justifying the claim of Reason.

Dr. Hobhouse opens with references to the Oriental tendency to an Ethics of resignation of the claims of the Individual Soul, and to the Western tendency to work in the other direction towards establishing the ultimate right of the Soul to self-assertion. And he sets before himself the pursuit of 'a more excellent way' (p. 15) than either of these diverging paths.

He takes advantage of the ground won by Reason in the sphere of Existence—the gains of the sciences and philosophy in the knowledge of what *is*—and asks whether we ought not to have confidence in a parallel success in the sphere of *values*—the realm of the Good. For himself he maintains that in values also we stand within a system in which all kinds of the Good are in an all-pervasive mutual connection: "Goodness is a universal harmony, and badness is everything that conflicts with it" (p. 158). And Reason's office is to discover this harmony or at least to discover a prevailing tendency towards it. Further, in regard to the Feelings, of which Dr. Hobhouse takes full account, whilst Reason does not produce them, it links them into system, by providing a harmony of ideas which renders possible a harmony among the Feelings also. The conspectus thus worked up to is of high interest, and only those who are infected with a false irrationalism can do other than welcome the wide range of the tendency to harmony which Dr. Hobhouse sets before us. He certainly gets below the surface of our ordinary experience, and uncovers for us 'a deeper order of reality' (p. 147).

Nevertheless we do not find that this Rational Ethics is completely satisfying or reaches to ultimate Reality itself. The harmonizing of all the concreated forms of Good requires a reference to a supersensible Form, which implies a higher kind of 'knowledge' and a transcendent source of inspiration, such as Mysticism, properly understood, stands for. Far and wide as Dr. Hobhouse's Rational Good covers the ground and justifies belief in immanence we are not able to yield assent to his claim for completeness, but are still impelled to belief in a transcendent Perfect Good which is, and can be, only partially expressed in all that can be found on the level of the human spirit. A. C.

## ALL IS ONE.

A Plea for the Higher Pantheism. By Edmond Holmes. London (Cobden-Sanderson); pp. 115; 5s. net.

THIS little book from the graceful pen of our respected colleague is one of his most intimate pronouncements. After a severe operation there fell to his lot the enjoyment of a transcendental experience which left him with a conviction, far beyond the normal limits of certitude, that "the Universe is an organic, living whole, that all is One." Though now only the memory of this experience remains, "so emancipative and illuminative is that memory that the conclusion has now merged itself in the conviction, and in so doing has widened its own range beyond all the horizons of my speculative thought, and raised to the highest imaginable power its influence over my life." Mr. Holmes now endeavours to set forth what he means by the three words which sum up for him the dominant impression left by the quality of this deep experience. He pleads eloquently for his faith in a higher pantheism, a genuine wholeness of being irradiate with goodness, and is well aware that any but the highest conception of such an idea falls miserably short of what that touch of reality brought home to him. In developing this thought he reaffirms the leading notion of that 'creed of my heart' which he has so eloquently set forth elsewhere in verse and prose, and is more than ever assured that the way of the spiritual life is that of self-realisation through self-sacrifice, and above all that in the life of the individual love should be all, end, beginning and means, as he is now convinced it verily is in the Whole. Though the actual experience was limited and transient and its memory only survives, its nature was unmistakably declared and its value permanent, as Mr. Holmes tells us in his concluding words: "I knew then, and I know now, that the vision of the All has love of the All as its other self; and that the truer and clearer is the vision, the larger is the scope and the purer the flame of the love. Whether the vision generates the love, or the love generates the vision, I cannot say. What I can say is that in the last resort the vision and the love are one." Such books are very welcome to fellow-farers on the way of the spirit and many of our readers will heartily thank the writer for sharing his good things with them.

## THE LETTERS OF SAINT TERESA.

By the Benedictines of Stanbrook, vol. ii. London (Baker); pp. 325; 10s. net.

THIS is the second volume of the Complete Edition of the Saint's Letters, translated and annotated and, we may add, also finely printed by the Benedictines of Stanbrook Abbey. The whole work is to run to four volumes. The Letters here given date from July, 1576, to Dec., 1577, and are mostly short and comparatively unimportant, though they shew us Teresa founding and governing her convents in a masterly manner. Besides reflecting the light in which she lived, and which she thought supernatural, they are filled with flashes of her wit and wisdom, and in general are written in an easy effective style, bright and brisk, clear and concise, as any of our own best prose to-day. In truth, apart from all questions of Religion and Sanctity, these Letters alone prove Teresa to have been a woman of great intellectual power and practical capacity, a leader well used to the management of men and women.

Writing about a proposed postulant who was poor, she advises giving her the habit, for "what is lacking in her dowry, will be made up by her virtue." In a letter to a priest about a novice she says: "I was amused at your Reverence's declaring that you could see her character at a glance. We women are not so easy to understand. A priest will hear our confessions for many a year and be astonished at the end to find how little he really knows of us." She was very keen to see that her nuns ate and slept well, and would stop their prayers and set them to manual work where any mental instability showed itself. Indeed her psychology, though expressed in simple terms of common sense, would be approved by modern doctors in their dealings with hysteria, neurasthenia and melancholia.

Her spiritual insight was sharp and searching, as here: "Ours would be a hard case if we could not seek God until we were dead to the world. Neither the Magdalene nor the Samaritan Woman nor the Canaanite were dead to the world when they found Him." Yet now and then we come upon a taste of her own time, especially in regard to evil spirits. "But the demon does not go unless the holy water touches him, so you must sprinkle it all around you." Then, on another page, we have this sound, sane teaching: "God prefers your health and obedience to your penances." Or again:

"I wish the virtues to be insisted on, not austerities." So these Letters, though mainly friendly and domestic, give a very plain picture of the time, of the saint, the founder and the woman of affairs.  
F. W.

#### SELF-TRAINING IN MYSTICISM.

A Guide to the Mystic Way. By H. L. Hubbard, M.A., Assistant Priest of S. Mary the Virgin, Ashford, Kent. London (Christophers); pp. 104; 4s. 6d. net.

THIS little volume deals solely with Christian mysticism. It is not written for students of history or theory but, as the author modestly puts it, in the hope that "a few simple experiences of a very ordinary man" may help to serve "as a warning and as an encouragement." It endeavours also to supply some elementary instructions. Mr. Hubbard has been encouraged to write this simple and sensible little 'guide' by the conviction that many are living the mystical life without being aware that they are so doing—or 'all unconsciously,' as he says. We wonder whether they may not be in better case in some ways than the students,—more simple, more natural. However this may be, Mr. Hubbard's contention is that the enjoyment of the mystic life is no monopoly of a few choice souls. "It is open to all who will respond to its demands. High and low, rich and poor, one with another can tread the mystic pathway which leads the soul to God." The exposition throughout keeps this point of view in mind; yet is there no minimizing of the demands which such a life of self-donation imposes on the lover.

#### MAINSRING.

By V. H. Friedlaender. London (Collins); pp. 324; 7s. 6d. net.

THOSE who have enjoyed the powerful poems of Miss Friedlaender which have from time to time appeared in our pages, will read with interest her first novel. It is a subtle study of two sisters who both love the same man. All have high ideals. The man offends his father and sacrifices a fortune to study medicine. That is his mainspring, the motor of his life-work. The younger sister, whose mainspring is human love, is secretly engaged to the man. He subsequently meets the elder, who is an artist. The two at once are drawn to one another. The younger, aware of what is taking place unconsciously to the two, persuades the man

that their engagement is a mistake, thus sacrificing her own happiness for the sake of those she loves best on earth, and makes the man promise her sister shall never know. She lives in the one hope of seeing them united, for there are many difficulties in the way. But all is in vain. For the artist sister has succeeded in painting at last a picture that is the true thing; insight has come to her. And so when by a sudden stroke of fortune the man has become wealthy and every obstacle of circumstance is removed, though he is in greatest sympathy with her work and ideals and is planning everything to further them, the woman feels that if she is to continue to bring forth work that really counts, the whole of herself must be given to her art. For the man matrimony seems to be no impediment to his work; the two can fruitfully combine. But the woman feels it is far otherwise with her. Marriage demands more of her, demands indeed the whole of her. Her work would have to come second and so not be her best; because true art demands of its votaries all or nothing. It is impossible to give herself fully to both. She must choose. After much struggle she decides that the mainspring of her life is art, and so the story closes abruptly, leaving the reader still to puzzle over the problem.

#### AN INTRODUCTION TO MAHĀYĀNA BUDDHISM.

With Special Reference to Chinese and Japanese Phases. By William Montgomery McGovern, Ph.D., Lecturer on Japanese and Chinese at the London School of Oriental Studies, Priest of the Nishi Honganji, Kyoto, etc. London. (Kegan Paul); pp. 293; 7s. 6d. net.

WE are glad to have this convenient Introduction to the Buddhism of the Great Vehicle by Dr. McGovern. It is a shortened and simplified form of the thesis, presented to the Nishi Honganji, which procured the author his Buddhist Doctor's degree. This is now adapted for the general reader, and is at the same time preparatory to a larger work on the subject in two volumes which Dr. McGovern has in preparation. There is much information crammed into these 293 pages, and some of it is of special value owing to the wide knowledge possessed by the author of Chinese and Japanese texts. For instance, the doctrine of the Trikāya or Triple Embodiment of the Buddha, is luminously dealt with and shown to be central in Mahāyāna Buddhology. The very difficult problem of the probable date of the earliest Mahāyāna views is

impartially set forth, and some of the disputes of the Chinese scholars on points of subtle doctrine are usefully thrown into diagrammatic form. Speaking generally, it is a very well-informed book and the product of a mind that has enjoyed exceptional opportunities in these studies. For Dr. McGovern has not come to Buddhism from other pursuits, but so to speak has grown up with it, in intimate contact with its teachers in Japan, at whose feet he sat from early youth, and so passed through the discipline of two of its greatest schools. At the same time he is thoroughly imbued with the spirit of exact scholarship, the methods of which indeed are now being busily employed in the Japanese schools of Buddhism and with increasingly fruitful results.

#### SHADOWLAND.

By E. P. Larken. London (Selwyn & Blount); pp. 95; 2s. net.

MOST of the sketches in this imaginative little volume have already appeared in our own pages. The main motive of the theme which Mr. Larken develops with much ingenuity and insight may be gleaned from the opening words: "Once upon a time there was a people whose shadows were endowed with intelligence and powers of will. The shadows were not entirely independent of their owners—they were only partially so. If the owner kept a tight hold upon his shadow the power of independent volition on the part of the latter grew less and less. On the other hand, if the owner slackened his grip in the slightest degree the individuality of the shadow grew in proportion. Sometimes shadows were found scarcely subject at all to their owner's will, and in that case the owner suffered great loss. For the tendency of the shadows if left to themselves, free from the guidance and control of the owners, was to sink back into the mass of foul things of which they were composed, and this degradation of the shadow reacted on the owner—and hindered him in his efforts to fit himself for the land beyond his own . . . known as the 'Shadowless Land.'" Those of our readers who have not made the acquaintance of these shadowfolk and their ways and the efforts of their owners to control them, should hasten to do so, and those who already know something about them, will be glad to have the whole of these suggestive sketches within a single cover. *Shadowland* is a *jeu d'esprit*; but the conceit is well conceived and allows its author to touch on many a serious problem in unfolding its implications.



## BERGSON AND FUTURE PHILOSOPHY.

An Essay on the Scope of the Intelligence. By George Rostrevor.  
London (Macmillan); pp. 152; 7s. 6d. net.

THE author is a close student of Bergson's works and considers that the importance of his leading principle of real time or duration—that life endures, that its moments interpenetrate, that it prolongs the past into the present, gathering itself up—cannot be exaggerated. Bergson contends that this life can be known directly only through the 'intuition,' and is not immediately accessible to the intellect. The main purpose of the essay before us is to dissent from Bergson on this important point. It presents us with a detailed criticism of the relevant arguments of this acute thinker scattered through his works, and contends that duration can be grasped by what Mr. Rostrevor calls the 'normal intuitive function of the intellect.' This is an ancient quarrel and it all depends on the definitions we give to such terms as intelligence, reason, intellect. In a concluding chapter our author treats of 'intellectual intuition,' as he conceives it, and the mystic. For him the way of the mystic is the unification of our experience with other experience, and in keeping with this view he contends that: "The intuition of the mystic would always remain intellectual; the method would be the same as with other men, but the experience to which the intuition was applied would be an experience more wide and rich than that of an individual man." Mr. Rostrevor admits that the intellect deals with the experience *after* it is had, and this seems to leave in doubt whether the 'intuition' or 'insight' itself can be characterized as solely intellectual.

## BUDDHIST PSALMS.

Translated from the Japanese of Shinran Shonin by S. Yamabe  
and L. Adams Beck. London (Murray); pp. 91: 3s. 6d. net.

THE Jōdo or Sukhāvati sect or school of Buddhism, which taught the doctrine of salvation through faith in Amitābha, devotion to his name and rebirth in what has been called the Western Paradise, was firmly established in China in the seventh century. Later on it was introduced into Japan. There perhaps its greatest exponent was Shinran Shonin, who flourished in the first half of the 13th century, and left his impress on this living faith in Amida Buddha which is the most popular form of Buddhism in

Japan. Jōdo Shinshu is the faith of the Pure Land, and the Jōdo-Wasan or Psalms of the Pure Land, composed by Shinran, are used in the daily worship of the followers of the school and aid greatly in the spiritual life of the people. The present little volume, which is one of the Wisdom of the East Series, contains a readable version of some of these Psalms, and will enable the reader to judge of the spirit of this devotion, which is, so to say, the most characteristic Bhakti-form of Greater Vehicle Buddhism, and very different from the primitive doctrine of Gautama himself. The transliteration back into Sanskrit of some of the proper names requires revision.

#### DEATH AND ITS MYSTERY.

Before Death. Proofs of the Existence of the Soul. By Camille Flammarion. Translated by E. S. Brooks. London (Unwin); pp. 322; 10s. 6d. net.

FOR many years the now veteran French astronomer, who has done so much to arouse popular interest in that high science, has devoted himself to a study of psychical phenomena. He has at last decided to speak out and in no uncertain tones, being convinced that he can furnish proofs of his hard-won assurance, first that, as he puts it, the human soul exists independently of the bodily organism, and secondly that knowledge may be had of its survival of the death of its physical embodiment. We have before us in translation the first volume of a complex work planned in three parts and designed to throw light on the mystery of death. These parts are respectively entitled:

- I. Before Death: Proofs of the existence of the soul.
- II. At the Moment of Death: The manifestations and apparitions of the dying; doubles; phenomena of occultism.
- III. After Death: The manifestations and apparitions of the dead; the soul after death.

The work is not a special treatise, but a wide survey intended for the general reader. There is, however, a distinctive feature in it. For many years Flammarion has received letters from all parts of the world, thousands of them. They are either touching appeals to him for help and guidance or records of first-hand material. These have been carefully preserved and classified. A number of these intimate communications are now made public and form by no means the least interesting matter of a volume

abounding with striking typical cases drawn from the very extensive literature of the subject. Rigorously trained in the method of accurate observation in his own special science Flammarion is well aware of what will be demanded of him in attempting to set forth the less positive data of the psychical; conviction as to their main purport is to be gained only by a cumulative process. There is a wealth of facts which remain unco-ordinated on any other assumption but that of the soul's existing in its own right; it stands apart from the mechanical order of things and refuses to reveal its secret when regarded simply as a function of the physical organism. This is the basic fact to be established before we are equipped to go forward to a consideration of the two parts which are to follow, and the author hopes that he has rigorously carried out this part of his programme. It is in any case a courageous undertaking and a useful exposition of this great question. The book is written with the vigour, enthusiasm and sense of responsibility which have characterized the pen of this well-known writer in presenting to the public the wonders of the heavens and endeavouring to open up for them vistas of future possibilities. The part played by psychical research and allied subjects in France naturally bulks largely in the exposition, and this will be informative for those who are not conversant with its literature in that country. The exposition eschews technicalities and is free from pedantry and pretention; it is to be easily read and followed. Flammarion takes the public into his confidence, counting the cost in face of tremendous prejudice; he stands forth as one of that growing band of open-minded men of science who after long enquiry into the relevant phenomena have had to confess that their scepticism has at last been broken down and that the great question of the survival of personality beyond death should be regarded as falling within the province of experience and experiment, instead of as previously being dismissed to the unverifiable regions of belief or faith. To-day there are millions who are so convinced on evidence they regard as sufficient for themselves. Enquiry is being made well-nigh all over the world; it is a subject that touches all deeply, every class, every grade of intelligence. It is at present embryonic; nevertheless it seems as though we have here the beginnings of an endeavour that may gradually lead to a great change in the general attitude towards death.

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